Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume
XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico

I warmly welcome reftel. Things
moving very quickly with apparently reliable reports military
movements in Minas Gerais fully backed by Governor Magalhaes Pinto and state police.
As of noon, no clear indications corresponding action Sao Paulo or
other states.

2.

I have taken action to get to key governors’ message on vital
importance color of legitimacy, stressing desirability political
coverage by majority Congress if that humanly possible. My
intermediaries are inquiring how governors’ group proposes handle
critical question mantle of legitimacy and position as defenders of
constitution, both in immediate and in subsequent actions, if
congressional coverage not available.3

3.

Most urgent logistical problem is motor and aviation gasoline in
event normal supplies become unavailable to friendly forces. Local
Esso contact states only Avgas tanker en route is Petrobras vessel,
and he knows of no Mogas in South Atlantic. Immediate action set
this in motion is in order. We are developing recommendations on
possible arms and ammunition requirements.

4.

Goulart’s Monday night
speech to sergeants,4 which was ending when you
telephoned, looks like last straw. He made appropriate verbal bows
to constitution and legality, to church, and to green and yellow
nationalism rather than red models, but this was transparent
disguise for active support of subversion in NCO’s and psychological warfare against officer corps,
as well as Congress, press, and foreign and domestic business
groups. While dictating this, I received reliable report that
Kubitschek phoned
Goulart this morning to
declare his open opposition and has so stated to press.5

5.

After deducting sixty-four dollars from my pay, my present
judgment is that this might not be last opportunity, but well might
be last good opportunity to support action by anti-Goulart group which still occupies
large proportion strategic military commands and direction
state-level forces in cohesive region states accounting for over
half population and all industry. I believe your major decision
should be in affirmative and will be preparing recommend means
giving resistance forces additional impetus.

6.

Your background briefing statement supplementing House Committee
Report was very well played here in press and serves immediate
purpose desired by my recommendations for some public expression
interest and concern.6

Gordon

Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Top Secret; Nodis; Flash. Received in the
Department at 12:21 p.m. and repeated at 6:23 p.m. to the White
House for Bundy, OSD for McNamara, and CIA
for McCone only. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. II,
3/64)↩

Mann told Rusk earlier that the Brazilian
Chargé d’Affaires had complained about the press reports,
predicting that he would receive “protest instructions.”
Mann asked how the
press spokesman should handle the incident at the noon briefing
and “it was agreed he should say in view of the situation we are
making no official comment and are following the situation
closely. Sec said if Linc thinks we cannot get away with that,
we will take another look. They agreed we should play for time;
maybe tomorrow we could talk.” (Mann to Rusk, March 31, 11:20 a.m.; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls
3/20/64–4/9/64)↩