How 9/11 'fundamentally changed' foreign policy and set the stage for the Iraq war

The
remaining tower of New York's World Trade Center, Tower 2,
dissolves in a cloud of dust and debris about a half hour after
the first twin tower collapsed September 11, 2001. Osama bin
Laden and his organisation al-Qaeda, were held responsible for
the attacks, that preceeded the US led war in
Afghanistan.REUTERS/Ray
Stubblebine

It's the 15th anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attack
on Sunday, an unprecedented act of aggression against the US that
has shaped global politics since.

One unintended consequence of the 2001 attacks was that it
"fundamentally changed" the US and UK's approach to Iraq, the
Chilcot Report concluded earlier this year, hardening the pair's
view of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The Chilcot Report, which took 7 years to write, was launched by
former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2009 to look into
the United Kingdom's involvement in the war in Iraq.

The report, which is estimated to have cost over £10 million of
taxpayers' money and runs to 2.6 million words, was chaired by
former senior civil servant Sir John Chilcot, hence the name.

One of the many things the inquiry touched upon is the role of
9/11 in setting the scene for Iraq.

The report concludes that after the 9/11 attacks, the West
abandoned its previous policy of "containment" in favour of
stamping out threatening regimes, either through diplomatic or
military efforts.

The Chilcot Report says then UK foreign secretary Jack Straw told
the inquiry "that the attacks led to a consensus across the world
that a policy of tolerating failing or failed states was
unacceptable. The perception of risk changed."

Tony Blair first floated the idea of regime change in Iraq just
three months after September 11, 2001.

Speaking at the launch of his long-awaited inquiry into the Iraq
War, Sir John Chilcot said Tony Blair "urged Bush not to take
hasty action" in the wake of the Al Qaeda attacks. But by
December 2001, the thinking had changed and Blair proposed a plan
to pursue regime change.

The former Labour Prime Minister "suggested a strategy for regime
change in Iraq that would build over time, including “if
necessary” taking military action without losing international
support."

This was because Blair was worried that the US would jump the gun
and attack Iraq, "which he considered would undermine the success
of the coalition which had been established for action against
international terrorism."

Chilcot says Blair chose to "emphasise the threat which Iraq
might pose, rather than a more balanced consideration of both
Iraq’s capabilities and intent."

Tony Blair "overestimated" his ability to influence the US

The conclusion is part of the damning verdict from Chilcot on
Blair's assessment of Iraq in the run-up to the war.

Chilcot says the UK's concerns about weapons of mass destruction
falling into the hands of terrorists pre-dated the 9/11 attacks.
But the sheer scale of the carnage wrecked by Al-Qaeda in New
York threw these concerns into sharp relief — suddenly they were
the number one concern.

2,996 people were killed and over 6,000 injured on September 11,
2001, when four passenger airlines were hijacked by Al-Qaeda
terrorists. Two planes crashed into the two World Trade Centre
towers in New York, one into the Pentagon, and the fourth was
heading for Washington but crashed in Pennsylvania after
passengers tried to overcome the hijackers.

The UK went to war with Iraq alongside the US in 2003. The US
stated
the intent was to remove "a regime that developed and used
weapons of mass destruction, that harbored and supported
terrorists, committed outrageous human rights abuses, and defied
the just demands of the United Nations and the world."

However, the UK public strongly opposed military action and the
UN refused to sanction it. The protracted conflict that followed
the declaration of war saw 179 British military personnel killed
and thousands of Iraqis also lost their lives.