Since the failed coup of July 2016, Turkey’s spiralling descent ever deeper into authoritarianism has been characterized by arbitrary arrests and widespread abuses of even the draconian powers afforded the regime under the continuing State of Emergency. In addition, the government’s domination of the media has meant that, for the mass of the Turkish public, the reality of what is happening in the country is submerged beneath a cacophony of distortions, delusions, untruths and febrile conspiracy theories.

The authority of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been challenged by the security apparatus, the police and parts of the judiciary that enjoy the backing of the brotherhood of the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. The unprecedented challenge compels Erdoğan to circumscribe the power of his erstwhile ally, which thrives with the application of oppressive security measures. Whether Erdoğan will now see the strong incentive to seek a democratic, negotiated solution to the Kurdish issue, or continue to concentrate power in his own hands, remains to be seen.

The Gülenists have lost the battle over the control of the state. Most damningly for them, they have been exposed as ruthless power grabbers. It has been of critical importance for the AKP government in its fight against the Gülenists that other groups within the judiciary have rallied to it. The lessons that the present Turkish government has had to learn the hard way are not going to be lost on future governments. One can assume that they are going to be very careful not to offer the Gülenists any leeway.

Ali Bayramoğlu in Yeni Şafak writes that AKP’s otherwise legitimate struggle against the Gülen fraternity will remain flawed from a democratic perspective until the party acknowledges its own responsibility for the acts of the “cemaat” when the two were still allies. Fatih Yaşlı in Yurt writes that Turkish intellectual and political life suffers from a predilection for what he calls “easy opposition” that does not question who one is allied with as long as the cause is deemed to be good, which today blinds the opponents of AKP to the responsibility of the Gülenists in bringing about the present authoritarian rule. Murat Yetkin in Radikal writes that the talk in political circles is that AKP is preparing for a coalition with MHP after the general election in June. Orhan Bursalı in Cumhuriyet writes that Erdoğan is distancing himself from the Kurds, and is instead teaming up with the military. Umut Özkırımlı on the news site Diken writes that AKP’s, and generally the Islamists’ lasting legacy is a generalized hatred that has become a permanent, defining feature of Turkey’s society.

On the 8th anniversary of the assassination of Armenian-Turkish editor Hrant Dink, Rober Koptaş in Agos noted that the AKP government has recently started to emphasize that police officers close to the Gülenist fraternity were implicated in the 2007 assassination. Aydın Engin in Cumhuriyet called on the opponents of the AKP regime not to put any faith in dissensions within the governing party leading to the fall of the regime. Kadri Gürsel in Milliyet similarly wrote that Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is never going to put up a fight against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Several columnists have brought up the recent attack against Charlie Hebdo in Paris. Yusuf Kaplan in Yeni Safak writes that the attack was the work of the French “deep state” in order to increase Islamophobia. Orhan Kemal Cengiz in Bugün writes that pious Muslims must stop hiding behind conspiracy theories, and Nuray Mert writes on the Diken news site that blaming such attacks on groups created by the West is simply an attempt to pretend that there is not a major problem that Muslims need to tackle.

On December 14, 2014, the Turkish police staged early morning raids in 13 provinces across the country following the issuing of arrest warrants for 31 alleged members of the Gülen Movement on terrorism charges. Those detained included six journalists, prompting claims in the national and international media that the arrests were another example of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s increasing suppression of freedom of expression. In fact, the narratives of the AKP and the Gülen Movement about the arrests are both attempts to coat a power struggle with the gloss of a commitment to principle.

The detentions of Gülenist media personalities have led to a discussion whether or not they deserve support in the name of the freedom of expression, against the background of the joint Gülenist-AKP assaults against the opposition and media in the past. Ekrem Dumanlı, the editor in chief of the Gülenist daily Zaman, who was one of those who was detained, defends past editorial policy, writing that “We honestly appropriated the Ergenekon investigation and lent whatever earnest support to it that we could,” because, he claims, there were many known examples of journalists collaborating with coup makers. Dumanlı concedes that some things that were published may have been “over the mark,” but he asks critical colleagues to support him nonetheless and not “make the same mistake against us.” Güray Öz in Cumhuriyet writes that “no journalist can be deprived of support because of what he has done in the past,” but that the assault against it today does not absolve Gülenist media from its responsibilities for what it has committed in the past.

The Turkish generals are no longer afraid to speak out and they exert influence over government policies. Erdoğan invited the military back into the power equation when, faced with the Gülenist challenge to his power, and in need of a new ally, he gave the signal to open the prison doors for the convicted officers. But more than anything else, it is the persistence of an authoritarian mindset that sets the stage for the recurrent assertion of the power of the military in Turkey.

On October 12, 2014, Turkey’s judges and prosecutors will choose ten members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) in an election which is likely to have far-reaching repercussions both for the government’s campaign against followers of the exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen and the broader issue of political control over the judiciary.