Allison F. Kingsley, MSL, Ph.D. Assistant Professor

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Professor Kingsley earned her Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, where she was a multi-year Jacob K. Javits Scholar. She also received her M.S.L. from Yale Law School and B.A. cum laude from Rice University.

Professor Kingsley's RESEARCH examines political risk and how it affects firms' location decisions, strategies, and performance. She focuses on the international and domestic investments of established and entrepreneurial firms. For methods, she employs game theory and formal modeling, large-N econometrics, case studies, and (forthcoming) field experiments. She has publications, R&Rs, multiple articles under review, and a pipeline of working papers that aim to advance understanding in the fields of political economy, strategy, international business, and entrepreneurship. She has been awarded research grants from institutions such as Ford Foundation, Sloan Foundation, and Center for International Business Education.

Professor Kingsley's current TEACHING interests include both market and nonmarket strategy and emerging markets, and she is the recipient of multiple teaching awards, including the business school's Professor of the Year (2011, 2013, 2014, 2015) and UVM's Kroepsch-Maurice Award for Excellence in Teaching (2012-2013). Previously, Professor Kingsley taught political economy courses at New York University and Yale University.

Prior to joining the UVM faculty, Professor Kingsley worked on WALL STREET for a decade, first in M&A investment banking at Lehman Brothers and then on the buy-side at Ambac and Reformation / PartnerRe principal finance. During those years, she focused on infrastructure, energy, and banking sectors, mainly investing in emerging market distressed debt and mezzanine deals. She executed several billions of dollars of transactions globally, and continues to manage an active CONSULTING practice on emerging markets, political risk, and strategy.

Professor Kingsley lived throughout Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa where she spoke Arabic with working knowledge of Hebrew and French. She now lives (and skis) in Vermont with her family.

Abstract: Managers can craft effective integrated strategy by properly assessing regulatory uncertainty. Leveraging the existing political markets literature, we predict regulatory uncertainty from the novel interaction of demand and supply side rivalries across a range of political markets. We argue for two primary drivers of regulatory uncertainty: ideology-motivated interests opposed to the firm and a lack of competition for power among political actors supplying public policy. We align three, previously disparate dimensions of nonmarket strategy???profile level, coalition breadth, and pivotal target???to levels of regulatory uncertainty. Through this framework, we demonstrate how and when firms employ different nonmarket strategies. To illustrate variation in nonmarket strategy across levels of regulatory uncertainty, we analyze several market entry decisions of foreign firms operating in the global telecommunications sector.

Abstract: Foreign investors are struggling to find effective ways to mitigate risks in emerging markets. Prior to the 2008-2009 global crisis, emerging market risks had largely progressed from the contagion paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s, and instead were viewed as idiosyncratic risks that could be mitigated and hedged. Now, conventional wisdom suggests that all emerging market investments are correlated and that risk is inherently systemic. Neither view is sufficient to explain how investors should approach investing in emerging markets. As an academic and investment professional, I integrate the competing paradigms and advocate one relatively crisis-resistant and development-positive investment: project finance.

Abstract: To stimulate investment and growth and to develop their infrastructure, governments around the world are seeking capital and technological know-how from private foreign investors. However, to attract the private sector to finance infrastructure projects these governments must develop the appropriate investment environment. I argue that governments and foreign investors in emerging markets develop strategies to "deal away" risk. To fill the gaps left by low market opportunity and low country credibility, governments and investors have developed deal mechanisms such as "profit safeguards" and "commitment institutions." Using a 103-country dataset over a 10-year period, this article tests the causal relationships among market opportunity, country risk, specific deal mechanisms, and private foreign investment performance.