The number of concussion-related lawsuits against the NFL continues to grow, with more than 3,000 former players now involved. Sporting News went to a legal expert to help provide the framework of the cases, as well as the possible implication for the league—which has billions of dollars in legal damages at stake.

How many cases—and what kind—have been filed against the NFL, and how many players are we talking about?

As of mid-August, there were 135 cases with 3,402 former players, according to The Washington Times. The plaintiffs range from Hall of Fame running backs Tony Dorsett and Eric Dickerson to former kicker Garo Yepremian. A “master complaint” was filed in federal court in June in Philadelphia, consolidating under U.S. District Judge Anita Brody more than 80 concussion-related suits at the time. The first concussion lawsuit was filed in California state court by 75 former NFL players and 51 spouses on July 19, 2011. This mass action lawsuit was filed against the NFL, NFL Properties and helmet-manufacturing company Riddell. The first federal lawsuit against the NFL was filed on August 17, 2011, in the U.S. District Court by seven players and their families, including Ray Easterling, who later died of a self-inflicted gunshot.

Many of these lawsuits claim that the NFL fraudulently concealed long-term effects of head trauma. The link between concussions and brain diseases is alleged to have been known by the NFL for decades, but that such information was withheld from the players. The lawsuits against Riddell claim strict liability for defective design and manufacturing, alleging that the helmets did not provide adequate protection against foreseeable risk of concussive brain injuries, failure to warn and negligence.

What is the league arguing in its defense?

The league will make several arguments:

Reasonable care/no negligence. The NFL will claim the league has long made player safety a priority and there was no intention to mislead players or deliberately conceal the impact of repeated head trauma. In addition, the league will argue that any long-term dangers of head injuries were unknown to the NFL.

Preemption. This is based on the idea the collective bargaining agreements that began in 1968 have governed the relationship between the players and owners. This has been a powerful argument that was used by owners in 2011 to prevent the players from obtaining a court order to end the lockout. The NFL was also successful with the preemption argument when the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to allow the widow of Vikings offensive lineman Korey Stringer to pursue a wrongful death suit in 2001.

By arguing the issue is a matter under the CBA, the NFL will say it should be resolved through the grievance process as stipulated in the agreement. The NFL will ask the court to dismiss the case and refer it back to the NFL arbitration process. The private arbitration process usually offers dramatically lower awards than those made by juries, and the removal from public scrutiny would benefit the NFL as it would not feel forced to offer an otherwise more generous settlement.

Assumption of risk. This means participants agree to the ordinary parts of the game. Under this theory, the league will claim that former players consented in advance to take any chance of injury from the known risks of playing football. Consequently, the league would be unburdened of its legal duty as a result of the players’ acceptance of the risk and therefore can’t be held liable of negligence.

Contributory negligence (or comparative negligence). Under this defense, the NFL will assert that players contributed to their injuries. The league will argue that when players who suffered concussions didn’t report this to the team’s medical staff or indicated they were ready to play while still suffering the effects of a concussion, the players’ injuries were, in part, due to their own negligence.

Causation. The league will examine injuries in college, high school or youth football, along with other outside factors such as alcohol or drug abuse, financial problems, and other physical and mental issues that may have caused the players’ current difficulties.

The players know football is a violent sport. So why do they think they have a case?

While the players may agree they knew about the violence of football, they may argue this would not clear the NFL of fraud from deliberately concealing information about concussions and brain diseases. If players were unaware of the long-term effects, they would be unable to assume such risks. They may argue they would have stopped playing if this information were available, and therefore their current difficulties are attributed to fraud committed by the NFL.

Is a class-action suit possible?

Considering the various elements of the lawsuits—and the increasing number of them—a class action is likely. Some estimate there might eventually be 5,000 former NFL players who join the litigation, making it impracticable to hear each case.

A class-action lawsuit would be an important milestone. This could significantly increase the potential damages the NFL may have to pay, as such a case would represent all individuals in the class (I have seen estimates from 12,000 to 20,000 former NFL players). The potential of a larger damages award increases the leverage of the plaintiffs in any settlement discussions.

Would OSHA become involved since this ultimately involves safety on the job?

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is a federal agency under the U.S. Department of Labor that oversees employees in private industry. Historically, OSHA has done little regarding on-field working condition issues with professional football.

However, the government is more likely to look into professional sports following a death. OSHA conducted an investigation following Stringer’s death from heat stroke in 2001 and eventually cleared the Vikings of any direct responsibility after determining the team took the proper steps for safety under its guidelines.

With regard to the issue of head-trauma cases involving former players, considering the breadth and magnitude of the problem and the fact OSHA examined the Stringer case, it is likely the agency will look into this issue, especially given the magnitude of former players who have sued the NFL and the recent high-profile deaths of players such as Easterling, Dave Duerson, and Junior Seau.

What amount could the NFL have to pay if it loses?

The amount of damages is difficult to predict.

First, the total number of plaintiffs who will sue the NFL is still unknown. Second, the extent of each plaintiff’s damages is still undetermined. There are some who are allegedly suffering the effects of repeated concussions, while others have only recently retired and don’t know the eventual extent of their physical and/or mental problems. This makes it difficult to put an amount for each former player, but using a $500,000 award average for each player (Derrick Walker’s lawsuit filed in July seeks at least that amount in damages for multiple concussions and blows to the head suffered throughout his nine-year NFL career) and the estimated total number of former players or their families who are impacted, the NFL could face a loss of $10 billion.

How will that money be divided among the plaintiffs?

The court, probably in a separate damages phase, can determine the amount each individual plaintiff will receive. In the alternative, looking at how families of 9/11 victims were compensated, the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund awarded $7 billion to 97 percent of the families. A special master of the fund, Kenneth Feinberg, was appointed to develop and administer all aspects of the program. He determined the amount of compensation for each victim’s family.

Bottom line: what’s the worst-case scenario for the NFL? Could this bankrupt the league?

If the NFL loses a class-action lawsuit, it’s possible the league could go bankrupt—although not likely with the estimated league revenues of $9 billion a year. The NFL has some insurance coverage, and how much of the damages/settlement will be paid by insurers is difficult to determine. One insurance company, Alterra America Insurance, has filed a lawsuit in New York arguing that it should not be required to cover the NFL in concussion-related litigation.

One possible comparison is the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement from November 1998 that settled for a minimum of $206 billion over the first 25 years of the agreement. Furthermore, a number of companies that were defendants in asbestos-related tort cases were forced into bankruptcy as claims against them continued to multiply, so however unlikely bankruptcy may be for the NFL, it’s still feasible.

Is there an impact beyond the NFL? How does this affect youth football leagues and helmet companies?

The litigation already has had an impact beyond the NFL, some of it positive. Awareness of the head trauma issue, more attention on the medical aspects and 38 states and the District of Columbia having legislation dealing with concussions in youth sports are all good for the sport and its participants. It could also impact the decisions families make on whether to let their children participate in football. There are reports from Minnesota that there has been a drop of up to 20 percent in youth football signups in 2012.

There may also be an impact on youth and high school football if insurance companies concerned about litigation either increase premiums and/or decide not to offer coverage for football programs. Helmet companies, which are also named defendants in many of the lawsuits, may be significantly impacted financially if they lose in litigation. In the long term, the helmet companies could also bear the cost of increased insurance coverage.

How long will it take for this litigation to play out?

Assuming there’s no pre-trial settlement, there will be motions, discovery, collecting information, expert witnesses (especially with the medical-related elements in this litigation). Some have speculated it will not reach the court until 2018. Then there would be appeals, so we’re talking lots of years.

Editor’s note: The Sporting News interviewed noted sports legal expert Dr. Glenn M. Wong, of the Mark H. McCormack Sport Management Department, Isenberg School of Management, at the University of Massachusetts, for this report.