BTW, as I've already mentioned, a bomb placed up a person's rectum has been used in an assassination attempt, while rumors abound regarding explosive breast implants.

Why was this? Because existing security measures forced the terrorists to use more exotic and difficult techniques to try to circumvent them. The more exotic and difficult, the greater the chance they fail or are intercepted prior to the attempt. The more they fail, the harder it is to recruit, as there is no reward from allah for dying in a supermax prison of old age.

"Get the vast, ineffective, bumbling, autocratic TSA out of the picture and let private firms run security as they are all ready doing at other airports with measurably better results."

Do you mean the private contractors that are supervised and regulated by TSA in some airports today, or the pre-9/11 contractors that were minimum wage employees, many with felony convictions and/or illegal aliens?

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta has probably dreaded thumbing through his press clippings. Day after day, it seems, journalists highlight every hole in the country's airport security system and each lapse by airport screeners. Last month, the media had a field day reporting that Argenbright Security Inc., one of the nation's largest screening firms, had hired convicted felons and illegal aliens. And then there was the startling story about how one airline passenger--who said he had forgotten he was carrying a loaded gun--had slipped through the security checkpoint in New Orleans. On October 30, Mineta finally had had enough. At a transportation security summit, he announced that the Federal Aviation Administration would begin to crack down on all security lapses. If secure airport areas are breached, he said, the FAA will immediately stop flights, empty the concourse, and rescreen all passengers. In addition, if the FAA finds untrained or incompetent screeners, officials will order a similar rescreening process.

"I want consistent accountability," he told summit participants. "I want confidence restored in the screening system, and the way to accomplish that goal under the current system is to know that when people fail to meet the current requirements, it is going to sting."

And that hasn't been a hollow promise. In the past several days, the FAA has taken the following actions:

■Delayed seven flights and ordered more than 1,000 passengers to pass through security a second time at the American Airlines concourse at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport after agents discovered that one screener wasn't using a metal-detector wand. ■Demanded a recheck of nearly 500 Vanguard Airlines passengers at Kansas City International Airport, because a screener didn't have the appropriate training and wasn't being supervised. ■Shut down the Southwest Airlines concourse at Baltimore/Washington International Airport when a female passenger breached security. ■And perhaps most notably, Mineta announced that the FAA will retrain all of the screeners at Chicago O'Hare International Airport--and possibly levy a large fine against United Air Lines--after a man carrying several knives, a can of pepper spray, and a stun gun was able to pass through the security checkpoint as he tried to board a United flight. Mineta called the security breach "a failure of dramatic dimensions." Yet what is most striking about the FAA's new crackdown is that it is such a stark departure from the apparently cozy relationship that the agency has had with airlines and airport security firms. The Los Angeles Times recently reported, for example, that the FAA has previously tipped off security companies about upcoming inspections and has also discouraged its agents from pursuing enforcement cases. Moreover, airlines have successfully scuttled past recommendations to improve airport security. Scott Brenner, the FAA's assistant administrator for public affairs, admits that the agency hasn't been as tough on security matters in the past, because security screening has always been a responsibility of the airlines, not the federal government. Still, he disputes the notion that the FAA is some sort of lackey to the airline industry. When it comes to airplane safety and design, he contends, the FAA and the industry have worked well together. "Our safety record is unmatched," he said.

Brenner believes that the FAA crackdown will produce some beneficial side effects. For starters, he said, it will force the airlines and the security firms to make needed improvements in their security procedures. Indeed, Argenbright--the firm responsible for the lapse at O'Hare--said this week that it was implementing new security measures that go "above and beyond current FAA regulations."

Forcing these kinds of improvements, Brenner says, is particularly important, since no one knows how long it will take Congress to finalize legislation transferring some or all of the responsibility for security screening to the federal government. Furthermore, the FAA hopes that the tough crackdown will help restore the public's confidence in the nation's aviation system.

Of course, shutting down concourses and delaying flights just because one screener forgets to frisk a passenger with a metal-detector wand will certainly hurt airlines' bottom lines, which are already in trouble. But, at least for now, airlines say they support the FAA's tougher stance.

"We wholeheartedly share the Secretary's concerns," said Michael Wascom, the spokesman for the Air Transport Association, which represents the major U.S. airlines. "Ignorance or incompetence is no excuse."

Southwest Airlines agrees. "We realize it is an inconvenience to our customers," said spokeswoman Beth Harbin. "[But] your average person--because it is about security--believes that it is well worth it."

Yet one airline lobbyist wonders how long the public will put up with constant shutdowns and delays caused by security lapses. "You can't travel freely in this country and ... not [find] some holes [in security]. There always will be holes," the lobbyist said.

But since September 11, with Americans skittish about aviation safety and security, the holes in the system have become magnified.

"We never tolerated them before, and we certainly don't tolerate them now," said Southwest's Harbin. "Unfortunately, they've just taken on a different level now."

I'd also start talking to the American people like adults, rather than treating them like sheep, telling them that we live in a violent world with violent people and that it is not possible to anticipate or address all possible threats, and indeed that attempts to do so in fact play in to the hands of our enemies as those measures create the exact kinds of disruptions our enemies intended.

Remember how after 9/11, much of the parking close to ther Terminals was closed as an anti-VBIED precaution, forcing the statistically fattest population in the world to walk some distance before reaching automated walkways and Cinnabuns? That went away after 6 months or so, because of public complaints.

As far as disruptions our enemies intended? Standing in line and getting searched is way too subtle for our enemies. Mass body counts are what they want, not sniveling inconveniences.

"I would make the actuarial point that the amount of time currently spent in line awaiting security theater performances greatly exceeds the number of life hours lost in past attacks and so some sort of rational benefit/risk assessment has to come into play as it does in all other activities from driving to walking into a 7/11 at night."

Past attacks, what of future attacks? Did the global jihad end when OBL had his fate SeAL'ed? How many more successful aviation attacks would push people into cars? How many airline would we have left after more 9/11s? In your vision of aviation security, or lack thereof, does the airline that has minimal or no screening have any civil or criminal liability for successful mass casualty attacks using their aircraft? How expensive is their liability insurance going to be? How expensive would it be to insure skyscrapers in NYC or other major cities in this scenario?

"As that may be, is it safe to assume you have no issue with 250 Americans dying a month directly due to TSA's onerous and ineffective measures? If so, how many Americans are too many to kill to keep Americans safe?"

How many died driving when all US aviation was shut down after 9/11? How many more would die if we had successful attacks on a regular basis, both directly and indirectly?

What exactly would your screening program look like, if you ran the TSA?

Anti-tax promoter Grover Norquist is losing his vice-like grip on the Republican party. The head of Americans for Tax Reform, who as recently as last year counted 238 members of the House and 41 members of the Senate among those who had signed his anti-tax pledge, has seen those numbers decline to 217 in the House, one shy of the 218 needed for a majority, and 39 in the Senate.

Both totals represent an all-time low. Last Wednesday, Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) disavowed his pledge not to raise taxes, even as he acknowledged doing so could hurt his reelection chances in 2014. ”I don’t worry about that because I care too much about my country,” he said. “I care a lot more about it than I do Grover Norquist.” Americans might not like seeing their taxes go up, but Grover Norquist’s fall from grace has its benefits: As he goes down, so goes his pro-Islamist agenda.

That agenda was laid bare by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) in a speech on the House floor, October 4, 2011. “My conscience has compelled me to come to the floor today to voice concerns I have with the influence Grover Norquist, the president of Americans for Tax Reform, has on the political process in Washington,” said Wolf. “My issue is not with ATR’s goal of keeping taxes low ... My concern is with the other individuals, groups and causes with whom Mr. Norquist is associated that have nothing to do with keeping taxes low.”

In 2004, Alamoudi, one of the most prominent and influential Muslim Brothers in the United States, was sentenced to 23 years in prison for supporting terror. Alamoudi, a self-described supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, had cultivated ties with the Clinton White House that eventually enabled him and his associates to select, train and certify Muslim chaplains for the U.S. military.

Fearing a loss by Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election, Alamoudi befriended Norquist to ensure his access to senior levels of the U.S. government would be maintained if Republicans took charge. He gave Norquist $20,000 to establish the Islamic Free Market Institute and Alamoudi’s longtime deputy, Khaled Saffuri, became the founding director.

Norquist and Saffuri eventually became an integral part of the Bush administration’s Muslim outreach efforts during the 2000 campaign, with Saffuri named as Muslim Outreach Coordinator. During that campaign, Bush was also introduced to Sami Al-Arian. In 2006, Al-Arian was sentenced to 57 months in prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to provide support to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

Wolf illuminated the bigger picture of that relationship, noting that Norquist was an “outspoken supporter of Al-Arian’s effort to end the use of classified evidence in terror trials.”

Al-Arian ran the National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom (NCPPF), and Norquist supported their efforts to weaken or repeal the Patriot Act as well, despite the terrorist atrocities perpetrated on 9/11.

Wolf also revealed that Norquist “was scheduled to lead a delegation to the White House on September 11, 2001, that included a convicted felon and some who would later be identified by federal law enforcement as suspected terrorist financiers.” One of the members of that delegation was Omar Ahmed, co-founder of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). CAIR was named an un-indicted co-conspirator when the Holy Land Foundation was convicted of sending million of dollars in funding to Hamas and other Islamic terrorist organizations.

Another relationship Norquist cultivated was with Suhail Khan, who has ties to a variety of Islamist movements. Khan’s father, the late Mahboob Khan, was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of the founders of the Muslim Students Association (MSA), whose anti-Semitic activities at American colleges has been documented on numerous occasions, including their latest attempt to organize a divestment campaign against Israel at the University of California, Irvine.

In 2007, Norquist promoted Suhail Khan’s candidacy for election to the American Conservative Union’s (ACU) board of directors. He was subsequently appointed. In 2012, at an irregular meeting of that organization, the board voted to dismiss accusations made against both Khan and Norquist by Frank Gaffney, head of the Center for Security Policy and a former defense official in the Reagan administration.

Gaffney has been hammered by the ACU and others for suggesting that the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood reached the highest levels of the U.S. government despite the reality that it was Gaffney who drew attention to Abdurahman Alamoudi and Sami Al-Arian, both of whom ended up as convicted felons for their terrorist activity. Yet it is Gaffney’s credibility that has been called into question for daring to draw attention to Norquist’s unseemly activity.

Wolf also pointed out that Norquist was “an outspoken advocate for moving Guantanamo Bay detainees to the United States,” and “led a public campaign to undermine Republican-led efforts to block the Obama Administration’s transfer of 9/11 mastermind Khaled Sheik Mohammed to New York City” in 2009.

In 2010, Norquist inserted himself into the Ground Zero Mosque controversy, which he characterized as a “Monica Lewinsky ploy,” distracting from the core Republican message heading into the 2010 elections. Yet according to Wolf, Norquist “used Americans for Tax Reform to circulate a petition in support of the ‘Ground Zero Mosque’” completely undermining his own contention that the issue was a distraction.

For years, Grover Norquist’s reputation as a staunch anti-tax advocate has overshadowed his dubious associations with Islamists, and anyone who has dared to criticize him for those associations has drawn rebuke from both sides of the aisle.

Thus, it is more than a little ironic that his ability to influence Republicans with respect to taxes is waning, even as Islamists, most notably Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, who are attempting to establish a dictatorship in Egypt, are becoming ever more powerful.

Sen. Chambliss isn’t the only Republican distancing himself from Norquist. House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-OH) has referred to him as “some random person.” Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) noted that “fewer and fewer people are signing this, quote, pledge.” Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK.) called the pledge a “tortured vision of tax purity.” House newcomer Rep. Ted Yoho, (R-FL), who declined to sign the pledge, was sarcastic. “I’ll pledge allegiance to the flag. I’ll pledge to be faithful to my wife,” he quipped.

Yet it was Rep. Peter King (R-NY) who best summed up the growing rebellion. “A pledge is good at the time you sign it,” he said. “In 1941, I would have voted to declare war on Japan. But each Congress is a new Congress. And I don’t think you can have a rule that you’re never going to raise taxes or that you’re never going to lower taxes. I don’t want to rule anything out.”

Republicans can resist raising taxes without signing a pledge should they choose to do so for the good of the nation. Yet without the pledge Grover Norquist has long wielded like a hammer, his leverage among Republicans is precipitously diminished. Considering his dubious ties to Islamists and their agenda, that’s more than a reasonable tradeoff.

If you thought President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder had given up on closing Guantanamo Bay and bringing jihadists to American soil, think again. Two troubling developments on the Gitmo front should have every American on edge.

The first White House maneuver took place in October, while much of the public and the media were preoccupied with election news. On Oct. 2, Obama's cash-strapped Illinois pals announced that the federal government bought out the Thomson Correctional Center in western Illinois for $165 million. According to Watchdog.org, a recent appraisal put the value of the facility at $220 million.

Democratic Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin led the lobbying campaign for the deal, along with Illinois Democratic Gov. Pat Quinn, who is overseeing an overall $43 billion state budget deficit and scraping for every available penny. The Thomson campus has been an empty Taj Mahal for more than a decade because profligate state officials had no money for operations. Economic development gurus (using the same phony math of federal stimulus peddlers) claim the newly federalized project will bring in $1 billion.

Durbin told a local Illinois paper that "the decision to move ahead came directly from President Barack Obama" and that he had secured the green light during a discussion on Air Force One earlier in the spring. But this gift to Obama's Illinois homeboys wasn't just a run-of-the-mill campaign favor.

Obama's unilateral and unprecedented decision steamrolled over bipartisan congressional opposition to the purchase. That opposition dates back to 2009, when the White House first floated the idea of using Thomson to house jihadi enemy combatants detained in Cuba. As you may recall, the scheme caused a national uproar. Rep. Frank Wolf, R-Va., chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing the Justice Department's budget, blocked the administration from using unspent DOJ funds for the deal. With bipartisan support, Congress passed a law barring the transfer of Gitmo detainees to Thomson or any other civilian prison.

The message was clear: Taxpayers don't want manipulative Gitmo detainees or their three-ring circuses of transnationalist sympathizers and left-wing lawyers on American soil. Period.

But when this imperial presidency can't get its way in the court of public opinion, it simply circumvents the deliberative process. As Wolf noted: The shady deal "directly violates the clear objection of the House Appropriations Committee and goes against the bipartisan objections of members in the House and Senate, who have noted that approving this request would allow Thomson to take precedence over previously funded prisons in Alabama, Mississippi, West Virginia and New Hampshire."

Obama and his Illinois gang insist that Thomson will not become Gitmo North. But denial is more than a river in the Muslim Brotherhood's homeland.

The 9/11 Families for a Safe and Strong America, which spearheaded the movement against shipping jihadi detainees to the mainland, exposed the fine print of the Obama DOJ's deal with the state of Illinois. The purpose of the Thomson facility acquisition, according to the DOJ notice filed in the D.C. courts, included this clause:

"... as well as to provide humane and secure confinement of individuals held under authority of any Act of Congress, and such other persons as in the opinion of the Attorney General of the United States are proper subjects for confinement in such institutions."

Guess whom that covers? Yup: Gitmo detainees, who are being held under the 2001 congressional act known as the Authorization for Use of Military Force.

Now, bear all this in mind as you consider the second and more recent Gitmo gambit. On Wednesday, in response to a whistleblowing report from Fox News homeland security reporter Catherine Herridge, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., released a General Accounting Office report exploring the feasibility of transferring the Gitmo gang to civilian prisons.

Lo and behold, Feinstein concluded, the report "demonstrates that if the political will exists, we could finally close Guantanamo without imperiling our national security."

The "political will" does not exist now, nor has it ever. But thanks to Obama's sneaky, back-door misappropriation of government funds to buy Thomson, the feds have exactly what they need to fulfill the progressive-in-chief's Gitmo closure promise: a shiny, turnkey palace in crony land tailor-made for union workers, lawyers and terror plotters to call their new home.

These could go in many different threads, but I want to keep them together. I think this is the best individual thread for them. Guro, of course, feel free to place them as needed on other threads (or direct if you wish).

"After the terrorist bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the Clinton administration launched cruise missiles against suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan, hoping bin Laden was there. If the missiles had killed him, would this have been improper? In March 2003, in the hours before the invasion of Iraq, the George W. Bush administration, thinking it knew where Saddam Hussein was, launched a cruise-missile strike against one of his compounds. Was it wrong to try to economize violence by decapitating his regime? Would it have been morally preferable to attempt this by targeting, with heavy bombing, not a person but his neighborhood? Surely not."

"It is irresponsible to concede that America is engaged in an "undefined war with a limitless battlefield," in part because both claims are false. Constitutionally, the so-called War on Terrorism is defined by the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which Obama is arguably exceeding, and I very much doubt Will really believe the battlefield to be limitless. Does he think Obama is empowered on no authority but his own to order a drone strike in Beijing? London? How about San Francisco? To grant Yoo's framing is often to concede dictatorial power to the president without quite realizing the sweep of the precedent you've unwittingly set. "

"Yoo ought to understand why that is so. He's the sort of complacent lawyer that power-hungry leaders rely upon when they want to torture or spy without warrants or extrajudicially kill in secret. The monopoly on force that the state enjoys, the tremendous power wielded by its functionaries, the incentives to target political enemies, and the frequency with which abuses occur are all reasons why restraining official use of this technology ought to be an urgent priority. There's also the reality that, whatever the future brings, government use of drones is now much more common."

"It’s a decade-long story that Josh Begley believes too few Americans know about. A story, he says, “that fundamentally shifts how we understand what war is.” It’s the story of unmanned drones redefining the front lines in the U.S. War on Terror. And a story of Apple—one of the most powerful and profitable corporations in the world—rejecting Begley’s iPhone application that maps strikes and alerts users to new attacks as they happen."

Quote:Iran has infiltrated a team of Quds Force terrorist leaders into the United States to attack from within in 2013, according to a source.

The source within the office of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic regime, said the team is to create instability in America through terrorism should the U.S. fail to accept the regime’s illicit nuclear program, increase sanctions, confront Iran militarily or intervene in the Syrian civil war.

Members of the team, no more than 10 Quds Force officers, each lead cells totaling about 50 terrorists already in the U.S.

The source is risking his life not only to reveal the terror operation but to warn that Iran is pursuing its nuclear bomb program around the clock from several secret sites.

Details of the terror plot, meant to disrupt the West, have been passed on to U.S. officials, who are taking countermeasures.

The source said the team members, unlike the alleged Iranian operative Manssor Arbabsiar, who was arrested in a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, D.C. in 2011, are highly trained and sophisticated.

The team leaders are all senior Revolutionary Guard officers who were recruited for this specific mission nine years ago on the recommendation of the Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, and with the approval of security advisers to Khamenei.

Some of these individuals held high-level posts before joining the mission. One served as the security officer in the supreme leader’s office, another was a member of the special forces for intelligence and security in charge of protecting regime officials, two were in charge of security of ground and air transportation, another was a commander of recruiting assets, and others had experience in security and intelligence.

Most of the team members have been in America for a year; a few were successfully placed here about five years ago.

The families of the team members are financially supported by the regime, but team members are financially supported through various means as they do not maintain any contact with Iran.

Two wealthy Iranian businessmen in Iran with ties in Europe are used to finance the team; one routinely travels to the U.S.

One well-established Iranian businessman in America who often travels to Iran was approached by the Quds Force for his collaboration in return for incentives in Iran. He acts as the sponsor of the team, transfers cash to team members, hosts meetings at his residence and passes on information from the regime to the team. He also takes care of any legal issues, leases, contracts and such.

Information and pictures of potential targets have been submitted for Khamenei’s approval, the source added. They include high-voltage towers to create blackouts, cell towers, water supplies, public transportation and various other buildings belonging to the Defense Department and military.

The source said the planned attacks could be greater than what happened on 9/11 and that in the last phase of the attack, al-Qaida operatives will also be involved.

After Osama bin Laden’s death, Khamenei has taken a greater role in leadership on the collaboration with al-Qaida, and according to the source, four top al-Qaida commanders visit Khamenei every two months.

The plan is that if by next six months America does not accept Iran’s nuclear program and either increases sanctions or a military confrontation occurs, the assets have been ordered to carry out their mission. The regime feels it must act by then because current sanctions, which have already had a serious effect on Iran’s economy, could spark civilian rioting.

As reported in the Washington Times on Oct. 5, a secret memo by the regime’s Intelligence Ministry warned that deteriorating economic conditions from international sanctions had greatly increased the possibility of an uprising and urged them to take appropriate action.

The United States has set a March deadline for Iran to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency demands on its nuclear program or face much harsher measures.

The regime believes, the source said, that if the U.S. fails to accept Iran’s nuclear program, Israel will be much more likely to attack its nuclear facilities and military installations.

Previously an exclusive report in WND revealed that terror cells of the Islamic regime were on high alert to attack targets in America. Gen. Massoud Jazayeri, deputy head of Iran’s armed forces, stated that, “In the face of any attack, we will have a crushing response. In that case, we will not only act in the boundaries of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, no place in America will be safe from our attacks.”

Iranian officials also see the possible overthrow of Syrian President Bashar Assad as a red line, and with the looming confrontation over their nuclear program, they have taken several measures, one of which is to retaliate against Israel through several fronts and in coordination with their proxies, such as Hezbollah. As reported in WND, 170 ballistic missiles have been pre-targeted on Tel Aviv alone, some with biological warheads. And an attack on America from within would create economic havoc on the fragile U.S. economy.

The source warned that the IAEA has no idea that the Islamic regime is actively working on its nuclear bomb program at secret sites, that it has even enriched uranium to over 90 percent – weaponization grade – and that with the help of North Korea, it is working on a plutonium bomb.

The assumption that Iran is far from accomplishing its goals is a hoax, the source warned. The regime next year will make operational intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. Armed with nuclear weapons, it would be too late for the world, he said.

Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for a former CIA operative in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and author of the award-winning book “A Time to Betray” (Simon & Schuster, 2010). He serves on the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and the advisory board of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI).

Top U.S. intelligence officials gathered in the White House Situation Room in March to debate a controversial proposal. Counterterrorism officials wanted to create a government dragnet, sweeping up millions of records about U.S. citizens—even people suspected of no crime.

Not everyone was on board. "This is a sea change in the way that the government interacts with the general public," Mary Ellen Callahan, chief privacy officer of the Department of Homeland Security, argued in the meeting, according to people familiar with the discussions.

A week later, the attorney general signed the changes into effect.

MoreA Comparison of the 2008 and 2012 NCTC Guidelines

The NCTC Controversy -- A Timeline

DocumentsNCTC Guidelines – 2012

View Interactive

.NCTC Guidelines -- 2008

View Interactive

.Homeland Security Department Email about the NCTC Guidelines

View Interactive

Through Freedom of Information Act requests and interviews with officials at numerous agencies, The Wall Street Journal has reconstructed the clash over the counterterrorism program within the administration of President Barack Obama. The debate was a confrontation between some who viewed it as a matter of efficiency—how long to keep data, for instance, or where it should be stored—and others who saw it as granting authority for unprecedented government surveillance of U.S. citizens.

The rules now allow the little-known National Counterterrorism Center to examine the government files of U.S. citizens for possible criminal behavior, even if there is no reason to suspect them. That is a departure from past practice, which barred the agency from storing information about ordinary Americans unless a person was a terror suspect or related to an investigation.

Now, NCTC can copy entire government databases—flight records, casino-employee lists, the names of Americans hosting foreign-exchange students and many others. The agency has new authority to keep data about innocent U.S. citizens for up to five years, and to analyze it for suspicious patterns of behavior. Previously, both were prohibited. Data about Americans "reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information" may be permanently retained.

The changes also allow databases of U.S. civilian information to be given to foreign governments for analysis of their own. In effect, U.S. and foreign governments would be using the information to look for clues that people might commit future crimes.

"It's breathtaking" in its scope, said a former senior administration official familiar with the White House debate.

Counterterrorism officials say they will be circumspect with the data. "The guidelines provide rigorous oversight to protect the information that we have, for authorized and narrow purposes," said Alexander Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the parent agency for the National Counterterrorism Center.

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution says that searches of "persons, houses, papers and effects" shouldn't be conducted without "probable cause" that a crime has been committed. But that doesn't cover records the government creates in the normal course of business with citizens.

Congress specifically sought to prevent government agents from rifling through government files indiscriminately when it passed the Federal Privacy Act in 1974. The act prohibits government agencies from sharing data with each other for purposes that aren't "compatible" with the reason the data were originally collected.

Three Years of WSJ Privacy Insights The Wall Street Journal is conducting a long-running investigation into the profound transformation of personal privacy in America.

Selected findings:

Companies today are increasingly tying people's real-life identities to their online browsing habits.Two students are outed as gay—provoking a crisis within their families—by a Facebook privacy loophole . (10/12/12)Suspicious spouses are taking investigations into their own hands as snooping technologies become cheaper and easier to use. (10/6/12)Americans' license plates are now being tracked not only by the government, but also by repo men who hope to profit from the information. (10/2/12) Google bypassed the privacy settings on millions of Web browsers on Apple iPhones and computers— tracking the online activities of people who intended that kind of monitoring to be blocked. (2/17/12) The government follows the movements of thousands of Americans a year by secretly monitoring their cellphone records . (9/9/11) iPhone and Android apps secretly shared data about their users, a Journal investigation found. (12/10/10) Top apps on Facebook transmit personal identifying details to tracking companies, a Journal investigation found. (10/18/10) One of the fastest growing online businesses is that of spying on Americans as they browse the Web. (6/30/10) Plus, the global surveillance bazaar , a secretive phone-tracking "stingray" and RapLeaf's clever way of figuring out Web surfers' real names .See full privacy coverage .But the Federal Privacy Act allows agencies to exempt themselves from many requirements by placing notices in the Federal Register, the government's daily publication of proposed rules. In practice, these privacy-act notices are rarely contested by government watchdogs or members of the public. "All you have to do is publish a notice in the Federal Register and you can do whatever you want," says Robert Gellman, a privacy consultant who advises agencies on how to comply with the Privacy Act.

As a result, the National Counterterrorism Center program's opponents within the administration—led by Ms. Callahan of Homeland Security—couldn't argue that the program would violate the law. Instead, they were left to question whether the rules were good policy.

Under the new rules issued in March, the National Counterterrorism Center, known as NCTC, can obtain almost any database the government collects that it says is "reasonably believed" to contain "terrorism information." The list could potentially include almost any government database, from financial forms submitted by people seeking federally backed mortgages to the health records of people who sought treatment at Veterans Administration hospitals.

Previous government proposals to scrutinize massive amounts of data about innocent people have caused an uproar. In 2002, the Pentagon's research arm proposed a program called Total Information Awareness that sought to analyze both public and private databases for terror clues. It would have been far broader than the NCTC's current program, examining many nongovernmental pools of data as well.

"If terrorist organizations are going to plan and execute attacks against the United States, their people must engage in transactions and they will leave signatures," the program's promoter, Admiral John Poindexter, said at the time. "We must be able to pick this signal out of the noise."

Adm. Poindexter's plans drew fire from across the political spectrum over the privacy implications of sorting through every single document available about U.S. citizens. Conservative columnist William Safire called the plan a "supersnoop's dream." Liberal columnist Molly Ivins suggested it could be akin to fascism. Congress eventually defunded the program.

The National Counterterrorism Center's ideas faced no similar public resistance. For one thing, the debate happened behind closed doors. In addition, unlike the Pentagon, the NCTC was created in 2004 specifically to use data to connect the dots in the fight against terrorism.

Even after eight years in existence, the agency isn't well known. "We're still a bit of a startup and still having to prove ourselves," said director Matthew Olsen in a rare public appearance this summer at the Aspen Institute, a leadership think tank.

The agency's offices are tucked away in an unmarked building set back from the road in the woodsy suburban neighborhood of McLean, Va. Many employees are on loan from other agencies, and they don't conduct surveillance or gather clues directly. Instead, they analyze data provided by others.

The agency's best-known product is a database called TIDE, which stands for the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. TIDE contains more than 500,000 identities suspected of terror links. Some names are known or suspected terrorists; others are terrorists' friends and families; still more are people with some loose affiliation to a terrorist.

Intelligence officials met at the White House in March to discuss the NCTC proposal with John Brennan, the president's chief counterterrorism adviser.

TIDE files are important because they are used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to compile terrorist "watchlists." These are lists that can block a person from boarding an airplane or obtaining a visa.

The watchlist system failed spectacularly on Christmas Day 2009 when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian man, boarded a flight to Detroit from Amsterdam wearing explosives sewn into his undergarments. He wasn't on the watchlist.

He eventually pleaded guilty to terror-related charges and is imprisoned. His bomb didn't properly detonate.

However, Mr. Abdulmutallab and his underwear did alter U.S. intelligence-gathering. A Senate investigation revealed that NCTC had received information about him but had failed to query other government databases about him. In a scathing finding, the Senate report said, "the NCTC was not organized adequately to fulfill its missions."

"This was not a failure to collect or share intelligence," said John Brennan, the president's chief counterterrorism adviser, at a White House press conference in January 2010. "It was a failure to connect and integrate and understand the intelligence we had."

As result, Mr. Obama demanded a watchlist overhaul. Agencies were ordered to send all their leads to NCTC, and NCTC was ordered to "pursue thoroughly and exhaustively terrorism threat threads." Quickly, NCTC was flooded with terror tips—each of which it was obligated to "exhaustively" pursue. By May 2010 there was a huge backlog, according a report by the Government Accountability Office.

Legal obstacles emerged. NCTC analysts were permitted to query federal-agency databases only for "terrorism datapoints," say, one specific person's name, or the passengers on one particular flight. They couldn't look through the databases trolling for general "patterns." And, if they wanted to copy entire data sets, they were required to remove information about innocent U.S. people "upon discovery."

But they didn't always know who was innocent. A person might seem innocent today, until new details emerge tomorrow.

"What we learned from Christmas Day"—from the failed underwear bomb—was that some information "might seem more relevant later," says Mr. Joel, the national intelligence agency's civil liberties officer. "We realized we needed it to be retained longer."

Late last year, for instance, NCTC obtained an entire database from Homeland Security for analysis, according to a person familiar with the transaction. Homeland Security provided the disks on the condition that NCTC would remove all innocent U.S. person data after 30 days.

After 30 days, a Homeland Security team visited and found that the data hadn't yet been removed. In fact, NCTC hadn't even finished uploading the files to its own computers, that person said. It can take weeks simply to upload and organize the mammoth data sets.

Homeland Security granted a 30-day extension. That deadline was missed, too. So Homeland Security revoked NCTC's access to the data.

To fix problems like these that had cropped up since the Abdulmutallab incident, NCTC proposed the major expansion of its powers that would ultimately get debated at the March meeting in the White House. It moved to ditch the requirement that it discard the innocent-person data. And it asked for broader authority to troll for patterns in the data.

As early as February 2011, NCTC's proposal was raising concerns at the privacy offices of both Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, according to emails reviewed by the Journal.

Privacy offices are a relatively new phenomenon in the intelligence community. Most were created at the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Privacy officers are often in the uncomfortable position of identifying obstacles to plans proposed by their superiors.

At the Department of Justice, Chief Privacy Officer Nancy Libin raised concerns about whether the guidelines could unfairly target innocent people, these people said. Some research suggests that, statistically speaking, there are too few terror attacks for predictive patterns to emerge. The risk, then, is that innocent behavior gets misunderstood—say, a man buying chemicals (for a child's science fair) and a timer (for the sprinkler) sets off false alarms.

An August government report indicates that, as of last year, NCTC wasn't doing predictive pattern-matching.

The internal debate was more heated at Homeland Security. Ms. Callahan and colleague Margo Schlanger, who headed the 100-person Homeland Security office for civil rights and civil liberties, were concerned about the implications of turning over vast troves of data to the counterterrorism center, these people said.

They and Ms. Libin at the Justice Department argued that the failure to catch Mr. Abdulmutallab wasn't caused by the lack of a suspect—he had already been flagged—but by a failure to investigate him fully. So amassing more data about innocent people wasn't necessarily the right solution.

The most sensitive Homeland Security data trove at stake was the Advanced Passenger Information System. It contains the name, gender, birth date and travel information for every airline passenger entering the U.S.

Mary Ellen Callahan, then-chief privacy officer of the Department of Homeland Security: 'This is a sea change in the way that the government interacts with the general public.'

Previously, Homeland Security had pledged to keep passenger data only for 12 months. But NCTC was proposing to copy and keep it for up to five years. Ms. Callahan argued this would break promises the agency had made to the public about its use of personal data, these people said.

Discussions sometimes got testy, according to emails reviewed by the Journal. In one case, Ms. Callahan sent an email complaining that "examples" provided to her by an unnamed intelligence official were "complete non-sequiturs" and "non-responsive."

In May 2011, Ms. Callahan and Ms. Schlanger raised their concerns with the chief of their agency, Janet Napolitano. They fired off a memo under the longwinded title, "How Best to Express the Department's Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns over Draft Guidelines Proposed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center," according to an email obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. The contents of the memo, which appears to run several pages, were redacted.

The two also kept pushing the NCTC officials to justify why they couldn't search for terrorism clues less invasively, these people said. "I'm not sure I'm totally prepared with the firestorm we're about to create," Ms. Schlanger emailed Ms. Callahan in November, referring to the fact that the two wanted more privacy protections. Ms. Schlanger returned to her faculty position at the University of Michigan Law School soon after but remains an adviser to Homeland Security.

To resolve the issue, Homeland Security's deputy secretary, Jane Holl Lute, requested the March meeting at the White House. The second in command from Homeland Security, the Justice Department, the FBI, NCTC and the office of the director of national intelligence sat at the small conference table. Normal protocol for such meeting is for staffers such as Ms. Callahan to sit against the walls of the room and keep silent.

By this point, Ms. Libin's concern that innocent people could be inadvertently targeted had been largely overruled at the Department of Justice, these people said. Colleagues there were more concerned about missing the next terrorist threat.

That left Ms. Callahan as the most prominent opponent of the proposed changes. In an unusual move, Ms. Lute asked Ms. Callahan to speak about Homeland Security's privacy concerns. Ms. Callahan argued that the rules would constitute a "sea change" because, whenever citizens interact with the government, the first question asked will be, are they a terrorist?

Mr. Brennan considered the arguments. And within a few days, the attorney general, Eric Holder, had signed the new guidelines. The Justice Department declined to comment about the debate over the guidelines.

Under the new rules, every federal agency must negotiate terms under which it would hand over databases to NCTC. This year, Ms. Callahan left Homeland Security for private practice, and Ms. Libin left the Justice Department to join a private firm.

Homeland Security is currently working out the details to give the NCTC three data sets—the airline-passenger database known as APIS; another airline-passenger database containing information about non-U.S. citizen visitors to the U.S.; and a database about people seeking refugee asylum. It previously agreed to share databases containing information about foreign-exchange students and visa applications.

Once the terms are set, Homeland Security is likely to post a notice in the Federal Register. The public can submit comments to the Federal Register about proposed changes, although Homeland Security isn't required to make changes based on the comments.

Active shooters in schools: The enemy is denialPreventing juvenile mass murder in American schools is the job of police officers, school teachers, and concerned parents

Editor's Note: Visit the Newtown Shooting special coverage page for more perspectives on active shooters in schools, including my article "Active shooters in schools: Should teachers be trained by police firearms instructors?" Have a perspective on this issue? Leave it in the comments below.“How many kids have been killed by school fire in all of North America in the past 50 years? Kids killed... school fire... North America... 50 years... How many? Zero. That’s right. Not one single kid has been killed by school fire anywhere in North America in the past half a century. Now, how many kids have been killed by school violence?”

So began an extraordinary daylong seminar presented by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, a Pulitzer Prize nominated author, West Point psychology professor, and without a doubt the world’s foremost expert on human aggression and violence. The event, hosted by the California Peace Officers Association, was held in the auditorium of a very large community church about 30 miles from San Francisco, and was attended by more than 250 police officers from around the region.

Grossman’s talk spanned myriad topics of vital importance to law enforcement, such as the use of autogenic breathing, surviving gunshot wounds, dealing with survivor guilt following a gun battle, and others. But violence among and against children was how the day began, and so I'll focus on that issue here.

Related Resources:Book Excerpt: On Sheep, Wolves, and SheepdogsVisit the Killology Research Group website

Related Feature: Helping schools prepare for an active-shooter showdownSheriff Fred Wegener says that preparing schools for an active shooter is community policing at its best.“In 1999,” Grossman said, “school violence claimed what at the time was an all time record number of kids’ lives. In that year there were 35 dead and a quarter of a million serious injuries due to violence in the school. How many killed by fire that year? Zero. But we hear people say, ‘That’s the year Columbine happened, that’s an anomaly.’ Well, in 2004 we had a new all time record — 48 dead in the schools from violence. How many killed by fire that year? Zero. Let’s assign some grades. Put your teacher hat on and give out some grades. What kind of grade do you give the firefighter for keeping kids safe? An ‘A,’ right? Reluctantly, reluctantly, the cops give the firefighters an ‘A,’ right? Danged firefighters, they sleep ‘till they’re hungry and eat ‘till they’re tired. What grade do we get for keeping the kids safe from violence? Come on, what’s our grade? Needs improvement, right?”

He paused, briefly, and answered with a voice that blew through the hall like thunder, “Denial, denial, denial!”

Grossman commanded, “Look up at the ceiling! See all those sprinklers up there? They’re hard to spot — they’re painted black — but they’re there. While you’re looking, look at the material the ceiling is made of. You know that that stuff was selected because it’s fire-retardant. Hooah? Now look over there above the door — you see that fire exit sign? That’s not just any fire exit sign — that’s a ‘battery-backup-when-the-world-ends-it-will-still-be-lit’ fire exit sign. Hooah?”

Walking from the stage toward a nearby fire exit and exterior wall, Grossman slammed the palm of his hand against the wall and exclaimed, “Look at these wall boards! They were chosen because they’re what?! Fireproof or fire retardant, hooah? There is not one stinking thing in this room that will burn!”

Pointing around the room as he spoke, Grossman continued, “But you’ve still got those fire sprinklers, those fire exit signs, fire hydrants outside, and fire trucks nearby! Are these fire guys crazy? Are these fire guys paranoid? No! This fire guy is our A+ student! Because this fire guy has redundant, overlapping layers of protection, not a single kid has been killed by school fire in the last 50 years!

“But you try to prepare for violence — the thing much more likely to kill our kids in schools, the thing hundreds of times more likely to kill our kids in schools — and people think you’re paranoid. They think you’re crazy. ...They’re in denial.”

Teaching the TeachersThe challenge for law enforcement agencies and officers, then, is to overcome not only the attacks taking place in schools, but to first overcome the denial in the minds of mayors, city councils, school administrators, and parents. Grossman said that agencies and officers, although facing an uphill slog against the denial of the general public, must diligently work toward increasing understanding among the sheep that the wolves are coming for their children. Police officers must train and drill with teachers, not only so responding officers are intimately familiar with the facilities, but so that teachers know what they can do in the event of an attack.

“Come with me to the library at Columbine High School,” Grossman said. “The teacher in the library at Columbine High School spent her professional lifetime preparing for a fire, and we can all agree if there had been a fire in that library, that teacher would have instinctively, reflexively known what to do.

"But the thing most likely to kill her kids — the thing hundreds of times more likely to kill her kids, the teacher didn’t have a clue what to do. She should have put those kids in the librarian’s office but she didn’t know that. So she did the worst thing possible — she tried to secure her kids in an un-securable location. She told the kids to hide in the library — a library that has plate glass windows for walls. It’s an aquarium, it’s a fish bowl. She told the kids to hide in a fishbowl. What did those killers see? They saw targets. They saw fish in a fish bowl.”

Grossman said that if the school administrators at Columbine had spent a fraction of the money they’d spent preparing for fire doing lockdown drills and talking with local law enforcers about the violent dangers they face, the outcome that day may have been different.

Rhetorically he asked the assembled cops, “If somebody had spent five minutes telling that teacher what to do, do you think lives would have been saved at Columbine?”

Arming Campus Cops is ElementaryNearly two years ago, I wrote an article called Arming campus cops is elementary. Not surprisingly, Grossman agrees with that hypothesis.

“Never call an unarmed man ‘security’,” Grossman said.

“Call him ‘run-like-hell-when-the-man-with-the-gun-shows-up’ but never call an unarmed man security.

"Imagine if someone said, ‘I want a trained fire professional on site. I want a fire hat, I want a fire uniform, I want a fire badge. But! No fire extinguishers in this building. No fire hoses. The hat, the badge, the uniform — that will keep us safe — but we have no need for fire extinguishers.’ Well, that would be insane. It is equally insane, delusional, legally liable, to say, ‘I want a trained security professional on site. I want a security hat, I want a security uniform, and I want a security badge, but I don’t want a gun.’ It’s not the hat, the uniform, or the badge. It’s the tools in the hands of a trained professional that keeps us safe.

“Our problem is not money,” said Grossman. “It is denial.”

Grossman said (and most cops agree) that many of the most important things we can do to protect our kids would cost us nothing or next-to-nothing.

Grossman’s Five D’sLet’s contemplate the following outline and summary of Dave Grossman’s “Five D’s.” While you do, I encourage you to add in the comments area below your suggestions to address, and expand upon, these ideas.

1. Denial — Denial is the enemy and it has no survival value, said Grossman.

2. Deter — Put police officers in schools, because with just one officer assigned to a school, the probability of a mass murder in that school drops to almost zero

3. Detect — We’re talking about plain old fashioned police work here. The ultimate achievement for law enforcement is the crime that didn’t happen, so giving teachers and administrators regular access to cops is paramount.

4. Delay — Various simple mechanisms can be used by teachers and cops to put time and distance between the killers and the kids.

a. Ensure that the school/classroom have just a single point of entry. Simply locking the back door helps create a hard target.b. Conduct your active shooter drills within (and in partnership with) the schools in your city so teachers know how to respond, and know what it looks like when you do your response.

a. Carry off duty. No one would tell a firefighter who has a fire extinguisher in his trunk that he’s crazy or paranoid.b. Equip every cop in America with a patrol rifle. One chief of police, upon getting rifles for all his officers once said, “If an active killer strikes in my town, the response time will be measured in feet per second.”c. Put smoke grenades in the trunk of every cop car in America. Any infantryman who needs to attack across open terrain or perform a rescue under fire deploys a smoke grenade. A fire extinguisher will do a decent job in some cases, but a smoke grenade is designed to perform the function.d. Have a “go-to-war bag” filled with lots of loaded magazines and supplies for tactical combat casualty care.e. Use helicopters. Somewhere in your county you probably have one or more of the following: medevac, media, private, national guard, coast guard rotors.f. Employ the crew-served, continuous-feed, weapon you already have available to you (a firehouse) by integrating the fire service into your active shooter training. It is virtually impossible for a killer to put well-placed shots on target while also being blasted with water at 300 pounds per square inch.g. Armed citizens can help. Think United 93. Whatever your personal take on gun control, it is all but certain that a killer set on killing is more likely to attack a target where the citizens are unarmed, rather than one where they are likely to encounter an armed citizen response.

Coming Soon: External ThreatsToday we must not only prepare for juvenile mass murder, something that had never happened in human history until only recently, but we also must prepare for the external threat. Islamist fanatics have slaughtered children in their own religion — they have killed wantonly, mercilessly, and without regard for repercussion or regret of any kind. What do you think they’d think of killing our kids?

“Eight years ago they came and killed 3,000 of our citizens. Do we know what they’re going to do next? No! But one thing they’ve done in every country they’ve messed with is killing kids in schools,” Grossman said.

The latest al Qaeda charter states that “children are noble targets” and Osama bin Laden himself has said that “Russia is a preview for what we will do to America.”

What happened in Russia that we need to be concerned with in this context? In the town of Beslan on September 1, 2004 — the very day on which children across that country merrily make their return to school after the long summer break — radical Islamist terrorists from Chechnya took more than 1,000 teachers, mothers, and children hostage. When the three-day siege was over, more than 300 hostages had been killed, more than half of whom were children.

“If I could tackle every American and make them read one book to help them understand the terrorist’s plan, it would be Terror at Beslan by John Giduck. Beslan was just a dress rehearsal for what they’re planning to do to the United States,” he said.

Consider this: There are almost a half a million school buses in America. It would require almost every enlisted person and every officer in the entire United States Army to put just one armed guard on every school bus in the country.

As a country and as a culture, the level of protection Americans afford our kids against violence is nothing near what we do to protect them from fire. Grossman is correct: Denial is the enemy. We must prepare for violence like the firefighter prepares for fire. And we must do that today.

Hooah, Colonel!

About the authorDoug Wyllie is Editor in Chief of PoliceOne, responsible for setting the editorial direction of the website and managing the planned editorial features by our roster of expert writers. In addition to his editorial and managerial responsibilities, Doug has authored more than 600 feature articles and tactical tips on a wide range of topics and trends that affect the law enforcement community. Doug is a member of International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association (ILEETA), and an Associate Member of the California Peace Officers' Association. He is also a member of the Public Safety Writers Association, and is a two-time (2011 and 2012) Western Publishing Association "Maggie Award" Finalist in the category of Best Regularly Featured Digital Edition Column. Even in his "spare" time, he is active in his support for the law enforcement community, contributing his time and talents toward police-related charitable events as well as participating in force-on-force training, search-and-rescue training, and other scenario-based training designed to prepare cops for the fight they face every day on the street.

Enemies Domestic Jose Padilla may have been an idiot who thought he could make a nuclear bomb by swinging uranium around in a bucket, but that doesn't mean he wasn't dangerous..By ALI SOUFAN

In 1992, Tarik Shah, an accomplished jazz musician, played at Bill Clinton's presidential inauguration. In 2004, he was being monitored by the FBI as he developed plans to train (he was also a martial-arts master) and recruit fighters for al Qaeda.

The FBI started focusing on Shah after learning he had been making inquiries into joining al Qaeda. Then a search of his car—occasioned by his arrest for petty larceny—uncovered the contact information of extremists with ties to al Qaeda. An informant sent to befriend Shah introduced him to an undercover FBI agent posing as a personal representative of Osama bin Laden. Over the course of the next year, Shah met and communicated with the agent numerous times. In May 2005, in an apartment in the Bronx, Shah and an associate pledged an oath of allegiance to bin Laden through the agent. The next day they were arrested.

In his telling of this story in "The Terror Factory," Trevor Aaronson omits some key facts. He doesn't mention, for example, Shah's early attempts to join al Qaeda or the evidence found in connection with his larceny arrest. Instead he portrays Shah as an otherwise innocent man entrapped by FBI informants. Mr. Aaronson should know better. He interviewed me (I was the undercover FBI agent), the court documents are public, and I told the entire story in my book "The Black Banners." Shah's lawyers certainly knew better and advised their client to plead guilty, whereupon a judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison.

Shah's story is buried among the many that Mr. Aaronson tells in a book trying to show that there is no threat from terrorism here in the U.S., only terrorists manufactured by the FBI to be caught by the FBI. He writes that the bureau "currently spends $3 billion annually to hunt an enemy that is largely of its own creation" and that those arrested are "nothing more than FBI creations, impressionable men living on the edge of society who become bomb-triggering would-be killers only because of the actions of FBI informants."

The Terror FactoryBy Trevor Aaronson (Ig, 272 pages, $24.95)

It doesn't take access to a classified FBI database to see that the reality is otherwise. Richard Reid tried to detonate a shoe bomb on a plane in December 2001; Jose Padilla flew into Chicago in May 2002 planning to build and set off a bomb; and Faisal Shahzad almost succeeded in blowing up his car in Times Square in May 2010. All developed their plots without any input from the FBI.

Typical of the cases Mr. Aaronson discusses is that of Michael Curtis Reynolds. In 2005, Reynolds logged into an Internet chat forum called "OBLcrew" and described his dream of bombing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. He repeatedly requested assistance, and eventually someone claiming to be an al Qaeda operative responded. When they finally met, Reynolds found himself surrounded by FBI agents.

To most people that was a job well done by the FBI. As you can't prosecute someone just for professing a desire to kill Americans, and you can't read minds to determine if they really intend to carry out their threats, either you wait to see if the real al Qaeda gets in contact—and hope you can track them—or you intercede. Most Americans would no doubt prefer the latter option to taking a serious gamble with civilian lives.

Mr. Aaronson disagrees. He says Reynolds was "unemployed, broke, and living with his mother at middle age, a caricature of the all-American loser"—implying that such a man wouldn't have the ability to be a terrorist. As the recent tragic massacre of school children in Newtown, Conn., reminds us, however, being considered a loser doesn't mean you aren't a threat to society. You don't today have to go to Afghanistan to get al Qaeda training—it is available on the Internet—and it is very easy to acquire serious weaponry in the U.S.

Many terrorists are literally idiots. Padilla thought he could make a viable nuclear bomb by swinging uranium around in a bucket about his head. But that doesn't mean that they aren't dangerous, and if al Qaeda gets their hands on them, they will utilize them (as happened with Padilla).

Where Mr. Aaronson is on solid ground is in discussing how FBI dealings with the Muslim community have backfired and alienated potential allies. He is correct that some "Muslims today see FBI agents as potential enemies, not as neighbors with a mutual interest in keeping the local community safe from harm." And he is right that "this means that credible and actionable tips from within Muslim communities—from the people with the best vantage points to see early problems or threats—are going unreported."

The U.S. government needs to do a better job of managing domestic antiterrorism efforts. The most successful such programs are holistic in nature, drawing on community-relations specialists, NGOs, psychologists and others—not putting everything on the back of the FBI. This is critical because as effective as the FBI and local police forces have been, sooner or later people slip through (like Shahzad). We need the Muslim community to be our ally, as they have shown they can be. For instance, in the 2009 case of five Virginia men traveling to Pakistan in hopes of fighting against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, it was their families who tipped off the FBI.

An impartial review of the FBI's efforts to fight terrorism after 9/11 would give it high marks overall. It gets hundreds of leads daily, and it has a duty to check them all out, no matter how dismissible they appear. The Iranian regime's 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., which was uncovered thanks to a Drug Enforcement Administration informant, is a reminder of why. Unfortunately Mr. Aaronson fails to appreciate this, and instead uses most of his pages to accuse the FBI of entrapment. Tellingly, he notes toward the end that "I am frequently asked why entrapment has never been an effective defense in the terrorism cases. I've struggled with the answer to this question." The answer, of course, is that the evidence shows that these were real threats to the U.S., and we are fortunate that the FBI intercepted them.

Mr. Soufan, an FBI supervisory special agent from 1997 to 2005, is CEO of the Soufan Group and the author of "The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al Qaeda."

The existence of multiple, overlapping and inconsistent definitions of the term “homeland security” reflects and reinforces confusion in the homeland security mission, according to a newly updated report from the Congressional Research Service.

“Ten years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government does not have a single definition for ‘homeland security.’ [Instead,] different strategic documents and mission statements offer varying missions that are derived from different homeland security definitions.”

The existence of multiple, overlapping and inconsistent definitions of the term “homeland security” reflects and reinforces confusion in the homeland security mission, according to a newly updated report from the Congressional Research Service.

“Ten years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government does not have a single definition for ‘homeland security.’ [Instead,] different strategic documents and mission statements offer varying missions that are derived from different homeland security definitions.”

Not surprised to read this at all. I was recently talking to a Deputy Sheriff who had been in the USGC before and after DHS was formed. His opinion of DHS and it's way of doing business wasn't favorable.

Obama signs Executive Order giving government complete control of all US infrastructure, food, water and citizens for "national defense" preparation.

On Friday, President Obama signed a sweeping Executive Order that would effectively nationalize everything - including food, water and U.S. citizens - in order to prepare for national defense.

Worse yet, the order would also allow for a civilian draft - the conscription of “persons of outstanding experience or ability” without compensation.

A post at Current.com adds:

“The EO also states that the President and his Secretaries have the authority to seize all transportation, energy, and infrastructure inside the United States as well as forcibly induct/draft American citizens into the military. The EO also contains a vague reference in regards to harnessing American citizens to fulfill “labor requirements” for the purposes of national defense.

Not only that, but the authority claimed inside the EO does not only apply to National Emergencies and times of war. It also applies in peacetime.

"The National Defense Resources Preparedness Executive Order exploits the “authority” granted to the President in the Defense Production Act of 1950 in order to assert that virtually every means of human survival is now available for confiscation and control by the President via his and his Secretaries’ whim," Current notes.

Oddly enough, the order does not say these are actions to be taken “in the event of a national emergency.” Instead, it uses the term “purposes of national defense.”

Under the section dealing with labor, the order says:

“Sec. 601. Secretary of Labor. (a) The Secretary of Labor, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other agencies, as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Labor, shall:

(1) collect and maintain data necessary to make a continuing appraisal of the Nation's workforce needs for purposes of national defense;

(2) upon request by the Director of Selective Service, and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, assist the Director of Selective Service in development of policies regulating the induction and deferment of persons for duty in the armed services;

(3) upon request from the head of an agency with authority under this order, consult with that agency with respect to: (i) the effect of contemplated actions on labor demand and utilization; (ii) the relation of labor demand to materials and facilities requirements; and (iii) such other matters as will assist in making the exercise of priority and allocations functions consistent with effective utilization and distribution of labor;

In order to prevent shortfalls in resources, the order also gives various cabinet-level secretaries the authority "to guarantee loans by private institutions," and gives the Treasury Secretary and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget complete authority to set terms, interest rates and maximum amounts to be paid.

If you think you can move to a farm in the country in order to escape the long arm of the regime, think again.

According to the "Definitions" section of the order, absolutely everything - including farm equipment, all food, water and medicine, energy, fertilizer and all forms of "civil transportation" - would be seized by the government. Even repair parts for farm equipment would fall under government jurisdiction.

The order does note, however, that "'[c]ivil transportation' shall not include transportation owned or controlled by the Department of Defense, use of petroleum and gas pipelines, and coal slurry pipelines used only to supply energy production facilities directly."

'Energy, for example, is defined as: "...all forms of energy including petroleum, gas (both natural and manufactured), electricity, solid fuels (including all forms of coal, coke, coal chemicals, coal liquification, and coal gasification), solar, wind, other types of renewable energy, atomic energy, and the production, conservation, use, control, and distribution (including pipelines) of all of these forms of energy."

The post at Current asks:

“Nevertheless, some have no doubt begun to wonder why the President has signed such an order. Not only that, but why did he sign the order now? Is it because of the looming war with Iran or the Third World War that will likely result from such a conflict? Is it because of the ticking time bomb called the economy that is only one jittery move or trade deal away from total disintegration? Is it because of a growing sense of hatred of their government amongst the general public? Is there a coming natural disaster of which we are unaware? Are there plans for martial law?

Finance Examiner Kenneth Schortgen, Jr., notes that previous administrations have taken actions limiting individual rights in the past. During the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended Habeus Corpus and Woodrow Wilson used an Executive Order giving him authority "over businesses, industry, transportation, food, and other economic policies" during World War 1.

"In both cases," Schortgen wrote, "it was only after the death of each President that full Constitutional powers were restored to the citizens of the United States."

This order, however, goes far beyond what either Lincoln or Wilson did, and if invoked, would basically turn the United States into a totalitarian regime with Obama as its dictator.

In June, 1966, Robert Kennedy said:

“There is a Chinese curse which says 'May he live in interesting times.' Like it or not we live in interesting times. They are times of danger and uncertainty; but they are also more open to the creative energy of men than any other time in history.

Indeed, we seem to be living in very interesting times.

Update: A number of people have commented that this is simply an update of an existing Executive Order (EO 12919) dating back to 1994, but that does not negate the fact that President Obama signed the order on Friday, nor does it change the contents of the order, which can be seen at the White House website here, and about which Ed Morrissey of Hot Air says is "really nothing to worry about at all." We'll let the reader be the judge of that.

Updaye 2: One of the criticisms that has been leveled is that the Executive Order supposedly does not allow the President or one of his Secretaries to hire civilians without compensation, however, Section 502 reads (emphasis added):

“Sec. 502. Consultants. The head of each agency otherwise delegated functions under this order is delegated the authority of the President under sections 710(b) and (c) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2160(b), (c), to employ persons of outstanding experience and ability without compensation and to employ experts, consultants, or organizations.

Pro-Taliban terrorist tries to blow up Oakland bank — and blame it on the Right — to start civil war

FBI thwarts terrorism meant as false-flag operation to ignite left-vs.-right armed conflict in the U.S.

by Zombie

February 8, 2013

Breaking:

A would-be Islamic terrorist tried to ignite a civil war this morning by bombing a bank in Oakland, California, saying that “he wanted the bank bombing to be blamed on anti-U.S. government militias”; luckily, the FBI thwarted his plan:

A man who was hoping to start a civil war in the United States with a terrorist attack in the Bay Area was arrested early Friday after trying to detonate what he thought was a car bomb at a Bank of America branch in Oakland, federal prosecutors said.

Matthew Aaron Llaneza, 28, of San Jose was taken into custody near the bank at 303 Hegenberger Road after pressing a cell-phone trigger device that was supposed to detonate the explosives inside an SUV and bring down the building, prosecutors said.

His supposed accomplice was an undercover FBI agent who had been meeting with him since Nov. 30, according to an FBI declaration filed in federal court. The declaration said the FBI had built the purported bomb, which posed no threat to the public.

…

The FBI agent quoted Llaneza as saying he supports the Taliban and wants to engage in violent jihad.

In the Nov. 30 meeting with an agent who posed as someone connected to the Taliban in Afghanistan, Llaneza said he wanted the bank bombing to be blamed on anti-U.S. government militias, triggering a government crackdown, a right-wing response and a civil war, the FBI declaration said….

Additional details, if any, will appear here as we learn of them.

UPDATE 1:

Here’s a photo of the bank branch at 303 Hegenberger he tried to destroy:

UPDATE 2:

Here is the official FBI press release about the incident, released a few minutes ago:

OAKLAND, CA—Federal agents arrested Matthew Aaron Llaneza, age 28, of San Jose, California, this morning after he allegedly attempted to detonate a vehicle-borne explosive device at a bank branch in Oakland.

Llaneza’s arrest was the culmination of an undercover operation during which he was closely monitored by the FBI’s South Bay Joint Terrorism Task Force. Unbeknownst to Llaneza, the explosive device that he allegedly attempted to use had been rendered inoperable by law enforcement and posed no threat to the public. Llaneza was charged this morning by criminal complaint with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction against property used in an activity that affects interstate or foreign commerce.

…

According to the affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint, on November 30, 2012, Llaneza met with a man who led him to believe he was connected with the Taliban and the mujahidin in Afghanistan. In reality, this man was an undercover FBI agent. At this initial meeting, Llaneza proposed conducting a car-bomb attack against a bank in the San Francisco Bay Area. He proposed structuring the attack to make it appear that the responsible party was an umbrella organization for a loose collection of anti-government militias and their sympathizers. Llaneza’s stated goal was to trigger a governmental crackdown, which he expected would trigger a right-wing counter-response against the government followed by, he hoped, civil war.

The complaint further alleges that Llaneza subsequently selected the Bank of America branch at 303 Hegenberger Road in Oakland as the target for the attack. Llaneza ultimately specified a spot next to a support column of the bank building as a good location for the bomb, expressed a desire for the bomb to bring down the entire bank building, and offered to drive the car bomb to the bank at the time of the attack.

According to the complaint, in January and February 2013, Llaneza and the undercover agent constructed the purported explosive device inside a sport utility vehicle (SUV) parked inside a storage facility in Hayward, California. As part of the process of assembling the device, Llaneza purchased two cell phones to be used in creating and operating the trigger device for the car bomb. One of these cell phones was incorporated into the trigger device itself. The other was reserved for use on the night of the attack.

The criminal complaint alleges that on the evening of February 7, 2013, Llaneza drove the SUV containing the purported explosive device to the target bank branch in Oakland. He parked the SUV beneath an overhang of the bank building where he armed the trigger device. He then proceeded on foot to a nearby location a safe distance from the bank building, where he met the undercover agent. Once there, Llaneza attempted to detonate the bomb by using the second cell phone he had purchased to place two calls to the trigger device attached to the car bomb. Federal agents then arrested him.

…UPDATE 3:

A few more sickening details at the Huffington Post:

[Llaneza] laughed and hugged the undercover agent after the agent showed him the SUV in a storage unit rented by the FBI. Llaneza also stated he wanted to travel to Afghanistan so he could train Taliban fighters, according to authorities.UPDATE 4:

Someone with the name Matthew Aaron Llaneza founded an Arizona LLC in 2008 called “Sand Fire Tactical.” The State of Arizona’s official “Arizona Corporation Commission” has scans of the LLC’s Articles of Organization, which you can also see here:

Same guy? Most likely. Does the name “Sand Fire Tactical” have anything to do with his earlier assault weapons conviction? (I.e. does the “tactical” refer to tactical weapons?) He describes his business type as “Internet sales, light manufacturing.” Was he making illegal weaponry and selling it over the Internet? Or was this business completely innocuous?

UPDATE 5:

The Phoenix Fox affiliate is searching for people who might have known Matthew Llaneza, adding to the likelihood of an Arizona connection:

Good afternoon… Kristen Keogh here. We are trying to find someone who knows a man named Matthew Llaneza….KSAZ FOX 10 News ‏myfoxphoenixUPDATE 6:

“Findthecompany.com” claims that

Sand Fire Tactical LLC had $58,000 in 2011 revenue (Estimated data).Still not clear what “Sand Fire Tactical” sold, or if this revenue data is accurate or just a generic estimate.

UPDATE 7:

Someone named Matthew Llaneza graduated from Red Mountain High School in 2003. Anyone who graduated from high school in 2003 would now be exactly 28 years old…the same age as the suspect. And where is Red Mountain High School? Mesa, Arizona, naturally, the same city where Sand Fire Tactical was founded.

UPDATE 8:

Lots of new details in a San Jose Mercury News article published 4 minutes ago:

Court records stemming from a 2011 weapons conviction show that the one-time Marine likely suffered from mental illness that included bouts of paranoia, suicidal tendencies, hallucinations and voices in his head, and had a vast working knowledge of weaponry.

Those same records show that Llaneza’s father long had concerns about his son’s stability, keeping him at arm’s length after he returned to San Jose from several years living with grandparents in Arizona and having abruptly converted to Islam.

During the planning of the attack, Llaneza also allegedly said “he would dance with joy when the bomb exploded.” After the attack, Llaneza had intended to flee by boat to Pakistan and then travel to Afghanistan to train with Taliban fighters….

…

Records indicate that the U.S.-born Llaneza lived with his grandparents in Mesa, Ariz., until 2011, when he moved back to California to live with his father in North San Jose in an RV parked out front. During his time in Arizona, Llaneza described himself as an “armorist” who was proficient in weapons assembly, and records show that in February 2008 founded Sand Fire Tactical LLC, which he described in its articles of organization as an “internet sales, light manufacturing” firm located in Mesa.

The complaint describes Llaneza as a detail-oriented person intent on an eye-catching act of terrorism that he believed would foment civil unrest. Court records in Santa Clara County seemingly set the foundation for those thoughts after he was convicted in 2011 for illegally having an AK-47 assault rifle and accompanying high-capacity magazines he purportedly purchased and registered in Arizona.

That discovery came out of an emergency call April 17 that year to the home of Steve Llaneza, who had recently allowed his son to live in an RV outside. Appearing under the influence of alcohol and marijuana — with a history of hard-drug use — the son threatened to kill himself and was hospitalized under a mental health hold.

Ensuing investigations by San Jose police led to them finding the assault rifle and magazines, which prompted officers to take Matthew Llaneza out of the hospital and into custody. He was convicted of the weapons offenses, and given a suspended sentence after having served six months in County Jail.

During the investigation and a corresponding preliminary hearing, Llaneza was described as being in and out of mental-health treatment, instead self-medicating with medically-obtained marijuana. He told interrogating officers about suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress from what he said were attempts by Arizona gangs to recruit him, expressing a fear of drug cartels and saying, “Someday you are going to find me dead in the desert.”

By the time of that 2011 arrest, Llaneza told police he was going by the name of Tarq Kahn and that he believed “secret police or government is trying to follow him.” His father told investigators that his son had briefly served in the Marine Corps before being discharged for an undisclosed reason.

…

Initially, Llaneza proposed attacking the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or another unspecified target. He later decided that there would too much security at the Federal Reserve Bank and instead began scouting Bank of America locations in Oakland — because of the symbolism of the name and his belief of Oakland being a center of protests.

… UPDATE 9:

As of 4:55pm, there is absolutely zilch on the Web about the name “Tarq Kahn” aside from that SJ Mercury News article. Could “Tarq” be a misspelling of “Tariq”? If so, there’d be little chance of digging up any info about him anyway, as “Tariq Khan” is an extremely common name.

UPDATE 10:

Here’s the FBI Criminal Complaint and Affidavit leading to Llaneza’s arrest.(Thanks to reader Paula B. for bringing this link to our attention.)

"There is but one straight course, and that is to seek truth and pursue itsteadily." --George Washington

The last few months have seen troubling news of massive government purchasesof ammunition. Agencies from the Social Security Administration to theDepartment of Agriculture to the Department of Homeland Security havepurchased millions of rounds. But is the whole thing more hype than substance?

Ever since Barack Obama was first elected in 2008, he has been selling gunsand ammunition at a faster clip than any gun salesman could hope for. Andsince his re-election, citizens have been faced with severe shortages of both.This can only be exacerbated by large government purchases. The SocialSecurity Administration (SSA), for example, purchased 174,000 rounds and theDepartment of Agriculture (USDA) bought 320,000 rounds. More understandable inpurpose but also perhaps more staggering in scale, the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) put in a request for 450 million rounds, while the FBI intendsto purchase 100 million.

The headlines are ominous, but some of the hype can be put in perspective bydoing a little math. National Review's Charles C. W. Cooke does just that. TheSSA's request for 174,000 rounds amounts to just 590 rounds for each of its295 inspector general agents "who investigate Social Security fraud and othercrimes." Some of us might go through 590 rounds in an afternoon at the range.As for the USDA, 320,000 is enough to provide the same number of rounds for542 agents, and, through the Forest Service, those agents have an area thesize of Pakistan to cover.

When it comes to the bigger orders, Cooke writes, "The FBI and DHS'sapparently vast orders are deceptively presented by the conspiracy theorists.It is true that in 2011, the FBI ordered up to 100 million bullets for its13,913 special agents (which works out to 7,187 per agent). And, yes, theDepartment of Homeland Security -- a composite department that oversees USCIS,Customs and Border Protection, FEMA, ICE, the TSA, the Coast Guard, the SecretService, and the National Protection Directorate -- placed a request for up to450 million rounds for its 65,000 armed personnel (which works out to 6,923per agent). But in the real world, ammunition is not divided up and handed outon such a basis. What is bought is stockpiled and then allocated on the basisof need. The DHS's order is expected to last for at least five years, and itwas placed up front primarily as a cost-saving measure." Indeed, DHS is noteven bound to buy that much; they merely have a tab on which to order morerounds as needed.

That certainly doesn't mean there aren't questions or that we should simplyshrug and look the other way. For starters, the Department of Educationrecently placed an order for "27 Remington Brand Model 870 police 12-gaugeshotguns." This might lead any reasonable person to ask, as Cooke does,"Whether it is in possession of one bullet or 1 million bullets, should thefederal Department of Education be armed in the first place? If so, why?" Wewould add, should there even be a Department of Education? But that's a topicfor another day. The DoE has been known to botch raids when it was the wrongenforcement vehicle from the start.

The same questions could be asked of any number of bureaucracies. Does theSocial Security Administration really need an armed enforcement division?We've known some unruly seniors in our day, but that seems to be overkill.

Then there's the information that's just plain false. Reports have beencirculating that DHS has procured 2,717 Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP)vehicles. The truth is, DHS has had retrofitted MRAPs since 2008, and now has16 of them for serving "high-risk warrants." The figure of 2,717 comes from adelivery to the Marine Corps, not DHS. None of that, however, takes away fromthe problem that these are more properly military vehicles for war zones, notlaw enforcement tools. The militarization of law enforcement is undeniablytroublesome. Furthermore, DHS is the same bureaucracy that claims right-wingextremists pose a threat, and it's run by an administration that thinks that"weapons of war" shouldn't be on our streets. Unless they're the ones drivingthem, apparently.

There are certainly troubling trends here and very real threats to ourLiberty, but we must be careful not to exaggerate. While readers know that wenever minimize the outrageous growth of government beyond its constitutionalbounds, it also doesn't seem to us that the government is, as some have putit, "stockpiling bullets in case of civil unrest." Questions aboutprocurements and functions? Absolutely. Apocalypse? Not yet.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released the 10th edition of its English-language magazine, Inspire, on March 1. After discussing its contents with our analytical team, initially I decided not to write about it. I concluded that Inspire 10 conformed closely to the previous nine editions and that our analysis of the magazine, from its inception to its re-emergence after the death of editor Samir Khan, was more than adequate.

Since making that decision, however, I have been very surprised at how the media and other analysts have received the magazine. Some have overhyped the magazine even as others have downplayed -- even ridiculed -- its content. I have heard others say the magazine revealed nothing about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. All these reactions are misguided. So in response, I've endeavored to provide a more balanced assessment that can be placed in a more appropriate perspective.

A Balanced Assessment

I am certainly not among those who want to sensationalize the threat the magazine poses. Inspire 10 is not going to launch the grassroots jihadist apocalypse al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula seeks to foment any more successfully than the magazine's previous nine editions. The fact that a photograph of Austin, Texas, appears in the magazine does not mean that the city is somehow being secretly targeted for attack by jihadist sleeper cells.

But laughing at the magazine or dismissing it as irrelevant would be imprudent. The magazine has in fact inspired several terrorist plots. In some cases, the connections to the magazine have been obvious, as in cases where plotters have attempted to assemble improvised explosive devices using instructions provided in Inspire magazine's first edition. This happened in July 2011, when U.S. Army Pfc. Naser Jason Abdo was arrested as he attempted to assemble explosive devices he planned to use in an attack against a restaurant in Killeen, Texas, that was popular with soldiers from nearby Fort Hood.

In November 2011, the New York Police Department arrested Jose Pimentel, also known as Muhammad Yusuf, a 27-year-old Dominican-American. Pimentel was arrested at an apartment in Manhattan as he was allegedly constructing homemade improvised explosive devices, again following the instructions provided in Inspire.

Other cases have not been as blatant as those involving Abdo and Pimentel. However, they have involved individuals who were radicalized or motivated by Inspire. As recently as March 15, three men in the United Kingdom pleaded guilty to terrorism charges related to attending terrorism training camps in Pakistan. The men allegedly were motivated by Inspire. They had discussed attack ideas from the magazine, and the wife of one of the men was convicted in December 2012 on charges of possessing two digital copies of the magazine on a memory card.

There are several other recent and notable cases connected to Inspire magazine. ■On Nov. 29, 2012, two brothers from Florida, Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi, were arrested and charged with plotting attacks in New York. Prosecutors noted that the pair had been motivated by Inspire magazine. ■On Oct. 17, 2012, Bangladeshi national Quazi Nafis was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation after he attempted to detonate a vehicle bomb outside New York's Federal Reserve Bank. Nafis reportedly was an avid reader of Inspire magazine. ■On Sept. 15, 2012, Adel Daoud, another avid Inspire reader, was arrested after he parked a Jeep Cherokee outside a Chicago bar and attempted to detonate the bomb he thought it contained. His was also an FBI sting operation. ■On April 25, 2012, four men were arrested in the British town of Luton and charged with plotting attacks against a British army base. The four were also charged with downloading and possessing six editions of Inspire magazine. They pleaded guilty March 1, 2013.

Target Audience

Some commentators have noted that most of the suspects arrested in connection with these plots were fairly hapless and clueless -- the type of individuals we have long referred to as "Kramer jihadists." Though partly incompetent, these grassroots operatives are exactly the demographic al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is targeting for radicalization and mobilization.

Inspire seeks to reach amateur terrorists living in the West; professional terrorists already know how to create pipe bombs. For this reason, the magazine urges amateurs to undertake simple attacks rather than the complex attacks. Too often they find assistance from an FBI informant.

It is a grave error to dismiss Kramer jihadists and assume they pose no threat. They can indeed kill people if they heed the advice of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and conduct simple attacks that are within their capability. That is what Maj. Nidal Hasan did in Fort Hood in November 2009 and what Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, also known as Carlos Bledsoe, did in June 2009. Both men were inspired to action by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Kramer jihadists can also be deadly if they actually find a real terrorist, rather than a government informant, to assist or equip them. It is very important to remember that amateur, committed jihadists such as shoe bomber Richard Reid and underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab nearly succeeded in destroying an airliner.

Twenty years ago last month, I witnessed firsthand the dangers of discounting Kramer jihadists when I peered into a massive crater in the floor of the World Trade Center parking garage. The FBI had deemed those responsible for the attack too hapless to do much more than assassinate the leader of the Jewish Defense League in a midtown Manhattan hotel. And they were -- until a trained terrorist operative traveled to New York and organized their efforts, enabling them to construct, deliver and detonate a massive 590-kilogram (1,300-pound) truck bomb.

I also take umbrage at those who snicker at the thought of grassroots jihadists lighting fires. As noted last month, I believe that fire is an underappreciated threat. Many people simply do not realize how deadly a weapon it can be, even though starting fires does not require sophisticated terrorist tradecraft.

Some Revelations

Despite claims to the contrary, Inspire 10 reveals much about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Like all propaganda and political rhetoric, its assertions must not be taken at face value. But to claim that the magazine tells us nothing about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is simply lazy analysis.

Clearly, the concept of reaching out and attempting to radicalize and equip English-speaking jihadists was not something promoted only by Anwar al-Awlaki and Khan. English-speaking outreach has continued after their deaths. The group maintains that traveling to places such as Yemen for training is too dangerous.

That al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continues to publish Inspire, which takes time and resources to produce, is also revelatory. The group has been under increased pressure over the past 18 months. The jihadists have been pushed back to their desert hideouts from much of the territory they conquered in southern Yemen. Yet despite these setbacks, they continue to devote resources to publishing Inspire, they have people with access to computers and the Internet, and they remain in contact with jihadists in other parts of the world, such as Pakistan and Mali.

The copyediting in Inspire 10 was also cleaner than the previous edition, which had a major typo on the front cover. The new editor, who uses the nom de guerre Yahya Ibrahim, has worked with Khan since the first edition of the magazine. He is a native English speaker who is familiar with Western culture and idioms. Ibrahim was clearly influenced by Khan and has attempted to continue Khan's work, but he lacks Khan's acerbic wit and irreverence. In Inspire 10, for example, Ibrahim attempts to replicate the insulting one-page "advertisements" that Khan included in earlier editions of the magazine -- one in particular racially derided U.S. President Barack Obama -- but they lack the bite and general snark of Khan. Inspire seems to be more serious and less edgy than when Khan was in charge. This may dull its appeal to its targeted audience.

Another thing we can ascertain from Inspire 10 is that, despite al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's continued commitment to foment grassroots terrorism in the West, the group is clearly disappointed by the response it has gotten. The magazine has mobilized some jihadists but probably not as many as the group would like. Those who have been inspired have not been very successful in their attacks.

The Open Source Jihad section also continues to show the low view that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's professional terrorist cadre has for grassroots operatives. They see them as not-so-exceptional individuals incapable of much more than simple attacks. Yet, since al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula lacks the ability to attack the West, the group must depend on these less than ideal individuals to do so for them.

In addition to what it reveals about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Inspire 10 can also tell us some important things about what tactics we can expect the group to use and what locations we can expect it to target. Clearly the magazine continues to focus on targets in the West that have insulted the Prophet Mohammed. It revives the "the dust has not settled" theme from the first edition of the magazine and provides an updated hit list of individuals who have insulted Mohammed, including Terry Jones, the controversial Koran-burning pastor; Morris Sadek, who made a controversial film that disparaged Islam; and Stephane Charbonnier of the French magazine Charlie Hebdo.

We have seen several attacks and thwarted plots directed against these individuals in the past. In fact, in November 2011, Charlie Hebdo's office was completely destroyed by fire, which was started by the very type of accelerant and match attack promoted in Inspire 10. We believe we will continue to see grassroots plots against these targets.

Despite the weakening of the al Qaeda core group and the serious blows that regional franchises such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab have suffered in recent months, jihadism continues to attract new adherents. And Inspire hopes to motivate and equip them to conduct attacks in the West.

Two deadly blasts disrupted the Boston Marathon today. The people of Boston have been terrorized and are panicked. International media are seeking information and inadvertently magnifying and spreading fear, while federal, state and metropolitan authorities are working to secure the city, treat the wounded, investigate the scene and hunt down the perpetrator(s).

With the attack over, everyone is left waiting for answers. Why was the marathon attacked? Who conducted the attack? What was the motive? In some attacks, the answers come quickly, as with the July 7, 2005, London transit bombings. In other cases, it can take years before those answers appear, as with the 1996 Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta.

The attack venue will greatly aid the search for answers. The heavy presence of people and media that presumably drew the attacker to target the Boston Marathon may prove to be the perpetrator's undoing if someone captured a photo of them delivering the devices. Indeed, there are reports that a man was photographed carrying multiple backpacks near the scene of the attack -- although at a major marathon the sight of a person carrying multiple backpacks or gear bags to friends at the finish line is not unusual.

At first look, the devices used in the attack appear to have been rudimentary explosive devices constructed with a common homemade explosive mixture. In other words, virtually anyone could have constructed them using readily available items. Although made of common items, it appears the bombmaker intended the devices to cause maximum casualties by adding shrapnel to multiple devices planted at a heavily congested event.

Still, investigators will painstakingly search the crime scene for evidence that could help identify the bombmaker. They will look for fragments of the device that they can use to potentially trace their origin. They will also be looking for evidence that could identify the bombmaker, such as fingerprints, fiber evidence and traces of DNA. If reports of multiple undetonated devices being located are true -- and they may not be, since in the wake of a blast everything tends to look like an improvised explosive device -- then the undetonated devices will provide a treasure trove of forensic evidence for the investigators to work with.

While any number of actors could have conducted this attack based on the simplicity of the devices, it took some degree of planning to create and place multiple devices. Many different types of groups have used multiple devices in terrorist attacks, so that fact alone does not help identify the culprits. But if there were multiple unexploded devices recovered from different areas in Boston in addition to the two that did detonate, this would indicate that more than one person carried out the attacks, meaning an organized group was involved rather than a lone wolf. Multiple unexploded devices could suggest some sort of tactical incompetence presented by the attackers. Long race venues such as the Boston Marathon also spread out security resources over large areas, likely allowing the attackers to more easily plant multiple devices throughout the city without being detected.

The identity of the perpetrator(s) will be critical to determining the U.S. reaction to the attack. A domestic group, or even a grassroots group without direct external connections, would cause a different reaction than if the attacker or attackers have direct connections to a foreign terrorist group like al Qaeda or one of its regional franchises.

By DEVLIN BARRETT The powerful blasts at the Boston Marathon finish line Monday underscore why the Federal Bureau of Investigation has spent years refining its "tripwire'' system for catching would-be bomb makers before they can build a deadly device.

For years, federal agents have asked businesses that sell materials useful in making bombs to alert authorities to any suspicious orders. The types of tripwires in place have shifted over the years. In the 1990s, law enforcement worried mostly about fertilizer-based bombs after such devices were used in the Oklahoma City attacks of April 1995. In the past decade, chemical-based bombs have come into focus as authorities adapt to the changing threat.

"The tripwires have certainly been successful in the past,'' said Don Borelli, a former counterterrorism official at the FBI who now works for Soufan Group.He pointed to the case of a Saudi man, Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, who was convicted last year of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. That case began in February 2011 with a tip from a North Carolina chemical-supply company about a suspicious $435 order by Mr. Aldawsari, who was legally in the U.S. on a student visa. A shipping company separately notified authorities the same day that it had similar suspicions because the order didn't appear intended for commercial use.

In a matter of weeks, agents had secretly searched the suspect's apartment, as well as his computer and email. The FBI found a journal entry by Mr. Aldawsari in which he wrote that he had been planning a terror attack in the U.S. for years. Authorities say that he was trying to make a chemical explosive similar to TNT. FBI experts said the amounts that were used in the Aldawsari case would have yielded nearly 15 pounds of explosives. He was convicted in June 2012.

The tripwire program can work even when suspects don't buy the materials that counterterrorism officials worry about. When Faisal Shahzad tried to detonate a car bomb in Times Square in May 2010, he intentionally worked with less-powerful substances. He was worried that if he bought materials to carry out the recipe of his Pakistani-based handlers, store owners would alert the FBI, according to statements he later made to investigators.

Investigators haven't said yet what explosives were used in Monday's attack in Boston, so it is unclear if any purchases could have been picked up by the FBI's tripwire efforts.

The tripwires aren't always successful. In a 2009 plot to bomb the New York City subway system, suspect Najibullah Zazi was able to purchase significant quantities of hydrogen peroxide, which he hoped to distill to a higher concentration that would make an effective bomb. Law-enforcement sources say Mr. Zazi's plot wasn't uncovered by the tripwire system, but through international intelligence-gathering. He eventually pleaded guilty to plotting with others to bomb the subway system.

Bomb plots, successful or not, typically prompt counterterrorism officials to review the tripwire system and look for possible improvements, a process just beginning in the Boston investigation.

After the explosions near the marathon finish line, counterterrorism officials scrambled to inspect a large number of discarded bags in and around Boston. They found some additional suspicious items and were investigating Monday evening whether they were bombs, according to people briefed on the matter. A law-enforcement official said late Monday that investigators initially believed some devices could be bombs, but closer examination led them to doubt that was the case.

The suspicious items were discovered over the course of a frantic inspection of packages, many of them abandoned as pedestrians, runners and others rushed away from crowded public streets.

The head of the Boston FBI office, Richard DesLauriers, said the agency's joint terrorism task force would take the lead on the investigation, and federal agents were already traveling to the area. He asked for the public's help to generate tips and leads in the case.

Any unexploded devices would be valuable evidence for investigators to determine who was behind the bombing. Even without unexploded devices, investigators can still sift through the blast marks of the detonated devices to determine how the bombs were constructed.

Aftermath of Boston Marathon Bombing: How Do Terrorists Use Improvised Explosive Devices?Two IEDs were detonated near the race’s finish line. An expert explains how they work and how they can lead investigators back to the bomb makersBy Larry Greenemeier

The bombing near the finish line of the 117th Boston Marathon on Monday killed two and injured more than 100 people on site. Now comes the search for who planted and detonated the explosives, and the motive.

The first bomb was detonated at about 2:45 P.M. local time near one of the many classic storefronts lining the marathon’s home stretch. The second explosive followed within minutes about 50 to 100 yards away. Law enforcement later found and dismantled at least two more explosive devices, according to various news reports.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) such as those used to attack the marathon are sometimes triggered remotely by cell phones. TheAssociated Press initially reported that law enforcement had the cell network in the vicinity of the finish line shut down after the incident, but later reports contradicted this, indicating that problems receiving a signal were due to the volume of cell phone users on the network.

Federal authorities classified the bombings as a terrorist attack as of Monday evening and indicated that both of the detonated bombs were small and did not contain C-4 or other high-grade explosives, CNN reported. Explosive devices have their own signatures, even those that have been pulverized by the force of their detonation.

Scientific American spoke with AJ Clark, a former military intelligence analyst with deployments to Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, about how IEDs work, how they are used and how they can be used to find those behind such an attack.

[An edited transcript of the interview follows.]

Reports indicate that IEDs were responsible Monday’s attack on bystanders at the Boston Marathon. Most people have heard the term “IED” in relation to combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, but what, exactly, is an IED?Most improved explosive devices include the following components: a cheap cell phone, electrical wire, a fuse, batteries (AA or 9-volt), electrical tape and a thyristor (a solid-state semiconductor device). This last piece provides the option of letting you wire into the positive and negative diodes of the speaker on the cell phone board.

Two common ways to complete the circuit between these components is to use the vibrating mechanism on the cell phone or the speaker—this could be either the speaker used to make your phone a speaker phone, or the speaker that you put up to your ear during a normal conversation. We found that the speaker phone has more power going to it and was more commonly used. When the phone is called, it activates the ringer, which makes the connection between those two components and kicks off the signal to detonate the explosive.

The typical makeup when you find these things will be based on the contents that the bomb maker had at their disposal and what it is they are trying to do. Over in Iraq, we had a lot of what are called explosively formed penetrators, where whole IED is designed to explode up under a vehicle to create the greatest destruction possible. In something that is meant to detonate in a crowd of people, a bomb maker would pack into the IED whatever they had at their disposal—such as nails or ball bearings.

How are IEDs different in a war zone, as opposed to something that is used in a city or other civilian area?You wrap the fragments around some type of explosive or ordinance. In a warzone you have lots of access to ordinance. Here you probably would probably try to find an explosive for blasting, say dynamite or C-4. Generally speaking a person wouldn’t use fertilizer in this situation, the way they did during the Oklahoma City bombing, because you need a lot of fertilizer—enough to fill a 5-gallon bucket or larger drum—to generate a decent-sized explosion. In a situation like this, you’re going to look for a something denser that you could put in a small location and then attach your cellular trigger to it.

How are these explosives detonated remotely?The concept is, I need to create the signal between my positive and negative circuit and then set off my fuse. The problem with a timed fuse is that it doesn’t necessarily happen when they want it to.

How do cell phones change this?The distance someone can be from the blast area is much greater. Generally speaking someone is in a crowd when they use these. Cell phones are also more reliable than other methods of detonating explosives. Within about 30 minutes, someone can buy a $10 phone and be able to set off the device.

What can an examination of the detonated device tell investigators?We can look and see the method of operations or the signature that the bomb maker had in terms of how they set up the fuse and what type of material they used. That’s our best way of tracking down who is responsible.

How badly are these bombs damaged during a detonation (such that it’s difficult to analyze the pieces for criminal evidence)?It varies, but you’ll find remnants, wires for example. You might even find a scrap like a red piece of tape that looks the kind of tape used at another bomb site. They’ll also see the complexity of how the bomb was put together. That’s really important too. Some bomb makers will also use other pieces of technology, like using a thyristor instead of connecting directly to the battery. A thyristor acts as a switch when an electrical signal is sent to it. That’s directly connected to the positive and negative diodes in the cell phone. Where you’ll get a real break is if a second or third bomb is found before detonation and the bomb squad is able to dismantle them and analyze how they were built.

Early reports out of Boston were that law enforcement had the cell network in the area around the finish line shut down (although the mobile service providers disputed that they had shut down their networks). Regardless, why would law enforcement want to cut off cell service?In shutting down cell service, you block the ability to create that circuit and ignite that fuse. In the military we would use jamming devices on our trucks, sometimes seven or eight of them on a single vehicle. Some of them work, some don’t. If law enforcement in Boston did shut down the service it could have been because they found other, undetonated IEDs that were equipped with cell phones.

Bombings End Decade of Strikingly Few Successful Terrorism Attacks in U.S.

By SCOTT SHANE

Published: April 16, 2013

WASHINGTON — The bombing of the Boston Marathon on Monday was the end of more than a decade in which the United States experienced strikingly few terrorist attacks, in part because of the far more aggressive law enforcement tactics that arose after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

In fact, the Sept. 11 attacks were an anomaly in an overall gradual decline in the number of terrorist attacks since the 1970s, according to the Global Terrorism Database, one of the most authoritative sources of terrorism statistics, which is maintained by a consortium of researchers and based at the University of Maryland.

Since 2001, the number of fatalities in terrorist attacks has reached double digits in only one year, 2009, when an Army psychiatrist killed 13 people at Fort Hood, Tex., officials say. That was a sharp contrast with the 1970s, by far the most violent decade since the tracking began in 1970, the database shows.

But the toll of injuries in the double bombing in Boston, with 3 dead and 176 wounded, ranks among the highest casualty counts in recent American history, exceeded only by Sept. 11, the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the poisoning of restaurant salad bars with salmonella bacteria by religious cultists in Oregon in 1984.

“I think people are actually surprised when they learn that there’s been a steady decline in terrorist attacks in the U.S. since 1970,” said Gary LaFree, a University of Maryland criminologist and the director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, which maintains the database.

In the 1970s, about 1,350 attacks were carried out by a long list of radical groups, including extremists of the left and the right, white supremacists, Puerto Rican nationalists and black militants, Dr. LaFree said. The numbers fell in the 1980s, as the groups were eroded by arrests and defections, and again in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had inspired or covertly supported some violent leftist groups, Dr. LaFree said.

He said there were about 40 percent more attacks in the United States in the decade before Sept. 11 than in the decade after.

“As a result of 9/11, there’s been a revolution in the way law enforcement treats this problem,” Dr. LaFree said. “Police agencies, led by the F.B.I., are far more proactive. They’re interrupting the plots before the attacker gets out the door.”

Spectators at the Boston Marathon described a heavy security presence, as has become standard at public events since 2001, including bomb-sniffing dogs that were deployed before the race. But the attack demonstrated an adage in counterterrorism: security officials have to be good all the time, and terrorists have to be good only once.

The terrorism consortium counted six past marathons disrupted by violent episodes: three in Northern Ireland and one each in Bahrain, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The only deaths occurred in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 2008, when a Tamil Tiger militant blew himself up as a marathon started, killing 14 people and wounding 83 others.

Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University, said that a marathon was a particularly difficult event to secure. “It’s a 26-mile route, densely packed in places, and you can’t search people the way you can for a stadium event,” he said.

One other statistic offers a cautionary note as investigators search for clues about the identity of the perpetrators of the Boston attack. About half of the attacks worldwide, and nearly a third of those in the United States, have never been solved, Dr. LaFree said.

Dr. Adam B. Hall, a forensic chemist and former crime-scene analyst for the Massachusetts State Police, teaches at the Boston University School of Medicine, home to a highly regarded forensic-science program. He had just left campus on Monday, around 3 P.M., when ambulances screamed past him on Massachusetts Avenue, which connects the South End of the city with the Back Bay, where thousands of marathon runners were still making their way toward the finish line, at Copley Square. Hall figured the urgency was due to an unusually high number of fatigued or injured runners. Then along came a bomb-squad truck, an unmistakable sight for Hall, who has processed hundreds of crime scenes, most involving arson and explosives.