Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East
and Africa, Volume VII

8901.01/2–2646

Memorandum by Mrs. Christina P. Grant of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs

[Washington,] February 26, 1946.

A. General Political. Our policy toward
Trans-Jordan has been based upon two principles: (1) recognition of the
responsibility of Great Britain for the administration of the Palestine
mandate, of which Trans-Jordan forms a part, under the terms of the
mandate from the League of Nations, to which administration the United
States consented in the American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of
December 3, 1924; and (2) the specific rights guaranteed the United
States in Trans-Jordan, under this same convention of December 3, 1924,
and indirectly confirmed by the Anglo-Trans–Jordan Agreement of February
20, 1928.

Trans-Jordan was accorded a special position within the Palestine Mandate
after April 1923, when the British Government recognized the existence
of an “independent Government” (not however an independent state) in
Trans-Jordan. The Government thus created was consented to by the League
of Nations, and its independent status was tacitly accepted by the
United States when the Convention of 1924 was signed with the British
Government. The terms of this Convention applied specifically to
Trans-Jordan as well as to Palestine.

Trans-Jordan is a class “A” mandate. When it was established as an
“independent Government” in 1923 it was specifically exempted from the
provisions of the Palestine Mandate dealing with the Holy Places and the
Jewish National Home. Relations between the United Kingdom and
Trans-Jordan are governed largely by an agreement signed on February 20,
1928, supplemented on June 2, 1934. This agreement delegates to the Amir
of Trans-Jordan the powers of legislation and administration entrusted
to Great Britain as the Mandatory Power for Palestine, reserving to
British “advice”, or control, certain matters such as foreign relations,
financial and fiscal policy, jurisdiction over foreigners and freedom of
conscience.

United States rights, as specified in the American-British Convention of
December 3, 1924, include guarantees of vested American property rights
in Trans-Jordan, the right of United States nationals freely to
establish and maintain educational, philanthropic, and religious
institutions there, and all the general rights and benefits secured
under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and
their nationals. Extradition and consular rights, guaranteed under
treaties and conventions between the United States and Great Britain,
are likewise extended to Trans-Jordan. Article 7 of this Convention
provides that the rights of the United States and its [Page 797]nationals as stated in the Convention
shall not be affected by any modification of the terms of the Mandate to
which the United States does not give its assent.

A new situation has been created by the declared intention of the British
Government to “take steps in the near future” with a view to
establishing Trans-Jordan as a fully independent and sovereign state.
This decision, welcomed by most Arab States, has been attacked by the
Zionists.

The strategic position of Trans-Jordan, as an interior section of the
land bridge connecting the Mediterranean and the Mesopotamian-Persian
Gulf area, gives the United States a definite interest in the political
fate of this purely Arab Country. The fact that any future pipe-line
connecting oil fields of Saudi Arabia with a Mediterranean port must
pass either through or at least close to the territory of Trans-Jordan
makes the security and general stability of that country of vital
concern to commercial interests in the United States.5

In the past the Government of the United States has taken the position
that it is not empowered, under the articles of the American-British
Convention of December 3, 1924, to prevent the modification of the terms
of any of the mandates. Under their provisions, however, this government
can decline to recognize the validity of the application to American
interests of any modification of the mandates unless such modification
has been assented to by the Government of the United States. Moreover
the question arises whether, as a signatory of the United Nations
Charter, the United States should take some action with respect to the
declared intention of the British Government to establish Trans-Jordan
as an independent state.

In formulating the policy of this Government the following considerations
have been taken into account:

1.

Trans-Jordan is at present, and de
jure, an autonomous and independent part of a class “A”
mandate. It was, furthermore, specifically exempted from the
provisions of the Palestine Mandate dealing with the Jewish
National Home.

2.

There is a basic difference in the categories of mandates
under the former League of Nations; the underlying purpose of a
class “A” mandate being the ultimate achievement of complete
independence, which should not be delayed if it is feasible
(Art. 22, sect. 4, of the Covenant of the League of
Nations).

3.

Syria and Lebanon, the two Levant States that jointly formed a
class “A” mandate after 1920, achieved their independence
without recourse to the League of Nations. They were recognized
as independent by France during the war when the Council of the
League of Nations was inoperative. Their independence was
subsequently recognized by the United States.

4.

The United States would be reluctant to take any position
which might convey the impression that the United States is
opposed to independence for any country or class “A” mandate
when such country or mandate should be ready for
independence.

5.

The United States could not take any obstructive position with
respect to the proposed independence of Trans-Jordan without
jeopardizing its relations with the whole Arab world.

6.

The United States would automatically resume the right to
exercise the capitulatory privileges formerly conceded by the
Ottoman Government, upon termination of the Mandate, under
Article 8 thereof. The United States would be extremely
reluctant to resume these capitulatory rights, however, since
such a retrogressive step would be contrary to the spirit of our
present policy.

In view of the above considerations, it is our present policy, subject to
the approval of the Secretary, to recognize the independence of
Trans-Jordan, as in the case of the Levant States, on securing a
satisfactory assurance of the continuation of the rights guaranteed the
United States under the American-British Convention of 1924. Formal
termination of the mandate with respect to Trans-Jordan would be
generally recognized upon the admission of the latter into the United
Nations6 as a fully independent country. The United States
would, however, view with concern any treaty between the British
Government and an independent Trans-Jordanian Government that would
accord the British Government or its nationals any special position or
privileges in Trans-Jordan.

[The independence of Trans-Jordan was recognized formally by the
United Kingdom in a treaty of alliance entered into at London with
Amir Abdullah on March 22, 1946 (British Cmd. 6779, Trans-Jordan No.
1 (1946): Treaty of Alliance between … the United
Kingdom and … the Amir of Trans-Jordan). On April 9,
Senator Francis J. Myers, in a letter to Secretary Byrnes, cited
Senate debate of the previous week on Trans-Jordan and requested
“all the necessary information as to the steps which the Department
has taken or contemplates in connection with Great Britain’s action
in Trans-Jordan which, as the consensus of opinion in the Senate
debate indicated, is considered to be a violation of the
Anglo-American Convention of 1924.” Mr. Byrnes’ reply of April 23
concluded: “After a careful study of the matter, the Department has
found nothing which would justify it in taking the position that the
recent steps taken by Great Britain with regard to Trans-Jordan
violate any treaties existing between [Page 799]Great Britain and the United States, including the
Convention of December 3, 1924, or deprive the United States of any
rights or interests which the United States may have with respect to
Trans-Jordan. The Department considers, however, that it would be
premature for this government to take any decision at the present
time with respect to the question of its recognition of Trans-Jordan
as an independent state.” (741.90i/4–946). The full text of Mr.
Byrnes’ reply is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1946, page 765. On May 20, the Department
authorized the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to attend the
ceremonies at Amman on May 25 when Abdullah was to be crowned King
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan, provided that he made “it
clear to all concerned that US Govt has not reached any decision as
to recognition of Trans-Jordan.” (890i001/5–1746)

The United States extended de jure recognition
to the Government of Trans-Jordan on January 31, 1949.]

For documentation on the negotiation of a pipeline
agreement between the United States and the Government of
Trans-Jordan, see pp. 18–30, passim.↩

With respect to the favorable
attitude of the United States toward admission of Trans-Jordan into
the United Nations, see telegram 3373, July 11, to Paris, and Under
Secretary of State Acheson’s communication of July 15 to President
Truman, volume i, documentation on Policy of the United States favoring early
admission of states eligible for membership in the United
Nations.↩