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*ATP 3-90.5 (FM 3-90.5)

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COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The material in this manual is under development. It is NOT approved U.S. Army doctrine andCANNOT be used for reference or citation. The approved FM is still current and must be used forreference or citation until this draft is approved and authenticated.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Upon completion, this publication will be approved for public release;distribution will be unlimited.

Principles of Fire Control ................................................................................... 4-24Fire Control Measures....................................................................................... 4-24

Section I Fires................................................................................................. 8-1Fire Support Organizations ................................................................................. 8-1Fire Capabilities in Support of the CAB .............................................................. 8-2Tactical Air Control Party .................................................................................... 8-3Fire Support Planning and Coordination ............................................................. 8-4Scheme of Fires .................................................................................................. 8-6Targeting ............................................................................................................. 8-9Rehearsals ........................................................................................................ 8-11Clearance of Fires ............................................................................................. 8-11Close Air Support .............................................................................................. 8-12

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Close Air Support Execution Considerations .................................................... 8-13

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Preface

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This Army Techniques Publication (ATP 3-90.5) describes the techniques and procedures to tactically employ thecombined arms battalion (CAB), the primary maneuver force of the Armored brigade combat team (ABCT) inunified land operations. While providing basic doctrinal principles, it attempts to refer tactical discussion out to theBrigade Combat Team Operations Field Manual (FM 3-96) and other appropriate manuals. This manual providestechniques and procedures appropriate for the CAB to effectively exercise the warfighting functions of missioncommand, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection, in the conduct of sustainedcombined arms and close combat land operations. The techniques and procedures described herein are intended as aguide and are to be viewed as flexible in application, depending on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain andweather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Each situation in combatmust be resolved by adaptable leaders who exercise initiative to intelligently interpret and apply the doctrine setforth herein.

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The principal audience for ATP 3-90.5 is the commander and staff of the CAB and its subordinate units. Thismanual emphasizes CAB operations with related information at the Armor and mechanized Infantry company teamlevel. Greater details and techniques on Armor and mechanized Infantry company team operations can be found inATP 3-90.1.

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The proponent of this publication is U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE). The preparing agency isthe MCoE, Fort Benning, Georgia. You may submit comments and recommended changes in any of several waysU.S. mail, e-mail, fax, or telephoneas long as you use or follow the format of Department of the Army (DA) Form2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms). Contact information is as following:E-mail:usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.milPhone:COM 706-545-7114 or DSN 835-7114Fax:COM 706-626-2323 or DSN 835-2323U.S. mail:Commander, MCoEDirectorate of Training and DoctrineDoctrine and Collective Training DivisionATTN: ATZK-TDDFort Benning, GA 31905-5410

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Unless otherwise stated in this publication, masculine nouns and pronouns refer to both men and women.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international,and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate inaccordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (Refer to FM 27-10 for more information.)ATP 3-90.5 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both theglossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponentpublication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.ATP 3-90.5 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, andUnited States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

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Introduction

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The focus of this ATP is to discuss how CAB leaders execute battalion-level tasks from planning throughpreparation and execution. The principles for planning operations are based on Army Doctrine ReferencePublication (ADRP) 5-0 and the military decision-making process (MDMP). Volume 1 of FM 3-90 dicussesoffense and defense, while ADRP 3-07 covers stability tasks, and FM 3-98 details reconnaissance and securityoperations. This ATP discusses some alternative planning processes in a time-constrained environment, butfocuses more on the identifying the tasks leaders should plan to prepare for in unified land operations in variedoperational environments. The functionality of this ATP will allow the force to improve upon the techniquesand procedures that are specific to the CAB by allowing Soldiers to make recommendations on a Wiki site.

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U.S. forces must retain those skills that have served them so well the last decade and develop a skill setnecessary to identify and face a hybrid threat of regular and irregular forces that will combine conventional andunconventional tactics while fighting in complex terrain to limit U.S. forces ability to develop the situation outof contact.

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U.S. forces will continue to operate in nation-states of varying degrees and actors (nation and nonstate) that arenot always readily identifiable and can quickly change allegiances. The threat will attempt to use all means attheir disposal to counter, interrupt, or degrade U.S. advantages in communications, surveillance, long-rangeprecision fires, armor protection, and mobility. We must continue to develop our Soldiers ability to operate in avariety of environments with and amongst a multitude of actors. We must prepare to face more conventionalthreats by relearning and sharpening skills to conduct decisive actions and transition to and from defense,offense, and stability tasks.

This publication Provides the doctrinal guidance for commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders and leaders of theorganizations who are responsible for conducting operations of the CAB (that is planning, preparing,executing, and assessing). Serves as an authoritative reference for personnel who Develop doctrine (fundamental principles and tactics, techniques and procedures) materiel and forcestructure. Develop institution and unit training. Develop unit tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP) for CAB operations. Does not cover deployment, reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) or redeploymentoperations. Additionally, it does not provide details on defense support of civil authorities within thecontinental United States (CONUS). (Refer to ADRP 3-28 and its subordinate ATPs for more information.) Provides urban operation considerations. (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.) Addresses operations for CABs organized under the Army modular concept that governs the developmentof equipment, training, and structure for Armor and mechanized Infantry battalions of former mechanizeddivisions. Highlights the importance of the forward support company (FSC) and likely engineer augmentation bydiscussing their employment and contributions to all CAB operations. Reflects and supports the Army operations doctrine as stated in ADRP 3-0, ADRP 5-0, FM 3-90-1, FM 390-2, and FM 3-96. This is not intended as the sole reference for CAB operations; rather, it is intended tobe used in conjunction with existing doctrine. Is published to provide CABs the framework in which they can operate as part of an ABCT, or whenattached to an Infantry BCT (IBCT) or Stryker BCT (SBCT).

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Summary of Changes

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FM 3-90.5 has been updated and provided as an ATP in accordance with 2015 Doctrine Strategy. In addition todoctrine changes, a significant effort has been made to eliminate redundancies with parent doctrinal manuals(for example ADRP 3-07). The end results are a reduction of chapters, from 12 to 8.

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Chapter 1 introduces unified land operations. It discusses an operational environment as a combination of thepolitical, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables(PMESII-PT). It also combines content from previous Chapters 2 and 3 to include discussion on the operationalareas, the role of the CAB and the operations process.

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Chapter 2 introduces reconnaissance and security operations as the primary means by which the CAB executesinformation collection. It thoroughly discusses reconnaissance to include aerial reconnaissance, and securitytasks.

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Chapters 3 discusses the characteristics of the offense, offensive tasks and forms of maneuver. This chapter alsodiscusses direct fire control measures during the offense.

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Chapter 4 discusses characteristics of the defense, defensive tasks, forms of the defense, and direct fire controlmeasures in the defense.

Chapter 6 provides doctrine for the use of combat and field trains. It continues to emphasize that sustainmentenables freedom of action and addresses the three major elements of sustainment: logistics, personnel services,and health service support.

Chapter 8 provides techniques for the integration and synchronization of warfighting functions as enablers toenhance the combat power of the maneuver companies (fires, aviation, protection, and engineers).

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Appendix A discusses the duties and responsibilities for the battalion staff.

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Chapter 1

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Unified Land Operations and the Combined Arms Battalion

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"There is still a tendency in each separate unit...to be a one-handed puncher. By that I

mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire...Thatis not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then withthe brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell ofa lot of noise but no music. To get the harmony in music each instrument must support theothers. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins.You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you...You must each ofyour own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at theproper time..."

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The role of the CAB is to close with and destroy enemy forces using fire, maneuver, andshock effect, or to repel his assault by fire and counterattack. The CAB combines theefforts of its Armor and mechanized Infantry companies to execute tactical missions aspart of an ABCT, or when augmenting another brigade combat team (BCT). CABs arepart of the Armys principal formation for conducting combined arms operations, capableof deploying worldwide and conducting unified land operations.

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General George S. Patton, Jr.

SECTION I OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

1-1. While ABCTs are the Armys armored combined arms force, it is the CAB, along with their main battletanks, Infantry fighting vehicles, and Infantry squads that provide tremendous striking power. Its combinationof firepower, mobility, protection, and information collection assets make it invaluable to an ABCT commanderin conducting unified land operations. The CAB can fight without augmentation, but it can also be tailored andtask-organized to meet the precise needs of its missions.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-2. Unified land operations is the Armys operating concept. It is how the Army seizes, retains, and exploitsthe initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations throughsimultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks in order to preventor deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (Refer to ADRP 3-0for more information.)

FOUNDATIONS OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-3. Commanders can achieve strategic success by integrating the four foundations of unified land operationsinitiative, decisive action, core competencies, and mission command. The foundations of unified landoperations begin and end with the exercise of individual and operational initiative.

Initiative1-4. Operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results by striking theenemy, both lethally and nonlethally, at times, places, or in manners for which the enemy is not prepared.Leaders at all levels, operating under mission command, exercise their discretionary judgment to assume riskand take the initiative to successfully accomplish the mission. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the

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terms of action throughout the operation. Individual initiative is the willingness to act in the absence of orders,when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise.

1-5. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability ordefense support of civil authorities tasks. CABs must be prepared to conduct any combination of these primarytasks either independently or as part of a larger force. The CAB is better designed for three of the four tasks ofdecisive action: offense, defense, and stability tasks. The CAB could also be given the task of supportinghomeland defense within the United States and its territories. In this case, they will combine the elements ofdefense support of civil authorities and, as required, offense and defense in conducting decisive action. Thetasks are as follows: Offensive. These are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seizeterrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commanders will on the enemy. Evenwhen conducting defensive tasks, seizing and retaining the initiative requires executing offensivetasks at some point. Defensive. These are combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economizeforces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. Successful defenses areaggressive, and commanders use all available means to disrupt enemy forces. Stability. These include various missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States incoordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secureenvironment, restore essential government services, and provide emergency infrastructurereconstruction and humanitarian relief. Defense support of civil authorities. Defense support of civil authorities includes tasks that addressthe consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in theUnited States and its territories. Army forces conduct defense support of civil authority tasks insupport of homeland defense only after civil authorities have requested assistance and the Secretaryof Defense has authorized it. This typically happens only when the size and scope of events exceedthe capabilities or capacities of domestic civilian agencies. The defense support of civil authorityactions are always subordinate to civilian authority control.

Core Competencies

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1-6. The CAB demonstrates the core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security bycombining offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks simultaneously. Theyemploy synchronized action of lethal and nonlethal effects, proportional to the mission and informed by anunderstanding of an operational environment.

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1-7. Combined arms maneuver and wide area security are not missions or tasks. They provide an operationalcontext to assist the commander and staff to assist them in determining the operational approach. This enablescommanders to combine the tasks of decisive action into a coherent operation that assigns missions tosubordinates. The CAB executes these assigned missions to defeat or destroy enemy forces, and seize keyterrain, while protecting civilians, infrastructure, and themselves.

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Combined Arms Maneuver

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1-8. Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeatenemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, andpsychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. (ADP 3-0) Combined armsmaneuver primarily employs defeat mechanisms (destroy, dislocate, isolate, and disintegrate) against enemiesand is dominated by offensive and defensive tasks. Advantages of these tasks include the following: Physical advantages may include the defeat or destruction of enemy forces or the control of keyterrain, population centers, or critical resources and enablers. Temporal advantages enable Army forces to set the tempo and momentum of operations and decidewhen to give battle such that the enemy loses the ability to respond effectively.

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Psychological advantages impose fear, uncertainty, and doubt on the enemy, which serves todissuade or disrupt the enemys further planning and action.

1-9. Commanders force the enemy to respond to friendly action through combined arms maneuver. In theoffense, it is about taking the fight to the enemy and never allowing the enemy forces to recover from the initialshock of the attack. In the defense, it is about preventing the enemy from achieving success and thencounterattacking to seize the initiative. The objective is more than killing the enemy personnel and destroyingtheir equipment. Combined arms maneuver forces the enemy to react continuously and finally driven intountenable positions. Ultimately, combined arms maneuver aims to break the enemys will through relentless andcontinuous pressure.Wide Area Security

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1-10. Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protectpopulations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidategains in order to retain the initiative. Wide area security primarily employs stability mechanisms (compel,control, influence, and support) against enemies and is dominated by stability or defense support of civilauthority tasks.

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1-11. Wide area security is about retaining the initiative by improving civil conditions and applying combatpower to prevent the situation from deteriorating. It is also about preventing the enemy from regaining theinitiativeretaining the initiative in the face of enemy attempts to regain it for themselves. Commandersidentify nonmilitary but critical objectives to achieving the end state. Such objectives may include efforts toensure effective governance, reconstruction projects that promote social well-being, and consistent actions toimprove public safety. All these objectives contribute to retaining the initiative in wide area security.

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Mission Command

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1-12. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders toenable disciplined initiative within the commanders intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in theconduct of unified land operations. (ADRP 6-0)

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1-13. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfightingfunctions to accomplish the mission. Mission command allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom ofaction.

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Art of Command

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1-14. Command is an art that depends on actions only humans can perform. It is a skill sharpened byexperience, study, and observation. Commanding is more than simply leading Soldiers, units, and makingdecisions. Commanders strive to understand all aspects of the operational environment. They understand thatoperations affect and are affected by human interactions. Effective commanders must create a positivecommand climate that instills a sense of mutual trust throughout the command.

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1-15. Authority refers to the right and power to judge, act, or command. It includes responsibility,accountability, and delegation.

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1-16. Decision making refers to selecting the most favorable course of action (COA) to accomplish the mission.Commanders apply knowledge to the situation, thus translating their visualization into action.

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1-17. Leadership refers to the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation,while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Commanders lead through acombination of personal example, persuasion, and compulsion. Through their decisions and actions, they serveas a role model to their units.

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Science of Control1-18. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordancewith the commanders intent. Control is fundamental to directing operations. Commanders exercise control overforces in their area of operation (AO). Control is the process by which the commander follows up a decision and

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minimizes deviation from his concept. It entails supervision of all aspects of the operation, includingsynchronization of all systems and activities.

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1-19. The commanders mission command system, especially the staff, assists the commander with control.However, the commander remains the central figure.

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1-20. Commanders use the science of control to manage information. Information must be relevant to missioncommand: accurate, timely, usable, complete, precise, and reliable. Relevant information fuels understandingand fosters initiative.

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1-21. Commanders disseminate and share information among people, elements, and places. Communication ismore than the simple transmission of information. It is a means to exercise control over forces. Effectivecommanders conduct face-to-face talks with their subordinates to ensure they fully understand and to receivefeedback from them. Commanders use face-to-face communication to assess the mental and physical state ofsubordinates expressed in nonverbal means. Nonverbal means may include gestures, sighs, and body language.They may provide indictors on the effectiveness of the communication.

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1-22. Organizational structure helps commanders exercise control. Structure refers to a defined organizationthat establishes relationships and guides interactions among elements. It includes procedures for coordinatingamong an organizations groups and activities. Structure is both internal (such as the organization of thecommand post) and external (such as the command and support relationships among subordinate forces).

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1-23. A key aspect of mission command is determining the appropriate degree of control imposed onsubordinates. The proper degree of control depends on each situation and is not easy to determine. Differentoperations and phases of operations require tighter or more relaxed control over subordinate elements than otherphases require.

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OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

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1-24. The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affectthe employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0) Understanding the specificenvironment is essential to the successful execution of operations. As commanders better understand theiroperational environment (including the capabilities of their own and threat forces), they more skillfully employand integrate their units actions to create the conditions that lead to the desired end state.

OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES

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1-25. Army leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations by analyzing the operational environment interms of the operational variables and mission variables. The operational variables include political, military,economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. The memory aid for thesevariables is PMESII-PT. Included within these variables are the enemy, friendly, and neutral capabilities; andactions and interactions that are relevant to a specific operation. An operational environment is more than justmilitary capabilities; it is a combination of the interrelated variables, or systems and the nodes that link them.(Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.)

THREAT

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1-26. Although threats are a fundamental part of an operational environment for any operation, they arediscussed separately here simply for emphasis. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces thathave the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland.(ADRP 3-0) Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitaryor military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Threats are sometimes categorized as traditional,irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic.

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1-27. Our enemies combine different kinds of threats in regular and irregular patterns: Catastrophic challenges involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. Although theiremployment may be unlikely, the CAB must consider their use in every mission.

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Irregular challenges from enemies employing unconventional methods to counter the strengths of theCAB. In order to defeat the mutating methods of challengers, leaders must adapt to the operationalenvironment more rapidly and more effectively than their opponents.Disruptive challenges from enemies who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate U.S.advantages. One example is the disruption of the CABs network-centric mission command systems.Traditional challenges posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in wellunderstood forms of military competition and conflict. Traditional challengers will seek to adapt theircapability as well.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS1-28. Understanding the situation is not complete without considering and understanding the civil aspects of theAOs. Commanders and staffs visualize and analyze civil considerations in terms of relevant areas, structures,capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). At the CAB level, civil considerations generallyfocus on the immediate impact of civilians on military operations; however, they also consider larger, long-termdiplomatic, economic, and information issues.

COMBAT POWER1-29. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a militaryunit/formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential intoeffective action. Commanders conceptualize their capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power haseight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires,sustainment, and protection. Commanders apply leadership and information throughout, multiplying the effectsof the other six elements of combat power: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires,sustainment, and protection, which are collectively known as warfighting functions.

LEADERSHIP1-30. Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, whileoperating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. (ADRP 6-22) An Army leader, by virtueof assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish the mission. Armyleaders motivate people to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of theorganization. They instill in Soldiers the Warrior Ethos, the indomitable spirit and will to win.

INFORMATION

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1-31. Information is a powerful tool in the operational environment. In modern conflict, information hasbecome nearly as important as lethal action in determining success or failure in operations at all levels. Everyengagement, battle, and major operation requires complementary activities that inform and influence a globalaudience and affect morale within the operational area. Commanders use information to understand, visualize,describe, and direct the warfighting functions. They depend on data and information to increase theeffectiveness of the warfighting functions.

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1-32. Since information shapes the perceptions of the civilian population, it influences the operationalenvironment. All parties in a conflict use information to convey their message to various audiences. Theseinclude enemy forces, adversaries, and neutral and friendly populations. Information is particularly critical inoperations focused on stability tasks where the indigenous population and institutions are a major factor insuccess or failure.

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WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS1-33. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organization, information, and processes)united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (ADRP 3-0)All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. No warfightingfunction is exclusively decisive, shaping, or sustaining, but may contain elements of more than one type ofoperation.

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Mission Command

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1-34. The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integratethose activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order tointegrate the other warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0) Mission command uses mission orders to ensuredisciplined initiative within the commander's intent, enabling agile and adaptive commanders, leaders, andorganizations.

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1-35. The commander is the central figure in mission command. Mission command invokes the greatestpossible freedom of action to subordinates, facilitating their abilities to develop the situation, adapt, and actdecisively through disciplined initiative in dynamic conditions within the commanders intent.

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Movement and Maneuver

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1-36. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employforces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. (ADRP 3-0) Direct fire isinherent in maneuver, as is close combat. The function includes tasks associated with force projection related togaining a positional advantage over the enemy. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational areathrough movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy toaccomplish the mission. Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass effects of combat power to achievesurprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Movement isnecessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering.

Intelligence

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1-37. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of theenemy, terrain, and civil considerations. (ADRP 3-0) The commander drives the intelligence warfightingfunction. Intelligence is more than just collection. It is a continuous process that involves analyzing informationfrom all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation.

Fires

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1-38. The fires warfighting function refers to related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinateduse of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. (ADRP 3-0) Itincludes tasks associated with integrating and synchronizing the effects of these types of fires with the otherwarfighting functions.

Sustainment

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1-39. The sustainment warfighting function refers to the related tasks and systems that provide support andservices to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. (ADRP 3-0) Theendurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth andduration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment is theprovision of logistics, personnel services, and health services support needed to maintain operations untilmission accomplishment.

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Note. Sustainment includes health services and excludes force health protection, which is acomponent of the protection warfighting functions.

Protection

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1-40. The protection warfighting function refers to the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so thecommander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. (ADRP 3-0) Preserving the forceincludes protecting personnel (combatant and noncombatant) and physical assets of the U.S. and multinationalmilitary and civilian partners to include host nation. The protection warfighting function facilitates thecommanders ability to maintain the forces integrity and combat power. The protection warfighting functionincludes force health protection. Force health protection includes all measures to promote, improve, or conserve

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the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injuryand illness, and protect the force from health hazards.

OPERATIONAL AREAS1-41. Operational area is an overarching term that encompasses more descriptive terms for geographic areas inwhich forces conduct military operations. Areas of operations, influence, and interest are the operational areasused most often for CAB operations.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

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1-42. A units AO is the geographical area assigned by a higher commander, including the airspace above, inwhich the unit commander has responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.

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1-43. AOs should allow the commander to employ his organic, assigned, and supporting systems to the limitsof their capabilities. In an urban environment, this can pose a greater challenge than sparsely populated openoperational areas. However, the CAB commander and his subordinates must prepare to use initiative andadaptability to effectively synchronize all their systems in multiple environments. The CAB commander willdesignate AOs for subordinate units, using control measures to describe each AO and designing them to fit thesituation, while taking advantage of capabilities. Commanders specify the minimum control measures necessaryto focus combat power, delineate responsibilities, assign geographic responsibility, and promote unified action.At a minimum, control measures include boundaries on all sides of the AO.

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1-44. Subordinate AOs can be contiguous or noncontiguous. (See Figure 1-1.) When friendly forces arecontiguous, a boundary, such as a road, or stream separates them. When friendly forces operate in anoncontiguous AO, the concept of operation links the elements of the force, but the AOs do not share aboundary. The unassigned area between noncontiguous AOs remains the responsibility of the higherheadquarters.

740Figure 1-1. Contiguous versus noncontiguous areas

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Area of Influence

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1-45. The AO has an associated area of influence. An area of influence is a geographical area in which thecommander can directly influence operations by maneuver or effects under his mission command. Areas ofinfluence surround and include the associated AO.

Area of Interest

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1-46. The CABs area of interest (AOI) is a geographical representation of the area from which information andintelligence are required to execute successful tactical operations and to plan for future operations. It includesany threat forces or other characteristics of the CABs operational environment that significantly influenceaccomplishment of the commands mission. The AOI can vary or change over time. A higher commander doesnot assign the AOI. The commander and his staff develop the AOI to help visualize the battlefield and theiroperational environment, and determine information requirements (IRs).

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1-47. Figure 1-2 portrays one example of the interrelationship between the AO, AOI, and area of influence.Actions that the CAB takes within its AO can influence adjacent neighborhoods. Likewise, the actions of otherunits can have influence within the CABs AO. The CABs AOI includes the area of influence and focusesintelligence support (such as requests for information [RFIs]) for monitoring enemy and other activities thatcould affect the CABs current and future operations.

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Figure 1-2. Area of operations, area of influence, and area of interest

DECISIVE-SHAPING-SUSTAINING FRAMEWORK

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1-48. As commanders visualize their operational environment, they arrange their subordinate forces accordingto purpose, time, and space to accomplish a mission. This framework centers on decisive, shaping, andsustaining operations. Purpose unifies all elements of the task organization by providing the common focus forall actions. ADRP 3-0 states the decisive operation is an operation that directly accomplishes the mission; theshaping operation as an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on theenemy, other actors, and the terrain; and the sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables thedecisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 formore information.)

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MAIN EFFORT1-49. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical tooverall mission success. (ADRP 3-0) Designation of a main effort is a temporary resource allocation decisionthat the commander makes. Commanders weigh other priorities and needed resources. The main effort and thedecisive operation are not always identical. Identification of the main effort in shaping operations is a resourcedecision. A shaping operation may be the main effort before execution of the decisive operation. However, thedecisive operation becomes the main effort upon execution.

SECTION II ROLE OF THE COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

1-50. The CAB is the ABCTs primary maneuver force. It is organized in a 2 by 2 design, consisting of twoArmor companies and two mechanized Infantry companies. CABs are modular in design, combining Armor andmechanized Infantry companies, 18 squads of Infantrymen, organic reconnaissance (scouts), snipers, 120-mmmortars, a fires cell capable of employing supporting artillery and attack helicopters, and close air support. Ifrequired, the CAB receives engineer support from the ABCTs brigade engineer battalion (BEB) or brigadespecial troops battalions (BSTB) engineer company or other engineer augmentation received by the ABCT.

MISSION

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1-51. The CABs mission is to close with the enemy by means of maneuver, to destroy or capture the enemy,repel the enemys assault by fire, and engage in close combat and counterattack. The armor and weapons of theAbrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) provides optimal fire power, mobility, protection, andprecision fires to conduct unified land operations in varied operational environments. The CAB is effectiveagainst enemy mechanized and armored forces, because the CAB offers the best protection and fire power ofany of the Armys maneuver battalions.

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1-52. Maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. Itachieves results that would otherwise be more costly. Effective maneuver keeps enemies off balance by makingthem confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can counter them. Maneuver is more than justfire and movement. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of all elements of combat power.

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1-53. ABCTs and their CABs are designed for expeditionary deployment. CABs usually deploy by sea,although CAB equipment is prepositioned worldwide. This equipment is in unit sets and is stored both ashoreand at sea.

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JOINT, INTERAGENCY, AND MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

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1-54. CABs can expect to work with forces of other services to accomplish their assigned missions. Someexamples of this may include the following: Fires from U.S. Air Force (USAF) systems create the conditions for decisive action and multiply theeffects of tactical maneuver. Army and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces are tactically interoperable. A USMC unit may replacean Army unit in an operation and vice versa. Typical USMC units that might task-organize with aCAB include light Armored reconnaissance companies equipped with light Armored vehicles andInfantry units. Special operations forces (SOF) provide complementary capabilities for tactical operations.Commands frequently task-organize military information support operations (MISO), and civilaffairs (CA), with CABs.

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1-55. Although not under military command, nonmilitary agencies are present in every military operation. TheCAB must synchronize its military action with interagency and humanitarian organizations operating within thearea of operation to facilitate the indigenous population and institutional support of U.S. military efforts in theircountry. Interagency cooperation is not easy. It might require the CAB commander to dedicate liaison personneland to share military resources to achieve overall success.

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1-56. Multinational operations is a collective term that describes military actions conducted by forces of two ormore nations. Maintaining a good rapport and integrating military transition teams in unit operations helps

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facilitate interoperability and command and control with foreign units. The CAB must articulate thecommanders intent and concept of operations clearly and simply to avoid confusion that could result fromdifferences in doctrine and terminology. The CAB commander and staff should plan to have longer planningsessions and more detailed rehearsals to develop a common understanding of the operations plan and controlmeasures.

COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

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1-57. CABs can be detached and attached to another BCT headquarters as needed. The division commandercan attach a CAB to another ABCT to add weight to his main effort. Another option is for the commander toattach a CAB, to an IBCT, or to an SBCT to provide them additional firepower and protection. The CABcommander and staff must ensure the sustainment and communications requirements of mechanized forces areaddressed when supporting another force.

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1-58. Within the BCT, task organization is very flexible. (See Figure 1-3.) For example, a CAB can detach acompany to reinforce the Cavalry squadron in order to support a particular mission. CABs can perform mostshaping operations, hasty defenses, convoy security, and stability tasks without reinforcement. For example,when one CAB executes the ABCT decisive operation, the other CAB may provide a company to reinforce it.Company teams of task-organized Infantry and Armor platoons are formed based on mission variables.

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1-59. CABs are organized to fight and win, but they are equally capable of executing stability and defensesupport of civil authority tasks as part of a joint task force. The CAB combines the efforts of its headquarters,mechanized Infantry, and Armor companies to execute tactical missions as part of an ABCT operation.Amassing the combat power of these companies quickly while integrating and synchronizing the supporting andsustaining multipliers, is the key to victory.

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Figure 1-3. The combined arms battalion

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1-60. The CAB commander usually organizes his companies as teams with a mix of Armor and Infantry unitsto accomplish the battalions mission. The company team is an organization whose effectiveness increases withsynergy of its subordinate elements, including tanks, BFVs, Infantry, and support elements. These componentshave a broad array of capabilities; individually, however, they also have a number of vulnerabilities. Effectiveapplication of the company team as a combined arms force can capitalize on the strengths of the teamselements while minimizing their respective limitations.

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MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY

1-61. The mission of the mechanized Infantry company is to close with the enemy by means of maneuver, todestroy or capture the enemy, repel the enemys assault by fire, and engage in close combat and counterattack.The company maneuvers in all types of terrain and climatic and visibility conditions. It capitalizes on all forms

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of mobility, to include helicopters and tactical airlift. The inherent versatility of Infantry also makes it wellsuited for employment against asymmetrical threats across decisive actions. Figure 1-4 illustrates theorganization of a mechanized Infantry company.

852Figure 1-4. Mechanized Infantry company

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1-62. The mechanized Infantry company is equipped with the BFV. The BFV provides the company the abilityto assault rapidly through small arms and indirect fires to deliver the Infantry squads to an objective or criticalpoint and continue the assault dismounted while being supported by the firepower of the BFV. (Refer to ATP3-90.1 for more information.)

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1-63. The BFV is an integral part of the combat power of the rifle platoon and the rifle company. The BFVequipped Infantry platoons fight as a team, with fully integrated vehicular and dismounted elements. Thedismounts provide the CAB a mutually supporting force capable of offsetting the vulnerabilities of the CABsmounted elements.

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ARMOR COMPANY1-64. The mission of the Armor company is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroythe enemy, repel the enemys assault by fire, and engage in counterattack. The company maneuvers in all typesof terrain, weather, and visibility conditions. It capitalizes on long-range, direct fire combat with enemymechanized or Armored units in open terrain with speed and shock effect. Figure 1-5 illustrates the organizationof an Armor company.

868Figure 1-5. Armor company

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HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

1-65. The headquarters company consists of the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC); the battalionsscout, mortar, and medical platoons; and the communications and sniper section. The headquarters companyprovides reconnaissance, sniper, mortar, communication, supply, administration, and medical support forbattalion. The FSC in direct support of the CAB provides most sustainment to the battalion. (See Figure 1-3.)The responsibilities of the command and staff sections are discussed throughout this ATP.

876Figure 1-6. Headquarters and headquarters company

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COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

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1-66. The company headquarters section provides the immediate leadership, supply, and human resourcessupport to all HHC personnel, including the CABs command group, coordinating, special and personal staff,and specialty platoons and squads. (See Figure 1-6.) It includes the HHC commander, first sergeant (1SG),executive officer (XO), supporting supply and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sections.In a tactical environment, the HHC headquarters section provides flexibility to the CAB commander. The HHCcommander, 1SG, and XO do not have a set location from where they conduct their duties and as such, can beplaced where they can most effectively help the battalion to execute the mission.

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1-67. The HHC commander is responsible for coordinating sustainment support from the FSC. The HHC 1SGcoordinates and supervises resupply of the scout and mortar platoons, the main command post (CP), combattrains, and attached support units. Generally, the HHC 1SG operates out of the combat trains.

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1-68. If the CAB organizes a field trains command post (FTCP), the HHC commander is generally the officerin charge (OIC). The FTCP is usually the coordination and control center for the human resources staff officers(S-1) personnel and administration center, company supply sections, and FSC. The HHC commander generallyfocuses on CP operations while the FSC commander commands his company and coordinates all sustainmentrequirements for the CAB. When trains are echeloned, the HHC commander usually is responsible for securingthe field trains and the logistics staff officer (S-4) is responsible for securing the combat trains.

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1-69. Depending upon his higher headquarters organization, the HHC commander receives direction andguidance from the CAB commander, headquarters staff officers, and from commanders of other units. To beeffective, the HHC commander must understand not only the breadth of his authority and responsibility, butalso his relationship with, and the role and function of, every leader with whom he interacts.

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SCOUT PLATOON1-70. The scout platoon conducts reconnaissance and security in support of the battalion mission. The scoutplatoon leader advises the CAB commander, intelligence staff officer (S-2), and operations staff officer (S-3) onemploying the scout platoon. The platoon also assists in controlling battalion movements but rarely conducts

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independent platoon-level offensive, defensive, or retrograde tasks. The scout platoon helps the commanderplan and execute operations by providing relevant operational information in a timely fashion during theplanning, preparation and execution of a mission. (Refer to ATP 3-20.98 for more information.)

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1-71. Often the scout platoon receives augmentation to perform specialized reconnaissance. This may includeengineer teams to gather obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) or conduct bridge and route classification, for theCBRN teams to locate hazards, and sniper teams to perform extended surveillance missions.

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1-72. The CAB commander is responsible for the employment of the scout platoon, since it is the commandersprimary source of information. The scout platoon leader must stay in contact with either the commander or theCAB CP. This is necessary if the platoon leader is to keep his platoon informed of the next higher commandersmost current friendly and threat situations. He must also ensure that information gained by the platoon istransmitted higher, to include personnel status and logistics reports to the HHC commander.

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SNIPER SQUAD1-73. Battalion snipers are employed to support maneuver, to kill essential enemy leadership or commandpersonnel, to disable lightly armored or thin skinned vehicles, to enhance force protection, to provide lethalaccurate fires in urban operations, to protect tanks from antiarmor fire, and to perform counter-sniperoperations. During security missions and stability tasks with extremely restrictive rules of engagement (ROE),sniper teams are used extensively in the countersniper role as a means of providing force protection withoutcreating unwarranted collateral damage.

921Figure 1-7. Sniper squad

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1-74. The battalion sniper squad consists of a squad leader and three similarly equipped three-man sniperteams. (See Figure 1-7.) Each team is capable of providing the battalion with a full range of sniper support andis equipped with both the M110 7.62-mm sniper rifle (providing antipersonnel fires out to 1000 meters) and the.50-caliber M107 sniper rifle (providing antipersonnel and antiequipment up to 1800 meters). The squad alsoutilizes the M210 Enhanced Sniper Rifle to the snipers arms room. The M210 is a bolt action, magazine-fed,precision 300 Winchester Magnum cartridge, direct line-of-sight weapon system capable of hitting personnelsize targets at ranges of 1200 meters or further. This arms room enables the sniper team to employ the snipersystem that best supports the mission parameters. Additionally, the third member of the sniper team is equippedwith an M203 or M320 rifle system to provide protection and security for the sniper and his spotter as well as ameans to break contact if the team is compromised.

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1-75. The sniper teams directly support the battalion direct fire priorities as established by the commander andS-3. The modularity of the sniper teams enables the augmentation of a sniper team to a subordinate company forthe execution of specific sniper missions. The support of the snipers is the responsibility of the HHCcommander unless the snipers are attached to another commander. (Refer to TC 3-22.10 for more information.)

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MORTAR PLATOON1-76. Mortars are suppressive, high-angle, indirect fire weapons that are organic to the battalion. They can beemployed to neutralize or destroy area or point targets, screen large areas with obscurants, and provide

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illumination or coordinated high-explosive illumination. The mortar platoon's mission is to provide immediateand close indirect fire support for maneuver battalions.

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1-77. The mortar platoon consists of four squads with one 120-mm mortar each and a fire direction center(FDC). (See Figure 1-8.) The mortars can fire as a platoon or by sections under the direct control of the FDC.The M121 mortar is capable of firing sixteen rounds per minute for the first minute with a sustained rate of fireof four rounds per minute after the first minute. It is capable of firing high explosives, illumination, and smokerounds.

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1-78. The platoon can deploy as one platoon or in two-gun sections. Mortars rarely are deployed as separatesquads. If deployed as sections, one vehicle configures its Mortar Fire Control System as an FDC and controlsthe second vehicles fires. This is possible even if the digital link to Advanced Field Artillery Tactical DataSystem (AFATDS) is lost.

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1-79. The CAB mortar platoon provides the commander with the following: Supporting fire that is immediately at hand and close to the company and CAB fight. The mortarplatoon is aware of the local situation and ready to respond quickly without lengthy coordination. Unique plunging fires that complement, but do not replace, the heavier fires of supporting fieldartillery, close air support, and naval gunfire. Weapons whose high rate of fire and lethality fill the gap between the field artillery fires' shift todeeper targets and the assault elements' closing onto the objective. A solid base of fire upon which to anchor his maneuver against the critical point of enemy weakness. Suppressing the enemy inhibits his fire and movement while allowing friendly forces to gain atactical mobility advantage. In the company- and battalion-level battle, mortar fire acts both as akiller of enemy forces and as an enhancer of friendly mobility.

962Figure 1-8. The mortar platoon

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1-80. Ultimately, the CAB commander is responsible for the tactical employment of his mortar platoon.However, the S-3 generally has the authority to direct the platoon to accomplish specific missions or taskswithin the framework of the commanders intent. The mortar platoon leader works closely with the fire supportofficer (FSO) to ensure mortar fires are planned on appropriate targets, and are delivered at the correct times.

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1-81. It is important to integrate mortars into battalion-level training, so they are familiar with the personneland systems they must operate with. One example is to have Soldiers use the AFATDS to send digital missionsto the Mortar Fire Control System. The mortar platoon leader must practice his role in the MDMP process bycoordinating with CAB operations and fires cell. Within HHC, the scouts and mortar platoon can train on callfor fire, which improves both of their skills.

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1-82. The HHC commander is a vital link in the chain of command between the CAB commander and themortar platoon leader. He exercises mission command of the mortar platoon, but not operational control(OPCON) during actual maneuver or combat. The HHC commander and the mortar platoon leader routinelyexchange information. The HHC commander provides administrative and logistical support to the platoon,while the mortar platoon leader reports the status of assigned personnel and equipment to the companycommander.

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MINE ROLLER SECTION

1-83. The CAB has countermine-team capabilities with mine-clearing blades and rollers. Mine-rollertechnology provides protection from improvised explosive devices. Blades and rollers are assigned to theheadquarters company. Commanders often distribute the blades and rollers to Armor companies to integrateinto training and conduct battle drills.

MEDICAL PLATOON1-84. The medical platoon provides Army Health System (AHS) support through its health service support(HSS) and force health protection (FHP) missions in support of the CAB. The medical platoon is organized witha headquarters section, a treatment squad, a combat medic section, and four ambulance squads (two ambulanceseach). (See Figure 1-9.)

Health Service Support

1-85. Health service support (HSS) consists of support and services to promote, improve, conserve, or restorethe mental and physical well-being of Soldiers. The medical platoons HSS responsibilities include: Providing Role 1 medical care. This includes emergency medical treatment for wounds, injuries, orillnesses; advanced trauma management; casualty collection; sick call services; Class VIII resupply;and medical evacuation from either point of injury or supported maneuver company to the battalionaid station [BAS] or the supporting treatment team. Establishing and operating the BAS where it can support CAB operations best. Providing training for combat lifesavers (CLS). This includes recertifying CLS personnel every 12months to ensure their skill proficiency remains in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 350-1. Allocating combat medics to mechanized Infantry companies (one per platoon and a senior healthcare sergeant and ambulance team for each company) and Armored units (one health care sergeantand, one ambulance team per company). Placing ambulances forward with supported maneuver companies to reduce evacuation time and toaugment maneuver company medical treatment, as required. Maintaining field medical records in accordance with AR 40-66.

Force Health Protection

1-86. FHP consists of measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being ofSoldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force fromhealth hazards. The medical platoons FHP responsibilities include:

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Implementing FHP operations to counter health threats and prevent disease and nonbattle injury.(Refer to FM 4-02.17 for more information.)Planning for and accomplishing predeployment and post deployment health assessments.Establishing and executing a medical surveillance program. (Refer to AR 40-5, AR 40-66, and FM 402.17 for more information.)Coordinating occupational environmental health surveillance programs.Establishing a combat and operational stress control program for the CAB.Assisting with the training of field sanitation teams.Conducting sanitation inspections of troop living areas, food service areas, waste disposal locations,and potable water distribution points/equipment.

ATTACHMENTS

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1-87. CABs can be attached to another BCT headquarters as needed; however, unit esprit and cohesion arepowerful multipliers and should be considered when task-organizing the CAB. Within the ABCT, taskorganization is very flexible. For example, a CAB may detach a company team to reinforce the BSTB when thethreat to the ABCT base elements exceeds their self-defense capability.

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1-88. The FSCs are normally organic to the BCT BSBs and are critical to the success of the logistic concept ofsupport. How the FSCs are deployed is critical to the success of the BCT The BCT usually provides each CABa FSC in an OPCON relationship from the brigade support battalion (BSB). The FSC commander is responsiblefor executing the sustainment plan in accordance with the CAB commanders guidance. The BSB providestechnical oversight to the FSC. (Refer to FM 4-90 for more information.) Employment of the FSC is discussedin Chapter 8.

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1-89. The BCT may provide the following assets to CABs in the course of decisive actions: Information collection assets from the Cavalry squadron and the military intelligence company. A variety of engineer assets from the ABCT BEB or BSTBs engineer company or augmentingengineer assets. Engineer teams from the BEB or BSTBs engineer company to facilitate reconnaissance missions. Human intelligence (HUMINT) support. Translator support. MISO along with other CA support from CA units. Electronic warfare (EW) support. Liaison officers (LNOs) or provincial reconstruction teams to assist with host-nation interaction. Military police (MP) and military working dog teams. Public affairs element to facilitate media operations. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team for unexploded ordnance.

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CAPABILITIES

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1-90. The CAB is optimized for high-tempo offensive as well as defensive tasks against conventional andunconventional forces in mixed and open terrain. It is capable of screen missions, and most stability tasks, withthe possible exception of stability tasks in mountainous or jungle environments.

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1-91. When a CAB executes decisive actions, it usually is reinforced with combined arms enablers such asengineers, artillery, and aviation. Reinforcing lethal and suppressive effects from a variety of sources providesadditional fire support. CABs can perform most shaping operations, hasty defenses, and convoy securitywithout reinforcement. CABs apply their combat power to Conduct sustained operations in all operational environments with proper augmentation and support. Conduct offensive tasks. Conduct defensive tasks. Accomplish rapid movement and limited penetrations. Exploit success and pursue a defeated enemy as part of a larger formation.

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1-92. CABs can perform many tasks associated with stability tasks and defense support to civil authorities, butwill likely receive reinforcement from civil affairs or other specialized units. CABs have the capability to Protect the local populace from external and internal threats. Provide most essential services (such as emergency medical care and rescue, food and water, andemergency shelter). Support internal security efforts (such as traffic checkpoints, contraband searches, and detainment ofsuspected criminals). Provide training to host-nation security forces and police. Coordinate with local officials/elders to fund limited projects using a commanders emergencyresponse program.

LIMITIATIONS

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1-93. The CAB requires significant amounts of strategic transportation to reach a theater of operations. Thereare limited sets of CAB equipment in Army prepositioned stocks afloat and ashore. Once a CAB deploys, ordraws its equipment and supplies, it still requires time for RSOI.

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1-94. The CABs operational limitations include:

Restricted mobility and firepower in urban areas, dense jungles, forests, very steep and ruggedterrain, and significant water obstacles. Vulnerability to EW due to high dependence on radio and satellite communications (SATCOM). High usage rate of consumable supplies, particularly Classes III, V, and IX. Vulnerability to mines and antitank weapons. Footprint is larger than a lighter force. No organic gap crossing capability. Need for a secure ground line of communication (to deliver supplies).

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SECTION III OPERATIONS PROCESS

1-95. The commanders intent focuses the operations process. This process (planning, preparation, execution,and continuous assessment) is described in detail in ADRP 5-0. Although planning, preparing, executing, andassessing occur continuously in operations, they need not occur sequentially. The CAB must prepare to performall four actions simultaneously, and the commanders intent is at the center of the process.

COMMANDERS INTENT

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1-96. The commanders visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding,determining a desired end state, and envisioning how the force will achieve that end state. Commanderssummarize their visualization in their intent statement. The commanders intent is a clear and conciseexpression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command,provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commandersdesired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (Refer to ADRP 3-0for more information.) Because the enemy can be unpredictable, and not constrained to friendly parameters, thecommanders intent should allow subordinate leaders to exercise their initiative in the face of adverse tacticalsituations.

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1-97. The CAB commander relies on his professional training and tactical experience to develop his intent. Ofall the activities required of a CAB commander, visualizing an operation from start to finish and describing thatvisualization to his staff and company commanders, are the most critical. When possible, the commanderdelivers his intent personally. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the commanderwants by allowing immediate clarification of specific points. The CAB commanders intent can be summarizedas

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The purpose of the operation (the why).

What key tasks the CAB must accomplish.The end state.

1-98. The commanders intent is critical to mission accomplishment. The military designs and executes itsoperations around the commanders intent: The commander develops his intent and concept of the operation within the framework of his highercommanders intent. During planning, the commanders intent drives the MDMP. Subordinates use the commanders intent to decide what to do when facing unforeseen opportunitiesand threats, and in situations where the concept of operations no longer applies. During execution, staffs work within the commanders intent to direct units and control resourceallocations.

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

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1-99. The commander and staff use the MDMP to develop plans and orders. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for moreinformation.) The MDMP is not a stand-alone process; it is synchronized with several other processes. Theseother processes do not occur at distinct points within the MDMP. They may occur before, during, or after theMDMP. At the CAB level, the processes and their products that support MDMP can include: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Targeting. (Refer to FM 3-60 for more information.) Risk management. (Refer to ATP 5-19 for more information.) Information collection. (Refer to Chapter 2 for more information.)

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1-100. Although commanders at all levels are expected to be involved in the MDMP, the CAB commandershould ensure that his intent (that is visualization) is clear to his subordinates during the entire operationsprocess. The CAB commander and staff should ensure all officers and NCOs are trained on the MDMP processand its products to enhance their planning capabilities.

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1-101. Throughout the operations process, the CAB staff analyzes the current situation in terms of METT-TCand prepares their running estimates. A running estimate is a staff sections continuous assessment of currentand future operations. The running estimate enables the staff to determine if the current operation is proceedingaccording to the commanders intent and if future operations are supportable. (ADRP 5-0) An effective runningestimate relies on accurate and continuous reporting from individuals and units in order for the staff to updaterunning estimates and make adjustments to the operation as necessary. Generally, the CAB commanderempowers his staff to make adjustments within their areas of expertise. When a decision is outside theirauthority, staff officers present the situation to those delegated the authority to act (for example, the S-3 or XO)or to the commander.

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1-102. Thinking in terms of desired and undesired effects helps commanders throughout the operationsprocess. Desired effects are results that support accomplishment of the mission. Undesired effects couldadversely affect accomplishment of the mission. The commander and staff examine ways to achieve desiredeffects best, while mitigating undesired effects. By integrating risk management processes throughout MDMP,the commander and his staff mitigate environmental and collateral damage. The commander and staff usecontrol measures to minimize civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure and the natural environment whileensuring the mission accomplishment. Regardless of the situation, the commander and staff are expected tomake values-based decisions that are ethical and effective.

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MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENTS

1-103. In time-constrained environments, the staff might not be able to conduct a detailed MDMP, and mightchoose to abbreviate the process using parallel and collaborative planning as described in ADRP 5-0. Theabbreviated process uses all seven steps of the MDMP, but the steps are done in a shortened and less detailedmanner.

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Parallel Planning1-104. The CAB staff does not wait for the BCT OPORD before beginning the MDMP. The CABs MDMPusually begins with a BCT warning order (WARNORD). However, a change in the situation, anticipation of anorder from the BCT, or changed CCIR can lead the commander to begin planning, and to base this planning onthe apparent changes. This is referred to as parallel planning. It is accomplished by issuing warning orders tosubordinate units at various stages of the MDMP. Parallel planning depends on distributing information as it isreceived or developed.

Collaborative Planning1-105. Collaborative planning is the real-time interaction among commanders and staffs at two or moreechelons developing plans for a particular operation. This can be collaboration between the BCT and CAB orthe CAB and its companies. One example could be a CAB conducting collaborative planning for a cordon andsearch. The responsible company knows its AO better, so it can recommend the necessary terrain information(such as routes and civilian locations), and timing for the operation. This allows the company to begin planningearlier and with more accurate information, while the CAB focuses on integrating other warfighting functionsinto the concept of the operation.

Distributed Planning1-106. Digital communications and information systems enable members of the CAB staff to execute theMDMP without being collocated. Distributed planning saves time and increases the accuracy of availableinformation through the use of rapid voice and data transmissions that the CAB can use throughout the AO,including the command group, main CP, combat trains command post (CTCP), and field trains command post(FTCP).

Fragmentary Orders1-107. The commander often bases fragmentary order (FRAGORD). on newly acquired intelligence.Predictive intelligence provides commanders and Soldiers with a high level of shared situational understanding(SU), delivered with the speed, accuracy and timeliness necessary to operate at their highest potential andconduct successful operations. Often the CAB XO/S-3, acting within the commanders intent, issues aFRAGORD to take advantage of the new information. The FRAGORD ensures that all subordinates andsubordinate units stay synchronized. Synchronization involves more than arranging military actions; it requiresunity of effort throughout the force.

Nested Concepts1-108. As the CAB completes MDMP and prepares the necessary orders, each subordinate unit mustunderstand how the purpose of its assigned tasks has been incorporated, or nested into the CABs operation.Nested concepts, however, are more than links between a subordinate units task and purpose, and the CABmain effort's task and purpose. Nested concepts include the integration of all the warfighting functions (forexample, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection duringthe course-of-action development process).

TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

1-109. Troop leading procedures (TLP) is a dynamic process used by small unit leaders to analyze a mission,develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. The MDMP and TLP are similar, but not identical. The type,amount, and timeliness of the information that the CAB passes to the companies and the scout platoon directlyinfluence these subordinates TLP. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 and FM 6-0 for more information.)

PREPARING FOR OPERATIONS

1-110. During preparation, the CAB commander continues to drive mission command and the operationprocess through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing leading, and assessing the information andintelligence provided to him through his staff from higher and subordinate echelons. Preparation takes place any

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time the CAB is not executing. Ideally, preparation begins with the receipt of an order (as does planning) andends as execution begins. Preparations for major operations include information collection tasks, planrefinement, rehearsals, coordination, inspections, and movement.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

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1-111. The commander tasks reconnaissance, security, surveillance, and intelligence operations to collect andprotect information during all operations to plan, organize, and execute shaping operations that answer theCCIRs and support the decisive operation. Information collection begins during planning to fill any IRs thatwere identified during mission analysis. IRs are those information elements necessary to address the factors ofMETT-TC. Those IR identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making arethe CCIRs. (ADRP 5-0) During MDMP, the commander decides whether to designate an IR as a CCIR basedon his likely decisions and his visualization operation. The staff develops an initial information collection planfocused on the intelligence gaps identified during mission analysis.

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1-112. This initial information collection plan should answer the IR needed to develop effective plans. Theinitial information collection plan can be issued as part of a WARNORD, a FRAGORD, or an OPORD.

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1-113. During preparation, the CAB commander receives answers to some of his IR, and improves hissituational awareness through his available information collection assets (such as scout platoon, unmannedaerial system [UAS], requested brigade assets, and so forth). The CAB plans and executes reconnaissance,security, surveillance, and intelligence tasks with the same level of importance as any operation. As the scoutplatoon (or another available information collection asset) gathers information (answering IR), the informationcollection plan is modified to account for new IR or approved CCIR, and efforts to collect additionalinformation are redirected. The S-3 usually updates the information collection plan with FRAGORDs.

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1-114. The commander and staff continuously review IPB products against the current situation. Thecommander (or S-3) redirects the scout platoon or other information collection assets to focus on the mostimportant unknowns remaining, while emphasizing the current CCIR. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.)When determining his need for information, the CAB commander must take several factors into consideration: The ability of the scout platoon to gather the needed information. The risk to the scout platoon during collection. The specialized augmentation necessary for the scout platoon to perform its role in the time allottedand the degree of detail required. The ability to sustain the scout platoon over time and distance. The requirement to have the scout platoon available at critical times and places to support thedecisive action. The availability (time, type, and quantity) of other information collection assets.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS1-115. Information operations integrate the employment, during military operations, of information-relatedcapabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Units want the civilian populationin their area of operations to be neutral, or in favor of their activities. Leader engagements at all levels are thekey to influencing the local populace perception of U.S. presence.

REHEARSALS1-116. Rehearsals are the commanders tool for ensuring that staffs and subordinates understand thecommanders intent and concept of operations. Rehearsals focus on synchronization and coordination. Each ofthe four types of rehearsals achieve a different result and have a specific place in the preparation time line.(Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

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EXECUTING OPERATIONS

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1-117. The commanders intent and mission orders focus every level of the CAB on executing the concept ofoperations. During execution, ensure the commander has the information he needs to assess the operation. TheCAB main CP conducts battle tracking, which involves monitoring all reports to identify information in order tokeep the subordinate units and warfighting functions synchronized. The commander and staff assess theprobable outcomes of the ongoing operation to determine whether adjustments are required to accomplish themission, to anticipate unforeseen enemy actions, or to take advantage of unexpected opportunities.

1-119. If the operation does not proceed as planned, and adjustments and synchronization are not leading tomission accomplishment, the staff conducts a quick meeting or huddle to develop alternate courses of action(COAs). In most cases, the XO (or S-3) conducts a mental wargame to validate the COAs. The commander thendecides on a COA and the staff implements the decision. The most important staff actions are resynchronizingthe warfighting functions and disseminating changes to control measures.

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1-120. The commander organizes his staff into CPs that provide staff expertise, communications andinformation systems that work in concert to aid the commander in planning and controlling operations. All CPshave the responsibility to conduct the five basic functions of information management: Collect relevant information. Process information from data to knowledge. Store relevant information for timely retrieval to support mission command. Display relevant information tailored for the needs of the user. Disseminate relevant information.

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1-121. While each echelon and type of unit organizes CPs differently, two types of CP cells exist: functionaland integrating. Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function. Integrating cellsgroup personnel and equipment by planning horizon. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

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Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to all successful operations.

Through effective information collection and continuous reconnaissance, combined armsbattalions develop and sustain the necessary understanding to defeat adaptive anddetermined enemies. Reconnaissance and security operations allow commanders to betterunderstand the tactical, human, and political environment, visualize operations, developthe situation, and identify or create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

requirements (CCIR) and enable the commander to make decisions and direct forces toachieve mission success. Both reconnaissance and security operations enable successfuloffense, defense, and stability tasks.

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SECTION I INFORMATION COLLECTION

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2-1. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment ofsensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support ofcurrent and future operations. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.) At the tactical level, reconnaissance,security, and intelligence operations are the primary means by which the CAB executes information collectionto answer the CCIRs and support decision making for the decisive operation. In addition to answering CCIR,information collection facilitates targeting and fills voids in information.

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2-2. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data andinformation provided by information collection assets. Timely and accurate intelligence provides Soldiers withthe tools and the confidence they need to proceed aggressively or overcome an enemys superiority in Soldiersand materiel. Timely and accurate intelligence usually depends on aggressive and continuous informationcollection.

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ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-3. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.Leaders rely on information and the intelligence resulting from it to make informed decisions. With timely andreliable information commanders can exercise their leadership through mission command. Everyone from thecommander to the Soldiers on the ground has a role to play in the information battle and the effectiveapplication of combat power. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)

COMMANDER

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2-4. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations. Understanding isfundamental to the commanders ability to establish the situations context. Understanding involves analyzingand understanding the operational or mission variables in a given operational environment. It is derived fromapplying judgment to the common operational picture through the filter of the commanders knowledge andexperience.

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2-5. The commander prioritizes collection activities primarily through providing guidance and intent early inthe planning process. Commanders must identify and update CCIRs to ensure they support the scheme ofmaneuver and decision points and are limited to only the most critical needs.

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2-6. The CAB executive officer coordinates and directs the efforts of special staff officers,, integrates andsynchronizes plans and orders, and supervises management of the CCIRs.

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2-7. The CAB intelligence cell is responsible for providing timely and accurate intelligence to the commander,staff, and subordinate units. The battalion S-2 leads the cell and supervises and coordinates informationcollection (in conjunction with the battalion S-3) and the production and dissemination of intelligence. Thebattalion intelligence cell Makes analytical predictions on when and where actions will occur. Provides analysis on the effects of the operational environment on friendly and threat COAs andcapabilities. Evaluates the threat in terms of doctrine, threat characteristics, high value targets (HVTs) and highpay-off targets (HPTs), capabilities, and vulnerabilities. In conjunction with the battalion S-3, coordinates the entire staffs recommended PIRs for inclusionin the CCIRs. Integrates staff input to IPB products for staff planning, decision making, targeting, and assessment. Plans and controls intelligence operations in coordination with the S-3 and battalion fire supportofficer.

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2-8. The CABs primary means of collecting information are their subordinate maneuver companies, patrols,scout platoon, snipers, Soldier observations, and field artillery forward observers. The battalion S-2 may alsorequest support from BCT information collection assets. If allocated, these assets would normally have asupport relationship with the battalion. The BCT military intelligence company commander assists the battalionin planning when military intelligence company assets are provided to the battalion.

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2-9. The S-2 section formulates collection requirements based on inputs from the commander and staff todevelop the information collection synchronization matrix and the information collection plan. The S-2 alsoidentifies those intelligence assets and resources that can provide answers to CCIRs.

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2-10. The 2X is the doctrinal term used to refer to the person who manages counterintelligence and humanintelligence operations in support of the overall unit operation. The 2X section works with the S-2 ininformation collection planning and assessing, taking developed counterintelligence and human intelligencerequirements and identifying the proper assets to answer the requirements. This information is used to developrequirement planning tools and the overall collection plan.

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2-11. The S-3 tasks and directs the staff along with the organic and assigned assets for information collectionexecution. The S-3 collaboratively develops the information collection plan to ensure its synchronization withthe operation plan.

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SCOUT PLATOON2-12. The scout platoon is the CABs primary means of conducting reconnaissance and security. The scoutplatoon provides early warning and helps control movement of the CAB or its elements. The scout platoon isusually under battalion control but could be attached to another unit in the CAB for certain operations. TheCABs sniper teams also can be assigned a surveillance mission. The following considerations apply toemployment of the scouts: The distance that scouts operate away from the main body is restricted to the range of supportingindirect fires and secure LOC for resupply and CASEVAC. Scout platoons can easily be over-tasked because reconnaissance and security missions usually arecontinuous operations that require careful planning for both Soldiers employment and their rest. Scouts are limited in their ability to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units. Augmenting the scout platoon with engineers could provide a better assessment of route and bridgetrafficability, and OBSTINTEL. Scout platoons are limited in their ability to conduct dismounted operations.

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COIST

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2-13. The CAB S-2 section can provide an intelligence analyst to the companies to support the commanderwith processing, exploitation and dissemination of timely usable relevant intelligence. Depending on theoperational tasks, the analyst can work independently for the commander, or as part of a company intelligencesupport team (COIST) supported by other company allocated personnel as determined by the commander.

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2-14. In a more static environment the commander may form a robust COIST support team capable ofcollecting and analyzing data from multiple sources to make recommendations to the commander anddisseminate information and intelligence to the S-2. (Refer to ATP 3-90.1 for more information.)

ABCT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

2-15. During operations, the CAB can receive support from the military intelligence company organic to theABCT. The military intelligence company supports the CAB through collection and analysis of information,and dissemination of intelligence. Task-organized via command and support relationships, the militaryintelligence company provides continual input for the CAB commander by intelligence operations andintelligence analysis tasks as part of the information collection plan. (Refer to ADRP 2-0 for more information.)

OTHER INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSETS

2-16. The CAB commander may have access to other information collection assets from the ABCT and higher,including UAS, recon troops, and possibly Army aviation. The CAB commander also may receive support fromor provide support to HUMINT or signals intelligence. The ABCT has both signals intelligence and HUMINTcapability in its military intelligence company. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.)

INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCESS

2-17. Information collection is a continuous feed of relevant information that facilitates the commanderssituational awareness, and enables him to make better decisions. Information collection involves the entire staff.The CAB S-3 is the chief integrator of the information collection process. The S-2 assists the S-3, along withthe rest of the staff. The CAB XO supervises synchronization of the information collection plan and itssubsequent execution of the following collection tasks, which are described in detail in FM 3-55: Plan requirements and assess collection. Task and direct collection. Execute collection.

PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESS COLLECTION

2-18. The CAB commander and staff develop information requirements to answer uncertainties about theenemy or other conditions of the operational environment that could influence planning or execution. The staffdevelops information requirement (IR) during mission analysis and war gaming as part of the MDMP. Oneresult of the MDMP is linking the situation and event templates with named areas of interest (NAIs) andtargeted area of interest (TAIs), both of which are linked to DPs for the commander. The commander approvesselected IR as his CCIR for his decision points (DPs).These NAIs, TAIs, and DPs are expressed on the DecisionSupport Tool (DST). DSTs link the information the commander needs to know with the geographic locationwhere the information can be found, and the time the information is likely to be available (based on the eventtemplate). The CAB subsequently receives specific information requirements from the ABCT. (See Figure 2-1.)Finally, DSTs could have specific RFIs from subordinates and adjacent units. Placed together, these IR driveinformation collection operations.

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1407Figure 2-1. Information requirements

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2-19. Regardless of the source, each IR should specify

WHAT (activity or indicator). WHERE (NAI or TAI). WHEN (time that the indicator is expected to occur and the latest time the information is of value[LTIOV]). WHY (justification - what decision is the PIR linked to). WHO (who needs the results).

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2-20. As the staff gathers all of the IRs and PIRs, they sort the requirements to eliminate redundancies,,andprioritize them to assist in allocating resources. The commander then re-evaluates each requirement andfinalizes his CCIR. This is a continuous process; as a given CCIR is answered or the operational situationchanges, other CCIRs usually are generated.

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2-21. Ideally, each IR is detailed and specific enough to facilitate collection. Once the commander approves theIR, he breaks the IR down into indicators. He then develops specific information requirements to ask veryspecific questions about indicators. Finally, the commander tasks these indicators to collectors and, takentogether, they answer the larger question. For example: one of the CAB commanders PIR is Will the enemyregiment attack through avenue of approach 2 with battalions abreast, or from the march? This is a broadquestion and many indicators could lead to its answer. Specific information requirements to support this PIRmight include: Will enemy units of 3-5 combat vehicles enter NAIs 11, 12, and 13 between 130400MAR and130700MAR? Will enemy battalion #2 move from its assembly area at NAI 7 prior to 130230MAR? Identification of second enemy battalion (over 40 BMP2s) in NAI 11, 12, or 13.

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DETERMINE INITIAL CCIRS AND EEFI

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2-22. Determining initial CCIRs and EEFI is the most important prerequisite for information collectionplanning. The staff refines the list of requirements they derive from the initial analysis of information availableand from intelligence gaps identified during IPB. They base this list on higher headquarters tasks, commandersguidance, staff assessments, and subordinate and adjacent unit requests for information. (Refer to FM 3-55 formore information.)

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2-23. The staff then nominates these requirements to the commander to be CCIRs and EEFI. Commandersalone decide what information is critical based on their experience, the mission, the higher commanders intent,and input from the staff. The CCIRs are the primary focus for information collection activities.

DEVELOP THE INITIAL INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN

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2-24. The initial information plan is crucial to begin or adjust the collection effort to help answer requirementsnecessary to develop effective plans. The initial information collection plan sets information collection inmotion. (A sample information collection matrix, formatted under the targeting method of decide, detect,deliver, and assess (D3A) is depicted in Figure 2-2.) Staffs may issue it as part of a warning order, afragmentary order, or an operation order. As more information becomes available, staffs incorporate it into acomplete information plan to the operation order.

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2-25. At this point in the MDMP, the initial information plan has to be generic because the staffs still mustdevelop friendly COAs. The basis for the plan is the commanders initial information collection guidance, theprimary information gaps identified by the staff during mission analysis, recommendations from the targetingmeeting (see paragraph 8-43 for more information on targeting), and the enemy situational template developed.

1451Figure 2-2. Information collection matrix

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PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT

2-26. The commander must consider whether the gathering of CCIR is worth the risk of compromising EEFI.This is often the case during surveillance of the maneuver objective. Commander emphasis on EEFI might

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cause conflicts with the information collection plan. This requires that the commander make a tactical riskassessment, and may cause him to change his CCIR or adjust his assigned sensor.

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2-27. By the nature of their missions, information collection assets must be placed where they might be lost toenemy action. The commander makes the decision whether the intelligence to be gained outweighs the risk tothe information collection asset.

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DEVELOP THE FINAL INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN

2-28. Once the CAB chooses an asset to collect information for an IR, planners turn the special informationrequirements into a task for a subordinate unit. This task is a directive statement that tailors the reporting criteriato the collection capabilities of the tasked unit. The Information collection plan is developed through these assettasking. Below are two examples: Example 1, mixing reconnaissance management: A special information requirement could ask, Is the enemy artillery battalion (over 12 2S-1s)located in NAI 8 between 040800 and 052000MAR? An information collection task to a scout team might state, Report the presence of 2S-1 artillerysystems in NAI 8 between 040800 and 052000MAR. LTIOV: 052200MAR. An information collection task to a UAS team might state, Report movement in NAI 8 between040800 and 052000MAR. LTIOV: 052200MAR. Example 2, mixing reconnaissance management: A special information requirement could ask, Is the Gordian insurgency using the mosque inNAI 5? An information collection task to an Infantry patrol might state, Report the presence of males inNAI 5 outside normal prayer hours (0545, 1215, 1430, 1700, 1930) between 011200 and071200NOV. LTIOV: 071400NOV. An information collection task to a Prophet team might state, Report any radio transmissions inNAI 5 between 011200 and 071200NOV. LTIOV: 071400NOV.

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2-29. Units prioritize information management tasks for each specific asset. For example, an informationcollection task that is the number one priority for an UAS might be lower in priority for a scout team. Figure 2-3depicts an information collection tasking matrix.

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PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, AND DISSEMINATION

2-30. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) is a general concept that facilitates the allocation ofassets to support intelligence operations. Under the PED concept planners examine all collection assets andthen determine if allocation of additional personnel and systems are required to support the exploitation of thecollected information. Accounting for PED facilitates processing collected information into usable and relevantinformation for all-source production in a timely manner. PED enablers are the specialized intelligence andcommunications systems, advanced technologies, and the associated personnel that conduct intelligenceprocessing as well as support other single-source analytic capabilities within intelligence units. These enablersare distinct from intelligence collection systems and all-source analysis capabilities. PED enablers areprioritized and focus on intelligence processing and assessment to quickly support specific intelligencecollection requirements and facilitate improved intelligence operations. (Refer to ADRP 2-0 and FM 2.0 formore information on PED and PED enablers.)

DISSEMINATE INFORMATION GATHERED

2-31. The ultimate goal of the dissemination process is to get the right information in the hands of the CABcommander in time for him to make the decision. Planners arrange direct dissemination from the collector to therequestor. Whenever possible, the information collection plan includes the requirement for direct disseminationof information to the requestor. For example, information regarding NAI 1 that triggers a targeting decision atTAI 1 (employment of the CABs allocation of CAS) should go to the CAB commander as well as the FSO,ALO, and S-2. The staff does this to determine if the information answers the CCIR and is what the CABcommander wants to target. A well-synchronized information collection plan directs the collectors as to whatnets to use to pass on information and to whom. The plan should detail when to use a net call, use of precedencecoding (flash, priority, and so forth), and dissemination using digital systems. Perishability is a keyconsideration in dissemination. At the CAB level, most information generated during execution is combatinformation and requires immediate dissemination to the commander and subordinate units affected.

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MONITOR OPERATIONS

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2-32. As the operation progresses, the S-2 tracks the status of each information collection task, analyzesspecific information requirement,and ultimately answers the CCIR. The S-2 pays particular attention to whichassets are not producing the required results. It is very likely that the staffs assumptions about the enemy COAswill not prove entirely correct. This may result in changes to the IR or adjustments to the collection timeline.During execution, the staff assesses the value of the information they received from collection assets and refinesinformation collection tasks to fill in gaps.

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2-33. Each unit monitors and evaluates its information collection efforts during execution. Companycommanders can use the intelligence analyst from the S-2 section, or the COIST, when METT-TC allows theformation of one to manage the information collection task by maintaining database information, collecting andreporting information to higher, lower, and adjacent units.

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UPDATE INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN

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2-34. As with all operations, the collection plan rarely survives contact with the enemy and requires adjustmentduring execution. The following factors could drive changes to the collection plan: A CCIR is satisfied or overcome by events, freeing an asset for other operations. A single information collection asset has unexpected success, freeing redundant assets for otheroperations. An asset cues the collection manager but requires confirmation that requires dynamic retasking ofother assets. The timing of the operation has become desynchronized, requiring modification of LTIOV orchanges to prioritization. The commander generates new CCIR as the operation evolves and the enemy situation develops. A change to the enemy situation (that is the enemy follows an unexpected COA). Higher headquarters changes the mission of the CAB into an unplanned operation

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2-35. The steps in updating the information collection plan are collaborative efforts by the S-2 section andoperations staff. Some steps predominately engage the intelligence staff, others the operations staff. Some stepsmay require coordination with other staff sections, and others may engage the entire operations and intelligenceworking group. The steps in updating the collection plan are discussed in further detail in FM 3-55.

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SECTION II - RECONNAISSANCE

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2-36. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and thedisposition of enemy forces and civilian population so the commander can maneuver his forces freely andrapidly. (Refer to FM 3-98 for more information.) Reconnaissance also answers the CCIRs. Reconnaissanceprior to unit movements and occupation of assembly areas is critical to protecting the force and preservingcombat power. It keeps the force free from contact as long as possible so that it can concentrate on its decisiveoperation.

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FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE2-38. To logically group specific information requirements (SIRs) and tasking into missions for subordinatecommanders, the CAB commander uses one of five forms of reconnaissance. (Refer to FM 3-98 for moreinformation.) The forms of reconnaissance refine the scope of the reconnaissance commanders mission andgive it a spatial relationship. The five forms of reconnaissance are: Zone reconnaissance. Area reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance. Reconnaissance in force. Special reconnaissance.

ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

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2-39. A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all enemy forces,routes, obstacles, and terrain within a zone defined by boundaries. The commander assigns a zonereconnaissance when the situation is vague or when information about cross-country trafficability is desired.Zone reconnaissance is appropriate when the units previous knowledge of the terrain is limited or when combatoperations have altered the terrain. The reconnaissance is either enemy-oriented or terrain-oriented. A zonereconnaissance can be deliberate and time consuming.

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2-40. The commander gives his guidance for a zone reconnaissance, which may be to determine the best routes,to move through the zone, or to locate an enemy force. The commander defines the zone to be reconnoitered byusing lateral boundaries, a line of departure, and the objective. The objective provides a termination point forthe mission, and might be occupied by the enemy. A phase line also can be used as a termination point. Figure2-4 provides an example of a zone reconnaissance for a scout platoon.

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1576Figure 2-4. CAB zone reconnaissance

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AREA RECONNAISSANCE

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2-41. An area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or threatactivity within a prescribed AOI. An area reconnaissance provides information about a specified area such as atown, ridge, woods, or other feature critical to operations. The commander must specify exactly what to look forand why. There are two ways of conducting reconnaissance of the area: by maneuvering elements through thearea, or by establishing observation posts within or external to the AOI.

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2-42. The commander designates the area to be reconnoitered by establishing a boundary line that encircles it.Area reconnaissance differs from zone reconnaissance in that the unit moves to the assigned area by the mostdirect route. Once in the area, the platoon reconnoiters in detail using zone reconnaissance techniques.

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ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

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2-43. A route reconnaissance obtains detailed information about specific routes. The route usually is a road thatunits can use for an axis of advance, MSR, or other movement. Units perform route reconnaissance to ensurethat the route is clear of obstacles and enemy, and that it will support planned movement. Units sometimesperform a route reconnaissance as part of an area or zone reconnaissance.

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2-44. The number of routes reconnoitered depends on the length of the routes, the enemy situation, and thenature of the routes themselves. When enemy contact is likely or expected, or when the route is long andstretches through difficult terrain, the CAB might require the entire scout platoon to reconnoiter that one route.If routes are short and enemy contact is unlikely, the platoon reconnoiters as many as three routes (one for each

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section) but no more. When the reconnaissance tempo is rapid or the desire for specialized route information ishigh, the scout platoon should be augmented with engineer reconnaissance capability.Reconnaissance in Force

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2-45. A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemysstrength, dispositions, and reaction, or to obtain other information. A commander uses a reconnaissance in forcewhen the enemy is known to be operating within an area and the commander cannot obtain adequateintelligence by other means. Since it generally must penetrate the security area of a larger enemy force, theCAB requires augmentation to conduct a reconnaissance in force. These augmentations include: Helicopter or UAS reconnaissance. CBRN reconnaissance assets. Artillery (or missile) fire support. Short-range air defense (SHORAD). Engineer mobility and countermobility assets.

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2-46. A unit may also conduct a reconnaissance in force in restrictive terrain where the enemy is likely toambush smaller reconnaissance forces. A reconnaissance in force is an aggressive reconnaissance, conducted asan offensive operation in pursuit of clearly stated CCIR. The overall goal of a reconnaissance in force is todetermine enemy weaknesses that can be exploited. It differs from other reconnaissance operations because itusually is conducted only to gain information about the enemy and not the terrain.

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SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE2-47. Special reconnaissance includes reconnaissance and security actions conducted as a special operation inhostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operationalsignificance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

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2-48. Reconnaissance planning starts with the commander identifying the CCIR. This process may beconducted while the unit is planning or preparing for an operation; in many cases, it continues throughout theoperation. (Refer to FM 3-98 for more information.) The commander outlines the following: Focus. Tempo. Engagement criteria. Reconnaissance objective.

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2-49. The commander considers mission variables as he plans for mounted, dismounted, aerial, or combinationsof reconnaissance. Conditions that lead to a decision about the type of reconnaissance include: Time constraints. Required detail level of reconnaissance. Availability of air units to perform coordinated reconnaissance with ground assets. IPB information. Avenues of approach that support friendly movement and exploit enemy weaknesses. Key positions, especially flanks that can be exploited. Information from observation posts. Type of terrain. Environmental conditions, such as deep snow and muddy terrain that greatly hinder mountedreconnaissance.

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2-50. The commander considers employing UAS for ground reconnaissance. Unmanned aircraft systemsprovide the commander with essential terrain and enemy information. Most UASs can operate in daylight orlimited visibility and are difficult to detect or shoot down.

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2-51. Leaders at all echelons coordinate and synchronize reconnaissance efforts. The key point is to usereconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and use their complementary capabilities to verify and expandon available information.

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2-52. Sustainment planning is indispensable throughout the planning process. The commander assesses allconstraints and considers the following: Resupply procedures for both mounted and dismounted reconnaissance missions. Predetermined locations and times for resupply. TTPs for casualty extraction and medical evacuation. Pickup points and times for pickup and aerial extraction of casualties. Resupply procedures for Class VIII by AHS support elements.

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2-53. The commander must provide specific guidance to the reconnaissance force. The commanders guidancefor reconnaissance includes focus, tempo, and engagement criteria. This guidance is an extension of thecommanders intent and is designed to focus the reconnaissance commanders efforts in relationship to the CABmission.

RECONNAISSANCE FOCUS2-54. Reconnaissance focus, combined with one or more reconnaissance objectives, helps to concentrate theefforts of the reconnaissance assets. The commanders focus for reconnaissance usually falls in three generalareas: CCIR, targeting, and voids in information. The commanders focus enables reconnaissance personnel toprioritize taskings and narrow their scope of operations. An operation may have a terrain focus where status ofroutes, bridges, and obstacles are more important than the enemy. Conversely, the operation may focus on theenemy where locating his security zone, main body, and reserves are essential. Additionally, commanders mayexpress their focus in terms of reconnaissance pull and push. (Refer to FM 3-98 for more information.)

Reconnaissance Pull2-55. The commander uses a reconnaissance pull when the enemy situation is not well known and or thesituation is rapidly changing. Reconnaissance pull fosters planning and decision-making based on changingassumptions into confirmed information. The CAB uses initial assumptions and PIR to deploy reconnaissanceassets as early as possible to collect information for use in developing COAs. The commander uses informationcollection assets to confirm or deny initial PIRs prior to the decision on a COA or maneuver option, thus pullingthe CAB to the decisive point on the battlefield. Success of the reconnaissance pull requires an integratedreconnaissance plan that can be executed prior to the commander having to make a COA decision.

Reconnaissance Push2-56. The commander uses a reconnaissance push once he has committed to a COA or maneuver option. Thecommander pushes his information collection assets forward, as necessary, to gain greater visibility on specificNAIs to confirm or deny the assumptions on which the COA is based. Information gathered duringreconnaissance push is used to finalize the CAB plan.

Reconnaissance Tempo2-57. The commander establishes the time requirements he envisions for the reconnaissance force. He thenexpresses these requirements in a statement that describes the degrees of completeness, covertness, andpotential for engagement that he is willing to accept. The following relationships describe the tempo CABcommanders use to control the momentum of reconnaissance operations. It is important for commanders tounderstand that there are advantages and disadvantages to each manner in which the commander issuesguidance on reconnaissance tempo. (Refer to FM 3-98 for more information.)

Engagement Criteria2-58. The commander determines which enemy forces he expects his reconnaissance forces to engage and withwhat level of force. This decision aids the reconnaissance leadership to plan direct and indirect fires, and to

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establish bypass criteria. This decision is very important when the reconnaissance force is augmented withcombat systems to conduct forceful reconnaissance.

AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

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2-59. UASs are capable of locating and recognizing major enemy forces, moving vehicles, weapons systems,and other targets that contrast with their surroundings. In addition, UASs are capable of confirming the positionof friendly forces and locating the presence of noncombatant civilians. Employed together, UAS and groundreconnaissance make an excellent team.

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2-60. While UASs are excellent force multipliers, they have limited effectiveness in locating enemy forces thatare well covered or concealed. They also are not well suited for wide area searches. Rather, employing a UASas part of an overall collection plan makes optimal use of their capabilities. (Refer to FM 3-04.155 for moreinformation.)

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2-61. Before using a UAS, the unit must coordinate airspace with the brigade aviation element (BAE). Theminimum information required is Time of launch/duration of mission. Location of the UAS restricted operations zone. Launch and landing coordinates. Required altitude. Laser designation code (if applicable).

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RQ-11 Raven

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2-62. The CAB currently has the Raven for UAS capability in the scout platoon and HHC. The Raven is a manportable, hand-launched small aerial vehicle designed for reconnaissance and surveillance. Two Soldiersoperate the Raven as an additional duty. The Raven requires no Class III fuel because batteries power anelectric motor, which powers the Raven.

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2-63. Most Raven missions occur between 100 and 300 feet. Depending on the battery used, mission time canrange from 60 to 90 minutes. A remote video terminal also provides a real time video feed of the mission. Theoptics package includes an electro-optical, color camera nose for day operations, and two infrared/thermal nosesfor night operations (Refer to FMs 3-52 and 3-52.1 for more information.)

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RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER2-64. Coordinating the transfer of an assigned reconnaissance area from one element to another is known asreconnaissance handover. Reconnaissance handover can involve physical, visual, electronic or digitalobservation in any number of combinations. Assets such as ground sensors and UAS are also transferred. Thereare numerous ways the CAB scout platoon and cavalry troops from the cavalry squadron can work together toperform reconnaissance handover during operations.

OFFENSE2-65. During the ABCT offense, the cavalry squadron is usually forward of the CABs. During the approach tothe objective the cavalry troops and CAB scouts may do the following (refer to Figure 2-5a-c): The cavalry troop may hand over key observation post positions to CAB scouts as they advancethrough the AO. The cavalry troop may guide the CAB scouts into position and keep them informed about terrain,enemy positions, and obstacles that they have already found. CAB scouts can provide overwatch for the cavalry troop scouts moving to their next series of OPs orconducting reconnaissance of the area or zone.

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2-66. In the defense, the primary mission of the scout platoon is to provide security and early warning for theCAB. Scouts conduct screens to the front, flanks, and rear of the CAB. The scout platoon generallyaccomplishes a screen by establishing a series of OPs and conducting patrols to ensure adequate reconnaissanceand surveillance of the assigned sector.

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2-67. The CAB employ its scouts to provide screening in depth for the counter reconnaissance force. Thereconnaissance teams and counter reconnaissance team occupy the most forward positions. The employmentand coordination of the CAB scouts and cavalry troops in the counter reconnaissance operation is TACSOPdriven.

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2-68. Using a company team in a forward screen role provides a strong counter reconnaissance capability, givesa measure of deception, and facilitates early engagement. The company team also has the assets to identify anddestroy most enemy reconnaissance elements.

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2-69. The CAB also can integrate its scouts into the ABCT counter reconnaissance mission. Cavalry troops andscout platoons provide stealthy observation and early warning of the enemys reconnaissance elements. Thereconnaissance teams locate the enemy reconnaissance forces, and then guides the counter reconnaissanceelements to them. The scouts maintain a low signature by not engaging any targets. Tanks, BFVs, anddismounted infantry in the counter reconnaissance team kill the enemy reconnaissance. Digitization enables thescouts and counter reconnaissance team to execute a more fluid and dynamic counter reconnaissance fight withless chance of fratricide due to the increased clarity of unit positions on the battlefield.

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2-70. Unit TACSOPs must address procedures for inoperative scout communications systems. Scouts withinoperative systems risk fratricide; the CP should account for scouts by using analog methods and with manualinput of platforms into the common operational picture. CPs must also have some method of tracking theoperational status of each scouts FBCB2 system.

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2-71. In order for the CAB scout platoon and cavalry troop to work together, the CAB and ABCT staffs need tocoordinate the following: Communications and digital architecture. Mission command architecture. NAI coverage and intelligence gaps. Fire support coordination measures (FSCMs). Fratricide avoidance measures.

SECTION III - SECURITY

2-72. The ultimate goal of security is to protect the force from surprise and reduce the unknowns in anysituation. That force being protected may be the civilian population, civil institutions, and civilian infrastructurewithin the units area of operation. A commander may conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear ofthe friendly force. Security operations are shaping operations. As a shaping operation, economy of force is oftena condition of tactical security operations.

PURPOSE OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

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2-73. The purpose of security is to provide the higher commander with information about threat and terrain,prevent the main body from being surprised, provide time and space for reaction, preserve initiative andfreedom of movement/maneuver, and to protect and preserve the combat power for decisive employment.Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance are inherent and continuous in all security tasks. The focus ofreconnaissance is preventing the surprise of the protected force commander. Reconnaissance providesinformation that allows the commander to make decisions regarding maneuver and fires, and provides reactiontime to implement those decisions.

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2-74. The CAB also conducts internal security operations using its own scout platoon, Armor companies, ormechanized Infantry companies. The CABs ability to conduct security missions in support of its ownoperations is generally limited to screening. The CAB generally performs two types of security missions: areasecurity and screen. It can conduct guard operations when augmented with artillery and aviation.

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2-75. Counterreconnaissance denies the enemy information about friendly operations or to destroy or repelenemy reconnaissance elements. Security forces operate either offensively or defensively when executingcounterreconnaissance. The designated counterreconnaissance plan provides the active and passive measures todefeat the enemys reconnaissance efforts and protect the friendly force from observation. Continuousreconnaissance and counterreconnaissance contribute to the fundamentals of security operations.

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FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY2-76. The five fundamentals of security operations are: Provide early and accurate warning. Provide reaction time and maneuver space. Orient on the force, area, or facility to be protected. Perform continuous reconnaissance. Maintain enemy contact.

PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNING

2-77. The security force provides early, accurate warning by detecting the threat force quickly and reportinginformation accurately to the main body commander. Early warning of threat activity provides the commanderwith the time, space, and information needed to retain the tactical initiative and to choose the time and place toconcentrate against the threat. At a minimum, the security force should operate far enough from the main bodyto prevent enemy ground forces from observing or engaging the main body with direct fire. Maneuver forces,sensors, and tactical UAS are positioned to provide long-range observation of expected threat avenues ofapproach.

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PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE

2-78. The security force operates as far from the protected force as possible within supporting range of theprotected force, consistent with the factors of METT-TC. Provided communications are maintained, moredistance usually yields greater reaction time and maneuver space for the protected force commander. Thesecurity force fights as necessary to gain and retain adequate time and space for the protected force commander,allowing him to maneuver and concentrate forces to counter the threat.

ORIENT ON THE FORCE, AREA, OR FACILITY TO BE PROTECTED

2-79. The security force focuses all its actions on protecting the secured force or facility and providingmaximum early warning of threat activity. It operates between the main body and known or suspected enemyunits. The security force must move as the main body moves and orients on its movement. The securitycommander must know the main bodys scheme of maneuver to maneuver his force so it remains between themain body and the enemy. The value of terrain occupied by the security force depends on the protection itprovides to the main body commander.

PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

2-80. Security comes in large part from knowing as much as possible about the threat and terrain within theassigned AO. This detailed knowledge results from ongoing, focused reconnaissance that aggressively andcontinuously reconnoiters key terrain; seeks the location, composition, and disposition of the threat; andattempts to determine the threats COA early so that the CAB can counter it. Stationary security forces usecombinations of observation posts, UAS, patrols, and other information collection assets to perform continuousreconnaissance. Moving security forces accomplish this fundamental by performing area, zone, or routereconnaissance in conjunction with temporary OPs and battle positions.

MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

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2-81. Unless otherwise directed, contact, once gained, is not broken. The individual scout or sensor that firstmakes contact does not have to maintain it; however, the security force, collectively, must maintain contact. Thesecurity force also must continuously gather information on the threats activities, and prevent the threat fromsurprising the main body or endangering adjacent friendly forces.

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2-82. This fundamental requires

Continuous contact (visual, electronic, sensor, or a combination). Capability to use direct and indirect fires. Freedom to maneuver. Depth (of observers in time and space).

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SECURITY OPERATIONS2-83. Security operations encompass five tasksscreen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. Screen is a security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (ADRP 3-90) Guard is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing andreporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the mainbody. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon firesand functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. (ADRP 3-90) Cover is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing andreporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the mainbody. (ADRP 3-90) Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actionswithin a specific area. (ADRP 3-90) Local security is a security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit toprevent surprise by the enemy. (ADRP 3-90)

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SCREEN2-84. The primary purpose of a screen is to provide early warning. It observes, identifies, and reports enemyactions. A screen provides the least amount of protection of any security mission. In general, a screening forcefights in self-defense; however, when necessary, it can engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance elementswithin its capabilities. (Refer to FM 3-98 for more information.)

COMBINED ARMS BATTALION SCREEN

2-85. At the battalion level, the scout platoon usually performs screen missions in support of CAB missions.When the terrain provides multiple enemy avenues of approach, the battalion commander can attach the scoutplatoon to a company to conduct a screen. The screening force establishes a series of observation posts andconducts patrols to observe NAIs and targeted areas of interest (TAIs) to meet the CCIR. Additionally, the BCTmight task the CAB itself to perform screening missions in support of a BCT defense or other operation. (SeeFigure 2-6.) In this instance, the CAB maneuver companies take on the role traditionally performed by thebattalion scouts who may or may not be placed OPCON to a company commander.

1859Figure 2-6. CAB conducting screen mission for ABCT

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PLANNING A SCREEN2-86. When assigning a screen mission to a company, the commander designates the general trace of the screenand the time it must be established. This general trace is based upon the S-2s designation of NAIs. The initialscreen line should be forward of the general trace but remain within range of supporting artillery and battalionmortars. Screen lines are depicted as phase lines; passage graphics are included in the overlay. Other planningconsiderations are:

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Designate the left and right limits of the screen as well as a phase line for the near boundary. Thisphase line also can become the on-order battle handover line (BHL).Confirm which unit has responsibility for the area between the screening forces rear boundary andthe main battle area (MBA). This should be the company that occupies the areas behind the screen.Propose general locations for observation posts that enable observation of the avenues of approachinto the area.Propose locations for prepared or situational obstacles.Develop trigger lines to mass direct and indirect fires.Select routes or lanes to facilitate rearward displacement.Augment the security force as needed to provide intelligence, engineer, air defense, signal, andsustainment.Ensure rearward passage of lines (RPOL) planning and rehearsals are executed.

2-87. When the CAB receives a security mission, the BCT usually provides this general guidance: Force or area to be secured. Location and orientation of the security area. Time allocated to establish the security force. Criteria for ending the security mission. Task organization and augmentation of security forces. Engagement and displacement criteria.

FORCE OR AREA TO BE SECURED

2-88. The commander must designate the exact force to be secured. This designation determines the limits ofthe security forces responsibilities. If the main body moves, the security force also moves to maintain itsposition in relation to the main body.

LOCATION AND ORIENTATION OF THE SECURITY AREA

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2-89. The commander determines the location, orientation, and depth of the security area in which the securityforce will operate. The commander might also designate specific avenues of approach or NAIs he wantscovered. Depth in the security area provides the main body with more time to react to approaching enemyground units. Occupying a deep security area allows the security force to destroy enemy reconnaissance assetswithout compromising critical observation posts or positions, or becoming decisively engaged. The wider thearea to be secured, the more difficult it is for the security force to position in depth; this is because it mustposition itself across the width of the area.

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2-90. The CAB then conducts a detailed analysis of the terrain in the security area. The commander establisheshis initial dispositions (usually a screen line) as far forward as possible on terrain that affords good observationof avenues of approach. Next, he clearly assigns responsibility for identified avenues of approach anddesignated NAIs. For a screen, the initial line must be within supporting range of the main body, yet provide thedesired amount of early warning.

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TIME ALLOCATED TO ESTABLISH THE SECURITY FORCE

2-91. The commander must determine when to establish the security force based on the activity of the mainbody and expected enemy activity. To prevent enemy forces from penetrating the security area undetected, hemust allow enough time for the security force to move into and occupy the security area.

CRITERIA FOR ENDING THE SECURITY MISSION

2-92. Security operations are usually time- or event-driven. The criteria for ending a security operation can bethe completion of an operation by the main body, a fixed time period (for example, not allowing enemypenetration of a phase line for two hours), or criteria based on the enemy force (such as size or specificelement).

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TASK ORGANIZATION AND AUGMENTATION OF SECURITY FORCES

2-93. The commander is responsible for task-organizing elements to augment the security force as dictated byMETT-TC. Depending on the threat and the size of the security area, additional combat assets may augment thesecurity forces organic combat power. Additional augmentation also can come from the military intelligencecompany in the form of ground-based sensors or UAS attachments; engineer augmentation to enhance mobility,countermobility, and survivability; or from the fires battalion.

ENGAGEMENT AND DISPLACEMENT CRITERIA

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2-94. The commander provides general engagement and displacement criteria as an extension of hiscommanders intent. Engagement criteria establish the conditions under which units are expected to engage thethreat, and what conditions dictate handing over threat elements to the CAB. The commanders understandingof the BCT commanders expectations, coupled with his knowledge of the threats most likely COA, enableshim to determine his battalions engagement criteria. The commander might require units only to observe threatactions, but not engage the threat; the purpose is to deceive the enemy as to the whereabouts of his screen line.He also could opt to engage all threat personnel or lightly armored vehicles on sight. When conducting stabilitytasks, he may stipulate nonlethal weapons.

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2-95. With clear engagement criteria, the commander can now establish displacement criteria based on what thebattalion can, cannot, orbecause of tactical considerationswill not destroy. The commander defines theevents or triggers that will cause the security force to displace; such as, a certain size force, or specific elementof the threat formation reaching a given point or graphic control measure.

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GUARD OPERATIONS2-96. A guard mission is assigned to protect the force by observing the enemy, reporting pertinent information,and fighting to gain time. The guard force differs from a screen force in that it contains sufficient combat powerto defeat, repel, or fix the lead elements of an enemy ground force to prevent it from engaging the main bodywith direct fires. The guard force normally deploys over a narrower front than a comparably sized screeningforce, allowing greater concentration of combat power. The guard force routinely engages enemy forces withboth direct and indirect fires and operates in range of the main bodys indirect fire weapons. The guard forcecommander must understand fully the degree of security his unit provides the larger unit. (Refer to FM 3-98 formore information.) This understanding is critical because, as the battle progresses, the higher unit commandermay require the degree of security to change (for example, from early warning to detailed and aggressivesecurity for the main body). There are three types of guard operations conducted in support of a stationary ormoving friendly force: advance, rear, and flank guard. (See Figure 2-7.)

ADVANCE GUARD2-97. The advance guard moves ahead of the main force to ensure its advance is uninterrupted, protect the mainbody against surprise, facilitate its advance by removing obstacles, capturing intact bridges, and enable the mainbody to deploy.

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1947Figure 2-7. Guard operations

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2-98. Usually, the advance guard functions as a movement to contact. Generally, a CAB receives an advanceguard mission when the BCT moves as part of the division main body in a movement to contact. In deployingan advance guard, the BCT ensures the CAB has priority of fires from the field artillery battalion. Unlike amovement to contact, however, the advance guard clears the axis of enemy elements within its capability; thisallows the unimpeded movement of the main body forces. The advance guard develops the situation to handover the enemy to the maneuver forces.

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2-99. Based on METT-TC, trail elements of the advance guard must ensure they maintain adequate distanceforward of the main bodys lead elements to ensure freedom of maneuver for the main body. These distancesare reduced in restrictive terrain and in low visibility conditions. The CAB commander establishes phase linesto control the movement of the main body and the advance guard. In addition, the battalion commander musttake into consideration the range of supporting indirect fires.

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2-100. The advance guard force destroys enemy forces through hasty attacks. It may be necessary for thebattalion to mass at certain locations, destroy the enemy, report, and continue its mission. If enemy resistance iswell prepared and cannot be destroyed, the advance guard reconnoiters to identify a bypass route for the mainbody, report enemy size and location, and, based on BCT commanders intent, fix and bypass the enemy. It isthen the responsibility of follow-on attacking forces to destroy the bypassed enemy. The main body commandercan elect not to bypass the enemy, but to attack. In this case, the advance guard keeps the enemy contained andprepares to pass main body elements through to eliminate the enemy.

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REAR GUARD2-101. The rear guard protects the exposed rear of the main body. This occurs during offensive tasks when themain body breaks contact with flanking forces or during a retrograde. The commander may deploy a rear guardbehind both moving and stationary main bodies. The rear guard for a moving force displaces to successive BPsalong PLs or delay lines in depth as the main body moves. The nature of enemy contact determines the exactmovement technique and form of bounding used in the displacement (bounding overwatch with successivebounds or bounding overwatch with alternate bounds or travelling overwatch).

FLANK GUARD2-102. A CAB may receive a flank guard mission during a division movement to contact. If so, the BCTusually augments the CAB with artillery and Army aviation. The flank guard is responsible for clearing the areafrom the division main body to the flank guards designated positions. The CAB must be prepared to operate ona frontage that is greater than for other tactical operations. Usually, the area extends from the forward screen,the forward line of own troops (FLOT) to the rear of the moving formation, tying in with the rear guard. Due tothe complexities of this operation, the following detailed discussion of flank guard operations is provided.

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COVER

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2-103. The covering force is a self-contained force capable of operating independently of the main body,unlike a screening or guard force to conduct the cover task. (FM 3-98) The covering force, or portions of it,often becomes decisively engaged with enemy forces. Therefore, the covering force must have substantialcombat power to engage the enemy and accomplish its mission. The company team may participate in coveringforce operations but does not conduct them on its own. The covering force develops the situation earlier than ascreen or a guard force. It fights longer and more often and defeats larger enemy forces.

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2-104. The CAB is not designed or equipped to conduct a cover on its own. It is likely, however, that the CABmay be assigned a screen or guard (with augmentation) mission in support of an ABCT conducting a cover.

1990

AREA SECURITY

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2-105. Area security is a form of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, installation routes,and actions within a specified area. (FM 3-90-2) Area security is conducted to deny the threat the ability toinfluence friendly actions in a specific area or to deny the threat use of an area for its own purposes. Areasecurity actions could include area reconnaissance and security of designated personnel, equipment, facilities(including airfield and seaports), main supply routes (MSRs), lines of communication, and critical points. TheCAB may be employed as an area security force during stability tasks or tasked with area security of a sensitivesite during major combat operations. Area security operations may be offensive or defensive in nature.

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2-106. Area security may entail occupying and establishing a 360-degree perimeter around the area beingsecured or taking actions to destroy threat forces already present. Area security operations may require theexecution of a wide variety of supporting operations and tasks. Depending on METT-TC factors a CAB mayrequire augmentation in order to conduct area security effectively. The most significant area of augmentation islikely to be in Infantry to offset the limited personnel present in its tank companies.

2003

AREA SECURITY PROCEDURES

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2-107. When conducting an area security mission, the battalion prevents threat ground reconnaissanceelements from directly observing friendly activities within the area being secured and prevents threat groundmaneuver forces from penetrating the defensive perimeters established by the commander. The commander maydirect his subordinate companies to employ a variety of techniques such as observation posts, battle positions,ambushes, and combat outposts to accomplish this security mission. A reserve or quick reaction force (QRF)enables him to react to unforeseen contingencies. Using information collection and intelligence capabilitiesavailable to the battalion and BCT, the battalion can execute ambushes and preemptive strikes proactively andwith great precision.

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2-108. An analysis of METT-TC determines the augmentation for the CAB. Particular consideration is givento the need for aviation, engineers, and artillery. Early warning of threat activity is paramount when conductingarea security missions, and provides the commander with time and space to react to threats. Proper informationcollection planning, coupled with dismounted/mounted patrols and aerial reconnaissance, is key to successfuloperations, especially when securing fixed sites. Failure to conduct continuous reconnaissance can create avulnerable seam through which the enemy can execute an infiltration or attack.

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2-109. A perimeter is established when a unit must secure an area where the defense is not tied into anadjacent unit. Perimeters vary in shape and distribution of assets based on the results of IPB and METT-TC. Amost probable direction of attack may require extra weighting of that portion of the perimeter to defeat anattack or infiltration.

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2-111. Most circumstances will not permit establishment of defined, neat perimeters. When a perimeter is notfeasible, the battalion secures the area by establishing a presence and conducting operations throughout the area.Subordinate units may establish perimeters around base camps, critical infrastructure, and high-value assets,while other units conduct operations to establish presence, provide security, assist the conduct of stability tasks,or provide the minimum levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment as described in ADRP 307. The battalion may position reaction forces or disperse its reserve between several secured perimeters. (Referto FM 3-37 for more information.) Other missions or tasks in support of area security may include thefollowing: Screens along zones of separation or other designated areas. Route and convoy security of critical LOCs. Checkpoint operations to monitor or control movement. Demonstrations to maintain an observable presence.

2040Figure 2-8. CAB conducting area security

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Route Security2-112. Route security is a subset of area security. The purpose of route security is to prevent a threat fromattacking, destroying, seizing, containing, impeding, or harassing traffic along the route. It also prevents thethreat from interdicting traffic by emplacing obstacles on or destroying portions of the route. Route securityoperations are defensive in nature and, unlike screen operations, are terrain-oriented.

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2-113. Roads and railways may be mined; ambush sites can be located adjacent to the route being secured; orbridges and tunnels can be destroyed by demolitions. Because of the nature of this mission, very long routesmay be extremely difficult to secure; however, measures can be enforced to reduce the effect of threat forces.(Refer to FM 34-22 for more information.)

Route Security Methods

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2-114. The following discussion highlights three methods that the CAB can use in executing route security.The method the CAB chooses to use depends on the nature of the threat, purpose of the security mission, andcharacteristics of the route.

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2-115. In the first method, the battalion conducts route reconnaissance at irregular intervals to avoiddeveloping a pattern that the threat may exploit. Companies reconnoiter the route, including conducting patrolsto either flank. Attached aviation assets or UAS may reconnoiter in advance of ground units or assist inscreening flanks. In addition to reconnaissance, companies or platoons may conduct combined arms operationswith engineers conducting route clearance, or escort engineers conducting route improvements/maintenance;clearing terrain at potential ambush sites; and repairing damage caused by threat actions.

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2-116. The second method entails using an economy of force technique to protect only critical lengths orlocations along the route. The battalion or company establishes mutually supporting combat outposts andprovides security between them. The battalion or company establishes outposts at critical points to preventsabotage and to defend against or respond to attacks to interdict the route between outposts. Based on METTTC, a company can establish one or two combat outposts, and a battalion typically can establish up to eight.Usually, the unit does not secure or patrol the route outside the reach of the combat outposts. A battalion canprovide route security by combining this method at two locations or critical points with patrols along the rest ofthe route. Combat outposts should include a well-defined fire support plan. Battalion mortars or howitzersections are positioned so they are capable of massing fires in support of both the outposts and the operationsbetween them. Units conduct patrols at irregular intervals between the outposts based on threat trends andrecent activities. Patrols must be organized with sufficient combat power to destroy near ambushes and tosurvive initial threat contact from far ambushes. Each combat outpost maintains a reaction force to respond tothreat activity or reinforce patrols.

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2-117. The third method is one that the battalion uses if it must take actions to seize or secure terrain needed topermit use along the entire route. The battalion conducts an initial route reconnaissance, with follow-on unitsestablishing a screen to either flank, checkpoints at access points to control access, and combat outposts atcritical choke points. As time and forces allow, the battalion establishes defensive positions on key terrain, withsubsequent positions prepared to support observation posts on the screen. It also establishes checkpoints atintersections, start points, and release points to monitor and control nonmilitary traffic. Checkpoints may also beestablished at irregular intervals so that troops can stop and search vehicles and personnel. Checkpoints shouldbe situated along the route or in terrain that does not allow travelers to observe and turn away from thecheckpoint holding area. As in the second method, the outposts established at critical choke points includesensors to provide early warning from immediate and surrounding areas. All positions must be defensible, withreinforced fighting positions. (See Figure 2-9a-e.) For this example, the BCT must provide the CAB withspecialized combat engineer augmentation to perform the inherent route clearance task associated with routesecurity.

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Figure 2-9e. Headquarters and mortars in support of CAB conducting route security

LOCAL SECURITY

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2-118. Local security includes measures taken by units to prevent surprise by the enemy. It involves avoidingdetection by the enemy or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intentions. Local security is animportant part of maintaining the initiative. The requirement for maintaining local security is an inherent part ofall operations. Units use both active and passive measures to provide local security. Active measures includeOPs, patrols and conducting stand-to. Passive measures include camouflage, noise and light discipline, andsensors to maintain surveillance over the area immediately around the unit.

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2-119. The company team is responsible for maintaining its own security at all times. It does this by deployingmounted and dismounted observation posts and patrols to maintain surveillance and by employing appropriateOPSEC measures. Besides maintaining security for its own elements, the company team may implement localsecurity for other units as directed by the CAB commander. Examples of such situations include, but are notlimited to, the following: Provide security for engineers as they emplace/clear obstacles or construct survivability positions inthe company team battle position (BP). Secure an LZ. Establish mounted and dismounted observation posts to maintain surveillance of enemy infiltrationand reconnaissance routes. Conduct patrols to cover gaps in observation and to clear possible enemy observation posts fromsurrounding areas. Secure HUMINT teams.

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The primary purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize an enemy force,seize terrain and resources, and control populations. A commander will also takeoffensive actions to deceive or divert the enemy, deprive him of resources or decisiveterrain, develop intelligence, or fix an enemy in position. Even in the defense, offensiveaction may be required to destroy an attacker and exploit success. The key to a successfuloffensive operation is to identify the decisive point, choose a form of maneuver thatavoids the enemys strength, and masses overwhelming combat power at the decisivepoint. This achieves a result with respect to terrain, enemy, and time that accomplishesthe units purpose.

SECTION I BASICS OF OFFENSE

3-1. The CAB commander gains and maintains the initiative and keeps constant pressure on the enemythroughout his AO. The CAB transitions from one offensive action to another without pausing. Planning andpreparing for the next operation and for follow-on operations occur simultaneously with execution of thecurrent action.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE TASKS

3-2. Success in offensive tasks depends on the proper application of combat power within the fundamentalcharacteristics of the offense: surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity.

SURPRISE3-3. A force achieves surprise by attacking the enemy at a time or place and in a manner for which the enemyis not physically or mentally ready. The CAB commander must have a clear understanding of his current statein relation to the enemy and other conditions of his operational environment; a sound understanding of what theend state is for the assigned mission, and a vision of how to move his force from the current situation to the endstate. The CAB achieves surprise by Conducting thorough information collection and counter-reconnaissance efforts. Striking the enemy from an unexpected direction at an unexpected time through the uniquecombination of rapid mounted movement and the ability of units to cross any type of terrain. Quickly changing the tempo of the operations. Being unpredictable.

CONCENTRATION3-4. A force achieves concentration by massing the effects of combat power. The CAB commander uses theshared common operational picture to maneuver his Armor and mechanized Infantry forces while applyingprecise indirect fires to overwhelm his foes at the decisive point, and quickly shift from one objective ordirection to another. A CAB achieves concentration through Careful planning and coordination based on a thorough terrain and enemy analysis plus accurate,timely reconnaissance. Designation of a main effort and allocation of resources to support it. Continuous information flow. Massing firepower using long-range precision fires and maneuvering Infantry and Armor forces.

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TEMPO

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3-5. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.(ADRP 3-0) It is the controlled rate of military action. While a rapid tempo is often preferred, the tempo shouldbe adjusted to ensure synchronization. The goal is to keep pressure on the enemy whether it is done quickly orslowly. The CABs information systems and mobility capabilities facilitate the synchronization necessary for arapid execution tempo.

AUDACITY

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3-6. Audacity is a simple plan of action, boldly executed. Audacity inspires Soldiers to overcome adversityand danger. Audacity is a key component of any successful offensive action and increases the chance forsurprise. Leaders must understand when and where to take risks, plan for them, and execute boldly.

OFFENSIVE TASKS

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3-7. An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, andpopulation centers. (ADRP 3-0) There are four offensive tasks, movement to contact, attack, exploitation, andpursuit. The CAB can plan and conduct a movement to contact and an attack independenttly, but can onlyparticipate in an exploitation or pursuit as part of a larger operational force.

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3-8. As in all military operations, the potential effects on the local populace warrant consideration not onlyfrom the potential collateral damage caused by lethal weapon systems and movement of large Armored andtracked vehicles, but also the mental impact on civilians as a result of decisive and lethal engagements in theirarea.

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MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

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3-9. Movement to contact (MTC) is a type of offensive task designed to develop the situation and establish orregain contact. (FM 3-90-1) It creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. The commanderconducts an MTC when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. Forcesexecuting this task seek to make contact with the smallest friendly force feasible. An MTC may result in ameeting engagement. Movements to contact include search and attack, and cordon and search operations.

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3-10. A meeting engagement is a combat action that occurs when a moving force engages an enemy at anunexpected time and place. The commander has five options: Attack. Defend. Bypass. Delay. Withdraw once making contact with enemy forces.

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ATTACK

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3-11. An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both.(FM 3-90-1) Attacks incorporate coordinated movement support by direct and indirect fires. They may be eitherdecisive or shaping operations. Attacks may be hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available forassessing the situation, planning, and preparing. However, based on mission variable analysis, the commandermay decide to conduct an attack using only fires. An attack differs from an MTC because enemy main bodydispositions are at least partially known, which allows the commander to achieve greater synchronization. Thisenables the massing of effects of the attacking forces combat power more effectively than in an MTC.

EXPLOITATION

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3-12. Exploitation is an offensive task that rapidly follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize theenemy in depth. (FM 3-90-1) Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the point where they have no

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alternative but surrender or take flight. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities, foreseen orunforeseen. Division and higher headquarters normally plan exploitations as branches or sequels.

PURSUIT3-13. A pursuit is an offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with theaim of destroying it. (FM 3-90-1) A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. However, any offensivetask can transition into a pursuit if it is apparent that enemy resistance has broken down entirely and the enemyis fleeing the battlefield. Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized control. Division and higherheadquarters normally plan pursuits as branches or sequels.

FORMS OF MANEUVER

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3-14. Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinalcharacteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy. (FM 3-901) The CAB is ideally suited to conduct each form of maneuver against armored and light forces. Thecommander selects a form of maneuver based upon an analysis of METT-TC, and uses this form of maneuverto develop the best COA. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more infromation.) The CAB uses six basic forms ofmaneuver during an attack: Envelopment. Turning movement. Frontal attack. Penetration. Infiltration. Flank attack.

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3-15. The maneuver process normally follows this sequence:

Movement from the LD to the probable line of deployment (PLD). Actions at the PLD, assault position, or FCL. Breaching operations. Actions on the objective.

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MOVEMENT TO THE LINE OF DEPARTURE

3-16. When attacking from positions not in contact, CABs often stage in tactical assembly areas, conduct atactical road march to attack positions behind friendly units in contact with the enemy, conduct FPOL, andbegin the attack.

APPROACH TO THE OBJECTIVE

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3-17. The commander and staff plan the approach to the objective to ensure security, speed, and flexibility.They select routes (direction of attack or axis of advance), techniques, formations, and methods (mounted ordismounted) that support actions on the objective best. All leaders must recognize this portion of the battle as atactical operation, not an administrative movement. The CAB may fight through enemy combat forces,obstacles, artillery strikes, security elements, or possible spoiling attacks to reach the initial objective. Thecommander employs techniques that avoid the enemys strength when possible and conceal the battalions trueintentions. The commander tries to prevent the enemy from focusing fires on decisive operations, uses surpriseto take advantage of his initiative in determining the time and place of his attack, and when available, usesindirect approaches to strike the enemy from a flank or the rear. As part of setting the conditions for success, thebattalion also develops an indirect fires plan, CASEVAC plan, and sustainment plan. Although the unit may notexpect contact prior to crossing the line of departure (LD), it must be prepared for it. The approach phase isterminated when the battalion reaches the objective or decisively engages the enemy force.

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3-18. While approaching the objective, the CAB must be prepared for any of the eight forms of contact: Direct.

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ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE

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3-19. During an offensive operation, the CABs objective may be terrain or force oriented. Terrain-orientedobjectives usually require the battalion to seize or secure key or decisive terrain. However, to gain a terrainoriented objective often requires fighting through enemy forces. Actions on the objective start when thebattalion echelons its fires onto the objective. Actions on the objective phase terminate when the unit reachesthe limit of advance (LOA) and begins consolidation and reorganization.

CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION

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3-20. The CAB reorganizes and consolidates as required by the situation and mission in order to transition tothe next mission. The consolidation and reorganization plan should be as detailed as the assault plan.Consolidation and reorganization tasks are discussed as part of the transition following offensive and defensivetasks.

3-21. The CAB executes follow-on missions as directed by the higher commander. Follow-on missions caninclude continuing the attack, supporting a passage of lines for a follow-on force, defending, or participating inan exploitation or pursuit. As populated areas are freed from enemy control, some portion of the force mayconduct stability tasks. This could include defeat of insurgents until control of the area reverts to local civilauthorities. The battalion develops plans for follow-on missions based on the higher headquarters plan, thehigher commanders intent, and the anticipated situation. Follow-on missions or tasks are discussed furtherduring the follow through of offensive and defensive task execution.

SECTION II MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

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3-22. Movement to contact is designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact using thesmallest force possible. It ends when units make contact. The CAB conducts a movement to contact when thetactical situation is not clear or when the enemy has broken contact.

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3-23. CABs conduct movement to contact independently or as part of a larger force. A CAB is given amovement-to-contact mission as the lead element of a BCT attack or as a counterattack element of a BCT ordivision. In the example below, the CAB has been augmented with a combat engineer company to facilitate itsmobility and counter-mobility during a movement to contact.

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3-24. A CAB assigned a movement to contact assigned an AO, axis of advance, and an objective at a depth toensure contact with the enemy. The CAB conducts movement to contact in a manner that allows it to maneuverand fully develop the situation, maintain freedom of action, and, if possible, to defeat the enemy once contact ismade.

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3-25. A meeting engagement is a combat action that occurs when the battalion meets with and engages asizable enemy force at an unexpected time and place or as the result of a movement to contact. The enemy forcemay be moving or stationary. The goal, once in contact, is to maneuver quickly to overcome the enemy beforehe can react.

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3-26. This requires the CAB commander to keep his force in a posture ready to react immediately to contactand develop the situation. Subordinate companies must quickly react to contact, develop the situation, report,and gain a position of advantage over the enemy to give the battalion time and space to act effectively. The

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battalions success depends on its subordinate units initiative and ability to develop the situation effectively.Prompt execution of battle drills at platoon level and below, and standard actions on contact for larger units, cangive that initiative to the friendly force. Techniques include: When the lead element makes initial contact with the enemy, it must quickly determine the size andactivity of the enemy force and avoid being fixed or destroyed. If the enemy is moving, the friendly force making initial contact determines the direction ofmovement and the size and composition of the force. Forward observers place fires on the leadenemy forces. Speed of decision and execution is critical when the enemy is moving. If the enemy is stationary, the friendly force determines whether the enemy force is occupyingprepared positions and whether they are reinforced by obstacles and minefields. The friendly forceattempts to identify antitank weapon positions, the enemys flanks, and gaps in his positions. The battalion advance guard moves quickly to overpower and destroy platoon-sized and smallerenemy security forces. Larger enemy forces normally require deployment of the main body. Theadvance guard protects the main body by fixing enemy forces larger than platoon size, which allowsthe battalion main body to retain its freedom to maneuver. Flank security may need to be enhancedthrough the employment of counter-mobility assets. In developing the situation, the advance guard commander maintains pressure on the enemy by fireand maneuver. He probes and conducts a vigorous reconnaissance of the enemys flanks to determinethe enemys exact location, composition, and disposition. The advance guard immediately transmitsthis information to the CAB commander and main body units.

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3-27. The battalion commander uses this information to develop a plan of action by selecting a maneuveroption from the several actions-on-contact options developed during planning: Attack. Defend. Bypass. Delay. Withdraw once making contact with enemy forces.

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ORGANIZATION OF FORCES3-28. An MTC is organized with a forward security force and a main body as a minimum. The security forcemust cover the frontage of the battalion axis of advance. (See Figure 3-1.)

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2323Figure 3-1. CAB movement to contact as part of an ABCT

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SECURITY FORCE

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3-29. The security force moves as quickly and aggressively as possible, but remains within supporting range ofthe main bodys weapon systems. It is essential to provide early warning and reaction time for the CAB. Itdestroys small enemy forces or causes the enemy to withdraw before they can disrupt the main body. Usually,the security force for the CAB is the scout platoon. This allows the CAB to locate the enemy with a minimumforce forward. Engineers and forward observers are attached to the security force as necessary. The securityforce normally has initial priority of indirect fires. The mission of the security force is to determine the size,activity, location, and depth of the enemy force.Other tasks include: Reconnaissance of routes, bridges, and roads. Reconnaissance of obstacles and restrictive terrain. Surveillance of named areas of interest (NAIs). Identify key terrain.

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3-30. The security force must cover the frontage of the battalion axis of advance. The security force avoidsdecisive engagement, but once it finds the enemy, it must maintain contact and report his activity.

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3-31. To provide flank security, platoon-size elements from one or more of the company teams in the battalionmain body provide a moving flank screen under company team control. These elements remain at a distancefrom the main body; this allows the CAB time and space to maneuver to either flank. Flank security elementsalso operate far enough out to prevent the enemy from surprising the main body with direct fires. Indirect firesare planned on major flank approaches to enhance security. One platoon pulled from the main body mayprovide rear security, but combat forces are not normally available to perform this mission. The CAB providesits own rear security, assisted by rapid forward movement, which gives the enemy less opportunity to react orreposition forces to attack the battalion.

ADVANCE GUARD

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3-32. The advance guard for a CAB is usually a company team. Its composition depends on METT-TC. In openterrain, it may move mounted; in restricted, close, complex, or urban terrain, dismounted movement withvehicles in the overwatch may be a better choice. Engineers follow or are attached to the lead elements. The twolead company teams are task-organized accordingly when a battalion moves in parallel columns.

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3-33. The advance guard operates forward of the battalion main body to provide security and ensure itsuninterrupted advance. It protects the main body from surprise attack and develops the situation to protect thedeployment of the main body when it is committed to action. The advance guard Maintains combat information on the entire CAB, especially the security force. Reports enemy contact to the battalion commander. Destroys or repels all enemy reconnaissance forces. Attempts to penetrate enemy security elements, and reach or identify the enemy main body. Prevents the enemy from engaging the main body with direct fires. Selects tentative fighting positions for following battalion units. Locates, bypasses, or breaches obstacles along the main bodys axis of advance. Executes tactical tasks, such as fix, seize, or block, against enemy forces to develop the situation forthe main body. Ensures that all pertinent information is passed to the rest of the battalion.

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3-34. The advance guard is the battalion commanders main effort until the main body is committed; then,priority of fires shift to the main body. In planning the movement to contact, each DP should be based on theactions of the advance guard.

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MAIN BODY

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3-35. The main body contains the bulk of the battalions combat elements and is arrayed to achieve all-aroundsecurity. The combat elements of the main body are prepared to deploy and maneuver rapidly to a decisivepoint on the battlefield to destroy the enemy.

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3-36. The main body keys its movement to the advance guard. It maintains information of the advance guardsactivities via FM crosstalk or digital communication, primarily FBCB2. The main body, remaining attuned tothe advance guards situation, provides responsive support when the advance guard is committed.

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3-37. The use of standard formations and battle drills allows the battalion commander, based on the informationavailable to him through the ABCS, to shift combat power rapidly on the battlefield. Company teams employthe appropriate movement techniques within the battalion formation. Company commanders, based on theirknowledge of the commanders intent and their own SU, anticipate the battalion commanders decisions forcommitment of the main body and plan accordingly.

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CONTROL MEASURES3-38. The commander controls the MTC by using phase lines, contact points, and checkpoints as required. Hecontrols the depth of the MTC by using an LOA or a forward boundary. The commander could designate one ormore objectives to orient the force. These objectives are often terrain-oriented and used only to guidemovement.

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PLANNING

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3-39. A movement to contact is one of the most difficult missions for staffs to plan. The goal is to develop thesituation and establish or regain contact with the enemy. Planning must allow for flexibility and promotesubordinate initiative. Planning begins by developing the concept of the operation with a focus on makingcontact with the enemy. This is accomplished by issuing a clear commanders intent, developing a simpleconcept of operations, and establishing a series of decision points to execute likely maneuver options. Increasedemphasis is placed on developing an aggressive and flexible reconnaissance effort that is linked to thecommanders PIR, which normally focuses on locating and gathering information about the enemys strength,disposition, and activities.

MISSION COMMAND

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3-40. The effective use and integration of available analog and digital systems enhances the CABs ability toconduct parallel and collaborative planning with higher and subordinates, as well as ensure a greaterunderstanding of the plan. Many of the digital systems must be stationary or line of sight (LOS) and therefore,are limited during movement. However, during planning and preparation the staff should maximize their use,while preparing for its limited use during execution. The information systems and networks should allow thestaff to Maintain continuous lower tactical Internet communication with higher headquarters and subordinateunits. Establish and maintain upper tactical Internet communications when the main CP is stationary. Maintain a digital COP using ABCS with an analog backup and on-the-move capability. Maintain a parallel and collaborative planning capability.

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3-41. One technique that ensures the transfer of the main CP functions goes smoothly is to integrate the planneddisplacement of the main CP into the decision support template for the CAB. Detailed planning in coordinationwith the S-3 (scheme of maneuver) and the S-6 (concept of communications support) should enable thebattalion to determine the optimal time to displace the main CP. This helps to ensure that the main CPreestablishes adequate communication with both higher and subordinate units during the decisive operation.

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3-42. The CAB staff must be prepared and resourced to execute mission command warfighting function tasksregardless of the availability of digital systems. Sometimes the tactical situation precludes the effective use ofdigital systems. Therefore, it is paramount that the CAB staff train and rehearse analog methods (such as FMvoice) of executing mission command over the subordinate units. The staff also can use FM voicecommunications to meet the reporting requirements of higher headquarters. The main and alternate CPs musthave the necessary tools they need to execute mission command warfighting function tasks in an analogenvironment. Such tools include paper maps, overlays, and status chart boards.

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MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

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3-43. Developing a simple scheme of maneuver, issuing a clear commanders intent, and developing plans toexecute likely maneuver options that may occur during execution contribute to flexibility and subordinateinitiative. Commanders must visualize the AO and employ the right force mix at the right place and time toachieve the desired effect.

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3-44. When developing his concept, the battalion commander anticipates where he is likely to meet the enemy,and then determines how he intends to develop the situation that leads to an attack under favorable conditions(hasty attack). The commander must attempt to visualize this process during his mission analysis and take intoaccount his active and passive responses to enemy contact. The commander focuses on determining thebattalions organization and formation that best retains his freedom of action on contact and supports hisconcept against known or anticipated enemy forces.

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3-45. The commander and his staff develop plans for the maneuver options of attack, report and bypass, defend,and retrograde based on the higher commanders intent and the situation. They define the conditions in terms ofenemy and friendly strengths and dispositions that are likely to trigger the execution of each maneuver option.They identify likely locations of engagements based on known or suspected enemy locations. The commanderstates the bypass criteria for the advance guard. He must recognize the loss of tempo created by fighting every

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small enemy force encountered with the lead element. The advance guard may attack small enemy forces that itcan quickly destroy without losing momentum, but it is best that the advance guard bypass larger or morestubborn enemy forces, and allow their engagement by the main body.

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3-46. Areas of likely contact, known enemy positions, and areas that are potentially dangerous to the CAB(such as potential ambush locations, obstacles, and open areas) require close planning consideration. The staffmust carefully plan actions for moving through these danger areas quickly and securely.

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3-47. Priority of engineer support is typically to mobility, although it may rapidly change to counter-mobility inanticipation of an enemy attack. Engineer teams may join the reconnaissance and security forces to reconnoiterobstacles, based on METT-TC. Additional combat engineers may also travel with the advance guard to assist inassuring the mobility of the advance guard and main body along with gather OBSTINTEL requirements.

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3-48. The following are key considerations for the scheme of engineer operations: Task-organize engineer forces well forward to support reconnaissance and potential breaching,clearing, or gap crossing operations. Ensure the reconnaissance plan integrates the collection of known or templated obstacles and otherterrain information, and is focused to verify critical information. Maintain the flexibility to mass engineers to breach complex obstacles. Plan obstacle control measures and situational obstacles to support flank security. Develop and adjustobstacle locations and triggers for execution based on the battalions movement and the enemysituation. Develop plans for the handover of marked obstacles, lanes, and bypasses.

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INTELLIGENCE

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3-49. The first consideration for a movement to contact is information collection planning. The BCT plays amajor role based on the assets available and its links to division and higher information collection assets. TheCAB is one of several elements executing the BCT offensive plan, and the CAB information collection planmust be integrated, synchronized, and coordinated with the BCT Cavalry squadron and other elementsexecuting the BCT information collection plan.

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3-50. The first priority is to determine anticipated enemy locations, strengths, and actions. Potential enemymission, intent, objectives, defensive locations, use of key terrain, avenues of approach and routes, engagementareas (EAs), population, and obstacles are among the items that must be identified early and incorporated intothe information collection plan. Various elements within the CAB conduct information collection tasks.

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UAS Teams

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3-51. UAS teams can prevent large enemy units from surprising the main body. After making contact, UASteams can maintain contact with ground scouts, reconnoiter elsewhere, or move to a vantage point that avoidsdecisive engagement. Units must remember to account for the airspace above the CABs AO. They should bealert for enemy attack aviation and UAS during movements through choke points, bridges, and other restrictiveterrain.

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3-52. Rapid exchange of relevant information between the CAB, Cavalry squadron, and the BCT is critical.Intelligence-gathering actions result in information dominance and, once established, can convert the movementto contact into an attack.

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FIRES

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3-53. Priority of fires are allocated to the advance guard. The fire support coordinator in coordination with theBCT S-3, positions field artillery units to provide continuous indirect fires for the moving CAB. Army attackhelicopters and CAS may be available to interdict enemy counterattack forces or destroy defensive positions.Given the BCTs emphasis on proactive counterfires and the likelihood for operating in close terrain, the CABmay need to rely on its organic mortars.

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3-54. The CAB mortars may be placed under the OPCON of the advance guard, based on METT-TC, toprovide responsive fires and obscuration to support initial actions on contact, or may be controlled by the

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battalion commander or FSO in support of the entire battalion effort. In either case, it is likely that the advanceguard will receive initial mortar priority of fires.

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3-55. The following are key considerations for the fire support plan: Facilitate responsive and decentralized fires by establishing a clear understanding of the essentialtasks for fire support in each phase of the operation. This understanding is critical to the success ofthe fire support plan. Upon contact, the battalion shifts control of all available fires to the observerwho is in the best position to control fires against the enemy. Plan targets based on known or suspected enemy locations and danger areas and to support futureoperations. Refine targets based on the reconnaissance effort as the operation progresses. Maximize the use of priority targets along the axis of advance and plan triggers to put these targetsinto effect and cancel them based on the movement of the battalion. Ensure immediate responsive fire support to the lead elements by assigning priority of fires to thesecurity force and the advance guard. Synchronize the movement and positioning of artillery, mortar assets with the tempo of the battalion,and the fire support requirements. Position observers and forward air controllers (FACs) effectively and maximize the use of leadmaneuver forces to call for fires since they often have the best view of the enemy. Observers mustunderstand the essential tasks for fire support for each phase of the operation.

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SUSTAINMENT

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3-56. Sustainment planners (S-1,S-4, MEDO, XOs, FSC CDR) must be able to anticipate requirements,improvise solutions, and be responsive and continuous. During the operations process, commanders and staffmust plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess sustainment support for the CAB to include attachedelements, such as an engineer company.

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3-57. The object of sustainment is to provide support as far forward as possible without disrupting operations.The priority is to move Class V forward and to evacuate casualties rearward. The FSC focuses on mobilesupport, which provides the CAB commander responsive support and reduces support areas to protect. Thenear-real-time information provided by FBCB2 enhances support.

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3-58. The commander and S-4 might determine that the mission requires additional Class III and V support bepositioned forward at the combat trains. If the CAB is widely dispersed, the FSC may position resupply of ClassIII and V forward at logistics release points (LRPs), rather than a centralized combat trains.

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3-59. FSC maintenance teams are positioned with companies to perform on-systems repair of combat vehicles.Equipment that cannot be repaired quickly is evacuated to the maintenance collection point (MCP). MCPsshould be located on the main axis or main supply routes (MSRs). In addition, the S-4 may request heavyequipment transport to assist in rearward evacuation.

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3-60. Medical treatment focuses on stabilization and rapid medical evacuation of patients. Although eachmaneuver company generally has a ambulance team, the CAB may receive additional wheeled ambulanceteams from the medical company (brigade support battalion),to expedite the evacuation of casualties to theBSMC. These ambulances may be held at the BAS or dispersed to ambulance exchange points (AXPs).

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3-61. The following are key considerations for the sustainment plan: Continuously update the sustainment plan based on status of units and ensure the plan is responsiveand flexible enough to support all maneuver options. Plan support from initiation of the operation to the final objective or LOA. Integrate backup support from the BSB to reinforce the support provided by the FSC. This mayinclude Class III, V, and IX support, medical treatment and ground ambulance teams to provide HSS,and maintenance and recovery teams. Consider risks that extended distances create for security of MSRs and sustainment assets based onthe potential of undetected or bypassed enemy forces. Integrate sustainment with the trains security plan. Develop and maintain an accurate enemy picture behind the lead maneuver elements.

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Plan and coordinate the locations, displacements, and routes of sustainment assets to maintainresponsive support.Plan and coordinate for aerial resupply.

PROTECTION

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3-62. Air defense artillery units are a limited resource. Available air defense artillery resources will bededicated to the protection of assets that the ABCT commander deems critical to the success of the tactical plan,leaving other assets without dedicated air defense artillery coverage. Units with or without dedicated air defenseartillery support must contribute to their own defense against air attack. (Refer to FMs 3-01 and 3-52 and ADRP3-37 for more information.)

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3-63. The commander integrates CBRN considerations into all types of mission planning. Implementing CBRNpassive defensive measures may slow the tempo, degrade combat power, and may increase logisticsrequirements. The following are key considerations for CBRN defense planning: Ensure the CBRN reconnaissance platoon within the ABCT is prepared to conduct CBRNreconnaissance tasks. Disseminate/report CBRN threats and hazards information immediately throughout the formationonce detected. Integrate and synchronize the use of obscurants to support critical actions such as breaching orassault.

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PREPARATION

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3-64. During preparation for movement to contact, the battalion continues to refine the enemy situation basedon higher intelligence reports and reporting from the CAB scout platoon. The primary concerns are that thebattalion commander and staff receive the latest information and that plans are updated to reflect the changes.

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3-65. The battalion commander must ensure that his subordinates understand his intent and their individualmissions as new information becomes available. He normally uses backbriefs and rehearsals to ensure his intentis understood and all actions are integrated and synchronized. Simple, flexible plans that rely on TACSOPs, andare rehearsed repeatedly against various enemy conditions, are essential to success.

INSPECTIONS3-66. The battalion commander inspects subordinate unit preparations to ensure they are consistent with hisintent and concept of operations. He emphasizes subordinate plans to move through danger areas, conductactions on contact, and transition into a maneuver option. The battalion commander ensures each subordinateforce understands its assigned mission during the movement to contact and the potential maneuver options thatmay develop during execution.

REHEARSALS3-67. The battalions leaders rehearse the plan against a wide range of likely enemy COAs that would cause thebattalion to execute various maneuver options at different times and locations. The goal of rehearsals is to helpprepare commanders to identify decision points that may arise during execution. This promotes flexibility andagility while reinforcing the commanders intent. The commander seeks to rehearse the operation frominitiation to occupation of the final objective or LOA, but due to time constraints, the commander prioritizes themaneuver options and enemy COAs to be rehearsed based on the time available. The focus of the rehearsal islocating the enemy, developing the situation, executing a maneuver option, and exploiting success. Therehearsal must consider the potential of encountering stationary or moving enemy forces. Other actions toconsider during rehearsals include: Actions to cross known danger areas. The advance guard making contact with a small enemy force. The advance guard making contact with a large force beyond its capabilities to defeat.

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The advance guard making contact with an obstacle the reconnaissance force has not identified andreported.A flank security force making contact with a small force.A flank security force making contact with a large force beyond its capability to defeat.Bypass criteria and reporting requirements.Transition into a maneuver option.

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3-68. The type of rehearsal is proportional to the amount of time to plan and prepare for execution. Ideally eachtype of rehearsal is conducted, but the CAB commander will almost always conduct backbriefs with hissubordinate commanders and staff. The combined arms and support rehearsal can be done in combination withthe backbrief with time permitting. The battle drill or standard operating procedure (SOP) rehearsal are usuallyconducted at platoon and below. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

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3-69. The six techniques for rehearsals are network, map, sketch map, terrain model, reduced force, and fulldress. These are listed in order of the amount of time, resources, leadership participation, and security risk fromleast to greatest in order to conduct the rehearsals. Because of the unknowns associated with respect to enemyduring a movement to contact, the execution of rehearsals during preparation is vital to success. (Refer to FM 60 for more information.)

3-71. This sequence is for discussion purposes only and is not the only way of conducting these offensive tasks.The five steps used in this publication to illustrate the execution of offensive tasks actually tend to overlap eachother during the conduct of offensive actions. Normally the first three of these steps are shaping operations orsupporting efforts, while the maneuver step is the decisive operation or main effort. Follow through is normallya sequel or a branch to the plan based on the current situation.

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3-72. During the movement to contact, the battalion moves rapidly to maintain the advantage of an appropriatetempo. However, the battalion commander must balance the need for speed with the requirement for security.This decision is based on the effectiveness of the information collection effort, friendly mobility, effects ofterrain, and the enemys capabilities.

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3-73. The COP should allow close tracking of the movement and location of battalion units. The battalion CPcontinually monitors the location and movement of the security forces through voice reports or FBCB2. Thisensures adequate security for the main body, and ensures the security forces are within supporting range of themain body, mortars, and artillery. The battalion CP also controls the movement of the FSC, adjusting itsmovements to meet support requirements, avoid congestion of routes, and ensure responsiveness.

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GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

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3-74. The battalion maintains continuous contact with an enemy force once located by the reconnaissance orsecurity element. Reconnaissance assets assist friendly forces by guiding them along the best routes to engagethe enemy. As contact develops, reconnaissance assets at every level report enemy actions and battle damageassessment (BDA).

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3-75. The battalion destroys small enemy forces with a combination of fire and maneuver. Depending on thebattalion commanders bypass criteria, the advance guard may fix small enemy forces identified by the securityforce. Once it fixes the enemy, the security force leaves a small combat force to contain the enemy until theadvance guard or main body can destroy it.

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3-76. The advance guard maintains contact with the scout platoon to coordinate combat actions and exchangerelevant information. As the scout platoon locates enemy positions, it hands these locations off to the advanceguard. In some cases, elements of the scout platoon maintain contact with the enemy and guide the advanceguard maneuver forces. Regardless of the technique used, units should rehearse these actions and closelycoordinate them during execution to prevent fratricide and confusion.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

3-77. Once making contact, the main body commander brings the overwhelming combat power, and shockeffect of his Armor and mechanized Infantry onto the enemy to prevent him from conducting either a spoilingattack or organizing a coherent defense. The security force continues to identify and report gaps in the enemy'sdefenses. The commander uses his information collection assets to gain as much information as possible aboutthe enemy's dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, and intentions. As more intelligence becomesavailable, the main body commander attacks to destroy or disrupt enemy command and control centers, firecontrol nodes, and communication nets. The main body commander conducts operations to prevent enemyreserves from moving to counter his actions.

FIX THE ENEMY

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3-78. The goal of the security force is to prevent enemy security and main body forces from maneuveringagainst his main body by fixing them. Therefore the commander must provide the security force appropriatelevels of organization, size, and combat power to defeat or fix the enemy without deploying the main body. Theorders intelligence summary and information collected prior to and during planning are the major factors thatdetermine the size of the security force along with the rest of the organization for the movement to contact.

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3-79. The commander augments the security forces ability to fix through the use of aerial maneuver, firesupport assets, situational obstacles to counter-mobility, and electronic warfare systems. The priorities aretypically to attack enemy forces in contact, enemy command and control and fire direction control facilities,enemy fire support assets, and moving enemy forces not yet in contact, such as follow-on forces and reserves.These priorities vary with the mission variables/factors of METT-TC. Attack helicopters and close air supportfixed-wing aircraft working in joint air attack teams are ideally suited to engage the enemy throughout the depthof the area of operations if suppression of enemy air defenses can reduce aircraft risk to an acceptable degree.

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MANEUVER3-80. Timely and accurate intelligence facilitate the battalion commanders selection of the appropriatemaneuver option. Usually, the CAB commander makes the final decision for execution of a maneuver optionbased on the progress of the initial engagement of the advance guard. The battalion movement to contactgenerally ends with the commitment of the main body. The following paragraphs provide a general descriptionof the options that may develop after a movement to contact

Maneuver Options

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3-81. If the security force cannot overrun the enemy with a frontal attack, the commander retains tempo byquickly maneuvering his main body to conduct a penetration, flank attack, or envelopment. To conduct asuccessful penetration, attacking units penetrate on a narrow front and drive deep into the hostile position toattack enemy reserves, artillery, command and control nodes, and lines of communication.To conduct anenvelopment, the security force fixes the enemy, while the commander focuses on attacking the enemy's flanksand rear to surprise and envelop him before he can prepare to counter these actions. If rapid forward movementis required and the BCT commander has authorized bypass of enemy forces, the CAB can bypass. The highercommander establishes bypass criteria that allow the battalion to report and bypass enemy forces of a specificsize. When an enemy force meets the bypass criteria, the battalion fixes the enemy force and leaves a smallforce to maintain contact while the remainder of the battalion continues the advance. Once bypassed, thedestruction of the enemy force becomes the responsibility of the battalions higher commander.

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3-82. Bypassed forces present a serious threat to forces that follow the maneuver elements, especiallysustainment elements. It is imperative that the battalion CP distributes the location and strengths of enemyforces throughout the CAB AO to enable following units to move around these threats.

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3-83. Ambush is effective against a moving or infiltrating force that is not aware of the presence of thebattalion. Instead of immediately engaging the enemy, the advance guard (and possibly the entire battalion)moves into hasty attack-by-fire positions oriented on an EA. This option is enabled by accurate informationupdates and the speed and accuracy with which FRAGORDs and other instructions can be developed andpassed. When most of the enemy is in the EA, the battalion uses massed direct and indirect fires and maneuverto attack the enemy.

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3-84. The commander directs an attack when the CAB has greater combat power than the enemy or when heassesses the CAB can reach a decisive outcome. The CAB commander quickly develops a scheme of maneuverand concept of fires for the attack and distributes orders to subordinate companies. The commander employsfires, CAS, and situational obstacles. He controls the movement, deployment, and possible changes to the taskorganization of the CAB forces. The envelopment is normally the most desirable form of maneuver and is usedwhen there is sufficient maneuver space. A penetration is normally used against a stationary enemy force thatdoes not have an assailable flank, such as one in a perimeter defense. After a successful attack, the CAB maycontinue the movement to contact or execute other missions as directed by the BCT commander.

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3-85. The commander directs a defense when the CAB has insufficient combat power to attack or when theenemys superior strength forces the CAB to halt and prepare for a more deliberate operation. The CABmaneuvers to the best available defensible terrain, either to the front or to the rear. The commander may directthe advance guard or another security force to delay an enemy attack to provide time for establishment of thebattalion defense. Companies quickly deploy, establish security, array forces, and develop fire and obstacleplans. Special emphasis is placed on flank protection and adjacent unit coordination. As the enemy attacks, theCAB commander repositions and maneuvers forces to defeat the enemy through massed fires, situationalobstacles, and counterattacks. The commander seeks to defeat an attacking enemy force and create theopportunity for offensive action. In some cases, the CAB may need to retain its position to allow the BCTcommander time to commit additional forces.

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3-86. The commander directs a retrograde when the CAB lacks the combat power to attack or defend, improvea tactical situation, or prevent a worse situation from developing. If other units are behind the CAB, planningand coordination for RPOL is necessary. Lead elements of the CAB establish initial defensive positions whilenonessential mobility, protection, and sustainment assets reposition to the rear. Indirect fires, obstacles, andobscurants are employed to assist forward elements with disengagement and displacement. Battalion elementsin contact avoid becoming decisively engaged.

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Actions at Obstacles

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3-87. Obstacles pose a significant threat to the CABs momentum. Once a battalion element detects an obstacle,it immediately distributes its location and description on FM radio or digitally. The battalion quickly seeks asecure bypass. If a bypass is available, the unit in contact with the obstacle exploits and marks the bypass; italso digitally distributes the route of the bypass around the obstacle as soon as possible. Usually, enemy forcescover obstacles with fires. Units should approach all obstacles and restrictive terrain with the same diligencewith which they approach a known enemy position.

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3-88. When the CAB must breach, it takes the steps to execute the breaching fundamentals of suppress,obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA) to create a breach lane and continue the movement to contact.Engineer forces from the main body support the breach effort by creating lanes, improving the marking of lanes,and guiding the main body through the obstacle. Should the unit anticipate breaching or gap crossingoperations, it will require engineer augmentation to support either hasty or deliberate operations.

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3-89. When mobility degrades due to movement of dislocated civilians, CA, MP or military informationsupport operations assets may be employed to redirect the civilians away from the route of advance. The enemycovers this type of obstacle with fires to degrade clearing efforts.

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FOLLOW THROUGH3-90. After a successful attack, the main body commander resumes the movement to contact if the location ofthe enemy main body is still unclear and the limit of advance has not been reached or the commander transitionsto the appropriate taskdeliberate attack, a defense, or retrogradefor the existing tactical situation. The CABmaintains contact and attempts to exploit its success.

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SEARCH AND ATTACK

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3-91. Search and attack is a technique for conducting movement to contact that shares many of thecharacteristics of an area security mission. A commander employs this form of a movement to contact when theenemy is operating as small, dispersed elements whose locations cannot be determined to targetable accuracy bymethods other than a physical search, or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move within a givenarea.

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3-92. The search and attack are normally conducted at battalion and company level. Since the CAB has acombination of Infantry and Armored elements, it can be employed anywhere in the world in manyenvironments, and face regular and irregular threats alike, it is worth discussing the fundamental techniques toconduct a search and attack. The search and attack is conducted for one or more of the following: Destroy the enemy. Render enemy units in the AO combat-ineffective. Deny the area. Prevent the enemy from operating unhindered in a given area (such as any area theenemy is using for a base camp or for logistics support). Protect the force. Prevent the enemy from massing to disrupt or destroy friendly military or civilianoperations, equipment, property, and key facilities. Collect information. Gain information about the enemy and the terrain to confirm the enemy COApredicted as a result of the IPB process.

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ORGANIZATION OF FORCES3-93. Forces organized into reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing forces. In a CAB level search and attack,companies would be assigned AOs. The reconnaissance forces can consists of scout, Infantry, sniper, aviation,and EW assets. Each company might designate its own reconnaissance forces, or they may be provided by thebattalion depending on METT-TC. Either way, its critical that all forces have an understanding of the commonoperational picture and that communications and updates are continuous in order to avoid fratricide.

EXECUTION

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3-94. The reconnaissance force gains and maintains contact with the enemy while the fixing force blocks routesto isolate the enemy, by preventing its movement, or reinforcement. The fixing force can also attack to disruptthe enemy until the finishing force can maneuver to bring its combat power to bear on the enemy. BFVs, tanksor a combination of them can serve as the fixing and finishing forces. Its also possible to utilize the movement,or positioning of tanks as part of a deception plan to divert attention, while reconnaissance efforts areundertaken.

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3-95. With companies operating within their own AOs they may also be called upon to conduct their ownsearch and attack efforts in their AOs within their capability. The commander should dedicate mortar support tothe most likely threat and plan for brigade support by fires utilizing TRPs. Other control measures for a searchand attack are an AO, objectives, checkpoints, and contact points. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

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CORDON AND SEARCH

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3-96. The cordon and search is a technique of conducting a movement to contact that involves isolating a targetarea and searching suspected locations within that target area to capture or destroy possible enemy forces andcontraband. (FM 3-90-1) It is frequently applied during stability tasks for a variety of reasons to includecapturing personnel, locating weapon caches, gathering combat information and intelligence, or securing keyfacility and terrain. The four key elements to the cordon are the command, security, search or assault, andsupport. Most cordon and search missions executed at battalion level and below. (Refer to FM 3-06/MCRP 331.4B for more information.)

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3-97. As discussed above, leaders must carefully consider the local populace during the execution of stabilitytasks. This is even more prevalent with forcible entry and the offensive nature of cordon and search missions,which involve limiting freedom of movement and searching dwellings. These actions provide a clear potentialfor negative consequences; therefore, organizing cordon and search elements requires extensive mission

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tailoring and consideration of mission ramifications. Commanders must always be prepared for a civildisturbance.

TASK ORGANIZATION3-98. In a built-up area, the CAB commander generally divides the area to be searched into zones, and assigns asearch party its own battle space. The cordon consists of two security elements: an outer cordon and an innercordon. The outer cordon is usually the responsibility of the CAB, as it requires a considerable amount of assetsto control it effectively. The outer cordon consists of a security element that encircles the area to prevententrance and exit, and to secure open areas. When necessary, the security element is augmented with thenecessary enablers (based on METT-TC) such as linguists and CA specialists. The inner cordon is establishedby the unit assigned the search mission. The higher headquarters must also establish a quick reaction forceelement to assist either element, as required. (See Figure 5-1.)

2776Figure 3-2. Typical organization for cordon and search operations

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Note. These teams are examples only. Civilians may support any or all teams employed.

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3-99. When conducting a cordon and search mission, the CAB may receive assets from higher headquarters.These same assets will also aide when conducting a cordon and search to support exploitation operations. Theseassets can include: Information collection assets from the Cavalry squadron and the military intelligence company. Mine detection or demolition support from engineer units. Interrogation, translator, and HUMINT support from the military intelligence company. Military information support operations (such as a loudspeaker) and other CA support from attachedCA units. Electronic warfare support (such as Prophet) from the military intelligence company. LNOs to assist with host-nation interaction. Quick reaction force.

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3-100. The quick reaction force is a mobile force positioned in a nearby area ready to help the search andsecurity elements, if they meet resistance beyond their ability to handle. The reaction force can replace orreinforce either of the other two elements if the need arises. Reaction forces are often a section or platoon sizeelement depending on METT-TC. These elements can also support medical evacuation and vehicle recoveryoperations. In short the QRF should be prepared to assist with multiple contingencies as prescribed by thecommander.

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ESTABLISHING THE CORDON

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3-101. An effective inner and outer cordon is critical to the success of the search effort. (See Figure 5-2.)Cordons are designed to isolate the area to be searched in order to protect the forces conducting the operation.Leaders should always plan for checkpoints and or roadblocks, patrols, aerial surveillance, engineers, militaryinformation support operations, search and entry teams, MPs, and documentation teams. Integration of allwarfighting function is critical to success. In remote areas, the CAB can utilize long range precision fires fromtanks, BFVs and snipers to establish the cordon without being detected. The use of limited visibility aids in theestablishment and security of the cordon but makes it difficult to control.

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3-102. Deployment for the search should be rapid, especially if the enemy is still in the area to be searched.Ideally, the entire area should be surrounded at once. Observed fire covers any gaps. The security elementsurrounds the area while the search element moves in. Members of the security element orient mainly on peopleevading the search in the populated area. The security element can also cut off any insurgents trying to reinforceothers within the area, isolating the search area internally and externally. Checkpoints and roadblocks areestablished. Subsurface routes of escape in built-up areas, such as subways and sewers, should also be searchedand blocked.

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3-103. The CAB must enforce the ROE and should develop plans to handle detained personnel. Infantry canalso conduct searches and assist in detaining suspects, under police supervision; their principal role, however, isto reduce any resistance that might develop and to provide security for the operation. Use of force is kept to aminimum.

2815Figure 3-3. Establishing the outer and inner cordon

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Entering Buildings3-104. There are various methods used to enter buildings on the objective, the method of choice depending onthe factors of METT-TC. Some of those methods include:

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Conduct a dynamic entry into a building using demolition, ballistic, or mechanical breach, and thenconduct a thorough search.Conduct a dynamic entry using an authorized mechanical breach; then choose a search method basedon the intelligence found on site.Conduct a passive entry with a cursory search only.Conduct a tactical callout. Use a megaphone to call personnel out of the building, and then conducta search of the objective using an appropriate search method.

CONDUCTING THE SEARCH

3-105. Units conduct a search of a built-up area with limited inconvenience to the populace. The search shouldinconvenience the populace enough for them to discourage insurgents and sympathizers from remaining in thelocale but not enough to drive them to collaborate with the enemy. A large-scale search of a built-up area is acombined civil police and military operation. Such a search should be planned in detail and rehearsed whileavoiding physical reconnaissance of the area just before the search. Aerial photographs can provide informationneeded about the terrain. In larger towns or cities, the local police might have detailed maps showing relativesizes and locations of buildings. As with any Army operation, mission analysis is critical. For success, thesearch plan must be simple and the search conducted swiftly. The search element is organized into teams. Theseteams can include personnel and special equipment for handling prisoners, tactical questions, documentation(using a recorder with a camera), demolitions, military information support operations and civil affairs, minedetection, fires and effects, employment of scout dogs, and tunnel reconnaissance.

Search Considerations3-106. Misuse of search authority can adversely affect the outcome of operations. Therefore, Soldiers mustconduct and lawfully record the seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other minoritems in order for these things to be of future legal value. Proper use of authority during searches gains therespect and support of the people. Some considerations include: Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed. Search teams have detailed instructions for handling controlled items. Language difficulties can interfere when U.S. forces conduct search operations involving the localpopulace. The U.S. units given a search mission are provided with interpreters as required. The CAB conducts search operations with a tempo that that allows for an effective search but rapidlyenough to prevent the enemy from reacting to the threat of the search. Soldiers use minimum essential force to eliminate any active resistance encountered. Searchers can return to a searched area after the initial search to surprise and eliminate insurgents ortheir leaders who might have either returned or remained undetected during the search. The unit should develop plans for securing the search area and for handling detained personnel. Disrupt or stop smuggling operations.

Search Methods

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3-107. Assemble inhabitants in a central location if they appear to be hostile. This method provides themost control, simplifies a thorough search, denies insurgents an opportunity to conceal evidence, and allows fordetailed interrogation. Depending on the objective of the search, a personnel search team may be necessary inthis central location. This method has the disadvantage of taking the inhabitants away from their dwellings, andencouraging looting, which, in turn, produces ill feelings from the inhabitants. The security element isresponsible for controlling the inhabitants. The search element may escort individuals back to their dwellings tobe present during the search, or it may leave them in the central location.

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3-108. Restrict inhabitants to their homes. This prohibits movement of civilians, allows them to stay in theirdwellings, and discourages looting. The security element must enforce this restriction. The disadvantages of thismethod are that it makes control and interrogation difficult, and it gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence intheir homes

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3-109. Control the heads of the households. The head of each household is told to remain in front of thehouse while everyone else in the house is brought to a central location. The security element controls the groupat the central location and provides external security. During the search, the head of the household accompaniesthe search team through the house. Looting is reduced, and the head of the household sees that the search teamsteals nothing.

Searching a House3-110. The object of a house search is to look for controlled items and to screen residents to determine if anyare suspected insurgents or enemy sympathizers. A search party assigned to search an occupied building shouldconsist of at least one local police officer, a protective escort for local security, and a female searcher (if thebuilding has female inhabitants). If inhabitants remain in the dwellings, the protective escort must isolate andsecure the inhabitants during the search. Escort parties and transportation must be arranged before the search ofa house. Forced entry might be necessary if a house is vacant or if an occupant refuses to allow searchers toenter. If the force searches a house containing property while its occupants are away, it should secure the houseto prevent looting. Before U.S. forces depart, the commander should arrange for the community to protect suchhouses until the occupants return.

Aerial Search Operations

3-111. Search units mounted in armed helicopters take full advantage of the mobility and firepower of theseaircraft. Air mobile combat patrols conducting an aerial search reconnoiter an assigned area or route in search ofenemy forces. When a patrol locates an enemy force, the patrol may engage it from the air, or may land andengage it on the ground. This technique has little value in areas of dense vegetation or when a significant manportable air defense threat is present. Air mobile combat patrols should be used only when sufficientintelligence is available to justify their use. Even then, ground operations should be used along with suchpatrols.

CAPTURING PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

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3-112. Commanders must carefully weigh the value of tactically questioning detainees at the point of captureagainst the thorough questioning at a safe haven. Although Soldiers on the ground desire to gather and act ontimely intelligence, there might be far-reaching damage to an ongoing investigation by military intelligence orhost-nation counterinsurgency operations. Often military intelligence and host-nation representatives canaccompany units conducting cordon and search to provide advice to on-site commanders.

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3-113. Soldiers should treat any enemy material found, including propaganda signs and leaflets, as if it isbooby-trapped until inspection proves it safe. Underground and underwater areas should be searchedthoroughly. Any freshly excavated ground could be a hiding place. Soldiers can use mine detectors to locatemetal objects underground and underwater. Certain kinds of equipment (for example, computers and cellphones) should not be exploited at the point of capture. Instead, the CAB should arrange for quick removal ofcaptured material to military intelligence units with the capability to handle exploitation properly.

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ROADBLOCKS AND CHECKPOINTS

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3-114. Roadblocks, traffic control points, and checkpoints are among the most visible actions performedduring stability tasks. Checkpoints offer a myriad of planning concerns. There is a high potential for juniorleaders and Soldiers to make decisions with international importance in essence becoming juniorambassadors. Therefore, establishment and continual analysis of standard operating procedures is critical toensuring equity and support.

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3-115. The ability to establish roadblocks and checkpoints is an important aspect of movement control andarea denial. Establish roadblocks in locations where approaching traffic cannot observe them until it is too lateto withdraw and escape. When possible, roadblock locations must be periodically relocated in order to mitigatebypassing and targeting by enemy forces. Narrow defiles, tunnels, bridges, sharp curves, and other locationsthat channel traffic are the preferred sites. Constructed, nonexplosive obstacles slow traffic, restrict it to a singlelane, and bring it to a halt. (See Figure 5-3.)

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3-116. Roadblocks and checkpoints help prevent smuggling operations and stop the movement of known orsuspected insurgents. They should be manned by host-nation police and observed by United Nation monitors(when appropriate) to stop vehicles and pedestrians, and conduct searches as required. Either host country orU.S. Army combat forces defend these roadblocks and checkpoints from enemy attack. If police strength isinsufficient for the number of positions required, the Army can operate them.

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3-117. Units establishing and manning checkpoints must have knowledge of civil authorities, factionalboundaries, significant cultural sites, linguist use, and knowledge of the local populous and geography. Further,it is imperative that leaders who are responsible for checkpoints appraise higher headquarters of problems andrender specific recommendations for mission accomplishment. (Refer to ATP 3-21.10 and FM 3-19.4 for moreinformation.)

2924Figure 3-4. Physical layout of a checkpoint

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2926

SECTION III ATTACKS

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3-118. An attack destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. Attacks may be hasty ordeliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. When thecommander decides to attack or the opportunity to attack occurs during combat operations, the execution of thatattack must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with atempo and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. The resulting combat should not be a contestbetween near equals. Attackers must be determined to seek decision on the ground of their choosing through thedeliberate synchronization and employment of the combined arms team.

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3-119. Attacks may direct the rapid execution of battle drills by forces immediately available or followdetailed plans and orders. At one extreme, the battalion discovers the general enemy situation through amovement to contact and launches an attack as a continuation of the meeting engagement to exploit a temporaryadvantage in relative combat power and to preempt enemy actions. At the other, the battalion moves into anattack from a reserve position or assembly area with detailed knowledge of the enemy, a task organizationdesigned specifically for the attack, and a fully rehearsed plan. Most attacks fall somewhere on this continuum.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES3-120. The commander task-organizes forces within the battalion after he chooses a scheme of maneuver. Thetask organization allocates sufficient combat power to allow subordinate companies to accomplish theirassigned tasks. The commander normally organizes the force into a security force, a main body, and a reserve,all supported by some type of sustainment. The commander should complete any changes in task organizationin time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached and supporting elements. The best place and timefor an attacking force to task organize is when it is in an assembly area.

SECURITY FORCES3-121. A commander can resource a dedicated security forces during an attack only if the attack will uncoverone or more flanks or the rear of the attacking force as it advances. Normally, an attacking unit does not needextensive forward security forces. Most attacks are launched from positions in contact with the enemy, whichreduces the usefulness of a separate forward security force. The exception occurs when the attacking unit istransitioning from the defense to an attack and had previously established a security area as part of the defense.

MAIN BODY3-122. The commander organizes the main body to conduct the decisive operation and necessary shapingoperations. The commander aims the decisive operation toward the immediate destruction of the enemy force,its will to resist, seizure of a terrain objective, or the defeat of the enemys plan. The maneuver schemeidentifies the focus of the decisive operation. All of the forces available resources operate in concert to assurethe success of the decisive operation. The element designated to conduct the decisive operation can changeduring the course of the attack. The commander must consider an assault, breach, and support force if thecommander expects to conduct a breach operation during the attack.

RESERVE

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3-123. The commander uses the reserve to exploit success, defeat enemy counterattacks, or restore momentumto a stalled attack. Once committed, the reserves actions normally become or reinforce the echelons decisiveoperation. The commander makes every effort to reconstitute another reserve from platoons made available bythe revised situation. Often a commanders most difficult and important decision concerns the time, place, andcircumstances for committing the reserve. The reserve is not a committed force; it is not used as a follow-andsupport force or a follow-and-assume force.

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3-124. In the attack, the combat power allocated to the reserve depends primarily on the level of uncertaintyabout the enemy, especially the strength of any expected enemy counterattacks. The commander only needs toresource a small reserve to respond to unanticipated enemy reactions when detailed information about theenemy exists. When the situation is relatively clear and enemy capabilities are limited, the reserve may consistof a small fraction of the force. When the situation is vague, the reserve may initially contain the majority of thecommanders combat power.

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2974

CONTROL MEASURES FOR AN ATTACK

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3-125. Units conducting offensive tasks are assigned an AO within which to operate. Within the AO, thecommander normally designates the following control measures whether or not the attack takes place in acontiguous or noncontiguous environment: AOs for subordinate units of battalion size or larger. Phase line as the LD, which may be the line of contact (LC). Time to initiate the operation. Objective.

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3-126. A commander can use any other control measures necessary to control the attack. Short of the LD/LC,the commander may designate assembly areas and attack positions where the unit prepares for offensive tasks orwaits for the establishment of the required conditions to initiate the attack. Beyond the LD/LC the commandermay designate checkpoints, phase lines, PLD, assault positions, and direct and indirect fire support coordinatingmeasures. Between the PLD and the objective a final coordination line, assault positions, support-by-fire andattack-by-fire positions, and time of assault to further control the final stage of the attack can be used.

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PLANNING

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3-127. The CAB directs its main effort against an objective, ideally an enemy weakness, which will cause thecollapse of the enemy defense. The battalion seeks to attack the enemys flanks, rear, or supporting formations.By doing so, the CAB retains the initiative and reduces its own vulnerabilities.

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3-128. The commander seeks to identify a poorly defended avenue of approach, a small unit lacking mutualsupport within the enemy defense, or a weak flank that he can exploit to gain a tactical advantage. (See Figure3-5.) When attacking a well-prepared enemy defense, the CAB commander usually tries to isolate and thendestroy small vulnerable portions of the enemy defense in sequence. The commander and staff develop the planusing a reverse-planning process from actions on the objective back to the LD or assembly area. Theyincorporate plans for exploiting success and opportunities that develop during execution. They emphasizesynchronization of mounted and dismounted movement, maneuver, fires, and support throughout the attack.

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PREPARATION3-129. The battalion uses available time prior to the attack to conduct extensive reconnaissance, precombatchecks, inspections, and rehearsals while concealing attack preparations from the enemy. The commander andstaff refine the plan based on continuously updated intelligence. Subordinates conduct parallel planning andstart their preparation for the attack immediately after the battalion issues a FRAGORD. As more intelligencebecomes available, the commander revises orders and distributes them via FM or FBCB2. Regardless of thetime available, the commander must conduct detailed planning and supervision of subordinate preparations.

INSPECTIONS3-130. The battalion commander supervises subordinate troop leading procedures to ensure planning andpreparations are on track and consistent with his intent. The commander may inspect subordinate unit orderbriefs and rehearsals. He focuses his inspections on the main effort and critical events such as assaults,breaching operations, and passages of lines.

REHEARSALS3-131. The CAB should conduct rehearsals, but the type of rehearsal and technique may vary based on timeavailable. The primary focus of the rehearsal is actions on the objective. Each subordinate commanderaddresses the conduct of his mission as the rehearsal progresses. The rehearsal places special emphasis ontiming of actions and the coordinated maneuver of forces. All subordinate commanders must accurately portrayhow long it takes to complete assigned tasks and how much space is required by their force. Direct and indirectfire plans are covered in great detail, including the massing and control of fires. The commander ensuressubordinate plans are coordinated and consistent with his intent. The rehearsal also covers the following: Plans to execute follow-on missions or exploit success. Likely times and locations where a reserve is needed.

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3033

RECONNAISSANCE

Execution of the fire support plan, including shifting fires, employing CAS, adjusting FSCMs, andpositioning observers and snipers.Breaching, gap crossing, and countermobility operations.Passages of lines.Contingency plans for actions against enemy counterattacks, repositioning, commitment of reserves,or use of CBRN capabilities.Consolidation and reorganization.Execution of branches or sequels assigned by brigade.Execution of the sustainment plan including MCP, CASEVAC, movement of combat trains, andcontingency resupply.

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3-132. Effective and current intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful attack. Before mounting an attack,the commander needs to determine the enemys strength and disposition. In an attack, the entire intelligencecollection, analysis, and dissemination process must rapidly respond to CCIR. The BCT provides most of theinformation available to the CAB commander and staff through updates and crosstalk, as well as updates basedon the brigades collection plan. The CAB commander must receive an accurate picture of the enemys defenseso he can decide on a COA and act faster than the enemy can react. Often, the BCT cavalry Squadron canprovide the best information to focus the CABs attack. In addition, the CAB commander may use elements ofthe sniper squad for surveillance, and in order to provide real time information of the objective or other areas ofinterest.

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3-133. When preparing for an attack, the commander and staff participate in development of the informationcollection plan. This is a well-resourced and coordinated reconnaissance effort that provides a detailed pictureof the enemy situation prior to execution of the attack. This reconnaissance effort must include redundantinformation-gathering systems to ensure continuous flow of information to the CAB and to the BCT. Thecommander uses this intelligence to decide on a COA and make refinements to the plan. The informationcollection effort also provides him with continuous updates during the attack so he can adjust execution of theoperation based on the enemys reactions.

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ENEMYS CURRENT ARRAY OF FORCES

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3-134. The intelligence available to the battalion comes from acontinuous stream of information that beginswith information collection systems, such as JSTARS, UAS, BCT cavalry Squadron, snipers, and scout platoonto establish the intelligence links to the battalion.

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3-135. The first priority is to confirm information available on the enemys composition, disposition,capabilities, and most probable COA. The next priorities are the effects of weather and terrain, and how theenemy is likely to fight. The S-2 tries to determine what the enemy will do and what information about theenemys action the battalion needs to confirm. The battalion information collection effort focuses on identifyingindicators required for confirming the enemys actual COA. Ideally, the commander does not make finaldecisions on how to execute the attack until he can identify the current array of enemy forces. Key areas ofinformation that friendly units should obtain about a defending enemy force include: Composition, disposition, and capabilities forces along a flank or an area selected for penetration. Composition, disposition, and capabilities of security forces. Location, orientation, type, depth, and composition of obstacles. Locations of secure bypasses around obstacles. Composition, disposition, and capabilities of defending formations. Composition, disposition, capabilities, and location of reserves. Location of routes the enemy may use to counterattack or reinforce his defense

ATP 3-90.5 (Final Draft)

activities and times of decreased readiness. The S-2 must discern any enemy deception efforts, such as phonyobstacles, dummy emplacements, and deception positions, designed to confuse an attacker.

SUPPORT ON THE APPROACH TO THE OBJECTIVE

3-137. A rapid, secure advance to the enemys main defense depends on ISR success in locating enemysecurity forces and obstacles. Reconnaissance initially focuses on the enemys security forces forward of hismain defense to locate his positions and obstacles along the CABs planned routes of advance. Reconnaissancealso locates gaps and the routes that allow them to infiltrate into the enemys main defensive area or rear area.Reconnaissance efforts continue by locating enemy forces that could reposition and affect the battalionsapproach to the enemys main defense. Successful attacks usually have reconnaissance forces placing indirectfires on targets to the enemys rear that isolate the enemys frontline forces and prevent them from beingreinforced.

EXECUTION3-138. The commander positions information collection assets to maintain observation of enemy reactions tothe CABs maneuver. Reconnaissance focuses on areas the enemy likely will use to reposition forces, commitreserves, and counterattack. As the force-on-force engagement on the objective develops, reconnaissanceelements report enemy reactions, repositioning, and BDA. Reconnaissance elements target and engage enemyrepositioning forces, reserves, counterattacking forces, and other HPTs with indirect fires. Early identificationof enemy reactions is essential for the battalion to maintain momentum and initiative during the attack.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT

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3-139. The CAB gains and maintains contact during the approach, and is ready to Bypass, breach, or cross obstacles. React to all eight forms of contact. Transition to different formations based on the terrain and enemy situation. Employ forces to screen flanks that could become exposed or threatened during the approach. Avoid terrain features that are likely enemy artillery reference points, locations for CBRN strikes, orlocations for situational obstacles. Employ indirect fire support to establish conditions for assault forces. Destroy or force the withdrawal of opposing enemy security forces. Minimize the effects of enemy deception.

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3-140. The CAB must counter the effects of enemy security forces to ensure an unimpeded and concealedapproach. Before the attack, reconnaissance forces seek to locate enemy security forces. Once located, thecommander has the following options available: Destroy them immediately with indirect fires and CAS (preferred option). Destroy them with indirect fires and CAS during the approach to the objective. Conduct limited objective attacks prior to execution of the main attack. Employ a strong advance guard to destroy or force the withdrawal of enemy security forces duringthe approach to the objective.

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3-141. The battalion must maintain tempo. Speed and dispersion, facilitated by close coordination andcommunication, are the norm when massing weapons effects to destroy the enemys defense. If the formationis too slow or becomes too concentrated, as it can in urban or restricted terrain, it is vulnerable to massed enemyfires. The three dimensional terrain of an urban environment will challenge the CABs ability to maintaintempo. It is paramount to keep the vehicles constantly mobile, as they are more vulnerable when static. TheCABs BFVs and tanks are effective at penetrating defenses and gaining a foothold when mutually supportedwith dismounted Infantry.

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DISRUPT THE ENEMY

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3-142. The battalion employs fires to disrupt and weaken the enemys position and set the conditions forsuccess prior to closure within direct-fire range of the enemy. Initially, fires focus on the destruction of keyenemy forces that can most affect the concept of operations. For example, during an attack to penetrate anenemy defense, the initial focus of fires is to destroy the enemy positions at the selected point of penetration.Fires can also Destroy enemy security forces. Weaken or neutralize enemy reserves. Disrupt enemy command and control Emplace artillery-delivered obstacles to block enemy reserve routes to the objective. Deceive the enemy as to the battalions actual intentions. Obscure friendly movements and deployment. Isolate the objective and suppress enemy positions. Neutralize the enemys indirect fires with counterbattery fires.

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3-143. The coordination between fires and maneuver is critical. As maneuver forces approach the enemydefense, the commander shifts fires and obscuration to suppress and obscure the enemy. Proper timing andadjustment of fires enable the maneuver force to securely close on the enemys positions. The commander mustmonitor the success of fires to determine when adequate conditions exist for commitment of the force.Reconnaissance elements provide BDA to the commander to assist him in making this decision. Thecommander may need to adjust the speed of the CABs approach to the objective based on reports from thescout platoon.

3135

FIX THE ENEMY

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3-144. The CAB can fix the bulk of the enemy forces into given positions or pursue a COA that limits theoptions available to the enemy. In limiting the options available to the enemy, the objective is to reduce theuncertainty during the battle. The primary goal is to isolate the unit targeted for destruction by preventing theenemy from laterally repositioning or reinforcing it.

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3-145. Usually, a company team fixes the enemy force by attacking an objective that isolates a portion of theenemys defense. In open terrain, the most common task for the shaping force is to fix the enemy with directand indirect fire. In more complex terrain, the supporting force may need to seize terrain or destroy key enemyforces in limited objective attacks. The use of fires and CAS is vital when attacking enemy forces and reservesin depth because fires and CAS prevent the enemys commitment against the battalion.

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MANEUVER

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3-146. The commander maneuvers combat forces and employs fires, situational obstacles, and obscurants tocreate favorable conditions for decisive maneuver against the enemy. The commander commits maneuverforces and fires to isolate, then rupture, a small vulnerable portion of the enemys defense to gain a flank orcreate a penetration. The CAB achieves final destruction of the enemy force through the attack of assaultingforces. Timely reporting, crosstalk, accurate assessments, and sharing of information by subordinatecommanders are paramount.

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3-147. The attacker must be agile enough to concentrate his forces and mass his combat power by maneuverbefore the enemy can reorient his defense. Usually, the destruction of a defending enemy force dictates anassault of the objective. The shaping force shifts direct and indirect fires, and repositions as required to supportthe maneuver of assaulting forces. As the assaulting force commits, the battalion commander and staff ensurethat current information is available about the Locations and types of enemy contact on the objective. Locations of friendly reconnaissance forces. Locations of lanes and obstacles, including lane markings. Recognition signals and guides. Specific routes to use for the approach.

ATP 3-90.5 (Final Draft)

Locations and orientations of fires from friendly forces.

Additions or modifications of graphic control measures.

3-148. Previously dispersed assaulting forces quickly assemble into combat formations, and rapidlymaneuvers to destroy the enemy forces and clear assigned objectives. The assaulting force moves along coveredand concealed routes to an exposed enemy flank, created penetration, or other position of advantage. The use ofobscurants helps to conceal the movement of assaulting forces. The assault includes destruction of defendingforces and clearance of trenches and fortifications; and can involve a combination of mounted and dismountedmovement. The CAB commanders main focus is maintaining momentum and security of the assaulting force.The information collection effort continues to report enemy repositioning, BDA, and enemy counteractions tothe assault. The battalion limits enemy repositioning and massing against assaulting forces through intensesupporting fires and CAS, a rapid assault, and employment of smoke.

FOLLOW THROUGH3-149. After seizing the objective, the commander has two alternatives: exploit success and continue the attackor terminate the offense. The CAB maintains contact and attempts to exploit its success. The higher commandermakes the determination whether to initiate a general, as opposed to local, exploitation or pursuit or terminateoffensive actions. The CAB commander must understand and report the status and limits of his sustainmentsupport capabilities for follow on actions. Executing the follow-on plans should not over-extend the sustainmentcapabilities of the BSB and FSCs, to do so creates risks to the success of the follow-on action.

SPECIAL PURPOSE ATTACKS

3-150. The CAB may also be tasked to conduct special purpose attacks such as an ambush, counterattack,demonstration, feint, raid, spoiling attack. The commanders intent and mission variables of METT-TC willdetermine the specific attack form. Special purpose attacks share many of the planning, preparation, andexecution considerations of the attack.

AMBUSH

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3-151. The ambush is an attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving ortemporarily halted enemy. (FM 3-90-1) An ambush capitalizes on the element of surprise. Ambushes arecategorized as near, or far ambushes, based on the proximity of the friendly force to the enemy and hasty ordeliberate. A hasty ambush is an immediate reaction to an unexpected opportunity conducted using SOPs andbattle drill. A deliberate ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target.

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3-152. The CAB will most likely execute company level and below ambushes as offensive tasks to a largeroperation. Because the ambush relies on the element of surprise, conducting a deliberate ambush in a populatedurban area with multiple actors is a challenge for large Armored vehicle formations. However, tank and BFVunits well trained in battle drills can achieve the element of surprise through the application of audacity,concentration, and tempo to conduct hasty ambushes at opportunistic times. The precision, lethality and rangeof tanks and BFVs are well suited for far ambushes in open terrain that afford some means of concealment.

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3-153. The three types of ambush are point, area, and anti-armor. In a point ambush, a unit deploys to attack asingle kill zone. In an area ambush, a unit deploys into two or more related point ambushes. A unit smaller thana platoon does not normally conduct an area ambush. Antiarmor ambushes focus on moving or temporarilyhalted enemy armored vehicles. The ambush by its very nature is a violent and decisive action and requiresSoldiers to harness the aggression that comes with its execution in a professional manner according to the lawsof war and rules of engagement.

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Organization of Ambush Forces

3-154. A typical ambush is organized into three elements: assault, support, and security. The assault elementfires into the kill zone to destroy the enemy force. The assault force, normally BFVs and Infantry dismounts,attacks into and clears the kill zone and may be assigned additional tasks, to include searching for items ofintelligence value, capturing prisoners, and completing the destruction of enemy equipment to preclude itsimmediate reuse. The support element consisting of BFVs and tanks, support the assault element by firing into

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and around the kill zone, and it provides the ambushs primary killing power. The security element isolates thekill zone by blocking enemy avenues of approach into the ambush site after the ambush has commenced. Theyprovide early warning of the arrival of any enemy relief force and security for ambush elements.

Planning and Preparing an Ambush

3-155. A key to the planning and preparation of any ambush is site selection. The site should provideconcealment and element locations, insertion and exit routes for assault forces, and natural, manmade, ormilitary obstacles to integrate with direct and indirect fires to trap enemy elements in the kill zone. (Refer to FM3-90-1 for more information on ambush planning, preparation considerations, and the types of formations andtheir use in point and area ambushes.)

Executing an Ambush3-156. Initiating the ambush when the bulk of the enemy is in the kill zone, coupled with precise anddiscipline fires are key elements to a successful ambush. After the conduct of an ambush the ambushcommander, or representative debriefs the force on enemy tactics, procedures and patterns utilized against theambush, in order for future units to account for these when planning for ambush operations.

COUNTERATTACKS

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3-157. A counterattack is an attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, forsuch specific purposes as regaining ground lost, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with thegeneral objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemys purpose in attacking. In sustaineddefensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives. (ADRP1-02) Counterattacks are conducted to regain key terrain and ultimately regain the initiative.

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3-158. A counterattacking force maneuvers to isolate and destroy a designated enemy force. It can attack-byfire into an EA to defeat or destroy an enemy force, restore the original position, or block an enemy penetration.Once launched, the counterattack usually becomes a decisive operation for the commander conducting thecounterattack. The integration of reconnaissance forces, indirect fires, and other enablers is critical for thesuccess of a counterattack. The CAB, with its communication systems, responsiveness, firepower,maneuverability, and protection, makes it a very powerful counterattack force. The CAB can be used as asubordinate element within a larger counterattack force, as the counterattack force, or use one or more of itssubordinate elements as a counterattack force within the CABs AO.

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3-159. The commander plans and conducts a counterattack to attack the enemy when and where he is mostvulnerable. Usually, the commander attempts to retain his reserve or striking force to conduct a decisivecounterattack once the enemy commits his main force to the attack. The commander assigns objectives tocounterattacking forces when he intends for them to assault the enemy. He usually assigns attack-by-firepositions when he intends to counterattack using primarily direct and indirect fires. Assuring the mobility of theCAB counterattack elements is critical to the success of the defense. Engineer assets generally are taskorganized to support the striking force or the reserve.

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3-160. The two levels of counterattacks are major and local counterattacks. In both cases, waiting for theenemy to act first may reveal the enemys main effort and create an assailable flank to exploit. A defending unitconducts a major counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy and defeat him through offensive actionafter an enemy launches his attack. A commander also conducts major counterattacks to defeat or block anenemy penetration that endangers the integrity of the entire defense, or to attrite the enemy by the defeat ordestruction of an isolated portion of the attacking enemy. Local counterattacks are designed to restore thedefense by immediately committing all available resources to prevent the enemy from consolidating his gains.A commander however, has to balance the advantages of a quickly developed local counterattack with thedanger of piecemeal commitment of his forces.

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Organization of Counterattack Forces

3-161. The CAB commander of a major counterattack force typically organizes units into security, main body,and reserve forces. He uses those defending forces already in contact with the enemy to fix or contain thosesame enemy forces. The commander may use a force committed to the counterattack, such as the striking force

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in a mobile defense, his reserve, another echelons reserve, or designate any other force he deems appropriate tobe the counterattack force. Any changes in task organization should be completed in time to allow units toconduct rehearsals with their attached or supported unit.

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3-162. A commander conducts a local counterattack with whatever forces are immediately available to retakepositions that have been lost to enemy action or to exploit a target of opportunity. The forces often consist of thereserves of subordinates and defending forces that survive after completing their withdrawal from lost positions.If possible, engineer assets should be included to assure mobility. While it is unlikely that the commanderchanges the task organization of the forces conducting a local counterattack, he organizes the force into asecurity force and a main body. He may be able to designate an element to conduct reconnaissance.

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3-163. If the CABs defensive scheme depends on a counterattack as the defeat mechanism, the counterattackforce is considered to be committed from the beginning of the defensive operation. In this case, the commandershould designate another force as his reserve.

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Planning a Counterattack

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3-164. The commander plans the counterattack to strike the enemy when the enemy force is vulnerable. As theenemy force advances, the defense may create gaps between enemy units, exposing the flanks and rear ofelements of the attacking force. Immediately after an enemy force occupies a defended position, it is oftendisorganized and ill prepared to meet a sudden local counterattack. Because the opportunities for effectivecounterattacks are usually brief, the commander must assess the situation rapidly, and the force must executethe counterattack swiftly. The commander assigns objectives or attack-by-fire positions to counterattackingforces, depending on whether or not he intends for the counterattacking force to close with and assault theenemy.

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3-165. Major counterattack plans usually are developed as a branch or sequel to the main defensive plan. Amajor counterattack may achieve surprise when it strikes the enemy from an unanticipated direction. For thatreason the force directed to conduct a major counterattack, such as the striking force in a mobile defense, shouldbe involved in developing those plans as well as any plans to exploit potential success. Local counterattacksmay or may not be the result of previous deliberate planning.

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Preparing a Counterattack

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3-166. Surprise, mobility, coordinated fires, and control are the keys to a successful counterattack. Surpriseenables the counterattacking force to seize control of the situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be asclose to total as possible so that the targeted enemy force does not expect the attack until it is too late to reacteffectively. Thorough planning and preparation help achieve surprise. The commander adjusts the positioningof his information collection assets and the tasks he gives those assets so that he can determine the location andtargets for his counterattack.

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3-167. The commander conducts a leaders reconnaissance with key personnel to confirm or modify hiscounterattack plan. If necessary, the commander modifies the plan and disseminates those changes tosubordinate leaders and other affected organizations. Each element of the counterattack force reconnoiters itsplanned axis of advance and routes it will take if possible. The commander maintains close control duringmovement to and occupation of hide positions and this reconnaissance process so the enemy does not detect thecounterattack force prior to initiating the counterattack. Leaders enforce camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

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3-168. The commander adjusts the planned positions of his weapons systems to obtain the maximumeffectiveness against targets in the planned EA. He coordinates all fires, including those of supporting artilleryand mortars. He wants his fires to isolate the targeted enemy force in the planned EA while preventing thetargets escape or reinforcement. These fires must inflict maximum damage quickly before the enemy canrespond to the counterattack.

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Executing a Counterattack3-169. Whenever possible, the commander retains his counterattack for his decisive operation, which isconducted after the enemy reveals his main effort by committing the majority of his combat power. If the

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commander orders his reserve to conduct a planned counterattack, the reserve becomes a committed force andthe commander should take measures to designate or reconstitute a new reserve.

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3-170. The commander conducts the counterattack in the same manner in which he conducts any other attack.He shifts support and priorities of fire, and designates targets to be engaged. The counterattack force performsthe same actions as an attacking force: Gain and maintain enemy contact. Disrupt the enemy. Fix the enemy. Maneuver. Following through.

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3-171. Subordinate commanders initiate local counterattacks with the forces on hand when it fits within thehigher commanders intent. A local counterattack should be swift and violent. It should exploit anydisorganization on the part of the enemy, such as the confusion that temporarily exists in an attacking force afterit seizes a defended position. A rapidly mounted local counterattack can yield better results than a moredeliberate counterattack executed by a higher echelon. This is because of the speed at which the mounted localcounterattack can be launched.

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3-172. In the face of a strong enemy penetration, a commander can conduct local counterattacks to retain orseize positions on the shoulders of the enemys penetration and potentially reinforce those positions with hastyobstacles. This prevents the enemy from widening the penetration while forces from other defending unitsengage the penetrating enemy forces. In addition, holding the shoulders can prevent the sacrifice of positionaldepth because the limited gap in the defensive position prevents an attacking enemy from fully exploiting hissuccess.

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DEMONSTRATION3-173. A demonstration is a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive anadversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended. (JP 3-13.4) Ademonstration can be achieved by repositioning, or moving forces in order to get enemy forces to reorient theirattention and weapon systems. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

FEINT

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3-174. A feint in military deception is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted forthe purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and time of the actual main offensive action. (JP 313.4) Feints must be of sufficient strength and composition to cause the desired enemy reaction. Feints mustappear real; therefore, some contact with the enemy is necessary. The feint is most effective under the followingconditions: When it reinforces the enemys expectations. When it appears to be a definite threat to the enemy. When the enemy has a large reserve that it has consistently committed early. When there are several feasible COAs open to the attacker.

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3-175. Planning for a feint mission follows the same sequence as any other attack. Special planningconsiderations include the following: Ensure the battalion resources the feint to make it appear as the main effort or as a significant threatto the enemy. Establish clear guidance regarding force preservation. Ensure adequate means of detecting the desired enemy reaction. Designate clear disengagement criteria for the feinting force. Assign attainable objectives. Issue clear follow-on missions to the feinting force

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RAID

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3-176. A raid is an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary,capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completionof the assigned mission. (JP 3-0) A raid ends with a planned withdrawal. Raids are usually small-scale attacksrequiring detailed intelligence, preparation, and planning. Typical raid missions accomplish the following: Capture prisoners, installations, or enemy materiel. Destroy enemy materiel or installations. Obtain specific information on an enemy unit such as its location, disposition, strength, or operatingscheme. Deceive or harass enemy forces. Liberate captured friendly personnel. Site exploitation (SE).

3-177. The raiding force may vary in size from an Infantry platoon to the entire CAB. It may operate within oroutside the battalions supporting range. The raiding force moves to its objective (either mounted ordismounted) for a quick, violent attack. Once it completes the raid mission, the raiding force quickly withdrawsalong a different route. The following are specific planning considerations for a raid mission: Conduct detailed reconnaissance and maintain constant surveillance of the raid objective to ensurethe enemy situation remains unchanged and within the capability of the raiding force. The BCT mustprovide information collection support to the CAB in order to plan and conduct a raid successfully. Position fire support systems to provide immediate responsive fires during the approach, actions onthe objective, and withdrawal. Interdiction fires, deception fires, counterstrikes, and situationalobstacles reduce the enemys ability to react to the raid. Ensure proper security because the raiding force is vulnerable to attack from all directions. Establish clear abort criteria for the raid. These may include loss of personnel, equipment, or supportassets as well as changes in the enemy situation. Develop contingency plans for contact prior to and after actions on the objective. Plan CASEVAC and raiding force extraction throughout the entire depth of the operation. Plan rally points for units to assemble to prepare for the attack or to assemble after the mission iscomplete and the force is ready to withdraw. Consider logistical factors such as the types and numbers of vehicles and weapons the raiding partywill have, movement distance, length of time the raiding party will operate in enemy territory, andexpected enemy resistance. Aircraft or linkup provides CASEVAC or resupply of the raiding force, ifrequired, during the withdrawal. Conduct withdrawal over a different route than that used to approach the objective.

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3-178. The CAB may participate in an artillery raid as part of a division operation. In such an operation, theCAB supports the positioning of artillery. If necessary, the battalion destroys or defeats enemy forces to allowthe artillery unit to position itself to strike the necessary enemy targets.

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SPOILING ATTACK3-179. A spoiling attack is an attack launched from the defense to disrupt the enemys attack preparations.Spoiling attacks focus on the enemys critical systems and forces that have the greatest impact on his ability tomount an attack. Lucrative targets include command and control systems, intelligence assets, fire support , andlogistics. Units can conduct spoiling attacks as often as needed to deny adequate attack preparation to theenemy. The CAB usually conducts a spoiling attack as part of the higher headquarters operation. Spoilingattacks are planned and executed in the same manner as an attack.

SECTION IV DIRECT FIRE CONTROL IN OFFENSE

3-180. The ultimate goal of direct fire control is to mass fires, but the concept of massing direct fires is widelymisunderstood. Frequently, it is mistaken for volume. Volume of fires does not equal massing of fires. Massing

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of fires is defined by the terminal effect on the enemy, not the number of systems firing or the number of roundsfired

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Principles of Direct Fire Control

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3-181. Effective fire control requires a unit to rapidly acquire the enemy and mass the effects of fires toachieve decisive results in the close fight. In addition, there are several principles of direct fire that the CABcommander and his subordinate leaders must know how to apply during tactical operations. The purpose ofthese principles of direct fire is not to restrict the actions of subordinates. Applied correctly, they help the CABto accomplish its primary goal in any direct fire engagement: to acquire first and shoot first. They givesubordinates the freedom to act quickly upon acquisition of the enemy. (Refer to ATP 3-90.1 for moreinformation.) This discussion focuses on the principles listed below: Mass the effects of fire. Destroy the greatest threat first. Avoid target overkill. Employ the best weapon for the target. Minimize friendly exposure. Prevent fratricide. Plan for extreme limited visibility conditions. Develop contingencies for diminished capabilities.

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DIRECT FIRE PLANNING

3-182. Leaders plan direct fires in order to be able to distribute and control their fire. Determining where andhow the company team can mass fires is an essential step in this process. Based on where and how they want tofocus and distribute fires, leaders can establish the weapons ready postures for their elements as well as triggersfor initiating fires. During mission preparation, leaders plan and conduct rehearsals of direct fires (and of thefire control process) based on the estimate of the situation.

DIRECT FIRE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

3-183. A well-rehearsed direct fire TACSOP enhances quick, predictable actions by all members of the CAB.The commander bases the various elements of the TACSOP on the capabilities of his force and on anticipatedconditions and situations. TACSOP elements should include means for Focusing fires. Distributing fire effects. Orienting forces. Preventing fratricide.

FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

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3-184. Fire control measures are the means by which the commander or subordinate leaders control fires.Application of these concepts, procedures, and techniques assists the unit in acquiring the enemy, focusing fireson him, distributing the effects of the fires, and preventing fratricide. At the same time, no single measure issufficient to control fires effectively. Fire control measures are effective only if the entire unit has a commonunderstanding of what they mean and how to employ them.

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3-185. The commander can use terrain-based fire control measures to focus and control fires on a particularpoint, line, or area, or he uses threat-based fire control measures to focus and control fires by directing the unitto engage a specific enemy element rather than on a point or area. Fire control measures are listed in Table 3-1.

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Table 3-1. Common offensive fire control measures

Terrain-Based Fire Control MeasuresTarget reference point (TRP)Sector of fireDirection of fireTerrain-based quadrantFriendly-based quadrantRestrictive fire line (RFL)Maximum engagement line (MEL)Engagement area (EA)Final protective line (FPL)Note: Likely offensive fire control measures are inthe offense.

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Threat-Based Fire Control Measures

Rules of engagement (ROE)Weapons ready postureWeapons safety postureWeapons control statusEngagement prioritiesFire patternsEngagement techniquesTriggersTarget arraybold print; other control measures are less likely in

SECTION V TRANSITIONS3-186. The CAB spends minimum time after concluding an engagement or actions on the objective toconsolidate and reorganize before continuing the attack. If the CAB must consolidate and reorganize, thecommander decides the best time and location; this facilitates future operations and provides force protection.The CAB must maintain local security when performing consolidation and reorganization activities.

CONSOLIDATION

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3-187. Consolidation of position is organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can beused against the enemy. (FM 3-90-1) The CAB may need to reorganize, avoid culmination, prepare for anenemy counterattack, or allow time for movement of adjacent units. The CAB commander makes consolidationplans before every mission, updates them during the attack, and passes them to units as the attack is completed.Consolidation actions include: Establishing contact (electronic, physical, or both) with adjacent friendly units. Reestablishing communications (if required). Eliminating pockets of enemy resistance. Establishing security consistent with the threat. Preparing defensive positions. Clearing obstacles or improving lanes to support friendly movement and reorganization activities. Planning and preparing for future operations. Conducting site exploitation and processing any detainees. Maintaining contact with the enemy and conducting reconnaissance. Cross-leveling ammunition and other supplies and conducting emergency resupply.

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3-188. The CAB maintains contact with the enemy by redirecting the scout platoon, directing small-unitpatrols, pulling the latest intelligence from the BCT S-2, and by conducting limited objective attacks.

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REORGANIZATION3-189. Reorganization planning begins before and continues during the attack as losses occur. Reorganizationincludes all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specifiedlevel of combat capability. Companies must feed reports to the battalion as losses occur so movement of neededresupply or replacements can begin promptly. If extensive reorganization is required, the CAB conducts itduring consolidation. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.) Reorganization tasks include the following: Reestablishing the chain of command, key staff positions, and command post facilities. Treating and evacuating casualties. Recovering and repairing damaged equipment as necessary. Reestablishing digital connectivity if required.

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Conducting resupply and refueling operations.

Repositioning mission command facilities, communications assets, and logistics for futureoperations.Reorganizing company teams and platoons if required.

CONTINUING OPERATIONS3-190. For all attacks, the CAB should plan to exploit success. However, at the conclusion of an engagement,the commander may be forced to defend. For short defensive operations, units make use of the existing terrainto enhance their survivability. If a longer defense is envisioned, engineer assets immediately should refocustheir efforts on providing survivability support (fighting positions and similar activities). Engineer assets shoulddo this even as they sustain mobility and integrate countermobility into the planned defense. The CABcommander considers the higher commanders concept of operations, friendly capabilities, and the enemysituation when making the decision to defend or continue offensive tasks.

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Defense

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Defensive tasks defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and developconditions favorable for operations focused on offensive and stability tasks. Defensivetasks alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for acounteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Defensive tasks areconducted to retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, attrite or fix theenemy as a prelude to offensive tasks, surprise action by the enemy, or increase theenemys vulnerability by forcing the enemy commander to concentrate subordinateforces. As part of the BCT, the CAB can defend, conduct retrograde operations,counterattack, or perform security operations. Often, a defensive engagement requires theCAB to execute several of these tasks over its course. Even while the BCT conducts adefense, the CAB exploits opportunities to conduct offensive tasks within its AOs todeprive the enemy of the initiative and create the conditions to assume the offensive

SECTION I BASICS OF DEFENSE

4-1. The main purpose of the defense is to force or deceive the enemy into attacking under unfavorablecircumstances, defeat or destroy his attack, and regain the initiative for the offense. The defending commanderattempts to determine the location of the fight. He prepares the terrain and conditions to his advantage whilesimultaneously denying the enemy adequate intelligence. Defense is a temporary measure that forces use toidentify or exploit enemy weaknesses. Use of the defense provides the opportunity to transition to the offense.In general, the CAB defends to Retain decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy. Attrite or fix the enemy as a prelude to offensive actions. Surprise action by the enemy. Increase the enemys vulnerability by forcing the enemy commander to concentrate subordinateforce.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENSE4-2. Because of its advantages in information, lethality, and mobility, the CAB can defend in contiguous aswell as noncontiguous frameworks. The information collection capabilities provided by the BCT, as well asthose within the CAB structure, enable the CAB to better locate and identify the enemys decisive and shapingefforts. Successful defenses share the following characteristic: disruption, flexibility, maneuver, massingeffects, operations in depth, preparation, and security. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for a discussion of thesecharacteristics.)

SECTION II - DEFENSIVE TASKS

4-3. The three defensive tasks are, area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. Each of these containselements of the others, and usually contains both static and dynamic aspects. CABs serve as the primarymaneuver elements, or terrain controlling units, for the ABCT in all types of defensive operations. They candefend AOs or positions, or they can serve as security forces or reserves as part of the ABCT coordinateddefense.

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Note. Division and smaller units generally conduct an area defense or a delay as part of the fixingforce as the commander shapes the enemys penetration. They might attack as part of the strikingforce. Alternatively, they can constitute a portion of the reserve.

AREA DEFENSE

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4-4. The area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designatedterrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADRP 3-90) Outright destruction of theenemy may not be a criterion for success. The focus is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending forcepositions itself in mutually supporting positions and controlling the terrain between positions. The defeatmechanism is fires into EAs, which reserve units can supplement. The commander uses his reserve force toreinforce fires, add depth, block penetrations, restore positions, or counterattack to destroy enemy forces andseize the initiative. Units conduct area defenses when The mission requires holding certain terrain for a specific period of time. There is enough time to organize the position. The CAB has less mobility than the enemy does. The terrain limits counterattacks to a few probable employment options. The terrain affords natural lines of resistance, and limits the enemy to a few well-defined avenues ofapproach, thereby restricting the enemys maneuver.

Types of Area Defense

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4-5. The two types of area defense are defense in depth and forward defense. While the CAB commanderusually selects the type of area defense to use, the higher commander often defines the general defensivescheme for the CAB.

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4-6. Based on the mission variables, the defense can consist of either strong points, battle positions, or acombination. Strong points that are located on, or covering decisive terrain, are extremely effective in thedefense. The CAB commander assigns the company teams their battle positions or AOs. Companies might betasked to detach a platoon to act as the CAB reserve.

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Defense in Depth

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4-7. A defense in depth is normally the commanders preferred option. (See Figure 4-1.) Forces defending indepth absorb the momentum of the enemys attack by forcing the enemy to attack repeatedly through mutuallysupporting positions in depth. Depth gives the commanders fire support assets time to generate devastatingeffects and affords the defending commander multiple opportunities to concentrate the effects of overwhelmingcombat power against the attacking enemy. This provides more reaction time for the defending force toappropriately respond to the attack. The commander continues to gather additional information about theattacking enemys intentions and capabilities between the time combat starts and the time the enemy commits toa COA. This reduces the risk of the enemy force quickly penetrating the main line of defense along anunexpected direction.

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4-8. While defending in depth, the CAB plan and prepare primary, alternate, supplementary, and subsequentfighting positions. As the attacking enemy force attempts to create a penetration, the CABs companies hold andor shift from one position to the next coordinating the combined effects of direct and indirect fire keepingcontinuous pressure on the advancing enemy. The mobility, firepower, and protection of the tanks and fightingvehicles in the company teams enable the option of using a more dynamic rather than purely static defense.Commanders continuously look for opportunity to conduct local counterattacks to destroy an enemy and seizethe initiative.

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4-9. The commander usually decides to conduct a defense in depth when

The mission is not restrictive and allows the commander to fight throughout the depth of thebattlefield. The terrain does not favor a defense well forward, and there is better defensible terrain deeper withinthe AO. The AO is deep compared to its width, and there is significant depth available.

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The cover and concealment on or near the FEBA is limited.

The enemy has several times the combat power of the defender.

3574Figure 4-1. Defense in depth

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Forward Defense

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4-10. The intent of the forward defense is to prevent enemy penetration of the defense. (See Figure 4-2.) Due toits lack of depth, a forward defense is the least preferred. The CAB deploys the majority of its combat powerinto forward positions near the FEBA. The commander fights to retain its forward position and may conductcounterattacks against enemy penetrations or destroy enemy forces in forward EAs. Often, counterattacks areplanned forward of the FEBA to defeat the enemy.

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4-11. In general, the commander uses a forward defense when a higher commander directs him to retainforward terrain for political, military, economic, and other reasons. Alternatively, a commander may choose to

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conduct a forward defense when the terrain in that part of the AOincluding natural obstaclesfavors thedefending force because The best BPs are located along the FEBA. Strong natural obstacles are located near the FEBA. Natural EAs occur near the FEBA. Cover and concealment in the rear portion of the AO are limited.

3590Figure 4-2. CAB in a forward defense

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ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

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4-12. Forces organize around a framework of a security area, a MBA and a support area. For an area defense,the CAB commander typically organizes his forces for reconnaissance and security, MBA, reserve, andsustainment missions.

SECURITY

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4-13. The commander balances the need to create a strong security force to shape the battle with the resultingdiversion of combat power from the main bodys decisive operation. The commander can allocate securityforces to provide early warning and protect those forces, systems, and locations necessary to conduct thedecisive operation from unexpected enemy contact.

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4-14. The CAB can assign a company team a security mission within the CABs security area is primarilytasked with the following: Deceive the enemy as to friendly locations, strengths and weaknesses. Inhibit or destroy enemy reconnaissance forces. Provide early warning and disrupt enemy attacks early and continuously. Protect the main body of the CAB in order to preserve combat power for the main defense.

MAIN BATTLE AREA

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4-15. Commander position their subordinate forces in mutually supporting positions in depth to absorb enemypenetrations or canalize them into prepared engagement areas as directed by the defensive plan in order todefeat the enemys attack by concentrating the effects of overwhelming combat power. The MBA includes thearea where the defending force creates an opportunity to deliver a decisive counterattack to defeat or destroy theenemy.

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4-16. The commander builds the decisive operation around identified decisive points, such as key terrain orhigh-payoff targets. The commander normally positions the main body within the MBA where the commanderwants to conduct the decisive operation. The majority of the main body deploys into prepared positions withinthe MBA.

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RESERVE

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4-17. The reserve typically locates in an assembly area or a concealed location until committed to the fight. TheCAB commander determines the size and task organization of the reserve based on his METT-TC analysis.Typically the reserve will have few if any other mission tasks during preparation and execution of the defenseother than rehearsing to respond to possible contingencies and the movement routes and techniques to moveanywhere in the units AO once committed.

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4-18. The reserve is not a committed force. In certain situations, it may become necessary to commit thereserve to restore the integrity of the defense by blocking an enemy penetration or reinforcing fires into an EA.

SUSTAINMENT4-19. The sustainment mission in an area defense requires a careful balance between establishing forwardsupply stocks of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); barrier material; and ammunition in adequate amounts tosupport defending units and having so many supplies located in forward locations that they cannot be rapidlymoved in conformance with enemy advances. Any suitable POL, barrier material, construction equipment, andlaborers that can be lawfully obtained from the civil infrastructure reduce the defending units transportationrequirements. Likewise, maintenance and Class VIII with their associated repair parts and medical suppliesmust be forward deployed.

PLANNING AREA DEFENSE

4-20. The commander must consider all the factors of METT-TC to determine how to concentrate his effortsand economize forces best. Detailed analysis of terrain may be the most important process that the commanderand his staff complete. A successful defense relies on a complete understanding of terrain. This understandingenables the commander to determine likely enemy courses of action and the optimal positioning of the CABassets to counter them. The commanders keys to a successful area defense include: Capability to concentrate effects. Depth of the defensive area. Security. Ability to take full advantage of the terrain. Verification of the status of obstacles and routes. Flexibility of defensive operations. Timely resumption of offensive action.

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LEADERS' RECONNAISSANCE

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4-21. When feasible, the commander and subordinate leaders conduct a reconnaissance of the AO to developmost of the plan based on their view of the actual terrain. The commander and staff develop a plan for theleaders reconnaissance that includes provisions for security, leaders and key staff members required toparticipate, designation of a recorder, areas to reconnoiter, and time allocated for the reconnaissance. Whenavailable, the commander might use aviation assets to conduct the leaders' reconnaissance.

MISSION COMMAND

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4-22. Defending an AO is a typical mission for a battalion. As in the offense, commanders and staffs integrateMDMP and TLP activities within the headquarters and across the force as they exercise mission command. Thedefense allows the commander to distribute forces to suit the terrain and plan engagement areas that integratedirect and indirect fires. The commander must ensure that subordinate unit defensive plans are compatible andthat control measures, such as contact points and phase lines, are sufficient for flank coordination to ensure thatthe plan for their part of the defense is properly coordinated, not only within their units, but also with flankingand supporting units. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

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4-23. The commander may change task organization to respond to the existing or projected situation, such asforming a detachment left in contact prior to conducting a withdraw. When possible the commander ensuresthat changes in task organization take place between units that have previously trained or operated together totake advantage of established interpersonal relationships.

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4-24. A critical step is the expression of the commanders vision of anticipated enemy actions integrated withthe staffs IPB. The CAB IPB and the ABCT IPB should not differ significantly and provide the CABcommander and staff a clear understanding of how the ABCT commander envisions the enemy will fight, andthe enemys plan for the operation. From that, the CAB commander and staff refine the IPB to focus on thedetails of the operation in the CAB AO. The ABCT commander usually defines where and how the ABCT willdefeat or destroy the enemy. The CAB commander defines how he envisions the CAB will execute its portionof the brigade fight.

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MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

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4-25. In noncontiguous operations, the CAB often must defend either on a broad front, or in an AO so large thatit would be unrealistic to employ units in mutually supporting positions. This requires a judicious effort by thecommander and his staff in determining the positioning of maneuver forces. The CAB has the ability to defendin restricted and severely restricted terrain with Infantry while also being able to cover mounted avenues ofapproach or open areas effectively with tanks and BFVs. During the terrain analysis, the commander and staffmust look closely for choke points, intervisibility lines, and reverse-slope opportunities in order to take fulladvantage of the CABs capabilities to mass firepower while providing protection for the Infantry.

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4-26. Once the commander has assigned AOs to his maneuver units, he must determine any potential gapsbetween units. The CAB should plan to cover these gaps with reconnaissance assets, aggressive patrolling fromthe company teams and local observation posts. The CAB must plan local counterattacks to isolate and destroyany enemy that manages to penetrate through a gap in the AO. The commander should also plan to repositionunits not in contact to mass the effects of combat power against an attacking enemy.

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4-27. The need for flexibility through the mobility of mechanized forces requires graphic control measures toassist in maneuver during local counterattacks and repositioning of forces. Specified routes, phase lines, attackand support-by-fire positions, BPs, EAs, TRPs, and other fire control measures are required to synchronizemaneuver effectively.

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INTELLIGENCE

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4-28. The purposes of the information collection efforts in the security area are to provide the commander withinformation to support the development of intelligence to aide decision making, to provide early warning andreaction time, and to support target acquisition. Guided by the CCIRs, the information collection plan, firesupport plan, and reconnaissance and security assets provide information that includes: Location, and movement of reconnaissance assets.

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Speed, direction, composition, and strength of enemy formations.

Locations of HPTs, such as artillery and rocket units, bridging assets, and C2 nodes.Enemy actions at DPs.Enemy flanking actions, breaching operations, force concentrations, and employment of enablers.Verification of the condition of obstacles and routes.Battle damage assessment.Movement of follow-on forces.

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4-29. The staff must integrate the information provided by the security forces with information received fromhigher and adjacent units, other subordinates, and sources such as JSTARS and UAS. The total reconnaissanceeffort must support the commanders decision-making. In an area defense, the commanders critical decisionsusually include: Initiation and employment of fires against enemy formations. Modifications or adjustments to the defensive plan. Execution of situational obstacles. Withdrawal of forward security forces. Commitment of the reserve, counterattack, or both.

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4-30. As with all tactical planning, IPB is a critical part of defensive planning. It helps the commander definewhere to concentrate combat power, where to accept risk, and where to plan potential decisive actions. To aid inthe development of a flexible defensive plan, the IPB must present all feasible enemy courses of action. Theessential areas of focus are: Analyze terrain and weather. Determine enemy force size and likely COAs with associated DPs. Determine enemy vulnerabilities and HVTs. Impact of civilian population on CAB defensive operations.

FIRES4-31. The CAB might have to rely on its own mortars until supporting artillery is available. The commandershould support the units decisive operation with priority of fires. The main effort prior to the initiation of thedecisive operation will have priority of fires if the operation contains phases. The following are considerationsfor the fire support plan: Allocate initial priority of fires to the forward security force. Plan targets along enemy reconnaissance mounted and dismounted avenues of approach. Engage approaching enemy formations at vulnerable points along their route of march with indirectfires and CAS, if available. Plan the transition of fires to the MBA fight. Develop clear triggers to adjust FSCM and priority of fires. Ensure integration of fires in support of obstacle effects. Ensure integration of fires with CAB counterattack plans and repositioning contingency plans. Integrate the emplacement of scatterable mine (SCATMINEs) into the countermobility andcounterattack plans (to protect flanks, and so forth).

SUSTAINMENT4-32. The CAB S-4 must ensure that the sustainment plan is fully coordinated with the FSC commander and therest of the staff. He coordinates with the S-3 to ensure that supply routes do not interfere with maneuver orobstacle plans, but still support the full depth of the defense. The commander ensures that sustainment operatorsdeliver combat-configured loads to maneuver units on a scheduled basis. Coordination with the S-3 providesengineer and potential MP support to keep supply routes open. The S-4 coordinates with the CBRN officer toensure there are appropriate routes for contaminated equipment. In addition, the S-4 coordinates with the FSCcommander for the possible use of prestocked classes of supply (Class IV and V).

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4-33. The commander positions sustainment forces where they can best fulfill its support tasks while usingminimal resources to maintain security in conjunction with other units located in the support area. In contiguousoperations position sustainment operations far enough away from the FEBA to avoid interfering with themovement of units. In noncontiguous operations sustainment may conduct operations from base clusters withinthe perimeters of ground maneuver units to provide security and avoid interrupting their sustainment functions.(Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more on sustainment considerations in the defense.)

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4-34. Enemy actions and the maneuver of combat forces complicate forward area medical operations. Healthservice support considerations for defensive operations include: Medical personnel have much less time to reach the patient, complete vital emergency medicaltreatment, and remove the patient from the battle site. The enemys initial attack and the CABs counterattack produce the heaviest patient workload. Theseare also the most likely times for enemy use of artillery and CBRN weapons. The enemy attack can disrupt ground and air routes and delay evacuation of patients to and fromtreatment elements. The depth and dispersion of the defense create significant time-distance problems for evacuationassets. The enemy exercises the initiative early in the operation, which could preclude accurate prediction ofinitial areas of casualty density. This fact makes effective integration of air assets into the medicalevacuation plan essential.

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Threats to Sustainment Sites

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4-35. During the MBA fight, protection of sustainment sites is necessary to ensure freedom of maneuver andcontinuity of operations. Because allocating forces against threats to CAB sustainment sites diverts combatpower from the MBA, the commander carefully weighs the need for such diversions against the possibleconsequences to the overall operation. To make such decisions wisely, the commander requires accurateinformation to avoid late or inadequate responses and to guard against overreacting to exaggerated reports.

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4-36. In general, the combat trains rely on positioning, movement, and self-protection for survival. The S-4plans for sustainment operations in covered and concealed areas away from likely enemy avenues of approach.The commanders responsible for the trains (for example, HHC and FSC commanders) establish and maintainperimeter security, using early warning observation posts, and integrating any weapons and crews that arepresent into the trains defense. They also keep sustainment nodes postured to move on very short notice as thesecurity situation changes.

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4-37. Early warning to sustainment units is critical to their survival in the event of a penetration of the MBA orenemy attack from an unexpected area. Sustainment plans and rehearsals must address actions to be taken in theevent of an attack, including defensive measures, displacement criteria, routes, rally points, and subsequentpositions to which to move.

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PROTECTION

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4-38. Air and missile defense (AMD) support to the CAB may be limited. Units should expect to use theirorganic weapons systems for self-defense against enemy air threats. Plan for CBRN reconnaissance at likelylocations where the emeny might conduct a CBRN attack. Use obscurants to support disengagement ormovement of forces. Assign sectors of fire to prevent fratricide. Engineer augmentation provides survivabilitysupport to the CAB by digging survivability positions and coutermobility tasks.

PREPARATION

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4-39. Preparation of the defense includes planning and plan refinement, positioning of forces, constructingobstacles and fighting positions, preparing other survivability requirements, planning and synchronizing fires,positioning logistics, and conducting inspections and rehearsals. Throughout the preparation phase, securityoperations must continue without interruption. Security forces may be assigned any combination of screen,guard, and area security missions. The scout platoon may be positioned to screen and provide early warning

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along most likely enemy avenues of approach, reinforced in depth with sections or platoons from the companyteams.

MOVEMENT INTO AN UNSECURED AREA OF OPERATIONS

4-40. The CAB should establish a security force when moving into an unsecured area.. The mission of thesecurity force is to clear the area, check for contaminated areas and obstacles, and establish security for theCAB main body. After clearing the CABs logistics sites and the area where the company teams will bepositioned, the security force should position itself to Prevent enemy observation of defensive positions. Defeat infiltrating reconnaissance forces. Prevent the enemy from delivering direct fires into the CAB defenses. Provide early warning of the enemys approach.

HOW AND WHERE TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY

4-41. The commander and staff analyze the forces and assets available, paying particular attention to theobstacle assets and fire support allocated by the BCT. The staff must define the engineer and fire supportallocation in terms of capability. For example, they should define engineer capability in terms of the number ofobstacles of a specific effect, and the number and type of fighting positions engineers can emplace or create inthe time available. Fire support analysis should include the number of targets to be engaged, at what point in thebattle they should be engaged, and with what expected result.

ENGAGEMENT AREA DEVELOPMENT

4-42. The critical planning piece for both maneuver and fire support during defensive operations is EAdevelopment. Although the commander can divide EAs into sectors of fire, he does not position his defensivesystems toward the EAs, but toward the avenues of approach. He uses EAs and sectors of fire as tools tooptimize the effects of fires, not to restrict fires or cause operations to become static or fixed. The seven stepslisted below represent a way to build an EA. Although listed sequentially, some steps (marked by an asterisk)can and should be done concurrently: Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach. Determine likely enemy concept of operations. Determine where to kill the enemy. Plan and integrate obstacles.* Emplace weapons systems (includes preparation of fighting positions).* Plan and integrate indirect fires.* Rehearse the execution of operations in the EA.

POSITIONING THE RESERVE

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4-43. The commander must designate and position the reserve in a location where it can effectively react toseveral contingency plans. He must consider terrain, trafficability of roads, potential EAs, probable points ofenemy penetrations, and commitment time. The commander can have a single reserve under CAB control, or, ifthe terrain dictates, the company teams can designate their own reserves. The reserve should be positioned in acovered and concealed position. Information concerning the reserve may be considered essential elements offriendly information (EEFI) and protected from enemy reconnaissance. The CAB commander must givespecific planning guidance to the reserve to include priority for planning. METT-TC might require that a CABcommander designate a reserve that can be called upon to accomplish tasks that include focusing on the MBAand responding to other missions needed to help the CAB to accomplish its mission. To generate larger groundmaneuver reserves, the CAB commander must redirect company or platoon committed elements after they haveaccomplished their initial tasks, or when the enemys defeat frees them for other tasks.

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4-44. Speed and agility at the platoon level enable the CAB commander to commit, withdraw, redirect, andrecommit the reserve during the fight. This use of the reserve requires the best possible SU and a COP that is

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constantly updated with accurate enemy intelligence. Moving a unit from one area (left to right or front to rear)requires each Soldier in the unit to know where he is, and also where both the enemy and friendly forces arelocated.

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4-45. Additionally, the movement of ground forces over the distances expected in an expanded AO requirestime. The time and distance relationship, especially under limited visibility conditions and rough terrain, is akey factor in determining which of the CAB units can realistically be considered for a reserve mission that willrequire a great deal of flexibility in accomplishing multiple missions.

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4-46. During preparation of the CAB defense, the CAB reserve sometimes conducts other tasks. The CABcommander might initially position his reserve in a forward location to deceive the enemy, obscure subordinateboundaries, or show strength in an area where he intends to accept risk. The reserve could serve in the CABsforward security area and provide area security for the logistics sites or unoccupied areas of the CABs AO.However, the CAB commander must consider the impact of these types of missions on his reserve forcesability to prepare for its critical role as the reserve during the MBA engagement.

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4-47. The CAB reserves commander should also expect to receive specific DPs and triggers for employmenton each contingency. This allows the reserve commander to conduct quality rehearsals and to anticipate hiscommitment as he monitors the fight.

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ENGINEER SUPPORT4-48. The priority of effort transition to countermobility and survivability over mobility requires detailedplanning at the CAB level to ensure subordinate engineers have adequate time for TLPs. The TF engineer andthe leadership of the supporting engineer unit(s) are key in the development and execution of engineer tasks.The following planning considerations apply to engineer support: Position situational obstacles early and link them to natural and other manmade obstacles. Plan multiple obstacle locations to support depth and flexibility in the defense. Ensure adequatesecurity for obstacle emplacement systems. Integrate triggers for the execution of situational andreserve obstacles in the decision support template. Focus the countermobility effort to encourage the enemy to maneuver into positions of vulnerabilitywhere the CAB intends to kill them. Ensure adequate mobility support for withdrawing security forces, the reserve, the counterattackforce, and the repositioning of MBA forces. Ensure the integration of survivability priorities for critical systems and units through thedevelopment and implementation of an execution matrix and timeline.

AVIATION SUPPORT

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4-49. In defensive operations, the speed and mobility of aviation can help maximize concentration andflexibility. During preparation for defensive operations, aviation units sometimes support the CAB commanderwith aerial reconnaissance and fires.

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4-50. During the defense, aviation forces can attack deep against HPTs, enemy concentrations, and movingcolumns, and they can disrupt enemy capabilities. Division will likely employ attack reconnaissance helicopterunits to attack follow-on echelons before they can move forward to the close battle. Aviation forces mightconduct screening operations, and might conduct guard operations of an open flank in conjunction with groundforces.

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4-51. Attack reconnaissance helicopters routinely support security area operations and mass fires during theMBA fight. Synchronization of aviation assets into the defensive plan is important to ensure aviation assets arecapable of massing fires and to prevent fratricide. Detailed air-ground operation and coordination are necessaryto ensure efficient use of aviation assets. If the CAB is augmented with aviation assets, it must give carefulconsideration to EA development and involve the direct fire planning and the supporting aviation unit, throughits aviation LNO, in the planning process.

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REHEARSALS4-52. The CAB and subordinate units should conduct rehearsals to practice their defense against multipleenemy COAs. When conducting rehearsals, all units must consider time, preparation activities, and OPSEC.Rarely will the CAB be able to conduct a full-dress rehearsal given the tempo of operations and the potentiallylarge size of the AO. It may be better for key leaders to conduct map, sketch map, terrain model, or reducedforce rehearsal in order to focus their attention on inspecting preparations and working with subordinate leaders.The rehearsal should cover the following: Reconnaissance and security operations. Battle handover and passage of lines. MBA engagement. The timelines and associated actions to create, handover, and activate all planned types of obstaclesand obstacle groups. Reserve employment options. Counterattack. Actions to deal with enemy penetrations, major enemy efforts along areas of risk or flank avenues ofapproach. Sustainment operations, particularly casualty evacuation and contingency resupply operations. Reorganization and follow-on missions to exploit defensive success. Integration of aviation assets, if available.

MONITORING DEFENSE PREPARATIONS

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4-53. As subordinate units position their elements and execute defensive preparations, the CAB staff monitorsand coordinates their activities and the overall situation. The S-2 monitors the enemy situation and focuses onindicators that reveal the enemys likely time and direction of attack. The staff continually analyzes thisassessment to determine the effects on preparation time available. The commander must update his PIR as thesituation changes and be prepared to adjust the reconnaissance effort to answer those questions. The S-3monitors the status of rehearsals and updates the plan as needed based on continuously updated intelligence andthe status of preparations. The XO analyzes the status of logistics and equipment maintenance within the CABto determine any required adjustments to the plan or task organization. The TF engineer monitors the progressof all engineer efforts within the AO. He continually projects the end state of this effort based on the current andprojected work rates. He must identify potential shortfalls early and determine how to shift assets to make upfor the shortfalls or recommend where to accept risk.

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4-54. As the enemy closes on the CABs AO, the CAB begins final preparations that typically include: Final coordination for battle handover and passage of lines. Positioning of situational obstacle employment systems. Verification of communications status. Evacuation of unused Classes IV and V (obstacle materiel and ammunition) to prevent capture orloss to enemy action. Withdrawal of engineer forces from forward areas. Linkup of mobility, protection, and sustainment assets with reserve or other supported combat forces(if not previously accomplished). Review of reconnaissance plan to ensure it still meets the commanders PIR. Final positioning or repositioning of reconnaissance assets, security forces, and observers. Positioning of teams to close lanes in obstacles or execute reserve obstacles. Execution of directed, reserve, or situational obstacles. Registration of indirect fire targets with mortars. Periodic situation updates and issuing of final guidance to subordinates.

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4-55. As in the offense, the defense follows the same sequence of events, or steps (gain and maintain enemycontact, disrupt the enemy, and fix the enemy, follow through), which may or may not happen sequentially andwhose actions often overlap, or occur simultaneously.

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4-56. Usually, the BCT has established some form of security before the CAB moves into the area. However,the CAB still must provide for its own security, especially on expanded or complex terrain. If transitioning froman offensive operation, the BCT and CABs establish the security area well beyond the desired MBA site inorder to prevent the enemy from observing and interrupting defensive preparations, and identifying unitpositions. If they cannot push the security area forward to achieve this, the BCT and its CABs might have tohold their positions initially as they transition and then withdraw units to the defensive MBA, establishing asecurity force in the process.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

4-57. Once security area forces have moved into position, actions in the security area predominantly focus onreconnaissance, security, counter reconnaissance, target acquisition, reporting, delay of the enemy main body,and battle handover. The CABs security area forces must integrate their actions with friendly forces forward ofthem, maintaining information flow and security. The CABs elements may have to execute battle handoverwith those forward elements and assist them in executing a rearward passage. This is especially likely if the fireelements are assets other than the BCT cavalry squadron, which must move through the CAB AO to recoverand prepare for another mission. Similarly, the security area forces must coordinate and crosstalk with the teamsto their rear. Eventually, they must execute a rearward passage or move to the flanks of the MBA. Onapproaches that the enemy does not use, it is usually advantageous to leave elements of the security forceforward to preserve observation and access to enemy flanks.

Security Area Engagement

4-58. Engagements in the CAB security area are usually limited. Counter reconnaissance forces focus onlocating and destroying enemy reconnaissance elements. The focal points are usually early warning andidentification of the enemys main and supporting efforts in order for the commander to make decisions andposition forces.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

4-59. After making contact with the enemy, the commander seeks to disrupt the enemys plan and his ability tocontrol forces. As the enemy closes into the area, observers initiate indirect fires and execution of situationalobstacles to disrupt the enemy. Ideally, the results of the commanders shaping operations should result in adisorganized enemy.

Execution of Planned Indirect Fires

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4-60. The CAB's planned indirect fires usually consist of security force elements' or a FISTs execution of oneor two indirect fire targets on a primary enemy avenue of approach. This may be in support of the higherheadquarters scheme of fires since the BCT usually controls artillery assets throughout most of theengagement.

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4-61. During the MBA engagement, the BCT and CABs shift combat power and priority of fires to defeat theenemys attack. This may require: Adjusting subordinates' AOs and missions. Repositioning of forces. Shifting of the main effort. Commiting the reserve. Modifying the original plan.

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4-62. Forward forces, obstacles, and fires within the MBA usually break the enemys momentum, reduce hisnumerical advantage, and force his troops into positions of vulnerability. The CAB masses fires (direct andindirect) to destroy attacking enemy forces as they enter the EAs.

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4-63. Depending on the defensive scheme, the CAB may conduct delay operations, capitalizing on movementand repeated attacks to defeat the enemy or it may fight primarily from a single series of positions.

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Execution of Situational Obstacles

4-64. The purpose of these obstacles is to force premature enemys deployment, thus slowing his advance. Thisallows for more effective engagement with indirect fires and, therefore, forces early deployment of enemybreaching assets. These obstacles usually are planned and triggered relative to specific enemy attack options.Situational obstacles may support an essential task for fires support. In this situation, a CAB company team maybe employed forward to cover fire support elements with direct fires, and then withdraw to its own defensivepositions within the MBA.

FIX THE ENEMY

4-65. The techniques for fixing the enemy in the defense are similar to those discussed in the offense, with theemphasis on shaping operations to constrain the enemy into a desirable COA in order to fix the enemy in agiven location. Combat outposts, strong points, and obstacles can deny enemy movement to or throughundesirable locations, or avenues.

MANEUVER

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4-66. Battle handover is the transfer of responsibility for the battle from the BCTs security area elements to theCABs. The higher commander who established the security force prescribes criteria for the handover anddesignates the location where it will pass through, routes, contact points, and the battle handover line. The battlehandover line is usually forward of the FEBA where the direct fires of the forward combat elements of theCABs can effectively overwatch the elements of the passing unit.

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4-67. The CAB commander establishes the criteria for the battle handover prior to the MBA fight, includingwhere it will pass through, and designates routes and contact points. The handover is usually forward of theFEBA where elements of the reconnaissance unit are effectively overwatched by direct fires of the forwardcombat elements of the CAB. The CAB ensures its coordination with the reconnaissance unit, and with theCABs company team commanders who will be directly involved in the passing of the reconnaissanceelements.Coordination usually includes: Establishing communications. Providing updates on both friendly and enemy situations. Coordinating passage. Dispatching representatives to contact points and establishing liaison. Establishing recognition signals. Checking status of obstacles and routes. Establishing fire support , AMD, and sustainment requirements. Defining exact locations of contact points, lanes, and other control measures. Synchronizing actions to assist the reconnaissance elements RPOL in or out of contact.

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Main Battle Area Actions

4-68. The CAB seeks to defeat the enemys attack forward of or within the MBA. If the CAB can bringsufficient firepower to shape the enemy in the security area fight, an MBA engagement might not occur. If so,then the BCT can rapidly transition and move its CABs into a strong counterattack. However, the BCT and theCABs usually defend over a large area, and enemy strength often forces a MBA engagement. The CABcommander integrates an MBA engagement that is a combined arms fight using both direct and indirect fires,and reinforced with obstacles. The BCT continues to focus artillery, CAS, and attack aviation in an effort toattack the enemy continuously throughout the depth of the battlefield. In this case, long-range fire support to the

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CABs might be limited to critical points and times in the MBA fight. Combining all available fires withmaneuver, obstacles, and reserve elements, the CAB commander seeks to destroy the enemy or force histransition to a retrograde or hasty defense. The BCT usually specifies control measures to coordinate and focusthe defensive operation.

FOLLOW THROUGH/COUNTERATTACK

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4-69. Following a successful defense, there might be a period of confusion that the defender can exploit. Giventhe information capabilities of the CAB, counterattacks can be executed quickly before the enemy can securehis gains or organize a defense. METT-TC, information collection results, and the higher commanders conceptof operations dictate the CABs follow-on mission.

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4-70. If the situation prevents offensive action, the CAB continues to defend. As in the initial establishment ofthe defense, gaining security area space is critical. A local counterattack can provide space for a security areaand time to reorganize. Any attack option must pay particular attention not only to the terrain and enemy, butalso to friendly obstacles (and their destruction times if applicable) and areas where dual-purpose improvedconventional munitions or bomblets have been used. If the CAB cannot counterattack to gain adequate securityspace, then the CAB may have to direct a company team to maintain contact with the enemy and guard the AOwhile other moves to reestablish the defense farther to the rear. Whether continuing to defend or transitioning tooffensive tasks, the CAB must quickly reorganize.

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MOBILE DEFENSE

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4-71. Mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through adecisive attack by a striking force. (ADRP 3-90) Mobile defense focuses on destroying the attacking force byallowing enemy to advance into a position that exposes the enemy to counterattack and envelopment. Thecommander uses the fixing force to hold attacking enemy forces in position, help channel attacking enemyforces into ambush areas, and retain areas from which to launch the striking force. A mobile defense requires anAO of considerable depth.

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4-72. The commander must be able to shape the battlefield, causing an enemy force to overextend its lines ofcommunication (LOCs), expose its flanks, and dissipate its combat power. Likewise, the commander must beable to move friendly forces around and behind the enemy force targeted to be cut off and destroyed. Divisionsand larger formations normally execute mobile defenses. However, the CAB generally conducts an area defenseor a delay as part of the fixing force as the commander shapes the enemys penetration, or they attack as part ofthe striking force.

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Note. Units smaller than a division do not usually conduct a mobile defense because of their inabilityto fight multiple engagements throughout the width, depth, and height of their AO, whilesimultaneously resourcing the striking, fixing, and reserve forces.

FIXING FORCE OR STRIKING FORCE

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4-73. The CAB, as part of a larger organization, participates in a mobile defense as either part of the fixingforce or part of the striking force, but not both. As part of the fixing force, the CAB defends within its assignedAO, although the AO might be larger than usual. As part of the striking force, the CAB plans, rehearses, andexecutes offensive tasks.

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4-74. The term striking force is used rather than the term reserve because reserve indicates an uncommittedforce. The striking force is a committed force and has the resources to conduct a counterattack as part of themobile defense. The striking force engages the enemy as they become exposed in their attempts to overcome thefixing force. Because the striking force normally attacks a moving enemy force, it is usually Armor heavy.

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4-75. Risks to the mobile defense include:

Becoming isolated and defeated in detail. Enemy operations may impair the ability of the striking force to react at critical points. Enemy may be able to confuse friendly forces as to its main attack.

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Increased criticality of mobility support requirements.

Increased potential for fratricide.

DEPTH OF MOBILE DEFENSE

4-76. A mobile defense requires considerable depth in the AO in order for the commander to shape thebattlefield, causing the enemy to extend his lines of communication and support, expose his flanks, anddissipate his combat power. The terrain must allow the commander to maneuver to attack an enemy flank orrear.

RETROGRADE

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4-77. The retrograde is a type of defensive tasks that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (FM3-90-1) The enemy may force these operations or a commander may execute them voluntarily. The CABconducts retrograde operations to improve a tactical situation or to prevent a worse situation from developing.CABs usually conduct retrogrades as part of a larger force but may conduct independent retrogrades asrequired, such as when conducting an area or point raid. In either case, the CABs higher headquarters mustapprove the operation.

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4-78. Retrograde operations accomplish the following:

Resist, exhaust, and defeat enemy forces. Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation. Avoid contact in undesirable conditions. Preserve friendly combat power. Gain time. Disengage a force from battle for use elsewhere in other missions. Reposition forces, shorten lines of communication, or conform to movements of other friendly units.

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4-79. The three forms of retrograde operations are:

Delay. This operation trades space for time and preserves friendly combat power while inflictingmaximum damage on the enemy. Withdrawal. A withdrawal is a planned, voluntary disengagement from the enemy, which may beconducted with or without enemy pressure. Retirement. A retirement is an operation in which a force that is not in contact with the enemymoves to the rear in an organized manner.

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Note. Maintaining morale is essential among subordinate leaders and troops in a retrogradeoperation. Movement to the rear may seem like a defeat or a threat of isolation unless Soldiers haveconfidence in their leaders, and know the purpose of the operation and their roles in it.

DELAY

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4-80. A delay is a form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down theenemys momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisivelyengaged. (FM 3-90-1) It is critical that the commanders intent defines what is more important in the mission:time, damage to the enemy, or force protection. Inflicting damage is usually more important than gaining time.The BCT commander establishes risk levels for each delay but maintaining freedom of action and avoidingdecisive engagement are ordinarily of ultimate importance. The CAB may execute a delay when it hasinsufficient combat power to attack or defend, or when the higher units plan calls for drawing the enemy intoan area for a counterattack, as in a mobile defense. Following is a brief discussion for planning, preparing andexecuting a delay.

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4-81. Delays gain time to:

Allow other friendly forces to establish a defense. Cover a withdrawing force.

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Protect a friendly forces flank.

Allow other forces to counterattack

Forms of Delay4-82. Based upon the commanders intent and METT-TC, the two types of delay missions are delay within anAO or delay forward of a specific control measure.Delay Within an Area of Operations4-83. Higher command might assign the CAB to delay within an AO. The higher commander usually providesguidance regarding intent and desired effect on the enemy, but he minimizes restrictions regarding terrain, time,and coordination with adjacent forces. This form of a delay is usually assigned when force preservation is thehighest priority, and there is considerable depth to the BCT or divisions AO.Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time4-84. Higher command assigns the CAB a mission to delay forward of a specific control measure for a specificperiod of time. This mission is assigned when the CAB must control the enemys attack and retain specifiedterrain to achieve some purpose relative to another element, such as setting the conditions for a counterattack,for completion of defensive preparations, or for the movement of other forces or civilians. The focus of thisdelay mission is clearly on time, terrain, and enemy destruction. It carries a much higher risk level for the CAB,with the likelihood that all or part of the unit will become decisively engaged. The CAB commander controlsthe movement of his forces by using a series of delay lines. Delay lines are phase lines that indicate the date andtime before which the enemy is not allowed to cross.

Planning the Delay

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4-85. The delay requires close coordination of forces and a clear understanding by subordinates of the conceptof operations and commanders intent. The potential for loss of control is very high in delay operations, makingcrosstalk and coordination between subordinate leaders extremely important. Subordinate initiative is critical,but it must be in the context of close coordination with others. Plans must be flexible, with control measuresthroughout the AO allowing forces to be maneuvered to address all possible enemy COAs.

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4-86. The commander determines the end state of the delay based on the higher commanders intent andspecific parameters of the higher headquarters delay order. The commander considers the factors of METT-TC,especially the effects of the terrain, to identify advantageous locations from which to engage the enemythroughout the depth of the AO. Specific delay planning considerations the commander and staff mustdetermine include: Force array and allocation of enablers, particularly fires and obstacles. Where and when to accept decisive engagement. Acceptable level of risk for each subordinate force. Form of delay and control measures (company teams delay in AO, control by BPs, or some othermethod). Maintaining adequate mobility to facilitate the delay. Integration of obstacle intent and essential tasks for fire support. Likely subsequent mission, transition point(s), and conditions.

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Delay Organization4-87. The CABs organization of its forces depends on how the BCT has structured its forces (unless the CABoperates independently). The BCT usually organizes into a security force, main body, and reserve, but a wideAO may preclude the use of BCT-controlled security forces and reserves. In this case, the BCT can direct theCAB to organize its own security, main body, and reserve forces, the same as if the CAB were operatingindependently. The brigade commander can designate a CAB, or companies within the CAB, as the security orreserve force for the BCT. If the CAB has to establish a security force, it usually uses the scout platoon as ascreen force positioned to observe the most likely enemy avenues of approach and to initiate indirect fires to

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slow and weaken the enemy. Initially, the CAB main body usually locates well forward in the AO, and thenfights from a series of subsequent positions. The reserve force is used to defeat enemy penetrations or to assistunits with breaking contact.

Delay Scheme of Maneuver

4-88. The scheme of maneuver must allow the CAB to determine the pace of the delay and maintain theinitiative. The commander selects positions that allow his forces to inflict maximum damage on the enemy,support their disengagement, and enable their withdrawal. (See Figure 4-3.) He may choose to delay fromsuccessive or alternating delay positions depending on the strength of the teams and the width of the AO.

4161Figure 4-3. CAB delay in a urban area

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Alternate and Subsequent Positions in a Delay

4-89. In planning, if the commander chooses to delay using BPs, he can use either alternate positions orsubsequent positions. In both techniques, the delaying forces maintain contact with the enemy between delaypositions. Table 4-1 shows the advantages and disadvantages of the two techniques. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 formore information.)

WITHDRAWAL4-90. Joint doctrine defines a withdrawal operation as a planned retrograde operation in which a force incontact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy. (JP 1-02) Units mightor might not conduct withdrawals under enemy pressure. Following is a brief discussion for planning, preparingand executing a withdrawl. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

Forms of Withdrawl4-91. The two types of withdrawals are assisted and unassisted. The commanders intent and METT-TCdetermine which type of withdrawal the units use.Assisted Withdrawal4-92. The assisting force occupies positions to the rear of the withdrawing unit and prepares to accept control ofthe situation. In addition, it can assist the withdrawing unit with route reconnaissance, route maintenance, firesupport, and sustainment. Both forces closely coordinate the withdrawal. After coordination, the withdrawingunit delays to a BHL, conducts a passage of lines, and moves to its final destination.Unassisted Withdrawal4-93. The withdrawing unit establishes routes and develops plans for the withdrawal, then establishes a securityforce as the rear guard while the main body withdraws. Sustainment and protection elements usually withdrawfirst, followed by combat forces. To deceive the enemy as to the friendly movement, the BCT or CAB mightestablish a detachment left in contact (DLIC) if withdrawing under enemy pressure. As the unit withdraws, theDLIC disengages from the enemy and follows the main body to its final destination.

Organization of a Withdrawal4-94. As with the delay, the CAB structures its force into a security force, main body, and reserve. It can electto use a single company team, or elements of a company team as the security or reserve force. It also canorganize a DLIC or stay-behind forces, if required by the enemy situation. If operating independently, the CABorganizes itself in the same manner.Security Force4-95. The security force maintains contact with the enemy until ordered to disengage or until another forcetakes over the task. It simulates the continued presence of the main body, which requires additional allocation ofenablers beyond that usually allocated to a force of its size.

Detachment Left in Contact

4-96. The DLIC is an element that is left in contact as part of the previously designated (usually rear) securityforce while the main body conducts its withdrawal. Its purpose is to remain behind to deceive the enemy intobelieving the CAB is still in position, while the majority of the unit withdraws. The DLIC should be one of thestrongest of the subordinate units with the most capable leadership.

Planning a Withdrawal4-97. Because the force is most vulnerable if the enemy attacks, the commander and staff usually plan for awithdrawal under enemy pressure. They also develop contingency plans for a withdrawal without enemypressure. During planning, the commander and staff consider the following: Disengagement criteria (time, friendly situation, enemy situation). Plan for a deliberate break from the enemy. Plan for deception to conceal the withdrawal for as long as possible. Displace the main body rapidly, free of enemy interference. Safeguard of withdrawal routes. Plan for breaching, gap crossing, or bypassing obstacles that hinder the withdrawal. Create obstacles between the enemy and the DLIC to complicate pursuit. Retain sufficient maneuver and functional and multifunctional support and sustainment/combatservice support capabilities throughout the operation to support forces in contact with the enemy.

Withdrawal Scheme of Maneuver

4-98. A withdrawal may be assisted or unassisted and may take place with or without enemy pressure. The planconsiders which of the variations the CAB faces based on the higher headquarters order and the enemysituation. Some other considerations include: The element that will be the DLIC or rear guard must transition to cover the CABs AO.Simultaneously, the CAB must prepare its sustainment assets and the remainder of the force to begina rapid withdrawal to the rear. The CAB should seek to move on multiple routes to gain speed andshorten formations. The CAB commander essentially has two options for breaking contact, break contact using deceptionand stealth or break contact quickly and violently under the cover of supporting fires reinforced byobstacles to delay pursuit. When conducting a withdrawal without enemy pressure, the commander can focus the plan on thebest method to displace forces rapidly. He can take prudent risks that increase his forcesdisplacement capabilities.

Preparation4-99. The commander prepares the CAB for the withdrawal through inspections and rehearsals in the samefashion as discussed with other defensive operations. Inspections focus on subordinate unit preparations toensure a clear understanding of the concept of operations and commanders intent.

Execution4-100. Execution of the CAB withdrawal essentially follows this pattern: Task-organizing and positioning security and deception forces. Reconnoitering withdrawal routes and subsequent positions. Preparing obstacles and fighting positions to support the DLIC and withdrawal. Preparing wounded Soldiers, damaged equipment, and nonessential supplies for movement. Positioning selected mobility and countermobility assets to respond to events that affect thewithdrawal. Moving nonessential mobility, protection, and sustainment units to the rear. Positioning MPs and other assets for traffic control.

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Initiating movement, leading with forward security forces.

The DLIC's breaking of contact and movement as a rear guard.

Concealing the Withdrawal

4-101. The first priority is to conceal the withdrawal from the enemy. As the BCT or CAB initiates the initialmovement of forces, it must take measures to deceive the enemy and to maintain OPSEC.Actions on Contact in a Withdrawal4-102. Security forces counter any enemy attempts to disrupt the withdrawal or pursue the BCT or CAB. If thesecurity force and the reserve cannot prevent the enemy from closing on the main body, the commandercommits some or all of the main body to prevent the enemy from interfering further with the withdrawal.Termination of the Withdrawal4-103. Once the BCT or CAB successfully disengages from the enemy, it usually has the following options: Rejoin the overall defense. Transition into a retirement. Continue moving away from the enemy and toward its next mission area.

RETIREMENT4-104. A retirement is a retrograde operation in which a force that is not in contact with the enemy moves tothe rear in an organized manner. The CAB conducts a retirement as part of the BCT to reposition for futureoperations. The CAB usually organizes itself with security, main body, and reserve elements, depending on thesituation and where the CAB is in the movement scheme. The commander and staff develop a movement planbased on the terrain, friendly situation and commanders guidance, and enemy situation. During preparations,BCT and CAB units conduct rehearsals and prepare for movement. During a retirement, the BCT and its CABsusually move to assembly areas to prepare for future operations. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

SECTION III FORMS OF DEFENSE

4-105. Subordinate forms of defense have special purposes and have their own unique planningconsiderations. The Army recognizes three forms of defense: Defense of a linear obstacle. Perimeter defense. Reverse-slope defense.

DEFENSE OF A LINEAR OBSTACLE

4-106. The commander may conduct an area or mobile defense along or behind a linear obstacle. Whenincorporating a linear obstacle into a mobile defense the commander may accept some risk by giving the enemythe opportunity to cross a portion of the obstacle in efforts to channel forces into engagement areas or routesadvantageous to the defense. When defending from a linear obstacle such as a mountain range or river, the CABcan dig in to protected positions and prepare to reinforce any successful penetration into the linear defense. Adisadvantage to the defense of a linear obstacle is the depth it provides the defender.

PLANNING THE DEFENSE OF A LINEAR OBSTACLE

4-107. The commander applies the same considerations he would apply to an area and mobile defense whenplanning to defend a linear obstacle. While the linear obstacle may provide increased natural protection, it mayoffer the enemy the ability to exploit a penetration. The commander should consider how to best instituteeconomy of force to concentrate effects in the event of any successful penetration along the breadth of thedefense.

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PERIMETER DEFENSE

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4-108. A perimeter defense is a defense oriented in all directions. The CAB and company teams use it for selfprotection, and to protect other units located within the perimeter. The unit establishes a perimeter defense whenit must hold critical terrain in areas where the defense is not tied in with adjacent units. Units may also form aperimeter when they have been bypassed and isolated by the enemy and must defend in place. These differencesare in contrast to the strong point defense, in which the position is tied in with the rest of the defense andconsiderable time and resources are spent to prepare the ground.

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4-109. In an urban environment, a CAB may form a perimeter defense around key terrain, such as a publicutility, communications center, government center, or traffic circle that enhances movement. It may protectfacilities useful to their sustainment, or the welfare, economy, and support of the local populace such as a waterpurification plant or refinery. (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)

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PLANNING PERIMETER DEFENSE

4-110. While in a perimeter defense, units should consider: Placing security as far out as possible. Positioning Armor and antiarmor weapons in protected positions, and concentrating their fires onArmor avenues of approach and related EAs. Maintaining a reserve. Retaining key terrain. Establishing a location of the reserve. Maintaining mission command. Ensuring the continuation of sustainment operations and sustainment security.

DEFENSE OF A BASE

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4-111. The CAB can establish bases to provide support for tactical operations. These bases are areas orcompounds set up for temporary (or longer duration) operations and may include a helicopter landing zone(LZ). They are similar to combat outposts, but larger. (Refer to FM 3-34.400 and ATP 3-37.10 for moreinformation.)

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4-112. The base defense plan should include a security plan that provides time and space for the operationalarea security force to react. Figure 4-4 depicts an information collection sketch for conducting surveillance ofthe key terrain around the base camp. Those NAIs at longer distances from the base camp may be monitored byhigher headquarters (for example, UAS). Figure 4-5 depicts a base camp defense sketch. Although defense of abase is similar to that of a perimeter defense, commanders need to consider several additional factors: Establishment of a base defense operations center. Implementing a base defense communications network. Establishing and rehearsing base defense TACSOP to include all non-CAB tenant units. Integrating intrusion detection systems as a base defense multiplier. Implementing perimeter security to include entry control points, and personnel and vehicle searchprocedures. Employing checklists for force protection operations, quick reaction force organization andemployment, and site security assessment.

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4337Figure 4-4. Base camp information collection sketch

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4339Figure 4-5. Base camp sketch

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REVERSE-SLOPE DEFENSE4-113. The CAB organizes a reverse-slope defense to use a topographical crest to mask the defender from theattacker's observation and from supporting direct fire. (See Figure 4-6.)

4344Figure 4-6. CAB reverse-slope defense

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PLANNING FOR A REVERSE-SLOPE DEFENSE

4-114. The CAB commander can adopt a reverse-slope position for elements of the CAB when: Enemy fire makes the forward slope untenable. Lack of cover and concealment on the forward slope makes it untenable. The forward slope has been lost or has not yet been gained. The forward slope is exposed to enemy direct fire weapons fired from beyond the effective range ofthe defender's weapons. Moving to the reverse slope removes the attacker's standoff advantage. The terrain on the reverse slope provides better fields of fire than the forward slope. The defender must avoid creating a dangerous salient or reentrant in friendly lines. Surprising and deceiving the enemy as to the true location of the CAB defensive positions isessential.

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FORWARD EDGE OF THE POSITION

4-115. The forward edge of the position should be far enough from the crest that fields of fire allow thedefender time to place well-aimed fire on the enemy before he reaches friendly positions.

FLANKING FIRES4-116. A reverse-slope position is most effective when units on adjacent terrain can place flanking fires on theforward slope.

SECURITY FORCE4-117. The units should establish a security force to the front to stop or delay the enemy, to disorganize hisattack, and to deceive him as to the location of the defensive position. When this security element withdraws,the unit must maintain observation, indirect fire, and security to the front.

OBSERVATION POSTS4-118. The unit establishes observation posts on or forward of the topographical crest. This allows long-rangeobservation over the entire front and indirect fire coverage of forward obstacles. Observation posts are usuallyprovided by the unit that owns the terrain being observed, and may vary in size from a few Soldiers to areinforced squad. They should include FOs. At night, their number should be increased to improve security.

SECTION IV DEFENSIVE DIRECT FIRE CONTROL

4-119. Defensive fire control and fire planning are key elements of successful defensive tasks. Since CABs arelikely to conduct defensive tasks against enemy forces with numerical superiority, it is vital that the CABcommander and staff have a thorough understanding of direct fire planning. The CAB S-3 section reviewscompany OPORDs to ensure an integrated and synchronized direct fire plan plan and execution. The principlesof direct fire planning remain unchanged from offensive tasks.

PRINCIPLES OF FIRE CONTROL

4-120. The principles of fire control in the defense are the same as those in the offense. They include: Mass the effects of fire. Destroy the greatest threat first. Avoid target overkill. Employ the best weapon for the target. Minimize friendly exposure. Prevent fratricide. Plan for extreme limited visibility conditions. Develop contingencies for diminished capabilities.

FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

4-121. Application of fire control measure concepts, procedures, and techniques assists the unit in acquiringthe enemy, focusing fires on him, distributing the effects of the fires, and preventing fratricide. At the sametime, no single measure is sufficient to control fires effectively. (See Table 4-2.) Fire control measures areeffective only if the entire unit has a common understanding of what they mean and how to employ them.

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Table 4-2 Common defensive control measures

Terrain-BasedFire Control MeasuresEngagement area (EA)Maximum engagement line (MEL)Final protective line (FPL)Direction of fireTerrain-based quadrantFriendly-based quadrantTarget reference point (TRP)Restrictive fire line (RFL)Sector of fire

TRIGGER LINE4-122. A trigger line is a phase line located on identifiable terrain that crosses the engagement areaused toinitiate and mass fires into an engagement area at a predetermined range for all or like weapon systems. (ADRP1-02) Commander can use a trigger line to specify the circumstances in which subordinate elements are toengage enemy forces. For example, the trigger for a friendly platoon to initiate engagement could be three ormore enemy combat vehicles passing or crossing a given trigger line. This line can be any natural or man-madelinear feature, such as a road, ridgeline, or stream. It could also be a line perpendicular to the units orientation,delineated by one or more reference points.

SECTION V TRANSITIONS

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4-123. During the planning for any operation, the CAB commanders and staffs must discern from the higherheadquarters OPORD what the potential follow-on missions are and begin to plan how they intend to achievethem. The principle concerns are the same when transitioning. Whether the CAB is concluding an offensive ordefensive operation, it must pause to consolidate and reorganize before the next operation. A successful defenseoften allows the CAB to transition to an attack, at other times to return to stability tasks.

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4-124. Transitioning to the offense depends on defeating the enemy decisively and recognizing that defeatpromptly. The ABCT commander must provide the planning and warning that precedes these transitions. CABand company team commanders must be ready to confirm sensor indications of enemy condition and torecommend transition to the offense as they sense the enemys defeat.

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CONSOLIDATION

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4-125. Consolidation considerations are the same as in the offense. Some of the considerations such asreestablishing communication and security and maintaining contact are readily achieved after a successful areadefense, which relied on them throughout the defense. After a mobile defense, or retrograde operationsconsolidation may require more time to achieve. Commanders might need to consolidate in order to reorganize,avoid culmination, prepare for an enemy counterattack, or allow time for movement of adjacent units.

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4-126. The CAB may be directed to maintain contact with the enemy by redirecting reconnaissance andsecurity assets, directing small-unit patrols, and possibly conducting limited objective attacks. In somesituations, the CAB might retain control of key terrain or complete clearing the objective while the remainder ofthe ABCT transitions to a new mission.

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REORGANIZATION4-127. All units undertake reorganization activities during operations as the situation allows for maintainingcombat effectiveness. After the CAB defeats an enemy attack, a more extensive reorganization can occur.Reorganization tasks usually include those items listed for the offense in chapter three. (Refer to FM 3-90-1.)

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CONTINUING OPERATIONS4-128. At the conclusion of an engagement, the CAB and its subordinate units may continue the defense, or ifordered, transition to offensive or stability tasks. All commanders consider their higher commanders concept ofoperations, friendly capabilities, and the enemy situation when making this decision. All missions shouldinclude plans for exploiting success or assuming a defense.

OFFENSE4-129. Higher commanders may order the subordinate unit to conduct a hasty attack, movement to contact, orparticipate in exploitation. In some cases, the defensive operation might immediately transition into a pursuit. Ifreorganization is required, the echelon maintains pressure on the enemy through artillery, CAS, and limitedobjective attacks while any necessary reorganization takes place.

STABILITY4-130. Commanders take care in planning transitions from defensive tasks to stability tasks and vice versa.Subordinate commanders and leaders look for ways to recognize activities that would initiate this transition.Commanders, staffs, and Soldiers need to be aware that elements of the CAB could be conducting offensive,defensive, and stability tasks simultaneously within a small radius of each other. Actions in one units AO canaffect a change in whatever type operation an adjacent unit is conducting. For example, an offensive operationmay result in displacing noncombatants to another section of the city, thus creating a requirement for stabilitytasks for the unit in that AO. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

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Stability

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Peace is a daily, a weekly, a monthly process, gradually changing opinions,

slowly eroding old barriers, quietly building new structures.

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U.S. forces conduct stability tasks to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace,strengthen democratic processes, retain U.S. influence or access abroad, assist U.S. civilauthorities, and support moral and legal imperatives. These actions include a wide rangeof activities. They provide policy makers with options to pursue national policyobjectives. U.S. forces can use stability tasks to complement any combination of the otherelements of national power.

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Stability tasks restore, establish, preserve, and secure areas, populations, and resources.They are fundamental to the conduct of Unified Land Operations: How the Army seizes,retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position in sustained landoperations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in order toprevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflictresolution. (ADRP 3-0)

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John F. Kennedy

SECTION I STABILITY TASKS

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5-1. Ideally, the CAB receives advance notice of stability missions and has time to complete a preparatorytraining program before deploying. At other times the battalion may deploy to conduct offensive and defensivetasks initially with the goal to transition to stability tasks once the necessary conditions have been achieved. Inthose cases, the unit relies on its training in the fundamental warfighing functions and trains to specific missionstability tasks during the operation.

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5-2. Stability tasks vary by the operational (PMESII-PT) and mission variables (METT-TC) present in theoperational environment. The CAB performs many familiar core tactical missions and tasks during stabilitytasks. The purposes of operations, the special constraints on commanders, and the unique missions and tasks,however, differentiate stability tasks from other operations.

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5-3. This section provides an introductory discussion of stability tasks. (Refer to ADRP 3-07, ATP 3-07.5 andFM 3-57 for more information.) Although the CAB can be assigned missions within all of these categories, itsfirepower, protection, and maneuverability make it more suited for the following operations: Foreign internal defense. Security force assistance. Show of force.

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5-4. Stability tasks leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force and are a keycomponent of unified land operations conducted in a peacetime environment, during conflict, or in a postconflict situation. As offensive tasks clear areas of hostile forces, the CAB (or follow-on forces) must ensure thesecurity of critical infrastructure and provision of essential services. Commanders are legally obligated tominimize and relieve civilian suffering. Leaders must promptly inform their higher headquarters of civilianrequirements and conditions that require attention. Unified action is crucial. Transitions to civil authorityrequire the coordination and integration of both civilian and military organizations.

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5-5. The combination of tasks conducted by the CAB during stability tasks depends on METT-TC. In someoperations, the host nation government can meet/satisfy most of the needs of its population. Conversely, Army

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forces operating in a failed state may be responsible for the well-being of the local populace. That situationrequires Army forces to work with civilian agencies to restore basic capabilities. There are five primary stabilitytasks, in which none are performed in isolation. (Refer to ADRP 3-07 for more information.)

ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY

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5-6. Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population,including protection from internal and external threats. It includes potentially physically disbanding armedgroups, removing the means of combat from former combatants and belligerents. These tasks help provideeffective security for the local populace by reducing their exposure to the threat of violent conflict.

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5-7. Ideally, the CAB defeats external threats posed by enemy forces that can attack population centers.Simultaneously, they assist host-nation police with internal security against criminals and small, hostile groups.Civil security is required for the other stability tasks to be effective.

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ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL

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5-8. Establishing civil control is a preliminary step toward establishing rule of law and stable, effectivegovernance. While establishing civil security is the first responsibility of military forces in a stability operation,they can only accomplish it by also restoring civil control. Civil control regulates selected behavior andactivities of individuals and groups. It reduces risk to individuals or groups and promotes security. Initialresponse tasks aim to develop interim mechanisms for establishing rule of law. Transformation tasks focus onrestoring an indigenous form of justice system and processes for reconciliation.

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5-9. The CAB assists with the establishment of public order and safety by protecting vulnerable elements ofthe population, such as dislocated civilians, ensuring humanitarian aid access and safeguarding key witnesses,or detaining perpetrators to ongoing investigations. CAB personnel can also support law enforcement and policereform by augmenting civilian police forces and at times provide training and capacity building until civilianagencies or military police can assume this role. Other examples of support include assisting with curfews andtraffic checkpoints, as well as physically segregating former warring factions and/or non-state actors. (Refer toATTP 3-39.10 for more information.)

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RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

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5-10. In restoring essential services, the CAB generally centers its efforts on the initial response taskssupporting the establishment or restoration of the most basic civil services. These are the essential food, water,shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. Othercivilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being to establish thefoundation for long-term development and resolving the root causes of conflict. The CAB may provide, or assistother government, intergovernmental, and host-nation agencies.

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5-11. Once immediate needs are satisfied restoring basic services and transitioning control to civil authoritiesbecomes the focus of government and civilian agencies. Essential services include sewage, water, electricityacademics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations (SWEAT-MSO). The CAB may support some ofthese efforts through continued security tasks, or provide some functional support like medics andtransportation.

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SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

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5-12. If the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions, then some degree ofmilitary support to governance may be necessary. Military support to governance focuses on restoring publicadministration and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effectivesystem of political governance. The support provided by military forces helps to shape the environment forextended unified action by other partners. Support to governance tasks establish conditions that enableinteragency and host-nation actions to succeed. The CAB commander focuses on transferring control ofgovernance efforts to a legitimate civil authority according to the desired end state.

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SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

5-13. Support to economic and infrastructure development helps a host nation develop capability and capacityin these areas. It may involve direct and indirect military assistance to local, regional, and national entities.CABs are capable of coordinating with local officials/elders to fund limited projects using a commandersemergency response program. These limited projects can support the local economy, and assist with rebuildingthe local infrastructure by providing employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the economyand stimulating market activity. It is important for military leaders to understand the economic fundamentals ofthe area to prevent artificial conditions that may not endure long term.

SECTION II PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

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5-14. Stability tasks tend to be decentralized and conducted over extended distances, with the exception ofspecific actions undertaken in combating terrorism, support to counterdrug operations, and noncombatantevacuation operations. As decentralized operations, the units activities consist largely of separated small unitoperations conducted across an assigned sector or AO. To encourage cooperation from indigenous forces andgain popular support, the CAB must conduct these operations with consistency, impartiality, and discipline.During transitions from offense or defense to stability tasks, commanders and staffs must quickly assess theircivil considerations in terms of the relevant factors of ASCOPE.

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5-15. Commanders must emphasize cooperating and communicating with joint headquarters, multinationalunits, civilian authorities, and nongovernmental organizations. Additionally, commanders must empowersubordinate leaders to develop, within the rules of engagements, close associations with the populations of theAOs. This empowerment typifies many stability tasks.

UNIT INTEGRATION5-16. When operating inside a multinational organization, commanders should expect to integrate units down tothe company level for combat units and to the individual level for support units. Commanders should train withthis reality in mind. Units operate under established procedures modified to agree with the standard operatingprocedures for the alliance or coalition. It is accepted that effectiveness initially decreases when operating in amultinational force, but through training and understanding of standards and procedures, unit performance willimprove.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION5-17. One factor that distinguishes stability tasks from offensive and defensive tasks is the requirement forinteragency coordination at the battalion-level and below. In interagency operations, Army commanders haveinherent responsibilities including the requirements to clarify the mission; to determine the controlling legal andpolicy authorities; and to task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations and individuals for whomthey provide the interagency effort. They also assure seamless termination under conditions that ensure theidentified objectives are met and can be sustained after the operation.

SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS5-18. The operational environment the CAB faces during stability tasks has special logistics considerations.These can include: Reliance on local procurement of certain items.

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Note. Local contracting might need to be split between belligerent parties.

5-19. ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances andlimitations under which United States forces will initiate or continue combat engagement with other forcesencountered. (ADRP 3-0) ROE reflect the requirements of the law of war, operational concerns, and politicalconsiderations when military force shifts from peace activities to combat operations and back to the peace phaseof an operation. These requirements are the primary means the commander uses to convey legal, political,diplomatic, and military guidance to the military force for handling the crisis in peacetime. The ROE is not justrestricted to units conducting stability tasks, but applies acrosstasks that the CAB excute.

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5-20. The ROE restrict the use of military force in order to achieve the political objectives. In all operations, thecommander is legally responsible for the care and treatment of civilians and property in the AO until transferredto proper authorities. The ROE assist the commander in fulfilling these responsibilities. They vary in differentconflicts and often change during the respective phases from combat or crisis through peace building or nationassistance.

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5-21. The ROE must be consistent with training and equipment capabilities. When necessary, commandguidance clarifies the ROE. While the rules must be tailored to the situation, commanders should observe thatnothing in such rules negates their obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action in unit self-defense,allowing Soldiers to protect themselves from deadly threats. The ROE can rule out, or impose speciallimitations on the use of weapons. Examples include the requirements for warning shots, single-shotengagements, and efforts to wound rather than kill. A CAB deploying for stability mission trains its Soldiers tointerpret and apply the ROE effectively. It is imperative for everyone to understand the ROE since small unitleaders and individual Soldiers must make ROE decisions promptly and independently.

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5-22. Changes to the ROE can result from immediate tactical emergencies at the local level. The commandershould be able to request changes to the ROE. Changes are requested through the operational chain of commandand must be approved by the designated authority, usually division or higher-level command. Commanders atall levels need to know the request channels for ROE as well as the procedures to obtain approval forrecommended changes to the ROE. Situations requiring an immediate change to the ROE could includeintroduction of combat forces from a hostile nation, attacks by sophisticated weapons systems includingweapons of mass destruction, or incidents resulting in loss of life. These situations should be wargamed andspecial instructions included in all OPORD and FRAGORDs that specifically state when and how commandersat all levels can adjust the ROE.

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5-23. The ROE are established for, disseminated down to, and understood by individual Soldiers. However, theROE cannot cover every situation. Soldiers at all levels must understand the intent of the ROE and actaccordingly despite any military disadvantage that may occur. The commander responsible for ROEformulation should consider including an intent portion that describes the desired end state of the operation aswell as conflict termination considerations. The intent portion should provide a framework for a proportionateresponse in the use of force. These considerations assist commanders and leaders at all levels in situations notclearly addressed in an OPORD. Further, ROE must be an integral part of all predeployment training. (Refer toAR 350-1 and FM 27-10 for more information.)

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LEVERAGE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, JOINT, INTERAGENCY,

AND MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION5-24. As with all operations, unity of effort is fundamental to success. SOF forces may have operated in theCAB AO prior to CAB deployment. The nature of SOF operations involves being familiar with the local cultureand the abilities of host-nation forces and civil authorities. Although SOF units might not directly operate withthe CAB, they are an excellent source of intelligence. Similarly, the CABs joint, interagency, and multinationalpartners may be able to provide valuable information on terrain, threats, and the local populace in the AO.Incorporating these personnel and their knowledge into planning work groups can aide in a greaterunderstanding of the pulse of the population and physical environment highlights, such as holy sites and keyfacilities and positively influence.

ENHANCE HOST-NATION LEGITIMACY

5-25. Army forces consciously enhance host-nation credibility and legitimacy by demonstrating the properrespect for the host-nations government, police, and military forces. Within the restrictions of international lawand U.S. policy, commanders use host-nation forces and personnel for all possible activities. Within itscapabilities, a host nation should take the lead in both developmental and security activities. When host-nationcapabilities prove inadequate for the task, Army forces enhance those capabilities through training, advice, andassistance.

POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ACTIONS

5-26. The actions of individuals and units can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command.When members of U.S. units display a lack of discipline or participate in lawlessness, they can destroy weeksand months of effort and, in some cases, can have strategic consequences. On the other hand, Soldiers andleaders who are disciplined, proficient, and knowledgeable in stability tasks can create the opportunity fordisproportionate positive consequences, while limiting the risk for negative consequences.

ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION

5-27. Decisive actions reassure allies regarding our strength and resolve and deter adversaries. Failure to actdecisively can cause a loss of respect for the force. A loss of respect for the capabilities or will of the force toaccomplish its mission can embolden adversaries, and therefore weaken the trust of the supported populationmaking the mission much more difficult. The nature of stability tasks ordinarily constrains forces in the waysand means available to accomplish military objectives. However, when action is necessary, stability tasks arecharacterized by initiative, speed, and determination. Units and individuals pursue military objectivesenergetically and apply military power forcefully, if required. Army forces may act decisively to dominate asituation by force, or negotiate to settle disputes. Without hesitation, they ensure mission accomplishment aswell as protection of themselves, the people, and facilities under their charge.

APPLY FORCE SELECTIVELY AND DISCRIMINATELY

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5-28. Forces apply combat power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed limitations.Commanders ensure that their units apply force consistent with assigned objectives, and not excessively.Excessive force can lead to the loss of sympathy and support from local and international community.Inadequate force can jeopardize mission accomplishment, and adversely affect the local populace and domesticsupport. Ordinarily, the local commander is best qualified to estimate the degree of force that must be used,consistent with established ROE. (Refer to ADRP 1 and JP 3-0 for more information.)

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5-29. Army forces must be prepared for combat when conducting stability tasks. Consistent with missionconstraints, units display preparedness by routinely conducting demanding combined arms training in the AO.The force demonstrates strength and resolve, without being threatening. The force should convey to all partiesthe breadth and depth of the resources available. To do so, it must be present in the communities and ensure(consistent with the demands of OPSEC) that the public knows the ROE and associated graduated response

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levels. The training should include challenging Soldiers to react to situations at all levels in the areas ofweapons use, levels of force, and ROE.

SECTION III - EXECUTING STABILITY TASKS

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5-30. Leaders often plan and conduct stability tasks in concert with those outside the U.S. military. Army forcesare often the supporting organization rather than the lead agency. However, the efforts of all involved must becoordinated toward a unified effort. Commanders use liaison elements and coordination centers to facilitateunity of effort. Commanders should be flexible in modifying standard mission command arrangements to meetspecific requirements of each situation and to promote unity of effort.

ESTABLISHING A COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

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5-31. Commanders must achieve mass, concentration, and their objective. In addition, they must not become sodecentralized as to piecemeal their efforts. The CAB creates and maintains a COP, utilizing both analog anddigital systems, which give the commander improved situational understanding. This improved SU enables himto command dispersed elements of the CAB while retaining the flexibility to quickly mass forces at the decisivepoint on the battlefield.

MAINTAINING COMMUNICATIONS

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5-32. When conducting stability tasks, communications can be difficult. In addition to problems ofcompatibility and security, many participants do not have enough communications equipment to meet missionrequirements. Communication planners should play an active role in the initial operations planning process toidentify the required communications architecture to interconnect the CAB with all of its military and civilianpartners. Liaison teams, with adequate communications gear, can reduce the severity of some of these problems.

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5-33. SATCOM are needed to provide communications between the higher-level headquarters. Other spacebased services, such as weather reporting and use of global positioning systems, might also be needed.Communications planners must anticipate these requirements during initial deployment planning, evaluate hostnation communications resources, and integrate them into the overall communications structure. Continualcentralized interfacing between key communications planners during planning, rehearsal, and operationalphases helps alleviate interoperability issues. Planners should address issues of spectrum management andcontrols on access to information systems early in planning. The loss of space-based communications due toenemy activity remains a major concern for U.S. Army forces conducting deployed operations. Whether theinterruption of the communications is caused by enemy action against satellites or through the use ofintermittent jamming/spoofing, the resulting "black-out" will require U.S. forces to adapt and adjust until thecapability is restored. Short term losses or disruptions of SATCOM will have to be mitigated throughalternative communications methods and courier networks.

4698

DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

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5-34. Subordinate commanders need maximum flexibility in executing their missions. Their commander shouldgive them specific responsibilities and ensure they understand his intent.

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5-35. Given the volatile and politically charged nature of most stability tasks, individual and small unit actionscan have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In some cases,tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic consequences. Preventing these problems requiresdisciplined, knowledgeable leaders and Soldiers at every level who clearly understand the CAB commandersintent.

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MISSION DEBRIEFINGS

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5-36. When conducting stability tasks, the S-2 should plan for debriefing any missions that occur outsideforward operating bases (FOBs). Soldiers on convoys, patrols, and LOGPACs have the capability to observesubtle changes in terrain, road conditions, civilian activity, and other indicators that are of intelligence value

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when reported. The use of digital cameras, along with mission prebriefings and debriefings should bestandardized in the unit TACSOP.

SECTION IV - TRANSITIONS5-37. Transitions could signal the next phase of an operation (such as a transfer to civilian authority) or as aresult of the changes in the operational environment. Regardless of the reason, transitions put the force in avulnerable position and require advanced planning and preparation.

TRANSITION TO OFFENSE5-38. Stability tasks may require a unit to rapidly transition to the offense. Commanders must ensure thatdetailed offensive tasks are indentified and part of the planning of stability tasks.

TRANSITION TO DEFENSE5-39. As with planning for transitions to the offense, transitioning to the defense also requires prior planning.The ability of a unit to transition back and forth between these tasks is critical to the success of stability tasks.

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The last 50 kilometers are the toughest in logistics. That's where our papers get graded."Brigadier General Vincent Boles

Sustainment is the provision of logistics, personnel services, and HSS necessary to

maintain operations until mission accomplishment. (ADRP 4-0) The provision ofsustainment is an integrated process (people, systems, materiel, health services, andother support) inextricably linked to operations. The forward support company hasgreatly reduced the CAB commander and staffs technical oversight responsibilitiesfor supply, transportation, and maintenance. Although the BSB provides technicaloversight to the FSC, the sustainment function is critical. The CAB commander andstaff still bear the responsibility of describing the requirements in the concept ofsupport, and integrating that support into the CABs concept of operations. Becauseof their criticality and proximity to combat operations, medical platoons remainorganic to CAB.

SECTION I SUSTAINMENT FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

6-1. The CAB commander ensures that sustainment is provided for organic and attached elements andensures OPCON or supporting units receive necessary support from the proper headquarters. Based uponguidance from the CAB commander and XO, the S-4 coordinates sustainment for the attachments andverifies who is to provide this support and how it is to be requested. When a large attachment joins theCAB, the attachment should bring an appropriate slice of logistics assets from its parent unit. The CAB S-4provides guidance to these assets as well as those of the FSC. The attached unit leaders must coordinatewith the CAB S-1 and furnish a copy of the unit battle roster. Thereafter, the attached unit submits reportsand requests resupply according to the CAB TACSOP.

SUSTAINMENT STAFF6-3. The sustainment staff has to be tied into every aspect of operations. They must monitor operationsthroughout and anticipate the needs of the CAB. They are subject matter experts in their areas and beadaptable to any unforeseen situation. The CAB S-1 and S-4 are the two primary staff officers and sectionsresponsible for sustainment along with the medical platoon leader.

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SUSTAINMENT ORGANIZATIONS

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6-4. Sustainment organizations are those that by design or mission provide one or more of the elements ofsustainment (logistics, personnel services, or HHS).

BATTALION MEDICAL PLATOON

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6-5. The medical platoon provides Role 1 medical support to the CAB and the supporting FSC. Themedical platoon triages, treats, and evacuates casualties or returns them to duty. It stocks medical suppliesand provides Class VIII support to company medical teams. It performs operator maintenance of thebattalions medical equipment and coordinates for biomedical equipment repair through the BSMC. Themedical platoon's survivability and mobility are increased by the use of Armored evacuation vehicles andaid stations. The medical platoon leader/physician and physician assistant oversee BAS operations. (Referto FM 4-02 for more information.) The medical operations officer, a medical service corps officer,coordinates the operations, administration, and logistics of the medical platoon. His duties include thefollowing: Overseeing the daily administrative and logistical operations for the medical platoon. Coordinating medical evacuations of patients to the BSMC. Supporting medical platoon personnel that are providing direct support to the maneuvercompanies.

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

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6-6. The battalion HHC is responsible for the administrative and sustainment support for the HHC andbattalion staff and its command posts. It has a supply section to provide unit-level supply and armorersupport to the Soldiers and equipment of the battalion headquarters.

BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

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6-7. The BSB is the BCTs organic sustainment unit. The BSB commander, assisted by the supportoperations officer (SPO) manages sustainment operations (including HSS) for the BCT commander. TheSPO is the key interface between the supported units and the BSB. The SPO plans and monitors supportoperations, and makes necessary adjustments to ensure support requirements are met. The SPO requestsand coordinates augmentation with the higher echelon when requirements exceed capabilities. The BSBalso has a sustainment automation management officer who assists with maintenance of logistics-relatedstandard Army management information systems (STAMIS), very small aperture terminal (VSAT), andcombat service and support automation information systems integrated throughout the BCT.

4797479847994800480148024803

6-8. The BSB can have up six FSCs and three other companies in addition to its HHC. (See Figure 6-1.)The BSB companies are: Distribution company. Field maintenance company. Brigade support medical company. Forward support companies (one for each CAB, cavalry squadron, and field artillery battalion).

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FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY

6-9. The role of the FSC is to provide direct logistics support to the supported battalion. The FSCprovides the supported commander with dedicated logistics assets organized specifically to meet thebattalions requirements. An FSC provides field feeding, bulk fuel, general supply, ammunition, and fieldmaintenance. The FSC commander receives technical logistics oversight and mentoring from the BSBcommander. FSC commanders must have a continuous relationship with the BSB SPO. The BSBcommander will utilize the SPO to ensure that all FSC commanders understand the BSB commandersbrigade logistics support plan. The FSC commander is the senior logistician for the CAB. The FSCcommander assists the battalion S-4 with the battalion logistics planning and is responsible for executingthe logistics plan in accordance with the BSB and supported battalion commanders guidance. FSCcommander is responsible for executing the sustainment plan in accordance with the CAB commandersguidance. The FSC receives supplies and specialized maintenance support from the BSB. (Refer to FM 4-0for more information.) The FSC is organized as in Figure 6-2 to support Food and water (Class I). Fuel (Class III). Ammunition (Class V). Repair parts (Class IX). Maintenance and recovery. Supply and distribution.

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4825Figure 6-2. Forward support company

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6-10. The FSCs normally operate in close proximity to the battalion. The location of the FSC is determinedby the battalion. The distance separating the FSC and the battalion is METT-TC dependent and will varybased upon the mission, situation, and environment. The FSC has distinct field maintenance teams tosupport each Armor and mechanized Infantry company. These teams generally have a direct supportrelationship to their supported companies.

BATTALION TRAINS OPERATIONS

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6-11. Trains are a unit grouping of personnel, vehicles, and equipment to provide sustainment. It is thebasic sustainment tactical organization. The CAB uses trains to array its subordinate sustainment elements,including their FSC. Battalion trains usually are under the control of the battalion S-4, and assisted by thebattalion S-1. The composition and location of battalion trains varies depending on the number of unitsattached to, or augmenting, the battalion.

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6-12. Battalion trains can be employed in two basic configurations: as unit trains in one location or asecheloned trains. Echeloned trains can be organized into company trains, battalion combat trains, or battalion fieldtrains. Figure 6-3a provides an example of echeloned trains. Unit trains at the battalion level are appropriate when the battalion is consolidated, duringreconstitution, and during major movements. Figure 6-3b provides an example of combinedtrains.

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4845Figure 6-3a. CAB trains during offense or defense

4846

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Chapter 6

4847Figure 6-3b. CAB trains during stability tasks

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BATTALION TRAINS

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6-13. Battalion trains consist of two types: combat trains and field trains. The CAB commander directs theestablishment and movement of combat trains and field trains in the battalion OPORD.Field Trains

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6-14. Field trains are not normally located in the BSA and include those assets not located with the combattrains. The field trains can provide direct coordination between the battalion and the BSB. When organized,the field trains usually consist of the elements of the FSC, battalion HHC, battalion (BN) S-1, and battalionS-4. The FSC facilitates the coordination and movement of support from the BSB to the battalion.Generally, field trains are located between 4 and 12 kilometers away from the battalions combatoperations. This allows the field trains to be outside of the enemys artillery range.

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6-15. The CAB company supply sergeants generally position themselves with the FSC. They assist theFSC in preparing company LOGPACs and then move their vehicles forward to the LRP. The company 1SGor his representative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to the company resupply point.

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Combat Trains6-16. The combat trains usually consist of the MCP, BAS, and emergency resupply trucks (for exampleClasses III and V). (See Figure 6-4.) The MCP should be positioned where recovery vehicles have access,or where major or difficult maintenance is performed. The factors of METT-TC must be considered whenpositioning the combat trains. Generally, combat trains are located between 1 and 4 kilometers away fromthe companys combat operations. This allows the combat trains to be outside of the enemys mortar range.The following factors govern the positioning of the combat trains: Communications are required between the CTCP, the CAB Main CP, the CAB FTCP, BCTmain CP, the BSB CP, and forward units. Room for dispersion and cover and concealment from both air and ground observation aredesired. The ground must support tracked and wheeled vehicle traffic. A suitable helicopter landing site for medical evacuation should be nearby. Routes to LRPs or to company locations must be available. Movement into and out of the area must not be restricted.

4877Figure 6-4. Combat trains

48784879

Maintenance Collection Point

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6-17. The MCP must maintain a current maintenance status on each of the companies equipment,especially on its vehicles in order to keep the commander apprised of its fighting capabilities. Like anyother unit in the CAB it prepares orders, tracks current operations with necessary overlays and providestactical SOPs. The MCP is usually a very active with personnel and vehicles coming and going for repairs,or resupply. The maintenance team must have a system to account for these personnel and vehicles at alltimes in order to move on order without losing any control of its assets. Company Trains

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6-18. Company trains provide sustainment for a company during combat operations. Company trainsusually include the 1SG, medical evacuation teams, supply sergeant, and the armorer. Usually, the FSC

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provides a field maintenance team, with capabilities for maintenance, recovery, and limited combat spares.The supply sergeant can collocate in the combat trains, if it facilitates LOGPAC operations. The 1SGusually directs movement and employment of the company trains; although the company commander mayassign the responsibility to the company XO. Generally, company trains are located between 500 and 1000meters away from the companys combat operations. By placing at least one terrain feature between it andthe enemy, the company trains will be out of the enemys direct fire weapons.

SUSTAINMENT-RELATED COMMAND POSTS

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6-19. The CAB commander may choose to create a CTCP or a FTCP as a headquarters for administrativeand logistics support. The S-4 is typically the OIC of the CTCP. If constituted, the FTCP is usually led bythe HHC commander. As an alternative the FSC commander can be in charge of the FTCP and the HHCcommander can assume command of the CTCP, depending on personnel experience and expertise. TheseCPs can be organized to accomplish specific logistical tasks: Situations that might dictate the need for a CTCP, which include: The combat trains require a dedicated mission command node. The CAB commander desires a battalion presence with the FSC. Situations that might dictate the need for a FTCP, which include: During periods of supply or resupply of major end items. The sustainment elements of the battalion are no longer 100 percent mobile.

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6-20. The CTCP generally consists of two S-4/S-1 tactical vehicles, the S-1 medium tactical vehicle, andthe FSCs CP carrier and enough personnel cross-trained to ensure continuous operation. The CTCP muststay abreast of the tactical situation and task organization; monitor the CAB command net to identifylogistics requirements; and receive requests, reports, and requirements from subordinate elements.Subordinate requirements are analyzed, consolidated, and forwarded to the FSC CP or other supportingactivity. The FSC commander coordinates and directs elements to take action to satisfy the forward units'requirements (for example, LOGPACs). Often the FSC will have a representative (for example, companyXO) at the CTCP to assist with coordination.

4914491549164917

6-21. If organized, the FTCP is the coordination and control center for the S-1s personnel andadministration center company supply sections, and FSC. The HHC commander generally focuses on CPoperations while the FSC commander commands his company and coordinates all sustainmentrequirements for the CAB.

4918491949204921

6-22. The S-1 section has personnel at both the CTCP and, if organized, the FTCP. The S-1 and his staff inthe CTCP primarily perform the critical tasks of strength accountability and casualty reporting as well ascommand post functions. The S-1 personnel in the FTCP perform replacement operations, administrativeservices, personnel actions, military pay, and coordinate legal services.

4922

SUSTAINMENT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

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6-23. The CTCP is the net control station for the CAB A/L net. The S-4, S-1, HHC commander, FSCcommander, FSC platoon leaders, medical platoon leader, company 1SGs, and FTCP operate in the A/Lnet. The CTCP also operates in the BCT A/L net and in the CAB command net.

492649274928492949304931

6-24. FBCB2 is the primary means of automated communication within the CAB. Unit 1SGs report theirpersonnel losses, maintenance problems, and emergency supply requirements immediately. Supply andpersonnel status reports are submitted periodically per the unit TACSOP. When use of radio or FBCB2 isnot possible, messages are sent with resupply or evacuation vehicles. The CTCP and FTCP maintaincontrol of vehicles moving forward to the LRPs. The CAB TACSOP establishes procedures for resupplywithout request in the event communications fail.

4932493349344935

6-25. The FSC utilizes combat service and support VSAT for sustainment communications external to theCAB (for example, BSB or sustainment brigade). The CAB S-1 also relies on the combat service andsupport VSAT for eMILPO. When the FSC is not positioned near the CTCP, the S-1 will need to travel to,or collocate with the FSC.

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6-26. Operations will require leaders to carefully plan for and rehearse mission command to report combatpower, repair part requirements, recovery needs, and other aspects of sustainment. Leaders must haveprimary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans to maintain a COP, using both sides of thecommunications spectrum when the advance digital systems widely being used do not provide operationalcapability on the move.

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6-27. The chart below (see Figure 6-5) represents a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergencycommunication plan with some of the enablers available at the BCT and CAB level. A well thought outprimary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plan will account for the systems that are not feasible formonitoring a decisive actions operation on the move.

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SECURITY OF THE TRAINS

6-28. Sustainment elements behind the forward line of own troops form base clusters and must be preparedto defend against hostile or insurgent forces that have broken through or bypassed the defense. Generally,the HHC commander is responsible for trains security when operating in a unit trains configuration. Whentrains are echeloned, the S-4 is responsible for securing the combat trains, and the HHC commander isresponsible for securing the field trains. If the CAB commander locates his field trains with the BSA, the

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HHC commander coordinates with the BSB commander to integrate the field trains into the BSA defensiveplan.

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6-29. The HHC commander and S-4 should consider all the assets at their disposal to increase trainssecurity to include vehicles receiving maintenance that are still capable of firing some or all of theirweapon systems, available personnel, to include maintenance and crews and other attachments.

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6-30. A perimeter defense is normally planned in all trains areas, and elements in the trains are assigned aspecific sector to defend. Mutually supporting positions that dominate likely avenues of approach areselected for vehicles armed with heavy machine guns. Reaction forces and observation posts are establishedbased on the unit TACSOP. To enhance security, an alarm or warning system is arranged. Sector sketches,fire plans, and obstacle plans should be prepared. Rehearsals are conducted to ensure that all personnelknow the part they play in the defensive scheme. The OIC at each location establishes a shift schedule foroperations and security on a 24 hour basis.

4965

MOVEMENT OF THE TRAINS

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6-31. Planning sustainment for decisive actions requires detailed planning and guidance, especially in theoffense when forward trains are required to move with the fight to provide the maintenance support andcombat power to maintain the momentum of the offensive operation.

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6-32. The XO and S-4, in coordination with the FSC commander, plan locations and movement of thetrains (or the FSC) to ensure responsive forward support. The displacement of the trains must be carefullycoordinated with the concept of operations, locations of the BSA and MSRs, communication links,establishment of digital nodes, priorities of support, and time available for sustainment brigade throughputsand displacement. It is important for the CAB staff to understand the impact of BSB to FSC deliveryschedules during the planning process. Movement of the trains or the FSC may severely constrain themaneuver commanders plan unless each echelon of sustainment is considered during the planned oremergency move.

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6-33. During decisive actions it is not feasible to assume that all maintenance can be conducted forwardwith the maneuver companies. Forward maintenance teams are limited on haul capacity to fix forward,.During the planning process, it is imperative to determine when evacuation to the field trains/brigadesupport area (BSA) is required. A solid trigger for that is an evacuation timeline with conditions thatindicate that pushing a piece of equipment to the rear formations is advantageous. This timeline should beestablished by the Brigade with input from the supporting elements. For example it can determine thatrepairs requiring up to 2 hours are conducted at company trains, 2-6 hour repairs at the CAB MCP and anyrepairs requiring greater than 6 hours go to the field trains.

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6-34. Resupply by air is an alternative to conducting resupply. Normally resupply is conducted by movingequipment, supplies and personnel around by trains or convoys. The combat trains can establish a helipadfor medical evacuation and sling load resupply of repair parts and other needed supplies, as oppose towaiting for convoy resupply to deliver supplies. To do so the S-4 must first carefully consider the road andrail networks, airfields, truck availability, bridges, ports, cargo handlers, petroleum pipelines, materialshandling equipment, traffic flow, choke points, and control problems to determine the best methods forresupply. (Refer to FM 4-20.41 for more information.)

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6-35. Security of sustainment assets during movement is a major consideration. The CAB, with FSC, hassufficient transportation assets to move its Soldiers and equipment in one move. However, downloadedsupplies at supply points and disabled equipment at maintenance sites create mobility problems. The CABstaff must closely monitor mobility status and anticipate mobility problems well in advance to developsolutions. For all additional transportation requirements beyond the CAB's capability, the S-4 mustcoordinate for external support with the BSB support operations section.

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6-36. In addition to conducting planned moves, both the combat trains and the field trains should have aTACSOP for conducting emergency moves. Emergency moves normally occur when the trains mustrelocate quickly to avoid a significant enemy threat. The CAB designates alternate trains locations andmovement routes. The CTCP, FTCP, and FSC commander disseminate emergency movement plans to all

Movement of Trains Within the CAB Formation

6-37. This technique is used when the likelihood of enemy contact is minimal, sustainment demands arelight, and the CAB companies can use basic loads and organic recovery assets to satisfy initialrequirements. Combat trains always move with the CAB. The trains are dispersed within march columnsand are secured by other elements of the CAB. Sufficient time must be allowed for the FSC to establishinterim support from the BSB prior to mission execution. This technique provides timely movement andmarch security but precludes any meaningful support until movement ceases. This technique may be usefulduring tactical road marches or approach marches.

Movement of Trains With the BSB

6-38. When BCT operations are conducted in clearly defined phases with identifiable windows betweenphases (such as in river crossings) the BSB may support the BCT from a BSA that includes the FSCs andthen displace as one entity to a subsequent BSA location. This allows the BSB to maximize support from amature logistical base that facilitates resupply and maintenance activities. This concept also enhancesmission command of the BSB and simplifies actions for supported forces since a single point of contact isestablished for each service and facility of the BSA. However, this movement method may cause gaps insupport.

Movement of Trains by Bounds

6-39. Sustainment assets are divided and displaced by successive bounds from one trains location to a newtrains location. The FSC commander normally moves with the initial logistics element to ensure rapid setupof the displacing echelon. This technique provides more responsive support by minimizing the throughputdistances to FSC elements. It also enhances the survivability of logistical assets by positioning them indifferent areas. Because of echelonment, mission command of the FSC operations may be degraded. Aheavy reliance on unit TACSOPs, communication links, and sustainment plans is vital to ensure smoothdisplacement of the trains.

LOGISTICS PACKAGE OPERATIONS

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6-40. An efficient method of resupply to forward companies is accomplished by LOGPACs. LOGPACs

are organized by the FSC commander and assisted by company supply sergeants. LOGPACs are organizedfor each company and separate unit in the CAB and usually moved forward daily for routine resupply.Special LOGPACs are organized and dispatched as required by the tactical situation and logisticaldemands.

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6-41. The S-4 must plan and coordinate LOGPAC operations to ensure that they fully support thecommander's tactical plans. The CAB TACSOP establishes the standard LOGPAC. Normally, a companyLOGPAC includes trucks for supplies, POL, Class V as well as vehicles with replacements and requiringrepair. (Refer to ATP 3-90.1 for more information.)

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6-42. LRP locations are determined by the S-4 based on the tactical situation. They should be well forwardand easily located. Normally, two to four LRPs are planned. LRPs, as well as the MSR, combat trains, fieldtrains, and BSA locations are included on the operations overlay, if possible. The CTCP notifiessubordinates and the FTCP well in advance which LRP(s) will be used. The LOGPAC convoy arrival timeat the LRP and the length of time it remains normally are established by TACSOP. If the tactical situationdictates otherwise, the S-4 must determine the time and notify units accordingly. LOGPACs may bescheduled to arrive shortly after arrival at a BP or intermediate objective. Subordinates must ensure that theresupply vehicles are returned to the LRP as soon as possible so that the vehicles can return to the fieldtrains and begin preparation for the next mission.

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6-43. At least one senior representative from the CTCP (S-4, S-1, or senior NCO) should be present at theLRP while it is in effect. His purpose is to meet with the unit 1SGs for coordination of logistical

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requirements and to ensure that the LOGPAC release and return takes place efficiently. A brief meeting isnormally held immediately before the 1SG picks up his LOGPAC. Coordination may include: Changes in logistical requirements reflecting any last-minute task organization. Reports on personnel, logistics, and maintenance from the companies. Confirmation of receipt of digital logistics situation reports (if FBCB2 equipped). First hand updates on the tactical situation and logistical status.

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6-44. Resupply of the scout and mortar platoons, the main CP, combat trains, and attached support unitsmust be planned and coordinated. The HHC 1SG coordinates and supervises resupply of these elements.Generally, the HHC 1SG operates out of the combat trains. The platoon sergeant of these elements orsenior NCO at a facility must report his requirements to the HHC 1SG or to the CTCP.

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6-45. The most desirable method of resupply is to form small LOGPACs for these elements, which theplatoon sergeant picks up at the LRP in the same manner as a company 1SG. In some cases, the HHC 1SGdelivers the LOGPAC to the main CP, combat trains, and scout and mortar platoons. Attachments canreceive resupply at one of these locations or as previously coordinated. Another option is for attachments tobe resupplied from a nearby company LOGPAC. The S-4 coordinates this resupply before the LOGPACsare dispatched.

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6-46. Resupply operations for the scout platoon pose several unique challenges. Special procedures may benecessary to resupply the scout platoon, to include: Resupplying the platoon by having each vehicle individually pull off line and move to a resupplysite. This is also known as the service station method. (Refer to ATP 3-90.1 for moreinformation.) This method may be feasible when the platoon is performing security for astationary force. Resupplying the platoon near the combat trains as the platoon repositions between missions.This is also known as the distribution point method. Designating one Class III vehicle in the combat trains to fuel the platoon on short notice. Thismethod is also known as the tailgate method.

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6-47. While the LOGPACs are the preferred methods of resupply, there will be times when other methodsof resupply are required: Resupply from the combat trains (emergency resupply). The combat trains have a limitedamount of Class III and V for emergency resupply. The S-4 coordinates emergency resupplyfrom the combat trains and then refills or replaces the combat trains' assets. Prestocking. Prestocking is the placing and concealing of supplies on the battlefield. This isnormally done during defensive operations when supplies are placed in subsequent battlepositions. These prestocked supplies are sometimes called a cache. Mobile prepositioning. This is similar to prestocking except that the supplies remain on thetruck, which is positioned forward on the battlefield.

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AERIAL DELIVERY

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6-48. The CAB and supporting FSC are 100 percent mobile with their organic vehicles and trailers.Depending on the level of supplies to be stocked, the FSC may not be entirely mobile. If the FSCs limitedassets are committed, the FSC requests extra transportation assets from higher headquarters.

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6-49. Aerial delivery is also used as a method of resupply. When employing aerial delivery, the ABCTshould consider the following: The use of aerial delivery requires the coordination of the CAB staff and the ABCT S-3, S-4,and ADAM/BAE sections. Special focus must be placed on the enemy air defense capability. The FSC must be prepared to both receive and package bulk supplies by sling-load operations orjoint precision airdrop system. To conduct these operations, sling load trained personnel arerequired in of the FSCs distribution platoon.

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6-50. All companies must know how to select LZ/DZ to receive aerial resupply. The delivered supplies areimmediately transported away from the LZ/DZ.

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SECTION II MAINTENANCE6-51. The Army has two levels of maintenance; field and sustainment. Field maintenance consistsprimarily of troubleshooting, repairing or replacing parts and assemblies on on the users system orplatform. It is the product of merging the previous organizational and direct support levels of maintenancetogether. Within the CAB, field-level maintainers are concentrated in the FSC. Field maintenance is alsodone in the battalion S-6 sections for network and signal equipment. Sustainment maintenance consists ofrepairing components major assemblies off the users system or platform and overhauling major end-itemsto the national standard, Sustainment level maintenance returns the products to the national supply system.COMSEC equipment is evacuated through maintenance channels from the unit to the first supportingmaintenance unit to complete a total supply transaction and return a serviceable device to the user. Therepair of communications security material is performed at sustainment level only.

FIELD MAINTENANCE

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6-52. Field maintenance is repair and return to user and is generally characterized by on-/near-systemmaintenance, often utilizing line replaceable unit, component replacement, BDA, repair, and recovery.(ATTP 4-33) It covers tasks previously assigned to operator/crew, organization/unit, and direct supportmaintenance levels. It includes some off-system maintenance critical to mission readiness.

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6-53. Company commanders ensure that vehicle crews and equipment operators perform preventivemaintenance checks and services. To provide quick turnaround of maintenance problems, each maneuvercompany has a field maintenance teams (FMT) from the supporting FSC dedicated to support them. TheseFMTs have forward repair systems and mechanics trained in the companys equipment. The company 1SGusually positions the FMT in the company trains. (Refer to FM 4-90 for more information.)

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6-54. The FSC performs field-level maintenance. The FSC has a maintenance platoon that repairsautomotive, armament, ground support, electronic, and missile equipment. The FSC focuses on linereplaceable units and component replacements, using combat spares from prescribed load list and shopstock. It has a service and recovery section and also performs battle damage assessment and repair. TheFSCs maintenance control section uses standard Army maintenance system-enhanced (SAMS-E) orGCSS-Amry to order repair parts. The FSC commander establishes MCPs in coordination with themaneuver battalion XO or S-4. These MCPs are generally in the combat trains.

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6-55. The BSBs field maintenance company provides limited backup support to FSCs,. It also serves asthe maintenance point for low density equipment. When required, the BSB dispatches FMTs to perform onsite diagnoses, make minor adjustments, and conduct repairs.

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BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND REPAIR

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6-56. Battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) is the procedure used to rapidly return disabledequipment to the operational commander by field expedient repair of components. BDAR restores theminimum essential combat capabilities necessary to support a specific combat mission or to enable theequipment to self- recover. BDAR is accomplished by: Bypassing components or safety devices. Relocating parts from like or lower priority systems on the equipment. Fabricating repair parts. Implementing a temporary repair. Using substitute fluids, materials or components.

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6-57. Based on the units standard operating procedures and at the commanders discretion, anyone canperform BDAR depending on the extent of repairs required and METT-TC conditions. The commanderdecides whether or not to use BDAR instead of standard maintenance procedures. Expedient repairs may ormay not return the vehicle to a fully mission-capable status. At the completion of immediate combatoperations, qualified maintenance personnel will make repairs to restore the equipment to fully missioncapable 10/20 maintenance standards. The Army Regulation 750-1 is the regulatory guidance for BDAR.

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RECOVERY AND EVACUATION

6-58. FSCs are responsible for recovering their own damaged equipment and the equipment of the unitsthey support. If the vehicle is repairable, the company recovers it, and transports it to the MCP, or to thenearest MSR, depending on what is specified in the TACSOP or the OPORD. The use of FBCB2 enablesrecovery vehicles to identify the exact location of the inoperable piece of equipment. When the decision ismade to repair the equipment at the BSA, either recovery or evacuation is used. If FSC recovery assets areoverextended, recovery support can be coordinated with the BSA to prevent excessive repair delays.Equipment that cannot be repaired at the BSA usually is evacuated to sustainment brigade units.

CONTROLLED EXCHANGE6-59. Controlled exchange is the removal of serviceable parts from an item of not mission capableequipment to install on another piece of equipment that can be rendered mission capable more quickly oreasily. The BCT commander can give battalion commanders the authority to direct controlled exchanges.

RESUPPLY6-60. The FSC has combat spares or shop stock to support maintenance of vehicles, generators, and otherequipment. Combat spares are a combination of on-board spares, shop stock, bench stock, and combatrepair stock. Combat spares are issued based on the commanders priority and authorization. The FSC mayallocate combat spares to FMTs, depending on the METT-TC. The FMTs replenish combat spares usingSAMS-E or GCSS-Army through the FSC. The company supply sergeant and communications personnelalso order parts as needed through the FSC

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MAINTENANCE

6-61. COMSEC equipment is evacuated through maintenance channels from the unit to the first supportingmaintenance unit to complete a total supply transaction and return a serviceable device to the user. Therepair of communications security material is performed at sustainment level only.

SECTION III ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT

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6-62. The Army HSS is arranged in progressive numeric roles of medical care. These roles begin at thepoint of injury with Role 1 emergency services, and progress to the CONUS support-base. Each rolereflects an increase in capability, with the functions of each lower role being within the capabilities of thehigher role.

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6-63. Role 1 and 2 care is described below. Role 3 medical care is provided by combat support hospitalslocated in the AO. Role 4 medical care is the CONUS support base for health care. Role 4 medical care isfound in support base hospitals. Mobilization requires expansion of military hospital capacities and theinclusion of Department of Veterans Affairs and civilian hospital beds in the National Disaster MedicalSystem to meet the increased demands created by the evacuation of patients from the AO. The support-basehospitals represent the most definitive medical care available within the AHS.

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ROLE 1 MEDICAL SUPPORT

6-64. The first medical care a Soldier receives occurs at Role 1. Combat medics, assisted by self-aid,buddy aid, and combat lifesavers provide Role 1 services. It continues at the BAS with treatment from thephysician and physician assistant. Role 1 care includes combat and operational stress control services,immediate lifesaving measures, patient collection, and medical evacuation to supported medical treatmentelements.

COMBAT LIFESAVERS6-65. The CLS is a nonmedical Soldier trained to provide enhanced first aid and lifesaving proceduresbeyond the level of self aid or buddy aid. The CLS is not intended to take the place of medical personnel,

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but to slow deterioration of a wounded Soldiers condition until medical personnel arrive. Each squad,crew, or equivalent-sized deployable unit has at least one Soldier trained and certified as a CLS.

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6-66. CLSs and buddy aid are crucial to HSS. The CLS is usually the first person on the scene of a medicalemergency, and provides enhanced first aid to wounded and injured personnel. The vehicle commander isresponsible for ensuring that injured crewmen receive immediate first aid, and that the commander isinformed of casualties. He coordinates with the 1SG and company senior medic for ground evacuation.

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BATTALION MEDICAL PLATOON

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6-67. The BN medical platoon is the focal point of HSS/FHP for the CAB. It is organized to support theBN CPs and companies; acquire, treat, evacuate casualties; and coordinate further evacuation as necessary.This platoon establishes a treatment point at the BAS. The medical platoon provides trained personnel tostabilize patients for further evacuation, provide emergency lifesaving and limb-saving treatment, and treatminor wounds or illness for return to duty. (Refer to FM 4-02.4 for more information.)

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6-68. Resupply of medical supplies is through medical channels. Medical personnel are responsible formaintaining their medical equipment sets. Combat lifesavers and company or platoon medics receivereplenishment for their aid bags from the battalion medical platoon. To prevent unnecessary depletion ofblankets, litters, splints, and other medical equipment, the receiving medical facility exchanges similarproperties with the BAS when it accompanies the patient. (Refer to FM 4-02.1 for more information.)

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MEDICAL EVACUATION

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6-69. Evacuation of injured Soldiers is categorized into two types:

Medical evacuation is the use of ground or air ambulances to evacuate from the point of injury toa MTF while providing en route care. CASEVAC is the use of non-medical vehicles or other means for patient movement withoutproviding en-route care.

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6-70. The medical evacuation plan is the key to the HSS plan. The battalion medical platoon is responsiblefor medical evacuation of casualties from the point of injury to the BAS. The CAB S-1/S-4 must ensurethere is a coordinated medical evacuation plan from all BN locations to the BAS, and to the BSMC in theBSA. The BCT surgeon section coordinates the medical evacuation plans of all BCT medical platoons andthe BSMC. The CAB S-4 and the ABCT S-4 coordinate AXP locations, and post them on the supportgraphics in FBCB2. The CAB S-4 also coordinates any available non-standard ambulance support fromwithin the battalion. He identifies and positions internal vehicles as required for mass CASEVAC. TheCAB S-4 tracks active and inactive AXPs, and disseminates that information to battalion CPs andcompanies.

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6-71. CAB medical platoons generally attach ground ambulances to companies in anticipation ofcasualties. The BSMC ambulance teams evacuate patients from the BAS back to the BSMC MTF locatedin the BSA. Prepositioning BSMC ambulance teams with the supported CABs BAS reduces ambulanceturnaround times. The BCT surgeon, in coordination with the BAE and the BCT S-4, plans the landing sitesfor aerial evacuation. BCT medical evacuation plans and exercises should include the use of aerialevacuation (when available) to transport litter-urgent patients.

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6-72. As casualties occur, the CAB S-4 directs assets to assist with CASEVAC. Medical evacuationoutside the BN can be accomplished by ground or air means. Recovery responsibility does not end untilcasualties are evacuated back to its Role 1 MTF/BAS. Responsibility for further evacuation from the BASis the mission of the BSMC ground ambulances or supporting air ambulance. Casualties can be evacuatedto the BSMC Role 2 MTF in the BSA or other supporting MTFs. Medical patients are evacuated no furtherto the rear than their condition requires, and return to duty as soon as possible.

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6-73. The preferred method of medical evacuation is by air ambulance, but air ambulance use is METT-TCdependent. The aviation brigade may position a forward support medical evacuation team (FSMT) usuallyconsisting of three UH-60 Blackhawk aircraft in support of the BCT. The FSMT is normally located in theBSA or with other aviation elements located in the brigade AO. The FSMT provides area support to theBCT and other units operating in the BCT AO. The BAE and BCT surgeon coordinate the use and

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positioning of the FSMT. They integrate air ambulance support to include coordination of AC2requirements, establishing clear lines of authority to launch a medical evacuation, and identification of PZand LZs.

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6-74. Planners must anticipate the potential for high casualty rates and long evacuation distances. Theyidentify and coordinate AXPs along the axis of advance and on the objective. Planners must identify theAXP locations for all phases of the operation; they must also identify triggers developed for AXPsdisplacement to their next locations. Planners must retain the flexibility to shift nonstandard evacuationassets to support mass casualty or CASEVAC as required.

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MEDICAL REPORTING

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6-75. MC4 and TMIP support the information management requirements for CAB medical platoon. TheCTCP uses FBCB2 and MC4-TMIP to support medical planning, coordination of orders and subordinatetasks, and to monitor and ensure execution throughout the mission. Medical reporting includes: disease andnon-battle injury reports; environmental and occupational health surveillance; and lost duty days.

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6-76. The MC4-TMIP is an automated system, which links health care providers and medical supportproviders, at all roles of care, with integrated medical information. The MC4-TMIP receives, stores,processes, transmits, and reports medical mission command, medical surveillance, casualty movement/tracking, medical treatment, medical situational awareness, and MEDLOG data across all roles of care.MC4 is capable of using the same combat service and support VSAT network for data transmission as theautomated supply and maintenance systems.

ROLE 2 MEDICAL SUPPORT

6-77. Medical companies provide Role 2 care. They examine and evaluate the casualtys wounds andgeneral status to determine treatment and evacuation priorities. Role 2 care can duplicate Role 1, but Role 2also provides expanded services to the casualty. When required to provide far-forward surgicalintervention, a forward surgical team may augment the medical company to provide initial wound surgery.

BRIGADE SUPPORT MEDICAL COMPANY

6-78. CAB Soldiers do not usually use host-nation or other non-U.S. medical facilities except foremergency medical treatment or for medical/surgical specialty consultation when a medical specialist, suchas a neurosurgeon, is not readily available. The BSMC examines and evaluates a casualtys wounds andgeneral physical condition to determine treatment and evacuation priorities. This role of care contains Role1 capabilities, and expands to Role 2 care with the following available services by adding operationaldental, laboratory, radiology, Preventive Medicine (PVNTMED), MEDLOG and blood management,combat and operational stress control, and patient holding capabilities. A forward surgical team mayaugment the BSMC as necessary to provide surgical resuscitation, stabilization, and initial wound surgery.The BSMC has a Brigade Medical Supply Office that serves as a forward distribution point for Class VIIIand synchronizes MEDLOG support for medical equipment and its maintenance within the BCT. (Refer toFM 4-90 and FM 4-02 for more information.)

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE PERSONNEL AND SERVICES

6-80. Preventive medicine support is provided by preventive medicine personnel who are organic to theBSMC. Preventive medicine personnel who are organic to the BSMC provide preventive medicine support.This BSMC preventive medicine section is equipped to conduct preventive medicine surveillance andcontrol. Level II operational tasks include, but are not limited to: Preparing a running estimate to identify the health threat in the BCTs AO. Preparations shouldinclude acquiring past after-action reports and data from higher headquarters, U.S. Army PublicHealth Command, and the National Center for Medical Intelligence. Advising the commander on impacts of the health threat to his forces and providingrecommended techniques and procedures to defeat/minimize the health threat. Preparing essential PVNTMED information for inclusion into the operation plan, operationorder, and briefings to ensure awareness of both the health threat and the correspondingPVNTMED measures. Performing sanitary inspections of supported units food service, field site, latrine, bathing, andother sanitation facilities. Performing sanitary inspections and providing PVNTMED recommendations for detaineefacilities. For additional information on medical support to detainee operations, refer to FieldManual Interim (FMI) ATP 4-02.46 (will replace 4-02.46 when revision is released). Providing early warning of any breakdown in basic sanitation practices so that corrective actionmay be conducted before diseases are transmitted. Providing early detection and warning of potential disease epidemics or suspected biologicalwarfare agent employment within the BCT AO. Providing limited pest management services and vector surveillance to supported units. Monitoring field water supplies, to include possible CBRN and toxic industrial materialcontamination. Collecting environmental samples from suspected CBRN- or toxic industrial materialcontaminated sources. Preparing samples for submission to supporting laboratories for analysis. Providing input and recommendations to contracting services to ensure PVNTMEDrequirements are adequately addressed. Preparing chain of custody documents and ensuring that the samples are not contaminated from39 sources outside the sampled site. Providing staff oversight of and assisting in the training in the proper use of PVNTMEDmeasures

COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL STRESS CONTROL

6-81. Provides direct support combat and operational stress control prevention and treatment services forbrigade combat team MH sections, division/corps and theater army, and joint or combined forces on anarea basis. Combat and operational and stress control prevents, identifies, and manages adverse Combatand Operational Stress Reactions (COSR) in supported units. Combat and operational stress controloptimizes mission performance, conserves the fighting strength, and prevents or minimizes adverse effectsof COSR on Soldiers and their physical, psychological, intellectual, and social health. Its goal is to returnSoldiers to duty expeditiously. Combat and operational stress control activities include routine screening ofindividuals when recruited; continued surveillance throughout military service, especially before, during,and after deployment; and continual assessment and consultation with medical and other personnel fromgarrison to the battlefield. (Refer to FM 6-22.5 for more information.)

CAB FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION PROGRAM

6-82. The CAB commander and all leaders, in conjunction with the company commanders, combat medic,and field sanitation teams, emphasize and enforce high standards of health and hygiene at all times. Aproactive FHP program implemented at the battalion and company levels should include personal health

and hygiene, preventive medicine, preventive dentistry, combat and operational stress control, food safety,and awareness of potential health threats. CAB leaders and members must be informed on preventivemedicine measures to counter health threats and to maintain their health and overall fitness to perform theirmission.

SECTION IV HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT

6-83. The S-1 section provides the CAB with an organic element for the planning, integration,coordination, and delivery of human resources (HR) support for the CAB. (Refer to ATTP 1-0.1for moreinformation.) The S-1 provides HR support in the following areas: Essential personnel services. HR planning and staff operations. Postal operations. Personnel information management. Personnel readiness management. Personnel accountability and strength reporting (PASR). Casualty operations.

Location and amount of secure/non-secure connectivity and bandwidth.

POSTAL OPERATIONS6-86. The CAB S-1 section is responsible for the development and coordination of the CAB postaloperations plan. The S-1 coordinates external postal support with the BCT S-1 and the human resourcescompany (postal). Normally, Soldier mail will arrive at the BSA already sorted by unit (for example, 4digit zip code extensions). Then the mail either is picked up by the designated battalion mail clerk, or issent forward to him in the combat trains. Outgoing mail is exchanged at the same time. The battalion mailclerk receives and distributes the mail to the company mail clerk who ensures it is delivered to the Soldier.

6-91. As casualties occur, the nearest observer informs the company 1SG via the most expedient methodavailable (for example, free text within FBCB2, FM voice) per unit TACSOP. The 1SG uses the FBCB2 tosubmit a personnel situation report, which documents duty status changes on all casualties. FBCB2 sendsthese reports directly to the CTCP. Casualties are taken to casualty collection points for classification ofinjury type (routine, urgent, return to duty), evacuation, and integration into the medical treatment system.The 1SG ensures completed DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Card) are forwarded to the CAB S-1, whothen enters the data into the Defense Casualty Information Processing System. The report is thentransmitted to BCT S-1, who verifies the information and forwards the report to the Corps and Division G1/AG, or deployed theater Casualty Assistance Center.

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6-92. The S-1 ensures the accuracy of the data in defense casualty information processing system to, inturn; ensure accurate and timely notification of the Soldiers next of kin. The CAB S-1 must establishprocedures to ensure that attachments and augmentations to the battalion are accurately reported, and thateach Soldier is reported at least, but not more than, once.

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6-93. Commanders and their 1SGs must establish procedures to ensure that the Soldiers next of kin arenotified properly and according to procedure. The proliferation of personal communications (for example,cell phones and computers) in proximity to the battlefield enables nearly every Soldier to contact his/herhome station. The next of kin for Soldiers wounded or killed in action should not receive notificationthrough unofficial means.

Medical/Personnel Accounting6-94. When a Soldier becomes a casualty, the unit medic from the medical platoon records medicaltreatment on the Soldiers DD Form 1380 (United States Field Medical Card). The BAS and BSMC readthe Soldiers DD 1380 when they treat the Soldier. The CAB S-1 should electronically receive anotification message to update the Soldiers patient tracking status. In this manner, a casualtys location canbe determined and Soldiers properly accounted for. If the electronic system does not work, the S-1 shouldplan to have a representative at the BAS. (Refer to FM 4-02.17 for addition reporting requirements.)

S-1 Responsibilities6-95. Key casualty operations responsibilities of the CAB S-1 section include: Maintain personnel asset visibility on all assigned or attached personnel. Provide Soldiers the opportunity to make changes to their DD Form 93 (Record of EmergencyData) and DD Form 8286 (Servicemans Group Life Insurance) when changes are necessary andensure both are current and uploaded into iPERMS. Ensure that all assigned or attached personnel are trained on and maintain required copies of DAForm 1156. Receive casualty information from subordinate or attached units (information may be receivedvia casualty reporting system, DA Form 1156s, radio, or by other available methods). Notify the battalion commander and the chaplain when a casualty occurs. Ensure a field grade officer from the CAB reviews and approves all casualty information prior tosubmission of the initial report. (If the tactical situation does not allow a review, follow-up theinitial report with a supplemental update as soon as possible.)

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Submit initial casualty reports to BCT S-1 using DA Form 1156 or defense casualty informationprocessing system -FWD within three hours of casualty notification when conditions permit.Provide supplemental casualty report information.Process posthumous promotions, awards, U.S. citizenship actions, if applicable.Appoint summary court-martial officer for personal effects.Coordinate for an investigating officer to conduct an AR 15-6 collateral investigation (requiredfor hostile deaths and accidental or operational nonhostile and hostile friendly fire incident).Appoint line of duty investigating officer for nonhostile injuries and deaths, as directed by thecommander.Prepare, review and dispatch letters of sympathy or condolence.Coordinate with the surgeon, battalion aid station, or medical company to monitor status ofpatients.Track evacuated casualties back to home station/demobilization site.Update the commander on the status of casualties.

6-96. Techniques for casualty management include:

Plan to receive reports from company 1SGs thirty minutes after casualties occur. Plan to forward reports to the BCT S-1 within one hour after casualties occur. Monitor mortuary affairs activities and reconcile casualty reports. Plan to prepare Purple Heart recommendations, letters of condolence, and posthumous awards. Coordinate with BAS, BSMC, and casualty liaison teams to monitor status of casualties. Coordinate requirements with the S-4 for mortuary affairs supplies for unit teams. Coordinate with the BSMC and casualty liaison teams for return to duty of battalion personnel.

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

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6-97. Commanders provide opportunities for the free exercise of religion through their chaplains andchaplain assistants. The unit ministry teams (UMTs) provide religious support by executing specificfunctions. Commanders expect chaplains and chaplain assistants to understand the tasks associated withthese functions. A partial, descriptive list of the religious support functions a UMT may use to accomplishthe operational religious support mission includes: Advising the command on religion, morals, morale, and ethical issues. Leadership of religious worship. Administration of religious rites, sacraments, and ordinances. Provision of pastoral care and counseling. Teaching and management of religious education. Provision of professional support to the command and staff. Liaison with local or host-nation religious leaders as directed by the commander. Conduct of religious support planning, training, and operations.

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6-98. The chaplain advises the commander on the impact of religion within the unit and how religionimpacts the units mission throughout its area of operations. Internally, the chaplain is responsible foradvising the command on the religious practices of Soldiers within the command. This can includeidentifying holy days, specific worship requirements, dietary requirements, and wearing of religiousgarments. Externally, the chaplain advises the command on the specifics of the religious environmentwithin their area of operations that may impact mission accomplishment. This can include indigenousreligions in the area of operations, holy days that could impact military operations, and the significance oflocal religious leaders and structures. The UMT can work within boards, bureaus, centers, cells, andworking groups to integrate their respective expertise and knowledge with the collective expertise of thestaff in order to focus on specific problem sets to provide coherent staff recommendations to thecommander. (Refer to FM 1-05 and the ATP 1-05 series for more information.)

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LEGAL SUPPORT6-99. The CAB S-1 has an assigned paralegal specialist (27D). Under the technical supervision of the BLSjudge advocate, the paralegal specialist assists with the delivery of the six core legal disciplines to thecommander: military justice, international and operational law, administrative and civil law, contract andfiscal law, legal assistance, and claims. The paralegal specialists duties include serving as a liaisonbetween the CAB and the BLS, preparing legal and administrative documents under the supervision of ajudge advocate, assisting with investigations as directed by the BLS, and tracking all unit legal actions.

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Chapter 7

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Enabling Tasks and Activities

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Every Soldier must know, before he goes into battle, how the little battle he is to fight fits into the largerpicture, and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole.Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

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Enabling tasks are specialized missions that units plan and conduct to achieve orsustain a tactical advantage. Units execute these operations as part of offense,defense, or stability tasks. The fluid nature of the modern battlefield increases thefrequency with which the CAB enabling tasks and activities, which include, tacticalroad march, site exploitation, linkup, passage of lines, relief in place, battle handover,gap crossing, assembly area operations and breaching operations. This chapterestablishes techniques and procedures unique to the CAB that the battalion can applyto these specialized tasks.

SECTION I ASSEMBLY AREA OPERATIONS

7-1. An assembly area is a location where a force prepares or regroups for further action. While inassembly areas, units execute the organization, maintenance, resupply, and personnel actions necessary tomaintain the combat power of the force.

ASSEMBLY AREA TASKS

7-2. Certain tasks are associated with planning, occupying, and operating an assembly area, largely as amatter of TACSOP. The circumstances in which the assembly area is occupied dictate to what extent thesetasks are performed. Assembly area tasks include: Site selection. Quartering party. Occupation. Security. Departure.

SITE SELECTION7-3. Although assembly areas are generally secure from enemy interference, commanders must considerthe possibility of enemy attacks or observation. Assembly areas should provide the following: Concealment from air and ground observation. Cover from direct fire. Terrain masking of electromagnetic signal signature. Sufficient area for the dispersion of subunits and their vehicles consistent with the enemy andfriendly tactical situation. Areas for unit trains, maintenance operations, and command posts. Suitable entrances, exits, and internal routes. (Optimally, at least one all-weather paved surfaceroad transits the assembly area and connects to the MSR in use.) Terrain allowing the observation of ground and air avenues of approach into the assembly area. Good drainage and soil conditions that support unit vehicle movement.

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QUARTERING PARTY

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7-4. Quartering parties have four responsibilities: conducting reconnaissance (if reconnaissance partiesare not used), securing the area, organizing the area, and guiding arriving units. During tactical unitmovement, the reconnaissance party can perform area reconnaissance as a follow-on mission.

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7-5. An area reconnaissance is performed to determine suitability of the area. The quartering party alsoprovides initial security of the area until the main body arrives. Aerial reconnaissance (that is UAS) canhelp the quartering party secure the assembly area by conducting screening missions and surveillance ofpossible threat avenues of approach. Organizing the area includes selecting and marking unit and vehiclepositions, improving and marking routes, and marking or removing obstacles. Guide duties include meetingunits at the release point and leading them to positions.

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OCCUPATION

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7-6. As units arrive, guides move them, without stopping, to unit locations and vehicle positions.Organization of the area based on the unit order of march prevents congestion at the release point. Once inposition, units and vehicles make adjustments. Positioning considerations are as follows: Locations selected to afford dispersion and hide positions. Vehicles oriented/positioned to facilitate defense. CPs and trains centrally located for security, ease of support, and road access. Mortars sited to provide fire support. Communications by wire or messenger established within companies and with the battalion.

Battalion Assembly Area vs. Individual Company Assembly Areas

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7-7. The CAB may assign AOs to subordinate companies and require them to tie in their fires andobservation with each other. The main CP, trains, and mortar platoon are located near the center of theassembly area. Ideally, company sectors are assigned to balance the task organization against theappropriate enemy avenue of approach. The scout platoon occupies observation posts at key points aroundthe entire perimeter of the battalion or screens along the most dangerous or likely avenue of approach. Thismethod configures the CAB in a perimeter defense with companies oriented outward. This is the mostcommon organization of battalion assembly areas.

Individual Company Assembly Areas in Battalion Area of Operations

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7-8. The CAB may assign separate individual assembly areas to subordinate companies, which establishtheir own 360-degree security. Areas between companies are secured through surveillance and patrolling.The main CP, trains, and mortar platoon establish positions central to outlying companies. The battalionusually establishes echelons of trains by locating the field trains with the FSC and positioning the combattrains centrally within the AO.

SECURITY

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7-9. An assembly area is not designated as a defensive position, but the CAB or company organizes it sothat a threat ground attack could be detected and defeated. Security against air attack is best provided bypassive measures designed to conceal the unit from detection. Additional security considerations includethe following: Guards at all entrances and exits control the flow of traffic. Observation posts cover key terrain features and likely avenues of approach. Platoons prepare fire plans and coordinate on the flanks. Fire support plans are prepared by the FIST and FC. Patrols, sensors, and surveillance devices augment security. Contact points for units assist in coordination. Roads are the specific responsibility of subordinate units.

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Movement is confined to roads to preclude needless surface disruption that could leave a visibleaerial indicator.Unnecessary vehicle movement is restricted.Minimal use of radios reduces electronic signature.Noise and light discipline is strictly enforced.The readiness condition level is established and adjusted based on METT-TC.Units must consider the location and activities of other units within the AO and coordinate withthose assets for mutual security.

DEPARTURE7-10. Departing the assembly area is the first step of a mission and is just as important as the mission itselfis. A progressive system of increasing readiness ensures that units are ready to move when required withoutneedlessly tiring Soldiers and wasting fuel during long waits. The assembly area is occupied with thefollow-on mission in mind to preclude congestion on departure. Routes from subordinate unit locations arereconnoitered and timed. Subordinate units designate a linkup point, and units move to and through thatpoint based on their reconnaissance. Depending on threat capabilities, departure may be conducted underradio listening silence.

SECTION II TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

7-11. A tactical road march is a rapid movement used to relocate units in a combat zone to prepare forcombat operations. (ARDP 3-90) Tactical road marches must have a synchronized plan incorporating allwarfighting functions. This movement must be planned for as if it were an offensive operation. Althoughhostile contact is not anticipated, the unit must maintain security measures and be prepared to react toenemy contact. At battalion level and higher, the S-3 is responsible for planning tactical road marches;while the S-4 generally plans administrative moves.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES7-12. The CAB organizes into march columns to conduct movement. A march column includes allelements of a force using the same route for a single movement under the control of a single commander.Whenever possible, a unit marches in multiple columns over multiple routes to reduce closing time. A largecolumn may be composed of a number of subdivisions, each under the control of a subordinatecommander. March columns are composed of four elements: reconnaissance party, quartering party, mainbody, trail party.

SECTION III LINKUP

7-13. A linkup is a meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of circumstances. A linkupwill usually require a passage of lines. Linkup can occur when two or more friendly forces Complete the encirclement of an enemy force. Assist breakout of an encircled friendly force. Join an attacking force with a force operating in the enemys rear area. Make contact with other forces on a noncontiguous battlefield.

TYPES OF LINKUP7-14. There are two linkup methods, the first of which involves the linkup of a moving force with astationary force. Under these circumstances the moving force usually has linkup points near the restrictivefiring line (RFL), or LOA, near the stationary forces security elements. The other method occurs when twothere are two moving forces. This is usually an indicator of a fluid operation, which requires the detailedcoordination and effective communication to avoid fratricide.

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Chapter 7

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LINKUP OF A MOVING FORCE WITH A STATIONARY FORCE

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7-15. To ensure the friendly forces join without engaging one another, the commander of the linkup forcedesignates the linkup points. These linkup points are at locations where the axis of advance of the linkupforce intersects the security elements of the stationary force. These points must be readily recognizable toboth forces and should be posted on both digital overlays and conventional maps in case of digitalcommunications loss. Alternate points are chosen so the units are prepared in case enemy activities causelinkup at places other than those planned. The number of linkup points selected depends on the terrain andnumber of routes used by the linkup force.

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7-16. The S-6 section is critical to linkup operations. Digital communications are used to transmit andshare combat information data. However, use of digital means depends on METT-TC factors and the abilityto maintain digital linkages between the moving unit and stationary unit.

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7-17. To facilitate a rapid passage of lines and to avoid inadvertent engagement of friendly forces,personnel in the linkup force must be thoroughly familiar with recognition signals and plans. As required,stationary forces assist in the linkup by opening lanes in minefields, breaching or removing selectedobstacles, furnishing guides, providing routes with checkpoints, and designating assembly areas.

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7-18.When linking up with an encircled force, the CAB carries as much supply material as possible during

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the linkup operation. This material includes Class I, III, V, and VIII. If an enemy force has encircled thestationary force, the battalion carries additional supplies and material requested through to the BCT S-4before the linkup takes place. The CAB S-4 ensures that each company has received the FBCB2sustainment overlay depicting MSRs, traffic control points, AXPs, and MCPs.

LINKUP OF TWO MOVING UNITS

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7-19. Linkup between two moving units is one of the most difficult operations. It is usually conducted tocomplete the encirclement of an enemy force. Primary and alternate linkup points for two moving forcesare established on boundaries where the two forces are expected to converge. As linking units move closer,positive control is coordinated to ensure they avoid firing on one another and to ensure the enemy does notescape between the two forces. Again, using digital systems facilitates planning, synchronization,execution, and fratricide avoidance. However, digital architecture limitations may mandate that analogprocedures be the primary method of coordination.

PLANNING A LINKUP OPERATION

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7-20. The linkup is a complex operation requiring detailed planning and coordination. Plans for a linkupare coordinated as far in advance as possible. The two forces carefully define and coordinate their schemesof maneuver with attention given to graphic control measures, communications, and the subsequent missionto be performed by each force after linkup operations are completed. Alternate linkup points are plannedand lend flexibility to the overall operation.

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7-21. Before commencing a linkup operation, the headquarters elements of the stationary force and linkupforce must share data including COMSEC procedures and digital graphic overlays consisting of thefollowing: Primary and alternate linkup points. Checkpoints and waypoints information. Unit disposition and activity (friendly and enemy). Locations and types of obstacles. Fire control measures and FSCMs, including RFLs.

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7-22. The two units establish liaison during planning and continue it throughout the operation. Liaisonparties must have the capability to communicate digitally with their parent unit. As the distance closesbetween the forces, the requirement to track movement through FBCB2 and maintain close liaisonincreases. Use of Army aircraft can improve and expedite this process.

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7-23. Linkup operations frequently require a passage of lines. Once through friendly lines, the CAB movesout as in an exploitation to affect the linkup. Speed, aggressive action, and boldness characterize thisaction. If possible, the linkup force avoids enemy interference with its mission and concentrates its effortson completing the linkup. If enemy forces threaten the successful accomplishment of the mission, they areeither destroyed or bypassed and reported.

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7-24. The BCT headquarters directing the linkup operation must establish command relationships andresponsibilities for the forces involved. Both the linkup force and the force with which linkup is to be madeshould remain under the control of the directing headquarters. Operational plans must prescribe the primaryand alternate day and night identification and recognition procedures, vehicle systems, and manmadematerials used to identify friend from enemy.

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7-25. When the BCT directs a linkup operation, it usually establishes an RFL for both battalions to ensurepositive control and reduce the risk of fratricide. It transmits these RFLs to both units by way of a digitaloverlay, and they are subsequently adjusted and overlays updated as one force moves toward the other.This process continues until a single RFL is established between the forces. Usually, this is the point on theground where the two forces plan to establish contact.

5716

COMMUNICATIONS DURING LINKUP OPERATIONS

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7-26. The stationary and linkup force must maintain positive control during linkup operations to preventinadvertent fratricidal engagements. They use FBCB2, ABCS, and FM voice systems as required to sharecombat information and to positively identify friend from foe. It is imperative that both the linkup andstationary units conduct precombat communications checks before the operation begins to ensure thatconnectivity and interoperability between digital systems are established and maintained.

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7-27. The S-6s of the two linkup units are integral to successful linkup operations when both units aredigitally equipped. These officers must ensure that units address both primary and alternate forms ofcommunications during planning, and that they synchronize both manual and digital systems used insupport of the linkup operation, and integrate these into the linkup plan.

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7-28. The CAB S-6 has special requirements related to digital operations. The following are examples: Exchange of unit Internet protocol address databases. SINCGARS and EPLRS radio hop set data. COMSEC requirements. Positioning of EPLRS position server links. Modifications to digital communications structure (digital architecture).

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DIGITAL TECHNIQUES FOR A LINKUP OPERATION

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7-29. Depending on the enemy situation and METT-TC, the initial conduct of the linkup operation may beidentical to an exploitation or attack. During the operation, the BCT commander monitors the progress andexecution through data passed using ABCS to ensure positive control measures established are followed oradjusted as required. Adjustments made to the OPORD are coordinated and synchronized by way of digitalsystems. If a FRAGORD is passed by FM voice, a digital follow-up is entered and transmitted throughFBCB2 to ensure all units are aware of the change.

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7-30. As the linkup forces begin their approach, they establish digital and FM voice communications andmaintain them throughout the operation. As each force maneuvers, progress is tracked by way of FBCB2,and adjustments to the linkup plan are made as METT-TC dictates. For example, if two forces are involvedin the operations and one is unable to travel at a speed commensurate with the plan, the linkup location mayrequire adjustment.

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7-31. The CAB FC changes or activates FSCM established for the operations based on the progress of theforces and the enemy situation. All changes are provided to the FCs of the maneuver units involved in thelinkup through FBCB2 or AFATDS. As the maneuver units draw closer to one another, Coordinated firelines are canceled and a RFL is placed into effect to prevent fratricide between the converging forces. Oncethe linkup has occurred, fire support is organized as per the higher headquarters OPORD.

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Chapter 7

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7-32. The CAB commander positions himself to observe the progress of the operation and maintains bothdigital and FM voice communications with the S-3. Effective digital communication provides thecommander flexibility in positioning since he can maintain a COP of both maneuver units and adjust thelinkup plan as required. The S-3 is positioned based on the operational concerns expressed by the battalioncommander. For example, if a certain flank is of concern to the commander during the operation, or asupporting attack is required to penetrate the enemys lines, then the battalion S3 is located where he canbest influence the battalions secondary action.

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7-33. When the linkup is complete, the linkup force may join the stationary force, pass through thestationary force, go around the stationary force, or continue the attack.

5758

SECTION IV BATTLE HANDOVER

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7-34. Battle handover is a coordinated operation executed to sustain continuity of the combined arms fightand to protect the combat potential of both forces involved. A passage of lines is an operation in which oneunit moves through another units positions with the intent of moving into or out of enemy contact. Battlehandover is usually associated with the conduct of a passage of lines.

BATTLE HANDOVER PLANNING

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7-35. Battle handover can occur during either offensive or defensive operations. During defensiveoperations, it is usually planned and coordinated in advance to facilitate execution and usually involves aRPOL. In the offense, it is situation dependent and often initiated by a FRAGORD. Battle handover usuallyoccurs in the offense when one unit passes through or around another unit. TACSOPs containing clear,simple, standardized procedures and control measures enhance the ability of units to coordinate withoutexperiencing a corresponding loss in momentum.

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7-36. Battle handover occurs along a line forward of the stationary force. The BCT commander establishesthis line in coordination with both stationary and passing battalion commanders. The stationary battalioncommander usually determines the BHL location. This line is forward of the FEBA in the defense or theFLOT in the offense. The BHL is located where elements of the passing CAB can be effectivelyoverwatched by direct fires or supported by indirect fires of the forward combat element of the stationaryCAB until the battle handover is complete.

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7-37. Physical handover usually occurs near the battle handover line. Events may dictate that a force breakcontact forward of or behind the BHL; for example, when there is a gap between echelons of the attackingenemy force. Close coordination (physical, digital, or voice) between the battalions involved in thehandover allows them to coordinate and execute this process at the small-unit level.

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7-38. The battle handover operation begins on order of the brigade commander of the units involved orwhen a given set of conditions occurs. Defensive handover is complete when the passing battalion is clearand the stationary battalion is ready to engage the enemy. These actions may occur at the same time.Offensive handover is complete when the passing battalion crosses the BHL. The BHL is usuallyconsidered the LD for the attacking battalion. Until the handover is complete and acknowledged by thecommanders, the battalion commander in contact is responsible for coordinating the fight.

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COORDINATION FOR BATTLE HANDOVER

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7-39. Coordination for battle handover flows from the battalion commander out of contact to the battalioncommander in contact. The coordination for a battle handover overlaps with the coordination for a passageof lines; the coordination for both should be accomplished at the same time. The TACSOP should outlinethese coordination requirements to facilitate rapid accomplishment.

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7-40. Digital information systems assist the battalion staff in its coordination and synchronization effortsfor the operation. Each unit transmits or delivers a complete copy of its OPORD and overlays by eitherdigital or analog means. Any changes made after initial distribution are updated immediately. Thecoordination between the two commanders involves Establishing digital and FM voice communications.

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Enabling Tasks and Activities

Providing updates of both friendly and enemy situations (digital, voice, and graphical).Coordinating passage points and routes and ensuring these are displayed on operational overlays(digital and analog).Collocating command post and exchanging liaison personnel (if required).Coordinating fires (direct and indirect) and ensuring the direct fire control measures and FSCMsdisplay on operational overlays (digital and conventional).Providing updated obstacle overlays including self-destruct date-time groups of emplacedFamily of scatterable mines (FASCAM) obstacles.Determining the need for and dispatching contact point representatives.Establishing and coordinating recognition signals.Exchanging locations of obstacles and related covering fires.Exchanging route information to include way points.Determining sustainment requirements.

7-41. Due to the fluid nature of a battle handover, commanders can use digital systems to speed theplanning, coordination, and execution processes. Units should plan FM voice; if digital capabilities arehampered, then units should use FM to coordinate and execute battle handovers.

SECTION V PASSAGE OF LINES

7-42. A passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through anotherforces combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. (JP 1-02) Unitsusually conduct forward and reward passage of lines when at least one METT-TC factor does not permitthe bypass of a friendly unit. A passage of lines is a complex operation requiring close supervision anddetailed planning, coordination, and synchronization between the battalion commanders of the unitconducting the passage and the unit being passed. The primary purpose of a passage of lines is to transferresponsibility (forward or rearward) for an area from one unit to another. Units can conduct a passage oflines to Continue an attack or counterattack. Envelop an enemy force. Pursue a fleeing enemy. Withdraw security forces or MBA forces.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES7-43. A passage of lines does not require a special task organization. Both the passing force and thestationary force maintain their previous combat organization during the passage. A forward passing unitsorder of march is generally reconnaissance (scouts) and security elements first, followed by ground combatforces support elements (engineers, artillery) and then sustainment forces.

PLANNING7-44. The ABCT plans and conducts a battalion-level passage of lines. Units involved in a passage of linesmust conduct detailed coordination to ensure they maintain positive control to avoid fratricide, speed thepassage, and reduce vulnerability to enemy attack. The S-2 leads the staff in IPB, and the S-3 prepares aconcept of operations based on stationary force restrictions, the IPB, and parameters established by thebattalion commander. The S-3s of the passing battalion and stationary battalion coordinate routes,checkpoints, linkup points, and passage points. Planners must evaluate the following basic considerationsand integrate them into the planning process: Terrain management and control measures. Terrain management is critical to successfulcompletion of a passage of lines. Terrain is controlled through the sharing of digital overlays thatcontain the following: Routes (primary and alternate). Checkpoint data.

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7-45. The terrain and number of the passage lanes determine the speed and disposition of the passingbattalion as it crosses the LD. When conducting a forward passage in preparation for a deliberate attack, itmay be important to create passage lanes with sufficient width to allow the passing force to move in atactical formation appropriate to the operation, such as company or platoon wedge.

FIRE SUPPORT

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Friendly and enemy unit locations and status.

Passage points. Contact points. FSCMs. Obstacle types and locations. Sustainment locations and descriptions.Liaison. Stationary and passing battalions exchange information by way of extensive anddetailed coordination and liaison before mission execution.Communications. Communication architectures, digital systems, COMSEC instructions,recognition signals, and communications procedures and requirements must be identified,synchronized, and integrated into the OPORD. Communications ensure units share data andpertinent combat information and maintain a COP.Mission transition. Plans for the conduct of the passage must facilitate transition to thesubsequent missions of both the passing and stationary battalions.Exchange of AO control. Control of the AO passes from one battalion to the other at a time andplace directed by the higher common commander or as mutually agreed on by the stationary andpassing battalion commanders.Routes. The passing battalion moves on multiple routes through the passed battalion and avoidsthe use of assembly areas. It does not halt within the passed battalions forward positions.Employment of deception obscuration. Deception obscuration operations can deceive theenemy as to actual unit locations, passage points or actual activity and intention of U.S. forcespertaining to the conduct of current or near-term military operations.Control measures. Established graphic control measures can ensure positive control of both thestationary and passing units.Location of stationary battalion and obstacles. The location and obstacle emplacement of thestationary battalion may influence planning and execution of the FPOL.

7-46. The passing battalion FSO reviews the fire support plan of the stationary unit and conducts directcoordination to ensure that a clear understanding exists between the passed and passing units on theestablished FSCMs. He does so through the transfer of digital fire support overlays between the two FCsvia AFATDS. The maneuver commander identifies and approves procedures to establish fire support battlehandover or transfer of control. Terrain and route management for artillery batteries and their support assetsare especially important due to potential terrain limitations and must be coordinated at the BCT level. Allartillery units, including reinforcing units, must be positioned to support the passage if enemy contact ispossible during the operation.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

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7-47. A passage of lines may require either the reduction of some obstacles or the opening and closing oflanes through friendly obstacles. The passing and stationary engineers must coordinate via digital means orface-to-face meeting. At a minimum, this coordination must address the following: Location and status of friendly and enemy tactical obstacles. Routes and locations of lanes and bypasses through friendly and enemy obstacles. Responsibility to close lanes through obstacles. Transfer of obstacle and passage lane responsibilities. Description of lane marking materials. Description of far and near recognition markers.

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SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT

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7-48. The sustainment plan is integral to a successful passage of lines. Sustainment assets are positioned tosupport the passage. MCPs and emergency refueling points are positioned where they can best keep lanesopen and vehicles moving.

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7-49. Conducting a passage of lines presents a challenge for the medical planner. There will be a numberof medical evacuation units using the same air and road networks. Coordination and synchronization areessential if confusion is to be avoided. The medical elements of the stationary force should provide areasupport to the force passing through; this allows continued mobility for the moving force. Examples ofinformation that should be coordinated include the following: Radio frequencies and call signs. OPORD and TACSOP. Location of medical treatment facilities (MTFs). Location of casualty collection points and AXP. MSR, forward arming and refuel points, and airspace control data. S-2 updates including areas of previous and/or anticipated attacks/ambushes/engagements.

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FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

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7-50. In a FPOL conducted as part of a BCT attack, both the stationary and passing battalion commandersmust be aware of the passing battalions objective. This awareness is especially important if the stationarybattalion must provide supporting fires. The stationary battalion and forward passing unit, through anexchange of combat information, share data needed to affect a passage of lines in a timely and safe manner.

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7-51. On receipt of an order, the passing battalion commander begins preparing his passage of lines planby conducting a reconnaissance while concurrently updating the information received from the stationarybattalion. For example, the passing CAB receives a digital operations overlay that delineates routes to thecontact points as well as the location of the actual linkup site. The battalion commander and staff of thepassing unit meet representatives from the stationary battalion at designated contact points to conductcoordination. During the physical reconnaissance, the passing battalion S-3 updates the initial operationsoverlay, incorporating information received from the stationary battalion by adding pertinent controlmeasures. On completion, the passing battalion S-3 forwards this overlay to the main CP. Based on thisinformation, the passing battalion staff completes development of the plan. Once approved by the battalioncommander, additional control measures are added to the operations overlay as necessary to complete theplan.

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Chapter 7

5923Figure 7-1. Forward passage of lines

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7-52. The passing battalion main CP forwards the validated operations overlay update containinginformation from the stationary and passing battalions, BCT, and subordinate units to the liaison teams.This technique enables the passing S-3 and battalion commander to develop their scheme of maneuver forthe passage of lines on a digital overlay concurrent with reconnaissance. At the conclusion of thereconnaissance and subsequent coordination with the stationary battalion, the revised passing battalion planis distributed digitally by the battalion headquarters using FBCB2.

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

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7-53. Typically, a RPOL occurs within a defensive framework in which elements of the security force (forexample, a cavalry squadron) operate forward of the MBA. MBA forces are the stationary unit in a RPOL.The covering force withdraws through them, handing off control of the fight at the BHL.

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Enabling Tasks and Activities

Passage points along the forward edge of the battle area.

7-55. Once he prepares the overlay, the stationary commander transmits it and any amplifying informationto the passing force commander by way of FBCB2 or MCS.

5942

5943Figure 7-2. Rearward passage of lines

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7-56. During a passage of lines, friendly unit density in a relatively small maneuver space may causeproblems in the ability of the commanders to maintain the COP in relation to both the passed and passingunits. The stationary and passing commanders should determine the best method of exercising missioncommand to avoid slowing the tempo of the operation and to reduce fratricide potential.

REHEARSAL7-57. During the rehearsal, the battalion commander ensures that each organization knows when and whereto move as well as how to execute the required coordination. Digital communications checks ensureconnectivity and interoperability. Other rehearsal items include the following: Fire support observation plan, target execution, communication linkages, and mutual supportoperations. Confirm FSCMs. Review unit routes and positioning.

ATP 3-90.5 (Final Draft)

Locations and descriptions of obstacles, lanes, bypasses, and markings.

Passage points, routes, and recognition procedures. Verify these and review numbers of vehiclesby type expected at each passage point. Confirm route management, contact points, and use ofguides.Locations for and movement of sustainment units. Arrange for mutual support and any transferof supplies.Locations of aid stations, AXPs, and casualty evacuation procedures.

SECTION VI RELIEF IN PLACE

7-58. A relief in place is an operation in which one unit replaces another in combat. The incoming unitassumes responsibility for the mission and the assigned AO. Units usually execute relief operations duringlimited visibility to reduce the possibility of detection. To facilitate and ensure successful operations, thelinkup and relieved force commanders and staffs exchange as much information as possible. This preventsthe inadvertent engagement of friendly forces by either direct or indirect fire systems during reliefoperations. Collocation of CPs for both types of units is recommended during the relief.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS7-59. On receipt of the order to conduct the relief, the incoming CAB commander and staff establishcontinuous communications with the stationary unit. This is done primarily through an exchange of liaisonpersonnel and a digital exchange of information pertinent to the relief operations (for units in the samedigital architecture). Commanders and staffs emphasize communications, reconnaissance, and transfer ofcommand. If possible, the relieving units main CP should collocate with the main CP of the unit to bereplaced. This facilitates continuous information exchanges relative to the occupation plan, fire supportplan, and intelligence updates, which include past, present, and probable enemy COAs. Althoughdigitization allows coordination without physically locating together, face-to-face coordination reduces anypotential misunderstanding related to relief preparation or the forthcoming operations. Units transferresponsibility for the area as directed by the senior common commander, usually when the incoming unithas a majority of his fighting force in place, and all communications systems (voice and digital) areoperating.

TRANSFER OF INFORMATION7-60. Before contact with the stationary unit, the relieving force digitally receives the combined armsgraphics, FSCM, obstacles, linkup points, signals, and current enemy situation by way of overlays (digitalor acetate). Analog units should exchange this information through liaison personnel and conventionalacetate overlays.

FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE7-61. When planning the relief, the battalion staff should consider the realities of risk management andfratricide avoidance in determining the most appropriate method for executing the relief. FBCB2 and thebattlefield combat identification system aid in differentiating friendly from enemy as units conduct thelinkup and passage of lines. This greatly reduces fratricide potential and expedites forward movement sincethe relieved force can monitor the progress of the linkup force. The relieved force can provide protectivefires or adjust fire control measures predicated on the speed with which the linkup force is moving.

METHODS OF RELIEF7-62. There are three techniques for conducting a relief: sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered. Asequential relief occurs when each element within the relieved unit is relieved in succession, from right toleft or left to right. A simultaneous relief occurs when all elements are relieved at the same time. Astaggered relief occurs when the commander relieves each element in a sequence determined by the tacticalsituation. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for more information.)

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Enabling Tasks and Activities

SEQUENTIALLY7-63. This method is the most deliberate and time consuming of the relief methods. It involves sequentiallyrelieving maneuver companies one at a time. The CAB plans separate routes to the rear of the relievedcompanies locations for each maneuver company, and places these plans on the operations overlay. Toavoid cluttering the FBCB2 display, only the routes of the relieving force are included on the operationsoverlay. The CAB labels routes sequentially to correspond to the order in which the company will use theroutes during the relief. When the lead relieving company reaches its release point, its platoons move to thepositions they will occupy. Crews exchange range card and fire support information, and the relieved unitthen moves to the rear to its next location. When the lead relieving company is in position, the nextrelieving company moves along its designated route to relieve its counterpart, repeating the relief process.This process repeats until each company has been relieved. If the BCT directs a transfer of supplies fromthe relieved unit, the battalion S-4 coordinates a transfer point to execute the exchange.

SIMULTANEOUSLY7-64. This method is the fastest, but it risks revealing friendly unit intentions. To expedite the relief, the inplace battalion prepares FBCB2 overlays to depict current friendly graphics, fire support measures, and thelatest enemy situation update. These overlays are passed to the relieving force before the two forces makecontact. Once the two command groups collocate and exchange plans, relief occurs at the same time at eachlocation. The units of the relieving and relieved battalions execute a move at the same time along differentroutes. Relieved units withdraw as soon as they are relieved, and do not wait for other units of the battalionto be relieved. The control measures at the battalion level are identical to those used for a sequential relief(one unit at a time).

STAGGERED7-65. This technique requires sufficient terrain to accommodate positioning of two similarly sized units atthe same time. In this case, the relieving unit must locate where it can observe and provide protective directand indirect fires for the relieved unit using the relieved units fire plans. This procedure requires thatrelieving company and battalion commanders conduct a detailed physical reconnaissance of the positionoccupied by their in-place counterparts. The relieving commanders and staffs enter operational informationgathered from the physical reconnaissance on operations overlays, and share them throughout the relievingunit during the planning process.

MISSION COMMAND DURING THE RELIEF

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7-66. During the relief, the command group and the staff in the main CP monitor the progress of the reliefthrough FBCB2 and their personal observations. To facilitate uninterrupted fires and effects to support therelief, indirect-fire assets should be the last units relieved regardless of the relief technique used.Throughout this process, the battalion may have to observe radio-listening silence until control of theposition passes to the commander of the relieving force. When the companies are set, and the relieved unitwithdraws from the position, company commanders send the battalion S-3 a spot report indicating that thecompany is defending.

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7-67. If either force makes direct-fire contact with an enemy force during the relief, it immediately notifiesthe other unit and the higher headquarters by voice communications. It then follows-up this voice reportwith an FBCB2-generated contact or spot report, so that the precise location of the enemy force (enemyicon) is displayed on FBCB2. If responsibility for the AO has not passed, the relieving unit becomesOPCON to the relieved unit. The assets and staff of the relieved unit become OPCON to the relieving unitwhen the responsibility for the AO has passed to the relieving CAB.

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SECTION VII SITE EXPLOITATION

7-68. Site exploitation is systematically searching for and collecting information, material, and personsfrom a designated location and analyzing them to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent

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operations, or support criminal prosecution. (ATTP 3-90.15) Cordon and search techniques are frequentlyemployed to conduct site exploitation.

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7-69. CABs may conduct site exploitation in the conduct of reconnaissance, security and other operationaltask during unified land operations. Leaders can deliberately plan for site exploitation, but must alsodevelop TACSOP to conduct on order, or at opportunistic times to exploit personnel, documents, electronicdata, and information captured during operations. Examples of unforeseen events that might require a hastysite exploitation include the discovery of Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive threats. Significant environmental hazards (hazardous materials or waste). High-value individuals. External disruptions, such as enemy attacks, that require protecting the site until specializedteams arrive to neutralize or reduce the threat. A large munitions or explosives cache. Information that meet the criteria for a sensitive site

7-70. Site exploitation fundamentally serves three basic purposes:

ORGANIZATION FOR SITE EXPLOITATION

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7-71. When planning for a site exploitation, the commander should plan his organization around theframework of search, collect, analyze, and disseminate. This framework along with the factors of METTTC will help the commander determine the size and assets required to secure a site and conduct siteexploitation. CAB personnel focus on search and collect while the intelligence and other experts analyzestarting at the point of capture to national level agencies. The same elements that analyze disseminatedeveloped intelligence back down to the capturing unit.

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7-72. Assets that assist with the execution of site exploitation include portions of a document and mediaexploitation team, an EOD exploitation team, or criminal investigation support. Document and mediaexploitation runs the spectrum from hasty analysis of personal documents or pocket litter, to mirrorimaging media and expediting various forms of media, to fusion cells for further exploitation. EOD siteexploitation teams conducting blast analysis can include specialized support from joint weaponsintelligence teams. Criminal investigation may incorporate host-nation support, the Central IntelligenceAgency and other governmental agencies.

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7-73. Regardless of the size of the element conducting the exploitation, the staff should assign a teamleader responsible for planning, organizing, equipping, and executing the site exploitation. At the CABlevel, this may be the assistant S-3, a company commander, or other staff member. At the company level, itmay be a platoon leader, a squad leader, a section leader, or a representative from the headquarters element.At the CAB level, an noncommissioned officer (NCO) from the S-2 section may be considered.

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7-74. Subordinate to the team leader will be a minimum of two elements: one for conducting tacticalquestioning, and another for conducting the search and analysis. The size and scope of these elements,along with the establishment of additional elements, vary with METT-TC considerations. Additionalelements include detainee, documentation, field interview, demolitions, and tunnel reconnaissance teams.Figure 7-3 and 7-4 show potential site exploitation organization for a CAB and company level siteexploitation.

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6089Figure 7-3. Sample CAB site exploitation organization

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6091Figure 7-4. Sample company level site exploitation organization

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7-75. The CAB does not possess many of the organic assets required to complete detailed Siteexploitations Based on the staffs estimate, the battalion might require attachments from EOD, militaryintelligence, and MP units as discussed above. When these teams are not available, the commander and thestaff must clearly identify these shortfalls and determine where these assets reside. If these assets are heldat the BCT or higher headquarters, the staff must determine the triggers and response time should theirsupport be required. Internally, the staff must plan to identify subordinate units to fulfill these roles whileunderstanding their organic capabilities and limitations. (Refer to ATTP 3-90.15 for more information.)

SE PERSONNEL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBITIES

7-76. All personnel on site exploitation have specific tasks to complete. The personnel and their tasks areexplained below.

Team Leader7-77. The team leader tasks include: Commanding site exploitation team.

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Initiating and controlling site exploitation.

Completing initial sketch of site.Documenting all activity.Deconflicting/validating information with each element.Reporting and recommending action on immediate intelligence to commander.Supervising collection of all personnel and material.Ensuring unit photographs detainees with evidence of illegal activity.

7-80. The execution of site exploitation normally occurs after forces have seized, cleared, or otherwisecontrolled the objective to the point where the exploitation team can conduct the search to the level ofdetail required with appropriate risk mitigation. In the case of a cordon and search operation, this couldmean after the objective location has been isolated and secured; and after the IED threat on the objectivehas been mitigated by EOD or explosive detection dog, if available. At a minimum, the site exploitationteam should understand the level of threat remaining on the site prior to exploitation. The site exploitationteam leader conducts an initial debrief of the assault force (initial entry force), and then assesses the site tomake a determination of the scope and breadth of the exploitation required.

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7-81. Upon completion of the initial assessment, the team leader updates instructions to the search teams,takes/directs initial photographic evidence of the site, completes a sketch of the objective site, andcoordinates marking of the objective for documentation purposes. The tactical questioning element(s)coordinate with the search element to segregate personnel found on the objective in secure areas, notingwhere personnel were located based on the team leaders site sketch.

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7-82. Search teams initiate the search of the site or objective using a defined pattern and collection processaccording to unit TACSOP. The team leader must have the ability to move throughout the site, andcoordinate with the tactical questioning and search teams. The team leader can focus search efforts basedon the information gained by tactical questioning, as well as guide the tactical questioning team based onthe items that are uncovered during the search. This can be a useful tool to identify additional information,and determine if suspected personnel are attempting to deceive the tactical questioning team. METT-TCconsiderations may facilitate the use of the head of household to lead the search team. This can prevent theperception of destruction of property, and mitigate the risks of IEDs. However, this technique presentslimitations to the search team as well.

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Enabling Tasks and Activities

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7-83. Collection of material should be completed with appropriate marking and tagging according toTACSOP and theatre requirements. Special considerations for handling material that can be exploited forforensic evidence must be observed during collection, as well as observing for evidence that could beassociated with detonation devices. When collecting material that may be used for evidence in judiciaryproceedings, the material should be photographed with the suspected individual. Maintaining control andcustody of collected material is also important to maintain the integrity of the search.

BIOMETRIC COLLECTION DEVICES

7-84. Some CABs will have biometric collection devices to collect physical information on key personnel.Biometrics positively identifies an encountered person. Fingerprints, iris pigmentation, facial geometry,voice, and handwritten signatures are all examples of characteristics that can be used to identify anindividual, regardless of paper documents, disguises, or aliases. This data is combined with local andnational databases. The intelligence data, coupled with verifiable biometrics, enables the commander toperform more precise and effective targeting missions. (Refer to ADRP 2-0 for more information.)

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ELIMINATION OPERATIONS

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7-85. Weapons of mass destruction elimination (WMD-E) operations is a combined arms effort aimed toprevent the looting or capture of WMD and related material. It renders-safe or destroys weapons, material,agents, and delivery systems that pose an immediate and direct threat to our forces. It exploits programexperts, document and other media and previously secured weapons and materials to counter furtherproliferation and prevents regeneration of the WMD capacity.

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7-86. WMD-E requires the application of several CBRN passive defense principles, such as contaminationavoidance through reconnaissance and surveillance; individual and collective protections; anddecontamination.

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Note. Once conventional CBRN forces arrive, they conduct assessment of the site and determineif the site requires exploitation. If the site is deemed to contain WMD, maneuver forces seize andsecure the site until technical CBRNE forces arrive.

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7-87. Once CBRN forces arrive and confirm WMD, maneuver forces seize and secure the site. Plannersshould address how and who on the site will detect, assess, and defeat site defenses and establish andmaintain secure control of the site. After the maneuver forces have created favorable conditions for thetechnical CBRNE forces, the technical CBRNE forces advance to conduct the exploitation activity.

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7-88. Maneuver forces continue to secure the site while technical CBRNE forces characterize, exploit andpossibly neutralize hazards and disable weapons. Exploitation may often require a combined arms effort tohelp technical CBRNE forces to search the site for remaining sensitive or exploitable material; however,commanders should only use maneuver forces for actual WMD exploitation operations as a last resort.When the use of maneuver forces extend beyond securing the site commanders should coordinate withhigher headquarters to ensure that the urgency of exploiting the site justifies the additional risk.Commanders should also organize and prepare carefully and proceed methodically. Commanders maintainsite integrity to support follow-on exploitation across all domains.

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7-89. Maneuver forces continue to support elimination operations. If the material is removed or transferredto another location, maneuver forces may be asked recon routes of travel and secure the material duringtransport. As forces continue through the destruction activity they move towards the final activity withinWMD-E. Maneuver forces continue to secure material and other forces until the material is transferred tothe appropriate authority for long term monitoring and redirection.

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SECTION VIII BREACHING OPERATIONS

7-90. Breaching is a synchronized combined arms operation under the control of a maneuver commander.Whenever possible, units should bypass obstacles, enabling them to maintain the momentum of theoperation. Commanders must ensure that conducting the bypass provides a tactical advantage without

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exposing the unit to unnecessary danger. Breaching operations begin when friendly forces detect andobstacle and no bypass meeting the commanders criteria can be identified. Breaching operations endwhen a lane through the obstacle has been created and friendly forces destroy the enemy on the far side ofthe obstacle or the enemy can no longer affect the breach site with the use of direct fires.

INTELLIGENCE7-92. It is critical to determine how the enemy applies obstacles to the terrain. The commander and staffconduct IPB to develop an initial situation template with expected obstacle locations. Intelligence gatheredby reconnaissance is essential to developing a finalized situation template and final point of breachlocations. Unverified enemy situation templates might cause friendly forces to deploy to reduce obstaclesearly, waste mission time attempting to locate nonexistent obstacles, develop COAs using ineffectiveobstacle reduction methods, or become surprised by an obstacle. Engineer teams can augmentreconnaissance forces as part of the overall information collection plan. Examples of OBSTINTELrequirements include: Location of existing or reinforcing obstacles. Orientation and depth of obstacles. Soil conditions (determines ability to use mine plows). Lanes or bypass locations. Composition of minefields (buried or surface laid antitank and antipersonnel mines . Types of mines and fuses (determines effectiveness of mechanical or explosive reductiontechniques). Composition of complex obstacles. Suspected intent of obstacle. Location of direct- and indirect-fire systems overwatching obstacle.

BREACHING FUNDAMENTALS7-93. Successful obstacle breaching depends on the CAB effectively applying the breaching fundamentalsof SOSRA. Deliberate, hasty (includes instride), and covert are the three general types of breachingoperations. (Refer to FM 3-34.22 for more information.) Breaching fundamentals always apply; however,they must adapt to the varying factors of METT-TC. Breaching fundamentals include: Suppression. Units use direct and indirect suppressive fires to protect friendly forces reducingand maneuvering through an obstacle. Typically, successful suppression initiates the rest of theactions at the obstacle. Obscuration. Obscuration degrades enemy observation and target acquisition by enemy forceswhile concealing friendly force reduction and assault activities. Obscuration planning factorsinclude wind direction, type of obscuration systems available (mechanical smoke, artillerydelivered, mortar-delivered, smoke pots), and the capabilities and limitations of these systems.Typically, the most effective placement of obscuration is between the obstacle and theoverwatching enemy forces.

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Secure. Friendly forces secure the point of breach to prevent enemy forces from interfering withthe reduction of lanes and passage of assault forces. The CAB must provide the breach forcewith sufficient combat power to secure the point of breach.Reduction. The creation of lanes through an obstacle is reduction. Units cannot accomplishreduction until they achieve effective suppression and obscuration, and secure the point ofbreach. The breach force reduces, proofs, and marks the required number of lanes to pass theassault force through the obstacle. Follow-on forces will continue to improve and reduce theobstacle when required.Assault. The assault forces primary mission is to seize terrain on the far side of the obstacle toprevent the enemy from placing or observing direct and indirect fires on the reduction area.

BREACHING ORGANIZATION7-94. Commanders develop COAs that organize friendly forces into a support force, a breach force, and anassault force to quickly and effectively execute the breach fundamentals. (See Table 7-1.) Support force responsibilities are to isolate the reduction area with direct and indirect fires,suppress enemy direct and indirect fire at the point of breach, and control obscuration. The breach force must have sufficient combat power to secure the point of breach as well assufficient reduction assets to clear the required number of lanes through the obstacle. Critial firezones should be activated at the point of breach before commitment of the breach force toprotect it from enemy indirect fires. The assault forces primary mission is the destruction of enemy forces and the seizure of terrainon the far side of the obstacle to prevent the enemy from placing direct fires on the breach lanes.

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Table 7-1. Breaching organization

BreachingOrganizationSupport Force

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Breaching Fundamentals

Responsibilities

Suppress.Obscure.

Support by fire.Suppress enemy with direct and indirect fires.Control obscuration (on the enemy) and screeningobscuration (on the friendly movement).Confirm / Deny suspected bypass(es) near point ofbreachEstablish near-side security.Reduce the obstacle.Proof and mark lanes or bypasses.Establish far-side security.Defeat forces that can place immediate direct fireson the reduction area.Report the lane status and location.Assist the support force with suppression if theenemy is not effectively suppressed.Secure the far side of an obstacle.Destroy any enemy forces capable of placing directfires on the reduction area from the far side of anobstacle.Be prepared to breach follow-on and protectiveobstacles after passing through the reduction area.

MASS7-95. The support force achieves mass by fixing and isolating enemy forces on the far side of the obstacle.The assault force achieves mass by projecting a 3:1 combat power ratio at the point of penetration

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(typically one isolated enemy platoon in an enemy company-sized defense for a CAB breach). The breachforce achieves mass by planning 50 percent redundancy of breach assets, creating one vehicle lane per eachassaulting company-sized element, and creating two lanes separated by 800 to 1000 meters (terraindependent) to pass the CAB.

SYNCHRONIZATION

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7-96. Synchronization of all combined arms elements to successfully achieve the breach fundamentals isessential. Commanders achieve synchronization through detailed reverse planning of offensive operations(from the objective back to the assembly area) by issuing clear subordinate unit instructions, planningeffective mission command, and ensuring their forces are well rehearsed. Detailed reverse planning isinitiated during IPB and development of the enemy SITTEMP. The scheme of maneuver, engineeroperations, fires, air defense, and actions at the obstacle are all based on this common SITTEMP. Forexample, the planning should consider the following: Actions on the objective determine the size and composition of the assault force based ondesired 3:1 combat power ratio. The size of the assault force determines the number and location of breach lanes required. Lane requirements, and disposition and composition of the obstacles, determine the mobilityasset requirement of the breach force. The enemys ability to interfere with the breach force at the point of breach determines size andcomposition of the security element within the breach force. The enemys ability to mass fires on the point of breach determines the amount of suppressionrequired as well as the size and composition of the breach force.

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7-97. Reverse planning begins with actions on the objective and continues to its deployment from tacticalassembly areas to identify all mobility requirements. Reverse planning should include enemy specialmunitions capabilities and effects. (See Figure 7-5.)

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Enabling Tasks and Activities

6293Figure 7-5. Breach reverse-planning sequence

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PLANNING BREACHING OPERATIONS

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7-98. Planning a breaching operation begins with the intelligence and engineer estimates. The CAB S-2templates the enemys threat characteristics and the battalion engineer assesses its engineer capabilities.Both the engineer and the S-2 template probable locations for the enemys tactical and protective obstacles,based on threat pattern analysis. The battalion staff develops COAs using threat pattern analysis, and theengineer staff officer develops his scheme of engineer operations for each COA. After selecting a COA, thebattalion commander must carefully allocate available assets to the breach, assault, and support forces toensure that they can accomplish their assigned tasks.

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7-99. Identifying the enemys vulnerability is important so that the force can mass direct and indirect firesand combined arms against that weakness. The CAB isolates a portion of the enemy to achieve the desiredcombat ratio at the point of assault. It achieves mass by hitting the enemy from multiple directions and bynarrowing attack zones to concentrate its force against a smaller defending element.

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7-100. The commander must not commit all the engineers to breach the first obstacle system unless he iswilling to risk his capability to breach follow-on obstacles. When the attack requires the breaching of twoor more complex obstacle systems, the battalion commander must retain enough engineers and sufficient

7-101. In task organizing for a combined arms breach during a deliberate operation, the CAB commanderconsiders organizing a support force task with weapons capable of a high volume of direct suppressivefires. The breach force disposition and composition is METT-TC dependent; and is determined by combatpower required to secure the point of breach and the reduction assets required to create the lanes. Figure 7-6depicts the task organization for the concept of operations in Figure 7-5.

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7-102. The battalion commander maneuvers his combat power to create sufficient suppression andsecurity for the breach to be successful. Adequate suppression, obscuration, and security trigger thecommitment of assault and breach forces. When the breaching site is free of direct fires, the commanderdeploys the breach force to create lanes through the obstacle. The commander must sense the progress ofthe breach so that he can decisively commit the balance of the force through the obstacle to continue themission.

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7-103. The breach and assault forces could require fires and obscuration under their control in addition tothat controlled by the support force. Support, breach, and assault forces place direct fires on enemypositions. This makes synchronization of direct and indirect fires extremely complex. Fire control must beplanned in detail using simple and well-understood control measures carefully rehearsed.

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7-104. Sometimes the BCT conducts a combined arms breach during a deliberate operation, or plans toconduct a passage of lines of a large force after a breach. In such cases, breach plans must include detailedplanning for the staging and movement of follow-on forces and equipment.

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Enabling Tasks and Activities

6333Figure 7-6. Organization for breaching operation

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PREPARING FOR BREACHING OPERATIONS

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7-105. The CAB continues an aggressive information collection plan using scouts, engineerreconnaissance teams, patrols, and aerial reconnaissance. The S-2 and the staff engineer continually refinethe template based on hard intelligence. The commander may adjust task organization as it uncovers moredetails of the defense and obstacle system. It also uses this information during the combined armsrehearsals.

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7-106. Continuous and aggressive information collection updates the enemy template as informationbecomes available. These changes are reflected as soon as possible in the rehearsal area. If updates becomeavailable after the last rehearsal, the CAB S-3 immediately passes this data to the affected force elements,especially the breach force.

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7-107. The CAB meticulously plans, manages, and controls the rehearsals. The battalion S-3 allocatestime for each unit to perform a combined arms rehearsal. When possible, the force rehearses the operationunder the same conditions expected during the actual engagement, including battlefield obscuration,darkness, CBRN mission oriented protective posture, and inclement weather. The rehearsal site reflects theactual obstacle system in as much detail as possible, as well as examples of lane marking. The forcechooses terrain as similar as possible to that of the operational area, and constructs a practice obstaclesystem based on OBSTINTEL. Rehearsals include a leader and key personnel walkthrough, as well asindividual and full dress rehearsals by support, breach, and assault forces.

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7-108. When the commander rehearses the breaching operation, he also rehearses several contingencyplans. The contingencies should include possible enemy counterattacks and attack by enemy indirect-firesystems. Rehearsals also include enemy use of CBRN munitions and FASCAM deployment.

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COLLECTIVE OBSTACLE INTELLIGENCE

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7-109. The breach will fail if the CAB does not have enough combat power to suppress the enemys fires,or enough breaching equipment to reduce the obstacles. Therefore, the size of the enemy force and the typeof obstacle are PIRs for reconnaissance. The S-2 confirms and updates the enemy template as intelligencereports are received. If necessary, the S-3 revises the plan. As the commanders PIRs are answered, it maybe necessary to refine the task organization of support, breach, and assault forces and the concept ofoperations. The sniper squad can also keep the area of the breach under observation and continually updatethe S-2.

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7-110. Engineer reconnaissance teams can be attached to the battalion scout platoon to gather detailedinformation on obstacle locations, composition, and orientation. Like any specialized collection asset, theengineer teams work for the scout platoon leader, and are integrated into the total battalion collection plan.The battalion S-2 and engineer provide the scout platoon with specific NAIs for engineer teams toreconnoiter.

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7-111. OBSTINTEL collection is particularly difficult when the breach is part of a movement to contact.Although engineers may be attached to the scout platoon, their ability to close with and gather detailedOBSTINTEL in time for the advance guard or main body to react is limited. Furthermore, organizing for abreach in a movement to contact quickly consumes the number of engineers available for thereconnaissance effort. The commander must determine which has a greater effect on the CABs missionaccomplishment: an engineer squad performing reconnaissance or an engineer squad conducting breaching.

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SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT7-112. Combat trains usually transport critical engineer Class V materials, such as an emergency resupplyof demolitions for the engineer force. The battalion commander, engineer, and S-4 anticipate when theseassets might be used and develop a plan for rapidly moving them forward. Plans must be in place forevacuating casualties since increased numbers of casualties should be anticipated during a breachoperation.

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6381

EXCUTING BREACHING OPERATIONS

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7-113. The force crosses the LD organized to conduct the combined arms breach. If the battalionencounters obstacles en route, it executes the breach with this organization. On arrival, the scout platoonadjusts artillery fires on the enemy positions to cover deployment of the support force. The support forcemoves into position and establishes its support by fire (SBF) position. Breach and assault forces move intoposition and prepare to execute their tasks. The battalion commander continues to incorporate last minuteinformation into his plan and makes final adjustments of positions and locations.

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7-114. The support force occupies its SBF position and begins suppressing with direct fires. The battalionFSO executes group targets planned on enemy positions. Mortar and artillery smoke are adjusted to obscurethe breaching site from enemy target acquisition. The breach force begins movement once suppression andsmoke are effective, based on clearly defined commitment criteria. Timing is critical since the high volumeof suppressing fires and obscuration can be sustained only for a short duration. SBF positions haveinterlocking sectors of fires and are positioned to ensure suppression of the enemys positions.

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7-115. Once suppression and obscuration have built to effective levels, the breach force moves forward tothe breaching site. The engineers create the lanes, while the combined arms breach force provides for localsecurity. The assault force penetrates the objective after receiving the order from the battalion commander.Due to the complexity of the breach, the mission command systems spread out to ensure synchronization.The battalion S-3 may control the multi-company support force while the CAB commander positionshimself where he can best control the entire breaching operation.

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7-116. A CAB needs at least one lane for each assaulting company (vehicle mounted) and one footpathper assaulting platoon (dismounted). The distance between lanes is tied to the concept of operations, thecomplexity of the terrain, and the composition and disposition of the overwatching force. Generalguidelines for the distance between lanes are 800 to 1000 meters between vehicle lanes (based on the complexity of the terrain and theprobability of enemy SCATMINE employment). Up to 100 meters between footpaths (usually based on the ability of the support force to achievesuppressive fires).

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CONTINUING AN ATTACK

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7-117. The enemy obstacle system acts as a chokepoint and is dangerous even after the CAB hasovercome the defenses. The CAB constructs additional lanes to speed the passage of follow-on forces.Next, it widens the lanes to allow two-lane traffic through the obstacles, and constructs switch lanes toprevent blocking by disabled vehicles or artillery fires. Deliberate marking and fencing systems areinstalled, and military police assets establish the necessary traffic control. Eventually, follow on engineerforces clear the obstacles and eliminate the chokepoint. After passage through the lanes, the combined armsforce continues its mission.

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7-118. Both the breaching and follow-on force must be aware of the potential for the enemy to reseedbreached obstacles with remotely delivered SCATMINEs or other rapidly emplaced obstacles. Thebreaching commander may develop a response plan and position remaining mobility assets near the breachlanes to re-breach, repair, or improve lanes as necessary. In addition, the commander can develop a reactionplan for combined arms or other forces that encounter a reseeded portion of the obstacle while passingthrough the lane. The commander of the follow-on force, regardless of the reported status of the breachlanes he is about to pass through, should organize mobility assets forward in his formation that are preparedto re-breach, repair, or improve these lanes as necessary.

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SECTION IX GAP CROSSING OPERATIONS

7-119. The purpose of any gap crossing operation is to project combat power across a linear obstacle toaccomplish a mission. Historically, doctrine addressed these gaps as rivers, but there are many other gapsthat Army units encounter. A gap crossing is a unique operation. It requires specific procedures, detailedplanning, and technical support that differ from other tactical operations (Refer to FMs 3-34.22 and 3-90.12for more information.)

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7-120. The three types of gap crossing operations are hasty, deliberate, and covert. Regardless of the typeof crossing, the planning requirements are similar (Refer to FM 3-90.12 for more information.) A hasty gap crossing is a continuation of an attack with no intentional pause to prepare for acrossing. This is possible when enemy resistance is weak and the gap is not a severe obstacle. Itis the preferred type of crossing. Examples include the seizure of existing fords or bridges. A deliberate gap crossing is required when there is a significant linear obstacle, strong enemyresistance, and the necessity to clear entry and or exit banks of enemy forces. This type ofcrossing requires centralized planning and control by a division or BCT; thorough preparationsincluding the time to perform extensive reconnaissance and rehearsals; and the massing of forcesand crossing equipment. The covert gap crossing is a gap crossing used to overcome gaps (wet or dry) without beingdetected by the enemy. It is used when surprise is essential to infiltrate across a gap and whenlimited visibility and gap conditions present an opportunity to accomplish the crossing withoutbeing seen. The CAB will typically not conduct a covert gap crossing due to its mechanizedequipment. Dismounted Infantry may be used in a covert fashion to support the CAB in adeliberate gap crossing.

HASTY GAP CROSSINGS

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7-121. CABs routinely make hasty gap crossings and reorganize on the far side to maintain themomentum of operations. The information provided through ABCS reduces uncertainty about the enemyand friendly situation, enabling the battalion to move rapidly to undefended or lightly defended crossingsites.

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7-122. Hasty gap crossings tend to be focused on a combined arms operation to project combat poweracross a terrain feature (wet or dry) that can be overcome by self-bridging assets within the BCT. Theseassets may be organic, provided as augmentation, or found as expedient crossing materials within the AO.They typically are, but are not limited to, gaps that are 20 meters or less in width. They are normally donethrough tactical bridging, such as the armored vehicle-launched bridge, joint assault bridge , Wolverine, orrapidly emplaced bridge. Most hasty gap crossings will be conducted using tactical bridging. They mayalso include support bridging and expedient bridging or gap crossing by other means.

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HASTY DRY GAP CROSSING

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7-123. Antitank ditches and craters are usually what CABs encounter as a dry gap obstacle. Dry riverbedsmay also present a crossing problem to vehicles. If an engineer support platoon is attached, the CAB canuse the XM1150 Assault breacher vehicle or M9 armored combat earthmover to push down the sides ofditches or to fill in craters. Substantial fill material placed in the dry gaps allows the passage of combatvehicles. Follow-on forces can improve and maintain the crossing site for wheeled-traffic use.

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7-124. For larger dry gaps, streambeds, antitank ditches, craters, canals, partially blown bridges, andsimilar obstacles, the CAB must request an armored vehicle launched bridge through the BCT. Whenavailable, an armored vehicle launched bridge can be launched in 2 to 5 minutes and retrieved in 10minutes. An armored vehicle launched bridge crosses gaps of up to 17 meters in length (without preparedabutments) with a military load classification of 70. A limited number of M104 Wolverine Heavy AssaultBridges are available. They have the capability to cross gaps up to 24 meters with a military loadclassification of 70. Bridges should be left in place across the gaps only as long as it takes the CAB tocross; then replaced with other fixed bridging, if necessary. The need for bridging must be identified wellbefore the operational need develops, or the momentum of the operation will come to a halt.

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HASTY WET GAP CROSSING

7-125. Bank conditions, the depth and width of the wet gap, and the currents velocity determine whetherthe CAB can cross its vehicles by fording or using other bridging assets. Identifying wet gaps early anddeploying the required bridging resources allow hasty crossings of known or anticipated gaps to occur.

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Enabling Tasks and Activities

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7-126. Because vehicles drain rapidly when exiting water obstacles, initially firm banks tend todeteriorate rapidly from multiple uses of the same exit point. The existence of mud or surface irregularitiesfurther degrades the percent of the slope that vehicles can overcome. When selecting a fording site in a wetgap crossing, the depth of the water is the most significant factor. The depth of the water in one crossingarea may change due to bottom surface mud or irregularities (boulders and potholes).

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7-127. Generally, advance elements seize existing crossing means intact and ahead of the main body. Ifpossible, the CAB crosses the water obstacle at multiple points across a broad front by fording mounted ordismounted forces. It makes the crossing as soon as its elements reach the obstacle. As the bulk of the CABcrosses the water, minimum forces remain to secure the crossing sites.

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7-128. The CAB may use expedient crossing means if they are readily available, and can be transported tothe crossing site. Battalion scouts and other reconnaissance elements should note construction material orexisting features that could be used as expedient crossing devices. These include culvert pipe, lumber or cuttimber, or war-damaged equipment. The pipe links system, which consists of bundles of 8-inch, highdensity plastic pipes chained together, can fill gaps up to 9 meters deep and support up to 70 tons.

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7-129. When facing negligible or light enemy resistance on both banks, the force does not have to clearall enemy forces from the river to conduct a hasty crossing. It capitalizes on the speed of the crossing andthe limited ability of the enemy to oppose the crossing effectively.

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DELIBERATE GAP CROSSINGS

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7-130. CABs do not make deliberate gap crossings independently; these are centralized operations wherethe controlling echelon is the BCT or higher. Deliberate gap crossings require extensive engineeraugmentation from an engineer brigade or a maneuver enhancement brigade. Their support is availableonly when higher headquarters has adequate time to position the assets at the right place to conduct acrossing.

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7-131. The organization of a deliberate gap crossing usually consists of an assault force, assured mobilityforce, bridgehead force, and breakout force. The CAB operates as one of these elements during a deliberatecrossing. The assault force seizes the far-shore objective and eliminates enemy direct fires on the crossingsite. The assured mobility force provides crossing means, traffic control, and obscuration. The forceusually consists of maneuver, engineer, MP, and CBRN units. The bridgehead force attacks from the far shore objective to secure the bridgehead, eliminatingenemy direct fire and observed indirect fire on the crossing area.

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7-132. Once the gap crossing is completed, and the bridgehead secured, a breakout force crosses the gapbehind the bridgehead force and attacks out of the bridgehead. This element usually is not part of theassault force. (Refer to FM 3-34.22 and ATTP 3-90.4 for more information.)

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Chapter 8

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Augmenting Combat Power

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We cannot count on the instinct for survival to protect us against war.

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To accomplish the assigned mission, the CAB commander must integrate andsynchronize all warfighting functions as enablers to enhance the combat power of hismaneuver companies. This chapter describes the fires, aviation, protection, informand influence activities, and engineers into CAB operations.

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Ronald Reagan

Section I Fires

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8-1. Fires are the use of weapons systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP3-09) The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinateduse of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. (ADRP3-0) The role of fires is to enable the CAB commander to seize and retain the initiative, gain and maintainfreedom of movement and action, and defeat adaptive threats across the range of military operations. Firesare surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and joint fires including electronic attack. Fires are integrated andsynchronized in support of the scheme of maneuver.

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8-2. The CAB commander uses fire support to create effects and set conditions to achieve theirobjectives. Each fire support task and purpose directly supports a maneuver task and purpose. Integratingfire support digital systems with other mission command systems enhances the CABs ability to focus firesby providing the commander with improved SU that enhances his ability to exploit his AO rapidly withfires.

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8-3. The Army must be dominant across the range of military operations. It must always be prepared tofight in high intensity conflict but is equally likely to conduct operations in mid- to low-intensity conflicts.Thus, forces that provide fires must be able to operate throughout an entire operational environment thatencompasses space, air, maritime, and land domains, and the information environment, and other variables.Fires must focus on the concentration of effects and not on the concentration of forces.

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8-4. Their first priority is to support forces in contact. Fire support organizations help shape theoperational environment, provide force protection, and set conditions for the ground maneuver forces theysupport. Modern weaponry, real-time information, and precision munitions allow for widely dispersed andnoncontiguous forces to conduct simultaneous operations throughout the entire AO.

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FIRE SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

8-5. The CAB FC plans, prepares, executes and assesses fires in support of current and future operations.The FC back briefs targeting guidance to the commander in accordance with the commanders intent forfires and maneuver, develops HPTs and prioritizes targets for attack, matched to a wide range of targetingand delivering systems. Collocated and integrated with the FC, is the Air Force Tactical Air Control Party(TACP). The TACP provides linkages to higher echelon TACPs to plan, prepare, execute, and assess airsupport for CAB operations, and maintains situational understanding of the total air support picture. EveryCAB has a habitual relationship with a fire support platoon comprised of a FC and company FIST as shownin Table 8-1.

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Chapter 8

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FIRE CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE CAB

8-6. The CAB commanders primary fie support assets are its mortars and field artillery support delegatedto the CAB based on the ABCT commanders tasks. Priorities of military fires will likely shift frombetween supporting and main efforts throughout operations.

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FIELD ARTILLERY

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8-7. Field artillery is the maneuver commanders principal means for providing indirect fire support to hismaneuver forces. The mission of the field artillery is to destroy, defeat, or disrupt the enemy withintegrated fires to enable maneuver commanders to dominate in unified land operations. Field artilleryelements within maneuver organizations serve as the integrating center for all elements of fire support.Field artillery delivery systems include cannons, rockets, and missiles. These systems can provide firesunder all conditions of weather and in all types of terrain. They can shift and mass fires rapidly withouthaving to displace.

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8-8. Within the ABCT, the fires battalion has three batteries of six M109A6 Paladin self-propelled 155mm howitzers. Each battery has two three-gun platoons.The headquarters and headquarters battery isequipped with both counterfire radars and lightweight counter-mortar radars.

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MORTARS

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8-9. Mortars are organic to all CABs. The mission of mortars is to provide immediate and closesupporting fires to the maneuver forces in contact. Maneuver unit mortars provide close, immediatelyresponsive fire support for committed companies. These fires harass, suppress, neutralize, and destroyenemy attack formations and defenses; obscure the enemy's vision; and inhibit the enemys ability tomaneuver. Mortars can also be used as final protective fires, obscuration, and illumination.

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8-10. The CAB commander decides how and when to integrate mortars, as a key fire support asset.However, since they are fire support assets, the FSO should give advice and make recommendations to thecommander. The amount of control the FSO has over the employment of available mortars is a matter forthe supported unit commander to decide. The commander may specify mortar support for subordinate unitsby changing the command relationship, assigning priority of fires, or assigning priority targets.

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8-11. Synchronization of the mortar fire plan and scheme of maneuver with the CAB fire plan and schemeof maneuver are critical to realizing the full potential that the mortar platoon brings to the battlefield. Themortar platoon leader participates in the CAB fire support rehearsals to ensure the mortar platoon canaccomplish its essential tasks for fire support.

Fires Support Officer

Fire Support Officer

8-12. The CAB FSO supervises fire support activities in the CAB. These include planning, coordinating,integrating and synchronizing all forms of fires, to include joint fires and electronic attack. The FC isorganized to help the CAB commander and S-3 integrate fires in support of current and future operations.The major functions of the FC include: Plan, integrate, coordinate, and synchronize through targeting, Army and joint fires and, whendirected by the maneuver commander, other nonlethal effects. Coordinate target acquisition, target dissemination and target engagement.

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Integrate and synchronize airspace coordination requirements with Army and joint aircapabilities which include FSCMs and ACMs.Produce and execute the fire support plan.Manage target nominations and track the life cycle of the nomination.Interface with all boards/cells.Provide input to the collection plan.Conduct fires, assess, and recommend re-attack.Recommend FSCMs and ACMs.Coordinate position areas for fires units with maneuver and airspace control agencies.Request and coordinate CAS and air interdiction.

8-13. The EW sergeant provides the CAB with an improvised explosive device expert. The EW sergeantalso provides the commander and staff guidance on how the electromagnetic spectrum can impactoperations, and how friendly EW can be used to gain an advantage in support of tactical and operationalobjectives across unified land operations. They provide military assistance involving the use ofelectromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagneticspectrum; provides technical assistance to support units; maintains and assists in developing the EWrunning estimate.

TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY

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8-14. The USAF augments the CABs fire support assets with a TACP that provides an ALO, NCO andenlisted Soldier to plan, control, and direct close air support. The collaborative working relationshipestablished between the TACP with their CAB provides a working knowledge of ground operations andenhances their ability to integrate fixed wing operations with ground schemes of maneuver effectively.

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8-15. TACPs coordinate activities through an Air Force air request net and the advanced airlift notificationnet. The TACP performs the following functions: Serve as the USAF commanders representative, providing advice to the CAB commander andstaff on USAF capabilities, limitations, and employment. Coordinate with respective FC to synchronize air and surface fires. Prepare the air support plan to include CAS, interdiction, airlift, reconnaissance, and suppressionof enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations. Provide appropriate final attack control for CAS. Operate the Air Force air request net. Develop contact points, initial points, and aircraft coordination areas in coordination with theFSO and S-3. Once developed, the TACP disseminates this information to the air supportoperations center (ASOC) and other USAF activities. Coordinate aircraft forward to the appropriate contact point or initial point and then hands themoff to the JTAC.

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JOINT TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROLLER

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8-16. An NCO, serves as the JTAC. The JTAC is a qualified (certified) service member who, from aforward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other air operations. (JP 3-09.3)They also coordinate air defense and airspace management between the Army aviation element and theASOC. CAB JTACs have the added responsibility of terminal attack control.

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8-17. The primary responsibility of a JTAC is the positive control of CAS aircraft flying missions insupport of the CAB. JTACs monitor the ground tactical situation using electronic COP displays and voiceradio nets to prevent fratricidal air-to-ground or ground-to-air engagements.

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FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION

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8-18. Fire support planning and coordination ensure that the CAB synchronizes all available fire support inaccordance with the commander's concept of operations. The key to effective integration of fire support isthe thorough inclusion of fire support in the operations process, and a vigorous execution of the plansupported by an aggressive coordination effort. Fire support planning is accomplished using targeting andthe running estimate. The objective of fire support planning is to effectively integrate fire support into thefight to optimize combat power. Initiated during mission analysis and continuing through post-executionassessment, fire support planning includes the end state and the commanders objectives; targetdevelopment and prioritization; capabilities analysis; commanders decision and force assignment; missionplanning and force execution; and assessment.

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8-19. Fire support coordination is the planning and executing of fires so that targets are adequatelycovered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JP 3-09) It provides a way to deconflict attacks, reduceduplication of effort, facilitate shaping of the battlefield, and avoid fratricide. Coordination proceduresmust be flexible and responsive to change, with simplified arrangements for approval or concurrence.

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PRINCIPLES OF FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

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8-20. The principles of fire support planning are

Plan early and continuously. Exploit all available targeting assets. Consider the use of all lethal and nonlethal attack means. Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support. Use the most effective fire support means. Furnish the type of fire support requested. Avoid unnecessary duplication. Coordinate airspace. Provide adequate fire support. Provide rapid and effective coordination. Consider the use of fire support coordination measures. Provide for flexibility. Protect the force.

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8-21. The effectiveness of fire support planning and the fire support system depend on the successfulperformance of the three basic fires warfighting function tasks: Deliver fires. Integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires. Conduct targeting.

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ABCT RESPONSIBILITIES

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8-22. The ABCT develops a synchronized scheme of maneuver and and scheme of fires. The scheme offires assigns fire support tasks, and allocates assets and effects to subordinates. It is the brigadesresponsibility to set conditions for and provide indirect field artillery fires in support of the CABs. Thebrigade may provide additional augmenting fires by coordinating with the division artillery or field artillerybrigade. The BCT must clearly specify priority of fires. Refinements to the brigade scheme of fires fromsubordinate units are integrated via essential tasks for fire support. Finally, the brigade integrates themovement of artillery units with the scheme of maneuver.

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8-23. The BCTs role in fire support planning includes the following tasks: Coordinate and synchronize air-ground operation. Implement the fire support plan. Conduct fire support planning.

COMBINED ARMS BATTALION RESPONSIBILITIES

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8-24. The CAB must understand the brigade concept of fires, its synchronization with the brigade schemeof maneuver, and its role in the execution of the Brigade scheme of fires. With this information, the CABdevelops its own concept of fires. This concept involves assigned tasks from the BCT scheme of fires andtargets to support the CAB close fight. This might require only the refinement of BCT targets, or it mightrequire the CAB to submit new targets to support the CAB commanders concept of operations. The CABdevelops a scheme of fires to support both those tasks assigned by the BCT and those targets developed bythe CAB. It then issues the fire support plan to its subordinates, and incorporates bottom-up refinement tosupport the company commanders schemes of maneuver. Finally, the CAB forwards its concept of firesand target refinements to the BCT, and participates in rehearsals to ensure the plan is clearly understood.

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8-25. The CABs role in fire support planning includes the following tasks: Coordinate air-ground operation when providing close combat attack (CCA) support. Conduct rehearsals with supporting fires agencies and airspace control agencies (battalion firescell). Conduct fire support planning. Coordinate target engagement. Synchronize and integrate delivery of fires.

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CAB COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ESTABLISHING TARGET PRIORITIES

8-26. The CAB commander is responsible for the effective integration of fires with his whole operation.The CAB commanders operational approach includes the scheme of fires, which enables commanders toshape the operational environment with fires to support the commanders requirements and objectives. TheFSO provides the nucleus for effective fire support planning and coordination with the CAB S-3 and S-2,supporting field artillery, and other attack resources. The commander must take an active role in thedevelopment of the CAB concept of fires by articulating the mission tasks and purpose to the entire staff.Priority of fires is the commanders guidance to his staff to employ fire support in accordance with therelative importance of the unit mission. The guidance emphasizes in broad terms where, when and how thecommander intends to synchronize the effects of fires and targeting functions with the other elements ofcombat power to accomplish the mission. (See Table 8-2.)

8-27. The scheme of fires is a supporting element of the scheme of maneuver. The scheme of fires mustdescribe what fires must do in order to achieve the commander's intent. It includes the priority of fires andexplains what must be accomplished in clear, measurable, and understandable terms. The fire support tasks must include the purpose as well as who, what, when, where and why, andsometimes how, for each task. The FSO develops the scheme of fires in coordination with the S3 and mortar platoon leader. When field artillery fires are allotted, the FSO also coordinates withthe ABCT fire support coordinator and the field artillery battalion S-3 and FDC. The scheme offires must identify all fire support tasks. (Refer to FM 3-09 for more information.) Once the CAB scheme of fires is finalized, it is essential that the CAB commander clearlyarticulate to the BCT commander and staff the importance of those fires to the CAB concept ofoperations. The CAB commander should be able to describe the impact on mission success ifthose fires are not received.

QUICK FIRE PLAN

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8-28. The purpose of a quick fire plan is to quickly prepare and execute fire support in anticipation of animpending operation. Quick fire plan techniques constitute an informal fire plan. Brigade, battalion, orcompany FSOs may develop quick fire plans to support their respective organizations. Like all fire supportplans, the maneuver commander approves the quick fire plan. In quick fire planning the FSO assignstargets (and possibly a schedule of fires) to the most appropriate fire support means available to supportthe operation. In this type of fire support planning the available time usually does not permit evaluation oftargets on the target list and consolidation with targets from other fire support staffs and units. (Refer to FM3-09 for more information.)

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OBSERVATION PLANNING8-29. The observation plan, a component of the fire support plan, should provide the task and purpose foreach phase of the operation. The observation plan should be synchronized with the scheme of maneuverduring the MDMP. The CAB FSO will develop the observation plan in concert with the S-2 and S-3, anduse terrain based computer programs to assist with position selection. The observation plan ensuresobservers are in position to support each essential task to be accomplished by fire support assets. Theobservation plan should address: Where the observer needs to be. Security. Communications. How the observer gets into position. What the observer is to accomplish. Disengagement criteria, if necessary. Designated primary and alternate observers.

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM CONTROL OPTIONS

8-30. A critical observation planning issue that must be addressed at CAB level is who controls andpositions the FISTs. (See Table 8-3.) The company commander needs the FIST company FSO to assist inhis fire support planning and to trigger targets assigned to the company for execution in accordance withthe CAB scheme of fires. The CAB commander or CAB FSO may also need to position FIST observers toensure they are in the proper position at the right time to execute battalion-directed targets. In most cases,the control and positioning of FIST personnel depends on the mission.

Option 1: Centralized at the CAB Level

8-31. Consolidate FISTs at the CAB level to maximize the CAB commander's ability to influence thebattle at a critical time and place. This option can provide the CAB commander flexibility and redundancyto meet the demands of a nonlinear or expanded area of operations. Company team commanders retainaccess to fire support expertise in the planning process while the FISTs are centralized at the CAB level forexecution.

Option 2: Decentralized at Company Team Level

8-32. FIST assets remain at the company team level for fire support planning, coordination, and execution.This option sustains a habitual relationship between the FIST and the supported company. It retains trainedobservers to call for field artillery and mortar fires for that company or platoon. FIST personnel qualifiedand certified as joint fires observers provide information to the JTAC in support of Type-2 and Type-3CAS.

Option 3: A Blend of Options 1 and 2

8-33. The CAB positions and employs selected FIST assets as needed. For example, the CAB mightposition a laser-equipped FIST headquarters vehicle with the senior fire support NCO at a CAB OP toexecute a target supporting an essential task for an attack. This allows the company FSO to travel with thecompany commander in his vehicle to advise, coordinate, and call for fires.

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Table 8-3. Sample FIST employment

The CAB retains control of the FIST because targets are fully synchronized with theCAB scheme of maneuver.The company generally has control of the FIST because the situation is unclear.The support force and breach force controls the FISTs to provide redundancy at thepoint of penetration.

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Chapter 8

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8-34. Regardless of how the CAB commander chooses to employ his FISTs, the CAB staff must provideeach FIST with the observation plan. The observation plan provides the FIST with proposed OP locations(with routes to and from these locations) from which the FIST can best execute its assigned CAB missionor support its companys concept of operations.

TOP-DOWN FIRE PLANNING

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8-35. To enhance the focus of fires, the CAB conducts formal fire planning through a deliberate top-downprocess with bottom-up refinement. This process occurs primarily during the "decide" phase of thetargeting process (decide, detect, deliver, assess).

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8-36. Top-down fire planning is a continuous process of analyzing, allocating, and synchronizing firesupport. It determines How the CAB will use fire support and what the essential tasks are. What types of targets will be attackedresulting in the HPTL (decide). What type of targets will not be attacked. What collection assets are available to acquire and track the targets (detect). What assets the CAB will use to attack different targets; what munitions, what affects, and whenthey will be engaged (deliver). System preferences for various targets. What assets are available to verify (assess) effects on the target.

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8-37. The basis of the top-down fire planning concept is that the plan originates at higher levels and isrefined at lower levels. At the CAB level, the commander receives the top-down fire plan from the ABCT.This plan focuses the fire support effort exactly where the ABCT commander wants it in his area ofoperations. It provides detailed execution guidance, fire support tasks, allocation of resources, assignedtarget execution responsibility, and fully supports the ABCT's concept of operations. The CAB FSO, afterreceiving this plan, begins to refine targeting information based on how the CAB commander intends tointegrate his plan into the Brigade plan.

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8-38. Planning must be flexible to accommodate unexpected and rapid changes. The Brigade plan shouldcontain only those fire support tasks necessary to support the commander's guidance for fires. Remainingassets are allocated to the subordinate CAB commanders according to their priorities for fires. In turn, eachCAB commander develops a concept of fires to support his concept of operations/scheme of maneuver andassigned essential tasks. He may allocate any assets not planned for down to the companies for theirplanning and execution.

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Note. When planning fires, it is essential to address the following aspects of each fire supporttask and target: purpose, location, trigger, shooter and backup shooter, sensor, observer andbackup observer, communications structure, rehearsal, and delivery assets. If any of theserequirements are not identified, planned, resourced, and rehearsed, the successfulaccomplishment of that fire support task is at risk.

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8-39. The primary advantage of top-down fire planning is that the commander develops the concept offires early, enabling the FC to plan concurrently. This process also allows for development of a plan thatfocuses the fires effort where and when and how the commander wants it.

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8-40. Digitized systems facilitate the dissemination of plans; provide the commander with near-real-timeinformation on the status of fire units; and allow him to modify and shift the focus of fires as the situationdevelops. The CAB commander can quickly assess where the focus of fires needs to be.

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8-41. The allocation of resources in top-down fire planning should be more than the mere "blind"allocation of a number of targets for planning without regard for the purpose and achievable effects duringthat part of the operation. Allocations at each level should emphasize the purpose, planning, and executionof fire support tasks. For example, allocating three targets to a company commander for planning does notgive him the possible purposes of those targets. However, allocating a subordinate a fire task in the form ofa TAI for the destruction of a platoon during a certain portion of the operation better accounts for the

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relationship of fires in time and space. The Brigade plan assigns execution responsibility down to the CAB.The CAB commander must then assign responsibility down to the companies.

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8-42. Bottom-up refinement is a key element of top-down fire planning. During the decision makingprocess, targets are planned based on map reconnaissance and situation templates. Targets must be refinedbased on the reconnaissance effort, actual occupation of the terrain, and updated intelligence. Theestablishment of fire support tasks early in the planning process allows company FSOs to be proactive intheir refinement and planning. Targets that facilitate the accomplishment of fire support tasks can benominated during the bottom-up refinement early in the planning process.

TARGETING8-43. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response tothem, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (ADRP 5-0) The purpose of targeting is tointegrate and synchronize fires into unified land operations. Army targeting uses the functions decide,detect, deliver, assess (D3A) as its methodology. D3A is designed to enhance fire support planning and theintelligence targeting process. Its functions complement the development, planning, execution, andassessment of the effectiveness of targeting and weapons employment. Targeting is continuously refinedand adjusted between the commander and staff as the operation unfolds. A Target is an entity or objectconsidered for possible engagement or other action. (JP 3-60) Targets also include the wide array of mobileand stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functions that an enemy commander can use to conductoperations. These include: Target acquisition. Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target insufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. (JP 1-02) Target discrimination. Target discrimination is the process of applying a system, action, orfunction to identify or engage any one target when multiple targets are present. Target engagement. Target engagement is the process of applying a weapon system, capability,action, or function against a target to achieve a desired lethal or nonlethal effect in support of thecommanders objectives.

TARGETING WORKING GROUP

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8-44. Targeting is a command function that encompasses many disciplines and requires participation fromthe CAB staff elements. The commanders targeting guidance describes the desired effects to be generatedby fires, physical attack and nonlethal activities. It must focus on essential enemy capabilities and functionsthat could interfere with the achievement of friendly objectives. Usually, targeting is synchronized withinthe setting of (informal) targeting working group sessions. Targeting working group sessions must beeffectively integrated into the CAB battle rhythm and nested within the BCT targeting cycle to ensure theresults of targeting focuses operations.

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8-45. In general, battalions use an abbreviated form of a targeting working group session. Table 8-4contains a list of staff member responsibilities for the targeting working group. The CAB FSO leads thetargeting working group and the CAB XO chairs the targeting board. The session Verifies and updates the HPTL and attack guidance. Establishes target selection standards. Nominates targets, FSCMS and ACMs to higher headquarters. Synchronizes the information collection plan with the fire support plan and observer plan. Synchronizes air and ground maneuver with fires to including recommendations for maneuvercontrol measures, FSCMs and ACMs. Monitors fire support systems and ammunition status. Receives and evaluates battle damage assessment. Synchronizes lethal and nonlethal activities.

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Table 8-4. Targeting meeting responsibilities

ResponsibilityReviews commanders guidance and commanders intent.Focuses targeting working group participants on the targeting board objectives.Arbitrates disagreements and ensures participants are actively involved.Focuses on the last time-phase line (for example, D+3 days).Creates current enemy situation template, threat COA (event template).Proposes HVT sets and link analysis.Prepares current and proposed PIR, BDA and AO assessments.Determines impact of light and weather data.Designs a threat COA event template (D, D+1/2/3).Builds a collection emphasis to include brigade-directed NAI coverage.Gathers a collection synchronization to include counter mortar radars.Prepares a status of collection assets.Drafts information collection plan (D, D+1/2/3).Briefs the status of current operations.Gathers and briefs friendly forces information requirement FFIR and commanders PIR (D-1review; D, D+1/2/3 recommendations).Performs BCT-directed and implied tasks.Plans for adjacent units affecting operations D, D+1/2/3.Spells out task organization (assets available to include anticipated combat power).Gathers troops-to-task ratios.Briefs current targeting products including the HPTL, attack guidance matrix, target selectionstandard, targeting synch matrix and fire support tasks (D, D+1/2/3)Briefs status of fire support assets.Recommends decide and detect data for TSM (D, D+1/2/3).Gathers radar operations and counterfire predictive analysis (D, D+1/2/3).Plans for approved preplanned air support requests and targets planned for next two airtasking order cycles.Plans for proposed HPTL for D, D+1/2/3.Briefs recommended changes to FSCM.Considers recommended changes, in conjunction with TACP, changes to working preplannedair support requests.Advises on the employment of air assets.Approves submission of airspace coordination measure (ACM) requests.Updates MOE matrix.Recommends information related capabilities to be synchronized, messages and informationengagement related targets.Coordinates civil reconnaissance.Coordinates key leader engagement by constantly vetting contacts to eventually identify eliteswithin the AO.Assists in the planning, coordination and management of CMO project management.Identifies and coordinates with NGO, and host-nation project management.Minimizes interference between civil and military operations.Synchronizes CMO to enhance mission effectiveness.Plans for vulnerabilities and flexibility (decision points).Approves MISO plans and programs.Approves and availability of products.Instructs on TPT tasks and purposes.Creates products and distribution plans/synchronization.Creates a public affairs media engagement plan.Designs a public affairs information strategies and media facilitation.Lays out a media security plan.Briefs a threat counter-mobility COA.Organizes the engineer and EOD assets available (D, D+1/2/3).Recommends reconstruction projects.Creates an environmental considerations assessment.Provides final guidance and direction to the staff.

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REHEARSALS8-46. Rehearsals are an integral part of the planning process. If possible the FSO conducts a fire supportrehearsal prior to the combined arms rehearsal in order to provide the fire support cell additional time torehearse fire support plans and products. The FSO participates in the maneuver commanders rehearsal andaddresses specific fires portions of the plan. Both fire support and maneuver actions should be rehearsed toreinforce the scheme of maneuver and fire plan. Rehearsals should both practice and test the plan.Rehearsal procedures should be established as part of unit TACSOPs.

COMBINED ARMS REHEARSAL

8-47. The CAB commander personally leads the rehearsal. Usually, the CAB S-3 organizes the rehearsalusing the commanders DST and the synchronization matrix; while the FSO uses the fire support executionmatrix. Subordinate company commanders and the scout and mortar platoon leaders participate in therehearsal. Other attendees include the CABs primary staff, company FSO and FIST personnel, CBRN andengineer staff officers, ALO, and the aviation LNO.

FIRE SUPPORT REHEARSAL

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8-48. The FSO runs the battalion fire support rehearsal. The fire support rehearsal focuses on the executionof fire support tasks, the fire support execution matrix, the effectiveness of FSCMs, and the timing andsynchronization of all fire support efforts with each other and with the maneuver operation. This rehearsalgenerally follows the combined arms rehearsal in order to cover any changes made to the plan. The CAB S2, S-3, TACP, firing unit leaders, and subordinate FSOs and observers should participate to Confirm sequence of targets and desired effects. Depict enemy and friendly actions and reactions. Synchronize air ground operation. Validate observer plan and JTAC positioning.

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8-49. The FSO establishes the time and location for the rehearsal. The FSO begins the rehearsal byannouncing key times or phases of the operation. Each participant then executes the actions he will take,normally just short of actually delivering fires on the appropriate target. Additionally, the FSO ensuressubordinate FSOs and observers understand their role in the CAB and BCT plan by having them articulatethe targets and triggers for which they are responsible. They should discuss lifting and shifting of fires insequence of the scheme of maneuver and identify FSCMs or ACMs in effect in relation to time, space, andpurpose relevant to the mission. The key is to ensure the battalion is able to execute its fire support tasks.

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8-50. Units use the fire support execution matrix as a script to conduct FS rehearsals, since the fire supportexecution matrix is tied directly to the concept of operations. The field artillery battalion representativeuses and verifies the information in the field artillery battalion OPORD or field artillery support plan.

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CLEARANCE OF FIRES

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8-51. The commander is responsible for the clearance of fires. Clearance of fires is the process by whichthe supported commander ensures that fires or their effects will have no unintended consequences onfriendly units or the scheme of maneuver. (FM 3-09) Fires must be cleared to prevent inadvertentengagement of friendly elements and noncombatants. Clearance of fires requires positive action; silence isnot consent. The commander can delegate coordination authority to the battle captain or FSO. The battlecaptain clears fires using either a staff process or control measures.

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8-52. Once the commander approves the control measures, they either are embedded in automated battlecommand systems, or are disseminated through active or passive recognition systems. During planning andexecution, the commander uses all of these means in various combinations to set the conditions forclearance of fires. Even with automated systems, clearance of fires remains a command responsibility atevery levelcommanders must assess the level of risks and decide to what extent they will rely onautomated systems to assist in the clearance of fires. (Refer to ATPs 3-09.30 and 3-09.24 for moreinformation.)

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CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

8-53. Close air support (CAS) is defined as the air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostiletargets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air missionwith the fire and movement of those forces. (JP 3-09.3) CAS can be employed by the CAB to blunt anenemy attack; to support the momentum of the ground attack; to help set conditions for CAB and ABCToperations counterfire fight; to disrupt, delay and destroy enemy forces and reserves; or to provide coverfor friendly movements. In planning CAS missions, the FSO ensures the commander understands thecapabilities and limitations of CAS (for example, time windows for use, airspace coordination, grounddesignator requirements) and munitions minimum risk estimate distances. The FSO is also responsible forintegrating and synchronizing CAS missions into the fire support plan and scheme of fires. Depending onthe situation and availability of CAS assets, the CAB may be allocated CAS missions or be assignedexecution responsibility for a Brigade CAS mission. More likely, however, CAS can be handed off to theCAB when the brigade has no viable target, or in response to the CABs request for immediate air support.

PREPLANNED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

8-54. The FC must forward CAS requests as soon as they can be forecasted. These requests for CASnormally do not include detailed timing information because of the lead-time involved. Preplanned CASrequests involve any information about planned schemes of maneuver, even general information, which canbe used in the apportionment, allocation, and distribution cycle. Estimates of weapons effects needed bypercentage (for example, 60 percent antiarmor and 40 percent antipersonnel), sortie time flows, peak needtimes, and anticipated distribution patterns are vital to preparing the air tasking order. The FC and TACPensure the proper information is forwarded through higher echelons within the air tasking order planningcycle.

CATEGORIES OF CAS8-55. Preplanned CAS may be categorized as follows: Scheduled Mission. CAS strike on a planned target at a planned time. Alert Mission. CAS strike on a planned target or target area to be executed when requested bythe supported unit. Alert missions can be accomplished via ground alert CAS, which is launchedfrom a ground alert status upon request or order; or via airborne on-call CAS, which iscomprised of designated airborne fixed wing assets pre-positioned for rapid response. Alert (oncall) CAS allows the ground commander to designate a general target area within which targetsmay need to be attacked. The ground commander designates a conditional period within whichhe later determines specific times for attacking the targets.

REQUEST CHANNELS

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8-56. There are specific request channels for preplanned CAS. Within the CAB, requests for preplannedtactical air support missions are submitted to the FC. The commander, FSO, ALO, and S-3 evaluate therequest; coordinate requirements such as airspace; consolidate; and, if approved, assign a priority orprecedence to the request. The request then flows to BCT and division FCs to the supporting USAF ASOC.

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8-57. Preplanned targets may be diverted to higher priority targets. For this reason, the FSO should planoptions for the engagement of CAS targets by other fire support assets.

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IMMEDIATE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

8-58. Immediate requests are used for air support mission requirements identified too late to be included inthe current air tasking order. Those requests initiated below battalion level are forwarded to the CAB FC.At battalion level, the commander, FSO, TACP, and S-3 consider each request. Approved requests aretransmitted by the TACP over the Air Force air request net (See Figure 8-1.) directly to the ASOC,normally collocated with the division CP. The TACP at each intermediate headquarters monitors andacknowledges receipt of the request. Silence by an intermediate TACP indicates approval by the associated

8-59. If any Army echelon above the initiating level disapproves a request or substitutes another supportmeans (for example, Army aviation or field artillery), the TACP at that headquarters notifies the ASOC atdivision and the originating TACP, which notifies the requester. When the division commander or hisrepresentative approves the request, the ASOC initiates the necessary action to satisfy the request. If alldistributed sorties are committed, the corps commander can request additional sorties from the next higherechelon, when appropriate. If the ASOC has no CAS missions available, it can, with Army concurrence,divert sorties from lower priority targets or request support from lateral or higher commands.

JOINT FIRES OBSERVER

8-60. Joint fires observers are qualified and certified Soldiers, who can request, adjust, and control surfaceto-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2 and 3 CAS terminal attack controls, andperform autonomous terminal guidance operations. The joint fires observer is not an additional positionwithin an organization but rather an individual who has received the necessary qualification andcertification. Within the CAB, Soldiers typically trained as joint fires observers include: Company FSOs and Fire support NCOs. Infantry platoon FOs. Scout platoon members.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

8-61. The BCTs have an organic air defense airspace management (ADAM)/BAE that is composed of airdefense artillery (ADA) and aviation personnel and performs the airspace control integration function forthe brigade in addition to its air and missile defense and aviation functions. While other members of thebrigade staff are key airspace control members (fires cell, ALO/TACP, unmanned aircraft operators) TheADAM/BAE is the airspace control integrator for the S-3, operations. They exercise the brigadecommanders authority over the airspace in his AO for airspace users, to include CAS in support of ABCToperations. The CAB TACP ALO and JTAC coordinate CAS through the ABCT FC unless immediateCAS is required as discussed above.

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FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE8-62. The safety of ground forces is a major concern during day and night CAS operations. Mostengagements that result in fratricide are caused by the incorrect identification of friendly troops operatingin an AO. The use of proper authentication and ground marking procedures assures that a safe separationexists between the friendly forces and the impact area of aerial delivered munitions. Proper radioprocedures and markings assist the JTACs and the strike aircraft in the positive identification of groundforces and the boundaries in which they operate.

Identification of Friendly Forces

8-63. FBCB2 provides digital data on the location and identity of friendly units to enhance safety marginsand reduce the potential of fratricidal engagements. Friendly unit locations and boundaries can also bemarked using flash mirrors, marker panels, and direction and distance from prominent land features ortarget marks. Strobe lights are very good markers at night and in overcast conditions. They can be usedwith blue or infrared filters and can be made directional using any opaque tube. Any light that can befiltered or covered and uncovered can be used for signaling aircraft or marking friendly locations.

Target Acquisition8-64. Targets that are well camouflaged, small and stationary, or masked by hills or other natural terrainare difficult for fast-moving aircraft to detect. Marking rounds (rockets) fired from aerial platforms orartillery can enhance target acquisition and help ensure first-pass success.

Target Identification8-65. Strike aircraft must have a precise description of the target and know the location of friendly forcesin relation to terrain features that are easily visible from the air. Airborne FACs can assist JTACs, sincethey have a better view due to their altitude and may have flown over the general area many times.

Final Attack Heading

8-66. Choice of the final attack heading depends upon considerations of troop safety, aircraft survivability,enemy air defense locations, and optimum weapons effects. Missiles or bombs are effective from anyangle. Cannons, however, are more effective against the sides and rears of armored vehicles.

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES

8-67. SEAD operations target all known or suspected enemy AMD sites that cannot be avoided and thatare capable of engaging friendly air assets and systems, including suppressive fires. The FC integratesSEAD fires into an overall fire plan. Synchronization of SEAD fires with the maneuver plan isaccomplished using procedural control (an H-hour sequence), positive control (initiating fires on eachtarget as the lead aerial platforms pass a predetermined reference point or trigger), or a combination of thetwo. Regardless of the technique, the FSO planning the SEAD must conduct detailed planning and closecoordination with the S-2, S-3, ALO, Army aviation LNO, and field artillery battalion S-3/fire directionofficer.

WEATHER8-68. Weather is one of the most important considerations when conducting Unified Land Operations.Weather impacts all the warfighting functions, and can hinder target acquisition and identification, degradeweapon accuracy and effectiveness, or negate employment of specific munitions types. The S-3 requestsweather data from the Division Staff Weather Officer to gain highly predictive and descriptive weatherinformation for specific time periods and locations within the CABs AO. This data improves his ability todetermine when friendly and enemy capabilities will be impacted by weather. In addition, the weatherprogram of record (that is DCGS-A) provides weather data from the Air Force Weather Agency andmeteorological sensors throughout the AO. This system interfaces with the ABCS systems anddisseminates weather information down to CAB level. The weather program of record can predict weather

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effects on a specific mission, desired AO, or particular system. The system also provides weather hazardsand forecasts for different locations, as well as current and forecast weather conditions for visibility, wind,precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, humidity, and atmospheric pressure in a specific AO.Meteorological satellite data may also be obtained to show regional cloud cover and precipitation.

SECTION II AVIATION

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8-69. Army aviation uses maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power at critical times and places tofind, fix, and destroy threat forces. Aviation units design, tailor, and configure their assets in support of thecompany team for specific operational support based on mission guidance and the specific theater in whichthe units operate. The organization could be any combination of attack reconnaissance, assault, lift, andmaintenance units. When providing support to ground maneuver elements, Army aviation will operate onthat echelons command net unless directed otherwise.

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8-70. The principles and guidelines for employment of aviation assets are as follows: Fight as an integral part of the combined arms team. Exploit the capabilities of other branches and services. Capitalize on information collection capabilities. Suppress threat weapons and acquisition means. Exploit firepower, mobility, and surprise. Mass forces. Use terrain for survivability. Displace forward elements frequently. Maintain flexibility. Exercise staying power.

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AIR/GROUND OPERATION

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8-71. The operational environment requires combined arms at all levels; therefore, the likelihood of CABcommander receiving attack and utility aviation assets in an operational control status is ever increasing.The following are considerations for the commander and staff when receiving aviation assets: Exchange of command frequencies/call signs, frequency modulation check-in times, andsynchronization. Terrain model and radio rehearsals, along with conducting regular training events. Location of air corridors and air control points. Location of aerial attack-by-fire/support-by-fire/BPs. Identification method for marking ground targets and SOPs. Aircraft weapons configuration capabilities and limitations of each force. Friendly recognition symbols for both aircraft and ground vehicles. Fire coordination measures. Location and marking of LZs and pickup zones (PZs) for medical evacuation, CASEVAC, andaerial resupply. Command and support relationship.

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8-72. Ground maneuver commanders must understand that aviation forces can provide a significantadvantage during operations. The commander and staff must understand that the unique capabilities ofArmy aviation require unique planning and coordination. The MDMP and TLP must fully integrate Armyaviation forces to ensure effective combined arms employment. Effective combined arms employmentrequires that aviation and ground maneuver forces synchronize their operations by operating from acommon perspective. This section highlights some possible procedures that aid in creating a common airground perspective.

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CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK

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8-73. When the CAB engages in CCA on the battlefield, it may request CCA support. Close combat attackas a hasty or deliberate attack by Army aircraft providing air-to-ground fires for friendly units engaged inclose combat as part of the Army combined arms team. Due to the close proximity of friendly forces,detailed integration is required. Due to the capabilities of the aircraft and the enhanced situationalawareness of the aircrews, terminal control from ground units or controllers is not necessary. CCA is notsynonymous with CAS.

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8-74. In most cases, Army attack reconnaissance helicopters are either employed by a preplanned missionor on an immediate or emergency basis. Attack reconnaissance aircraft engage targets near friendly forces,thereby requiring detailed integration of fire and maneuver of ground and aviation forces. To achievedesired effects and reduce risk of fratricide, air/ground operation must take place down to team levels. Bothtypes of CCA represent a powerful battlefield asset, capable of destroying threat elements of varying sizes,including large Armor formations and during counter-insurgency operations in urban terrain. Most aspectsof CCA employment and target effects are similar to those for CAS that fixed-wing aircraft provide.

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EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS8-75. Mission success in CCA employment is dependent on leaders conducting detailed planning andcoordination between the aerial attack team and the ground unit already engaged in close combat. Onceexecution begins, there must be effective integration of the fires and movement of both maneuver and aerialelements. (Refer to ATP 3-04.14 for more information.)

Planning and Reconnaissance

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8-76. Planning for attack reconnaissance helicopter support usually begins at squadron/battalion level orabove. The squadron/battalion provides the aviation brigade or CAB with information on locations, routes,and communications before the attack teams departure from its assembly area. As part of this effort, thecompany team and platoons usually provide information for CCA employment. All Soldiers shouldfamiliarize themselves with the procedures used to call for attack reconnaissance helicopter support. Ifattack reconnaissance helicopter assets are working for the battalion, they must provide suppressive fires onany known or suspected threat air defense artillery locations.

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8-77. Critical elements of the planning process are the procedures and resources used in marking andidentifying targets and friendly positions. Leaders consider these factors thoroughly, regardless of the timeavailable to the ground and air commanders.

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Coordination

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8-78. The aerial attack team coordinates directly with the lowest-level unit in contact on the company teamcommand net. Whenever practical, before the attack team launches the CCA operation, the ground leaderconducts final coordination with attack reconnaissance helicopters in a concealed position known as theaerial holding area. The holding area is a point in space within the supported units AO that is orientedtoward the threat; it allows the attack team to receive requests for immediate CCA and expedite the attack.The aerial holding area could be an alternate BP positioned out of range of the threats direct fire andindirect fire weapons ranges.

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8-79. Final coordination between the ground and aviation units must include agreement on methods ofidentifying and marking friendly and threat positions. This should take advantage of the equipment andcapabilities of the attack team, including the Forward-Looking Infrared System, the Thermal ImagingSystem, and night-vision devices.

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8-80. Coordination should cover the BPs, attack-by-fire, or support-by-fire positions used by attackreconnaissance helicopters. The commander should offset these positions from the ground maneuver unit tomaximize the effects of the attack teams weapons and to minimize the risk of fratricide. To preventindirect fires within the AO from posing a danger to the helicopters, the ground commander informs directsupport artillery and organic mortars of the aerial positions and coordinates through the FSO and battalionfires support element for de-confliction.

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AIR MOVEMENT

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8-81. Air movement operations are conducted to reposition units, personnel, supplies, equipment, and othercritical combat elements in support of current and future operations. These operations include both airdropsand air landings.

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8-82. Planning for air movements is similar to that for other missions. Besides the normal planningprocess, air movement planning must cover specific requirements for air infiltration and exfiltration. Therequirements are as follows: Coordinate with the supporting aviation unit(s). Plan and rehearse with the supporting aviation unit prior to the mission if possible. If armedescort accompanies the operation, the commanderas well as the assault or general supportaviation unitshould ensure that aircrews are included in the planning and rehearsal. Gather as much information as possible, such as the enemy situation, in preparation for themission. Plan and coordinate joint suppression of enemy air defenses.

8-84. Planned extraction points and emergency extraction rally points require communications to verify thepreplanned pickup time or coordinate an emergency pickup time window. Planning must include details forextraction when communications between higher headquarters and the unit are lost. The lostcommunications extraction point involves infiltration teams moving to the emergency extraction point aftertwo consecutive missed communications windows and waiting up to 24 hours for pickup.

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AIR RESUPPLY8-85. Units may operate in forward locations and even distant hide positions requiring helicopter resupplyincluding both internal and external load operations.

PLANNING

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8-86. Planning for aerial resupply requires close coordination, with elements reviewing the entire missionand resolving all limitations and problem areas. If a resupply item poses a problem that cannot be resolved,leaders should consider another mode of transport. Planning factors include the following: Priorities of cargo/unit resupply. Integration of the resupply operation into the tactical plan. Selection, identification, and marking of the PZ/LZ. Type/amount of cargo. Helicopter assets available. Requirements for slings, cargo nets, and cargo containers. Ground crew-training requirements; such as those for ground guides and hookup personnel. PZ and LZ security. Flight routes.

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8-87. The selection of a usable PZ or LZ is extremely important. The commander analyzes logistical andtactical considerations taking into account that PZ/LZ positioning is at the right place to support the groundunit. The area must be accessible to the aircraft involved in the resupply operation. The air missioncommander, the pilot in command, an aviation liaison officer, or a Pathfinder-qualified officer or NCOmake the final decision on PZ/LZ selection and acceptance.

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8-88. The unit receiving the supplies is responsible for preparing the PZ/LZ. Besides the general PZ/LZresponsibilities, they perform the following specific tasks for aerial resupply: Recover and assemble equipment and supplies.

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Chapter 8

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Train available ground crews to guide the aircraft during approach, landing, unloading/loading,departure, and de-rigging the load.Train hookup personnel.Coordinate with the sending unit for the control and return of that units transport equipment,such as slings and A-22 bags.Prepare, coordinate, and inspect backloads (such as slings and A-22 bags) and have them readyfor hookup or loading when the aircraft arrives.

SECTION III PROTECTION

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8-89. The protection warfighting function is the preservation of the effectiveness of mission-relatedmilitary and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed orlocated within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. Preserving the force includesprotecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States andmultinational military and civilian partners, to include the host nation. The protection warfighting functionenables the commander to maintain the forces integrity and combat power. Protection determines thedegree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and then counters or mitigates those threats.Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes,and protect forces. (Refer to ADRP 3-37 for more information.)

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8-90. Units must consider the twelve protection functions identified in ADRP 3-37. The followingProtection tasks are discussed below. Others are covered in other chapters throughout this ATP: Coordinate air and missile defense. Implement OPSEC Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.

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COORDINATE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

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8-91. The CAB has no organic air defense assets, but the BCT has an ADAM/BAE section with an air andmissile defense workstation. Air and missile defense workstation is the mission command component of theAMD planning and control system. It is the staff planning and situational awareness tool used to integratesensors (for example, Sentinel radar) with air defense fire units. Based on METT-TC, divisions may locateADA units well forward in the area of operations. A short-range air defense platoon may be in directsupport of a CAB. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for more information.)

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8-92. Air defense artillery units are a limited resource. Available ADA resources will be dedicated to theprotection of assets that commanders deem critical to the success of the tactical plan, leaving other assetswithout dedicated ADA coverage. All units with or without dedicated ADA support must contribute to theirown defense against air attack.

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8-93. The battalion adopts its air defense posture based on the type of supporting air defense assets that areattached. The battalion always uses a combination of active and passive measures to protect itself againstair attack.

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8-94. The type of SHORAD ADA systems that the brigade and the CAB may have in their AOs are: Stinger man portable air defense system a man-portable, shoulder-fired guided missile system. Avengera pedestal-mounted Stinger system mounted on a high-mobility multipurpose wheeledvehicle (HMMWV). Linebackera pedestal mounted Stinger on a BFV. Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar

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THE THREAT8-95. In analyzing the physical variable of a CABs operational environment, planners must take intoaccount the airspace above the CABs AO. Some areas to consider include: Location of threat airfields and launching points.

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Range of aircraft and missiles.

Physical constraints in the friendly AO.Buildings and other structures.Power lines and antennas.Hills, trees, and other natural barriers to movement and observation.Weather.

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8-96. The following are some of the types of air threats and typical maneuvers that the CAB can expect toencounter against a well-equipped enemy: Unmaned aerial vehicles (UAVs)are small and elusive. They usually fly low, but the altitudecan vary. Once in the target area, they may fly an orbit attempting to stay out of engagementrange of ADA. Most surface-launched cruise missiles follow the terrain and use terrain masking. Due to theirrange, they might take indirect approach routes. Ballistic missiles are not terrain-dependent. They fly from launch point to objective. Their flightis not restricted by terrain. Tactical air-to-surface missiles usually fly direct routes from launch platform to the target. Rotary-wing aircraft primarily conduct contour flights. They follow ridgelines and militarycrests, using the terrain to mask their approach to the target area. Fixed-wing aircraft usually follow major terrain or man-made features. Depending on range,they may fly a straight line to the target. Ordnance or payload can affect range and altitude of the air system and, thus, influence theselection of avenues of approach for airborne and air assault operations.

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8-97. Units can expect the threat to attempt to counter U.S. defensive and offensive operations with amyriad of aerial platforms. UAS provide the threat commander the necessary information to determinefriendly unit locations, movements, and objectives. Aerial and artillery strikes can be generated from theintelligence gathered against the following targets: Maneuver force. Forward arming and refueling points. Aviation bases. Command and control nodes. Reserve troop concentrations. Forward support company areas. Terrain features. Obstacles constricting unit movements as U.S. forces advance to close with the enemy forces.

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8-98. Lethal UAS can be effective in disabling command, control, communications, and intelligencefacilities or destroying armored vehicles. The threat probably will use cruise missiles against logisticalconcentration, C2 nodes, or with submunitions for area denial. It probably will use rotary wing aircraft toattack forward elements and the flanks of the advancing enemy maneuver force to slow their tempo, causeconfusion and, thereby, inflict maximum casualties. Rotary wing aircraft also can be used to conductoperations across FLOT, CAS, and air insertion operations. Armed attack helicopters constitute the mostwidespread and capable air threats to friendly ground forces in the close battle.

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PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

8-99. Soldiers use passive air defense measures to avoid detection from enemy air attack. Passive airdefense is all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air andmissile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment,deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the use of protectiveconstruction. (JP 3-01) Concealing large vehicles like the Abrams tank and BFV is difficult. Commandersshould consider deception techniques to disguise their intentions and active air defense.

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Damage-Limiting Measures8-100. Damage-limiting measures are attempts to limit any damages should the enemy detect friendlyforces. These measures are used when units are in a static position such as an assembly area, or when theyare maneuvering. If caught in the open, personnel should immediately execute battle drills and move topositions of cover and concealment that reduce the enemy's ability to acquire or engage them. The samemeasures taken to limit damage from artillery attack are used for dispersion, protective construction, andcover. Examples of damage-limiting measures include vehicle dispersion, camouflage, and dug-in fightingpositions with overhead protection.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

8-101. Although passive measures are the first line of defense against air attack, troops must be preparedto engage attacking enemy aircraft. The decision to fight an air threat is based on the immediate situationand weapons system capabilities. Based on the mission, companies do not typically engage aircraft exceptfor self-preservation or as directed by the battalion or company commander.

Engagement Techniques8-102. The crews goal is to engage and destroy or suppress targets as fast as possible. Basic engagementprocedures used for all engagements include: The vehicle commander might be required to lay the gun for direction if the gunners scan isaway from the target. He will release control to the gunner (target hand-off) and issue the firecommand. Once the target is acquired, the gunner identifies and discriminates the target. The vehicle commander then confirms the target and gives the fire command. The gunner completes his switch checks.

Aircraft Engagement Techniques for Tanks

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8-103. Tank automatic weapons can be used effectively against UAS, jets, and helicopters especiallywhen several tanks are firing at the same time. The tank main gun can be used with good results againsthelicopters. It cannot be used effectively against jets because of the difficulty of tracking high-speedtargets.

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8-104. Engage hostile helicopters and UAS immediately with the tank commander's M2 or the loadersM240B machine gun. Firing quickly will Alert other tanks that hostile targets are in the area. Destroy the target or spoil the pilot's aim. Give the tank commander time to engage the target with the main gun and coaxial, if desired.

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8-105. The tank commander's and loaders machine guns are useful weapons against unarmored threats.They can be fired quickly with volume fire. Before firing, ensure that the firing fan is clear of friendlyunits. Use the following guidelines: When the targets is hovering or inbound, aim high with the machine gun and fire a continuousburst, adjusting onto target by observing the tracers. Remember, at longer ranges tracers mayappear to be striking the target when they are actually going under it. If the target is moving, track along its flight path using a lead of 50 meters (half a football field).Fire a continuous burst, forcing the target to fly through the cone of fire.

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8-106. The tank main gun should be used against armored threat helicopters. If an attack helicopter ishovering, it is probably preparing to fire a missile. Time is essential; fire any round that is battle-carried.The M830A1 multipurpose antitank round is, by design, the most accurate round for engaging helicoptersand should be the next round fired after any preloaded round. When engaging moving helicopters with anM1-series tank, smoothly track the target while aiming at the center of mass. Lase to the target, wait for theautomatic lead to be induced (about 2 seconds), and fire. Be prepared to fire a second round using the sametechnique used for the first round.

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8-107. Because of the high speed of jet aircraft, the best technique to use against them is to fire all tankautomatic weapons in continuous bursts. If the jets are inbound, aim slightly above the nose or fuselage andfire. If the jet is crossing, use a lead of 200 meters (two football fields) and fire, letting the jet fly throughthe cone of fire from the machine guns. Do not try to track or traverse your fire with the jetit flies too fast.

Smalls Arms Used for Air Defense

8-108. Small arms used for air defense incorporate the use of volume fire and proper aiming pointsaccording to the target. The key to success in engaging enemy air is to put out a high volume of fire. Allweapons designated by the commander should be used, including M2s, mounted on tracks and trucks, andInfantry direct fire automatic weapons. The commander must decide whether to engage and must providethe engagement command for the entire unit to fire upon the attacking aircraft rather than having Soldiersfire at the aircraft individually.

AIR DEFENSE WARNINGS AND WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS

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8-109. Battalion leaders should ensure their subordinates understand the air threat and air threat warningconditions. Air defense conditions are stated in the OPORD: Red. Indicates the attack is imminent. Yellow. Indicates that an attack is probable. White. Indicates that an attack is not likely.

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8-110. A local air defense warning describes the air threat in the immediate area. Local air defensewarnings are designed to alert a particular unit, several units, or an area of the battlefield of an impendingair attack. Air defense units use local air defense warning s to alert Army units about the state of the airthreat in terms of "right here and right now." They can be used in conjunction with air defense warningsestablished by higher headquarters. Examples of local air defense warning s are described below: Dynamite. Indicates an attack is imminent or in progress. Lookout. Indicates an attack is likely. Snowman. Indicates an attack is not likely.

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8-111. Weapons control status determines the conditions for using weapons against enemy aircraft: Weapons Free. Enemy air is probable, and Soldiers may fire at aircraft not positively identifiedas friendly. Weapons Tight. Enemy air is possible, and Soldiers may fire only at aircraft positivelyidentified as hostile according to announced hostile criteria. Weapons Hold. Enemy air is not likely, and Soldiers may not fire except in self-defense.

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IMPLEMENT OPSEC8-112. To accomplish the assigned mission, the CAB commander must integrate and synchronize allwarfighting functions as enablers to enhance the combat power of his maneuver companies. OPSEC is acritical element that applies to all operations across the range of military operations. Listed below are areasthat the CAB commander may need to consider when performing OPSEC.

INFORMATION PROTECTION8-113. Information protection refers to active or passive measures that protect and defend friendlyinformation and information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant friendly information. It deniesenemies, adversaries, and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systemsfor their own purposes. (ADRP 3-0) The S-6 leads the staffs efforts to protect the CABs missioncommand systems. There are six primary means to attack information systems: Unauthorized access. Malicious software. Electromagnetic deception.

COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE

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8-115. Computer network defense (CND) are actions that the CAB takes through the use of computernetworks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD informationsystems and computer networks. CND includes all measures that detect unauthorized network activity andadversarial computer network attack; and all measures that defend computers and networks againstunauthorized and adversarial network activities. Such measures include access controls, maliciouscomputer code and program detection, and intrusion-detection tools.

8-118. Electronic protection is the division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protectpersonnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagneticspectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. (JP 3-13.1) The role of electronicprotection in operations is to protect the electromagnetic spectrum for use by friendly forces. The CABaccomplishes this by taking passive and active actions to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment fromthe effects of both friendly and enemy electronic warfare.

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8-119. Examples of electronic protection include:

Spectrum management and deconfliction of electromagnetic spectrum frequencies used byfriendly information systems to reduce interference and ensure that information systems operateeffectively. Electromagnetic hardening of facilities and equipment against known enemy and friendlyelectronic attack systems to reduce damage to friendly information systems. Emission control procedures for friendly systems to reduce potential interference and thelikelihood of detection and exploitation.

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8-120. Equipment and procedures designed to prevent adversary disruption or exploitation of theelectromagnetic spectrum are the best means that friendly forces have to protect and ensure their ownuninterrupted use of the electromagnetic spectrum during operations. In addition to equipment hardeningand control of emissions, it is vital that the S-6, S-2, coordinate closely to ensure proper deconfliction ofEW activities with friendly information systems and intelligence operation activities supporting anoperation.

CONDUCT CBRN OPERATIONS

8-122. Threat forces will seek opportunities to employ weapons of mass destruction to inflict a largenumber of casualties, slow U.S. forces and unified action partners advancement, and test their resolve.They will target friendly urban centers, initial entry points, aerial ports of debarkation, and seaports ofdebarkation. The hybrid threat will conduct unconventional tactics such as contaminating fuel or watersources. U.S. forces and unified action partners should be prepared to implement protective measures,enhance survivability, and provide timely information to higher headquarters should a CBRN attack occur.

PRINCIPLES OF CBRN DEFENSE

8-123. CBRN operations are conducted pre-incident (CBRN active defense) and post incident (passivedefense). CAB should execute active and passive defense principles to minimize or negate the effects ofCBRN attacks A combination of these measures reduces the enemies capability to deliver CBRN weaponsand the effects of those weapons if successfully delivered.

CBRN Active Defense

8-124. Successful information collection and intelligence operations are critical to employing activedefense measures, which include missile and air defense, special and security operations. The CAB can Destroy CBRN-capable artillery battery by coordinating counterbattery fires. Destroy munitions on vehicles or caches before they are delivered. Detect planned terrorist actions involving CBRN weapons

CBRN Passive Defense

8-125. Passive defense measures include actions taken to minimize the effects or vulnerability to CBRNattacks: Avoidance of CBRN hazards. Protection of individuals, units and equipment from unavoidable CBRN hazards. Decontamination to restore missioncapability.

Avoidance8-126. The best defense against CBRN weapons is using the fundamental principles of contaminationavoidance. Avoid the hazard by deterring or preventing it from being released in the first place; or knowexactly where, what, and how much contamination is present in the area of operation and avoid entering itunless it is vital to mission success. Successful contamination avoidance prevents disruption to operationsand organizations by minimizing unnecessary time in cumbersome protective postures and by minimizingdecontamination requirements. Successful avoidance may be achieved by bypassing contamination orcalculating the best time to cross contaminated areas using the procedures described in this manual.

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Avoiding contamination requires the ability to recognize the presence or absence of CBRN hazards in theair; on water, land, personnel, equipment, and facilities; and at short and long ranges.

Protection

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8-127. CBRN protection is an integral part of operations. Techniques that work for avoidance also workfor protection, such as shielding Soldiers and units and shaping the battlefield. Activities that compriseprotection involve sealing or hardening positions, protecting Soldiers, assuming mission-oriented protectiveposture (MOPP), reacting to attack, and using collective protection.

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8-128. The Abrams tank provides its crew protection CBRN contamination because it is equipped with agas particulate filter system. It is also equipped sensors such as radiological and chemical point detectorsthat warns the crew that hazards are present. The crew can then decide to either leave the contaminated areaor prepare to operate within the contaminated environment, i.e conduct the isolation of an objective in acordon and search.

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Decontamination8-129. If contamination avoidance is not possible, personnel and equipment must be decontaminated toreduce or eliminate the hazard. CBRN decontamination prevents the erosion of combat power and reducespossible casualties resulting from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. Decontamination allowscommanders to sustain combat operations. Decontamination principles involve conductingdecontamination as quickly as possible, decontaminating only what is necessary, decontaminating as farforward as possible, and decontaminating by priority. (Refer to FM 3-11 for more information.)

SECTION IV ENGINEER OPERATIONS

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8-130. Engineers support CABs with combat, general, and geospatial engineer support. The focus ofcombat engineers is on executing engineer-related mobility, countermobility, and survivability (M/CM/S)tasks. The CAB uses engineers to shape the AO by providing freedom of maneuver for friendly forces,denying movement to the enemy, and protecting friendly forces from the effects of enemy weaponssystems. The CAB must fully integrate combat engineers into the battalion.

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8-131. The TF engineer recommends engineer-related M/CM/S tasks and supports the CAB staff as thestaff lead for the integration of these tasks while it plans operations throughout the battalions AO. Inaddition, the TF engineer ensures that the staff integrates all military and civilian engineer efforts within thebattalions AO. That includes the following: Mobility operations preserve friendly force freedom of maneuver. Mobility missions includebreaching, and clearing obstacles, maintaining battlefield circulation, providing gap crossing,and identifying routes around contaminated areas. Countermobility denies mobility to enemy forces. It limits the maneuver of enemy forces andenhances the effectiveness of fires. Countermobility missions include the creation andintegration of obstacles and, potentially, the use of obscurants. Survivability operations protect friendly forces, equipment, and supplies from the effects ofenemy weapons systems and from natural occurrences. Hardening of facilities and thefortification of battle positions are active survivability measures. CBRN passive defensivemeasures are included in survivability operations.

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ESSENTIAL TASKS FOR MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, AND

SURVIVABILITY8-132. An essential task for M/CM/S is a specified or implied task that is critical to mission success. Mostof these will be engineer-related, but not all of them. Ultimately, an essential task for M/CM/S enables theCABs main effort to achieve its task and purpose. It can be accomplished directly in support of the maineffort or one of the CABs shaping operations. Identification of the essential tasks helps to focus the

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development of plans, staff coordination, and allocation of resources. Failure to achieve an essential taskfor M/CM/S could require the commander to alter his tactical or operational plan.

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8-133. A fully developed essential task for M/CM/S has a task, purpose, method, and effects. The taskdescribes what objective the unit must achieve to support friendly formations, or what it will do to anenemy formations function or capability. The purpose describes why the task contributes to maneuver andis nested with the maneuver task and purposes. The method describes how the task will be accomplished byassigning responsibility to maneuver units, supporting units, or delivery assets and by providing amplifyinginformation or restrictions. The effect is the general narrative of what the commander wants to happen.

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8-134. The approved essential tasks for M/CM/S are described in the concept of operations paragraphwithin the base order. The concept of operations includes the logical sequence of essential tasks forM/CM/S that, when integrated with the scheme of maneuver, will accomplish the mission and achieve thecommanders intent. The scheme of engineer operations describes the detailed, logical sequence of allengineer-related tasks within the CABs M/CM/S operations; general engineer tasks; obscuration, andgeospatial engineering tasks; and their impact on friendly and enemy units. It also details how thesupporting engineers are to accomplish the commanders essential tasks for M/CM/S.

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ENGINEER SUPPORT

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8-135. The CAB should expect to receive an engineer attachment for most combat operations. Theorganizational structure of this engineer attachment is dependent upon whether or not the ABCT has a BEBor a BSTB. (Refer to FM 3-96 for more information.)

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8-136. The ABCT may receive additional engineer units to provide additional capability similar to itsorganic engineer companies in the BEB or the BSTB with a combat engineer company as well asspecialized additional breaching, clearing, or gap crossing capabilities and equipment. Priority of engineersupport from the BEB or the engineer company in the BSTB is typically to mobility, although it mayrapidly change to countermobility in anticipation of an enemy attack The CAB can expect to receive someof the engineer augmentation received by the ABCT. (See Table 8-5.)

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8-137. It is critical that supporting and supported elements understand their support relationships. Thefactors of METT-TC help to determine whether OPCON or tactical control. Distance and time are a keyfactor in determining the Engineers company ability to support its subordinates. When operating in largeAOs attaching units is the most likely COA, requiring the supported unit and FSC to provide the logisticalsupport required for the engineer augmentation. The Engineer company does not have an organicmaintenance team, so requesting and planning for additional maintenance capability must also beconsidered.

8-139. EOD capabilities are not organic to the BCT. Usually, one EOD company is attached to eachdeployed BCT. Explosive hazard SPOTREPs are processed through S-3 channels to the BCT assuredmobility section, who then forwards the request to the supporting EOD headquarters. Once explosiveordnance is located and reported, the EOD headquarters determines what EOD assets will respond. TypicalEOD assets in the BCT AO include: EOD response team, which includes: 2-3 Soldiers. Smallest EOD maneuver element. Organized as a combined arms explosive ordnance response unit (augmented by securityteams). EOD platoon, which includes: 7-9 Soldiers (based upon 2-3 Soldier response teams). Smallest EOD deployable element. Organized as a battalion/company combined arms explosive ordnance response platoon(augmented by security element).

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SECTION V INFORMATION OPERATIONS

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8-140. Unified land operations require effective commanders to consider what will affect the operationalenviroment. Commanders lead information operations (IO) while considering the following: combat power,mission command, mission command system, themes and messages, information management andknowledge management, legal considerations, and intelligence support. Information operations are anintegration process that assists commanders with synchronizing all information-related capabilitiesavailable to them while taking account of the above considerations into the operations plan

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8-141. Information operations concept brings together several separate functions as information-relatedcapabilities which commanders use to shape the information environment. This allows for messagealignment, reinforcement, and consistency in support of the overall concept of operations rather thanindividual events or missions.

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INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES8-142. Information-related capabilities are capabilities that support a commanders ability tocommunicate across a range of operations and many audiences to inform or influence and, consequently,shape desired outcomes. Theoretically, all capabilities send a message (or make an impression) and serve toinform and influence audiences. While conducting IO, commanders consider all capabilities in devisingsolutions and plans. The commander and staff regularly use traditional information-related capabilitieswhen conducting the following IO: Public affairs. Military information support operations. Soldier and leader engagements. Combat camera. Military deception. Cyber electromagnetic activities. Operations security

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Appendix A

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Duties and Responsibilities

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BATTALION COMMANDER

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A-1. The CAB commander has total responsibility for the CAB and its actions. He commands all CAB units,whether organic, assigned, under OPCON, or attached. The commander plans his operations with the assistanceof his staff and subordinate leaders. He leads the CAB by providing purpose and direction to accomplish themission and by his presence and direction during operations. He increases the effectiveness of the battalion bydelegating to his subordinates the authority to accomplish their missions; holding subordinates responsible fortheir actions; and fostering a climate of mutual trust, cooperation, and teamwork. He organizes his force basedon the mission of the higher headquarters and a thorough understanding of METT-TC.

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A-2. The commanders personal staff group consists of the command sergeant major (CSM) and chaplain. Thecommanders personal staff group can be adjusted to accommodate evolving mission requirements to include,for example, a personal security detachment, a legal advisor, or an interpreter.

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COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

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A-3. The CSM is the senior NCO in the battalion. He is responsible for providing the commander withpersonal, professional, and technical advice on enlisted Soldier matters and the NCO Corps as a whole. Hefocuses on Soldier welfare and individual training and on how well the CAB carries out the commandersdecisions and policies. The CSM can act as the commanders representative in supervising aspects vital to anoperation as determined by the commander. For example, he can help control movement through a breach in acritical obstacle or at a river crossing, or he can help coordinate a passage of lines or quarter assembly areas.

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A-4. The CSM also plays a key role in the sustaining effort as the sustaining troubleshooter for the CAB. TheCSM must be involved during the conduct of sustainment planning, rehearsals and operations (that is supportrehearsals, paragraph 4 of the operations order, logistic-resupply points (LRPs), casualty collection points,maintenance collection points, ambulance exchange points (AXPs), CASEVAC rehearsals, support graphics,and so forth). The assignment of Soldiers in the CAB requires the CSM to step beyond his basic branchorientation and serve as advocate, mentor, and role model for every Soldier in the battalion.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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A-5. The XO is the principal assistant to the battalion commander. As the second in command, the XO must beready to assume command immediately if the commander becomes a casualty. The XO transmits thecommanders intent for the battalion. His two main responsibilities are to direct the operational efforts of thestaff and to sustain battalion readiness.

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A-6. The XO is the commanders chief of staff. He directs, coordinates, supervises, trains, and synchronizesthe work of the staff, ensuring efficient and prompt staff actions. The commander usually delegates executivemanagement authority (equivalent to command of the staff) to the XO for the coordinating and special staff.The commander usually retains responsibility for supervising the personal staff. Staff members inform the XOof any recommendations or information they pass directly to the commander, and of instructions they receivedirectly from the commander.

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A-7. The XO must understand the commanders intent and ensure the staff implements it. He monitors thecombat status of all subordinate units, and ensures that status is provided to the commander. The XOsynchronizes all the elements of combat power, including the information element, into CAB operations; thegoal is to implement the commanders intent and concept of operations. The duties of the XO include: Management of the commanders critical information requirements (CCIRs). Information management within the CAB.

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Appendix A

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Recommended organization of the staff.

Determination of liaison requirements and supervision of LNOs.Supervision of work quality from and crosstalk between staff officers and sections.Synchronization of the staff during MDMP.Establishment and maintenance of staff planning timelines.Integration of the information collection tasks and targeting plans with MDMP.Supervision of the main CP, its operations, and its positioning.Integration of attached units in accordance with the BCT/CAB plan.

BATTALION UNIT MNISTRY TEAM

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A-8. As a member of the units staff, the chaplain serves as the religious staff advisor to the commander andstaff. Chaplains provide religious, moral, and ethical leadership to the Army by advising the commander onthese issues and their impact on Soldiers, Family Members, and unit operations. Chaplains advise commanderson the moral and ethical nature of command policies, programs, actions, and the impact of such policies onSoldiers and Families. They advise the command on such issues as Accommodation of religious needs and practices for Soldiers, Families, and authorized civilians tosupport the free exercise of religious beliefs. Religious and ethical issues in the area of operations and the potential impact on missionaccomplishment. The needs and concerns of Soldiers, Families, and authorized civilians, to include suicidal ideation,alcohol or drug abuse, or other at-risk behaviors that impact mission accomplishment. Marital and parenting stressors resulting from extended deployments for training or operations. Morale as a unit recovers from combat operations.

COORDINATING STAFFA-10. The CAB commander uses his professional knowledge, experience, and leadership style to organize hisstaff. The staff organization in garrison might not work in a combat environment. The commander, assisted bythe XO, organizes the various staff elements into functional cells. (See Figure A-1.) The CAB staff usuallyorganizes into these four functional cells: Operations. Intelligence. Sustainment. Network operations.

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7676Figure A-1. CAB staff organization

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A-11. During the preparation for and execution of operations, staff officers have two broad areas ofresponsibility. The first is to provide information, assistance and recommendations to the commander. Thesecond is to supervise the preparation for and execution of the plan within their functional areas. Specificresponsibilities include anticipating requirements, monitoring operations, taking action to support the plan,managing the information flow, making timely recommendations, conducting coordination, synchronizingoperations, and maintaining continuity.

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A-12. The coordinating staff includes the S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, and the signal staff officer (S-6). Knowledge of thecommanders intent guides specific decisions within the staffs authority. The staff operates to carry out thecommanders intent functionally. Usually, the commander delegates authority to the staff to take final action onmatters within command policy. Assignment of staff responsibility does not include authority over other staffofficers or over any command element.

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HUMAN RESOURCES STAFF OFFICER (S-1)

A-13. The S-1 is the coordinating staff officer for all matters concerning human resources support (military andcivilian). The S-1 provides technical direction to subordinate units in four functional areas and subordinatefunctions. (Refer to FM 1-0 for more information.) Those areas include the following: Man the force, which includes:

Personnel readiness management (PRM).

Personnel accountability .

Strength reporting .

Retention operations.

Personal information management (.

Provide human resources services, which includes:

Essential personnel services .

Postal operations.

Casualty operations. Coordinate personnel support, which includes:

Morale, welfare, recreation operations.

Human resources planning and staff operations.

Command interest programs.

Army band operations.

Conduct human resources planning and operations, which includes:

Human resources planning and operations.

Operate human resources mission command nodes.

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A-14. The S1 NCO provides technical and doctrinal advice to the S1 and commander. The S1 NCO serves asshift NCO in charge (NCOIC) within the CP. He also Executes personnel administrative and replacementoperations to include soldier recognition and promotion and reduction actions.

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A-15. The S-1 section generally operates from the combat trains command post (CTCP); though it may havepersonnel at the FTCP, if it is constituted. The S-1 coordinates the staff efforts of the battalion surgeon, and isthe staff point of contact for equal opportunity, retention, and inspector general activities. The responsibilities ofthe S-1 also include: Military pay support. Legal support through the legal personnel in the brigade legal section (BLS). Liaison with the battalion family readiness group. Internal Army Records Information Management System compliance.

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INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER (S-2)

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A-16. The S-2 is responsible for providing timely and accurate intelligence analyses and products in support ofthe commander, staff, and subordinate units. The S-2 supervises and coordinates collection, processing,production, and dissemination of intelligence, and integrates this into the CABs MDMP. The S-2 is responsiblefor evaluating the enemy in terms of doctrine, pattern analysis, threat characteristics, capabilities, andvulnerabilities. The S-2 section usually has representatives in both the main CP and the tactical CP.

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A-17. The S-2 is responsible for intelligence readiness, tasks, synchronization, and support. In addition, the S-2plans and executes physical security programs. The duties of the S-2 include: Management of the intelligence process. Management of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), including integration of input fromother staff sections. Situation development, to include updating the enemy/threat, terrain and weather, and civilconsiderations portions of the common operational picture (COP).

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Intelligence support to the targeting process, including participating in the targeting meetings,developing high-value targets (HVTs), and tracking high-payoff targets (HPTs).Integration of information operations considerations into the other intelligence tasks.Supporting COIST personnel training and operations.Synchronization of intelligence support with combat and information collection operations throughclose coordination with the XO and S-3.Analysis of CCIRs. This includes priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), friendly forcesinformation requirements (FFIRs), and other IRs to develop collection tasks and requests from higherand adjacent units.Synchronization of intelligence support with fire support through close coordination with the FSOand S-3.

A-18. The S-2 NCO provides technical and doctrinal advice to the S-2 and commander. The S-2 NCO alsosupervises and trains the S-2 personnel, serves as shift NCOIC for main CP, executes the battalions commandsecurity programs, attends targeting meetings, and assists the S-2 in product preparation.

OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICER (S-3)

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A-19. The S-3 is the coordinating staff officer for all matters concerning tactical operations of the CAB. The S3 provides technical guidance to subordinate units in the areas of training, plans, and operations. The S-3section runs the main CP, under XO supervision. Usually, the S-3 is the senior staff member of the TAC CP, ifthe commander employs one.

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A-20. The S-3 section also manages the battle rhythm of the CP, which includes orders production, battletracking, operations updates and briefings, rehearsals, receipt of reports, and reports to higher headquarters. Inaddition, the operations section develops and synchronizes the information collection plan. Other duties of theS-3 include: Synchronizing the effects of CAB units in accordance with the commanders intent. Developing the information collection plan. Identifying training requirements, recommending allocation of training resources, and preparing thecommanders training guidance. Participating in the targeting process. Reviewing orders, plans, and SOPs from subordinate units. Planning unit movements, to include deployments, air assaults, and ground convoys. Managing Army airspace control and terrain in the CAB AO. Coordinating and integrating joint, interagency, and multinational assets into operations. Planning for dislocated civilian operations and detainee operations (to include civilian internees, andenemy prisoners of war [EPWs]). Coordinating with the XO, S-6, and HHC commander on the location of CPs.

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ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER

A-21. For operations that require detailed and highly synchronized planning, the S-3 usually assigns thisresponsibility to his assistant operations officer. The assistant operations officer also serves as unit movementand air movement officer.

OPERATIONS SERGEANT MAJOR

A-22. The operations sergeant major supervises the staff on the control of the TAC CP and the main CP. Duringtactical operations, he remains with the TAC CP until the main CP jumps to a new location. Operations sergeantmajor supervision responsibilities include, the following: Ensure proper accountability and maintenance of equipment and vehicles. Supervise precombat inspections (PCIs) and precombat checks (PCCs). Deploy with the assault element during tactical jumps.

Monitor and supervise the distribution of messages and operational overlays (analog/digital) oneorganizational level up and two levels down.Coordinate and brief displacement (jump CP) procedures including tear down, setup, and quarteringparty activities, and be responsible for the physical setup, arrangement, and breakdown of the mainCP.Ensure accurate setup of TAC CP and all supporting vehicles to approved configuration.Supervise control over both the exterior and interior organization of the main CP to includepersonnel, vehicles, and tents.Leverage biometric capabilities to validate identity of authorized visitors to the CP.Supervise the CP security plan and develop specific security programs such as threat awareness andoperational security (OPSEC).Responsible for staff training.Assist the battle captain with rehearsals and executing battle drills.Give guidance and supervise the construction of the terrain board model during planning phases.Ensure all information within the CP (coming and going) is disseminated, updated, collaborated, andmanaged properly.Monitor situations and ensure CP maintains communications with attached, subordinate, adjacentunits, and higher headquarters.Manage reports/battle tracking.Oversee the timely and accurate posting of graphics and overlays.

A-23. The S-3 NCO acts as battle NCO. He also provides technical and doctrinal advice to the S-3 andcommander, prepares CP for orders, drills, briefs, and rehearsals, executes CP security and movement, briefsattachments on TOC SOPs, and can serves as shift NCOIC for CP.

ENGINEER OFFICERA-24. The battalion engineer is responsible for the integration of assured mobility within the CAB. He advisesthe commander and staff on all aspects of engineer-related planning, coordination, and support of operations. Inthe role of integrating all of the engineer functions, the battalion engineer is also the TF engineer, and remainsso even when other engineer augmentation is task-organized to the CAB. The TF engineer facilitates allnecessary reachback for engineer expertise and advises the commander on necessary engineer and EODaugmentation to support specific CAB missions. His responsibilities include: Recommending essential tasks for mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks (M/CM/S) tothe commander. Participating in targeting meetings. Coordinating for general engineering work (like construction) in the battalion area of operation. Integrating environmental considerations into the operational plan. Advising the commander on his command environmental program. Coordinating for geospatial engineering support.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OFFICER

A-25. The battalion CBRN staff typically includes a CBRN officer and CBRN NCO. Many battalion-size unitsalso have a CBRN specialist assigned to assist in the employment of organic operational-level decontaminationcapabilities. The staff performs core CBRN staff functions, as applicable, with emphasis on the following keytasks: Advise the commander on all CBRN threats and hazards. Implement CBRN protective measures. Provide CBRN warning and reporting. Prepare CBRN plans and orders. Plan operational-level decontamination missions. Train and mentor company level CBRN Soldiers.

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Duties and Responsibilities

MASTER GUNNERSA-26. The BFV and tank master gunners are primarily responsible for certifying the crew evaluators. Theyassist the S-3 with training scenarios and forecast ammunition, ranges, and training aids. They also train rangesafety personnel. During combat operations, master gunners advise the commander on the tactical capabilitiesof the BFV and tank weapons systems against threat systems. They also assist with CP operations.

BATTLE CAPTAINSA-27. The officers and NCOs of the operations section serve as battle captains and battle staff NCOs to assistthe command group in controlling the CAB. They remain in the CP, keeping focused on the current operation,and continuously assisting the commander in the mission command of the fight. When operations deviate fromthe plan, they assist the commander with his decision making. Their responsibilities include: Monitoring the status of CCIRs. Conducting battle tracking by

Monitoring current location of friendly and enemy units, and groups of civilians.

Assessing the activities and combat power of friendly and enemy units.

Monitoring the status of adjacent and supporting units.

Monitoring and synchronizing the COP displays in the main and tactical CPs. Ensuring that CAB COP information and required status reports are provided to higher subordinate,adjacent, and supported headquarters. Supervising the flow of information among staff cells within the CAB CPs. Providing current status to assist with MDMP and planning future operations. Enforcing CP policies in accordance with unit TACSOPs and current operations order (OPORD). Continuing to perform their primary staff responsibilities as well as those of the battle captain.

LOGISTICS STAFF OFFICER (S-4)

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A-28. The S-4 is the coordinating staff officer for sustainment operations. The S-4 provides staff oversight toCAB units in the areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, and field services. Usually, the S-4 is the OIC ofthe CTCP.

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A-29. The S-4 is the CAB staff integrator for the FSC commander, who executes sustainment operations for theCAB. The duties of the S-4 include: Developing logistics plans and support annexes to support CAB operations. Coordinating with the supporting FSC and BSB on current and future support requirements andcapabilities. Coordinating for all classes of supply. Designating supply routes and locations of logistical elements (in coordination with the S-3 and FSCcommander). Organizing logistics package (LOGPAC) operations. Monitoring and analyzing the equipment readiness status of all CAB units. Planning transportation to support special transportation requirements (such as casualty evacuation[CASEVAC]). Recommending sustainment priorities and controlled supply rates to the commander.

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SIGNAL STAFF OFFICER (S-6)

A-30. The S-6 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning communications, electromagneticspectrum operations, and networks within the units area of operations. The S-6 is responsible for informationmanagement usage procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminateinformation. The S-6 provides technical oversight of CAB units in the areas of network operations, informationdissemination, and information assurance. The S-6 section establishes and operates the battalion radio, satellite,

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONSA-31. During stability and defense support of civil authorities tasks, the CAB commander may assign thisresponsibility to an officer or senior NCO to assist him on relations between the civilian population and militaryoperations. The responsibilities can include: Advising the commander on the effects of the civilian population on operations. Assisting a CA unit in the operation of a civil-military operations center. Assisting the S-3 to integrate attached CA units into the CAB. Assisting the development of plans to deconflict civilian activities with military operations. Planning community relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding and support ofmilitary operations. Coordinating with the FSO on culturally sensitive sites and protected targets.

SPECIAL STAFFA-32. The CAB staff includes several special staff sections that assist the commander in providing professionalor technical oversight of CAB units. The commander delegates each staff officer an appropriate planning andsupervisory authority.

FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

A-33. The FSO is the special staff officer responsible for coordinating and synchronizing fire support, whichincludes Army indirect fires and joint fires. He advises the commander and staff on all aspects of fires planning,coordination, and execution in support of operations. He assists the S-3 to integrate fires into the maneuvercommanders concept of operation. (Refer to Chapter 6 for more information.)

AIR LIAISON OFFICER

A-34. The battalion air liaison officer (ALO) is usually a highly experienced enlisted Air Force joint terminalattack controller (JTAC) responsible for coordinating and controlling all close air support (CAS) andemployment of Air Force assets in support of the CAB. (Refer to Chapter 6 for more information.)

SNIPER EMPLOYMENT OFFICER

A-35. The commander assigns the mission of sniper employment officer (SEO) as an additional duty. The SEOshould understand sniper employment as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the personnel in the snipersquad. The SEO can be a member of the battalion staff or the HHC. In the SEO's absence, either the snipersquad leader or the individual sniper team leader can act as the SEO. Selecting an officer with the capability andtime to function as an SEO is critical to ensure the snipers are trained and represented during the planningprocess. The scout platoon leader and HHC XO are possible candidates for SEO. (Refer to TC 3-22.10 for moreinformation.)

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Duties and Responsibilities

SURGEONA-36. The medical platoon leader serves as the battalion surgeon. He is responsible for advising the commanderon the health of the command and other AHS issues. The surgeon receives assistance from a medical operationsofficer for administration, logistics, and planning of medical platoon operations; a physicians assistant formedical treatment; and a medical platoon sergeant for platoon operations. The surgeon is usually located in theBAS during combat operations. The surgeons responsibilities include: Oversight of medical treatment that medical platoon personnel provide. Supervision of HSS and FHP planning, maintenance, and training. Recommendations for casualty collection point and aid station locations and the evacuation routes tosupport them. Coordination for ground and air ambulance support. Integration of the CAB HSS/FHP plan into the BCT plan. Identifying health threats and medical-related CCIRs. Ensuring that health threat and medical intelligence considerations are integrated into the MDMP. Advising commanders on FHP CBRN defensive actions, such as immunizations, use ofchemoprophylaxis, pretreatments, and barrier creams. Monitoring occupational health surveillance in coordination with the preventative medicine team.

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B-1. Mission command systems are the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processesand procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations. (ADRP 6-0) Thesesystems provide the CAB with the tools and the ability to receive, analyze, and distribute relevant informationand orders rapidly. The CAB utilizes these multiple mission command systems, both analog and digital, to gainan information advantage to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information whileexploiting or denying an adversarys ability to do the same.

PERSONNELB-2. Soldiers and leaders exercise the human skills, knowledge and abilities making them the most importantof the five. Commanders key personnel include seconds in command, command sergeants majors, and staffs.

NETWORKSB-3. Networks are a grouping of interconnected things that enable commanders to connect and communicatewith individuals and organizations with a common interest or goal. Connecting people and organizations allowthe ability to share information, ideas, and promote unit of effort. An example of a network is LandWarNet.This system allows the Army to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide.

PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES

B-5. Processes are a series of actions directed to an end state. Procedures are standard, detailed steps whichdescribe how to perform specific tasks to achieve the desired end state. Together they minimize confusion,misunderstanding, and hesitation while increasing organizational competence.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

B-6. A facility is a structure or location that provides a work environment and shelter such as, command posts,platforms, operation centers, and signal nodes for the other components of the mission command system.Facilities range from a command post composed of vehicles and tentage, to platforms, to hardened buildings.Examples of equipment needed to sustain a mission command system include vehicles, radio or signalequipment, generators, and lighting. (ADRP 6-0)

OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS

B-7. In addition to ABCS, the CAB staff is equipped with several other information systems that supportmission command.

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Command Post of the Future

B-8. The command post of the future is a collaborative application that enables the commander and battle staffto collect, collate, display, map, and analyze data. command post of the future uses three monitors to display itsvarious applications. It provides planning and mapping tools to support the commanders battle management.command post of the future is not a replacement for the ABCS, since it depends on ABCS for most of its data.Usually, the CAB has two command post of the future terminals.

Property Book Unit Supply - Enhanced

B-10. The property book unit supply - enhanced (PBUSE) is a web-based system that operates on the ArmyKnowledge Online portal. The S-4 section uses PBUSE to help logistically support BCT units. PBUSEautomates the process to account for, and order, all Class VII and other nonexpendable items in the CAB.PBUSE provides a responsive and efficient means to maintain accountable records for the Armys inventory ofproperty in the hands of modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and tables of distribution andallowance (TDA) units in the Regular Army, National Guard, Reserve, and on installations.

Movement Tracking System

B-11. The Movement Tracking System enables the CAB to examine radio frequency identification tags,identify position, track progress, and communicate with the operators of tactical wheeled vehicles. MovementTracking System uses an L-Band, satellite-based system consisting of mobile units mounted in vehicles andbase units in CPs. The Movement Tracking System includes a global positioning system (GPS), which enablesthe Movement Tracking System to send messages between base and mobile units; examine radio frequencyidentification tags on the payload to question or verify transportation control number, commodity/class ofsupply, consignee Department of Defense activity address code and status; and locate/track a vehicle positionon a map background. Movement Tracking System can exchange text messages with FBCB2 and sharesituational awareness data. Usually, the S-4 section houses the Movement Tracking System.

Army Human Resource Workstation

B-13. The Army human resource workstation is a system of web-based, automated personnel systems. Armyhuman resource workstation includes electronic military personnel office (eMILPO), a web-enabled applicationthat users can access via the Army Knowledge Online portal to perform personnel actions and strengthaccounting.

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Mission Command

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Personal ComputersB-14. MTOE does not authorize the purchase of personal computers; however, CABs may obtain authorizationthrough TDA to purchase personal computers. These computers, once properly accredited, can be grantedaccess to the CAB LAN. The systems architecture in the CAB main CP includes data and Voice over InternetProtocol (VoIP) access to the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION

B-15. CAB command post facilities consist of the vehicles and locations from which the CAB commander,aided by staff, directs the battle and sustains the force. These facilities are organized with varying levels of staffparticipation at each echelon. The CAB always has two standard command posts, the command group and themain CP. Depending on METT-TC analysis, the CAB commander could choose to deploy a TAC CP, CTCP, orFTCP. Figure B-1 shows CAB CPs positioned for a movement to contact.

8032Figure B-1. CAB command post arrangement

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B-16. The CAB commander, assisted by his XO and CSM, ensures proper staffing when he chooses to deploy aTAC CP, CTCP, or FTCP. Even if the CAB has enough personnel to support multiple CPs, it might havecommunications or other equipment constraints. Figure B-2 illustrates one way to distribute staff officersamong various CAB CPs. Figure B-3 illustrates one way to arrange the main CP.

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Appendix B

8038Figure B-2. Notional arrangement of CAB staff by command post

8039

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Mission Command

8040Figure B-3. Notional main command post arrangement

8041

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Appendix B

8042

COMMAND GROUP

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B-17. The CAB command group consists of the commander and those selected to assist him in critical missioncommand functions during the battle. The commander determines the composition of his command group basedon METT-TC analysis. Usually, the FSO and ALO are part of the CAB command group.

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B-18. The command group fights the battle. The group positions itself so that it can see the battle, and so thatthe commander can issue appropriate orders at critical times. Seeing the battle means more than simply beingin a location to observe decision points (DPs) and critical actions. Seeing the battle also means that thecommand group is in a position to receive reports on key indicators that the commander discussed with hissubordinates, and that upon receipt of these reports, the commander is in a position to order decisive action. TheFSO must be in a position to coordinate indirect fires; he must quickly respond to changes in the situation ormission with recommended changes to the fire support plan. The ALO must be in a position to see thebattlefield in order to coordinate close air support, shift preplanned CAS targets, and advise the commander onCAS issues.

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TYPES OF COMMAND POSTS

B-19. There are several types of command post from which the commander and staff conduct mission commandand other warfighting functions during unified land operations.

MAIN COMMAND POST

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B-20. The main CP is the CAB commanders principal mission command facility. Usually, the XO isresponsible for supervising all staff activities and functions of the main CP.

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B-21. The primary considerations in positioning the main CP are survivability, communications, andaccessibility. The CAB main CP must maintain continuous communications and coordination with thecompanies and the BCT main CP. The main CP must physically configure itself in a manner that facilitates thebest flow of information and crosstalk across all staff cells. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

8065

TACTICAL COMMAND POST

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B-22. The TAC CP is a facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control portionsof an operation for limited time. The TAC CP aids in the control of maneuver and fires during the battle. Basedon METT-TC analysis, the commander determines the composition, nature, and tasks of the TAC CP. (Refer toFM 6-0 for more information.)

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B-23. The S-3 usually leads the TAC CP with representatives from S-2, S-3, and fires cells sections. The TACCP is not a permanent organization and usually is prescribed by TACSOP and modified as necessary. It is fullymobile, enabling the S-3 to assist the commander anywhere on the battlefield. Usually, the CAB employs theTAC CP only for the actual battle, with the main CP controlling the CAB during other periods.

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B-24. The TAC CP usually operates in two to three armored vehicles modified for mission command. Thecrews of the vehicles in the TAC CP assist in operating radios and network systems, moving the vehicles, andproviding security; thus freeing the staff officers and NCOs to concentrate on the battle.

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COMBAT TRAINS COMMAND POST

B-25. The CTCP is the coordination center for sustainment of the CAB. Usually the S-4 is responsible foroperations, movement, and security of the CTCP and the combat trains. Often, the FSC has a representative,such as XO, at the CTCP. The CTCP also monitors the current tactical situation on the command net to assumeits function as the alternate main CP. The CTCP usually performs the following functions: Plans and coordinates sustainment for tactical operations. Serves as alternate for the main CP. Prepares to shift support if the main effort changes. Maintains personnel and logistics status reports on all organic and attached units. Reports to the main CP any change in the ability of the sustainment system to support the operation.

B-26. The combat trains usually consist of emergency Class III and Class V supplies, the MCP, the S-1 and S-4sections, and the BAS. The factors of METT-TC must be considered when positioning the CTCP in the CABAO. (Refer to Chapter 8 for more information.)

FIELD TRAINS COMMAND POST

B-27. Usually, the HHC commander leads the FTCP, and the FSC commander or his XO collocate with theCABs FTCP. The FTCP is usually the coordination and control center for the S-1s personnel andadministration center , company supply sections, and FSC. The HHC commander generally focuses on CPoperations while the FSC commander commands his company and coordinates all sustainment requirements forthe CAB.

COMMAND POST SURVIVABILITY

B-28. CP survivability depends mostly on concealment and mobility. The best way to protect a CP is to preventthe enemy from detecting it. Good camouflage and proper noise, light, and signal discipline enhance thesecurity provided by a good location. In an urban environment, emphasis is placed on check points, road blocks,and observation posts to secure the command post.

LOCATION

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B-29. Built-up areas are good locations for CPs because they provide cover and concealment, access toelectricity and other services, and good access and egress routes. However, they also can put indigenouspopulations at risk, and can provide enemy units covered and concealed positions to monitor and attack the CP.If a built-up area is not available, position the CP on a reverse slope with cover and concealment. Avoid keyterrain features such as hilltops and crossroads. Locate CPs on ground that is trafficable, even in poor weather.Other considerations for positioning CPs include: Ensuring LOS communications with higher, lower, and adjacent units. Avoiding redundancy of communications. Masking signals from the enemy. Using terrain for passive security (cover and concealment). Collocating with tactical units for mutual support and local security. Avoiding possible enemy target reference points (TRPs) for enemy artillery and CAS. Locating the CP near an existing road network out of sight from possible enemy observation.

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B-30. Other factors that can enhance survivability include dispersion, size, redundancy, and mobility. Largefacilities and formations attract attention while smaller, mobile, formations are more readily concealed andprotected. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

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OPERATIONAL SECURITY

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B-31. In general, positioning CPs away from major enemy mounted avenues of approach reduces the enemythreat. There should be no signs advertising CP locations. Disperse CP vehicles, and thoroughly camouflage allvehicles and equipment. Maintain noise and light discipline.

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B-32. CPs require a security force, and this force must have communications with the CPs. Establish securityforce positions as in any defensive position. That is, with a 360-degree perimeter and located far enough out toprevent enemy fires on the CPs. The security force should have antitank weapons to protect CPs from enemyarmor. Establish a quick reaction force and rehearse the execution of the perimeter defense. CABs usually relyon off-duty personnel for CP security. The command group may assist in securing a CP if collocated since unitssometimes are unable to employ combat elements to help secure a CP.

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Appendix B

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B-33. All subordinate units and elements of the CP must receive near and far recognition signals. The CP usesthese signals, challenges, and passwords to control access into its perimeter. In case of artillery or air attack, adesignated rally point and an alternate CP should be at least 500 to 1000 meters away.

COMMAND POST DISPLACEMENT

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B-34. CPs can displace as a whole or, more often, by echelon. Displacement as a whole usually is reserved forshort movements, with communications maintained by alternate means and minimal risk of degrading CPoperations.

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B-35. A portion of the CP, called a jump CP, moves to the new location, sets up operations, and takes overOPCON of the battle from the main CP. The remaining portion of the CP then moves to rejoin the jump CP.The jump CP consists of the necessary vehicles, personnel, and equipment to assume CP operations while theremainder moves. At battalion level, the jump CP usually comes from within the main CP. Another technique ofdisplacement is to hand off control to the TAC CP, and move the main CP as a whole.

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B-36. The XO or S-3 selects a general location for the jump CP site. Sometimes a quartering party accompaniesthe jump CP. The quartering party can consist of a security element and personnel, and equipment forquartering the remainder of the CP. The S-6, who is usually part of the quartering party, ensures that the newsite can communicate on all nets. When the jump CP becomes operational, it also becomes the net controlstation for the unit. The remainder of the CP then moves to rejoin the jump CP.

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COMMAND POST STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

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B-37. TACSOPs for each CP should be established, known to all, and rehearsed. An inclusive CP SOP willassist with efficient mission command. The CABs SOP must be tied into and support the SOP for the ABCT,as the company SOP should be based on the CAB SOP to ensure they all support one another. (Refer to FMs 60 and 7-15 for more information.) Some items to include are: The organization and setup of each CP. Plans for teardown and displacement of each CP. Eating and sleeping plans. Shift manning and operation guidelines. Physical security plans. Priorities of work. Loading plans and checklists. Orders production. Clearance of fires drills. Techniques for monitoring enemy and friendly situations. Displays of electronic map boards and status charts. Maintenance of CP journals and logs.

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B-38. Although the CAB is digitally equipped, there could be elements operating within a joint or multinationalenvironment that does not have digital equipment. In such cases, the staff must realize that integrating an analogunit into the CAB requires the use of older analog control techniques. In essence, two control systems must bein operation, with particular attention paid to keeping the analog unit(s) apprised of all the relevant informationthat is flowing digitally. The CAB TACSOP should include: Production and distribution of hard copy orders and graphics. More graphic control measures. Digital units tend to use fewer graphic control measures due toincreased SU. Instructions on how to receive standardized reports over voice communications. Procedures to equip LNO teams with digital systems to give analog units limited connectivity.

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COMMAND POST FUNCTIONS

B-39. All CPs perform six basic functions. The six functions are receive, distribute, analyze information, submitrecommendations to the commander, integrate resources, and synchronize resources. Each have subtasks andare listed below: Receive information, which includes:

Conduct predictive analysis based on the tactical situation.

Identify information that relates to CCIRs.

Identify the need to execute contingency plans based on the current situation. Submit recommendations to the commander, which includes:

Submit recommendations to the commander based on information available and analysis

conducted. Integrate resources, which includes:

Coordinate the integration of all warfighting functions.

Synchronize resources, which includes:

Coordinate the capabilities of all warfighting functions.

MAPS AND CHARTS

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B-40. Maps and charts help staffs present relevant information to the commander. Although the CAB hasnumerous information systems that assist in presenting that information, it is easy to become overwhelmed withvast amounts of information. The CP should maintain current information in the form of easily understood mapgraphics and charts. Combining situation maps with status charts gives the commander and staff a verynecessary snapshot during both the planning process and during battle execution. Commanders and staffsmust update this information continuously. Examples of information to be plotted and tracked include: Friendly unit locations. Enemy unit locations. Graphic control measures (restrictive and permissive). Obstacles (friendly and enemy). Personnel status. Weapons system status.

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B-41. For simplicity, analog and digital maps should be the same size and scale. This makes the informationeasier to comprehend when shifting from one view to another. Following operations, Soldiers should conductafter action reviews on the tracking systems.

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Appendix B

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PERSONNELB-42. The battle captain and operations sergeant major are vital to effective command post operations. Otherkey staff personnel responsibilities are discussed throughout with respect to the primary warfighting functioneach support. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

BATTLE CAPTAIN

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B-43. The focus of the main CP staff is on collecting the critical information that the commander needs to fightthe battle. Information flow is a constant problem in most CPs, especially since everyone in the CP mustprovide input to the COP. The battle captains role is to plan, coordinate, supervise, and maintaincommunication flow throughout the main CP to ensure the success of all assigned missions. The battle captainassists the commander, XO, and S-3 by being the focal point for communications, coordination, andinformation management. The battle captain can also be the main CP OIC in the absence of the commander,XO, and S-3.

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B-44. The battle captain has the overall responsibility for the smooth functioning of the main CP and its staffsections. This responsibility includes: Maintaining continuous operations of the main CP while static and mobile. Battle tracking the current situation using decision support templates, triggers, and executionmatrices to ensure events are proceeding as planned. Ensuring that all stations maintain communications with and among each other and that stationpersonnel route and log all messages and reports according to TACSOP. Assisting the XO to coordinate staff functions, ensuring a smooth and continuous information flowamong the staff sections. Processing essential data from the incoming flow of information; gathering all tactical and logisticalinformation; and distributing the information to the XO, S-3, and other staff sections on a regularbasis. Ensuring prompt clearance of fires.

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B-45. The battle captain ensures that all staff sections in the main CP understand their functions in accordancewith TACSOP, and coordinates staff briefings, updates displays and charts, and performs other staff actions. Asa focal point in the CP, the battle captain processes essential information from incoming data, assesses it,ensures dissemination, and makes recommendations to the CAB leadership. The battle captain assists the CABcommander by ensuring the warfighting functions stay synchronized.

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B-46. Information management in the CP can include processing emails, journals, messages, reports,FRAGORDs, and RFIs. The battle captain ensures the consistency, accuracy, and timeliness of informationleaving the CP, including preparing and dispatching FRAGORDs and WARNORDs. In addition, he monitorsand enforces chart and status board updates, which are necessary for battle management. The battle captainensures this posted information is timely, accurate, and accessible.

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B-47. To function effectively, the battle captain must have a working knowledge of all sections in the main CP,understand the unit TACSOP, and ensure the staff section uses the TACSOP. He must know the current planand task organization of the unit, and understand the commanders intent. In addition, the battle captain mustunderstand the limits of his decision making and action authority.

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B-48. The CAB must include the battle captain in the decision-making process; this is because the battle captainmust know the rationale behind certain key decisions. He must know the technical aspects of the battle plan andunderstand the time-space relationship to execute any specific support task. He must understand and enforce thebattle rhythm the standard events or actions that happen during a typical 24 hour period, and ensure that themain CP staff is effective throughout the period. Battle captains use their judgment to adjust staff activities andevents to accomplish the CP mission across different shifts, varying tactical circumstances, and changes in CPlocation.

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OPERATIONS SERGEANT MAJOR

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B-49. The operations sergeant major is the senior NCO in the main CP and is responsible for running the CP.He is responsible for the proper manning, training, equipment, and execution of operations. The operationssergeant major is responsible for ensuring that all assigned and attached personnel adhere to both unit standardsand TACSOPs (including movement, setup, maintenance of power and climate control, and internal security).The success of operations in the CP can be directly attributed to how well the operations sergeant major runs theCP.

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B-50. Usually, the operations sergeant major is responsible for conducting the main CP battle drills. UnitTACSOPs should define these drills, and units should rehearse them during training and operations. Typical CPbattle drills include: Execute a downed aircraft recovery team mission. React to an air attack. React to a ground attack. React to a CBRN attack. React to indirect fire. Clearance of fires. React to jamming or suspected communications compromise. Execute time-sensitive targets. Execute a close air support or joint fires mission. React to a mass casualty incident. React to a civil riot or incident. React to significant collateral damage. React to a misinformation incident.

SIGNAL SUPPORTB-51. Communication is the means through which the CAB exercises mission command. There must be openlines of communication up, down, and laterally. Effective communications at all levels is maybe the greatestchallenge, because of the influx of technology and the fog of war. Communications are further complicatedduring combined arms maneuver and operational environments with reduced lines of sight. Training, planning,and rehearsing communications should include: Back-up means of communications at key locations. TACSOPs that specify immediate actions to take in case of jamming, including prearranged alternatefrequencies and code words. Make sure subordinates know what to do during interruptions in communications. Practice disciplined communications procedures to eliminate nonessential conversations and avoidoverloading communications systems.

RESPONSIBILITIESB-52. All units take immediate action to restore lost communications; this includes communications betweenand among headquarters CP. These responsibilities apply to establishing a liaison between headquarters. Theorder of responsibilities for communications is Senior to subordinate. Supporting to supported. Reinforcing to reinforced. Passing to passed (for forward passage of lines [FPOL]). Passed to passing (for RPOL). Left to right. Rearward to forward.

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B-11

Appendix B

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MISSION COMMANDB-53. The CAB has an integrated system of communications and networks to aid the commander in missioncommand. These capabilities enable him to rapidly share information between him and his subordinatecommanders, staff, and higher headquarters. The CABs communications and networks Provide the information needed to develop SU in support of the commander's mission. Support the commander's implementation of mission command across the range of militaryoperations by regulating forces and functions in accordance with the commander's intent. Provide a link to develop a COP of the situation. Recognize and protect friendly forces. Conduct operations with lethal and nonlethal means. Operate with joint and multinational forces.

Frequency Modulation and Digital Communications

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B-54. Whether to use analog/frequency modulation (FM) or digital means of communication is a function of thesituation and TACSOPs. Even though both systems are critical for effective mission command in the CAB, FMcommunications is the primary method for control during operations while on the move, with additional supportfrom the situational information display provided by FBCB2. Some general considerations can help guide theunderstanding of when to use which mechanism. The following paragraphs detail those considerations.

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B-55. FM is the primary method of communications when units are in contact. Prior to and following anengagement, the staff and commanders use digital systems for disseminating orders and graphics andconducting routine reporting. During operations, however, the CAB staff uses a combination of systems toreport and coordinate with higher and adjacent units.

B-56. Staffs must remain sensitive to the difficulty and danger of using digital systems when moving or incontact. They should not expect to send or receive digital reports under those conditions. Digital reportingbuilds the COP (particularly the posting of enemy icons), and failure to render such reports results in anincomplete COP. Additionally, the units must build the COP as the action occurs in order to provide thecommander with a COP that contains relevant information that leverages his decision making. Other generalguidelines include: CAB personnel at any echelon should use FM voice to report initial contact; digital enemy spotreports should follow as soon as possible to generate enemy situational information. Elements moving about the battlefield (not in command posts) use FM voice unless they can stop andgenerate a digital message or report. Emergency logistical requests, especially casualty evacuation requests, should be initiated on FMvoice with a follow-up digital report if possible. Combat elements moving or in contact should transmit enemy spot reports on FM voice; their higherheadquarters should convert FM reports into digital spot reports to generate situational information.At company level, the XO and 1SG convert the reports. Calls for fire on targets of opportunity should be sent on FM voice; fire support teams (FISTs)submit digitally to AFATDS. When equipped with the far target locator, vehicle crews should engage the target with the far targetlocator and select the call for fire message button on the spot report enabling a digital call for fire. In the initial part of an engagement, FISTs should send planned calls for fire digitally. Units should send routine logistical reports and requests digitally. Subordinates to CAB should send routine reports digitally prior to and following combat. Units should send orders, plans, and graphics digitally, accompanied by an FM voice call to alertrecipients that they will receive critical information. Additionally, the transmitting element shouldrequest that an appropriate Soldier (usually not the computer operator) verbally acknowledge bothreceipt and understanding of the transmitted information.

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Mission Command

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Units should send obstacle and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN-1) reports byvoice initially; and then follow with digital reports. The digital reports can generate a geo-referencedsituational information message portraying the obstacle or contaminated area across the network.

Limitation of Digital Mission Command Systems

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B-57. The major limitation when dealing with the various types of digital systems is the difficulty in employingthem while moving. Many of the digital systems must be stationary or have LOS communications with BCTwarfighter information network-tactical (WIN-T) systems. Although FBCB2 (EPLRS or BFT) can provide agood deal of situational awareness to the CAB commander and his staff, the full capabilities of the ABCSsystem might not be available when the CAB main CP is moving or preparing to move.

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B-58. Because of this limitation, it is important that the staff develop and rehearse tactics, techniques, &procedures (for example, TACSOP) for transferring the functions of the main CP to alternate CPs. Thenwhenever the tactical situation requires the main CP to displace, the main CP staff can transfer functions to theTAC CP, CTCP, FTCP, or a combination of the CABs alternate CPs.

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B-59. One technique that ensures the transfer of the main CP functions goes smoothly is to integrate the planneddisplacement of the main CP into the decision support template for the CAB. Detailed planning in coordinationwith the S-3 (scheme of maneuver) and the S-6 (concept of communications support) should enable thebattalion to determine the optimal time to displace the main CP. This helps to ensure that the main CPreestablishes adequate communication with both higher and subordinate units during the decisive operation.

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B-60. The CAB staff must be prepared and resourced to execute mission command of the battalion regardless ofthe availability of digital systems. Sometimes the tactical situation precludes the effective use of digital missioncommand systems. Therefore, it is paramount that the CAB staff train and rehearse analog methods (forexample, frequency modulation voice) of executing mission command over the subordinate units. The staff alsocan use frequency modulation voice communications to meet the reporting requirements of higher headquarters.The main and alternate CPs must have the necessary tools they need to execute mission command in an analogenvironment. Such tools include paper maps, overlays, and status chart boards.

8384

Friendly Situational Information

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B-61. The creation of friendly situational information is extensively automated, requiring minimal manipulationby CPs or platform operators. Each platform creates and transmits its own position location and receives thefriendly locations (displayed as icons) of all the friendly elements in that platform's wide area network. Thisdoes not necessarily mean that all friendly units in the general vicinity of that platform are displayed, however,since some elements may not be in that platforms network. For example, a combat vehicle in a CAB willprobably not have situational information on a field artillery brigade operating nearby since the two are indifferent networks. The situational information generated from individual FBCB2-equipped platforms istransmitted to command posts through the main CP server to Maneuver Control System (MCS). The otherABCS can access the friendly situational information picture through MCS.

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B-62. Commanders must recognize limitations in the creation of friendly situational information that resultsfrom vehicles or units that are not equipped with the latest digital or analog technology. Commanders mustenforce training and rehearsals with the systems they will operate with to include units, or attachments theymust communicate and share information with.

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B-63. With any mission, there are risks to consider. The following are ways to overcome potential shortfalls: A digitally-equipped element tracks the location of specified dismounts and manually generates andmaintains an associated friendly icon. As an example, the mechanized team XO can generate an iconfor dismounted squads. The CAB main CP tracks analog units operating with the CAB and generates associated friendlyicons. A digitally equipped platform acts as a liaison or escort for analog units moving or operating in theCAB AO. The LNO must inform battalion and higher elements of the association of the LNO iconwith the analog unit.

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B-13

Appendix B

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Note. Use friendly situational information to deny fires and to aid in the clearance process, but do notuse it as the sole source for clearance of fires. This applies to all digital information systems.

Enemy Situational Information

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B-64. The hardest and most critical aspect of creating the situational information picture is creating a picture ofthe enemy. The enemy situational information picture at BCT and CAB levels is the result of multiple inputs FM spot reports, UAS and JSTAR reports, reports from FBCB2 in subordinate units, electronic or signalintelligence feeds, and inputs from the S-2 section. Enemy situational information generation is partiallyautomated, but it still requires a great deal of work and attention to detail by personnel.

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B-65. Personnel at all echelons can generate the enemy situational information picture. At CAB level andbelow, the primary mechanism for generating situational information is FBCB2. When an observer acquires anenemy element, he creates and transmits a spot report, which automatically generates an enemy icon thatappears network-wide. Only those in the address group to whom the report was sent receive the text of thereport, but all platforms in the network can see the icon. As the enemy moves or its strength changes, theobserver must update this icon. If the observer must move, he ideally passes responsibility for the icon toanother observer. If multiple observers see the same enemy element and create multiple reports, the CAB orABCT S-2 (or some other element that has the capability) must eliminate the redundant icon(s).

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B-66. FBCB2 spot reports must include the higher headquarters S-2 in the address group for the data to berouted through the main CP server into Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) to feed thelarger intelligence picture. The S-2 section can manually input FM reports received at a CP into the DCGS-Adatabase. FBCB2 and FM voice reports are the primary sources of enemy situational information for fightingthe close and rear battles.

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B-67. At ABCT level, the S-2 section and the supporting military intelligence company receive intelligencefeeds from higher and adjacent units along with feeds from Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System(JSTARS), UAS, and the common ground station. They enter enemy information from these sources into theDCGS-A database and send this information via DCGS-A to subordinate battalion S-2s. These feeds, alongwith FM voice and FBCB2 reports, are the primary source of enemy situational information for BCTs shapingoperations and for providing battalions a picture of what is coming into their AOs.

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B-68. Usually, BCT and division levels fuse all of the intelligence feeds. The ABCT S-2 routinely (every 30minutes to every hour) sends the updated enemy situational information picture to subordinate units down toplatform level. Since the fused DCGS-A database is focused outside CAB AOs and its timeliness can vary,subordinate CAB elements usually use only the FBCB2-generated intelligence picture. Company teams shouldstay focused entirely on the FBCB2-generated enemy situational information. The CAB commander and staffrefer occasionally to the DCGS-A-generated intelligence picture to keep track of enemy forces that the CABwill encounter in the near future but that are not yet part of the CAB close fight.

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B-69. The success of the intelligence effort depends primarily on the ability of staffs to analyze enemy activitieseffectively; to develop and continuously refine effective IPB; and to create and execute effective collectionmanagement plans. Automation and displays greatly help to disseminate information and display thatinformation in ways that foster comprehension. However, for information to be useful, personnel must generateit rapidly and analyze it thoroughly.

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B-70. The enemy situational information picture usually is incomplete and less current than friendly situationalinformation. Units must always scrutinize the timeliness and accuracy of the enemy picture. Units must use thepicture to focus observers and orient the fire support process. However, units should not use it as the sole sourcefor generating indirect fire support target location data; it usually will not be timely enough.

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Graphics and Overlays

B-71. All digital information systems effectively support the creation and transmission of doctrinal field orders.The CAB staff sections usually develop their portions of OPORDs and send them to the S-3 section. The S-3section then merges the individual portions into a single document, and transmits it via MCS to subordinate,

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higher, and adjacent units. When creating OPORDs, remember that the tactical Internet has both fast and slowtransmission rates.

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B-72. Table B-1 illustrates some of the different data rates for CAB communications systems. Orders andgraphics must be concise to reduce transmission times. Orders transmitted directly to FBCB2-equipped systemsmust meet the size constraints of the order formats in FBCB2. Graphics and overlays should be constructed withthe same considerations for clarity and size. Situational information reduces the need for control measures tosome degree, but the staff must always consider the integration of analog units and that situational informationmight not always be available to all elements.

Brigade Command Net

B-74. The brigade command net is a secure FM voice net. The S-3 section controls this net at the BCT mainCP, and BCT command uses the net to execute mission command. All organic and attached units, the BCT firesupport coordinator, ALO, and supporting units operate on this net. The brigade uses the command net to sendcritical combat information to the CAB commander or the S-3 and to enable the CAB and BCT commanders totalk to each other. The CAB command group, TAC CP, and main CP also monitor this net and respond, ifnecessary, for the CAB commander.Brigade Operations and Intelligence NetB-75. The brigade operations and intelligence (O&I) net is a secure FM net; the S-2 section controls this net atthe BCT main CP. The brigade sends all routine tactical reports and other intelligence matters on the O&I net,

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freeing the command net for command and critical combat traffic. The CAB command group, TAC CP, andmain CP monitor this net.Brigade Fire Support NetB-76. The fire support net is a secure FM voice net; the BCT FC controls this net at the BCT main CP. TheCAB command group, TAC CP, and main CP monitor this net.Brigade Administrative and Logistics NetB-77. BCT A/L net is a secure FM voice net. The BCT S-4 section controls the brigade administrative andlogistics (A/L) net at the BCT main CP. The CAB main CP, CTCP, and FTCP monitor this net.Battalion Command NetB-78. The S-3 section controls this secure FM net at the main CP. CAB command uses this net for missioncommand. All organic and attached units, the FSO, the ALO, and supporting units operate on this net. Thecommand net provides the means by which the commander or the S-3 receives critical combat information, andit enables the CAB and company commanders to talk to each other. Other units (such as mortar and scoutplatoons) also monitor this net and respond if necessary.Battalion Operations and Intelligence NetB-79. The S-2 controls this secure FM net at the main CP. The S-2 sends all routine tactical reports and otherintelligence matters on this net. This net frees the command net for command and critical combat traffic.Battalion Fire Support NetB-80. The fire support net is a secure FM net that the FC controls in the main CP. It is the primary means ofcalling for indirect fires or CAS for the CAB. Company FISTs, the main CP, command group, TAC CP, andmortar platoon use this net.Battalion Administrative and Logistics NetB-81. The A/L net is a secure FM net that the S-4 section controls. The S-4 section uses this net to send andreceive A/L reports and coordinate maintenance operations. The CAB XO, company 1SGs, main CP, medicalplatoon, FSC, and combat trains operate on the A/L net. The CTCP and FTCP also operate on this net.Retransmission NetB-82. The CAB S-6 section has one retransmission (retrans) team, which is dedicated to retransmission of anytwo of the battalion nets. The team has the capability for retransmitting two FM nets using single-channelground/airborne radio systems (SINCGARS), and it can use its enhanced position location reporting system(EPLRS) to serve as a link in the lower tactical Internet. The S-6 positions the retrans team in the battalion AO,balancing the need to maximize LOS and range with the requirements of local security. Retrans capabilities andlimitations are important planning considerations when operating in a noncontiguous AO.Company NetsB-83. Each company operates its own command net. The company command net is a secure FM net that thecompany XO controls in the company CP. All organic and attached elements of the company operate on thisnet. Company command forward all tactical and logistics reports to the company CP on this net. Subordinateplatoons operate their own internal nets.

Communications SystemsB-84. The CAB relies on a federation of communications networks that collectively enables battle command.Not all components of the network are under CAB or ABCT control. The tactical radio network is a critical toolin the fight and must be robust, redundant, flexible, and adaptive. It is important that all CAB leaders are

B-85. The SINGARS family of radios is the primary means of voice communications available to the CAB. TheCAB uses SINCGARS primarily as a voice transmitter, but also uses it to pass limited data transmissions andfor short-range, secure voice communications. The planning range for this system is a maximum of 10kilometers dismounted and 35 kilometers mounted. Since large terrain features can block FM radios,retransmission teams usually are used to ensure coverage of the BCT AO. SINCGARS features include: Very high frequency, FM radio system. Secure communications by transmitting tactical voice and data, using COMSEC and frequencyhopping technologies.

B-87. The CAB has the Spitfire Tactical satellite system. The Spitfire is a single-channel, man-portable, ultrahigh frequency SATCOM terminal. The Spitfire provides LOS communication, and has embedded COMSEC.With the use of the SINCGARS Internet controller, it can support beyond LOS extension of the tactical Internetwhen operating in a retransmission mode. The Spitfire provides critical mission command communicationsamong the division and its subordinate maneuver units. The terminal is usually positioned with the main CP andoperates under the control of the S-6.

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Tactical Internet

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B-88. The tactical Internet is a collection of interconnected tactical radios and computer hardware and software.It provides situational information and data to support mission command at BCT and below.

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B-89. The WIN-T provides the transport for relevant information among the BCT and its battalion CPs, and thedivision/corps CPs.

FORMSDA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card.DD Form 93, Record of Emergency Data.DD Form 1380, U.S. Field Medical Card.DD Form 285, Appointment of Military Postal Clerk, Unit Mail Clerk or Mail Orderly.DD Form 8286, Servicemans Group Life Insurance.

ATP 3-90.5 (Final Draft)

References-3

References

WEBSITESMost Army doctrinal publications and regulations are available online at: http://www.apd.army.mil.Servicemans Group Life Insurance:http://www.armyg1.army.mil/dcs/docs/DD%20Form%208286%20SGLI%20Election%20and%20Certificate.pdf.Reimer Doctrine and Training Digital Library, http://www.atiam.train.army.mil.Most joint publications are available online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/doctrine.htm.