[Last updated: 17 February 1992]
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The USSR in 1991:
The Implosion of a Superpower
by Dr Robert F. Miller
Sr Fellow in Political Science, Division of Economics and Politics, RSSS, ANU
If 1989 and 1990 were the years of the sudden dismantling of the Soviet empire
abroad, 1991 witnessed the extension of the collapse of communist rule to the
imperial heartland itself. Toward the close of the year it was not at all clear
whether something resembling a unified state could even be stitched together to
provide a partner for negotiating with the Western allies on the terms for the
further reduction of nuclear weapons and the final ending of the cold war.
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev still officially represented the Soviet side, but
in the wake of the failed putsch of 19-21 August, his position had been
fundamentally altered. It was no longer clear whom he was speaking for on a
given issue or whether his policy initiatives could be taken as the
authoritative position of his country. These were matters of more than merely
speculative or theoretical interest: the territory of the former USSR contained
some 27,000 nuclear warheads scattered among several of the former republics,
many of which were now actively pursuing their sovereign independence. Who
controlled these weapons and their potential involvement in internal civil
conflict were serious issues for international stability. Indeed, US President
George Bush's radical proposal on 27 September to scrap the majority of tactical
nuclear weapons in all three environments was undoubtedly motivated by precisely
this concern. More than at any other time in seven decades the internal
concatenation of power in the USSR had become a decisive factor in the nation's
foreign policy.
The dramatic events of 1991 had their origins in Gorbachev's decision to shift
his base of political support to the right in the fall of 1990, when he
abandoned the so-called '500 days' program of economic reform by his liberal
economic advisors in favour of a hybrid compromise plan espoused by his Prime
Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and supported by anti-reform conservatives. Along with
the radical reform plan Gorbachev was also clearly distancing himself from his
key liberal supporters, while at the same time arrogating to himself the powers
of direct presidential rule.1 A further tangible sign of the shift was his
sacking of the relatively liberal Minister of the Interior (MOI), Vadim Bakatin,
in November and his replacement with the hardliner Boriss Pugo, a former KGB
boss in Latvia and most recently the communist party's chief disciplinarian.
Pugo was supplied with a new deputy, Major General Boris Gromov, the former
commander of the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan, who was put in charge of the
greatly strengthened internal security forces of the MOI, with their main
objective the suppression of nationalist outbursts in the non-Russian republics.
Gromov's forces (the notorious OMON troops) were heavily involved in the
crackdowns in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991. Other significant
conservative personnel changes were the appointment of Valentin Pavlov as Prime
Minister and Gennady Yanaev as Vice-President—figures who were to be prominent
among the 'gang of eight' who sought to overthrow Gorbachev on the 19th of
August.
Perhaps the most striking symbol of the shift to the right was the dramatic
resignation of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in a speech to the USSR
Supreme Soviet on 20 December 1990. Among Shevardnadze's most telling
accusations in his prophetic warning of impending dictatorship in the USSR was
the charge that conservatives had been hounding him for having 'given away' the
Soviet strategic patrimony in Eastern Europe and for allegedly planning to send
Soviet troops to fight alongside the US-led UN forces in the campaign against
former Soviet ally Iraq. Gorbachev, he complained, had not lifted a finger to
defend him and the policies he had devised and conducted with Gorbachev's full
endorsement, against these charges.2 In short, the implication was that
Gorbachev's shift in his domestic political alignment signalled a change in the
USSR's foreign policy orientation as well.3
The signs of a reversion to a tougher line on East-West relations were not slow
in coming. At the December Supreme Soviet session, KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov
(another member of the 'gang of eight') accused Western intelligence agents of
intensifying their subversive activities against the Soviet economy and in
fomenting separatist nationalism. His First Deputy Viktor Grushko echoed these
charges in a TASS interview in mid-February.4 Prime Minister Pavlov, at about
the same time, sought to justify his very unpopular decision to withdraw from
circulation all 50- and 100-ruble notes with the ludicrous charge that Western
financial circles were conspiring to flood the USSR with billions of rubles in
order to destabilise the Soviet economy.5
Pavlov's subsequent half-hearted, clumsy efforts to resile from these charges
merely reinforced the impression that Gorbachev was willing to sacrifice much of
the goodwill he had previously accrued in West to beef up his political base at
home and mollify his new conservative allies. It was becoming clear that under
the less authoritative new Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Soviet
acquiescence in the general direction of Western post-Cold War foreign policy
could no longer be taken for granted. Moscow was evidently making a renewed
effort to carve out a special, independent role for itself in international
relations, as Gorbachev had attempted to do in the early days of 'perestroika'
and 'new political thinking'—the period of the 'common European home and the
Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk initiatives—when the USSR still seemed to have the
will and capacity to challenge US global hegemony. Pavlov and the other
conservatives in charge of economic policy began acting as if the country could
solve its economic problems without massive injections of foreign assistance;
indeed, some were still arguing that the country would be better off by reducing
its dependence on such assistance.6
During conversations with Soviet foreign policy specialists in Moscow in April
and May, the author was told that there were two basic, competing positions in
the foreign policy decision-making establishment on the question of Soviet
commitments throughout the world. The first, represented by Shevardnadze and the
reformers, was in favour of cutting losses associated with the maintainenance of
what was left of the global Soviet strategic presence—for example, in Eastern
Europe, Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The second, closely, but not exclusively,
identified with the conservatives, was to preserve these links wherever
possible.
Under Bessmertnykh during the first four months of 1991 at least, it was evident
that the second position was again in the ascendancy. Evidence of this were
1)the increasing difficulties posed by the Soviet military over the pace and
conditions of the withdrawal of troops from Poland and Germany; 2)the brutal
repression in the Baltic states, despite widespread condemnation by the West;
3)tough negotiating tactics in bilateral economic dealings with the former East
European satellite countries; 4)Gorbachev's efforts—to Washington's unconcealed
annoyance—to arrange a face-saving compromise to extricate Saddam Hussein from
Kuwait and preserve the Soviet Union's special position in Iraq; 5)the rigid
position adopted by Gorbachev on the Southern Kurile Islands in April during his
historic trip to Japan, which made the visit much less economically and
diplomatically productive than many Western (and Soviet) observers had
anticipated; 6)the sudden obstacles placed by the Soviet military to the
conclusion of the conventional forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, including blatant
subterfuge in shifting substantial armoured forces to non-CFE categories 7;
7)the decision to maintain economic and military links with Cuba, Afghanistan
and Vietnam, despite the admittedly heavy resource burden of doing so.8
The reasons for Gorbachev's shift to the right on foreign policy are not
entirely clear, but the domestic factor was undoubtedly crucial. One element
there was the rise to a position of independent power of his nemesis Boris
Yeltsin, whose ventures into foreign policy and domestic nationalities affairs
were of a decidedly liberal colouration. This was probably a significant
psychological impetus to Gorbachev's determination to take a contrary position.
It is well known that Yeltsin and his policies were anathema to military and
civilian conservatives. Gorbachev's adoption of a harder line in foreign policy
may have been partly designed also to assure the conservatives that he was not
contemplating an alliance with Yeltsin— something they evidently anticipated
with fear and loathing.9
Their fears soon proved to be well founded. By the time Gorbachev had returned
from Tokyo, he had evidently become convinced of three unpleasant realities: 1)
that Pavlov's economic policies were failing badly and the economy was in
free-fall; 2) that the impulse toward sovereignty and potential secession by the
republics, despite the ambiguous results of the national referendum on the Union
on 19 March, had become too strong to be dealt with by the traditional methods
favoured by his conservative allies; and 3) that his own personal power and
prestige had been seriously undermined, while Yeltsin's had become too strong to
ignore in fashioning a new basis for national unity.
Ever the pragmatist, Gorbachev drew certain unpalatable conclusions from these
facts and undertook yet another shift in the structure of his alliances and
policies. Western economic aid had become essential, and he was willing to pay
almost any price in both foreign and domestic concessions in order to attract
it. In foreign policy this new flexibility was evident in his dispatch of
radical economist Grigory Yavlinsky to Harvard to work out a program of economic
reform with American academic specialists to present to the upcoming G-7 metting
in London in June. Previous obstacles on the Soviet side to disarmament and arms
control measures under the CFE and START rubrics were quickly set aside in
preparation for Bush's visit to the USSR in July.
Domestically, Gorbachev was forced to make a number of important concessions to
Yeltsin and other rising stars among the new republican elites, such as
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, in an historic
agreement signed on 23 April at Novo-Ogarevo, a government dacha outside of
Moscow, after some nine hours of haggling—the so-called '9+1' agreement on a new
Union Treaty, involving the centre and the nine republics which had indicated a
willingness to remain in the USSR. Under this agreement Gorbachev accepted in
principle the transfer of a major share of his central presidential authority to
the republics, not only in economic management but also in important areas of
political power.
It was the scheduled signature of the final draft of this agreement on 20 August
which provided the proximate cause of the conservative putsch on the 19th to
head off the weakening of the central power of the traditional instruments of
Soviet rule: the party apparatus, the KGB and the Army. The ignominious defeat
of these bastions of the old system and the associated discrediting of Gorbachev
for allowing its leaders to remain in a position to carry out the putsch created
a totally new situation in the Soviet domestic political order and its ability
to carry out an integrated foreign and security policy. By the end of 1991 the
institutional and policy aspects of these changes were still being worked out,
but certain basic directions were already becoming fairly clear.
US President George Bush and other Western leaders were patently uneasy over the
effects of the putsch and their implications for relations with the Soviet
Union. They clearly preferred to continue to deal with Gorbachev, but they
recognised the importance of opening up communications with Yeltsin and the
leaders of the other key republics that were threatening to go it alone. Bush's
exhortations to the Ukrainians in July in Kiev against 'hasty' moves toward
independence were singularly inappropriate at the time and looked even more so
after the putsch. The issue of control over nuclear weapons was obviously a
crucial consideration here. After previously declaring their intention to free
their republics of nuclear weapons, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine and Nursultan
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan began to have second thoughts about transferring
control to Yeltsin and the Russian Republic, particularly after Yeltsin had
brazenly threatened to seek territorial alterations to protect the large ethnic
Russian populations in the two break-away republics. The leaders of Ukraine,
Belorussia and Kazakhstan, where the major part of the nuclear arsenal ouside of
Russia were deployed, evidently wished to keep control over these weapons as at
least a short-term bargaining chip in dealings with Yeltsin and Gorbachev, on
the one hand, and the West, on the other. The much warmer welcome they began to
receive in the West after the putsch suggested that this tactic had been
successful.
At the same time, the economic plight of the country came to receive a much more
sympathetic hearing in the West after Yeltsin's demonstration of the strength of
the democratic forces of Russia against the putsch leaders. Gorbachev's dispatch
of Yavlinsky to present the Soviet case for reform and assistance at the G-7
summit in Bangkok in October elicited a much more positive response than in
June.10 The West seemed to feel a renewed sense of responsibility for preventing
the collapse of the USSR, now that Gorbachev had given up all pretenses of
acting from a position of strength. But even here it was not at all clear just
how that aid would be distributed and utilised. Republican representatives were
in disagreement over how to divide up amongst themselves the hard-currency
investment credits being made available from overseas sources.11
The economic and diplomatic implications of the post-putsch situation were
particularly visible in the USSR's relations with former client states, such as
Cuba, Vietnam and India. The costs of retaining even a downgraded military
presence in the former two countries were now even more difficult to bear,
especially in the light of Washington's threat to link economic aid to a
reduction of that presence, particularly in Cuba. Accordingly, Gorbachev in
mid-September announced the withdrawal, over Cuban protests, of the so- called
'training brigade' from Cuba, which had been a source of consternation in
Washington ever since the Carter presidency.12 The earlier decision to retain a
continuing naval and air presence at Camranh Bay in Vietnam, by late September,
seemed likely to be reversed, especially now that the Americans would be forced
to vacate their naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines much sooner than had
been anticipated.13 With respect to India, with whom over the years the USSR had
developed important two-way trade relations, as well as major military links,
the post- putsch indeterminacy threatened to disrupt the comfortable payments
system based on the Indian rupee. India had accumulated a substantial trade
surplus in recent years, which the decline in Soviet exports made it
increasingly difficult to balance under the conventional clearing arrangements.
Indian foreign policy-makers have evidently come to the same conclusion as their
Western counterparts: namely, that in order to maintain viable economic ties it
had become necessary to develop relations with the individual republics as well
as with Moscow. In future, it was expected, the centre would perform at most a
co-ordinating role in Soviet- Indian trade.14
The change in Soviet conduct of world affairs since the August putsch is
symbolised by the radical shakeup in the composition of the high command of the
armed forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is still in progress.
One of the most significant potential changes in these organisations will be a
promised downgrading of the role of the KGB in personnel appointments and the
operational patterns of both.15 The removal of communist party organisations
from both the central administration and the local operative units (companies,
embassies, etc.) of the MOD and the MFA will presumably have a similarly
'normalising' impact. In line with the 'confederalisation of the USSR, the
republics will in future have permanent representation in the central and
operative bodies of the MFA, and there has been some talk of combining foreign
trade and foreign affairs staffs, as has been the case in Australia. It is still
too early to predict what the effects of these measures will be, but they are
bound to considerable in both the formulation and implementation of the
country's foreign policy.
Gorbachev's personal role in foreign policy has undoubtedly been shaken, but it
would be at least premature to write him off, even if, for the time being, he
will have to consult with his republican colleagues and liberal advisers before
taking major foreign policy initiatives to a much greater extent than was his
wont in the past. The time-consuming nature of these processes and the
instability of the emerging temporary institutional relationships may well see a
logical gravitation of decision-making authority back to the centre; the longer
Gorbachev remains in office, the greater his chance of benefiting from this
consolidation of power. It is clear that his determination to hang on to
whatever power his Presidential office still commands is largely motivated by
this expectation, as well as by his knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of
his potential opponents and of the precariousness of their respective economic
and political situations. In the meantime, Gorbachev is constrained to cooperate
with and facilitate the foreign policy initiatives of persons like Yeltsin and
Nazarbayev. Yeltsin seems to have taken charge of negotiations with Japan on the
disposition of the South Kurile Islands and is evidently much more willing than
Gorbachev had been in April to make concessions to the Japanese in return for
economic assistance in developing the Far East of the Russian Republic.
Paradoxically, Gorbachev's chances of resuming the dominant role in foreign
policy are probably inversely proportional to the successes of his rivals in
this area.
Gorbachev still enjoys a considerably wider constituency of supporters abroad
than he does at home, and this well known fact will probably serve him well in
arguing his irreplaceability to his colleagues. That being the case, and given
the extent of the latent power that the military-strategic weight of the USSR
still confers, it is likely that his vision of the role of the USSR as a major
factor in international relations will retain its influence. Whether that is a
good thing for future world stability remains to be seen. It is obvious that
many world leaders—in the West, the East and the Third World, including some in
the Asia-Pacific Region—still think that it is. For the foreseeable future,
however, Soviet energies will be considerably more heavily engaged in problems
of domestic crisis-management and economic and political consolidation, and in
relations with countries nearer to the borders of the USSR, than in the
grandiose global strategies of the era of Gorbachev's Vladivostok and
Krasnoyarsk initiatives. Once the current 'time of troubles' is over and the
problems of the economy and the political order are settled—and they inevitably
will be, sooner rather than later—the successor of the Soviet state, whatever it
is called, can be expected to resume its natural place as a world power. By that
time, the basis of that power will probably have changed, but so, of course,
will the world order itself.
NOTES
1 According to one of them, economist Nikolai Petrakov, Gorbachev was bowing to
an ultimatum by the leader of the conservative 'Soyuz' group in parliament,
Colonel Viktor Alksnis, on 17 November 1990, that he had one month to restore
order. Report on the USSR, 8 February 1991, pp. 38-9.
2 See the analysis of Shevardnadze's resignation by Al'bert Plutnik, 'Strel'ba
po odinokim misheniam', Izvestiia, 22 December 1990, p. 1.
3 Conservatives had a field day castigating Shevardnadze and his record for
'selling out' the Soviet position in international affairs and gaining little in
return. Some even discredited the entire policy of 'new political thinking' that
formed the basis of Gorbachev's post-Cold War foreign policy. See, for example,
A. Krasnov and Iu. Nikolaev, 'Na kacheliakh "novogo myshleniia"', Sovetskaia
Rossiia, 15 July 1991, p. 5.
4 Report on the USSR, 22 February 1991, pp. 39-40.
5 Ibid.
6 According to the Economic Department of the CC CPSU journal Kommunist, 'Many'
still see the recommendations of the IMF for reforming the Soviet economy as
'interference in our internal affairs'. 'Otsenki, prognozy, sovety', Kommunist,
No. 4 (March 1991), p. 52.
7 Douglas L. Clarke, 'Trouble with the Conventional Forces Treaty', Report on
the USSR, 12 April 1991, pp. 6-10.
8 On the decision to retain the basing facilities at Camranh Bay in Vietnam see
Michael Richardson, 'Soviet reverse decision: air and naval forces will remain',
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. XVII, no. 2 (August 1991), p. 17; see also,
for a post-putsch view, B. Vinogradov, 'Kamran' bez tain i ekzotiki', Izvestiia,
23 September 1991, pp. 1, 4.
9 Petrakov, loc. cit.
10 Laura Tingle, 'G-7 to expand aid for Soviets', The Australian, 14 October
1991, p. 1; also, Tim Dodd, 'Talks clear the way for a major Western air package
to USSR', The Australian Financial Review, 14 October 1991, p. 5.
11 According to the Chairman of the temporary Economic Committee charged with
setting overall economic policy, Ivan Silaev, in an interview with V. Romaniuk,
'"Vremennoe pravitsl'stvo" peredaet polnomochiia', Izvestiia, 19 September 1991,
p. 2.
12 Evg. Bai, 'Moskva zaiavliaet o vyvode voisk s Kuby. Gavana protestuet',
Izvestiia, 12 September 1991, p. 1.
13 B. Vinogradov, loc. cit.
14 N. Paklin, '"Osobye otnosheniia": voprosy bez otvetov', Izvestiia, 27
September 1991, p. 5.
15 Stanislav Kondrashov, 'Souznyi MID: Reorganizatsiia na marshe', Izvestiia, 23
September 1991, p. 7.