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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KAMPALA 000095
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25
TAGS: PGOVPRELPHUMKDEM
SUBJECT: UGANDA: ELECTORAL COMMISSION FALLS FLAT, AGAIN
CLASSIFIED BY: Aaron Sampson, Pol/Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: The opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)
party narrowly defeated the ruling National Resistance Movement
(NRM) in a February 15 by-election marred by mismanagement, rain,
and a shoot-out involving the Minister of Housing's bodyguard. The
FDC attributed its victory to superior organization and the
government's inability to rig the election due to the presence of
international observers led by the U.S. Mission. The NRM dismissed
the outcome as a gift to the FDC from the disgruntled NRM member
who siphoned off critical NRM votes by running as an independent.
The Electoral Commission once again disenfranchised voters through
mismanagement of the voter registry and polling stations. Citing
the U.S. congressional reporting requirement, the Commission
refused to provide the Mission with information related to the
Mbale by-election and directed the Mission to route requests for
election related material via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. End
Summary.
------------------------------------------
Opposition Holds on to Mbale Seat
------------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) The FDC narrowly maintained its parliamentary seat from
the eastern town of Mbale on February 15, defeating the NRM by less
than 1,000 votes. The Mbale seat opened in December when FDC member
Wilfred Kajeke resigned in disgust over the NRM-dominated
Parliament's failure to tackle government corruption. Kajeke
accused the NRM of "mortgaging Uganda" and vowed not to return to
the legislative body as long as the NRM remains in power. Kajeke's
resignation offered the NRM an opportunity to capture one of the
FDC's 39 parliamentary seats and embarrass the Chairman of the
Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC), Mbale-native and FDC member
Nadala Mafabi, who is spearheading Parliament's investigation into
the massive Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)
corruption scandal (ref. A).
¶3. (SBU) Internal squabbles over the NRM's method of selecting a
candidate to run for Kajeke's seat, however, resulted in one
official NRM candidate and a second NRM-affiliated independent
candidate. In the campaign's final days, President Museveni and
several Ministers travelled to Mbale to convince the NRM
"independent," Shinyabulo Mutende, to withdraw for the good of the
party. Accusing the NRM of rigging its own internal primary,
Mutende refused and garnered just enough votes - 1,199 (12%) - to
force the NRM's official candidate into second place with 3,875
(38%) votes. FDC candidate Jack Wamanga Wamai won with 4,776 (47%)
votes. The election's participation rate was approximately 25%.
-----------------------------------
Electoral Commission Follies
-----------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) With just 72 polling stations all located within the
town's city limits, the Mbale election should have been less
complicated and cheaper than the January 19 Budiope by-election
which involved 141 polling stations spread across an isolated and
rural part of central Uganda (ref. B). However, as in that race,
the Electoral Commission again finalized the voter registry only
two days before election day, depriving opposition parties and
voters of the ability to obtain copies of the registry or
scrutinize its contents. The Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) party,
which purchased an out-of-date voter registry from the Commission
prior to the election, did not receive an accurate copy until 11pm
on election eve. Several FDC poll watchers reported discrepancies
between unofficial registries sold to the FDC and official
registries issued to poll workers on election day. Observers
recorded numerous instances where poll workers turned away voters
with voter cards because their name failed to appear on voter
registries.
KAMPALA 00000095 002 OF 004
¶5. (SBU) The Commission's inexplicable failure to alphabetize the
voter registry resulted in major delays and confusion. One
exasperated polling officer gave up trying to locate voter names on
his registry, and resorted instead to reading the names of several
hundred registered voters aloud before an increasingly frustrated
crowd of potential voters (a security officer later fired into the
air in front of this polling station to disperse angry crowds).
Opposition parties also complained that the Commission neglected to
invite opposition representatives to a Commission-funded January 13
training for poll workers, police, and NRM party delegates; that
some local government officials were running various polling
stations; that the Commission failed to provide opposition parties
with sample ballots in advance of election day, resulting in
ballots that depicted the FDC's skeleton key logo in black and
white while the NRM's school bus logo appeared in color; and that
the Commission's opaque reorganization of several polling stations
disenfranchised voters. Election observers confirmed most, if not
all, of these allegations.
--------------------------------------------
And Then There Was the Shoot-Out
-------------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) In the days before the election, President Museveni and
several Ministers travelled to Mbale to drum up support for the
official NRM candidate and shame the rogue NRM independent
candidate Mutende into withdrawing from the race. In response,
Mutende accused the government of harassing and intimidating his
supporters, and police arrested one Mutende booster for allegedly
threatening supporters of the official NRM candidate with a gun.
Meanwhile, FDC candidate Wamanga accused the government of
harassing his supporters after police arrested 24 individuals on
February 9, allegedly for refusing to close their shops during a
campaign visit by Housing Minister Michael Werikhe. Wamanga also
complained that Mbale's Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and
District Internal Security Officer (DISO) hand picked presiding
officers at certain polling stations to tilt the election in the
NRM's favor.
¶7. (SBU) On election day, opposition leaders accused the government
of using the security forces to frighten voters and depress
turnout. Several opposition leaders also accused Presidency
Minister Beatrice Wabudeya and Housing Minister Werikhe of using
their government vehicles and armed security details to intimidate
voters at polling stations by threatening to record the names of
those voting against the NRM. U.S. Mission observers did not see
Ministers Wabudeya and Werikhe on election day, and were unable to
substantiate these claims. However, local NGO observers recorded
one instance of an unnamed NRM official with armed guards
threatening poll workers.
¶8. (SBU) At 2pm, Minister Werikhe's vehicle became entangled with a
vehicle belonging to the wife of NRM independent candidate Mutende
in front of a particularly disorganized and tense cluster of
polling stations in downtown Mbale. According to reliable
eyewitness accounts, Werikhe's bodyguard descended from the
Minister's vehicle and shot out the tires of Mutende's car,
wounding one member of Mutende's entourage in the foot. In the
ensuing chaos, Werikhe fled to the Mbale police station. Werikhe
later escaped the mob assembled outside the police station by
exiting through a back door. After the incident, a police spokesman
told international observers that Werikhe's bodyguard fired warning
shots into the air, and that the wounded individual's foot was
punctured by a "sharp object." Police later said Werikhe ordered
his bodyguard to fire in self defense. Werikhe claimed he never
gave the order to fire, and that the bodyguard fired into the air.
---------------------
Fraud Deterrents
---------------------
KAMPALA 00000095 003 OF 004
¶9. (SBU) Applying lessons learned from the January 19 Budiope
by-election, where more than 20% of polling stations carried by the
NRM reported impossibly inflated participation rates, the FDC
paired one local poll watcher with one trusted party operative at
each of Mbale's 72 polling stations to prevent NRM payoffs of FDC
poll workers. A contingent of approximately 20 international and
local observers served as an additional check, likely visiting each
polling station at least once on election day. In general, poll
workers and party delegates appeared dedicated and cheerful despite
less than ideal circumstances, organizational problems, and
sporadic rain. However, there were isolated incidents of fraud and
malfeasance.
¶10. (SBU) For instance, the Electoral Commission re-named and
re-located one polling station for unexplained reasons just days
before the election. When U.S. observers finally located this
station at 11:30 am, participation rates were already nearly triple
the average turnout rates at other polling stations, even though no
one in Mbale seemed to be aware of this polling station's location.
This was the only station where we observed newly registered voters
with registration slips issued in January 2010, and the Director of
the European-funded $20m Deepening Democracy Project later noted
that the Commission was unable to explain the unusual addition of
100 new voters to this polling station. Turnout at this station
mysteriously dropped to near zero after our arrival, and final
results revealed this station as a significant outlier, with a
remarkable 89% of votes cast in favor of the NRM.
¶11. (SBU) The atmosphere at the cluster of polling stations where
the Werikhe shooting occurred was particularly tense. An opposition
poll watcher at one of these stations told the Mission that the
station's presiding officer tried to pressure fellow poll workers
to sign the final tally sheet in the morning, before voting even
began. A subsequent procedural "error" by a presiding officer at a
separate station led the Electoral Commission to void results from
the entire polling station. A particularly aggressive presiding
officer at a third polling station repeatedly challenged observers
to show proof of identification and accreditation. A procedural
"error" by this presiding officer later led the Commission to also
void all ballots from this station.
¶12. (SBU) Failures by presiding officers to properly complete tally
sheets or seal results envelopes resulted in the disqualification
of results from four polling stations. The FDC claimed its
candidate carried each of these stations, and accused presiding
officers and the Electoral Commission of conspiring to
disenfranchise opposition voters. On February 21, FDC spokesman
Wafula Oguttu attributed his party's narrow victory to the
vigilance of FDC poll watchers, the U.S. congressional directive to
monitor preparations for the February 2011 presidential election,
and the presence of foreign observers.
--------------------------------------------- --
Electoral Commission: No Info for You
--------------------------------------------- --
¶13. (SBU) Prior to the Mbale election, the Commission's Secretary
Sam Rwakoojo repeatedly refused to release budget information for
the Mbale by-election or the 2011 general elections to the U.S.
Mission. Rwakoojo also refused to provide the Mission with copies
of the final results for Mbale, first instructing the Mission to
send a request in writing, and then responding with a February 18
letter instructing the Mission to channel all requests for
election-related information via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Rwakoojo told PolOff that the Commission believes the Foreign
Ministry should be aware of any information shared with the U.S.
Mission due to the congressional reporting requirement. As of
February 24, Rwakoojo had also refused to share the Mbale results
and budget information with European donor partners.
KAMPALA 00000095 004 OF 004
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
-----------
Comment: Electoral Commission Shoots Itself in the Foot, Again
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
-----------
¶14. (C) The atmosphere in Mbale was particularly tense. In the
evening after voting ended, security forces twice fired into the
air to disperse crowds gathered around the Electoral Commission's
tallying center in downtown Mbale. The Commission's penchant for
last minute changes to the voter registry once again undermined an
election's credibility. These opaque changes needlessly raised the
suspicions of opposition parties and disenfranchised voters. U.S,
U.K., and Dutch observers were disappointed by the Commission's
passive response to legitimate allegations of voter intimidation
and electoral malfeasance on election day, as well as the clearly
duplicitous claims by government officials that Minister Werikhe's
body guard shot only into the air and that the wounded individual
was injured not by a bullet but by a sharp object.
¶15. (C) In a February 23 editorial entitled "Voter Registers: Are
the EC and NRM Bedfellows?", the FDC's parliamentary opposition
leader Morris Ogenga Latigo observed that the Commission can
disenfranchise more than 700,000 voters by merely striking - or
adding - 20 to 50 voters at each of Uganda's 20,000 polling
stations. The Budiope and Mbale by-elections suggest that minor
alterations at the micro level are already underway. FDC spokesman
Oguttu's assessment of the Mbale contest is probably correct: the
vigilance of FDC poll watchers and presence of international
observers likely prevented additional and more widespread fraud.
Uganda's next parliamentary by-election is in March in Kabale along
Uganda's border with Rwanda. An additional by-election will also
occur in Arua in northern Uganda to replace a parliamentarian who
died unexpectedly of natural causes on February 21.
HOOVER