The central problem relating to
legislative review of executive and administrative law‑making is the
degree to which Parliament should involve itself in attempting to influence and
control the course of administration. If Parliament goes too far into the substance
of day‑to‑day administration, it defeats many of the underlying
reasons for delegating powers to make laws in the first place.

Special Committee on Statutory
Instruments,

Third Report (Journals,
October 22, 1969, p. 1482)

Some acts of Parliament delegate to Ministers,
departments, agencies, boards or other authorities the power to make and apply
subordinate legislation described only in general terms in the acts. Delegated
legislation is a term used to describe these regulations, orders, rules, by‑laws
and other instruments. Parliament scrutinizes most delegated legislation to
ensure that their provisions do not exceed the powers approved by Parliament
itself.

This responsibility to scrutinize delegated
legislation has been assigned to the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny
of Regulations. In addition to the terms of reference set out by the House
itself, this Committee’s mandate is in part described by an act of Parliament.[1]
Its activities sometimes lead to the invocation of special procedures in the
House when the Committee makes a report to the House advocating the revocation
of a regulation.

This chapter discusses the mandate of the
Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations and the procedures the
House follows to adopt or reject a resolution revoking a statutory instrument.