This page from President Eisenhower's Memoires, Mandate
for Change, page 372, shows that he believed Ho Chi Minh
would have won any free election in Vietnam in 1954. This is
certainly why the U.S. did not permit such an election, though
the Geneva Convention of 1954 required it.

"Reviewing the entire episode in retrospect, I find
that four questions merit consideration:

(1) Why, with the superiority in manpower and resources
available, were the French unable to win?

(2) Why was the very considerable amount of material
American aid not more effective in helping the French?

(3) Why, when the French were in difficulty and the
interests of the Free World affected, at least indirectly,
were the successive French governments unwilling to take
logical and reasonable steps to bring United States' and
other support to their assistance?

(4) What lessons or benefits, if any, accrued to the Free
World as a result?

I am convinced that the French could not win the war
because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and
confused, badly weakened their military position. I
have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable
in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections
been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per
cent of the populations would have voted for the Communist Ho
Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai.
Indeed, the lack of readership and drive on the part of Bao
Dai was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese
that they had nothing to fight for. As one Frenchman said to
me, 'What Vietnam needs is another Syngman Rhee, regardless
of all the difficulties the presence of such a personality
would entail.'

In the earlier stages of the conflict, the fighting was
mostly conducted where rough terrain made it impossible to
seek out the enemy and bring him to a pitched battle. Later,
even when the battle lines became so located that the grouses
mobiles could be effective, there still existed within the
Red River Delta a condition in which the French could control
even the main roads for only about two or three hours a day.
The rest of the time all lines of communication were in the
hands of the Vietminh. This meant that the mass of the
population supported the enemy. With such a feeling
prevalent, it was inevitable that the French should find it
impossible to retain the loyalty of their Vietnamese
troops." (emphasis added - GF)