PER CURIAM: After receiving a complaint from Edward Boulware that his case
went nearly ten years without resolution, the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) conducted an investigation and filed
formal charges against his attorney, Michael Atwater. Following a hearing, a
Panel from the Commission on Lawyer Conduct found Atwater violated various
Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended Atwater receive an admonition and
pay the costs of the proceedings. ODC took exception to the Panel's report,
arguing it should have found Atwater violated additional Rules of Professional
Conduct. Additionally, ODC argues a sanction harsher than an admonition is
warranted. We agree.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. BOULWARE MATTER

Shortly after a water main adjacent to Boulware's
property ruptured in January 2000, Boulware retained Atwater to bring a suit
against the City of Rock Hill. At their initial meeting and in the following
months, Boulware provided Atwater with several documents related to this
matter, including estimates of the damage, pictures of the flooding, Boulware's
recent tax returns, and the City's letter rejecting Boulware's claim. With
this information in hand, Atwater filed a complaint against the City in May
2000. In February 2001, the water main broke again and flooded Boulware's
property a second time. Atwater accordingly filed an amended complaint
reflecting this additional damage.

At this stage, it is undisputed that Atwater engaged
in at least some discovery. For example, he responded to interrogatories and
requests for production from opposing counsel, and he deposed and interviewed
various witnesses. By the time the case was called for trial in June 2003,
Atwater believed he had enough evidence to move forward and try the case.
However, just as the case was called for trial, it was removed from the circuit
court docket and set for binding arbitration. The matter was scheduled to be
arbitrated in 2003, and Atwater met with Boulware to prepare an arbitration
packet in anticipation of the proceeding.

This arbitration ultimately fell through. Atwater's
work on the matter subsequently diminished precipitously, and he never resolved
the case. Atwater's main contention as to why he was unable to proceed was a
lack of evidence to support Boulware's claims. However, in the six and a half
years after the case was to be arbitrated, Atwater interviewed at most only a
handful of witnesses, took just a few depositions, and only visited the
property three times. Rather than actively investigating Boulware's claims
himself, Atwater instead primarily relied on Boulware to come forward with
evidence on his own initiative.

As a prime example, Atwater's chief evidentiary
concern was a lack of proof as to the damages Boulware incurred.[1]
However, he never asked Boulware for copies of the cancelled checks he wrote
for repairs to substantiate his claim of damages. It was not until opposing
counsel requested them in 2005, five years after the flooding, that Atwater
received them. Only then did Atwater ask Boulware for more information about
his expenditures. Unfortunately, Boulware was unable to provide anything more
specific to Atwater because so much time had passed since he wrote the checks;
had Atwater told him to keep better records from the start, Boulware testified
he would have done so. Furthermore, Atwater never had his own estimate of
Boulware's damages performed despite his reservations about the estimate
Boulware provided.[2]

Also during these six and a half years, the evidence
before us shows Atwater sent only a few letters and e-mails, and made only a
few telephone calls, to Boulware. Atwater testified, however, that he was
routinely in contact with Boulware and many of his meetings also were in
person. On the other hand, Boulware offered copies of his telephone records to
show the numerous calls he made to Atwater, the vast majority of which Boulware
claims went unanswered or unreturned.[3]
In fact, Boulware wrote multiple e-mails and letters to Atwater expressing his
frustration in reaching his attorney and the slow progress of his case.[4]

Over the years, the settlement offers tendered by the
City ranged from $15,000 to $22,000, with an assurance that the City could go
up to $25,000 if necessary. Boulware rejected each of these, claiming he
needed at least $30,000 to adequately cover the necessary repairs. Also during
this time period, the matter was set to be arbitrated on at least three
different occasions, each of which fell through.[5] Unsatisfied with Atwater's progress on his case after eight years, Boulware
requested his file from Atwater in 2008. He made a second request a few months
later and copied ODC in his letter. In the fall of 2009, when Atwater was
suspended by this Court in another matter,[6] Boulware retained a different attorney to handle his case. He settled the case
seven months later for $22,000, claiming this sum was now acceptable only
because the age of the case had diminished its value. ODC subsequently filed
formal charges against Atwater.

II. PANEL REPORT

Based on the foregoing, the Panel concluded Atwater violated
the following Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.1
(competence); Rule 1.3 (diligence and promptness); and Rule 3.2 (duty to
expedite litigation). However, the Panel found ODC had not set forth clear and
convincing evidence that Atwater violated Rule 1.2 (scope of representation and
allocation of authority), Rule 1.4 (communication), Rule 3.1 (meritorious
claims and contentions), and 8.4(e) (conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.

In particular, the Panel found Atwater violated Rule
1.1 by exhibiting a lack of thoroughness and preparation. While the Panel did
note that Atwater possesses the necessary legal skill and knowledge to practice
law, it nevertheless found his lack of investigation and preparation
constituted a violation of Rule 1.1.

As to Rules 1.3 and 3.2, the Panel similarly found
that Atwater failed to diligently prosecute the claims he brought on Boulware's
behalf. While the Panel agreed that some delays are inevitable and outside of
an attorney's control, it was extremely concerned with Atwater's refusal to
accept any responsibility for the numerous delays that caused a case
"uncomplicated both factually and legally" to drag on for nearly ten
years. As the Panel found, there was much Atwater could have done to advance
the matter even if there were obstacles to his progress along the way.
Although Atwater maintained he thoroughly investigated the case, the Panel
found no evidence to support this contention and resolved this credibility
issue in favor of Boulware.

With respect to Rules 1.2 and 1.4, the Panel noted
there was a factual dispute as to the extent Atwater maintained contact with
Boulware. In the end, the Panel found credible Atwater's testimony that he
routinely discussed the case with Boulware in person and over the telephone.
Atwater's "shortcoming," according to the Panel, was instead with
"his failure to adequately document his client file to reflect those
discussions and meetings." The Panel therefore found ODC failed to meet
its burden in proving Atwater violated Rules 1.2 and 1.4.

As to Rule 3.1 regarding meritorious claims and
contentions, the Panel summarily found ODC presented no evidence as to any
violation of this rule. In a similarly summary fashion, the Panel also
concluded that Atwater's conduct did not violate Rule 8.4(e) and therefore was
not prejudicial to the administration of justice.

In aggravation, the Panel considered Atwater's failure
to acknowledge any wrongdoing, his prior disciplinary history, and his pattern
of misconduct. First, as noted previously, Atwater failed to take any
responsibility for the delays in prosecuting Boulware's case, instead laying
the blame primarily on Boulware for not coming forward with evidence on his own
and other individuals for cancelling the scheduled arbitrations.

Of particular concern to the Panel were Atwater's
actions in Atwater I. In that case, among other things, Atwater failed
to respond to the opposing party's motion for summary judgment. Atwater I,
355 S.C. at 623, 586 S.E.2d at 591. As a result, his client's claims were
dismissed. See id. The Panel accordingly viewed his prior dilatory
representation as demonstrating a pattern of misconduct. Furthermore, Atwater
received this public reprimand in Atwater I during his representation of
Boulware, and more specifically, at the very time when he essentially ceased
working on Boulware's case.

In mitigation, the Panel considered Atwater's lack of
dishonest or selfish motive. The Panel found that Atwater did not personally
benefit in any way from his misconduct as he took this case on contingency and
received no fees for his work.

Ultimately, the Panel recommended that we give Atwater
an admonition and order that he pay the costs of the proceedings.

LAW/ANALYSIS

ODC takes exception to the Panel's report and requests
that we find Atwater violated both Rules 1.4 and 8.4(e). In addition, ODC asks
us to impose a more severe sanction than an admonition regardless of whether
Atwater also violated Rules 1.4 and 8.4(e).

"The findings of the panel are entitled to great
weight, particularly when the inferences drawn from the testimony in the record
depend largely on the credibility of the witnesses." In re Johnson,
380 S.C. 76, 80, 668 S.E.2d 416, 418 (2008). In the end, however, we have the
sole authority to discipline attorneys for misconduct. In re Greene, 371
S.C. 207, 216, 638 S.E.2d 677, 682 (2006). Thus, we are not bound by the
Panel's findings and recommendations, and we make our own findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Id. Furthermore, we are to impose the sanction we
deem appropriate. Id. ODC bears the burden of proving any allegation of
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

Atwater has not filed a brief taking exception to the
Panel's findings and recommendations, and he is therefore bound by them. See Rule 27(a), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. Furthermore, we concur in the Panel's
findings that Atwater violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 3.2. ODC has not taken
exception to the Panel's findings that Atwater did not violate Rules 1.2 and
3.1. We agree with the Panel that ODC presented no evidence Atwater violated
Rule 3.1. However, we believe the Panel's analysis of Rule 1.2 is subsumed
within ODC's challenge to the Panel's findings regarding Rule 1.4 and discuss
it below.[8]

I. COMMUNICATION

ODC contends the Panel erred in finding Atwater did
not fail to adequately communicate with Boulware. Because the Panel based this
holding on a finding that Atwater's testimony was credible, we defer to the
Panel.

Rule 1.4(a) states, in pertinent part,

A lawyer shall

. . . .

(2) reasonably consult with the client
about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;

(3) keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter; [and]

(4) promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.

Rule
1.2(a) similarly requires that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule
1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued."

In our opinion, ODC has set forth a colorable claim
that Atwater violated these rules. Throughout the hearing, Boulware detailed
his attempts to reach Atwater to discuss the case and his frequent inability to
actually do so. Boulware bolstered his claims by providing phone records
demonstrating his efforts to contact Atwater and various letters he wrote
complaining of Atwater's failure to respond. Additionally, Boulware
specifically instructed Atwater to proceed with the evidence he already had,
which Atwater clearly did not do. In sum, these claims reveal a complete breakdown
of communication between Boulware and Atwater, even with Boulware's
instructions to proceed despite the perceived evidentiary deficiencies.

Atwater, on the other hand, maintained he was
frequently in contact with Boulware either over the telephone or in person.
The Panel agreed, finding his testimony credible and noting that Atwater's
problem really was just a failure to adequately document these communications.
While we are troubled by ODC's allegations and the lack of a documentary record
supporting Atwater's contentions, we nevertheless give deference to the Panel's
finding that Atwater's testimony was credible. Accordingly, we find ODC has
not submitted clear and convincing evidence to show Atwater violated Rules 1.2
and 1.4. In the future, though, it would greatly behoove Atwater and other
members of the Bar to adequately document their communications with clients to
avoid similar problems.

II. CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

ODC next argues the Panel erred in finding Atwater did
not violate Rule 8.4(e), which prohibits engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. We agree.

In this matter, the Panel, despite concluding Atwater
did not violate Rule 8.4(e), found "there is no evidence to suggest any
meaningful effort on [Atwater's] part to resolve this case" after
consenting to mediation in 2003. The Panel also concluded that "[i]t is
difficult to imagine any circumstances in which such a matter would take nearly
a decade to resolve." We completely agree and believe this finding is at
odds with the Panel's summary conclusion that Atwater did not violate Rule
8.4(e). To use an oft-quoted phrase, justice delayed is justice denied.
Although this saying is often invoked in the criminal context, it is no less
applicable to civil cases. The evidence before us demonstrates that Boulware
was unable to provide some of the evidence Atwater claimed was necessary for
the case as a result of Atwater's dilatory practices. Moreover, the evidence
Boulware could have procured may have increased his eventual recovery. Thus,
the delays Atwater occasioned prejudiced Boulware's case and potentially
reduced the damages to which he was entitled.

Furthermore, "[p]erhaps no professional
shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination." Rule 1.3 cmt.3,
RPC, Rule 407, SCACR. "Even when the client's interests are not affected
in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety
and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness." Id. Thus,
even without prejudice and accepting that Boulware ultimately settled the case
for the same amount Atwater could have, the amount of time Atwater spent on a
relatively simple matter itself casts a shadow over the profession. Atwater
even continued to delay the case despite Boulware's obvious frustration with
Atwater's slow progress. It is also particularly disconcerting to us that
Atwater claimed he was ready to proceed to trial in June 2003, while at the
same time premising his defense now on a lack of evidence to support Boulware's
claims.

In sum, we find there is clear and convincing evidence
that Atwater violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.1,
Rule 1.3, Rule 3.2, and Rule 8.4(e). Accordingly, Atwater is subject to
discipline under the following provisions of Rule 7, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR:
Rule 7(a)(1) (violating the Rules of Professional Conduct) and Rule 7(a)(5)
(engaging in conduct tending to pollute the administration of justice and
bringing the profession into disrepute).

ODC takes exception to the Panel's recommendation that
we give Atwater an admonition, and we agree based on the aggravating
circumstances found by the Panel. In particular, we share the Panel's grave
concern with respect to Atwater's failure to acknowledge any responsibility for
the delays in Boulware's case. See In re Hendricks, 319 S.C. 465, 468,
462 S.E.2d 286, 287 (1995) (noting that failure to accept personal
responsibility for conduct is an aggravating factor). Without a doubt, delays
arise in litigation, and the fact that a case may take longer than initially
expected is simply a reality all clients must face. In the case before us,
unquestionably there were delays and setbacks beyond Atwater's control.
Nevertheless, these do not account for failing to resolve a relatively simple
case for nearly ten years. There were myriad other things Atwater could have
done to advance Boulware's case despite any roadblocks he may have encountered.
Alternatively, he could have withdrawn from the representation if the case
became too problematic. In other words, he should have fished or cut bait.

Instead of doing so, Atwater sporadically worked on
and investigated Boulware's claims, unnecessarily prolonging the case. Before
this Court, just as he did before the Panel, Atwater refused to accept any responsibility
for these delays, instead finding someone else to blame for the case's slow
progress at almost every turn. Furthermore, Atwater feigned surprise at
Boulware's complaint, claiming he never had any prior problems with Boulware despite
Boulware's numerous communications expressing his concerns. In fact, Atwater
callously told us Boulware's complaint to ODC was just Boulware taking his
frustrations regarding the weaknesses of his case out on Atwater.[9]
This inability to recognize that he bears at least some responsibility for
failing to advance this case and letting it languish for almost a decade is cause
for great concern. We also find it spurious for Atwater to complain of a lack
of evidence to support Boulware's case when Atwater himself never sought to
fill these gaps.

Additionally, not only does Atwater have a prior
disciplinary history, but that history reflects a pattern of similar misconduct. See In re Sturkey, 376 S.C. 286, 290, 675 S.E.2d 465, 467 (2008)
(stating panel considered prior disciplinary history and pattern of misconduct
in aggravation). As previously noted, Atwater received a public reprimand in
2003 for violating the rules regarding competence, diligence and promptness,
expediting litigation, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Atwater I, 355 S.C. at 625-27, 586 S.E.2d at 592. These are
the exact same rules he violated in this case. More troubling is the fact
that he received this public reprimand during his representation of Boulware.
Even more troubling is the fact that his work on Boulware's case began to
dwindle right after he was sanctioned for doing just that in Atwater I.

In mitigation, we do agree with the Panel that
Atwater's lack of personal gain and dishonest motive is a relevant mitigating
factor. See In re Larkin, 336 S.C. 366, 371, 520 S.E.2d 804, 806
(1999). Nevertheless, while Atwater may not have been malintentioned, the
delays occasioned by his actions potentially prevented the discovery of relevant
evidence supporting Boulware's case. In our opinion, this prejudice to
Boulware's case, coupled with Atwater's pattern of misconduct and inability to
accept responsibility for his actions, warrants a sanction harsher than an
admonition.

Under these facts, we find a six-month definite
suspension is appropriate. See Sims, 380 S.C. at 64-65, 668 S.E.2d at 409-10
(imposing a ninety-day suspension for violating the rules regarding diligence
and promptness, communication, expediting litigation, not responding to ODC,
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); In re
Sturkey, 376 S.C. 286, 291, 657 S.E.2d 465, 467-68 (2008) (finding a
nine-month suspension was warranted for failing to communicate with clients,
comply with disciplinary proceedings, and pursue litigation); In re Cabaniss,
369 S.C. 216, 218, 632 S.E.2d 280, 281 (2006) (imposing a twelve-month
suspension for violating the rules regarding competence, diligence and
expediting litigation, communication, responding to ODC investigation, and
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); In re Davis, 352
S.C. 29, 31-32, 572 S.E.2d 285, 287 (2002) (finding a sixty-day suspension
appropriate for not providing competent representation, failing to diligently
and expeditiously pursue litigation, failing to communicate with client, and
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); In re
Smith, 337 S.C. 582, 586-87, 524 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1999) (ordering attorney
be suspended for twelve months when his neglect of a client matter prejudiced
client, he did not cooperate with ODC, and he had a prior disciplinary record); cf. Hendricks, 319 S.C. at 468, 462 S.E.2d at 287 ("We decline to
accept the assertions of impairment as mitigation in view of the serious
misconduct committed and in light of respondent's failure to accept personal
responsibility for his conduct."). We also order Atwater pay the costs of
these proceedings.

CONCLUSION

We
hold Atwater has violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, and 8.4 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Accordingly, Atwater is subject to discipline under
Rules 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(5) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.
Based on the facts of this case and particularly in light of Atwater's prior
history and failure to accept responsibility for his conduct, we order Atwater
be definitely suspended for a period of six months and pay the costs of these
proceedings. Within fifteen days of the filing of this opinion, Atwater shall
file an affidavit demonstrating he has complied with the requirements of Rule
30, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

[1] Boulware spent approximately $14,000 out of pocket to
perform some repairs to the building. He testified further repairs were
needed, but he could not afford them. Atwater's concern was that Boulware's
damages estimate was inflated and that his actual expenses included payments
for items other than flooding damage. He was also concerned that the estimate
Boulware tendered was performed by an old friend of Boulware's, not an
independent contractor.

[2] Atwater claimed that Boulware would not let him get his
own estimate. The Panel found this assertion "entirely lacking in
credibility."

[3] These records were used only to show the telephone
calls Boulware made to Atwater, not whether Atwater returned any telephone
calls.

[4] For example, Boulware wrote a letter to Atwater in
2005 expressing his desire to just get the matter behind him given how long it
had taken to resolve. In 2007, he wrote, "Let's just proceed with what we
have." By 2008, his frustration had grown: "I cannot phantom [sic]
any civil case of this nature taking over eight years to reach settlement. I
do not understand why I have been unable to obtain basic information concerning
this matter, or why the case has not and is not being settled."

[5] There is evidence to suggest Atwater was not at fault
in these cancellations. However, Boulware testified Atwater failed to keep him
fully apprised of them. Additionally, Atwater points to these cancellations as
being a contributing factor for why Boulware's case took ten years to resolve.

[7] In Atwater II, Atwater was charged with five
complaints of misconduct. 385 S.C. at 258, 684 S.E.2d at 558. The Panel found
he committed misconduct in three of the complaints but his conduct was not
sanctionable. Id The remaining two complaints were dismissed. Id.
However, the Panel found Atwater failed to cooperate with ODC during its
investigation of these complaints and this alone was sanctionable. Id. at 258-59, 684 S.E.2d at 558.

[8] The Panel discussed Rules 1.2 and 1.4 in tandem,
noting they impose similar ethical obligations. ODC, however, only challenges
the Panel's conclusion with respect to Rule 1.4. Because these obligations are
similar in this case, we will discuss them both under our de novo standard of
review.

[9] Atwater's one statement that he believes there was
more he should have done and perhaps he should have withdrawn is utterly
unconvincing. Immediately after he made this statement, he backtracked by pointing
out Boulware did not receive a better result after retaining a new attorney and
mentioning once again that Boulware was just aggravated because he had a weak
case.