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UNCLAS SKOPJE 000234
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
FOR SENATOR VOINOVICH AND DELEGATION FROM THE AMBASSADOR
DEPT FOR H, EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIPOREPAMGTASECMK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL VOINOVICH VISIT
MARCH 24-26
REF: A. STATE 29812
¶B. SKOPJE 218
¶1. (SBU) Your visit comes as the government and opposition
are gearing up for this summer's parliamentary election, the
actual date of which has yet to be determined. Amid the
clamor of mutual recrimination and mudslinging of the
"pre-campaign," which already is underway, your visit is an
excellent opportunity to remind the government and opposition
of the importance of free and fair elections to Macedonia's
NATO and EU membership prospects. It is also an opportunity
to press the government and opposition to stay focused on key
reforms, despite the inevitable distractions of the political
campaign and regardless of which parties emerge to lead the
next government after the elections.
MUCH PROGRESS SINCE 2001 CONFLICT
---------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Although the 2001 armed insurgency by the
ethnic-Albanian National Liberation Army left wounds and a
controversial legacy, the interethnic coalition that came to
power in the 2002 parliamentary elections has made important
progress since then in implementing the Ohrid Framework
Agreement (FWA) that ended the conflict. In the process, the
government has built a democratic, multiethnic state and
Macedonia is now a secure, stable country.
¶3. (SBU) PM Vlado Buckovski's Social Democratic Union (SDSM)
is in an uneasy coalition with ethnic Albanian party DUI,
whose president is the former leader of the 2001 insurgency.
Despite occasional intra-coalition clashes, the government
has passed the constitutional amendments and legislation
required by the FWA, which enhanced the language rights and
local government decision-making powers of ethnic minorities
in Macedonia.
¶4. (SBU) Although language rights and national symbols remain
sensitive issues, the coalition continues to make measured
progress on FWA-related decentralization reforms. Government
entities are stepping up the hiring of ethnic minorities to
ensure that all ethnic groups are equitably represented in
the public administration. Recent measures of public opinion
are also encouraging; a poll last year found that for the
first time in seven years, both major ethnic groups had a
positive view of each other. And only three percent of
Macedonians list ethnic relations as the country's largest
problem -- the vast majority consider economic issues to be
Macedonia's greatest challenge.
FAIR ELECTIONS KEY TO MACEDONIA'S FUTURE
----------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Conducting free and fair elections is the first
challenge Macedonia must face as it aims to strengthen its
NATO and EU membership bids, as our Ambassador to NATO
pointed out during a recent visit to Skopje. The municipal
elections early in 2005 were characterized by a series of
irregularities, especially in predominantly ethnic Albanian
areas. A flawed system for ruling on challenges to electoral
results, and lackluster follow-through by prosecutors on
credible allegations of misconduct compounded the problem.
¶6. (SBU) In light of last year's events, Macedonian officials
will be keen to demonstrate their commitment to fair
elections. PM Buckovski will tell you that the government is
fully committed to "zero tolerance for electoral fraud" and
may note that the State Electoral Commission, which
administers the overall election process, is now fully funded
and operational. In addition, the Macedonian government has
worked with OSCE experts to draft an electoral code that
addresses concerns raised by the international community
following irregularities noted in previous elections. The
electoral code is under consideration by Parliament, which is
expected to pass it by the end of March.
¶7. (SBU) The only serious obstacle to the passage of the
electoral code is a dispute over the composition of local
electoral boards (LEBs). Although the OSCE found the
government draft electoral code acceptable, the main
opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, objects to the government's
proposal to staff LEBs with civil servants. The party argues
that the politicized nature of the civil service guarantees a
heightened potential for fraud. The government is working on
a compromise solution that would allow party representatives
to serve on the boards in addition to civil servants.
¶8. (U) President Branko Crvenkovski kicked off on March 2 an
initiative to intensify outreach to the media, civil society,
religious communities, and political parties to highlight the
need for free and fair elections. I participated in a
two-hour session during which the President, the OSCE and EU
representatives, and I gave the media our views about their
role in the elections. We underscored our hope that they
would work to create a positive, constructive atmosphere for
political debate as campaigning gets underway, and would
highlight the critical importance of a free and fair process
for the country's NATO and EU membership prospects. A
similar session with NGOs will take place in mid-March.
COOPERATIVE ON KOSOVO FINAL STATUS
----------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) The GOM acknowledges that the Contact Group will
take the lead on Kosovo final status talks, but strives to
play a small but constructive role in that process. The
government will accept any final status outcome that respects
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Due
to its experience with decentralization and defining the
rights of ethnic minorities, Macedonia is sometimes described
as a possible model of a multiethnic democracy for Kosovars
to emulate.
¶10. (SBU) Macedonia also hopes for demarcation of its border
with Kosovo before final status talks conclude. Limited
talks have been held at the technical level, but the Kosovars
are unwilling to accept a 2001 agreement between Belgrade and
Skopje delineating the border. We support resolution of the
demarcation issue within the framework of final status talks,
and we continue to emphasize that Kosovo, whatever its final
status, will need an internationally recognized and
demarcated border.
¶11. (SBU) Relations between Skopje and Pristina are good, and
links between Macedonia and Kosovo are growing. Macedonia
opened a trade office in Pristina last year, and the Prime
Minister and President frequently host working meetings with
PISG leaders on issues of common concern. Trains now run
between the two cities, and a free trade agreement signed in
July 2005 is a significant example of deepening economic
ties. PM Buckovski has expressed interest in hosting a visit
of PISG Prime Minister-designate Agim Ceku in the near
future.
MEASURED PROGRESS TOWARD NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP
--------------------------------------------- -
¶12. (SBU) A reliable U.S. ally, Macedonia's government was
disappointed by our announcement that we would not support a
summit on NATO enlargement before 2008. Macedonian officials
have been encouraged, however, by our message that Macedonia
is on the right path, even if difficult tasks remain. PM
Buckovski understands that NATO members want stable, secure
contributing members in the Alliance. He is likely to
emphasize that Macedonia has made good progress on defense
reforms and contributes to alliance operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Macedonia has been an important contributor to
regional cooperation, both as part of the Adriatic Charter
(A-3 -- Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) and as a contributor
to the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG). A recent poll
found that 90 percent of Macedonians support joining NATO.
¶13. (SBU) Macedonia was declared an EU candidate country in
December in recognition of the significant strides it has
taken toward meeting EU membership criteria. The European
Council determined, however, that Macedonia must make further
progress to strengthen the rule of law, fight corruption, and
enact judicial reforms before accession talks can begin. The
European Commission will report on Macedonia's progress in
the fall, but we do not expect the EU to set a date for the
opening of membership talks with Macedonia before late 2007.
CONSOLIDATING RULE OF LAW
-------------------------
¶14. (SBU) Ethnically mixed police patrols have access to all
communities in the country, including former "police no-go
zones" scattered throughout predominantly ethnic Albanian
parts of the country. Largely as a result of recent
standoffs in the Skopje suburb of Kondovo, the police often
get political buy-in for police operations before undertaking
them in ethnic Albanian villages. This pragmatic approach
normally minimizes the need to launch potentially violent
operations that could spark inter-ethnic violence.
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, TIP REMAIN ISSUES
----------------------------------------
¶15. (SBU) General rule-of-law weaknesses hamper Macedonia,s
ability to combat corruption, organized crime, and
trafficking in persons (TIP). The Ministry of Interior,s
Professional Standards Unit (PSU) has investigated a number
of allegations of police abuse, and has sanctioned such abuse
when it occurred. However, the PSU,s record is
inconsistent, and systems to ensure transparency in the MOI
are inadequate. Similarly, Macedonia,s fall from Tier 1 to
Tier 2 in the State Department,s annual Trafficking in
Persons report for 2005 reflected lack of political
commitment to combat aggressively lucrative organized crime
activities, as reflected in the GOM,s continuing lack of a
national action plan for combating TIP.
INDEPENDENT AND EFFICIENT JUDICIARY
-----------------------------------
¶16. (SBU) The parliament in December 2005 passed a package of
11 constitutional amendments strengthening the independence
and efficiency of the judiciary, which currently is one of
the least-trusted of all Macedonian government institutions.
The amendments curtail the role of Parliament in selecting
judges, who will now be selected and dismissed by an
independent State Judicial Council. Parliament is expected
to pass bylaws to implement the amendments by June 2006,
although the process could be delayed if the parties involved
cannot agree on bylaws to bring the reforms into effect.
Together with other aspects of the government's judicial
reform strategy, these steps reflect Macedonia's commitment
to increase the responsiveness and professionalism of its
judiciary and sharply reduce the system's backlog of over one
million cases.
CORRUPTION CONUNDRUM
--------------------
¶17. (SBU) As elsewhere in the Balkans, corruption is a
pervasive problem here. Macedonia was ranked 104 of 159
countries in the 2005 Transparency International annual
corruption perception index (CPI) report. Very few
high-profile corruption cases have been successfully
prosecuted, with even fewer cases involving a significant
sentence as a sanction. According to government data, in
2005 a total of only 37 persons were convicted on
corruption-related charges, 24 for abuse of their official
positions. According to some government sources, the lack of
an effective wiretapping law thwarts more effective
prosecution of corruption cases. In reality, there is a lack
of political will -- in the government and the judiciary --
to tackle this problem effectively.
GOVERNMENT LOOKS TO PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
--------------------------------------------- -
¶18. (U) The government,s most significant economic
achievement has been maintaining macroeconomic stability and
fiscal discipline. The economy has grown at a consistent
rate of 2 to 4 percent from 2002 to 2005. The government
budget deficit is low (-0.6% in 2005), inflation minimal
(0.5% in 2005), the currency is stable, and the level of
debt-to-GDP (40%) is manageable. Despite some marked
progress, however, both domestic and foreign business
investment is low, and GDP growth rate is not strong enough
to lower unemployment or the poverty rate significantly.
Macedonia ranks 57th in the Heritage Foundation,s 2005 Index
of Economic Freedom, closely behind A-3 partners Albania
(52nd) and Croatia (55th).
¶19. (U) The government has made significant economic reforms
in a number of areas, including recent implementation of a
"one-stop shop" that has reduced the time required for
registering a new business. However, more needs to be done
to create an economic climate that will attract increased
investment and bring official unemployment figures down from
over 30 percent. Essential remaining steps include enforcing
property and contract rights, and completing privatization of
the state-owned electricity monopoly to bolster investor
confidence in the country.
MACEDONIAN, SERBIAN CHURCHES AT ODDS
------------------------------------
¶20. (SBU) An ongoing dispute between the Serbian Orthodox
Church (SOC) and the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) over
which church may represent Macedonia's Orthodox believers has
affected relations between Belgrade and Skopje. The
imprisonment last year of Zoran Vraniskovski, a former MOC
bishop now recognized by the SOC as Archbishop Jovan of
Ohrid, was criticized by the international community and many
human rights NGOs. Vraniskovski was released on March 3
after the Supreme Court reduced Vraniskovski's sentence for
inciting religious intolerance. Despite this positive step,
however, Vraniskovski is likely to return to prison unless an
appeals court reverses his September 2005 conviction for
embezzlement.
¶21. (U) A government commission is working on a draft law
that will determine, inter alia, whether Vraniskovski's
SOC-affiliated church can register officially as a religious
group in Macedonia. Recent revelations that Vraniskovski's
group is funded by the Serbian government -- a move widely
seen here as a provocative intrusion into Macedonia's
domestic affairs -- are likely to complicate the situation.
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBS -- MODERATE FORCE
-------------------------------------------
¶22. (U) On a political level, ethnic Serbs are represented in
the Parliament by the Democratic Party of the Serbs (DPS), a
junior member of the ruling coalition. The DPS largely
avoids controversial language and religious issues, although
its MP, Ivan Stoiljovic, introduced a draft law in Parliament
last year that would have amnestied Vraniskovski. According
to the 2002 census, just under two percent of Macedonia's
population are ethnic Serbs.
NAME DISPUTE WITH GREECE CONTINUES
----------------------------------
¶23. (SBU) Although Macedonia and Greece have extensive
economic relations, the ongoing dispute over Macedonia's
constitutional name has complicated relations between the two
countries. Efforts to resolve the dispute are being led
under UN auspices by Matthew Nimetz, a process that the USG
strongly supports. While the UN continues to recognize
Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (or
FYROM), the U.S. moved to recognize the country as the
Republic of Macedonia in November 2004, joining over 100
other countries that have chosen to do so. That decision
dramatically lifted the opinion most Macedonians had of the
United States.
MILOVANOVIC