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For the third article in my Reading the game series, I will dive into one of my own favorite game franchises, Bethesda’s Fallout series. Once again, I will look at it from a philosophical angle, for the simple reason that philosophy is my own field, and I want to write some good pieces about it before I take on other classes. Also, that I covered a specific game doesn’t mean I won’t cover it again. On the contrary: there are plenty of games that allow for more than one class or even science to give it a take.

Spoiler warning: this article describes some plot elements from Fallout 4 and the entire Human Error questline. Do not read below this if you plan to play this game in the future.

For this second Reading the game article, I will be taking a look at Deux Ex: Human Revolution, part three of the role-playing game series that started back in 2000, and will see its fourth installment, Mankind Divided, later this year. Human Revolution has some particularly interesting story elements from a philosophical perspective. This article discusses one of these elements and its potential in (philosophy) education in detail, leaving room for additional articles on some of the many elements of this game that have educational potential. Mind that this series is open to all educational applications, I merely focus on philosophy because it is my own field. I would very much like some biological (for example) perspectives on this game, so if you can provide some please don’t hesitate to get in touch.

Spoiler warning: this article describes major plot elements. Do not read below this if you plan to play this game in the future.

Augmentations

If you haven’t played the game and aren’t planning to, Deus Ex: Human Revolution is a so called action role-playing game situated in Detroit, in the year 2027. Sarif Industries, the company for which you, Adam Jensen, work as head of security (official for corporate spy/detective), is one of the world-wide forerunners in augmentations, technologically sophisticated additions to or replacements of human organs that make their owners run faster, jump higher and think quicker (among many other things). The game starts with Jensen waking up after a life-saving surgery operation, now being kept alive by a wide variety of augmentations and prosthetic limbs.

Abstract
In this thesis I investigate the moral contents of the concept of privacy, moral contents interpreted broadly as those elements that directly concern value or a moral obligation or right, as well as those that concern the preconditions for a moral framework, and the concept of privacy understood, wherever it cannot be understood in the abstract, as it is used (in all its variety) in contemporary liberal societies.

Firstly I adopt Daniel Solove’s view that the concept of privacy is better understood in terms of family resemblance than in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, as well as that privacy’s value is instrumental rather than intrinsic. This also leads me to the view that the moral content of privacy does not include moral obligations or rights. The concept of ‘privacy’ has no fixed content, and consequently no normative content in the sense of explicit obligations or rights. The moral content of privacy, I argue, is to be found in the existing moral frameworks that presume it. I investigate two specific moral frameworks, those of German philosopher Immanuel Kant and British philosopher and politician John Stuart Mill. In the first place, I choose specifically these frameworks because Kant and Mill have been, each in their own way, major influences not only on ethical theory, but also on the development of liberalism. Although their ideas of individual liberty and especially its relation to the state were in several respects controversial in their own times, they have been influential on and are still strongly connected to ours, that is. I link their thoughts with the different existing types of privacy (as stipulated by Finn et al.). Discussing their works, I establish two theses about the moral content of the concept of privacy.

The Kantian thesis: insofar privacy violations (as privacy violations) force a will, physically or psychologically, in its operation, and insofar privacy violations (as privacy violations) performed by the state have as a consequence that that state is no longer a means to (or: enables) freedom, Kant’s moral framework provides us with a moral reason to forbid these violations.

The Millian thesis: insofar privacy violations (as privacy violations) harm rather than promote total utility, and insofar privacy violations (as privacy violations) interfere with the sphere of liberties of a person who does not do harm to others, Mill’s moral framework provides us with a moral reason to forbid these violations.

These theses are structured alike, inquiring firstly about the consequences of the privacy violation itself, secondly about the privacy violation being performed legitimately or not, and then, thirdly, establishing whether the literature applies to it. For both frameworks, I argue, the most fruitful path is that of investigating the moral legitimation of state authority, and Kant’s and Mill’s positions can be seen as converging on at least one point, namely that they are able to show that certain specific privacy violations are wrong, not because the acts are wrong in themselves, but because of their context: the violator is the state operating outside of its moral authority.

In chapter four, I show that governments are actually violating all types of privacy (although some on a larger scale than others), and that there is thus a conflict between current practices and the moral frameworks discussed (regardless of the differing arguments underlying those positions). This suggests that certain justifications of privacy violations (like the general motivation of the protection of public health and safety) are not sufficient and should be given more substance. Governments should put more effort in demonstrating why certain privacy violations are needed, and why they weigh up against the interference with individual liberties. A rough sketch of such a proposal would be:

Assure that privacy violations are happening overtly, i.e. assure that citizens know or can know in general terms what kinds of privacy are violated and why, and do not want to find out afterwards that our governments were operating a massive espionage programme on their own citizens.

Assure that privacy violations for the protection of public health and safety are non-discriminatory, i.e. assure that individuals or groups are targeted because there are strong reasons for seeing them as threats (to public health and safety, to the freedoms of others, etc.), not for any other reason.

Assure that if privacy is violated, it is done according to public laws.

Assure that privacy, if it is violated, is violated within the moral authority of the state.

Mind that this is only a rough sketch, and additionally, only concerns privacy violations by states, not by businesses. I hope my findings in this thesis can contribute to shining a light on the moral content of privacy violations by businesses in the future.

– the original assigment (Dutch version, see below) was given a 7.5/10 by Peter Sperber, under Approval of Marcus Düwell

If Immanuel Kant states that we always have to act according to maxims of which we can at the same time will that they become a Universal law, how much does his conception differ from rule-utilism? In this summarized form there seems to be not difference: both principles order a certain way of acting without looking at the consequences per act. I here want to address this question, and argue why there is a difference.

Central in Kant’s ethics is the Categorical Imperative, a universal principle that applies to all reasonable beings. “Act only according to that maxim[1] whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law”, it states.[2] If I can not wish a maxim to be a universal law applying to all reasonable being, it cannot be moral. It is, according to Kant, the only moral obligation, because all other thinkable imperatives serve a goal, and are therefore hypothetical imperatives. As long as an act is not done from the principle of duty, it has no moral worth, even when it brings happiness to you and to the other.

Utilitarianism (utilism in short) defends the so-called greatest happiness principle, which says that the right thing to do is the act that brings as much happiness as possible to as many as possible people.[3] This almost per definition requires the use of rules, because calculating for each act what the possible consequences are is theoretically and practically impossible. Utilism knows two main conceptions on how to deal with these rules. Act-utilism says that these rules may be broken when this causes more happiness in a specific situation, rule-utilism states that one has to accept a set of rules that one is not allowed to break, even if the exception would bring more happiness about. The fact that a number of rule-utilitarians uses sub-rules that make exceptions possible indirectly is left out of consideration here, because with these sub-rules, the distinction between act- and rule-utilism blurs so much that it would make answering the question impossible.

To the question whether there is a difference between the conceptions of Kant and rule-utilism I surely can say “yes, there is.” In short, the two seem similar because both give strict rules for moral behavior, but in essence they differ strongly.

This difference lies in the fact that rule-utilism gives rules to block the possibility of bizarre exceptions. As an act-utilitarian it would not at all be problematic to cheat on your wife if that produced more overall happiness. Richard Brandt, among others, gives this as an argument against act-utilism.[4] Although the categorical imperative does not allow exceptions in a similar way, rule-utilism gives rules with a goal in mind, where the categorical imperative is characterized by its being a goal in itself. Because rule-utilism in the end judges the morality of a set of rules (not of the rules in themselves), it is a consequentialist (also teleological) ethical theory; a theory that states that the outcomes of actions determine the moral worth. Kant’s ethical theory morally judges actions on basis of their motivations, and therefore of a fundamentally different kind, a deontological: an ethical theory based on rules, that looks at the motivated action instead of only the consequence. The rule-utilitarian thus assumes that morality is a means to general happiness, whereas Kant states that morality exists in itself, has no external purpose. It is the expressing of the free will of the person. In short: rule-utilism says that happiness is the greatest good, Kant says the good will is.

Stephen Darwall formulates the underlying normative difference as follows: the rule-utilitarian believes that together we are all responsible for everyone’s happiness, where Kant states that together we are all responsible for the conditions that are necessary for supplying everyone in what they need for living their (moral) lives.[5]

A last difference is the following: a formulation of the categorical imperative that Kant names is that you must always treat people as ends, never as means. [6] Utilism puts everything in the service of the greater happiness, through which humanity (man-hood) automatically becomes a means.

So once again, yes, Kant’s view differs widely from utilism’s. Kant’s ethical theory is first of all a deontological, not a teleological. The set of moral rules of rule-utilism is given to promote a greater good, the categorical imperative has morality as a goal in itself. Then there are some differences in, for example, how the two treat acts concerning humanity (man-hood) and the conception of the greatest good. More than enough to separate the two.

– the original paper (Dutch version, see below) was given a 7.8/10 by Jos Philips

In ‘Eradicating Systemic Poverty – Brief for a Global Resources Dividend’ Thomas Pogge does a proposal for resolving extreme poverty. The proposal is meant to show that “there are feasible alternatives for the current global economic order, that the choice among these alternatives makes a substantial difference to how much severe poverty there is worldwide.” Also, according to Pogge, there are strong moral reasons for making this choice. [1] These two claims will be the subject of this paper, my question will be whether Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend (from here on referred to as GRD) actually delivers, and whether it is justified. I will discuss this along the lines of the discussion about the causes of poverty, from which I take Mathias Risse’s position to assess Pogge’s proposal critically. I will state that whether the GRD is justified depends on the use that it produces (with which I mean the decrease of extreme poverty), and that Risse’s Institutional Stance (to be explained further on) gives good reasons for assuming that Pogge’s GRD is not as useful as it seems, and that with this, the moral justification falls away.

1. Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend

1.1. The Moral Background

A moral duty can be positive or negative. A positive duty is a duty to do something, a negative duty is a duty to not do something. The positive duty usually asks more of the individual, takes more effort to be acted upon. It is harder to do something yourself when you witness a bad situation (someone being threatened) than it is to not do something (threatening someone yourself). The negative duty, however, “weighs” more than the positive duty. We cannot find the positive duty to help people we have nothing to do with. When someone suffers by our actions, however, most of us would say we have a heavily pressing duty to stop this action and thereby the suffering. This is the negative duty.

This is why Pogge tries to deduce a negative duty for our actions regarding extreme poverty. [2] He does this by stating that there is a global institutional order (organizations like the IMF and the WTO), that favors countries that are already relatively rich, and thereby keeps the poorer countries small. He also names other causes like corruption and the political structures of these countries , but I will return to that. It is so that, because of our being inhabitants of the countries that are members of this global institutional order, we actively cooperate in the maintaining of the poverty in the countries that have little to say in this order. We thus cause suffering actively, and because we would morally reject this in a situation closer to home, we should do the same at this level. This is the primary argument of Pogge’s “Assisting the global poor.” In ‘Eradicating systemic poverty’ he involves the claim that radical inequality in itself is already a violation of the negative duty. Pogge defines radical inequality with five conditions that have to be satisfied:

1. The worse-off are very badly off in absolute terms.

2. They are also very badly off in relative terms very much worse off than many others.

3. The inequality is impervious: it is difficult or impossible for the worse-off substantially to improve their lot; and most of the better-off never experience life at the bottom for even a few months and have no vivid idea of what it is like to live in that way.

4. The inequality is pervasive: it concerns not merely some aspects of life, such as the climate or access to natural beauty or high culture, but most aspects or all.

5. The inequality is avoidable: the better-off can improve the circumstances of the worse-off without becoming badly off themselves. [3]

But with this, we do not yet have a negative duty. That follows from a certain addition to these conditions. Further conditions follow from three different approaches to the grounds of injustice of radical inequality: (a) the effects of shared social institutions, (b) the uncompensated exclusion from natural resources and (c) the effects of a common violent history. [4]

At (a), to the list above are added the following conditions:

6. There is a shared institutional order that is shaped by the better-off and imposed on the worse-off.

7. This institutional order is implicated in the reproduction of radical inequality in that there is a feasible institutional alternative under which such severe and extensive poverty would not persist.

9. The better-off enjoy significant advantages in the use of a single natural resource base from whose benefits the worse-off are largely, and without compensation, excluded.[6]

At (c) to the conditions 1-5 is added the following condition:

10. The social starting positions of the worse-off and the better-off have emerged from a single historical process that was pervaded by massive, grievous wrongs. [7]

However, we do not have to choose sides, because all three approaches will judge the existing radical inequality as unjust and its coercive upholding as a violation of the negative duty, and all three approaches can agree about the same feasible reform of the status quo as a major step toward justice. An example of that is the GRD. [8]

1.2. The Global Resources Dividend

The GRD, in short, means that the ones who extensively use the earth’s natural resources have to compensate to the ones who unwillingly make little use of them. The proposal, intentionally moderate (governments maintain possession over the resources), is not drawn out in detail, but Pogge examines what effects a GRD of 0,67 percent of the global product would have on extreme poverty.[9] So that’s about the magnitude involved.

The GRD, in the first place, has to be “easy to understand and apply.” Also, it must have only a small impact on the price of goods consumed to satisfy basic needs. Also, it has to be focused on resource uses whose disencouragement is especially important for conservation and environmental protection. About the more detailed aspects, Pogge gives several directives, but I will not explain these here. No doubt one could see countless practical and philosophical problems in them, but that is not the issue here.

2. The causes of poverty and Risse’s defense of the institutional stance

The relevant point from Risse’s paper ‘What we owe to the global poor’, which I discuss here, is the question for the causes of economic growth or the lack of it. According to Risse, there are three notable approaches of this problem:

2. Integration: Growth is primarily determined by world market integration.

3. Institutions: Prosperity depends on the quality of institutions, such as stable property rights, rule of law, bureaucratic capacity, appropriate regulatory structures to curtail at least the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behavior, and graft, quality and independence of courts, but also cohesiveness of society, existence of trust and social cooperation, and thus overall quality of civil society. [10]

Of course Risse’s formulation of these approaches is already in the favor of the last one because of the much more distinguished definition and versatility, but that is no problem for his stance in the debate.

The wealth of countries is often dependent on multiple factors, like the other two stances and human history and choices, he admits. However, institutions are of vital importance for wealth. He concludes this from a heap of empirical data he refers to. The causality of institutions is crucial, he even says. The quality of institutions influences market integration vastly, and vice versa, and geography influences the quality of institutions. “It is mostly through their impact on institutions that geography and market integration matter without undermining the causal efficacy of institutions.” [11] So, altogether, it looks something like this: Geography has some influence on how institutions are formed. With good institutions global market integration can be set up, which influences wealth positively. However, with bad institutions, the goods that come in through market integration fall in the hands of a country’s elites and thus have no effect on overall wealth. Institutions take a central position in this scheme, and through this are crucial for the generating of wealth.

For a further defense of this Institutional Stance I refer to Risse’s paper, and for an elaboration within a broader theory I refer to John Rawls’ ‘The Law of Peoples’[12]. We have already seen Pogge giving more attention to integration than to institutions, and thus my question is what implications this view on the importance of institutions has for Pogge’s GRD, in the first place on the effects of it.

3. The use of the GRD and the institutional stance

Before answering the question of this paragraph, I will first shortly summarize what are Pogge’s grounds for thinking that a GRD will be useful in the first place. (‘use’ defined as the effectively reducing of global poverty) Poverty is so extreme in some parts of the world, Pogge states, that only a small GRD will already make things much better than they are now. [13] Although it is the norm of the United Nations since 1970 already that members transfer 0,7percent of their national product to development aid, this is hardly happening. But let’s assume a number of richer countries would cooperate with this proposal.

“Present radical inequality is the cumulative result of decades and centuries in which the more affluent societies and groups have used their advantages in capital and knowledge to expand these advantages ever further. This inequality demonstrates the power of long-term compounding more than powerful centrifugal tendencies of our global market system. It is, then, quite possible that, if radical inequality has once been eradicated, quite a small GRD may, in the context of a fair and open global market system, be sufficient continuously to balance those ordinary centrifugal tendencies of markets enough to forestall its reemergence.”[14]

I here assume “its reemergence” means something like the reappearance of extreme poverty. It’s still possible that a greater GRD is needed to eradicate extreme poverty and come to an acceptable distribution profile. This is in short why Pogge thinks a GRD would be useful.

A question that he does not address is the question where the money will end up. Will it really be used for eradicating poverty? Or will the money fall into the hands of the corrupt government or rich elite of a country? This is where Risse takes stance and (on the first question) answers “No”. We first have to make sure that the countries possess decent institutions so the country can be economically healthy and just of its own. About this, Pogge says that in some cases it might be so that the leader(s) of a country might have an interest in “keeping their subjects, destitute, uneducated, docile, dependent, and hence exploitable.” For these cases, he provides alternatives: (1) In these cases there first has to be searched for other ways to improve their conditions and chances. (2) If this is not possible, the money is better invested in a country where it does have the desired effect. (3) And even when the incentives of the GRD disbursement rules may not always be successful, they at least shift the political balance in the right direction. For a bad government, it is harder to prevent a coup when the people are supported from the outside and have interests in GRD-accelerated economic improvements under a different government. [15]

Pogge covers a wide range of objections, but I do want to make some remarks on these defenses.

(1) This shows well that the GRD as Pogge imagines it is still much undeveloped. In a decently developed GRD there will have to be a list of priorities, and more important, a final goal. Risse gives a good account of this in his theory, he shows well how far to go in the giving of aid. But whatever the goal is, the countries that may not be considered at first because there is no reasonable way of improving the situation with monetary aid will at some point in the future remain. And that is what Pogge does not consider.

(2) The problem is exactly that the countries where aid is most needed are the countries where monetary aid is least sufficient. Corruption, a strong dictatorial regime, a powerful army and little facilities is what makes it so hard to give aid efficiently, and at the same time, they are the problems for the country. When applying the GRD, people will quickly face the problem that extreme poverty is located in the countries that are hardest to help.

(3) This is a very hypothetical argument, and mainly assumes a certain sympathy for the rest of the proposal. In reality, it is so that many “bad” governments are rich enough to keep themselves in position for several years, simply by means of violence. On this point, the international community can mean a lot, but this is outside of Pogge’s proposal, and secondly, the removal of a “bad” government is no guarantee for a good new one. Besides, when GRD-money ends up in a country with a bad government like discussed earlier, the money will only remain in this country (countries like these often export more than they import), and as long as a bad government rules, the corruption and inequality will in the end only work advantageous for the ones already in power.

Pogge himself admits multiple times (implicit and explicit) that it is very important for wealth that a government functions well, and in ‘ “Assisting” the Global Poor’ he names the influence of corruption and malfunctioning governments as well. Therefore, my question is why he confines his proposal to the transferring of money, and doesn’t aim for founding good institutions. As a goal of the GRD, he simply leaves this out of view in the texts here discussed, and out of the above, I want to conclude that the GRD is by far not sufficiently developed to really prove its use, especially considering Risse’s defense of the Institutional Stance. But how about the moral arguments?

4. The justification of the GRD and the Institutional stance

In paragraph one I discussed Pogge’s foundation for the duty to help. Pogge formulates his GRD in line with the approach of the causes of inequality that says that radical inequality is caused by the uncompensated exclusion of natural resources (b). This fits the other approaches of the causes of inequality, he says.

[16] Now the justification of the GRD depends mainly on the use it has. From the negative duty, Pogge deduces that we either have to stop taking part in the global institutional order, or that we have to compensate for the damage we do. The first is no realistic option; after all we are civilians of a country that is a member of the institutions that make up this order. So we have to compensate the damage we do, and thus we have to join in whatever does this best. This implies that, now we have seen that the GRD might not be useful in cases where the institutions in a country are of poor quality, the moral justification falls away. There is an alternative that can mean more for the global poor, potentially, that does not consist of transferring money but of building better institutions. Now we can ask ourselves whether Pogge would find it a problem when the GRD would be used to set up quality institutions. I think not, and thus it turns out that Pogge’s story has not been held in vain. Only there are good reasons to spend the money differently, and Risse’s proposal (in the vein of Rawls) is a really good candidate.

– the original paper (Dutch version, see below) was given a 7.8/10 by Rob van Gerwen

Colors, Barry Maund states in his article ‘Color’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosohpy, “are of philosophical interest for two kinds of reasons. One is that colors comprise such a large and important portion of our social, personal and epistemological lives and so a philosophical account of our concepts of color is highly desirable. The second reason is that trying to fit colors into accounts of metaphysics, epistemology and science leads to philosophical problems that are intriguing and hard to resolve. Not surprisingly, these two kinds of reasons are related. The fact that colors are so significant in their own right, makes more pressing the philosophical problems of fitting them into more general metaphysical and epistemological frameworks.”[1] I would like to add to the list of theories in which it is hard to apply a theory of color that of aesthetics. Not only are colors especially relevant for the object of aesthetics: the beautiful, but several important aesthetic theories were developed in a time when multiple definitions of color were also rapidly developing: Goethe published his book on colors Zur Farbenlehre in 1810, and later in the 19th century, physicists like Maxwell and Helmholtz confirmed the theory of Isaac Newton from the early 18th century. In this paper, I want to compare two aesthetic theories, with a focus on the notions of color of their authors. These are Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) and his great predecessor in aesthetics, David Hume (1711 – 1776). I will start with Kant’s distinction between the material and the formal, and will show how he (successfully) deals with a number of problems concerning color. From here, I will jump to the contemporary physical/physiological description of the process of color perception, and show that Kant’s notion of color in combination with his aesthetics, considering the contemporary definition of color, stands stronger than Hume’s, which I will also shortly explain.
In short, Kant’s analysis of the judgment of taste revolves around two things. Everyone has his/her own opinions about works of art, and people have a hard time convincing each other of the beauty of a thing. Still, there is something in judgments of taste that makes us suspect that our judgment is about more than just an opinion, there is a certain universality to it (the antinomy of taste).[2][3] In short, the explanation lies, according to Kant, in the fact that our judgments of taste are founded on a concept, but that this concept is vague, indefinite. So we suspect that we have a grounded opinion, but we can hardly convince others that they have chosen the wrong view on a certain object of art. If we ourselves want to make a pure judgment of taste, Kant says, we have to found it on subjective purposiveness, and very importantly, make it without interest, unhindered by charm/excitement and emotion (Reiz und Rührung). Only then the judgment is pure. What “genius” is, what true art is, what the experience of beauty and how this fits within Kant’s epistemology I will not discuss here, because for the rest of this paper, it is (highly) suggested as base knowledge, but it is not needed for my conclusion.

Traditionally, the formal aspects of our states of mind are associated with what is communicable, not the material aspects. Therefore the grounds of a judgment of taste would in some way be formal and not material. Charm/excitement (arousement may also be a fitting translation) is more of a direct effect of the objects on us, and it requires little to no reflection from us. The communicability is of great importance, at least for Kant, and for him it is a reason to say that charm is of such a different category that it cannot play a part in stating the pure judgment of taste. It always disturbs impartiality.[4]To clarify this problem, it is useful to repeat the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.[5] “The primary qualities of an object are properties which the object possesses independent of us — such as occupying space, being either in motion or at rest, having solidity and texture. The secondary qualities are powers in bodies to produce ideas in us like color, taste, smell and so on that are caused by the interaction of our particular perceptual apparatus with the primary qualities of the object.”[6] We may say that secondary qualities are rather less formal and communicable, and that primary qualities thus are of more relevance for our judgments of taste (for Kant, something non-communicable cannot help form a pure judgment of taste at all). [7]Now, in the contemporary qualia debate, but also in Kant’s time there are/were theories that state(d) that secondary qualities are reducible to spatio-temporal structures: primary qualities. This debate is far from over, and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is probably in no way as simple as the definition stated above may cause to suspect. On top of that, we are far from sure whether primary and secondary qualities are coextensive with the formal and material aspects of a work of art, so when, in forming a judgment of taste, we abstract from charm and emotion, we are still not sure whether we have abstracted from all secondary qualities.[8]

Kant is aware that secondary qualities are possibly reducible to primary ones. This does not at all mean that this would be a weak point in his theory. If colors and tones turn out to belong to the formal aspects, says Kant, this might, consistent with his theory, simply lead to a pure judgment of taste. What we used to regard as colors and tones simply turn out to belong to the formal structure (we can form pure judgments of taste about them now), and our feelings of excitement and emotion turn out simply to be delight in the beautiful.

“If one assumes, with Euler([9], JJK), that the colors are vibrations (pulsus) of the air immediately following one another, just as tones are vibrations of the air disturbed by sound, and, what is most important, that the mind does not merely perceive, by sense, their effect on the animation of the organ, but also, by reflection, perceives the regular play of the impressions (hence the form in the combination of different representations) (about which I have very little doubt), then colors and tones would not be mere sensations. They would be nothing short of formal determinations of the unity of a manifold of sensations, but would already be a formal determination of the unity of a manifold of them, and in that case could also be counted as beauties in themselves. [10]”

From this follows that, when all secundary qualities are reducible to primary ones, we can, for example, see the colors in a painting as intrinsically beautiful. But can we then, in the description of a painting, make a distinction between colors and shapes, and if not, isn’t this problematic? And is there something more to a painting than the colors, which in fact are reducible to shapes? With the separation of formal and material aspects we could see a painting as a whole that causes two kinds of states of mind in us: formal and material. Now we treat color as causing a formal state of mind in us, en we can only see the painting as form that is color, or color that is shape. Isn’t there something that distinguishes color from form here, even with this new notion of color?

In discussing these problems, I will not talk about tones, because for the relevant part, perception of color and sound for humans are similar. The question we have to ask is: given a certain definition of color perception (Euler’s, for example), how does Kant’s theory deal with it?
To clarify the situation, I will first shortly describe modern color theory. When electromagnetic radiationhas a wavelenght within the range of what humans can perceive, it is called ‘light’. The spectrum of light is determined by the intensity of different wavelenghts. The full spectrum of light that falls on an object determines how the object appears to us. A surface that absorbs all wavelengths fully is called ‘black,’ while a surface that reflects all wavelengths fully is called ‘white.’ Light itself has no color! Distinguishing colors is possible through three different types of cells in the retina, called ‘cones.’ Our visual acuteness is greatest in the so called yellow spot, diametrical opposite the lens. [11][12](see figure)

Color blindness can help us understand how much colors are inside of us. With color blindness, one or more types of cones do not work properly. As a result, less colors are perceived. Kant wasn’t aware of details like this, but from his perspective, it is maintainable that reflected light becomes color only when it is perceived by us, until when it is nothing more than a collection of wavelengths (like modern physicists maintain[13]). The quotation above (If one assumes, with Euler, that the colors are vibrations (pulsus) of the air immediately following one another, (…)) implies that vibrations in the air are the colors. The stated contemporary definition does not state this. It states that wavelengths that reached the eye that were perceived are colors, and that without present humans capable of visual perception, there would be no color.[14] Modern color theory does reduce colors to spatio-temporal structures, but involves human activity (perception). Thus color can be completely explained in material terms, but does not become a primary quality according to Locke’s definition because it is still dependent of us. With this definition we can still make the distinction between color and shape, because color requires activity from us, humans. There thus is no need to apply the alternative that Kant discussed with reference to Euler, and Kant’s theory corresponds with the above explained color theory perfectly.

Someone who does get into trouble with the explained theory is Kant’s great predecessor in (among others) aesthetics: David Hume. Hume was an empiricist, and his aesthetics is greatly empirically designed. That is not of the greatest importance here, though. What matters is that Hume was, concerning colors, a subjectivist. Objectivism, concerning colors, opposes that and states that names for colors refer to qualities in reality. Hume, on the other hand, believed that we project colors on reality, and that names for colors do not refer to objects in that reality. It follows from his skeptical position that he was extra careful with deriving “truths” from the empirical. Colors are objects of our perception, but there is nothing we can deduce from that they are properties of the objects.
Hume’s empirical aesthetics concern, in short, emotions caused by objective properties, properties we can discuss, while our emotions remain subjective. A judgment of taste expresses an emotion, a sentiment of beauty. An object has certain objective qualities that, through perception in the spectator, cause a certain emotion, that makes him/her attribute a certain quality to the object. A judgment of taste depends on the concepts with which the object is named and on the kind of beauty that is perceived in it.[15] After experiencing the sentiment of beauty, what we call the search for intelligibility takes place, and finally we want to communicate our judgments.

However, just like the way Hume’s notion of colors and the contemporary theory stated simply contradict, Hume’s aesthetics, with which we are concerned here, is hardly thinkable with a theory that in such a way assumes an origin of color perception in “reality.” One of Hume’s most widely known objections on empirical science was that causality, he said, in itself is not derivable. When frequently perceiving the same series of events, we gain some sort of habit. This happens strictly in our minds. We derive nothing from external reality.[16] Without causality’s certainty, we don’t have the certainty of the truth of the theory described. Hume’s aesthetics can’t be imagined with a description of color that fully contradicts his epistemology. When we assume one thing as true, we undermine the other thing, and vice versa.
What becomes clear is at least that the theories of Hume and Kant, as far as this goes, are of different kinds. Kant gives an aesthetic theory that distinguishes formal and material aspects. Although this might not seem plausible in all contexts, Kant is prepared for a changing definition of color (and sound) perception. Hume, on the contrary, makes assertions on color perception that is safe as long as we accept his remarks on deriving knowledge from reality. However, we can’t just grab a new definition of color that assumes we can derive knowledge from reality, and insert it in his theory.
Hume’s skepticism, and his refusing to acknowledge that colors (partly) have their origin in reality is a well defendable position, but incompatible with the modern scientific that says that colors are our perceptions of reflected light. As far as concerns the strictly argumentative maintainability, we better knock at Hume’s door. But when we are looking for a theory (from that period, at least) that is able to deal with physical/physiological development of the following decennia, (which are not to be disregarded, to say the least) Kant seems to be the better option.

“If one assumes, with Euler([8], JJK), that the colors are vibrations (pulsus) of the air immediately following one another, just as tones are vibrations of the air disturbed by sound, and, what is most important, that the mind does not merely perceive, by sense, their effect on the animation of the organ, but also, by reflection, perceives the regular play of the impressions (hence the form in the combination of different representations) (about which I have very little doubt), then colors and tones would not be mere sensations. They would be nothing short of formal determinations of the unity of a manifold of sensations, but would already be a formal determination of the unity of a manifold of them, and in that case could also be counted as beauties in themselves. [9]”