Multilateralism, but not as we know it: Anglo-American economic diplomacy in South America during the Second World War

Abstract

This article explores the economic diplomacy between the United States and Great Britain in South America during the Second World War. The dominant theme presented in the existing relevant literature on this subject is one whereby the US promoted a multilateral economic system, based on equal access to markets and resources, against the opposition of a British government determined to protect a closed trading system. The situation that arose in South America was markedly different. It was Britain that promoted multilateralism in South America, based on the belief that such a system would provide the surest means of protecting its interests in this region. The US, on the other hand, prioritised security concerns and short-term economic gains over the promotion of a multilateral trading system in its policy towards South America. In exploring this alternative situation that arose in South America, this article represents a challenge to traditional conceptions of Anglo-American economic diplomacy during the Second World War.

Keywords

His research lies in the field of twentieth century international relations, with particular interests in US foreign policy in Latin America and diplomatic relations between the US and Great Britain. He has published widely in these areas, including his recent book Post-War Planning on the Periphery: Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy in South America, 1939-1945 (Edinburgh University Press, 2012). Thomas is currently conducting research exploring relations between the US and Britain in Latin America throughout the twentieth century.

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