DAF

Posted on Wednesday 20th June 2018

DAF

Did
RAF torpedo-bombers sink Rommel’s last chance at El Alamein?

Was
the momentous victory in October/November 1942 by the British Eighth
Army at El Alamein over Rommel’s Axis Army clinched in a little
known way? In ‘The Decisive Campaigns of the Desert Air Force
1942-1945’, military historian Bryn Evans unearthed the little
known story of how an RAF raid clearly sank Rommel’s last chance.

*

It
was October 26 1942 on the coast of Libya as the sun dipped towards
the horizon. Flight Lieutenant Lloyd Wiggins led off a flight of
three Wellington torpedo-bombers on a mission that sought to change
the course of the North African campaign. The aim was to cripple the
Axis Army of Germany’s notorious ‘Desert Fox’ Field Marshal
Erwin Rommel. Three days earlier at 21.40 hours on the night of 23
October 1942 at El Alamein in Egypt, the British Eighth Army had
launched its major offensive against Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika.
The Axis Army was positioned behind extensive minefields awaiting
further supplies. There was one vital ingredient missing from
Rommel’s battle plans – fuel.

Could
the Axis fuel supplies be cut off?

Over
many months, interdiction by the Royal Navy and the RAF of the Axis
shipping supplies, lay at the heart of the Allies’ strategy to
defeat the Panzerarmee Afrika. With the Allied attack at El Alamein
under way, the pressure was acute to intensify the blockade of Axis
supplies. On the evening of 24 October No 38 Squadron RAF planned two
strikes by Wellington torpedo-bombers on enemy shipping consisting of
one merchant vessel and one destroyer. For the first strike two
aircraft, flown by Wing Commander Pratt in EX442 and Sergeant Price
in HX517, took off at 18.00 hours from the Shallufa airfield in
Egypt’s Suex Canal zone in formation with a Special Wellington of
No 221 Squadron RAF.

The
Vickers Wellington was a medium twin-engined bomber with a top speed
of 250mph, a service ceiling of around 16,000 feet, and a range of
1,750 miles. The role of the Special Wellington was reconnaissance
and illumination by flares of enemy ships. The crews were briefed to
maintain contact with each other if possible until the Special
Wellington located the convoy, and then make a moonlight attack.
Unfortunately severe electrical storms all along the coast forced
these two aircraft to return to base without reaching the target
area. In case of failure two other Wellingtons and their crews had
been detailed to stand-by for take-off at 23.00 hours.

In
the hope that the storms may have abated and the general weather
conditions of the coast had improved, the second strike force took
off, Sergeant Taylor in Wellington HF893 at 23.04 hours and
Australian Flight Lieutenant Wiggins in HX472 at 23.20 hours. With a
later take off Wiggins was unable to penetrate storms and
deteriorating weather, and returned after two hours. On landing at
the Gianaclis satellite airfield a tyre burst, causing the aircraft
to crash incurring serious damage. Luckily Wiggins and his screw were
unhurt. Meanwhile Sergeant Taylor found a break in the storm clouds,
and reached the target area some ten miles north of Derna. Despite
searching the inlets and sea along the coast from Cap El Tin to Cap
Elihall, Taylor and his crew were unable to sight any shipping.

The
return of the Desert Fox

One
month earlier on 23 September Rommel had handed over command to his
deputy, General Stumme, and because of his worsening bad health had
flown back to Germany for treatment. During a brief stop en route in
Rome he had remonstrated with Mussolini that his demands for
supplies, 30,000 tons in September and 35,000 tons in October, must
be met as a minimum. Otherwise the campaign in North Africa would be
lost. Rommel’s recuperation was disrupted on the afternoon of 24
October when he was telephoned by Field Marshal Keitel. He was told
of the massive attack by Eighth Army on the previous evening, and
asked to again take command of the Afrika Korps and Panzerarmee
Afrika. At 07.00 next morning 25 October Rommel’s plane left for
Rome.

On
arrival in Rome in late morning he was briefed by General von
Rintelen, who was attached to Italian forces: the British Eighth Army
attack was still pressing forward, General Stumme was reported
missing, and because of ships sunk by the Royal Navy and the RAF only
three issues of petrol remained for the Axis army. Rommel was
bitterly angry, and demanded that all Italian naval resources be
tasked with the immediate shipment of petrol and ammunition to
Axis-held ports in North Africa, and particularly Tobruk which was
the nearest to his positions at El Alamein. He knew that one issue of
petrol was required for each day of battle, without which an army was
hamstrung.

After
leaving Rome at midday on 25 October in a single-engined Storch
aircraft, Rommel landed in the twilight at his HQ. There he was told
that the fuel shortage was constraining Axis forces to only localized
and tactical counter-attacks against Eighth Army. He had a feeling of
impending doom, and felt the supply situation was now approaching
disaster. Rommel’s troops had only enough fuel for transport
vehicles to keep various general supplies moving from Tobruk to the
front lines. They had no new fuel for tanks and other armoured
vehicles. If some Italian oil tankers could reach and off-load at
Tobruk, it would give front-line armour and motor transport, another
week’s supply of fuel in battlefield conditions. It was a pivotal
moment. Rommel’s
last hope of fuel re-supply hung in the balance.

Searching
for the Axis oil tankers

On
the evening of 25 October soon after 22.00 hours ten Wellingtons of
No 38 Squadron, one bomber and nine torpedo-bombers, took off to
intercept a convoy of enemy merchant ships and destroyers. The plan
was to proceed in conjunction with a Special Wellington from No 221
Squadron to Cap El Tin, and then from there to search for and locate
the convoy at a position north of Derna. Soon after take-off the
aircraft of Sergeant Viles suffered engine trouble, forcing Viles to
jettison its torpedoes and return to base. All remaining aircraft and
the Special Wellington stayed on course and made landfall over Cap El
Tin.

As
planned north of Derna the Special Wellington spotted the convoy, and
dropped its flares. Despite the illumination there was intense
darkness and patches of cumulous cloud at 2,000 to 3,000 feet, which
made the weather unfavourable for torpedo attacks. In addition less
than ideal positioning of the flares, resulted in only two merchant
ships and five destroyers being sighted, and prevented some aircraft,
that were unable to see the convoy, from making an attack.

Of
those aircraft able to see the convoy and make an attack on a ship,
Flight Lieutenant Gillingham dropped one torpedo on his first run at
1,000 yards, and found that the second torpedo had hung up. One
splash was observed but nothing else was seen. Against anti-aircraft
flak from all of the enemy ships, Gillingham circled around five
times to make further runs to release the remaining torpedo, before
he was forced to abandon his attacks. Meanwhile Wing Commander Pratt
attacked the largest merchant ship, dropping two torpedoes, one at
800 yards and one at 600 yards. Neither torpedo hit the vessel, and
as Pratt pulled away his aircraft came under heavy flak.

Sergeant
Jones made his run at one of the merchant ships, dropping a torpedo
as close as 400 yards, and like Gillingham also found that his second
torpedo had hung up. Although no actual result from the launched
torpedo was seen, Jones claimed a hit since he and his crew felt the
effect of an explosion on their aircraft. Sergeant Page, pilot of the
sole Wellington carrying bombs, took his aircraft into a low level
attack at about 150 feet above the sea. All bombs were released in a
single stick, falling either side of the vessel without a hit.
Despite receiving anti-aircraft fire and some attacks by enemy
night-fighters, from 07.00 hours on the morning of 26 October all
aircraft returned safely to base. The last to land at 08.55, delayed
by his repeated attempts to launch his second torpedo, was Flight
Lieutenant Gillingham.

Meanwhile
at El Alamein during 24 and 25 October Eighth Army’s X Corps
(armour) and XXX Corps (infantry) failed to break through the Axis
lines. In the forty-eight hours against determined Axis defences,
they had been unable to even reach the positions planned to be taken
by the morning of 24 October. General Montgomery’s offensive was
stillborn, teetering on the verge of collapse. On 26 October while
Montgomery remained at his HQ reviewing and revising his plans, the
RAF pressed on with its well established strategy.

Around
noon on 26 October Beaufort and Bisley bombers of No. 47 Squadron RAF
attacked an Axis convoy heading for Tobruk, setting on fire an oil
tanker, the Proserpina (4,809
tons).
Another oil tanker in the convoy of supply ships, Tergestea
(5,809 tons),
escaped damage and continued on. Out of ten aircraft in the operation
six were lost. A further attack in the afternoon by Beaufort bombers
on the convoy failed to stop the Tergestea.
With the Tergestea only
some fifty miles from Tobruk, and estimated to dock by nightfall, it
was critical to mount another attack quickly and stop its fuel
reaching the Axis army. Even though dusk was not long away, a
decision was taken to make another attack at once.

Sink
the Tergestea!

The
afternoon of 26 October was fine with good visibility and little
cloud. Three crews of Wellington torpedo-bombers, the leader Flight
Lieutenant Wiggins in aircraft HX633, Pilot Officer Bertran in HF595,
and Sergeant Viles in HF912, were briefed on a desperate final
attempt to stop the tanker Tergestea
reaching the safety of Tobruk harbour.

Flight
Lieutenant Lloyd Wiggins was twenty-five years old from Middleton,
South Australia, where he worked as an auctioneer. He had enlisted in
the RAAF in November 1940, and after going through the Empire Air
Training Scheme, was posted to No 38 Squadron RAF in North Africa.
The Wellington bombers of No 38 Squadron were armed with two
torpedoes each, while some were radar equipped to enable them to
locate and attack targets at night from very low level. It was a role
described by Wiggins as, ‘Not for the faint-hearted.’

That
description was particularly apt for the mission of No 38 Squadron on
26 October. To evade interception by German fighters and keep below
enemy radar, the plan was for the three aircraft to first fly due
north out to sea for about sixty miles, trying to keep as low as 100
feet above the water. Then they were to turn west, and fly
approximately parallel to the coast until they reached a position
some sixty miles north east of Tobruk. At that point the formation of
three Wellingtons was to turn onto a south west heading, and fly
directly towards Tobruk to take the enemy air defences by surprise.
By making their attacking runs out of a darkening sky, it was hoped
to catch the Tergestea
outside Tobruk harbor before it was able to dock.

At
15.40 hours Flight Lieutenant Wiggins led the three aircraft into the
air, and brought them down towards the waves as they sped north out
into the Mediterranean. If their raid was successful, it would
paralyse Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika.

This
is the last chance!

Helped
by excellent work from his navigator, Wiggins spotted the Tergestea
only a few miles from Tobruk harbour. In
the first dusk attack ever attempted by No 38 Squadron, the three
aircraft headed straight for the Tergestea,
a tanker/freighter carrying cargo thatincluded
1,000 tons of petrol, and 1,000 tons of ammunition. Wiggins’
bombing run came in with fading light behind the three Wellington
bombers, whereas their target, the Tergestea
stood out against the sun setting in the west. There were many
destroyers escorting the Tergestea,
but they were taken completely by surprise. It was not until the
aircraft were beginning their run less than two miles from the
Tergestea,
that frantic signalling took place from the destroyers to the oil
tanker. Ignoring the anti-aircraft flak, Wiggins held the three
Wellington bombers dead on course.

It
was the last chance for the RAF to sink the tanker Tergestea
before it reached the protection of Tobruk harbour and it’s
anti-aircraft defences. A second bombing run without the element of
surprise and at night, would almost certainly be unsuccessful. Led by
Flight Lieutenant Wiggins who made the first run, all three bombers
each dropped two torpedoes at a distance of around 500-600 yards from
the target. Of the six torpedoes launched, three ran well, striking
the Tergestea,
and causing an enormous explosion.

After
dropping his torpedos Wiggins chose to take his lead aircraft
climbing straight over the top of the Tergestea,
attracting
the greatest concentration of anti-aircraft fire from the escort
destroyers. Despite his aircraft suffering multiple hits, Wiggins was
able to maintain his escape flight beyond the range of the
destroyers’ guns. Sergeant Bertran banked his Wellington away to
starboard, and received lighter anti-aircraft fire. The aircraft
crews observed a huge column of black smoke, surging up from the
Tergestea
to an estimated 3,000 feet.

Sergeant
Viles’ aircraft, after releasing its torpedos was seen to stagger,
probably from receiving fire from the destroyers. The last that was
seen of Viles was his aircraft breaking away to port. Both Wiggins
and Bertran completed their return flights safely to base by 22.00
hours. A search sortie that night reported that there was no sign of
Viles’ Wellington nor of the Tergestea,
which must have sunk. Nothing remained of the convoy except for the
tanker Proserpina,
now settling low in the water and still burning after the earlier
attack by Beaufort aircraft.

Rommel
is left powerless

The
same evening of 26 October, unaware of the torpedo attack on the
Tergestea,
Rommel wrote to his wife that the loss of the Proserpina
made the supply situation critical. Next day on 27 October after
hearing of the confirmed further loss overnight of the Tergestea
tanker and its fuel supplies, Rommel wrote to his wife again. In near
defeatist mood he doubted that he would survive. Starved of fuel,
running out of other supplies, and powerless to withstand Eighth
Army’s renewed attack in Operation SUPERCHARGE, on 4 November
Rommel ordered a general retreat.

In
words that intimated a heartfelt relief and appreciation, General
Montgomery conveyed his thanks for the outstanding efforts of No 38
Squadron and 201 Group RAF:

Recent attacks
carried out against enemy ships so vital … were a wonderful
achievement. I would be grateful if you would convey to those
responsible our gratitude for operations carried out … epic against
ships at sea.

It
is of course purely speculative to try and imagine what might have
been the consequences, if either the Proserpina
or Tergestea
had made it to Tobruk. But given Rommel’s experience and aggressive
nature as an innovative battlefield general, it would seem extremely
probable that he would have attempted some kind of surprising counter
attack. What can be said is, that if he had gained this capability,
the battle of El Alamein may have taken a very different course.

The
reality was that the RAF had eliminated all of Rommel’s remaining
options bar one – acceptance of defeat and ignominious retreat
westwards from El Alamein.

Author’s
Note:

The
above account of the sinking of the Proserpina
and Tergestea,
is based upon an edited extract from my book The
Decisive Campaigns of the Desert Air Force 1942 – 1945,
(Pen and Sword Books, April 2014), including interviews with Wing
Commander Lloyd Wiggins, the Operations Record Book of No 38
Squadron, and a number of other sources that recount air operations
at that time.

Wing
Commander Lloyd Wiggins, DSO, DFC, MID, was awarded the DSO for the
sinking of the Tergestea.
While serving in UK he met Thelma Wigfield, an officer in the WAAF,
and they married in 1944. In the same year he was posted as CO to No
455 Squadron RAF in UK, flying Beaufighters until promoted to Wing
Commander prior to the end of the war. Lloyd and Thelma returned to
Adelaide in South Australia, where they raised four children, and
Lloyd established his own auction company. In December 2015 in his
100th year Wing Commander Wiggins passed away at his home in
Adelaide.

In
my most recent book Air Battle
for Burma (Pen and Sword Books,
November 2016), first-hand accounts by pilots in their torrid
struggle against the Japanese air force, include a number of airmen
who were transferred from the Desert Air Force to the Far East
campaign.

Further Reading

Compared to the RAF's Fighter and Bomber Commands, the Desert Air Force (DAF) is far less well known, yet its achievements were spectacular.

DAF led the way in North Africa and Italy in pioneering new tactics in close Army-Air Force co-operation on the battlefield, DAF and Allied air forces gave Allied armies in North Africa and Italy a decisive cutting edge.

Further Reading

Air Battle for Burma(Hardback - 251 pages)
ISBN: 9781473858923

by Bryn Evans Only £25.00

After a long series of crushing defeats by the apparently unstoppable Japanese air and ground forces, the eventual fightback and victory in Burma was achieved as a result of the exercise of unprecedented combined services cooperation and operations. Crucial to this was the Allies’ supremacy in the air coupled with their ground/air support strategy.

Using veterans’ first-hand accounts, Air Battle For Burma reveals the decisive nature of Allied air power in inflicting the first major defeat on the Japanese Army in the Second World War. Newly equipped…Read more at Pen & Sword Books...

Further Reading

With The East Surreys in Tunisia and Italy 1942 - 1945(Hardback - 240 pages)
ISBN: 9781848847620

by Bryn Evans Only £25.00

The East Surreys were in near continuous action from November 1942, when they landed in North Africa (Operation TORCH) through to the end of hostilities in May 1945. During these three years of bitter fighting they cleared the Germans from Tunisia, took part in Operation HUSKY, (the invasion of Sicily) and fought up through Italy as far as the River Po.

Trained as mountain troops, the East Surreys saw set piece and patrol action in the Atlas Mountains, on the slopes of Mount Etna and Monte Cassino,…Read more at Pen & Sword Books...

About bryn evans
About bryn evans

Bryn
Evans is a management consultant with many years’ experience of
finance and IT at boardroom level. As well as military history Bryn
writes extensively across a wide range of categories, be it business
management, sport, travel, or fiction, and his work has been widely
published. His fiction work has earned a Second Prize in the
Catherine Cookson Short Story Competition and other awards.

Bryn
is the author of With the East Surreys in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy
1942 – 1945 (2012), and The Decisive Campaigns of the Desert Air
Force 1942 – 1945 (2014), both published by Pen and Sword Books
Ltd, UK. In his research he has interviewed veterans and their
families world-wide, and visited battlefields and campaign locales in
Egypt, Tunisia, Sicily and Italy.

After
periods residing in UK, Zambia, and Germany, Bryn his wife Dr Jean
Evans have lived for many years in Sydney, Australia.