Bush and Saakashvili: A Case Study in What Not to Do

Thomas de Waal reviews Saakashvili’s presidency in Foreign Affairs. He recounts how his American cheerleaders enabled some of his most reckless behavior, including the August 2008 war:

American support served to insulate him from some of the domestic criticism — but eventually it proved to be his undoing. Although Americans and Georgians had adopted the habit of using the word “ally” to refer to each other, there was never a formal alliance between the two countries. Saakashvili allowed his judgment to be skewed by his glowing testimonials from the Bush White House.

Saakashvili’s miscalculations were tragically exposed in August 2008, when war broke out with Russia over Georgia’s breakaway province of South Ossetia. We now know that the war was triggered by Saakashvili’s decision to attack the South Ossetian town of Tskhinvali in a doomed attempt to reconquer the province by force, only to provoke a massive — and well-prepared — Russian assault on his country. Saakashvili probably believed that if he captured Tskhinvali, the United States would back him against Russia.

Saakashvili is responsible for his serious blunders, but the Bush administration’s role in encouraging him in his worst instincts needs to be remembered as an example of how not to manage relations with a would-be client. The first mistake that the Bush administration made in its handling of Georgia was the promotion of the new Georgian government as a model of both political and economic reform and the celebration of Saakashvili as a democrat. The economic reforms were real enough, but the rest was mostly nonsense. Saakashvili was given credit for being what he was not mainly because he was seen as fiercely anti-Russian and “pro-Western,” which are often mistaken as proof of adhering to liberal and democratic political principles. The semi-authoritarian nature of Saakashvili’s government by itself wouldn’t have been so remarkable, except that the primary and perhaps sole justification offered for the U.S.-Georgian relationship in the Bush years was the myth that Georgia was a success story of the so-called “freedom agenda.”

The degree to which the relationship was built around empty rhetoric and hollow promises was impressive. Saakashvili flattered Bush by borrowing from Bush’s own delusional rhetoric about global democratic revolution, which won Bush’s admiration. Bush in turn gushed about freedom under Saakashvili (who actually presided over a diminution of civil liberties and political rights in Georgia), thus helping to legitimize the heavy-handed and abusive rule of Saakashvili in Western eyes. Finally, Saakashvili took Bush’s empty promises of support as if they were practically formal security guarantees, and made the disastrous decision to fight a war that Georgia could not possibly win in the vain expectation that the U.S. would rescue him. The Bush administration’s enthusiasm for Georgian membership in NATO only made this worse, since it seemed to confirm that the U.S. really was willing to come to Georgia’s defense and aggravated tensions with Russia so that conflict became more likely. Both governments managed to deceive each other, and Georgia suffered terrible damage as a result.

NATO originated as a defensive alliance to protect Europe from the threat of Soviet aggression. It succeeded in that mission and the Soviet Union has been gone for almost a quarter century. Seriously. The USSR has been in the history books for longer than the period between the two World Wars. Why is NATO still here?

It ought to be disbanded with a hearty “well done,” hand out some medals, build a couple of monuments and replace it with a new European collective security agreement with the US and Canada as friendly observers.

This notion of permanent military alliances is nothing but trouble because it assumes something we know is not true — things change. There is no earthly reason to think that a 64-year-old alliance makes sense. Someone born on NATO’s birthday is about ready for Social Security!

We talk too much. Much too much. There’s a scene in one of the Monty Python movies where Death comes to an English country house and says, “You Americans–always talking!” Point taken, but not by our leaders.

It ought to be disbanded with a hearty “well done,” hand out some medals, build a couple of monuments and replace it with a new European collective security agreement with the US and Canada as friendly observers.

I do suspect, though, that an unspoken rationale of NATO (beyond containing the Russian Bear–who nowadays is mostly harmless), is to help ensure the Bundeswehr stays within its borders. As the world’s greatest singing mathematician observed back in the 60s:

Once all the Germans were warlike and mean
But that couldn’t happen again
We taught them a lesson in 1918
And they’ve hardly bothered us since then…

That would make a lot more sense if there was any hint that the Germans were all that interested in using their military in this way. Other NATO members keep trying to lure them into wars, and the Germans keep saying, “No, thanks.” If NATO disappeared tomorrow, Germany wouldn’t have to keep apologizing to other Western countries for not wanting to bomb foreigners.

And the Georgians weren’t the only “color revolutionaries” to gain power by pretending to be “democratic.” Of course, there is a case to be made that they weren’t fooling anyone, even the Bush Administration, and all that was required, for neo con support, was to be anti Russian, or anti Yugoslavian, or anti Syrian, or anti whatever the US disliked in the country or region. Be against whoever the US disfavored, and everyone was willing to at least pretend to believe you when you also claimed to be democratic and liberal.

Much the same with Obama, really, but without the high flying rhetoric. The Libyan rebels were all about the democracy too, remember? As are the Syrian rebels now, no doubt. And the Egyptian military crackdown (don’t call it a coup!) which overthrew an elected government, was, somehow, in service to democracy as well!

I think there’s a bit more lingering mistrust of Berlin (among Europeans) than you might suspect, Daniel–although right now, more Europeans (particularly those in the South, with mountains between them and Germany) are worried about the Bundesbank than the Bundeswehr…

Let’s remember that Vladimir Putin told George W. Bush several months before Saakashvili’s blunder, that Georgia would not be allowed to resolve the separatist dispute in S.O. by military means. Stunning incompetence on Bush’s part for failing to ensure this message was delivered to Georgia’s president.

Was there a military contractor who profited from the conflict? Then there’s a pretty good chance the Bush administration knew exactly what they were doing, and got exactly the result they wanted. I’ve yet to see any evidence than any of their decisions had any basis other than how much money their buddies would make from it. Their successor is not much better, although restrained by the tribalism of the electorate.

Today, NATO is simply political cover and operational base for American hegemonic ambitions. Europe wins here because it allows its countries to spend less on their own militaries while still being part of the alliance.

As Larison explains, they only have to put up with American (and sometimes British) prodding to join the team on its field trips to other countries.

NATO is another example of organizational momentum. Big organizations are hard to kill. They just never seem to go away. When its mission went away, it started inventing new missions. Too many people owe their livelihood to NATO. What a waste of money and resources, including human resources. Its time for all those people to start doing productive things for their respective countries.

For those dismayed at the lack of democracy in Georgia, there’s a simple solution: give Georgia NATO membership. This would make the country significantly more secure and all of the energy currently being put towards defending itself from Russia can be directed towards democracy and other political luxuries. Right now, the situation resembles one in which observers are surprised and offended that a man with a gun to his head is acting in an uncivil manner.

Bush was so flattered that he started calling Georgia the “beacon of democracy”, and refrained from any and all public criticism of Saakashvili from that point on.

@creasy Had Georgia been able to join NATO, it would have likely become even more belligerent, not less. And NATO membership does not automatically translate into democratic reforms; both Greece and Turkey were ruled by military juntas throughout much of their NATO history. Moreover, over the last few years, both Turkey and Hungary have been sliding towards autocracy.

In fact, what NATO membership gives its members is a sense of invulnerability, which is fine as long as the country in question stays within certain limits; if it doesn’t, it can get away with pretty much anything, witness the occupation of Cyprus by an autocratic Turkish government in the 70s.