The Politics of Intraparty Dissent: Blue Dog Democrats in the 111th U.S. Congress

Abstract: This study examines the interactions of fiscally conservative Blue Dog Coalition members with their respective constituencies and the Democratic majority in the 111th U.S. Congress. As a result of the Democratic National Committee‘s "50 State Strategy," non-traditional Democratic candidates were financed and recruited to win in mostly rural, and outer ring suburban districts. The 17-member expansion of the moderate-to-conservative Blue Dog Coalition complemented growth in the House Democratic majority during this period. This study analyzes two questions arising from the expansion of the moderate and conservative Congressional wing of the Democratic Caucus. First, with regard to member and majority interactions, what electoral, district demographic, and voting behavior differences distinguish the Blue Dog Coalition as a whole from the liberal Progressive Caucus? Second, with regard to member and constituency interactions, do Blue Dog Coalition members explain their votes differently than Progressive Caucus members? Applying Mayhew (1974), I assumed that members are preeminently motivated to win reelection. I found that when compared with Progressive Caucus members, Blue Dog incumbents are reelected by smaller margins. Moreover, Blue Dogs are elected from more marginal, less "safe" districts that have a greater likelihood to split ticket vote for a Republican presidential candidate and a Democratic Congressional candidate. Accordingly, these electoral realities coincide with the Blue Dog Coalition‘s diminished party unity indices; Blue Dogs oppose the majority on both fiscal measures where the Coalition has expressed a specific policy position and highly publicized, highly salient votes. Although a direct relationship is inconclusive, I infer a correlation between a Blue Dog member‘s election marginality and the low party unity index. With respect to district demographic differences, I found that the use of Census statistics to delineate between Blue Dog and Progressive districts did not provide significant contrasts. My second research question derives from my first: if Blue Dog members are more marginal collectively, do members explain Washington voting behavior differently than Progressive Caucus members? I examined 188 separate press releases explaining two highly salient votes in the 111th Congress, and found that coalition membership influences only specific messages. Blue Dogs cited the need to reduce the deficit to their constituencies more consistently than Progressive members. Overall, most messages were generally salient across each coalition, with few significant differences in member explaining behaviors. Although messages were more similar, Blue Dog and Progressive appeals differed: Blue Dogs were more likely to appeal to the local impact of legislation and to added amendments within legislation than Progressive counterparts.