Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,

Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and

Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.

Article III

For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

Article V

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAGeorge W. Bush

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIONVladimir V. Putin

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

The White HouseJune 20, 2002

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the “Moscow Treaty”).

The Moscow Treaty represents an important element of the new strategic relationship between the United States and Russia. It will take our two nations along a stable, predictable path to substantial reductions in our deployed strategic nuclear warhead arsenals by December 31, 2012. When these reductions are completed, each country will be at the lowest level of deployed strategic nuclear warheads in decades. This will benefit the peoples of both the United States and Russia and contribute to a more secure world.

The Moscow Treaty codifies my determination to break through the long impasse in further nuclear weapons reductions caused by the inability to finalize agreements through traditional arms control efforts. In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both countries’ strategic nuclear arsenals remained far larger than needed, even as the United States and Russia moved toward a more cooperative relationship. On May 1, 2001, I called for a new framework for our strategic relationship with Russia, including further cuts in nuclear weapons to reflect the reality that the Cold War is over. On November 13, 2001, I announced the United States plan for such cuts--to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1700 and 2200 over the next decade. I announced these planned reductions following a careful study within the Department of Defense. That study, the Nuclear Posture Review, concluded that these force levels were sufficient to maintain the security of the United States. In reaching this decision, I recognized that it would be preferable for the United States to make such reductions on a reciprocal basis with Russia, but that the United States would be prepared to proceed unilaterally.

My Russian counterpart, President Putin, responded immediately and made clear that he shared these goals. President Putin and I agreed that our nations’ respective reductions should be recorded in a legally binding document that would outlast both of our presidencies and provide predictability over the longer term. The result is a Treaty that was agreed without protracted negotiations. This Treaty fully meets the goals I set out for these reductions.

It is important for there to be sufficient openness so that the United States and Russia can each be confident that the other is fulfilling its reductions commitment. The Parties will use the comprehensive verification regime of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the “START Treaty”) to provide the foundation for confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. In our Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the United States and Russia, President Putin and I also decided to establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers. This body will be the principal mechanism through which the United States and Russia strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.

The Moscow Treaty is emblematic of our new, cooperative relationship with Russia, but it is neither the primary basis for this relationship nor its main component. The United States and Russia are partners in dealing with the threat of terrorism and resolving regional conflicts. There is growing economic interaction between the business communities of our two countries and ever-increasing people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges. The U.S. military has put Cold War practices behind it, and now plans, sizes, and sustains its forces in recognition that Russia is not an enemy, Russia is a friend. Military-to-military and intelligence exchanges are well established and growing.

The Moscow Treaty reflects this new relationship with Russia. Under it, each Party retains the flexibility to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, and how reductions are made. This flexibility allows each Party to determine how best to respond to future security challenges.

There is no longer the need to narrowly regulate every step we each take, as did Cold War treaties founded on mutual suspicion and an adversarial relationship.

In sum, the Moscow Treaty is clearly in the best interests of the United States and represents an important contribution to U.S. national security and strategic stability. I therefore urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the Treaty, and to advise and consent to its ratification.

George W. Bush.

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

The Secretary of State,Washington.

The President,The White House.

Mr. President: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002.

INTRODUCTION

The Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between the United States and Russia. This short, legally binding document codifies in a flexible manner both countries’ commitment to make deep strategic offensive reductions. It facilitates the transition from strategic rivalry to a genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. The Moscow Treaty is one important element of a new strategic framework, which involves a broad array of cooperative efforts in political, economic and security areas.

BACKGROUND

The Moscow Treaty codifies the deep reductions that you announced during the November 2001 Washington/Crawford Summit and President Putin announced at that time and a month later. It reflects the shared desire to conclude a legally binding document that would outlast both of your presidencies and to provide openness and predictability over the longer term in this important area of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The transition to a relationship based on mutual trust and cooperation enabled us to conclude an agreement in months, not years. At the same time, the Treaty affords flexibility to each Party to meet unforeseen future contingencies, while avoiding unnecessary restrictions on either Party’s forces or activities.

REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS

The United States and Russia both intend to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations. The Treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 each by December 31, 2012, a reduction of nearly two-thirds below current levels. The United States intends to implement the Treaty by reducing its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 through removal of warheads from missiles in their launchers and from heavy bomber bases, and by removing some missiles, launchers, and bombers from operational service.

For purposes of this Treaty, the United States considers operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at heavy bomber bases. The United States does not consider these spares to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only “nuclear” reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject to the 1700-2200 limit.

RELATIONSHIP TO START

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues in force unchanged by this Treaty. In accordance with its own terms, START will remain in force until December 5, 2009, unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.

START’s comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. As noted in the May 24 Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, may be agreed in the future.

BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION

The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic consultative forum that will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. The BIC will be separate and distinct from the Consultative Group for Strategic Security, established by the Joint Declaration of May 24, which will be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials.

ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL

The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. It is to remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

The Treaty also provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from the Treaty upon three months’ written notice to the other Party.

STATUS OF START II TREATY

The START II Treaty, which was signed in 1993, and to which the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1996, never entered into force because Russia placed unacceptable conditions on its own ratification of START II. Russia’s explicit linkage of START II to preservation of the ABM Treaty and entry into force of several agreements, signed in 1997, which related to ABM Treaty succession and ABM/TMD demarcation, made it impossible for START II to enter into force. With signature of the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia have now taken a decisive step beyond START II.

CONCLUSION

Accompanying this report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty. By deeply reducing operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads while preserving each Party’s flexibility to meet unforeseen future contingencies, the Moscow Treaty will enhance the national security of the United States. I strongly recommend its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.

Respectfully submitted,Colin L. Powell.

Enclosures: As stated1.

___________________1 Enclosures include the Moscow Treaty and the Article-by-Article Analysis

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ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the Moscow Treaty) consists of a Preamble and five Articles.

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

The title of the Moscow Treaty is “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.” This title was deliberately chosen to reflect the fact that this Treaty focuses on reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, rather than on “strategic offensive arms,” which traditionally have been considered to be delivery vehicles and launchers. For linguistic reasons, the title of the Russian language version of the Treaty is “... on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Potential.” The English language text of the Treaty was agreed first, but the phrase “strategic offensive reductions” could not be literally translated into Russian. The substantive meanings of the titles are the same.

The Preamble to the Moscow Treaty sets forth the intentions of the Parties in broad terms. The first preambular paragraph designates the United States and Russia as “the Parties” to obviate the use of their full names throughout the Treaty. The second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs set forth the Parties’ shared commitment to conducting their relations in the new century on a fundamentally different and more cooperative basis than had characterized their relations in the past. The reference to “mutual security” in the fourth paragraph refers to the non-threatening nature of the Parties' new strategic relationship; it does not imply a specific relationship between the Parties’ forces. The fifth paragraph reaffirms the Parties’ general, longstanding commitment to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms. This paragraph introduces references to specific prior commitments and obligations by the Parties in the sixth, seventh and eighth paragraphs that immediately follow, including those in the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty) and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 (the NPT). The sixth paragraph recognizes Joint Statements made by Presidents Bush and Putin in Genoa on July 22, 2001 and in Washington, DC on November 13, 2001 that detail the new basis for relations between the United States and Russia. This preambular language does not imply any restrictions or obligations relating to defensive programs. The seventh and eighth paragraphs make reference to two existing agreements of the Parties with regard to nuclear weapons, the START Treaty and Article VI of the NPT. The final paragraph sets forth the Parties’ conviction that this Treaty will establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation and enhancing international security.

ARTICLE I

Article I contains the central obligation of the Moscow Treaty. The first sentence of this paragraph obligates the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. The Moscow Treaty's limits relate solely to the number of each Party’s strategic nuclear warheads. The Moscow Treaty does not limit the number of U.S. or Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or their associated launchers, or heavy bombers. Article I, by referencing the statements of both Presidents, makes clear that the Parties need not implement their reductions in an identical manner.

The United States will implement Article I as stated by President Bush on November 13, 2001: “... the United States will reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level fully consistent with American security.”2 U.S. negotiators noted to their Russian counterparts that, in carrying out the reductions provided for in this Treaty, in using the term “operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads” the United States means reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers, reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. The United States also made clear that a small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) would be located at heavy bomber bases and that the United States would not consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The United States intends to reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads in a manner consistent with these statements. In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only “nuclear” reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject to the 1700-2200 limit.

The method by which U.S. warhead numbers will be determined under the Moscow Treaty differs from the START Treaty methodology. The START Treaty contains counting rules that attribute specific numbers of warheads to each type of ICBM, SLBM or heavy bomber regardless of the actual number of warheads on the missile or bomber. These numbers may be different from both the actual capacity of the specific system and the number actually carried by the system.

Under the U.S. approach, certain strategic nuclear warheads, such as those nominally associated with submarines in overhaul or submarines modified for other purposes, those downloaded from ICBMs and SLBMs, and those nominally associated with deactivated Peacekeeper ICBMs, will continue to be subject to the START Treaty unless such ICBMs or SLBMs and their associated launchers are eliminated or converted in accordance with START Treaty procedures. At the same time, however, under the Moscow Treaty, once such warheads are no longer in operationally-deployed status, they will be included as part of the United States’ reductions. Thus, among other things, missiles from which some warheads have been removed will be considered for purposes of the START Treaty as carrying more warheads than they in fact carry. By contrast, under the Moscow Treaty, the United States will limit its strategic nuclear warheads based on the actual number of warheads on missiles in their launchers and at bomber bases (other than spare warheads).

President Putin, for his part, stated at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC on November 13, 2001:

... Russia is stating its readiness to proceed with significant reductions of strategic offensive arms. That is why today we are proposing a radical program of further reductions of SOA -- at the least, by a factor of three -- to the minimum level necessary to maintain strategic equilibrium in the world.3

and in a statement on December 13, 2001:

... a particularly important task in these conditions is to legally formalize the agreements that have been reached on further drastic, irreversible, and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms, which we believe should be at the level of 1,500-2,200 nuclear warheads for each side.4

President Putin did not state explicitly how Russia intends to implement its reductions. During the negotiations the Russians suggested that they anticipated reducing warheads by eliminating or converting missiles, launchers and heavy bombers. As noted above, Russia, like the United States, may reduce its strategic nuclear warheads by any method it chooses. Russia did not state conclusively during the negotiations how it intends to carry out its reductions.

The Moscow Treaty does not provide for sublimits or interim reduction levels or require a Party to reach the final reduction level prior to December 31, 2012. Therefore, prior to December 31, 2012, each Party is free to maintain whatever level of strategic nuclear warheads it deems appropriate, consistent with its obligations under the START Treaty and its obligation to meet the specified limit by the specified date.

The second sentence of Article I states that each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads. As noted earlier, the Moscow Treaty does not limit the total number of strategic offensive arms, or contain either numerical sublimits or bans on categories of forces. Under the Moscow Treaty, each Party will thus have flexibility in structuring its forces to reach these new low levels for strategic nuclear warheads. The Treaty does not restrict a Party’s decisions regarding how it will implement the required reductions.

___________________2 Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East Room, on November 13, 2001.3 Speech of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to Representatives of the American Public and U.S. Politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in Washington. [Official U.S. translation]4 Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the Decision of the U.S. Administration to Withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. [Official U.S. translation]

ARTICLE II

In Article II, the Parties recognize that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. The purpose of this Article is to make clear that the Moscow Treaty and the START Treaty are separate. The START Treaty’s provisions do not extend to the Moscow Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty does not terminate, extend or in any other way affect the status of the START Treaty. The START Treaty will remain in force until December 5, 2009, unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.

ARTICLE III

Article III establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic consultative forum which shall meet at least twice a year, to discuss issues related to implementation of the Moscow Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. Extension of the Treaty is not automatic but must be done by agreement of the Parties. Since such an extension is authorized by the Treaty, it would constitute an agreement pursuant to the Treaty and would accordingly not be subject to Senate advice and consent.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from the Treaty upon three months’ written notice to the other Party. Unlike some other arms control agreements, this withdrawal clause is not tied to a Party’s determination that extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

Unlike several earlier arms control agreements, including the START Treaty, there are no specific provisions for either amending the Moscow Treaty or for making “viability and effectiveness” changes to the Treaty. Such provisions were not seen as necessary given the structure and content of this Treaty.

For international agreements submitted to the Senate that do not have specific amendment procedures, U.S. practice has been to submit amendments to the Senate for its advice and consent unless the Senate agrees that submission is not required.

ARTICLE V

Article V sets forth standard provisions for registration of the Treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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July 22, 2001

Joint Statement by U.S. President George W. Bush and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin on Upcoming Consultations on Strategic Issues5

We agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and defensive systems. We already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We will shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems.

___________________5 This joint statement was made on the margins of the G-7/8 Summit in Genoa, Italy.

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November 13, 2001

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia

Our countries are embarked on a new relationship for the 21st century, founded on a commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law. The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy or threat. Aware of our responsibility to contribute to international security, we are determined to work together, and with other nations and international organizations, including the United Nations, to promote security, economic well-being, and a peaceful, prosperous, free world.

We affirm our determination to meet the threats to peace in the 21st century. Among these threats are terrorism, the new horror of which was vividly demonstrated by the evil crimes of September 11, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, militant nationalism, ethnic and religious intolerance, and regional instability. These threats endanger the security of both countries and the world at large. Dealing with these challenges calls for the creation of a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States and Russia, and the world community.

We have agreed that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic realities of today. Therefore, we have confirmed our respective commitments to implement substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. On strategic defenses and the ABM Treaty, we have agreed, in light of the changing global security environment, to continue consultations within the broad framework of the new strategic relationship. On nonproliferation matters, we reaffirm our mutual commitment to the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, and endorse efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states, and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking.

We support the building of a European-Atlantic community whole, free, and at peace, excluding no one, and respecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. To this end, the United States and Russia will work, together with NATO and other NATO members, to improve, strengthen, and enhance the relationship between NATO and Russia, with a view to developing new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. We believe that these mechanisms should reflect the fact that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism, regional instability and other contemporary threats, and that the NATO-Russia relationship should therefore evolve accordingly. We will also work to strengthen our cooperation in OSCE as a broadly representative, inclusive organization for conducting consultations, taking decisions, and working together in the region.

We recognize a market economy, the freedom of economic choice and an open democratic society as the most effective means to provide for the welfare of our citizens. The United States and Russia will cooperate, including through the support of direct contacts between the business communities of our countries, to advance U.S.-Russian economic, trade, and investment relations. The achievement of these goals requires the removal of legislative and administrative barriers, a transparent, predictable investment climate, the rule of law, and market-based economic reforms. To this end, it is important to reduce bureaucratic constraints on the economy and to combat economic crime and corruption.

Reaffirming our commitment to advance common values, the United States and Russia will continue to work together to protect and advance human rights, tolerance, religious freedom, free speech and independent media, economic opportunity, and the rule of law. In keeping with these commitments, we welcome the initiative of Russian and American media executives, journalists, and independent organizations to convene a Russian-American Media Entrepreneurship Dialogue. We will promote intense people-to-people exchanges as an important factor for enhancing mutual understanding between the American and Russian peoples. We pledge ourselves to the principles and values that represent the best traditions of both our nations, and to cooperation in order to realize them now and in the future.

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November 13, 2001

Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin

The East Room6

It’s a great honor for me to welcome President Vladimir Putin to the White House, and to welcome his wife as well. This is a new day in the long history of Russian-American relations, a day of progress and a day of hope.

The United States and Russia are in the midst of a transformation of a relationship that will yield peace and progress. We’re transforming our relationship from one of hostility and suspicion to one based on cooperation and trust, that will enhance opportunities for peace and progress for our citizens and for people all around the world.

The challenge of terrorism makes our close cooperation on all issues even more urgent. Russia and America share the same threat and the same resolve. We will fight and defeat terrorist networks wherever they exist. Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Today, we agreed that Russian and American experts will work together to share information and expertise to counter the threat from bioterrorism. We agreed that it is urgent that we improve the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking.

And we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, materials and expertise. Today, we also agreed to work more closely to combat organized crime and drug-trafficking, a leading source of terrorist financing.

Both nations are committed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, once hostilities there have ceased and the Taliban are no longer in control. We support the UN’s efforts to fashion a post-Taliban government that is broadly based and multi-ethnic. The new government must export neither terror nor drugs, and it must respect fundamental human rights.

And Russia and the United States -- as Russia and the United States work more closely to meet new 21st century threats, we’re also working hard to put the threats of the 20th century behind us once and for all. And we can report great progress.

The current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect today’s strategic realities. I have informed President Putin that the United States will reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level fully consistent with American security.

Russia and the United States have also had vast discussions about our defensive capabilities, the ability to defend ourselves as we head into the 21st century. We have different points of view about the ABM Treaty, and we will continue dialogue and discussions about the ABM Treaty, so that we may be able to develop a new strategic framework that enables both of us to meet the true threats of the 21st century as partners and friends, not as adversaries.

The spirit of partnership that now runs through our relationship is allowing the United States and Russia to form common approaches to important regional issues. In the Middle East, we agree that all parties must take practical actions to ease tensions so that peace talks can resume. We urge the parties to move without delay to implement the Tenet work plan and the Mitchell Report recommendations.

In Europe, we share a vision of a European Atlantic community whole, free and at peace; one that includes all of Europe’s democracies, and where the independence and sovereignty of all nations are respected. Russia should be a part of this Europe.

We will work together with NATO and NATO members to build new avenues of cooperation and consultation between Russia and NATO. NATO members and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism, regional instability, and other threats of our age. And NATO must reflect this alliance.

We’re encouraged by President Putin’s commitment to a political dialogue in Chechnya. Russia has also made important strides on immigration and the protection of religious and ethnic minorities, including Russia’s Jewish community. On this issue, Russia is in a fundamentally different place than it was during the Soviet era. President Putin told me that these gains for freedom will be protected and expanded.

Our Foreign Ministers have sealed this understanding in an exchange of letters. Because of this progress, my administration will work with Congress to end the application of Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Russia.

Russia has set out to strengthen free market institutions and the rule of law. On this basis, our economic relationship is developing quickly, and we will look for further ways to expand it.

A strong, independent media is a vital part of a new Russia. We’ve agreed to launch a dialogue on media entrepreneurship, so that American and Russian media representatives can meet and make practical recommendations to both our governments, in order to advance our goal of free media, and free exchange of ideas.

Russia and the United States will continue to face complex and difficult issues. Yet, we’ve made great progress in a very short period of time. Today, because we are working together, both our countries and the world are more secure and safe.

I want to thank President Putin for the spirit of our meetings. Together, we’re making history, as we make progress. Laura and I are looking forward to welcoming the Putins to our ranch in Crawford, Texas. I can’t wait to show you my state, and where I live. In the meantime, I hope you have a fine stay here in Washington, D.C. And it’s my honor to welcome you to the White House, sir, and welcome you to the podium.

___________________6 For clarity, only the transcript of President Bush's statement is included here. The official U.S. translation of President Putin's statement is provided on page 18. A question and answer session has been omitted.

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November 13, 2001

Speech by RF President V.V. Putin in Response to Questions by Journalists at the Joint Press Conference with U.S. President George Bush 7

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I don’t know if I will have another opportunity to appear before such an impressive gathering of the press. Therefore, I would like to start by thanking the President of the United States not only for his kind invitation to visit the United States and Washington, but also for the informal way in which our negotiations have begun today.

Both I and my colleagues are gratified to be at the White House. This is a historic place. And President Bush most graciously gave me a tour not only of the formal reception areas but also the quarters where he lives. He showed and told me everything. We stopped in front of almost picture [sic]. This not only interested me but also changed the quality of our relationship for the better, as it were.

I would like to express my condolences to the U.S. President and all the American people in connection with the disaster in New York as a result of the airplane crash [sic]. You know, there is a Russian proverb that says “Misfortunes never come alone, but strike one after the other.” We commiserate with you in this tragedy and are certain that the inhabitants of New York and all the American people will face these adversities with fortitude.

Now let me tell you directly about the progress of our work. The Washington phase of the talks is coming to an end, and I must note that our conversations already have been very substantive, interesting, and useful, but they will be continued at Crawford as well. However, we view the preliminary results as being very positive. This is my fourth meeting with President Bush in the last several months. I believe that this graphically demonstrates the current dynamic nature of Russian-U.S. relations. We have come to understand each other better, moving step by step to bring our positions closer together on key issues of bilateral and international relations. Today we are already prepared to seek solutions in all areas of our joint activities. We are willing to dismantle, once and for all, the legacy of the Cold War and begin fashioning a strategic partnership for the long term.

Naturally, we discussed in detail the fight against international terrorism. The tragic events of September 11 vividly demonstrated the need to join forces to counter this global threat decisively. And we do indeed regard it as a global threat. Terrorists and those who abet them must know that just retribution is inescapable and will overtake them wherever they try to hide.

The question of the post-crisis political structure of Afghanistan was also addressed. Right now the most important thing is that peace and a decent life be restored in the country, and that there be no threat to other countries, or to international stability, emanating from Afghanistan. Of course, we do not intend to impose our own plans on the Afghan people. They must decide their fates for themselves, with the active participation of the UN.

We also discussed in detail the course of our dialogue on the interrelated issues of strategic offensive and defensive arms. We have succeeded in making some progress in this area, particularly with respect to the prospects for working out a reliable and verifiable agreement on further major reductions in the nuclear potential of Russia and the United States. In this connection, I must say that we deeply appreciate the decision by the U.S. President on reducing strategic offensive arms to a designated threshold and we, for our part, will endeavor to respond in an appropriate manner. On missile defense issues Russia’s position remains unchanged, and we agreed that we will continue the dialogue and consultations on this matter. I believe that it is too early to provide a final summary of the results of the discussion of this problem as well. We will have an opportunity to continue our work at President Bush’s ranch in Crawford.

We also exchanged opinions on critical international problems. We discussed the situation in the Balkans and the situation surrounding Iraq. In the Joint Statement adopted, we reaffirmed that Russia and the U.S. are determined to facilitate resolution of the crisis in the Middle East and, above all, early resumption of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.

There was also a serious discussion of the development of relations between Russia and NATO. This includes taking into account the changed international situation. I believe that it is possible to establish qualitatively new mechanisms for cooperation, specifically, joint decision-making and coordinated actions in the area of security and strengthening stability.

There was detailed discussion of a number of fundamental issues related to economic interaction. As you know, the Russian-U.S. dialogue in this area has recently become more intensive and substantive. The implementation of such major investment projects as Sakhalin I and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s oil pipeline is gaining momentum. We are successfully moving ahead with cooperation in the aerospace field, the mining and chemical industries, automobile manufacturing, and other areas. Direct contacts among our countries’ entrepreneurs are expanding, specifically, within the framework of the Russian-American Business Dialogue. We are pleased to note that definite progress has been made in resolving issues related to Russia’s accession to the WTO and granting Russia market economy status. And we sensed a clear understanding that the question of graduating Russia from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment must finally be resolved-not de facto, but de jure. In this context, our Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, Messrs. Ivanov and Powell, exchanged letters confirming the commitment of Russia and the United States to common values in the area of human rights and religious freedoms.

Of course, the potential for bilateral economic cooperation is still far from being fully realized. Here, as in other areas, a great deal of joint work lies ahead of us. But we strongly believe that success is already, to a large extent, predetermined. It is predetermined by our common willingness to cooperate actively and constructively. I am absolutely certain that this cooperation, which is reflected in today’s visit, will benefit both countries.

___________________7 Official U.S. translation of the Kremlin's transcript of the Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East Room, November 13, 2001. For clarity, only the transcript of President Putin's statement is included here. The transcript of President Bush's statement is provided on page 16. A question and answer session has been omitted.

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November 13, 2001

Speech of Russian Federation President V. V. Putin to Representatives of the American Public and U.S. Politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in Washington8

It is of fundamental importance that our countries’ collaboration in combatting terrorism not remain merely an episode in the history of Russian-U.S. relations, but become the start of long-term partnership and cooperation. Today we must once more look back at the history of our relations. “History,” said our great thinker, the Russian historian Vladimir Klyuchevskiy, “is not a teacher, but a supervisor. She does not teach anything, but only punishes us for not knowing our lessons.”

After the Second World War, the ties between our countries developed differently. Nonetheless, we achieved the main aim in the end: our countries have ceased to be afraid of each other. This opened the possibility of freeing ourselves also from what, for decades, aroused horror in the whole world’s peoples: the arsenals of nuclear and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. Their current quantitative level is not at all in keeping with the current world situation or the nature of today’s threats.

I did not doubt that on this issue we should encounter the understanding of the United States; and President Bush’s statement today confirms this. That is why Russia is stating its readiness to proceed with significant reductions of strategic arms. That is why today we are proposing a radical program of further reductions of SOAs--at the least, by a factor of three--to the minimum level necessary to maintain strategic equilibrium in the world. We no longer need to frighten each other in order to arrive at agreements. Security is established, not by weapons and mountains of metal, but by the political will of states and of the leaders of these states.

Yes, today the world is still far from having international relations built exclusively upon trust. Unfortunately. That is why it is so important today to rely upon the existing foundation of treaties and agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control.

___________________8 Official U.S. translation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs transcript of President Putin's November 13, 2001, speech at the Russian Embassy in Washington. For clarity, only the text relevant to the Moscow Treaty is included.

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December 13, 2001

Text of Diplomatic Notes Sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on U.S. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

The following is the text of diplomatic notes sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine on December 13, 2001:

The Embassy of the United States of America has the honor to refer to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed at Moscow May 26,1972.

Article XV, paragraph 2, gives each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

The United States recognizes that the Treaty was entered into with the USSR, which ceased to exist in 1991. Since then, we have entered into a new strategic relationship with Russia that is cooperative rather than adversarial, and are building strong relationships with most states of the former USSR.

Since the Treaty entered into force in 1972, a number of state and non-state entities have acquired or are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It is clear, and has recently been demonstrated, that some of these entities are prepared to employ these weapons against the United States. Moreover, a number of states are developing ballistic missiles, including long-range ballistic missiles, as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction. These events pose a direct threat to the territory and security of the United States and jeopardize its supreme interests. As a result, the United States has concluded that it must develop, test, and deploy anti-ballistic missile systems for the defense of its national territory, of its forces outside the United States, and of its friends and allies.

Pursuant to Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States has decided that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Therefore, in the exercise of the right to withdraw from the Treaty provided in Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States hereby gives notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty, withdrawal will be effective six months from the date of this notice.

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December 13, 2001

A Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 19729

The U.S. Administration today announced that it will withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty in six months’ time.

The Treaty does indeed allow each of the parties to withdraw from it under exceptional circumstances. The leadership of the United States has spoken about it repeatedly and this step has not come as a surprise to us. But we believe this decision to be mistaken.

As is known, Russia, like the United States and unlike other nuclear powers, has long possessed an effective system to overcome anti-missile defense. So, I can say with full confidence that the decision made by the President of the United States does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.

At the same time our country elected not to accept the insistent proposals on the part of the U.S. to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty and did everything it could to preserve the Treaty. I still think that this is a correct and valid position. Russia was guided above all by the aim of preserving and strengthening the international legal foundation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

The ABM Treaty is one of the supporting elements of the legal system in this field. That system was created through joint efforts during past decades.

It is our conviction that the development of the situation in the present world dictates a certain logic of actions.

Now that the world has been confronted with new threats one cannot allow a legal vacuum to be formed in the sphere of strategic stability. One should not undermine the regimes of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

I believe that the present level of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the U.S. should not only be preserved but should be used for working out a new framework of strategic relations as soon as possible.

Along with the problem of anti-missile defense a particularly important task under these conditions is putting a legal seal on the achieved agreements on further radical, irreversible and verifiable cuts of strategic offensive weapons, in our opinion to the level of 1,500-2,200 nuclear warheads for each side.

In conclusion I would like to note that Russia will continue to adhere firmly to its course in world affairs aimed at strengthening strategic stability and international security.

___________________9 From the English transcript by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Daily News Bulletin, December 14, 2001.

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December 13, 2001

Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal

The United States welcomes President Putin’s statement. We agree with President Putin that the decision taken by the President of the United States presents no threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.

We have worked intensively with Russia to create a new strategic framework for our relationship based on mutual interests and cooperation across a broad range of political, economic, and security issues. Together, the United States and Russia have made substantial progress in our efforts and look forward to even greater progress in the future.

The United States in particular welcomes Russia’s commitment to deep reductions in its level of offensive strategic nuclear forces. Combined with the reductions of U.S. strategic nuclear forces announced by President Bush in November, this action will result in the lowest level of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by our two countries in decades. We will work with Russia to formalize this arrangement on offensive forces, including appropriate verification and transparency measures.

Russia’s announcement of nuclear reductions and its commitment to continue to conduct close consultations with the United States reflect our shared desire to continue the essential work of building a new relationship for a new century.

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May 24, 2002

Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Recalling the accomplishments at the Ljubljana, Genoa, Shanghai, and Washington/Crawford Summits and the new spirit of cooperation already achieved;

Building on the November 13, 2001 Joint Statement on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia, having embarked upon the path of new relations for the twenty-first century, and committed to developing a relationship based on friendship, cooperation, common values, trust, openness, and predictability;

Reaffirming our belief that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new foundation for our relationship;

Determined to work together, with other nations and with international organizations, to respond to these new challenges and threats, and thus contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, and free world and to strengthening strategic security;

Declare as follows:

A Foundation for Cooperation

We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.

To advance these objectives the United States and Russia will continue an intensive dialogue on pressing international and regional problems, both on a bilateral basis and in international fora, including in the UN Security Council, the G-8, and the OSCE. Where we have differences, we will work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect.

We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media, tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.

We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international cooperation.

The further development of U.S.-Russian relations and the strengthening of mutual understanding and trust will also rest on a growing network of ties between our societies and peoples. We will support growing economic interaction between the business communities of our two countries and people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges.

Political Cooperation

The United States and Russia are already acting as partners and friends in meeting the new challenges of the 21st century; affirming our Joint Statement of October 21, 2001, our countries are already allied in the global struggle against international terrorism.

The United States and Russia will continue to cooperate to support the Afghan people’s efforts to transform Afghanistan into a stable, viable nation at peace with itself and its neighbors. Our cooperation, bilaterally and through the United Nations, the ‘Six-Plus-Two' diplomatic process, and in other multilateral fora, has proved important to our success so far in ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaida.

In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common interest in promoting the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region. The United States and Russia reject the failed model of "Great Power" rivalry that can only increase the potential for conflict in those regions. We will support economic and political development and respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation on counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

The United States and Russia will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova. We strongly encourage the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to exhibit flexibility and a constructive approach to resolving the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. As two of the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, the United States and Russia stand ready to assist in these efforts.

On November 13, 2001, we pledged to work together to develop a new relationship between NATO and Russia that reflects the new strategic reality in the Euro-Atlantic region. We stressed that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism, regional instability, and other contemporary threats. We therefore welcome the inauguration at the May 28, 2002 NATO-Russia summit in Rome of a new NATO-Russia Council, whose members, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will identify common approaches, take joint decisions, and bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. In this context, they will observe in good faith their obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. They aim to stand together against common threats and risks to their security.

As co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, the United States and Russia will continue to exert joint and parallel efforts, including in the framework of the “Quartet,” to overcome the current crisis in the Middle East, to restart negotiations, and to encourage a negotiated settlement. In the Balkans, we will promote democracy, ethnic tolerance, self-sustaining peace, and long-term stability, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United States and Russia will continue their constructive dialogue on Iraq and welcome the continuation of special bilateral discussions that opened the way for UN Security Council adoption of the Goods Review List.

Recalling our Joint Statement of November 13, 2001 on counternarcotics cooperation, we note that illegal drug trafficking poses a threat to our peoples and to international security, and represents a substantial source of financial support for international terrorism. We are committed to intensifying cooperation against this threat, which will bolster both the security and health of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia remain committed to intensifying cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on January 31, 2002.

Economic Cooperation

The United States and Russia believe that successful national development in the 21st century demands respect for the discipline and practices of the free market. As we stated on November 13, 2001, an open market economy, the freedom of economic choice, and an open democratic society are the most effective means to provide for the welfare of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia will endeavor to make use of the potential of world trade to expand the economic ties between the two countries, and to further integrate Russia into the world economy as a leading participant, with full rights and responsibilities, consistent with the rule of law, in the world economic system. In this connection, the sides give high priority to Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization on standard terms.

Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations demands that we move beyond the limitations of the past. We stress the importance and desirability of graduating Russia from the emigration provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, also known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. We note that the Department of Commerce, based on its ongoing thorough and deliberative inquiry, expects to make its final decision no later than June 14, 2002 on whether Russia should be treated as a market economy under the provisions of U.S. trade law. The sides will take further practical steps to eliminate obstacles and barriers, including as appropriate in the legislative area, to strengthen economic cooperation.

We have established a new dynamic in our economic relations and between our business communities, aimed at advancing trade and investment opportunities while resolving disputes, where they occur, constructively and transparently.

The United States and Russia acknowledge the great potential for expanding bilateral trade and investment, which would bring significant benefits to both of our economies. Welcoming the recommendations of the Russian-American Business Dialogue, we are committed to working with the private sectors of our countries to realize the full potential of our economic interaction. We also welcome the opportunity to intensify cooperation in energy exploration and development, especially in oil and gas, including in the Caspian region.

Strengthening People-to-People Contacts

The greatest strength of our societies is the creative energy of our citizens. We welcome the dramatic expansion of contacts between Americans and Russians in the past ten years in many areas, including joint efforts to resolve common problems in education, health, the sciences, and environment, as well as through tourism, sister-city relationships, and other people-to-people contacts. We pledge to continue supporting these efforts, which help broaden and deepen good relations between our two countries.

Battling the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, ending family violence, protecting the environment, and defending the rights of women are areas where U.S. and Russian institutions, and especially non-governmental organizations, can successfully expand their cooperation.

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Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and International Terrorism

The United States and Russia will intensify joint efforts to confront the new global challenges of the twenty-first century, including combating the closely linked threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We believe that international terrorism represents a particular danger to international stability as shown once more by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It is imperative that all nations of the world cooperate to combat this threat decisively. Toward this end, the United States and Russia reaffirm our commitment to work together bilaterally and multilaterally.

The United States and Russia recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The specter that such weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists and those who support them illustrates the priority all nations must give to combating proliferation.

To that end, we will work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material. We will also continue cooperative threat reduction programs and expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material. In that regard, we will establish joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons-usable fissile material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. We also intend to intensify our cooperation concerning destruction of chemical weapons.

The United States and Russia will also seek broad international support for a strategy of proactive non-proliferation, including by implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the conventions on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The United States and Russia call on all countries to strengthen and strictly enforce export controls, interdict illegal transfers, prosecute violators, and tighten border controls to prevent and protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States and Russia proceed from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington.

The United States and Russia are taking steps to reflect, in the military field, the changed nature of the strategic relationship between them.

The United States and Russia acknowledge that today’s security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense, including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems. They also intend to take the steps necessary to bring a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems into operation.

The United States and Russia have also agreed to study possible areas for missile defense cooperation, including the expansion of joint exercises related to missile defense, and the exploration of potential programs for the joint research and development of missile defense technologies, bearing in mind the importance of the mutual protection of classified information and the safeguarding of intellectual property rights.

The United States and Russia will, within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on missile defense for Europe.

The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations.

A major step in this direction is the conclusion of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

In this connection, both sides proceed on the basis that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, remains in force in accordance with its terms and that its provisions will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed.

The United States and Russia agree that a new strategic relationship between the two countries, based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability requires substantive consultation across a broad range of international security issues. To that end we have decided to:

establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials. This group will be the principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest; and

seek ways to expand and regularize contacts between our two countries’ Defense Ministries and Foreign Ministries, and our intelligence agencies.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

MoscowMay 24, 2002.

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June 5, 2002

Fact Sheet on the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions

On May 24, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin signed the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under this Treaty, the United States and Russia will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012, a level nearly two-thirds below current levels.

This new, legally-binding Treaty codifies the deep reductions announced by President Bush during the November 2001 Washington/Crawford Summit and by President Putin at that summit and one month later. The two Presidents agreed on the need for a legally binding document that would outlast both of their presidencies, to provide openness and predictability over the longer term in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. At the same time, reflecting the mutual trust in this relationship, the Treaty affords flexibility to each Party to meet unforeseen future contingencies.

The Treaty is part of the new strategic framework that the United States and Russia have established. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, also issued in Moscow on May 24, records mutual commitments to a broad array of cooperative efforts in political, economic, and security areas. It marks a new era in our bilateral relationship.

Treaty Provisions

The Treaty requires each country to reduce and limit its strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012. Each side may determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic forces consistent with this limit.

Both the United States and Russia intend to reduce their strategic offensive forces to the lowest possible levels, consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations. The U.S. intends to reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200, as President Bush announced on November 13, 2001. The United States considers operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers, reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments located at heavy bomber bases. In addition, there will be some spares stored at heavy bomber bases.

A Bilateral Implementation Commission will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty.

Ratification Process

The Treaty will be transmitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification; in Russia, the two Chambers of the Federal Assembly must approve a bill on its ratification. Assuming positive action by the legislatures of both countries, the United States and Russia will exchange instruments of ratification and the Treaty will enter into force. It will remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended or replaced with a subsequent agreement.

Relationship to START

The five-Party Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 continues in force unchanged. (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States are Parties to START.) START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic reductions. As noted in the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship also issued in Moscow on May 24, supplementary measures, including transparency measures, may be agreed in the future. The United States and Russia will establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers. This group will be the principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.

The 1993 START II Treaty never entered into force because of the long delay in Russian ratification and the fact that Russia conditioned its ratification of START II on preservation of the ABM Treaty. The new Moscow Treaty moves us beyond START II, both in reductions to even lower levels of operationally deployed warheads and in our relationship with Russia.

U.S. Reduction Plans

As outlined in the Department of Defense’s Nuclear Posture Review submitted to Congress in January of this year, the United States plans to deactivate all 50 of its ten-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and remove four Trident submarines from strategic service. Additional steps to reduce the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the 1700-2200 level, including missile downloading and lowering the number of operationally deployed weapons at heavy bomber bases, will be decided subsequently.

Some of the warheads removed from deployed status will be used as spares, some will be stored, and some will be destroyed. The U.S. will continue to deploy land-, sea- and air-based strategic forces as part of one element of the New Triad described in the Nuclear Posture Review Report to Congress.

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June 14, 2002

Statement by the Russian MFA on the Legal Status of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)10

In May 2000, the Russian Federation ratified the START II Treaty and the New York agreements of September 26, 1997, regarding the ABM Treaty. In this connection, there was a mutual understanding with the U.S. side that the U.S. would act in a similar fashion. This would have made it possible to implement the aforementioned, very important agreements on the strategic offensive and defensive arms of both Parties.

However, the U.S. declined to ratify the START II Treaty and the New York agreements. Moreover, on June 13, 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and, as a result, this instrument of international law, which for three decades had served as the cornerstone of strategic stability, is no longer in effect.

Taking into account the above mentioned actions of the U.S. and based on the provisions of the Federal Law on Ratification of the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation notes the absence of any of the prerequisites for entry into force of the START II Treaty and no longer considers itself bound by the obligation, provided for under international law, to refrain from actions that could deprive this Treaty of its object and purpose.

___________________10 Official U.S. translation of a Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of June 14, 2002.

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