Radical Destabilizing Effects of New Technologies

THOMAS K. ADAMS

There is a tendency among strategic thinkers, especially
in the military, to ignore or discount the potential effects of technology
beyond its short-term applicability to military systems. This tendency
complements a pervasive lack of interest within the services regarding
the state of the defense technology and industrial base and the possible
military consequences of any significant change in that industrial base.[1]
The current information revolution is a case in point. The Army's
Force XXI experiments and the Marine Corps' Hunter
Warrior Exercise have taken great pains to upgrade the conventional industrial-age
war machinery left over from the Cold War through application of automated
information systems.[2]

But there is little apparent interest in the wider effects of these
developments and their implications for national security. In fact, attempts
to foresee even the near-term future are remarkable for their conservative
approach and the general belief that the future will be very much like
today with a few advances in technology. Not surprisingly, there have been
even fewer attempts to anticipate basic change caused by technologies whose
practical applications are only now being discussed by specialists.

This is a serious shortcoming because major changes in human affairs
often have serious unexpected consequences. In the 18th and 19th centuries,
the industrializing countries gained enduring advantages over non-industrial
peoples. But urbanization, the demise of the extended family, and displacement
of ruling elites (whose power depended chiefly on ownership of land) were
among the casualties of industrialization. The industrial revolution also
promoted democratic institutions by giving rise to a powerful middle class.
It has taken hundreds of years to adapt to those changes, as spotty and
uneven as that adaptation has been.

Even this painful process, however, has done little to prepare us for
the rapid changes now under way. The examples described in this article
suggest that new technology is evolving much more rapidly than anything
in our collective experience or imagination. More important, they suggest
that some of the results will be economic; traditional relationships between
capital and labor will change profoundly. Social effects will follow quickly
as modifications in agriculture, trade, and manufacturing lead to population
shifts and new migration patterns. The technologies described here can
create a climate of such uncertainty that individuals and states unable
or unwilling to adapt may seek outlets for their rage and frustration in
violence. The same outcome may be the only recourse to those in developed
nations. Change this profound would surely create serious transnational
tensions.

This article suggests that what we know as the information revolution
is no more than the first stirring wavelet that precedes a tsunami. It
further suggests that the most profound effects will stem from three of
the many new technologies now being developed. They will profoundly alter
our thinking about economics, manufacturing, social issues, and national
security in ways we can as yet barely describe. The three fields discussed
here are information systems, biotechnology (including genetic engineering),
and nanotechnology. Known and potential advances in these fields can have
radically destabilizing consequences in all walks of life. The opportunities
and the dangers of rapid change will remain in equilibrium only if there
is an unprecedented degree of economic, social, diplomatic, and military
cooperation as we explore the limits of change.

Key Emerging Technologies

A number of emerging technologies are potentially destabilizing, but
three are obvious, important, and already in progress: information systems,
biotechnology, and nanotechnology. Furthermore, progress in these areas
is accelerating rapidly. Because these three developments are mutually
reinforcing, advances in any one of the three lend impetus to the others.

The most familiar area, information technology (infotech), includes
the entire realm of automated information handling technology from computer
programming to ancillary facilities such as the networks that connect the
various nodes. The heart of infotech, however, is the microchip-based ability
to process vast amounts of data with extraordinary speed and accuracy.
Improvements in this basic capability drive development throughout the
field.

The field of biological technology (biotech) is less familiar but is
assuming great importance. Like infotech, the field includes a variety
of applications ranging from traditional breeding of plants and animals
to medical research. As with information technology, there is a central,
driving development: new understanding of genetics and the ability to manipulate
the genetic codes of plants and animals to produce wholly new results.

The third area, nanotechnology (nanotech), is even less familiar but
holds almost boundless potential. The term is often misapplied to micro-machines;
what it really means is the development of devices (including computers)
orders of magnitude smaller than the human cell. Possible consequences
of these developments, from medical applications to manufacturing, are
staggering.

Acceleration in information technology is obvious; technology improvements
render systems "old" after one year and obsolete after two. Each
level of improvement becomes the foundation for the next round of releases.
Meanwhile the increasing utility of the systems creates a demand that fuels
still more research and improvement as producers seek a competitive advantage,
however fleeting they know it will be. This same dynamic seems to be emerging
in genetic research. Nanotechnology, however, is still a theoretical field,
but one with almost incalculable potential. While the effects of these
trends are impossible to predict, it is worthwhile to consider potential
shorter-term consequences for security issues and military organizations.

Information Systems

Infotech development has been the subject of considerable speculation.
Military vision statements, including the JCS's current
Joint Vision 2010 and the accompanying Army product, Army Vision
2010, attempt to predict how these systems will affect warfighting.[3]
Some of the immediate effects are already evident, and efforts are under
way to incorporate this technology in military operations.

The straightforward, expected application of these technologies is "information
dominance" of the battlefield. This means coupling them with reconnaissance
and surveillance systems to provide decisionmakers with a near-real-time
view of the battlespace and to link them with response systems, which are
usually weapons. Early military applications of these technologies are
in use, and a prototype of a combat information system was tested at the
National Training Center in early 1997.[4] Meanwhile the Navy and Marine
Corps are testing their own, very similar, versions.[5] Nor is the United
States alone in this effort. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency,
"Foreign states are increasingly cognizant of the link between automation
and warfighting effectiveness and . . . information warfare" and are
developing capabilities to wage it.[6]

A draft version of FM 100-5, Operations, the Army¢
s capstone warfighting manual, devotes 11 pages to information warfare,
which it describes as a combination of "jamming, signal acquisition,
PSYOPS, imitation and C2 [command and control] attack."[7] This description
is certainly a credible one based on current developments. But the problem
with this kind of straightforward extrapolation is that it is almost always
wrong. The information revolution has already provided some unexpected
developments, the most spectacular of which was probably the 1987 stock
market crash created by computer-driven trading. In another instance, a
group of fairly junior American military intelligence personnel, frustrated
by an official system they consider sluggish and antiquated, have organized
their own open-source information system called "G-2I" using
the e-mail capabilities of the Internet.[8] When terrorists seized the
Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, the G-2I system was able to produce sketches
and photos of the embassy from open sources within a matter of hours.

A darker side of information systems has also emerged. While the 1987
market crash was an inadvertent product of information processing, we now
have threats from "computer hackers and crackers" who deliberately
attack information systems as a hobby. Malicious computer viruses were
unheard-of ten years ago; now they plague all manner of systems. During
the Gulf War a Dutch hacker managed to pull a great deal of critical information
on US forces, strengths, and dispositions from unclassified DOD computer
systems. He offered to sell all this to the Iraqis, who fortunately didn¢
t believe him or trust his information. Police report a number of instances
of innovative bomb-building by high school youngsters who learned how from
Internet sites. Meanwhile, two private experts on nuclear weapons are publishing
a guide to more than 500 nuclear-related websites called "The Internet
and the Bomb."

These phenomena are interesting for several reasons. First, they were
wholly unexpected; second, they are related less to the technology of the
web and the Internet than to the uses people make of them. They are also
interesting because none of these cases involved cutting-edge developments
or even especially sophisticated users, which points to another and perhaps
most important issue: all of these are examples of the diffusion of power
brought about by the new information systems.

Biotechnology

The biotechnology revolution is already enhancing human health and nutrition
well beyond earlier expectations. The field had been evolving quietly until
the revelation of a cloned adult sheep named "Dolly" generated
popular interest. The US government-funded "Human Genome" project
to map human genetic structure is proceeding much faster than expected,
due largely to new applications of information technology.[9] Serious money
is being spent on projects, however seemingly fantastic, that appear feasible.
Affymetrix Corporation, a leader in gene analysis, was able to raise $50
million in private capital in 1993. Fortune magazine and Business
Week, two notably sober publications, each devoted multiple articles
to biotech in their March 1997 issues, advising readers on which biotech
stocks they should buy. According to Steven Fodor, research scientist and
president of Affymetrix, "Ninety-nine percent [of the general population]
have no idea how fast this revolution is coming."[10] Because the
field of biotechnology is less well developed and generally less well publicized
than information technology, the path and probable consequences of the
biotech revolution are harder to discern. However, it has the potential
to create greater social upheaval than the information revolution.

Much of the recent attention has been directed at cloning and the ability
to alter plants and animals to produce products useful to humans. Cows
have been engineered that create insulin and other drugs as a byproduct
of milk production.[11] Hemoglobin, a key ingredient in human blood, has
been produced from genetically engineered tobacco plants. Plants that produce
plastic have already been developed at the Carnegie Institute. Commercial
development of these plants to produce enough plastic to reduce dependence
on oil is also under way.[12] Other far-reaching projects are currently
in research, and private corporations feel certain enough of success to
invest heavily in them. Examples include:

. Food. Genetic engineering of plants to
increase yields is an old story. New developments are enabling food plants
to survive with less water and to resist threats such as insects, disease,
and even fire. In principle there is no reason why inedible plants that
are easy to grow cannot be made nutritious. Likewise, faster-growing forage
will reduce pressure on grain supplies, while hardier grazing animals will
make animal husbandry more efficient and perhaps practical in areas where
it is not now profitable or even feasible. All of this will significantly
affect farming patterns, especially in food exporting nations such as the
United States. Some of the most destabilizing initial consequences may
be felt by those nations that derive much of their national income from
food exports.

. Energy. Work is in progress to develop
microorganisms that can withstand high amounts of radiation and be used
to clean up highly radioactive wastes. Similar organisms can be engineered
to clean up other forms of waste and even make methane--natural gas--from
inorganic material.[13] In the mid-1970s a world oil squeeze prompted attempts
to use traditional plant-breeding methods to enhance so-called "energy
crops." Slow progress and the return of cheap oil ended the attempts.
Now, however, gene-tailored plants may produce cheap, locally available
ethanol, methanol, and methane as supplements to and replacements for coal
and oil as energy sources.[14] The potential effects of these developments
on energy production are readily imaginable.

. Materials Production. In addition to the
plastics mentioned above and new, more durable forms of wood, it now appears
that certain strains of bacteria can be used to separate useful ores and
other materials from deposits that are not currently exploitable. Not only
is this potentially less expensive than current methods, but many developing
countries depend on extractive industries and export of these materials
for much of their income. Assuming that ores presently considered not economically
practical as sources of raw materials would now become attractive, income
for some of those countries could be seriously reduced. Such an outcome
has consequences for trade and shipping as well as for employment patterns;
mining and ore processing are still labor-intensive businesses.

The mutually reinforcing nature of these technologies is illustrated
by genetic studies whose purpose is to learn the information-storing secrets
of DNA, which compresses enormous amounts of data into microscopic spaces.
Techniques from DNA studies are already being applied to computer microchips
to create information systems much smaller, faster, and more capable than
existing ones.

Other relatively short-term developments from biotech will certainly
include "predictive medicine," some forms of which are already
in use through genetic screening.[15] The ability to identify and treat
potential problems before they occur holds out the prospect of even longer
and healthier lives for individuals who can afford such treatment. A more
immediate consequence is fear that discovery of "bad" genes will
make the carriers uninsurable, subject them to penalizing premiums for
health and life insurance, or even affect their employability. Of course,
within every country there are those more fortunate than others, so the
new genetics raises the possibility of serious social schisms within nations.
During the Black Death of the 14th century, the plague took rich and poor,
royalty and commoner alike. Consider the consequences if the rich and powerful
sectors of society had the means to immunize themselves while the masses
of ordinary people around them were dying.

This can also contribute to greater differences between the advanced
countries and the developing world. Development has been uneven, as the
"green revolution" of the 1960s has demonstrated. Although aggregate
world food production has continued to rise faster than population since
1967, this has done little to eliminate chronic malnutrition and occasional
famine in Africa and South Asia.[16]

Unfortunately, this technology may offer as many, if not more, opportunities
for abuse than have emerged from the information revolution. With a complete
catalog of the human genome it should be possible to create chemical and
biological weapons that will target only specific genotypes. This would
make it possible to kill or incapacitate persons with specific characteristics
in a given area without affecting other persons. Even combinations of physical
characteristics could be targeted, such as all left-handed redheads.

Nanotechnology

Dr. Ralph Merkel, a researcher in the field, states: "Nanotechnology
should let us economically build a broad range of complex molecular machines
(including, not incidentally, molecular computers). It will let us build
fleets of computer-controlled molecular tools much smaller than a human
cell."[17] Just as information science helped in genotechnology, biotech
and infotech come together to assist the development of nanotechnology.
Computer modeling makes much of this research possible, while analogies
from DNA formation become the basis for building nano-devices.

"Nano" means one billionth; it suggests the size of nano devices
when compared to current machinery. Nanotech is the business of creating
("building" is the wrong word for this process) very small machines,
not just micro machines, but devices smaller than bacteria. To give an
idea of the size of these machines, a volume only slightly larger than
0.001 cubic microns could hold a small computer (a typical cell is thousands
of times larger).[18] The first commercial nanomachine, a biosensor with
components measured in billionths of a meter, was announced in June 1997.[19]
Because such devices operate on the molecular level and may be self-replicating,
they could replace some or all of current manufacturing, not with various
kinds of new factories but with a sort of general purpose facility that
could make almost anything. Since these devices can be programmed, and
because they operate at the level of individual molecules, a single facility
could simply be given the basic materials and instructed how to make anything
from ashtrays to auto parts.

The mutually reinforcing nature of these developments is again illustrated
by the fact that bacteriological processing of ores and other materials
could do away with the need to import many of the materials for these facilities.
Even if such nanofacilities turn out to be very expensive, in some instances
they would still be cheap compared to the cost of developing and sustaining
a traditional industrial base. At this point in its evolution, nanotech
seems to offer the prospect of something close to independence from the
need for conventional manufacturing. It also could mean truly massive displacement
of all those skills used in manufacturing, from tool and die making to
industrial management.

Once more, this is not science fiction. The principles of molecular
nanotechnology were first demonstrated in 1990 when industry researchers
at IBM were able to arrange 35 individual xenon atoms to spell out "IBM."[20]
In 1991, the Japanese government reportedly began budgeting an annual $185
million for nanotech research.[21] Since that time three-dimensional structures
have been experimentally produced from DNA,[22] and researchers have demonstrated
the engineering of branched, non-biological protein with enzymatic activity,[23]
a basic methodology for nano devices. Computer software to aid in the development
of molecular nanotechnology is also being produced with computer-aided
design and modeling software.

If the trends associated with nanotech do no more than live up to their
initial promise, the changes in the worldwide manufacturing base would
be dramatic and likely irreversible. Sophisticated manufacturing would
consist entirely of advanced programming and the transport of raw materials.
Even the distribution of finished products could be substantially reduced
since, in principle, any nanofacility could produce any product. It would
not be long before weapons of all kinds could be manufactured, not from
purpose-built factories as they are now, but from any nanofacility anywhere
in the world. And nanofacilities would become so common that it would be
much more difficult, perhaps impossible, to prevent weapons proliferation.
Weapon-producing processes derived from nanotechnologies could certainly
become a major part of worldwide illegal trafficking.

Beyond the Blue Event Horizon

"Event horizon" is a term borrowed from astrophysics and refers
to the area around a singularity or "black hole." The important
feature of this phenomenon is that it marks the point at which nothing
can escape from the singularity, not even information. It is impossible
to know what is on the other side of such an event horizon.

We are rapidly approaching an event horizon in human development, a
point at which the mutually reinforcing trends described here will combine
to produce an aggregate result so different from what we now know that
it is impossible to guess what it will be. Some short-term consequences,
however, can be predicted with a degree of confidence.

The foremost consequence--the bottom line--will be a tremendous diffusion
of power. The examples above illustrate the likelihood of a greater diffusion
of power both within and among societies, the consequences of which could
be to make the world a more dangerous place. Although the radical diffusion
of power in the form of infotech, biotech, and nanotech will certainly
have unanticipated consequences, some can be foreseen. Despite the claims
of some commentators, the nation-state will probably remain the dominant
form of large-scale social organization--at least in the short run. Nation-states
are still the locus of power and legitimacy. Furthermore, the nation remains
the center of loyalty for most persons. No one is likely to fight and die
for Chrysler or Mitsubushi or even the International Union of Machinists
and Sheet Metal Fabricators.

Nevertheless, there is a wide variety of violence-prone groups that
could take advantage of power diffusion and, in so doing, disrupt nations
at all levels of development. A list suggested by Steven Metz includes
organized crime, private armies, urban gangs, insurgents, regional separatists,
conspiracy theory terrorists, radical cults, neo-Luddites, and violent
environmentalists.[24] To this list, one might add anti-government militias
and the "hobbyists" who disrupt information systems as a form
of recreation.

Some territorial-based entities (states and sub-states) may become economically
more independent while others will become less so. The combination of increased
power through technology and greater economic independence will likely
make it both attractive and feasible for various sub-regions and even cities
to break way from larger states. A city like Vancouver, for example, will
be in a much better position to go it alone than a country like Somalia.
It can be argued that a material-producing province like British Colombia
will need metropolitan Vancouver more than Vancouver needs British Colombia--or
Canada, for that matter. Comparable conditions could apply to Seattle and
the state of Washington, to Los Angeles or San Francisco and the state
of California. As smaller political entities acquire power from the new
technologies, they will increase their ability to advance an agenda that
may have little in common with either rural regions or urban centers in
their states. And as they become capable of prospering on their own, some
of them will want independence, while others will want a greater share
of political power. One outcome of such a trend could be much smaller nation-states
but more of them.

The breakup of the USSR, aided and abetted by the new information technologies,
may be an early model of this process. China likewise is a composite state,
made up of parts such as Tibet and the western provinces that have historically
been independent. They would like to be independent again, especially if
the means could be found to support that desire. Other areas such as the
advanced economic zone between Shanghai and Hong Kong might choose to alter
their relationship with the remainder of China. City-states, now mere oddities
existing under the wing of nation-states, could become successful, independent
structures for the first time since the 17th century. An increase in the
number of states will also increase the number of probable friction points,
resulting in a net increase in conflict, with violence a likely outcome
in some instances.

The developments described above are inherently destabilizing to the
current political and social order; one likely consequence would be a great
deal of competition and a number of failed states, old and new. Migration
pressures in the form of illegal aliens will certainly increase as workers
are displaced and the economic differences between political entities,
whether traditional states or new city-states, become even more marked.
Some forms of nontraditional military missions, especially those that fall
under the broad heading of stability and support operations, will be increasingly
common as the international community (including the United States) tries
to stabilize conditions within and among both new and existing parastates.

These prospects suggest that there could be many new opportunities for
nontraditional military operations in many parts of the world, including
within the United States itself. It has become common to predict that the
next 20 years will see an increase in such activities, especially in failed
states. Less frequently noted, however, is the likelihood that the expected
diffusion of power will make these missions increasingly dangerous. If
the expected dissolution of the composite states and others turns ugly,
there may also be requirements for forceful intervention in the form of
peace enforcement or large-scale rescues. Unfortunately these tasks could
emerge while the ability to resist such interventions is also on the rise.

The Military Future

It would be wonderful if new developments in technology promised only
peace and plenty, but no one should count on it. Some disputes are intractable,
and organized, targeted violence will still be seen by some as a legitimate
way to achieve political and economic ends. Conventional war probably will
remain a very powerful instrument. Even the most advanced countries may
initially find themselves vulnerable to old-fashioned brute force.

Some of the military consequences of the information revolution are
becoming evident. One may be a structural change, leading to "two-tier"
militaries in developed countries. Current attempts to apply new information
systems to existing military formations are proving to be far more expensive
than their advocates admitted or even understood. Military information
systems for combat may be efficient and effective, but they also tend to
be expensive and difficult to use and maintain. It is hard to believe that
average recruits with a high-school education will be able to learn to
use these systems as easily as they can learn to fire a rifle or machine
gun.[25] Video games don¢ t teach the players
anything about system maintenance. These qualifying circumstances make
it unlikely that entire armies will be so equipped. Instead we may soon
witness the creation of an upper tier, consisting of a small number of
technically advanced military units, while the bulk of the armed forces
remains more-or-less conventional, industrial-age formations. Although
militaries will remain committed to their conventional weapons for at least
a few more decades, the proliferation of targeting information and "smart
weapons" suggests a brief future for large warfighting machinery such
as tanks, airplanes, and warships.

This trend can be expected to accelerate as threats based on information
warfare and genetic engineering methods become feasible. Jane¢
s Defense Weekly commented in 1997, "It is possible to produce
new organisms, exploit variations on organisms, or induce organisms to
respond in new ways, such as producing synthetic bioregulators or chemical
toxins."[26] Some insects, ants for example, might be programmed to
attack specific types of economic targets such as communications facilities.
A conventional armed force will not be very useful against threats that,
for most purposes, are not even military in the usual sense. In order to
protect themselves, states and other entities will need very sophisticated
security forces, not necessarily armies as we understand the term. These
security forces may be composed chiefly of technical specialists, educated
at the graduate-school level and paid professional-level wages. They will
carry out what we consider today to be preemptive functions and capability-against-capability
missions rather than reactive missions using force-against-force methods.
Much of what they do would not be considered war by current definitions.[27]
Conventional forces, especially of the advanced states, will be the residual
elements of the industrial-age force structures of the late 20th and early
21st centuries. At the same time, the size of advanced military establishments
may shrink significantly. Reduction in size would be accompanied by less
capacity to perform large-scale or manpower-intensive missions, such as
humanitarian assistance, at exactly the time that such operations may be
most in demand.[28]

Even this residual conventional capacity may erode. As advanced countries
move into new information- and genetics-based economies, it is reasonable
to expect that much basic heavy industry such as steel, shipbuilding, and
chemical production will be almost entirely relocated to the developing
nations of the so-called "second and third worlds" such as Argentina,
Brazil, Hungary, or Pakistan. Even a cursory reading of the daily newspapers
shows that some of this is already happening. This is not to argue that
America will lose its production capacity; rather, it will be devoted increasingly
to processes and products fundamentally different from our 19th- and 20th-century
experiences. It may no longer be "industrial" in the usual sense
of smokestacks and factories. Should a trend of this sort occur, it could
mean that advanced nations like the United States might lose the heavy
industrial base needed to mobilize and sustain forces to fight large-scale
conventional wars.

Violence will not disappear in this version of our brave new world;
it is too useful for that to happen. Instead, the conventional component
of warfare may be conducted by relatively small, highly trained organizations
like the US Army's "Delta Force." Operations
appropriate for these groups would include precision missions designed
to conduct surveillance, destroy critical nodes, recover vital equipment,
or rescue personnel. Other elements of the special operations community,
especially psychological operations units, may also find their future roles
different from their past ones. And changes of this sort may be so expensive
that the size of such military establishments could be severely constrained.

While it might seem that covert operations would play an important role
in future conflict, that may not be true. One of the effects of the information
revolution is the loss of privacy, an early example of which is the capability
to trace individuals through their various commercial transactions. Right
now, anyone who uses a credit or cash card for purchases at a scanner-equipped
store is identifying himself and his personal preferences right down to
hard or soft bristles on his toothbrush.[29] Increasing use of electronic
media, such as computer banking, will only increase the "resolution"
of such systems. Genetic identification may make it possible to further
trace or track individuals with considerable precision.

Given the progress in micro-miniature systems and information processing,
it may soon be possible to monitor virtually all electronic transmissions,
from radio and e-mail to cellular telephones. The only thing presently
lacking is the information processing capability to usefully collect and
analyze the resulting oceans of data. Very quickly the same progress could
make it possible to conduct full-time, remote surveillance of any area,
large or small. Sub-miniature video "cameras on a chip" for such
systems are cheap and available right now.[30] Later, thousands of tiny,
inexpensive nanotech imaging devices monitored by automated systems would
make it possible and feasible to monitor the entire public area of a city
or, given the motivation and the capital, an entire country. Although such
systems will be created as crime prevention measures, they will also have
the effect of stripping the concealment and anonymity of covert operators,
who after all are criminals to the target state.

Despite the assurances of some commentators, there is no guarantee that
the United States will dominate the environment of information, biotechnology,
and nanotechnology. At the close of World War II the US military had the
atom bomb, millions of battle-hardened fighters, unprecedented mobility,
systematic training, global logistics, the best battlefield communications
anywhere, and a host of other capabilities from sophisticated artillery
coordination to medical evacuation helicopters. In the words of historian
Geoffery Perret, it was "at least a decade ahead" of any other
force in the world.[31] Yet, slightly less than five years later in Korea,
that same military was fought to a standstill by a fourth-rate power backed
by a third-rate one. The consequences of that stalemate remain with us.

Unsurprisingly, the most likely outcome of rapid, destabilizing changes
inherent in the new technologies will be a mix of advantages and disadvantages.
While the millennium is not at hand, neither is anarchy inevitable. Some
destabilization and consequent violence and suffering is probably unavoidable.
Cooperation in development may help mitigate the causes of instability,
while security cooperation may help deal with its consequences. International
cooperation, especially in the parallel development of these technologies,
may help assure that no states or peoples become desperate at being left
behind, leading to war. But that will not prevent other forms of difficulty.

Most people will eventually adjust and come to accept the future as
routine and ordinary. It is sometimes easy to forget how far we have come
already. In the fifth century, the Bishop of Milan was praised as an advanced
intellectual on the grounds that he could actually read without moving
his lips. The idea that someday reading would be the most basic skill required
of virtually everyone would have been incomprehensible to the good bishop.

All of this adds up to what the ancient Chinese might have called "interesting
times." But remember, they intended that phrase as a curse.

30. Andrew Pollack, "New Technology Promises 'Camera
on a Chip,'" The New York Times, 27 May
1997, "CyberSection," p. 1.

31. Geoffery Perret, There's a War to Be Won: The United States Army
in WWII (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 543.

Thomas K. Adams is a political-military strategist with more than 30
years of experience in all forms of military operations other than war,
including counterguerrilla operations in Vietnam, humanitarian assistance
in Haiti, counterdrug missions in South America, and peace operations in
Bosnia. His recent publications include Special Operations and the Challenge
of Unconventional Warfare (Cass, 1998). His last operational military
assignment was with the NATO stability force in Bosnia. A retired Army
lieutenant colonel, Adams holds a Ph.D. in political science from Syracuse
University, an M.A. in international relations, an M.S.Sc. in social psychology,
and a B.A. in liberal arts.