SALT LAKE CITY - With no debate, House representatives on Tuesdayapproved a measure that ensures the public won't be able to see staterecords on livestock populations and efforts to trace diseased animals.

The 68-0 vote came as Utah prepares to join a national identificationprogram for livestock that would make it possible for diseased animalsto be traced back to their farm of origin within 48 hours.

The secrecy bill now goes to the Senate for a vote.

Rep. Craig Buttars, a Republican who runs a 220-head Holstein dairy farmin Lewiston, said farmers should be able to expect privacy for recordson livestock operations and animals.

"We don't want the public and those who want to harm us to have accessto records that could give them the opportunity to harm our operations,"he said Tuesday.

At least five other states - Kansas, Kentucky, Idaho, Nebraska andWashington - have similar animal identification laws, though only Idahoexempts cattle records from public disclosure, according to the NationalConference of State Legislatures.

The Utah measure may be in line with "a long history of manipulatingagricultural information for protectionist reasons," said LaurieGarrett, a national health policy expert and fellow at the Council onForeign Relations.

There's little value in keeping the information from the public, saidJames R. Greenwood, director of environmental health and safety at theUniversity of California at Los Angeles.

In brief floor remarks Tuesday Buttars rejected this criticism, sayingother businesses "wouldn't want people to come off the street and gothrough their personal records."

The Utah Department of Agriculture is compiling records of farms,ranches and other livestock operations in Utah. It plans to requirefarmers to register all animals at birth for a state database.

The ability of government regulators to trace livestock became apparentfollowing the discovery of the nation's first case of mad cow disease ina Washington state Holstein in December 2003. The cow's origins werelater traced to Canada, but not before dozens of countries closed theirborders to U.S. beef products.

Earlier this year, Washington state started assigning identificationnumbers to farms and ranches - a precursor to the broader animalidentification system.

http://www.kansas.com/mld/kansas/news/state/10905863.htm

Greetings,

> Rep. Craig Buttars, a Republican who runs a 220-head Holstein dairy> farm in Lewiston, said farmers should be able to expect privacy for> records on livestock operations and animals.>> "We don't want the public and those who want to harm us to have access> to records that could give them the opportunity to harm our> operations," he said Tuesday.>

SEEMS what happened with the Washington MAD COW and it's cohortsthat went to who knows how many dinner plates, will now be law in UTAHand these other states ;

Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall ProgramsTo examine the voluntary recall of beef products associated with theDecember 2003 discovery of an animal infected with BSE, we analyzed thedistribution lists USDA collected from companies and the verificationchecks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating the location andvolume of recalled beef that reached different levels of the distributionchain. We compared the distribution lists and verification checks toidentify how many customers listed on the distribution lists did notreceivethe recalled beef and the number of customers not listed on distributionlists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed USDA and FDA staffinvolved with the recall to understand the timing of recall actions and thechallenges encountered during the recall.To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground beef by a ConAgraplant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDAs recall file and otherdocuments on the recall. We also met with the departments Office ofInspector General and reviewed the Inspector Generals September 2003report.1We conducted our review from May 2003 through August 2004 inaccordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, GreatPlains Region AuditReport: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight of ProductionProcess and Recall atConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No. 24601-2-KC (September 2003).Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall ProgramsAppendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSE Appendix IIOn December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the state ofWashington had tested positive for BSEcommonly referred to as madcow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA took to recall themeat and the actions FDA took with respect to FDA-regulated products,such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered parts of theanimal.Beef Recall WasTriggered by a BSEPositiveSample fromOne CowOn December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered 23 cows. USDA,in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the time, took asample of1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition of the tested cow isnow disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its Ames, Iowa NationalVeterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner because the cowdid not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA test resultsindicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December 23, 2003.Recall Begun inDecember 2003 WasCompleted in March2004On December 23, 2003, after learning about the positive BSE test, USDAheadquarters notified the Boulder District Office, which is the fieldofficewith jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder District begangathering information about the recalling companys product distribution.Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were on-site at 7:00 p.m.The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the recalling companysproduction would have to be recalled, but further examination of facilitycleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only necessary torecall 1day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15 p.m. and discussedthe science related to BSE and whether the recalling companys cleanuppractices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day of production.Following USDAs determination to conduct a Class II recallthat is, thebeef posed a remote possibility of adverse health consequencesUSDAcontacted the recalling company to discuss recall details and the pressrelease. The press release and Recall Notification Report were releasedthat evening.On December 24, 2003, USDAs Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)sent inspectors to the recalling companys primary customers to obtainsecondary customer distribution lists and product shipping records. USDAconducted 100 percent verification checks for this recallit contactedevery customer that received the recalled meat. This level of verificationchecks is well above the percentage of checks conducted by USDA districtoffices for the Class I recalls we reviewed.Appendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSEPage 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall ProgramsOn December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondarycustomers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although theentire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDAtried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it usedverification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary andtertiarycustomers of the recalling company.Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDAdistricts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder Districtcoordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis DistrictOffice for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office forcustomers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primarychecks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiarychecks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent ofthe secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officialshelped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took along time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at leasttwice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and againto verify product disposition.On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall wasconducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDAs RecallManagement Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall,and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDAconsidered the recall to be complete.Recall WasComplicated byInaccurate DistributionLists and Mixing ofPotentiallyContaminated andNoncontaminated BeefUSDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together wherethe recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of therecalling companys three primary customers was slow in providing itscustomer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for thatprimarycustomer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recallingcompany provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify whichcustomers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA couldnot quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to taketime conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine whichspecific customers received the product.Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agencystill had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments,suchas grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individualstores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixingAppendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSEPage 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programsand the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributorspurchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and losetrack of the source of the beef they send to the stores that theysupply. Todeal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beefwas shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the storesthatwere shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores wereincluded in the recall that may never have received recalled beef.The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef withnonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in therecall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003,and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer onDecember 10, 2003. The recalling companys carcasses were tagged toidentify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customerremoved the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses withthe 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not bedistinguished, the recall included all 43 carcasses at the primarycustomer.After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from thecarcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Bothestablishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses withmeat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cowresulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef.Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined tocomplicate USDAs identification of where the product went. Specifically,on December 23, 2003, USDAs initial press release stated that therecallingcompany was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed withinWashington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that oneof the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef tofacilitiesin California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a totalof four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of thesecondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributedthe product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total ofeight states and one territory.On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determinedthat the beef went to only six statesWashington, Oregon, California,Nevada, Idaho, and Montanaand that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, orGuam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shippingrecords, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piecetogether exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The listsAppendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSEPage 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programsshowed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of thosemay have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef,includingthe customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDAs review also indicated thatrecalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDAchecked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm thatwas thecase. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713customers on the lists. USDAs initial checks identified an additional 45customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not includedon the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4summarizes USDAs verification efforts during the recall.Appendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSEPage 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall ProgramsFigure 4: USDAs Recall Verification Checks by Location and CustomerType for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected withBSENote: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customersplus the recallingcompany, for a total of 582 verification checks.USDAs press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beefproducts, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us thatdownstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, fora total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at thesecondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with theD = DistributorR = RetailerSF = Storage facilityP = ProcessorPrimary customers(15 total)Recallingslaughterhouse(WA) 1 R(OR)1 P(WA) 1 P(OR)1 P(OR)11 R(WA)Secondary customers(40 total)Tertiary customers(526 total)1 R(OR)1 SF(OR)3 D(OR)3 D(WA)2 dual D(OR)59 R(OR)79 R(WA)5 R(ID)3 R(UT)4 R(MT)161 R(WA)8 R(ID)15 R(OR)2 R(AK)31 R(OR) 8 R(WA)10 R(NV)5 R(ID)10 R(CA)2 R(CA)17 R(OR)5 R(WA)1 D(NV)11 R(CA)85 R(NV)3 D(OR) 11 R(OR)2 D(CA) 26 R(CA)2 R(WA)( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations for each state.Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check documents.Appendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSEPage 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programsrecall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level isunknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalledmeat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers,and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much ofthe original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000pounds that were recovered.FDAs Role in USDAsRecallParts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on December 9, 2003, werenot used for food, but they were sent to renderers to be separated into rawmaterials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered materials are used formany purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA has jurisdictionover renderers.When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December 23, 2003, theagency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003, FDA sent aninspection team to a renderer that handled materials from the BSE cow.Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered BSE positive cowwere on the premises. FDA later identified a second company thatpotentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE cow. Bothrenderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product processed from thediseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by FDA and localauthorities.On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated, renderedmaterial (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently loaded on a ship, and onJanuary 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington, for Asia. The rendererinitiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it could be disposedof asdirected by FDA and local authorities. The ship carrying the materialreturned to the United States on February 24, 2004, and the material wasdisposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004.On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to expand their voluntaryholds to rendered materials processed from December 23, 2003, throughJanuary 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some recalled meat ortrim that was recovered from retail establishments. Both renderers agreedto the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested that renderersvoluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered material. FDAconfirmed that none of the potentially contaminated, rendered materialentered commerce, because FDA accounted for all rendered material. FDAAppendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSEPage 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programsreported that no recall was necessary because no product was distributedcommercially by the rendering companies.USDA and FDAWorked Together onthe RecallUSDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both agencies notifiedeach other if their investigations yielded any information about productswithin the jurisdiction of the other agency. For instance, when conductingthe second round of verification checks, USDA tracked the disposition ofthe product to renderers and landfills and notified FDA when the productwent to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped conduct verificationchecks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification checks (approximately 5percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both agencies indicated theyregularly interacted and shared information. Table 3 outlines the agenciesactions.Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company Actions Related tothe Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSEDate USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is slaughtered.12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSEtesting." Recalling company sendscarcasses to primary customer forprocessing.12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meatproducts to two other primarycustomers for further processing.12/12 -12/23/03" Other primary customers distributerecalled product to secondarycustomers." Secondary customers distributerecalled product to tertiarycustomers.12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptivelypositive." Recall meeting." Initiation of voluntary recall." Press release." FDA notified of BSE test results." FDA dispatches investigation teams.12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1." FDA determines some renderedmaterial from Renderer 1 is intendedfor Indonesia." FDA discovers some material mayhave been sent to Renderer 2." Renderer 1 agrees to hold remainingrendered material." Recalling company contactsprimary customers." Primary customers contact theircustomers.Appendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSEPage 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation fromreference lab in England that cow inquestion is BSE positive.12/26/03 " Verification checks begin" USDA announces recalled product inWashington State and Oregon." FDA begins process of comparingrecords to ensure all products fromRenderers 1 and 2 are accounted for." Renderer 2 agrees to hold all materialthat may have been derived fromBSE cow. None of the renderedmaterial has been distributed.12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product wasdistributed in Washington State,Oregon, California, and Nevada." FDA issues statement confirming thatthe rendering plants that processedall of the nonedible material from theBSE cow have placed a voluntaryhold on all of the potentially infectiousproduct, none of which had left thecontrol of the companies and enteredcommercial distribution.12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product wasdistributed in Washington State,Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana,Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Servicedetermines that the recalled meatproducts were distributed to 42locations, with 80 percent of theproducts distributed to stores inOregon and Washington State.12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA tocomplete recall verification checks.1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled productwas only distributed in WashingtonState, Oregon, California, Nevada,Montana, and Idaho.1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer thatsome of the rendered material onhold from Renderer 1 wasinadvertently shipped to Asia.Renderer 1 commits to isolate andreturn the rendered material." Rendering company notifies FDA ofshipment of product on hold.(Continued From Previous Page)Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actionsAppendix IIFederal Actions Associated with theDiscovery of an Animal in the United StatesInfected with BSEPage 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall ProgramsSource: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information.1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 thatthey may have rendered meat or trimsubject to recall from retail stores." FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 toplace all rendered material fromDecember 23 to January 9 on hold." FDA determines neither renderer hadshipped rendered materialmanufactured after December 23,2003.2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed ofin landfill, except material shipped toAsia.2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered materialreturns to U.S. port.2/25/04 " Verification checks complete." USDA Boulder District Officeconcludes recall is effective.3/1/04 " Recall is closed.3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill ofremaining rendered material...