And Yet Another U.s. Border Crisis

September 27, 1994|By Robert Thacker. and Robert Thacker is director of the Canadian Studies program at St. Lawrence University.

Even now, with the U.S. occupation of Haiti taking place and a signed agreement with Cuba on immigration, there's another ticking hemispheric time bomb that may soon force President Clinton to turn around and look north to Canada.

The recent election of Parti Quebecois separatist leader Jacques Parizeau as Quebec's premier has set the stage for a showdown that will certainly require Clinton's attention. It may even demand his participation.

Consider a reality of geography: Cuba and Haiti are tiny island nations separated from the U.S. mainland by a comfortable span of water. Between Canada and the U.S., on the other hand, is what has proudly been called "the longest undefended border in the world," representing our most intimate bilateral relation.

This proximity makes Canada's problems our problems. The looming showdown over separatism holds peril for the United States if our single neighbor to the north becomes two sovereign nations. For even if Canada and Quebec part on relatively amicable terms, a sour tension will remain between them that will affect every agreement with the U.S. from the North American Free Trade Agreement to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

As is usual with events in Canada, the Quebec election received little media attention in this country. This ho-hum response is understandable since, superficially, the Sept. 12 provincial election appeared to be yet another electoral contest in which Quebec's possible separation was an issue. After all, this thinking goes, the Parti Quebecois was in power from 1976 to 1985 and they lost a referendum on "sovereignty-association" in 1980. Today, decisive support for the next referendum Parizeau has promised to call just isn't there.

All of this is true, but it ignores much of what else happened since the 1980 referendum. During his two terms, former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sought constitutional arrangements that would accord special recognition to Quebec's distinctive society, with its unique cultural definition. These attempts failed and since last fall's election of a new prime minister, Jean Chretien, the word "constitution" has scarcely been uttered.

More than this, there's a real difference now: English-speaking Canadians don't seem to care what Quebec wants. French-speaking Canadians rejected the October 1992 Charlottetown constitutional accord because it did not give Quebec the special status and powers it wanted. English-speaking Canadians rejected it because it gave Quebec too much.

Thus, Parizeau will govern differently, with Quebec's separation-or "sovereignty"-always in mind. He will disrupt, rather than participate in, the Canadian federation. The rest of Canada, English-speaking and fed up with all of this, is likely to say "Fine, if you want to go, go; we don't care anymore."

Parizeau has promised a referendum on sovereignty within a year. He makes separation sound inevitable and painless. Prime Minister Chretien, passionately opposed to separation, has been staying away from this issue as a matter of practical politics and to save his presence for the upcoming referendum campaign.

This is where Clinton comes in, and he needs to be careful. Since assuming office late last year, Chretien has yet to have the full-scale meeting with Clinton that has become traditional in view of the intimate and extremely important relations between the U.S. and Canada. Such a meeting is rumored to be planned for this fall, with Clinton traveling to Canada. This will put him there between Parizeau's election and the separation referendum. The official American position on Quebec nationalism has always been that we hope Canada will remain united, but it is a domestic Canadian matter.

Clinton could change that. As president of the United States, he could go to Canada with the referendum looming and overturn Parizeau and the separatists altogether. By diplomatically suggesting that an independent Quebec's cordial relations with the United States are by no means a given, he could have a decisive effect. Rather than the rosy inevitability of separation painted by Parizeau, whereby Quebec would have to be included because it couldn't be excluded, Clinton could say that an independent Quebec might not be included in NAFTA or GATT, that it's just not that easy. Or he could point to numerous other North American arrangements between Canada and the United States: Social Security, boundary waters, reciprocal tax treaties, telecommunications, migratory fowl-the list goes on and on. Clinton needs to be cautious because Canadians fear American might and, doubtless, many would not take kindly to such meddling by an American president.

Yet whatever Canadians think, Americans have a stake in Canada's future direction and we certainly don't have to make things easier for Parizeau. Such a comment from Clinton could derail the separatist cause. Whatever Parizeau says, his referendum prospects are far from good. Clinton should think about making them a whole lot worse.