Essays on Fair Division and Social Choice

Author

Ertemel, Sinan

Date

2013-12-04

Advisor

Moulin, Herve

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Abstract

In my dissertation, I studied Social Choice and Fair Division problems under
uncertainty. In the first chapter, I defined welfare egalitarianism in the form of
certainty equivalence where the individuals are endowed with state contingent
consumption bundles and provided an axiomatic characterization of this ordering
by efficiency, equity and monotonicity axioms. In the second chapter, I defined two
proportional rules on the rationing problem with state contingent claims and gave
the characterization of those two rules by No Advantageous Reallocation. And in
the last chapter, I consider a class of resolute social choice correspondences and
characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms
of a generalization of the Condorcet principle.