Non-technical manager’s guide to protecting energy ICS/SCADA

Sophisticated cyber-attacks known as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a growing challenge to the Energy Sector of our nation’s critical infrastructure. These attacks can largely be attributed to well-funded, dedicated nation-state actors.

Sophisticated cyber-attacks known as Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are a growing challenge to the energy sector of our nation’s critical infrastructure. These attacks can largely be attributed to well-funded, dedicated nation-state actors.

APT attacks against Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are increasing; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) cited ICS/SCADA and control system networks as one of the top two targets for hackers and viruses. These vulnerabilities begin with the human interface (13% of vulnerabilities required local access) and end with the actual Internet-facing ICS/SCADA hardware (87% of vulnerabilities are web-accessible).

There is a firm business argument that support the protection of ICS/ SCADA. Without proper safeguards in place, continued APT attacks will cause disruption, degradation, disability, and possible destruction of costly and/or irreplacible Energy Sector equipment and facilities. The economic impact to energy companies would be minor in comparison to the impact of a loss of electricity, natural gas, and petroleum throughout the United States. It is in the best interest of both Energy Sector companies and the Nation to immediately plan, fund, and effectively secure ICS/SCADA from front-to-back.

Critical Infrastructure interdependencies identified by the Department of Homeland Security

The Business Argument for Securing ICS/SCADA.

The major benefits of funding and supporting ICS upgrades and replacements are as follows:

The economy and lifestyle of the United States will be preserved.

U.S. Critical Infrastructure will be preserved and operational.

Corporate profitability and shareholder security will be preserved.

Corporate liability will be minimized.

The U.S. Government will be less inclined to seek additional power and/or impose additional regulation, and therefore expense, on the Energy Sector.

Controlling human factor variables

Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) are popular attack surfaces. The use of phishing, spearphishing, and other social engineering techniques continues to provide adversaries with access to administrative and ICS/SCADA systems. In spite of the best internal training programs and monitoring, an infected vendor or associated network connection can often open the gates to attackers, even within an otherwise well-protected system. An intentional insider threat is even more difficult to anticipate, identify, and often, act upon. Employees are unlikely to identify issues with colleagues for fear of litigation, embarrassment, or loss of prestige within the company.

Training is an effective tool for reducing or eliminating human-borne attacks. A dynamic program that informs, instructs, verifies, and requires written agreement of compliance should be mandatory within all Energy Sector organizations. Instructional System Design pre-tests employees and tailors the amount/level of instruction to their needs. Engaging training should not be entirely online or computer based; effective training should include live presenters, webinars, and case studies or practicum.

Security challenges

A human operator is the most likely cause of unauthorized access, malware infection, or inadvertent damage to ICS/SCADA networks and/or equipment.

Networks may be compromised by malware or denial of service. Radio telemetry is a new attack surface being exploited by threats.

Humans are required for most tasks within the Energy Sector Infrastructure.

Accidents happen. Critical Infrastructure can still be disabled.

ICS/SCADA systems are often one-off (especially created for a single purpose or industry) and operate using legacy operating systems and data links. The growth of digital networks and the inevitable Internet connection of ICS/SCADA equipment never designed for network operation continues.

At the conclusion of training, a post-test should be administered. Passing the test with a high average indicates the lessons were internalized and, more importantly, demonstrates that the employee did indeed receive and understand the information. An employee who successfully passes the testing cannot at a later time claim “I didn’t know,” or claim ignorance if aware of a colleagues security failures.

ICS/SCADA systems originally were designed to operate alone, without network connection. Once networked, information is remotely requested. This human-machine communication is viewable by attackers unless precautions are taken. Secure connections, similar to the systems used in online banking, must always be established during the HMI to deny attackers visibility into network command, control and communications. VPNs are a necessity for mobile, remote communication with ICS/SCADA equipment.

Other best practices to control the HMI technical threat include the use of least-privilege accounts, two-person control for critical activities, careful control of portable media, and assigning personal passwords and accounts to superusers as opposed to a general “admin” logon in order to maintain attribution for system access and changes.

It is important not to overlook interconnected networks such as vendor organizations. Lack of access controls within a third-party company may result in unauthorized persons being granted administrative privileges. These privileges, if misused or hijacked, can be used to access the primary company and achieve control via the interconnected system (as happened to Target in 2014 via an HVAC vendor). Third-party vendors may not have the resources or motivation of the primary company.

External partners may be encouraged to enforce cyber-security by offering preferential contracts for those who comply or even by levying business restrictions against those who fail to meet energy sector standards for safe network operation.

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