Sometimes an actor, sometimes a fan,
sometimes a chief, always a man,
Loved by the women, and feared by the men,
who will put Humpty Dumpty back together again?

Scenes burnt beneath his boots from 20,000 Ft.
twice he fell into the mist, there was no time for sleep.
Under fire in arid office, under strain in jungle rains,
he cried once to a tree for hours, yet he carried well his pain.

3 older brothers shared the cause, the truth now if it kills,
the battle rages on today, the war is fueled by wills.
He tried to help the weak survive, when being stepped on by the strong,
when chaos reigned the world of reason, an infant full of dawn

His children are alert and brave, Their fight is not denied,
they roam the world and carry on, they would like to be defied,
2 women brought them into life, his memory lives in them,
and we are here because he's gone, we know who was his friend

If all men were angels, go the words, we seek to hope this so,
he made mistakes as do we all, but which are those we know,
we shan't be sad, he lived quite full, he knew this is no bloody game,
and if God forgives transgressions, then I guess we all can do the same.

Respect and love are intertwined, his dignity not bled,
Have a good time I said in parting, he knew just what I meant
So pass in peace my Father's brother, I feel you were my friend.
It's nice to know that you have found, that this is not the end.

You can now also find these lyrics at this site: http://shawnphillips.wordpress.com/2011/01/27/impressions-of-david-atlee-phillips/

Many thanks to Steve Rosen for providing the photo and poem.
http://limitedhangout.tumblr.com/

"Let me begin by first making a couple of quotations," Hal Verb began, adding that collecting quotations was something of a hobby for him. "There are two: 'We see what we see because we miss all the finer details,'...and 'There is only one thing that moves government on any level, and that is utter, stark fear.'" The first quotation was attributed to someone who was unintelligible on my tape recording, unfortunately --- although Mr. Verb added that the man was the founder of general semantics. The second is by the late William Kunstler.

"I'm talking about the fear when they see the people mobilized, who have truth on their side, and then do something about it," Verb continued. "That's why I'm here [at COPA], and I hope that's why you're here."

Verb said, before getting to the body of his talk, that he did not know Lee Harvey Oswald, but Oswald knew of him, at least indirectly. Verb said in the early sixties, he---Verb---participated in distributing a Fair Play for Cuba Committee pamphlet, "Cuban Counter-revolutionaries in the United States," that Oswald ordered through the mail. Verb added that he used to write for The Militant and was a member and organizer of the New Jersey chapter of the FPCC.

"Many of the theories that are bandied about say that [Oswald] was an agent of the FBI or the CIA...but I say he was an agent of the ONI...Office of Naval Intelligence...Since the Marine Corps is under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy, and since his Marine Corps discharge was handled by the Navy, there's no way that you can have this discharge, and his conduct---before, during and after---unless the ONI started it."

This association of Oswald, however, with ONI, does not by any means prove or disprove that if there were a conspiracy in the murder of President Kennedy it follows that ONI is directly involved in that conspiracy. It can be argued, however, that a failure to completely uncover and thoroughly understand this Oswald-ONI relationship would, without doubt, prevent us from reaching any final conclusions as to the nature of the conspiracy: no other avenue of pursuit is possible unless this fact is recognized.

Why is ONI singled out rather than the traditional and usual "spy" agencies (such as the CIA or FBI) when Oswald's intelligence links are cited?...The argument can be offered that drawing attention to such agencies as the CIA and FBI provides an exercise in futility where these agencies become mere "whipping boys" frustrating serious attempts to unravel the truth of Oswald's ONI association, in a real sense, then, a cover-up of a cover-up.

There are three distinct and substantive reasons to conclude that Oswald was an ONI agent. Of these three the first is logical and quite apparent and the other two relate to my own personal and direct experiences in tracking down, examining and analyzing the data in Oswald's short-lived career as an intelligence agent.

The first of these reasons is, in my view, an obvious one. I would cite here what the American philosopher Alfred Whitehead's observation that "it takes an unusual mind to see the obvious." What is "obvious" here applies to the necessary fact that while Oswald was in the Marine Corps if there were any questions arising during his tour of duty about his "conduct" during (and after) his Marine Corps service it would come automatically to the attention of the ONI. That is because [as noted] the Marine Corps is under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department. Oswald's "discharge" status, thus, involved ONI vis-a-vis the Marine Corps and US Navy branches.

The other two reasons involving my own experiences occurred in 1965 and 1966. The latter date I will cite here as it relates more directly to the first reason discussed above: Oswald's ONI links principally those immediately before his release from the Marine Corps.

In December 1966 I appeared on a radio interview program in Oakland, California together with Harold Weisberg, the noted author of many books on the JFK case. At the very end of the show a caller, who would not identify himself, phoned in and wanted to speak with Weisberg. By happenstance I was able to hear what the caller had to say. Some of what the caller discussed is mentioned in Weisberg's Oswald in New Orleans (p. 87) [p. 85 in the Canyon Books edition---Ed.] but not all...

"He [the caller] engaged in a recreational activity which I'm not going to mention, because it gives a clue as to who he is," Verb told his rapt COPA audience. "At least who I think he --- who I've tracked down --- think he is. In fact I tracked him down. I refused to give his name to any individual, and I finally gave his name to Harold Weisberg yesterday [October 21, 1995, presumably---Ed.] in a handwritten note. I did not want to put this in the form of a letter, or even mention his name. When Harold saw it, he said, 'That name seems familiar.' Now, I don't know what he's going to do with it. But, I have tracked this person down."

Essentially, the caller, who was stationed at El Toro Marine Corps base when Oswald was there, knew Oswald and was a barracks roommate of his. Oswald, he asserted, had a "crypto clearance" and during Oswald's remaining two weeks before receiving his "hardship" discharge was constantly in the base's "C.I.D." (Criminal Investigation Division) HQ being "briefed" for a "mission." As we all know, Oswald went to Russia [right after his discharge]. The caller maintained that Oswald was "set up with a specific discharge" and that the "crypto" work involved "black box" stuff.

According to the caller, Oswald worked in decoding "IFF" (Identification of Friend of Foe) aircraft. The caller said there were about 180 individuals assigned to the unit and five were classified. Thus, Oswald had to be one of these five.

"Now, the obvious implication is that Oswald was on a mission," Verb stated, "as an agent of the ONI. Now, like I say, I tracked down that person---and that's one of the reasons---that's my personal experience with showing that he is an agent."

In testimony before the ARRB (the presidential Assassination Records and Review Board) in Dallas, November 1994, I cited this particular 1966 call and urged the Board to review this matter and interview not only those in the CID but also the ONI as well. I pointed out that if Oswald were briefed by the CID it could not escape the notice and attention of the ONI. To date (July 1995) there is no indication or prospect that the ARRB has or will look into this but, at least, now it is a matter of historical record. [Note: The ARRB is not an investigative body---Ed.]

The second (personal) reason noted above deals with an event in 1965. A friend, knowing of my deep interest in the JFK case, gave me a record he found at a record store. This record, which I still own, is extremely rare (I've seen only one other copy) and was made around 1964. It is called The President's Assassin Speaks, and has Oswald's actual voice during a radio debate he had with Ed Butler (and others) in New Orleans, August 21, 1963. Produced by "Key Records" in Los Angeles, it is an anti-communist propaganda production of Dr. Billy James Hargis, founder and director of "The Christian Crusade." Naming Oswald as the assassin, the record strives mightily to link Owald with an (implied) communist conspiracy. If you listen to this record, the back of the record assures us, "you will be able to decide for yourself who gave the orders to Oswald to take the life of President Kennedy."

My interest in this record, however, was not the propaganda content but rather in a discovery I made of a "slip" Oswald made on that tape while defending his stay in Russia as a "defector." Oswald "slipped" and stated he "was under the protection of the American government," quickly recovering from his "slip" and then saying he was "not under" that protection.

"When I heard that record, I went ballistic. Of course, in those days you didn't use the term 'ballistic.' But I did go ballistic. I said, my God! The guy has slipped and made an admission---to me---which represents that he is representing the U.S. Government!...

"So I immediately went to the [Warren Commission] volumes...and they left out the part where he says 'I was under the protection of---' and they leave in the 'I was not under the protection of.'
"I just spoke recently to John Newman and I said, 'You know, John, why did you publish in your book, Oswald and the CIA --- I'm a stickler for details. I mean, I probably find errors in virtually all the books, it's just something I do because I want to get the record straight --- I said, 'Why did you publish that?' And he said, 'Hal, I just didn't know about that.' Of course, he's learned about it. So, all he did was reprint what's in the volumes. But the volumes didn't get it straight. You start questioning, why didn't the volumes publish it? That's another story."

Forgetting for the moment [that] the Warren Commission "transcript" did not print Oswald's "slip," for myself, it again offered a clear and strong indication that Oswald was, indeed, a U.S. intelligence agent whose assignment was his stay in Russia. In summary for the three main reasons cited above the evidence is sufficient, compelling and substantive: Lee Harvey Oswald was a U.S. intelligence agent engaged in various activities at home (the U.S.) and abroad beginning with his Marine Corps discharge and ending with his death at the hands of Jack Ruby.

As to the final question of the nature of the conspiracy: Unravelling Oswald's intelligence connections provides the key. The answer or answers lie staring us in the face if only we would truly look! As the noted philiosopher Wittgenstein so well counseled us, "Look---and then think!"

1994 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ARRB

Dallas, Texas -- November 18, 1994 Hearing

MR. MARWELL: Mr. Hal Verb.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Mr. Verb, we didn't have you on the list ahead of time. Could you spell your name for the record?

MR. VERB: Yes, my name is Hal, H-a-l, and the last name is Verb, that is like pronoun, subject, V-e-r-b.
CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Go ahead, sir. Thank you.

MR. VERB: I am from San Francisco. I am a private researcher. I have been conducting research for about 30 years, in fact, almost from the very first day of the assassination because it was a tremendous event in American history, still unresolved in my mind, and still unresolved in the minds of most of the American public. That is why I am here, and that is why you are here.

I am here as a private citizen who is deeply concerned to know the full truth about the assassination of President Kennedy. Today I wish to call attention to a serious question that has long lingered about the event, and that is precisely the accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, and his alleged association, connection or involvement with the U.S. Government as a possible agent for an agency or agencies that represented the U.S. Government.

Regardless of whether one believes or asserts that there was no conspiracy or there was a conspiracy, the unresolved question of Oswald's ties to the U.S. Government looms large and, indeed, hangs over us like the proverbial Damocles sword, and that is over all of us, including the U.S. Government, whether the U.S. Government is in any way connected or not.

Now I realize fully well that virtually no government reveals its agents or its methods of operations, but in the matter of the President Kennedy's death this question can no longer be ignored, and the longer it is avoided the greater the harm that will befall us all.

To focus the attention of the Review Board more closely in this regard, I specifically call your attention to a radio program that I appeared on in December 1966 which was several hours long and concerned the Kennedy murder. I was in the radio station studio, this was in Oakland, California, and the other half of the program was a telephone hook-up to a Maryland writer and researcher Harold Weisberg who had written and began a series of books called Whitewash, the Whitewash series.

At the end of the program, the program moderator received a call from an individual who did not wish to be heard on the radio, and who stated he wished to speak only to Mr. Weisberg confidentially. Now I was able to hear the contents of this discussion, the entire discussion between Mr. Weisberg and the caller, and the phone call from the individual who insisted that he not be identified and who wanted to remain anonymous. In fact, Weisberg asked the individual if you desire to come forward, you always know how to reach me, but this individual never did step forward.

I am going to go into what the nature of this call was. The gist of the phone call was this. The caller had been a barracks roommate of Lee Harvey Oswald who was stationed at El Toro Marine Corps Base in California. The caller stated that about two weeks before Oswald received his so-called alleged hardship discharge, which is all over the record, can be established, he was constantly in the CID Headquarters being briefed for a mission overseas. The caller provided the information that Oswald also had a crypto secret clearance.

Now I raise this matter because if, indeed, the CID was involved in such an event -- I am not here to state flatly that they did engage in this, I don't know, I want the evidence to be presented -- it would necessarily follow that the ONI, which is the Office of Naval Intelligence, must certainly have been aware of this. It just boggles my mind.

I at one time served in an intelligence section during the Korean War, and it is impossible for me to believe that the CID could not have had in some way connection or approval by the ONI.

Now I mention ONI because there is a lot of speculation in the literature, some of which you may have read, you may not have, and none of this speculation has proven to be final, and this speculation is pointing to Oswald being connected in some capacity with the ONI. Other writers will suggest FBI, CIA, my concern here is with the ONI.

Recently Professor John Newman, who has appeared I believe at the last hearing, he has been looking into this matter, and has stated that as significant portion of the ONI files relative to JFK have been destroyed. There are still remaining, however, at least two boxes of ONI files that still have to be gone through. I have not, myself, seen these so I do not know what the nature of those files consist of. I believe it is incumbent upon this Board to reach a fairly definitive determination as why, when and how these ONI files were destroyed and whose responsibility it was for the destruction.

Since ONI files necessarily involve the Navy Department, it appears evident that those individuals from the Secretary of the Navy on downward, and those immediately below charged with their necessary responsibilities be asked precisely about the issues and points raised in my statement today.

If this is not done, history will not be served, and the American people will once again, as in prior investigations, be the ultimate losers. Respectfully, that is my -- I will be willing to send you this entire statement in a letter which I will forward to the Board, and I will answer any questions that you have about this.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Thank you, Mr. Verb.
Any questions?

DR. GRAFF: What do you mean, Mr. Verb, by crypto security clearance?

MR. VERB: Well, a crypto secret clearance has to do, as the caller explained -- I didn't get into it further. Actually crypto secret clearance is mentioned in the Warren Commission documents, in its actual Warren Commission volumes. I found that out after having looked into it. You can find them.

Crypto secret clearance is a very specialized high security clearance that very, very few people would obtain in any capacity, and it is interesting to note that at this time while Oswald was in the Marine Corps he was receiving "Communist literature," so you have a pro-Communist, Marxist having crypto secret clearance.

I talked to a General who was an aide to President Kennedy, who accompanied President Kennedy, I asked him about crypto secret clearance. He knew about it. He said, I have not confirmed this, that the only way that you could obtain crypto secret clearance is that you had first top secret clearance. Crypto secret clearance had to do with black box stuff, which is the information provided on atomic warhead missiles in case of atomic attack. I understand the Strategic Air Command has the capacity for this kind of information. I don't know precisely the nature of it, I haven't looked into it further.

But I have spoken to people who have had crypto secret clearance, many people, in fact, that I have spoken to who have pretty much asserted that what I have learned through this broadcast and other means turns out to be fairly accurate, and I only go by what I can document. I am not interested in speculation. I do not go by hearsay to the extent that I simply believe every single theory. I want documentation to prove what can be clearly set in the record and determined to be the truth.

DR. HALL: Have you made requests of the United States Government?

MR. VERB: No, I have not. I have not. In fact, I have never issued a single FOIA request in the years that I have been doing this, although I have relied on other FOIA requests from other -- not necessarily connected with this particular issue, but I have interviewed people who would have been in a position to know precisely what this kind of clearance was, and the nature of ONI and related matters.

DR. HALL: Well, the issue that you raise, of course, is one that goes to the availability or the destruction of materials held by the United States Government.

MR. VERB: Exactly.

DR. HALL: May I ask why you decided or have foregone the opportunity to use the Freedom of Information Act?

MR. VERB: To be quite honest, I am primarily involved in so many other areas. My area that I have been looking into is the photographic evidence, and that takes an enormous amount of time. I write letters and receive letters.

In fact, I should mention one important thing that may go to the heart of the matter. I recently received a call from a person who took Oswald's place in the Marine Corps in his very position after he left and went to Soviet Russia. I hope to be in communication with this person to find out precisely what the nature, if he knows anything at all, about crypto secret clearance.

So my answer would be, I simply have not had the time to do this. If you have been involved in this case, it is very time consuming. I have a full-time job during the day. I am not a member of any particular group or organization, nobody is sponsoring me. All the money I have put into this basically simply because I desire the truth, and I think justice will be served if the truth is known.

DR. HALL: I do think it is the case that part of what the Board is interested in is the efficacy and efficiency of the Freedom of Information Act as it relates to this matter, so my questions are directed to that issue and not directed necessarily to your personal capacity.

Dallas, Texas -- November 18, 1994 Hearing
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/arrb/index80.htm
MR. SCHAEFFER: My name is Roy Schaeffer and I am a private citizen, and I never met Hal Verb, but I am –

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Could you spell your name for the record?

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay, it is S-c-h-a-e-f-f-e-r.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Thank you.

MR. SCHAEFFER: I am the person Hal Verb mentioned, I am the person who replaced Oswald after he left El Toro in 1960. He left in 1959, and I joined his unit. So I did have a crypt clearance. I don't want to get into that.

Basically, what I would like to mention is, I am a private probably an assassination buff more or less. In 1986, I contacted Jim Garrison, and before he died he had sent -- well, when he got the Zapruder film down at the trial on '66, he ran off 100 copies. Sometime in 1989, you know, I received a copy from him, and then I have been researching using a copy of the 100 that was made.

Now what I had found then at first, you know, I am interested in this flawed editing of the Zapruder film, and I wondered, Zapruder said that he had set his camera on a film speed of 24, and so over the years it got me thinking. In 1963, I worked for the Dayton Daily News, and Hess & Eisenhart was the company that rebuilt the Presidential Limousine, so I had gone down there with a fellow reporter because I had like a scientific background.

Okay, so anyway what was unique about that time was the emergency lights on the Presidential car. Now the lights were interesting in one aspect, they blinked, they would blink on one side and then on the other. So one problem I had in -- so I know there was a constant blink rate. Now, I have taken a lot of eight millimeter film. In other words, if something has a constant blink rate and you are photographing it through, like Zapruder, that Bell & Howell camera, then it would show a constant rate.

In other words, if it found that the blink rate was .41 seconds, so it would show a rate of nine blinks in the film. Now what I had submitted, I believe you have that record I gave to Mr. Gunn, I plotted from 133 to 238, and the pattern does not show up that way. So I am suggesting, you know, to yourselves that that proves that alterations was done to the Zapruder film.

Also on the night of the assassination, what I believe, the film -- in other words, Zapruder took the film to the Kodak lab in Dallas. Now I have some film expertise. I served a six-year government sponsored apprenticeship in film, and that had what they call a 14K process. This 14K process is how they developed Kodachrome. It is quite complicated. At that time, the only place that had that process was here in Dallas next to Love Field, and that was at the Dallas Eastman-Kodak lab.

From my information on the Max B. Phillips minimal, I think Paul Halp talked about that on Commission Exhibit 450, that it shows that the Zapruder film, and I believe three copies were flown to Washington the night of the assassination, I believe they were taken into -- they had five hours from my timetable. I worked with a Dr. James Fetzer on this, and also Mike Pinser, he is an attorney. So any way, I interjected on that, but anyway I lost my place when I said that. Could you help me? I lost my place.

DR. HALL: You were saying only the Dallas Eastman-Kodak lab.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay. So anyway, it is a very complicated process, and it takes about 45 seconds, so it is called the K-14 but the 14K process because it is what they call a subtractive process. It is a reversal film that like comes into a color transparency after it is developed. So, in other words, I believe that they took the original film to the National Interpretation Lab and at that point they altered it down to approximately 18 frames per second. Like I say, in 1960 -- so what I am saying is that I believe Frame Z-133 to 238 is where they altered that.

Now the way I found that out was, I personally had the film and I went through and I plotted each blinking light per frame, and that is how I derived that the film was altered. Unless you have the actual film, you can't -- there is no way you can determine that.

So that is pretty much what I had to say. I thank you for your time.

CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Any questions for Mr. Schaeffer?

DR. NELSON: I have one. You say you replaced Oswald, that is to say you took over all of his functions, his job?

MR. SCHAEFFER: That's correct.

DR. NELSON: Which were? What was the job assignment?

MR. SCHAEFFER: We worked at TACC, Tactical Air Control Center, basically, and it was basically tracking IFF boxes. In other words Strategic Air Command, and then they had like IFF boxes. And then they would set those in the morning, and then your crypt orders would come down from Washington, and they were like Zulu Time Rated, 24-hour time, and then there was what you call authentifications. So that is what a person that has crypt does.

So our job was, when the planes left the United States through the EDACs area was to clear them and plot them, and so that was basically what our job function was there at El Toro, and I am sure Oswald did the same thing.

Tuesday, October 25, 2011

According to Douglas Richmond in The Archaeologist Was a Spy: Sylvanus G. Morley and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Tim Nenninger created a finding aid for ONI records held at the NARA.
Here's a finding aid to the ONI records related to Interagency Groups on Nazi Assets that he helped compile.

This finding aid was prepared for the Interagency Group on Nazi Assets, directed by Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, the Under Secretary of Commerce. The finding aid is part of a report for the Interagency Group on Nazi Assets that was prepared under the direction of Dr. William Z. Slany, Chief Historian of the Department of State.

Development of this finding aid actually predated the Interagency Group on Nazi Assets,
beginning in early April 1996, when researchers began asking about our holdings relating to Swiss banks. The Archives II Textual Reference Branch staff was canvassed and a ten-page finding aid was produced by the preparer of this finding aid. It was made available to researchers on April 19, 1996. It identified the records in a half-dozen record groups and identified pertinent series of records. For the next six months an increasing number of researchers desired more information and, thus, the initial finding aid was periodically updated. Then in November 1996, with increased interest in the multitude of questions relating to Nazi looted assets, particularly gold, and the creation of the Interagency Group on Nazi Assets, increased attention was devoted to expanding the finding aid. The present version, prepared for the Interagency Group on Nazi nAssets, is not the end of NARA’s efforts to provide “ready access to essential evidence.” As time permits and researcher interest continues this finding aid will be periodically updated.

Purpose of the Finding Aid

The purpose of this finding aid is to assist researchers locating within the National Archives at bCollege Park those records that pertain not only to the subject matter of the report but also to those records relating to the broader subjects listed in the title to the finding aid.

Specifically, the finding aid provides a guide to records pertaining to:
• efforts in 1940-1942 to freeze, block, and seize Axis and other assets located in the United States; efforts, in conjunction with the Allies, during the 1942-1944 period, to blockade the Axis to prevent them from obtaining the resources necessary to wage war;
efforts during 1944 and 1945, to prevent the Axis from secreting and cloaking their assets in neutral and other countries (i.e., the Safehaven Program); efforts in 1945 and in the aftermath of the war to locate looted and other Axis assets; The U.S. postwar role in restitution and reparation activities; and, The U.S. diplomatic efforts to work with the neutral countries to obtain the return of and disposition of Axis looted assets as well as other enemy assets.

This finding aid is by no means comprehensive, given the wealth of the holdings of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and given the time constraints in its preparation.

There are, most likely, other series of records within the Record Groups mentioned as well as series in Record Groups not mentioned that contain information about World War II economic warfare, Nazi looted assets, Safehaven Program activities, post-war restitution and reparation activities, and the financial and diplomatic aftermath of the war. There is also a possibility that some pertinent records are still in the legal custody of one or more Federal agencies. This finding aid, nevertheless, should provide researchers with a relatively full guide to the archival records in College Park and give clues where other material may be held.

The National Archives and Records Administration and Archival Records

The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) acquires, preserves, and makes available for research records of enduring value created or received by organizations of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government. A relatively substantial amount of the NARA holdings relate to World War II and are held in its facility in College Park, Maryland. Other NARA facilities hold many records and donated material related to World War II, including records related to the subjects covered in this finding aid. This is particularly true of the Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Harry S Truman, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Libraries. Researchers should contact the other NARA facilities for assistance in their research
efforts.

Arrangement of Archival Records

NARA arranges its holdings according to the archival principle of “provenance.” This principle provides that records be attributed to the agency that created or maintained them and arranged there under as they were filed when in active use. In the National Archives, application of the principle of provenance takes the form of numbered record groups, with each record group comprising the records of a major government entity, usually a bureau of an independent agency.

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Most record groups include records of any predecessors of the organization named in the title of the record group. A few record groups combine the records of several small or short-lived agencies having an administrative or functional relationship with each other.
Within a record group, the records of a government agency are organized into series. Each series is a set of documents arranged according to the creating office’s filing system or otherwise kept together by the creating office because they related to a particular subject or function, result from the same activity, document a specific kind of transaction, take a particular physical form, or have some other relationship arising out of their creation, receipt, or use.

NARA endeavors to keep records in the order in which they were maintained by the creating agency, in the belief that this best preserves their integrity and interrelationships. The agency filing systems were designed for administrative purposes and not for the benefit of future researchers. This finding aid seeks to assist subject-oriented researchers in understanding the complexities of the recordkeeping systems and in locating relevant material among the vast quantities of records.

Introduction to the Finding Aid

This finding aid is divided into three parts--the records of military agencies, records of civilian agencies, and records in the National Archives Gift Collection. The latter are subdivided by the individual who donated their personal papers to NARA. The military and civilian agency sections of the finding aid are subdivided by Federal agency and then by Record Group.

Within each Record Group the descriptions of the records are, for the most part, in a hierarchial order. For each series of records a Series Title is provided. In most instances the date span of the series is provided as well as the series entry number. In many instances an arrangement statement and full description of the records in the series is provided. When applicable, the total number of boxes in the series is given along with the beginning location of the series. Where specific boxes are identified, the exact box location is provided. When a folder or file title in a particular box or boxes of a series is given, the term “File Title” is used to indicate only certain file titles are identified; when all the files in a box or series are given then the term “File Titles” is used.

The location of each series of records at Archives II at College Park, Maryland, is provided, with the stack area, the row, the compartment, and the shelf where the series begins. When specific boxes are indicated, generally the exact location of the box or boxes is given. Thus a location of 450/34/7/01 would mean stack area 450, row 34, compartment 7, and shelf 1. There is one exception to this general guidance. The newly accessioned Department of Treasury records, mainly from the predecessor offices of the Office of International Affairs, have been declassified and moved to an unclassified stack area. To make the pertinent records more accessible we have moved many boxes, including those of several other Federal agencies, to the Textual Research Room (Room 2000) hold area. Thus the location for these newly declassified records is the Compartment Number. Also provided is the original stack location.

For example: Compartment 6 [450/34/33/01]. Records in stack 631, as a general rule, are classified. As they are declassified, they are being moved to nonclassified stack areas. Thus, researchers should check with the staff to determine whether records identified as being in stack 631 are still classified or have been moved to a new location.

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Access to the Records

Almost all of the records described in this finding aid are located in the Archives II building in College Park, Maryland. The records are serviced by the Textual Reference Division. The Division’s Archives II Textual Reference Branch assists researchers in locating records and the Division’s Archives II User Services Branch assists researchers in the research room. Some of the records are microfilmed as NARA microfilm publications and those records are self-service.

These microfilm publications are located in Room 4050 of the Archives II Building. Other NARA facilities have copies of many of these microfilm publications. To contact the Textual Reference Branch about our holdings or to request records please call 301- 713-7250 and ask to speak to either a military records archivist or a civilian agency records archivist depending upon the records in which you are interested. Please be as specific as possible so you may be directed to an appropriate staff member. If you would like to write us, please do so at the following address: Archives II Textual Reference Branch (NWDT2), Textual Reference Division, Office of Records Services-Washington, Room 2400, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001

The Naval Establishment Records

Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (RG 38)

By an Executive order of December 18, 1941, the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet was removed from the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations and was put in supreme command of the Navy’s operating forces. On March 12, 1942, however, another Executive order made provision for combining the duties of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and those of the Chief of Naval Operations and assigned them to one office with the title of “Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.” This official would serve as the principal naval adviser to the President on the conduct of the war, and principal naval adviser and executive to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Naval Establishment. Admiral Ernest J. King, who had become Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, in December 1941, was given the dual role, and retained it during the remainder of the war. As Chief of Naval Operations he succeeded Admiral Harold R. Stark, who had held that office since before the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939.

Records of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Administrative) Division of Pan American Affairs and United States Naval Missions 1940-1946 With the outbreak of World War II, the increased importance and complexity of problems with respect to Latin American relations resulted in the establishment of a Pan American Division set up directly under the Chief of Naval Operations in January 1942. Rear Admiral W. O. Spears, who had been named Director of the new division, had previously been assigned duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in June 1940 to exercise overall supervision of naval missions.

80
After World War II, the division became the Division of Pan American Affairs and United States Naval Missions, responsible for the administering of United States naval missions and advisory groups; for assisting in plans for effective naval cooperation with the American republics; and for the arranging of training in the United States of armed forces personnel of these and other countries.

Correspondence relating to Hemispheric Security 1940-1945 (Entry 48B)

This series contains copies of intelligence reports prepared by naval and military attaches
in Latin American countries concerning political elections; political developments; and other related subjects. Also included are memorandums concerning agreements made during the years 1940-1942 for cooperation against possible Axis aggression. Most of the records relate to Lend Lease. The records are arranged by country and thereunder according to an alpha-numeric filing scheme.

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), holding the rank of Vice Admiral,
under the authority and direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, prepared strategic plans and policies and was responsible for the organization, operational development, readiness, administration, and operations of seagoing forces, sea frontiers, and overseas naval command areas. He had the overall direction of the Intelligence Service, evaluated and disseminated operational information, and had representation on joint operational agencies.

Records of the Office of Naval Intelligence

During World War II the Naval Intelligence Division was part of the “Services” group
under the Sub Chief of Naval Operations. During the war the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was responsible for the collection and distribution of naval intelligence for Navy bureaus and offices. It cooperated closely with the Military Intelligence Division (MID), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department, the Office of U.S. Censorship, and the British Imperial Censorship Office. Since Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief , United States Fleet (COMINCH) and ONI both carried on intelligence activities, a more clear-cut distinction was made between them when COMINCH established the Combat Intelligence Division on July 1, 1943. The general line of demarcation between their duties was that the Naval Intelligence Division was responsible for strategic intelligence and the Combat Intelligence Division was responsible for operational intelligence.

The Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) asked the Office of Naval Intelligence to
furnish Safehaven data to it whenever possible. In case at least, that of Tangier, the Naval Attache sent reports of a very useful nature relating to enemy assets and enemy influence in that territory.

On the basis of its reception of these reports, the FEA requested that naval attaches in other neutral territories be requested to initiate similar studies.

ONI in April 1945, issued a special report (FT-11-2-45) defining its Safehaven program
and tying it in with current Naval interests. The report was planned to expedite the securing of Safehaven data and was distributed to Naval Commands abroad, Naval Attaches, Liaison Officers, and District Intelligence Officers.80 General Records 80 Clarke, “Safehaven Study,” p. 113.

This index is arranged alphabetically under 30 major headings, including: all nations;
commerce; financial; government, foreign relations; social and economic conditions; and, societies and organizations. Under each of the major headings the cards are arranged by subject or country, and there under by subject or country. Included on the cards are register number, file designation, date, title, the source of the information, and the original security classification on the document.

Also included on some cards are lists of the enclosures to the document and cross-references to other subjects in the index. The index has been microfilmed and is available as NARA Microfilm
Publication M1332.
Boxes 1-35 location: 370/13/9/05

Formerly Confidential Reports of Naval Attaches 1940-1946 (Entry 98A)

This series consists of intelligence reports submitted by naval attaches based upon their
observations concerning foreign naval activities. Most reports contain military, economic, and political information about the country. The series is arranged by subject classification number and there under numerically. See series 95A for a subject index for the World War II intelligence
summaries and reports.

These records are much like those described above but were classified Secret. Arranged by subject classification number and thereunder numerically , with a few reports arranged by a separate number scheme at the end of the series. See series 95A for a subject index for the World

These records are much like those described in series 98A. Also included in this series is
correspondence relating to counter-espionage activities within the various embassies; excerpted foreign intelligence reports; and comments on current political events in foreign countries. The records are arranged by top secret document control number. 41 rolls 35mm negative microfilm;
19 rolls 35mm positive microfilm contained in boxes 16 and 17. Boxes 1-15 contained textual
records. A partial list of files is available in the first box of the series, as well as in the
consultation area in Room 2400.

82
Boxes 1-17 location: 370/14/13/03

Records of the Foreign Intelligence Branch

The Foreign Intelligence Branch was responsible for the obtaining, evaluating, and
disseminating information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters. In addition, it directed the activities of US naval attaches and maintained liaison with foreign naval attaches accredited to the United States. An important aspect of the Branch’s task was the preparation of the so-called naval monographs, which were compiled for all countries with sea power. The monographs, which were indexed and kept current, supplied essential naval, political, and economic information in regard to possible enemies or allies.

This series is arranged first alphabeticlly by the name of the country and thereunder by the ONI Monograph Guide which is a numeric filing system.
Boxes 1-67 location: 370/15/29/01
Foreign Publications and Reports 1940-1950 (Entry UD 88)
Arranged alphabetically by name of country/geographical location. A folder list is
available in the consultation area in Room 2400.
Boxes 1-76 location: 370/15/30/06

Shipping 1941-1945 (Entry 176)
This series, which is arranged topically (sometimes by the name of ship), contains
intelligence reports, dispatches, booklets, pamphlets, and other material received from Europe and the Far East relating to enemy shipping, axis blockade runners and raiders.
81 This series also contains references to Reports (“Registers”) of Naval Attaches, 1886-1922 (Entry 98), which are located in the Archives I Building and serviced by the Archives I Textual Reference

I probably will not do much more work on this before November, but I would like to encourage other people to pursue these ideas and share their opinions and information. Please do not cite any of my allegations without checking with me so I can discuss them and verify the details.

[Drama in the Pentagon]

Every intelligence agency in Washington must have gone right to its files upon hearing of Oswald's arrest. The Office of Naval Intelligence had its special concerns, since Oswald was an ex-Marine and a returned defector to the USSR. Whatever ONI found, it was not eager to pass the file around.

When John McNaughton, the General Counsel of the Defense Department, saw one file during the night after the assassination, "he expressed a strong desire to review" three Navy documents which were referred to but "not held in the file." Although those documents now look unimportant, an unfulfilled pre-assassination CIA request for Oswald's photo was missing from the ONI file sent to the Warren Commission. Notes in the ONI file logging the early response to the assassination refer provocatively to a "supplemental file" in one instance, and to "3 files" in another. Navy personnel were even reluctant to give the records to the General heading the Defense Intelligence Agency.

[What the HSCA published]

The most striking positive result of the HSCA inquiry relating to Oswald and military intelligence was the Report's account of the destruction of an Army Intelligence file in 1973. (See my article in "The Third Decade," which includes the memo I sent to the HSCA after finding an FBI document about the actions of certain Army Intelligence agents right after the assassination.)

Less obvious was a staff report relegated to Vol. 11, not mentioned in the Report or explicitly linked to other questions about the withholding of information by military intelligence, about an apparent post-assassination investigation by the Marine Corps.

Another intriguing aspect of the HSCA's work in this area was an omission. Peter Scott, Russ Stetler, Tink Thompson and I focused on it in Ch. 7 of our unpublished 1980 book, "Beyond Conspiracy." The HSCA Report included a "finding exculpating the Secret Service, FBI, and CIA of any involvement in the assassination. Despite the long digression on military intelligence, there is not a word to admonish the reader to presume innocence when contemplating the curious behavior of the Defense agencies. Questions and suspicions seem to be left deliberately in the reader's mind. And, off the record, at least three Committee sources have cryptically confirmed their lingering doubts in the area of military intelligence." I have received no support for our suggestion that the language deliberately failed to exculpate the military from involvement in a plot; such involvement would indeed not be the logical consequence of what the authors of the Report specifically said could not be ruled out, Oswald's affiliation with military intelligence.

The Report stated that "The Committee found this 'routine' destruction of the [Army's] Oswald file extremely troublesome, especially when viewed in light of the Department of Defense's failure to make this file available to the Warren Commission." But the HSCA Report failed to clarify that more was involved: as detailed below, the DoD responded to a direct WC request by falsely stating that all DoD records had been provided.

The Report also appeared to be seriously confused about the ONI file on Oswald. The Army file was referred to as "Oswald's military intelligence file," as if it were the only one. This led to a bizarre footnote in the following section, which provided a rather obvious explanation for one aspect of the handling of Oswald's photo within ONI - certain notations (e.g., "CIA 77978") which are hardly the most interesting points in the ONI file. The footnote said that "As noted, the military file on Oswald, presumably including the ONI photograph, was destroyed by the Department of Defense." The Report failed to explain how the HSCA then knew of the notations on the photo.

The obvious answer is that the ONI file was of course not the destroyed Army file, and had been provided to the WC. (It has long been a special interest of mine. In 1967, the National Archives sent me 325 pages from the ONI file; some pages were still withheld in full.)

In essence, because of the interesting HSCA material about the Army file, and the apparently low level of sophistication and care applied to Navy- related matters in the Report, I failed to refocus critically on the ONI file.

Recent discussions with another researcher forced me to do so, and to consider another answer. Why was I sure, he challenged me, that HSCA did not really mean to say that the Defense Department had destroyed records other than the one Army file discussed in detail?

I was well aware of several minor errors in the Report, and years ago, a staff member had cautioned me against over-analyzing some footnotes which I found misleading. On the other hand, the HSCA had not published everything it found, for various reasons. What I had heard about DoD-HSCA relations gave me no confidence that the DoD would have cooperated if there was something more to hide. So the idea of a frustrated author of the Report deliberately making the strongest possible case against the DoD had a certain appeal.

There seemed to be another logical jump in the Report which I had not taken seriously.
The brief section on the Oswald photo in the ONI file was predicated on the apparently trivial suggestion that the markings "raised the possibility that Oswald had been in some way associated with the CIA."

However, that section concluded with the apparently unrelated assertion that the "destruction of the military file on Oswald prevented the Committee from resolving the question of Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence." Similarly, the section on the Army file reached the same conclusion, although this "possible affiliation" was hardly the main point raised by the actions of Army intelligence, and was not analyzed elsewhere in that section. Could someone have really meant that "the question of Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence" could not be resolved for various significant reasons, beyond the ones cited?

One HSCA staff source firmly disabused me of some of these notions. The language was just careless, he suggested. If they had found something significant along those lines, he felt it would have been leaked.

The HSCA's unpublished work will stay locked up for years, unless Congress unexpectedly takes action, or the knowledgeable staffers decide to talk. But some relevant DoD documents are available, and others are in principle subject to FOIA actions.

The issues raised by the ONI file are significant, whether or not the HSCA looked at them. The Army file, while intriguing and unsatisfactorily explained, might turn out to be peripheral to Oswald's career and to the investigation of the assassination. However, the Navy file is certainly central to the questions of who Oswald was, and how material relevant to the assassination investigation was not freely shared, even within the
government.

[Were the files given to the Warren Commission sanitized?]

The HSCA Report's discussion of the photo in the ONI file omitted some provocative information. It noted that "Because of the absence of documentation, no explanation could be given for how or when the [ONI] received this particular photo of Oswald" from the Marine Corps. More than just such documentation was absent.

The HSCA said that its "review of CIA cable traffic confirmed that cable No. 77978, dated October 24, 1963, was in fact a request for two copies" of the Navy's most recent Oswald photo. The reference to a "review" is peculiar.

First, the text of the CIA cable was released in 1972, and readily available. Also, this language seems to hint at the fact, known to the HSCA, that this cable to the Department of the Navy was not in this ONI file.

I first learned that it was not there in 1975, from a FOIA request for all DoD copies of the cable. I was told that none was in the ONI file, and that the Marines also found none. (The Archives told me earlier that it was not in the withheld portion of the WC's version of the ONI file.)

In a 1978 memo for the Navy's Office of General Counsel, the Naval Investigative Service (NIS, basically the successor to ONI) said that "it is not known why a copy of [that cable] was not contained" in the ONI file on Oswald. (NIS got a copy from the CIA and noted that it explained thenotation of interest to the HSCA on the photo.)

The HSCA failed to make an issue of the absence of this document. As far as I know, they did not press the DoD on the absence of any related documents.

In 1975, I dismissed the problem as probably routine misfiling, but I had no good reason to do so. Now we can justifiably wonder whether the document was deliberately removed from the file.

At first glance, there is no obvious reason to suppress this cable. The more sensitive CIA message of October 10, reporting a misdescribed Oswald's visit to the Soviet Embassy, was in the file (and released in 1973).

But the slow ONI response - the photo was not provided before the assassination - could have been considered embarrassing. Could the cable have been removed at the request of the CIA? Might it have originally been forwarded to some unit within ONI which had a special Oswald file? More likely, were there problematic notations which could not immediately be deleted?

In HSCA-like language, I can not at this point exclude the possibility that the CIA request generated paperwork which was deemed unreleaseable. Would someone at ONI have called the CIA? Might they have shared information about either agency's interest in Oswald which the WC did not need to know?

Did someone simply point out that the newspaper photos of Oswald at the time of his defection, which both agencies in fact had, were more recent, and presumably more useful, than the Marine Corps induction photo?

If such documents were removed, it could have been shortly before the file was given to the WC in March 1964. From what we know, however, there was no clear reason to take that risk. The CIA message was presumably available to the WC from the CIA, and could have prompted a WC inquiry. But perhaps material was removed right after the assassination, when the context was quite different - Oswald was a live suspect who might start talking about his Marine career. He might try to bring it up at his trial, to argue (honestly or not) that he was not a Communist traitor because, as he wrote from Russia to John Connally in 1962, "I have and always had the full sanction of the U.S. Embassy... and hence the U.S. government."

We can turn with a suspicious eye to what we know of the handling of the file right after the assassination. (Ironically, this comes from documents in the file given to the WC, which suggests a non-sinister interpretation.) Making the file available outside ONI was evidently a touchy problem.

[The sensitivity of ONI records, November 22-23, 1963]

Lt. JG Patrick D. Molinari recorded for the file what he knew of events at USNAVCINTSUPPCEN (Naval Intelligence Support Center?) on the evening of November 22. The (Marine?) service record and the "jacket" were not immediately available, and were to be provided. At 5 p.m., "Mr. Pascal delivered supplemental file to Intelligence Plot." At 7 p.m., "ONI investigative file received at Center and reviewed by Capt Johnson. Capt Jackson and Adm. Taylor informed."

Donald R. Paschal was a civilian assigned to OP-921E2, the Programs Section of the Counterintelligence branch, which had "primary responsibility for monitoring the file within ONI" before the assassination. Robert Jackson was then the Assistant DNI (Director of Naval Intelligence), and Jack Johnson was his Executive Officer. Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor was DNI at the time.

Are the "investigative file" and the "supplemental file" the same thing?

If not, have both been released? Oswald's "case history file" was still charged out to RADM Taylor in July 1964. Most provocatively, an undated and unsigned note says "0900 - briefed Taylor on 3 files."

Within hours, interest in the ONI records spread. In some regards, ONI seems to have been candid: Johnson called the FBI in Dallas with the gist of a letter from Oswald to Connally, and Molinari was authorized to "prepare copies of the files" for possible use by the FBI and the Secret Service.

On the 23rd, a copy of the file went to the Secret Service, to be restricted to those requiring official access, and returned on DNI "upon completion of Secret Service review."

On the other hand, ONI may have been unwilling to circulate the entire file, even within the Defense Department: "Meanwhile, ONI duty officer had been informed of a request being prepared from General Carroll of DIA to see the file on Oswald. Admiral Taylor and Capt Jackson advised of this request by Capt Johnson at approximately 2000. Admiral Taylor's instructions were to prepare a file for him to be passed to General Carroll. This file is to be carried to Admiral Taylor's office by special agent [M. Sherman] Bliss who will then carry the file to General Carroll who will peruse the file and return it to the special agent."

In other words, the General who headed DIA could look at but not keep the file. DIA was a new unit in the Pentagon, set up in 1961 by Robert McNamara to produce strategic intelligence and, to some degree, coordinate and oversee the individual service intelligence agencies. So, General Carroll could have been considered an outsider who would cause trouble if he discovered something irregular in the ONI file on Oswald.

Taylor's instructions were to "prepare a file" - not, it seems, to "prepare copies" or "make a copy." Is this just another odd choice of words, as when Cmdr. Humes was "instructed" that a piece of bone brought into the autopsy room had been "removed" from JFK's head (rather than being told it had been blown off)?

Another memo (unsigned and handwritten) noted discussions about Carroll's request. "6. Called IDO. Stated Gen Carroll DIA wants to borrow file. 7. Called Op-92 [ONI]. Cited ltr 1-30-61 [Oswald to Connally]. He was cautious about passing file to DIA....8. Called 921 [Security Division, including Counterintelligence]. He wants... b. Prepare a copy of entire file. 9. IDO called. 92 told him to prepare file for review by him & for agent to take file for DIA to read & for agent to return. 10. 92 1 above agreed that a copy of file can go to DIA, via agents delivery first to 92 & then DIA."

Should this make us wonder whether there was funny business afoot?

"At approximately 2200 I [Molinari] received a call from the Intelligence Duty Officer [unnamed here] that I was to release no files to anyone except by his order" – except possibly the SS, FBI, and other "authorized activities."

All this may have delayed Gen. Carroll's access to the file. SA Bliss hand-carried the file to Carroll's office at 8:30 on the morning of the 23rd, where it was reviewed for about an hour "by the Director, and only by the Director," in Bliss' presence.

By then, the file had circulated a bit: "In response to specific query,... Carroll was advised that Mr. McNaughton of the Office of General Counsel (OGC) had previously had access to subject file." (It was OGC which initially failed to deliver the ONI file to the WC.)

There had been action at another Naval office ("Intelligence Plot") late into the night of the 22nd. Capt. Elmo Zumwalt reviewed the file there and "transported" it to the office of Fred Dutton of the State Department. It was reviewed there "for prosecutive purposes" by several people from State, the Deputy Undersecretary for Defense (Adam Yarmolinsky), and McNaughton. This group seems to have included several Kennedy-loyalist civilians.

(Yarmolinsky was seen by some as JFK's man in the DoD, and was considered left-leaning in certain circles; five years later Dutton was an aide to RFK.)

"Mr. McNaughton expressed a strong desire to review the following [three] documents [referred to but] not held in the file." Two were from DIO-9ND, the Navy's Ninth Naval District Intelligence Office in Chicago.

McNaughton was not satisfied by a general statement that the DIO-9ND file contained only letters of transmittal. (I wouldn't have been, either. I got these documents under FOIA; they look innocent enough, but I would miss any subtleties.) Did McNaughton suspect that something of substance was being kept from him?

[Warren Commission requests for military records]

In 1980, I wrote incorrectly that the ONI file was not forwarded in response to the WC's first request, for all DoD records on Oswald. In fact, that first request was not general (like the one made to many minor agencies), but carefully limited (like the request to the FBI). In a letter drafted by Howard Willens of the Justice Department, Warren asked for "the military records" of Oswald and Ruby, "as well as any other information relating to these principals which you believe may be relevant to our investigation."

I now suspect that Willens knew that there were intelligence files which would not be routinely provided, so it would be best not to ask for them routinely.

The military service record was provided on January 10; Sam Stern soon noticed references to the Navy Discharge Review Board's proceedings relating to Oswald, and asked for them. In February, noting information about an ONI investigation, the Commission asked for anything on Oswald in ONI files. The WC staff had apparently tired of the game, and included a comprehensive request - "any additional information on Mr. Oswald in the files of any other department, agency, office, or organization, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense."

The reaction to this letter indicates that the OGC did not have the ONI file at that time. On February 25, OGC told DNI about the WC's request. McNaughton's assistant, Frank Bartimo, noted that "Oswald's Marine Corps personnel file, which is presently in the custody of this office, contains two references to documents that appear to be covered by Mr. Rankin's request" - two of the three cites noted earlier by McNaughton. Nothing in this memo indicates that Bartimo knew there was a substantial ONI file on Oswald. Bartimo's office got it and sent it to the WC with the dismissive description, provided by ONI, that it consisted mostly of reports from other agencies.

On March 9, four days after this file was received, Stern drafted a letter (sent two days later) noting that the ONI file contained documents from the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations "and from intelligence activities of the Department of the Army. The Commission wishes to be certain that it has reviewed all materials concerning... Oswald in any files under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense."

This request should have produced quite a reaction - among people throughout DoD, and on paper. The HSCA had nothing to say. All I have is a terse response dated March 16 from Bartimo, asserting that "all known materials concerning... Oswald under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense have been furnished to the Commission." (This letter could not be found for me in the Archives; I got a copy from the DoD in 1970. Some information below the signature may have been deleted - perhaps a note.)

The WC got Oswald's pay records months later, which put them on notice that the DoD letter was untrue - but they evidently never learned of Col. Jones' Army Intelligence file. Is there any way that the Army file could be missed innocently after that kind of request from the WC?

[How many military files were there?]

What other files might not have been provided? As with the FBI, the WC failed to deal with the issue of Navy field office files. The FBI's implausible and (in this context) misleading assertion that everything of substance in the field office files was sent to Headquarters was not challenged.

In fact, based on a phone request from FBI HQ on November 26, New Orleans sent 17 serials from its Oswald file which were apparently not in HQ's possession. The earliest concerned a review by SA John Quigley of records held by ONI's 8th Naval District office in Algiers, Louisiana, on April 18, 1961. The Oswald file there included some State Department telegrams, four newspaper clippings, records relating to his discharge, and more. Quigley noted that much of it had come from the 9th Naval District (Chicago).

The 1961 FBI investigation of Oswald was in fact prompted by a note from ONI-8ND (N.O.) to the FBI in Dallas, advising that Oswald had received a undesirable discharge. This ONI-8ND to FBI-field-office channel (bypassing both HQ's) looks like a routine quirk in the communications chain, but possibly more was said in the field (or at HQ) either to encourage or discourage the investigation.

The file Quigley examined looks routine, but it might not have stayed that way, especially after Oswald's return to New Orleans. For example, did Oswald's leaflet distribution at the USS Wasp really escape the attention of Naval Intelligence? After the Harbor Police told Oswald to go away, would the local ONI office have had no reason to be interested?

After Oswald's defection, the Naval Attache (ALUSNA) in Moscow sent a cable to ONI. Copies of early cables from ONI went to the Attaches in Bonn and Helsinki, and to apparent ONI components identified as 06, 60, 61, 63 and 09. Two October CIA memos on Oswald in Mexico City went to the Naval Attache there. Should we just assume that his office played no active role? The 10/10/63 CIA message in the ONI file bears a handwritten notation which appears to be "passed to G2 - USMC." (G2 generally refers to an intelligence branch.) How much intelligence work did the Marines do, independent of ONI? In 1975, NIS followed up this notation when looking for the missing message of 10/23/63, "but their search results were also negative."

In any event, the ONI field office files as such never went to the WC - or to the HSCA, as far as I know.

[Oswald's clearance and the reaction to his defection]

The question of field office files becomes particularly relevant in connection with the clearance issue. The WC pursued testimony that Oswald had at least Secret clearance. In conjunction with the unpublished WC inquiry, the USMC response can fairly be read as more than the simple denial the WC chose to make of it. Essentially, the Marines said that if Oswald was really doing secret work, he probably had a secret clearance.

The HSCA found only Confidential clearances for four fellow Marines. But the Report does not mention what these Marines said about their clearances.

A footnote pointed out that Oswald's superior, John Donovan, had a Secret clearance, but not whether or in which file his claim was confirmed. The WC, at least, seems not to have asked where records of a Secret clearance should be. Possibly "Confidential" was treated differently, administratively, from a higher clearance - with different requirements for investigation, approval, and record-keeping.

Back in 1959, ONI (through CNO) falsely told the Moscow attache that there was "no record of clearance at HQ, Marine Corps but possibility exists he may have had access to confidential info." One possibility is that Oswald had a higher clearance which could not be mentioned, and someone used a simple false version, rather than admitting the Confidential clearance.

In passing, the HSCA mentioned a name in connection with the clearance issue which was unfamiliar to me - Lt. Col. Bill Brewer of the Intelligence Division of Marine Corps Headquarters. According to an unpublished "outside contact report" - which could be a staffer's imperfect notes on a phone call - "Brewer had been in charge of compiling the Oswald military file [sic, again] for the use of the Warren Commission." The first half of the next sentence is at best debatable, and the provocative second half is too cryptic to decipher: "Brewer stated that the Warren Commission had been interested primarily in records concerning Oswald's security classification in the military and that his records check had only included local records within the individual commands where Oswald had served and did not include records that were classified secret or top secret."

The clearance question came to the attention of the FBI within a week. On November 26, 1963, the Los Angeles office interviewed Col. W. L. Abblett, the Commanding Officer of MACS, Santa Ana. He said that the roster of Marines there at the same time as Oswald would be at USMC HQ, and "he additionally advised file reflecting security clearance investigation concerning Oswald maintained at Headquarters Eleventh Naval District, San Diego." (Did Abblett mean "is" or "would be" maintained?) On the 28th, FBI HQ instructed the San Diego office to "review security clearance file for Oswald and report."

San Diego's response is presumably in the released FBI files, but I know of no easy way to find it. (Could someone check the indices for Abblett?) There is no mention of this review or its results in the synopses of the five reports from San Diego which went to the WC as CD's over the next three weeks.

Critics raised questions about the apparent absence - judging from the Warren Report - of a post-defection investigation of Oswald. This question was also raised seriously inside the FBI, by T. N. Goble. In a memo of April 2, 1964, Goble noted that three fellow Marines had said that they had been interviewed about Oswald. Goble noted that no such statements or interview reports had been located in USMC or ONI files, and instructed the St. Louis office to look in the personnel files.

In a postscript for the HQ file, Goble did not suggest any doubt that such interviews had taken place. Their absence from USMC and ONI files "indicates that perhaps they have been destroyed." This is strong language, implying (intentionally or not) post-assassination destruction. He did not say "perhaps they were routinely destroyed before the assassination." Goble presumably understood that anything about an intelligence matter as sensitive as a defection by an ex-Marine would not be routinely destroyed within five years, if at all. Again, there should be more on this in released FBI
files.

[Possible revelations in the suppressed material]

Irregularities relating to the clearance and the damage assessment, if significant, must make sense as part of some larger scenario. At this point, I have no favorite among a wide range of possibilities.

Why, hypothetically, might something be removed from the Oswald files right after the assassination? In a trial, Oswald's lawyer could be expected to muddy the waters by dredging up irrelevant but embarrassing information.

Within a few days, Oswald was dead and his files could be considered ancient history, not too important to clean up. The Warren Commission's investigation did not come along until later.

Why should we assume that apparently irrelevant secrets would be given to the WC upon request? Inter-agency deception was not unheard of - the CIA apparently misled the FBI on November 22 by saying that their Oswald file contained only material from FBI and State. (FBI and CIA records should be checked for accounts of post-assassination liaison with ONI.)

Since I am speculating, I will simply touch on some possible reasons for sanitizing the files. This section deserves much more detail, but even putting together the published analyses would take much time. Donovan, for example, is mentioned in at least ten books, from Anson's to Weisberg's.

ONI people may have suspected that Oswald had ties with someone else, such as the CIA. (The HSCA Report mentioned the possibility of a CIA affiliation in connection with the photo in the ONI file.) But it seems less unlikely that there were ties with ONI itself.

It has often been suggested that Oswald's connection with the military, before and through his defection, was not what it seemed to be. Questions have been raised about the possibility of intelligence assignments in Japan (including contacts with Japanese nationals). Perhaps Oswald was initially approached by the KGB there, and turned around by ONI.

One incident caught the eye of Ray Rocca, Angleton's CIA associate, and was emphasized in his analysis. Fellow Marine Nelson Delgado testified about a mysterious visitor who came to see Oswald in California after Oswald had been in correspondence with the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Rocca seemed to think this probably was a Cuban DGI contact. Is it not more likely that the man - who presumably passed base scrutiny - was from U.S. intelligence?

Some foreign intelligence responsibilities were apparently shifted from the military to the CIA in the late 1950's. Harry Rositzke of the CIA wrote that "For almost fifteen years after World War II the CIA's intelligence targets were dictated almost exclusively by the Department of Defense." This has led to the suggestion that Oswald was the last fake Navy defector to the
USSR. In this case, the files could have been cooked up even before the assassination, to keep the CIA (or DIA, or Otto Otepka) from getting upset.

Richard Helms testified to the HSCA, more than once, that the CIA presumably didn't debrief Oswald on his return from Russia because that was thought to be a Navy responsibility. Was he trying to suggest (accurately or not) that Oswald had been planted in Russia by the Navy?

The NIS told the HSCA that "It has been standard operating procedures [sic] for this Service to interview returning defectors when of interest to and under the jurisdiction [whatever that means] of this Service."

J. Lee Rankin's early reference to Oswald studying Russian at the Monterey Language School remains unexplained. If he had any basis for it,
it could be related to the incompleteness of the initial routine WC request.

The HSCA's "defector study" concluded that the failure to debrief a returnee was not unique, but said nothing publicly about fake defectors or the normal role of the military in debriefings, as suggested by Helms' testimony.

Very hypothetically, the file could have been sanitized innocently if it contained anything from the CIA's HT/LINGUAL mail intercept program. That was extremely sensitive in 1963, and surely the CIA would have insisted that any such letters be deleted before the ONI file went to the Warren Commission.

Ed Epstein claimed that the CIA intercepted a letter from Oswald (contrary to what the CIA told the Abzug Committee, that only one innocuous letter, to Oswald, was copied). Can we dismiss Epstein's account as a typical combination of spookiness and sloppiness on his part (or perhaps Angleton's)?

It is hard to see why either one would have invented such a detail. Is it possible that someone intercepted this letter, shared it with Angleton, and then removed it from the file in 1963?

Oswald's first paragraph certainly would have raised a red flag to intelligence agencies, since Oswald flatly said that he wanted the U.S. government "overthrown." Although I would not call the letter threatening, he said "in the event of war I would kill any American who put on a uniform in defense of the American government."

A second category of "unreleaseable" records might relate to post-return surveillance of Oswald. This sounds unlikely, in the absence of evidence of ONI domestic surveillance as early as 1963. I am not familiar enough with the record on the allegedly improper DoD domestic activities whose exposure led to the purging of DoD files on non-DoD people in the 1970's.

Would ONI simply have let the FBI keep an eye on a returned defector? Presumably, if Oswald had been sent back by the Russians, it could have been to dig up more information related to the Marine Corps.

An article on "Spies in Dallas?" in a Dallas paper in summer 1963 lends support to speculation about active ONI interest, as it does to many ideas about a nexus of DPD, federal, and private intelligence outfits in Oswald's Dallas milieu. Capt. Pat Gannaway of the DPD (and Army Intelligence Reserve) described the work against subversion and espionage of his Special Services Bureau, requiring "the closest cooperation" with other agencies, including the FBI, "military intelligence teams from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and other federal agencies.... Dallas police have been highly successful in recent years in penetrating so-called subversive or radical groups...."

Certainly there was some interest by military intelligence in anti-Castro groups - for example, the Army had an "operational interest" in Antonio Veciana of Alpha 66. Congressional committees were very concerned about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and the CIA planned a counter-propaganda operation against it in 1963. Apparently the HSCA asked the Navy about its coverage of anti-Castro groups, especially in Miami and New Orleans.

A "knowledgeable individual" said that "any necessary contacts or utilization of anti-Castro Cubans" in those two cities had to be "coordinated through" the FBI or CIA. That does not establish that ONI was inactive in Cuban matters.

A third major concern for any intelligence agency would be a failure to respond to Oswald's actions after his return. The most natural reaction would be, should we have paid more attention to Oswald, knowing what we knew?

One letter in the ONI file did get some attention as evidence of Oswald's state of mind. Even the FBI Summary Report referred to Oswald's letter to Connally dated January 30, 1961 (1962 intended), and given to the FBI by the Navy on November 22. The strongest language is Oswald's statement that he will "employ all means to right this gross mistake or injustice," which seems threatening only with hindsight. ONI seems to have circulated this letter to the FBI and Secret Service immediately after the assassination, which hardly suggests a coverup of knowledge of Oswald's potential for violence.

Could there have been another letter from Oswald? Andy Kerr, special counsel to Navy Secretaries Connally and Korth, wrote about forwarding a letter from Oswald to the USMC before Connally resigned (although his account otherwise fits the 1962 letter). He says he studied the file, wrote a memo, and talked with Connally about Oswald "for half an hour or so." Related material - a subsequent letter, or an evaluation of Oswald as dangerous which was not passed to the FBI - could have been purged as evidence of not enough alertness, as the FBI got rid of the note to Hosty.

[Post-assassination military investigation]

One account of a Marine investigation in Japan and Dallas more or less fell into the HSCA's lap. The staff confirmed the existence of some allegedly relevant flights, but did not uncover the results of the investigation. Either something was very special about Oswald's stay in Japan, or – more likely - this was part of a bigger investigation. Blakey himself was the first co-author of the staff report, indicating more than routine interest.

The surviving ONI file shows some interest in allegations with clear Navy angles. For example, on November 22, ONI interviewed a patient at a Naval Hospital who had a typical story of "bar talk" in New Orleans about JFK's impending death. ONI in Dallas received, and passed on to the FBI, a story about Ruby and Oswald visiting an electronics shop. This "Oswald" turned out to be Larry Crafard, but on November 27 the story was considered important enough to passed on by Adm. Taylor's office to an Adm. McDonald. Crossreference sheets dated 1964 refer to clippings on Mark Lane, FBI reports on the Paines and others, and so on.

Would ONI have left the investigation of Oswald's military service to the CIA, FBI, and WC, especially if there were serious uncertainties? Was ONI completely uninterested in what happened at Bethesda Naval Hospital?

The WC staff talked with ONI agents who were looking into the shooting death of fellow Marine Martin Schrand; there might have been more liaison.

An unlikely possibility is that the CIA used military contacts to investigate domestic aspects of the case, being unwilling to rely on the FBI.

(The National Photographic Interpretation Center did study the Zapruder film; was that done just for the CIA?)

[The scope of the HSCA's inquiry]

In 1981, the NIS (for itself, not for all of DoD) provided Mark Allen with 50 HSCA-related pages; no pages were withheld in full. These mostly relate to name checks requested by the HSCA; the names are almost all deleted.

The HSCA was told a bit about ONI's overall organization, but - it seems - not about what information would have been dealt with in which offices. It is not clear how the HSCA came across Bill Brewer. Did they check post-assassination G2-USMC records as carefully as they should have?

The HSCA did get a negative record check from NIS on Carlos Marcello's Town & Country Motel.

[Getting the rest of the story]

Without backup from a news organization, a FOIA request is not likely to be very productive. NIS told the HSCA they had provided everything, so if there is any more, they are certainly not going to just give it to me. Any documents pulled from the files in 1963 are probably long gone.

The HSCA did get some names, and people might still remember things. (The staff report on the military investigation in Japan mentioned the towns in which a couple of witnesses lived - practically an invitation to follow up?) The officers responsible for the Oswald file at various times were Lt. JG George M. Frederickson, Lt. JG Peter C. LeSourd, and Ensign John A. Hazelton. Also, NIS provided the names and latest addresses of eight ONI people (three civilians, a commander, three captains, and a vice admiral) who "would have become connected with and knowledgeable about the file" because of their positions at the time of the assassination or earlier. The addresses are withheld, but getting them should not be a big problem.

Adm. Rufus Taylor, the head of ONI, died in 1978. William Abbott, the top civilian in ONI counterintelligence, was (like Taylor) involved in the Shadrin case, but would not talk with Henry Hurt about it.

The HSCA really should have talked to most of these ONI people. Were they perhaps under specific orders not to talk about the JFK case, as Naval personnel at the autopsy were until the HSCA pressed the issue?

The ONI file includes the names of some lower-ranking people who wereat or near centers of activity right after the assassination. Judging from the productivity of some interviews with "minor" witnesses - e.g., at Bethesda - there may be a substantial chance of digging up a newsworthy story.

[From “Letter to ARRB (Wray, 4 Sep 96) re military records”]

I have long thought that it could be very productive for someone familiar with military files and procedures to do a detailed "traffic analysis" of the known pre-assassination Oswald files - something comparable to John Newman's analysis of the CIA files.

I have seen Peter Scott's recent work in this area, which I understand he has submitted to you. The interpretation of apparent anomalies in the files is tricky, but his work seems likely to point to additional records which (like the Army intelligence file) never got to the Warren Commission.

In 1975, I submitted a FOIA request to the Defense Department for a few specific items. I am enclosing my letter of March 7, 1975 (with the 5 pages of enclosures) and the reply from Capt. Barney Martin of the Naval Investigative Service, dated March 27, 1975.

I was particularly interested in the Navy's reaction to two pre -assassination CIA messages. One copy of the first bears the notation "Passed to G2-USMC 10/11/63"; the second message was evidently not in the ONI file given to the Warren Commission and was not found for me in 1975.

Capt. Martin told me that the notation on the first message "was followed-up with the Marine Corps, but their search results were also negative."

At the time, I was more interested in the substance of the Navy's response to these messages than in issues raised by records which could not be located. Thus, I did not follow up on the negative search results.

Now, however, you might find this correspondence helpful, particularly in light of Mr. Scott's focus on Marine G-2 files in Washington and elsewhere.

In particular, the records created by my 1975 request might contain information about the existence and location of pre-assassination Oswald records.

Specifically, what kind of search did the Marine Corps perform? Do their records on this FOIA request identify any G-2 files which existed in 1975 (or earlier)?

2. Record Group Title:
Records of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service

3. Allocation Statement: Allocate to this record group records created or maintained by the headquarters office and by field offices of the

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS),
Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Department of
the navy (1993- )

Also allocated to this record group records created or maintained by the headquarters office and by field offices of NCIS's predecessors in the Department of the Navy, the

Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OCNO,....

RECORD GROUP ALLOCATION STATEMENT

4a. Status of Records Creator: The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) was established by Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 5520.3B, January 4, 1993......

Naval Investigative Service (NIS) established in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OCNO, by Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Notice 5450, February 4, 1966. Pursuent to aboltion of ONI and establishment of Naval Intelligence Command (NIC), by SECNAV Notice 5450, April 19, 1967....

RECORD GROUP ALLOCATION STATEMENT

4b. Extant Records: Over 4,000 cubic feet of records of NCIS and its predecessor organization are currently stored at the Washington National Records Center. No permanent records have yet to be accessioned....

4. The Office of Naval Intelligence remains responsible for review of an additional 950 cubic feet (2.4 million classified pages) of material originated roughly between 1955 and 1965 not specifically identified in reference (a). The likelihood that responsive records may be contained in those files cannot be precluded. Those documents, located at the Washington National Records Center as well as Regional Records Centers in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Seattle and San Francisco, are scheduled for review during this fiscal year. Any and all additional files responsive to reference (a) identified during this process will be forwarded.

5. Questions or comments regarding this review may be directed to LCDR Florence T. Pike, Office of Naval Intelligence, at (301) 669-3124.

Signed
F. T. Pike

APPENDIX F - LIST OF FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER AND REGIONAL ARCHIVES

Federal Records Centers

A table showing specific areas served by each
Federal Records center appears in 36 CFR 1228
(See app. B of this handbook)

List of Certain Archive Records To Be Retrieved By the Navy and Reviewed For Assassination Records*

- * - On January 3, 1997 the staff of the Assassinations Records Review Board provided the Navy (Lt. Col. Mike Finnie) copies of the SF-135 forms for these archived records with a request that they be retrieved and reviewed for assassination-related materials.

38.10 TEXTUAL RECORDS (GENERAL) 1963-93
Selected records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, including information concerning the enlistment, service, and discharge of Lee Harvey Oswald from the Marine Corps; Oswald's defection to and return from the Soviet Union; investigations of other persons associated with Oswald; and requests for information about Oswald from various agencies after the assassination; 1963-93.