Here is the third in a series of blogs that I started on May 18. The first was called “Why YOU may LIKE Government ‘Theft’”. In it, I listed four possible justifications for government to act like Robin Hood, taking from the rich to give to the poor. The point is to think about whether the top personal marginal tax rate really should be higher or lower than currently, as currently debated these days in the newspapers.

However, perhaps we should also remember what is wrong with government using high marginal tax rates to take from the rich in order to help the poor. The problem is that a higher personal marginal tax rate distorts individual behavior, particularly labor supply and savings behavior, by discouraging work effort and investment. Since those are good for the economy, high marginal tax rates are bad for the economy! In fact, economic theory suggests that the “deadweight loss” from taxation may increase roughly with the square of the tax rate. In other words, doubling a tax rate (e.g. from 20% to 40%) would quadruple the excess burden of taxes – the extent to which the burden on taxpayers exceeds the revenue collected.

The point is just that we face tradeoffs. Yes, we have four possible reasons that we as a society may want higher tax rates on the rich in order to provide a social safety net, but we also have significant costs of doing so. Probably somewhere in the middle might help trade off those costs against the benefits, but it’s really a matter of personal choice when you vote: how much do you value a safety net for those less fortunate that yourself? And how much do you value a more efficient tax system and economy?

In the first blog on May 18, I listed all four justifications, any one of which may or may not ring true to you. If one or more justification is unconvincing, then perhaps a different justification is more appealing. In that blog, I put off the last three justifications and mostly just discussed the first one, namely, the arguments of “moral philosophy” for extra help to the poor. As a matter of ethics, you might think it morally just or fair to help the poor starving masses. That blog describes a range of philosophies, all the way from “no help to poor” (Nozick) in a spectrum that ends with “all emphasis on the poor” (Rawls).

In the second blog on July 13, I discussed the second justification. Aside from that moral theorizing, suppose the poor are not deemed special at all: every individual receives the exact same weight, so we want to maximize the un-weighted sum of all individuals’ “utility”, as suggested by Jeremy Bentham, the “founding figure of modern utilitarianism.” His philosophy is “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”. Also suppose utility is not proportional to income, but is instead a curved function, with “declining marginal utility”. If so, then a dollar from a rich person is relatively unimportant to that rich person, while a dollar to a poor person is very important to that poor person. In that case, equal weights on everybody would still mean that total welfare could increase by taking from the rich to help the poor.

The point of THIS blog is a third justification, quite different in the sense that it does NOT require making anybody worse off (the rich) in order to make someone else better off (the poor). It is a case where we might all have nearly the same income and same preferences, and yet we might all be better off with a tax system that has higher marginal tax rates on those with more income, and transfers to those with little or no income. How? Suppose we’re all roughly equally well off in the long run, or in terms of expectations, but that we all face a random element in our annual income. Some fraction of us will have a small business that experiences a bad year once in a while, or become unemployed once in a while, or have a bad health event that requires us to stop work once in a while. To protect ourselves against those kinds of bad outcomes, we might like to buy insurance, but private insurance companies might not be able to offer such insurance because of two important market failures:

Because of “adverse selection”, the insurance company might get only the bad risks to sign up, those who are inherently more likely to become unemployed or to have a bad year.

Because of “moral hazard”, insurance buyers might change their behavior and become unemployed on purpose, or work less and earn less.

With those kinds of market failure, the private market might fail altogether, and nobody is able to buy such insurance. Yet, having such insurance can make us all better off, by protecting us from actual risk!

Potentially, if done properly, the government can help fix this market failure. Unemployment insurance is one such attempt. But the point here is just that a progressive income tax can also act implicitly and partially as just that kind of insurance:

In each “good” year, you are made to pay a “premium” in the form of higher marginal tax rates and tax burden. Then, anytime you have a “bad” year such as losing your job or facing a difficult market for the product you sell, you get to receive from this implicit insurance plan by facing lower tax rates or even getting payments from the government (unemployment compensation, income tax credits, or even welfare payments).

I don’t mean that the entire U.S. tax system works that way; I only mean that it has some element of that kind of plan, and it might help make some people happier knowing they will be helped when times are tough. But you can decide the importance of that argument for yourself.

Next week, the final of my four possible justifications for progressive taxation.

Way back on May 18, I wrote a blog called “Why YOU may LIKE Government ‘Theft’”. In it, I listed four possible justifications for government to act like Robin Hood, taking from the rich to give to the poor. This combination of economics and philosophy is meant to help each of us think about what really should be the top personal marginal tax rate: should it be higher or lower than currently? This topic is hotly debated these days in the newspapers!

In that blog, I listed all four justifications, any one of which may or may not ring true to you. If one or more justification is unconvincing, then perhaps a different justification is more appealing. I put off the last three justifications to later blogs and mostly just discussed the first one, namely, that some “ethicists” in the field of “moral philosophy” have found ethical justifications for extra help to the poor. The moral justification may be the most common or usual one; you might think it morally just or fair to help the poor starving masses. That blog describes a range of philosophies, all the way from “no help to poor” (Nozick) in a spectrum that ends with “all emphasis on the poor” (Rawls).

But that’s not the only reason to have some degree of progressivity in our income tax system (taking higher percentages of income from those with more income). The second justification basically says okay, let’s skip the moral theorizing. Instead, suppose the poor are not deemed special at all. Suppose that ALL individuals receive the exact same weight. Suppose the objective is to maximize the un-weighted sum of all individuals’ wellbeing (or what we call “utility”). Actually, this is perhaps the view of Jeremy Bentham, who came to be considered the “founding figure of modern utilitarianism.” His philosophy is “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”. That is, just add up all individual utilities, without weights, and maximize that sum.

So far, that might sound like no justification for taking from the rich to give to the poor. However, we did not say just add up their incomes, or to maximize total GNP. Instead, one might also believe that utility is not proportional to income, but is instead a curved function, as in the diagram below. In other words, “declining marginal utility”. If so, then a dollar from a rich person is relatively unimportant to that rich person, while a dollar to a poor person is very important to that poor person. In that case, equal weights on everybody would still mean that total welfare could increase by taking from the rich in order to help the poor.

The only remaining question is the degree of curvature, or the rate at which marginal utility declines. If it is a nearly straight line, then we might not want much redistribution. But if it has a lot of curvature, then the sum of utilities could be maximized by taking more from the rich than we do currently.

What is that, a gastrointestinal disorder? No, it’s the title of one of my recent research papers (joint with Dan Karney and Kathy Baylis) about unilateral efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). When worldwide agreement is not possible, then the question is whether GHG abatement policy might be implemented by only one country, or bloc of countries (or region or sector). The fear of any one country or bloc is that they would only raise their own cost of production, make themselves less competitive, and lose business to firms in other countries that may increase production and emissions. When only one country limits their emissions, any positive effect on emissions elsewhere is called “leakage”.

In efforts to “abate” or to reduce GHG emissions, the fear of lost business has pretty much deterred any attempt at unilateral climate policy. That positive leakage might be called a “terms of trade effect” (TTE), because unilateral policy raises the price of exports and reduces the price of imports. But our recent research paper points out a major effect that could offset part of that positive leakage. The “negative leakage” term in the equation might be called an “abatement resource effect” (ARE). That is, one additional thing happening is that the domestic firms face higher costs of their emissions, and so they want to substitute away from GHG emissions and instead use other resources for abatement – such as windmills, solar cells, energy efficient machinery, hybrids, electric cars, and even “carbon capture and sequestration” (CCS). Thus they have at least SOME incentive to draw resources AWAY from other sectors or other countries. If that effect is large, the result might shrink those other sectors’ operations overall, and thus possibly SHRINK emissions elsewhere.

I don’t mean to oversell this idea, because it probably does not completely offset the usual positive “terms of trade effect”. But in some circumstances it COULD be large, and it COULD result in net negative leakage. The best example is probably to think about a tax or permit price for carbon emissions only in the electricity generating sector, within one country. For simplicity, suppose there’s no trade with any other countries, so the only choice for consumers in this country is how much to spend on “electricity” and how much to spend on “all other goods”. Demand for electricity is usually thought to be inelastic, which means consumers buy almost the same amount even as the price rises. If firms need to produce almost as much electricity, while substantially reducing their GHG emissions, they must invest a lot of labor AND capital into windmills, solar panels, and CCS. With any given total number of workers and investment dollars in the economy, then fewer resources are used to produce “all other goods”.

The ability of consumers to substitute between the two goods (electricity vs “all other”) is called the “elasticity of substitution in utility.” The ability of firms to substitute between GHG emissions and those OTHER inputs is called the “elasticity of substitution in production”. If the former is bigger than the latter, then net leakage is positive. If the latter is bigger than the former, then net leakage can be negative.

Okay, too technical. But the point is that other researchers have missed this “abatement resource effect” and overstated the likely positive effect on leakage. And that omission has led to overstated fears about the bad effects of unilateral carbon policy. What we show is that those fears are overstated, in some cases, where leakage may not be that bad. With some concentration on those favorable cases, one country might be able to undertake some good for the world without fear that they just lose business to other sectors.

A recent NY Times has an article about SOL Austin, an acronym for Solutions Oriented Living. This housing development is interesting for at least two reasons. First, the designs and materials are intended to be “sustainable” (whatever that means), but also “net zero” (which I gather means that it will produce all the energy consumed). The houses have solar panels and geothermal wells.

Second, however, it is interesting because it is in east Austin, the low-income part of town. In fact, a 1928 “city plan” decided that east Austin would be “designated African-American”. The 1962 construction of Interstate I-35 further divided east from west. The relatively flat east side of Austin had all the industrial blight, pollution, and low-income housing. In fact, it was quite cheap! The hilly west side of Austin had the fancy new upscale houses with views of the Hill Country.

One would think that the intellectual-academic, left-leaning, high-income households of west Austin might be more interested in sustainable housing that could go “off the grid.” Why then are these developers building super-energy-efficient houses in east Austin?

Well, for one thing, the 2010 census showed a 40% increase in east Austin’s white population and a drop in minority population. In correlated fashion, land prices in east Austin have risen considerably. In fact, a different article in the NY Timestells about a study based on the 2010 census finding that all residential segregation in U.S. cities has fallen significantly. Cities are more racially integrated than at any time since 1910. It finds that all-white enclaves “are effectively extinct”. Black urban ghettos are shrinking. “An influx of immigrants and the gentrification of black neighborhoods contributed to the change, the study said, but suburbanization by blacks was even more instrumental.”

Since I’m visiting here in Austin, Texas, it is easy enough to go see the new development. As you can see in the snapshot below, the houses have a modern box-like style. They range from 1,000 to 1,800 square feet. That explains the article’s reference to “matchbox” houses. But the roofs are sloped enough to hold photovoltaic arrays and to channel rainwater into barrels.

The developers said they wanted to “examine sustainability on a more holistic level, that would not just look at green buildings, but in our interest in affordability, in the economic and social components of sustainability as well.” As stated in the NY Times article, the developers “hammered out a plan with … the nonprofit Guadalupe Neighborhood Development Corporation, to sell 16 of the 40 homes to the organization. The group, in turn, sold eight of the houses at a subsidized rate to low-income buyers (who typically were able to buy a house valued at more than $200,000 for half price).” Each of those 16 subsidized homes has a photovoltaic array on the roof, though not necessarily large enough to produce all of the needed power for the house.

Of the “market-rate” houses, all sold at prices in the low $200,000’s. Eleven have been sold, and thirteen have yet to be built. Because of the financial and housing crisis, however, the “holistic” development ideas have not worked perfectly. Homeowners got rebates from Austin Energy and tax credits from the federal government. So far, however, only four market-rate house owners paid the extra $24,000 for photovoltaic arrays substantial enough to fully power a house. Only one is also heated and cooled by a geothermal well. But they all have thermally efficient windows, foam insulation, and Energy Star appliances.

So far, only one couple paid to install the geothermal well and the extra energy monitoring system: a systems engineer and a microbiologist. So, “sustainability” in low-income neighborhoods might still require some gentrification.

Taxes are bad, on that we can agree. So not paying taxes must be good, right?

Wrong. A reform to cut taxes for everybody might be a good idea (or not). But having millions of individuals cheat to reduce their own taxes is never a good idea. It is a tax cut without reason, without fairness, and without the incentive or cost advantages of a cut in tax rates.

Just to focus on that last point, note that some people have to go to a lot of trouble to re-arrange their affairs to be able to cheat on their taxes, and they have to take on extra risk to do so – the risk of getting caught. So their net “advantage” from cheating is much less than their dollars of tax savings. That cost of tax cheating does not apply to the case where Congress and the President agree to cut taxes for everybody, because then all those dollars stay in the private sector instead of being wasted.

The IRS has just released new numbers on the “tax gap” in the United States, the amount of U.S. tax liability that goes unpaid. From 2001 to 2006, as you can see in the table below, the tax gap increased from $290 billion to $385 billion. Just to reverse the increase in unpaid tax would gain the much-discussed and much-needed $100 billion revenue per year, or $1 trillion over ten years. The percent of tax voluntarily paid has fallen from 83.7% to 83.1%. After expected small amounts are recovered by our meager enforcement efforts, the “overall net compliance rate” has fallen from 86.3% to 85.5%.

The average taxpayer cheats on about 15% of their tax liability, but almost nobody is “average.” Rather, the huge majority of Americans earn wages and salaries that are reported by their employers to the IRS, on which tax withholding is paid by the employer to the IRS. Workers cannot cheat on that income, and so the huge majority of Americans pay all of their tax due. The cheating is highly concentrated among other Americans, especially those who are self-employed and get paid in cash that is never even reported to the IRS. In fact, the IRS estimates that noncompliance or misreporting is 1% of wages and salaries, but a huge 56% of proprietor income!

This issue is covered nicely in the blog by Bruce Bartlett, who also points out that “The number of IRS employees fell to 84,711 in 2010 from 116,673 in 1992 despite an increase in the population of the United States of 53 million over that period.” Fewer auditors chase large numbers of tax cheaters, so of course compliance falls. When I worked at the U.S. Treasury Department, in the Office of Tax Analysis, I used to hear about revenue/cost ratios of ten to one! That is, one additional dollar spent on enforcement could generate an additional ten dollars of revenue. And the problem has only gotten worse since then.

We don’t want a huge number of IRS enforcement agents to strike fear into the hearts of average law-abiding Americans who do pay their taxes on time. But a lot of us might feel better about our country if a few more IRS agents struck some fear into the hearts of those who are supposed to pay their taxes and don’t! And those cheaters don’t have to bear extra cost of getting caught, if they just paid taxes instead of cheating.

Just a couple days ago, the Wall Street Journal reported that “U.S. exports of gasoline, diesel and other oil-based fuels are soaring, putting the nation on track to be a net exporter of petroleum products in 2011 for the first time in 62 years.” Taken literally, this fact is strictly “correct”, but it is misleading. It is therefore very poor reporting. The authors either don’t understand the words they use, or they are deliberately trying to mislead readers.

The reason it is misleading is because the article implies the U.S. is headed toward “energy independence”, and that implication is wrong. It goes on to say: “As recently as 2005, the U.S. imported nearly 900 million barrels more of petroleum products than it exported. Since then the deficit has been steadily shrinking until finally disappearing last fall, and analysts say the country will not lose its ‘net exporter’ tag anytime soon.” That statement and several expert quotes in the article clearly imply the U.S. is headed toward “energy independence”.

Strictly speaking, the WSJ is correct that the U.S. exports more “petroleum products” than it imports, … but “petroleum products” do not include crude oil!! “Petroleum products” include only refined products like gasoline, diesel fuel, or jet fuel. The implication is only that the U.S. has a large refinery capacity!

The U.S. is a huge net importer of crude oil, and a huge net importer of all “crude oil and petroleum products” taken together, as you can see from the chart below (provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration). In other words, we import boatloads of crude oil, we refine it, and then we export slightly more refined petroleum products than we import of refined petroleum products. Big deal.

If the WSJ reporters knew what they were talking about, or if they were not trying to mislead readers, then they should have just stated that the U.S. is a huge net importer of all “crude oil and petroleum products” taken together. They didn’t. That is why I conclude they do not understand the point, or that they are trying to misrepresent it. Neither conclusion is good for the Wall Street Journal.

They are simply wrong when they say: “The reversal raises the prospect of the U.S. becoming a major provider of various types of energy to the rest of the world, a status that was once virtually unthinkable.” Just look at the figure!

My green choice is to get about 12 miles to the gallon. Here is why it’s so green.

Some people think it’s obvious that I ought to buy a hybrid or other fuel-efficient vehicle. But that’s just wrong. Certainly some drivers should have a hybrid car to reduce emissions and energy use, namely somebody like my brother who has an hour commute each day, driving 20,000 or more miles per year. But not everybody. Take for example a person like me who lives near work, rides a bicycle, and doesn’t like spending hours in the car – even for a road trip to the Grand Canyon or Yosemite. I use the car once a week for the grocery store, or a restaurant, driving less than 5,000 miles per year.

Let’s suppose a hybrid gets 50 miles per gallon, so my 5,000 miles per year would cost about 100 gallons ($300 per year). The standard non-hybrid gets 25 miles per gallon, which would cost twice as much ($600 per year). I’d save $300 per year in the hybrid. But that doesn’t mean I should buy a hybrid. A new hybrid like a Toyota Prius costs about $6,000 extra to get that great fuel-efficiency (about $26,000 instead of $20,000). In other words, it would take twenty years for my $300-per-year savings to make up for the extra $6,000. It’s not worthwhile for me. If my brother drives four times as much, however, he could break even in just five years.

So far, that means I should not buy a hybrid. Does that mean I buy the normal new car with 25 mpg for $20,000? No! I should buy a beaten old 8-cylinder Bonneville, which looks like a tank and gets only half the mileage! That Bonneville may be headed for the junk heap, so it’s certainly cheaper, even if I have to pay more for gas.

But even ignoring the price of the Bonneville, I claim that the fuel-use of the Bonneville is less than the fuel use of the normal new car! Why? Consider the emissions from fuel used in production. The fuel used to make the Bonneville back in 1980 is a “sunk cost”, a done deal that does not change whether that car gets junked now or later. In other words, keeping that Bonneville off the junk heap requires no extra fuel and emissions to produce it. But buying a new car does involve more fuel and emissions just to produce it. Think about all the emissions from the steel mill, the tire factory, the glass furnace, and the electric generating plant that provides power for the tools and machinery to make the new car.

In other words, I can reduce total fuel use and emissions much more if I purchase the 1980 Bonneville and drive it 5,000 miles per year, than if I buy a new car with twice the mpg. Now all I need is a bumper sticker for my 1980 Bonneville to say how green I really am!

With all the argument in Washington about how to balance the budget, a reminder is worthwhile that none of these numbers make any sense at all! What “should” be the meaning of the government budget? And, does any number provided by anybody actually have that meaning?

In general, a budget deficit is supposed to mean that one’s current consumption exceeds income, which would indicate a decrease in wealth. Indeed, that’s the problem with a deficit – drawing down our wealth (which could even turn from positive to negative!). The U.S. Federal budget numbers fail to provide such a meaning, for several reasons.

First, the Federal budget includes ALL spending, not just consumption. Some of that spending is actually investment, such as new spending on buildings, bridges, roads, airplanes, and any long-lived military equipment. The budget does not show the breakdown between what we really use up this year, and what spending is really investing in the future.

Second, Social Security is “off-budget”, unless you are looking at a unified budget. Okay, I said that in a way that is intentionally confusing! The basic problem here is that social security is SUPPOSED to run a surplus, so that we can set aside some funds from those now working to pay them when they are retired. If it does not run a surplus to save for the retirement of the baby boom generation, then we’ll be in big trouble when the baby boom generation retires! The current social security surplus is too small for that. Then, however, the big problem is that the unified budget mixes the social security budget with the rest of federal spending. So when you see a deficit in that account, it’s really worse than it looks, because it includes the small social security SURPLUS that’s already not a big enough surplus for social security to break even!

Third, the U.S. Federal Budget is confusing about what is a “Tax Expenditure” and what is government “Spending”. A tax expenditure is really ‘spending via tax break’, as when a taxpayer gets a special credit or deduction for doing some particular activity. The Congress could instead have accomplished the exact same thing by an ACTUAL spending program, providing subsidy to the same set of eligible individuals for doing the exact same activity. So it really does not make much sense to say you want to cut spending and not raise taxes, because eliminating one of those tax breaks is really the same as eliminating an equivalent spending program.

Fourth, a Federal “mandate” might require a certain kind of spending by a firm. To take a simple example, suppose some safety regulation requires construction firms to provide a hard hat to all workers. That’s really equivalent to a tax on that firm, equal to the amount they have to spend on hard hats, where the revenue of that “tax” is spend by government on the provision of hard hats. But then the problem is that mandates are so pervasive. Some ‘true’ measure of the size of government would be HUGE, if we counted the dollar cost of all mandates as a “tax”, as if it were in the government budget.

The New York Timestoday says that the Federal Housing Finance Agency is set to sue major U.S. banks such as Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Deutsche Bank, among others. The U.S. government argues that the banks sold packaged mortgages as securities to investors while ignoring evidence that the homeowners’ incomes were inflated or falsified. That is, the banks failed to perform the due diligence required under securities law. When many of those homeowners were unable to pay their mortgages, the securities backed by the mortgages tanked. Housing and financial crises ensued.

Kinda late, isn’t it? Well, certainly it’s too late this time, to prevent the housing and financial crises of the past few years. What is the point of the suit, then? Does the U.S. Federal government really need the money that they can get from these banks, as damages, and will they give it back to all of us who lost money during those years? The U.S. might sue for around a billion dollars, which is peanuts these days. Divided by 333 million Americans, that would be about three dollars each. Why bother?

An important conceptual point here is the difference between ex post liability (after the fact) and ex ante incentives (beforehand). The point of this suit is not to collect a billion dollars after the fact, although arguments are made about the fairness of those liable to pay for damages. Rather, the point is to provide the proper incentives to private companies before the next time. To a private company, a billion dollars really is a lot of money. If they have to worry about the loss of a billion dollars, for ignoring their legal responsibilities, then maybe next time they’ll be more careful to follow the law.

Government regulation can take alternative forms. One alternative is to send auditors and inspectors into every bank, every day, to check what they are doing. That would be very expensive. A cheaper alternative is to let the banks decide for themselves if they are exercising due diligence, but with the “threat” hanging over their head that they might get sued if they don’t.

The last-minute deal between Congress and the President managed to save the day, just before the deadline, but it’s not a very specific plan. Any coherent long term plan for serious deficit reduction will still have to include cuts to defense and cuts to entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare. But the Republicans did not want to cut defense, the Democrats did not want to cut Medicare, and they can’t cut the large portion of the Federal budget that goes to interest payments on existing debt. So instead, in the short run, they load high percentage cuts onto the small percentage of the remaining Federal budget that could be called discretionary. Thus it seems we will experience very large cuts to items like National Parks, environmental programs, highways, training, education, and social infrastructure.

If the American people really want a government that is extremely small, especially compared to other developed economies such as those in the OECD, then the deficit problem could conceivably be solved by spending cuts alone (as long as those cuts include defense and entitlements). Certainly some Tea Party Republicans want a Federal budget that small. But I suspect that some other Republicans only think they want a Federal budget that small and would change their minds once they see the decimation of so many Federal programs.

In 2009, before the current round of cuts, the United States ranked third-to-last among the 23 OECD countries for the percentage of GDP collected by government. I’m sure we would not want to match the 48% collected by some Scandinavian countries, or even the 40% collected by other European countries. Somewhere in the middle, Canada appears with 31% of GDP collected by government. The United States stood at only 24%, which exceeds only Mexico and Chile. With only spending cuts and no increase in taxes, the U.S. could soon have the smallest government among all 23 nations of the OECD. The following graph is from the Toronto Globe and Mail.

What might this mean for our state? Illinois is quite unusual, having just raised the State income tax to cover some of the growing annual deficit. Other states with new Republican governors have drastically cut spending instead of raising taxes. These actions might nudge Illinois upward, in the ranking of states by the ratio of tax collections to total state income, but it may allow Illinois to meet more of its obligations (including unfunded pension liabilities). If Illinois did not raise any taxes, it may have had to renege on some such promises.

Republicans would tell you that smaller government and a smaller tax bite is always better for job growth. But it’s a matter of degree, and a matter of balance. A state with the smallest possible budget would have very little spending on infrastructure, road quality, sanitation, police protection, education, training, and other social services. Yet many of those programs are important for businesses to be able to function properly. The trick is to find the right balance, with spending on the minimal decent level of such programs, as necessary for businesses and employees alike.

With no increase in Federal taxes, the recent deal on cuts in spending is likely to mean cuts in all kinds of Federal discretionary spending, including grants to the states. The U.S. Congress will then be likely to enact more unfunded state mandates, which means requiring the states to spend their own money to provide basic services that the Federal government used to provide. State governors and legislators will be unhappy about these changes, with even more pressure on state governments.