In a meeting with senior Japanese Foreign Ministry intelligence officials, [Randall Fort, head of the US State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau] urged his counterparts to tap the ”underutilised assets” represented by the global network of Japanese businesses.

”Japan, with its economic and diplomatic presence in countries like Iran, could draw on insights that would be of great interest to the United States,”

Japan had a ”unique opportunity” to collect intelligence inside Iran where the US had no embassy, he argued.

”Any diplomatic or intelligence reporting Japan received from Iran, no matter how seemingly mundane, would be extremely valuable to us.”

However, Japan’s poor control over its information security left the US and Australia cold (this was a time when the MSDF were losing data to Chinese honeytraps and computer file-sharers). Indeed, Japan’s lax security are often blamed for Chinese military developments by security otaku in Japan.

It is unclear to what extent this intelligence exchange grew and how well it survived Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (assuming it was his initiative – he showed interest in bilateral security exchanges and the beefing up of Japanese intelligence).

On Monday, Jan 10, Defense Ministers Toshimi Kitazawa and Kim Kwan-jin agreed to pursue an eventual Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and South Korea. They hope to finalise the ACSA by the end of the year, and it would allow for logistics sharing in joint operations (primarily UN peacekeeping operations). They also noted their mutual interest in a possible General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

Japan clearly has designs on formalised defence ties with South Korea, beyond being on the ends of mutual security agreements with the US, and so far so good. Japan has a stake in events on the Korean Peninsula, and it is hedging towards improved regional security. The only question is whether any agreements can withstand the shock of any contingencies around Takeshima/Dokdo or the opposition entering the Blue House once more.

On Friday, Jan 14, Prime Minister Naoto Kan tried to relieve pressure from the opposition by ditching Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku and Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Minister Sumio Mabuchi. Without the support of the opposition, Kan would be unable to pass the ¥92.4 trillion budget.

The Cabinet shuffle leaves only one woman by Kan’s side: 43-year old Renho, also the youngest member of the Cabinet. Yosano, 72, is now the joint oldest member of the Cabinet (alongside Kitazawa) and he also has the unlikely portfolio of Social Affairs and Gender Equality (also replacing Tomiko Okazaki).

POST: In terms of Japan increasing its capabilities, the secretary of defense, when he was in China, was talking about his interest in seeing whether Japan also wanted to see Japan pursue its own fifth-generation fighter program, perhaps by purchasing U.S. technology or U.S. systems. Is that something that, given China’s modernization, that Japan will look at more seriously?

KITAZAWA: As I mentioned, the Chinese increasing military capability – mainly air and naval power – regarding this trend, Japan is open to its defense capability, mainly focusing on the defense of the southeastern island areas. And at the same time, we are producing what we call a dynamic defense force, which evolves from the traditional base defense capability concept to more of a high-readiness as well as an operating posture in order to deal with such a trend. As for the international trade regarding military equipment as well as production of military equipment, now it is an international trend to do development jointly with several countries, thereby trying to reduce the cost of a program. So we would like to consider measures to accommodate such a trend. This will have a relation to our three principles regarding arms exports, so we would like to have appropriate explorations.

POST: So does that mean you’re going to change your principles?

KITAZAWA: We will continue our studies and considerations. As you will know the basis of Japan is to pursue peace. And so we will permanently abide by this principle. But we also have to deal with the international trends as part of the international community, so we need to have measures to avoid being left behind of the trends. It has nothing to do with … changing the policies completely to become a country that exports its military equipment to other countries, thereby becoming a death march. It’s nothing like that.

It’s an interesting read, but nothing too juicy. I think there is an implied push away from Hatoyama’s devastating handling of the alliance, but again, this is nothing new: this month so far has been proof enough of a sea change.

Some time earlier today, a South Korean fishing boat was apparently involved with a confrontation in Japanese-controlled waters near the disputed island Takeshima (Dokdo to Koreans, Liancourt Rocks to the rest of the world). From Xinhau:

Patrol ships of the both sides began the joint investigation at around 3:53 p.m. local time in waters about 36 sea miles southeast off the disputed islets in the Sea of Japan, to find out whether a 29-ton South Korean fishing boat intruded into Japan’s exclusive economic zone, Korea Coast Guard said in a press release.

Earlier reports said a South Korean coast guard vessel have involved in a confrontation with four Japanese patrol ships as of 2:00 p.m. local time.

Seoul’s coast guard dispatched the patrol vessel to conduct joint investigation with the Japanese side after the receiving report from the fishing boat “SSangyong”, which was chased by Japanese coast guards’ ships when it was sailing in waters about 42 sea miles southeast off Dokdo earlier in the day and then sailed back toward South Korean side, the press release said.

Charlie Reed at the Stars and Stripes quotes Denny Roy of the East-West Center in Hawaii as saying:

“North Korea provides the political excuse for what would otherwise be a strategic move” against China, Roy said. “It’s a fig leaf.”

“Japan-South Korea defense cooperation is an example of what the Chinese want to avoid,” said Roy, a senior fellow at the center. “China has long understood, and feared, that its rise might cause other countries in the region to cooperate strategically against (it.)”

Certainly, regardless of what motives are behind the Japanese push for better ties, China will interpret it as US-directed encirclement. That would no doubt accelerate Chinese military development and give the Chinese a sense of urgency.

Labelling China a threat would only escalate tension and become a self-fulfilling prophecy, [Bruce Klingner at the Heritage Foundation] said. But moves to strengthen Japan-South Korea military cooperation represent long-range goals for the U.S. and its democratic Asian allies to hedge against China’s massive and growing military.

The US has to tread a delicate line between hedging against and placating China’s ambitions and Japan will play an important role in maintaining that balance. That will require a lot of foreign policy savvy on the Japanese side, something that was in short supply in 2010.

A Brief History of Japanese Defence in Context

Support for Article 9 Reform (2006) via The American

Emerging from the Second World War, humiliated by defeat and as the first nation to fall prey to the atomic age, Japan was left with the nationalistic former representatives of the wartime state and the left-wing antimilitarist pacifists scarred by their wartime experience. The American occupation authorities at GHQ purged war criminals from the government and its institutions and tried to ensure that Japan would not rearm as Germany had after the Great War. Through negotiations between GHQ and the Japanese government, they crafted their answer in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (1947):

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. [1]

Article 9 was only possible through the security guarantees provided by the American occupation, but the idealism of this paragraph was shattered by the realities of the Cold War. The Korean War forced the creation of the National Police Reserve in 1950, which was reorganised into the National Safety Force in 1952, before being formed into the Self-Defense Force in 1954. Each change in name and mission pushed the boundaries of Article 9 and increased the friction between the autonomists – who wished for rearmament – and the antimilitarists – who were unwilling to see Japan be dragged into war again. The antimilitarists were also against the US military protection that guaranteed Japan its security, and their historic opposition to the 1960 renewal of the 1951 Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation that led to the resignation of the Kishi cabinet.

As Japan sought to find its feet in the postwar world, it was guided by a general vision promoted by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, later known as the Yoshida Doctrine. This saw defence from the position of Mercantile Realism: let the US provide security for Japan and instead focus the national effort on rebuilding the economy. This was the dominant defence mindset until Japan’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’ raised US ire in the Gulf War.

As a economic powerhouse, and with much talk of Japan ‘overtaking’ the US, the US pushed Japan to make ‘physical’ contributions to global security, and Japan responded by pushing through the International Peace Cooperation Law (1992). The ‘PKO Law’ allowed the SDF to take part in international peacekeeping operations as non-combatants, significant because it allowed Japanese boots on foreign soil for the first time since the Second World War.

Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi did more to ‘normalise’ Japan than any other prime minister to date, at least in terms of precedents. Under a series of Special Measures Laws, he allowed the Coast Guard to sink a suspected North Korean spy ship, dispatched SDF units in support of reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and helped logistical efforts in the Indian Ocean. Since Koizumi’s departure from office, the mission of equal significance has been the dispatch of MSDF vessels to the coast of Somalia in anti-piracy efforts.

As Japan faces the threats of rising China, and the nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, it will no doubt undergo further changes. How these changes develop will depend on the views of the people who guide them.

Major Perspectives on Defence

Japan has several major schools of thought regarding the role of Japan and the SDF.*

Pacifists are typically still opposed to the existence of the SDF, which they regard as unconstitutional and a military in anything but name. They hold Article 9 as sacred, and also reject the need for a US military presence in Japan. The key political proponents of this philosophy can be found in Japan’s left-wing parties, namely the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party.

Middle-Power Internationalists adhere to the Yoshida Doctrine and see the US security alliance as essential to maintaining Japan’s role as a global economic power. They are likely to be open to continuing Japan’s UN-based multilateral security role, but fall short of allowing Japan to have a ‘normal’ military. There are fewer Mercantile Realists these days, but the LDP’s Yasuo Fukuda, Yohei Kono and Koichi Kato could be said to be one of them.

Normal Nationalists are the dominant force in Japanese politics at the moment. They are follow the spirit of Ozawa’s ‘normal nation’ philosophy and are willing to reinterpret the constitution and SDF to improve burden-sharing within the alliance. Like the middle power internationalists, they are supportive of Japan’s international security role but are typically less enthusiastic about the US military presence. Their ultimate goal is for Japan to be an equal partner of the US. The leadership of Democratic Party is most typically associated with a softer version of this perspective, particularly Ozawa himself and former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, concerned with international security, while the neo-conservatives of the LDP, Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso, follow a more hawkish perspective.

Neo-Autonomists seek a full constitutional revision to allow a full-spectrum military capable of offensive as well as defensive operations. They are the only group likely to be open to a change in the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, seeking independence from the US nuclear umbrella. They are also likely to view the US presence as a violation of Japanese sovereignty. There are few neo-autonomists in government, but Takeshi Hiranuma, Terumasa Nakanishi and Shintaro Ishihara are among them.

Japan Today

As it currently stands, Japan is heading towards the ‘normal nation’ that Ozawa envisioned. Pacifism is a much-valued principle that many Japanese citizens still support (at least in principle), but its support has been eroded as the US pushed Japan to secure itself in the Cold War. The Yoshida Doctrine fell by the wayside in the 1990s as Japan adapted to the ‘New World Order’ and Internationalism. Since Koizumi’s time in the Kantei, the normal nationalists have made great strides, although the balance between ‘normal’ and ‘independent’ is a delicate one. As Japan faces up to future threats, the balance could tip. Of any nation, the US holds the key in preventing Japan from remilitarising in earnest, but the final decision will lie with the Japanese people. As it stands, autonomy is unlikely to come about anytime soon.