There were fears that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in the Iraq attack [1], [2], fears that did not materialize. Hence some will argue that the current fears of a nuclear strike against Iran may not materialize either. Some will argue that there were many other occasions in the past 60 years when the U.S. appeared to come close to using nuclear weapons and did not [1], [2], that the threshold for using nuclear weapons always was and remains extraordinarily high, and that the nuclear “saber-rattling” is just trickery to scare our opponents ( “madman theory”). These arguments are wrong. The U.S. is closer than it has been since Nagasaki to using nuclear weapons again. This year, for the first time in its history, the American Physical Society, representing 40,000 members of the profession that created nuclear weapons, issued a statement of deep concern on this matter: “The American Physical Society is deeply concerned about the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and for preemptive counter-proliferation purposes."

In the case of Iraq, our adversary was so weak that there was no way the use of nuclear weapons could have been justified in the eyes of the world. Iran is different: it possesses missiles that could strike U.S. forces in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, as well as Israeli cities. Iran also has a large conventional army. The 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq will be at great risk if there is a war with Iran, and Americans will support a nuclear strike on Iran once the administration creates a situation where it can argue that such action will save a large number of American lives.

The aforementioned Department of Defense Web site on “nuclear matters” states that “there are a number of arms control agreements restricting the deployment and use of nuclear weapons, but there is no conventional or customary international law that prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.” That statement defines the “rules” by which the U.S. government plays. No matter that it ignores (and the Web site’s list of “arms control agreements” also doesn’t mention) the “negative security assurance” issued by the U.S. in 1978 and reaffirmed in 1995 promising not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states. Nor that it ignores the 1996 ruling of the International Court of Justice.

As Time magazine reported in its Aug. 20, 1945, issue right after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “One hundred and twenty-three planes, each bearing a single atomic bomb, would carry as much destructive power as all the bombs (2,453,595 tons) dropped by the Allies on Europe during the war." And this was beforehydrogen bombs. To the extent that the U.S. military will be able to replace conventional weapons by nuclear weapons to carry out its missions, it will have achieved the ultimate “downsizing." That is the key to Rumsfeld’s “transformation of the military”; everything else is window-dressing.

“The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required,” according to NSC 30 from 1948. According to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the chain of command flows from the president through the secretary of defense to the geographic combatant commanders. If Gen. John Abizaid (CENTCOM commander) or Gen. James Cartwright (STRATCOM commander) asks authorization from President Bush to use nuclear weapons, following the guidelines in the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, what will Bush’s response be? As he often repeats, “I’m going to be listening to the people that know what they’re talking about, and that’s the commanders on the ground in Iraq. They’ll make the decisions.” The commanders on the ground will be driven by what they perceive to be the immediate military necessity, without regard to the larger issues such as the survival of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

The potentially disastrous consequences of this action cannot be overestimated. Once the U.S. has used its nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear signatory of the NPT, the NPT will fall apart. Many more countries will strive to develop and test nuclear weapons, overtly or covertly, as North Korea has just done. With no nuclear taboo left, many more countries will feel entitled to use their nuclear weapons against nuclear and non-nuclear adversaries. Military conflicts inevitably lead to escalation, and they usually end only when one side prevails. That is not how a global nuclear conflict will end.

If the U.S. attacks Iran and does not use nuclear weapons, it will incur military losses that will vastly outweigh any benefits of such a war. If there is no Iran war, the Bush presidency will be remembered predominantly for the disastrous Iraq war. Crossing the nuclear threshold will overshadow all the other events of the Bush presidency. To the (however unlikely) extent that it results in an advantage to America, Bush’s achievement could conceivably be hailed by future generations. The “rational” choice for the administration is clear.

Like desperate gamblers in a losing streak, Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld have nothing to gain and everything to lose by not attacking Iran with nuclear weapons.

Only Democratic Congress members have, however weakly, questioned the wisdom of the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies [1], [2], [3]. No Republicans in Congress have done so, nor have they questioned the fact that the nuclear option against Iran is “on the table.” This is not to say that Republican members of Congress would necessarily approve of the use of nuclear weapons against Iran; in fact, many if not most are likely to oppose it. And some Democratic members of Congress may be more hawkish than Republicans in regard to Iran [1], [2], [3]. However, the principle of “party discipline” applies to both Republicans and Democrats, and the administration that is planning to use nuclear weapons against Iran is Republican.