The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.

From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."

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Friday, August 2, 2013

The
greatest success of the Arab States against Israel (there aren't many)
has been to change the terms of reference. In 1947, the Arabs
unanimously rejected the UN Partition Plan for Palestine and in 1948
attacked Israel, Goliath against David. Through 1956, 1967, and 1973
Israel was understood to be on the receiving end of the enormous wealth,
fury and rejection of the Arab States -- hence the name, "Arab-Israel
conflict." But with the exercise of the Arab oil weapon international
priorities were transformed, the first priority being not to irritate
Saudi Arabia. The Arab States let themselves off the hook, passing the
onus of rejectionist thuggery on to Israel, the Goliathite aggressor
against the Davidish Palestinians. Now there is the "Palestinian-Israeli
conflict," reflecting the preference of the Arab States and priorities
of Washington.

To
read the Washington newspapers this week, which are representative,
Israeli and Palestinian negotiators are meeting under the auspices of
the American government to make Palestine. The Palestinians and
Secretary of State John Kerry allowed it to be known that the Israelis
were asked/pushed/threatened to provide a prisoner release, a settlement
freeze, and a commitment to begin negotiations on the 1949 Armistice
Line (the so-called 1967 border). The Palestinians were asked to
provide... well, nothing, actually because that's not the issue.

The Washington Post
subhead on page one read, "Jewish Settlements Pose Major Test." It
could equally have read, "Palestinian Veneration of Terrorists Dalal
Mugrahi, Wafa Idriss, Um Nadal and Ahlam al Tamimi Poses Major Test." Or
"Fatah's Lack of Authority to Negotiate on behalf of Hamas or Gaza
Poses Major Test." Or "Abbas's Announcement that No Jews will be Allowed
in Palestine Poses Major Test."

Its competitor, The Washington Times, listed five substantive issues for discussion:

The final borders of an independent Palestinian State.Security guarantees for Israel and the composition of a future Palestinian security force.The status of Jerusalem, which each side claims.The limits of the "right of return" for Palestinians who left following the formation of Israel in 1948 and their families.The future of Jewish settlements on land claimed by the Palestinians.

The
image emerges of Palestinians who need to claim their state and their
rights from Israel. Israel, it appears, has no corresponding claims on
the Palestinians. But each Washington Times issue should be turned the other way around to protect Israel's claims:

Israel
is entitled to the "secure and recognized boundaries free from threats
or acts of force" that are the promise of UN Resolution 242. That
obligation accrues to the Arab States that made war against Israel in
1967 and Israel is entitled to have them end it.Israel
is entitled to an end to the Palestinian and Arab state of war against
it. An agreement that leaves Israel in need of outside "guarantees"
indicates that the U.S. believes Israel should plan to be no more
secure, and may in fact be less secure, than it is now.Israel
is entitled to protection of Jewish rights in Jerusalem. Having
accepted the 1947 UN decision to make Jerusalem corpus separatum, Israel
lost access to the Holy City and lost much of Jewish patrimony there to
the illegal Jordanian occupation.Israel
is entitled to redress for more than 800,000 Jews, some of whose
families had resided in Arab countries for a millennium, who were made
refugees in the mid-20th Century by the Arab States.Israel
is entitled to the legitimation of its sovereignty. Official
Palestinian maps, and textbooks in PA schools, indicate that Tel Aviv,
Netanya and Ashkelon are all Jewish "settlements."

The
special American envoy to the talks, Martin Indyk, is a purveyor of the
theme that Israel is required to "fix" the Palestinian problem. In an
IDF radio interview more than a year ago, Indyk said, "I think that the
heart of the matter is that the maximum concession that this government
of Israel would be prepared to make, fall far short of the minimum
requirements that Abu Mazen will insist on."

The
"heart of the matter" is that Israel can't give enough to make the
Palestinians happy. What are the Palestinians offering to make Israel
happy? Where is the Palestinian "concession" to Israel's legitimacy,
security and peace? What if the Palestinian offer falls "far short of
the minimum requirements" that the Government of Israel will insist
upon? It doesn't appear to have crossed his mind.

Former
diplomat and envoy to many, many "peace talks," Aaron David Miller,
wrote recently about clues to watch for during the talks and favors
written texts, outlines and maps. "Maps, perhaps more than any other
single element... are a critical sign of seriousness or lack of
seriousness. If we're talking borders, then maps, particularly those
presented by Israel, will become an early test of whether this is
serious."

He is almost right.

Maps
presented by Israel, however, are already a fairly well known quantity.
They will look more or less, give or take, like the outline of the West
Bank (and Gaza under some future circumstance) with the "major
settlement blocs" ending up inside Israel. The better question -- and
the better test of seriousness -- is whether the Palestinians come with a
map and where they place the sovereign State of Israel on that map.

Without
sharper focus on Israel's rights and requirements as well as
Palestinian interests and goals the process deserves to fail.

Abbas may be conducting peace
talks with Israel, but at the same time he is also backing campaigns
that promote boycotts and hatred of Israel. What Secretary Kerry and the
U.S. need to understand is that Abbas has failed to prepare his people
for the possibility of peace.

If Mahmoud Abbas does not have the power or courage to allow an
Israel-based clothing shop to open branch near his residence in
Ramallah, how will he ever be able to make peace with Israel?

This is the question some Palestinian businessmen have been asking
during the past few days in light of an organized campaign to prevent
the Fox clothing chain from opening a store in the city.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's strenuous efforts to resume
peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority led two Israeli
Arab businessmen to take the initiative and open the first Fox store in
the West Bank.

After investing hundreds of thousands of dollars in renovations and
the training of employees, the two businessmen soon found themselves at
the center of a protest organized by "Anti-normalization" activists and
journalists.

Facing daily threats, the two entrepreneurs decided to call off the
project, which would have provided jobs to nearly 150 Palestinians.

Although the Palestinian Authority gave permission to the two
businessmen to open the Ramallah Fox branch, it was yet unable to do
anything to protect them against the threats, including calls for
fire-bombing the store.

The opening of a clothing store in Ramallah may be a minor issue,
especially compared with the major and explosive issues facing Israeli
and Palestinian negotiators.

But this incident, in which a clothing shop is forced -- under
threats -- to withdraw plans to open branch in a Palestinian city, is an
indication of what awaits Abbas if and when he dares to reach any
agreement with Israel.

The same "anti-normalization" movement which Abbas supports will be
the first to turn against him if he strikes a deal with Israel.

Although Fox clothes are immensely popular among young Palestinian
men and women, the fashion retailer did not have a branch in the West
Bank or Gaza Strip.

While many Palestinian merchants have been quietly selling Fox
clothes in several Palestinian cities, they are particularly afraid of
the strong "anti-normalization" movement that prohibits any form of contact with Israelis.

Ironically, this movement is fully supported by the same Palestinian
Authority and Fatah leaders whose leaders do not hesitate to conduct
public meetings with Israelis, in addition to security coordination with
the Israel Defense Forces in the West Bank.

Just this week, senior Fatah officials were invited to the Knesset
for talks with Israeli colleagues about peace and coexistence; and
earlier, Fatah leaders in Ramallah hosted scores of Israeli politicians,
including members of the Likud and Shas parties, to an event organized
by the joint Israeli-Palestinian Geneva Initiative group.

The campaign against the opening of a Fox store in Ramallah also
coincided with the launching of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in
Washington.

While Palestinian activists were busy threatening the owners of the
clothing store, their representatives, Saeb Erekat and Mohamed Shtayyeh,
were sitting with Israeli minister Tzipi Livni in Washington and
talking about ways of achieving peace and coexistence between the two
sides.

What Kerry and the U.S. Administration need to understand is that
Abbas has failed to prepare his people for the possibility of peace with
Israel. Abbas may be conducting peace talks with Israel, but at the
same time he is also backing campaigns that promote boycotts and hatred
of Israel. It is important to talk peace. But it is even more important
to educate people about peace -- something that neither Yasser Arafat
nor his successor, Abbas, have done for the past two decades.

by Jonathan S. TobinEven optimists about the new round of
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks acknowledge that the Hamas problem makes
it difficult to imagine an actual agreement coming out of the
negotiations. So long as Gaza is ruled by Hamas and Hamas is unwilling
to recognize Israel’s existence, let alone its legitimacy, how could any
accord survive? But some are seeking to downplay this all-too-obvious
flaw in Secretary of State John Kerry’s reasoning in making his
diplomatic push by arguing that the Islamist rulers of Gaza (which
contains 40 percent of the Arab population of the disputed territories)
are either weak or about to fall.

The glass-half-full peace process scenario seems to rest on the
assumption that Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas will get a
major boost in popularity if he is able to win, with the help of
American pressure, an Israeli withdrawal and an independent state. The
hope is that this will render Hamas’s opposition ineffective. An even
more wildly optimistic scenario goes so far as to envisage Hamas falling
from power or becoming so weak that talk of a merger with Fatah becomes
a reality, thus ending the Palestinian schism and easing the way to
peace.

Unfortunately, this sort of optimism tells us more about the desire
on the part of some in both the United States and Israel to ignore the
reality of Palestinian politics than it does about the possibility of
regime change in Gaza. For example, even if we take all the assertions
in veteran Israeli journalist and author Ehud Yaari’s analysis of the situation in Gaza in the New Republic
at face value, there is very little reason to believe that the downturn
in Hamas’s fortunes will be translated into it being more amenable to
peace or a genuine chance that it will loosen its hold on power.

Yaari is right when he asserts this isn’t the best of times for the
Hamas regime. The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt is a
body blow to the Palestinian group that traces its own origins back to
that organization. Though relations with the recently toppled Morsi
government were not always smooth, his military successors are openly
hostile to Hamas. They have not only shut down the border with Gaza and
closed many smuggling tunnels, they have publicly charged Hamas with
providing assistance to Brotherhood efforts to subvert the new regime as
well as implicating it in violence and murders associated with Morsi’s
escape from a Mubarak regime jail in 2011. This has not only deepened
its isolation but shut down a vital source of funds.

While significant in and of itself, the loss of Egypt is all the more
devastating to Hamas because of its decision to part ways with Iran in
the last year. Siding with the Syrian rebels and discarding its formerly
close ties with Tehran may have made sense in 2012 for a Hamas that
thought it could count on both Egypt and Turkey. Iran was once Hamas’s
primary source of both funding and weapons, but the Islamists thought
they were better off sticking with the Sunnis against the Shiites. But
the ability of the Assad regime to hold onto power in Damascus with the
aid of Iran and Hezbollah is making it look as if they backed the wrong
horse. With the Turks and the Gulf states that have pledged money to
keep Hamas afloat primarily interested in the Syrian struggle these
days, Gaza now finds itself more isolated than ever. That has also
accentuated the split in the Hamas high command that has always existed
between the Gaza leadership and its political bureau abroad.

All this has also strengthened the heretofore-marginal Islamic Jihad
terror group that now represents itself as the true face of Palestinian
resistance instead of a Hamas that is seen by some radicals as at fault
for seeking to preserve the current cease-fire with Israel. As the New York Times reports today,
Iran’s increased funding of the group in the wake of its dispute with
Hamas over Syria has raised its profile and its ability to compete with
the bigger terror group for popularity in Gaza.

But however serious these problems may be, they do not at present
constitute anything that comes even close to a mortal threat to Hamas.
The group’s iron grip on Gazan society remains undiminished. Though it
is broke, even in times of plenty it has always depended on UNRWA, the
United Nations agency devoted to aiding and perpetuating the Palestinian
refugee problem, to take care of the strip’s poor.

Moreover, Hamas officials are as capable of seeing which way the wind is blowing in the Middle East as anyone else and have launched diplomatic initiatives
to get back into Tehran’s good graces. Though these efforts have, as
yet, yielded no concrete results, should they deem it necessary, there
is little doubt that Hamas will bend to Iran’s will in order to keep
themselves afloat.

Moreover, the expectation that the peace talks will sink Hamas’s
standing among Palestinians has it backwards. Should the negotiations
succeed, Hamas will be well placed to blast Abbas for betraying the
refugees and Palestinian hopes of destroying Israel. Should they fail,
they will assail him for groveling to the Jews and America. Either way,
they are set up to make political hay and mayhem from Kerry’s folly.

The fantasy of Hamas fading away is just that. In spite of its
serious problems, the Islamist group is in no imminent danger. The same
can’t be said of its Palestinian rivals and no amount of optimism about
the talks can change that.Jonathan S. TobinSource: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/08/01/hamas-cant-be-wished-away-in-gaza/Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

For many people in the Arab
world, "democracy" is good and people should vote only because voting
can bring the undemocratic Muslim Brotherhood to power. But if voting
does not bring the desired outcome -- a Muslim state wedded to Sharia
law -- then back to the revolution and the caliphate.

Following another night of violence in Cairo during which 72 people were killed, The New York Times
accused the military led government of Abdul Fattah al Sisi of
"radicalizing" the Muslim Brotherhood. "For all its stated commitment to
democracy and nonviolence, the Brotherhood's only reliable partners now
are other Islamist groups whose members may be more willing to use
violent or radical tactics -- partners that would tar the Brotherhood's
identity as a more pragmatic movement with a broader base."

The poor Brotherhood. It seems, according to The Times, that
people it cannot control are pushing it into violence it does not want.
Pardon me, but how do you "radicalize" an organization the credo of
which is, "Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law, the Prophet is
our leader; Jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the
highest of our aspirations"? The Brotherhood was born in violence and
knows the value not only of violence, but also of martyrdom. Since its
ouster, its leaders have been threatening and inciting violence, hoping
to provoke the secular government into killing.
The organization works much the same way Hamas -- the Brotherhood's
Palestinian franchise -- does. Hamas implants its military capabilities,
storehouses and launch sites in civilian neighborhoods in Gaza. From
behind the captive civilians, it fires rockets and missiles at Israeli
towns, putting on high alert a million people on who will have exactly
15 seconds to find shelter when the alarm goes off. When the situation
becomes intolerable, Israel responds and Hamas wins: if the Israelis are
cautious, and there are no civilian casualties, Hamas has terrorized
Israel with no consequence. If there are civilian casualties, Hamas wins
again, bewailing Israeli brutality in front of Western media.

The wailing and moaning of Cairenes over the Brotherhood dead is
similarly suspect. The temporary, albeit decades-long non-violence of
the Egyptian Brotherhood was the product of decades of imprisonment and
persecution at the hands of secular Egyptian governments, and the
knowledge that it would not come to power in Egypt by the sword. But
what The Times calls the Brotherhood's "stated commitment to
democracy and nonviolence," was belied by its violent and non-democratic
year in power, and by its behavior since its ouster.

Coptic Christians have born the brunt of the Brotherhood's disregard
for minorities in general and Christians in particular. The Morsi
government denied culpability in an attack on April 4, in which four men
were killed and homes, a nursery and a church were burned. But video
from an April 7 attack on St. Mark's Church
, in which two Copts were killed and 84 wounded, show Egyptian security
forces ignoring the perpetrators. When it was over, the only people
arrested were four Copts. Coptic Christians have been fleeing the country to wherever they can find asylum.

So it may have been out of an interest in self-preservation that the
Coptic community supported the ouster of Morsi, and the Coptic Pope
Tawadros II agreed to sit on the Interim Council. The Brotherhood,
however, has been looking for scapegoats, and at least nine Copts have been killed as the Brotherhood has denounced Christian support for the al Sisi government.

Far from showing itself to be inclusive, the Muslim Brotherhood has
denounced the Copts, the liberals and even the Salafists who were part
of the anti-Morsi coalition of 2011-12. "These people dare to mock our
religion!" shouted Safwat Hegazy, a Brotherhood leader, as reported in
the New York Times. "God will punish them."

Far from being "democratic," the Brotherhood simply found the ballot
box a convenient mechanism for lifting the better-organized parties to
victory in what was more a referendum than an election of competing
ideas and competing parties. One young man told reporters, "No more
ballot boxes. We used to believe in the caliphate. The international
community said we should go with ballot boxes, so we followed that path.
But… if ballot boxes don't bring righteousness, we will all go back to
demanding a caliphate."

And here, in a single sentence, is the problem not only of Egypt, but
of the American desire to implant "democracy" in hostile territory, as
if elections were the same thing as democracy instead of just one small
part of many institutions, including free speech, equal justice under
law, freedom from religion, property rights, and other systems that need
to be implanted before elections, not after. For many people in
the Arab world, though, "democracy" is good and people should vote only
because voting can bring the undemocratic Muslim Brotherhood to power in
a way the international community finds acceptable. But if voting does
not bring the desired outcome -- a Muslim Brotherhood state wedded to
Sharia law -- then back to revolution and the caliphate, "democracy" and
the Western world be damned. The Muslim Brotherhood was born radical,
and its relative "moderation" was at best a temporary expedient.

This leaves the Obama Administration in a difficult position.
Violence by the interim government makes it harder to move Egypt toward
the economic and political changes required to keep the country afloat,
despite the cash infusions by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But having lost
power and with nothing more to lose, it is the Muslim Brotherhood that
is provoking the government. The United States, in this event, should
make it clear we will stand by the interim government. The descent of
Egypt into violent chaos has to be as unacceptable to Washington as it
is to Cairo.

The Democracy Index released, by the International Development Center,
Thursday statistics on Egyptian nationwide demonstrations in the month
of July, stating there were 1432 demonstrations, with an average of 46
demonstrations a day and two demonstrations every hour.

The Democracy Index, a body that measures the state of democracy in 167
countries, described July's protests as "one of the biggest waves of
demonstrations in Egyptian and international history."

The Index discussed the issue of contested numbers in protests
nationwide. It stated that more than 30 million protesters participated
in nationwide protests against Mohamed Morsi's rule and the Muslim
Brotherhood, from which Morsi hails, demanding their fall and supporting
the transitional period.

On the other hand, the Index stated that less than one million
protesters nationwide took to the streets in support of Morsi,
denouncing what they describe as a military coup on constitutional
legitimacy.

The first three days of July, according to the Index, witnessed a sum
of 420 protests that ended in the toppling of Morsi from power along
with his Cabinet. The numbers of demonstrations then fluctuated
throughout the month, with the least number of demonstrations on 10
July, with only 12 demonstrations nationwide, and the most
demonstrations on 1 July, where 147 demonstrations took to the streets
across the country.

The Democracy Index concludes that Morsi opponents outnumber his
supporters by 30 to one. However, despite what the Index dubs a "vast
difference" in numbers, both Morsi opponents and supporters managed to
organise almost equal numbers of demonstrations.

In July, there were 24 different forms of protesting witnessed: the top
three, in terms of frequency, were marches, where 582 marches were
organised, representing 40.89 percent of all forms of protest;
demonstrations, where 264 demonstrations represented 18.55 percent of
all protests; and roadblocks, at 8.29 percent of all protests.

Cairo took first place among Egyptian governorates for most protests,
witnessing 19.74 percent of total demonstrations. Gharbia governorate
came second with 6.76 percent, while Giza came third with 6.69 percent.
Surprisingly, Alexandria governorate was not in the top three places —
it came fifth, witnessing 5.83 percent of the nation's protests.

Reasons for protesting were divided into two: protesting for political
and civil rights increased 60 percent from June to 89.50 percent in
July, while protesting for economic and social rights marked 10.50
percent of total demonstrations, including denouncing power cuts and
water shortages.

In the categories of the protestors, 37.66 percent were categorised
under political Islamist currents, 27.19 percent as people and citizens,
and 16.2 percent political activists. The least percentage went to
intellectuals, at 0.08 percent.

The Index noted the emergence of "dangerous" developments in protests,
including civilians trying to confront other protesters, which is
attributed by the Index to a lack of security forces on the ground, and
also the use of weapons by Morsi loyalists. The Index also noted the use
of children by pro-Morsi protesters, the same observation made by
UNICEF Tuesday, decrying the use of children and indicating that such
use can have "long-lasting and devastating physical and psychological
impacts on children."

The Index noted an unprecedented general propensity to use violence in protests.
Egyptian labour movements also organised tens of demonstrations, according to the Democracy Index.

Labour demonstrations have called for better work conditions. Some 38
demonstrations were organised in July by factory and company workers; 36
by workers in the educational sector; 31 by the workers in governmental
sectors; 18 in the security sector; and 16 by workers in the medical
sectors.

The Index predicted an increase in the use of violence by pro-Morsi
demonstrators, to the extent of "terrorist attacks" if a political
solution is not reached.

Continued tensions are also predicted between people and protesters,
even if protests are not for political reasons, which might endanger the
"right to organise" in Egypt.

In addition, if security forces do not adopt international standards in
dispersing the pro-Morsi Rabaa Al-Adawiya sit-in, there will be
disputes and conflicts on domestic, regional and international levels,
the Index noted.

The Index recommends adopting lawful means to disperse pro-Morsi
sit-ins, so Egypt can be an example of freedom and democracy, and not
return to the repressive and violent state it was.

“The
study of antisemitism,” admits Bruno Chaouat, a professor of French in
Minnesota, “can be tedious.” This admirably candid confession appears
relatively early in the pages of Resurgent Antisemitism: Global Perspectives, a
collection of nineteen new essays edited by Alvin H. Rosenfeld, the
distinguished director of Indiana University’s Institute for the Study
of Contemporary Antisemitism and author of several major books about the
Holocaust. Chaouat is right, of course: while a single anecdote about
irrational hate can breed sorrow, anger, and/or shock, a thick book
consisting entirely of such material is more likely to be, quite simply,
numbing. It is Rosenfeld’s accomplishment to have assembled a volume
that, rather than seeming to repeat the same points over and over again,
feels consistently fresh as it moves from region to region, approaches
its topic from one angle after another, and serves up new historical
information and cultural insights at every turn.

Most of the essays illuminate the current situation for Jews in a
specific corner of the world: Alejandro Baer sums up antisemitism in
today’s Spain; Zvi Gitelman does the same for the former Communist
countries of Eastern Europe; Szilvia Peremiczky focuses on Hungary and
Romania; Rifat N. Bali, on Turkey. And Paul Bogdanor proffers an account
of antisemitism in modern Britain, as expressed in a thoroughly
ugly-sounding play, “Seven Jewish Children,” by Caryl Churchill, and an
equally horrid little poem about “the Zionist SS,” written by the
well-known poet (and Oxford professor) Tom Paulin and published a few
months before 9/11 in The Observer.

Anna Sommer Schneider, for her part, takes on Poland, noting that
while Pope John Paul II was vividly aware of Polish antisemitism and
addressed it publicly on many occasions, other church leaders have not
been so sensitive to the problem, the result of which is that the years
since his papacy have yielded first-class examples of ecclesiastical
Jew-hatred. Schneider quotes the observation of one Polish priest that
“the Jews are not needed to perpetuate antisemitism. A sick Christianity
is sufficient. And Polish Christinaity – and more precisely, what
dominates in Polish Catholicism – is sick and infected with
anti-Judaism.” Schneider also cites a Polish archbishop’s explanation of
the affliction, rife in his country, known as “the antagonism of
suffering”: while both Jews and Catholics in Poland were victims of the
Nazis, he explains, the Jews were of course the greater victims; yet
Polish Catholics are offended when they feel that their
victimization is being overshadowed by that of the Jews, and the
consequences of this feeling of offense are, shall we say, not always
salutary.

I was especially taken by Eirik Eiglad’s essay on antisemitism in
Norway, not just because I live in the land of the fjords but because
Eiglad does a splendid job of elucidating just how a nation with so few
Jews came to be infected with such a virulent strain of Jew-hatred in
the years after World War II. It all began, he tells us, when Maoists
acquired a “disproportionate influence” on Norwegian society in the
1960s. A significant part of their hideous contribution to postwar
Norwegian thought, alas, was a fierce enmity toward Jews and the Jewish
state. For these Norwegian Maoists, writes Eiglad, “Palestine was the
new Vietnam, and the Israeli state was…a lackey for U.S. imperialism” –
its objective, in the words of one of them, being “to conquer land for
‘European culture.’” The views on Israel and Palestine that, a half
century ago, were held by virtually no one in Norway except for
its small cadre of Maoists are now a key component of the cultural
elite’s orthodoxy in that country, where, Eiglad notes, “explicit calls
for the destruction of Israel are accepted as ‘criticisms of Israeli
policies,’ and anti-Zionist hatred is discreetly tolerated as legitimate
frustration over alleged acts of Israeli inhumanity.”

The one criticism I might make of Eiglad’s piece is that, even though
he does make the important point that many of those former Norwegian
Maoists are now Muslims, he doesn’t place sufficient emphasis on the way
in which Islam factors into antisemitism in today’s Norway. Still, his
relative inattention to this subject is nothing alongside the approach
of Gunther Jikeli, who in an essay entitled “Antisemitism among Young
European Muslims,” makes the mindboggling statement that “issues such as
terrorism plots by young European Muslims, public approval of the
Shari’a, clashes in reaction to cartoons mocking the prophet Muhammad,
public discussions about Muslim women wearing a veil or about outlawing
the burkha, forced marriages, and ‘honor killings’ mostly concern a
minority of Muslims and do not lead to a general alienation of Muslims
from mainstream society.” Jikeli, author of a book (in German) on the
topic of his essay, insists that the real problems involving
Europe’s Muslim communities are anti-Muslim “discrimination,” “racism,”
“xenophobia,” and “negative stereotypes.” As if this weren’t baffling
enough, Jikeli, after supplying a quick overview of European Muslim
attitudes toward Jews as expressed in man-in-the-street interviews,
concludes that the interviewees’ overwhelmingly hostile attitudes “are
fragmented and multifaceted” and “can neither be reduced solely to
hatred of Israel nor to references to Islam or Muslim identity.” For
Jikeli, apparently, the fact that not all of those surveyed explicitly
mentioned Allah, Muhammed, or the Koran while raging violently against
Jews and Israel is reason enough to question the religious roots of
their hatred.

Then there’s Matthias Küntzel, who, writing about antisemitism in the
Middle East, quite properly rejects the argument, advanced by many,
that that antisemitism is the result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
– but also embraces the ridiculous claim that there wasn’t any
appreciable level of anti-Semitism among Muslims in the Middle East
before they were touched by the influence of Hitler. In other words,
“the roots of Arab antisemitism” lie in Nazism – not in the Koran.
(Küntzel, it should be noted, is the author of a 2007 book entitled Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism, and the Roots of 9/11 – which Andrew Bostom, writing at this website shortly after its publication, criticized
at length for absurdly underemphasizing the Koranic origins of both
jihad and Islamic Jew-hatred.) Another view of the Islamic world is
provided by Jamsheed K. Choksy, who, in an essay on Iran, recalls that
2500 years ago, Cyrus the Great practiced “civility” toward Jews, and
that during World War II the Pahlavi dynasty, resisting Nazi pressure,
made clear that it regarded Iranian Jews as full and equal citizens of
the kingdom. Indeed, Choksy points out, “Iran even became a transit
point for approximately 2,000 Jews escaping Europe,” and retained
“vibrant” ties with Israel right up until Khomeini’s revolution – all of
which makes Choksy hopeful for Muslim-Jewish relations in a post-sharia
Iran.

Less encouraging is the essay by Tel Aviv University’s Ilan Avisar,
who, pondering the especially depressing topic of Israeli antisemitism,
declares: “Anti-Zionist argumentation has become a major phenomenon in
Israeli intellectual life.” Emanuele Ottolenghi, who also probes Jewish
antisemitism, is particularly interested in the history of the
self-hating Jew, a type exemplified by “Jewish converts, like Pablo
Cristiani, who led the medieval trials against the Talmud, and Alfonso
de Valladolid, who wrote ferocious anti-Jewish polemics in the
fourteenth century.” Dina Porat explores Holocaust denial; Tammi
Rossman-Benjamin examines the way in which victim-group studies at U.S.
colleges have intensified antisemitism on campus; and then there’s
Chaouat’s piece, in which, among much else, he tells us about a
colleague at the University of Minnesota who ranted at a faculty party
that Caouat’s department, with a total of two Jewish professors out of
twelve, was a “Jewish enclave” with a “Jewish agenda,” and so forth.
“What we have here,” Chaouat observes, is “a textbook case:
postcolonial, anti-Israeli ideology directly inspired by Edward Said,
coupled with a traditional antisemitism.” Welcome to the American
academy, A.D. 2013.

One of this collection’s most eminent contributors is Robert S.
Wistrich, who heads up the antisemitism center at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem and has written several books on the subject. Here, in
addition to outlining the role of the USSR in turning the UN against
Israel and in shaping its post-1967 image “as a racist, Nazi state,”
Wistrich explains how Soviet rhetoric about Israel was picked up “by
Arab intellectuals, nationalists, Islamists, and Marxists” – and,
reaching across the Atlantic (as these essays otherwise seldom do), how
antisemitism in Venezuela surged under the Hugo Chávez regime. Finally,
Rosenfeld himself winds up the anthology with an essay asking, apropos
of antisemitism around the world today: “How bad is it likely to get?” The
pages that follow, in which he ticks off gloomy predictions by one
respected observer of current events after another, are sobering indeed.
(Here’s Ron Rosenbaum in 2004: “The second Holocaust. It’s a phrase we
may have to begin thinking about. A possibility we may have to
contemplate. A reality we may have to witness.”)

This is a serious book – an important book. Yet it is also a book,
alas, in which several of the contributors seem to shy away from
spelling out the role of Islamic theology itself – of, most
fundamentally, the actual contents of the Koran – in Islamic
antisemitism. Yes, the Nazi-Muslim connections are important; but the
reason why Nazi attitudes toward Jews took root so swiftly in the dry
sand of the Muslim world, and flowered so lushly, is that they differed
very little, in substance, from attitudes that are articulated
repeatedly throughout Islam’s holiest of books. I can understand, to be
sure, why authors on the subject of Jew-hatred might want to take extra
pains to avoid saying anything that might expose them to charges of
Muslim-hatred; but let’s face it, those charges will be leveled anyway.
What matters is the truth: and the truth is that Islam, from its very
beginnings, has demonized Jews, and that this demonization is not a
peripheral but a central element of the Muslim faith. Unless and until
we recognize this fact, and address it head-on, we will not get very far
at all in our effort to challenge the toxic Jew-hatred that is on the
rise everywhere on the planet where the followers of Muhammed make their
homes.

The
David Horowitz Freedom Center’s public opposition to an extreme
anti-Israel candidate for UC Student Regent has helped to trigger a
national conversation about the growing problem of anti-Semitism on
college campuses.

UC Berkeley student Sadia Saifuddin was recently appointed student
regent-designate for the University of California over protests by the
Freedom Center and a few others who opposed her nomination on the
grounds that her extreme anti-Israel views and activism with
organizations known for their anti-Semitism make her unfit to represent
all students in the UC system. The controversy sparked by the Freedom
Center’s opposition has become national news.

During her years at Berkeley, Saifuddin was a leader in two Muslim
Brotherhood-linked organizations, the Muslim Students Association and
Students for Justice in Palestine, which regularly invite anti-Semitic
speakers to UC campuses and sponsor an annual hate-week known as
“Israeli Apartheid Week.” She was also an active participant in the
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement which calls for the
destruction of the Jewish state and led vicious attacks on Tammi
Rossman-Benjamin, a lecturer at UC Santa Cruz who has dedicated herself
to protecting Jewish students from anti-Semitism on UC campuses.

In an open letter sent to the University of California Board of
Regents, the Freedom Center’s chairman, David Horowitz, and director of
campus campaigns, Jeffrey Wienir, urged the Board to reconsider their
selection: “Appointing Sadia Saifuddin to the Board of Regents would be
an offense to the ‘Principles of Community’ for UC Berkeley which are
supposed to be core values in the UC system, and which call on UC
students to ‘respect the differences as well as the commonalities that
bring us together and call for civility and respect in our personal
interactions,’’ the letter stated. “How is it respectful for the
organizations that Sadia Saifuddin represents to sponsor ‘Israeli
Apartheid Weeks’ which support terrorist organizations like Hamas and
call for the destruction of the Jewish state?”

Despite the regents’ failure to reconsider their nomination of
Saifuddin, the Freedom Center’s protests garnered widespread press
coverage of Saifuddin’s questionable ties to anti-Semitic organizations
and helped to raise awareness of the often-threatening environment
confronting Jewish students on UC campuses.

In covering the story,
the Associated Press framed their coverage in light of the Freedom
Center’s objections: “The University of California’s governing board
confirmed its first Muslim student member Wednesday, despite some Jewish
groups’ claims that she marginalized Jewish students and promoted an
anti-Israel agenda.” The AP story about Saifuddin’s controversial
nomination was picked up by dozens of other newspapers and websites.

In an editorial in the Los Angeles Times,
the editors offered their congratulations to Saifuddin but noted that
the “one glitch” in her resume is her outspoken criticism of Israel
which the editors labeled “the third rail of UC politics.” The Times
editorial went on to quote David Horowitz’s statement in his open
letter that “If [Saifuddin] were confirmed, it would set a dangerous
precedent to encourage anti-Semitism on campus, which is already a big
problem in the UC system.”

We may have lost the battle against Saifuddin’s confirmation as UC
Regent. But by sparking a national conversation about how her
anti-Israel activism and leadership in organizations known for their
anti-Semitism should disqualify her for such a position, we are a step
closer to winning the war.

By all accounts, the
attack was planned with care and executed with precision. At two
notorious Iraqi prisons, Abu Ghraib and Taji, al-Qaida combatants last
week used mortars, small arms, suicide bombers and assault forces to
free 400 prisoners, including several who had been on death row.
Al-Qaida spokesmen hailed those released as mujahedeen -- holy warriors
-- who will rejoin the jihad on battlefields throughout the Middle East
and beyond.

Where had al-Qaida
gone? Dig deep in the memory hole -- all the way to last summer. At the
prestigious Aspen Security Forum, Peter Bergen,
CNN's national-security analyst and a director at the New America
Foundation, gave a talk titled "Time to declare victory: Al-Qaida is
defeated."

Lt. Col. (ret.) Thomas
Lynch III, a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense
University, was writing and speaking widely on the same theme. And U.S.
President Barack Obama's re-election campaign was making similar claims,
for example, "the tide of war is receding" and "Osama bin Laden is dead
and General Motors is alive." Mitt Romney hardly attempted to rebut the
thesis.

I don't like to say "I
told you so" -- oh, whom am I kidding? Of course I do. But in this
instance, there is more than ample justification. Scholars at the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, in particular Thomas Joscelyn and
Bill Roggio, have argued consistently
and forcefully, based on solid evidence, that the May 2011 killing of
Osama bin Laden, followed by the elimination of other al-Qaida leaders,
did not, by any stretch of the imagination, mean the demise of al-Qaida.

Instead, it led
al-Qaida to adapt, evolve and morph. It is essential to study these
changes and probe their strategic significance -- an assignment unlikely
to be seriously undertaken by those convinced al-Qaida swims with the
fishes.

On July 18, Joscelyn testifiedbefore
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, attempting to make clear to
members of Congress that al-Qaida has become "a global international
terrorist network … that, despite setbacks, contests for territory
abroad and still poses a threat to U.S. interests both overseas and at
home."

The nodes of al-Qaida's
network are affiliates that pledge "bayat," unswerving allegiance, to
"core al-Qaida" while retaining substantial operational autonomy. That
makes them harder for intelligence operatives to monitor, penetrate,
weaken or eliminate. Nine years ago, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies's Jonathan Schanzer wrote a book called "Al-Qaeda's Armies,"
predicting that such al-Qaida affiliates would increasingly constitute
the organization's "outer perimeter and the pools from which new
terrorists can be drawn. Indeed, al-Qaeda affiliates, in the Arab world
and beyond, represent the next generation of the global terrorist
threat."

Since the waving of the
"mission accomplished" banner last summer, al-Qaida affiliates have
killed an American ambassador in Libya, and hoisted their flag above the
U.S. Embassy in Cairo. They have taken the lead in the rebellion
against the Assad dynasty in Syria. They have fought an American-backed
government in Yemen, and conquered much of Mali until French troops
drove them back into the desert. They continue to slaughter Christians
in Nigeria -- more than a thousand last year. They have regenerated in
Iraq since the departure of American troops, killing 700 peoplein
July alone. They remain undefeated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, poised
for the opportunity further American troop withdrawals will present.
Last week, they attacked Turkish diplomats
in Somalia. On Monday, al-Qaida's close ally, the Taliban, attacked a
jail in northwest Pakistan freeing as many as 200 prisoners.

Joscelyn and Roggio
have been making another argument that has challenged the conventional
wisdom: They have maintained that al-Qaida has long had a working
relationship with Iran's rulers. Two years ago, the U.S. government
formally affirmed that
hypothesis, yet now as then, many Iran experts deny the links, arguing
that there is no way that Sunni al-Qaida and Shiite Iran could
collaborate.

What those experts fail
to grasp is that Iran's rulers and al-Qaida's commanders, despite very
real theological disagreements and differing strategic interests --
indeed, they are literally at each other's throats in Syria -- are
united in their commitment to what they see as the moral imperative of
Islamic supremacy and domination. Their shared goal is a global
revolution leading to the defeat and/or submission of those they regard
not just as inferior, but also as "enemies of God." America and Israel
top both their lists.

This worldview is very
difficult for Westerners to take seriously. Surely, there must be a less
medieval explanation -- perhaps grievances that can be addressed or
fears that can be assuaged. But this conflict is deeper and more
complex. Until that is understood, the U.S. and its allies cannot
possibly devise a coherent strategic response -- which is why 34 years
after Iran's revolution and 12 years after 9/11 we still don't have one.
That is another point that Joscelyn and Roggio have long been making,
and that too many in the government and the foreign policy community
have been either unable or unwilling to grasp.

Clifford D. May is president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security.Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=5209Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Now
that most protests have come to an end and the rest of the world is
focusing on Egypt rather than Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan has decided that the time is ripe for some good, old-fashioned
revenge. Turkish style.

As I reported earlier for FrontPage Magazine, it started early in
July, when a few journalists were publicly harrangued for their coverage
of the protests in Gezi Park. One of them was even publicly called a “traitor“ by the mayor of Ankara, a member of the prime minister’s party, the AK Parti (Justice and Development Party).

In the following weeks, as many as 22 journalists and columnists have been fired
since the start of the famous protests in Istanbul and other major
Turkish cities. Thirty-seven others had to accept a “forced leave of
absence,” meaning that they had to pretend to enjoy some precious
off-time, while they, in fact, were desperate to get back to work.

One of the fired columnists is Yavuz Baydar from the daily Sabah. His first mistake was, as Sabah’s
ombudsman, publishing letters from readers that criticized the
government’s stance on the protests. After that he went even further by
writing a column related to the protests and media-government relations.
The editorial board refused to publish his piece, however.

At that moment, Baydar decided to take a leave of absence. Instead of
keeping silent about the stranglehold in which the government holds the
media, he decided to speak out. In a column for the New York Times,
he explained that media moguls are undermining the “basic principles of
democracy” in Turkey. He added that media “bosses fear losing
lucrative business deals with the government.”

After having written the opinion piece for the New York Times, Baydar once again tried to get a similar critical column published in Sabah. Instead, he was fired.

Many other journalists have have gone through the same ordeal in the
last few weeks. And they are the lucky ones. According to Reporters
Without Borders’ (RWB) World Press Freedom Index,
the situation has gotten so out of hand that Turkey is now “the world’s
biggest prison for journalists.” Yes, the country beats Afghanistan,
North Korea, China, Iraq and Iran in that regard. Of course more
journalists may be killed in some of those countries, but with regards
to locking them up, Turkey leads them all.

Apparently, Erdogan is quite happy with that remarkable record.
Instead of backing down, his government is arresting even more people.
Not only journalists, but whomever has the audacity to criticize the
AKP. For instance, nine more Twitter- users and protesters, living in five different cities, were recently detained.

At the same time, two “suspects” were sent to court on July 30 to
face charges of “opposing the law on public marches and
demonstrations.” Their crime? They had organized an iftar dinner in Gezi
Park. An iftar dinner is the evening meal that breaks the fast during
Ramadan. Erdogan organizes such dinners for his own supporters, but when
those critical of him try to do the same they are considered enemies of
the state, and quickly detained.

University students are in trouble too, for it was announced
Tuesday that students who engage (or engaged) in “resistance, stage
boycotts, chant slogans or become involved in similar activites” will no
longer be granted student loans. The Higher Education Loans and
Dormitories Institution (KYK) says that such activities constitute “a
violation of the right to an education.”

That the constitutional and human right to free speech is being
violated by punishing students apparently does not bother the
Institution one bit. “In the education institutions he/she attends, in
its extensions in the dormitory he/she resides, outside of the education
institution or the dormitory, either solely or collectively, in
whichever form, those who are concerned with events of anarchy and
terrorism, engaging in behaviors violating the right to education
(resistance, boycott, occupation, writing, painting, slogan-chanting, et
cetera), whether attempted partially or fully,” are ineligible.
Note how the KYK uses words such as “anarchy” and “terrorism”: These
are the same phrases Erdogan uses to describe the Gezi Park protesters.
When he is not calling them “piteous rodents,” that is. Somewhat surprisingly, this report was later denied by Youth and Sports Minister Suat Kilic.
However, according to Hurriyet Daily News, the anti-protesting policy has been in place for several years, but has simply not been implemented. That might, the Turkish English-language newspaper says, change this year around.

Going after students in this fashion would undoubtedly make sense to
the increasingly paranoid and authoritarian Erdogan since the protests
were led by them and soccer (football) supporters … which leads me to another measure
the AKP government may take according to the Interior Minister:
outlawing “chanting political or ideological slogans at
stadiums/matches.” If Erdogan and his allies have their way, no opinions
critical of the AKP will be heard on campus, in stadiums, in parks, or
on the streets. In other words: anywhere.

If Erdogan continues down this path, freedom of speech will be no
more in Turkey. Sadly, I have little reason to believe that terrible
fate can be averted. There still are no alternatives for voters who have
had enough of the AKP, except the notoriously corrupt (secular) CHP and
the radically-nationalist MHP. For many, that isn’t a choice at all.

Additionally, increasingly more people are allowing the government to
silence them out of fear for their livelihoods. After all, students
want – no, need – loans and journalists need to make
money. Rather than growing a backbone and continuing their resistance
regardless of the price to be paid, many opt for the easy way out:
remaining silent, not saying a word about what they really think.
That’s why the freedom of speech may not only be on trial in Turkey,
but may very well have already been sentenced to death. The prosecution
and the judge want to end its life, and dissenting jurors, who
understand what is at stake, are too afraid to intervene on the
defendant’s behalf.

by Seth MandelThe decision by Tom Cotton, a rising Republican
star and congressman from Arkansas, to challenge Democratic Senator Mark
Pryor fits seamlessly into the news of the week. Cotton’s reputation as
a foreign-policy hawk and a veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars,
as well as his age (36), will undoubtedly cast him as heralding the
arrival of reinforcements for the GOP’s internationalist wing.

In Politico’s story
on Cotton’s candidacy the author even gives more prominence to his role
as a “counterweight” to Rand Paul and Ted Cruz (though Cotton shares
Cruz’s Ivy League pedigree) than to the possibility Cotton could help
the GOP win back the Senate, though the latter is arguably the more
significant aspect of his candidacy. But national-security rhetoric is
what, still more than a year out from this Senate race, the political
sphere is looking for, and on this Cotton doesn’t disappoint. There are
few young Republicans willing to say things like “I think that George
Bush largely did have it right,” as Cotton said to Politico in an
earlier interview. He went on to state:

That we can’t wait for dangers to
gather on the horizon, that we can’t let the world’s most dangerous
people get the world’s most dangerous weapons and that we have to be
willing to defend our interests and the safety of our citizens abroad
even if we don’t get the approval of the United Nations.

On this, Cotton’s Senate candidacy joins that of Liz Cheney, daughter
of the former vice president, who is running a primary challenge
against Wyoming Senator Mike Enzi. Though foreign policy doesn’t usually
play much of a role in Senate elections (or even, arguably,
presidential elections), this debate should not surprise. The GOP is
(mostly) in the wilderness, a time when parties traditionally look
inward and chart their future path back to power.

The Republican Party’s identity on fiscal issues is more settled than
its foreign policy identity. Neither the libertarians nor the
internationalists campaign for tax increases, but they do disagree on
foreign affairs. Just how even that disagreement is remains up for
debate. When asked whether retrenchment chic is gaining a wide following
in the GOP, Weekly Standard editor Bill Kristol said: “I think Christie-Cotton is much more likely in 2016 than Paul-Amash.”

That is true enough in that particular hypothetical, and the
temporary halt in hostilities called by Chris Christie and Rand Paul may
give it an added boost. Paul proposed
a beer summit between the two men, an invitation Christie rejected
while taking a parting shot at Paul. How this ceasefire came about can
be interpreted in one of two ways. Paul is surely hoping it makes him
look mature and statesmanlike, sending out a peace offering and backing
off, citing concerns for the party. Christie, on the other hand, seemed
happy to keep swinging away, as if Paul was the one who had had enough.

Paul is also coming off a setback in the Senate, where his attempt to
cancel American foreign aid to Egypt was brushed aside by his party and
soundly defeated on the Senate floor.
Christie may think his side has the momentum–and in any case he enjoys a
good verbal sparring too much to want to pipe down. But the interesting
question here relates more to what each combatant has to lose in the
exchange. Christie’s weakness in a presidential primary contest would be
the suspicion with which the conservative base views him after his
embrace of the president. For Paul it’s the question of his mainstream
appeal and electability.

Paul hinted at this aspect of the dust-up in his beer-summit
proposal: “I think it’s time to dial it down. I think we’ve got enough
Democrats to attack. I’ve said my piece on this. I don’t like
Republicans attacking Republicans because it doesn’t help the party grow
bigger.” But that’s not exactly accurate in this instance: Christie
probably thinks he can win over independents and undecideds by
establishing himself as a mainstream alternative to a supposedly fringe
element in his party.

Whether or not Paul actually belongs to a “fringe” is far from
settled. As I’ve written before, there has always been a strain of
conservatives who genuinely worry that the national security state
represents a military twin of the New Deal: expensive, secretive–and
now, with the NSA scandals, seemingly intrusive–bureaucracies whose
budgets grow inexorably even at a time when conservatives broadly favor
austerity.

Those who support a robust American presence in the world counter,
correctly, that Western prosperity relies on the peace kept by America
and the orderly system of global trade that is highly dependent on the
U.S. In many cases foreign aid, too, is a bargain–for the influence it
earns the American government abroad, the prevention of armed conflict
in some cases, and even the direct economic benefits it secures by
spurring foreign investment in the American defense sector. Christie may
not have the ear of the base when he makes these points–and the same
can be said for veteran senators like John McCain and Lindsey Graham–but
Cotton does, and that’s why his candidacy is already generating this
attention, and will continue to do so.Seth MandelSource: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/08/01/tom-cotton-and-the-foreign-policy-debate/#more-830293Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Thursday, August 1, 2013

With the beginning of
meetings in Washington, Mahmoud Abbas announced that in a future
Palestinian state "we would not see the presence of a single Israeli --
civilian or soldier -- on our lands."

It is possible that the
Palestinian Authority's president was referring to the land swap
formula the negotiations are predicated upon. Within such a framework,
Israel would retain large settlement blocs, and perhaps Abbas was
hinting that he would not accept Israeli enclaves inside a sovereign
Palestinian state. Surely the president, known for his Holocaust denial,
meant to say, "Palestinian area completely free of Jews."

Also this week, right
in the center of Israel at the junction along Highway 4 near Moshav Beit
Hanania at the foot of the Carmel mountain range, stood Sammi el-Ali,
the parliamentary assistant for MK Jamal Zahalka (National Democratic
Assembly), leading a protest rally from the village of Jisr az-Zarqa
while proudly waiving a Palestinian flag and demonstration signs.

Ali is a central and
vociferous activist in the committee trying to expropriate agricultural
lands from Beit Hanania for the Arba village's real estate ventures,
which he claims are the result of demographic growth. The expropriation
of this land -- which serves Ali and his people in their desire to raise
apartment blocs for the village's Arab residents -- will cost the tax
payer both in the loss of agricultural lands and in an investment of
over half a billion shekels to build bypass roads and bridges.

The situation is
Kafkaesque: While Israeli leaders are busy preparing a deal that will
provide two states for two peoples, Ali is protesting with the people of
his village just a few meters away from the land he claims for himself
and his friends. He is waging his battle in and against the Israeli
homefront. With Palestinian flags at his back, he defiantly flashes the
Arafat-like "V" sign (all of this is Palestine) toward the abashed gazes
of Beit Hanania's residents, who shamefully swallow their outrage. Ali
stands proud, in all his democratic glory, while voicing nationalistic
Palestinian slogans, including a few "for the Arab lands of the Negev."

Something strange is
happening in the Jewish state: Abbas is declaring a "territory free of
Jews" but is demanding the release of Arab-Israeli murderers, those who
have killed Jews in the name of the Palestinian problem but who were
never under any form of Palestinian jurisdiction. Arab citizens of
Israel, protesting with Palestinian flags in their hands, are demanding
state lands that never belonged to them within the 1967 borders [sic], and
Arab MKs are telling their youth to refrain from performing any type of
national service. On top of all this, Palestinian leaders continue to
demand a "return" of refugees, to Israel of all places, which they call a
state of Apartheid, oppression and occupation, and not to the
Palestinian state they are seeking to establish.

The strangest
phenomenon is that in Umm al-Fahm of all places, the hotbed of hatred
toward the Jews and the state, residents are rejecting any proposal that
includes "freeing themselves from the occupation" and transferring,
with their lands and property, to the jurisdiction of an independent
Palestinian state, the same one that will be "clean of Jews."

How pathetic it is to
recall that every time peace efforts have failed and it was apparent
that the Palestinians, despite the generous offers they received, were
neither ready "nor able" to reach an agreement and recognize the state
of Israel (fill in the blank here with the unmentionable). The shocked
and dumbstruck Left would gather itself and again blame the Israeli
negotiators for the failure.

A Palestinian friend
used an Arab allegory to tell me bluntly, "Just as you came empty
handed, so you will leave." In the jails for security prisoners, the
murderers know they will go free. Those who planned and carried out
terrorist attacks know in advance that if they are caught, they will be
released and will return to their activities. The refugees are certain
they will return to Palestine, in other words to Jaffa, Acre and Haifa.
Hamas, the "rejectionist organizations" and the refugees continue to
demand their "return" to Palestine.

According to my friend,
most Palestinians are of the mind that Abbas barely represents himself,
and any agreement he signs, much like the ancient Treaty of
Hudaybiyyah, will be broken and the conflict will resume -- only this
time under more optimal conditions.

As for Justice Minister Tzipi
Livni, my Palestinian friend left me with one more allegory, this time
about a woman who "wistfully returns to her old habits." Because Mrs.
Livni refuses to kill hope with the weapon of cynicism, we can only hope
that the paper the deal is signed on is soft and gentle.

European governments speak as
enemies of Israel, behave as enemies of Israel and take decisions only
enemies of Israel would take. They are at war with Israel. There is no
doubt they hope for results similar to those at Auschwitz, just by other
means. If moral values are what Israelis and Jews are looking for in
Europe, they are looking in the wrong place.

For nearly two millennia, the European continent has been a land of
persecution and hatred for the Jewish people. The blood libels and the
vilest accusations against the Jews have been accompanied by violence,
pogroms, and confinement in ghettos and of course death camps. Eight
decades ago, in the 1930's, anti-Semitism was considered honorable and
aroused few objections. Later, the Nazi machine set into motion the
"final solution," and zealous collaborators existed in virtually all of
continental Europe. "Willing executioners" were not only Germans -- far
from it.

After 1945, anti-Semitism suddenly became unmentionable, and European
anti-Semites had to be silent. But they did not disappear. In the
1960s, after the Six Day War, a new way of being anti-Semitic emerged
that allowed them to recycle their old way: they could not be
"anti-Semites", but they could be "anti-Israelis". They rejoiced when
General de Gaulle in France spoke of the Jews as a "proud and
domineering people," and saw those words as a kind of official sanction,
a green light. Since then, "anti-Israelism" rapidly became mainstream.
European politicians, diplomats and journalists have done their best
never to miss an opportunity to berate and criticize Israel.
Anti-Semitic terms used in the 1930s began to be used again, this time
to describe the Jewish State.

When the "Palestinian cause" appeared, it immediately became a sacred
cause in Europe, never mind what sort of values or governance it
espoused. When it seemed possible to accuse Jews of "behaving like
Nazis," the opportunity was not missed.

Today, hatred of Israel is one of the most shared and prominent
feelings in Europe. Using anti-Semitic terms to criticize Israel is
common, normal and "politically correct." Fighting for the "Palestinian
cause" in the name of "peace" is the only fight that can bring together
politicians from the left and the right. Any terrorist attack against
Israel is almost unanimously described as a fruit of the "cycle of
violence" and of "Israeli intransigence," never mind that it is actually
the Palestinians who historically have been intransigent. An Israeli
response to a terrorist attack is immediately criticized by European
diplomats as "disproportionate." A Palestinian attack is never
criticized at all.

When anti-Israeli groups rally to boycott Israel and violently invade
stores selling Israeli products, the only condemnations to be heard are
from Jewish organizations.

It is in this context that the recent EU decision to ban its members
from dealing with Jewish communities and with any Jew living beyond
"1967 borders" must be viewed.

European leaders who took the decision, and those who approved it,
know perfectly well that there has never been a "1967 border," only
armistice lines drawn in 1949, but they act as if they did not know.
European leaders know perfectly well how indefensible the "1967 borders"
are for the Israeli army, but again they act as if they did not know.

European leaders also know that the "1967 borders" place the Old City
of Jerusalem and the Western Wall and the Temple Mount (the holiest
site of Judaism) outside the boundaries of Israel. They know, too, what
the loss of these would mean for Israel and the Jewish people, but they
stand their ground. They know, as well, that their position is similar
to that of the Palestinian Authority, which seeks ethnic cleansing of
Judea, Samaria and eastern Jerusalem, but self-righteously insist. They
know that the Golan Heights, under Israeli law and administration since
1981, was used for years by Syria to shoot down from the plateau at the
farmers in the valley, and are fully aware of the situation in Syria and
its al-Qaeda affiliates near the Golan Heights today, but nonetheless
stand fast.

For more than four decades, several European countries, and the
European Union itself, have established close and compromising
relationships with various regimes in the Arab world. They have become
prisoners of what is called Europe's "Arab Policy" -- with full support
for the "Palestinian cause" and "anti-Israeli" activities and movements,
regardless of how thoroughly detrimental these might be to their own
survival -- as so presented by Bat Ye'or in her prophetic book, Eurabia,
published in 2005.

European leaders who voted for the ban and those who approved it also
stand their ground in part because migration flows have changed the
demographics of Europe, and because in Europe the number of Muslims -- a
significant proportion of whom have become radicalized -- has sharply
increased. Europe today is therefore not only a prisoner of Europe's
"Arab Policy," support for the "Palestinian cause" and "anti-Israeli"
activities and movements: it is also hostage to its Muslim population,
to Islamists, and to the immense success of the campaign of intimidation
waged against it by Muslims, such that any incident, or any political
position unpleasant to Muslims, can lead to riots.

When Israel's leaders appeal to Europe's "moral values," they should
realize that when the subject is Jews, almost all Europeans abandoned
moral values seven decades ago, and the same may be said for their views
of Israel. If moral values are what the Israelis and Jews are looking
for in Europe, they are looking in the wrong place.

Europe has once again chosen cowardice and complicity.

European governments and the European Union are the biggest donors of
financial assistance to the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian
Authority. They are also the biggest donors to most anti-Israel
movements operating in Europe and in Israel. They in fact funded BDS
(Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movements long before they took the
decision that now makes BDS official.

The Israeli government has warned European governments and the
European Union that this may trigger a "serious relationship crisis
between Europe and Israel;" in reality the crisis has been ongoing for a
long time.

On July 26, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon ordered the Coordinator of
Government Activities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to turn down any
request by the European Union concerning these regions.

In an article published July 27 in the Jerusalem Post, Caroline Glick
suggested further Israeli responses to the European decision: "passage
in the Knesset of a law requiring all Israeli entities that agree to
operate under the EU's funding guidelines to register as foreign agents
and report all EU contributions." "Those contributions," she
added,"should be taxed at the highest corporate tax rate."

As "Area C" is the area of Judea and Samaria where Israel exercises
most civil and military authorities, Glick writes that Israel should
"suspend all EU projects in Area C. Future EU projects should be subject
to intense scrutiny by the civil administration. Israel's default
position should be to reject, rather than approve such requests, given
their hostile intent."

Israel's leaders surely see that European governments and the EU are not friends of Israel.European governments and the EU have never been friends of Israel.
Now, they are less friends of Israel than ever. The likelihood that they
will adopt a more positive attitude toward Israel is nil.

They speak as enemies of Israel. They behave as enemies of Israel. They take decisions only enemies of Israel would take.

They are at war with Israel. They do not wage war directly: they
engage battle through other channels, hypocritically, viciously, and
cowardly.

In the 1940s, Europe was the continent of Auschwitz. Today, Europe is
a continent where politicians and technocrats support what Abba Eban
called the "Auschwitz borders". There is no doubt they hope for results
similar to those obtained in Auschwitz, just by other means.