[Text: Edgar Allan Poe, Review of The History of the Navy, from
Burton's Gentleman's Magazine, July 1839, pp. xx-xx.]

The History of the Navy of the United States of America. By J.
Fenimore Cooper. Lea and Blanchard, Philadelphia.

In appearing before the public with this History of our Navy, Mr. Cooper
has had two serious difficulties to surmount -- one of prejudice, and one
of exaggerated anticipation. It cannot be denied that, for many years past,
he has been rapidly sinking in the estimation of his countrymen, and indeed
of all right minded persons. Even his firmest friends were becoming ashamed
of the universality of his cynicism; and his enemies, ceasing in a measure
from open hostility, have been well content to abide the apparently inevitable
self-ruin which his own unconquerable ill temper was so speedily bringing
about. A flashy succession of ill-conceived and miserably executed literary
productions, each more silly than its predecessor, and wherein the only
thing noticeable was the peevishness of the writer, the only thing amusing
his self-conceit -- had taught the public to suspect even a radical taint
in the intellect, an absolute and irreparable mental leprosy, rendering
it a question whether he ever would or could again accomplish any thing
which should be worthy the attention of people not positively rabid. In
this state of affairs, it was not at all wonderful that the announcement
of a Naval History of the United States, by the author of the attack upon
Sir Walter Scott, was received with apathy and general distrust -- with
a feeling very different indeed from that which would have agitated the
whole reading world at a similar announcement during the golden days of
the celebrated novelist, and once exceedingly popular man.

Among the few, on the other hand, who had better opportunities of penetrating
the mystery, and fathoming the extent, of that obstinate disease of the
spleen which had so long made the author a burden to himself, and an object
of compassion to his friends -- among those who knew the disorder not altogether
incurable, and who had good reason to rely firmly upon the innate vigor
and elasticity of the constitution -- even among these we have noticed
a want of proper consideration in regard to the subject matter of the anticipated
work -- a misconception of the extent and capacities of the theme -- which
has operated to the temporary disadvantage of the historian.

Mr. Cooper's strength in sea narrative was well known, and justly appreciated;
and in a work on Naval History, much was expected of a character very similar
to that which had afforded its charm to the "Pilot," and rivetted attention
in the "Red Rover." This expectation would have been comparatively well
founded had the announcement been that of a Naval Biography. Here, an allowable
minuteness of detail would have given vigor and vitality to the narration,
and the personal adventures of the several heroes would have been overspread,
in the simple discussion of fact with all the warm hues of the most spirit-stirring
romance. In no general naval record, however, should we look too confidently
for interest, beyond that grave species which is attached to the mere statement
of fact. In records of our own marine, especially, we should look for little
farther than this. The story of the simple events of our experience (for
we are a nation of single ships) must always be deficient in that excitement
which is derivable from the unity and majesty of the combined operations
of fleets. Here then our sea-history labors under disadvantages not experienced
by that of Europe. The tales we have to tell, of detached combat after
combat, can form, at best, but a series of monotonous episode, where if
the mind seeks, as it will, for connexion, this can only be established
by means of a dry and barren mass of documental and statistical detail.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, (whose importance
we have by no means adequately pointed out) Mr. Cooper has succeeded in
writing a book which cannot fail to do him lasting honor, not more in a
literary point of view, than as affording evidence of the final triumph
of his kindlier and more manly feelings over the promptings of Satan and
the spleen. The very preface is redolent of a returning good humor -- of
a recovered modesty -- of a resuscitated common sense. Mr. Cooper is evidently
Mr. Cooper once again, and as such we most cordially welcome him home to
the good will, and to the affections, of his countrymen. That
he, in preference to any one, should have written the Naval History
of the United States, is a matter about which there is but little difference
of opinion; and we rejoice, from the bottom of our heart, that he has arisen
to the good work, from the moral death which has so long enwrapped him,
while it is yet a convenient season for the undertaking -- before the veteran
actors in the drama have all passed away from among us while there is yet
many a tongue to tell what the eyes have seen -- many a living witness
to the gallant and glorious exploits which have had so much to do in the
rendering us, and in the preserving us, a free people.

It is not our design, of course, to speak at length of any portion of
a History which will speak so very eloquently for itself. The narrative
commences with the first settlement by the English, proceeds with some
details respecting the earliest achievements of the rival French and British
colonies, connected with a clear and rapid survey of the condition of the
maritime powers of Europe, and after discussing, in a masterly manner,
every momentous event in the annals of our Navy, terminates with the contest
of 1812. The war of the Revolution is brought to a close about the middle
of the first volume, and the more important subsequent occurrences occupy
the remainder of the publication.

The work, as a whole, has, we think, all the great requisites of a proper
History -- distinctness of narration, rigorous impartiality, an evident
anxiety for truth, and a concise philosophical discussion of fact, rather
than a shadowy speculation upon motive. Every similar book, as a matter
of course, is liable to objection -- to cavil -- in regard to its detail;
and, in the present case, we have heard occasional censures upon which
we scarcely think it necessary to comment. Battles, whether by sea or land,
(and battles form our staple here) are seldom witnessed by distinct authorities
from the same points of observation, and this fact alone is sufficient
to account for a thousand immaterial discrepancies.

In regard to style, let us hear Mr. Cooper himself.

"Some of the greatest writers of the age have impaired the dignity of
their works, by permitting the peculiarities which have embellished their
lighter labors to lessen the severity of manner that more properly distinguishes
narratives of truth. This danger has been foreseen in the present instance,
though the nature of the subject, which seldom rises to the level of general
history, affords a constant temptation to offend. A middle course has been
adopted, which, it is hoped, while some defects of execution may probably
be detected, will be found on the whole to be suited to a recital of facts,
in the familiar form that, in a measure, the incidents have de-manded."

The mere English of our author was never, at any period, remarkable
for precision of arrangement, and however easily, in a work of pure romance,
such defect may be disregarded, we must own that it derogates very materially
from the beauty of an otherwise excellent historic style. In the volumes
before us sentences occur, by far too frequently, where positive ambiguity
arises from sheer negligence in regard to the ordinary proprieties of grammar.

"Republicanism itself is brought into disrepute, in denying the just
rewards of long services to officers, by attaching to it the weakness of
a neglect of incentives, an ignorance on the subject of the general laws
of discipline, and the odium of injustice. It is by forgetting the latter
quality, more through the indifference of a divided power, than from any
other cause, that republics have obtained their established character of
being ungrateful."

Here is great confusion of expression. By "the latter quality"
justice is intended, while injustice is implied.

"A territorial aristocracy, promotion, in both the army and the navy,
is the inevitable fruit of favor, or of personal rank."

This sentence, as it stands, is utterly unintelligible, and can only
be comprehended at all by placing before it the words immediately antecedent
-- which are "The nature of the English government is no secret." It now
appears that the English government is "a territorial aristocracy." But
every properly constructed sentence should have within itself the means
of its own (grammatical) comprehension.

"The man who, refusing to adopt remedies that he believes unsuited to
his constitution, is discreet, when he carries his system so far as to
forget to look for others to supply their places, becomes careless and
culpable."

This exceedingly ambiguous proposition is rendered perfectly plain by
merely a different arrangement of the same words.

"The man who is discreet in refusing to adopt remedies that he believes
unsuited to his constitution, becomes careless and culpable when he carries
his system so far as to forget to look for others to supply their places."
But upon this topic quite enough has been said.

Mr. Cooper's observations on the subject of our general marine policy
are, we think, among the very best portions of his book. They are strikingly
comprehensive in view, and evince a profound knowledge of the true incentives
of human action. Our limits will permit us to give but a small portion
of his remarks.

"A careful review of these facts and principles must satisfy all who
study the subject, that the United States of America have never resorted
to the means necessary to develope, or even in a limited sense, to employ
their own naval resources. As a consequence, they have never yet enjoyed
the advantage of possessing a powerful marine in time of war, or have felt
its influence in sustaining their negotiations, and in supporting their
national rights in a time of peace. As yet the ships of America have done
little more than show the world what the republic might do with its energies
duly directed, and its resources properly developed, by demonstrating the
national aptitude for this species of warfare.

"But the probationary period of the American marine is passing away,
and the body of the people are beginning to look forward to the appearance
of their fleets on the ocean. It is no longer thought there is an unfitness
in the republic's possessing heavy ships; and the opinion of the country
in this, as in other respects, is slowly rising to the level of its wants.
Still many lingering prejudices remain in the public mind, in connexion
with this all important subject, and some that threaten the service with
serious injury. Of these, the most prominent are, the mode in which the
active vessels are employed; a neglect of the means of creating seamen
for the public service; the fact that there is no force in commission on
the American coast; the substitution of money for pride and self-respect,
as the aim of military men; and the impairing of discipline, and lessening
the deference for the justice of the state, by the denial of rank.

"Under the present system of employing the public vessels, none of the
peculiar experience that belongs to the higher objects of the profession
is obtained. While ships may be likened to regiments as regards the necessity
of man&oelig; uvring together, there is one important feature in which
they are totally dissimilar. It may be pretty safely thought that one disciplined
regiment will march as far, endure as much, and occupy its station as certainly
as another, but no such calculation can be made on ships. The latter are
machines, and their qualities may be improved by human ingenuity, when
their imperfections have been ascertained by experiment. Intelligent comparisons
are the first step in this species of improvement.

"It will be clear to the dullest mind, that the evolutions of a fleet,
and, in a greater or less degree, its success, must be dependent on the
qualities of its poorest vessels; since its best cannot abandon their less
fortunate consorts to the enemy. The naval history of the world abounds
with instances, in which the efforts of the first sea-captains have been
frustrated by the defects of a portion of the ships under their command.
To keep a number of vessels in compact order, to cause them to preserve
their weatherly position in gales and adverse winds, and to bring them
all as near as possible up to the standard that shall be formed by the
most judicious and careful commander, is one of the highest aims of naval
experience. On the success of such efforts depend the results of naval
evolutions more frequently than on any dexterity in fighting guns. An efficient
fleet can no more be formed without practice in squadrons, than an efficient
army without evolutions in brigades. By not keeping ships in squadrons,
there will also be less emulation, and consequently less improvement.

"Under the present system three principal stations are maintained; two
in the Atlantic, and one in the Mediterranean. On neither of these stations
would the presence of a vessel larger than a sloop of war be necessary,
on ordinary occasions, provided a force of heavy ships could periodically
and unexpectedly appear on all. It is seldom that a single ship of the
line is required on any service; and it is certain that a solitary two-decked
vessel could have no great influence on those important interests which
it is the practice of the rest of Christendom to refer to the agency of
fleets. By putting in commission six or eight two-decked ships, and by
causing them to appear, from time to time, on all the more important stations
this side of the two great southern capes, the country, at no material
additional cost, would obtain the several objects of practice in fleets,
of comparative trials of the qualities of the most important class of vessels
in the navy, of a higher state of discipline, and of a vast improvement
in the habits of subordination on the part of commanders, a defect that
all experience shows is peculiar to the desultory mode of service now in
use, and which has produced more naval disasters in the world than probably
any other one cause. In a word, the principal ends of a navy can no more
be obtained, by the services of single ships, than wars can be decided
by armies cut up into battalions."