Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National
Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

396.1–PA/4–451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the
Embassy in France

top secret

Washington, April 4,
1951—7 p. m.

5238. For Jessup.1 To advise you progress here in developing proposals on
inspection and verification as well as control, reg and limitation armed
forces and armaments, fol is summary situation.

1.

Desirability of advancing comprehensive proposals which wld cover
armaments as well as such polit questions as problem of Germany has
been discussed in State–JCS mtgs and
working group composed of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff designees has
been formed to study possibility including atomic energy in system
of inspection and verification and to attempt develop foundation for
comprehensive proposals.

2.

Frank Nash is participating in working group. We are presently
consulting AEC and intel
agencies.

3.

Is prelim view of State reps that system census and verification
will have real meaning only if it is undertaken on continuing basis
and in connection with system of regulation and limitation armed
forces and armaments. Also our prelim view that any such program wld
require phased implementation in order provide safeguards to
participants during substantial prd involved in arriving at
reduction armed forces and armaments to agreed levels.

4.

It appears that effective program inspection and limitation wld
have to cover para-military, security and police forces as well as
regular [Page 470]armed forces and
State reps believe some percentage of population, together with an
absolute ceiling, might provide feasible criterion. Whether former
enemy countries wld be subject more stringent limitations wld have
to be considered.

5.

Dept believes might also need be limitation on percentage of natl
production which cld be utilized for mil purposes and limitations on
quantity of particular armaments each country permitted to retain.
Re control and reg of atomic energy activities, we wld have to
insist on UN plan or one no less
effective.

6.

Settlement particular polit problems such as Ger, wld also be
included in comprehensive proposal for reduction of tensions.

7.

Is recognized that acceptance of comprehensive program by Sov
highly unlikely at this time. Our approach to development of
proposals is to assure they wld be acceptable to us if agreed to by
Sov and wld provide us propaganda advantage if rejected. Since Sov
has repeatedly stated it wld support idea of census and verification
if it included atomic energy, we believe we wld derive substantial
advantage if we cld now broaden our proposals to include atomic
energy and confront Sov with necessity rejecting them or permitting
broad inspection behind iron curtain.

8.

Plus work described above, we are preparing material for
presentation under item “existing levels of armaments.” In prelim
view is necessary trace comparative levels of armaments since end of
war and we will probably wish to confine presentation to Sov bloc
and Western forces in Europe. Here we may have some difficulty
because of security classification part of material but believe it
possible make comparisons in rounded totals.

9.

Rationale of Western position in draft form has been subj
consultation with Mosely.2 In present view it wld be
advisable develop two briefs: one, to be used at CFM opening, wld define principles on
which negots and settlements cld be based; and second, to be used in
event it becomes apparent mtg will not succeed, wld spell out
obstacles to settlement that result from Sov attitudes and
intentions.

Acheson

Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at
Large; United States Deputy at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at
Paris.↩

Presumably Dr.
Philip E. Mosely, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia
University; political adviser on United States delegations to
various international conferences concerned with the European
peace settlements, 1943–1946.↩