This book analyses how the European Union translates its principles of peace and justice into policy and puts them into practice, particularly in societies in or emerging from violent conflict.

The European Union treaty states that in its relations with the wider world, the EU is to promote peace, security, the protection of human rights, and the strict observance and the development of international law. The EU is active in peace processes around the world, yet its role in international peace mediation is largely ignored.

In late 2013 and early 2014, I headed a research team (pictured left) on behalf of International Alert and Mouvement Malivaleurs. Our objective was to identify ways in which donors could contribute to long-term, peaceful change in Mali after the calamities of 2012. We listened to Malians from different walks of life from across the country. The hunger for debate on every aspect of what it means to be Malian was striking.

We heard a strong desire for a new Mali, a Mali of the 21st century. In this new Mali, inclusive participation will replace the old systems of ‘consensus’ politics, mousalaka, clientelism, corruption and the divisions between the nyèmogow and the brousse konomogow, the leaders and the led. Public institutions and the political class will be reformed and reinvigorated.

But this desire for change does not imply agreement. There are deep fractures between communities, between citizens and the state, between generations, and between men and women, rural and urban, rich and poor, conservative and progressive, traditional and reformist. The challenge for the donor community is to engage sensitively, supporting a process of long-term reform and inclusion. Avoiding difficult issues may leave tensions festering, only to erupt again, as they did in 2012. The report, (disponible aussi en français, bien sûr!) details our findings and recommendations to donors.

This article, published in European Security (2014), assesses whether the EU contributes to long-term positive change in societies emerging from violent conflict, helping them ‘mend’ or whether it simply encourages societies to ‘make do’ with the status quo. To do so, the article focuses on two of the principles found in the EU Treaty, peace and justice for human rights violations. It examines how the EU translates the principles of peace and justice into policy and puts them into practice by analyzing EU engagement in peace mediation, transitional justice, and security sector reform in general and through in-depth examination of EU engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In the article, I question the prevailing discourse that greater inter-institutional coherence would improve EU security provision and considers whether and how the EU prioritizes between peace and justice. I find that principles may be translated into policy and put into practice, and practice is often ahead of policy. But this is uneven within as well as across the institutions. Greater coherence between principle, policy, and practice, rather than between institutions, would improve EU security provision and enable prioritization. If the EU settles for making do, it undermines its considerable potential to contribute to long-term solutions to complex conflicts.

This briefing paper for the Oslo Forum Africa Mediators Retreat 2013 aims to stimulate discussion within the mediation community about the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in peace processes. In a brief overview of the peace-versus-justice debate to date, it lays out the main arguments for and against the Court. The paper then argues that the ICC has become a ‘straw man’ in the peace and justice debate, being misrepresented sometimes. It is one actor among many in the complex fields of justice and peacemaking – equating the ICC with justice oversimplifies the complexity of justice in (post-) conflict situations. The paper closes with suggestions for greater synergies between peace and justice, including the Court. There are many options on the spectrum between ICC indictments and amnesty that are yet to be explored, and which could advance a pro-justice and pro-peace agenda.

The Global Accord (2002) ended the Congo War, contributed to the creation of the Third Republic and influenced subsequent peace agreements. This article (in the International Journal of Human Rights, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 2, 289–306) analyses how justice for human rights violations was included in the Global Accord and later peace deals. It assesses how the power-sharing aspects of these agreements affected the pursuit of accountability, and finds they undermined transitional justice efforts and contributed to continued abuse. It concludes that free-wheeling power-sharing within the security institutions is the biggest challenge to both accountability and peace: post-conflict security arrangements are therefore the crucial nexus between peacebuilding and accountability for human rights violations.

EU foreign policy chiefs were unusually quick off the mark to comment on the fall of Sirte and reported death of Colonel Gaddafi today. Presidents Van Rompuy and Barrosso called on the National Transitional Council (NTC) to ‘pursue a broad-based reconciliation process which reaches out to all Libyans and enables a democratic, peaceful and transparent transition in the country.’ High Representative Ashton said ‘It is important that [Libya’s] leadership unite to build a democratic future for the country in full respect of human rights. While the crimes of the past must be addressed, the leadership must also seek a path of national reconciliation… The EU will remain a strong and committed partner in the future’.

The emphasis on human rights and transitional justice in Ashton’s statement is important (interestingly, this is lacking from van Rompuy’s and Barrosso’s); the EU has also repeatedly stated its commitment to supporting human rights, civil society and security sector reform in Libya. Experts argue that transitional justice is more effective when trials, truth commissions and security sector reform are complementary. Yet – as I have argued elsewhere , the EU’s extensive support to transitional justice in other parts of the world has been largely ad hoc: the EU has no policy guidance on supporting transitional justice. A key question will be how will the new government addresses not only the legacy of the Gaddafi regime, but also atrocities allegedly committed by both sides during the recent conflict. What will the EU do to support this?

The EU has become increasingly engaged in peace processes, which is welcome. This engagement has often been through the European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs), and has tended to be ad hoc. In this Security Policy Brief for Egmont, the Royal Institute for Foreign Affairs I argue that the External Action Service (EAS) should address the role the EU could and should play early on in peace processes. It is not a role that can develop organically anymore; it is time for strategic decision-making. Ten years on, the review of the Gothenburg programme on conflict prevention has been shelved, and the direction of the so-called ‘horizontal’ issues – like peace mediation – in the EAS are still under consideration.. This presents an ideal opportunity to assess what EU diplomats should be contributing to peace processes, and for making the necessary support available to them. After all, interventions of this kind affect not only the EU’s external action and its intended beneficiaries, but also the Union’s identity on the world stage.

What is the ideal transitional justice scenario in Ivory Coast? the Belgian newspaper De Morgen asked me this week in an interview published on Thursday. It is always impossible to predict these types of questions, but there are some trends we can see from other places, which might help the Ivoriens build peace – in the aftermath of so much violence.

Attention at the moment is focussed on prosecuting former President Laurent Gbabgo, his wife and senior aides. Ideally these trials should take place in Ivory Coast, but in many post-conflict situations, the justice system is unable to guarantee fair trials. If this is the case, the International Criminal Court could step in. But the ICC is a court of last resort – and there are disadvantages to pursuing alleged human rights violators through it. In DR Congo, for example, the Court is often portrayed as ‘foreign justice’. And when trials take place in The Hague, so far from where the violations have occurred it is difficult for the victims and affected communities to access proceedings.

Between national trials and the ICC, there are other options. In the past, the UN has set up ‘hybrid’ courts, like the Special Court for Sierra Leone and ad hoc tribunals, like the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). But although these courts have made invaluable contributions to combatting impunity for the worst crimes, they are expensive, and slow. There is little appetite amongst the donors for funding more such courts in the future. But there are alternatives, such as providing international support for trials within national systems – as in Bosnia. A ‘mixed’ court along these lines is currently in development in DR Congo.

For justice to prevail, it is important not to lose sight of the bigger picture. The President of the UN Human Rights Council has appointed an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights violations committed in Ivory Coast, identify those responsible, and bring them to justice. If the Commission identifies perpetrators who have been loyal to President Ouattara, they must also be prosecuted. The International Community should support the Commission in its work, ensure it has the access it needs in Ivory Coast to conduct a thorough investigation, and follow up on its recommendations.

And justice is not limited to prosecutions. There have been President Outtara has promised to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Ivory Coast, which could be a useful complement to (but not a replacement for ) criminal prosecutions. Where truth commissions have been most successful, there have been widespread popular consultations to determine their purpose, mandate and composition. At best, truth commissions can contribute to building a peaceful society; at worst they can be a whitewash and leave the roots of the conflict unaddressed.

Finally, a lesson we can learn from countries like Afghanistan and DRC is that failing to reform public institutions – and particularly the armed forces, police and judiciary – and remove those responsible for human rights violations from public service stores up more problems for later. Fair vetting processes, which remove human rights abusers, install discipline and civilian oversight can make a vital contribution to democracy-building.

Prosecutions alone can’t deliver justice; but combined with truth-seeking , vetting and reform of the public institutions and reparations for victims, they may be able to help address the root causes of the conflict and prevent its recurrence. The Commission of Inquiry is potentially a good start in this direction; engaging the Ivoriens, especially the marginalised, will be crucial in making any of these processes succeed.

The European Union is increasingly involved in mediating peace deals around the world, and has strong commitments to international justice and human rights. Including justice provisions for the victims of a conflict in the peace agreement may make an important contribution to a durable peace. In this paper published by the Initiative forPeacebuilding, I analyse EU capacities for promoting justice for human rights violations in peacemaking, identify gaps and recommend ways to fill these gaps. I argue that a comprehensive EU approach to transitional justice would make the EU a more credible mediator, and should also improve the impact of post-conflict peace- and democracy-building interventions.