Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

I 119
Self-Presentation / Chisholm: "Cartesian" Properties: e.g. being sad, think of a golden mountain - even "reddish feeling" - possession involves considering - difference: self-presentation / self-oriented: a self-presenting property will not be considered and is therefore not self-presenting - universal properties not sp: E.g. the property to be so that there are stones - s.p.: e.g. ponder and think - Def consciousness: a thing is conscious if it has a s.p. property
I 128
Self / Chisholm: a person uses the notion of a self, but not an idea of ​​herself - it is not true that when a person is pondering her attribution of being sad, that she has not only an idea of sadness but also an idea of herself._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals
indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate
the page number. The corresponding books
are indicated on the right hand side.
((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.