[Here follows discussion of the United States position should a meeting of
the Council of Foreign Ministers occur, and of problems relating to
Germany.]

Mr. Nitze said that State has been considering a proposal for a continuing
census and verification of all armaments. State did not believe [Page 464]that the Soviets could accept this and that
it would probably be advantageous to us if they did. If we could advance
such a proposal, we could build the rest of our program for a peaceful
settlement around this. Admiral Sherman asked whether the proposal related
to the census and verification of all armed forces and armaments or was
restricted to those in Central Europe. Mr. Nitze said we had been
considering the former. Admiral Sherman suggested that another possibility
was a census and inspection of Central Europe—of the countries that have, in
effect, been occupied countries. He expressed some concern over a universal
census and recalled our previous experience in China when the number of
troops we had stationed in Tsingtao at the time of a census became a virtual
ceiling beyond which we could not increase. General Bradley also saw some
dangers in this proposal, largely because of the difficulties inherent in
inspecting the Soviet Union and particularly Soviet atomic energy
stockpiles. Mr. Nitze reviewed briefly the technical possibility of
determining how much fissionable material had been produced by examination
of the production facility and of requiring an accounting for the total
output thus calculated.

7. General Collins suggested that it might be wise to put forward a proposal
which we were quite sure the Soviets could not accept in order to establish
a good political position, provided this proposal would be acceptable to
us—though not perhaps greatly to our advantage, in the event the Soviets did
accept it. Mr. Nitze thought an armaments proposal might provide the
foundation on which we could positively support German unification and the
solution of other troublesome issues. Admiral Sherman felt that we should
take the firm position that the German problem is one which cannot be
considered in isolation from the whole European problem. It was agreed that
a State-Joint Chiefs of Staff group should be established to consider what
kind of an inspection and verification system we would require and could
permit. It was also agreed that this group should make recommendations on
how data on the existing level of armaments could best be presented in its
relation to causes of present tensions. (The terms of reference and
composition of the group are indicated in Annex A to this memorandum.)13

[Here follows discussion on aspects of a possible settlement with the Soviet
Union in Europe, and on the situation in Korea.]

For information on the nature of the
State–JCS meetings, see footnote 1,
p. 33.↩

General of the Army
Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩