Having regard to the observations submitted by
the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by
the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Hristo Peshev Raichinov, is
a Bulgarian national who was born in 1935 and lives in Sofia. He is
represented before the Court by Ms I. Lulcheva and Ms Y. Vandova, lawyers
practising in Sofia. The respondent Government are represented by Ms
M. Pasheva, co-agent, of the Ministry of Justice.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties,
may be summarised as follows.

At the relevant time the applicant was head of
the Ministry of Justice's division responsible for the financial and
logistical support for the judicial system. In his capacity he sometimes
attended meetings of the Supreme Judicial Council – the body responsible
for, inter
alia, implementing the judicial budget. The Supreme Judicial
Council has twenty-five members, including the chairpersons of the Supreme
Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor-General.
Its meetings are presided by the Minister of Justice.

The Supreme Judicial Council had a meeting on
15 December 1993, at which the issue of an end-year bonus for judges,
prosecutors, and investigators was discussed. The applicant attended
the meeting, as he usually did in cases when budgetary matters were
considered. The Deputy Prosecutor-General, Mr S., who was a member of
the Council, was also present.

At some point during the meeting, after commenting
the provisions of the State Budget Act, the applicant said: “You have
decided to have financial matters dealt with by Mr S. For me he is not
a clean person...”. He then added: “I can prove this”. The Prosecutor-General
reacted vehemently, asking the applicant to leave the room. The applicant
tried to continue but was interrupted by Mr S. who asked him to clarify
what he meant by “unclean person”. The Minister of Justice intervened
and requested the applicant to retract the words “unclean person”.
The Prosecutor-General reacted immediately: “There is no retraction,
there are prosecution authorities. This is already a problem, this is
already a crime”. The Minister insisted on the applicant apologising
for the words “unclean person”. Thereupon the applicant said: “Alright,
I apologise”. Because of the tense situation all financial matters
which were due to be discussed at the meeting were adjourned.

Immediately after the meeting the Prosecutor-General
requested a copy of the minutes. He received it on 27 December 1993
and on 12 January 1994 sent it to the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office
with instructions to carry out a preliminary inquiry with a view to
opening criminal proceedings against the applicant. On 11 February 1994
the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office transmitted the case file to the
Sofia District Prosecutor's Office with instructions to open criminal
proceedings against the applicant for insult. The investigation was
to be performed not by an investigator, as would usually be the case,
but by a prosecutor.

On 16 February 1994 the Sofia District Prosecutor's
Office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for “having
said publicly 'for me he is not a clean person' in respect of [Mr S.]
in his presence ... which was degrading for the latter's dignity”,
contrary to Article 148 § 1 (1), (3) and (4) in conjunction with Article
146 § 1 of the Criminal Code.

On 20 April 1994 the applicant was charged.

The investigation was concluded on 16 June 1994
and the applicant and his counsel were allowed to consult the case file.
After having done so, counsel for the applicant requested that all members
of the Supreme Judicial Council who had been present at the meeting
be questioned and that an expert report be prepared to compare the audio
tape of the meeting with the written minutes. The prosecutor in charge
of the investigation refused, reasoning that the facts of the case had
been elucidated by the evidence already gathered, which supported the
accusation.

The applicant was indicted. The trial against
him took place on 11 April 1995 at the Sofia District Court. The court
heard two witnesses: the alleged victim of the insult, Mr S., and another
member of the Supreme Judicial Council. Mr S. stated that it was difficult
for him to say whether the applicant's remark had changed the Supreme
Judicial Council's opinion of him. The other witness stated that sometimes
the discussions in the Council were quite heated but that no one had
ever used such words or made such remarks. Three other witnesses called
by the prosecution failed to show up and the court struck them out of
the evidence, holding that the circumstances of the case had been sufficiently
elucidated through the testimony of the witnesses who had been questioned
and through the written evidence. Counsel for the applicant did not
reiterate the request that all members of the Council be summoned as
witnesses, instead stating that the facts had been fully clarified.

After that the court heard the parties' closing
argument. Counsel for the applicant pleaded for a verdict of not guilty,
relying, inter alia, on Article 10 of the Convention. She argued that
the words “for me he is not a clean person” were only an expression
of the applicant's personal opinion about Mr S. The applicant's words
were objectively not rude, vulgar or insulting. He had simply exercised
his right to voice what he thought about another person, in purely neutral
terms. To equate this with an insult would mean that only those who
had a favourable opinion of Mr S. would be allowed to express it. In
her view, the entire case had been sparked by the Prosecutor-General's
vindictiveness.

In a judgment of 12 April 1995 the Sofia District
Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to a fine
of 3,000 old Bulgarian levs (BGL) and to a public reprimand. The court
held as follows:

“The actus reus consisted of uttering words
which were humiliating and disparaging for [Mr S.] in his presence.
It is not disputed ... that the accused ... said in respect of [Mr S.]
'For me he is not a clean person'. The expression has an insulting character,
because it dishonours [Mr S.]. It contains a disproval of his ethical
and moral qualities, which is irreconcilable with his functions as a
person disposing with budgetary funds. In this fashion the personality
of [Mr S.] and his authority in front of the other members of the [Supreme
Judicial Council] were encroached upon. 'Not a clean person' has only
one interpretation, that the person concerned has a tainted consciousness
and lacks morality. Even if this is the [applicant's] personal opinion
about the qualities of [Mr S.], the remark was aimed at affecting the
honour and the dignity of [Mr S.]. Criticism ..., especially when it
comes to the public manifestations of persons who represent state institutions,
has to be consistent with the rules of society, ethics and the common
rules of decency and morality. These must not be trampled on under the
pretence that the personal opinion about another is a matter of perception
and [represents the exercise] of the constitutional right to freedom
of expression... It is unconstitutional and criminal to criticise in
an insulting form, as in the case at hand...

The offence was intentional... It was committed
in public, in front of twenty-five members of the Supreme Judicial Council
and the Deputy-Minister of Justice. This increases the gravity of the
offence, because the offensive words were heard not only by the victim,
but also by a large group of persons...

The fact that the [applicant] apologised to the
victim after being invited to do so by the [Minister of Justice] does
not remove the criminal character of his act or its harmful consequences.
By uttering words which were humiliating for the victim, [the applicant]
completed the offence and the harmful consequences arose. The derogation
of the victim's reputation was irreversible. The fact [that the applicant
apologised] must, however, be taken into consideration for the purpose
of assessing the gravity of the offence ... and for the purpose of sentencing.

The defence's argument that the [applicant's]
act was not criminal because it was in fact the expression of a personal
criticism by a person exercising his freedom of expression ... cannot
be sustained. The right to freedom of expression carries the duty, set
out in Article 39 § 2 of the Constitution, not to exercise this right
to the detriment of the reputation of another. The present case represents
an abuse of this right, because the personal disproval of [Mr S.] which
the [applicant] expressed publicly had a humiliating content. The negative
opinion was expressed indecently, in an insulting and humiliating manner,
which is contrary to the law. This implies that the [statement] was
contrary to both Article 146 of the Criminal Code and Article 39 of
the Constitution and Article 10 of the European Convention for Human
Rights ..., which enshrine the right to freedom of expression, but in
the bounds of decency, respect for the rights of every member of society,
tolerance and respect for the reputation of the others...”

The applicant appealed to the Sofia City Court.
His counsel again argued that the applicant's remark had not been couched
in offensive terms, that he had expressed his personal views in an entirely
acceptable way and that a penalty imposed on him for having voiced an
opinion ran counter to his freedom of expression.

The prosecution appealed as well, requesting
an increase of the applicant's sentence.

The Sofia City Court held a hearing on 27 November
1995.

In a judgment of 23 January 1996 the Sofia City
Court dismissed the applicant's and the prosecution's appeals. It held, inter alia,
as follows:

“The [court below] correctly concluded that
the [applicant's] words had an insulting content. The expression was
examined by the district court in accordance with the meaning which
was put in it – a disproval of the ethical and moral qualities of
[Mr S.], which was incompatible with his function as a person disposing
with budgetary funds; a disproval aiming to impinge on the victim's
personal dignity. The [words] were analysed by the first-instance court
in view of their objective potential to impinge on the dignity of the
victim, because they exceeded the bounds of ethical communication and
the generally accepted rules of decency.

The defence's arguments ... that the [words]
in issue were in fact the [applicant's] personal opinion, the expression
of which is protected by the rule of Article 39 of the Constitution,
are unfounded. The district court was correct in concluding that the
expression of a personal opinion about someone, even though a constitutionally
protected right, should not exceed the bounds set out in paragraph 2
of [Article 39 of the Constitution]. In other words, the right to freely
express one's opinion may not be used to infringe the rights and reputation
of another...

In its reasoning the district court examined
all arguments of the defence, relying on the courts' constant case-law
under the Constitution and the European Convention for Human Rights.
...”

On 2 April 1998 the applicant lodged a petition
for review with the Supreme Court of Cassation, claiming that the lower
courts' judgments were unfounded and in breach of the law.

On 27 April 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation
accepted the petition for examination and listed the case for hearing.

The court held a hearing on 10 June 1998. It
heard the parties' argument and reserved judgment. Prior to the hearing
the applicant's defence presented written observations, in which it
argued that the lower courts' judgments were unfounded and unlawful.
In particular, the courts' holding that the applicant's words were offensive
was arbitrary. On the opposite, they were not rude, vulgar or cynical,
but completely neutral. The defence also reiterated its submissions
in respect of the applicant's right to voice personal opinions.

The Supreme Court of Cassation delivered its
judgment on 8 July 1998, dismissing the petition for review. The court
held as follows:

“[The words] used by [the applicant] in the
presence of [Mr S.] were humiliating and it cannot be accepted that
this was in line with the rule of Article 39 of the Constitution, which
guarantees to all Bulgarian citizens the possibility to express their
personal opinion and criticise other persons. This possibility is subject
to and dependent on the limitations of paragraph 2 [of this Article],
according to which this right should not be used for impinging on the
reputation of another. In the case at hand there has been an abuse of
the right under paragraph 1 [of this Article], because the personal
opinion, expressed by [the applicant] in respect of [Mr S.] has a disparaging
content. The negative opinion is expressed in an indecent, insulting
and humiliating manner... As such it falls under the prohibition of
Articles 148 [and] 146 of the Criminal Code, because it not only goes
against Article 39 § 1 of the Constitution, but also against Article
10 of the European Convention for Human Rights ... which enshrine the
right to freedom of expression, but within the bounds of decency, respect
for the rights of the person, tolerance, and protection of the reputation
of the others. These rules are valid in all civilised and democratic
societies.

It is unconstitutional and criminally liable
to 'criticise' in an insulting manner, as has been done in the case
at hand. The words which were used had an insulting content, because
they debased the victim's dignity and his authority before the other
members of the [Supreme Judicial] Council. They contained a disproval
of his moral and ethical qualities which is incompatible with his function
as a person disposing with budgetary funds. What was said could be interpreted
in one manner only: that the person in question has a tainted consciousness
and lacks morality; it was aimed at impinging the honour and dignity
of [Mr S.]. ...”

It is unclear whether the applicant in fact paid
the fine. He was not publicly reprimanded and on 23 March 1999 a prosecutor
of the Sofia District Prosecutor's Office ordered that his sentence
was not to be enforced because the relevant limitation period had expired.

B. Relevant domestic law

1. The Constitution

Article 39

“1. Everyone is entitled to express an opinion
or to publicise it through words, written or oral, sound, or image,
or in any other way.

2. This right shall not be used to the detriment
of the rights and reputation of others, or for the incitement of a forcible
change of the constitutionally established order, the perpetration of
a crime, or the incitement of enmity or violence against anyone.”

2. The Criminal Code

Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code, as in
force at the relevant time, provided:

“Whoever says or does something degrading for
the honour or the dignity of another in his presence shall be punished
for insult by up to six months' imprisonment or a fine of up to three
thousand levs. The court may also impose a public reprimand.”

If an insult has been made in public, or against
an official in the performance of his duties, or by an official in the
performance of his duties, it was punishable by up to two years' imprisonment
or a fine of up to BGL 5,000 (Article 148 § 1(1), (3), and (4) of the
Code).

3. The Code of Criminal Procedure

Prior to the reform of 1 April 1998 Bulgarian
criminal procedure provided for three levels of jurisdiction: trial,
appellate and review. Judgments delivered on appeal were final, but
subject to review by the Supreme Court (former Article 349 § 1 (3)
of the Code). In review proceedings, which were instituted pursuant
to a petition by the accused or a “protest” by the Chief Prosecutor
(former Article 350 of the Code), the Supreme Court could quash the
lower courts' judgments and decide the case on the merits or remit it
(former Article 357 § 1 of the Code).

After the reform, which was effected through
the Act for the Amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure of February
1998 (effective 1 April 1998), criminal procedure provides for three
levels of jurisdiction: trial, appellate and cassation.

By paragraph 37(2) of the transitional and concluding
provisions of the Act for the Amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of February 1998, first-instance judgments which had entered into force
before the entry into force of the Act could be reviewed by the Supreme
Court of Cassation pursuant to petitions for review submitted within
six months after their entry into force. Second-instance judgments were
also reviewable if the petitions for their review had been submitted
within three months after their delivery (paragraph 37(1) of the transitional
and concluding provisions of the Act).

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complained under Article 10 of
the Convention that he had been convicted for having expressed, in purely
neutral terms, his personal opinion about the Deputy Prosecutor-General.

2. The applicant complained under Article 7 of
the Convention that the domestic courts' holding that his words were
insulting was the result of an impermissibly extensive construction
of the applicable law. He was thus convicted of an act which did not
constitute a criminal offence under domestic law.

3. The applicant complained under Article 6 §
3 (d) of the Convention that during the investigation the prosecutor
had denied his request to call all members of the Supreme Judicial Council
as witnesses and to order an expert report to compare the audio tape
of the Council's meeting with the written minutes, with the motive that
the available evidence supported the accusation.

THE LAW

1. The Government raised an objection, claiming
that the application had been lodged outside the six-months' time-limit
laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They submitted that
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation should not be taken into
account for the purposes of calculating the running of the six-months'
time-limit. According to them, that court had delivered an inadmissible
judgment pursuant to a petition which had not been capable of instituting
review proceedings, because it had been lodged out of time. Instead
of declaring the petition inadmissible, that court had erroneously listed
the case for hearing and had decided it on the merits. The judgment
whose review was requested had entered into force on 23 January 1996
and therefore paragraph 37 of the transitional and concluding provisions
of the Act for the Amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure of February
1998 was inapplicable to it. It could only apply if the petition for
review had been lodged within three months after the delivery of the
judgment or within six months after its entry into force. It was obvious
that the petition for review had been lodged by the applicant solely
with a view to interrupting the running of the six-months' time-limit
under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. That period had actually started
to run on 23 January 1996; therefore the application had been lodged
out of time.

The applicant replied that before the amendment
of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 1 April 1998 the possibility to
lodge a petition for review with the Supreme Court had not been limited
in time. It was unacceptable to retrospectively deny convicted persons
the right to lodge such petitions through amendments of the procedural
rules. It was exactly with a view to preventing this from occurring
that the Act for the Amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
February 1998 had provided for a six-months' time-limit after its entry
into force during which convicted persons could lodge petitions for
review with the Supreme Court of Cassation. The applicant had not been
the only one who had availed himself of this right; the Supreme Court
of Cassation had reviewed a number of judgments which had entered into
force more than six months before the entry into force of the amendment
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In addition, the applicant submitted
that it was inadmissible for the Government to challenge a judgment
of the Supreme Court of Cassation which was binding upon all, including
them. The issue whether the applicant's petition for review had been
timely had already been resolved and could not be re-examined in the
proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights.

The Court starts by noting that review proceedings
before the former Supreme Court were not extraordinary proceedings,
but a part of the normal three-instance proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 24140/94, Commission decision of 22
February 1995, unreported, and Marintchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 43232/98, 8 July 2003).
They were therefore an effective remedy which in principle needed to
be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

The Court further notes that the parties are
in dispute as to whether the review proceedings before the Supreme Court
of Cassation in the present case were properly instituted and as to
whether that court had jurisdiction to examine the applicant's petition
for review on the merits and deliver a judgment pursuant to it. However,
the Court does not consider that it has to address this question of
Bulgarian law. It merely notes that that court did not consider that
the applicant's petition had been lodged out of time, in fact proceeded
to examine it on the merits and, moreover, gave judgment as a court
of last instance. The fact that the petition was declared ill-founded
on the ground that the lower courts had properly established the facts
of the case and had correctly applied the law takes nothing away from
that finding. It suffices to note that by lodging a petition with the
Supreme Court of Cassation the applicant set in motion a procedure which,
in the present case, proved to be effective (see, mutatis mutandis, Öztürk v. Turkey [GC], no. 22479/93, §§ 45 and 46, ECHR
1999-VI). The six months' period therefore began to run on 8 July 1998,
the date of the Supreme Court of Cassation's judgment.

As the applicant lodged his application in good
time, the Government's objection must be dismissed.

2. In respect of his complaint that he was convicted
for having expressed his personal opinion about the Deputy Prosecutor-General
the applicant relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which provides,
as relevant:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers. ...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.”

The Government submitted that the applicable
domestic law was formulated with sufficient precision to allow the persons
concerned to foresee the consequences of their actions. The clear definition
of the offence was a guarantee against arbitrary encroachment by the
authorities upon the citizens' freedom of expression.

The interference had also pursued a legitimate
aim, namely to protect the rights and reputation of others.

The interference had also been necessary. It
was beyond doubt that the reputation and dignity of a high-ranking magistrate
were subject to enhanced protection. Mr S.'s election as a judge in
the Constitutional Court was proof of his high moral and professional
qualities. It was true that the applicant's words represented his personal
opinion, but this opinion had unjustifiably infringed the reputation
of a member of the Supreme Judicial Council who had been entrusted with
dealing with the budget of the judiciary. The suggestion contained in
the applicant's words could thus undermine the trust in the judiciary
as a whole.

Having diligently examined the arguments raised
by the applicant's defence, the domestic courts had struck a proper
balance between Mr S.'s reputation and the applicant's freedom of expression.
The courts had reviewed all relevant circumstances and had delivered
carefully considered judgments. The balance was also apparent from the
punishment imposed on the applicant: while the courts could sentence
him to imprisonment, they had opted for the lesser penalty – a fine
and a public reprimand. Moreover, these punishments had not been enforced.

Article 39 of the Bulgarian Constitution and
Article 10 of the Convention enshrined the right to freedom of expression.
However, that right was not absolute. It could be interfered with for
the protection of the reputation and rights of others. Imposing criminal
liability for insult was proportionate to the character of the protected
value. The level of limitation of the freedom of expression was dependent
of the importance of the value.

The applicant submitted that he had expressed
his personal opinion about Mr S. According to Bulgarian law, expressing
a personal opinion in a decent manner was not an offence. His personal
opinion apparently differed from the views of the Government. He further
submitted that evidently, according to the Government, the expression
of a negative opinion was not only undesirable, but also criminal.

At the time when the applicant had expressed
his opinion about Mr S. the latter had been Deputy Prosecutor-General.
It had been years later that he had been elected as president of the
Supreme Administrative Court and member of the Constitutional Court.
In any event, the mere fact that a person had a special status was not
sufficient to warrant special treatment.

The Court had many times ruled that the exceptions
to freedom of expression had to be narrowly interpreted and the necessity
for any restrictions had to be convincingly established. On the other
hand, the restrictions under paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention
should not be used to restrict the possibility to express one's personal
opinion.

The applicant had expressed his opinion before
the Supreme Judicial Council, which was a body having solely staffing
and organisational duties and not judicial ones. It was thus farfetched
to argue that by expressing his opinion before it the applicant had
infringed the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. This restriction
derived from the common law concept of contempt of court. The applicant's
situation was obviously materially different. Moreover, this motive
– maintaining the authority of the judiciary – could not be used
as grounds for restraining criticism of a prosecutor.

Finally, the applicant submitted that the Government's
argument that his words implied that Mr S. lacked morality and could
thus undermine the trust in the judiciary as a whole could not be accepted.
The Bulgarian Supreme Court's case-law was constant on the point that
making implications could not carry criminal responsibility.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties'
submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law
under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination
of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is
not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

3. In respect of his complaint that was convicted
of an act which did not constitute a criminal offence under domestic
law the applicant relied on Article 7 § 1 of the Convention, which
provides, as relevant:

“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under national or international law at the time when
it was committed. ...”

The Government did not comment on this complaint.

The applicant did not comment either.

The Court recalls that it is not its task to
deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court
unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms
protected by the Convention (see Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, § 49,
ECHR 2001-II, and Kyriakides v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 53059/99, 11 December 2001).
Therefore, insofar as the applicant challenges the domestic courts'
finding that his words were insulting within the meaning of domestic
law, his complaint cannot be entertained.

The other issue before the Court is whether,
from the standpoint of Article 7 § 1, the applicant's act constituted
an offence defined with sufficient foreseeability by domestic law. This
requirement is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording
of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the
courts' interpretation of it and appropriate legal advice, what acts
or omissions will make him criminally liable (see Streletz, Kessler and Krenz, cited above, §§ 50 and 51).

The Court notes that the applicant's conviction
was based on Article 148 in conjunction with Article 146 of the Criminal
Code. While Article 146 § 1, which defines the offence of insult, is inevitably
couched in somewhat general terms, it cannot be regarded as vague and
imprecise to the point of becoming unforeseeable as to its meaning and
effects. The Court thus finds no basis on which to hold that the applicant's
act did not constitute an offence defined with sufficient precision
in Bulgarian law.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.

4. In respect of his complaint that during the
investigation the prosecutor denied his request to call other members
of the Supreme Judicial Council to testify and to order an expert report
to compare the audio tape of the Council's meeting with the written
minutes the applicant relied on Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention,
which provides:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence has
the following minimum rights:

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;”

The Government did not comment on this complaint.

The applicant did not comment either.

The Court recalls that the refusal of an investigator
to call and question a witness requested by the defence does not give
rise to an issue under Article 6 § 3 (d) if the witness may be called
later, at the trial (see Schertenleib v. Switzerland, no. 8339/78, Commission decision
of 12 July 1979, Decisions and Reports 17, p. 180, at p. 225). It notes
that in the present case the applicant's counsel requested that all
members of the Supreme Judicial Council be questioned during the preliminary
investigation, but did not reiterate that request during the trial.
It is not disputed that the applicant's counsel could have done so and
that the Sofia District Court had the power to call these persons as
witnesses if it considered that their testimony was relevant and necessary
for establishing the facts of the case.

Likewise, it does not appear that counsel for
the applicant reiterated before the Sofia District Court her request
for an expert report, which the court could have ordered if it deemed
it needed.

It follows that this complaint must be rejected
under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant's
complaint under Article 10 of the Convention that his freedom of expression
was infringed in that he was convicted for having expressed his personal
opinion about the Deputy Prosecutor-General;