O‘Toole v. Denihan,
118 Ohio St. 3d 374,
2008-Ohio-2574 – Paragraph one of the syllabus: "A public children‘s
services agency and its employees, upon receipt of a case referral, do not have
a duty under R.C.
2151.421(A)(1)(a) to cross-report the case to a law-enforcement agency and
are immune from liability for failing to do so."

In re
A.G.B., 173 Ohio App. 3d 263,
2007-Ohio-4753 – Parents were divorced. Instead of seeking a
modification of custody within the domestic relations case,
which would require proof of changed circumstances, the father
filed an abuse-neglect-dependency complaint. Children Services
was not involved. Reversed, as the court was required to appoint
a guardian ad litem, notwithstanding the mother‘s failure to
object in the trial court. Dissent believes
Chapter
2151 does not apply to private custody disputes.

In re
Baby Boy Doe, 145 Ohio Misc. 2d 1,
2007-Ohio-7244 – Trial court determines Ohio‘s deserted
child law (R.C.
2151.3515-2151.3530)
is invalid because its notice provisions, which are procedural,
are at odds with rules adopted by the Supreme Court, which take
precedence.

In re R.A., 172
Ohio App. 3d 53,
2007-Ohio-2997 -- In what appears to be a battle between counties to avoid
expenses of providing for dependent children, the last county on the hook can't
wiggle off citing the sunset provision applicable to temporary custody orders.
After giving appellant Mercer County the win, the court rules against it on its
claim regarding intervention in Van Wert County proceedings.

In re
L.W., 168 Ohio App. 3d 613,
2006-Ohio-644 -- The child who was the subject of neglect
and dependency hearing died during the objections process. The
action is moot. The subject matter of the action, custody, was
abated. The capable of repetition evading review exception does
not apply since the repetition aspect is too speculative. Nor
does the debatable constitutional question exception apply.

In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369,
2006-Ohio-1191 -- Case involves competing motions for custody of a neglected
child by the father and two sets of relatives. (1) At ¶6: Trial court is
strongly criticized for extending three days of hearings over a two month
period, citing Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(8). (2) The court distances
neglect, dependency and abuse proceedings from the parental unfitness rule of
In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St. 3d 89. Syllabus: "(1) An award of legal
custody of a child does not divest parents of their residual parental rights,
privileges, and responsibilities. (2) A juvenile court adjudication of abuse,
neglect, or dependency is a determination about the care and condition of a
child and implicitly involves a determination of the unsuitability of the
child's custodial and/or noncustodial parents. (3) When a juvenile court
adjudicates a child to be abused, neglected, or dependent, it has no duty to
make separate findings at the dispositional hearing that a noncustodial parent
is unsuitable before awarding legal custody to a nonparent."

In re James, 163 Ohio App. 3d 442,
2005-Ohio-4847 -- (1) At ¶19: "...(W)e hold that when a nonparent has
nonpermanent custody of a child, the requirement in
R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) that
the child's parent must demonstrate a change in circumstances for either the
child or the nonparent in order for the court to modify custody is
unconstitutional." (2) At ¶28-41: The court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the grandparent's motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
the child late in proceedings, following the submission of a report by an
independent custody investigator favoring the award of custody to the parents.

In re McDaniel, Lake App. Nos.
2002-L-158, 159,
2004-Ohio-2595 -- No abuse of discretion in refusing foster
parents' motion to intervene. Foster parents do not have a constitutionally
protected interest in proceedings concerning the foster child. At ¶41: Although
participation may be warranted in some cases, when the issue is deprivation of
parental rights, the foster parents' interest in preventing the return of the
child to the parent in order to further their own desire for adoption is too
predictable to left the addition of the foster parents as parties."

In re McBride, 111 Ohio St. 3d 19,
2006-Ohio-3454 -- Syllabus: "A parent who has lost permanent custody of a child
does not have standing as a nonparent to file a petition for custody of that
child. (R.C. 2151.414(F) and
2151.353(E)(2), applied.) Reverses
In re McBride, 158 Ohio App. 3d 572,
2004-Ohio-5269

In re Byerly, Portage App. Nos.
2001-P-0158,
2004-Ohio-523 -- To have standing on appeal, a substantial right of
a party must be affected. Though the motion leading to the hearing was
dismissed, the magistrate changed orders controlling visitation, thus affecting
a substantial right. Appellant was denied right to be heard through
cross-examination and by calling witnesses. The court also erred by refusing to
allow a proffer and by refusing to allow deposition of an expert.

In re Don B., Huron App. No. H-02-033,
2003-Ohio-1400 -- Cuyahoga County child was placed in a Huron County foster home
where he was sexually abused. Huron county resisted return of child to Cuyahoga
County because of slow progress towards adjudication there. Held that child
remains within the jurisdiction of Cuyahoga County where his parents apparently
continued to live.

In re Olah (2000), 142 Ohio App. 3d 176 --
Failure to conduct a dispositional hearing within 90 days of the filing of the
complaint requires dismissal without prejudice. Dissent would find implicit
waiver of the time limit.

Ross v. Saros, 99 Ohio St. 3d 412,
2003-Ohio-4128 -- Mother who claimed to have missed termination of parental
rights hearing because of lack of notice brought a habeas action. Held that she
had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a previous unsuccessful appeal.
Also held she would not necessarily have been entitled to release as it would
not have been in the child's best interest to release him to a crack head who
had stopped visiting.

In re Spangler, 162 Ohio App. 3d 83,
2005-Ohio-3441 -- Active efforts by caseworkers to encourage mother to divorce
her abusive husband violated the public policy against interference in a
marriage. But there had been no objection to the stay-away aspect of the case
plan and the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights was supported by the
evidence.

In re T.R. (1990), 53 Ohio St. 3d 6 --
Paragraph three of the syllabus: "Proceedings in juvenile court to determine if
a child is abused, neglected, or dependent, or to determine custody of a minor
child, are neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed to the public.
The juvenile court may restrict public access to these proceedings pursuant to
Juv. R. 27 and R.C. 2151.35 if the court finds, after hearing evidence and
argument on the issue, (1) that there exists a reasonable and substantial basis
for believing that public access could harm the child or endanger the fairness
of the adjudication, and (2) the potential for harm outweighs the benefits of
public access." Also see State ex rel Dispatch Printing Co. v. Lias
(1994), 68 Ohio St. 3d 497 (when and how closure hearing may itself be closed);
In re D.R.
(1993), 63 Ohio Misc. 2d 273; In re Joanne M. (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d
447 (summary denial of child welfare agency's motion for closure, without an
evidentiary hearing, was erroneous).

In re Poling (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 211 --
Syllabus: "(1) Pursuant to
R.C. 2151.23(A), the juvenile court has jurisdiction
to determine the custody of a child alleged to be abused, neglected or
dependent, when that child is not the ward of any court in this state. This
jurisdiction includes children subject to a divorce decree granting custody
pursuant to R.C. 3109.04. (2) When a juvenile court makes a custody
determination under R.C. 2151.23 and
2151.353, it must do so in accordance with
R.C. 3109.04. (R.C. 2151.23[F][1], construed and applied.)" See fn. 3 at p. 218.

In re Young Children (1996), 76 Ohio St.
3d 632 -- Syllabus: "The passing of the statutory time period ('sunset date')
pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(F) does not divest juvenile courts of jurisdiction to
enter dispositional orders." Temporary custody order ends, but court's
jurisdiction to put on a new order does not. Agencies do not need to file new
complaints alleging same facts to maintain intervention.

State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne (1998) 82
Ohio St. 44 -- Maternal grandmother petitioning a juvenile court for custody had
the right to have counsel appointed to represent her pursuant to
Chapter 120 of
the Revised Code. R.C. 2151.353 entitles all indigent parties in juvenile
proceedings to appointed counsel, and this is not limited by reference in
R.C.
120.06 to representation in prosecutions which could result in the loss of
liberty. Also see McKinney v. McClure (1995), 102 Ohio App. 3d 165.

Davis v. Trumbull County Children Services
Board (1985), 24 Ohio App. 3d 180 -- (1) A guardian ad litem is required in
neglect and abuse cases, but not in dependency proceedings. (2) An agency report
containing social history information is hearsay and may not be admitted to
prove allegations in a dependency complaint. (3) An agency may not seize a
person's child and then be the sole judge of how much evidence as to agency
conduct it will divulge.

In re Burchfield (1988), 51 Ohio App. 3d
148, 154 -- The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to
civil proceedings, including dependency and neglect cases. However, the
fundamental right of parents to raise their children is protected by due
process. See Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645; State, ex rel.
Heller, v. Miller (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 6.

In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St. 3d 155 --
An adjudication that a child is neglected or dependent, accompanied by a
disposition awarding temporary custody to a children services agency is a final
appealable order.

McNeal v. Miami County Children Services Board
(1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 208 -- In very limited circumstances involving child
custody, where time is of the essence, habeas corpus may be an alternative to
appeal (but not in this case). For a case where habeas was allowed to proceed
see Marich v. Knox County Dept. of Human Services (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d
163.

In re Bacorn (1996), 116 Ohio App. 3d 489
-- (1) At. p. 496: "..(W)e hold as a matter of law, that in order for a court to
rely upon R.C. 2151.415(C)(1)(c) when ordering long-term foster care, the child
at issue must be sixteen at the time she was counselled, as well as at the time
she expressed her opinion regarding the disposition, and at the time of the
hearing." (2) Though court's findings may have been supported by the evidence as
a whole, they were not supported by the specific testimony referred to.
Appellate court will not second guess why trial court did not rely on other
evidence.

In re Franklin (1993), 88 Ohio App. 3d 277
-- Foster parents wished to become parties in voluntary surrender of parental
rights proceeding, but did not file a motion seeking custody or ask to be made
parties until after dispositional order had been entered. Held: (1) that the
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider its prior
dispositional order pursuant to
R.C. 2151.417(A). (2) Pursuant to Juv. R. 2(16)
they could be made parties at the discretion of the court, but were not entitled
to become parties.

In re Ring (June 28, 1994) Franklin Co.
App. No. 93APF12-1693, unreported (1994 Opinions 3001) -- Determination whether
former foster parents should be allowed to intervene and seek visitation and
custody following permanent commitment, should be guided by Civil Rule 24. There
is no right to intervene and permissive intervention rests within the sound
discretion of the court. Also see In re Deleon (December 22, 1994),
Franklin Co. App. No. 94APF05-763, unreported (1994 Opinions 6008) reaching the
same conclusion as to grandparents.

In re Carroll (1997), 124 Ohio App. 3d 51
-- When children entered protective supervision, there was no limit placed on
the number of extensions. Court holds subsequent amendment of
R.C. 2151.353(G)
limiting such extensions may not be applied retroactively.

In re Collier (1993), 85 Ohio App. 3d 232
-- Analyzing R.C. 2151.353(G), court concludes children services agency was not
precluded from applying for a second extension of a protective services order.

In re Kost (January 27, 1994), Franklin
Co. App. No. 93AP-683, unreported (1994 Opinions 193) -- In response to the
claim that the trial court could not extend a temporary custody order beyond the
one year limitation imposed by
R.C. 2151.353(F), court construes action of the
trial court as a new dispositional order, entered in accordance with the court's
continuing jurisdiction.

In re Sims (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 37 --
(1) By not contesting the allegations in a complaint, a party does not waive his
or her right to participate in the proceedings. (2) A causal link must be shown
between the fault or habit of the parent and the neglected condition of the
child.

In re Pryor (1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 327 --
(1) After discussion of custody awards in divorces and juvenile court
proceedings, at pp. 334-335: "In sum, the Boyer, Perales and
Thrasher decisions all affirm that the best interest of the child remains
the primary standard to be applied in custody cases. Nevertheless, while the
welfare of the child is the primary consideration, suitable parents have a
paramount right to custody...Before divesting a parent of this right and
awarding custody to a nonparent, the court must determine whether a
preponderance of the evidence shows that the parent abandoned the child, that
the parent contractually relinquished custody of the child, that the parent has
become totally incapable of supporting or caring for the child or that the award
of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child." (2) At p. 336:
There is no requirement that the factors enumerated in
R.C. 3109.04(F) be
considered in an award of custody under
R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). (3) At pp. 338-339
the court questions whether a parent has standing to challenge the effectiveness
of a guardian ad litem.

In re Sarah H. (1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 455
-- It was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to order a father to
undergo therapy as a sex offender as a condition of continued visitation with
his daughter, absent a finding that he was responsible for any abuse.

In re Simons (1997), 118 Ohio App. 3d 622
-- Couple lived in Kentucky during marriage. Wife filed for divorce there, then
moved to Ohio to live with her mother. Seeking to remove custody issue from the
divorce action, mother's mother filed a complaint alleging child of the marriage
was abused and sought custody. Held Ohio judge acted within his discretion under
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in declining to exercise
jurisdiction. Further held Ohio judge properly communicated ex parte with
judge in Kentucky concerning status of the case.

State v. Tyren (1998), 91 Ohio Misc. 2d 67
-- Negotiations to resolve an abuse and dependency matter required defendant to
undergo sex offender treatment. Admissions made during therapy led to an
indictment, which the court dismisses to serve the interests of justice.

In re Zeiser (1999), 133 Ohio App. 3d 338
-- Six and eight year olds were left alone on a regular basis. All indications
were that they were mature for their age and had not encountered or created any
situations posing an actual risk. Neglect finding affirmed. See dissent.

In re Johnson (Mach 22, 2001), Franklin
Co. App. No. 00AP-691, unreported -- A child may not be found dependent or
neglected when a parent enters into a voluntary arrangement to have the child
cared for by relatives, and the care thus furnished is adequate.

In re Riddle (1997), 79 Ohio St. 3d 259 --
Child was placed with grandparents through an agency mediated agreement,
precipitated by parents' transient lifestyles. Such an arrangement made by a
parent would usually forestall claims of neglect, though a distinction may be
drawn when placement is arranged by agency. Dependency might have been the more
appropriate finding.

In re Reese (February 23, 1982), Franklin
Co. Case No. 81AP-739 (1982 Opinions 298) -- A child is not neglected if,
regardless of the faults and habits of its parents, it is receiving adequate
care from a relative.

In re Gutman (1969), 22 Ohio App. 2d 125
-- Headnote 1: "A Juvenile Court cannot deprive the mother of an adulterine
bastard of the custody of such child, in the absence of evidence to warrant a
finding that such mother is unfit or that or that such child is dependent or
neglected within the purview of law or that the best interests of the child
require such action."

Waterman v. Kitrick (1989), 60 Ohio App.
3d 6 -- Neglect established where mother may have been intoxicated, struck
daughter with a shoe and caused bruises by grabbing arms.

In re A.W., 195 Ohio App. 3d 379,
2011-Ohio-4490 –
R.C. 2151.04(D) allows the court to find a child dependent if it is residing
in a household where the parent or other member of the household committed an
act which resulted in a sibling being adjudicated abused, neglected or
dependent. A younger child had been taken to the hospital for treatment of a
hematoma on the brain and chest bruising. No perpetrator was identified. That
child was permed shortly before the mother gave birth. The infant was removed
from the hospital and the agency subsequently obtained custody pursuant to (D),
but not (C) of the dependency statute. Reversed. Though the infant is a sibling,
notwithstanding the permanent commitment, the agency failed to prove one of the
three people living in the household was responsible for the injury to the other
child. The general responsibility of a mother for her child is not sufficient.

In re Alexander C., 164 Ohio App. 3d
540,
2005-Ohio-6134 -- There were reports of domestic violence in the parents'
relationship, and they had not been particularly cooperative with the child
welfare agency. But dependency focuses on the condition and environment of the
children, not the faults of the parents. By all accounts the children were well
provided for, and the parent's conduct was not shown to have had an impact
sufficient to warrant state intervention. Nor was the parents' relationship
shown to have an impact on the children amounting to neglect as defined by
statute. Noncompliance with a case plan does not by itself constitute neglect.

In re Stoll, 165 Ohio App. 3d 226,
2006-Ohio-346 -- Mom had a meth lab in her garage, but dad lived with his mother
in a adequate and well maintained home, had visited, and contributed to support.
Though the mother preferred the children stay with her parents, the suitability
of their father's home meant they were not dependent or neglected. The mother
had arranged for her parents to care for the children before she entered drug
rehab, so the children were properly provided for, applying In re Crisp
(Feb. 5, 1981), Franklin App. No. 80AP-678; In re Darst
(1963), 117 Ohio App. 374, 379; and In re Riddle (1997), 79 Ohio St. 3d
259. The father's alleged drug use did not make him an unsuitable custodian.

In re R.S., R.S., A.P., and A.G.,
Summit App. No. 21177,
2003-Ohio-1594 -- Mother's admitted use of marijuana
outside the presence of her children was not shown to have impaired fulfilling
her duties as a parent. Dependency finding reversed.

In re T.M., 161 Ohio App. 3d 638,
2005-Ohio-3083 -- Custody of six dependent children was split - four to mother,
two to father. Mother sought leave to move to Florida. Father sought custody of
all of the children. Court erred by not considering change of custody motion at
the same time as relocation.

In re Hunt (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 378 --
To bring the case within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, a dependency
complaint must state the essential facts.

In re Burrell (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 37 --
Children are not dependent merely because their mother is living with her
boyfriend, in the presence of the children, without plans to marry.

In re Bishop (1987), 36 Ohio App. 3d 123
-- (1) Dependency focuses on the condition of the child and not the faults of
the parents. (2) Dependency is to be determined as of the date of the hearing.
(3) Past history can be used to predict the fitness of a potential custodial
placement.

In re Bibb (1980), 70 Ohio App. 2d 117 --
Dependency focuses on whether children are receiving proper care and not on the
faults and habits of the parents. Though mother was periodically hospitalized
for depression, she always made adequate arrangement for care of her children.
Children were not dependent and court suggests agency's meddling exacerbated
mother's problems, to the detriment of the children.

In re Tikyra A. (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d
452 -- Teenage mother ran away from home to stay in house where drugs were
allegedly used, leaving her young children in the care of their grandmother.
Although the children may have been neglected, they did not fit the statutory
definition of dependency as they were not homeless, destitute, or without proper
care or support.

In re Robert S. (1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d 84
-- Huron County couple adopted child who was in the permanent custody of a
Cuyahoga County child welfare agency. Child's emotional and behavioral problems
led to filing of a dependency action and placement. Cuyahoga County agency held
subject to contributing to costs of inpatient care, primarily because their lack
of candor as to the child's problems and history, and promises of aid if needed,
estopped them from denying payment.

In re Pieper (1993), 85 Ohio App. 3d 318
-- (1) Incidents occurring following an initial finding of dependency, and while
the children were in the custody of a children services agency, may be
considered in a subsequent dependency action. (2) An order prohibiting any
contact between husband and wife is overly broad. Restrictions on contact must
be limited to when the children are present or in her custody.

In re Willman (1986), 24 Ohio App. 3d 191
-- Sick child may be found dependent based on refusal of parents to allow
further medical treatment for religious reasons. Compare
R.C. 2151.03(B).

In re Brown (1989), 60 Ohio App. 3d 136,
137-138 -- "In proving that a child is dependent in that he or she lacks proper
parental care because of the mental condition of a parent, evidence must be
adduced to demonstrate not only that the parent had a mental incapacity, but
also that the child lacked 'proper care' because of the mental incapacity."

In re Ward (1992), 75 Ohio App. 3d 377 --
(1) Mother's frequent incapacitation due to hypoglycemic reactions requiring
care from nine year old and emergency squad runs, and proof of adverse impact on
child supported finding of dependency. (2) Court allows one year period of
limitation on temporary custody order to run from agency's request for temporary
custody rather than from date of original filing.

In re Shott (1991), 75 Ohio App. 3d 270 --
A juvenile court may not award custody of a dependent minor to a mental health
agency without complying with the requirements of
Chapter 5122.

In re Baby Boy Blacksheares (2000), 90
Ohio St. 3d 197 -- Syllabus: "When a newborn child's toxicology screen yields a
positive result for an illegal drug due to prenatal maternal cocaine abuse, the
newborn is, for purposes of
R.C. 2151.031, per se an abused child." Court
avoids deciding whether a fetus is a "person" and thus a "child."

In re Pitts (1987), 38 Ohio App. 3d 1 --
In abuse proceedings, it is only necessary to prove that the child has been
abused, regardless of who was responsible.

In re Boyce (1987), 37 Ohio App. 3d 105 --
Father's conviction for endangering children admissible in abused child action.
Pursuant to Evidence Rule 803(21), the journal entry of judgment reflecting a
jury's guilty verdict on an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for more
than one year (or of a guilty plea, but not judgments entered on no contest
pleas) is admissible in a subsequent civil case. This rule does not apply to
criminal cases.

Clark v. Clark (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d
558 -- Corporal punishment administered by father to child may have been
unwarranted and excessive, but did not amount to abuse as it did not create a
substantial risk of serious physical harm.

In re Schuerman (1991), 74 Ohio App. 3d
528 -- Abuse established where discipline of child with belt left substantial
bruising. Sibling found dependent based on history of corporal punishment in
mother's household.

State ex
rel. Brooks v. O‘Malley, 117 Ohio St. 3d 385,
2008-Ohio-1118 – Because "any person" may file a complaint
alleging neglect, dependency or abuse, a court does not lack
jurisdiction in proceeding on a complaint filed by an employee
of a child welfare agency who is not a lawyer. Such filings do
not constitute unauthorized practice.

In re
Luman, 172 Ohio App. 3d 461,
2007-Ohio-2565 -- According to
R.C. 2151.353(J) the jurisdiction of a juvenile court
concerning a child residing in a different county in some
circumstances terminates a year after the last action taken in a
case. Mother who lived in county 1, sought unsuccessfully to
regain custody in county 2 where the child had been adjudicated
dependent. More than a year later she sought custody in county 3
where the child actually lived. Applying the statute, which is
deemed unambiguous, the court in county 3 erroneously dismissed
the mother's motion for want of jurisdiction. The court notes
there may still be an impediment based on a prior paternity
action in county 4.

In re Don
B., Huron App. No. H-02-033,
2003-Ohio-1400 -- Cuyahoga County child was placed in a
Huron County foster home where he was sexually abused. Huron
county resisted return of child to Cuyahoga County because of
slow progress towards adjudication there. Held that child
remains within the jurisdiction of Cuyahoga County where his
parents apparently continued to live.

In re
Hlavsa (2000), 139 Ohio App. 3d 871 -- A juvenile court
judge ordered granted permanent custody of children to a child
welfare agency, but was suspended from practice before the order
was journalized. Order was void. Order was not saved by
journalization by administrative judge acting as the court's ex
officio clerk.

In re
H.W., 114 Ohio St. 3d 65,
2007-Ohio-2879 -- Syllabus: "A trial court does not abuse
its discretion when, after a minor parent or parents involved in
a custody proceeding and who were minors at the onset reach the
age of majority, the court removes as parties to the action the
child's grandparents, who have no independent legal interest or
rights in the proceeding." Agency continued to seek PCC in
litigation dating back to 2001. For an earlier round see In re Walker, 162 Ohio App. 3d 303,
2005-Ohio-3773. Mother is retarded. Grandparents had been
active litigants. Opinion emphasizes the minimal legal rights of
grandparents.

In re
Williams, 101 Ohio St. 3d 398,
2004-Ohio-1500 -- Syllabus: "Pursuant to
R.C. 2151.352, as clarified by Juv. R. 4(A) and Juv. R.
2(Y), a child who is the subject of a juvenile court proceedings
to terminate parental tights is a party to that proceeding and,
therefore, is entitled to independent counsel in certain
circumstances." Conflict case. In re
Williams, Geauga App. Nos. 2002-G-2454 and 2459,
affirmed. In re Alfrey, Clark App.
No. 01CA0083, disapproved.

In re
McDaniel, Lake App. Nos. 2002-L-158, 159,
2004-Ohio-2595 -- No abuse of discretion in refusing foster
parents' motion to intervene. Foster parents do not have a
constitutionally protected interest in proceedings concerning
the foster child. At ¶41: Although participation may be
warranted in some cases, when the issue is deprivation of
parental rights, the foster parents' interest in preventing the
return of the child to the parent in order to further their own
desire for adoption is too predictable to justify the addition
of the foster parents as parties."

In re
Zhang (1999), 135 Ohio App. 3d 350 -- Child of
schizophrenic mother was temporarily committed to child welfare
agency and placed with foster parent. Mother absconded with
child and returned to China. Agency and trial court were at odds
as to whether this was acceptable. Ultimately the foster mother
was permitted to intervene and obtained legal custody. Affirmed.
See dissent as to why this was improper.

In re
Jordan Mourey, Athens App. No. 02CA48,
2003-Ohio-1870, ¶ 19-23 -- Grandmother sought leave to
intervene in permanent custody proceedings. Generally a
grandparent has no constitutional right to associate with
grandchildren, but may be joined if they have visitation rights.
No error as such rights had been terminated before the motion to
intervene was filed.

In re J.S., 184 Ohio
App. 3d 310,
2009-Ohio-5189 – Father missed the “adjudicatory” hearing on
agency’s permanent custody motion but appeared for
“dispositional” hearing, at which time counsel was appointed at
his request. Failure to appoint counsel before the adjudicatory
hearing did not violate his statutory right to counsel, but did
violate due process. Here the court was aware of his assertion
that he could not afford transportation to the hearing from his
residence in an adjoining state, and that there were justifiable
reasons for having missed some earlier hearings. The court had
enough information at the beginning of the adjudicatory hearing
to know counsel might be necessary to protect the father’s
rights.

In re
A.L., Franklin App. No. 07AP-638 and 647 -- In abuse
cases Juv. R. 4(A) requires the appointment of counsel in
addition to a GAL. Here the failure to do so at the time of the
initial proceedings appears not to have been prejudicial, and
the time to appeal has passed. Nor is the subsequent failure to
appoint counsel during termination of parental rights
proceedings prejudicial, there having been no allegations of
subsequent abuse, and as the child‘s wishes, to the extent they
could be discerned at age four, had been conveyed to the court.

In re
P.M., 179 Ohio App. 3d 413,
2008-Ohio-6041 – Hearings were scheduled to determine
support for a dependent child. Father missed some hearings and
complained in objections of counsel‘s efforts. Failure to
provide transcript did not justify overruling objections since
they turned on complaints that would not be reflected by a
transcript.

In re
Sherman, 162 Ohio App. 3d 73,
2005-Ohio-3444 -- (1) Three children wanted to be
permanently committed. One wanted to live with her father.
Because of a conflict of interest, the same attorney could not
continue to represent all four children. Reversed for failure to
appoint separate counsel. (2) The statements of the children in
a permanent custody case are inadmissible unless they fall
within a hearsay exception. (3) The psychologist's report was
erroneously admitted as it contained information based on the
observations of others which was not in evidence. (4) The same
applies to the written guardian ad litem's report, said to have
been based on records and conversations. (5) The court should
have appointed a psychologist for the father to rebut the
conclusions of the agency's expert.

In re
Williams, 101 Ohio St. 3d 398,
2004-Ohio-1500 -- Syllabus: "Pursuant to
R.C. 2151.352, as clarified by Juv. R. 4(A) and Juv. R.
2(Y), a child who is the subject of a juvenile court proceedings
to terminate parental tights is a party to that proceeding and,
therefore, is entitled to independent counsel in certain
circumstances." Conflict case. In re
Williams, Geauga App. Nos. 2002-G-2454 and 2459,
affirmed. In re Alfrey, Clark App.
No. 01CA0083, disapproved.

In re
Moore, 158 Ohio App. 3d 679,
2004-Ohio-4544 -- In re Williams
applies retroactively. The issue is not waived by the parent's
failure to request appointment of counsel in addition to a
guardian as it is the child's right to counsel that is at issue.
Held error not to investigate the need to appoint counsel for
children who had consistently expressed a desire to return home
and the guardian was not an attorney. Compare
In re R.A. Miller, Franklin App. No.
04AP-783,
2005-Ohio-897 where the children had not recently expressed
a desire to return.

In re
Wylie, Greene App. No. 2004CA0054,
2004-Ohio-7243 -- Sister's statement to the guardian, taken
to mean both girls wished to return to their mother, placed the
court under a duty to ascertain the need to appoint counsel.
This was partially satisfied when one girl was interviewed in
chambers and expressed no preference, but the issue was
unresolved as to the other, requiring reversal. Compare
In re Graham, 167 Ohio App. 3d 284,
2006-Ohio-3170 where the children were not consistent in
expressing a desire to live with their mother.

In re
M.L.R., 150 Ohio App. 3d 39,
2002-Ohio-5958 -- Dispositional hearing was set for 9:00.
Counsel for father was allowed to withdraw when his client had
not appeared by 9:45. Father arrived as hearing was underway.
The court refused to appoint new counsel and father did not
waive his right to counsel. Reversed. Claimed lack of
"cooperation" at the last minute and without elaboration was not
a sufficient basis for permitting withdrawal. Nor did the
attorney's conduct satisfy ethical standards. Also see
In re Tyler S., Lucas App. No.
L-04-1294,
2005-Ohio-1225. Compare In re C.H.,
162 Ohio App. 3d 602,
2005-Ohio-4183 which focuses on the mother's
uncooperativeness and apparent disinterest over the course of
proceedings.

In re
Stacey S. (1999), 136 Ohio App. 3d 503 -- (1) Children in
permanent commitment proceeding had a right to have counsel
appointed to represent their interest. This was not discharged
by appointment of a lay guardian and counsel to represent that
guardian who later became guardian as well. Guardian favored
termination of parental rights, but children expressed
continuing love for their parents. (2) Missed doctor's
appointment and obnoxious conduct of father escalated into PCC
of six children. Reversed based on part of sufficiency of proof
claim.

In re C.C., 187 Ohio
App. 3d 365,
2010-Ohio-780 – In permanent custody proceedings the court
was not obligated to notify the Cherokee tribe based only on the
father’s representation that the child’s great-grandmother was a
member of the tribe. Under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act
notice must be sent to the tribe when a youth meets the
definition of an “Indian” child, being either a member of a
tribe or eligible for membership and the biological child of a
member.

In re B.S., 184 Ohio App. 3d 463,
2009-Ohio-5497, ¶62-64 – Father asserted his child had
Native American ancestry but provided no support for this claim.
None of the tribes he mentioned claimed an interest in the
child, and declined to participate in permanent custody
proceedings because the child was not deemed an “Indian child”
under federal law. Because of this the father could not advance
claims premised on 25 U.S.C. 1911 and 1912.

In re
Thompkins, 115 Ohio St. 3d 409,
2007-Ohio-5238 -- Issue is what constitutes reasonable
diligence in obtaining service on a missing father in
termination of parental rights proceedings before service by
publication. Attempt to obtain certified mail service at an out
of county address where the father was thought to have lived was
returned marked "attempted, not known" by the Post Office.
Majority holds there was no need to attempt service by ordinary
mail. Minority would remand for a determination whether
sufficient efforts were made, applying Suzemore v. Smith (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 330.

In re
Sheffey, 167 Ohio App. 3d 141,
2006-Ohio-619 -- Rush to permanently commit a newborn as the
initial disposition for a neglected and dependent child ignored
many procedural requirements as to notice and participation in
hearings. Reversed as a denial of due process. Mother was
imprisoned in Columbus when proceedings were conducted in
Ashtabula. Though older children had been permanently committed,
there was no plan put forth for reunification.

Ross v.
Saros, 99 Ohio St. 3d 412,
2003-Ohio-4128 -- Mother who claimed to have missed
termination of parental rights hearing because of lack of notice
brought a habeas action. Held that she had an adequate remedy at
law in the form of a previous unsuccessful appeal. Also held she
would not necessarily have been entitled to release as it would
not have been in the child's best interest to release him to a
crack head who had stopped visiting.

In re T.C. (2000), 140 Ohio App. 3d 409 -- (1) Father was
served by publication in the initial neglect, dependency and
abuse proceedings, and was personally served in prison with
regard to the permanent custody motion. He appeared and
contested the action without claiming the initial service was
defective. Therefore, the issue of proper service at the initial
hearing on temporary custody was waived. (2) No abuse of
discretion in denial of continuance when father fired his
attorney midway through the hearings.

In re
Lisbon, Stark App. No. 2003CA00318,
2004-Ohio-126 -- While a parent has a due process right to
be present for termination of parental rights hearings, this
right is not absolute when the parent is incarcerated. No error
found in denial of a motion asking the mother be brought to
court from Miami where she was being held. Court allowed
deposition in lieu of testimony and a continuance for that to be
done. Miami-Dade prison officials would not allow a deposition
to be conducted.

In re
Kutcher, Belmont App. No. 02 BE 58,
2003-Ohio-1235 -- No abuse of discretion found in refusal to
continue a termination of parental rights hearing because of the
mother's unexplained absence.

In re
Q.G., 170 Ohio App. 3d 609,
2007-Ohio-1312 -- Mentally retarded mother had attended
earlier hearings, but informed counsel she could not make it to
court for the adjudicatory hearing on a PCC motion because she
did not have money for bus fare. The hearing proceeded in her
absence and parental rights were terminated. Reversed. The court
was required to take extra care to assure due process was
afforded.

In re
C.T., 119 Ohio St. 3d 494,
2008-Ohio-4570 – Syllabus: "A guardian ad litem has
authority under
R.C. 2151.281(I) and
2151.415(F) to file and prosecute a motion to terminate
parental rights and award permanent custody in a child welfare
case. Reverses. In re C.T., 174 Ohio
App. 3d 594,
2007-Ohio-6970. The referenced provisions provide
independent statutory authority for the GAL to file a permanent
custody motion. Note:
2151.414 is limited to
2151.413 motions which must be filed by an agency. GAL
motions probably would be adjudicated pursuant to
2151.353.

In re
Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 3d 92,
2002-Ohio-5368 -- Syllabus: "In a permanent custody
proceeding in which the guardian ad litem's report will be a
factor in the trial court's decision, parties to the proceeding
have the right to cross-examine the guardian ad litem concerning
the contents of the report and the basis for a custody
recommendation."

In re
Kelley, Ashtabula App. No. 2002-A-0088,
2003-Ohio-194 -- Eleventh Circuit sua sponte reverses in a
permanent commitment case where the magistrate failed to fully
and specifically discuss the
R.C. 2151.414(D) factors in determining whether termination
of parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
Trial judge deemed to have abused his discretion in adopting the
magistrates decision. Also see In re Smith,
Ashtabula App. No. 2002-A-0098,
2003-Ohio-800.

In re
Elliott, Jefferson App. Nos. 03 JE 30, 33,
2004-Ohio-388 -- (1) Where the mother's mental health was a
central issue in termination of parental rights proceedings, it
was error not to appoint an expert examiner upon her motion. (2)
Reasonable efforts to reunite the family is an element
controlling the award of permanent custody. Award of permanent
custody reversed where reunification was not a part of the
agency's initial plan, then parent complied with the case plan
when it was made an objective. In particular, there was no
evidence the father could not parent the child.

In re
Tyas, Clinton App. No. CA2002-02-010,
2002-Ohio-6679 -- Court finds neither plain error or
structural error where no request was made to call the guardian
as a witness or to cross-examine the guardian concerning the
report. Also see In re Bowers
Franklin App. Nos. 02AP-347 and 379,
2002-Ohio-5084, ¶32-43.

In re
Johns, Stark App. No. 2003CA00146,
2003-Ohio-3621 -- No error in the guardian's report being
filed eight days after the hearing. Report offered no new facts
or thoughts on relevant issues, already testified to by social
workers. Mother's counsel had passed up opportunity to
cross-examine the guardian. PCC reversed anyway. Agency
primarily relied on permanent commitment of two older children.
But mother had complied with case plan and began with a fresh
slate as to this child.

In re
Mack, 148 Ohio App. 3d 626,
2002-Ohio-4161 -- Psychological evaluation report offered
into evidence at a PCC hearing was inadmissible hearsay.
Examiner did not testify. Error harmless as the judgement was
supported by the balance of the evidence.

In re
Olah (2000), 142 Ohio App. 3d 176 -- Failure to conduct a
dispositional hearing within 90 days of the filing of the
complaint requires dismissal without prejudice. Dissent would
find implicit waiver of the time limit.

In re
L.R.T., 165 Ohio App. 3d 77,
2006-Ohio-207 -- Magistrate granted agency's motion for
permanent custody. Judge sustained mother's objections and
granted legal custody to a family member. This was improper as
the family member had not filed a motion seeing custody. It was
also improper for the judge to sustain objections without a
complete review of the transcript.

In re A.B., 110 Ohio St. 3d 230,
2006-Ohio-4359 -- Syllabus: "After a public children services agency or private
child placing agency is granted temporary custody of a child and files a motion
for permanent custody, a juvenile court does not have authority to place the
child in a planned permanent living arrangement when the agency does not request
this disposition. (R.C. 2151.353(A)(5), applied.)" Decision is driven by
Dickensian sentimentality instead of the rules of statutory construction.
Reverses In re A.B., Summit App. No. 22659,
2005-Ohio-4936 which found
R.C. 2151.353(A)(5) requires the request of a child welfare agency, but
R.C.
2151.415(F) does not.

In re A.S., 163 Ohio App. 3d 647,
2005-Ohio-5309 -- Of its own motion a court hearing a request for permanent
custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 may order a child placed in a PPLA. Here the
mother of a five year old became mentally ill when the child was three . After
time spent in jail and a mental hospital she was unlikely to be able to resume
care anytime soon. But visits were affectionate and the mother-child bond was
strong. The foster parents were receptive to either adopting or continuing to
provide care in a PPLA. The trial court properly determined permanent custody
was not in the child's best interest. Opinion is post
R.C. 2151.414 counterpart
to In re Gibson and In re McGraw (July 19, 1979), Franklin App.
Nos. 78AP-856 and 857. Reversed: In re A.S., 110 Ohio St. 3d 283,
2006-Ohio-4479.

Miller v. Greene County Children Services
Board, 162 Ohio App. 2d 416,
2005-Ohio-4035 -- Agency sought permanent
custody of a Down syndrome child. Guardian ad litem filed a motion for placement
in a planned permanent living arrangement and prevailed. The evidence supported
the conclusion the child was unable to function in a family-like setting and
needed to remain in residential or institutional care. The foster home was able
to manage his problems due to special training, but was not in a true sense a
family-like setting.

In re Tanker (2001), 142 Ohio App. 3d
159 -- Court denied agency's PCC request, but extended the agency's legal
custody to permit long-term foster care. On appeal the agency claimed the
criteria for a planned permanent living arrangement were not met. The four
siblings live together with foster parents who are willing to continue, but
unwilling to adopt because of their age and financial considerations. Special
needs of the children are being met, and it is unlikely they could be placed for
adoption singly, let alone as a group. "We fail to see what purpose it would
serve to put the children in the agency's permanent custody for the sole purpose
of forcing the foster parents' hand in adoption."

In re
C.W., 104 Ohio St. 3d 163,
2004-Ohio-6411 -- A complaint for permanent custody must
allege conditions that currently exist. For 12 of 22 months in
placement to be a basis for PCC, those 12 months must have
passed by the time of filing, not the time of adjudication.
Requiring the full 12 months to pass before filing recognizes
the constitutional rights of parents. Also see In re K.G., Wayne App. Nos.
03CA0066-68,
2004-Ohio-1421.

In re K.H., 191 Ohio
App. 3d 251,
2010-Ohio-5172 – Mother consented to award of permanent
custody. (1) Consent was invalid as the court did not fully
review the alternative categories of eligibility under
2151.414(B)(1)(a). (2) Consent is not enough for an agency
to be awarded permanent custody. Abbreviated testimony by the
caseworker was insufficient.

In re
B.M., 181 Ohio App. 3d 606,
2009-Ohio-1718, ¶615 -- Stipulations have the same force and
effect as testimony and may rise to the level of clear and
convincing evidence depending on the nature of the matters
stipulated. In a termination of parental rights proceeding the
parties worked out a stipulation of facts while the father was
debating surrender of parental rights. This formed the basis for
the court‘s adjudication. Majority rejects claims a due process
claim that a Juv. R. 29 inquiry was required and that proceeding
in this manner amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

In re
Terrence-Jamieson S, 162 Ohio App. 3d 229,
2005-Ohio-3600 -- Mother's consent to surrender of custody
in was not voluntary. By telephone from prison, she participated
in mediation leading to the agreement. The hearing took
forty-five minutes and required three pauses for consultation
with counsel. She consented because she believed she could not
win on the merits. Opinion is critical of the use of mediation
in permanent custody proceedings citing the unequal positions of
the parties - agencies have everything to gain and if an
agreement is reached parents can only lose.

In re
Lakes, 149 Ohio App. 3d 128,
2002-Ohio-3917 -- At ¶34: "Furthermore, Juv. R. 34
pertaining to dispositional hearings does not require the court
to engage in a colloquy with a parent in an
R.C. 2151.414 proceeding, which this proceeding was, such as
that required by Juv. R. 29 at adjudicatory hearings." At ¶71:
Lacking the effect of a plea to a charge, a parent's admission
in a dispositional hearing that his or her child's best interest
would be served by permanent placement elsewhere than with the
parent is not a matter that requires protections similar to
those in Juv. R. 29(D). The admission is but one more article of
testimonial evidence for the court to consider in resolving the
best-interest question. The court is entitled to credit the
admission or discredit it, on the merits." Also see
In re Baby Girl Doe, 149 Ohio App.
3d 717,
2002-Ohio-4470, ¶64-67; In re Williams,
Franklin App. No. 03AP-1007,
2004-Ohio-678.

In re K.W., 185 Ohio
App. 3d 629,
2010-Ohio-29 – Magistrate granted agency’s
R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) motion to bypass the statutory
requirement of reasonable reunification efforts based on prior
termination of parental rights with respect to other children.
The sole assignment of error maintained termination of parental
rights before the child’s first birthday violated the mother’s
constitutional rights. A subsidiary argument maintained
R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) was unconstitutional, both on its face
and as applied to her. The court finds the provision
constitutional, and notes the mother’s uncontrolled drug and
mental health issues.

In re
A.N., 181 Ohio App. 3d 793,
2009-Ohio-1873 – (1) That a parent may be incompetent is not
a bar to proceeding with termination of parental rights
proceedings. In any event, counsel stipulated a report finding
his client competent. (2) Mother may not challenge her initial
admission child was abused and neglected and notice of appeal
was not filed within thirty days of that portion of proceedings.
(3) Father‘s attorney was remiss in not attending later
hearings, but outcome would not have changed.

In re
D.H., 177 Ohio App. 3d 246,
2008-Ohio-3686 – Mother was not present for hearing on
status of child and disposition by grant of permanent custody to
child welfare agency. (1) Juvenile Rule 34 requires there be at
least one day between the adjudication of neglect, dependency or
abuse and disposition unless the parties have been served with
all documents required for the dispositional hearing and agree
to proceeding immediately. (2) Appeal tolls the running of the
thirty days allowed for disposition following a finding of
neglect dependency or abuse. (3) Notice requirements were
satisfied by counsel‘s representation he had spoken with mother
about the hearing date. (4) No error in failure to record
pretrial hearings. (5) Failure to object in the trial court
waives claimed error with regard to service of the guardian ad
litem‘s report.

In re
Rodgers (2000), 138 Ohio App. 3d 510 -- When ruling on a
motion for permanent custody, a trial court should usually apply
the version of the statute in effect at the time the motion for
permanent custody was filed. However, no retroactive law
violation is found where an amended version of
R.C. 2151.414 contains language indicating it is to apply
retroactively to a limited number of cases where the motion was
filed before its effective date, and the change was remedial.
Also see In re Ament (2001), 142
Ohio App. 3d 302, 308-309.

In re
Nice (2001), 141 Ohio App. 3d 445 -- (1) Extension of a
temporary custody order is a final order and may be appealed.
But such extension becomes a moot issue once permanent custody
has been granted. (2) A court may hear testimony pertaining to
neglect and dependency that is relevant to determination of a
permanent custody motion. The prohibition in
R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) "is merely an attempt to emphasize that
the outcome of the permanent custody hearing has no effect on
the prior adjudication of neglect or the prior order of
temporary custody, meaning that the parent cannot 'erase' past
findings of neglect by defeating the agency's motion for
permanent custody." (3) If children have been in custody for
more than 12 of 22 months the court must proceed to find whether
permanent custody is in their best interest. It does not have to
determine whether they cannot or should not be returned to their
parents.

In re Sadiku (2000), 139 Ohio App. 3d 263 -- Fifteen year old
mother of twins was arrested for shoplifting a $20 Mickey Mouse
watch she needed to keep track of time for children's
appointments. Agency put her and twins in separate foster homes,
provided little in the way of services, blew off phone calls,
then sought permanent custody. (1) Court improperly prevented
mother from presenting testimony rebutting the report of the
guardian ad litem because the report was not sworn testimony.
(2) Though the issue is moot, court questions propriety of
ordering PCC against this background.

In re S.C., 189 Ohio
App. 3d 308,
2010-Ohio-3394 – Agency did not carry its burden of proof
with respect to termination of the father’s rights Psych exam
relied upon was two years old.

In re A.S., 193 Ohio App. 3d 697,
2009-Ohio-3932, ¶49-58 – The Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation does not apply in termination of parental rights
proceedings. Court erred in admitting grandmother’s ten year old
psychological evaluation, relying on Evid. R. 804, as the report
did not fall within any of the hearsay exceptions set forth in
that rule. Error was harmless as much the same information
appeared in a properly admitted subsequent psych. report.

In re
S.B., 183 Ohio App. 3d 300,
2009-Ohio-3619 – (1) ¶9-24: Attorney was appointed as both
counsel and guardian ad litem. Child gave conflicting responses
when asked how she felt about being adopted. Though the
prescribed procedure is appointment of a new GAL, and
continuation as counsel, the court appointed new counsel and
allowed the guardian to continue in that role, as he was also
the guardian for siblings. Imprisoned father assigned this as
error. Held that he lacked standing as his interest and the
child‘s were not aligned as to continuation of the family unit.
Court notes standing had been found in another case where such
interests were aligned. Furthermore, error was waived by both
the initial GAL-counsel and new counsel appointed for the child.
(2) ¶32-35: Presumption of abandonment set forth in
R.C. 2151.011(C) applies to any 90-day period, even when
contact has resumed. Court holds incarcerated father to this
presumption, noting paternity was determined only recently and
recent visits and calls followed seven years of no contact.

In re
Kayla H., 175 Ohio App. 3d 192,
2007-Ohio-6128 – At ¶44 the court is of the view that
parental unfitness must be established as to each parent through
a finding on one or more
R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. Basis for the agency‘s motion was
that the father was a convicted pedophile, though the children
in the household had not been victimized. Parents were compliant
with the case plan, but the father‘s time in therapy had not
satisfied those running the programs. The court concludes that
being a pedophile constitutes a severe mental illness within the
meaning to
R.C. 2151.414(E)(2). The mother‘s continued cohabitation
with a pedophile is deemed an unwillingness to prevent her
children from suffering sexual abuse pursuant to
R.C. 2151.414(E)(14). Essentially a sixteen year old
sex-offense conviction was the sole basis for terminating
parental rights. Affirmed: In re
K.H., 119 Ohio St. 3d 538,
2008-Ohio-4825. The Supreme Court claims the basis for
granting permanent custody is the lack of successful therapy,
not the diagnoses of pedophilia.

In re
J.L., 176 Ohio App. 3d 186,
2008-Ohio-1488 – Termination of parental rights premised on
corporal punishment amounting to abuse reversed. Using a belt to
discipline a three-year old was within the range of permissible
discipline as outlined in ¶12.

In re C.F., 113 Ohio St. 3d
73,
2007-Ohio-1104 -- (1) With exceptions, an agency seeking
permanent custody must prove reasonable efforts were made
towards reunification. While
R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) does not apply
to permanent custody proceedings, there may be an obligation to
attempt reunification under other provisions, and such planning
is a matter for consideration when the court relies upon
2151.414(E)(1). The court may rely on a reasonable efforts
finding from an earlier hearing in relation to this factor or
may find a child cannot or should not be returned home pursuant
to other Subdivision (e) factors. Dissent would require such a
finding across the board. (2) Courts have the discretion to deny
an in camera interview of a child concerning his or her wishes
with regard to termination of parental rights. Without
addressing hearsay concerns, the court finds the statute allows
children's wishes to be expressed through the guardian ad litem.

In re D.A., 113 Ohio St. 3d
88,
2007-Ohio-1105 -- Syllabus: "When determining the best
interest of a child under
R.C. 2151.414(D) at a
permanent-custody hearing, a trial court may not base its
decision solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the
parents."

In re Nicholas P., 169 Ohio
App. 3d 570,
2006-Ohio-6213 -- A prior award of permanent
custody does not constitute a de facto termination of parental
rights as to later born children. Treating it as such would
violate the constitutional protection of parental rights. The
agency had done little investigation, and the evidence did not
establish that this child was dependent. There was no evidence
the parents had failed to remedy the conditions that led to
removal, and the agency at a "bypass" hearing was improperly
relieved of its obligation to provide services directed towards
reunification.

In re Beatty, 167 Ohio App. 3d
730,
2006-Ohio-3698 -- It was a denial of procedural due process
to forbid mother calling relatives who had been considered as a
placement on the basis they had not filed a motion seeking
custody. Their testimony would have been relevant to determining
the child's best interest.

In re Stillman, 155 Ohio App.
3d 333,
2003-Ohio-6228 -- (1)
R.C. 2151.414 does not require the
court to make an express finding of parental unfitness when
terminating parental rights. (2) Court declines to address
constitutional claim that 12 of 22 months in placement as a
qualifying category for terminating parental rights violates
substantive due process, equal protection and procedural due
process. Dissent is favorably disposed towards these claims. (3)
Majority is of the opinion that 12 or more months in placement
is an indication of parental unfitness.

In re Sean B., 170 Ohio App.
3d 557,
2007-Ohio-1189 -- (1) ¶30: "Before any court may
consider whether a child's best interests may be served by
permanent removal from his or family, there first must be a
demonstration that the parents are 'unfit.'" Citing
Quilloin v.
Walcott (1978), 434 U.S. 246, 255 and
In re Schoeppner (1976),
46 Ohio St. 2d 21, 24. (2) ¶40: To exploit the "catchall"
subsection within R.C. 2151.414(E) a court must explain with
specificity what other factor the court deems comparable. (3)
Grant of PCC reversed. Children were teenagers. Caseworker
didn't care for "Uncle Charlie," members of the mother's family,
or mother's efforts. Parental unfitness was not proven. The
court is uneasy about the constitutionality of the 12 of 22
provision, though that was not raised by the parties. Accepting
it as a basis for PCC the court finds termination of parental
rights is not in the children's best interests. ¶69: When PCC is
granted on the basis of the passage of a "mere amount of time"
courts must examine such awards "with exacting scrutiny."

In re Alyssa C., 153 Ohio App.
3d 10,
2003-Ohio-2673 -- (1) ¶12: The court applies to permanent
custody proceedings the In re Perales principle that an award of
custody to a non-parent depends on a finding of parental
unsuitability, then says this has been statutorily defined and
sets forth an incomplete, but well-intended, reading of
2151.414. (2) ¶13: "A parent's failure to adhere to or complete
a case plan is not, in itself, a ground for the termination of
parental rights. (3) ¶ 28: Without a record as to why the child
was removed from the home, it is impossible to tell whether the
mother remedied that situation. (4) ¶32: For an appellate court
to consider "any other factor" as permitted by
2151.414(E)(6),
the trial court must articulate what that factor is. (5) ¶
37-48: Court reverses on unassigned plain error. Trial court
allowed mother's attorney to withdraw when she did not appear
for the hearing. Counsel's tenacity in attempting to contact her
was placed in doubt by caseworker having spoken with mother two
days earlier. Court never appointed counsel for the father, who
was out-of-state avoiding a warrant.

In re Baby Girl Doe, 149 Ohio
App. 3d 717,
2002-Ohio-4470 -- Infant was found in a garbage bag
abandoned in a dumpster. Juvenile mother was bound over and
indicted for attempted murder. College student putative father
did not appear committed to assuming care. Grandparents wanted
child placed for adoption in a religiously observant home of
their choice. Trial court held not to have abused its discretion
in granting agency motion for permanent custody.

In re Wingo (2001), 143 Ohio
App. 3d 652, 659-660 -- (1) "...R.C. 2151.414 does not require
that each and every condition listed in subsection (E) exist
before the court may terminate parental rights...When
R.C.
2151.414(E)(1) forms the basis for the court's finding, the
agency must have provided a case plan and tile to remedy the
situation that led to removal of the children from the
household." (2) When permanent custody is sought by motion,
R.C.
2151.419 is also applicable.
R.C. 2515.419(A)(1) requires that
the court determine whether the children services agency that
will be given custody of the child has made reasonable efforts
to make it possible for the child to return home safely."

In re Glen (2000), 139 Ohio
App. 3d 103 -- (1) PCC affirmed where indications were mother
would resume relationship with abusive father after his release
from jail, and had otherwise failed or had been slow in
complying with case plan. (2) Direct of mother included question
"Why would you visit this guy who seems to make a career
of...impregnating first, then beating up girls, and does it for
years and years?" While court does not agree with strategy, it
refuses to reverse on ineffective assistance of counsel claim
premised on Richman v. Bell (6th Cir. 1997), 131 F. 3d 1150.

In re Secrest, Montgomery App.
No. 19377,
2002-Ohio-7096 -- Second District is of the view
award of permanent custody requires proof that reasonable
efforts at reunification have been made or that such efforts
would be futile. Reversed as agency did not make a reasonable
effort to reunify child and parent who had moved to Pennsylvania
and remarried. Whether or not this is a correct reading of
R.C.
2151.414, such an requirement may be argued adjunct to either
determining the best interests of the child, or an agency's
reliance on the amount of time spent in its custody. Companion
case: In re Secrest, Montgomery App. No. 19378,
2002-Ohio-7094.
Also see In re Starkey, 150 Ohio App. 3d 612,
2002-Ohio-6892.

In re
T.R., 120 Ohio St. 3d 136,
2008-Ohio-5219 ¶17-- "R.C.
2151.413(E) requires a children-services agency seeking
permanent custody of a child to update the child‘s case plan to
include adoption plans, but it does not require the agency to
perform this action before the juvenile court rules on the
motion for permanent custody." Time line in the Administrative
Code exceeded the authority of the Department of Job and Family
Services.

In re C.C., 187 Ohio
App. 3d 365,
2010-Ohio-780, ¶25 – A parent’s successful completion of the
terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of
reunification. In determining whether a child can or should
return home the ultimate question is whether the parent has
remedied the conditions that required removal. The case plan is
a means of achieving that goal, but is not the goal itself.

In re West, Athens App. No.
03CA20,
2003-Ohio-6299 -- Even though mother was in compliance
with the case plan, permanent commitment is upheld, as her
conduct demonstrated termination of parental rights was in the
children' best interest.

In re Moore, 153 Ohio App. 3d
641,
2003-Ohio-4250 -- (1) At a shelter care hearing the court
is required to advise parents of the possible consequences of
not complying with the case plan. But the failure to do so does
not require reversal following termination of parental rights
where the subsequent information provided eliminated the
prejudice the initial error may have caused. (2) Full compliance
with a case plan does not guarantee denial of a permanent
custody motion. (3) Absent a request for the appointment of
replacement counsel, no abuse of discretion found in not doing
so. Father discharged appointed counsel indicating he intended
to hire new counsel, but ultimately went to trial unrepresented.

In re Jordan, Clark App. No.
02CA0092,
2003-Ohio-6071 -- Permanent commitment reversed as
there was not clear and convincing evidence that the mother's
mental retardation (I.Q. 61) was so severe she would be unable
to provide a permanent home for her 11-year old son. Mother had
lived on her own until serving 30 days for child endangerment,
which was the result of suddenly being called upon to care for
three children in addition to her own.

In re Graham, 167 Ohio App. 3d
284,
2006-Ohio-3170 -- Mother and kids were all in therapy, but
months away from the point at which family therapy might become
beneficial. Even then problems might be beyond remedy. Despite
bonds, the children's need for secure placement supports
decision to terminate parental rights.

In re Tashayla S., Lucas App.
No. L-03-1253,
2004-Ohio-896 -- Father's failure to visit or
communicate with his daughter is not excused by his belief he
was not at fault for circumstances resulting in her being put in
agency custody, and thus should not have faced the indignity of
supervised visitation. Court further notes he was not absolved
of the duty to remain aware of his child's living conditions.

In re Cravens, Defiance App.
No. 4-03-48,
2004-Ohio-2356 -- Abandonment as a qualifying
category for termination of parental rights is subject to the
R.C. 2151.011(C) presumption of abandonment after 90 days
without a visit of contact. Court properly rejected father's
claims his efforts were frustrated by the child welfare agency.

In re
G.N., 176 Ohio App. 3d 236,
2008-Ohio-1796 – Reversed, because in undertaking the best
interests determination, the court, in weighing factor
R.C. 2151.414(D)(4), concluded custody to the agency was the
best option for achieving a legally secure placement. Agency
custody must be the only way this can be achieved. Case had been
previously reversed at 170 Ohio App. 3d 76,
2006-Ohio-126 for failure to properly weigh the statutory
factors. This returned to the case to the posture it was in at
the time error was committed. Since this was prior to arriving
at a final judgment, mother‘s attempt to use Civil Rule 60(B) to
introduce new evidence of her improved fitness was properly
rebuffed. Civ.R. 60(B) only applies to relief from final
judgments.

In re J.W., 171 Ohio App. 3d
248,
2007-Ohio-2007 -- Focusing on
R.C. 2151.414(D)(4) weighing
of a child's need for a legally secure placement and whether
that placement can be achieves without PCC, the court reverses.
Present foster parents do not appear to be an adoptive home.
Father has maintained bond and had prospects of marriage,
housing, and employment in another state. Both father and GAL
appealed.

In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.
3d 498,
2006-Ohio-5513, ¶63-65 -- In weighing the best interest
of the child in accordance with the factors listed in
R.C.
2151.414 a court is not required to determine permanent custody
is the only option. The court of appeals had found the
availability of a relative placement precluded permanent
commitment.

In re Lopez, 166 Ohio App. 3d
688,
2006-Ohio-2251 -- Reversed as to a five year old deemed
mature enough to have her wishes made known through the guardian
ad litem or interview. Affirmed as to two and three year olds
with delays indicating insufficient maturity. On remand the
court is to consider whether independent counsel should be
appointed for the five year old.

In re Wright, Franklin App.
No. 04AP-435,
2004-Ohio-4045 -- Court did not err by not making
findings as to the child's wishes where the child was four and
the caseworker indicated he was not mature enough to understand
the situation. In re Swisher, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1408,
2003-Ohio-5446 distinguished on the basis some of those children
were older. Nor a request the child be interviewed in chambers
improperly refused. Mother did not have standing to complain
counsel was not appointed for the child.

In re Bounds, Allen App. No.
1-03-11,
2003-Ohio-4733 -- Inertia of child welfare agencies in
pursuing reunification with a mother who lived in Missouri, the
trial court's reliance on outdated information, and positive
steps taken by mother, lead to conclusion that the trial court
erred in concluding termination of parental rights was in the
child's best interest.

In re Alexis K., 160 Ohio App.
3d 32,
2005-Ohio-1380 -- Award of permanent custody reversed as
not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Court sees
termination as a last resort remedy for incapacity or something
akin to criminal neglect. Mother's difficulties meeting
objectives of the case plan characterized as Kafkaesque. Wishes
of the children were not made known to the trial court by the
guardian, who may never have spoken with them or otherwise
attempted to ascertain their wishes. Trial court is praised for
focusing on parental unfitness instead of 12 of 22 months in
custody, as that provision may not survive due process scrutiny.

In re J.S., 157 Ohio App. 3d
127,
2004-Ohio-2328, ¶33 -- "Our review of a custody
determination by the juvenile court begins with the recognition
that the court's exercise of discretion should be accorded the
utmost respect. A reviewing court must take into account that
the 'knowledge gained through observing the witnesses and the
parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a
reviewing court by a printed record.' A court exercising
juvenile court jurisdiction is invested with very broad
discretion, and, unless that power is abused, a reviewing court
is not warranted in disturbing its judgment." (Footnotes
omitted.)

In re Byerly, Portage App.
Nos. 2001-P-0158,
2004-Ohio-523 -- To have standing on appeal, a
substantial right of a party must be affected. Though the motion
leading to the hearing was dismissed, the magistrate changed
orders controlling visitation, thus affecting a substantial
right. Appellant was denied right to be heard through
cross-examination and by calling witnesses. The court also erred
by refusing to allow a proffer and by refusing to allow
deposition of an expert.

In re Washington (2001), 143
Ohio App. 3d 576 -- (1) At p. 579: "When evaluating whether a
judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence in a
civil context, the standard of review is the same as that in a
criminal context." (2) Reversed because psychological evaluation
of the parents was inadmissible hearsay, received in violation
of Juv. R. 34(I).

In re J.C., 186 Ohio
App. 3d 243,
2010-Ohio-637 – Although an appellate court is not obligated
to consider an issue not explicitly raised by the parties, it
may consider an issue implicit in an issue properly raised in
the appeal. Agency moved for permanent custody after children
had only been back in their custody or two months. District
precedent calls for twelve months at the time the motion is
filed, not encompassing time from earlier cases

In re C.B., 129 Ohio St. 3d 231,
2011-Ohio-2899 – Syllabus: “When a trial court denies a
children-services agency’s motion to modify temporary legal
custody to permanent custody, terminates the placement of
temporary custody with the agency, and awards legal custody to a
parent, the order is final and appealable under
R.C.
2905.02.” In In re Adams the Court held a child welfare
agency could not appeal the denial of a motion seeking permanent
custody. The distinction is that agencies do not have a
substantial right in the permanent custody of a child based on
their temporary custody, but parents do have substantial rights
in the custody of a child.

In re
H.F., 120 Ohio St. 3d 499,
2008-Ohio-6810 – Syllabus: "An appeal of an adjudication
order of abuse, dependency, or neglect and the award of
temporary custody pursuant to
R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) must be filed within 30 days of the
judgment entry pursuant to App. R. 4(A)." Parent sought to raise
an assignment of error pertaining to the initial proceedings
which resulted in an award of temporary custody in an appeal
from the order granting permanent custody. Reverses
In re H.F., 176 Ohio App. 3d 106,
2008-Ohio-1627.

In re Adams, 115 Ohio St. 3d
86,
2007-Ohio-4840 -- Syllabus: "A trial court order denying the
motion of a children-services agency to modify temporary custody
to permanent custody and continuing temporary custody is not a
final, appealable order under
R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) or (2)." At ¶7:
Children and their parents have an interest in reunification and
with limited statutory exceptions the state must make reasonable
efforts to reunify the family before terminating parental
rights. In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St. 3d 155 continues to
permit appeals by parents from orders finding children
neglected, dependent or abused.

In re McMillin, 171 Ohio App.
3d 686,
2007-Ohio-2046 -- Reversed because the trial court
judgment entry does not reflect that it addressed the factors
listed in
R.C. 2151.414(D) for determining the best interests of
the children. This omission also makes it impossible for an
appellate court to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence.

In re M.B., Franklin App. No.
04AP-755,
2005-Ohio-986 -- At ¶21: "Permanent custody motions
supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the
essential elements of the case will not be reversed * * * as
against the manifest weight of the evidence."
In re Brown,
Franklin App. No. 03AP-969,
2004-Ohio-3314, at ¶4, citing
In re Brofford (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 869;
Abram, supra. Further, in
determining whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, the reviewing court is guided by the presumption
that the findings of the trial court are correct.
Brofford,
supra, citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.
3d 77."

In re Harris, Hamilton App.
No. C-020512,
2003-Ohio-672 -- In an appeal from the grant of
permanent custody, the initial determination of dependency may
not be assigned as error, when the thirty days for perfecting a
timely appeal have already passed.

In re Salsgiver, Geauga App.
No. 2002-G-2477,
2003-Ohio-1206 -- Permanent custody case had
been remanded for further consideration of matters bearing on
the best interest of the child. Trial court ordered a
supplemental report from the guardian ad litem, which the father
assigned as error. While the general rule is that a trial court
is to start anew at the point the error occurred, here the
failure was that of the guardian, not that of the child welfare
agency. No abuse of discretion found in order of an additional
report. Reversed anyway, because the court failed to schedule an
additional hearing to permit the father to present additional
evidence in response to the report and to permit
cross-examination of the guardian. Court also erred by failing
to make complete findings on statutory best interest factors.

In re Walker, 162 Ohio App. 3d
303,
2005-Ohio-3773 -- There had been a previous reversal based
on inadmissible hearsay within a psychologist's report and
testimony. On remand, the trial court reopened the hearing and
allowed the agency to remedy this situation, including offering
the testimony of another psychologist. Reversed. On remand, a
case returns to the docket of the trial court in the same
condition that obtained before the action that resulted in
appeal and reversal. Here that was the hearing on the motion for
permanent custody. A full new hearing should have been
conducted. Furthermore, it was error to allow the agency to
present an additional witness but deny the parent and
grandparent that opportunity. Issue on this remand is the
present situation, after five years have passed. Also suggested
that a new magistrate be assigned.

In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d
369,
2006-Ohio-1191 -- Case involves competing motions for
custody of a neglected child by the father and two sets of
relatives. (1) At ¶6: Trial court is strongly criticized for
extending three days of hearings over a two month period, citing
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(8). (2) The court distances
neglect, dependency and abuse proceedings from the parental
unfitness rule of In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St. 2d 89.
Syllabus: "(1) An award of legal custody of a child does not
divest parents of their residual parental rights, privileges,
and responsibilities. (2) A juvenile court adjudication of
abuse, neglect, or dependency is a determination about the care
and condition of a child and implicitly involves a determination
of the unsuitability of the child's custodial and/or
noncustodial parents. (3) When a juvenile court adjudicates a
child to be abused, neglected, or dependent, it has no duty to
make separate findings at the dispositional hearing that a
noncustodial parent is unsuitable before awarding legal custody
to a nonparent."

In re McBride, 111 Ohio St. 3d
19,
2006-Ohio-3454 -- Syllabus: "A parent who has lost permanent
custody of a child does not have standing as a nonparent to file
a petition for custody of that child. (R.C. 2151.414(F) and
2151.353(E)(2), applied.) Reverses
In re McBride, 158 Ohio App.
3d 572,
2004-Ohio-5269

In re
O.H.W., 175 Ohio App. 3d 349,
2008-Ohio-627 – Grandparents obtained custody through a
privately filed neglect complaint. Children services agency was
not a party. Mother was served by publication, but resurfaced
and filed multiple pro se motions directed at regaining custody.
Mother‘s prospects turned on a whether or not there had been a
State v. Perales mandated finding of
parental fitness, and on the applicability of
In re Hockstok, 98 Ohio St. 3d 349,
2008-Ohio-627. Majority sidesteps addressing the merits
based on timeliness of filing objections. Dissent notes failure
to contain required advisement regarding necessity of objections
as foundation for appeal and the ambiguity of the judgment
entry.