Archive for the ‘Natural Gas’ Category

The Nautilus Institute has published a report on energy supply in the DPRK by David F. von Hippel and Peter Hayes. You can read it here.

Here is a small section of the paper:

Overall energy use per capita in the DPRK as of 1990 was relatively high, primarily due to inefficient use of fuels and reliance on coal. Coal is more difficult to use with high efficiency than oil products or gas. Based on our estimates, primary commercial energy[19] use in the DPRK in 1990 was approximately 70 GJ per capita, approximately three times the per capita commercial energy use in China in 1990, and somewhat over 50 percent of the 1990 per capita energy consumption in Japan (where 1990 GDP per-capita was some ten to twenty times higher than the DPRK). This sub-section provides a brief sketch of the DPRK energy sector, and some of its problems. Much more detailed reviews/estimates of energy demand and supply in the DPRK in 1990, 1996, and particularly in 2000, 2005, and 2008 through 2010, are provided in later chapters of this report.

The industrial sector is the largest consumer of all commercial fuels—particularly coal—in the DPRK. The transport sector consumes a substantial fraction of the oil products used in the country. Most transport energy use is for freight transport; the use of personal transport in the DPRK is very limited. The residential sector is a large user of coal and (in rural areas, though more recently, reportedly, in urban and peri-urban areas as well) biomass fuels. The military sector (by our estimates) consumes an important share of the refined oil products used in the country. The public/commercial and services sectors in the DPRK consume much smaller shares of fuels supplies in the DPRK than they do in industrialized countries, due primarily to the minimal development of the commercial sector in North Korea. Wood and crop wastes are used as fuels in the agricultural sector, and probably in some industrial subsectors as well.

Key energy-sector problems in the DPRK include:

*Inefficient and/or decaying infrastructure: Much of the energy-using infrastructure in the DPRK is reportedly (and visibly, to visitors to the country) antiquated and/or poorly maintained. Buildings apparently lack significant, and often any, insulation, and the heating circuits in residential and other buildings for the most part apparently cannot be controlled by residents. Industrial facilities are likewise either aging or based on outdated technology, and often (particularly in recent years) are operated at less-than-optimal capacities (from an energy-efficiency point of view).

*Suppressed and latent demand for energy services: Lack of fuels in many sectors of the DPRK economy has apparently caused demand for energy services to go unmet. Electricity outages are one obvious source of unmet demand, but there are also reports, for example, that portions of the DPRK fishing fleet have been idled for lack of diesel fuel. Residential heating is reportedly restricted in the winter (and some observers report that some public-sector and residential buildings have not received heat at all in recent years) to conserve fuel, resulting in uncomfortably cool inside temperatures.

The problem posed by suppressed and latent demand for energy services is that when and if supply constraints are removed there is likely to be a surge in energy (probably particularly electricity) use, as residents, industries, and other consumers of fuels increase their use of energy services toward desired levels. (This is a further argument, as elaborated later in this report, for making every effort to improve the efficiency of energy use in all sectors of the DPRK economy as restraints on energy supplies are reduced.)

*Lack of energy product markets: Compounding the risk of a surge in the use of energy services is the virtual lack of energy product markets in the DPRK. Without fuel pricing reforms, there will be few incentives for households and other energy users to adopt energy efficiency measures or otherwise control their fuels consumption. Recent years have seen limited attempts by the DPRK government to reform markets for energy products. Some private markets exist for local products like firewood, and some commercial fuels have in recent years reportedly been traded “unofficially” (on the black market), but for the most part, energy commodity markets in the DPRK essentially do not exist[20]. Energy consumers are also unlikely, without a massive and well-coordinated program of education about energy use and energy efficiency, to have the technical know-how to choose and make good use of energy efficiency technologies, even when and if such technologies are made available.

The DPRK’s energy sector needs are vast, and at the same time, as indicated by the only partial listing of problems many of these needs are sufficiently interconnected as to be particularly daunting to address. The DPRK’s energy sector needs include rebuilding/replacement of many of its power generation and almost all of its substation equipment, repair, replacement, and/or improvement of coal mine production equipment and safety systems, updating of oil refineries, improvement or replacement of most if its energy-using equipment, including coal-fired boilers, electric motors and drives, transport systems, and many other items, modernization of energy use throughout the country, rebuilding of the DPRK forest stocks, and a host of other needs. As one example of the interrelations of energy problems in the DPRK, renovating the DPRK’s coal mining sector is made more difficult because coal mines lack electricity due to electricity sector problems, and electricity generators in some cases have insufficient coal to supply power demand because of coal mine problems and problems with transporting coal to power plants.

Energy demand and supply in general—and, arguably, demand for and supply of electricity in particular—have played a key role in many high-profile issues involving North Korea, and have played and will play a central role in the resolution of the ongoing confrontation between North Korea and much of the international community over the North’s nuclear weapons program. Energy sector issues will continue to be a key to the resolution of the crisis, as underscored by the formation of a Working Group under the Six-Party Talks that was (and nominally, still is) devoted to the issue of energy and economic assistance to the DPRK.

The purpose of this report is to provide policy-makers and other interested parties with an overview of the demand for and supply of the various forms of energy used in the DPRK in six years during the last two decades:

1990, the year before much of the DPRK’s economic and technical support from the Soviet Union was withdrawn;

1996, thought by some to be one of the most meager years of the difficult economic 1990s in the DPRK; and 2000, a year that has been perceived by some observers as a period of modest economic “recovery” in the DPRK, as well as a marker of the period before the start, in late 2002, of a period of renewed political conflict between the DPRK, the United States, and it neighbors in Northeast Asia over the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development program; and

2005, also a year in which observers have again noted an upward trend in some aspects of the DPRK economy, as well as the most recent year for which any published estimates on the DPRK’s energy sector and economy are available.

2008, the last year in which the DPRK received heavy fuel oil from its negotiating partners in the Six-Party talks; and

2009, the most recent year for which we have analyzed the DPRK’s energy sector.

UPDATE 43 (2015-6-17): Gazprom official claims pipeline not feasible. According to NK News:

The deputy CEO of Russia’s Gazprom told reporters that connecting South Korea to Russian gas supplies is economically attractive but politically infeasible on Tuesday.

The long-gestating pipeline project would extend through the DPRK and provide natural gas to energy-hungry South Korea.

But Alexander Medvedev, speaking from a press conference in Moscow yesterday, said the project was too difficult in the current climate.

“The level of communications, the level of cooperation is not that which would make it possible to speak of advancing to the feasibility study stage, let alone implementing a project to supply gas via North Korea.”

Despite the political hurdles, the project is still interesting from an economic standpoint.

“From the economic standpoint, this would probably be the most efficient option for supplying gas to Korea … There is demand for pipeline gas,” Medvedev added.

…

Despite the numerous roadblocks, the deputy CEO of the world’s largest gas producer remained hopeful that political changes could move the project forward.

“The opportunity remains all the same, but it depends on a resolution of the political issues between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. There are certain positive signals, but there are negative signals too,” Medvedev said at the press conference.

Post 41 (2014-3-29): According to Yonhap, the Russians and the North Koreans held talks on a number of issues including the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Iron Silk Road, and the gas pipeline. No information on the pipeline was made public.

Post 40 (2013-11-13): The Russians and South Koreans most recently discussed the Russia – South Korea gas pipeline at a presidential meeting in Seoul. No decisions were made. Read more here.

Post 39 (2012-10-4): The Choson Ilbo reports that the pipeline talks are delayed because DPRK is asking for transit rates above the international norm:

A South Korean government source said talks have dragged on because the North is demanding a transit fee that is two to three times more than international rates.

Based on a method of calculation used by Ukraine — about $2 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas for 1 km of pipeline — a reasonable fee would be about US$150 million a year given the estimated amount of gas South Korea would import from Russia and the 700-800 km of the gas pipeline running through the North. But the North reportedly demanded $300-500 million a year.

“It’s likely that the North asked for such a high price in the first place to gain the upper hand in future talks,” the source added. “There have been no full-fledged talks yet. At the moment, Pyongyang, Seoul and Moscow are just trying to read each other’s minds.”

Post 38 (2012-2-27): The Daily NK reports on details being discussed in the pipeline talks:

The Republic of Korea Ambassador to Russia, former chief nuclear negotiator Wi Sung Lac, says there has been progress on a gas pipeline connecting Russia, North Korea and South Korea.

“At the moment it is at the stage of enterprises discussing commercial conditions, and I am aware that there has been progress. North Korea and Russia are also discussing issues of transit and transit fees via working-level consultations,” he explained to reporters on a visit to Seoul today.

Wi would not be drawn on what kind of progress has been achieved, saying, “It’s about commercial details and so is hard to explain, but it appears there has been progress on supply quantities and supply conditions.”

Post 37 (2012-2-20): Gazprom reports “progress” in talks with North Korean government. According to Bloomberg:

OAO Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas exporter, said it made progress in talks to supply Korea Gas Corp. (036460) through a pipeline across North Korea, the Moscow-based company said today in an e-mailed statement.

Gazprom and Kogas, as the Korean company is called, plan to meet again in Moscow next month to continue talks, Gazprom said.

In Hanchon, a district in Pyongwon county of South Pyongan province, the small wind energy project team visited the houses of two farmers Mr. Ri Chum Uk and Mr. Kin Yong Ki, who have had wind turbines installed inside their homes. These are small wind turbines, 5 metres high with 300 Watts of installed capacity charging individual 12 volts batteries. With it the farmer says he can operate such electric items as 2 bulbs, a TV, a DVD or a karaoke system with amplifier.

When asked, the two farmers each explained that they had paid $150 for the wind turbine, and spent $5.00 on annual maintenance cost. This info was not independently verified.To charge a full battery takes between 4 to 6 hours and can last about 7 days, depending upon the wind speed and the state of the battery. In the village, it seems that one or two neighbours can each bring their battery to get it charged at Mr. Ri or Mr. Kim’s house.

When asked “what did they like the best with this admittedly small improvement“, both replied; “to have electricity when I want it”.

In this county alone, according to the local county manager, 100 turbines were installed in people’s households and in farm offices, made in the Daily Necessities Factory in the adjacent county of Sukchon. Mr. Kim Ryong Kuk, the manager of the Factory explained that almost once every quarter, he or his colleagues were observing almost 60 turbines in order to get feedback from clients. All users receive training during installation by the manufacturer. Batteries are made locally or in China.

The role of UNDP’s small wind energy project is to promote and diffuse this green technology by improving quality standards and guidelines and demonstrating best practices for households along with social buildings to directly improve people’s energy status in concrete ways.

These types of projects aim to provide support to rural populations in concrete ways. I have no doubt that there will be many obstacles along the way but I feel that we can overcome them in time and in the process improve peoples’ lives.On another day, we went to Pyongsong city to see a larger Mast (10 Kilo Watts) and a solar panel in full use at the County Hospital. We could see how the staffs were strategic in their use of the renewable energy to conduct operations and obstetric aid in emergency cases during electricity cuts; the wind turbine is backing up the work of two operation rooms and two emergency rooms. When looking through the door of one emergency room, the surgeon, operating on a young boy’s leg, saw me and pointed at the light overhead appreciatively. The whole package of a 5 kW wind turbine and a solar panel is $30,000.

These types of projects aim to provide support to rural populations in concrete ways. I have no doubt that there will be many obstacles along the way but I feel that we can overcome them in time and in the process improve peoples’ lives.

In 2010, the volume of trade between these two countries was merely $110 million. As international trade goes, this volume is tiny. By comparison, in the same year North Korea’s trade with China was around $3.4 billion, some 30 times larger than its trade with Russia.

The reason for this inactivity is quite simple: Russian companies have no interest in dealing with North Korea. In the Soviet era, trade flourished because it was subsidized due to geopolitical concerns of Moscow. Currently, when it comes to pure economic considerations, North Korea has almost nothing to offer the new Russian economy.

North Korea has only two resources that can be sold on the international market. First, it has deposits of minerals (coal, iron ore). Second, it has a relatively large quantity of cheap labor ― or to put things in a less cynically capitalist way, there are millions of North Koreans willing to work for $10 a month.

But Russian companies are decisively uninterested in North Korean minerals. These mines may be attractive to resource-hungry China, but not to Russia, which has the riches of Siberia at its disposal. The chronic political instability in which North Korea is immersed is another reason which lessens Russian interest in North Korean minerals.

Cheap labor is more attractive, and indeed Russia has continuously used North Korean labor since 1967 but not in the North itself. Some Chinese companies began to outsource to North Korea, and built small factories there, in order to take advantage of the obscenely low local wages. This approach is not very attractive to Russia, since it is not a major player in producing winter parkas, wool hoods, or running shoes. Russian companies prefer to use North Korean workers inside Russia itself.

These workers are sent to Russia by the North Korean authorities and can be described as indentured labor. Their families are hostages who can be punished if a worker does something improper and the workers are also expected to ‘donate’ a significant part of their wages to the state. Despite these harsh conditions, one should not forget that these jobs are among the best paid regular jobs in the country. North Koreans compete for opportunities to become indentured laborers in Russia.

That said, the scale of these ventures is rather limited, as is the demand for cheap labor in the Russian Far East (the only part of Russia where the use of North Korean laborers really makes practical sense).

Aside from this, North Korea has something else to offer – its geographical location. This country blocks all land routes to the prosperous South. Russia has much interest in the South Korean market, especially when it comes to the sale of natural resources. Impeding this is the existence of North Korea, and the continued strained relations between the two Korean states, making sales of Russian commodities rather difficult.

So it is not incidental that the two most important potential projects are a railway and a gas pipeline. Both projects can hardly be described as “economic cooperation” between North Korea and Russia, since neither has much to do with the North Korean economy itself. North Korea, in these cases, is present merely as a space to be traversed. It would be no different if it were a dessert or jungle. Russia is willing to pay North Korea for facilitating Russia’s economic link with the South, and that is all.

So it is not surprising that an agreement on the pipeline construction was signed after the Russian-North Korean summit. This project is indeed acceptable to the North, since it will mean easy money for transit, it is favorable to Russia, and it will be good for the general situation since it will bind Russia, North and South Korea closer.

Yet, a word of caution is necessary. In spite of all official statements, we should not expect large-scale construction work to begin in the near future. The political risks remain huge, so it is likely that Russian companies will not rush headlong into the project. The recent agreement should rather be seen as a declaration of intent. In all probability, the trans-Korean pipeline and trans-Korean railway will be built eventually. But the completion of these important initiatives will probably take many, many years.

Read the full story here:
Russia-N. Korea TradeKorea Times
Andrei Lankov
2011-9-25

An article entitled, “Joint energy project on the agenda” was featured in the KCNA on August 31, which elaborated on the agreement reached between the DPRK and Russia on August 24 for the construction of a gas pipeline. The joint project is also inclusive of South Korea.

The KCNA said in the article, “The three countries have explored various options in transporting gas and have reached a consensus on building a gas pipeline running through North Korea will be the most cost-effective option.”

It also stressed this project will be beneficial for all three parties. In addition, Russia was commended as the major world power in natural gas and oil reserves and production and stressed Russia is turning its attention to expanding the energy sector.

When the Sakhalin – Komsomolsk – Khabarovsk pipeline that began construction in 2009 is completed, it will be equipped to provide enough gas not only domestically but across the Pacific-Asia region, producing a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year.

The news also covered the specific plans of the Russian government to expand its energy supply; to boost the exports of oil and gas from three to thirty percent and five to twenty-five percent respectively, until the year 2020.

Therefore, the inter-Korean gas pipeline construction between the DPRK and Russia will be a vital project for Russia.

On August 30, the ROK’s Grand National Party (GNP) chairman Hong Jun-pyo declared, “The trilateral negotiation will be expected to take place sometime in November on the inter-Korean gas pipeline project.”

Hong also stated, “The ROK-Russia and the DPRK-Russia bilateral agreements have already been reached. Once the three parties meet to sign the tripartite agreement, the project will soon take off.” He also added, “President Lee Myung-bak has quietly pushed forward with the gas pipeline project since he first took office and it will be his major accomplishment.”

After the bilateral summit was held between the two leaders of Russia and the DPRK on August 24, the two nations have consented to establish a special commission to work cooperatively on the gas transit project running through the territories of North Korea to South Korea.

UPDATE 12 (2011-8-31): The North Koreans have made a short documentary of Kim Jong-il’s trip to Russia. I have uploaded it to YouTube in three parts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3. The North Koreans published footage of Kim’s trip through China on the evening news (2011-8-30: Part 1, part 2, part 3) and in a separate documentary (2011-9-8: Part 1, part 2, part 3).

UPDATE 11 (2011-8-29): When Kim Jong-il returned to Pyongyang his trip was hailed as a success. A banquet was held for him and he attended a performance of the State Merited Chorus. According to Yonhap:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il attended a banquet held to congratulate him on his “successful” recent visits to Russia and China, the North’s state media said Monday.

The banquet was hosted by the Central Military Commission of the ruling Workers’ Party and the National Defense Commission, according to a brief dispatch by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), monitored in Seoul. It did not mention where or when the event took place.

UPDATE 10 (2011-8-27): According to Yonhap, Kim Jong-il’s train has crossed back into the DPRK. Given the information provided, it appears that Kim entered the DPRK via the railroad crossing at Manpo (Manpho, 만포). See the bridge in Google Maps here. According to Yonhap:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il returned home by train Saturday, wrapping up a week-long trip to Russia and China, during which he discussed the resumption of stalled six-party talks on his country’s nuclear ambitions.

Kim’s special train was seen crossing into North Korea via the Chinese border city of Jian around 5 p.m. local time (6 p.m. Korean time). The train had left the northeastern Chinese city of Daqing on Friday evening and made a stop in the city of Tonghua on Saturday morning.

According to KCNA, Kim Jong-un and Kim Kyong-hui were there to welcome him. Kim Jong-un played the same role on Kim’s previous trip to China in May.

UPDATE 9 (2011-8-26): While Kim travels in Russia and China, Yonhap reports a KCNA announcement that the DPRK and Russia signed a protocol calling for economic cooperation between the two countries. According to the article:

A Russian economic delegation, led by Minister of Regional Development Viktor Basargin, was in North Korea to sign “a protocol of the 5th Meeting of the DPRK (North Korea)-Russia Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology,” the North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

Trade Minister Ri Ryong-nam inked the protocol on behalf of North Korea, said the KCNA report, monitored in Seoul.

The report did not give any details of the protocol.

Also on Friday, the North’s premier, Choe Yong-rim, met with the Russian economic delegation at the Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang, the KCNA said in a separate report.

UPDATE 8 (2011-8-26):Xinhua reports on Kim’s activities in China. According to the article:

Top leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Kim Jong Il visited northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province on Friday at the company of Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo.

…

During his stay in Heilongjiang, Kim visited the cities of Qiqihar and Daqing. In Qiqihar, Kim toured Qier Machine Tool Group Co., a large state-owned enterprise, and Mengniu Dairy, a leading Chinese dairy producer. In Daqing, he toured an urban planning exhibition hall and a residential district.

“I’ve seen new changes every time I came here,” he said. He wished that China would smoothly realize the goals set in its 12th Five-year Plan under the leadership of the CPC.

He passed through the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of China on August 25.

He arrived in Manzhouli of the region, the border railway station, that afternoon.

When the train pulled in the railway station, he was warmly greeted by Wang Jiarui, Sheng Guangzu, Hu Chunhua, secretary of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Regional Party Committee, Fu Taizeng, secretary general of the autonomous regional party committee, Luo Zhihu, secretary of the Hulun Buir City Party Committee, the mayor of Hulun Buir City, the secretary of the Manzhouli City Party Committee and other central and regional senior officials of China.

He exchanged cordial greetings with the senior officials present to greet him and had a talk with them.

Wang Jiarui said he was specially dispatched to conduct Kim Jong Il who is passing through Northeast China in the whole period of his visit upon the authorization of the collective leadership of China including Hu Jintao. He paid highest tribute to Kim Jong Il for having made a great contribution to boosting the friendship among countries and accomplishing the human cause of independence through his energetic external activities.

Kim Jong Il thanked Wang Jiarui and other senior central and local officials and people for their warm reception.

He, conducted by senior party and government officials of the autonomous region, toured Hailar District, Hulun Buir City of the region.

Commanding a bird’s-eye view of the night scenery, he got familiar with the history and culture of the region and the achievements made by its people in construction.

The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Regional Committee of the CPC gave a grand banquet in honor of Kim Jong Il visiting the region.

When he appeared in the banquet hall, women of the Mongolian tribe of the autonomous region presented him with a blue silk towel and liquor according to the customs peculiar to the nation, warmly welcoming him.

Hu Chunhua said that today they welcomed Kim Jong Il to the vast steppe where President Kim Il Sung was accorded enthusiastic welcome several times long ago, thereby seeing the desire of the party, the government and the people of the autonomous region come true at last.

Hu Chunhua noted that the traditional Sino-DPRK friendship will remain ever-green like the vast steppe along with history, expressing firm belief that the friendly Korean people would make fresh success in the efforts to improve the standard of people’s living and build a prosperous and powerful nation.

A specially prepared art performance was given in honor of Kim Jong Il.

The performers clearly reflected the boundless respect and reverence of the government and the people of the region for Kim Jong Il visiting China again for the development of the Sino-DPRK friendship.

Kim Jong Il conveyed a floral basket to the performers in congratulation of their successful performance and had a photo taken with them.

He was presented with a gift by Hu Chunhua on behalf of the party committee of the autonomous region.

He expressed thanks for the warm reception and cordial hospitality accorded him by the party, government and people of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. He hoped the people of the region would achieve a fresh victory in their struggle for the prosperity and development of the country under the leadership of the CPC.

Here is the KCNA report for August 26th:

Kim Jong Il passed through Heilongjiang Province of China on August 26.

He arrived in Qiqihar City, Heilongjiang Province that morning.

When the train pulled in Qiqihar Railway Station, he was warmly greeted by Ji Bingxuan, secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee, Wang Xiankui, governor of Heilongjiang Province, the secretary of the Qiqihar City Party Committee, the mayor of Qiqihar City and other senior party and government officials of the province and the city.

He exchanged warm greetings with the senior officials present to greet him and had a talk with them.

Ji Bingxuan said it is great honor and pride to welcome again to their place Kim Jong Il on a long foreign tour for friendship among countries and warmly welcomed him on behalf of the party, the government and the people of Heilongjiang Province.

After being briefed on its history by a senior official of the group, he went round several production processes to acquaint himself with its production, technological development and management in detail.

Then he visited the Qiqihar Branch Company of the Mengniu Dairy.

He went round the general control room, milk tank, packing shop and the products on display and wished the company greater progress in its work for the improvement of the standard of people’s diet and welfare.

Kim Jong Il also visited Daqing City that day.

He visited the urban planning exhibition hall in Daqing City and was briefed on the urban construction and long-term plan. Then he went round the housing construction district, a large bridge, Lake Liming Bridge now under construction and other places in the province.

The provincial party committee gave a banquet that evening in honor of Kim Jong Il visiting the province.

He was present at the banquet on invitation.

Ji Bingxuan said that the historic visit paid by Kim Jong Il to Heilongjiang Province again after the lapse of the three months is a striking demonstration of the Sino-DPRK friendship growing stronger day by day, adding that the provincial party, government and people would join the Korean people in playing a greater role in inheriting and developing the Sino-DPRK friendship generation after generation.

A special art performance was given in welcome of Kim Jong Il.

The performers successfully represented the excitement and joy of the Chinese people at welcoming again Kim Jong Il to meaningful Northeast China.

Kim Jong Il conveyed a floral basket to the artistes in congratulation of their successful performance.

He was presented with a gift by the provincial party and people’s government that day in welcome of him visiting the province.

He expressed thanks for the warm reception and cordial hospitality accorded to him by the party, government and people of Heilongjiang Province. He hoped the people of the province would achieve a fresh victory in their struggle for the prosperity and development of the country under the leadership of the CPC.

Here is the KCNA report for August 27th:

He arrived in Tonghua City, Jilin Province that morning.

When the train pulled in Tonghua Railway Station, he was warmly greeted by Sun Zhengcai, secretary of the Jilin Provincial Party Committee, Wang Rulin, governor of Jilin Province, Liu Baowei, secretary of the Tonghua City Party Committee, Tian Yulin, mayor of Tonghua City, and other senior party and government officials of the province and the city.

He exchanged warm greetings with the officials present there to receive him and visited the Tonghua Wine Co. Ltd., conducted by them.

He recollected with deep emotion the noble footprints left by President Kim Il Sung who was absorbed in thinking and made inquiry for the sake of the country and its people only when visiting the company nearly half a century ago.

He went round various places including the wine depot, its exhibition hall to learn in detail about the history of the company and its production system, storage of products and its taste. He wished the company greater progress in its work for the well-being of the people.

The party and government of the province hosted a grand banquet in honor of Kim Jong Il visiting the province.

He was present there on invitation.

Sun Zhengcai said that it was particular privilege and honor for his province to receive Kim Jong Il, the great leader of the Korean people, three times in a little more than one year. He offered the highest regard and warm welcome to Kim Jong Il on behalf of the party, government and people of the province.

Noting that all the Chinese people including the people of the province are rejoiced as over their own over the successes made by the Korean people recently in their efforts to significantly commemorate the centenary of birth of Kim Il Sung, Sun Zhengcai expressed expectation and belief that the Korean people would surely win a shining victory in the drive for building a prosperous and powerful socialist nation under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea headed by Kim Jong Il.

Sun noted that the party, government and people of the province would join the Korean people in playing a bigger role in inheriting and developing the Sino-DPRK friendship generation after generation.

An art performance was given in welcome of Kim Jong Il.

The performance replete with the warm feelings of the DPRK-China friendship was acclaimed by the audience.

He was presented with a gift by the provincial party and people’s government that day in welcome of his visit to the province.

He expressed thanks for the warm reception and cordial hospitality accorded to him by the party, government and people of Jilin Province. He wished them a fresh success in their efforts for the prosperity of the country and the well-being of its people under the leadership of the CPC.

He wrapped up his 8 000 km odd-long trip to the Far East and the Siberian regions of Russia and Northeast China and left for the homeland that day.

Before his departure, he exchanged warm farewell greetings with central leading officials including Wang Jiarui and Sheng Guangzu who conducted him with sincerity in the whole period of his visit and leading officials of the party and government of the province and the city including Sun Zhengcai and Wang Rulin.

When the train started from the border station, central and local leading officials of China warmly sent him off, waving their hands for a long while.

Passing through several cities and regions of China, he acquainted himself with construction projects, ideas and feelings, politics, economy, history, culture, etc. of the Chinese people more deeply and conducted unremitting and energetic external activities, making another great contribution to the development of the DPRK-China friendship.

UPDATE 7 (2011-8-25/26): According to Voice of America, Kim Jong-il has left Russia and is returning to the DPRK via China. His train crossed the Russia-China border at Zabaikalsk (Забайкальск, See in Google Maps here). Yonhap reports that on the Chinese side of the border Kim’s Train was greeted in Manzhouli by senior Chinese Communist Party envoy Wang Jiarui and other officials. Kim attended a banquet and arts performance before heading to nearby Hulunbeier (See in Google Maps here).

Medvedev ordered a commission to evaluate the parameters of laying a gas pipe through North Korea, according to the president’s statement posted on the Kremlin website. The pipe would stretch for more than 1,100 km, 700 of which would run through North Korea and would pump 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually.

The two leaders also discussed a plan for Russia to extend power lines into North Korea to sell electricity from facilities like the Bureya hydroelectric plant. Before arriving to meet Medvedev, Kim visited the Bureya plant, where he swam in a pool filled with water from Lake Baikal. Afterward, the North Korean strongman was treated to such local cuisine as meat dumplings and fish prepared over an open fire, press reports said.

North Korea is willing to return to the six-party talks and to consider a moratorium on nuclear testing, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Wednesday.

Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il met in Sosnovy Bor, a garrison town in the Russian Republic of Buryatia in South Siberia, RIA Novosti reported.

Natalia Timakova, a spokeswoman for Medvedev, said Kim was prepared to resume nuclear talks without any preconditions. The talks were suspended two years ago, and Russia and China have said they are prepared to return to the table immediately while the United States, Japan and South Korea want North Korea to show good faith first.

Kim also agreed to allow Gazprom, the state-owned Russian natural gas company, to build a pipeline to South Korea through his country. The two leaders also discussed North Korea’s outstanding debt to the former Soviet Union and possible food aid from Russia.

RIA Novosti said some reports estimate the project could bring about $100 million a year in much-needed hard currency to Pyongyang.

“We’ve ordered our government bodies to establish a special commission … to outline the details of bilateral cooperation on gas transit through the territory of North Korea and the joining of South Korea to the project,” Medvedev was quoted as saying.

The Russian leader said technical work on the pipeline would start soon.

South Korea is one of the largest buyers of natural gas, with imports of liquefied natural gas from Russia alone totaling 1.5 million tons last year, South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported. The report said North Korea reacted favorably to the project during the visit of Gazprom officials.

North Korea owes Russia $11 billion of debt that dates back to the Soviet period and the two countries have resumed talks to restructure the Asian state’s liabilities, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak said.

Russia hasn’t lent money to North Korea since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 because the communist state hasn’t settled its debt, Storchak told reporters at a military base near Ulan-Ude, a Siberian city close to the border with Mongolia. North Korea also has yet to recognize Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union, he said.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed on a joint approach to debt restructuring with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il at their meeting near Ulan-Ude today, said a Kremlin official, who declined to be identified in line with government policy. Russia and North Korea restarted talks on the issue a month and a half ago after a long pause, the official said.

The resumption of negotiations is seen as a breakthrough by the Russian delegation attending today’s meeting, according to the official.

Kim took a two-hour Baikal tour on a yacht guarded by two North Korean boats, the Inform Polis Online website reported quoting eye-witness accounts. The water in Baikal is ice-cold even in summertime, so Kim had to take a swim onshore — in a pool filled with Baikal water. The speaker of Buryatia’s legislature joined Kim in the swim, the news website reported.

On the shore, the North Korean leader was treated to traditional Buryat food including meat dumplings and Baikal fish prepared over an open fire.

Later on Tuesday, Kim went back to Ulan-Ude to visit a major aircraft factory, which among other things produces Sukhoi attack planes, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported from the plant.

…

The North Korean leader’s visit is shrouded in mystery. A few people managed to take photos of Kim at his previous stop on Sunday, but heavy police cordons kept the media and onlookers in Ulan-Ude away from the train station and the adjacent square.

Anna Ogorodnik, a photographer from Ulan-Ude, told the Associated Press by phone that nearby streets were full of riot police. The station square looked clean and deserted after authorities had tugged away cars and local buses.

The windows of the station building overlooking the tracks were plastered with sheets of paper and station employees had been ordered to stay indoors, Ogorodnik said.

The photographer said she had been detained after trying to take pictures. She was released after she had presented her journalist ID.

The station square remains cordoned off and Kim’s train is still at the station, Ogorodnik said.

It is Kim’s first visit to his country’s Cold War ally in nine years.

Russian military officials arrived in the North Korean capital on Monday for a five-day visit. The Russian Defense Ministry said the talks will focus on the renewal of military cooperation between the countries, possible joint exercises “of a humanitarian nature” and an exchange of friendly visits by Russian and North Korean ships, ITAR-Tass reported from Pyongyang.

UPDATE 4 (2011-8-23): Writing in the Asia Times, Sunny Lee offers some political context of the trip as well as offering an estimated sum the DPRK can expect to earn if it agrees to the pipeline deal:

Cash-strapped North Korea, committed to staging a great national display of prosperity next year to mark the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday, is likely to welcome any such deal. If realized, it could expect to earn more than US$500 million a year in handling charges over the gas pipeline alone. Russia is also interested in linking the Trans-Siberian Railways to both Koreas, with the aim of reviving the Far Eastern region’s economy.

For North Korea, the gas pipeline could provide a stable income of approximately $100 million-$150 million. Compared to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which requires more than 47,000 workers and earns North Korea just $50 million, it is a very attractive figure.

North Korea’s reclusive leader Kim Jong Il and his wife received a red carpet welcome Sunday in Russia’s Amur region where they toured a giant power station ahead of talks with President Dmitry Medvedev.

It was the second day of Kim’s week-long visit to the Russian Far East and Siberia, a rare trip out of his country battling isolation and hunger.

Earlier on Sunday his special armoured train arrived at the small Bureya station in the Amur region and smiling Russian women dressed in red national costumes offered the high-profile guest a loaf of bread and salt, in accordance with Russian tradition.

The 69-year-old leader looked serious and slightly tired as flag-waving locals greeted him at the station.

Sporting sunglasses and his trademark khaki-coloured military-style suit, Kim broke off a piece of bread as the Kremlin’s regional envoy Viktor Ishayev and a throng of local officials looked on.

“He is rather simple, seems to be a genial man,” gushed a young Russian woman in the national dress, speaking later in televised remarks.

After the short welcome ceremony Kim got into an armoured Mercedes, which he brought with him on the train, to visit a nearby hydro-power station.

He appeared to take a keen interest in the 2,000 megawatt-strong Bureiskaya power station as Ishayev and the local governor gave him a tour of the plant.

South Korea’s Yonhap news agency, citing pictures taken at the plant, said 47-year-old Kim Ok — a former secretary known as Kim’s fourth wife — was accompanying the leader on the journey.

At the power station — the largest in Russia’s Far East — Kim was treated to a spectacular show of the water being discharged into the river, a local law enforcement official said.

He watched the water release from the safety of a white tent pitched at the station, next to a table with snacks, pies and a watermelon, and was also shown a film about the plant translated into Korean, the official said.

“Inexhaustible is the strength of the Russian people who occupied Bureya nature,” the official Korean Central News Agency quoted Kim as saying in the visitor’s book.

A Russian official familiar with the matter told AFP Kim had planned to visit the station earlier in the summer when he had been expected to hold a bilateral summit with Medvedev in or near Vladivostok.

A Kremlin official was quoted as saying at that time that Kim had cancelled due to media leaks about the visit.

Yelena Vishnyakova, a spokeswoman for state-run RusHydro which operates the power plant, said her company was not currently holding any talks with North Korea about any possible construction of power stations.

While Kim toured the power station, his entourage cleaned and polished his armoured train parked at Bureya, a tiny economically depressed town near the city of Blagoveshchensk on Russia’s eastern fringes.

After returning from the station he continued his journey along the famed Trans-Siberian railway.

UPDATE 2 (2011-8-20): The Washington Post offers some political and economic context of the trip:

Kim’s trip, Pyongyang said, came at the invitation of Medvedev, whose government in recent weeks has pushed North Korea to cooperate on plans to connect a railway and a gas pipeline that would run from Russia through the divided Korean Peninsula.

North Korea has remained largely a no-go zone for massive foreign projects, with outside economic investment allowed only in special development zones. But if North Korea goes along with the gas pipeline project — in which Russian exporter Gazprom will annually send 10 billion cubic meters of gas to South Korea for three decades — it stands to collect handling fees. It would also allow the North a measure of influence in Seoul’s economy.

…

Some North Korea analysts say that Kim has grown wary of depending so heavily on China, particularly as North Korea prepares for the 100th anniversary next year of the birth of founder Kim Il Sung. The North has promised to build a strong and prosperous economy to mark the occasion, but such a display is largely at the mercy of foreign aid.

“North Korea has had no choice but to deepen its dependence on China, so they now need some counterbalance,” said Yun Duk-min, a professor at Seoul’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. “Kim Jong Il uses such tactics. This is using Russia to check Chinese influence.”

UPDATE 1 (2011-8-20): KCNA takes the unusual step of confirming KJI is out of the country (rather than waiting until he has returned). According to KCNA:

Kim Jong Il Passes through Khasan Railway Station, Russia
Pyongyang, August 20 (KCNA) — Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, passed through Khasan, the border railway station of Russia this morning on his way to pay an unofficial visit to Siberia and the Far East Region of the Russian Federation at the invitation of Dmitri Anatoliyevich Medvedev, president of the Russian Federation.

He was greeted at Khasan Railway Station by Viktor Ishayev, presidential envoy to the Far East Region of the Russian Federation, who came to Khasan to conduct him.

He was also greeted by Sergey Darikin, governor of Maritime Territory, Valery Sukhinin, Russian ambassador to the DPRK, Irina Skorobogatova, deputy governor of Maritime Territory, and other senior officials of Moscow, maritime territory, city and district.

When the train pulled in the station, the senior officials got on the train and offered greetings to him.

Medvedev, who has paid deep attention to the Russia-DPRK friendship, dispatched them to greet Kim Jong Il, Viktor Ishayev and other senior officials said, warmly welcoming him to Russia upon the authorization of its President.

Kim Jong Il’s current visit to Russia will mark a historic occasion in putting the Russia-DPRK friendly and cooperative relations onto a fresher and higher stage, they noted.

He said he was very pleased to see for himself the achievements made by the diligent and resourceful Russian people through his current visit, thanking the senior officials of Moscow and local areas and people for warmly greeting him.

He was presented with a souvenir by Sergey Darikin on behalf of the Maritime Territorial Government and people.

After a while, he left for his destination amid send-off by senior officials of Russia.

Prior to it, he left the country to pay an unofficial visit to Siberia and the Far East Region of the Russian Federation.

He is accompanied by Kim Yong Chun, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Kang Sok Ju, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and vice-premier of the Cabinet, Jang Song Thaek, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and vice-chairman of the NDC, Kim Yang Gon, Pak To Chun and Thae Jong Su, alternate members of the Political Bureau and secretaries of the WPK Central Committee, Ju Kyu Chang, alternate member of the Political Bureau and department director of the WPK Central Committee, Pak Pong Ju, first vice department director of the WPK Central Committee, O Su Yong, chief secretary of the North Hamgyong Provincial Committee of the WPK, Kim Kye Gwan, first vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Kim Yong Jae, DPRK ambassador to Russia, and Sim Kuk Ryong, consul general of the DPRK Consulate General in Nakhodka of Russia.

His visit to Russia, another event in achieving world peace and security and the human cause of independence, will mark a historic occasion in boosting the DPRK-Russia friendship given steady continuity generation after generation and putting strong impetus to the drive of all the servicepersons and people to build a thriving socialist nation.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-8-20): Kim Jong-il has made a “surprise” trip to Russia. According to the AFP:

North Korea’s reclusive leader Kim Jong-Il on Saturday arrived in his armoured train in Russia and plans to meet President Dmitry Medvedev, the Kremlin said.

During the visit, his first since 2002, Kim is expected to meet with the Kremlin chief for talks in Siberia to discuss North Korea’s nuclear programme, bilateral economic projects and a worsening food crisis in the isolated state.

“A meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Kim Jong-ll will be the main event of the visit,” the Kremlin said in a statement, saying Kim would also visit the Far Eastern and Siberian regions.

The Kremlin did not release further details but a local official in the Far East told AFP Kim’s train crossed the border earlier in the day.

…

Kim, who is known to dislike air travel due to security concerns, arrived in Khasan district after crossing the Tumangan river at 12 pm local time (0100 GMT), Naryzhny said.

He said he was unaware of the North Korean leader’s programme in Russia, adding he did not leave his train upon arrival.

Kim Jong Il’s visit to Moscow on August 20 is sparking interest for the future of economic cooperation between the two countries.

According to the KCNA, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressed interest to increase trilateral cooperation between the ROK-DPRK-Russia in the gas, energy, and railroad sectors. In the message sent from Medvedev to mark the 66th anniversary of independence from Japanese colonial rule, “plans to expand cooperation with the DPRK and the ROK in gas, energy, and railroad industry” were emphasized.

The cooperation projects are evaluated to have “great economic and political significance contributing to the stability in Northeast Asia and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”

In July 4, the KCNA reported that the delegates from the Russian energy giant Gazprom headed by Chairman Alekhsandr Ananenkov visited Pyongyang to discuss energy cooperation, although details of the visit was not elaborated. Ananenkov was reported to have met with North Korean officials in gas and oil industriesto discuss bilateral cooperation in these areas.

Russia has also expressed interest in linking gas pipelines to export natural gas to South Korea via inter-Korean railroad system.

A spokesperson of the foreign ministry of the DPRK reported on the recent visit from the vice-foreign minister and chief representative of Russia on Six-Party Talks, Aleksei Borodavkin, this past March. In the statement, the Russian government expressed concerns for improving inter-Korean relations and stressed prospects of the tripartite economic cooperation projects with North and South Korea including the construction of railways, gas pipeline, and a transmission line linking the three countries. The DPRK also expressed support for the upcoming economic cooperation projects.

In result, the main agenda in the bilateral economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea entails railway, gas pipeline, and transmission line construction.

President Lee Myung-bak has met with the Russian president Medvedev in September 2008 in Moscow. At the summit, the two presidents reached an agreement to pursue projects to export Russian PNG or pipeline natural gas to South Korea through a pipeline via North Korea from 2015.

Immediately following the summit, South Korea’s Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) and Russia’s Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to jointly study the possibilities of constructing a long-distance pipeline running from Vladivostok. Under the contract, Russia will send at least 7.5 million tons of natural gas annually for a period of 30 years through a pipeline to South Korea via North Korea.

This joint study between ROK-Russia is expected to serve as a momentum in bringing diverse economic cooperation between North and South Korea as well.

While it is still premature to judge the long-term outlook for such trilateral economic cooperation, its effects are anticipated to contribute to stability and peace in the Northeast Asian region.

A new paper by David von Hippel, Scott Bruce, Peter Hayes is up at 38 North. Here is the conclusion:

North Korea has demanded the inclusion of energy aid and development assistance in every agreement covering its nuclear weapons program because it cannot develop into a “strong and prosperous nation” without such help from the international community. The country’s energy infrastructure is decrepit, and until it is redeveloped, the country will remain stuck in survival mode. Energy imports from China keep the North aﬂ oat while it sells its minerals assets for hard currency. Until the DPRK earns enough foreign exchange to diversify imports and to refurbish its reﬁ neries, it has no alternative but to rely on China. This situation means that the United States and its partners must prepare to engage the North on energy issues to prevent conﬂ ict, avoid the collapse of the North Korean regime, build transparency and gather real data on the DPRK economy, and develop communication channels with North Korea. Without convincing the DPRK that it can overcome its energy insecurity and achieve a sustainable energy economy, it is unlikely that Pyongyang will shift away from an economy that emphasizes exports of military hardware and illicit goods, cease its provocative behaviors, and take steps to assume productive relationships with the global community.

The DPRK’s small LWR and uranium enrichment programs present an additional challenge, but if managed correctly, are an opportunity for engagement on energy issues. Moreover, the immediate demonstration of good faith on both sides will be necessary to proceed with denuclearization. Since big ticket energy infrastructure projects will take some time to deliver, non-nuclear fast fuels and technical assistance will be more useful in the short-term. There are a number of options for energy sector engagement available, ranging from capacity-building in science, technology, law, and economics to assistance with implementation of energy efﬁ ciency and renewable energy measures and refurbishing/replacing major energy infrastructure to connecting the DPRK with big regional energy grids. Though engagement should start small, it should also start soon in order to open doors, establish relationships, and create a foundation for the peaceful economic growth in the North necessary to sustain a thaw in the DPRK’s relations with the United States, its allies, and the international community.