Ratings for the Transmission, Distribution and Disaster Reconstruction Project for Vietnam were as follows: outcomes were moderately satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was moderate, the Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and the... Подробнее +Ratings for the Transmission, Distribution and Disaster Reconstruction Project for Vietnam were as follows: outcomes were moderately satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was moderate, the Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and the Borrower performance was moderately unsatisfactory. Some lessons learned included: while it is important to ensure that pricing is set at proper levels, the approach of agreeing a targeted level of tariffs and a schedule by which they are achieved does not appear to have been successful. Apart from the possibilities that the level and timing may be set incorrectly or that circumstances might change, ensuring that they are implemented as agreed is difficult. It may be better to avoid tariff covenants altogether and only look at financial performance, since this then opens up the range of options including to cut costs. Better still might be the introduction of an agreed tariff methodology which removes the political dimension to tariff setting; in practice this is the basis on which utility regulators often agree tariffs. If financial performance targets are used, however, they must still be backed by covenants, and again they should not be of the all or nothing kind implied by suspension. The adoption of covenants at least as they were formulated in the project legal agreements presents difficulties because of the extreme nature of the remedy that is applied. More nuanced covenants, for example by applying interest rate or grace period penalties for the time that the covenant is breached, may be more effective at sustaining the dialogue while providing a clear incentive for action.
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