The second anniversary of 26/11 Mumbai attacks is a grim reminder of not only what the terrorist did during 26-28 November, 2008 but also of their growing capabilities and of the urgent need for significantly enhancing our abilities to deal with the current dangerous dimensions of terrorism by addressing lacunae in our response mechanism. Before reviewing our preparedness to deal with the terrorism, it is necessary to have a look at the sinister plans and the growing capabilities of terrorists.

Dimensions of terrorism

Notwithstanding the "war on terror", the ability of terrorists to plan and execute attacks meticulously almost like armed forces has not been adversely affected. The terrorists appear to have evolved a two-fold strategy for violent incidents. At one level, terrorists are planning bold operations to launch another 26/11 type attack, as reported by intelligence agencies. A similar bold attempt had been made at our Embassy in Kabul. Against the US, terrorist attempts include failed plan to blow an aircraft on 25th December, 2009, plan to carry out an attack at the Times Square in New York and attempt to blow cargo aircraft going to Chicago (Operation Hemorrhage). At another level, terrorists are launching smaller attacks to cause panic amongst the population and the feeling of insecurity and thereby cause economic damage in broad terms. Instances of such incidents are attack on German Bakery in Pune (February 13, 2010), explosion in Bangalore outside the cricket stadium (April 17, 2010) and attack on two Taiwanese tourists in Delhi (September 19, 2010). The second types of attacks fall into the category of causing harm through the "strategy of a thousand cuts". According to an article in the New York Times (November 20, 2010), the Al Qaeda leaders are exhorting their terrorists to adopt these low-cost operations to inflict broad economic damage. According to the article, the current thinking of the Al Qaeda leaders is to launch smaller attacks that do not cost much, require less time for preparations and involve less number of players. These are less likely to be detected by the barriers of security forces. Such plans as well as incidents reflect that terrorists are adopting more sophisticated strategies for terrorist operations and that their capabilities are growing. A study of the plans and activities carried out in recent years suggest that their targets include economic centres, technological hubs, vital installations and transport systems. The intelligence inputs indicate that air and railway transport systems and our key infrastructures including Nuclear Reactors are now the primary targets of terrorists.

While Al Qaeda’s central mechanism is not effective as was the case earlier, its ideology is now playing a critical role in motivating terrorists. Some of the professionals and educated persons have been radicalized through jehadi websites utilizing highly pernicious Al Qaeda ideology. Pan Islamic outfits are circulating audio/ video tapes of Al Qaeda leaders. The planning and execution of attacks are now left to the local units. This decentralization has in fact made it more difficult for intelligence agencies to get the relevant information by penetrating the terrorist hubs. For India, it is the LeT and also HuJI, Hizbul Mujahedeen as well as Jaish-e Mohammed are more important, which are closely linked to Al Qaeda. To these has been added the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, who is reported to be a member of the Advisory Council (Shura) of Al Qaeda. Reports of Al Qaeda leaders mentioning India as a target in their speeches exist. In 2007, a group of pure Arabs belonging to Al Qaeda was reported to have visited India, disguised as tourists, looking for suitable targets for attacks in Mumbai, Goa, Pune and Bangalore. In addition, the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan also focuses on Indian targets. The ability of these terrorist outfits to plan and execute terrorist attacks remains undiminished mainly because of the fact that they continue to get support and guidance of Pak ISI. Their organizational structure has been systematized reflecting improved managerial skills. These outfits have not only terrorist wings but also political wings and have separate sections for making logistic arrangements, recruitment, training and motivation of cadres, intelligence collection, planning and execution of operations. The terrorist operations now involve a number of modules for separate tasks, which remain unaware of the activities of other modules. This makes it difficult for intelligence agencies to know about the entire plan even if they succeed in their attempts to penetrate into one of the modules. The terrorist networks now are now evolving into "more fluid, independent and unpredictable groups" as stated by Marc Sageman, an expert on terrorism.

LeT, in fact has acquired the status of a global terrorist organization with presence in twenty countries. Despite the ban in Pakistan as also in other countries including the US, its activities continue unabated. The Pak media has reported that in main markets in Pakistani major cities, it continues to collect funds openly. In addition, this outfit has a number of fronts for fund collection. Its strength in recent years has gone up significantly and now it is better organized to carry out deadlier attacks than before. Several experts have indicated that LeT is the covert branch of ISI/Pak Army.

The terrorist outfits have formed a seamless web of linkages which has considerably multiplied their capabilities and has resulted in consolidation of infrastructure. The International Islamic Front that was formed by Osama bin Laden, which included LeT, HuM, HuJI, and Jaish-e Mohammed remains a force to reckon with. As mentioned earlier, several other Pak based terrorist groups have now joined these outfits to form broad anti-India association. They share their resources and have joint training centres.

The increasing use of locals including women to assist in carrying out supportive terrorist activities to evade detection has been noted. They provide safe shelters to terrorists; assist in making logistics arrangements and help in collection of intelligence. The Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) are being used by ISI-LeT combine to provide assistance to terrorists. A number of sleeper cells are reported to have been created in India.

Professionals and educated persons are increasingly getting involved in terrorist activities. The intelligence reports suggest that with terrorist outfits recruiting experts in cyber technologies, their capabilities for cyber terrorism are acquiring dangerous proportions. In addition, internet is allowing terrorists to remain in touch without physically moving out of their locations. They resort to different methods like stegnography and keeping the messages only in draft mode (and sharing the passwords with other members of the module) to ensure that their messages remain undetected.

Reports suggest that terrorist groups continue to make efforts to acquire WMD capabilities. While LeT, according to intelligence agencies including those of US, has employed specialists/scientists to develop CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) capabilities, a website linked with Al Iqlas (an entity within the Al Qaeda family) has claimed that Al Qaeda has acquired at least one suitcase bomb (small nuclear bombs left by Soviet forces). Reports of arrest of two Hungarians and one Czech with high grade Uranium suggest that terrorist groups acquiring radiological material remain a distinct possibility.

Terrorist are increasingly employing suicide bombers to attack important targets. Terrorists are receiving training in Indian culture and languages to easily mingle with the Indian population.

Reports suggest increasing use of fake Indian currency notes (FICN) in a big way to fund the terrorist activities by Pakistan. High quality notes are being smuggled into India to finance the terrorist groups. The ISI’s network for smuggling and circulation of FICN spreads across Pakistan, UAE, Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh and Nepal. A module that was busted earlier clearly established that diplomatic channels were utilized by ISI to facilitate the smuggling of large quantities of FICN. A Peshawar based firm known as the Baad Agency was reported to be supplying FICN to terrorists. The induction of FICN is not only intended to finance the terrorist groups but also aimed at the subversion of Indian economy. The addition of financial terrorism to the violent terrorist activities is a major challenge for the Indian intelligence and security agencies.

Despite NATO led operations, Pakistan-Afghanistan remains the epicenter of terrorism. The infrastructure of terrorism as far as India is concerned remains intact. The ISI is maintaining more than 50 terrorist camps in Pakistan/PoK. The direct role of ISI officials in providing assistance to terrorists is well documented. With the increase in the Taliban base, more drug money would be available with the ISI to support the terrorists operating in India.

The above facts reflect that the terrorists have upgraded their capabilities and are systematizing their strategies to increase violence and depredations. Equipped with better resources and using modern technologies, terrorists have potentials to cause heavier damage to the country. The incident- kill ratio is continuously increasing reflecting a palpable improvement in the terrorist capabilities.

Our preparedness

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks brought out clearly the inadequacies in the security and intelligence mechanism. The Home Minister Chidambram in the Parliament admitted certain shortcomings in the system. Pointing out an important flaw, he stated that the responsibility of preparing defensive plans on the basis of intelligence inputs was diffused. The other significant flaw noted by him was the need for improving intelligence coordination. Based on several recommendations of the Committees which examined the system as well as his interactions with Indian and American counter terrorist experts, he came up with his plan which he outlined at the DsG’s Conference on 23rd December, 2009. This included strengthening of police and security forces, providing them with better technology, establishment of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), formation of a network for sharing of intelligence in real time and the need for a separate ministry to deal with the internal security.

The infrastructure the Home Minister had outlined is still to be put in place. It would be wrong to conclude that the changes already made would be sufficient to deal with the terrorists, who are now operating more aggressively and have considerably enhanced their capabilities. Some of the important steps that are needed for adequate response from us are given in the succeeding paragraphs.

While it is true that global terrorism require close coordination amongst the affected nations, we can not ignore the limits of such cooperation in our security environment. One of our neighbours is using terrorism as an instrument of State policy to deal with India. The cooperation with the US has its own limits. In the US policy, Pakistan occupies a central place to achieve the American strategic objectives in the region. Therefore even if it has information about the involvement of the Pakistani Establishment in supporting terrorists, it is not going to share everything as that can be embarrassing for its ally in Afghanistan. Therefore, we have to depend upon our own robust system to deal with the terrorism. At the same time, it must be admitted that even when foreign agencies share inputs, we do not have an effective mechanism to develop leads that can help in turning those bits of information into actionable intelligence. The failure to develop the report provided by the US prior to the Mumbai attacks substantiates this.

Therefore, we have to establish a centre where all inputs should reach in real time and to develop those leads into actionable intelligence in coordination with the relevant agencies and security forces, prepare plans for preventive operations and ensure their proper implementation. The proposed National Counter Terrorism Centre was to undertake these responsibilities. This should be established at the earliest possible as the present system, in which agencies place the inputs before the concerned security forces/police, does not allow the latter to understand the real significance of the reports and therefore adequate measures are not taken. This Centre would significantly improve coordination between intelligence agencies and the security forces.

The orchestration of different agencies in accordance with National Intelligence and Security Plans requires an effective oversight mechanism with the authority to task different agencies. While the meetings taken by the Home Minister may have increased cooperation amongst the agencies, this can not replace a professional body to streamline the functioning of all the agencies. In US and UK, effective oversight mechanisms exist. It is understood that such a move may be resisted by the agencies as happened in US when it considered the creation of office of Director National Intelligence (DNI). The decision makers will have to take this decision in the interest of effective functioning of agencies. This is all the more necessary as the number of agencies has gone up in the last decade and to ensure that they operate as parts of one Intelligence Community working for the common mission. This would also introduce the system of accountability for the agencies. In US, a system of punishment has also been introduced. Former DNI Dennis Blair was made to resign when the agencies failed to take action on the basis of inputs available with them on the failed attempt to blow the aircraft by a Nigerian student last year on the 25th December. Similar system should be introduced in our country.

Our technical agency should concentrate in monitoring internet which provides useful information. Capabilities like ‘internet gateway-sniffers’ and state-of-the-art software should be developed. In this attempt cooperation with US can prove valuable as their National Security Agency has such technologies. This would also require sufficient number of technical experts and analysts. In addition, our technical agency should ensure that our network for sharing information remains secure. Encryption as well as decryption needs to be given adequate attention. The National Technical Research Organization was created for these tasks. It should be given all the resources to undertake these tasks.

In addition, we must involve common citizens to check terrorist activities. It may be recalled that the attempt to blow aircraft by the Nigerian student and the Time Square attack were stopped by alert citizens. State police in coordination with Intelligence Bureau should set up auxiliary groups of citizens, who could act as spotters and form part of an extensive ‘look out system’. They could also act as terrorist wardens in public places.

As the first responder to terrorist attacks remain the State police, in each State specialized counter terrorist units should be established. These units should include an armed complement, capable of taking covert as well as commando actions.

In conclusion, it can be said that while some measures have been taken to improve our capabilities to deal with terrorism, they are still not adequate to deal with terrorist threats which are multiplying. The emergence of new terrorist groups and coalitions add a disturbing dimension to the terrorist threat to India. The anti terrorist units in States where they have been created are reported to have not been given all the necessary equipment needed for the task. The need to take necessary steps urgently can hardly be under estimated. We need not wait for another 26/11 type of attack.

DISCLAIMER : Views expressed above are the author's own.

Comments on this post are closed now

Be the first one to review.

Author

S D Pradhan has served as chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee. He has also been the country's deputy national security adviser. He was chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Mechanism (2008-2010), which was constituted to review the functioning of the intelligence agencies. He has taught at the departments of defence studies and history at the Punjabi University, Patiala. He was also a visiting professor at the University of Illinois, US, in the department of arms control and disarmament studies. The ministry of defence had utilized his services for the preparation of official accounts of the 1971 war and the counterinsurgency operations in the northeast. In the JIC/National Security Council secretariat, he was closely involved with the preparation of the reports of the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers on national security as also with the implementation of their recommendations. His publications include two books and several articles.

S D Pradhan has served as chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee. He has also been the country's deputy national security adviser. He was chairman. . .