Sensibilities

[T]here is clearly no guarantee that a state arbiter won’t cede to the most unreasonable and extreme demands of religious groups, expressed with adequate fervour and implied threats, especially as we have declared in advance that their ‘sensibilities’, however irrational, are somehow worth regarding. Thus, by abandoning a consistent first principles approach to freedom of expression in favour of some kind of dialectic between reasonable (us) and unreasonable (them) people, we may well find ourselves conceding tactical defeat ad nauseam, to the point where those who do accept the ‘fallibility of human knowledge’ must chafe under the de-facto rule of those who don’t.

Allow me to take stock of our new situation with reference to two hypothetical social groups, A and B. Group A is rather scientific and sceptical, curious and uncertain—at once interested in discovering ‘truths’ through rational inquiry, while remaining open to the possibility that existing knowledge can be falsified. Group B subscribes, with a famous ardour and certainty, to a bundle of unproven and unfalsifiable beliefs—a religion—and thus necessarily rejects the very premise of the ‘fallibility of human knowledge’. Clearly, as B already has The Truth, it shall be somewhat lukewarm on allowing any ‘conflicting notions’ to exist at all….[S]o long as B can bring enough rancour and enmity down on A for showing disrespect to some aspect of B’s unproven and unfalsifiable beliefs, the state may side with B against A…Incredibly, due to the philosophical nature of B’s beliefs as unfalsifiable dogma, we have also necessarily admitted that B can be morally justified in heaping massive opprobrium on A, without being asked or even being able to explain precisely why. That is to say, B may mercilessly assault the character of A without bothering to provide a credible, logical, reason—I’m afraid ‘because God says so’ is no such reason. In short, by allowing any superstition to have a role in determining the theoretical legal limits of ‘free speech’ we are inadvertently crafting a doctrine for unscientific, irrational bullies.

And behold – it shall be so.

We now observe the pitfalls of trying to adjust a scientific forum for free expression to any sensibilities arising from unfalsifiable dogma—as many religious claims are absolute and ‘unimpeachable’ by nature, it is not clear whether ‘believers’ are significantly more tolerant of a serious intellectual challenge from outside the ‘faith’, however polite, than they are of cheap abuse. Indeed, there is some evidence that the more fervent of believers may have some trouble distinguishing between the two.

And actually some may find serious intellectual challenge considerably more of an outrage than cheap abuse. Cheap abuse is not much of a threat, but serious intellectual challenge, naturally, is.

So long as the ‘contestability of ideas’ is open to any compromise with the sensibilities of religious believers, it shall almost invariably be the case that our ‘reasonable person’ test will be held to ransom by religious stonewalling—the sheer weight of numbers, and the intensity of their resolve, can too easily dictate the terms of arbitration. If serious threats to the social peace are enough to force massive concessions on the part of liberals, to the point of endorsing blasphemy laws, precisely how will any forum for the contestation of ideas withstand calls for the prohibition of vigorous religious criticism and inquiry?…To ‘compromise’ freedom of expression by erecting statutory guard-posts around a bundle of unproven and unfalsifiable assertions is to assault the very foundations of science, logic and rationality. Instead of allowing the veiled, and not-so-veiled, threats of irrational zealots to guide our notions of justice, we should resolve to protect all individuals from aggression and threats of aggression, emphasise the rights of freedom of association and conscience as they arise from the axiom of ‘non-aggression’, and redouble our commitment to a free, open and enlightened society.

“Allow me to take stock of our new situation with reference to two hypothetical social groups, A and B. Group A is rather scientific and sceptical, curious and uncertain—at once interested in discovering ‘truths’ through rational inquiry, while remaining open to the possibility that existing knowledge can be falsified. Group B subscribes, with a famous ardour and certainty, to a bundle of unproven and unfalsifiable beliefs—a religion—and thus necessarily rejects the very premise of the ‘fallibility of human knowledge’.”

This is a rather tendentious classification, though, isn’t it? And that undermines a lot of what else he has to say. We all now that ther is actaully a group C which I would guess is much larger than group B (which I imagine to be minuscule, at least in my country). Group C is rather scientific (it includes some world-renowned scientists and other thinkers) and sceptical, curious and uncertain—at once interested in discovering ‘truths’ through rational inquiry, while remaining open to the possibility that existing knowledge can be falsified, and is also religious. People who belong to group C are likely to have a critical and often troubled relationship to their religion but are nonetheless religious and believe that some aspect of the truth about how the world is is best approached through the forms of their religion. I meet people like this all the time but have never knowingly met anyone from Group B.

Surely group C are just people who can’t make up their minds whether they’re in group A or B? Or in both at once?

One has to do some *serious* compartmentalisation to take any of the historical claims of the major religions [i.e. manna from heaven, Jonah and the whale, raising the dead, ascending bodily to the heavens, etc] at face value, and be enough of a rational empiricist to be a scientist.

And if they don’t take the historical claims seriously, in what sense are they ‘religious’, as opposed to floating around in their own personal cloud of metaphysical vagueness?

Or is all holy scripture just a metaphor? If it is, I wish someone would tell all those religious people out there.

What about group D who believe that group A’s deity was merely a prophet?

Then to group A, group D is committing blasphemy by denying the divinity of God; while to group D, group A is committing blasphemy by proclaiming the divinity of someone other than God.

And group D has members who say “Behead the blasphemers”. What should we do then ? What behaviour is “respectful” of both sets of beliefs?

It seems to me that it is not the case that members of groups A and D are unhappy that there are people who do not believe in God; rather they are unhappy that there are people who do not accept their specific conception of God.

I obviously agree with John M. here. What is really at issue here is not a dichotomy between rational, skeptical scientists and necessarily fanatical and intolerant believers: it’s one between people who have a certain degree of critical distance between them and their beliefs, and people who do not. Among the former group, there are quite a few religious persons, and even people who accept religion on faith alone, as long as they are aware of the faith-based nature of their personal faith. Has nothing to do with not being able to make up one’s mind, but everything with awareness of the nature of one’s own reasoning.

Perhaps what comes into play again is that I’m from a part of Europe where most varieties of Christianity are quite withdrawn rather than evangelical – but I must say that the vast majority of believers I have met belong firmly in John M.’s group C. And don’t forget that some of the abuse hurled at Christianity in Western Europe goes quite a bit beyond, say, the Danish cartoon affair. Engaged in some of it myself during my black metal period ;-) But even if there are occasional sputterings from the more strict side of the Christian spectrum, most believers do not even take notice of this.

Nope. Nothing to do with compartmentalization and vagueness. Anything to do with recognizing the fact that your beliefs, whatever they are, necessarily involve some assumptions that are in themselves unsupported and may turn out to be wrong. Note: this is not saying that science or atheism is “just another religion” (nothing could be further from my own opinions). More importantly, that no belief deserves to be immune to criticism or mockery: that making them so is an affront to human freedom which is kind of important. Recognizing this is does not imply atheism, or metaphysical naturalism, or anything of the sort.

Are you sure? Not even a hint of compartmentalisation and vagueness? Not a teeny unvoiced suggestion that all that Noah-Elijah-Jonah-Moses-JC-walking-on-water-angels-whispering-in-Mo’s-ear stuff is all just a little far-fetched? No sign that sophisticated religious belief involves some form of dissociation from the words of scripture itself, and all the billions of followers who have, down the ages, insisted on believing them to be literally the Word of God?

Yeah, I have to agree with Dave on this; I think it is compartmentalization. If it’s not (and it’s not B) then it just empties religion of all content – which means it simply redefines it. Well to the extent that religion is not religion, I have no quarrel with it; but how far is that really? Why has the very word been all but replaced in both the UK and the US by the word ‘faith’ if religion is not taken to be a matter of ‘faith’?

and this, surely, is why Dawkins is causing such conniptions. His TV progs and the book based on them is aimed at showing the ‘Group C’ folk that by sitting on their hands (or waving them)they are validating the lunatics in Group B.

Indeed, in one of the progs he observed that he was more impressed by the scenery chomping fundamentalist he met in the USA than the typically wishy-washy bishop he chatted to in the UK in that the former at least had the courage of his convictions.

Yeh. I think the guy who wrote the piece clarifies the matter admirably. It’s a question of people who make fallibilist claims versus people who claim certainty; of people who ask for reasons that homosexuality is wrong versus people who say God said so and leave it at that. That is a real and current and pressing problem, and I don’t see how it can be addressed without addressing the whole question of what ‘faith’ is and where it is and is not appropriate.