PER
CURIAM: In this disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (ODC) brought formal charges against Respondent Charles E. Johnson arising
out of his alleged neglect of a client's case and his failure to follow proper
procedures in numerous real estate closings. In one particular closing, ODC
alleged Respondent was not present at the closing. In another closing, ODC
alleged Respondent was responsible for a real estate transaction involving
mortgage fraud. A Hearing Panel of the Commission on Lawyer Conduct ("the
Panel") found ODC's allegations to be true and recommended an indefinite
suspension as a result of the misconduct. We agree with the Panel in
substantial part, but we find ODC failed to meet its burden of proof that
Respondent actively participated in the transaction involving
mortgage fraud. Based on the proven misconduct, we suspend Respondent for one
year from the practice of law.

I.

a. Longwood Matter

On February 20,
1998, Pamela Longwood and Beverly Sumter retained an associate with
Respondent's firm to represent them regarding an automobile accident that had occurred
just days prior. Longwood and Sumter, who are cousins, informed the associate
that they were involved in an accident with James Usher and that Sumter was the
driver and Longwood was her passenger. Subsequently, the associate left
Respondent's firm, and Respondent assumed representation in May 1999. In July
1999, Usher filed suit against Sumter, the at-fault driver. As a result of
this suit, Respondent learned of a potential conflict of interest between
Sumter and Longwood and terminated his representation of Sumter. In April
2001, two months after the expiration of the statute of limitations, Respondent
filed suit against Usher and Sumter, despite Longwood's continued instructions
not to file suit against her cousin.[1] The case was dismissed
as time-barred.

b. Cantey Closing Matter

Amanda Cantey
purchased a home in which her father, Amos Price, was the co-signor.
Respondent served as the closing attorney, and Joseph Wright served as the
broker. The closing documents indicated that the closing took place on October
2, 2001. ODC alleged Respondent could not have been present at the closing at
his office in Columbia because he was attending the public defenders conference
in Myrtle Beach on this date.

c. Amos Price/Joseph
Wright Matter

On
November 29, 2001, approximately two months after the Cantey closing, Respondent
conducted a closing on a $340,000 home located in the Spring Valley subdivision
in Columbia. The HUD statement indicated that Amos Price, Cantey's father, was
the borrower and the purchaser of the home. In 2003, the mortgage company
began contacting Price regarding his failure to make mortgage payments on the
Spring Valley home. Price and his family informed the mortgage company that he
had not purchased the home, and he did not know how or why the mortgage was
listed under his name.

An investigation revealed that Joseph Wright, the
broker involved in the Cantey closing, had assumed Amos Price's identity and
had moved into the home. Wright was indicted for financial identity fraud and
pled guilty to forgery. ODC alleged Respondent knowingly participated, either
directly or indirectly, in the fraudulent transaction.

At the hearing
before the Panel, Sumter and Longwood testified that Respondent never warned
them of the potential conflict of interest. Moreover, Sumter testified that
Respondent did not obtain her consent to sue her despite her status as a former
client. Longwood testified that she had specifically instructed Respondent not
to sue Sumter and never directed him otherwise.

Regarding the
Cantey closing, Amanda Cantey testified that Respondent was not at the closing
on October 2, 2001. Cantey stated that she, her husband, Wright, and Beulah
Stallings, who is Respondent's secretary and sister, were the only individuals
present at the closing. She testified she had never been to Respondent's
office prior to this closing and that only one meeting took place. Cantey
further testified the signatures on the documents relating to the Spring Valley
closing were not her father's signatures, her father was not involved in the Spring Valley home purchase, and he was unaware of Wright's actions.[2]

ODC called Wright
to testify as to the Price/Wright matter. He testified that he had received
the loan closing documents from the lender and then compiled the forged
documents prior to the closing. He admitted that he had contacted Amanda
Cantey and Amos Price and falsely told them he needed to make another copy of
Price's driver's license for the Cantey file. Wright stated that the closing
took place in Respondent's office and Respondent was not present, but Stallings
was present at the closing. Wright maintained that he acted alone in forging
the documents and neither Respondent nor Stallings had knowledge of his
scheme. Respondent declined to cross-examine Wright.

As to the various
real estate closings that ODC examined, ODC called Andrew Syrett to testify.
Syrett served as the seller's attorney and Respondent represented the buyer in
a transaction in which the buyer had been renting the home on a lease/purchase
contract. Syrett testified Respondent drafted a HUD statement indicating a
refinancing transaction, yet the transaction was clearly a purchase
transaction. Syrett testified that Respondent prepared an incorrect HUD
statement and an incorrect deed. Syrett instructed his client not to sign
either document, and he subsequently redrafted the documents correctly.

In
addition to witness testimony, ODC submitted HUD and disbursement statements
from twelve other real estate closings, all of which contained numerous
financial discrepancies and inaccuracies. In essence, the files contained HUD
statements which did not match the disbursement sheets and did not match the
checks drawn on Respondent's trust account. The documents included inaccurate
numbers for cash advanced to the borrower, processing fees, and the price of
the homes.[3]

Stallings testified
on Respondent's behalf at the hearing. Concerning the Cantey closing, she
maintained all the parties were present and had executed the closing documents
at a "dry closing" that took place the Friday before October 2.[4]
Stallings also testified as to the Price/Wright matter. She stated Wright
arrived at Respondent's office with a man she believed to be Amos Price, she
made copies of the driver's license that he presented to her, which indicated
he was Amos Price, and she recognized the man as Amos Price from the October 2
closing. Stallings testified Wright did not bring in pre-signed documents
because "[Wright] know[s] we wouldn't do that." She further
testified that she witnessed the man sign "Amos Price" on the
documents.

Finally,
Respondent testified. He admitted he neglected Longwood's case in failing to
file her claim within the statute of limitations. However, he claimed he
drafted pleadings in February 2001, but Longwood refused to come to his office
to review them. He indicated the reason he knowingly filed the claim outside
the statute of limitations was because he thought he may be able to obtain a
settlement offer from the insurance company.

Respondent
admitted he was in Myrtle Beach on October 2 and acknowledged that the closing
could not possibly have occurred on that date. Respondent testified that,
although he could not recall what exactly transpired, "the only thing [he]
can think of" was that a dry closing took place the Friday before in which
the parties executed the documents.[5]

Regarding
the Price/Wright closing, Respondent insisted that Wright brought in a man who
purported to be Amos Price. Respondent testified that Wright told him Price
was his grandfather and that Price intended to purchase the home for Wright's
use. He too asserted that he recognized Price from the Cantey closing and that
the man brought in a driver's license indicating he was Amos Price. Respondent
could not offer an explanation as to why Wright "lied" to the Panel
in saying he brought pre-signed documents to the closing. On
cross-examination, Respondent admitted he was "shocked" that Amos
Price was approved for a loan for $340,000 for the Spring Valley home after
co-signing on Cantey's loan just a month earlier. Similarly, at oral argument,
Respondent acknowledged that he was concerned with the nature of this
transaction from an economic standpoint.

The Panel found
that Respondent's actions in failing to file suit on behalf of Longwood within
the statute of limitations and in suing Sumter against Longwood's instructions
constituted misconduct. Regarding the Cantey closing, the Panel found clear
and convincing evidence that Respondent allowed a non-lawyer to conduct a real
estate closing, to sign his name to the HUD document, and to notarize a
document bearing his signature that falsely reflected that he was present on
October 2. As to the Price/Wright matter, the Panel noted that this matter was
most troubling to the Panel and that it was a question of credibility. The
Panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Wright committed fraud by
forging the closing documents and obtaining a loan in Price's name and found
that Price was not present at the closing. The Panel ruled that by allowing
criminal activity to occur in his office, Respondent violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Finally, regarding the thirteen closings containing
inaccurate HUD and disbursement statements, the Panel noted that although there
were no allegations of misappropriation of funds, the transactions did
implicate Respondent's trust account and found that Respondent's actions in
this matter constituted misconduct.

III.

This Court has the sole authority to discipline attorneys and to
decide the appropriate sanction after a thorough review of the record. In re Thompson,
343 S.C. 1, 10, 539 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2000). We “may
accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, conclusions and
recommendations of the [Panel].” Rule 27(e)(2), Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR. While this Court may
draw its own conclusions and make its own findings of fact in an attorney
disciplinary matter, the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Panel are
entitled to much respect and consideration. In re Thompson, 343
S.C. at 11, 539 S.E.2d at 401. ODC carries the burden of proof and most prove misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence. Rule 8, Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule
413, SCACR.

IV.

Respondent challenges the Panel's findings as to all
four matters. Specifically, Respondent claims there was not clear and
convincing evidence to support the allegations in the Price/Wright matter,
there was no testimony contradicting his version of the Cantey closing, and the
Panel's report contains no allegations of misconduct in the thirteen real
estate closings. While he admits he violated Rule 1.3 (diligence) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR, in the Longwood matter, he claims the
Panel's further findings of misconduct related to this matter are not supported
by clear and convincing evidence and the proper sanction is an admonition.

We find that
Respondent's actions in the Longwood matter violated the rules on conflicts of
interest as well as the rules on competence and diligence. Longwood and Sumter
made a full disclosure to Respondent regarding the accident. Respondent should
have informed Sumter and Longwood of the potential conflict of interest before he
agreed to represent both of them. Respondent clearly neglected this matter by
filing Longwood's suit after the statute of limitations had expired and by
filing it against Sumter in direct contravention to Longwood's instructions.
We give no credence to Respondent's assertion that Longwood refused to come to
his office to review the pleadings, for it was Respondent's responsibility to ensure
that his client review the pleadings before the eve of the expiration of the
statute of limitations.

Next, we find that
Respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct in the Cantey closing.
We agree with the Panel's findings that Respondent allowed a non-lawyer to
conduct a real estate closing and sign his name to a HUD statement. We find
that Respondent's and Stallings' assertion regarding a prior "dry
closing" lacks credibility. Neither Respondent nor Stallings mentioned a
dry closing in their testimony at the Notice to Appear hearing. Cantey
unequivocally testified that she went to Respondent's office only one time, Respondent
was not present, and there had been no dry closing. Regardless of any
purported dry closing, Respondent allowed Stallings to notarize a document
indicating that Respondent was present on October 2, when in fact, he was not.

In our view, the Price/Wright
matter is extremely troubling and is the most serious of the allegations. As
stated above, we find Cantey's testimony that Respondent was not present at her
closing is credible. Thus, Respondent would likely not be in a position to
identify Amos Price. Moreover, one could reasonably question why Wright would
provide false testimony, before the Panel and at his guilty plea, by asserting
that he brought pre-signed documents to the closing. In both proceedings,
Wright's testimony was consistent, and he openly admitted his actions. Wright
did not shift blame or implicate anyone but himself and consistently maintained
that neither Respondent nor Stallings was involved in or aware of his
fraudulent scheme to assume Amos Price's identity.[6]
In our view, Stallings' and Respondent's version of events is problematic, yet
we must examine the evidence through the lens of the clear and convincing
standard.

Applying this
heightened standard, we find that ODC did not meet its burden of proving the
allegation that Respondent actively participated in this fraudulent scheme.
Neither Respondent nor Stallings was ever indicted for any offense arising out
of this matter, and the only evidence ODC presented in support of this
allegation was Wright's testimony. In our view, this does not rise to a level
of clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was an active participant in
the fraud and forgeries. While we do not overlook or disregard the undisputed
fact that serious criminal conduct occurred in Respondent's office, we do not
find that ODC established Respondent’s knowing participation in the fraudulent
scheme. We view Respondent’s conduct in line with his general slack and casual
approach to real estate closings, perhaps explaining Wright's choice of
Respondent as the closing attorney for his fraudulent scheme.

Finally, we agree
with the Panel's finding that the numerous inaccurate closing documents reflect
Respondent's loose approach in the handling of real estate closings. The HUD
statements and disbursement sheets reflected incorrect, inaccurate, and
sometimes missing important information. This court takes real estate
transactions very seriously, and we have consistently issued harsh sanctions
against attorneys who do not conduct closings in accordance with proper
procedures. See In re Moore, 382 S.C. 610, 677 S.E.2d 598 (2009)
(suspending attorney for one year for failing to follow proper procedures in
real estate closings); In re Hall, 370 S.C. 496, 636 S.E.2d 621 (2006)
(imposing a nine-month suspension where lawyer served as the senior South
Carolina attorney for a national title agency company that conducted closing
which did not follow proper closing procedures). Moreover, not only did
Respondent's files indicate failure to follow proper closing procedures, they
also reflected failure to properly maintain his trust account. In our view,
this evidence establishes a consistent pattern of negligence, inattention,
failure to supervise, and an overall cavalier attitude and approach to real
estate transactions, his client's interests, and the practice of law.

We
recognize that this disciplinary matter was highly contentious. We commend the
Panel for conducting a thorough hearing and completing a careful assessment in
making their fact-finding determinations.

V.

By
his misconduct in the Longwood matter, we find Respondent violated the
following Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: 1.1 (competence); 1.2
(scope of representation); 1.3 (diligence); 1.7 (lawyer shall not represent a
client if representation is adverse to another client's interests unless both
clients consent); and 1.9 (lawyer owes a duty of loyalty to former clients).
As to the Cantey closing, we find Respondent violated the following Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 407, SCACR: 1.1 (competence); 1.3 (diligence); 5.3
(addressing responsibilities for non-lawyer assistants); 5.5 (lawyer shall not
assist another in the unauthorized practice of law); and 8.4(a) and (e) (lawyer
shall not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice). Lastly, regarding the
thirteen real estate closings containing inaccurate closing documents, we find
Respondent violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407,
SCACR: 1.1 (competence); 1.3 (diligence); 4.1(a) (lawyer shall not make a false
statement of material fact to third persons); 5.3 (addressing responsibilities
for non-lawyer assistants); and 8.4(a) (lawyer shall not violate Rules of
Professional Conduct).

As to mitigating
factors, we have considered the fact that Respondent was admitted to the South
Carolina Bar in 1985 and has no prior disciplinary history. Additionally, as
noted above, Respondent was not indicted as a result of the Price/Wright
matter.

We
hold that a sanction of a one year definite suspension is warranted in light of
Respondent's misconduct, especially his neglect in supervising real estate
transactions. In issuing this sanction, we especially considered the fact that
serious criminal conduct was so easily perpetrated in his office while under
his watch and control. See In re Johnson, 375 S.C. 499, 654 S.E.2d 272
(2007) (issuing a definite suspension of one year
where attorney unknowingly assisted others in perpetrating real estate fraud by
failing to adequately investigate the facts surrounding the circumstances of
the loans); In re Helton,372 S.C. 245, 642 S.E.2d
573 (2007) (indefinitely suspending a lawyer who allowed
closings to be conducted by his non-lawyer assistants, was not present when the
closing documents were executed, improperly witnessed documents, and failed to
review the closing documents).

Respondent
has exhibited a pattern of a careless
approach to real estate closings. Accordingly, we suspend Respondent for one
year effective the date of this opinion and direct Respondent to pay the costs
of these proceedings. We further order Respondent to participate in the LEAP
program.

DEFINITE
SUSPENSION.

TOAL, C.J.,
WALLER, PLEICONES, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.

[1] Respondent attempted to serve Sumter, but the pleadings were returned for non-service.

[3] The amount of the inaccuracies ranged from
hundreds to thousands of dollars. Wright acted as the mortgage broker in
several of these closings.

[4] According to Respondent, a "dry closing" is
a closing where the documents are executed, but funds are not exchanged and the
property is not transferred until days later. On cross-examination, ODC
pointed out that Stallings never mentioned a dry closing in her testimony at
the Notice to Appear hearing.

[5] Similar to Stallings' testimony, ODC pointed
out that Respondent also never mentioned a dry closing in his testimony at the
Notice to Appear hearing.

[6] We do not intend to commend Wright for his
actions or to excuse his criminal conduct. We are examining and analyzing
Wright's testimony solely for the purpose of ascertaining how a criminal was
able to perpetrate serious mortgage fraud involving identity theft in a
lawyer's office.