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B. KINSHASA 465
Classified By: POLCOUNS LGURIAN for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Diplomatic relations between Belgium and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are at a low point
as Congolese officials reacted negatively to recent public
comments Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht made
regarding poor governance, lack of transparency, corruption
and disrespect for human rights in the Congo. These
statements reiterate the broad criticisms de Gucht raised
while on a trip to the DRC April 16-23 (ref a). De Gucht
claims he gave the same message privately to Congolese
President Kabila during the trip. The Congolese closed their
consulate in Antwerp and recalled their ambassador from
Brussels, although the closure and recall may be for other,
unrelated reasons. The Congolese government ordered the
Belgians to close their consulates in Bukavu and Lubumbashi,
though Belgian officials continue to operate their
consulates. Prime Minister Yves Leterme reportedly expressed
doubts about his foreign minister's diplomacy style, while
supporting his message. Leterme publicly expressed the hope
relations between Belgium and the Congo will soon return to
normal as he tries to reach President Kabila by phone. He
may suggest to Kabila sending a special envoy to work out
their differences. It will be a test of Leterme's diplomatic
skills to deal with Kabila in such a way as to move forward
in their relations without damaging his domestic image. End
Summary.
2. (C) Jozef Smets, MFA Africa expert and Great Lakes
Contact Group envoy, was open and frank about the current
crisis in Belgian/Congolese relations and the resulting
fallout within the Belgian government. Smets told poloff he
was not surprised by the backlash reaction from the Congo.
Smets was on the trip with de Gucht; he said their meeting
with President Kabila in which de Gucht talked about evidence
of corruption, human rights issues, and the lack of good
governance and transparency in government and finance and
economics, did not go well. De Gucht was particularly
concerned about the Congolese failure to renew the mandate
for UN experts on human rights in the Congo and about their
assertion that human rights were no longer problematic.
Smets noted de Gucht had visited the Congo numerous times and
given Kabila similar, though discreet, messages of concern
but, seeing no changes, de Gucht had decided to go public
with tough messages for the government.
3. (C) The first conversations were publicized in the Congo
and news reports made it appear de Gucht humiliated Kabila.
Although Smets says there is a general consensus here that de
Gucht's message is correct, e.g., there is corruption in high
places and the DRC government record of human rights is poor,
the issue is the sensitivity of the perception of a former
colonial nation humiliating a democratically elected African
leader. Adding fuel to the fire, the Belgian press actively
reported numerous differences of opinion on Belgian/Congolese
relations and the Congolese closed their consulate in Antwerp
and recalled their ambassador from Brussels (although the
closure and the recall may be for other, unrelated reasons).
Although ordered to close their consulates in the DRC, the
Belgians continue to work in their offices in Bukavu and
Lubumbashi Smets believes the issues will be settled given
time and said Belgium will remain fully engaged in the DRC
despite this crisis.
4. (C) Leterme did talk to Congolese PM Gizenga May 27 and
continues to try to reach President Kabila by phone.
According to Smets, Leterme's message points will include:
asking the Congolese to postpone closing the Belgian
consulates, stressing the importance to the Goma peace
process of the consulate in Bukavu; asking if Kabila will
receive the Belgian Ambassador to the DRC; and mentioning a
plan to send a high level special envoy to Kinshasa to work
out the problems. This message, Smets noted, adds to the
sensitivities within the Belgian government since sending a
special envoy would in effect be telling de Gucht he can no
longer do the job there. There are also press stories
Leterme has pulicly distanced himself from de Gucht; Leterme
reportedly called de Gucht twice to explain he really agrees
with de Gucht's message.
5. (C) There is some concern de Gucht's statements will
cause the Congo to turn away Belgian interests and favor more
the Chinese for economic development. China is said to have
given the Congo a USD 9 billion loan in return for access to
important mining sites. Another version is the Chinese have
a deal that, in exchange for 10 million tons of copper, they
will build 3500 km. of roads and 3250 km of railways for the
Congo. The market price of 10 million tons of copper is USD
70 billion and the estimated value of the new roads and
railways is USD 6.5 billion. Kabila allegedly will get USD
500 million in kickbacks from the Chinese.
6. (C) Two legal cases in Belgium add new fodder for
comment. The Congolese Interior Minister Kalume is involved
in a court case in Belgium on money laundering practices.
Recently a Belgian judge decided to freeze Kalume's
(considerable) assets in Belgium. The second case involves
the arrest of Congolese opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba
on an ICC warrant (ref b). A Belgian judge ruled Bemba must
be held in custody until his transfer to the Hague to face
the ICC charges. His lawyer is appealing, asking for Bemba's
release on bail. The Belgian authorities made the arrest
after receiving information Bemba was about to leave Belgium.
(NOTE: Bemba had also applied for a visa at the U.S.
Embassy in Brussels. Lacking approval from the Department to
issue the visa, the visa was not granted. END NOTE.)
7. (C) In an earlier meeting with visiting AF Office
Director Karl Wycoff, Belgian MFA Africa hands stressed that,
because of the many familial and historic ties between
Belgium and the Congo, any mistake in Congo policy quickly
becomes a domestic political issue in Belgium. There are
many power centers in Belgium in the Congo debate -- the
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, the President of
the Parliament, the regional governments and (quietly) the
monarchy itself. Also, although Belgium,s economic
interests in the Congo are much less than in the past,
Belgium remains concerned that Congo,s rich resources be
used for the best interests of the Congo. Finally, Belgium
feels strongly other countries in Europe and Africa continue
to look to Belgium to take the lead in the Congo.
8. (C) Comment: The DRC is one of Belgium's top priority
foreign policy concerns and the latest diplomatic flare-ups
are provoking discussions on future involvement there. The
DRC was a top item on the Council of Ministers agenda and
will be a focus for future sessions. One goal of the April
trip was to present to the Congolese a unified Belgian
government message; the recent dissension in Belgium makes it
difficult for any Belgian message critical of the DRC
government to be effective. The Belgians, from all
indications, plan to remain engaged and to keep open the
lines of communication with the Congolese government. The
Belgians asked their Consul Generals to remain at their posts
for now and have not recalled the Belgian ambassador. It
will be a test of Leterme's diplomatic and political skills
to deal with Kabila in such a way as to move forward their
relations without damaging his domestic image and making the
Congo even more of a football in Belgium's already difficult
political debates. End Comment.

Raw content

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000819
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, DRC, CH, BE
SUBJECT: BELGIUM DIPLOMATS IN DISARRAY OVER CONGO
REF: A. BRUSSELS 719
B. KINSHASA 465
Classified By: POLCOUNS LGURIAN for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Diplomatic relations between Belgium and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are at a low point
as Congolese officials reacted negatively to recent public
comments Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht made
regarding poor governance, lack of transparency, corruption
and disrespect for human rights in the Congo. These
statements reiterate the broad criticisms de Gucht raised
while on a trip to the DRC April 16-23 (ref a). De Gucht
claims he gave the same message privately to Congolese
President Kabila during the trip. The Congolese closed their
consulate in Antwerp and recalled their ambassador from
Brussels, although the closure and recall may be for other,
unrelated reasons. The Congolese government ordered the
Belgians to close their consulates in Bukavu and Lubumbashi,
though Belgian officials continue to operate their
consulates. Prime Minister Yves Leterme reportedly expressed
doubts about his foreign minister's diplomacy style, while
supporting his message. Leterme publicly expressed the hope
relations between Belgium and the Congo will soon return to
normal as he tries to reach President Kabila by phone. He
may suggest to Kabila sending a special envoy to work out
their differences. It will be a test of Leterme's diplomatic
skills to deal with Kabila in such a way as to move forward
in their relations without damaging his domestic image. End
Summary.
2. (C) Jozef Smets, MFA Africa expert and Great Lakes
Contact Group envoy, was open and frank about the current
crisis in Belgian/Congolese relations and the resulting
fallout within the Belgian government. Smets told poloff he
was not surprised by the backlash reaction from the Congo.
Smets was on the trip with de Gucht; he said their meeting
with President Kabila in which de Gucht talked about evidence
of corruption, human rights issues, and the lack of good
governance and transparency in government and finance and
economics, did not go well. De Gucht was particularly
concerned about the Congolese failure to renew the mandate
for UN experts on human rights in the Congo and about their
assertion that human rights were no longer problematic.
Smets noted de Gucht had visited the Congo numerous times and
given Kabila similar, though discreet, messages of concern
but, seeing no changes, de Gucht had decided to go public
with tough messages for the government.
3. (C) The first conversations were publicized in the Congo
and news reports made it appear de Gucht humiliated Kabila.
Although Smets says there is a general consensus here that de
Gucht's message is correct, e.g., there is corruption in high
places and the DRC government record of human rights is poor,
the issue is the sensitivity of the perception of a former
colonial nation humiliating a democratically elected African
leader. Adding fuel to the fire, the Belgian press actively
reported numerous differences of opinion on Belgian/Congolese
relations and the Congolese closed their consulate in Antwerp
and recalled their ambassador from Brussels (although the
closure and the recall may be for other, unrelated reasons).
Although ordered to close their consulates in the DRC, the
Belgians continue to work in their offices in Bukavu and
Lubumbashi Smets believes the issues will be settled given
time and said Belgium will remain fully engaged in the DRC
despite this crisis.
4. (C) Leterme did talk to Congolese PM Gizenga May 27 and
continues to try to reach President Kabila by phone.
According to Smets, Leterme's message points will include:
asking the Congolese to postpone closing the Belgian
consulates, stressing the importance to the Goma peace
process of the consulate in Bukavu; asking if Kabila will
receive the Belgian Ambassador to the DRC; and mentioning a
plan to send a high level special envoy to Kinshasa to work
out the problems. This message, Smets noted, adds to the
sensitivities within the Belgian government since sending a
special envoy would in effect be telling de Gucht he can no
longer do the job there. There are also press stories
Leterme has pulicly distanced himself from de Gucht; Leterme
reportedly called de Gucht twice to explain he really agrees
with de Gucht's message.
5. (C) There is some concern de Gucht's statements will
cause the Congo to turn away Belgian interests and favor more
the Chinese for economic development. China is said to have
given the Congo a USD 9 billion loan in return for access to
important mining sites. Another version is the Chinese have
a deal that, in exchange for 10 million tons of copper, they
will build 3500 km. of roads and 3250 km of railways for the
Congo. The market price of 10 million tons of copper is USD
70 billion and the estimated value of the new roads and
railways is USD 6.5 billion. Kabila allegedly will get USD
500 million in kickbacks from the Chinese.
6. (C) Two legal cases in Belgium add new fodder for
comment. The Congolese Interior Minister Kalume is involved
in a court case in Belgium on money laundering practices.
Recently a Belgian judge decided to freeze Kalume's
(considerable) assets in Belgium. The second case involves
the arrest of Congolese opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba
on an ICC warrant (ref b). A Belgian judge ruled Bemba must
be held in custody until his transfer to the Hague to face
the ICC charges. His lawyer is appealing, asking for Bemba's
release on bail. The Belgian authorities made the arrest
after receiving information Bemba was about to leave Belgium.
(NOTE: Bemba had also applied for a visa at the U.S.
Embassy in Brussels. Lacking approval from the Department to
issue the visa, the visa was not granted. END NOTE.)
7. (C) In an earlier meeting with visiting AF Office
Director Karl Wycoff, Belgian MFA Africa hands stressed that,
because of the many familial and historic ties between
Belgium and the Congo, any mistake in Congo policy quickly
becomes a domestic political issue in Belgium. There are
many power centers in Belgium in the Congo debate -- the
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, the President of
the Parliament, the regional governments and (quietly) the
monarchy itself. Also, although Belgium,s economic
interests in the Congo are much less than in the past,
Belgium remains concerned that Congo,s rich resources be
used for the best interests of the Congo. Finally, Belgium
feels strongly other countries in Europe and Africa continue
to look to Belgium to take the lead in the Congo.
8. (C) Comment: The DRC is one of Belgium's top priority
foreign policy concerns and the latest diplomatic flare-ups
are provoking discussions on future involvement there. The
DRC was a top item on the Council of Ministers agenda and
will be a focus for future sessions. One goal of the April
trip was to present to the Congolese a unified Belgian
government message; the recent dissension in Belgium makes it
difficult for any Belgian message critical of the DRC
government to be effective. The Belgians, from all
indications, plan to remain engaged and to keep open the
lines of communication with the Congolese government. The
Belgians asked their Consul Generals to remain at their posts
for now and have not recalled the Belgian ambassador. It
will be a test of Leterme's diplomatic and political skills
to deal with Kabila in such a way as to move forward their
relations without damaging his domestic image and making the
Congo even more of a football in Belgium's already difficult
political debates. End Comment.