Introduction The first thing to say about liberal order is that it hasn’t been that liberal. Since
the Second World War, the production of subjects obeisant to the rule of liberal institutions
has depended on illiberal and authoritarian methods – not least on the periphery of the
world system, where conversion to Western reason has been pursued with particularly millenarian
zeal, and violence. The wishful idea of an ever more open and global market economy has been
continuously undermined by its champions, with their subsidies and monopolistic

show how social dynamics are re-enacted in a
context of crisis. Background Historical analyses have attributed the failure of the Guinean, Liberian and Sierra
Leonian governmental responses at the onset of the epidemic to a number of factors
related to history and international political economy. They range from the legacy
of the transatlantic slave trade and colonial histories to economic structures built
around international extractive industries and aid dependency ( Benton and Dionne

Global South, and none at all to their use in the humanitarian context. As noted by
Ruckenstein and Schüll, the health-wearables literature focuses on the Global
North, where there is ‘relatively broad embrace of the Internet and
self-tracking technology by citizens; a cultural model of the ideal citizen as
digitally literate and self-advocating; and a robust public debate around the
ethical, legal, and social implications of big data’ ( Ruckenstein and Schüll, 2017: 262 ). There is thus a

Sphere Handbook is a key reference point and identifies
minimum standards for the field. It reinforces the importance of communicating
‘in languages, formats and media that are easily understood, respectful and
culturally appropriate for different members of the community, especially vulnerable
or marginalized groups’ ( Sphere
Association, 2018 : 63). Providing ‘interpreters and translators if
needed’ is also identified as a key action for sharing information with

protectionism.
Unfortunately, today, Brazil isn’t exporting a single idea. But when we have a legitimate
government once again, Brazil will work on these things and on South–South
cooperation. JF: The human rights and humanitarian movements have often been seen as vectors of
Western influence – expressions of soft power – not only because of their practices
but also because of the cultural origins of their ideals… CA: … Which is not necessarily a bad thing. I was Brazilian representative
to the UN in Geneva twice. Although I gave most attention to trade

what Barry called ‘the liberal outlook’: secular humanitarians are modern
missionaries even in their very being, carrying with them modernity in terms of ideas about
gender, sexuality, freedom of choice and more. This is entirely consistent with the emphasis on
the consuming individual at the core of the modern market-based global economy. For the majority
of humanitarians, a set of rights-based freedoms are ‘normal’. Along with shelter,
food and medicine come ways of living that challenge long-established social and cultural norms
as well as

contribute to
the positivity of the network. To ‘like’ content
and ‘pages’ is now the most popular action taken on Facebook; every day
the ‘like’ button is hit 3.2 billion times across the world contributing
to what some have termed a ‘like economy’. 18 Facebook’s architecture scripts
actions that conform to an ‘affirmative atmosphere, in which people only
agree and do not disagree or express discontent

deficit for several decades. That deficit reflects a long-standing habit: the
American economy absorbs more than it yields; it consumes and invests
more than it produces. The difference is the habitual external deficit and it
has to be financed, one way or another, by Europe and Japan. In other
words, America’s high growth and high standard of living are borrowed, in
part, from the rest of the world. Financing this deficit has generally been
easy, thanks not least to the international role of the dollar. But European
Monetary Union (EMU), with its emerging euro, creates

a hedge, albeit not a very strong one without the United States. 26 However, Japan is no longer core to China’s economic growth. While Japan was critical in building China’s economy in the first wave of liberalisation, China has leveraged Japanese investments, trade and intellectual property, to build scaled industries of its own, displacing former Japanese partners domestically and increasingly internationally too. 27 While Japan has an opportunity to partner with India to aid its development, cultural differences make this a slow and difficult process