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Monday, March 19, 2007

Thoughts On Free Will

The recent discussion Paul’s been having on compatibalism reminded me of an argument by Arthur W. Pink in The Sovereignty of God. This argument is addressed to believers (sorry, atheists who wish to respond—this is an intramural discussion) who have a problem with the Calvinistic understanding of the sovereignty of God:

Friend, was there not a time when you walked in the counsel of the ungodly, stood in the way of sinners, sat in the seat of the scorners, and with them said, “We will not to have this Man to reign over us” (Luke 19:14)? Was there not a time when you “would not come to Christ that you might have life” (John 5:40)? Yea, was there not a time when you mingled your voice with those who said unto God, “Depart from us; for we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways. What is the Almighty, that we should serve Him? and what profit should we have, if we pray unto Him?” (Job 21:14, 15)? With shamed face you have to acknowledge there was. But how is it that all is now changed? What was it that brought you from haughty self-sufficiency to be a humble suppliant, from one that was at enmity with God to one that is at peace with Him, from lawlessness to subjection, from hatred to love? And, as one “born of the Spirit,” you will readily reply, “By the grace of God I am what I am” (I Cor. 15:10). Then do you not see that it is due to no lack of power in God, nor to His refusal to coerce man, that other rebels are not saved too? If God was able to subdue your will and win your heart, and that without interfering with your moral responsibility, then is He not able to do the same for others? Assuredly He is. Then how inconsistent, how illogical, how foolish of you, in seeking to account for the present course of the wicked and their ultimate fate, to argue that God is unable to save them, that they will not let Him. Do you say, “But the time came when I was willing, willing to receive Christ as my Saviour”? True, but it was the Lord who made you willing (Ps. 110:3; Phil. 2:13); why then does He not make all sinners willing? Why, but for the fact that He is sovereign and does as He pleases!

One point I would focus in on is the personal aspect Pink brings up. Everyone is born a sinner in rebellion against God, and as such “a non-believer.” Each of us—even those of us who were saved at a young age—knows what it is like to be in rebellion against God. The question is rightly asked: “What was it that brought you from [that state] to one that is at peace with Him…?”

The common reply of “I was willing to receive Christ” begs the question. Why did one become willing? What is it that was involved in the mechanics of your choice? The choice is not made in a vacuum—if it were, it would be a random, arbitrary choice, morally no different than flipping a coin.

Yet we know that when we chose Christ, it was because we desired Him. We longed to be with Him. We wanted fellowship that only He could give us.

In short, the choice was made only after we found Christ desirable. We could not have chosen Christ if we hated Him for such a choice would go against our nature! We could only choose Him then if we are coerced into doing so. But that is not how we know we were saved. We did not choose Christ grudgingly or against our desires; we chose Him after our very hearts were already turned toward Him! We chose that which we most desired.

The choice, therefore, was nothing but a reflection of what was already present in our heart.

Scripture is clear that we are born at enmity with God (Romans 8:5-8). This explains why those who are disbelieve refuse to submit to God’s law. Yet something must occur within us to change us from hating God to loving God. This change cannot be the choice we made to follow Christ for, again, that choice can only be made after the change has already taken place.

The common Arminian refrain, “I’m elected because I selected” echoes hollowly when you realize that your being—your nature—began to love Christ before you chose Him. Your selection had nothing to do with your altered nature; your altered nature dictated your selection.

78 comments:

I think a more accurate characterization of the Arminian "refrain" would be that in his normal state, man has no desire for God or even the ability to desire a relationship with God. But a Christian grasps faith through enabling prevenient grace and the hearing of the Gospel of Christ. And that through that faith obtains grace and a transformed nature.

It still may not carry the day, but its closer to what Arminians I know seem to believe. They certainly are no pelagianists.

Layman wrote:---It still may not carry the day, but its closer to what Arminians I know seem to believe. They certainly are no pelagianists.---

I actually had in mind a specific individual who uses the term "I'm elected because I selected"...

But I have no problem labeling him a Pelagian either :-D

I also find it interesting you brought up the concept of prevenient grace, which tends to be a Weslyan belief. Aside from the logical problems involved in that system, I've always wondered: if it is morally permissible for God to move a sinner from depravity to neutrality, why is it immoral for Him to move a sinner from depravity to regenerate? What is the moral distinction between the two?

As to the concept that God moves men to a neutral "middle ground" where they can choose Him...this only manages to turn choice into a random coin flip once more. After all, if a person is truly neutral between two positions, what basis does he have to choose one over the other; and can such a choice actually be considered morally culpable?

Moving to a neutral middle ground doesn't solve the problem; it in fact creates the problem.

I actually had in mind a specific individual who uses the term "I'm elected because I selected"...

But I have no problem labeling him a Pelagian either :-D

Fair enough -- though the reference to the "common Arminian refrian threw me off -- but if he is a Pelagian then he is no Arminian.

I also find it interesting you brought up the concept of prevenient grace, which tends to be a Weslyan belief.

From what I have read, the doctrine of preceding grace goes back to Arminius; preceding Wesley by many years. But it is true that Wesley and his theological descendants are one of the most notable streams of Arminian theology.

Aside from the logical problems involved in that system, I've always wondered: if it is morally permissible for God to move a sinner from depravity to neutrality, why is it immoral for Him to move a sinner from depravity to regenerate? What is the moral distinction between the two?

This seems to me a false dictotomy. I don't argue that God is immoral if Calvinism is true or that Arminianism is true (if at all) because it has the "moral" view of God.

And perhaps I am mistaken, but most Arminians seems to hold that everyone is moved to having a freed will capable of reacting to the Gospel. That is, the "common grace" accepted by most Calvinists does more than just keeps us all from murdering each other, but provides us with a "freed will" in terms of choosing faith, though not sufficient to live a regenerated life.

Calvinists, on the other hand, see only a few moved from depravity to regeneration.

Admittedly, some Arminians I have read suggest that giving all a chance matches better our understanding of a loving God than does, say, double election. But even those have said that if they were proven wrong from an exegetical stand point that they would have to reconcile Calvinism with the truth that God is a loving deity.

As to the concept that God moves men to a neutral "middle ground" where they can choose Him...this only manages to turn choice into a random coin flip once more. After all, if a person is truly neutral between two positions, what basis does he have to choose one over the other; and can such a choice actually be considered morally culpable?

Most Arminians that I know do not believe everyone is put on the exact same footing. Neutrality as I guess you've decided to call it. Preceding or prevenient grace simply makes the decision possible. A child raised in a Christian home is obviously going to be more likely to develop faith than is a child in the old Communist CCCP that was raised an atheist.

But perhaps your point was broader than articulated and was meant to claim that the very concept of making a decision is irrational or unsupportable. That would be, I suppose, what some call hyper-calvinism and would not be accepted by many Calvinists I have known or read.

Moving to a neutral middle ground doesn't solve the problem; it in fact creates the problem.

Since most Arminians I know do not posit a "neutral" ground then perhaps they have not created an additional problem. On the other hand, if you contend that the very idea of decision-making is an illusion -- even when enabled by the Grace of God -- then I suppose you would have a point, if you are correct about that.

The specific person I was thinking of regarding the "I'm elected because I selected" comment was none other than the Great and Magnificant Ergun Caner, PBUH. You can read Gene's response here.

I only ask because it's hard to respond to "Arminians I know believe X..." in any meaningful manner.

Anyway, you said:---And perhaps I am mistaken, but most Arminians seems to hold that everyone is moved to having a freed will capable of reacting to the Gospel.---

And how has what I've written not responded to this concept already? What does it mean to be "capable of reacting to the Gospel"? Firstly, they are capable of reacting to it BEFORE God's grace does anything!

I think what you mean is that Arminians think God's grace allows people to respond favorably to God's Gospel...but that again falls into the very argument I've been making.

In it's most simplistic form: One can only choose an option if one desires it. The desire precedes the choice.

Thus, in the above Arminian concept, one can only be moved by God's grace to respond favorably if God changes you to the point where you desire Him. In which case, you've reached regeneration.

Moving on, you said:---Calvinists, on the other hand, see only a few moved from depravity to regeneration.---

Actually, Calvinists don't put a number on it. God elects whom He elects.

You said:---Most Arminians that I know do not believe everyone is put on the exact same footing. ---

And this is where it breaks down using the "Most Arminians that I know" tactic. Every single Arminian I know has said that God does give everyone an equal "chance" at salvation. The entire argument hinges on the fact that it's not "fair" for God to treat one person differently than another.

So, we can offer competing "Arminians I know" claims...but what will that get us?

For the intents of our current discussion, you apparently acknowledge that God does not treat everyone equally. This is fine and dandy. What more needs to be said on it? :-)

You said:---On the other hand, if you contend that the very idea of decision-making is an illusion -- even when enabled by the Grace of God -- then I suppose you would have a point, if you are correct about that. ---

I don't understand what you mean by "an illusion" here. That something is misunderstood by many does not make it an illusion when you point out the truth of the matter. In point of fact, it's only if you accept choice based on the nature of a person that you can have any meaningful choice in the first place. That is, unless you're a Calvinist you do have an illusory choice.

>Yet something must occur within us >to change us from hating God to >loving God. This change cannot be >the choice we made to follow Christ >for, again, that choice can only be >made after the change has already >taken place.

If this was a valid argument, nobody would ever change their mind about anything without supernatural intervention.

Not sure what you mean. If you want to take this up a notch and have the patience, we can start referring to what actual published scholars self-identifying as Armenian or Calvinist are saying.

The specific person I was thinking of regarding the "I'm elected because I selected" comment was none other than the Great and Magnificant Ergun Caner, PBUH. You can read Gene's response here.

Fine. I hope my confusion was understandable. When you speak of a "common Arminian refrain" I think it is a general response rather than a response to what one unnamed person who claims not to be an Arminian says. I'm not trying to rag on the imprecise terms here, just explain that I was offering what I thought was a better explanation of Arminian belief. If I thought this was a response to one scholar I probably would not have commented at all.

And how has what I've written not responded to this concept already? What does it mean to be "capable of reacting to the Gospel"? Firstly, they are capable of reacting to it BEFORE God's grace does anything!

You've removed the comment from the context. I was responding to your assumption that my comments or Arminianism was based on the notion that Armininiasm envisioned a moral God whereas Calvinism envisions an immoral God. My first response was that I did not believe that to be a basis for Armininiasm and my second response -- which is the one you selected -- was that Arminians might find it more consistent to believe in a loving God that gives all the possibility of choosing God rather than a loving God who decrees hell for most humans.

In any event, I do not understand your last comment. Are you saying that Calvinism affirms that man can respond affirmatively to the Gospel without any affect of grace on man's will?

I think what you mean is that Arminians think God's grace allows people to respond favorably to God's Gospel...but that again falls into the very argument I've been making.

I thought I made that clear. Yes, Arminiams believe that prevenient grace allows a favorable response to the Gospel.

In it's most simplistic form: One can only choose an option if one desires it. The desire precedes the choice.

Thus, in the above Arminian concept, one can only be moved by God's grace to respond favorably if God changes you to the point where you desire Him. In which case, you've reached regeneration.

You seem to be playing definitional games here. Arminians believe prevenient grace allows a person to want to, and to have, faith in God. Regeneration and salvation follow that choice. Simply having faith is not enough to earn a person's salvation. That is, apart from God's predestination of those who have faith to regeneration and salvation.

Actually, Calvinists don't put a number on it. God elects whom He elects.

Yes, and most Calvinists believe God elects some, not most or a majority, right?

And this is where it breaks down using the "Most Arminians that I know" tactic.

It is not a "tactic." Though I have some sympathies I have not yet declared for either side in this debate, but I have read a number of scholars and commentators on both sides. Rather than obligate myself to positions I have not yet embraced, I thought I'd refer to my best understanding of the commonalities of people I have read on the Arminian side, such as Robert Picirilli, Vic Reasoner, Roger Olson Jerry L. Walls, and Joseph R. Dongell. I didn't have time to go back and give you chapter and verse for every one, but perhaps we can do that in the future if we do in fact disagree over what Arminians believe.

And it is an odd criticism considering that you admit that the basis for your "common Arminian refrain" was in fact the comment of one person who denies being an Arminian. I was perfectly happy deeming this just an imprecise comment the kind of which we are all guilty of from time to time, but should I know deem it some sort of rhetorical tactic?

Now, is this going to remain pleasant or are you going to assume nefarious methods in my comments?

And this is where it breaks down using the "Most Arminians that I know" tactic. Every single Arminian I know has said that God does give everyone an equal "chance" at salvation. The entire argument hinges on the fact that it's not "fair" for God to treat one person differently than another.

So, we can offer competing "Arminians I know" claims...but what will that get us?

For the intents of our current discussion, you apparently acknowledge that God does not treat everyone equally. This is fine and dandy. What more needs to be said on it?

I was not espousing my own personal beliefs, but what I understood to be Arminianism. Arminians believe that God equally extends prevenient grace to all, but that not all will respond to it equally. There are different life circumstances, backgrounds, inclinations, desires, and reasoning that will and does result in different circumstances.

What is your authority -- other than what unnamed and perhaps un-self-identified Arminians say -- for the proposition that Arminians hinges on the belief that God must give every single person the planet an exactly equal chance to choose him? Because my reading has focused on seeing God as more loving when he gives everyone a chance and does not predestine them to hell than when he predestines some to heaven and most to hell.

I don't understand what you mean by "an illusion" here. That something is misunderstood by many does not make it an illusion when you point out the truth of the matter. In point of fact, it's only if you accept choice based on the nature of a person that you can have any meaningful choice in the first place. That is, unless you're a Calvinist you do have an illusory choice.

So there is only choice if the nature of a person compels them to go down a certain path? Sounds like saying a broken steering wheel that only turns left means that you chose to make that last turn east when you were heading south.

"If this was a valid argument, nobody would ever change their mind about anything without supernatural intervention."

Horrific argument.

The argument Pike brings up is valid because of the premise that we are dead as sinners, unable to respond favorably to God's Son. In order for our desire to move from rejection to acceptance of God's Son, a change must take place.

If I change my mind from wanting Lucky Charms for breakfast to wanting Cocoa Puffs, then I don't need the Holy Spirit's regenerative work to bring about this new decision because I don't need to be regenerated in order to do so.

I originally said:---Yet something must occur within us to change us from hating God to loving God. This change cannot be the choice we made to follow Christ for, again, that choice can only be made after the change has already taken place.---

Orthodox responded:---If this was a valid argument, nobody would ever change their mind about anything without supernatural intervention.---

As Paul already pointed out, this is a hasty generalization as well as a non sequitur.

My argument was that in order to choose something one must have a desire for that thing. A person originally starts out hating X, and then later he loves X--a change has occured.

Taking it out of the realm of soteriology for a minute, let us suppose we are dealing with something trivial here. I'll give a personal example. When I was a kid, I hated eating green peppers. I despised them, would try to feed them to the dog when given them, etc. Now, I like them.

My tastes changed as I grew up. This change was not caused by any supernatural force. Thus, already, your argument falls flat on its face.

That turning from a heart of stone to a heart of flesh requires a supernatural change does not mean all changes in a person's nature require a supernatural change.

Thus, my argument remains. A person must change from a state of being at enmity with God to loving God so that he can then choose to follow God. How this change occurs is irrelevant to the necessity of that change occuring, so again my point stands.

Layman said:---When you speak of a "common Arminian refrain" I think it is a general response rather than a response to what one unnamed person who claims not to be an Arminian says.---

Firstly, you are making too much of a big deal over absolutely nothing here. The quote I gave was meant to remind people who have had past experience already with Caner about this. The quote itself is not the argument I gave.

Secondly, you seriously have no concept of the extent of Caner's influence in the SBC via such institutions as Liberty University, etc. Caner is also not speaking in a vacuum here--he has many allies who are saying the same thing in many pulpits. Again, I refer you to Gene's article if you'd like to familiarize yourself with the history here.

You said:---Are you saying that Calvinism affirms that man can respond affirmatively to the Gospel without any affect of grace on man's will?---

No, I said that man can respond to the Gospel. He has this ability. He will always respond negatively until he is regenerated, but a negative response is still a response.

You said:---I thought I made that clear. Yes, Arminiams believe that prevenient grace allows a favorable response to the Gospel.---

Then, once again, I point out that I already addressed this notion.

You said:---Arminians believe prevenient grace allows a person to want to, and to have, faith in God. ---

Then we have a problem. If prevenient grace causes a person to have faith in Christ, then this is no different than the special elective grace Calvinists refer to.

So what is it that prevenient grace (PG) actually does? Again, my original questions stand: 1) If PG can move a depraved person to a neutral person (defined as someone who could go either way), what reason is there that it couldn't go the one extra step further and actually tip the person toward Christ? 2) If a person truly is in a neutral standpoint where his nature is no longer bent toward depravity, but it is likewise not bent toward Godliness, then how can such a person make any choice?

Dancing around with the concept of PG solves nothing for the Arminian. The problems only mount.

You said:---Now, is this going to remain pleasant or are you going to assume nefarious methods in my comments? ---

You said:---What is your authority -- other than what unnamed and perhaps un-self-identified Arminians say -- for the proposition that Arminians hinges on the belief that God must give every single person the planet an exactly equal chance to choose him? Because my reading has focused on seeing God as more loving when he gives everyone a chance and does not predestine them to hell than when he predestines some to heaven and most to hell.---

The section I highlighted in bold should be sufficient to demonstrate the contradiction in the above.

You said:---So there is only choice if the nature of a person compels them to go down a certain path?---

Yes. This is the definition of choice. Choice is doing what you want to do.

What do you want to do? What your nature desires you to do.

If your choice is not based on this nature, it's just an arbitrary coin-flip. To deny that choice is based on nature is to deny choice completely.

"Yes. This is the definition of choice. Choice is doing what you want to do.

What do you want to do? What your nature desires you to do.

If your choice is not based on this nature, it's just an arbitrary coin-flip. To deny that choice is based on nature is to deny choice completely."

First as to the definition of *choice*. Most people do not define it as merely "doing what you want to do." In the infamous Frankfurt cases people do what they want to do though they do not have a choice as the intervener will intervene and make sure they do a particular action. Choice presupposes actually available alternatives. If the person is unable to choose from available alternatives he has no choice. When someone says "I had no choice . . .' they mean that they did not have alternatives but could only do one action. Where there are not alternatives there is no choice. So if you are going to talk about choices then you will be talking about alternatives from which the person may select.

Second, as to nature determining what you want to do. We choose based upon reasons. Human nature partly consists in being creatures capable of deliberation, thinking, and performing our own actions. When we perform our actions usually we do so for reasons. And what we want to do also involves our reasons as well as doing what we consider important.

Third, our choices are not based solely upon our nature but upon reasons. A false dilemma is presented here: either your choice is based on your nature OR your choice is arbitrary like a coin-flip. Obviously people do not want to charaterize their choices as arbitrary like a coin flip, so then they *must* conclude that their choice is based on their nature. And according to Peter to deny this "is to deny choice completely." There is a third option: our choices are not based upon our nature nor are they arbitrary random events, rather, they are choices based upon reasons.

In philosophy they call this agent causation: the agent causes his own actions based upon reasons. Considering that agent causation is the view of the more sophisticated non-calvinists (e.g. J. P. Moreland)you should not ignore this view of human action. If you want to build straw men then continue to present the false dilemma of choices based upon nature or choices being completely arbitrary. If you want to engage the stronger non-calvinists, then deal with agent causation and the view that actions are performed for reasons.

Firstly, you are making too much of a big deal over absolutely nothing here. The quote I gave was meant to remind people who have had past experience already with Caner about this. The quote itself is not the argument I gave.

Well frankly it still boggles my mind that you seemed to think I was missing an obvious point when in fact you created the exact perception I accepted.

And I turned it back on you because you seemed more intent on attacking my "tactics" than engaging in some real discussion. Why this turned sour so quick surprised me. You seem to treat questions or comments about Calvinism with the same contempt your co-bloggers treat atheists and skeptics. You also seem to switch topics/arguments quickly or accept use terms in a distinct manner without acknowledging the shifting grounds of the discussion or the common understanding of the terms. I have noted such arrogance among some, but by no means all, Calvinists, but expected something more here.

Secondly, you seriously have no concept of the extent of Caner's influence in the SBC via such institutions as Liberty University, etc. Caner is also not speaking in a vacuum here--he has many allies who are saying the same thing in many pulpits. Again, I refer you to Gene's article if you'd like to familiarize yourself with the history here.

Like I said, if I knew you were picking on one guy -- no matter the extent of his influence in Southern Baptist circles -- I wouldn't have added a corrective elaborating on what Arminians believed. I would have thought, "Okay, I have no idea who that guy is so I won't try to clarify what that guy believes." Instead, I thought, "Hmmmm, that is at best an oversimplification of Arminian belief, so I'll add a corrective."

No, I said that man can respond to the Gospel. He has this ability. He will always respond negatively until he is regenerated, but a negative response is still a response.

Are you seriously saying you did not know what I meant? Or are you trying to educate me by feigning ignorance about my intention so you can claim definitional high ground?

If you know we are likely to disagree about the meaning of terms, just come out and state so clearly and provide your definition.

Then, once again, I point out that I already addressed this notion.

If you think so, fine. My whole point was to clarify Arminian belief, not refight issues here that have been a source of ongoing theological discourse for hundreds of years.

Then we have a problem. If prevenient grace causes a person to have faith in Christ, then this is no different than the special elective grace Calvinists refer to.

According to Arminianiasm, previent grace is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith. So it obviously is not the same thing as irresistible grace. Arminianism seems to require a more libertarian notion of "choice" whereas Calvinism requires a deterministic approach to "choice."

So what is it that prevenient grace (PG) actually does? Again, my original questions stand: 1) If PG can move a depraved person to a neutral person (defined as someone who could go either way), what reason is there that it couldn't go the one extra step further and actually tip the person toward Christ?

I tried mightily to say the person is not moved to neutral ground. My efforts apparently have been ignored.

If you are asking why PG couldn't simply be compelling grace, my answer is that it would no longer be preceding grace. But if your question is simply could not God skip that step and just use compelling grace, then my answer is that I believe God can do that if he desires. But surely you realize that simply because something is hypothetically possible does not make it true.

Most Christians have not believed that the Bible teaches that. But I accept the high authority of scripture and if convinced that irresistible grace is true, will accept that. If convinced that is it not Biblical, then I will not accept it.

2) If a person truly is in a neutral standpoint where his nature is no longer bent toward depravity, but it is likewise not bent toward Godliness, then how can such a person make any choice?

Again, I did not say it was a neutral standpoint. Remember?

But it is obvious that you have a fundamental difference of opinion with Arminians in that your are a determinist and they are not.

Dancing around with the concept of PG solves nothing for the Arminian. The problems only mount.

Not that you have shown. The "problem" only mounts if you deny that a person can make a choice about something. Simply saying you "choose" what your nature requires you to choose is to say there is no choosing at all, only causal factors. That may be an accurate description of the human condition, but that does not mean that "choice" or "choose" is an accurate term to describe the condition.

I was clear. First, because of your claim that my attempts to articulate Arminian beliefs as simply a "tactic." Second, because you still seem to think I was missing the obvious about your comment about a "common Arminian refrain" when you meant, "what one scholar says about this" when that scholars denies being an Arminian.

The section I highlighted in bold should be sufficient to demonstrate the contradiction in the above.

It does not. Saying people are given an opportunity to do something is not the same as saying all people have the exact same probability or chance of making the decision. Everyone has the opportunity to vote Republican in this country, but for various reasons not all are equally disposed to make that choice.

Yes. This is the definition of choice. Choice is doing what you want to do.

Perhaps when stated as a tautology. This is like saying that the cow in the Restaurant at the End of the Universe that invited the patrons to eat her had a choice. It is one way of describing the invitation, I suppose, but not what is generally understood by the term "choice."

What do you want to do? What your nature desires you to do.

So you do accept complete determinism. But since you choose to label that determinism as involving choice, I guess that makes you a compatabalist. That's fine and from what I understand is necessary for Calvinism, but it is not an assumption I am ready to embrace or that you have demonstrated.

Henry said:---First as to the definition of *choice*. Most people do not define it as merely "doing what you want to do."---

A) This goes to the same thing I pointed out with Layman re: "most people I know say blah blah blah."

B) Even if "most people" did not define it that way, this does not affect my argument.

You said:---In the infamous Frankfurt cases people do what they want to do though they do not have a choice as the intervener will intervene and make sure they do a particular action. Choice presupposes actually available alternatives. If the person is unable to choose from available alternatives he has no choice.---

I disagree. It would depend on why a person would be unable to choose from available alternatives. Naturally, if we speak of coersion we know that is not a "free choice"; but you can still have internal restrictions in place that keep specific alternatives from being viable without affecting free choice.

To take a specific example: the average heterosexual (not bisexual) when given the available alternative of having sexual relations with a member of the same sex would find that option so inconsistent with his desires as to never engage in that action. This is because he finds the behavior revoltion, abhorent, or whatever. Does this mean he has no choice in refusing to engage in homosexual behavior? Such would be a very odd definition of choice indeed if that were the case!

No, indeed we say that he freely chooses not to engage in that behavior since A) he is not being externally coerced into doing it and B) he does as he pleases.

Suppose hypothetically then that someone has put in place a system whereby if this person does engage in homosexual relations he will be killed for doing so; further suppose that this person knows this threat. None of that alters the fact that the homosexual relationship is not something he would choose in the first place. It is not a viable option because it is contrary to his nature and not because someone forces him to refrain from taking that choice.

You said:---When someone says "I had no choice . . .' they mean that they did not have alternatives but could only do one action. ---

Firstly, why would a person have "no choice" in a matter? If it is due to someone else acting (for instance, a mugger putting a gun to his head and demanding his money) we know that his choice has no moral impact--he has been coerced. On the other hand, if he has no choice because that is who he is--like a psychopath who says he has no choice but to kill--he retains his guilt. The morality of the restricted choice is determined by what restricts the choice.

By the way, I would argue that it is impossible to actually get to the point where there is only one theoretical action available. There may often be times when there is only one action you would be willing to do, but there always remain options you are not willing to do, so your restriction of options is artificial in the first place.

You said:---Second, as to nature determining what you want to do. We choose based upon reasons.---

And:---Third, our choices are not based solely upon our nature but upon reasons.---

Which is the same point restated. However, your problem is in making the dichotomy between our nature and our reasons. Reasons are not "things" that are out there; reasons are subjective and thus are dependent upon our nature in the first place.

(Note: I say "reasons" are subjective, not "reason" itself.)

Hitler had reasons for hating the Jews. We may disagree with them, but Hitler still had them. We may condemn them as immoral reasons (and they are), but Hitler did not view them this way. His nature was evil; he therefore had evil reasons for acting. His reasoning pursuaded him to do as he did. This is what the depraved mind does: it causes you to choose depraved things.

Thus, your third option is really just a restatment of my original option when you say:---There is a third option: our choices are not based upon our nature nor are they arbitrary random events, rather, they are choices based upon reasons.---

Since our reasons are determined by our nature, then we are yet again left with the difference between nature and random choices.

>My argument was that in order to >choose something one must have a >desire for that thing. A person >originally starts out hating X, and >then later he loves X--a change has >occured.

Apparently the Calvinists here believe that were God to micro-manage our every action via continual adjustments to our nature, then that would be compatibilism. So if God wants us to eat that Pizza, he just makes us a bit more greedy, or if he wants Pilate to crucify Jesus, he injects Pilate a bit more callousness to get the job done. This apparently is a "compatibilist" model of God's sovereignty, because the person is doing what their nature desired.

If someone says to me: what are my choices? Or, what are my options? We both understand this to mean that the person is talking about a situation where he has more than one option, or alternative available to him. We are talking about the reality of choice. This is both common sense and common usage in regard to the word "choice". As I said earlier: "Choice presupposes actually available alternatives. If the person is unable to choose from available alternatives he has no choice."

Peter disagrees. If we cannot agree as to the meaning of a term such as choice, then we cannot discuss things very well.

I can guess as to why Peter disagrees. As a theological determinist, a Calvinist, who also holds to compatibilism, he feels the need to define acting freely as being actions which are uncoerced and involve doing what we want to do. Compatibilists since Hobbes have held these same definitions. Compatibilists since Hobbes have also denied that free will includes the ability to choose from among alternatives.

If he were consistent with his theological determinism he would admit that if all events are predetermined then the reality of choice is an illusion. In each and every situation we find ourselves we may think that we could actually choose from among available alternatives, but in reality, since every event is predetermined, we can only do the one action which we were predetermined to do in a particular situation. And if we are only able to do that one action, then we do not have a choice. We may be acting without coercion, and we may be doing what we want to do, but we do not have a choice. In order to have an actual choice, actual alternatives must be available and doable.

Sometimes I wish theological determinists were more forthright about their view. If they were, they would openly admit that since everything is predetermined we have no real choices. But if they were that forthright, most people would reject their view. So they have to present it as if they believe in acting freely as most people understand it. So they use terms like "free will", free agency, acting freely, doing what you want to do, and so on, all attempting to convince people that their exhaustive determinism does not eliminate the reality of choice.

As theological determinists they also want to point to the *determining* factor which determines our actions. For Peter this is our *nature*. So our *nature* determines our actions. Because of his commitment to *nature* as the determining factor he presents his false dilemma that our actions are either caused by *nature* or they are random arbitrary events.

Peter left out the third option, that our actions are caused by ourselves, by us choosing to do actions for reasons. This notion of human action called agent causation does not claim that our actions are due to an abstraction such as our *nature*, but are done by *us.* *Our* actions are done by our self, our soul, whatever term you prefer really does not matter. The point is that our actions are not caused by an abstraction, but by *us*. We are responsible for our own actions because they are *our* own actions. This view of human action is common sensical and reflected in our language (e.g. first person versus third person) and experienced by us directly countless times.

And yet some will ignore all of the evidence for agent causation and try to present some other factor that determines our actions. For secularists it is our *brains*. For theological determinists it is our *natures* which are further determined by God's all encompassing plan. Some are suggesting that the determining factor is our genes. For others it is our environment. It just cannot be *us*.

It is significant that the theological determinist cannot be consistent with his own beliefs. In spite of the fact that his exhaustive determinism if true, precludes the possibility of choices. He will nevertheless speak of choices and choosing our action.

Peter asks: "Firstly, why would a person have 'no choice' in a matter?"

Let's see, if everything is predetermined by God, then you can only do what He has predetermined for you to do, so you have no choice in the matter. So the answer to your own question is your own preferred system of belief.

Peter goes on to to say: "By the way, I would argue that it is impossible to actually get to the point where there is only one theoretical action available. There may be times when there is only one action you would be willing to do, but there always remain options you are not willing to do, so your restriction of options is artificial in the firt place."

Has Peter forgotten his theological determinism here? If God predetermines every event, then not only is it possible to be at a point where only one action is available, it is a necessary state that we always find ourselves in (i.e. in each and every situation the only action available to us is the one action God has predetermined for us).

Why is it that theological determinists cannot own up to their own view and stop claming that we have choices from among actually available alternatives? Instead they have to masquerade behind terms like compatibilism, soft determinism, acting freely, acting without coercion, doing what you want to do, and doing what our nature determines us to do. Instead of being open about what they really believe, they speak of choices like everybody else. They speak of options in a situation like everybody else. They are "borrowing from the world view" of the noncalvinist. They are using capital from another system of thought. And if they speak of choices and alternatives in situations do they do so because that is reality, or is part of the compatibilist masquerade?

If he were consistent with his theological determinism he would admit that if all events are predetermined then the reality of choice is an illusion. In each and every situation we find ourselves we may think that we could actually choose from among available alternatives, but in reality, since every event is predetermined, we can only do the one action which we were predetermined to do in a particular situation. And if we are only able to do that one action, then we do not have a choice.

**********************

But in reality, we can only make one choice at a time even if our choices were not predetermined and we had a variety of live options.

So why, even on your own grounds, is it necessary to have a number of unexemplified alternative possibilities if the choice you make is the choice you were going to make all along?

Steve begins: "But in reality, we can only make one choice at a time even if our choices were not predetermined and we had a variety of live options."

So Steve would you agree that in order for us to actually have "a variety of live options" that our actions could not have not been predetermined? Or put it another way: in order for us to actually be facing a choice in which we could select from "a variety of live options" our action could not be predetermined. Or could it be predetermined and yet we still have "a variety of live options before us"?

Steve can we ever have "a variety of live options before us" if everything has been exhaustively predetermined by God?

Steve went on to write: "So why, even on your own grounds, is it necessary to have a number of unexemplified alternative possibilities if the choice you make is the choice you were going to make all along?"

I need some clarification to make sure that I understand your question here. What are "unexemplified alternative possibiities"?

Also, what do you mean to say when you say "the choice you were going to make all along"?"

"All along"? Does that mean that when I make a selection from among alternatives that I had this decision in my mind as long as I have been conscious? How long is "all along"? And what are you suggesting by this phrase?

Orthodox said:---Apparently the Calvinists here believe that were God to micro-manage our every action via continual adjustments to our nature, then that would be compatibilism. ---

I'm blinded by your sheer brilliance. While you're at it, can you tell us what the Calvinists here believe about the quality of Persian rugs, the quantity of Prozac on sale these days, or at least the proper means with which we ought to worship Star Trek? I only ask because you have this great ability of not reading words and coming to amazing conclusions, so I figure you can find something one of us said to answer the above. And I'd really like to know if I'm "in the TR fold" ya know...

Orthodox continued:---So if God wants us to eat that Pizza, he just makes us a bit more greedy, or if he wants Pilate to crucify Jesus, he injects Pilate a bit more callousness to get the job done.---

Since Calvinists in Orthodox's universe don't believe in Total Depravity, I suppose he's correct, eh? I mean, it's not like anyone would ever say that God doesn't need to make someone more evil--that the only good in anyone is due to the grace of God already. I mean, no Calvinist has EVER said such a thing.

Surely, we must await in anxious anticipation yet more brilliance from Orthodox!

Henry said:---If someone says to me: what are my choices? Or, what are my options? We both understand this to mean that the person is talking about a situation where he has more than one option, or alternative available to him.---

So philosophical usage is determined by colloquial usage now?

Henry said:---I can guess as to why Peter disagrees. As a theological determinist, a Calvinist, who also holds to compatibilism, he feels the need to define acting freely as being actions which are uncoerced and involve doing what we want to do. Compatibilists since Hobbes have held these same definitions. Compatibilists since Hobbes have also denied that free will includes the ability to choose from among alternatives.---

So you're admitting that I have a philosophical background to my position.

Henry said:---If he were consistent with his theological determinism he would admit that if all events are predetermined then the reality of choice is an illusion. ---

Here's where you beg the question as to the definition of "choice" though. Choice isn't an illusion when it's defined as "doing what you want to do." It's only an illusion in your view; but I can hardly be "consistent with his theological determinism" if I were using your definitions instead of the definitions provided by compatibalism. That would, in fact, be the defintion of inconsistency.

Henry said:---Peter left out the third option, that our actions are caused by ourselves, by us choosing to do actions for reasons. ---

Except I've already shown that this third option is the same option as saying our nature determines our choices. What is the difference, Henry, between saying "Our nature determines our choices" and saying "People determine their choices"? What is a person if not the attributes of their nature?

Henry said:---And yet some will ignore all of the evidence for agent causation and try to present some other factor that determines our actions. For secularists it is our *brains*. For theological determinists it is our *natures* which are further determined by God's all encompassing plan. Some are suggesting that the determining factor is our genes. For others it is our environment. It just cannot be *us*.---

And what is "us"? Just something magical out there? Define it for us please.

Henry said:---Let's see, if everything is predetermined by God, then you can only do what He has predetermined for you to do, so you have no choice in the matter. So the answer to your own question is your own preferred system of belief.---

Which again relies on his smuggling in his definition of "choice" and pretending that it is the correct one. Henry wins by default with no need to actually validate his position.

Henry said:---Why is it that theological determinists cannot own up to their own view and stop claming that we have choices from among actually available alternatives?---

Why is it that you cannot address my arguments and look at the issue I presented already?

Steve can we **ever** have a "variety of live options before us" if everything has been exhaustively predetermined by God?

Steve wrote: "Whether you subscribe to determinism, predeterminism, or indeterminism, there is only one actual future."

Ok, Molinists, Arminians, Open theists, atheists, whomever, will agree that there is only one actual future. As you make this point repeatedly, what is your point?

The more interesting statement by Steve was:

"Hence there is only one future choice you were actually going to make."

A famous example of the fallacy of complex question is: "have you stopped beating your wife?" The question as stated already contains a questionable assumption: that in fact the person has already been beating his wife. Similarly, Steve's statement here has an assumption that needs to be brought to light and exposed. In a completely predetermined universe, of the kind which Steve as a Calvinist believes to be the case: there is never a situation in which a genuine choice occurs as there is never a situation in which genuine available alternatives exist. In each case, the person doing an action cannot do multiple actions but can only do the action which God predetermined for them to do in a particular situation. A future choice like the one to which Steve refers in his comment can only occur in a universe which is not completely determined. But Steve wants to assume that a genuine choice could occur in a completely predetermined universe.

If all events are predetermined by God there are no choices between alternatives in the future. If all events are predetermined by God then there is not "only one future choice you were actually going to make." This is true because there will be NO SITUATIONS IN WHICH A GENUINE CHOICE OCCURS (or could occur). There may be actions which we do in that completely predetermined future, but NOT CHOICES. Steve's system of theological determinism in which every event is predetermined by God precludes, eliminates the possibility of actual choices occurring in the future.

If Steve were consistent with his own system of exhaustive determinism he would rewrite the sentence to better state what he believes (and what his system leads to) as:

"Hence, there is only one future action you were actually going to make [in any given situation in the future]."

To speak of a choice actually occurring in the future, when his system does not allow for the reality of choices, is inconsistent and irrational. To speak of future choices as if they are real is to again borrow from the non-Calvinist world view.

Steve wrote: "This is irrespective of what preconditions you posit for that outcome."

Again, there will only be one actual future. But this comment raises an interesting issue. If genuine choices exist in the future for us, then the preconditions that make those choices possible would include: actually avaiable alternatives, a self capable of making a choice between alternatives, a self whose every action is not predetermined, and the falsity of exhaustive determinism. So Steve's system of theological determinism would have to be false for there to be actual choices in the one actual future.

Steve also asked: "That being the case, why do you assume that freedom of opportunity or freedom to do otherwise is morally essential or even morally significant?"

First, if God desired to create persons capable of actual choices He would create reality in such a way that the preconditions necessary for actual choices would be present. If that is what God sovereignly decided to do, then that is the way that things would be. He does as He pleases so if *that* is his "design plan" for human persons then that is the way things are. Another reason is that our assessments of actions as blameworthy or praiseworthy involve consideration of whether or not the person could have, should have done otherwise, when they performed a particular action. If we know that a person had reasons to be fearful about doing the right thing, and so could have done otherwise. And yet they did do the right thing, it was their choice to do the right thing we assess this as praiseworthy.

Another reason is that in order to be a person, we must be capable of doing our own actions. If we have no choices, but simply act like machines or chemical reactions, how are we persons?

Consider two different worlds. In one world, no persons or agents exist, everything is merely physical inanimate objects and the laws of physics. In such a world there would be no persons and no choices would occur. If we have another world where persons who are capable of choosing their own actions exist, then in this world choices would be possible. God desired to create a world in which persons capable of their own actions and choices exist: this actual world in which we find ourselves.

What makes a person an individual is his/her own actions being up to him/her. If the intentional action is not up to me, then it is not my action. And if the action is up to me, then I can both do a particular action or refrain from doing that action. If my actions were all predetermined then my actions are not up to me. It also seems that when God created us in His image, this includes being individual persons capable of performing our own actions.

Henry said:---Steve can we **ever** have a "variety of live options before us" if everything has been exhaustively predetermined by God?---

I don't think you're thinking this through at all. The predetermination of God is irrelevant in the above. I could just as simply ask: "Can we **ever** have a 'variety of live options before us' if everything has been exhaustively foreknown by God?" If God foreknows it, regardless of whether He ordains it, the future cannot be other than it will be. Thus, you cannot have an actual choice as you've constructed the term.

Thus, unless you are an Open Theist who would deny God's omniscience, you have the same "problem" (not that it actually is a problem, since the only problem is that you don't understand either philosophy or theology).

By the way, regarding the idea of "future choices"--the future only exists for time-based creatures, not for the atemporal Creator of all things. There is no "future" choice for you from His perspective. The future is just as solid as the past is. It will not deviate from what it will be because, in God's mind, it's not future at all! This is true even if you deny God's foreordination of all things.

So I merely ask you, Henry, to clear the slate for us. Are you an Open Theist?

If so, then this discussion we are currently having is not the discussion we need to be having as there are more foundational problems between our positions. If not, then you will need to jettison your arguments, for they undermine your own position.

Peter has problems with my use of the word *choice*. The normal and ordinary meaning for the word is to select, pick, or choose from among avaiable alternatives. Now if Peter does not like the word *choice* then let's use a different word for this phenomena of choosing, selecting, picking from among alternatives. I like the word "choice" as it is the word that virtually everyone uses to refer to this phenomena.

I just want to use the word that nearly everyone uses except Peter with his idiosyncratic meaning of doing what we want to do. "Doing what we want to do" does not adequately capture the meaning of a "choice" involving selection from alternatives.

Peter writes: "Here's where you beg the question as to the definition of 'choice' though. Choice isnt' an ilusion when it's defined as 'doing what you want to do.' It's only an illusion in your view; but I can hardly be 'consistent with his theological determinism' if I were using your definitions instead of the definitions provided by compatibilism."

Compatibilism provides the definition of *free will* as being actions in which we are not coerced and doing what we want to do. But I am not talking about the definition of free will in compatibilism but about the meaning of the word "choice". Peter is confusing the phrase "free will" and the word choice.

Peter seems to want to hijack and change words so that they fit the system that he wants to defend and protect. Cults do the same thing, they take common christian words and redefine them completely differently. Peter wants to do that with the word "choice". He also wants to do so with the word "nature" as he writes:

"Except I've already shown that this third option is the same option as saying our nature determines our choices. What is the difference, Henry, between saying 'Our nature determines our choices' and saying 'People determine their choices'?"

So now the agent causal theory of human action is identical to Peter's theory of nature determining our actions?

When a agent theorist like Plantinga speaks of a person causing their own actions he does not say that we are determined by our natures. According to Peter now, his theory of nature determining our actions is the same as the agent cause theory of people like Plantinga and Moreland! Obviously Peter is attempting to equate two very different notions of human action. Peter do you even know the theory of agent causation? That you could suggest that it is identical to your theory of nature determining actions suggests you do not know the differences between the two.

I had talked about how various theories attempt to claim that our brains, or our genes or our environment or our nature determines our actions and had said: "It just cannot be *us*."

Peter responds to this with: "And what is 'us'? Just something magical out there? Define it for us please."

Nonbelievers such as Hobbes, Hume, Dennett, Flanagan, and Honderich have all attacked the agent causal theory ridiculing the idea of a *self* or *human soul* performing actions. They speak of it being so strange and mysterious. They mock what christians have believed for centuries that we have both immaterial and material aspects to our being. When the bible speaks of "absent from the body present with the Lord", what is it referring to? The human soul. "Us" is the plural of the singular "I" or "Me". Nonbelievers mock the reality of the human soul and now Peter does so as well. But this should not be surprising as compatibilists usually have disdain for both dualism and the agent causal theory of human action.

Peter goes on to say: "Which again relies on his smuggling in his definition of 'choice' and pretending that it is the correct one. Henry wins by default with not need to actually validate his position."

How can I be smuggling the definition of choice when I am simply using the almost universal standard meaning of the term? I am using the most open and obvious meaning of the word available and Peter suggests that I am engaged in some sort of covert operations. He also says that I am pretending in regards to the meaning of the word "choice". Pretending? Just check any dictionary or any source you want that defines words and you will find that "choice" refers to selection from among alternatives, not doing what you want to do.

Regarding "winning" by default, I am only suggesting we use the common meaning for the word choice. What the real issue is not the meaning of the word choice but a major problem with Peter's theological determinism. If his view is correct, then God has predetermined every event which occurs and so there is no possibility of choices ever occurring. That is what needs to be brought into the open. But Peter hides behind his "compatibilism" and idiosyncratic meanings for common words so that we do not see this necessary implication of his view.

I believe that some events are predetermined some are not. So in my view there can be real genuine instances of choice. Peter believes in exhaustive determinism, in a system in which God ordains whatsoever comes to pass. It is this system that eliminates the possibility and reality of choice, that is the real issue. The words people use to cover this up are the real smuggling operation are the real pretending. Perhaps that is why Kant described compatibilism as that wretched subterfuge. Or as one of my friends labels it: the semantic shell game played by calvinists.

Henry seems to have a problem thinking outside his own little box. For purposes of this discussion, I’m not presenting or defending my own theological position. Rather, I’m posing a more general, philosophical question as it bears on his underlying assumptions.

On any view you take, whether libertarianism, soft determinism, or hard determinism, there is only one actual future. So there is only one action you were going to perform.

This doesn’t depend on whether you always intended to do that. It doesn’t depend on a particular chain of causality.

Rather, I’m merely posing a question about the fact that there is only one actual future, and hence, only one future action that you can take at a time, in which case, that’s the only thing you were ever going to do.

If that is the case, then why is it morally significant to have unexemplified alternative possibilities? Alternatives which you were never going to act on.

Suppose you're given an apparent choice between Door A and Door B.

Unbeknownst to you, Door A is locked. So you didn't have a "genuine" choice. You couldn't go through Door A even if you wanted to.

Yet, suppose you choose Door B. And since you choose Door B, that was the only door you were going to choose. That's the only door you were ever going to choose.

In that event, what does it matter if Door A was locked or unlocked?

It would only matter if you tried to choose Door A. If you tried to open Door A, and failed, because it was locked.

"Frankfurt cases people do what they want to do though they do not have a choice as the intervener will intervene and make sure they do a particular action. Choice presupposes actually available alternatives. If the person is unable to choose from available alternatives he has no choice."

First, Frankfurt is a libertarian; so, so much the worse for your 'every one agrees on A" appraoch here.

Furthermore, Kane, arguably one of the top libertarian writters today, has admitted FSC work.

FSC are imported to undercut the alleged notion that "ability to do otherwise" is required for moral responsibility.

"When a agent theorist like Plantinga speaks of a person causing their own actions he does not say that we are determined by our natures. According to Peter now, his theory of nature determining our actions is the same as the agent cause theory of people like Plantinga and Moreland!"

And compatibilists have said that in some sense we cause our actions. And the we can be a metaphysical substance. Substance dualism isn't unique to libertarianism.

The debate hinges upon "ultimately responsible for who we are." Quite obviously, there are numerous factors that were outside our control and that could have turned us into different sort of agents. Say, our parents beating our heads when we were younger.

Given God's sovereignty and providence, it is he who is ultimately responsible for who we are in the sense of determining our nature. There are countless things that could have happened which would have made you a different agent. God directed and ordained that the events which make you who you are today would obtain rather than other ones. But, as Fischer has shown (say I), this doesn't take away moral responsibility.

The external conditions, outside our control, are causal sustaniers in that they contribute to the causally necessary conditions for the individual's being the way he is and behaving the way he does. Libertarians seem to want us to have *total* control. But, as has been pointed out by many, this is the illusion, not the "free will" of compatibilism.

At any rate, all your talk about PAPs is refuted by the likes of FSCs. I've seen no adequate rebuttal to them, other than reasserting your notion of free will. Indeed, to invoke your kind of argumentation, most men on the street would say that S chose to kill S*, and S is morally responsible for killing S*, even thou if S wouldn't have pulled the trigger a man would have pushed a button making him do it. The man didn't push the botton, though. Most laymen I have talekd to agree that S chose to do what he did.

Peter wrote: "I don't think you're thinking this through at all. The predetermination of God is irrelevant in the above. I could simply ask: 'Can we **ever** have a 'variety of live options before us' if everything has been exhaustively foreknown by God?' If God foreknows it, regardless of whether He ordains it, the future cannot be other than it will be. Thus, you cannot have an actual choice as you've constructed the term."

In answer to *your* question, we can have choices in the future if everything has been exhaustively foreknown by God.

You assert that to give this answer: "I don't think you're thinking this through at all." Actually your claim here applies to a lot of people: to anyone who believes that exhaustive foreknowledge and the reality of choices can exist simultaneously.

Peter goes on to say: "Thus, unless you are an Open Theist who would deny God's omniscience, you have the same 'problem' (not that it actually is a problem, since the only problem is that you don't understand either philosophy or theology).

Peter now puts me down claiming that I "don't understand either philosophy or theology."

And why am I being put down by Peter? Because I am claiming the reality of choices in the future. So he sees my claim as showing that I have not thought things through at all and I don't know anything about philosophy and theology.

If Peter is correct then some very intelligent christians are just as unknowledgeable about philosophy and theology as I am. If we believe Peter then people like Alvin Plantinga, J.P. Moreland, William Craig, Thomas Flint, Alfred Freddosso, and other molinists are in the same boat. As are Thomists and Arminians. Actually, anyone who believes in both divine exhaustive foreknowledge and the reality of choices is just as unthinking and ignorant as I am according to Peter. Put another way, all non-calvinists who believe in foreknowledge and choice but are not calvinists are in the same boat.

Peter will never arrive at the level of Plantinga or some of the others, but because they think differently than he does, they just haven't thought things through or they just don't know anything about philosophy and theology.

Peter Plantinga deals with your argument on pgs. 66-73 of his small but well thought out and certainly informed on philosophy and theology book titled GOD, FREEDOM AND EVIL. Have your read it?

It is significant that Peter wants to know if I am an open theist. My problem with open theism is that they deny that God has exhaustive foreknowledge. It is interesting that both open theist and calvinists appeal to the same argument to support their view: there cannot be choices in the future if God has exhaustive foreknowledge. So the open theists keeps choices and rejects foreknowledge while the calvinist keeps foreknowledge and rejects choices. They are opposite extremes on the theological spectrum. In the middle of these two extremes, holding that both foreknowledge and choices are real, are people like Plantinga, other molinists, Thomists, Arminians, and myself.

There are interesting parallels with the way cults deal with the trinity. One side throws out the truth that God is one God and ends up with tritheism. The other side throws out the the truth that God is three persons, so they end up with modalism. The truth is that God is both one God and that He exists in three persons. But for those who reject the truth, they end up on one extreme or the other. Calvinists and open theists do the same thing. They present either/or positions (either you hold to choices and not foreknowledge/open theists, or you hold to exhaustive foreknowledge but not choices). I say that it is both/and, I hold to both of these truths and see evidence in both scripture and experience that God does know the future and at least sometimes we do have genuine choices.

Peter wants to attack this as not thinking things through and being ignorant of both philosophy and theology. Actually, the shoe is on the other foot here. I trust that people like Plantinga et al have done a lot more careful thinking on this subject than Peter has.

Steve is right in stating that Henry cannot think outside of his own little box. The very fact that he cannot understand philosophical and technical definitions of words demonstrates this sufficiently.

Henry says:---The normal and ordinary meaning for the word [choice] is to select, pick, or choose from among avaiable alternatives.---

And yet as soon as one applies this concept in a technical manner, it falls to pieces. That most people do not think technically and use words loosely does not alter the technical definition of the word. Steve and I have both given several examples where the word "choice" is used by everyday people despite there not being any actually available alternative choices.

Henry accuses me of hijacking the term; yet it is Henry who refuses to deal with the term in a technical manner, relying on the ambiguity of "common use" to overthrow the concrete implications of the term.

In point of fact, Henry hasn't engaged a single one of my arguments yet. Instead, he only poisons the well by trying to link my position to non-Christian and cultic positions! I could just as easily respond that this is the sort of tactic a non-Christian cult member would engage in...but what would be served by such avoidance of the issue?

Finally, Henry wants to duck out completely from the issue of how decisions are made. When I asked him to define the "us" that makes choices, he says the "us" refers to the soul. But this doesn't answer the question.

Henry: what are the attributes of the soul? How is it possible for the soul to make a decision? What is the basis by which a soul decides anything? What determines how a soul will act?

You seem to be saying that nothing does; a soul simply determines itself. But how does it "determine" itself? Does it not do so based on the make-up of the soul itself? Is this not the same thing as saying the nature--the ontology--of the soul determines what the soul will choose?

These questions don't disappear just because Henry says, "The soul determines itself."

Steve writes: "Henry seems to have a problem thinking outside his own little box."

I am not the one who has God in a box claiming that he cannot know the future choices of human persons unless he predetermined all of them. That is your imaginary box,not mine.

Steve went onto write: "Rather, I'm merely posing a question about the fact that there is only one actual future, and hence, only one future action that you can take at a time, in which case, that's the only thing you were ever going to do.

If that is the case, then why is it morally significant to have unexemplified alternative possibilities? Alternatives which you were never going to act on."

So you are asking *why* it is morally significant to have "alternatives which you were never going to act on"?

Seems to me the more important question is whether alternatives to the actions which we choose to perform ever exist (or are doable). It is no use discussing why these unrealized alternatives exist, if it has not been first established that alternatives exist when we decide from among alternative actions. This is why I have been discussing the reality of choices. Choices cannot exist unless alternatives exist because to make a choice, select, decide, is to do so from among available alternatives.

In my previous post I gave some reasons why alternatives are important for moral purposes, and you chose to ignore them all.

But let's assume that choices do occur and that alternatives do exist including *unemplified alternative possibilities".

First their existence is a real indicator of the reality of choices. To have unchosen alternatives also means there are alternatives that we can choose, that we could have done otherwise. The presence of both alternatives we choose to do and alternatives that we did not choose to do, but could have done, is good evidence for the reality of choices.

Second, the presence of "unexemplified alternatives" can be instructive at times. When we *regret* what we have done, we are thinking about alternatives that we did not choose and probably should have chosen. We can learn a lot from our regrets and our past ommissions (e.g. next time I will not make that mistake again, I will do what I didn't do that other time). Regret by the way presupposes that we could have done otherwise, that we had a choice, and that we believe that we chose wrongly.

When Jesus is about to be arrested he claims that he could call a legion of angels to deliver him. Did he do so? NO. But his appeal to an "unexemplified alternative" is evidence of His power and authority.

In the so-called warning passages in Hebrews, assuming rightly, that we cannot lose our salvation. Some calvinists will speak of these warnings as pointing to "unexmplified alternatives" that are useful for sanctification purposes. So again, "unexemplified alternatives" can be instructive.

In the story of Keilah where David is told about what would happen if he stayed (an unexemplified alternative), based on this information he then decides to leave Keilah. Knowing the "unexemplified alternative" was useful for him to know.

Steve then gives an illustration similar to Locke's sleeping guy locked in a room. All that illustration shows is that our alternatives can sometimes for various reasons be limited or even eliminated. We need to distinguish between our capacity to make choices and what alternatives are actually available in a particular situation. The alternatives may vary from person to person and situation to situation. The Frankfurt cases are imaginative thought experiments showing that a particular alternative may not be available and yet the person can still be held responsible for the actions which he does.

But none of this has much of a bearing on what I have been emphasizing, which is that exhaustive determinism eliminates the reality of choices.

I have asked you repeatedly if you think there are ever situations in which actual choices can occur if every event has been predetermined by God and you won't answer that question. That is the more interesting issue for me, than "unexempified alternatives."

“I am not the one who has God in a box claiming that he cannot know the future choices of human persons unless he predetermined all of them. That is your imaginary box,not mine.”

Henry appears to have difficulty sorting out who said what. In the course of this thread, I’ve never said whether God’s foreordination is or is not a prerequisite for his foreknowledge.

i) Since, however, he raises the issue, I would note that, in Isaiah 40-48, God’s foreordination is a prerequisite for his foreknowledge. God knows the future because he planned it, and nothing can thwart his plan.

So my box is the Bible.

ii) And, of course, an open theist would say that Henry is putting God in a box by insisting that God must know the future to control it.

“Seems to me the more important question is whether alternatives to the actions which we choose to perform ever exist (or are doable).”

How is that more important if their existence is morally inconsequential?

“It is no use discussing why these unrealized alternatives exist, if it has not been first established that alternatives exist when we decide from among alternative actions.”

Sigh. Someone else who can’t follow his own line of reasoning. Traditionally, the primary appeal of libertarianism has been the intuition that alternate possibilities are necessary to ground responsibility.

Now, Frankfurt-type examples of the sort mentioned by Manata have forced some libertarians to reconstruct libertarianism.

So the question of whether alternative possibilities are morally significant is quite germane to the case for or against libertarianism.

After all, it’s not as if we enjoy independent access to alternate possibilities. For even if these “exist” (whatever that means), they cannot be simultaneously realized—otherwise they wouldn’t be *alternate* possibilities. So even if we could act on one, we cannot explore all of them. Therefore, we have no direct evidence for the existence of alternate possibilities.

Hence, the arguments for their existence are indirect, such as arguing from responsibility to alternate possibilities.

“This is why I have been discussing the reality of choices.”

You don’t get to dictate the terms of the discussion.

“Choices cannot exist unless alternatives exist because to make a choice, select, decide, is to do so from among available alternatives.”

This simply begs the question in favor of libertarianism. And, as Peter has pointed out, it also equivocates over what makes a choice a choice.

“In my previous post I gave some reasons why alternatives are important for moral purposes, and you chose to ignore them all.”

Yes, because they’re nullified by the question I’m asking, unless you can answer it.

“The presence of both alternatives we choose to do and alternatives that we did not choose to do, but could have done, is good evidence for the reality of choices.”

You don’t have any evidence for that since you can only make one choice at a time. Hence, you don’t know if the other apparent options were live options or not. You never tried that doorknob.

One of the problems is that you’re confounding imagination with alternate possibilities. The fact that you can imagine alternative scenarios, and the further fact that this figures in your moral or rational deliberation, does not, of itself, mean that you could actually have done otherwise.

“Regret by the way presupposes that we could have done otherwise, that we had a choice, and that we believe that we chose wrongly.”

No, it merely presupposes an active imagination. We can imagine having done otherwise.

“When Jesus is about to be arrested he claims that he could call a legion of angels to deliver him. Did he do so? NO. But his appeal to an ‘unexemplified alternative’ is evidence of His power and authority.”

You’re tacitly assuming that divine and human freedom are analogous. The fact that Jesus could do something doesn’t me that you or I could do the same thing.

“In the so-called warning passages in Hebrews, assuming rightly, that we cannot lose our salvation. Some calvinists will speak of these warnings as pointing to ‘unexmplified alternatives’ that are useful for sanctification purposes. So again, ‘unexemplified alternatives’ can be instructive. In the story of Keilah where David is told about what would happen if he stayed (an unexemplified alternative), based on this information he then decides to leave Keilah. Knowing the ‘unexemplified alternative’ was useful for him to know.”

A Calvinist doesn’t deny alternate possibilities. That’s not the question.

The question, rather, is whether these possibilities are indexed to the agency of man or God.

From a Reformed standpoint, a counterfactual is something that could have been otherwise had God chosen to decree otherwise.

“But none of this has much of a bearing on what I have been emphasizing, which is that exhaustive determinism eliminates the reality of choices.”

Another one of Henry’s problems is the assumption that by merely annexing an adjective to a noun, like *real* choices or *actual* choices, he has presented a metaphysically tenable or meaningful distinction.

“I have asked you repeatedly if you think there are ever situations in which actual choices can occur if every event has been predetermined by God and you won't answer that question.”

This is simplistic. Can a man choose contrary to what God has decreed? No. Are the reprobate free to either believe or disbelieve the gospel? No. Can the saints in heaven commit apostasy? No. Can the damned repent? No. Can Pharaoh resist the hardening of God? No.

On the other hand, human beings are free to follow their strongest desire as long as they have the opportunity to do so.

Paul begins with: "First, Frankfurt is a libertarian; so, so much the worse for your 'every one agrees on A' approach here."

Are you sure about Frankfurt being *libertarian* I thought that he was a compatibilist. I will have to check further on that.

Paul goes on to say: "FSC are important to undercut the alleged notion that 'ability to do otherwise' is required for moral responsibility."

Sure that was his goal, no problem with that.

Paul wrote: "Substance dualism is not unique to libertarianism."

Right, I was making the point that the nonbelieving compatibilists consistently attack the notion of an immaterial human soul. They make fun of it as strange and mysterious and Peter makes the same point about this mysterious thing out there.

Paul wrote: "The debate hinges upon 'ultimate responsible for who we are'."

I was not discussing ultimate responsibility, but more simply whether or not choices are real and can occur in situations including the future. God is *ultimately responsible* for everything as the creator of everything. But ultimate responsibility is not my issue here: the reality of choices is my concern here. I am sure that you are also aware of ultimate causation versus proximate causation. The reality of choices relates to proximate causation, not ultimate causation.

Paul wrote: "Libertarians seem to want us to have 'total' control. But as has been pointed out by many, this is the illusion, not the 'free will' of compatibilism."

Which libertarians are you referring to? Do you have quotes supporting that? The libertarians that I know and have read (that are christians) are quite aware of us not having "total control."

The extremes are "total control" and "no control". Most will speak of **some** control. If we do not have any control over our actions then they are not our actions and we are not responsible. When people are held responsible it is related to things over which they had *some* control. So it is a straw man to claim that libertarians seem to want us to have total control. I have not heard Plantinga or Moreland or others say or write that.

Paul wrote: "At any rate, all your talk about PAP's is refuted by the likes of FSC's. I've seen no adequate rebuttal to them, other than reasserting your notion of free will."

FSC's do not refute the reality of choices. If you think that that is what they do then you do not properly understand them. They are aimed at showing that someone can be held responsible for an action when (in that circumstance) they could not have done otherwise. They do not eliminate the reality of choices and to suggest that they do so, is to overreach quite a bit.

Regarding rebuttals to them, you apparently are not aware of the literature, and there is a lot related to FSC's. Widerker has a good book on this subject and even Kane whom you mentioned has some good arguments against FSC's. Just one example of something you ought to read is Stewart Goetz "Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question." Goetz shows very clearly that the FSC's beg the question against the libertarians by assuming the truth of causal determinism. Goetz takes on Fischer and Hunt and McKenna very well in that article. You can get if off the web.

I find it interesting that you want to argue against the reality of choices based upon your theological determinism. You do so in spite of the fact that you experience choices all the time. For example in writing your post you chose the words you would use, the arguments you would present, the order of presentation, etc. etc. And all of these choices were up to you and chosen without any supernatural intervention.

Even when you attack the reality of choices you are engaging in choices. This means that making choices is something that is inescapable for human persons. The issue is not whether or not we will make choices, rather, the issue is whether or not our choices are God-honoring.

The minute that you open your mouth or write anything you are engaging in a series of choices. You also could have chosen not to speak or write, or to speak or write later. Choices, choices, choices. They are absolutely inescapable. Unfortunately for the theological determinist, he cannot account for the reality and experience of these choices because his exhaustive determinism eliminates the possibility of choices. Yet he continues making choices daily.

Jeremy from Parableman, a Ph.D candidate, notes here that: "The first principle is called the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). Harry Frankfurt famously argued against this principle (I think successfully) but still thinks you can meet condition 2 without having alternative possibilities, so he considers himself a libertarian. He just only adopts the second condition."

But, it gets worse. Even those you've cited above, like Bill Craig for example, aren't on your side here. They note that FSCs show that the idea of "ability to do otherwise" is not necessary for moral responsibility. Thus Craig,

"It is plausible that so long as a person’s choice is causally undetermined, it is a free choice even if he is unable to choose the opposite of that choice. Imagine a man with electrodes secretly implanted in his brain who is presented with the choice of doing A or B. The electrodes are inactive so long as the man chooses A; but if he were going to choose B, then the electrodes would switch on and force him to choose A. If the electrodes ﬁre, causing him to choose A, his choice of A is clearly not a free choice. But suppose that the man really wants to do A and chooses of his own volition. In that case his choosing A is entirely free, even though the man is literally unable to choose B, since the electrodes do not function at all and so have no effect on his choice of A. What makes his choice free is the absence of any causally determining factors of his choosing A. This conception of libertarian freedom has the advantage of explaining how it is God’s choosing to do good is free, even though it is impossible for God to choose to sin, namely, His choosing is undetermined by causal constraints. Thus, libertarian freedom of the will does not require the ability to choose other than one chooses." - William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity (Wheaton 2001), 261–262.

So, to present your side has a united front on the matter, and that "everyone" agrees with these prephilosophical notions, is either ignorant or dishonest. I don't think it's the latter. (And, no, saying *you're* ignorant of the issues is not the same as saying, say, *Plantinga* is ignorant. So, don't try the same sophistic trick on me as you tried on Pike.)

Paul goes on to say: "FSC are important to undercut the alleged notion that 'ability to do otherwise' is required for moral responsibility."

Henry retorts:Sure that was his goal, no problem with that.

Paul responds by saying: This comment isn't really helpful to the dialogue. No response would be better than just concurring with what I said while not providing any substantive counter.

Paul wrote: "Substance dualism is not unique to libertarianism."

Henry counters:Right, I was making the point that the nonbelieving compatibilists consistently attack the notion of an immaterial human soul. They make fun of it as strange and mysterious and Peter makes the same point about this mysterious thing out there.

Paul comes back: But this is not what Peter was doing. He was trying to present a biblical understanding of an agent. At any rate, to pretend that libertarians alone say that it is really S who chooses action A, while Calvinists don't, is to simply show an ignorance of what Calvinists say. It is *S* who does *A* and not God pulling our strings. So, Peter is importing something like Jeremiah's concept of man: "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." See, it is *S* that does evil, but S is more than just a simple substance without any desires or predetermined nature causally determining S's actions.

Paul wrote: "The debate hinges upon 'ultimate responsible for who we are'."

Henry complains:I was not discussing ultimate responsibility, but more simply whether or not choices are real and can occur in situations including the future. God is *ultimately responsible* for everything as the creator of everything. But ultimate responsibility is not my issue here: the reality of choices is my concern here. I am sure that you are also aware of ultimate causation versus proximate causation. The reality of choices relates to proximate causation, not ultimate causation.

Paul responds: I was discussing it. It directly bears on your claims about "agent causation." You admit God is ultimately responsible for everything. Well, your choices are things, and God is ultimately responsible for them. Your "self" is a thing, and it chooses based on its likes and desires, and God is ultimately responsible for this, as you admit. Anyway, who says our choices aren't real? That I chose A over B, and I chose A because of my desires, doesn't mean I didn't make a choice. You seem to think that S can only chose A, if it is possible that S could have done otherwise. But, this idea has been refuted. Even libertarians and Molinists agree. I've not seen it interacted with here, and so, despite your protests and assertions, I deny your constraints on choices.

Paul wrote: "Libertarians seem to want us to have 'total' control. But as has been pointed out by many, this is the illusion, not the 'free will' of compatibilism."

Henry walks into it:"Which libertarians are you referring to? Do you have quotes supporting that? The libertarians that I know and have read (that are christians) are quite aware of us not having "total control."

The extremes are "total control" and "no control". Most will speak of **some** control. If we do not have any control over our actions then they are not our actions and we are not responsible. When people are held responsible it is related to things over which they had *some* control. So it is a straw man to claim that libertarians seem to want us to have total control. I have not heard Plantinga or Moreland or others say or write that."

Paul responds: First, there are non-Christian libertarians who say that total control, or, complete causation of self, is necessary for moral responsibility.

Second, which Calvinists say that we have "no control" over our choices? If we don't say this, then how is your point a point against compatibilists?

Third, if your choice is in your control, then it is caused (otherwise you have uncaused events, and you're not responsible). Call what caused your choice A, and A was thus in your control. Is A caused? it must be, or else it's not in your control. So, what caused A? Call it B, a previous event. Now, what caused B (B must be caused, else it's not in your control)? Call it previous event C. So on and so on....

But what's your response? That your choice wasn't caused by a prior event, but it wasn't uncaused either? It was caused *by you.* But your choice was not caused by anything prior, and it wasn't completely random either. So, your will wasn't caused to cause. This is why van Inwagen calls free will a mystery, and just thinks the other views (i.e., compatibilism) are bigger mysteries.

But what about the event of your self-causing it? Is this event caused or uncaused? it seems we'd have the same regress as above. Now, you can either admit the regress, or say that your causing the event is not itself an event. I think this is ad hoc.

Paul wrote: "At any rate, all your talk about PAP's is refuted by the likes of FSC's. I've seen no adequate rebuttal to them, other than reasserting your notion of free will."

Henry responds:FSC's do not refute the reality of choices. If you think that that is what they do then you do not properly understand them. They are aimed at showing that someone can be held responsible for an action when (in that circumstance) they could not have done otherwise. They do not eliminate the reality of choices and to suggest that they do so, is to overreach quite a bit.

Paul answers back: Good, as you say, an agent can *chose* even though there's no other live option available for him. I think you pretty much just shot your case in the face. So, your position is that S choices A even though other options were not live options for S. So much the worse for your claim that there have to be live options! Above you said,

"In each and every situation we find ourselves we may think that we could actually choose from among available alternatives, but in reality, since every event is predetermined, we can only do the one action which we were predetermined to do in a particular situation. And if we are only able to do that one action, then we do not have a choice."

But now you've just noted note that a Frankfurt agent still makes a choice, even though he's "only able to do that one action." "In due time their foot shall slip."

Henry wishes:Regarding rebuttals to them, you apparently are not aware of the literature, and there is a lot related to FSC's. Widerker has a good book on this subject and even Kane whom you mentioned has some good arguments against FSC's.

Paul helps Henry out: I sure am aware, but I think you may not be aware of the responses by Haji et al. which are sound, IMO.

In the literature on the Frankfurt-style counterexamples to Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), there is some debate concerning whether cases of responsible comissions and cases of responsible omissions are alike in the sense that one falls prey to the Frankfurt-style counterexamples just in case the other does, too.

Peter van Inwagen, for example, treats cases of responsible omissions and commissions differently. He thinks Frankfurt refutes PAP as concerns commissions but not omissions. And he tries to show how a PAP-like principle concerning responsible omissions is immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples.

Fischer disagrees and treats the two cases alike. He thinks that Frankfurt-style cases can be constructed that refutes a PAP-like principle for omissions as much as commissions.

The standard PAP principle concerning responsible (committed) acts, is this (PAP-c): S is morally responsible for performing A only if S could have done otherwise than perform A.

A PAP-like principle for responsible omissions is this (PAP-o): S is morally responsible for failing (or omitting) to do A only if S could have performed A instead.

Now, if Frankfurt-style cases refute (PAP-o), as much as (PAP-c), then this show that--theoretically, at least--an agent can be responsible for failing to do something (he ought to have done it) even if he couldn't have done it (due to the counterfactual intervener, e.g.)

Henry allows us more glimpses into his ignorance:I find it interesting that you want to argue against the reality of choices based upon your theological determinism. You do so in spite of the fact that you experience choices all the time. For example in writing your post you chose the words you would use, the arguments you would present, the order of presentation, etc. etc. And all of these choices were up to you and chosen without any supernatural intervention.

Paul responds: I don't argue against the reality of choices. Indeed, I showed you that if I did, then you do. You don't think you do, therefore you shouldn't think I do.

Yes, I made all these choices. There was no "supernatural intervention." Well, other than the fact that, as you admit, God was ultimately responsible for my choices, he ordained and governed all the details of my life prior to this conversation which caused me to respond the way I did, etc. if God had allowed me to stay in a libertarian church, not read compatibilists, have a girlfriend at the church who I didn't want to lose by becoming a mean and angry Calvinist, then perhaps I would have responded different. But, God directed my life in such a way that I responded to you the way I did. But, those responses and ways I chose to respond, were still *my* choices.

I'll just dismiss the rest of your silly attempt at catching me in some sort of self-referentially incoherency. Rather sophomoric, don't you think?

The belittling comments and sniping remarks need to end now. I am interested and open to a civil and rational discussion but the responses lately have contained lots of inappropriate comments. As professing christian gentlemen you ought to be exhibiting better speech.

Peter *begins* his post with "Steve is right stating that Henry cannot think outside his own little box. The very fact that he cannot understand philosophical and technical definitions of words demonstrates this sufficiently." This is precisely the kind of comment that is unacceptable.

I had suggested that "the normal and ordinary meaning for the word [choice] is to select, pick or choose from among available alternatives."

Peter responded: "And yet as soon as one applies this concept in a technical manner, it falls to pieces."

If you don't like the word *choice* for this phenomena of picking, selecting, deciding from among various alternatives, then what is your suggested term to replace "choice.?"

Peter says: "it is Henry who refuses to deal with the term in a technical manner, relying on the ambiguity of 'common use' to overthrow the concrete implications of the term."

What are the concrete implications of the word "choice"? What does it mean to deal with the word *choice* "in a technical manner? And how is the word *choice* ambiguous?

Peter says: "Finally, Henry wants to duck out completely from the issue of how decisions are made. When I asked him to define the 'us' that makes choices, he says the 'us' refers to the soul. But this doesn't answer the question."

This is unfair. Peter asked me what I meant by the word "us". I answered that I was referring to the human soul. Now he says that I was ducking from the issue of how decisions are made. You didn't ask how decision are made, you asked me what I meant by "us" and I directly answered your question. Now if you are going to switch topics like this we will not be able to carry on a discussion.

Peter asks: "How is it possible for the soul to make a decision?

The person, self, soul, makes decisions by using the mind to consider various possibilities. A decision presupposes at least two alternatives that the soul is considering and then the soul considers reasons, beliefs, desires and what is important to the person, and then chooses from one of the alternatives. In a word, the soul decides by thinking about it. We are also able to think about our thinking in a self-reflective fashion.

Peter then asked: "What is the basis by which a soul decides anything?"

The ordinary basis is upon reasons.

Peter continues: "What determines how a soul will act?"

If the self is an agent cause, the soul/self determines its own actions. Precisely *how* this is done is a bit of a mystery. How does the spirit/soul interact with the brain and body? We do not know how this works, but we know that it does in fact occur. A similar mystery involves how God who is pure Spirit interacts with the physical universe which He created. That He does interact with the universe is certain, *how* this occurs is a mystery. It seems to me that anytime there is an interaction between an immaterial spirit and the physical world we will never fully understand the process by which this occurs. As a dualist and bible believing christian I have no trouble with the concept of immaterial spirits (whether it is God, or angels, or human souls) performing actions. I think that only God fully understands the actions performed by immaterial spirits.

Peter went on to say: "You seem to be saying that nothing does; a soul simply determines itself. But how does it 'determine' itself? Does it not do so based on the make-up of the soul itself? Is this not the same thing as saying the nature --the ontologoy-- of the soul determines what the soul will choose?

These questions don't just disappear just because Henry says, 'The soul determines itself'."

When you say that I seem to be saying that "nothing does", you do not seem to understand the agent causal view. God creates the soul, so if you think that I think that I created my soul by some self effort this is not the case. I do believe that the individual soul performs his/her own actions. **I** do my actions. My *spirt* performs these actions. **I** determine my own actions in many situations. The human soul has capacities, but as a spirit does not have parts.

This is one of the reasons the nonbelievers mock agent causation, because to them nothing immaterial could possibly exist in this world since everything is supposedly material. But if God created us as personal spirits, then part of being human is to be a spirit that performs ones own actions, often by means of the physical body that we have. But *we* are not just our bodies or our brains. And again, as we are talking about the actions of an immaterial being without parts there is some mystery involved here.

I do not remember ever saying that "The soul determines itself." Do we create our individual spirits? No, God alone does so. Do we do our own actions by means of thinking, deliberation, and then making choices? Yes.

"When you say that I seem to be saying that "nothing does", you do not seem to understand the agent causal view. God creates the soul, so if you think that I think that I created my soul by some self effort this is not the case. I do believe that the individual soul performs his/her own actions. **I** do my actions. My *spirt* performs these actions. **I** determine my own actions in many situations. The human soul has capacities, but as a spirit does not have parts. "

So, what Henry means by agent causation is that: it is S who does A.

But, take determinism. God foreordains that S would do A, therefore it is S who does A.

No, it is Henry that seems to not have a grasp on his own position. Surely he's not refuting compatibilism with something compatibilists would accept!

Christian compatibilism has never denied that it is *we* who do the action. We are not puppets. God isn't the one *doing* the action. *We* are.

None of this refutes the idea that God has foreordained all of our actions and choices.

Steve wrote: "I would note that, in Isaiah 40-48,God's foreordination is a prerequisite for his knowledge. God knows the future because he planned it, and nothing can thwart his plan.

So my box is the Bible."

The Isaiah passage is a good one to present to open theists as in in it is made clear that God knows the future. But the claim that "foreordination is a prerequisite for his foreknowledge" is merely the statement of a calvinist presupposition. Calvinists commonly believe/assume that the reason God knows the future is that He predetermined it in its entirety. Other christians do not hold this assumption.

Regarding the idea that God accomplishes his purposes this is clearly stated in scripture. However, the idea that God predetermined every event is yet another assumption, again not held by the majority of christians throughout church history. Particularly in the centuries before Augustine we do not see christians espousing either of these assumptions. The idea that God predetermines all events is in fact the controlling presuppositon of the calvinist system. It is one thing to say that God accomplishes his purposes and quite another to say that every event that occurs is predetermined by God.

Steve writes: "Traditionally, the primary appeal of libertarianism has been the intuition that alternative possibilities are necessary to ground responsibility."

I think it is even more basic than that: we control our actions and often make selections from alternatives so we reasonably conclude that our choices are real. If our choices are real, if we really are able to choose from among various alternatives that are available, we conclude that our actions are freely performed and not exhaustively determined. We see evidence of the reality of choice in both our own experience as well as in scripture. John Searle makes these points about our constantly presupposing free will, when we reason or perform our actions, very well in his book RATIONALITY IN ACTION. I wonder if anyone here has read this book.

Steve writes: "You don't get to dictate the terms of the discussion."

If we are not going to speak of choices as involving selections from among various available alternatives, then not only are we denying the meaning of the word, we are denying our universal and almost constant experience. Frankfurt cases are imaginative stories involving interveners whom we do not encounter in everyday experience. In every day experience we constantly encounter decisions, choices, selections from alternatives, choices.

Steve says that "This simply begs the question in favor of libertarianism."

If the word choice and the reality which it represents are eliminated from the discussion this begs the question for the determinist. We seem to experience choices between actual and available alternatives constantly. How do we account for this phenomena? Is it real? In which case exhaustive determinism is then false. Or if not real, and merely illusory, why does scripture even use the language of choices and could have done otherwise/should have done otherwise? I do not believe that either our experience or scripture is misleading us. So what appears to be misleanding us is the **assumption** of exhaustive determinism.

Steve wrote: "One of the problems is that you're confounding imagination with alternate possibilities. The fact that you can imagine alternative scenarios, and then the further fact that this figures in your moral or rational deliberation, does not, of itself,mean that you could actually have done otherwise."

Whenever we consider multiple alternatives we use our imagination. And this consideration of various alternatives is critical for our deliberation and reasoning. But either we can do these various alternatives or we cannot. Experience and scripture say these alternatives are real: theological determinism must claim them to be merely imaginary. Most of our lives when we move our hand one way it goes that way, and if we move it the other it goes that way. So either this is a very powerful delusion or it is reality.

I say it is reality you say it is imaginary.

This also has very practical consequences for example in your denial of the reality of regret. When people regret they are convinced they could have done otherwise. You negate this by saying of regret: "No, it merely presupposes an active imagination. We can imagine having done otherwise." Again you deny a universal human experience because of your system of determinism.

I think that a key disagreement is stated by you as follows: "The question, rather,is whether these possibilities are indexed to the agency of man or God."

For you, since you *assume* exhaustive determinism, every thing that occurs is exactly what God predetermined to occur so possibilities are "indexed to God" alone. For me some possibilities are "indexed to God" and some are "indexed to man." I take the view that some events are predetermined but not all.

You state your views very well when you write:

"Can a man choose contrary to what God has decreed?

Not if everything is decreed exhaustively as you assume.

"Are the reprobate free to either believe or disbelieve the gospel?"

It is impossible for those preselected to be damned to ever be saved. They have no possibility of being saved. And as their every action is predetermined by God according to you. They live a life of sin and then are eternally condemned for performing the very sins which God planned for them to commit [since according to your determinism their every action is predetermined, they can never do otherwise than they actually do].

Most christians told that this is what your assumption of exhaustive determinism leads to, will rightly reject this view and its underlying assumption.

You ask a series of "can . . ." questions. And in each case the answer is No. No one can do other than what God has predetermined for him to do. Your whole system is driven by the *assumption* of complete determinism. People who understand the implications of this system and the lack of biblical support for this system, rightly reject it. I appreciate your honesty here that according to your system what people believe to be genuine choices from among availabe alternatives is only their imagination, it would not be true if your system were true.

You conclude with: "On the other hand,human beings are free to follow their strongest desire as long as they have the opportunity to do so." Yes and they need to be aware that according to your determinism even their desires like everything else is predetermined by God. In fact every thing they do is predetermined by God and they never have a choice. Choice is merely their imagination, it is not real nor will it ever be.

"It is impossible for those preselected to be damned to ever be saved. They have no possibility of being saved. And as their every action is predetermined by God according to you."

But, of course, Jesus said that "no man *is able* to come to Jesus unless the Father draws that man, and, if so, Jesus will raise that man up on the last day."

Next, let's ask what Henry means by "impossible." It is not logically impossible since God could have decreed different than He did. God was under no constraint to save S over against S*. So, yes, *given the same decree,* it would be "impossible." But, these are things you need to make explicit, otherwise your critiques are very sloppy.

At any rate, the main thing to point out is that Henry lets his philosophy rule his theology. It isn't Calvinists who claim the above, but Jesus does.

Also, notice that Henry has no problem with the *self* determining his actions, but if it is God, this can't be! This is autonomy in action. Anthrocentric determinism is allowed, but not theocentric.

Notice above how Henry likes to liken us to "non-believers" who deny the existence of a soul, or a self that does the actions. But, we have seen that we do not deny this. Ironically, it is Henry who joins hands with the unbelievers. Unbelievers have sought to throw off God's sovereign control of *every detail* of his creation, up to and including the number of hairs on our head, and birds who die. They cannot fathom this:

Psalm 2

1 Why do the nations rage, And the peoples meditate a vain thing?

2 The kings of the earth set themselves, And the rulers take counsel together, Against Jehovah, and against his anointed, saying,

3 Let us break their bonds asunder, And cast away their cords from us.

"This also has very practical consequences for example in your denial of the reality of regret. When people regret they are convinced they could have done otherwise."

But above I maintained:

Now, if Frankfurt-style cases refute (PAP-o), as much as (PAP-c), then this shows that--theoretically, at least--an agent can be responsible for failing to do something (he ought to have done it) even if he couldn't have done it (due to the counterfactual intervener, e.g.)

We can regret not doing A when A is what we ought to have done.

At this point Henry can argue that 'oght implies can,' but this principle is hotly debated, even libertarians nto all agreeing. So, it has many problems, not the least of which one can get out of an obligation by rendering himseld unable to perform it. Or, despite the small little problem of people not being able to do A for moral or psychological reasons, yet those people still ought to have done A.

"They live a life of sin and then are eternally condemned for performing the very sins which God planned for them to commit [since according to your determinism their every action is predetermined, they can never do otherwise than they actually do]. "

Acts 2:22 "Men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man attested to you by God with mighty works and wonders and signs that God did through him in your midst, as you yourselves know-- 23 this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men.

_____

So, were these men held responsible and condemned for performing the sins God planned and foreknew they would perform?

Oh, I guess you could say that God predestined that Jesus would die (could Jesus have done otherwise? that's a sticky one), but didn't predestine the agents that would do it.

This depends on how you're using the word "can." For example, God predetermined that Jesus would not break his bones on the cross. So, "could" the bones of Jesus be broken? Or, did he have metal bones?

"Yes and they need to be aware that according to your determinism even their desires like everything else is predetermined by God."

Above he claimed:

"God is *ultimately responsible* for everything as the creator of everything."

So, why is Henry the way he is rather than the way I am? Why does Henry like the things he likes, which cause him to chose what he does, rather than some of the things I like? Who is ultimately responsible for Henry's character, his desires, his wants, and... his choices? Well, as Henry says, God is.

Henry whines:---Peter *begins* his post with "Steve is right stating that Henry cannot think outside his own little box. The very fact that he cannot understand philosophical and technical definitions of words demonstrates this sufficiently." This is precisely the kind of comment that is unacceptable.---

It's hard to take your complaint that this is "uncivil" seriously after you said:---Peter seems to want to hijack and change words so that they fit the system that he wants to defend and protect. Cults do the same thing, they take common christian words and redefine them completely differently.---

and:---Nonbelievers mock the reality of the human soul and now Peter does so as well.---

Hey, Henry--at least my comment about your philosophical ignorance was based in fact, unlike your insinuation that I'm a cultist nonbeliever. You've yet to demonstrate you understand even how to begin addressing this issue. Now you're complaining that I'm being uncivil when I've responded to you truthfully.

“The Isaiah passage is a good one to present to open theists as in in it is made clear that God knows the future. But the claim that ‘foreordination is a prerequisite for his foreknowledge" is merely the statement of a calvinist presupposition.”

Wrong. That linkage is made in Isaiah itself.

“Calvinists commonly believe/assume that the reason God knows the future is that He predetermined it in its entirety. Other christians do not hold this assumption.”

What other Christians assume is not an argument.

“Regarding the idea that God accomplishes his purposes this is clearly stated in scripture. However, the idea that God predetermined every event is yet another assumption, again not held by the majority of christians throughout church history. Particularly in the centuries before Augustine we do not see christians espousing either of these assumptions.”

For some unstated reason, you seem to think this historical appeal is important. It isn’t.

Consensus is not the rule of faith. People are not the rule of faith. Revelation is the rule of faith.

The fact that you feel the need to retreat into this historical appeal shows what a weak hand you have.

“The idea that God predetermines all events is in fact the controlling presuppositon of the calvinist system.”

Calvinism doesn’t have just one controlling presupposition. We are only discussing the predestinarian aspect of Calvinism because that’s what *you* want to talk about.

“It is one thing to say that God accomplishes his purposes and quite another to say that every event that occurs is predetermined by God.”

Scripture says both.

“I think it is even more basic than that: we control our actions and often make selections from alternatives so we reasonably conclude that our choices are real. If our choices are real, if we really are able to choose from among various alternatives that are available, we conclude that our actions are freely performed and not exhaustively determined. We see evidence of the reality of choice in both our own experience as well as in scripture.”

“If we are not going to speak of choices as involving selections from among various available alternatives, then not only are we denying the meaning of the word, we are denying our universal and almost constant experience.”

Once again, you have nothing new to say. Both hard determinism and soft determinism are well aware of this appeal, and both of them can account for the experience on their own terms.

“Frankfurt cases are imaginative stories involving interveners whom we do not encounter in everyday experience.”

That’s irrelevant. It’s a limiting case. Its function is to undermine the intuitive presumption that freedom to do otherwise is a precondition of responsibility. You thereby lose *your* controlling presupposition. You can no longer object to determinism in *principle*.

“If the word choice and the reality which it represents are eliminated from the discussion this begs the question for the determinist.”

You have a problem when it comes to interacting with anyone who doesn’t already share your precious assumptions.

No one is eliminating “choice” from the discussion. The question at issue, rather, is our concept of what makes a choice a choice.

And, as I’ve said before, using adjectives like “real” or “genuine” is not an argument.

“We seem to experience choices between actual and available alternatives constantly. How do we account for this phenomena?”

Once again, you’re simply repeating yourself without advancing your original argument, or addressing the counterargument.

“Is it real? In which case exhaustive determinism is then false.”

i) As Manata, for one, has demonstrated, compatibilism can process this experience.

“Or if not real, and merely illusory, why does scripture even use the language of choices and could have done otherwise/should have done otherwise?”

i)You are reading more into Scripture than is there. Libertarianism is not a Scriptural teaching. At best, libertarianism would only be a possible inference from Scripture. An extrascriptural way of grounding certain Scriptural statements. A metaphysical presupposition.

ii)But that inference is ruled out by many other Scriptural teachings involving predestination, providence, original sin, &c.

iii)One of the stated functions of preaching in the Bible is to harden the audience. It does not assume that the listener could do otherwise. To the contrary, its purpose is to harden his heart against the truth.

iv)You yourself are very dismissive of certain hypotheticals. You dismiss Frankfurt-type cases as mere thought-experiments. And, indeed, they are.

They are imaginary scenarios which have, as of yet, no real life counterpart.

But, in that event, why should we take your own hypotheticals any more seriously?

v)Even if a conditional or counterfactual statement implies a possible world in which that scenario plays out, this doesn’t mean that the human agent is in a position to actuate that possible world. I can conceive of many apparent possibilities which I am quite unable to actuate. I can imagine a bodacious blond in a Duisenberg. But, unfortunately, I’m unable to will my hypothetical into existence.

“I do not believe that either our experience or scripture is misleading us.”

To the contrary, you have written off many major teachings of Scripture to salvage libertarianism.

“Whenever we consider multiple alternatives we use our imagination. And this consideration of various alternatives is critical for our deliberation and reasoning. But either we can do these various alternatives or we cannot. Experience and scripture say these alternatives are real: theological determinism must claim them to be merely imaginary.”

So, according to Henry, whatever we can imagine, we can do. All I can say is that, if that’s the case, then we must suffer from a pretty limited imagination. Certainly the world I see out the windows bears precious little resemblance to the imaginary world of Ray Bradbury or Cordwainer-Smith.

“Most of our lives when we move our hand one way it goes that way, and if we move it the other it goes that way. So either this is a very powerful delusion or it is reality.”

Once more, Henry has no grasp of compatibilism.

And how far does he plan to take this example? Ants and cockroaches move left or right as well. Do they also have freewill?

Actually, I never said it was imaginary. Rather, I simply pointed out that your conclusion was underdetermined by the evidence. That imagination alone could account for rational and moral deliberation.

“This also has very practical consequences for example in your denial of the reality of regret.”

The “reality” of regret as in what? The *feeling* of regret?

“When people regret they are convinced they could have done otherwise. You negate this by saying of regret: ‘No, it merely presupposes an active imagination. We can imagine having done otherwise.’ Again you deny a universal human experience because of your system of determinism.”

In point of fact, this is transparently false. What people frequently regret is that they were unable to rise to the occasion. They would have done better if only they were better. They regret their lack of control over their own emotions.

Someone who’s hooked on drugs or gambling or pornography may profoundly regret his addiction. And what exacerbates his regret is that he lacks the willpower to kick the habit. He hates what he’s doing. He hates himself for doing it. He hates what he’s doing to himself and his loved ones. He can see the dire consequences of his actions. And yet the urge to do it is irrepressible.

The most charitable interpretation of Henry’s statement is that he’s very young, naïve, and inexperienced. But for those who haven’t led such a charmed life or sheltered existence, the source of bitter regret is not that we could have done otherwise, but that we couldn’t bring ourselves to do otherwise.

“For you, since you *assume* exhaustive determinism, every thing that occurs is exactly what God predetermined to occur so possibilities are ‘indexed to God’ alone.”

You continually make the false and foolish imputation that a Calvinist merely “assumes” exhaustive determinism. Try not to flaunt your ignorance of Reformed theology.

This is an exegetical finding with many lines of evidence. Some online materials include:

The two standard Reformed commentaries on Romans are by Tom Schreiner and John Murray.

And that’s just for starters.

“It is impossible for those preselected to be damned to ever be saved. They have no possibility of being saved. And as their every action is predetermined by God according to you. They live a life of sin and then are eternally condemned for performing the very sins which God planned for them to commit [since according to your determinism their every action is predetermined, they can never do otherwise than they actually do].”

This is true as far as it goes. But it oversimplifies the issues by omitting many other things. Predestination does not select for any particular model of causality. And predestination is not a coercive force.

“Most christians told that this is what your assumption of exhaustive determinism leads to, will rightly reject this view and its underlying assumption.”

This is a purely emotional appeal, which is the last resort of the scoundrel. You reject the witness of Scripture because you dislike the consequences.

“Your whole system is driven by the *assumption* of complete determinism.”

No, we’re discussing determinism because that’s what you want to discuss. It’s not the be-all and end-all of Calvinism. It’s a necessary feature of Calvinism. But there are many other equally important things we believe in.

“Yes and they need to be aware that according to your determinism even their desires like everything else is predetermined by God.”

Other issues aside, the logical alternative to divine determinism is not some form of indeterminism. Rather, the logical alternative is some naturalistic form of determinism, like social conditioning or biochemistry.

I went and looked at the "rules of engagment" of this group. It talks about how people ought to behave here. At one point it states in regards to guests like myself:

"A lurker or commentator who is not "one of us" should not be made to feel that he has strayed into enemy territory and needs to keep his head down lest he get it blown off."

I had written:

"Most christians told that this is what your assumption of exhaustive determinism leads to, will rightly reject this view and its underlying assumption."

Steve Hays responded: "This is a purely emotional appeal, which is the last resort of the scoundrel. You reject the witness of Scripture because you dislike the consequences."

SCOUNDREL? Engaging in my last resort?

This seems inconsistent with the statement about how guests are to be treated here. I have had lots of ad hominems and personal attacks by the three persons supposedly dialoging with me here (i.e. Steve, Paul and Peter). I do feel like I am geing shot at and as if these people would like to blow my head off.

I really would like to respond to things which have been said. Lots of interesting things have been said.

But if I am going to be called a "scoundrel" who "rejects the witness of scripture" that is unacceptable from someone who professes to be a christian and really does not know me or my personal life whatsoever.

I love the Lord and I love His Word. I do not reject Him or His Word, what I reject is the presupposition of exhaustive determinism and the consequences of theological determinism. For people who claim to hold to doctrines of **grace** I am seeing only an argumentative spirit, condescending comments and put downs. And being treated as if I have proposed a heresy simply because I believe in the reality of both choices and God's exhaustive foreknowledge, but not in exhaustive determinism.

Can we get back to a rational and civil discussion as *christians*? And can that statement from the rules of engagement actually be practiced here?

As a fellow Calvinist, I am shocked and disgusted by the tone of these posts from Peter, Paul, and (to a lesser extent) Steve.

I think the Lord has used you to effectively refute various heresies, but non-Calvinism is not a heresy, and the Lord commands us to love one another as a testimony to the world. You three are not manifesting love to your brother; instead, the tone of your posts manifests arrogance, anger, and disdain.

I for one would be interested in reading a *respectful* dialog on this topic; but I have no interest in worldly put-downs and name-calling.

I don't think I've done anything in this thread to warrant those charges. Same goes for Henry's charges. I think that to the extent Henry has made some jabs, so have I. I thought that was just part of what a loving family does, like when two brothers wrestle.

The rules of engagement never said we needed to blow sunshine up people's skirts, either.

As I read the rules of engagement, if you give, you can take. If you stroll into the combox and liken us to materialists and cult members, then I'd say you should expect a couple of shots back.

Lurker said:---I for one would be interested in reading a *respectful* dialog on this topic...---

Right now I'd settle for *ANY* dialogue! But dialogue is a two way street, and when one side refuses to deal with your arguments, accuses you of being cultish, and shows absolutely no ability to reason then it is impossible for there to be dialogue.

As to the tone...well, I'm sure the Pharisees thought Jesus could tone it down a bit too. But the fact of the matter is that I never stated anything about Henry that was not my honest opinion of him backed up by the the evidence he has portrayed in the "responses" he gave. If I call a spade a spade and the spade is offended, the spade needs to get out of internet communication. I, at least, try to read someone's comments charitably until they give me reason to think otherwise; Henry went out of his way to find any little thing that he could claim was a personal attack, all the while forgetting the log in his own eye. Likewise, it's not like Henry was asking innocent questions seeking knowledge; he was asking trick questions, twisting my (and others) views, and attempting an argument for his position. If he is hurt by the fact that his position is so easily thwarted, perhaps he needs to learn a stronger defense.

Finally, I acknowledge that it is possible I misinterpret my own behavior and ought to speak differently...but thus far nothing you've said gives me a reason to think such a possibility is actually so. Feel free to demonstrate for me where I have done anything wrong.

Paul, I'm not asking you to blow sunshine up anyone's skirt. I'm not asking for you to be dishonest. But an honest insult is worse than an unintentional one. I know you honestly believe Henry is "ignorant," but did you really intend, "Henry allows us more glimpses into his ignorance" to be something other than an insult?

Peter, you compare my reaction (or Henry's) to the Pharisees reaction to Christ. Is this supposed to be justification for your haughty attitude, or just another example of it? Are you saying that you are modeling Christ and Henry is a Pharisee? Do I have to point out that you do not have Christ's authority, insight into men's hearts, and wisdom; nor Henry a Pharisee's hypocrisy and unbelief?

As for evidence of wrongdoing, just look at the post you made immediately before mine.

Guys, your appeal to Henry's rhetoric is an ad hominem tu quoque. Even if he has engaged in similar tactics (he has, but not to the degree you guys have), that is no excuse for you to do the same.

Brothers, please take these comments as gentle, respectful correction, offered in Christian love.

The object is not to win the argument by devastating the other guy - the object is to glorify Christ. You can do that by arguing your position without the sarcasm and chest-beating. You're making excellent points. They can stand on their own.

Henry has professed a genuine Christian faith. Until he gives us reason to doubt his word, I'm appealing to you to treat him as your brother - and not one you fight with in sibling rivalry (which is certainly NOT the standard Christ holds us to).

So, Henry gave us more of a glimpse into his uniformed views on Calvinism and compatibilism.

"Guys, your appeal to Henry's rhetoric is an ad hominem tu quoque. Even if he has engaged in similar tactics (he has, but not to the degree you guys have), that is no excuse for you to do the same."

Not all tu quoques and ad hominems are fallacious, Lurker.

Furthermore, I take it that we are brothers. I never implied that henry was a heretic or an unbeliever. But, I don't know about you, sometimes my brother and I, growing up, got into some fights. Sometimes that's just the way it is when brothers are arguing.

Anyway, the point here is that we assumed Henry didn't mind the liberal use of sarcasm. If he had came in and acted different, so would we have.

But, we assumed Henry gave, and so could take. I don't think we had anger or malice in our hearts. We just assumed that a guy who likened us to materialists and non-Christian cults could take a little rhetoric back.

I don't know, maybe I'm a throw back. I'm not down with the feminization of modern males. It seems that Calvin and Luther could engage in some serious smack talk, and their opponants gave back. I didn't read anyone complaining that Calvin et al (or, their opponants) were a bunch of meanies.

"Perhaps if I had used the synonym you liked, then I'd be 'speaking in love?'"

Perhaps if you had simply said, "Henry says:" without pejoritvie comment, that would have been speaking in love.

As for the Bible's usage, I'm not aware that we are anywhere enjoined to speak harshly to a brother, even one in error; the opposite, in fact.

You continued:

"Not all tu quoques and ad hominems are fallacious, Lurker."

I didn't say "ad hominem" AND "tu quque." I said "ad hominem tu quoque." It's one fallacy, and it's always fallacious. (See, I could offer correction without calling you a name or commenting on what you know and don't know).

You go on:

"But, I don't know about you, sometimes my brother and I, growing up, got into some fights. Sometimes that's just the way it is when brothers are arguing."

I think I addressed this point. Sure, siblings fight. Where does the Bible say this is OK? Does it not tell us to rise above our flesh and agape one another?

"But, we assumed Henry gave, and so could take."

I addressed this point, too. Simply because you see Henry behaving in a negative way, does not justify responding in kind, and escalating it further.

"I'm not down with the feminization of modern males."

And how is it a 'feminization' to be quick to apologize when offense is taken? The men I know who are examples of mature Christian manhood accept correction humbly and prayerfully. They don't try to justify their behavior before men.

Paul, perhaps you don't realize how you're coming across, here. I'm trying to offer you an outsider's perspective. You can take account of it or not - whichever is your strongest desire ;-)

I'm not asking you to minimize the differences between Calvinism and Arminianism - that would be a feminization: "Can't we all just get along?" I'm disgusted with the current state of the American church and the de-emphasis on doctrine and a concurrent emphasis on ecumenicism.

Just soften it a bit, Paul. Take the high road. You're a smart guy; you're well-read; as I said before, you're making excellent points, and I'm genuinely interested to see how Henry will respond. The Gospel is offensive; make sure the other guy is offended by it, and not you.

I'm speaking as one who has spent some time, over the years, debating JWs and other heretics online. They can be exasperating and stubborn and insulting. It's hard not to fight fire with fire. But I've learned, through the work of the Holy Spirit in me and in those that I correspond with, that 1 Peter 3:15 is not just a guideline - it's a very practical command: Others are more inclined to listen to what you say when you speak with gentleness and respect (or fear of the Lord, whichever you prefer).

OK. I've had my say; thanks for listening. Unless I see something requiring further comment, I'll drop back to lurker status.

Henry, if you read this, please apply what I've said to yourself as well. It's a fascinating dialog, and I invite you to continue it.

"As for the Bible's usage, I'm not aware that we are anywhere enjoined to speak harshly to a brother, even one in error; the opposite, in fact."

But that's just the question, isn't it. Why is it when I say that Henry is uninformed and unaware am I not speaking in love, but when the Apostle Paul says it, he is?

I'm not taking this wrong. I appreciate you comments, and, to be honest, in many cases they'd stick. I think I've been 10 times worse in many other dialogues.

Lastly, our use of the tu quoque (which is *always* ad hominem, so you don't need to say, "ad hominem tu quoque," was that a nice correction :-) ) was not fallacious. It served to make the point that we assumed Henry didn't mind the jabs. If someone isn't offended, it's not necessary that you be sinning against them, right? Sometimes, my brother or friends might call me a dork, but we have an understanding, and so I'm not offended. Henry called us materialists and cultists and was being dishonest in his argumentation. So, it was assumed that Henry was made of tougher material.

Anyway, thanks for your thoughts. I'll do some more self-examination. But, I'd also add, that some who aren't in the fight, and aren't aware of the agreed upon rules, may think things are fouls which really are not. I thought Henry and us had implicitly agreed upon the rules. Honestly, someone who likens others to unbelievers and cultists, and then complains about getting name called, seems, from where I'm standing, to be trying to find a way out of the dialog.

I want to start by saying that I agree with “Lurker’s” posts and the things which he/she expressed. And that hopefully the discussion from this point on will be more respectful without the unnecessary personal attacks while focusing on the issues in a rational manner.

Paul wrote: “ First, Frankfurt is a libertarian”. And I responded: “Are you sure about Frankfurt being libertarian I thought he was a compatibilist. I will have to check further on that.” Paul then responded: “yes, Henry, and frankly I’m surprised that someone as knowledgeable and conversant with the literature as you’re purporting to be here, doesn’t know these things.

Frankfurt libertarianism is discussed here, for instance.”

I went ahead and checked some sources and Paul is the one who is wrong here.

Galen Strawson in his article on compatibilism for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy says of Frankfurt:

“In general, compatibilism has many variants. According to Harry Frankfurt’s version, for example, . . .”

Kane in his recent and excellent book A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL says of Frankfurt: “This is the position taken by Harry Frankfurt and other ‘new compatibilists.” Frankfurt knows of some of the problems of traditional compatibilism (the kind apparently held by Paul) and modifies his compatibilism to attempt to deal with some of these problems.

Paul had also claimed that Frankfurt libertarianism is discussed here, and gave Timpe’s article which does not discuss Frankfurt’s libertarianism (he is not a libertarian) but rather discusses the view of Eleonor Stump a libertarian who agrees with Frankfurt on some issues. So Paul is the one not knowing Frankfurt’s view and then citing an article that has nothing to do with showing that Frankfurt is a libertarian. It appears that Paul saw the title of the Timpe article “A Critique of Frankfurt Libertarianism” and assumed that that must have meant that Frankfurt was a libertarian. Timpe says that he was dealing with what he called “Frankfurt libertarians”. The Frankfurt cases are imaginary and there are no counterparts in real life, and apparently Paul does not understand or know Frankfurt’s position (considering his view to be libertarian when it is compatibilist) so I suggest that we leave these aside for now, there are much more interesting things to discuss regarding some of Paul’s other statements.

Paul wrote: “At any rate, to pretend that libertarians alone say that it is really S who chooses action A, while Calvinists don’t is to simply show an ignorance of what Calvinists say. It is S who does A and not God pulling our strings.”

I never said that only libertarians say that the person is choosing the action A. I said that exhaustive determinism eliminates the possibility of choices, so in a completely determined world no one ever makes a choice. Paul then says that God is not pulling our strings, presumably referring to the analogy of a puppet master pulling the strings of his puppet and so completely controlling the puppet. If God predetermines every event as Paul believes, then God predetermines our every action, belief, desire, mental state, physical state, thoughts, everything.

And if he does so, how is **that** different from a puppet master who completely controls his puppet by pulling all of their strings? The control is equally total and in both cases, whether it is the puppet or us, we have no free will, no choice, we do only what the one “pulling the strings” directs us to do.

Paul writes: “You admit that God is ultimately responsible for everything. Well your choices are things, and God is ultimately responsible for them. Your “self” is a thing, and it chooses based on its likes and desires, and God is ultimately responsible for this, as you admit.”

God is ultimately responsible since He has created everything, He is the ultimate reality behind the existence of everything. But surely you are aware that when we speak of proximate causation, when referring to the one who is directly responsible for an action (e.g. like sin). God created us to be capable of making choices including choosing to sin against Him. So God is ultimately responsible for the possibility of sin. Yet when we sin we take responsibility for it as we are the proximate cause of our own sin. God does not cause us to sin we do so of our own choice.

You are also making a mistake when you refer to choices as “things”. Choices and other mental activities are immaterial realities, you could never weigh a choice. Likewise the self is also not a thing, but a conscious personal agent. How long is a self? What color is a person’s soul? By referring to these realities as things you are distorting these realities and making a category mistake.

Paul went onto to write: “That I chose A over B, and I chose A because of my desires, doesn’t mean I didn’t make a choice. You seem to think that S can only chose A if it is possible that S could have done otherwise. But, this idea has been refuted. Even libertarians and Molinists agree.”

Choice presupposes actually available alternatives. Where there is no alternative there can be no choice. Paul’s exhaustive determinism eliminates available alternatives and so eliminates the precondition (available alternatives) that makes a choice possible. If all events are predetermined by God, then I had to type the words that I just typed, it is impossible that I have written anything else. If I could only type those words, then I had no available alternatives. With no available alternatives I did not have a choice. Take any event that occurs in this one actual world, if all is predetermined then only that event was possible, no other event was possible and no choice can ever be present. It is Paul’s view that eliminates the preconditions that make choices possible. Since we do make choices, Paul’s view must be false. Everytime Paul speaks of having a choice he is contradicting his own view and borrowing from the non-calvinist view (a view where choices are possible, where choices are not eliminated).

Then Paul claims that the possibility of doing otherwise has been refuted and that libertarians and molinists agree. Paul is mistaken again, both libertarians and molinists hold to the libertarian view which suggests that we do one action and also are able do another action in the same circumstances when engaging in a choice. If we can do either action, and the decision is up to us, then we can do otherwise. If the idea that we could do otherwise had been refuted then theological determinists would be providing this proof. It does not exist because it has not happened. And if theological determinism is false, it never will happen.

Paul has another section that merits attention because in this section he shows lack of understanding the agent causal view.

Paul writes: “if your choice is in your control, then it is caused (otherwise you have uncaused events, and you’re not responsible). Call what caused your choice A, and A was thus in your control. Is A caused? It must be, or else it’s not in our control. So, what caused A? Call it B, a previous event. Now, what caused B (B must be caused, else it’s not in your control)? Call it previous event C. So on and so on . . .”

The who not what that caused your action is **you**. A is not something separate from me that I control, A is **me**. Am I caused? If you mean is the individual human soul a created being? The answer is yes (and I do not care to get into the issue of traducianism or creationism here). So if you mean was the soul caused to be, then the answer is Yes, by God. Paul assuming that event-event causal chains are the only form of explanation that exists, goes on to ask “what caused A?” Which he then answers is another event, B. He then asks what event caused B and the answer is C and so it develops into an infinite regress argument. But this whole infinite regress argument **assumes** that our choices are the result of a causal chain that eventuates in our choice. But that is not how agent causal theorists see human causation.

Let’s start with **the** model of agent causation, God himself. Take the creation of the universe as our example. God had a choice of creating or not creating the universe, He decided to create this actual world. Was his action of creating the universe out of nothing, random? No, He did so for reasons. Was his action an event at the end of a causal chain of events which were antecedent and external to Himself? No, His action proceeded forth from Himself. His action was agent caused by Himself for reasons. Was his action a necessitated action (i.e. predetermined), one which He had to perform because of external and antecedent causes outside of Himself? No. Does a causal chain of events explain His action? No. Put simply God perfectly exemplifies what agent causal theorists mean by **agent-causation**. I have always found it to be both humorous and sad that people will argue against agent causation as if it is just the most ridiculous irrational thing. And yet when we consider God as an agent cause, all of these arguments against libertarian view of actions being random, determined, mysterious, resulting in infinite regresses, all break down simply and quickly. So we start with God if we want to understand how agent causation can be plausible. Then we add the thought that if God decided to create Human persons to be agent causes of their own actions, then we can be agent causes in a similar fashion.

Paul went onto to write: “But what’s your response? That your choice wasn’t caused by a prior event, but it wasnt’t uncaused either? It was caused **by you**. But your choice was not caused by anything prior, and it wasn’t completely random either. So your will wasn’t caused to cause. This is why van Inwagen calls free will a mystery, and just thinks the other views (i.e. compatibilism) are bigger mysteries.”

I don’t see much **mystery** in accounting for both its nature and it reality: God is an agent cause of His own actions and created us with a similar capacity. Where is the mystery in **that**? And as God’s actions are not caused by prior events and are not random, but are done for reasons, so our actions are not caused by prior events and are not random, but are done for reasons, when we agent cause an action. The phrase “your will wasn’t caused to cause” is a bit strange to me. It sounds almost as if my will is separate from me, and this separate entity is caused by a causal chain of prior events to do what it is supposed to do. I forgot who said it, but someone once said: we are not a person with a will, but we are a will. That better captures the notion for the agent causal view.

Paul continued: “But what about the event of your self-causing it? Is this event caused or uncaused? It seems we’d have the same regress as above. Now you can either admit the regress, or say that your causing the event is not itself an event. I think this is ad hoc.”

And I think Paul is setting up a false dilemma again here: it is either caused or uncaused, if it is caused it ends up in the same infinite regress that he had argued for earlier. Let’s apply Paul’s words here again to the ultimate exemplar of agent causation, God himself. But what about God’s self causing His own action of creating the world? Is this event caused or uncaused? Well it seems to be self-caused by God. Oh, in that case then God’s self caused action of creating the world “ends up in the same infinite regress” that Paul had argued for earlier? Does it? No, unless you are going to argue that God’s agent caused actions result from a chain of events that are exterior to God and antecedent to his action of creating the world.

Paul can you (or any of the others here) direct me to the writings of Calvinist compatibilists like yourself who argue against the agent causal view of human action?

People who argue against agent causal theorists such as Plantinga and J. P. Moreland? In my reading of the literature I keep seeing these same old arguments against the libertarian view consisting of arguments claiming that if actions are freely chosen as libertarians conceive them to be, then they are random, or determined, or resulting from a causal chain of events and an infinite regress (basically the same arguments as Paul has presented here). Is there some kind of template that the Calvinists are operating from?

It seems like the same arguments, which all break down when we see that God Himself agent causes His own actions.

1. Notice that Henry simply ignores many objections which Peter, Manata, and I have raised to his position.

2. In addition, why should we agree with his claim that God causes his actions? Does Henry regard God as a composite being, so that you can subdivide God into actions which are the effect of his "self causes?"

3. And even if we accepted (2), for which Henry offers no supporting argument, why should we further assume that divine and human agency are sufficiently analogous for Henry's further inference to hold?

"I never said that only libertarians say that the person is choosing the action A. I said that exhaustive determinism eliminates the possibility of choices, so in a completely determined world no one ever makes a choice."

This has been addressed above. Henry is simply repeating claims he's made above.

"Paul then says that God is not pulling our strings, presumably referring to the analogy of a puppet master pulling the strings of his puppet and so completely controlling the puppet. If God predetermines every event as Paul believes, then God predetermines our every action, belief, desire, mental state, physical state, thoughts, everything."

Of course I used Acts 2 above to argue against this. Since the men who put Jesus to death had been predestined to do so, and since they were not like puppets, then Henry's view must be false since Scripture is infallible.

Furthermore, Henry has refused to show the logical connection he's making. How does God G determining someone's S actions A imply that it was G, not S, who committed A? Indeed, there's a built in problem. Henry claims that we believe that God determined that *people would do* certain things. But, then his view ends up saying that the people did not do the things they were determined to do.

Lastly, Henry confuses *causation* and *coercion.* That G *causes* S to A does not logically entail that G *coerced* S to do A. S *wanted* to do A, G did not *force* S to do A against S's will. Puppets don't "want" to do anything, hence Henry argues from disanalogy.

"And if he does so, how is **that** different from a puppet master who completely controls his puppet by pulling all of their strings?"

Because in the one, there is no desire or will to do A, in the other, there is. And, if the puppet did have a will, the puppet master will still *make* the puppet do things--say, kiss the female puppet in the play--against the puppets will. In compatibilism, this *never* happens.

"God is ultimately responsible since He has created everything, He is the ultimate reality behind the existence of everything. But surely you are aware that when we speak of proximate causation, when referring to the one who is directly responsible for an action (e.g. like sin). God created us to be capable of making choices including choosing to sin against Him. So God is ultimately responsible for the possibility of sin. Yet when we sin we take responsibility for it as we are the proximate cause of our own sin. God does not cause us to sin we do so of our own choice."

But the point is that you choose things according to your desires, likes, dislikes, etc. It was God who caused you to be *that kind* of person, rather than another. And, since you chose based on these things, and since it was God who, via his providential governing of all events, determined that you'd be *this* way rather than *that* way, it is God who determined what you would chose.

"You are also making a mistake when you refer to choices as “things”. Choices and other mental activities are immaterial realities, you could never weigh a choice. Likewise the self is also not a thing, but a conscious personal agent. How long is a self? What color is a person’s soul? By referring to these realities as things you are distorting these realities and making a category mistake. "

No, "thing" is appropriate. As the Oxford Companion to Philosophy states: "'Thing,' in its most general sense, is interchangeable with 'entity,' or 'being' and is applicable to any item whose existence is acknowledge by a system of ontology, whether that item be particular, universal, abstract, or concrete. In this sense not only material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are - if they are acknowledge as existing - to be accounted 'things'" (p. 871).

"Choice presupposes actually available alternatives. Where there is no alternative there can be no choice."

This is addressed above.

"If all events are predetermined by God, then I had to type the words that I just typed, it is impossible that I have written anything else."

Addressed above.

"With no available alternatives I did not have a choice. Take any event that occurs in this one actual world, if all is predetermined then only that event was possible, no other event was possible and no choice can ever be present."

The problem, then, for Henry, is that the Bible, the rule of faith, tells us that all is determined:

GENESIS 50:20 - "As for you, you meant evil against me, but GOD meant it for good IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THIS PRESENT RESULT..."

EXODUS 4:11 - "And the LORD said to him, "WHO HAS MADE man’s mouth? Or WHO MAKES him DUMB, or DEAF, or SEEING or BLIND? IS IT NOT I, THE LORD?"

EXODUS 4:21 - "And the Lord said to Moses, 'When you go back to Egypt see that you perform before Pharaoh all the wonders which I have put in your power; but I WILL HARDEN HIS HEART and he will not let the people go."

DEUTERONOMY 32:39 - "See now that I, I AM HE, And there is no god besides Me; IT IS I WHO PUT TO DEATH AND GIVE LIFE. I have WOUNDED, and it is I who HEAL; And there is no one who can deliver from My hand."

1 SAMUEL 2:6-7 - “THE LORD KILLS and MAKES ALIVE; HE brings down to Sheol and raises up. The LORD MAKES POOR AND RICH; HE brings low, HE also exalts."

PSALM 33:10 - "The LORD NULLIFIES the counsel of the nations; HE FRUSTRATES the plans of the peoples."

PSALMS 47:1-4 - "O Clap your hands, all peoples; Shout to God with the voice of joy. For the Lord Most High is to be feared, a great King over ALL the earth. HE SUBDUES peoples under us, and nations under our feet. HE CHOOSES OUR INERITANCE FOR US, The glory of Jacob whom He loves."

PSALMS 119:89-91 - "Forever, O LORD, Thy Word is settled in heaven. Thy faithfulness is to all generations: Thou has established the earth, and it abides. They continue this day ACCORDING TO THINE ORDINANCES: FOR ALL ARE THY SERVANTS."

PSALM 139:16 - "Your eyes saw my substance, BEING YET UNFORMED. And in Your book THEY ALL WERE WRITTEN, THE DAYS FASHIONED FOR ME, When AS YET there were none of them."

PROVERBS 16:4 - "The LORD has made ALL THINGS FOR HIMSELF: yes, EVEN THE WICKED FOR THE DAY OF DESTRUCTION."

ISAIAH 14:24 - "The LORD of Hosts has sworn, saying, 'Surely as I have thought, SO SHALL IT COME TO PASS; and as I have purposed, SO SHALL IT STAND ..."

ISAIAH 30:28 - "And GOD'S breath, as an overflowing stream, which reaches up to the neck, to sift the nations with the sieve of vanity: and there shall be a bridle in the jaws of the people, CAUSING THEM TO ERR."

ISAIAH 45:7 - "I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, AND CREATE EVIL: I the LORD do ALL THESE THINGS."

ISAIAH 46:9-11 - "Remember the former things of old: for I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like Me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, 'MY COUNSEL SHALL STAND, AND I WILL DO ALL MY PLEASURE: calling a ravenous bird from the east, the man that EXECUTES MY COUNSEL from a far country: yes, I have spoken it, I WILL ALSO BRING IT TO PASS; I HAVE PURPOSED IT, I WILL ALSO DO IT."

ISAIAH 55:11 - "So shall My Word be that goes forth out of My mouth: it shall not return to Me void, BUT IT SHALL ACCOMPLISH THAT WHICH I PLEASE, and IT SHALL PROSPER IN THE THING WHERETO I SENT IT."

JEREMIAH 10:23 - "I know, O Lord, that a MAN'S WAY IS NOT IN HIMSELF; nor is it in a man who walks to direct his steps."

LAMENTATIONS 3:37-38 - "Who is he that says, 'and it comes to pass, when the LORD commands it not? Out of the mouth of the Most High proceeds not EVIL AND GOOD?'"

AMOS 3:6 - "... Shall there be evil in a city, AND THE LORD HAS NOT DONE IT?"

ACTS 4:26-28 - "'The kings of the earth stood up, and the rulers were gathered together against the Lord, and against His Christ ... to do WHATSOEVER THY HAND AND THY COUNSEL DETERMINED BEFORE TO BE DONE."

ACTS 17:26 - “and GOD made from one, every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having DETERMINED their APPOINTED times, AND THE BOUNDARIES of their habitation,”

ROMANS 9:9-24 - "For this is the word of promise, 'At this time will I come, and Sarah shall have a son.' And not only this: but when Rebecca also had conceived by one, even by our father Isaac; (For the children, being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, THAT THE PURPOSE OF GOD ACCORDING TO ELECTION MIGHT STAND, NOT OF WORKS, BUT OF HIM THAT CALLS:) It was said to her, 'The elder shall serve the younger.' As it is written, 'Jacob have I loved, but Esau HAVE I HATED.' WHAT SHALL WE SAY THEN? IS THERE UNRIGHTEOUSNESS WITH GOD? GOD FORBID. For He says to Moses, 'I will have mercy ON WHOM I WILL have mercy, and I will have compassion ON WHOM I WILL have compassion.' So then, IT IS NOT OF HIM THAT WILLS, NOR OF HIM THAT RUNS, BUT OF GOD WHO SHOWS MERCY. For the Scripture says to Pharoah, 'Even for this same purpose have I raised you up, that I might show My power in you, and that My Name might declared throughout all the earth.' Therefore He has mercy ON WHOM HE WILL have mercy, and WHOM HE WILL HE HARDENS. You will say to me then, 'Why does He still find fault? For who has resisted His will?' Nay but, O man, WHO ARE YOU THAT REPLIES AGAINST GOD? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, 'Why have You made me thus?' Has not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel TO HONOUR, and another TO DISHONOUR? What if God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath FITTED TO DESTRUCTION: and that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessel of mercy WHICH HE HAD

EPHESIANS 1:4-5 - "He CHOSE US in Him BEFORE THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD, that we should be holy and without blame before Him in love; having PREDESTINED US TO ADOPTION AS SONS by Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the good PLEASURE OF HIS WILL"

So, Henry can drop his PAP libertarianism, or the Bible. Which will it be? Take any event in this world. God has ordained it, predetermined it, and brought it about. So, at the end of the day, despite all the talk, Henry's position cannot stand in the face of God's word.

"Then Paul claims that the possibility of doing otherwise has been refuted and that libertarians and molinists agree. Paul is mistaken again, both libertarians and molinists hold to the libertarian view which suggests that we do one action and also are able do another action in the same circumstances when engaging in a choice."

Actually, Paul cited W.L. Craig as saying that "ability to do otherwise" was not necessary for moral responsibility.

Furthermore, I have argued that in FSC, the people make a choice, yet they couldn't have done otherwise. It is prima facie obvious that they chose their action. They would feel like they chose. So, how can Henry explain this phenomena? I can keep all the *experiences* the same, yes not have libertarianism to account for it. If the experiences which Henry relies on to make his case can be had even though there is no live available option, then his argument from experience doesn’t necessarily follow for libertarianism.

" If we can do either action, and the decision is up to us, then we can do otherwise."

Use of "can" is sloppy. This has been addressed above.

"Paul assuming that event-event causal chains are the only form of explanation that exists, goes on to ask “what caused A?”"

No, I'm not, but I deny that the buck stops at agent causation. As John Frame says,

"Of course, "free will" can be used in various senses. If someone wants to use the phrase to refer to the obvious fact that we do what we desire to do (i.e. "compatibilism"), I can't imagine any serious objection. Here we are just using a word to describe a capacity that everyone agrees we have. Even libertarians agree that we have compatibilist freedom; they just want to insist that we also have freedom in another sense as well.

Of course, those who use "free will" to refer to compatibilist freedom must beware of misleading people. There is a tendency to equate "real freedom" with libertarianism. So one who claims "real freedom" and interprets the phrase in a compatibilist sense may lead his hearers astray.

And of course the very idea of a "will" which exists in some independence from the person, the intellect, and the emotions, is deeply problematic. See my Doctrine of the Knowledge of God for a more "perspectival" view of intellect, will, emotions, imagination, etc. So I prefer to speak of "freedom" in general rather than free will.

Agent causation is certainly an interesting concept. In common discourse, we often consider the decision of an agent to be a sufficient causal explanation. E. G., We find a newspaper on a chair and ask how it got there. When told that the wind blew it there, we obviously want further explanation: how did the window get left open, so that the wind could mess up the living room? But when we're given a personal explanation, "Joe put it there," we don't usually ask further explanation, except about Joe's motives. So personal explanations tend to satisfy causal questions in a way that impersonal explanations don't. That has implications for theistic arguments and the like.

Still, it is at least abstractly possible to ask what caused a person to decide in a certain way. Those further questions can be answered along the lines of psychology, and those along the lines of neurology, genetics, etc. So in some contexts it makes sense to regard agent causation as something needing explanation, rather than as itself a final explanation.

And the phrase "Joe decided" requires further explanation. If it means that Joe's will acted without cause, independently of his desires, then agent causation is the same as libertarianism. If, however, Joe's decision is determined by his desires, then we must ask where those desires came from. If they are undetermined, the same problem arises as with libertarianism. If they are determined, then we must ask where they came from. This discussion progresses through a causal chain all the way to the will of God. So our final choices seem to be still between determinism and indeterminism. And I would argue that any kind of indeterminism contains the same problems as libertarianism. With any kind of indeterminism there is something that pops out of nowhere, with no explanation, that invalidates moral responsibility. "

"But this whole infinite regress argument **assumes** that our choices are the result of a causal chain that eventuates in our choice. But that is not how agent causal theorists see human causation. "

No, it assumes that you must now say that your choices just "popped into existence." So, S causes A, but what causes S to cause A? Or, why did S pick A over B?

Lastly, Henry thinks that saying that S chose A over B **for reasons* is a magic phrase. So what? Compatibilists can agree that we choose A over B **for reasons.* But, why do you think *those* reasons are good ones for you to choose A over B? Why not *these other* reasons? A Muslim may have "reasons" to do A, while we have reasons to not do A. But why do we think these reasons, reasons to act or not act? Well, because of other conditions. These conditions were all brought about by God.

Furthermore, that S has reasons for A over B does *not* entail that S has the ability to choose either option.

Take an FSC. S kills Jim for reasons. S "feels" the experience of making a choice. But, if S had decided not to kill Jim, then S* would have pushed a button that controlled S's body, making S kill Jim. Therefore, even having "reasons for A" does not entail "the libertarian ability to refrain from A."

Anyway, Henry's talk about god is easily refuted. God does cause his actions. But, he does so according to his nature. God does not have "the ability" to, say, lie.

Hebrews6:17 Wherein God, being minded to show more abundantly unto the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed with an oath;

18 that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have a strong encouragement, who have fled for refuge to lay hold of the hope set before us:

So, even God does not have libertarian free will.

So, let's apply this. God promised to save His people from their sins.

Did God have a choice, after this promise, to allow Jesus to not face the cross?

Was this a "live option?"

If it was "possible" in the libertarian sense, then God would have "lied," but it is "impossible" for God to lie, hence it would be "impossible" for God to chose to have Jesus not face the cross. But, God *did* choose for Jesus to face the cross, but there was no live option to the contrary available, but it was still a choice, ergo, Henry's position is false.

Or, what about Judas being *predestined* to betray Jesus. Jesus says that he "chose" the 12. Was it "possible," in a libertarian sense, that Jesus not choose Judas? "Could" he have chooses Larry, instead? So, "could" God's prophecy have been proven wrong? No. But, Jesus *did* choose Judas (as he says). Also, the live option of picking Larry instead of Judas was not open because God's prophecy would fail, he would then be a liar, but it is impossible for him to lie. So, we *know* that Jesus *chose* Judas, and we *know* that Larry was not a "live option."

It appears that Paul went and cut and pasted some things in response to my comments. I do not have the time to deal with all of his points here, so I will deal with only some of them. Paul had brought up puppets so I asked this question:

"And if he does so, how is **that** different from a puppet master who completely controls his puppet by pulling all of their strings?"

Paul responded:

“Because in the one, there is no desire or will to do A, in the other, there is. And, if the puppet did have a will, the puppet master will still *make* the puppet do things--say, kiss the female puppet in the play--against the puppets will. In compatibilism, this *never* happens.”

So the puppet and human person differ in that we have a will and they do not. And what if another person controls, or better yet predetermines our desires as well as every other aspect of our being? Then that person would be pulling “all of our strings” our wills being just another string under the control of the puppet master. Paul does not see my point: If everything about us is predetermined and controlled by an external person (including our desires which according to Paul necessitate our actions) then that external person is just like a puppet master pulling all of our strings.

Paul wrote:

“But the point is that you choose things according to your desires, likes, dislikes, etc. It was God who caused you to be *that kind* of person, rather than another. And, since you chose based on these things, and since it was God who, via his providential governing of all events, determined that you'd be *this* way rather than *that* way, it is God who determined what you would chose.”

If I understand Paul’s reasoning here, God causes us to be the **kind of person** that we are, he determines whether we are this way or another way, and God even determines what we will choose. According to this reasoning then, a child molester, a homosexual, a false teacher in a cult, an unfaithful spouse, a serial killer, a rapist, etc. Etc. Are the kind of persons that they are because God “caused you to be that kind of person”? I was talking with a friend recently who deal with human trafficking (that is the kidnapping and physical, mental and sexual abuse of persons, mostly women and children, for profit). According to Paul these traffickers are the kind of person that they are because God caused them to be that kind of person? This is precisely what happens when one endorses exhaustive theological determinism, everything that occurs is exactly what God wants it to be. J. P. Moreland calls this unfortunate consequence of determinism “actualism”: “If determinism is true, all our acts are the inevitable results of events in the past that are beyond our control. Another way to state the problem is to say that determinism implices actualism -- only what actually happens is possible. What a person actually **does** do coincides with what a person possibly **could** do.” (PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW, P. 280) In contrast, I see traffickers and others who commit sins as freely choosing to sin, acting as agent causes of their own actions, actions which are not always caused by God.

I had said:

"Choice presupposes actually available alternatives. Where there is no alternative there can be no choice."

Pal responded:

“This is addressed above.”

I do not believe that Paul ever shows that my conception of choice is false or that his conception of choice as not involving actually available alternatives is true. The closest that he comes is when I say:

If we can do either action, and the decision is up to us, then we can do otherwise.

Paul responds: “Use of ‘can’ is sloppy. This has been addressed above.”

Paul never explained how my statement is a **sloppy** use of “can”. Non-determinists and determinists like Paul have two very different conceptions of the word “can.”

In terms of my view, this comment is brief, to the point, and fits perfectly with my view. So why is it “sloppy”? When it comes to the meaning of **can** there are two very different conceptions, not surprisingly, one held by libertarians and one held by compatibilists. Neither conception is **sloppy** they are just dfferent.

In the libertarian conception, when we say that “we can do (x)”, we mean that before the person is the live option (to use Steve Hays’ language) of selecting between at least two different alternatives (i.e. to do action X, or to refrain from doing action X). By “live option” we mean that the person really could choose to do either of these two actions. In the very same circumstances he really is able to do either alternative. Expressed another way: he can/could have done X or he can/could have done otherwise. Unless he can do otherwise, could have done otherwise, in respect to a specific choice, he does not have a real choice. Let’s call this the **actual** “can” view. Actual because in the same circumstances the two alternatives are **both** available options. He **actually** can do one or the other of the two alternatives.

In contrast, the compatibilist conception is that when we say that “we can do (X)” we mean that the person when doing an action is doing what he wants to do and his action is not externally coerced. He does X because He wants to do X. Now because compatibilism also includes determinism within it, the action which the person does, X, is a determined action. This means that the persons can only do the action which he is predetermined to perform (the determining factor may be God, genes, background, environment, stimulas/response conditioning, desires, our nature, etc. etc.). In regards to “doing otherwise”, then, given the circumstances are the same, we cannot do otherwise than what we actually did. Given two alternatives we can do one, but not both. The reason that we cannot do both, is because only one action is the predetermined action. So how could the person do other than X, if X was the determined action he was to perform? The circumstances must be different. Given the same circumstances the same action will be performed. However, ***if*** the circumstances were different, then the person could do differently. Theological determinists who believe that all events are predetermined will claim that the person could have done otherwise if he had desired otherwise (the change in circumstance being a different desire determining the action). The problem is that this is ***hypothetical***. In the actual world, the one which is exhaustively determined, persons can never do otherwise than how they are predetermined to act. In order for them to do differently, God would have needed to have predetermined a different world with different circumstances. So the ability to do differently, is not an actual ability to do otherwise in the same circumstances, but is a hypothetical ability (***if*** the determining circumstances were different then he can do differently). Let’s call this the **hypothetical** “can” view because the ability to do otherwise is not present in the actual world, but must take place in a different world, a different set of circumstances.

Neither of these conceptions of “can” is “sloppy”, both make sense from within their respective contexts. We could view these as two differing **models** of what it means to be doing otherwise, two different interpretations of “can”. The issue then becomes how do we know which one is true? We test our models by comparing them with both the reality of scripture and the reality of our ordinary experiences.

Paul believes in the hypothetical view, I hold to the actual view of “can” when it comes to whether or not a person can do otherwise, or could have done otherwise with respect to a particular alternative. Paul may not be aware that his analysis of “can” has failed. As McKenna shows here:

“3.3 The Classical Compatibilist Conditional AnalysisConsider the following incompatibilist objection to the classical compatibilist account of free will:If determinism is true, and if at any given time, an unencumbered agent is completely determined to have the wants that she does have, and if those wants causally determine her actions, then, even though she does do what she wants to do, she can not ever do otherwise. She satisfies the classical compatibilist conditions for free will. But free will requires the ability to do otherwise, and determinism is incompatible with this. Hence, the classical compatibilist account of free will is inadequate. Determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility because determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise.Is the incompatibilist correct? Notice that the incompatibilist's objection does not deny either of the classical compatibilist conditions of free will. Her concern is, even if they are necessary, they are not jointly sufficient; a freely willing agent must also be able to do otherwise.Some classical compatibilists, such as Hobbes, did not take up this incompatibilist challenge, opting for a sort of one-way freedom that required only that what a person did do, she did unencumbered as an upshot of her own agency. Thus, the one-way classical compatibilists relied exclusively on a Source Model of control. But other classical compatibilists took the challenge seriously and argued for a sort of two-way freedom.[15] Clearly, the two-way compatibilists were prepared to defend a Garden of Forking Paths model of control.The two-way classical compatibilists responded by arguing that determinism is compatible with the ability to do otherwise. To show this, they attempted to analyze an agent's ability to do otherwise in conditional terms (e.g., Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.73; Ayer, 1954; or Hobart, 1934). Since determinism is a thesis about what must happen in the future given the actual past, determinism is consistent with the future being different given a different past. So the classical compatibilists analyzed any assertion that an agent could have done otherwise as a conditional assertion reporting what an agent would have done under certain counterfactual conditions. These conditions involved variations on what a freely willing agent wanted (chose, willed, or decided) to do at the time of her freely willed action. Suppose that an agent freely willed X. According to the classical compatibilist conditional analysis, to say that, at the time of acting, she could have done Y and not X is just to say that, had she wanted (chosen, willed, or decided) to do Y and not X at that time, then she would have done Y and not done X. Her ability to have done otherwise at the time at which she acted consisted in some such counterfactual truth.Is this analysis plausible? Given that a determined agent is determined at the time of action to have the wants that she does have, how is it helpful to state what she would have done had she had different wants than the wants that she did have? Assuming the truth of determinism, at the time at which she acted, according to the incompatibilist, she could have had no other wants than the wants that her causal history determined her to have. How is this counterfactual ability more than a hollow freedom? The classical compatibilist held that that the conditional analysis brings into relief a rich picture of freedom. In assessing an agent's action, the analysis accurately distinguishes between those actions she would have performed if she wanted, from those actions she could not have performed even if she wanted. This, the classical compatibilist held, effectively distinguishes between those alternative courses of action that were within the scope of the agent's abilities at the time of action, from those courses of action that were not. This just is the distinction between what an agent was free to do from what she was not free to do. This is not at all a hollow freedom; it demarcates what persons have within their control from what falls outside that purview.Despite the classical compatibilists' ingenuity, their analysis of could have done otherwise failed decisively. The classical compatibilists wanted to show their incompatibilist interlocutors that when one asserted that a freely willing agent had alternatives available to her—that is, when it was asserted that she could have done otherwise—that assertion could be analyzed as a conditional statement, a statement that is perspicuously compatible with determinism. But as it turned out, the analysis was refuted when it was shown that the conditional statements sometimes yielded the improper result that a person was able to do otherwise even though it was clear that at the time the person acted, she had no such alternative and therefore was not able to do otherwise in the pertinent sense (Chisholm, 1964, in Watson, ed., 1982, pp.26-7; or van Inwagen, 1983, pp.114-9). Here is such an example:Suppose that Danielle is psychologically incapable of wanting to touch a blond haired dog. Imagine that, on her sixteenth birthday, unaware of her condition, her father brings to her two puppies to choose between, one being a blond haired Lab, the other a black haired Lab. He tells Danielle just to pick up whichever of the two she pleases and that he will return the other puppy to the pet store. Danielle happily, and unencumbered, does what she wants and picks up the black Lab.When Danielle picked up the black Lab, was she able to pick up the blond Lab? It seems not. Picking up the blond Lab was an alternative that was not available to her. In this respect, she could not have done otherwise. Given her psychological condition, she cannot even form a want to touch a blond Lab, hence she could not pick one up. But notice that, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would have done so. Of course, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would not suffer from the very psychological disorder that causes her to be unable to pick up blond haired doggies. The classical compatibilist analysis of ‘could have done otherwise’ fails. According to the analysis, when Danielle picked up the black Lab, she was able to pick up the blonde Lab, even though, due to her psychological condition, she was not able to do so in the relevant respect. Hence, the analysis yields the wrong result.The classical compatibilist attempt to answer the incompatibilist objection failed. Even if an unencumbered agent does what she wants, if she is determined, at least as the incompatibilist maintains, she could not have done otherwise. Since, as the objection goes, freedom of will requires freedom involving alternative possibilities, classical compatibilist freedom falls.3.4 The Lasting Influence of the Conditional AnalysisIt should be pointed out that the classical compatibilists' failure to prove that ‘could have done otherwise’ statements are compatible with determinism does not amount to a proof that ‘could have done otherwise’ statements are incompatible with determinism. So the incompatibilists' compelling counterexamples to the analysis (such as the one involving Danielle and the blond haired puppy) do not alone prove that determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise.

Despite this qualification, given the classical compatibilists' failure, they had no reply to the Classical Incompatibilist Argument. What the classical compatibilists attempted to do by way of their conditional analysis was deny the truth of the second premise: If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise. But, given their failure, it was incumbent upon them to respond to the argument in some manner. It is only dialectically fair to acknowledge that determinism does pose a prima facie threat to free will when free will is understood in terms of the Garden of Forking Paths model. The Classical Incompatibilist Argument is merely a codification of this natural thought. In light of the failure of the classical compatibilists' conditional analysis, the burden of proof rests squarely on the compatibilists. How can the freedom to do otherwise be reconciled with determinism? It is the mark of contemporary compatibilists that they speak to this issue.”=================================================================

Before engaging in prooftexting by listing verses which he believes to prove his exhaustive determinism, Paul writes:

“The problem, then, for Henry, is that the Bible, the rule of faith, tells us that all is determined:”

The Bible presents clear verses that God does as He pleases (which is the biblical definition of sovereignty) some of which Paul lists. The Bible however does not say that all events are predetermined by God. While it clearly says some are, for example the crucifixion of Jesus, it does not say that all events are predetermined. This is an important point that I want to deal with at a later time. Paul completely leaves out the verses that suggest the reality of choices, that we can choose from among available alternatives.

After listing his “prooftexts” Paul writes:

“So, Henry can drop his PAP libertarianism, or the Bible. Which will it be? Take any event in this world. God has ordained it, predetermined it, and brought it about. So, at the end of the day, despite all the talk, Henry's position cannot stand in the face of God's word.”

I will drop my “PAP libertarianism, when the Bible drops its passages which refer to the reality of choices, free will, being able to do otherwise, AND when Paul comes up with a good argument to deny the daily reality of choices from available alternatives which we deal with daily and universally. The Bible presents passages suggesting that some events are predetermined it also presents verses that some events involve real choices from among available alternatives. Our experience also presents both of these kinds of data. From these two types of data I conclude that some events **are** predetermined and some events involve **actual choices** from among available alternatives. I do not have to only quote some verses and leave out others. But I will discuss this more at a later time.

Paul wrote:

“Furthermore, I have argued that in FSC, the people make a choice, yet they couldn't have done otherwise.”

Paul brings up Frankfurt cases again. Paul do you now admit that you were wrong about Frankfurt being a libertarian rather than a compatibilist? And do you acknowledge that your citing the “Frankfurt Libertarian” paper by Timpe was also a mistake as it discussed Stump’s libertarian view not Frankfurt’s alleged libertarianism?

At one point Paul brings up Frame and writes:

“No, I'm not, but I deny that the buck stops at agent causation. As John Frame says,”

I deny that the buck stops at human agent causation as well. We may be able to perform our own actions because God created us to be agent causes as He is an agent cause of His own actions, but we are finite and limited and created beings. The buck stops with God and His purposes. Whatever He wants to do, He does, and no one can resist His will. It is a mischaracterization of the agent causal view to claim that we believe that the buck stops at the agent causation of mankind.

Dissecting Frame’s comments would also be a useful thing to do in the future as well. He has mistakes that can easily be shown and demonstrating these mistakes will show further problems with Paul’s views.

There are so many other points that could be made, but I will end with one last error by Paul.

Paul wrote:

“Anyway, Henry's talk about god is easily refuted. God does cause his actions. But, he does so according to his nature. God does not have "the ability" to, say, lie.

Hebrews6:17 Wherein God, being minded to show more abundantly unto the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed with an oath;

18 that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have a strong encouragement, who have fled for refuge to lay hold of the hope set before us:

So, even God does not have libertarian free will.”

Consider the logic here. Paul brings up something that God cannot do (he cannot lie as scripture clearly reveals). From this Paul concludes: “So, even God does not have libertarian free will.”

That is quite an unwarranted leap. Just because God cannot do something, in this case, lie, does not mean that He cannot choose from among alternatives based upon reasons. For God to have libertarian freedom it would mean that he would be able to choose from among available alternatives, that His actions are not predetermined, that He causes His own actions. Does the fact that God cannot lie show that He did not have an actual choice in regards to creating or not creating this universe? Are all of God’s actions necessitated so He has no choices simply because He cannot lie? Just because I am unable to do one thing, does that mean that I never have any choices in other areas and in other circumstances? Put another way, you cannot go from one negative instance of what God cannot do, to the universal negative that God never has free will, never has a choice.

I have limited time, so that’s it for now. But there is lots more to say about what Paul has argued at another time.

"The Bible however does not say that all events are predetermined by God."

Actually, it does. Trying reading the online article by Warfield which I referred you to.

"I will drop my “PAP libertarianism, when the Bible drops its passages which refer to the reality of choices, free will, being able to do otherwise."

This is typical of a weak opponent. Henry raises an objection, his objection is answered, then he repeats the very same objection without bothering to interact with the counterargument.

"The Bible presents passages suggesting that some events are predetermined it also presents verses that some events involve real choices from among available alternatives."

i) He continues his vacuous and question-begging habit of using adjectives ("real," "genuine") as a substitute for a reasoned argument.

ii) In addition, he's evidently unacquainted with the literary background for these "alternatives." This is a literary convention which goes back to the covenantal format of Scripture. As one scholar observes:

"Many comparisons have been made between the Mosaic codes in the Pentateuch and cuneiform law codes from the third-millennium BC...Not only do both employ the conditional 'if-then' clauses, but many of the laws are nearly identical," Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch, 576.

Scripture uses conditional clauses because Scripture is covenantal, and conditional clauses were a stock feature of that literary genre.

"Our experience also presents both of these kinds of data."

As I've pointed out before, this is demonstrably false. We only get to do one thing at a time. Hence, we have zero experience testing each alternate possibility. Hence, there's absolutely no experimental evidence that we can actuate alternate possibilities.

I don't have much else to say. My post remais undefeated and your position still remains defeated. I proved that Jesus could still "choose" and yet not have the libertarian ability, or live ootion, of picking Larry over Judas. That pretty much slams the door shut on your case. You either have to say: (a) Jesus didn't "really choose," (b) since Jesus said he chose he really could have chosen Larry over Judas, and falsified the prophecies, thus making God a liar.

So, if you just wanted to win the war of word count, I gladly concede.

"I will drop my “PAP libertarianism, when the Bible drops its passages which refer to the reality of choices, free will, being able to do otherwise."

Steve responded:

“This is typical of a weak opponent. Henry raises an objection, his objection is answered, then he repeats the very same objection without bothering to interact with the counterargument.”

Steve says that he answered my objection (i.e. the Bible verses which show the reality of choices, free will, being able to do otherwise), and that I repeat the same objection without interacting with his counterargument. Big problem needs to be made explicit here: I **never** presented these verses.

So how is Hays answering an objection that has not even been stated yet?

This is highly presumptuous. How do you know that you “answered” someone’s argument if they had not even made their argument?

I had written:

The Bible presents passages suggesting that some events are predetermined it also presents verses that some events involve real choices from among available alternatives.

Steve responded:

“i) He continues his vacuous and question-begging habit of using adjectives ("real," "genuine") as a substitute for a reasoned argument.

ii) In addition, he's evidently unacquainted with the literary background for these "alternatives." This is a literary convention which goes back to the covenantal format of Scripture. As one scholar observes:

‘Many comparisons have been made between the Mosaic codes in the Pentateuch and cuneiform law codes from the third-millennium BC...Not only do both employ the conditional 'if-then' clauses, but many of the laws are nearly identical," Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch,’ 576.

Scripture uses conditional clauses because Scripture is covenantal, and conditional clauses were a stock feature of that literary genre.”

Regarding my use of adjectives, we have to use adjectives to make proper distinctions. For example, if someone thinks he can choose certain alternatives (and those alternatives are available to the person) we could call that a **genuine**, or **actual** or **real** choice because the alternatives are doable by the agent, within his power to do. On the other hand, if the person thinks that he can choose certain alternatives and none of those alternatives are doable by the agent, or within his power to perform, we could call that “unavailable alternatives” or “illusory alternatives” to convey the fact that these alternatives are not available for the agent to do.

Hays brings up the “if-then clauses” present in the OT anticipating that this is one of my arguments for the reality of choices in scripture. The fact that I have written **nothing** about If-then clauses in any of my posts and that this subject has not been discussed in this thread until Steve brings it up, indicates that now Hay is putting words in my mouth. It is significant that Hays brings up the subjunctive mood, which refers to events which are conditional in nature. In a completely predetermined world, such as Steve believes to be the case, where there is no free will in the libertarian sense, there are no contingent events, all events are necessary events in which nothing could possibly be otherwise as there are no choices, no alternatives. There would be no need or usefulness in using the subjunctive mood in such a world. And yet our languages contain statements in the subjunctive mood, because this reflects the **fact** that some realities are conditional, dependent on actual choices occurring or not occurring. In scripture often when a conditional is present, the resulting event is something connected to a human individual’s choice (i.e., If you repent, God will turn from judgment; If you obey, then you will be blessed; etc. etc.). So God’s response is sometimes conditioned upon the choices made by the people. This is further evidence of the reality of choices, unless you claim that the invitations and commands to respond were appeals which the people could never respond to (“illusory invitations”, “illusory promises”).

I had written:

Our experience also presents both of these kinds of data.

Steve replied:

“As I've pointed out before, this is demonstrably false. We only get to do one thing at a time. Hence, we have zero experience testing each alternate possibility. Hence, there's absolutely no experimental evidence that we can actuate alternate possibilities.”

Demonstrably false?

Calvinists dream of having such a **demonstrable proof**. A sort of mathematical equation showing the non-reality of free will and choices. There is no such thing. And if Hays had it, or was familiar with it, he’d already have happily paraded it before us. But there hasn’t been any such parade or anything even close. Hays has made no such demonstration, nor even attempted to do so. His claim is merely an unsupported dogmatic assertion.

He starts with the claim that “we only get to do one thing at a time”. First, there are cases of multi-tasking, but assume that he is right, and let’s put these aside. Doing one thing at a time does not negate the reality of the deliberation and actual choice from among alternatives which resulted in that **one** action occurring. In many of our experiences the resulting **one** action is the outcome of a process of deliberating and considering and evaluating multiple available alternatives. Examples of this process would include the words we use to express our selves, daily decisions, where we will vacation, where we will go to school, what books we will read for recreation, the moves we make in a chess game, and on and on and on.

The next statement indicates a major misunderstanding of the nature of choices: “we have zero experience testing each alternative possibility”. This is misunderstanding the nature of intentional actions. Intentional actions involve consideration of various available actions (i.e. deliberation) and then the person chooses one of the actions which he intends to actuate. We do not have to **test** every alternative possibility before we choose the **one** action we end up doing. Nobody thinks that way, lives that way, or makes decisions that way. This is disconnected from our actual decision making reality.

But it gets worse.

Steve then asserts that: “there’s absolutely no experimental evidence that we can actuate alternative possibilities.”

First, this is precisely the kind of statement materialists such asDennett or Flanagan make in regard to the reality of intentional actions by a self, or immaterial human soul. This is a statement of **scientism**, the claim that unless some piece of knowledge derives from the scientific disciplines, it cannot constitute reliable or accurate information. Implying that if something is not physical and capable of mathematical description and so in some way observable by means of observational equipment, it cannot be real or exist.

Why don’t we recast Steve’s statement to include other bothersome immaterial realities: “there’s absolutely no experimental evidence that [God exists] [that angels exist] [that the human soul exists] [that the soul interacts with the brain/body] [that mental actions occur in an immaterial mind] [that non-physical selves exist] [that human spirits exist] [that the immaterial soul actuates his/her choices] etc. Etc. Does Hays adopt his interpretations of scripture passages by means of experimental evidence? Does Hays confirm and disconfirm things in his everyday thinking by means of experimental evidence? Does Hays apply this principle to every area of his thinking?

Hays believes Calvinism/exhaustive determinism to be true: did he establish by this by “experimental evidence”?

Does he practice what he preaches here, or is it just empty rhetoric?

We might also ask: Steve subscribes to this principle that we ought **only** affirm things which are demonstrated by experimental evidence as true, that being so, **when** was this principle, itself, demonstrated via **experimental evidence** to be true?

Second, this statement assumes that something must be capable of investigation by scientific disciplines which involve mathematical descriptions in order for it to be true or real. But how would we scientifically falsify the reality of choices or free will? Demonstrate the non-reality of choices via scientific investigation? What experimental evidence will establish the non-reality of choices or free will?

We could ask Steve: what experimental evidence would persuade you about the reality of choices and free will?

Third, while we may not be able to investigate immaterial actions by an immaterial spirit (the human soul) by means of scientific experimental evidence, we could develop some ways of examining what occurs when people make choices. Say we set up experiments involving controlled conditions in which individual persons are given a TV remote control and then tested to see if they are able to select from among differing TV channels under observable conditions. We could ask the persons questions as they make selections by means of the remote, questions about what alternatives they are considering, why they are about to choose certain channels (their reasons for doing so) or why they are refraining from other channels, which channel they are about to select from the alternatives. We would find people making one selection at a time and we would find that they consistently appear to be in complete control of the deliberation, selection, and actuation of alternative possibilities. We could do this test at different locations world wide with all sorts of control conditions, variable changes, etc. Etc. And this experimentation would not allow us to observe or mathematically describe the actual actions of the human soul (the operations by the human soul though real would be incapable of observation by an external observer nor mathematically describable). Nevertheless, the evidence which would result from such testing, would overwhelmingly confirm the common sense notion that we are able to deliberate, select from among available alternatives, and then actuate those decisions.

Why am I so confident of this finding?

Because we all have had this very experience of making choices from available alternatives and actuating those decisions once they are made by the agent causing these phenomena to occur. This is a major reason why Calvinism/exhaustive determinism will always be an extreme minority position among human persons. People have just had too many of their own experiences of the ability to actuate the alternative which they choose to actuate from among available alternatives. In reality, we have all been performing experiments confirming the reality of choice since we were born. Babies are already learning about actuating alternative possibilities and we have been doing it ever since. One of the reasons that Calvinism is a tough sell is because it requires that we deny, put under the rug, hide in the closet, our whole lifetime of daily experiences. It is surprising that Calvinists are shocked when their views are rejected by most people. The Calvinist frustration then manifests itself when they will sometimes attack people’s experience and common sense conclusions as succumbing to unreliable “intuition” or putting experience ahead of scripture.

Yet these same Calvinists will applaud and use Plantinga’s concept of a cognitive design plan which is properly functioning. It is true that our senses can sometimes be unreliable, our perceptions false or inaccurate, but part of that design plan includes knowing how we make choices from among available alternatives as well as that we do so. One of the proper deliverances of this cognitive design plan when it **is** properly functioning is the true belief that we sometimes make actual choices from among available alternatives; we make choices. The denial of this reality, of this true belief, leads to desperate arguments including appealing to the principle of scientism that something is not real unless it can be shown by means of experimental evidence limited to scientific disciplines.

How sad that the capacity to choose which is one of the preconditions of performing actions of worship of the one and only God, is turned by some into a tool for attacking what we all experience daily: choosing from among available alternatives. They choose the arguments they will use against the reality of choices, and free will, when these choices are themselves just more evidence of the reality of choices. Making choices is an inescapable reality for human persons so even when some deny this reality and choose to argue for theological determinism with various arguments of their choice, they cannot escape the reality of choice. It is similar to the materialist who in arguing against the reality of an immaterial mind or soul is himself using this immaterial mind to make those arguments.

"Steve says that he answered my objection (i.e. the Bible verses which show the reality of choices, free will, being able to do otherwise), and that I repeat the same objection without interacting with his counterargument. Big problem needs to be made explicit here: I **never** presented these verses. So how is Hays answering an objection that has not even been stated yet? This is highly presumptuous. How do you know that you “answered” someone’s argument if they had not even madetheir argument?"

It's a pity that Henry is so forgetful. Earlier in this same thread he referred to the admonitions in Hebrews, along with 1 Sam 23, as prooftexts for his position.

"Regarding my use of adjectives, we have to use adjectives to make proper distinctions."

Which is not the point. The point, rather, is his use of adjectives as if they were arguments.

"For example, if someone thinks he can choose certain alternatives (and those alternatives are available to the person) we could call that a **genuine**, or **actual** or **real** choice because the alternatives are doable by the agent, within his power to do. On the other hand, if the person thinks that he can choose certain alternatives and none of those alternatives are doable by the agent, or within his power to perform, we could call that 'unavailable alternatives' or 'illusory alternatives' to convey the fact that these alternatives are not available for the agent to do."

Which illustrates my point. His use of these adjectives assumes the conclusion of an argument he has failed to make. So his usage is prejudicial.

"Hays brings up the “if-then clauses” present in the OT anticipating that this is one of my arguments for the reality of choices in scripture. The fact that I have written **nothing** about If-then clauses in any of my posts and that this subject has not been discussed in this thread until Steve brings it up, indicates that now Hay is putting words in my mouth."

Two issues:

i) As I just pointed out, Henry can't remember his own argument. And I'd add that the admonitions in Hebrews have their precedent in the Mosaic covenant.

ii) And even if he hadn't brought it up before, I don't have to lag behind my opponent. I reserve the right to skip ahead and cut to the chase.

"It is significant that Hays brings up the subjunctive mood, which refers to events which are conditional in nature. In a completely predetermined world, such as Steve believes to be the case, where there is no free will in the libertarian sense, there are no contingent events, all events are necessary events in which nothing could possibly be otherwise as there are no choices, no alternatives."

As I pointed out before, this doesn't entail libertarianism, for counterfactuals can be indexed to the divine will rather than the human will. Once again, Henry is simply repeating himself rather than addressing the counterargument.

What we have in Calvinism is the conditional necessity of all events. They are bound to happen, for God decreed them. But God could have decreed otherwise.

Predestination does not obviate contingency. Rather, it's a question of what the outcome is contingent upon. In Calvinism, it's contingent on the divine decree. It would be helpful if Henry made an effort to acquaint himself with the opposing position.

"There would be no need or usefulness in using the subjunctive mood in such a world. And yet our languages contain statements in the subjunctive mood, because this reflects the **fact** that some realities are conditional, dependent on actual choices occurring or not occurring."

An obviously lame argument since it's possible to construct many linguistic statements which are inactionable. If I could go back in time, I'd like to hear George Whitefield preach. Does this mean that I can actually go back in time to hear George Whitefield preach?

"In scripture often when a conditional is present, the resulting event is something connected to a human individual’s choice (i.e., If you repent, God will turn from judgment; If you obey, then you will be blessed; etc. etc.). So God’s response is sometimes conditioned upon the choices made by the people."

But that's not the final explanation. For Scripture attributes human choices to God's ulterior plans and action.

"This is further evidence of the reality of choices, unless you claim that the invitations and commands to respond were appeals which the people could never respond to ('illusory invitations', 'illusory promises')."

He continues to miss the point. This is a literary convention, not a metaphysical claim—just as a sonnet is a literary convention.

"Calvinists dream of having such a **demonstrable proof**. A sort of mathematical equation showing the non-reality of free will and choices. There is no such thing. And if Hays had it, or was familiar with it, he’d already have happily paraded it before us. But there hasn’t been any such parade or anything even close. Hays has made no such demonstration, nor even attempted to do so. His claim is merely an unsupported dogmatic assertion."

i) Not an assertion. I have, in fact, argued that point in my replies to Henry. Once again, he seems to suffer from short-term memory loss.

ii) Then he tries to erect a straw man argument by redefining my statement as "a sort of mathematical equation." That was no part of my argument.

"He starts with the claim that 'we only get to do one thing at a time'. First, there are cases of multi-tasking, but assume that he is right, and let’s put these aside."

Is he trying to play coy? In context, my statement has reference to the question of alternate possibilities.

"Doing one thing at a time does not negate the reality of the deliberation and actual choice from among alternatives which resulted in that **one** action occurring. In many of our experiences the resulting **one** action is the outcome of a process of deliberating and considering and evaluating multiple available alternatives. Examples of this process would include the words we use to express our selves, daily decisions, where we will vacation, where we will go to school, what books we will read for recreation, the moves we make in a chess game, and on and on and on."

As I've said before, this doesn't rise above the level of the imagination. We can imagine alternate possibilities, and the consequences of each. And we can imagine many things which we are unable to actuate. (Or does Henry suppose that every figment of the imagination must correspond to a real world situation?)

Once more, all we get is Henry's broken record. No attempt to address the counterargument.

"The next statement indicates a major misunderstanding of the nature of choices: 'we have zero experience testing each alternative possibility'. This is misunderstanding the nature of intentional actions. Intentional actions involve consideration of various available actions (i.e. deliberation) and then the person chooses one of the actions which he intends to actuate."

For which an active imagination will suffice.

"We do not have to **test** every alternative possibility before we choose the **one** action we end up doing. Nobody thinks that way, lives that way, or makes decisions that way. This is disconnected from our actual decision making reality."

As usual, Henry can't follow his own argument. The point at issue is not whether we have to test every alternative possibility to make a choice. Rather, the point at issue is whether we have any evidence for either the "reality" of alternative possibilities or the availability of alternative possibilities absent actual experience with alternative possibilities.

Henry never fails to miss the point. Let's go back to one of his own examples: "In the story of Keilah where David is told about what would happen if he stayed (an unexemplified alternative), based on this information he then decides to leave Keilah. Knowing the 'unexemplified alternative' was useful for him to know."

Does David get to experiment with both? Does he get to try out each scenario? Is it possible for David both to stay in Keilah and leave Keilah at one and the same time? No.

So David has no "actual" experience of alternate possibilities. Therefore, David has no "real" evidence that he could have actuated either scenario.

Could God have actuated the alternative? Yes—providing that he had decreed otherwise.

"First, this is precisely the kind of statement materialists such as Dennett or Flanagan make in regard to the reality of intentional actions by a self, or immaterial human soul. This is a statement of **scientism**, the claim that unless some piece of knowledge derives from the scientific disciplines, it cannot constitute reliable or accurate information. Implying that if something is not physical and capable of mathematical description and so in some way observable by means of observational equipment, it cannot be real or exist."

Unfortunately for Henry, this doesn't begin to follow from what I said. Perhaps Henry has a limited command of the English language. Maybe, for him, the word "experiment" automatically connotes "scientific" experimentation.

If so, then he doesn't know the history of English usage. "Experimental" is synonymous with experiential. 18C divines used to speak of "experimental religion." That was not a scientific classification.

Henry then carries on and on with his faulty understanding of English usage, so I'll skip over the rest of his mini-diatribe.

"We would find people making one selection at a time and we would find that they consistently appear to be in complete control of the deliberation, selection, and actuation of alternative possibilities."

Two or three more errors:

i) To say that an agent can make a selection does not imply that an agent can actuate reality. A more theologically orthodox explanation is that God foreordains our choices and then actuates our choices. The future is what we choose it to be because God foreordains our choices, and actuates the future consistent with his decree, inclusive of the choices he foreordained for us.

ii) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the human agent actuates reality, he never ever actuates *alternate* possibilities. Alternate possibilities are incompossible. That's what makes them "alternate" possibilities. They are mutually exclusive. The agent has zero experience doing what Henry claims for him.

So even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the agent can actuate reality, there is no evidence that he can actuate more than one reality. Actuate more than one future.

iii) And even if, ex hypothesi, an agent could do so, there is no evidence that he could so. No evidence that these apparent alternatives were ever in play. Were ever live options.

"This is a major reason why Calvinism/exhaustive determinism will always be an extreme minority position among human persons."

No, the major reasons are as follows:

i) Many people are just as illogical as Henry.

ii) Many people simply dislike the idea of predestination.

"One of the reasons that Calvinism is a tough sell is because it requires that we deny, put under the rug, hide in the closet, our whole lifetime of daily experiences."

It is to Calvinism's credit that it doesn't pander to humanistic self-flattery, our overweening pride, and our delusions of godhood.

"It is surprising that Calvinists are shocked when their views are rejected by most people."

Can Henry quote any Reformed theologians who are "shocked" by this phenomenon?

The rest is more of Henry's broken record. It was a trite tune to begin with, and it doesn't improve with repeated hearings.

Before I go onto discuss Paul’s post on 3-30-07 I want to repost the ending of my earlier post. Apparently, Manata did not read this carefully enough. If he had done so, he would have realized the answer to his argument was already stated there. Here again is the portion that had direct bearing on his post.============================================

Paul wrote:

“Anyway, Henry's talk about god is easily refuted. God does cause his actions. But, he does so according to his nature. God does not have "the ability" to, say, lie.

Hebrews6:17 Wherein God, being minded to show more abundantly unto the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed with an oath;

18 that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have a strong encouragement, who have fled for refuge to lay hold of the hope set before us:

So, even God does not have libertarian free will.”

I responded:

Consider the logic here. Paul brings up something that God cannot do (he cannot lie as scripture clearly reveals). From this Paul concludes: “So, even God does not have libertarian free will.”

That is quite an unwarranted leap. Just because God cannot do something, in this case, lie, does not mean that He cannot choose from among alternatives based upon reasons. For God to have libertarian freedom it would mean that he would be able to choose from among available alternatives, that His actions are not predetermined, that He causes His own actions. Does the fact that God cannot lie show that He did not have an actual choice in regards to creating or not creating this universe? Are all of God’s actions necessitated so He has no choices simply because He cannot lie? Just because I am unable to do one thing, does that mean that I never have any choices in other areas and in other circumstances? Put another way, you cannot go from one negative instance of what God cannot do, to the universal negative that God never has free will, never has a choice.================================================

Note that I was attacking Paul’s unwarranted leap from one thing that God cannot do (i.e. lie) to the conclusion that therefore God does not ever have libertarian freedom. I specified what would be the case if God had libertarian freedom: (1) “it would mean that he would be able to choose from among available alternatives”, (2) that His actions are not predetermined”, (3) that He causes His own actions. I then gave a specific example: Does the fact that God cannot lie show that He did not have an actual choice in regards to creating or not creating this universe? Consider these three points a bit more. We know that God chose Israel as the chosen nation in the OT, could He have chosen a different nation if He had wanted to? If God is sovereign the answer is yes. And if the answer is Yes, then God had a choice from among alternatives (different nations) but He chose one nation, Israel. So (1) is obviously true.

How about (2), are His actions predetermined? Is there another being or force or laws of nature that predetermines all of the Lord’s actions? The answer is again, obvious, NO. So (2) is true of God. And then (3), does God cause His own actions? Answer Yes. So clearly all three of these things are true, and God appears then to have libertarian freedom in spite of the fact that He cannot lie. The same principle is true of us as well: just because I am unable to do one thing, does that mean that I never have choices in other circumstances. Say I break my arm so that I am unable to engage in the local church softball league game. Does that mean that when I go to Baskin Robbins after the game with my friends that I am unable to choose from among the available alternatives in regards to which flavor of ice cream that I will have?

This points out a very simple principle that Paul completely ignores: not having the ability to make a particular choice from available alternatives in one situation does not entail that I am unable to make a choice from available alternatives in another situation.

What Paul also neglects is that the burden of proof is upon the one making the assertion and he claims that libertarian free will does not exist, never exists. So he’s got to prove a **universal negative.** And you cannot prove, for instance, that since God cannot lie (a particular negative instance), that therefore he **never** has libertarian free will (a universal negative).

Now consider what Paul writes:

“I don't have much else to say. My post remains undefeated and your position still remains defeated. I proved that Jesus could still "choose" and yet not have the libertarian ability, or live option, of picking Larry over Judas. That pretty much slams the door shut on your case. You either have to say: (a) Jesus didn't "really choose," (b) since Jesus said he chose he really could have chosen Larry over Judas, and falsified the prophecies, thus making God a liar.”

It seems that here Paul is appealing to something which he had argued earlier when he wrote this:

=============================================“So, let's apply this. God promised to save His people from their sins.

Did God have a choice, after this promise, to allow Jesus to not face the cross?

Was this a "live option?"

If it was "possible" in the libertarian sense, then God would have "lied," but it is "impossible" for God to lie, hence it would be "impossible" for God to chose to have Jesus not face the cross. But, God **did** choose for Jesus to face the cross, but there was no live option to the contrary available, but it was still a choice, ergo, Henry’s position is false.

Or, what about Judas being *predestined* to betray Jesus. Jesus says that he "chose" the 12. Was it "possible," in a libertarian sense, that Jesus not choose Judas? "Could" he have chosen Larry, instead? So, "could" God's prophecy have been proven wrong? No. But, Jesus *did* choose Judas (as he says). Also, the live option of picking Larry instead of Judas was not open because God's prophecy would fail, he would then be a liar, but it is impossible for him to lie. So, we *know* that Jesus *chose* Judas, and we *know* that Larry was not a "live option."================================================

Paul believes that my position is refuted by what he says here. I had not dealt with these words directly, but will do so now.

He starts out referring to God’s promise to save His people from their sins. When I make a promise in many situations that limits my options, **if** I fulfill my promise. I promised my wife to be faithful so my options of physical intimacy are now limited to only her. Is that a weakness on my part? And the fact that my alternatives are limited in that area, does that mean that I am unable to make choices from available alternatives in other areas? No. Similarly, when God makes promises he keeps them so by doing so He limits Himself in one area while limiting His ability to choose among available alternatives in other areas.

Just as God was not necessitated or obligated by some external factor to create the world (he had the choice of creating the world or not creating the world), likewise, was God obligated or necessitated when it comes to saving sinners from the penalty of their sins? No, he had a choice, He could have left mankind in its sins, or He could deal with the sin problem. So once God makes promises in regard to saving people from their sins, He has already made a prior choice from among alternatives (to save people/or leave them in their sins).So God was an agent cause self-determining which alternative He would select when it came to the creation of the world and saving men from their sins.

Calvinists believe that before anyone is born, God has already decided their eternal destiny. This is called unconditional election. Did this involve actual choices for God? Were these choices necessitated? Were God’s selections in regards to individuals, predetermined by some other person or factor? Were God’s actions in making choices His own actions? Were they random actions? Were they done for reasons? So if the Calvinist wants to argue against the existence or coherence of agent causation, he has to argue against unconditional election which (if true) would have involved agent causation on the part of God. This demonstrates that the Calvinist system presupposes the truth of agent causation with respect to unconditional election.

Then Paul asks whether or not Jesus going to the cross was a “live option” or not? If God had already **decided** (i.e., made a choice from among available alternatives) to save men from their sins, and God developed a plan which included the cross, then Jesus had to go to the cross to actualize that plan. So did God have a choice in regards to whether or not Jesus had to die on the cross? No. But now not having that option does that entail that God is unable to make a choice from among available alternatives in other situations? No. Or that God **never** experiences choices from available alternatives? No. For Manata’s argument to work, it is not sufficient to show that since God had no option in regard to the cross after developing His own plan which included the cross: he has to show that God **never** has a choice from among available alternatives. He has to prove a universal negative to show that God never experiences libertarian freedom. And this universal negative, Paul never gets even close to in his argument.

Notice carefully Paul’s words that:

“but there was no live option to the contrary available, but it was still a choice, ergo, Henry’s position is false.”

We need to see that an important fact to notice is whether or not some action is within the power of an agent to perform. Because if it is within their power to perform, it is also within their power to refrain from performing a particular action. So sometimes, a choice may simply be between doing a particular action and refraining from doing that particular action.

Consider Plantinga’s definition of human free will: “If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t.” Choosing between chocolate and strawberry ice cream at Basking Robbins involves a choice. But so does choosing chocolate or refraining from choosing chocolate ice cream. Sometimes the “live options” may only include doing a particular action and refraining from doing that particular action (both actions being within the agent’s power to perform).

If there was not a live option, involving two alternatives both of which were within the agent’s power to perform, then there was no choice. It is a misleading to define choice in such a way that it does not involve selecting from among available alternatives which were within the agents power to perform. In Paul’s statement here he claims that there is no live option and yet a choice is made. A person may choose one alternative even though the other alternative was within his power to perform.

Next Manata brought up Judas being predestined to betray Jesus. Manata asks whether or not Jesus in a “libertarian sense” could have not chosen Judas? Well if it was prophesied, and if God has complete foreknowledge of the future, then Jesus knew Judas was the betrayer and chose him knowing that. While it was within Jesus’ power not to choose Judas, it was also within His power to choose Judas. In order to fulfill prophecy and carry out the redemptive plan, Jesus chose Judas.

Manata seems to think that if libertarian free will exists, then God is incapable of knowing what choices persons will freely make in the future (according to calvinists God can **only** know the future if He predetermined it, if He did not completely predetermine it, then He could not know the future choices of persons). He also thinks that if people really had free will, then it must be possible to falsify biblical prophecies (i.e. if free will exists as conceived by libertarians, then Jesus could have chosen otherwise and chosen “Larry” instead of Judas). Open theists also believe that God is incapable of knowing what choices persons will freely make in the future, so they reject foreknowledge. Open theists also believe that if libertarian free will exists that it always exists. But the bible teaches otherwise. God in His sovereignty can intervene in such a way that ordinary choices are eliminated: just ask Nebuchadnezzar when God had the most powerful man in the world at that time, eating grass like an animal. Where was Nebuchadnezzar’s libertarian free will? Suspended for a while, but later when He was restored he was able to make choices again. So this notion that our choices can never be limited or even temporarily eliminated is not what the Bible teaches.

Paul brings up “Larry” as an alternative to Judas. But if God has foreknowledge and is even able to know in advance the freely chosen actions of Judas. Would God know what would happen if Judas were chosen as a disciple, what choices Judas would freely make, including betraying Jesus? Yes, so God via his foreknowledge could choose Judas as an apostle knowing that he would freely choose to betray Jesus. Paul wrote: “the live option of picking Larry instead of Judas was not open because God’s prophecy would fail, he would then be a liar, but it is impossible for him to lie.”

“Larry” was not a live option, Jesus selected Judas knowing that Judas would eventually betray him, so there was no need to choose “Larry”. God is able to prophesy with perfect accuracy because He is able to foreknow exactly how every person is actually going to choose in the future. Unlike the open theist, I exult in God’s ability to foreknow the future free choices of men. It is significant that both open theists and Calvinists consider this kind of foreknowledge of future free choices impossible (Open theists for philosophical reasons, Calvinists because they believe that unless God predetermined it, He cannot know the future events).

After making his arguments Paul concluded: “Thus, Henry’s arguments fail.”

I don’t think Paul gets even close to meeting his burden of proof of **proving his universal negative** that libertarian freedom or agent causation, never occurs and can never occur, based on a few instances in which for various reasons particular alternatives for various reasons, are not available to an agent.

Look at what Paul then wrote piggybacking on his earlier claim:

“I proved that Jesus could still "choose" and yet not have the libertarian ability, or live option, of picking Larry over Judas. That pretty much slams the door shut on your case. You either have to say: (a) Jesus didn't "really choose," (b) since Jesus said he chose he really could have chosen Larry over Judas, and falsified the prophecies, thus making God a liar.”

Notice the dilemma which Paul is attempting to construct here: (1) if Jesus had chosen “Larry” instead of Judas, then biblical prophecy would have been falsified (obviously not the way that we want to go); AND (2) if Jesus had chosen Judas since He had to do so in order to fulfill biblical prophecy then we would have a **choice** that was necessitated proving that we can have choices that do not involve the ability to do otherwise (thus invalidating Henry’s view that choices presuppose alternatives).

Paul in constructing his dilemma commits the fallacy of false dilemma, claiming there are only two options here, when in fact he has left out a legitimate third option that fits my views nicely. (3) While the choice between Judas and Larry was not a live option available to Jesus. The selection of Judas as one of His apostles did involve a live option as follows. It was both within Jesus’ power to choose Judas or to refrain from choosing Judas. Both of these options were within His power to perform. So He had a choice between refraining from choosing Judas and choosing Judas. In order to fulfill biblical prophecy he freely chose Judas. Was it within His power not to choose Judas? Yes. Was an actual choice between alternatives involved? Yes, the two alternatives were to choose Judas or refrain from choosing Judas. Both alternatives were within Jesus’ power. He chose Judas as an apostle, though it was also within His power to refrain from choosing Judas as an apostle.

Paul left out this third possibility, so his constructed dilemma is false.

Unfortunately Henry just admitted that it would have "been possible" for God to be proven a liar, but the Bible says it is *impossible* that God should lie. That Henry can't see this isn't a critique of determinism. I constructed an appropriate dilemma. Henry's way out is to say that it is actually possible for God to lie. Okay, well you got me there. I was assuming that we were both constrained by the biblical witness.

Henry claims,

"If there was not a live option, involving two alternatives both of which were within the agent’s power to perform, then there was no choice."

But Jesus claims, "I chose you, you did not chose me."

Henry claims,

"It was both within Jesus’ power to choose Judas or to refrain from choosing Judas. Both of these options were within His power to perform."

See, he admits that it is *possible* that Jesus could have not chosen Judas, hence making it *pssoble* that God would be proven a liar. If it was *possible* that Jesus could refrain from chosing Judas, then it was a possibility that God could have lied. It is not a possibility that God could lie. Therefore, it was not possible that Jesus could have refrained from picking Judas (in the libertarian sense). If, says Henry, this was not possible, then no choice occurred. But Jesus, whose word trumps Henry's, said that He did indeed choose. Thus Henry's constraint is false, and, therefore, his libertarian constraint on choice has been defeated.

Thus due to the modalities involved, Henry's way out of the dilemma cannot be made for those who want to remain consistent with tota Scriptura.

And so as I said above, if Henry can;t see this, that's not Calvinism's problem. But, the bottom line is that it was not possible given the prior decree that Jesus could have lied by not doing what he said he would do. If this was a real possibility, then we *must* say that it was a real possibility that God could have lied. We can't say the later, so we deny the former. What's left? That Jesus "made a choice."

So, in actuallity, the way out of the dilemma is for Henry to admit that Jesus' choice wasn't "real."

Paul presented his argument yet again and here seems to be the heart of it:

“See, he admits that it is *possible* that Jesus could have not chosen Judas, hence making it *possible* that God would be proven a liar. If it was *possible* that Jesus could refrain from choosing Judas, then it was a possibility that God could have lied. It is not a possibility that God could lie. Therefore, it was not possible that Jesus could have refrained from picking Judas (in the libertarian sense). If, says Henry, this was not possible, then no choice occurred. But Jesus, whose word trumps Henry's, said that He did indeed choose.”

I showed in my previous post that Jesus had the capacity to make a choice when it came to Judas because it was within Jesus’ power to both choose Judas or refrain from choosing Judas. Paul claims that in presenting this **capacity to make a particular choice**, it amounts to God being a liar since then biblical prophecy would be invalidated.

Manata wants a world where **all of our actions are predetermined** (i.e. necessitated) and yet we also have actual choices. This is not the reality that we deal with daily and he misundertands the nature of choices. If some choices occur then **some actions are not predetermined**, not necessitated. If Jesus’ action of selecting Judas as an apostle was a necessitated action, Jesus could not have done otherwise, then Calvinism amounts to Jesus Himself not ever having a choice.

One problem with Manata’s argument is that he **assumes** that Jesus could not have chosen differently (because he assumes exhaustive determinism). For example, choosing someone else to be an apostle other than Judas. Paul believes that it was impossible for Jesus to have refrained from choosing Judas as an apostle. This is because he thinks that if Jesus had a real choice and had chosen differently, then biblical prophecy would be invalidated and God would then be shown to be a liar.

But this does not logically follow. What Paul’s assumption misses is that if Jesus had chosen differently, then God would have foreseen that different choice and revealed a different future to the prophets. Since I believe that God is able to foreknow an event involving free choices of men (without having predetermined every event as calvinists mistakenly claim), this would not be difficult for God. And say that Jesus had chosen differently, then perhaps someone else would have betrayed Jesus someone not named Judas. If God is able to foreknow any future event, then He could do all of this easily. It is also significant to note that God did not reveal to the OT prophets the name of the person who would betray Jesus.

Scripture provides cases in which a person had an actual choice, they had the capacity to both do and refrain from doing an action AND yet made one choice rather than another.

Matt. 26:52 presents just such a clear example involving Jesus. When Jesus was about to be arrested. A disciple cuts off the ear of the servant of the high priest and then Jesus says: “Put your sword back in its place,’ Jesus said to him, ‘for all who draw the sword will die by the sword. Do you think that I cannot call on my Father and he will at once put at my disposal more than twelve legions of angels? But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled that say it must happen in this way?”

Note that **according to Jesus himself** it is within Jesus’ power to call legions of angels to deliver him and prevent His arrest. We know that he had the ability to refrain from calling the angels, because in fact He did so. We know that he had the ability to call on the angels, because in fact He said so. So it was within Jesus’ power both to call upon the angels or refrain from calling on the angels. He could do either one of these alternatives, so He had a choice. And the choice He made was to refrain from calling on the angels in order to fulfill biblical prophecy. So in this verse we have a clear example of how an actual choice can be present for a person, a choice involving alternative possibilities and yet only one of these possibilities is actualized. A choice is made and Jesus refrains from calling upon the angels.

Now in contrast to what I just shared: apply Manata’s logic to this statement in Matt. 26. Could Jesus have actually called on thousands of angels to deliver him? Jesus says that he could have, but Manata’s position would be NO he could not have done so. Since Manata believes every event is a predetermined/necessitated event, it was impossble for Jesus to **actually call upon these angels to deliver Him**. So according to Paul’s logic: it would make Jesus a liar (or deluded, or mistaken) for claiming to be able to do something which it was impossible for Him to do. In the actual world according to the biblical record, he refrained from calling upon the angels. And since according to Calvinism, no one can ever do otherwise than what was predetermined for this actual world (i.e. what he actually does in the actual world is all that he could do, since we can never actuate alternative possibilities according to Steve Hays). Jesus himself could not have done otherwise, could not have actuated an alternative possibility, according to calvinism: yet Jesus **said** he could have done otherwise, that He could have actuated an alternative possibility.

I can account for bible verses like this, while Manata’s calvinism breaks down on these kinds of verses. So is Jesus lying, deluded, or mistaken about what he could or could not do, or is calvinism mistaken?

Paul wrote:

“But Jesus, whose word trumps Henry's, said that He did indeed choose.”

Jesus’ word trumps Manata’s calvinism because Jesus said that he actually could have called the angels to deliver Him, but he chose not to actualize that alternative possibility. If Jesus had refrained from choosing Judas, God in his foreknowledge would have known what other circumstances would have occured and would have revealed those things to the prophets, if God chose to do so. A world in which sometimes actual choices are present and God is able to foreknow all events even when He does not predetermine them all, allows for that.

Paul wrote:

”And so as I said above, if Henry can’t see this, that's not Calvinism's problem.”

Calvinism **is** the problem because it eliminates the reality of choices from both human persons and Jesus. Yet both our common daily experience as well as scripture presents the reality of choices both for us and for persons in scripture.

Significantly, God allows the calvinists to make the mistake of holding to their calvinist system (being created in His image and created with the capacity to make choices, that includes choosing calvinism as well). They then return the favor, by using their capacity to make choices to develop and select the arguments that they choose to make against the reality that God has made them personal agents capable of freely performing their own actions. The reason we sometimes face actual choices, is because God created reality to be that way. The structure of reality includes situations in which real choices are present and are made. And while these choices are freely chosen, God with His foreknowledge knows exactly how the future will actuate itself, without having predetermined every event.

Henry fails to grasp is that **at the moment** Jesus chose Judas he could not have **at that moment** chosen Larry.

Henry says that God "looked into the his crystal ball, saw that Judas would betray Jesus, and the predetermined that Judas would betray Jesus. So, God "predetermined" Judas to do what Judas did without being predetermined.

Anyway, despite that confusion, the **point is** that **at the moment** Jesus made the "choice" he could not have, **at the moment,** chosen Larry.

Once the prophecy was made, the choice was determined.

Heny says that *if* Jesus chose differently, prophecy would have been different. Okay. But, and here's his big problem, this contradicts indeterminism. Indeterminism says that **given the *same* ** history and background, S could have chosen different in W than W*, where W and W* had *the same* decree, and history.

Anyway, Henry has the odd view that God "pre-destines" and "prophecies" abouyt things he saw happen irregardless of his "pre-destining" and his "prophesying." He says we can't make sense of choice, he can't make sense of pre-destined" and "foreordain."

Henry then wants to say, to get out of the dilemma, that God din't really predestine that anone in particular would betray Jesus, just that someone would. Well, that's not correct. How can we say it? Someone who isn't anyone will betray Jesus.

Then, Henry tries to do the same kind of move I do. I succeed, he doesn't. Jesus could have called down angels **HAD HE WANTED TO.** Doing what one wants is what is needed in compatibilism. So, I have avoided any charge of needing to drop Calvinism. Anyway, Jesus "could" do so in that he had the power and ability to do it if he had wanted to do it.

Jesus' words don't trump my Calvinism.

Henry's position is trumped by the fact that Jesus says he chose things, even though he could not have chosen otherwise.

Anyway, we've seen no counter to the argument that:

If it was possible, in a libertarian way, at the time of the choice for Jesus to chose otherwise than Judas, then it would have been possible that the prophecy regarding Judas could have been falsified. This would mean that God lied. But, it is impossible for God to lie, therefore it is impossible, given the prior decree, for Jesus to chose otherwise.

I'd like Henry to briefly exegete two passages for us. I think it should be helpful:

Acts 4:27 for truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, 28 to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place

and

Acts 2:22 "Men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man attested to you by God with mighty works and wonders and signs that God did through him in your midst, as you yourselves know-- 23 this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men.

Oh, and P.S., sayingt hat God "pre-determined" them to do what they already did without the **PRE**determining, isn't a satisfactory answer for most.

And, the point still remains, Jesus called what he did at time t1 a choice, and at t1 Jesus could not have chosen Larry. So, at t1 there was no genuine alternate possibility, but yet Jesus still referrs to his actions at t1 as a "choice."

Paul Manata has now presented what I am going to call “Manata’s Judas argument” multiple times not only in this thread but now on a thread regarding “contemporary compatibilism”. Paul also says that Steve Hays approves of this argument. So in showing the problems with this argument, both of them will be shown to be mistaken. So that everyone sees Manata’s Judas argument I am reposting some of Paul’s comments were he refers to this argument. That way no one can claim that I am misrepresenting his argument when I show it to be false. Here are some quotes from Paul:====================================================

“I think we can take our cue from Jesus. Before I explain, allow a brief digression, and apologies to those who aren’t familiar with the eschatological terms. I think one of the best lines I have ever heard was in a debate between gene Cook and Hyper-preterist H.L. James. Now, H.L. was kind of ridiculing the idea of a bodily resurrection. He pointed out that Jesus had holes in his hands, and so asked if Gene would have tattoos, scars, or things like that in heaven. Gene’s voice and response was unforgettable. In a humble sounding voice, he meekly replied: “If it’s good enough for Jesus, it’s good enough for me.” Now, I don’t think Gene think we will have said scars, but even if we did, so what. Our Lord has them. Of course he has them for theological reasons that we don’t need to get into. My point in all this is to talk about a choice Jesus made. If it’s “good enough” for Him to call it a choice, then it’s “good enough” for me to call my choices, choices. If it’s “real enough” for Jesus, it’s “real enough” for me.

In John 6:70 Jesus tells us that he chose all 12 disciples, yet one, speaking of Judas, was the devil. In John 13:18 Jesus tells us that he chose Judas, along with the other 11, “so that the Scriptures may be fulfilled.” Now, this shows that it was pre-determined that Judas would betray Jesus. We are told in Hebrews 6 that it is “impossible” that God can lie. So, was it “possible” that Jesus could have, in a libertarian way, chosen rabbi Larry over Judas? If Jesus had libertarian free will, wouldn’t his “choice,” to be real” have to be between at least two live options, both of which were possible to actuate? If it was “possible” that Jesus could falsify Jehovah’s prophecy, God would have turned out a liar. But, this is “impossible,” therefore it seems “impossible” that Jesus could have chosen otherwise. Yet. Jesus calls it a “choice.” Hence if my choices aren’t real, neither was Jesus.’ If the libertarian doesn’t allow me to have a “real” choice, so what? If it is good enough for Jesus, it’s good enough for me.

See, he admits that it is *possible* that Jesus could have not chosen Judas, hence making it *possible* that God would be proven a liar. If it was *possible* that Jesus could refrain from choosing Judas, then it was a possibility that God could have lied. It is not a possibility that God could lie. Therefore, it was not possible that Jesus could have refrained from picking Judas (in the libertarian sense). If, says Henry, this was not possible, then no choice occurred. But Jesus, whose word trumps Henry's, said that He did indeed choose. Thus Henry's constraint is false, and, therefore, his libertarian constraint on choice has been defeated.

Thus due to the modalities involved, Henry's way out of the dilemma cannot be made for those who want to remain consistent with tota Scriptura.

And so as I said above, if Henry can’t see this, that's not Calvinism's problem. But, the bottom line is that it was not possible given the prior decree that Jesus could have lied by not doing what he said he would do. If this was a real possibility, then we *must* say that it was a real possibility that God could have lied. We can't say the later, so we deny the former. What's left? That Jesus "made a choice."

So, in actuality, the way out of the dilemma is for Henry to admit that Jesus' choice wasn't "real."

QED

Henry fails to grasp is that **at the moment** Jesus chose Judas he could not have **at that moment** chosen Larry.

Henry says that God "looked into the his crystal ball, saw that Judas would betray Jesus, and the predetermined that Judas would betray Jesus. So, God "predetermined" Judas to do what Judas did without being predetermined.

Anyway, despite that confusion, the **point is** that **at the moment** Jesus made the "choice" he could not have, **at the moment,** chosen Larry.

Once the prophecy was made, the choice was determined.

Henry says that *if* Jesus chose differently, prophecy would have been different. Okay. But, and here's his big problem, this contradicts indeterminism. Indeterminism says that **given the *same* ** history and background, S could have chosen different in W than W*, where W and W* had *the same* decree, and history.

Anyway, Henry has the odd view that God "pre-destines" and "prophecies" about things he saw happen irregardless of his "pre-destining" and his "prophesying." He says we can't make sense of choice, he can't make sense of pre-destined" and "foreordain."

Henry then wants to say, to get out of the dilemma, that God didn’t really predestine that anyone in particular would betray Jesus, just that someone would. Well, that's not correct. How can we say it? Someone who isn't anyone will betray Jesus.

Then, Henry tries to do the same kind of move I do. I succeed, he doesn't. Jesus could have called down angels **HAD HE WANTED TO.** Doing what one wants is what is needed in compatibilism. So, I have avoided any charge of needing to drop Calvinism. Anyway, Jesus "could" do so in that he had the power and ability to do it if he had wanted to do it.

Jesus' words don't trump my Calvinism.

Henry's position is trumped by the fact that Jesus says he chose things, even though he could not have chosen otherwise.

Anyway, we've seen no counter to the argument that:

If it was possible, in a libertarian way, at the time of the choice for Jesus to chose otherwise than Judas, then it would have been possible that the prophecy regarding Judas could have been falsified. This would mean that God lied. But, it is impossible for God to lie, therefore it is impossible, given the prior decree, for Jesus to chose otherwise.

QED

Let's also note that Jesus' *choice* to chose Judas was *SO THAT* the prophecy would be fulfilled.

"I am not referring to all of you; I know those I have chosen. But this is to fulfill the scripture: 'He who shares my bread has lifted up his heel against me.'"

The choice was never made, therefore, in absence of the decree.

"If Jesus’ action of selecting Judas as an apostle was a necessitated action, Jesus could not have done otherwise, then Calvinism amounts to Jesus Himself not ever having a choice."

Notice how Henry begs the question and lets his a priori assumption rule the Bible. If Calvinism is true, Jesus had a choice because JESUS SAID HE HAD A CHOICE.

So what is Paul arguing? It seems that he is arguing that if it was possible for Jesus to choose “Larry” rather than Judas as an apostle (or simply not to choose Judas), that these **possibilities** would negate biblical prophecy and so God would be shown to be a liar (i.e.,as not telling the truth about events which He spoke about in His predictive prophecies). Paul also believes that this sets up an inescapable dilemma for me. If I claim that Jesus **could have** (claim that the possibility of making that choice existed) chosen Larry instead of Judas, then I am claiming that it is possible for God to be a liar (obviously I don’t want that, so obviously I shouldn’t take that horn of the dilemma). Paul also emphasizes that Jesus himself said he make a choice when he chose Judas. So the other horn of Paul’s constructed dilemma is that if I then admit that Jesus **had to** choose Judas, since Jesus said that he had made a choice in selecting Judas. That means we then have a “choice” in which Jesus could not have done otherwise. And a “choice” in which Jesus could not have done otherwise, fits what Paul wants to believe (i.e., exhaustive determinism) very well. So then Paul can then make the claim that we are experiencing, making “choices” all the time, which are all predetermined. So everything is predetermined and yet we make choices. This is the form of compatibilism that Paul desperately argues for.

From Paul’s repeated appeals to this argument, it seems that he must be very confident about it. And at first glance it **sounds very good**. But Paul has made some errors in logic here.

I take a “choice” to mean that in a given situation that it is within a person’s power to do or refrain from doing something (recall again Plantinga’s definition of free will: “If a person is free with respect to a given actin, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it: no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t”). A “choice” then, involves by its very nature, at least two **possibilities**. If you cannot actuate at least one of two available alternative **possibilities**, then you don’t have, or are not facing a choice. I am only stating the standard usage meaning for the word “choice” here. This is a given for most discussions like this.

It also needs to be remembered that a **possibility** by its very nature means that the **possibility** IS NOT ACTUAL. If something is **actual** it is **not a possibility** and if something is a **possibility** then it is **not yet actual** (an action cannot be both a possibility and an actuality at the same time). Can we all agree as to these meanings for the words **possibility** and **actual** (or actuality)?

So let’s look at the Manata’s Judas argument. He argues that if it was **possible** for Jesus to select Larry instead of Judas (or simply to not make a choice of Judas), then biblical prophecy would be falsified and God shown to be a liar. Manata is mistaken in his thinking in regards to **possibility** and **actuality** here.

An extremely important question to ask which when understood and applied to Manata’s argument unravels the whole argument is this:

What would it take to falsify a prophecy?

What would **actually** have to take place in order for a given predictive prophecy to be shown to be false? We need a criteria for knowing what will falsify a prophecy before we can conclude that a given prophecy had been falsified. It seems to me that what **actually** happens in regards to a given prophesied event would have to be different from what had been prophesied would take place if the prophecy had **actually** occurred. Does that seem like a reasonable criteria?

Another good question to ask here is: does the fact that something is ***possible*** negate something that is ***actual*** the case?

In answer to my question about what it would take to falsify a given prophecy, it would take AN ACTUAL EVENT OTHER THAN THE EVENT WHICH GOD HAD PROPHESIED WOULD ACTUALLY OCCUR, TO OCCUR. Another event **actually** occurring, rather than what was prophesied to **actually** occur, would negate the biblical prophecy.

With the prophecy about Judas betraying Jesus, it would take Judas **not actually** betraying Christ to falsify that prophecy (or Jesus not choosing Judas as an apostle, if he had not been chosen then he would not be in the place to be the apostle that betrays Jesus). I am sure that some already can see where I am going: is the **possibility** that Jesus could have chosen Larry (or someone else than Judas; or simply not chosen Judas) sufficient to falsify the prophecy that Judas **actually** would betray Jesus? The answer is NO.

In order for Jesus to have experienced an actual choice in regard to choosing Judas as an apostle, it had to have been within Jesus’ power to choose Judas and refrain from choosing Judas. That is because the nature of a choice, if actually present, involves the person having within his power to actuate one of at least two alternative possibilities. Was it within Jesus’ power to choose Judas? Yes. Was it within Jesus’ power to refrain from choosing Judas (or choose someone else like “Larry” instead of Judas)? Yes. Now does the fact that both of these **possibilities** were within Jesus’ power, negate the ***actuality*** that in fact Jesus **actuated** the possibility of choosing Judas rather than doing otherwise and not selecting Judas? No.

The only way that Jesus could have falsified the prophesy is if He had **actually** not chosen Judas as an apostle (i.e., if He had refrained from choosing Judas,or if he had picked someone else instead of Judas, or if He had not picked anyone at all to be an apostle). Jesus only could have falsified the prophesy if HE HAD ***ACTUALLY NOT CHOSEN*** JUDAS.

The fact that it was both within Jesus’ power to choose Judas or not choose Judas, points only to the reality, the actuality that He was facing a real choice between alternative **possibilities**. The fact that it was possible for Him, or within His power not to choose Judas, is insufficient to falsify the biblical prophesy (because in order to have falsified the biblical prophesy he would have had to **actually** have not chosen Judas, to **actually** not have made the choice of Judas). But in fact He did choose Judas, faced with the **possibilities** of choosing Judas or not choosing Judas, he actuated the possibility of choosing Judas. Thus making the **actual** fact of the matter that His choice was to have Judas as an apostle and in doing so to fulfill biblical prophecy as Judas then later chose to betray Jesus.

Manata’s Judas argument thus collapses due to critical misunderstandings in regards to the nature of choices, possibilities and actualities.

Here is another example to make my argument crystal clear. It is an **actual** fact that I do not know how to speak the Spanish language. And let’s say that I grew up in Texas where they offered Spanish as a language learning **possibility** in High School. Let’s say due to budgetary problems, at my High School they only had two foreign language teachers (one Spanish teacher and one Russian teacher). So the choice I would have been faced with at that particular school under those circumstances were three (1) take Spanish, (2) take Russian, or (3) take neither (but let’s say it was required that you had to take some language classes in order to graduate; so we can rule out possibility # 3).

At that time then, I had two **possibilities** before me of taking Spanish or Russian (having at least two **possibilities** from which to choose, I had an **actual choice**). But I foolishly took Russian thinking we were going to be taken over by the Russians as I mistakenly believed that we would be conquered by the Russians as a result of the “cold war”.

Now does the **possibility** that I could have chosen otherwise and taken Spanish instead of Russian back then, **negate the reality** (or actuality) that I do not know Spanish now? The facts are that I did have the choice back then of actualizing either **possibility**, but did in fact actualize the Russian **possibility**. And suppose that because I made that choice, I do not know Spanish now and have forgotten all of the Russian which I learned back then. :-) Does the fact, the actuality, that I had the **possibility** back then of choosing Spanish rather than Russian, negate the fact that I do not know Spanish now? And say that God had prophesied that at a certain point in 2007 I would not know Spanish. Does the fact that I had the **possibility* of learning Spanish back in High School negate the fact that right now I do not know Spanish and thus negate God’s prophecy? No.

But according to Manata’s Judas argument the **possibility** that I could have chosen Spanish instead of Russian in High School, wipes out the **actuality** that I do not know Spanish now. Anybody else see problems with this argument now?

Jesus said that he had a choice involving choosing Judas. And he **did** have a choice between at least two **possibilities** (choosing Judas or refraining from choosing Judas). And since God has **foreknowledge** of all events (including the freely made choices of persons), He knows what specific ***choices*** will be actualized from out of the alternative possibilities. So He can then tell exactly what will actually occur in the future.

It is exhaustive determinism such as the Calvinism that Paul believes in, that entails the ***impossibility of choices***. If God predetermined all events then in every given situation we can only perform the action that He predetermined that we would perform in any given situation. So alternative **possibilities** which are the preconditions for actual choices are eliminated in a completely predetermined world. Actual choices involving the ability to actuate from among various alternative possibilities is not possible in such a world. Both the bible and our daily experience however, present lots of evidence of the reality of choices.

I thought it was interesting that Paul made no attempt to deal with the Matt. 26 passage which I had brought up which presents clear evidence of the reality of choices. Having said what I have said here, it will be useful to consider that passage again. Here is what I said about it:

Scripture provides cases in which a person had an actual choice, they had the capacity to both do and refrain from doing an action AND yet made one choice rather than another.

Matt. 26:52 presents just such a clear example involving Jesus. When Jesus was about to be arrested. A disciple cuts off the ear of the servant of the high priest and then Jesus says: “Put your sword back in its place,’ Jesus said to him, ‘for all who draw the sword will die by the sword. Do you think that I cannot call on my Father and he will at once put at my disposal more than twelve legions of angels? But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled that say it must happen in this way?”

Note that **according to Jesus himself** it is within Jesus’ power to call legions of angels to deliver him and prevent His arrest. We know that he had the ability to refrain from calling the angels, because in fact He did so. We know that he had the ability to call on the angels, because in fact He said so. So it was within Jesus’ power both to call upon the angels or refrain from calling on the angels. He could do either one of these alternatives, so He had a choice. And the choice He made was to refrain from calling on the angels in order to fulfill biblical prophecy. So in this verse we have a clear example of how an actual choice can be present for a person, a choice involving alternative possibilities and yet only one of these possibilities is actualized. A choice is made and Jesus refrains from calling upon the angels.

Now in contrast to what I just shared: apply Manata’s logic to this statement in Matt. 26. Could Jesus have actually called on thousands of angels to deliver him? Jesus says that he could have, but Manata’s position would be NO he could not have done so. Since Manata believes every event is a predetermined/necessitated event, it was impossible for Jesus to **actually call upon these angels to deliver Him**. So according to Paul’s logic: it would make Jesus a liar (or deluded, or mistaken) for claiming to be able to do something which it was impossible for Him to do. In the actual world according to the biblical record, he refrained from calling upon the angels. And since according to Calvinism, no one can ever do otherwise than what was predetermined for this actual world (i.e. what he actually does in the actual world is all that he could do, since we can never actuate alternative possibilities according to Steve Hays). Jesus himself could not have done otherwise, could not have actuated an alternative possibility, according to Calvinism: yet Jesus **said** he could have done otherwise, that He could have actuated an alternative possibility.

I can account for bible verses like this, while Manata’s Calvinism breaks down on these kinds of verses. So is Jesus lying, deluded, or mistaken about what he could or could not do, or is Calvinism mistaken?

"Paul also says that Steve Hays approves of this argument. So in showing the problems with this argument, both of them will be shown to be mistaken."

And, so has Sean Choi who, btw, is doing his dissertation on free will and compatibilism related issues at UCSB. But, I suppose he's another person who just can't seem to use "choice" in the proper/pre-philosophical way.

"From Paul’s repeated appeals to this argument, it seems that he must be very confident about it. And at first glance it **sounds very good**. But Paul has made some errors in logic here.

I take a “choice” to mean that in a given situation that it is within a person’s power to do or refrain from doing something'

And I've pointed out that this is sloppy. How is "power" to be understood? That is, was Jesus *physically able* to moth the words "I choose Larry over Judas."? So, on my view Jesus "had the power."

Henry seems to mean by "power" the live option that S can actualize A or B.

"(recall again Plantinga’s definition of free will: “If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it: no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t”)."

Three problems:

1. Henry doesn't quote Plantinga is saying that this is how Plantinga defines the meaning of "choice."

So Henry continues to smuggle his tendentious definition into the debate, even interpolating it into a quote.

2. Even if that were how Plantinga defines it, we already know that Plantinga is a libertarian, so he naturally defines freedom in libertarian terms, which begs the question in favor of libertarianism.

3. As shown by my verses above, this is false. God predestines people to do *whatever* His hand determined.

"A “choice” then, involves by its very nature, at least two **possibilities**."

But it doesn’t involve the ability to have to be able to actuate either. So, we have Judas and Larry as the possible choices. Jesus could not actuate Larry, but still chose Judas.

"If you cannot actuate at least one of two available alternative **possibilities**, then you don’t have, or are not facing a choice. I am only stating the standard usage meaning for the word “choice” here. This is a given for most discussions like this."

And Jesus actuated one of the possibilities. It's a non-sequitur to claim that he must be able to actuate *either* possibility.

"So let’s look at the Manata’s Judas argument. He argues that if it was **possible** for Jesus to select Larry instead of Judas (or simply to not make a choice of Judas), then biblical prophecy would be falsified and God shown to be a liar. Manata is mistaken in his thinking in regards to **possibility** and **actuality** here."

No, I argue that if it were *possible* to actuate Larry as a choice then it would be *possible* that God could be a liar. Henry thinks it is *possible* that Jesus could have actuated Larry over Judas, thus Henry thinks it's *possible* that God could lie.

"In answer to my question about what it would take to falsify a given prophecy, it would take AN ACTUAL EVENT OTHER THAN THE EVENT WHICH GOD HAD PROPHESIED WOULD ACTUALLY OCCUR, TO OCCUR. Another event **actually** occurring, rather than what was prophesied to **actually** occur, would negate the biblical prophecy."

No, I've argued simply that the possibility of falsifying the prophecy means that there is a possibility that God lied.

But, it seems Henry has slipped. He said that something X needs to be actualized in order for prophecy P to fail. Thus, in our case, X *could not* have been actualized, even according to Henry. Therefore, Jesus "could not" (in a libertarian way) have refrained from actualizing Judas. There were two possibilities, but one was not able to be actualized. Ability to genuinely actualize either A or B is not required for a choice, even Henry must admit this. Since God cannot lie, it cannot be the case that an agent can have the power to actualize either option.

So, Jesus *could not* actualize Larry, he could only actualize one option, yet he still calls this a choice. I frankly don't see how Henry can be missing all of this.

"With the prophecy about Judas betraying Jesus, it would take Judas **not actually** betraying Christ to falsify that prophecy (or Jesus not choosing Judas as an apostle, if he had not been chosen then he would not be in the place to be the apostle that betrays Jesus)."

Henry isn't even on the same page as I am.

The debate here is about the strong modal operator used in Hebrews: "It is **impossible** that God can lie."

If this is **impossible** then it is **impossible* that someone *could* actuate another alternative than the one God said would happen. Thus, S **cannot** bring about B just as easy as he could "choose" to bring about A.

To say that B is **possible** is to say that it is **possible** that God could lie.

"I am sure that some already can see where I am going: is the **possibility** that Jesus could have chosen Larry (or someone else than Judas; or simply not chosen Judas) sufficient to falsify the prophecy that Judas **actually** would betray Jesus? The answer is NO."

And some can see that Henry hasn't grasped the argument. Is the **possibility** that Jesus could, in a libertarian way, chose Larry over Judas sufficient to show that it would be **possible** to make God a liar.

It doesn't have to be actualized. All that matters for my argument to work is that Henry grants that it is **possible** for God to lie, and all that it takes to show this is that it is **possible** that Jesus could falsify God's prophecy.

"In order for Jesus to have experienced an actual choice in regard to choosing Judas as an apostle, it had to have been within Jesus’ power to choose Judas and refrain from choosing Judas."

Again, "within power" is vague. Anyway, it could not be within Jesus' power to make himself a liar. That's self-referentially incoherent. That a being who cannot lie can lie is contradictory. So, does God have "the power" to lie? No. Does he have "the power" to do something which would, if done, render him a liar? No. Why? Because it is **impossible** that he could lie.

Stated in other terms: is it possible that pigs could fly? Yes. Is it possible that pigs could fly and not fly at the same time? No, that's impossible. Hence, it is not within the "pigs power" to actualize the state of affairs constituted by the latter.

"Now does the fact that both of these **possibilities** were within Jesus’ power, negate the ***actuality*** that in fact Jesus **actuated** the possibility of choosing Judas rather than doing otherwise and not selecting Judas? No."

Again, this is only borne out of a severe misunderstanding of the argument.

"The only way that Jesus could have falsified the prophesy is if He had **actually** not chosen Judas as an apostle (i.e., if He had refrained from choosing Judas, or if he had picked someone else instead of Judas, or if He had not picked anyone at all to be an apostle). Jesus only could have falsified the prophesy if HE HAD ***ACTUALLY NOT CHOSEN*** JUDAS."

Granted. My point, though, is that Jesus *could not* have actuated Larry because, as Henry admits, this would falsify the prophecy, and hence prove God a liar, and Henry admits this cannot be done. So, it was not within Jesus' "power" (genuine ability to actuate) to chose Larry over Judas. Hence, according to Henry, there was no choice. Jesus says there was a choice. Jesus wins over Henry, IMHO.

"The fact that it was both within Jesus’ power to choose Judas or not choose Judas, points only to the reality, the actuality that He was facing a real choice between alternative **possibilities**. The fact that it was possible for Him, or within His power not to choose Judas, is insufficient to falsify the biblical prophesy "

But, again, I'm not talking about the prophecy actually being falsified. I'm talking about the *possibility* that God could be a liar. Henry must say this is a real possibility. But, this contradicts Hebrews, hence, Henry is wrong, IMHO.

"Manata’s Judas argument thus collapses due to critical misunderstandings in regards to the nature of choices, possibilities and actualities."

Henry's counter fails for not even being in the same ballpark as my objection. Indeed, as we saw above, Henry refuted his own position.

Henry’s analogy about Russian and Spanish classes fails under the same misunderstanding.

Furthermore, it suffers from FSCs. That the gunman couldn't actualize the possibility that he walk away, thereby rendering the *ability* to do otherwise void, does not imply that the gunman didn't chose to kill the president.

"But according to Manata’s Judas argument the **possibility** that I could have chosen Spanish instead of Russian in High School, wipes out the **actuality** that I do not know Spanish now. Anybody else see problems with this argument now?"

How could people see the problems with *my* argument if you haven't given *my* argument?

A better analogy is this: Suppose Henry had a mouth and tongue and vocal cord defect whereby it was physically impossible for his mouth to form and utter Spanish words.

Now, Henry has two languages he could learn to speak, Spanish and Russian. Henry chooses Russian because he's aware of his defects. It was not *possible* for Henry to speak Spanish. To say this was a real *possibility* would be to deny that he had the undeniable physical defect we all agree he had. It would be impossible to bring about a state of affairs where by, given this prior defect, he could speak Spanish. For it to be a real possibility that Henry could have spoken Spanish it would have to be a real possibility that Henry didn't have the attending defect which would prohibit Spanish speaking. The latter, granting, was not a possibility, therefore it was likewise not a possibility that Henry could have actually spoken Spanish.

So, as with Jesus and Judas, it was not a possibility that Jesus could have actually chosen Larry, thus he couldn't refrain from choosing Judas. But, Jesus calls what he did a choice, therefore, granting inerrancy, Henry is wrong.

"Actual choices involving the ability to actuate from among various alternative possibilities is not possible in such a world."

Yeah, but the problem is that I've proven that Bible does allow for a notion of "choice" which is less radical (for lack of a better word) than the typical libertarian notion that requires genuine alternative possibilities, but is nonetheless portrayed as being significant.

So, it's Henry's philosophy verses the Bible.

"I thought it was interesting that Paul made no attempt to deal with the Matt. 26 passage which I had brought up which presents clear evidence of the reality of choices. Having said what I have said here, it will be useful to consider that passage again. Here is what I said about it:"

But, in reality, I did answer Henry. he just didn’t like my answer since it didn't agree with the cashier at Taco Bell's pre-philosophical notion of choice.

"Could Jesus have actually called on thousands of angels to deliver him? Jesus says that he could have, but Manata’s position would be NO he could not have done so."

Again, we must point out the consistent sloppiness of "could have," Jesus did have the power, he was Lord of the angels. Jesus could have decreed that such would be the case. But, as long as the Son decreed to not call the angels down, then he could not have because then he would make himself a liar. This is impossible, therefore..., well, you get it by now.

"Since Manata believes every event is a predetermined/necessitated event, it was impossible for Jesus to **actually call upon these angels to deliver Him**. So according to Paul’s logic: it would make Jesus a liar (or deluded, or mistaken) for claiming to be able to do something which it was impossible for Him to do."

No, by definition, an omnipotent being "could" have done so. But, in the sense of actualizing it, Jesus would not because, as Henry's verse points out:

"53Do you think I cannot call on my Father, and he will at once put at my disposal more than twelve legions of angels? 54But how then would the Scriptures be fulfilled that say it must happen in this way?"

Thus, if Jesus could actualize the calling of the angels, then he *could* actualize the falsification of the Scriptures, thus not fulfilling what he said he would fulfill. Jesus cannot not fulfill what he says he will fulfill, therefore Jesus cannot actualize the calling of the angels as it would have been contrary to the *prior* decree.

"I can account for bible verses like this, while Manata’s Calvinism breaks down on these kinds of verses. So is Jesus lying, deluded, or mistaken about what he could or could not do, or is Calvinism mistaken?"

Actually Henry cannot account for the verses because his account means that there would be a *possibility* to make god a liar, which is *impossible.*

In fact, i have engaged all of Henry's verses (all 1 or 2 of them), but we saw that he "accounts" for mine by waving his hand and uttering the magic words: "He's just proof texting." and, regards the two I gave directly above, Henry doesn't even touch them, but, for some reason, makes it a point to say that I "failed" to interact with his verses.

9 a Remember the b former things of old: for c I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is d none like me, 10 a Declaring the b end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My c counsel shall stand, and I will do all my d pleasure:

YOU MUST BE BORN AGAIN

Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God [John 3: 3].

About 3 years ago I dropped into a black hole – four months of absolute terror. I wanted to end my life, but somehow [Holy Spirit], I reached out to a friend who took me to hospital. I had three visits [hospital] in four months – I actually thought I was in hell. I imagine I was going through some sort of metamorphosis [mental, physical & spiritual]. I had been seeing a therapist [1994] on a regular basis, up until this point in time. I actually thought I would be locked away – but the hospital staffs were very supportive [I had no control over my process]. I was released from hospital 16th September 1994, but my fear, pain & shame had only subsided a little. I remember this particular morning waking up [home] & my process would start up again [fear, pain, & shame]. No one could help me, not even my therapist [I was terrified]. I asked Jesus Christ to have mercy on me & forgive me my sins. Slowly, all my fear has dissipated & I believe Jesus delivered me from my “psychological prison.” I am a practicing Catholic & the Holy Spirit is my friend & strength; every day since then has been a joy & blessing. I deserve to go to hell for the life I have led, but Jesus through His sacrifice on the cross, delivered me from my inequities. John 3: 8, John 15: 26, are verses I can relate to, organically. He’s a real person who is with me all the time. I have so much joy & peace in my life, today, after a childhood spent in orphanages [England & Australia]. God LOVES me so much. Fear, pain, & shame, are no longer my constant companions. I just wanted to share my experience with you [Luke 8: 16 – 17].