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Friday, December 16, 2011

Is This a 1971 Moment in Pakistan's History?

Pakistani-American Mansoor Ijaz's confidential memo to retired US Admiral Mike Mullen on behalf of former Ambassador Hussain Haqqani makes a reference to the 1971 war where it says "this is a 1971 moment in Pakistan’s history". What does it really mean? Does it mean there is another India-Pakistan war in the offing? Or an expansion of US Afghan war into Pakistan? Or further splintering of Pakistan?

Let me try and interpret it by explaining it in the context of civilian-military relations in Pakistan in 1971.

The key result of the 1971 India-Pakistan war was the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh after a humiliating defeat of Pakistani military and Gen Nizai's surrender on December 16, 1971. This military defeat discredited, demoralized and sidelined Pakistani generals and paved the way for the Pakistan Peoples' Party leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to become an all-powerful civilian dictator and Chief Martial Law Administrator of what remained of Pakistan.

It can be reasonably argued that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a key architect of the tragic events that unfolded in 1971. Many analysts agree with late Governor Salman Taseer of the PPP who said that "the lion's share of the blame" for 1971 goes to Mr. Bhutto. Here's what Mr. Taseer wrote in his book "Bhutto: A Political Biography":

"Blame can never be satisfactorily or finally apportioned to the major players in this grisly drama, but that Bhutto, Mujibur Rahman and Yahya Khan share responsibility there can be no doubt. Many, indeed, are inclined to the view that Bhutto, as the most sure-footed politician of the three and thus the best equipped to assess the consequences of his actions, must accept the lion's share of the blame. Argument on this point will remain one of the central themes of Pakistani politics, perhaps for decades."

A number of actions and pronouncements by Mr. Bhutto support Gov Taseer's conclusion. Some of these are:

1. While the rest of the political parties winning two-thirds of the National Assembly seats agreed to attend the 1971 post-election session in Dacca, Mr. Bhutto refused to do so.

2. Not only did Mr. Bhutto announce his PPP's boycott of the assembly, he also threatened to "break the legs" of any one from West Pakistan who agreed to attend.

3. Mr. Bhutto urged the military to act against Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rahman's Awami Leage which had absolute majority in the National Assembly elected in 1971.

4. After General Yahya Khan was persuaded by Bhutto to act against the Awami League, Mr. Bhutto welcomed the army operation in East Pakistan by saying "Thank God, Pakistan is saved" on the day the military started its action in East Pakistan....knowing full well that it would invite an Indian invasion as it did.

5. There was wide support for a Polish ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council to end the 1971 India-Pakistan war before Dhaka fell. But Mr. Bhutto, as General Yahya Khan's special envoy, refused to go along and walked out of the UN meeting.

All of the above facts lead to only one conclusion: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto engineered the defeat of Pakistani military in East Pakistan in 1971 to discredit and marginalize the generals and consolidate his own power at the expense of the unity of Pakistan.

Is today's PPP inviting the US military to defeat, demoralize and destroy Pakistan's military in 2011? Are Abbottabad and Mohmand part of this strategy? Are US and Pakistan heading towards a dangerous military confrontation in the near future?

Sher: "Personally, I do not know whether it would have been good or bad for Pakistan? What do you think?"

I think it was a very tragic and extremely traumatic split that caused tens of thousands of innocent lives in 1971.

We now know in hindsight that, if the purpose was to weaken military's power in Pakistani politics, it didn't happen. And Bhutto contributed to it by creating the ISI's political cell which cost him his own life after Gen Zia's coup.

A better model to pursue is the Turkish model which has evolved to the point where the elected civilian leaders have become more powerful than the military.

All of the above facts lead to only one conclusion: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto engineered the defeat of Pakistani military in East Pakistan in 1971 to discredit and marginalize the generals and consolidate his own power at the expense of the unity of Pakistan.

Its very easy to blame all defeats on one man/factor.The seeds of Bangladesh had been sown much earlier.

1.Making Urdu the sole national language while most Pakistanis spoke Bengali(E+W pakistanis)

2.Making disproportionate amount of investments in West PAkistan vis a vis East PAkistan.While the west surged ahead of India in quality of life indices the East PAkistanis actually were less developed than the poorest parts of India.

3.Ridiculous and self serving martial race theory which actively discriminated against Bangladeshis in the army on grounds of their being non martial.

4.In absolute stark contrast to Mrs. G's cold and calcuulated moves a tradition of bravado and irresponsible delusions of grandeur 'we are descendants of turks/arab/persian conquerors','one pakistani=10 indians' etc etc led to a politico=military strategy that was to match for what India had.

"The Pakistanis are straightforward and sometimes extremely stupid. The Indians are more devious, sometimes so smart that we fall for their line " Richard Nixon

All these are a telling indicment on the ENTIRE Pakistani establishment.Bhutto was just the convenient scape goat specially now that is dead.Blaming just him is another wway of avoiding any significant institutional reform in PAkistan.

AOA. Very good analysis indeed. I think that was the plan of that memo. That is why Zardari is hiding in Dubai now. I am sure it will be hard to implement now that this plan has been exposed. General Aslam Baig wrote something similar a week ago even though he was not very clear and he beat around the bush as most Pakistani writers do. May Allah protect Pakistan from evil of all evil-doers. Aameen.

I do hope you are right when you say that "it (Zardari-Haqqani plan) will be hard to implement now that this plan has been exposed".

But I think Pakistan still faces significant risks as long as Zardari is around as President and Head of PPP and the US troops are still in Afghanistan. Gen Kayani, the Pak military and the rest of the politicians have to tread very carefully to avoid stepping on big landmines.

All these are a telling indicment on the ENTIRE Pakistani establishment.Bhutto was just the convenient scape goat specially now that is dead.Blaming just him is another wway of avoiding any significant institutional reform in PAkistan.

Exactly the Pakistanis must ask themselves why have they not been able to get quality civilian leaders comparable to others in the regions for example Rao,Indira,Nehru,Vajpayee etc??

I think it has to do with the feudal structure and the crowding out of the middle class from the higher echelons of power.The Indian power clique by contrast almost always come from middle class backgrounds...

i.e it took something like 40 years for the transition from aristocratic/feudal/ex maharaja background to the middle class preponderence in power in India.

Just to put things in the proper context.

However the Indian feudal/aristocratic establishment was relatively very graceful in bowing out in favour of the middle class as it matured.In that sense they and their descendants can be proud of being good custodians of power.

Fact of the matter was that thousand of bangl Muslim were killed by Pakistan army. Even today they are talking about trying the Pakistan army for war crime. Pakistan general gave the surrender letter when threatened by Indian army that they will hand over them to the newly formed bangla army. IN return the Indian army allowed safe exit of the army back to Pakistan.

Split of bangla was due to the rigidity of Bhutto in not recognizing the regional aspiration of Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rahman.

If Pakistan could have done the needful to recognize the federal structure, bangla would not have happened.

2. Bangladesh is still categorized by the Word Bank among the least developed countries of the world because it started with a lower base than West Pakistan, and the loss of its Hindu business elite in 1947 left it worse off. It also didn't have the benefit of the large number of Muslim businessmen who migrated to West Pakistan, particularly Karachi, after partition.

3. Pakistani economist Dr. Ishrat Husain explains it well when he says that "although East Pakistan benefited from Ayub’s economic reforms in 1960s, the fact that these benefits were perceived as a dispensation from a quasi-colonial military regime to its colony—East Pakistan—proved to be lethal."

2. Bangladesh is still categorized by the World Bank among the least developed countries of the world because it started with a lower base than West Pakistan, and the loss of its Hindu business elite in 1947 left it worse off. It also didn't have the benefit of the large number of Muslim businessmen who migrated to West Pakistan, particularly Karachi, after partition.

3. Pakistani economist Dr. Ishrat Husain explains it well when he says that "although East Pakistan benefited from Ayub’s economic reforms in 1960s, the fact that these benefits were perceived as a dispensation from a quasi-colonial military regime to its colony—East Pakistan—proved to be lethal."

Here are parts of a Daily Times Op Ed by Javed Jabbar on 40th anniversary of the Fall of Dhaka:

In the narrative adopted by Bangladesh and echoed by India and most of global discourse, about three million Bengalis were killed and about 300,000 women were allegedly raped by the Pakistan Army during the nine-month conflict resulting in the secession of Bangladesh. These numbers fail spectacularly on the anvil of factual scrutiny, documentation and rationality. In the 262 days between March 26 and December 16, 1971, Pakistan’s armed forces did not exceed 45,000 troops at optimal levels. The 90,000 prisoners-of-war held by India included over 50,000 non-combatant, unarmed West Pakistani civilians.

Spread out in small, embattled formations across East Pakistan, facing a newly unfriendly or uneasy population, an India-supported insurgency, preparing for an Indian invasion, constantly under-supplied and under-equipped, the Pakistani forces would have had to kill 11,450 Bengalis and rape 1,145 women every single day for 262 days to reach the levels claimed. Not a single credible document has been cited in 40 years to substantiate such absurd allegations of scale.

By unverified frequent repetition of the grotesque figures, the names of Pakistan and Pakistan’s armed forces have become synonymous with the charge of a ‘genocide’ in East Pakistan, which actually never took place. The unfounded charge amounts to the character assassination of a nation’s armed forces.

The Pakistani version is diametrically different. The official Commission of Inquiry headed by a former chief justice could only estimate 36,000 dead. Other estimates go between 100,000 to 200,000 killed. To contrast the two claims is not to demean the gravity of the catastrophe by cold statistics. Every human life is sacred. Every human being’s dignity is sacrosanct. Any violation of either is reprehensible.

Some atrocities by Pakistani troops did take place. Several eye-witness accounts state that the targets were almost always adult males, that women and children were spared. The killings were not one-sided. Many thousands of non-Bengalis and West Pakistanis, including women and children, were brutally slaughtered by Bengalis between 1st March and March 26, 1971, and subsequently as well, as also after December 16, 1971. About 4,000 Pakistani troops also perished in the conflict.

The need to revisit this facet of history to conclusively establish the truth is superbly highlighted by the meticulous research recorded by a scholar who is neither a Pakistani nor a Bangladeshi. In her unusually sensitive and remarkably balanced book, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, Sarmila Bose — an Indian Bengali Hindu by birth, a senior Research Fellow at Oxford University — powerfully and persuasively presents the case for a rigorous, evidence-based search for the truth.

Bangladesh Financial Express reported that BD's per capita income increased to $818 from $751 a year earlier:

The Bangladesh's per capita income (gross national income) has swelled to US$818 in the outgoing fiscal 2010-2011, a $67 year-on-year rise compared to $751 in the last fiscal 2009-10, official data showed. According to Bangladesh Economic Survey 2011 report, the per capita GDP (gross domestic product) at the constant market price also rose by $68 to $755 in the outgoing fiscal from US$687 in the last FY2009. Based on total 147.90 million population in the country, the per head GNI (gross national income) has increased significantly to $818 in the outgoing fiscal as the remittance flow was buoyant, said the survey report, released Thursday at the budget session. On the constant market price, the per capita GNI (total income including the remittance sent by the non-resident Bangladeshis abroad) has stood at US$818, up by $67 from $755 in the last FY2009, the report said quoting the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) survey data. According to economic survey report, the growth in manufacturing and service sectors and the remittance flow have attributed the per head income though the global economic recession affected the global economy in the last few years. The GDP growth in the country has also performed satisfactorily in the outgoing fiscal as the BBS estimates 6.66 per cent economic growth. Bangladesh government has set the target to become a middle-income country by 2021. It is going to frame a "Perspective Plan 2021" to achieve double digit growth by FY 2018 and cut the extreme poverty line below 15 per cent by 2011.

Bhutto can be blamed for putting last nail in the coffin because the real crisis started with strangling of democratic values in starting Years. India got its constitution in just 3yrs and hold first general election in just 5 yrs. But in case of Pakistani politicians, they were more busy in internal fighting instead of giving constitution to Pakistan and finally Pakistan had their constitution after 9yrs and first general election after 24 years.

Bengalis formed 55% of the population but irony was majority never dominated in Pakistan's politics. In India the majority North Indians mainly from "Hindi heartland" made Sanskritized Hindi (rejecting Persianized Hindi) in Devanagari script as the Official language of the India and they dominated everywhere but what we see in case of Pakistan is minority is forcing Bengalis to give up Bengali in favor of Urdu and abandoning Bengali script in favor of Arabic Script. They seemed to be struggling for everything that made mockery of them being in majority.

In UK its English who dominates, in Singapore its Chinese who dominates, in Malaysia its Malaya who dominated but majority Bengalis never dominated in their home country. Mujib won absolute majority in election then who was Bhutto at distant Second to stop him from becoming Prime Minister.

But I talked to many Bangladeshi most of them said that many were even contented with Mujib not becoming Prime Minister but when the killing of Bengalis started by Yahya Khan, the same day they stop considering themselves as Pakistanis. Mujib was in Jail and it was Ziaur Rahman who declared independence of Bangladesh. Ziaur Rahman was a patriot and fought against India in 1965 war but killings made him to revolt along with all Bengali soldiers of Pakistan Army against Pakistan army.

And I was listening to a couple of programs from Pakistani news channel,"Have we learnt anything from 1971 debacle, certainly NO because we are repeating same mistakes in Balochistan."

'In India the majority North Indians mainly from "Hindi heartland" made Sanskritized Hindi (rejecting Persianized Hindi) in Devanagari script as the Official language of the India '

That move almost caused the breakup of India with Tamil Nadu almost declaring independence.That circular declaring Hindi the official language was never implemented.To this day Hindi is NOT used in offical communication in non Hindi states such as those in the south and the east.

India has 18 official languages with English being the defacto official language.

One of Nehru's most astute political compromises which survives to this day!

@Anonymous"That move almost caused the breakup of India with Tamil Nadu almost declaring independence.That circular declaring Hindi the official language was never implemented.To this day Hindi is NOT used in offical communication in non Hindi states such as those in the south and the east."

Well, You know only half story. In 1950 both Hindi and English were made the Official languages of Federal Government of India and by 1965 Hindi was going to be sole official language of Federal government discontinuing use of English. It was Shastri not Nehru who handled language issue. And Dravidian nationalist never raised issue of independence during 1965 protests.

Tamils were against the move of removal of English because they feared that they would not compete with North Indians when it comes to jobs if Hindi will remain sole official language. Like East Pakistanis feared of Urdu being sole official language of Pakistan will make them difficult to get jobs. The dispute started in 1965 and ended in 1965 when Shastri gave assurance that both Hindi and English will remain official languages of federal government.

But in the last,majority North Indians made Hindi as a official language and concerns of minority Tamil people were also respected. And the side effect of 1965 protests was that Indians becoming on of the largest English speaking community in the world and people are mostly bilingual-trilingual.

The crises of 2011 are ripping apart a working relationship with Pakistan. Controversy over CIA agent Raymond Davis, the raid on the bin Laden compound, accusations of ISI support for the Taliban, civilian casualties caused by drone attacks, and now NATO airstrikes on Pakistani soldiers have roiled emotions. One must view these events as a whole, not individually. They are tying the hands of Pakistan's military and civilian leaders in cooperating with the U.S. to fight our common enemies. Here, political attitudes and opinions on Capitol Hill and among voters have hardened, complicating our ability to forge policies that enable effective engagement with Pakistan.

The interests of both countries mandate that Pakistan's military and elected government unite in fighting violent extremism. One needed step is strong Pakistani communication campaign to marginalize and de-legitimize the extremists. That could lay the political foundation for taking the military battle to militants. They've at time proven they can do that. But the controversies over U.S. actions have instead led Islamabad to adopt policies that obstruct fighting extremists. Success requires that we work together to overcome the widely shared perception that the U.S. deliberately seeks to abuse Pakistani sovereignty and that cooperation with us makes the military or civilians American pawns.------------

What can the presidential aspirants do? They can go beyond the current rhetoric to register points that resonate with Pakistanis and serve our mutual interests. Turning relations with Pakistan into partisan fodder is not useful. It would send a powerful message for the Pakistanis to hear from both parties the following:

· The U.S. supports the primacy of elected civilian government and democratic institutions even while it works with Pakistan's military leaders to address our interests, especially in Afghanistan.· While we may have to condition our military aid to Pakistan's cooperation within its borders in fighting Afghan insurgents, we should stand strongly behind pro-democracy forces. That embraces targeted civilian aid that is carefully monitored to ensure proper use and branding so that we receive credit for our contributions.· The U.S. is ready to expand trade by foregoing the protectionism so hurtful to Pakistan's struggling economy. This assistance as well as creation of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones will win us more friends than our current aid programs. This will show that in the national interest we are prepared to make difficult domestic political decisions.· We recognize that Pakistan has legitimate security interests in Afghanistan and that with 35 million Pashtuns, no Pakistan government can support action that fails to address their concerns. But we won't tolerate its using the Pashtun card to meddle, andwon't allow it to obstruct a political settlement that would end the insurgency.· Whatever suspicion Pakistan may harbor, as journalist Zahid Hussain has noted, only the U.S. offers Pakistanis hope for the future. No other nation does that.

These messages to Pakistan will put the political discourse between Pakistan and the U.S. on a sounder footing. It will vest Pakistani policy makers and military with more flexibility to fight violent extremism and help revitalize ties with the U.S. What the candidates for President say, and how they say it, can make a huge difference in advancing or blocking what is mutually beneficial. Meanwhile, it will require Pakistani leaders who are willing to stand up against the tide of opinion and take their own political risks.

Here's a Daily Times Op Ed by AR Siddiqui on Bhutto and the Army in 1971:

The field marshal’s soaring ambition had been to prove his status as a great military leader and Bhutto’s burgeoning desire to cut him to size had fuelled the engine of the 1965 war

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), an offshoot of Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s Convention Muslim League, emerged in 1967 as the single most formidable force against Ayub, under founding chairman Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Quitting the government as its youngest and about the brightest foreign minister, Bhutto, once like a son to papa Ayub, emerged as the ultimate challenge to him at the zenith of his power between 1958-1968.

It hit its nadir towards the end of 1968 in the face of virtual political revolt in East Pakistan led by the fiery Maoist, Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and the doyen of the fledging PPP, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan.---------------The trilateral talks in Dhaka (March 21- 27) between Yahya, Bhutto and Mujib failed to pre-empt Operation Search Light planned for the night between the 25th and 26th of March. Yahya left Dhaka on March 26, after telling his local commander Lietenent General Tikka Khan to go ahead with the assault on Bengali civilians.

Bhutto saw the burning ghats (series of steps leading down to a water body) of Dhaka and heard the earth-shaking explosions from his hotel room. In the fierce display of the army’s firepower, Bhutto saw the vision of his political power rise like the proverbial sphinx from the ashes.

On his return to West Pakistan on March 27, Bhutto would be the first to bless the army action as he disembarked from his Boeing 707. “Thank God Pakistan has been saved,” he declared, to put his stamp of approval on Operation Search Light. The operation destroyed the last chance of an amicable political resolution of power transfer between the east (Awami League) and the west (PPP). It also tolled the bell for a untied Pakistan.----------The ghost of military rule, which Bhutto believed to have exorcised, materialised once again. Bhutto’s six year rule, at the best of times, had been a twilight zone between democracy and dictatorship. He never allowed institutional democracy to take root in the country, and ended up as an unsuccessful democratic strongman.

General Zia’s martial law came on probation for a period of three months. The military’s time frame was, apparently, a reflection both of its characteristic exactitude as well as of its tendency to oversimplify matters. The soldiers initially saw no problem with setting the mess right by holding elections in three months and going back to the barracks. The enormity of the task simply shocked them, however, once they were faced with it. Elections were indefinitely postponed and the martial law regime embarked on a programme of national reconstruction, moral as well as material.

Bhutto’s PPP used the army to get Mujib out of the way only to be overthrown by the army and hanged after a dubious Supreme Court diktat.

Here's a Reuters' report suggesting Nawaz Sharif also sought US help against military coup in Pakistan in 1999:

The U.S. State Department says the memo scandal is an "internal matter" for the Pakistani government. On Wednesday, Pentagon spokesman George Little, speaking generally about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, said the United States was committed to pushing through difficult issues.

"It's not going to be easy but with a lot of work we think we can do it," he told reporters.

QUESTIONS ABOUT PAKISTANI MOTIVES

There are also doubts in Washington about how much turbulence Pakistan's fragile democracy can withstand and whether courts can conduct a fair trial in a charged climate.

"The fact that the Supreme Court has now been involved gives (the memo matter) extra importance and legitimacy," said Shujaa Nawaz, a Pakistan scholar with the Atlantic Council.

Pakistan's top court is now moving ahead with the petition, filed by Nawaz Sharif, Zardari's chief opponent, raising questions about the political motivations for the case.

Bruce Riedel, a former CIA and White House official who chaired President Barack Obama's 2009 review of U.S. policy on the region, said Sharif himself initiated a similar petition over a decade ago.

He recalled a 1999 meeting with Sharif's brother Shahbaz, who he said traveled to Washington to warn of what civilian officials at the time feared was a brewing military coup.

"It was an entire day spent at the Willard Hotel listening to Shahbaz talk about their fears that a military coup was coming and asking for American help to prevent it," he said.

"That's pretty much the charge (that) is being leveled against Ambassador Haqqani."

If you really DONT like Zardari then let him complete his remaining one year, let him be defeated by people in elections AND NOT BY ARMY COUP! Any unconstitutional attempt to oust zardari will give him a golden chance to become a political martyr.

Naeem: "If you really DONT like Zardari then let him complete his remaining one year, let him be defeated by people ..."

Memogate should be fully investigated to expose the culprits who invited US intervention in Pakistan, and the Supreme Court must not be stopped from it just because Gilani is crying foul.

Constitution is not meant to be a suicide pact. The constitutional restrictions on Pak military must be balanced against the need for survival of the state and its people, and the constitution must never be allowed to be used as a refuge for scoundrels like Zardari and his cronies like Haqqani and Ispahani, etc. etc.

Agriculture represents the backbone of our economy. It can serve as a launching pad for transition to a knowledge economy, as it has a huge potential for revenue generation. But that can happen only if agricultural practices are carried out on scientific lines and use of technology maximised. The four major crops of Pakistan are wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane. They contribute about 37 percent of the total agricultural income and about nine percent to the GDP of Pakistan.-----------Wheat is the most important crop of Pakistan, with the largest acreage. It contributes about three percent to the GDP. The national average yield is about 2.7 tons per hectare, whereas in Egypt the yields are 6.44 tons per hectare and in European countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom they are above seven tons per hectare. We presently produce about Rs220 billion worth of wheat. If we can boost our yields to match those of Egypt, it can generate another Rs350 billion, allowing us to systematically pay off the national debt and make available funding for health and education.

However, the government has been reluctant to invest in research, water reservoirs and dams and extension services so that the country continues to suffer. Some progressive farmers in irrigated areas have been able to obtain yields of 6-8 tons per hectare but they are very much a minority. In rain-fed areas the yields are normally between 0.5 tons to 1.3 tons per hectare, depending on the region and amount of rainfall. In irrigated areas the yields are normally higher, in the range of 2.5 tons to 3.0 tons per hectare. Improved semi-dwarf cultivars that are available in Pakistan can afford a yield of wheat between 6-8 tons per hectare. It is possible to increase the yields substantially with better extension services, judicious use of fertilisers and pesticides, and greater access of water from storage reservoirs and dams that need to be constructed.

Cotton represents an important fibre crop of Pakistan that generates about Rs250 billion to the national economy, and contributing about two percent to the national GDP. Pakistan is the fourth-largest producer of cotton in the world, but it is ranked at 10th in the world in terms of yields. The use of plant biotechnology can help to develop better cotton varieties. Bt cotton produces a pesticide internally and safeguards the plant against chewing insects. The yields of Pakistani seed cotton and cotton fibre are both about half those of China. A doubling of cotton yields is doable and it can add another Rs250 billion to the national economy.

---------

The failed system of democracy in Pakistan is strongly supported by Western governments. It serves Western interests as it leads to docile and submissive leaders who serve their foreign masters loyally. The stranglehold of the feudal system thrives with no priority given to education. More than parliamentarians have forged degrees and the degrees of another 250 are suspect. The Supreme Court decision of verification of their degrees is flouted and ignored by the Election Commission. The bigger the crook, the more respect he is given by the government and the biggest crooks are conferred the highest civil awards. The economy has nosedived and we are today ranked among the bottom six countries of the world in terms of our expenditure on education.

...Almost from its inception, and certainly since 1954 when Ayub Khan was concurrently defence minister and commander-in-chief, the Pakistan army has been a political force even when it was not at the helm of the state. This was always true except for a brief period during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's term as prime minister when, after its defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the army was firmly under civilian control.

In the periods between military rule when elected governments were in power, the military has still been considered a political force. Even during the term of Gen Jehangir Keramat, perhaps the least politically threatening of the army chiefs, politicians would reach out to him to establish their "GHQ connections". Even though Gen Keramat was sacked by Nawaz Sharif in 1988, Mr Sharif never managed to tame the military and was eventually overthrown by another military dictator, Gen Pervez Musharraf.

In her first term as prime minister, Benazir Bhutto also attempted to exert her influence over the military, but was destined to be toppled by the then-president, Ishaq Khan, with the support of the military.

Every civilian government in Pakistan has learnt to live with the army's political role and adjusted to it in different ways.-------------Far from doing so, the elected government neither governed effectively nor tamed the military. Continuing on a path of corruption, it ceded political space to the military.

Had the elected government wanted to, the US incursion to assassinate Osama bin Laden on May 2 offered a priceless opportunity to sack the army chief and the director general of the ISI. Instead, it seems that President Asif Ali Zardari sought US assistance to keep the military at bay. The "memo-gate" scandal that broke last month involved the former ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, allegedly delivering a letter to the Pentagon asking for US assistance to stave off a military coup. One can only assume that in exchange Mr Zardari's administration was offering its subservience to Washington and control of Pakistan's nuclear assets.--------------On December 22, Pakistan's Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani thundered on the floor of parliament that he would not tolerate "a state within a state", an unambiguous reference to the army. The next day, Gen Kayani did his best to dispel rumours of a coup but the rumour mill keeps churning.

At the heart of this is the possibility of treason charges under Article 6 of the constitution; that trail could lead all the way to Mr Zardari and the presidential office. Having offered up Mr Haqqani as a sacrifice, the government would have liked to forget the scandal, but the Supreme Court has now sought responses from everyone concerned, including the chiefs of the army and the ISI.

Both the army and the ISI submitted affidavits stating that there was enough evidence to implicate Mr Haqqani. The government, in turn, has challenged the Court's jurisdiction in the affair. But the Supreme Court's continued inquiry could very well capsize this government.

The threat, then, posed to the elected government is not from the military but from the judiciary, which has implied that even the issue of presidential immunity is being considered. The most intriguing part of this affair is that, while the military seems fully conscious of the limits of its political power, the elected government's actions in the "memo-gate" affair has forced the military to become more involved. But it will be the decisions of the judiciary, not the military, that will see this government survive or fall.

Mr. Bhutto Zardari uses his op-ed, published in the English-language Express Tribune newspaper, to enumerate what he sees as his mother’s achievements, including pushing women’s rights. The PPP in the 1980s could have used its popular position to unseat the military-run government of the time, but did not do so, he writes. “The PPP has always been careful to distinguish between the army as an institution and the dictator who abuses his position,” he says.

It’s a challenge to the military to stay out of politics. And it seems that army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani for now has no designs to take over the government.

Still, the PPP is a lot less popular in Pakistan than it was in Ms. Bhutto’s day and you sense her son feels that. In many places of the op-ed, it feels as if he is writing as the head of an opposition party, not co-chairman of the ruling PPP.

“We can only dream of what might have been had she lived,” he writes at one point of his mother.

He enumerates the challenges facing Pakistan –from education, to energy shortages to the investment-starved economy – but offers no solutions. It’s easy to forget reading it that the PPP is in power.

What we do know is that there are 86,000 more schools because of Shaheed Benazir Bhutto. That, under her government foreign investment quadrupled; energy production doubled; exports boomed. Under her government, 100,000 female health workers fanned out across the country, bringing health care, nutrition, pre and postnatal care, to millions of our poorest citizens. It was under her government that women were admitted as judges to the nation’s courts, that women’s police departments were established to help women who suffered from domestic violence and a women’s bank was established to give micro loans to women to start small businesses. It was under Shaheed Benazir Bhutto’s leadership that cell phones, fibre optics and international media were introduced, and the Pakistani software industry blossomed. And it was on her very first day as prime minister, that all political prisoners were freed, unions legalised and the press uncensored. It was an amazing record of accomplishment, made even more remarkable by the constraint of aborted tenures, by constant pressure from a hostile establishment and presidents with the power to sack elected governments.

Here's an interesting account in Dawn newspaper of Sashi Tharoor's visit to Pakistan and discussion at Jinnah Institute:

...It was only his third day in Pakistan, yet it was surprising for him and his wife to see “how much we have in common and how much we differ”. He is visiting on the invitation of Jinnah Institute (JI) to be the first in its Distinguished Speakers series, which is part of the Track-II engagement between the civil societies of the two countries.

Dr Tharoor started by saying that as a member of Lok Sabha he sees the foreign policy in the perspective of improving the life of the poor and the marginalised – for which peace is essential.

“Peace is indivisible and so is freedom and prosperity,” he said.

In the age of globalisation it has become more so and that was why Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to resume the dialogue process that India had halted after the 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai.

Since the technological tools that benign forces used to bring the world together are used by the malign forces to disrupt the process, nations need to cooperate to fight terrorism, he said, bluntly charging the ISI and Pakistan army with using terrorism as a strategy.

“Pakistan defines itself in opposition to India and the “previously benign forces of religion and culture have become causes of conflict”, he said and decried its `Kashmir solution first` policy.

While other states have army, Pakistan army is said to have a state to itself.

As a consequence the civilian governments live in awe of the army and the few steps they took to improve relations with India were torpedoed by the military, he surmised.

But he welcomed the present government`s decision to grant Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India because it reflected how important it was for Pakistan to normalise relations with India after ignoring India`s grant of Most Favoured Nation to Pakistan for 16 years.

Dr Tharoor forcefully rejected “the notion that India is a threat to Pakistan and dismissed the Indian military action in support of Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan in 1971 that created Bangladesh as “a very special case”.

Otherwise, according to him, India had been magnanimous to Pakistan, like when it returned the strategic Hajipir Pass in Kashmir after 1965 war and had given up “first strike” in a nuclear conflict.

His discourse seem to hold Pakistan polity responsible for all the troubles and invited riposte from the panelists Nasim Zehra and Ejaz Haider and sharp questions from the audience comprising Pakistani diplomats, academia and some commoners.

“I am disappointed,” blurted out Nasim Zehra, a current affairs presenter on a private TV channel. “Whether it is fact or fiction depends on the narratives. The distinguished speaker has been selective.”

“I too believe India-Pakistan is a must. Here we have been pushing for a new vision. You have to change the narrative,” she said to applause from the audience.

Ejaz Haider, executive director of Jinnah Institute, was more subtle.

“I agree with your poetry but what about the prose,” he told Dr Shashi Tharoor, who is the author of several fiction and non-fiction books. How India has behaved and been doing in the last 60 years should be kept in mind also.

India`s military intervention in East Pakistan is a special case because stronger states use humanitarian and other international laws for their real politik, he said.

As for Hajipir Pass, he noted that post-1965 India had to chose between that pass and Kargil and “chose correctly”.

Dr Tharoor replied to the points raised and questions that followed on the same lines, more as a diplomat than a politician.

Here are excerpts of an AP report taking about how much Pakistan has changed:

Pakistan appears on the brink of chaos again, with the judiciary and army bearing down on its elected leaders. But already the crisis has underlined how Pakistan has changed in recent years: The military can no longer simply march in and seize power as it has done three times over the last six decades.

As a result, opportunities remain for both sides to back down. The civilian government may be able to ride it out until elections now seen likely in late summer.

"If this were the '90s, there would have been a coup a year ago," said Moeed Yusuf of the Washington-based United States Institute of Peace.

A watchful media poised to hound the generals — and a populace under few illusions that the top brass can be saviors after failing so many times before — seem to have acted as a brake on any designs by the army. The judiciary itself, although regarded by some as out to get President Asif Ali Zardari, would not sanction a coup.

It's also unclear how much of an appetite the judges have for dismissing a government that heads a coalition with a solid majority in parliament and with just one year left before it has to call elections.

Opposition parties are happy to see the government weakened. But the country's largest party, that of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, is no fan of the army and might not want to come to power on the shoulders of a military intervention.

"The status quo remains, despite all the institutions coming to a head. Every scenario you paint, there will be chaos and no one benefits," Yusuf said.

To be sure, tensions are higher now than they have ever been since Zardari took office in 2008, and the crisis could yet turn in unpredictable and dangerous directions. The political turmoil has all but paralyzed governance in the nuclear-armed country, hampering American hopes of rebuilding strained ties with Islamabad and securing its help with negotiating peace in neighboring Afghanistan.

Last week, coup jitters spread after the army issued an unusual warning of "grievous consequences" for the country over a scandal involving an unsigned memo sent last year to Washington asking for U.S. help in preventing a coup in the aftermath of the American raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

But pundits and government critics alike have been predicting the imminent fall of either Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani or the government they head for much of the past four years. Each time, they have been proven wrong.-----------

Many observers suspect Zardari's party is happy to play up conflict with the army and the judges because it diverts attention from its paltry list of achievements in office. The party may even embrace the prospect of being kicked out because it would fire up its base ahead of elections.

The Pakistan People's Party has a long history of battles with the army. Benazir Bhutto's father, Former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was executed by a military dictator in 1979. Zardari himself was elected on a massive sympathy vote after Benazir Bhutto's Dec. 27, 2007 assassination, which the party was happy to hint could have been orchestrated by elements of the army establishment.

US President Barack Obama wants the United States and Pakistan to continue to work together for achieving their common goals of defeating terrorism and building a stable and peaceful Pakistan, says the White House.

A brief statement, issued by the White House on Thursday, said Mr Obama conveyed this message to Pakistan’s new Ambassador Sherry Rehman who presented her credentials to the US president on Wednesday.

The White House statement pointed out that usually it did not provide readouts of such formal meetings but it was making an exception because of the media’s interest in Ambassador Rehman’s meeting with the president.

‘The president welcomed Ambassador Rehman to Washington and expressed his desire that our two governments continue to work closely together towards our shared objectives of defeating Al Qaeda, combating violent extremism, and supporting a stable and peaceful Pakistan, Afghanistan and wider region,’ the statement said.

The brief statement covers almost all significant points of a relationship which has continued to strain since the May 2 US raid on Osama bin Laden`s compound in Abbottabad and received another major jolt on Nov 26 when Nato aircraft bombed Pakistani military posts and killed 24 soldiers.

After the attack, Pakistan ordered a parliamentary review of its relations with the United States, but Ambassador Rehman has dismissed suggestions that the review would have a negative impact on bilateral relations.

“The review will present an opportunity for both countries to reset ties on more consistent, transparent and predictable lines,” she said.

...Gilani’s argument (about president's immunity) is likely to be contested when the judges convene again, on Feb. 1. “On the next date, let’s hear you convince us the issue is of the president’s immunity,” one of the judges told the prime minister. “Let’s grab the bull by the horns.” In fact, however, there seems to be some doubt as to whether the prime minister will be required to appear in person for the hearing. Meanwhile the prime minister’s lawyer, Aitzan Ahsan, hastened to assure the court that his client intends to comply with the order—eventually. “The letter shall be written when Asif Ali Zardari is no longer president,” Ahsan told the judges.-------------Not that Zardari is in such good shape politically. His approval rating at best is just above 20 percent. Ordinary Pakistanis are struggling to hold themselves together, buffeted by inflation, energy shortages, and worry. Steel mills, railways, the national airline and other state-run enterprises are in pitiful shape as they drain the country’s already depleted treasury. Corruption and cronyism rage unchecked.

To make matters worse, Zardari still has not lived down his reputation for corruption. Back in the late 1980s, when his wife, Benazir Bhutto, was serving her first term as prime minister, Pakistanis contemptuously nicknamed him “Mr. 10 Percent,” and in 2003 a Swiss court convicted the couple in absentia of skimming and laundering tens of millions of dollars from a Swiss contract. In 2008, after Zardari was elected president in the wake of his wife’s assassination, the Swiss closed the case at his government’s request.------------As if Zardari didn’t have enough problems, his generals hate him. “The military sees him as a man with no principles, who is prepared to be pro-American and pro-Indian without any ideology of his own,” says retired Lt. Gen. Talat Masood. “They consider him to be a parasite. They really look down on him.” The dislike has only worsened as the military’s relations with Washington have deteriorated. “The Army is unhappy with the Americans, and they are taking it out on Zardari,” says opposition parliamentarian and political columnist Ayaz Amir. “It’s the Army, the judiciary, it’s everyone who wants his scalp.”------------ “The military sees him as a man with no principles,” says retired Lt. Gen. Talat Masood. “They consider him to be a parasite. They really look down on him.”

At present, though, time appears to be on his side. His term of office (and those of the Parliament his party controls) won’t expire until 2013. His party and its allies are expected to prevail in the upcoming Senate elections this March, and Zardari could even call for early elections this year to ensure his hold on power. Despite the government’s incompetence, his Pakistan People’s Party remains strong and well-organized and the only party with roots in all four provinces...

Here is a December 06,2012 article that agrees with you that (a) PakArmy never committed genocide in Bangaldesh and that (b) the it was the Bangalees who committed atrocities against Pakistani civilians.

Here are some excerpts of a story in The Economist magazine raising questions about Bangladesh tribunal on war crimes in 1971:

ON 6th DECEMBER 2012 the presiding judge of Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal, Mohammed Nizamul Huq, passed an order requiring two members of The Economist to appear before the court, demanding that they explain how we have come by e-mails and conversations between himself and Ahmed Ziauddin, a lawyer of Bangladeshi origins based in Belgium. The tribunal was established in 2010 to consider accusations of war crimes committed in 1971, during Bangladesh’s war of independence from Pakistan.

The Economist has heard 17 hours of recorded telephone conversations and seen over 230 e-mails between the two men. This material is confidential and we are bound by law and the British press’s code of conduct not to reveal such information except in matters of the most serious public interest. We did not solicit the material, nor pay for it, nor commit ourselves to publish it.

These e-mails, if genuine, would indeed raise questions about the workings of the court and we are bound to investigate them as fully as we can. It was in the course of those investigations that we contacted the two men.

Our investigations are continuing. Once they are concluded and if we consider the allegations contained in them to have merit, we will publish them. Meanwhile, we are publishing a short account of our dealings with Mr Huq and Mr Ahmed. These, we believe, have a bearing both on the tribunal’s proceedings and on the order of December 6th.

Mr Huq is a Supreme Court judge and “chairman” of a trio of judges on the tribunal. There is no jury and the court can impose the death penalty. The verdict in its first case could come within days. Mr Ahmed is an expatriate Bangladeshi who is an academic specialising in international law who lives in Brussels. The two men have known each other for 25 years, as they were human-rights campaigners and Mr Ahmed’s late brother had been a student friend of the judge. Mr Ahmed is not just an international lawyer, he is also the director of the Bangladesh Centre for Genocide Studies in Belgium, which is dedicated to ending what he has called “the ingrained culture of impunity” surrounding the war crimes in Bangladesh.

The order includes a description of Mr Huq’s relationship with Mr Ahmed. It explains that the tribunal is based on “new law”, so the judges need to “take assistance of researchers from inside and outside the country”. It names Mr Ahmed as just such an expert. “During the proceedings of the trial and orders the Chairman also took assistance from him,” it says.

Speaking to The Economist in Brussels on December 4th, Mr Ahmed had said something similar, “It’s up to judges to decide where they are going to get research support or other support they need. They are quite entitled to do it. The more so when they really don’t have that research backup [in Bangladesh]. [They ask for help] if they feel if there are people more informed about the issue, especially where [international law] is so new in Bangladesh. I’m not really advising him, but if there is a question then I try to respond.”

-------Several questions are raised by all this. On what bases did the judge select the experts who would help him? Why was Mr Ahmed’s role not revealed to the court and to the public until the tribunal order on 6th December, after we had contacted him? The order refers to the presiding judge of the tribunal “receiving the support [of Mr Ahmed] on the developments on International Criminal law throughout the world” and taking assistance “during the proceedings of the trial and orders”. Why then did he tell us on December 5th that the two men had had no talks regarding the tribunal or regarding the proceedings? And why did he say that it would not be appropriate for a Supreme Court judge to talk to others about the proceedings?

The affair of the printing press highlighted the biggest problem being faced by Pakistan. India, which had finally been recognized by the British government as the successor state on 17 June after further pressure from Mountbatten, would simply take over a going concern with everything in place. Pakistan, on the other hand, would be starting from scratch without any established administration, without armed forces, without records, without equipment or military stores.

As early as 9 May, during his stay in Simla with Nehru, Mountbatten had admitted the problem. "What are we doing?" he had asked then. "Administratively, it's the difference between putting up a permanent building, a nissen hut, or a tent. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we are putting up a tent".

In "A History of Pakistan and its origins", Christophe Jafferlot cites British-Pakistani Prof Samuel Martin Burke rejecting the notion that the Two-Nation Theory died in 1971 with Pakistan's split into Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Burke says that the two-nation theory was even more strongly asserted in that the Awami League rebels had struggled for their own country, Bangladesh, and not to join India. In so doing, they had put into practice the theory behind the original resolution to form Pakistan, which envisaged two Muslim states at the two extremities of the subcontinent.

Here's an excerpt of Washington Post book review of Hussain Haqqani's "Magnificent Delusions":

Read his book and you might think Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington from 2008 to 2011, is no friend of his homeland. Its leaders are liars, double-dealers and shakedown artists, he says. They have been this way for decades, and, as Haqqani ably documents, the United States often has served as Pakistan’s willing dupe. But for all its criticism of Pakistan, “Magnificent Delusions” is a necessary prescriptive: If there’s any hope of salvaging what seems like a doomed relationship, it helps to know how everything went so wrong. Haqqani is here to tell us.

These days Haqqani lives in virtual exile in Boston. A liberal academic and player in Pakistani politics since 1989, he has long been a critic of the country’s all-powerful military and intelligence apparatus. In 2011, in a curious episode dubbed “Memogate,” he was accused of seeking U.S. help to subdue the Pakistani military. He denied the allegations but lost his post. Later, a commission established by Pakistan’s Supreme Court tarred him as a traitor, making it dangerous for him to return to the country once he left.

Bhutto apologists peddle every one of his striking list of hypocritical ‘follies’ as being the need of the hour; the only possible solution or the product of political ‘pressure’ that the man succumbed to with escalating frequency. This leeway is reserved for only two leaders in Pakistan’s history, Jinnah and Bhutto. Everyone else is answerable to our liberals, sometimes simply owing to the fact that they propagated an ideology that our liberals do not conform to.

Just because Bhutto signed the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims reluctantly it should not purge him from allegations of bigotryThe Bhutto and Jinnah apologists are no different to the Taliban or Islamism apologists – they pick their favourite cherries. That Bhutto – or Jinnah – took leaves out of the aforementioned ideology to propagate themselves is paid no heed, since all one needs to do to become the proponent of secularism in Pakistan is not be a practicing Muslim, and everything else becomes justifiable thenceforth.

It was ‘secular’ Bhutto whose constitution made Pakistan an Islamic Republic – an A-grade oxymoron. It was ‘secular’ Bhutto who shut down bars and banned alcohol – which apparently is compatible with our liberals’ brand of Islam. It was ‘secular’ Bhutto who vied to personify Iqbal’s pan-Islamic ‘Mard-e-Momin’, by uniting the Islamic world and formulating the Islamic bomb to counter the threat of the imaginary Jewish, Christian and Hindu bombs. And of course it was ‘secular’ Bhutto under whose leadership Ahmadis were excommunicated in 1974, politicising the process of takfir and in turn creating a beast of bigotry that has its claws around the Shia community as things stand.

The justification provided for all of the above manifestations of ‘secularism’ is solely: reluctance. Just because Bhutto reluctantly signed the paper declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims it should suffice in purging the man from allegations of bigotry, but Zia’s Ordinance XX that debarred Ahmadis from using any Islamic titles is a brazen depiction of bigotry, since it was in synchrony with his own ideology.

Hussain Haqqani is not a traitor, he wants a progressive Pakistan. He was a very ambitious individual, probably the 'real' heir to BB but he tried to run before he could walk. He was caught in the crossfire between Kayani, Pasha, the military establishment and the PPP government. What actually transpired was a 'sting' operation conducted by the ISI using a dubious character (Mansoor Ijaz) in order to remove HH from his post as Ambassador to US. I have read his books too and I like the guy a lot. I don't agree with everything he says but hey isn't it a god damn 'democracy' after all, we're not communists right??

Hussain Haqqani is the ultimate LOTA. He got his start as Gen Zia's lackey in 1970s. Since then, he has been in every party on Pakistan's political spectrum from right to left: Jamiat/JI, PML (N) and now PPP.

ISLAMABAD: Husain Haqqani, former Pakistan ambassador to US, has claimed in his latest book — Magnificent Delusions — that Benazir Bhutto during her visit to the United States in 1989 as the Prime Minister of Pakistan committed to Washington that Islamabad would not produce an atomic bomb.Haqqani said the nuclear programme continued and the country was enriching uranium in violation of Pakistan’s commitment to the US, as the then tough opposition of Nawaz Sharif distracted Benazir Bhutto.

He wrote: “The United States had also learned that Pakistan was enriching uranium in violation of Zia’s promise of capping enrichment at 5 percent, and Bhutto was unable to promise that enrichment would be capped. Bush agreed to certify one last time that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons in return for Bhutto’s commitment that Pakistan would not produce an atomic bomb, but while the tough opposition that Sharif put up at home distracted her, Pakistan violated that commitment without her full knowledge.”He added that Benazir Bhutto asserted later that she was told about Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment programme but not informed of the exact level of enrichment.Haqqani said during her state visit to Washington in June 1989 Bhutto received a warm welcome at the White House. She also became the only Pakistani prime minister to be invited to address a joint session of the Congress.“The US media recognised Bhutto’s “claim on American backing” on the ground of her adherence to democracy and moderation in the Islamic world. But in private talks with US officials she realised that the Americans did not think she was fully in control, and they could not offer her any help in asserting authority.”Later the CIA analysts had concluded that Pakistan had taken the final step toward “possession” of a nuclear weapon by machining uranium metal into bomb cores.Washington was certain that “Pakistan had crossed the line.” But the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the then Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg told the visiting Robert Gates that Pakistan’s nuclear capability had not advanced.“Unless Pakistan melted down the bomb cores that it had produced, Gates warned, ‘Bush would not be able to issue the Pressler Amendment certification needed to permit the continued flow of military and economic aid.’ When the Pakistanis denied that they had ‘crossed the line,’ Gates commented, ‘If it waddles like a duck, if it quacks like a duck, then maybe it is a duck.’”Then Husain Haqqani in his book ruled: “The Pakistanis had lied to Gates on both issues he raised in Islamabad. Although Bhutto was the best disposed toward the United States among Pakistan’s major power players, she did not control the levers of power. The State Department and the CIA did not see any advantage in trying to secure the Pakistan military’s subordination to an elected civilian; instead, they effectively leaned in the military’s favour by directly discussing major issues with Beg and other generals, assuming that the military could deliver on key issues of US interest—Afghanistan, nuclear weapons, and security in South Asia.”

Husain Haqqani has many detractors in Pakistan due to his shifting political allegiances and book publications. The thesis of Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (2005) is about a longstanding alliance of convenience between the Army and Pakistan’s religious parties “to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and to put pressure on India,” which cemented the Army’s domestic dominance and policies with dire consequences. Husain treads lightly on the failings of Pakistan’s political class, which bid for the Army’s favors while accumulating wealth. Washington comes in for heavy criticism for backing military strongmen and for not making assistance conditional on behavioral change. Pakistan comes across as a “rentier state” – one that “lives off the rents of its strategic location” — yet another reason why this book did not receive rave reviews in Rawalpindi.

Payback came when Husain was forced out of his post as President Asif Zadari’s emissary to Washington. After the US raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound, an orchestrated media campaign charged him of conspiring with a Pakistani-American living in Monaco to seek the Obama administration’s help to prevent an imaginary military coup attempt. Pakistan’s judicial system, which has difficulty prosecuting the perpetrators of mass-casualty attacks, quickly found sufficient evidence to launch judicial proceedings of treasonous behavior.

Husain is now back in the United States writing books. His latest, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, will add Pakistan’s diplomatic corps to his list of detractors. He has burned another bridge, this time with a historical narrative of Pakistan’s play book to secure US economic and military assistance. “Since 1947,” he argues, “dependence, deception, and defiance have characterized US-Pakistan relations. We sought US aid in return for promises we did not keep.” His sources – US archival material providing direct quotes and summaries of high-level exchanges, as well as personal recollections – are too detailed to be dismissed as anti-Pakistan propaganda.

Husain’s bottom line: “Pakistan and the United States have few shared interests and very different political needs… If $40 billion in US aid has not won Pakistani hearts and minds, billions more will not do the trick… The US-Pakistan alliance is only a mirage.” Not exactly your standard, dispassionate diplomatic history....

The experience of Nawaz Sharif’s earlier terms in office (1990-1993, 1997-1999) shows that Nawaz Sharif and his close associates overestimated their electoral clout in dealing with the military. In January 1993, differences developed between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on the selection of the army chief after General Asif Nawaz Janjua died of a heart attack. Nawaz Sharif’s famous speech of not accepting anybody’s dictates in April ultimately brought him in conflict with the army top leadership when it worked towards seeking the resignations of Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan to break the political deadlock in July 1993. Another example of poor management of civil-military relations is Nawaz Sharif’s interaction with the army top brass in the post-Kargil period, especially in August-October 1999. Shahbaz Sharif went to Washington to obtain American support for democracy. This support could not secure civilian rule as Nawaz Sharif attempted to remove General Pervez Musharraf in a dramatic manner and appointed his protégé as the army chief.........In a country like Pakistan, where internal and external security pressures are intense, the military cannot be pushed to the sidelines. Civilian leaders will have to change Pakistan’s internal security profile and build peace on its borders in order to cut back on the role and status of the military.If Pakistan continues to suffer from violence and terrorism and its ultranationalists want to wage war against India, dominate Afghanistan and keep Iran under pressure, the military and its needs and requirements will override other considerations influencing policymaking and its execution..............At a time when the “performance legitimacy” of the PML-N government has slipped downwards, it has embarked on two extremely contentious policies: talks with the TTP and the trial of Pervez Musharraf for “high treason”. The talks with the Taliban in an apologetic manner cannot go on for an indefinite period. The civil government will have to produce positive results by the end of April in terms of the TTP giving up violence and agreeing to work within the framework of the Constitution. The army cannot afford to let the summer of 2014 pass by and let the Taliban consolidate their position in the tribal areas. This will increase the cost of defending Pakistan’s security for the military in 2015.....The civilian government needs to undertake a dispassionate review of its policies on both issues. Stepping back on these issues may subject the civilian government to criticism by a section of political leaders. However, the cost is likely to be higher for sleepwalking into the Taliban trap in the name of dialogue and settling old scores with Musharraf. ...http://tribune.com.pk/story/692158/nawaz-sharifs-predicament/

Here's a Dawn report on Pakistan Air Force inducting old Jordanian F-16s:

Pakistan received on Sunday its first batch of F-16 fighter jets delivered from Jordan, DawnNews reported.

Sources said that the Pakistan had signed a contract with Jordan for the supply of 13 fighter jets out of which five were delivered at the Mushaf Mir Airbase in Sargodha and inducted in the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fleet.

The inclusion of the 13 jets would take the strength of the PAF F-16s to 76.

Media reports indicated the PAF had agreed to purchase an entire squadron from Jordan, consisting of 12 A models and one B model. According to one news report, the jets "were in good condition since they had attained Mid-Life Update (MLU) and they would be providing service for another 20 years with almost 3,000 hours on average available to them for flying."

A court in Bangladesh has found a British journalist guilty of contempt of court for questioning the official version of the number of people who died in the country's war of independence in 1971.The judges said a 2011 blog post by David Bergman had deliberately distorted history.He was ordered him to pay a fine of $65 or go to prison for seven days.According to the official account, three million people died in the war of independence from Pakistan, but Mr Bergman said there was no evidence to support that.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30298784

From Bergman's blog:

There have been a number of other estimates on the number of people who died in 1971.

(i) The Peace Research Institute in Norway along with Uppsala University in Sweden, have collected information on the numbers of 'battle deaths' in all wars since 1900. Apparently, on the basis of eye-witness and media reports as well as other data, they have estimated that about 58,000 people died in battle in 1971 in Bangladesh.

However, it has proven difficult to clarify the methodology upon which they came to this figure and relying on press reports (if this is what they have done) is clearly a far from accurate method of ascertaining the number of deaths. It should be noted that this figure does not seem to include the numbers of deaths of civilians.*

(ii) More recent research conducted by academics at the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, at the University of Washington in Seattle, and published in 2008 in the British Medical Journal, analysed World Health Organisation population surveys, looking at sibling deaths, to estimate the number of 'direct violent deaths' in different wars in different countries. Their calculation suggest that the number of 'deaths from war injuries' in 1971 was closer to 269,000 – five times the number of the Scandinavian researchers which involved only 'battle deaths'. Their figures range from 125,000 to 505,000. It should be noted this does not include other war related deaths.

The reports also says that the 'estimates presented here should be viewed as conservative', pointing out that the surveys were unable to capture 'families with no survivors'. ****(iii) Perhaps the most reliable estimate of number of deaths as a result of the war in 1971 is found in a little known study published in 1976 by the Cholera Hospital (now the ICDDRB) in a prestigious journal called 'Population Studies'. One of the article's three authors was Lincoln Chen who subsequently became a very noted public health specialist and is due, I understand, to be honored by the Bangladesh government for his contribution to independence in 1971.

The article looked at changes in population numbers in the rural area of Matlab Bazaar Thana. The Cholera hospital had collected detailed population data, including details of birth and deaths, on this area since 1963, and so was able to compare the population figures collected in 1972 with those collected during the war and prior to it to make an estimate of the number of 'excess' deaths.

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I am the Founder and President of PakAlumni Worldwide, a global social network for Pakistanis, South Asians and their friends. I also served as Chairman of the NEDians Convention 2007. In addition to being a South Asia watcher, an investor, business consultant and avid follower of the world financial markets, I have more than 25 years experience in the hi-tech industry. I have been on the faculties of Rutgers University and NED Engineering University and cofounded two high-tech startups, Cautella, Inc. and DynArray Corp and managed multi-million dollar P&Ls. I am a pioneer of the PC and mobile businesses and I have held senior management positions in hardware and software development of Intel’s microprocessor product line from 8086 to Pentium processors. My experience includes senior roles in marketing, engineering and business management. I was recognized as “Person of the Year” by PC Magazine for my contribution to 80386 program. I have an MS degree in Electrical engineering from the New Jersey Institute of Technology.
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