Kremlin is behind anti-Ukrainian protests in Poland: analysis of the hacked correspondence

In recent months, relations between Ukraine and Poland have suddenly soured. Several anti-Ukrainian protests took place in Poland, and some Polish politicians again brought up the Volyn massacre, and began to demand that Ukraine revise its history. In turn, in Ukraine, someone began to vandalize Polish monuments. It seemed that the complicated issues of the Ukrainian-Polish history had been long settled on the bilateral level, but someone again has begun stirring up the bitter past. However, neither Ukraine nor Poland is interested in a falling-out. So, who is behind these events?

Ukrainian hacktivists of CyberHunta and Ukrainian Cyber Alliance (UCA) handed over to InformNapalm volunteers an email dump of one of the shadow operators of the Russian foreign policy in Eastern Europe.

Please meet Alexander Usovsky, a citizen of Belarus, born April 09, 1968, registered at the address: Prospect Mira, Building 2, Apt. 66, Beloozersk, 225215, Belarus. Ukrainian readers may remember him as a zealous fan of the Russian world, a historian, writer and journalist who often wrote for the Ukrainian Choice web site of Viktor Medvedchuk’s political project. Ukrainian hackers have gained access to Usovsky’s computer, and for a few months monitored all his correspondence.

Recently, Usovsky actively engaged in organizing anti-Ukrainian rallies in Poland and other Eastern European countries. He uses a fictitious NGO called East European Cultural Initiative (Východoeurópska kultúrna iniciatíva) as an official cover for such projects. It was registered in the Slovak capital at the end of 2013, at the following address: Hurbanovo námestie 1, 811 03.

From the first days of the NGO’s existence, Usovsky starts searching for sources of funding. The fan of the Russian world does not shy from probing even the EU institutions for money.

Since mid-2014, Usovsky’s organization begins cooperation with the Institute of CIS Countries, which is headed by State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin (United Russia party).

Initially, Usovsky’s idea was to create a non-government organization operating in the media space of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), promoting the ideas of ​​the Russian world in Eastern Europe. The estimated budget for the project – €42,000 per month.

Zatulin’s people took interest in such an organizer, and took his ideas up for further development. Usovsky begins to study the political space of Eastern Europe, and writing analytical memos for Zatulin.

Even on the Russian television, he began to appear as an expert on Poland.

Gradually, Usovsky acquires connections among the pro-Russian organizations in Eastern Europe, and his proposals become more specific. The project budgets also increase. Here is a letter apparently addressed to Igor Shishkin, Zatulin’s deputy:

“Hello Igor!

Yesterday, my boys from OWP (Obóz Wielkiej Polski) held talks with the leadership of PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, parliamentary party traditionally represented in the Sejm, today their faction has 28 representatives and 2 senators) and arrived at a mutually beneficial consensus. PSL is prepared to put the OWP candidates in their electoral lists in all 42 districts, or, better yet, candidates from the newly established center-right party (tentative name – Nadzieja dla Polski) and ensure that five of our candidates get into the Sejm; possibly more, but five for sure. This will allow the creation of a pro-Russian group in the Sejm (OWP – the organization which, in the autumn of last year in Poland, organized 12 protests in support of Novorossia and against the Kyiv junta). Once again – in the POLISH Sejm, the group of PRO-RUSSIAN representatives. This hasn’t happen since the defeat of PUWP in the parliamentary elections of 1989, and the collapse of the socialist Poland!All this work can be carried out under the banner of the Institute of CIS countries, and under the personal leadership of comrade Zatulin.The amount needed for this is €285,000.The decision should be QUICK. “

Gradually Usovsky began to communicate with representatives of the ultranationalist organizations, eurosceptics, and left and right radicals.

Here he talks to the representative of the Polish nationalists Dawid Berezicki (OWP, Obóz Wielkiej Polski, Camp of Great Poland) about issues related to the elections in Russia: until the new Duma is elected, all the ideas are on hold.

Duma elections took place September 18, 2016, after which the curators of main activity areas were appointed, and work was resumed on all fronts. And it was after the Duma elections, that the relations between Ukraine and Poland suddenly began to sour, numerous anti-Ukrainian rallies were held in Poland, whereas in Ukraine someone suddenly began to destroy the Polish monuments. Coincidence? I don’t think so…

After Zatulin’s election to the Duma, Usovsky sends him another project. This time, it is an attempt to drive a wedge between the Ukrainians and the Poles with he hands of the Polish nationalists. To that end, he forms a plan to create a debating club Polonia Vita. This plan involves the parliamentary parties Kukiz’15 and PSL.

During the discussion, we develop common principles with respect to the Ukrainian situation, wherein we declare our absolute rejection of the existing Kyiv authorities, and refusal of any cooperation with the regime which associates itself with the UPA (Ed.: Ukrainian Insurgent Army), and agree on ways and methods of struggle against it, including all non-criminal ways of opposition.

The formulated modus operandi (refusal of housing rental, hiring, and of all other types of assistance to the Ukrainian refugees caught on worshipping “the UPA heroes”, as well as to those who participated in the ATO, were jumping on the Maidan, and publicly displaying the loyalty towards the Kyiv junta on social networks, and also refusal to provide any kind of assistance to the existing Ukrainian state) with respect to the current Ukrainian authorities we announce in a special Declaration, which we publish in all nationalist media, both traditional and online.

Since the publication of the above Declaration, the current government of Ukraine becomes illegitimate for all Polish nationalists. And all the Polish officials who dare to support it will be subjected to public ostracism and boycott by all legal means. “Nothing to do with the anti-Polish regime in Kiev!”, will become the main slogan of every Polish nationalist.

The opposition forces in the Sejm (Kukiz’15 and PSL) will put forward an initiative to freeze diplomatic relations with Ukraine until Poroshenko or his replacement publicly repents for UPA crimes in the Volyn region, apologizes to the Polish people for the murder of innocents, and declares OUN (Ed.: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and UPA to be criminal organizations, prohibiting any glorification thereof.

All Ukrainians in Poland will have to sign a statement that the aforementioned citizen fully shares the pain and grief of the Polish people for the victims in the Volyn massacre, and that the said citizen considers OUN-UPA to be a criminal organization guilty of the deaths of a hundred or thousands of innocent Polish citizens. Without such a signed statement, no Ukrainian citizen can be employed in Poland, nor ask for asylum in Poland.”

In subsequent letters, Usovsky provides the text of the future statement for Ukrainians:

“Having organized the Discussion Club of Polish nationalists, at its plenary meetings it is necessary to adopt a joint document, the Declaration on the Ukrainian problem. It should clearly and unambiguously declare that only those Ukrainians who respect the Polish customs, Polish tradition, abide by the Polish law, can receive shelter and work in Poland. It will sound as follows: “A Ukrainian vying for favor and regard of the Polish people, and for us Poles to share our food and shelter, undertakes to acknowledge in writing that the OUN-UPA were criminal organizations, Volyn massacre was a genocide of the Polish people, and the followers of Bandera who carried it out were war criminals. Only after the signing of such a document can a Ukrainian get a job in Poland.”

The text of this statement will be as follows:“I, a citizen of Ukraine, name surname date of birth registration believe that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were criminal organizations, the Volyn massacre organized by them was a genocide of the Polish people, and the killers of Polish women, children and the elderly were war criminals. Signature, date. “

Zatulin liked Usovsky’s ideas. They discuss the details of further cooperation at their meeting, and Usovsky thanks for the payment of travel expenses.

The price tag of starting of the project is €30,000.

In February, the project starts taking shape and receiving deadlines. After talking with the Polish side on February 1, Usovsky sends the Russians an estimate for the start of the project:

Founding Conference – €5,000.2. Information support of the Discussion Club activity outside of the plenary meetings – €8,000.3. Three plenary sessions – €39,500.4. The ceremonial signing of the Declaration in Czestochowa – €21,620.

Subtotal: €74,120 (RUB 5,335,000).

Project Manager fee – RUB 500,000.

Total RUB 5,835,000.

Timeframe – 7 weeks.”

However, in parallel with the large-scale projects, small events happen across Poland, which also cost money. Traditional rallies, pro-Russian events with the participation of Polish nationalist organizations OWP and KORWiN cost just a few thousand euros.

“Evgenievich, something else for Igor Sergeyevich.On March 5, my guys from OWP together with KORWiN plan to hold a rally against the Ukrainian aggression in Donbas:Zarejestrowałem manifestację na 5-go marca w porozumieniu z Lili Mosschethovą (this is the assistant to Korwin-Mikke) a spotkamy się w najbliższą sobotę aby omówić ostatecznie wszelkie szczegóły akci.In addition, they planned to file a notice with the Warsaw city hall for protests on March 11 (Remembrance March for Volyn Massacre) and the March 18 (Russian Crimea!).It would be damn good (to maintain their morale and zeal) to support them financially a bit (banners, leaflets, sound equipment, sandwiches for participants, tea and water). All in all, this needs about €3,500-4,000.Please add this request to the previous one, about €600 for the certified translation of Molokov’s expert analysis.

Working with the members of the Polish Sejm is a bit more expensive:

“There is a real chance to push through to the Sejm the draft law about obliging all Ukrainians coming to Poland to sign an anathema against the OUN-UPA. Ryszard Czarnecki (Deputy Chairman of the European Parliament, MEP from PiS) in a conversation with Andrzej Romanchuk, chairman of the Russian Cultural Society in Bialystok, said that the Sejm leadership seriously believes the next step of the opposition (KOD and Ryszard Petru’s Nowoczesna) will be hiring Ukrainian guest workers for street protests, because Poles do not want to sign up for such a thing; the main target of recruitment are the unemployed, and they are not well-suited for the role of “street infantry”. But the ukies very much are! And if you force the ukies to sign such a paper, they will be afraid to participate in the opposition’s escapades, since the police know about them, and will deport them at the first sign of any impropriety.Additionally, there is a chance to work through the unions: they have a grudge against ukies (who undercut the wages).Altogether, the algorithm will look as follows: the executive committee of the Discussion Club will seek firms which employ ukies, and will propose to take from their employees (citizens of Ukraine) individual statements that the aforementioned Ukrainians support Poland declaring ONU-UPA to be criminal organizations, and Volyn massacre, a genocide. If the management refuses, that will be followed by a threat to put that company (shop, factory, etc.) on the list of organizations supporting Bandera and his followers in Poland. A very effective measure!In general, we need €20,000 to begin work. After that, everything will be totally fucking amazing! Ukraine will receive the full-fledged battlefront in the West, and the ukies in Poland will instantly dry up, and cease to take photos in front of the Polish monuments with flags of the Right Sector (as they do now). They won’t cease supporting Bandera, but they’ll understand that to support Bandera in Poland is a very crappy position to take, and they will cease supporting Poroshenko.In the second phase we will discuss and formulate the Declaration, iron it out, establish the executive body of the Discussion Club, and do the actual work of identifying ukies in Poland, to be followed by getting them to sign a statement about emphatic rejection of the ideology of OUN-UPA, plus work in the Sejm; all this will require approximately €120,000.”

Preparation for the communication goes through the assistants to the Sejm members:

“Here’s something my man in Warsaw wrote me. Yesterday evening, he met with the assistant to Ryszard Czarnecki (MEP from PiS, deputy chairman). The assistant said verbatim: “If you in your think-tank won’t be too obvious in holding on to Moscow’s line, it is possible that some functionaries of PiS also will join the plenary sessions.”

And here’s a communication with the supposed (?) representative of the right-wing party Kukiz’15 (35 of 460 seats in the Sejm after the 2015 election) about a possible funding scheme.

“Today, a letter came from the assistant to Paweł Kukiz. If you do not read Polish, I will explain briefly.Kukiz’15 proposes contributing to the budget of the Discussion Club not PLN 43,450 (€9,875, half of the €19,750 which they, along with KORWiN, agreed to contribute if their questions are considered), but one hundred thousand, that’s €22,700, but on condition they will form the agenda. We don’ really care about the first three questions in that agenda: the ban on GMOs in Poland, the elimination of subsidies to the Catholic Church, and the increase in the tax-exempt income for Poles. They have placed our question, the ban on expressions of russophobia in Poland, as the fourth point item; that is, on a leftover basis.This is a bad option. Our Poles will get mired in disputes with the Kukiz members on topics that we don’t care about. And we run the risk of not receiving the document we need.Therefore, I believe that the right course of action would be to follow the previously proposed plan: Kukuz’15 and KORWiN contribute half of the funds for the plenary session, €9.750, and we put one of their questions each on the list of items for discussion. But we are setting the agenda, we are writing the text of the concluding Declaration.In this situation, we save money, without compromising principles.”

Note: Alert readers pointed out to us that Adam Rynkowski, who was mentioned in the letter, writes in very poor Polish, resembling a Google translation from Russian into Polish. We checked Usovsky’s mail for mention of Mr. Rynkovski, and it turned out that in 2015 Usovsky received an email with the access credentials for the email [email protected], which at the time of writing were still active. Subsequently, Usovsky introduces Mr. Rynkovski as the person responsible for advertising on his projects.

In November 2016, Usovsky commences contact with Andrei Ivanov, who works as an assistant of the newly elected State Duma member from the Communist Party, Sergei Shargunov. He offers his cooperation on the Polish issue.

In further communication he proposes various projects, and in one of his letters he mentions Adam Rynkowski as an assistant to Paweł Kukiz, and hints at a discount in getting problems solved. Most likely, Rynkowski is a fictitious identity, created by Usovski to collect additional money from the Moscow curators, and to offer them enticing discounts, supposedly from assistants of Polish politicians. A man who does not know the Polish language, and is not a regular in the Polish political circles, is unlikely to be able to verify the authenticity of the Usovsky-Rynkowski proposals. But to persuade the Moscow curators, even such a crude scheme will do.

Hacktivists of CyberHunta also extracted the dump of Adam Rynkowski’s mailbox ([email protected]). Anyone interested can check the Polish proficiency of Mr. Usovsky-Rynkowski.

Another one of Usovsky’s projects was Czestochowa Declaration on the prohibition of russophobia in Poland. Judging from the file names, it was offered to Zatulin (United Russia party), Slutsky (LDPR), and Malofeyev (an Orthodox oligarch). On November 28, 2016, in a letter titled Montenegro VS Poland, Usovsky tells someone that he could remedy the situation for “K.V.” (Konstantin Valerievich Malofeev?) after the failure of the armed coup attempt in Montenegro.

“Lena, hello!The attached file shows what I can do in Poland, guaranteed. Legally, lawfully, and fairly quickly. Without any conspiracy, strictly in the legal field. Nevertheless, the effect of this plan will be a hundredfold greater than it would have been after the failed events in Montenegro.Seven weeks. From the moment or issuing the money, and until the information bomb explodes in the media.After that, nobody will remember KV for the failure of his Montenegrin misadventure; everyone will know him as the pacifier of Poland, and the person who made the first (and most important) step in the elimination of Polish russophobia.I’m not kidding.I really can do all this. On the specified schedule and with the specified funding.”

The grand scheme could seem a laughing matter, but in subsequent letters we find a detailed report of the expenditures under this plan. The price tag is €75,000.

In addition to the clumsy propagandist advocacy, Usovsky’s fund was preparing the so-called “soft power” events: Russian interests in Eastern Europe getting promoted under the guise of cultural exchange.

At the same time, the same Usovsky’s foundation tests the waters for a referendum on Slovakia’s exit from NATO.

Also worth noting, is that among the files obtained from Usovsky’s computer, there are two interesting documents titled: “Project Moldova is not Romania” and “Project Ukraine is not EU”. Judging by the contents, of one of the authors of the above mentioned documents is Ivan Skorikov, assistant to Konstantin Zatulin. The following are the objectives to be achieved within the framework of these projects.

Creating a community of patriotic bloggers, operating in different virtual environments, for rapid response to information and propaganda tasks aimed at defending the sovereignty of Moldova as a pro-Russian state aligned with the EAEU.

“Patriotism” in this context refers to the Moldovan political identity, as opposed to the aims of European integration and unionism. It is important to form an understanding that such an identity is inextricably linked with the image of Moldova as a Eurasian, and consequently a pro-Russian, state.

Creating a community of patriotic bloggers, operating in different virtual environments, for rapid response to information and propaganda tasks aimed at defending the pro-Russian orientation of Ukraine. It is important to create an understanding that Ukraine’s identity is inextricably linked with the image of Russia as a Eurasian state.

Conclusions: There are active pro-Russian NGOs in Eastern Europe which, under the guise of cultural, discussion and analysis platforms, monitor the situation with the aim of staging pro-Russian actions. Some of their ideas are crude and too straightforward and therefore remain only on paper and in correspondence with the client.

Some of their activities do not appear to have openly pro-Russian character. Really, what could be wrong with a film contest? However, in such a way they lure and recruit a network of pro-Russian elements in Eastern Europe. Today, it is mainly cultural influence agents; what sort of agents will they become tomorrow?

It begins with harmless pickets against the Ukrainian army’s actions in Donbas, or collection of aid for Novorossia, and then it transitions to discussions of anti-Ukrainian actions with the representatives of various political forces. It would seem that there is no risk for the domestic politics of these countries, but gradually these organizations get to communicate with the assistants of active politicians, where they are quoted specific amounts for cooperation.

And then suddenly a wave of anti-Ukrainian rallies passes through Poland, while at the same time someone in Ukraine vandalizes Polish graves, exacerbating the rift between the two friendly countries.

Usovsky and similar organizations continue to send to Moscow a steady stream of quotes for their services on destabilizing the situation in Europe. Russians are prepared to “promote the Russian world” at any cost, and, judging by the amounts discussed, they are willing to be generous.

Disclaimer:

Evidence was provided to InformNapalm on an exclusive basis by the hacktivists of the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance for analysis and processing. InformNapalm Community bears no responsibility for the sources and origin of the data.

This publication was prepared by Cyril Mefodiev

Translated by Victor Danilchenko, edited by Artem Velichko

(CC BY) Information specially prepared for InformNapalm.org site, an active link to the authors and our project is obligatory for any reprint or further use of the material.

[…] to the Kremlin’s interference in the internal affairs of Poland. In the investigation titled Kremlin is behind anti-Ukrainian protests in Poland: analysis of the hacked correspondence we presented the information about Moscow’s voluntary agent, Belarusian citizen Alexander […]

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