1Challenge in these appeals is to
the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court
dismissing the First Appeals filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (in short 'CPC'). The First Appeals were filed against
the judgment and decree passed in OS No.285/1984 and OS No.286/1984 on
the file of XXXI Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, decreeing the
suit for specific performance.

Background facts in a nutshell
are as follows:
Two suits were filed by the respondent, which were consolidated. The
respondents as plaintiff sought specific performance in respect of
certain properties which were allegedly agreed to be sold by the
appellants Smt. B. Saroja Devi and her husband Sri B.K. Harsha under the
contract. Since the validity and the genuineness of two agreements
Exhibits P-1 and P-2 were not disputed, the Trial Court was of the view
that the only question which arises for consideration was whether the
respondent was entitled to the relief of specific performance. The Trial
Court came to hold that the respondent-company was always ready and
willing to perform its part of the contract. It was also found that the
two agreements were never revoked or cancelled by the appellants at any
time. Further, it was held that the suit for specific performance was
filed within the period of limitation. The Trial Court further came to
hold that the respondent-company being in possession of the suit
property from 2.5.1974, equality lies in its favour in granting specific
performance and more so, when major portion of the agreement
consideration had already been paid. Therefore, both these suits were
decreed. The High Court as noted above, dismissed the First Appeals.

3. Learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that though the judgment and decree impugned run to
several pages, major part of it consists of the averments and
reproduction of the part of the trial Court's judgment.

4. It is submitted that this was not
an appropriate way for disposal of the First Appeals. It was also
submitted that some of the conclusions were legally unsupportable. It
was submitted that when the suit is for specific performance, the
special features of such a suit have to be kept in view, which has not
been done.

5. Learned counsel for the
respondent on the other hand submitted that the High Court had referred
to the factual and legal position in detail and, therefore, the judgment
and decree do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.

6. It is to be noted that pages 4 to
18 of judgment (in the paper book) are quotations from the Trial Court's
judgment. The quotation was made after briefly referring to the major
issues. Upto page 21 contentions were noted. Learned Single Judge
dismissed the appeals in purported exercise of power under Order 41 Rule
1 CPC. Though strictly speaking, the judgment cannot be said to be in
limine dismissal of the appeals, yet the manner of disposal of the First
Appeals leaves much to be desired. When triable issues are involved, the
appeals should not be summarily dismissed or disposed of in the manner
done. The suit was for specific performance and the Trial Court recorded
findings about adverse possession. That being so, according to learned
counsel for the appellants, triable issues are involved. It was pointed
out that the stand of the appellants was relatable to lack of readiness,
alleged latches, limited novation.

7. A bare reading of the High
Court's judgment shows that there was no serious effort to analyse the
various points raised. It was submitted that there was notice
terminating the agreement. It was categorically stated that plaintiffs
were never ready and willing to fufil their part of contract.

8. The nature of suit for specific
performance of contract has been highlighted by this Court in several
cases. In Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria (2005 (7) SCC 60), it was
inter-
alia observed as under:
"5. Normally, a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale
of immovable property involves the question whether the plaintiff was
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in terms of
Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, whether it was a case for
exercise of discretion by the court to decree specific performance in
terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and whether there were
laches on the part of the plaintiff in approaching the court to enforce
specific performance of the contract. In some cases, a question of
limitation may also arise in the context of Article 54 of the Limitation
Act on the terms of the agreement for sale. Other questions like the
genuineness of the agreement, abandoning of the right to specific
performance, a novation and so on, may also arise in some cases. No
doubt, a finding on the three primary aspects indicated earlier would
depend upon the appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence in the
case in the light of the surrounding circumstances.

6. The right to specific performance
of an agreement for sale of immovable property, when filed, raises
questions of substantial importance between the parties as to whether
the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Section 16 of the
Specific Relief Act, whether it is a case in which specific performance
of the contract is enforceable in terms of Section 10, whether in terms
of Section 20 of the Act, the discretion to decree specific performance
should be exercised by the court and in some cases, whether the suit was
barred by limitation and even if not, whether the plaintiff has been
guilty of negligence or laches disentitling him to a decree for specific
performance. These questions, by and large, may not be questions of law
of general importance. But they cannot also be considered to be pure
questions of fact based on an appreciation of the evidence in the case.

They are questions which have to be
adjudicated upon, in the context of the relevant provisions of the
Specific Relief Act and the Limitation Act (if the question of
limitation is involved). Though an order in exercise of discretion may
not involve a substantial question of law, the question whether a court
could, in law, exercise a discretion at all for decreeing specific
performance, could be a question of law that substantially affects the
rights of parties in that suit."

8. The High Court has also given a
finding regarding adverse possession in a suit for specific performance.
Above being the position, there is total non-application of kind. The
manner in which the appeals were dismissed cannot be said to be proper.

9. Above being the position, the
impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. The matter is remitted to
the High Court to consider the matter afresh. The appeals are
accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.