War of Attrition, 1969­1970

By Tom CooperSep 24, 2003, 20:09

After the end of the Six Day War, the Israelis attempted to develop gooddefensive positions along the borders of the newly conquered Sinai Peninsulaand on Golan. The Arabs ­ especially Egypt ­ were still under the shock ofthe severe defeat, but wanted to hit back at every opportunity. Initially,the Egyptian Air Force, re­named back from UARAF in 1968 ­ was foremosttrying to shake­down the sad memories and also the wrong lessons from itsSoviet instructors, who trained the Arab pilots to fight at high levels andintercept straight­flying targets using MiG­21s and air­to­air missiles.Neither the aircraft nor ist main armament, the R­3S (AA­2 Atoll) missile,were actually built to fight at low levels and against hard manoeuvringopponents, but the Egyptians were now about to adapt them for this task.Namely, the Israelis have deployed several long­range radar stations onmountain peaks of Sinai, as well as a number of MIM­23 HAWK SAM­sites, whileIDF/AF interceptors were permanently based at several local airfields,foremost Bir al­Jifjafa (now renamed into Refidim), from where they wereable to swiftly react to every Egyptian attack.

Recognizing the Israeli superiority in air combat arena, but willing to hitback, the Egyptians properly concluded that in order to hit their targets inSinai and return safely, they had to use the moment of surprise.Consequently, their fighter­bombers had to fly low. Another consequence wasthat the Egyptian interceptor­pilots had to learn how to fight with theirMiG­21s at low levels as well, then this was where they were now about toengage the Israelis. While they would be learning to do so, and becausethere was no guarantee that the MiGs could always intercept their targets intime, the SAMs were to increasingly take over the air defence of mostimportant areas.

The Israelis, on the other side, were foremost interested in holding theEgyptians back, but only enough not to provoke a major confrontation. Fromtheir standpoint it was imperative to impose heavy attrition upon the Arabs,showing them that all their efforts were in vain.

Despite the losses they were about to suffer, the Egyptians would not giveup: they would neither stop learning nor attacking the Israelis.Consequently, this process resulted in very intensive operations over theSuez and the Sinai, flown by both sides. It was eventually to become sopainful and costly for both sides, that by 1970 this "War of Attrition" wasmore than either Israel or Egypt could bear. Both sides were therefore morethan glad to be able to disengage under the pressure of foreign powers, theUSA and USSR.

The Soviets were relatively swift to replace the losses suffered by theUARAF during the Six Day War: by the end of the year over 70 MiG­21PFs andMiG­21PFMs were delivered, together with a similar number of MiG­17Fs, andsome Su­7s. Consequently, the UARAF did not took long to rebuilt itsstrength ­ at least theoretically ­ to the levels from before the war in1967. However, the UARAF has suffered a heavy loss in qualified pilots andneeded not only several years to train new crews, but even more so, workingaccording the "trial­and­error" method, it needed time and combat experienceto train these properly, while fighting from a position of a humiliatingdefeat.

Besides, the Egyptians had to go through this process with the sameequipment they had before and that was not only defeated in the Six Day War,but also more than well­known to the Israelis. The Soviets, interested inEgypt only from the aspect of the Cold War struggle for influence in theMiddle East and Africa, were neither ready nor really able to deliveraircraft and armament equal or superior to that of the Israelis. At thetime, the advanced versions of the MiG­21PF, and the old R­3S missile, wereactually the best they could supply. Certainly, they had a number ofslightly more powerful and capable systems in service at home, but theywould not supply these to the Arabs, and the worth of such fighters likeYak­25 or Su­9 for a conflict like fought between Egypt and Israel can onlybe questioned. The USSR, namely, was only now developing a new generation offighters ­ including MiG­23 and MiG­25, as well as the Su­15 ­ that weredesigned to challenge such Western types like F­104 Starfighter, F­105Thunderchief, and the F­4 Phantom in power and armament, and these were notto become ready for service for a number of years to come.

Therefore, the Egyptian Air Force ­ renamed back from "UARAF" in 1968 ­entered what later became known as the "War of Attrition" not onlyundermanned, but also undergunned and undertrained.

The Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) was to become the "third" factor in theair­to­air arena of the War of Attrition, but ­ even if it was not to seeanything like an involvement of the Egyptian or the Israeli air forces ­ itwas one to go through the most dramatic development in the time between 1967and 1973. From a relatively small force, capable only of limited pointdefence and badly damaged by Israeli raids in June 1967, the SyAAF wasdeveloped into a strong and professional force. The MiG­21­force wassignificantly increased, and the MiG­17­units reinforced. The Syrians havealso got Su­7s, but in general their fighter­bombers did not take part inthe fighting before the next war in 1973.

In all possible publications about the Egyptian and Syrian air forces it isoften explained how both were reorganized along "Soviet principles" afterthe Six Day War. This was only partially truth. For example, while both theEAF and the SyAAF have had their squadrons put under command by air brigadesor air regiments, the importance of the squadron remained the same as before­ something that was unheard of in the Soviet system. The Egyptians hadtheir Air Brigades organized already before the war in 1967, and havesubsequently only changed their designations: this was done several times,but was essentially everything. Actually all the Egyptian and Syrian unitsvery much continued following their traditions, even if many ­ especially inthe EAF ­ were re­named, or split into two units, re­equipped with differentaircraft, while some were disbanded. Even the use of unit insignia was notdiscontinued: it was only so that none was applied on aircraft. Within theSyAAF there was even less of the change, then the Air Brigade structure wasnot introduced until after the war in 1973, even if the number of units wasdoubled between 1967 and 1973.

Other Arab air arms were not to take part in the War of Attrition, even ifan Algerian detachment was active with the EAF until 1968, and from 1970again (albeit it was stationed in Libya during its second stint).

Above and bellow: immediately after the Six Day War the Egyptians startedcamouflaging their MiGs ­ a late measure, proposed several times alreadybefore the catastrophe of the 5 June 1967. In emergency, and lacking othersuitable colours, the Egyptians used a stock from a car factory at Hulwan!This early camouflage pattern was later to become known ­ albeit in amodified form ­ as "Nile Valley". It consisted of Sand, Black, and LightGrey colours. Serials were still applied, albeit not as prominently asbefore, and unit insignia completely disappeared: after all, innitiallyafter the Six Day War all the surviving aircraft and pilots wereconcentrated within two "Big Squadrons", and only slowly through 1968 werethe old units re­established. (all artworks by Tom Cooper unless otherwisestated)New Friends for the IDF/AF

The IDF/AF has suffered some pretty painful losses in aircraft and pilotsduring the Six Day War, and was then hit severely by the French embargo onarms deliveries, introduced because the French President de Gaulle feltpersonally insulted by the Israelis initiating the war despite his warningsnot to do so. While they were later able to recover or clandestinely receivesome powerful and capable systems in service at home, but they would notsupply these to the Arabs, and the worth of such fighters like Yak­25 or Su­9 for a conflict like fought between Egypt and Israel can only bequestioned. The USSR, namely, was only now developing a new generation offighters ­ including MiG­23 and MiG­25, as well as the Su­15 ­ that weredesigned to challenge such Western types like F­104 Starfighter, F­105Thunderchief, and the F­4 Phantom in power and armament, and these were notto become ready for service for a number of years to come.

Therefore, the Egyptian Air Force ­ renamed back from "UARAF" in 1968 ­entered what later became known as the "War of Attrition" not onlyundermanned, but also undergunned and undertrained.

The Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) was to become the "third" factor in theair­to­air arena of the War of Attrition, but ­ even if it was not to seeanything like an involvement of the Egyptian or the Israeli air forces ­ itwas one to go through the most dramatic development in the time between 1967and 1973. From a relatively small force, capable only of limited pointdefence and badly damaged by Israeli raids in June 1967, the SyAAF wasdeveloped into a strong and professional force. The MiG­21­force wassignificantly increased, and the MiG­17­units reinforced. The Syrians havealso got Su­7s, but in general their fighter­bombers did not take part inthe fighting before the next war in 1973.

In all possible publications about the Egyptian and Syrian air forces it isoften explained how both were reorganized along "Soviet principles" afterthe Six Day War. This was only partially truth. For example, while both theEAF and the SyAAF have had their squadrons put under command by air brigadesor air regiments, the importance of the squadron remained the same as before­ something that was unheard of in the Soviet system. The Egyptians hadtheir Air Brigades organized already before the war in 1967, and havesubsequently only changed their designations: this was done several times,but was essentially everything. Actually all the Egyptian and Syrian unitsvery much continued following their traditions, even if many ­ especially inthe EAF ­ were re­named, or split into two units, re­equipped with differentaircraft, while some were disbanded. Even the use of unit insignia was notdiscontinued: it was only so that none was applied on aircraft. Within theSyAAF there was even less of the change, then the Air Brigade structure wasnot introduced until after the war in 1973, even if the number of units wasdoubled between 1967 and 1973.

Other Arab air arms were not to take part in the War of Attrition, even ifan Algerian detachment was active with the EAF until 1968, and from 1970again (albeit it was stationed in Libya during its second stint).

Above and bellow: immediately after the Six Day War the Egyptians startedcamouflaging their MiGs ­ a late measure, proposed several times alreadybefore the catastrophe of the 5 June 1967. In emergency, and lacking othersuitable colours, the Egyptians used a stock from a car factory at Hulwan!This early camouflage pattern was later to become known ­ albeit in amodified form ­ as "Nile Valley". It consisted of Sand, Black, and LightGrey colours. Serials were still applied, albeit not as prominently asbefore, and unit insignia completely disappeared: after all, innitiallyafter the Six Day War all the surviving aircraft and pilots wereconcentrated within two "Big Squadrons", and only slowly through 1968 werethe old units re­established. (all artworks by Tom Cooper unless otherwisestated)

New Friends for the IDF/AF

The IDF/AF has suffered some pretty painful losses in aircraft and pilotsduring the Six Day War, and was then hit severely by the French embargo onarms deliveries, introduced because the French President de Gaulle feltpersonally insulted by the Israelis initiating the war despite his warningsnot to do so. While they were later able to recover or clandestinely receivesome Israeli sources deny this, stressing that only between 40 and 80 werefound. Whatever the truth, the fact is that at least a dozen were later sentto the USA, around two dozens fired in testing in Israel, while some werefinally pressed into service with the IDF/AF. Namely, the "indigenous"Israeli Shafrir Mk.1 air­to­air missile proved a failure, and after the SixDay War the IDF/AF found itself without any useful weapon of this type: theShafrir Mk.2 was still in development, while the US­built AIM­9 Sidewinderwas not yet available. Consequently, the Israelis have armed a number oftheir Mirage IIICJs with the R­3S, and ­ according to USAF records ­ startedusing the weapon in combat (conflicting Israeli reports indicate that somekills were scored by the weapons, but others say that while deployed, theywere eventually never used in combat).

Clearly, having all of these assets at hand was making the Israelisexceptionally interesting for the USA. The situation was only to improve ­from the Israeli standpoint ­ in the following years, when the IDF/AFstarted encountering Soviet­built systems in Arab arsenal that were farsuperior to anything the USA have encountered in Vietnam. Eventually, thedirect US involvement on the Israeli side, and the correspondingintensification of the Soviet involvement on the Arab side, were to havesome quite unpredictable repercussions ­ not only on the political arena,but even more so in the arena of air warfare.

Basic Principles

Interestingly, despite their ferocity, the air combats during the War ofAttrition have not influenced the development of new weapons in the way thiswas the case with the air warfare during the subsequent war in 1973. Thiseven if most of the clashes between the Israelis and Egyptians have not onlyconfirmed classic theories about the methods of fighting for airsuperiority, but have also seen the introduction of many new weapons. All ofthese weapons ­ with exception of electronic countermeasures ­ however, werealready existing and developed before the outbreak of the Attrition War.Besides, neither side was actually fighting for some kind of a clear airsuperiority in strategic sense: the Israelis could not establish airsuperiority over Egypt, for example, without starting an all­out war, whilethe Egyptians could not establish air superiority even over Sinai, becausethey lacked corresponding weapons system and personnel needed to make themcapable of this task. Instead, both sides were doing their best to simplycause losses to the other side.

Consequently, there was no frontal collision between the EAF and the IDF/AF,but rather a series of piecemeal campaigns, limited in scope and intention,all the time followed by periods of relative peace, used for re­assessmentsof the situation, acquisition of new equipment (if available), additionaltraining and planning of new operations. The air­to­air battles werecharacterized by high tempo and swift manoeuvres, in which each sideattempted to inflict as much damage to the other as possible within theshortest period of time and at lowest possible cost. Neither side possessedthe distinct initiative, even if ­ due to distinctive advantages in trainingand technology ­ the IDF/AF was usually able to operate according to ownideas, and thus inflict heavy losses upon the Arabs. The Israeli operationswere characterized by:

­ Operations in reinforced strike and demonstrative groups, consisting of

aircraft flown by hand­picked highly experienced pilots;

­ Extensive use of deception manoeuvring;

­ Operations in demonstration groups, flyng at different places, differentcourses, and against different targets than the main strike group, thatusually waited below the radar horizon or behind terrain obstacles thatdisturbed the radar picture, with the task of luring the opponent in thefront of the stike group;

­ Gradual introduction of several types of improved air­to­air missiles,

starting with AIM­9D Sidewinder (the liquid­cooled version developed by theUSN), and then Shafrir Mk.2, which caused an increase in engagement ranges,but also ­ due to limited front­aspect capability of these two weapons, andtheir good engagement envelope from the rear aspect ­ further shortened theduration of engagements;

­ The deployment of the AIM­7E and then AIM­7E­2 "all­aspect" semi­active­radar­homing, medium range air­to­air missiles on IDF/AF F­4 Phantoms had avery small impact on the overall flow of air­to­air battles: these wereespecially not used at ranges "beyond the visual range" (BVR). In fact, theeffective range from which they could have been used at the time was on thebrink of the visual range ­ i.e. 10­12km ­ and well­known for theirunreliability, so that the pilots tended to use them from shorter ranges,and then mainly to break cohesion of Arab formations and put Arab pilots ondefensive early during the engagement. But, in general, Israeli Phantom­pilots were doing their best to avoid engagements with small (i.e.problematic to sight) and more nimble MiGs, while they considered theSparrow a very poor weapon as well. Eventually, there was only a singleengagement fought over "BVR" distance during this conflict, and that wasset­up especially on US pressure.

Due to these facts alone, the Israelis tended to have the advantage of beingin the offensive during most of the air­to­air engagements. Strategically,however, they were not interested in a wider conflict, and consequently itcan be said that the Egyptians had the advantage of being in the offensivefor most of 1968 and 1969. Clearly, the Israeli extensive testing of MiG­17sand MiG­21s helped them obtain intimate knowledge about the weaknesses oftheir opposition's armament, and their best pilots developed highlyeffective tactics for flying Mirage IIICJ in dogfights against ­theoretically ­ more nimble MiGs. This tactics was mainly dependent on thefact that original R­3S missiles as supplied to the Arabs used were not onlytechnically unreliable, but also had a very narrow engagement envelope and apoor tracking capability, as well as that the Arab MiG­21­pilots were notvery skilled in flying their aircraft at critically low speeds. The MiG­21PFs and MiG­21PFMs that were the mainstay of the EAF at the time alsolacked the guns. Given that the minimal engagement range of the R­3S was800m, and that it was essentially useless at levels bellow 500m, while mostof the engagements of the Attrition War were fought at low levels and rangesaround 400­700 meters, the MiGs were actually unarmed. Their pilotstherefore had to look for executing slash attacks from the rear hemisphereagainst non­manoeuvring Israeli fighters, and learn doing so from rangesbetween 800 and 1.500m.

The Israelis, on the other side, would in air combat use the large delta­wings of their Mirages as air breakes to execute very tight turns and pointtheir aircraft at the opponent, followed by the use of the afterburner toaccelerate back into the fight. Such turns were excellent measure against R­3S, but would usually also enable the Mirage to position behind the MiG.Besides, the theoretically dangerous use of the afterburner was not thatmuch of a problem in a situation where enemy infra­red homing missiles wereusually useless. The situation could thus only change by the widespread useof the guns on MiGs, and due to more reliable and effective missiles ­ butalso by much training of Arab pilots, which were not only flying more bytheir own instincts than according to any official tactical methods but alsoregularly firing their missiles too early (before all the firing parameterswere established). It is pretty certain that the poor sighting over the longnose of the MiG­21 was one of decisive points for the later factor.Certainly, in a conflict against pilots that were so expertly trained inaerial gunnery ­ like Israelis were ­ the EAF had to suffer extensive lossesbefore learning the lesson, and before being equipped with better­armedaircraft.

The air­to­air weaponry used during the War of Attrition was initiallyrelatively simple: guns (which most of Arab MiG­21s were lacking) were used­ usually with deadly results ­ from distances of 50 to 100 meters; air­to­air missiles at distances from 700 to 3.000 meters. The surviving MiG­21F­13s in EAF and SyAAF were armed with the NR­30, 30mm cannon, which was apowerful weapon, and were bellowed by pilots for this fact, as well as theiragility. The MiG­21PF, MiG­21PFMs and similar sub­variants carried no suchweapon and it would take some time until at least some were equipped withthe gun­pod containing a two­barrel GSh­23 cannon, calibre 23mm. From thespring of 1970 also the much improved MiG­21MF was delivered to Egypt. Thiswas not only equally fast like Phantom and Mirage at low levels, but alsoarmed with built­in GSh­23 gun, and had also an additional hardpoint pereach wing, enabling the theoretical capability to carry four air­to­airmissiles. At the time the R­3S was the main armament of the aircraft, thiswas an important improvement, then it was often enough the case that both R­3S used by pilots of MiG­21PF/PFMs either malfunctioned or were fired out ofthe envelope: a MiG­21MF­pilot could not attempt a second attack withremaining two missiles, or fire all four in quick succession, thusincreasing the probability of a hit. Nevertheless, this capability was notvery often used, except by aircraft assigned for point defence: namely,during the Attrition War combat endurance was less important than the range,then especially the Egyptian MiGs were all too often confronted by Israelifighter­bombers that were underway at a very high speed, and attemptingtheir best to avoid interception. Consequently, the speed and the range weremore important than the number of reasons, and for this reason theadditional underwing pylons were more frequently used for carriage ofadditional fuel tanks.

The Israeli problems with early air­to­air missiles were already describedto some degree above. From 1969, however, they started getting AIM­9DSidewinders from the USA. These missiles were a considerable improvementcompared to either the earlier AIM­9B (which Israel has never got), or itsSoviet­copy,, the R­3S, then they were equipped with cooled seeker heads,with expanded envelope and tracking capability. Almost simultaneously withfirst deliveries of the AIM­9D the Israelis had finally brought also theShafrir Mk.2 to a standard that permitted its deployment. The availabilityof the AIM­9D almost killed the Shafrir project, but eventually the decisionwas brought to start the production of the second version and ­ althoughthis was not to prove as sophisticated in specific aspects as the US­weapon­ the Shafrir was to prove more reliable and eventually score not only morekills during the Attrition War, but also become improved into the ultimateair­to­air weapon of the subsequent Yom Kippour/Teshreen War, in 1973.

With the arrival of the first F­4E Phantoms, in September 1969, the IDF/AFwas also equipped with the AIM­7E Sparrow, a semi­active radar­homingweapon. Although the Sparrow was offering the advantage of a considerablyexpanded range (theoretically, it could be fired from distances as far as15­20km from the targets), their pilots were not especially enthusiasticabout it, finding this weapon complicated to use in manoeuvring battles andat low levels, and insufficiently reliable. Eventually, only very few killswere to be scored during the whole Attrition War, at least two of which werestaged after heavy US­pressure. Sparrow eventually became the weapon ofchoice for Israeli Phantom­pilots that were underway on attack missions,then two could always be carried in the rear bays on the underside of theaircraft, not interfering with the carriage of bombs, ECM­pods, or externalfuel tanks: consequently, even if the F­4 was carrying a maximal bomb­load,it could always take also two Sparrows for self­defence. Disappointed,however, the Israelis were to overcome even this problem, however, then theysubsequently developed indigenous pylons for Sidewinder that could bemounted into Sparrow­bays of their Phantoms! These were to enter service by1973 at least.

In the Begin...

The War of Attrition actually began only days after the end of the Six DayWar: on 1 July 1967 Egyptian commandos attacked an Israeli armouredformation near Ras al­Ushsh. Even if already active, the UARAF was not yetfully ready to hit back: most of Egyptian airfields were repairedsufficiently to permit normal operations already before the ceasefire on 10June, but the UARAF still needed some time to get new aircraft, reorganizebattered units, and put together all the available pilots and personnel.

Through late June and early July 1967 the USSR was swift to supply a largenumber of new MiG­21s, Su­7s, and MiG­17s to Egypt: actually, the Egyptianspreferred MiG­21s and MiG­17s to anything else, while also asking Sovietsfor more powerful aircraft that could increase their offensive capability.Moscow refused to deliver anything similar (like Yak­25s), insteadpreferring to develop and train the EAF in a purely defensive air arm,capable only of defending the air space over the Nile Delta, but wassupplying Su­7s as well ­ to offer some kind of high­speed offensivecapability. This lead to a sort of contradiction, as Egyptians tried to usetheir air power in a manner similar to that of the Israelis, while lackingthe technology, firepower, and experience. Under such circumstances, the EAFwas clearly on the best way to suffer extensive losses.

On 4 July 1967, the EAF flew the first offensive operation of this period,striking several targets in Sinai, but losing one MiG­17 in the process. AMiG­21 equipped for reconnaissance was sent over Israeli positions near el­Qantara on 8 July, but also shot down by air defences. Nevertheless, Cairoremained stubborn and the EAF was ordered to dispatch two Su­7s equippedwith recce cameras into a new mission on the next morning. The Sukhois didseveral turns over the Sinai without facing any opposition, and in theafternoon the mission was repeated by two other Su­7s. This time, however,the Israelis waited for them, and one fighter was shot down by Mirages.

The EAF reacted by placing all its flying units on alert, and then startinga series of strikes against different Israeli positions. The situationculminated between the 11 and 15 July, when the IDF/AF deployed twosquadrons of Mirage IIICJs to stop Egyptian attacks. In numerous aircombats, the Israelis downed a total of two Su­7s, one MiG­17, and severalMiG­21s. The Egyptians claimed to have shot down up to 15 enemies, but infact their MiG­21s downed one Mirage the pilot of which ejected safely.

Subsequently, the Soviets forced the Egyptians to stand down, and continuethe reorganization of their armed forces. But, in mid­October 1967, the EAFwas back in the air and on offensive again, and new strikes were flown. TheIDF/AF used the short break to develop two forward bases ­ at Bir Jifjafa,now called Refidim, and Ras Nisrani, now called Ophir. Each airfield had atlest four Mirages and sometimes also other aircraft on temporary deployment,with their crews on constant alert in order to be able to react to anyEgyptian attack. In their first operation out of Refidim, on 12 October, forexample, Israeli Mirages downed four Egyptian MiG­19s. On 21 October 1967,however, it was the Egyptian Navy which hit back, when its fast missilecrafts sunk the Israeli destroyer Eilat with three SS­N­2 Styx surface­to­surface missiles. This was a turning point in the development of the navalwarfare, then for the first time anti­ship missiles have proven their worthand capability of disabling major warships. Until that time this was only atheory, and although some smaller navies were already well­armed with fastmissile crafts now all the larger navies around the world started to armtheir major ships with anti­ship missiles as well.

Through 1969 and 1970 modified versions of the Nile Valley camouflagepattern were developed, including this one. Due to the heavy wear onaircraft it is not sure if the main colour in this case was indeed OliveGreen: possibly, it was also Black, but it faded over the time. Note thegun­pod for the GSh­23 cannon carried under the centreline: the Egyptianslearned their lesson of lacking gun armament on the MiG­21PF and MiG­21PFMand were swift to obtain a number of these pods. It remains unclear,however, if any were used during the Attrition War.

The Siege of Israel

By late 1967 and early 1968 the situation on the Suez quietened down, butnow the Palestinian fighters became active with a series of attacks againstIsraeli troops, staged out of Jordan. Because of this, on 21 March 1968, theIDF initiated the operation "Inferno" ­ a joint­forces strike againstPalestinian bases around the city of Karameh, inside Jordan. The operationwas initiated by helicopters deploying paras around the city, and then anarmoured force attacking the bases. But, disturbed by the bad weather, thehelicopters were late, and in the following battle the coordination of theIsraeli forces broke down, causing heavy losses to the IDF.

On 8 September 1968, the Egyptian Army opened artillery fire against allIsraeli positions along the Suez, killing ten Israelis and injuring 18. TheIsraelis attempted to respond, bombarding Suez and Ismailia. Two days later,EAF MiG­17s hit two Israeli posts in Sinai, losing one plane to Mirages, andon 31 October another Egyptian artillery strike killed 14 Israelis. Thistime, the IDF reacted with a commando attack, and in the following night thehelicopters of the 123rd Sqn were used to deploy commandos at two Egyptiandams on Nile, the transformator station at Naj Hammadja, and the QeenaBridge. All four targets were heavily damaged, and the operation caused ashock in Egypt, as it was clear now, that the Israelis can strike all aroundthe country. The EAF responded by another MiG­17­strike, on 3 November, andthis time Israeli interceptors were less successful, as during the ensuingcombats with escorting MiG­21s no Egyptians were shot down, but one Miragedamaged.

After replacing the old S­58 helicopters of the 124th Sqn. by newer Bell205s, on 1 December 1968 the IDF/AF launched another commando operation,"Iron", against four bridges near Amman. This was a highly successfulenterprise, in which all targets were destroyed without causing any lossesto Jordanian or Palestinian civilian population. Two days later it was turnon PLO­bases in Jordan to be attacked, and while the strike flown by fourSMB.2s was successful, one of the Israeli fighters was subsequently damagedduring a brief air combat with RJAF Hunters.

After two new air combats ­ including one with Egyptians, on 12 December, inwhich a MiG­17 was shot down; and one with Syrians, on 24 December, in whichtwo MiG­21s were destroyed ­ the next Israeli heliborne commando raid wasundertaken on 28 December against the Beirut International Airport (IAP), bya force flown in Super Frelons and Bell 205s and in attempt to punishLebanon for tolerating concentrations of Palestinian fighters on its soil.Within minutes, the Israelis blocked the roads to the airfield, and thendestroyed 13 airliners of the Lebanese Middle East Airline before pullingout without any losses. The attack on Beirut IAP was a considerable shockfor the Arabs, then it was not only executed in quite a nonchalant manner(the IDF commander of the raiding party walked into a restaurant of the mainbuilding and ordered a coffee), but also once again proved how far were theIsraelis ready to go in retaliation for Arab terrorist attacks. It was,however, not to have any deterrent effects.

Meanwhile, by the late 1968, the EAF was completely reorganized into twoseparate arms. The EAF was now to control foremost the strike assets, likeSu­7s, MiG­17s, and MiG­21s, while the air defence of the Egyptian air spacewas taken over by the EAF/Air Defence Command, which controlled two brigadesof manned interceptors (MiG­21s) and several units equipped with SAMs andradars. The EAF/ADC was now to ease the burden of the EAF, and concentrateon fighting for air superiority over the Suez Channel, along which meanwhileno less but 150.000 Egyptian soldiers were deployed, while the EAF (nowcounting something like 50 MiG­21s, 80 MiG­19s, 120 MiG­17, 40 Su­7s, 40 Il­28s and a dozen or so Tu­16s) was to hit the Israelis on the Sinai. TheSyrian Air Force was also back on the line, boasting a total of around 60MiG­21s, 70 MiG­17s and 20 Su­7s by January 1969. In both air forces, newerMiG­21PFs have partially replaced the older MiG­21F­13s in interceptorunits, and Su­7BMKs have taken the role of primary strikers from MiG­17s.Nevertheless, the Egyptians have upgraded their MiG­17s by adding newhardpoints and making them capable of carrying more weapons. While stillheavily dependant of the Soviet help and instructions, both the EAF and theSyAAF have re­started their cooperation, as well as cooperation withnumerous other air forces, foremost the Iraqi, Pakistani, Indian, Saudi andsome others.

The Israelis, on their side, have meanwhile built a series of fortificationsalong the Suez, which became known as the "Bar­Lev Line". This Line wasactually established foremost to make any Egyptian attempt to swiftly crossthe Canal and break deeper into Sinai before the Israeli Army could bemobilized, but not to completely prevent or stop any such efforts. However,with the time, misreporting about the Bar­Lev Line lead to the Israelipublic developing a feeling about these fortifications being similar tothose established in the well­known French "Maginot" Line. In connectionwith exaggerated claims about the superiority of the IDF in comparison ofthe Arab militaries, the Israeli public believed the "Bar­Lev Line" to be"impenetrable": this was later to have severe repercussions for thegovernment in Jerusalem during and after the war in 1973.

During February 1969, the IDF/AF bombed several targets inside Syria, andwhen Syrian interceptors reacted new air combats developed in which two MiG­17s and two MiG­21s were shot down. Actually, at the time the Israeli AirForce was still in a pretty bad shape, as the acquisition of new aircraftwas initially slow. But, with US help, this was now rapidly to change. Asfirst, Washington finally started to deliver 48 A­4E Skyhawks, and then alsoagreed to deliver 44 F­4E Phantoms. Very soon and again with the US help,the cooperation with France was re­established in a clandestine operation,which saw delivery of 50 "embargoed" Mirage 5Js in crates to Israel with thehelp of US C­5 Galaxy transports. These aircraft were not the same 50 Mirage5J built for Israel: these were taken by the French Air Force. Instead,between 1969 and 1971 Dassault has built a new series: the aircraft werepaid for by the USA and then shipped to IAI, which put them together betweenlate 1969 and 1973, explaining in the public that it was beginningproduction of an "indigenous" Israeli fighter, originally called Mirage Mod,but later Nesher. Officially, this was "possible" due to cooperation of aSwiss engineer who should have "revealed" the secrets of Mirage 5 to Israel(and was even sentenced to several years of prison for doing this!).However, the company for which he was working was involved only in theproduction of Atar engines, and he could in no way have supplied the entiretechnical documentation need for the Israelis to build a completely newfighter. Actually, the whole operation had to be organized in such manner becauseFrench were now officially "Arab­friends", and ­ after the coup against theEmperor Idriz of Libya, which brought Col. Qaddafi to power ­ supplyingMirage III and 5 fighters also to Libya (where these were actually flown byEgyptian pilots)! The clandestine US­French­Israeli connection was finallyso far developed, that it lead to a project in which Mirage 5 was to bemated with a US­supplied J­79 engines by the IAI, in a project lead by USdesigner ­ Gene Salvay. Thus the "Kfir" came into being, which, however,entered production only after the war in 1973. Nevertheless, in the meantimethe IAI was able to ­ again with considerable US support ­ re­engine itsfleet of surviving Super Mystére B.2s with the J52 engine from the A­4Skyhawk. This necessitated a longer fuselage, but offered a considerableadvantage, then the aircraft could now carry a heavier payload as well.Consequently, they were equipped with additional hardpoints too.

From 1968 the IDF/AF received the first batch of 48 A­4E Skyhawks. Theselight fighters could nevertheless carry large amounts of weapons and were toprove their worth beyond any doubt, eventually leading to IDF/AF orderingadditional examples of the A­4N, a version specifically developed accordingto the needs of the IDF/AF. (artwork by Mario Golenko)

The Wild West

On 8 March 1969 the Egyptians launched a new offensive over the Suez, actingentirely with the air force and artillery. A large EAF formation hit anumber of Israeli command posts, depots and artillery positions in Sinai. Anescorting section of four MiG­21s, led by Maj. Shamala, was directed againstfour intercepting Mirages, led by Giora Yoeli and Michael Tzuk, underwayalong the canal. The EAF leader jettisoned his drop tank but also both R­3Smissiles his aircraft carried in a mistake, so he had to hand over theinterception to the rear pair of MiGs. This delay enabled the Israelis tospot the MiGs and attack. Eventually, the rear pair of MiGs was then able tosandwich the Israelis, hitting one with an R­3S missile. Eventually,however, the lead Israeli pair won overhand over the lead pair of MiGs: asTzuk entered scissors against Lt. Abd el­Baki, flying the MiG­21 Number 2,Yoeli positioned behind him, and when the Egyptian lost energy whilemanoeuvring with Tzuk he was shot down by Yoeli. Lt. el­Baki ejected and wastaken PoW.

Several hours later, the Egyptian artillery opened a massive barrage againstthe Bar­Lev Line, and President Nasser declared on radio, that Egypt isstarting the "War of Attrition". The massive Egyptian onslaught forced theIDF/AF to change its overall strategy. Bearing in mind that the EAF wasflying over the Sinai every day, and that Egyptian pilots were obviouslyeager to engage, the Israeli interceptors were not to wait any more for theenemy, but were to be used offensively, foremost by luring the enemy intopre­selected areas where these could then be cut off from eventual supportand shot down.

Additional clashes occurred through March, April, and then in May, the EAFlosing a MiG­21 or two each time the Israelis set up a new trap for almostno gains in exchange. Several air battles from this period are interesting,then meanwhile accounts from both sides are now available, showing thatduring some of the fierce clash both sides were apparently taken bysurprise. On 14 April, for example, a pair of Mirage IIICJs from 119Squadron, flown by Reuven Rosen and Menachen Eyal, was scrambled fromRefidim AB to intercept a formation of Su­7s on reconnaissance mission overSinai. The Sukhois were escorted by four MiGs, the second pair of which wasflown by Capt. Aziz Mikhail and Ismail Imam. The Israeli leader did a seriesof mistakes, starting with forgetting to jettison his drop tank:consequently, he was at a distadvantage after only a couple of turns, andhad a MiG at his 6 o'clock. Entering scissors against the MiG, however,Rosen managed to gain advantage despite his problems: the MiG overshoot andthen extended in an attempt to regain speed, swiftly distancing to more than1.200m. Rosen then fired a Sidewinder and shot the MiG down. Meanwhile Eyalengaged another MiG and damaged it with a Sidewinder, forcing the Egyptianto disengage. Meanwhile, Mikhail was on Eyal's tail, but the Israelisuccessfully disengaged. Rosen failed to do so and this was his secondmistake in that engagement: in an attempt to hit another MiG, he failed tosee Mikhail behind his Mirage, and got hit by a R­3S. While the Egyptianclaimed a kill, Rosen managed a successful emergency landing at Refidim.

The number of air battles in which the Israelis did such mistakes, and theEgyptians did as well, however, remained relatively low, and most werepretty one­sided. On 21 May, for example, the Israelis almost completelydestroyed two sections of four Egyptian MiG­21s each, downing four of themin air combats and one by MIM­23A Hawk SAMs. The Egyptians claimed oneMirage as shot down, and explained the pilot ejected only to drawn in theSuez Canal.

From June 1969, the IDF intensified its operations, starting with ademonstration flight of four Mirages over Cairo, on 17th of the month. Threedays later the Operation "Rimonim" was initiated, with the objective ofluring EAF interceptors into an area south of the Suez City, which was notwell covered by the Egyptian radar net. In a series of battles here by 7July, a total of nine MiG­21s and one MiG­17 were shot down, in exchange fora single Mirage IIICJ, lost on 26 June. In another ­ completely unrelated ­air combat, caused by the activity of Israeli recce aircraft over Syria, on8 July 1969, seven Syrian MiG­21s were shot down as well.

Nevertheless, Israeli pilots were not to get any rest. After an Egyptiancommando attack against IDF installations in Sinai, on 18 July 1969, theIDF/AF was chosen to answer and three days later the Operation "Boxer" waslaunched: in 171 combat sorties, the Israelis dropped something like 200tsof bombs on Egyptian SAM­sites and artillery positions. The EAF reacted onlyin the afternoon of 20 July with a strike against Israeli SAM­sites, but thestrike package was intercepted while over the target and four aircraft wereshot down by Mirages, in exchange for two Israeli fighters shot down by MiG­21s. Because of this, the IDF/AF intensified the operation Boxer for a fullweek, during which a total of over 700 combat sorties was flown. The resultwas a complete break­down of the EAF/ADF's net of SAM­sites and radars alongthe Suez, massive destruction of the artillery positions, and the loss ofeight MiGs. "Boxer" was the first operation in which the IDF/AF flew pre­planned and well coordinated strikes against integrated air defencesincluding SAM­sites, and it proved highly successful, especially as the SA­2bs could not target the low­flying Israeli aircraft.

Still, due to swift Soviet deliveries of new weapons, the EAF/ADF was fastto recover, and the IDF/AF was ­ now in the role of Israeli "flyingartillery" ­ compelled to start another massive operation, "Drizzle",initiated in the night from 9 to 10 September. This started with commandoattacks against Egyptian missile crafts, and a landing of a commando­party,equipped with captured T­55 tanks and BTR­50 APCs near the port of Ras el­Sadat. The raiders drove between the SAM­sites, destroying one after theother, and causing havoc in Egyptian organization. On the following morningthe IDF/AF hit additional targets, causing ever more destruction and losses,even if losing one SMB.2 in the process, together with the pilot.

Within six weeks of launching "Boxer", the Israelis flew over 1.000 combatsorties, destroyed two dozens of SAM­sites, and shot down 21 Egyptianaircraft, in exchange for three own fighters. Nevertheless, already on 11September, the EAF hit back, deploying over 100 fighter­bombers againstIsraeli SAM­sites. Near el­Qantara four Mirages tried to cut off a formationof eight MiG­17s, several Su­7s, and eight MiG­21s, causing an air battlethat extended over the Egyptian airspace, ending almost directly over theFayid AB. While five MiG­21s were shot down by the Israelis, Maj. FawziSalama shot down the IDF/AF leading "ace" of the time, Giora Rom. Shortlylater, in another engagement Lt. Ghema shot down Capt. Jacob Roun when thisattempted to catch one of the MiGs that was in the landing pattern. TheEgyptians also claimed that Capt. Mikhail shot down a Mirage IIICJ flown bypilot named Weintraub, but this kill was not confirmed, while the Israelisclaimed two additional kills, for a total of seven on this day (includingfour MiG­21s, two Su­7s and one MiG­17).

Subsequently the Egyptians even increased the pace of their operations, andon 28 October their Mi­8s deployed a commando­party near an enemy basealmost 100km east of el­Qantara, causing surprise and losses to theIsraelis. Such operations were a reason of grave concerns on the Israeliside, which tried to downplay the Egyptian successes, explaining that theseare not capable of causing any damage, while superimposing feats of theIDF/AF's aces. The fact was, that the EAF and the EAF/ADF suffered extensivelosses in the summer of 1969, and that they were not especially successfulagainst the Israelis in the air, but also that the EAF was also hitting backvery hard, causing losses and damage too.

Therefore, the War of Attrition was continued, and on 6 October 1969, theIDF/AF was again in action, deploying 200 fighters to attack Egyptian SAM­sites along the Suez. During these operations, Israeli aircraft ­ foremostA­4 Skyhawks ­ were carrying ECM­pods for the first time, and wereapparently also supported by a Vautour or two, equipped for supportingstrike packages with electronic countermeasures, but also monitoring theenemy emissions. Due to this, even if the Egyptians had more SAM­sites, andwere now firing many more SAMs, only one out of at least a hundred of SA­2sexploded near one A­4, causing some damage. When the EAF tried to strikeback, two Su­7s were shot down, and the strike package was forced to abort.

Even if they would not admit this in public, by the time the Egyptians werenow definitely on the end of their capability to continue the war at thesame pace. Between July 1967 and November 1969, the EAF and the EAF/ADF havesuffered a loss of 51 combat aircraft, of which 34 in air combats, nine toAAA, and eight to Israeli MIM­23 Hawk SAMs. The Egyptians have also lost atleast 30 SAM­sites and over 1.500 soldiers.

Mirage IIICJ remained the mainstay of the Israeli fighter fleet for most ofthe Attrition War, and was the main interceptor even after the arrival ofthe first Phantoms. The type ­ nick­named "Shahak" in IDF/AF service ­chalked an impressive score of over 100 air­to­air victories during thisconflict. The example shown here in the colours of the 101 Squadron, wasflown by Eitan Ben­Eliyahu when he claimed his first kill, on 8 July 1969.

Israeli Hammers

The situation was now to change, as the IDF/AF was short or introducing anew weapon in the War of Attrition: the powerful, fast, and lethal McDonnellDouglas F­4E Phantom II. The Phantom was the aircraft which was to fascinatenot only the Israelis, but also their enemies to a degree where in thefuture these were prone to declare any Israeli aircraft they saw for a"Phantom", in the manner similar to the years before, where almost eachdowned IDF fighter was either a "Mystére" or "Mirage" ­ regardless itsactual type!

The arrival of the F­4E in Israel was foremost important because the typewas so powerful that it could fly over 300km deep into Egypt, carrying morebombs than almost a squadron of SMB.2s, at a speed of Mirage III, albeit ata much more comfort (especially in the low­level ride) and security for thecrew, and still carrying missiles for self­defence. The F­4E was also tochange the behaviour of Israeli pilots in air combats: the early Phantomsthey have got were still un­slated, and thus slightly less manoeuvrable thanthe MiG­21s or Mirages, albeit, they were much better armed. Therefore,initially after their introduction, the IDF/AF was apparently reluctant touse them for air combats, and rather tended to deploy them in demonstrationgroups which would initiate any operation by either attacking some target onthe ground, or dragging enemy interceptors towards places where smaller andmore agile Mirages waited in ambush. The Phantom introduced also moremodern, built­in, ECM­systems to the IDF/AF, which were not only showing thethreat to the pilot, warning him to start evasive manoeuvring, like standardRWRs, already introduced on Skyhawks and upgraded SMB.2s, but alsoautomatically jamming enemy radars. In addition, the aircraft had anintegrated navigation and attack suite, which was easing the work of thecrew.

Neither the Egyptians nor the Soviets could put anything similar like the F­4E into the air: the Soviets would not supply them any of their more modernor powerful fighters (not that they have had many at the time, as the newgeneration with MiG­23s and MiG­25s was still in the development phase), andthe Libyan deal for Mirage III/5s was still in its early stages. What Moscowmade available were Su­20s, which at the time were a simple derivative ofthe Su­7B, albeit with wings which outside parts could be swept, thussimplifying operations, while increasing the payload and range. However,even the Su­20s would not reach Egypt before 1972.

Meanwhile, the Israeli Phantoms flew their first combat missions in theframe of the Operation "Pirkha", initiated on 22 October 1969, with a strikeof four Phantoms against two Egyptian SAM­sites near Abu Sawayr AB. Thepower of the new fighter was immediately demonstrated: a pair of Phantomscould drop up to 18 Mk.82 bombs calibre 250kg against a single SAM­site. Noobject could survive such pounding, especially not the sensitive radarstations, non­armoured command vans, and launchers, and the Egyptian losseswere heavy. Yet, the IDF/AF was to further increase the pressure. On 4November, Phantoms were also "shown" to the citizens of Cairo, when four ofthem thundered low over the Egyptian capital, and on 11 November, theydowned their first MiG­21, during an air combat over Jebel Ataka, afteranother ambush was set up south of Suez. From that time on for the next twomonths, the two IDF/AF­units equipped with Phantoms were targeting oneEgyptian SAM­site after the other, destroying at least three dozens of themby late December, including no less but eight on 15 December. As if thiswould not be enough, on 23 December the Israelis mounted a commando raid,which captured an Egyptian P­12 radar recently placed some 200km south ofthe Suez City. The radar and the support equipment were subsequently loadedunder two CH­53 helicopters, and then flown out to Israel (some say, via aUS aircraft carrier, waiting for the helicopters in the Red Sea).

One of the two first IDF/AF units to operate the mighty F­4E Phantom II wasthe 69/Patishim Squadron. The example here is shown carrying a load of fiveM­117 bombs under the centreline, two Sidewinders under inboard underwingpylons, two Sparrows in the rear bays, and a QRC­335 ECM­pod ­ a load moreusually seen during the subsequent Yom Kippour War, but nevertheless clearlypresenting the immense warload the F­4Es could haul, and which made them alegend of their times. The availability of the F­4 was of immense importancefor Israel: although much more expensive in acquizition, they eventuallyenabled the IDF/AF to operate more efficiently, then a single Phantom couldcarry more bombs than four Mirages or eight SMB.2s. Thus, a formation ofeight Phantoms could obliterate up to four SAM­sites in a single strike ­ ajob for which the Israelis previously needed whole squadrons of earlierFrench­fighters. This capability enabled the IDF/AF to start its first SEAD­offensive in the frame of the Operation Blossom, but also fly numerous deep­penetration strike sorties, hitting targets all over Egypt. High Noon

The year 1970 was to begin very bad for the EAF, as the Israelis once againchanged their modus­operandi: highly experienced IDF/AF were now penetratingdeep into Egypt at a very low level, and attacking MiGs directly over theirair bases, preferably while in landing pattern, but often enough shortlyafter these were scrambled to intercept a demonstration group of Israeliaircraft. On 4 January, Mirages lured several MiGs into another ambush anddowned two of them. This caused the EAF to become very careful, as theIDF/AF was now seemingly constantly mounting such operations, while,actually, the Israelis had something else in mind: three days later twoPhantoms thundered in low level over the Suez, but instead of attacking someSAM­site, they continued straight towards Cairo, and then attacked the EAFtraining centre at Bilbeis. The surprise on the Egyptian side was complete:since the Six Day War, the IDF/AF flew no similar attacks so deep intoEgypt. This was now to change, however, as this attack signalized theinitialization of the Operation "Blossom", in which the IDF/AF was to gooffensive and establish a sort of air superiority along the Suez Canal.Three days later several ammunition depots near Cairo were hit. On 18January, also the bases near Hulwan, and the Camp Watza were attacked andseverely damaged. Each time, Egyptian interceptors were not able to react,as the fast and powerful Phantoms were back over Sinai before they could bescrambled.

In February the IDF/AF continued attacking EAF/ADF SAM­sites, usually

deploying eight F­4Es armed with M­117 bombs to hit several sitessimultaneously, foremost in the areas around Dahshur and Hulwan. During oneof these strikes, on 9 February, the Mirages and MiGs clashed once again,with each side losing one aircraft, even if the Egyptians claimed twoIsraelis as shot down: certainly, only the IDF/AF pilot Avinoam Keldes wascaptured. Over the following weeks and months the Israelis gradually movedtheir targets further south along the Red Sea coast, generating a series ofdeadly duels against the SAMs.

The Operation "Blossom" was obviously too successful: it clearly illustratedthe whole Egyptian military and civilian population, that the IDF/AF couldstrike all over Egypt and cause tremendous ­ sometimes shocking ­ damage andlosses, without even being disturbed. The war was thus brought directly toEgypt, and the leadership in Cairo compelled to request even more help fromthe Soviets. Moscow was not especially interested to increase the Egyptiancapability to fight: Moscow was interested in keeping Arabs under controland supplying them only with (what the Soviets though was) enough weapons todefend themselves, but nothing else. The Soviet leadership knew very wellthat any larger conflict could easily escalate into a direct confrontationwith the USA ­ and this could lead into an all­out global conflict. Besides,most of the Soviet leadership could simply not understand the Arab wish formore and more advanced weapons. Nevertheless, the USSR was not ready toadmit a defeat of its arms ­ especially not at the hand of a US­built systemsupplied to Israel. Consequently, a decision was taken to "show" ­ theEgyptians, Arabs, and the World ­ what the Soviets were able.

Before the first units of the Soviet Air Defence Force (V­PVO) could arrivein Egypt, however, the Operation "Blossom" was continued, with new attacksagainst targets deep inside Egypt being flown at least two or three times aweek. By 26 February, when the EAF/ADF MiG­21s managed for the first time toforce four Phantoms to abort their mission (albeit, losing three aircraft inan encounter with escorting Mirages), the F­4Es of the 69th and 201st Sqns.IDF/AF flew a total of 118 combat sorties deep into Egypt. In addition,Mirages and Phantoms equipped with reconnaissance equipment flew severaldozens of recce missions over all the Egyptian main bases, gathering immenseamounts of intelligence. In early March, some of these produced photosshowing the first Soviet troops which landed in Egypt. Israeli Mirage IIIRJs were very active during the Attrition War. Equippedwith a range of differently configured "reconnaissance noses", they rangeddeep over Egypt and Syria on a number of highly dangerous missions. Severaltimes their operations caused clashes with Egyptian fighters. From 1970their role was increasingly taken over by RF­4Es, but IIIRJs remained inservice until after the Yom Kippour War, and were subsequently replaced byreconnaissance versions of the IAI Kfir fighter.

Soviet Intervention

The deployment of Soviet units to Egypt was relatively swift, even if

gradual. Organized in the frame of the Operation "Kavkaz", the first unitsof the Soviet Air Defence Force, the V­PVO to arrive in Egypt were equippedwith SA­3 SAMs and early warning radars. A total of three SAM­brigadesarrived, one deploying along the Hulwan­Suez axis, another in the Alexandriaarea, and a third one defending Cairo and two other important bases. Thefirst SAM­site was declared operational on 15 March 1970.

Once these units were in place the V­PVO started deploying mannedinterceptors as well: these were flown by hand­picked and specially trainedpilots ­ all "1st" or "2nd Class Snipers" (Soviet equivalent for excellentfliers). They were formed into two regiments (one of which was 135th IAP),each equipped with 36 MiG­21MFs. The so­far unidentified regiment was undercommand of Col. Konstantin Korotyuk, and based in northern Egypt, onairfields in the Nile Delta, including el­Mansourah and Kom Awshim. Theother unit, the 135th IAP, was under command of Col. Yuriy Nastenko, andbased on airfields south­west of Suez, including Kutamiyah, Cairo West, andBani Suwayf. The Soviet pilots were scrambled for the first time on 18 April1970, when two IDF/AF RF­4E were underway on a reconnaissance mission. TheIsraelis have listened to Soviet communications, and knew very well who wassent to intercept their recce planes; as no confrontation with the USSR wasintended, the Phantoms were ordered to abort the mission and return.Instead, from that moment on, the IDF/AF tried to evade any confrontationswith Soviets, while concentrating on operations against areas defended onlyby Egyptians: all deep strike sorties into Egypt were cancelled.Nevertheless, by that time a total of over 3.300 combat sorties were flownduring the Operation "Blossom", and over 8.000 bombs dropped on differenttargets.

Meanwhile, the Soviets in Egypt acclimatized and ­ after their first

"operational" missions ­ became bold as well, trying several times tointercept Israeli fighters that were operating against the EAF/ADF. Withinseveral days, the Israelis started to feel the Soviet presence ­ and thepresence of their weapons: first a Skyhawk was shot down, then two Phantoms­ all by SA­3s ­ and subsequently two MiG­21s from the 135th IAP intercepteda formation of Skyhawks near Giancalis and pursued them over Suez and deepover Sinai, damaging one of them (but claiming it as shot down). Additionalengagements between Soviet and Israeli fighters were almost unavoidable, andin the following weeks more clashes were reported, with Soviets evenclaiming several kills, even if they have apparently not shot down a singleIDF/AF fighter. On 8 June, for example, both the Soviet and the EgyptianMiG­21­pilots claimed two kills each against Israeli Phantoms: none could beconfirmed, but it was clear that a new battle for air superiority was inlooming and the IDF/AF was losing the advantage it gained during "Blossom".Two Phantoms were definitely shot down, however, by SA­3s on 30 June whenthey were ambushed by the Soviets that deployed several sites to a newposition within a single night. The F­4s were hit while underway to attackSAM­sites near the 101­kilometer mark on the Suez­Cairo road. Two pilots anda navigator were captured, while the second navigator was recovered byIsraeli helicopters in the following night, but the loss was a devastatingblow for the Israeli Phantom­units. The problem was that the SA­3 had abuilt­in "dive­on­target" capability: it could target even low­flyingtargets. It was a much smaller missile than the SA­2, not leaving asdistinctive smoke trails like the earlier model, and was also highlymanoeuvrable.

The US rushed QRC­335A (later re­named into AN/ALQ­101) ECM­pods to the

IDF/AF in reaction and it was expected that these would solve the problem: aretaliation attack was to be launched on 18 July by both F­4E­units theIDF/AF had at hand at the time, which were to fly strikes against a group offive Egyptian SA­2 sites, some 55 kilometres west of Suez. The USAF advisedthe Israelis to fly at a medium level and left their ECM­pods "do the job",and this suggestion was followed. Yet, as the Phantoms were about the crossthe Suez they flew straight into a new trap and faced salvoes of the SA­3s.While the pilots evaded most of the missiles in this exchange, one explodednear the F­4E flown by the CO 201 Squadron, and he went down with hiscrippled aircraft while attempting to dive and disengage at 600kt, severalkilometres outside Ismailia. Two other Phantoms managed to damage one SAM­site, and destroy another, but then another F­4E was badly damaged and thecrew landed it in flames at Refidim, where it was written off. This was anew surprise for the Israelis: although not a single missile scored a directhit, it was obvious that the new ECM­pods were either not functioning, ornot sufficient against a possible use of so­called "Soviet War ReserveModes" (WARMS), unknown to either the USA or Israel.

The first batch of MiG­21MFs arrived to Egypt in the frame of deployment oftwo regiments of V­VS. The aircraft were flown by hand­picked Soviet pilotsand wore different versions of this camouflage pattern, as applied at theZnamya Truda Works.

Ambush for Russians

Eventually, the situation became unbearable for the Israelis: the gloveswere now to be taken off. Free from defending neuralgic areas, and with theIDF/AF reluctant to engage MiGs it was not sure if they were flown by theSoviets or Egyptians, the EAF was now able to hit enemy positions in Sinaivery hard, while simultaneously moving its SAM­sites closer to the Suez,thus closing the sky over potential crossing points for IDF/AF aircraft. Thelosses in Phantoms were also painful and there was no clear solution for thenew SAM­threat. Therefore, on 25 July, the IDF/AF began planning a newambush, this time specifically planned to lure Soviet MiG­21s in front ofthree sections of Mirages and Phantoms, flown by hand­picked pilots, andthus make the situation "clear".

On 30 July, shortly after 1400hrs, two F­4Es bombed the Egyptian radarstation at Sohana, in the Gulf of Suez. Four high­flying Mirages werenearby, with four additional Phantoms at low level, all waiting for theSoviets to appear. Further to the rear four additional Mirages werepositioned as well. When there was no reaction from the Soviets, the frontsection of Mirages penetrated deeper into Egypt: almost 12 minutes after theinitial attack, the Soviets finally reacted. The first to be scrambled wereeight MiG­21s of the 135th IAP, led by Capt. Kamencev. They expected toclash with a group of Skyhawks or Phantoms that were apparently underwaytowards Cairo: in fact, the Mirages were only dragging them in front ofPhantoms. As the pursuit continued, four additional MiGs were scrambled fromKom Awshim, and now the rear quartet of Mirages joined the fray as well: inresponse, the Soviets scrambled four additional MiGs from Kutamiyah. AviemSela later provided the following account in an interview for the Israelipress: ­ I was a number two of a section of Phantoms; we and two Mirages were upagainst about ten MiGs. It was little unsettling to see so many aircraft atonce, so many fuel tanks being jettisoned all over the place. I didn't careabout numerical superiority ­ I was just afraid someone might bump into myaircraft!

One of Mirages (flown by Asher Snir) fired an air­to­air missile seconds

after the battle began. The missile hit a MiG and set it on fire. The pilotbailed out; the aircraft went into a spin and dropped like a stone from30.000ft. The Russian pilot's parachute opened right away ­ it's notsupposed to: chutes are designed to open automatically at 10.000ft, so theirwearers don't freeze or suffocate at high altitudes. But, this pilot usedthe manual apparatus and opened the chute himself! Maybe he didn't want tobe taken alive... or maybe he just didn't know any better.

Now some more of our aircraft had joined the battle; the Russians no longerhad numerical superiority. I started looking for a MiG to kill. Finally, Ifound one ­ its pilot making a right turn, trying to close in on my numberone. I broke to the right ­ the MiG left my number one and started chasingme! We stuck together for a while, dropping to about 15.000ft; at that pointhe was only about 150 meters from me. I could see the pilot's helmetclearly.

By this time I'd realized the Russian pilot was inexperienced; he didn'tknow how to handle his aircraft in a combat situation. At 15.000ft he provedthis fact by trying to escape in a steep dive to 7.00ft. All we had to dowas follow him and lock our radar onto him ­ and fire a missile. There was atremendous explosion ­ but the MiG came out of the cloud of smoke apparentlyunharmed. That made me mad and I fired a second missile ­ which turned outto be unnecessary. The Russian aircraft had, in fact, been severely damagedby the first missile; suddenly, it burst into flames and fell apart. By thetime the second missile reached it, it wasn't there any more.

Out of the five Russian pilots shot down, one ejected safely and wasrecovered; one died under his parachute, and Captains Zuravyev, Yurchenkoand Yakovlev were killed.

At the end of the battle formations from both sides became dispersed: theSoviets were attempting to disengage, while the Israelis were at the timestill not especially good in providing mutual support. The Soviets fired anumber of R­3S' in these moments, but all of these missed. Eventually,however, Capt. Kolesovlev and Puskarskiy managed to hit the Mirage flown byAsher Snir while he was engaged with another MiG (the kill against which wasnever confirmed): the Israeli landed safely at Refidim.

In conclusion, there was little doubt that the Israeli plan worked: fiveRussians were shot down one after the other after being hit by Mirages andPhantoms successively. Except for damaging one Mirage, the Russians weregiven a perfect lection in modern air­to­air combat, the outcome of whichconsists not only from excellent and combat proven pilots or good aircraft,but also of reliable and functional weapons and combat experience, as wellas good preparation and lots the support. At latest now it became completelyclear who controls the air over the Suez Canal. Not that the Egyptians werevery sorry for their often arrogant Russian "instructors", but the EAF wasin action only days later, again attacking Israeli SAMs and causing severalair combats. The Soviets tried now several times also to set traps for theIsraelis, but with exception of one Mirage being damaged in a dogfight withMiG­21s, and one Phantom by SA­3s (the pilot managed to land the badlydamaged aircraft at Refidim; if this Phantom was indeed written­off, then itwas the 16th Israeli loss since 1967) they obviously came away with emptyhands. The "Shahak" 52 was flown by Iftach Spector during the legendary clash withthe Soviets, on 30 July 1970. Sadly, no photograph of the entire aircraftfrom this period is available, so that only the camouflage in the cockpitarea on this artwork can be considered as "authentic". The aircraft was lostin a skirmish with Syrian MiG­21s, on 15 April 1974.

Conclusion

The "official" part of the Attrition War came to an end by a cease­fire, atMidday of 4 August 1970. By that time, both sides were actually on the endof their strengths: the Egyptians have suffered a loss of between 101 and113 aircraft, of which 25 to Hawk SAMs, but their human losses were at leastten times higher and including ­ according to Egyptian sources ­ up to 4.000civilian engineers and workers. Besides, in his book "MiG­21 v LokalniyhKonfliktah", A.V. Kotlobovskiy specified that a total of 68 Soviet andEgyptian MiG­21s were shot down by the Israelis between July 1967 andSeptember 1973, while 68 others were lost in training accidents. TheIsraelis suffered a loss of 594 dead (including 33 IDF/AF personnel) inaddition to 15 or 16 aircraft. Both sides could actually not push for muchlonger, then there was a need to absorb more modern equipment, trainadditional personnel and prepare for the inevitable new war that everybodyknew had to come, then it was clear that the Egyptians would sooner or laterrequest Sinai to be returned.

The conflict, namely, was far from over, and it was clear that both sideswere not satisfied with the situation. The Egyptians wanted Sinai back, justlike Syrians wanted Golan, but the Israeli political leadership lacked thewill to negotiate, feeling safe after the huge success of the Six Day War,in 1967, and the successes of the IDF(AF during the War of Attrition.Israeli Air Force, however, knew that the situation was different. Not onlyhave the Egyptians established a powerful SAM­belt between the Canal­zoneand Cairo, but they now also had a free hand to move their SAMs closer toSuez, and thus disturb IDF/AF aircraft in their operations there. TheIsraelis, namely, needed the freedom of operation to be able to conductreconnaissance operations, needed in order to detect Egyptian preparationsfor attack into Sinai, which clearly had to come ­ sooner or later. Theyalso needed the ability to hit back so to pre­empt any Egyptian surprise­attack. If the EAF/ADF could control the skies over the Suez, however, theIDF/AF could not complete its task and it was clear that the Egyptian Armycould also cross it without being disturbed by Israeli Air Force. Exactlythis was now to happen and therefore influence heavily the outcome of thenext round.

The "War of Attrition" was the first armed conflict in the Middle East inwhich truly modern technology was used and of decisive importance forsuccess. Continuous battles between SAM­sites, fighter­bombers andinterceptors, and frequent changes of the tactical situation forced theIsraelis and Arabs to use more sophisticated and complicated equipment, andthus constantly train for maintenance and combat. The battles also becamemore sophisticated, after all, both sides trained each other intensively bytheir operations for years. Especially the involved air forces needed aquiet period of time to reorganize, train replacements for so many losses ­which were felt badly on both sides ­ prepare reserves, better study theiropponents, and understand the situation. There was, however, hardly enoughtime for this.

The EAF started getting its own MiG­21MFs already in late 1969, when thefirst out of some 110 aircraft arrived. However, the type was used in combatfor the first time by the Soviets, in April 1970, when several werescrambled to intercept an IDF/AF RF­4E underway over Egypt. This aircraft,wearing the serial 8454 was one from the second batch of MiG­21MFs suppliedto the EAF after the end of the Attrition War. It survived the subsequentcarnage of the October/Yom Kippour War, in 1973, and was seen while still inservice during the mid­1970s.