Energy Independence and Electricity StorageEnergy Collective... States to achieve energy
independence by 2020. That plan is explained in a little more detail in
a document entitled “A Romney Plan for A Stronger Middle Class: Energy Independence”, which was released earlier this week by the Romney-Ryan campaign.

Iran: Bushehr nuclear reactor reaches full capacityUSA TODAYIran's deputy nuclear chief, Mohammad Ahmadian, said the reactor at the Bushehr power plant was brought to its "full capacity of 1,000 megawatts" Friday evening. The reactor went into operation for the first time last year at minimum capacity. The ...

Report: IAEA's findings may move up plans forYnetnewsThe recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which indicated that Iran is forging ahead with its nuclear program, has strained the tense relationship between the West and the Islamic Republic further. The IAEA's report, released ...

India should deprioritise Nuclear EnergyMoneycontrol.comThe book looks at the history of nuclear power in India. The Department of Energy had made a series of projections for how much nuclear power would contribute to India's energy production over the past 60 years. These projections have not come through.

By Annette Cary. Tri-City Herald. RICHLAND — Early steps in an
investigation into whether one of Hanford's double shell tanks may have a
leak from its inner shell have turned up troubling results. More
unknown material has been found in a third place ...

A second leak of suspected radioactive material at the Hanford Nuclear
Reservation was recently detected, the U.S. Department of Energy
confirmed Friday. As with the first leak revealed last month, the new
material was found in a gap between the walls of a ...

Up to 150,000 gallons of water spilled from a broken pipeline Thursday
at Hanford not too far from one of the most highly radioactive soil
contamination sites known at the nuclear reservation. However, the water
did not reach the spilled radioactive waste ...

Two Hanford workers are being checked for radioactive cesium 137 in
their bodies after a seal on a pipe from a waste storage tank failed. If
they did have an internal uptake of cesium 137, it was at a very, very
low level, said John Britton, spokesman for ...

University of New Mexico Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Science and Technology (http://www.unm.edu/~cnnst/)

At one point John Kennedy predicted there might be over 20 nuclear powers by the mid-1970s – one of the triumphs of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
is the fact that, as of the year 2000, there were fewer than 10 and
only North Korea was added to the total since then. But we know that the A Q Khan network
was selling nuclear weapons technology to anyone with a checkbook –
we’re still not sure exactly who his clients were, but even one would be
too many. And we also know that the US developed a nuclear weapon with
1940s-era technology – every nation on Earth now has access to the level
of knowledge and technology adequate to design their own nuclear
weapons.
Uranium enrichment is one way to produce fissionable materials, but
it’s not the only method – plutonium also explodes quite nicely and
plutonium production is not very hard to do. In fact, every operating
nuclear reactor produces plutonium; a significant fraction of the power
produced by our nuclear reactors comes from the fission of plutonium
that’s produced in the core during normal operations. This means that,
with very few exceptions, every nuclear reactor on Earth produces
plutonium and the spent fuel from these reactors contains this plutonium
– with some chemical processing this plutonium can in theory be
extracted and made into a nuclear weapon. This is one of the downsides
of nuclear energy – the spent fuel is not only intensely radioactive,
but the plutonium it contains must also be safeguarded. This is one of
the trade-offs of nuclear energy – carbon-free baseload power and
plutonium. One of the advantages of the thorium fuel cycle is that is it
more proliferation-resistant than the more typical uranium cycle –
let’s see why.
A quick recap – in a “conventional” nuclear reactor the uranium fuel
holds in the neighborhood of 5% fissionable U-235 and the other 95% or
so is U-238. In the neutron-rich environment of the reactor core the
U-238 atoms capture a neutron to become U-239 and, a few days to weeks
later, the U-239 decays to form Pu-239 – the stuff of which bombs can be
made. This means that 95% of “conventional” reactor fuel has the
potential to become plutonium and the plutonium can be chemically
separated from the uranium to be made into weapons. By comparison, a
thorium-powered reactor uses neutron capture to turn Th-232 into U-233,
which is what fissions. And this is where things get a little
interesting.
First, U-233 is about as fissile as Pu-239 – there’s no getting
around the fact that a thorium-cycle nuclear reactor produces material
that can be made into nuclear weapons. What makes the thorium cycle more
proliferation-resistant is that there are some kickers.
One of these is that the thorium cycle not only produces U-233, but
also U-232 and over time U-232 decays to stability through a slew of
other nuclides. Some of these nuclides emit gamma radiation and one, the
thallium-208 gamma – is a whopper with an energy of 2.6 million
electron volts (by comparison, visible light photons have energies of
several electron volts, x-ray energies are typically in the tens of
thousands of eV (keV), and even most gamma rays have energies of in the
hundreds of keV). As the U-232 ages, the radiation from its progeny will
increase – it can actually become increasingly dangerous to work with
as time goes on. Not only that, but these high-energy gammas are hard to
hide – they are so penetrating that they’ll punch through standard
radiation shielding.
OK – so why not just separate the U-233 a nuclear weapons program
would want from the U-232 that they don’t want? The big reason is that
U-232 and U-233 are chemically identical (unlike plutonium) so removing
the U-232 poses the same challenges as uranium enrichment
– in effect, a nation trying to use the thorium cycle to produce
nuclear weapons would have to face the technical challenges of both
uranium enrichment and running nuclear reactors. It just doesn’t make
sense to pursue this route to a nuclear weapon. It’s possible, of
course, to chemically remove the decay products that produce the gamma
radiation, but it’s just going to keep coming back as long as there’s
any U-232 present; with a half-life of nearly 70 years the U-232 is just
not going to go away anytime soon. Another easy-to-take step can help
to reduce the proliferation threat even further – adding some U-238 to
the mix to make it even more difficult to produce something that will go
boom. And, again, the fact that U-232, U-233, and U-238 are both
chemically identical means that separating the U-238 and U-232 from the
U-233 still requires uranium enrichment. The bottom line is that using
the thorium cycle to produce the material for nuclear weapons is
dangerous and difficult, it’s easy to thwart, and it’s hard to hide the
weapons that are produced.
Of course there’s another route from thorium to a nuclear weapon – trying to breed U-235 or Pu-239
by successive neutron capture. The problem here is that a single
neutron capture is not necessarily a likely event; the odds that an atom
to capture the six neutrons required to turn into Pu-239 is vanishingly
small. Of course it’s easier (and more plausible) to capture two
neutrons to become U-235 but, again, there’s the same problem with
separating U-235 from the rest of the uranium. So this route is also a
non-starter.
So let’s put this together with some other things that have been
happening. In spite of the concerns raised by the Fukushima accident,
many nations are continuing to go forward with their nuclear energy
plans, in addition to the reactors being built by Iran and North Korea.
To some extent it doesn’t matter whether these nations are friendly or
not – conventional nuclear reactors produce plutonium as a byproduct of
normal operation. Nations we don’t trust (e.g. Iran and North Korea) can
separate the plutonium from their spent fuel (and terrorist groups can
try to seize the spent fuel to separate the plutonium). The bottom line
is that any reactor fueled with low-enriched uranium poses a potential
proliferation risk and that the risk from reactors fueled with U-233
that has been bred from Th-232 is far lower.
Finally, I have to admit that when I first started looking into this
particular topic I was somewhat dubious that thorium would live up to
the claims of the pro-thorium crowd in this particular area. I should
add that I wasn’t necessarily dubious that thorium posed a lower
proliferation hazard than uranium, I just wasn’t sure that it would live
up to the hype. But as I looked into it – especially as I dug into the
likelihood of multiple neutron capture and the gamma radiation emitted
by the U-232 decay series nuclides – I realized that thorium-cycle
reactors are every bit as proliferation-resistant as claimed. In a world
in which we worry about both nuclear weapons detonated in anger and
about global warming it seems that thorium-cycle reactors offer a viable
approach to addressing both of these concerns.

The OIG Report on the -12 security breach - dismaying. Go to:
http://energy.gov/node/387253
If you are unable to access this report, please call (202) 586-4128 for assistance.

Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex, IG-0868

We
initiated this inquiry to identify the circumstances surrounding the
Y-12 National Security Complex breach because of the importance of
ensuring the safe and secure storage of nuclear materials. Our review
found that the Y-12 security incident represented multiple system
failures on several levels. We identified troubling displays of
ineptitude in responding to alarms, failures to maintain critical
security equipment, over reliance on compensatory measures,
misunderstanding of security protocols, poor communications, and
weaknesses in contract and resource management. Contractor governance
and Federal oversight failed to identify and correct early indicators of
these multiple system breakdowns. When combined, these issues directly
contributed to an atmosphere in which the trespassers could gain access
to the protected security area directly adjacent to one of the Nation's
most critically important and highly secured weapons-related
facilities. We noted that following the incident, Y-12 and the National
Nuclear Security Administration took a number of actions designed to
improve security at the site. However, the successful intrusion at Y-12
raised serious questions about the overall security approach at the
facility.
Given the unprecedented nature of this security event, prompt and
effective corrective actions are essential. Accordingly, we made
several recommendations for corrective actions in the report. NNSA
management agreed to implement the report's recommendations and outlined
a number of corrective actions it had initiated or completed.
Management's comments were responsive to the report and its
recommendations.

NRC Finalizes Guidance Documents for Post - Fukushima Requirements

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, protecting people and the environment.

NRC NEWSU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOffice of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 E-mail: opa.resource@nrc.gov Site: www.nrc.gov Blog: http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.govAugust 31, 2012NRC FINALIZES GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS FOR POST-FUKUSHIMA REQUIREMENTSThe Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) to U.S. nuclear power plants to ensure proper implementation of three Orders the agency issued in March, in response to lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident.The ISGs represent acceptable approaches to meeting the Orders’ requirements before their Dec. 31, 2016, compliance deadline. The ISGs are not mandatory, but U.S. nuclear power plants would have to seek NRC approval if they wanted to follow a different compliance approach. The NRC issued draft versions of the ISGs on May 31 and asked for public input; the final ISGs reflect information gained from the month-long comment period and subsequent public meetings.The first Order requires all U.S. plants to better protect portable safety equipment put in place after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and to obtain sufficient equipment to support all reactors and spent fuel pools at a given site simultaneously. The ISG for this Order endorses the industry’s updated guidance for dealing with a scenario that knocks out all of a plant’s alternating current electric sources. The updated approach includes the use of backup power supplies for devices that would burn off accident-generated hydrogen before it could accumulate to explosive levels. The staff concludes the updted approach will successfully implement the Order. The ISG is available in the NRC’s electronic document database, ADAMS, under accession number ML12229A174; the associated industry document is available under accession number ML12242A378.The second Order applies only to U.S. boiling-water reactors that have “Mark I” or “Mark II” containment designs. Mark I reactors must improve installed venting systems that help prevent core damage in the event of an accident; Mark II reactors must install these venting systems. The ISG for this Order provides more detailed technical information on the vents, as well as how vent designs and operating procedures should avoid, where possible, relying on plant personnel taking actions under hazardous conditions. The second ISG is available in ADAMS under accession number ML12229A475.The third Order requires all plants to install enhanced equipment for monitoring water levels in each plant’s spent fuel pool. The ISG for this Order largely endorses an industry document that the staff concludes will successfully implement the Order. The ISG defines inNo. 12-097more detail the water levels the new equipment must accurately report, as well as standards for equipment mounting, powering and testing, personnel training and other criteria. The final ISG notes several areas, including instrument qualifications and instrument protection from falling debris, where the industry revised its initial approach. An exception in the staff’s endorsement sets specific seismic criteria to ensure the instruments will survive an earthquake. This ISG is available in ADAMS under accession number ML12221A339; the associated industry document is available under accession number ML12240A304.###News releases are available through a free Listserv subscription or by clicking on the EMAIL UPDATES link on the NRC homepage (www.nrc.gov). E-mail notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are posted to NRC's website. For the latest news, follow the NRC on www.twitter.com/NRCgov.

Article Highlights

The positive elements of the Nuclear Security Summit process pale in
comparison with the selective application of the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime to developing states that seek to create nuclear
power industries.

Despite their failures to fully support nonproliferation efforts,
India, Iran, and North Korea have been treated well under the global
nonproliferation regime, but Pakistan, which vigorously supports the
regime, has been denied membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The importance of protecting nuclear power plants (NPPs) from extreme
natural hazards remains a priority for the nuclear power industry. In
this light, the International Experts' Meeting (IEM) on Protection
Against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunamis in the Light of the Accident at
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant is being convened by the IAEA under the framework of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.
This meeting will take place in Vienna, Austria from 4 to 7 September
2012. More than 120 experts and government officials from 37 countries,
from regulatory bodies, utilities, technical support organizations,
academic institutions, vendors and research and development
organizations will participate in the meeting.
The IEM will discuss technical developments and research programmes
in site evaluation and nuclear plant safety, particularly as they relate
to extreme natural hazards such as earthquake and tsunamis.
The IEM will provide an opportunity to share lessons learned from
recent extreme natural events, including the Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami of 11 March 2011. This earthquake and associated tsunami
affected the Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini, Tokai and Onagawa NPPs
in Japan and triggered the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station.
This was the first NPP accident to arise from the combined hazards of
ground motion and flooding. It highlighted the importance of preparing
not only for a single external hazard, but also the combined effect of
multiple external hazards, in the safety assessment of NPPs, and the
measures for defence in depth.
The IEM will be chaired by Antonio Godoy of Argentina. The IEM will
consist of a plenary session and four technical sessions dealing with
seismic hazard, tsunami hazard, seismic safety and tsunami safety,
respectively. The plenary session will include keynote presentations by
the chairpersons of all the technical sessions. At the technical
sessions, international experts will make presentations focusing on
seven main thematic areas. These include: databases, hazard assessment,
characterization of loading effects, event warning systems, safety
assessment, protective measures and lessons learned.
There will be a closing session on the final day, when the
Co-chairpersons of the technical sessions will present their
conclusions. The Chairperson of the IEM will provide an overall summary
of the meeting.Background
The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, consisting of 12
actions and 39 sub-actions, outlines a programme of work to strengthen
global nuclear safety. Activities include enhancing and strengthening
IAEA expert peer reviews, developing more robust and effective national
regulatory bodies, and strengthening emergency preparedness and
response. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident highlighted the
importance of protecting nuclear power plants against extreme natural
hazards such as earthquakes and tsunamis.
Valuable experience and many lessons have been and are being learned
by Member States and operators in managing NPPs under adverse
conditions. At the IAEA, seismic safety activities are coordinated
through the International Seismic Safety Centre (ISSC). It plays a
leading role in supporting nuclear safety globally. Its work and
research on external events such as earthquakes, tsunamis, tornadoes and
flooding offers the sound, scientifically-proven basis for the
effective implementation of best practices in seismic safety.
The ISSC also compiles a data bank on external hazards and their
impact on NPPs as a resource base for Member States. The latest addition
to the data bank will be the findings from a recent seismic expert
mission to the Onagawa nuclear power station in Japan.-- By Rodolfo Quevenco, IAEA Division of Public Information

ANS’s Nuclear Technology journal for September

By rmichal on Aug 30, 2012 01:00 am

The September 2012 edition of the technical journal Nuclear Technology
is available electronically and in hard copy for American Nuclear
Society member subscribers and others. Nuclear Technology is an
international journal of the American Nuclear Society and is edited by
Dr. Nicholas … Continue reading →Read in browser »

Here's the topic summaries for today's Fukushima Updates. Click the link for the full reports...

After three days of close inspection, the two fuel bundles from #4
Spent Fuel Pool at F. Daiichi have shown no visible damage... Nuclear
energy cutbacks in Japan present a harsh economic reality... Fukushima
Prefecture attacked an environmentalist for an unrealistic threat to
young adults... Tepco reports that the decay heat from F. Daiichi’s
damaged fuel cells caused them to reduce cooling water flows... The
recent results of a nation-wide voluntary survey on nuclear opinion
continue to draw criticism... Finally, the Japanese Press has gone
public with the financial and material drawbacks of replacing nukes with
renewables.

NRC denies license for 3rd reactor in MarylandBusinessweekANNAPOLIS, Md. (AP) — The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
can't issue a license to a French company to build a new nuclear power
plant in Maryland as long as the company is completely foreign owned, a
panel of judges ruled Thursday. The 29-page ...

Nuclear plant returning to full powerDetroit Free PressIt has received more attention since February, when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
labeled it one of the nation's four worst-performing nuclear plants.
The increased scrutiny followed performance and equipment failures. One
lapse was an electrical ...

Unraveling the Nuclear RenaissanceNew York Times (blog)The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
might well have approved the site over these objections, but the
company said the economics were not favorable. On Thursday, a panel of
administrative law judges ruled that Electricite de France could not
proceed with ...

U.S. NRC Blog

San Onofre Senior Resident Inspector Greg Warnick (left) and Resident Inspector John Reynoso at the Dana Point Safety Expo.

This
past weekend, NRC set up information booths at two events that each
drew several thousand attendees. On Thursday, Aug. 23, the resident
inspectors from the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant joined two public affairs officers as well as the Director of the Office of Public Affairs at San Luis Obispo Market Night.

Every
Thursday night, city officials close off the downtown area in San Luis
Obispo and set up a street fair. NRC staffers interacted with about 75
individuals, answering questions on a wide range of issues ranging from
seismic safety to nuclear waste storage and transportation. This is the
third year that NRC has attended the SLO Market Nights, setting up a
booth in order to provide brochures about agency programs and functions
as well as answer questions from members of the community.

On
Saturday, Aug. 25, we did the same thing at a safety expo in Dana
Point, Calif., where we appeared side by side with representatives from
numerous Orange County public safety organizations. We set up a booth
where we were joined by the resident inspectors from San Onofre.

There,
about 200 individuals came to the NRC booth where NRC staffers answered
questions, distributed literature and shared our safety message. We got
lots of questions about steam generator issues at the plant and brought
with us large posters that we used to describe the nature of the
problems and NRC’s role in ensuring public safety.

These
appearances are part of an ongoing effort in Region IV to expand our
public outreach initiatives and develop new ways of communicating the
agency’s mission and public safety goals with the public.

Recently,
Will Davis had the opportunity to ask Matt Miles of
Babcock & Wilcox some questions about the Generation mPower SMR
effort. These questions and answers, as well as technical details, some
great illustrations, and links are available at APR now.