The Battle of Falkirk, 1298

The Battle of Falkirk,
which took place on 22 July 1298, was one of the most important
engagements of the Scottish Wars of Independence. While it is not as
well-known today as the later clash at Bannockburn, by medieval
standards it was a very large battle, with thousands of men fighting
on both sides. Falkirk was also significant because it involved two
of the most famous personalities in medieval British history: King
Edward I of England and Sir William Wallace.

Setting
the Scene

Edward
invaded Scotland for the first time in 1296, having previously
attempted to assert his claim to ‘superior lordship’ by more
subtle means. His initial campaign was crushingly successful. The
King of Scots, John Balliol, was forced to give up his throne; he was
taken as a prisoner to England and never returned to Scotland
(although he eventually died in France). Many Scottish nobles were
also taken into captivity, and Edward filled the resulting power
vacuum by imposing a new regime. However, the exactions and brutality
of Edward’s officials soon provoked risings in various parts of
Scotland. Two of the rebel leaders became increasingly prominent:
Andrew Murray achieved a great reputation in the north, while this
period also marked the emergence of William Wallace further south.

Murray
and Wallace came from very different backgrounds – the former was a
member of a well-established noble family, whereas the latter was
born a commoner – but in time they formed an effective partnership,
joining forces for a siege of Dundee. In September 1297 they won a
spectacular victory over English forces at Stirling Bridge, and most
of Scotland slipped out of Edward’s control. Murray, however, was
badly wounded and later died of his injuries, leaving Wallace as the
pre-eminent Scottish leader; he was knighted by one of the Scottish
nobles and formally acknowledged as sole Guardian. Later in the year
the Scots raided northern England, effectively enabling Wallace to
maintain his army at English expense.

The
English response was hindered because Edward I was then in Flanders,
engaged in an abortive expedition against the French. However, in the
spring of 1298 he returned to England, now determined upon vengeance
against the Scots. In the summer he assembled a huge army, including
around 3,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry (of whom over 12,000 were
Welsh). Edward crossed the border in early July. By the middle of the
month he was established at Kirkliston, to the west of Edinburgh, but
Wallace and the Scottish army were nowhere to be seen. Moreover,
there were logistical issues and the supply chain failed, which meant
that food had to be strictly rationed.

Soon
the Welsh troops were on the point of mutiny - following the
suppression of a drunken fracas in which some of them were killed -
and Edward made plans to withdraw. The situation changed again,
though, on 21 July, when he received news that Scottish forces had at
last been sighted; presumably Wallace had hoped to take the English
army unawares, but his plans had now been foiled. ‘May God be
praised’, Edward is said to have exclaimed, ‘for he has solved
all my problems’.

On
the evening of 21 July, the English camped near Linlithgow. Wary now
of the prospect of a surprise assault, they spent the night arrayed
for battle. The lords and men-at-arms apparently wore their armour,
with their horses tethered by their sides. But one of Edward’s
squires was careless in his duties: a horse stepped on the king,
injuring his ribs. In the resulting commotion the English came to
believe they were under attack, and panic could easily have ensued.
But Edward was able to calm the situation. Doubtless gritting his
teeth, he also successfully conveyed the impression that he was not
seriously hurt – even though he must surely have experienced
considerable pain. Edward could take consolation, however, from the
certain knowledge that his enemies were now close at hand.

Preparations
for Battle

On
the following morning, the English left their camp at dawn. Their
route to Falkirk from Linlithgow would have taken them across the
River Avon close to Manuel Priory (near the village of Whitecross),
before taking the higher ground towards Redding Muir. It was probably
here where, according to the English chronicler Walter of
Guisborough, Edward’s vanguard encountered a force of spearmen.
Evidently this was not the main Scottish army, as the English
initially supposed, because when Edward’s vanguard advanced up the
hill the spearmen quickly melted away. Presumably the Scots in
question were in fact a small party of scouts, who now provided
warning of the English advance.

When
Edward himself reached the crest of the hill a tent was pitched so
that he could pause to hear mass. From this vantage point the English
could now see the rest of the Scottish army, hurriedly engaged in
manoeuvres, as the Scots prepared for battle. In the absence of
archaeological evidence, our knowledge of the ensuing events is also
derived largely from chronicles. The location of the Scottish
position has not been determined with certainty - the site of the
battle is still not marked on modern Ordnance Survey maps - but it is
generally accepted that the Scottish army was drawn up to the south
of Falkirk, about a mile to the north-west of Redding Muir.
Guisborough tells us that the Scots took position on a hill, which
has been identified as the ridge to the south of Callendar Wood (an
area now occupied by Woodend Farm Riding School). The Glen and
Westquarter Burns flow through the valley below. At the time of the
battle the confluence of the two burns appears to have formed a boggy
loch, at first undetected by the English, which then covered part of
the valley floor.

Denied
the element of surprise, which had now passed to Edward, Wallace
adopted defensive tactics. According to Guisborough Wallace drew up
his spearmen, which formed the bulk of his army, in four large
circles called schiltroms. Each of the four circles was ‘made
up wholly of spearmen, standing shoulder to shoulder in deep ranks
and facing towards the circumference of the circle, with their spears
slanted outwards at an oblique angle’. This would suggest that the
Scots’ flanks were not protected by geographical features, and that
Wallace was expecting attacks from all sides. Another chronicler,
William Rishanger, adds the detail that the Scots attempted to
fortify their position by means of ropes and stakes, although this is
not corroborated by Guisborough’s more detailed account.

It
should not be assumed that Scottish spearmen adopted circular
formations on every occasion (as is sometimes supposed), but this was
obviously a sensible disposition for dismounted soldiers to take up
when they were likely to face attacks from waves of cavalry;
contemporary Flemish armies adopted similar tactics when fighting
defensive battles against the French. But of course Wallace’s
spearmen were not the only troops at his disposal. There was also a
contingent of bowmen (though it was probably not as numerous as
Wallace would have liked) and a small force of cavalry (which was
presumably made up of noblemen and their retinues). The archers were
apparently positioned in the spaces between the schiltroms; the
cavalry were stationed on the flanks, to the rear.

It
appears that the mood in the Scottish camp was grim, but stoically
determined. Wallace’s quip to his men, as recorded by Rishanger,
has justly become famous: ‘I have brought you to the ring; hop
[dance] if you can’

Having
surveyed the Scottish dispositions (as Guisborough tells the story),
Edward became cautious; initially he gave orders to call a halt, in
order to make time for sustenance and rest. His army it should be
remembered, had been on the road since early in the morning, covering
a distance of several miles, and Edward was mindful that his men had
not eaten since the previous day. But his barons were still
apprehensive about the possibility that the Scots could attack and
take the English unawares. In truth, assuming that the battlefield
has been correctly identified, Wallace’s position on this occasion
was not really well-suited to unexpected rapid manoeuvres. Perhaps
surprisingly, however, Edward deferred to his subordinates’
concerns. Invoking the Holy Trinity, he now ordered an immediate
assault.

‘Like
Blossoms in an Orchard’

Edward
himself would also have ridden towards the Scots, surrounded and
protected by carefully chosen members of his household, although he
did not lead the advance in person. Judging from Guisborough’s
account, which can be partly corroborated by the Falkirk Roll of
Arms, it appears that Edward led the third of four battalions of
cavalry in column, with the Earl of Surrey commanding the reserve.
Edward’s banner would provide a point of focus and inspiration on
the field, but it was common for a medieval general to hold himself
somewhat aloof in a battle – at least at first.

The
first battalion of cavalry was commanded by the Earls of Norfolk,
Hereford and Lincoln; the second was led by the Bishop of Durham. The
vanguard encountered the loch, and they were forced to make a
substantial detour, but the Bishop of Durham’s battalion followed a
more direct route across the Westquarter Burn. It is said that the
bishop, feeling dangerously exposed, sought to restrain his men,
instructing them to wait for the king’s division; presumably the
infantry were also following some way behind. However, one of Bek’s
knights, a Yorkshiremen by the name of Sir Ralph Basset, was scornful
of the bishop’s caution. Taunting Bek, he urged the bishop to
return to his mass, while Basset and his companions would do all that
was necessary to prove one’s knightly courage. At this the bishop’s
men pushed on towards the Scottish army.

As
the cavalry neared the ranks of the schiltroms, riding in a tightly
packed formation, the Scottish archers would have unleashed a last
desperate volley of arrows – but there is no indication to suggest
the English attack was stalled. The spearmen themselves, with the
butts of their twelve-foot weapons thrust firmly into the ground,
presented more formidable opposition. If the ranks of spearmen had
wavered then this would have provided an opportunity for the cavalry
to drive their horses into any gaps that appeared, thereby breaking
up the Scottish formations. But the cavalry were unable to find any
weak points – at least not at this stage.

The
first English assault on the schiltroms was therefore repulsed, but
most of the sources indicate that the Scottish cavalry acquitted
themselves much less bravely than the spearmen. The role envisaged by
Wallace is unclear, because it is implied in several of the
chronicles that they fled the field almost immediately in the face of
the English advance. But not all of the Scottish nobles fled with the
cavalry, and at least some remained to fight on with the foot. Rather
confusingly, Guisborough appears to suggest that some of them drew up
the infantry into new schiltroms; this has led Professor A.A.M.
Duncan to argue that it was not until this point that the Scots
adopted circular formations. Some of the Scottish archers, now also
driven to fighting hand-to-hand, were rallied by Sir John Stewart;
but Sir John was quickly killed, and many of the archers were cut
down by English knights.

The
Lanercost Chronicle implies that the English cavalry did most
of the fighting at Falkirk – attacking from all sides, as Wallace
probably feared – although the narratives by Guisborough and
Rishanger suggest that Edward’s infantry also played a crucial
role. It appears the cavalry drew off, but the static Scottish
formations were now at the mercy of Edward’s archers and
crossbowmen - as well as others who hurled stones. Gaps then
appeared, providing an opportunity for the cavalry to charge again
and force themselves amidst the Scottish ranks. There is evidence to
suggest that Edward’s infantry also fought hand-to-hand: the
millenar William de Felton – an officer in charge of 1,000
men - lost his horse at Falkirk, which might imply that he led his
men into the fray and that they were consequently heavily engaged.

The
Scots were now assailed from all side, and almost certainly
grievously outnumbered, but Lanercost acknowledges that those who
remained ‘stood their ground and fought manfully’. Eventually,
however, the Scots’ losses took their toll, and the survivors broke
and ran. Casualties in a rout were almost always heavy; noblemen, if
they were fortunate, might be taken into captivity (honourable or
otherwise), but the rank and file were often slaughtered without
mercy. The Scottish fugitives were gleefully pursued by Edward’s
cavalry, as well as the Welsh infantry (notwithstanding their
truculent attitude before the battle). In the words of Rishanger, the
Scots ‘fell like blossoms in an orchard when the fruit has
ripened’.

After
Falkirk

Wallace
escaped to fight again another day, but the field was now covered
with the bodies of many of his followers. Guisborough and Rishanger
provide absurd numbers – 56,000 and 100,000, respectively – but
we must surely assume that thousands were killed. On the English
side, the author of the Lanercost Chronicle was pleased to
note ‘there were no noble men killed … except the Master of the
Templars [Sir Brian Jay] and five or six esquires’, but of course
this does not account for fatalities among the infantry. Records show
that that over 3,000 of the infantry were suddenly removed from the
pay roll. As historian Fiona Watson has put it, ‘we are left to
draw the inevitable conclusion that these men fell at Falkirk, the
silent, but significant, casualties of an English victory’.

English
writers celebrated Falkirk as a great triumph, avenging the defeat at
Stirling Bridge, but it had come at a considerable cost – and the
battle did not come close to ending the war. Wallace resigned as
Guardian (perhaps he was forced to do so), but other men took on his
mantle and continued the struggle for several more years. A series of
gruelling campaigns eventually forced the submission of many leading
Scots, and Wallace’s execution in 1305 was supposed to provide a
symbolic end to the conflict, but when Robert the Bruce claimed the
Scottish throne the war began again. Edward I made a final attempt to
subdue the Scots in the summer of 1307, setting out from Carlisle on
yet another campaign, but the effects of age and illness prevented
him from even crossing the border. He died at Burgh by Sands on 6
July, bitterly aware that a final victory remained as distant as
ever.

Article written by author, David Santiuste on 26 April 2017
Check out David's personal Author and Historian website here.
David Santiuste
Check out David's Author and Historian website and blog here.

David
Santiuste studied history at the University of St Andrews, where he
was awarded a master's degree with distinction. He is the author of
two books: Edward IV and the Wars of the Roses and The
Hammer of the Scots. He currently teaches history at the Centre
for Open Learning, University of Edinburgh.

A
modern statue of Edward I at Burgh by Sands (Rose and Trev Clough)

A
contemporary illustration of a battle from the Queen Mary Psalter
(British Library)

Battle Map illustration taken from the book, The Hammer of the Scotts

Further Reading

The Hammer of the Scots(Hardback - 240 pages)
ISBN: 9781781590126

by David Santiuste Only £25.00

Known to posterity as Scottorum Malleus – the Hammer of the Scots – Edward I was one of medieval England's most formidable rulers. In this meticulously researched new history, David Santiuste offers a fresh interpretation of Edward's military career, with a particular focus on his Scottish wars. This is in part a study of personality: Edward was a remarkable man. His struggles with tenacious opponents – including Robert the Bruce and William Wallace – have become the stuff of legend.

Further Reading

Edward IV and the Wars of the Roses(Paperback - 192 pages)
ISBN: 9781848845497

by David Santiuste Only £12.99

Indisputably the most effective general of the Wars of the Roses, Edward IV died in his bed, undefeated in battle. Yet Edward has not achieved the martial reputation of other warrior kings such as Henry V – perhaps because he fought his battles against his own people. It has also been suggested that he lacked the personal discipline expected of a truly great commander. But as David Santiuste shows in this perceptive and highly readable new study, Edward was a formidable military leader whose strengths and subtlety have not been…Read more at Pen & Sword Books...

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