Friday, April 29, 2016

Hawija The Moment Iraq’s Insurgency Was Reborn

Three years ago the Iraqi insurgency re-emerged. In April
2013 the Baathist Naqshibandi group was able to provoke Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki to send the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to attack the Hawija protest
site in southern Kirkuk governorate. Immediately afterward other demonstration
areas talked about taking up arms against the government, and there was a wave
of violence by all the major militant groups. Security steadily deteriorated
over the next year culminating in the fall of Mosul in 2014. The Hawija raid
then was the moment the Iraqi militants began operating out in the open once
again after their nadir following the U.S. Surge.

When the Sunni protest movement started at the end of 2012,
the Baathists attempted to take advantage of it. The demonstrations began when
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki moved against Finance Minister Rafi Issawi in December
2012 by claiming he was behind terrorist attacks. Protests started in
Anbar, Issawi’s home, and then spread to other provinces. The one in Hawija
began in January
2013, and was led by the Intifada
Ahrar al-Iraq, the political wing of the Baathist Naqshibandi insurgent
group. It wanted to provoke a conflict with the security forces that could be
used to turn the public against the government and towards violence. The
Baathists attempted to do so
in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah, but failed. It finally found its moment in
Hawija.

In April 2013, the Naqshibandi was able to create a
confrontation with the ISF in Kirkuk. On April
19, a checkpoint outside the Hawija protest area was attacked leading to
several casualties. The Army then raided
the demonstration site, which caused some fighting. Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq
claimed that 114 people were arrested as well. The ISF then demanded
that the perpetrators of the checkpoint assault be turned over. Negotiations
were going on when the ISF attacked the site on April
23. The Defense Ministry claimed
20 protesters and 3 soldiers were killed in the process, while a parliamentary
committee later said 44 total died. It was widely believed
at the time that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had grown tired of the protests
and wanted to stamp them out with force. That was the reason why he didn’t wait
for talks to come to any fruition, and sent in the ISF instead so quickly. That
played directly into the hands of the militants.

The raid upon Hawija had the desired affect of turning many
protesters towards armed struggle. First, Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq announced
that it was officially joining the Naqshibandi army, and called on others to take
up what it called a defensive jihad against Baghdad. At the Ramadi
demonstrations a speech
was given calling to take up arms. Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman claimed he was
forming a Pride and Dignity Army to protect the protesters, and Sheikh Abdul
Malik al-Saadi, the religious leader of the Anbar protests called for a tribal
army. By June
the demonstrations across the country were shrinking. Many had either given up
believing that they could achieve anything peacefully, or they had joined the
new insurgency. The Baathist plan had worked perfectly. It provoked Maliki to
crackdown on Hawija, and given people a reason to take up arms. In the process
the demonstrations eventually gave way to a new wave of violence.

All of the old insurgent groups came out of the woodwork
after Hawija. There were attacks
upon the ISF in Tuz Kharmato, Baiji, Ramadi, and Fallujah, along with open
fighting in Mosul,
and the Naqshibandi temporarily seized
the town of Suleiman Beq. In a foreshadowing of what would happen a year later
in Mosul and Tikrit, soldiers were reported
to have abandoned their posts, some senior commanders resigned, and others
refused orders. Besides the Baathists, the Islamic Army (1), Ansar
al-Islam, and the Islamic
State of Iraq all claimed responsibility for attacks. Many tribes joined in
as well. A sheikh in Hawija for example named Abu Abdullah told the Global
Post after the raid upon the protest site he decided to take up arms
against the government. He didn’t think his tribe was strong enough to take on
the ISF alone, so it made a deal with ISI. The Naqshibandi also tried to co-opt
the tribes by forming Military
Councils to organize them under its leadership. By 2008 these groups had
all hit a nadir. The United States Surge had killed much of the militants’
leadership or turned their membership towards the Sahwa to fight ISI. Maliki then
neglected the Sahwa, which had too many ghost fighters to be integrated anyway,
while the Islamic State stared a campaign to kill and intimidate them to turn them
backed to militancy. The prime minister had also undermined the integrity of
the security forces by appointing men loyal to him as commanders down to the
brigade level, few of which were competent as leaders. All together this provided
a perfect environment for the insurgency to make a comeback.

Ironically, what the Naqshibandi started the Islamic State
would usurp. ISI made alliances with all the major militant groups and tribes
to launch the summer offensive in 2014. It was able to take Mosul, Tikrit, and
the Hawija district in June. It then demanded baya, allegiance from all the
other armed groups. Those that refused were attacked and killed. That actually
started by the end of 2013, but the other organizations chose to ignore that
and the history of ISI, which had done the same thing before the Surge. They
believed that they could carve out their own areas of control and co-exist with
the Islamic State, but that was impossible. ISI wanted to create a caliphate
under its sole leadership, which it eventually did. By 2015 all the other
insurgent groups including the Baathists that helped it seize territory were
dormant. Hawija then became a pyrrhic victory for the Naqshibandi.

FOOTNOTES

1. Al-Aalem, “Islamic Army: Year not ready for power and are
looking for a partnership and decision by Naqshibandi the wrong move to fight
Baghdad,” 4/30/13

SOURCES

Al-Aalem, “Islamic Army: Year not ready for power and are
looking for a partnership and decision by Naqshibandi the wrong move to fight
Baghdad,” 4/30/13

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the politics, economics, security, culture and history of Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com