Complete comps prep deck - SAMS Comp Prep 13-01

Seminar 4
“The House of Commons”
Comps Prep
(TOA,Q1) 1. Describe your personal theory of war that you developed in TOA
a. Present your definition of war
b. Define other important terms specific to your theory
c. Perhaps describe the history and path of your thought in developing your theory
d. Diagram and describe your theory.
e. What’s your theory’s form, function, and logic (as Clausewitz uses with regard to war and
Gharajedaghi models with his systems analysis)?
f. Discuss theory definitions (can do this first), criteria, or other aspects of theory (Reynolds,
Kuhn, or other) and “validate” your theory
2. How has it changed since TOA, and why?
a. Articulate changes from initial take on it and how specific aspects of the course have
enhanced or altered your theory.
b. Is there relevance or connection to your monograph? Or relevance to the campaign you’ll
brief? (or just use some historical example(s) to test your theory.
3. Also, discuss what usefulness this project served for you while a student in SAMS
and how you think it will continue to prove useful to you as a SAMS graduate.
a. Discuss how you can use your theory while deployed to Afghanistan or assignment
elsewhere.
b. Discuss the utility of understanding of how to build a theory or recognize one in daily work.
c. Can also scheme to work other theory questions from the sheet into your answer as to
eliminate the need for panel to ask other questions (although this could open up the avenue
for further questions in detail on those areas).
Wrap-Up, Answer this: Why is my theory (or having done this project) important when I’m a
planner and operational artist?
Craig’s crack at question #1.
1. Describe your personal theory of war that you developed in TOA
At the root of war, I believe there is natural conflict between the belief systems and worldviews between and within differing
entities (national, sub-national, or supra-national collective groups who associate for any reason; they include organizations, nationstates, cultural and civilization identities, and political establishments). My definition of war is this… my theory is this, seen in this
diagram… Describe non-violent war and violent war, giving examples of each.
FORM, FUNCTION, LOGIC: The form of my theory gets at the root of war—the intangible place that war and conflict come from. The
structure is of an open system. The function of my theory is that it accounts for war on a global scale based on historical example and
provides a tool in comprehending potential aggressors and their purposes and underlying agendas. It provides the impetus to
strengthen relationships among allies based on common values , and alerts policy makers of the strategic implications for engaging in
non-violent war with other entities in the proper time and space to prevent violent conflict from occurring. The logic of my theory is
shown in causal relationship. When people choose to believe certain tenets of a worldview, they inherently clash with certain tenets
of other worldviews. Certain tenets, seen by the categories in the roots, cannot coexist. They are fundamentally at odds. When
people and groups
2. How has it changed since TOA, and why?
I’ve begun to refine it, define more terms, and conduct more research into this topic. As the course progressed, I realized I was in way
over my head with this approach, especially after completing the design block of instruction. I gained deeper insight regarding
exploring the meta-cognition and analysis of entities, as described by Henrotin. Regardless, progressing through SAMS has made me
realize that I can easily spend several years in exploring, adding, and researching the elements of this theory, and it could easily
become a book. I’ve been able to put a name on several aspects of my theory, such as the form, function, and logic, based on course
material from Clausewitz and Gharajedaghi.
3. usefulness this project served for you while a student in SAMS and how you think it will continue to prove useful
to you as a SAMS graduate.
My theory has served as a learning tool first and foremost in understanding theory, and how we develop theories and identify them
in operational approaches of other units or developing my own post-graduation [give example of some products 3ID was producing
during the MRX I attended]. Class readings helped further my understanding of my theory and how war itself results and how it
manifests out of the natural conflict between roots of worldviews—for example, Kalyvas, and the Logic of Civil War helped me
understand the relationships involved in the American Civil War and why violence escalates [continue in further detail about the
book]. I can also apply this theory to my understanding of Afghanistan as I prepare to deploy there. In light of Brinton’s Anatomy of
Revolution, which helps to flush out manifestations of Revolution, primarily based on economic and class warfare, and other differing
beliefs in various worldview roots, I see how war has manifested itself throughout Afghanistan’s history[continue in this tangent]
Also, can discuss economics, as a root of worldviews, and relate to Commanding Heights, the opposing theories (Hayek & Keynes, as
well as Marxism/Leninism) and discuss historical example of economics as a source of conflict and how it manifested in war.
Question 2 (TOA)
John Lewis Gaddis, in The Landscape of History, discusses the
concepts of continuity and contingency. How does he define
these terms and what usefulness do they have for historians,
academics in other fields, and military practitioners? Consider
readings from one of the SAMS courses that reflects the
presence of continuities and contingencies (whether or not the
author explicitly refers to them as such) and discuss how your
understanding of those terms helped you as you read and
interpret the text. For example, place a historical campaign or
war you read about in context by using the concepts of
continuity and contingency as Gaddis described them.
Question 2. (TOA) John Lewis Gaddis, in The Landscape of History, discusses the concepts of continuity and contingency. How does he define these terms and what
usefulness do they have for historians, academics in other fields, and military practitioners? Consider readings from one of the SAMS courses that reflects the presence of
continuities and contingencies (whether or not the author explicitly refers to them as such) and discuss how your understanding of those terms helped you as you read and
interpret the text. For example, place a historical campaign or war you read about in context by using the concepts of continuity and contingency as Gaddis described them.
Big Ideas
Continuities (Pg. 30) Patterns that extend across time. Not laws or theories.
Continuities are phenomena that recur with sufficient regularity to make
themselves apparent. They help generalize about human experience (ex.
empires expand until overreach, birth rates decline as society becomes more
wealthy, democracies don’t fight each other). We can expect long lasting
trends to continue (or not change quickly).
Contingencies (Pg. 30) Phenomena that do not form patterns. Individual
actions/choice (ex. Lee Harvey Oswald). May have sensitivity to initial
conditions (chaos theory). Intersection of two or more continuities (new
combination = unpredictability). They don’t fall within the realm of repeated
and therefore familiar experience: we generally learn about them only after
they’ve happened (Black Swan).
Supporting Ideas
(Pg. 22) Historians have the capacity for selectivity (choice of what is important), simultaneity (describe multiple things happening at the same time), and the
shifting of scale (zoom in and out on the level of analysis, ex. Coastline of Britain[Pg. 27] or fractals [Pg. 81]).
Links to Other Works
Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) Rough comparison of continuity
to Paradigm/normal science and contingency to anomaly/paradigm shift.
Linn (The Echo of Battle) Example of continuity is the resiliency of three
martial traditions: Guardians, Heroes, and Managers. However, what
tradition is ascendant at any given time is a contingency, as is the character
and choices of influential individuals.
Examples
AQI/Suni Awakening Continuity(historical pattern) Radical ideologies, like
empires, expand until they overreach and then subside or moderate ex.
Communism. The contingency was the individual decisions of Sunni Sheiks in
Anbar to turn against AQI.
1973 Arab-Israeli War The macro continuity is that successful militaries tend
toward complacency/overreach. The specific continuity was that Israeli had
an intelligence/air power dominance that they expected to extend into the
future. The contingency was the Arab’s ability to adapt and deceive.
Implications
Scaling Sometimes zooming out and taking a macro perspective makes
patterns more discernible. Zooming in (micro) tends to highlight
contingencies. The challenge for planners is to identify the macro/patterns
and identify/manipulate the micro/contingencies within that context.
Time In the future contingencies/continuity coexist. The present solidifies
those relationships and they become fixed in the past. This has implications
for understanding current environment/problem frame, the desired system,
and how to get there.
Prediction Continuities provide general story/narrative arcs. They do not
provide specific predictions for individual actors, only the possibility to think
through indicators of change. Contingencies cannot be predicted based on
past trends (Black Swan).
Planning Have to be sensitive to continuity – especially in understanding the
environment and constructing a narrative logic. The existing patterns form a
basis for planning/action. However, careful attention to assumptions will
define the requirement for branch planning to deal with contingencies.
Question 3. Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA (Mintzberg,
Brinton, Kalyvas, or Herbst), and argue whether the author developed a
theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility of
theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or
develop a strategy or plan to deal with it.
Reynolds says that theories have three desirable characteristics:
abstractness, inter-subjective (shared agreement with a body of experts),
and empirical relevance (predictive or explanation). They are general,
timeless, applicable across time and space. The 3 P’s to theories:
Powerful, parsimonious (short), and Predictive.
Based on Reynolds’s definition, does the selected author’s work
constitute a theory?
May also be useful to define theory in terms of Kuhn.
One approach is to discuss to pros and cons of using Reynolds’s definition
of theory in social science. He clearly wrote his book for the hard sciences
where theories predict future phenomena. Social science theories tend to
be more descriptive and less predictive. See the three blocks for
summarizations of Kalyvas, Herbst, and Brinton. See following slides.
Q 3: Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated
the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it.
Kalyvas – The Logic of Violence in Civil War
Civil war: armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the onset of the hostilities
Violence: deliberate infliction of harm on people (he specifically focuses on non-combatants during civil war)
He rejects the extant literature on the subject b/c it suffers from a # of pathologies:
- Madness and “bloodless convention”: violence is seen as irrational or the outcome of narrowly instrumental goals
- Partisan bias: taking sides (revolutionary romanticism, intellectual distance, etc)
- Political bias: conflation of civil wars with regular politics
- Urban bias: studies often done by urban intellectuals and information is ‘costly’ (access to countryside is hard if not impossible); privileges top-down perspectives
over bottom-up perspectives, assumes unchanging identities, choices, etc.
- Selection bias: data distorted during collection/interpretation, overaggregation and acontextualization (info concerning the 5W’s of the violence is usually missing)
Theory: Irregular war fundamentally alters the nature of sovereignty through the breakdown of the state’s monopoly of violence by way of territorially based armed
challenge. The simplest way to conceptualize the division of sovereignty in civil war is to distinguish between zones of incumbent control, zones of insurgent control,
and zones in which control is contested. This places a premium on the effective use of violence as a key instrument for establishing and maintaining control – and thus
for generating collaboration and deterring defection; in turn, effective violence requires discrimination.
- Control spawns collaboration - the higher the level of control by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration w/this political actor.
However, the absence of alternatives often produces collaboration irrespective of the level of popular satisfaction or lack thereof, which may be then wrongly
interpreted as a reflection of legitimacy” (p. 93).
- MIL resources generally trump the pop’s prewar political and social preferences in spawning control
- Indiscriminate violence is, first, “a way to come to grips with the identification problem”—that is, the problem of determining allegiances in the civil war
environment—and thus is likely to occur “where and when resources and information are low” (p. 147); and, second, a means of “shap[ing] civilian behavior
indirectly through association” (p. 150). Thus, indiscriminate violence is not likely to occur where actors possess great levels of information and/or control, and
Kalyvas hypothesizes that the negative repercussions of such violence will lead actors to move away from it as the conflict progresses.
Zones of control:
Kalyvas divides areas undergoing civil war into five zones of control: (1) total incumbent control, (2) dominant incumbent control, (3) contested control,
(4) dominant insurgent control, and (5) total insurgent control. Given the linkage between control and violence, his theory predicts violence perpetrated by the group
in power to be unlikely in zones 1 and 5, respectively. Actors are more likely to employ indiscriminate violence against zones of enemy control (zones 1 and 2 for
insurgents and zones 4 and 5 for incumbents). In areas of fragmented control, selective violence is employed primarily by the dominant political actor: incumbents in
zone 2 and insurgents in zone 4. Finally, this theory surprisingly predicts that the balance of control between insurgents and incumbents in zone 3 areas is likely to
produce no selective violence by either side, which “suggests a complete contrast between symmetric and asymmetric war when it comes to violence. In the ideal
type of conventional war, all violence takes place on the front line; in the ideal type of irregular war, the functional equivalent of the front line turns out to be
peaceful for civilians” (p. 204).
Abstract: yes; Inter-subjective: draws on historical and social science research; Empirical relevance: analyses conflict from Thucydides to OIF
Utility to the practitioner:
- MIL resources spawn control but requirements for the establishment and preservation of control over an entire territory (country) are staggering
- Force of arms alone will not prevail – incumbents need to persuade hostile pop to their side by offering political liberalization, econ development, and civic action
- Indiscriminate violence occurs in zones where the other side (incumbent or insurgent) has control; does not occur in zones of contested control
- Inferring preferences from observed behavior is exceedingly difficult b/c preferences are open to manipulation and falsification, actual behavior (passive or
supporting behavior) is difficult to observe in civil war environments.
- Launching an insurgency and eventually winning only requires “the commitment of a significant part of the pop” – burden greater on the incumbent
- Commitment (to one side or the other) may result from varying combinations of persuasion and coercion
Q 3: Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the
utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it.
Herbst – States and Power in Africa
Thesis (not theory): The fundamental problem facing state builders in Africa - be they pre-colonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent era – has been
to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people. (page 11)
Pre-Colonial Era
• Cost calculations directed leaders to formally control only a political core that might be a small percentage of the territory over which they had at least some claim because
the cost of extending formal authority in Africa was very high. This cost structure came about for several reasons:
• Control of territory was often not contested because it was often easier to escape from rulers than to fight them
• Warfare tended to concentrate on seizing booty as it was hard to hold onto territory
• Central governments were not concerned about what outlying areas did as long as tribute was paid and no security threats emerged to challenge the center
• Pre-colonial African states therefore had precisely the opposite physiology of many in Europe. Power assets were concentrated in the center, as opposed to the
European model which placed assets in the hinterland to protect against outsiders and invasion.
Colonial Era
• The colonial powers had little ambition to rule the hinterlands of Africa; therefore, they did not extend and establish the infrastructure and administrative systems needed
to modernize the more rural portions of the continent.
• Given the European failure to extend power and infrastructure, such as roads, it is hardly a surprise that migration, the traditional African response to political
distress, continued throughout the colonial period. Africans subverted the state for many years by simply leaving.
• European colonialism in Africa could be arrayed across a vast spectrum from the Portuguese with the most direct system of rule to the famous system of indirect rule used
by the British.
• Boundaries were, in many ways, the most consequential part of the colonial state. The establishment of the territorial grid respected by other powers allowed European
rulers to be free of competition from other Imperial states and enabled them to establish internal administrative structures and pace that was convenient, given the
resources they were willing to deploy.
Post-Independence
• Due to the demography, ethnography, and topography of Africa, African leaders decided to retain their colonial boundaries. The new leaders had no interest in organizing
boundaries around actual territorial control, and they were also unwilling to resort to war as a way of redrawing the boundaries.
• War causes states to become more efficient in revenue collection by forcing leaders to dramatically improve their administrative capabilities. Because African
governments chose not to settle disputes through war, they have failed to create the bureaucracy necessary to generate an effective tax base (particularly in the
hinterlands).
• Politics between countries is well ordered while domestic politics does not evidence many signs of stability
Abstract: yes; Inter-subjective: draws on historical and social science research; Empirical relevance: surveys hundreds of years of history
• It’s your call whether he is a theorist or not. I’d submit that he is a historian and his research used process tracing to explain the origin/evolution of the African response to
power projection over harsh geography during 3 x distinct periods in African history.
Utility to the practitioner:
• The European experience does not provide a template for state making in other regions of the world. Many other regions of the world share the African experience of
having significant outlying territories that are difficult for the state to control because of relatively low population densities and difficult physical geographies
• Because African governments do not tax their people, they have felt no need to make concessions to their populations. Therefore, foreign aid and natural resources are
essentially a windfall for those in power creating massive corruption
• Migration is a historical norm in the region, particularly during conflict, famine, etc.
• The central difficulty of nation-building in much of Africa results from the lack of any shared historical mythology and memory on which state elites can set about building
the nation – no concept of a national identity.
Q 3: Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading
illustrated the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it.
Title: The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning by Henry Mintzberg
Thesis: There are ways to couple the skills and inclinations of the planners with the authority and flexibility of managers to assure strategy
making is informed, integrative, and responsive to environmental change . Additionally Strategy and Planning are different and Strategy and
Strategy formation are different.
Planning: (a process) a formalized procedure to produce articulated results in the form of an integrated system of decisions. Rest on analysisprovides data for strategy formation. Planning operationalizes strategy
Strategy formation: an output of an ongoing dialogue between managers, leaders and operators with many feedback looks seeking to capitalize
on rapid adaptation to changing environment. Requires synthesis
Strategy-(a function) an art-a plan, pattern, position or perspective regarding intentions.
Four types: Intended/Deliberate-plans for the future
Unrealized-concepts developed but not realized
Emergent-a realized strategy that was not indentified ahead of time
Umbrella (realized)-a combination of intended and emergent strategy
Mintzberg recommends the use of both Performance Control and Action Planning methods to address all elements of both planning and strategy
Performance Control (Detailed-inductive-reality)-Budget and Objectives
Top Down development/Constraints
Focus is control not strategy development
Action Planning (Conceptual-deductive-best case)-Strategy and Programs
Often Ad hoc/May be bottom up
Focus is decision making and action/generates LOO/LOEs
Combined these elements bridges the great divide of planning (reflect integrated planning)-reflects umbrella strategy-represents analysis and
synthesis but takes a concerted effort-Military only true agency capable of integrated planning
Is this a Theory: No
Abstract: No-focuses on “current” issues with planning/strategy, really only presents a list of issues and a list of possible remedies-no theory
presented; Inter-subjective: Yes (weak)-defines terms but there are still many other acceptable definitions in use; Empirical relevance: No-only
presents a list of issues and solutions-does not provide case studies or anything more then observations.
As a Planner-Mintzberg discusses the challenges in bridging the great divide-provides proposals for fostering performance control and action
planning methods-or design and MDMPWatch out for people who are wedded to the plan or only see the plan as a closed system-must have the ability to adept/plan needs to support
reality
Synthesis comes when analysis interacts with reality
Don’t fall in love with the plan-you could miss emergent factors
Q 3: Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading
illustrated the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it.
Title: Pure Strategy by Everett Carl Dolman
Thesis: Meaningful exploration of the tenets of war and strategy requires more than rigorous mathematical analysis and complete rationality of
purpose. It requires revelation, insight, steadfast commitment, and faith, for strategy is not a pure science.
Strategy: It is an idea, a product of the imagination. It is about the future, and above all it is about change. It is anticipation of the probable and
preparation for the possible. It is alchemy; a method of transmutation from idea into action.
Strategy formation: Strategy is not about winning. The pure strategist understands that war is but one aspect of social and political competition,
an ongoing interaction that has no finality.
Strategic Thinking- concern with aggregate interactions and conditions.
Tactical Thinking-concerned with individual action and decisions.
Grand Strategy (pg 26)-process by which all the means available to the state are considered in pusuit of a continuing political influence.
Military Strategy-formulates a coordinated war plan, developing policy and instructions that conform to the overall and specific political
directives.
Operations-command the medium in which his or her fores are to operate. When command is not achievable, then endeavor to contest the
medium, so as not to give unencumbered use of it to the enemy.
Is this a Theory: No
Abstract: (Yes) While use of the term strategy and his demonstration of how it functions and influences military operations are in deep abstract,
they are neither novel or explanatory. Inter-subjective: (Yes) There is strong inter-subjectivity in this book, though he focuses on land and air. By
illustrating the relationship between strategy, tactics, and operations, Dolman articulated the differences in thinking which can be applied to any
organizations . Empirical relevance: (No) Outside of quotes form other scholars and authors, Dolman used very little empirical data to support
his thesis. In his defense, he never set out to develop a theory on war or strategy, but to answer two questions: Can there be an operational
theory of war? If so, what is the utility of culling from a broader theory of war a unique and meaningful operational one? He wanted to show
that the principles of strategy and war are remarkably robust in the coming ages or space and information as well as the new sciences of chaos
and complexity are used to drive home the notion that strategy is about change and adaptation.
Usefulness to a Planner-Dolman describes in detail the various ways of thinking at various levels. This allows the planner to understand the
purview and priorities at their respective level. In other words, when to widen or focus the lens through which they plan.
4. (TOA) Critically evaluate whether current Army and Joint doctrine rest on a foundation of systems theory, and more specifically Network Centric
Warfare theory. Define terms with precision and support your assertions with evidence from both doctrinal and non-doctrinal material presented in the
various courses you took during AMSP, to include your participation in the Exercise program.
(Senge, 69-73) Systems thinking - a discipline for seeing the "structures" that underlie complex situations, with its greatest use in dynamically complex
situations - Key to the system is not the loop v. the linear, but the inputs/delays that occur during the system's cycle. Systems thinking is holistic and about
seeing relationships rather than cause and effect chains. It is looking at processes not snapshots.
(Bousquet, 140-144) Systems analysis falls under the "cybernetic" warfare, with computers featuring prominently. With more machines involved in the war,
there is a greater predictability to actions, thus making creating a system with fewer points for unexpected input/delay. The concept of self-regulation with
feedback in an open system first appeared in the 1940s and looked for patterns within systems. Understand the patterns = understand the system.
(Osinga, 70) The word "system" was coined to denote both living organisms and social systems and from that moment on a system had come to mean an
integrated whole whose essential properties arise from the relationships between its parts, and systems thinking, the understanding of a phenomenon within
the context of a larger view.
(Boyd) emphasized both the need for analysis (breaking down the system to its parts) and synthesis (identifying how the parts worked together) because
neither alone will give a complete perspective on the system.
(Gharajedaghi) points to four attributes to systems thinking: holistic thinking, chaos and non-linear feedback, self-organization, and iteration and interactive
design (learning). Although holistic, systems thinking is not always better since the trap of understanding the system is dangerous.
U.S. military doctrine uses two opposed but complementary types of thinking: reductionist and systems thinking.
Reductionist thinking breaks down concepts into component parts to better understanding them. Reductionist thinking simplifies complex problems with a
finite and logical structure. It is extremely useful to understand simple or clearly defined problems, but is limited in application because of its reliance upon
cause and effect relationships.
Army: ADP 3-0 and FM 5-0 use reductionist and systems thinking. Multiple lists of foundations, tenets, functions, processes, and principles illustrate
reductionist thinking within the doctrine. ADP 3-0’s foundations and tenets, operations structure, and warfighting functions break ULO into component parts
for better understanding. The central idea of ULO is linear: gain the initiative to maintain a position of advantage in order to create conditions for conflict
resolution. The strategic context in ADP 3-0 and the nature of operation in FM 5-0 uses a systems approach as army operations contribute to a greater JIIM
actions. Doctrine acknowledges the evolving nature of the operational environment and threat, but the approach to understanding uses fixed categories such
as PMESII-PT and METT-TC. However, the operations process (plan, prepare, execute) and commanders activities (UVDDLA) are decidedly a non-linear
system, which incorporates feedback and adjusts outputs even though the process used to produce the outputs (plans and orders) can be reductionist/linear
(MDMP) or systematic (ADM).
Joint: JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 describe the environment as complex and uncertain creating a backdrop of systems thinking but provide a series of reductionist
templates to plan and execute operations. The joint manuals derive plans and orders from national strategies and orders using Operational Design and JOPP.
This process is linear and assumes cause and effect (FDO’s for example). The recent change to joint doctrine reduced the discussion of assessment and
maintained the principles of war and joint functions to construct plans, a decidedly reductionist approach. Only within JIPOE does systematic thinking truly
occur but even here it is tempered with linear thought.
5. Compare and Contrast Jomini and Clausewitz. Consider their backgrounds, intellectual and cultural influences on their
theoretical efforts, the similarities and differences in purpose and content of their published work, and their relevance to presentday military doctrine and theory. Then offer a more general description of your method of looking for a theory in an academic
work or in doctrine or journal articles, and how that method helps you assess whether an underlying theory serves as a
foundation for the ideas you are reading, and how this helps you assess the usefulness and relevance of the work.
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CARL-theory-framework to study war and its complexity/nonlinearity
Theory of war: Absolute v Real
War the act of force to compel the enemy to do your will
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Paradoxical Trinity: Violence, Hatred, Enmity
Chance/Probability/Fog-Friction
Emphasis on Policy and Strategy
Govt, Military, people
Military Genius/Coup d’oeil
Reflective/descriptive
Utilized History appropriately-understood context-identified
change/continuity
Nature v character of war
Systems approach-nonlinear-war is complex
German/Prussian influence
Scharnhorst (Aufklares-military
ed/professionalism)/Romanticism/Kant/Hegel-dialetic reasoning
Son of Prussian Officer-wrote to support Prussian political and military
Reform
Significant military training/education
Abstract
Concentrate military force against COG
Strategic Perspective
Human Dimension
Defense/Battle centric
Objective Knowledge/proves theory through Scientific Knowledge
War is art and science
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Jomini-guidebook of doctrine-sought to simplify war
Strategy-art of making war on a map
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Battle is the means
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Strategy=maneuver
Tactics=fighting
Immutable principles/Reductionist
Apply military power against mass of the enemy, maneuver to encounter,
mass at decisive point-at the proper time and with the proper force
Enlightenment
Born into a middle class Swiss family/French Enlightenment
Wrote during and after the Napoleonic Wars
Influenced by Bulow’s work
Prescriptive/Explanatory
Agrees with the impact of friction and the Genius of the CDR
Did not believe battle was the only way to decide war
More Science/More Tactical
Formulaic/Linear-checklists-procedural
Failed to recognize adaptability of enemy
Simplicity=more popular by professionals initially
Utilized History to his advantage
Offense/Interior Lines
Scientific Knowledge-founder of military science
Lines of operations/Decisive Point
Read each other’s works
Involved/Influenced by Napoleonic Wars
Different Intent: Sell Books v Develop Theory
Interest in Frederick the Great’s campaigns
War or military conflict=perpetual behavior by societies
Reynolds: Abstract, Intersubjective, Empirical Relevance=CARL yes a theory/Jomini not a theory
SAMS/Powell Doctrine/MSN CMD-Clauswitzian DOTMLPF/Doctrine/Reductionist ideals(predictability/certainty)Jominian(OP ART Straddle both)
Question 6:
Explain the main stages in the development
of operational art from the 18th to the 21st
century. Identify the major theories,
doctrines, technological advances, and other
contributors to this evolution.
#6
18th Century
Mechanical Era
19th Century
Thermo Era
Themes
• Romanticism
• Limited Objectives
• Conscripts/Mercenaries
• Fighting Season
• Lack of operational reach
• Political and Military leader the same
• Fortress fighting
• Direct fire short range fires capability
• Franco-Prussia (Prussia Wins – Frederick the
Great)
• American Revolution
• Theorist
• Thucydides – Fear, Honor, Interest
• Fredrick the Great
Theory of Warfare
• Single decisive battle decides the outcome of
war
Key:
Bousquet, Antoine, The Scientific Way of
Warfare TOA 13 and 14
Themes
• Enlightenment
• Beginnings of Industrial Revolution
• Uncle Carl and Jomini cut their teeth
• Napoleonic warfare
• interior lines of communication
become important
• General staff focused on
sustainment
• massing of artillery assets
• Corps/DIV organizations
• distributed movement but still
decisive battle
• Campaigning
• Campaigns
• Scott and Mexico
• Grant overland Campaign
• Franco-Prussia (Nap vs
Moltke/Bismarck)
• Theorist
• Clause and Jom
• Mahan and Corbett (Sea Power)
• Douhet and Mitchell (Air Power)
Theory of Warfare
• Still seek decisive battle but the advent of
campaigning is changing that theory.
20th Century
Cybernetics Era
Chaopletic Era
Themes
• Industrial revolution continues (full bore)
• Air power, mechanization
• Trench warfare
Maneuver Warfare
• Commanders begin to have staffs (Prussian Command
and General Staff College=Professionalization)
• Interwar Period
• German Focus
• blitzkrieg
• Soviet Focus
• Deep Battle
• American Focus
• Deployment and Sustainment (Early
1900’s)
• AirLand battle
• Combined Arms Maneuver
• Total War to Limited War
• Atomic and Nuclear developments
• Proxy Wars (Cold War Era)
• Campaigns
• WWI/II
• Korea
• Vietnam
• Arab/Israeli War
• Desert Storm
• OIF/OEF
• Theorist
• Naveh – difference in Soviet and American Op
Art (Soviet Emphasized Maneuver; US
emphasized Firepower, true op art however
needs both)
• Boyd
• Dolman – Position of Advantage
Theory
• “American Way of War” technological advantage will
win the day
Question 7
•
•
•
Simultaneity and Depth: (IDF, 1973) Simultaneity refers to the “concurrent conduct of operations at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels.” (JP 5-0) The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy
throughout the area of operations, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy
commanders and resources and contributing to the enemy’s defeat.” The Egyptians and Syrians had
seized the initiative at the outset of hostilities on 6 Oct 73. The IDF were then able to repel,
counterattack, and seize the initiative against the Syrians on the Golan front, thus forcing Assad to plea to
Sadat for help. Sadat ordered a Sinai offensive that the Israelis were able to defend, counterattack, and
seize the initiative against the Egyptians too. (Gawrych, 1973 Arab-Israeli War, pp. 55-56)
Tempo: (IDF, 1973) Tempo and proper timing allow the friendly commander to “dominate the action,
remain unpredictable, and inhibit the enemy.” The Israeli air force diverted north from the Sinai to meet
the crisis on the Golan front where Israeli armor was outnumbered six to one. It halted the Syrian
advance and allowed the IDF to reinforce with a second division on 7 Oct and a third division on 8 Oct.
The IDF also reinforced the Sinai with armor, TOW missiles, and air force to repel the 13 Oct Egyptian
offensive. (Citino, 176-179)
Center of Gravity: Desert Storm) “A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and
sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to
act.” (JP 5-0) The Iraqi COG was adjudged to be the Republican Guard, three heavy and five motorized
divisions equipped to be the highest Iraqi standards. (Brown, “Maturation of Op Art, ” p. 462)
Question 8
• 1-9. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable
disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of full spectrum
operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting
functions to accomplish the mission.
• 2-6. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess throughout operations. The focus
of their efforts varies during different operations process activities. (See figure 2-2 on page 2-3.) For
example, during planning commanders focus more on understanding, visualizing, and describing while
directing, leading, and assessing. During execution, commanders often focus more on directing, leading, and
assessing while improving their understanding and modifying their visualization.
Example
• Westmoreland vs. Abrams
• Westmoreland failed to understand his enemy, visualize the operational environment and operational concept, and
did not create effective measure of success due to those shortcomings (IE Body count-attrition approach)
• Abrams was better able to describe his understanding of the operational environment and utilize better measure of
effectiveness to direct tactical actions on the ground that were linked to the strategic end state.
Question 9: Challenges and differences
in Command at the operational and
tactical
levels
• Challenges
– Tactical:
•
•
•
•
Winning current fight
Constrained Time-line
Troop to task tension
Resource Constraint
– Operational:
• Operating within the strategic flux of information, objectives, and
changing time lines.
• Anticipate 2nd and 3rd order effects from tactical actions and managing
their risks
• Vast and ambiguous implied task
• Developing campaign plans
• Managing Risk
Question 9: Challenges and differences
in Command at the operational and
tactical levels
• Differences:
levels of war have no finite limits or boundaries. These levels are
characterized by the different responsibilities and actions
performed at each echelon of military headquarters. The
headquarters at each level of war have different perspectives,
requirements, and constraints associated with them and different
horizons for planning, preparation, and execution.
vs.
Tactical thinking is concerned with individual actions and decisions.
(Dolman pg 5)Tactical commanders focus primarily on employing
combined arms within an area of operations. Tactical planning
takes into account the numerous boundaries that restrict action.
From the tactical perspective, war is bounded by real and artificial
restrictions of time and space.
13. (EOA) Discuss the cognitive tension between strategy, operations,
and tactics. Provide at least one example from the course.
Tension (Merriam-Webster)
3 a : inner striving, unrest, or imbalance often with physiological indication of emotion
b : a state of latent hostility or opposition between individuals or groups
c : a balance maintained in an artistic work between opposing forces or elements
Thus, "Cognitive Tension" is the creative opposition between ideas, concepts or beliefs.
Naveh
Strategy
The art and science of employing the elements of national
power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve
theater, national and/or multinational goals. (FM 1-92)
The use of the engagement for the purposes of the war.
(Clausewitz)
"Operational Art" is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in
whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions
in time, space and purpose. (ADP 3.0)
Operations
Tactics
"Operational Art" organizes the separate tactical activities
into the operation proceeding from the criterion of the
operation as a whole. (Svechin) Architect of Soviet Victory,
Harrison, p34
The employment of units in combat... The ordered
arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each
other, the terrain, and the enemy in order to translate
potential combat power into victorious battles and
engagements. (FM 1-02)
Tactics teaches the use of the armed forces in the
engagement. (Clausewitz)
• Generation
• Decision
• Paradigm Shifting
• Synthesis
• Inquiry
• Framing
Dolman, Pure Strategy
For the goal of strategy is not to
culminate events, to establish finality in
the discourse between states, but to
influence states' discourse in such a way
that it will go forward on favorable terms.
(6)
Tactics has its place, on the field of
competition or battle space, and there it
is supreme. Strategy, too, has realm of
its own, at the point where military force
and policy converge. Here the strategist
must link the logic of tactics and war with
the intent of policy. That link will be
identified later as operational art. (14)
• Analysis
• Action
• Adaptation
To the tactical and operational planner,
wars are indeed won or lost, and the
difference is clear. Success is
measurable; failure is obvious. (5)
14. Moltke has stated that no plan survives first contact with the enemy.
Agree or disagree and provide examples
•
Agree-however, impact can be mitigated if the plan is flexible, the intent is clear,
and assessment methods/criteria, branches and sequels are components of the
initial overall plan.
– Planning v Predicting
– War requires interaction of two human components-each with their own
will/context/perspective
– Plans must be flexible and adaptive-enemy is adaptive, plan is a reductionist concept
– Plans cannot cover every contingency; if done correctly-planning mitigates risk through
identification, reflect ion on OE, understanding of self, enemy and problem
– CARL-enemy gets a vote/fog and friction/Chance and probability
– Boyd-OODA Loop-assessment and reframing
– Doctrine-Mission Command-mission and intent and endstate
•
•
•
•
Planning is iterative
Pitfalls in planning: forecasting, planning in too much detail, prescriptive
Integration of red team
Planning based on incomplete knowledge and assumptions
– War is a system
•
Examples-1973 Arab Israeli War, Vietnam, Napoleon’s approach, Eastern Front,
Maginot Line, duration/intensity of WWI
Strategy
• Liddell Hart (Strategy) – mil strat is
close to Moltke “adaptation of
means..to attain objective in view”
(334); BHL close to Moltke and agrees
w/ JFC Fuller in describing strat as art
of distributing and applying military
means to fulfill policy (335);
“dislocation is aim of strategy” (339) =
ADP 3-0’s position of relative
advantage
• Gray (War, Peace, and Intl Relations)
– Thucydides’ “Fear, honor, and
interest” as causes for war still valid
(2); seven ideas to examine when
looking at strat context: Political;
Socio-cultural; Economic;
Technological; Military-Strategic;
Geographical; Historical (9-12)
• Yergin/Stanislaw (Commanding
Heights) – Keynesian (control of
markets 37-38) vs. Hayek (free market
124-25) are important to consider
when planning
• Strachan (Lost Art of Strategy, 35-36)
– Jomini “art of making war upon a
map”;
OPART
• Strachan (– OPART in 80s was
strat in 1914; clouds the issue
because it implies that OPART can
take the place of strategy since
wars are single campaigns
• ADP 3-0 (p.9) – Pursuit of
strategic objectives, in whole or
in part, through the arrangement
of tactical actions in time, space,
and purpose
• FM 3-0 c1 (p.7-2) places OPART
between tactics and strategy and
links them via OPARTs
arrangement of campaigns and
major operations containing
multiple arranged tactical actions
to the strategic ends; OPART is
specifically described as
employing tactical actions to
achieve the strategic end state;
the campaigns and operations are
designed to establish the
conditions that define the end
state (p.7-3)
Linkage
• Strategy, as determined by the
NCA (for national level) and
COCOM (theater level) drives what
the operational planner/artist
plans for; they look to arrange
tactical actions in time, space, and
purpose to achieve strategic ends
ICW whatever other instruments
of national power are available or
being used in the planner’s AO
• Factors to be considered can be
derived from Gray (1st seven),
classroom discussion (last 2,
included as necessary), and others
the planner or commander deem
relevant for the AO in question:
• Political
• Socio-cultural
• Economic
• Technological
• Military-Strategic
• Geographical
• Historical
• Theory (economic and IR)
• Religion (although part of sociocultural, may warrant separate
consideration
• Ideological
• Enemy/Threat
• Individuals
15. (SCOA) What is the relationship between strategy & operational art?
What factors should be considered in examining the strategic context for
operational art?
Military
tical
omic
Social
Information - Infrastructure
Physical Environment
PMESII-PT (ADP 3-0)
Political: What politics do
leaders profess? (Drezner)
-- what artifacts / values /
assumptions exist (Schein via Hatch)
Political / Military-Strategic:
Intended/deliberate/ realized/emergent
strategy (Mintzberg)
Historical: Nation’s Foreign Policy
Traditions
(McDougall: Old/New Testament)
Economic: Who controls the
Commanding Heights? (Yergin &
Stanislaw)
Socio-Cultural: Discourse & Reality of
War (or anything else) (Lynn)
Time
Grand Strategy
(Nat’l Objective – Liddell
Hart)
ENDS:
Policy
articulated
thru DIME
WAYS:
Prioritized
Resources
that weight
the DIME
MEANS:
DIME-Specific Strategy
(e.g., “Military Strategy” or
Liddell Hart’s military aim:
way forces directed to meet
/ achieve political purpose)
Operational Art:
• the pursuit of
strategic objectives (in
whole or in part) through
arrangement of tactical
actions in time, space, &
purpose [ADP 3-0]
• How CDRs balance
risk & opportunity to
maintain relative
advantage while linking
tactical actions to reach a
strategic objective
• Requires
understanding the OE,
strategic objectives &
force capabilities.
Q 16 (SCOA). What is deterrence? What is the military’s role in deterrence? [primarily from lesson SCOA 6
Foreign Policy Traditions II ,& SCOA 7 Cold War Plans.]
References: FM 1-02; Lawrence Freedman’s Deterrence(2004); Bernard Brodie’s “Anatomy of Deterrence”(1959); Colin Gray’s War, Peace and International Relations
(2007); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle(2006); Henry Hendrix’s Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy(2004) (from SCOA 3);
FM 1-02: Deterrence is the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of
a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.
Freedman: Both of these controlling strategies are more
(Freedman 26-27) 2 COMPETING STRATEGIES:
2. Controlling
1. Coercive
Have a capable & credible force
Compellence (Do this
or else I’ll use force
against you
Deterrence (Do NOT
do this or else I’ll use
force against you if you do.
2 Methods of Deterrence:
1. Strategic Deterrence—taking steps to persuade
opponent that a particular act against my interests
would be unwise and unwelcome. --set boundaries
for actions and determine associated risks.
relevant than deterrence for contemporary environment
(can rarely deter non-state actors)
1.Pre-Emption
2.Prevention
Historical Example of Coercive Strategies: - 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
the U.S. warned the Soviets to stop constructing missile sites in Cuba
(compellence) and NOT to pass ships carrying more missiles through
the American blockade (deterrence). The Soviets warned of
consequences if the threats were implemented. Thus, it was a
process of coercion and counter-coercion with deterrence and
compellence used on both sides. (Freedman, p. 110)
2. Internalized Deterrence—actions that are not being deliberately
applied as a strategy.
Historical Examples of each:
1. Gray 218. Strategic Deterrence--The Cold War served as the environmental frame for America’s nuclear strategy where the US searched for the most
effective deterrence against the Soviets by using nuclear threats. Placing NATO troops in Germany served as a deterrence. Gulf War Op DESERT
SHIELD—deter Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia.
2. Hendrix 168-9. Roosevelt’s naval diplomacy, using the Great White Fleet, (naval power--greatest guarantor of peace) provides an example of internalized
deterrence; (from class notes and p 169)—potentially deterred Japan for about 20 years from continuing expansion and seizing Philippines sooner .
Military’s Role: (from notes) Maintain training and posture for expeditionary operations; maintain ability to make good on the threat of force. Maintain
presence globally. See JP 5-0: Military role to deter and compel adversaries; III-39 to 43 (PHASE 1, Deter), and Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) (appx E)
Other Synthesis: Clausewitz says war is an act to compel enemy to do our will (75).
Bonus Material to think/talk about --With regard to Nuclear Policy, Strategy, in context of Cold War:
Freedman 11. In dealing with the Soviet Communist threat, DOCTRINE of CONTAINMENT was implemented in the late 1940s under the assumption that the
Communist model would expand into Europe. So, the only way to keep it from expanding was to threaten the use of force. DETERRENCE is the METHOD used in
containment (also referenced by Brodie p173)
Gray 213, The US threatened to use nuclear forces, and its sole function was to deter. Thus in the case of nuclear strategy, military officials could not responsibly
settle for a strategic context that guaranteed mutual suicide, with regard to the deterrent concept that backed up the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) policy.
Further, this policy was not true strategy because it would not provide any position of advantage, and the military needed to develop alternative measures to
achieve strategic advantage. (nuclear strategy is probably a contradiction in terms).
Gray 217. It wasn’t until the 1960s that both the US and Soviets concluded that nuclear weapons could not be used to threaten for the purpose of gain, but strictly
for defense, which reveals, militarily, why doctrine moved to “active defense”-1970s, (then to airland battle--80s )(Krause, Historical Perspectives of Op Art, pgs 13-15)
Walter McDougal Promised Land, Crusader State
•
Page 2-3
–
–
–
•
McDougall's compelling thesis is that there is a fundamental dichotomy in US Foreign Policy, with two competing doctrines each influenced by four different themes. There is the
Promised Land (or Old Testament) impulse, which is based on four key traditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
•
Exceptionalism (Focus on liberties at home): (p. 18) “special” because of geography and so called religious freedom (Americans were a chosen people delivered from bondage to a Promised Land, and
you can’t get more exceptional than that)
Unilateralism (as opposed to isolationism): (p. 40) self-evident course for the US was to avoid permanent, entangling alliances and to remain neutral in Europe's wars except when our liberty – the
first hallowed tradition – was at risk.
The American System (Monroe Doctrine): (p. 39) not enough to steer clear of European wars and ambitions but US must also make sure that European powers did come over to the “Western
Hemisphere”
Expansionism (Manifest Destiny): (p. 77) US was to remain free and independent the first tradition then it must pursue a unilateral foreign policy expansionism was the logical corollary of the first
three US Foreign policy traditions.
This was the prevailing approach to foreign policy—designed to protect America's liberty and independence from the outside world—until 1898 and the Spanish American War, at which
point a New Testament (Crusader State) gained ascendancy, likewise guided by four traditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
•
#17
The Good – Despite occasional funks and lapses, US has struggled to acquit itself abroad in a more high minded fashion than the imperial monarchies of the 19th century or the dictatorship of the 20th
The Bad – Sense of exploiting our military dominance to plunder or bully other nations
The Ugly – History of foreign policy ought not to be discussed in moral terms at all, because every responsible government conducts its affair according to balance of power and coup d'état
Progressive Imperialism: (p. 103) necessary to retain the US defensive posture (western hemisphere) and establish global reach (navy refueling stations) to project power around the world.
Liberal Internationalism (Wilsonianism): (p. 132) four main ideas: (1) no more territorial gains achieved by conquest; (2) equality of rights for small nations; (3) government control of arms
manufacture; (4) association of nations wherein all shall guarantee the territorial integrity of each.
Containment: (p. 157) effort to contain the communist ideology (in this case Soviet Union specifically) from spreading threatening the American system
Global Meliorism (reforming other nation’s internal problems): (p. 173) simply the socio-economic and politico-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place.
Conclusions:
–
–
–
“The United States went off the rails, in terms of its honored traditions, when it went to war with Spain in the first place (118).”
“Our first four foreign policy traditions—the Old Testament of American diplomacy—reflected that balance of reason and faith (203).”
ANSWER: Based on McDougall’s Promised Land, Crusader State, one could argue that any strategic or operational planning must be able to support any of the eight foreign policy traditions that
McDougall identifies. McDougall asserts that all eight of these traditions to some extent, exist in our current form of government and within the hearts of policy makers and may not change as
America’s leadership changes.
John Lewis Gaddis Surprise, Security, and the American Experience
–
Main Idea: (p. 13) Historians James Chace and Caleb Carr persisted ever since DC was burned do3wn by Brits that the United States safety comes from enlarging rather than from contracting its
sphere of responsibilities. (US does not circle the wagons like the Buffalo Bills, we expand the circle to ensure US security)
•
Page 37: When confronted with unexpected dangers, we tend to expand rather than contract our sphere of responsibilities. Running and hiding has rarely been our habit.
–
Only three great surprises in American History
•
•
•
–
Burning of DC
–
Exemplified in continental hegemony, ideological example, and commercial opportunity
Pearl Harbor
–
Expanded sphere of influence that amounted to informal empire on a global scale
9/11
–
Secure American liberty and security throughout the world by promoting democracy
The key to American influence in the world has always been the hope for a better life that we still, more credibly than anyone else, have to offer
18.
•
Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy (Hendrix) contained several examples of where TR
used military force to induce rivals and those we were in cooperation with to act IAW U.S.
wishes
–
–
–
–
•
Great White Fleet (p.160-62) made voyage around the world in 1908 stopping in several locations (AUS, NZ,
Philippines, Japan, China, and informal stops in the Mediterranean, including providing HA following earthquake
in Sicily); led to important agreements with Japan regarding Philippines and to formation of AUS-NZ-US
partnership prior to WWII and following
(Overwhelming force) Venezuela (p.25-53) in 1902-03 had potential for UK and GE landings because of debt
issues; TR mobilized 54 ship fleet to Caribbean to conduct exercises with ADM Dewey as commander (from
position as CNO IOT emphasize importance of mission to UK and GE); UK friendly with US, so decided not to
interfere; GE took more persuasion including large scale LFX by US Navy and TR pressuring GE diplomats for
Kaiser Wilhelm to believe US was serious in its invocation of the Monroe Doctrine to keep from further
colonization of Americas; TR understood the effect a large naval force could have on European countries far from
their bases of supply
(Scalable response) Panama (p.54-81) in late 1903 was another example; US having difficulty with Colombia (who
owned Panama at the time) or changing requirements for Isthmus Canal; US prepared to back Panamanian
revolution to break away from Colombia by sending ships and Marines under USMC Commandant (ala Venezuela
by using powerful figure in rarely used role to emphasize importance of mission to US); the naval/marine forces
were to deter Colombia from invading Panama after their declaration of independence from Colombia. Threat
was adequate to encourage Colombia to accept peace terms with Panama; TR planned invasion of Colombian
port, if necessary, to force them to w/d from Panama; TR actually changed his mind several times about whether
or not to put Marines ashore because of the diplomatic implications
(Limits of Naval Power) Morocco (p.82-103) in 1904 had problems with an outlaw kidnapping American ex-pats;
TR re-directed Battleship Squadron on summer cruise of Med to Morocco ITO influence Moroccan govt to
acquiesce to outlaw’s demands; famous "Perdaciris alive or Raisuli dead“ telegram left out that State Dept
(ultimately TR) had to authorize force, indicating TR’s understanding of the limits of military power
Scott’s invasion of Mexico in A Gallant Little Army (Johnson) – GEN Winfield Scott created
plan that invaded Mexico to take Mexico City and force the Mexican govt to peace talks
and treaty to allow US to express Manifest Destiny in taking NM, AZ, and CA to allow US to
spread from Atlantic to Pacific; Scott used operational pauses to encourage Mexico’s
cooperation and because he did not desire to destroy the entire Mexican military, but to
leave them as a viable government continuing after the treaty was reached
Question 19: How Economic Theory can Influence Military Operations (SCOA)
Colin S Gray - War, Peace and IR ( pg11)
•Strategic history an economic story.
•An economic context to record of war, peace and order.
•The economic context a potential show stopper.
•Defence preparation and actual warfare are exercises in economic choice.
•Fall of Germany and Soviet Union prove that an economic shortfall is fatal.
Keynesian
Hayek
Managed Capitalism
Regulated by
governmental control.
Regulatory Capitalism
Free Markets
Lesser governmental
Intervention.”Laissez
Army of excellence
Reforger reps
Modularity
Air Land battle
FSO/ULO.
COIN.
Tenets
Increased Risk taking
ability.
Mission command
Tenets
Centralized execution.
Marxist
Socialist
Governmental
Control.
Fare”
Deep operations
theory.
Global Meliorism
is the socio-economic
and politico-cultural
expression of an
American mission of
make the world a
better place, a policy
that directly influenced
the conduct of military
operations
References : Commanding
Heights Yergin & Stanislaw
Promised Land McDougall
Economy: Capitalist (realism; Smith) or liberal (global trade)
Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies
(editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War”
There is a final war.
Eschatological (final war)
Philosophies of War
Divine Eschatological
(religious final battle)
Economy: Islamic (ideological)
Religious movements
that feature an
“Armageddon plot” or
the return of a savior
with the destruction of all
non-believers follow this
logic.
A final war will, God
Willing, end human
conflict; this is predetermined (linear
causality), and the
chosen people will reign
supreme.
Example: Iran launching
WMD at Israel to trigger
emergence of 12th Imam.
Natural Eschatological
(planet extinction;
human extinction)
Prevent all war.
Human (messianic)
Eschatological (people
here now)
Economy: Marxist Socialist
Extreme
environmentalism
movements; anti-human
movements (by humans,
oddly). Non-human
events such as planet
destruction, asteroid
event, or disease
epidemic that ends
human (or all) life.
Example: the dinosaurs
did not wage “war” but
their existence was
terminated this way.
Humans waging limited
war while an asteroid
hurtles towards us
makes a similar
example….
A group of people already on
the planet that will bring about
the final battle- the Nazis, early
Soviet Party, and other extreme
non-religious groups followed
this logic.
The Proletarian Revolution
where workers of the world
unit.
American Manifest Destiny
during the Great Plains Indian
Wars has components of this
logic also.
Example: Soviet Party of the
early 20th century followed this
logic, according to Rapoport.
Cataclysmic (world
destruction) Philosophies
of War
Ethno-centric Cataclysmic
War Theory
Global Cataclysmic
War Theory
Economy: Marxist Socialist
Economy: Capitalist Liberal
Rapoport claims the Soviets
switched to this during the
Cold War- the chief difference
is:
1. War is NOT a tool.
2. The outside world wants
to destroy the unique
ethnic identity of the
select people.
3. Protective measures such
as the Berlin Wall are not
for keeping people in,
but keeping outsiders
out.
4. The world will end in a
final show-down.
Example: MAD in the Cold
War fueled this logic; Soviets
sought to preserve their
state versus Capitalist
westerners.
Rapoport calls this a systemtheoretical approach. The
principles are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
War is NOT a tool.
ALL war is bad.
Global government is the
answer to ending conflict.
International systems will aid
in preventing global
cataclysmic war.
The nuclear age advanced
this logic.
Example: The United Nations
pursues international systems
and a form of weak global
governance with the general
position that all war is
bad…NATO is not an example of
this; NATO is an alliance under
Clausewitzian logic.
#20
• Since the War of 1812, American foreign policy tradition centers on guaranteeing its security. America’s conduct of small wars was military
action deemed necessary to ensure its security in the form of preemption and expansionism. In Surprise, Security, and the American Experience,
John Gaddis asserts that unlike its Asian and Europe counterparts, America’s maintains a foreign policy based off the Monroe Doctrine that
expands its hegemony outwards, not inwards, following a traumatic security experience from a foreign threat.
The following are examples:
•Westward expansion/Frontier wars. This was un-colonized territory. From the U.S. perspective, if the U.S. didn’t seize control, then European
colonial powers would first. As a result, the Indian wars occurred in the West.
•The Spanish-American War resulted in U.S. re-asserting its hegemony in the Western hemisphere against European powers, and also resulted in
U.S. gaining control of previously held Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. U.S. counterinsurgency operations (another
small war) in the Philippines that followed was the U.S. retaining control of its “sphere of security” since it now had control of those colonies and
Hawaii as a U.S. territory.
•After World War I (Wilson), U.S. policy transitioned towards global Meliorism a.k.a. Wilsonianism. The U.S. experience in Vietnam was another
small war where military force was deployed to buy time for the civil programs to build South Vietnam into a viable non-Communist state.
•Operation Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, Gaddis, argues, were small wars consistent with historical American policy traditions and it wouldn’t
have mattered if it was Gore or Bush as President; after 9/11, the U.S. would have invaded Afghanistan and eventually Iraq as part of its tradition
of expanding outward to guarantee its security.
References:
• Surprise, Security, and the American Experience by John Gaddis
• Promised Land, Crusader State by Walter A. McDougall (Chapter 8)
Alternative Examples:
• Henry Hendrix Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The US Navy and the Birth of the American Century
• Chapter 2: Overwhelming force and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903
• Chapter 3: Scalable Response in Defense of the Panamanian Revolution
• Chapter 4: Morocco and the Limits of Naval Power
Question 21: Use theory, history, and doctrine to
explain the relationship between detail and conceptual
planning
• Answer/Arguement: The relationship between conceptual and detailed
planning is mutual: Conceptual planning without a detailed component
results in a “daydream on acetate” and equally, a detailed plan without a
conceptual component results in a “road to nowhere” because they are
not tied to the overarching purpose.
• History: Operation overlord is an historical example of the mutual
relationship between conceptual and detail planning. Over nine months,
the staff conducted half a dozen distinct iterations of cyclic planning
refinement, moving from a general concept to a specific planning
directive, while simultaneously generating movement tables, detailed
topographic and oceanographic surveys, and refined statements of
operational requirements. The efforts of the staff transcended any
previous definition of planning. In its final form, Operation Overlord was a
military undertaking of a “magnitude undreamt of before,” eventually
involving over 130,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from seven
different countries.
Question 21…
• Doctrine(FM 5-0 Ch 2): Conceptual planning is determining
the operation’s end-state, establishing objectives, and
sequencing the operation in broad terms through the
understanding of the environment and the problem. It
answers the question what to do and why. Detailed
planning translates the broad operational approach into a
complete and practical plan—the specifics of execution,
such as, scheduling, coordination, synchronizing and
directing of the force. It answers the question how.
• Theory: Bar-yam: relationships to parts give rise to be like
the behaviors of the system and how the system interacts
and forms relationships with its environment (WEAK)
Q 22. Using theory, history, and doctrine explain the relationship between design and mission command.
BLUF: Design is the underpinning of battle command, especially in the complex environment of modern operations. Personal Examples.
The tie between design and MSN CMD is in the transition from conceptual planning to detailed planning.
The Army Design Methodology (ADM) as described in doctrine supports battle command, which according to FM 3-0 is the “art and science of understanding, visualizing,
describing, directing, leading, and assessing forces to impose the commander’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership
to translate decisions into actions—by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose—to accomplish missions.” (FM 3-0, 5-2). Design
underpins the exercise of battle command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing. As these iterations
occur, the design concept—the tangible link to detailed planning—is forged (FM 5-0, 3-1). Thus, design enhances the “understand” and “visualize” components
of battle command, and provides the links to the “describe” and “direct” elements of battle command. The continual assessment, a fundamental part of battle
command, is also served by problem re-framing in the ADM.
Theory. Situational understanding is fundamental to effective command and control. Complexity theory, open systems theory, chaos theory, emergence
History. Slim in Burma; Lawrence in the Hejaz; BG Aviv Kochavi during the attack on Nablus in April 2002. All recognized aspects of complexity and adaptation,
recognizing the environment, enemy, and intervention as systems and sought an understanding of the nature of the system they wished to transform. After a
combination of reflection, critical and creative thinking, and creation of a shared understanding, each visualized and described novel and effective approaches to
transforming the system to a favorable state.
Doctrine. Per FM 5-0, Ch 3, design supports battle command. Commanders are the central figure because they maintain decision and direction authority. “Commanders
are not continuously engaged in the design method; rather, they participate enough to inform and guide design through its course.” (3-1) Design provides an
approach for leading adaptive work from which a complex, ill-defined situation can be made sense of and acted upon effectively.
Argument: Design goes hand-in-hand with battle command. Design has always been a critical facet of battle command, even before it was called ‘design’, defined,
studied, pondered, and written on. Commanders perform design in their minds as they seek to understand the situation and the problem, and as they visualize
and describe the situation, problem, and possible solution to their staffs and soldiers. As battle command is a cycle, so too is design—demanding continuous
observation, assessment, adjustment, adaptation, and, upon occasion, reframing. While application of design once varied greatly from commander to commander
and organization to organization (and still does to some extent) by deliberately (though not restrictively) tying design to the battle command process, the
commander helps engender shared understanding throughout his organization, adaptability and agility in the face of the complex operating environment or
complex enemy systems, and more likelihood of success as a learning organization. In short, design is the method that enables battle command
Sources for Theory:
G-Man w/ the 2 order machine
Bar-Yam: systems thinking and emergence (Design and BTL CMD Linkage)
Checkland: Rich Picture and Soft Systems Methodology
Schoen: Reflection in Action (feedback) and Teacher-Mentor
Mary Jo Hatch: Organization Structures
23. FM 6-22 Army Leadership discusses informal leadership. Define the
concept and give an example of a situation that required you to use informal
leadership during practicum or exercise. How does information, effective
communication and influence play a role in informal leadership?
•
Informal Leadership: A type of leadership that is not based on command or other designation of formal authority. Informal
leadership occurs as an individual exerts influence others for the good of the organization (FM 6-22: 3-15)
–
–
•
•
•
•
Army considers leadership to be formal-legitimate or informal-influential
Army is a team of teamsMay lead outside chain of command (in a JIATF/HN) or lead by example
Information
–
–
–
•
–
–
Must create a common vision/apply cultural sensitivities/establish trust
Mission Command enables leaders to support the requirements of subordinates and peers to execute informal leadership and still
accomplish the mission
March-teams req coordination and communication/discuss and understand personal inconsistencies
. Kotter-good communication/good relationships enable leaders to overcome resistence
Influence-compliance/commitment-provide purpose, motivation and understanding
–
–
–
•
Informal Leaders may have access to additional knowledge but must have a clear understanding of the commander’s mission and access
to the same information as the CDR/Staff (Mission CMD)
March-knowledge is power/Team members must understand one another’s inconsistencies-members influence one another
Kotter-keep the boss informed/understand perspectives-context of situatin and individual
Communication
–
–
•
Often a result of experience
May req initiative by the individual to assume the role of an informal leader
Kotter-IPC skills/judgement must be applied by informal leaders/understand self, subordinates and seniors/must get things done through
others without control (capacity to develop sufficient sources of power to make up for the gap inherent in the position-avoid
parochialism, infighting, power struggles)/understand why people resist informal leadership and the decisions-context
Senge-leaders must learn, grow and change and assist others to do so/reflection and collaboration are critical
March-direct conflict do not reduce it/social norms and judgment shape decision making/be ware of ambiguity
Historical Examples: TE Lawrence-utilized informal leadership within both the British Chain of Command and the Arab
sphere of influence. Ike had to hold together and balance the coalition during WWII and Abrams worked with DoS reps to
implement CORDs-and to work with the SVn. Isserson although more jr in the Soviet System fostered deep battle/op shock
doctrine.
24. (DOA) Explain the difference between complex and complicated systems. Using theory, a historical campaign(s), and personal experience give
examples of both, and explain the implications for how to ensure relevant action when performing simple, complicated, and complex tasks.
Dorner: The Logic of Failure. Human planning and decision making processes can go awry if we do not pay enough attention to possible side effects and longterm repercussions; if we apply corrective measures too aggressively or timidly; or if we ignore premises we should have considered. Comprehensive Systems
Approach allows commanders to make decisions with full understanding of nuances and interlocking elements of a complex system and not make decisions
on an ad hoc basis (pg 5)
Schön: iteration includes reflection while acting. To make use of this gained reflective ideation, Schön recommends what he calls reciprocal reflection, which
also requires numerous iterations for effect. He adds a third component to the iterative process – trust. Educating the Reflective Practitioner, 87-8; 101; 163.
“Making Things Work” by Yaneer Bar-Yam: this book provides a description of concepts as they have been developed in the scientific study of complex
systems, but here they are directed at solving complex problems of our world. This book attempts to discuss complex systems concepts in order to provide
new insights about how to approach solving deeply rooted complex problems. 50 Complex adaptive systems are special cases of complex systems. They are
complex in that they are diverse and made up of multiple interconnected elements (and so a part of network science) and adaptive in that they have the
capacity to change and learn from experience. "complex systems" is a new approach to science, which studies how relationships between parts give rise to
be like the behaviors of the system and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its environment. 24
Historical Campaigns: “Complex adaptive systems modeling shows that the global nature of the present Islamist jihad, and hence its dangerous character,
derives from the links in the system – energy pathways that allow disparate groups to function in an aggregated fashion across intercontinental distances –
rather than the elements themselves.” Kilcullen, D. J. 2005. "Countering Global Insurgency". Journal of Strategic Studies. 28, no. 4: 597-618. (pg 75 of SAMS
Student Text v 2.0)
“As Grant approaches the Chattanooga area, he reflects, acts, reflects some more, gains new information and intelligence, acts some more. His approach is
that of iteration.” Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs (New York, NY: Literary Classics, 1990), 403-421. (SAMS Student Text v 2.0,108)
Implications for relevant action for simple, complicated and complex tasks:
Simple:
-Closed systems
- Known knowns
- clear actors
- linear causality
- reduction friendly
- mechanistic friendly
- principles/procedures
- reverse engineerable
- predictable
Intricate:
- one solution
- many steps
- time consuming
- precise
- reverse engineerable
- mechanistic
- 100% predictable
Complicated:
-Closed systems
-Known unknowns
- many actors
- often linear
- description rich
- reduction friendly
- interiority
- mechanistic prone (COGs)
Complex:
- iteration
- reflection
- flexibility
- assessments
- open systems
- unknown unknowns
- exteriority
- adaptive actors
- innovation
- holistic approaches
- dynamic
- explanation over
description
- reduction does not
explain
- mechanistic resistant
Simple problem: Completing my six year-old’s math homework.
Intricate problem: Completing a tough crossword puzzle. There is only 1x right solution.
Complicated problem: Normandy Amphibious Assault on D-day.
Complex Problem: Accomplishing vague strategic goals that change under limited conditions (no troops on ground) with NATO and the Arab League in Libya
while waging 2+ other wars.
25. (DOA) Discuss the function and utility of narrative in design as well as its relationship to discourse. Focus
on defining what narrative and discourse are, what comprises them, how you ‘do’ them, how they function,
and how they inform design.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “narrative” as follows: “That part of a deed or document which narrates the relevant or
essential facts.” A “narration” is “The action of relating or recounting, or the fact of being recounted; an instance of this.” Finally,
“narrate” means “To relate, recount, give an account of.” The etymology of this word is also significant: “L. narrat-, narrare, prob
for gnarrare, related to gnarus knowing, and thus ult. to know.” A narrative recounts relevant circumstances using plot and logic to
make, and project into the future, decisions about how relevant circumstances should or should not connect.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “discourse” as follows: “Onward course; The act of the understanding by which it passes
from premises to consequences; reasoning, rationality, reason; Communication of thought by speech.” Alternatively, “discourse”
means “To run or travel over a space, region, etc.; To pass from premises to conclusions…”
Possessing a conception of the cognitive process that results in strategy, one achieves at least three useful insights. First, it is
possible to determine if a rival is operating in accordance with a strategy or simply executing tactical actions on the basis of
expediency. This claim is based on the assumption that strategy has a distinct form that enables specific types of change; activity
within a different form will not achieve these types of change and is thus not truly “strategy.” Second, an anatomy of strategy
offers a way to make broad evaluations of a competitor’s truthfulness. If an actor’s stated concerns are not addressed by his
actions, then it is reasonable to assume he is not honest about or alternatively, unaware of, his actual strategy. Such a “truth test”
sounds straightforward, but is in fact impossible without understanding the linkage between thought, word and deed; narrative
provides this linkage. Third, one can evaluate strategy for potential efficacy. By studying the narratives of strategic discourse, one
can evaluate the logic of projected decisions and circumstances. Logical inconsistency significantly lowers the probability that a
strategic actor will achieve and sustain a desired position of advantage.
Makers and consumers of strategy exist within an ocean of circumstances that benefit or hinder their community's ability to
survive on its own terms. Strategy confronts this reality by explaining why some circumstances are relevant to a given concern,
and then how those circumstances enable a reconfiguration of the larger context to improve conditions within the community.
The reconfiguration of circumstance is achieved by using one part of a larger system to influence another part of the same
system.
Therefore, circumstances without narrative are “like uncarved wood. Merged, undifferentiated… Like muddy water.” Confronted
with bounded but largely undifferentiated circumstances, the strategist must still create a narrative to explain why the
circumstances he contemplates are bounded in one way and not another. It is thus apparent that strategy cannot exist
independently of narrative.
Q 26. Define adaptive work and describe how one leads this type of effort.
(See D322 from 20 Oct 10, Leadership Without Easy Answers by Ronald A. Heifetz. References below.)
Adaptive work is defined as an adaptive challenge when a gap exists between values and circumstances and that gap cannot be closed by application of current technology,
know-how, or routine behavior. “Adaptive work consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the
values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs, or behavior. The exposure and orchestration of conflict – internal
contradictions – within individuals and constituencies provide the leverage for mobilizing people to learn new ways.” P. 22
The example studied for class was the 1983 case between the Environmental Protection Agency and the American Smelting and Refining Company copper plant near
Tacoma, WA (p. 88). The processing of copper ore involved the use of arsenic, which had been determined to cause cancer. William Ruckleshaus was the head of the
EPA who was responsible for protecting the public health. His involvement required that he:
Identified an adaptive challenge; Regulated level of distress; Focused attention on relevant issues
Devised strategy that shifted responsibility for the problem to the primary stakeholders
Other terms introduced include:
Adaptive vs. Technical Work (pp. 73-76)
Routine – technical work
Non-routine – technical to adaptive work
Non-routine/requiring learning – adaptive work
4Heifetz’ thesis is that leadership is organized around two key distinctions: technical versus adaptive problem solving and leadership versus authority. P. 8
Leadership is a social contract mobilizing people to tackle tough problems. P. 15
Iteration and adaptive work:
How does one lead it? Look at Senge (Arrows) and COL Grigsby Nexus (team building)
Checkland: SSM to lead it.
Schoen:
History: Wedemeyer and T.E. Lawrence
“Leadership w/o Easy Answers” by Heifetz defines adaptive work as “the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between
the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs, or behavior = culture. The exposure and orchestration of
conflict – internal contradictions – within individuals and constituencies provide the leverage for mobilizing people to learn new ways.” (p.22)
“Leadership will consist not of answers or assured visions but of taking action to clarify values. It asks questions like: That are we missing here? Are there values of competing
groups that we suppress rather than apply to out understanding o he problem at hand? Are the shared values that might enable is to engage competing views?
Ongoing adaptive capacity requires a rich and evolving mix of values to inform a society’s process of reality testing. It requires leadership to fire and contain the forces
of invention and change and to extract the next step.” (p.35)
Q 26. Define adaptive work and describe how one leads this type of effort.
References: Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, 22,69,75,101, 87-88.
Art of Design Student Text, 16, 40, 113, 114
Heifetz defines adaptive work as “the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to
diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a
change in values, beliefs, or behavior. The exposure and orchestration of conflict – internal contradictions
– within individuals and constituencies provide the leverage for mobilizing people to learn new ways.”
(p.22)
“Leadership will consist not of answers or assured visions but of taking action to clarify values. It asks
questions like: That are we missing here? Are there values of competing groups that we suppress rather
than apply to out understanding o he problem at hand? Are the shared values that might enable is to
engage competing views? Ongoing adaptive capacity requires a rich and evolving mix of values to inform a
society’s process of reality testing. It requires leadership to fire and contain the forces of invention and
change and to extract the next step.” (p.35)
Strategic Principles of leadership:
1. Identify the adaptive challenge. Diagnose the situation in light of the values at stake, and unbundle the
issues that come with it.
2. Keep the level of distress within a tolerable range for doing adaptive work.
3. Focus attention on ripening issues and not on stress-reducing distractions.
4. Give the work back to the people, but at a rate they can stand.
5. Protect voices of leadership without authority. (p.128)
Question 27: How do you build organizational learning to facilitate integrated
planning? Using theory, history and doctrine, describe how this might contribute to
the organization’s ability to reframe during execution.
The Fifth Discipline Peter Senge
•Ideas of systems thinking, particularly equilibrium, patterns, and team learning through
discourse.
•Fighting complex systems with complex solutions is the antithesis of Systems thinking.
•understand the underlying dynamic complexity and address it with a simple mean.
•Look for interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect chains.
•See the process rather than a snapshot.
•From the systems perspective, human actors are part of the feedback process.
•Reinforcing and Balancing Feedback & Delays.
Current
system
Desired
system
Design
Visualization of OE
( Form, Function, Logic & ecology)
W/O reductionism unveil the
ill structured problem
SLIM & Burma Campaign : Reframing in Execution
Sit May 1942
Unstructuring of Defeat :
Destructive deduction
Restructuring :
Creative induction
Defeat into
Victory
Retreat( defeat).
Japanese
superiority.
Over running of
Burma and threat
to India.
Lack of preparedness.
No tactical acumen &
training in jungle Warfare.
Lack of air support.
In adequate medical and
logistical support.
Faulty generalship.
Rigorous training.
Master the
‘surround’ tactics.
Conquer the jungle.
Innovative use of
resources. (MFTUs)
Morale.
Unifying logic –
destroy Japanese
evil.
Three lines of
effort
1. Superior
jungle craft
and Training.
2. Efficient
logs.
3. Morale.
Q 28
• DOA Paper
Q 29
• Trends in warfare in the next 5-10 years
• Can link to question to 32
Q.30 (FOA). What is the utility of Scenario Planning for anticipating future conflicts? What did you learn about operational
art in using this process?
Detriments of Scenario Planning:
PROBLEM: Tetlock“Tarot on K St” -Most forecasters fail to
outperform the proverbial dart-throwing monkey. From
Marx: when history throws a curve, the intellectuals fall off
the train. (in a non-linear, open system world, great demand
exists for forecasting future events so preparations can be
made, but is difficult to do). “History rarely overtly repeats
itself, but it often rhymes.”
1.
2.
3.
Utility of Scenario Planning (Developed by Peter Schwartz):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Planners can easily misuse this tool. This is not a crystal ball. It
generates options for planning- it does not make predictions.
Can become a source of Anchoring Bias; could prevent planners from
seeing indicators of differing situations than anticipated.
Black Swans are not anticipated. Scenario planning probably only
captures white and grey swans (known-unknowns), especially if
conducted prior to executing design for an environment.
Use scenario planning as a tool to structure and analyze potential situations in the future for which military forces could be used (5-10 yrs)
We see the most utility in that it generates discourse with Senior Leaders; reveals indicators for events that require preparation and action.
Merges well with Design’s conceptual planning…works as a potential intermediate step between conceptual and detailed planning (this
way scenario planning is based off of a much more understood environment).
Can be used to reinforce the existing planning progress—both to develop branch plans within an existing OPLAN when we are already
committed to a COA, or provides the impetus, based on current indicators, to get increased resourcing (such as increased funding) to
execute plan/branch plan
Generates options that reflect logic, not just wild speculation about the future; but also avoids the mentality of dealing only with “knownknowns” of the future. Scenario Planning process could be used in the context of an OODA LOOP (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act).
OP Art Evolution over Time
Environmental Progress:
internal/external
happenings—social,
political, technology,
military systems, doctrine,
competitors, enemies
1700s
FUTURE
What did I learn about operational art in using this process?
Seeing that scenario planning cannot predict all events that could
occur in the future, military forces must maintain the flexibility to
address the wide range of events that may arise. On the same token,
operational art must maintain the creative flexibility and iterative
process that allows planners the freedom to best conceptualize and
develop operations to handle a wide spectrum of operations.
In light of scenario planning and the entire SAMS course, I see that
our views and definition of OP ART need to continue to evolve based on
environmental context, just as it has since the 1700s. Understanding
scenario planning allows us to know we must not become bound to a
system of conducting war just because it works today. **Every era
probably thought they had the optimal solution with regard to “op art”
or their view on “strategic-tactical” matters.
Thus, just as scenario development helps us generate options for the
future, so too must we continue to refine the way we view and
implement what we call operational art today.
EXAMPLE:
High Corruption
Legitimate Economy
Prosperity
High Violence
Low Violence
This model features an improving
Mexican legitimate economy with a
booming illicit commodity- violence
will increase as Mexico buys more
security capabilities while drug
cartels can also purchase more
lethal hardware and
mercenaries/influence.
This model features an improving
Mexican legal economy with a
declining illicit economy; positive
feed-back loops funnel greater
security resources against a
diminishing rival criminal
enterprise. Best possible future
scenario.
Illicit
Economy Prosperity
Illicit
Economy Entropy
This model features a booming illicit
commodity with a declining legal
economy. With limited resources
for security costs, Mexico will lose
legitimacy and face state failure
without outside intervention. Cartel
growth and robust black markets
will hasten this collapse.
High Corruption
High Violence
Low Corruption
This model features a declining
legal and illegal economy in Mexico.
With less legal enterprise options
and no rival illicit economy, Mexico
will slide into a collapsed state
condition where extreme poverty
occurs. Violence will be moderate
due to limited illicit options.
Legitimate Economy
Entropy
High Corruption
Moderate Violence
32. What trends will influence the future operating
environment? How will these trends affect operations in the next
5-10 years
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
JOE-Trends may suggest possibilities and potential directions, but they are unreliable for understanding the future because
they interact with and are influenced by other factors. Trend analysis is the most fragile element of forecasting
Trends are non-linear and are part of a larger system
JP 1-02 operational environment — A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the
employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander
Global Trends 2025: Global Multipolar system, shift in relative wealth and economic power, energy crisis, climate change,
resource shortfalls, regional instability, emergence of China/India/Russia, increased terrorism and weapons proliferation
JOE-Nature vs Character of war
– globalization, pandemics, economic shifts, energy crisis, climate change, resource shortages, cyber, space
JOC-irregular warfare/irregular threats continue to evolve-target non state actors and leverage IA, long term involvement vs
decisive victory, target threat as well as governance, RoL, Eco development-security cooperation
ACC-Future threat-conventional/unconventional and will target our vulnerabilities-comms, surveillance, precision fires,
mobility, armor; will target will of Am. People, US Forces will be limited by air and sealift capabilities and budget/
concerned with demographic shifts, climate change, pandemics and HADR, food and water shortages, shifting eco patterns,
cyber and space conflict
AOC: types of enemies: existing military powers with advanced technology, terrorist groups, insurgents, militias, cartels, IR
forces, increased antiaccess capabilities by state and nonstate actors, enemy use of complex/urban terrain, increased use of
technology by nonstate actors, adaptation to counter our strengths, WMD
Biddle-Military Power-Force Structure v Technology-Policy and Strategy must evolve, RMA v evolution, budgetary
constraints, Joint Campaign Assessment must evolve to embrace current/future tech, LETHALITY & ADAPTABILITY
Group discussion-arc of instability, robotics, regional instability, is conventional war becoming extinct, CAM and WAS
War shaped by DIME-T and IR/ECO Theories-the cultural /strategic context
Trends help identify areas of concern, areas to be monitored, areas or issues that may require a response-impacts Strategy,
R&D, DOTMLPF, defines the capabilities required by the armed forces
• (EX) 33. FM 3-0 described lethal actions as critical to accomplishing
offensive and defensive missions while stability and civil support operations
emphasized nonlethal, constructive actions. ADP 3-0 departs from this
philosophy, stating that “lethality is the foundation for effective offensive,
defensive, and stability operations,” and that “lethality is a persistent
requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the
implicit threat of violence is sufficient to accomplish the mission through
non-lethal engagements and activities.” What are the implications of this
philosophical shift in planning and preparing forces for operations?
See figure 3-3 in FM 3-0; FSO are always combinations of offensive, defensive and stability operations.
What changes is the preponderance of one type of operation within the context of a specific OE. Based
on this understanding, ADP 3-0 does not reflect a change in thinking so much as an explicit recognition
that military forces cannot sever their connection to force and violence: lethality is always at least
implicit. The only implication is thus that violence or the threat of violence must always be considered in
the planning of operations. This is the case for two reasons:
1)Violence or it's threat are key enablers within a mission set. Non-lethal capability is not sufficient
reason for military employment. If non-lethal capabilities are truly sufficient, a nation can contract such
assets. It is the need for security that prompts use of the military instrument.
2)Violence or it's threat may hinder the accomplishment of national objectives. If lethality is always part
and parcel of a military force, planners must be aware of how this essential nature changes the
environment. Often, steps must be taken to reduce the perception of lethality in order to accomplish
tasks. This can only be the case if lethality is inseparable from military forces.
Question 36 (EX)
Both JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 identify a thorough mission analysis as crucial
to planning. Explain the primary purpose of mission analysis and
describe how JOPP differs from MDMP during the mission analysis
phase. What are the command and control implications of these
differences? Would a brief to your division commander using MDMP
be different than a brief to the SECDEF or CJCS using JOPP?
Question 36. (EX) Both JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 identify a thorough mission analysis as crucial to planning. Explain the primary purpose of mission analysis and describe how JOPP
differs from MDMP during the mission analysis phase. What are the command and control implications of these differences? Would a brief to your division commander using
MDMP be different than a brief to the SECDEF or CJCS using JOPP?
Purpose
FM 5-0 The commander and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the
situation and problem, and identify what the command must accomplish, when and
where it must be done, and most importantly why – the purpose of the operation.
(Pg. B-6)
JP 5-0 Mission analysis helps the Joint Force Commander (JFC) understand the
problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the
rest of the planning process. (Pg. IV-4)
Differences in Mission Analysis
Command and Control Implications
The big difference is that JOPP must account for a much broader scope and purpose
than MDMP – it incorporates civilian strategic guidance, a greater number of
stakeholders (JIIM), force planning (RFFs), strategic deployment, and a distinct
approval process (APEX IPRs, see below). Some of the discrete differences in mission
analysis are:
1) JOPP includes a step to “Develop Mission Success Criteria” this can be linked
either to the overall mission or phase/major operation within a campaign
(transitions/assessments).
2)Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) vs
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), procedurally JIPOE is done
separately and is an input to JOPP MA / IPB is done within MDMP MA. Additionally,
the relative purpose, focus, and level of detail also differ. JIPOE is broader,
purposefully systemic/holistic, includes strategic & operational COGs, and looks to
determine enemy military COAs. MDMP seeks the detail necessary to counter enemy
CONOPS.
3) INTEL, In JOPP the J2 staff estimate produced in MA addresses the ability to
produce Annex B and the entire integrated INTEL operation/support plan. In MDMP,
where assets are already known, MA develops an ISR plan and synchronization tools.
The most significant implication for command and control between the two
processes stems from the fact that in JOPP the planning JFHQ may not have
allocated forces or established command authorities.
1) In a JIMM (Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational) environment
developing command relationships is a much more complicated (& possible
complex) undertaking. There are more stakeholders (ex. USMC who want MAGTF
OPCON to MARFOR vice a Land Component Command, non-DoD agencies, and
coalition/allied partners). Some negotiation may be required.
2) A Combatant Command has the option to create subordinate Joint Task Forces, an
option not available to service commands using MDMP.
3) Typically in HQs using MDMP units are allocated from a higher HQ with
established command relationships/authorities (ex. OPCON, TACON,
Supporting/Supported).
4) For Control, interoperability is more complicated in a JIIM environment.
Would a brief to your division commander using MDMP be different than a brief to the SecDef/CJCS using JOPP?
Of course. SecDef is like the honey badger – he doesn’t care about your happy weather & light data, or your interpretation of specified & implied tasks. Aslo, SecDef typically
doesn’t have the time to check your homework and review 157 slides. More importantly, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) uses the Adaptive Planning and
Execution System (APEX) to accomplish joint planning. APEX uses a series of formalized In-progress Reviews (IPRs) to structure dialogue between Joint Force Commanders
(JFCs) and higher headquarters. They are part of the plan review and approval process. The IPRs are A (Strategic Guidance), C (Concept Development), F (Plan Approval), and
R (Plan Assessment). IPRs can be iterative (ex. Multiple IPR As to develop the strategic guidance). Additionally, the CJCS/Joint Staff will specify the level of planning detail for
the plan under consideration. A Level 1 plan is a commander’s estimate, a Level 2 plan is a Base Plan (BPLAN – CONOPS, without annexes or TPFDD), a Level 3 Plan is Concept
Plan (CONPLAN – BPLAN+ plan summary + Annexes A,B,C,D,J,K,S,V,Z / may also include TPFDD/Annex E for a Level 3-T Plan), a Level 4 Plan is an OPLAN (a complete and
detailed Joint plan with annexes and TPFDD). Briefings to SecDef/CJCS will be influenced by the IPR schedule, level of planning detail required, and time available. All of
these factors will cause significant variation from a typical MDMP brief.
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