Blossom by blossom the spring
begins--and bursts forth into allergies, sniffles, and the last flushes
of flu across the land. Several ASRS reporters affected by these and
other seasonal maladies share their stories of how the autopilot played
a (mostly) saving role in their flights. We begin with an air taxi pilots
drowsy experience aloft.

VFR flight
at 3,000 feet to avoid headwinds. I had been up all night with the
flu and was more tired than I thought. The autopilot was on and was
going direct [using] GPS. I fell asleep about 40 miles out and woke
up 15 minutes later over the airport. I did not know what to do or
who to call, so I deviated to a lower altitude. I circled to the south
of the airport, at which point I made a call to Approach Control,
received a clearance for Runway 27 and landed without any trouble.
I spoke to nobody about this incident. Approach, Tower, and Ground
Control made no comment to me at any time. Cause--flying while ill
and tired--resulted in falling asleep. Remedy--being more cautious
about health concerns and not flying if needed.

This reporter was lucky that
ATC didn't get upset over the unauthorized penetration of Class B and
D airspace. His remedy is on target, and we hope he and others will
practice it in the future.

A
General Aviation pilot sensitive to sun exposure took the precaution
of applying a sunscreen lotion before flying over a desert area. But
as the cockpit became warm, he started to perspire. Then began a horrific
experience:

At 7,500
feet on a heading to the East...my eyes started reacting in a very
violent way to the sun lotion that I had applied to my face prior
to takeoff. The allergic reaction resulted in at least 5-8 minutes
of total blindness. I just managed to set the autopilot on a heading
away from the high terrain to the East. On partial recovery of sight,
I found that I had intruded into a [Restricted Area].

During a callback conversation
with an ASRS analyst, the reporter stated that when the sunscreen lotion
ran into his eyes, he experienced sharp pains and loss of vision in
both eyes. Fortunately, he was able to put the aircraft on autopilot.
The reporter recalled that he had placed a can of soda in the cockpit.
He managed to find the soda and pour it on one eye, while wiping the
eye with a tissue until it became usable. He ran out of soda, but then
saw a container of water, which he used to clean the other eye. After
he had recovered his sight, he checked his position and discovered that
he had overflown a turn point and was now inside a Restricted Area.
He called the Center controller, who vectored him clear and on course.

According to the reporter,
on the back of the sunscreen container--in fine print--was a warning
to avoid eye contact with the contents. He told ASRS that he remembered
reading the warning before the flight, but never considered the possibility
of perspiration causing eye contact with the sunscreen lotion ingredients.
The reporter felt that there should be a stronger and more complete
warning on the container. He knew of another pilot who had a similar
experience, using the same sunscreen lotion.

Schnooked
by the Schnozzle

The late Jimmy ("The
Schnozz") Durante might have appreciated this report from a Captain
with a new First Officer on board, who found that sneezing at the wrong
time had unforeseen consequences:

I was
doing IOE [Initial Operating Experience] with a new First Officer.
I had turned off the Flight Director and autoflight systems except
autothrottle was engaged. Cleared altitude was FL220. Approaching
level-off with normal rate of climb I had a violent sneeze. I was
unable to lower the nose promptly for level-off. Maximum altitude
reached...was 22,300. While descending. TCAS II gave us an RA [Resolution
Advisory].

The autopilot was unfortunately
disengaged before the Captain's "nose over," which led to
the altitude bust and traffic conflict.

"...And
I was the April Fool"

A report from a Captain having
a really bad day:

Tower
cleared me for takeoff and maintain visual separation with crossing
traffic. (Confused), I read back position and hold, because I couldn't
yet see the traffic and I wasn't sure I'd heard clearly "Cleared
for takeoff."

[After takeoff], contacting Departure, I got 7,000 feet and runway
heading. But when I got to the normal turn point, I turned. Departure
caught it and turned me back to runway heading. Then a turn to intercept
a radial, and I turned too far and overshot. While doing this, I climbed
through 7,000 feet. At 7,200 feet, bless their forgiving hearts, they
cleared me to 17,000.

Fatigue, a dash of distraction, and I was the April Fool. Thanks to
a busy ATC for being on the ball and keeping me out of trouble.

SID
Issues in International Flights

U.S. flight crews operating
outside the country often face a number of different operating procedures.
A frequent subject of ASRS reports involving foreign locations is the
misreading of arrival or departure procedures, especially when the chart
depictions are similar. An example reported to ASRS is the similarity
between four SIDs for Frankfurt, Germany. Although the names and numbers
of the SIDs have changed since the following report was submitted, the
issue is still relevant. Here, the Captain of a widebody jet made the
assumption that the two Runway 7 SIDs would have the same ground track,
just as the two Runway 25 SIDs did.

We were
flight-planned for the NAPIT 3G departure [for Runway 25]. Prior to
taxi out, the wind shifted in favor of Runway 7, so we were cleared
for the NAPIT 3D. The First Officer loaded the NAPIT 3E SID. I noticed
this, reviewed the SID, and saw the note about the "D" designation
being for heavy aircraft. I did not see the verbal description for
the NAPIT 3D. I thought the ground track for the SIDs was the same.
We took off and flew the NAPIT 3E.

After turning north at 1.5 DME, Departure Control asked if we had
started our turn. We replied affirmative, and he immediately gave
us clearance [further east]. We were then given a heading to intercept
and continue the 3D SID.

I had flown the NAPIT 3G many times, and...there is no difference
in the ground track from the NAPIT 3F, so I did not look closely enough
at the plate for the difference [between the 3D and 3E SIDs].

Since the SID graphic and
accompanying descriptive text may not be on the same page, thorough
review of charts and their related text is the best defense against
deviations from published departure procedures.

Last
Tango in Zurich

Misunderstanding of clearances
and instructions is a common problem for English-speaking crews operating
in countries where English is not the native language, as another Captain
reports:

After
departing the gate at Zurich, we received an entire new clearance
SID. We verified the new routing and manually loaded the new flight
plan. We were given the ZURICH 5E SID. We were told [to fly to] the
ZURICH EAST VOR, out to TANGO, climb to FL080 [8,000 ft].

The crew apparently started
to follow these instructions, turning north toward TANGO after the VOR.
Then...

The Controller
gave us a vector, and said we were supposed to go to ALAGO, then TANGO
[that is, further east before turning north]. What he had really said
[in the new clearance] was, "ZURICH, ALAGO, TANGO," not
"ZURICH, and out to TANGO."

The clearance as the crew
understood it was not in accordance with the published procedure, which
should have been a heads-up to question ATC about the instructions.
Following the incorrect headings, particularly in IMC, could have put
the flight at an unsafe altitude in this mountainous terrain.

The
Transition Altitude Challenge

Outside North America, the
altitude at which pilots transition from indicated altitude to pressure
altitude is variable. Above this Transition Altitude, the term "Flight
Level" (FL) is used. In most of Europe, the Transition Altitude
is between 4,000 and 6,000 feet MSL, but in some areas, it ranges from
as low as 3,000 to as high as 7,000 feet.

In the following report from
an air carrier First Officer on a European flight, the unfamiliar, nonstandard
Transition Altitude added to the distractions of an inexperienced crew
attempting a very complicated departure procedure.

This SID
is no problem for a glass cockpit, but requires a lot of support on
[this non-glass aircraft]. Takeoff Runway 24, track 240 degrees to
3.8 NM on VOR #1, turn left to 226 degrees, track to intercept a radial
outbound on VOR #2 to 19 nm, to begin turn just prior to ADF #1, passing
abeam of it above 3,000 feet, to intercept and track out the 331 degree
radial of ADF #1 until intercepting and tracking outbound of VOR #3,
contacting Departure Control at 2,000 feet, transition altitude of
3,000 feet, climb limit of FL060.

The Captain had just a few departures out of here; the Flight Engineer
had never been out of here before. We thoroughly briefed the departure
earlier, then in detail again as we were taking the runway. The SID
also prescribes a maximum of 220 knots in the turns, which alters
our after-takeoff clean-up.

I made the 1,000-foot callout ("5,000 feet for 6,000 feet")
at about 5,200 feet and realized that the Captain had not yet called
Departure Control (which was required at 2,000 feet). By the time
he made contact, I was leveling at 6,000 feet, and ATC was requesting
we check our Mode C. We were still at an altimeter setting of about
29.58 inches instead of the required 29.92 at 3,000 feet, so we were
about 300 feet high. I corrected back to FL060.
In spite of thorough briefings--twice--the Captain and I both missed
the frequency change at 2,000 feet and the altimeter setting at 3,000
feet.

The reporter emphasizes that
in the future, he will use the autopilot, especially when flying with
crew members who are unfamiliar with this complex departure.