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Issue 190

May 15, 2013

José Azel*

Raúl
Castro plots his endgame**

The succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro, programmed since the
early days of the Cuban revolution, was efficient, effective and seamless.
Gen. Castro now is orchestrating his own succession, but this one lacks
the historical legitimizing elements of the 1959 revolution.

The recent appointment of Miguel Diaz-Canel, a 52-year-old party apparatchik
factotum, as first vice president of the Council of State places him
in line to succeed Raúl Castro in that state body. This, however,
is not equivalent to being No. 2 in the regime as the international
media seem to have concluded.

Article 5 of the Cuban constitution makes it clear that the Communist
Party is “the superior leading force of the society and the state.”
The 15-member Politburo of the Communist Party remains headed by Raúl
Castro as first secretary, and by 82-year-old Machado Ventura as second
secretary.

It is not often understood that Raúl Castro leads Cuba not because
he is president of the Council of State, but because he is first secretary
of the Communist Party and Fidel’s brother. Under the Cuban governing
succession scheme, the military-dominated Politburo would recommend
Cuba’s next leader.

The succession plot thickens when we consider that constitutionally,
the president of the Council of State is also the supreme chief of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces. Cuban history offers no tradition of military
subordination to civilian rule. With Raúl Castro gone, it is
difficult to envision old comandantes like Ramiro Valdes and three-star
generals of the Politburo obediently offering military allegiance and
saluting in subordination to a civilian bureaucrat like Diaz-Canel.
This comportment of unchallenged civilian command of the armed forces
is not in the Cuban memes (cultural genes).

When thinking about change in Cuba, it is essential to keep in mind
that Cuba’s history for the past half century is that of the Castro
brothers and their ideas. Raúl Castro’s inner circle is
not made up of closet democrats waiting for an opportune moment to put
into practice their long-suppressed Jeffersonian ideals. Their governing
modality is ontologically inseparable from their ideology. In a symbiotic
relationship, authoritarianism engenders a corrupt oligarchy, and that
oligarchy profits from the continuation of corrupt authoritarianism.

Behind the Diaz-Canel designation — let’s make sure we
do not label it an election — is a venal plot of political maquillage.

The role of the Cuban military in the economy is extensive and pervasive,
with the military managerial elite controlling over 60 percent of the
economy. Therefore, from a longer-term strategic perspective the critical
question is: What follows when the Raúl era comes to an end,
leaving the generals in control of both the Politburo and the economy?

When enterprises are state-owned and managed, the military-officers-turned-business-executives
enjoy the privileges of an elite ruling class. Their standard of living
is higher, they move into better homes, etc. But these benefits are
minuscule when compared with the opportunities to gain significant wealth
by owning the enterprises under their control. The military elite understands
that managing government-owned enterprises offers only limited benefits
— owning the enterprises is far more lucrative.

In the years to come, the military elite will be highly motivated to
arrange a manipulated privatization of the economy in order to monetize
their positions. Alas, this corrupt mockery of privatization ends with
the generals and colonels as the new Cuban “captains of industry.”

This, however, requires support from the international investment community,
and for that, the Cuban leadership must appear willing to make changes
in the political realm. Enter the Diaz-Canel designation. Surely, he
is a capable, obedient and disciplined party loyalist and fully aware
of the dire fate of those civilians who preceded him in prominent positions
when their loyalty was questioned e.g., Aldana, Lage, Robaina, Perez
Roque.

In the Cuban governing madhouse, Gen. Castro is seeking regime continuity
presenting a façade of political lawfulness that will enable
his generals and family to monetize their loyalty. The military will
oversee a hegemonic party system offering a patina of political legitimacy
for the benefit of the international community.

It is not important who fills the civilian poster-face roles. After
all, Roman Emperor Caligula, in his insanity or perversion, sought to
make his favorite horse into a Roman consul to show that a horse could
perform a senator’s duties.

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**Previously published in The Miami Herald on
April 27, 2013.

_________________________________________________

*José Azel is a Senior Research
Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University
of Miami. He is the author of the recently published book, Mañana
in Cuba.