This case is before the Authority on the Activity's
application for review of the Regional Director's Decision and Order on a
petition for clarification of unit. The Authority granted the Activity's
application in U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Arlington
Field Office, 34 FLRA 127 (1989) (Arlington Field
Office).

The Activity's application sought review of the Regional
Director's decision concerning 10 General Attorney positions in the Solicitor's
Arlington Field Office. The Regional Director found that the General Attorneys
should be included in the bargaining unit represented by the American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 12 (Union) because they are
not confidential employees within the meaning of section 7103(a)(13) or
employees engaged in personnel work under section 7112(b)(3) of the Federal
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute).

In granting the Activity's application for review, the
Authority asked the parties to submit briefs on: (1) whether the General
Attorneys' role, or potential involvement, in internal labor relations and
personnel work is of such a nature as to create an inherent conflict of
interest between the General Attorneys' job duties and their union affiliation;
and (2) whether the frequency or the amount of such work is a controlling
factor in determining if the General Attorneys are confidential employees or
perform personnel work within the meaning of the Statute. Pursuant to the
Authority's request, the Activity and the Union filed briefs. The Department of
Justice requested and was granted permission to file an amicuscuriae brief.

For the following reasons, we find that the General
Attorneys are confidential employees, within the meaning of section 7103(a)(13)
of the Statute, and may not be included in the bargaining unit represented by
the Union.

II. Background and Regional Director's
Decision

The Union currently represents a unit of all eligible
Department of Labor employees in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area,
including field office employees. The Union seeks to clarify the unit by
including 11 nonsupervisory General Attorneys located in the Solicitor's
Arlington Field Office. The General Attorneys participate in litigation arising
under a variety of statutes including the Black Lung Benefits Act, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Service Contract Act, and the Mine Safety and Health
Act. Some of the General Attorneys also participate, as representatives of
management, in internal employment and labor relations cases before
arbitrators, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.

The Regional Director concluded that the bargaining unit
should be clarified to include 10 of the 11 General Attorney positions in the
Office of the Solicitor's Arlington Field Office. The Regional Director found
that the General Attorneys were not confidential employees under section
7112(b)(2) or employees engaged in personnel work under section 7112(b)(3) of
the Statute, citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 9 FLRA 973,
976 (1982) (EEOC). The Regional Director determined that the General
Attorneys' "involvement in internal labor relations cases, when compared to
their overall work load, [had] been deminimus [sic] and
insufficient to exclude them from the existing bargaining unit." Regional
Director's Decision at 5. In this regard, the Regional Director found that the
evidence established that the General Attorneys' participation in internal
labor relations cases was sporadic and was not a consistent and routine aspect
of their overall job duties.

The Regional Director also concluded that Sheila K.
Cronan, who occupied the remaining General Attorney position, participated in
internal labor relations cases on a regular and consistent basis and was a
confidential employee within the meaning of the Statute.

III. The Application for Review and the Authority's
Decision in Arlington Field Office, 34 FLRA 127

The Activity sought review of the Regional Director's
decision on the grounds that there was an absence of, and a departure from,
Authority precedent. The Activity argued that the Authority has never found a
bargaining unit appropriate which included attorneys who represent management
at administrative proceedings involving internal labor relations. The Activity
also argued that the Regional Director's decision departed from Authority
precedent, which prohibits employees from being represented by a union where
such representation would pose a "conflict of interest." The Activity asserted
that the deminimis doctrine was inapplicable or was misapplied.
Finally, the Activity argued that an inherent "conflict of interest" is created
by placing attorneys who represent management at internal labor relations
proceedings in a bargaining unit.

The Union opposed the application for review. The Union
contended that: (1) the Regional Director's decision was consistent with
Authority precedent concerning the use of the deminimis doctrine
regarding confidential employees; (2) the Activity was merely disagreeing with
the Regional Director's application of the deminimis doctrine
and such disagreement was not a basis for granting an application for review;
and (3) no conflict of interest results from the General Attorneys' access to
confidential management documents.

In Arlington Field Office, the Authority granted
the Activity's application for review. The Authority requested the parties to
submit briefs on the two questions noted above.

IV. The Positions of the Parties

Following the Authority's grant of the Activity's
application for review, the Activity and the Union submitted briefs. The
Department of Justice filed a request to present an amicuscuriae
brief, which was granted. We have considered all these documents in this
decision.

A. The Activity's Position

The Activity contends that the General Attorneys' role in
internal labor relations and personnel work creates an inherent conflict of
interest between the attorneys' duties and their membership in a bargaining
unit. Citing Department of the Navy, Automatic Data Processing Selection
Office, 7 FLRA 172, 174-75 (1981), the Activity argues that the General
Attorneys are management advocates in internal labor relations matters and
must, like management officials, be identified with management. As management
advocates, they have access to confidential labor relations information which
they could use in grievances against management and therefore would not have
the confidence of management if they were in a bargaining unit. In the
Activity's view, the General Attorneys should be excluded from the unit because
they engage in confidential duties in concert with employees who formulate or
effectuate labor management policies, citing Headquarters, 1947th
Administrative Support Group, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., 14 FLRA
220, 224-25 (1984) (1947th Administrative Support Group), and have
duties which directly affect personnel operations of their own agency, citing
Office of Personnel Management, 5 FLRA 238, 246 (1981). The Activity
argues further that placing the General Attorneys in a bargaining unit might
create an ethical conflict of interest and be contrary to 5 C.F.R. § 735.201a(d) and (f), which prohibits any action by an employee that "might
result in or create the appearance of . . . losing complete independence or
impartiality . . . or affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the Government." Activity Brief at 5.

The Activity also contends that the frequency and/or the
amount of internal labor relations work is not a controlling factor in making
bargaining unit eligibility determinations. The Activity argues that National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) precedent for determining confidential
status should be applied in this case, relying on Associated Day Care
Services of Metropolitan Boston, 269 NLRB 178, 181 (1984) (Associated
Day Care) and cases cited therein. The Activity maintains that the NLRB:
(1) does not consider the amount of time a clerical employee expends on
confidential matters; and (2) excludes employees who are expected to perform
confidential duties but have not done so. The Activity also argues that the
rationale underlying NLRB precedent concerning confidential employees is
equally applicable for determining if employees are engaged in personnel work
under section 7112(b)(3). Accordingly, the Activity asserts that the General
Attorneys also engage in personnel work under section 7112(b)(3) because their
work involves the personnel operations of the Agency.

B. The Union's Position

The Union contends that the legislative history of the
Statute indicates that attorneys, like other professionals, have a right to the
benefits of the Statute, citing U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of
Regional Counsel, Western Region, 1 FLRC 258 (1973) (Treasury, Western
Region). Second, the Union contends that the language and legislative
history of section 7112(b)(2) indicate that Congress intended to follow the
NLRB approach concerning the exclusion of confidential employees, which limits
confidential employees to secretarial and clerical positions, citing NLRB v.
Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981)
(Hendricks County), and does not include positions encumbered by
professionals working in the personnel area, citing Red River Army Depot,
Texarkana, Texas, 2 FLRA 659 (1980). The Union notes that the case relied
on by the Regional Director, EEOC, 9 FLRA at 973, did not involve
confidential employees under section 7112(b)(2) but rather employees performing
personnel work under section 7112(b)(3). Third, the Union contends that
attorneys excluded under section 7112(b)(3) should be limited to those
specializing in personnel-related litigation, citing U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Boston Regional Office, Region I, Boston,
Massachusetts, 16 FLRA 38 (1984). Fourth, the Union contends that section
7112(b)(4) is not applicable to the instant case as the General Attorneys do
not administer chapter 71 of title 5, citing United States Department of
Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Region III, 8 FLRA 286 (1982). Finally, the
Union contends that, if the Authority does not want to apply the deminimis standard established in EEOC to exclude attorneys under
section 7112(b)(2) or section 7112(b)(3), then the case should be remanded to
the Regional Director to gather evidence to develop a new standard.

C. The Department of Justice's Position

The Department of Justice (DOJ) contends that Authority
and NLRB precedent strongly support the classification of the General Attorneys
as confidential employees, citing 1947th Administrative Support Group,
14 FLRA at 224-25 and Associated Day Care, 269 NLRB at 181. DOJ argues
that the definition of confidential employee in section 7103(a)(13) of the
Statute does not contemplate varying degrees of confidentiality and that there
is no place for quantitative inquiry when determining whether individuals are
confidential employees, citing Bechtel Incorporated, 215 NLRB 906, 907
(1974) (Bechtel); Associated Day Care, 269 NLRB at
181.

DOJ also contends that a serious conflict of interest
would result if the General Attorneys were in any bargaining unit. DOJ argues
that the trust and confidence of the Activity's management personnel in the
General Attorneys would be seriously undermined if these same attorneys were
members of a bargaining unit because in labor relations matters the interests
of labor and management are generally opposed. DOJ also argues that allowing
attorneys who are in a bargaining unit to represent the Activity in a labor
relations case is wholly inconsistent with the spirit of Disciplinary Rule
5-101 of the American Bar Association's Model Canons of Professional
Responsibility, which forbids an attorney from representing someone "'if the
exercise of professional judgement [sic] on behalf of his client will be or
reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or
personal interests.'" DOJ Brief at 7-8. Finally, DOJ argues that restricting
the use of General Attorneys to cases not involving employees from the General
Attorneys' bargaining unit would interfere with management's right to assign
work.

V. Analysis and Conclusions

For the following reasons, we find that the General
Attorneys are confidential employees within the meaning of section 7103(a)(13)
of the Statute.(1)

A. Authority Precedent

Section 7103(a)(13) of the Statute defines a
"confidential employee" as an employee "who acts in a confidential capacity
with respect to an individual who formulates or effectuates management policies
in the field of labor-management relations." An employee is "confidential" if:
(1) there is evidence of a confidential working relationship between an
employee and the employee's supervisor; and (2) the supervisor is significantly
involved in labor-management relations. U.S. Army Plant Representative
Office, Mesa, Arizona, 35 FLRA 181, 186 (1990) (U.S. Army, Mesa)
(citing 1947th Administrative Support Group, 14 FLRA at 225). SeeDepartment of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. and
Internal Revenue Service, Cincinnati District, Cincinnati, Ohio, 36 FLRA
138, 145 (1990); Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, 8th Coast
Guard District, New Orleans, Louisiana, 35 FLRA 84, 89 (1990); U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 34 FLRA 207, 211-13 (1990);
Headquarters, Fort Sam Houston, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 5 FLRA 339,
341-43 (1981). An employee is not "confidential" in the absence of either of
these requirements. U.S. Army, Mesa, 35 FLRA at 186 (citing Tick
Eradication Program, Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, United States Department of Agriculture, 15 FLRA 250, 252 (1984);
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 5 FLRA 28, 31 (1981)). This
two-part analysis is the Authority's "labor-nexus" test, which we use to
examine the nature of an employee's confidential working relationship. Of
course, we will also exclude as a confidential employee any individual who
actually formulates or effectuates management policies in the field of
labor-management relations. SeeU.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Washington, D.C., 35 FLRA 1249, 1255-57 (1990) (HUD,
Washington).

We base bargaining unit eligibility determinations on
testimony as to an employee's actual duties at the time of the hearing rather
than on duties that may exist in the future. HUD, Washington, 35 FLRA at
1256-57; Veterans Administration Medical Center, Prescott, Arizona, 29
FLRA 1313, 1315 (1987) (VA, Prescott). Bargaining unit eligibility
determinations are not based on evidence such as written position descriptions
or testimony as to what duties had been or would be performed by an employee
occupying a certain position, because such evidence might not reflect the
employee's actual duties. VA, Prescott, 29 FLRA at 1315 (citing
Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Mint, U.S. Mint, Denver,
Colorado, 6 FLRA 52, 53 (1981)). Seealso, U.S. Army
Engineer Topographic Laboratories, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 10 FLRA 125, 127
n.3 (1982) (incumbent employees, who were expected to perform certain duties
sometime in the future, were not management officials because those duties were
not actually assigned to them at the time of the hearing).

In cases where an employee has recently encumbered a
position, we consider duties to have been actually assigned where: (1) it has
been demonstrated that, apart from a position description, an employee has been
informed that he or she will be performing the duties; (2) the nature of the
job clearly requires those duties; and (3) an employee is not performing them
at the time of the hearing solely because of lack of experience on the job.
U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Yuma Projects Office,
Yuma, Arizona, 37 FLRA 239, 245 (1990) (Interior, Yuma). SeealsoUnited States Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor,
Region III, 8 FLRA 286, 287-88 (1982) (DOL, Solicitor) (Authority
dismissed representation petition based on section 7112(b)(4) noting that,
although there was no record evidence that the attorneys actually provided
legal advice and assistance regarding the enforcement of section 7120(a)-(e) of
the Statute, similarly situated employees had participated in such activities
and it was clear the attorneys would also be called upon to administer those
provisions of section 7120). On the other hand, we do not consider duties to
have been actually assigned to a new incumbent where: (1) the assignment of
duties is speculative because the nature of the job may change or the nature of
the job does not require such duties; or (2) although duties may be included in
a written position description, it is not clear that the duties actually will
be assigned to the employee or that the employee has been informed that he or
she will perform those duties. Interior, Yuma, 37 FLRA at
245.

The Authority has not previously addressed: (1) the
circumstances under which attorneys would be considered confidential employees;
or (2) whether persons are confidential employees if, although not having a
confidential working relationship with a person exercising managerial functions
in the labor relations area, they may obtain, in the normal performance of
their duties, advance information of management's position with regard to
contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, and other labor relations
matters.

'management should not be required to handle labor
relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which
the [c]ompany is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their
duties may obtain advance information of the [c]ompany's position with regard
to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, and other labor
relations matters.'

In B.F. Goodrich, the Board reaffirmed its
previous ruling in Ford Motor and stated its intention "to limit the
term 'confidential' so as to embrace only those employees who assist and act in
a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations." Hendricks County,
454 U.S. at 189 (quoting B.F. Goodrich, 115 NLRB at 724). The Board has
narrowly construed the definition of confidential employee because most
employees have an arguably confidential relationship with management, and
because an expansive application of the exclusionary rule would deprive many
employees of the right to bargain collectively. Union Oil at 853 (citing
Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669, 670 (6th Cir.
1968) (Westinghouse Electric); B.F. Goodrich, 115 NLRB at
724).

In addition, the Board has not viewed the amount of time
devoted to labor relations matters as a controlling factor in determining
confidential status. Associated Day Care, 269 NLRB at 181 (citing
Reymond Baking Co., 249 NLRB 1100 (1980); Siemens Corp., 224 NLRB
1579 (1976); West Chemical Products, 221 NLRB 250 (1975);
Bechtel). Rather, the Board determines the nature of an individual's
alliance with management by making a complete examination of all the factors
present, such as the relative amount of interest the individuals have in
furthering the policies of the employer as opposed to those of the bargaining
unit in which they would be included. Cf.Detroit College of
Business, 296 NLRB No. 40, slip op. at 8-9 (Aug. 25, 1989).

In applying the labor-nexus test set forth in B.F.
Goodrich, the NLRB has deviated from its stated definition in only one
major respect. In a separate line of decisions, the NLRB has designated as
confidential employees persons who, although not assisting persons exercising
managerial functions in the labor-relations area, "regularly have access to
confidential information concerning anticipated changes which may result from
collective-bargaining negotiations." Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 189
(quoting Pullman Standard Division of Pullman, Inc., 214 NLRB 762,
762-63 (1974) (Pullman Standard) and citing Triangle Publications,
Inc., 118 NLRB 595, 596 & nn.3-4 (1957)). The NLRB has not followed a
practice of depriving all employees who have access to confidential business
information of the full panoply of rights afforded by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) (Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 189), but attempts
to strike a balance between the right of employees to be represented in the
collective bargaining process with the right of the employer to formulate,
determine, and effectuate its labor policies with the assistance of employees
not represented by the union with which it deals (Westinghouse Electric,
398 F.2d at 670-71). "[E]mployees who by their duties, knowledge, or sympathy
[are] aligned with management should not be treated as members of labor."
Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 193 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

The Board considers the precise nature of the allegedly
confidential information to be significant in making confidential employee
determinations. The Board will not exclude as "confidential" those employees
who merely have access to personnel or statistical information upon which an
employer's labor relations policy is based; nor will it exclude employees with
access to labor relations information after it has become known to the union or
the employees concerned. Pullman Standard, 214 NLRB at 763 (citing
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 119 NLRB 1715
(1958)).

Finally, the NLRB does not take the view that unionized
employees would be more disposed than unrepresented employees to breach their
obligation of confidentiality. Thus, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 240
NLRB 162, 163 (1979) (Dun & Bradstreet-II), the Board stated:
"'[t]he law has clearly rejected the notion that membership in a labor
organization is in itself incompatible with the obligations of fidelity owed to
an employer by its employee.'"

C. Application of Private Sector
Precedent

When there is an absence of specific precedent under the
Statute, an analogy to comparable legal developments in the private sector is a
useful guide. SeeLibrary of Congress v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280,
1286 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Library of Congress), enforcingAmerican Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
2477 and Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 7 FLRA 578 (1982). When
there are comparable provisions under the Statute and the NLRA, decisions of
the NLRB and the courts interpreting the NLRA have a high degree of relevance
to similar circumstances under the Statute. SeeLibrary of
Congress, 699 F.2d at 1287. While decisions of the NLRB are not controlling
in the Federal sector, the Authority appropriately takes into account the
experience gained in the private sector. Department of the Navy, Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard Restaurant System, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 28 FLRA 172,
176 n. (1987).

The confidential employee labor-nexus tests of the
Authority and the NLRB are similar although the NLRB test is somewhat more
restrictive. The NLRB, however, has also designated as confidential employees
persons who, although not assisting persons exercising managerial functions in
the labor-relations area, "regularly have access to confidential information
concerning anticipated changes which may result from collective-bargaining
negotiations." Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 189 (quoting Pullman
Standard, 214 NLRB at 762-63). The Authority has not, before this case, had
an opportunity to address this issue.

In Arlington Field Office, we accepted the
Activity's application for review and raised two questions with regard to their
status as confidential employees: (1) whether the General Attorneys' union
affiliation would create a conflict of interest with their role in internal
labor relations, and (2) whether the frequency or amount of internal labor
relations work performed is a controlling factor in determining if the General
Attorneys were confidential employees under the Statute.

Regarding the first question, we agree with the Union
that Congress intended attorneys, like other professionals, to have the same
right to be represented by a union that Congress conveyed to other Federal
employees. Membership in a labor organization is in itself not incompatible
with the obligations of fidelity owed to an employer by its employees.
SeeDun & Bradstreet-II, 240 NLRB at 163. We do not agree
with the DOJ that 5-101 of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Canons of
Professional Responsibility is controlling here. We do not consider the ABA's
Model Canons of Professional Responsibility when making bargaining unit
determinations under the Statute. SeeTreasury, Western Region, 1
FLRC at 260 (ABA restrictions upon the conduct of its members do not control
unit determinations and qualifications of a labor organization for exclusive
recognition under Executive Order 11491). Nonetheless, the right of an employee
to be represented in the collective bargaining process must be balanced with
the right of the employer to formulate and effectuate its labor policies with
the assistance of employees not represented by the union with which it deals.
SeeWestinghouse Electric, 398 F.2d at 67-71. In our view,
inclusion of the General Attorneys would present a conflict of interest
because, as representatives of management in the type of internal labor
relations matters they handle, they may obtain advance information of
management's position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of
grievances, and other labor relations matters.

Regarding the second question, we conclude that the
Regional Director mistakenly relied on EEOC in finding that the 10
General Attorneys were not confidential employees under section 7112(b)(2)
because their "involvement in internal labor relations cases, when compared to
their overall work load, has been deminimus [sic] and
insufficient to exclude them from the existing bargaining unit." Regional
Director's Decision at 5. EEOC involved the application of the deminimis doctrine, which concerns the frequency and the amount of work an
employee performs, to determine the bargaining unit eligibility of employees
performing personnel work within the meaning of section 7112(b)(3) and not
confidential employee status under section 7112(b)(2).

We reject any shorthand approach, such as the deminimis doctrine, for determining the bargaining unit eligibility of
confidential employees. Rather, a complete examination of all the relevant
factors must be made to determine the nature of an employee's confidential
working relationship. While the frequency and the amount of an employee's
working time devoted to labor relations matters may be relevant factors in
determining confidential status, we do not view such factors as controlling.
SeeU.S. Department of Labor, 33 FLRA 265, 267-68 (1988)
(Authority rejected union's argument that a limited amount of actual
confidential labor relations work does not provide a substantial basis for
excluding employees from a bargaining unit); Associated Day Care, 269
NLRB at 181 (amount of time devoted to labor relations matters is not the
controlling factor in determining confidential status under the
NLRA).

We have decided to apply the Pullman Standard
doctrine, as set forth in Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 189, to
circumstances such as those in the present case. Thus, we believe that the
definition of confidential employee under the Statute includes employees who,
in the normal performance of their duties, may obtain advance information of
management's position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of
grievances, and other labor relations matters. In our view, management should
not be faced with having bargaining unit members in positions where they could
divulge information that they obtained as part of their confidential internal
labor relations duties.

The General Attorneys clearly have access to internal
personnel policy documents, management's positions on labor-related issues, and
management's guidance to supervisors and managers concerning such issues.
Transcript at 139-44. Based on this demonstrated access to significant
management labor-relations documents and positions, the General Attorneys have
been placed in a confidential relationship, within the meaning of section
7103(a)(13), with some of the Activity's labor relations officials. Memorandum
Supporting Activity's Application for Review at 3-7 (Attachment to Activity's
Brief). Thus, we find that the General Attorneys' duties and knowledge align
them with management and provide them access to labor relations information
that would not normally become known to the Union or the employees concerned.
SeeNLRB v. Lorimar Productions, Inc., 771 F.2d 1294, 1298 (9th
Cir. 1985); Pullman Standard, 214 NLRB at 763. Accordingly, we conclude
that the General Attorneys are confidential employees under the Statute because
they may obtain, in the normal performance of their duties, advance information
of management's position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition
of grievances, and other labor relations matters.(2)

We note that with regard to three of the General
Attorneys--Charles Jackson, Pamela Silverman, and Robert Wilson--the Regional
Director found that, although they had essentially the same basic job duties
and responsibilities as the other General Attorneys who the Regional Director
included in the bargaining unit, they had never handled an internal labor
relations case. Regional Director's Decision at 6. However, the record
establishes that at the time of the hearing in this matter they had been
employed at the Activity for less than a year. Activity Brief at 11, citing
Agency Exhibit 1. In our view, it is appropriate to also exclude the three
General Attorneys from the bargaining unit because: (1) the record
demonstrates, apart from their position description, that they will be called
upon to handle internal labor relations cases; (2) the nature of the General
Attorney's job clearly requires them to handle internal labor relations cases;
and (3) the employees were not performing such duties at the time of the
hearing solely because of lack of experience on the job. SeeInterior, Yuma, 37 FLRA at 245. SeealsoDOL,
Solicitor, 8 FLRA at 287.

VI. Order

The bargaining unit for which clarification was sought is
clarified to exclude the General Attorney positions in the Arlington Field
Office.