Over two decades, Poland experienced the most stable high growth in the EU with an average rate of 3.7 percent a year, earning it the nickname of the European Tiger. This achievement was even more remarkable because it was inclusive: jobs and wages increased, inequality across income groups and regions remained low, and poverty declined.

But Poland’s rapid economic ascent created new challenges. The creative destruction on which the growth process was based also caused massive social changes that challenged citizens’ resilience. Workers moved from farms to factories and then to offices, with a significant increase in temporary or “junk” contracts and relatively limited social assistance. Together with automation trends, and its adverse impact on low-skilled jobs, many working-class families faced heightened anxiety and uncertainty about their future.

And while workers responded to the incentives coming from market competition by increasing labor productivity, Polish wages remained among the lowest in the EU. In 2015, the average hourly labor cost (excluding agriculture and public administration) was €25.00 in the EU, but just €8.60 in Poland, placing it in the bottom six of the EU28 countries. And the convergence with wages in Germany—its immediate neighbor to the west and an important destination for its workers—is occurring only slowly; productivity growth and real wages tracked each other significantly more in Germany than in Poland. For instance, between 2000 and 2016, Polish labor productivity (the output of goods and services per hour worked) grew by about 51 percent, but compensation for workers grew only 33 percent.

In addition, there is frustration even among those most favored by the economic trends. Polish people’s aspirations and perceptions grow as welfare improves: catching up with high-income economies in the EU, and in particular with Germany, is perceived by many to be frustratingly slow. This includes catching up on governance in the public sector, particularly in government effectiveness and accountability to citizens with the delivery of public services.

And it does not help that, as in the rest of Europe, there has been a loss in confidence in the EU, a key external anchor of Poland’s reforms. Accession and commitment to the EU’s acquis communautaire were key factors driving the vision and consistency of the reforms that propelled Poland into high income. But this anchor now faces challenges of its own:

Despite this [progress], many Europeans consider the Union as either too distant or too interfering in their day-to-day lives. Others question its added-value and ask how Europe improves their standard of living. And for too many, the EU fell short of their expectations as it struggled with its worst financial, economic and social crisis in post-war history (European Commission 2017:2).

The sources of growth that propelled Poland to high-income status and delivered major increases in prosperity have less scope now to bring about further large improvements in incomes. Many countries that reached high-income status have experienced relatively slow growth since. From the 1960s to the 1990s, only 10 countries entered the high-income country (HIC) club and had average annual GDP per capita growth close to or above 2 percent (see Figure 1).

Addressing these challenges in the present global context, is no small undertaking. Like the rest of the world, Poland now faces a different global context—one of lower growth and greater uncertainty. Manufacturing is less labor intensive than before. The fourth industrial revolution, characterized by the automation of production processes, is causing the loss of significant numbers of medium-skilled workers in the developed world.

The experience of consolidated high-income economies provides the following insights for Poland going forward (see Figure 2). First, better governing is needed to build more trust in government. This could be achieved by making public services more client-oriented, more transparent, and more efficient, and by involving citizens more directly in improving public service delivery. Second, sustaining sound macroeconomic policies will now need to include creating fiscal space to deal with the increasing pressures coming from aging and a more uncertain global context. Third, continuing to connect the country internationally to allow citizens to continue reaping the benefits of trade and integration implies ramping up investments in the appropriate hard and soft infrastructure. And the stance on migration can be more inclusive. Fourth, moving up the global value chains by focusing on the quality of products and services through more concerted support to innovation for it to become a key driver of growth. Finally, including all citizens means continuing to expand investment in quality education and health care for all. It also means striking a better balance between job security and labor market flexibility, supporting workers between jobs, targeting social spending to aging and vulnerable parts of population, and ensuring progressivity in the tax system.

Figure 2. Insights for Poland based on the experience of consolidated high-income economies

And finally, as the country rises to meet these challenges, it should make sure that it guards the shared vision and long-term policy continuity that have served the country so well in the past.

]]>
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/global_poland_002.jpg?w=270By Enrique Aldaz-Carroll, Rogier van den Brink, Emilia Skrok
Over two decades, Poland experienced the most stable high growth in the EU with an average rate of 3.7 percent a year, earning it the nickname of the European Tiger. This achievement was even more remarkable because it was inclusive: jobs and wages increased, inequality across income groups and regions remained low, and poverty declined.
But Poland’s rapid economic ascent created new challenges. The creative destruction on which the growth process was based also caused massive social changes that challenged citizens’ resilience. Workers moved from farms to factories and then to offices, with a significant increase in temporary or “junk” contracts and relatively limited social assistance. Together with automation trends, and its adverse impact on low-skilled jobs, many working-class families faced heightened anxiety and uncertainty about their future.
And while workers responded to the incentives coming from market competition by increasing labor productivity, Polish wages remained among the lowest in the EU. In 2015, the average hourly labor cost (excluding agriculture and public administration) was €25.00 in the EU, but just €8.60 in Poland, placing it in the bottom six of the EU28 countries. And the convergence with wages in Germany—its immediate neighbor to the west and an important destination for its workers—is occurring only slowly; productivity growth and real wages tracked each other significantly more in Germany than in Poland. For instance, between 2000 and 2016, Polish labor productivity (the output of goods and services per hour worked) grew by about 51 percent, but compensation for workers grew only 33 percent.
In addition, there is frustration even among those most favored by the economic trends. Polish people’s aspirations and perceptions grow as welfare improves: catching up with high-income economies in the EU, and in particular with Germany, is perceived by many to be frustratingly slow. This includes catching up on governance in the public sector, particularly in government effectiveness and accountability to citizens with the delivery of public services.
And it does not help that, as in the rest of Europe, there has been a loss in confidence in the EU, a key external anchor of Poland’s reforms. Accession and commitment to the EU’s acquis communautaire were key factors driving the vision and consistency of the reforms that propelled Poland into high income. But this anchor now faces challenges of its own:
Despite this [progress], many Europeans consider the Union as either too distant or too interfering in their day-to-day lives. Others question its added-value and ask how Europe improves their standard of living. And for too many, the EU fell short of their expectations as it struggled with its worst financial, economic and social crisis in post-war history (European Commission 2017:2).
The sources of growth that propelled Poland to high-income status and delivered major increases in prosperity have less scope now to bring about further large improvements in incomes. Many countries that reached high-income status have experienced relatively slow growth since. From the 1960s to the 1990s, only 10 countries entered the high-income country (HIC) club and had average annual GDP per capita growth close to or above 2 percent (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Achieving high-income status and average GDP growth, 1965–95
Source: TED database.
Note: Countries in light green experienced annual GDP growth of about 2 percent or higher
Addressing these challenges in the present global context, is no small undertaking. Like the rest of the world, Poland now faces a different global context—one of lower growth and greater uncertainty. Manufacturing is less labor intensive than before. The fourth industrial revolution, characterized by the automation of ... By Enrique Aldaz-Carroll, Rogier van den Brink, Emilia Skrok
Over two decades, Poland experienced the most stable high growth in the EU with an average rate of 3.7 percent a year, earning it the nickname of the European Tiger.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/12/17/how-to-avoid-the-middle-income-trap-lessons-from-poland-a-european-tiger/How to avoid the middle-income trap: Lessons from Poland, a European Tigerhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/587920248/0/brookingsrss/topics/europeanunion~How-to-avoid-the-middleincome-trap-Lessons-from-Poland-a-European-Tiger/
Mon, 17 Dec 2018 17:44:05 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=553457

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By Enrique Aldaz-Carroll, Rogier van den Brink, Emilia Skrok

World Bank staff spend their careers traveling from country to country. Most of these countries struggle to implement good policies and only a few succeed in reaching high-income status and sustaining growth. Take Turkey, which was growing towards high-income status but then experienced a slowdown; or Argentina, which reached high-income status but fell again to middle-income status riddled with policy uncertainty; or Romania, which has been unable to make the most of its EU membership and is suffering from governance issues. So when we came across Poland, which moved from middle to high income in less than 15 years, we wanted to take a closer look.

Over the last two decades, Poland experienced the most stable high growth in the EU, increasing the size of its economy by two and a half times and raising incomes. In 1994, the Poles had one-fourth less income than the Mexicans did. By 2014, the incomes of Mexicans had grown annually at about 0.9 percent (to $16,300); whereas Poles saw their incomes grow annually at 4.2 percent (to $25,000). In only 20 years, a Pole had become 50 percent richer than a Mexican.

Even more remarkable, this economic growth spurt was inclusive: jobs and wages increased, inequality across income groups and regions remained low, and poverty declined (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Poland’s rapid ascent earned it the nickname “European Tiger,” in reference to similarly rapid ascents of the Asian Tiger economies.

Just good luck?

Poland and a handful of other economies that sustained high growth and graduated to high income focused on five key policy areas (see Figure 3):

Figure 3. The five key policy areas

1. Governing

It is important to get the institutions right—economic but also political—and guide reform with a shared vision. What sets Poland apart from the Asian Tigers is that it sustained its high growth with a vibrant democracy—one that supported a shared vision of a socially responsible market economy. Such a vision facilitated remarkable policy continuity spanning 17 governments since democratization. Reforms were sequenced effectively. Rapid liberalization was quickly followed by the creation of a support structure of basic democratic institutions at the local and national level. This support structure, together with the use of EU accession as an anchor, helped create a political consensus for deeper economic institutional change. And the inclusive political institutions at all levels of government also made the Poles pay their taxes, something other transition economies often struggle with but is a key pillar of sustainable public finances.

2. Sustaining

Ensuring macroeconomic stability is key to keep inflation and debt under control. Poland did this through a rules-based but flexible fiscal framework that limited deficits and debt, and a flexible exchange rate backed up by a credible inflation-targeting monetary policy. Poland’s effective restructuring, regulating, and supervising of the financial sector also ensured that banking crises were avoided.

3. Connecting

Integrating domestic markets into global markets helps increase firm competitiveness. Poland did this through rapid, but sequenced, integration: cutting tariffs first to help markets “get the prices right,” then tackling the more complex soft infrastructure in advance of EU accession, and finally making the most of EU hard infrastructure funds to connect domestic and external markets. Poland welcomed foreign direct investment enabling its domestic firms to participate in global value chains and exposed them to the global markets, which provided access to quality inputs, capital goods, and technological transfers.

4. Growing

Making a good use of the market helps reallocate resources as the country grows. Poland balanced factor accumulation—“perspiration”—and productivity improvement—“inspiration”—by allowing market forces to reallocate resources between sectors (structural transformation), within sectors (enabling the efficient firms to grow and the inefficient to shrink) and within firms (adopting better management and new technology): the increasing competition continuously strengthened the incentives for firms to improve, innovate and focus on comparative advantage. Poland not only facilitated markets’ reallocation of resources, it also helped expand them with focused reforms and investments in human capital, which resulted in large gains in educational performance.

5. Including

Providing opportunities for all promotes shared prosperity. Poland ensured broad-based access to quality education across income groups and regions. It increased business opportunities, but also earnings. Poland’s competitive and open markets provided business opportunities for firms and jobs for workers, but this was also complemented with regular raises in the minimum wage.

As was also the case in the handful of other economies that sustained high growth and graduated to high income, the rapid economic ascent has generated new challenges that require the continued attention of policymakers. This is covered in the report and in part two of this blog series.

]]>
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/global_poland_001.jpg?w=270By Enrique Aldaz-Carroll, Rogier van den Brink, Emilia Skrok
World Bank staff spend their careers traveling from country to country. Most of these countries struggle to implement good policies and only a few succeed in reaching high-income status and sustaining growth. Take Turkey, which was growing towards high-income status but then experienced a slowdown; or Argentina, which reached high-income status but fell again to middle-income status riddled with policy uncertainty; or Romania, which has been unable to make the most of its EU membership and is suffering from governance issues. So when we came across Poland, which moved from middle to high income in less than 15 years, we wanted to take a closer look.
Over the last two decades, Poland experienced the most stable high growth in the EU, increasing the size of its economy by two and a half times and raising incomes. In 1994, the Poles had one-fourth less income than the Mexicans did. By 2014, the incomes of Mexicans had grown annually at about 0.9 percent (to $16,300); whereas Poles saw their incomes grow annually at 4.2 percent (to $25,000). In only 20 years, a Pole had become 50 percent richer than a Mexican.
Even more remarkable, this economic growth spurt was inclusive: jobs and wages increased, inequality across income groups and regions remained low, and poverty declined (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Poland’s rapid ascent earned it the nickname “European Tiger,” in reference to similarly rapid ascents of the Asian Tiger economies.
So what lay behind Poland’s success? What was the formula? What can others learn from it? We tried to answer these questions in the report Lessons from Poland, Insights for Poland: A Sustainable and Inclusive Transition to High-Income Status.”
Just good luck?
Poland and a handful of other economies that sustained high growth and graduated to high income focused on five key policy areas (see Figure 3):
Figure 3. The five key policy areas
1. Governing
It is important to get the institutions right—economic but also political—and guide reform with a shared vision. What sets Poland apart from the Asian Tigers is that it sustained its high growth with a vibrant democracy—one that supported a shared vision of a socially responsible market economy. Such a vision facilitated remarkable policy continuity spanning 17 governments since democratization. Reforms were sequenced effectively. Rapid liberalization was quickly followed by the creation of a support structure of basic democratic institutions at the local and national level. This support structure, together with the use of EU accession as an anchor, helped create a political consensus for deeper economic institutional change. And the inclusive political institutions at all levels of government also made the Poles pay their taxes, something other transition economies often struggle with but is a key pillar of sustainable public finances.
2. Sustaining
Ensuring macroeconomic stability is key to keep inflation and debt under control. Poland did this through a rules-based but flexible fiscal framework that limited deficits and debt, and a flexible exchange rate backed up by a credible inflation-targeting monetary policy. Poland’s effective restructuring, regulating, and supervising of the financial sector also ensured that banking crises were avoided.
3. Connecting
Integrating domestic markets into global markets helps increase firm competitiveness. Poland did this through rapid, but sequenced, integration: cutting tariffs first to help markets “get the prices right,” then tackling the more complex soft infrastructure in advance of EU accession, and finally making the most of EU hard infrastructure funds to connect domestic and external markets. Poland welcomed foreign direct investment enabling its domestic firms to participate in global value chains and exposed them to the global ... By Enrique Aldaz-Carroll, Rogier van den Brink, Emilia Skrok
World Bank staff spend their careers traveling from country to country. Most of these countries struggle to implement good policies and only a few succeed in reaching high-income status ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/17/succeeding-in-german-politics-while-female/Succeeding in German politics while femalehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/587889312/0/brookingsrss/topics/europeanunion~Succeeding-in-German-politics-while-female/
Mon, 17 Dec 2018 14:15:59 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=553093

]]>
By Constanze Stelzenmüller

I’m no fan of reducing complex political and social processes to a question of gender. But. It’s a fact that a diminutive working mother of three has just made German postwar history by becoming the first woman to succeed another woman as leader of a major political party. Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (or AKK, because even Germans feel life is too short for names with eight syllables) is the new chairwoman of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). She follows on Angela Merkel, who had led it for 18 years.

The handover raises compelling political questions. What does this mean for the future of the country’s increasingly fragmented party system? Does Kramp-Karrenbauer, 56, have what it takes for the next step—succeeding Merkel as chancellor, in an international environment that may be the most challenging a German leader has ever seen?

Yet judging by much of the commentary, the far more consequential issue is what this shift presages for the future of the nation’s manhood. Have—shudder—Merkel and Kramp-Karrenbauer dealt the final death blow to German machismo?

The track record is, well, suggestive. Postwar West German politics were dominated by larger-than-life titans who smoked, drank and womanized, reveled in political combat, and generally oozed a thick fug of testosterone. This was particularly true of the four chancellors who ruled between 1969 and 2005: Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schroeder. Add the last’s streetfighter-turned-foreign-minister Joschka Fischer, and they total 16 marriages between the five of them. (To be fair, it is easy to forget that Germany’s male population had been decimated by two world wars. This was the rambunctiousness of survivors in a world without fathers.)

So Merkel, the daughter of an East German Protestant pastor, taking over the party leadership in 2000 was a jarring shock to a male-dominated and mostly-Catholic CDU debilitated by a financing scandal. When Kohl refused to step down, it was Merkel—and not one of the dozen or so young conservative “warlords” who were jostling for the succession—who felled him in one swift bite to the jugular with a front-page newspaper article calling for his resignation.

A generation earlier, the clever grocer’s daughter Margaret Thatcher had ripped into Britain’s smug conservative establishment with a gale-force combination of vicious class resentment and sexy ankles. The male contingent of the Tory party has arguably never quite recovered—as evidenced this week by its latest abject failure to unseat Prime Minister Theresa May.

Merkel found herself at the turn of the millennium confronting a generation of similarly entitled and complacent middle-aged German conservatives; the elusive female of the species came wreathed in deference and pearls. Trained to navigate limited sovereignty and accustomed to following orders and convention, her CDU peers were disoriented by the confusing new post-Berlin Wall world.

For Merkel, it was liberation. And it must have been intoxicating. Moreover, she had grown up in a Communist country where most women worked and had families, whereas in postwar West Germany, women with children who shyly expressed a desire to work risked being called Rabenmütter—basically, unnatural mothers. Even in 2000, Germany was well behind other Western democracies in that it had never had a female chancellor, foreign minister or defense minister, and its constitution prohibited women from serving in the armed forces (except as doctors or members of a military band).

Today’s Germany is still quite a ways from equal pay for women, or parity of representation in legislatures or on corporate boards. But some of the Bundeswehr’s combat units are commanded by women. Ursula von der Leyen is the defense minister, and women are either leading or co-leading all except two of Germany’s political parties. Merkel has been chancellor for 13 years. During her time in office, she has presided over the extension of paid parental leave and the legalization of same-sex marriage. Those male rivals from her early days have, one by one, displayed a remarkable tendency to come to grief of their own accord.

At last weekend’s leadership convention, Kramp-Karrenbauer and her main opponent, Friedrich Merz, represented genuinely competing visions for the future of the party and the country: big-tent centrism versus a pivot to the right; a European focus versus a strong Atlanticist bent. But the contest also had startling overtones of gender warfare.

In an irony lost on no one in Germany, Merz—a millionaire corporate lawyer and one of those young conservative “warlords” pushed out by Merkel—was narrowly defeated by her chosen successor. His most important backer was another Merkel foe with an ax to grind, the CDU’s grand old man Wolfgang Schäuble. Functionaries and pundits opined darkly that “another woman” in the top job would be the last straw. Members of the CDU womens’ grouping Frauenunion, meanwhile, were wearing what J.R.R. Tolkien would have called a “fell gleam” about their brows.

After the vote, a journalist had to apologize for tweeting “yet another white, old, ugly woman.” He tried to explain that is had been a “joke.”

Machismo is alive and well in my country. Nonetheless, the CDU is now headed by a woman who has twice won elected office as the German equivalent of a state governor, resigned, rejected a cabinet post to serve instead as her party’s secretary general, and vaulted to the top position only nine months later with a cheerfully combative performance at the convention. In a time where strongmen and authoritarians around the world are attempting to denigrate and subordinate women, I’ll take that as good news.

Now can we get back to the politics?

]]>
By Constanze Stelzenmüller
I’m no fan of reducing complex political and social processes to a question of gender. But. It’s a fact that a diminutive working mother of three has just made German postwar history by becoming the first woman to succeed another woman as leader of a major political party. Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (or AKK, because even Germans feel life is too short for names with eight syllables) is the new chairwoman of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). She follows on Angela Merkel, who had led it for 18 years.
The handover raises compelling political questions. What does this mean for the future of the country’s increasingly fragmented party system? Does Kramp-Karrenbauer, 56, have what it takes for the next step—succeeding Merkel as chancellor, in an international environment that may be the most challenging a German leader has ever seen?
Yet judging by much of the commentary, the far more consequential issue is what this shift presages for the future of the nation’s manhood. Have—shudder—Merkel and Kramp-Karrenbauer dealt the final death blow to German machismo?
The track record is, well, suggestive. Postwar West German politics were dominated by larger-than-life titans who smoked, drank and womanized, reveled in political combat, and generally oozed a thick fug of testosterone. This was particularly true of the four chancellors who ruled between 1969 and 2005: Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schroeder. Add the last’s streetfighter-turned-foreign-minister Joschka Fischer, and they total 16 marriages between the five of them. (To be fair, it is easy to forget that Germany’s male population had been decimated by two world wars. This was the rambunctiousness of survivors in a world without fathers.)
So Merkel, the daughter of an East German Protestant pastor, taking over the party leadership in 2000 was a jarring shock to a male-dominated and mostly-Catholic CDU debilitated by a financing scandal. When Kohl refused to step down, it was Merkel—and not one of the dozen or so young conservative “warlords” who were jostling for the succession—who felled him in one swift bite to the jugular with a front-page newspaper article calling for his resignation.
A generation earlier, the clever grocer’s daughter Margaret Thatcher had ripped into Britain’s smug conservative establishment with a gale-force combination of vicious class resentment and sexy ankles. The male contingent of the Tory party has arguably never quite recovered—as evidenced this week by its latest abject failure to unseat Prime Minister Theresa May.
Merkel found herself at the turn of the millennium confronting a generation of similarly entitled and complacent middle-aged German conservatives; the elusive female of the species came wreathed in deference and pearls. Trained to navigate limited sovereignty and accustomed to following orders and convention, her CDU peers were disoriented by the confusing new post-Berlin Wall world.
For Merkel, it was liberation. And it must have been intoxicating. Moreover, she had grown up in a Communist country where most women worked and had families, whereas in postwar West Germany, women with children who shyly expressed a desire to work risked being called Rabenmütter—basically, unnatural mothers. Even in 2000, Germany was well behind other Western democracies in that it had never had a female chancellor, foreign minister or defense minister, and its constitution prohibited women from serving in the armed forces (except as doctors or members of a military band).
Today’s Germany is still quite a ways from equal pay for women, or parity of representation in legislatures or on corporate boards. But some of the Bundeswehr’s combat units are commanded by women. Ursula von der Leyen is the ... By Constanze Stelzenmüller
I’m no fan of reducing complex political and social processes to a question of gender. But. It’s a fact that a diminutive working mother of three has just made German postwar history by becoming the ... https://www.brookings.edu/media-mentions/20181213-wapo-amanda-sloat/20181213 WaPo Amanda Sloathttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/585866920/0/brookingsrss/topics/europeanunion~WaPo-Amanda-Sloat/
Thu, 13 Dec 2018 21:44:24 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=media-mention&p=552981

On December 4, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced that Russia has 60 days to come back into compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, Washington will suspend its obligations under the agreement.

The treaty’s future appears grim. The Kremlin has threatened countermeasures if the United States goes through with suspension, while Washington seems uninterested in preserving the treaty. If the treaty is to be saved, European leaders should act.

Up until recently, senior European officials said little publicly about the need for Russia to correct its violation of the treaty. They did not make that a major issue in their diplomacy with Moscow. In a recent discussion about the INF Treaty’s potential demise, a former U.S. government official even asked whether Europeans cared.

They should. While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security. It resulted in the banning and elimination of U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles of intermediate range (500–5,500 kilometers), missiles that were deployed in large numbers between the Atlantic and the Ural Mountains in the 1980s.

While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security.

Russia’s development and deployment of an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile known as the 9M729 now constitutes a material breach of the treaty. U.S. officials have raised this violation with their Russian counterparts for some five years, all to no avail.

In October, President Trump said the United States would exercise its right to withdraw.

Many expected Mr. Pompeo to announce that the United States had given Moscow formal notice that it would withdraw from the treaty in six months’ time, as the treaty allows. A leaked memorandum prepared by National Security Advisor Bolton, no fan of the INF Treaty, said the notice should be conveyed by December 4 and that the Pentagon should develop a U.S. intermediate-range, ground-launched missile as soon as possible.

However, apparently reflecting discussions between Mr. Trump and German Chancellor Merkel in Argentina, Mr. Pompeo instead announced the 60-day period, after which the United States would suspend its INF Treaty obligations if Moscow does not return to compliance. U.S. suspension of its obligations would relieve Russia of its obligations to implement the treaty. The treaty would technically remain in force, but neither side would be observing its terms.

Russia has shown no sign of readiness to address its violation. Neither Mr. Trump nor Mr. Bolton appears interested in maintaining the agreement, while interest in the Pentagon in having an intermediate-range missile seems to be growing.

That bodes ill for the agreement’s prospects. If America’s European allies, whose countries derive the most security benefits from the treaty, wish to preserve it, they should try three things.

First, European leaders should engage President Putin directly and forcefully on this issue. He needs to hear from Ms. Merkel, President Macron, Prime Minister Conte and other leaders that the 9M729 poses a major problem for relations with his European counterparts.

To date, Mr. Putin has taken little direct heat over this question. If European leaders want to save the treaty, they should change that.

They do not have to ask Mr. Putin to admit the 9M729 is a violation. They can instead note that the missile poses an unacceptable threat to their countries and urge him to make a critical contribution to European security by eliminating that missile. He could do it as a confidence-building measure, without admitting guilt. They also need to make clear that, if Mr. Putin does not act, this will remain a difficult issue for him in the future.

Second, Europeans need to take a serious look at military steps to respond to the 9M729. Upping the political pressure on the Kremlin would prove useful, but military steps would carry far greater weight, especially at the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow never would have agreed to the INF Treaty in the first place had NATO not deployed Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s.

Are NATO allies ready to countenance deployment in Europe of a new U.S. intermediate-range missile? That would definitely grab the Russians’ attention, but it may be a bridge too far. European allies nevertheless could immediately begin a detailed and substantive discussion about military steps that NATO should and will take to offset Russia’s 9M729. The Pentagon is ready for that exchange. That said, it would have greater impact in Moscow if it were European governments and militaries that press the question of military countermeasures.

Third, European officials should recommend to Washington that, if the Russians change course and begin to deal seriously with Western concerns about the 9M729, the Pentagon should explore ways to address Russia’s concern that the Aegis Ashore missile defense launchers in Romania could carry offensive missiles. That does not pose an intractable problem. The United States could fix it, also as a confidence-building measure.

Would these steps succeed? Russia thus far has shown no readiness to abandon its investment in the 9M729. Saving the INF Treaty would prove an uphill struggle, but the fight is not yet over.

Do Europeans care? If so, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Budapest, The Hague and other European capitals will have to decide to make preserving the treaty an urgent priority in their relations with Moscow. If they do not care, the handwriting is on the wall. In early February, the U.S. government will suspend its treaty obligations, relieving Russia from performing its treaty obligations. The INF Treaty effectively will be dead.

The clock is ticking.

]]>
By Steven Pifer
On December 4, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced that Russia has 60 days to come back into compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, Washington will suspend its obligations under the agreement.
The treaty’s future appears grim. The Kremlin has threatened countermeasures if the United States goes through with suspension, while Washington seems uninterested in preserving the treaty. If the treaty is to be saved, European leaders should act.
Up until recently, senior European officials said little publicly about the need for Russia to correct its violation of the treaty. They did not make that a major issue in their diplomacy with Moscow. In a recent discussion about the INF Treaty’s potential demise, a former U.S. government official even asked whether Europeans cared.
They should. While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security. It resulted in the banning and elimination of U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles of intermediate range (500–5,500 kilometers), missiles that were deployed in large numbers between the Atlantic and the Ural Mountains in the 1980s.
While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security.
Russia’s development and deployment of an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile known as the 9M729 now constitutes a material breach of the treaty. U.S. officials have raised this violation with their Russian counterparts for some five years, all to no avail.
In October, President Trump said the United States would exercise its right to withdraw.
Many expected Mr. Pompeo to announce that the United States had given Moscow formal notice that it would withdraw from the treaty in six months’ time, as the treaty allows. A leaked memorandum prepared by National Security Advisor Bolton, no fan of the INF Treaty, said the notice should be conveyed by December 4 and that the Pentagon should develop a U.S. intermediate-range, ground-launched missile as soon as possible.
However, apparently reflecting discussions between Mr. Trump and German Chancellor Merkel in Argentina, Mr. Pompeo instead announced the 60-day period, after which the United States would suspend its INF Treaty obligations if Moscow does not return to compliance. U.S. suspension of its obligations would relieve Russia of its obligations to implement the treaty. The treaty would technically remain in force, but neither side would be observing its terms.
Russia has shown no sign of readiness to address its violation. Neither Mr. Trump nor Mr. Bolton appears interested in maintaining the agreement, while interest in the Pentagon in having an intermediate-range missile seems to be growing.
That bodes ill for the agreement’s prospects. If America’s European allies, whose countries derive the most security benefits from the treaty, wish to preserve it, they should try three things.
First, European leaders should engage President Putin directly and forcefully on this issue. He needs to hear from Ms. Merkel, President Macron, Prime Minister Conte and other leaders that the 9M729 poses a major problem for relations with his European counterparts.
To date, Mr. Putin has taken little direct heat over this question. If European leaders want to save the treaty, they should change that.
They do not have to ask Mr. Putin to admit the 9M729 is a violation. They can instead note that the missile poses an unacceptable threat to their countries and urge him to make a critical contribution to European security by eliminating that missile. He could do it as a confidence-building measure, without admitting guilt. They also need to make clear that, if Mr. Putin does not act, this will remain a difficult issue for him in the future.
Second, Europeans need to take a serious look at military steps to respond to the 9M729. Upping the political pressure on the Kremlin would ... By Steven Pifer
On December 4, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced that Russia has 60 days to come back into compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, Washington will suspend its obligations under the ... https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/theresa-may-survives-no-confidence-vote-but-brexit-future-still-uncertain/Theresa May survives no-confidence vote, but Brexit future still uncertainhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/587894384/0/brookingsrss/topics/europeanunion~Theresa-May-survives-noconfidence-vote-but-Brexit-future-still-uncertain/
Thu, 13 Dec 2018 14:51:56 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=on-the-record&p=553260

Why didn’t parliament vote on the Brexit deal?

On Tuesday, British members of Parliament (MPs) were scheduled to hold a “meaningful vote” on the Brexit deal: a 585-page withdrawal agreement negotiated over 16 months and a 26-page political declaration on the future relationship between the U.K. and EU. But on Monday, British Prime Minister Theresa May cancelled the vote because it “would be rejected by a significant margin.” She told Parliament that she would ask European leaders to make changes to the Northern Ireland backstop. Her office later said the vote would be held by January 21, which cuts close to the March 29 date when Brexit takes effect—particularly as the U.K. Parliament still needs to adopt implementing legislation and the European Parliament must ratify the deal.

Remind me why people object to the Northern Ireland backstop?

The U.K. is currently part of the EU’s customs union and single market. It will leave both after Brexit, which will raise the status of the Irish border to that of a customs border. In order to avoid a hard border, the EU insisted on a “backstop” in the agreement. The initial version said Northern Ireland would remain in the EU customs union and in “full regulatory alignment” (at least for goods) with the single market, if London was unable to devise alternative arrangements. This eliminates the need for checks at the Irish land border, pushing them to sea and air entry points to the island of Ireland. Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—whose 10 MPs prop up May’s government—balked at the creation of an economic frontier between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The final version of the backstop would keep the entire U.K.—not just Northern Ireland—aligned with the EU customs union, as well as require Northern Ireland to follow regulatory measures related to the single market (on goods and food). This agreement is not time-limited and the U.K. cannot unilaterally withdraw. While London hopes to negotiate a future economic agreement with the EU that eliminates the need for a backstop, critics fear the U.K. could remain permanently bound by these provisions.

Will Europe offer a better Brexit deal?

Theresa May spent Tuesday on a whirlwind tour of European capitals—The Hague, Berlin, and Brussels—but returned to London empty-handed. She cancelled her Wednesday trip to Dublin. European leaders were clear and unanimous that the withdrawal agreement cannot be renegotiated, although they expressed goodwill and a desire to help (e.g., clarifications and political assurances). Similarly, the European Parliament’s governing committee issued a statement saying the backstop cannot be renegotiated and parliament will not approve any deal without one.

It is doubtful any minor changes would ensure parliamentary support for the deal, with DUP leader Arlene Foster calling for the backstop to be dropped entirely.

EU leaders will meet on Thursday and Friday in Brussels at a long scheduled summit, with Brexit back on the agenda. European Council President Donald Tusk has said leaders must discuss the state of preparations for a no-deal scenario.

What is the future of Prime Minister Theresa May?

If May had lost the Brexit vote in Parliament, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn might have tabled a motion of no confidence in her government with the hope of forcing a general election. Yet he refrained in the wake of the delayed vote, calling on May to stand down given the “chaos” in her government but rejecting calls for a confidence motion.

On Wednesday morning, rebels in May’s Conservative party triggered a confidence vote in her leadership. (This occurred through an arcane process by which 48 MPs—15 percent of the parliamentary party—submitted letters to the chairman of the “1922 committee” of backbench members, who holds them until the requisite number has been reached.) Hard Brexiteers, who believe May has failed to deliver a deal that takes back control from Brussels, were frustrated by the delayed vote.

The secret ballot will occur on Wednesday evening. May needs the support of 159 Conservative MPs to survive (see BBC reporting for more details). There are several scenarios:

If May wins the vote, she cannot be challenged as Conservative leader for at least another year.

If she wins by a small margin, she may opt to stand down as party leader and trigger a leadership contest in which she could not stand.

If she loses the vote, there would be a Conservative leadership contest in which she could not stand. May would be expected to remain as caretaker prime minister until a new leader was chosen, which could take up to six weeks. The new leader, as head of the largest party in Parliament, would be expected to form a government and become prime minister; given current parliamentary math, this would require the continued support of the DUP.

Will there be a second referendum?

There are increasing calls for a second referendum. Although May has opposed another vote, she could change her mind amid current wrangling. If another poll was held, it is unclear what question would be asked. One option would be to re-run the first vote: Leave or Remain. Another option would accept the Brexit decision but ask voters about the terms: leave with May’s deal or with no deal (i.e., return to WTO trading rules). Other scenarios envision multiple questions on the ballot.

Is there any good news?

Brexit is stoppable. On Monday, the European Court of Justice affirmed last week’s advisory opinion and ruled the U.K. could unilaterally revoke Article 50 notification of its intention to leave the EU. May has consistently ruled out this approach. Such a decision would be easier politically if the initial Brexit decision was overturned in a second referendum.

]]>
By Amanda Sloat
Why didn’t parliament vote on the Brexit deal?
On Tuesday, British members of Parliament (MPs) were scheduled to hold a “meaningful vote” on the Brexit deal: a 585-page withdrawal agreement negotiated over 16 months and a 26-page political declaration on the future relationship between the U.K. and EU. But on Monday, British Prime Minister Theresa May cancelled the vote because it “would be rejected by a significant margin.” She told Parliament that she would ask European leaders to make changes to the Northern Ireland backstop. Her office later said the vote would be held by January 21, which cuts close to the March 29 date when Brexit takes effect—particularly as the U.K. Parliament still needs to adopt implementing legislation and the European Parliament must ratify the deal.
Remind me why people object to the Northern Ireland backstop?
The U.K. is currently part of the EU’s customs union and single market. It will leave both after Brexit, which will raise the status of the Irish border to that of a customs border. In order to avoid a hard border, the EU insisted on a “backstop” in the agreement. The initial version said Northern Ireland would remain in the EU customs union and in “full regulatory alignment” (at least for goods) with the single market, if London was unable to devise alternative arrangements. This eliminates the need for checks at the Irish land border, pushing them to sea and air entry points to the island of Ireland. Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—whose 10 MPs prop up May’s government—balked at the creation of an economic frontier between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The final version of the backstop would keep the entire U.K.—not just Northern Ireland—aligned with the EU customs union, as well as require Northern Ireland to follow regulatory measures related to the single market (on goods and food). This agreement is not time-limited and the U.K. cannot unilaterally withdraw. While London hopes to negotiate a future economic agreement with the EU that eliminates the need for a backstop, critics fear the U.K. could remain permanently bound by these provisions.
Will Europe offer a better Brexit deal?
Theresa May spent Tuesday on a whirlwind tour of European capitals—The Hague, Berlin, and Brussels—but returned to London empty-handed. She cancelled her Wednesday trip to Dublin. European leaders were clear and unanimous that the withdrawal agreement cannot be renegotiated, although they expressed goodwill and a desire to help (e.g., clarifications and political assurances). Similarly, the European Parliament’s governing committee issued a statement saying the backstop cannot be renegotiated and parliament will not approve any deal without one.
It is doubtful any minor changes would ensure parliamentary support for the deal, with DUP leader Arlene Foster calling for the backstop to be dropped entirely.
EU leaders will meet on Thursday and Friday in Brussels at a long scheduled summit, with Brexit back on the agenda. European Council President Donald Tusk has said leaders must discuss the state of preparations for a no-deal scenario.
What is the future of Prime Minister Theresa May?
If May had lost the Brexit vote in Parliament, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn might have tabled a motion of no confidence in her government with the hope of forcing a general election. Yet he refrained in the wake of the delayed vote, calling on May to stand down given the “chaos” in her government but rejecting calls for a confidence motion.
On Wednesday morning, rebels in May’s Conservative party triggered a confidence vote in her leadership. (This occurred through an arcane process by which 48 MPs—15 percent of the parliamentary party—submitted letters to the chairman of the “1922 ... By Amanda Sloat
Why didn’t parliament vote on the Brexit deal?
On Tuesday, British members of Parliament (MPs) were scheduled to hold a “meaningful vote” on the Brexit deal: a 585-page withdrawal agreement negotiated over 16 ... https://www.brookings.edu/media-mentions/20181211-newsy-amanda-sloat/20181211 Newsy Amanda Sloathttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/585169002/0/brookingsrss/topics/europeanunion~Newsy-Amanda-Sloat/
Tue, 11 Dec 2018 17:50:25 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=media-mention&p=552609