DOD tripped up by low staffing, poor planning

The Defense Department has struggled to keep track of contracts awarded during the wartime operations of the past eight years because of the sheer size and urgency of the operations and the shortage of workers to oversee those contracts. The result is wasted money and poor oversight of companies in the war zone, according to a new audit.

Although DOD officials do not have details on the number of its Iraq contracts that are eligible for closeout, Government Accountability Office auditors have concluded that DOD must review and potentially close at least 58,000 contracts that were awarded between fiscal 2003 and 2010, according to the report released today.

Since 2002, DOD has obligated at least $166.6 billion on contracts that support reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO auditors said DOD will end relatively few contracts by their closeout date. About 90 percent of them are already overdue, based on the information DOD has about a limited number of contracts.

GAO blames DOD’s lack of planning for workforce shortfalls — including the number of employees at the Defense Contract Audit Agency — and contractor accounting problems, which are costing DOD money due to delayed audits of the contractors’ incurred costs.

Furthermore, DOD officials can't identify the improper payments it's been making because of the limited information it has about its own contingency contracts. Stopping improper payments is an issue the Obama administration has tried to tackle across the government. DOD officials also identified at least $135 million in unspent funds that could potentially not be available to meet other DOD needs, GAO reported.

In 2008, DOD officials tried to catch up on the backlog, but the help arrived too late.

So now, DOD has decided to transition the responsibility for closing out contracts awarded by the U.S. Central Command’s Contracting Command and its predecessors to the Army Contracting Command. But the takeover will cause more delays due to staffing issues, GAO reports.

The auditors recommended that top DOD and Army officials make sure the ACC has enough people to handle the work. Officials told GAO that the Army has made progress in closing out contracts even as it works to increase staff numbers.

Looking further out, GAO recommended that DOD revise its contingency contracting doctrine to reflect the need for advanced planning for closing out contracts. Officials have changed provisions in DOD’s acquisition rules and are developing new language to impress the need on contracting officers for better planning in contingency contracting.

DOD also needs to have senior contracting officials monitor and assess the progress of contract closeouts throughout the contingency operation to rearrange resources if a backlog emerges.

The realities of contract waste and contractor fraud in contingency operations raised concerns on Capitol Hill and elsewhere this month. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan’s final report to Congress, released in August, paints an ugly picture of what’s happening in the background of the battlefield.

The commission said the government has lost at least $31 billion to waste and fraud, and the true figure could be closer to $60 billion. As a result, members of Congress have introduced legislation to correct some issues. One bill includes a resource center for training in contingency contracting.

DOD officials said they had begun instituting many of the commission’s recommendations even before the final report was released.

About the Author

Matthew Weigelt is a freelance journalist who writes about acquisition and procurement.

OPM is partnering with CSID to try to manage the fallout from a massive breach of some 4 million federal personnel records.

Reader comments

Tue, Aug 5, 2014
Arnela
It is important to note that the GAO Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs rpreot is not the same as the DoD SAR, which is far more detailed. The GAO's document devotes 2 pages to the F-35, while the DoD's Selected Acquisition Report can run 50+ pages.

It is important to note that the GAO Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs rpreot is not the same as the DoD SAR, which is far more detailed. The GAO's document devotes 2 pages to the F-35, while the DoD's Selected Acquisition Report can run 50+ pages.

Fri, Oct 14, 2011

The buzz word mentality replaced competency and leadership based on professional and managerial sills. There is poor accountability with promotions often not based on a demonstrated and measured excellence.
We contracted out far too much competency and are over reliant on contractors. There is no sense of urgency and almost no accountability and that culture needs to change. Its not that Government employees are lazy, management at every level less than the best.
The layers upon layers of structures are not value added and take resources away from those who are trying to do their job. When problems do occur instead of addressing the specific problem or issue new regulations, guidance and training is issued to all instead of fixing what is wrong and disciplining the real problem.
A small but illustrative point, how about suicide prevention training for all?

Fri, Sep 30, 2011
NowWhatCanUDo4Me

As a DoD Engineer, (coming from industry) I have gone through the DAIWA-SPRDE III levels. Ok now what? How about adding to my technical abilities? When you find a solution for that, I am all ears. So far, every class that I apply for (something worthy to sharpen my skillsets on my resume), I am told that it does not apply to my role. This includes Cyber training. So, I sit in an office with contractors that spew off powerpoint wizardry and watch my leadership be dazzed with BS. I just sit there an wonder .... do what I am told (IE:shut up, and play the game). Now I realize why these contractors don't compete in the real world. Simply, because they can't.

Thu, Sep 29, 2011
RayW

Down at the much lower levels, some of us DoD engineers are being forced to take acquisition training because we might be involved with a contract. Having only been through 1.7 introductory units so far, I am by far not an expert, but what should be done apparently has not.

Looking at the title, we see that the author thinks part of the problem is under manning, which of course leads to the second part, poor planning. Poor planning can occur due to many reasons including lack of training (like what I have to force into my schedule) and also due to the lack of time as you struggle to put out many fires and can not focus on any one item like you should.

The same email that this came in had another article that seemed to be saying that the workers may be cut even more by hiring freezes and attrition, as well as benefits cuts. So we will have a vicious cycle going – Lazy Gov employee falling behind, get rid of some; Lazy Gov employee has not learned lesson and is even further behind, cut some more.

Please post your comments here. Comments are moderated, so they may not appear immediately
after submitting. We will not post comments that we consider abusive or off-topic.