Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security Studies

Abstract:

Perceptions of victory and defeat in international crises,
regardless of the reality, can make or break political
careers, destroy or solidify alliances, and produce a
distribution of praise and blame that endures long into the
future. On the face of it, evaluating the winning and losing
states in crises often seems a straightforward question –
winning results from achieving one's aims and gaining
tangible benefits in the final settlement or outcome. This
talk will argue, however, that people's beliefs about which
country has won or lost can be influenced as much by
perceptions and misperceptions of the crisis, as they are
by the actual reality of the final outcome. The talk, based
on a forthcoming article in Security Studies, will focus on
how evaluations of which side had won and lost the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis were distorted by a triad of influences:
prior biases; the particular evolution of the crisis itself;
and the deliberate manipulation of opinion. The talk will
show how this new framework of understanding victory
and defeat can be applied to perceptions of a number of
other crises and wars, including the 1968 Tet offensive,
the 1973 Yom Kippur war, and the recurrent crises with
North Korea since the early 1990s. Understanding these
sources of bias is vital for policy-makers who wish to hold
on to power during and after crises, and for the public and
media, if they are to hold their leaders accountable.

Description:

The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.

URI:

http://hdl.handle.net/1811/32008

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