27 Mar 2014

An
idea to develop a new impetus in Africa-Europe relations on the eve of the 4th
EU-Africa Summit

A new impetus in Africa-Europe relations is
sorely needed. By the middle of the twenty-first century, Africa and Europe
will have 2.5 billion citizens that share a common border with close economic,
cultural and linguistic ties that need to peacefully co-exist.

If current trends persist then security and
development will remain at the top of the priorities of the two
continents. Both Europe and Africa must focus on this core area of mutual
interest in the long term.

The 4th Africa – EU summit takes place in
Brussels on 2 – 3 April. For the convening leaders, I am proposing a
Euro-African Alliance (Treaty) for Peace, Security and Development.

My argument is built around seven pillars, outlined
in further detail in my paper.
These are:

- Peace and security can act as the mainspring
of EU-Africa relations;

- There will be ever growing common
challenges in Europe and Africa in an area inhabited by 2.5 billion people by
2050;

- The management, prevention, and resolving
of crises and their consequences for Africa and Europe will become an ever
more pressing need.

- The security-development nexus will demand
a multi-dimensional long-term approach;

- Both Africa and Europe need to pool resources
to a critical mass in order to address these issues effectively;

- The Joint Africa-EU Strategy needs to
evolve to become a security and defence Treaty between the two Unions as
well as a political alliance

The
road towards a Euro-African Alliance for Peace, Security and Development

On substance my proposal suggests to go
beyond the current policy framework of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership and
the rhetoric of the Summit meetings that take place every three years. To be
recognised and effective, the commitments by the partners on both sides of the
Mediterranean must be fixed in a formal agreement that will consolidate the
Africa-EU Partnership into a legally binding framework.

In Europe, although it is up to the EU
institutions to inject a new momentum in this area, Member States should take
their responsibility, hence the need for a binding agreement, which they cannot
evade according to national interests.

Neither the Cotonou Agreement and its ACP
nebula, nor the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in their current state can meet
this dual concern of strategic and legal commitment. Both provide a starting
point to the feasibility of the project I propose - Cotonou for the legal force
of its framework and the JAES for the political dialogue between the two Unions
with its new approaches to security and international cooperation.

My proposal is financially and politically
feasible as a pragmatic and legal variation of the Strategic Partnership
outlined in Lisbon in 2007 and confirmed in Tripoli in 2010[1]. It draws lessons from experience - from
the Libyan crisis, Mali, Somalia and the 'Arab Springs' and other regional or
international security challenges.

Offering a real anchor point for a revival
of the European defence project with the ambition to better link peace,
security and development, the proposal would in turn meet the expectations of
citizens on both sides of the Mediterranean. It could also enhance the mutual promotion
of strategic interests between the EU and Africa as a whole (AU + Morocco).

The fundamental issues of EU-Africa
relations in the coming years will be the conflicts, crisesand the consequences of the Arab Spring. A
more ambitious and more integrated partnership approach will have to succeed
the current practise of interventions in 'silos' through national means or
instruments of the kind seen in the EU’s African Peace Facility.

In Europe, the mutualisation of security
and defence resources, urged by the Euro and budgetary crises, could lead to a revival of the
European defence policy. Between Europe and Africa, an international treaty in
the form of an Alliance for peace, security and development would address more
effectively the common challenges of the two continents. It would further
optimise the pooling of resources on the two sides whilst boosting the
integration process of the two Unions.

It is now time to take Europe-Africa
relations to the next level.

________

Philippe Darmuzey, is an Honorary Director
European Commission and is a former Director of the Pan African Division in the
European Commission’s DG DEVCO.

He writes this in a personal capacity and the views expressed may not represent that of ECDPM

24 Mar 2014

The EU removed
sanctions on some of Zimbabwe's elite this week. It should drop the rest as
soon as possible. They have been a complete failure.

On 17th February, the European Union further pared down its
list of Zimbabwean sanctions, suspending so-called 'targeted measures' against
eight members of the country's political and military elite. Sanctions on
President Robert Mugabe and his wife remained in place.

Since their imposition in
2002, EU sanctions have both expanded and
contracted in
size and scope, and have ultimately showcased EU foreign policy at its most
ineffective and increasingly unjustifiable.

Sanctions against Zimbabwe have failed completely. That may
seem like a bold statement, but the main thing militating against it is the
awkward fact that to demonstrate a policy’s failure, one must first be able to
articulate what that policy was intended to do. When it comes to EU (as well as
US, Canadian and Australian) sanctions against Zimbabwe, that's not an easy
task.

What's the point of sanctions?

Let's start by turning the clock back to 14 June 2004 when
Tony Blair informed the
UK House of Commons that: “these measures and sanctions…are of limited effect
on the Mugabe regime. We must be realistic about that. It is still important
that we give every chance to, and make every effort to try to help, those in
south Africa − the southern part of Africa − to put pressure for change on the
Mugabe regime, because there is no salvation for the people of Zimbabwe until
that regime is changed.”

This was classic Blair, underlining several crucial aspects
of his approach to Mugabe: the idea of "regime change", the
missionary zeal to pursue "salvation", the pragmatism to recognise
that sanctions are actually ineffective, and the conviction that it is the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) which holds the key diplomatic
position. (Such statements, combined with what we already know of Blair’s
foreign policy lend plausibility to former South African president Thabo
Mbeki’s recent claim that
the former British prime minister urged South Africa to assist military action
to overthrow Mugabe.)

If we use Blair’s stated goal of regime change as the metric
against which to judge the success or failure of 12 years of sanctions, there
can be only one judgement: abject failure. British prime ministers have come
and gone, and Mugabe has seen them one by one (five and counting). It is hard
to imagine Mugabe leaving office, except at a time of his own choosing or when
age and infirmity finally take their toll.

Furthermore, the inconsistently-enforced partial asset
freeze and travel ban on Mugabe and his wife is hardly any easier to defend on
the grounds that it does anything to foster democracy, the rule of law and
respect for human rights − which is the broader
justification for the EU measures. Blair’s defence of sanctions
suggested that they helped to support SADC-mediated change. But Mugabe has used
the presence of Western sanctions to deft rhetorical effect
at every opportunity, and SADC-mandated facilitators have repeatedly called for
the removal of sanctions, seeing them as an obstacle to progress.

The US Ambassador to Harare was right to say last week that
“sanctions don’t create potholes,” but this underplays the extent to which they
have created diplomatic potholes into which opportunities for progress have
often fallen.

Confused leaders?

The total failure yet curious longevity of the targeted
measures demonstrate something about sanctions in general − namely the
distinction between what we might crudely call ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sanctions.

For sanctions to be ‘good’ they must form part of coherent,
focused policies designed to achieve specific, feasible changes. But the
measures against Mugabe and Zimbabwe’s worst human rights abusers and
wealth-expropriators were never part of carefully-calibrated, coordinated,
multilateral efforts to either change the behaviour of the Mugabe government or
precipitate regime change.

For sanctions to change the behaviour of any state, they
must also be uniformly and consistently enforced. But freezing assets in UK or
US financial institutions and prohibiting London shopping trips was never going
to exert influence over an elite which could effortlessly switch their shopping
sprees and bank accounts to South Africa or Asia. And with a long queue of
Chinese and other investors seeking access to Zimbabwe’s diamond wealth, the
Mugabe government’s retention of political power and building up of personal
fortunes could continue apace.

It is possible, then, that sanctions were an instance of
Blair’s reach exceeding his grasp. But another way to see it would be as an
example of a phenomenon Henry Kissinger described
whereby “confused leaders…substitute public relations manoeuvre for a sense of
direction.” Far from being a failed attempt at ‘good’ sanctions, this approach
would see the sanctions as deliberately symbolic and aimed at appeasing a
domestic audience keen to see their government "doing something" even
though it may achieve nothing in practice.

A petulant symbol

Perhaps the most tragic aspect of this whole sorry saga is
the historical inconsistency and double standards it highlights. After all,
arguably Mugabe’s most reproachable act as a political leader was the Gukurahundi − the
brutal killing of an estimated 20,000 mostly Ndebele citizens − which was
conducted seven years before his was awarded a knighthood in 1994.

We shouldn't doubt the good faith of the EU's commitment to
democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe, but it is undeniable that this concern
was much too slow in coming, and it is extremely regrettable (to say the least)
that it was the plight of the country's white minority commercial farmers that first precipitated this
shift.

Sanctions continue to fail because they are not fit for the
purpose of changing the behaviour of Mugabe’s regime, still less for effecting
the removal of that regime. That Blair conceded as much in 2004 should give
pause for thought as we see the measures pointlessly extended for another year.
They are now little more than a petulant symbol of Western disapproval for
Mugabe himself.

It would be better by far to press the reset button,
eliminate the measures entirely, and focus attention on the many excellent
development projects funded by Western donors throughout the period of
sanctions. Better still would be to support the efforts of civil
society groups to pursue criminal proceedings against those guilty of human
rights abuses. As we have seen, sanctions − the largely symbolic acts of disapproving
Western nations − are unlikely to help in the pursuit of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

21 Mar 2014

What next for Africa-EU Relations?

On 2-3 April Africa and EU leaders will meet in Brussels to agree a way forward of this 50 year old relationship. Both continent face a few questions in a changed world Is the relationship in its current form sustainable? What about the joint institutions through which the relationship is managed? Are they still relevant today? What will happen after the Cotonou Agreement expires in 2020 Are the regional groupings founded on colonial ideology still relevant today?

Is the relationship flexible enough to deal with changes within the international community such as the new providers of development aid? Join us as we explore these issues. main Discussants include, Jimmy Kainja- Media Scholar and Lecturer in media studies, TMS Ruge- Lead Social Media Consultant at the World Bank Georgina Awoonor-Gordon-Programme Manager Common Ground Initiative: Enterprise & Employment ¦Health- COMIC RELIEF.

20 Mar 2014

The meeting will
take place in Brussels on April 2and 3, 2014, gathering African and European
partners under the theme ‘Investing in people, prosperity and peace.’

The IV EU –
Africa Summit will take place in Brussels on April 2and 3,
2014, gathering African and European partners under the theme ‘Investing in
people, prosperity and peace.’ Notwithstanding the good promises, the
preparation process that has been done lately showed several cracks between the
two continents.

Signed in Brussels in 2007, the EU – Africa joint
partnership aimed at creating a ‘relationship between peers,’ focused on the
populations of the two continents. The testing ground of the partnership, and
consequently its importance, would have been measured through the benefits
generated for European and African citizens. Yet, something hasn’t worked
properly so far – it will be necessary to analyse the proposals for reform
brought about by both Member States and civil society, keeping into account how
global dynamics have evolved both in Africa and in Europe.

What has changed then, since 2007? The European Union is
suffering for a massive loss in credibility into the African continent, yet it
refuses to face the consequences. The Arab world has been overwhelmed by crisis
for years, tragically highlighting that the enduring authoritarian regimes in
Egypt and Libya was supported even by Europe; that the European Union is moved
by ‘ground-level’ principles such as geopolitical stability and trade, more
than by human rights and democracy. The revolutionary changes occurred in these
two African countries took them out of the scene, hence pan-African development
and African continental institutions improvement missed two of their leading
actors. Both Egypt and Libya were among the main financial promoters of the
African Union, crucial engines for intercontinental relationships with the
European Union. Their progressive weakening has undoubtedly slowed down the
relationships between the two continents, and triggered the internal fight for
power in the appointment of the President of the African Commission, ended up
in a victory of South Africa.

On the other hand, Africa is becoming more and more
self-confident, diversifying its partnerships, in particular with China, India
and Brazil; it has been reducing its dependency from traditional allies – such
as the EU. Its renewed self-confidence lies on the awareness of being a ‘young’
continent, targeted by international investors even during a lingering
financial crisis. This new awareness allowed Africa to show its dissent on the
international stage, at the UN or during the WTO for instance.

The controversies connected with the International Criminal
Court, accused of pestering African Heads of State and of being the new tool for
Western countries in managing the world order, are poisoning the relationships
between the two partners. Dealing with this matter, the European Union has
repeatedly asked Africa to solve the issue at The Hague, instead of Brussels.
Yet, the EU was committed in dealing with Africa as a ‘peer’ since the signing
of the agreement, while it did not hesitate in signing bilateral economic
agreements with other African actors, complying with the end of privileged
exchange regimes as imposed by the World Trade Organization. For sure their
actions were aimed at creating a ‘no-barrier’ market – yet they did not take
into consideration that Africa is quite late in political and industrial
policies development. To cap it all, several western strategic allies, such as
Nigeria and Uganda, has recently adopted laws criminalising LGBTs, and both the
EU and the US have expressed their deep disappointment, threatening
retaliations – which have led to nothing. It won’t be an easy summit.

Yet, there would be several reasons to renew mutual efforts:
both continents are suffering for the effects of climate change, with
disastrous effects on food safety and on the stability of entire areas. The
economic and financial crisis forces these partners to make joint efforts for
fighting tax evasion and corruption, subtracting remarkable funds to both
Africa and Europe, reducing their investments in services. Africa is rich in
the natural resources Europe needs so much, and the regimes regulating minerals
extraction and use need to be reviewed. Finally yet importantly, migration
flows – generated by both extreme poverty and humanitarian crises overwhelming
Africa – need to be regulated on the basis of not only safety policies, but
also aiming to create real job opportunities and to respect human rights.

The political dialogue generated by the partnership is
crucial, yet it cannot be an end to itself. It shall be a tool for realizing
joint benefits for European and African citizens. Failing this, it could turn
into another beautiful, empty shell.

Marta Martinelli is Senior
Policy Analyst, EU External Relations at the Open Society European Policy
Institute. She writes in her personal capacity.