Do Analysts Follow Managers Who Switch Companies? An Analysis of Relationships in the Capital Markets.

Abstract

We examine the importance of professional relationships developed between analysts and managers by investigating analyst coverage decisions in the context of CEO and CFO moves between publicly listed firms. We find that top executive moves from an origin firm to a destination firm trigger analysts following the origin firm to initiate coverage of the destination firm in 10% of our sample, which is significantly higher than in a matched sample. Analyst-manager "co-migration" is significantly stronger when both firms are within the same industry. Analysts who move with managers to the destination firm exhibit more intense and accurate coverage of the origin firm than they do in other firms and compared to other analysts covering the origin firm. The advantage no longer holds after the executive's departure, and most of the analysts' advantage does not carry over to the destination firm. However, the analysts do increase the overall market capitalization of firms in their coverage portfolio. Our results hold after Regulation Fair Disclosure, suggesting that these relationships are not based on selective disclosure. Overall, the evidence shows both the importance and limitations of professional relationships in capital markets.

Noble Group, founded in 1986, was a large commodities trader based in Hong Kong and listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. In 2012, Noble shifted its business strategy towards an asset-light model. Under this model, Noble did not own mines or farms to produce commodities but built commodity sourcing capacity by working with and investing in producers in exchange for purchase and marketing contracts. Noble also worked with customers to secure supply contracts. Noble had a portfolio of 12,000 commodity contracts by end of 2014. The contracts were measured at fair value. Iceberg Research, an anonymous blog, released a series of reports starting in February 2015 alleging that Noble was too aggressive in its fair value accounting for contracts and investments in producers. Iceberg did not accuse Noble of fraud, but suggested that Noble’s profits and balance sheet were highly inflated and Noble was headed for disaster. Noble defended its accounting policies and hired PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to provide an independent review of fair value measurement. PwC released a positive review of Noble’s accounting. However, questions remained whether Noble’s contracts and investments were overvalued. The case explores Noble’s business and investigates whether questions about its accounting practices were in the past following the attestation by PwC.