The market is intended to be conducive to increased competition ,
increased specialisation , larger economies of scale , allowing goods
and factors of production to move to the area where they are most
valued, thus improving the efficiency of the allocation of resources.
It is also intended to drive economic integration whereby the once
separate economies of the member states become integrated within a
single EU-wide economy. Half of the trade in goods within the EU is
covered by legislation harmonised by the EU. The creation of the
internal market as a seamless, single market is an ongoing process,
with the integration of the service industry still containing gaps.
It also has an increasing international element, with the market
represented as one in international trade negotiations.

One of the original core objectives of the European Economic
Community (EEC) was the development of a common market offering free
movement of goods, service, people and capital (see below). Free
movement of goods was established in principle through the customs
union between its then-six member states .

However the EEC struggled to enforce a single market due to the
absence of strong decision-making structures. It was difficult to
remove intangible barriers with mutual recognition of standards and
common regulations due to protectionist attitudes.

In the 1980s, when the economy of the EEC began to lag behind the
rest of the developed world,
Margaret ThatcherMargaret Thatcher sent Arthur Cockfield,
Baron Cockfield , to the
Delors Commission to take the initiative to
attempt to relaunch the common market. Cockfield wrote and published a
White Paper in 1985 identifying 300 measures to be addressed in order
to complete a single market. The White Paper was well received and
led to the adoption of the
Single European Act , a treaty which
reformed the decision-making mechanisms of the EEC and set a deadline
of 31 December 1992 for the completion of a single market. In the end,
it was launched on 1 January 1993.

The new approach, pioneered at the Delors Commission, combined
positive and negative integration, relying upon minimum rather than
exhaustive harmonisation. Negative integration consists of
prohibitions imposed on member states banning discriminatory behaviour
and other restrictive practices. Positive integration consists of
approximating laws and standards. Especially important (and
controversial) in this respect is the adoption of harmonising
legislation under Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European UnionEuropean Union (TFEU).

The Commission also relied upon the
European Court of JusticeEuropean Court of Justice 's
Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence, under which member states were
obliged to recognise goods which had been legally produced in another
member state, unless the member state could justify the restriction by
reference to a mandatory requirement. Harmonisation would only be used
to overcome barriers created by trade restrictions which survived the
Cassis mandatory requirements test, and to ensure essential standards
where there was a risk of a race to the bottom . Thus harmonisation
was largely used to ensure basic health and safety standards were met.

By 1992 about 90% of the issues had been resolved and in the same
year the
Maastricht Treaty set about to create an Economic and
Monetary Union as the next stage of integration. Work on freedom for
services did take longer, and was the last freedom to be implemented,
mainly through the Posting of
WorkersWorkers Directive (adopted in 1996) and
the
Directive on services in the internal market (adopted in 2006).

In 1997 the
Amsterdam Treaty abolished physical barriers across the
internal market by incorporating the
Schengen Area within the
competences of the EU. The
Schengen Agreement implements the abolition
of border controls between most member states, common rules on visas,
and police and judicial cooperation.

Even as the
Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009 however, some areas
pertaining parts of the four freedoms (especially in the field of
services) had not yet been completely opened. Those, along with
further work on the economic and monetary union, would see the EU move
further to a European Home Market.

The
European UnionEuropean Union is also a customs union . This means that member
states have removed customs barriers between themselves and introduced
a common customs policy towards other countries. The overall purpose
of the duties is "to ensure normal conditions of competition and to
remove all restrictions of a fiscal nature capable of hindering the
free movement of goods within the Common Market".

Article 30
TFEU prohibits member states from levying any duties on
goods crossing a border and covers both goods produced within the EU
and those produced outside. Once a good has been imported into the EU
from a third country and the appropriate customs duty paid, Article 29
TFEU dictates that it shall then be considered to be in free
circulation between the member states.

Neither the purpose of the charge, nor its name in domestic law, is
relevant.

Since the
Single European Act , there can be no systematic customs
controls at the borders of member states. The emphasis is on
post-import audit controls and risk analysis. Physical controls of
imports and exports now occur at traders' premises, rather than at the
territorial borders.

Charges Having Equivalent Effect To Customs Duties

Article 30 of the
TFEU prohibits not only customs duties but also
charges having equivalent effect. The European Court of Justice
defined "charge having equivalent effect" in Commission v Italy. ny
pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designation and mode
of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign
goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is
not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having
equivalent effect... even if it is not imposed for the benefit of the
state, is not discriminatory or protective in effect and if the
product on which the charge is imposed is not in competition with any
domestic product.

A charge is a customs duty if it is proportionate to the value of the
goods; if it is proportionate to the quantity, it is a charge having
equivalent effect to a customs duty.

There are three exceptions to the prohibition on charges imposed when
goods cross a border, listed in Case 18/87 Commission v Germany. A
charge is not a customs duty or charge having equivalent effect if:

* it relates to a general system of internal dues applied
systematically and in accordance with the same criteria to domestic
products and imported products alike,
* if it constitutes payment for a service in fact rendered to the
economic operator of a sum in proportion to the service, or
* subject to certain conditions, if it attaches to inspections
carried out to fulfil obligations imposed by Union law.

Taxation

Article 110 of the
TFEU provides: No Member State shall impose,
directly or indirectly, on the products of other member states any
internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or
indirectly on similar domestic products. Furthermore, no Member
State shall impose on the products of other member states any internal
taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other
products.

In the taxation of rum case, the
ECJ stated that: The Court has
consistently held that the purpose of Article 90 EC , as a whole, is
to ensure the free movement of goods between the member states under
normal conditions of competition, by eliminating all forms of
protection which might result from the application of discriminatory
internal taxation against products from other member states, and to
guarantee absolute neutrality of internal taxation as regards
competition between domestic and imported products".

Free movement of goods within the
European UnionEuropean Union is achieved by a
customs union and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages
imports from non-member states, duties between member states are
prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the
Treaty on the Functioning of the
European UnionEuropean Union article 34,
‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In
Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this
rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States"
which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or
potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian
law requiring
Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin
was unlikely to be lawful. It discriminated against parallel importers
like Mr Dassonville, who could not get certificates from authorities
in France, where they bought the Scotch . This "wide test", to
determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade,
applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the
former "
Buy Irish " company that had government appointees. It also
means states can be responsible for private actors. For instance, in
Commission v
FranceFrance French farmer vigilantes were continually
sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries , and even
BelgianBelgian tomato
imports.
FranceFrance was liable for these hindrances to trade because the
authorities "manifestly and persistently abstained" from preventing
the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or
practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under
TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The
justifications include public morality , policy or security,
"protection of health and life of humans , animals or plants ",
"national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value"
and "industrial and commercial property". In addition, although not
clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on
trade as an overriding requirement derived from
TFEU article 11. More
generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental
human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in
Schmidberger v
AustriaAustria the Court of Justice held that
AustriaAustria did
not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy
traffic passing over the A13,
Brenner AutobahnBrenner Autobahn , en route to Italy.
Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German
undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice
reasoned that freedom of association is one of the "fundamental
pillars of a democratic society", against which the free movement of
goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member
state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it
takes have to be applied proportionately . This means the rule must be
pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be
necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the
same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free
trade with interests in article 36. In Schmidberger v
AustriaAustria ,
protests blocked trucks for goods through the
Austrian Alps on the
Brenner AutobahnBrenner Autobahn . The Court of Justice recognised fundamental rights
take priority over free trade.

Often rules apply to all goods neutrally, but may have a greater
practical effect on imports than domestic products. For such
"indirect" discriminatory (or "indistinctly applicable") measures the
Court of Justice has developed more justifications: either those in
article 36, or additional "mandatory" or "overriding" requirements
such as consumer protection , improving labour standards , protecting
the environment, press diversity, fairness in commerce, and more:
the categories are not closed. In the most famous case Rewe-Zentral
AG v Bundesmonopol für Branntwein , the Court of Justice found that
a German law requiring all spirits and liqueurs (not just imported
ones) to have a minimum alcohol content of 25 per cent was contrary to
TFEU article 34, because it had a greater negative effect on imports.
German liqueurs were over 25 per cent alcohol, but
Cassis de Dijon ,
which Rewe-Zentrale AG wished to import from France, only had 15 to 20
per cent alcohol. The Court of Justice rejected the German
government's arguments that the measure proportionately protected
public health under
TFEU article 36, because stronger beverages were
available and adequate labelling would be enough for consumers to
understand what they bought. This rule primarily applies to
requirements about a product's content or packaging. In Walter Rau
Lebensmittelwerke v De Smedt PVBA the Court of Justice found that a
BelgianBelgian law requiring all margarine to be in cube shaped packages
infringed article 34, and was not justified by the pursuit of consumer
protection. The argument that Belgians would believe it was butter if
it was not cube shaped was disproportionate: it would "considerably
exceed the requirements of the object in view" and labelling would
protect consumers "just as effectively". In a 2003 case, Commission v
ItalyItaly Italian law required that cocoa products that included other
vegetable fats could not be labelled as "chocolate ". It had to be
"chocolate substitute". All Italian chocolate was made from cocoa
butter alone, but British, Danish and Irish manufacturers used other
vegetable fats. They claimed the law infringed article 34. The Court
of Justice held that a low content of vegetable fat did not justify a
"chocolate substitute" label. This was derogatory in the consumers'
eyes. A "neutral and objective statement" was enough to protect
consumers. If member states place considerable obstacles on the use of
a product, this can also infringe article 34. So, in a 2009 case,
Commission v
ItalyItaly , the Court of Justice held that an Italian law
prohibiting motorcycles or mopeds pulling trailers infringed article
34. Again, the law applied neutrally to everyone, but
disproportionately affected importers, because Italian companies did
not make trailers. This was not a product requirement, but the Court
reasoned that the prohibition would deter people from buying it: it
would have "a considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers"
that "affects the access of that product to the market ". It would
require justification under article 36, or as a mandatory requirement.
In 2002,
Rem KoolhaasRem Koolhaas ' proposed "barcode"
Flag of EuropeFlag of Europe ,
caused uproar as it symbolised the EU becoming no more than a market
economy for endless competitive consumption, devoid of social values
and rights.

In contrast to product requirements or other laws that hinder market
access , the Court of Justice developed a presumption that "selling
arrangements" would be presumed to not fall into
TFEU article 34, if
they applied equally to all sellers, and affected them in the same
manner in fact. In
Keck and Mithouard two importers claimed that
their prosecution under a French competition law , which prevented
them selling
Picon beer under wholesale price, was unlawful. The aim
of the law was to prevent cut throat competition , not to hinder
trade. The Court of Justice held, as "in law and in fact" it was an
equally applicable "selling arrangement" (not something that alters a
product's content ) it was outside the scope of article 34, and so did
not need to be justified. Selling arrangements can be held to have an
unequal effect "in fact" particularly where traders from another
member state are seeking to break into the market, but there are
restrictions on advertising and marketing. In Konsumentombudsmannen v
De Agostini the Court of Justice reviewed Swedish bans on
advertising to children under age 12, and misleading commercials for
skin care products. While the bans have remained (justifiable under
article 36 or as a mandatory requirement) the Court emphasised that
complete marketing bans could be disproportionate if advertising were
"the only effective form of promotion enabling to penetrate" the
market. In
Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet AB the Court suggested
that a total ban for advertising alcohol on the radio, TV and in
magazines could fall within article 34 where advertising was the only
way for sellers to overcome consumers' "traditional social practices
and to local habits and customs" to buy their products, but again the
national courts would decide whether it was justified under article 36
to protect public health. Under the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive , the EU harmonised restrictions on restrictions on
marketing and advertising, to forbid conduct that distorts average
consumer behaviour, is misleading or aggressive, and sets out a list
of examples that count as unfair. Increasingly, states have to give
mutual recognition to each other's standards of regulation, while the
EU has attempted to harmonise minimum ideals of best practice. The
attempt to raise standards is hoped to avoid a regulatory "race to the
bottom ", while allowing consumers access to goods from around the
continent.

Free movement of capital was traditionally seen as the fourth
freedom, after goods, workers and persons, services and establishment.
The original
Treaty of Rome required that restrictions on free capital
flows only be removed to the extent necessary for the common market.
From the
Treaty of Maastricht , now in
TFEU article 63, "all
restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and
between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited". This
means capital controls of various kinds are prohibited, including
limits on buying currency , limits on buying company shares or
financial assets, or government approval requirements for foreign
investment . By contrast, taxation of capital, including corporate tax
, capital gains tax and financial transaction tax , are not affected
so long as they do not discriminate by nationality. According to the
Capital Movement Directive 1988 , Annex I, 13 categories of capital
which must move free are covered. In Baars v Inspecteur der
Belastingen Particulieren the Court of Justice held that for
investments in companies , the capital rules, rather than freedom of
establishment rules, were engaged if an investment did not enable a
"definite influence" through shareholder voting or other rights by the
investor. That case held a Dutch Wealth Tax Act 1964 unjustifiably
exempted Dutch investments, but not Mr Baars' investments in an Irish
company, from the tax: the wealth tax, or exemptions, had to be
applied equally. On the other hand,
TFEU article 65(1) does not
prevent taxes that distinguish taxpayers based on their residence or
the location of an investment (as taxes commonly focus on a person's
actual source of profit) or any measures to prevent tax evasion .
Apart from tax cases, largely following from the opinions of Advocate
General Maduro , a series of cases held that government owned golden
shares were unlawful. In Commission v
GermanyGermany the Commission claimed
the German
Volkswagen Act 1960 violated article 63, in that §2(1)
restricted any party having voting rights exceeding 20% of the
company, and §4(3) allowed a minority of 20% of shares held by the
Lower Saxony government to block any decisions. Although this was not
an impediment to actual purchase of shares, or receipt of dividends by
any shareholder, the Court of Justice 's Grand Chamber agreed that it
was disproportionate for the government's stated aim of protecting
workers or minority shareholders. Similarly, in Commission v Portugal
the Court of Justice held that
PortugalPortugal infringed free movement of
capital by retaining golden shares in
PortugalPortugal Telecom that enabled
disproportionate voting rights, by creating a "deterrent effect on
portfolio investments" and reduing "the attractiveness of an
investment". This suggested the Court's preference that a government,
if it sought public ownership or control, should nationalise in full
the desired proportion of a company in line with
TFEU article 345.

Capital within the EU may be transferred in any amount from one
country to another (except that
GreeceGreece currently has capital controls
restricting outflows, and
CyprusCyprus imposed capital controls between 2013
and April 2015). All intra-EU transfers in euro are considered as
domestic payments and bear the corresponding domestic transfer costs.
This includes all member States of the EU, even those outside the
eurozone providing the transactions are carried out in euro.
Credit/debit card charging and ATM withdrawals within the
EurozoneEurozone are
also charged as domestic; however, paper-based payment orders, like
cheques, have not been standardised so these are still domestic-based.
The ECB has also set up a clearing system ,
TARGETTARGET , for large euro
transactions.

The final stage of completely free movement of capital was thought to
require a single currency and monetary policy , eliminating the
transaction costs and fluctuations of currency exchange. Following a
Report of the
Delors Commission in 1988, the Treaty of Maastricht
made economic and monetary union an objective, first by completing the
internal market, second by creating a European System of Central Banks
to coordinate common monetary policy, and third by locking exchange
rates and introducing a single currency, the euro . Today, 19 member
states have adopted the euro , while 9 member states have either
determined to opt-out or their accession has been delayed,
particularly since the
EurozoneEurozone crisis . According to
TFEU articles
119 and 127, the objective of the
European Central BankEuropean Central Bank and other
central banks ought to be price stability . This has been criticised
for apparently being superior to the objective of full employment in
the Treaty on
European UnionEuropean Union article 3.

As well as creating rights for "workers" who generally lack
bargaining power in the market, the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European UnionEuropean Union also protects the "freedom of establishment" in article
49, and "freedom to provide services" in article 56.

In Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano the Court of Justice held that to be "established" means to
participate in economic life "on a stable and continuous basis", while
providing "services" meant pursuing activity more "on a temporary
basis". This meant that a lawyer from
StuttgartStuttgart , who had set up
chambers in
MilanMilan and was censured by the
MilanMilan Bar Council for not
having registered, should claim for breach of establishment freedom,
rather than service freedom. However, the requirements to be
registered in
MilanMilan before being able to practice would be allowed if
they were non-discriminatory, "justified by imperative requirements in
the general interest" and proportionately applied. All people or
entities that engage in economic activity, particularly the
self-employed, or "undertakings" such as companies or firms, have a
right to set up an enterprise without unjustified restrictions. The
Court of Justice has held that both a member state government and a
private party can hinder freedom of establishment, so article 49 has
both "vertical" and "horizontal" direct effect. In Reyners v
BelgiumBelgium
the Court of Justice held that a refusal to admit a lawyer to the
BelgianBelgian bar because he lacked
BelgianBelgian nationality was unjustified.
TFEU article 49 says states are exempt from infringing others' freedom
of establishment when they exercise "official authority", but this did
an advocate's work (as opposed to a court's) was not official. By
contrast in Commission v
ItalyItaly the Court of Justice held that a
requirement for lawyers in
ItalyItaly to comply with maximum tariffs unless
there was an agreement with a client was not a restriction. The Grand
Chamber of the Court of Justice held the Commission had not proven
that this had any object or effect of limiting practitioners from
entering the market. Therefore, there was no prima facie infringement
freedom of establishment that needed to be justified. The Court
of Justice in Centros Ltd held that people can establish a UK company
or any other, to do business EU-wide, but must comply with
proportionate requirements in the public interest, such as the basic
labour right to a voice at work .

In regard to companies, the Court of Justice held in R (Daily Mail
and General Trust plc) v HM Treasury that member states could restrict
a company moving its seat of business, without infringing
TFEU article
49. This meant the
Daily MailDaily Mail newspaper's parent company could not
evade tax by shifting its residence to the
NetherlandsNetherlands without first
settling its tax bills in the UK . The UK did not need to justify its
action, as rules on company seats were not yet harmonised. By
contrast, in
Centros Ltd v Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen the Court of
Justice found that a UK limited company operating in
DenmarkDenmark could not
be required to comply with Denmark's minimum share capital rules. UK
law only required £1 of capital to start a company, while Denmark's
legislature took the view companies should only be started up if they
had 200,000
Danish krone (around €27,000) to protect creditors if
the company failed and went insolvent . The Court of Justice held that
Denmark's minimum capital law infringed Centros Ltd's freedom of
establishment and could not be justified, because a company in the UK
could admittedly provide services in
DenmarkDenmark without being established
there, and there were less restrictive means of achieving the aim of
creditor protection. This approach was criticised as potentially
opening the EU to unjustified regulatory competition , and a race to
the bottom in standards, like in the US where the state of Delaware
attracts most companies and is often argued to have the worst
standards of accountability of boards, and low corporate taxes as a
result. Similarly in
Überseering BV v Nordic Construction GmbH the
Court of Justice held that a German court could not deny a Dutch
building company the right to enforce a contract in
GermanyGermany on the
basis that it was not validly incorporated in Germany. Although
restrictions on freedom of establishment could be justified by
creditor protection, labour rights to participate in work, or the
public interest in collecting taxes, denial of capacity went too far:
it was an "outright negation" of the right of establishment. However,
in
Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt the Court of Justice affirmed
again that because corporations are created by law, they are in
principle subject to any rules for formation that a state of
incorporation wishes to impose. This meant that the Hungarian
authorities could prevent a company from shifting its central
administration to
ItalyItaly while it still operated and was incorporated
in Hungary. Thus, the court draws a distinction between the right of
establishment for foreign companies (where restrictions must be
justified), and the right of the state to determine conditions for
companies incorporated in its territory, although it is not entirely
clear why.

Since its foundation, the Treaties sought to enable people to pursue
their life goals in any country through free movement. Reflecting the
economic nature of the project, the
European Community originally
focused upon free movement of workers : as a "factor of production ".
However, from the 1970s, this focus shifted towards developing a more
"social" Europe. Free movement was increasingly based on "citizenship
", so that people had rights to empower them to become economically
and socially active, rather than economic activity being a
precondition for rights. This means the basic "worker" rights in TFEU
article 45 function as a specific expression of the general rights of
citizens in
TFEU articles 18 to 21. According to the Court of Justice
, a "worker" is anybody who is economically active, which includes
everyone in an employment relationship, "under the direction of
another person" for "remuneration". A job, however, need not be paid
in money for someone to be protected as a worker. For example, in
Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie , a German man claimed the
right to residence in the Netherlands, while he volunteered plumbing
and household duties in the
Bhagwan community, which provided for
everyone's material needs irrespective of their contributions. The
Court of Justice held that Mr Steymann was entitled to stay, so long
as there was at least an "indirect quid pro quo" for the work he did.
Having "worker" status means protection against all forms of
discrimination by governments, and employers, in access to employment,
tax, and social security rights. By contrast a citizen, who is "any
person having the nationality of a Member State" (
TFEU article 20(1)),
has rights to seek work, vote in local and European elections, but
more restricted rights to claim social security . In practice, free
movement has become politically contentious as nationalist political
parties have manipulated fears about immigrants taking away people's
jobs and benefits (paradoxically at the same time). Nevertheless,
practically "all available research finds little impact" of "labour
mobility on wages and employment of local workers". In Angonese
the Court of Justice gave "horizontal direct effect " to free
movement, so a bank could not refuse employment to a worker who lacked
a
BolzanoBolzano language certificate.

The Free Movement of
WorkersWorkers Regulation articles 1 to 7 set out the
main provisions on equal treatment of workers. First, articles 1 to 4
generally require that workers can take up employment, conclude
contracts, and not suffer discrimination compared to nationals of the
member state. In a famous case, the
BelgianBelgian Football Association v
Bosman , a
BelgianBelgian footballer named
Jean-Marc Bosman claimed that he
should be able to transfer from
R.F.C. de Liège to
USL Dunkerque when
his contract finished, regardless of whether Dunkerque could afford to
pay Liège the habitual transfer fees. The Court of Justice held "the
transfer rules constitute an obstacle to free movement" and were
unlawful unless they could be justified in the public interest, but
this was unlikely. In
Groener v Minister for Education the Court of
Justice accepted that a requirement to speak Gaelic to teach in a
DublinDublin design college could be justified as part of the public policy
of promoting the Irish language, but only if the measure was not
disproportionate. By contrast in Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di
BolzanoBolzano SpA a bank in
BolzanoBolzano , Italy, was not allowed to require Mr
Angonese to have a bilingual certificate that could only be obtained
in Bolzano. The Court of Justice, giving "horizontal" direct effect to
TFEU article 45, reasoned that people from other countries would have
little chance of acquiring the certificate, and because it was
"impossible to submit proof of the required linguistic knowledge by
any other means", the measure was disproportionate. Second, article
7(2) requires equal treatment in respect of tax. In Finanzamt Köln
Altstadt v Schumacker the Court of Justice held that it contravened
TFEU art 45 to deny tax benefits (e.g. for married couples, and social
insurance expense deductions) to a man who worked in Germany, but was
resident in
BelgiumBelgium when other German residents got the benefits. By
contrast in
Weigel v Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg the Court
of Justice rejected Mr Weigel's claim that a re-registration charge
upon bringing his car to
AustriaAustria violated his right to free movement.
Although the tax was "likely to have a negative bearing on the
decision of migrant workers to exercise their right to freedom of
movement", because the charge applied equally to Austrians, in absence
of EU legislation on the matter it had to be regarded as justified.
Third, people must receive equal treatment regarding "social
advantages", although the Court has approved residential qualifying
periods. In
Hendrix v Employee Insurance Institute the Court of
Justice held that a Dutch national was not entitled to continue
receiving incapacity benefits when he moved to Belgium, because the
benefit was "closely linked to the socio-economic situation" of the
Netherlands. Conversely, in
Geven v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen the
Court of Justice held that a Dutch woman living in the Netherlands,
but working between 3 and 14 hours a week in Germany, did not have a
right to receive German child benefits, even though the wife of a man
who worked full-time in
GermanyGermany but was resident in
AustriaAustria could.
The general justifications for limiting free movement in
TFEU article
45(3) are "public policy, public security or public health", and
there is also a general exception in article 45(4) for "employment in
the public service".

Beyond the right of free movement to work, the EU has increasingly
sought to guarantee rights of citizens, and rights simply by being a
human being . But although the Court of Justice stated that
‘Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals
of the Member States’, political debate remains on who should have
access to public services and welfare systems funded by taxation. In
2008, just 8 million people from 500 million EU citizens (1.7 per
cent) had in fact exercised rights of free movement, the vast majority
of them workers. According to
TFEU article 20, citizenship of the EU
derives from nationality of a member state. Article 21 confers general
rights to free movement in the EU and to reside freely within limits
set by legislation. This applies for citizens and their immediate
family members. This triggers four main groups of rights: (1) to
enter, depart and return, without undue restrictions, (2) to reside,
without becoming an unreasonable burden on social assistance, (3) to
vote in local and European elections, and (4) the right to equal
treatment with nationals of the host state, but for social assistance
only after 3 months of residence. The
Berlin WallBerlin Wall (1961-1989)
symbolised a bordered globe, where citizens of the
Soviet UnionSoviet Union had no
right to leave, and few could enter. The EU has progressively
dismantled barriers to free movement, consistent with economic
development.

First, article 4 of the
Citizens Rights Directive 2004 says every
citizen has the right to depart a member state with a valid passport.
This has historical importance for central and eastern Europe, when
the
Soviet UnionSoviet Union and the
Berlin WallBerlin Wall denied its citizens the freedom
to leave. Article 5 gives every citizen a right of entry, subject to
national border controls.
Schengen Area countries (not the UK and
Ireland) abolished the need to show documents, and police searches at
borders, altogether. These reflect the general principle of free
movement in
TFEU article 21. Second, article 6 allows every citizen to
stay three months in another member state, whether economically active
or not. Article 7 allows stays over three months with evidence of
"sufficient resources... not to become a burden on the social
assistance system". Articles 16 and 17 give a right to permanent
residence after 5 years without conditions. Third, TEU article 10(3)
requires the right to vote in the local constituencies for the
European ParliamentEuropean Parliament wherever a citizen lives. All EU citizens
have the right to child support , education , social security and
other assistance in EU member states. To ensure people contribute
fairly to the communities they live in, there can be qualifying
periods of residence and work up to five years.

Fourth, and more debated, article 24 requires that the longer an EU
citizen stays in a host state, the more rights they have to access
public and welfare services, on the basis of equal treatment . This
reflects general principles of equal treatment and citizenship in TFEU
articles 18 and 20. In a simple case, in
Sala v Freistaat Bayern the
Court of Justice held that a Spanish woman who had lived in Germany
for 25 years and had a baby was entitled to child support , without
the need for a residence permit, because Germans did not need one. In
Trojani v Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles , a French man
who lived in
BelgiumBelgium for two years was entitled to the "minimex"
allowance from the state for a minimum living wage. In Grzelczyk v
Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve a
French student, who had lived in
BelgiumBelgium for three years, was entitled
to receive the "minimex" income support for his fourth year of study.
Similarly, in
R (Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing the Court of
Justice held that it was lawful to require a French UCL economics
student to have lived in the UK for three years before receiving a
student loan, but not that he had to have additional "settled status".
Similarly, in Commission v
AustriaAustria ,
AustriaAustria was not entitled to
restrict its university places to Austrian students to avoid
"structural, staffing and financial problems" if (mainly German)
foreign students applied, unless it proved there was an actual
problem. However, in
Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig , the Court of Justice
held that the German government was entitled to deny child support to
a Romanian mother who had lived in
GermanyGermany for 3 years, but had never
worked. Because she lived in
GermanyGermany for over 3 months, but under 5
years, she had to show evidence of "sufficient resources", since the
Court reasoned the right to equal treatment in article 24 within that
time depended on lawful residence under article 7.

Public procurement legislation and guidance, based on the four
freedoms, require equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual
recognition, proportionality and transparency to be maintained when
purchasing goods and services for EU public sector bodies.

* Single Digital Gateway (a proposal for a single digital access
point for information and administrative services)
* Single Market Information Tool (a proposed regulation under which
the Commission could require EU businesses to provide information in
relation to the internal market and related areas where there is a
suspicion that businesses are blocking the operation of the single
market rules)
*
SOLVIT Action Plan (aiming to reinforce and improve the
functioning of the existing
SOLVIT network).