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The Theory of Imitation in Social Psychology

Charles A. Ellwood
University of Missouri

MOST prominent among the results of the attempt to apply psychology in the
interpretation of social phenomena is the theory of imitation, formulated first
by M. Gabriel Tarde[2]
in France and
later, but independently, by Professor J. Mark Baldwin[3]
in
this country. Among all the theories of the nature and process of human society
this " imitation theory" is today most widely accepted and most in the public
eye. It enjoys such enviable popularity, indeed, that it is expounded, not only
by professors of sociology and psychology in our colleges and universities, but
by many of the teachers of psychology and pedagogy in our secondary schools.
Such a theory, which has gained so wide an acceptance in a brief time, deserves
the careful examination and candid criticism of every social thinker ; and such
this paper will endeavor to give it.

Professor Baldwin's statement of the theory diverges slightly, though
immaterially, from M. Tarde's statement. For this reason, as well as on account
of its priority in time, M. Tarde's formulation of the theory may he
advantageously given first.

(
722)

It is worthy of note, however, before consideration of M. Tarde's and
Professor Baldwin's views, that they approached their subject from different
sides. Professor Baldwin, as is well known, arrived at his conclusions from the
side of individual psychology, through study of the mental development of the
child ; while M. Tarde reached his theories from the sociological side, through
study of the phenomena of crowds, crazes, fads, fashions, and crime. He saw that
the underlying fact in these social phenomena—namely, the process of suggestion
and imitation — could be generalized and used as the basis of a system of social
philosophy. The repetition of the act of one person by another under the
influence of suggestion offered, he thought, "the key to the social mystery."[4]
The influence of one mind upon another was explained by this
suggestion-imitation process, and consequently all changes and movements in
society.[5]
"Society is imitation," he
says, "and imitation is a species of somnambulism.[6]
Moreover, imitation is "the elementary social phenomenon,"[7]
" the fundamental social fact ; "[8]
it
is the criterion of the social and alone constitutes society. "The unvarying
characteristic of every social fact whatsoever is that it is imitative. And this
characteristic belongs exclusively to social facts."[9]
The unity of society, both on its functional and structural sides, M. Tarde
argues, is wholly due to the process of imitation. "This minute interagreement
of minds and wills, which forms the basis of social life . . . . is not due," he
maintains, "to organic heredity . . . . ; it is rather the effect of that
suggestion-imitation process which, starting from one primitive creature
possessed of a single idea or act, passed this copy on to one of its neighbors,
then to another, and so on."[10]

Consistently with the above positions, M. Tarde declares that all the
activities of men in society, from the satisfying of simple organic needs to the
inventions of science and art, are in one way or another outcomes of the process
of imitation.[11]

(
723)

There is not a word that you
say which is not the reproduction, now unconscious, but formerly conscious and
voluntary, of verbal articulations reaching back to the most distant past, with
some special accent due to your immediate surroundings . . . even your very
originality itself is made up of accumulated commonplaces, and aspires to become
commonplace in its turn.[12]

Just as all the phenomena of the universe can be reduced to the three forms,
repetition, opposition, and adaptation, the last two of which are in reality
only outcomes of the first ;[13]
so all
the phenomena of human society can be reduced to three corresponding
forms—imitation, conflict, and invention. But the last two are again merely
outcomes of the first; for conflict is but the interference of two dissimilar
waves of imitation, and invention but the union of two harmonious imitations.[14]
Finally, M. Tarde thinks that the process of imitation going on throughout
society may be formulated into two general laws. The first is that all
imitations tend to spread throughout society in a geometrical progression, and
do so spread if interferences in the form of competing imitations are absent.[15]
The second law, already implied in the conditioning of the first, is that
imitations are always refracted by their media.[16] These laws of imitation "are
to sociology," M. Tarde thinks, "what the laws of habit and heredity are to
biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to
physics."[17]

More careful and more scientific, though not essentially different from M.
Tarde's, is the formulation of the imitation theory given by Professor Baldwin.
As noted above, Professor Baldwin gathered the material for his theory in
child-study. His conclusion from the study of mental development in the child is
that "the prime and essential method of his [the child's] learning is by
imitative absorption of the actions, thoughts, expressions of other persons ;"[18]
further, that "all his personal absorption from his immediate associates is
through his tendency

(
724) to imitate ; "[19]
and,
therefore, that " imitation is the method of his personal progress,"[20]
" the essential method of his growth." But if this holds of the individual, it
must hold also of society ; for whether we view society as an aggregation, or as
a functional combination, of individuals, it can contain no elements, factors,
or forces not discoverable in the individual. The processes of the social life
are implied in the processes of individual life. If the principle of imitation
will explain fully the method of personal progress, it will also explain fully
the method of social progress. Professor Baldwin, therefore, quite properly
generalizes his theory of personal growth by imitation and applies it to
society. "Society," he tells us, "grows by imitative generalization of the
thoughts of individuals."[21]
Therefore,
" imitation is the method of social organization,"[22]
and all progress takes place through society's generalizing by imitation the
inventions of individuals. Thus we have a circular process : the individual
develops intellectually and morally by imitating the mental attitudes and
actions of those about him, while society changes through the continued
imitation of the thought of some individual, a " leader " or a " genius."

Here we must note the chief points of divergence of Professor Baldwin's
theory from M. Tarde's. Baldwin nowhere says that "society is imitation,"that
imitation is the criterion of the social, as Tarde says. On the contrary,
Professor Baldwin distinguishes between the matter, or content, of social
organization and the method, or process,[23]
and affirms that imitation has to do exclusively with the latter. Imitation is
the method of the social life, but not its content.[24]
This distinction, it may fairly be urged, is implicit in Tarde's writings ; but
that Professor Baldwin makes it explicit is sufficient testimony to the superior
logic and scientific method of his work. Again, Professor Baldwin finds the
matter or content of social life in thought,[25] while M. Tarde apparently
finds it in beliefs and desires. This, however, is a minor divergence between
the two theories, for Professor

(
725)

Baldwin makes beliefs and desires functions of thought.[26]
Finally, we have to note that Professor Baldwin develops a clear and consistent
theory of the social process as a whole, which Tarde fails to do, however much
he labors, and however much may be implied in what he says. Briefly stated,
Professor Baldwin's theory may be thrown into four propositions, namely : (1)
the matter of social organization is thoughts; (2)
the method of their organization is imitation ; (3) these thoughts originate
with the individual;[27]
(4) later
certain of these thoughts are imitated, and so generalized, by society.[28]

The above, it is believed, is a fair statement of the sociological theories
of M. Tarde and Professor Baldwin, stripped of unnecessary details. Without
denying or belittling in any way the importance of their contribution to
psychological sociology, may we not question the finality of their
interpretation of the process of the social life? Is their description of that
process a faithful picture of reality? Does it adequately explain the social
life, as we know it, on its psychical side? Are there not other elements, other
factors, in the process than imitation, which our authors have overlooked? Are
there not limitations to the imitation theory, however broadly conceived, which
make it profoundly inapplicable in the interpretation of certain phases of the
social life? Finally, is not a deeper interpretation of the social life-process
possible which shall reconcile imitation with other plainly discernible factors
in that process? These are some of the questions which we may legitimately raise
without putting ourselves in the light of captious critics ; and as our
discussion proceeds, answers to some of them may become apparent. We shall
confine ourselves mainly to Professor Baldwin's presentation of the theory,
inasmuch as it is more fully and more logically developed than M. Tarde's, and
rests more upon observed facts.

Passing by the vagueness and "extreme generality" of the term "imitation" as
employed by both our authors—though it is well to note that with Tarde it
denotes a process at some point of its development "conscious and voluntary,"
while with

(
726) Baldwin it is merely the "
circular type of reaction,"[29]
but
still, he seems to think, a "mental" process—the first and most obvious
criticism of the theory is the fact that we do not imitate every-body
indiscriminately ; that we make conscious choice in large measure of the persons
whom we shall imitate—imitating usually only those whom we consider our
superiors or our equals, and imitating our enemies and inferiors only when we
believe that it will be to our advantage to do so. An attempt to explain this
fact is, however, made by both our authors. M. Tarde's explanation is that there
is always a conflict between different suggestions —"an interference between
imitation-rays," to use his own phrase—in the brain of each individual, which is
decided upon either logical or teleological grounds.[30]
Thus the beliefs and desires of the individual, which have been themselves
acquired by imitation, are the basis upon which discrimination is made between
different examples for imitation.[31]
Professor Baldwin's explanation is that we imitate those actions, thoughts, and
expressions which we can assimilate in the organization of our personal selves.[32]
The basis of our choice, he says, is their "fitness for imitative reproduction
and application."[33]
In other words, the
basis of our discrimination is simply the habits of imitation which we have
already set up, since we can assimilate, reproduce, and make use of only that
which is in part already organized into our personality. We imitate, then,
according to Professor Baldwin, simply what we have gotten in the habit of
imitating; for it must be remembered that according to him imitation is the
method by which the personal self becomes organized. Thus, if we have given the
capacity to form habits, the process of imitation itself, when viewed in its
entirety, Professor Baldwin implies, is the explanation of the selective
character of our imitations. This theory is certainly ingenious and

(
727) in accord with some psychological teaching of the present time. That it
does not satisfy all inquiring minds, however, is evident from the fact that
Professor Giddings, in an able review of Professor Baldwin's work,[34]
suggests that the real basis of our discrimination in selecting models for
imitation is the consciousness of similarity or of "kind." We chiefly imitate,
he argues, our similars, especially those who are
like-minded with ourselves ; indeed, we do not receive suggestions at all
from creatures wholly unlike ourselves. Men imitate other men, but show little
or no tendency to imitate sheep. The consciousness of kind, especially of mental
and moral resemblance, evidently comes in to limit and control the process of
imitation; it leads to an instinctive discrimination among possible models for
imitation and to an instinctive selection of those models whom we believe to be
most nearly like ourselves. Therefore Professor Giddings thinks that the
principle of " consciousness of kind" should be recognized as another factor in
the social process, a factor which limits and modifies the action of the
principle of imitation.

The contention seems to us a good one ; but why stop with admitting a single
other factor in our interpretation of the social process? There are manifestly
cases of imitation which the principle "consciousness of kind" does not help to
explain, and this Professor Giddings acknowledges. Why, then, limit the social
process to the working of these two factors ? Are we not dealing all along in
this matter of the discrimination and selection of possible models for imitation
with a series of instinctive impulses, like "consciousness of kind" or
organic sympathy,[35]
which condition and
form the final basis of the process of discrimination and selection in
individual consciousness ?

But this brings us to another objection to Professor Baldwin's theory, which
it will be well to consider before discussing this last question.

Our second criticism of the imitation theory, as developed by M. Tarde and
Professor Baldwin, is that it is impossible to

(
728) understand how a single instinct, "the instinct to imitate," has come
to dominate the whole process of human society, and alone to constitute the
method of all personal and social growth,[36]
while many other instincts are plainly discernible determining the associations
of animals below man. The theory sets up, in the language of Professor Baldwin
himself, "an absolute gulf between man and the animal world in which instinctive
equipment in definite directions is supreme,"[37]
and so violates the " doctrine of development" which since Darwin has been the
major premise of all scientific thought about man. How explain the enormous
development in man of the imitative instinct which the imitation theory
implies ? This Professor Baldwin does not attempt to do, but he evades the
difficulty of his position by denying that the associations of animals
constitute true societies. Animal associations he terms "companies ;" and the
difference between companies and societies, he says, is that, while in the
former the individuals feel and act alike, in the latter the individuals
also think alike.[38] How he gets his knowledge that the individuals of
animal societies or groups do not think alike Professor Baldwin does not
tell us; indeed, the fact that they feel and act alike,
which he admits, would seem to favor the presumption that they in some
measure also think alike, since thought is acknowledged to be a function
of activity. But the historical objection to such a classification, which makes
a break between animal and human societies and estops reasoning from the one to
the other, is even more cogent. As Professor Giddings says :

From the standpoint of the
observer of animal and primitive human societies, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to establish a line of demarcation between the more highly organized
bands of animals, like troops of monkeys, or herds of elephants, or bands of
wild horses, and the simplest hordes of human beings, like Bushmen or Australian
Blackfellows.[39]

Indeed, Professor Baldwin can refuse to consider animal societies only by
denying that they are unified at all on the psychical

(
729) side. If the organization which animal societies reveal is wholly a
physiological matter,[40]
and not also a
matter of feeling, intelligence, and impulse, then Professor Baldwin is
justified in leaving them out of consideration in his attempt to give a
psychological interpretation of the human social process. If, on the contrary,
the unity and organization of animal groups is in some measure psychical, and if
human society be supposed to have arisen out of some pre-human form of
association, then the burden of showing why human society differs from animal
societies in its process of organization rests upon the supporters of the
imitation theory.

Let us consider the case of the social insects—the ants, bees, and wasps—to
bring out our point still clearer. As is well known, these animals exhibit a
marvelous degree of organization in the groups which they form, the division of
labor and the corresponding division of individuals into classes among them
often surpassing that found in human societies of considerable development. From
an objective point of view these groups of insects seem as truly societies as
any human groups. Moreover, we cannot well deny to these creatures some degree
of mental life, for they are known to show, both as individuals and as groups,
considerable power of adaptation in the presence of danger.[41]
Some have even gone so far as to claim that they see among them the beginning of
that process of suggestion and imitation[42]
which M. Tarde and Professor Baldwin make the sole factor in the human social
process. However, it is usually recognized that the organization which colonies
of these insects exhibit is an outcome of certain habits of cooperation which
have become innate in the species through a process of natural selection
in the course of a long period of evolution. In other words, the societies
formed by ants, bees, and wasps are organized upon the basis of instinct. Now,
if instinct plays such a

(
730) r˘le in the organization of sub-human societies, and if human societies
are admittedly genetically related to these, is it not probable that instinctive
impulses have much to do with the organization of human society ; and not simply
one instinctive impulse, the tendency to imitate, but many ? If it be objected
that, in so far as the organization of society is a matter of instinct, it is
physiological and not psychological, the reply is that then all social
organization is physiological, for the tendency to imitate is admitted to be an
instinct.[43]

Another objection to the theory that imitation constitutes the sole method of
social progress comes to light when we consider animal societies. Animal
societies are by no means stationary. The changes which take place in them,
though not readily observable, cannot be questioned. The high degree of
organization of such insect societies as we have just considered is
unquestionably to be regarded as the result of a series of gradual adjustments
made through a long period of evolution and fixed by natural selection. The
organization of sub-human societies would seem, then, to be wholly an outcome of
the process of natural selection, and the changes and progress which they
exhibit, though perhaps in some measure mediated by the process of suggestion
and imitation, seem largely to be due to the working of the same principle. Now,
if natural selection be the method of progress in the societies of the animal
world, is it not reasonable to suppose that it is also in some measure a factor
in the progress of human societies ? "Certainly," a defender of the imitation
theory might reply ; "but natural selection is not a psychical process ; it is
wholly physical and physiological." This position is, however, not tenable. On
the contrary, natural selection is mediated everywhere throughout the higher
stages of animal life by certain psychical processes, and in so far is itself a
psychical process. Thus sexual selection, now quite generally recognized as a
part of the process of natural selection, is largely a conscious process. Even
that form of

(
731) social selection which results from the competition of individuals with
one another for place and honor in society is recognized by Professor Baldwin as
constituting truly a part of the process of natural selection.[44]
There is nothing in Professor Baldwin's position in this regard, therefore, to
prevent his recognition of natural selection as a factor in the human social
process. Indeed, it is to be feared that it is only his ardor for the
recognition of imitation and his desire to make a very complex problem unduly
simple which prevent him from recognizing natural selection in its psychical
aspect as a part of the method of progress of human society co÷rdinate with
imitation.[45]

Our third criticism of the imitation theory of social organization and
progress is, then, that it makes no allowance for the influence of various forms[46]
of
natural selection in controlling, guiding, and supplementing the process of
imitation. Let us take the organization and evolution of the family to
illustrate further our meaning. According to the imitation theory, not only has
our present form of the family come down to us solely by imitation, but changes
in the form of the family in the past have been accomplished by imitative
generalization of some variation, which in turn was an imitative adaptation or
combination of forms already existing. Indeed, Professor Baldwin implies that
the very process of idealizing the family has been essentially a process of
imitation.[47]
On the other hand,
Westermarck[48] and other ethnologists
who have investigated the historical and ethnological material bearing upon the
evolution of the family hold that the present monogamic form of the family is
largely due to a process of natural selection. Other forms of the family have
not persisted, they tell us, because individuals and groups which adopted the
inferior forms have constantly been eliminated in competition with the
individuals and groups

(
732) which adopted the superior form. Moreover, the feelings and impulses
which led to the formation of monogamic unions, having been found favorable to
race survival, have tended more and more to become fixed by heredity, inasmuch
as those individuals who did not possess these feelings and impulses would leave
no offspring to survive. Thus the picture of the evolution of the family which
we obtain from ethnology shows us, not merely the continued imitation of a
primitive pattern, but also the constant
elimination of those who do not conform to the pattern, plus the
fixing in the race of those instinctive impulses which make conformity to the
pattern easy.

Almost any practical social problem would serve for further illustration. Let
us take the drink problem. Many social thinkers hold that families which have
the appetite for the stronger and more harmful alcoholic drinks are being
steadily eliminated, and that a state of society will soon result in which there
will survive practically no individuals with the " drink-crave." This theory
seems to get some inductive support from the fact that those countries which
have had the longest experience with alcoholic beverages have little or no
drunkenness. In this case, then, as in the evolution of the family, the process
of natural selection appears to come in to limit and control the process of
imitation. Like the "consciousness of kind," it serves to make the process of
imitation definite or within certain limits. Men imitate one act rather than
another, and one mental attitude rather than another, because it is of
life-saving advantage to do so. Moreover, and most important of all, the
individuals who do not select the right models for imitation are constantly
eliminated, and thus natural selection fixes in the race a larger and larger
number of instinctive impulses which tend to discharge themselves along one line
rather than along another.

The whole drift of our argument against the imitation theory of social order
and progress must now be apparent. It divorces the social process from the
life-process as a whole. It takes no sufficient account of those deeper
characteristics of species and race which come to light in the psychical life of
the individual and in the psychical processes of society. It matters

(
733) not whether we name these race characteristics "instincts," "impulses,"
or what not. The important thing is to recognize that race heredity has fixed in
us, and is tending more and more to fix in us, through a process of evolution by
natural selection, certain co÷rdinations of nerve cells and muscle fibers which
tend to discharge in one way rather than in another, and which make personal and
social development tend to take one direction rather than another. But to
recognize this truth would be fatal to the imitation theory of individual and
social development, even in the moderate form in which it is stated by Professor
Baldwin. Accordingly, we find Professor Baldwin, almost alone among eminent
modern psychologists, refusing to recognize the importance of the innate or
instinctive in mental development. James,[49]
Dewey, Wundt,[50]
and lately H. R. Marshall [51]
have all
elaborated arguments in the spirit of the doctrine of descent to show the
importance of " instinct," or of "innate impulses," in the mental life of man as
well as in that of the animals beneath him. But Professor Baldwin says : " The
human infant has very few instincts, and these are almost all fitted to secure
organic satisfaction."[52] These instincts, plus the " magnificent
capacity of learning" by imitation, he thinks, are sufficient to account for the
growth of the child into the fully equipped
socius.[53]And they are,
if the imitation theory of personal development is correct.

But it is evident that Professor Baldwin is using the term "instinct" in
quite a different sense from that in which it is employed by the writers above
mentioned, and in which it has been used in this paper. With him "instincts" are
those " ready-made activities " which manifest themselves in the child at birth
or soon after, and which are best exemplified among the

(
734) lower forms of animal life, particularly among the insects.[54]
With the psychologists we have named, however, the "instinctive " is practically
identified with the " innate," and " instincts " are simply " innate impulses "
which tend to discharge themselves in one way rather than in another; they are "
inborn
capacities to act with reference to biological ends ;"[55]
they are that part of our race heredity which manifests itself psychically, and
hence they may be viewed as " species " or " race habits " in contrast with the
acquired habits of individuals. In criticism of the narrower view of
instinct adopted by Professor Baldwin it may well be urged that the " hard and
fast " type of instinct is rarely met with among the higher animals.[56]
Such animals as the dog, cat, and horse, for example, have almost no instincts
which cannot be modified, even utterly changed, by training. Again, "ready-made
activities" which are manifest soon after birth are comparatively few among all
higher animals ; many of their instincts do not ripen until after physical
maturity is reached. But, as we said above, the question is not at all one of
terminology. This cannot be too strongly emphasized with reference to the
content of our criticism. It matters not whether we name the psychical aspects
of race heredity " instincts " or not. The important thing is whether we
recognize or not the part which the "innate," the species or race habit, plays
in the mental life of individuals and in the social process. It would be unfair
to Professor Baldwin to say that he in no way recognizes the importance of the
innate save as has been indicated. Formally he does;[57]
but not in such a manner as to affect his

(
735) conclusions, so far as we can see. He in no way embodies such
recognition, for example, in his conclusions regarding social organization and
progress. It must be remembered, too, that this is an impersonal criticism, a
criticism of a theory as popularly accepted, not of a man or of a book. If it
were the latter, generosity would compel us to observe that important
modifications of Professor Baldwin's conclusions might be found implied in his
discussion. Indeed, it would not be difficult to construct from implications
scattered throughout his work an argument for the very position taken in this
paper.[58]

The truth for which we are contending, then, is that the process of imitation
is at every turn limited, controlled, and modified by a series of instinctive
impulses which have become relatively fixed in the individual through a process
of evolution by natural selection. Such "instincts" include not only organic
sympathy and antipathy (consciousness of resemblance or non-resemblance) , the
economic instinct, and the like, but a whole series of innate tendencies and
mental attitudes, down even to certain innate attitudes toward the universe
(instinctive religion) and toward social organization (instinctive morality). If
the process of growth by imitation were not limited and modified by innate
tendencies, we should expect children of different races, when reared in the
same cultural environment, to develop the same general mental and moral
characteristics. But the negro child, even when reared in a white family under
the most favorable conditions, fails to take on the mental and moral
characteristics of the Caucasian race. His mental attitudes toward persons and
things, toward organized society, toward life, and toward religion never become
quite the same as those of the white. His natural instincts, it is true, may be
modified by training, and perhaps indefinitely modified in the course of
generations ; but the race habit of a thousand generations or more is not
lightly set aside by the voluntary or enforced imitation of visible models, and
there is always a strong tendency to reversion. The reappearance of voodooism
and fetichism among the

(
736) negroes of the South, though surrounded by Christian influences, is
indeed to be regarded as due not so much to the preservation of some primitive
copy of such religious practices brought over from Africa as to the innate
tendency of the negro mind to take such attitudes toward nature and the universe
as tend to develop such religions. But the influence of innate tendencies upon
the process of personal and social development is manifest not merely when we
consider those broad differences between men which we term racial ; it is in
evidence also to some extent when we consider national differences, for these
are by no means wholly imitative differences. It is even to be seen in family
traits ; for any group which remains sufficiently isolated long enough to
develop by natural selection physiological peculiarities may also develop innate
psychical tendencies of its own. Again, it is plainly discernible in the
pathological phenomena of the social life ; the " instinctive criminal " and the
"hereditary pauper " are such, not because of the contagion of vice, crime, and
shiftlessness which certain models in society may furnish, but because inborn
tendencies lead them to seek such models for imitation rather than others ;
because they naturally gravitate to a life of crime or pauperism.[59]
Finally, and most important of all, is the influence upon social organization of
those innate tendencies which are common to the whole human species—to human
nature. These are especially liable to the overlooked, because they vary so
slightly in individuals and races. The instinct to imitate is admittedly one of
these. But there are many others. Who can doubt that such universal tendencies
as the tendency to store up a food-supply, to co÷perate in obtaining a
food-supply or in repelling the attacks of enemies, to form enduring family
groups, to live in communities, to render obedience to elders and authorities,
to judge some kinds of action right and other kinds wrong, to communicate by
means of articulate sounds, to worship supernatural beings, etc., have long been
innate, instinctive, in our species, and are truly matters of race heredity? And
if they are instinctive tendencies of the same sort as the tendency to

(
737) imitate, are they not equally with imitation factors in the social
process ?

"Yes," some defender of the imitation theory may possibly say; " but your
whole argument misses the point. Imitation, as Professor Baldwin clearly states,
is simply the functional method of personal development and of social
organization. There are other factors, doubtless, in social and individual
growth, but the method of development remains the same in any case. The negro
child may never take on qualitatively the same mental attitudes as the white ;
but in so far as he progresses toward the mental status of the white, the
method of his progress is imitation."But this is manifestly
the very position against which we have been arguing from the beginning of our
criticism ; it is just this form of statement of the theory to which we object.
Imitation is, to be sure, always, in form at least, to be seen in the method of
development ; but it is imitation multiplied into some other factor or factors
which is the method of development. If it be admitted that the process of
imitation is limited, controlled, and guided by numerous instinctive impulses,
or instincts, then it must also be admitted that the unfolding of these
instincts is a part of the method of growth, both personal and social.
Imitation, then, is but one aspect of the method of personal progress and
of social organization. It is an aspect which is in form, perhaps, always
present; but there are other aspects of the method of progress, and these must
not be neglected for the construction of sound social theory. The method of
progress of the negro child may appear to be a process of imitation ; but deep
beneath this outward aspect the currents of race heredity are controlling his
progress and determining its outcome.

We have said that imitation is an aspect of the process of development which
is, in form at least, always present. Yet we have to notice that in many
instances it is present only in form. A kitten brought up in isolation
from its kind, if given a spool or a thimble to play with, goes through all the
movements necessary to catch a mouse or a bird. It thus spontaneously develops
in its play those faculties which guarantee to it later its food-supply.[60]
Manifestly there is no real imitation here; for

(
738) there have been no models to copy from. What we have is simply
hereditary repetition, the unfolding of a race habit, an instinct. In other
words, a co÷rdination of nerve cells and muscle fibers, which has become fixed
by heredity through natural selection on account of its importance to the
species, simply discharges itself in the presence of the appropriate stimulus.
This constantly happens in the development of all animals, and so, it is
reasonable to suppose, in the process of human development. Thus, much which
seems to us imitation in human society may be imitation in form only. The social
philosopher in viewing society objectively sees that nearly all the activities
of men are imitative in their outcome, and he therefore falls easily into
the fallacy of believing that they are imitative in their process. That
this is a fallacious method of reasoning illustrations like the above make
evident. Apparently, then, Professor Baldwin and M. Tarde have been guilty of
committing what Professor James calls "the psychologists' fallacy,"[61]
in that they seem to have judged of the nature of a process by the nature of its
outcome. Our last objection to the imitation theory may well be, therefore, that
it rests upon a foundation of fallacious reasoning, and will probably not be
supported by a more accurate and less superficial investigation of the facts.

Before concluding, two points which have become tolerably clear in the course
of our discussion may profitably be noticed. The first is in regard to the true
function of imitation in individual and social development. If the positions
taken have been in any degree correct, it is evident, as Professor Dewey says,
that "imitation comes in to mediate the natural tendency."[62]
It helps forward, makes easy, development in certain directions wherein society
has furnished models ; it thus secures social adjustments with greater quickness
and ease, and assures greater uniformity of thought and action throughout a
society. The function of the imitation instinct is, then, to mediate the
development of other natural tendencies with reference to the conditions of

(
739) social life; and as such a mediator in the adjustment of
individuals to each other and to society at large imitation plays a great r˘le
in human affairs.

The second point has reference to the matter or substance of social
organization. If the interpretation of the social life implied in this paper is
at all true; if the social process is, indeed, any part of the life-process,
then, in the words of Professor Dewey,[63]
"society cannot be adequately conceived as an organization of thoughts."
"Thoughts are relevant to the life-process — to functioning activities." Thought
functions to control and mediate activities on their universal side, while
feeling functions to evaluate activities on their individual side. An
organization of thoughts or feelings in the abstract is, therefore, impossible,
as it presupposes an organization of activities, just as all psychical
organization presupposes physiological organization. There is no tendency toward
the organization of thoughts (or of feelings) save as there is need of the
organization of activities in the process of living. Indeed, the organization of
thought exists because of the organizing or organization of functional
activities which must be controlled. The family, for example, presents an
organized life ; it is, as has often been said, "society in miniature." But it
is impossible to conceive of the family as simply an organization of thoughts—or
even of feelings; it is primarily an organization of activities ; and just
because it is an organization of activities it develops a wonderful organization
of thoughts and feelings, making the unity of its life on the psychical side
complete. So of society; primarily an organization of activities, a "functional
interdependency," it becomes in time an organization of feeling, and finally an
organization of thought. Why Professor Baldwin holds that the matter or
substance of social organization consists of thoughts[64]
is difficult to understand, unless he conceives this position to be more
strictly in accord with the abstract requirements of the imitation theory of
social organization. Herein we agree with him. But in so far as we recognize
that the social process is linked with the whole life-process, we must

(
740) recognize that the substance of social organization consists of
activities as well as of thoughts and feelings ; in brief, that society
organized is life organized.

To sum up : Our criticisms of the theory that imitation is the method of
social organization and progress are, in detail: (1) it cannot sufficiently
explain the manifest limitations in the process of imitation without introducing
other factors in the method of development ; (2) it creates a gulf between human
society and the societies of the animal world which are organized upon a basis
of instinct; (3) it makes no allowance for the process of natural selection to
bring about gradual changes in human society ; (4) it rests upon no sufficient
basis of ascertained facts, but has apparently been built up by a fallacious
method of reasoning. In general, our criticism of the imitation theory is that
it makes the social process something apart from the life-process. It does not
link, in any definite way, the forces which are molding human society today with
the forces which have shaped evolution in the past. Both as M. Tarde and as
Professor Baldwin conceive it, the social process is a process which might very
well go on in a company of disembodied spirits—in a vacuum! In this sense the
imitation theory of the social process is abstract ; it makes no sufficient
reference to the concrete conditions of human life to give a faithful
description of the social reality. In this sense, also, the theory is mechanical
; men might be copying machines and still reproduce the social process. For
these reasons, finally, the theory is impractical; the economist, the political
scientist, and the moralist, on the one hand, can make but little use of the
imitation theory in explaining the phases of the social life with which they
deal ; and, on the other hand, the practical worker, the legislator, the social
reformer, and the philanthropist can find but little help in their work from a
knowledge of the theory. Only the recognition of the fact that life is
the subject-matter of social theory, and that human society is an outcome of
the entire process of life from its beginning to the present, can create a
sound, sane, helpful social philosophy ; and to this end social psychology
exists.

(
741)

Social psychology must keep close to life if it is truly to interpret life.
Its standpoint must be one of function—that of a developing life-process. The
"interdependence of function," which begins in the biological and ends in the
ethical stage of human development, is the fundamental fact of all
sociopsychological phenomena. The working unities which organisms formed, at
first unconsciously, but finally consciously and purposefully, to sustain and
develop the life-process, have alone made possible the development of that
intercerebral process which in humanity we rightly term, by way of
preeminence, the
social process. The co÷rdination of functioning activities into working
unities larger than the individual organism,[65]
then, viewed in the light of evolution, explains all socio-psychical phenomena,
including suggestion, imitation, consciousness of kind, and the like. Upon this
basis a deeper interpretation of the social process which shall reconcile the
conflicting theories of the present seems to us possible; while the recognition
of the working unity, "the social co÷rdination," as the fundamental fact with
which it deals, should make social psychology at once concrete and practical.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

Notes

Read at the meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, Lincoln,
Neb., January 2, 1901.

Mental Development in the Child and the Race, 1895; Social and
Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, 1897.

Social Laws, p. 47.

Ibid., p. 39.

Les Lois de l'Imitation, p. 95.

La Logique sociale, p. 76.

Social Laws, p. 56.

Ibid., p. 41.

Ibid., pp. 38, 39.

Ibid., pp. 39-41.

Ibid., pp. 40, 41.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., pp. 133-5, 202-4.

Les Lois de l'Imitation, p. 18.

Ibid., p. 24.

Social Laws, p. 61.

Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, p. 58.

Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, p. 100.

Ibid., p. 100.

lbid., p. 507.

Ibid., P. 476

Ibid., pp. 478, 479, 507-9.

Ibid., pp. 487-506.

Ibid., p. 508.

Ibid., p. 488.

Ibid., pp. 455 ff.

Ibid., pp. 466-8.

Mental Development in the Child and the Race, pp. 217, 264-8, 282,
283, 350, 487.

Social Laws, pp. 64, 65, 135, 136.

M. TARDE's book, La Logique sociale, is largely given up to
a discussion of this question why one copy is imitated rather than another. We
must refer to it rather than attempt to give his argument in full. He seems to
me, however, to arrive at a formulation of the problem rather than at a true
genetic explanation.

Which Professor Giddings identifies with "consciousness of kind" in the
third edition of his
Principles of Sociology.

For Professor Baldwin's argument in this connection see his Mental
Development in the Child and the Race, chaps. ixľxii.

Social and Ethical Interpretations, p. 237.

Ibid., pp. 486, 487.

Democracy and Empire, p. 38.

This Professor Baldwin appears to assert, Social and Ethical
Interpretations,
p. 476; but in this case the criticism given at the end of the next
paragraph would apply.

Cf. LUBBOCK, Ants, Bees, and Wasps.

Cf. GIDDINGS, Principles of Sociology, p. 143

For Professor Baldwin's argument that the tendency to imitate is a true
instinct see his
Mental Development in the Child and the Race, pp. 261, 290, 356 ; and
also p. v of his preface to GROOS,
Play of Animals.

Social and Ethical Interpretations, p. 181.

This seems to be plainly implied in Bagehot's pioneer discussion of the
social importance of imitation in his Physics and Politics, pp. 89-111.

I. e., those which manifest themselves psychically.

Social and Ethical Interpretations, pp. 296 ff.

The History of Human Marriage.

See his famous chapter on " Instinct " (pp. 383—441)in Vol. II
of his
Principles of Psychology.

See Lecture XXVII in his Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology.

See chaps. ii and iii in his Instinct and Reason. Compare also the
chapter on " Play and Instinct " in GROOS, Play of Animals, especially
pp. 66-76.

Social and Ethical Interpretations, p. 62.

Ibid., pp. 58, 59.

'Social and Ethical Interpretations, pp. 61, 62. Professor
Baldwin seems to adopt in the main Professor C. Lloyd Morgan's conception of
instinct, which makes instinct the "crystallized form" of innate capacity or
impulse. See MORGAN, Habit and Instinct.

A definition formulated by Professor G. H. Mead. Compare Schneider's
definition: "By instinct we understand the impulse to an action whose end the
individual is unconscious of, but which nevertheless furthers the attainment
of that end."

We cannot but remark Professor Baldwin's inconsistency in arguing that so
indefinite and variable a thing as the tendency to imitate is a true instinct,
while he holds that definiteness and invariability are the marks of all
instinctive activity.

See especially the chapter on the person's instincts and emotions (chap.
vi) in
Social and Ethical Interpretations.

The argument which Professor Baldwin uses against Le Bon's " mob theory of
society" might very well be turned against the imitation theory itself.

It is unnecessary to point out that this is practically the unanimous
conclusion of all experts engaged in the study of these classes.

Cf. GROOS, Play of Animals, especially pp. 130 ff.

Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 196.

See the valuable review of PROFESSOR BALDWIN'S Social and
Ethical Interpretations
by PROFESSOR DEWEY in the New World, September, 1898.

New World, September, 1898.

Social and Ethical Interpretations, pp. 487-506.

See the writer's paper on "The Fundamental Fact in Social Psychology," in
the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, May, 1899.

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