September 20, 2006

Thailand: Background

by hilzoy

dr ngo has graciously agreed to let me front-page his comment on Thailand from Charles' thread. Everything after this point is his -- and you should be grateful for that, since he knows something about Thailand, and I don't. Or didn't, until I read this.

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Desultory Musings on the Thai Coup of 2006

OK, here I am. Have skimmed through many of the useful links provided by CB (and by Spartikus - the Manthorpe piece is nice, though the headline may be misleading, as it omits an "it seems" that Manthorpe carefully inserted in the text) I assume that anyone who wants to can get up to speed fairly quickly with what is known (and still not known). So my role, as I see it, is to provide a bit of perspective.

- First, the disclaimers. It's NOT about Islam. It's NOT about us.

Although there is an Islamic insurgency in the far south of Thailand, it is physically and culturally removed from the center of action, and there's no likelihood whatsoever that this is any kind of Islamic plot (though Sondhi is a Muslim, he's from Bangkok, not the south). The parallel that jumps to my mind is the "Irish Question" in 19th-century Britain. Governments might fall over their inability to resolve the "IQ" (including Gladstone's once, IIRC), but there was never an Irish threat to England itself. So with Bangkok and its Muslim south.

We can expect almost no change in Thai-US relations, regardless of the outcome of this event, unless we decide to make an issue of it. The Thai are, over the past century and a half or so, the world's finest practitioners of "bending to the prevailing wind" (e.g., they started WWII on Japan's side and ended it with a pro-Allied government - along the way they declared war on the USA, but never delivered the declaration!), and no change of government in modern history has resulted in a significant change in foreign policy.

- So, what IS it about? You'll see a number of theories in the links, most of them equally plausible (or not) at this stage. It's urban (Sondhi, the middle class) against rural (Thaksin, the farmers). It's personal (Thaksin was trying to fire Sondhi). It's for reform OR against reform, depending on the valence you give "reform." It's all of the above, or none of the above. I don't know, but ...

... as a historian, I tend to see it as an interesting overlap of the three major political themes of the past century or so: monarchy, the military, and democracy. Let me take them up in reverse order:

Democracy, in a functional (rather than ritual) sense, is relatively new in Thailand, though lip-service has been paid to it since the 1930s. Except for a brief period between 1973 and 1976 (ended by a military coup), the Thai had no really free elections until the early 1990s. Over the past 15 years, however, they've gotten into democracy in a big way, with numerous meaningful elections AND with the problems associated with such elections, including outright cheating, attempts to "buy" votes either directly (for cash) or for electoral promises, manipulation of the media, &c. I think we're all familiar with these.

Thaksin, the most successful politician of this era, has been frequently compared with Italy's Berlusconi, which seems apt - parlaying a communications empire with populist politics to seize and hold political power. The (rural) masses have been willing to forgive his indiscretions, to judge by election results. But his selling off his largest holding (for $1.9 billion) to a foreign firm (Singapore's Temasek) and managing to avoid taxes on the sale may have pushed the balance against him.

Unlike Italy and most of the West, the military has also played a strong political role in the recent past. They seized power (from the absolute monarchy) in 1932, and continued to hold it, directly or indirectly, for most of the next sixty years. There were some "civilian" governments during that period, but it was clear that they served only as long as the military let them. Coups were abundant (17-18 of them, about half successful), but generally bloodless; a dictator would wake up in the morning, see the tanks surrounding the palace, and be allowed to proceed to the airport, where he could fly off and spend as much as he had managed to salt away while it was his "turn" to rule. That's one reason the Thai public seems relatively blase about this whole thing - they're like Filipinos facing yet another typhoon, or Angelenos an earthquake.

The king is the real wild card in this situation. The absolute monarchy lasted until 1932, and the greatest heroes in Thai history are all kings (led by Chulalongkorn, 1868-1910, grandfather of the current monarch). When the military took over in 1932, they reduced the monarchy to a limited one - roughly comparable to the British in constitutional power - and for twenty years or so the kings had little to say or do. But starting in the 1950s the military started building up the symbolic role of the monarchy again, taking advantage of the fact that young King Bhumibol (b. 1927; r. 1946-present!) was sincere and likeable; the military positioned itself as the protector of King, Country, and Religion (Buddhism).

Over the past half-century, the king has increased in personal* prestige and (therefore) indirect power until it can reasonably be said that no political solution to any crisis is possible without his imprimatur. He still tends to stay in the background, but when he emerges, people pay attention: the last coup (1992) ended when the king scolded the general on TV! The current coup leaders all claim loyalty to the king - which of course they would (as would Thaksin, I'm sure) - and "it seems" that the king is going along with the coup, though he has not given it any kind of public blessing yet. We may never know whether he knew of it in advance or simply approved of it after the fact (it was well known that he disliked Thaksin), but the result is the same, if it appears to the public that he supports it.

*This is very much a personal prestige that Bhumibol has, and it is questionable how much of it will carry over to his heir, whoever s/he may be.

The king has a reputation for being honest, conservative (with a small "c" = move cautiously forward, not leap violently backward), and in favor of Good Things like the environment and democracy. It seems very likely that, even if the coup leaders had not promised to turn the country over to a new government in two weeks (?!), they would have to be seen to be on track toward civilianizing, if not democratizing, the country very soon if they were not to lose the royal and public support they apparently have at the moment.

So, what it looks like now (= 5pm Wednesday, EDT) is that Thaksin is out, the coup is on, there will be little violence, a new government will be appointed shortly, and there will be business as before ...

UNTIL

... the next election. From a pro-coup standpoint, the problem is that they need to have elections to restore democratic legitimacy BUT they don't have any obvious way to beat the proven power of Thaksin's vote-getting machine (centered on the TRT: "Thai Love Thai" party). Stay tuned.

Comments

"The head of the coup, Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin, has said he will appoint a new prime minister within two weeks.

He has also promised the interim government will draft a new constitution with the aim of restoring democracy within a year."

Does anyone know whether there is (thought to be) an actual problem with the existing Constitution? Or is this just Sonthi Boonyaratglin saying something to provide an excuse for the coup? If there is a problem, what is it (thought to) be?

So yesterday I didn't go to school, which meant I had no internet access - thus the radio silence from me yesterday.

It's all very peaceful, though, tanks notwithstanding. And the king agrees with the revolution, and EVERYONE adores the King (it would not be an exaggeration to put him on a par with Mohamed in Egyptian terms. Seriously. We have an altar to him here in the school. Everyone LOVES him. When he was sick earlier in the year, thousands of people dropped everything and went to camp outside the hospital. Insulting the king is one of the few ways you could get a Thai person to resort to physical violence.) Thaksin's been v. unpopular for a while, and there were protests last year that only calmed down when the king stepped in - this is a very Thai way of getting rid of him. They wait until he leaves the country, and then lock the door behind him.

This discussion gives me a flashback to the early sixties. I was a freshman in college and a Thai graduate student lived down the hall. One afternoon he showed my roomate and me a book of beautiful photos of his home country.

Leafing through the pages he got to a section near the end which had the official pictures of the country's top leaders.

"This is the King," he said, showing a splendid image that made us think of European royalty.

"And this is the President," he continued. We concluded at this point that Thailand's monarchy was something like those we already knew, figure-heads and all that.

"And this," he said, turning another page, "is our dictator."

We were amazed at the casual way that he showed us these pictures, never breaking that serene South Asian expression or showing any indication there was any problem moving from king to president to dictator...and having them all shown together in a single published book!

It was an early lesson in how, uh, carefully (?) democracy can be practiced in other parts of the world.

I was in Bangkok in 1992 during the last coup. A fair number of people were killed (there were accusations afterwards that many more simply disappeared) by the army as they protested and rioted. Some government buildings were torched as well. It was somewhat surreal to walk down an Khao San Road (the centre of Bangkok's backpacker district), be allowed to pass by a military "checkpoint" where the soldiers ignored foreigners entirely and then walk the block or so the the main square where several hundred Thais, led by monks, were marching and chanting under the guns of hundreds of troops positioned behind coils of razor wire.

As Dr. Ngo mentioned, the king summoned the two main political opponenents, a very recently retired top general and his populist opponent, to an audience. Protocol required both men to walk toward the seated king on their knees. The footage and photos of the two of them crawling on their knees and then listening to the king were all over the tv and papers. The ex-general was in an Armani suit (he had the reputation of being a proud and powerful man) while the populist wore his usual simple peasant clothes (he cultivated the image of simplicity and humility). Not surprisingly, the images appeared to seal the ex-general's political fate (and this appeared to have been the king's intention by allowing the audience to be filmed and photographed).

Let me catch up with a few of my interlocutors, both on this thread and the previous one:

Hilzoy: An excellent question about the constitution, for which I have only a rather vague answer. I don't know exactly what the coup leaders object to in the current constitution, but their abrogation of it was immediate and apparently central to their actions, leaving the country, for the moment, without one.

We must realize that Americans hold our "Constitution" in greater regard than the vast majority of the world's peoples do theirs. Over time ours has taken on a sacredness, or at least respectability, which simply doesn't apply to more recent ones, which are often changed as regularly as last season's clothes. [This is, for me, a purely hypothetical comparison - I'm still wearing clothes older than some of the ObWi regulars, I suspect.] (For that matter, Americans don't seem to have worried much about dumping the Articles of Confederation back in the day!)

Thailand has had a number of constitutions since the 1932 end of the absolute monarchy, and the current one (1997) is presumably tainted by its association with Thaksin, who was instrumental in passing it AND who has - in the views of his critics - systematically abused it. Supposedly non-partisan branches of the government have been politicized, &c. (True cynics might also point out that T. keeps winning elections under it, in itself a possible motive for changing it.) Beyond that I cannot say.

Hilzoy (earlier): Thanks for your concern, but the dentist appointment was quite routine. I only mentioned it as a partial excuse for my tardiness in getting up to speed ... as opposed to, say, the fact that I was watching "Firefly."

Anarch: Yes, I think Chulalongkorn is a greater Thai hero than his daddy. (Parenthetical sigh - the lack of respect for the paternal generation is much to be regretted, of course.) He has bigger statues; he has the top university named after him; I think he gets longer chapters in textbooks, &c. The problem is that Mongkut's greatest achievement, in a sense, was to surrender gracefully to the pressure of the West, to concede minimal reforms in order to retain Siam's independence. It was, arguably, both wise and courageous, but is not "heroic" as we like to understand the term. It was Chula who actually instituted reforms, built up the administration and the army and the educational system and the other institutions that made Thailand "modern."

Slarti: I'm happy to post here whenever I encounter a topic in which I think my remarks might be welcome. You must bear in mind that unlike some others (GF at the forefront, of course) I don't really try to keep up on the very latest developments in anything, even my "area," so mine are likely to be more reflective essays than cutting-edge commentary.

CB: I didn't mean to tweak you about the Islamic connection. I realized you did not intend it seriously, which is why I didn't mention you on that point, and did acknowledge your excellent collection of links. But having the "Muslim" question opened - by anyone, under any rubric - I thought I ought to close it as quickly and definitively as I could. Sorry if that seemed like an attack on you.

LJ: I don't really have any comments on your rural-urban fantasy and fugue - it has possibilities, if one could pin it down - but commend to your attention (and that of others here) a truly prescientessay in Far Eastern Economic Review wrtten before the actual coup, I believe, which sets out the grounds of conflict between the King and Thaksin more articulately than any other account I've seen.

If I've missed anyone's queries, let me know. I appreciate comments by Hootsbuddy, Yukoner, and Dr. Science, but have nothing to add to them.

I've just seen an article in the Asia Times by Shawn W. Crispin that seems on point here:

Thaksin's ouster will pave the way for important democratic reforms, which under the military's and monarchy's watch will broadly aim to dilute the power of the executive branch, limit the power of large political parties, and strengthen the independent checking and balancing institutions that Thaksin stands accused of undermining.

With the likely legal dissolution of Thaksin's powerful Thai Rak Thai political party, the nation now seems set to return to the wobbly coalition politics composed of several competitive middle-sized parties that characterized Thai democratic politics throughout the 1990s after the last coup in 1991 and the restoration of civilian rule after the bloody street protests of 1992.

More significant, perhaps, Thaksin's departure from the political scene will allow the Privy Council and the palace to plan without worries for a dynastic transition that maintains the centrality of the monarchy in Thai society. Thai democratic history shows that the country often takes one step backward to take two steps ahead, and Tuesday's royally backed coup is consistent with that tradition.

Sorry, Joni Mitchell. Couldn't resist the quote. Nobody wants a coup, of course, if only because it makes this well educated, aggressively modern and fairly functional country sound like some sort of Asian banana republic. But in a way, it's provided the perfect outcome. Thaksin, his extensive cohort and the impenetrable undergrowth of venality he sowed and nurtured, is suddenly gone. Just like that. In retrospect, it was exactly the right move for this particular budding democracy, weird as that sounds and strange as it felt to type thosewords. As the Bangkok Post titled this morning's leader "A Step back To Take A Step Forward." Let's hope so. But the coup leaders today broadcast a ban (which they claim is temporary) on all activity by political parties. Nobody appears to know just what that means, including the head of the largest opposition formation.

And one must remember that this marginally rose-tinted report is being written in Bangkok, epicenter of Thaksin hatred. There are few here who mourn his ejection, despite its martial flavor. Outside of Bangkok and the South, where he is roundly pilloried, the Shinola could very well hit the fan at any moment if his peeved loyalists organize, and they are still legion (including elements of the army.). The vast and heavily populated region of Isaan which borders Laos and Cambodia and is the voting equivalent of America's rural blue states, could erupt at any moment. Blood always runs hot in Isaan. They are the ones who have something to lose by thedisgrace and banishment of old Moneybags. They were the beneficiaries of his largesse. It was in dirt-poor Isaan that he would stump around the villages handing out wads of cash to buy votes, quite openly and in insolent disregard of everything democratic. Unfortunately it was not his money that he was throwing around for his own benefit at the time. It was Thailand's.

Q: In your vision of a Thai democracy, who provides the check and balances on the military and security class?

THAKSIN: The role of military is [decreasing] in terms of involving in politics. So we don't need a check and balance system on that part anymore because...this is [the] 21st century...[t]he memory is still about the 20th century. This is 21st. I think things [are] changing a lot. Thank you.