What is North Korea's goal with missile tests? Perhaps not what you think

U.S. officials believe North Korea would respond to a U.S. strike by attacking South Korea or Japan. (Aug. 29, 2017)

U.S. officials believe North Korea would respond to a U.S. strike by attacking South Korea or Japan. (Aug. 29, 2017)

Stephan Haggard

The North Korean missile test this week and those on July 28 and 4 -- timed to irritate the Trump administration -- all signal a dangerous development of capabilities.

The intelligence community has assessed that North Korea is on a path to miniaturize a nuclear weapon, and the range of North Korean missiles has steadily expanded.

North Korea can already strike U.S. forces in the region and is on a path to reach the homeland, if it cannot already.

But what is our theory of the case? What is North Korean leader Kim Jong Un doing?

Although the country is notoriously opaque, the acceleration of tests could signal weakness, rather than strength. It could mean there is nervousness in Pyongyang that the U.S. strategy might actually be working.

It is not the time to be unnerved or to act rashly. Rather, the administration should stick to the strategy that has been outlined by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, in part to keep China on board.

How did we get here?

Kim Jong Un's only hope is to drive political wedges between the tacit coalition that is forming among China, the United States, Japan and Korea.

It is natural for any incoming administration to belittle the efforts of its predecessors. The Obama administration’s strategy for North Korea was dubbed “strategic patience.”

The idea was to steadily ratchet up pressure on North Korea through sanctions, while simultaneously holding out the prospect of a return to multilateral negotiations. This approach came after the so-called Six Party Talks collapsed at the end of the Bush administration in 2008.

The new administration ultimately landed on a quite similar position, although with one important twist: a willingness to more aggressively use sanctions, including against Chinese firms.

Since the never-ending nuclear crisis broke in 2002, North Korea’s trade with Japan, South Korea and most other countries in the world has fallen to virtually zero. (The United States has practically no trade with the country).

The result: North Korea has become increasingly dependent on China, and exactly as the economy was becoming more open and dependent on trade.

Since the United States cannot sanction North Korea directly, a pressure strategy depends crucially on getting China’s support. While China has been firm in its opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program, it has also been reluctant to squeeze Pyongyang too hard.

The reasons are geostrategic, but also quite practical. While some Chinese conservatives fear a unified Korea, there is also fear that too much pressure might bring down the regime and unleash a flood of refugees.

As a result, getting China to cooperate has hinged on delicate diplomacy.

Earlier this month, the Trump administration registered a little-noticed win by getting China to sign on to measureable United Nations Security Council sanctions that will dramatically cut North Korea’s access to foreign exchange going forward.

The State Department has also been doing quiet shoe-leather diplomacy to assure that countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines don’t provide North Korea relief.

In 2011, following the death of his father, Kim Jong Un came to power promising a more forward-looking regime -- still brutally authoritarian, but with a great focus on the economy and material benefits after many lean years.

To realize this dream, however, requires that North Korea follow the other Asian countries’ successful integration into global markets.

This is impossible under a heightened sanctions regime, and Kim Jong Un no doubt understands that fact. Therefore, his only hope is to drive political wedges between the tacit coalition that is forming among China, the United States, Japan and Korea.

What better way to put stress on that coalition than by testing missiles? Such tests not only force closer cooperation between the U.S. and its Asian allies — which China fears — but also but unleashes the president’s Twitter account as well.

As soon as China feels that American alliance capabilities are strengthening, and that the U.S. might be poised to attack, Beijing drifts back to equivocation and its maddening stance for “all sides” to stay calm.

The U.S. needs to stick calmly to the course that Tillerson has laid out, with surprisingly strong and overt support on the part of top military commanders.

To be sure, we will underline our commitment to allies in the region, strengthening their defensive capabilities and deploying additional defensive forces.

But the task is also diplomatic: to continue to stress to China that this problem is festering and that a solution needs to be found that moves back toward talks.

Every Korea watcher -- left, right and center -- at some point harbors fantasies of simply taking Kim Jong Un out.

But the risks are extraordinarily high, and fall mostly on South Korea.

As we have seen, the gains of tough talk are limited. Note how quickly the president’s remarks about respect have run hollow.

But in fact, staying the course is probably already ringing economic alarm bells in Pyongyang. The task right now is to keep them ringing rather than handing the North Koreans a diplomatic win.

Stephan Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at the University of California San Diego.

Guest Voices is always open to new points of view. If you have an opinion to put forth in a column, email us at jen.steele@sduniontribune.com.