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Thursday, 22 February 2018

Julian’s New Concept of Deterrence Effects?

Mission:

Regular
readers of this missive know that it is not my normal practice to post a blog a
day. I am too busy for that.Still, this
morning I sent a memo to a very senior friend and colleague who had asked me to
expand my thinking on a new concept of deterrence outlined in my blog of 13
February entitled MAD Again? Competing in
the New Strategic Arms Race.Therefore,
given I am grappling with a range of ideas on the future of deterrence I
thought I might try and provoke a wider debate in the strategy community by
sharing the memo with you.

Headline:

My aim
is to arrive at a new concept of deterrence by which new and emerging non-nuclear
technologies could be 'bundled' and applied via new strategy and new thinking
to generate deterrent effect across the conflict spectrum in conjunction with
existing Alliance conventional and nuclear capabilities and postures.

THEREFORE, if deterrence is an effect the question I
am posing is thus: could the Alliance generate the same or similar deterrent
effect as nuclear escalation across the low to high yield, SRM to ICBM nuclear
spectrum by matching new strategy with new non-nuclear technology, rather than
return to a form of mutuallyassured nuclear destruction or MAD-ness?

Assumptions:

1.I am concerned that if we simply follow the Russians by matching nuclear
system for system - SRMs, MBRMs, IRBMs, ICBMs – that will not re-set a ‘strategic
balance’ and make the situation even more unstable by destroying treaty
frameworks and with it arms control.

2.By introducing new nuclear systems into Europe such a response could
lead to similar if not more intense 'populism' to that prior to signing of the 1987
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty when the Carter administration wanted
to introduce enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) in the 1970s, and deployed Cruise
and Pershing 2s in the 1980s, to match Soviet SS20s.

3.Such a popular 'revolt' would cause significant political strains within
the polis of already fragile political systems in many European countries,
tense after many years of austerity etc., and would probably split NATO.

4.By introducing Iskandrs, SS-29, RS
28, enhanced A2/AD, advanced nuclear-armed submarines etc. that is
precisely the political calculation Moscow has made. Indeed, such deployments
are part of Moscow’s strategy to offset its relative weakness by exploiting the
'strengths' of what the Putin regimes sees as a far more powerful, but divided
adversary. Given that an adversarial relationship with much of the West is
central to the Kremlin's domestic justification of power it is unlikely that
such a strategy is going to change soon.

New Concept of Deterrence Effects?

My
assertion on deterrence effects can be thus summarised: deterrence is an effect
not a technology or even a capability, even if it is dependent on both. Indeed,
technology is merely a means to a deterrence end. Since the 1950s deterrence
has been dominated by nuclear experts because for decades what might be called 'strategic deterrence' has essentially been about balancing nuclear systems of
mass destruction. Therefore, every nuclear 'hammer' has, by and large, been matched by a matching nuclear 'hammer'. The recent US Nuclear Posture Review
was a continuation of that tradition.

However,
our November 2017 report (GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Report https://www.globsec.org/news/globsec-nato-adaptation-initiative-gnai/)
rightly identified new forms of warfare, and new technologies and new
strategies IN future war, precisely to reduce the threat of such warfare - from
hybrid to hyper via cyber war as we deemed it. In that context, si vis pacem para bellum (‘if you want
peace prepare for war’) requires entirely new thinking (si vis pacem bellum cogita, or If you want peace think about war) about strategy, technology, capability and
effects.This is not least because such
new thinking would play to ‘our’ strengths and thus enable the Alliance to set
the deterrence agenda, not simply respond to agendas set elsewhere.

Hypothesis

Given my assumptions my central hypothesis is thus:

1. The
primary weakness of the Alliance deterrence posture is the lack of a heavy
'conventional' reserve force able to support front-line states in strength,
quickly, and across a broad conflict spectrum in a crisis and during an
emergency, if the threat comes from several directions at once.

2. Such
threats would see an attack from Russia to the east, chaos and terrorism to the
south of the Alliance, and attacks within Alliance states, allied to
sophisticated and co-ordinated efforts to generate popular discord via disinformation and attacks on critical infrstructures, and thus undermine an effective and coherent response.

3. Such
a threat would be dangerously exacerbated if the US was also engaged
simultaneously in a major crisis elsewhere, such as in Asia-Pacific.

4. Even
if the Americans, Canadians, and possibly the British, could despatch a heavy
reserve force simultaneously to the East, North and South of NATO's European
theatre the infrastructures to transfer such forces across the Atlantic/Channel
quickly, receive them effectively and efficiently, and then transport them rapidly
into the Area of Operations (AOO) simply do not exist.

5. Much
of the ‘Main Force’ assigned to the NATO Command Structure either exists only
on paper, or is incapable of acting (see “German Army Problems ‘dramatically bad’”
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43134896)

6. To
offset what I call the 'deterrence gap or deficit' the reflex tends to be to
resort to nuclear weapons. Indeed, first and early use of such weapons was
the central assumption of Alliance deterrence during the Cold War on NATO's
Central Front when our forces were a) not as extended as far to the east as
they are now; and b) the south was relatively more stable, thus enabling a vaguely
credible conventional Main Effort.

7.
Resorting early to nuclear escalation in Alliance defence strategy would be a
political trap for all the reasons I explain above. The political consequences
for strategy could thus be the weakening of political solidarity
upon which credible deterrence and defence stands at the Schwerpunkt
or decisive climax of a pre-war crisis, dangerously weakening, not strengthening, Alliance deterrence.

Desired
Deterrence Outcomes?

1.My desired deterrence outcome is a natural follow on to our NATO
Adaptation Report. The strategic 'bandwidth' that could be applied to
generating credible deterrence seems to be expanding exponentially due to
emerging technologies.

3.Such technologies should be allied to new thinking on the possible application of critically disruptive strategies and
technologies able to exploit systematically the seams that exist with an
adversary - societal, political, economic, as well as critical infrastructure
destruction and disruption.

4.The legitimate counter-argument would be to question the applicability of such technologies
and the time it would take to develop and deploy them, not least because NATO
Europe is so bad at fielding times for new systems.

More
thinking and work needs to be done on a new concept of deterrence effects, which
I will do. However, to my mind what is urgently needed is that such new
thinking takes place, and not only by me.

About Me

Julian Lindley-French is Senior Fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, Director of Europa Analytica & Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington DC. An internationally-recognised strategic analyst, advisor and author he was formerly Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy,and Special Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden. He is a Fellow of Respublica in London, and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington.
Latest books: The Oxford Handbook on War 2014 (Paperback) (2014; 709 pages). (Oxford: Oxford University Press) & "Little Britain? Twenty-First Strategy for a Middling European Power". (www.amazon.com)
The Friendly-Clinch Health Warning: The views contained herein are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution.