Plaintiff
brings federal and state law claims against her ex-husband,
Brandon Donahue; the Sheriff; and the Deputies, alleging
Defendants conspired “to thwart the prosecution of
Brandon Donahue, a fellow law enforcement officer, for
domestic violence.”[5] On August 3, 2017, this Court ruled on
Defendants' motions to dismiss.[6]

Plaintiff's
remaining federal claims are her claims against (1) Brandon
Donahue and the Deputies, in their individual capacities, for
the alleged conspiracy to violate her right to equal
protection under § 1983; (2) the Sheriff, as the proper
defendant for Plaintiff's claims against the Deputies in
their official capacities, for the alleged conspiracy to
violate her right to equal protection under § 1983; (3)
the Sheriff, in his official capacity, for Monell
liability; and (4) Plaintiff's request for attorney's
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in the event she is
the prevailing party on any of the above
claims.[7] Plaintiff's remaining state-law claims
are her claims against (1) Brandon Donahue and the Deputies
for violating Plaintiff's right to equal protection under
the Louisiana Constitution by actions occurring within one
year of her filing suit on November 18, 2015, and (2) her
claim against the Sheriff based on respondent superior for
Brandon Donahue's and the Deputies' alleged state
constitutional violation of Plaintiff's right to equal
protection.[8]

Brandon
Donahue served as a reserve deputy with the St. Tammany
Parish Sheriff's Office from 2012 until
2014.[9] According to Plaintiff, Brandon Donahue
“engaged in a pattern of violence against Sarah, which
he justified and excused and was furthered by virtue of his
position as a reserve deputy sheriff.”[10] Plaintiff
alleges that, during the course of their marriage, Brandon
Donahue threatened to kill her, threatened to use his
Sheriff's office-issued taser on her, threw coffee in her
face, pressed his knee into her stomach, and pushed the back
of her body into a shower door.[11] To provide context, the
Court summarizes Plaintiff's allegations below.

According
to Plaintiff, on July 7, 2013, following a domestic
disturbance between Plaintiff and Brandon Donahue,
“[s]everal of Brandon Donahue's colleagues from the
St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office . . . responded to
[a] 911 call at the Donahue residence.”[12]Plaintiff
claims she described her injuries to the responding officers
and advised them of Brandon Donahue's history of domestic
abuse, but the responding officers refused to arrest Brandon
Donahue.[13] This incident, Plaintiff alleges, was
the first act in a continuing conspiracy between Brandon
Donahue and the Deputies “to protect Brandon Donahue
from prosecution for assault and to discredit Sarah in order
to benefit Brandon Donahue in his anticipated divorce and
child custody case against Sarah.”[14]

Plaintiff
alleges that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, Sergeant
Steven Gaudet conducted a “slip-shod and
outcome[-]determinative” investigation into
Plaintiff's allegations against Brandon Donahue.
According to Plaintiff, Gaudet's police report
“falsely suggested that Sarah had been the
aggressor” and falsely stated that Plaintiff did not
want to pursue criminal charges against Brandon
Donahue.[15] Plaintiff further alleges that Gaudet
relied heavily on his “consultation” with Brandon
Donahue instead of Plaintiff, the alleged
victim.[16]

In
furtherance of the conspiracy, Plaintiff contends Sergeant
Michael Ripoll, when investigating an alleged assault against
Plaintiff by Plaintiff's attorney, “ignor[ed] and
wholly disregard[ed] evidence that supported
[Plaintiff's] version of events and [relied] on
information provided by Brandon Donahue that discredited
[Plaintiff] by portraying her as unstable and
unreliable.”[17]

According
to Plaintiff, the conspiracy continued when Brandon Donahue
submitted a written request to the St. Tammany Parish
Coroner's Office for an Order for Protective Custody for
Plaintiff, “alleging falsely that she had stated
several times . . . that she ha[d] thought about
suicide.”[18] Plaintiff alleges she was involuntarily
admitted to the hospital, but was later
released.[19]

Following
her release from the hospital, Plaintiff attempted to pick up
her son “as it was her time to have custody of her
child.”[20] When Plaintiff arrived at Brandon
Donahue's parents' residence to retrieve her child, a
St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office deputy informed her
“he would not release the child to her, despite that it
was [her] court-ordered night to have custody of her
son.”[21] In response, Plaintiff called the
Sheriff's Office, which dispatched Sergeant Alex
Dantagnan. Dantagnan allegedly “blocked [Plaintiff]
from exiting the house, ” “screamed in
[Plaintiff's] face that she was psychotic, [and] that she
was not leaving with the child, ” and threatened to
arrest her if she did not leave the house.[22]

Plaintiff
alleges that this event prompted her to file a complaint with
the Internal Affairs Division of the St. Tammany Parish
Sheriff's Office on December 11, 2013. Plaintiff's
complaint alleged “unfair favoritism shown by the
Sheriff's Office to Brandon Donahue” and a
“continuous pattern of unfair and harassing treatment
she received from the Sheriff's Office and the Defendant
Deputies.”[23] Plaintiff alleges that, in furtherance
of the conspiracy to protect Brandon Donahue, “the
Sheriff's Office never contacted [her] to obtain more
information or advise her of the status or outcome of her
complaint.”[24]According to Plaintiff, the Sheriff's
Office later advised her that Dantagnan had been cleared of
any misconduct.

Finally,
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 24, 2015, she met with Gaudet
to inform him she wished to press criminal charges against
Brandon Donahue for the alleged acts of domestic abuse that
occurred in July of 2013. Plaintiff claims that, in
furtherance of the conspiracy to protect Brandon Donahue from
arrest and prosecution, Gaudet attempted to intimidate and
discourage Plaintiff from pursuing charges against Brandon
Donahue by informing Plaintiff that any criminal charge
against Brandon Donahue had “probably
prescribed.”[25] According to Plaintiff, Gaudet promised
to send reports from the July 2013 incident to the district
attorney's office, but never did so.

Plaintiff
alleges that Brandon Donahue was formally charged with
domestic abuse aggravated assault by the St. Tammany Parish
District Attorney's office, and the charge was dismissed
in July of 2016.[26]

ANALYSIS

Summary
judgment is proper only “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”[27] “An issue is material if its
resolution could affect the outcome of the
action.”[28]When assessing whether a material factual
dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the
evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.”[29] All
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party.[30]There is no genuine issue of material
fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of
fact could find for the non-moving party, thus entitling the
moving party to judgment as a matter of law.[31]

“[A]
party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion[] and identifying those portions of [the
record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.”[32] If the
dispositive issue is one on which the non-moving party will
bear the burden of persuasion at trial, to satisfy Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56's burden, the moving party
must do one of two things: it “may submit affirmative
evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim” or “demonstrate to the Court
that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to
establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's
claim.”[33] When the moving party chooses the latter
option it

must affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the
record. This may require the moving party to depose the
nonmoving party's witnesses or to establish the
inadequacy of documentary evidence. If there is literally no
evidence in the record, the moving party may demonstrate this
by reviewing for the court the admissions, interrogatories,
and other exchanges between the parties that are in the
record.[34]

If the
moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be
denied.

If the
moving party successfully carries its burden, the burden of
production then shifts to the non-moving party to direct the
Court's attention to something in the pleadings or other
evidence in the record setting forth specific facts
sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material fact
does indeed exist.[35] Thus, the non-moving party may defeat a
motion for summary judgment by “calling the Court's
attention to supporting evidence already in the record that
was overlooked or ignored by the moving
party.”[36]“[U]nsubstantiated assertions are
not competent summary judgment evidence.”[37] Rather,
“the party opposing summary judgment is required to
identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate
the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her
claim. ‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court
a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to
support a party's opposition to summary
judgment.'”[38]

SECTION
1983 CONSPIRACY CLAIMS

To
state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiff
must allege: (1) an agreement between the private and public
defendants to commit an illegal act and (2) a deprivation of
a constitutional right.[39] Plaintiff's remaining claim of an
underlying constitutional deprivation is her right to equal
protection. To make out a “class of one” equal
protection claim, Plaintiff must prove Defendants
intentionally treated her differently from the way they
treated similarly situated individuals without any rational
reason for doing so and that this differential treatment was
motivated by “an illegitimate animus or ill-will”
towards Plaintiff.[40]

In
their motions for summary judgment, Defendants seek dismissal
of Plaintiff's § 1983 conspiracy claims, arguing the
evidence Plaintiff puts forth in support of her allegations
cannot establish, even circumstantially, that Defendants
agreed to deprive her of any rights protected by the U.S. or
Louisiana Constitutions.[41] Defendants further argue that, even
if Plaintiff can show an agreement, she has not put forth
sufficient evidence to show Defendants treated Plaintiff
differently from the way they treated any other alleged
victim of domestic violence or that any disparate treatment
stemmed from Defendants' ill will towards
Plaintiff.[42] Plaintiff claims she has offered
sufficient circumstantial evidence to demonstrate genuine
issues of material fact exist with respect to these issues
and that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment with
respect to her § 1983 claims.[43]

Existence
of Agreement

To
establish the existence of a conspiracy, a plaintiff
“must show that the defendants agreed to commit an
illegal act”[44] and “allege specific facts to show
[their] agreement.”[45] Allegations that are merely
conclusory, without reference to specific facts, will not
suffice.[46] “This requirement must often be
met by circumstantial evidence; conspirators rarely formulate
their plans in ways susceptible of proof by direct
evidence.”[47] A conspiracy allegation under §
1983 allows a plaintiff to “impose liability on all of
the defendants without regard to who committed the particular
act.”[48] “A private party may be held
liable under § 1983 if he or she is a ‘willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its
agents.'”[49]

To show
an illegal agreement, a plaintiff's evidence, “when
‘placed in . . . context . . . [must raise] a
suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel
conduct that could just as well be independent
action.'”[50] In Jabary v. City of Allen,
[51]
to support his § 1983 conspiracy claims, the plaintiff
alleged the defendants “held private meetings to devise
a method of shutting down” the plaintiff's business
and they had “several conversations, private meetings,
and other communications” in which the defendants
discussed ways to “deprive [the plaintiff] of his civil
rights and the due process of the law.”[52] Even at the
motion to dismiss stage, allegations that the defendants held
“private meetings, ” were not sufficient when, as
the Fifth Circuit noted, “[t]he times, places, and
other circumstances of the ‘private meetings' and
secret conversations [were] notably absent” from the
plaintiff's evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiff “fail[ed] to create a reasonable inference
that such an agreement existed.”[53]

In
Thomas v. City of New Orleans, [54] the Fifth
Circuit held the plaintiff had put forth sufficient evidence
at the trial of the case to show the defendants had agreed to
commit an illegal act that resulted in his injury. In that
case, the plaintiff, a police officer, testified that after
he reported a fellow officer for using deadly and unnecessary
force in executing a misdemeanor arrest, he was suspended and
ultimately discharged.[55] The record showed “that the
various defendants had participated in private meetings
during which [the plaintiff's] contentions were
discussed” and included witnesses who testified that a
“blue curtain” existed within the police
department.[56] The Fifth Circuit held that, based on
this circumstantial evidence, “a jury reasonably could
. . . infer[] that . . . a conspiracy
existed.”[57]

In
discharging his initial burden on summary judgment, Brandon
Donahue avers Plaintiff will not be able to prove an
essential element of her conspiracy claim because the record
is devoid of any evidence showing Defendants agreed to
deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights.[58] Brandon
Donahue argues the only evidence Plaintiff offers to show the
existence of an agreement is her own deposition[59] in which she
was questioned about evidence of a conspiracy and responded:

(3) “the fact that I didn't leave with my son on my
custody day”;[62] [and]

[(4)] “the fact that Sergeant Gaudet [] assured me that
he would send the file over to the District Attorney's
Office from the July 7th incident.”[63]

By
pointing to Plaintiff's deposition testimony that is in
the record, [64] Brandon Donahue argues that he has
demonstrated the absence of any evidence indicating
Defendants agreed to protect him from prosecution, thereby
violating Plaintiff's right to equal protection.
Plaintiff's testimony does not support an inference that
there was an agreement between Defendants. The burden,
therefore, shifts to Plaintiff to direct the Court's
attention to evidence sufficient to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact does indeed exist.[65]

In her
oppositions to Defendants' motions for summary judgment,
Plaintiff points to five overt acts she contends are
circumstantial evidence of Defendants' agreement to
violate her right to equal protection.[66] In a prior
ruling on Defendants' motions to dismiss, [67] the Court
determined that all but one of the alleged overt acts had
prescribed, leaving only Plaintiff's June 24, 2015
interaction with Gaudet, in which Plaintiff sought to press
charges against Brandon Donahue for the alleged July 2013
battery, as the basis for her cause of action.[68] Although the
prior alleged overt acts have prescribed, “[i]t does
not follow, however, that the statute of limitations excludes
those same allegations from the determination of whether an
agreement existed.”[69] Accordingly, the Court may
consider the other alleged overt acts that took place before
Plaintiff's June 24, 2015 interaction with Gaudet as
relevant background evidence.[70]

As
explained above, the four prescribed overt acts may be
considered to determine whether an agreement existed. With
respect to these overt acts, Plaintiff offers the following
communications between Brandon Donahue and the Deputies as
circumstantial evidence that an agreement existed: (1)
Gaudet's phone call with Brandon Donahue during his
investigation into the July 2013 alleged domestic violence
incident, [71] (2) Ripoll's interview with Brandon
regarding Plaintiff's mental health after Plaintiff
complained about her lawyer's misconduct, [72] and (3)
Dantagnan's interaction with both Plaintiff and Brandon
Donahue following the November 2013 child custody
incident.[73]These communications occurred during the
course of routine police investigations and, most often, were
accompanied by communications with Plaintiff. Plaintiff has
offered no evidence of private meetings or secret
conversations in which Defendants discussed an agreement to
deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights.

With
respect to the overt act on June 24, 2015, which has not
prescribed, Plaintiff describes no communications that would
provide circumstantial evidence of an
agreement.[74]

Finally,
Plaintiff offers as circumstantial evidence of an agreement
to violate her constitutional rights that “Brandon
served as a reserve officer of the St. Tammany Parish
Sheriff's Office from 2004 to 2014 and had personal
friendships with various Sheriff's Office employees. His
role as a Reserve Deputy Sheriff was known by each of the
Defendant Deputies involved in any investigation of
[Plaintiff's] claims.”[75]

That
Brandon Donahue served as a reserve deputy sheriff is
undisputed. To support her assertion that Brandon Donahue had
formed “personal friendships with various
officers, ” Plaintiff points to Brandon
Donahue's and Scott Lee's depositions.[76]The
Court's review of these depositions reveals that they
either do not support Plaintiff's assertions or do not
raise a material factual dispute. For example, in
his deposition, [77]Brandon Donahue testified that “the
only people current or former at the sheriff's office who
[he had] spent any time outside of the sheriff's office
with . . . are Jeff Jardine and Scott Lee, ” neither of
whom is a defendant in this case and neither of whom is
alleged to be part of the conspiracy.[78] Lee states in
his deposition that, although he and Brandon Donahue are
friends, “[i]t's been years” since he has
seen him.[79] No testimony from Jeff Jardine was
introduced. Neither Lee nor Jardine is a defendant in this
case and there is no evidence that either of them
communicated with Brandon Donahue about his divorce case or
with the Deputies or the Sheriff about Brandon Donahue. There
is no evidence in the record that Brandon Donahue was Steven
Gaudet's friend. In Gaudet's deposition, he testified
that, other than speaking to Brandon Donahue on the phone
once in 2013, Gaudet had “[n]ever met the gentleman
before, ”[80] a statement Plaintiff does not dispute.

Plaintiff's
circumstantial evidence with respect to the existence of an
agreement is (1) that Brandon Donahue was a reserve deputy at
the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office from 2012 until
2014, (2) that Defendants worked at the St. Tammany Parish
Sheriff's Office, (3) that Defendants were aware of
Brandon Donahue's “role as a Reserve Deputy
Sheriff, ”[81] and (4) that Brandon Donahue is friends
with Lee and Jardine, neither of whom is a defendant.
Although “determining whether a conspiracy existed . .
. ‘may involve questions of motive or intent,
'”[82] Plaintiff's bare assertion of the
existence of a conspiracy is insufficient to create a factual
dispute. “[A] mere possibility, based upon speculation,
is insufficient to preclude the entry of summary
judgment.”[83] Plaintiff offers no evidence that
Defendants held private meetings, [84] had secret
communications, [85] or that Brandon Donahue asked the
Deputies for assistance with his divorce.[86] Plaintiff has
failed to provide the Court with “specific facts to
show an agreement”[87] and, therefore, has not demonstrated
a genuine factual dispute with respect to whether Defendants
agreed to conspire against her.[88] Even construing this
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
finds no reasonable trier of fact could conclude Defendants
agreed to prevent Brandon Donahue's arrest and protect
him from prosecution, thereby violating Plaintiff's right
to equal protection.[89] Simply stated, Plaintiff fails to create
a reasonable inference that an agreement existed between
Defendants to deprive her of her right to equal
protection.[90]

Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on this basis alone.
Nevertheless, the Court also will examine whether Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not
demonstrated a factual dispute as to whether Defendants'
ill will towards Plaintiff caused them intentionally to treat
her differently from the way they treated other alleged
victims of domestic violence.[91]

Deliberate
Deprivation of Constitutional Right for No Rational
Reason

As the
underlying constitutional violation in her § 1983
conspiracy claim, Plaintiff contends “she, as a
‘class of one, ' was ‘intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated' for no
‘rational' reason.”[92] In Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, the Supreme Court held that
“the Equal Protection Clause can give rise to a cause
of action on behalf of a ‘class of one' even when
the plaintiff does not allege membership in a protected class
or group.”[93] “To state a claim sufficient for
relief, a single plaintiff must allege that an illegitimate
animus or ill-will motivated her intentionally different
treatment from others similarly situated and that no rational
basis existed for such treatment.”[94] At trial
Plaintiff must establish “that the unequal police
protection had no rational basis, ” which requires
Plaintiff to show “that the defendant deliberately
sought to deprive [her] of the equal protection of the laws
for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the duties of
the defendant's position.”[95] Evidence of ill intent is
critical-“its absence will defeat an Equal Protection
challenge to unequal police protection.”[96]

Plaintiff,
belatedly in her surreply, identified Brittany Torregano as a
similarly situated comparator.[97] Plaintiff identifies the
different treatment of former St. Tammany Parish Deputy
Torregano, who she argues committed domestic abuse battery on
his spouse and, as support, attaches an April 27, 2015
article in the New Orleans Advocate, titled
“St. Tammany Sheriff's Deputy, wife arrested in
domestic disturbance.”[98] Plaintiff argues that in 2015,
then Sheriff Strain's office arrested Deputy Derrick
Torregano for domestic abuse battery and fired him following
an altercation with his wife, who stabbed him during the
incident, [99] but failed to arrest or fire Brandon
Donahue following an altercation with his wife in 2013.

Plaintiff
characterizes her “class of one” claim as one
based on personal vindictiveness and acknowledges that, in
addition to identifying a comparator, she must show improper
motive, animus or ill will.[100] To show ill intent, a
plaintiff must put forth “proof that the cause of the
differential treatment of which the plaintiff complains was a
totally illegitimate animus towards the plaintiff by the
defendant.”[101] In Mata v. City ofKingsville, [102] the facts of which are
substantially similar to the facts of this case, the
plaintiff alleged that following a physical altercation with
her husband, a police officer, “she was unjustifiably
stopped on five or more occasions by police officers . . .
and that [her husband] stalked her in his patrol
car.”[103] The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, explaining that

While it is certainly conceivable that members of the police
department may have harbored ill will towards [the plaintiff]
since [her husband] was employed as an officer of the
department, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
“conclusory statements in an affidavit do not provide
facts that will counter summary judgment evidence, and
testimony based on conjecture alone is insufficient to raise
an issue to defeat summary judgment.”[104]

In
contrast, in Shipp v. Mahon, [105] the
plaintiff alleged she was the victim of a long, increasingly
violent pattern of spousal abuse that culminated in her
husband's kidnapping, raping, and shooting her in the
chest with a shotgun.[106] The plaintiff, who fortunately
survived the assault, claimed that the local sheriff's
department ignored her reports of domestic violence because
her mother-in-law was a sheriff's deputy and also
happened to be the dispatcher who received the
plaintiff's call reporting the abuse.[107] The Fifth
Circuit concluded

It is undisputed that Betty Shipp's son engaged in
reprehensible behavior against her daughter-in-law that
finally resulted in law enforcement and judicial
intervention. It is not improbable that Betty Shipp developed
some animosity against her daughter-in-law during her
volatile relationship with Dalton or after Shipp fled when
Dalton's escalated abuse prompted criminal charges
against him. If deputy Betty Shipp did foster ill-will
against her daughter-in-law that ultimately influenced the
level of protection Shipp received from the [Sheriff's
Office], Shipp may be able to establish an unequal police
protection claim.[108]

The
court vacated and remanded the case, concluding that with
this circumstantial evidence of ill-will the plaintiff
“may be able to establish an unequal police protection
claim within the framework elucidated in Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech.”[109]

In this
case, Defendants point to the affidavit and deposition of
Steven Gaudet as demonstrating that “any differential
treatment Plaintiff may have received was rationally based
upon investigative judgment and
discretion.”[110] In his affidavit, Steven Gaudet states
that he did not attempt to dissuade or intimidate Plaintiff
from moving forward with criminal charges against her
husband, but did tell her that the decision whether or not to
bring the case to trial rests with the District Attorney. He
further told Plaintiff that he would speak with the District
Attorney's Office about the July 7, 2013
incident.[111] In his deposition, Steven Gaudet
testified that Plaintiff did not approach him until two years
after the initial incident.[112] Gaudet testified that he
did contact the district attorney's office to inform them
about Plaintiff's desire to press charges.[113]

The
Sheriff and the Deputies, by submitting “affirmative
evidence that negates an essential element of
[Plaintiff's] claim, ” have shifted the burden of
production to Plaintiff.[114] The plaintiff responds that
“she, as a ‘class of one, ' was
‘intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated' for no ‘rational'
reason.”[115]

With
respect to whether Plaintiff was treated differently from
other similar situated individuals, Plaintiff correctly
points out that the “requirement that a class-of-one
plaintiff's comparators be ‘similarly situated'
is not a requirement susceptible to rigid, mechanical
application-‘[t]here is no precise formula to determine
whether an individual is similarly situated to
comparators.'”[116] Instead, the determination
is case specific and depends on the facts and context of the
case.[117] To state a class of one claim under
the equal protection clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that she has been treated differently from others similarly
situated and there was no rational basis for the disparate
treatment.[118] The two page newspaper article
represents that the deputy was stabbed in the back during the
domestic disturbance and that both former Deputy Torregano
and his wife were arrested the following
morning.[119] By contrast, neither Sarah Donahue nor
Brandon Donahue wished to pursue charges after the July 7,
2013 incident and neither one was arrested.[120] Plaintiff
did not approach Gaudet about arresting Brandon Donahue until
two years after the incident occurred.[121] The Court
finds that, after considering the facts and context of this
case as contrasted with the Torregano case, Plaintiff has not
put forward evidence that she was treated differently from a
similarly situated individual.

Although
the lack of a comparative is sufficient to defeat
Plaintiff's claim, the Court will examine whether
Plaintiff has created a disputed issue of fact with respect
to whether an illegitimate animus or ill-will motivated
Defendants' treatment of her and whether any rational
basis existed for such treatment Plaintiff points to five
overt acts, claiming that this circumstantial evidence, when
viewed as a whole, demonstrates Defendants' coordinated
effort to undermine Plaintiff and assist Brandon Donahue in
the upcoming divorce and child custody
proceedings.[122] The bulk of Plaintiff's evidence
stems from overt acts that have prescribed. Because in the
context of a conspiracy claim under § 1983, “the
actionable civil injury to a plaintiff results from the overt
acts of the defendants, not from the mere continuation of a
conspiracy, ”[123] the Court evaluates only
Plaintiff's June 2015 interaction with Gaudet to
determine whether Plaintiff has established a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to whether Defendants
“deliberately sought to deprive [Plaintiff] of the
equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature
unrelated to the duties of the defendant's
position.”[124]

To show
Defendants' ill intent and lack of a rational basis for
the actions of Gaudet in June 2015, Plaintiff points to the
fact that, after she approached Gaudet about pressing charges
against Brandon Donahue for the July 2013 incident of alleged
domestic violence, “he was unsupportive of charges
being filed . . . and forwarded no documents (including the
photos of [Plaintiff's] injuries) to the D.A. for
evaluation.”[125] Plaintiff claims that, in furtherance
of the conspiracy to protect Brandon Donahue from arrest and
prosecution, Gaudet attempted to intimidate and discourage
Plaintiff from pursuing charges against Brandon Donahue by
informing Plaintiff that any criminal charge against Brandon
Donahue had “probably prescribed.”[126] According
to Plaintiff, Gaudet's actions demonstrate he “was
undermining efforts to prosecute Brandon Donahue for domestic
violence in furtherance of a conspiracy to protect Brandon
Donahue from prosecution and aid him in his divorce and
custody proceedings.”[127] Gaudet explains his actions
by testifying in his deposition that Plaintiff did not
approach him until two years after the initial
incident.[128] Gaudet admits he did not forward any
materials to the district attorney's office, but states
he did contact the district attorney's office to inform
them about Plaintiff's desire to press charges,
[129] and Brandon Donahue was charged
thirteen days after Plaintiff contacted Gaudet about her
desire to press charges.[130] Given these facts, it is
implausible that Gaudet's actions stemmed from “a
totally illegitimate animus toward[]” Plaintiff or that
they had no rational basis.[131] “[C]onclusory
statements in an affidavit do not provide facts that will
counter summary judgment evidence, and testimony based on
conjecture alone is insufficient to raise an issue to defeat
summary judgment.”[132]

A
reasonable jury could not conclude, without more, that
Gaudet's June 2015 interaction with Plaintiff
demonstrates his animus towards her or that there was no
rational basis for his conduct during their interaction.
Because Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence
demonstrating Defendants' malicious intent to violate her
right to equal protection, she has failed to create an issue
of disputed fact with respect to whether any perceived
differential treatment was motivated by illegitimate animus
or ill will.[133]Further, Plaintiff has not created a
material factual dispute with respect to whether Defendants
had a rational basis for treating her differently from any
other alleged victim of domestic violence.

Plaintiff
has not made out the elements necessary for a “class of
one” claim. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims on this basis.

STATE
LAW CLAIMS

The
Deputies[134] and the Sheriff[135] move for
summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's state law causes
of action.[136] The Court in its Order and Reasons on
Defendants' motions to dismiss[137] has dismissed
Plaintiff's state law causes of action for abuse of
rights against Donahue, the Deputies, and the Sheriff,
[138] as well as her negligence claim
against Brandon Donahue.[139] For the reasons expressed
in the Court's Order and Reasons on the motions to
dismiss, the Court now dismisses Plaintiff's causes of
action under the Louisiana Constitution for violations of her
right to petition, to free speech and association,
[140] and to privacy, [141] as well
as for violations of her due process rights.[142]Plaintiff's remaining cause of
action for a state constitutional violation is based on equal
protection for violations occurring after June 24,
2015.[143] “Louisiana jurisprudence does
not recognize an equal protection claim in the context of
only a single member, or a class-of-one
plaintiff.”[144] Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiff's state constitutional claims is
granted.

Because
the claims for constitutional violations have been dismissed,
Plaintiff's claim against the Sheriff for respondent
superior liability based upon the actions of Brandon Donahue
and the Deputies[145] also is dismissed.

MONELL
CLAIM

Plaintiff
claims the Sheriff's alleged failure to adequately train
“his officers in the handling of domestic violence
complaints”[146] “amounts to a deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come in contact.”[147] In his motion for summary
judgment, the Sheriff seeks dismissal of this Monell
claim against him. Municipal liability under § 1983 has
three elements: (1) a policy maker, (2) an official policy,
and (3) “a violation of constitutional rights whose
‘moving force' is the policy or
custom.”[148] Having found no underlying
constitutional violation in this case, the Court dismisses
this claim. “If a person has suffered no constitutional
injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the
fact that the department regulations might have authorized
the [alleged violation] is quite beside the
point.”[149]

CONCLUSION

IT
IS ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment
filed by Brandon Donahue;[150] Sergeants Michael Ripoll,
Jr., Alex Dantagnan, Jr., and Steven Gaudet;[151]and
Sheriff Rodney J. Strain, Jr.[152] are
GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims against all
Defendants are DISMISSED with
prejudice.[153]

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