What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of ...
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What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.Less

Motivation and Agency

Alfred R. Mele

Published in print: 2003-02-13

What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional ...
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Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. The book aims to bring together “systematic” and more historically-oriented work on these issues.Less

Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good

Published in print: 2010-07-08

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. The book aims to bring together “systematic” and more historically-oriented work on these issues.

Hegel’s Logic reveals an insightful and subtle engagement with the traditional problem of free will as it emerges from our basic commitment to the explicability of the world. While the dominant ...
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Hegel’s Logic reveals an insightful and subtle engagement with the traditional problem of free will as it emerges from our basic commitment to the explicability of the world. While the dominant current interpretations of Hegel’s theory of agency find little of significance in the Logic and suggest that Hegel avoided the traditional problem, Yeomans argues both that the problem is unavoidable, and that the two versions of the Logic fruitfully engage the tensions between explicability and both the control and alternate possibilities constitutive of free agency. In particular, Yeomans examines Hegel’s response to three different versions of the principle of sufficient reason that have historically seemed to make free will problematic. The central three chapters take up each of these versions in turn. For each, Yeomans first explores the nature of its challenge to free will with glances both at Hegel’s precursors and contemporaries and at the philosophy of action of our own time. Then Yeomans delves into the arguments of Hegel’s Logic to see how he construed the problematic concepts in question. Finally, Yeomans returns to the issue of free will to bring Hegel’s interpretations of the concepts in the Logic together with elements of his moral psychology from his practical philosophy both to show how the problem of free will can be resolved, and to trace in outline the shape of free will that such a resolution produces. The key connection between the Logic’s reflections on the form of explanation and the practical philosophy’s theory of the will is that both attempt to do justice to the mutual necessity of self-determination and external influence.Less

Freedom and Reflection : Hegel and the Logic of Agency

Christopher Yeomans

Published in print: 2011-12-14

Hegel’s Logic reveals an insightful and subtle engagement with the traditional problem of free will as it emerges from our basic commitment to the explicability of the world. While the dominant current interpretations of Hegel’s theory of agency find little of significance in the Logic and suggest that Hegel avoided the traditional problem, Yeomans argues both that the problem is unavoidable, and that the two versions of the Logic fruitfully engage the tensions between explicability and both the control and alternate possibilities constitutive of free agency. In particular, Yeomans examines Hegel’s response to three different versions of the principle of sufficient reason that have historically seemed to make free will problematic. The central three chapters take up each of these versions in turn. For each, Yeomans first explores the nature of its challenge to free will with glances both at Hegel’s precursors and contemporaries and at the philosophy of action of our own time. Then Yeomans delves into the arguments of Hegel’s Logic to see how he construed the problematic concepts in question. Finally, Yeomans returns to the issue of free will to bring Hegel’s interpretations of the concepts in the Logic together with elements of his moral psychology from his practical philosophy both to show how the problem of free will can be resolved, and to trace in outline the shape of free will that such a resolution produces. The key connection between the Logic’s reflections on the form of explanation and the practical philosophy’s theory of the will is that both attempt to do justice to the mutual necessity of self-determination and external influence.

This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ...
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This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.Less

Action and its Explanation

David-Hillel Ruben

Published in print: 2003-05-22

This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.

For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and ...
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For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to each of the contributors in a way that provides a lively dialogue on the topic. The book begins with an introduction by Audi that presents a thematic overview of his philosophy and connects his views in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and action. Each of the thirteen chapters that follow concentrates on one or another of these three main areas. The chapters are followed by Audi's replies.Less

Rationality and the Good : Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi

Published in print: 2007-09-01

For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to each of the contributors in a way that provides a lively dialogue on the topic. The book begins with an introduction by Audi that presents a thematic overview of his philosophy and connects his views in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and action. Each of the thirteen chapters that follow concentrates on one or another of these three main areas. The chapters are followed by Audi's replies.

This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some ...
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This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some alternatives to the author's view. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less

Introduction

Ruben David-Hillel

Published in print: 2003-05-22

This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some alternatives to the author's view. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.

This chapter introduces some further distinctions and terminology for the ensuing discussion of action. It notes the distinction between action and activity. It presents the idea of events intrinsic ...
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This chapter introduces some further distinctions and terminology for the ensuing discussion of action. It notes the distinction between action and activity. It presents the idea of events intrinsic to actions and considers which, if any, causal antecedents or consequences of one's own actions are themselves intrinsic to one's own actions. It distinguishes three kinds of chains that are action-involving: action-causal chains, action chains, and teleological chains. It discusses the concept of base action. Finally, the chapter argues that there are both physical and mental actions, and argues against the proposal that every action is a mental action.Less

Some Preliminaries

Ruben David-Hillel

Published in print: 2003-05-22

This chapter introduces some further distinctions and terminology for the ensuing discussion of action. It notes the distinction between action and activity. It presents the idea of events intrinsic to actions and considers which, if any, causal antecedents or consequences of one's own actions are themselves intrinsic to one's own actions. It distinguishes three kinds of chains that are action-involving: action-causal chains, action chains, and teleological chains. It discusses the concept of base action. Finally, the chapter argues that there are both physical and mental actions, and argues against the proposal that every action is a mental action.

This chapter addresses the causal theory of action. It clarifies the idea of belief and argues that there is no genuine sense of ‘belief’ in which there are sufficient beliefs to meet the ...
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This chapter addresses the causal theory of action. It clarifies the idea of belief and argues that there is no genuine sense of ‘belief’ in which there are sufficient beliefs to meet the requirements of the causal theory of action. It describes some possible responses by the causal theorist and rejects them. Finally, the chapter discusses the category of mental action and claims that the causal theorist cannot provide a convincing reconstructive analysis for an important subset of them.Less

The Causal Theory of Action

Ruben David-Hillel

Published in print: 2003-05-22

This chapter addresses the causal theory of action. It clarifies the idea of belief and argues that there is no genuine sense of ‘belief’ in which there are sufficient beliefs to meet the requirements of the causal theory of action. It describes some possible responses by the causal theorist and rejects them. Finally, the chapter discusses the category of mental action and claims that the causal theorist cannot provide a convincing reconstructive analysis for an important subset of them.

This chapter introduces the idea of a particular sort of philosophical naturalism — folk naturalism — and explains what this doctrine says about action. It describes its commitment to a ...
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This chapter introduces the idea of a particular sort of philosophical naturalism — folk naturalism — and explains what this doctrine says about action. It describes its commitment to a reconstructive analysis of action in folk terms, but ones thought to be acceptable to the naturalist. It proposes three theories of action, pointing out a crucial assumption that all three share, and then focuses on the theory favoured by folk naturalism, the causal theory of action. The chapter explains some of its main ideas and, in particular, focuses on the requirement of rationalization that is part of the causal theory's requirements for action.Less

Theories of Action and an Introduction to the Causal Theory of Action

Ruben David-Hillel

Published in print: 2003-05-22

This chapter introduces the idea of a particular sort of philosophical naturalism — folk naturalism — and explains what this doctrine says about action. It describes its commitment to a reconstructive analysis of action in folk terms, but ones thought to be acceptable to the naturalist. It proposes three theories of action, pointing out a crucial assumption that all three share, and then focuses on the theory favoured by folk naturalism, the causal theory of action. The chapter explains some of its main ideas and, in particular, focuses on the requirement of rationalization that is part of the causal theory's requirements for action.

Examines Hooker’s philosophy of action, and in particular his views on defective action and belief-formation, in order to understand how the mental faculties, examined in the previous chapter, ...
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Examines Hooker’s philosophy of action, and in particular his views on defective action and belief-formation, in order to understand how the mental faculties, examined in the previous chapter, interact together. It is argued that Hooker stresses the inherently voluntary nature of all sin, and humanity’s potential through diligence to know and choose the good. Attention is given to Hooker’s theory of certainty, which considers just how certain the reason must be in any given case in order to fulfil its responsibilities, and this also forms a fundamental basis for the discussion of religious authority to be found in ch. 4.Less

Philosophy of Action: Defective Action and Belief-Formation

Nigel Voak

Published in print: 2003-03-13

Examines Hooker’s philosophy of action, and in particular his views on defective action and belief-formation, in order to understand how the mental faculties, examined in the previous chapter, interact together. It is argued that Hooker stresses the inherently voluntary nature of all sin, and humanity’s potential through diligence to know and choose the good. Attention is given to Hooker’s theory of certainty, which considers just how certain the reason must be in any given case in order to fulfil its responsibilities, and this also forms a fundamental basis for the discussion of religious authority to be found in ch. 4.