Bruno
KalninsThe fateful summer of 1940
From a memoir published in the monthly Briviba (Freedom), 1980

Translated by Irene Kalnins

In the summer of 1940
I lived in Helsinki, Finland. I had gone there voluntarily in 1937, unwilling
to live under a dictatorship and unable to get any kind of work. In Helsinki I
worked for two years as a press attaché at the Embassy of the Spanish Republic,
but after the end of the Spanish Civil War I was a correspondent for
Lithuania’s biggest newspaper, “Lietuvos Þinios”, and during the Winter War I
telephoned daily reports on the progress of the war. During my time at the
Spanish Embassy I had contact with the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. There I got
to know Ambassador Derevjanski, who later became Ambassador to Latvia. In 1940
he played a major role in the first Kirchenstein government, during the months
of July and August.

Observing events in Latvia from Finland

On the afternoon
of July 17 I was visiting the press attaché at the Polish Embassy in Helsinki,
N. Þaba (now an immigrant in Sweden). At that time I was the chair of the
foreign journalist corps in Finland, and we matters pertaining to that. Þaba
was called to the telephone. A few minutes later he returned to say that the
Polish Embassy had just received news – the Soviet Army had just occupied
Latvia, with the consent of the Ulmanis government!

In the next few
weeks the situation was very unclear. Moscow’s intentions were unknown. In
Finnish political circles there were differing views about Latvia’s future
fate. Vein Tanner, then a member of Finland’s government, as well as K.A.
Fagerholm, told me that Palin, the Finnish Ambassador in Riga, was unclear as
to if and how the Latvian state would continue to exist, but without a doubt it
would be a satellite of the USSR.

A few days later
the radio announced the new government appointed by Ulmanis. There were seven
Citizens (from the Citizens Party), three Communists, and also one right wing
Social Democrat (Janis Jagars). The Minister President August Kirchensteins was
a former participant in the 1905 uprising, during the independence years a
Democrat, a writer at the “Jaunakas Zinas” (Latest News), head of the Veterinary Inspector’s Office of
the Latvian Army. His brother Rudolf, an officer in the Soviet Army, was killed
in 1938 during the Stalinist terror. The Minister of War, General Roberts
Dambitis, was a member of the Farmers Union, one of the organizers of the
national army in 1918, during Ulmanis’ term for four years the Assistant Chief of Staff, and a member of
fraternity “Vendia”. After the
incorporation of Latvia into the USSR Dambitis was appointed a member of the
Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. Interior Minister Vilis Lacis was a well
known writer, who during Ulmanis’ term collaborated with Alfreds Berzins and
the Social Affairs Ministry he led,
which produced Lacis’ film, “The Fisherman’s Son”.

The
Welfare Minister Julius Lacis was one of the editors of the bourgeois newspaper
“Jaunas Zinas” (Latest News). The Social Affairs Minister was Peteris Blaus, an
officer in the Home Guard and the chief editor of “Jaunas Zinas”, an active
participant in the 1934. putsch.

The Minister of
Justice Juries Papers was a well known bourgeois politician from the province
of Latgale, a parliamentary representative from the Progressive Union and twice
a minister in bourgeois governments, also the Associate Judge of the Daugavpils
Circuit Court, who had imposed long sentences on members of the illegal Latvian
Communist Party. Paberzs was later a member of the Latvian Soviet Socialist
Republic (LSSR) Supreme Soviet. A second member of the same party, V.
Latkovskis, was appointed Assistant Minister for the Interior and chief of
staff. The conservative Agriculture Academy professor, P. Lejins, was appointed
Minister of Education. In place of K. Berzs, dismissed after the 1934 putsch,
Roberts Klavins, longtime commander of the Democratic 4th Infantry
Battalion of Valmiera, was appointed as commander of the army. He had been dismissed from service after the
Ulmanis putsch. Klavins was well known.
I served under him as a reserve officer.

There were no
communists at all in the makeup of the first government. On June 20th K. Ulmanis appointed the Kirchenstein government, but the communist Ministers
J. Vanags, K. Karlsons and A Tabaks only on July 2,3,and 4, so approximately
two weeks later. Bet they too were insignificant persons, insignificant also to
the Latvian Communist Party (LCP). In addition, Tabaks and Karlsons had joined
the communists only during Ulmanis’ term. Tabaks was a member of the student
fraternity “Zemgalia”.

K. Ulmanis
remained in office and collaborated with A. Vishinski, who together with
Ambassador Derevjanski put together the Kirchenstein government. Ulmanis
appointed the new government, opened its first session, gave a speech on June
17, emphasizing: ”I want the people of our country to look on the army units
that have come in with friendship”, and he finished the speech with the
words:”I am remaining in my place, you remain in yours”. During the next two
weeks, while I was still in Helsinki, Riga radio reported Ulmanis’ orders, with
which a number of high officials and officers were fired; the Home Guard was
disbanded, and other major changes. Ulmanis rescinded a whole lot of laws that
he himself had earlier ordered. There was no doubt, that in those circumstances
Ulmanis felt it necessary to collaborate with the Russian occupation, hoping to
stay in office in the future.

Latvia’s
ambassadors abroad also recognized the new government and followed the orders
of the Kirchensteins government (he was also Minister of the Exterior). Zarins,
Krievins, Feldmanis, Salnais, Dumanis, Tepfers and others in June and July
represented the Kirchenstein government and recognized it as legitimate. Up
until the point that the decision was made to annex Latvia to the Soviet Union,
which happened on July 21, not a single ambassador protested. Ambassador A. Bilmanis in a press release on
June 25 (No.6), which was sent to the US press and politicians, presented
glowing biographies of the new ministers, ending his overview with this
evaluation of the Kirchenstein government:

“We must clarify
the doubts emerging in the foreign press, that the new government is friendly
toward the Soviet Union, but it is not communistic in any sense of the word,
and none of the ministers is a communist.”

The old general
staff of the army, prior to its removal, also seconded Ulmanis’ optimistic
assessment of collaboration. On June 17 the Army Commander General K. Berkis
and Chief of Staff General H. Rozensteins sent an order to all commanders,
emphasizing among else:” At present there is no reason to exaggerate the nature
of events and to lose confidence. ..In any case in the pact (1939 pact between Latvia and USSR “mutual assistance”
pact) the strong principle of noninterference in our internal politics remains
in force.” This old leadership had also, on the night from June 16th
to 17th, delegated Colonel O. Udentins to sign an agreement
regarding the placement of Soviet Army Units in Latvia, that is, the military
occupation of Latvia. This agreement was ratified on June 18th by
Ulmanis’ government; after creating a special communication unit attached to
the army commander, General M. Hartmanis, who was close to the Farmers’ Party,
was appointed chief of this unit.

My return to Latvia

In this confused situation, when Ulmanis and
those who surrounded him seemed to maintain hopes for the continuation of
Latvia’s independence, I stayed on in Helsinki for the next 17 days. Nobody
invited me to return home, I had to make my own decision. A few days after the
appointment of the Kirchenstein government I called my father in Riga, who was
the Chair of Saema, Dr. Paul Kalnins, and asked about the political situation.
He said that Ulmanis’ circle was collaborating with the Russians and hoping
that Latvia would remain independent in the future. The view in the bourgeois
circles was that in the future Latvia would have the “status of Outer
Mongolia”. Democracy was not being renewed, parties were banned, including the
LCP, which still had few adherents. The social democrats were taking a wait and
see attitude, because nobody knew what would happen next. The illegal left wing
“Latvian Socialist Workers & Farmers Party” (LSWFP) in which a few left
leaning social democrats and young people were active, was disbanded, but few of them joined the
LCP. Other parties were surprised by
the Russian collaboration with Ulmanis and by the fact that they kept him in
office, while the press and meetings were attacking his regime. They were no
longer calling it a dictatorship, but a kind of “plutocratic regime”. In this
unclear situation, the fear of Nazi Germany also influenced the stance of
Latvians. Many recommended, that “its better to be under Russia”. In fact,
according to my father, everything was being run by A. Vishinsky and Ambassador
Derevjanski, whom I knew. When I asked what I should do, my father recommended
returning to Latvia “You’ll find some sort of work, you’ll be able to live somehow,
you have been away long enough as an emigrant”.

After this
conversation with my wife Maiga, who always gave her advice on my political
decisions, we decided to return home. I too hoped for the continuation of
Latvia’s independence, even if it was limited. There was also the purely
personal desire to return home after three years abroad. In addition, after the
Winter War life in Finland was becoming harder, and my friends, Finnish social
democratic politicians, advised me to return home.

On July 3 I
traveled through Tallinn to Riga. Finnish friends, including the editor of the
main social democratic newspaper, E. Kilpi, and parliamentary representative K.
Sundstrom, accompanied me to the passenger port. In Tallin I met with the
social democratic parliamentary representative Andrezen (later deported, now
back in Tallinn), who informed me about changes in Estonia and was of the
opinion that both Estonia and Latvia would remain independent states. Still, he
had no definite grounds on which to base this assessment.

On July 4 I
arrived in Latvia. Meeting me in Valka was my friend from sporting days, A .
Udris. On the train he told me about the situation, but could say nothing
definite about the future. At the Riga station I was met only by the chair of
the former independent labor unions Andrejs Veckalns and a few SSS (Social
Democrat Union) workers. I got the impression that it was not especially
advisable to be linked to me in the new situation. About my return “Jaunas Zinas” had only a few lines.

Along with my
family I settled next door to my father’s summer home in the Forest Park, on
Yachtclub Street, where V. Olav’s widow who was moving to the country gave her
apartment.

First days in Riga

During
the first three days I tried to meet with democratic politicians and get to
know their views. J. V., former secretary of the consortium of independent
unions during democratic rule told me that he had tried to resurrect unions,
but the leadership was being taken over by communists and he did not foresee
anything good. Several former social democratic representatives gathered in the
apartment of former Minister of Finance V. Bastjanis; they thought that in the
new circumstances we were faced with a fait accompli, and should do our best to
protect Latvia’s interests. They said
that Ulmanis hoped that Latvia as a state would continue to exist. Given the situation, the only option seemed
to be cooperation with the Russians.

My father took me
to a meeting of Latvian parties, which was preparing a joint slate of
candidates from democratic circles for the Saema elections, which had been
announced for June 14 and 15. It took place in the apartment of an attorney on
Marija’s street. There were about 20 well-known politicians from the bourgeois
parties, with former ministers A. Kenins, P. Berkis, V. Zamuels. There was
nobody at the meeting from the putch of May 15.

A.Vishinsky had
promised A. Kenins that the elections would be free and non-communist slates
would participate in them too. The bourgeois politicians believed it, and
readied themselves for elections in all seriousness. Besides the names already
mentioned, among the candidates was also K. Skalbe, Gen. J. Balodis, and former
Minister President H. Celmins. The platform of the bourgeois block declared a
desire for close and continuing cooperation with the Soviet Union, but at the
same time emphasized the preservation of “free, independent, democratic Latvia”.

My contacts in the leadership of the Latvian Army

On
the second day after my return I was visited already by the new army commander,
General R. Klavins, who told me that he and the new Chief of Staff Gen. Jeske
had suggested, that I should be appointed as the political leader of the army,
but the LCP Central Committee opposed this. I asked if the senior officers of
the army had grown friendlier, formerly they were conservative and not
positively disposed toward me. Klavins answered, that the situation was
drastically different now, and the generals though that I would be the best
candidate for the new position, they were pinning high hopes on me. After all,
for 15 years I was on the Saema Armed Forces committee, and knew our army.

However, Klavins
thought that his proposal would be unsuccessful because of LCP opposition. The
general also told me that the army leadership was convinced of Latvia’s
continued existence: Vishinsky had promised that to Kirchensteins, and Klavins
had heard it personally the commander of the Russian Army, Lt. Gen. Kuznecovs.
He thought that Moscow was well aware of the value of Baltic and especially
Latvian armies, they had not forgotten the contributions of Latvian divisions
in the Civil War, and it would be senseless on their part to eliminate this
army. Moscow had to reckon with a possible war against Nazi Germany. Therefore the officers were prepared for the
continuing existence of our army and wanted to remain in the service in the new
circumstances. In this atmosphere of
uncertainty and contradictions, but also hopes and illusions, I spent the first
three days after returning home at the beginning of July.

My appointment to the post of the army’s political
director

On
one of the first three days after my return to Latvia a meeting had taken place
of leading politicians. My father Dr.
Pauls Kalnins had approached them to learn their thoughts about my appointment
as the political directior of the Latvian Army. Adolfs Blodnieks, the Minister
President of the last legitimate democratic government, whom I knew since 1919
after 15 years of working together on the Constitutional Assembly and during
all four Saema’s, came to see me. He announced that the group had unanimously
expressed an opinion that I should take on the difficult task of political
leadership for the sake of the nacional army. They hoped that I would be successful
to keep our army from “being scattered all over Russia”, as he wrote in a
notarized explanation on October 7, 1949. Blodnieks announced also that Gen.
Janis Balodis, former Commander in Chief during the war for independence, held
the same views. He had also discussed it with several generals who wanted to
see me in the position of political director, and held great hopes for me. I
knew Balodis well since the 1919 war of liberation, when I served in his
brigade and formed two units of volunteers. During the years of independence,
1922-1934, I worked with him on the Saema Armed Forces committee, whose chair
Balodis was.

Then suddenly came
a telephone invitation from Ambassador Derevjanski to come see him at the
Soviet Embassy. There I was met by the ambassador, his aide, secretary and a
few more staffers. Derevjanski received me in a friendly way, he recalled our
meeting a few years ago in Helsinki and asked about mutual acquaintances in
Helsinki. Then he said that he would
like me to accept a responsible post in the new administration, especially the
political director post for the army. He said he would soon return to this
topic.

On my way back
along Freedom Boulevard I met the Estonian Ambassador in Moscow, August Reij. He was the chair of the Estonian
social democratic party, and I had met with him over long years of congresses
and visits in Tallinn. Reij told me he had just flown in from Moscow and was
flying on to Stockholm. He was very optimistic and said that the new regime
would not last long in the Baltic States, “ these guys are caliphs for an hour
only”. He hoped for intervention from other countries, and it seems also for
war.

On July 8 I had a
call from the Ministry of War and was invited to come immediately to see
Minister of War Gen. R. Dambitis in his apartment. They had looked for me earlier, but I wasn’t home. So I arrived
in the evening to see Dambitis, whom I knew since November of 1918, when he was
one of the founders of the Latvian Army. Dambitis announced that this day he
had appointed me acting political director of the army, and I must take office
without delay! So I was faced with a fait accompli, and there was no backing
out.

Thus began my
service in the Latvian Army, which lasted from July 9 until September 20. The
next morning I arrived at the staff headquarters and presented myself to the
commander, Gen. R. Klavins and the new chief of staff, Gen M. Jeske. With them
I would work daily in the coming critical weeks, and with good harmony.

Klavins was a
person with a broad view, with definitely democratic leaning, who for 8 years
had commanded the 4th Valmiera Infantry, which was loyal to the
democratic constitution; I was a reserve officer in that unit. After Ulmanis’
putsch he was removed from the army. As a pensioner he studied jurisprudence at
the university, and earned a Juris Doctor degree. Klavings was a patriotic
officer who always looked out for the interests of the army and in no sense was
a tool of the Russians.

Gen. M. Jeske had
fought in the French Army in World War I, and during the years of independence
had graduated from the French military academy. He also was known for his
strongly democratic views.

I reported to both
the army commander and the Minister of War. I had many meetings with Minister
of War R. Dambitis. He was different than the previously described generals.
Dambitis was an opportunist and very interested in material goods. In the first
months of the summer of 1940 he showed much greater submissiveness to the
occupants than Klavins and Jeske. Politically he was right wing and belonged to
the Farmers Party. With Ulmanis’ help his career had flourished during
independence, and helped him survive several unpleasant financial scandal.

Lt. Colonel R.
Osis, aide to Gen. Berzs, remained as Dambitis’ aide; Osis was later the
organizer of the police battalions during the German occupation (died in
England). Klavins appointed as his adjutant the former Lt. Col. Of the Valmiera
battalion, Gredzens (communist partisans shot him in Vidzeme in 1942).

Political officers

When
I arrived at Gen. Klavins headquarters on the morning of July 9, we discussed
the appointment of political officers and their role in the army. First the
general recommended keeping in the service and appointing as my aide A.
Kontrovskis, in charge of the training
department during the Ulmanis regime. He was one of the “Valmieras battalion”
people, and I agreed. I had no difficulty in working with him. Klavins also
expressed his wish that the appointees be men who knew the army, preferably
instructors and officers, as much as possible avoiding foreigners. “You had a
lot of good men in the Worker Sports Association”, said the general. Otherwise
he had no recommendations. Klavins also expressed worry that the LCP would be
trying to force their candidates on the army. “Try as much as possible to
appoint as few communists as possible, we are counting on you,” that is
approximately how our conversation and agreement on future work went. The
Minister of War Gen. R. Dambitis expressed little interest about political
officers.

The
legal basis for my activity was the Kirchenstein regime’s law on July 4, with
amendments on July 12, and the Minister of War’s instructions on July 5 about political officers in the army.

All
the political officers were considered on active duty and enjoyed the rights of
active duty officers. In my role I had disciplinary rights, and as part of army
governance a Culture and Propaganda Board was established, including two aides
to the army’s political director and 6 political officers.
The
political officers were intended to be only at army headquarters, at the
division and brigade level, at specific institutions. They were not appointed
to smaller units, battalions and platoons. All political officers were under
the commanders of the army units, and also under their superior political
officers.
As
the political director of the army, I reported to the Minister of War and the
army commander. All political officers were appointed and removed by the army
commander on my recommendation, and appointments came as orders of the
commander. We had no disagreements in this sphere. All together 76 political
officers were appointed. Compared with 2000 officers, their numbers were small.
Most of them were former members of “Labor Sport and Guard” workers, whom I
knew personally and could trust. There were no communists among them, although
there were several active Latvian Social Democratic Party workers.

The
LCP was very ineffectual during the first two weeks when it came to army
affairs, and did not give me any candidates for the political officer
positions. Their explanation was the
lack of appropriate candidates, because in June and July the party consisted of
only a few hundred members. Only in the middle of July the secretary of the LCP
Central Committee Spure sent me a list with names and demanded their
appointment as political officers. I did that, but sent them to the provinces.

Completely
untrue is Zagars’ assertion in his book “Socialistic transition in Latvia,
1940-1942” (Riga, 1975), that the LCP and labor unions sent the army “a whole
lot of active communists”. This untruth is repeated by LME (III: 61). Of the 6 communists, whom the LCP secretary
recommended appointing as political officers, one (I don’t recall the name)
turned out to be a provocateur, who was a spy for political unit of the party,
and was later arrested. He and other agents of the illegal communist party were
discovered by the Ulmanis’ regime security forces and the Director of the
Security Department, Fridrichsons. Among the communists sent me I recall the
current editor for foreign affairs for “Cina”, M. Vulfson (Wolf), the others
were insignificant persons.

As
my other aide I appointed one of the Arturs Zirnitis (died during the war),
assistant officer in the military police. Reserve Ltn. Pauls Lejins (deported
in June, 1941), former Saema representative and former member of the War
Department, active social democrat, became the political officer of the Vidzeme
Division and the Riga unit. A number of other political officers were members
of the Latvian Social Democrat Party, for instance, P. Grundulis, K. Kurmis, P.
Grigans, K. Zamariters etc. Reserve Ltn. Janis Bauskis (now in Upsala, Sweden)
was appointed the political officer of the Valmiera Division. The editorial staff of “Latvian Soldier”
remained unchanged, with former Valmiera division officer Captain Rudzis (now
in the US) as the chief editor.

The
duties of the political officers were determined by government edict. They
included familiarizing soldiers with the government’s laws, instructing them in
“the spirit of the democratic transition”, strengthening military discipline
and organizing a military press. Soldiers’ committees, which were begun in some
divisions in the first weeks, were subordinate to the political officers and
later had little significance.

Relationship
with the Russian Army leadership

On
the second day after my appointment, Soviet Military Attaché Col. Zavjalov came
tu see me, and invited me to visit the commander of the army of occupation,
General Ltn. Fjodor Kuznecov.

His
headquarters were in the former 4th High School, but soon moved to
the Riga People’s Palace. As it turned out, waiting for me was not only the
commander, but also the chief of headquarters General Major Aleksejev, and a
member of the War Council, who was the highest political officer in the Soviet
Army (I don’t recall the name). The first thing Kuznecov said to me was “Why
aren’t you in uniform?” Then the political discussions began, and after every
few sentences he turned to his political officer, asking officially,”War
Council member, is it right what I am saying?” It turned out that I was in a meeting of the occupation army’s War
Council, and there in the presence of all the members the commanded announced
to me the views and demands of the Red Army.

He
had no specific demands, but emphasized, that I was responsible for events in
the army, I had to look after discipline and order, and cooperation with the
Russian Army leadership. With that the meeting ended. Still, I got the
impression that this was a transitional period, after which would come harsher
conditions, of which the Russians in charge at present said nothing.

A
few days later a Russian colonel Bartasun was announced to me, and turned out
to be a border patrol officer from the Russian-Latvian border, Lithuanian by
nationality, who had fought in the Latvian Rifles in World War I. He was attached from the occupation army to
“maintain communication”. Later it turned out that he had been sent to watch
us. He did not interfere in our work.

Untrue
is the assersion of Zagars, that “great assistance to the Latvian Army
political officers was given by the Red Army senior political officer Janis
Avotins”. Actually Avotins arrived from Russia only at the end of July and
presented himself as a journalist, who might “help” with the military press. I
passed him on to the editor of “Latvian Soldier” Captain Rudzis, and knew no
more about his “great help”.

I
must mention that at that time the Russians’ behavior was determined, of
course, by A. Vishinsky, with who I met several times. I recall, a week prior
to Saema elections, the Russians had a big reception, where artists from Moscow
entertained. A full complement of our
army leadership was present too. Vishinsky made a speech, in which he clearly
declared:”We don’t need your land, we have plenty of land. Do not fear, that
Latvia will annexed by the Soviet Union. Those are only rumors, they will not
happen”. Such a categorical
announcement from the Vice Chairman of USSR government left an impression and
the generals later said, that the future did not seem lost. They all tried to
believe Vishinsky.
Kirchensteins
and Ulmanis in July

Kirchensteins
had similar hopes, when I visited him to present myself, as he had wished. He
received me in the Ministry of Exterior offices, because he also fulfilled the
functions of Minister of the Exterior. The first thing he said was that “people who have lived abroad for a while
are the most successful”, therefore I would be too. Further he emphasized, that
there was no need to worry about the continuing independence of Latvia. Vishinsky had declared that to him in the
name of Stalin. At the beginning of July Kirchensteins voiced this viewpoint in
various press releases and elsewhere. I had the impression that he believed
this. In any case he had not been informed about Moscow’s future plans. That
was confirmed for me by his personal friend from emigration times in
Switzerland, an old social democrat Varkals, who was in charge of the courier
service in the Ministry of the Exterior. Kirchensteins used to talk with him
completely openly.
I
did not get to meet with Ulmanis personally. Gen. Klavins according to law
reported appointments and removals in the army to him. At the beginning of July
he told me that surprising as it seemed, Ulmanis still seemed to think he was
in charge. He continually made it clear to one and all that the Russians
recognized him as President, and it would continue that way in the future. Another
time he told me, that Ulmanis had contributed 5000 Ls to “Red Aid”. Klavins said – “ He should not have done
that, it won’t strengthen his position”.

Klavins
related another surprising thing. When on July 20th amnesty was
declared for political prisoners, Ulmanis asked Vishinsky, did he want them to
to also free the “Swastika fashists”? Vishinsky denied that, and thanked Ulmanis for calling attention to
this. Later Vishinsky spoke very favorably about Ulmanis, and referred to him
as “gosudarstvenij muzh”, a real statesman. In connection with Ulmanis
intervention then the swastika group, among them Prof. Ernests Plakis (son of
Prof. Plakis), Fricis Kronbergs and others were held in the rock quarries in
Kalnciems and later after annexation sent to Russia, where they died.

Changes
in the Latvian Army

What
happened in the Latvian Army during my time up to the beginning of August, when
the dissolution of the army began? There were no radical changes in the
structure of the Latvian Army. Overall, everything stayed the same. The work of
the political officers actually was dealing with minor demands and complaints
of soldiers, setting disputes without difficulty in direct conversation with
the unit commanders.

There
were also no changes in the officer corps. Participants of the 1934 putsch and
some military court judges who had led political trials during the Ulmanis
regime, were relieved of duty and removed from the service. The same thing
happened with chaplains, because religious observances were no longer held. All
together 55 officers were relieved, and at that time there was no persecution
against them, and a good many were active again during the German occupation,
but a number ended up abroad after the war (for instance, Lavenieks, Colonels
Malcenieks, Pripens, etc).

Officers
who did not want to remain could request to be relieved from service. Few
wanted to do that, they all wanted to stay in the army. That was wrong, because it was precisely in
the army that they had to await the future, the repressions, when their
background was examined.

In
July and August no officers were arrested, and not a single case was brought by
the military court. However, in some cases the arrests were carried out
by the Russian security organizations (Colonel Lejins, Captain Vidins). That
happened without the knowledge of the army commander, and so we both with Gen.
Klavins went to the Soviet Embassy and protested, but unfortunately with no
result.

The
attitude among the officer corps was passivity. No protests or resistance took
place. The higher ranking officers adapted to the circumstances and hoped to
remain in the service. They had served in the Russian Army formerly, and
assumed it would be the same. There were others, who showed unexpected and
excessive submissiveness.

The
attitude was different among the younger officers and some instructors. They
had grown up in independent Latvia and prepared for an eventual defense against
a Soviet attack. They were dissatisfied with the surrender of Ulmanis’
government and did not hide their dissatisfaction with the new circumstances.
Still no confrontations occurred and the political officer reports always
repeated the same pharases: “Nothing to report”, or “the spirits of the troops
good”.

The
return of several officers was encouraged, those who during Ulmanis’
dictatorship had been removed from the army as unreliable. The former commander
Gen. M. Penikis, Chair of the military court colonel Birkensteins, Ltn.
Colones Lielbiksis, army staff Ltn. Colones Milevskis and other were among them.

This
period ended abrupty when the “People’s Saema”, elected in illegitimate
elections on July 21, voted to annex Latvia to the Soviet Union. Vishinsky
dropped his mask and revealed the true aims of the Soviets, carefully hidden
until that moment.

Even
before the convening of the illegitimately elected “Saema) Ulmanis had changed
his earlier optimism and dropped his mistaken illusions about the possibility
of a “communist-bourgeois” state. That happened after the candidate list of the
bourgeois parties was not allowed, and the organized or the list was arrested.
Now Ulmanis understood that the Russians would not keep him as President, but
he began in all seriousness to have new illusions. He imagined that the
Russians would let him leave for Switzerland. Dambitis and Klavins told me,
that Ulmanis had made this request to Vishinsky and Kirchensteins, and the
latter notified the government. The Russians and the Kirchenstein government
agreed to Ulmanis departing to Switzerland. Derevjanski ordered a passport to
be prepared for him, and gave him foreign currency in the amount of 3000
Ls. His departure was set on the
opening day of the new Saema, when he would lay down his mandate.

It
was hard to imagine, that the cautious and experienced Ulmanis could believe
such promises, but he did! However,
Ulmanis on July 21 gave up to A. Kirchensteins the office of President, but
they did not let him go to Switzerland, and took him by train to exile in
Voroshilovsk. Ulmanis had let himself be hoodwinked.

A
few days after Ulmanis deportation I had a conversation with Kirchensteins
about the reasons. I sat next to Kirchensteins at the graduation of the 14th
and last class from the War College, where 106 cadets were promoted to
lieutenants. He asked me among other
things, did I know, why Ulmanis was not allowed to go to Switzerland? When I said I did not, he told me how it all
happened. The acting director of the chancellery R. Bulsons had showed the
government previously unknown minutes from a meeting of the Cabinet on May 17,
1940. There was an order for extraordinary mandate for Ambassador Zarins,
signed by Ulmanis. This mandate was aimed against the current regime, and
therefore it was no longer possible to release Ulmanis. I personally do not think that this decided
Ulmanis fate, the Russians were not so naïve as to leave him at liberty, and
they did not leave at liberty Estonian President Pets either, although he had
given no extraordinary mandate.

Speaking
of this conversation at the War College graduation, I want to mention a memoir
of one of the participants, former cadet V. Jaunkalnietis, today printed in DVM
(Nr. 1-2). Among other things he writes about the political officers: “They did
not talk much about politics, but invited us to have sports contests, which we
had always had. They did initiate the “wall newspaper” and found it an editor,
Cadet Indans, but it was kept pretty moderate.”

When
Ulmanis left Latvia, the senior officers privately expressed their
dissatisfaction with his actions. He had judged the situation and Latvia’s
chances of remaining independent wrongly, and inexplicably forced the officers
and officials to remain in their places and not leave Latvia. The passports
have been rescinded and foreign travel forbidden. Because of that, they felt
that many people would now suffer, and a few months later that came about.

Of
course, there was a larger number of Ulmanis’ inner circle who turned and
sought to save their own skins, betraying other Ulmanis administration
people. Besides the already mentioned
Fridrichsons, who betrayed secret agents to the LCP (among them Communist Youth
Central Committee member Kurlis and others); I must also mention Riga circuit
court prosecutor A. Karcevskis, who prosecuted all political cases during Ulmanis
regime, but not offered the Kirchensteins government to prosecute Ulmanis
himself! In the Ministry of War
intelligence section one of the leaders and liason with western intelligence
services was Fridrichs Linde. One day he vanished, and appeared again in the
fall of 1940. He had contacted Soviet Army intelligence and been taken to
Moscow, where he spilled all his secret information and then was hired on with
Soviet intelligence. He returned to Riga in a fancy personal auto, and when
friends asked how he was, explained – “better than ever”. He said he was
working in his old profession and earning big money.

The
visit of the Swedish military attaché

Around
this time in the middle of July I was visited by Ltn. Colonel Karl Almgren, military attaché to army
headquarters. Our conversation was in
Swedish, because I knew this language since high school days in Helsinki during
World War I. Almgren was critical of the one-party elections and asked me, what
would happen next?

I
explained the real situation and worries that the new “Saema” would vote to
annex Latvia to the Soviet Union. I said, that the army commander and I were
trying to save the army, but that in fact we were under Russian power and could
do less and less. I asked Almgren to inform Swedish Minister President Per
Albin Hanson and Social Minister Gustav Meller, whom I knew personally, about
our hopeless situation. Almgren
promised to do it without delay. After the war I found out that he had done it.
In later years Almgren had a notable career
in the Swedish Army and in the 70’s was the army commander. Now he is retired.
Change at the headquarters of the
occupation army

A
few days after the convening of the “Saema” on July 21, in which “Soviet power”
was proclaimed in Latvia as well as its joining the Soviet Union, there was a
sudden change in the headquarters of the occupation forces. The commander, Ltn.
Gen. F, Kuznecovs, his chiev of staff Maj. Gen. Aleksejevs, the entire war
council and staff left Riga in great haste and secrecy. The Latvian Army, which still remained as a
separate formation in its old configuration, did not receive any explanations,
and Gen. Klavins said that nobody had even said goodbye to him.

In
place of the recalled staff new Russian generals soon arrived. Now it was
revealed that after annexation the army of occupation was to become the Soviet
Union’s separate Baltic Military District, which would include Russian armed
forces in all 3 Baltic States. Soon Klavins received notice, that the commander
appointed for the new military district was Lt. Col. Aleksandr Dmitrijevich
Loktionov.

He
had been a noncommissioned officer in the Czar’s army, participated in the
Civil War as a Red Army battalion, division and brigade commander and
commissar, but after the was he was a
division and corps commander. After the arrest of Alksnis in 1937, Loktionov was appointed in his place as
commander of all air forces. From this
post, at age 48, he was sent to Riga in the fall of 1940 and appointed as
commander of the military district.

Loktionov
also was to rule about the future status of the Latvian Army, a matter of which
the army leadership was completely in the dark. All through August the Latvian
Army continued unchanged in its previous formation. The changes then came gradually, and in fact over September and
October. A struggle took place over the
fate of the Latvian Army, in which the commander and I tried for the last time
to save what we could.
Lost
positions

The
next time period included the last days of July, August, and September. During
this time the Latvian Army still remained in its old formation and was led by
officers who had been appointed to their commands during independence. However, the army’s gradual liquidation was
already taking place, side by side with changes in the state’s operations. The
illegitimate annexation of Latvia into the Soviet Union was in fact concluded
only in the beginning of October 1940.

The
army experienced great uncertainty about the future. Various stories abounded,
which for the most part turned out to be untrue. It seems that even in Moscow
the final decisions had not been made yet, and various proposals existed as to
what to do with the armies of the three Baltic States. Still, it was foolish to
think, as some of our generals at that time did, that prolonged discussions
about this question took place in Moscow. With Stalin’s total dictatorial power
at that time, such questions could be decided only by Stalin himself.

Even
right after the act of annexation on July 21st, the leadership of
the LCP tried to get me out of the post of Chief Political Officer. From the Communist ranks came word that
Spure in the name of the Central Committee asked Vishinsky to finally get me
out of the post of Chief Political Officer, inasmuch as I was a Social Democrat
who had fought the Communists for years. In connection with this I was called to the Soviet Embassy. Vishinsky
and Derevjanski awaited me. They informed me of the LCP CK demand, at the same
time explaining that this question was “settled”. They had refused the party’s
demands. That might cause unnecessary unrest in the army. However, Vishinsky
stressed that now after annexation the role of the LCP in internal affairs
would continue to grow. He smiled, and said something like:”In the usual Soviet
practice, you (as holder of that post) should be not only a party member, but
at least a central committee member”. That seemed to be an indication that the
demands of the LCP had a basis.

After
this conversation, CK Secretary Spure called me and explained, that they no
longer demanded my removal, because all the blame for the faults of Social
Democrats could not be laid on one man. After what had taken place, I knew my days were numbered, and I could
stay in my post only until the liquidation of the army. That did not sadden me,
for the political game was lost, and I had never had a thought about entering
the Red Army service.

Gen.
Klavins thought otherwise, He was very concerned about my situation. He thought
that we were facing an important duty. Both of us had to try to save the
Latvian Army from being scattered all over Russia.

He
thought that the Latvian political officers and I would be removed. Loktionov had told him about this plan. The
Latvian Army was to be moved from Latvia to the Turkestan Military District in
the steppes of Asia. It would be dangerous to keep a politically unreliable
army in a border district, according to Loktionov.

We
decided to bet everything on one last card, and appeal to Stalin himself.
Klavins got in touch with Gen. Dambitis (the Minister of War). The latter had
his secretary Col. Kaneps without delay go to historian Professor Arveds Svabe
and ask him to write an appeal to Stalin, arguing mainly historical facts. He was to stress the Latvian Riflemen and
their role in the Russian Civil War in 1918-20. Klavins thought, that Russia’a
dictator would not have forgotten the Riflemen. That might influence him in the critical 1940 events of Word War
II to not destroy such a valuable military unit, as at that time our army
undoubtedly was.

The
documents were written without delay. Klavins planned to give it to Vishinsky
as he was leaving for Moscow. The final document was ready only a few hours
before Vishinsky’s train was to leave. I don’t recall the date for sure, but it
was a few days after the so-called “People’s Saema” , which concluded on July
23.

After
Vishinsky left, we remained uncertain as to what Stalin’s reaction would be. An
ominous sign was the position of Loktionov, who par in favor of sending our
army to Turkestan. In the army headquarters the usual routine went on. On July
30th a 20-person delegation from the “Saema” left for Moscow, Gen.
Dambitis among them.

We
hoped for some clarification on the delegation’s return. However, on August 13
when the delegation returned, even Gen. Dambitis was unable to give us any
definite answer about the future fate of the Latvian Army.

The
army’s fate finally was settled only in mid- August. Loktionov notified
Klavins, that the Latvian Army would not be sent to Turkestan, bet it would be
transferred into the Baltic Military District, renaming it the 24th.
Territorial Latvian Riflemen Corps. The corps was made up of the 181st
and 183rd divisions, as well as several technical units. A few days
later, on August 24 – 26 th, the Council of Ministers was renamed the People’s
Council of Commissars (PCC) with V. Lacis as chair, but the President was
replaced by a Supreme Council Presidium with Kirchensteins as head. The “Saema” was renamed after the Russian
fashion the Supreme Council. The PCC
hastily legalized the liquidation of the Latvian Army, deciding to make it the
Red Army 24th Corps.

With
that, Klavins and I had succeeded in stopping the sending of out army to
Turkestan. That was an important achievement! The corps remained in Latvia’s
territory, and at the start of the Russian-German war in 1941 it fell apart.
Most of the soldiers deserted, and the majority were able to return to their
homes. What had influenced Stalin to
accept our appeal and refuse the option presented by the Soviet Army Staff,
that we still have no way of knowing. In any case, we achieved our goal.
Klavins was very satisfied, and said: ”Kalnins, we saved the army after all!”
Satisfaction reigned in the army too, especially among officers.

I
had a chance to personally see that on a visit to the 3rd Jelgava
Infantry, stationed in Jelgava, and announce that the army was not going to
Turkestan and was staying in Latvia. The news was also published in “Latvian
Soldier”.
The
Turkestan project was known to many army officers. It was also discussed in the
intellectual circles. Turkestan was a global term for the Russian Central Asia
– five republics of Turkish peoples (Kazachstan, Khirgiziya, Uzbekistan,
Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan). Many Latvian’s were deported to Turkestan
during Stalin’s rule. If the Latvian Army were moved to such a far and foreign
place, it would be completely isolated from Latvia. In the Soviet Army leaves
are rare, and letters are censured. In Latvia there would be practically no
news of what was happening to our soldiers in Turkestan. It can be assumed that the army would be
divided into small units and scattered all over the wastes of Turkestan. Arrests could be carried out in secret –
nothing would be known of them in Latvia. The matter revolved around preserving our vital force. Everything
possible had to be done, to save our more than 20,000 soldiers.

The
final act

Four
weeks were left before the transformation of the Latvian Army into a
corps. It was not until September 20th
that Minister of War Dambitis, with Order #21, ended the political officer
institution and with October 1st removed from active duty the all
the Latvian political officers. Paul Lejins (former independence era Saema
representative) were ordered to report to the Ministry of War Sekretatiat
“until further notice”, until we found another post. On October 18th
of 1940 Dambitis removed the two of us. With Oder #1739 it was communicated to
the chief political officer of the Baltic Military District, Damanin. On
October 9 the post of army commandy was ended. For a few more months the
commission to liquidate the army continued to work, under Dambitis. Mainly it
dealt with logistical details. The formal transition into a Red Army Corps was
concluded only on February 23 of 1941, when all the formalities were complete
and the soldiers gave the loyalty oath to the Red Army.

It
is characteristic that the liquidation began with the replacement of Latvian
political officers. They were all replaced with Russians. They came from
various parts of the Soviet Red Army and they did not know Latvian. Now
political officers were appointed even to the smaller units. The assertion of E. Zagars in LME, that
“some of the political officers became political officers in the Red Army”, is
untrue. They were all removed, including the few Latvian communists. Not a
single Latvian was retained in the Red Army. The leadership of the occupation
feared that the incorporation of the Latvian Army into the Red Army could cause
some resistance, and therefore they did not trust the Latvian political
officers. The one exception is the current foreign correspondent for “Cina”, M.
Vulfson (Wolf), bet he was not really Latvian, and he was kept on the “Latvian Soldier” (already renamed “The Red
Soldier”) editorial staff.

There
followed the dismissal of 730 officers. That was done by the Baltic Military
District staff according to their own views. Some were dismissed because in the Red Army corps there were no
equivalent ranks (for example, Court Martial Board, several technical boards);
probably the Russians had political objections against the rest. No recommendations were asked for, from
either the Latvian Army commander or myself. We heard about the changes only
after the fact.

When
I went to the Citadel to say farewell to Gen. Klavins, he explained that he had
been appointed as corps commander with the Russian rank of Lt. General. For his
chief of staff they had appointed Col. Udentins, who was also promoted to Major
General. With irony he pointed out that
the officers known for their democratic views, whom Ulmanis removed after the
1934 putsch, were not moved to the Red Army. However, the Farmers’ Party
adherents and the adherents of A. Berg’s conservative party were assigned to
the Red Army, and none of them refused. That was done, however, by the democratically oriented Gen. M.
Jeske. “So you see, my chief of staff
will be the former conservative Udentins, and in charge of the auto pool and
tanks will be the Nacional Club member, Gen. Grosbart,” exclaimed Klavins. We
parted with warmth. The general clasped my hand and said darkly: ”You were my
support in hard times, from whom I could always get political advice. Now comes
Russian Commissar Smirnov, whom I do not trust at all.”. The general added some words about the
fateful summer months. He thought that we had done what we could to preserve
our army. Nobody could say that we had not done our duty; that was his view.

So
ended my work in the Latvian Army in 1940. Today in the diaspora, looking at my
work during this critical period, sharp criticism is often expressed. However, those judging look at things from
today’s circumstances, which differed greatly from the actual situation in 1940.
When the two forces hostile to us came to an understanding, and Hitler betrayed
Latvia to the Soviet Union, we were faced with a fait accompli. Ulmanis had
agreed to the occupation of Latvia, in the false hope in the continuing of
Latvian independence. The majority of the Latvian people thought that an
occupation by Hitler would be a much greater evil than a Soviet occupation. In
some cases our politicians and parties found it justified cooperating with the
new regime, in order to do all that was possible for Latvia. That was also the view of the Latvian Army
leadership, which asked me to become the Chief Political Officer. Undeniably I
was able to achieve some results, saving our army from being sent abroad. None
of those who have attached me in the émigré press after the war can name a single
Latvian politician, who at that time would have recommended withholding any
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Latvia’s ambassadors abroad up to July 21st recognized the
Kirchenstein government as legitimate. Their protests (and not all of them protested) came only after July 21st,
when Latvia was annexed to the Soviet Union.

Blaming
me personally now for what, in June and July of 1940, Ulmanis, his government,
party leaders, ambassadors and senior army officers accepted as inescapable is
factually incorrect and historically baseless.

The
future fate of some persons

What
happened further with the participants in the events of 1940?
Gen.
Roberts Klavins commanded the corps until June of 1941. I met him for the last time in May, when he
came to my place in Meza Parks late one evening, dressed in civilian clothes.
The general was very somber and asked for advice on what to do. The situation
in the corps was getting worse, some officers had been arrested, and his
protests were ignored. A Russian general had been appointed his aide. Now he
wanted to leave the service in the Red Army and take retirement. We talked it
over and concluded, that his resignation could be used as justification to
arrest him. That happened soon enough, in any case. In June the corps senior
officers were sent to Russia on the pretext of courses; there they were
arrested and sent to Norilsk in the far North. There they were imprisoned in a
concentration camp, where he died in 1944 at the age of 59.

Gen.
R. Dambitis, on the retreat of the Red Army in 1941, did not follow the
Russians, but went to Trikata and at his country home waited for arrest. I
spent 5 months with him in the Riga Central Prison. We had a chance to
communicate. In 1942 Dambitis was taken to Berlin by the Gestapo, and
imprisoned in Sachenhausen concentration camp. After the war he returned to
Latvia and lived in Trikata, since 1948 he is retired. He died in 1957. His
daughter lives in the US. His fate after the war was incorrectly portrayed in
LE. It was mentioned there that he died
in a concentration camp. The Finnish historian S. Milliniemi likewise
mistakenly asserts, that Dambitis shot himself in 1940, while he was still
Minister of War! (S.Myllyniemi, Die
baltische Krise 1938-1941, Stuttgart 1979).

General
Otto Udentins was posted to Moscow in June of 1941, where he was first an
auditor and later an instructor at the General Staff Academy. From 1948 to 1956 he led the military
science department at the University of Latvia. Since 1956 he is a personal
pensioner (for special merit) in Riga. A few times he has spoken on Riga radio.

Gen.
Otto Grosbart was assistant
quartermaster for the 24th corps. When the German army marched into
Latvia, he offered his cooperation with German occupation forced, but he was
arrested and imprisoned in the Central Prison. Later he was sent to live in
Northern Latvia. After the war he taught at the university. At the end of 1944
his mistress shot him.

General
M. Jeske after his dismissal from the army lived in the country. He was deported
in June of 1941 and died in the concentration camp.

Lt.
Col. Aleksandr Loktionov was arrested
and shot during the early days of the war. Probably that was because of the
failures of the army he led. In 1963
“Krasnaja Zvezda” (Red Star) on August 11th wrote, that he had
“fallen victim to lies and abuses” which dominates during the “cult of
personality”. He was replaced once again by General F. Kuznecov.

The
author of this memoir after dismissal from the army worked at the university,
where on Prof. K. Disler’s recommendation I was appointed docent in
international and state law. The
frequent evil-minded assertions, that I was a lector or even the head of the
department of Marxism-Leninism, are lies. This department was chaired by the “granddad” and Professor of
Marxism-Leninism, V. Miske, who was sent from Russia. Likewise untrue are the
assertions that I was a LCP member. Unfortunately such gossip is being repeated
by historian E. Andersons (DVM, 1980/6), who writes: “ In the early enthusiasm
he even tried to join the Communist Party”, but the following year he was
“forced to hide out”. Likewise a fantasy is his assertion that I was expelled
from Latvia in 1937. I left Latvia at
that time of my own free will, because I did not want to live under a
dictatorship. My work at the university ended in June of 1941, when I was let
go. The university rector’s motivation was that “in the Soviet Union members of
minority parties have no place as teachers in higher education”. I spent the last week before the war with
relatives in Vidzeme. to: Crimes Against Humanity