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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2005]

Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves the process by
which Ohio classifies prisoners for placement at its highest
security prison, known as a Supermax facility.
Supermax facilities are maximum-security prisons with highly
restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most
dangerous prisoners from the general prison population. We
must consider what process the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution requires Ohio
to afford to inmates before assigning them to Supermax. We
hold that the procedures Ohio has adopted provide sufficient
procedural protection to comply with due process requirements.

I

The use of Supermax prisons has
increased over the last 20 years, in part as a response to the
rise in prison gangs and prison violence. See generallyU.S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Corrections,
C. Riveland, Supermax Prisons: Overview and General
Considerations 1 (1999),
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/1999/014937.pdf (as visited June 29,
2005, and available in Clerk of Courts case file). About
30 States now operate Supermax prisons, in addition to the two
operated by the Federal Government. SeeBrief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 2. In 1998, Ohio opened
its only Supermax facility, the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP),
after a riot in one of its maximum-security prisons. OSP has
the capacity to house up to 504 inmates in single-inmate cells
and is designed to separate the most predatory and dangerous
prisoners from the rest of the . . . general [prison]
population. See189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723 (ND Ohio 2002) (Austin I)
(quoting deposition of R. Wilkinson, pp. 2425).

Conditions at OSP are more restrictive
than any other form of incarceration in Ohio, including
conditions on its death row or in its administrative control
units. The latter are themselves a highly restrictive form of
solitary confinement. See Austin I, supra,
724725, and n. 5 (citingOhio Admin. Code
§5120913 (2001) (rescinded 2004)). In the OSP
almost every aspect of an inmates life is controlled and
monitored. Inmates must remain in their cells, which measure 7
by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A light remains on in the
cell at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed, and an inmate
who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further
discipline. During the one hour per day that an inmate may
leave his cell, access is limited to one of two indoor
recreation cells.

Incarceration at OSP is synonymous
with extreme isolation. In contrast to any other Ohio prison,
including any segregation unit, OSP cells have solid metal
doors with metal strips along their sides and bottoms which
prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All
meals are taken alone in the inmates cell instead of in a
common eating area. Opportunities for visitation are rare and
in all events are conducted through glass walls. It is fair to
say OSP inmates are deprived of almost any environmental or
sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact.

Aside from the severity of the
conditions, placement at OSP is for an indefinite period of
time, limited only by an inmates sentence. For an inmate
serving a life sentence, there is no indication how long he may
be incarcerated at OSP once assigned there. Austin I,
supra, at 740. Inmates otherwise eligible for parole
lose their eligibility while incarcerated at OSP. 189
F. Supp. 2d, at 728.

Placement at OSP is determined in the
following manner: Upon entering the prison system, all Ohio
inmates are assigned a numerical security classification from
level 1 through level 5, with 1 the lowest security risk and 5
the highest. See Brief for Petitioners 7. The initial
security classification is based on numerous factors
(e.g., the nature of the underlying offense, criminal
history, or gang affiliation) but is subject to modification at
any time during the inmates prison term if, for instance,
he engages in misconduct or is deemed a security risk.
Ibid. Level 5 inmates are placed in OSP, and levels 1
through 4 inmates are placed at lower security facilities
throughout the State. Ibid.

Ohio concedes that when OSP first
became operational, the procedures used to assign inmates to
the facility were inconsistent and undefined. For a time, no
official policy governing placement was in effect. See
Austin I, supra, at 726727. Haphazard placements were not uncommon, and some
individuals who did not pose high-security risks were
designated, nonetheless, for OSP. In an effort to establish
guidelines for the selection and classification of inmates
suitable for OSP, Ohio issued Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction Policy 11107 (Aug. 31, 1998). This policy has
been revised at various points but relevant here are two
versions: the Old Policy and the New Policy.
 The Old Policy took effect on January 28, 1999, but
problems with assignment appear to have persisted even under
this written set of standards. 189 F. Supp. 2d,at
728736. After forming a committee to study the
matter and retaining a national expert in prison security, Ohio
promulgated the New Policy in early 2002. The New Policy
provided more guidance regarding the factors to be considered
in placement decisions and afforded inmates more procedural
protection against erroneous placement at OSP.

Although the record is not altogether
clear regarding the precise manner in which the New Policy
operates, we construe it based on the policys text, the
accompanying forms, and the parties representations at
oral argument and in their briefs. The New Policy appears to
operate as follows: A classification review for OSP placement
can occur either (1) upon entry into the prison system if the
inmate was convicted of certain offenses, e.g.,
organized crime, or (2) during the term of incarceration if an
inmate engages in specified conduct, e.g., leads a
prison gang. App. 4243. The review process begins when
a prison official prepares a Security Designation Long
Form (Long Form). Id., at 20. This three-page
form details matters such as the inmates recent violence,
escape attempts, gang affiliation, underlying offense, and
other pertinent details. Id., at 20, 3845.

A three-member Classification
Committee (Committee) convenes to review the proposed
classification and to hold a hearing. At least 48 hours before
the hearing, the inmate is provided with written notice
summarizing the conduct or offense triggering the review.
Id., at 22, 58. At the time of notice, the
inmate also has access to the Long Form, which details why the
review was initiated. SeeTr. of Oral Arg. 1317.
The inmate may attend the hearing, may offer any
pertinent information, explanation and/or objections to [OSP]
placement, and may submit a written statement. App.
22. He may not call witnesses.

If the Committee does not recommend
OSP placement, the process terminates. Id., at 62, 65.
See also Brief for Petitioners 9. If the Committee does
recommend OSP placement, it documents the decision on a
Classification Committee Report (CCR), setting
forth the nature of the threat the inmate presents and
the committees reasons for the recommendation, App.
64, as well as a summary of any information presented at the
hearing. Id., at 5965. The Committee sends the
completed CCR to the warden of the prison where the inmate is
housed or, in the case of an inmate just entering the prison
system, to another designated official. Id., at 23.

If, after reviewing the CCR, the
warden (or the designated official) disagrees and concludes
that OSP is inappropriate, the process terminates and the
inmate is not placed in OSP. If the warden agrees, he
indicates his approval on the CCR, provides his reasons, and
forwards the annotated CCR to the Bureau of Classification
(Bureau) for a final decision. Id., at 64. (The Bureau
is a body of Ohio prison officials vested with final
decisionmaking authority over all Ohio inmate assignments.)
The annotated CCR is served upon the inmate, notifying him of
the Classification Committees and wardens
recommendations and reasons. Id., at 65. The inmate
has 15 days to file any objections with the Bureau of
Classification. Ibid.

After the 15-day period, the Bureau
of Classification reviews the CCR and makes a final
determination. If it concludes OSP placement is inappropriate,
the process terminates. If the Bureau approves the
wardens recommendation, the inmate is transferred to OSP.
The Bureaus chief notes the reasons for the decision on
the CCR, and the CCR is again provided to the inmate.
Ibid.

Inmates assigned to OSP receive
another review within 30 days of their arrival. That review is
conducted by a designated OSP staff member, who examines the
inmates file. Id., at 25. If the OSP
staff member deems the inmate inappropriately placed, he
prepares a written recommendation to the OSP warden that the
inmate be transferred to a lower security institution. Brief
for Petitioners 9; App. 25. If the OSP warden concurs, he
forwards that transfer recommendation to the Bureau of
Classification for appropriate action. If the inmate is deemed
properly placed, he remains in OSP and his placement is
reviewed on at least an annual basis according to the initial
three-tier classification review process outlined above. Brief
for Petitioners 910.

II

This action began when a class of
current and former OSP inmates brought suit under Rev. Stat.
§1979, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio against various Ohio prison
officials. We refer to the class of plaintiff inmates,
respondents here, collectively as the inmates. We
refer to the prison officials, petitioners here, as
Ohio.

The inmates complaint alleged
that Ohios Old Policy, which was in effect at the time
the suit was brought, violated due process. In addition the
inmates brought a claim that certain conditions at OSP violated
the Eighth
Amendments ban on cruel and unusual punishments, but
that claim was settled in the District Court. The extent to
which the settlement resolved the practices that were the
subject of the inmates Eighth Amendment
claim is unclear but, in any event, that issue is not before
us. The inmates suit sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. On the eve of trial Ohio promulgated its New Policy
and represented that it contained the procedures to be followed
in the future. The District Court and Court of Appeals
evaluated the adequacy of the New Policy, and it therefore
forms the basis for our determination here.

After an 8-day trial with extensive
evidence, including testimony from expert witnesses, the
District Court made findings and conclusions and issued a
detailed remedial order. First, relying on this Courts
decision in Sandin v. Conner,515 U.S. 472 (1995),
the District Court found that the inmates have a liberty
interest in avoiding assignment to OSP. Austin I, 189
F. Supp. 2d, at 738740. Second, the District Court found
Ohio had denied the inmates due process by failing to afford a
large number of them notice and an adequate opportunity to be
heard before transfer; failing to give inmates sufficient
notice of the grounds serving as the basis for their retention
at OSP; and failing to give the inmates sufficient opportunity
to understand the reasoning and evidence used to retain them at
OSP. Id., at 749. Third, the District Court held that,
although Ohios New Policy provided more procedural
safeguards than its Old Policy, it was nonetheless inadequate
to meet procedural due process requirements. Id., at
736, 750754. In a separate order it directed
extensive modifications to that policy. 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024
(ND Ohio 2002) (Austin II).

The modifications the District Court
ordered to Ohios New Policy included both substantive and
procedural reforms. The former narrowed the grounds that Ohio
could consider in recommending assignment to OSP. For
instance, possession of drugs in small amounts, according to
the District Court, could not serve as the basis for an OSP
assignment. Id., at 1028. The following are some of
the procedural modifications the District Court ordered:

(1) Finding that the notice provisions of Ohios
New Policy were inadequate, the District Court ordered Ohio to
provide the inmates with an exhaustive list of grounds believed
to justify placement at OSP and a summary of all evidence upon
which the Classification Committee would rely. Matters not so
identified, the District Court ordered, could not be considered
by the Committee. Id., at 1026.

(2) The
District Court supplemented the inmates opportunity to
appear before the Committee and to make an oral or written
statement by ordering Ohio to allow inmates to present
documentary evidence and call witnesses before the Committee,
provided that doing so would not be unduly hazardous or
burdensome. The District Court further ordered that Ohio must
attempt to secure the participation of any witness housed
within the prison system. Id., at 10261027.

(3) Finding the New Policys provision of a brief
statement of reasons for a recommendation of OSP placement
inadequate, the District Court ordered the Classification
Committee to summarize all evidence supporting its
recommendation. Id., at 1027. Likewise, the
District Court ordered the Bureau of Classification to prepare
a detailed and specific statement set[ting]
out all grounds justifying OSP placement including
facts relied upon and reasoning used.
Id., at 1027. The statement shall
not use conclusory, vague, or
boilerplate language, and must be delivered to the
inmate within five days. Id., at 10271028.

(4) The
District Court supplemented the New Policys 30-day and
annual review processes, ordering Ohio to notify the inmate
twice per year both in writing and orally of his progress
toward a security level reduction. Specifically, that notice
must advise the inmate what specific conduct is necessary
for that prisoner to be reduced from Level 5 and the amount of
time it will take before [Ohio] reduces the inmates
security level classification. Ibid.

Ohio appealed. First, it maintained
that the inmates lacked a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in avoiding placement at OSP. Second, it argued that,
even assuming a liberty interest, its New Policy provides
constitutionally adequate procedures and thus the District
Courts modifications were unnecessary. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District
Courts conclusion that the inmates had a liberty interest
in avoiding placement at OSP. 372 F.3d 346, 356 (2004). The
Court of Appeals also affirmed the District Courts
procedural modifications in their entirety. Id., at
359360. Finally, it set aside the District Courts
far-reaching substantive modifications, concluding they
exceeded the scope of the District Courts authority.
This last aspect of the Court of Appeals ruling is not
the subject of review in this Court.

We granted certiorari to consider
what process an inmate must be afforded under the Due Process
Clause when he is considered for placement at OSP. 543 U.S.
___ (2004). For reasons discussed below, we conclude that the
inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding
assignment at OSP. We further hold that the procedures set
forth in the New Policy are sufficient to satisfy the
Constitutions requirements; it follows, then, that the
procedural modifications ordered by the District Court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals were in error.

III

Withdrawing from the position taken in
the Court of Appeals, Ohio in its briefs to this Court conceded
that the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment
at OSP. See Pet. for Cert. i; Brief for Petitioners i. The
United States, supporting Ohio as amicus curiae,
disagrees with Ohios concession and argues that the
inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding assignment to a
prison facility with more restrictive conditions of
confinement. See Brief for United States 10. At oral argument
Ohio initially adhered to its earlier concession, seeTr. of Oral Arg. 5, but when pressed, the State
backtracked. See id., at 67. We need
reach the question of what process is due only if the inmates
establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest, so it
is appropriate to address this threshold question at the
outset.

The Fourteenth
Amendments Due Process Clause protects persons
against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those
who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish
that one of these interests is at stake. A liberty interest
may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees
implicit in the word liberty, see, e.g.,
Vitek v. Jones,445 U.S. 480,
493494 (1980) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary
psychiatric treatment and transfer to mental institution), or
it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state
laws or policies, see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell,418 U.S. 539,
556558 (1974) (liberty interest in avoiding withdrawal of
state-created system of good-time credits).

We have held that the Constitution
itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding
transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.
Meachum v. Fano,427 U.S. 215, 225
(1976) (no liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause
itself in transfer from low- to maximum-security prison because
[c]onfinement in any of the States institutions is
within the normal limits or range of custody which the
conviction has authorized the State to impose). We have
also held, however, that a liberty interest in avoiding
particular conditions of confinement may arise from state
policies or regulations, subject to the important limitations
set forth in Sandin v. Conner,515 U.S. 472
(1995).

Sandin involved
prisoners claims to procedural due process protection
before placement in segregated confinement for 30 days, imposed
as discipline for disruptive behavior. Sandin observed
that some of our earlier cases, Hewitt v. Helms,459 U.S. 460
(1983), in particular, had employed a methodology for
identifying state-created liberty interests that emphasized
the language of a particular [prison] regulation
instead of the nature of the deprivation.
Sandin, 515 U.S.,at 481. In Sandin, we
criticized this methodology as creating a disincentive for
States to promulgate procedures for prison management, and as
involving the federal courts in the day-to-day management of
prisons. Id., at 482483. For these reasons, we
abrogated the methodology of parsing the language of particular
regulations.

[T]he search for a negative implication from mandatory
language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real
concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause. The time has come to return to the due process
principles we believe were correctly established in and applied
in Wolff and Meachum. Following Wolff, we
recognize that States may under certain circumstances create
liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process
Clause. But these interests will generally be limited to
freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence
in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by
the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id., at
483484 (citations and footnote omitted).

After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the
inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created
liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of
confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those
conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life. Id., at 484.

Applying this refined inquiry,
Sandin found no liberty interest protecting against a
30-day assignment to segregated confinement because it did not
present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of
[the inmates] sentence. Id., at 485. We
noted, for example, that inmates in the general population
experienced significant amounts of lockdown
time and that the
degree of confinement in disciplinary segregation was not
excessive. Id.,at 486. We did not find,
moreover, the short duration of segregation to work a major
disruption in the inmates environment. Ibid.

The Sandin standard requires
us to determine if assignment to OSP imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. Id.,at 484. In
Sandins wake the Courts of Appeals have not
reached consistent conclusions for identifying the baseline
from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any
particular prison system. Compare e.g., Beverati v.
Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (CA4 1997), and Keenan
v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (CA9 1996), with Hatch
v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 847 (CADC
1999). See also Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173,
1177 (CA7 1997). This divergence indicates the difficulty of
locating the appropriate baseline, an issue that was not
explored at length in the briefs. We need not resolve the
issue here, however, for we are satisfied that assignment to
OSP imposes an atypical and significant hardship under any
plausible baseline.

For an inmate placed in OSP, almost
all human contact is prohibited, even to the point that
conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light,
though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1
hour per day, but only in a small indoor room. Save perhaps
for the especially severe limitations on all human contact,
these conditions likely would apply to most solitary
confinement facilities, but here there are two added
components. First is the duration. Unlike the 30-day
placement in Sandin, placement at OSP is indefinite and,
after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just annually.
Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible
inmate for parole consideration. Austin I, 189 F. Supp.
2d, at 728. While any of these conditions standing alone might
not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together
they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the
correctional context. It follows that respondents have a
liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP. Sandin,
supra, at 483.

OSPs harsh conditions may well
be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that
high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to other
prisoners. See infra, at 1516. That
necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the
conditions give rise to a liberty interest in their
avoidance.

IV

A liberty interest having been
established, we turn to the question of what process is due an
inmate whom Ohio seeks to place in OSP. Because the
requirements of due process are flexible and cal[l] for
such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands, Morrissey v. Brewer,408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972), we generally have declined to establish rigid rules and
instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency
of particular procedures. The framework, established in
Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319 (1976),
requires consideration of three distinct factors:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Governments interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. Id., at
335.

The Court of Appeals upheld the
District Courts procedural modifications under the
assumption that Sandin altered the first Mathews
factor. It reasoned that, [i]n this first factor,
Sandin affects the due process balance: because only
those conditions that constitute atypical and significant
hardships give rise to liberty interests, those interests
will necessarily be of a weight requiring greater due process
protection. 372 F.3d, at 358359. This proposition
does not follow from Sandin. Sandin concerned
only whether a state-created liberty interest existed so as to
trigger Mathews balancing at all. Having found no
liberty interest to be at stake, Sandin had no occasion
to consider whether the private interest was weighty
vis-&racute;-vis the remaining Mathews factors.

Applying the three factors set forth
in Mathews, we find Ohios New Policy provides a
sufficient level of process. We first consider the
significance of the inmates interest in avoiding
erroneous placement at OSP. Prisoners held in lawful
confinement have their liberty curtailed by definition, so the
procedural protections to which they are entitled are more
limited than in cases where the right at stake is the right to
be free from confinement at all. See, e.g.,Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975); Wolff,418 U.S. 539. The
private interest at stake here, while more than minimal, must
be evaluated, nonetheless, within the context of the prison
system and its attendant curtailment of liberties.

The second factor addresses the risk
of an erroneous placement under the procedures in place, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative
procedural safeguards. The New Policy provides that an inmate
must receive notice of the factual basis leading to
consideration for OSP placement and a fair opportunity for
rebuttal. Our procedural due process cases have consistently
observed that these are among the most important procedural
mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous deprivations.
See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and
Correctional Complex,442 U.S. 1, 15
(1979); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill,470 U.S. 532, 543
(1985); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)
(For more than a century the central meaning of
procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in
order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
notified (quoting
Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864))).
Requiring officials to provide a brief summary of the factual
basis for the classification review and allowing the inmate a
rebuttal opportunity safeguards against the inmates being
mistaken for another or singled out for insufficient reason.
In addition to having the opportunity to be heard at the
Classification Committee stage, Ohio also invites the inmate to
submit objections prior to the final level of review. This
second opportunity further reduces the possibility of an
erroneous deprivation.

Although a subsequent reviewer may
overturn an affirmative recommendation for OSP placement, the
reverse is not true; if one reviewer declines to recommend OSP
placement, the process terminates. This avoids one of problems
apparently present under the Old Policy, where, even if two
levels of reviewers recommended against placement, a later
reviewer could overturn their recommendation without
explanation.

If the recommendation is OSP
placement, Ohio requires that the decisionmaker provide a short
statement of reasons. This requirement guards against
arbitrary decisionmaking while also providing the inmate a
basis for objection before the next decisionmaker or in a
subsequent classification review. The statement also serves as
a guide for future behavior. See Greenholtz,
supra, at 16.

As we have noted, Ohio provides
multiple levels of review for any decision recommending OSP
placement, with power to overturn the recommendation at each
level. In addition to these safeguards, Ohio further reduces
the risk of erroneous placement by providing for a placement
review within 30 days of an inmates initial assignment to
OSP.

The third Mathews factor
addresses the States interest. In the context of prison
management, and in the specific circumstances of this case,
this interest is a dominant consideration. Ohio has
responsibility for imprisoning nearly 44,000 inmates.
Austin I, 189 F. Supp. 2d, at 727. The States
first obligation must be to ensure the safety of guards and
prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves.
See Hewitt,459 U.S., at 473.

Prison security, imperiled by the
brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop of the
States interest. Clandestine, organized, fueled by
race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a
means of disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs
seek nothing less than to control prison life and to extend
their power outside prison walls. See Brief for State of
California et al. as Amici Curiae 6. Murder of an
inmate, a guard, or one of their family members on the outside
is a common form of gang discipline and control, as well as a
condition for membership in some gangs. See, e.g., United
States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 888 (CA9 1995);
United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1341
(CA7 1984). Testifying against, or otherwise informing
on, gang activities can invite ones own death sentence.
It is worth noting in this regard that for prison gang members
serving life sentences, some without the possibility of parole,
the deterrent effects of ordinary criminal punishment may be
substantially diminished. See id., at 1343 ([T]o
many inmates of Marions Control Unit [a federal Supermax
facility,] the price of murder must not be high and to some it
must be close to zero).

The problem of scarce resources is
another component of the States interest. The cost of
keeping a single prisoner in one of Ohios ordinary
maximum-security prisons is $34,167 per year, and the cost to
maintain each inmate at OSP is $49,007 per year. See Austin
I, supra, at 734, n. 17. We can assume that Ohio,
or any other penal system, faced with costs like these will
find it difficult to fund more effective education and
vocational assistance programs to improve the lives of the
prisoners. It follows that courts must give substantial
deference to prison management decisions before mandating
additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards
when correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has
engaged in disruptive behavior.

The States interest must be
understood against this background. Were Ohio to allow an
inmate to call witnesses or provide other attributes of an
adversary hearing before ordering transfer to OSP, both the
States immediate objective of controlling the prisoner
and its greater objective of controlling the prison could be
defeated. This problem, moreover, is not alleviated by
providing an exemption for witnesses who pose a hazard, for
nothing in the record indicates simple mechanisms exist to
determine when witnesses may be called without fear of
reprisal. The danger to witnesses, and the difficulty in
obtaining their cooperation, make the probable value of an
adversary-type hearing doubtful in comparison to its obvious
costs.

A balance of the Mathews
factors yields the conclusion that Ohios New Policy
is adequate to safeguard an inmates liberty interest in
not being assigned to OSP. Ohio is not, for example,
attempting to remove an inmate from free society for a specific
parole violation, see, e.g.,Morrissey, 408 U.S.,
at 481,or to revoke good time credits for specific,
serious misbehavior, see, e.g.,Wolff, 418 U.S.,
at 539, where more formal, adversary-type procedures might be
useful. Where the inquiry draws more on the experience of
prison administrators, and where the States interest
implicates the safety of other inmates and prison personnel,
the informal, nonadversary procedures set forth in
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional
Complex,442 U.S.
1 (1979), and Hewitt v. Helms,459 U.S. 460 (1983),
provide the appropriate model. Greenholtz,
supra, at 16 (level of process due for inmates being
considered for release on parole includes opportunity to be
heard and notice of any adverse decision); Hewitt,
supra, at 473476 (level of process due for inmates
being considered for transfer to administrative segregation
includes some notice of charges and an opportunity to be
heard).Although Sandin abrogated
Greenholtzs and Hewitts methodology
for establishing the liberty interest, these cases remain
instructive for their discussion of the appropriate level of
procedural safeguards. Ohios New Policy provides
informal, nonadversary procedures comparable to those we upheld
in Greenholtz and Hewitt, and no further
procedural modifications are necessary in order to satisfy due
process under the Mathews test. Neither the District
Court nor the Court of Appeals should have ordered the New
Policy altered.

The effect of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), in particular 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a)(1)(A), in this case has not been discussed at any
length in the briefs. In view of our disposition it is
unnecessary to address its application here.

Prolonged confinement in Supermax may
be the States only option for the control of some
inmates, and claims alleging violation of the Eighth
Amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments were resolved, or withdrawn, by settlement in an
early phase of this case. Here, any claim of excessive
punishment in individual circumstances is not before us.

The complaint challenged OSP
assignments under the Old Policy, and the unwritten policies
that preceded it, and alleged injuries resulting from those
systems. Ohio conceded that assignments made under the Old
Policy were, to say the least, imprecise. The District Court
found constitutional violations had arisen under those earlier
versions, and held that the New Policy would produce many of
the same constitutional problems. Austin I, supra, at
749754. We now hold that the New Policy as described in
this opinion strikes a constitutionally permissible balance
between the factors of the Mathews framework. If an
inmate were to demonstrate that the New Policy did not in
practice operate in this fashion, resulting in a cognizable
injury, that could be the subject of an appropriate future
challenge. On remand, the Court of Appeals, or the District
Court, may consider in the first instance what, if any,
prospective relief is still a necessary and appropriate remedy
for due process violations under Ohios previous policies.
Any such relief must, of course, satisfy the conditions set
forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A).

***

The Court of Appeals was correct to
find the inmates possess a liberty interest in avoiding
assignment at OSP. The Court of Appeals was incorrect,
however, to sustain the procedural modifications ordered by the
District Court. The portion of the Court of Appeals
opinion reversing the District Courts substantive
modifications was not the subject of review upon certiorari and
is unaltered by our decision.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.