The world is rocked by chaos, manifest in the =93war=94 that goes =
on in many=20
regions particularly in the third world.=20
In Southeast Asia, cases of enmity abound: the East Timor and =
Aceh=20
questions in Indonesia, the racial issue in Malaysia and Singapore, =
the=20
Muslim secessionism in southern Thailand and in Mindanao =
(Philippines), the=20
never-ending conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and =
so on. In=20
the Philippines, the secessionist problem in the south has taken =
much=20
toll.It is waged by the =
Moros (term=20
for Muslims in the Philippines) a marginalized group of some 5 =
million=20
people. This conflict started some 300 years ago and, like many =
neighboring=20
countries in Southeast Asia, its origin is unmistakably ethnic, =
religious,=20
cultural.

This presentation is a modest attempt to describe this conflict =
to open=20
up a new vista or approach to what may appear as a =93clash of =
civilizations.=94=20
It is a re-configuration of some theories of conflict that zeroes in =
on the=20
cultural, to answer the basic question =93Why do men rebel?=94 I =
submit that a=20
large part of the answer lies in the issue of identity, whose =
fundamental=20
reference is social location.

The Politics of =
Identity

From any indication, the conflict is due to ethnic and cultural=20
differences =96 leading to a sort ofpolitics of identity =96 =
where a=20
marginalized community or their members are embattled to re-affirm =
their=20
unique identity. Stated another way, it is the struggle over =
definitions of=20
or claims to politically and culturally sensitive categories of=20
being/becoming (limited here to ethnic and religious identities). =
Identity=20
is the sense of being, or of becoming, a badge that distinguishes =
one from=20
others. Descartes=92 famous line =93I think therefore I am=94 is a =
crucial index=20
of the novel stress on identity. This sense of self is validated by=20
membership in a group, or affiliation in something intangible like =
culture=20
or religion. For one, religion seems to have played a central role =
in the=20
politics of identity. Membership in the ummah (literally, Muslim =
community)=20
is what confers the Islamic identity. We have seen how Islam or its =
militant=20
adherents have acted as visible players on one side, and the =
government or=20
dominant ethnic groups, on the other. Militant Islam has waged=20
jihad or holy war against =
its=20
enemies. Jihad, often =
mistakenly=20
assumed as the =93war=94 between Muslims and a non-Muslim enemy, is =
actually a=20
struggle against all evil including the self. The internal battle is =
the=20
better jihad.

To place this type of conflict on a larger perspective, it is =
necessary=20
to see Islam as a religion upon whose believers the issue of =
identity is a=20
matter of life and death. More specifically, they see themselves as=20
defending their faith and ummah=20
against a sea of influences, propagated by infidels (kafir) whose ultimate =
purpose is to=20
stamp out Islam as a way of life.

=20

Map 1 - Islamic Development,=20
13th-18th Centuries

=20

Map 2 =96 Islamic Malacca (now part =
of=20
Malaysia) in 1500

Historically, Islam had taken root much earlier than these more =
recent=20
but threatening influences. Islam came to Southeast Asia from India =
as early=20
as the 13th century, antedating the arrival of =
=93modern=94=20
influences, such as the western concept of the state and other =
global=20
influences which tend to obliterate things that are sacred. Malacca =
was the=20
seat of an established Muslim community in 1400 as Islam spread to =
the other=20
regions, including those islands now belonging to Malaysia, =
Indonesia,=20
southern Thailand, and southern Philippines (Mindanao).

When western powers came to Southeast Asia about 100 years later, =
they=20
found established social institutions there based on Islam =96 =
polity, economy=20
and family. The sultanate is perhaps the most tangible creation of=20
Islam.But westernization =
and=20
globalization effectively demolished this institution, notably the =
last=20
vestige of Islam in Europe that stood its way, the Ottoman empire. =
In=20
Southeast Asia, the sultanate of Brunei is the only one remaining in =
the=20
world today.Moreover, it =
is caught=20
in this vicious struggle of whether to secularize or remain deeply=20
Islamic.

In the Philippines, Islamic preachers or makhdumin are said to have =
reached=20
the southern tip of Mindanao (Tawi-Tawi) in 1380. By 1450, a Islamic =
form of=20
government (sultanate) had been established in Sulu by Abu Bakr, a =
leader of=20
Arabic descent, and somewhat later in Maguindanao by Sharif =
Kabungsuwan, a=20
native prince from Johore, Malaysia (Map 3).=20
Together, these two sultanates ruled much of Mindanao, and =
roamed the=20
Philippine seas uninhibited. They were masters of the land. By the =
middle=20
part of the next century, the coming of Spain to colonize the =
Philippines=20
islands arrested the change initiated by Islamization.

In search of spices and motivated by trade, Spain came to =
colonize the=20
Philippines in 1565. In 1578, the first attempt to stamp out Islam =
in=20
Mindanao was launched by an attack in Sulu and north Borneo. The =
succeeding=20
periods of the Spanish regime (1579-1898) were punctuated by =
=93wars=94 until Las Islas Filipinas (the =
Philippine=20
islands) landed on the lap of another colonizer, the United States, =
for=20
another three decades of more effective colonial rule (1899-1935). =
In all=20
these times, Mindanao has continued to be treated as a colonized =
frontier=20
where Islam is relegated to the backseat. The Muslims became the=20
=93Other.=94

Thus began a strife whose root is basically an ethnic problem =
associated=20
with nation-building. Many Moros today could not identify with the =
Filipino,=20
thinking that they do not belong to this nation. (The slogan of the =
Moro=20
Islamic Liberation Front is: =93We are Moros, not Filipinos.=94) =
They claim they=20
had been a sovereign people before the colonial powers came, that =
they were=20
unnecessarily integrated to a state about which they did not have =
any part=20
in making.Stirrings to =
reclaim a=20
=93lost identity=94 began in 1968 with the formation of a Mindanao =
Independence=20
Movement in the Cotabato region, and a few years later by a group of =
young=20
professionals who bannered their cause under the Moro National =
Liberation=20
Front (MNLF).

The Philippines is not alone. Identity issues are also bitterly =
fought in=20
neighboring countries, particularly Malaysia, Indonesia and =
Thailand, where=20
the Muslim populations assert their native rights and claim to the =
land.=20
Singapore is perhaps the only exception, or of a different genre, in =
this=20
politics of identity, where nativity or indigenous rights is muted. =
The=20
closest parallel of the MNLF is Thailand=92s Islamic secessionism =
waged by the=20
Pattani Liberation Organization (PULO), and the Free Aceh Movement =
(GAM) in=20
Indonesia. Nothing of this kind happens in Malaysia, where the =
politics of=20
Islamic identity is brought to the halls of decision making by =
parliamentary=20
means.There, the Muslims =
are=20
defended by a staunch Islamic Party (PAS) who advocate for =
islamization of=20
the state with the shari'ah as the basis for governance.

In the Philippines, the perfection of the concept of nation with =
an=20
integral territory came at the turn of this century under the =
American=20
colonial period.Before =
1898,=20
Mindanao was a frontier yet to be won. What Spain ceded to America =
in the=20
1898 Treaty of Paris was a contested territory, partially hispanized =
and=20
largely under Moro control. After that period, the Philippine flag =
proudly=20
displays the =93three stars=94 representing the major islands of the =
Philippines: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

One unmistakable consequence of colonization in Mindanao is the =
making of=20
a tri-people: Moros, Lumads (tribal peoples) and Christian =
Filipinos. In=20
many ways, the conflict revolves around them, especially between the =
Moros=20
and Christian population as the latter is symbolically linked to the =
Philippine government (a Christian state).

Two other countries in Southeast Asia portray a more rigid =
stratification=20
based on race: Malaysia and Singapore. In Malaysia, colonization has =
left a=20
deeper and more marked imprint in the racial composition of its =
people:=20
Malays (bumiputra), Chinese and Indians, the latter two =
groups are=20
imported by the British government to work in tin mining and =
plantation=20
economy. The predominant Malays have taken the reign of government =
and took=20
steps to protect their kind, instituting a =93Malay-first policy=94 =
to give them=20
a leverage against the wealthier Chinese and more educated Indians. =
In=20
Singapore, it is the more numerous Chinese who call the shots in =
government=20
and education.

The discomfort of the Moros is understandable if one takes a look =
at the=20
way their identity was threatened by colonization.From being =93masters of the =
land=94 they are=20
now reduced to a marginalized people largely concentrated in a small =
section=20
of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago (see Map 4). Their quest for =
identity=20
may be interpreted another way as an effort to recover the =
Bangsamoro=20
homeland, which the Moro National Liberation Front did in the early =
1970s.=20
We shall return to this later.

Major Policies of the =
State

The state in Southeast Asia basically aims at its ideal the =
making of=20
citizens who conform to the national identity defined in the =
singular=20
sense.It is easy to =
discern why the=20
Moros are adamant to accept Filipino identity. Since the Spanish =
times down=20
to the present, the Philippine state has adopted a policy of =
nation-building=20
defined by the principle of integration. That is, the unity of the =
state is=20
anchored on the idea of =93one nation, one thought=94 (isang bansa, isang diwa). =
However,=20
the Moros interpret this policy as assimilationist whose aim is to =
make=20
their culture similar to the dominant Christian majority.

In the case of Malaysia, the colonial government respected =
cultural=20
differences as it installed the concept of civil government without=20
=93eradicating=94 native institutions like the sultanate. This is =
why the=20
country, like Thailand, remains up to now as a constitutional =
monarchy, with=20
a King (sultan) as head of the government although power in reposed =
in the=20
parliament. The Malaysian state is a class in itself.It is secular but proclaims =
Islam as a=20
state religion, that it is an =93Islamic state=94according to =
outgoing Prime=20
Minister Mohammad Mahathir. Further, it has constitutionalized or =
racialized=20
the Malay as a Muslim more than anything else. Its policy in the =
beginning=20
is =93100% Malay,=94 which meant that other groups fall outside the =
graces of=20
government unless they assimilate by becoming Malays.

Neighboring Indonesia is also a secular state. With more than 300 =
ethnic=20
groups and four major religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism =
and=20
Islam), it is the world=92s fourth biggest nation with the largest=20
concentration of Muslims found in a single country.It=92s=20
motto of =93unity in diversity=94 and the policy ofpancasila give the basis =
for=20
secularization that does not favor any religious group. =
Moreover,=93Javanization=94 is inherent =
in many of its=20
policies, notably transmigration whereby the Javanese and the =
Madurese are=20
resettled into the outer islands with government support.

Educationally, the state has carried out policies meant to =
integrate the=20
Muslim population into the mainstream. In the Philippines, the =
curriculum=20
requires Filipino language in all levels. Furthermore, English is =
taught in=20
the higher levels of education. Meanwhile, the Muslim educational =
system or=20
madrasah continues to =
operate=20
outside the framework of the national education system. In =
Singapore, whose=20
national language is Malay, English is the favorite medium of =
instruction=20
and communication. Indonesia and Malaysia follow an indigenization =
pattern=20
which gives emphasis on Bahasa Indonesia or Bahasa Melayu (both are =
a=20
variant of a language spoken in Sumatra).

In the realm of economy, the incorporation of Mindanao into the=20
Philippine state has opened the flood gate of rapid development =
programs=20
calculated to =93develop the southern frontier=94 but interpreted =
otherwise by=20
many dissatisfied residents. They feel that the government is in =
cahoots=20
with the MNCs (multinational corporations) to =93milk=94 Mindanao, =
leaving very=20
little benefits for the people, especially the indigenous population =
(Moros=20
and lumads).

Politically, the Islamic mode of government or sultanate has been =
superceded by the modern state system, patterned after those of the=20
colonizers=92.Thus, in the =
Philippines=20
the Republican mold became the basis of of governance. With it in =
place, the=20
sultanate has ceased, animated only during social functions as a =
source of=20
prestige among those who inherit traditional titles as sultan, datu, =
hadji=20
and others. Recently, however, the government formally recognized =
the=20
existence of an autonomous region in =93Muslim Mindanao=94 based on =
culture,=20
tradition and identity. Its 1987 constitution paved the way for the=20
discussion of the stalled 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the MNLF =
and the=20
Philippine government, which was successfully implemented 20 years =
later.=20
Thus in 1996, the Peace Agreement was forged and the Autonomous =
Region for=20
Muslim Mindanao realized.

In Malaysia, the institution of a democratic form of government =
has=20
worked best for the more prosperous Chinese who began to dominate =
the=20
economic scene while the native Malays are favored in government. =
After=20
independence from Great Britain in 1957, the government started a =
more=20
autocratic program to contain ethnic stirrings by accommodation, =
termed by=20
scientists as =93consociation,=94to refer to the way a dominant =
political party=20
like UMNO handles the demands of the minority groups with a measure =
of=20
ethnic balance.Singapore =
seems to be=20
more successful in this regard, especially after it left the =
Malaysian=20
union, with its policy of multiculturalism. Both countries are=20
consociationalists, but the latter adheres more to meritocratic =
principles=20
than the politics of ethnicity and religion.

Visible Signs of Identity=20
Conflict

Ethnic/racial - Since independence in 1946, there =
have been=20
signs of uneasiness in the south marked by Moro rebellion, labeled =
by the=20
government as plain banditry. The most notable is the Kamlon =
uprising in=20
Sulu during the 1950s. Starting in 1970, the troubles escalated into =
a=20
full-blown secessionist problem which has not been resolved until =
these=20
days. First, the Moro National Liberation Front waged a three-decade =
=93war=94=20
against the government. It was coopted to accept political autonomy =
under=20
the 1996 Peace Agreement, but Muslim autonomy did not work, with the =
MNLF=20
leader Nur Misuari declaring that the government reneged on its =
position and=20
was not sincere to implement the terms of the Peace Agreement. After =
a=20
short-lived rebellion in 2001 in Sulu, Misuari sought refuge in =
Malaysia,=20
was captured by its police and turned over to the Philippines. He is =
now in=20
jail on charges of =
subversion.

In Mindanao, other Moro groups have taken up the cudgel and =
continued to=20
foment instability. For one, the notorious and fanatical Abu Sayyaf =
group=20
has perpetrated heinous crimes of murder, kidnapping and rape of =
Christians,=20
foreigners and tourists while pretending to be Islamic and doing =
service in=20
the name of their religion. Another group is the Pentagon gang known =
for=20
kidnapping and banditry.

Meanwhile, another faction of the Moro secessionist group has =
maintained=20
the struggle.The Moro =
Islamic=20
Liberation Front, which was put into the sidelight, has sued peace =
with the=20
government since 1998. =
After a=20
fragile cease-fire truce, =93war=94 broke out in 2000 and another =
this year=20
(2003) when government troops stormed the MILF camps in hot pursuit =
of=20
kidnappers and other bad elements, including Islamic militants =
(terrorists)=20
who are allegedly protected by the MILF high command.

In Malaysia, the most important inter-ethnic rivalry is =
occasioned by the=20
violent race riots in 1969. Since then, conflict has been contained. =
But not=20
in Indonesia where race and religious conflicts break out and =
disturb the=20
peace during 1998-2000. Muslims and Christian fight each other in =
Ambon due=20
to the instigation of Laskar Jihad, Chinese are attacked all over, =
and the=20
trouble in Aceh continues even under Martial Law.Like Mindanao and Southern =
Thailand, an=20
emboldened Islamic separatist movement is in place in Bandah Aceh. =
East=20
Timor is now peaceful after its independence in 2002 under UN =
control.

Contested territory - Territorially, Mindanao is a=20
contested region because many Muslims believe that this is their =
traditional=20
homeland. They were a majority group in Mindanao and Sulu before the =
colonial period, but were reduced to a marginalized, demographic =
minority=20
after 1960. Now they constitute only about 20% of Mindanao =
population,=20
although they are predominant in five provinces under the =
jurisdiction of=20
the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

Similar observations occur in Indonesia on territoriality issues =
as=20
Jakarta attempts to bring in large numbers of Javanese to Irian =
Jaya,=20
Moluccas, East Timor and other frontiers. (About 60% of =
Indonesia=92s=20
population reside in Java.) The Christian-Muslim conflicts in the=20
peripheries are occasioned by the clash of beliefs about land =
ownership and=20
homeland, but frequently revolve around feelings of job =
discrimination by=20
the dominant Javanese and Madurese settlers.

In eastern Malaysia (Sarawak), bitter rivalry divides not only=20
christianized Malays and their Islamic counterparts but also between =
the=20
Malays and the Chinese. Recently, there were reported attacks made =
by the=20
Dayaks (christianized Malays) on =93outsiders=94 including other =
Malay settlers,=20
Chinese and to some extent Indians and Bangladeshis.The Kaduzun Christians in Sabah =
are also=20
apprehensive over the Malay identity, feeling that they also belong =
but are=20
excluded by its apparently legalized Islamic ascription.

Cosmology - Ideologically, Islamic precepts and =
cosmology=20
are in conflict with secular governments such as those of the =
Philippines,=20
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. As Bauzon says, =93in =
the=20
Philippines, the conflict of identity between Islam and Christianity =
is=20
louder than the sounds of bullets and cannons.=94 Whereas Islam =
believes in=20
unity (tauhid), in =
which religion=20
and the state are not distinguished from each other, the modern =
concept of=20
governance insists on separation and specialization of powers. =
Islamic laws=20
propagated under the shari=92ah are considered divine and =
could not be=20
contained by man-made agreements. =
In=20
Mindanao, even moderate Muslims see this difference. The =
factionalism in the=20
Moro struggle between the MNLF (secular) and the MILF (religious), =
and now=20
the war between the MILF and the government are all indicative of =
the battle=20
between the secular and the sacred.=20
The MILF believes that the only way out of the mess is for =
the=20
Bangsamoro to form their own Islamic government based on the =
Qur=92an.

In Indonesia, the October 2002 Bali bombing is a calculated =
message sent=20
by militant Islam, notably Jemaah Islamiyah, to the secularized =
Indonesian=20
government. They wanted less of =93western=94 things and more of =
Islam. The=20
clamp down on JI and its leader, Abu Bakr Bashir, is a battle =
between =93good=94=20
and =93evil=94 =96 goodness being defined as things secular. =
Moreover, hardline=20
Islamists also demonize almost everything that is western, =
particularly the=20
United States.

Jihad, Extremism and Islamic=20
Identity

A word very rich in meaning but hardly understood by anyone, even =
by some=20
of its believers, is jihad. Literally, it is given the scary =
phrase=20
=93holy war,=94 for which it is not all about.=20
Truth is, nowhere in the 114 chapters or suhras of the =
Qur=92an is this=20
word mentioned, although references to war (qital or =
harb) are=20
aplenty. Most Islamic scholars agree that jihad is nothing =
but=20
struggle, exerting one=92s utmost toward the true path of Islam. It =
is an=20
effort to purify oneself and get rid of the evil from within through =
prayers=20
(salat), giving of alms and helping the needy (zakat), =
fasting=20
during the month of ramadhan, and more. This struggle is intended to =
make=20
the self good as a foremost virtue. In another sense, there is a =
struggle=20
waged against injustice and oppression, and other bad practices in =
the=20
environment, hence the Islamic response is one meant to cleanse the =
world.=20
Of these two, the first is the most favored=96 it is the greater jihad, =
a=20
life-long activity among Muslims.

Declaring war on others in defense of Islam is accepted, but on =
certain=20
conditions: only when the ummah is on the verge of life and =
death,=20
and when livelihood and survival is at stake. The Qur=92an even =
warns the=20
faithful about exceeding the limits, or else he is likewise guilty =
and risks=20
penalty during the Day of Judgment. (The Qur=92an says in 2/190, =
=93Fight in the=20
cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits, for =
God does=20
not love transgressors.=94)

But some interpret the Qur=92anic verses in their literal =
meaning, often=20
read out of context because these are read alone without relating =
them to=20
some other verses elsewhere. Others probably do it on purpose =
because of=20
extreme hatred against the infidel and the Qur=92anic permission to =
go to war.=20
No wonder that jihad is misinterpreted (or misread), and=20
misapplied.Because of this =
misreading even by Muslims, outsiders are quick to notice what some =
Muslims=20
actually do compared to what they should do. Thus the labeling =
continues.=20
Here is a typical interpretation, by Bernard =
Barber:

Jihad delivers a different set of virtues: a vibrant local =
identity, a=20
sense of community, solidarity among kinsmen, neighbors, and =
countrymen,=20
narrowly conceived. But it also guarantees parochialism and is =
grounded in=20
exclusion. Solidarity is secured through war against outsiders. And=20
solidarity often means obedience to a hierarchy in governance, =
fanaticism in=20
beliefs, and the obliteration of individual selves in the name of =
the=20
group.

In other instances, those who have been inspired by jihad =
show a=20
different perspective =96 that of looking backward, a kind of time =
warp. This=20
tendency takes the label of Islamic revivalism, which glorifies the =
past and=20
valorize old practices that have become anachronistic in modern =
times. The=20
movement called Wahhabism, or its wrong interpretation, exemplifies =
this=20
strain of Islam, which is responsible for creating extremists in the =
likes=20
of Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, Abu Sayyaf, Laskar Jihad and other=20
terrorist groups who have hijacked Islam to advance their cause. Its =
proponent, Mohhamad bin Abd al Wahhab, called for a return to the =
true path=20
of Islam some 300 years ago as a consequence of the declining =
Ottoman empire=20
and the rising prosperity of the West. Wahhabism shows up in the =
strict=20
dietary and dress codes (e.g., observing food taboos (halal), =
proper=20
Islamic rituals, hijab or head covering for women, growing of =
beard=20
for men, etc.). But with all its honest intentions, Wahhabism is =
probably=20
also misread by many of those who propagate it in present-day =
Arabia,=20
Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is easy to conclude that many =
ideological=20
mujahideen (warriors of God) from Southeast Asia who saw =
action=20
during the Afghanistan war have brought home the strict, austere =
Wahhabi=20
tenets of yesteryears.

In any case, Islamic extremism (not fundamentalism as others say =
it),=20
including the way the Wahhabi doctrine is followed, is bred by new=20
circumstances as regions of the world become increasingly =
interconnected=20
(i.e., it is globalized) and where the hegemonic west shows its =
dominating=20
character in the global economy and politics. Thus, extremism is a =
localized=20
response that brings to life the glorious past of Islam as if time =
is frozen=20
and conditions have remained stationary. But modern Islamists argue =
that=20
Islam is for all time, and that jihad means reforming =
society that=20
has gone bankrupt or corrupt.

Observations/Conclusions

As of this writing, the identity conflict in Mindanao is still =
raging -=20
there seems to be =93no light at the end of the tunnel,=94 so to =
speak. The MILF=20
still discusses peace with the Philippine government under the =
auspices of=20
Malaysia who brokers the talks. Some extremist groups like the Abu =
Sayyaf=20
and Pentagon Gang that sow terror by killing and kidnapping =
Christians and=20
foreigners are relentlessly hunted down by government troops who =
have=20
considerably degraded their capability. But the moderate Muslims, =
who=20
compose the majority of Muslims, are somewhat silent although they =
do=20
condemn the atrocities of the Islamic extremists as =
=93un-Islamic.=94 In any=20
case, the events suggest that Islamic identity is very much alive =
and=20
continues to re-affirm its being, although in different ways.

Meanwhile, recent disturbances in Southeast Asia, particularly in =
Indonesia, has drawn world attention on the Jemaah Islamiyah and =
other=20
militant Islamic groups believed to be associated with the Al-Qaeda =
terror=20
network. Indonesia banned a similar Islamic group, the Laskar Jihad, =
while=20
Malaysia declared the Dar Al-Arkham as an illegal organization. =
Malaysia=92s=20
Internal Security Act (ISA) is used not only to crack down on =
terrorists but=20
also oppositionists who do not tow the line. Moreover, the Islamic =
Party is=20
now gaining strength in the Malaysian Parliament owing to the =
increase of=20
their number of seats from 7 to 27 out of 193 during the last =
elections. PAS=20
now controls two states (Trengganu and Kelantan) out of 13.In Bandah Aceh, the rebels =
continue to=20
press for freedom, with the Islamic mould of governance in mind if =
they=20
succeed in doing it, amid the atrocities and human rights violation=20
committed by the military.

The plan of Islamists to form a regional government in Southeast =
Asia for=20
Muslims seems symbolic of a revivalist attempt to bring back a =
glorious=20
past, once enjoyed by the Malaccan sultanate in the Malayan world, =
and by=20
the Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates in Mindanao. Longing for the =
past has=20
become a major feature of their orientation in identity building, =
because it=20
represents =93the best part of their lives,=94 as Moro scholar Salah =
Jubair=20
would point out. Further, the Islamic identity is more concerned =
with the=20
protection of the ummah, hence a fixed being, rather than of=20
becoming.

Any attempt to root out the causes of conflict is laudable, =
especially if=20
done with greater diplomacy. =
But it=20
is prudent to separate terrorism from legitimate demands, allowing =
law and=20
justice to take its course. =
There is=20
also value in encouraging dialogues as basis for new action in order =
to=20
manage, or mitigate, the violence and instability of ethnic =
conflict. In the=20
Philippines, non-governmental organizations, or more broadly =
elements of=20
civil society are now at work to help reduce the level of conflict =
before it=20
breaks out anew. Religious organizations such as the Bishops-Ulama =
Forum,=20
and even community initiatives to form Peace Zones (demilitarized =
areas in=20
Mindanao), are good signs that people still love peace more than =
they hate=20
war.

More importantly, government reforms are badly needed to =
alleviate the=20
sufferings of poverty stricken Muslims in countries where they =
constitute=20
the minority group. This plea particularly applies to the =
Philippines and=20
Indonesia owing to their facile militaristic approach to the Islamic =
dilemma. Failing to do so only angers the Muslim ummah and gives =
justification for=20
jihadic wars, making conflict rather than peace the most viable =
option.