1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered the continued
threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the indefinite possession of nuclear
weapons by the nuclear-weapon states as well as by those three nuclear-weapons-capable
states that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the attendant
possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this
predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests conducted by India
and Pakistan.

2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of
the Canberra Commission in their Statement that "the proposition that nuclear weapons
can be retained in perpetuity and never used - accidentally or by decision - defies
credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance
that they will never be produced again".

3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already
in January 1946 - in its very first resolution - unanimously called for a commission to
make proposals for " the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and
all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." While we rejoice at the
achievement of the international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on
chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore
the fact that the countless resolutions and initiatives which have been guided by similar
objectives in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half century remain unfulfilled.

4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the
nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that
fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total
elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to
take that step now.

5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has
entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These undertakings have been made in
the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states
to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the persistent
reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach their Treaty obligations as an urgent
commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory
Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control.

7. The international community must not enter the third millennium
with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate for
the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to
eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the governments of each of
the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit
themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps
and negotiations required for its achievement.

8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings
leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those states that have
the largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they be joined in a seamless
process by those with lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapon
states should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect.

9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and
the future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and subsequently
plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon states, for the practical
dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the
elimination of nuclear weapons.

10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development
of requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But there are a number
of practical steps that the nuclear weapon states can, and should, take immediately. We
call on them to abandon present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and
de-activating their weapons. They should also remove nonategic nuclear weapons from
deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament
efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorised launches.

11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the
three nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of
their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any actions
which could undermine the efforts of the international community towards nuclear
disarmament. We call upon them, and all other states that have not yet done so, to adhere
to the Non-Proliferation treaty and take the necessary measures which flow from adherence
to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and ratify the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.

12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Cut-off) would further underpin the
process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States
Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiations on such a convention should commence
immediately.

13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free
from nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of
these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of controls
over all fissile material and other relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence
of any new nuclear-weapon state, as well as any non-state entity in a position to produce
or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the process of eliminating
nuclear weapons.

14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination
of nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with respect to a
joint no-first use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon states and as regards non-use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, so called negative
security assurances.

15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok
and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Antarctic Treaty have
steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of the world. The further pursuit,
extension and establishment of such zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the
Middle East and South Asia, represents a significant contribution to the goal of a
nuclear-weapon-free world.

16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and
should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon states among themselves; and by the
nuclear -weapon states together with the non-nuclear weapon states, thus providing a road
map towards a nuclear weapon-free world.

17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require
the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument
or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives
outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world free from nuclear
weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid preparation for the post-nuclear era
must start now.