Leros,
Churchill's folly

by Tony Rogers

With little
to offer the average holidaymaker Leros has escaped the ravages of mass
tourism that is evident elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The coastline is
mainly rocky with few sandy beaches. Much of the rugged hilly terrain
remains unspoilt. Inevitably, there has been some expansion of residential
areas but there are still only a handful of small hotels. It is enough to
cater for the few visitors. They include a dwindling number of returning
war veterans who come to pay tribute to fallen comrades, most of whom were
killed in five days of fighting in November 1943.

Leros and the Greek Dodecanese islands had been under Italian rule since
1912. The decision by Italy to unite with Germany in 1940 would change
everything. By autumn 1943, Hitler’s
Wehrmacht was faltering as it fought a war on too many fronts. In
Russia, the Soviets had finally halted the German advance; Axis forces had
surrendered in North Africa; the Allies had landed in Sicily and Italy and
American-led forces were pushing north towards Nazi-occupied Europe. In
July, he Italians turned against Il Duce Benito Mussolini replacing
him with Maresciallo Pietro Badoglio. The Italian armistice
followed in September.

In
the First World War Winston Churchill had been forced to resign as First
Sea Lord as a consequence of his role in the disastrous Allied effort in
the Dardanelles. It fostered in him a dangerous obsession with the region.
Now, as Britain’s
Prime Minister, Churchill seized upon the opportunity to open a new front
in the eastern Mediterranean. It was felt that such a move could only add
to the pressure being applied against Germany; furthermore it might
provide encouragement for Turkey to join the Alliance. Rejected by the
Americans, it was a strategy fraught with difficulties.

Soldiers belonging to the 22. Infanterie-Division before
landing in Kos, October 1943.

For
the operation to have any chance of success it was imperative that Rhodes
be seized together with the island’s
all-important airfields. Italian co-operation was essential. Accordingly,
a military mission was tasked with preparing the way for the main assault.
Raiders of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) would spearhead the occupation
of other islands. Churchill approved the plan on 9 September: “This
is a time to play high. Improvise and dare.”

Before the
British could act, however, the German Sturmdivision Rhodos,
numbering approximately 7,500 men, seized control of Rhodes. Up to 40,000
Italians were taken prisoner thus ending British hopes of an assisted
take-over. Nevertheless, there was hope in the British camp that even
without Rhodes some islands might be occupied. Kos,
Samos and Leros were duly secured and garrisoned primarily by troops of
234 Brigade, whose line regiments had recently arrived in the Middle East
after enduring the siege of Malta. Island outposts were also manned by
detachments of the SBS and the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG). There were
already on Kos 3,5004,000
Italians including the majority of two infantry battalions. The air
defence consisted of a handful of operational Spitfires provided by two
squadrons and around 500 officers and men. There were also about 680
British Army personnel on the island, consisting mainly of 1st Battalion
The Durham Light Infantry. Plans were afoot to improve the island’s
defences but any proposals were purely academic, for events were taking
place that would soon place Kos firmly under German control.

In
mid-September the Germans in central Italy were forced to pull back in the
wake of the successful Allied landing at Salerno. In the eastern
Mediterranean it was altogether different. On 23 September
Generalleutnant Friedrich-Wilhelm Müller commanding 22.
Infanteriedivision was ordered to make preparations for the seizure of
Kos and Leros. Müller intended to make Kos his first objective in a
combined amphibious and airborne assault. Accordingly, the first wave of
Kampfgruppe von Saldern landed at Marmari on the north coast at
0500hours on 3 October. Further landings took place along the
rugged south coast.
Soon after 0700, paratroopers of the élite Division Brandenburg
were dropped. The Germans pushed towards their objectives overrunning each
in turn until arriving on the outskirts of Kos town later the same day.
That night, the demoralised remnants of the British defence withdrew into
the hills. The battle was concluded the next day. For the
Italians, Kos was the latest in a series of defeats. For the British, it
was a disaster. Without Kos there was no longer any possibility of
providing air support for the remaining islands in British hands.

Obergefreiter Walter Keller of
3./Fallschirmjäger-Rgt.2 immediately after the British surrender on
Leros.

The enemy’s
main efforts now turned to Leros with the Luftwaffe concentrating
on targeting key installation and shipping. It was Malta all over again,
or so it must have seemed to many including the commander of 234 Brigade
Major General F. G. R. Brittorous. He had arrived to take charge after
commanding 8th (Ardwick) Battalion The Manchester Regiment (TA) in Malta.
If he had then been a popular and well respected figure, on Leros
Brittorous was almost universally loathed by officers and men alike.
Unable to cope with the increasing air raids, he disappeared for hours at
a time. But it was his punctilious observance of parade ground discipline
that most remember. While taking a break during training, a number of LRDG
troops were harangued for failing to salute Brittorous as he drove past in
his jeep. The General was apoplectic: “So you
think yourselves tough, do you? I’ll
bloody well give you something to be tough about.”
One assumes that the threat had nothing to do with the decision shortly
afterwards to send nearly fifty officers and men thirty miles by sea to
occupy the little island of Levitha. The ill-conceived operation went
ahead without prior reconnaissance or preparation. It was a disaster that
cost the lives of at least five of these skilled specialists. Most of the
remainder were captured. Only two officers and five ORs managed to return
to Leros.Eventually,
a senior officer was sent on a pretext to Cairo to report on the
relationship between Brittorous and his subordinates. On 5 November
Brigadier Robert Tilney arrived and was appointed as the new Fortress
Commander.Originally, Lieutenant Colonel Maurice French commanding
2nd
Battalion The Royal Irish Fusiliers (the Faughs) had deployed his troops
on the dominating high ground. Historians
have criticised Brigadier Tilney for ordering a drastic reorganisation of
the established defensive system. In
fact Tilney was only acting on the instructions of his superior, Major
General H. R. Hall. The revised strategy was
designed to deny the beaches to the enemy. It was a plan flawed in design
and, ultimately, in practice. Troops were deployed on a dangerously wide
front thereby aggravating the already poor line of communications.

By
this time there was on Leros a substantial British presence including the
Faughs; ‘B’
Company of 2nd Battalion The Queen’s
Own Royal West Kent Regiment; 4th Battalion The Royal East Kent Regiment
(the Buffs) and 1st Battalion The King’s
Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster), plus artillery and supporting sub-units
and detachments of the LRDG and SBS; all in all some 3,000 officers and
men.The
Italian garrison numbered approximately 5,500 personnel and included an
infantry battalion;two machine-gun companies and part of a
maritime reconnaissance squadron equipped with Cant seaplanes. The
Italians occupied positions overlooking likely landing areas and also
manned hilltop gun sites.

On
the eve of Operation ‘Taifun’
(‘Typhoon’)
the
German codename for the capture of Leros Generalleutnant
Müller had at his disposal a force of experienced and motivated combat
troops. They were divided into three sub-divisions: the initial wave
comprising four seaborne Kampfgruppen (combat groups) and a
Luftwaffe parachute battalion. A second wave stood by with
anti-aircraft and artillery units, as well as heavy weapons for the
infantry and infantry and paratroopers of Division Brandenburg were
held in reserve near Athens. In the early hours of 12 November Allied air
reconnaissance reported two groups of ‘barges’
inside a minefield east of Kalymnos. It was assumed that the enemy was
assembling in preparation for a daylight assault on Leros. However, the
threat posed by mines precluded a pre-emptive strike by the Royal Navy.
Only later was it realised that this was the main (eastern) force en route
to Leros. It has been since argued that even if the Navy had reacted, the
enemy would have received sufficient warning to avoid an attack and to
respond with retaliatory action. The only certainty is that the last real
chance of halting the invasion was now irrevocably lost. It
had been the intention of Generalleutnant Müller to land each group
simultaneously and to seize control of central Leros before the garrison
could react. Unforeseen circumstances and a determined resistance ensured
that on the first day only part of the invasion force reached shore and
not all at the designated points. At
about 1430 hours the air armada with Kampfgruppe Kühne began its
final approach: some three dozen Junkers Ju 52 transports in line ahead
escorted by bombers and cannon-armed floatplanes. There can be no doubt
that the decision by the Germans to deploy paratroopers decisively
affected the outcome of the battle. By the end of the first day units
under Major Sylvester von Saldern had achieved its objectives and
held, albeit temporarily, the high ground on and around the dominating
Clidi feature to within 500 metres of the coast at Alinda Bay. With
Hauptmann Martin Kühne’s
paratroopers in control of most of the key points south of Clidi, the
Germans had effectively divided the island in two.Fighting
continued for five days as both sides lost and re-took ground in a series
of see-saw actions. German and British reinforcements were ferried to
Leros until the very end, but the latter were greatly disadvantaged by not
having air support. The Germans, on the other hand, had Junkers Ju 87
Stuka dive bombers on call from dawn till dusk.

The castle on Point 189 seen from a gun
position on Meraviglia just after the battle

Both sides
suffered from problems with inadequate signalling equipment. The Germans
attempted to overcome this by adhering to their original plan of attack,
whereas the British had to constantly adapt to the changing situation
using runners to try to maintain contact. Invariably, messages got through
too late, if at all. Officers received conflicting and confusing orders
and men were flung into the attack sometimes with little or no idea of
their objectives. Communications eventually broke down altogether and,
with it, command and control.

On
the morning of 16 November it seemed that the Germans were on the verge of
overrunning Brigade Headquarters on Mount Meraviglia. Signallers were
ordered to destroy secret ciphers to prevent their being captured and
compromised and Tilney withdrew with his staff hoping to relocate his
command post at Lakki in the south. At 0825 the enemy intercepted a signal
sent in clear advising British General Headquarters in Cairo that German
reinforcements had landed; that Stukas had neutralised Meraviglia’s
defences and that troops were demoralised and facing a hopeless situation.
When the message was translated and relayed to Kampfgruppe Müller
it was duplicated in leaflet form with an added word of encouragement from
the German commander: “Now
let’s
finish them off!”.
Copies were then dropped by aircraft over German positions. When it became
clear that Meraviglia’s
defending troops had stemmed the German advance Tilney returned to his
headquarters and attempted to restore order out of the chaos. It was
hopeless. That afternoon a renewed effort by the Germans resulted in the
capture of Tilney and his staff. Elsewhere, British troops still felt that
they retained the upper hand. The Brigadier, however, quickly concluded
that further resistance was futile and in a highly controversial move
agreed to end the fighting.In the wake
of events in the Aegean, New Zealand was quick to make known her anger.
Remembering, perhaps, the losses suffered in the Dardanelles by the
Dominions nearly twenty-eight years before, the New Zealand Prime Minister
Peter Fraser wrote to the High Commissioner in London on 27 November 1943: when it becomes known that a number of New
Zealanders were stupidly sacrificed without even consent for their
inclusion in the task force being asked from our Government, the
disappointment and bitterness here will be intensified many times over

End of the line for most of the Leros
defenders: Lieutenant Ted Johnson of the Faughs as a prisoner of
war at Oflag VIIIF near Märisch Trübau in Sudentenland
(present-day Czech Republic).

Only too
aware of the backlash to be expected from his critics, a few days after
the fall of Leros Winston Churchill recommended that the Foreign Secretary
adopt an evasive policy when the issue was raised in Parliament:Not advisable to answer in detail such questions as to
why lessons of Crete were not learned. Samos,
the final obstacle to Germany’s conquest of the Aegean, was abandoned by
the British and fell without a fight on 22 November 1943. German forces
had unknowingly undertaken their last successful operation to seize and
occupy foreign soil.The struggle for the Aegean
was a costly yet unnecessary sideshow. Before long, events were
overshadowed by the situation on other fronts, not least in Italy.
Attention turned to fighting at the Anzio beachhead and along the German
Gustav line especially in and around Cassino. Then, as now, Leros was all
but forgotten.