UN Security Council

Interviewer:

CAN YOU DESCRIBE SORT OF
THE HOPES OF THE SOVIET UNION GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME, FROM THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS?
I'M TALKING ABOUT SAN FRANCISCO IN '45.

Roshin:

The main preoccupation
for our country in San Francisco Conference was the security of the country. And that's why the
main problem was to participate in the committee dealing with the General Assembly and Security
Council. I represented the Soviet Union in the Committee, to one and to two, dealing with the
competence of the General Assembly, and procedure of the General Assembly. My counterpart
from the United States was Senator Vandenberg, probably you know him quite well, and Sol Bloom
as a representative of the Committee to one.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT
WERE --

Roshin:

The point of
contention was the problem of voting in the Security Council, as you know. Because we insisted
that the unanimity of the five great powers was the general rule and it was the main problem
which was solved at the Crimean Conference in 1945. And as well as we insisted that in the
Security Council that the Security Council should decide about the many problems including the nomination
of the Secretary General. And I remember that in the Committee II-1 was rather divided
opinion, between me and between American representative Sol Bloom, when he suggested that the
nomination of the General Secretary should be without consent of the five great powers. And he
voted in favor of the Australian resolu -— Australian resolutions for nomination. The simple
majority in the Security Council, we were strongly against --I was strongly against, but
unfortunately the majority in the committee decided in favor of the simple majority without
unanimity of great power. And it was decided after the long procedure undertaken by our chief
representative, Mr. Gromyko. He was invited the special executive committee and secondly a
special nominated committee of that four great powers: the United States, Soviet Union, Great
Britain, and if I am not mistaken, Australia. Mr. Evatt was Australian representative. And
at that time it was re-decided, if I may say so in English, because my English is not that well. And
it was decided finally that the nomination of the Security Council...General Secretary of the
United Nations should be nominated by the unanimity, by the recommendation taken unanimously by
the great power in the Security Council.

Interviewer:

ASKS ABOUT UNANIMITY
OR VETO RIGHT—WHY SO IMPORTANT.

Roshin:

It was in this
particular case, or in general?

Interviewer:

IN GENERAL.

Roshin:

In general because we
tried to keep the unanimity of the powers participated in the Second World War. We tried that
Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and China at the time, France was...to take a
substantial decision concerning the security. Otherwise we may create such an unstable situation
in the world that some countries would act against the other, the other great powers. And it
would create a very complicated situation and even lead to the war between the great powers. One
would like to eliminate these case. And as the nomination in the unanimity recommendation of the
Secretary General of the United Nations, we would also for the unanimous decision. Otherwise the
Soviet Union will be taken aside, if I may say so, taken aside fro m the activity of the
Secretariat as the main organ of the United Nations organization.

Interviewer:

TELL ME WHAT IS THE
QUESTION OF HOW MANY VOTES WILL THE SOVIET UNION HAVE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY? WAS THAT AT THE
TIME THE SUBJECT OF THE CONFERENCE TOO?

Roshin:

Yes, it was a subject
of the ah, probably um I am not ah,...in my... in my memory of the details. But at any rate I
may say to you when we accepted the, full United Nation's charter it was accepted unanimously.
Including voting procedure in the Security Council. And I remember at that time was a
representative off the United Kingdom, ambassador at that time, in the United States. Ah, he
invited the all delegation to arise in favor of the activity, and all risen unanimously, and it
was a very interesting moment in the history of the San Francisco in the history of the United
Nations.

Baruch Plan

Interviewer:

OK, LET'S GO TO THE
UNITED NATIONS MEETING IN 1946 IN NEW YORK, THE SUBJECT IS THE BARUCH PLAN.

Roshin:

Ah, Baruch Plan was
presented not at the session of the General Assembly. It was presented in the special atomic
commission which was created during the first part of the Joint Session of the General Assembly
in London. It was unanimously taken a resolution to create such a such a committee, atomic
committee. And in this atomic committee 11 June, if I'm not mistaken, Baruch presented his
Baruch Plan, and it was not satisfactory for the Soviet Union because it envisaged in the future
that United States would be monopolize the whole activity in the field of atomic energy,
including military utilization of this energy. I remember that it was a question was asked to
the Baruch, probably in 1947 ( )whether the United States would be able to use nuclear weapon.
And whether the United States ah, would be able to make some perfection in the atomic weapon?
And he answered positively. And we concluded that the United States not only tried to monopolize
the atomic energy for military purposes as well as for peaceful purposes, but use this weapon in
future and to ( ) these weapons. And we were strongly against, and represented our proposal which
envisage to abolish the whole nuclear weapons in very short period of time. If I am not mistaken
it was only three month, yes. And it was suggested to create a two commission. One commission
dealing with the exchanges of scientific information concerning peaceful utilization of nuclear
weapon. And other was for elimination of all atomic weapon from the equipment and from the
military forces of all parties including the United Nations. Because unfortunately the American
side rather wa... was in favor to eliminate all the nuclear weapon in the national armaments,
but to leave this weaponry in the United Nations organization in which they possessed at the
time the overwhelming majority. And unfortunately at that time United Nations organization
included only 51 country, including 22 for western hemisphere. 22. And Europe was represented at
the time only for ten countries, including three countries from the Soviet republics. That's why
I will tell you quite frankly that we vote in favor the full elimination of nuclear weapon at
the time. And we repeated this proposal many times in the second, fourth, and ah, fourths,
fifths and other session of the General Assembly, nearly all session of the General Assembly we
repeated our proposal, to eliminate the nuclear weapon including the last session of the General
Assembly too.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU GIVE ME YOUR
PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF BERNARD BARUCH? AS A PERSON RATHER THAN A POLITICIAN?

Roshin:

Ah, unfortunately I
was represent — not representative in the Atomic Energy Commission. I was at that time in the
foreign ministry, and I met only from the great distance, Baruch himself in the one session of
the General Assembly, if I am not mistaken, the second session of the General Assembly. That's
why personal opinion, I have not personal opinion concerning Baruch personally. But I will tell
you quite openly, quite decidedly that he intended rather to keep the atomic energy only in the
United States hands. It was quite clear from all his pronouncements for all his activity in the
Atomic Energy Commission who lasted until 1949. In '49. And that's why um, our strong opinion
was that Baruch acted himself strongly in accordance with the general policy of Administration
of Truman at that time, in order rather to keep atomic energy as a very strong ah, power of
pressure to the other countries of the world. And we were not in favor of such a situation.
That's why we were obliged to produce our own weapon, and as you know, we exploded the first
atomic weaponry in 1949, and unfortunate since this period of time we were, rather two countries
were in a different position as competitors.

Korean War

Interviewer:

TELL ME SOMETHING,
WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE WAY THE KOREAN CONFLICT WAS REFLECTED IN THE UNITED NATIONS? THE
NOTION THAT THE FORCES FIGHTING IN KOREA, MOSTLY THE AMERICAN'S POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
WAS? CAN YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

Roshin:

No, we understand
that it was a full American activity, despite the fact that it was covered by the flag, by the
banner of the United Nations, but it was activity of the United States. That's why we opposed it
very strongly and we take an active, not very active part, but at any rate diplomatically a very
active part against this war against the activity of the United Nations at that time, or
practically against the United States.

Interviewer:

HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE —
THERE WERE PROVISIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER WHICH EXACTLY WAS SUPPOSED TO PREVENT
(?).CAN YOU EXPLAIN IT?

Roshin:

I will explain to you
that every time because of the United States ah, opposed to admission of the People's Republic
of China in the United States, we abstained from the activity in the General Assembly and the
Security Council. That's why the decision, ah, concerning the undertaking the measures against
the North Korean was taken with our absence at that time. And only we, take the activity in
August or Sept... September 1950. At that time, and the United States developed its activity
against Korea, and it was against our will, against our possibility to act against the banner of
the United Nations at that moment. And finally it was our initiative -- initiative of the Soviet
Union to stop the Korean War, and it was the speech of Mr. Malik, who was at the time our chief
representative before the United Nations organization. And he stressed the necessity to stop the
activity and negotiations started in Panmunjom and finally that war was over.

Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Interviewer:

I WANT TO COME, TO
JUMP AGAIN A FEW YEARS AND COME TO THE TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963. FIRST OF ALL CAN YOU SORT OF TRY
TO ESTIMATE WHAT MOTIVATED BOTH POWERS AT THAT TIME TO A FIRST SET OF REAL
NEGOTIATIONS?

Roshin:

Ah, the main idea of
these negotiations from the Soviet side was to stop all ah, nuclear explosions. To stop all
nuclear explosions. It was even in preamble of... for this treaty, was stressed that all
countries will continue its activity in order to eliminate nuclear weapon from the... from the
equipment of all countries. And to stop all test explosions. But I will tell you quite frankly
that unfortunately the western side refused to eliminate all test explosions and suggested to
undertake as a first step in free environments--it means that um, underwater, in atmosphere,
and in cosmos. And we were obliged to accept this point of view, that we expect that during the
first -- during the follow negotiations we will reach the agreement in favor of the full
elimination of test explosion. And I remember that in 1978 it was quite good document published
by the three countries, published I remember in United Nation organization as well as in our
paper, was published that all agreed to eliminate all nuclear explosion including underground.
But unfortunately until now this problem is not solved, and with great regret for our
country.

[END OF TAPE 649000]

Interviewer:

THAT IT WAS SUGGESTED
THAT BOTH SIDES GOT RATHER SCARED BY THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, AND THAT TO SOME EXTENT THE TEST
BAN TREATY WAS SORT OF THE RESULT OF THIS AWARENESS OF THE( ). CAN YOU TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN MOSCOW AND IF YOU WANT THE UNITED STATES, CONCERNING SORT OF THE
GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TEST BAN TREATY?

Roshin:

I am rather doubtful
concerning the direct line between the Cuban Crisis and the problem of the test ban treaty. Ah,
because the negotiations concerning the prohibition of the test explosion in three environments
started much earlier, much earlier. And we insisted and the United States also was rather in
favor only to stop this explosion in three environments because the United States started at the
time to explode underground, and we were in favor also to stop this explosion in free
environment as a first step towards the full prohibition of the test explosions, full
prohibition. And since then we insisted nearly during all sessions of the general assembly that
the American side as well as since then, United Kingdom and France become also partner of this
negotiation in 1964, China exploded the first explosion also. ( ). That's why represented the
proposal to eliminate all test explosions, during many, many session of the General Assembly.
Until the present moment we were strongly in favor of elimination, all the test explosion is (
). Because we can see that...that this is the real stop...a real step towards elimination of
nuclear weapons, weaponry as a whole. And –

Interviewer:

WAS IT, YOU KNOW, IN
THE STATES THERE IS A TENSION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL PARTS, AH, POLITICAL SEGMENTS OF THE
NEGOTIATING TEAM THAT WOULD LIKE TO STOP AND MILITARY SEGMENTS THAT FEEL THAT THEY MUST
CONTINUE. DID SUCH A TENSION ARISE IN THE SOVIET DELEGATION?

Roshin:

I don't think so. And
I am sure that that all majority, not only majority but the whole people and in the all
environment if I may say so, up and down, all in favor of the elimination of the whole test
explosions. Why? Because this is talk towards the real disarmament, towards the real elimination
of the nuclear weapon. And as well as — as soon as this question is solved, it will be much
easier to solve the problem and so on in the conventional weaponry, concerning the conventional
rather problem and so on. That's why this is a most important, a real step toward eliminate the
nuclear weaponry from its armaments of the states. Otherwise it will be a very dangerous
situation. If it will include and if it will even augment, if I may say so, augment --( ) rather
that stockpiles of the nuclear weapon in our country as well as the United States and so
on.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU TALK ABOUT
THE SIGNING? THE SIGNING CEREMONY OF THE TEST BAN TREATY. DO YOU HAVE THE SENSE OF WHO WAS
THERE? WHAT WAS THE ATMOSPHERE, THE TEXTURE OF THE TIME?

Roshin:

Ah, texture of the
time. It was signed in Moscow -- in Moscow. It was signed in that so-called [IN RUSSIAN], it was
a residence of the foreign minister. And it was signed by the our minister for foreign affairs,
Mr. Gromyko as well as from the American side, if I'm not mistaken. This is a probably a sign to
(?) like that. I don't remember, sorry. I don't remember. Sorry. And from the, and it was signed
as well in (?), by this countries in the same year, 1963, and these treaty, signed by many
countries, the same year, and it's enter into force in October 1963 but who signed from the
American side and from the English side. It miss me.

Interviewer:

SO DID YOU HAVE THE
SENSE OF ACHIEVEMENT? DID YOU HAVE A SENSE OF --?

Roshin:

Oh yes, this was a
rather great achievement at that time. And we were all quite satisfied that even we signed an
agreement concerning three environments and taking into consideration that in preamble was very
strongly stressed that all countries obliged to take negotiation and to take the necessary step
in order to eliminate the test explosion even under terra...