I have not read all that much on the crash yet, but since this is a conventional turbo prop, in that the engines are mounted on the wings and are not pushers, prop blast added to the lift of the wing, unlike say tail mounted engines as on a MD-80. When one engine fails, the normal procedure is to keep the aircraft over VMC and add 5% of bank into the operating engine, along with a number of other things. The wing where the operating engine is, especially since at that point it should be at full throttle, will produce more lift and a rolling motion toward the inoperative engine. This is will be coupled with a yawing tendency due to asymmetrical thrust and is why maintaining Vsse or at least over VMC, is so important. For a normal engine out emergency going too slow, the aircraft will normal both roll over and spin. Then also ACTUAL VMC is effected by 7 different criteria, including weight and CG position in addition to the norms like density altitude, amount of thrust on the operating engine, bank angel etc. The wing could have been stalled, but also could have just been rotating due to the differential lift, but again the black boxes should shed some light. Could have pitched up momentarily to miss a building, slowed and then that wing did stall during all of that.

With regard to pulling the good engine, that might have happened and might have happened in one of two ways. Having put a couple of hundred students through their Commercial Instrument Multi and or ATP course, one of the first thing you learn is to "watch the hands", which is why I liked to have a second student along as an observer since the person flying could not look for traffic and if I was watching their hands, I could not watch for traffic. Very common in the heat of the moment for the pilot to "Verify" buy pulling the throttle back, but grabbing the wrong throttle. The second time, is when it is necessary if you can not maintain at least VMC, so the only way to equalize the turning and yawing motion is to reduce the power on the operating engine, such as in a take off with an engine failure below VMC, or what was always termed a V1 Cut. Some aircraft, like the MU-2 Short Body and the Aero Stars are so tricky with an engine out that they are equipped by AD with auto-feather. If the inoperative engine was not feathered, then there would even be more drag on that side creating more of a yawing motion into the inop engine.

Will be interesting to find out all the final details.

Bob

SUPPORTING MEMBER

BobWest Nyack Aviation, L.L.C. New York, New York - East Hampton, New York & Warwick, New York 631.374.9652rkittine@aol.com WA2YDV

TransAsia Airways ordered its ATR pilots to undergo written and oral exams in the next few days to continue flying, CNN reported Friday. The airline also plans to have the 71 pilots take simulator tests, according to the report. The moves come as investigators probe the cause of this week's ATR-72 crash with 58 people on board. Thirty-five have been confirmed dead so far. Taiwan's Aviation Safety Council is examining the flight data recorders and told reporters Friday the crew appeared to have had problems with both engines just before the turboprop, seen on video footage, struck a bridge in a steep bank and crashed into the Keelung River.

The safety council said the stall warning system went off in the cockpit five times starting about 37 seconds after takeoff and the crew could have shut down the left engine in response to a problem with the right engine, CNN reported. Stephen Fredrick, a pilot who had flown ATRs for American Airlines, told CNN the TransAsia ATR appeared to be gliding with at least one engine out, wings level and a slight nose-down attitude before the crash. The Taipei-based TransAsia line suffered an earlier crash in July, when another ATR-72 crashed in Penghu, killing 48 people. That crash is still under investigation.

Pretty normal occurrence in new Multi-Engine candidates. Although when an engine goes out, you do not have a lot of time to react, you do need to go carefully and diligently. Surprised it would roll like that though with both engines not developing thrust, but then again who knows what he may have tried to miss.

Bob

SUPPORTING MEMBER

BobWest Nyack Aviation, L.L.C. New York, New York - East Hampton, New York & Warwick, New York 631.374.9652rkittine@aol.com WA2YDV

I remember not being signed off for my ME Commercial CR before I had feathered the wrong fan. My instructor started laughing and said something about not doing on the checkride what you have hopefully done at least once during training. Rule of thumb: you learn more from doing it here with me than you will from old salt grumpy DPE who will fail your ass before you even thought of shutting down the wrong engine.

Later, when flying 91 Corporate we would frequently fail engines on each other, but only when empty.

Very true. I did not offer guaranteed ratings and used a part 141 training syllabus that required a minimum of 13 hours prior to the CR. All three of my Duchess's had accumulators and rather then simulated Zero Thrust, each student would get at least a few Full Feather tries. Watched a lot of hands in almost 3,000 hours of MEI given.

Bob

SUPPORTING MEMBER

BobWest Nyack Aviation, L.L.C. New York, New York - East Hampton, New York & Warwick, New York 631.374.9652rkittine@aol.com WA2YDV

While I haven't given that many hours of ME dual, I agree with watching many hands during simulated engine outs. One should take ones time when deciphering which engine it is that has failed. I had one real partial engine out on a ferry flight and reacted appropriately due hours of dual given. The worst situation is someone who immediately starts throwing levers before thinking about what they are doing.

The captain of the TransAsia Airways turboprop that crashed in Taipei in February had shut down the working engine when the other failed after departure, Reuters reported Thursday. The pilot, Liao Jian-zong, then caught the error, but it was too late, Taiwan’s Aviation Safety Council said in Reuters' report. The cockpit voice recorder indicated Liao said, “wow, pulled back the wrong side throttle," but in the ensuing confusion the ATR crashed into a river, killing 43 of the 58 people on board. The council determined that Liao attempted several engine restarts before a junior pilot called, ”impact, impact, brace for impact." Liao and the other two pilots aboard were among those killed, Reuters reported.

The council also said Liao failed a simulator check in May 2014 when pursuing his promotion to captain, then passed a second test in June, making captain two months later. An ATR 72-600 instructor noted in November that Liao "may need extra training" for engine failures after takeoff, according to Reuters. He was previously an air force pilot who started flying commercially in 2009 and was hired at TransAsia in 2010, the report said. Since the Feb. 4 crash, TransAsia retested its ATR pilots and on Thursday, the airline’s president said the carrier will improve its training and safety operations.

Pilots of an ill-fated TransAsia Airways ATR 72-600 should have aborted its departure from Taipei Songshan airport after noting that a power-control system had not armed, investigators have indicated.

Flight GE235 crashed into the Keelung river shortly after take-off when the crew inadvertently reduced power from its healthy left-hand engine, instead of the right-hand engine which was exhibiting problems.

Taiwanese investigators have disclosed that the aircraft’s automatic take-off power control system (ATPCS) had not initially been armed when the turboprop began its departure roll.

The system provides automatic support – including uptrim and auto-feathering – in the event of an engine failure during take-off.

Investigators probing the fatal 4 February crash, citing flight-recorder data, state that the monitoring pilot, in the right-hand cockpit seat, declared the ATPCS was not armed about 4s into the take-off roll.

In an interview with the inquiry team a TransAsia crew training supervisor said that ATR 72-600 pilots should abort take-off if the ATPCS is not armed during the roll, and that this point was “emphasised” during pilot training.

This requirement to abort is based on there being several procedures to be carried out if the ATPCS is not armed, which are unsuitable to perform during the take-off run.

But the inquiry points out that this policy of aborting is “not clearly described” in any manuals and notices to flight crew. The situation is further complicated by a policy allowing pilots of ATR 72-500s, faced with the same issue, to continue the take-off under certain conditions.

Just after the standard 70kt speed call, the monitoring pilot exclaimed that the ATPCS had become armed, before the ATR became airborne a few seconds later.

Some 34s into the climb the ATPCS appears to have commanded an uptrim to the left-hand engine, to increase its power, and started auto-feathering the right-hand engine – these actions are the ATPCS system’s normal response to a developing problem in the right-hand powerplant.