Research is reviewed that addresses itself to human language learning by developing precise, mechanistic models that are capable in principle of acquiring languages on the basis of exposure to ...
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Research is reviewed that addresses itself to human language learning by developing precise, mechanistic models that are capable in principle of acquiring languages on the basis of exposure to linguistic data. Such research includes theorems on language learnability from mathematical linguistics, computer models of language acquisition from cognitive simulation and artificial intelligence, and models of transformational grammar acquisition from theoretical linguistics. It is argued that such research bears strongly on major issues in developmental psycholinguistics, in particular, nativism and empiricism, the role of semantics and pragmatics in language learning, cognitive development, and the importance of the simplified speech addressed to children.Less

Formal Models of Language Learning

Steven Pinker

Published in print: 2013-10-25

Research is reviewed that addresses itself to human language learning by developing precise, mechanistic models that are capable in principle of acquiring languages on the basis of exposure to linguistic data. Such research includes theorems on language learnability from mathematical linguistics, computer models of language acquisition from cognitive simulation and artificial intelligence, and models of transformational grammar acquisition from theoretical linguistics. It is argued that such research bears strongly on major issues in developmental psycholinguistics, in particular, nativism and empiricism, the role of semantics and pragmatics in language learning, cognitive development, and the importance of the simplified speech addressed to children.

Jennifer Greenwood

Published in print:

2016

Published Online:

September 2016

ISBN:

9780262029780

eISBN:

9780262329828

Item type:

book

Publisher:

The MIT Press

DOI:

10.7551/mitpress/9780262029780.001.0001

Subject:

Philosophy, General

Contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and psychology of emotion construes emotions as falling into two distinct groups, one being largely innate, the Basic Emotions and, the other, being largely ...
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Contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and psychology of emotion construes emotions as falling into two distinct groups, one being largely innate, the Basic Emotions and, the other, being largely socially-constructed, the Higher Cognitive Emotions. In addition, current orthodoxy construes emotions as operating primarily in individual psychological economies, that is, as individualistic. In this monograph I argue that both of these construals are mistaken. I argue that Basic Emotions and, subsequently, Higher Cognitive Emotions develop from inborn emotion precursors (affect expressions) concurrently with language and, by implication, symbolic thought and through the same developmental mechanisms. I argue, further, that emotions operate primarily in social economies to enable human social life, firstly through interpersonal regulation and, subsequently, through intrapersonal regulation. In light of these analyses, I also argue that emotional ontogenesis, which includes the ontogenesis of emotional intentionality, is a world-to-brain transcranial achievement, that is, it is radically externalistic. The development of human emotionality, language and thought is dependent upon the deep functional integration of two exquisitely complementary repertoires of constraints, one neonatal and, the other, maternal (or primary caregiver). Drawing on insights primarily from developmental sciences and philosophy, I show how a limited range of shared developmental mechanisms results in the concurrent development of at least some aspects of human emotionality and language. The deep functional integration of neonatal and maternal constraints repertoires results in the progressively synchronised, mutual modulation of relevant causal processes in both partners together with the neurogenesis and close, linguistically-mediated social relationship prerequisite to such development.Less

Jennifer Greenwood

Published in print: 2016-01-22

Contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and psychology of emotion construes emotions as falling into two distinct groups, one being largely innate, the Basic Emotions and, the other, being largely socially-constructed, the Higher Cognitive Emotions. In addition, current orthodoxy construes emotions as operating primarily in individual psychological economies, that is, as individualistic. In this monograph I argue that both of these construals are mistaken. I argue that Basic Emotions and, subsequently, Higher Cognitive Emotions develop from inborn emotion precursors (affect expressions) concurrently with language and, by implication, symbolic thought and through the same developmental mechanisms. I argue, further, that emotions operate primarily in social economies to enable human social life, firstly through interpersonal regulation and, subsequently, through intrapersonal regulation. In light of these analyses, I also argue that emotional ontogenesis, which includes the ontogenesis of emotional intentionality, is a world-to-brain transcranial achievement, that is, it is radically externalistic. The development of human emotionality, language and thought is dependent upon the deep functional integration of two exquisitely complementary repertoires of constraints, one neonatal and, the other, maternal (or primary caregiver). Drawing on insights primarily from developmental sciences and philosophy, I show how a limited range of shared developmental mechanisms results in the concurrent development of at least some aspects of human emotionality and language. The deep functional integration of neonatal and maternal constraints repertoires results in the progressively synchronised, mutual modulation of relevant causal processes in both partners together with the neurogenesis and close, linguistically-mediated social relationship prerequisite to such development.

This is the second chapter on emotional ontogenesis which also addresses the acquisition of language (and, by implication, symbolic thought). The analysis focuses on species typical behaviour ...
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This is the second chapter on emotional ontogenesis which also addresses the acquisition of language (and, by implication, symbolic thought). The analysis focuses on species typical behaviour patterns (STBPs) which provide the basis for the development of language. It is argued that the linguistic environments into which human neonates are born and the complementary repertoires of neonatal STBPs and maternal intuitive parenting skills provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the construction of the pragmatic foundation into which a semantic lexicon will be subsequently incorporated. The analysis demonstrates the singular importance of ‘punctuated’ suckling, joint attention and the different types of gestures used by children. The analysis also demonstrates the importance of “motherese” in the establishment of the child’s developing pragmatic framework. The child naturally imitates the interactive timing and clause boundary recognition of motherese and the rhythms, stresses and intonations associated with different speech acts. Before the child can comprehend and produce her first word she can engage in ‘conversation’ with adults.Less

Out of the Mouths of Babes and Sucklings

Jennifer Greenwood

Published in print: 2016-01-22

This is the second chapter on emotional ontogenesis which also addresses the acquisition of language (and, by implication, symbolic thought). The analysis focuses on species typical behaviour patterns (STBPs) which provide the basis for the development of language. It is argued that the linguistic environments into which human neonates are born and the complementary repertoires of neonatal STBPs and maternal intuitive parenting skills provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the construction of the pragmatic foundation into which a semantic lexicon will be subsequently incorporated. The analysis demonstrates the singular importance of ‘punctuated’ suckling, joint attention and the different types of gestures used by children. The analysis also demonstrates the importance of “motherese” in the establishment of the child’s developing pragmatic framework. The child naturally imitates the interactive timing and clause boundary recognition of motherese and the rhythms, stresses and intonations associated with different speech acts. Before the child can comprehend and produce her first word she can engage in ‘conversation’ with adults.