Tag Archives: #cybersecurity

In 2004, Triconex safety expert Robert Adamski told me, “I’m going to share my nightmare with you.” He proceeded to talk about, not a safety issue, but a cyber security issue. He predicted that it would be possible to penetrate a control system and enter the safety instrumented system, the SIS, which is designed to safely shut down a plant in the event of a failure in the process. He explained exactly how his hacker, “Let’s call him Ali al Qaeda,” would be able to do that, and he dared me to tell him it couldn’t happen.

Ever since then, I have been talking about Bob Adamski’s nightmare, and nobody has ever been able to tell me it couldn’t happen.

The best they could do was to assert, pretty baldly, that it was highly unlikely, that it would require great resources, and would not happen because it would potentially cause extreme damage. Neither Adamski, who passed away a few years ago, nor I ever believed much in that argument, and we’ve been waiting for Bob’s nightmare to come true.

Well, now it has. Not quite as badly as Adamski feared, and no plant was destroyed. But an attacker targeted an SIS system, and caused it to shut down the plant.

The best description of what happened, and what the malware can do is in a blog by Heather MacKenzie of Nozomi Networks. You can read the entire blog here. She makes some important points.

“The attack reprogrammed a facility’s Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers, causing them to enter a failed state, and resulting in an automatic shutdown of the industrial process,” MacKenzie wrote.

“The attack is bold and notable,” she said, “because it is the first known industrial control system (ICS) attack that has targeted and impacted not just an ICS, but SIS equipment. Also, the type of SIS attacked is widely used and is commissioned in a consistent way across many industries.”

She then makes an important point. “The SIS system that was attacked was a Schneider Electric Triconex Safety Instrumented System (hence the malware moniker “TRITON”, also known as “TRISIS”.) However, the malware was not designed specifically for Triconex, it was designed because the target organization was using Triconex(emphasis added).”

What MacKenzie, and Nozomi Networks’ partner, Fireye, which discovered the exploit, says is that FireEye is moderately confident that the attacker inadvertently shutdown operations while developing the ability to cause physical damage. You can read their reasons for coming to this conclusion, and many other important details about the attack, in the FireEye blog post on TRITON.

MacKenzie notes, “ It is the first known malware targeting SIS, and only the fifth malware known to specifically target ICS (after Stuxnet, Havex / Dragonfly, Blackenergy2, and Industroyer / CrashOverride).”

It is likely that if the target enterprise had been using another SIS system, the exploit would have targeted that one instead of the Triconex system.

Now that the exploit has demonstrated that SIS systems as a class are penetrable and vulnerable, we can expect to see more attacks.

“Cassandras” like Joe Weiss, myself, Eric Byres (of Tofino fame) and others have been pointing out for a decade that there is a thought gap between data security, which most cyber security systems are based on, and process safety. You cannot have a secure system unless it is a safe system. You cannot have a safe system unless it is a secure system. We can no longer ignore this fact or Bob Adamski’s nightmare will become all too real.

Intel, AMD, and Other Processors Vulnerable

If the Triton Exploit weren’t enough, the entire computing world was rocked in December and early January by the revelation that processors by Intel, ARM, AMD, and even Qualcomm (one of the largest manufacturers of mobile device processors) are vulnerable to a series of vulnerabilities, like Spectre and Meltdown, which leave them open to attack.

How this impacts the automation industry is obvious. Since the major automation vendors abandoned making their own chips, almost forty years ago, chipsets by Intel, ARM, AMD and others have been used in everything from sensors to controllers, to the computers that DCS and SCADA systems run on. The computers that serve as cloud servers are not immune either.

A report from CNET describes the issue: “Researchers found two major weaknesses in processors that could let attackers read sensitive information that should never leave the CPU, or central processing unit. In both cases, attackers could see data that the processor temporarily makes available outside of the chip.

Here’s why that happens: To make computer processes run faster, a chip will essentially guess what information the computer needs to perform its next function. That’s called speculative execution. As the chip guesses, that sensitive information is momentarily easier to access.”

Spectre and Meltdown (which targets cloud servers) can be used on systems that are not patched to prevent it, to permit unauthorized entry into the system. Now, it is in the industrial space that systems will potentially NOT be patched.

This is because in many cases, the system cannot be shut down to patch it, or the system is running on an archaic processor. There are thousands of Windows XP systems running in the industrial environment. There are instances of even Windows 3.11 and DOS systems running processes yet today. These systems cannot be patched.

Intel and the others state that the flaw has existed for at least twenty years, so all those archaic systems are vulnerable.

CNET reports, “Researchers, chipmakers and computer companies all say there are no known examples of hackers using these weaknesses to attack a computer. However, now that the details of the design flaws and how to exploit them are publicly available, the chances of hackers using them are much higher.”

As the Triton Exploit and others have proven, hackers up to and including nation states, have been trying to penetrate Industrial Control Systems for at least a decade and a half already. This just gives them another avenue to exploit. And as the ICS malware exploits we have already seen show, it is not all that difficult to attack a control system that is not adequately defended.

Operating system manufacturers like Apple and Microsoft are scrambling to patch their systems so that the exploits cannot be used. But the fact that it exists in nearly all processors means that it will be hanging over us for a long time.

In the meantime, be wary of phishing and other means of achieving entry into your control systems. Be afraid. Be very afraid.

This first appeared in the December 2017 INSIDER. If you like this kind of reporting and analysis, please consider becoming an INSIDER subscriber. Visit http://www.spitzerandboyes.com/insider for more information.

(Originally published in the December 2017 Industrial Automation and Process Control INSIDER)

The big appeal of the Industrial Internet of Things is the potential vast increase of meaningful information we could obtain by increasing the sheer number of sensors and the analytical methodologies of Big Data and the latest visualization tools for working with that data. The central axiom of the IIoT is that this information will be used to operate plants and even entire enterprises much more profitably.

There are some obvious problems with this axiom, It is pretty glaring that you have to collect the right information. It doesn’t help to add 100 or 1000 sensors to a process if the values of those sensors aren’t critical information. The problems don’t stop there.

We have pointed out before that the cost of sensors must decrease dramatically be- fore the IIoT can become a reality. I remember hearing a friend from Shell saying that if they needed a measurement, they’d be willing to pay for it. The flip side of that is that if the cost of making those measurements goes down substantially, the impetus for needing the measurement goes up.

But the real issue that IIoT boosters don’t want to talk about is security.
There are two basic schools of thought about IIoT security. One is that nobody would try to penetrate a network through its edge devices. The other is that the problem is so large that it is basically unsolvable, so who cares.

The first school of thought is the same old “security by obscurity” nonsense. Our concepts of cyber security have been formed by network-centric security experts. There have been some lonely security researchers, like Joe Weiss, and others like the INSIDER who have been pointing this bias out for years. And for years, we have noticed a steadily growing number of “security researchers” at Blackhat and other gatherings, who have concentrated their research on network penetration through the sensor network.

The other school of thought is much more pervasive and even more insidious. This claim is the reason that there is always the next patch coming out for software. You can’t solve the problem because there are always smarter black hats.

Somehow, it seems to us, that both schools of thought are missing the point. Which is that if the potential users of the Industrial Internet of Things see that from a cost-benefit viewpoint the potential loss from an attack far outweighs the potential gain from all that beautiful information, adoption of the IIoT will stall.

We are already seeing this in the commercial IoT world. Sales of Nest thermostats and household control systems have stalled. People are concerned. Now, with the latest revelations about inherent design flaws in Intel, AMD, and other processor chips, they are becoming frightened. All they can see to do is to pray that nobody ever attacks them. And we see the same fear in the industrial space.
So, if the IIoT is to be a success, we have to focus on two things. First and foremost, we need to make security inherent in every de- vice and the firmware and software that runs on them, from field sensor to process controller to MES and ERP systems.

And, second, we need to focus on providing the right information at the right time, or there will be no value add with the IIoT.
End users vote with their feet, and their dollars, pounds, euros, pesos and yuan. For all the ballyhooed new IIoT centric plants, there are dozens more built to the old standards, because we are sure that they work, and the perceived risk is less.

HIMA, the largest independent safety instrumented system manufacturer, today released this press release:

(Houston, TX, January 11, 2018)

In late 2017 the ICS cybersecurity specialist Dragos announced that a safety controller (SIS) of a HIMA competitor in a process facility in the Middle East had been targeted by a new malware attack and successfully hacked. The SIS was compromised, leading to a shutdown of the facility. The professional execution of the attack again clearly shows that facility operators need to take the subject of cybersecurity very seriously. HIMA, a leading global independent vendor of smart safety solutions for the process industry, therefore offers to provide expert consulting on the subject of cybersecurity in safety-critical systems.

The above-mentioned cyberattack represents a new dimension of cyber threats to critical infrastructure. According to current knowledge, it was specifically planned and designed to target the SIS of a particular manufacturer. This sort of attack on a SIS, the first ever seen worldwide, is very sophisticated and only possible with significant effort.

Dr Alexander Horch, Vice President Research, Development & Product Management at HIMA, comments: “The incident with our competitor should serve as a wake-up call for all of us and further enhance awareness of the subject of cybersecurity in the industry. Work processes and organizational deficiencies are by far the most common areas of vulnerability for successful cyberattacks. System interfaces that remain open during operation and can be used to program the systems concerned, for example, give attackers a potential point of access. We urgently advise facility operators to not rely solely on cyber safe components, but instead to establish a comprehensive security concept for their own facilities.”

To achieve maximum safety and security, it is especially important for facility operators to implement the requirements of the standards for functional safety and automation security (IEC 61511 and IEC 62443) for physical separation between process control systems and safety and security systems.

In addition to providing automation solutions conforming to relevant national and international standards, HIMA supports plant engineers and operators in developing security concepts for the entire life cycle.
“For facility operators it is important to constantly keep an eye on potential forms of manipulation. In this regard, safety-critical applications are fundamentally different from other industrial PLC or office applications. Considerable expertise is necessary to ensure cybersecurity in safety applications. Maintaining and constantly refining security often poses a challenge to facility operators. It is therefore advisable to draw on the services of experienced safety and security experts in order to jointly develop and implement effective concepts”, says Heiko Schween, a security expert at HIMA.

The December 2017 INSIDER has been released. The cover story, “Extreme Badness from Malware and Design Flaws Impact Industry” discusses the two cyber issues impacting the ICS community that surfaced in late December: the Triton Exploit and Spectre and Meltdown. The INSIDER has been discussing this for years, and your editor and Joe Weiss beat the drum for years at Control magazine. The late Robert Adamski called something like the Triton Exploit “Adamski’s Nightmare.” It has been infecting my dreams since 2004, and I am pleased to pass it along to you. If you aren’t afraid yet, you haven’t been paying attention.

In the Health Watch, NIck Denbow and I look at the state of the Automation Industry through the lens of ABB, and we take a look at Endress+Hauser’s alliances, distribution, and newest product and what it means for Millenials as they become engineers and operators.

If you’re not a subscriber, visit Become an INSIDER and subscribe. Individual subscriptions are $500 per year…that works out to less than $40 a month for the best news and commentary in the industry. Corporate subscriptions are also available. Contact David Spitzer for details.

From the Schneider Electric announcement:Malware Discovered Affecting Triconex Safety Controllers V1.1 December 14, 2017Overview
____________________________________________________________________________Schneider Electric is aware of a directed incident affecting a single customer’s Triconex Tricon safety shutdown system.____________________________________________________________________________We are working closely with our customer, independent cybersecurity organizations and ICS- CERT to investigate and mitigate the risks of this type of attack. While evidence suggests this was an isolated incident and not due to a vulnerability in the Triconex system or its program code, we continue to investigate whether there are additional attack vectors. It is important to note that in this instance, the Triconex system responded appropriately, safely shutting down plant operations. No harm was incurred by the customer or the environment.Triconex user documentation contains detailed security guidelines and recommendations on how to protect Triconex systems from attack. We strongly encourage all our customers to follow these recommendations regarding product use and security, as well as apply and follow industry-recognized cybersecurity best practices at all times to protect their installations:• Ensure the cybersecurity features in Triconex solutions are always enabled;• Never leave the front panel key position in the “Program” mode when not activelyconfiguring the controller;• And ensure all TriStation terminals, safety controllers and the safety network are isolatedfrom the rest of the plant communication channels.Also, review and assess your site’s cyber preparedness. Schneider Electric is a proponent of the NIST Cyber Security Framework and is ready to assist should this be necessary.The Schneider Electric Product Security Office continues to work with ICS-CERT and will update this advisory as more information becomes available.DetailsThe modules of this malware are designed to disrupt Triconex safety controllers, which are used widely in critical infrastructure. The malware requires the keyswitch to be in the “PROGRAM” mode in order to deliver its payload. Among others, the reported malware has the capability to scan and map the industrial control system environment to provide reconnaissance and issue commands directly to Tricon safety controllers.

Bob and I, and Joe Weiss, have been continuously predicting this development since at least 2004. Yet it is now 2017, and the systems are still vulnerable. This is stupid.

Although the attack apparently only accidentally shut down the plant, during a search for operational data, the attack could have easily been used to destroy the plant utterly by spoofing the SIS system and using it to cause extremely unsafe conditions leading to catastrophic accidents.

At some point, somebody has to be willing to recognize how fragile OT systems are, really, and how easily they can be disrupted. It is said that our civilization is three days from anarchy. The late Dr. Jerry Pournelle, inventor of the Star Wars Defense for Ronald Reagan, said we were three weeks from cannibalism if the lights went out and stayed out.

This is seriously dangerous, folks, and I am tired, and Joe Weiss is tired, and Bob Adamski was tired before he died, of being told we are fear-mongering. We aren’t. And now we can prove it.

At the INSIDER we’ve been saying this for years. The adoption of even basic cyber security actions in the industrial space is very low. Many companies believe that they are “pretty safe” because they are relatively obscure. But I recall a conversation with the head of IT of a regional potato chip company about 7 or 8 years ago: “I never thought anybody would cyber attack us. We make potato chips, for God’s sake.”

Honeywell, which has maintained a very high emphasis on cyber security in the industrial environment for over a decade now, sponsored a report by LNS Research on adoption of cyber security practices.

Here’s the press release with the study’s findings. All we can say is, “Wake up, people!”

The issue has gone beyond lack of knowledge. As Joy Ward, Spitzer and Boyes LLC’s director of research says, if you put together a good intellectual argument, and nobody is buying, you are looking at high emotional barriers. She recommends doing some serious qualitative research to determine what those barriers are, so that the intellectual argument can be adjusted and become effective.

Either that, or we need to prepare for a cyber disaster of enormous proportions.

Almost two thirds of surveyed companies don’t monitor for suspicious behavior

HOUSTON, December 6, 2017 – Honeywell (NYSE: HON) today released a new study showing industrial companies are not moving quickly to adopt cyber security measures to protect their data and operations, even as attacks have increased around the globe.
The survey – Putting Industrial Cyber Security at the Top of the CEO Agenda – was conducted by LNS Research and sponsored by Honeywell. It polled 130 strategic decision makers from industrial companies about their approach to the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), and their use of industrial cyber security technologies and practices. Among the findings were:
• More than half of respondents reported working in an industrial facility that already has had a cyber security breach.
• 45% of the responding companies still do not have an accountable enterprise leader for cyber security.
• Only 37% are monitoring for suspicious behavior.
• Although many companies are conducting regular risk assessments, 20% are not doing them at all.
“Decision makers are more aware of threats and some progress has been made to address them, but this report reinforces that cyber security fundamentals haven’t been adopted by a significant portion of the industrial community,” said Jeff Zindel, vice president and general manager, Honeywell Industrial Cyber Security. “In order to take advantage of the tremendous benefits of industrial digital transformation and IIoT, companies must improve their cyber security defenses and adapt to the heightened threat landscape now.”
The study suggests these three immediate actions for any industrial organization to capture the value of the new technologies:
1. Making industrial cyber security part of digital transformation strategies;
2. Driving best practice adoption across people, processes and technology, from access controls to risk monitoring, and tap external cyber expertise to fill gaps
3. Focusing on empowering leaders and building an organizational structure that breaks down the silos between IT and OT.
“Cyber security needs to be part of every CEO’s agenda to ensure the effective, immediate and long-term deployment of strategies and technologies such as IIoT,” said Matthew Littlefield, president and principal analyst, LNS Research. “In short, in order for a business to succeed on its digital transformation journey, it needs to succeed with industrial cyber security.”
LNS Research is a global leader in research and advisory for digital transformation of industry, delivering technology insights for business executives. Its analysts focus on identifying the metrics, leadership, business process, and technology capabilities effecting change.
​Honeywell’s industrial cyber security technologies and expertise address many of the issues identified in the LNS Research study. For more information, please visit https://hwll.co/uhrgs and www.becybersecure.com.

I’ve been fighting off a flu bug, so it was a few days later than I wanted it to be…but it is out. I will be posting some articles from it throughout the month, but if you want to read them now, visit http://www.spitzerandboyes.com/insider to subscribe.

The cover story in the August INSIDER is an Insider Special Report on “Cyber Security in the Age of the Industrial Internet of Things.” I think you will find it thought provoking.