Egypt: The Ceaseless Struggle for Political Power

Is history being repeated? Can the Egyptian revolution of 2011 be compared to 1952 revolution or can it be argued that Egypt's history is inevitably linked to the army? Both revolutions ended in the same way: a military coup d'etat while it cannot be denied that in the end the army helped significantly to ouster Mubarak.

Two years later, when Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called people to take to the streets on July 26th 2013, he said: “We didn’t betray anybody. Don’t think that I betrayed the former president. I told him that the Egyptian army belongs to all Egyptians. The army existed only to serve the will of the people." The majority of Egyptian people had seen the army as a patriotic institution that can be trusted to act in the interests of the nation. But all that was long before the army took control of the government and before the new Constitution was approved.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the First Constitution

Mohamed Morsi was elected president on 2012, after what seemed to be of the most democratic elections in the history of Egypt and clearly with a divided, non-organised secular participation. The political power had been monopolised by the islamists. The first constitutional Assembly charged with the drafting of the new Constitution was suspended by the Administrative Court for not representing Egyptian society and a second one was elected by the parliament in June 2012, which was equally questioned for its unbalanced representation. The assembly included members of the same parliament which the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional after several irregularities were observed during the election period. The transition appeared trapped in a political scene dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood where there was no space for real economic reforms, rising the risk of a macroeconomic crisis.

The autocracy exercised by the governing party got more absolute with the Presidential decrees, issued by Morsi, depriving the judiciary of any right to challenge his power. According to these decrees, the Muslim Brotherhood–dominated constituent assembly, which was responsible for drafting the constitution, could not be legally dissolved. Moreover, the upper house in the parliament was also excepted by any dissolution and acquired legislative powers that originally belonged to the lower house. These movements provoked protests all over the country, decreasing even more the Muslim Bortherhood's popularity. In December 2012 the Assembly approved Morsi's draft constitution. This draft was focused more on Sharia law than the truly important issues like the unlimited executive power, the weak role of the parliament or the lack of protection of civil rights caused by its new provisions.

But what the Muslim Brotherhood got wrong was that the uprising, this powerful movement, was fighting for democracy and not another disguised dictatorship. The fact that they excluded non-islamic forces from this draft, as well as its several authoritarian provisions on civil-military relations, religion-state relations, civil liberties etc. would only work against them and waste all the effort to appear as the unique viable political alternative to the corrupted old regime. The same fears reappeared, no institution was empowered enough to tackle the old state. International Amnesty released a report saying that "A draft constitution approved by Egypt's Constituent Assembly falls well short of protecting human rights and, in particular, ignores the rights of women, restricts freedom of expression in the name of protecting religion, and allows for the military trial of civilians".

Despite everything, the Muslim Brotherhood remained rigid till the end. It chose to remain isolated from the rest of Egypt society that did not support the idea of political islam, besides it was held responsible for promulgating hate speech against secularists or religious minorities. It further appointed its own cabinet ministers and replaced the old regime's remnants with its own members in other important judicial, executive and administrative positions.

The army and the second Constitution

On 30 June 2013, the result of this political deadlock was manifested in the massive anti-Morsi protests which led to the ousting of Morsi, the following coup d'etat and an appointed interim government. A great debate was initiated about the nature of military intervention. Undoubtedly, the legitimate government, even if it had lost its legitimacy in the eyes of people, was displaced illegally by the army. In the beginning, Morsi opponents chose to see it as a kind of deliverance but army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was not going to be a defender of democratic values.

Since that time, violence has continued, with hundred of casualties, arrests and detentions, including a massive crackdown on supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. The declaration of the latter as terrorist organisation as well as the trial of Morsi accusing him of responsibility for the deaths of protesters during his time in office had been mere excuses to consolidate and legitimise the coup d'etat.

This political alteration produced a new Constitution. All committee members were appointed by the interim President Adli Mansour, himself appointed by the military. In the referendum to approve the new constitution, the reported turnout of about 35 to 38 percent of eligible voters did not significantly surpass the percentage of Egyptians who voted in a 2012 referendum on a constitution, but the first one passed with just 63 percent approval. On the other hand, Irregularities and abuses could not easily be reported as international observers were able to get only a glimpse of the electoral reality in a country such as Egypt.

"Certainly the interim government is going to perceive and present the vote as one that legitimises the ouster of Morsi" said Dr. H.A. Hellyer, Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.

It is a constitution that gives autonomy and power to the army, keeping the military budget beyond civilian scrutiny and allowing the military to appoint the defence minister. It equally states that civilians cannot be tried by military tribunals unless they carry out “direct attacks” on the armed forces, but there are critics about how this provision can be interpreted to apply to journalists, protesters and dissidents.

Creation of politics

Will it be fair to say that Egypt is back to where it started? So what about the 2011 and 2013 uprisings? And what about that part of the population that once it went to the street, it never stopped going back?

The most popular movement before the uprisings had been Kefaya (كفاية) which means enough in Arabic. It pushed for political reform, criticising the extension of Mubarak's presidential term. Other movement that became active under Mubarak's regime is called April 6 movement. It was created to support workers who were planning to strike in El-Mahalla El-Kubra, an industrial town. It also organised rallies to free imprisoned journalists and defend freedom of speech. Among its founders, there are Ahmed Maher, who participated in the 2011 anti-Mubarak demonstrations and Mohammed Adel who was with the Kefaya movement before. In October 2011, one striking example of their protests was to launch a “black circle, white circle” political awareness campaign. It was aimed to prevent former members of Mubarak's regime from winning seats in the future parliament. The white circle listed a set of qualification and characteristics they hoped to see in elected candidates. The April 6 youth movement also worked with other grassroots groups and on 12 May 2013 decided to join the Tamorod campaign that was calling for a vote of no-confidence in the Morsi administration.

In July 2013, following the military coup against Morsi, members of 6 April joined the Third Square, a movement created by liberal, leftist and moderate Islamist activists who reject both Muslim Brotherhood and military rule. One of the protesters, Ahmed Adel, director of an NGO, said, "we are a group of young people whose views are not represented either in Tahrir Square or Rabaa al-Adaweya." Tahrir Square is where military-organised protests are held, while Rabea al-Adaweya is a site of a sit-in of Morsi supporters. There is hope that this kind of youth movements can have a strong impact on the society and stand as a symbol of resistance to the semi-authoritarian regime that keeps changing faces and keeps intimidating through illegal arrests. In 26th November 2013, Ahmed Maher, Mohamed Adel and another key activist Ahmed Douma were arrested after assisting a protest organised by the "no military trials for civilians" campaign. They were sentenced to 3 years in jail and EG50000 fine each. It has certainly been a coup against the revolution but at the same time the regime revealed its weakness, signalling its fear of political activism and its potentiality.

The future of Egypt is still in the hands of its people but the country faces enormous challenges. The political power of the army should be controlled and it should play its last role ensuring political stability and lead the country to elections. Only if the army stops dominating the political scene, there is hope that divisions and fears of civil war will fade away. The presidential election as well as the parliamentary one are ahead. The political transition is still in an unknown path whereas questions about the interpretations of the constitution are hard to answer. It is important for the new elected government to reconcile all sides, help promote a pluralistic society and defend the freedom of expression, starting by letting activists out of jail.

Director

Konstantina Kostami is co-founder of Open Society and researcher on Democratization and Development in the Arab/Muslim world at the Complutense University of Madrid.

Education

Ph.D. in Political Science at Complutense University of Madrid, M.Sc. in International politics at the Complutense University of Madrid, B.Sc. in International and European Economic Studies at the Athens University of Economics and Business

Languages

English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Greek

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