Colombia
held legislative elections over the weekend, a preliminary to presidential elections
later in the year. President Andres Pastrana, who has functioned as the U.S.
government's "partner" in the ostensibly anti-drug campaign dubbed
"Plan Colombia," cannot run for another term.

The candidate
who now appears strongest is Alvaro Uribe, who is generally considered more
hard-line toward the leftist guerrilla group FARC. Horacio Serpa, who has questioned
Plan Colombia and the drug war in general, looked to be a strong candidate a
few months ago, but seems to have faded lately. Uribe hasn't said much about
Plan Colombia lately. Presumably he would want to resist complete domination
by the United States but would welcome money and military materiel so long as
they were delivered on his terms.

The upshot of
the elections over the weekend is that the traditional political parties got
routed. The Conservatives of Andres Pastrana lost ground severely, as did the
Liberal Party. The two parties traded occupancy of the presidency for most of
the 20th century.

REJECTING
PLAN COLOMBIA?

Some analysts
– notably Al Giordano of narconews.com
– have suggested that the results of Colombia's parliamentary election this
past weekend indicate a firm rejection not only of the two major parties but
also of U.S. involvement in that country's civil war, which has been compounded
in the last decade or so by narcoterrorism. A closer look suggests dissatisfaction,
frustration and disillusionment, but something less than a clear direction among
Colombian voters.

That outcome
still suggests that the United States should reconsider the ambitious Plan Colombia
initiated by the Clinton administration and continued under President Bush.
It is difficult to see a clear path to a result most Americans would find satisfactory.

REJECTING
THE ESTABLISHMENT

Last weekend's
result did indicate frustration with current conditions, which include an intensified
civil war that has heated up even more lately in the wake of recently collapsed
peace efforts. The leftist rebel group FARC had called for a boycott and only
about 44 percent of Colombian voters showed up. That is actually not much lower
than is relatively normal in Colombia, but still a symbol that the FARC has
some influence. It probably helped itself, if anything, by not precipitating
violence during the balloting.

The voters who
did turn out were not happy but may have been understandably
confused. They reduced Pastrana's Conservative Party from 17 seats to
13 in the 100-member Senate. The establishment opposition Liberal Party lost
19 Senate seats, reducing its representation from 48 seats to 29.

In both the 100-member
Senate and the 175-member House of Representatives small independent parties
now hold majorities. But they are split. Supporters of independent presidential
candidate Alvaro Uribe, generally described as a hard-liner who would intensify
the war against FARC, did best. But followers of Antonio Navarro Wolf, a former
guerrilla from the demobilized M-19 group, came in second.

INSTABILITY
COMPOUNDED

Thus the
voters seem impatient with the two parties that have dominated Colombian politics,
but split between what could be called far-right and far-left alternatives.
This suggests that the instability that has characterized Colombian politics
for some time is poised to become even more unstable.

The U.S. mission,
consisting mostly of military aid and military advisers, was sold to Americans
as a battle in the drug war, but it was recently expanded to include guarding
a pipeline owned by Occidental Petroleum. It has not stemmed the flow of cocaine
and it has not brought stability.

House Republicans
recently pushed through a resolution urging the president to support our noble
Democratic allies in Colombia with even more aid and possibly more military
power. That would probably make the situation even worse. Continued U.S. aid
increases the resources the two sides – well, actually there at least three
and probably more sides in a devilishly complex political landscape – have available
and reduce any incentive for the Colombians to handle the problems themselves.

ABOVE
IT ALL

I
talked to Sanho Tree, an analyst at the Institute for Policy Studies who has
traveled to Colombia many times in recent years. He explained that the elite
in Colombia, such as it is, is reasonably well insulated from the violence afflicting
the country – although they do have to invest in extra security precautions
and sometimes in personal bodyguards. But at least they don't have to worry
about their sons being put in harm's way.

The Colombian
military is one of the most top-heavy and bureaucratic in Latin America, which is saying something. There are 13 desk jockeys for every soldier in the field.
Anybody with a high school diploma is excused from combat. "So the elites
are more than willing to keep the civil war going, fighting to the last peasant,"
as Tree put it to me.

But it would
be virtually impossible to keep the war going without money from Uncle Sap.
The Colombian government collects about 10 percent of GDP in taxes, and about
2 percent of GDP is used for the military. Without money from the United States
the war would have to be de-escalated – or left to the guerrillas and quasi-private
right-wing paramilitaries to battle it out among themselves.

SUBSIDIZING
BOTH SIDES

If the
United States subsidizes the Colombian military directly, however, its policies
lead to huge quantities of money being available to the guerrillas and the paramilitaries.
This is because the vaunted Holy War on Drugs profitizes an otherwise marginally
profitable crop like coca, making large quantities of money and weapons available
to those willing to protect growers and traffickers from generally ineffective
but nonetheless pesky enforcement efforts.

Every observer
of Colombia has noted that both the leftist guerrillas and the paramilitaries
(originally formed to protect landowners from guerrilla attacks) are increasingly
financed by drug money. Intensifying the drug war has never yet stopped the
flow of drugs, but only increases the advantage and the profits of those skilled
at violence, blackmail, concealment and intimidation.

So U.S. taxpayers'
money flows to the Colombian military, and active drug war measures make cocaine
more profitable for guerillas and narcoterrorists.

The best bet
would be to end U.S. intervention and end the war on drugs so we can concentrate
on the struggle against terrorism. The Colombian civil war would probably continue,
but neither side would have as many resources for killing.

Such an outcome
is unlikely; instead, despite a few budding questions among Washington policymakers,
the likelihood is that U.S. involvement will increase, which will almost certainly
only increase the level of violence and instability.

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