Tuesday, 29 November 2011

One of my longest-lasting friends is just purely anti-revolution. He somewhat hates me and other common friends for being in Tahrir and participating in the protests, and believes that gradual reform would have been better for a country like Egypt rather than a pure and radical overthrow of the regime. He does not like Mubarak, never did, but does not hate him either, and believes he was not going to continue as president in any case for another term. Despite hating the revolution, he still believes those who died in January & February were "martyrs" who fought bravely for a noble goal. He walks a middle line between the anti-revolution folk. But his biggest gripe is what he said to me today: "You people in Tahrir are doing almost everything you claim to hate about the former and current regime."

I asked him what meant, with a degree of very visible surprise on my face, to which he responded:

"You Tahrir people are trying to impose your will on us. You portray all of us who are against even some of your ideas or positions as idiots, led sheep, paid thugs, ignoramuses, or people with a fetish for being abused. You mocked us when we worried about the economy, tourism and security, you lecture us on patriotism, and you still do as our fears continue. What's worse, you too sometimes make up stuff on twitter and facebook to get people on your side, or spread rumours without verifying them, including many conspiracy theories as well, and you rarely apologise when you are proven wrong. Some of you even lie intentionally, like those people who put the pictures on twitter of a teargas canister that was claimed to have come from Israel to incite more people to come to Tahrir. Some of you even try to hide unflattering truths. You don't try to approach us decently or talk with us properly, and you spend so much time arguing that we are the 'silent majority' who will just remain silent. You just can't keep doing that anymore. Guess what? I went to the protest in Abbasiyya out of my own free will, not because I support SCAF, but because I am tired of what you are doing, and I want to be recognised as a citizen with unique and legitimate concerns. You and your friends in Tahrir want generally noble things, no question about that, but your ways aren't always as perfect and harmless as your goals."

Do you agree with his take? I won't tell you how I responded, so as to let your mind wander in thought for a bit.

Monday, 28 November 2011

It has often been said that one either has to choose between Evolution and Revolution...

Tahrir On November 21st

Tahrir, as a movement, began as an unlikely association of diverse people united around one single unifying demand: the downfall of the Mubarak regime, beyond which intense rivalries between the different groupings that made up Tahrir had still remained. But even then, Tahrir had its differences. Some believed Mubarak should be given a chance to stay until September, some believed he shouldn't. While these differences evaporated to a great deal after the battle of the Camel, yet even then there seemed to remain ambiguity over what Tahrir wanted after the fall of Mubarak.

And with every single protest or sit in, Tahrir focused often on defining clearly "what it rejected", but often lacked clear the presentation of the alternatives it wanted. When Tahrir demanded something, it was often vague, up for interpretation, and lacked detail, whether in terms of description or in terms of how to execute such demands. Tahrir would demand "social justice" or "police reform", but these broad terms lacked the clarity and detail that would have allowed more people to debate and improve them as proposals, that same clarity that would have also allowed for intensely greater pressure on SCAF or the affected institutions and forces, by showing the public an attractive, detailed and ready option.

Even more, Tahrir would often drown its more immediate demands with many others during the same protest. It was not uncommon to find 20 separate demands each week on documents purporting to speak for the protest, with many of these documents often written in simplistic, unrealistic or conflicting detail. That was, of course, more apparent in March, April and May.

But now, for a change, Tahrir is doing almost just the opposite.

Tahrir is demanding a single clear goal, rallying people and centering the media debate around it, and supplanting it with significant detail: the demand for a national salvation government with full authority.

It even suggested the names that would lead such a government, a degree of detail that proved powerful in forcing a quick response from the ruling Military Council indeed, with regular (calls for) meetings with these figures and others. Of course, the responses, to this point, have been much less than what Tahrir desires, but the pace of the negotiation and bargaining is much more rapid, and the debate is much more intense and focused.

When one performs an act of absolute defiance, an act that may involve the possible harming of oneself, one must at least believe that it is indeed the only remaining solution, or that it is the one that has the best odds of achieving anything. In either case, there should at least be the honest belief that this act would, or even could, actually achieve something in the end, and that actual the risk is in some way or another deserving of any potential reward.

There is blood on the streets. The electoral system is complex for even the most educated for us and will yield, by design, assymetric and illogical results over an unreasonably and laughingly long and worn out process. In fact, many statements and laws appear to contradict one another up to this point with regards to how the electoral process would finally take place. The military council organizing the elections is struggling to prove its fledgling (and some would argue as quite depleted) legitimacy, and is the subject to intense criticisms both locally and on the international stage. There are many potential violations up to this point in many districts, and many insufficiently vetted candidates running. Some of the candidates are experiencing intimidations, with one actually stabbed. Even more, liberal, nationalist and leftist parties are weak and disorganised, the nature of all new parties perhaps, and only the conservatives are set to win big for a multitude of reasons, leading to a parliament that will not necessarily represent the true ideological spectrum of Egyptians. Even worse, the ballot boxes will stay overnight under government care as each electoral phase runs for two days, leaving all fears of potential electoral fraud not unfounded. I have so many reasons why neither the vote should take place, more than the above, nor I should not vote on a personal level.

And yet, it seems, these reasons will not be enough, at this point, to merit any logical and benefit-based argument against voting.

In March, many (including myself) organised and participated a massive "Vote No" campaign on the constitutional referendum, and practically had most of the media and an avalanche of celebrities out there supporting it, and there was a considerable ground campaign as well. The revolution was even at its most popular at the time. The "No" camp lost, by more than 77%.

The fact is that the overwhelming majority of likely voters will vote, whether out of faith in the process, desire to move forward, following the rules, confusion, or just to avoid the monetary penalty.

And this time, we do not even have a boycott campaign in place. Even the pro revolution & Tahrir people (of which I describe myself as one) are divided on the subject. Political parties themselves have decided to go forward with the elections as well, seeing that their earlier threats to boycott wielded little & pathetic results.

Even more, speaking of and to one particular political segment, most of the voices calling for a boycott have seemingly come from liberals & secularists, though with some degree support from Islamists and Nationalists to be sure, and those liberals & secularists are already a small base in the elections where every single vote matters. Assuming a predominantly liberal boycott, and with the numbers I'm interpolating, enough people will end up voting in Egypt for this to be a truly legitimate national election process (though I don't think there is reason, other than the threat of a monetary fine, for the number to surpass the 40%+ of voters in the March referendum), but also the boycotting votes could be enough to seriously damage the already supposedly meagre liberal share of parliamentary seats in possibly the most critical election in the history of Egypt and the region.

Even in terms of support of the revolution, an elected body, no matter how deformed it is, gives a voice to the people in front of the ruling Military Council. Yes, the constitutional declaration strips it of so many of its normal powers, and most of the candidates seem uninspiring and some even possibly damaging to the gains of the revolution, but the parliament would remain vested with the (significantly manipulated) votes of the people, and can mount a serious challenge to the regime whenever necessary. There would finally be a civil political body that can represent the people, something sorely needed at this point, even if that representation is indeed distorted.

The elections will go forward, with the votes of those who boycott or not, and the choice now is between having any real influence on a magnanimous (and at this point, seemingly inevitable) step in the history of Egypt, while maintaining all options with regards to the continuation of the protests and the sit-in in Tahrir as well with their demand for a national unity/salvation government, or risking potentially destructive losses without any likely gains to justify the risk.

This is why, with a heavy heart, I will vote.

Then return to Tahrir...

B.

Note: I am merely trying my human best to come up with a logical position. I could be wrong of course.

Wednesday, 16 November 2011

There remains a film-noir political impasse and standoff with regards to the infamous (Supra) Constitutional Principles Document, the CPD.

The genesis of the idea for the Document took place after many had called for a Civil Rights And Liberties Charter right after the Egyptian revolution. The call came both as a reflection of the ensuing euphoric feelings of victory and reinvigorated national identity, as well as a hope for a safeguarding mechanism against any conservative forces who may hold political power in Egypt, in the case that such political forces may carry a possible vision towards limiting personal or group freedoms, or devise a theocratic or quasi-theocratic state.

Following the referendum on the constitutional amendments, and the resounding defeat of those who wanted a new constitution before parliamentary elections, a compromise was suggested. A document containing the basic principles of the coming constitution, whether in general guidelines or in the actual verbatim phrasing in which they are supposed to be incorporated within the actual constitution, would be drafted. This document would be undersigned by all/most political forces in Egypt as a binding commitment by them towards these principles and articles, in an effort to diffuse any volcanic future debates on the issue, and severe polarisation. In addition to liberals essentially pushing for the idea, certain conservatives saw in it a chance to block any movements towards a fully secular constitution, though its appeal was much lesser for the conservatives who were confident of their parliamentary majority.

Mohammed ElBaradei picked up the idea, and developed the first integral draft of such a document. Other political forces, including Mamdouh Hamza's National Council, followed suit, and the government and SCAF themselves developed interest. The SCAF & cabinet then took over the initiative, eventually spearheading deputy PM & deputy head of Al Wafd Dr. Ali ElSelmi to coordinate the project. Once more, at this phase, the idea was to develop a document focusing on the "Civil & Democratic" nature of the state, and outline the basic Civil, Economic and Political rights of Egyptian Citizens.

Things took a quick turn to the severe at first when certain Salafi groups objected to the document, between those who objected to the idea in the first place, and those who objected to the system of government & state it proposed, hoping for a more traditional Islamist government. Certain factions within the Muslim Brotherhood as well expressed their condemnation of the document, though mostly regarding the possibility of it being legally binding in some capacity. After a while, compromises appeared to have been struck towards the end of Ramadan, and it seemed the document was on a set path towards adoption.

But then the SCAF decided to add articles and clauses that were not popular from the first moments they were initially suggested. SCAF suggested articles granting it constitutional powers, setting it as the "Guarantor of Constitutional Legitimacy", allowing it to veto warfare, handle 'alone" all legislation related to the armed forced, and have the sole right of seeing & debating the military budget. Even more, it added clauses on the make up of the Constitutional Assembly, rather than leaving that to the elected parliament as expected. What became the final straw was the idea that SCAF would then adopt the document as a binding Constitutional Declaration on everyone as a charter of "Entrenched Constitutional Clauses", rather than a document of voluntary association among political forces. That was when the document turned into "dictation from above" as some had put it, a phenomenon whose continuation was not exactly the point of the January Revolution.

Liberals were slightly less furious than the Islamists to be sure, as they agreed with most of the principles, some even liked the idea of the army as "saviour of last resort", but eventually they came on board the opposition's side. Islamists (both the MB and, more adamantly, the Salafis) threatened a mass million-man protest on November 18th unless the document is withdrawn and Ali El Selmi resigns. A process of haggling then started between the Cabinet, SCAF and the myriad of political forces out there, particularly the Islamists of course.

The idea of having "Entrenched Constitutional Clauses" is not unheard of. In Bosnia, for example, there are non-amendable articles that attach to the constitution a human rights charter (of the European Convention On Human Rights), while stipulating that no law could be enacted if it contradicted the principles of the charter. In the French Constitution, the article on the Republican Form of government cannot be amended. The German Constitution also bans changes to the Länder (Federal) system, while also outlining a series of non-amendable civil, social and political rights to which all laws must adhere and not contradict. Even the US Constitution has an Entrenched Clause that makes it almost impossible for a constitutional amendment that would modify the equal representation of all states in the US Senate. Turkey, of course, is the most famous case. The process of drafting these clauses varied between popular enactment via elected representation and council, usually after massive political upheaval (e.g. WWII) or a more top-down approach by a political elite who found themselves at a historic crossroads. But Egypt's situation is sensitive given an uprising of the country in revolution against top-down authoritarianism (among others), the lack of any single group or person capable of presenting itself as the legitimate face of the revolution and carrier of its legitimacy, as well as the general pervading feeling on the streets that "the revolution is being hijacked by the current regime."

Various sources are reporting that the SCAF/Cabinet removed and/or amended (most of) the controversial articles and clauses (almost the 18th round of amendments up to this point), and that what rather remains right now as a point of contention is the debate over whether or not the document takes the form of a binding constitutional declaration or just a document of voluntary or "guiding" nature, as the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP Party has put it. The debate, of course, will most likely be settled tomorrow to avoid a mass protest on Friday.

There are a number of ideas out there that could end the gridlock, assuming the current path fully fails. These ideas could either be used separately, or in a complementary.

1- The Document could remain as binding-only for signatories.

2- The Document could become, after sufficient national consensus, a binding constitutional declaration whose power expires as soon as the new constitution is enacted, or within 5-10 years for example.

3- If the Document gets an extended lifespan, certain articles and clauses from it could become not exactly "impossible to amend", but rather more difficult to amend, requiring greater majorities in both the parliament and the ensuing referendum.

4- A separate Egyptian Charter for Human Rights could be drafted, to be enshrined by the constitution.

5- A mechanism for the "Immediate Expiration" of the document could be stipulated. For example, parliament can call (if it wishes to do so), no more than once a year, for a referendum on the expiration of the document, after a 60% majority approval for such motion in parliament (the 60% majority is just an example).

These are all very rough ideas, essentially aimed at opening new axes of thinking, and are not meant as solid and concrete proposals. I do believe that a National Consensus Document on constitutional principles should exist at this point, to avoid extreme polarisation in the parliament, and to avoid an even more toxic debate on the issues within the Egyptian Street. It would also allow a more early and direly shift of some political effort and resources towards actual national policy debates on matters such as Healthcare, Education, Subsidies and more, rather than putting the entire national thinking capacity on hold or on a monorail until a constitution is finally enacted, while leaving some space for multipartisan cooperation on these matters.

Wednesday, 9 November 2011

There has been an immense call for an English version of the full text of Egypt's Constitutional Principles Document, otherwise called "The Supra-constitutional Principles Document". The document is an attempt to create a binding charter of entrenched constitutional clauses & principles that would guide the process of creating the upcoming legislative assembly, as well as the actual spirit & articles of the new Egyptian constitution. The Document was drafted by the Egyptian Cabinet under the supervision of Egypt's ruling Military Council, and the effort was spearheaded by deputy PM Dr. Ali El Selmi. The document has become in fact known informally and in many news outlets in Egypt as "El Selmi's Document". Below is the original draft away from all recent proposed & adopted amendments, translated by Constitution.Net. The file was originally a PDF, and was turned into separate standard pictures. You can still access the full original PDF here. You can also check out my own highlights of the text's original (Arabic) draft and its first set of amendments, as well as the original Arabic text.

Tuesday, 8 November 2011

The (slowly, but surely, dying) epidemic of torture in Egypt has been on my mind a lot recently. One issue in particular: how Egyptians perceive torture. While for the clear and undoubted majority it remains anathema, an act of monstrosity, and a violation of all law & human progress, some haven't quite caught that train.

I am reminded of this today after a discussion I had over the matter of Essam Atta, a man who recently died in prison amidst allegations of torture currently under investigation. What troubled me was that I remember telling people about it when the news first broke out, and the first non-emotional reaction of a "significant percentage" of them to the information in many cases was:

- "...why did they torture him? What did he do?"

Either you get what is abominably wrong with that initial first response & question above, or you don't. I'm not even going to clarify...

(Update: Draft has been updated. Changes are below the original article)

I finally managed to get my hands on the full text of the "Constitutional Principles Document" by Dr. Ali El Selmi, the document that SCAF is pushing for adoption. Here are some of the highlights:

1- Document outlines basic human rights in general (free speech, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, etc...) in a manner that is almost verbatim from the current Constitutional Declaration.

2- Article two of the Egyptian Constitution is maintained as is, stipulating that Islam is the religion of the State, that "the principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation", that Arabic is the official language, and that "non-Muslims can refer to their own Shara'e" (roughly translated as: "Laws", legislations) for their civil & religious matters.

3- A few interesting notes on the army. Only SCAF will be allowed to analyse and debate any matters pertaining the army or the details of the military budget, and the military budget as a whole would be submitted as one single figure to the parliament for the annual State budget debate & voting. Also, war can only be declared by the President after the approval of both Parliament & SCAF. Oddly, this ignores the fact that the Parliament may choose a Parliamentary System without a strong President to begin with.

4- The Constitutional Assembly charged with the writing & the creation of the constitution will be composed of 80 members who do not come from parliament, which is the current biggest problem and source of outcry for political parties as we speak, particularly the Islamists & Conservatives. The members would come from a wide variety of sources, including unions, Al Azhar & Churches, industrial chambers, human rights organizations, university professors, the police, judges, farmers, sports federations (yep, you know how sports are important for Egypt and all), public figures nominated by the cabinet, civil associations, party representatives & independents based on the ratios of party members in the parliament. The total must contain at least 10 women, and 5 also members whose age does not exceed 35 years.

5- If the proposed constitution is seen by SCAF to contain articles that defy the basic rights and principles as stated in the Constitutional Principles Document & "All [Previous] successive Egyptian Constitutions", SCAF will ask the Constitutional Assembly to revise the texts within 15 days. If the Assembly fails to adjust the texts or refuses to comply with the initial request itself, the Supreme Constitutional Court would then revise the proposed texts & issue a binding judgement that even SCAF cannot refuse.

6- If no draft for a constitution is prepared within 6 months, SCAF may dissolve this committee and create a new one that has to draft a constitution within 3 months, which would then be subjected to a referendum.

Update: Following pressures by Egypt's political forces, Dr. El Selmi has decided to amend the draft. AMAY reports the major amendments as follows:

"He explained that the amendments include omitting the word “solely” regarding the right of the armed forces to review their own affairs, and that the National Defense Council would have the right to supervise the budget of the armed forces.

He also said the council would be comprised of the People’s Assembly, Shura Council speakers, and the head of the Central Auditing Agency.

According to the amendments, the constituent committee would include ten female members from women’s and human rights organizations, three representatives of Al-Azhar, another three from the church (rather than one), a member of the Book Authority and another from the Chamber of Tourism.

Consultants and university professors would be reduced from 15 to 12 members each, while the prime minister would no longer nominate ten public figures for membership as was initially put forward in the document."