This started out as a response to a commenter but I thought it was important enough to use as a post for an article. I noticed in the recent Loftus-Wood ‘cross-fire’ debate on the infidelguy show, that Wood seemed to be using the argument that God has a different standard for morality than us. I seem to see this argument a lot. In fact, a recent commenter seemed to be using it against John, and then when I countered it, a different commenter defended it. I wonder how can it be justified that the Abrahamic God should not be expected to adhere to the same rules that we are expected to adhere to with respect to morality.

A father that smokes and tells his son not to smoke creates a problem in his credibility. While it is true that smoking is not healthy and the son is not justified in disregarding that advice, the fact that it can be shown empirically that smoking is unhealthy supports the fathers claim and weakens the effect of the charge of inconsistency. I don't see how anyone can support the claim that God should not be expected to adhere to the same rules that we are expected to adhere to with respect to morality. I don't see how anyone can support a double standard for morality. My argument is an argument from ignorance intended to show that it is more plausible that there should not be a double standard for morality.

The only way that I can see for the believer to refute it is to say something like God is a mystery and that we can not expect to dictate what God can do. This would be a mischaracterization and an appeal to the supernatural, specifically God, but the presumption of God and the supernatural is controversial. In the case that the believer says that God is a special case, for whatever reason, would be a case of special pleading, and they would have to show why morality rules for us don't apply to God. In the end, their presumption is still that God exists and as I said before this is a weak premise in that it is controversial on two, maybe three, points.1. that there is a god2. that it is the Abrahamic god3. Possibly irrelevant, but that he had anything to do with scripture.

In the case that they choose that strategy, it would be an argument from ignorance as well, but weaker because its premises are controversial. I am not suggesting that I have authority to decide or dictate what God can or cannot do, I can only say what he should or should not do using informal logic and defeasible reasoning schemes.

The exchange in the forums went as follows.

Commenter1: have you ever stopped to realize how infinitely gracious God is to not have annihilated the entire human race?

Lee: Would you say that my dogs should be infinitely grateful that I don't kill them when I get up in the morning?Commenter2: I cant see the dog analogy as a viable one…Its an argument of proportion.

My point was that that there is a strong presumption that God shouldn't kill us therefore it doesn't follow that we should be grateful that he doesn't. For him to kill us would be immoral or criminal. There is a weaker presumption that I shouldn't kill my dog. It would be more immoral for God to kill me than it would be for me to kill my dog. I think this argument should expose the 'double standard' for morals that I see being argued by believers for humans and God. What follows is a 'dizzying' defense of that claim.

Most analogies are flawed, that is why they are a defeasible form of argument. But when analogies can be shown to be similar enough to a situation, they can be used to increase the plausibility of a position.The dog analogy is not similar in the fact that I am not a God and my dog is not a human and I didn't create the dog.The dog analogy works because of the relationship, not because of the proportion.

When a Christian says that we should be grateful that God lets us live, that sets up the relationship. In theory, God created us, he is more powerful than us, he has control of whether we live or die, we should thank him for our daily bread (which creates the presumption that he has some control over it), and we should thank him that he lets us live.

When I say that my dog should be grateful that I let him live, In reality, I did not create him (negative analogy), I am more powerful than him (positive), I am in control of whether he lives or dies (pos.), he should thank me for his food (pos.), and he should thank me that I let him live.

The discrepency in my analogy (that I did not create the dog), is actually a negative for the believers argument. Here's why. I should have used my son instead of my dog, because it would have been more appropriate but I didn't think about it. In a way, I created my son, or at least I was a catalyst for his existence.

Here is the rough hierarchy for that analogy, dog < son < me < God. For me to kill my dog is less criminal than for me to kill my son, therefore, I should be expected to be less likely to kill my son than my dog. Therefore, to say that my dog should be happy that I let him live has more force than to say to my son that he should be happy that I let him live, and it should have less force to say that I should be happy that God lets me live. It should be less likely that God would kill me than I would kill my son. Therefore, if God were to kill me, it would be more criminal / immoral than if I were to kill my son, or my dog.

If I injected God into the equation, it would have more force to say that I should be happy that God lets my dog live, less force to say that I should be happy that God lets my son live, less force to say that I should be happy that God lets me live. I know that in reality, my son and I should be equal in Gods eyes, but like I said, analogies are defeasible.

So for me to kill my dog would be less criminal than for God to kill me, and therefore it would be more criminal for God to kill me than for me to kill my dog, therefore there is a stronger PRESUMPTION that God shouldn't kill me therefore it can be EXPECTED that God shouldn't kill me, therefore it doesn't follow that we should be grateful that God doesn't kill us because there is a strong presumption that he shouldn't kill us because it would be criminal or immoral, more so than if I were to kill my dog.