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S14016 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE November 10, 1969
from the remainder of the agencies on
budget, estimates as well as requested
restorations. The committee also heard
statements from numerous public witnesses on
various subjects and concluded the hearings
on July 22.
At that time it was the intention of the
committee to report the bill promptly, with
the hope that the bill could be finally enacted in the comparatively early days of
the new fiscal year beginning on July 1.
The good intentions of the committee have
been hopelessly stymied month after month
after month by the failure of the legislative
committees to act upon three authorizations
which are essential to the consideration by
the committee of the funding required for
those agencies in the bill—National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, National
Science Foundation,and Appalachian Development Act.
The real victims of this frustrating delay
are the other agencies in the bill that do
not require annual authorization. Personnel
and funding restrictions in recent years have
held them back, including the continuing
resolution, and they must await the
enactment of the bill for any relief in the way
of new authority.
CONTRACT AUTHORITY
The Appropriations Committee takes note
that a practice is developing which it feels
is unwise and economically inadvisable;
namely, the granting of contract authority
by various legislative committees without
consultation with the Appropriations
Committee as to what ultimate effect this might
have on our fiscal stability. We would hope
that the Appropriations Committee, which is
responsible for all Federal appropriations,
would not be denied through this process
the opportunity and the jurisdiction of
determining the funding process of the Senate.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, this is
what we say:
The real victims of this frustrating delay
are the other agencies in the bill that do not
require annual authorization. Personnel and
funding restrictions in recent years have held
them back, including the continuing
resolution, and they must await the enactment of
the bill for any relief in the way of new
authority.
Then, of course, speaking on this
question about the contract authority,
our committee is pretty much irked over
the procedure taking place, because we
feel, there again, that is not the proper
way for the Senate and the Congress to
proceed.
This is what we say:
The Appropriations Committee takes note
that a practice is developing which it feels is
unwise and economically inadvisable;
namely, the granting of contract authority
by various legislative committees without
consultation with the Appropriations
Committee as to what ultimate effect this might
have on our fiscal stability. We would hope
that the Appropriations Committee, which
is responsible for all Federal appropriations,
would not be denied through this process the
opportunity and the jurisdiction of
determining the funding process of the Senate.
Mr. President, my colleague from
Colorado and I both feel very strongly
about this, and so does the whole
committee.
I thought I would point that out again,
with no impertinence, that it should be
called to the attention of the Senate.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF
SENATOR HATFIELD TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the
distinguished senior Senator from Oregon
(Mr. Hatfield) be recognized for not to
exceed 45 minutes tomorrow at the conclusion
of the morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
RECESS
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate stand
in recess until 5 minutes of 2 today.
There being no objection, at 1 o'clock
and 36 minutes the Senate recessed until
1 o'clock and 55 minutes, when called to
order by the Presiding Officer (Mr.
Mansfield in the chair).
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The clerk
will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Inouye in the chair). Without objection,
it is so ordered.
TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY:
THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIR
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in
recent years it has become distressingly
apparent that there is often a great
discrepancy between the facts of a given
international crisis and the image of
them as presented by the executive
branch to the American public and Congress.
This may be attributed in part to
the increasing complexity of our
foreign relations. Upon closer examination,
however, other, deeply disturbing,
explanations are revealed. Foremost among
these is an increasing tendency on the
part of the executive branch policymakers
to make arbitrary decisions regarding
what the public needs, or has a right to
know. In some instances, it is difficult,
if not impossible to avoid the conclusion
that the "facts" selected for public
revelation have been chosen with an eye to
their utility in justifying actions
contemplated or, indeed, already taken.
There are, to be sure, certain restraints
which inhibit this practice: the greater
the body of openly available information,
the greater the difficulty in staging
selective presentations. When all the
pertinent evidence of a highly classified
intelligence nature, as was the case in the
events in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2
and August 4, 1964, is in the hands of the
policymakers, however, the public and
Congress are relatively helpless.
An even more serious aspect of such
situations is the degree to which the
highest policymakers themselves may be
in the hands of intelligence technicians
and managers operating without policy
guidance or responsibility.
This problem has been carefully
documented in the recently published book
"Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf
of Tonkin Affair" by Mr. Joseph C.
Goulden. There is no single piece of
writing on this subject which I could
commend more highly to my colleagues as
we struggle to extricate ourselves from
the aftermath of the Tonkin Gulf
affair and to assess the implications of
the secret war in Laos.
Mr. Goulden's book has already
received widespread and highly favorable
recognition in book reviews and news
articles. I ask unanimous consent that
these items be printed in the Record,
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the Record,
as follows:
[From the Dallas Morning News, Oct. 9.
1969]
The Big Question: What Happened?
(By Jim Wright)
In trying to evaluate our entry to the
Vietnam War, one of the first steps—and
one of the hardest—is trying to find out
what happened.
A new book, just out, is the result of an
expert's attempt to find out what happened
during the two confusing days in the
summer of 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the
writing business, the experts at finding out
what actually happened are the reporters.
Author Joe Goulden, who once worked in
that capacity for The News, was and is an
excellent reporter, skilled at digging up facts,
interviewing witnesses, comparing stories and
giving an account of events that sorts out
fact from rumor or opinion.
His efforts to find out what happened in
the Gulf of Tonkin have produced "Truth
Is the First Casualty" (Rand-McNally, $6.95).
In his conclusions, Goulden makes it clear
that he believes the Johnson administration's
actions during the incident were a
"medley of misrepresentations, contradictions
and half-truths."
But what lifts this book far above the
mass of works on Vietnam is that the text is
aimed primarily at getting the facts and
letting them speak for themselves.
Goulden did not try to slant or choose his
facts to project any particular line, hawk or
dove, liberal or conservative. He just reported
them, allowing the reader to form his own
conclusions which may be somewhat different
from Goulden's.
The combination of exhaustive research
and objectivity in presenting the results has
drawn praise from such disparate sources as
the leading dove, Sen. Fulbright, and Holmes
Alexander, syndicated conservative columnist.
If anything is clear about the incidents
of Aug. 4, 1964, it is the lack of clarity in
the reports back to the States on what
happened.
On Aug. 2, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol
through an area in which the South Vietnamese
had recently staged commando raids,
intercepted radio messages indicating that
the North Vietnamese intended hostile
action against the ship.
When three Red PT boats approached the
Maddox in what appeared to be a high-speed
torpedo attack, the destroyer fired three
"warning shots." Then, when the boats
launched torpedoes, she opened fire with her
main batteries, hitting one boat. The air
cover called in damaged the other two boats.
The Maddox left the area, but was ordered
back and two days later, accompanied by the
Turner Joy, patrolled the waters off North

S14016 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE November 10, 1969
from the remainder of the agencies on
budget, estimates as well as requested
restorations. The committee also heard
statements from numerous public witnesses on
various subjects and concluded the hearings
on July 22.
At that time it was the intention of the
committee to report the bill promptly, with
the hope that the bill could be finally enacted in the comparatively early days of
the new fiscal year beginning on July 1.
The good intentions of the committee have
been hopelessly stymied month after month
after month by the failure of the legislative
committees to act upon three authorizations
which are essential to the consideration by
the committee of the funding required for
those agencies in the bill—National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, National
Science Foundation,and Appalachian Development Act.
The real victims of this frustrating delay
are the other agencies in the bill that do
not require annual authorization. Personnel
and funding restrictions in recent years have
held them back, including the continuing
resolution, and they must await the
enactment of the bill for any relief in the way
of new authority.
CONTRACT AUTHORITY
The Appropriations Committee takes note
that a practice is developing which it feels
is unwise and economically inadvisable;
namely, the granting of contract authority
by various legislative committees without
consultation with the Appropriations
Committee as to what ultimate effect this might
have on our fiscal stability. We would hope
that the Appropriations Committee, which is
responsible for all Federal appropriations,
would not be denied through this process
the opportunity and the jurisdiction of
determining the funding process of the Senate.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, this is
what we say:
The real victims of this frustrating delay
are the other agencies in the bill that do not
require annual authorization. Personnel and
funding restrictions in recent years have held
them back, including the continuing
resolution, and they must await the enactment of
the bill for any relief in the way of new
authority.
Then, of course, speaking on this
question about the contract authority,
our committee is pretty much irked over
the procedure taking place, because we
feel, there again, that is not the proper
way for the Senate and the Congress to
proceed.
This is what we say:
The Appropriations Committee takes note
that a practice is developing which it feels is
unwise and economically inadvisable;
namely, the granting of contract authority
by various legislative committees without
consultation with the Appropriations
Committee as to what ultimate effect this might
have on our fiscal stability. We would hope
that the Appropriations Committee, which
is responsible for all Federal appropriations,
would not be denied through this process the
opportunity and the jurisdiction of
determining the funding process of the Senate.
Mr. President, my colleague from
Colorado and I both feel very strongly
about this, and so does the whole
committee.
I thought I would point that out again,
with no impertinence, that it should be
called to the attention of the Senate.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF
SENATOR HATFIELD TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the
distinguished senior Senator from Oregon
(Mr. Hatfield) be recognized for not to
exceed 45 minutes tomorrow at the conclusion
of the morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
RECESS
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate stand
in recess until 5 minutes of 2 today.
There being no objection, at 1 o'clock
and 36 minutes the Senate recessed until
1 o'clock and 55 minutes, when called to
order by the Presiding Officer (Mr.
Mansfield in the chair).
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The clerk
will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Inouye in the chair). Without objection,
it is so ordered.
TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY:
THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIR
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in
recent years it has become distressingly
apparent that there is often a great
discrepancy between the facts of a given
international crisis and the image of
them as presented by the executive
branch to the American public and Congress.
This may be attributed in part to
the increasing complexity of our
foreign relations. Upon closer examination,
however, other, deeply disturbing,
explanations are revealed. Foremost among
these is an increasing tendency on the
part of the executive branch policymakers
to make arbitrary decisions regarding
what the public needs, or has a right to
know. In some instances, it is difficult,
if not impossible to avoid the conclusion
that the "facts" selected for public
revelation have been chosen with an eye to
their utility in justifying actions
contemplated or, indeed, already taken.
There are, to be sure, certain restraints
which inhibit this practice: the greater
the body of openly available information,
the greater the difficulty in staging
selective presentations. When all the
pertinent evidence of a highly classified
intelligence nature, as was the case in the
events in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2
and August 4, 1964, is in the hands of the
policymakers, however, the public and
Congress are relatively helpless.
An even more serious aspect of such
situations is the degree to which the
highest policymakers themselves may be
in the hands of intelligence technicians
and managers operating without policy
guidance or responsibility.
This problem has been carefully
documented in the recently published book
"Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf
of Tonkin Affair" by Mr. Joseph C.
Goulden. There is no single piece of
writing on this subject which I could
commend more highly to my colleagues as
we struggle to extricate ourselves from
the aftermath of the Tonkin Gulf
affair and to assess the implications of
the secret war in Laos.
Mr. Goulden's book has already
received widespread and highly favorable
recognition in book reviews and news
articles. I ask unanimous consent that
these items be printed in the Record,
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the Record,
as follows:
[From the Dallas Morning News, Oct. 9.
1969]
The Big Question: What Happened?
(By Jim Wright)
In trying to evaluate our entry to the
Vietnam War, one of the first steps—and
one of the hardest—is trying to find out
what happened.
A new book, just out, is the result of an
expert's attempt to find out what happened
during the two confusing days in the
summer of 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the
writing business, the experts at finding out
what actually happened are the reporters.
Author Joe Goulden, who once worked in
that capacity for The News, was and is an
excellent reporter, skilled at digging up facts,
interviewing witnesses, comparing stories and
giving an account of events that sorts out
fact from rumor or opinion.
His efforts to find out what happened in
the Gulf of Tonkin have produced "Truth
Is the First Casualty" (Rand-McNally, $6.95).
In his conclusions, Goulden makes it clear
that he believes the Johnson administration's
actions during the incident were a
"medley of misrepresentations, contradictions
and half-truths."
But what lifts this book far above the
mass of works on Vietnam is that the text is
aimed primarily at getting the facts and
letting them speak for themselves.
Goulden did not try to slant or choose his
facts to project any particular line, hawk or
dove, liberal or conservative. He just reported
them, allowing the reader to form his own
conclusions which may be somewhat different
from Goulden's.
The combination of exhaustive research
and objectivity in presenting the results has
drawn praise from such disparate sources as
the leading dove, Sen. Fulbright, and Holmes
Alexander, syndicated conservative columnist.
If anything is clear about the incidents
of Aug. 4, 1964, it is the lack of clarity in
the reports back to the States on what
happened.
On Aug. 2, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol
through an area in which the South Vietnamese
had recently staged commando raids,
intercepted radio messages indicating that
the North Vietnamese intended hostile
action against the ship.
When three Red PT boats approached the
Maddox in what appeared to be a high-speed
torpedo attack, the destroyer fired three
"warning shots." Then, when the boats
launched torpedoes, she opened fire with her
main batteries, hitting one boat. The air
cover called in damaged the other two boats.
The Maddox left the area, but was ordered
back and two days later, accompanied by the
Turner Joy, patrolled the waters off North