From the beginning of hostilities in Korea, General
Partridge employed some of his Fifth Air Force fighters on armed reconnaissance
missions. When the 24th Infantry Division fought the North Koreans at Taejon in
early July, Partridge sent the Fifth Air Force to furnish close support and
throughout the critical days in July the Fifth Air Force and the Eighth Army set
a brilliant example of air and ground cooperation at its best.

Earle Everard
Partridge was born in Winchendon, Mass., enlisted in the Army in July 1918 at
Fort Slocum, N.Y., and was assigned to the 5th Engineer Training Regiment at
Camp Humphries, Va. He went to France in August 1918 to join the 79th Division,
participating in the St. Mihiel and Argonne operations prior to the Armistice.
When the division returned in June 1919 he was honorably discharged.

Partridge spent a year at Norwich University, reenlisted in June 1920, and four
years later graduated from the U.S. Military Academy as a second lieutenant in
the Air Service. Partridge received flight training at Brooks and Kelly fields,
Texas. He served 10 months with the 3rd Attack Group at Kelly, where he was a
flying instructor until September 1929. He had been appointed first lieutenant
in December 1928.

Lieutenant Partridge taught mathematics at West Point for a
year and then went to the Canal Zone with the 6th Composite Group at France
Field. He was adjutant and assistant operations officer of the 1st Pursuit Group
at Selfridge Field, Mich., in the spring of 1933. He later served there as
commanding officer of the 94th Pursuit Squadron. Partridge was promoted to
captain in April 1933.

In mid-July 1936 Partridge became a test pilot at
Wright Field, flying many of the planes which were later used in World War II.
Captain Partridge completed the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field,
Ala., and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He
became major in March 1940 and helped establish flying schools in the Southeast.
Partridge started single-engine flying schools at Barksdale Field, La., and
Dothan, Ala.

Major Partridge was a member of the Air War Plan's Division at
Headquarters Army Air Forces from October 1941 until the following March. He was
appointed lieutenant colonel in November 1941. He became a colonel and a member
of the Joint Strategy Committee, Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department
General Staff in March 1942. Partridge was promoted to brigadier general in
December 1942 and appointed commanding general of the New York Air Defense Wing
at Mitchel Field, N.Y.

That spring Partridge went overseas as
operations officer for the Northwest African Air Force and became chief of staff
of both the 12th Bomber Command and the Fifteenth Air Force. He moved to England
in January 1944 as deputy commander of the Eighth Air Force and became major
general in May. One month later General Partridge became commanding general of
the 3rd Bomb Division. He became deputy commanding general of the Eighth Air
Force in August 1945, assisting in its reorganization and movement to Okinawa.

Partridge returned to Headquarters Army Air Forces in January 1946 as
assistant chief of staff for operations.

KOREA

He went to Japan in October 1948 as
commanding general of the Fifth Air Force, serving through the first year of the
Korean War. Partridge was promoted to lieutenant general in April 1951.

On his
return to the United States in June Partridge commanded the newly formed Air
Research and Development Command at Baltimore, Md., until June 1953 when he went
to Headquarters U.S. Air Force as Deputy Chief of Operations for Operations.

Going to Japan in April 1954 as a four-star general he became commander of the
Far East Air Forces at Tokyo. Partridge returned home in July 1955 and was named
commander in chief of the North American Air Defense Command and its Air Force
Component, the Air Defense Command, at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs. He
retired from active duty July 31, 1959.

Two days later General Stratemeyer ordered
Partridge to step up night attack sorties to 50 a day, using
B-26 's,
F-82 's,
F-51 's, and
F-80 's. General Partridge had already tried F-80 night intruders, but they had found it impossible to strafe enemy road traffic, which could not be easily identified at fast speeds even on moonlit nights. Night attack missions by F-82's had been of little value except against known and fixed targets, such as airfields and towns.

Some F-51 night harassing missions had been attempted with "almost nil" destructive results; although targets could be located by the Mustang pilots without too much difficulty, rocket or machine-gun fire so blinded the pilots that accuracy was impossible. Night dive bombing was not effective since targets were not easily discernible from any appreciable altitude and faulty depth perception generally induced early release and inaccurate drops.

June 25, 1950

June 25:
North Korea invaded
South Korea.
Simultaneously, North Korean troops made an amphibious
landing at
Kangnung
on the east coast just south of the
38th parallel. North Korean fighter aircraft attacked
airfields at
Kimp'o and
Sŏul, the South Korean capital,
destroying one USAF
C-54 on the ground at Kimp'o.

John J. Muccio, US ambassador to South Korea, relayed
to
President Harry S.
Truman a South Korean request for
US air assistance and ammunition. The UN Security
Council unanimously called for a cease-fire and
withdrawal of the North Korean Army to north of the 38th
parallel. The resolution asked all UN members to support
the withdrawal of the
NKA and to render no assistance to
North Korea.

Recognizing the limited value of battalion-level
training,
General Partridge worked earnestly to secure closer joint operations
with the Eighth Army. Following the failure of communications in a joint
theater-command post exercise early in April 1950, Partridge specifically
recommended that a
joint operations center be established, with regularly assigned Army,
Navy, and Air Force representatives. Unfortunately, this proposal was not
approved by the
Far East Command.#83

He will cry about this for the next year.

The air units in FEAF lacked much that they needed
for peak effectiveness, but all of them were able to operate on the day
that the war began.

Such was not true of the engineer aviation units assigned
to FEAF, and this construction capability was a significant weakness to
offensive planning.

Assigned to FEAF were two engineer aviation group
headquarters and service companies, five engineer aviation battalions, and
one engineer aviation maintenance company.
Headquarters and Service Company, 930th Engineer Aviation Group, was
assigned to the Fifth Air Force. With station at Nagoya, this group directed
construction done by civilian contractors in Japan.

All aviation engineer troops were "Special
Category Army Personnel with Air Force" (SCARWAF)
troops. They were recruited, trained, and assigned to units by the
Department
of Army, but they were charged against Air Force strength. All of these
aviation engineer units were in sad shape.

Theater-work assignments had not developed battalion
skills. Serving on Guam-where a normal tour of duty was twelve months-the
811th Battalion was "totally untrained.#

In the scheduled construction projects on Okinawa,
the prime duty of the 822nd Battalion had been to operate a rock quarry.
Most engineer equipment was war-weary from World War II, and, for some more
obsolete items, spare parts were no longer stocked.

Engineer aviation skill specialties had been marked
by inadequate training and improper balances of supervisory and operating
personnel.

June 25, 1950 0945

Back in Tokyo, FEAF headquarters first learned of the
hostilities at 0945 hours, Japanese
time, by a message from the OSI office in Sŏul; by 1130 hours all key staff
officers had been notified.
General Partridge at the moment was acting commander of FEAF, while
General Stratemeyer was en route back from the United States, but pending
higher level decisions he had to stand by until
CINCFE issued
an order to cover the situation.

June 25, 1950 1130

As the Sunday which was 25 June 1950 began there was
little to mark it different from any other first day of the week. Over most of
Japan the weather was fine, except that it was becoming hot and there were
scattered showers. The summer monsoon was beginning. Weather predictions called
for continued good weather on Monday and most of Tuesday, but thereafter a
southwardly drifting polar front promised to bring low clouds and rain down
through nearby Korea and across the narrow sea to Japan. The weather prediction
did not seem particularly important to the duty officers in the
Meiji building as they managed the routine of the
morning at FEAF headquarters. Business was generally quiet in Tokyo.
General Stratemeyer was not in Japan.

With
Stratemeyer absent,
General Partridge
was acting commander of FEAF He had
been spending a part of his time in Tokyo, but on the morning of 25 June
he was with his family in
Nagoya. 1o

Although the report was promptly flashed to all FEAF
units, General Partridge was not in his quarters in
Nagoya and did not get
the news from Korea until 1130 hours. General Partridge at once
acknowledged the gravity of the situation, but he knew that the Far East
Command had only one minor mission concerning Korea. At the outbreak of a
war or general domestic disorder, and then only at the request of the
American ambassador, the Far East Command was required to provide for the
safety of American nationals in Korea.

June 25, 1950 1130

General Partridge at once acknowledged the gravity
of the situation, but he knew that the
Far East Command
had only one minor mission concerning Korea. At the outbreak of a war or
general domestic disorder, and then only at the request of the American
ambassador, the
Far East Command was required to provide for the safety of American
nationals in Korea. #14

For the accomplishment of the air-evacuation mission
General MacArthur had charged FEAF to furnish such air-transport aircraft
as might be needed to move Americans out of Korea. He had also charged FEAF
to be ready to attack hostile ground and surface targets in support of the
evacuation, but not before he issued specific instructions so to do. The
Fifth Air Force had issued its operation plan on
1 March 1950.

Since
Itazuke
Air Base was closest to Korea, General Partridge had designated the
commander of the
8th Fighter Bomber Wing as air-task force commander. Assisted by other
combat wings as needful. the 8th Wing commander was directed to provide
fighter cover for air and water evacuations. and he was given operational
control over the transport planes which the
374th troop Carrier Wing would send to him from
Tachikawa.

Other wing commanders had stipulated duties: the
3rd Bombardment Wing, for example, was to stage six
B-26's to
Ashiya
Air Base (near Itazuke) where they would fly reconnaissance and cover
missions over the water areas off Korea. #15

Shortly after 1130 hours
General Partridge ordered all Fifth Air Force wing commanders to complete
the deployments required to implement the air evacuation plan, but he cautioned
all of them that flights to Korea would await further orders.#16

During the afternoon and early evening of 25 June
Col. John M. ("Jack") Price, commander of the 8th Wing, marshaled
his own F-80 and F-82 fighters, 10 B-26's, 12 C-54's, and 3 C-47's.

By a fortunate circumstance, the
8th Bombardment Squadron (Light) had come to Ashiya for a FEAF air-defense
readiness test on 24 June, and its B-26's were in place when the alert sounded.

June 25, 1950 1130

Back in Tokyo, FEAF headquarters first learned of the
hostilities at 0945 hours, Japanese time, by a message from the OSI office
in Sŏul; by 1130 hours all key staff
officers had been notified.
General Partridge at the moment was acting commander of FEAF, while
General Stratemeyer was en route back from the United States, but pending
higher level decisions he had to stand by until CINCFE issued an order to
cover the situation.

At 2100 hours
Colonel Price telephoned
Fifth
Air Force operations that he was prepared to execute the evacuation
operations plan beginning at 0330 hours on 26 June, a time which would permit
the first C-54 to arrive at
Sŏul's Kimp'o Airfield before dawn. #17

That same evening
General Partridge, who had elected to remain at
Nagoya while his air force implemented the evacuation plan, held a conference
of his key staff members. All of them agreed that the
Fifth Air Force was
ready for such instructions as it might receive. The talk then drifted around
to American policy toward Korea, what it was likely to be. One staff officer
suggested that the United States might abandon South Korea to the Reds.
General Partridge disagreed completely. Such a line of action, he said,
was "unthinkable." He believed that new policies on Korea would
be forthcoming from Washington. #18

General Partridge instructed the
8th
Fighter-Bomber Wing to furnish the freighters with combat air patrols. Within
a few minutes, however, Fifth Air Force operations let General Crabb know that
Colonel Price anticipated difficulties. This patrol work was a job for long-range
conventional aircraft, not for the speedy but fuel-hungry jets. Colonel Price's
68th Fighter
All-Weather Squadron had twelve operational
F-82's, but he needed more aircraft than this. The Fifth Air Force first asked
if it would not be possible to use the
RAAF
No. 77 Squadron's Mustangs, but General Crabb replied that the British had not
yet taken a stand in the Korean war. The Fifth Air Force therefore ordered the
339th Fighter All-Weather Squadron to move its combat-ready F-82's from
Yokota to
Itazuke.
This was still not enough of the long-range fighters, and General Crabb ordered
the Twentieth
Air Force to send eight of the
4th Squadron's planes up to Itazuke from
Okinawa. To
clear his ramps to receive these additional fighters, Colonel Price moved the contingent
of
C-54's
from Itazuke to nearby
Ashiya.

June 26, 1950

Early on the morning of 26 June
General Partridge
flew from
Nagoya to Tokyo's
Haneda Airfield. At
FEAF headquarters he
held a staff conference, where the principal matter of discussion was
the evacuation operation. Throughout the morning intelligence reports
were optimistic.
KMAG reported "increased
steadiness" on the part of ROK troops opposing the tank column
north of
Sŏul, that
Ch'unch'ŏn had been retaken, and that the invaders
on the east coast had been contained. These reports were so favorable
that FEAF released the C-54 transports at
Ashiya
to return to normal duties.#27