JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion. Justices Neville and Pierce concurred in the
judgment and opinion.

OPINION

MASON,
JUSTICE

¶
1 Plaintiff Geraldine Mular appeals from the trial
court's dismissal of her construction negligence
complaint against defendant Dawn Ingram, arising out of
injuries Mular allegedly sustained when she fell while a
guest at Ingram's house. The trial court dismissed the
complaint based upon its finding that the cause was barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, Mular
contends that the trial court erred when it applied the
doctrine of res judicata to this case because she
attempted to bring her construction negligence claim in her
original complaint but was denied the opportunity to do so.
Mular further contends that res judicata should not
be applied to this case in the interests of fundamental
fairness. We affirm.

¶
2 This court set forth the facts relevant to this cause in
our prior decision. See Mular v. Ingram, 2015 IL App
(1st) 142439 (Mular I). As we previously noted, this
cause arises out of injuries Mular claimed she suffered when
she fell in the backyard pool area of Ingram's home
during a social gathering on July 18, 2010.

¶
3 On July 16, 2012, Mular filed a complaint, in case number
12 L 7928, alleging that Ingram, as homeowner, owed Mular a
duty to maintain her property in a safe condition, which
Ingram breached by (i) failing to provide a safe means of
ingress and egress to the area; (ii) failing to keep the area
free of tripping hazards; (iii) allowing the area around the
pool to become unsafe due to uneven surfaces and poorly
maintained concrete and concrete expansion joints; (iv)
failing to inspect the area for hazardous conditions; and (v)
failing to warn others of such conditions. The complaint also
alleged that Ingram "failed to maintain the area around
the premises' pool maintained and properly constructed
[sic]."

¶
4 On August 15, 2013, Ingram filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 103(b), alleging that a nearly
one-year delay in service constituted a failure to exercise
reasonable diligence. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 103(b) (eff. July 1,
2007) ("[i]f the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable
diligence to obtain service on a defendant prior to the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the
action as to that defendant may be dismissed without
prejudice. If the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to
obtain service on a defendant occurs after the expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal shall be
with prejudice"). Specifically, the complaint was filed
on July 16, 2012, and Ingram was not served until July 9,
2013. The motion also alleged, inter alia, that
there was a six-month delay between the return of the first
alias summons in September 2012 and the issuance of a second
alias summons in March 2013, that the two alias summonses
were issued to the wrong address, and that Ingram had
continuously lived at the same address since 1990. The motion
further alleged that Mular knew Ingram's correct address
and that the proper address was listed in the complaint.

¶
5 In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court first
noted "the length of time" it took Mular to serve
Ingram, that is, "four days short of one year." The
court then stated that the addresses on the first and second
alias summonses were incorrect and that the first attempt to
serve Ingram was done after the expiration of the two-year
statute of limitations. The court found it "particularly
troubling to understand" the delay because Mular knew
where Ingram lived and the proper address was listed in the
complaint. The court was unpersuaded by Mular's
"excuses and explanations" and held that Mular did
not act with reasonable diligence in attempting to serve
Ingram. The court dismissed the cause with prejudice because
Ingram was not served until almost 11 months after the end of
the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal
injury cases.

¶
6 Mular's counsel then asked whether the court considered
the four-year statute of limitations applicable to
construction negligence claims "as there is an
allegation pursuant to the construction of the improvement of
the property." Counsel asked for the opportunity to
amend the complaint if the trial court felt that claim was
"not clearly stated." The court directed the
parties to file additional briefing as to whether the
dismissal of the case should be with prejudice and postponed
entry of the order.

¶
7 At a later hearing, the trial court stated that it
"re-reviewed everything" and failed to see how the
cause was a construction case "at all" when nothing
alleged that construction was "going on." Rather,
the case was a "trip and fall like any other trip and
fall." Accordingly, on May 20, 2014, the trial held that
the four-year statute of limitations applicable to
construction negligence did not apply to the cause of action
as pled and dismissed the cause with prejudice pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 103(b). The trial court denied Mular's
motion to vacate and reconsider, and to file an amended
complaint. Mular filed an appeal. ¶ 8 In July 2014,
during the pendency of the appeal in case 12 L 7928, Mular
filed a complaint alleging construction negligence and
seeking damages for injuries arising out of the same
occurrence. Mular claimed that as the owner of the home,
Ingram owed a duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety
of persons who entered the property and that she violated
that duty by, inter alia, negligently allowing the
area around the pool to be unsafe due to uneven surface
levels and poorly maintained concrete. The complaint further
alleged that Ingram owed a duty to exercise ordinary care to
design and construct improvements and repairs to the property
and that she breached this duty when she (i) failed to design
and construct a safe means of ingress and egress to the
property; (ii) failed to design and construct the area of the
pool to be clear of tripping hazards; (iii) constructed the
area around the pool in an unsafe condition by having uneven
surface levels and poorly maintained concrete and concrete
expansion gaps; (iv) designed the premises and in particular
the area around the pool; and (v) constructed and designed
the premises and area around the pool.

¶
9 In December 2014, Ingram filed a motion to dismiss pursuant
to section 2-619(a)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)
(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 2014)), alleging the instant
cause was barred by the doctrine of res judicata
pursuant to trial court's May 20, 2014 order dismissing
case 12 L 7928 with prejudice. The motion further alleged
that the cause was barred by the two-year statute of
limitations, and, assuming that Mular had sufficiently
alleged that Ingram was involved in the construction of the
pool area, a fact Ingram disputed because the pool was built
before she purchased the house, the claim was barred by the
10-year construction statute of repose (735 ILCS 5/13-214(b)
(West 2014)).

¶
10 In February 2015, the trial court stayed its ruling on the
issue on res judicata pending a ruling on
Mular's appeal from the trial court's dismissal with
prejudice in case number 12 L 7928. On May 20, 2015, this
court issued its opinion.

¶
11 On appeal, this court first considered Mular's
argument that the four-year statute of limitations applicable
to construction negligence claims applied to the case. We
noted that the types of claims to which section 13-214(a) of
the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 2010)), applied were
limited to construction activities related to the design,
planning, supervision, observation, or management of a
construction project. Mular I, 2014 IL App (1st)
142439, ¶¶ 15-16. Therefore, a landowner's
maintenance of an existing improvement to real property,
without an allegation that the landowner took part in the
construction of that improvement, did not fall within the
purview of section 13-214. Id. ¶ 16. The
"sole" reference to construction found in
Mular's one-count complaint alleged that Ingram was
guilty of negligence because she " '[c]arelessly and
negligently failed to maintain the area around the
premises' pool maintained and properly constructed
[sic].' " Id. ¶ 18. No
allegations of fact in the complaint supported the inference
that Ingram participated in the design, planning, or
supervision of the construction of the pool. Id. We
also noted that the proposed amended complaint lacked any
well-pled facts other than conclusory allegations that Ingram
was under a duty to design and construct improvements to her
property to be safe for persons entering the property and
failed to design and construct the area around the pool to be
free of tripping hazards. Id.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&para;
12 Mular I therefore concluded that Mular&#39;s
complaint asserted a premises liability claim against a
property owner governed by a two-year statute of limitations,
and, consequently, service on Ingram on July 9, 2013 for
injuries sustained by Mular on July 18, 2010, was beyond the
applicable two-year statute of limitations. Id.
&para;&para; 18-19. Dismissal with prejudice pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) was proper when, inter
alia, nearly one year elapsed between the filing of the
lawsuit and the date Ingram was served, and Ingram was
"easy to locate." Id. ¶ 25.
Accordingly, under the circumstances of the case, Mular's
delay ...

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