Since the initiation of the US-led airstrikes against Islamic State (or ISIL) forces in Iraq and Syria in August and September of last year, the legality of the strikes in Syria has been the subject of much discussion. Much of the focus has been on whether collective self‑defence – of Iraq – allows the use of force against non-State actors in foreign territory (Syria), where the territorial State (Syria) is ‘unable or unwilling’ to stop the attacks itself. However, the legality of airstrikes occurring on Iraqi territory does not appear to have occasioned any discussion at all (although see this previous post on the debate in the British House of Commons on authorising the use of force in Iraq). The presence of consent by the internationally recognised government of Iraq to the airstrikes (see here) seems to make legality of foreign military action against Islamic State under the jus ad bellum so obvious as not to require much commentary. However, a closer look at the scholarship on consent to the use of force reveals that the legality of what has variously been called ‘intervention by invitation’ or ‘military assistance on request’ has traditionally been more contentious than this simple statement would suggest. As discussed below, many scholars, and indeed some States, have suggested that there is a general prohibition on military assistance to governments in a situation of civil war or internal rebellion. This suggestion was particularly prominent in the Cold War era and seemed to represent an attempt to limit indirect uses of force by the superpowers. The rule is said to be derived from the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of other states, as well as from the principle of self-determination. The argument made by those in support of the rule is that intervention even with the consent of the government denies the people the right to govern their own affairs and to determine their political future. In short, on this view international law guarantees the right to rebel against the government. Others have doubted that a rule prohibiting assistance to governments in civil wars ever did emerge. This post seeks to demonstrate that recent state practice relating to the use of force in Iraq against Islamic State suggests that the evidence of opinio juris in relation to that rule is at present quite weak.

Support for a Rule Prohibiting Military Assistance to Governments in Civil Wars

According to a 1975 resolution of the Institut de Droit International on “The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars”, “[t]hird States shall refrain from giving assistance to parties to a civil war which is being fought in the territory of another State.” The resolution defines a “civil war” as a non-international armed conflict: a) between the established government of a State and one or more insurgent movements whose aim is to overthrow the government or the political, economic or social order of the State, or to achieve secession or self-government for any part of the State, or b) between two or more groups contending for control of the State in the absence of an established government. Read the rest of this entry…

On any account, the conflict in Gaza is depressing. It is clear that Hamas’ firing of rockets which are incapable of distinguishing between military and civilian targets is a violation of international humanitarian law. However, the question whether Israel’s actions in Gaza, which have reportedly resulted in the death of over 2000 people, comply with international law generates much more heated debate. As Professor Geir Ulfstein has pointed out, in a recent post on Just Security, in discussions about whether Israel has violated international law, “the focus is only on violations of international humanitarian law (jus in bello), not on breaches of restrictions following from the right of self-defence (jus ad bellum).” An example is this post by Mark Ellis, Executive Director of the International Bar Association on Huffington Post. One of the key questions that arise in connection with Israel’s actions in Gaza is whether its actions are proportionate. In a later post I will focus on proportionality and what it might mean in this conflict. Suffice it to say for now that as Geir Ulfstein notes (and as pointed out by Marko in this post) the “requirements of proportionality are different in international humanitarian law (IHL) and as a restriction on the right of self defence”. One may also note that even if every individual acts of targeting by a party to a conflict is proportionate under IHL, the overall campaign might still be disproportionate under the law relating to self defence in the jus ad bellum. Prof Ulfstein ends his post by saying that “the restrictions on self-defence for Israel’s military operations should receive more attention”. This posts responds to that call.

In this post, I wish to address the question whether Israel is bound by the law relating to self-defence in the action it is taking in Gaza. Put differently, the question is whether the international law limitations on the right of self-defence apply to Israeli action in Gaza? As Israel’s actions in Gaza are taken in response to Hamas’ actions and Israel claims to be acting in self defence, our intuitions might suggest that we ought to assess whether Israel’s actions comply with the international law limits on self defence. In particular, one may ask whether Israel’s actions are proportionate in the jus ad bellum sense.

Despite first impressions, it is not at all obvious that the jus ad bellum applies to Israel’s use of force in Gaza. When one scratches beneath the surface, the question appears more complicated. Read the rest of this entry…

There is a lingering sentiment on this blog (see the posts by Nico Krisch and Christian Marxsen) that “the Kosovo issue” has facilitated the blatant violations of international law recently committed by Russia with regard to Crimea (notably the unlawful annexation of that territory), and that “the West’s” behaviour in the Kosovo context now prevents clear condemnations and robust reactions towards these violations. That view has also been espoused elsewhere (see, e.g., Marcelo Kohen, “L’ Ukraine et le respect du droit international”, Le Temps, 13 March 2014 and Bruno Simma, “The West is hypocritical” (interview), Der Spiegel, 7 April 2014). The basic idea is that “the West” now pays the price for Kosovo, and that such a situation was predictable (and has been predicted) by those who now deplore it, and allows them to think (or even to say): “Well, we warned you from the beginning on, and this is now what comes out of it … so we were right”.

In this post, I would like to investigate the soundness of this position. We first have to ask what is meant by “the Kovoso issue”. Actually “Kosovo” refers to two events: not only to the sponsoring of Kosovo’s independence in 2008, but also to the possible unlawfulness of NATO’s military intervention of 1999. Both events were politically linked, and they concerned three different core norms of international law: the prohibition on the use of force, territorial integrity/inviolability of boundaries, and the self-determination of peoples.

In the Crimea crisis, all three norms are again at stake: Russia both relies on its right or even responsibility to intervene with military means to prevent human rights abuses committed against ethnic Russians and Russian citizens (humanitarian type /R2P-type intervention) and on the Crimean (or even Eastern Ukrainian) right to secession based on the right to self-determination whose exercise in Crimea led to a disruption of Ukrainian territorial integrity.

Yesterday, on 15 April 2014, Ukrainian interim president Turtschinov considered to hold, simultaneously with the presidential elections, a referendum on regional competences in Ukraine. On 8 April 2014, separatists in the Ukrainian region of Donetsk proclaimed that they would hold a referendum on the independence of that Eastern region of Ukraine. Some days before, representatives of the Crimean Tatars announced that they sought to hold a referendum on their political autonomy within Crimea.

On 16 March 2014, the population of Crimea had overwhelmingly voted in favour of joining the Russian Federation. The population was asked to choose between the following alternative: “1) Are you in favour of Crimea joining the Russian Federation as a subject of the Russian Federation?” or “2) Are you in favour of re-establishing the 1992 constitution of the Republic of Crimea and Crimea’s status as a part of Ukraine?” The maintenance of the territorial and status quo was not given as an option in that referendum, and no international observers were admitted. With a voter turnout of 83.1 %, 93 % answered with a “Yes” to the second question, and thus pronounced themselves in favour of joining the Russian Federation.

The spokespersons of the Tatars now declare that their ethnic group had boycotted the referendum of 16 March, and assert that the majority of Tatars would have preferred to stay within Ukraine. Tatars currently form about 10 percent of the Crimean population. Probably hundreds of thousands of Tatars were killed, starved, and were deported from the 1920s to the 1940s under Soviet policy. The new government of Crimea rejects the idea of a politically autonomous territory for the Crimean Tatars but holds that the Tatars can only claim “cultural autonomy”.

The 16 March referendum, and announced further territorial referendums in Ukraine, place in the limelight the problématique of this legal institution. Are not the outcomes of referendums in ethnically mixed units most often ethnically pre-determined? And does not the resort to a referendum lead to ever smaller subgroups which again seek to detach themselves from a larger one? After all, the Ukrainian people, including the Crimean population, had some 20 years ago voted in favour of independence from the Soviet Union. (See on the 1991 referendum in Ukraine Anne Peters, Das Gebietsreferendum im Völkerrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1995), 184-88; specifically on previous Crimean referendums ibid., 190-91, 211-15). That Ukrainian referendum of 1 December 1991 had been at the time widely appreciated as having rung the death knell for the dissolution of the USSR one week later, when the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States of Minsk of 8 December 1991 declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. But even before that date, and later, Crimean politicians had several times (in 1991, 1992, 1994, and so on) planned and sometimes held “polls” on a special status of Crimea.

This post postulates that, as a matter of international customary law, and as a matter of legal consistency and fairness, a free territorial referendum is emerging as a procedural conditio sine qua for any territorial re-apportionment. However, the 16 March referendum was not free and fair, and could not form a basis for the alteration of Crimea’s territorial status. Read the rest of this entry…

On 27 March 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon states not to recognize changes in status quo of Crimea region. 100 states voted in favor, 11 were against and 58 abstained. In terms of international law, Ukraine’s continued sovereignty over Crimea is supported by the absolute majority of states, even though Crimea is now de facto annexed by the Russian Federation. In this post I want to make two points: one concerning the Russian scholarship on international law and the second on the history of Russia’s treaty practice regarding Crimea.

The first point is that the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation goes against pretty much everything that has been written in Russia over the last twenty years (plus during the Soviet period) on the legality of the use of military force and the right or peoples to self-determination in international law in non-colonial contexts. Suffice it to say that the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by President Putin on 12 February 2013, emphatically criticizes and condemns the use of military force outside the framework of the UN Charter.

One of the more remarkable aspects of the whole unfortunate Ukraine episode is the rampant hypocrisy on part of all of the major players involved in the dispute. Those same Western states that unlawfully invaded Iraq, and supported Kosovo’s secession from Serbia while endlessly repeating that Kosovo was somehow a really super-special sui generis case, are now pontificating about the sanctity of the UN Charter and territorial integrity. On the other hand, that same Russia that fought two bloody wars in the 1990s to keep Chechnya within its fold, that same Russia that to this day refuses to accept the independence of Kosovo, has now rediscovered a principle of self-determination that apparently allows for the casual dismemberment of existing states.

I am not saying that no distinctions can be drawn between the various situations I just mentioned. In particular, I agree with many of the arguments in the recent posts by Christian Marxsen and Jure Vidmar about the differences between Crimea and Kosovo, the critical one being that Crimea’s secession is the direct result of Russia’s unlawful military intervention against Ukraine, whereas Kosovo’s secession was not tainted to the same extent by NATO’s 1999 intervention due to the subsequent adoption of Resolution 1244, which authorized the presence of international forces in Kosovo while disabling Serbia from taking military action to suppress Kosovo’s secession. I would also note that it is more difficult to levy charges of hypocrisy against international lawyers, rather than states or politicians – and I hope that speaks well of our profession. Most international lawyers after all considered the 1999 intervention against Serbia or the 2003 invasion of Iraq to have been unlawful, and most justifiably feel the same way with regard to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.

But even if Kosovo and Crimea are legally distinguishable, they are still close enough. The West’s position on Crimea is undeniably undermined by their previous stance regarding Kosovo, and they can only blame themselves for that. Just consider President Putin’s speech justifying the annexation of Crimea by reference to Kosovo and the ICJ’s advisory opinion:

On 16 March 2014, Crimea held a referendum on its future legal status. Reportedly, the choice to join Russia was supported by an overwhelming 95.5 per cent of all votes cast, with the turnout of 83 per cent. A day earlier, Russia vetoed a draft Security Council resolution which sought to declare the referendum as ‘having no legal validity’ and urge the international community not to recognise its results. The draft resolution was otherwise supported by 13 members of the Security Council, with China abstaining. On 17 March 2014, the Crimean parliament declared independence and applied to join Russia. This contribution explains that while the referendum itself was not illegal in international law, the shift of territorial sovereignty would be illegal. Moreover, in the legal circumstances underlying the situation in Crimea, even the declaration of independence violated international law. As a result, the obligation to withhold recognition of the effective situation is applicable under general international law. No Chapter VII Resolution is required. This is not because international law would see territorial integrity of states as an absolute norm, but because the effective situation was created by Russia’s use or threat of force. Although parallels have been drawn to Kosovo (see the discussion in Christian Marxsen’s post) and even Scotland, in terms of international law Northern Cyprus would be a more accurate comparison.

Secession and neutrality of international law

Groups seeking independence usually present self-determination as an absolute entitlement. Conversely, states countering secession usually present territorial integrity as an absolute entitlement of states. Neither camp is right. As follows from the General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law (GA Res 2625), the Quebec case (Supreme Court of Canada) and partly also from the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (ICJ), international law is actually neutral on the question of unilateral secession. This means that unilateral secession is neither prohibited nor an entitlement. Furthermore, for the purposes of international law, it does not matter whether or not secession is explicitly prohibited under domestic law. As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case, an entity may declare independence extra-constitutionally and yet nevertheless become independent if other states are willing to recognise it (the Quebec case, para 155). This further confirms that unilateral secession unto itself does not trigger an obligation to withhold recognition. [I explain this further here].Yet states are very rarely willing to grant recognition on a widespread basis to entities seeking independence unilaterally. By holding a referendum and declaring independence, such an entity in most circumstances does something that remains legally ineffective, yet not internationally wrongful. The burden of changing the territorial status quo lies on the secession-seeking entity and this exercise is very rarely successful if the parent state does not agree. However, a declaration of independence may be given effectiveness through foreign military assistance. This is where neutrality of international law ends. International law is neutral only with respect to a declaration’s unilateral character, but not in general, where territorial illegality is attached to the situation.

When are declarations of independence illegal?

Territorial illegality arises under a serious breach of certain fundamental norms of international law, in particular jus cogens. Read the rest of this entry…

The referendum on Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and on the subsequently planned accession to the Russian Federation has produced the expected results. An overwhelming majority has voted against Crimea remaining part of the state of Ukraine. Already one day after the referendum, the Supreme National Council of Crimea has declared the independence of Crimea and requested other states to recognize it as an independent sovereign state. And today Russia and Crimea signed an agreement on Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation. Crimean and Russian authorities seek to justify their actions under international law, especially by reference to the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on Kosovo. In a statement of March 11, 2014, the Supreme Council of Crimea proclaimed that it is acting “with regard to the charter of the United Nations and a whole range of other international documents and taking into consideration the confirmation of the status of Kosovo by the United Nations International Court of Justice on July, 22, 2010, which says that unilateral declaration of independence by a part of the country doesn’t violate any international norms.” (link to press report) How do these claims hold under international law?

In evaluating the significance of the ICJ’s advisory opinion to Crimea it is important to highlight that the opinion only had a very limited scope. It did not answer the question whether Kosovo had a right to secession under international law, it did not address the question whether there is a general entitlement to secession; nor did it answer the question of the legal consequences of the declaration of independence or whether Kosovo has become an independent state. Rather, the opinion is limited to an analysis of the legality of the declaration itself (I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 51, 56).

The Kosovo opinion relies on a brief review of norms of international law, which – as the ICJ concludes – do not generally prohibit unilateral declarations of independence. The principle of territorial integrity only applies in the relations between states, but not in regard to internal secessionist movements. However, the ICJ mentions a situation in which unilateral declarations of independence can nevertheless be in violation of international law, namely where they “were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (ius cogens)” (ibid. para. 81). The violation of international law then does not stem from the unilateral character of the declaration of independence, but from its reliance on the violation of a peremptory norm of international law.

In regard to Crimea, the declaration of independence would have been impossible without Russian troops backing up the steps towards secession. Only the fact that Ukrainian forces on Crimea have been locked in their posts and that the public infrastructure has been taken over by pro-Russian forces made it possible to hold the referendum on which the declaration of independence is based. It can therefore hardly be argued that the declaration would not rely on the use of force. According to the criteria elaborated in the ICJ’s advisory opinion, if that use of force was illegal, so was the declaration of independence.

A further question is whether Crimea has a substantive right to secession under international law. Crimean authorities refer to the UN Charter and rely on the principle of self-determination (Article 1 (2) UN Charter) which, as they argue, would assign them a right to secession. Such a claim is also not supported by international law. State practice is very reluctant to acknowledge a right to secession, since states fear that their own territorial integrity might be endangered by an empowerment of secessionist groups. Indicative for the traditional position on the right to self-determination is General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970). After acknowledging the right to self-determination this resolution stresses that such acknowledgment may not “be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States” as long as those states internally respect the right to self-determination of peoples. The right to self-determination requires states to respect minority rights, but does not grant a sub-entity of states the right to freely chose to which state a territory shall belong. Self-determination is usually limited to internal measures, such as the right to be granted a certain status of autonomy within a state. Although one might certainly argue about the necessary degree of autonomy, it is important to highlight that Crimea already had the status of an autonomous republic under Ukraine’s constitution. In principle, the institutional arrangements for implementing the right to self-determination were in place.

The legal situation in regard to the self-determination of Crimea is therefore rather clear. But, as Nico Krisch has pointed out on this blog, the more formal, traditional norms of international law have come under pressure from what he calls liberal interventionism. In regard to self-determination, Western states have created such pressure, for example, when recognizing Kosovo as an independent state immediately after its declaration of independence in 2008. Those who argued for these exemptions referred to the history of internal conflict and the human rights violations that preceded Kosovo’s declaration of independence. A comparable history of conflict does not exist in Crimea, but since the concept of self-determination has been expanded in the past when it seemed opportune, it is not surprising that secessionist movements try to push the limits even more. Since Russia is powerful enough to pursue its interests anyway, it does not need an ultimately convincing legal justification. A justification that is at least not totally absurd, but somehow arguable, is already good enough for making a case in the international political sphere. In expanding the right to self-determination in regard to Kosovo, Western states bear their share of responsibility in enabling such arguments and in undermining international law.

Over the past couple weeks, there has been a flurry of writing on this blog (see here, here, here and here) and elsewhere about events in Crimea/Ukraine. Oxford University Press have produced another of their ever so useful Debate Maps on Ukraine.

“The . . . index maps scholarly commentary on the legal arguments regarding the public international law (and some domestic constitutional law) aspects of the use of force in Ukraine, published in English language legal blogs and newspapers, and free content from OUP’s online services.

Use this map to review scholarly arguments and to keep track of which issues have been covered and who has said what.”

I could not recommend this Debate Map, and the other OUP maps (here, here, here), more highly. There is so much writing on topical international law issues that it can be difficult to stay abreast of what has been written, particularly over a short space of time. The Debate Map is an excellent way of doing so.

Jure Vidmar and I are in agreement about the processes by which new States are created. Indeed, I think his book makes a really valuable contribution in setting out those processes of State creation. As Jure notes in his rejoinder, the difference between us is that he places these processes outside the Montevideo (and additional) criteria for Statehood and I argue that they are within the criteria. In particular, I argue that those processes help us in assessing fulfilment of the fourth Montevideo criteria of “capacity to enter into legal relations.” I argue that this criterion simply means independence (legal and factual).

Although Jure is willing, for the purposes of argument, to go along with interpreting the 4th criterion to mean independence, he has “mixed feelings” about this claims. He thinks considering the two to be the same is trying to fit concepts that don’t quite fit. In my view, the 4th criterion is about something more than its plain words indicate. It speaks about a “capacity” to enter into legal relations but it does not tell us precisely what confers this capacity. So we have to imply something that confers this capacity. This interpretive exercise is required by the very wording of the criterion and should not be seen as illegitimate. I suggest it is independence that confers this capacity as the “capacity” referred to is to a formal capacity and not a functional capacity.

Jure’s main argument with regard to fitting the political processes he identifies into the independence criterion is that it would lead to a problem of circularity. He says that argument would essentially be that a State would be a State because it is a State. I disagree. He uses the example of Somaliland (which I do not consider to be a State, yet). Jure says that on my argument, Somaliland is a state because it is a State. No, if I considered Somaliland to be a State, it would be a State because it is independent. Why would it be independent? Because the claim to territorial integrity of Somalia (the parent State) can be overcome. How is the claim overcome? It would have to be by parental consent, collective recognition or some other process. There would be no circularity here. Read the rest of this entry…

Dapo Akande is one of the editors of EJIL:Talk!. He is Professor of Public International Law at the University of Oxford and Yamani Fellow of St Peter's College, Oxford. He is Co-Director of the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law & Armed Conflict, and also of the Oxford Martin Programme on Human Rights for Future Generations. Dapo is a member of the Editorial Boards of the European Journal of International Law and the American Journal of International Law.
Zachary Vermeer is a DPhil candidate at Somerville College, University of Oxford. He is writing his thesis on military intervention with the consent of the government in international law. He has previously worked at the Australian Attorney-General’s Department, and as a lecturer in international law at the University of Notre Dame Australia.

About EJIL:Talk!

Welcome to EJIL:Talk! the blog of the European Journal of International Law.