Accident Reports

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Accident Reports

This page is a complete list of all 172 Boeing 737 write-offs. It should be said that
there have been other accidents with more serious damage than some of these
listed here, but if the aircraft was repaired they do not appear. Similarly some
less serious accidents have resulted in a write-off because the operator could
not, or did not, wish to pay for a repair. This is particularly true of
737-2/3/4/500's in recent years. For non-write-off accidents click
here.

All of the information, photographs & schematics from this website and much more is now available in a 374 page printed book or in electronic format.

A quick look at the main cause of the accidents shows the following
results:

Phase of Flight / Type of Incident

Number of Occurrences

Ground

10

RTO - Departed runway

12

RTO - Remained on runway

3

After Take-off

13

Climb

6

Cruise - Structural failure

3

Cruise - Other

5

Hijack / Bomb

4

Double Engine Failure

3

Fuel Exhaustion

1

Rudder Problem

2

Approach - Non Precision

19

Approach - Other

12

Landing - Collision

1

Landing - Short

8

Landing - Long

11

Landing - Heavy

20

Landing - Fast

6

Landing - Gear Up

3

Landing - LOC after touchdown

17

Go-Around

5

There have been 172 737 hull-losses, including 4 hijackings/bombings and
7 ground accidents. This may sound high but remember that almost 10,000 737's have
been built since 1967. This gives a 2.3% accident rate or approx 3 per year or
one every 2.5 million flight hours. Furthermore, over
40% of occupants survive fatal 737 accidents.

The table below shows that more accidents have befallen the older
aircraft. This is to be expected because they have amassed more flying hours /
cycles and later generations have 50 years of design and technology improvements
built in to them. A fairer comparison across the generations would be rate per
flying hours or cycles but I do not have the data for this.

Series

W/O's

No Built

W/O Rate / A/C

737-1/200

109

1144

1 in 11

737-3/4/500

49

1990

1 in 45

737-NG

14

6658+

1 in 512+

737-MAX

2

200+

1 in 100

Details have been compiled
from a variety of sources ie Aviation journals, books, news reports, internet sites (particularly AvHerald and the Aviation
Safety Network) and of course the official
accident reports, some of which is contradictory. Any additional information about any
of these
incidents would be gratefully received.

Overran Runway 35 by 30m whilst landing in heavy rain. The preliminary report states that at approx 550 feet, the PIC instructed the SIC to turn on the wiper and reconfirmed to SIC that the runway was in sight. Between altitude 500 feet to 200 feet, the EGPWS aural warnings “Sink Rate” and “Pull Up” sounded. Aircraft written off but no fatalities.

The flight from Lima to Jauja (SPJJ, elevation 11,034ft) reportedly made a heavy landing on Runway 31 (LDA 2810m) at 21:40z. The aircraft suffered a collapse of RH MLG landing gear then veered off the right hand side of the runway causing the remaining landing gear to collapse. The right wing of the aircraft went through the perimeter fence causing a fire. Media reporting 29 occupants have been taken to hospital with injuries but no fatalities.

The outboard right main tyre burst during the landing rollout causing a rupture of the hydraulic lines and R MLG brake failure; this lead to a runway excursion. The tyre burst was caused by an overbent wheel rim as result of the tyre repeatedly being over inflated due to repeated reports of low tyre pressure

The aircraft was approaching runway 33 at Wamena (Elev 5,084ft) in level flight at 5,600ft from a visual approach in a 400ft cloudbase. When the crew saw the airfield they pitched down sharply towards the runway generating a GPWS aural warning “SINK RATE”. The aircraft touched down with 3.25g vertical acceleration causing both MLG to collapse.

The aircraft overran Runway 28 after a long landing in a thunderstorm. The aircraft broke through the airport perimeter fence, car park and dual carriageway before coming to a stop 580 meters beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft was extensively damaged but there were no reported injuries. The Italian ANSV has determined that the aircraft crossed the threshold at 155kt and floated for 14 seconds at a height of 20-30ft before touching down 2000m beyond the threshold of Runway 28 (LDA 2,874m 9,429ft) which was also wet. It went through the airport perimeter fence at 109kt.

It appears that the Captain was not aware that the A/T had not disengaged when he disengaged the A/P. During the flare the A/T simply applied thrust to keep the approach speed (rather than retarding it) and did not sink onto the runway. The F/O had only 86hrs on type and did not see the error.

The aircraft had made an approach to Rostov On Don but had gone around due to poor weather. It then took up the hold for almost 2 hours until commencing its next approach. The aircraft went around from the second approach and crashed shortly after at 00:43z with loss of all 62 PoB. The preiminary report showed the following inputs:

Flap was retracted to 15 as normal by the crew

At 1900ft the control column was pushed forward causing the speed to increase to 200kts and the flap to auto-retract from 15 to 10 (SFP aircraft feature).

The thrust reduced for 3 secs causing a deceleration and auto-flap extension back to 15.

The crew selected TOGA thrust

The control column was pulled back momentarily giving a RoC of 3150fpm (16mps).

At 2950ft (900n) the control column was pushed forward and nose down stab trim which lasted 12 secs, both of which resulted in-1g dive to impact.

The aircraft made an ILS approach to Runway 05L at Mexico City at about 18:26L Reports say that the left main gear gave way after touchdown and collapsed rearwards becoming wedged below the left wing/engine and the ground. The strut separated and the left engine contacted the ground. The aircraft stopped on the runway and although there was no fire, fire services sprayed the aircraft with foam. The passengers disembarked via mobile stairs on the runway. There are no reported injuries to the 139 passengers or crew. The incident was in darkness but the weather was fine.

The aircraft was written off in a runway excursion following damage sustained during a poorly performed go-around on its previous approach in fog which left the aircraft with an engine and hydraulics failure. The report issued by the MAK in Russian describes how the crew should have commenced the go-around at a height of 60m but was belatedly initiated at 45m. The weather conditions were below minimums for the Cat 1 ILS on Runway 12 which are published as 720m RVR / 200ft DH. UCFO 220200Z 27003MPS 0050 R12/0050 FG VV001 05/04 Q1025 R12/19//65 NOSIG The captain (PF) applied TOGA thrust and called for flap retraction, but then pushed forward on the yoke in response to the natural pitch-up motion of the aircraft due to somatogravic illusion (nose up illusion) due to possible fatigue. This lead to the aircraft descending towards the runway. The gear was retracted before a positive rate of climb had been confirmed. 5 seconds after TOGA was selected the aircraft was still at 38m/125ft over the runway. The inactivity of the first officer prevented rectification of the captain's error. The GPWS "DONT SINK" sounded and although the RoD was reduced from about 1,570ft/min to 790ft/min, the aircraft struck the runway at 178kt, 226m beyond the threshold with a force of +3.96G. The landing-gear had been only 4s into its 9s retraction cycle and the undercarriage was still in an intermediate position when the impact occurred causing the aircraft to sink onto its belly and sustain damage to the landing gear, #2 engine and hydraulic systems A & B. The aircraft became airborne and the Captain initially elected to divert to Bishkek because of the weather but as the engine and hydraulics failed he elected to return to Osh. On the second landing the landing gear failed on touchdown. the aircraft effectively landed on its engines and the underside of the fuselage. It touched down about 1,400m from the threshold and continued to slide along the runway for about 500m. The occupants evacuated via slides, there were injuries but no fatalities.

Shaheen Air flight NL142 from Karach to Lahore (OPLA) with 112 passengers and 7 crew appears to have landed to the left of runway 36L in 1500m visibility. Both main landing gear were torn off as the aircraft crossed a taxyway. The aircraft settled down onto the grass and stopped to the left of runway 36L, about 2500m from the runway threshold and about 200m from the end of the runway. The aircraft was substantially damaged and 10 passengers received minor injuries. Runway 36L is 3,360 meters long and the primary runway at Lahore but at the time of the accident the ILS was NOTAMed not available due to CAT IIIB upgrade works in progress. There are VOR/DME, NDB and RNAV non-precision approaches available for all four runways. The VOR approach has a 5 degree offset. OPLA 030455Z 00000KT 2000 FU SCT100 23/16 Q1018 BECMG 3000

The aircraft landed on runway 03R at Johannesburg's but the left main gear collapsed. There were no injuries but the aircraft is a commercial write-off. A passenger reported that the captain had announced prior to landing that they would need to land without left main gear.

The preliminary report states that the aircraft touched down 35 meters before the runway threshold with a vertical acceleration of +3.68G and came to a stop about 1500 meters past the runway threshold. The left hand main gear collapsed with the trunion link fractured, the right main gear's shock absorber leaked and deflated, the left engine's thrust reverser received inner damage and engine housing received damage, the left wing's trailing edge flaps were dented, outboard and inboard flap fairings were dented, the flap transmission assembly #2 was broken.

The aircraft was operating for affiliated carrier ASKY as flight KP4016 from Lome in Togo. The aircraft landed on runway 03 at Accra at 11:05L (11:05Z) but veered right off the runway, rotated through 180 degrees and came to a stop with substantial damage to gear, nose, right hand engine and wing. The three crew survived and were taken to hospital.

The left MLG axle assembly detached from the inner cylinder during braking after a normal landing due to the momentary increase in bending load during the transition from auto to manual braking. The failure was as a result of stress corrosion cracking and fatigue weakening the high strength steel substrate at a point approximately 75 mm above the axle. The origin of the failure was an area of intense, but very localised heating, during the overhaul process, which damaged the chrome protection and changed the metallurgy; ie the formation of martensite within the steel substrate. This resulted in a surface corrosion pit, which, along with the metallurgical change, led to stress corrosion cracking, fatigue propagation and the eventual failure of the inner cylinder under normal loading.

The right hand MLG collapsed after landing. The cause of the MLG failure and resultant accident was the inappropriate rework (ie, machining and re-threading) of the tee-bolt fitting and the associated installation of a reduced size nut and washer, at the last overhaul in 2004.

Crashed just short of the runway in poor weather, All 50 on board are believed to have died.

Information released by Rosaviatsia on Nov 28th 2013 based on preliminary investigation results by MAK states, that the captain of the flight (47, ATPL, 2736 hours total, 2509 hours on type, 528 hours in command) was rated for CAT I ILS approaches only, the first officer (47, no type of pilot rating provided, 2093 hours total, 1943 hours on type) was rated for CAT II ILS approaches. According to preliminary information the crew was significantly (4km) off the approach track prompting ATC to query the crew. Corrections were made, the aircraft remained significantly right of the extended runway centerline however until the crew selected heading 250 into autopilot (heading select mode) and the aircraft intercepted the localizer automatically about 2nm short of the runway threshold at about 1000 feet AGL, the glideslope did not capture due to height however. After passing the missed approach point the crew discussed a go-around and communicated with dispatch, then disengaged both autopilots engaged in the automatic approach and continued manually on flight director. Engines accelerated to 83% N1 (near Go-Around Thrust) and continued at that speed until almost impact. The aircraft began to pitch up under the influence of engine acceleration and flaps retraction reaching 25 degrees nose up, the stabilizer trim system wound - most likely automatically - nose down commanding the aircraft into a dive. In the meantime the crew retracted the gear, there had been no input on the yoke since deactivation of autopilot until that time, the airspeed had decayed from 150 to 125 KIAS. The crew now applied full forward pressure, the aircraft began to accelerate again after reaching a minimum speed of 117 KIAS at 700 meters/2300 feet above the runway, and began to rapidly descent, EGPWS alerts "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP" sounded, there was no reaction to the extreme nose down attitude however and the vertical acceleration became negative. The aircraft impacted ground at 75 degrees nose down at about 450 kph at coordinates N55.608818 E49.276852, the impact occurred 45 seconds after initiating the go-around and 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height.

The First Officer had flown the approach until at a point below 400 feet there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing. At touchdown, the airspeed was approximately 133 knots and the aircraft was pitched down approximately 3 degrees; the aircraft landed on its nose gear. The nose landing gear collapsed rearward and upward into the fuselage. The electronics bay was damaged. The exterior of the airplane was also damaged from sliding 2,175 feet on its nose along runway 4 before coming to rest, off to the right side of the runway. A preliminary examination of the nose gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload. PROBABLE CAUSE: "The captain's attempt to recover from an unstabilized approach by transferring airplane control at low altitude instead of performing a go-around. Contributing to the accident was the captain's failure to comply with standard operating procedures."

The aircraft was destroyed by fire which started in the flightdeck during push-back from the gate. There were 189 passengers and 7 crew on board; 27 passengers were hospitalized, with 2 serious injuries reported from the emergency evacuation.

The aircraft departed the left hand side of the runway after landing in heavy rain. The nose landing gear dug in soft ground and collapsed. WIOO 010530Z 23022KT 0600 FEW009CB BKN007 29/25 Q1008 RMK CB OVER THE FIELD

The Captain (PF) flew an unstable VOR/DME approach to runway 09. After touchdown, PF activated the thrust reversers but the crew did not feel any deceleration. Prior to the end of the runway, PF believed that the aircraft would not be able to stop on the runway and decided to turn the aircraft to the left. The aircraft stopped at 75m from the end of runway 09 and 54m from the left side of the centre line. The nose and right hand main gear collapsed.

On 20 August 2011, the Boeing 737-210C combi aircraft (registration C-GNWN, serial number 21067), operated by Bradley Air Services Limited under its business name First Air, was being flown as First Air charter flight 6560 from Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, to Resolute Bay, Nunavut. At 1642 Coordinated Universal Time (1142 Central Daylight Time), during the approach to Runway 35T, First Air flight 6560 struck a hill about 1 nautical mile east of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and an ensuing post-crash fire. Eight passengers and all 4 crew members sustained fatal injuries. The remaining 3 passengers sustained serious injuries and were rescued by Canadian military personnel, who were in Resolute Bay as part of a military exercise. The accident occurred during daylight hours. No emergency locator transmitter signal was emitted by the aircraft.

One passenger was killed and 34 were injured when lightning hit an airplane and caused it to split into at least two parts when landing early Monday on the island of San Andres, Colombia, Gov. Pedro Gallardo told CNN en Espanol. There were 131 people on-board the Aires airline 737-700 jet when it crashed around 1:50 a.m. (2:50 a.m. ET), the Colombian national police said. The flight had 121 adult passengers, four minors and six crew members, the police said.

A Merpati Nusantara Boeing 737-300, registration PK-MDF performing performing flight MZ-836 from Ujung-Padang/Makassaur to Manokwari (Indonesia) with 97 passengers and 6 crew, overran runway 35 while landing at Manokwari in rain and mist and came to a stop in a river about 170 meters past the end of the runway (2000 meters long). 23 people received injuries and were taken to a local hospital, the airplane received substantial damage, the fuselage broke up in at least two parts. No Metars are available, the local weatherstation reported at 9am local (around the time of the landing): winds 5 knots from the north, 1000 meters visibility, rain, 100% humidity, temperature 24 degrees C.

The crew made an approach to Runway 12 during a rainstorm with a 14kt tailwind because the other end did not have an ILS. The aircraft landed 4100ft into the 8900ft runway and bounced before settling onto the runway. It overran the runway end at 62 kts and came to rest on a beach. The plane's fuselage was cracked, its right engine broke off from the impact and the left main landing gear collapsed. No fatalities.

The Boeing 737 was flying from Bangui, capital of Central African Republic, to Zimbabwe for a maintenance check and was carrying 2 crew and 5 mechanics when it crashed at 0600h local time around 210 km (125 miles) east of Kinshasa. All 7 on board died. History here

The aircraft was making a coupled ILS to runway 18R when the Captains radio altimeter erroneously indicated ground level. The autothrottle retarded the thrust levers as though for an autoland which was not noticed by the crew. 1m40s later at 100kts the stickshaker activated and the F/O started to recover; the Captain took control but did not notice the autothrottle again retard the thrust levers. The aircraft impacted tail first and broke into 3 pieces. 9 of the 134 on board died.

The aircraft started to swung to the left at approx 90kts on its take-off roll. The crew aborted the take-off and the aircraft reached 119kts before departing the left side of the runway where it caught fire. No fatalities.

Early information from the NTSB states that that a combination of crosswind, handling and possibly a broken steering cable could have been factors. The surface wind was 290 degrees at 24kt with gusts to 32kt created a strong left crosswind during the takeoff roll. The Captain (PF) has stated that “However at about 90 knots (prior to the monitoring pilot’s 100kt call out), I felt the rear end of the aircraft slip out hard to the right and the wheels lose traction, it had felt like a slick patch of runway, or a strong gust of wind, or a combination of both, had pushed the tail hard to the right. The aircraft tracked left and I countered with right rudder to full right. This was ineffectual.”

The crew encountered several hundred small birds several meters above the runway. The crew elected to go-around but the engines lost thrust due to bird ingestion. The aircraft landed heavily on the runway. No injuries, but the aircraft was an insurance write-off.

The crew made a go-around from its first approach due to a flap problem. The crew made several orbits whilst executing the QRH, but appear to have forgotten to lower the undercarriage for landing. No injuries but the aircraft was an insurance write-off.

The crew were approaching Perm at night and in cloud, with the autopilot and autothrottle disconnected when they became disorientated and lost control of the aircraft. The Russian investigators noted that the throttles had to be staggered to give equal thrust and that the crew were possibly fatigued and not used to the western artificial horizon display. All 82 passengers and 6 crew were killed.

Official information about the investigation from the Russian MAK can be viewed here.

The 30-year old Boeing 737-200 disappeared while en route from Maiquetia to Latacunga. It was being ferried to a new owner after storage at Caracas with 3 crew on board. The aircraft struck Iliniza volcano, elevation 17,000ft. There is no evidence of poor weather in the area around Latacunga Airport at the time. All 3 occupants were killed.

The airplane had been landing towards northwest in heavy rain and marginal conditions, when the brakes failed. The airplane went about 250 meters past the runway and 3 meters below runway elevation. The right hand wing received damage, both engines and the main landing gear detached. Initial reports state that the flaps were at 15 and the thrust reversers were stowed. Jambi Sultan Taha has a single 2000 x 30m asphalt runway and no ILS. Passengers reported that the captain made an announcement before landing of a possible problem and "not to worry".

Iran Aseman Airlines flight 6875 from Bishkek Manas, Kyrgyzstan to Tehran Iran was carried out by Itek Air. The aircraft was returning to Manas on a visual approach after developing a pressurisation fault shortly after takeoff. Preliminary FDR information suggests that the first approach was too fast (250kts at 6.5d and 185kts at 2.5d at 400m height). The crew made a left orbit with 30 degree bank and speed continued to decrease to 155kts. After a minute the plane was downwind at very low altitude. The plane contacted the ground 7.5km from Runway 08, with gear down and flaps 15. According to preliminary analysis of FDR and accident site there were no signs of a technical malfunction except for the original pressurization fault. 65 of the 90 persons on board died.

Engine #1 caught fire shortly after docking destroying the aircraft. No fatalities. The cause was the detachment of a slat pylon bolt which fell off and pierced the fuel tank which leaked and ignited. According to the JTSB the washer that should have held the nut in place probably detached during maintenance 6 weeks before the incident. The design of the nut has since been changed to limit the likelihood of detachment.

The aircraft was carrying 78 passengers from Luanda to M'Banza Congo, in northern Angola.
The Angolan news agency said the aircraft lost control while
landing and crashed into a building, destroying it. There were 5
Fatalities

The aircraft took off from Douala, Cameroon at 00:05L in a rainstorm after waiting an hour for a thunderstorm to pass. At 1500ft the Captain called for the autopilot to be engaged but this did not happen. The aircraft slowly rolled rolled 35 degrees to the right when the crew noticed and rolled further right and pulled back. The aircraft reached 118 degrees AoB right and impacted at 48 degrees nose up and 3.75G. It is believed that the crew were not aware that the autopilot was not engaged and became disorientated. All 114 passengers & crew killed.

After a high energy, unstabilized approach, the aircraft landed at a speed of 221kts with flap 5 set. It bounced twice, snapping off the nosegear and broke through the perimeter fence where it was destroyed by impact forces and subsequent fire. There were 21 fatalities and 50 serious injuries among the 133 people on board.

Aircraft damaged beyond economical repair after a heavy
landing in possible windshear. The aft fuselage bent down several degrees
causing the fuselage to crack aft of the wings. The undercarriage remained
intact. No fatalities.

The aircraft touched down 20-30m short of the runway whilst
landing in fog. It skidded along the side of the runway for a further 1,000m
during which time the undercarriage and No2 engine detached. No fatalities.

The aircraft was in the
cruise at FL350 in marginal VMC conditions when it developed an IRS fault. The
crew were preoccupied with the IRS malfunction for the last 13mins of the flight
and subsequently lost control of the aircraft after one of the IRSs was switched
to ATT. The aircraft reached 100deg bank, 60deg nose down and 3.5g; it broke up
at 490kts in the dive. The aircraft had a history of "154 recurring defects
directly and indirectly relating to the IRS between Oct and Dec 2006". All 96 passengers and 6 crew
perished.

The crew were conducting a visual approach on a left downwind pattern to runway 31. The crew reported a flap asymmetry when selecting flap 30. They referred to the QRH and they also checked the actual landing distance for flaps 15 landing. According to witness reports, on landing the aircraft was not on centerline, it bounced twice, and swerved down the runway. The aircraft came to rest beyond the runway. The passengers were evacuated with no reports of injuries. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft collided with an Embraer "Legacy" executive
jet at 37,000ft whilst en-route from Manaus to Brasilia. The Legacy landed
safely but all 149 passengers and 6 crew aboard the 737 were killed. The 18 day
old 737-800SFP had only flown 234 hours since new. Initial reports suggest that
ATC believed the Legacy to have been at FL360, the correct FL for that
direction. The transponder and TCAS of the Legacy was off or inop for at least
50 minutes before the collision.

After an uneventful cargo flight from Liege, Belgium, with
two flight crew on board, the aircraft entered a holding pattern, as the weather
at its planned destination of Stansted precluded making an approach.
Approximately 30 minutes later, the commander initiated a diversion to
Nottingham East Midlands airport, where the weather conditions required the crew
to plan and conduct a Category IIIA approach to Runway 27. In the late stages of
this approach, the autopilot momentarily disengaged and re-engaged, and the
aircraft deviated from both the glideslope and localiser. It landed heavily on a
grass area to the left of the runway threshold, whereupon the right main landing
gear detached from the aircraft. After scraping the right engine, outer flap
track fairing and right wing tip on the ground, the aircraft became airborne
again and made an emergency diversion to Birmingham Airport. The aircraft landed
on Runway 33 on its nose and left landing gears, and the right engine. There
were no injuries or fire.

The aircraft took off from Lagos airport at 2045 local time
in heavy thunderstorms. Three minutes later the aircraft made a distress call
and was lost from radar. The wreckage was found in Lissa about 20 miles
northwest of Lagos the following day.

Fidelis Onyeyiri, director general of the Nigerian Civil
Aviation Authority said, 24 hours after the crash, “Our preliminary appraisal
suggests that the aircraft might have started stalling after passing flight
level 130, lost control, then nosedived into the ground and created a huge
crater into which it disappeared.” Eyewitness reports say the aircraft exploded
before impact.

On 12 Feb 2008, Samuel Oduselu, commissioner of the
Accident Investigation Bureau, said the Nigerian police claimed they retrieved
the black box of the aircraft shortly after the crash, but had yet to hand it
over to the accident bureau. "The police said they found the recorder and we
have been writing to them. Up to now, they cannot tell us the one they found,
where it is and to whom they gave it," he said. There were several high ranking officials on board and
accident investigators are not ruling out sabotage.

The aircraft sustained substantial damage after it overran runway 27 at Mumbai landing in poor weather. The gear collapsed and the aircraft became stuck in mud from which it took 2 days to move. No fatalities.

The aircraft was approaching Pucallpa's runway 02 in a
storm. The F/O was under training and had only 60h on type and the covering F/O
was in the cabin rather than on the jump-seat. The aircraft descended to 987ft
AGL and entered intense hail bombardment that caused the crew to lose
situational awareness. Shortly after the crew disengaged the autopilot, the 737
entered a sharp descent exceeding 1,700ft/min and struck terrain 34s later,
3.8nm (7km) from the Pucallpa VOR, travelling 1,500m through trees. The accident
killed 40 of the 98 persons on board.

Peru's accident investigation board, the CIAA, attributed
the crash to the crew's decision to continue the approach despite a
non-stabilised approach. A "lack of airmanship", the absence of the assigned
first officer, and a failure to adhere to standard operating procedures were
contributing factors.

The aircraft departed Larnaca at 06:07 GMT for Athens. As
the aircraft climbed through 16 000 ft, the Captain contacted the company
Operations Centre and reported a Take-off Configuration Warning and an Equipment
Cooling system problem. At 06:26 the crew said that they had
solved the problem and requested a climb to 34,000ft. Radio contact was lost
with the aircraft at approximately 06:37, 30 minutes after its departure,
although it did squawk 7700. Greek F16s intercepted the aircraft at 07:20 and
reported that the Captain was not visible and that the F/O appeared to be
slumped over the controls. Two mayday calls were recorded on the CVR at 08:54, some reports say that a cabin crew member with a PPL
licence was in the flight deck at impact. The aircraft crashed into mountains at
09:03 GMT after running out of fuel approx 19NM North of LGAV near the village
of Grammatiko, the passenger oxygen masks had deployed. All 115 pax and 6 crew
died.

Depressurisation is the probable cause but why the crew were
not able to use their oxygen and descend the aircraft to safety is still a
mystery. The FDR was recovered immediately but the CVR was in poor condition. Autopsies found that those crew and passengers
examined were alive on impact
possibly indicating that they suffered from a lack of oxygen and were
unconscious. The same aircraft has had a history of pressurisation related
problems and suffered a loss of cabin pressure on 20 Dec 2004 in flight from
Warsaw to Larnaca.

A summary report issued 10 Oct 2006 states "The direct
causes were: 1. Non-recognition that the cabin pressurization mode selector was
in the MAN (manual) position during the performance of the Preflight procedure,
the Before Start checklist and the After Takeoff checklist. 2)
Non-identification of the warnings and the reasons for the activation of the
warnings (Cabin Altitude Warning Horn, Passenger Oxygen Masks Deployment
indication, Master Caution). 3) Incapacitation of the flight crew due to
hypoxia, resulting in the continuation of the flight via the flight management
computer and the autopilot, depletion of the fuel and engine flameout, and the
impact of the aircraft with the ground." It also acknowledges that a
contributory cause was the "omission of returning the cabin pressurization mode
selector to the AUTO position after non-scheduled maintenance on the aircraft".

The crew were approaching Kabul which was in a snowstorm. They were told to expect a VOR/DME approach to Runway 29, descend to FL130 and maintain VFR. Three minutes later it disappeared
from radar. The aircraft struck a ridgeline 50ft below the crest of the
mountain ridge at 9600ft. The FDR did not record and the
CVR was never found. All 104 pax and 8 crew died.

The aircraft was making a normal landing at Banda Aceh
airport when it hit a water buffalo that had strayed onto the runway. The port
main gear collapsed and the port engine and landing gear were badly damaged. The
Republic of Singapore Air Force was called in to use their Chinooks to “float”
the aircraft off the runway using airbags.

There were no injuries and the aircraft was declared a
write off and scrapped several months later.

The aircraft had a bird-strike in the area of the nose
landing gear just before rotation from Amsterdam. The crew raised the gear and
had no abnormal indications in the flight deck so they continued to Barcelona
(their intended destination). During the landing roll the airplane started
deviating to the left. The crew applied right rudder, braking and nose wheel
steering tiller but could not keep the aircraft on the runway. It left the
runway at around 100 knots, hit some obstacles from building works and suffered
major damage. An emergency evacuation was carried out with minor injuries to
some passengers. There was no fire but the airplane was subsequently declared a
Hull loss.

Examination of the aircraft revealed that the cables and
pulleys of the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) system sustained damage from the
bird-strike, resulting in a left steering command after nose wheel touch down. (NWSB
cable was found broken, and NWSA cable was found jammed in a pulley on the nose
landing gear.) This resulted in loss of directional control after the rudder was
no longer aerodynamically effective during landing rollout. Also, the cables
were severely worn in the trunnion seal area.

The FCTM now contains the following advice: “Aggressive
differential braking and/or use of asymmetrical reverse thrust, in addition to
other control inputs, may be required to maintain directional control.”

The Aircraft had just got airborne from Lungi airport in
Sierra Leone's capital Freetown at 14:23 local time bound for Banjul. It crashed
into a swamp three miles from the runway, leaving one wing partly submerged in
mud. Eyewitness reports say that the left wing caught fire after take-off and
that the left engine subsequently exploded shortly before impact. About 50
passengers were treated in hospital for shock and minor injuries but all 126
survived.

The Aircraft departed from Runway 22L at Sharm el Sheikh.
The weather was night visibility 10K+, 17C, light winds. The aircraft took off, climbed normally and began a left hand turn as scheduled. But at 2000ft the
turn slowly reversed to the right until at its maximum altitude of 5460ft it
was banked 50 degrees. It continued to roll to 111 degrees and 43 degrees nose down, rapidly loosing height and hit the sea at 416kts, 2 minutes after takeoff. No mayday call was made.

The accident report was inconclusive. No technical fault
was found with the aircraft but it is believed that the crew were not aware that the autopilot was not
engaged and became disorientated.

The Egyptian operated charter flight was bound for Cairo
for a crew change and then on to Paris.
All 135 pax and 13 crew died.

The aircraft had been holding for approx 30 mins before
making its approach due to heavy rain. It landed on Runway 16 (3000m) but
overran by approx 500m, stopping beyond the airport boundary fence. The engines
and landing gear separated from the airplane. No serious injuries to the 118
passengers and 6 crewmembers on board were reported. The investigation is being
conducted by the government of Gabon. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

15 minutes after takeoff, the Captain reported an engine
failure, and that it had been shutdown. He elected to return to Port Sudan. The
crew made an ILS approach to Runway 35 but went around because they were right
of centreline. Power was increased and the gear retracted but the aircraft
appeared to have gone out of control during the go-around. The aircraft crashed
in flat wasteland about 3 miles from the airport. Night visibility was 4000m in
sand. 115 of the 116 people on board died. The sole survivor, a two year old boy
lost a leg in the crash.

The aircraft took-off at 150kt and the First Officer (PF)
called for the undercarriage to be raised (but this was not done). Immediately
after rotation, the first stage of the No1 engine (JT8D-17A) HP turbine suffered
a major uncontained failure. Several seconds after the left engine failure,
there was a significant unexplained power reduction on the No2 engine, and the
Captain took control. He maintained the same rate of climb, but the speed
decreased toward the stall and the aircraft descended, generating a GPWS “Don’t
sink” alert. The aircraft was near MTOW and briefly became airborne reaching
400ft, then veered and stalled striking the airport perimeter fence tail-first
600 metres beyond the runway. Tamanrasset was hot and high, the runway elevation
was 4500ft with an OAT of 23C.

The Captain came under scrutiny in the report for various
aspects of his operation. Most importantly as to why he took control from the
F/O (who had 5000hrs experience) 8 sec after the engine failure and allowed the
speed to decay to the stall with the same rate of climb being maintained. He
also did not retract he gear on the F/O's request after take-off nor did he
allow her to retract the gear after he had taken control.

The report stated “The accident resulted from the loss of
an engine during a critical phase of flight, from the failure to raise the
landing gear after the engine failure, and from the taking of control by the
Captain before he had completely identified the nature of the failure.”

102 of the 103 people on board died. The sole survivor was
a young soldier, seated in the last row and with seat belt unattached, who
according to his statement, was ejected from the plane by the impact and escaped
from the accident.

The First Officer (PF) was approaching Runway 06 at Rio
Branco Airport when it flew into fog. The crew continued the approach below MDA
and collided initially with a tree and then touched down 100 meters short of the
threshold. At the time of impact, both engines cut out and the Captain took
control. The aircraft skidded some 600 meters and came to rest on the taxiway.
The undercarriage was torn off and the aircraft struck several small trees
causing damage to both engines, forward & mid fuselage and horizontal
stabilizers. No injuries.

Landing gear failed to extend on approach to Tunis. Crew
went around but aircraft crashed into a hillside about 6km from the airport on
second non-precision approach. Reports said “The control tower had lost contact
with the plane a few seconds before the crash, just after a distress call from
the pilot.”

Weather was foggy and rainy at the time, with a sandy wind,
called the “Khamsin,” blowing from the Sahara desert.

The aircraft was descending from FL320 when the aircraft
entered a heavy thunderstorm with both engines at flight idle. Both engines lost
power while passing FL180 in heavy precipitation and turbulence. Three
unsuccessful attempts were made to relight the engines and one unsuccessful
attempt was made to relight the APU. The crew then decided to carry out a flaps
and gear up emergency ditching in a shallow, 1 metre deep, part of the Benjawang
Solo River. One stewardess was killed in the rear of the aircraft which broke
off during touchdown.

Similar occurrences (Boeing 737-300 double engine flameout
while descending in heavy precipitation with engines at flight idle) happened
May 24, 1988 and July 26, 1988. Following these incidents OMB 89-1 & AD 89-23-10
were issued to require minimum rpm of 45% and to restrict the use of
autothrottle in moderate/heavy precipitation; engine modification was provided
for increased capacity of water ingestion. eg spinner redesigned.

The First Officer (PF) started the take-off run. The
Captain called “V1” and “ROTATE” and the FO rotated the control column to 15deg
nose up. The aircraft’s nose was lifted up but the aircraft did not get
airborne. The FO felt the stick shaker. The Captain added power which increased
the speed to V2+15 (158kts) but the aircraft still did not get airborne. The
Captain aborted the take-off but the aircraft nose went down hard and opened the
front left door. The aircraft veered to the right of the approach lights and
stopped after hitting trees 275 meters from the end of runway.

The crew did not perform Before Take-off Checklist properly
and inadvertently tried to take-off with flap up rather than the scheduled flap
5. There was no take-off config warning because the associated CB was found to
be unable to latch in. No fatalities.

Heavy landing during rain at Santa Genoveva airport. The
aircraft touched the left side of the runway with the right landing gear, at 500
meters (1,640 feet) from Runway 14, and then touched with the left gear, leaving
the runway right after that, when it collided with the landmark electricity
boxes. The aircraft had its nose gear retracted; suffered a break in the right
landing gear and thus a loss of the right engine. With this, it ended up by
touching the ground with the tip of the right wing. No fatalities.

As the aircraft approached Yellowknife, the spoilers were
armed, and the aircraft was configured for a visual approach and landing on
Runway 33. The computed Vref was 128 knots, and target speed was 133 knots.
While in the landing flare, the aircraft entered a higher-than-normal sink rate
(1140fpm reducing to 400fpm at touchdown), and the pilot flying (the First
Officer) corrected with engine power and nose-up pitch. The aircraft touched
down on the main landing gear and bounced twice. While the aircraft was in the
air, the captain took control and lowered the nose to minimize the bounce. The
aircraft landed on its nose landing-gear, then on the main gear.

The aircraft initially touched down about 1300 feet from
the approach end of Runway 33. Numerous aircraft rubber scrub marks were present
in this area and did not allow for an accurate measurement. During the third
touchdown on the nose landing-gear, the left nose-tire burst, leaving a
shimmy-like mark on the runway. The aircraft was taxied to the ramp and shut
down. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There were no reported injuries.

The weather at St John's was as follows: wind 050/35G40kts;
visibility 1 statute mile in light snow and blowing snow; ceiling 400 feet
overcast; temperature -1ºC; dew point -2ºC. The crew decided to make an ILS
approach onto Runway 16 since it was the only runway with a servicable ILS.

The aircraft touched down at 164 KIAS (Vref +27Kts),
2300 to 2500 feet beyond the threshold. Radar ground speed at touchdown was
180 knots. The wind at this point was determined to be about 050ºM at 30 knots.
Shortly after touchdown, the speed brakes and thrust reversers were deployed,
and an engine pressure ratio (EPR) of 1.7 was reached 10 seconds after
touchdown. Longitudinal deceleration was -0.37g within 1.3 seconds of touchdown,
suggesting that a significant degree of effective wheel braking was achieved.
With approximately 1100 feet of runway remaining, through a speed of 64kts,
reverse thrust increased to about 1.97 EPR on engine 1 and 2.15 EPR on engine 2.
As the aircraft approached the end of the runway, the captain attempted to steer
the aircraft to the right, toward the Delta taxiway intersection. Twenty-two
seconds after touchdown, the aircraft exited the departure end of the runway
into deep snow. The aircraft came to rest approximately 75 feet beyond and
53 feet to the right of the runway centreline on a heading of 235ºM. One engine
was sheared off and one main gear was damaged. The 737 has been written off. No
fatalities.

The flight was being prepared by 5 cabin crew members and 3
ground staff members for a flight to Chiang Mai. The Thai Prime Minister was one
of the 149 passengers waiting to board the plane. 27 minutes before scheduled
departure time, a fire erupted in the cabin, killing a flight attendant and
injuring 6 others. The fire was put out in an hour, but by then the aircraft had
been gutted.

Subsequent investigation discovered that the centre tanks
pumps had been left running when tank was dry which caused the explosion.
Accident very similar to Philippine Airlines 737-300 accident on 5 Nov 90.

The aircraft was inbound to Patna. It was cleared for the
VOR/DME arc to ILS Runway 25. The crew took a direct track to the intercept and
ended up high on the approach. 30 seconds before impact they requested an orbit
to lose height and hit the ground in the orbit. The CVR recorded the
stick-shaker in the orbit suggesting that the aircraft stalled. The aircraft
crashed into a residential area about 2 km from the airport. All six crew
members and 49 passengers were killed. Five people on the ground were also
killed.

“The court of enquiry determined that the cause of the
accident was loss of control of the aircraft due to aircrew error. The crew had
not followed the correct approach procedure which resulted in the aircraft being
high on approach. They had kept the engines at idle thrust and allowed the
airspeed to reduce to a lower than normally permissible value on approach. They
then manoeuvred the aircraft with high pitch attitude and executed rapid roll
reversals. This resulted in actuation of the stick shaker warning indicating an
approach to stall. At this stage the crew initiated a go-around procedure
instead of an approach to stall recovery procedure resulting in an actual stall
of the aircraft, loss of control and subsequent impact with the ground.”

The aircraft had gone around from an ILS approach onto
Runway 05 at Francisco Bangoy Airport in Davao because of an aircraft on the
runway. The crew requested a VOR/DME onto Runway 23 and was cleared to do so.
The aircraft hit a hill on Samal Island at 570ftamsl at 7dme on the
non-precision approach and was destroyed by impact forces and a post-accident
fire. All 7 crew and 124 passengers were killed.

Aircraft had been held high by ATC and eventually touched
down at 181kts deep into an 1840m runway. The aircraft overran and went through
the perimeter fence at 32kt coming to a halt at a petrol station.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause of a Southwest
Airlines accident was the flight crew’s excessive airspeed and flight path angle
during the approach and landing at Burbank, California. The Board also
attributed the cause of the accident to the crew’s failure to abort the approach
when stabilized approach criteria were not met.

Contributing to the accident was the air traffic
controller’s positioning of the airplane, which was too high, too fast, and too
close to the runway threshold. As a result, no safe options existed for the
flight crew other than a go-around manoeuvre. Furthermore, the Board found that
had the flight crew applied maximum manual brakes immediately upon touchdown,
the aircraft would likely have stopped before impacting the blast fence,

The aircraft settled back onto the runway just after
takeoff, overran the runway, hit two cars on a nearby road, and caught fire. The
crew had not selected take-off flap and had continued the takeoff despite the
take-off configuration warning horn sounding for the entire 37 second take-off
run. There were 65 fatalities among the 98 passengers and five crew members. Two
of the occupants in the cars were also killed.

The aircraft was approaching Runway 27 at night with
reported wind 280/15G30kt and turbulence. The approach was stable but a gust
from the right was encountered below 100ft RA. The aircraft touched down softly
(1.1G) 5m left of centreline, with its left main gear which delayed deployment
of the spoilers by two seconds until the right MLG touched down. Directional
control was lost and the aircraft ran off the side of Runway 27. The nose-gear
dug into the ground and collapsed. No fatalities.

Shortly after takeoff from Runway 8R, the crew reported a
hydraulic problem and declared an emergency. The aircraft was vectored to a
visual approach and landing on Runway 9L. During the landing, while decelerating
through 100 knots, the aircraft's steering system failed due to hydraulic
pressure, and the aircraft departed the left side of the runway, coming to rest
between Runway 9L and Taxiway L. Mechanical failure. No injuries.

After executing a missed approach on their first ILS
approach to Runway 28, the flight was vectored for a second approach to the same
runway. The second approach was reported by both pilots to be uneventful;
however, after touchdown, the aircraft drifted to the left side of the runway.
The left main landing gear exited the hard surface of the runway approximately
2,700 feet from the landing threshold and eventually all 3 landing gears exited
the 197 foot wide asphalt runway. The First Officer, who was flying the
airplane, stated that he never felt any anti-skid cycling during the landing
roll and did not feel any “radical braking” which was expected with the
autobrake 3 setting.

The airplane's nose landing gear collapsed resulting in
significant structural damage. A total of 15 runway lights on the southern edge
of runway 28 were found either sheared or knocked down. There were no injuries.

The tower operator reported that intermittent heavy rain
showers accompanied with downdrafts and strong winds associated with a
thunderstorm northeast of the airport prevailed throughout the area at the time
of the accident. The two transport category airplanes that landed prior to
Continental flight 475 reported windshear on final approach. The winds issued to
Continental 475 by the tower while on short final were from 360 degrees at 20
kts, gusting to 40 kts.

The Boeing 737 suffered hydraulic problems shortly after
takeoff. The crew elected to return to Khartoum. Upon landing one of the tires
burst. The crew, hearing the bang thought it was an engine malfunction and
deactivated the thrust-reversers. The 737 overran the runway and came to rest in
a ditch. No fatalities.

The aircraft crashed near the Andoas airport during an NDB
approach, in a rainstorm, after a flight from Iquitos. The aircraft had been
leased by Occidental Petroleum from the Peruvian Air Force in order to ferry its
workers to the Andoas area. Five of the seven crew members and 69 of the 80
passengers were killed.

SilkAir Flight 185 was en-route to Singapore from Jakarta.
While cruising at FL350, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens and was
seen crashing nose-down into the river bed of the River Musi. One of the wings
is understood to have broken off during the dive. The FDR was retrieved 27
December and the CVR January 4, both were buried in the mud of the river bed.
Sections of the aircraft's empennage were found on land, away from the main
wreckage. Investigators found more than 20 screws missing on the top and bottom
of the right-hand horizontal stabilizer where the leading edge attaches to the
front spar. It appeared that the fasteners were never installed. The stabilizer
may have separated in flight, causing the plane to lose control. The FAA issued
an AD January 8, 1998 requiring operators of Boeing 737s to check the horizontal
stabilizers to make sure that all fasteners and elevator attachment fitting
bolts are properly in place. Due to other circumstances, many people also
suspect suicide by the Captain. All 7 crew members and 97 passengers were
killed.

At 95kts on the take-off run, the crew noted that the No2
engine thrust suddenly increased. At 120kts the EGT warning light illuminated.
The Captain attempted to reduce thrust of the No2 engine but was unable to do
so; he aborted the take-off. The thrust reversers did not deploy and the
aircraft overran the runway. The gear and No2 engine detached as the aircraft
ground looped and caught fire. No fatalities.

The take-off from Runway 30 was abandoned following a tyre
burst at 110kts. The aircraft skidded off the runway into shrubs and was
engulfed in smoke when coming to rest 130m past the runway. No fatalities.

The aircraft made a heavy landing at night during a
rainstorm at Shenzhen-Huangtian airport, pushing the nose-gear up into the
fuselage. The crew performed a go-around and tried to land 9 minutes later.
After the 2nd touchdown the aircraft broke up in three pieces. It veered off the
runway and caught fire. Two of the nine crew members and 33 of the 65 passengers
were killed.

The aircraft touched down at Carajas' Runway 10 in bad
weather (thunderstorm, bad visibility) following a VOR approach. The right
main-gear collapsed rearwards, causing the plane to veer off the right side of
the runway, 700m from the point of touchdown. The aircraft ended up in a forest.
The First Officer was the only fatality.

The aircraft crashed into a hill at 2300ft while making an
NDB approach to Runway 12 in IMC conditions. It was 1.7nm left of the extended
centerline and 1.8nm North of the runway, at a speed of 133kts and a 118 degree
right bank. It appeared that the aircraft had strayed off course because the
aircraft flew a 110 bearing instead of 119, after passing the KLP beacon (final
approach fix). Weather at the time was 8km in rain; wind 120/12kts; cloud base
120m broken and 600m overcast; temp 12C.

All 6 crew members and 29 passengers were killed, including
the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown.

The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic night flight from
Lima to Arequipa. When doing a VOR/DME approach to Runway 09, the aircraft
crashed into a hillside at 3 miles out, at an altitude of 8015ft - almost 400ft
below the airfield elevation of 8404ft. It appeared that the pilot reported
flying at 9500ft, but was actually at 8644ft. Visibility was given as between
2000 and 4000m and the FDR showed that the aircraft had been well below the
published approach path for some distance before impact. All 117 passengers and
six crew members were killed.

The aircraft was on a flight from Cotonou, Benin and
crashed in darkness in a steep dive about three miles (4.8 km) short of the
runway in a mangrove swamp. The crew members had reportedly aborted the first
approach due to landing gear problems and they were on a go-around from their
second approach when the accident occurred. It appeared that the aircraft was
carrying out a go-around and that the No.2 engine was operating at high power
while the No.1 engine was not developing power. Four of the six crew members and
68 of the 72 passengers were killed.

At 12.56h LT flight IC492 arrived from Bombay and Jaipur,
but touched down just 600m before the end of the runway and overran by 450m.
Both engines, all undercarriage and the wings sustained major damage. No
fatalities.

Flight WT 357 touched down more than half way down Kaduna's
Runway 23 in good, dry weather but with a 10-15kt tailwind. The plane veered off
the left side, skidded sideways and came to rest 35m beyond the end of the
runway. A fire broke out on the dry grass under the aircraft on the right hand
side and destroyed it. Nine of the 129 passengers were killed.

Flight GUG901 encountered heavy rain & thunderstorms while
approaching San Salvador at night. The crew diverted off Airway G346 to avoid
the thunderstorms but the accident report states that the aircrafts DME had been
damaged by a lightning strike. The aircraft should then have passed overhead the
airport and turn right downwind for an ILS approach to Runway 07. There seemed
to be some confusion as to the position of the aircraft. The aircraft was at
5000ft, as cleared by ATC, when the GPWS sounded. Full power was applied, but
the aircraft struck Mt. Chinchontepec volcano (2181m high) at an altitude of
1800m. All 7 crew members and 58 passengers were killed. The accident report
attributes the let-down error to the pilots’ failure to realise that the DME
readouts were incorrect.

Aircraft departed Sao Paulo-Guarulhos for a flight to
Buenos Aires. Following flap retraction the No.3 flap IN TRANSIT light remained
on and the crew noticed some other problems: They were not able to reduce No.2
engine thrust below 1.15 EPR and the hydraulic system A suffered a pressure
loss. An emergency return was made and the aircraft touched down on Runway 09L
at 185kts, flaps 15. The 737 overran the runway by 200m and came to rest
following a collapse of the nose-gear and right hand main gear. It appeared that
the No.3 leading edge flap actuator attachment fitting on the wing front spar
had fractured due to corrosion. The actuator came away and caused the failure of
some hydraulic lines and damage to the thrust control cables. Some 1981 Boeing
Service Bulletins had not been complied with. One of these included the
replacement of the aluminium leading edge flap actuator attachment fitting with
a steel one; this had not been done. No fatalities.

Flight SG416 landed on Runway 09 (1858m long) with flap 30
at Yokyakarta, which was wet with pools of standing water after a thunderstorm.
It overran the runway by 100m and the nose-gear collapsed. No fatalities.

The aircraft hit a hill 4km from the airport during the
fourth VOR/DME approach in snow (900m visibility, reducing to 300m in driving
snow). Six of the seven crew members and 49 of the 55 passengers were killed.

The aircraft had left Amsterdam at 07.42h but had to divert
East Midlands due to bad weather at Coventry. After awaiting better weather, the
flight took off again at 09.32h. While approaching Runway 23 the aircraft
descended below MDA, clipped the roofs of two houses, rolled and crashed
inverted into a wood.

CAUSAL FACTORS: “i) The crew allowed the aircraft to
descend significantly below the normal approach glidepath during a Surveillance
Radar Approach to Runway 23 at Coventry Airport, in conditions of patchy lifting
fog. The descent was continued below the promulgated Minimum Descent Height
without the appropriate visual reference to the approach lighting or the runway
threshold.; ii) The standard company operating procedure of cross-checking
altimeter height indications during the approach was not observed and the
appropriate Minimum Descent Height was not called by the non handling pilot.;
iii) The performance of the flight crew was impaired by the effects of
tiredness, having completed over 10 hours of flight duty through the night
during five flight sectors which included a total of six approaches to land.”

Two mechanics were repositioning the aircraft to
Continental departure gate 41. Simultaneously, Flight 1176, a Boeing 737-300,
from gate 44 was under the control of the pushback team consisting of a tug
driver and a wing walker. The right wing of N11244 contacted the left outboard
flap, cockpit crew, in the process of starting engine No1, felt the impact,
aborted the engine start, and looked aft from the cockpit window. N11244 was
damaged substantially and considered a loss. PROBABLE CAUSE: “The failure of
maintenance personnel to follow the taxi checklist resulting in the hydraulic
pumps not being turned on.”

Flight 427 was approaching Pittsburgh Runway 28R The
aircraft was levelling off at 6000ft & 190kts and rolling out of a 15deg left
turn (roll rate 2deg/sec) with flaps at 1, the gear still retracted and
autopilot and auto-throttle systems engaged. The aircraft then suddenly entered
the wake vortex of a Delta Airlines Boeing 727 that preceded it by approx. 69
seconds (4,2mls). Over the next 3 seconds the aircraft rolled left to approx.
18deg of bank. The autopilot attempted to initiate a roll back to the right as
the aircraft went in and out of a wake vortex core, resulting in two loud
“thumps”. The First Officer then manually overrode the autopilot without
disengaging it by putting in a large right-wheel command at a rate of
150deg/sec. The airplane started rolling back to the right at an acceleration
that peaked 36deg/sec, but the aircraft never reached a wings level attitude. At
19.03:01 the aircraft's heading slewed suddenly and dramatically to the left
(full left rudder deflection). Within a second of the yaw onset the roll
attitude suddenly began to increase to the left, reaching 30deg. The aircraft
pitched down, continuing to roll through 55deg left bank. At 19.03:07 the pitch
attitude approached -20deg, the left bank increased to 70deg and the descent
rate reached 3600fpm. At this point, the aircraft stalled. Left roll and yaw
continued, and the aircraft rolled through inverted flight as the nose reached
90deg down, approx. 3600ft above the ground. The 737 continued to roll, but the
nose began to rise. At 2000ft above the ground the aircraft's attitude passed
40deg nose low and 15deg left bank. The left roll hesitated briefly, but
continued and the nose again dropped. The plane descended fast and impacted the
ground nose first at 261kts in an 80deg nose down, 60deg left bank attitude and
with significant sideslip. All 132 aboard died.

PROBABLE CAUSE (US Airways): “An uncommanded, full rudder
deflection or rudder reversal that placed the aircraft in a flight regime from
which recovery was not possible using the known recovery procedures. A
contributing cause of this accident was the manufacturer's failure to advise
operators that there was a speed below which the aircraft's lateral control
authority was insufficient to counteract a full rudder deflection.”

The aircraft landed fast and long on Runway 03 in
thunderstorms and rain. It overran across soft ground and struck approach lights
and the ILS antenna. The nose-gear collapsed and was pushed into the avionics
bay. No fatalities.

A Training Captain and three new pilots were performing
circuits for crew training. During the sixth take-off the instructor pilot apparently decided to introduce a simulated engine failure. This had not been pre-briefed. The aircraft attained a steep nose-up
attitude and the left wing dropped. The aircraft crashed and slid into a parked
Ilyushin 86 airliner. Both aircraft burned out. All 4 occupants and 5 persons on
the ground were killed.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The accident occurred due to application of wrong rudder by trainee pilot during engine failure exercise. Capt. did not guard/block the rudder control and give clear commands as Instructor so as to obviate the application of wrong rudder control by the trainee pilot".

The aircraft touched down in a crosswind following an ILS
approach onto Runway 03R, but wasn't properly aligned with the runway. The 737
then departed the runway 2500ft past the threshold and crossed taxiway H. The
nose-gear collapsed. Weather was bad with low clouds, turbulence and rain. No
fatalities.

The aircraft collided with a ridge of the Mount Ungeo
(1050ft high) at an altitude of 800ft, in strong winds & heavy rain about 4nm
from the runway while it was making its third attempt at a VOR/DME approach into
Mokpo. Four of the six crew members and 64 of the 104 passengers were killed.

The aircraft landed heavily on Runway 09, skidded to the
right off the runway. The nose-gear collapsed and both engines were torn off.
The aircraft came to rest 200ft right of the runway. The weather was bad at the
time of the accident with heavy rain and lightning. No fatalities.

The aircraft failed to climb after take-off with weight
about 2000kg (4400lbs) above RTOW for the conditions (OAT 40C). It struck a
large vehicle on a road just outside the airport with its landing gear. The
vehicle strike also damaged one engine and the aircraft later hit power lines
and crashed 7km from the airport. Four of the six crew members and 52 of the 112
passengers were killed. Maintenance deficiencies were found including the fact
that the aircraft was despatched with an unserviceable FDR. Both pilots were
charged with negligence. The administrators of the airport were also cited for
failing to regulate traffic on that same road.

On approach the aircraft pitched violently up and down
several times, appeared to go out of control and crashed. The stabilizer was
said to have been mis-trimmed, but the cause is not known. The aircraft tech log
showed recent problems with horizontal stabilizer control, which were being
investigated at the time by Boeing. All 6 crew killed.

Aircraft hit high ground at 7000ft (500ft below MSA) during
approach to Runway 36. A serious vibration had reportedly occurred in the No 2
engine before the aircraft crashed in a steep right hand turn. FDR data
indicates that the aircraft levelled off at 7200ft during a descent towards the
airport with the autopilot and autothrottle engaged, the left throttle lever
advanced but the right did not. The FDR also indicated that the same problem had
occurred earlier in the same flight and had been corrected manually. All 8 crew
members and 133 passengers were killed.

The aircraft had previously made a heavy landing which was
inspected by an engineer on the turnaround. The aircraft back-tracked Runway 18
for departure, but tyre marks on the runway showed that the number 3 & 4 tyres
had locked up during the line-up. During the take-off run, No3 tyre lost
pressure and No4 tyre burst just before V1. The aircraft began vibrating and
pulling to the right. The take-off was aborted and the aircraft overran by 125m
and caught fire. No fatalities.

During the descent to Cruzeiro do Sol, the crew's attention
was distracted by the cargo compartment warning system, which began to activate
intermittently. The aircraft crashed in the jungle while performing a Delta 1
arrival. All 3 crew on board were killed.

Twenty minutes after leaving Panama City at FL 250, the
crew became disorientated when the artificial horizon failed. The aircraft
rolled through 90deg, entered a steep dive and broke up at approximately FL130.
The aircraft entered an area with thunderstorms, but it is not known if it
sustained a lightning strike. However, a wire from the gyroscopes to the
instruments had frayed, creating a short circuit and was giving erroneous
attitude indications. The aircraft, although in VMC, was flying over featureless
woodland at night and the crew were unable to determine the aircrafts attitude.
All seven crew members and 40 passengers were killed.

The aircraft appeared to be left of the centerline during
the final stages of the ILS approach. The crew made a correcting manoeuvre,
which resulted in the aircraft landing on the right main gear first. The right
main gear collapsed, followed by the left gear.

The aircraft crashed into a hill about 30km from the
airport while positioning for a Runway 04 ILS approach. The pilot had extended
the outbound leg too far, flying over mountainous terrain. All six crew members
and 63 passengers were killed.

The aircraft departed from controlled flight approximately
1,000 feet above the ground and struck an open field on approach to Colorado
Springs. All 25 people on board were killed.

After a 21-month investigation, the Board issued a report
on the crash in December 1992. In that report, the NTSB said it “could not
identify conclusive evidence to explain the loss of the aircraft”, but indicated
that the two most likely explanations were a malfunction of the airplane’s
directional control system or an encounter with an unusually severe atmospheric
disturbance.

The NTSB has since adopted a revised final report on this
crash. The Board said that the most likely cause of the accident was the
movement of the rudder in the direction opposite that commanded by the flight
crew. The decision tracks information learned from the investigation of two
fatal 737 accidents - including this one - and a non-fatal incident.

US Air flight 1493 entered LAX airspace around 17.57 and
was cleared for a profile descent and ILS Runway 24R approach. At 17.59 this was
changed to a Runway 24L approach clearance. At about the same time a SkyWest
Metro II aircraft (Flight 5569 to Fresno) taxied to Runway 24L. At 18.03 the
crew were advised to, “taxi up to and hold short of 24L” because of other
traffic. At 18.04:49 the flight was cleared to taxi into position and hold.
Immediately thereafter, the controller became preoccupied with instructing
WingsWest Flight 5006 who had unintentionally departed the tower frequency. The
WingsWest 5072 reporting ready for takeoff caused some confusion because the
controller didn't have a flight progress strip in front of her. The strip
appeared to have been misfiled at the clearance delivery position. Meanwhile,
Flight 5569 was still on the runway at the intersection with taxiway 45,
awaiting takeoff clearance. At 18.07 Flight 1493 touched down. Simultaneous to
the nose-gear touchdown, the US Air B737 collided with the SkyWest Metro. Both
aircraft caught fire and slid to the left into an unoccupied fire station.

Two of the six crew members and 20 of the 83 passengers on
the USAir jet were killed. All 10 passengers and two crew members on the Metro
III were killed.

The centre fuel tank exploded while the aircraft was
taxiing for departure. 8 of the 113 passengers were killed.

The airline had fitted logo lights after delivery which
involved additional wires to be passed through vapour seals in the fuel tanks.
The NTSB recommended to the FAA that an AD be issued requiring inspections of
the fuel boost pumps, float switch and wiring looms as signs of chafing had been
found. The FAA declined to issue the AD.

A hijacker detonated a bomb during approach, causing the
737 to hit parked aircraft on the ground. Seven of the nine crew members and 75
of the 93 passengers were killed.

The hijacker had ordered the flight crew out of the cockpit
except for the Captain. He refused an offer from the Captain to fly to Hong Kong
and the dispute continued until the fuel was nearly exhausted, necessitating the
landing. Shouts and sounds of a struggle were heard from the cockpit during the
approach. The aircraft landed hard and veered off the runway and clipped a 707
and a 757 before coming to a halt upside down in a grassy area.

The No.1 engine accelerated beyond target EPR on take-off.
The crew aborted the take-off, but the No.1 engine didn't respond to the
retarded power lever, so had to be shut down with the fuel shut-off lever.
Asymmetric thrust was controlled with nose wheel steering. The nose-gear wheels
separated from the gear before the aircraft was brought to a halt. No
fatalities.

PROBABLE CAUSE: “Failure of the fuel pump control shaft
because of improper machining by the repair facility during maintenance
modification of the pump and improper procedures during overhaul of the nose
landing gear.”

The aircraft crashed about 7.5 miles short of Runway 14,
Unalakleet, Alaska, while executing a localizer approach to that runway in IMC.
There were no passengers on board but the crew sustained injuries and the
airplane was destroyed.

The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this
accident was deficiencies in flightcrew coordination, their failure to
adequately prepare for and properly execute the UNK LOC Rwy 14 non-precision
approach, and their subsequent premature descent. The Safety Board issued a
safety recommendation on approach chart standardization to the FAA.

While descending to Tucson, a 115Volt AC wire of the No.2 B
hydraulic pump shorted and punctured a hydraulic system A line. As the aircraft
was approaching the airport a fire erupted and burned through to the electrical
power wires to the standby hydraulic pump. After landing at Tucson, the aircraft
overran the runway, collided with an abandoned concrete arresting gear
structure, shearing off the nose-gear and continued to slide for 3,803ft. The
aircraft had flown 62,466hrs and 38,827 cycles.

The aircraft swung to the left during the F/O's takeoff,
the Captain aborted at Vr+5. Auto-throttle was not used and autobrake RTO mode
had not been selected both of which increased the accelerate-stop distance. The
aircraft overran the wet runway and dropped onto the wooden approach light pier,
which collapsed causing the aircraft to break into three and drop into 7-12m
deep East River. Two of the 55 passengers were killed.

The swing was caused by the rudder trim having been placed
unintentionally at 16 degrees (full) left position. This could have been caused
by the foot of the jumpseat passenger on the centre console or the knob could
have stuck whilst being moved. Boeing have since redesigned the rudder trim knob
to a cylinder rather than a blade and placed a rim around the console.

The pilot set a heading of 270 instead of 027 and ended up
600 miles off course. The error led to fuel exhaustion and a forced landing in
jungle, 12 of the 48 passengers were killed in the crash. It took two days for
the survivors to be found.

The heading mistake went unnoticed because the crew was
reportedly listening to the Brazil v Chile World Cup qualification football
match.

13 minutes after take-off from LHR, while climbing through
FL283, moderate to severe vibration was felt, accompanied by a smell of fire in
the cockpit. The outer panel of one of the No.1 engine fan-blades detached,
causing compressor stalls and airframe shuddering. Believing the No.2 engine had
been damaged the crew throttled it back. The shuddering stopped and the No 2
engine was shut down. The crew then decided to divert to East Midlands. The
flight was cleared for a Runway 27 approach. At 900ft, 2.4nm from the runway,
engine No.1 power suddenly decreased. As the speed fell below 125kts, the stick
shaker activated and the aircraft struck trees at a speed of 115kts. The
aircraft continued and impacted the embankment of the M1 motorway and came to
rest against the wooded embankment, 900m short of the runway. 47 people were
killed.

The engine was a CFM56-3C1 at 23,500lbs and failed after
only 500hrs, this was followed by several other failures of the 3C1 which ran at
higher rotational speeds than previous CFM56s. The engines were then derated
down to 22,000lbs until a permanent cure was found.

The runway in use at Ushuaia was 16 with a wind of 230/12.
However during the approach the wind changed to 360/20 so the crew elected to
use Runway 34, despite being warned of possible windshear for that runway. The
aircraft touched down hard (1.89G) 12kts fast, bounced and landed back 3/4 of
the way down the 1400m runway. It then veered off and went down a slope into 2m
deep water. No fatalities.

During take-off, just past VR, at a speed of 146kts, the
737 suffered a birdstrike. Both engines ingested a number of birds, which
resulted in a rise in engine temperature on climb-out and the engines backfiring
at 100-200ft. The crew made a right turn to return to the airport with the EGT
at limits. On base leg at 7100ft amsl with 190kts, both JT8D-17A engines
backfired & flamed out. A wheels-up crash landing was made. The aircraft caught
fire. The aircraft had been delivered on October 29, 1987 and had accumulated
just 1377hrs flying time and 1870 cycles.

PROBABLE CAUSE: “The accident occurred because the airplane
could not be safely returned to the runway after the internal destruction and
subsequent failure of both engines to operate arising from multiple bird
ingestion by both engines during take-off.” Engine failure due to ingestion of
10-16 Columba Guinea birds (approx. 320 grams each).

As a result of the crash landing, 31 of the 105 passengers
were killed.

The aircraft experienced an explosive decompression at
24,000ft due to metal fatigue in upper cabin area. The crew was able to execute
a successful emergency landing with an 8ft x 12ft section of the upper fuselage
missing from aft of the forward entrance door to the leading edge of the wing.
One of the flight attendants was swept overboard and killed.

The aircraft was the second highest cycle 737 in the world
at 89,193; the highest also being in the Aloha fleet. The original design life
of the 737 was 75,000 cycles but this had been increased to 130,000 in 1987.
However Boeing had been expressing concern at the condition of three high cycle
Aloha aircraft since 1987. The NTSB blamed Aloha for failure to detect fatigue
damage and an inadequate maintenance policy. Aloha voluntarily scrapped the
other two aircraft in July 1988.

The flight was cleared to the CU NDB for an ILS approach to
Runway 35. After passing the NDB the pilots switched to ILS and thus couldn't
verify their position in the procedure turn. The aircraft was outside the 35deg
sector of the ILS centreline and the crew followed the wrong side beam. The crew
descended to Outer Marker altitude and the 737 struck a hill. PROBABLE CAUSE:
Presumed NDB passage, wrong use of VOR and ILS, overconfidence of the Captain
and considerable inactivity of the First Officer (PF). All five crew members and
11 passengers were killed.

While descending during a daylight approach in good
weather, the crew lost control of the aircraft and crashed into the Andanan Sea.
All of the nine crew members and 74 passengers were killed.

The airport had no radar and the crew were concerned that
another aircraft was behind them flying 500ft lower, on a different VOR radial,
and was cleared to land. During this distraction the aircraft stalled and was
unable to recover before hitting the sea. The controllers were re-assigned and
their supervisor disciplined.

The aircraft was approaching Runway 27 which had an 880m
displaced threshold due to construction work. The pilot was landing into sun and
touched down 520m short of the displaced threshold. The nose-gear collapsed as
it hit obstacles and the aircraft broke in two. A fire broke out 30mins later
and destroyed the aircraft. One of the 27 passengers was killed.

The aircraft was en route between Baghdad, Iraq and Amman,
Jordan when hijackers set off a hand grenade in the passenger cabin and started
a gunfight with security forces on board the aircraft. An emergency descent was
initiated immediately. Descending through FL160, a hand grenade in the cockpit
exploded. The aircraft crashed trying to land at a small airfield near Arar
Saudi Arabia; it broke in two and caught fire, killing 67 of the 107 passengers.

Flight 467 landed on Runway 36R after an ILS approach.
About 24 seconds after touchdown, the aircraft overran the runway, struck a
localizer antenna array, a concrete culvert, continued through a chain link
fence and came to rest upon the edge of railroad tracks, 440ft past the runway
end. Three passengers sustained serious injuries, but there were no fatalities.

PROBABLE CAUSE: “The Captain's failure to stabilize the
approach and his failure to discontinue the approach to a landing that was
conducted at an excessive speed beyond the normal touchdown point on a wet
runway. Contributing to the accident was the Captain's failure to optimally use
the airplane deceleration devices. Also contributing to the accident was the
lack of effective crew co-ordination during the approach. Contributing to the
severity of the accident was the poor frictional quality of the last 1500ft of
the runway and the obstruction presented by a concrete culvert located 318ft
beyond the departure end of the runway.”

A nose gear tyre had reportedly burst during the first
attempt to land. The aircraft went around and crashed into the sea 12 miles
North of Makung. All six passengers and seven crew members were killed.

The aircraft was hijacked to Malta. After several hours of
negotiations, Egyptian troops stormed the aircraft. During the ensuing battle,
the hijackers threw several hand grenades. The aircraft was severely damaged by
the explosions and fire. Two of the six crew members and 58 of the 90 passengers
were killed.

The aircraft began its take-off from Runway 24 at
Manchester with the First Officer handling. About 36 seconds later, as the
airspeed passed 125 knots, the left engine suffered an uncontained failure,
which punctured a wing fuel tank access panel. Fuel leaking from the wing
ignited and burnt as a large plume of fire trailing directly behind the engine.
The crew heard a thud, and believing that they had suffered a tyre-burst or
bird-strike, abandoned the take-off immediately, intending to clear the runway
to the right. They had no indication of fire until 9 seconds later, when the
left engine fire warning occurred. After an exchange with ATC, during which the
fire was confirmed, the Captain warned his crew of an evacuation from the right
side of the aircraft, by making a broadcast over the cabin address system, and
brought the aircraft to a halt.

As the aircraft turned off, a wind of 7 knots from 250°
carried the fire onto and around the rear fuselage. After the aircraft stopped
the hull was penetrated rapidly and smoke, possibly with some flame transients,
entered the cabin through the aft right door which was opened shortly before the
aircraft came to a halt. Subsequently fire developed within the cabin. Despite
the prompt attendance of the airport fire service, the aircraft was destroyed
and 55 of the 137 persons on board lost their lives.

The cause of the accident was an uncontained failure of the
left engine, initiated by a failure of the No 9 combustor can which had been the
subject of a repair. A section of the combustor can, which was ejected forcibly
from the engine, struck and fractured an under wing fuel tank access panel. The
fire which resulted developed catastrophically, primarily because of adverse
orientation of the parked aircraft relative to the wind, even though the wind
was light.

The major cause of the fatalities was rapid incapacitation
due to the inhalation of the dense toxic/irritant smoke atmosphere within the
cabin, aggravated by evacuation delays caused by a door malfunction and
restricted access to the exits.

Shortly after starting a descent to 3000ft the crew
reported that they were not receiving the DME. ATC asked if they would prefer a
VOR approach to Runway 09 instead of a visual to 27, although it was night
(23:25 local), the visual approach to 27 was continued. Later the crew reported
that they had lost both engines and were descending through 3400ft and had
nearly hit a mountain. The aircraft eventually hit high ground at 800ft and was
destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. The crash killed all four
passengers and seven crew members.

When taxiing out for a flight to Garoua via Yaound‚ a
compressor disc in the No.2 JT8D-15 engine failed. Debris punctured the wing and
fuel tank, causing a fire. The aircraft burned out. Two of the 108 passengers
were killed.

An explosion occurred in the rear cabin whilst climbing
through 8000ft after take-off. The crew retuned to Huambo for an emergency
landing but were unable to extend the flaps because of damage to the hydraulic
systems. The aircraft landed flapless and fast and overran the runway by 180m.
No fatalities.

About 20 seconds into the take-off roll, at an airspeed of
70 knots, the flightcrew heard a loud bang which was accompanied by a slight
veer to the left. The No1 engine 13th stage compressor disc had
failed 1,300 feet into the take-off roll. A piece of the disc punctured a fuel
cell which ignited instantaneously and the fire engulfed the left wing and aft
section of the aircraft.

The Captain immediately rejected the take-off using brakes
and reverse thrust. Both the pilots suspected a tyre on the left main landing
gear had blown. While the aircraft was vacating the runway, the crew noted that
left engine low pressure unit rpm was indicating 0 per cent. The purser then
entered the flight deck and reported a fire on the left wing. It took
approximately 1min 30secs for the crew to initiate the evacuation.

The aircraft took off and climbed to 200ft before turning
steeply to the left and crashing about 800m from the end of the runway. The
crash killed all five crew members and 121 of 126 passengers. Angolan
authorities blamed technical failure; however, anti-government guerrillas
claimed to have shot the aircraft with a surface-to-air missile.

Crashed during approach into Abu Dhabi after a bomb had
exploded in the baggage compartment. The crash killed all six crew members and
105 of 111 passengers. There were indications of a pre-impact explosion in a
cargo hold, with resultant structural damage and an uncontrollable fire
producing toxic fumes that rapidly overcame the occupants. The evidence pointed
away from a blaze of either electrical or fuel origin, and it was later
concluded that the 737 had been sabotaged. Some checked-in luggage was carried
by a ticket holder who did not board the aircraft.

While on final approach at night, the pilot reduced engine
power to flight idle. At 230ft (70m) the pilot added some power, but the
airspeed had decayed below Vref. The stick-shaker activated and full power was
applied. The 737 touched down 400m short of the runway, causing the
undercarriage to fail.

PROBABLE CAUSE: Misjudged speed, distance and altitude.
Contributing factors were the inadequate crew supervision and the non-use of
VASIs. There were 110 people on board but no fatalities.

The First Officer lost control of a simulated engine
failure after take-off during a training flight. The retarded thrust lever was
advanced, but the engine stalled. The Boeing then rolled left and crashed.

PROBABLE CAUSE: Failure to follow procedures, attempted
operation with known deficiencies and inadequate supervision were factors. Both
pilots were killed.

The crew made a crosswind landing on Runway 22 with a wind
of 300/12, the speed at touchdown was Vref+6kts. The aircraft bounced and landed
back. When the spoilers and reversers didn't seem to operate, the crew shut down
both engines, thus making it impossible to use the anti-skid system. The inner
tyres on both main gear legs burst almost simultaneously at 125m short of the
runway end. The aircraft skidded to the left, overran the runway and came to
rest 145m further on. The aircraft caught fire after the evacuation. No
fatalities.

The crew used reverse thrust to assist the push-back off
stand and taxied close behind another aircraft for heat from the exhaust, both
of which may have contributed to the airframe snow/ice accretion. They also did
not use engine anti-ice whilst taxiing out during snow causing the PT2 (EPR )
probes to misread. Although anomalous engine instrument readings were called
during the takeoff, the Captain neither aborted nor adjusted the thrust levers
to allow sufficient thrust for takeoff and the aircraft stalled and crashed into
the frozen Potomac River. Take-off was almost an hour after de-icing had been
completed and the CVR shows that the crew were aware of 10-20mm of snow on the
wings. Four of the five crew members and 70 of the 74 passengers were killed.

The aircraft experienced in-flight structural failure at
22,000ft. The crash killed all six crew members and 104 passengers. The aircraft
had experienced rapid depressurisations 2 weeks previously and that morning. The
aircraft was the one built immediately before the Aloha 737 which ripped open
in-flight.

The cause was found to be serious belly corrosion,
exacerbated by the fact that the aircraft had been frequently used to carry fish
in the hold. The first 418 737s were susceptible to structural problems as they
were built with a production method of stiffening with bonded doublers (cold
bonding). This was changed to chemical milling.

The crew had received a clearance for a visual approach to
Runway 19R. Meanwhile the controller cleared another flight for take-off from
the same runway. When recognising the hazard, the controller ordered the landing
aircraft to go-around and the departing aircraft to abort its take-off. The
departing aircraft rejected its take-off, but the Captain of the landing
aircraft delayed the go-around by approximately 12 seconds and then selected the
gear UP before achieving a positive rate of climb. The 737 left the runway
surface at 900ft past the threshold and skidded another 1170ft before coming to
rest 115ft to the right of the centreline. No fatalities.

PROBABLE CAUSE: “The captain's failure to immediately
initiate a go-around when instructed to do so by the tower's air traffic
controller and his subsequent failure to correctly execute the specified
go-around procedure which resulted in the retraction of the landing gear after
the aircraft touched down on the runway.”

The aircraft landed 4m short, causing the gear to collapse.
The aircraft slid 900m and came to rest 20m to the side of the runway. The no.1
engine and right wing caught fire. The aircraft was destroyed during recovery
attempts. PROBABLE CAUSE: Lack of VASIs and threshold markings caused the
pilot's inability to follow the correct approach slope.

On its way from Trivandrum to Madras, the aircraft was
cleared to descent from FL270. Shortly afterwards an explosion took place in the
forward lavatory, causing a complete instrument and electrical failure. The
aircraft had to make a flapless landing at Madras. The aircraft touched down
2500ft past the Runway 25 threshold and overran. The right side of the plane
caught fire. PROBABLE CAUSE: “Detonation of an explosive device in the forward
lavatory of the aircraft. The aircraft overshot the runway due to high speed of
touchdown, non-availability of reverse thrust and anti-skid system due to
systems failure from explosion.”

The aircraft lifted off from Runway 09, but could not climb
because the leading edge devices did not deploy and as a result the aircraft
became aerodynamically unstable. The take-off was aborted and the aircraft was
flared for a belly landing with undercarriage retracted. The aircraft belly
landed in nose up, left wing low attitude, on the centre line of the runway. It
slid for 3080 feet, hit a boundary fence, crossed a drain and ploughed in rough
terrain negotiating with small boulders and came to rest. Fire broke out on
impact. One passenger and 3 maintenance workers cutting grass were killed.

The aircraft was performing circuits on a training flight.
During a touch-and-go on Runway 25, the aircraft struck a flock of birds. The
take-off was aborted, but the aircraft overran, struck the localiser antennas
and skidded. The right main gear collapsed and the no.2 engine was torn off in
the slide. The aircraft came to rest 300m past the runway end and was destroyed
by fire. There were no fatalities.

During landing in darkness and fog, on their last flight of the day, the crew forgot to lower the gear. The aircraft
landed on the runway and skidded for about 2000 ft before it veered off the side and came to rest in grass. The aircraft collided with small trees on its path sustaining damage to both engines,
forward and mid fuselage and horizontal stabilizers. No fatalities.

The aircraft touched down just as the crew noticed a snow
blower on the runway. A go-around was initiated, but the thrust reversers did
not stow away properly because hydraulic power was automatically cut off at
lift-off. The aircraft missed the vehicle, overran the runway, crashed and
burned. Estimated time of arrival given by Calgary ATC was considerably in
error. Crew did not report over the final approach beacon. The crash killed four
of the crew members and 38 of the 44 passengers.

The flight was approaching Kuala Lumpur when the pilot
radioed that a hijacker had taken control of the aircraft. The aircraft
continued to Singapore. While descending from FL210 to FL070 the nose suddenly
pitched up. Control was lost and the aircraft crashed into a swamp and
disintegrated.

All seven crew members and 93 passengers were killed. Both
pilots had been shot.

The Captain was flying a back-course localizer approach to
Runway 25, even though a full ILS was available on runway 07. The weather was
500ft cloud base with visibility less than 1 mile in light snow and a slight
tailwind of 030/08. The runway had been ploughed earlier but there was now an
estimated 2-3 inches of snow on the runway. The aircraft levelled off at MDA
with flap 25 set. After 4 sec the F/O became visual and selected flap 30 at the
Captains request who descended toward the runway. The aircraft remained high and
fast until touchdown and no advisory/warning callouts were made by the F/O. He
touched down 2375ft into the 8681ft runway at Vref+20 and ran off the end by
800ft hitting the approach lights at the far end. Aircraft sustained substantial
damage but there were no fatalities.

The aircraft was making an NDB approach with visibility
below minima, but the crew continued the approach and descended below minimum
descent altitude without seeing the runway. The aircraft collided with high
tension wires, crashed and caught fire. The crash killed five of the seven crew
members and 43 of the 58 passengers.

Aircraft crashed in a residential area about 1.5 miles from
Runway 31L during a non-precision approach. The aircraft was observed below the
overcast in a nose-high attitude and with the sound of high engine power just
before it crashed into structures on the ground. It is believed that the
aircraft was in the landing configuration but with the flight spoilers still
deployed after a deceleration which caused the aircraft to stall.

The NTSB determined that the cause was “the Captains
failure to exercise positive flight management during the execution of the
non-precision approach, which culminated in a critical deterioration of airspeed
into the stall regime were level flight could no longer be maintained.”

3 of the 6 crew, 40 of the 55 passengers and 2 people on
the ground were killed.

The First Officer (PF), initiated the takeoff roll. Shortly
after rotation, at a speed above V2, a loud bang was heard and the aircraft
veered to the right. The Captain moved both throttles forward but there seemed
to be no response. The Captain then made the instantaneous decision to land back
on the runway. The aircraft touched down 1075ft before the end of the runway, it
overran and continued across the blast pad. It crossed a field, passed through a
6-foot high aluminium chain link fence into an area covered with high grass,
weeds and brush. The aircraft came to rest 1634ft past the end of the runway.

The NTSB report states the cause as: “The termination of
the take-off, after the No.1 engine failed, at a speed above V2 at a height of
approximately 50 feet, with insufficient runway remaining to effect a safe
landing. The Captain's decision and his action to terminate the take-off were
based on the erroneous judgment that both engines had failed.” There were no
fatalities.