Editors Note:
Article is derived from General Gilanis Strategy Research Project completed during
his attendance at the US Army War College during Academic Year 2006.

The 58-year history of relations between the United States
and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been marked by periods of courtship and phases of
distrust. Since 9/11, these relations have again entered an era of close ties with shared
interests. However, there is a perception that the renewed friendship is being driven
solely by Americas need for Pakistani cooperation in the War on
Terrorism and is dependent upon the continued presence and leadership of President
Pervez Musharraf. The perception, if true, portends severe consequences for both the
United States and Pakistan. This article examines the fidelity of this perception in view
of the history of US-Pakistan relations. It reviews the major factors currently
influencing this relationship and proposes an approach to build upon this foundation to
enhance future US-Pakistan cooperation.

A Historical
Review

Under the leadership
of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan became independent on 14 August 1947 after a
long struggle by the Muslims of British India. Jinnah is considered the father of
Pakistan; he set in motion many political initiatives that became the foundation for
Pakistans society.

Jinnah was
influenced by both his life experiences and the challenges he overcame. A Muslim from
Karachi, Jinnah received most of his higher edu-

84/85

cation in legal
studies in London. As a barrister, he soon became the leading lawyer of Bombay, India. As
a politician, he was known for his commitment to the western style of democracy. Jinnah
initially joined the Indian National Congress and launched the struggle to free India from
the British, joining hands with the prominent Hindu leaders, especially, Gandhi. He
eventually found himself at odds with the Hindu majority as he was convinced that the
caste-centric Hindus did not intend to recognize the Muslims as equal citizens in India.1

He then led the
struggle for creation of an independent Muslim state located within the Muslim majority
areas of India. Jinnah died on 11 September 1948, just one year following Indias
independence from Great Britain. Newly independent states at the outset of the Cold War,
India and Pakistan were soon faced with the dilemma of aligning either with the United
States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Although India promptly entered
into favorable relations with the USSR, Pakistani leaders, mostly groomed in Western
institutions, opted for aligning with the West. Correspondingly, Liaqat Ali Khan, the
first prime minister of Pakistan, turned down Stalins invitation to visit Moscow and
instead visited Washington in 1950.2
President Harry S. Truman generally remained indifferent toward Pakistan from 1947 to
1952. When the Eisenhower administration took office in 1953, the US government became
increasingly anxious about the spread of communism to Asia and started to take an interest
in Pakistan. This recognition culminated in the 1954 Mutual Defense Agreement.3

The US-Pakistan
relationship continued to improve as Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) in 1955 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1956. A main
pillar of the relationship was the military cooperation between the two countries, which
blossomed through an active training exchange program and the fielding of US weapons and
equipment within the Pakistan military. Additionally, Pakistan gave the United States
access to the Bataber Air Force Base near the Afghan border for U-2 reconnaissance flights
over the USSRat substantial risk to its own security.4 Meanwhile, in 1965 Pakistan fought a major war with India
over the state of

85/86

Kashmir. A smaller but well-trained
Pakistan Army equipped with US weaponry, was able to defend the country against a larger
force.

Pakistan also played
a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the United States and China when, President
Richard M. Nixon, decided to begin the process of normalizing relations with Beijing. In
July 1971, Pakistan facilitated the secret mission to China undertaken by Dr. Henry
Kissinger, the US Secretary of State. Actually, the first meeting between the two
countries took place aboard a Pakistan Airlines plane flying to Beijing.5
Pakistan soon paid the price for this diplomatic activism: India, exploiting the political
turmoil after the 1970 Pakistani general elections, attacked Pakistans eastern wing
(now Bangladesh) with support from the USSR. In the midst of this crisis, Pakistan turned
to the United States for assistance, but was met with a distressing refusal. The war
resulted in the division of Pakistan: West Pakistan became Pakistan and East Pakistan
became the independent country of Bangladesh. In 1972 as a consequence of this strategic
loss a socialist democratic political party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, came to power.
Accordingly, US-Pakistan relations, which had already deteriorated because of the lack of
US support in the 1971 war, declined further as the United States did not favor a
socialist government in Pakistan.

Twin events in 1979,
the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, renewed American interest
in improving the US-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan suddenly became a key geostrategic
player as it served as a buffer between the USSR and the Persian Gulf. The United States
then decided to fight a proxy war in land-locked Afghanistan, and America sought
Pakistans support to spearhead this fight. General Zia ul Haq who had assumed
control of Pakistan in a 1977 military coup offered America Pakistani support in the
effort to drive the Soviets from Afghanistan. Pakistan more than served the US aims and
was instrumental in forcing the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan in 1988.

In retrospect, the
period from 1979 to 1988 was a golden period in US-Pakistan relations. Unfortunately, both
the governments remained fo-

86/87

cused on narrow
national interests relevant to their own security issues. Indeed, the American interest
focused almost entirely on unrestricted support to the Afghan jihad. Although successful,
it accomplished only a relatively short-term and limited strategic aim, the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The interests of Pakistan were also myopic, characterized
by limited modernization of the armed forces and US political support for the Pakistani
military government. No worthwhile long-term economic policy was pursued, nor was any
major economic infrastructure developed. Overall, positive US-Pakistan ties of the 1980s
were shaped by military interactions. However, they did not include any projects designed
to serve the long-term interests of either country.

Although it forced
the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the war effort also produced many negative
consequences in the region. An immediate effect of the US policy was a sharp rise in the
number of madrassas (religious seminaries) in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).
These madrassas were configured to indoctrinate young Muslim students from Afghanistan,
Pakistans tribal areas, and some Arab countries. The students were also given
military training and were recruited in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. The indirect
effects of US policies in Pakistan in the 1980s included the spread of what has been
called the Kalashnikov culture. Thus, the United States indirectly supported
many of the less desirable policies of the Zia regime: suppressing freedom of the press; a
rise in ethnicity and sectarianism; and the deterioration of Pakistani domestic
institutions. Overall, the joint policies of the American and Pakistan governments, with
active support from some Arab countries, resulted in the militarization of a number of the
Muslim youth, with far-reaching consequences related to the growth of terrorism.

During this period
Pakistan suffered extreme internal instability thanks to the joint efforts of the Soviet
Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) and its Indian equivalent, the Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW). Pakistan endured thousands of bomb attacks on trains, bus and railway
stations, shopping centers, and other public places resulting in large numbers of civilian
casualties. There was also a rise in political polarization due to the continued
governance by the military, and increased instability due to an unprecedented rise in
ethnic and sectarian violence. This internal strife was fueled by an influx of cheap
Soviet weapons, including Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers, and many other weapons.

At the same time,
Pakistan responded to Indias nuclear development program by beginning the
development of its own nuclear capability. Although the United States was strongly opposed
to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it effectively turned a blind eye to these
developments because Pakistan was its most important ally in the containment of Soviet

87/88

southward expansion.
When the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in 1988, the US interest in South Asia began to
wane. Afghanistan, at that time, was in deep turmoil as a result of a decade of Soviet
occupation and civil war. Against the advice of Pakistani leadership, America left
Afghanistan.

Americas
treatment of Pakistan was not much better. Not only was its promised aid of $4.02 billion
to Pakistan withdrawn, the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan for pursuing the
development of nuclear weapons. The blind eye, no longer obscured by the
threat of Soviet expansion, began to see. It was at this time that President Zia ul Haq,
along with some of his top military generals and the US Ambassador, were killed in an
airplane crash in what many believed was an act of terrorism. There were no smoking
guns, but the list of possible perpetrators included the RAW, KGB, and the Pakistan
Peoples Party (the political party in power at the time of Zia ul Haqs coup). Some
within Pakistan even speculated that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) may have
been involved on the premise that President Zia ul Haq had become a liability for the
United States. The mystery of the air crash was never solved, but the resultant
uncertainty cast another shadow over the US-Pakistani relationship.

Thus, the courtship
between the United States and Pakistan during the final decade of the Cold War was
followed by a decade of declining cooperation highlighted by sanctions in the Pressler
Amendment that prohibited US aid to Pakistan unless the President certified that Pakistan
was not in possession of nuclear weapons. Although there were four democratically elected
governments in Pakistan during the 1988-98 period, they focused mainly on petty internal
politics to the strategic detriment of the country. In many respects, it was a lost decade
for Pakistan. In May 1998, Pakistan again seized center stage in South-Asia when it
exploded six nuclear devices in response to the Indian nuclear explosions in Pokharan. The
United States responded by further tightening sanctions against Pakistan. As a
consequence, Pakistans economic condition worsened while ethnic and sectarian
extremism began to build. During this period, the newly liberated Central Asian Republics
(CARs) provided the majority of economic and trade opportunities for Pakistan. However,
the instability in Afghanistan continued to impede Pakistans relations with the
CARs. Starved for energy resources and hoping to access Central Asian markets via the
shortest route, Pakistan initiated its relationship with the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan.6

Growing discontent
among Pakistans masses along with successive corrupt governments and the immediate
fallout of the conflict with India in Kashmir, served as catalysts for the bloodless coup
of October 1999. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Pervez Musharraf, assumed
administrative control of the country with an agenda for reform, economic revival, and
eradication of

88/89

extremism. President
Musharrafs approach to governance was essentially different from previous military
regimes. He did not impose martial law, did not limit freedom of the press, and did not
attempt to appease the religious right. His rule also differed from that of the four
previous civil governments that lost credibility due to their corrupt practices. By way of
contrast, President Musharraf rid his own administration of the corrupt elite; this
included bureaucrats, politicians, and even senior military officers. Regarding the
situation in Afghanistan, President Musharraf endeavored to convince American leaders of
the threat posed by al Qaeda and offered Pakistans support to counter it.7

Post 9/11

The fateful events
of 11 September 2001 had a dramatic impact on US-Pakistan relations. President Musharraf
was prompt in extending full support to America in the ensuing war against terrorism. He
readily agreed to all requests by Secretary of State Colin Powell. According to a number
of sources, his positive response exceeded expectations.8 Indeed, President Musharraf has been frequently
criticized within Pakistan for cooperating too readily and conceding too much to the
United States without adequate recompense.9 The most probable reason for his forthright response was his recognition that
America and Pakistan could join in quelling the radical religious and terrorist elements
growing within the region. President Musharraf had already been moving along that path.
His whole-hearted support to the United States subsequently helped build a strong
relationship between the two nations.10 Pakistan has assumed a central and active
role in the war on terrorism.

There are those who
contend that Pakistans support for the war on terrorism is being sustained solely by
the force of President Musharrafs personality alonethat it does not reflect
the true priorities of the countrys populace and is not in accord with
Pakistans national interests. Interestingly, this argument is used by
Musharrafs political foes as well as some of his supporters. His political opponents
and the anti-US lobby try to imply that supporting the war on terrorism is extremely
unpopular in Pakistan. They argue that President Musharraf is fighting an unholy war to
please the Americans and that he should be removed from power. On the other hand, the
Presidents supporters, assert that it is only President Musharraf who can provide
unrestricted Pakistani support to the war on terrorism. If this is true then his
continuation as president is crucial to the interests of the United States. Both arguments
miss the mark and undermine President Musharrafs personal security. It should be
obvious that the perception that this policy is dependent on the individual has led to
multiple attempts on the Presidents life, at least two of which nearly succeeded. In
fact, President Mushaffafs opposition to religious extremism began well before 9/11.

89/90

President Musharraf
began to strike at the roots of extremism long before being approached by the United
States following 9/11. Moreover, a large majority of Pakistanis do not share the
Islamists vision of the future of the country and are concerned about the growth of
extremism. Consider, for example, Pakistans 2002 general election: The Pakistan
Muslim League (Quaid) and its allied parties that supported President Musharrafs
political ideology, won in three of the four provinces and were able to form a central
government as well as three provincial governments. Conversely, the Muttahida Majlis Amal
(MMA), a grouping of six religious parties, running on anti-Musharraf and anti-US
platform, won its seats primarily within the Pushtun area of the tribal-dominated NWFP.
According to Hussain Haqqani, Despite the MMAs unprecedented electoral
performance in 2002, the alliance (MMA) garnered only 11 percent of the total votes cast;
the Islamist vote as a percentage of total registered voters has been more or less
stagnant since the 1970s.11 The results of the election also reflect
the pattern of support within the country for the war on terrorism; with a decisive
majority supporting President Musharrafs hardline approach.

Not only does the
ruling Pakistan Muslim League support the war on terrorism, many of the opposition
leaders, who sometimes criticize President Musharraf on other issues, support him on
countering terrorism. Notwithstanding the force of his own personal commitment to the war
on terror, President Musharrafs policies are well accepted throughout much of
Pakistan at large as well as within the political and military leadership.

In contrast to the
relationship between the United States and Pakistan in the 1980s, current cooperation,
although initiated as a result of the 9/11 attacks, has developed along a more
sophisticated agenda. Instead of a one-item agenda focused on the war on terrorism,
Pakistan has used the current situation of improved relations to pursue a broad series of
issues. The policies pursued by the government of President Musharraf have proven to be in
the best interest of both Pakistan and the United States in both the short- and long-term.

This comprehensive
approach consolidates national views related to globalization, the eradication of
militancy, economic development, and democratization. The US government has also genuinely
sought to reduce Pakistans foreign debt. Besides using its influence on G-8
countries for economic cooperation, the United States was facilitated
Pakistans negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). America has also
removed all sanctions imposed on Pakistan and has reassured the countrys leadership
that its nuclear weapon capability is acceptable and will not result in future roll-backs.
The United States and Pakistan are also cooperating on matters related to nuclear
nonproliferation, agreeing to resolve the proliferation issues involving Dr.

With regard to
Pakistans economy, President Musharraf has enacted macroeconomic measures to remove
the country from its long-term debt trap. According to the CIA Fact Book,
IMF-approved government policies, bolstered by generous foreign assistance and
renewed access to global markets since 2001, have generated solid macroeconomic recovery
in the last three years. The government has made substantial macroeconomic reforms since
2000. . . . While long-term prospects remain uncertain, given Pakistans low level of
development, medium-term prospects for job creation and poverty reduction are the best in
nearly a decade.12 Additionally, Islamabad has raised
development spending from about 2 percent of GDP in the 1990s to 4 percent in 2003, a
necessary step towards reversing the broad underdevelopment of its social sector. GDP
growth, spurred by double-digit gains in industrial production over the past year, has
become less dependent on agriculture. Foreign exchange reserves continued to reach new
levels in 2004, supported by robust export growth and steady worker remittances.13

Pakistan is enjoying
an economic upturn. The past fiscal year has indeed been fruitful for Pakistans
economy, recording several multiyear firsts. Pakistans real GDP growth
of 8.4 percent in 2004-05 is the most rapid in two decades. Pakistan has positioned itself
as the second fastest growing economy after China in 2004-05. It witnessed the largest
expansion of private sector credit in the 2004-05 timeframe. Pakistans exit from the
IMF Programme marked an important milestone; and the countrys public and external
debt burden declined to their lowest levels in decades.14

Besides the
improvement in macroeconomic indicators, Pakistan has enjoyed marked improvements in
social and living conditions. Key indicators such as the literacy rate; gross and net
enrollment in primary, middle and high schools; access to sanitation and safe drinking
water; use of electricity and gas as sources of lighting and cooking fuel; various health
indicators such as child immunization and treatment of diarrheaall have shown marked
improvements over the past four to seven years. While Pakistans socioeconomic and
macroeconomic polices have facilitated these positive developments, an increasingly broad
and dynamic global recovery has also aided the nation.15

The government has
also launched some mega-projects to improve the macroeconomic situation of the country.
The port of Gwadar is being constructed in the relatively underdeveloped province of
Balochistan on the Arabian Sea and is near completion. The project had been on the drawing
board since the early 1990s but could not be initiated earlier due to politico-economic
disconnects. Finally, initiated in 2002, this deep-sea port will pro-

91/92

vide docking for
large cargo ships, offering the shortest access to the land-locked regions of Afghanistan,
Central Asia, and Western China.

The Thar Coal
Project likewise promises significant economic gains. The Thar coalfield contains 175
billion tons of coal covering an area of 9,000 square kilometers in the Tharparker
District of the Sindh province. This project will be providing a total of 500 megawatts of
electricity for at least the next 30 years. Pakistan will be able to significantly reduce
its reliance on imported oil.16

The Pakistani
government is negotiating participation in the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline projects.17 If
these projects succeed, they will completely fulfill Pakistans energy requirements.
Current plans to extend these projects to India will provide additional revenues from
transit fees. The gas pipelines are also likely to bring India and Pakistan closer
politically and economically.

Pakistan has become
the United States most trusted ally in the global war on terrorism. This war cannot
be won without winning the hearts and minds of the Pakistani populace and denying
terrorists their support base. As Pakistans border with Afghanistan is being
cleansed of terrorist cells, large-scale economic and development projects have been
launched in the tribal areas in an effort to curtail future terrorist activities. The
construction of roads, schools, and hospitals in previously inaccessible regions has
helped bring local inhabitants into the mainstream of national life. This two-pronged
strategy was developed to achieve both the short-term goal of defeating the terrorists and
the long-term objective of eliminating the conditions that foster terrorism. A political
initiative is underway to integrate the Maliks (elders) in this process. Operations by law
enforcement agencies are opening the border region and denying access and support to
terrorists and other miscreants.

Development work and
political engagement in previously inaccessible and unfriendly regions has benefitted the
GWOT. Pakistani security forces have captured many al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists,
including such top leaders as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Abu Zubaydah, and Abu Faraj
al-Libbi.18 The Pakistan Army has killed over 300
terrorists and apprehended approximately 700 terror suspects in the Afghan border region.
Civilian law enforcement agencies have conducted more than 194 raids throughout the
country, resulting in the apprehension of some 573 terrorists. In these efforts the
Pakistani security forces have suffered more casualties than any nation except the United
States. More than 300 soldiers have lost their lives and some 600 have been wounded in
these operations. Through a combination of constitutional reforms, enactment of
anti-terrorist laws, and cooperation with international law enforcement organizations, the
terror suspects involved in such attacks as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade

92/93

Center (WTC), the
assassination of two CIA officials in Virginia, and the bombing of the US Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania were captured and deported to America.19

In addition to its
ongoing campaign against terrorism, Pakistan is in the process of improving its
educational system and increasing the nations literacy rate. Almost half of the
Pakistani population is currently illiterate. Young illiterate boys from poor families,
who either cannot afford schooling or do not have access to a school, are recruited into
small Masjid (mosque) schools or madrassas. Unfortunately, the madrassa system is
generally perceived in a negative light and considered a breeding ground for terrorism.
This perception is not correct. Indeed, madrassas form one of the largest non-government
organizations in the world. These religious schools provide succor to the poor and the
needy. Madrassas provide food, shelter, and education to children whose parents cannot
afford these basics. Education in such schools is generally limited to the tenets of
religion. The Pakistani government neither funds nor exercises control over the curriculum
of these schools and does not monitor the quality of the religious teachers Imams.
These schools are run by local communities and the Imams are hired locally. More than 95
percent of madrassas are politically moderate providing a strong moral foundation for
their students.20 Unfortunately, some madrassas are
controlled by hard-line and militant organizations, including a few with foreign sponsors.
These schools expound extremist views and indoctrinate their students against the greater
society. Although the government has initiated a strict crackdown against extremist
madrassas, it has also developed a thoughtful and comprehensive strategy to bring these
institutions into the mainstream. Steps initiated by the government include monitoring the
recruitment of teachers, provisions for training workshops, government funding, control
over outside sources of funding, audits of organizational accounts, and regular monitoring
and evaluation by the Department of Education. The government has also introduced
standardized subjects in 8,000 Madaris in an effort to bridge the gap between madrassas
and the formal education system. The governments involvement is designed to
strengthen the lines of communication between the madrassas and the government, educate
over 1.5 million students, and help eradicate extremism throughout the country.21

Education reform has
been a major priority of the Pakistan government for the last five years. These reforms
included measures such as the separation of the general, higher, and special education
ministries; provisions for free education through high school; and unprecedented increases
in funding, especially in the sciences and technology. Curriculums are being revised in an
effort to rid them of extremist ideologies and make them compatible with

93/94

international
standards. These revisions are critical to Pakistans efforts to have Pakistani
degrees accepted in the West. The governments endeavors have borne positive results.
The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) for primary schools (ages 5-9) has increased from 72
percent in 2001-02 to 86 percent in 2004-05. The increase of the Metric Level (age 13-14)
in the GER was a moderate 42 to 44 percent. The real impact will be observable in four to
five years when the existing primary-level cohort will reach high school.22 The US government is taking a keen interest in supporting
Pakistans education reforms; having already invested about $100 million. According
to the State Department, the United States has a long-term vision for Pakistans
education system and also plans to support modernization of Pakistans engineering
and high-technology sectors.23

Additionally, the
government of Pakistan has made a commitment to democratization. The government is now in
the hands of elected representatives who serve in a legitimate parliament. An extremely
courageous and ultimately popular step by the leadership has been the transfer of control
of local government to elected representatives. These and other initiatives by President
Musharraf as part of his policy of modernization and enlightened moderation are not only
important for Pakistans long-term goals; they also serve the long-term interests of
the United States related to globalization, eradication of extremism, and democratization.
President Musharrafs sincerity in such matters has attracted critics because he
continues to don his military uniform. He has made it quite clear, however, that his
rationale for not removing the uniform is that the democratic reforms he initiated have
not yet taken root. Suggestions that he resign as President would almost certainly result
in those programs and initiatives not being completed. A majority of the Pakistani people
who have witnessed the improved economic activity and the transition to a less corrupt
environment believe him. They prefer that he continue to oversee the government and
sustain his strategic direction for the modernization of Pakistan. The PEW Global
Attitudes Project in its Gauging National Satisfaction survey reports that:
Pakistan, despite continued conflict in neighboring Afghanistan, also weighs in on
the positive side, with 57 percent of the public content with the countrys current
course, compared with 39 percent who are not. This represents continued improvement over
the 54 percent to 41 percent margin recorded a year ago and a sharp reversal from the 29
to 67 percent balance of dissatisfaction recorded in May 2003.24

Opportunities
for Expanding US-Pakistan Interests

Continued
improvements in the US-Pakistan relationship provide unique opportunities for both
countries. A country of more than 150 million

94/95

people, Pakistan is
the sixth most populous nation on the planet and the second largest in the Muslim world.
Among Muslim countries, it has the most promising and technologically sound population.
English is widely spoken and understood across the country. Located on the mouth of the
Persian Gulf at the strategic junction of the Middle East, Central Asia, China, and South
Asia, Pakistan provides the shortest route for the CARs and China to reach the Arabian
Sea. It also serves as a land-bridge between energy-starved India and the energy-rich CARs
and Iran. Located at the cross-roads of competing economic routes and strategic interests,
Pakistan is also a nuclear power. An important player in the region, it holds a very
respectable position in the 54-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). All
these factors and its proximity to China, India, Afghanistan, and Iran make Pakistan an
extremely lucrative geopolitical ally.

Pakistan was created
through a democratic constitutional process assuring freedom of religion.25 Although it has periodically resorted to the imposition
of martial law and lapsed into military dictatorships, it continues to maintain a
pluralistic character and is moving inexorably toward full democracy. Its non-Muslim
minorities enjoy complete freedom of religious practice and are represented in all tiers
of democratic institutions. Among the 342 representatives in the national assembly of
Pakistan, a minimum of 10 seats are reserved for non-Muslims. Likewise, 73 women currently
serve in the assembly13 above the minimum of 60 prescribed in the constitution. In
addition, non-Muslims have reserved seats in provincial assemblies and local bodies.
Women, besides having genuine equal opportunities in all walks of life, have 33 percent of
the seats in local government reserved for them.26 Today Pakistan serves as a
shinning example of a modern democratic Muslim state.

Given the
aforementioned developments and a strong, if uneven, tradition of US-Pakistan friendship,
Pakistan remains extremely relevant to US national interest on several levels, to include
national security, access to the energy-rich regions of the Middle East and the CARS, and
the politico-economic goals of democratization and globalization.

It is also in
Pakistans national interest to mold the nation into a modern Islamic state capable
of attaining its national goals of economic autonomy, political sovereignty, and
widespread prosperity. As a leading Muslim country, Pakistan has an obvious interest in
countering the growing global perception of a breeding-ground for conflict between the
Western and Islamic worlds. The emergence of a violent, terrorist-based Islamic movement
is as much a threat to Pakistan as to Western countries. If Pakistan is to be successful
in modernization initiatives, it needs to exploit the Wests technology. It also
needs to capitalize on the institutional reforms

95/96

used by established
democracies to eliminate corruption, especially with regard to the accountability of
democratically elected and appointed government officials.

Improving the
Substance and Visibility of
US-Pakistan Cooperation

While the
cooperation between nations has dramatically increased since 9/11, residual distrust has
only been marginally reduced. According to the PEW survey, while 57 percent of Pakistanis
favor the current government policies and 52 percent consider Islamic extremism a threat,
only 23 percent view the United States favorably. Although this is an improvement over the
17 percent reported two years ago, it is still well below acceptable standards.27 What is needed is a deliberate strategy for improving the
US-Pakistan relationship. A concentrated effort to debunk the perception that the
relationship is based on the vested interests of the United States and the power-base of
President Musharraf. It is reassuring that the US government has declared its policy
regarding Pakistan is based on the following five goals:28

 Winning
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

 Nonproliferation
of WMD.

 Promoting
a peaceful Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.

 Improving
the Pakistan-India relationship.

 Promoting
Democracy.

While these goals
appear to focus mainly on security, there are a number of other areas where the United
States and Pakistan can work together to improve their current relationship.

Literacy and
Education

The Pakistan
government, with the financial and technological support of the United States, needs to
improve the regulation of private schools; to include monitoring the qualifications and
selection of its instructors, in addition to a standardizing of curricula. The influence
of ideological extremism needs to be halted at its source and prevented from infecting
Pakistans youth. Pakistan, with continued financial and technological support from
the United States will successfully accomplish this important goal.

A mass literacy
drive needs to be launched, this will require increased funding from the government and
the involvement of relevant NGOs. In the region, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have made
tremendous strides in the eradication of illiteracy. Pakistan certainly could learn from
their experience. The United States needs to visibly contribute to this effort by offering
scholarships to promising young people based on their academic credentials, and

96/97

through the sharing
of new technologies and distributed learning approaches. To be successful, however, all
Pakistani and American efforts need to take into consideration the culture of both nations
and the Islamic ethos. No matter how good the intentions, culturally insensitive
initiatives are likely to be counter-productive, especially if hidden agenda
caveats are attributed to such efforts.

The Pakistan
Millennium Conference on Higher Education, organized in 2002, sought to identify a number
ways to enhance the quality of higher educationthis was certainly a step in the
right direction.29 The conferences recommendations deserve serious
consideration:

 There
is no one right model for achieving quality; therefore universities must be given autonomy
to set their own directions to achieve quality, with some minimal standards set by a
monitoring body. Government control over universities must be eliminated.

 In
order to promote responsible institutional discourse, faculty must be given guaranteed
autonomy to conduct research and debate issues. Institutional autonomy and intellectual
freedom are fundamental imperatives.

 The
financial management system as well as models of accountability of the universities for
using allocated funds should be radically restructured.

 In
the short-term, public funds should be raised by eliciting the support of people who are
widely trusted and reputable. In the long-term, the universities should build credibility
by efficient and visible utilization of donor funds to harness non-governmental fiscal
resources.

 Universities
must undertake initiatives to lower the cost of education by utilizing new technologies.
They should capitalize on the many available opportunities, such as the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) open-courseware initiative to enhance instruction.

Building of
National Institutions

Despite a strong
desire among Pakistanis for an effective democratic order, the nations democratic
governments have persistently failed to perform well primarily due to poor governance. The
weak performance of elected governments has prevented democracy from establishing solid
roots in the country. Every day that these conditions persist serves to reinforce the
opinion that governance within a democratic framework is inherently corrupt and
inefficient. There is a need for immediate and highly visible actions to change this
perception if there is to be any reform at Pakistani institutions. The United States, as
the most established and successful democracy in the world, should assist in developing
Pakistani democratic institutions and the

97/98

education of its
politicians and legislators. In the long-term, such support may constitute Americas
greatest contribution to Pakistan. Other major institutions like the judiciary, police,
tax structure, and state bureaucracy also need reform. Again, an approach embedding sound
policies and processes within the Pakistani bureaucracies need to be consistent with
culture and religion. Nevertheless, an innovative program of US-Pakistan exchanges at
every level of government, including independent assessments of governmental agencies by
combined teams of experts, with follow-up action plans for short- and long-term reforms,
ought to be initiated. The establishment of permanent oversight organizations (inspector
generals, governmental accounting offices) empowered and trained to conduct organizational
assessments and recommend reforms would go a long way toward improving Pakistani
institutions. The United States, with the help of European nations, is already engaged in
reforming important institutions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The same type of investments, at
a fraction of the cost, in Pakistan where there is already a fairly well developed
infrastructure would almost certainly result in success.

Economic
Assistance and Technology Transfer

Although Pakistan
has an extremely promising young population with a fairly large pool of information
technology (IT) experts and nuclear scientists, it is striving to enter the industrial age
and has yet to challenge the information age. Even its modest consumer-based industries
that have continued to grow have come under tremendous pressure as markets are flooded
with cheap Chinese goods. Pakistans economy could be bolstered through direct
foreign investment in the industrial infrastructure or by means of the transfer of crucial
technologies to the manufacturing sector. The United States is in a position where it
could take highly visible and meaningful actions to enhance Pakistans exports to
American markets. Similarly, Pakistan needs to invest in making its industrial output more
competitive on the international market. American involvement in Pakistani economic
development could provide a highly visible means of gaining the confidence of both the
Pakistani people and the international community, bringing added value to the US-Pakistani
relationship.

Kashmir

The Kashmir dispute
between India and Pakistan has remained unresolved; it provides both risks and
opportunities for the US-Pakistan relationship. The dispute has absorbed huge amounts of
Indian and Pakistani resources over the last half-century, and it continues to bleed both
countries

98/99

of valuable
resources that could be better applied to economic and social programs. India insists on a
bilateral resolution of the dispute, however, this is unrealistic from the Pakistani
viewpoint since the resolution would entail the ceding of disputed territories.
Involvement of the international community, especially the United States, could help
promote an early resolution of the dispute. The dispute has worked a severe economic
hardship on Pakistan because the country is compelled to maintain a large military, far
greater than normal regional security threats require. Further, the continuing insurgency
in the Indian-Held Kashmir (IHK) has aroused a militancy among the Muslim youth. These
young people are not only motivated to fight the Indian occupation forces in IHK, but are
further inclined to take up arms against perceived injustices anywhere in the world. Fair
resolution of the dispute would help quell this militancy among the youth and would go a
long way in reducing popular support for such behavior. The United States should lead an
effort leveraging Indias economic dependency on America. This effort should focus on
the United Nations resolution based on granting the right of self-determination to the
people of Kashmir. To ensure future security between the two nuclear rivals, America could
enter a trilateral security arrangement designed to enhance nuclear command and control
arrangements in South Asia. Perhaps, no other US action would receive so positive a
response from both the Pakistani populace and the international community as the peaceful
resolution of this divisive issue.30 Even incremental progress would receive
regional visibility and dispel the perception that the US-Pakistani relationship is
Musharraf-dependent or War-on-Terrorism centric. Moreover, progress in resolving this
security issue would allow for the reduction of Pakistani armed forces, in addition to
freeing up significant forces for security operations against terrorists.

Global War on
Terrorism and Military Cooperation

Military-to-military
cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has stood the test of time and has
developed into a close relationship. The Pakistan military is a well-trained and highly
motivated force; it has played an important role in national decisionmaking. Additionally,
the bulk of the Pakistani military equipment is of US origin. Also, many senior military
officers have attended professional courses in US military schools and have enjoyed
positive exposure to American culture. Despite this long military relationship, the US
military recently lost touch with the Pakistan armed forces. During a meeting with some
middle-ranking Pakistani Army officers prior to 9/11, the Commander in Chief of US Central
Command was surprised to find that none of the Pakistani officers present had attended a
US military school. He then re-

99/100

marked that the
United States had lost a relationship with a complete generation of Pakistani military
officers due to the Pressler sanctions. At that time, he made a commitment to correcting
that mistake. Consequently, literally hundreds of Pakistani military officers have
interacted and trained with their US counterparts over the past five years. Certainly, the
training of Pakistani military personnel with the US military should be maintained,
however, there are areas for improvement:

 Operations against terrorists are more successful when
conducted by means of timely information sharing between US and Pakistani agencies; while
still respecting one anothers sovereignty and values. Many of the top leaders of al
Qaeda have been captured or killed by Pakistani security forces or law enforcement
agencies based on information provided by US intelligence. Conversely, on some occasions
US forces have acted unilaterally inside Pakistani territory. These incidents, which have
mostly failed to achieve their intended objectives, often produced civilian casualties and
loss of property resulting in intense politico-diplomatic backlashes. For example, on 13
January 2006, 13 innocent people (3 men, 5 women, and 5 children) were killed in four
houses in Pakistan by a US air or missile attack.31 Besides the loss of
innocent lives, the incident resulted in a diplomatic rebuke by the Pakistan government,
public unrest in Pakistan, and a plethora of problems for Pakistani security forces
operating in the area. America should not act unilaterally with disregard for the
territorial integrity of an ally; violation of sovereignty does not serve the long-term
interests of either nation. Further, such acts have a negligible impact on the easily
replaceable leadership of al Qaeda. Information-sharing has produced the best results and
should be relied upon in the future.

 The
United States needs to provide Pakistan forces with technologically advanced
equipmentincluding sensors, surveillance and acquisition means, telecommunication
equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles for monitoring movements and conducting search and
destroy missions in the border areas.

 Through
active socioeconomic measures, Pakistan needs to bring its tribal areas into the
mainstream of the national political structure, thereby eliminating terrorist sanctuaries.
The US government and NGOs can provide much needed financial and technological assistance
to Pakistan in an effort to bolster regional economies.

 Pakistan
can enhance jointness among its military services, benefiting from the rich US experience.

 The
US could, on a limited basis, allow the licensed production of US military equipment in
Pakistan.

100/01

Conclusion

Pakistans
support to the United States in the war on terrorism is buttressed by a consensus from
within the Pakistani nation and actively led by President Musharraf. Liberated through a
democratic process, Pakistan has strong traditions of pluralistic attitudes in religion,
politics, and freedom of speech that are compatible with US values and strategic
objectives. Although the events of 9/11 have served as a catalyst for bringing America and
Pakistan closer, US policy with regard to Pakistan is not limited to the Global War on
Terrorism. Although both nations have their respective national interests and security
concerns, most long-term US objectives are shared by Pakistan. Importantly, there are no
areas of significant divergence regarding the national interests of both nations.

Historically, some
issues and isolated incidents have led to mutual distrust. Both countries have worked
through these and acknowledged major areas of coincident interests, deliberately pursuing
a closer relationship for the benefit of all. Nevertheless, there are additional
opportunities for improving this relationship. An improved US-Pakistani relationship will
solidify Pakistan as a reliable regional partner and strengthen the overall conduct of the
global war on terrorism, further stabilizing a region that at one time was fraught with
danger.

6. There were also
other reasons meriting Pakistani support to the Taliban. The Afghan civil war had two
distinct groupings based on their historic affinity: the Taliban, who were mostly Sunni
Pushtoons, had actively fought for the liberation of Afghanistan from the Soviets and had
been supported by the West, the Arab countries and Pakistan; the Northern Alliance was a
collection of various minority ethnic and sectarian groups living in the northern and
western parts of Afghanistan, their support base being in the Soviet Union, Iran, and
India. Peaceful Afghanistan was also a strategic necessity for Pakistan due to
Pakistans threat perception vis a vis India and Afghanistans role as a state
capable of providing strategic depth. The Taliban held fundamentalist religious ideology,
but were extremely honest and, at the time, were the only hope for bringing peace to the
war-torn country.

7. Tommy Franks, American
Soldier (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), pp. 214-15. It is generally
thought that due to lack of engagement with Pakistan, the US did not understand
Pakistans economic hardships and compulsions vis a vis Afghanistan. However, the
conversation between General Tommy Franks, then Commander in Chief of the US Central
Command, and George Tenet, former Director of the CIA, before the formers visit to
Pakistan in 2001, revealed the US understood the situation in Afghanistan and reflects an
understanding of the ground realities of the time: As a practical matter, Pakistan
will continue an accommodation with the Taliban until we are able to offer a better
alternative. Musharraf is between a rock and a hard placeIndia and the Pressler
Amendment . . . Afghanistan offers the Pakistanis what we call
strategic depth. Thats battle space to maneuver and support Pakistani
combat forces in the event of another war with India. Tenet responded,
Thats what my people tell me also. In his meeting with President
Musharraf, General Franks was told: We have no choice but to work with the
Taliban . . . I can assure you that we dislike their extremism, but they
brought stability to Afghanistan and ended the bloodshed after the Soviets left. We must
have stability on at

101/02

least one border. .
. . The Taliban is isolated. We have some influence with them, but we dont control
them. I will do my best to help, but we need help from the international community. . . .
Pakistan would like to help with the problem of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. If we can
increase our influence with the Taliban, it is possible they would agree to expel him to
some neutral state for either exile or to be put on trial. General Franks then said
he could not grant concessions, but indicated that he would carry the message to
Washington.

18. Christina Rocca,
Assistant Secretary of the State for South Asian Affairs, Statement before the House
International Affairs Committee for Asia and the Pacific, 14 June 2005,
http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/2005/47892.htm.

25. The introduction
to the National Assembly of Pakistan starts with these words: Pakistan was created
entirely through a democratic and constitutional struggle. Islam is the anchor-sheet of
Pakistan and democracy is ingrained deep into the Muslim psyche. Islam permits no
hero worship. Pakistans record of parliamentary democracy may be
checkered but its return to this form after each pause and break more than vindicates the
fact that democratic traditions are deep-rooted in Pakistans polity,
http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/.

30. Although beyond
the purview of this article, following are a few thoughts on resolution of this long
standing dispute, which has aptly been termed as the nuclear flash point: US mediation can
greatly facilitate PakistanIndia negotiations keeping them focused. The position
that USA cannot mediate between these two countries is fallacious, because the US has
mediated between them on two recent occasions, during the Kargil conflict in 1999 and the
standoff in 2002. In the short term, the emphasis has to be on reduction of forces on both
sides of the Line of Control and bringing peace to the people of Indian-Held Kashmir. For
ultimate resolution of the dispute, the model of entire Kashmir being one constituency for
plebiscite can be modified to allow self determination on regional basis and a realignment
of the border to accommodate the wishes of the people of Kashmir. This would not only
allow self determination for the Kashmiri people, but also allow face saving to both
Pakistan and India. Management of the dispute through purely bilateral measures, without
substantive external efforts for its resolution is unlikely to be successful.

Brigadier General Gilani is a
field artillery officer currently commanding a brigade in the Pakistani Army. His
assignments have included duties as a brigade operations officer and served as an
instructor at the School of Artillery and the Pakistan Military Academy. He is a graduate
of the Pakistan Military Academy; the Army Command and Staff College in Camberley, U.K.;
and the Pakistan Armed Forces War Course. He holds a Master of War Studies degree from
Quaid Azam University in Islamabad, and is a 2006 graduate of the US Army War College.