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LEGAL MEMORANDUM 02-265
TO: ALL JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
ALL CRIMINAL COURT CLERKS
FROM: PATRICIA W. GRIFFIN
CHIEF MAGISTRATE
RE: 1) DUE PROCESS
2) REINSTATEMENT OF CHARGES IN ANOTHER COURT
DATE: MAY 16, 2002
________________________________________________________________________
A recent Delaware Supreme Court case, State v. Pruitt, 2001 WL 1830709 (Del. Supr.) highlights two points of importance to Justice of the Peace Court clerks and judges. These are:
1) If the prosecution seeks to reinstate charges against a defendant, the Court must:
a. Notify the defendant that there has been a motion to reinstate the charges; and
b. Provide the defendant with the opportunity to request a hearing on the motion to reinstate the charges.
2) If charges are reinstated, the defendant must be given prior notice of the hearing on the reinstated charges even if the hearing is scheduled to coincide with a previously scheduled hearing on other charges.
The case is discussed in more detail below. You may find a copy of the opinion at HYPERLINK http://courts.state.de.us/supreme/ordsops/204-2001.pdf http://courts.state.de.us/supreme/ordsops/204-2001.pdf
BACKGROUND
Pruitt was arrested on several traffic charges (including Driving Under the Influence, Driving While License Suspended or Revoked, and Disregarding a Red Light) as well as possession of marijuana. The arresting officer issued two summonses, one for the traffic charges, and the other for the marijuana charge. The two summonses were issued for different appearance dates. When Pruitt appeared for the first date, which was for the traffic charges, the Court could not find any paperwork on the charges and ordered him to return the following day. The next day, the paperwork still could not be located and the judge dismissed the traffic complaints. When the arresting officer learned of the dismissal, he informed the clerk that he had filed the summons and complaint with the Court. The clerk then found the paperwork for the traffic charge filed with that for the marijuana charge.
When the judge learned that the paperwork had been misfiled, the judge reinstated the traffic charges and reset the hearing for the date already scheduled for the marijuana charge. No notice was given to Pruitt of either the motion to reinstate the charges or the fact that the charges had been reinstated and a hearing scheduled. (The bail sheet stated the case had been reopened upon the arresting officers motion.) Pruitt did not appear at the hearing. Thereafter, the Attorney Generals office entered a nolle prosequi on all of the charges and brought them by indictment in the Superior Court. The Superior Court dismissed the charges for unnecessary delay pursuant to Superior Court Rule 48(b).
THE ACTIONS OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT
As discussed below, the Supreme Court found due process violations in the Justice of the Peace Courts handling of the traffic charges.
1. The ex parte application to reinstate and de facto reconsideration of the dismissal.
The officers request to reinstate the charges, the Supreme Court said, constituted an ex parte communication between the officer and the justice of the peace and led to a de facto reconsideration of the Courts earlier dismissal. That reconsideration was undertaken without holding a hearing and thus, deprived Pruitt of due process because he was not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard. As the Court stated:
A decision by any trial court to reinstate charges that it had previously dismissed may come only after all parties have been given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Indeed, our courts have held that appropriate notice of a judicial action and an adequate opportunity to be heard are the essential elements of the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This protection includes the right to receive notice and to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner before the deprivation of a protected interest. Although the courts maintain some flexibility in the manner by which they protect the rights of parties to present an argument, this Court has held that, at a minimum, due process requires some form of notice and a hearing [T]he police officers ex parte communication of his application to reinstate the traffic charges led to a de facto reconsideration of the courts earlier dismissal. The fact that the Justice of the Peace Court both failed to provide notice to Pruitt and based its decision on this ex parte application are prejudicial to Pruitt and standing alone constitute a due process violation.
Pruitt, 2001 WL 1830709, WL op. at 2-3.
2. The scheduling of the reopened traffic charges without notice to Pruitt.
The Supreme Court further emphasized that the scheduling of the reopened traffic charges at the time already scheduled for the arraignment on the marijuana charge, without notice to Pruitt also denied him due process. The Court stated:
In addition, the mere fact that the Justice of the Peace placed the reopened traffic charges on the docket to coincide with Pruitts previously scheduled arraignment on the marijuana charge does not satisfy a courts due process obligation. In Tsipouras, we held that an appropriate notice must be reasonably calculated not only to apprise a party of the pendency of an action, but of its nature as well. In that case, the notice sent to a husband of a hearing on his former wifes Motion & Affidavit to Modify Custody Order was not meaningful because it made no mention of a pending contempt charge that the court also intended to address. This reasoning comports with the United States Supreme Courts holding that a State must give notice sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and that notice must also set forth with particularity the alleged misconduct in order to comply with due process requirements. In this instance, the failure of the Justice of the Peace to inform Pruitt that he had reinstated the traffic charges is not rendered harmless by the fact that he ordered them combined with earlier notice to appear for a mere arraignment on the marijuana charge. For these reasons, we find that the Superior Court judge correctly determined that the Justice of the Peaces action rested on a constitutionally questionable foundation
Pruitt, 2001 WL 1830709, WL op. at 3 (emphasis added).
Thus, if charges need to be reinstated, the Court should provide notice to the defendant that it is considering reinstating the charges and an opportunity should be given to the defendant to contest the potential reinstatement. If requested by the defendant, a hearing should be held to determine whether the charges should be reinstated. If it is determined that the charges should be reinstated, the defendant must be given adequate notice of the hearing on the charges so that he or she can adequately prepare a defense.
THE SUPERIOR COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE CASE UNDER RULE 48(b)
The Supreme Court upheld the Superior Courts dismissal of the case unnecessary delay pursuant to Rule 48(b). (Delay on the part of the State is required for such a dismissal and the Court found that the State had, by nolle prossing the charges in the Justice of the Peace Court and reinstituting them in the Superior Court, compounded the delay created by the dismissal and reinstatement of the charges in the Justice of the Peace Court.) In so doing, the Court expressed concern that the State had attempted to cure a due process violation in the Justice of the Peace Court by nolle prossing the charges there and proceeding by indictment in the Superior Court. This action, the Court said, manipulated the judicial process to Pruitts detriment. In addition, the Court indicated that permitting this type of action would undermine the inherent powers of the Justice of the Peace Court discussed in State v. Guthman, 619 A. 2d 1175 (Del. 1993) by allowing the State to negate a decision of the Justice of the Peace Court and renew the case in another court without the weight of the Justice of the Peace Courts unfavorable decision. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that:
[W]e find that the Superior Court judge acted properly and within the bounds of his discretion when he dismissed the charges against Pruitt under rule 48(b). Although we may initially attribute the delay experienced by Pruitt to a clerical error in the Justice of the Peace Court, the facts clearly support the Superior Court judges conclusion. We agree that when the State entered the nolle prosequis on the traffic charges, the State manipulated the judicial process with the intent to remedy the error in the office of the Justice of the Peace to the substantial prejudice of the defendant. The fair and efficient administration of criminal justice cannot be adequately provided for when the Attorney General may unilaterally and arbitrarily remove a case to a court with concurrent jurisdiction in a manner that subverts the authority of the lower court to the defendants prejudice. We conclude that the substantial interest the public maintains in the speedy, fair and orderly administration of justice is inconsistent with this practice. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Pruitt, 2001 WL 1830709, WL op. at 5.
NOTE: THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS ROLE WITH REGARD TO
NOLLE PROSEQUIS
Although not discussed in the Pruitt opinion, it should be noted that under the circumstances of the Pruitt case, the Justice of the Peace Court had no authority to prevent the prosecuting agency from nolle prossing the case. Pursuant to Justice of the Peace Court Rule 48(a), the Courts consent to a nolle prosequi by the prosecuting agency is only required when a plea of guilty or nolo contendere has been entered or a finding of guilt has been made. Thus, the Justice of the Peace Court cannot prevent a prosecuting agency from entering a nolle prosequi earlier in a case. However, when the prosecuting agency nolle prosses charges in the Justice of the Peace Court and reinstitutes them in a higher court, the higher court may take such action as it finds appropriate under the circumstances.
PWG/crm
cc: Honorable E. Norman Veasey
Honorable Joseph T. Walsh
Honorable Henry duPont Ridgely
Honorable Alex J. Smalls
Honorable Vincent J. Poppiti
Honorable Alicia B. Howard
Thomas W. Nagle
Anna A. Lewis
H. John Betts
Larry Sipple
Law Libraries: New Castle County, Kent County, Sussex County,
Widener University School of Law
The Court further stated that the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court was not justified under Justice of the Peace Court Criminal Rule 36 which permits a justice of the peace to correct clerical errors without notice. The Court found the rule to be inapplicable in this case because [r]ule 36 is intended only as a tool for the court to correct clerical errors appearing on the face of the record to reflect the courts previously announced intent. It is not appropriately invoked in any case in which substantive rights have yet to be determined. Pruitt, 2001 WL 1830709, WL op. at fn. 3. Furthermore, the Court stated that even when Rule 36 is properly used, it does not permit the Court to correct errors, without notice, when notice would be otherwise required in order to afford due process.
Pruitt could have made the argument at his hearing in the Justice of the Peace Court that he had been denied due process and the justice of the peace could have dismissed the traffic charges on that basis.
If the Justice of the Peace Court had dismissed the charges at the hearing on due process grounds, the State would then have had to appeal under 10 Del.C. Ї 9902.
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