General Sir Nick Parker: Leadership across the globe can end rape as a weapon

War violence: from Angelina Jolie’s film In the Land of Blood and Honey just before a violent attack

The proposition that rape is used in many countries as a weapon of war, thereby perpetuating violence and causing human misery, will be uncontroversial. But what can we do to change behaviours that are so widespread, often underpinned by national or institutional culture?

History shows that we are not innocent bystanders but that as our society has developed, so this type of behaviour has become unacceptable. Many people refer to the “rape and pillage” of the Vikings as characteristic of its times. It was just part of the culture.

In 1812, the sequel to the third British siege of Badajoz in Spain is noted for all control being lost by the attacking

British force, which then indulged in an orgy of drunken rape and plunder. This was all the more horrific since the inhabitants of the town were our Spanish allies who had been overrun by Napoleon’s forces. It provides evidence of some sort of acceptance of the spoils of war being taken by the victors, even though commanders were trying to restrain their men.

More recently, as the Second World War drew to a close, there were many recorded incidents of rape both during combat operations and the subsequent occupation of Germany. There is a general consensus in the West that the vast majority of these were perpetrated by the Red Army, but there is also evidence that the US and British forces committed these crimes in the aftermath of combat.

There appear to be two broad circumstances when rape occurs in combat. The first is in the immediate aftermath of battle, when blood is up and the chain of command loses control. The second is when the culture of the organisation condones a sense that this is simply an eye for an eye, and will use rape as an institutional weapon to intimidate and subjugate.

I would argue that in the first case rape is not a weapon of war but a manifestation of ineffectual or incompetent leadership. It is a crime. At the conclusion of an attack, where emotions are barely under control, fear is replaced by relief and a desire to take revenge on anyone who is perceived to be on the “other” side.

This is not excusable and can be directly controlled by a properly functioning chain of command. The responsibility of commanders, first to instil standards and then to act as a “safety catch” on their men in combat, should not be underestimated, even with improved education, training, communications systems and the accuracy of weapons. They must encourage aggression and motivate their subordinates to take risks in the most terrifying circumstances but must always ensure that behaviour is proportionate.

Even in our most recent conflicts there is evidence of leaders working hard to regain control. And as combat has become more conditional, we have made leadership even harder. For example, in Afghanistan we have seen the introduction of controversial policies such as “courageous restraint” which, if taken to an extreme, could have placed our own people at greater risk than the enemy for fear of harming innocent civilians. So in battle the prevention of rape is just one part of commanders’ duty to ensure that their subordinates obey both the law and the mandated rules of engagement.

The situation is clearly more serious and complex when the culture of a state, group or institution condones or may even encourage behaviour that is unacceptable. In these circumstances rape becomes a part of conflict: it is a consequence of defeat and can be used to strengthen the power of a force. It is being used deliberately as a weapon.

We should be doing all we can to drive it out of soldiers’ behaviour but it would be a mistake to blame only them. When rape is used deliberately to humiliate an enemy in a systematic manner, it is being sanctioned by the authorities to create an effect. It may also exploit deeply engrained perceptions in some cultures that those in uniform are superior to those who are not. Countering this behaviour has to be the business of governments, providing strategic leadership and developing policies that will address long-standing custom and practice in societies where there may be considerable deprivation and educational standards are low.

So this is both a command and a cultural issue. Command is probably the easiest aspect to address. Considerable time has to be invested in preparing young officers to lead in combat. Even then they will need to have a highly developed chain of command above them which can apply unfailing wisdom and support. The training of officers and NCOs is an essential component of effective combat power, as is a robust hierarchy — one that may appear inflated to those who advocate efficiency through “flat” structures.

Professional soldiers around the globe will agree that leadership standards and regular training will encourage appropriate behaviour and reduce the risk of rape in combat. This could be underpinned by a code of conduct but it will not be enough without simultaneously addressing wider national cultures. We have to be extremely sensitive to the pressure that may be applied to the army of a country where resources are limited, where educational standards are low and where the value of life is interpreted differently.

This is not to conclude that we should take no action but rather to say that while the application of a code of conduct may be an appropriate focal point, it has to be underpinned by much more. If the right conditions are to be set, it will require governments to agree to collaborative policies that integrate the power and influence of the private sector combined with humanitarian and international organisations. Effectively applied, this will encourage job creation, education, food and water security, healthcare and the fight against corruption. All these will set a foundation for security forces to behave in a manner that reflects the developing societies they serve — and go a considerable way to eradicating the horrors of rape from contemporary conflicts.