To link to the entire object, paste this link in email, IM or documentTo embed the entire object, paste this HTML in websiteTo link to this page, paste this link in email, IM or documentTo embed this page, paste this HTML in website

-3-
Nevertheless, it is increasingly important for sustained work with
soldiers to be carried on. Elite units of the Army, like the 82ndAirborne,
seem increasingly to be preparing as domestic and foreign "shock police," ■ ."'
for riot-control—which has been the role of the 82nd at the Miami conventions—perhaps for strike-breaking (see Drew Middleton's N.Y. Times article
of July 30, 1972, "Urban Guerillas Studied in West"). At the same time, young
men and women, largely of working-class and lower middle-class origins, are
being drawn into the Army because of unemployment, underemployment, or the
essential barrenness for them of the civilian economy. At Ft. Lewis, in
Tacoma, a new unit, the 9th Infantry Division, is being constituted (Vietnam
vets of the 3rd Armored Brigade.are carefully being transferred out of the
area), drawing primarily from the huge pool of unemployed youth (perhaps up
to 30%) in the Pacific northwest. The deal is, superficially, attractive:
over 300 steady jobs (as the recruiting poster says); 18-mpnth choice of unit
or post; solid, manly training and body-building. For any 18-year-old working-
man, a 20-year hitch, with a $300-$400/month pension and some kind of skill
at the end is very likely to seem better than the uncertainties of Seattle
industry. What the Army's for, now that less of it is in Vietnam, may not be
a heavy consideration.
An organizing strategy for approaching this New Volunteer Army is gradually
beginning to emerge; the GI Alliance in Tillicum, Washington, for example,
has been doing much thinking on the subject, as have some other army-based
projects. That strategy will probably involve much more emphasis on "local"
issues, like housing, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Company democracy.
At the same time, it will attempt to keep clearly before GI's the fundamental
missions of the Army, its historic roles in domestic control and foreign
expansion, the objectives of their training. Very likely, new Army projects
will try to involve GI's.much more in on-going community efforts—strikes,
ghetto organizing, anti-war campaigns in factories, etc.—trying to maintain
a GI's identification with his origins and people rather than with his unit
and the military. In a sense, one might say that as the Army acts more^ and
more like a big company in recruitment, discipline, (docking pay, restriction),
and training, the organizing of men and women in the Army will take on many
forms familiar from other organizing of working people. The problems of such,
organizing may—because of transience, lack of stable "union" organization,
low skill levels—resemble more those of organizing migrant agribusiness
workers than, say, steelworkers.
4. During 1971 in particular, USSF moved strongly in the direction of
long-terra sustenance of on-going programs, and away from very heavy investments
in new projects. In many respects that was a desirable development, and a
more productive expenditure of money. But that commitment also had serious
drawbacks,, none more apparent to me, now, than the fact that it tied up even
modest sums that xvere often desperately needed by new projects or older ones
undergoing transitions., The experience of the Black Servicemen's Caucus (see
below) especially confirms in my mind the need to maintain within USSF, or
to have available elsewhere, sufficient cash to assure modest ($500-1500)
project development grants during the crucial early stages. My observations
on the coast suggest that money so spent has more impact than too-long-
sustained regular stipends. Partly as a result of these observations, USSF has
decided to change Its funding policies, in a number of fundamental ways.

Copyright belongs to the individuals who created them or the organizations for which they worked. We share them here strictly for non-profit educational purposes. If you believe that you possess copyright to material included here, please contact us at asklibrary@wisconsinhistory.org. Under the fair use provisions of the U.S. copyright law, teachers and students are free to reproduce any document for nonprofit classroom use. Commercial use of copyright-protected material is generally prohibited.

Copyright belongs to the individuals who created them or the organizations for which they worked. We share them here strictly for non-profit educational purposes. If you believe that you possess copyright to material included here, please contact us at asklibrary@wisconsinhistory.org. Under the fair use provisions of the U.S. copyright law, teachers and students are free to reproduce any document for nonprofit classroom use. Commercial use of copyright-protected material is generally prohibited.

Owner

Paul Lauter Collection, Trinity College

Full text

-3-
Nevertheless, it is increasingly important for sustained work with
soldiers to be carried on. Elite units of the Army, like the 82ndAirborne,
seem increasingly to be preparing as domestic and foreign "shock police" ■ ."'
for riot-control—which has been the role of the 82nd at the Miami conventions—perhaps for strike-breaking (see Drew Middleton's N.Y. Times article
of July 30, 1972, "Urban Guerillas Studied in West"). At the same time, young
men and women, largely of working-class and lower middle-class origins, are
being drawn into the Army because of unemployment, underemployment, or the
essential barrenness for them of the civilian economy. At Ft. Lewis, in
Tacoma, a new unit, the 9th Infantry Division, is being constituted (Vietnam
vets of the 3rd Armored Brigade.are carefully being transferred out of the
area), drawing primarily from the huge pool of unemployed youth (perhaps up
to 30%) in the Pacific northwest. The deal is, superficially, attractive:
over 300 steady jobs (as the recruiting poster says); 18-mpnth choice of unit
or post; solid, manly training and body-building. For any 18-year-old working-
man, a 20-year hitch, with a $300-$400/month pension and some kind of skill
at the end is very likely to seem better than the uncertainties of Seattle
industry. What the Army's for, now that less of it is in Vietnam, may not be
a heavy consideration.
An organizing strategy for approaching this New Volunteer Army is gradually
beginning to emerge; the GI Alliance in Tillicum, Washington, for example,
has been doing much thinking on the subject, as have some other army-based
projects. That strategy will probably involve much more emphasis on "local"
issues, like housing, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Company democracy.
At the same time, it will attempt to keep clearly before GI's the fundamental
missions of the Army, its historic roles in domestic control and foreign
expansion, the objectives of their training. Very likely, new Army projects
will try to involve GI's.much more in on-going community efforts—strikes,
ghetto organizing, anti-war campaigns in factories, etc.—trying to maintain
a GI's identification with his origins and people rather than with his unit
and the military. In a sense, one might say that as the Army acts more^ and
more like a big company in recruitment, discipline, (docking pay, restriction),
and training, the organizing of men and women in the Army will take on many
forms familiar from other organizing of working people. The problems of such,
organizing may—because of transience, lack of stable "union" organization,
low skill levels—resemble more those of organizing migrant agribusiness
workers than, say, steelworkers.
4. During 1971 in particular, USSF moved strongly in the direction of
long-terra sustenance of on-going programs, and away from very heavy investments
in new projects. In many respects that was a desirable development, and a
more productive expenditure of money. But that commitment also had serious
drawbacks,, none more apparent to me, now, than the fact that it tied up even
modest sums that xvere often desperately needed by new projects or older ones
undergoing transitions., The experience of the Black Servicemen's Caucus (see
below) especially confirms in my mind the need to maintain within USSF, or
to have available elsewhere, sufficient cash to assure modest ($500-1500)
project development grants during the crucial early stages. My observations
on the coast suggest that money so spent has more impact than too-long-
sustained regular stipends. Partly as a result of these observations, USSF has
decided to change Its funding policies, in a number of fundamental ways.