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The temporal life of eadi may be shorter than the life of the suit 15. The same view was taken by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Kamini Kumar Roy v. I find myself in respectful agreement with the dictum laid in the aforesaid cases. The result will be that the probate proceeding shall be restored to the file of the trial Judge who will dispose it of in accordance with law. In so far as it is not possible to say that the impugned action is taken otherwise than in accordance with the strict require- ment of the letter of law, the petitioner cannot get any assistance from C. Syed Ali Zaheer was in charge in capadty of Minister for Justice and, according to the petitioner, the Law Department of the State of Uttar Pradesh after examining the book found it objectionable and re- commended action against the petitioner with the result that it came to be pros- cribed in accordance with that recom- mendation. The petitioner alleges that the book- let in question does not contain any jectionable matter and no reasonable person on its examination can come to a conclusion that it contains preludiam reports as defined in clause (7) of Rule 35 of the Defence of India Rules. In his affidavit dated 6th September, 1968 the petitioner points out that much v^vse publications extracts from which ha TO been filed as annexures 'A’ to 'F to the smd affidavit escaped action at the hands of the Central Government and accord- J^ly the impugned action deserves to be struck down as_ discriminatory. In paragraph 14 of the Colter-Affidavit it is asserted that the action of the Central Government in pro- scribing the booklet was a bona fide exer- cise of the powers of the Government and the suggestion that the action of the Cen- tral Government was provoked by the question sent by Sri Atal Behari Baipayee is denied. Artlde 14 of the Constitution- could not be invoked in respect of an action t^en at a time when the Article stood suspended by an Order of ^e President under Article 359(1) of the Constitution.

Secondly, it provides that notice may be dispensed with where the court is satisfied that it would defeat the purpose of granting an injunction. The law does not require the Issue of notice when an ex parte injunc- tion is made, although courts, as a nutter of caution, issue a notice. Issues were framed, parties led evidence and the case was argued on their behalf on several dates before the trial Judge. 45 — Opinion is subjective and is not revisable — Govern- ment need not specify particular sub- ck pf Cl. 35 which de fin e "pre- judicial acts” — If action taken is strictly according to law, S. The action is thus to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the Central Government. Lack of harmony simpliciter means cessation of feelings of friendship but there can be no disturbance of communal harmony in the absence of feelings of enmity and hatred. On the same day the Ordi- nance was promulgated by the President, lids Ordinmce was amended by Ordi- nance No, 6 of 1962 promulgated on Nov- ember 3, 1962. 385 boo Met in ifs issue dated 12th June, 1966 characterising it as a commimal propa- ganda.

Rule 3 firstly provides that an interim injunction should orditoarfly be granted after notice to the adversary par^. D/- 30-10- 1968, from order of Add L Dist J., Lude- now. Chinna Muthu Nadar 6 (1926) AIR 1926 Cal 233 (V 13)- 42 Cal LJ 219. Smt Sulochana filed a written statement in the case and infer pleaded that the application for probate was not maintainable. 45 and 35(6) — Scope — Opinion of Government under R. 45 that the Central Government is competent to take action thereimder once it forms an opinion that the docu- ment in respect of which action is pro- posed contains one of the three matters stated therein. But the same Is not true when it is said that it is likely to disturb communal harmony. C Agarwal Ramesh Singh and Saghir Ahmed, for Petitio Der: K. The prayer in the petition is that the lollow- ing notification dated 18th Augipt, 1966 publi^ed in the Gazette of India dated 27th August, 1966 be quashed: "Whereas in the otfnion of the Central Government the book entitled "Tashkent Declaration and the Problem of Indo-Pak Minorities” written by Dr. Ibis Proclamation dedared that a ■»rave emergency existed whereby tiie security of India was threatened external asetesaon.

Gujarat Bhrl Lamodac Khlmchand Shah, b.8&i II»v.| . • Jammu ft Kashmir 7AMMU Sbii Bakshl lahwai Singh, Adyocati, Bnpiema Oooxt of Lidia. at the point of sale by a dealer , to the consumer. Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This "entertainment” may be either at the time of admi^on or at the hearing whenever It is taken up "tor corsideration". an api^^ has to be rejected on this ground, is what a Full Bench of this Court held recently in Janta Cycle Motor Mart V. This question does not, ^er^ fore, require detailed consideration by us now. the app^ itself would be incompetent md couldbe rejected even if wrongly admitted for L^g.

Obwously, the tax imposed in the manner pointed out abovo 1140 S. I may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 488^ (1968) 21 STC 154. .tr-hirh be- OTium ‘S Sn Su Sl S te'thc 'Sdstcnce of the directive in sub-section (1) that the tax shall he levied at one point only, viz. could be exempted from tax under Section 3-AA of the UJ*. P., added as an opposite party after the filing of the writ petitions, sightly rejected the appeals of the pi^- tioning assessee against the orders of the Sales Tax Officer solely on the ground that the memorandum of app eal each case did not disclose the admitted to be due with the result that the memo- landa of appeals were defective. nevertheles, aa alternative remedy open to the peti- tion er by means of an application for rewsioa ond^ Sec. What Is required Is satisfactory proo L at the time of "enter- tainment’’ of the appea L that the admitted tax 1^ been paid. If this provision is not complied mth, in the sense that the ap- pellant does not give satisfactory proof of payment of the admitted amount of tax vdthin the time given by law. 1968 All _LJ 547 = (AIR 1969 AU 200 (FB ) ) follo^g the law declared by the Supreme Court In Laxmi Ratan Engineering Worte case, AIR 1968 SC 488 = (1968') 21 STC 154 (Supra). Sales Ta^ coifid not stmd however, prayed that the case should b sent back for a decision by the Commissioner, before hearmg each appe^ whether the appeal was conyetent and could be heard in view of fte ^^t prowo to Section 9, sub-section (1) of the Ach K the admitted tax had not been pmd within the time prescribed by law.

Disobedience of that injunc- tion will result in the diversion of the levy to a point not considered taxable by the Legislature. In- asmuch as the petitioner deliberately chose the forum of appeal during the pen- dency of these writ petitions, and we have been invit^ to consider whether the orfers of the appdlate authority dismiss- ing the appeals are well founded in law I think it only right that having held that the appellate orders are erroneous the cases ^ould go back to the appellate authority for reconsideration and deosion in accordance with law. against the petitioning company, have been referred to this Bench for decision of the whole case. One of these ques- tions was whether sales of cotton blankets by the petitioning company, for Rs. 63, 351-14 P, in the assessment year 1961-62, for Rs. This question resolved itself Into: Kd the blankets, after having been cut Into convenient rires. a955) 6 STC 388 t AR) with regard to saris, lihap^g phaids, and bed-covers, or. Two other questions, which have been argued before us remain to be de- cided by us. It was .quite PO-^*le that the Assistant Commissioner, vnthout ^nsi^^S the validi U- of the rule, may We Placed the same interpretation on ■Ru Ip 12-A as we have adopted in teis case ^ Sprits of the appeals could have, been it S? Moreover, the difficulty caused by the questions of law which arose hawng been removed by us now, it seems just and proper that the petitioner should be re- legated to the remedy which the law pro- vides under S. sub-section (1) of the Act against any errors which may have been committed by the Sales Tax Officer on merits.

It is an injunction which cannot be disobeyed by the assessing authority. lore, to express any otanion In respect of that question. The petitioner urges that the as- sessnaent orders should be quashed by this Court and the cases sent down to the Sales Tax Officer for reassessment. It was indicated in the referring order that this question could be more appro- priately decided on evidence on record by the Sales Tax authorities themselves. In the cases before ns toe appeals came up "for considera- tion’’ when arguments were heard by the Assistant Commissioner, At that time the mind of the appellate authority was ap- 1970 J. Such a shortcoming would, m^l^ors in draiving up the memo- rl SL^f appeal, afiect the competence and maintainability ^ on^the Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the S^ha^i urged that it is more mpr^ priate that we should quash the mses^ Sent order in each case as well as the order of the Assistant Commissioner so Irih is=ssme.,ts may ba m|J fa thp lieht of our decisions on the first oi the two questions considered above. Although the writ petition wme entertained against the asses^ent orde^ tee petitioner had already chosen m ■nronriale mode of recess and Sa S^befom the Assistant Comm^sioner. inter alia, the assessee alleged teat un reasonable terms had a S stay of realisa Uon of the v-hole sessed so that the petitioner s busmess xvm Sy to be ruined.

Surely, they cannot arise because the cultivators of one district are more ad- venturous or more technology-minded tbari those of the other districts. It may have been a different matter if sub-section (2) had read, "unless the dealer proves other* wise in the manner prescribed ”, when it could have been legitimately contended that the only mode of proof available to the dealer was the mode prescribed in Rule 12-A But that the Legislatiire did not enact. The goods are pur- chased by the purchasing dealer for re- sale in the same condition in which he piurchased them. Inasmuch as the sale by him £s a sale to the consumer, it is the purchas- ing dealer who is liable to tax. Rule 12-A it is true, has been made in the exerdse of the power conferred on the State Gov- ernment imder Section 24, sub-section (4) of which provides that the rules shall have effect as if enacted in the Act. Sub-sec- tion (1) empowers the State Government to make rules "to carry out the purposes of this Act”, and no rule can be made In the exercise of that power which nul Mes the purposes of the Act or of any of its provisions. The Supreme Court held that the ten M of the proviso to Section 9 were fi^eral; ^ that the proviso required was sati^acto^ proof, and it was not open to a Rule to make the section narrower by prescnbu^ a . The Supreme Court observed; "The rule lays down one unconte^ble mode of proof which the Court ways accept but it does not exclude the operation of the proviso when equally satisfactory proof is made available to the officer hearing the appeffi ^d it ^ proved to his satisfaction tbat the pay ment of the tax has been duly made and ffi toe this sense, the. Sales Tax Act and Section 5 (2) (a) (U) or gld* to the Act and S %= so conattucd » ^ co^ct Om Sr” Am 1966 sc 12-HS65) 10 STO 607. or of such instalments thereof as may have become x)ayable.” The proviso does restrict the right of appeal itsell In Ratan Engineer- ing Works’ case.

That such differences in the average yield oc- cur also in the different districts of the States of Madras and Mysore is also clear. It must not be forgotten that Rule 12-A has been framed for giv- ing effect to the purposes of Section 3-AA If it seeks to li m it the selling dealer to a specific mode of proof it clearly attempts to impose restriction which was not con- templated by sub-section (2). If Rule 12-A provides the only mode for a selling dealer to prove that the sale by him is not to the consumer there will be cases where the Rule may operate to nu Qify the object of S. A registered dealer sells goods -to another registered dealer. Provisions relating to evidence, specially those made in the exercise of a rule-making power, cannot be so construed as to limit or defeat the statutory provision laying down the substantive law. ^Before the Supreme Court it was contended that Rule oo provided the only mode of provmg the admitted tax had been deposited. "Tt is to be remembered that all rules of w Sodo S io tateoded to advaoce justice and not to defeat it. The appdlant could not be denied a decision on merits unless there was an incurable defect of such a character in the memoranda of appeals that it co^d ^ held that there were no appeals at a B Mfore the Assistant Comnflssioner. The more important question about whi A the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax said nothing was whether the provi- sions of Rule 66 (2). Apparently, this rule has been made so as to give effect to a statutory obligation of the assessee to satisfy, the Court that the appeal Is maintainable on a groiind apart from either the form of the appeal or the merits of the questions raised by the appellant In the grounds of appea L This statutory requirement Is imposed by the first pro- viso to Section 9 (1) in the following terms : — "Provided that no appeal against an assessment shall be entertained unless It is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due.

i Courts do not oniinarily additions In enactments. Rules 1 and 2 provide for the making of an inte- rim order of injunction. Lahshmudu ' 5 (1932) AIR 1932 Mad 155 (1) f V 19) ■=1931 Mad "WN 1148, Maruda- f-hala Nadar v. On the basis of a wffl which was alleged to have been executed b y AM/KM/A94/69/TVN/D , Sulochana (Tripathi J.) A, LB. Gopal Narain Fadnis died on 19-1- 1963 leaving his only daughter Smt Sulo- rttana as his survivor. It Is true that "lack of harmony” does not necessarily mean promotion of fedings of enmi^ and hated. ORDER: — This is a petition xmder Article 226 of the Constitution. That is why on October 2d, 1962 the President Issued a Proclamation under Article 352 of the Constitution.

No adequate reason is shown for interpolating the word •final’ before ’order* in Rule l(r). Let us now exa mine the sdieme of Rules 1 to 4 of Order XXXIX. AIR 1931 Mad 715 A AIR 1932 Mad 155 (1) & AIR 1926 Cal 233, Fol L — (Succession Act (1925), S. (Paras 3 & 8) Cases Referred: Chrono Togical Fans (1951) AIR 1951 Had 715 (V 38)=» 3951-1 Mad LJ 194, Veeraswami V. Mathur, for Appellant; R CL Baf- pai, for Respondent JUDG5IENT:— Appellant Balbir Singh had filed a petition for probate cmder Section 276 of the Indian Succes d on Art on 5-3-1963. Prasad J.) ♦•IJkely to'disturb communal harmony” Es not the same thing as ’’Likely to result in lack of communal harmony”. 7 Zamir Mansion, Gwynne Road, Lucknow, con- tains prejudicial reports as defined In clause (7) of Rule 35 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 45 of the De- fence of India Rules, 1962, the Centra] Government hereby — , (a) prohibits the sale or distribution of the said book or any extract therefrom or of any translation thereof, and declares the 6^d book and every copy or transla- tion thereof or extract therefrom, to be forfeited to Government; and\ (b) directs every 'person possessing any copy of the said book to deliver the same to the local police authorities.” It Is a matter of common knowledge that on September 8, 1962 the Chinese attacked the northern border of India and that constituted a threat to the secu- rity of iudca.

The provi- sions of the first proviso to Section 9 are qxiite clear on the requirements of law. Question (1): It is now to be seen whether an ex parte order of to- junction falls within the purview of Rule l(r) of Order 43. Firstly, the language of Rule l{r) is unhedged and broad.