British Submarines and the Baltic Sea

British submarines were used to great
effect in the Baltic Sea during World War One. On
September 17th, Admiral John
Jellicoe gave the order to send submarines
into the Baltic – the so-called “backyard” – to complete a blockade on
Germany. By the end of 1915, the submarine blockade had proved to be extremely
successful:

“During
the whole course of the war, nothing has occurred more dramatic than the
successes achieved by British submarines in the Baltic. Their actions
cannot fail to have an influence on the course of the war.” (US Naval
Proceedings 1915)

The route from the North
Sea to the Baltic Sea was exceptionally dangerous. The Sound, to the east of
Denmark, was a mixture of salt and fresh water and various parts of the Sound
experienced different degrees of water density depending on the combination of
the two. A stable depth proved difficult to keep, especially as the area around
the Sound was no deeper than 35 feet. The narrow channel produced very swift
currents and the lights from towns on either side of the Sound clashed with
navigational lights and complicated the journey still further. To overcome these
problems, each submarine commander was instructed “to follow a neutral ship
through the Sound into the Baltic at night” and once there “ to attack the
enemy’s fleet which is said to be carrying out gunnery practice in the
Baltic.” (P G Halpern)

The completion of the Kiel Canal enabled
the Germans to use the Baltic Sea for naval exercises and as a means of
importing foodstuffs and vital minerals. This was almost completely stopped by
the British submarines. By the end of 1915, merchant vessels refused to make the
journey from Sweden unless they were convoyed and the German Baltic and High
Seas Fleets were effectively trapped in their own harbours.

Merchant vessels, however, proved
valuable but boring targets.

“Our
men felt about sinking merchant vessels as a big-game hunter would feel
if he were to turn his rifle on a domestic cow in a barnyard.” (W G
Carr)

The most important result of the
campaign against merchant shipping was the virtual ending of the transport of
iron ore from Sweden to Germany. German soldiers were forced to requisition iron
ore in much greater quantities from other European countries under their control
such as Russia. As the expanding German war machine needed more and more iron,
so the need to gain it became more and more difficult. As long as this
difficulty occurred, the German army could never be at its most functional and
efficient. If the German military hierarchy was putting some of its efforts into
such a basic issue as the acquisition of iron ore as opposed to other more
military-based problems, then the latter had to suffer accordingly.

Such was the impact of British
submarines in the Baltic, that the German High Command believed that the
submarines were operating in the Baltic but with their own supply vessel there.
In fact, only a total of five E-class submarines operated in the Baltic though
this represented 1/3rd of Britain’s long distance submarines at the
start of 1915.

Monday, October 11th 1915,
proved to be a very decisive day against merchant vessels in the Baltic. On this
day, E-19, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Cromie, sank five merchant ships
within eight hours. They carried a total of 20,000 tons of iron ore. The shock
of this loss was such that it led to a complete standstill of all ships engaged
in the transportation of iron ore and food within the Baltic. A British Naval
officer, Lieutenant Mee, claimed that he was told by a Swedish captain that
there were fifteen merchant ships laden with iron ore in Lulea “but not daring
to sail until Germany provided some sort of convoy system.” (K Edwards)

A report in the US Naval proceedings of
1916 stated:

“The
ports from which iron ore and timber are exported are crowded with
vessels which dare not put to sea owing to the activity of underwater
boats.”

The psychological impact of the five
submarines that operated in the Baltic Sea was huge. They could not be
everywhere at once, but the fear that they might be in an area where a merchant
ship was sailing was enough for that ship to remain in port. After 1916, the
Germans did introduce a convoy system and the number of targets was suitably
reduced.

The German Baltic Fleet was also
affected by the submarines. E9, commanded by Max Horton, raided Kiel harbour and
threw the fleet into a general panic. Two squadrons of heavy capital ships were
withdrawn to Swinemünde, and
fifteen destroyers were used in an attempt to detect E9, using up vital fuel
reserves.

Both E9 and E1 had a major impact in the
Baltic. Prince Henry of Prussia, the German Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic
Fleet, said:

“I
consider the destruction of a Russian submarine a great success, but I
regard the destruction of a British submarine as being at least as
valuable as that of a Russian armoured cruiser.”

The potential clout of E1 and E9 was augmented when
three more E-class submarines were sent to the Baltic. Training at sea for the
German Baltic Fleet was affected as their commanders could not risk a capital
ship being sunk – yet the effectiveness of the crews relied upon them being
able to train and this could only be done at sea. The Baltic Fleet attempted to
take on the submarines but suffered losses. E8 sank “Prinz Adalbert” while
the “Augsburg” and “Friedrich Albert” were both seriously damaged in a
submarine attack. All three ships were heavy cruisers and the Germans could
ill-afford such losses. The problem was more acute for the Germans because they
had so few natural harbours in the Baltic – therefore, the area British
submarines had to patrol was relatively small compared to the actual size of the
Baltic Sea. Blockading Kiel was relatively simple for submarines once they had
got into the Baltic Sea itself.

Whereas German surface vessels presented
a large target, British submarines were not. During the conflict, not one
British submarine was lost due to a direct attack upon it. E18 was sunk by a
mine.

During 1915, the Germans
planned a major attack on Russia – principally targeting the city of Riga
- in an attempt to turn the Russians northern flank. A land attack by the
Germans was to be supported by a formidable naval force led by admirals Schmidt
and Hipper. The combined German naval force for this attack was fifteen
battleships, thirteen cruisers and seventy-one destroyers, whose principal task
was to guard the larger ships against British submarines. The naval force left
Danzig on August 19th 1915. On the outward journey the heavy cruiser
“Moltke” was torpedoed by E1 and severely damaged. Hipper immediately turned
around his part of the fleet and retuned to Danzig. Schmidt did the same when it
was confirmed that British submarines were in the vicinity.

“As
he (Schmidt) now received confirmation of the presence of enemy
submarines, he came to the conclusion that the advance of the ships
would not be in accordance with the Imperial Decree (that losses were
not to be risked). The whole operation was therefore suspended, and two
days later an Imperial Order directed that the ships of the High Seas
Fleet were to leave the Baltic. It has been said with truth that, but
for the activities of E1 and E9 the Germans might have been in Petrograd
by the end of the summer in 1915” (K Edwards).

Without any naval support, the army’s attack on Riga
failed and the whole action was cancelled. Lietenant Commander Laurence of E1
was told by Nicholas II, “You have saved our town of Riga.”

1915 was a high point for the British
submarines in the Baltic. After this year, the Germans introduced a convoy
system for merchant ships. British commanders refused to fire on merchants ships
without warning – so the convoy system (with so many destroyers present)
greatly reduced their targets. Prior to convoys, a merchant ship would be
stopped by a surfaced E-class submarine, the crew were give time to get off and
the ship was only then destroyed with no loss of life. The convoy system ended
such a luxury. However, few would have derided the impact of British subs in the
Baltic.

“I have learned
form a reliable source that there have been for some past several months
English submarines in the Baltic……In consequence, the German ships
of war dare not sail out of Kiel, and even the trial dates of some newly
launched ships have had to be postponed.”

Diary entry by a director at
Krupps dated November 9th, 1915.

“The (German)
Baltic Fleet feared the activities of your submarines more than all of
the Russian Fleet.”

Admiral Hoffman, commander of “Prinz Adalbert
in 1915

“During those two
years (1915-1916) the Germans lost command of those waters (the Baltic),
perhaps the biggest dividend ever earned by so small a naval force in
the whole of maritime history.”

P Kemp

The British submarines that operated in
the Baltic had an inglorious end. One of the terms of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk was that the Russians had to hand over any British submarines in a
Russian port. These ports were used by the British for re-fueling and
re-supplying a submarine. Rather than hand them over, seven British submarines
were scuttled by their commanders.

The blockade of German ports had a huge impact on
Germany itself. Food prices rose sharply and food shortages were common. The
role of the submarines in this blockade was crucial. What impact British submarines had on the German naval mutiny
in 1918 is difficult to assess. We do know that men in the German Navy had an
understandable fear of British submarines. In late 1918, the German Admiralty
decided on one last confrontation with the British Navy. The sailors refused to
obey what they considered to be a suicidal order and mutiny ensued. Just how
important a fear of submarines was in sparking off this muting is all but
impossible to quantify as there were other reasons for the mutiny. But it is
possible that the endeavours of the E-class submarines in the Baltic Sea might
well have played some small part in this.