In State v. Sandoval, the WA Court of Appeals held that an access device (credit card) need not be able to obtain something of value at the time it is found on a defendant. The access device need only be able to obtain something of value at the time it was last in the possession of its lawful owner.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Ms. Sandoval entered into an agreement with a car dealership. The agreement allowed Sandoval to take home and use a vehicle for three days to determine whether she wanted to purchase it. After three days, the dealership lost contact with Sandoval and made unsuccessful attempts to retrieve the vehicle. The dealership reported the vehicle stolen.

Eventually, the police found Sandoval and her husband in the stolen vehicle at the address
listed in the agreement. The police arrested Sandoval for possession of a stolen vehicle and
searched her incident to that arrest. In Sandoval’s purse, the police found a credit card with somebody else’s name on it, Sandoval’s sister’s birth certificate, and a pipe with methamphetamine residue.

The credit card had been stolen in early February. At that time, the card was active and could have been used to buy goods. Shortly thereafter, the card’s owner cancelled the card.

At trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of possession of stolen property in the second degree. The court told the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the stolen property was an access device.

The court defined an access device as, “any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used alone or in conjunction with another access device to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of value. In the same instruction, the court stated, “The phrase ‘can be used’ refers to the status of the access device when it was last in possession of its lawful owner, regardless of its status at a later time.

The jury convicted Sandoval on all charges except identity theft in the second degree. The
State dismissed that charge.

Sandoval appealed on the argument that an access device must be able to obtain something of value at the time it is found on a defendant, not at the time it was last in the possession of its lawful owner.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals reasoned that RCW 9A.56.010(1) defines “access device” as any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used alone or in conjunction with another access device to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument.

Here, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s definition containing the phrase “can be
used,” a phrase which is not statutorily defined. It reasoned that under State v. Schloredt, it was irrelevant whether a victim cancelled his or her account prior to a defendant’s arrest in determining whether stolen credit cards were “access devices” under the statute. Similar to the facts in Schloredt, it was irrelevant that the credit cards Ms. Sandoval possessed were cancelled by its lawful owner.

Also, the Court of Appeals rejected Sandoval’s argument that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to request a jury instruction for unwitting possession as an affirmative defense for her possession of a controlled substance charge.

The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel’s errors, the results of the proceedings would have differed.

Here, the Court reasoned that Sandoval testified that she obtained the credit card and methamphetamine pipe at the same time, and both items were found on Sandoval in the same location. Therefore, if the jury found that the State carried its burden in showing beyond a reasonable doubt that Sandoval knowingly possessed the credit card, then it is doubtful that Sandoval could have carried her burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she unwittingly possessed the methamphetamine pipe.

“Thus, we conclude that it was not reasonably probable that the jury would have found Sandoval not guilty of possession of a controlled substance if they had been instructed on the unwitting possession defense.”

Therefore, the Court reasoned that Sandoval was not prejudiced by her counsel’s failure to request the instruction. Because Sandoval has not met her burden to prove prejudice, her ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member are charged with a crime. Hiring a competent and effective defense attorney is the first and best step toward getting justice.

In 2012, A.Z. lived with her older brother and her mother in Anacortes. All parties were addicted to heroin, methamphetamine or both. A.Z. was using heroin and methamphetamine on a daily basis during 2012.

In January 2012, A.Z.’s mother introduced A.Z. to 40-year-old Marc Daniel McKee during a “drug deal” for methamphetamine. McKee started spending a lot of time with the family and supplied them with methamphetamine. They would often “get high” together. At the end of June, McKee left to go to Alaska for work.

When McKee returned two months later, he immediately contacted A.Z. McKee told A.Z. he had heroin and methamphetamine. McKee and A.Z. spent three days together at a Burlington motel using the drugs and engaging in consensual sex.

Eventually, A.Z’s mother confronted McKee about the sexual encounters between A.Z. and McKee. Bringing another male with her A.Z.’s mother confronted McKee at a hotel room, beat him up, took his cell phone, and pulled A.Z out of the room. Later, A.Z.’s mother scrolled through the phone. She found pictures and videos of her daughter A.Z tied naked to a bed as well as videos of McKee and A.Z. having sex.

After A.Z.’s mother looked at the video clips and photographs on the cell phone, she contacted the Mount Vernon Police Department. On October 30, A.Z.’s mother met with Detective Dave Shackleton. A.Z.’s mother described the video clips and photographs she saw on the cell phone. She left the cell phone with Detective Shackleton. Later, A.Z.’s mother contacted Detective Shackleton to report that J.P., another minor female, told her that McKee gave J.P. drugs in exchange for sex. Brickley obtained a restraining order prohibiting McKee from contacting A.Z.

Application for a Search Warrant

On October 31, Detective Jerrad Ely submitted an application and affidavit (Affidavit) in support of probable cause to obtain a warrant to search McKee’s cell phone to investigate the crimes of “Sexual Exploitation of a Minor RCW 9.68A.040” and “Dealing in Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct RCW 9.68A.050.” The court issued a search warrant.

The warrant allowed the police to obtain evidence from the cell phone described as an LG cell phone with model VX9100 currently being held at the Mount Vernon Police Department for the following items wanted:

The search warrant authorizes the police to conduct a “physical dump” of the memory of
the cell phone for examination. On November 7, 2012, the court filed a “Receipt of Execution of Search Warrant.” The Receipt of Execution of Search Warrant states the police conducted a “Cellebrite Dump” of the cell phone on November 6. Cellebrite software obtains all information saved on the cell phone as well as deleted information and transfers the data from the cell phone to a computer.

Criminal Charges

The State charged McKee with three counts of Possession of Depictions of Minors Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the first Degree in violation of RCW 9.68A.070(1) based on the three cell phone video clips, one count of Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct in the Second Degree in violation of RCW 9.68A.070(2) based on the cell phone photographs, one count of Commercial Aex Abuse of J.P. as a minor in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, three counts of Distribution of Methamphetamine and/or Heroin to a person under age 18 in violation of RCW 69.50.406(1) and .401(2), and one count of Violation of a No-Contact Order in violation of RCW 26.50.110(1).

Motion to Suppress

McKee filed a motion to suppress the evidence the police seized from his cell phone. McKee asserted the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement to describe with particularity the “things to be seized.” McKee argued the warrant allowed the police to search an “overbroad list of items” unrelated to the identified crimes under investigation. McKee also argued probable cause did not support issuing a search warrant of the cell phone for the crime of dealing in depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. The court found the allegations in the Affidavit supported probable cause that McKee committed the crimes of sexual exploitation of a minor and dealing in depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The court concluded the citation to the criminal statutes established particularity and the search warrant was not overbroad.

At trial, the jury found McKee not guilty of distribution of methamphetamine and/or heroin. The jury found McKee guilty as charged on all other counts.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.

The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was adopted in response to indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants.’

“The problem posed by the general warrant is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” said the Court. “The Fourth Amendment
addresses the problem by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized . . .

The court further reasoned that by limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and would not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit.

“The degree of specificity required varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the types of items,” said the Court. “The advent of devices such as cell phones that store vast amounts of personal information makes the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment that much more important.” The Court also quoted language from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Riley v. California and the WA Supreme Court’s State v. Samilia; both cases strongly supporting the notion that cell phones and the information contained therein are private affairs because they may contain intimate details about individuals’ lives.

“Here, the warrant cites and identifies the crimes under investigation but does not use the language in the statutes to describe the data sought from the cell phone,” said the Court. “The warrant lists the crimes under investigation on page one but separately lists the “Items Wanted” on page two.” Consequently, the Court reasoned that the description of the “Items Wanted” was overbroad and allowed the police to search and seize lawful data when the warrant could have been made more particular.

Furthermore, the Court held that the warrant in this case was not carefully tailored to the justification to search and was not limited to data for which there was probable cause. The warrant authorized the police to search all images, videos, documents, calendars, text messages, data, Internet usage, and “any other electronic data” and to conduct a “physical dump” of “all of the memory of the phone for examination.”

“The language of the search warrant clearly allows search and seizure of data without regard to whether the data is connected to the crime,” said the Court. “The warrant gives the police the right to search the contents of the cell phone and seize private information with no temporal or other limitation.” As a result, reasoned the Court, there was no limit on the topics of information for which the police could search. Nor did the warrant limit the search to information generated close in time to incidents for which the police had probable cause:

“The warrant allowed the police to search general categories of data on the cell phone with no objective standard or guidance to the police executing the warrant. The language of the search warrant left to the discretion of the police what to seize.”

With that, the Court of Appeals held the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reversed and dismissed the four convictions of Possession of Depictions of a Minor Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct.

My opinion? For the most part, courts look dis favorably on the searches of people’s homes, cars, phones, etc., unless the probable cause for the search is virtually overwhelming, and/or an emergency exists which would spoil the evidence if it was not gathered quickly; and/or a search warrant exists. Even when search warrants are drafted and executed, they must be particular to the search. In other words, law enforcement can’t expect that a general, non-specific search warrant is going to win the day for them and allow a fishing expedition to take place.

Here, the Court of Appeals correctly followed the law. In this case, limiting the search to the crimes cited on the first page of the warrant was insufficient. The descriptions of what to be seized must be made more particular by using the precise statutory language to describe the materials sought.

Please contact my office if you, a friend or family member’s person, home, vehicle or cell phone was searched by police and evidence was seized. The search may have been unlawfully conducted in violation of your Constitutional rights.

InState v. Yelovich, the WA Court of Appeals held that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property when (1) the interference with the property occurs when the defendant was not present, (2) the interference has been completed and the property is no longer in the owner’s possession, and (3) the property has been removed from an area within the owner’s control.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Assault & Arrest

Defendant Yelovich and his ex-girlfriend De Armond dated for several years before breaking up. A domestic violence no-contact order was in place that prevented Yelovich from contacting De Armond. According to Yelovich, on the morning of June 7, 2015, he was at his son’s house packing boxes in the garage and moving them to his car. While he was working, Yelovich left several items unattended in his car, which had a broken passenger-side window. One of the items was a cell phone. As Yelovich was taking a box to his car, he caught a glimpse of someone walking down the street. At that time, he could not tell who the person was.

When he reached his car, he noticed that his cell phone and other items were missing.
Yelovich walked to the middle of the street and saw that the person in the street was De
Armond. De Armond was repeatedly turning around and looking back toward Yelovich.
Yelovich immediately believed that she had taken his cell phone.

Yelovich got into his car and chased after De Armond. He drove to the end of the road a
few blocks away and turned the corner before encountering De Armond. He parked his car, got out, and demanded that she return his phone. Yelovich knew at that point that he was violating the no-contact order. But he believed that the action was necessary before De Armond disappeared with his phone.

Yelovich grabbed De Armond’s purse strap and attempted to pull the purse from her, believing that the cell phone was in the purse. De Armond resisted, holding tightly to her purse. In the struggle, De Armond fell to the ground. After a bystander intervened, law enforcement officers arrived and arrested Yelovich.

The State charged Yelovich with violating the no-contact order. The information alleged
that Yelovich had assaulted De Armond, making the violation a felony under RCW
26.50.110(4).

Trial and Conviction

At trial, the witnesses testified to the facts recited above. Yelovich proposed a jury instruction that included both defense of property and self-defense components. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that a defense of property instruction did not apply because Yelovich was not using force to prevent the cell phone from being taken; he was trying to recover the cell phone that was no longer in his possession.

A jury convicted Yelovich of the felony contact order violation. Yelovich appeals his
conviction.

COURT’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

In short, the Court of Appeals disagreed with Yelovich’s argument that the trial court erred by refusing to give a defense of property jury instruction.

“Yelovich asserted as a defense that he was justified in using force against De Armond because she had taken his cell phone,” said the Court. It reasoned, however, that Yelovich’s own testimony established that he used force in an attempt to recover the cell phone after De Armond allegedly had taken it and had left the immediate area, not to prevent De Armond from taking the cell phone in the first instance. “The issue here is to what extent a defendant can rely on the defense of property as a defense when he or she uses force to recover property that already has been taken and is no longer in his or her possession,” said the Court.

The Court further reasoned that the plain language of the “Use of Force” Statute RCW 9A.16.020(3) establishes that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property after the interference with the property has been completed.

First, the property owner can use force only if he or she is about to be injured. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, the owner no longer is about to be injured; he or she has been injured,” said the Court.

Second, the property owner can use force only in preventing or attempting to prevent
the interference. An action taken to prevent interference must occur before the interference has been completed. Defense of property by definition is defensive rather than offensive. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, the owner’s use of force is to recover the property, not to prevent the interference,” said the Court.

Third, the property owner can use force only if the property is lawfully in his or her
possession. “Once the interference with the property has been completed, another person has obtained possession of the property and the owner necessarily no longer has possession,” said the Court.

“Based on the language of RCW 9A.16.020(3) and relevant case law, we hold that an owner of property cannot use force to defend that property when (1) the interference with the property occurs when the defendant was not present, (2) the interference has been completed and the property is no longer in the owner’s possession, and (3) the property has been removed from an area within the owner’s control.”

The Court reasoned that here, application of this three part test and the statutory language show that a defense of property instruction was not appropriate. First, Yelovich was not present at his car when De Armond allegedly removed the cell phone. He discovered that the cell phone was gone only after it already had been taken. Second, at that point De Armond had completed the alleged taking and had possession of the phone. Third, De Armond had left the area of Yelovich’s control – his car – and was a few blocks away. Therefore, the undisputed evidence shows that De Armond’s theft of Yelovich’s cell phone, if it occurred, already had been completed when Yelovich chased after De Armond and accosted her. Yelovich was attempting to recover the cell phone, not to prevent its theft.

The Court furthe rreasoned that Yelovich was not about to be injured when he accosted De Armond; he already had been injured through the loss of his cell phone. He was not attempting to prevent a theft; the theft already had occurred. And Yelovich no longer had possession of the cell phone; the phone allegedly was in De Armond’s possession.

“Therefore, defense of property under RCW 9A.16.020(3) cannot apply and there was no evidence to support Yelovich’s other proposed instruction,” said the Court.

So, people already were allowed to watch and record police in Seattle. But the council’s vote means the rights of police observers are now recognized in city law.

According to Beekman, the ordinance says officers should assume members of the public are observing and possibly recording their work at all times. Councilmember Herbold initially proposed the change last year, pointing to high-profile shootings that was recorded by bystanders.

Across the country, smartphones are helping regular people hold their police departments accountable. But people watching, recording and criticizing officers have in some instances been arrested, according to a council memo.

My opinion? Wonderful! I’ve had many Clients complain that their attempts to record interactions with police result in their cameras being confiscated and being slapped with charges of Obstructing and Resisting police.

I’ve said it once, and I’ll say it again: recording interactions between police and citizens makes everyone behave better and shows proof of what really happened. Kudos to the Seattle City Council.

David Novick and Lisa Maunu began dating in December 2013. Novick bought her a new mobile phone on March 11, 2014, and set it up for her. Unbeknownst to Maunu, Novick installed an application called Mobile Spy on Maunu’s new phone. The application allowed a person to log onto the Mobile Spy website and monitor the phone on which the application was installed.

From the Mobile Spy website, a user could access all the information stored on the monitored phone, including text messages, call logs, and e-mails. The versions of Mobile Spy software also permitted a user to send commands to the targetted phone from a “live control panel” on the website. One such command allowed a user to activate the phone’s microphone and recording features and record audio into a file that could then be downloaded from the website.

Eventually, Novick was caught after his girlfriend Maunu became suspicious. In short, Maunu became concerned because Novick expressed specific knowledge about Maunu’s health conditions, medications, doctors’ appointments, and private conversations.

With the assistance of Novick’s employer, it was discovered that Novick had downloaded over 500 audio files from Mobile Spy, searched for GPS (global positioning system) locations, and searched for particular telephone numbers.

The State charged Novick with eight counts of Computer Trespass in the First degree and eight counts of Recording Private Communications based on Novick’s use of Mobile Spy to record Maunu’s conversations. At trial, Novick was convicted on all charges.

Novick appealed on arguments that (1) the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that he intentionally recorded a private communication, and (2) entry of eight convictions of each crime violated his right against double jeopardy because the correct unit of prosecution covers the entire course of conduct.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals disagree with Novick and affirmed his convictions.

THE PROSECUTION SHOWED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF COMPUTER TRESPASS FIRST DEGREE.

First, the Court explained that Computer Trespass in the First Degree occurs when a person intentionally gains access without authorization to a computer system or electronic database of another and the access is made with the intent to commit another crime. The Court further reasoned that here, the underlying crime was Recording Private Communications. A person commits the crime of recording private communications when he intercepts or records private communications transmitted by any device designed to record and/or transmit said communications.

Second, the Court reasoned that a forensic review of Novick’s computer activity revealed that he intentionally logged into Mobile Spy’s webiste and sent commands from the website to Maunu’s phone. Also, Novick’s computer records showed that he visited the live control panel on Mobile Spy’s website, downloaded audio files collected from Maunu’s phone and intentionally recorded Maunu’s private communications.

Accordingly, the Court held that the State presented sufficient evidence that Novick committed the crime of Recording Private Communications, and with that, committed Computer Trespass First Degree.

2. NO EVIDENCE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

Next, the Court rejected arguments that Novick’s multiple convictions for Computer Trespass and Recording Private Communications violated the prohibition against Double Jeopardy because the correct unit of prosecution for each crime covers the entire course of Novick’s conduct.

Furthermore, when a defendant is convicted for violating one statute multiple times, the proper inquiry is, “What unit of prosecution has the Legislature intended as the punishable act under the specific criminal statute?” The Court explained that in order to determine whether there is a double jeopardy violation, the question becomes “what act or course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act?” Consequently, the scope of the criminal act as defined by the legislature is considered the unit of prosecution.

The Court explained that the first step is to analyze the statute in question. If the statute does not plainly define the unit of prosecution, we next examine the legislative history to discern legislative intent. Finally, a factual analysis is conducted to determine if, under the facts of the specific case, more than one unit of prosecution is present.

Ultimately, the Court was not persuaded by Novick’s “plain language of the statute” argument the if the legislature intended a single unit of prosecution based on a course of conduct, it could have said so plainly.

“What matters is not what the legislature did not say, but what it did say,” said the Court. “The plain language of the statutes support the conclusion that the units of prosecution . . . are each separate unauthorized access and each recording of a conversation without consent.” The Court further reasoned that while Novick’s actions were somewhat repetitious, they were not continuous:

“On at least eight separate and distinct times, Novick logged onto Mobile Spy’s website, accessed Maunu’s phone by issuing a command through the live control panel, and downloaded at least eight different recordings of conversations between Maunu and various other people. Each access was separated by time and reflected a separate intent to record a separate conversation.”

The Court concluded that the State proved that Novick intentionally recorded eight private communications. Additionally, Novick’s actions constituted multiple units of prosecution, and therefore, his multiple convictions did not violate double jeopardy principles. Thus, the Court affirmed Novick’s convictions.

My opinion? On the one hand, it’s shocking that citizens can be convicted of felonies by accessing mainstream computer software. Shouldn’t the software itself be outlawed instead? On the other hand, I see how parents can legally using the same software to track their minor children’s whereabouts, conversations and activities. That type of activity os not illegal.

This case presents a very good example of an atypical computer crime. We see that Computer Trespass First Degree is very similar to standard Burglary charges in that the State must prove the Defendant intends to commit a crime once they gain access to the victim’s computer system or electronic database. Recording Private Communications is a crime. Therefore, if a defendant records private communications after gaining access, they can be found guilty of Computer Trespass in the First Degree. Simple.

Computer crime cases require experts and/or lay witnesses who are competent in discussing these matters. Speaking for the defense, it’s usually best to hire experts familiar with computer forensics to determine if/when the said access was unlawful and/or intentional. Again, the State must prove intent.

Defendant Angel Rose Marie Nelson was a Kmart employee. A surveillance video showed that Nelson left her cash register three times to retrieve an empty gift card, then activated each card by adding funds to it without adding cash to the cash register.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Nelson’s case.

First, the Court reasoned that, under MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, gift cards can access an account because the plain meaning of the word “account” is broad enough to cover a gift card’s balance:

“Under this definition, a gift card can access an account as described above. It is a card that can be used to receive goods or services of a specified value. A gift card thus shows a resulting balance. It is a device that can be used to access a record of a business relationship with outstanding credits, debits, or obligations, and a sum of money—that is, an account.”

In conclusion, the Court held that the definition of “access device” can include gift cards so long as they are a means of account access. The word “account” is not limited to a bank account because the plain language of the statute includes no such limitation. The funds to which a gift card provides access can be an account under this statute.