First, the good news. Congress did not approve the Pentagon request that would have allowed it to go ahead with the project and there are people in Congress who are skeptical of the idea. The bad news is that the concept is still very much alive, fairly popular in some quarters, and the DoD got money to study the concept further. I'm sure they will come back for more.

There are many problems with the “prompt global strike” concept (Ted Postol made some very good points about feasibility of the plan), but I will talk primarily about the risks associated with the plan that mixes nuclear and conventionally-armed missiles on the same submarines. Of course, we can hope that in normal circumstances no one would mistake a single Trident missile (why does it have to be a single missile, by the way?) that would be launched to “promptly strike a target of opportunity” for a beginning of a full-scale nuclear attack. Or maybe they would. The reality is that we don’t really know that, just as we don’t know in what circumstances this kind of launch may occur and how “normal” they might be. One thing is clear, though – deployment of conventionally-armed missiles alongside with nuclear ones can only increase the probability of misunderstanding or misinterpretation.

When asked about the risks, proponents of the Trident conventionalization present a sort of a multilayered defense in support of the idea. The arguments that are supposed to address the risk issue go roughly like that:

“The Russians won't see the missile”

“If they see it, they will be able to determine that the missile is not coming their way”

“We will notify them”

“Even if everything fails, the Russians will not do anything because they know that we are not after them.”

Let's take a look at these arguments. First, “Russia won't see it”. The idea here, as I understand it, is that since the Russian early-warning system does not have global coverage, Russia would not even know that a missile was launched, let alone mistake it for anything. Well, not necessarily. While the Russian early-warning system is quite far from its prime, it appears that it's not dead either. The Cosmos-2379 satellite, deployed in geosynchronous orbit, appears to have the capability to detect SLBM launches from North Atlantic (in my recent article I have a map that shows potential coverage provided by this satellite). Apparently, STARTCOM has been thinking about moving submarine patrol area to the Indian Ocean (out of sight of the Russian satellites and radars or just closer to potential targets?), but this may prove to be only a short-term solution. Russia has been paying more attention to its space-based early-warning system recently and it is quite likely that the plans to deploy the second-generation US-KMO satellites will materialize at some point. This won't happen this year or the next year, but if we are thinking longer term, it is certainly a possibility.

As for “they will determine that the missile is not coming their way” argument, I don’t find it convincing. This certainly requires some additional analysis, but it is clear that a trajectory of a missile can be determined with limited accuracy, especially at the early stages of flight and especially from space. The accuracy can be improved, but it takes time. Besides, given that some “prompt global strike” missiles can aim at targets fairly close to Russian borders, it is not clear if that determination can be reliably made.

Now the notifications. The problem here is that the only notification mechanism that Russia and the United States have today is singularly unsuitable to the prompt-strike scenarios. The 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement requires 24-hour notification of an upcoming launch, which doesn't fit into the 60-minute “prompt strike” timeline. Of course, that agreement, which was folded into the START I Treaty in 1991, could expire with the treaty in 2009, but this only means that we will have no notification arrangement at all. If it doesn’t expire, it would have to be modified beyond recognition to allow for the notification required by the global strike.

Another arrangement, the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), which could potentially provide the United States and Russia with the capability to notify each other on a very short notice, is showing no signs of life, despite General Cartwright’s apparent belief to the contrary. But even if it were, it is not clear if JDEC is the right arrangement for this kind of job – putting too much faith in it may in fact increase the probability of an accident (I try to develop this argument in my “accidental launch” article).

As a bit of a good news, General Cartwright apparently discussed the matter with General Baluyevski, the Chief of Russian General Staff (at least this is what he tells Congress). But we are yet to see anything emerging from these discussions. Besides, there is a serious problem there – the kind of measures that would be necessary to find an adequate solution to the notification problem might be far beyond of what is possible today in the U.S.-Russian relations.

Which brings us to the last point – whether Russia would believe, of only for a brief moment, that the United States might attack it. Normally, the answer is no. After all, the cold war has been long over and there has been no shortage of declarations of partnership between Russia and the United States. However, we should not overestimate the ability of the militaries to change and to adjust their operational practices and plans to the new realities. The strategic weapon systems that they operate were build with cold-war missions in mind and it is only natural that they impose cold-war thinking on their operators.

Here are some examples. One of the fighter pilots who were scrambled into the air on September 11, 2001 was reported to testify that

“I reverted to the Russian threat – I'm thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us.”

If on September 10, 2001 someone would suggest that a U.S. pilot would assume that Russia might attack the United States, that person would have been laughed out of the room. But this is exactly what happened. Two more “coincidences” of that day – NORAD was scheduled to conduct an exercise, known as Vigilant Guardian, “which postulated a bomber attack from the former Soviet Union” (look for Note 116 in the 9-11 Commission Report), while Russian strategic bombers were indeed conducting an exercise that involved flights in the direction of the United States. As far as we know, NORAD never began the exercise that day and the Russian military grounded the bombers as soon as they learned about the events in the United States, but the number of coincidences is quite alarming.

Not that there are any signs that the military on both sides have changed their plans and no longer practice attacking each other. Just recently Russia conducted a large-scale exercise of its strategic bombers, in which they got close enough to the United States to be intercepted by NORAD fighter planes. The United States also routinely conduct exercises that involve a nuclear exchange with Russia. One of these, Vigilant Shield 07, described by Bill Arkin in his Early Warning blog just yesterday, has steps like these in its scenario (Ruebek is Russia):

Bill Arkin rightly points out that these scenarios (see also an earlier one in which Russia was Slomonia) have very little to do with the reality. But they help keep alive the idea that a nuclear exchange (even if a “limited” one) between Russia and the United States is possible. Unfortunately, ideas like this are likely to be around for a while – the inertia of the system is enormous.

It is true that the United States and Russia have made significant progress in overcoming the inertia of the cold war mentality. But this process has slowed down in the last few years and even shows signs of being reversed. The United States has grown indifferent to Russia, believing that it’s no longer a problem, while Russia is becoming increasingly suspicious (and sometimes paranoid) about U.S. intentions and policies. This is not a healthy situation, which is largely a result of the slow disappearance of the network of contacts and cooperative programs between Russia and the United States. Some programs are still holding on, but the cooperation field is shrinking in almost all areas. It is not hard to guess what will take its place if this filed is allowed to disappear completely – the “limited strategic attack scenarios”.

The bottom line, I guess, is that it’s not that Russia and the United States should check their every step to see if its fits into a cold war-type deterrence relationship. Certainly not. This would be a sure way to get locked in that kind of relationship for a long time. But I believe it is dangerous to simply dismiss the machinery of strategic nuclear forces that was built during the cold war as if it is not there. Which, unfortunately, is exactly what the “prompt global strike” proposal does.

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Comments

Hello,

how useful is it in a miltary way to use such an expensive weapon for a conventional strike? I guess a conventional MIRV has the yield of maybe a 500kg bomb and a CEP of 100 m (using the data of the actual W-88). Thats quiet bad for a 23 Mio USD missile.
So beneath the problems such a weapon system creats described by Pavel above, I doubt the sense of that at all.

It has been published in various American defense circles that GPS accuracy is the goal of the American ICBM force. An updated conventional weapon Trident has been selected for this upgrade, in place of, say, a 36 year-old existing Minuteman III missile because the Trident system is the only American ICBM still being manufactured. The system has been tested by Lockheed and “validated” but I have no real clue that that means in practical terms. I would strongly suggest this weapon system will go forward. Whether the launch vehicle will be an operational Trident nuclear submarine or a harden silo at Vanderburgh Air Force Base remains to be seen.

I wouldnßt only concerned about the russian reaction on such a launch (although this is a blog about russian forces), but also on the Chinese. I think they are more suspicious about the US than the russians, and two or three Tridents would be able to kill the whole chinese ICBM force. So its not unlikely that they will be much more concerned about such a launch than russia and that they react on it (if they can detect it).

Arming strategic ICBM with conventional warhead is a serious matter indeed. If we consider the real perspective it is just clear that there is no need to do so. ICBM isn’t needed to destroy terrorist dens in distant parts of the world. American conventional weaponry system could be reached any part of the world.

Concern of Russia should be addressed very first. Other parties such as China should also be taken into confidence before taking any real decision. Accidental launch of ICBM is also a grave concern. Some kind of misunderstanding and misinformation could cause serious consequences. The US defense official should understand the ground reality and act accordingly. Strategic arms should be used for strategic war, not for conventional war

Word out of the US Department of Energy is that the W-76 warhead that is undergoing update & configuration remanufacturing is to be GPS “capable”. (I not exactly sure what that means) The nominal warhead yield is being reduced from 100kts to 60kts because of additional warhead shielding (hardening) and the perception the warheads will have far increased accuracy. Reports are the Lockheed contractors, overseeing these “GPS tests”, have been stunned by the accuracy. From this work on the new W76/Tridant came the birth of the conventional Trident project. How you can get a MIRV payload traveling at 25,000km/h to hit a target on the other side of the world with an accuracy of only meters is beyond my understanding.

While the US Military can indeed conventionally attack any part of the world, it would be done with conditions that are now deemed unsatisfactory in the current “War Against Terror”. The B-2 bomber could hit any target in the world with a 24 hour mission package (target planning and flight time) but only at night. A US Navy ship or submarine could launch a Tomahawk cruise missile if you had such an asset in theater or a B-52 bomber could be used to launch a CALCM but you are probably talking about a 48 hour cycle to plan the mission, program the cruise missile, get the launch platform in range, and flight time of the cruise missile itself. However, a conventional Trident launch could cover the globe with an hour mission package, thirty minutes to “plan” the mission and a 30 minute flight time to target. It is that capacity the Pentagon wants.

I do not think that Global Strike dismisses the problems associated with the presence of nuclear forces. It simply part of a new US posture, at the core of which lies the assumption that the defeat of terrorism is an absolute priority and no obstacles should exist for this campaign.
Existing platforms do not have the reaction time, resistance to interception or unlimited range of the Trident. For example, an IRBM being readied for launch deep inside a country such as Iran could be photographed by sattellites, but be impossible to attack at short notice by anything other than a Trident. What Russia thinks about this is of no relevance, as long as she does not propose immediate and permanent solutions to such problems.

“further alienate itself through its arrogance” from whom? It seems to me America is pretty much out there on its own, now. Our obligation is to defend our country from enemies near and far. Here is the central issue; the United States does not fear Russia. Within certain reason, we are no more concerned about Russian nuclear ambitions than we are the French. The Cold War is over. Most Americans are far more excited to be able to openly travel to St. Petersburg and visit the Hermitage Museum than worrying about the old soviet past.

The "nuclear war thing" does not concern me, because Russia does not have a choice. It will have to live with Global Strike.
The GS concept is very relevant today, as I agree with Mr. Wolfson in regarding war with Iran as certain. Additionally, conflicts with other rogue nations which posess IRBMs armed with WMD are likely in the future. Therefore, conentional Trident is a necessary capability.

Well, the concept of “rogue nations” is relative to who claim it. I’m pretty sure that USA is a "rogue state" for most Muslims people. Anyway, launching a conventional D-5 to an Iranian missile test is mad.
Remember, Iran have a limited but non-zero asymmetric retaliation capability. Surely westerners economies will feel the consequences of a bragging-out by testing conventional D-5 on Iran. It will do little damage to its military muscle and will expose occupiers in Iraq to an even worse than today scenario.
Anyway, if USA want a conventional SLBM it will have it, regardless international opinion and treaties. She’s pattern is consistent and no surprising in any way.

An Iranian IRBM aimed at the US would be laughable since it would simply fall into the ocean because of lack of range.

It is true that the US has acted the last 15 years like it doesn't care what Russia thinks. It worked because Russia was tremendously weak then. Now its finally starting to recover. Russia could say since the US doesn't care about Russia's concerns, Russia doesn't care about the US's concerns. So the nuclear reactor in Iran will go ahead. Russia will sell Iran, Venezuela, Syria, China and other anti-US regime any weapon system it wants.

What will war with Iran will be like if they were equipped with the best Russian SAM systems? Perhaps they will give Iran the AT-14 and RPG-29 that worked so well against Isreali tanks in Lebanon? Perhaps they will sell the latest shoulder-launched SAMs and the Iraqi insurgents will no longer have to rely on 30-year old SA-7s?

How can we expect to win the War on Terror or in fact accomplish anything, if the US is alone in the world? So, you see, it does matter what Russia and other countries think.

War with Iran is certain because she does not intend to verifiably curtail the development of nuclear weapons. Since Israel can be destroyed by a nuclear attack (although not a single warhead), she will plan to take pre-emptive action. This will most likely take the form of a limited nuclear strike directed at the core Iranian nuclear sites. The US cannot influence the Israeli position, as Israel rules out restraint when its survival is concerned. The use of nuclear weapons by Israel would have an extremely adverse and permanent impact on world stability, so it must be prevented.
The only choice left to the US is to attack instead of Israel, thus making the use of nuclear weapons unnecessary. Effectively, the policies of the three presidents preceeding Bush are now forcing Israel, and by extension the US, to commence hostilities.
There is a third possibility, that of non-nuclear Israeli strikes, which will not prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. This option is seen as catastrophic by everyone, so it does not present the administration with an alternative.

Well James, that’s the key: If USA want to have conventional D-5, go ahead. Russia will find the way to exploit this (may be deploying IRBM) in the same way it exploited the US withdrawal of the ABM treaty (by retaining heavy RS-20 and terminating STAT II in order to MIRV some ICBM). But the launch of several conventional D-5 will do little or no damage to the Iranian buried nuclear infrastructure. Simply, it will not work and probably will unleash undesired consequences.

How does Russia selling Iraqi insurgents the latest shoulder-launched SAMs make Russia safer? The international arms bazaar would only funnel these same weapons back to Chechnya. AT-14s and RPG-29s? How long before Russian T-90 tanks faced these same weapons? I think Russia and the United States do respect each other; accepting at times we share different interest and goals. The only weapon Russia has agreed to supply Venezuela with that has raised a legitimate issue with the United States is 100,000 Kalashnikov’s and a factory to make more. That concerns America.

While I understand your thought process, I completely disagree on your conclusions. I think a shooting war with Iran is both impractical and counter productive to the cause. What does Iran want? Some kind of international respect that really is only understood in Tehran. She is attempting to build that respect on the back of nuclear weapons. Persia wants what she has wanted from the time of Alexander, regional power and control of commerce between Europe and the great expanses of Asia. How is Iran paying for all this ambition? Oil. Take the oil away from Iran and the “emperor wears no clothes”. Control the oil; control the ambition. Block the Straits of Hormuz to Iranian oil. That is the fulcrum and lever to deal with this situation. Russia would be publicly supportive of Iran and privately pleased to realize her oil revenue would double-treble in value. The incredible level of pressure the EU, Japan, India, and China would have on Iran to “end this nuclear crisis” would be interesting to follow. Somewhere in all the pragmatic diplomacy to follow, a solution would be found.

Russia can gain nothing through an "assymetric" reply to GS. The SS-18 example is instructive in this connection - these missiles are vulnerable and will in any case be phased out of service in the medium term.
Iran's ambitions are even less relevant than Russia's. Israel will not tolerate even the theoretical possibility of a second Holocaust. Instituting extremely strict sanctions against Iran immediately after August 31 was the international community's last chance to convince Israel that her existence would not be called into doubt.
The administration knows by now that there will be no meaningful sanctions and Israel is preparing all options, including the nuclear one. Hence the only question is whether it will be Israel or the US attacking Iran.
War with Iran will be difficult, but it is practical. The policy shift being made now involves defining the goal as "regime attrittion" rather than "regime change". In practice this will involve the destruction of government facilities concurrently with nuclear ones, downgrading the regime's ability to control the population and lengthening the recovery period. This is essentially similar to what Israel did in Lebanon and success rests on making it clear that the US is prepared to bomb as long as necessary and repeat the bombing in the future.

James, many would argue that the United States has been at war with Iran since November 4th, 1979. I'm not referring to the "inevitability of war" with the Persians but winning such a war. As Napoleon would say, find the center, attack. Oil is the Iranian center.

The US has not been at war with Iran, because it has not used armed force against that country. Because decisive military or political action was not taken, Iran is now in a position to develop nuclear weapons.
The only two ways to curtail this development were massive military action or extremely stringent sanctions. Due to the deliberate and premediated hostility of Russia and China, as well as the irresponsibility of the EU, effective sanctions are impossible. Therefore, the oil issue is only relevant insofar as Iran will attempt to use its share of supplies and presence in the Hormuz strait to disupt markets.

Direct one on one talks with the US and Iran without non-starters in a private setting is the way. Tell Israel to stand down and settle her own internal political house, i.e. Olmert and Katsav's domestic and personal problems, etc. and (post political turmoil in Israel following the recent conflict in Lebanon, which many Israelis still view as a failure). There is a lot to talk about with Iran if the US keeps an open mind, like the rebuilding of Iraq into a stable state, the easing of Shiite Sectarian strife there and security matters in the Hormuz - but it won't happen with this White House's current state of siege mentality. Russia is now the number one exporter of arms to the world again and will remain so while rebuilding its military - the US needs to begin to respect that again ... instead of undermining Russian interests. We wanted Capitalism instead of Communism and now we have it big time from Moscow to Vladivostok - so stop telling Putin and Ivanov and ask them instead, that is the key to global cooperation between the two largest nuclear powers - not the `double-standards' the US currently expects the rest of the world to maintain for its own benefit!

I am not sure what is the main base for JC's arguments accept contuned repetition of the same assertion. First of all, when Russian continues to develop its anti ABM missile potential, this not only will perpetuate its special relationship vis-a-vis the US (the ability to destroy US, that is), but give it a strong strategic ace in future relations with China, since the latter will have to rely o Russian technology if they want to be able to feel confident their ICBMs can fly past US defenses. Russia's other response is to put cruise missiles with ranges beyond 3,000 km...in the late 1980s, USSR developed 4,000-4,500 km range cruise missiles that can attack the US from non-strategic submarines. Whatever bravado rhetoric somebody might use - let's sober up and look at Iraq, didn't Putin say it was a mistake, a few weeks before the invasion? Of course that was irrelevant as well, I guess - increased insecurity in Russia only puts the US mainland at a greater risk. When Russia arms its formerly nuclear missiles -as it has began doing with some ALCMs - and uses them against its own rouge states, how will the US feel about that? It has already appeared ineffective in the Ukraine gas crisis and sanctions against Georgia. When Russia begins to reply to US space weaponizations programes, and cooperate with China, will the US be concerned? If not, then we should worry about the myopia of our leadership.
Regarding Iran, one might see that just like Iraq it has extensive oil and gas reserves, a strategic position, and no nuclear weapons. If it doesn't want to be invaded or struck, it ought to develop nuclear and missile technology as a reaction and defense against US ambitiouns. US consumers and citizens perhaps ought to hope for the same, as they, not the super-lobbies of oil and other special interests will suffer the collapse of the dollar and punishing energy prices and very likely a losing war on a larger scale than Iraq.

Section 243 -
Requires the: (1) Secretary to submit to the defense and appropriations committees a research, development, and testing plan for prompt global strike program objectives for FY2008-FY2013; and (2) Under Secretary to submit to such committees a plan for the obligation and expenditure of funds available for such program for FY2008.