The year 2019 is a year of landmark anniversaries: a centenary of the Versailles-Washington world order; the 90th anniversary of the Great Depression, which reverberated throughout the 20th century; the 80th anniversary of World War II; the 70th anniversary of the nuclear parity and NATO, the start of the Cold War confrontation; the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran; the 30th anniversary of changes in Eastern Europe; and the 20th anniversary of NATO’s war against Yugoslavia.

The transformation of Europe after the end of the Cold War, which promised a peaceful and prosperous Europe without dividing lines, ended with a reconfiguration of military and political alliances with clear-cut boundaries and a reassessment of allies and potential adversaries.

Within the framework of “civilizational realism” existing contradictions between Russia and the West could be solved by reaching an agreement with the “civilizational leaders” of the Euro-Atlantic region to create a demilitarized buffer zone made up of limitrophe Eastern European states.

It is worth recalling that, back in May 2014, the Verkhovna Rada recognized the need to prioritize reconciliation. Adopted just five days before the presidential elections, had this policy actually been implemented, Ukraine’s subsequent history might have been very different.

There has again emerged an area of instability and armed conflict (Ukraine) on Poland’s borders. Its relations with neighbors that are vital for its national security and economic development (Russia, Germany, and the European Union as a whole) are ruined again.

The rearmament program, now underway in the U.S., may lead to a new round of “militarization of international relations” and a new arms race between Russia, the United States, and probably China at a time when the strategic arms limitation regime is crumbling.

The implementation of the “Belt and Road” initiative became dependent on the pro et contra balance that is not conducive to cooperation for the time being. “Gains and prospects” are abstract, while “risks and threats,” on the contrary, are quite concrete and cannot be ignored.

The U.S.-China relationship and the economic and security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific are riddled with contradictions that raise questions about both the Chinese and American policies. How this drama plays out will have no small impact on a global and regional system in transition looking out to 2025.

An attempt at decommunization in Russia has brought about the failure of de-Stalinization. As the Yeltsin regime positioned itself as an opponent of all Soviet history, many Russians were reluctant to see a larger part of their lives thrown into the dustbin.

Since around 2017–2018, the world has been living through a period of progressive erosion, or collapse, of international orders inherited from the past. With the election of Donald Trump and the rapid increase of US containment of Russia and China—which is both a consequence of this gradual erosion and also represents deep internal and international contradictions—this process entered its apogee.

The announcement of the US pullout from Syria was received with caution in Moscow. Besides the security and political challenges it may bring about, the Trump decision could mean the end of a practical, relatively constructive US-Russian approach to conflict at flashpoints.

The presidents of Russia, Turkey and Iran convened for their fourth summit on Syria in Russia’s southern resort city of Sochi on Feb. 14. Earlier leaders of the “guarantor countries” of the Astana process met in November 2017 in Sochi, in April 2018 in Ankara and in September 2018 in Tehran.

Anyone who has at least some idea about the theory of international relations should remember the oft-quoted formula put forward by the father of British geopolitics, Halford Mackinder: “Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world.”

Relations between the US and Russia are at their worst since the end of the Cold War, China and the US have tense relations, India and China are trying to stabilize relations after a period of acrimony. The major powers appear today to be like the unhappy families in Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina: ‘Each unhappy family (major power in this case) is unhappy in its own way.’

Freedom of movement and freedom to choose a place of residence can be ranked among the category of freedoms which, as part of the Global Commons, have been restricted to varying degrees at the level of communities, states, and international associations.