Espuelas, Sergio
2017.
POLITICAL REGIME AND PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING IN SPAIN: A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS (1850-2000).
Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History,
Vol. 35,
Issue. 03,
p.
355.

This article analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel data set of Spanish provinces in 1880–1914, we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime's global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation.

Wallis, John Joseph. “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending Revisited, Again: with and without Nevada.” Explorations in Economic History35, no. 2 (1998): 140–70.

Wallis, John Joseph, and Weingast, Barry R.. “Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Infrastructure Investment in the Antebellum Era.” NBER Working Paper No. 11397, Cambridge, MA, June 2005.