Landmine Monitor 2004

Banning Antipersonnel Mines

Since March 1999, pursuing a ban on antipersonnel mines through cooperative implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty has produced impressive results. The compliance rate for States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is an admirable 91 percent.[3] A total of 80 States Parties declared stockpiles totaling over 48 million antipersonnel mines, 37.3 million of which have been destroyed. Sixty-five States Parties have completed stockpile destruction. Another 51 States Parties have declared that they did not possess stockpiles to be destroyed. Forty States Parties have enacted national legislation to implement the treaty. Some states not party to the treaty have voluntarily submitted transparency reports and states globally observe an unofficial ban on the transfer and export of antipersonnel mines.

Unfortunately, antipersonnel mines continued to be used albeit at lower rates and scale than in previous decades. At least 13 non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty have used antipersonnel mines in the past five years.[4] Another four states have admitted using antipersonnel mines after signing the treaty, and there have been serious allegations about use by three other signatories and one State Party.[5] Fifteen states actively produce or retain the right to produce antipersonnel mines. Stockpiles of antipersonnel mines globally remain considerable and in some cases appear to be unsecured. While the global trade in antipersonnel mines has collapsed, armed non-state actors continue to have access to manufactured antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor has identified at least 70 armed non-state groups that have used antipersonnel mines in the past five years.

As an alternative to a total ban, ten states follow regulations on the use of antipersonnel mines contained in the 1996 amendment of Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[6] Sixty-nine states are party to both this agreement and the Mine Ban Treaty.[7] There are 27 states that have not joined either the Mine Ban Treaty, Protocol II, or Amended Protocol II.[8]

Universalization

Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. A total of 76 states have ratified or acceded (57 ratified and 19 acceded) to the treaty since 1 March 1999, and 67 before that date. There are nine states that have signed but not yet ratified the treaty: Brunei, Cook Islands, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Poland, Ukraine, and Vanuatu. The numbers of states that ratified or acceded to the treaty each year since it opened for signature are as follows: 1997 (December only)—3; 1998—55; 1999—32 (23 after 1 March); 2000—19; 2001—13; 2002—8; 2003—11; 2004 (as of Oct.)—2.

A total of nine states joined the treaty since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003. Guyana ratified in August 2003; Greece ratified and Belarus, Serbia & Montenegro, and Turkey acceded in September 2003; Burundi and Sudan ratified in October 2003; Estonia acceded in May 2004; and Papua New Guinea acceded in June 2004. Four of these states hold over 10 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines combined (Belarus, Greece, Serbia & Montenegro, Turkey). Two are significantly mine-affected and experiencing internal conflict in which antipersonnel mines are still being used (Burundi and Sudan). While these are very important additions, the fact that only two nations joined from November 2003-September 2004, despite increased universalization efforts on the part of governments and NGOs in the lead-up to the Nairobi Summit, is disturbing.

There are positive indications from a number of states that they will join the treaty in the near-term. Latvia has declared that it intends to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty by November 2004. Likewise, in June 2004, an official from Vanuatu told States Parties that ratification should “definitely” be completed by the opening of the Review Conference in November 2004. The ratification process in Brunei has progressed and as of August 2004 was reportedly in its final stage. On 10 September 2004, Bhutan formally indicated that it intends to accede, but must wait until its national assembly next meets in mid-2005. On 24 September 2004, the Council of Ministers in Ethiopia reportedly approved ratification legislation and unanimously agreed to send it to the national parliament for consideration. It was also reported in September 2004 that Poland’s Defense Ministry supported ratification of the treaty and that the Defense Minister did not see any obstacles to beginning the process of ratification.

There has been less encouraging progress toward ratification for the other signatories. In March 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Haiti stated that ratification legislation would soon be published, but this had not occurred by September 2004. Indonesia has repeatedly stated its commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty, but has not prioritized ratification. The government of Ukraine is still seeking guarantees from the international community to address the stockpile destruction issue of almost 6 million PFM mines before ratification can proceed. No apparent progress has been made toward ratification by the Cook Islands and Marshall Islands.

A number of other non-signatory States have made statements indicating that they intend to eventually accede. Morocco has stressed that it is in de facto compliance with the treaty. In February 2004, Sri Lanka set a goal of becoming mine-free by the end of 2006 and said that it is working toward possible accession. Also in February, Palau said it is taking every step to make sure it will soon join the treaty. Laos is showing increasing interest in accession and officials made positive comments at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok. Mongolia has repeatedly expressed its commitment to the ultimate goal of a total ban of landmines and a process to assess accession to the treaty had been initiated.

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions. In December 1995, a US-proposed resolution called for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines, attracted 110 co-sponsors, and was adopted without a vote. A year later, UNGA Resolution 51/45S unambiguously called for states to pursue a legally-binding agreement to ban the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines as soon as possible. A total of 155 states supported the resolution, no state voted against it, but ten states abstained.[9] Two of the ten have subsequently joined the treaty: Belarus and Turkey.

Beginning in 1997, the annual UNGA resolution on antipersonnel mines was recast to indicate support for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.[10] Many non-States Parties consistently voted in favor of these resolutions from 1997-2003, including Armenia, Bahrain, Bhutan, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, and the United Arab Emirates.[11] The 20 or so states habitually abstaining in voting on the resolution have also remained relatively consistent, including Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, United States, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Lebanon is the only state to ever vote against a resolution, in 1999. Tajikistan is in the anomalous position of being the only State Party to abstain from voting, in both 2002 and 2003. The vote on the resolution in 2003 totaled the highest number of favorable votes, 153.

Despite the growing list of states committed to banning antipersonnel mines, there were discouraging actions and inactions among some of the 42 states not party to the treaty. Most egregious, government forces in Georgia, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. In February 2004, the United States abandoned its goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006, and instead indicated it would keep self-destruct and self-deactivating antipersonnel mines in its arsenals indefinitely. On 10 September 2004, Finland announced that it would not join the Mine Ban Treaty until 2012, six years later than its previously stated goal.

Implementation - The Intersessional Work Program

States Parties have created an array of structures and processes to ensure progress is made in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. These include the intersessional work program (established in 1999); the Coordinating Committee (2000); the Contact Groups on Universalization (1999), Articles 7 and 9 (2000), and Resource Mobilization (2002); the Sponsorship Program (2000); and the Implementation Support Unit (2001).

During 2003-2004, the intersessional work program, established to carry the work of the Mine Ban Treaty forward between the annual Meetings of States Parties, focused on the needs, gaps, and resources available for the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The landmark “Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World” formed a central focus for Standing Committees’ decision-making and planning. The intersessional meetings are unique for their informality, inclusiveness and sense of cooperation. The ICBL and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) remained full and active participants in the intersessional process, showing that the strong partnership with governments continues.

The four Standing Committees—Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies; Stockpile Destruction; and General Status and Operation of the Convention—each met twice in 2003 and twice in 2004 at the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in Geneva. An Action Program endorsed at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties served as the basis for planning for the fifth year of intersessional work. Approximately 535 participants representing 120 countries, ICBL members, and international, UN and regional organizations attended intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in February and June 2004.

The Coordinating Committee (CC) of the States Parties met monthly in 2003 and 2004 to discuss practical coordination matters relating to the intersessional work program and the Mine Ban Treaty more generally. The President of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties chairs the CC, which includes the co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the intersessional Standing Committees, the chairs of the ad hoc contact groups for Universalization (Canada), Articles 7 & 9 (Belgium), Resource Mobilization (Norway), and the Sponsorship Group (UK), and the presidents of past and forthcoming Meetings of States Parties. The ICBL and ICRC continued to participate in these meetings on a regular basis.

Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) became operational in January 2002, it has more than proven its worth by ensuring better preparations for the intersessional meetings, providing valuable support to all interested States, serving as an information source, and contributing to strategic thinking on how to achieve the overall goals of the treaty. The ICBL works very closely with the ISU. The ISU together with the Sponsorship Group of interested States Parties helps to enable full participation in the intersessional program of mine-affected countries with limited resources.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

A total of 97 states were party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) as of 1 October 2004. In December 2001, States Parties to the CCW agreed to expand the scope of the CCW to apply to internal as well as international armed conflicts; by 1 October 2004, 35 had ratified this amendment to Article 1 of the Convention.[12] The amendment entered into force on 18 May 2004. The States Parties also agreed to form a Group of Governmental Experts to explore the problems posed by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM).

In December 2003, the States Parties agreed to adopt a legally binding instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for ERW. Three states have ratified this Protocol V so far: Sweden, Lithuania, and Sierra Leone. Work on MOTAPM continued in 2004 as did discussions on measures to prevent specific weapons, including cluster munitions, from becoming ERW.

A total of 80 countries were States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, as of 1 October 2004. Amended Protocol II regulates landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices; it took effect on 3 December 1998. A total of 11 states have joined since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2003: Belarus, Burkina Faso, Chile, Honduras, Malta, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Turkmenistan. All are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty except Sri Lanka and Poland (a signatory). Ten of the 80 States Parties to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the United States.

Two States Parties to Amended Protocol II are known to have used antipersonnel mines since December 1998: India and Pakistan.[13] US forces in Afghanistan have incorporated Soviet-era minefields into their perimeter defense, deriving military advantage from these minefields. India, Pakistan, and the US are obligated to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II requirements to mark and monitor minefields to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. But none of these countries provided detailed information on measures taken in their annual national reports for Amended Protocol II submitted in December 2002 or December 2003.

China and Pakistan deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex of Amended Protocol II, until 3 December 2007. Neither country has provided detailed information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability requirement.

Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US, while India is developing such systems. Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and the UK have destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines in order to comply with Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Belarus, Greece, and Turkey will also have to destroy their remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008.

Amended Protocol II States Parties China, Pakistan, and Ukraine have deferred compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex. They have up to nine years to come into full compliance with the technical specifications. The deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and Pakistan, and 15 May 2008 for Ukraine. Ukraine, a signatory of the Mine Ban Treaty, is taking steps to destroy its stockpile of nearly six million PFM-type remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. India and Pakistan have reported that new compliant remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines are being developed and tested.

Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines

The marked drop in the use of antipersonnel mines around the globe since the mid-1990s is without question one of the great achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty and the movement to ban antipersonnel mines more generally. Antipersonnel mines have been used by fewer countries and in lesser numbers than seen from the 1960s through the early 1990s, when the global landmine crisis was created.

Since 1999, there have been three instances in which government forces have made very extensive use of antipersonnel mines. India and Pakistan mined their border during a period of tensions from December 2001 to mid-2002, laying perhaps two million or more mines. Russian forces used perhaps hundreds of thousands of hand-emplaced and scatterable mines in Chechnya in 1999 and 2000. Ethiopia and Eritrea laid hundreds of thousands of antipersonnel mines during their border war from 1998 to mid-2000.

The only governments that have used mines continuously in the 1999-2004 period are Russia and Myanmar (Burma). Landmine Monitor has confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by 16 governments at some point since 1999.[14] There is compelling evidence that another five have used them.[15] In looking at the trend, Landmine Monitor Report 1999 identified confirmed use by eight governments, and compelling evidence of use by another seven; in 2000, the totals were eight and four; in 2001, nine and four; in 2002, nine and five, in 2003, six and three; and in 2004, three and one.

In the current reporting period (since May 2003), there is confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by three governments: Burma/Myanmar, Nepal and Russia. There is compelling evidence of use by one other government: Georgia. Additionally, there have been serious allegations of ongoing use by the armed forces of Burundi (a signatory since 1997 and a State Party since April 2004). There have also been some reports of use in this reporting period by Cuba and Uzbekistan.

Antipersonnel Mine Use Since May 2003

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties:In this reporting period, Landmine Monitor has found no definitive evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by any State Party. However, in Burundi, a number of mine incidents, as well as statements by Burundi officials, UN representatives, and local populations, give rise to concerns of continued mine use by the Burundi Armed Forces, though Landmine Monitor cannot determine with certainty when the mines were laid, or by whom. Burundi ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 22 October 2003 and became a State Party on 1 April 2004. Burundi strongly denies any use of mines.

Mine Ban Treaty Signatories: Other than Burundi, there have not been any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty in this reporting period.

Mine Ban Treaty Non-Signatories: The government of Nepal acknowledges using antipersonnel mines in this reporting period, and it is clear that the government forces in Myanmar and Russia continued to lay mines. There have been credible reports of use by Georgian forces. There have also been isolated reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by Cuba and Uzbekistan.

Armed Non-State Actors (NSAs): Armed opposition groups have used antipersonnel mines in at least 16 countries in this reporting period. In some cases this involved use of standard, factory-manufactured mines, but often involved homemade mines, improvised explosive devices and explosive booby-traps. Mine use by NSAs was reported in the following States Parties: Bolivia, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, and Uganda. NSAs used antipersonnel mines in these non-States Parties: Bhutan, Burma/Myanmar, Georgia, India, Iraq, Nepal, Russia (in Chechnya and North Ossetia), and Somalia.

Use of antipersonnel mines by NSAs is cited in four countries for the first time since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999: Bolivia, Bhutan, Iraq and Peru. Renewed use of antipersonnel mines by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has returned Turkey to the list, and fresh evidence of use by the Lord’s Resistance Army has returned Uganda to the list.

The use of antipersonnel mines by Non-State Actors in 16 countries in this reporting period compares to reported NSA use in 11 countries in Landmine Monitor Report 2003, 14 countries in Landmine Monitor Report 2002, and 18 countries in Landmine Monitor Reports 2001, 2000, and 1999.

Sporadic and small-scale use, including by criminals, was reported in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Serbia and Montenegro.

Initiation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines

In Sudan, Landmine Monitor has received reports in 2004 of use of antipersonnel mines by government-supported militias in Upper Nile. In the DR Congo, the Army accused insurgent troops of new mine use when their forces took the town of Bukavu in May/June 2004.

In Bolivia, there were numerous incidents involving the use of Improvised Explosive Devices by cocaleros (coca leaf-growing farmers). In Peru, in June and July 2003, the media reported that the Shining Path had used landmines in various villages in the department of Ayacucho, Huanta province. According to some media sources, Cuba has planted mines in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq and increased tensions with the US.

In Nepal, there were no confirmed instances of new mine use by security forces or Maoist rebels during the cease-fire from January to August 2003, but in the wake of renewed fighting since then, both sides are again laying mines or improvised explosive devices in significant numbers. In Bhutan, Indian rebels are reported to have used antipersonnel mines during a Bhutanese military offensive to oust them in December 2003.

In Georgia, a group of insurgents in Ajaria province reportedly laid landmines in 2004. In February 2004, Kyrgyzstan accused Uzbekistan of replanting mines in areas that Kyrgyzstan had recently cleared. In Turkey, the government reported that in 2004, attacks by the PKK increased, including use of mines; this is the first time in several years the PKK has been accused of laying mines.

Since August 2003, Iraqi insurgents have greatly increased their use of improvised explosive devices.

Ongoing and Increased Use of Antipersonnel Mines

In Burundi, FNL rebel forces have continued to use antipersonnel mines, and there have been continued allegations and indicators of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces as well. In Uganda, the government has stated that the Lord’s Resistance Army has continued to lay antipersonnel mines in the north in 2003 and 2004. Various factions in Somalia continued to lay landmines, impeding the initiation of any mine action activities.

It appears that rebel and paramilitary forces in Colombia are among the most prolific users of antipersonnel mines in the world. In 2003 and 2004, the use of mines, especially by FARC, continued at a significant level.

Myanmar’s military and at least 15 rebel groups have continued to use antipersonnel mines; there are some indications of increased mine warfare. In India there continue to be numerous reports of armed NSAs using improvised explosive devices, and sometimes landmines, including insurgent groups in Jammu and Kashmir and Naxalite militants in Central and Eastern Indian states. In the Philippines, the rebel New People’s Army and Abu Sayyaf Group used improvised landmines; the armed forces also accused the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which denied laying mines. In Pakistan, antivehicle mines and improvised explosive devices have been used in tribal conflicts and against government law enforcement agencies, most notably in Baluchistan. In Afghanistan there have been some reports indicating new use of antipersonnel mines by Taliban or other opposition forces.

Russian forces and Chechen fighters continued to use antipersonnel mines. The rebels who seized the school in Beslan, North Ossetia in 2004 with disastrous consequences emplaced both antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices throughout the school. Despite a formal moratorium on use of antipersonnel mines, it appears that Georgian forces have used antipersonnel several years in a row, in various locations. In September 2004, the OSCE expressed concern about new mine-laying by both Georgian and South Ossetian forces.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines Since May 2003*

Africa

Americas

Asia/Pacific

Europe/

Central Asia

Middle East/

North Africa

Burundi:

rebels

DR Congo:

NSAs

Somalia:

various factions

Uganda:

LRA rebels

Bolivia:

NSAs

Colombia: FARC and other rebels, AUCparamilitaries

Peru:

Shining Path rebels

Bhutan:

Indian rebels

Burma/Myanmar: government and 15 rebel groups

India: rebels

Nepal: government and Maoist rebels

Philippines:

rebels

Georgia: government and NSAs

Russia: government and rebels (in Chechnya and North Ossetia)

Turkey:

PKK rebels

Iraq:

NSAs

* In addition, there have been serious allegations of use by government troops in Burundi and government-backed militia in Sudan. There were also reports of new use by Cuba and Uzbekistan.

Key Developments Since 1999

Cessation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines

Since 1999, government and rebel forces in three of the most mine-affected countries in the world have foresworn use. Use stopped in Afghanistan (aside from sporadic instances) with the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, in Sri Lanka with the cease-fires in December 2001, and in Angola with the peace agreement in April 2002.

Mine Use in Africa

Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but acknowledged that it continued to use antipersonnel landmines until the peace agreement signed with UNITA forces in April 2002; UNITA forces also used mines until the agreement. There have been credible, though unconfirmed, allegations of antipersonnel landmine use by the Burundi Army throughout the period since 1999. The government has strongly denied the charges. Rebels have admitted to using antipersonnel mines in Burundi. Since 1999, many armed forces have been accused of using antipersonnel mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, including those of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. All have denied it. There were serious and credible allegations indicating a strong possibility of Ugandan use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC, particularly in the June 2000 battle for Kisangani; Uganda was already a State Party at the time.

In Sudan, from 1999-2002, Landmine Monitor reported serious allegations about use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, the SPLM/A and other rebel groups. The government has consistently denied any use. During their 1998–2000 border conflict, Eritrean forces laid an estimated 240,000 mines, and Ethiopian forces laid an estimated 150,000 to 200,000. Eritrea has admitted to using mines, but Ethiopia has been reluctant to do so.

Mine Use in the Americas

Landmines have been used more extensively in Colombia than anywhere else in the Americas; at many points since 1999, Colombia has been the only location in the hemisphere where mines were being used. FARC guerrillas have been the main users, but other guerrilla groups as well as the AUC paramilitaries are also responsible. The government reports very significant increases in use in 2003 and 2004; the number of mine-affected municipalities increased from 125 in 1999 to 422 in 2003.

In its 2002 and 2003 Article 7 reports, Venezuela revealed that it had laid antipersonnel mines in May 1998, five months after signing the Mine Ban Treaty, but prior to entry-into-force. Similarly, in its Article 7 report, Ecuador revealed that it laid antipersonnel mines from 1995 to 1998, confirming mine use after it had signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997, but prior to entry-into-force. The United States apparently did not use antipersonnel mines in Iraq in 2003, and according to the government’s statements, has not used antipersonnel mines since the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Mine Use in Asia/Pacific

In Afghanistan, the Taliban declared an end to the use of mines in 1998, but began using them again in 2001 after the Coalition invasion. The Northern Alliance used landmines throughout the period since 1999. During the military operations in late 2001 and 2002, Northern Alliance, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters all used landmines and booby-traps. There has been continuous use of antipersonnel mines in Burma (Myanmar) since 1999 by Myanmar’s military and at least 15 rebel groups. It appears that mine warfare has increased during much of the period.

India’s massive mine-laying operation on its border in late 2001 and early 2002 was characterized as one of the biggest in years or decades anywhere in the world; apparently millions of mines were emplaced. Pakistan also laid large numbers of mines at that time. In Nepal, government forces and Maoist rebels have used antipersonnel landmines and improvised explosive devises in the internal conflict since 1996. The Maoists have used mines/IEDs much more extensively than security forces. The use of mines and IEDs increased every year from 1999 to 2002, until the cease-fire which lasted from January to August 2003. Since then, both sides are again laying mines or IEDs in significant numbers. All 75 districts are now affected, compared to four in 1999. The government did not officially acknowledge using mines until 2002.

In Sri Lanka, increased fighting in 2000 and 2001 with the LTTE rebels resulted in increased use of antipersonnel mines by both sides, increased military and civilian mine casualties, and the termination of UN mine action programs. Fighting stopped in December 2001 and a formal cease-fire agreement came into force in February 2002. There have been no confirmed reports of new use of mines by either government or LTTE forces since December 2001.

Mine Use in Europe/Central Asia

During the 1999 crisis in Kosovo, Yugoslav forces laid significant numbers of antipersonnel mines, and the NATO bombing campaign left extensive contamination from cluster bomblets and other UXO. Over the past five years, the most extensive antipersonnel mine use in Europe and Central Asia has consistently been in Chechnya, by both Russian forces and Chechen fighters. Since 1999, Russia has also deployed mines inside Tajikistan along its Afghan border, and in its pursuit of rebels, Russia dropped mines on Georgia on at least two occasions.

Uzbekistan has laid antipersonnel mines on its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and both governments have accused Uzbekistan of emplacing mines across the border in their territory. Kyrgyzstan used landmines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its border with Tajikistan. It appears that Georgian Armed Forces have used antipersonnel mines each year from 2001-2004, despite repeated government denials and Georgia’s 1996 moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines. Abkhazian troops have also mined contested territory. In addition, private armed groups from Georgia have infiltrated into Abkhazia and laid antipersonnel mines.

Mine Use in Middle East/North Africa

Saddam Hussein's forces used antipersonnel mines in the lead-up to and during the conflict in Iraq in early 2003. Iraqi forces planted mines extensively, and also abandoned caches of weapons that included landmines, in many parts of the country. There were also reports of the PKK using landmines in northern Iraq in 1999. Israel acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in South Lebanon prior to its withdrawal from the area in 2000, and there were allegations of use in the Occupied Palestinian Territories until 2002. There have been allegations of Palestinian mine use as well.

Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines.[16] This number has been dramatically and permanently reduced in recent years due in large part to the public outcry against the continued production of the weapon. Thirty-six states have formally renounced and ceased the production of antipersonnel mines. [17] This includes three countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Finland, Israel, and Poland.[18] Taiwan has also stopped production. Twenty-three treaty members have reported on the status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of antipersonnel mine production facilities.[19] Since it began reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor has removed Turkey and FR Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) from its list of producers.

Among those who have stopped manufacturing are a majority of the big producers from the 1970s to mid-1990s; with the notable exceptions of the China, Russia and the United States, the biggest producers and exporters from the past 35 years are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.[20] Landmine Monitor identifies 15 countries that continue to produce, or retain the right to produce, antipersonnel landmines. Nepal was added to the list in 2003 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories. This was the first time that the number of antipersonnel mine producers has increased since Landmine Monitor reporting started in 1999.

India and Pakistan are actively engaged in the production of antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW, including new remotely delivered mine systems. Officials in Singapore and Vietnam admit that the production of antipersonnel mines is on-going. Burma, Cuba, and North Korea have made no public confirmation or denial of production activity since 1999.

In some cases it is unclear if production lines were active between 1999 and 2004. Egypt has unofficially stated that it ceased production in 1988. While the US has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997, two research and development programs are under way that could result in the resumption of production in 2007. South Korea has stated it has not produced any mines since 2000. An official from China stated in September 2003 that no production is occurring there. Production of certain types of antipersonnel mines by Russia has apparently stopped.

In September 2002, Iran said it had not produced antipersonnel mines since the end of its war with Iraq in 1988. Landmine Monitor reported in 2001, however, that demining organizations in Afghanistan were encountering hundreds of Iran-manufactured antipersonnel mines with production stamps of 1999 and 2000.

An Iraqi diplomat told Landmine Monitor in February 2004 that production continued in recent years, including during the lead-up to the invasion in 2003. Since the coalition occupation of Iraq, any industrial production of antipersonnel mines has, presumably, ceased. Landmine Monitor will keep Iraq on the list of producers until a new government officially renounces antipersonnel mine production.

On the positive side, the investment community in several countries has taken up the recommendations of NGOs to further stigmatize the production of the antipersonnel mines. Several North American and European socially responsible investment managers have created filters that preclude their funds from investing in publicly traded companies associated with antipersonnel mine production. The Norwegian Petroleum Fund removed Singapore Technologies Ltd. from its investment portfolio in 2002, due to the company’s involvement in production of antipersonnel mines.

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer or export of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since 1996. This ban is directly attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon, the unilateral actions of key countries, and the subsequent implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has not documented any state-to-state transfers or exports and antipersonnel mines since then. It is believed that the trade in antipersonnel mines has dwindled to a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged trade.

A significant number of states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted or extended export moratoria in the past five years including China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States. In addition, representatives of Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam have claimed not to export antipersonnel mines, but no formal unilateral prohibition has been put into place. While there is no evidence of transfers by them since 1999, Burma, Nepal, and North Korea still produce antipersonnel mines and apparently do not observe any restrictions on transfers or exports.

Questions remain about exports from Iran. Newly produced Iranian antipersonnel mines were found in Afghanistan in 2001 and others were intercepted en-route to Palestine. An export moratorium was instituted by Iran in 1997, but it is not known if it is still formally in effect.

The scope of the now defunct global landmine trade is reflected in Mine Ban Treaty transparency reports. Of the over 48 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines declared so far by 80 States Parties, 29 million antipersonnel mines appear to have been domestically produced, 13.6 million were inherited, and 6 million were imported from other countries.[21] Successor states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia that are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty inherited 11.3 million and 2.3 million antipersonnel mines respectively.[22] Three exporting states account for the vast majority of the imported antipersonnel mines declared by States Parties between 1999 and 2004: United States (1.7 million), China (1.4 million), and Russia/USSR (1.06 million). Another 22 countries contributed to the stockpiles of States Parties.[23]

There are a number of instances of possible continuing illicit trade involving antipersonnel mines. According to a media account, in May 2003, a Panamanian court imprisoned four Panamanians and three Colombians for attempting to import into Colombia weapons acquired in Nicaragua, which included thirteen Russian antipersonnel mines. In July 2003, the head of the Transitional National Government in Somalia accused Ethiopia of supplying arms, including landmines, to Somali factions; Ethiopia dismissed the claim. A 2003 report to the UN Security Council said that landmines had been shipped from Yemen and Ethiopia to Somalia. A media report in November 2002 claimed that Turkish customs officials had detained a truck containing a large load of weapons, including antipersonnel mines, at the border with Georgia, allegedly coming from Kazakhstan. There were also reports of attempts by Pakistan Ordnance Factories to sell antipersonnel mines to British journalists posing as representatives of private companies in both November 1999 and April 2002.

In July 2004, the United States announced its intent to pursue negotiations on an international ban on the sale or export of non-self-destructing landmines in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. Canada noted that the 42 CD member states that are already part of the Mine Ban Treaty “will not be in a position to enter negotiations on a lesser ban, aimed at arresting trade in one category of antipersonnel mines alone but implying the acceptability of trade in other categories of these weapons.”[24] The CD has not been able to agree on its agenda since 1997.

Transfers for Purposes Permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty permits the transfer of antipersonnel mines for the purpose of their destruction or for training and research needs. In the past five years, Denmark, Netherlands, United States, and Taiwan have transferred antipersonnel mines to companies in Germany for destruction. Ecuador and Romania reported transferring antipersonnel mines to the United States, a non-State Party, for demining research and training purposes. Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and possibly Sweden reported acquiring foreign antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes.

Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction

At the time when the Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated and entered into force, a staggering 131 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. This stunning global total has been significantly reduced due in large part to five years of implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and the widespread rejection of the weapon, even among states not party to the ban on antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor estimates that there are approximately 200 million antipersonnel mines currently stockpiled by 67 countries. In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, some four million stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed, bringing the global total to about 62 million in recent years.

States Parties

A total of 78 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty reported holding stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Of these States Parties, 65 have completed the destruction of their stockpiles. In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2003, Argentina, Chile, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lithuania, Mauritius, Romania, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uruguay, and Venezuela reached this milestone. The remaining 13 States Parties that have reported stockpiles have either started destruction or are in the planning process.[25]

States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 37.3 million antipersonnel mines.[26] Italy destroyed the most mines (7.1 million), followed by Turkmenistan (6.6 million). Others destroying more than one million antipersonnel mines included: Albania, France, Germany, Japan, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Landmine Monitor estimates that 18 States Parties currently stockpile at least 11 million antipersonnel mines.[27] This number has fluctuated over the years as mine stockpiles are destroyed and states with significant stockpiles join the treaty. For example, over 10 million newly declared antipersonnel mines are now required to be destroyed since Belarus (4.6 million), Greece (1.56 million), Serbia and Montenegro (1.32 million), and Turkey (3.04 million) all joined the treaty in September 2003.

A total of 51 States Parties reported that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.[28] Since May 2003, Cote d’Ivoire, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste have officially confirmed that they do not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.

Fourteen States Parties need to officially declare the presence or absence of stockpiles; only three of these have informally indicated that they possess stocks to be destroyed (Guyana, Serbia & Montenegro, and Turkey).[29]

Signatories

Landmine Monitor estimates that five signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile 7-8 million antipersonnel mines. The majority of these mines are held by Ukraine (5.95 million) and Poland (996,860). Ukraine destroyed 404,000 conventional antipersonnel mines with NATO support between July 2002 and May 2003 and now only PFM-type scatterable antipersonnel mines remain in stocks. Poland dismantled 58,291 POMZ-2(2M) mines due to the expiry of their shelf-life during 2003. Indonesia in May 2002 revealed it has a stockpile of 16,000 antipersonnel mines. Ethiopia also likely holds stockpiles and Brunei has acknowledged possessing antipersonnel mines (possibly Claymore-type only). It is unlikely that the four other signatories stockpile antipersonnel mines (Cook Islands, Haiti, Marshall Islands, and Vanuatu).

Non-States Parties

Landmine Monitor estimates that the greatest numbers of antipersonnel mines, between 180 million and 185 million, are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (estimated 50 million)[30] and the United States (10.4 million). Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million), India (estimated 4-5 million), and South Korea (2 million). Other states not party to the treaty believed to have large stockpiles are Burma, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Syria, and Vietnam.

Non-States Parties have destroyed significant numbers of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in recent years. Some have chosen to take this action as a confidence building measure prior to fully joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Others have destroyed antipersonnel mines that were not in compliance with the technical requirements of CCW Amended Protocol II. For others, the destruction of stockpiles reflects routine ammunition management practice. Russia surprisingly reported in 2003 that it had destroyed 16.8 million antipersonnel mines from 1996 to 2002. Russian military sources told Landmine Monitor that Russia destroyed another 1.85 million antipersonnel mines in 2003. The United States completed destroying over 3.3 million non-self-destructing M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines in 1998. In late 1999, China reported that it had destroyed over 1.7 million old antipersonnel mines. Between 1992 and January 2004, Belarus, prior to becoming a State Party, destroyed an estimated 300,000 antipersonnel mines without any international assistance, including approximately 223,000 mines in 2003 alone.

An important milestone in the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was reached on 1 March 2003: the four-year deadline for destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines for all states that were party to the treaty when it first entered into force on 1 March 1999. States Parties are obligated to destroy stockpiles under their jurisdiction and control four years after entry into force of the treaty for that state.

It would appear that all States Parties with a 1 March 2003 deadline met their obligation, with the minor exception of Djibouti, which was two days late, and an issue of serious concern regarding Turkmenistan.

Turkmenistan notified the United Nations that it completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpiles on 28 February 2003, except for 69,200 mines retained for training purposes. Turkmenistan’s decision to retain such a large number of mines was roundly criticized in the international community and engendered claims that Turkmenistan was violating both Article 3 by retaining an excessive number of mines for training, and Article 4 for still holding an operational stockpile after the destruction deadline. In a reversal announced 11 February 2004, Turkmenistan said it had started to destroy 60,000 of the antipersonnel mines retained for training; it later indicated that all 69,200 mines would be destroyed by the end of 2004.

Since this 1 March 2003 milestone passed, all States Parties, except one, have met their respective deadlines; all are now in compliance with this important arms control aspect of the Mine Ban Treaty. Guinea did not meet its stockpile destruction deadline of 1 April 2003. A significant amount of uncertainty and contradictory information existed about whether Guinea possessed a stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the date its initial transparency measures report was due (1 September 1999) until it submitted a report on 24 June 2004. The report revealed that Guinea destroyed 3,174 antipersonnel mines between 26 September and 11 November 2003, six months past its deadline.

The Mine Ban Treaty requires that States destroy their stockpiles “as soon as possible,” but no later than four years after entry into force. Most States Parties completed the destruction of their stockpiles a year or more before their deadline:

Twelve States Parties destroyed their stockpiles prior to entry into force of the treaty: Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Guatemala, Germany, Luxembourg, Mali, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, and South Africa;

A number of States Parties, including Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, and Croatia have reported discovering and destroying previously unknown stockpiles of antipersonnel mines after formally completing their destruction programs. The Mine Ban Treaty does not explicitly deal with this phenomenon. The ICBL has stressed the importance of timely destruction of these newly found mines, no later than one year after discovery, and has urged complete transparency about numbers and types discovered and the destruction process.

The costs of stockpile destruction have varied greatly, depending on the types of mines in stockpile, their location, and the amount of transport and preparation necessary to destroy the mines. Most States Parties have chosen to dispose of their stockpiles by open detonation or open burning techniques. Others have disassembled the mines for recovery of materials as a way to demilitarize part or all of their stockpiles.

There are examples in the past five years of armed non-state actors getting access to factory-manufactured stockpiled antipersonnel mines. For example, several types of Russian antipersonnel mines were among the weapons used by Chechen insurgents during the disastrous siege at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia in early September 2004. Significant supplies of unsecured conventional weapons and ammunition are now quite common in conflict zones including Afghanistan, DR Congo, Iraq, and Somalia. Antipersonnel mines among these stocks will continue to pose a threat for years to come if they remain unsecured and available to non-state actors.

Mines Retained for Training and Research

Declaring a stockpile of antipersonnel mines obligates a state to destroy it within four years, with a permissible exception under Article 3 for the minimum number of mines absolutely necessary to develop and train in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques. The ICBL has urged that all states should declare the intended purposes and actual uses of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3. During the Oslo negotiations in 1997 and during Standing Committee discussions from 1999-2004, most States Parties have agreed that the minimum number of mines retained should number in the hundreds or thousands or less, but not tens of thousands. The ICBL believes that states that retain thousands of antipersonnel mines and apparently do not use any of these mines for permitted purposes abuse the exception permitted by Article 3.

Of the current 143 States Parties, 66 retain over 233,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes under Article 3. At least 62 have chosen not to retain any mines. New additions to this latter group since May 2003 include Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lithuania, Mauritius, and Timor-Leste. A total of 17 States Parties once possessed stockpiles but have chosen not to retain any mines.[31] Fifteen States Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any mines.[32]

Only four States Parties accounted for nearly a third of all retained mines: Brazil (16,545), Sweden (15,706), Algeria (15,030), and Bangladesh (15,000). Brazil reported the destruction of 455 mines between March 2000 and December 2001. Sweden has fully reported on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines, but the number of mines retained by a private company is greater than initially reported thus increasing Sweden’s totals. Algeria and Bangladesh have not detailed the intended purposes or requirements for retaining so many antipersonnel mines. Turkey has indicated to Landmine Monitor its intention to retain 16,000 antipersonnel mines, but it has not submitted its initial transparency measures report as of 1 October 2004.

A total of 34 States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.[33] Nigeria (3,364 retained mines) and Angola (1,390 retained mines) are notable additions to this group since May 2003. Another 20 States Parties retain less than 1,000 mines.[34] Joining this group in this reporting period are the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Suriname.

One encouraging trend is the significant number of States Parties that have reduced the number of mines retained from high levels originally proposed. Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Italy, Lithuania, Mauritania, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Zambia have taken this step between March 1999 and September 2004. Nine of these States Parties originally intended to retain 10,000 mines or more.[35] On 11 August 2004, Ecuador destroyed 1,970 of the 3,970 antipersonnel mines previously retained for training. Venezuela intends to destroy 3,960 mines by October 2004, leaving 1,000 mines for training.

A total of 17 States Parties reported consuming 3,112 mines for training and research in 2003. In 2002, 16 States Parties reported consuming 2,540 mines in 2002. At least 26 States apparently did not consume any retained mines in 2003: Bangladesh, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, El Salvador, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Similarly, 29 States Parties did not report consuming any in 2002. Too many states retain thousands of mines without any evidence of consuming those mines for permitted purposes or plans stated for their intended and actual use. Retained stockpiles of this scale without a declared plan or evidence of actual consumption of the mines raises the specter that these States Parties possess a residual operational stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

Chad, Lithuania, Mauritius, and Turkmenistan have reconsidered their retention of mines and now have chosen not to retain any live mines. In contrast, El Salvador, Hungary, and Mozambique changed their initial decision not to keep any mines and subsequently retained mines. Against the trend of reducing the numbers of mines retained, Bosnia & Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and Sweden have actually increased their holdings significantly.

Transparency Reporting

As of 1 October 2004, the UN has received initial Article 7 transparency measures reports from 129 States Parties. The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency reports is an impressive 91 percent, up from 88 percent reported last year, 75 percent reported in 2002, and 63 percent reported in 2001. A total of 14 States Parties have submitted initial reports since May 2003: Angola, Belarus, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Eritrea, Greece, Guinea, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Suriname, and Timor-Leste.

Through concerted efforts to promote full transparency, the number of late initial reports has dramatically declined. As of 1 October 2004, a total of 12 States Parties were late in submitting their initial report: Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Liberia, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, and Turkey. This number has been significantly reduced over the past five years: Landmine Monitor Report 2003 reported that 15 States Parties were late in submitting their initial reports; the 2002 edition listed 30 states being late; in 2001 the number was 37; and in 2000 the number of late reports was 36.

Equatorial Guinea (due date 28 August 1999), St. Lucia (29 March 2000), and Liberia (28 November 2000) can only be considered grossly non-compliant in fulfilling the treaty’s transparency obligation. All three have passed their deadlines for destroying any stockpiled antipersonnel mines (respectively, 1 March 2003, 1 October 2003 and 1 June 2004), but have not informed States Parties of compliance with this core obligation.

States Parties have commendably improved the rate of annual updates submitted for the previous calendar year. As of 1 October 2004, the rate of compliance for annual reports due on 30 April 2004 for calendar year 2003 was 78 percent. The rate for calendar year 2002 was 62 percent. Of the 27 States Parties not submitting an annual update in 2004, 15 of them also did not submit reports in 2003. Eight States Parties have not submitted annual updates for any subsequent years after submitting their initial reports in 1999 or 2000: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bolivia, Botswana, Madagascar, St. Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland, and Trinidad & Tobago.

In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports, including Cameroon in 2001 and Lithuania in 2002 when they were signatories. Non-State Party Latvia and signatory Poland submitted initial reports in 2003 and annual updates in 2004. Other non-States Parties have announced their intention of voluntarily submitting a transparency report in the future, including Sri Lanka and the Ukraine.

Belgium has coordinated an informal contact group aimed at promoting transparency reporting since 2000. In November 2002, Belgium hosted a seminar in Brussels for African countries on transparency reporting under Article 7. The NGO VERTIC, in cooperation with the ICBL and the ICRC, developed the “Guide to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention.”

National Implementation Measures

Only 40 of 143 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the Mine Ban Treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.[36] This is an increase of five States Parties since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003: Belize, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Seychelles, South Africa, and Zambia. A total of 27 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway.[37] Those initiating the process in the past year include DR Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, and Guinea. However, legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years in Benin, Cameroon, Mauritania, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Swaziland, and Uganda.

A total of 34 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty.[38] Belarus and Chile joined this category in the past year. The Dominican Republic, Holy See, Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Qatar believe that no steps are necessary because they have never produced, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines and are not mine-affected. The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 42 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.[39] States Parties where antipersonnel mines have been used remain the greatest concern: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Greece, and Serbia and Montenegro.

The ICRC has produced an “Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines.” This kit is available from the ICRC in English, French, and Spanish and is also available on the Internet.[40]

Special Issues of Concern

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force, the ICBL has consistently raised questions about how States Parties interpret and implement certain aspects of Articles 1, 2, and 3. In particular, the ICBL has expressed concerns regarding the issues of joint military operations with non-States Parties, the prohibition on “assist,” foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training and development purposes. (The latter issue, related to Article 3, has been discussed above). The ICBL has pointed out that some States Parties have diverged from the predominant legal interpretation and predominant State practice on these matters. The ICBL and ICRC have urged States Parties to reach common understandings on these matters, in order to eliminate ambiguity and preserve the integrity of the treaty.

Discussions on Articles 1, 2, and 3 have occurred at every Meeting of States Parties and during every intersessional week. The need to promote further clarity on how States Parties fulfill their obligations on these issues has been repeatedly recognized, including in the Final Report and President’s Action Program agreed upon at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok in September 2003. The Final Report states that “the meeting called upon States parties to continue to share information and views, particularly with respect to Articles 1, 2, and 3, with a view to developing understandings on various matters by the First Review Conference.”

Despite efforts by the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention at the February and June 2004 intersessional meetings, a number of States Parties remained opposed to reaching understandings or conclusions on Articles 1, 2 and 3 before or during the Review Conference.

Joint Military Operations and the Meaning of "Assist" (Article 1)

Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates States Parties to “never under any circumstances...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” There has been a lack of clarity, however, regarding what types of acts are permitted or banned within the context of the prohibition on assistance, especially during joint military operations with non-States Parties that may use antipersonnel mines.

States have recognized the need to address this issue and to share views on policy and practice. Over the past five years of treaty implementation, an understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist” has begun to emerge. A total of 35 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations. Kenya, Tanzania, Turkey, and Zambia provided new statements since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003.[41] Australia, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Zimbabwe, and most recently Zambia have interpreted participation as “active” or “direct,” but each country’s understanding of what constitutes “active” or “direct” assistance varies. Brazil, Mexico, and the United Kingdom would reject participation in joint operations if its military forces derived direct military benefit from antipersonnel mine use. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and United Kingdom would reject rules of engagement permitting antipersonnel mine use or orders to use antipersonnel mines. Norway obtains written precondition for placing forces under the command of a non-State Party.

Though often discussed in terms of potential US use of antipersonnel mines in NATO operations, this is by no means a problem limited to the NATO alliance. It appears that a number of States Parties in Africa have engaged in military operations with (or in support of) armed forces or armed non-state actors that may be using antipersonnel mines. In this reporting period, Landmine Monitor raises serious concerns about Rwanda’s possible assistance to rebels in the DR Congo that are using antipersonnel mines, and about Sudan’s support for militia in the South who have also been accused of using antipersonnel mines. In the past, Landmine Monitor has expressed concern with regard to Namibia (assisting Angola against UNITA), as well as Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe assisting various forces in the DR Congo. All have denied any activities that contravene the Mine Ban Treaty.

US-led coalition military operations in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 and Iraq in 2003 made the issue of joint operations a concrete reality for many. States Parties Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom contributed either ground forces that engaged in combat operations or peacekeepers for one or both conflicts. Other States Parties participated in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, commanded at various periods by the United Kingdom and Turkey (then a non-State Party), and now operating under NATO command. There is no evidence that any Coalition troops or peacekeepers, including those of non-States Parties, have used antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan or Iraq. Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain used this circumstance to publicly reiterate their operational understanding of their obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty in joint operations with non-States Parties.

Some States Parties made new policy statements or announced concrete steps taken nationally on these issues since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included here, see individual country reports for details.

In comments to Landmine Monitor in August 2004, Australia said, “The Australian Defence Force’s activities in military coalitions conducted with non-Ottawa States are governed by rules of engagement which comply, without exception, with the terms of the Convention (including the Declaration made by Australia when depositing its instrument of ratification) as incorporated into domestic legislation by the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Act 1998.”

The Ministry of Defense of Croatia confirmed in April 2004 that its soldiers are not allowed to use or assist in the use of antipersonnel mines within Croatia or in other countries, including those not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Italy confirmed previous statements that national legislation permits joint military activities with non-States Parties only if the activities are compatible with Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The armed forces “continue to receive strict instructions to abstain from participating in actions contrary to the letter and spirit of the Ottawa Convention.”

Kenya’s draft implementation bill does not permit the military to participate in joint operations or drills where antipersonnel mines are being used. The government reiterated this position in interventions on Article 1 at the February 2004 Standing Committee meeting on General Status and Operation of the Convention, and urged that in order to embrace the spirit of the ban treaty, it was necessary for States Parties to review the status and contents of memoranda of understanding allowing for joint operations.

Serbia and Montenegro submitted a formal declaration with its instrument of accession stating that, “it is the understanding of Serbia and Montenegro that the mere participation in the planning or conduct of operations, exercises or any other military activities by the armed forces of Serbia and Montenegro, or by any of its nationals, if carried out in conjunction with armed forces of the non-States Parties (to the Convention), which engage in activities prohibited under the Convention, does not in any way imply an assistance, encouragement or inducement as referred to in subparagraph 1 (c) of the Convention.”

The Spanish government, in response to a parliamentarian’s question, said that Spanish military personnel were forbidden to use antipersonnel mines under any circumstances, that operations in which antipersonnel mines are used will not be planned, directed or carried out, and that no forces under Spanish command will use antipersonnel mines other than under the exceptions allowed by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Tanzania informed the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention that it does not subscribe to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations and would not provide assistance “to anyone in activities prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Similarly, in its June 2004 Article 7 report, Tanzania states, “Since the United Republic of Tanzania became a party to ‘The Landmine Ban Treaty of 1997,’ the state has not used any type of APMs on either joint military operations or provision of assistance to anyone in activities prohibited to a state party under this convention.”

According to its diplomatic mission in Geneva, Turkey will not permit the use of antipersonnel mines in Turkey by other States during joint military operations.

Zambia’s new national legislation says that members of its armed forces can participate in operations or other military activities with the armed forces of a State not party to the Convention, “Provided that the operation, exercise or military activity is not in contravention of the Convention and that such participation does not amount to active assistance in any activity prohibited by the Convention and this Act.”

Over the years, Landmine Monitor has raised concerns about certain national declarations and certain clauses in the national implementation legislation of several nations with respect to joint operations and “assist.” Among others, it has raised these concerns regarding Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Serbia and Montenegro, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. A highly regarded new legal commentary on the Mine Ban Treaty examines Australia’s National Declaration and a statement by Zimbabwe on the prohibition on “assist,” and concludes that “it is not clear how these interpretations can be legally sustained. Reservations are prohibited by Article 19” of the treaty.[42] The commentary draws particular attention to Australia’s position that the treaty would allow “indirect support such as the provision of security for the personnel of a State not party to the Convention engaging in such [prohibited] activities,” including presumably the laying of antipersonnel mines by the non-State Party.

It appears that at least a small number of States Parties have differing views about whether the Mine Ban Treaty’s prohibition on “transfer” of antipersonnel mines also applies to “transit.” The main issue is whether a non-State Party’s aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines can pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in, restock in) a State Party on their way to a conflict in which those mines would be used. The ICBL believes that if a State Party willfully permits transit of antipersonnel mines which are destined for use in combat, that government is certainly violating the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, is likely violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer. The ICRC has also expressed its view that the treaty prohibits transiting of antipersonnel mines.

A total of 26 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing foreign antipersonnel mines on national territory. Turkey and Zambia provided new statements to this effect since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003.[43]

As reported in the past, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Norway believe that the Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the transit of antipersonnel mines, at least in certain circumstances. Germany and Japan view the issue in terms of the US mines stored in their countries, and maintain that because they do not exercise jurisdiction or control over the mines, they cannot prohibit transit. Canada states that it discourages the use of Canadian territory, equipment or personnel for the purpose of transit of antipersonnel mines.

With respect to foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, US antipersonnel mines have been removed from Italy (announced in May 2000), Norway (November 2002), and Spain (November 1999). However, Germany, Japan, Qatar, and the United Kingdom state that US antipersonnel mine stocks are not under their national jurisdiction or control. Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in its Article 7 report the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by a non-State Party on its territory. Russian forces hold 18,200 antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan.

Some States Parties made new policy statements or announced concrete steps taken nationally since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included here, see individual country reports for details.

In December 2003, the Bulgarian parliament supported in principle the stationing of US military bases in the country. Regarding the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of transit and stockpiling of foreign antipersonnel mines on Bulgarian national territory, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in March 2004 that Bulgaria’s position is “based on its obligations in accordance with Article 1 and Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Ottawa Convention.”

At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties Sweden announced its “preliminary interpretation that transit of antipersonnel mines (for military use in an armed conflict) through the territory of a State Party to the Convention would in fact be prohibited.” The final position was stated in February 2004: “With regard to the aim and purpose of the Convention it is suggested that transit should be regarded as prohibited by the Convention. This shall mean that antipersonnel mines cannot be transferred over Swedish land, sea or air territory in violation of the regulations of the Convention.”

According to its diplomatic mission in Geneva, Turkey considers the stockpiling or transit of foreign antipersonnel mines on its territory as a breach of the Mine Ban Treaty, and “will never permit stockpiling or transfer of any type of antipersonnel landmine on its territory.”

Zambia’s new legislation states that “transfer” includes “the transit of anti-personnel mines into, out of, or through Zambia by any means....”

Prior events demonstrate that this issue is not theoretical. In 1999, US Army engineer units deployed to Albania with antipersonnel mines and their delivery systems (MOPMS and Volcano mixed mine systems) as part of Task Force Hawk to support operations in Kosovo. Most of the US Army units deployed from bases in Germany. At the time of this deployment, Albania was a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty and Germany was a State Party. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Portugal have addressed this issue in light of the use of facilities in their countries by the US.

Landmine Monitor has previously reported that the United States stored antipersonnel mines on the territory of at least 14 countries, including seven States Parties.[44] US antipersonnel mines have been removed from States Parties Italy, Norway, and Spain, at the request of those countries. Germany, Japan, the UK, and informally Qatar, state that US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines on their territory are not under their jurisdiction or control. It is not possible to confirm current locations or numbers of US antipersonnel mines in foreign countries following the significant movements of equipment and ammunition during the military build-up in the Persian Gulf region preceding the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

Mines with Sensitive Fuzes and Antihandling Devices (Article 2)

Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL has emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, any mine equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. Applying the definition in Article 2 to all mines that function as antipersonnel mines, including those designated as antivehicle mines, remains a highly contentious issue. The way that States Parties agree—or disagree—on what practices are acceptable may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and universalized.

Many States Parties support the view that any mine, despite its label or design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited. Among the States Parties that have publicly expressed this understanding of what was agreed upon during the treaty negotiations in Oslo in 1997 are Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Zambia. Unfortunately only a small number of States Parties, 27 of the current 143, have expressed views or shared national practice on this issue.[45] Commendably, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland have reported on specific details regarding this issue, including the types of mines other than antipersonnel mines possessed and their method of initiation. However, some States steadfastly refuse to accept that an antipersonnel mine is a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact with a person. Their key argument is that the requirement that the mine was designed to fulfill is the determining factor, and not the consequence of the design. Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are the only States Parties that have publicly stated the view that the Mine Ban Treaty does not apply to antivehicle mines at all, regardless of their employment with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices. Australia and Sweden, while not directly subscribing to this position, expressed the view that the CCW is the more appropriate forum to consider any restrictions on mines other than antipersonnel mines.

A dangerous loophole may be created by the unwillingness of States Parties to address this issue and the possibility exists of heretofore prohibited mines being re-defined as to be permissible. A potentially slippery slope may be developing wherein mines possessing inherent and irreversible victim-activated design features are considered to be beyond the treaty’s definition of an antipersonnel mine. If the issue remains unaddressed, other mines with features and design consequences that serve the same function as an antipersonnel mine could conceivably be viewed by some as “compliant” with the Mine Ban Treaty. Thus, a mine equipped with a tripwire would not be considered an antipersonnel mine if it is simply called something other than an antipersonnel mine. A confusing situation is beginning to develop wherein some States Parties have chosen to keep for future use and export mines that other States Parties have determined are antipersonnel mines and destroyed. Notably, Italy destroyed its stocks of the MUSPA and MIFF mines, which another State Party, Germany, does not classify as antipersonnel mines and has not destroyed.

While state practice in this area is not yet universal, some progress has been made on clarifying what specific types of fuzes and mines pose unacceptable dangers to civilians. Within the context of the CCW, Germany and the United Kingdom made statements in 2003 and 2004 supporting the view that mines equipped with tilt rod, tripwire, and breakwire fuzes are inappropriate and cannot be designed in a way to prevent detonation by a person.

There appears to be broad agreement that a mine that relies on a tripwire as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine. Sweden has prohibited its forces from using tripwire fuzes with mines if they are ever removed from storage for use. However, the Czech Republic continues to market a mine with a tripwire fuze, stating it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The low amount of lateral pressure necessary to activate a mine with a tilt rod fuze makes it quite susceptible to victim activiation. Canada, France, Mali, and the United Kingdom have removed tilt rod fuzes from their inventories. Hungary has withdrawn from service and destroyed some of its mines equipped with tilt rod fuzes; it will not export these mines and plans to destroy all of them. Croatia and Slovenia have stated their willingness to discuss the appropriateness of tilt rod fuzes within the context of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Czech Republic admits possessing tilt rod fuzes but stated that the mines that are capable of using them are considered to be obsolete and will be retired within 15 years.

Breakwire fuzes should not be used as the sole fuze mechanism for a mine because a person can easily activate a breakwire, much like a tripwire. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have retired from service mines with a breakwire fuze. France is exploring alternative fuzing mechanisms for its mines with breakwire fuzes.

Several other States Parties have reported that they have removed from service and destroyed certain ordnance items that when used with mines can cause them to function as antipersonnel mines. Germany and Slovakia have retired and destroyed antilift mechanisms that could be attached to mines.

Some States Parties made new policy statements or announced concrete steps taken nationally on these matters since publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2003. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included here, see individual country reports for details.

Bulgaria reported that existing stocks of TM-46 antivehicle mines, the only type in stockpiles capable of having an antihandling device, have been decommissioned, and the destruction process is expected to be completed by the end of 2005.

In October 2003, the German Initiative to Ban Landmines reported that the Croatian company Agencija Alan offered the TMRP-6 for sale at the IDEF weapons exhibition in Ankara, Turkey. The ICBL believes that the sale of TMRP-6 mines with tilt rods would constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

During the June 2004 intersessional meetings, Colombia made a strong and unequivocable statement that any mine that is victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine and therefore banned. Colombia expressed concern that the threshold of what constitutes an antipersonnel mine was being limited or narrowed, and stressed that the treaty is a comprehensive ban.

At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2003, the Czech delegation gave its opinion that Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty “does not ban sensitive fuses that may have unintended effects,” but if States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty “find it more appropriate to discuss the problem within this forum, we will not be against this effort.”

At the Meeting of States Parties in September 2003, Kenya stated, “Any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine or can be modified to function like an antipersonnel mine, should be considered an antipersonnel mine and therefore banned within the context of the definition of a mine and in cognizance of the letter and spirit of the convention.”

A legal advisor from Mozambique stated that Mozambique believes that the effect of the mine should be taken into account, and that, “The emphasis must be on the humanitarian character of the convention.” More specifically, he indicated that while Mozambique considers mines that detonate with more than 150 kilos of pressure to be antivehicle mines, any mine that is capable of exploding from the contact of a person is prohibited by the convention.

In February 2004, New Zealand’s Ambassador for Disarmament stated, “New Zealand regards anti-vehicle mines that can be ‘exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person’ to be anti-personnel mines.... It would leave open the possibility that States Parties could deploy excessively sensitive [antivehicle mines]...which were capable of being detonated by the presence of a person, relying on the exception under Article 2.1 as a defence by asserting that the mines were designed to be detonated by vehicles. Such an interpretation would leave a worrying loophole in the Convention, effectively giving States Parties scope to interpret their obligations under this provision in a manner that could compromise the humanitarian objectives of the Convention.”

In September 2003, Norway reiterated its position that the treaty text negotiated in Oslo in 1997 establishes an effect-oriented definition of antipersonnel mines which includes any mine which functions as an antipersonnel mine: “The definition of an anti-personnel mine in the Mine Ban Convention simply lays down that any mine designed to explode by human contact is defined as an antipersonnel mine. This is the ordinary meaning to be given to the text, in accordance with the principles of international law.... It does not matter whether the main purpose of usage for that mine is directed towards vehicles. It does not matter whether it is called something else than anti-personnel mine. If it falls within the definition, then it is an anti-personnel mine.”

During 2003, Slovakia carried out a study of which antivehicle mines may be prohibited or permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty. As a result, Slovakia has adopted a “Best Practice Policy for Antivehicle Mines” which involves taking “appropriate measures to ban the use of antivehicle mines which are activated by sensitive fuses and which are able to function as antipersonnel mines.” These include “antivehicle and antitank mines activated by trip wire running over the blocked stage of terrain or activated by tilt rod.” The Ministry added that, “Slovakia has also taken best practice measures banning the use of antihandling/explosive device Ro-3 together with mines.”

Zambia’s national legislation passed in December 2003 prohibits antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices that function as antipersonnel mines, including those equipped with tripwires, breakwires, and pressure-activated fuzes that operate at thresholds less than 150 kilograms.

Claymore Mines (Article 2)

Claymore-type mines (directional fragmentation munitions) are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances. They are inherently dual-use, designed to be command-initiated by electric means or victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes. In many cases, options for both means are packaged with the mine. In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them, to ensure that the means for victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations. Some States Parties have chosen to physically modify the mine to accept only electric detonation and some have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire assembly and appropriate blasting cap.

This notion has recently been extended to include the OZM-72, a bounding fragmentation mine, because according to available technical information it was designed and issued to be dual use with both victim-activated and command-detonated features. Both Lithuania and Moldova have reported modifying OZM-72 mines so that they no longer consider them antipersonnel mines, and count them as neither mines to be destroyed or mines retained for training. At the June 2004 Standing Committee meetings, the ICBL expressed concerns that this was not a desirable practice in that it could open the door for attempts to modify many types of mines in ways that may not be effective in protecting civilians.

A total of 24 States Parties have declared that they retain stocks of Claymore-type mines.[46] New among this group since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003 are Belarus, Lithuania, and Serbia & Montenegro. A majority of these states (17) have reported on the measures taken to ensure that their Claymore-type mines cannot be used in the victim-activated mode, including destruction of the tripwire assemblies and mechanical fuzes. Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Moldova have not made such statements.

Another 27 States Parties have declared that they do not possess Claymore-type mines.[47] New among this group since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2003 are Qatar, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, and Uruguay. For one of these, the Philippines, there are some contradictory indicators whether the armed forces possess Claymore-type mines.

The vast majority of States Parties, a total of 92, have not declared whether their forces possess Claymore-type mines. While 45 of these States Parties have declared that they do not possess antipersonnel mine stockpiles, in some cases it cannot be presumed that this includes Claymore-type mines. In September 2003, Bangladesh said, “The development of command-detonated mines, their use and sale would be another source of concern, if not humanitarian, of strategic import. This would be another case of vertical proliferation establishing discriminatory regimes and disparity between countries.”

The ICBL urges these 93 States Parties to declare whether they possess Claymore-type mines, and if so, include in their Article 7 transparency reports the measures that have been taken to ensure that they cannot be used in the victim-activated mode.

States Parties should also include Claymore-type antivehicle mines (“off route” directional mines) in this category. When equipped with a tripwire fuze, this mine meets the definition of antipersonnel mine in Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty and is therefore prohibited. The Czech Republic continues to market a Claymore-type antivehicle mine with a tripwire fuze, stating it does not consider the use of tripwires with antivehicle mines to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

[3] Twelve States Parties whose deadlines have passed have not submitted an initial transparency report.

[5] Angola, Ecuador, Ethiopia, and Venezuela have admitted using antipersonnel mines after signing the Mine Ban Treaty. There have been serious allegations regarding Burundi, Rwanda and Sudan as signatories and Uganda as a State Party.

[6] China, Finland, India, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the United States are party to CCW Amended Protocol II but not the Mine Ban Treaty. Poland and Ukraine are party to Amended Protocol II and signatories of the Mine Ban Treaty. Latvia and Sri Lanka have expressed their intent of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in the near future. Morocco states that it is in de facto compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

[7] Amended Protocol II also regulates the use of booby-traps, other explosive devices and, to a limited extent, antivehicle mines.

[9] The ten countries that abstained in voting on UNGA Resolution 51/45S: Belarus, China, Cuba, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and Turkey. Belarus and Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2003.

[15] There is compelling evidence of use by Burundi, Georgia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda. All of these governments deny use.

[16] There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total of 51 are the following. Five States Parties have been cited as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. Croatia unsuccessfully attempted to replicate production of the PMA-3 antipersonnel mine but discontinued this activity. Officials from Nicaragua note that the former government produced crude antipersonnel mines around 1985 during the civil war period but this activity stopped before the end of the war. In addition to those five, there remain unanswered ambiguities about past antipersonnel mine production in Sudan and Syria. Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of production, export, or capture. There was one unconfirmed US government report in 2000 that identified Sudan as a current producer of landmines, an allegation not been seen before or since.

[18] Production of antipersonnel mines in Finland ended in the early 1970s. Israel confirmed to Landmine Monitor in 2004 that its production lines for antipersonnel mines have been decommissioned. Mine Ban Treaty signatory Poland has voluntarily disclosed that its production activities stopped in 1988.

[19] Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Peru, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, and the United Kingdom. Fourteen others have not officially declared the ultimate disposition of production capabilities in transparency reports despite admissions or evidence of prior production activities, which includes the loading, assembling, and packing of antipersonnel mines: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. For many of these states however, antipersonnel mine production ceased prior to entry into force of the treaty.

[20] Former major producers and exporters include: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia), France, Germany (including the former East Germany), Hungary, Italy, and United Kingdom.

[21] Approximately 158,000 antipersonnel mines declared by States Parties cannot be attributed to a source because of the use of non-standard nomenclature by the declaring state.

[22] Ex-USSR states now party to the Mine Ban Treaty Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan declared stockpiles; Estonia has not. All states of the ex-Yugoslavia declared stockpiles: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovenia.

[23] Other big suppliers were Brazil, Germany (including the former East Germany), Spain, and the former Yugoslavia, followed by Belgium, Chile, former Czechoslovakia, France, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, and Singapore. Lesser exporters included Argentina, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, North Korea, Portugal, South Africa, Syria, and the United Kingdom.

[24] Statement by Ambassador Paul Meyer, Canada, to the Conference on Disarmament, 29 July 2004.

[25] As of 1 October 2004, Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Cameroon, Colombia, Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania had begun destruction, while Algeria, Bangladesh, DR Congo, Greece, and Zambia were in the planning stage.

[42] Stuart Maslen, Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties, Volume 1, The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2004), pp. 92-95.

[43] Previous editions of the Landmine Monitor Report contain statements or developments on the issue of foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines from States Parties Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Each individual country report in this edition contains a summary of their position and statements.

[44] Apart from the seven States Parties, the countries have included: Bahrain, Greece, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. Landmine Monitor had included then non-State Party Turkey on this list in the past, but Turkey now denies the presence of US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Greece is also a State Party now, but the current status of US mines there is unknown.

[45] Previous editions of the Landmine Monitor Report contain statements or developments on the applicability of Article 2 to all mines from States Parties Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Each individual country report in this edition contains a summary of their position and statements.