CRS Annotated Constitution

In the cases just reviewed, it was attempted to close
the mails to communication which were deemed to be
harmful. A much broader power of exclusion was asserted in
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.1321
To induce compliance with the regulatory requirements of
that act, Congress denied the privilege of using the mails
for any purpose to holding companies that failed to obey
that law, irrespective of the character of the material to
be carried. Viewing the matter realistically, the Supreme
Court treated this provision as a penalty. While it held
this statute constitutional because the regulations whose
infractions were thus penalized were themselves
valid,1322 it declared that “Congress may not
exercise its control over the mails to enforce a
requirement which lies outside its constitutional
province. . . .”1323

In determining the extent to which state laws may
impinge upon persons or corporations whose services are
utilized by Congress in executing its postal powers, the
task of the Supreme Court[p.293]has been to
determine whether particular measures are consistent with
the general policies indicated by Congress. Broadly
speaking, the Court has approved regulations having a
trivial or remote relation to the operation of the postal
service, while disallowing those constituting a serious
impediment to it. Thus, a state statute, which granted to
one company an exclusive right to operate a telegraph
business in the State, was found to be incompatible with a
federal law, which, in granting to any telegraph company
the right to construct its lines upon post roads, was
interpreted as a prohibition of state monopolies in a
field Congress was entitled to regulate in the exercise of
its combined power over commerce and post roads.1324

An Illinois statute, which, as construed by the state
courts, required an interstate mail train to make a detour
of seven miles in order to stop at a designated station,
also was held to be an unconstitutional interference with
the power of Congress under this clause.1325
But a Minnesota statute requiring intrastate trains to
stop at county seats was found to be
unobjectionable.1326

Local laws classifying postal workers with railroad
employees for the purpose of determining a railroad’s
liability for personal injuries,1327 or
subjecting a union of railway mail clerks to a general law
forbidding any “labor organization” to deny any person
membership because of his race, color or creed,1328
have been held not to conflict with national legislation
or policy in this field. Despite the interference pro
tanto with the performance of a federal function, a State
may arrest a postal employee charged with murder while he
is engaged in carrying out his official duties,1329
but it cannot punish a person for operating a mail truck
over its highways without procuring a driver’s license
from state authorities.1330

Clause 8.
The Congress shall have Power * * * To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.[p.294]

This clause is the foundation upon which the national
patent and copyright laws rest, although it uses neither
of those terms. So far as patents are concerned, modern
legislation harks back to the Statute of Monopolies of
1624, whereby Parliament endowed inventors with the sole
right to their inventions for fourteen years.1331
Copyright law, in turn, traces back to the English Statute
of 1710, which secured to authors of books the sole right
of publishing them for designated periods.1332
Congress was not vested by this clause, however, with
anything akin to the royal prerogative in the creation and
bestowal of monopolistic privileges.1333 Its power is
limited with regard both to subject matter and to the
purpose and duration of the rights granted. Only the
writings and discoveries of authors and inventors may be
protected, and then only to the end of promoting science
and the useful arts.1334 The concept of originality is
central to copyright, and it is a constitutional
requirement Congress may not exceed.1335 While
Congress may grant exclusive rights only for a limited
period, it may extend the term upon the expiration of the
period originally specified, and in so doing may protect
the rights of purchasers and assignees.1336
The copyright and patent laws do not have, of their own
force, any extraterritorial operation.1337

1335
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., Inc.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991) (publisher of
telephone directory, consisting of white pages and
yellow pages, not entitled to copyright in white pages,
which are only compilations). “To qualify for copyright
protection, a work must be original to the author. . . .
Originality, as the term is used in copyright, means
only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that
it possesses some minimal degree of creativity. . . . To
be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely
low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id., 345. First
clearly articulated in The Trade Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879), and
Burrow–Giles Lithographic Co. v. Saroney,
111 U.S. 53, 58–60 (1884), the
requirement is expressed in nearly every copyright
opinion, but its forceful iteration in Feist was
noteworthy, because originality is a statutory
requirement as well,
17 U.S.C.
Sec. 102
(a), and it was unnecessary to discuss the
concept in constitutional terms.

1337
Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 183, 195
(1857). It is, however, the ultimate objective of many
nations, including the United States, to develop a
system of patent issuance and enforcement which
transcends national boundaries; it has been recommended,
therefore, that United States policy should be to
harmonize its patent system with that of foreign
countries so long as such measures do not diminish the
quality of the United States patent standards.
President’s Commission on the Patent System, To Promote
the Progress of Useful Arts, Report to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st
sess. (1967), recommendation XXXV. Effectuation of this
goal was begun with the United States agreement to the
Berne Convention (the Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886), and
Congress’ conditional implementation of the Convention
through legislation. The Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988, P. L. 100– 568,
102 Stat. 2853
,
17 U.S.C.
Sec. 101
and notes.