On Wednesday 24 of April 2006, in front of the Palacio das Cinzas (Palace
of the Ashes), when two representatives from the protesting petitionary
soldiers sacked by the Falintil-Força de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) led
by First Lieutenant Gastão Salsinha met with president Xanana Gusmão to
present their demands, Eric Campbell reported to Radio Australia: "The march
began peacefully but soon turned into a violent ethnic clash as protestors
attacked a market run by stallholders from the country's eastern regions.
591 soldiers form the western regions were dismissed last month after they
went AWOL (Absent Without Leave) claiming their commanders were favouring
eastern soldiers."

A day later, Suara Timor Lorosa'e (STL) , a national paper published in
Dili with a distribution of no more than 1000 copies, wrote two articles on
the front page in Tetum and Indonesian, Demo Petisionariu Lao Ho Diak (The
Petitioners' Demonstration Went Peacefully) and Keributan Warnai Aksi Demo
F-FDTL 'Petisi' (F-FDTL 'Petitioner's' Action Marked by Unrest).

The framing of political messages presented by STL proved to be a fatal
editorial blunder so that the two articles they produced are contradictive
and cannot be trusted at all. One article reported that the Petitioner's
Action Went Peacefully, where as on a separate column, another article
reported F-FDTL 'Petitioner's' Action Marked by Unrest .

On Eric Campbell's report, the Australian public is led to believe in a
'fabricated' political event that there is severe unrest in Dili, which
Campbell reported as an all out ethnic clash.

On the first day of demonstration by the petitionary F-FDTL soldiers, I
covered this event along with tens of local and international journalists.
Indeed disturbances did occur around Mercado Lama. A group of people at the
market hurled stones against the demonstrators. This incidence occurred as a
spontaneous reaction against the calls made by the demonstrator's
sympathisers which they rejected, as testified by many journalists on that
location. Another possibility is that the stone throwing could have been a
concoction to encourage ethnic clash. And if the second assumption is right,
then the stone throwing incidence has become a covert political agenda which
seeks to create confrontation between the grassroots community of
Timor-Leste.

Towards mid April Dili was abound with rumours through words of mouth,
through SMS or mobile phones with the objective of fragmenting the
Timor-Leste community into two camps: lorosa'e (easterners) versus loromonu
(westerners). According to the rumour, this fracture would result in civil
war. Initiating in these rumours without any clear indication of their
origins, the Dili residents began their exodus by taking refuge in places
that are deemed safe or by returning to their own home districts.

In February, before president Xanana Gusmão made his trip to Portugal,
petitionary F-FDTL soldiers organised a protest action at the Palacio das
Cinzas demanding a resolution to the problems of discrimination which they
raised. Other than the President and the National Parliament, they also
addressed their demands to foreign diplomatic representations in
Timor-Leste. President Xanana urged them to return to their headquarters and
to resolve this problem from within the F-FDTL institution. In March, the
Chief of Staff of F-FDTL, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak announced the
sacking of the 591 members of the F-FDTL under the pretext of indisciplinary
action for abandoning the headquarters. The sacking was announced prior to
the return of President Xanana Gusmão to Timor-Leste.

Through his state address which was broadcast by Radio no Televisaun
Timor-Leste (RTTL) , President Xanana viewed the decision taken by the F-FDTL
headquarters as unjust; however as the head of the state, the president
accepted that decision. In his address president Xanana also mentioned that
the Chief of Staff of F-FDTL had said "If you want war, we'll make war." It
is not clear when and under what circumstance were these words said. The
president also mentioned the existence within F-FDTL that the loromonu were
never involved in the struggle and that loromonu is composed of 10
districts, starting from Manatuto until Oecusse. It was from that moment
that the issue of discrimination within the military institution raised by
the petitionaries evolved to become rumours that there would be a civil war:
the three districts from the east (Lospalos, Baucau and Viqueque) against
the ten other districts. And different rumours also developed in the wider
community. But no civil war erupted in Timor-Leste. The pro and contra with
respect to the sacking of the members of F-FDTL continued to develop.

The petitionary soldiers, under the leadership of Gastão Salsinha, held
demonstrations and general meetings starting from 24th of April demanding
President Xanana to form a commission to investigate discriminatory
practices within F-FDTL. On the fourth day, 28th of April, the action which
started as a peaceful demonstration ended in violence. According to
government's version, 4 civilians were killed; civilian houses were burnt,
as well as a number of kiosks, in Taci Tolu and the Taibesi market.
Furthermore, another action took place on the 8th of May in the Ermera where
a member of the police force from the UIR (Rapid Intervention Unit) was
killed. Other than demanding the government to settle the petitionary F-FDTL
soldier's problems expeditiously, they also called for a general boycott of
local government workplaces in 10 Timor-Leste districts. This call for
boycott, launched with the objective of paralysing the government led by
Mari Alkatiri never received any response from the public.

On its Tuesday 9th of May 2006 edition, the daily Kompas, a media
establishment which has a large following in Indonesia, carried an article
about Timor-Leste and "Failed States" which was written by Baiq LSW Wardhani,
a staff lecturer in Political Affairs at the University of Airlangga (UNAIR),
Surabaya. Once again, STL carelessly re-published this article in its
opinion column thanks to the 'magic' of internet download technology. This
attitude of this opinion piece was intellectually biased and attempted to
change the opinion in Indonesia that the current political atmosphere in
Timor-Leste is heading towards a failed state/disrupted state. Regrettably,
STL published a piece which was biased and inaccurate from a foreign country
about its own country.

Wardhani used the political "turmoil" in Timor-Leste as an indicator by
arguing that "if the political turmoil keeps occurring, it will result in
the fragmentation of the political elite and bring about a state of
powerlessness within the state itself to settle its own conflicts,
attracting foreign intervention" [ "[J]ika kekacauan politik ini terjadi
secara terus-menerus, maka akan terjadi fragmentasi elit politik yang
menimbulkan ketidakmampuan satu negara untuk mengatasi konfliknya sehingga
mengundang intervensi pihak asing." ]. In his analysis, Wardhani blamed the
foreign countries, especially Australia for its double standards, which he
described as an irresponsible "doctor" who has failed to assist the birth of
this new nation. On the one side Australia tried to become god by helping,
on the other side Australia tried to brutally dominate Timor-Leste's wealth
in the Timor Gap, hence Wardhani's accusations.

This argument showed the author's ignorance of the actual political
situation in Timor-Leste when it underwent the transition towards an
independent nation and its aftermath. Or it can be that this argument relied
on rumours and hearsays which spread throughout the mass media, be it in
Timor-Leste or in foreign media, particularly in Australia and in Indonesia.
I myself suspect that this argument came from the disillusionment of the
'nationalist' camp in Indonesia which regretted the "separation" of
Timor-Leste from the Republic of Indonesia . Does STL also regret this
separation?

If we look at the various factors in the East Timorese political events,
there are no indications which could compel an examination into a failed or
disrupted state. This discussion is irrelevant because the criteria of a
failed state (a very market oriented theory) have not permeated the current
Timor-Leste politics. Apart from political instability through permanent
conflict between political, ethnic, religious and racial groups which occur
in a state, the most important indicator which points towards a failed state
is the process of systematic poverty. Of the various policies set out by the
government of Timor-Leste in its development program, there are no
indications to suggest that the state is powerless in its provision of
public services. Evidently, Wardhani's analysis depended solely on the
rumours which float around the mass media.

When the unrest took place on the 28th of April, with a number of
vehicles set alight in front of the Palácio do Governo, there was an
important event which nearly escaped media interest: President Xanana Gusmão
and Prime Minister Alkatiri were at Hotel Timor to participate in a seminar
organised by Forum Empresario Timor-Leste (Entrepreneur's Forum of
Timor-Leste). It was an entrepreneur's forum supported by the US
government's development body, USAID, through the Dezemvolve Setor Privada
(Private Sector Development) program.

In the middle of the 'crisis' facing the Mari Alkatiri's government, on
the 8th of May, the Minister for Development and Economy, Abel Ximenes
(Larissina) resigned. Although there are sections which noticed the
differences between Abel Larissina and Mari Alkatiri on the direction the
nation is taking, Abel has denied it. Abel Larissina stated that he is
concentrating on Fretilin to strengthen the party and as an entrepreneur, he
will develop the strength of the private sector.

This week, 16-19th of May, Fretilin will hold its II National Congress.
Abel Larissina and his group are an influential force in the congress which
will elect and install a new president and a new general secretary of
Fretilin, posts held currently by Lu Olo and Mari Alkatiri.

As a new nation, Timor-Leste was formed through the involvement of
various countries and was left with a range of lingering issues which
require swift resolutions. The political differences in the formation of
various state institutions suffered "stagnation" and Timor-Leste was
"forced" to accept different policies which later on resulted in problems.
Meanwhile, the ongoing process of reconciliation was also not responding to
the demands for justice, which various sections struggled for.

One of the UN legacies which are quite problematic is the establishment
of the armed forces institution, the F-FDTL. The UN established the armed
forces of Timor-Leste following a study prepared by the King's College
(England) in May 2000 and through the United Nations' Transition
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) Regulation No. 1 year 2001 (UNTAET/REG/2001/1).
The F-FDTL institution was established through an agreement from the
National Council which at the time was headed by Xanana Gusmão.

The recruitment process and the process of determining the military posts
resulted in disappointment from various sections who viewed this process as
unfair ( Buletin La'o Hamutuk, Vol. 6 No. 1-2 April 2005). The
transformation of Falintil, a national liberation army, into a regular army
destroyed the relationship which evolved along the struggle. The
relationship between the armed guerrilla fighter and the people along the
history of resistance can be compared to that between the fish and the
water. The fundamental relationship such as this was never considered as
important in the process of establishing the F-FDTL institution.

The recruitment disadvantaged many guerrilla fighters who had for many
years participated in the armed struggle, but could not pass the entry test
for F-FDTL because of health and height prerequisites. Another problem was
to do with military posts. There are those who had been commanders in the
armed resistance but were made ordinary soldiers inside F-FDTL, whereas the
younger recruit who had been helping them working as estafeta was elevated
to the post of a captain. It's not clear if this has to do with the level of
education or because of other reasons which are not connected to the
previous Falintil struggle.

In the initial stages of the recruitment, F-FDTL recruited 600 people
from guerrilla units. The former Falintil guerrillas who were not successful
were integrated into the community through a Reintegration Program which was
run by the IOM (International Organisation of Migration) and funded by the
World Bank.

The process of reintegration also caused problems which were becoming
more and more delicate. Prior to returning to their communities, the former
Falintil guerrillas were equipped with crash courses and were given
financial assistance to set up a small business. Many of the small
businesses failed because of the limited management capacity. It could also
be argued that their daily life while resisting in the jungle consisted only
of matters related to war strategies. Mari Alkatiri himself, on the program
Visaun Governu on RTTL, at the start of this month, voiced his
dissatisfaction towards the process carried out in that moment.

In the meantime, the training and the education programs in F-FDTL were
handed to foreign countries, especially from Australia and Portugal, which
agreed to provide funding and send in military instructors.

If we look at the problematic process of establishing the F-FDTL
institution, the demands of the 591 petitionary F-FDTL soldiers, which took
on the issues of discrimination, do have a basis. However the issue of
discrimination based on regionalism that they raised, soldiers from eastern
regions versus soldiers from western regions, seemed to have missed the
point. In fact, in the process of establishing this institution, there were
many former guerrillas who chose not to be involved and returned to the
community as a civilian because of their dissatisfaction for the process or
personal choice. These former Falintil guerrillas could have come a western
or an eastern region, for example the former commander Samba 9, secretary
Renan Selac, commander Ernesto Dudu, commander Eli Foho Rai Boot, and
others.

There is no basis for dumping these UN legacies or other past unresolved
issues on the government of Mari Alkatiri. It is this type of
misinterpretation that is frequently published in the Timor-Leste and
Australian mass media, which view Mari Alkatiri's government as a source of
all of the problems. The mass media does not recognise that in fact Alkatiri
does attempt to minimise or even remove the overseas' forces which dominated
the decision making in Timor-Leste for sometime.

Among the critiques directed at Alkatiri's government so far, be it from
his own comrades within Fretilin or from the opposition groups, we have not
seen a vision or an 'alternative' model for the development of this new
nation. The attacks aimed at Mari Alkatiri often come from the
disappointments and the failure to accommodate the bourgeois class in
Timor-Leste. Even worse, there are sections that chose instead to raise the
issue of his nationality, his race and his religion, which is Islamic.

The liberal democracy promoted by default by the UN turned political
parties into electoral machines. When a party becomes an electoral machine,
in this case Fretilin, it can't escape the democratic model in which popular
participation is removed.

In 1975 Fretilin integrated the struggle for national liberation with
people's liberation through cooperative programs, eradication of illiteracy
and development of a national culture. At that time Fretilin became a
people's political force with a clear vision about the future of an
independente Timor-Leste. Unfortunately, these popular ideas which
flourished in the 1970s are considered by many sections within Fretilin as
outdated ideas. There is but a small Fretilin elite who continue to defend
them, one of them is Mari Alkatiri.

Amid Fretilin's various shortcomings and the crushing different foreign
interests, Mari Alkatiri struggled to find an 'alternative' path to the
development of Timor-Leste. Indeed there is no room politically to follow
the paths of Venezuela, Brazil or Bolivia. Nevertheless, having learnt from
other countries, including Indonesia, Mari Alkatiri did not direct
Timor-Leste towards borrowing from the World Bank or the IMF. This policy
was not only opposed by the pro-market opposition parties, but it was also
opposed by his comrades in Fretilin. At the moment a large number of
Fretilin elite hold important positions in Mari Alkatiri's cabinet, one of
them is Abel Ximenes Larissina, who later resigned.

Alkatiri's government's three priority sectors are education, agriculture
and health which also became a target for other critics. Alkatiri's policy
of bilateral cooperation with the governments of Cuba and China came
frequently under scrutiny. Mari Alkatiri is accused wanting to tilt this new
nation closer to China and Cuba which are 'communists'.

Through Timor-Leste's Departments of Health and Education, the government
has sent hundreds of students to study medicine in Cuba; and Cuba has sent
volunteer doctors to Timor-Leste to assist in the provision of health
services in the clinics which are spread through out the thirteen districts.

In the non-formal sector of education, in response to an illiteracy rate
of over 50% in the Timor-Leste community, the government is carrying out a
program of illiteracy eradication. The Cuban government has sent mass
education trainers who will be working alongside the local teachers at the
community level.

Not surprisingly the negative voices coming from the opposition groups
against Mari Alkatiri are reinforced through the political role played by
the media. Even through the standards of a liberal media, the reporting by
the Timor-Leste mass media on Mari Alkatiri and his policies are quite
disturbing.

None of the criticism addressed to Mari Alkatiri—'who wants to tilt
Timor-Leste closer to Cuba and China'—through mass media reports could be
substantiated by the parties involved. For example in its reports about the
Cuban medical services as having low standards, the newspaper never even
interviewed the patients who received care from the Cuban doctors and nor
interviewed the doctors themselves.

Other than bilateral cooperation with Cuba and China, actually the
government of Timor-Leste also receives different types of assistance from
other Western countries. In the justice and education sectors, the
governments of Australia, the US and Portugal also provided financial
assistance. Other Western government establishments also provide
scholarships to Timor-Leste university students. If we make a comparison,
the scholarships offered by these Western countries usually go to students
who have finished their education in areas with little use to the community,
and many of their graduates do not work for the people but work for
international institutions operating in Timor-Leste.

A group of activists composed of university students and NGO workers in
Dili, whom are known as the Farol Group, often 'labelled' as close to Mari
Alkatiri because of their ideas and beliefs, recognises that the latest
political contest is heading towards the consolidation of the bourgeois
elite to remove Mari Alkatiri; be it an internal contest within Fretilin or
at the upcoming 2007 general elections. This view was put forward at a
discussion last Saturday 13 th of May, which took place at the Institutu
Edukasauun Popular to discuss the latest political development in
Timor-Leste.

Not all of Mari Alkatiri's policies are supported by the Farol Group. The
immigration act and the defamation law have caused apprehension among this
group of activists. However if we look at the policies for the exploration
of Timor-Leste's resources through the petroleum revenue from the Timor Gap,
this group of activists is of the opinion it has a strong basis for.

In the Petroleum Laws, the Alkatiri government has attempted to avoid the
'resource curse' which has affected many poverty stricken countries rich in
resources and oil, by creating a Petroleum Fund, an institution, which will
exploit the national resources, known as the "Norway Plus".

Through the Petroleum Fund, 90% of the national wealth obtained from oil
and gas is required to be invested for use in the long term. This
requirement is aimed at avoiding the various problems which generally
affected countries rich in oil and gas that suffered from domestic inflation
which weakened their competitiveness to improve their national revenue.

The revenue from the Petroleum Fund will be stored into a bank account
controlled by the BPA (Banking and Payment Authority). A parliamentary
decree and a declaration by an independent audit are required in order to
use the fund.

Other than managing the oil and gas resources resulting from the
cooperation between Australian and Timor-Leste governments, the Alkatiri
government also plans to set up a state venture which will cooperate with
China, Malaysia and Brazil. This venture will be set up so that Timor-Leste
can gain a bigger share of the revenue from oil fields currently in dispute
with Australia.

At the moment Timor-Leste is one of the only poorest countries in the
world that has no debt. Ten percent of the revenue from the Petroleum Fund
will be used to develop education, health and agricultural programs through
public sector investment.

The health services in Timor-Leste are free, as well as the cost of
education from primary to secondary levels. This education policy will be
implemented from the coming month of June.

In order to implement these development programs, the Alkatiri government
is preparing a new model for cooperation which will involve the community
sectors (local governments, the church and the civil society) through a New
Partnership Program.

On the other hand, the bourgeois class, which is undergoing political
consolidation, which during the transition period benefited from the
exploitation of donor funds through the World Bank via the distribution of
tenders to the private sector, is yearning for something different. And of
course, with policies as outlined above, their interests will be hampered.
Truly, a very alarming contest!

*Rahung Nasution filmmaker and works for the Institutu Edukasaun Popular,
resides in Dili, Timor-Leste

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This is an unofficial translation of the original
article, which was written in Indonesian Malay. The translator is
responsible for all errors made in the translation. Translator: Alex Tilman
( <mailto:alextilman@gmail.com>alextilman@gmail.com).