After you got everything off your chest, I’d point out that there is a legitimate fear of Ebola. That 70% of the people that contracted it, died. That it is over THERE, and Americans don’t want it over HERE. That we have enough deadly diseases here that you can’t catch (e.g., cancer). Americans don’t want a disease here that you can catch.

I know…it’s very difficult to catch Ebola, but you have to admit, some people missed the hygiene class and all the repeat sessions. If one of them gets Ebola…

I’d point out that you treated people who had Ebola and that a couple of other people who treated people with Ebola contracted the disease.

I’d point out that it’s very unlikely you, like many of the others treating Ebola patients, would get the disease. Thank God.

I’d also say that you’d have to agree that anyone who has treated someone with Ebola or who has been around someone who has treated Ebola has quite a bit of anxiety until the 21-day period has passed. Come on, you have to admit, you are a little worried.

Finally, I’d point out that you are a wonderful person who demonstrated all that is good about America. You went to a place that had a deadly disease outbreak and put yourself at risk. Thank God for people like you!

Now, about this quarantine. I know you think it’s unfair, unconstitutional and maybe even illegal. You may be right. However, as Kenny Rogers sang, “you have to know when to fold them.”

As difficult, unfair and unjust as it may be, your best course of action is to quarantine yourself for 21 days. Think about it, there’s no downside. You will demonstrate loudly that you care about others so deeply, that you are willing to sacrifice your own freedom for a period of time. You will be an angel! Sounds like a movie!

Now, let’s talk about what happens if you resist a quarantine. You may show that you are principled and you will feel good and strong by not letting politicians (or anyone) dictate how you live. That’s good, I guess. However, many people are scared. When they are scared, they get mean. Really mean. They will turn on you and all the good you have done will be forgotten. You will be called a narcissist and other colorful names. The reality is that you probably don’t have Ebola. The perception is that you do until proven otherwise. You will be that nurse who was willing to infect others so she could go ride her bike. The one who cared more about people over there than here. You will be mercilessly “attacked” by the media until a bigger story comes out. If, God forbid, you become symptomatic, Ebola will be the least of your concerns.

Kaci – save yourself now and hold a press conference (by Skype). Tell everyone that you were wrong. Here’s what you should say:

“I spent a lot of time in a place that was full of death and despair. I longed for the time I could come home and enjoy the beauty of this country we sometimes take for granted. I let my desire to get back to normal cloud my judgment. I should have been more sympathetic toward the feelings of others and their fears. With a clear mind, I will self-quarantine in my home. I am truly sorry for any trouble this has caused and hope to come outside after 21 days and breath the sweet air of liberty.”

]]>http://securitydebrief.com/2014/10/30/know-when-to-fold-em-ms-hickox/feed/0Only in Washington – Regulations Proposed as Way to Fix Failed Regulationshttp://securitydebrief.com/2012/08/31/only-in-washington-regulations-proposed-as-way-to-fix-failed-regulations/
http://securitydebrief.com/2012/08/31/only-in-washington-regulations-proposed-as-way-to-fix-failed-regulations/#commentsFri, 31 Aug 2012 12:00:16 +0000http://securitydebrief.com/?p=13667In a recent op-ed, Christine Todd Whitman, the former head of the EPA, proposed greater regulation of the U.S. chemical sector because the current regulations aren’t working. Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Standards (CFATS) were regulations set up in 2007 to help better defend facilities that process, manage or store high-risk chemicals. While this program is lauded as well written and well-intended, CFATS have become complicated and burdensome.

Gov. Whitman is right on one thing: the current system isn’t working, but it is not because of a lack of regulation. Chemical companies have tried – they made security changes, submitted security plans, and have undergone several inspections, but DHS isn’t keeping up. News reports in the last year have slammed DHS’ management of CFATS, which has yet to complete a final compliance inspection and is slow to approve companies’ security plans. Personnel issues, a lack of transparency, changing rules, and other problems typical in bureaucracies have severely hampered DHS’s effectiveness.

The solution to this problem is not more regulation. It’s giving the private sector more room for innovation while scaling back already excessive and failing regulation.

]]>http://securitydebrief.com/2012/08/31/only-in-washington-regulations-proposed-as-way-to-fix-failed-regulations/feed/1Water and Chemical Security – Whitman Got it Wronghttp://securitydebrief.com/2012/08/30/water-and-chemical-security-whitman-got-it-wrong/
http://securitydebrief.com/2012/08/30/water-and-chemical-security-whitman-got-it-wrong/#commentsThu, 30 Aug 2012 21:38:06 +0000http://securitydebrief.com/?p=13659Yesterday, the New York Times ran an editorial by Christine Todd Whitman, titled “The Chemical Threat to America.” In the op-ed, the author calls on the Administration to expand and implement chemical security regulations in the water sector as a means to protect America. She advocates that the federal government should be able to mandate chemical processes and force water systems to use so-called Inherently Safer Technologies. Ms. Whitman is smart and capable, but on this issue she is wrong, wrong, wrong.

I don’t see how expanding a failed chemical security program (i.e., CFATS) by including water would serve to enhance the nation’s safety. At this point, the greatest impact of additional regulation would be to heave more unfunded mandates on an already financially overburdened sector.

Are there facilities that have changed their chemical processes? Yes, but just because some have switched doesn’t mean they all can (or should). This is not a Coke vs. Pepsi decision, and it is concerning to read that the former head of the EPA doesn’t understand that.

The wastewater plant in DC she uses as an example did convert their processes following 9/11; however, it had been planning and preparing to do so for years prior to those terrible attacks on our nation. That’s because converting operations takes time and an immense amount of money.

Overlooked in the op-ed is that countless water systems across the nation have invested millions to protect the hazardous materials they store and use on site. Why those security upgrades, some of which include hiring their own police force, are “insufficient” is not addressed.

Also overlooked is the glaring possibility that two different Administrations and 10-years worth of Congressional legislators from both parties may have “neglected” to expand this regulation because they felt it was simply unnecessary.

I recommend that Ms. Whitman spend more time speaking to utility owners and operators concerning this issue and rethink her approach to addressing the security needs of water systems and the communities they serve.

Chemical facility security is getting bogged down in Congress, due, evidently, from lack of energy (energy – get it? no one?):

A set of bills that would extend the federal government’s ability to assess chemical facility security have never had a clear path to enactment, largely due to longstanding disagreements between lawmakers about whether the Department of Homeland Security should be able to require certain safety measures. In the last month, though, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) bills’ fate has become even more murky. Supporters of the legislation received a reminder of the challenges ahead Friday, when a committee deadline to review one bill expired. The House Homeland Security Committee marked up its reauthorization bill (HR 901) in June and sent it to the Energy and Commerce panel for approval. But the Energy panel did not address the measure before the referral deadline ran out.

According to the recent IAEA report, Iran is closer to having nuclear weapons that was widely assumed. Once it does goes nuclear, Tehran will be almost impossible to stop. To prevent it, the Obama administration must use military force–and soon.

The U.S. isn’t prepared to respond to a pandemic or large biological attack, federal officials said. “We’re not ready for a global catastrophe involving” a pathogen, Tara O’Toole, undersecretary for science and technology at the Department of Homeland Security, said today at a Senate Homeland Security committee hearing.

]]>http://securitydebrief.com/2011/10/18/u-s-isnt-ready-for-large-biological-attack/feed/0Weapons of Mass Destruction – A Dangerous and Uncertain Futurehttp://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/25/weapons-of-mass-destruction-a-dangerous-and-uncertain-future/
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/25/weapons-of-mass-destruction-a-dangerous-and-uncertain-future/#commentsThu, 25 Aug 2011 16:36:29 +0000http://securitydebrief.com/?p=11826The present, predominant view that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is confined to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) only is now passé. Many people do not even include the “E”. This is far too narrow a view!

Clearly our enemies, extremists in the main, but also rouge states, continue to seek the full gamut of Chem, Bio, Rad, Nuke, and HYE devices. They have few if any scruples that would deter them from deploying such devices against any vulnerable target – Gov’t, Military, or civilian, including complete innocents. One imagines that using such a terror-producing device against the most innocent of targets would actually be a more desirable outcome for many of these groups.

This view is daunting enough, but as noted above, today it is too narrow to cover the true scope of the issue. At least two other categories must be included in the pantheon of WMD. These are cyber weapons and economic warfare. Some may baulk at this widening. Obviously, ALL chem, bio, rad, and nuke devices are considered a WMD, regardless of size and effected area. HYE are more subjective. How big does an explosive device have to be before it becomes HYE and therefore WMD? One imagines that the old saw about pornography would apply; “I know it when I see it.”

Similarly, not every piece of malware should be considered WMD. In fact, most would not be. Frankly, most are not nor should not even be considered a weapon at all. We have trouble today determining what constitutes a cyber attack at all without a great deal of debate. If anything, we probably over use the term “cyber attack” for instances that are really only info gathering probes and cyber espionage.

There are however, certain types of cyber events that will constitute a WMD. We have seen that closed loop, air gapped (i.e., not on the Internet) systems can be penetrated, as was done with the StuxNet worm. That means we must consider any industrial control system to be a potential target. This is the sort of cyber event that would most likely rise to the level of a WMD. One can imagine the elegance (for a terrorist or rouge state) of hitting the “enter” button on one continent and having all the valves in a chemical plant next to an American city open simultaneously? We would suddenly have a “Bopol, India-like” disaster that kills a multitude. What if StuxNet had caused the Iranian centrifuges to rip themselves apart instead of just degrading their performance? It would not have been too difficult.

Those who say there is no such thing as cyber terrorism are blind to how terrorists think and have little appreciation for their level of imagination. Additionally, cyber can be used to augment other more “conventional” terrorist events to make them more effective, or to enhance the effect of the terror. Hacking a major city’s 911 system to redirect first responders away from real incidents and to ambushes would devastate the confidence of citizens and cripple those whose job it is to help those in need.

The same type of argument can be made for economic warfare. Every embargo is not a WMD, but taking actions to ruin a peoples’ ability to function in an economy (devaluing their currency, flooding a market with much cheaper products, etc.), or other actions that bankrupt or starve a people should be considered to have crossed the line into a realm of WMDs. They may use cyber means (corrupt or change the data of a national bank), chemical means, (introducing agents that make a factory area unusable), biological means (spraying crops with agents that kill them or make them inedible), or radiological (setting off a dirty bomb anywhere on Manhattan Island, causing financial and other businesses there to leave NYC forever – considered by many to be NYC’s biggest terrorist concern by the way).

Our leaders should look at these high-end cyber and economic warfare issues because the enemy with surely consider their use. We should go from “CBRNE” to “CBRNE-CE”.

There may be considerable overlap between the various parts of this construct. Cyber may be used to augment and enhance any of the other methods, as would Economic Warfare. Multiple device / methodology scenarios are only limited by one’s imagination, and more likely than unitary ones.

Frankly, highly effective Chem, Bio and Nuke devices are hard to make. Quite often they are as dangerous to their makers as they are to the intended targets. Dirty bombs are much easier to create and deploy but are far less destructive, if just as fear producing. The components needed to create all of these genres of weapons are being watched, monitored and reported on by the civilized nations of the world. It is really hard to move this stuff around without setting off “flags” everywhere. This is not so with cyber means and the potential economic warfare methods.

These methods have no one watching out for proliferation or dual use, and they do not take a large number of people or a huge set of industrial facilities to develop them. They need highly qualified people, but not many, and those cyber ninjas and economic gurus exist in every country in the world. They can do the analysis, targeting and operational planning that will lead to enormously devastating effects, and many will be manifested in the physical realm.

As we close more and more doors to our easily accessible physical targets, the enemies of this Nation will adapt and look elsewhere.

If we chose to leave cyber and economic warfare outside the intellectual category of WMD’s, our enemies will not. Again, we need to embrace CBRNE-CE.

]]>http://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/25/weapons-of-mass-destruction-a-dangerous-and-uncertain-future/feed/0National EMP Awareness Day: The Threat that Can’t Be Ignoredhttp://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/10/national-emp-awareness-day-the-threat-that-cant-be-ignored/
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/10/national-emp-awareness-day-the-threat-that-cant-be-ignored/#commentsWed, 10 Aug 2011 12:28:16 +0000http://securitydebrief.com/?p=11719An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack—produced by a nuclear weapon detonated at a high altitude or by a geomagnetic storm—has the potential to decimate America’s electrical and technological infrastructure, effectively sending the U.S. back to back to the 19th Century—to a world without cars, cell phones, computers or any other electronics. EMP is not just a threat to cell phones and other electronic gadgets but to all critical electrical infrastructures that the American people and U.S. armed forces depend upon.

Indeed, the congressionally mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack found that a “high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is one of a small number of threats that has the potential to hold our society seriously at risk and might result in defeat of our military forces.” The Commission found that several potential adversaries have or can acquire the capability to attack the United States with a high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated EMP—and the missile wouldn’t have to be launched from 3,000 miles away.

Indeed, the missile could be launched from a freighter in international waters right off the East or West Coast using short-range missiles—the so-called “scud-in-a-bucket” scenario. Scud missiles are shorter-range weapons, originally manufactured and proliferated worldwide by the Soviets. Today, over 28 countries posses these missiles and several countries make their own versions, making the source harder to identify. Indeed, Iran has conducted tests in the Caspian Sea to determine whether its ballistic missiles could be detonated at a high altitude by remote control while still in flight. The purpose of this is to simulate an EMP attack. But Iran is not the only potential threat.

The EMP Commission ominously warned “China and Russia have considered limited nuclear attack options that, unlike their Cold War plans, employ EMP as the primary or sole means of attack.” This should come as no surprise as Russian, Chinese, and Iranian military writings abound with references to EMP strikes against the United States. The Commission concluded that the current vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructures can both invite and reward attack if not corrected.

The EMP Commission’s report represents the consensus view of the defense and intelligence communities as well as the nuclear weapon labs. Moreover, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States independently re-examined the EMP threat and concurred with the assessment and recommendations of the EMP Commission. In all, five commissions and major independent U.S. government studies have independently concurred with the EMP Commission’s threat assessment and recommendations.

Despite this broad consensus, Congress has yet to act in a substantive manner. For the most part, U.S. government agencies have not taken planning for their response to an EMP attack out of the theoretical stages. For the past several years, The Heritage Foundation has been working to raise awareness on the electromagnetic pulse threat and seek solutions to correcting this vulnerability by calling for a national EMP recognition day. This year’s event will coincide with the anniversary of the 2003 East Coast blackout, the results of which were just a small example of the devastation that could occur from an EMP attack on the United States.

]]>http://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/10/national-emp-awareness-day-the-threat-that-cant-be-ignored/feed/1A Retrospective Look at Chem-Bio Terrorismhttp://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/02/a-retrospective-look-at-chem-bio-terrorism/
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/02/a-retrospective-look-at-chem-bio-terrorism/#commentsWed, 03 Aug 2011 00:00:18 +0000http://securitydebrief.com/?p=11676The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) has released another excellent study, and its launch was accompanied by an event on July 28 at the Willard Hotel that included nearly the entire team of authors. The report, available on the CNAS website, is called “Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons.” The authors included the Honorable Richard Danzig, former Secretary of the Navy and a national security advisor to Senator and candidate Obama, several specialists in the psychology of terrorism, chemical and biological weapons, and Japanese linguists.

CNAS is known for going after issues in ways that are original but highly relevant. This report could easily be used as the exemplar of the interesting and effective way this young (by DC think tank standards) and sharp organization approaches its work.

Many readers may not even remember Aum Shinrikyo (AS), the radical and eccentric Japanese cult that made a big splash by deploying homemade Sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. Thirteen people died, and numerous more became seriously ill from the gas. Danzig and crew not only did extensive research into the cult and their numerous attempts at WMD prior to the Sarin attack but also was able to interview the incarcerated cult members.

The result is a superb history of a singular event in modern terrorism history. The complete history of this odd group of people and their dangerously charismatic leader is fascinating and gives great insight into how cults like this work and why they remain dangerous. That alone is worth the read. That, however, was not the point of the study.

The team used Danzig’s policy expertise to highlight that sixteen years later, still facing a threat from terrorists, we need to learn from this incident.

They show how a small group of dedicated loyalists can pull off some acts that many “experts” still persist in saying only nation states can do. No, I am not saying that AS’s actions were the equivalent of the vaulted Soviet WMD programs, or even Saddam Hussein’s pre-First Gulf War programs; they were not.

That said, if AS had not been a little crazy (OK, more than a little), they could have done a lot more damage. I will not re-iterate the report (read it please), but they had several shots at the terrorist “home run,” and only through luck (for the good guys) and strange internal dynamics did they drop the ball.

The bottom line is simple folks – we CANNOT underestimate the creativity of terrorists. We CANNOT underestimate the resourcefulness of a small handful of scientists who are also true believers (regardless of the craziness of the beliefs). We CANNOT assume that only nation states can create dangerously deadly chemicals and bio weapons. These guys did it, and so can others. It is not easy, but being hard and being impossible are a long way apart.

Read the history, but please LEARN from it. There are bad guys out there ready to exploit the superior ability we now have for research, the many radicalized intellectuals and the readily available funds to develop WMD. They might not take out a city, but many would potentially die. Underestimating our enemies could be deadly.