P-38F-1-LO Lightning Glacier Girl
94th FS/14th FG in 2004. This aircraft was abandoned during
operation Bolero in 1942 on a glacier in Greenland, and recovered in
1992 following an excavation from a depth of 270 ft of ice (U.S.
Air Force image by TSgt Ben Bloker).

Introduction

The contribution of Lockheed's twin-boom P-38 Lightning
fighter
to the crucial air battles of World War II has been consistently
understated
for the last five decades. Receiving far less publicity than its single
engined stablemate, the P-51, the big twin fought the most important
air
battles of the 1943 to 1944 period and was a key element in breaking
the
back of Axis air power over Germany, and in the Mediterranean and the
Pacific.

The P-38 excelled in that design parameter which is pivotal to
fighting
a strategic air war, its combat radius in excess of 700 NM (1) had no
equivalent
in either camp. The Lightning's combat radius was exploited repeatedly
and surprisingly, the Lightning repeatedly succeeded in catching its
opponents
off guard. Both in the Pacific and the Mediterranean, the P-38 provided
long range escort for heavy bombers, long range fighter sweeps deep
into
hostile airspace and interdiction of surface targets. In the UK, the
P-38
wings initially provided long range escort for the 8th Air Force, in
that
critical phase of the daylight bombing offensive, when Luftwaffe
strength
was at its best, and US bomber losses began to reach unsustainable
proportions.
The presence of the P-38 allowed the offensive to continue at a point,
where it may have been scaled down due disproportionate attrition.

The Lockheed P-38 was a complex aircraft, using innovative
technology,
which experienced a painful and protracted development phase and in the
end, was denied the credit which it deserved for the importance of its
role. This becomes all the more apparent upon closer examination.

Early
Development - the XP-38 and YP-38

The story of the Lightning began in the mid 'thirties, in a
United
States still very much isolationist, and in an acquisition climate
dominated
by fierce rivalry between the Army and Navy, who fought bitterly over
what
little money was spent on aircraft procurement. There was little
support
for developing new technology, either from the politicians who saw
little
payoff in buying toys for the boys, as with senior military officers,
most
of whom were still thinking in terms of 1920s technology. This now
absurd
mindset decreed that a single seat fighter was to be restricted to a
gun/ammunition
load of 500 lbs and a powerplant well below 1,000 HP. At this time, two
forward thinking junior officers, Lt. Benjamin Kelsey and Lt. Gordon
Saville,
realized that a fighter with an air-air weapon load of 1,000 lbs and at
least 1,500 HP was both feasible and necessary to defeat the coming
generation
of long range bombers.

To beat the bureaucracy and circumvent the rules restricting
what could
be done with fighters, Kelsey and Saville invented the interceptor
category
and convinced the Army Air Corps to invite submissions on such a
design.
The February, 1937 Circular Proposal X-608 (ie RFP) for a single and a
twin engine fighter called for the use of the very new Allison V-1710
inline
liquid cooled V- 12, equipped with the new GE turbocharger for high
altitude
performance, and for the use of very heavy armament including cannon.
Tricycle
undercarriage was specified as preferred and large internal fuel
capacity
was mandatory, to circumvent an administratively imposed ban on the use
of drop tanks by fighters.

The single engine fighter contract was won by Bell with what
eventually
became the ineffective P-39, while the $163,000 AC-9974 twin contract
went
to Lockheed's Model 22. Lockheed's chief designer, Hall Hibbard, and
senior
designer, Clarence "Kelly" Johnson, an MIT Master's graduate, had gone
through six unorthodox airframe configurations before settling on the
twin-
boom layout. The XP-38 airframe proposal carried 400 USG of fuel
internally,
employed a near to symmetrical NACA 23016/4412 section and grossed out
at 11,400 lb. Designed for 1,150 HP engines, the Model 22 was built to
exceed 360 kts at altitude, stunning performance for the time. Johnson
had at the time commented in detail on the possibility of
compressibility
affecting the handling of the aircraft, this was later to prove to be a
major issue.

Construction of the first XP-38 began in July, 1938, while
Lockheed
was gearing up for mass production of Hudsons for the RAF. Some
fabrication
problems developed, but these were overcome and the first prototype was
loaded on a truck for its journey to March Field on the 31st December,
1938.

The sleek silver prototype was worked on for the following two
weeks,
and first flew on the 27th January, piloted by Lt. Ben Kelsey, the
writer
of the initial specification. The first flight was troubled, with
severe
flap vibration due to a broken support rod, but ended safely, in spite
of brake problems. Subsequent flights saw a range of minor problems
resolved,
as the flight test program progressed.

The XP-38 proved to be a stunning performer, easily achieving
350 kt
speeds. The system design of the airframe and propulsion was unique and
radical, while strictly functional. The powerplant installation in the
nacelle/tail booms exemplified this. The V-1710 engine was mounted in
the
front of the nacelle, driving a large 3-bladed Curtiss Electric
constant
speed prop. The GE turbochargers were mounted in the booms, aft of the
wing, with intercoolers embedded in the outer leading edges of the
wing,
ie: The airflow was channeled to the wing-tip via a corrugated double
skin
and back via the leading edge cavity, and engine glycol radiators in
aft
boom scoops. The armament of four 0.50 cal machine guns and a single
cannon
was mounted in the nose, thus avoiding the dispersion problems
associated
with wing mounted guns.

The test program progressed rapidly and by February, 1939, the
flight
test team decided to attempt a long range record breaking flight across
the continental U.S., in spite of unresolved flap and brake system
problems.
The attempt ended however in disaster, when carb icing during a
prolonged
approach at Mitchel Field (2) on Long Island, near the very end of the
flight, caused a loss of power. Lt. Ben Kelsey force landed the
aircraft
on a local golf course. The XP-38 was wrecked, but fortunately Kelsey
survived
and had successfully demonstrated the superlative speed and range of
the
aircraft.

The USAAF on the strength of completed tests, ordered thirteen
development
aircraft, designated YP-38. The Lockheed Model 122-62-02 was fitted
with
a pair of V-1710-F2 engines rated at 1,150 BHP with GE B-2
turbochargers
and weighed in at 11,171 lb empty for a design weight of 13,500 lb.
Armament
was specified at one 37 mm Oldsmobile M9 cannon, two .50 cal and two
.30
cal machine guns. Counter-rotating props were specified, these rotating
inboard.

The P-38 was clearly a hot performer and the UK Air Ministry
and French
AF soon took an interest in the type, seeking a non-turbocharged
variant
with identical powerplants (and same sense prop rotation) to the
Curtiss
Tomahawks at that time ordered in significant numbers. Designated the
Model
322B and F respectively, the RAF promptly sought a total of 667 of
these
aircraft, a far cry from the 60 or so which Lockheed expected the US
government
to purchase. Unfortunately, the buyers did not appreciate the
limitations
of the V-1710 without turbochargers and Lockheed negotiators accepted
the
order in spite of the known discrepancy and objections from
engineering.
This was to have unfortunate consequences at a later stage. The US
government
also moved to order the P-38, requesting in July, 1939, 66 aircraft.

1940 saw the collapse of France under the treads of Wehrmacht
armour,
while Lockheed worked away at producing the first YP-38s. The Battle of
Britain passed, and much was learned about what was really needed in a
fighter, particularly performance at altitude. The first YP-38 flew in
September, 1940, soon followed by the development aircraft.

These in turn, were followed by thirty P-38s, armed with four
.50 cal
machine guns in addition to the cannon, the balance of the initial
sixty
being made up of the subsequent P-38D.

Baptism of Fire
- the P-38D and E

Lockheed delivered all thirty P-38Ds to the USAAF by August
1941.
The D-model was the first combat capable subtype and was fitted with
self
sealing tanks, detail aerodynamic changes, Dural bladed props, a low
pressure
Oxygen system and typically a 23 mm cannon.

The P-38D was followed in production by the P-38E from
September 1941
through to April 1942. The P-38E saw further refinements, with a single
Bendix 20mm M1 cannon (Hispano) with 150 rpg fitted, changes to the
hydraulic
and electrical systems, flight instruments and nose undercarriage. In
total,
2,000 design changes were carried out to meet the needs of mass
production.

The P-38E was followed in production by P-38Fs and RAF spec
non-turbocharged
322-Bs, 143 of which were ordered in April 1940 as the Lightning I. The
first RAF machines were delivered for testing in March, 1942.

The RAF was unhappy with the 322, as its high altitude
performance was
inferior to the then current Merlin 40 series powered Spitfire V. The
322
had by that time also demonstrated problems due compressibility in
dives
which caused 'Mach tuck', a severe nose down pitching moment due to the
aft of the CoP. This often led to the breakup of the aircraft and
usually, loss of the pilot. Like prop rotation sense impaired engine
out
handling. The 322 affair escalated into a major dispute between
Lockheed
and the RAF and in the end, all Lightning I airframes were transferred
to the USAAF which used them as trainers, under the designation of
P-322.
The turbocharged Lightning IIs became USAAF production P-38Gs.

Interestingly, the performance problems could have been fixed
by fitting
Merlins, Lockheed engineers considered this seriously enough to do a
paper
study in 1941 which indicated that Merlin XX powerplants would provide
superior performance, while improving reliability. The US Army however
rejected the idea (it has been stated as under the influence of US
commercial
interests) and thus sentenced the P-38 to engine problems which were
not
solved until mid 1943.

When the US entered the war in December, 1941, the only
serious fighters
it had were a mixed bag of P-38Ds and Es, the Curtiss P-40 and Bell
P-39
lacked the speed and altitude performance to challenge the Japanese
Zero
and German Bf109s.

The first Lightnings to see combat operations were the
photorecce F-4s
of the 8th Photo Group, based in Australia, flying recce sorties over
New
Guinea and the Coral Sea. Initial deployments of P-38D and E models saw
units stationed in the Aleutians and Iceland, with the first combat
kill
credited to a P-38E in the Aleutians in August 1942, downing a H6K
Mavis
recce aircraft, soon followed by the killing of a Fw200 Condor off
Iceland,
by a P-38D.

As the US moved to a war footing, the P-38E was deployed
during operation
BOLERO to the UK together with later model P-38F aircraft. Initial
deployments
saw the P-38s fly the Atlantic via Greenland, led by B-17s. After some
losses, subsequent aircraft were transported on ships.

The Fork-Tailed
Devil - the P-38F, G and H

P-38F-1-LO Lightning Glacier Girl 94th
FS/14th FG. This aircraft is the only flyable early variant in
existence at this time (U.S. Air Force
image).

P-38F deliveries commenced in March 1942, this variant
being fitted
with
F-4 model engines rated at 1,225 HP and equipped with pylons for 165
USG
drop tanks. Combat flaps were fitted, this facility allowing partial
flap
deployment at maneuver speeds to increase turn rate. The P-38F was
followed
in production by the P-38G from August 1942. The P-38G had F-10 engines
rated at 1,325 HP, a 300 psi Oxygen system using three bottles in the
booms,
strengthened pylons for 300 USG drop tanks and a larger combat flap
envelope.

The mixed P-38E/F force was deployed to New Guinea, while the
UK based
aircraft were redeployed to North Africa for the Torch landings. In the
Pacific, the P-38 quickly demonstrated its superiority over the A6M3
Hamp
(Zero) and Ki-43 Oscar. The P-40's and P-39's suffered heavy attrition
in the defense of Port Moresby, and the arrival of the P-38 late in
1942
saw the odds swing in favor of Gen. Kenney's 5th Air Force. The P-38
first
engaged the Japanese on the 27th December, destroying 12 aircraft and
claiming
four probables in a sortie over Buna. By early 1943, several P-38
pilots
reached ace status, including Richard Bong, later to become the leading
US ace of the war. Equipping the 9th and 39th FS of the 49th and 35th
Fighter
Groups respectively, these aircraft played a major role in the March
1943
Battle of the Bismarck Sea, stripping the Japanese convoy of its
fighter
cover.

In August, 1942, the Americans landed on Guadalcanal and the
P-38 was
deployed there soon after with the 13th AF, flying long range fighter
missions
into the Solomons. Flying from Guadalcanal, in April, 1943, 16 P-38Fs
of
the 70th and 339th Fighter Squadrons flew 350 NM to Bouganville, at low
level, to engage and destroy a Japanese flight carrying Adm Isoroku
Yamamoto,
Japan's leading naval strategist. In the engagement, Capts. Tom
Lanphier
and Rex Barber downed two G4M Bettys, (3) one of which contained the
Japanese
admiral.

Maj Richard Bong (U.S. Air Force
image).

The key to extracting range from the P-38 was very much in
flying technique,
using low RPM and high boost (eg: P-38H 2,300/34 for 215 kt at 146
USG/hr
for 600+ NM radius), and until 1944 this was the art of individual
units
and pilots.(4)

In the ETO, the 8th Air Force was still working up and the
bomber commanders
initially saw little use for the Lightning, as they still believed in
the
concept of unescorted daylight bombing. Nearly all P-38F/Gs were
deployed
to North Africa, to support the Torch landings in Morocco and Algiers.

P-38F-1-LO over California during
factory test flights (U.S. Air Force).

The P-38s flew air superiority and ground attack missions in
the MTO,
inflicting heavy damage on the German and Italian air, sea and land
convoys
attempting to reinforce the theater. The P- 38 was the only US fighter
capable of engaging the Bf109G and Fw190A on equal terms, providing
escort
for bombers well out of the range of the RAF Spitfires. By mid March
1943,
the Axis had a force in excess of 500 Ju-52s, Me-323s and SM.82s
dedicated
to reinforcing the theater. The Allies applied the long-legged P-38 to
cut this air bridge from Sicily, some measure of the intensity of this
battle can be gauged by three notable sorties. On the 5th April 26
P-38s
engaged a convoy of 70 Ju-52s escorted by 24 Luftwaffe fighters,
destroying
11 transports and 2 fighters, for the loss of 3 P-38s. On the 10th
April,
41 transports and 8 fighters were dispatched, the following day 26
Ju-52s
and 5 fighters were destroyed for no loss. The Allied landings in
Sicily
and Italy saw further successes for the P-38 force, a notable highlight
being an Allied convoy escort CAP on the 9th October, during which
Lt.Col.
W.L. Leverette killed 7 Ju-87 dive bombers, another of his pilots
killing
another 5 aircraft. It is not surprising that German pilots nicknamed
the
P-38 Der Gabelschwanz Teufel (the Fork-Tailed Devil).

The outstanding success of the P-38 in the Med and the Pacific
was not
matched by units of the 8th AF in the UK. These were applied to the
long
range escort role, equipped with the P-38H. The H model, a stopgap
while
production of the P-38J was being organised, supplanted the G in May,
1943,
and differed primarily in the use of more powerful F-17 engines with
automatic
engine mixture controls (autolean/autorich), B-33 turbochargers and
automatic
oil cooler flaps, and a new AN-M2C cannon. The more powerful V-1710F-17
hit the design limits of the leading edge intercoolers, oil coolers and
radiators, which limited military power output to 1,240-1,350 HP, only
late build aircraft with improved oil coolers could maintain the
nominal
1,425 HP.

The 55th FG became operational with the P-38H at Nuthampstead
in the
UK, in October, 1943, deploying from McChord Field in Washington state,
where it was a training unit periodically stripped of squadrons to
reinforce
MTO and SWPA FGs. Tasked with bomber escort at high altitude, the
single
group of P-38s provided deep escort outside of the range of the seven
P-47
groups and numerous RAF Spitfire squadrons, which escorted bombers over
the Channel. At this time the Luftwaffe was at its peak, with 8
JagdGeschwaders
(JG1, JG2, JG3, JG11, JG26, JG51, JG106) equipped with Bf109G and
Fw190A
and 3 NachtJagdGeschwaders (NJG1, NJG2, NJG6) equipped with Bf110G
available
to defend the continent, each JG/NJG with typically 3 Staffels
(Squadrons)
per JG/NJG.

The P-38s were all that stood between the Luftwaffe and the
bombers,
500 NM deep inside hostile airspace. Unescorted, the B-17s and B-24s
suffered
up to 30% attrition on some raids and the P-38s were the only aircraft
with the radius to the task. Typically, P-47 Thunderbolts provided
fighter
cover to and from the German border. The P-47, truly an excellent high
altitude fighter, was saddled with its limited range. They were just
beginning
to be equipped with belly mounted drop tanks. Yet, these were still
inadequate
for flying beyond the German frontier. The rotund Thunderbolt would
suffer
from a lack of range until the arrival of the P-47D-25-RE later in
1944.
This model had 100 gallons of increased internal tankage and provision
for three external drop tanks. Even with the arrival of some P-51B
Mustangs,
the P-38 was to bear the brunt of deep penetration escort duty for the
next several months. The P-51B equipped 354th (9th AF) went operational
in late December, 1943, followed by the 357th and 4th FGs in February,
1944. The P-38 equipped 264th went operational in March, 1944, and the
479th as late as May 1944. During the critical late months of 1943 the
P-38 stood alone, with Mustang numbers building rapidly from February
1944.

Factory
image of a P-38H Lightning in 1943 (Lockheed).

With a large proportion of Pacific and Med P-38 operations
flown at medium
to low altitudes, Lockheed and Allison had little operational
experience
with the aircraft at high altitude and low ambients and this was
quickly
revealed. The Allisons misbehaved quite consistently, 'throwing rods,
swallowing
valves and fouling plugs' while the intercoolers often ruptured under
sustained
high boost, and turbocharger regulators froze at 10 in. or 80 in. of
boost,
the latter often resulting in catastrophic failures. Even with the
arrival
of the P-38J, engines and turbochargers continued to fail. The new
intercooler/oil
cooler design was actually too efficient and the enlarged radiators
became
a new problem. Fuel too, was a source of trouble, it is believed by
many
knowledgeable people that the majority of fuel used in Britain was
improperly
blended, the anti-knock lead compounds coming out of solution
(separating)
in the Allison's induction system at extreme low temperatures. This
could
lead to detonation and rapid engine failure, especially at the higher
power
settings demanded for combat.

Many of the P-38's assigned to escort missions were forced to
abort
and return to base. Most of the aborts were related to engines coming
apart
in flight. The intercoolers that chilled the fuel/air mixture too much.
Radiators that could lower engine temps below normal operating
minimums.
Oil coolers that could congeal the oil to sludge. These problems could
have been fixed at the squadron level. Yet, they were not. It took the
P-38J-25-LO and L model to eliminate these headaches. Add sub-standard
fuel, green pilots, poor tactics and the 8th had a serious problem in
the
making. Having had their numbers seriously reduced by aborts, the
remaining
fighters were all the more hard pressed by vastly superior numbers of
Luftwaffe
fighters. The single inexperienced 55th FG often fought the JGs
outnumbered
5:1, and the operational debut of the 20th FG in late December 1943,
equipped
with a mixed inventory of P-38H and P-38J-5/10-LO did not dramatically
improve the situation.

There is little wonder that loss rates were relatively high
and the
kill to loss ratio was below that of the P-47's which could be massed
by
the hundreds (700 P-47's flying escort was not uncommon). The Luftwaffe
quickly learned to position the bulk of their fighters just beyond the
range of the Thunderbolts and repeatedly flew aggressive small unit
ambushes
against the handful of P-38s tied to close escort and thus denied the
freedom
to engage at will.

To aggravate these problems, inadequate cockpit heating
resulted in
severe pilot frostbite, while the Luftwaffe quickly learned about the
compressibility
problems in dives, with German pilots evading the P-38s by executing a
split-S at high speed. The initial roll rate was not spectacular and
the
easily recognized planform provided the Luftwaffe with yet another
advantage
to play.

Poor serviceability and engine problems meant that initially
50 or less
aircraft were available for such missions, including the first escorts
over Berlin, and therefore the 55th and later also 20th FG usually
fought
the JGs outnumbered between three to one and five to one, as noted
previously.
The large number of engine failures deep inside enemy airspace
exacerbated
the problem, and the aggregate exchange rate, accidents inclusive,
dropped
to about 1:1.5 in favour of the Lightning by 1944. Aircrew morale
dropped,
moreso due to the large number of single engine landing accidents, thus
further damaging the aircraft's reputation. The technical problems were
not resolved until the introduction of the P-38J-25-LO, by which time
the
8th had decided that the new Merlin powered P-51B/C was a better choice
for the mission.

In hindsight, while the P-38H and early J variants may not
have performed
to expectations in the ETO, what is overlooked is that their presence
alone
allowed the daylight offensive to proceed at the most crucial phase of
the battle, the last quarter of 1943, leading to eventual air
superiority
by the middle of 1944, when the P-51's reached full strength. It is
safe
to say that were larger numbers of the P-38 available to offset
Luftwaffe
numbers, and more experienced pilots made available to crew the P-38,
the
overall result would have looked far better.

The common conclusion that the P-38 was inadequate for the
needs of
the 8th is frequently based upon comparisons of the scores achieved by
the 20th and 55th FGs during the late February "Argument" raids, in
comparison
with the P-51B equipped 354th FG (9th AF) and the 357th FG (8th AF),
and
the scoring performance of the P-51B equipped 4th FG in the early March
raids into Germany. The factor which is ignored by critics of the P-38
is tactical and aircraft/powerplant handling experience. The 4th FG
comprised
the former RAF Eagle Spitfire squadrons, and was by far the most
experienced
USAAF FG in the ETO. The 354th was being led by Blakeslee, formerly of
the 4th FG. The 357th drew directly on the experience of the 4th and
the
354th FGs. All three FGs drew on the initial long range escort
experience
of the 55th.

In summary a valuable pool of tactical experience and
engine handling
experience for the Merlin equipped P-51B existed in the 4th FG, and
this
experience could be directly applied to the P-51B. No such experience
existed
for the turbocharged Allison powered twin engined P-38 in theatre. The
valuable tactical and handling experience of the SWPA FGs was a theatre
away. Only a limited number of MTO pilots were made available for the
20th
and 55th, and both units had taken heavy losses during the early escort
missions, impacting both morale and the rate at which experience could
be accumulated in these FGs. Many of the P-38 handling techniques
developed
in the SWPA to counter the highly manoeuvrable and skilled Japanese
opposition,
such as differential throttle and rudder assisted roll entries, were
never
practiced widely in the ETO.

Despite these difficulties the 55th did well on a number of
sorties
during this period. On the 3rd November, 1943, the 55th in concert with
the experienced 4th, 56th and 78th FGs clashed with the elite JG 1. The
55th accounted for 7 Luftwaffe fighters of the 13 claimed. On the 25th
November, 1943, 4 FW-190s were claimed for the loss of one P-38H, one
of
the Focke-Wulfs belonging to Major J. Seifert (an "expert" with 57
kills),
Gruppenkommandeur of II/JG26. Other sorties were much less successful,
and heavy losses were suffered on a number of occasions. A heavy price
was exacted for the deployment of inexperienced pilots in a very
demanding
theatre in the hitherto untried long range escort mission profile.

Perhaps the best critique of the ETO record of the P-38 is
that by former
20th FG Capt. Arthur Heiden, who flew the P-38 during the Spring of
1944,
in the company of better known pilots such as Jack Ilfrey, and Ernest
Fiebelkorn,
later instructed on the P-38 and P-51, and after the war went on to log
in excess of 25,000 hrs of flying time:

"The quality of multi-engine training during World War II
bordered
on the ridiculous. I am convinced that with training methods now in use
we could take most of civilian private pilots who might be about to fly
the Aztec or Cessna 310, and in ten hours, have a more confident pilot
than the ones who flew off to war in the P-38. A P-38 pilot usually got
his training in two ways. The first way, of course, was twin-engine
advanced
training in Curtiss AT-9s, which had the unhappy feature of having
propellers
you couldn't feather. After sixty hours of this, the student received
ten
hours of AT-6 gunnery, although he might get his gunnery training in
the
AT-9, since AT-6s were in short supply."

"At this point he had his chance to fly the RP-322 for
another twenty
hours. The 322, as you know, was the British version of the airplane,
and
they came with assorted equipment and things on them that nobody could
predict. Upon graduation from the RP-322 he was assigned to a P-38
Replacement
Training Unit (RTU) or an Operational Training Unit (OTU) for 100 hours
or more of fighter training. A second way to get into the P-38 was to
transition
from single engine fighters. In this event, someone probably took him
up
in a multi-engine transport or bomber and demonstrated engine shutdown
a couple of times after skimming the tech order, a blindfold check, and
then Ignoring the check list (not for real fighter pilots!), he blasted
off. More than one neophyte has described his first "launch" in a P-38
as being hit in the ass with a snow shovel."

"Either method of training, probably, made little
difference as neither
guy knew that much about multi-engine operations and procedures. True,
he had been warned about the magic number of 120 miles per hour his Vme
(editor:Vmca) or single-engine control speed. He had swam in glue
during
a couple of prop featherings while in formation with his instructor. He
was, also, warned never to turn into a dead engine, never put down the
gear until he had made the field, and never to go around with one
caged.
That was about it until shortly thereafter the old Allison time bomb
blew
up, and he was in business the hard way. Right on takeoff. "Some people
lucked out if the runway was long enough. Some overshot or undershot
and
they bent the whole thing. Some tried a single-engine go-around anyway,
usually with horrible results. Such happenings would make a son of a
bitch
out of any saint."

"Tony Levier's spectacular demonstrations were an attempt
to rectify
all these problems, but the damage had been done. The Air Corps, as far
as I knew, never did change its pilot training."

"For perspective, it must also be remembered that two other
significant
events had taken place in training (in England). Theater indoctrination
at Goxhill in England had received the same overhaul that had occurred
in the States. The most important of all may have been the training
units
set up by the combat organizations themselves. Here it was possible to
up-date training to the latest information and for individual
commanders
to put their special stamp on things and develop new tactics. "But and
this is giant towering BUT this was all for the P-51 pilots."

"What would have happened if the P-38 pilots and their
units could
have been blessed with the same wonderful opportunity?"

For context, we present a previously unpublished letter from
the Commanding Officer
of the 20th Fighter Group, to the 8th Air Force Headquarters. The
letter spells
out the problems faced by the P-38 Groups in clear, unambiguous terms.

20th Fighter Group Headquarters
APO 637 U.S. Army
(E-2)

3 June 1944

Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.

To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S.
Army.

1. The following observations are being put in writing by
the
undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC. They
are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended in any
way to "low rate" our present equipment.

2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred
hours on
combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is
too
complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on
the
word 'average, taking full consideration just how little combat
training our
pilots have before going on as operational status.

3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us
assume that
we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of
twenty-five
hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep
ramrod,
penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising
along
with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100
RPM.
He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to
relieve
the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained
heavy
load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch
may or
may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets
"bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must
increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main.
So, he reaches down
and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on
his drop
tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto
rich (two
separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his
manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel
for and cannot
possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At
this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of
several things
wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before
increasing
RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he
forgets
to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head
temperature
with subsequent engine failure.

4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have
lost as least
four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action.
The
logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to
get organized that they were shot down before they could get going.

5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do
about it?
It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes
before R/V
and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal
for
everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters
on,
combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure
to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who
is
bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and
equipment
for the escort job ahead.

6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the
past several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time
again by Lockheed
representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army
personnel
connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and
then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have
devised
to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as
"unnecessary".
Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic
manifold
pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of
a single
lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that
in
combat.

7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have
never been in
combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a
"bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another
nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the
enumerated
above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective
combat airplane.

8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify
the gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector
handles} are all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The
toggle switches for
outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.

9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a
fine piece of
equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that
the enemy
can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the
capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel
Ben Kelsey and Colonel
Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also
believe that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking
and ability on
the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going
into his
first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done,
in my
opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane.

HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

Captain Stan Richardson of the 55th Fighter Group recalls some
of his
experiences as an instructor (before his tour with the 55th) at a
stateside RTU.

The airplane was a "dream" on single-engine. While I was
instructing in P-38's at Muroc AAF, on occasion the instructor and
three students (four ship flight) would each feather the right
propeller (remember, only a single generator, and that on the left
engine) for a "tail chase" which included loops, slow and barrel rolls,
and just generally having a good time. The exercise was to instill
confidence in the pilots ability to control the aircraft on one engine.
My area of "expertise" while instructing at Muroc was single-engine
demo's in a piggyback P-38. Take-off on two engines, feather the right
engine shortly after take-off. Climb to 10,000'. Demonstrate various
emergency procedures (landing gear and flap extension), propeller
operation in fixed pitch (simulating electrical failure), high speed
stalls, a loop, a roll or two, then return to the airfield for landing
on one engine. Make a typical fighter approach on the deck, pitch out,
drop the landing gear, then some flaps, finally full flaps and plunk it
onto the runway.

For a short period in my life flying P-38's I had as much
time on one engine as I did on two. Keep in mind that most of my P-38
flying occurred just after my 20th birthday. Some of my P-38 combat
time was while I was a 20 year old snot-nosed kid. No brains, lotsa
luck. Gad! I love that bird.....

It was a dandy flying machine in instrument conditions
associated with poor weather. I had to return once from Berlin on one
engine. No problem."

Capt. Heiden went on to discuss some of the problems inherent
with high
altitude escort missions over Europe. He points out that all the combat
instructors who gained their experience in Africa or in the Pacific,
had
done the vast majority of their combat flying below 20,000 feet.
Therefore,
new pilots were trained to fly the P-38 at altitudes below that height.
Very few pilots had flown the Lightning at the altitudes required by
8th
Air Force mission profiles and were loath to do so. Many of the P-38
trained
pilots arriving in Britain requested assignment to the 9th Air Force in
order to fly at lower levels where they had both experience and
confidence
in the ability of the airplane to do the job. Nonetheless, the high
priority
given to providing escort fighters determined that nearly all the
incoming
pilots were destined for the 8th. Most P-38 pilots were completely
unprepared
for high altitude operations nor the technical problems involved.

Capt. Heiden continues:

"These new pilots made their attempts to go to altitude.
This is
what the curriculum called for and they gave it their best, but those
early
airplanes, the way they were set up, just wouldn't make it. There were
disastrous incidents of ignition breakdown because of high-tension
leakage.
The oxygen systems were woefully inadequate. This is what they put into
the airplane and the pilot in the cockpit was stuck with he had. It
just
wouldn't do the job. No one liked 30,000 feet anyway. There had been no
training for it. There had never been any need for it. It was too cold
and the windows frosted up."

"All this piled up on the 8th Air Force pilots, but there
they were
at 30,000 feet plus and sixty below zero. It was miserable."

"Then things really started to come apart. Now, suddenly,
turbochargers
were running away. They were blowing up engines on the basis of one
engine
blow up every seven hours. Intercoolers were separating the lead from
the
fuel and the result was lowered octane. Hands and feet were freezing;
pilots
were calling their airplanes airborne ice wagons and they were right.
Frost
on the windows got thicker than ever. Most disgusting of all was the
leisurely
way the German fighters made their get-aways straight down."

"Another problem seldom mentioned was the single generator
problem.
If a generator was lost or a low battery the Curtis Electric prop would
lose the Dynamic Brake and go to extreme Low Pitch. This was called a
RUN AWAY. It could happen on Take Off with a low battery. Since you
couldn't feather it set up a lot of drag making it difficult to make it
around to land. The Killer situation was to lose the Generator or lose
the engine with the Generator on it while 2 or 3hrs into Germany.
Procedure was to SET the Props then turn off all electrical power. Then
momentarily turn it back on to reset the props as needed. Being sure
everything electrical was also turned off -- No Radios. The forgotten
thing was you were at altitude and the OAT was -60degrees and the
little old battery was cold soaked. Hence, dead as a dog. Result, with
a lot of altitude you have less than an hour with one or two props in
RUNAWAY.

I have no statistics to back me up on this, but believe,
that more P-38s were lost from this than any other factor including
combat. This simple problem did not receive attention until April, '44."

"This leads us to another vague fact. This is the need of
boost pumps to maintain fuel pressure to the engines at around 20,000'
and above. No boost pumps, a pilot will need to get down to 20K or
below, and if he needs more than cruise power he will have to get way
down low."

"My only experience in these problems, was of course the
runaway prop, and once when the boost pump circuit breakers popped
while we were engaged with some 109s. So there I was holding in the
circuit breakers with my right hand while flying with my left, hoping
to get to a lower altitude before something burned up."

Original photo via W.M. Bodie

"P-38 units from the moment of going on initial operational
status
were committed to MAX EFFORT. No two ways about it. No time to shake
things
out, to discover your problems. You got there and zap, you were in up
to
your eyeballs. This meant that everything flyable went and everything
that
still had wings would be made flyable. No matter what. This in effect
was
the same as demanding, by direct order, that everyone and everything
must
have, immediately if not sooner, 100 percent combat capabilities. Like
Casey Jones, the pressure was all the way up without any margins
whatsoever."

"Despite these revolting developments, the pilots of the
8th knew
that the P-38 could outturn, outclimb, outrun and outfight anybody's
airplane
in the air so they set about rectifying their problems."

"Every one of these problems was solved with the
introduction of
the P-38L."

"Let me repeat this again and again. It can never be
emphasized too
strongly. It makes up the Gospel Word. The P-38L. Now there was the
airplane."

"Nothing, to these pilots, after the hard winter of 1943-44
could
be more beautiful than a P-38L outrolling and tailgating a German
fighter
straight down, following a spin or split-S or whatever gyration a
startled,
panicked and doomed German might attempt to initiate. You just couldn't
get away from the P-38L. Whatever the German could do, the American in
the P-38L could do better." (cited from [8] with permission from
Arthur
W. Heiden).

Captain Stan Richardson comments on the slow
initial roll rate of the early P-38H and J models deployed with the 8th
Air Force.

"The P-38 was a large fighter with much mass. 52' wingspan
and long, wide-chord ailerons contributed to slow response along the
longitudinal axis of the early airplanes. The higher the indicated
airspeed, the slower the response. At very high IAS it took plenty of
muscle to roll the airplane. I don't believe that a joystick would have
improved matters over the wheel. The Luftwaffe soon recognized the slow
roll rate of the "H" and early "J" model Lightnings and used it to
their advantage. It also learned of the dive restrictions caused by
"compressibility" and used that advantage also.

Sometime in the development of the P-38, the design
engineers must have realized that P-38's didn't have great roll
capability. When Tony Levier, Lockheed test pilot, visited the 55th FG,
he heard a common thread of complaints from the pilots. Cold cockpit,
poor "flick" roll rate, and inability to dive after the Bf-109's and
FW-190's from high altitude.

The complaints were relayed to the Lockheed factory, and
design changes were incorporated in the P-38L. Prior to the arrival of
the "L's" at Wormingford, many modification kits were shipped to
Langford Lodge, North Ireland, for field modifications of the "J" model
Lightning then arriving in the theater. Unfortunately, an early
shipment aboard a DC-4 was lost at sea when the Brits shot the cargo
plane from the sky. It took several months to replace the lost
modification kits. Early P-38J-5-LO's were modified at Langford Lodge
by the addition of the replacement kits. The kits added dive recovery
flaps under the wings, outboard of the engines, and a 3000psi
hydraulically boosted aileron system. The P-38L's were now coming down
the production line with the aileron boost and "speed boards"
installed.

P-38's from the J-25's onward were what we should have had
when we went operational in October 1943. The compressibility problem
of the P-38 was also experienced by P-47 Thunderbolts, and was not a
mystery to aeronautical design engineers.

The P-38J25-LO and P-38L's were terrific. Roll Rate? Ha!
Nothing would roll faster. The dive recovery flaps ameliorated the
"compressibility" (Mach limitation) of earlier Lightnings. An added
benefit of the dive recovery flaps was their ability to pitch the nose
10-20 degrees "up" momentarily when trying to out turn the Luftwaffe's
best, even when using the flap combat position on the selector. Of
course the nose "pitch-up" resulted in increased aerodynamic drag, and
must be used cautiously. High speed is generally preferred over low
speed in combat situations. Properly flown, the Fowler flaps of the
P-38 allowed very tight turning radius."

Arthur Heiden observed first-hand how tight a well flown P-38
could turn.

"I remember an amusing incident, Apr '44. We had run into a
real mess and the Luftwafe was bouncing everybody. My flight had just
been bounced, did the break, and the Luftwaffe kept on going. While I
was on guard, I saw this other flight get bounced. While the rest of
that flight did a halfhearted break, old tail-end Charlie's P-38
emitted a cloud of exhaust smoke (thought he had been hit), saw his
nose come up and wrap up his turn. Before I could think, old #4 was in
the lead of that flight. Impressed the hell out of me. Turned out to
have been Fiebelkorn -- he was off to a good start."

The decision to replace the P-38J in the 8th AF with the P-51,
rather
than the P-38L, meant that the 8th never got to exploit the full
performance
and combat potential of the P-38.

Capt. Heiden makes some further interesting observations.

"The P-51 was a new airplane and we were eager to fly it
and were
happy with it. It was so easy and comfortable to fly. The P-38 had kept
us on our toes and constantly busy--far more critical to fly. You never
could relax with it. We were disappointed with the 51's rate of climb
and
concerned with the reverse stick, especially if fuel was in the
fuselage tank, the
rash of rough engines from fouled plugs, and cracked heads which dumped
the coolant. With the 38 you could be at altitude before landfall over
the continent, but with the 51 you still had a lot of climbing yet to
do.
The 38 was an interceptor and if both engines (were healthy), you could
outclimb any other airplane, and that's what wins dog fights. When you
are in a dog fight below tree tops, it is way more comfortable in a 38
with its power and stall characteristics and, for that matter at any
altitude."

To summarise the performance of the P-38 in the 8th AF, Capt
Heiden
notes:

"Aug 43, 8thAF has retrieved some Bomber Gps and has
several original
Spitfire/P-47 FGs. Two P-38 FGs, 1-P-51 FG that will not be operational
till late Oct and have to workout tactics and maintenance problems,
which
all are severe. Highly inadequate supply of A/C."

"Nov. 43, P-38Hs and P-51Bs beginning ops, find themselves
in a climate
environment none had experienced before and a superior opponent with 10
times the numbers. Forced to take the bombers to, over and withdraw
them.
Lucky to get half of what they had to the target after aborts/early
returns.
Sometimes as few as four fighters made it to target under attack
continuously
going and coming. Five minutes of METO power was planned into the
profile.
Meaning that if you fought over five minutes you wouldn't make it home.
Remember, you were being bounced continuously."

"Feb 11, 44, 357thFG goes on Ops (P-51). 4thFG converts to
P-51s.
2-weeks later and other groups are converting by end of Feb. Now
fighter
groups don't have to go the whole to, over, and from target. The escort
is now Penetration, Target, and Withdrawal, each leg is assigned to
only
one FG. and many operational problems are being resolved. Internal fuel
on P-38s has been greatly increased with Wing and Leading edge tanks.
P-47s
are starting to get external fuel tanks."

"The last half of 43 brought horrendous losses, had forced
German
manufacturing underground and had forced Germany to go to synthetic
oil.
This had increased the cost of war exponentially to the Germans."

"Feb 44 we went back to Schwienfurt with acceptable loses.
March
3rd the 20th & 55thFGs went to Berlin--Bombers were recalled.
March,
April, and May brought vicious battles, often with heavy loses.
However,
Germany were throwing their valuable flight instructors and 100hr
students
in to the battle. The Luftwaffe was at last starting to die."

"The 8th was, at last, being flooded with Mustangs and well
trained
pilots. The Mustang was a delight to fly, easier to maintain cheaper to
build and train pilots for, and had long legs. In those respects you
can
rightfully call it better, but it could not do anything better than
a P-38J-25 or L. Just remember who took the war to the enemy and
held
on under inconceivable odds. Enough of the crap."

The Best of the
Breed - the P-38J and L

Contemporary (2009) image of
P-38J-20-LO (U.S. Air Force image).

The P-38J resolved the intercooler efficiency problems of the
earlier
subtypes via the use of a core type intercooler in the forward nacelle
chin. While prototypes were being tested in early 1943, P-38H
production
continued. The new nacelle chin provided increased oil cooling
capacity,
and automatic control of the intercooler vent, resulting in the full
availability
of the 1,600 HP War Emergency rating of the F-17 powerplant. Other
design
changes were introduced, including enlarged glycol radiators in the
tail
booms, in later build aircraft additional outboard leading edge tanks,
and two major control system changes. These were hydraulically boosted
ailerons which decreased control forces by a factor of six, and
electrically
actuated dive flaps under the wings which cured the dive
compressibility
problems. The latter were fitted standard from the P-38J-25-LO,
sadly
almost all retrofit kits intended for earlier P-38J subtypes were lost
in a friendly fire incident in early 1944, thereby delaying the
introduction
of this important modification to theatre units by several months.
Curiously,
the modification entered production as a kit in late 1943, yet was not
incorporated into production aircraft for another six months, until the
P-38J-25-LO, although some P-38J-10/15-LO aircraft were retrofitted in
the field.

Contemporary image of P-38L-5-LO S/N 44-27231
rebuilt from an F-5G-6-LO and painted as X/Ruff Stuff (U.S. Air Force
image).

Contemporary image of P-38L-5-LO S/N 44-27231
rebuilt from an F-5G-6-LO and painted as X/Ruff Stuff (U.S. Air Force
image).

Contemporary image of P-38L-5-LO S/N 44-27231
rebuilt from an F-5G-6-LO and painted as X/Ruff Stuff (U.S. Air Force
image).

P-38L-5-LO S/N 44-53015 on static display as
131/Pudgy V at McGuire AFB, New
Jersey. This former F-5G-6-LO spent some of its earlier life as
Bendix Racer 55 (U.S. Air Force).

In addition, the windscreen was changed to flat armour glass
plate,
the control wheel was changed and proper cockpit heating and defrosting
fitted. Although the heating and defrosting problems were not fully
cured
until the arrival of the P-38J-25-LO, which was nearly identical to the
penultimate P-38L. The electrical fuses were replaced with breakers
allowing
the pilot to reset the breaker in flight rather than suffer the loss of
a system.

George Ceuleers collection

Deliveries of the P-38J commenced in August, 1943, however, the
P-38J-25
did not arrive until July of 1944. Too late to affect 8th Air Force
thinking
as the die had been cast in the ETO and the 8th began to phase in the
P-51B
and C from early 1944. The P-38s were gradually shifted to the ground
attack
and Flak suppression roles, where their superior payload radius
performance
easily outclassed the single engined types.

The result was an aircraft which could well exceed the
Luftwaffe fighters
in performance, while further extending the type's radius performance.

Almost 3,000 were built and deployed to every theater, with
increasing
numbers to the MTO with the 15th AF, the Pacific with the 5th, 7th,
11th
and 13th AF's, and Burma/India with the 10th and 14th AF's.

In the Pacific, the 5th and 13th AF's used the P-38J to its
fullest.
The invasion of the Philippines saw redeployment from New Guinea to the
Philippines, and the 475th FG, Satan's Angels, with four squadrons of
P-38s
led the scoring contest, well ahead of the mixed FG's. The 475th was a
late entry, formed at Ipswich in mid 1943 with a mixed force of G/H
models.
Many aces flew with the Fifth Air Force, and the two highest scoring US
pilots of
the war, Richard Bong (40) and Tommy McGuire (38), both flew the P-38,
Bong with
the 49th Fighter Group and McGuire with the 475th. By the end of the
war, the 475th had destroyed 551 for 56 losses,
a ratio of 10:1. The 49th, having flown mostly P-40s and P-38s, with
some P-47Ds
thrown in for good measure, out scored the 475th with 668 air to air
victories.
This score ranked them third of all American Fighter Groups behind the
the 354th and 56th
in the ETO. A much publicized event in the Pacific was the 1944 visit
by Charles Lindbergh, who widely disseminated the knowledge of range
performance
improvement through optimal cruise control technique (discussed above),
getting the message to pilots and unit commanders throughout the
theater.(4)

In the Med, the P-38Js flew from Italy on escort and fighter
sweep missions
into Southern and Central Europe, attacking targets as far North as
Vienna
and Prague, and repeatedly raiding the Rumanian oilfields at Ploesti.
The
Ploesti oilfields were the target of many a B-24 raid, with
questionable
results, P-38 strikes however reduced production to a fraction of full
capacity. The P-38s became a familiar sight all over Europe, strafing
railway
locomotives and Flak sites in areas once the inviolate domain of the
Luftwaffe.
With ability to carry two 2,000 lb bombs to substantial radii the P-38
became a major battlefield interdiction asset, playing a key role in
the
1944 invasion.

The P-38J was followed by the P-38L, deliveries of which
commenced in
June, 1944, almost 4,000 were built by the end of hostilities. The
P-38L
was fitted with F-30 engines, delivering equal or better power to
higher
altitudes, and slightly larger fuel tanks, with booster pumps in the
wings.
Detail changes included the first tail warning radar in a fighter.

By the end of 1944, the role of the P-38, like that of most
Allied fighters,
had shifted to tactical ground support largely due to the absence of
serious
fighter opposition. As the Third Reich crumbled and the Japanese
retreated
into their final defensive perimeter, the operational career of the
P-38
reached its final stage.

Expensive to maintain and fly, most P-38s were phased out soon
after
the end of hostilities in the Pacific, the F-51 Mustang assuming its
role.
It is interesting to note that the haste with which the aircraft were
disposed
of prevented their use in the subsequent Korean war, an environment
where
the P-38 would doubtless have thrived in its tactical interdiction
role,
with better payload/radius, firepower and resilience to ground fire
than
the F-51. The last operational P-38s remained in service with several
US
aligned Third World countries, but spares availability and operating
costs
soon led to their demise. Today only a small handful of aircraft
remain,
with even fewer flyable.

Derivatives -
the F-4, F-5, Droop Snoot, Pathfinder, P-38K and P-38M

Early production F-4A-1-LO
photoreconnaissance variant (U.S. Air Force image).

The F-4 and F-5 photorecce derivatives
of the P-38 were without doubt the
most important reconnaissance aircraft in the USAAF inventory. After
the
difficulties the USAAF encountered with its prewar A-20 derivative F-3
recce platform, Lockheed exploited the opportunity with a proposal for
a P-38E fitted with four K-17 cameras in a customised nose. In late
1941
the 116th production P-38E was converted to the new F-4 photorecce
configuration,
soon followed by new build F-4-1-LOs, which numbered one hundred. These
were subsequently followed by twenty F- 4A-1-LOs which were essentially
P-38E airframes built concurrently with the P-38F.

The speed and range of the F-4 guaranteed success and set the
trend,
with the later P-38G metamorphosising into the F-5A, of which no less
than
60 were built. Later photorecce subtypes were created by conversion
from
fighter airframes rather than new build.

The P-38J was the last subtype to provide for new built
photorecce airframes,
with 200 built as F-5B-1 models, followed by 123 F-5C-1 and an
undisclosed
number of F-5E-2 and F-5F conversions. The subsequent P-38L was only
ever
modified for this role, with 705 rebuilt to E-3 configuration and many
more to other subtypes, including the F-5G with the bulbous nose
configuration.

Late production F-5B-1 aircraft in
faded and new Haze Blue PR camouflage (U.S. Air
Force image).

Late production F-5B-1 aircraft over
France in June, 1944 (U.S. Air Force image).

Another important variant of the P-38 was the Droop Snoot. The
P-38
could carry up to two 2,000 lb bombs, or at more useful radii, one bomb
and a 300 USG tank. This payload/radius capacity begged to be exploited
and in mid-1943, USAAF Colonels Hough and Ostrander, capitalizing on
the
pressure created by heavy losses in the B-17 and B-24 force, proposed
the
use of the P-38 as a level formation bomber, led by two-seat
pathfinding
P-38s with bomb sights. By late February, 1944, Lockheed's facility at
Langford Lodge in the UK rebuilt several P-38Js to the proposed
configuration.
This involved removing the armament, installing a transparent perspex
nose
with an optical flat panel, fitting a Norden gyro stabilised bombsight
and adding lead ballast and armor plate about the bombardier's station.
At least one aircraft is known to have had a flexibly mounted .50 cal
gun
in the perspex nose, a field retrofit.

The Droop Snoots proved most successful, with over one hundred
aircraft
rebuilt, but the concept was in practice limited to tactical
operations,
largely due to the opposition of the heavy bomber commanders who
rejected
the idea. Droop Snoots were used extensively in the ETO, MTO and India,
and when not providing bomb aiming were used as a navigational lead
aircraft.
A derivative of the Droop Snoot concept, in turn, the radar equipped
P-38J
and L Pathfinders were rebuilds from standard J/L-models. These
aircraft
had a dielectric nose cone covering an AN/APS-15 navigation/attack
radar,
with the operator hidden in the forward fuselage compartment. No
records
exist on the number built, these aircraft were employed to lead P-38
level
bombing formations under non-visual conditions, eg bombing through an
undercast.

A formation of ETO P-38J fighters in
June 1944 (U.S. Air Force).

The obscure P-38K was a one-off prototype of an optimized high
altitude
subtype, intended to resolve the problems found in the ETO with the
P-38G/H
models. Fitted with F-15 engines, chin intercoolers not unlike the
later
P-38J, and Hamilton Standard Hydromatic propellers optimized for high
altitude
performance, the P-38K-1-LO would outclimb (4,800 fpm @ SL), outrun
(375
kt @ Alt) and out accelerate the P-38J at altitude. The pressure to
maintain
production rates spelled doom for the P-38K, as the US Government was
not
(ostensibly) prepared to accept a reduction in volume resulting from
the
retooling required to accommodate the bigger props. In any event, the
P-38J
had resolved most of the powerplant related failings of the G/H series
and was considered adequate to the task.

P-38M-6-LO (U.S. Air Force).

Somewhat more successful, but equally obscure was the P-38M, a
dedicated
night fighter derivative of the P-38L. The P-38M Night Lightnings were
a factory design which followed a number of successful field
conversions
in New Guinea and Guadalcanal, where P-38Fs were fitted with SCR-540 or
APS-4 search radar.

The P-38L to M rebuilds involved fitting a cramped
'piggyback' radar operator's station aft of the cockpit, under a bubble
canopy, and mounting an AN/APS-4 air intercept radar in a cylindrical
pod
under the nose, the mounting derived from the standard wing pylon.
Seventy
five P-38L-5-LOs were rebuilt to glossy black P-38M-6-LOs in late 1944,
and deployed to the Pacific theater in 1945, too late to score any
kills.

The
P-38L-5/10-LO - A Technical Perspective

The P-38L will appear quaint to those familiar with modern combat
fighter
design, but includes many modern design features and was as densely
packed
as any contemporary tactical fighter. A measure of how well Lockheed
engineers
designed the aircraft is the fact that the airframe experienced only
detail
changes throughout its production history, that being the longest of
any
of the US wartime fighters.

The principal structural elements of the P-38 were the wing
and the
tail booms, the latter housing engines, turbochargers and associated
systems.
The wing structure was of a cantilever type, comprising a center
section
assembly, outer sections and wingtips. The wing employed a single main
spar at about 35% chord, with an auxiliary rear spar and a forward spar
in the center section. Torsion boxes were formed by skinning the wing
with
panels which were corrugated span-wise on the inner surface, in the
center
section these panels had an additional internal smooth skin to form
true
sandwich skins, which enclosed the main fuel tanks. The Fowler flaps
were
structurally attached to the rear spar. The wing leading edges formed a
stiffened structure, which contained 62 USG (5) integral fuel cells.

The 90 USG main tanks were aft of the center section main
spar, with
the cavity between the main and forward spars filled with the 60 USG
reserve
tanks. Wet pylons provided for additional 165 or 300/310 USG drop
tanks.
While each engine had a separate fuel system, tanks could cross feed
the
engines with the exception of the reserve tanks.

The wing structurally supported the central nacelle and
forward boom
structure. The forward nacelle carried the nose wheel, guns and
magazines,
and the cockpit. The pilot was seated fore of the main spar, with a
canopy
built up from forward and aft sections, with a jettisonable top cover
and
downward cranked side windows. The windshield was a single slab of
armor
glass, with a single forward armor steel plate and multiple rear plates
to provide comprehensive fore and aft aspect armor coverage. The tail
boom
turbochargers were contained in an armor ring to shield the pilot from
disintegrating turbines. The nose wheel retracted under the cockpit,
with
an entry ladder hinged at the end of the nacelle.

Avionic fit typically comprised an SCR-522A transceiver, an
SCR-274N
or BC1206 ranging receiver, an SCR-695A IFF transponder and an APS-13
tail
warning radar, fitted to the left aft boom. F-5 photo-recce aircraft
often
carried a DF receiver with a loop antenna under the forward nose.

Control was via a yoke on an inverted L shaped boom, with
radio and
gun buttons on the yoke, yoke aileron inputs were augmented by a
hydraulic
booster system. Engine controls were to the left of the cockpit, with
pitch/RPM
and throttles clustered, and a separate mixture control group forward
of
the throttles. The elevator trim wheel was below the throttles. Primary
flight instruments occupied the left half of the panel, with engine
instruments
to the right, using dual indicator dials.

The gun fit comprised a centrally mounted AN-M2C 20 mm cannon
with up
to 150 rpg, about which were clustered four MG-53-2 .50 cal (12.7 mm)
machine
guns with up to 500 rpg. Bombs of up to 2,000 lb weight were carried on
the centresection pylons, and tree launchers for ten 4.5 in. rockets
were
optionally fitted to the outboard wing.

The low pressure oxygen system employed an A-12 demand
regulator, fed
from two F-1 bottles in the left aft boom and a single bottle in the
right
boom. Pressure drop below 100 psi was typically signalled with a
cockpit
lamp. The aft boom mounted the coolant radiators and the detachable
tail
assembly, the forward boom housing the rearward retracting mainwheels
under
the turbochargers.

The two Allison V-1710F-30 V-12s had a 5.5 in. bore and 6.0 in
stroke,
providing a compression ratio of 6.5. These drove Curtiss Electric
constant
speed props via a 2:1 reduction gear, delivering 1,475 HP military and
takeoff ratings at 3,000 RPM, or 1,612 HP maximum rating at 3,000 RPM
and
60 in. of manifold pressure. Some later engines are described as
delivering
up to 1,725 HP WEP rating. The engines required 100 octane or higher
rated
fuel, and had 13 USG oil capacity. The oil was cooled in two outboard
chin
core radiators, vented via automatically controlled flaps on either
side
of the nacelle. Fuel consumption was 0.65 lb/HP./hr at 1,100 HP normal
rating, at 2,600 RPM.

The B-33 turbochargers drew air from outboard scoops on the
booms, feeding
central chin core intercoolers with automatic temperature control,
which
in turn fed the carbs. The B-33 was redlined at 26,400 RPM and
exhausted
upward, ejector hoods were not used due the device's intolerance of any
significant backpressure.

The Strategic
Perspective

Combat radius helps to win air wars. This simple
observation
sums up much of what distinguished the P-38 from its contemporaries,
and
also why this aircraft must be considered the single most significant
fighter
in the US inventory in W.W.II. The critical air battles, when Allied
strength
was still building up and Axis strength was at its peak, were fought by
the P-38 force, deep inside hostile airspace against a numerically
superior
enemy.

All other parameters being equal, it was the radius of the
Lightning
which allowed the ETO daylight bombing offensive to succeed at a time
when
losses were high and long term success questionable. By the time
Mustang
numbers built up in the ETO, the Luftwaffe had already crossed the knee
in the Lanchesterian attrition war curve and defeat was inevitable.
While
the much admired P-51 made a critical contribution, it is worth noting
that cumulative deployments of the Merlin powered P-51 matched the P-38
only as late as the end of 1944, which is clearly at odds with the
established
mythology. With the 8th AF, the long range escort load was shared
equally
by the P-38 and P-51 throughout the decisive first half of 1944.

In the Pacific, where land based air grappled with the
Japanese, the
Lightning was the foremost fighter, destroying more Japanese aircraft
than
any other Allied fighter. The air battles over New Guinea, the
Solomons,
the invasion of the Phillipines and later Okinawa were all campaigns
where
the radius and performance of the P-38 were fundamental advantages over
Japanese air assets.

The perception of the P-38 as a mediocre aircraft is clearly
the
result of wartime propaganda run unchecked, and lay interpretations of
period statements. The historical record clearly indicates that the big
twin was there when it really mattered and there can be no greater a
compliment
for its designers. It was the aircraft which allowed the USAAF to play
an offensive strategy almost from the very beginning of combat
operations.

The P-38 was without doubt the strategically most important
American
fighter of World War II.

Notes

1) Ultimately, combat range of the P-38 grew until it
easily exceeded
the endurance of its pilots. Equipped with 310 gallon drop tanks, over
1,030 gallons in total, the P-38 was capable of a combat radius in
excess
of 1,300 miles. The P-38 outranged its contemporary versions of the
P-51.

2) Mitchel Field was (is) not far from Roosevelt Field
where
Lindbergh
began his epic solo flight to Paris in 1927. Today Mitchel Field is
occupied
by the Cradle of Aviation museum and Nassau Colliseum, the home of the
New York Islanders ice hockey team. Roosevelt field is now an extensive
indoor shopping mall.

3) It is now generally accepted that it was Rex Barber
who
shot down
Yamamoto.

4) There has been much written on Charles Lindbergh's
contribution to
increasing the range of the P-38. Much of this falsely states why he
went
to the SWPA. Lindbergh's purpose in the SWPA was not originally to
instruct
P-38 pilots in fuel conservation methods. He arrived in the area as a
consultant
for United Aircraft. He visited the 5th Air Force Headquarters and
managed
to convince the brass to allow him to observe P-38 combat operations.
He
soon discovered that the pilots were not being efficient with fuel. The
P-38 manual called for cruise settings of 2,200 - 2,400 rpm in
auto-rich.
Lindbergh lectured on using 1,600 rpm in auto-lean.

5) Some sources list the leading edge tanks as having a
55
gallon capacity.
It is possible that both capacities may have been installed during the
production run. It is known that some early model P-38J aircraft were
retrofitted
with leading edge tanks, not standard on very early build aircraft.

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to Warren Bodie, Keith Meggs, Dave Prossor
and Lockheed
Corporation for their assistance in the preparation of this article. In
addition, special thanks is in order to Warren Bodie for the use of his
photographs and his
insightful discussions with the editor.

The author and editor would like to thank Capt.
Arthur
Heiden, USAF
(ret) for his insightful and generous commentary on ETO P-38 and P-51
fighter
issues through email correspondence with the author and editor in late
1998 and early 1999.

We also want to express our deepest thanks to
Captain Stan
Richardson Jr.
for his ongoing commentary on the P-38 and his experiences flying in
combat
and as a P-38 Instructor. Without the pilots of the P-38, this story
could
never be fully told.

This web document is an amended and greatly
expanded
version of a two part series published
in Australian Aviation, in 1992. It has been updated with a new layout
in 2010 and published in the APA Technical Report Series, as a result
of the original website going offline.