Oh the hell with my last patent and the great one that Nadas posted before mine, take a look at this will you...OMG.......

it has what I said I guessed would be involved from the get-go....Strep and Staph....

here you go:

Animal models and methods for sepsis

Claims:
1. A method for selecting a candidate drug for treating sepsis, comprising:

(i) selecting a model system of sepsis, said model system comprising an animal species and a pathogen species that causes sepsis in said animal species, in which model system a critical rate or pathogen load increase has been ascertained,

(ii) infecting an experimental animal of said animal species with a dose of reporter-labeled pathogen of said pathogen species, where said dose is sufficient to result in a rate of pathogen load increase exceeding said critical rate;

(iii) administering a test drug to said experimental animal;

(iv) measuring the level of said reporter in said experimental animal; and

(v) selecting said test drug as a candidate drug for treating sepsis if said test drug is effective to decrease the rate of pathogen load increase in the experimental animal below said critical rate of pathogen load increase.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the pathogen species is a bacterium species and the pathogen is a bacterium.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the bacterium species is selected from the group consisting of Enterococcus spp., Staphylococcus spp., Streptococcus spp., Enterobacteriacae family, Providencia spp. and Pseudomonas spp.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the bacterium is a Pseudomonas spp.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the animal species is a mammal.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein the mammal is a rodent.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the rodent is a mouse. 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the reporter is light-emitting reporter.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the light-emitting reporter is a luminescent reporter.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the reporter comprises a luciferase enzyme.

11. The method of claim 8, wherein the measuring is done using a photon detection device. 12. The method of claim 11, wherein the photon detection device is selected from the group consisting of an intensified CCD camera and a cooled CCD camera.

13. A method for selecting a candidate drug for treating sepsis, comprising:

(i) selecting a model system of sepsis, said model system comprising an animal species and a pathogen species capable of causing sepsis in said animal species, in which animal species a time of onset of terminal sepsis, in response to a selected dose of said pathogen species, has been ascertained;

(ii) infecting experimental and control animals of said animal species with a reporter-labeled pathogen of said pathogen species;

(iii) administering a test drug to said experimental animals;

(iv) measuring the level of reporter in said experimental and said control animals at a selected time after onset of terminal sepsis; and

(v) selecting said test drug as a candidate drug for treating sepsis if said test drug is effective to cause a statistically significant reduction in the level of reporter in said experimental animals as compared with said control animals.

14. The method of claim 13, wherein the pathogen species is a bacterium species and the pathogen is a bacterium.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein the bacterium species is selected from the group consisting of Enterococcus spp., Staphylococcus spp., Streptococcus spp., Enterobacteriacae family, Providencia spp. and Pseudomonas spp. 16. The method of claim 15, wherein the bacterium is a Pseudomonas species. 17. The method of claim 13, wherein the animal species is a mammal.

18. The method of claim 17, wherein the mammal is a rodent.

19. The method of claim 18, wherein the rodent is a mouse.

20. The method of claim 19, wherein the reporter is light-emitting reporter.

21. The method of claim 20, wherein the light-emitting reporter is a luminescent reporter.

22. The method of claim 21, wherein the reporter comprises a luciferase enzyme.

23. The method of claim 20, wherein the measuring is done using a photon detection device.

24. The method of claim 23 wherein the photon detection device is selected from the group consisting of an intensified CCD camera and a cooled CCD camera.

25. A method for selecting a candidate drug for treating sepsis, comprising

Recognition of Illness Associated with the Intentional Release of a Biologic Agent
On September 11, 2001, following the terrorist incidents in New York City and Washington, D.C., CDC recommended heightened surveillance for any unusual disease occurrence or increased numbers of illnesses that might be associated with the terrorist attacks. Subsequently, cases of anthrax in Florida and New York City have demonstrated the risks associated with intentional release of biologic agents (1). This report provides guidance for health-care providers and public health personnel about recognizing illnesses or patterns of illness that might be associated with intentional release of biologic agents.

Health-Care Providers
Health-care providers should be alert to illness patterns and diagnostic clues that might indicate an unusual infectious disease outbreak associated with intentional release of a biologic agent and should report any clusters or findings to their local or state health department. The covert release of a biologic agent may not have an immediate impact because of the delay between exposure and illness onset, and outbreaks associated with intentional releases might closely resemble naturally occurring outbreaks. Indications of intentional release of a biologic agent include 1) an unusual temporal or geographic clustering of illness (e.g., persons who attended the same public event or gathering) or patients presenting with clinical signs and symptoms that suggest an infectious disease outbreak (e.g., >2 patients presenting with an unexplained febrile illness associated with sepsis, pneumonia, respiratory failure, or rash or a botulism-like syndrome with flaccid muscle paralysis, especially if occurring in otherwise healthy persons); 2) an unusual age distribution for common diseases (e.g., an increase in what appears to be a chickenpox-like illness among adult patients, but which might be smallpox); and 3) a large number of cases of acute flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies, suggestive of a release of botulinum toxin.

CDC defines three categories of biologic agents with potential to be used as weapons, based on ease of dissemination or transmission, potential for major public health impact (e.g., high mortality), potential for public panic and social disruption, and requirements for public health preparedness (2). Agents of highest concern are Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), variola major (smallpox), Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), filoviruses (Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Marburg hemorrhagic fever); and arenaviruses (Lassa [Lassa fever], Junin [Argentine hemorrhagic fever], and related viruses). The following summarizes the clinical features of these agents (3--6).

Anthrax. A nonspecific prodrome (i.e., fever, dyspnea, cough, and chest discomfort) follows inhalation of infectious spores. Approximately 2--4 days after initial symptoms, sometimes after a brief period of improvement, respiratory failure and hemodynamic collapse ensue. Inhalational anthrax also might include thoracic edema and a widened mediastinum on chest radiograph. Gram-positive bacilli can grow on blood culture, usually 2--3 days after onset of illness. Cutaneous anthrax follows deposition of the organism onto the skin, occurring particularly on exposed areas of the hands, arms, or face. An area of local edema becomes a pruritic macule or papule, which enlarges and ulcerates after 1--2 days. Small, 1--3 mm vesicles may surround the ulcer. A painless, depressed, black eschar usually with surrounding local edema subsequently develops. The syndrome also may include lymphangitis and painful lymphadenopathy.

Plague. Clinical features of pneumonic plague include fever, cough with muco-purulent sputum (gram-negative rods may be seen on gram stain), hemoptysis, and chest pain. A chest radiograph will show evidence of bronchopneumonia.

Botulism. Clinical features include symmetric cranial neuropathies (i.e., drooping eyelids, weakened jaw clench, and difficulty swallowing or speaking), blurred vision or diplopia, symmetric descending weakness in a proximal to distal pattern, and respiratory dysfunction from respiratory muscle paralysis or upper airway obstruction without sensory deficits. Inhalational botulism would have a similar clinical presentation as foodborne botulism; however, the gastrointestinal symptoms that accompany foodborne botulism may be absent.

Smallpox (variola). The acute clinical symptoms of smallpox resemble other acute viral illnesses, such as influenza, beginning with a 2--4 day nonspecific prodrome of fever and myalgias before rash onset. Several clinical features can help clinicians differentiate varicella (chickenpox) from smallpox. The rash of varicella is most prominent on the trunk and develops in successive groups of lesions over several days, resulting in lesions in various stages of development and resolution. In comparison, the vesicular/pustular rash of smallpox is typically most prominent on the face and extremities, and lesions develop at the same time.

Inhalational tularemia. Inhalation of F. tularensis causes an abrupt onset of an acute, nonspecific febrile illness beginning 3--5 days after exposure, with pleuropneumonitis developing in a substantial proportion of cases during subsequent days (7).

Hemorrhagic fever (such as would be caused by Ebola or Marburg viruses). After an incubation period of usually 5--10 days (range: 2--19 days), illness is characterized by abrupt onset of fever, myalgia, and headache. Other signs and symptoms include nausea and vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, chest pain, cough, and pharyngitis. A maculopapular rash, prominent on the trunk, develops in most patients approximately 5 days after onset of illness. Bleeding manifestations, such as petechiae, ecchymoses, and hemorrhages, occur as the disease progresses (8).

Clinical Laboratory Personnel
Although unidentified gram-positive bacilli growing on agar may be considered as contaminants and discarded, CDC recommends that these bacilli be treated as a "finding" when they occur in a suspicious clinical setting (e.g., febrile illness in a previously healthy person). The laboratory should attempt to characterize the organism, such as motility testing, inhibition by penicillin, absence of hemolysis on sheep blood agar, and further biochemical testing or species determination.

An unusually high number of samples, particularly from the same biologic medium (e.g., blood and stool cultures), may alert laboratory personnel to an outbreak. In addition, central laboratories that receive clinical specimens from several sources should be alert to increases in demand or unusual requests for culturing (e.g., uncommon biologic specimens such as cerebrospinal fluid or pulmonary aspirates).

When collecting or handling clinical specimens, laboratory personnel should 1) use Biological Safety Level II (BSL-2) or Level III (BSL-3) facilities and practices when working with clinical samples considered potentially infectious; 2) handle all specimens in a BSL-2 laminar flow hood with protective eyewear (e.g., safety glasses or eye shields), use closed-front laboratory coats with cuffed sleeves, and stretch the gloves over the cuffed sleeves; 3) avoid any activity that places persons at risk for infectious exposure, especially activities that might create aerosols or droplet dispersal; 4) decontaminate laboratory benches after each use and dispose of supplies and equipment in proper receptacles; 5) avoid touching mucosal surfaces with their hands (gloved or ungloved), and never eat or drink in the laboratory; and 6) remove and reverse their gloves before leaving the laboratory and dispose of them in a biohazard container, and wash their hands and remove their laboratory coat.

When a laboratory is unable to identify an organism in a clinical specimen, it should be sent to a laboratory where the agent can be characterized, such as the state public health laboratory or, in some large metropolitan areas, the local health department laboratory. Any clinical specimens suspected to contain variola (smallpox) should be reported to local and state health authorities and then transported to CDC. All variola diagnostics should be conducted at CDC laboratories. Clinical laboratories should report any clusters or findings that could indicate intentional release of a biologic agent to their state and local health departments.

Infection-Control Professionals
Heightened awareness by infection-control professionals (ICPs) facilitates recognition of the release of a biologic agent. ICPs are involved with many aspects of hospital operations and several departments and with counterparts in other hospitals. As a result, ICPs may recognize changing patterns or clusters in a hospital or in a community that might otherwise go unrecognized.

ICPs should ensure that hospitals have current telephone numbers for notification of both internal (ICPs, epidemiologists, infectious diseases specialists, administrators, and public affairs officials) and external (state and local health departments, Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, and CDC Emergency Response office) contacts and that they are distributed to the appropriate personnel (9). ICPs should work with clinical microbiology laboratories, on- or off-site, that receive specimens for testing from their facility to ensure that cultures from suspicious cases are evaluated appropriately.

State Health Departments
State health departments should implement plans for educating and reminding health-care providers about how to recognize unusual illnesses that might indicate intentional release of a biologic agent. Strategies for responding to potential bioterrorism include 1) providing information or reminders to health-care providers and clinical laboratories about how to report events to the appropriate public health authorities; 2) implementing a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week capacity to receive and act on any positive report of events that suggest intentional release of a biologic agent; 3) investigating immediately any report of a cluster of illnesses or other event that suggests an intentional release of a biologic agent and requesting CDC's assistance when necessary; 4) implementing a plan, including accessing the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism, to collect and transport specimens and to store them appropriately before laboratory analysis; and 5) reporting immediately to CDC if the results of an investigation suggest release of a biologic agent.

Reported by: National Center for Infectious Diseases; Epidemiology Program Office; Public Health Practice Program Office; Office of the Director, CDC.

Editorial Note:
Health-care providers, clinical laboratory personnel, infection control professionals, and health departments play critical and complementary roles in recognizing and responding to illnesses caused by intentional release of biologic agents. The syndrome descriptions, epidemiologic clues, and laboratory recommendations in this report provide basic guidance that can be implemented immediately to improve recognition of these events.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, state and local health departments initiated various activities to improve surveillance and response, ranging from enhancing communications (between state and local health departments and between public health agencies and health-care providers) to conducting special surveillance projects. These special projects have included active surveillance for changes in the number of hospital admissions, emergency department visits, and occurrence of specific syndromes. Activities in bioterrorism preparedness and emerging infections over the past few years have better positioned public health agencies to detect and respond to the intentional release of a biologic agent. Immediate review of these activities to identify the most useful and practical approaches will help refine syndrome surveillance efforts in various clinical situations.

Information about clinical diagnosis and management can be found elsewhere (1--9). Additional information about responding to bioterrorism is available from CDC at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov>; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at <http://www.usamriid.army.mil/education/bluebook.html>; the Association for Infection Control Practitioners at <http://www.apic.org>; and the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense at <http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org>.

References to non-CDC sites on the Internet are provided as a service to MMWR readers and do not constitute or imply endorsement of these organizations or their programs by CDC or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. CDC is not responsible for the content of pages found at these sites.

Disclaimer All MMWR HTML versions of articles are electronic conversions from ASCII text into HTML. This conversion may have resulted in character translation or format errors in the HTML version. Users should not rely on this HTML document, but are referred to the electronic PDF version and/or the original MMWR paper copy for the official text, figures, and tables. An original paper copy of this issue can be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC 20402-9371; telephone: (202) 512-1800. Contact GPO for current prices.

**Questions or messages regarding errors in formatting should be addressed to mmwrq@cdc.gov.
Page converted: 10/19/2001

Editorial Note:
Health-care providers, clinical laboratory personnel, infection control professionals, and health departments play critical and complementary roles in recognizing and responding to illnesses caused by intentional release of biologic agents. The syndrome descriptions, epidemiologic clues, and laboratory recommendations in this report provide basic guidance that can be implemented immediately to improve recognition of these events.

What a Load of Crap, man what an understatement. I wonder how much tax money is spent preparing documents like this only to be completely ignored by those that need to be paying attention. Here's more to add to this load of crap.

"The life sciences are developing so quickly that a watch list of dangerous pathogens and toxins is useless in fighting the threat of bioterrorism," says a new report from the US National Academy of Sciences.

US 'unaware' of emerging bioterror threats

Kurt Kleiner in New Scientist writes:

"The life sciences are developing so quickly that a watch list of dangerous pathogens and toxins is useless in fighting the threat of bioterrorism," says a new report from the US National Academy of Sciences.
The report, on "next generation" bioterrorism, was requested by the US government. It concludes that intelligence agencies are too focused on specific lists of bacteria and viruses, and are not aware of emerging threats.
Focusing on the list of about 60 "select agents", such as the smallpox virus and botulism toxin, might simply divert resources from newer and more dangerous threats, such as RNA interference, synthetic biology or nanotechnology.
Our report "pushes back against the monomaniacal focus on bacteria, against the idea that if you can write a list of bad bacteria and control them then you're okay," says Peter A Singer, a bioethicist at the University of Toronto, Canada, who was on the NAS report committee.
As examples, the report suggests it might soon be possible to engineer a virulent pathogen from scratch using DNA synthesis and that advances in gene therapy might make it possible to release an aerosol of a harmful gene that would be inhaled by victims.
Insect terror
An especially insidious threat, says the report, comes with more knowledge of bioregulators – chemical compounds that regulate bodily functions. Terrorists could potentially develop bioregulators that disrupt the immune system, neurological system or endocrine system.
The report also criticises efforts to prevent bioterrorism by clamping down on the free flow of scientific information – this will only backfire and leave the US unprepared against a new generation of threats.
Furthermore, discouraging foreign scientists from working on sensitive topics in the US will only threaten to cripple the ability to respond to threats, the report says. For example, background checks that can stretch to a year discourage foreign scientists from coming to the US, denying the US their expertise.
"There's the famous expression that when you build a wall, always make sure you know what you're walling in and what you're walling out. [The US has] set up a set of mechanisms that have the power to do more harm than good," says Steven M Block, a biophysicist at Stanford University, California, and another member of the committee.
The best defence, according to the report, is for the US to encourage a free flow of information among international scientists while also setting up international agreements that prohibit work intended specifically for biological weapons. In the shorter term, the US should set up a special committee to monitor scientific developments and report to intelligence agencies, the report says.

Southcity

"First they ignore you...
Then they laugh at you...
Then they fight you...
Then you win." - Mahatma Gandhi

The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (PL 107-188) prohibits the public disclosure of any theft or loss of a potential bioterrorism agent, as well as any information related to site-specific security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to biological agents. Although reporting of releases and thefts of bioterrorism agents from laboratories are mandatory, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may only provide public notification if the incident represents a serious public health emergency.
http://www.gene-watch.org/bubiodefense/ ... dents.html

Southcity

"First they ignore you...
Then they laugh at you...
Then they fight you...
Then you win." - Mahatma Gandhi

oohh you fellas don want to go there .. . id rather keep on assuming that
humanity is as graceful as nature right..
what with ion accustic particle beams for watering the yard right.. or spaced based multi-angular halographic plasma projection system for what? a toxin free july fouth .. ooooooook lets not get into unmanned global hawks cloaked with a boeing "commenly refered to as product placement by the industry"

after a childish rant
i could hear the micro organisims whispering in ear of the architect

Hello, duh on me; I just realized some people do care and have written in on this forum and also on the Morg watch Blog.....I asked for help/suggestions and I do think I have been given that thru TamTam and also quite a few other posters as well.

So thanks and sorry I'm just now seeing all the post and reaizing this fact. I am going to chill for quite a while now and concentrate on my health.....

THIS really ticks me off - how can this Mary Leitao lady get on PrimeTime - when HER own foundation is falling apart. How can someone like her take money from people and not send it to what the name of her foundation is "research". I feel sorry for her son with a mother like that.

An intron-encoded protein is active in a gene conversion process that
spreads an intron into a mitochondrial gene.

While specific horizontal transfer events may be difficult to predict the genetic consequences of
these events can be detected in sensitive molecular phylogenetic analyses. If the intron phylogenetic
tree is discordant with the tree generated from 16S rRNA gene data then, the most probable explana-
tion is that the sporadic distribution observed is indeed best explained by lateral transfer.
There has been no rigorous attempt to examine the evolutionary history of this intron in such a phy-
logenetic context. In order to test the two competing evolutionary hypotheses in this study a systematic
survey to broaden the known distribution of the intron and to assess the frequency of the endonuclease
encoding introns was undertaken. Phylogenetic analyses were employed to determine the level of con-
gruence between the cyanobacteria host and intron. This allowed the resolution of the evolutionary
history of the intron in cyanobacteria and shows that while horizontal transfer plays a role in the evolu-
tionary history of this intron it is likely that the intron was present in the last common ancestor of mod-
ern cyanobacteria.

The self-splicing retention by extant cyanobacteria and the loss of splicing is consistent with the idea
that splicing originated as a RNA-mediated reaction. The RNA structure creates the active site but is
unable to function efficiently in vivo only when assisted by a protein complex.