Designing Our General Purpose Forces

Our major effort over the past year has been to develop a
military posture consistent with these strategic guidelines
and adequate to protect our overseas interests.

Europe. During 1970 the NATO Alliance concentrated on thorough
review of its defense posture. The central question was what
strategy and mix of conventional and theater nuclear forces
was best suited to the defense of the alliance when both the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have the capabilities for mutual nuclear
devastation. The review reflected the fact that Europe is
moving through a time of change, and that the relationship of
NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces can have a significant
effect on the outcome of political negotiations.

Thus we had to consider carefully not only the forces already
deployed in Europe, but the capabilities the NATO Alliance
maintains for rapid mobilization and reinforcement, and the
probabilities of receiving early warning. The commitment of
our own strategic forces to the alliance deterrent, of course,
was not in question.

For our part we reviewed the contribution of United States
ground, air and naval forces. Together with our allies we
concluded that:

We should not decrease our present forces, nor should any
other ally.

The basic alliance strategy would require maximum flexibility
to deal with the full range of possible attack.

Important qualitative improvements would have to be made by
all allies to offset the continuing improvements by the Warsaw
Pact.

Asia. The situation in Asia differs significantly from that in
Europe. The People's Republic of China has substantial military forces. But those forces pose a more limited and less
immediate threat in Asia than do the forces of the Soviet
Union in Europe. Chinese nuclear capabilities are still in an
early stage of development. At the same time our allies in
Asia have not yet fully developed their own defense capabilities.

Taking account of these facts, we have reviewed general purpose force requirements in Asia. Our review indicates that we
can meet our collective security objectives while placing
greater reliance on our allies for their own defense. The
growing strength of our allies has already resulted in a
reduction of the level of our general purpose forces stationed
in the region.

In All Areas.The primary role of our general purpose forces
is to deter and, if necessary, cope with external aggression.
If aggression occurs, the use of our forces will be determined
by our interests, the needs of our allies and their defense
capabilities, which we are seeking to improve. It is clear,
however, that the Soviet Union's strong and balanced conventional capability enables it to project its military power to
areas heretofore beyond its reach. This requires us to maintain balanced and mobile ground, sea and air forces capable of
meeting challenges to our worldwide interests.

This may impose new requirements and new burdens in the coming
decade. We would prefer that rivalry with the U.S.S.R. be
contained through self-restraint, mutual respect for interests
and specific agreements. But I am determined that our general
military posture will remain as strong as the international
situation dictates.