(December 1, 1966)

This memorandum discusses how to proceed with improving
U.S.-Egypt relations, and
encourages Secretary of State Dean Rusk to meet with both President
Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan on his next trip
to the Middle East.

SUBJECT
UAR Decisions Up in the Air

Before Secretary Rusk leaves for the Far East Sunday,/2/ we badly need
to get him to focus on the UAR. Two decisions must be made:

/2/December 4.

1. The food recommendation has been hanging fire in State for three
weeks simply because Ray Hare tried unsuccessfully to talk with the
Secretary before he discussed it in the IRG. As you remember, the Egyptian
economic delegation told you officially in September that the UAR would
have to have our answer by the end of November in order to get grain
elsewhere if necessary. This is such an important decision that we should
not make it by default.

2. Budget Bureau now has the Presidential Determination necessary to
continue our technical assistance program. The President agreed in June
to continue this when he approved offering CCC credit sales for six
months, but we can hardly ask him to sign a new Determination without
having some notion of where we're going.

One way to handle this would be for the Secretary to stop in Cairo
on the way to Paris. The main problem in our UAR relations is lack of
confidence. Nasser believes we're out to get him, and the fact that
our high level travellers bypass him just confirms his belief. The Egyptians
still consider that postponement (for pressing US reasons) of the Secretary's
scheduled visit last spring was a calculated slight, but the invitation
has been repeated.

A visit would have several advantages. If we can't make a food decision
now, he could explain why. He could also make plausible our line that,
even though we have difficulties with further concessional food aid,
we're not trying to bring Nasser down. At the least, it would give the
Secretary a chance for a heart-to-heart talk with Nasser which could
be a sound basis for the President's decision.

We are coming to believe that we've reached a "crossroads"
in US-UAR relations--though not necessarily the "crossroads"
Kamel keeps talking about.

The Kennedy experiment is over. We gambled that a three-year food deal,
personal correspondence, and a certain amount of human respect for Nasser
might moderate his revolutionary policies. We probably went too far
too fast, but we have been frankly disappointed in results. He continued
clandestine organization against the more moderate, oil-rich monarchies;
he ventured into the Congo rebellion; more recently, his army has become
increasingly Draconian in the Yemen; Radio Cairo continues to agitate
Arab "nationalism"; his policy often parallels Moscow's.

Now that that experiment has run out of steam, and we have to decide
among three possible courses:

--We can give up, drop food aid and try to live with a potentially
more troublesome UAR.

--We can go on--if the President will approve--with an uncertain series
of interim food agreements.

--We can seek some new base for our relationship, though less ambitious
than our 1962 effort.

Our own inclination is to try the last, though we would settle for
the second this time. We can't see that the first buys us anything and
it could cost us a lot. Nasser could behave much worse and do much greater
damage to our interests. On balance, within the Arab world he has been
a restraining force vis-a-vis Israel. His present involvement in Syria
is a force for restraint, not aggression. He has not precipitated attacks
on Western oil interests or inhibited movement of oil.

The Secretary's visit could be the first step in building something
new. The main disadvantage to his going now without going to Amman would
be our apparent support for Nasser at a time when Nasser's propaganda
machine has King Hussein on the ropes. It would be ideal if the Secretary
could go to Amman too though that may be impossible.

We think this idea is worth considering. But the main point is to find
out how the Secretary plans to handle these UAR decisions. If we're
going to let them drift till he comes back, we ought to be signalling
the UAR that we're just being indecisive--not saying no.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United
Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. Filed with a brief covering memorandum
of December 2 from Wriggins to Rostow, suggesting that he talk to Rusk
and urge him to stop in Cairo on the way to Paris. Rusk was about to
leave on a trip in which he visited several countries in Asia, concluding
with a visit to Paris, where he attended a December 15-16 meeting of
the North Atlantic Council.