The firing of Professor Marc Lamont Hill as a CNN contributor after his speech at a United Nations event commemorating the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People has generated considerable debate about free speech that goes beyond the case itself—what is legitimate criticism of Israel, and what constitutes anti-Semitism. A recent University of Maryland public-opinion poll indicates that many aspects of Hill’s views are widely shared among the American public—and that these views are not reflective of anti-Semitic attitudes, or even of hostility toward Israel as such. On these issues, there is a gap between the mainstream media and U.S. politicians on the one hand, and the American public on the other.

While many issues were raised about Hill, the part of his speech that received the most criticism was his call for a “free Palestine from the river to the sea,” which was seen by some as calling for the end of Israel. Hill himself clarified almost immediately that “my reference to ‘river to the sea’ was not a call to destroy anything or anyone. It was a call for justice, both in Israel and in the West Bank/Gaza.” In an op-ed he penned later, he acknowledged that the language he chose may have contributed to the misperception that he was advocating violence against Jewish people—and apologized for that.

But, perceptions aside, are Professor Hill’s views exceptional?

The first issue to consider is advocacy for a one-state solution, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, with equal citizenship for all, which would in effect threaten Israel’s status as a Jewish-majority state, as Arabs might soon outnumber Jews on that territory. In fact, this solution has considerable support among the American public, as revealed in a University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, fielded by Nielson Scarborough, which was conducted in September and October among a nationally representative sample of 2,352 Americans, with a 2 percent margin of error. When asked what outcome they want U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration to seek in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Americans are split between one state with equal citizenship and two states coexisting side by side: 35 percent say they want a one-state solution outright, while 36 percent advocate a two-state solution, 11 percent support maintaining the occupation, and 8 percent back annexation without equal citizenship. Among those between 18 and 34 years old, support for one state climbs to 42 percent.

Furthermore, most of those who advocate a two-state solution tend to choose one state with equal citizenship if the two-state solution were no longer possible; the last time the survey asked this question, in November 2017, 55 percent of two-state solution backers said they would switch to one state in such circumstances. Bolstering this result is Americans’ views on the Jewishness and democracy of Israel: If the two-state solution were no longer possible, 64 percent of Americans would choose the democracy of Israel, even if it meant that Israel would cease to be a politically Jewish state, over the Jewishness of Israel, if the latter meant that Palestinians would not be fully equal.

When one considers that many Israelis and Palestinians, as well as many Middle East experts, already believe that a two-state solution is no longer possible, especially given the large expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, it’s not hard to see why more people would be drawn to a one-state solution—or see the advocacy for two states as legitimizing the unjust status quo through the promise of something unattainable.

Second, while most Americans have probably never heard of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement that Hill backs, our poll shows that a large number of Americans support imposing sanctions or more serious measures if Israeli settlements in the West Bank continue to expand: 40 percent of Americans support such measures, including a majority of Democrats (56 percent). This comes as senators, including Democrats, are proposing, despite continued ACLU opposition, to delegitimize and criminalize voluntary boycotts of Israel or settlements through the Israel Anti-Boycott Act, while not differentiating between Israeli settlements in the West Bank from those in Israel proper.

Third, there is a growing sense that the Israeli government has “too much influence” on U.S. politics and policies: 38 percent of all Americans (including 55 percent of Democrats, and 44 percent of those under 35 years old), say the Israeli government has too much influence on the U.S. government, compared with 9 percent who say it has “too little influence” and 48 percent who say it has “about the right level of influence.” While the number of Jewish participants in the sample (115) is too small to generalize with confidence, it is notable that their views fall along the same lines of the national trend: 37 percent say Israel has too much influence, 54 percent say it has the right level, and 7 percent say it has too little influence.

These results indicate neither a rise in anti-Semitism nor even a rise in hostility toward Israel as such. As analysis of previous polls has shown, many who espouse these opinions base them on a principled worldview that emphasizes human rights and international law.

Keep in mind that, in a polarized America with deep political antagonism, it’s hardly surprising that Americans would have sharply divided views on Israelis and Palestinians. What many read as a rising anti-Israeli sentiment among Democrats is mischaracterized; it reflects anger toward Israeli policies—and increasingly, with the values projected by the current Israeli government.

On the question of whether Americans want the Trump administration to lean toward Israel, toward the Palestinians, or toward neither side, there is a vast difference between Republicans and Democrats in the new poll: While a majority of Republicans want Washington to lean toward Israel outright (57 percent), a substantial majority of Democrats (82 percent) want it to lean toward neither side, with 8 percent wanting it to lean toward the Palestinians and 7 percent toward Israel. Still, it’s inaccurate to label the Democrats’ even-handedness as “anti-Israel.”

It’s hardly surprising that Democrats are unhappy with the current Israeli government, which is seen to have tied itself to the Republican Party, to have intervened in Congress against a Democratic president on the critical issue of Iran, and with many of its members publicly opposing the stated aim of negotiations with the Palestinians, a two-state solution to the conflict. And there is an apparent clash of values that goes beyond occupation, into the character of Israel itself. In particular, the recent passing of the Nation-State Basic Law, which defined Israel as a Jewish state without reference to democracy, and bestowed special rights to Jewish citizens over non-Jewish ones—received much criticism, including from top Jewish-American leaders.

Americans and the U.S. government should be worried about genuine anti-Semitism. There has been a documented rise in anti-Semitic incidents. The violent massacre at a Pittsburgh synagogue in October, which left 11 people dead simply for being Jewish, was a reminder that words have consequences, and that the Trump era has emboldened and empowered racists of all types, including anti-Semites. Yet there is little evidence that the number of racists has actually expanded, and some evidence to suggest that the reaction to racist rhetoric in some cases has generated the opposite results. (Attitudes toward Islam and Muslims, for example, haveimproved in the Trump era, despite the anti-Muslim rhetoric.)

With regard to attitudes toward Jews specifically, Americans have strongly favorable attitudes toward Judaism and Jews. In a poll conducted in November 2015, 81 percent of Americans said they have a favorable view of the Jewish religion compared with 37 percent having a favorable view of Islam; 89 percent expressed favorable views of Jews compared to 53 percent having favorable views of Muslims. In our June 2016 poll we asked if Americans would vote for candidates of various religions. Sixty-nine percent said they would vote for a Jewish candidate, compared to 57 percent for an evangelical Christian, and 37 percent for a Muslim candidate. More Democrats (72 percent) than Republicans (67 percent) and independents (57 percent) said they would vote for a Jewish candidate. The prevalent American views toward Israel, especially among Democrats, appear to be expressions of opposition to current Israeli policies and projected values, not “anti-Israel” views, and certainly not an expression of expanding anti-Semitism.

One can agree or disagree with the wisdom of advocating one state or two states, or the desirability and effectiveness of sanctions against Israel or anyone else. These are legitimate views to be debated, and they need to be debated more than ever, as there is a sense that after years of trying, American efforts to mediate conflict are headed toward a dead end, with Palestinians remaining under occupation after 51 years, with no end in sight.

America needs speech that’s free of racism, for sure, but it also needs free speech. Whatever was behind CNN’s decision to fire Hill, it must not be allowed to restrict the mainstream conversation on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when it’s needed most.

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By Shibley Telhami
The firing of Professor Marc Lamont Hill as a CNN contributor after his speech at a United Nations event commemorating the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People has generated considerable debate about free speech that goes beyond the case itself—what is legitimate criticism of Israel, and what constitutes anti-Semitism. A recent University of Maryland public-opinion poll indicates that many aspects of Hill’s views are widely shared among the American public—and that these views are not reflective of anti-Semitic attitudes, or even of hostility toward Israel as such. On these issues, there is a gap between the mainstream media and U.S. politicians on the one hand, and the American public on the other.
While many issues were raised about Hill, the part of his speech that received the most criticism was his call for a “free Palestine from the river to the sea,” which was seen by some as calling for the end of Israel. Hill himself clarified almost immediately that “my reference to ‘river to the sea’ was not a call to destroy anything or anyone. It was a call for justice, both in Israel and in the West Bank/Gaza.” In an op-ed he penned later, he acknowledged that the language he chose may have contributed to the misperception that he was advocating violence against Jewish people—and apologized for that.
But, perceptions aside, are Professor Hill’s views exceptional?
The first issue to consider is advocacy for a one-state solution, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, with equal citizenship for all, which would in effect threaten Israel’s status as a Jewish-majority state, as Arabs might soon outnumber Jews on that territory. In fact, this solution has considerable support among the American public, as revealed in a University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, fielded by Nielson Scarborough, which was conducted in September and October among a nationally representative sample of 2,352 Americans, with a 2 percent margin of error. When asked what outcome they want U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration to seek in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Americans are split between one state with equal citizenship and two states coexisting side by side: 35 percent say they want a one-state solution outright, while 36 percent advocate a two-state solution, 11 percent support maintaining the occupation, and 8 percent back annexation without equal citizenship. Among those between 18 and 34 years old, support for one state climbs to 42 percent.
Furthermore, most of those who advocate a two-state solution tend to choose one state with equal citizenship if the two-state solution were no longer possible; the last time the survey asked this question, in November 2017, 55 percent of two-state solution backers said they would switch to one state in such circumstances. Bolstering this result is Americans’ views on the Jewishness and democracy of Israel: If the two-state solution were no longer possible, 64 percent of Americans would choose the democracy of Israel, even if it meant that Israel would cease to be a politically Jewish state, over the Jewishness of Israel, if the latter meant that Palestinians would not be fully equal.
When one considers that many Israelis and Palestinians, as well as many Middle East experts, already believe that a two-state solution is no longer possible, especially given the large expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, it’s not hard to see why more people would be drawn to a one-state solution—or see the advocacy for two states as legitimizing the unjust status quo through the promise of something unattainable.
Second, while most Americans have probably never heard of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement that Hill backs, our poll shows that a large number of Americans support imposing ... By Shibley Telhami
The firing of Professor Marc Lamont Hill as a CNN contributor after his speech at a United Nations event commemorating the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People has generated considerable debate about ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/06/%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%81-%d9%8a%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a5%d8%b5%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ad-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%88%d8%b1-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%ba%d8%b2%d9%91%d8%a9/كيف يتم إصلاح الأمور في غزّةhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/584024418/0/brookingsrss/topics/israel~%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%81-%d9%8a%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a5%d8%b5%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ad-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%88%d8%b1-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%ba%d8%b2%d9%91%d8%a9/
Thu, 06 Dec 2018 14:04:15 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=551600

Executive Summary

Situation Overview

A crisis is unfolding in the Gaza Strip. Its nearly 2 million residents live amid a man-made humanitarian disaster, with severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Three rounds of open warfare have devastated Gaza while endangering Israel, and the situation remains on the brink of another conflict. Gaza’s deterioration further fosters instability in neighboring Sinai while creating opportunities for external extremist influence. Moreover, the continued political and physical separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank hinders Palestinian national development while making a two-state solution even more remote. Given the moral, security, and political costs of this state of affairs, the United States should no longer accept its perpetuation.

A standoff has persisted since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, leading to an ugly and predictable pattern of events. Hamas has repeatedly turned to violence to build political support in Gaza and apply pressure on Israel. Israel, with support from Egypt and, in recent years, from the Palestinian Authority (PA), has used a blockade to deter Hamas and deprive it of materiel. This dynamic has led to intermittent bouts of conflict. When the situation escalates, the international community has stepped in, led by Egypt and the U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), to negotiate fragile, temporary cease-fires and marginal economic relief for Gaza. After each conflict, however, no long-term resolution has been found for the severe differences between Israel, Hamas, the PA, and Egypt, and thus the pattern has repeated itself with no end in sight.

U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has focused primarily on final status negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. This limited attention has led to reactive and unimaginative American policy toward Gaza. When Hamas first took power, the United States responded by pursuing a policy that attempted to isolate and then dislodge the group from Gaza. When that failed, the United States shifted to a more passive approach, deferring to others. Throughout, policymakers treated the Gaza Strip as a side issue that would resolve itself once peace was achieved. With no peace agreement likely in the near future, a proactive U.S. policy on Gaza, as part of a broader approach to the Israeli-Palestinian challenge, can no longer wait.

A New American Approach

The authors recommend a new U.S. policy toward Gaza. This will not require a fundamental shift in objectives, but it will demand both a major change in the strategies and tools the United States uses to achieve them and greater American engagement.

U.S. policy toward Gaza should pursue two central objectives:

Stabilize Gaza, address the dire humanitarian and economic conditions, and prevent, or if necessary shorten, any future conflicts between Hamas and Israel.

Pursue the political and physical reintegration of Gaza and the West Bank in a manner that promotes a two-state solution and avoids the permanent separation of the two territories.

These objectives are consistent with past U.S. policy and international efforts that have prioritized either intra-Palestinian reconciliation or a long-term cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. These efforts have failed, in part because they were pursued independently of each other, and they lacked international coordination and proactive U.S. involvement.

Tension exists between these two objectives, and pursuing them simultaneously is difficult. A policy focused on addressing the immediate emergency in Gaza risks reducing pressure on Hamas and legitimizing it, thus weakening the PA in any reintegration negotiation. A policy focused solely on reintegrating Gaza and the West Bank may take years, during which time the humanitarian crisis will likely worsen. Despite this tension, U.S. policy can and should pursue both objectives, recognizing the balance required and managing the necessary tradeoffs between conflicting imperatives. From these two objectives, the authors derive a strategy consisting of three lines of effort, which should be pursued with far greater intensity than in the past:

Use vigorous diplomatic and economic means to alleviate the humanitarian, economic, and security emergency in Gaza.

In close consultation with other partners, actively support a political process that simultaneously pursues the reintegration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a long-term cease-fire between Israel and a group of Palestinian factions that includes Hamas and Fatah and that has the blessing of the PLO, managing the necessary tradeoffs between conflicting imperatives.

Plan for contingencies, most importantly another major conflict between Israel and Hamas.

While shifting away from the West Bank-first policy, the United States must avoid a Gaza-only strategy that ignores the peace effort between Israel and the PLO. Such neglect would cement Palestinian division, empower Hamas at the expense of the PA, and scuttle any chance of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal in the future.

A new U.S. policy toward Gaza will not require a fundamental shift in objectives, but it will demand both a major change in the strategies and tools the United States uses to achieve them and greater American engagement.

Before the United States can credibly promote a resolution of the crisis in Gaza, however, it must walk away from several major recent policy decisions. It must recommit to pursuing a two-state solution and act in a manner that supports that objective. This includes restoring U.S. funds to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), especially for its vital Gaza operations, and finding ways to close the breach with the PA that followed the decisions to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and subsume the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem into the U.S. Embassy. Without such a commitment, many critical players – most importantly the PA – will view American efforts with deep suspicion, worrying that the U.S. focus on Gaza is simply an effort to permanently separate the Palestinian polity and foreclose the possibility of a two-state solution. This must not be the U.S. objective, and it must not be seen as such. As long as the Trump administration continues to pursue its current policies, any effort by the United States to take on a greater role in Gaza will be dead on arrival.

Allow new categories of individuals to regularly and reliably travel from Gaza to Israel, the West Bank, and elsewhere.

Double Egyptian supply to over 50 Megawatts.

Double the water supply from Israel.

Support PA resuming salary payments but rationalizing them down over time.

Once U.S. assistance is restored, double U.S. staffing footprint in Gaza.

Ease significantly import and export restrictions.

Double Israeli supply to 200-240 MW.

Accelerate sewage treatment.

Appoint an economic coordinator who reports directly to the special envoy.

Permanently ease fishing restrictions.

Long-term, large-scale desalinization.

Build online resource center to coordinate international donors.

Reopen and develop industrial zones on Gaza side of the border.

Immediate Stabilization

Given Gaza’s size and population density, its economy cannot function while closed. Even if its nearly 2 million residents were provided with access to unlimited electricity and water, they could not afford to buy it without jobs. Such jobs could only be provided within the context of a viable economy, and a viable Gazan economy requires a vastly freer flow of people and goods as well as the provision of water and electricity. These issues, in other words, are deeply connected – without progress on all, progress on any one area will be limited.

Several steps should be taken to increase freedom of movement and economic activity. Israel should gradually reissue permits to residents of Gaza to work in Israel, increasing their number from a small initial amount over time, and it should also allow new categories of people to leave Gaza for business and professional training. Other key steps include: reopening and upgrading industrial zones just inside Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt; expanding fishing zones off the Gaza coast; and easing dual-use restrictions on imports as well as other restrictions on exports.

The international community should simultaneously work to address the water and electricity emergencies directly. Israel and Egypt should take steps to boost the supply of electricity they make available for sale in Gaza, as both have indicated they are keen to do, while the PA should reduce the cost of fuel in Gaza so its power plant can operate at greater capacity. Renewable sources of energy, such as solar fields inside and just outside of Gaza, can be quickly and cheaply developed. Support from international donors will continue to be necessary to provide for Gaza’s short-term electricity expenses until improving economic conditions allow Gaza’s residents to pay for it themselves.

To increase the supply of potable water, international aid should focus on existing infrastructure and fixing a rampant problem of leaky pipes, and on short- and long-term desalination projects. More water should be piped in from Israel. Continued funding is also necessary to guarantee electricity for Gaza’s main sewage treatment plant. In addition, Israel should ease its dual-use restrictions to allow in the materials needed to complete the construction of new sewage treatment plants.

If the United States is to play a serious and credible role in improving the situation in Gaza, Washington should go beyond these areas, resuming funding to UNRWA so it can restore services in Gaza, restoring and indeed expanding the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance that goes to Gaza, and supporting cash-for-work programs. The United States should also at least double its local-hire Gaza staffing footprint, consider allowing American officials to re-enter Gaza after a 15-year absence, and create a senior position focused on improving the situation on the ground in both the West Bank and Gaza to knit together the various relevant U.S. government entities both in Washington and the region. This person should report directly to the senior U.S. official responsible for overseeing the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Sustainable Political Arrangements

The authors recommend working toward a sustainable political arrangement on two pillars, pursued as part of a wider initiative: (1) an agreement between the PA and Hamas on the gradual reintegration of the West Bank and Gaza, and (2) a long-term cease-fire between Israel and a group of Palestinian factions that includes Hamas and Fatah and that has the blessing of the PLO.

Numerous efforts to pursue these tracks independently have failed. Integrating them would bring a greater chance of success. For example, a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas would require the easing of the blockade, which is only possible with Israeli consent, a much harder prospect without a PA presence in Gaza. Similarly, reintegration without a serious cease-fire would last only as long as the quiet lasts, as a new major Hamas-Israel conflict would make it impossible for the PA to continue to simultaneously integrate with Hamas while maintaining peace with Israel.

Table 2. Summary of a Sustainable Political Arrangement

Hamas

PA/PLO

Israel

Accept the PLO’s continued role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Allow for the establishment of a joint committee for consultation on governance that would include Fatah, Hamas, and other key political parties and draw its legitimacy from the PLO.

Agree to Palestinian reintegration and to working with a Palestinian national unity government, including people acceptable to, if not members of, Hamas.

Agree to abide by a long-term cease-fire in Gaza.

Agree to a process to reintegrate the public-sector workforce in Gaza.

Agree to meaningful gestures to the PA/PLO in the West Bank such as the reclassification of a portion of Area C into Area B.

Suspend military operations in the West Bank.

Take a much more proactive posture in supporting infrastructure and long-term economic development in Gaza. Play a central role as part of the delegation that negotiates a long-term Gaza cease-fire.

Agree to significant long-term relaxation of restrictions on the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza, most importantly by offering a meaningful number of work permits for the residents of Gaza.

Freeze any expansion of its military capabilities, destroy its attack tunnels, commit to not launch rockets, and agree to a gradual process for dismantling its offensive capabilities.

Retake control of the ministries responsible for key services inside Gaza.

Agree not to hold the PA/PLO responsible for any and all rocket fire or other attacks coming out of Gaza – instead continuing to hold Hamas directly responsible.

Relinquish its control of key civilian governing ministries inside Gaza.

Gradually insert PA security forces to Gaza, first at the border crossings and over time inside the Strip.

Agree to a process to reintegrate the public-sector workforce in Gaza.

Work toward a long-term vetting process to integrate its security forces in Gaza with PA security forces, which would gradually re-enter Gaza starting with the border crossings.

Should such an arrangement succeed, Hamas would see an end to the Gaza Strip’s economic strangulation and could relinquish unwanted governing responsibilities in Gaza while being included in Palestinian political decision-making. Israel would receive sustained long-term quiet. And the PA would receive both the national unity ordinary Palestinians desire in overwhelming numbers and actions from Israel and/or international players that strengthen its position in the West Bank and signal progress toward a two-state solution.

This proposal would require concessions by all parties. Hamas would have to agree to a long-term suspension of hostilities, allow the PA back into the Gaza Strip, and enter into a process that would include significantly reducing its military capabilities. Israel would have to significantly ease restrictions on the movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza, despite its security concerns, and hold Hamas, not the PA, responsible for infringements of the cease-fire. Israel would also have to agree to one meaningful step inside the West Bank to signal to the PA its continued commitment to a two-state solution. The PA would have to retake control over the ministries faced with the daunting task of servicing Gaza’s battered population while accepting Hamas’ inclusion in Palestinian-wide decision-making. Both Israel and the PA would also have to accept that Hamas would retain some of its military capabilities for the time being.

While this agreement may be unlikely today, the authors believe that when a moment of opportunity presents itself, it is the political formula most likely to succeed.

A Greater American Role in Orchestrating a Solution

The strategy described requires effective coordination between the many interested international actors. This can only be achieved if the United States uses its influence to help coordinate the effort in close partnership with Egypt and UNSCO. The United States should not attempt to take over the process, pushing out other key players, as its limited influence with the Palestinian actors means it cannot single-handedly solve this problem. The United States does not engage with Hamas and the authors do not recommend opening any such direct channel. Additionally, the United States’ relations with the PA have soured dramatically in recent months. The United States does, however, have the greatest influence of any actor with Israel, the various Gulf states, the European Union (EU), and many European countries, and so has a special role to play in this effort.

The United States, UNSCO, and Egypt should work quietly in concert, engaging with Israel, the PA, Hamas, and the international community on a common vision for the economic development of Gaza, while simultaneously the United States and UNSCO can forge ahead with an economic development agenda for the West Bank. Once goals and methods are aligned, the parties should form an international coalition in which outside players can take coordinated leadership roles in various subsectors or projects. As part of this effort, the United States should back an international mechanism being set up by UNSCO to provide more direct, emergency relief in Gaza.

A similar U.S.-Egyptian-UNSCO partnership should guide the pursuit of a long-term political arrangement. Egypt and UNSCO can bring their leverage with Hamas and the PA and experience in previous intra-Palestinian reconciliation and Israel-Hamas cease-fire negotiations, while the United States can offer its unique influence with other actors. Egypt, UNSCO, and the United States, consulting with the parties, should agree on a common political plan and rally the other external actors.

As part of this effort, the United States should both press the Gulf states and Arab League to publicly pressure Hamas to accept the authority of the PA and encourage the constructive role Qatar has played in providing aid to Gaza, but make sure the Qatari message to Hamas is that the Egyptian-U.N.-U.S. plan is the only political option. Europe should present the PA with incentives to enter into a political arrangement and provide pressure when necessary. Getting agreement from Israel, Hamas, and the PA/PLO will still be extraordinarily difficult, but a campaign coordinated between all the external actors has the greatest likelihood of success.

Table 3. Coordination of Key Roles by External Actors

United States

Play the role of international coordinator, pressing all of the external actors to line up behind an Egypt-U.N.-U.S. approach.

Use its special relationship with Israel to encourage it to end the blockade, take steps in the West Bank that strengthen the PA, and show it is serious about a two-state solution.

Re-establish some influence and leverage with the PA by reversing some of the recent policy shifts.

Egypt

Continue to play the role of mediator between the PA and Hamas in negotiating a reintegration arrangement.

Work with Israel on loosening the blockade, using its strong defense relationship and geographic location.

Provide additional electricity to Gaza in the near term.

Play a role in monitoring and execution of any agreement.

U.N./UNSCO

Take on a greater role in implementing projects inside Gaza.

Act as real-time mediator between Israel and Hamas.

Given the U.N.’s central role in the PA’s internationalization strategy, encourage the PA to be more flexible in taking on a greater role in Gaza.

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates

Incentivize Israeli and PA cooperation in an agreement on Gaza by offering openings to Israel and financial aid to the PA and projects in Gaza.

Make a declaratory statement supported by the Arab League that affirms the importance of “one authority, one gun” in Gaza.

Qatar

Continue to act as a significant donor for financial projects inside Gaza. Coordinate carefully with UNSCO and the United States to make sure these projects reinforce the Egypt-UNSCO-U.S. plan.

Ensure that any political mediation does not conflict with the Egyptian role.

Europe

Incentivize PA cooperation, such as by offering greater recognition and diplomatic support, tied to progress on Gaza.

Reprogram funding and assistance if the PA is not cooperative in pursuing a constructive solution for Gaza or tries to financially strangle Gaza.

Provide economic and political incentives and disincentives for Israel as part of a Gaza package.

Non-EU countries, especially Switzerland and Norway, can play a constructive role in encouraging and echoing the political plan with Hamas and coordinating aid from Europe into Gaza.

Switzerland and Norway can assist in the implementation and monitoring of any agreement.

Jordan

Use its relationship with the PA and Israel to press both sides to agree to the Egypt-U.N.-U.S. plan.

Turkey

Provide funding for projects inside of Gaza but only through the agreed funding mechanism. Coordinate carefully with UNSCO and the United States to make sure these projects reinforce the Egypt-UNSCO-U.S. plan.

Avoid (and be dissuaded by the United States from) playing a role in the political mediation process other than reinforcing support for the Egypt-UNSCO-U.S. plan.

Contingency Planning

American policy should prepare for significant changes in the political landscape that may create severe challenges but also new opportunities. The most important scenario would be a major new military conflict between Israel and Hamas. The United States should also be ready for a change in Israeli or Palestinian leadership that could create new opportunities for a breakthrough.

The United States should do everything possible to prevent fighting. However, should conflict break out, it could create a moment in which all sides feel immense pressure to be more flexible. In such a scenario, the United States and the international community should avoid the temptation to again take the simplest route, with Egypt negotiating a “quiet-for-quiet” deal that ends immediate hostilities but preserves the status quo. Instead, the parties should pursue a more detailed and comprehensive agreement such as the one outlined below.

Such an agreement cannot possibly be developed from scratch in the middle of a fast-paced war. If the United States were to pursue the political arrangements recommended in this report now, however, the groundwork could be laid for the parties to accept this outcome in a moment of crisis. Thus, even if the PA, Israel, and Hamas are not yet ready to accept such a formula today, pursuing it now could facilitate its success in the future.

Conclusion

The situation in Gaza holds extraordinary challenges, and the authors recognize that the critical parties may reject these proposals many times before they have a chance to succeed. The framework laid out in this report, however, presents the best chance to escape the present situation. In proposing an effort focused both on the political reintegration of the Palestinian polity and the stabilization of Gaza, in the short and long terms, the authors aim to move past the failed policies of the past dozen years. The United States can contribute greatly to this effort. It should take on a far more active role, working closely with other external actors, Israel, and the Palestinians to end the perpetual disaster in Gaza.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/GazaAirstrike_001.jpg?w=291By Hady Amr, Ilan Goldenberg, Kevin Huggard, Natan Sachs
Executive Summary
Situation Overview
A crisis is unfolding in the Gaza Strip. Its nearly 2 million residents live amid a man-made humanitarian disaster, with severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Three rounds of open warfare have devastated Gaza while endangering Israel, and the situation remains on the brink of another conflict. Gaza’s deterioration further fosters instability in neighboring Sinai while creating opportunities for external extremist influence. Moreover, the continued political and physical separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank hinders Palestinian national development while making a two-state solution even more remote. Given the moral, security, and political costs of this state of affairs, the United States should no longer accept its perpetuation.
A standoff has persisted since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, leading to an ugly and predictable pattern of events. Hamas has repeatedly turned to violence to build political support in Gaza and apply pressure on Israel. Israel, with support from Egypt and, in recent years, from the Palestinian Authority (PA), has used a blockade to deter Hamas and deprive it of materiel. This dynamic has led to intermittent bouts of conflict. When the situation escalates, the international community has stepped in, led by Egypt and the U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), to negotiate fragile, temporary cease-fires and marginal economic relief for Gaza. After each conflict, however, no long-term resolution has been found for the severe differences between Israel, Hamas, the PA, and Egypt, and thus the pattern has repeated itself with no end in sight.
U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has focused primarily on final status negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. This limited attention has led to reactive and unimaginative American policy toward Gaza. When Hamas first took power, the United States responded by pursuing a policy that attempted to isolate and then dislodge the group from Gaza. When that failed, the United States shifted to a more passive approach, deferring to others. Throughout, policymakers treated the Gaza Strip as a side issue that would resolve itself once peace was achieved. With no peace agreement likely in the near future, a proactive U.S. policy on Gaza, as part of a broader approach to the Israeli-Palestinian challenge, can no longer wait.
A New American Approach
The authors recommend a new U.S. policy toward Gaza. This will not require a fundamental shift in objectives, but it will demand both a major change in the strategies and tools the United States uses to achieve them and greater American engagement.
U.S. policy toward Gaza should pursue two central objectives:
- Stabilize Gaza, address the dire humanitarian and economic conditions, and prevent, or if necessary shorten, any future conflicts between Hamas and Israel. - Pursue the political and physical reintegration of Gaza and the West Bank in a manner that promotes a two-state solution and avoids the permanent separation of the two territories.
These objectives are consistent with past U.S. policy and international efforts that have prioritized either intra-Palestinian reconciliation or a long-term cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. These efforts have failed, in part because they were pursued independently of each other, and they lacked international coordination and proactive U.S. involvement.
Tension exists between these two objectives, and pursuing them simultaneously is difficult. A policy focused on addressing the immediate emergency in Gaza risks reducing pressure on Hamas and legitimizing it, thus weakening the PA in any reintegration negotiation. A policy focused solely on reintegrating Gaza and the West ... By Hady Amr, Ilan Goldenberg, Kevin Huggard, Natan Sachs
Executive Summary
Situation Overview
A crisis is unfolding in the Gaza Strip. Its nearly 2 million residents live amid a man-made humanitarian disaster, with severe urban crowding, ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/03/how-to-fix-gaza/How to fix Gazahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/583487230/0/brookingsrss/topics/israel~How-to-fix-Gaza/
Mon, 03 Dec 2018 14:00:47 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=550476

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By Hady Amr, Ilan Goldenberg, Kevin Huggard, Natan Sachs

Crisis remains the baseline in Gaza, and wider conflict always looms near. Recent weeks reinforced this reality, as Israel and Hamas teetered on the edge of catastrophe after an Israeli covert incursion into Gaza was exposed, nearly leading to another war that nobody wanted.

None of this is new. A bloody cycle has been repeating itself for over a decade. Hamas uses demonstrations and violence to pressure Israel, and Israel uses an economic blockade, tacitly supported by Egypt, as well as military actions to pressure and contain Hamas. Eventually an incident of some sort leads to a significant explosion—just as we saw in recent weeks.

Then, after a certain amount of violence, Egypt and the U.N. typically mediate a deal to end the fighting. This sometimes comes after the sides have suffered just a handful of casualties, but sometimes after many more—as was the case in 2014 when war led to over 2,100 Palestinian and over 70 Israeli deaths. Through this mediation, Israel agrees to some marginal economic relief for Gaza in exchange for an unstable short-term ceasefire. The parties never move beyond this toward a more sustainable political deal, and the tragic cycle repeats itself, again and again.

The United States, which has spent most of its energy on that elusive “deal of the century” between Israelis and Palestinians, is ill-prepared for these rounds of conflict and therefore quietly supports short-term quiet-for-quiet deals. It wants an immediate solution that addresses the humanitarian situation, but fears that such a deal will reward Hamas for bad behavior and give it the economic benefits it needs to permanently consolidate power in Gaza, separating it from the West Bank and harming the prospects of a two-state solution.

The biggest losers in all of this are the nearly two million people of Gaza, which is just twice the size of Washington, D.C. They live in terrible conditions, with an economy that has nearly ground to halt. As only a few hundred Palestinians, on average, are able to exit Gaza every day, unemployment has risen to one of the highest rates on earth—over 50 percent. Severe shortages of electricity and clean drinking water also plague Gaza—97 percent of the water in its aquifer is unfit for human consumption. Meanwhile, the people of southern Israel are routinely subject to rocket fire and the burning of their fields by incendiary kites.

Ironically, the latest fighting comes soon after an apparent breakthrough. In early November, with Israeli consent, suitcases full of Qatari cash entered the Gaza Strip and reached Hamas—a move that was intended to be an early step towards reducing tensions. Israel and Hamas, when not killing each other, appear ready to reach some sort of accommodation, and to accept some political risk to do so.

Neither Israel nor Hamas wants to keep fighting, but they have not found a way out.

Herein lies another tragedy of the Gaza Strip. Neither Israel nor Hamas wants to keep fighting, but they have not found a way out on which they can agree. And so they perpetuate the status quo while civilians on all sides suffer.

The Hamas leadership wants an end to the blockade but wants to stay in power. It is willing to enter a long-term ceasefire and even to give up some of its responsibility for governance in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority (PA), but insists on keeping its weapons.

Israeli leadership wants an end to the fighting but fears that relieving the blockade will further legitimize Hamas and allow it to rearm or build attack tunnels. As it heads into an election year, Israel’s freedom of maneuver is also highly constrained by domestic politics. Netanyahu’s wise but unpopular decision in November to avoid a broader war led to wide criticism from both the right and the left and resulted in the resignation of Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman.

The Palestinian Authority leadership, which governs in the West Bank and has renounced violence against Israel, fears that any deal between Israel and Hamas will permanently separate Gaza from the West Bank and legitimize Hamas. But it wants no part of ruling Gaza unless Hamas gives up its weapons and has objected to any international deals that would strengthen Hamas like the one recently approved by Israel.

The situation is further complicated by the wide array of external diplomatic players, including Egypt, the European Union, Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. These actors have somewhat conflicting interests in Gaza and none has the leverage to singlehandedly force a solution. Instead, by working at cross-purposes, they tend to make things worse.

Here’s what might work: The United States and Egypt, with the Office of the U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, should agree—as key influencers to the parties—on a joint framework, get the rest of the international community on board, and push it in times of both conflict and peace. Such a framework would join short- and long-term economic stabilization initiatives with the political arrangements needed to avert conflict and achieve the reintegration of Gaza and the West Bank.

As a first step, the plan should include immediate steps to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, among them measures to drastically improving the supply of water and electricity. But more important will be allowing greater freedom of movement for Palestinian people and goods in and out of Gaza, including the issuing of some number of permits for residents of Gaza to work in Israel, where many thousands once worked in the 1990s. Indeed, it is this freedom of movement that lies at the core of the economic crisis in Gaza, which cannot be alleviated unless Gaza is opened to the world.

The plan must also include a sustainable political deal that includes all three main parties: Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas. As part of this, Hamas must commit to a long-term ceasefire and gradual, though probably imperfect, demilitarization. Israel must agree to significantly ease the blockade on Gaza as part of the ceasefire. And the Palestinian Authority must agree to slowly resume control over elements of governance in Gaza, even while Hamas retains some weapons. Further, Hamas would receive a role in future Palestinian decisionmaking, but only through accepting the supremacy of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). And, finally, Israel would need to take significant positive steps in the West Bank to strengthen the footprint of the PA’s control to signal that this deal is wider than just Gaza, incentivizing the PA’s participation and providing the foundation for a long-term solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

We recognize that the arrangement we propose contains a number of component parts that have proven difficult to achieve in themselves. Yet their realization becomes more likely—although still far from easy—in combination, with benefits for each actor balancing the concessions required of them, and with the weight of the coordinated international actors behind them. Still, our proposal faces many obstacles and at present would likely not have buy-in from all the relevant parties. Its achievement may only be possible with the extreme pressures the parties would face in the middle of another war or with changes of leadership or policy from Israel, the Palestinians, and the United States.

Nonetheless, short of comprehensive peace, this framework is the most viable option we see to ending the perpetual crisis in Gaza, which itself is a key component to broader Israeli-Palestinian peace. Therefore, the international community can and should start working together now to set the table for this solution, even if it is still years away. Israelis and Palestinians deserve better than this perpetual cycle of violence and economic malaise.

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By Hady Amr, Ilan Goldenberg, Kevin Huggard, Natan Sachs
Crisis remains the baseline in Gaza, and wider conflict always looms near. Recent weeks reinforced this reality, as Israel and Hamas teetered on the edge of catastrophe after an Israeli covert incursion into Gaza was exposed, nearly leading to another war that nobody wanted.
None of this is new. A bloody cycle has been repeating itself for over a decade. Hamas uses demonstrations and violence to pressure Israel, and Israel uses an economic blockade, tacitly supported by Egypt, as well as military actions to pressure and contain Hamas. Eventually an incident of some sort leads to a significant explosion—just as we saw in recent weeks.
Then, after a certain amount of violence, Egypt and the U.N. typically mediate a deal to end the fighting. This sometimes comes after the sides have suffered just a handful of casualties, but sometimes after many more—as was the case in 2014 when war led to over 2,100 Palestinian and over 70 Israeli deaths. Through this mediation, Israel agrees to some marginal economic relief for Gaza in exchange for an unstable short-term ceasefire. The parties never move beyond this toward a more sustainable political deal, and the tragic cycle repeats itself, again and again.
The United States, which has spent most of its energy on that elusive “deal of the century” between Israelis and Palestinians, is ill-prepared for these rounds of conflict and therefore quietly supports short-term quiet-for-quiet deals. It wants an immediate solution that addresses the humanitarian situation, but fears that such a deal will reward Hamas for bad behavior and give it the economic benefits it needs to permanently consolidate power in Gaza, separating it from the West Bank and harming the prospects of a two-state solution.
The biggest losers in all of this are the nearly two million people of Gaza, which is just twice the size of Washington, D.C. They live in terrible conditions, with an economy that has nearly ground to halt. As only a few hundred Palestinians, on average, are able to exit Gaza every day, unemployment has risen to one of the highest rates on earth—over 50 percent. Severe shortages of electricity and clean drinking water also plague Gaza—97 percent of the water in its aquifer is unfit for human consumption. Meanwhile, the people of southern Israel are routinely subject to rocket fire and the burning of their fields by incendiary kites.
Ironically, the latest fighting comes soon after an apparent breakthrough. In early November, with Israeli consent, suitcases full of Qatari cash entered the Gaza Strip and reached Hamas—a move that was intended to be an early step towards reducing tensions. Israel and Hamas, when not killing each other, appear ready to reach some sort of accommodation, and to accept some political risk to do so.
Neither Israel nor Hamas wants to keep fighting, but they have not found a way out.
Herein lies another tragedy of the Gaza Strip. Neither Israel nor Hamas wants to keep fighting, but they have not found a way out on which they can agree. And so they perpetuate the status quo while civilians on all sides suffer.
The Hamas leadership wants an end to the blockade but wants to stay in power. It is willing to enter a long-term ceasefire and even to give up some of its responsibility for governance in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority (PA), but insists on keeping its weapons.
Israeli leadership wants an end to the fighting but fears that relieving the blockade will further legitimize Hamas and allow it to rearm or build attack tunnels. As it heads into an election year, Israel’s freedom of maneuver is also highly constrained by domestic politics. Netanyahu’s wise but unpopular decision in November to avoid a broader war led to wide criticism from both the right and the left and resulted in the resignation of Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman. ... By Hady Amr, Ilan Goldenberg, Kevin Huggard, Natan Sachs
Crisis remains the baseline in Gaza, and wider conflict always looms near. Recent weeks reinforced this reality, as Israel and Hamas teetered on the edge of catastrophe after an Israeli ... https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/recommendations-for-us-policy-toward-gaza/Recommendations for US policy toward Gazahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/582750348/0/brookingsrss/topics/israel~Recommendations-for-US-policy-toward-Gaza/
Wed, 28 Nov 2018 22:31:58 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=podcast-episode&p=550195

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By Hady Amr, Ilan Goldenberg, Natan Sachs, Adrianna Pita

In between spikes of violence, the people of the Gaza Strip live in a state of perpetual crisis—a man-made humanitarian disaster of severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. A high-level task force, assembled by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, examined U.S. options for addressing the ongoing crisis in Gaza and will issue a report with recommendations for a change of strategy to tackle both the near-term humanitarian challenges as well as the long-term political problems plaguing the Gaza Strip.

In this episode, CNAS Middle East Security Program Director Ilan Goldenberg, Brookings Center for Middle East Peace Director Natan Sachs, and Brookings Visiting Fellow Hady Amr—directors of the task force—lay out the critical challenges in Gaza and highlight the role the U.S. can play in bringing an end to this continued state of crisis.

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By Hady Amr, Ilan Goldenberg, Natan Sachs, Adrianna Pita
In between spikes of violence, the people of the Gaza Strip live in a state of perpetual crisis—a man-made humanitarian disaster of severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. A high-level task force, assembled by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, examined U.S. options for addressing the ongoing crisis in Gaza and will issue a report with recommendations for a change of strategy to tackle both the near-term humanitarian challenges as well as the long-term political problems plaguing the Gaza Strip.
In this episode, CNAS Middle East Security Program Director Ilan Goldenberg, Brookings Center for Middle East Peace Director Natan Sachs, and Brookings Visiting Fellow Hady Amr—directors of the task force—lay out the critical challenges in Gaza and highlight the role the U.S. can play in bringing an end to this continued state of crisis.
Upcoming report launch: Ending Gaza's perpetual crisis
Show notes:
- Merging the US consulate and embassy in Jerusalem shows US is no longer truly pursuing a two-state solution - In one move, Trump eliminated US funding for UNRWA and the US role as Mideast peacemaker - Podcast: What’s next for Israel and the Palestinians 25 years after Oslo?
Direct download this episode (mp3)
With thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo, Chris McKenna, Brennan Hoban, Fred Dews, Camilo Ramirez, and interns Churon Bernier and Tim Madden for additional support.
Listen to Intersections here, on Apple Podcasts, or now on Spotify. Send feedback email to intersections@brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.
Intersections is part of the Brookings Podcast Network. By Hady Amr, Ilan Goldenberg, Natan Sachs, Adrianna Pita
In between spikes of violence, the people of the Gaza Strip live in a state of perpetual crisis—a man-made humanitarian disaster of severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, ... https://www.brookings.edu/events/ending-gazas-perpetual-crisis/Ending Gaza’s perpetual crisishttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/581313002/0/brookingsrss/topics/israel~Ending-Gaza%e2%80%99s-perpetual-crisis/
Tue, 20 Nov 2018 16:39:58 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=event&p=548297

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An acute crisis has been unfolding in the Gaza Strip for over a decade. Its nearly 2 million residents live amid a man-made humanitarian disaster, with severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Three rounds of open warfare have devastated Gaza while placing Israelis under constant threat. Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in fighting, again illustrating the precarious balance of this situation. Moreover, the continued political and physical separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank hinders Palestinian national development while making a two-state solution even more remote.

On December 3, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and the Center for a New American Security launched their new report, “Ending Gaza’s Perpetual Crisis: A New U.S. Approach.” The authors, informed by the deliberations of a high-level task force on the future of U.S. policy toward Gaza, argue that the United States should no longer accept the perpetuation of the current state of affairs in Gaza, given its moral, security, and political costs. They propose instead a route by which American policymakers can help bring an end to this continued state of crisis.

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Washington, DCpast15438492001543856400America/New_YorkAn acute crisis has been unfolding in the Gaza Strip for over a decade. Its nearly 2 million residents live amid a man-made humanitarian disaster, with severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Three rounds of open warfare have devastated Gaza while placing Israelis under constant threat. Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in fighting, again illustrating the precarious balance of this situation. Moreover, the continued political and physical separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank hinders Palestinian national development while making a two-state solution even more remote.
On December 3, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and the Center for a New American Security launched their new report, “Ending Gaza’s Perpetual Crisis: A New U.S. Approach.” The authors, informed by the deliberations of a high-level task force on the future of U.S. policy toward Gaza, argue that the United States should no longer accept the perpetuation of the current state of affairs in Gaza, given its moral, security, and political costs. They propose instead a route by which American policymakers can help bring an end to this continued state of crisis. An acute crisis has been unfolding in the Gaza Strip for over a decade. Its nearly 2 million residents live amid a man-made humanitarian disaster, with severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including ... https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/how-will-political-strife-in-israel-impact-trumps-deal-of-the-century/How will political strife in Israel impact Trump’s ‘Deal of the Century’?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/581166320/0/brookingsrss/topics/israel~How-will-political-strife-in-Israel-impact-Trump%e2%80%99s-%e2%80%98Deal-of-the-Century%e2%80%99/
Mon, 19 Nov 2018 21:32:33 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=podcast-episode&p=548859

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By Natan Sachs

Natan Sachs, director for Middle East Policy, discusses how recent events in Israeli politics, including corruption accusations against Prime Minister Netanyahu, a controversial ceasefire with Hamas, and the cancelled resignation of Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, will impact the upcoming Israeli elections and Trump’s ‘Deal of the Century’ for Middle East peace.

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By Natan Sachs
Natan Sachs, director for Middle East Policy, discusses how recent events in Israeli politics, including corruption accusations against Prime Minister Netanyahu, a controversial ceasefire with Hamas, and the cancelled resignation of Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, will impact the upcoming Israeli elections and Trump’s ‘Deal of the Century’ for Middle East peace.
Related content:
The two things that will determine Netanyahu’s fate
In Trump we trust? Israel and the Trump administration
Why Israel is stuck with Hamas
Subscribe to Brookings podcasts here or on iTunes, send email feedback to bcp@brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.By Natan Sachs
Natan Sachs, director for Middle East Policy, discusses how recent events in Israeli politics, including corruption accusations against Prime Minister Netanyahu, a controversial ceasefire with Hamas, and the cancelled resignation of ... https://www.brookings.edu/media-mentions/20181114-vox-khaled-elgindy/20181114 Vox Khaled Elgindyhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/583904278/0/brookingsrss/topics/israel~Vox-Khaled-Elgindy/
Wed, 14 Nov 2018 21:18:07 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=media-mention&p=551487