Q337: What proportion of troops that have been
involved in recent MACA operations have been regulars, and what
proportion have been reserves?

Operation

Regular Forces

Reserve Forces

Army

RN (incl RM)

RAF

TA

RNR

RAFR

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

Fuel (Sept 00)

600

15

66

0

0

0

Fuel (on standby November 00)

1,301

162

537

0

0

0

Floods, Autumn 00

About 1,100

15

218

154

0

0

Foot and Mouth1

1,907

178

91

2662

0

0

1 This serial records the maximum number of regulars deployed
on a single day during the foot and mouth crisis and the total
number of TA soldiers deployed throughout the crisis.

2 It is possible that the figure may count some individuals,
involved more than once in support of MAFF/DEFRA, as two individuals.

Q353: What is the time-scale for updating "Military Aid
To The Civil Community; A pamphlet for the Guidance of Civil Authorities
and Organisations," known as the Blue Book.

A revised version of the Manual was ready for publication
when the events of 11 September occurred. In view of the need
to review responses in the light of the threat from international
terrorism it was decided not to publish this revised version.
Guidance will be issued reflecting the results of work on the
New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review. The Manual remains
relevant as detailed guidance on Military Aid to the Civil Community.
It should of course be read in conjunction with Dealing With
Disaster and related documents, issued by the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat, which provide fundamental guidance on emergency responses.

Q361: Have the Home Office engaged local authorities in discussion
of the SDR New Chapter?

1. As we informed the Committee, the MoD has worked closely
with the Home Office, ACPO, and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat,
as well as other government departments, in developing the SDR
New Chapter.

2. Responsibility for development of the SDR New Chapter
rests clearly with the Ministry of Defence, rather than the Home
Office. We have sought to encourage a public debate about the
work we are currently undertaking. We want to ensure that the
views of Members of Parliament, members of the Armed Forces, local
authorities, academics, other experts and members of the public
are properly taken account of in the work.

3. To help promote this debate we published on 14 February
a discussion paper entitled "The Strategic Defence Review:
A New Chapter". As well as being available on the MoD internet
site, the discussion paper was sent to 470 local authorities in
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as, for
example, over 4,000 public libraries and every MP and member of
the Northern Ireland Assembly, Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament.

4. By 15 March, when we asked for responses by, we had
received over 200 responses to the discussion paper. These include
a number of useful contributions from local authorities.

Q456:The Committee asked for information on how quickly EOD
teams and CBRN response teams (able to make safe a device) could
respond in different parts of the country.

Whilst there are many variables which could affect transit
times, estimates for both road and air movement are given below.

Assumptions: *** involves a number of units from different
locations, the following assumptions have been made:

(a) Notice to move timings (NTMs) have not been included.

Those units required early in any incident *** whilst those
which will *** The times outlined below are for movement between
base locations and arrival at an incident.

(b) No assumption has been made about the threat. Deployment
times are for both chemical/biological (CB) and radiological/nuclear
(RN) elements of ***. It is unlikely that any single incident
would require such a full response. Generally the response to
a ***

(c) Road Moves. ***

(d) Air Moves. *** and time required at the airfield to
prepare vehicles and equipment for loading onto aircraft ***.
Even a very limited deployment of ***. Movement of such a force
would require *** TRF planning is that, except in the most extreme
cases, ***

Destination

(a)

Plymouth

* * *

Portsmouth

Bristol

Cardiff

Birmingham

Norwich

Liverpool

Leeds

Newcastle

Carlisle

Edinburgh

Glasgow

Aberdeen

Belfast

Q468: The Committee asked for information on the involvement
of local authority representatives in joint service co-ordination
group meetings.

1. Regional liaison with local authorities and emergency
services is conducted by the Army's regional structure, which
provides the tri-service command structure for MACA operations.
This consists of 11 brigades (arranged into three Divisions) each
with responsibility for an area of Great Britain, giving nation-wide
coverage.

2. The precise manner in which the JSCG function is discharged
varies significantly. For instance in Scotland it is the regional
Division rather than Brigades that co-ordinates the bulk of liaison
and has responsibility for JSCGs. In other areas Brigades have
strong links with the appropriate local bodies through a variety
of means. In many cases these have superseded the "formal"
JSCG structure (although formal JSCG meetings can still be convened
if the civil authorities wish). These include study days, routine
desk level liaison and meetings to deal with specific issues.

3. The focus of effort for the brigades has been to concentrate
on links with the police. This is wholly appropriate given the
central role of the police in the response to disaster and emergency,
notably in providing the GOLD commander for an incident.

4. But this has not been to the exclusion of other civil
authorities in the regions. Thus, 160 (Wales) Brigade demonstrated
the strength of their relationship with the appropriate local
bodies, and the Welsh Assembly, during the Foot and Mouth epidemic,
without recourse to the formal JSCG structure. Similarly 15 (North
East) Brigade's Study Day (see Serial 7 of the attachment) demonstrates
the strong links between civil authorities and the armed forces
in that area. RAF Regional Liaison Officers are members of the
Emergency Planning Society, reinforcing the link between the command
structure and civil organisations.

5. Our understanding is that the JSCG process and its
regional variations are understood and accepted by local authorities
and emergency services within the regions. Clearly, significant
gaps or serious dissatisfaction with the JSCG process in any region
would be a cause of some concern, both to the regional command
and the MoD as a whole. Access to the JSCG process, and access
to advice and information on Military Aid to the Civil Authorities,
is, in any event, not difficult for those responsible for civil
emergency planning in the regions. Contact with the Brigade and
Divisional structure can be made directly, or through any service
unit, police station, or single service liaison officer.

6. Specific examples of local liaison arrangements and
meetings are outlined at Annex A.