About Rationally Speaking

Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Thursday, July 28, 2011

On ethics, part I: Moral philosophy’s third way

by Massimo Pigliucci

Ethics, its implications and its justifications keep appearing at Rationally Speaking in a variety of forms, from my critique of Sam Harris’ scientism to my rejection of Objectivism, from Julia’s skepticism about meta-ethics to Michael’s criticism of the non-morality of markets. This is, of course, inevitable because ethics is both a crucial component of our lives and a topic that can — with due caution — be approached rationally, which means it does belong to this blog.

So, I have decided to take the bull by its nasty horns and do a multi-part series on ethics (haven’t decided how many parts just yet) with the following objectives: a) make as clear as possible my “third way” between moral relativism and objective moral truths (this essay); b) systematically explore the differences among the major ethical systems proposed by philosophers: deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics and egalitarianism; and c) apply the method of reflective equilibrium to my own thinking about ethics to see whether I need to revise my positions about moral philosophy (I am starting this quest with a marked preference for virtue ethics, but mixed with the apparently not so easy to reconcile with egalitarianism of John Rawls). We’ll see how far we get, yes?

The starting point for my discussion of what I will refer to as ethics’ “third way” is a recent thoughtful article published in The Stone, the New York Times’ philosophy blog. There, NYU philosopher Paul Boghossian does an excellent job at summarizing the perennial discussion between moral relativists and moral absolutists. Boghossian introduces an interesting contrast to make his readers think about the differences among moral absolutism, moral relativism, and nihilism. Consider first the ancient concept of witches. We (well, most of us) no longer believe that there are witches in the world, so we have dropped talk of witches altogether, engaging in what Boghossian calls “eliminativism” about witches (analogous, of course, to the much more debatable eliminativism in philosophy of mind proposed by Patricia and Paul Churchland).

Now think of Boghossian’s second example: Einstein’s theory of Special Relativity, which teaches us that there is no such thing as absolute space and time. That did not lead us to abandon the concepts of space and time, but rather to substitute relative forms of those concepts in our ways of thinking about the world. We can still all agree about a particular space-time point if we have already agreed to use a given frame of reference. Change the frame of reference and you’ll have to rethink that particular point in space-time.

I think you know where this is going. The question is whether ethics is more like the case of witches or that of Special Relativity. As Boghossian puts it: “When we reject absolute moral facts is moral relativism the correct outcome or is it moral eliminativism (nihilism)?” Think about that one for a second before we proceed.

Okay, we are back. So next consider the quintessential example of culturally relative rules: etiquette (this is also from Boghossian’s article, I told you it’s good!). There is no question that etiquette is not per se a moral absolute: if you are in a certain country and/or a particular type of company, action X (say, belching at the dinner table) will be frowned upon and cause offense, but in a different company or culture the same action X will be welcomed, indeed, even considered a required response to show your appreciation of what the locals have done for you.

Boghossian then proceeds with the punch line, which I will leave entirely to him: “our relativism about etiquette does not actually dispense with all absolute moral facts. Rather, we are relativists about etiquette in the sense that, with respect to a restricted range of issues (such as table manners and greetings), we take the correct absolute norm to be ‘we ought not, other things being equal, offend our hosts.’ This norm is absolute and applies to everyone and at all times. Its relativistic flavor comes from the fact that, with respect to that limited range of behaviors (table manners and greetings, but not, say, the abuse of children for fun), it advocates varying one’s behavior with local convention.”

Did you see that coming? Good for you, but let’s recapitulate what Boghossian is saying: if you take the road to moral relativism you only have two choices, let’s call it Boghossian’s dilemma (in homage to the famous Euthyphro’s dilemma, which allowed Plato to dispense once and for all with the pernicious idea that gods are necessary for morality, regardless of whatever other nonsense you may have heard from religious people). Either you go all the way down to moral nihilism, or you have to assent to some absolute standard with which to ground your (now local) relativism. If you pick nihilism, you will have a hard time justifying or criticizing any kind of societal conduct at all, while if you go for local relativism you will have won a Pyrrhic victory and essentially conceded the case to the moral absolutist.

But there is a third way, and it is indeed illustrated precisely by Boghossian’s example of Special Relativity applied to etiquette. It is also what I have been trying to articulate for some time now, so I’ll give it my best shot yet. For me, moral philosophy is about a type of reasoning, which — like all reasoning, and particularly the logico-mathematical variety — begins with certain assumptions (which can, of course, in turn be scrutinized, empirically or logically) and attempts to unpack the logical consequences of such assumptions. Occasionally, some of those consequences lead to incoherence, or to unfruitful results, in which case one may want to (very cautiously) go back and revise a sub-set of the assumptions themselves before resuming the process. (This is a common procedure in philosophical reasoning, the above mentioned reflective equilibrium.)

In Special Relativistic terms, of course, this means that we first agree to a particular frame of reference — which we may choose because it is convenient for our purposes, it’s easy to calculate, or whatever — and then all our measures of space-time are objective and unquestionable relative to that frame of reference. In terms of the etiquette example, Boghossian is quite right that what appears to be culturally relative is in turn the result of what seems to be a human cultural universal: don’t offend your hosts if you can avoid it. But of course one can imagine situations in which that universal does not apply, for instance and most trivially in the case of a non-social species of primates, where the very concept of “host” (of “social offense”) doesn’t compute.

Where does all of this leave us? With the idea that morality is a human (and other relevantly similar beings’) phenomenon, so that to talk about universal morality makes precisely no sense. But human beings share certain (local to the species) attributes,*** such as preferring a long and healthy life to a nasty and short one, and it is those parameters of humanness that set the axioms of our moral thinking. Ethical reasoning, then, consists of what sort of rules and outcomes logically emerge from that particular set of assumptions. Just like a good mathematician would do, we pick the most promising axioms and work with them, but we acknowledge that sometimes the search gets stuck into unproductive corners of logical space and we go back and — cautiously — tweak the assumptions themselves and get back to work.

Two obvious caveats about ethics’ third way: first, the assumptions from which we start are arrived at empirically (human nature), but this does not mean that science is sufficient to answer moral questions, because most of the work is done by logical analysis unpacking the implications of those assumptions. Second, I am not arguing that what is (human nature) in any straightforward way determines what ought to be (ethics), I am simply taking the eminently sensible position that morality is about human behavior, and so it cannot prescind from considerations of human nature.

So, in a nutshell:

* Moral absolutism: X is universally right / wrong.

Indefensible because one cannot make coherent sense of what “universally” may possibly mean in this context.

Inevitably leads to either sterile nihilism or to some sort of hidden absolutism.

* Moral reasonism (for lack of a better term): If assumptions {W,Z} are accepted, then X is right / wrong.

Where the assumptions are provided by our best (and changing) understanding of human nature, and the rest is done via rational thinking.

Next: the four major systems of moral reasoning, and where they lead us if we adopt them.

—-

*** Yes, I’m aware that some human beings do not seem to care about other people having the same sort of long and healthy lives that they wish for themselves (many Republicans in Congress come to mind); or indeed that some don’t even necessarily wish for long and healthy lives. We call the first ones psychopaths and we try to help the latter out of their depression. And that’s all I’m going to say about those exceptions in this context.

81 comments:

I was glad to see that my comments on your facebook link were mostly in line with how you unpacked this issue. Though I think "moral reasonism" might need a better label. :)

I do think the exceptions you bring up are important though, because they are extreme versions of of a general standard deviation in human attributes and cognition. This is what I was getting at with my comment about current and possible configurations of a system. And I think it's particularly relevant when adopting a virtue ethics approach (though it's an important consideration for ethics in general). An action may be "appropriate" for someone given their current psychology and neurophysiology, while at the same time allowing us to say that given other configurations there are other actions that would be more appropriate, more ontologically fulfilling ways of being. But how to get from one to the other, and how to balance the divide in the mean time seems quite non-trivial.

I expect to give your essay a closer read, but upon first review two things came to mind. I hope you do not find my mention of them pedantic.

First, John Rawls was not, on meta-ethical grounds, an egalitarian. A true meta-ethical egalitarian would be someone like G.A. Cohen. Rawls instead established his political theory upon a contractarianism not unlike that of Shelly Kagan, Nozick, or Hobbes, e.g. (though, of course, differing greatly with the latter two), though he (Rawls) concludes with egalitarian-friendly outcomes.

Second, in your brief list of alternative meta-ethical systems, you leave out contractarianism. Why? Though there are deontological and consequentialist elements to contractarianism, it *is* a distinct ethical system.

I thought the fourth option for ethics, Egalitarianism, was interesting. I am not sure I have seen that separated out as an individual system, though I am a fan of Rawls. I have also argued in the past, perhaps in a Rawlsian fashion, that since absolutism is not an option, that our baseline has to be egalitarianism, but that also includes asking questions about why any individual has come to live the life that they lead- which gets into some of the issues you and Julia raised in the last podcast.

Lastly, though I have problem with Harris's language, I think his view of Ethics is probably going to be pretty close to what you are calling for. He may eschew philosophy to a degree, but he is certainly using it to understand what we "ought" to do as well as taking our scientific notions into accout, which you do as well. In other words, I think he may be actually following your moral "reasonism" (that word leaves a bad taste) while using language closer to moral absolutism. Not to say that he does not have some bad arguments in there to try to buttress his position.

As a pragmatist, I prefer Mill's Utilitarianism as a guide for ethics and morality. If any action increases overall good, then it is right. If any proposed direct moral rule, when generally acted from, increases overall good, then it is a correct direct moral rule.

Now, one of the so-called "moral rules" is never to tell a lie. But if I was in a situation where I was told that if my name was such and such--20 people would die--I would like and say my name was something else in order to save those 20 people. This is one of the reasons why utilitarianism is one of the better NET's.

I'm not sure why Sam Harris has such an aversion to using the word philosophy. If you look at what he says, he's pretty much redefining philosophy as science, since he states that he's not simply talking about double blind research carried out in a lab, but that he's incorporated a more broad process of respect for the scientific method, and reason and logic and proper justification for beliefs in his definition. I define this as philosophy.

"sure, but I don't see the point of ethics being to micromanage one's quest for eudaimonia, only to give everyone the broad tools people need to engage in the quest."

I tend to agree Massimo. But I think these sorts of considerations are relevant for a few reasons:

a) the actions of others (like psychopaths) affect our ability to engage in that quest b) when we understand more about human agency we come to understand that the tools needed may be different for different people c) under a virtue ethics approach, if we understand what bars someone else from engaging in that quest effectively, would it not be a virtue to help them? (whether personally or on the societal level) and even under a utilitarian approach would it not bring about the best outcome to help them?d) and maybe most importantly, to what degree can we make a normative statement about an inherently more fulfilling state of eudaimonia that the average human can attain vs. a possible state of eudaimonia given someone's current neurophysiology?

I don't think it's so much about micromanaging, but rather, if as you say, in moral reasonism we accept certain assumptions, and those assumptions come from our biology (as a result of our evolutionary history), can we really say that certain types of flourishing are better than others (if we can only judge them against facts about our biology)?

I think we can, but I do think it's important to address the issues head on. I think my point about how to get from one to the other is also relevant in that we might be able to make a theoretical statement that that there are ways of being that are inherently more fulfilling, but we can't neglect the process of getting from one to the other. What if the process of change is painful and difficult, and rips apart family and relationships? Is the process itself such a worthy pursuit that we can neglect the (ever evolving) consequences to the individual and those around them in the meantime? But I think I'm getting off topic here.

The argument is based on the premise that moral antirealism leads to moral nihilism (moral eliminativism), but I don't think that case has been made.

We are eliminativist about witches because witch phenomena do not exist, even in our local reference frames. We are not eliminativist about simultaneity because simultaneous phenomena are found every day in our local reference frames. So I think the moral eliminativism is a non-starter because moral phenomena are still with us. Neither can we be eliminativist about what I'll call "apparent normativity". Since we can't eliminate phenomena, only explanations of phenomena, we can't eliminate the feelings of "oughts", and that means we're still justified in using the language of morality. The only thing we antirealists are eliminating is absolute normativity, and there's no problem I can see with eliminating absolute normativity.

That said, I like moral reasonism with one provision: our assumptions {W,Z} are provided by our moral sentiments, not by our "understanding human nature."

I only know of reflective equilibrium in its Rawlsian context, and the framework of reasonism is a genuine application of the concept in deriving moral principles as it is for the principles of justice. Since you are using human nature as an a priori/empirical assumption, as opposed to controversial or uncertain moral principles, I think reasonism avoids the kind of problem Rawls faced taking for granted the the acceptance of the Kantian interpretation with reflective equilibrium prior to distancing himself from it in Political Liberalism. However, I like to take a stab at using human nature on an a priori/empirical basis. What if human nature is not immutable and could be changed or suppressed through a combination of culture, upbringing, and other environmental factors? In other words, what if even human nature takes on a relativistic manifestation? If this was true, I don't think we would have to abandon using human nature as an empirical assumption upon further reflective equilibrium, but I wouldn't know how to proceed from there. If I missed something immensely important, I would appreciate being told to look more closely.

> though I have problem with Harris's language, I think his view of Ethics is probably going to be pretty close to what you are calling for. <

Well, I find Harris both insufferably arrogant and hopelessly confused about these matters, but I've written enough about him already on this blog.

Doctor Logic,

> based on the premise that moral antirealism leads to moral nihilism <

You seem to be equating anti-realism in ethics to relativism, I don't think that's the case.

Dennis,

> I only know of reflective equilibrium in its Rawlsian context <

It is actually a general method in philosophy, which originated with Nelson Goodman in the context of justifying inductive logic.

> What if human nature is not immutable and could be changed or suppressed through a combination of culture, upbringing, and other environmental factors? <

Excellent point. I don't think it is either, it keeps evolving, not just biologically, but also culturally. (Interestingly, Hume had already suggested that, but that's another discussion.)

Even so, that's no excuse for relativism, it simply means that our moral systems need to evolve to track evolving human concepts of flourishing. And indeed, moral systems have been evolving! It used to be inconceivable to grant rights to slaves, women, and people of different ethnic backgrounds. Now, at least in civilized parts of the world, it is inconceivable *not* doing so.

What you're describing is a form of morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives (to use the title of Philippa Foot's paper). I.e: here is what you must do IF this goal is to be forwarded.

I take this as a form of metaethical relativism since an action is right or wrong relative to the goal[s] we consider axiomatic (as you put it). It is not, however, the common sort of 'when in Rome' cultural relativism, since judgments apply cross-culturally depending on how actions affect the goal.

For example, Sam Harris takes the goal of improving the well-being of conscious creatures as his moral axiom...and then points out how such moral judgments are valid even in cultures which approve of doing things highly detrimental to the well-being of conscious creatures. He denies that this is relativism, but I think he — and Boghossian — are conflating cultural relativism with the broader category which can include goal-based relativism.

As for Boghossian's charge that relativists may as well be nihilists, I disagree for reasons explained in Stephen Finlay's paper "The Error in the Error Theory." The lack of an absolute morality does not mean our moral claims are systematically false...if not all of our moral claims imply an absolute morality. An alternative is metaethical contextualism, the view that moral claims are incomplete propositions until some information is filled in from the context of the utterance. For example, a fundamentalist Christian claiming "Homosexuality is wrong!" may mean that homosexuality is against God's plan for human beings. If this is in fact the case, then the claim would be true. If Sam Harris says "Female genital mutilation is wrong!" he almost surely means it is detrimental to the well-being of conscious creatures. Again, if this is in fact the case, then his claim is true.

The notion that people mean different things by moral claims has some empirical support from the work of Jonathan Haidt et al.'s Moral Foundations Theory.

It seems to me that moral nihilism (in the absolute sense) is implicit in the moral reasonism view. The difference between reasonism and relativism seems to be that relativism implies that the assumptions upon which a system of morality is built are arbitrary whereas reasonism is based on what we can understand of human nature itself. Although my gut agrees with this my brain is not so certain.

I think it will also be tricky to decide which aspects of human nature count as values. This is not just because of heterogeneity within the population. Certain well-established shared aspects of human nature (e.g. irrationality) might be difficult to turn into virtues.

Perhaps it is best to examine the issue functionally. What role does/should(?) morality play? It seems to me that in order to answer that you need to either turn to something like contractarianism or posit some other reason why we need guiding principles in the first place. Maybe by looking at the 'reason' why we live in societies we can better elucidate the morality that ought to underpin virtuous social behavior.

Finally, how about moral constructionism in lieu of reasonism? Or moral deductivism? Or tempered moral relativism?

> In terms of the etiquette example, Boghossian is quite right that what appears to be culturally relative is in turn the result of what seems to be a human cultural universal: don’t offend your hosts if you can avoid it. But of course one can imagine situations in which that universal does not apply, for instance and most trivially in the case of a non-social species of primates, where the very concept of “host” (of “social offense”) doesn’t compute. <

Hey, no fair! We're talking about humans here, aren't we?

> Where does all of this leave us? With the idea that morality is a human (and other relevantly similar beings’) phenomenon, so that to talk about universal morality makes precisely no sense. <

I'm not sure I follow you there. Why does it make no sense to talk about universals with regard to human phenomena?

ResCognitans>"will you go into a further discussion of what should be considered when making a law - as distinct from a question of morality?"One difference is that when writing new law, one does not have to pretend that it is something other than man made law.

The hidden moral absolute can be found in the fact that even in a modern world humans are still tribal. Moral absolutism for all tribes is about as likely as God's morality. But within the tribe one deviates from the tribal mores at great peril to ones position in the tribe. Whether the tribe is financial managers, political idiots, or us rational speakers, the mores are extremely well defined, and no variation is possible if one is to remain in the tribe. There are few flexible enough to move smoothly among several tribes. Therefore the moral absolutes of the chosen tribe are inviolable.

I think that's an unfortunate choice of words, as it tends to encourage the common misperception that moral relativism is the only usual alternative to moral realism. But that omits subjectivism, non-cognitivism and error theory (my position). It seems to me that relativism is not very common among analytical philosophers, and that non-cognitivism and error theory are probably more common.

True, you mentioned moral "nihilism" (I prefer the term "anti-realism") later, but even then you seemed to treat it as a form of relativism, which it isn't. Either relativism should be treated as a form of nihilism, or they should be treated as two alternatives, in which case your way is the fourth, not the third!

Proceeding to Boghossian's argument, I argue that it's fatally flawed. He starts by arguing for this conclusion:

--In other words, the relativism of etiquette depends on the existence of absolute moral norms.--

From this he thinks it follows that, "there have to be some absolute moral facts."

Note that he has slid from "absolute moral norms" to "absolute moral facts". But they needn't be the same thing. Remember here that we're using "absolute" to mean non-relative, not objective. Suppose that my society has a non-relative moral code. For example, we believe that murder is wrong, and that there's nothing relative about that fact. That could be considered an absolute (non-relative) moral norm. But it doesn't follow that there really is such a fact, only that we believe it to be a fact. So "absolute moral norms" at best entails _belief_ in "absolute moral facts", not actual "absolute moral facts".

Suppose, on the other hand that, when Boghossian said "absolute moral norms" he was using this as a synonym for "absolute moral facts", i.e. he was taking them to be semantically equivalent. Then we can substitute "absolute moral facts" for "absolute moral norms" in the first conclusion. But then the conclusion is not justified by his argument. Even if we accept his argument up to that point, it only follows (at best) that the relativism of etiquette depends on _belief_ in the existence of absolute moral facts, and not on their actual existence.

Boghossian's argument depends on a conflation of two different meanings of "absolute moral norms". He has committed a fallacy of equivocation.

My broader point is that all of human moral discourse and behaviour can be explained by human _belief_ in absolute, objective moral truth. We are not forced to infer that such beliefs correspond to actual truths. (We may have other reasons to infer it, but that's another matter.)

P.S. On reflection, Boghossian was probably only arguing that normal moral discourse is committed to the existence of absolute (non-relative) moral facts, and not that it demonstrates the actual existence of such facts. In that case I would agree with his conclusion (though I still don't like his argument from etiquette, for other reasons than the one I gave above). That's why I'm not a relativist or non-cognitivist.

Very stimulating discussion so far, all! I'll make a few additional comments, I wish I had more time...

Garren,

> this as a form of metaethical relativism since an action is right or wrong relative to the goal[s] we consider axiomatic (as you put it). <

I suppose you could see it that way, but it seems a stretch to call that "relativism," particularly because the term has a different common usage in philosophy.

> The notion that people mean different things by moral claims has some empirical support from the work of Jonathan Haidt et al.'s Moral Foundations Theory. <

Yes, I find Haidt's research intriguing, but his take on it both philosophically naive and quite frankly, irritating. See, for instance: http://goo.gl/w9gwu

ResCogitans,

> will you go into a further discussion of what should be considered when making a law - as distinct from a question of morality? <

No, I think philosophy of law is sufficiently distinct (and I know very little about it) that I'll leave it alone.

Nick Barrowman,

> Why does it make no sense to talk about universals with regard to human phenomena? <

I meant a timeless, cosmic type of universal. It makes perfect sense to talk about *human* (quasi) universals.

slofox,

> The difference between reasonism and relativism seems to be that relativism implies that the assumptions upon which a system of morality is built are arbitrary whereas reasonism is based on what we can understand of human nature itself. <

Right, that seems to me to separate "reasonism" significantly from relativism.

Richard Wein,

> Either relativism should be treated as a form of nihilism, or they should be treated as two alternatives, in which case your way is the fourth, not the third! <

Yes, you are correct, I was simply going under the (perhaps questionable) assumption that nobody wants to take nihilism as the option, so that it isn't a viable position.

> Note that he has slid from "absolute moral norms" to "absolute moral facts". But they needn't be the same thing. <

I agree, but since I have a hard time making sense of moral facts outside of the specific context of social beings with certain needs and capable of reflecting on their condition, the distinction becomes, ahem, academic.

I would challenge you to to try writing an article in which you do not engage in an ad hominem attack on the Republican or any other party. I fail to see how that advances rational discussion. While I am as frustrated with all sides in Congress as anyone, I do not believe the problem is one of compassion.

I encourage attacking the silly methods used and policies proposed by our politicians, but impugning your opponents concern for their fellow man is unproductive.

The ends have been stipulated..."maximize human flourishing"...and it seems that the current exercise is about either stipulating or discovering the appropriate moral guidelines as the means to the stipulated ends.However, the ends need additional articulation before the possible means can be intelligently discussed. Is the ultimate end or goal the maximizing of human flourishing for the greatest numbers? For the most needy or excluded members?For equality of individuals' flourishing? There will be conflicts regarding whose flourishing shall trump others flourishing.It seems this question should be settled before we move on to the question of what are the "proper or best moral means" to whatever ends are stipulated.

Massimo, this is a fascinating post -- I'm always pleased and impressed when you take on such ambitious questions, regardless of whether I agree with your conclusions!

In this case, I think I see where you're going, but I'm not certain that Special Relativity is a very good analogy for a third way between absolutism and nihilism. To my mind, Special Relativity feels a lot like Boghossian's etiquette example. Accepting, for a moment, the premise that etiquette is relative but is grounded on an absolute moral maxim, I would say that likewise, space and time are relative, but are grounded on an absolute, viz. the speed of light.

More precisely, space and time are relative to one's chosen frame of reference, but spacetime intervals (for example) are invariant under the Lorentz transformation, which transforms coordinates from one frame to another. More generally, one formulates physical laws in such a way that they remain invariant under the Lorentz transformation.

The analogy is surprisingly robust; one could say that under an "etiquette transformation" from one cultural frame to another, the rule "do not offend your host" remains invariant.

If the analogy fails, I think it fails because the domain of applicability of such an "etiquette transformation" is much narrower than the domain of applicability of the Lorentz transformation. Most notably, as you and others have observed, it doesn't apply when the concept of "host" doesn't apply. So one important question might be, is it possible to formulate an "ethical transformation" from one cultural frame to another that has a very broad domain of applicability? And if so, how broad?

It seems to me that Reasonism doesn't have the same position to Relativism that localized observations have to relativistic physics. Localized observations give us common sense answers to questions of where an object is or how quickly it's moving, but those answers stem from a another, less visualizable realm of facts about location and speed. Those facts do not seem to fit into common sense, which is why Einstein was such a genius. But they are still facts.

By contrast, it seems that a statement like "from this vantage point, hitting on another man's wife is wrong" does not stem from a localization of more tangible, universal facts.

Let's just be clear. According to relativity, all points in space time can be related to one another with absolute mathematical certainty. We determine our position on the earth using GPS satellites that orbit at great speed while experiencing less gravity than we do down here. Yet we know exactly where we are, because, thanks to Einstein (and no thanks to Heidegger) we can compute the relativistic effects. No, there is no single privileged frame of reference, but once you pick the frame of reference, all other points in the universe can be described with precision.

So, while I applaud your project (and I would call it Moral Perspectivism) I think we should be careful about what analogies we draw to physics. There will never be a moral philosophy that can do what relativity does. To make that claim puts you dangerously close to Sam Harris.

Yours is the most grounded approach to understanding morality I've read yet Massimo. Our irresistible urge to understand something completely will drive quite a few people nuts with regards to morality. Not only would the axioms need to be agreed upon, but nearly every variable has subjective valuation, which also must be agreed upon before moral consensus is reached.

There's physics all the way down, so science could hypothetically understand all parts of our moral system. But that would require understanding cause and effect of every constituent particle of every neuron in every brain on Earth, as well as the operation of the systems they are within. I see Harris' understanding as an unachievable ideal. Worthwhile as a guiding light to better understand morality, but not useful as a rubric to operate by.

It's been a while since I read the book "The science of good and evil" (Michael Shermer), and I might also be misunderstanding Massimo's position here... But this "moral reasonism" sounds quite a bit like Shermer's "provisional ethics". What did I miss? Or are you reinventing the wheel? Or improving on it?

Massimo wrote: "Yes, you are correct, I was simply going under the (perhaps questionable) assumption that nobody wants to take nihilism as the option, so that it isn't a viable position."

That's a strange assumption, given that many philosophers do take that option. I think you've said before that you can't believe anyone is really a moral nihilist. To me this is a bit like the theist who finds atheism so repellent he can't believe that anyone is really an atheist.

No one of the ones we call "sciences" will explain morality. Not even knowing the functioning of the whole brain...maybe what keeps us or some of us always meaning this, is the fact that sciences are rational subjects, and their method is rational, the use of human reason. In this sense we can maybe find the way to morality/ethics using science (human reason). But never in the sense of "sciences" (e.g. physics, chemistry).

Given this, I like the idea, but I see that when comes to the crucial point, namely, to set "those parameters of humanness that set the axioms of our moral thinking", using Massimo's words, the problem arises, when we do not follow the method, setting before the consequences than the assumptions, or setting the assumptions that drive to those consequences. And that explains maybe the quoted note (***) of Massimo. Coming back to the beginning of my comment, human beings are not only rational, but also irrational (feelings, emotions, fears, beliefs, whatever), so I think it would be nice to proceed with this attempt trying to take into account also these other factors, so important as to forget them.

All, more interesting comments, good food for thought. As usual, I have time only to briefly comment on a few points:

dubitojeff,

> I would challenge you to to try writing an article in which you do not engage in an ad hominem attack on the Republican or any other party. <

I don't see why. I used to be open to the possibility that Republican politicians were reasonable, I have entirely lost my confidence in that idea, so until I see empirical evidence to the contrary I'll engage in whatever sneering comment I feel like. It lowers my stress level.

Scott, OneDayMore

> I'm not certain that Special Relativity is a very good analogy for a third way between absolutism and nihilism. <

Yes, but, first, the analogy is not mine, it's Boghossian's. Second, let's not push it beyond what it is supposed to be: an analogy, not a close mapping.

J,

> this "moral reasonism" sounds quite a bit like Shermer's "provisional ethics". What did I miss? Or are you reinventing the wheel? <

First of all, neither Shermer nor I are inventing anything. Both his and my ideas have been circulating in various forms in the moral philosophy and neuroscience literature for a while.

Second, Shermer's take is much closer to Harris', where morality becomes an empirical matter of what works and what doesn't. Mine takes empiricism to only help provide the boundary conditions and axioms, while the core of the reasoning is done by philosophical moral theorizing.

Richard Wein,

> I think you've said before that you can't believe anyone is really a moral nihilist. To me this is a bit like the theist who finds atheism so repellent he can't believe that anyone is really an atheist. <

The difference is that I have seen plenty of people coherently behaving as atheists, the only nihilists I've seen tend to be psychopaths.

> The difference is that I have seen plenty of people coherently behaving as atheists, the only nihilists I've seen tend to be psychopaths. <

Meaning, I suppose, that moral nihilists don't behave the way you think moral nihilists should, which is like psychopaths. Again, you sound a bit like the theist who insists that atheists don't behave the way he thinks consistent atheists should behave.

In fact, we shouldn't expect a moral nihilist (properly understood) to behave like a psychopath. First, moral nihilists reject moral truth at an intellectual level, but that doesn't mean they can't still have realist attitudes at a deeper, more instinctive level. Second, they can value just the same kind of behaviours and outcomes that other people do, without labelling them "moral".

I don't deny that moral realism is useful for positively influencing the way people behave, and moral nihilism _could_ lead to a weakening of useful pro-social inclinations. But of course that doesn't count against its truth.

Besides, IIRC the kind of moral realism that you have sometimes espoused (and which Julia has criticised) is the kind that _defines_ moral terms as natural properties, such as the property of maximising well-being. If so, you apparntly think moral facts are just facts about what maximises well-being (or whatever your preferred property is). I may well agree with you on all such facts. I just refuse to describe those facts as "moral" because I reject your definition. If you consistently hold such a view, then the dispute between us is a purely semantic one, about the meaning of moral terms. If I'm wrong, I'm merely making a semantic error. Why should a semantic error lead me to behave like a psychopath? (In reality I don't think the difference is a mere semantic one, because I don't think moral naturalists are consistent in applying their definition.)

I'm not sure why it matters what my position *sounds* like. Surely you know that religious fundamentalists claim that atheism *sounds* like religion, and yet they are wrong, so let's drop this sort of talk.

As for moral nihilism, I see it as analogous to empirical skepticism: possibly true, but worthless, and I consider any philosophy (or science) that is worthless a type of mental masturbation. Not interested.

I don't see why talking about morality as being in the business of maximizing well being makes it a form of realism, it makes it a form of reasoning grounded in certain facts about human nature, but that's not the same as what most philosophers mean by moral realism.

I presume 'empirical skepticism' refers to external world skepticism, e.g., that we are in the Matrix or disembodied brains in a vat, etc., etc. If taken seriously, *this* form of skepticism is indeed a 'worthless type of mental masturbation'.

Massimo,

I really see no profit in employing 'human nature' and 'human flourishing' in moral discourse. In fact, for the sake of philosophical hygiene, I really think we ought to efface moral discourse of terms which undoubtedly carry unnecessary metaphysical baggage.

Instead, why not place matters in terms of preference maximization? All things considered, a moral system is a framework through which agents maximize their considered subjective preferences (whatever they might be) given various social factors, viz. the existence of other preference maximizing agents (note: preferences needn't be self-interested in the naive Randian sense; one can have considered preferences for the well-being of others, the environment, etc.).

In a nutshell- though I have placed matters crudely-, in this light we can consider morality to be nothing more than plain old means-end reasoning.

I have no problem with the phrase human flourishing used here in moral reasonism because using human nature as the point of reference gives it a different derivation than that of the flourishing in virtue ethics. But it's the very grounding of moral reasonism in human nature that I need some clarification.

It seemed from your reply that you could conceive human nature manifesting in different ways in different people. Since everyone's point of reference varies, this could lead to different moral perspectives leading to different outcomes. Wouldn't this then become a kind of ethical egoism? That too could lead to some unsavory outcomes.

If I'm not off the mark so far, how would you rescue moral reasonism from this criticism? (By the way, I've always been told in my classes that egoism is bad, so I'm presuming it would be bad in any context It may not always be, I don't know).

OK, I'll drop this sort of talk if you will, i.e. if you'll stop claiming that moral nihilists don't mean what they say.

> As for moral nihilism, I see it as analogous to empirical skepticism: possibly true, but worthless, and I consider any philosophy (or science) that is worthless a type of mental masturbation. Not interested. <

Well, that's a better argument, though a rather unkind slur on truth-seekers. OK, if you prefer a practical falsehood to the truth, I have no argument with you. We just want different things from philosophy. (But may I suggest that what you have in mind is not really analytical philosophy. It's more like practical philosophy, or politics!)

I think that rumors that human nature is highly heterogeneous are highly exaggerated. There are many ways to look at this, from the large number of human universals compiled by cultural anthropologists to the fact that most genetic variation in the human genome is found within, not between populations. So I really don't think the concept of human nature is as problematic as so many philosophers seem to think it is. Yes, of course there is huge cultural variation, but we are talking about the fundamentals here.

I never said that, I said they don't behave coherently with what they believe, and stand by my statement.

> if you prefer a practical falsehood to the truth, I have no argument with you. We just want different things from philosophy. <

I didn't explain myself clearly: I don't believe that moral nihilism and empirical skepticism are true, just that they are not defeasible by logic or evidence. Like God. That doesn't mean I believe in god or that anyone's life is actually affected by its alleged existence.

I thought about you said. I have always wondered how cultures that are in different hemispheres and thousands of miles apart discovered independently the same tools and practiced similar rituals. Maybe human nature gets a bad rap because I conflated with many others that cultural variation could only lead to the denial of human universals but that is an unsound conclusion. Empirically, you are right that geneticists are confirming the hunch of cultural anthropologists.

"I never said that, I said they don't behave coherently with what they believe, and stand by my statement."

And you have a strong, comprehensive argument for this? You're not dismissing creationists here, you're dismissing people like Russell Blackford and John Mackie (and Richard Wein) as "mental masturbaters." But as an English major at a major university, I can tell you some defining features of mental masturbation:

- It prizes opulent phrasing.- It lacks structure.- It doesn't have clear-cut goals.

These three marking features are absent from most of the arguments by moral skeptics. They are taking the question seriously and writing carefully considered articles and books about it.

Apparently, denying that a certain category of claims (moral claims) can be true is akin to denying that any claim about the world can be true. I don't see it.

Massimo>"As for moral nihilism, I see it as analogous to empirical skepticism: possibly true, but worthless, and I consider any philosophy (or science) that is worthless a type of mental masturbation. Not interested.How about trying to create a new "Moral System"that will not become law or standard? Is that also "mental masturbation"?

Massimo> "As for moral nihilism, I see it as analogous to empirical skepticism: possibly true, but worthless,"If it becomes understood, after learning more about the function of morality, that morality is a tool for controlling behavior...a tool for our desire to control....get our own way...as in "Johnny gets to go....it's not 'fair' that I don't" ... That it is not a concept that is true or false, but only a tool or weapon....then this type of knowledge regarding morality should not be dismissed as "worthless". It should be described as an intellectual or philosophical breakthrough...an improvement in our understanding of how we use moral words....as Moore, Russell,Wittgenstein, Nietzsche,Austin,Et al have discussed. Hardly "worthless" thoughts.What is worthless is trying to replace "politics" with the word "morality".

of course morality's purpose is, to an extent, to control behavior. That's hardly an intellectual breakthrough. The question is whether morality does that in an arbitrary fashion or following reason and compassion. I am arguing the latter.

> I didn't explain myself clearly: I don't believe that moral nihilism and empirical skepticism are true, just that they are not defeasible by logic or evidence. <

Thanks for clarifying. But the two cases are very different. Empirical skepticism (which I take to be the claim that we can have no empirical knowledge) itself denies the possibility of empirical refutation. You can't make an empirical case against it without begging the question. Nothing of that sort is true of moral nihilism. May I suggest you try to give a reason _why_ moral nihilism (or the existence of moral truth) is indefeasible.

And again I make a similar point to one which you didn't respond to earlier. You have sometimes taken the moral naturalist position that takes moral facts to be semantically equivalent to ordinary, non-moral facts, by defining a moral action to be one that maximises well-being (or something of that sort). If you consistently take such a position then the dispute between us is a purely semantic one about the meaning of moral terms. Do you think that semantic claims are indefeasible? (If you no longer or haven't ever taken this position, please let me know, and I won't bring it up again.)

> Are you sure those people would consider themselves to be moral nihilist, as opposed to simply anti-realists? The two are not synonymous. <

I must say I've been taking them as more-or-less synonymous. But on further reading it looks like moral nihilism is a narrower term, and seems generally to be restricted to error theory (my position) and possibly non-cognitivism. Russell Blackford is an error theorist, and I believe Mackie was the originator of the idea. Perhaps they don't call themselves "moral nihilists" and neither normally do I. The term seems relatively unusual, and I don't like it. I'd prefer to be more specific and talk about "error theory", as that's the only position I want to defend.

MassimoMy point was about the word and it's use. When you say "so and so was immoral", you are not saying anything true or false....you are doing something by your act (calling it immoral). Your speech act is to condemn behavior that you do not like. Sort of like a dog barking when you approach the food he is eating. It's not about "what is moral or immoral"....It's not about what behavior is "moral or immoral". It is about your "fors" and "againsts"....and that is why I see this approach of yours to be a discussion of political ideology going by another name....."morality". It's seems to be about having a more "caring" society (egalitarianism or socialism) rather than individualism and free enterprise. Replacing a Liberal Democracy with a Social Democracy. That's also what Rawls was about. Political ideology....not morality.

Massimo>"The question is whether morality does that in an arbitrary fashion or following reason and compassion. I am arguing the latter."How does arguing in favor of replacing our current ideals and decisions with ideals based on reason and compassion differ from creating a system based more upon Deliberative Democracy and a Welfare State? Isn't that what we are talking about?

Commenter with knowledge of Special Relativity:>I'm not certain that Special Relativity is a very good analogy for a third way between absolutism and nihilism. <

Massimo's response:Yes, but, first, the analogy is not mine, it's Boghossian's. Second, let's not push it beyond what it is supposed to be: an analogy, not a close mapping.

Only in the use of the beloved word, "relativity" is it an analogy; otherwise it is diametrically opposed, and therefore it is either an "appeal to authority" and a chance to refer to Einstein, or merely propagating ignorance of the science it is purporting to mimic.

But as can be seen by the large differences in ethical opinion, even in this relatively small forum, specific meta-ethical precepts are unlikely to ever gain enough leverage to be declared the sole valid moral behaviors for an entire population. Even should that happen, the ethical rules/laws that emerge would still be either absolutes, or relativistic and subject to change.

i enjoyed your essay; thanks for writing on this topic. the discussion that has followed has been nice as well. however, it seems incomplete.

i wonder how aesthetics may--or not--fit into your ideas regarding ethics. reason (or rationality) in the logic of ethics has its place, but a common connection through many influential philosophers from antiquity to contemporary is that the arts, as a means to exercise our passions and not specifically a kind of logic, are ethically influential. so it seems that the arts shouldn't simply be passed over while reason is emphasized. in fact, simply to emphasize rationality and logic would be delusional in its denial (implicit or explicit) of the ethical component our emotions--whether it is from an absolutist, relativist, nihilist, or reasonist.

All, again, thanks for all the interesting feedback. This is going to be even faster than usual, though, because my daughter is visiting, and she takes pretty much all of my time when she is around. So, briefly:

Richard Wein,

> May I suggest you try to give a reason _why_ moral nihilism (or the existence of moral truth) is indefeasible. <

I wasn't suggesting that the two cases (moral nihilism and empirical skepticism) are identical, only that they both strike me as the sort of philosophical position that is both sterile and at the same time difficult to argue with (which doesn't imply truth). It would require a separate post to mount a full argument against nihilism, something I might do, if I come to think it's actually worth the effort.

> I'd prefer to be more specific and talk about "error theory", as that's the only position I want to defend. <

Would you mind summarizing it for the readers? But it should be noted that that is only one of many types of moral anti-realism.

DJD,

> Your speech act is to condemn behavior that you do not like. Sort of like a dog barking when you approach the food he is eating. <

Baloney, unlike dogs I try to give arguments for why I think something is moral or immoral.

> It's seems to be about having a more "caring" society (egalitarianism or socialism) rather than individualism and free enterprise. Replacing a Liberal Democracy with a Social Democracy. That's also what Rawls was about. Political ideology....not morality. <

And you think political ideology should somehow be decoupled from ethical theory? *That* was Rawls' point.

Stan,

> Only in the use of the beloved word, "relativity" is it an analogy; otherwise it is diametrically opposed, and therefore it is either an "appeal to authority" and a chance to refer to Einstein, or merely propagating ignorance of the science it is purporting to mimic. <

You may have missed the point of the analogy (which, again, isn't mine, I was only commenting on it). Indeed, in the example Special Relativity is used to counter the moral relativist position.

Hmm, I do think that ethics and aesthetics are two different beasts, and I sympathize - to a point - with the philosophers you mention on aesthetics. One definitely *can* show that, say, Beethoven's symphonies are more musically rich, structured, etc. than anything Britney Spears has ever done. But if you insist in preferring Spears, all I can say is shrug at your bad (in my opinion) taste. There is more to be said about this, but not in this post.

DJD said:Your speech act is to condemn behavior that you do not like. Sort of like a dog barking when you approach the food he is eating. < Massimo responded: "Baloney, unlike dogs I try to give arguments for why I think something is moral or immoral." DJD responded: So does Haidt's dog. That is my point.

Massimo>"And you think political ideology should somehow be decoupled from ethical theory? *That* was Rawls' point."No....I think they are one in the same. We evolved with the cognitive skills and ability to intricately use language, in great part, to be able to construct political ideology AND moral arguments for the purpose of advancing our interests and desires.....including how we want things to be.

Massimo >"Baloney, unlike dogs I try to give arguments for why I think something is moral or immoral." I am making reference to Haidt's "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail".

We evolved with the cognitive skills and ability to intricately use language, in great part, to be able to construct political ideology AND moral arguments for the purpose of advancing our interests and desires.....including how we want things to be.

> It would require a separate post to mount a full argument against nihilism, something I might do, if I come to think it's actually worth the effort. <

But you just claimed that moral nihilism is indefeasible, in which case there _can't_ be any argument against it! Perhaps you meant to say that you might give an argument as to _why_ it's indefeasible. But so far you haven't given even a hint of a reason for thinking it's indefeasible, so it's hard to take your claim seriously.

We see philosophers arguing for and against moral nihilism (e.g. error theory). But you come along and dismiss these arguments as "mental masturbation" without giving any reason whatsoever for thinking so.

Massimo, looking back over your post, perhaps I misunderstood "illustrated precisely by Boghossian’s example of Special Relativity," which I took to indicate that you were disagreeing with the absolutist interpretation of SR.

right, I meant a post about why nihilism is not defeasible, not why it's wrong. Reasons might include the fact that it is too easy to shift the burden of proof on the other side ("you are making a claim about moral truths") while at the same time equivocating about what counts as a moral truth (Platonic ideas? Empirical facts about human nature? Etc.)

At any rate, in the meantime you entirely dodged my question about what you find so compelling about error theory.

Massimo>fascinating. And we know this how? And it matters because?I like your question "and it matters because"? The answer to that question can shed light on the meaning of a persons assertion or argument. So, given that you have opened the door to this type of analysis, I would ask you the same question about your third way theory. "and it matters because"?

> I would ask you the same question about your third way theory. "and it matters because"? <

No my friend, it doesn't work that way. First, because I have addressed those questions in my main post; second, because I have asked you first, with regard to a specific comment you made. C'mon, don't be shy...

> right, I meant a post about why nihilism is not defeasible, not why it's wrong. Reasons might include the fact that it is too easy to shift the burden of proof on the other side ("you are making a claim about moral truths") while at the same time equivocating about what counts as a moral truth (Platonic ideas? Empirical facts about human nature? Etc.) <

It's easy to make bad arguments on other philosophical questions too. That's no reason to say that the bad arguments can't be revealed as bad ones, or that no good arguments can be made. If someone is equivocating, we can call them on it. Of course, calling someone on their bad arguments usually won't change their minds. That's human nature. But it doesn't make their position indefeasible.

Maybe you're not talking about indefeasibility in principle, but some sort of practical indefeasibility, namely that there's insufficient evidence to decide one way or the other.

If you really are talking about indefeasibility in principle, then surely by now it's time for you to start questioning your belief, given that you're having so much difficulty finding any good reason for it.

To briefly answer your question about why I accept error theory, my reason for rejecting objective moral truth is that it seems impossible to make any sense of it. Whereas non-moral assertions are describing aspects of reality, there seems to be nothing in reality that moral assertions (like "X is morally wrong" or "you morally ought to do Y") can be describing. As Mackie famously put it, moral truth (if it exists) is "queer". It's like no other sort of truth we know. But there is no epistemic need to include this mysterious concept in our model of reality. Human moral discourse and behaviour can be explained perfectly well by reference to people's moral beliefs and attitudes, without any need for any of those beliefs to be true. "Naturalized" models explain what needs to be explained. There's nothing left for the concept of moral truth to explain. To borrow from Laplace: I have no need of that hypothesis.

As for why I prefer error theory to other varieties of moral anti-realism, the evidence of how people use moral claims indicates that they are usually used as objective, absolute assertions. That rules out subjectivism, relativism and non-cognitivism. People making moral claims are making objective attributions of moral properties, but no such properties exist.

I don't expect anyone to find this compelling. It's just an outline. If we were to discuss this at length I would start by refuting your own meta-ethical view (which appears to be a form of moral naturalism) because as long as you mistakenly think you can reduce moral truth to something non-mysterious you have no reason to take anti-realism seriously.

any position that basically says "I'm not claiming the existence of anything, you are" cannot be defeased in principle, I think, though very convincing arguments against can be made.

Yes, I know of Mackie's argument, and frankly I find it, well, queer. I am not claiming the existence of Platonic moral truths (which would, indeed, be strange objects), but simply advocating an advanced version of instrumental ethical reasoning. Yes, it starts out with naturalistic roots, but it is not determined entirely by biological facts, as I tried to argue in the post.

MassimoHumans..do not desire "human flourishing". They never even think such a thought. That's your thought. So...are you constructing a new moral system based upon the way you want the world to be? I would not think basing a new moral system on our instincts...our desires (for status)...would be a good starting point for a new moral system. I am assuming that you are in the process of assembling a new moral system, not attempting to discover one.

P.S. Let me clarify. My argument is an inference to the best explanation. Error theory is a perfectly adequate explanation of human morality. The concept of objective moral truth is deeply mysterious and unnecessary. So error theory is the better explanation.

well, that may be *your* inference to the best explanation. I'm sure you are aware I'm not the only one in this area whose inferences led in different directions altogether. And you insist in using a very narrow concept of morality that is simply not what I'm talking about.

DJD,

humans do desire flourishing, as plenty of psychological and sociological research has shown. They may simply not use that phrase, and often they have a vague notion of what it means. That's where social science and philosophical analysis can help.

MassimoHaving read your main post several times, I can't help recognizing that your exercise, your method, is the same as that used by our Founding Fathers when they wrote our constitution. First they asked themselves, and each other, what do most humans naturally desire and pursue. Then they debated what kind of constitutional laws and form of government would best allow and assist members of society in pursuing and achieving those assumed ends. There were certainly other concerns, such as what kind of government and constitution might have the best chance of surviving over time. But, the two main questions they asked themselves were the same that you are asking. What are somewhat universal desires, needs, and goals of humans....and what rules would be best to have in place in order to maximize those desires and need fulfillment.Is this assessment close to the mark?

I've never been compared to the Founding Fathers, but yes there are some similarities of approach, once we take into consideration that they were interested in coming up with the best law for the land and I'm after a reasonable moral system. The similarity probably arises from the fact that the FF were in turn heavily influenced by the ideals of the Enlightenment.

MassimoWhat will have to occur in order to turn your "instrumental" means/ends knowledge.. into a moral system rather than a knowledge system. Knowing how is different than believing that one 'should' or 'must' or 'are expected to' or 'will be praised for doing' or 'will be disrespected if you don't'or any of those social forces that convert instrumental knowledge (what is ) to moral knowledge (you 'should')?

MassimoYou have identified the ends (human flourishing) that you will use to judge actions in terms of whether they promote or interfere towards the this end. You refer to these means as being in effect judged by their instrumental value in pursuing human flourishing. Does the fact that you have identified "human flourishing" as a moral end have the result of making the instrumental means also moral? Won't each proposed means have to be judged as moral or immoral based upon their relationship to all the other proposed means? Will they interfere with the effectiveness of other means...other individual's means, and other individual's ideas of what constitutes "human flourishing"?

MassimoIt is difficult for me to see this proposal as anything other than fleshing out instrumental means to achieving whatever an individual seesas constituting "human flourishing".It seems that what and whose idea of human flourishing will prevail or take precedent. The discussion regarding what is or should be encompassed by "human flourishing" needs as much debate and determination as do the conflicting means.

MassimoBesides using our new knowledge of evolved needs and desires...shouldn't we also rely heavily on history and our own experience? The founders called upon anything they thought might be of value before they settled on a constitution and form of government, and before they infused both with ideals. Starting over can be dangerous....as Edmund Burke has pointed out. Perhaps incrementalism is the better approach.

Good post. Stanley Fish had (for once) an interesting reply to the Boghossian piece, and Brian Leiter had a discussion thread on the exchange on his blog, in which Boghossian appeared to comment. I also left some comments, broadly in line with your own, though I'm a bit more interested in arguments against the coherence of mind-independent moral absolutes (though, to be fair, Boghossian had neither the space nor the correct forum to launch a proper defense). Anyhow, you might find the exchange interesting, and if you'd care, I'd love to hear your take on my comments. I was hoping the generate more discussion, but I suspect I was too late to the fray, and possibly too dismissive.

The thread is here: http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2011/08/fish-v-boghossian.html