The FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, Section 1037) indicated that it is the
sense of Congress that "the United States should pursue negotiations with the Russian
Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed nonstrategic nuclear
forces." The United States and Russia have not included limits on these weapons in past arms
control agreements. Nevertheless, some analysts and Members of Congress have argued that
disparities in the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons may become more important as
the United States and Russia reduce their numbers of deployed long-range, strategic nuclear
weapons.

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear
weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish
between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic
weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used
to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery;
short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In
contrast with the longer-range "strategic" nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower
profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a
direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had
thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and
on aircraft.

In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and
eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States
now has approximately 760 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with
aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts
believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons
in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed and removed some of the nuclear
weapons deployed in Europe. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on
nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed
away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and
Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security
of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another
nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security
policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is
a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the
implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and
U.S. nonproliferation policy.

Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not
alter its policy. Others argue that NATO should consider expanding its deployments in
response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Some believe the United States should reduce its
reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that
the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure
storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms
control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in
monitoring their deployment and elimination. The 114th Congress may review some of these
proposals. This report will be updated as needed.

Introduction

In late January 2015, Representatives Mike Rogers and Mike Turner, both Members of the
House Armed Services Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and then
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, seeking information about the agreements that would be
needed and costs that might be incurred if the United States sought to deploy dual-capable
aircraft and nuclear bombs at bases on the territories of NATO Members in eastern Europe.
Neither NATO, as an organization, nor any the nations who are Members of NATO have
called on the United States to pursue such deployments. However, Representatives Rogers
and Turner noted that Russian actions in 2014--including aggression against Ukraine,
noncompliance with the 1987 INF Treaty, and threats to deploy nuclear weapons in
Crimea--have threatened European security and warrant a more potent U.S. response. |1|

This interest in possible new deployments of U.S. nonstrategic, or shorter-range, nuclear
weapons differs sharply from previous years, when Members of Congress, while concerned
about Russia's larger stockpile of such weapons, seemed more interested in limiting these
weapons through arms control than expanding U.S. deployments. During the Senate debate
on the new U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010, many
Members noted that this treaty did not impose any limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Many also noted that Russia possessed a far greater number of these systems than did the
United States. Some expressed particular concerns about the threat that Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons might pose to U.S. allies in Europe; others argued that these weapons might
be vulnerable to theft or sale to nations or groups seeking their own nuclear weapons. In
response to these concerns, the Senate, in its Resolution of Ratification on New START,
stated that the United States should seek to initiate within one year, "negotiations with the
Russian Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic
(tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and
to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner." |2| In addition, in the
FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, Section 1037), Congress again indicated that
"the United States should pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation aimed at the
reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed nonstrategic nuclear forces."

Although the United States did raise the issue of negotiations on nonstrategic nuclear
weapons with Russia within the year after New START entered into force, the two nations
have not moved forward with efforts to negotiate limits on these weapons. Russia has
expressed little interest in such a negotiation, and has stated that it will not even begin the
process until the United States removes its nonstrategic nuclear weapons from bases in
Europe. According to U.S. officials, the United States and NATO have been trying to identify
and evaluate possible transparency measures and limits that might apply to these weapons.
While some Members in the 114th Congress may continue to press the Administration to
seek solutions to the potential risks presented by nonstrategic nuclear weapons, others may
join Representatives Rogers and Turner in calling on the United States to explore possible
new deployments at bases in additional NATO nations.

This report provides basic information about U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
It begins with a brief discussion of how these weapons have appeared in public debates in the
past few decades, then summarizes the differences between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. It then provides some historical background, describing the numbers and types of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed by both nations during the Cold War and in the past
decade; the policies that guided the deployment and prospective use of these weapons; and
the measures that the two sides have taken to reduce and contain their forces. The report
reviews the issues that have been raised with regard to U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, and summarizes a number of policy options that might be explored by Congress,
the United States, Russia, and other nations to address these issues.

Background

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were central to the U.S. strategy of deterring Soviet
aggression against the United States and U.S. allies. Towards this end, the United States
deployed a wide variety of systems that could carry nuclear warheads. These included
nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles;
and gravity bombs. The United States deployed these weapons with its troops in the field,
aboard aircraft, on surface ships, on submarines, and in fixed, land-based launchers. The
United States articulated a complex strategy, and developed detailed operational plans, that
would guide the use of these weapons in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union and its
allies.

During the Cold War, most public discussions about U.S. and Soviet nuclear
weapons--including discussions about perceived imbalances between the two nations' forces
and discussions about the possible use of arms control measures to reduce the risk of nuclear
war and limit or reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons--focused on long-range, or
strategic, nuclear weapons. These include long-range land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers that
carry cruise missiles or gravity bombs. These were the weapons that the United States and
Soviet Union deployed so that they could threaten destruction of central military, industrial,
and leadership facilities in the other country--the weapons of global nuclear war. But both
nations also deployed thousands of nuclear weapons outside their own territories with their
troops in the field. These weapons usually had less explosive power and were deployed with
launchers that would deliver them across shorter ranges than strategic nuclear weapons. They
were intended for use by troops on the battlefield or within the theater of battle to achieve
more limited, or tactical, objectives.

These "nonstrategic" nuclear weapons did not completely escape public discussion or arms
control debates. Their profile rose in the early 1980s when U.S. plans to deploy new cruise
missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, as a part of NATO's nuclear
strategy, ignited large public protests in many NATO nations. Their high profile returned
later in the decade when the United States and Soviet Union signed the 1987 Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and eliminated medium- and intermediate-range ballistic
and cruise missiles. Then, in 1991, President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev each announced that they would withdraw from deployment most of their
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and eliminate many of them.

These 1991 announcements, coming after the abortive coup in Moscow in July 1991, but
months before the December 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, responded to growing
concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons at a time of growing
political and economic upheaval in that nation. It also allowed the United States to alter its
forces in response to easing tensions and the changing international security environment.
Consequently, for many in the general public, these initiatives appeared to resolve the
problems associated with nonstrategic nuclear weapons. As a result, although the United
States and Russia included these weapons in some of their arms control discussions, most of
their arms control efforts during the rest of that decade focused on strategic weapons, with
efforts made to implement the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and negotiate
deeper reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.

The lack of public attention did not, however, reflect a total absence of questions or concerns
about nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In 1997, President Clinton and Russia's President Boris
Yeltsin signed a framework agreement that stated they would address measures related to
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in a potential START III Treaty. Further, during the 1990s,
outside analysts, officials in the U.S. government, and many Members of Congress raised
continuing questions about the safety and security of Russia's remaining nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. Congress sought a more detailed accounting of Russia's weapons in legislation
passed in the late 1990s. Analysts also questioned the role that these weapons might play in
Russia's evolving national security strategy, the rationale for their continued deployment in
the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and their relationship to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, also reminded people of the catastrophic
consequences that might ensue if terrorists were to acquire and use nuclear weapons, with
continuing attention focused on the potentially insecure stock of Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons.

The George W. Bush Administration did not adopt an explicit policy of reducing or
eliminating nonstrategic nuclear weapons. When it announced the results of its Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) in early 2002, it did not outline any changes to the U.S. deployment
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons at bases in Europe; it stated that NATO would address the
future of those weapons. Although there was little public discussion of this issue during the
Bush Administration, reports indicate that the United States did redeploy and withdraw some
of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons from bases in Greece, Germany, and the United
Kingdom. |3| It made these changes quietly and unilaterally, in response to U.S. and NATO
security requirements, without requesting or requiring reciprocity from Russia.

The Bush Administration also did not discuss these weapons with Russia during arms control
negotiations in 2002. Instead, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty),
signed in June 2002, limited only the number of operationally deployed warheads on
strategic nuclear weapons. When asked about the absence of these weapons in the Moscow
Treaty, then Secretary of State Powell noted that the treaty was not intended to address these
weapons, although the parties could address questions about the safety and security of these
weapons during less formal discussions. |4| These discussions, however, never occurred.

Nevertheless, Congress remained concerned about the potential risks associated with Russia's
continuing deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The FY2006 Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 109-163) contained two provisions that called for further study on these weapons.
Section 1212 mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a report that would determine
whether increased transparency and further reductions in U.S. and Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons were in the U.S. national security interest; Section 3115 called on the
Secretary of Energy to submit a report on what steps the United States might take to bring
about progress in improving the accounting for and security of Russia's nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. In the 109th Congress, H.R. 5017, a bill to ensure implementation of the 9/11
Commission Report recommendations, included a provision (§334) that called on the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report that detailed U.S. efforts to encourage Russia to
provide a detailed accounting of its force of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It also would have
authorized $5 million for the United States to assist Russia in completing an inventory of
these weapons. The 109th Congress did not address this bill or its components in any detail.
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 1 sought to ensure the implementation of the 9/11 Commission
Report recommendations. However, in its final form (P.L. 110-53), it did not include any
references to Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Several events in the past several years have served to elevate the profile of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons in debates about the future of U.S. nuclear weapons and arms control
policy. For example, in January 2007, four senior statesmen published an article in the Wall
Street Journal that highlighted the continuing threat posed by the existence, and proliferation,
of nuclear weapons. |5| They called on leaders in nations with nuclear weapons to adopt the
goal of seeking a world free of nuclear weapons. After acknowledging that that this was a
long-term enterprise, they identified a number of urgent, near-term steps that these nations
might take. They included among these steps a call for nations to eliminate "short-range
nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed." In a subsequent article published in
January 2008, they elaborated on this step, calling for "a dialogue, including within NATO
and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to
enhance their security, as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual
elimination." They noted, specifically, that "these smaller and more portable nuclear weapons
are, given their characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist groups." |6|

In addition, as a part of its renewed interest in the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national
security strategy, Congress established, in the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 110-181 §1062), a Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. The
Congressional Commission, which issued its report in April 2009, briefly addressed the role
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and noted that these
weapons can help the United States assure its allies of the U.S. commitment to their security.
It also noted concerns about the imbalance in the numbers of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons and mentioned that Russia had increased its reliance on these weapons to
compensate for weaknesses in its conventional forces. |7|

The 110th Congress also mandated (P.L. 110-181, §1070) that the next Administration
conduct a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The Obama Administration completed this
NPR in early April 2010. This study identified a number of steps the United States would
take to reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. A few of these
steps, including the planned retirement of nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles,
affected U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons. At the same time, though, the NPR recognized
the role that U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons play in assuring U.S. allies of the U.S.
commitment to their security. It indicated that the United States would "retain the capability
to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers" and that the United
States would seek to "expand consultations with allies and partners to address how to ensure
the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent. No changes in U.S. extended
deterrence capabilities will be made without close consultations with our allies and
partners." |8|

Discussions about the presence of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons at bases in Europe and
their role in NATO's strategy also increased in 2009 and 2010 during the drafting of NATO's
most recent strategic concept. |9| Officials in some NATO nations called for the removal of
U.S. nonstrategic weapons from bases on the continent, noting that they had no military
significance for NATO's security. Others called for the retention of these weapons, arguing
that they played a political role in NATO, with shared rights and responsibilities, and that
they helped balance Russia's deployment of greater numbers of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. When it was published, the Strategic Concept did not call for the removal of U.S.
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It stated that "deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of
nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy." It also
indicated that "the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be
contemplated are extremely remote," but indicated that "as long as nuclear weapons exist,
NATO will remain a nuclear alliance." It then concluded that NATO would "maintain an
appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces." |10| NATO nations continue to share
responsibility for basing and delivery of the weapons and would weigh in on decisions about
their possible use.

At the same time, NATO recognized that the new Strategic Concept would not be the last
word on the role or presence of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in NATO. In the declaration
released at the conclusion of the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, the allies agreed that they
would continue to review NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full
range of threats to the Alliance. They commissioned a comprehensive Deterrence and
Defense Posture Review (DDPR) that would examine the range of capabilities required for
defense and deterrence, including nuclear weapons, missile defense, and other means of
strategic deterrence and defense. |11| The DDPR was presented at the May 2012 NATO summit
in Chicago. It did not, however, recommend any changes in NATO's nuclear posture. Instead,
it noted that "nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for
deterrence and defence," and that "the Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the
criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture." |12| NATO reaffirmed this conclusion
after its summit in Wales in September 2014, noting that "deterrence, based on an appropriate
mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our
overall strategy." |13|

The Distinction Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons
reflects the military definitions of, on the one hand, a strategic mission and, on the other
hand, the tactical use of nuclear weapons. According to the Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military Terms, |14| a strategic mission is:

Directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of
progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's warmaking capacity and
will to make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw
material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems,
communication facilities, and other such target systems. As opposed to tactical
operations, strategic operations are designed to have a long-range rather than
immediate effect on the enemy and its military forces.

In contrast, the tactical use of nuclear weapons is defined as "the use of nuclear weapons by
land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities, in
support of operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited
scope, or in support of the military commander's scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the
area of military operations."

Definition by Observable Capabilities

During the Cold War, it was relatively easy to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic
nuclear weapons because each type had different capabilities that were better suited to the
different missions.

Definition by Range of Delivery Vehicles

The long-range missiles and heavy bombers deployed on U.S. territory and missiles deployed
in ballistic missile submarines had the range and destructive power to attack and destroy
military, industrial, and leadership targets central to the Soviet Union's ability to prosecute
the war. At the same time, with their large warheads and relatively limited accuracies (at least
during the earlier years of the Cold War), these weapons were not suited for attacks
associated with tactical or battlefield operations. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, in contrast,
were not suited for strategic missions because they lacked the range to reach targets inside
the Soviet Union (or, for Soviet weapons, targets inside the United States). But, because they
were often small enough to be deployed with troops in the field or at forward bases, the
United States and Soviet Union could have used them to attack targets in the theater of the
conflict, or on the battlefield itself, to support more limited military missions.

Even during the Cold War, however, the United States and Russia deployed nuclear weapons
that defied the standard understanding of the difference between strategic and nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. For example, both nations considered weapons based on their own
territories that could deliver warheads to the territory of the other nation to be "strategic"
because they had the range needed to reach targets inside the other nation's territory. But
some early Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles had relatively short (i.e., 500 mile)
ranges, and the submarines patrolled close to U.S. shores to ensure that the weapons could
reach their strategic targets. Conversely, in the 1980s the United States considered sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) deployed on submarines or surface ships to be
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. But, if these vessels were deployed close to Soviet borders,
these weapons could have destroyed many of the same targets as U.S. strategic nuclear
weapons. Similarly, U.S. intermediate-range missiles that were deployed in Europe, which
were considered nonstrategic by the United States, could reach central, strategic targets in the
Soviet Union.

Furthermore, some weapons that had the range to reach "strategic" targets on the territory of
the other nations could also deliver tactical nuclear weapons in support of battlefield or
tactical operations. Soviet bombers could be equipped with nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles;
U.S. bombers could also carry anti-ship weapons and nuclear mines. Hence, the range of the
delivery vehicle does not always correlate with the types of targets or objectives associated
with the warhead carried on that system. This relationship between range and mission has
become even more clouded since the end of the Cold War because the United States and
Russia have retired many of the shorter- and medium-range delivery systems considered to
be nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Further, both nations could use their longer-range
"strategic" systems to deliver warheads to a full range of strategic and tactical targets, even if
long-standing traditions and arms control definitions weigh against this change.

Definition by Yield of Warheads

During the Cold War, the longer-range strategic delivery vehicles also tended to carry
warheads with greater yields, or destructive power, than nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Smaller warheads were better suited to nonstrategic weapons because they sought to achieve
more limited, discrete objectives on the battlefield than did the larger, strategic nuclear
weapons. But this distinction has also dissolved in more modern systems. Many U.S. and
Russian heavy bombers can carry weapons of lower yields, and, as accuracies improved for
bombs and missiles, warheads with lower yields could achieve the same expected level of
destruction that had required larger warheads in early generations of strategic weapons
systems.

Definition by Exclusion

The observable capabilities that allowed analysts to distinguish between strategic and
nonstrategic nuclear weapons during the Cold War have not always been precise, and may
not prove to be relevant or appropriate in the future. On the other hand, the "strategic"
weapons identified by these capabilities--ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers--are the only
systems covered by the limits in strategic offensive arms control agreements--the SALT
agreements signed in the 1970s, the START agreements signed in the 1990s, the Moscow
Treaty signed in 2002, and the New START Treaty signed in 2010. Consequently, an "easy"
dividing line is one that would consider all weapons not covered by strategic arms control
treaties as nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This report takes this approach when reviewing the
history of U.S. and Soviet/Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and in some cases when
discussing remaining stocks of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

This definition will not, however, prove sufficient when discussing current and future issues
associated with these weapons. Since the early 1990s, the United States and Russia have
withdrawn from deployment most of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and eliminated many
of the shorter- and medium-range launchers for these weapons (these changes are discussed
in more detail below). Nevertheless, both nations maintain roles for these weapons in their
national security strategies. Russia has enunciated a national security strategy that allows for
the possible use of nuclear weapons in regional contingencies and conflicts near the
periphery of Russia. The United States also maintains these capabilities in its nuclear arsenal
and does not rule out the possibility that it might need them to deter or defeat potential
adversaries. The distinction, therefore, between a strategic and a nonstrategic nuclear weapon
may well reflect the nature of the target, not the yield or delivery vehicle of the attacking
warhead.

U.S. and Soviet Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

U.S. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War

Throughout the Cold War, the United States deployed thousands of shorter-range nuclear
weapons with U.S. forces based in Europe, Japan, and South Korea and on ships around the
world. The United States maintained these deployments to extend deterrence and to defend
its allies in Europe and Asia. Not only did the presence of these weapons (and the presence of
U.S. forces, in general) increase the likelihood that the United States would come to the
defense of its allies if they were attacked, the weapons also could have been used on the
battlefield to slow or stop the advance of the adversaries' conventional forces. The weapons
in Asia also contributed to U.S. efforts to defend its allies there from potential threats from
China and North Korea.

Strategy and Doctrine

In most cases, these weapons were deployed to defend U.S. allies against aggression by the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, but it did not rule out their possible use in
contingencies with other adversaries. In Europe, these weapons were a part of NATO's
strategy of "flexible response." Under this strategy, NATO did not insist that it would
respond to any type of attack with nuclear weapons, but it maintained the capability to do so
and to control escalation if nuclear weapons were used. This approach was intended to
convince the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact that any conflict, even one that began with
conventional weapons, could result in nuclear retaliation. |15| As the Cold War drew to a close,
NATO acknowledged that it would no longer maintain nuclear weapons to deter or defeat a
conventional attack from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact because "the threat of a
simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been
removed." |16| But NATO documents indicated that these weapons would still play an
important political role in NATO's strategy by ensuring "uncertainty in the mind of any
potential aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression." |17|

Force Structure

Throughout the Cold War, the United States often altered the size and structure of its
nonstrategic nuclear forces in response to changing capabilities and changing threat
assessments. These weapons were deployed at U.S. bases in Asia, and at bases on the
territories of several of the NATO allies, contributing to NATO's sense of shared
responsibility for the weapons. The United States began to reduce these forces in the late
1970s, with the numbers of operational nonstrategic nuclear warheads declining from more
than 7,000 in the mid-1970s to below 6,000 in the 1980s, to fewer than 1,000 by the middle
of the 1990s. |18| These reductions occurred, for the most part, because U.S. and NATO
officials believed they could maintain deterrence with fewer, but more modern, weapons. For
example, when the NATO allies agreed in 1970 that the United States should deploy new
intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, they decided to remove 1,000 older nuclear
weapons from Europe. And in 1983, in the Montebello Decision, when the NATO defense
ministers approved additional weapons modernization plans, they also called for a further
reduction of 1,400 nonstrategic nuclear weapons. |19|

These modernization programs continued through the 1980s. In his 1988 Annual Report to
Congress, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger noted that the United States was
completing the deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe; modernizing two types of nuclear artillery shells;
upgrading the Lance short-range ballistic missile; continuing production of the nuclear-armed
version of the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile; and developing a new nuclear
depth/strike bomb for U.S. naval forces. |20| However, by the end of that decade, as the Warsaw
Pact dissolved, the United States had canceled or scaled back all planned modernization
programs. In 1987, it also signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which
eliminated all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched shorter and intermediate-range ballistic and
cruise missiles. |21|

Soviet Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War

Strategy and Doctrine

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also considered nuclear weapons to be instrumental
to its military strategy. |22| Although the Soviet Union had pledged that it would not be the first
to use nuclear weapons, most Western observers doubted that it would actually observe this
pledge in a conflict. Instead, analysts argue that the Soviet Union had integrated nuclear
weapons into its warfighting plans to a much greater degree than the United States. Soviet
analysts stressed that these weapons would be useful for both surprise attack and preemptive
attack. According to one Russian analyst, the Soviet Union would have used nonstrategic
nuclear weapons to conduct strategic operations in the theater of war and to reinforce
conventional units in large scale land and sea operations. |23| This would have helped the Soviet
Union achieve success in these theaters of war and would have diverted forces of the enemy
from Soviet territory.

The Soviet Union reportedly began to reduce its emphasis on nuclear warfighting strategies
in the mid-1980s, under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. He reportedly believed that the
use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic. Nevertheless, they remained a key tool of
deterring and fighting a large-scale conflict with the United States and NATO.

Force Structure

The Soviet Union produced and deployed a wide range of delivery vehicles for nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. At different times during the period, it deployed devices that were small
enough to fit into a suitcase-sized container, nuclear mines, shells for artillery, short-,
medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, short-range air-delivered missiles, and
gravity bombs. The Soviet Union deployed these weapons at nearly 600 bases, with some
located in Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe, some in the non-Russian republics on the
western and southern perimeter of the nation and throughout Russia. Estimates vary, but
many analysts believe that, in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 20,000 of these
weapons. The numbers may have been higher, in the range of 25,000 weapons in earlier
years, before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. |24|

The 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

In September and October 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev sharply altered their nations' deployments of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. |25| Each announced unilateral, but reciprocal initiatives that marked the end of many
elements of their Cold War nuclear arsenals.

U.S. Initiative

On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States
would withdraw all land-based tactical nuclear weapons (those that could travel less than 300
miles) from overseas bases and all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface
ships, submarines, and naval aircraft. |26| Under these measures the United States began
dismantling approximately 2,150 warheads from the land-based delivery systems, including
850 warheads for Lance missiles and 1,300 artillery shells. It also withdrew about 500
weapons normally deployed aboard surface ships and submarines, and planned to eliminate
around 900 B-57 depth bombs, |27| which had been deployed on land and at sea, and the
weapons for land-based naval aircraft. |28| Furthermore, in late 1991, NATO decided to reduce
by about half the number of weapons for nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe, which led
to the withdrawal of an additional 700 U.S. air-delivered nuclear weapons.

The United States implemented these measures very quickly. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons
were removed from bases in Korea by the end of 1991 and Europe by mid-1992. The Navy
had withdrawn nuclear weapons from its surface ships, submarines, and forward bases by the
mid-1992. |29| The warhead dismantlement process has moved more slowly, taking most of the
1990s to complete for some weapons, but this was due to the limits on capacity at the Pantex
Plant in Texas, where dismantlement occurs.

The first Bush Administration decided to withdraw these weapons for several reasons. First,
the threat the weapons were to deter--Soviet and Warsaw Pact attacks in Europe--had
diminished with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989. Further, the military utility of the
land-based weapons had declined as the Soviet Union pulled its forces eastward, beyond the
range of these weapons. The utility of the sea-based weapons had also declined as a result of
changes in U.S. warfighting concepts that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Moreover,
the withdrawal of the sea-based weapons helped ease a source of tensions between the United
States and some allies, such as New Zealand and Japan, who had been uncomfortable with
the possible presence of nuclear weapons during port visits by U.S. naval forces. |30|

The President's announcement also responded to growing concerns among analysts about the
safety and security of Soviet nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had deployed
thousands of these weapons at bases in remote areas of its territory and at bases outside
Soviet territory in Eastern Europe. The demise of the Warsaw Pact and political upheaval in
Eastern Europe generated concerns about the safety of these weapons. The abortive coup in
Moscow in August 1991 had also caused alarms about the strength of central control over
nuclear weapons inside the Soviet Union. The U.S. initiative was not contingent on a Soviet
response, and the Bush Administration did not consult with Soviet leadership prior to its
public announcement, but many hoped that the U.S. initiative would provide President
Gorbachev with the incentive to take similar steps to withdraw and eliminate many of his
nation's nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Soviet and Russian Initiatives

On October 5, 1991, Russia's President Gorbachev replied that he, too, would withdraw and
eliminate nonstrategic nuclear weapons. |31| He stated that the Soviet Union would destroy all
nuclear artillery ammunition and warheads for tactical missiles; remove warheads for nuclear
anti-aircraft missiles and destroy some of them; destroy all nuclear land-mines; and remove
all naval non-strategic weapons from submarines and surface ships and ground-based naval
aviation, destroying some of them. Estimates of the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons
deployed by the Soviet Union varied, with a range as great as 15,000-21,700 nonstrategic
nuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal in 1991. |32| Consequently, analysts expected these
measures to affect several thousand weapons.

Russia's President Boris Yeltsin pledged to continue implementing these measures after the
Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991. He also stated that Russia would destroy many of
the warheads removed from nonstrategic nuclear weapons. |33| These included all warheads
from short-range missiles, artillery, and atomic demolition devices; one-third of the warheads
from sea-based nonstrategic weapons; half of the warheads from air-defense interceptors; and
half of the warheads from the Air Force's nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Reports indicate that the Soviet Union had begun removing nonstrategic nuclear weapons
from bases outside Soviet territory after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and they had
probably all been removed from Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus prior to the 1991
announcements. Nevertheless, President Gorbachev's pledge to withdraw and eliminate many
of these weapons spurred their removal from other former Soviet states after the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Reports indicate that they had all been removed from the Baltic States and
Central Asian republics by the end of 1991, and from Ukraine and Belarus by mid-late spring
1992. |34|

The status of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed on Russian territory is far less certain.
According to some estimates, the naval systems were removed from deployment by the end
of 1993, but the Army and Air Force systems remained in the field until 1996 and 1997. |35|
Furthermore, Russia has been far slower to eliminate the warheads from these systems than
has the United States. Some analysts and experts in the United States have expressed
concerns about the slow pace of eliminations in Russia. They note that the continuing
existence of these warheads, along with the increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in
Russia's national security strategy, indicate that Russia may reverse its pledges and re-introduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons into its deployed forces. Others note that financial
constraints could have slowed the elimination of these warheads, or that Russia decided to
coordinate the elimination effort with the previously scheduled retirement of older
weapons. |36|

U.S. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War

Strategy and Doctrine

NATO Policy

In U.S. and NATO policy, nonstrategic nuclear weapons have served not only as a deterrent
to a wide range of potential aggressors, but also as an important element in NATO's cohesion
as an alliance. NATO reaffirmed the importance of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for
deterrence and alliance cohesion several times during the 1990s. In the press communique
released after their November 1995 meeting, the members of NATO's Defense Planning
Committee and Nuclear Planning Group stated that "Alliance Solidarity, common
commitment, and strategic unity are demonstrated through the current basing of deployable
sub-strategic [nuclear] forces in Europe." |37| In 1997, in the Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, NATO members assured Russia that it had "no intention, no plan, and
no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members." But NATO also
stated that it had no need "to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear policy--and do not
foresee any future need to do so [emphasis added]." |38| Finally, the "New Strategic Concept"
signed in April 1999 stated that "to protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion,
the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional forces. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of
aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable." |39|

NATO completed the next review of its Strategic Concept in November 2010. In this
document, the allies indicated that "deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy." The document
went on to indicate that NATO would remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons
continued to exist. It also noted that the alliance would "maintain an appropriate mix of
nuclear and conventional forces" to ensure that "NATO has the full range of capabilities to
deter and defend against any threat." However, the Strategic Concept did not refer,
specifically, to the U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe, as had the communique released in
1995. Instead, the Strategic Concept noted that the "supreme guarantee of the security of the
Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the
United States [emphasis added]." It went on to indicate that "the independent strategic
nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own,
contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies." |40|

Moreover, the 2010 Strategic Concept alluded to the possibility of further reductions in
nuclear weapons, both within the alliance and globally, in the future. The document noted
that the allies are "resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a
world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of
undiminished security for all." It also noted that the alliance had "dramatically reduced the
number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe" and had reduced the role of nuclear
weapons in NATO strategy." The allies pledged to "seek to create the conditions for further
reductions in the future." The Strategic Concept indicated that the goal in these reductions
should be to "seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in
Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members." Moreover,
the document noted that this arms control process "must take into account the disparity with
the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons." |41| Hence, even though NATO
no longer views Russia as an adversary, the allies apparently agreed that the disparity in
nonstrategic nuclear weapons could create security concerns for some members of the
alliance.

In recognition of different views about the role or nuclear weapons in alliance policy, the
allies agreed that they would continue to review NATO's deterrence and defense posture in a
study that would be completed in time for NATO's May 2012 summit in Chicago. They
agreed that the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) would examine the full
range of capabilities required, including nuclear weapons, missile defense, and other means
of strategic deterrence and defense. |42| However, the completed DDPR did not recommend any
changes in NATO's nuclear posture. Instead, it noted that "nuclear weapons are a core
component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defence," and that "the
Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and
defence posture." |43| This force posture includes shared rights and responsibilities, with nuclear
weapons stored at bases on the territories of five NATO nations, and all NATO nations
(except France, which has chosen not to participate in nuclear decision-making or operations)
participating in nuclear planning and policy-making. Specifically, NATO calls for "the
broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in
peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements."

The DDPR reiterated the alliance's interest in pursuing arms control measures with Russia to
address concerns with these weapons. It noted that the allies "look forward to continuing to
develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian
Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of developing detailed proposals on
and increasing mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force
postures in Europe." It also indicated that NATO would "consider, in the context of the
broader security environment, what [it] would expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian
actions to allow for significant reductions in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons
assigned to NATO." |44| In other words, any further changes in NATO's nuclear posture were
linked to reciprocal changes in Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons posture.

Extended Deterrence

Recent discussions about the U.S. nuclear weapons policy have placed a renewed emphasis
on the role of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and assurance.
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks,
from Russia or other adversaries, against allies in NATO and some allies in Asia. |45| Assurance
refers to the U.S. promise, made to those same allies, to come to their defense and assistance
if they are threatened or attacked. The weapons deployed in Europe are a visible reminder of
that commitment; the sea-based nonstrategic nuclear weapons that were in storage that could
have been deployed in the Pacific in a crisis served a similar purpose for U.S. allies in Asia.
Recent debates, however, have focused on the question of whether a credible U.S. extended
deterrent requires that the United States maintain weapons deployed in Europe, and the
ability to deploy them in the Pacific, or whether other U.S. military capabilities, including
strategic nuclear weapons and conventional forces, may be sufficient. |46|

In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama Administration stated that the United States
"will continue to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to their security and to
demonstrate this commitment not only through words, but also through deeds." |47| The NPR
indicated that a wide range of U.S. military capabilities would support this goal, but also
indicated that U.S. commitments would "retain a nuclear dimension as long as nuclear threats
to U.S. allies and partners remain." The Administration did not, however, specify that the
nuclear dimension would be met with nonstrategic nuclear weapons; the full range of U.S.
capabilities would likely be available to support and defend U.S. allies. In addition, the
Administration announced that the United States would retire the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles that had helped provide assurances to U.S. allies in Asia. In essence,
the Administration concluded that the United States could reassure U.S. allies in Asia, and
deter threats to their security, without deploying sea-based cruise missiles to the region in a
crisis.

Moreover, the possible use of nuclear weapons, and extended nuclear deterrence, were a part
of a broader concept that the Administration referred to as "regional security architectures."
The NPR indicated that regional security architectures were a key part of "the U.S. strategy
for strengthening regional deterrence while reducing the role and numbers of nuclear
weapons." As a result, these architectures would "include effective missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and integrated command and
control--all underwritten by strong political commitments." |48| In other words, although the
United States would continue to extend deterrence to its allies and seek to assure them of the
U.S. commitment to their security, it would draw on a political commitments and a range of
military capabilities to achieve these goals.

Regional Contingencies

In the past, U.S. discussions about nonstrategic nuclear weapons have also addressed
questions about the role they might play in deterring or responding to regional contingencies
that involved threats from nations that may not be armed with their own nuclear weapons.
For example, former Secretary of Defense Perry stated that, "maintaining U.S. nuclear
commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet
various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression,
protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing
proliferation (emphasis added)." |49|

Specifically, both during the Cold War and after the demise of the Soviet Union, the United
States maintained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional,
chemical, or biological weapons. For example, in 1999, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Edward Warner testified that "the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and
devastating military response with the full range of military capabilities will remain the
cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue nation ballistic missile and WMD
proliferation threats. The very existence of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces, backed
by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader
contemplating the use of WMD against the United States, its overseas deployed forces, or its
allies." |50| These statements do not indicate whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be
used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or whether they would contribute to strategic
missions, but it remained evident, throughout the 1990s, that the United States continued to
view these weapons as a part of its national security strategy.

The George W. Bush Administration also emphasized the possible use of nuclear weapons in
regional contingencies in its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The Bush Administration
appeared to shift towards a somewhat more explicit approach when acknowledging that the
United States might use nuclear weapons in response to attacks by nations armed with
chemical, biological, and conventional weapons, stating that the United States would develop
and deploy those nuclear capabilities that it would need to defeat the capabilities of any
potential adversary whether or not it possessed nuclear weapons. |51| This does not, by itself,
indicate that the United States would plan to use nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However,
many analysts concluded from these and other comments by Bush Administration officials
that the United States was planning for the tactical, first use of nuclear weapons. The Bush
Administration never confirmed this view, and, instead, indicated that it would not use
nuclear weapons in anything other than the most grave of circumstances.

The Obama Administration, on the other hand, seemed to foreclose the option of using
nuclear weapons in some regional contingencies. Specifically, it stated, in the 2010 NPR, that
"the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations." Specifically, if such a nation
were to attack the United States with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons, the
United States would respond with overwhelming conventional force, but it would not
threaten to use nuclear weapons if the attacking nation was in compliance with its nuclear
nonproliferation obligations and it did not have nuclear weapons of its own. |52| At the same
time, though, the NPR stated that any state that used chemical or biological weapons "against
the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating
conventional military response--and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether
national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable." |53|

Force Structure

Through the late 1990s and early in George W. Bush Administration, the United States
maintained approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its active stockpile.
Unclassified reports indicate that, of this number, around 500 were air-delivered bombs
deployed at bases in Europe. The remainder, including some additional air-delivered bombs
and around 320 nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, were held in storage areas in the
United States. |54| After the Clinton Administration's 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the United
States eliminated its ability to return nuclear weapons to U.S. surface ships (it had retained
this ability after removing the weapons under the 1991 PNI). It retained, however, its ability
to restore cruise missiles to attack submarines, and it did not recommend any changes in the
number of air-delivered weapons deployed in Europe. During this time, the United States
also consolidated its weapons storage sites for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It reportedly
reduced the number of these facilities "by over 75%" between 1988 and 1994. It eliminated
two of its four storage sites for sea-launched cruise missiles, retaining only one facility on
each coast of the United States. It also reduced the number of bases in Europe that store
nuclear weapons from over 125 bases in the mid-1980s to 10 bases, in seven countries, by
2000. |55|

The Bush Administration did not recommend any changes for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear
weapons after completing its Nuclear Posture Review in 2001. Reports indicate that it
decided to retain the capability to restore cruise missiles to attack submarines because of their
ability to deploy, in secret, anywhere on the globe in time of crisis. |56| The NPR also did not
recommend any changes to the deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe,
leaving decisions about their status to the members of the NATO alliance.

Nevertheless, according to unclassified reports, the United States did reduce the number of
nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and the number of facilities that house those weapons
during the George W. Bush Administration. Some reports indicate that the weapons were
withdrawn from Greece and Ramstein Air Base in Germany between 2001 and 2005. In
addition, reports indicate that the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from the RAF
Lakenheath air base in the United Kingdom in 2006. |57| According to unclassified reports, the
United States now deploys 160-200 bombs at six bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Turkey. |58| Some of these weapons are stored at U.S. bases and would be
delivered by U.S. aircraft. Others are stored at bases operated by the "host nation" and would
be delivered by that nation's aircraft if NATO decided to employ nuclear weapons.

The Obama Administration has not announced any further reductions to U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe and has indicated that the United States would "consult with our allies
regarding the future basing of nuclear weapons in Europe." In the months prior to the
completion of NATO's new Strategic Concept, some politicians in some European nations
did propose that the United States withdraw these weapons. For example, Guido
Westerwelle, Germany's foreign minister, stated that he supported the withdrawal of U.S.
nuclear weapons from Germany. Some reports indicate that Belgium and the Netherlands
also supported this goal. |59| As was noted above, NATO did not call for the removal of these
weapons in its new Strategic Concept, but did indicate that it would be open to reducing them
as a result of arms control negotiations with Russia.

Moreover, in the 2010 NPR, the Obama Administration indicated that it would take the steps
necessary to maintain the capability to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. It indicated
that the U.S. Air Force would retain the capability to deliver both nuclear and conventional
weapons as it replaced aging F-16 aircraft with the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The NPR
also indicated that the United States would conduct a "full scope" life extension program for
the B61 bomb, the weapon that is currently deployed in Europe, "to ensure its functionality
with the F-35." This life extension program will consolidate four versions of the B61 bomb,
including the B61-3 and B61-4 that are currently deployed in Europe, into one version, the
B61-12. Reports indicate that this new version will reuse the nuclear components of the older
bombs, but will include enhanced safety and security features and a new "tail kit" that will
increase the accuracy of the weapon. |60|

On the other hand, the NPR indicated that the U.S. Navy would retire its nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles (TLAM-N). It indicated that "this system serves a redundant
purpose in the U.S. nuclear stockpile" because it is one of several weapons the United States
could deploy forward. The NPR also noted that "U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs are capable of
striking any potential adversary." As a result, because "the deterrence and assurance roles of
TLAM-N can be adequately substituted by these other means," the United States could
continue to extend deterrence and provide assurance to its allies in Asia without maintaining
the capability to redeploy TLAM-N missiles. |61|

Russian Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War

Strategy and Doctrine

Russia has altered and adjusted the Soviet nuclear strategy to meet its new circumstances in a
post-Cold War world. It explicitly rejected the Soviet Union's no-first-use pledge in 1993,
indicating that it viewed nuclear weapons as a central feature in its military and security
strategies. However, Russia did not maintain the Soviet Union's view of the need for nuclear
weapons to conduct surprise attacks or preemptive attacks. Instead, it seems to view these
weapons as more defensive in nature, as a deterrent to conventional or nuclear attack and as a
means to retaliate and defend itself if an attack were to occur.

Russia has revised its national security and military strategy several times in the past 20
years, with successive versions appearing to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. |62|
For example, the military doctrine issued in 1997 allowed for the use of nuclear weapons "in
case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation." The doctrine published in 2000
expanded the circumstances when Russia might use nuclear weapons to include attacks using
weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies "as well as in response to large-scale
aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the
Russian Federation." |63| In mid-2009, when discussing the revision of Russia's defense strategy
that was expected late in 2009 or early 2010, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia's
Presidential Security Council, indicated that Russia would have the option to launch a
"preemptive nuclear strike" against an aggressor "using conventional weapons in an all-out,
regional, or even local war." |64|

However, when Russia published the final draft of the doctrine, in early 2010, it did not
specifically authorize the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Instead, it stated that "Russia
reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of
mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in a case of an aggression against her
with conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state." |65| Instead
of expanding the range of circumstances when Russia might use nuclear weapons, this
actually seemed to narrow the range, from the 2000 version that allowed for nuclear use "in
situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation" to the current form that
states they might be used in a case "that would put in danger the very existence of the
state." |66|

Hence, there is little indication that Russia plans to use nuclear weapons at the outset of a
conflict, before it has engaged with conventional weapons, even though Russia could resort
to the use of nuclear weapons first, during an ongoing conventional conflict. |67| This is not
new, and has been a part of Russian military doctrine for years.

Analysts have identified several factors that have contributed to Russia's increasing
dependence on nuclear weapons. First, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the economic
upheavals of the 1990s, Russia no longer had the means to support a large and effective
conventional army. The conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia highlighted seeming weaknesses
in Russia's conventional military forces. Russian analysts also saw emerging threats in other
former Soviet states along Russia's periphery. Many analysts believed that by threatening,
even implicitly, that it might resort to nuclear weapons, Russia hoped it could enhance its
ability to deter similar regional conflicts. Russia's sense of vulnerability, and its view that the
threats to its security were increasing, also stemmed from the debates over NATO
enlargement. Russia has feared the growing alliance would create a new challenge to Russia's
security, particularly if NATO moved nuclear weapons closer to Russia's borders. These
concerns contributed to the statement that Russia might use nuclear weapons if its national
survival were threatened.

For many in Russia, NATO's air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 underlined Russia's growing
weakness and NATO's increasing willingness to threaten Russian interests. Its National
Security Concept published in 2000 noted that the level and scope of the military threat to
Russia was growing. It cited, specifically, as a fundamental threat to its security, "the desire
of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for
ensuring international security." There are also threats in the border sphere. "A vital task of
the Russian Federation is to exercise deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale and
nuclear or otherwise, against Russia and its allies." Consequently, Russia concluded that it
"should possess nuclear forces that are capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired
extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and
circumstances." |68|

The debate over the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's national security strategy in the late
1990s considered both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. With concerns focused on
threats emerging around the borders of the former Soviet Union, analysts specifically
considered whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons could substitute for conventional
weaknesses in regional conflicts. The government appeared to resolve this debate in favor of
the modernization and expansion of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in 1999, shortly after the
conflict in Kosovo. During a meeting of the Kremlin Security Council, Russia's President
Yeltsin and his security chiefs reportedly agreed "that Moscow should develop and deploy
tactical, as well as, strategic nuclear weapons." |69| Vladimir Putin, who was then chairman of
the Security Council, stated that President Yeltsin had endorsed "a blueprint for the
development and use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons." |70|

Many analysts in the United States interpreted this development, along with questions about
Russia's implementation of its obligations under the 1991 PNI, to mean that Russia was
"walking back" from its obligation to withdraw and eliminate nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Others drew a different conclusion. One Russian analyst has speculated that the documents
approved in 1999 focused on the development of operations plans that would allow Russia to
conduct "limited nuclear war with strategic means in order to deter the enemy, requiring the
infliction of preplanned, but limited damage." |71| Specifically, he argued that Russia planned to
seek a new generation of nonstrategic, or low yield, warheads that could be to be delivered by
strategic launchers. Others believe Russia has also pursued the modernization of existing
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and development of new nuclear warheads for shorter-range
nuclear missiles.

The potential threat from NATO remained a concern for Russia in its 2010 and 2014 Military
Doctrines. |72| The 2010 doctrine stated that the main external military dangers to Russia are
"the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move
the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian
Federation, including by expanding the bloc." It also noted that Russia was threatened by "the
deployment of troop contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states
contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies and also in adjacent waters." The 2014
doctrine repeated these concerns. Hence, Russia views NATO troops in nations near Russia's
borders as a threat to Russian security. This concern extends to U.S. missile defense assets
that may be deployed on land in Poland and Romania and at sea near Russian territory as a
part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). In an environment where Russia
also has doubts about the effectiveness of its conventional forces, its doctrine allows for the
possible use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons during a local or regional conflict on its
periphery. The doctrines do not say that Russia would use nuclear weapons to preempt such
an attack, but it does reserve the right to use them in response. |73|

Force Structure

It is difficult to estimate the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons remaining in the Russia
arsenal. This uncertainty stems from several factors: uncertainty about the number of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union had stored and deployed in 1991, when
President Gorbachev announced his PNI; uncertainty about the pace of warhead elimination
in Russia; and uncertainty about whether all warheads removed from deployment are still
scheduled for elimination.

Analysts estimate that the Soviet Union may have deployed 15,000-25,000 nonstrategic
nuclear weapons, or more, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the 1990s, Russian
officials stated publicly that they had completed the weapons withdrawals mandated by the
PNIs and had proceeded to eliminate warheads at a rate of 2,000 per year. |74| However, many
experts doubt these statements, noting that Russia probably lacked the financial and technical
means to proceed this quickly. In addition Russian officials have offered a moving deadline
for this process in their public statements. For example, at the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty review conference in 2000, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that Russia was
about to finish implementing its PNIs. But, at a follow-up meeting two years later, Russian
officials stated that the elimination process was continuing, and, with adequate funding,
could be completed by the end of 2004. |75| In 2007, an official from Russia's Ministry of
Defense stated that Russia had completed the elimination of all of the warheads for its ground
forces, 60% of its missile defense warheads, and 50% of its air force warheads, and 30% of
its naval warheads. |76| In 2010, the Russian government revised this number and said it had
reduced its nonstrategic nuclear weapons inventory by 75%. |77|

In 2003, General Yuri Baluyevsky, who was then the first deputy chief of staff of the Russian
General Staff stated that Russia would not destroy all of its tactical nuclear weapons, that it
would, instead, "hold on to its stockpiles" in response to U.S. plans to develop new types of
nuclear warheads. |78| General Nikolai Makarov, head of the Russian General Staff, made a
similar comment in 2008. He said that Russia would "keep nonstrategic nuclear forces as
long as Europe is unstable and packed with armaments." |79|

With consideration for these uncertainties, recent estimates indicate that Russia may still
have up to 4,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. |80| In its report, the
congressionally mandated Strategic Posture Commission indicated that Russia may have
around 3,800 operational nonstrategic nuclear weapons. |81| This number may exclude
warheads slated for retirement. Within this total, some estimates indicate that Russia may
have around 2,000 active warheads assigned to non-strategic delivery vehicles, while the
remaining warheads are probably retired or awaiting dismantlement. |82| While some estimate
that only air-delivered weapons remain operational, the total amount may be split between
warheads for tactical aviation, naval nuclear weapons, and air defense missiles, with some
ground forces still in the mix. |83| One recent source concludes that, within its total, Russia has
approximately 170 warheads for Army missiles, 430 warheads for missile- and air-defense
forces, 730 warheads for the air force, and 700 naval nonstrategic nuclear warheads. |84|
Another source, using a different methodology, concludes that Russia may have half that
amount, or only 1,000 operational warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. |85| This
estimate concludes that Russia may retain up to 210 warheads for its ground forces, up to 166
warheads for its air and missile defense forces, 334 warheads for its air force, and 330
warheads for its naval forces. |86| Where past studies have calculated the number of operational
warheads by combining estimates of reductions from Cold War levels with assessments of
the number of nuclear-capable units and delivery systems remaining in Russia's force
structure, the author of this new study focuses on the number of operational units and the
likely number of nuclear warheads needed to achieve their assigned missions.

Russia had also reportedly reduced the number of military bases that could deploy
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and has consolidated its storage areas for these weapons.
According to unclassified estimates, the Soviet Union may have had 500-600 storage sites for
nuclear warheads in 1991. By the end of the decade, this number may have declined to about
100. In the past 10 years, Russia may have further consolidated its storage sites for nuclear
weapons, retaining around 50 in operation. |87|

Changing the Focus of the Debate

The preceding sections of this report focus exclusively on U.S. and Soviet/Russian
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These weapons were an integral part of the Cold War stand-off
between the two nations. The strategy and doctrine that would have guided their use and the
numbers of deployed weapons both figured into calculations about the possibility that a
conflict between the two nations might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Other
nations--including France, Great Britain, and China--also had nuclear weapons, but these
did not affect the central conflict of the Cold War in the same way as U.S. and Soviet forces.

The end of the Cold War, however, and the changing international security environment
during the past 20 years has rendered incomplete any discussion of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons that is limited to U.S. and Russian forces. Because both these nations maintain
weapons and plans for their use, the relationship between the two nations could still affect the
debate about these weapons. In addition, Russian officials have turned to these weapons as a
part of their response to concerns about a range of U.S. and NATO policies. Nevertheless,
both these nations have looked beyond their mutual relationship when considering possible
threats and responses that might include the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Both
nations have highlighted the threat of the possible use of nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons by other potential adversaries or non-state actors. Both have indicated that they
might use nuclear weapons to deter or respond to threats from other nations.

In addition, many analysts believe that a debate about nonstrategic nuclear weapons can no
longer focus exclusively on the U.S. and Russian arsenals. Even though tensions have eased
in recent years, with their nuclear tests in 1998 and continued animosity towards each other,
India and Pakistan have joined the list of nations that may potentially resort to nuclear
weapons in the event of a conflict. If measured by the range of delivery vehicles and the yield
of the warheads, these nations' weapons could be considered to be nonstrategic. But each
nation could plan to use these weapons in either strategic or nonstrategic roles. Both nations
continue to review and revise their nuclear strategies, leaving many questions about the
potential role for nuclear weapons in future conflicts. China also has nuclear weapons with
ranges and missions that could be considered nonstrategic. Many analysts have expressed
concerns about the potential for the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan or other
areas of China's interests. This report does not review the nuclear weapons programs in these
nations. |88| However, when reviewing the issues raised by, problems attributed to, and
solutions proposed for nonstrategic nuclear weapons, the report acknowledges the role played
by the weapons of these other nations.

Issues for Congress

During the 2010 debate on the New START Treaty, many Senators expressed concerns about
Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They noted that these weapons were not covered by
the new treaty, that Russia possessed a far greater number of these weapons than did the
United States, and that Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons might be vulnerable to theft or
sale to other nations seeking nuclear weapons. More recently, some Members have raised
concerns about the possibility that Russia might deploy these weapons in Crimea, which
Russia annexed in March 2014, bringing them closer to the borders of some NATO allies.
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov ignited these concerns in December 2014, when he
noted that Russia had a right to put nuclear weapons in Crimea because Crimea was now a
part of Russia. |89| Although he did not offer details of plans for such deployments, other
reports have indicated that Russia might move missile and bombers that could deliver either
nuclear or conventional weapons into Crimea in the next few years. |90|

At the same time, during the 2010 debates prior to the completion of NATO's new Strategic
Concept, analysts and government officials raised many issues about U.S. nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. These debates focused on questions about whether NATO should continue
to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security and whether the United States should
continue to deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons at bases in Europe. Many of the discussions
that focused on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons and many of those that focused on
U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons reached a similar conclusion--there was widespread
agreement about the need for further cooperation between the United States and Russia in
containing, controlling, and possibly reducing nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The 112th
Congress reiterated its support for this agenda, when in the FY2013 Defense Authorization
Act (H.R. 4310, Section 1037) it indicated that "the United States should pursue negotiations
with the Russian Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed
nonstrategic nuclear forces." The 113th Congress has remained involved in the discussion as
the United States and its allies prepare to pursue these issues with Russia, but it has not
legislated similar support for negotiations on reductions in these weapons.

Safety and Security of Russian Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

One source of risk from Russia's continued deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons
stems from potential problems with their safety and security in storage areas and a possible
lack of central control over their use when deployed in the field. These weapons were
deployed, and many remain in storage, at remote bases close to potential battlefields and far
from the central command authority in Moscow. The economic chaos in Russia during the
1990s raised questions about the stability and reliability of the troops charged with
monitoring and securing these weapons. At the time, some raised concerns about the
possibility that the weapons might be lost, stolen, or sold to other nations or groups seeking
nuclear weapons. |91| Even though economic conditions in Russia have improved significantly,
some analysts still view Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a possible source of
instability. Specifically, some have noted that "the continuing existence of ... tactical nuclear
weapons ... creates a risk of accidental, unauthorized or mistaken use. In addition, the risk of
terrorist groups acquiring these weapons is high. Therefore, security vigilance is essential." |92|

Russian officials deny that they might lose control over their nonstrategic nuclear weapons
and they contend that the problems of the 1990s were resolved as the weapons were
withdrawn to central storage areas. |93| Moreover, there is no public evidence from Western
sources about any episodes of lost, sold, or stolen Russian nuclear weapons. Nevertheless,
concerns remain that these weapons might find their way to officials in rogue nations or non-state actors. For example, during comments made after a speech in October 2008, Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates stated that he was worried that the Russians did not know the
numbers or locations of "old land mines, nuclear artillery shells, and so on" that might be of
interest to rogue states or terrorists. |94| Russian officials noted, in response to this comment,
that its stocks of nuclear weapons were secure and well-guarded and that Gates's concerns
were not valid.

The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia's National Security Policy

Many analysts argue that Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons pose a risk to the United
States, its allies, and others because Russia has altered its national security concept and
military strategies, increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. Some fear that Russia might
resort to the early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict along its periphery, which could lead
to a wider conflict and the possible involvement of troops from NATO or other neighboring
countries, possibly drawing in new NATO members. Some also believe that Russia could
threaten NATO with its nonstrategic nuclear weapons because Russia sees NATO as a threat
to its security. Russian analysts and officials have argued that NATO enlargement--with the
possible deployment of nuclear weapons and missile defense capabilities on the territories of
new NATO members close to Russia's borders--demonstrate how much NATO could
threaten Russia.

The congressionally mandated Strategic Posture Commission expressed a measure of
concern about the military implications of Russia's nonstrategic nuclear forces. It noted that
Russia "stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations
west of the Urals." It further noted that the current imbalance between U.S. and Russian
nonstrategic nuclear warheads is "worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe." It
argued that this imbalance, and the allies' worries, could become more pronounced in the
future if the United States and Russia continue to reduce their numbers of deployed strategic
nuclear weapons. |95| Moreover, some have questioned, if the United States and Russia no
longer see each other as adversaries, and a conflict between Russia and NATO is so remote,
why Russia feels it needs to maintain so many nonstrategic nuclear weapons or to
compensate for the weaknesses in its conventional forces. This posture could indicate,
particularly when combined with Russia's statements about NATO in its military strategy,
that Russia still views NATO as a threat to Russian security and as a potential source of
conflict in the region.

Others argue, however, that regardless of Russia's rhetoric, "Russia's theater nuclear weapons
are not ... destabilizing." Even if modernized, these weapons will not "give Moscow the
capability to alter the strategic landscape." |96| Further, Russian weapons, even with its new
military strategy, may not pose a threat to NATO or U.S. allies. Russia's doctrine indicates
that it would use these weapons in response to a weak performance by its conventional forces
in an ongoing conflict. Since it would be unlikely for NATO to be involved in a conventional
conflict with Russia, it would also be unlikely for Russian weapons to find targets in NATO
nations. This does not, however, preclude their use in other conflicts along Russia's
periphery. As Russian documents indicate, Russia could use these weapons if its national
survival were at stake.

The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy

The Bush Administration argued, after the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, that the United
States had reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons by increasing the role of missile defenses
and precision conventional weapons in the U.S. deterrent posture. At the same time, though,
the Administration indicated that the United States would acquire and maintain those
capabilities that it needed to deter and defeat any nation with the potential to threaten the
United States, particularly if the potential adversary possessed weapons of mass destruction.
It noted that these new, threatening capabilities could include hardened and deeply buried
targets and, possibly, bunkers holding chemical or biological weapons. It indicated that the
United States would seek to develop the capabilities to destroy these types of facilities.

Using a similar construct, the Obama Administration, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,
also indicated that the United States would reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.
regional deterrence strategies by increasing its reliance on missile defenses and precision
conventional weapons. Unlike the Bush Administration, however, the Obama Administration
did not seek to acquire new nuclear weapons capabilities or to extend U.S. nuclear deterrence
to threats from nations armed with chemical or biological weapons. It stated that it would not
consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, chemical, or biological
attack if the attacking nation were in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation
obligations. Instead, in such circumstances, the United States would deter and respond to
attacks with missile defenses and advanced conventional weapons. In addition, the
Administration announced that it planned to retire the Navy's nuclear-armed, sea-launched
cruise missiles, which had been part of the U.S. extended deterrent to allies in Asia.
Nevertheless, the Administration pledged to retain and modernize the B-61 warheads, carried
by U.S. tactical fighters and bombers; these are also a part of the U.S. extended deterrent.

Some have questioned the wisdom of this change in policy. They recognize that the United
States would only threaten the use of nuclear weapons in the most extreme circumstances,
but they argue that, by taking these weapons "off the table" in some contingencies, the United
States might allow some adversaries to conclude that they could threaten the United States
without fear of an overwhelming response. |97| The Obama Administration argued, however,
that although it was taking the nuclear option off the table in some cases, this change would
not undermine the U.S. ability to deter attacks from non-nuclear nations because the United
States maintained the capability to respond to attacks from these nations with overwhelming
conventional force. According to Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, "we retain the
prospect of using devastating conventional force to deter and respond to any aggression,
especially if they were to use chemical or biological weapons. No one should doubt our
resolve to hold accountable those responsible for such aggression, whether those giving the
orders or carrying them out. Deterrence depends on the credibility of response. A massive
and potential conventional response to non-nuclear aggression is highly credible." |98|

The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in NATO Policy and Alliance Strategy

Many analysts have questioned whether the United States needs to continue to deploy nuclear
weapons in Europe, nearly 25 years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and demise of the
Soviet Union. During the Cold War, these weapons were a part of NATO's effort to offset the
conventional superiority of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. With the demise of
the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet-era military, this role is no longer relevant.
Most analysts agree that, at the present time, NATO conventional forces are far superior to
those of Russia. However, NATO policy still views nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a
deterrent to any potential adversary, and they also serve as a link among the NATO nations,
with bases in several nations and shared responsibility for nuclear policy planning and
decision-making. They also still serve as a visible reminder of the U.S. extended deterrent
and assurance of its commitment to the defense of its allies. But, if the United States and its
allies agree that this assurance can be provided with either conventional capabilities or
strategic nuclear weapons, the need for forward basing in Europe may diminish.

The United States, its allies, and analysts outside government engaged in a heated debate
over the role of and need for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe in the
months leading up to the completion of NATO's Strategic Concept in November 2010. In
early 2010, political leaders from several NATO nations--including Belgium, Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway--called for the United States to remove these
weapons from Europe. They argued that these weapons served no military purpose in Europe,
and that their removal would demonstrate NATO's commitment to the vision of a world free
of nuclear weapons, a vision supported by President Obama in a speech he delivered in April
2009. |99| Those who sought the weapons' removal also argued that NATO could meet the
political goals of shared nuclear responsibility in other ways, and that the United States could
extend deterrence and ensure the security of its allies in Europe with conventional weapons,
missile defenses, and longer-range strategic nuclear weapons. |100| Moreover, some argue,
because these weapons play no military or political role in Europe, they no longer serve as a
symbol of alliance solidarity and cooperation. |101|

Others, however, including some officials in newer NATO nations, have argued that U.S.
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe not only remain relevant militarily, in some
circumstances, but that they are an essential indicator of the U.S. commitment to NATO
security and solidarity. Some analysts have noted that some of the newer NATO allies, such
as Poland and the Baltic states, may feel threatened by Russia and its arsenal of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons and that they would view the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons as a
change in the U.S. and NATO commitment to their security. |102|

NATO foreign ministers addressed the issue of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons during
their meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, in April 2010. At this meeting, the allies sought to balance
the views of those nations who sought NATO agreement on the removal of the weapons and
those who argued that these weapons were still relevant to their security and to NATO's
solidarity. At the conclusion of the meeting, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the
United States was not opposed to reductions in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe, but that the removal of these weapons should be linked to a reduction in the number
of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. |103| Moreover, according to a NATO spokesman, the
foreign ministers had agreed that no nuclear weapons would be removed from Europe unless
all 28 member states of NATO agreed. This view is shared by the senior statesmen who
served on a group of experts that evaluated NATO strategy and doctrine in the months prior
to the drafting of the new Strategic Concept. They agreed that a decision to withdraw or
reduce the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe should be made "by the NATO
alliance as a whole in consultation with Russia." |104|

Some also question whether the United States and NATO might benefit from the removal of
these weapons from bases in Europe for safety and security reasons. An Air Force review of
nuclear surety and security practices, released in early 2008, identified potential security
concerns for U.S. weapons stored at some bases in Europe. |105| The problems were evident at
some of the national bases, where the United States stores nuclear weapons for use by the
host nation's own aircraft, but not at U.S. air bases in Europe. The review noted that "host
nation security at nuclear-capable units varies from country to country" and that most bases
do not meet DOD's security requirements. Some analysts have suggested that, in response to
these concerns, the United States might consolidate its nuclear weapons at a smaller number
of bases in Europe. |106| Moreover, another review of the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise found
that U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), which was once the "principal advocate for
nuclear weapons in Europe," no longer advocates for these weapons and no longer recognizes
a political role for these weapons in NATO. According to this study, officials at USEUCOM
have argued that an "over-the-horizon" capability, weapons deployed outside of Europe,
could be just as credible as a deterrent to attack on NATO. |107|

Some argue that reducing or eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would not only
address the Air Force's operational and security costs associated with their deployment, but
also could serve as a signal to Russia of NATO's intentions to address Russia's perception of
the threat from NATO. This, in turn, might encourage Russia to accept negotiated limits or
transparency measures on its nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some also believe that a NATO
"step away" from these weapons would encourage Russia to reduce its reliance on
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, the authors of the Task Force study cited above hold
a different view. They argue that U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO remain "a pillar of NATO
unity." They argue that these weapons "convey the will of multiple allied countries, creating
real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military
advantage through the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the Alliance." |108|
Removing these weapons from Europe would, therefore, do more to undermine NATO's
political unity and military security than it would to encourage Russia to reduce or contain its
nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

As was noted earlier, some in Congress would like the United States to consider expanding
its deployment of dual-capable aircraft and nuclear bombs into eastern NATO nations, in
response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. They argue that such moves would demonstrate
that "Russian actions will come at a price." |109| Some have also suggested that the United
States consider deploying new nuclear-armed missiles in Europe, in response to Russia's
violation of the 1987 INF Treaty. |110| There is little evidence that NATO has requested, or
would welcome, such deployments. Some have argued that such steps could ignite a new
arms race that could further undermine security in Europe. Others have noted that these
weapons might be destabilizing if they were vulnerable to preemptive strikes. |111| Moreover,
NATO has adjusted its conventional force posture and operations in response to Russia's
actions in Ukraine. According to NATO documents, these changes, when backed by the
strategic nuclear forces of the United States and United Kingdom, should help assure the
eastern allies of NATO's ability to defend them. |112|

The Relationship Between Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Nonproliferation
Policy

The George W. Bush Administration stated that the U.S. nuclear posture adopted after the
2002 NPR, along with the research into the development of new types of nuclear warheads,
would contribute to U.S. efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. It argued that, by creating a more credible threat against the capabilities of nations
that seek these weapons, the U.S. policy would deter their acquisition or deployment. It also
reinforced the value of the U.S. extended deterrent to allies in Europe and Japan, thus
discouraging them from acquiring their own nuclear weapons. |113|

Critics of the Bush Administration's policy questioned whether the United States needed new
nuclear weapons to deter the acquisition or use of WMD by other nations; as was noted
above, they claim that U.S. conventional weapons can achieve this objective. Further, many
analysts claimed that the U.S. policy would actually spur proliferation, encouraging other
countries to acquire their own WMD. Specifically, they noted that U.S. plans and programs
could reinforce the view that nuclear weapons have military utility. If the world's only
conventional superpower needs more nuclear weapons to maintain its security, then it would
be difficult for the United States to argue that other nations could not also benefit from these
weapons. Such nations could also argue that nuclear weapons would serve their security
interests. Consequently, according to the Bush Administration's critics, the United States
might ignite a new arms race if it pursued new types of nuclear weapons to achieve newly
defined battlefield objectives. |114| The Bush Administration countered this argument by noting
that few nations acquire nuclear weapons in response to U.S. nuclear programs. They do so
either to address their own regional security challenges, or to counter U.S. conventional
superiority. |115|

The Obama Administration, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, set out a different
relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons policy and nonproliferation policy. The Bush
Administration had indicated that a policy where the United States argued that it might use of
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations would discourage these nations from acquiring
or using weapons of mass destruction. In other words, they could be attacked with nuclear
weapons whether or not they had nuclear weapons of their own. The Obama Administration,
however, argued that its adjustment to the U.S. declaratory policy--where it indicated that it
would not use U.S. nuclear weapons to threaten or attack nations who did not have nuclear
weapons and were in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations--would discourage
their acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nations that did not yet have nuclear weapons would
know that they could be added to the U.S. nuclear target list if they acquired them. And
others, like Iran and North Korea, who were already pursuing nuclear weapons, would know
that, if they disband their programs, they could be removed from the U.S. nuclear target list.

The debate over the relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy
has also focused on extended deterrence and the assurances the United States provides to its
allies. Many analysts have argued that, if these allies were not confident in the reliability and
credibility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, they may feel compelled to acquire their own nuclear
weapons. This view is evident among analysts who express concerns that Turkey, in
particular, with its proximity to Iran, might pursue its own nuclear weapons if the United
States were to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. |116|

Such calculations might also be evident in Japan and South Korea, as they face threats or
intimidation from nuclear-armed neighbors like China and North Korea. In recent years,
some politicians in South Korea have called for the return of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear
weapons to the peninsula, or even South Korea's development of its own nuclear capability,
as a response to North Korea's development and testing of nuclear weapons. |117| This view has
not received the support of the current government in South Korea, but it does demonstrate
that some may see U.S. security guarantees as fragile. Many analysts note, however, that
extended deterrence rests on more than just U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons. For example,
in recent years the United States and South Korea have participated in the U.S.-ROK
(Republic of Korea) Extended Deterrence Policy Committee and the United States and Japan
have pursued the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue to discuss issues related to
regional security and to bolster the allies' confidence in the U.S. commitment to their
security. Moreover, in early 2013, after North Korea issued verbal threats and tensions rose
on the Korean peninsula, the United States flew B-2 and B-52 bombers in joint exercises with
South Korea to demonstrate its ability to project power, if needed, into a conflict in the
area. |118|

Arms Control Options

The George W. Bush Administration did not adopt any new policies to address the potential
risks created by Russia's continued deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It did not
address these weapons in the negotiations on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,
although Bush Administration officials did pledge to raise concerns about these weapons in
discussions with their Russian counterparts. However, the Bush Administration appeared to
believe that any concerns about the safety and security of these weapons could be addressed
through the ongoing Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which the United States uses to
assist to Russia and other former Soviet states in improving security and control at nuclear
weapons storage facilities. |119| They argued, however, that Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons posed no military threat to stability or security for the United States or its allies, and
therefore, required no unilateral or cooperative responses from the United States. |120|

Further, some argued that any reciprocal or cooperative effort to address concerns about
Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons, such as negotiated transparency or arms control
measures, could undermine U.S. flexibility and limit U.S. and NATO options for the
deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Specifically, "pursuing arms control
agreements on these weapons might undercut NATO's nuclear posture, generating political
pressure to withdraw the remaining weapons." In addition, "arms control would make
problematic the development of new [nonstrategic nuclear weapons] capabilities that may be
required to deter and defend against today's threats, and, especially, for the deterrence of
rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction." |121| Instead, when possible, the Bush
Administration pursued unilateral reductions in U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

Some analysts who supported the Bush Administration's views on nonstrategic nuclear
weapons have recently altered their conclusions. Where before they argued that Russia's
nonstrategic nuclear weapons did not pose a threat to the United States or its allies, they now
contend that Russia's weapons, and particularly the imbalance in numbers between Russian
and U.S. weapons, can pose a threat to U.S. allies in Europe. And where before they argued
that the two sides should not pursue arms control solutions to address this imbalance, they
now argue that any future arms control agreement between the United States and Russia
should make reductions in Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons a top priority. |122|

Concerns about the disparity between the numbers of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons have dominated recent calls for the inclusion of these weapons in future arms
control agreements. But these concerns could reflect political, rather than military,
calculations. The United States and Russia have never employed their nonstrategic nuclear
weapons to counter, or balance, the nonstrategic nuclear weapons of the other side. For
NATO during the Cold War and for Russia in more recent years, these weapons have served
to counter perceived weaknesses and an imbalance in conventional forces. As a result, there
has been little interest, until recently, in calculating or creating a balance in the numbers of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. |123|

Some who have expressed a concern about the numerical imbalance in nonstrategic nuclear
weapons argue that this imbalance will become more important as the United States and
Russia reduce their numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. They fear that NATO nations
located near Russia's borders may feel threatened or intimidated by Russia's nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. They assert that Russia's advantage in the numbers of these weapons, when
combined with a reduction in U.S. strategic forces, could convince these nations that Russia
was the rising power in the region, and that they should, therefore, accede to Russia's
political or economic pressure. Others, however, have questioned this logic. They agree that
Russia's ability to intimidate, and possibly attack, NATO nations on its periphery may be
related to the capabilities of Russia's conventional forces and the existence of Russia's
nuclear forces. But this ability would exist whether Russia had dozens or hundreds of nuclear
weapons in the region. And NATO's ability to resist Russian pressure and support vulnerable
allies would be related more to its political cohesion and overall military capabilities than to
the precise number of nuclear weapons that were deployed on European territory. Moreover,
some note that, in spite of Russia's advantage in the aggregate number on nonstrategic
nuclear weapons, many of Russia's weapons may be deployed at bases closer to its border
with China than its borders with NATO nations, so many of these weapons should not count
in the balance at all.

Regardless, the concerns about the disparity in numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons
have led officials in NATO and the United States to insist that reductions in U.S. numbers of
these weapons in Europe must occur in conjunction with reductions in the numbers of
Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Further, while the United States has often reduced
these weapons through unilateral measures in the past, most official statements, and many
analysts outside government, now contend that these reductions should occur through
negotiated arms control agreements with Russia.

Increase Transparency

Many analysts argue that the United States and Russia should, at a minimum, provide each
other with information about their numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the status
(i.e., deployed, stored or awaiting dismantlement) of these weapons. According to one such
article, "a crucial first step ... would be to ... agree on total transparency, verification, and the
right to monitor changes and movement of the arsenal." |124| Such information might help each
side to monitor the other's progress in complying with the PNIs; it could also help resolve
questions and concerns that might come up about the status of these weapons or their
vulnerability to theft or misuse. The United States and Russia have discussed transparency
measures for nuclear weapons in the past, in a separate forum in the early 1990s, and as a
part of their discussions the framework for a START III Treaty in the late 1990s. They failed
to reach agreement on either occasion. Russia, in particular, has seemed unwilling to provide
even basic information about its stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some in the
United States resisted as well, arguing that public discussions about the numbers and
locations of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe could increase pressure on the United States to
withdraw these weapons.

After NATO completed its new Strategic Concept in 2010 and Deterrence and Defense
Posture Review in 2012, many experts recognized that NATO was unlikely to approve
reductions in U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe unless Russia agreed to similar
reductions. As a result, in recent years, some have again argued that NATO and Russia
should focus on transparency and confidence-building measures as a way to ease concerns
and build cooperation, before they seek to negotiate actual limits or reductions in
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They could begin, for example, with discussions about which
types of weapons to include in the negotiation and what type of data to exchange on these
weapons. Some have suggested, in addition, that the two nations could exchange information
on the locations of storage facilities that no longer house these weapons, as a way to begin
the process of building confidence and understanding. Those who support this approach
argue that it would serve well as a first step, and could eventually lead limits or reductions.
Others, however, believe these talks might serve as a distraction, and, if the United States and
Russia get bogged down in these details, they may never negotiate limits or reductions.
Moreover, Russian officials seem equally as uninterested in transparency negotiations as they
are in reductions at this time.

Expand Threat Reduction Assistance

In the early 1990s, as a part of the early efforts of the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program, the United States provided Russia with assistance in transporting nuclear weapons
back to Russia from other former Soviet republics. It has also provided Russia with
assistance in improving security at its central storage facilities for nuclear weapons.
However, much of this assistance focused on the warheads removed from strategic nuclear
weapons, rather than nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Many nonstrategic nuclear weapons
remain at storage areas near former deployment areas, and concerns remain about security at
these facilities. The United States could expand its threat reduction assistance to these sites,
so that it could build confidence in the safety and security of these weapons. Under CTR,
however, the United States usually only provided security assistance at sites that store
nuclear weapons that have been retired from the deployed force; it has not provided funding
for sites that can support the weapons' continued deployment. In addition, Russia may not
accept assistance at these sites, particularly if it were not permitted reciprocal access to U.S.
weapons storage sites. Moreover, the U.S.-Russian agreement governing the CTR program
lapsed in 2013, so the United States may no longer be in a position to help Russia enhance
security at weapons storage facilities.

Negotiate a Formal Treaty

Many analysts have suggested that the United States and Russia negotiate a formal treaty to
put limits and restrictions on each nation's nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This was a central
theme in the debate over the New START Treaty in late 2010. Not only did Members of the
Senate call on the Obama Administration to pursue such negotiations, Administration
officials noted often that the New START Treaty was just a first step, that the United States
and Russia would pursue limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons in talks on a subsequent
agreement. |125| In April 2009, when Presidents Obama and Medvedev outlined their approach
to nuclear arms control, they indicated that arms control would be a step-by-step process,
with a replacement for the 1991 START Treaty coming first, but a more comprehensive
treaty that might include deeper cuts in all types of warheads, including nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, following in the future.

Negotiations on a treaty to limit nonstrategic nuclear weapons could be complex, difficult,
and very time-consuming. |126| Given the large disparity in the numbers of U.S. and Russian
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and given the different roles these weapons play in U.S. and
Russian security strategy, it may be difficult to craft an agreement that not only reduces the
numbers of weapons in an equitable way but also addresses the security concerns addressed
by the retention of these weapons. A treaty that imposed an equal ceiling on each sides'
numbers of deployed nonstrategic weapons might appear equitable, but it would require
sharp reductions in Russia's forces with little impact on U.S. forces, since Russia maintains
more than 2,000 of these weapons while the United States has fewer than 200. A treaty that
required each side to reduce its forces by an equal percentage would have a similar result,
requiring far deeper reductions on Russia's part. |127|

Some analysts view this outcome as necessary, because Russia possesses so many more of
these weapons than the United States, but Russia may be unwilling to agree to such limits
without similar restraints on U.S. weapons. At the very least, Russian officials have insisted
that the United States remove all its nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Europe before it even
considers negotiating reductions in its own systems. |128| Moreover, several Russian officials,
including Foreign Minister Lavrov and Deputy Prime Minister Ryabkov, have indicated that
it is too soon to move forward on negotiations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons; they have
argued that these talks should wait until the United States and Russia pursue the
implementation of the New START Treaty. |129|

Even if the United States and Russia could agree on the depth of reductions to impose on
these weapons, they may not be able to agree on which weapons would fall under the limit.
For the United States, it may be relatively straightforward to identify the affected
weapons--the limit could apply to the gravity bombs deployed in Europe and any spare
weapons that may be stored in the United States. Russia, however, has many different types
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including some that could be deployed on naval vessels,
some that would be delivered by naval aircraft, and some that would be deployed with
ground forces. Moreover, while many of these weapons might be deployed with units in
western Russia, near Europe, others are located to the east, and would deploy with troops in a
possible conflict with China.

To address these problems, some analysts have suggested that the limits in the next arms
control treaty cover all types of nuclear warheads--warheads deployed on strategic-range
delivery vehicles, warheads deployed with tactical-range delivery vehicles, and nondeployed
warheads held in storage. |130| The Obama Administration has reportedly considered this
approach, and is studying the contours of a treaty that would limit strategic, nonstrategic, and
nondeployed nuclear warheads. |131|

This type of agreement would allow each side to determine, for itself, the size and mix of its
forces, within the limits on total warheads. |132| For example, Russia might choose to keep a
greater number of warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons, while the United States could
keep a greater number of nondeployed warheads that had been removed from its strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles. In addition, the limit set in the treaty could be low enough to
produce reductions that addressed each side's concerns with the other's arsenal. Russia might
reduce its numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, easing concerns about both the disparity
between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the potential role these weapons
might play in a conflict between Russia and its neighbors. The United States might reduce its
number of stored, nondeployed weapons. This could ease Russia's concerns about the U.S.
ability to exceed the limits in the New START treaty by returning these warheads to
deployed systems in a short amount of time. |133|

While this type of comprehensive agreement may seem to provide a solution to the
imbalance between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it may be more attractive
in theory than in practice. It is not clear that, once the parties move beyond limits on just their
deployed strategic weapons, they will be able to limit the scope of the treaty in this way.
Each side has its own list of weapons that it finds threatening; each may seek to include these
in a more comprehensive agreement. For example, Russian officials, including the Foreign
Minister, Sergei Lavrov, have stated that a future arms control agreement should also include
limits on missile defenses, strategic-range weapons that carry conventional warheads, and
possibly weapons in space. Minister Lavrov stated, specifically, that

it is impossible to discuss only one aspect of the problem at strategic parity and
stability negotiations held in the modern world. It is impossible to ignore such aspects
as non-nuclear strategic armaments, on which the United States is actively working,
plans to deploy armaments in space, which we oppose actively, the wish to build
global missile defense systems, and the imbalance of conventional armaments. It is
possible to hold further negotiations only with due account of all these factors... ." |134|

The United States has no interest in including these types of limits in the next agreement.
Hence, it is not clear that the two sides will be able to agree on which issues and what
weapons systems to include in the next round of arms control negotiations.

In addition, the parties might find it difficult to devise and agree on a monitoring regime that
would help them verify compliance with a treaty that limited strategic, nonstrategic, and
nondeployed nuclear warheads. In strategic arms control treaties, the parties monitor and
count deployed weapons primarily by counting the delivery vehicles--land-based missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers--that are large enough to locate
and identify with satellites and other remote monitoring systems. But this type of system
probably would not work with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, as each side uses dual-capable
launchers--like fighter aircraft--to deliver these weapons. Instead, the parties would
probably have to identify and count the warheads directly. The same would be true if they
were to limit nondeployed warheads in storage. Yet neither the United States nor Russia may
be willing to allow monitoring equipment or inspectors to have access to their warhead
storage areas if this revealed sensitive information about their nuclear weapons programs.

Moreover, although President Medvedev agreed, in April 2009, that the United States and
Russia should pursue more arms control reductions after completing New START, Russia
may have little interest in limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Russian officials have
denied that their weapons pose a safety and security problem, and they still consider these
weapons essential to Russian military strategy and national security. Hence, they may
consider a treaty limiting these weapons to be more of a long-term project than a next step in
arms control. For example, in early January 2011, Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that
"before talking about any further steps in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, it's necessary to
fulfill the New Start agreement." |135| Since the United States and Russia have agreed to
implement New START over seven years, this could delay talks on nonstrategic nuclear
weapons until the latter part of this decade.

Hence, even though there is widespread interest among U.S. officials and analysts in the
negotiation of a treaty that would limit nonstrategic nuclear weapons, such an agreement may
not be completed for many years. |136| Nevertheless, some analysts believe that Russia might be
convinced to take some steps to at least increase transparency, improve security, and possibly
reduce deployments, if the United States and NATO took concrete steps to reduce the
number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. |137| As a result, some analysts have argued that the
United States and Russia should begin the process of reducing their nonstrategic nuclear
weapons without a treaty. They could, instead, rely on unilateral, reciprocal steps like those
employed by President George H. W. Bush and President Gorbachev in the waning months
of the Cold War.

Most analysts agree, however, that the United States and Russia are unlikely to make any
progress on either limits or transparency measures related to nonstrategic nuclear weapons in
the current environment. Russia's annexation of Crimea, aggression against Ukraine, and
violation of the INF Treaty have altered the security atmosphere in Europe and quieted calls
among officials in NATO nations for reductions in these weapons. According to U.S.
officials, the U.S. offer for further negotiations remains on the table, but "progress requires a
willing partner and a conducive strategic environment." |138|

15. "The United States retains substantial nuclear capabilities in Europe to counter Warsaw Pact
conventional superiority and to serve as a link to U.S. strategic nuclear forces." National Security Strategy of the
United States, White House, January 1988, p. 16. [Back]

18. Toward a Nuclear Peace: The Future of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy,
Report of the CSIS Nuclear Strategy Study Group, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993. p. 27. [Back]

19. The text of the Montebello decision can be found in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger,
editors. Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force,
Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001. pp. 265-266. [Back]

21. For a description of the terms and implications of this treaty see, CRS Report RL30033, Arms
Control and Disarmament Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events, by Amy F. Woolf, coordinator. (Out of print.
For copies, contact Amy Woolf). [Back]

25. The speeches outlining these initiatives can be found in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger,
editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force,
Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001, pp. 273-283. [Back]

26. President Bush also announced that he would remove from alert all U.S. strategic bombers and 450
Minuteman II ICBMs that were to be eliminated under the START Treaty. He also cancelled several
modernization programs for strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. [Back]

28. The United States maintained the capability to return sea-based nuclear weapons to aircraft carriers
and submarines until this policy was changed through the Nuclear Posture Reviews of 1994 and 2001. [Back]

31. President Gorbachev also addressed strategic nuclear weapons in his initiative, announcing that he
would remove bombers and more than 500 ballistic missiles from alert and cancelling many modernization
programs. [Back]

35. Joshua Handler, "The September 1991 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage and Security Aspects of
TNWs," Presentation for seminar at the United Nations, New York. September 24, 2001. [Back]

36. For details on current concerns with Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons, see Miles Pomper,
William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in
Europe, The James Martin Center For Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
Monterey, CA, December 2009. [Back]

45. The United States extends nuclear deterrence to Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It may also assure
other allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, but these assurances do not necessarily include legally
binding commitments to retaliate with nuclear weapons, if necessary. See Clark A. Murdock and Jessica M.
Yeats, Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance, CSIS, Workshop
Proceeding and Key Takeaways, Washington, DC, November 2009, http://csis.org/publication/exploring-nuclear-posture-implications-extended-deterrence-and-assurance. [Back]

46. For see a discussion of these issues, see several essays in In the Eyes of the Experts: Analysis and
Comments on America's Strategic Posture, ed. Taylor Bolz (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press,
2009). [Back]

51. See, for example, "Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon's New Offensive Strike Plan," by
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, March 15, 2005, pp. 108. [Back]

52. The NPR did include caveats to this declaration. The Obama Administration stated that it would not
use nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attack, if the attacking nation were in compliance
with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The possibility of a nuclear response remained, however, if a
nation armed with nuclear weapons uses nuclear, chemical, biological, or even conventional weapons against
U.S. forces or allies. In addition, the NPR stated that the United States might reconsider the pledge not to
respond to biological weapons with nuclear weapons in the future. [Back]

83. A table summarizing three different estimates can be found in Andrea Gabbitas, "Non-strategic
Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Definition," in Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors, Controlling
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for National
Security Studies, July 2001, p. 25. See also Nikolai Sokov, "The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Controversy," Jane's
Defence Weekly, January 2001, pp. 16-17. [Back]

91. "Because of their size and forward basing, they are especially vulnerable to theft and unauthorized
use." See William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, "Nuclear Weapons that People Forget," International Herald
Tribune, May 31, 2000. [Back]

93. Russia's defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, has said that Russia's nuclear arsenal is safe and militants
could never steal an atomic bomb from the country. He further noted that it is a myth that "Russian nuclear
weapons are guarded badly and weakly." See "Russia Says No Militant Threat to Nuclear Arsenal," Reuters,
August 3, 2004. [Back]

98. Statement of Ellen O. Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security. U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services, The Nuclear Posture Review, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 22,
2010. [Back]

104. Martin Matishak, "NATO Must Decide on Removing U.S. Tactical Nukes, Albright Says," Global
Security Newswire, May 21, 2010. For the full text of the report from the group of experts see, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and Recommendations of
the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, May 2010, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf. [Back]

113. An Assessment of the Impact of Repeal of the Prohibition on Low Yield Warhead Development on
the Ability of the United States to Achieve its Nonproliferation Objectives, jointly submitted to the Congress by
the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy, March 2004, p. 4. [Back]

114. "The long term consequences of developing new nuclear weapons might well be to push Iran, North
Korea, and other states to work harder and faster in developing and manufacturing their own nukes." See
William Arkin, "New Nukes? No Way," Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2003. [Back]

115. An Assessment of the Impact of Repeal of the Prohibition on Low Yield Warhead Development on
the Ability of the United States to Achieve its Nonproliferation Objectives, jointly submitted to the Congress by
the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy, March 2004, p. 4. [Back]

119. For details on this program, see CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction
Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy F. Woolf. [Back]

120. An official with the Bush Administration's National Security Council staff has stated that "Russia's
theater nuclear weapons, even if modernized, will not give Moscow the capability to alter the strategic
landscape." He further noted that "Russia's theater nuclear weapons are not... destabilizing." See Robert Joseph,
"Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence," In Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors,
Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for
National Security Studies, July 2001, p. 90. [Back]

125. Peter Baker. "Smaller Arms Next for U.S. and Russia," New York Times. December 25, 2010. p. 4.
See, also, Rose Gottemoeller and Dr. James Miller, Remarks at New START Treaty Discussion at the Brookings
Institution, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, December 7, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/l7avc/rls/152658.htm. [Back]

127. A proposal of this type can be found in Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake,
Germany Opens Pandora's Box, Centre for European Reform, Briefing Note, London, February 2010, p. 3. [Back]

132. "The only way to get a real handle on NSNF security, and the relationship of these weapons to
strategic arms control and the real military threats they pose (while maintaining some capability) is the warhead
control route." See Joseph F. Pilat, "Controlling Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces," in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J.
Klingenberger, editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United
States Air Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001, p. 243. [Back]

136. Support for such an agreement is not universal. According to Baker Spring, at the Heritage
Foundation, the United States should not get into a negotiation on these weapons because, with the disparity in
favor of Russia, the United States "has no cards to play." See Peter Baker, "Smaller Arms Next for U.S. and
Russia," New York Times, December 25, 2010, p. 4. [Back]

138. Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Nuclear Arms
Control Policy, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., December
18, 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/235395.htm. [Back]

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