This
case is before the Court for review of the decision of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Smith v. Smith,
199 So.3d 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). The district court
certified the following question to be of great public
importance:

WHERE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY HAS NOT BEEN REMOVED
FROM A WARD UNDER SECTION 744.3215(2)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES,
DOES THE STATUTE REQUIRE THE WARD TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM THE
COURT PRIOR TO EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO MARRY, WITHOUT WHICH
APPROVAL THE MARRIAGE IS ABSOLUTELY VOID, OR DOES SUCH
FAILURE RENDER THE MARRIAGE VOIDABLE, AS COURT APPROVAL COULD
BE CONFERRED AFTER THE MARRIAGE?

Smith v. Smith, 195 So.3d 416, 416 (Fla. 4th DCA
2016). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, §
3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons discussed below, we
quash the decision of the Fourth District and hold that where
the right to contract has been removed under section
744.3215(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), the ward is not
required to obtain court approval prior to
exercising the right to marry, but court approval is
necessary before such a marriage can be given legal effect.

OVERVIEW

When a
person is deemed incapacitated, a guardianship court may
remove some of his or her rights. See §
744.331, Fla. Stat. (2016).[1] Section 744.3215, Florida
Statutes (2016), titled "Rights of persons determined
incapacitated, " separates the rights of an
incapacitated person into three distinct categories: rights
retained by the incapacitated person (or rights that cannot
be removed through incapacity proceedings); rights that can
be removed and delegated to a guardian; and rights that can
be removed, but not delegated to a guardian. The right to
marry falls within the latter category, under section
744.3215(2)(a), which provides:

(2) Rights that may be removed from a person by an order
determining incapacity but not delegated to a guardian
include the right:

(a) To marry. If the right to enter into a contract has been
removed, the right to marry is subject to court approval.

Consequently,
a guardianship court may remove an incapacitated person's
right to marry if there is clear and convincing evidence that
he or she is incapacitated with respect to that right.
Id.; § 744.331(6), Fla. Stat. However, even
when a guardianship court does not remove the right to marry,
an incapacitated person's right to marry becomes
"subject to court approval" when his or her right
to contract has been removed. § 744.3215(2)(a), Fla.
Stat. The question presented in this case is whether court
approval must be obtained before the incapacitated
person marries.

FACTS
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This
annulment challenge is an offshoot of a guardianship case
initiated by the daughter of Respondent, J. Alan Smith
(Alan), in 2010 after Alan was involved in an automobile
accident in which he suffered head trauma. Smith,
199 So.3d at 911; id. at 914 (Warner, J.,
dissenting); see also Martinez v. Guardianship of
Smith, 159 So.3d 394, 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). According
to Alan's daughter, Alan was no longer competent to
handle his financial affairs or care for his property as a
result of his diminished mental capacity. In April 2010, Alan
was determined to be partially incapacitated. Alan's
right to contract and his right to manage property were
removed and delegated to John Cramer, who was appointed to be
Alan's limited guardian of property. However, the court
specifically found there was "no incapacity on the part
of [Alan] that would warrant a guardian of a person."
The court issued an Order that provided:

The following rights of the Ward are delegated to the
Guardian appointed by this Order:

[X] to Contract,

[X] to manage the property of the Ward

Note: If the right of the Ward to Contract has been
delegated to the Guardian but the right to marry is retained,
then the right to marry is subject to Court
approval.[2]

(Emphasis added.)

It is
undisputed that Petitioner, Glenda Martinez Smith (Glenda),
met and became engaged to Alan before he was deemed
incapacitated. In 2009, the year prior to his accident, Alan
executed a Designation of Health Care Surrogate and Living
Will Declaration naming Glenda as his health care surrogate
and preneed guardian.[3] Alan also gave Glenda durable power of
attorney.

In
December 2011, Glenda and Alan were married. Court approval
was not obtained prior to the marriage ceremony. However,
Glenda asked Cramer to seek court approval on two separate
occasions, but Cramer refused.

Alan's
court-appointed counsel, Lynne Hennessey, filed a petition
for annulment in early 2013 based solely on the assertion
that the marriage was void because court approval had not
been obtained prior to the act of marriage. Glenda then moved
to ratify the marriage, and Hennessey moved for summary
judgment. After a hearing, the court denied Glenda's
motion and granted Hennessey's motion, concluding section
744.3215(2)(a) requires prior court approval because the
"statute does not contemplate the right to ratify or
somehow prove an existing marriage." Because neither
Alan nor Glenda obtained court approval before marrying, the
court concluded their marriage was void and incapable of
ratification.

Glenda
appealed the final judgment of annulment, arguing that
neither the statute nor the order that removed Alan's
right to contract explicitly required prior court
approval, and as such, the marriage could be ratified by
obtaining approval after the marriage was solemnized. Glenda
also asserted such approval had been obtained during a
December 2012 hearing.[4] The Fourth District Court of Appeal
rejected Glenda's assertions and affirmed the trial
court's decision. Smith, 199 So.3d at 912. The
district court agreed with the trial court's rationale
that the plain language of the statute

does not state that "a marriage" is subject to
court approval, but rather, it states that "the
right to marry" is subject to court approval.
Therefore, if a person deemed incapacitated has had his or
her right to contract removed, he or she has no right to
marry unless the court gives its approval.

Id. The district court explained that, because a
"marriage entered into by a person with no right to
marry is void . . . it follows that in order to enter into a
valid marriage, an incapacitated person who has had his or
her right to contract removed must first ask the court to
approve his or her right to marry." Id.
Accordingly, the district court held "the trial court
correctly determined that the marriage was void."

Id.

The district court also concluded that because

the marriage was void from the inception, [Glenda's]
argument that the court "ratified" the marriage by
acknowledging it at the December 18, 2012 hearing is without
merit. A void marriage, in legal contemplation, has never
existed and, therefore, cannot be ratified. At any rate, this
Court reversed the court's order stemming from the
December 18, 2012 hearing and remanded for a new hearing. By
...

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