The Road From Copenhagen

The drama was of high order. In the decidedly unglamorous side-rooms of Copenhagen’s Bella Center, leaders of the most powerful countries of the world faced off, trying to rewrite the rules for how the world confronts the risk of catastrophic climate change. Thousands in the center and untold numbers around the world awaited the result.

The outcome — a three-page political declaration known as the “Copenhagen Accord” — has been roundly attacked. “The worst development in climate change negotiating history,” said the spokesman for the G-77 block of about 130 developing nations. Greenpeace, which is hardly ever satisfied with anything, declared it “a crime scene with the guilty leaving for the airport.” The London Independent’s front page proclaimed it “a historic failure that will live in infamy.”

These descriptions are ridiculous. The Copenhagen Accord is a serious step forward, if a severely limited one. It starts by establishing a concrete and demanding goal: keeping the rise in global temperature to two degrees Centigrade. Up to now we have been working with a slippery aim of avoiding dangerous harm to the atmosphere. The new objective lets people and governments do the math, and see if their efforts are adding up.

Moreover, for the first time in 17 years of negotiations all the major emitters of greenhouse gases have acknowledged that they have specific individual responsibilities to reduce their emissions.

The Kyoto protocol divided the world into industrialized countries, which had specific obligations to control their emissions, and developing ones, which didn’t. With countries like China and India now becoming major emitters, this no longer makes sense. But the developing countries have clung to it, making international progress impossible. The Copenhagen Accord should end this distinction for good.

Wealthier nations, meanwhile, offered serious money to help poorer states reduce their emissions and adapt to the consequences of climate change.

The accord also makes some progress in establishing the responsibility of all major emitters to transparently report on their efforts, and to cooperate with international analysis of them, in order to demonstrate that their claimed reductions and efforts are real. This was an essential element for any deal to be worthwhile.

Each of these accomplishments, of course, has big limits. The promised Chinese and Indian efforts are not yet commensurate with the risks posed by climate change. The United States still must pass essential climate and energy legislation if it is to meet its stated obligations. There will remain haggling over how the two-degree goal translates into actual emissions. It is unclear where the promised money will come from. The reporting and verification commitments are relatively weak. They will need to be fleshed out carefully over the coming years if they are to meet their potential.

Yet the big picture is that nearly all the countries in the world have, for the first time, agreed on an important set of building blocks for climate cooperation.

The problem with Copenhagen is not that the outcome was meager. It is that the process that produced it is unlikely to deliver an effort that matches the climate danger.

Copenhagen, like earlier rounds of the climate talks, was conducted under United Nations rules that require not only that every one of the 193 participants have a voice, but also that final decisions be made unanimously. The loudest critics in the final phases of the negotiation included Sudan, which can’t even protect its own people, much less the world; Venezuela, which, as a major oil producer should probably recuse itself for having a conflict of interest; and Bolivia and Cuba, who are more interested in political score settling than in dealing with climate change.

The world cannot let marginal or conflicted actors bring all progress to a halt. Efforts must focus first on those with the desire and power to actually solve the problem. When the United Nations tackles nuclear issues with grave consequences, they are handled in the Security Council, or by small groups of critical powers with the means and will to confront them. They are not dealt with by the United Nations General Assembly or by the inclusive and impotent Conference on Disarmament.

Future climate cooperation should be driven by whatever coalitions are best suited to the task. The geometry will differ depending on the specific challenge. Broader representation will be needed to deal with adaptation to climate change, which affects scores of vulnerable countries worldwide. Narrower groups, like the G-20, should become the focal points for efforts to actually reduce emissions.

These groups could report their results to a larger U.N.-wide body and ask for broader support. But change will not come from the present process. The Copenhagen Accord lays a valuable foundation for future action. But, if we are to succeed, that action must primarily happen elsewhere.

Frank E. Loy was undersecretary of state for global affairs and the lead U.S. climate negotiator from 1998 to 2001. Michael A. Levi is a senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations.

A version of this op-ed appears in print on December 24, 2009, in The International Herald Tribune. Today's Paper|Subscribe