The City of Woodbury, Minnesota is a growing suburb of Saint Paul. To reduce the public burden of road construction to new subdivisions, the city passed an ordinance in 2016 which provides that the city may not approve a proposed subdivision if it is deemed “premature.” The city may deem a subdivision “premature” if streets “to serve the proposed subdivision” are not “available,” which is defined as streets “existing or readily extended and funded” as “consistent with the phasing in the comprehensive plan.”

However the city provides that a new development without existing road infrastructure may be deemed mature if the developer is willing to “pays its own way” and “all associated costs” for “public infrastructure” will “be the sole responsibility of the developing property owner.” To determine these associated costs, the city has allocated undeveloped land into three phases, each of which has an estimated associated cost per acre associated for “increased traffic and trips that are generated” by expected development in that area. This fee is referred to as a “major roadway assessment” or MRA and is used as the starting point for a negotiated agreement with developers.

Martin Harstad, of Harstad Hills Inc., submitted an application to to develop 77 acres of phase – two land into a 183 – home residential community called “Bailey Park on July 23, 2015. The city informed Harstad about certain deficiencies in the application. Harstad remedied the majority of them and was then informed by the city that the remaining deficiencies where relatively unimportant. This is significant because once the city receives a complete application under Minnesota law, if it does not deny that application with cause, it is automatically approved. After receiving the cost estimate from the city for the major roadway assessment, Harstad challenged the ability of the city to collect this fee in court. He also made a takings claim, arguing that the city had deprived him of use of his property without compensation. Finally he claimed that his application had already been approved as the statutory period that the city had to deny the claim had elapsed.

The district court found for the city on the latter two claims. The permit was not entirely complete, therefor the statutory period had never begun. The court also found that Harstads takings claims were immature as the permit had never been fully submitted nor had the fee been collected. The court did however find that the city had no power to collect fees to pay for road infrastructure.

The City of Woodbury appealed this decision to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals focused its analysis on the question of the power of Woodbury to collect a “major roadway assessment.” The City of Woodbury is a statutory city; thus, it “has no inherent powers beyond those expressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powers which have been expressly conferred.”

The city argues it has express authority to impose the MRA under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2a . Section 462.358, subdivision 1a, provides that “a municipality may by ordinance” regulate the subdivision of land to , among other things, facilitate “adequate provision for transportation.” Minn. Stat. § 462.35 8, subd. 1a . Subdivision 2a states , in relevant part:

The standards and requirements in the regulations [authorized by subdivision 1a] may address without limitation : the size, location, grading, and improvement of lots, structures, public areas, streets, [and] roads . . . . The regulations may prohibit the issuance of permits or approvals for any tracts, lots, or parcels for which required subdivision approval has not been obtained.

The regulations may permit the municipality to condition its approval on the construction and installation of sewers, streets , electric, gas, drainage, and water facilities, and similar utilities and improvements or, in lieu thereof, on the receipt by the municipality of a cash deposit.

The city maintains that subdivision 2a’s “open-ended language” unambiguously authorizes it to condition subdivision approval on a developer’s agreement to pay an MRA that funds necessary road improvements “without limitation on location.”

The Court disagrees. This section only authorizes city planning not the collection of a fee to cover road construction costs. The Court pointed out the legislature has explicitly authorized municipalities to assess water and sewer connection charges against developers to fund public water and sewer improvements made necessary by development. The legislature has never made similar provisions for roadways.

The court agreed with the district court finding that although the city had communicated with Harstad that the remaining deficiencies in his application were minimal, the fact that they were never corrected meant that the statutory period in which the city had to approve or deny the application never began.

Finally the court affirmed the district courts denial of Harstad’s taking claim. The permit has not yet been denied nor has the major roadway assessment been collected, so no taking could have occurred.

The City of Woodbury has appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court which accepted to hear the case. A date for oral argument has not been set.

More information and the link to registration for the Spring 2018 Introduction to Planning and Zoning workshops can now be found by going to the “Intro to Planning and Zoning Workshops” link at the top of your screen.

Croell Redi-Mix owns and operates a quarry located in Pennington County, South Dakota. The quarry has been in operation since the 1970s and was acquired by Croell in 2015. Croell intended to expand the operation. After the quarry was opened, but before it was acquired by Croell, Pennington County adopted zoning ordinances. The quarry falls into the “A-1 General Agricultural District” which allows “temporary quarries” ,by right, and mining operations, provided that a construction permit is obtained.

In late 2015, working in consultation with staff from the Pennington County Planning Department, Croell submitted an application for a construction permit to expand its operations. On February 8, 2016 staff issued a recommendation that the permit be granted subject to 11 conditions. The Pennington County Planning Commission reviewed the report and approved the application subject to the recommended conditions that same day.

On February 10, 2016, the Pennington County Board of Commissioners received a letter signed by 37 area residents requesting an appeal of the approval of the permit. The Board of Commissioners held a special meeting on March 2 to consider the appeal. Opponents expressed concerns about the quarry’s expansion including: dust, traffic, availability of groundwater, runoff, and depreciation of property values. At a second hearing the board voted 4-1 to reverse the approval of the permit.

Croell appealed to the circuit court which reversed the Board of Commissioners decision finding:

The residents who sent the letter did not have standing to appeal.

The Commissioners misinterpreted their own ordinance in their decision.

The Commissioners’ decision to deny the permit was arbitrary.

The Board of Commissioners appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court which granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court reconsidered the three findings of the circuit court.

Standing to Sue Pennington County’s Zoning Ordinance states:

“Any action taken by the Planning Director in administering or enforcing Section 507(A) may be reviewed by the Pennington County Board of Commissioners upon the request of any person affected by such action.” [PCZO § 507(A)(7)(f)]

Croell argues, and the circuit court agreed that this right to appeal only extends to considerations of erosion and storm water control. The Supreme Court reads this passage differently, interpreting the word ‘administer,’ ‘affected,’ and ‘any’ above quite broadly:

PCZO § 507(A) is titled “Erosion and Storm Water Control,” the right to appeal under §507(A)(7)(f) extends to anyone “affected” by “any action taken by the Planning Director in administering . . . Section 507(A)[.]” (Emphasis added.) Noticeably absent from §507(A)(7)(f) is any language limiting the right to appeal to matters involving erosion and storm – water control. Thus, §507(A)(7)(f) provides a right to appeal any action taken by the Planning Director under §507(A). In this case, the action challenged is the Director’s issuance of a construction permit — i.e., the Director’s administering of §507(A)(3).

Because the individuals appealing would be affected by the zoning administrators decision, they have standing to appeal.

Statutory Interpretation Croell argues that the use of its property as a quarry is a permitted use in an A-1 General Agricultural district given that the statute permits temporary quarries and requires only a building permit for the “extraction of sand, gravel, or minerals.”

The County claims that Croell would need to obtain a seperate mining permit as required in the plain language of the ordinance which states, “no extraction of any mineral or substance […] shall be conducted without a Mining Permit.” Here the court identifies a question of statutory interpretation and supports the Commissioners’ interpretation. Further the Court cites the US Supreme Court’s opinion from Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council (1984), which established the principle of “Chevron deference.” Chevron established the principle that courts will defer to the interpretation of those administering a statute as long as that interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” In this case the South Dakota Supreme Court found that the Pennington Board of Commissioners interpretation was permissible.

Arbitrariness Because the Supreme Court found that the Board of Commissioners was able to consider more than erosion and storm water control in its decision making, the argument for arbitrariness is moot. The Board’s decision was based on evidence in the scope of its review.

The Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in reversing the Commissioners’ decision.

Cecelia Kent purchased a previously undeveloped lot in Des Moines with the intent of building a single family home. However the winding road and a thirty-foot easement for a public storm sewer running diagonally across the back of the lot complicated Kent’s plans. On November 14, 2015, Kent appealed to the Des Moines Zoning Board of Adjustment for an exception to the district’s fifty-foot front yard setback, allowing her to build a house with a front yard setback of just thirty feet. She also asked the board for a variance to the setback required for a parking lot and an exception to the side yard setback.

The board denied the variance and the side yard set back, but voted to approve the exception to the front yard setback.

(1) the board failed to make required written findings
(2) substantial evidence does not support the grant of an exception.

As quasi-judicial bodies, boards of adjustment are required to make written findings of all facts present. The intent of these is “to enable a reviewing court to determine with reasonable certainty the factual basis and legal principles upon which the board acted.” In this case, the court of appeals determined that the staff report as well as the minutes of the discussion during the meeting was sufficient to allow the court to determine the factual basis and legal principles upon which the board acted.

The criteria that the board is required to consider in granting an exception is detailed in Des Moines City Code:

1. (a) Such exception does not exceed [fifty] percent of the particular limitation or number in question . . .
2. The exception relates entirely to a use classified by applicable district regulations as either a principal permitted use, a permitted accessory use, or a permitted sign, or to off-street parking or loading areas accessory to such a permitted use;
3. The exception is reasonably necessary due to practical difficulties related to the land in question;
4. Such practical difficulties cannot be overcome by any feasible alternative means other than an exception; and
5. The exception is in harmony with the essential character of the neighborhood of the land in question.

Graziano challenged that the board had failed to show to show that there was no “feasible alternative” to granting the exemption and that the reduced setback would be “in harmony with the essential character of the neighborhood.”

With regards to feasible alternatives, the meeting minutes show that the board of adjustment did discuss the possibility of moving the easement as well as to whether a smaller reduction to the setback might be adequate. Although this reasoning was not included in the final written findings, the court found this to be adequate to support the fact that the board “substantially complied” with the mandate to consider feasible alternatives.

Graziano also challenged that by not including expert testimony on the effect that this exemption may have on neighboring property values, the board failed to show that the setback would be “in harmony with the essential character of the neighborhood.” The court found that expert testimony is not required citing an earlier case which found:

[T]he board may rely upon “commonsense inferences from evidence relating to other issues, such as use and enjoyment, crime, safety welfare, and aesthetics, to make a judgment as to whether the proposed use would substantially diminish or impair property values in the area.”

The court affirmed the district court’s ruling upholding the exception granted to Kent.

Cahalan Investments purchased two residential properties in the City of Eagle Grove, one in 2002 and the other in 2011. Both properties have remained unoccupied and in deteriorating condition since their purchase. The properties were the subject of multiple complaints by neighbors and were found to be unfit for human occupancy. In 2014 the city began an effort to clean up a number of nuisance properties, these properties were among those targeted. The city sent several letters to Cahalan advising them that they were in violation of the city’s nuisance ordinance. Cahalan made no effort to abate the nuisance and would later testify that they had no intention of making either property habitable in the foreseeable future

Iowa Code section 657A.10A allows cities to petition a district court to transfer ownership of abandoned properties to the city. The code details the following criteria that a court is to use when determining if a property has been abandoned.

a. Whether any property taxes or special assessments on the property were delinquent at the time the petition was filed.
b. Whether any utilities are currently being provided to the property.
c. Whether the building is unoccupied by the owner or lessees or licensees of the owner.
d. Whether the building meets the city’s housing code for being fit for human habitation, occupancy, or use.
e. Whether the building is exposed to the elements such that deterioration of the building is occurring.
f. Whether the building is boarded up.
g. Past efforts to rehabilitate the building and grounds.
h. The presence of vermin, accumulation of debris, and uncut vegetation.
i. The effort expended by the petitioning city to maintain the building and grounds.
j. Past and current compliance with orders of the local housing official.
k. Any other evidence the court deems relevant.

The code then states that if the court finds the property is abandoned, “the court shall enter judgment awarding title to the city.” In this case, the district court found that Cahalan’s properties were indeed abandoned under the definition set forth in the statute. In fact Cahalan Investments does not dispute this finding; however, Cahalan argued that awarding ownership of these properties to the city without compensation violated the takings clause of the US Constitution. In this case, the district court found Cahalan Investment’s argument convincing and did not award title to the City of Eagle Grove.

The City of Eagle Grove appealed the district court’s decision to the Iowa Supreme Court.

The Iowa Supreme Court revisited the question of whether awarding ownership to a city under Iowa Code section 657A.10 is constitutional.

Proving that a section of state code is unconstitutional is not easy. The court quotes an earlier decision stating that, “statutes are cloaked with a presumption of constitutionality. The challenger bears a heavy burden, because it must prove the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Takings jurisprudence is based primarily on the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment which states that, “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” To determine if a governmental action has violated the takings clause, the court uses the following framework:

(1) Is there a constitutionally protected private property interest at stake? (2) Has this private property interest been “taken” by the government for public use? and (3) If the protected property interest has been taken, has just compensation been paid to the owner?

In this case, Cahalan’s case fails on the first question. The court cites an earlier ruling which states that “the State has the power to condition the permanent retention of [those] property right[s] on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to retain the interest[s].” Ownership of property comes with many rights, but is not absolute. Here the court is saying that in Iowa a property owner’s rights do not include allowing properties to remain abandoned. By doing so here, Cahalan has forfeited their rights.

By allowing the properties to persist in a condition unfit for human habitation, allowing the properties to remain vacant, and failing to make timely and reasonable efforts to remedy the public nuisances created by the properties after notification of the problems, Cahalan did not comply with the section 657A.10A(3) criteria. Thus it failed to “indicate a present intention to retain the interest.” See id. at 526, 102 S. Ct. at 790. We conclude the district court erred in concluding Cahalan holds a constitutionally protected private property interest in the abandoned properties for which just compensation is owed.

Finding that Cahalan Investment’s stake in the properties was not a constitutionally protected right is enough to decide the case, but for completeness the court did examine the second question as well.

Assuming that Cahalan did have a constitutionally protected private property right the court still found that takings jurisprudence supports the city’s actions. A taking occurs when the government denies a property owner “all economically beneficial or productive use” of property. In this case there is no dispute that Cahalan Investments has been deprived of all use of these two properties. Generally when that occurs, the government is required to pay just compensation. However, there is a public nuisance exception in takings jurisprudence. The state has the “power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise,” and this action, “is not a constitutional taking for which compensation is required.”

The court also examined whether the fact that Cahalan Investments purchased these properties before the enactment of this particular section of 657A would prevent it from being applied in this case. Here the court found that the state’s existing legislation as well as the principles of nuisance law already in place at the time of purchase were sufficient to hold that Cahalan never possessed the right to maintain properties in an abandoned state.

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the finding of the district court that the city’s exercise of 657A constituted an unconstitutional taking and remanded the case back to district court.

Interstate 90 runs through the town of Campbell, Wisconsin where it is crossed by two streets and a pedestrian overpass.

Gregory Luce and Nicholas Newman, two members of the local Tea Party, chose to use the pedestrian overpass to promote their views. With their group, they held American flags along with banners and signs messages such as “HONK TO IMPEACH OBAMA.” This led the Town’s legislature to enact an ordinance forbidding all signs, flags, and banners (other than traffic-control information) on any of the three overpasses, or within 100 feet of the end of these structures.

Complicating this case is the fact that the local police chief, Tim Kelemen, and the Tea Party protesters escalated the conflict. The members of the Tea Party group posted videos and messages online. One video showed police removing a protestor for unfurling an American flag.

The police chief responded by posting the name and email address of one of the protestors on same-sex dating and pornography websites. Kelemen also posted comments on the local newspaper’s website accusing that protestor of failing to pay his property taxes and other debts and asserting that his car was about to be repossessed. When this behavior was revealed, Kelemen resigned his post as police chief and was prosecuted for “unlawful use of a computerized communication system.”

In this case the plaintiffs considered the actions of the police chief to have been retaliation by the city for their speech. However the court found that Kelemen’s vigilante actions were private in nature:

The court concluded that Kelemen was not engaged in state action when “messing with” Luce and that the First Amendment therefore did not apply (for it deals only with governmental conduct). Acting as a vigilante is not part of a police officer’s job. Kelemen did some of the dirty work while on duty and used an office computer for some posts. But he did not use official information or privileged access to information. All of the facts he gathered and disclosed about Luce, such as his physical and email addresses, were available to the general public. Anyone else could have done exactly what Kelemen did.

While Kelemen’s actions were not “state action” the court does say that his actions undermine his credibility as a witness stating the dangers presented by signage on the overpass. While one photograph of a car, which had stopped to take a picture, was shared at trial, without Kelemen’s testimony there was no other evidence to prove this law advances a “significant governmental interest.”

However, the court asserts that case law shows that reasonable, content-neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions on speech have not required empirical evidence to pass constitutional muster. As long as the legislatures assertions are reasonable, “the Court “hesitate[s] to disagree with the accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers.” Novel signs do attract more attention than fixed billboards. The City Council does not need a specific double-blind study to support that fact in this case.

A regulation of the sort the Town has adopted rests on a belief that overhead signs and banners will cause at least some drivers to slow down in order to read what the banners say, and perhaps to react to them (say, by blowing the car’s horn in response to “HONK TO IMPEACH OBAMA”). Stopping to take a picture is just an extreme version of slowing down. Reading an overhead banner requires some of each driver’s attention, and diverting attention—whether to banners or to cell phones and texting—increases the risk of accidents. This effect is well established for cell phones and texting and is the basis for legislation by many jurisdictions, uncontested in court as far as we are aware, though talking and texting are speech.

It does not take a double-blind empirical study, or a linear regression analysis, to know that the presence of overhead signs and banners is bound to cause some drivers to slow down in order to read the sign before passing it. When one car slows suddenly, another may hit it unless the drivers of the following cars are alert—and, alas, not all drivers are alert all the time

The court did remand a portion of the law which bans all signage within 100 feet of the overpasses including those which would not be visible to drivers on the interstate.

This dispute concerns the repair and maintenance of a 600 foot fence separating the properties of Matthew Hopkins and Robert Dickey. Iowa’s Fence Code 359.17(1) uses the “right hand rule” to determine who is responsible for the maintenance of a fence. Essentially, if the two property owners were to stand facing one another at the center of their adjoining property line, each is responsible for the fence to his/her right unless an alternate agreement is made in writing. In this case, Dickey is responsible for the west 300 feet and Hopkins is responsible for the east 300 feet.

In 2010 after several instances of cattle escaping, Dickey informed Hopkins that he needed to repair that portion of the fence. Hopkins declined to do so, stating “that’s not what the law requires” and he already had “too many projects.” Dickey filed a complaint with the local township trustees, who are responsible for managing fence disputes. The trustees ordered Hopkins to “erect and maintain the East 300 feet of the partition fence” and that such be a “lawful fence” having “five barb wires attached to posts not more than 10 feet apart.”

Hopkins appealed the trustees’ decision to district court. The district court upheld the trustees’ decision, finding the application of the right-hand rule was both “a customary practice” and “fair and equitable.” Hopkins then appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals alleging:

A verbal agreement with the previous landowner excused Hopkins from all responsibility to maintain the fence.

The fact that the decision only applied to him violated case law that states that Iowa’s fence law exists “to equalize the partition fence burden.”

The specifications that he was ordered to build the fence to exceeded those required by law.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court on all three points.

The alleged prior verbal agreement is hearsay and therefore inadmissible. Further, even if a prior agreement existed, it should be legally recorded according to Iowa Code 359A.13 to have any authority.

The fact that the court order only applies to Hopkins does not violate the principle of equalizing the burden as, at the time of trial, Dickey had recently rebuilt half of the partition fence. The court stated that it is undisputed that the portion of the fence built by Dickey was “in good repair” at the time of the fence viewing. Therefore it was not necessary to order Dickey to maintain the fence.

Finally, the appeals court found that the trustees have some leeway in deciding what constitutes a legal fence:

The term “legal fence” as defined in the statute is not a prescription, however, for how every partition fence must be constructed or what fence viewers must require, but sets forth a minimum standard for a “legal fence.” […] In this case, the fence viewers and the court determined Hopkins was responsible for a portion of existing fence that was in such disrepair it did not constitute a “legal fence.” The district court ordered Hopkins to construct a new fence in keeping with the style and character of the existing fence and in keeping with the fence constructed by Dickey and approved by the fence viewers.

In 2014 North Liberty was in the process of developing what would become Iowa City Liberty High School to alleviate overcrowding in the Iowa City School District. However, the site selected did not have access to sanitary sewer. To service the area, the City of North Liberty explored several options before selecting its ultimate path in 2014. This path crosses the private property of 13 individuals. The city was able to secure temporary easements (for construction) and permanent easements (for ongoing maintenance) from 12 of the 13. The final holdout was Dr. Gary Weinman who first sought through a pair of lawsuits to force the city to stop construction and reconsider other routes. Those suits failed.

Easements are always considered takings and therefore Weinman was entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. A compensation commission decided that Weinman was entitled to $75,000. This included a temporary easement for construction (1.1 acres for four months) and a permanent easement (.75 acres). The city appealed claiming that amount was excessive. Weinman requested a jury trial so the matter was tried de novo to the jury. The jury set the compensation amount at $25,000 relying largely on the testimony of an expert assessor brought by the city.

Weinman appealed this decision to the Iowa Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals does not generally reverse compensation awards provided that they are not “wholly unfair or unreasonable.” In this case, because the jury’s decision was reasonable based on the evidence, the award of $25,000 was affirmed.

Members of the Lansing City Council voted to remove city council member William Burke from office for claimed violations of our open meetings law (OML). On one occasion the council issued an agenda for a closed session “to discuss strategy in matters that are presently in litigation or where litigation is imminent.” After the agenda was issued, the city clerk requested an opinion from the Lansing city attorney as to whether the two topics she understood to be up for discussion actually qualified for closed session under the OML. The city attorney opined that the topics did not, in fact, qualify for closed session. The clerk forwarded the memo to the city council members, including Burke. Burke notified the clerk that he disagreed with the clerk’s characterization of the purposes of the meeting as the clerk had reported them to the city attorney. When the scheduled meeting was held the council voted 2-1 to go into closed session, with Burke being one of the two council members to vote in favor. Later, the council held another special meeting on an unrelated matter. Twenty-four-hour notice was not given.

Tensions between the council and residents resulted in an investigation by the Allamakee County attorney into the council’s actions. The county attorney filed a petition alleging the two meetings violated the OML. The attorney retained to represent the council and its members concluded the county attorney had “made some legitimate allegations,” and predicted fines, costs and attorney’s fees will likely be assessed against each council member. The attorney set forth a potential settlement strategy she had discussed with the county attorney that would require Burke to resign from the council in exchange for dismissal of the lawsuit. After a closed session of the council which Burke did not attend, the mayor petitioned the council to remove Burke from office for “willful misconduct and maladministration in office” in his handling of several matters relating to OML which resulted in litigation against the city and members of the council. After a special meeting, the council voted 4-0 to remove Burke from office (Burke abstained from the vote). Thereafter Burke challenged his removal in district court, raising several issues with the council’s proceedings. The district court denied Burke’s petition, and Burke appealed. The sole issue considered by the Court of Appeals was procedural due process.

Burke argued that the removal proceeding was fundamentally unfair because each member of the council who voted on his removal had a pecuniary conflict of interest in deciding his fate, and the “council itself generated the factual record necessary to sustain its decision, which perpetuates its conflict of interest.” The Court of Appeals determined that Burke did not receive a “fair trial in a fair tribunal” as required by the Constitution. The council members understood that they would eliminate their own financial exposure for possible violations of the OML if they removed Burke. Furthermore, the council combined the prosecutorial function (by authorizing initiation of the removal process) with the adjudicative function (by presenting their own witness testimony to document their own personal knowledge of the grounds for removal).

Because the removal proceeding violated Burke’s right to procedural due process, the Court of Appeals sided with Burke and reversed the order of the district court.

Residents who live near Grain Processing Corporation’s (GPC) corn wet milling plant in Muscatine brought an action for nuisance, trespass and negligence against GPC for its manner of operation of the plant and the resulting “haze, odor, and smoke” emanating from the plant. The residents moved to treat the claim as a class action suit on behalf of all residents suffering the effects of the plant’s operation. GPC resisted the motion to certify the case as a class action, arguing that the claims of the residents were “inherently individual, and as such, individual issues predominated over those common to the class.” The district court granted class certification. Noting its authority to modify or decertify the class at any time, the court divided the class into two subclasses: one for members in close proximity to GPC, and the other for those in peripheral proximity. GPC appealed. Certification of the class action suit was the sole issue before the Iowa Supreme Court (in an earlier case, posted here, these same parties litigated the applicability of the Clean Air Act to local claims for nuisance).

Under Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.261 – 1.263 a district court may certify a class action if “the class is so numerous…that joinder of all members…is impracticable” and “there is a question of law or fact common to the class.” In addition, a class action should be permitted for the “fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy” and “the representative parties fairly and adequately will protect the interests of the class.” The Court of Appeals first noted that caselaw requires that “a failure of proof on any one of the prerequisites is fatal to class certification,” but also that, at this stage, “the proponent’s burden is light.” The Court of Appeals does not review the decision to certify the class itself, but simply whether the district court abused its discretion in doing so.

GPC argued that the district court erred because the requirement of commonality was not met, and that in this case individual issues predominate over common questions of law or fact.

Commonality. It is not sufficient that class members have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law. Rather, claims must depend on a common contention of an issue that central to the validity of each one of the claims. GPC argued that the named plaintiffs did not suffer the same injury of other class members; particularly in the types of harm suffered and the degree of proof needed to prove causation. The district court initially agreed, noting that two of the plaintiffs –the one closest to GPC and the one furthest – suffered significantly different “concentration totals” of particulates tested in the air. The Court resolved this disparity, however, by creating the two subclasses and grouping the plaintiffs accordingly. Thus the plaintiffs within each subclass had identified common questions of extensiveness of emissions, what caused them, what precautions were taken, and economic impact.

Predominance. A common question does not end the inquiry. Courts consider class actions appropriate “only where class members have common complaints that can be presented by designated representatives in the unified proceeding.” It “necessitates a close look at the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.” The district court spent considerable time addressing the predominance question in its ruling. It concluded “While variations in the individual damage claims are likely to occur and other sources of emissions may pose unusual difficulties, common questions of law and fact regarding defendant’s liability predominate over questions affecting only individual class members such that the subclasses should be permitted for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” After going through the standards of proof for negligence, trespass, and nuisance claims, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that common questions of law, with common evidentiary findings required of each, will predominate the action, and that therefore class action treatment is appropriate.