Wednesday, December 18, 2013

Window on Eurasia: Weakness of Russian Regime Leads It to Use Repression, Gannushkina Says

Paul
Goble

Staunton, December 18 – The weakness
of the Russian state explains why the Kremlin is increasingly relying on
repression, according to the founder of Memorial, and that weakness in turn is
at least in part a reflection of Vladimir Putin’s effort to destroy any
autonomous structures that might prevent him from acting in an arbitrary
faction, according to a leading regionalist.

Gannushkina argues that “the
intensification of repression in Russia is the result of the weakening of executive
power in [Russia] because only a weak regime is forced to use force to
administer the country.” Other countries with stronger state administrations
can rely on law and institutions instead.

At present, she continues, “the
Russian powers that be run to repression on any occasion: in the struggle with
the opposition, to put down civil society, dealing with migrants or even the
carrying out of reforms of science.” Asa result, she says, she is “constantly encountering people who each day
live in fear” of official arbitrariness and repressssion.

Gannushkina adds that “we see
extremely negative trends in Russia today,” including the use of xenophobic
rhetoric by all political groups in the campaign for the Moscow mayoralty and
outbursts of violence as at Biryulevo. The MVD reported yesterday there have
been at least 150 such clashes in the last 18 months (nazaccent.ru/content/10051-zamglavy-mvd-za-poltora-goda-policiya.html).

According to the Memorial founder,
after Biryulevo, “the powers that be opened a genuine hunt for migrants and the
police ceased to look at the documents people carry but only glanced at the
color of their skin or the shape of their face,” a campaign intended to direct
popular anger away from the regime and toward immigrants.

Aleksey Sakhnin, a member of the
Left Front movement, says he agrees and that he chose to go into exile when he
saw his friends “one after another” be arrested and go to prison or still worse
be confined to a psychiatric prison as part of the authorities’ attempt “to paralyze
our movement.” All this recalls the worst features of Soviet campaigns against
the dissidents.

Sakhnin points to the anti-gay
campaign the authorities have launched, a campaign that has stirred up some
Russians but proved less effective that the xenophobic one because “while
Russia was never especially tolerant toward gays, this issue was not one of the
most important” for the population.

Neither Gannushkina nor Sakhnin see
much hope in the near term despite the weakness of the regime because the
weakness of the opposition and particularly the inability of its leaders to
cooperate. Navalny, for instance, isn’t interested in that. Instead,
Gannushkina says, he is “a dangerous man” whose rhetoric reflects a desire to
be the only leader and who “appeals to emotions rather than facts.”

Over the last several months, he
writes, there has been “a strange trend: the institutions which guarantee the
functioning of society are being destroyed.” Among these are the Academy of
Sciences, the judicial system, the procuracy, the Novosti news agency, and “even
the Book Chamber.”

The official explanations don’t
stand up to scrutiny, Svyatenkov says. Not only do they keep changing, but they
contradict one another, a pattern that suggests analysts need to consider the
broader pattern and revise some of the things that they have been saying about
Putin and his regime.

Six months ago, many commentators
were suggesting that “Putin was setting up ‘a corporate state,’” but that is
clearly wrong: “any corporate state presupposes the present of corporations,”
not so much major companies like Gazprom but rather self-administrating “guilds”
of a medieval type.

But it is now clear that “Vladimir
Putin does not trust [such] corporations” and intends to try to subordinate
everything to himself in a way that will allow him maximum freedom of action to
intervene, even though that will increase the level of fear in society and
overwhelm his or anyone else’s capacity to run the country.

To be effective, “corporations must
function autonomously,” Svyatenkov says. Their destruction “testified to a deep
uncertainty in the stability of the state. The ruler cannot do everything
himself,” however much he would like to. He has to rely on others; the question
is whether they will be institutionally based or only personally loyal.

“The Americans say that there are to
styles of administration, the ‘Carter’ and the ‘Reagan.’” The first tries to
make all the decisions centrally, something beyond its capacity, while the
second sought to set general policies and then allow others to fill in the
details and implement them.

Each approach has its positive and
negative features, but pushing too far in either direction is dangerous.Putin clearly isn’t trying to get involved in
everything all the time, but he equally clearly wants to be able to get
involved in anything when he wants to without regard to existing institutional
arrangements.

That should be a major of “extreme concern”
because it shows the “decomposition of the state” since “without the president
it won’t be possible to solve even on question.” Moreover, Svyatenkov says, such
arrangements create the potential for even more serious problems in a crisis or
after Putin leaves, yet another reason why he may have chosen this approach.