Retrospect and Prospect
WORKS BY
CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN
^x
The Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1660-1783.
The Influence of Sea Power upon the French
Revolution and Empire. Two volumes.
The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the
Sea Power of Great Britain. Two volumes.
The Life of Nelson. Popular edition. One
volunte.
The Interest of America in Sea, Power,
Present and Future.
Lessons of the War with Spain, and other
Articles.
The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon
International Policies.
Types of Naval Officers, with Some Re-
marks on the Development of Naval
Warfare during the Eighteenth Century.
Retrospect and Prospect. Studies in Inter-
national Relations, Naval and Politi-
cal.
Retrospect ^ Prospect
Studies in International Relations
Naval and Political
By
A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D.
Captain, United States Na<vy
Author of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1660-1783," " The Influence of Sea Power
upon the French Revolution and
Empire,' ' etc.
Boston
Little, Brown, and Company
1902
: :
W\v
b
Copyright, 1901,
By Doubleday, Page, & Co.
Copyright, 1902,
By Judge Co.
Copyright, 1902,
By The S. S. McClure Co.
Copyright, 1902,
By Frederick A. Richardson.
Copyright, 1902,
By A. T. Mahan.
/
All rights reserved.
Published October, 1902.
THE LIBRAffY OF
\ CONGRESS,
Two ComeB Received
OCT. 18 19G?
CL.A88 0L *X* No.
COPY B,
university press • john wilson
and son • Cambridge, u. s. a.
PREFACE
IN their main features, the following essays
are in direct sequence to those of the
author's previous volumes, "The Interest of
America in Sea Power," and " The Problem
of Asia." The title article, Retrospect and
Prospect, in its scope serves as a connecting
link between the present and their prede-
cessors ; indicating the continuity of interest
and gradual development of the several sub-
jects dealt with. As the future has passed
into the present, it has brought with it the
unfolding of inevitable policy, evolving fresh
problems, that are in essence only new phases
of a steady progression, which in its course is
making history.
As has hitherto usually been the case, the
articles in this book for the most part have
been written, not of the author's own initiative,
but in response to the request of editors. Such
significance as may attach to this is due to the
fact that the work consequently indicates, not
vi Preface
the trend of a single mind, but the outlook of
those whose business is to study the current
of events, to watch the tide of popular interest
and feeling, and thus to provide for readers
information or discussion upon matters toward
which general curiosity is seen to be turning.
It is perfectly consistent with the general tend-
ency thus avouched, and even illustrative of it,
that the series, if it may be called such in vir-
tue of a consecutiveness rather essential than
formal, has led out from considerations nar-
rowly American, with which the papers began,
into the broad field of world policies; for
thither our nation also is indisputably and
irresistibly moving.
Herein lies whatever of lasting value or
interest may attach to the subjects treated, or
the treatment given. In retrospect, and from
this point of view, it now seems a kind of happy
forecast that the first of the long succession,
written over twelve years ago, began with the
words, " Indications are not wanting of an
approaching change in the thoughts and policy
of Americans as to their relations with the
world outside their own borders." * The pres-
age has been fulfilled, far beyond any con-
sciousness then possible to the writer.
1 Interest of America in Sea Power, p. 3.
Preface vii
I desire to return my cordial thanks, for the
permission here to reprint, to the several pro-
prietors and editors of the periodicals in which
the articles first appeared. I owe to them not
only the recognition of their courtesy in this
respect, but the further acknowledgment that,
save for their intervention, probably no single
one would have been undertaken. The name
of each magazine, with the date of publication,
is attached to the title in the Table of Contents.
The dates at the head of the articles show the
time of writing.
A. T. MAHAN.
September, 1902.
>
CONTENTS
i
Page
Retrospect and Prospect 3
By Courtesy of The World's Work, February, 1902
II
Conditions Determining the Naval Expansion of
the United States 39
By Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly, October, 2, 1902
III
The Influence of the South African War upon
the Prestige of the British Empire ... 57
By Courtesy of The National Review, December, 1901
IV
Motives to Imperial Federation 89
By Courtesy of The National Review and the International
Monthly, May, 1902
V
Considerations Governing the Disposition of i 0t s'
Navies 139
By Courtesy of The National Review, July, 1902
x Contents
VI
Page
The Persian Gulf and International Relations . 209^^
By Courtesy of The National Review, September, 1902
VII
The Military Rule of Obedience . . . . . . 255
By Courtesy of The National Review and International
Monthly, March, 1902
VIII
Admiral Sampson 287
By Courtesy of McClure's Magazine, July, 1902, and the
Fortnightly Review, August, 1902
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
December, 1901
IT has often been remarked, as a curious
coincidence, that momentous events, direc-
tive of the fortunes of nations and of the
world, are found to cluster about the end of
our conventional centuries. The final decade
of the fifteenth saw both the discovery of
America and its complement in maritime
achievement, the reaching of India by the
passage round the Cape of Good Hope. It
witnessed the consummation of the Spanish
monarchy by the fall of the last of the Moorish
kingdoms, at the very instant that the new
possessions in America constituted the com-
mencements of the Spanish Empire. During
it occurred also, in 1494, the first of the
organized French invasions of Italy, concern-
ing which a master of history has observed
that it marked the end of the middle ages, —
and so the beginnings of modern history, —
because it put forth a scheme of aggrandize-
Retrospect and Prospect
ment foreign to mediaeval conceptions. France
and Spain, in rivalry, the scope of which was
not yet realized by either, were preparing to
attempt the extension of their power over the
rest of Europe.
In this effort Spain first succeeded ; but, as
the sixteenth century drew to its close, the
annihilation of the Armada, in 1588, gave re-
sounding proof of her inefficiency as a maritime
nation. This defect had for its near result the
success of the Dutch in their struggle for
independence ; but in it was necessarily in-
volved the ultimate downfall of the primacy
of Spain among nations, and of her colonial
Empire, then apparently untouched. The
years remaining to 1600 were spent by her in
continued strife with the seamen of England
and Holland, the predestined destroyers of her
international predominance. To this position
France succeeded, reaching the height of her
power in the latter half of the seventeenth
century; but in 1688 the English Revolution,
which decided finally the conflict between
King and Parliament, thus shaping the future
of another Empire, imparted also the impulse
for the descent of France from the eminence
Retrospect and Prospect
she had attained. The coming of William of
Orange to the throne entailed as a necessary
consequence the accession of England to the
two general wars of the Continent against
Louis XIV. These, by their drain upon his
resources, and the miseries undergone by his
kingdom, sapped the foundations of the abso-
lutism upon which the greatness of France had
been erected, and precipitated the nation upon
the path to decay and revolution.
Great Britain at the same epoch, and through
the same causes, was urged further along the
way that led her at the end of the war of the
Spanish Succession, in 171 3, to the unques-
tioned and unapproached naval supremacy in
which lay the germ of her expansion that was
to be. Her progress in territorial and com-
mercial aggrandizement was the dominant
feature of the eighteenth century, which, though
one of chequered strife, was marked upon the
whole by the ascent of Great Britain, and still
more by the decisive decline of France. As
it drew to its close, Louis XVI., in 1788, by
summoning the States General to meet after
an intermission of many generations, gave the
signal for the French Revolution. This, like
Retrospect and Prospect
its English predecessor, brought France and
Great Britain into a prolonged warfare which
divides into two periods, the Republic and the
Empire, corresponding to the last two wars
of Louis XIV. At the peace of 1815 Great
Britain stood in influence at the head of ; the
states of European civilization, with a secured
colonial empire, which, in the final decade]of
the century, has involved her in a war the most
momentous she has known since Waterloo,
and probably productive of permanent results
to her imperial constitution.
More striking outwardly, even if not more
actually decisive, were other events that oc-
curred between 1890 and 1900. The disap-
pearance of the colonial empire of Spain after
four hundred years of continuous life, although
but the close of a long process of decline, had
singular dramatic effect. The once colossal
structure that so long was crumbling had yet
retained a phantom grandeur, a relic of real
greatness, which enhanced the majesty of the
final fall; for in the days of her supremacy
Spain had over England an ascendency which
France never attained, and the vastness of her
power made upon the imagination of English-
Retrospect and Prospect
men of that day an impression, traces of which
long, remained and have been transmitted to
their descendants in the United States. In
history, too, few events have been told us with
as great narrative force as the conquest of
Granada, and the early contact of Spain with
America. Upon them the genius of American
writers has dwelt with peculiar sympathy, both
from their intrinsic romantic interest and their
close connection with' the beginnings of our
own country. In her past, thus told, Spain
has an immortality resembling that of Rome ;
and like her she survives and ever will survive
in the tales of her heroic prime, and in the
enduring impress of her speech and national
characteristics left upon great part of the
peoples of the new world.
The loss of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Phil-
ippines, the last remnants of a former vast do-
minion, is an event which, so far as Spain is
involved, concerns the past only. At most,
if it has for her a future, it is one as yet not
even vaguely indicated. As a matter of world
interests, its effect upon her is part of the
retrospect. From the same point of view the
future of that catastrophe lies in the influence
8 Retrospect and Prospect
it is to exert upon the prospective course of
the United States, upon her internal consti-
tutional development and her external policy.
Not only in the lost possessions of Spain has
the old order yielded, giving place to the new.
To the former mother country, forced back
upon herself, to seek in the organization of
her abundant internal resources the spring of
a new life, it may yet prove a cause of national
regeneration, the precursor of re-entrance at
some future day upon international power rest-
ing on more solid foundations. Upon the
United States it has imposed the necessity of
reconsidering some of the postulates that were
supposed fundamental and irreversible in the
scheme of her national existence, and of her
international relations. The Bible of Ameri-
can political tradition has had new light thrown
upon it, and has had to submit to new criti-
cism, based upon truths newly apprehended
under the pressure of unforeseen conditions.
It would not be unprecedented that popular
conception of the meaning of ideas and phrases,
formulated and transmitted by our ancestors,
should be found imperfect or exaggerated under
the clearer appreciation of a later day. The
Retrospect and Prospect
authority hitherto attaching to the popular
understanding may in such case have to be
transferred to the correcter signification which
advancing experience shall have revealed ; and
obligation, true obedience, will then be seen
due to the spirit not to the letter. This would
be but the repetition of a very old story in the
political as in the religious history of mankind.
Whenever it happens, however, the transition
of thought and action consequent upon such
riper views affects both inner principle and
outward action. It must therefore bring shock
to those who are too old to change ; and when
compressed within a very few years, as our
recent experience has been, the blow is not
broken by the slow reconcilement which suc-
cessive steps effect. It is not surprising that
the recoil on the part of those thus dismayed
has been intense, and, it must be added, marked
less by reasonableness of argument than by
extravagance of expression ; by tenacious insist-
ence upon the traditional letter and stubborn
rejection of evident modifying circumstance.
Yet, although in point of duration of time
the change has been too sudden, or at least
too rapid, to allow the process of gradual
io Retrospect and Prospect
mental adjustment which obviates moral dis-
tress, it has not been without its marked suc-
cessive stages which might have prepared an
attentive onlooker for the final outcome. I
have been told that at the time of the regener-
ation of the material of the navy, and the lay-
ing down of modern ships, some fifteen years
ago, a sagacious political student remarked
that the measure would be followed by expan-
sive results resembling those we have recently
witnessed. There was here, I think, the error
of taking one link in a chain of events for a
final cause; but nevertheless the observer
showed that having a clue in his hand he
could, as they say at sea, " underrun " it, till
it led him to the unseen point at which it for
the moment terminated. That mysterious
thread of purpose which runs through the
progression of history comes to the surface
from time to time in some marks of evident
preparation. These may be construed, accord-
ing to individual bias, either as providential,
or merely as symptomatic of a tendency already
formed, and which unconsciously manifests
itself in particular actions conducive to its
general end. Whichever view be adopted, the
Retrospect and Prospect 1 1
opportune renewal of the navy is to my appre-
hension not a cause, but one in a series of
events which has constituted the general un-
witting advance of the nation towards wider
influence. It was the more notable because
without visible immediate urgency, save that
of repairing a cumulative neglect which had
resulted in atrophy. No cloud on the political
horizon commanded it; but when the cloud
afterwards arose the navy was there.
The foregoing remarks are prefatory to the
following brief survey of incidents in our own
history, which have impressed upon the final
decade of the nineteenth century a significance
for us, resembling those noted in its prede-
cessors, prophetic of issues not yet fully to be
foreseen. It w r as undertaken at the request of
the editor of the World's Work, — not by my
own initiative. Thus much is said in explana-
tion of an attempt which of my proper motion
would scarcely have been made; for the hasty
glance which it caused over my occasional
magazine papers, during the ten years in ques-
tion, gave me an unexpected start as I realized
from them the singularly different points of
view necessarily occupied by an American, at
1 2 Retrospect and Prospect
their beginning and at their end, because of
changes only partly foreshadowed at the earlier
day when I began to write.
It was in August, 1890, that the editor of
the Atlantic Monthly, Mr. Horace E. Scudder,
wrote to ask from me what proved to be the
first magazine article I ever published. He
referred to a very brief and casual remark in
my book then recently out — "The Influence
of Sea Power upon History"- — touching the
exposed condition of our Pacific Coast in the
event of an isthmian canal being made. I
had quoted in that connection the expression
of a French admiral to me, during a cruise
then recent, that in our " little corner " of the
world we did not need the military and naval
preparation incumbent upon the nations of
Europe. To this I added, " Yet should that
little corner be invaded by a new commercial
route through the isthmus, the United States
in her turn may have the rude awakening of
those who have abandoned their share in the
common birthright of all people — the sea."
This reflection, which followed upon a sum-
mary of the consequences to Spain — and, it
may be added, to France — of a like neglect,
Retrospect and Prospect 1 3
had caught Mr. Scudder's attention, and he
wrote to know whether I could give the
Atlantic a paper upon the following general
argument. " The centre of maritime opera-
tions has shifted once from the Mediterranean
to the Atlantic. It may pass in the distant
future (my italics) to the Pacific. Meanwhile,
would not the completion of a canal, taken
with the British movements at the terminal
of the Canadian Pacific, the occidentalizing of
Japan, and the growth of Australasia, im-
mensely quicken the process? and, if so, will
not the Pacific Coast of our country become
a far more important factor in our historical
development than it has been ? " It will be
observed that Mr. Scudders suggestion, con-
sciously or unconsciously to himself, tran-
scended the bounds of United States' interests,
and embraced in its scope the politics of the
world.
The canal as yet is not, though it has
very measurably advanced through the tedious
stages that precede undertakings the impor-
tance of which is rather national than corporate,
and which therefore do not find their support
in private enterprise ; but how much of what
14 Retrospect and Prospect
is here outlined has passed from the realm of
speculation to that of action? and how little
distant does that future now appear as com-
pared to the anticipations of 1890? In writing
on these themes in those days one felt that,
while the chain of reasoning was eminently
logical, yet there was a lack of solid foundation;
that though argumentation were sound, premise
was perhaps mistaken ; and that when indulg-
ing in such forecasts one was in the fantastic
sphere familiarized to us by Mr. Edward
Bellamy and others. But what events have
since happened, bringing the abstract con-
ceptions of theorists and extremists, as they
then seemed, down to earth in very concrete
realization ! What once were visions are now
accepted as solid present matters of course by
our very practical nation. They have almost
ceased to excite vivid interest, because of a
familiarity which eliminates surprise. The
condition, however, if no longer novel, is one
so substantial that it can never again in our
day pass out of sight, or out of national con-
sideration.
Since Mr. Scudder wrote, the occidentaliza-
tion of Japan, in methods although not in
Retrospect and Prospect 1 5
national spirit, — which changes much more
slowly, — has been fully demonstrated to an
astonished world by the war of 1894 with
China. It is one of the incidents of the clos-
ing nineteenth century. To this achievement
in the military sphere, in the practice of war
which Napoleon called the science of barba-
rians, must be added the development of civil
institutions that has resulted in the concession
to Japan of all international dignity and privi-
lege; and consequently of a control over the
administration of justice among foreigners
within her borders, not heretofore obtained by
any other Oriental State. It has thus become
evident that the weight of Japan in the inter-
national balances depends not upon the quality
of her achievement, which has been shown to
be excellent, but upon the gross amount of
her power. Moreover, while in wealth and
population, with the resources dependent upon
them, she may be deficient, — though rapidly
growing, — her geographical position relatively
to the Eastern centre of interest, and her ad-
vantage of insularity, go far to compensate such
defect. These confer upon her as a factor in
the Eastern problem an influence resembling
1 6 Retrospect and Prospect
in kind, if not equalling in degree, that which
Great Britain has held and still holds in the
international relations centring around Europe,
the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean.
Yet the change in Japan, significant as it
is and influential upon the great problem of
the Pacific and Asia, is less remarkable and
less important than that which has occurred
in the United States. If in the Orient a
nation may be said to have been born in a day,
even so the event is less sudden and less revo-
lutionary than the conversion of spirit and of
ideals — the new birth — which has come over
our own country. In this are evident a rapid-
ity and a thoroughness which bespeak impulse
from an external source, rather than any con-
scious set process of deliberation, of self-deter-
mination within, such as has been that of Japan
in her recognition and adoption of material
improvements forced upon her attention in
other peoples. No man or group of men can
pretend to have guided and governed our
people in the adoption of a new policy, the
acceptance of which has been rather instinc-
tive — I would prefer to say inspired — than
reasoned. There is just this difference be-
Retrospect and Prospect 1 7
tween Japan and ourselves, the two most
changed of peoples within the last half-century.
She has adopted other methods; we have re-
ceived another purpose. The one conversion
is material, the other spiritual. When we
talk about expansion we are in the realm of
ideas. The material addition of expansion —
the acreage, if I may so say — is trivial com-
pared with our previous possessions, or with
the annexations by European states within a
few years. The material profit otherwise, the
national gain to us, is at best doubtful. What
the nation has gained in expansion is a regen-
erating idea, an uplifting of the heart, a seed
of future beneficent activity, a going out of
self into the world to communicate the gift it
has so bountifully received.
In this connection, and in emphatic contrast
of past with present, how very apt is the ex-
pression of the French admiral, our " little
corner," — the Jack Horner of nations. How
accurately did the phrase then represent our
own estimate, and that of the outer world,
concerning our political and international ex-
posure, responsibilities, and duties, in days
when the ideas, imperialism and anti-imperial-
1 8 Retrospect and Prospect
ism, had scarcely received formulation. I re-
member that imperialism had not long before
been associated in my mind with certain vague
impressions of Mr. Blaine and his supposed
projects. As far as my own views went, I
might say I was up to 1885 traditionally an
anti-imperialist; but by 1890 the study of the
influence of sea power and its kindred expan-
sive activities upon the destiny of nations had
converted me, and my new faiths, thus origi-
nated, colored the first of my writings, as they
have continued to do the rest.
The natural tendency of the line of thought
which leads up to the appreciation of sea
power and to the vision of expansion of
national influences — rather than of national
possessions — when acting upon a person in-
heriting Anglo-Saxon political traditions, is in
commercial matters towards freedom of trade.
Mr. Blaine, a protectionist by antecedents and
by party affiliation, as his mind expanded to
embrace the idea of an American system, in-
evitably moved on to modify the idea of pro-
tection to that of reciprocity. Reciprocity is
far from being free trade ; but in principle it
is nearer to that than to protection. Reci-
Retrospect and Prospect 1 9
procity has abandoned the view-point of exclu-
sive interest, which is the citadel of protection,
to embrace that of mutual benefit, the corner-
stone upon which the advocates of freedom of
trade rest their argument.
The beneficiaries of protection see this
clearly enough, as is shown by their recent
capture of the Reciprocity Convention and
renewed proclamation of their favorite dogma.
The fate of the measures proposed for Cuban
relief, in the session that has passed since this
article was first written, is probably an indica-
tion in the same direction. But protection is
essentially a defensive measure, and in all
struggles, in commerce as in war, it is not de-
fensive action but offensive — conquest, expan-
sion — which ultimately wins. It is in truth
this factor of offence, shown in the activity of
the American mind, in the energy with which
it carries ideas into practice and in the flexibility
which readily embraces improvement, that has
won the superiority which enables us latterly
to invade the markets of the world. The
credit is claimed for protection, and is too
easily yielded because the coincidence of our
advance with the protective system confuses
20 Retrospect and Prospect
thought ; but it is easy to see that, left to itself
alone, the assurance of an adequate market —
the secured home market — removes that ne-
cessity which is the mother of invention, the
necessity which competition imposes. Ameri-
can inventive aptitude and American energy
have triumphed over the enervating influence
of the protection that would and long did
restrain them from efficient action without their
own borders, and in so doing hindered that de-
velopment of sea power, commercial and naval,
which expansion, material and moral, requires.
Reciprocity, increased freedom of movement, is
the logical corollary of expansion, which itself
is but increase of scope and power to act.
It is, therefore, not a disconnected feature
of the situation that reciprocity is no longer
the idea of the few, but has assumed a con-
spicuous place in the thought of a party and of
a leader — President McKinley — whose very
names have been synonymous with protection.
It is but another aspect of that mysterious,
subtle influence, already vaguely felt in the
early years of the last decade of the nineteenth
century, and then, before its end, bursting
suddenly into life and taking definite form in
I \
Retrospect and Prospect 2 1
the acceptance of national expansion — terri-
torial, political, naval, commercial. In every
one of these aspects we find not merely develop-
ment, but extension ; not merely growth from
what has been, but the grafting on of that
which before found no place in our national
conceptions. It resembles the breach of con-
tinuity between the middle ages and modern
times. Our development on former lines has
reached into maturity and, unless renewed by
fresh influence, would pass into decadence ;
that which now succeeds it is new life, not new
growth. In the Philippines, Porto Rico, and
Hawaii, we have territorial expansion. They,
as well as Cuba, require us to constitute and
establish political relations of a kind not here-
tofore admitted as compatible with our scheme
of existence, — in short, expansion of political
thought. These changed conditions have ne-
cessarily entailed naval expansion; and there
can be little doubt that they will also imper-
ceptibly — perhaps the protectionist may say
" insidiously " — promote reciprocity of trade,
expansion of commercial thought, with the
logical consequences that follow the admission
of a new principle.
2 2 Retrospect and Prospect
Mr. Scudder named my first article, " The
United States Looking Outward." It was
particularly apt, for it exactly described the
national attitude then. We were looking, but
we had not got beyond that point where a baby
vaguely follows with its eyes something which
has caught its attention but not entered its
understanding. Yet I have felt it significant,
then and now, that in casting round for a start-
ing point I, with all my professional preposses-
sions naturally maritime and military, should
have opened my theme, not by a discussion of
the naval or strategic situation, but by indicat-
ing the essential feebleness of a commercial
policy which was primarily — nay wholly — de-
fensive, and in which aggression, expansion,
found no place. I quoted joyfully Mr. Blaine's
words, " It is not an ambitious destiny for so
great a country to manufacture only what we
can consume, or produce only what we can
eat ; " and I had pleasure in likening the ex-
travagances of the then recent tariff legislation
to Napoleon's Continental system, — a proph-
ecy by implication which it must be admitted
has not yet received fulfilment.
There has, however, been realized so much of
Retrospect and Prospect 2 3
the other indications of the future in that article,
so much beyond what I dared to expect in my
time, that I am not without hope that herein
also I may live to see beneficial results. This
paper some half-dozen years later was gath-
ered into a book with a series of seven others
on kindred topics, all falling under the general
head of arguments for expansion ; not, indeed,
specific in detail, but I think not without clear-
ness in the enunciation of principles governing
its general direction and character. The very
enumeration of the successive titles has par-
ticular suggestion to those interested in the
general subject, as bearing upon the gradual
expansion of the nation's thought, the gradual,
though very rapid, development of policy; be-
cause in none save one, and that the last of
all, was the article prompted by myself. In
each case, as in the first, it was elicited by
the request of the editors, whose perceptions
were quickened by their need to watch the
trend of events and provide the public with
matter concerning which its interest was
stirring.
Of course, naval officers, moving round the
world, talking with its inhabitants in various
24 Retrospect and Prospect
localities and afterward bringing the various
ideas to the common exchange of the mess-
table and of other professional intercourse,
imbibe a good deal of information particularly
pertinent to the question of expansion, needing
only digestion and arrangement to have a use-
fulness quite peculiar to itself. I was there-
fore pretty full of matter/ and to this day
remember the delightful ease of production
due to that fact, as contrasted with some heart-
breaking work done since. Nevertheless, for
the reasons noted, the record of articles traces
not my development, but the progress of na-
tional awakening from 1890 to 1897; to the
eve, that is, of the great year when old things
passed away, and all things became new in the
birth of a new national resolve, quickened into
life by the crash of a falling empire and the
devolution of its responsibilities upon our con-
science. In some measure through the cir-
cumstances of my profession, but chiefly
through the solicitation of others, it fell to me,
though by no means to me alone, to chronicle
from time to time the stages of the antecedent
process of preparation ; to note the advance of
ideas, as step by step the editorial watchers saw
Retrospect and Prospect 25
that advance had been made, but needed defi-
nition and formulation.
As far as known to me, " The United States
Looking Outward " attracted no special atten-
tion in any quarter. The only comment I can
now recall was by, I think, a Protectionist sheet,
to the effect that it seemed to be an argument
for free trade. This critic apparently had not
got beyond the first two pages. Yet the other
topics, incidentally touched or more fully de-
veloped, need only to be named in order to
show the most casual reader of to-day the im-
portant possibilities involved in the external
objects which demanded the consideration of
the United States in 1890. Samoa; Hawaii;
German commercial and colonial push in the
Caroline and other islands near the Philippines,
which the empire has since acquired by pur-
chase ; the progress of German influence in
Central and South America, notably in the
southern province of Brazil ; the increasing
importance of the Pacific and the effects upon
it of an isthmian canal ; the political wisdom
of maintaining with Great Britain a cordial un-
derstanding, approaching cooperation, though
distinctly rejecting the idea of alliance; the
26 Retrospect and Prospect
question of purchase by European powers of
stations in the West Indies, such as the Danish
St. Thomas and the Dutch Cura9ao; the
strategic features of the Gulf of Mexico and
the Caribbean Sea, with the transcendent mili-
tary value of Cuba and Jamaica in that connec-
tion. As regards these external points the
United States was perhaps looking outward,
but she evidently was not, as a nation, taking
notice ; and my remarks that " whether they
will or no, Americans must now begin to look
outwards," rested upon the necessities of the
case as set forth, not upon any certain evidence
of such watchfulness begun.
The first really arousing event occurred
where naval officers had long recognized the
most critical of our external interests; the one
where political change of condition detrimen-
tal to our military security was most likely to
occur, and to be allowed by default. The
islands and mainland of America were fairly
covered from serious aggression by national
susceptibility, pointed in the phrase " the
Monroe Doctrine." What the doctrine was,
was perhaps not very clearly understood, but it
was a good war-cry and might be depended on
Retrospect and Prospect 2 7
to serve its turn, although the experience
of generations had shown it impotent to insure
naval expansion adequate to enforce its asser-
tion. Hawaii, however, could not be construed
to fall under the Monroe Doctrine; and, al-
though many men in the country appreciated
its consequence to us, it was not certain that
the people generally would sustain an active
policy based upon the need of our predominance
there.
It is not necessary to recall in detail the
occurrences in Hawaii at the end of 1892,
which led to the treaty of annexation sent to
the Senate by President Harrison, and with-
drawn upon the change of administration by
President Cleveland. What then occurred was
the outcome of conditions which had led me in
my first article to say, " At this moment inter-
nal troubles are imminent in the Sandwich
Islands, where it should be our fixed determi-
nation to allow no foreign influence to equal
our own." The submittal and withdrawal of
the treaty in rapid succession demonstrated the
doubtful attitude of national opinion in 1893,
just as the annexation of five years later showed,
not growth, but conversion. Nevertheless I
28 Retrospect and Prospect
have always felt the first abortive movement to
have been the more conspicuous landmark.
Though without result, it was the awakening ;
too late to seize the current opportunity, but not
so late as to be unprepared for the events which
the near future was to bring.
It may profitably be noted that the contrary
decisions of the two administrations in this
matter were prophetic of party fortunes. In
the face of an emergency such as in 1893 arose
in Hawaii, with its extravagantly mixed popu-
lation, foreign not only in extraction, but in
sentiment and allegiance, a political party which
held that our action was to be controlled by a
count of heads among them was evidently un-
able to deal with impending questions. I do
not pretend to have foreseen the events that
ensued between 1893 an d 1898; but it was
clear enough in 1892 that we had to look out
into the Pacific and toward China. We could
never act there efficiently with our intellects
manacled by a traditionalism which saw in
the population of Hawaii a capacity for self-
determination like that of the Pilgrims, and
which failed to comprehend that Hawaii was an
outpost of the utmost value in the Pacific, for
Retrospect and Prospect 29
the tenure of which, in the rapid decay of the
aboriginal population, East and West were
already striving.
This Hawaiian business drew from me, by
request from the Forum, of which Mr. Walter
H. Page was then editor, my second article,
" Hawaii and Our Sea Power ; " to which suc-
ceeded almost immediately an invitation from
the Atlantic to treat the question of the isthmus
and its canal from the same point of view. The
latter of itself, coming so quickly, indicates how
the former affair had waked the people up, not
to Hawaii alone, but to the broader issues of
which Hawaii only happened by special circum-
stances to become the exponent. I do not think
I erred then in saying, in the first of these
articles, with reference to Mr. Harrison's treaty,
" The United States now finds herself com-
pelled to answer a question — to make a deci-
sion — not unlike and not less momentous
than that required of the Roman Senate when
the Mamertine garrison invited it to occupy
Messina, and so to abandon the hitherto tra-
ditional policy which had confined the ex-
pansion of Rome to the Italian peninsula."
"What is here involved is not so much a
3<d Retrospect and Prospect
particular action as a principle pregnant of
great consequences."
A reasonable regard for the patience of
readers, and for the proprieties, limits me to
mentioning simply the titles of the articles
asked from me in the successive years 1894,
1895, 1896, 1897; indicative not only in their
particular subject, but in the very order of the
series, of the awakening consciousness of the
people, reflected in the attentive minds of
editors. They were, " The Possibilities of
Anglo-American Reunion, " "The Future in
Relation to American Naval Power," " Pre-
paredness for Naval War," and " A Twentieth
Century Outlook."
The last decade of the century carried the
outward look on from the Isthmus and Hawaii,
and from the naval preparations essential to
maintaining the nation's requirements, as form-
ulated in the Monroe Doctrine and evident in
the conditions of the Pacific, to consider the
general outward movement of the European
world, evinced in the new era of colonization
and the search for naval stations which had
recently begun. This impulse, I believe, will
hereafter be recognized as the chief among
Retrospect and Prospect 3 1
those transmitted by the nineteenth century
to its successor. Viewed with the new and
significant restlessness among the Oriental
peoples, aroused at length, by intimate contact
with Europeans, from the torpor and change-
lessness of ages — an awakening of which the
occidentalizing of Japan is merely the most
conspicuous incident — this is the significant
feature of the opening century, that should
direct the attention of our people in external
policy. This European movement has three
principal fields: the Levant, — in which Egypt
may for convenience be included, — Africa, and
Asia. Though locally Asiatic, the Levant is a
European interest, pure and simple ; and Africa,
in relation to world politics, is but an annex of
Europe, geographically as well as, now, by pre-
emption. Eastern Asia, however, and China
especially, with all its immense possibilities,
stands over against us, demanding our most
careful and constant thought; all the more
because there would appear to be a disposition
in some quarters to question our right of inter-
est. In a Parliamentary blue book published
some eighteen months ago with reference to
the incipient troubles in China which after-
3 2 Retrospect and Prospect
ward became so acute, the Russian ambassador
at Peking is mentioned as saying to his British
colleague that only Russia and Great Britain
had serious interests in China. We shall not
err greatly, I imagine, in believing that Great
Britain does not share this sentiment.
As a matter of national decision Hawaii is
already past history, and the Monroe Doctrine
seems even now to be approaching a condition
of general silent acquiescence, which, if realized,
will give to it also the quality of permanence that
distinguishes the past from the present. The
living external issue of the present and the
future, the field for us alive with multifold possi-
bilities and uncertainties, is Eastern Asia; so
far in 1901 have we travelled, in the eight years
that began by seeing even Hawaii rejected and
have ended with the Philippines possessed. The
elements of the situation in China, as determi-
native of national watchfulness, may be stated
as follows. The great stream and valley of
the Yangtse Kiang is the natural focus of trade
for the greater and richer part of the empire,
which it divides roughly into two halves. It is
navigable continuously by steamers for a thous-
and miles, and for a great part of that distance
Retrospect and Prospect 33
by sea-going vessels, including large ships of
war. Here, therefore, is the great command-
ing interest of commercial nations and of mari-
time Powers. Here, and here only, apart from
the seaboard itself, can they effectually assert
their force to control infringement upon China s
right of self-direction, and to support the
Chinese themselves in their resistance which,
unaided, has not been able to retain Manchuria.
The maritime Powers are several ; but of them
France has seen fit to identify her policy with
Russia and cannot be depended upon, even if
her irritable national sensitiveness permitted
other peoples to count upon the reasonableness
of her action in any particular case. Regard
for the interests of China, of the commercial
world at large, and of our own people, there-
fore impel us to cooperation with Great Brit-
ain, the greatest of naval states; for her aim, as
a free-trade nation with large carrying trade,
must necessarily be to increase the volume of
commerce in a country like China, and to sup-
port her against the encroachments of another
people, of whose policy exclusive trade is a
dominant factor. For the same reasons, though
to a less degree, we find ourselves impelled to
3
34 Retrospect and Prospect
act in this matter in unison with Germany and
Japan. As the world is now balanced, the
British Empire is in external matters our
natural though not our formal ally.
The canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines are
valuable to us as positions even more than as
possessions. In the problem of Eastern Asia,
still in an early stage of its solution and of
doubtful issue, they are important as facilita-
ting our access to the seas of China and to the
valley of the Yangtse, and as furnishing terri-
torial support to our action there. Intrinsically,
their future now presents but few elements of
anxiety. In the grave uncertainties surround-
ing China, it is along the great river, of which
Shanghai is the chief port, that the interest of
the western world centres. From it our eyes
should never wander. There rests the centre
of Chinese power as susceptible of future
development, and there it should receive firm
support from us, disregardful of the place
where the Chinese Court may see fit to estab-
lish its abode. Peking, as has been clearly
shown, is too easily controlled from the land
side. Partition is one thing which we may
well reject; but it would be very different
Retrospect and Prospect 35
to see established along the course of the
Yangtse a native Power strong enough to
resist dictation from the capital, and, if need
be, strong enough also to resist those by whom
the capital may be oppressed.
CONDITIONS DETERMINING THE
NAVAL EXPANSION OF THE
UNITED STATES
CONDITIONS DETERMINING THE
NAVAL EXPANSION OF THE
UNITED STATES
January, 1902.
AT this time, while naval manoeuvres are
attracting attention among the people of
the United States, it is pertinent to point out
that it is commonly, but mistakenly, supposed
that the present necessity for naval enlarge-
ment rests upon the acquisition of oversea
territories, as a consequence of the war with
Spain. The error is natural, for undoubtedly
the war convinced the American people of the
advantage — nay, the necessity — of a great
navy, and so led to the increase we are wit-
nessing; but the necessity was approaching
unobserved, and would have come upon the
nation unawares and unprepared, but for the
fortunate intervention of the war, and its dem-
onstration of the usefulness of navies.
We have the highest military authority for
saying that the best and only sure form of de-
4-0 Conditions Determining the Naval
fence is to take the offensive, or at least to be
evidently ready so to do at brief notice. The
navy is essentially and pre-eminently a force
that thus acts, in virtue of the mobility which
is its prime quality; and it is scarcely neces-
sary to argue that the more wide-spread the
interests open to attack, the more valuable in
this sense the navy is, and the more numerous
and powerful must it be. So long as the
United States had no external possessions, it
was comparatively easy to blind people to the
usefulness of a navy, or to the necessity for it.
A navy for coast defence only was then a plaus-
ible, though deceitful, cry; and it was a very
easy further step to say that fortifications, sta-
tionary land defences, were cheaper and more
effective. On the narrow ground of passive
defence, that is true; therefore, ignorance of
military principles being characteristic of man-
kind generally, and of Americans perhaps par-
ticularly, the need of a mobile force to act
offensively could not obtain recognition.
It is not the least of the advantages derived
from the new possessions that this condition of
the public mind can exist no longer. It was
Expansion of the United States 4 1
very soundly argued, by the American oppo-
nents of the expansion which has been realized
in the last decade of the nineteenth century,
that transmarine acquisitions would be so
many new exposed points, to be supported by
sea only, not by land, as the continental terri-
tory can. They were very right, and this is
very true ; the flaw in their argument, as well
as the beam in the eye of the American public,
which prevented it from seeing clearly, was the
failure to note that, even when not possessing
a square foot of territory without its borders,
there were manifold interests abroad, assailable
by a superior navy, and only to be protected
by such display of force as should make it not
worth while to arouse the nation to action.
The argument of the opponents of territorial
expansion, even within moderate limits, and
with due regard to locality and consequent
utility in the positions acquired, was thus
plausible, and was deplorably successful ; but
it was fallacious. It adduced a sound military
reason, — the increased exposure, — but wholly
ignored qualifying considerations of the most
serious character, reversive of conclusions. It
may with much more certainty be now alleged,
42 Conditions Determining the Naval
and the assertion can be supported to the point
of demonstration, that the acquisitions of re-
cent years, despite the additional requirement
of their defence imposed upon the United
States, have not necessitated any increase of
naval force beyond that which would have been
imperatively demanded at the present time,
had they never passed into American hands.
More still, they have lessened the burden of
purely naval increase, which but for them
would have been necessary ; for by the tenure
of them, and due development of their re-
sources, the navy itself receives an accession
of strength, an augmented facility of move-
ment, by resting upon strong positions for
equipment and repair, — upon bases, to use the
military term, — in several parts of the world
where national interests demand naval pro-
tection of the kind already mentioned ; namely,
readiness to take the offensive instantly.
Facilities of this character add a percentage
of value to a given mobile force, military or
naval, for they by so much increase its power
and its mobility. This percentage may be
difficult of precise definition as to amount,
Expansion of the United States 43
but it none the less exists. That coal can be
obtained near at hand, plentifully, and with
certainty; that ships can remain in readiness,
and in security, near the possible scene of op-
erations ; that they can be repaired there, in-
stead of returning to the United States ; all
these conditions, which the new possessions
will afford, enable the work on the spot to be
done by fewer ships. Furthermore, by their
storage facilities, by their accumulated and
natural resources, they diminish the immediate
dependence upon home by a long chain of
communications, which is the great drain on
all military operations.
Thus, according to the particular conditions,
one ship may do the work of two, or three ships
of five, or perhaps nine of ten ; but, be the pro-
portion more or less, the gain in efficiency
means, as such gain always does, smaller num-
bers and therefore less expense. When a
battleship in war time runs upon an un-
charted rock, as the Oregon did a year ago
in the China Seas, it makes an immense differ-
ence to an admiral, and to the operations in
hand, whether she can be repaired at a dis-
tance of five hundred miles, or of five thou-
44 Conditions Determining the Naval
sand. The case is the same with minor repairs,
and with the renewal of coal, one of the great-
est of naval anxieties. For instance, it would
be difficult to exaggerate the value of Guanta-
namo, only fifty miles from Santiago de Cuba,
to the American fleet off the latter port, which
otherwise had to coal in the open, or depend
upon a base many hundred miles away.
It may be advisable here to notice passingly
an argument at times maintained, and often
advanced during recent discussions concerning
the annexation of the Philippines, that, while
such bases of naval action are intrinsically
advantageous, there attaches to them no ex-
pediency of holding adjacent territory in polit-
ical tenure. The United States therefore, so
it was urged, for the security of her naval situa-
tion in eastern waters would require in the
Philippines no more than a navy yard. From
the military point of view this is wholly in-
accurate. Any military permanent station,
land fortress or naval arsenal, gains immeasur-
ably in strength from the support of a friendly
region in which it is situated, because of the
contribution to its resources and the distance
at which attack is held. The impressiveness
Expansion of the United States 45
of the word " isolation, " which we all instinc-
tively feel, testifies to this condition. Nor is it
conclusive against the military argument that
the friendliness be of a passive or reluctant
character, as of a population subjected to mili-
tary control. This consideration is indeed
material to the general conduct of a war, for
the force thus engaged in insuring submission
is withdrawn from that available for other
operations; but so long as it is effective in
compelling or inducing the co-operation of the
inhabitants, either as peaceful workmen and
agriculturists, or more positively in the field,
the particular fortress, land or sea, is far
stronger than it could be if surrounded by
territory under alien government, even though
neutral.
Extent of territory is a real factor in military
strength, and for this reason a small island is
decisively less valuable than a large one. It
is a distinct weakness to Gibraltar that it is
backed by a country wholly foreign, though
probably not belligerent ; and Malta, if severed
from a predominant navy, would find its in-
trinsic power inadequate to prolonged endur-
ance. On the other hand, places on the coast
46 Conditions Determining the Naval
of the United States, or of Australia, or New
Zealand, though individually weak from a
purely military standpoint, derive great in-
crease of resistant force, and still more of pro-
ductive energy, — a large element in military
offensive efficiency, — because in the midst of
a friendly and industrious community* The
questions of resources and of support, both
very important factors in military vigor, turn
largely upon this one consideration.
This is not, in itself, an argument for large
annexations, or indefinite territorial expansion.
These, if desirable, rest upon reasons other
than military. We are dealing here with a
purely military consideration, and supporting it
by military argument, which, however, cannot
be pressed to the extent of supporting an action
political in origin. The military argument
amounts simply to this : that a moderate num-
ber of such bases, suitably chosen in view of
their position and resources, strengthen a mili-
tary or naval situation, and thereby enable
fewer men or fewer ships to do the necessary
work ; but it must be at once qualified by the
other perfectly familiar military maxim, that
the multiplication of such bases, as soon as you
Expansion of the United States 47
pass the limits of reasonable necessity, becomes
a source of weakness, multiplying exposed
points, and entailing division of force. It is
not even a matter of indifference that you have
too many; it is a positive injury. Conse-
quently, the necessity of naval bases to efficient
naval action cannot by itself be made into an
argument for indefinite expansion.
Such oversea expansion as the United States
has so far made has not been primarily for
military purposes. Incidentally, it has contrib-
uted to naval power, and it has not as yet
transcended the limit of utility to that end.
What has been already gained is useful, either
directly or indirectly ; the increase of exposure,
as yet, does not equal the increase in strength.
It is, of course, very possible that considerations
of political or commercial expediency, or even
necessity, might lead to acquisitions, the
exposure and burden of which would find no
compensation in increase of naval "strength, or
of general national military security. The
justification of such measures, if taken, must
rest on other than military or naval rea-
sons, and would not concern this argument ;
48 Conditions Determining the Naval
but in fact no such undue expansion has yet
occurred.
The march of events, not in the United
States only, but over the world at large, not of
military or naval events chiefly, but of political
events, events economical and commercial, has
brought about a necessity for large navies;
for navies much increased over the standard of
twenty years ago. This is now universally
recognized. Of this course of events in those
two decades, and their result to-day, the war
with Spain, which led directly or indirectly to
the acquisition of every foot of insular territory
possessed by the United States, is simply one
incident; and that an incident rather discon-
nected, something of a side issue, though one
most timely for the welfare of the^ nation.
Had that war not occurred, there is no
reason to believe that the mighty events which
have transpired in Africa, Egypt, the Levant,
and China, would not have happened ; still less
that there would not have been the immense
commercial developments, which, if less strik-
ing, are even more momentous, and more
influential at this moment upon the policy of
nations. Issues and conditions which are mov-
Expansion of the United States 49
ing the world would have been as they are had
the distress of Cuba never compelled interven-
tion. The difference now would have been that
the United States would be without Porto Rico,
Hawaii, and the Philippines ; without reserved
rights in Cuba, the key of the West Indies and
Gulf of Mexico ; and that she would not have
received the impulse, which the war and its
consequent acquisitions most timely gave, to the
building of the navy towards a point necessary
to meet the demands of a political and com-
mercial future, which in any case would have
arrived, and, but for that war, have found the
nation unprepared.
The general strenuous impulse of the great
civilized states of the world, to find and to estab-
lish markets and commercial relations outside
their own borders and their own people, has
led to multifold annexations, and to commer-
cial and naval aggressions. In these the United
States has had no part, but they have consti-
tuted a political situation that immensely in-
creases her political and commercial anxieties,
and consequently her naval responsibilities ;
for, as interests of this kind are outside the
North American continent, it is upon the navy
4
50 Conditions Determining the Naval
that their support rests. This external impulse
of the commercial nations is of two-fold char-
acter. First, there is the perfectly legitimate
and unobjectionable form of commercial com-
petition, in open field and without favor ; but
there is, besides, the effort to extend and sustain
commercial advantage by the extension of politi-
cal power, either by controlling influence or by
actual annexation, under cover of either of
which the commercial system of the particular
country obtains favored conditions, injurious to
others, from special privilege all the way up to
a practically exclusive market. The history of
the past twenty or thirty years abounds in such
instances, reversive of the course of trade, even
to the destruction at times of a well-established
commerce.
Much of this politico-commercial movement
has occurred in regions where the United
States has been compelled, by her recognized
traditional policy, to abstain from intervention,
or even remonstrance. The politics are none
of our business, and the resultant commercial
inconvenience, if it touch us, has to be ac-
cepted. This applies to Europe generally ; to
Africa, which, both by position and now by
Expansion of the United States 5 1
annexation, is an appendage of Europe; and
probably also to those parts of Asia commonly
known as the Levant, which by juxtaposition
are European in interest. The case is very
different in South America, in Eastern Asia,
and in the Pacific. From interest in none of
these is the United States excluded by the
Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, by which
she simply defines her policy to be hands-
off in matters of purely European concern;
while by express declaration political interfer-
ence in South America, of a character to
intrude European political control, will be
resented as directly injurious to American
security.
As regards the Pacific and China, the move-
ment there, and especially in the latter, has
been lately so much before the public that it
is unnecessary to recall details. It is obvious,
however, that where the commercial interests
at stake are so great, and political conditions
so uncertain, the desire to secure commercial
opportunity will lead countries that possess
force into a dangerous temptation to use it for
the extension of their influence. Therefore,
unless prepared to maintain the national rights,
52 Conditions Determining the Naval
either singly or in combination with others,
backed by force at hand, the United States
may find her people excluded, more or less,
by the encroachment of rivals.
The case in South America is even more
serious ; for political interference there not only
may injure the nation commercially, but would
certainly dishonor it, in face of its clearly
avowed policy. It must be remembered that
this extension of commerce by political pres-
sure is a leading element in the spirit of the
times ; and, when such a spirit is looking watch-
fully for a field in which to act, one so fruitful
and so promising as South America can secure
exemption only by a display of power to resist,
which South America itself does not possess,
and which the United States alone can supply.
These are among the Leading conditions
which necessitate the creation of a powerful
navy by the United States, and they are quite
independent of her relatively small external
possessions, most valuable though these are
from the naval point of view. She is con-
fronted, in short, by a general movement of
the nations, resting upon a spirit spread among
Expansion of the United States
DO
their peoples, which seeks to secure commer-
cial advantages in all quarters of the world ;
peaceably, if may be, but, if not, by pressure.
In this collision of interests, force will have a
determining part, as it has in all periods of
the world's history ; and force, in such remote
localities, means necessarily naval force. It is
upon the spread of this spirit and the action
ensuing from it, that the necessity for a great
navy rests, and not upon the fact of having
assumed oversea charges. Porto Rico, Hawaii,
the Philippines, and if there be any other
acquisition at present, have not created the
necessity; on the contrary, they have reduced
the weight of the burden, by contributing to
support it.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN WAR UPON THE PRES-
TIGE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN WAR UPON THE PRES-
TIGE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
November, 1901.
WITHOUT seeking excessive refinement
in definition, it may profitably be re-
called that the common colloquial use of the
word " prestige " overlooks its primary significa-
tion, which involves the idea of illusion, or
even of delusion. When employing it in ordi-
nary speech we do not think of a veil conceal-
ing truth, but of a solid basis of achievement
or power which underlies present acknowl-
edged reputation. Thus the word is practically
affirmative, not negative ; it suggests actuality,
not a mask. But for the very reason that
prestige is popular impression, resting upon
surface appearance assumed to be substantial
fact, it is among the most uncertain of posses-
sions ; upon a pedestal to-day, in the dust to-
morrow, with the facile fickleness noted in
58 The Influence of the South African War
populaces. When to this source of error in
the adoption of opinion is added the misguid-
ing influence of strong prejudices, when mis-
understanding of conditions combines with bias
of judgment, mutabilities of prestige may be
both sudden and extreme. " Presto ! Change ! "
and prestidigitator, are prominent and charac-
teristic members of the volatile family to which
prestige owes its birth. The decline of prestige
may involve as much illusion as its growth ;
therefore its value, while not to be denied, may
easily be exaggerated.
Prestige then does not necessarily corre-
spond with fact, even moderately ; on the
contrary, it is apt to be much in excess or
much in defect. Nevertheless, it is a valuable
possession; an asset which counts for a good
deal in the reckoning of international balances.
Accepted at its face value, and repeated in the
street from man to man, it constitutes a mass of
impression which finally affects even the more
judicious and better-informed, and may become
of weight in diplomatic action. Consequently,
when impaired, it is worth the effort to restore
it, and to bring it into conformity with material
facts. These do not change either with the
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 59
suddenness, or in the degree, to which mere
moral effect is specially liable.
Qualifying the word and its idea with the
remarks so far made, the prestige of the British
Empire has assuredly suffered diminution from
the South African war. Men in the street,
and the hurried writers of the press, have re-
ceived an impression of bafflement, or even of
failure, in holding which they support one
another. From the very outset prepossession
stood ready upon the Continent, and among
many of the American people, not only to re-
joice over British reverses, but to draw from
them quick, disparaging conclusions, affecting
prestige, by the easy process of forgetting fun-
damental conditions and dwelling upon surface
events. Precisely the same disposition was
entertained towards the United States a year
before, at the beginning of our war with Spain,
as I had opportunity to observe by the experi-
ence of dining in company with several diplo-
mats in a European capital at the moment of
the outbreak of hostilities. That the gratifica-
tion of gloating over our defeats was confi-
dently anticipated also is a matter of common
notoriety. We were out of favor, and our
60 The Influence of the South African War
prestige was naturally low. The fortunate
event of our war having at least not lowered
it further, there is no necessity to inquire how
far the original estimate corresponded with the
facts. Of one thing, however, we may be sure ;
that had temporary unsuccess attended us, the
difficulties of our undertaking, which formed the
basis of unfavorable prediction and were by no
means small to a dispassionate judgment, would
not in the least have qualified unfavorable criti-
cism. Prejudice is a two-edged sword, and
cuts both ways. So it has been in South
Africa. The evident military difficulties gave
hostile sentiment the basis on which to build
prophecies of disaster; but having served that
purpose, when it comes to comment and infer-
ence, the difficulties no longer find place for
consideration.
The military conditions before and during
the war, and now existing in South Africa, are
so much matters of present remembrance that
it is unnecessary to enumerate them at large.
What can profitably be done is to select from
them those which constitute the distinctive
characteristics, differentiating this from other
struggles, and yet at the same time enabling it
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 6 1
to be in some measure classified; for such
features suggest resemblances as well as differ-
ences. The prominent facts, thus separated
from less noteworthy surroundings, can then
be brought to the test of criticism as to their
positive influence in the present case, and also
to comparison with other historical experiences.
Whatever may be the prestige, in the strict
sense of the word, of the British Empire, at
home or abroad, its real meed of praise or
blame depends upon the way it has met, and is
meeting, these distinctive conditions.
The characteristic elements of this war re-
sulting from the permanent conditions, irre-
spective of the conduct of the present hostilities,
and anterior to their beginning, are (i) The
remoteness of the British base of operations
from the scene of fighting, contrasted with the
nearness of the Boers; in other words, the
length of the British lines of communication.
(2) The nature and extent of the country over
which operations had to be conducted. ( 3 ) The
character of the hostile people ; including there-
in the advantage which familiarity with a region
and its conditions, especially when sparsely
settled, undeveloped, and consequently imper-
62 The Influence of the South African War
fectly known, always gives to inhabitants over
invaders. All three particulars, indeed, fall
under the general head of communications,
which, on the strategic side at least, dominate
war. The nature and extent of the country
affect materially the maintenance of commu-
nications, their security and their rapidity. So
also the native and acquired characteristics of
the enemy act and react upon communications.
If of extremely simple wants, capable of rapid
movement, familiar with the country, surrounded
by sympathizers, their own communications are
relatively invulnerable, and to the same degree
they are facilitated in attacking those of the
invader. Roles are, in a measure, reversed;
the offence is constantly on the defence for his
communications, the defence on the offensive
against them.
These factors, onerously adverse to Great
Britain, were and are permanent. To them
must be added a present consideration, which
existed from the beginning, but which it was
then perhaps impossible to anticipate ; namely,
the difficulty under which the British Govern-
ment would be plated in dealing with partially
organized forces maintaining insurrection rather
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 63
than war ; with no organic social system be-
hind them, and, from that very lack, without
vital centres, or social articulations, at which
to strike ; capable of indefinite subdivision and
consequent elusiveness, due to the very low
type of social and political cohesion which has
been characteristic of the Boer peoples from
their beginnings. When highly organized and
complex, national vitality may be paralyzed
without killing men; but where organization
is defective, the same end cannot be quickly
reached without a slaughter of individuals from
which modern humanity rightfully revolts.
Here has been the difficulty confronting the
Empire since the end of the war proper. From
the delay in solving it proceeds the present
impairment of prestige, which, granting the
idea of illusion inseparable from the word, is
natural and to be expected. For many obvious
reasons, the individual Boer, when caught, can-
not be killed. Great Britain is limited to cap-
ture and exportation ; processes indefinitely
tedious, owing to the nature of the country
and other causes before noticed, and further
protracted by the necessity of diverting a huge
fraction of the large available forces to the
64 The Influence of the South African War
protection of the communications. These
stretch a thousand miles from the sea-board to
the seat of war, and thence ramify throughout
the extensive regions over which desultory and
elusive fighting may spread. This burden is
even greater than during regular hostilities,
both because the lines are more disseminated,
and because the evasive action of the small
bands now in the field is harder to counteract
than the efforts of large masses, compelled by
their very size to consider their own com-
munications.
The military operations of the war in South
Africa may be divided into two principal and
easily recognized stages. There is, first, that
of regular hostilities, which terminated not long
after the fall of Pretoria; to which succeeded
the existing conditions of what is commonly
called guerilla warfare. In the former, the
British were confronted by large numbers,
more or less organized, acting in masses, and
representing a regular Government which had
its staff of officials and local habitat. In the
present embarrassing situation, the permanent
natural factors (the nature of the country, and
the racial characteristics of the opponents, with
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 65
their consequent individual tendencies of ac-
tion) remain much the same ; but the accidental
temporary elements are changed. The Boer
forces are no longer organized, in the sense of
having a common centre of action, or a regular
gradation of even military authority. They no
longer act in masses, but are scattered in small
bodies, much of whose immunity depends upon
their faculty of melting away and subsequently
reuniting ; and there is behind them no recog-
nized and efficient civil government. On the
civil side the Boer bands represent a past, not
a present ; the organic society and government
no longer exist.
The conduct of the earlier stage of the war
by the British, with its effect upon prestige, is
first to be considered. Bearing in mind the
respective distances of the antagonists from the
seat of war, the outbreak of hostilities gave to
the Boers the advantage, to the British the dis-
advantage, of a surprise. That this is so is
seen by considering how the case would have
stood had the British Islands been where Cape
Colony is. That larger organized forces were
not assembled in South Africa at an early date
will be differently criticised even by impartial
5
66 The Influence of the South African War
observers. It may at least be observed that, if
injurious to the prestige of the Government on
the score of unwise delay, it cannot at the
same time be attributed to eagerness for war.
Also, however viewed, this is chargeable to
political calculation, not to military ineffi-
ciency. But when war was at last resolved, it
cannot, I think, be considered as less than ad-
mirable that over 165,000 men, with the vast
mass of warlike equipment, were transferred
six thousand miles from the British Islands to
South Africa in six months. Nor yet that,
from the sea-coast, the same huge numbers
and equipment were carried by single track
railroads a thousand miles inland, there main-
tained, and within eight months, not of their
arrival in Africa, but of their earliest departure
from England, had possession of the capitals
of both their opponents, having driven them
from position to position in a notoriously diffi-
cult country, devoid alike of natural and of
artificial resources. The numbers of the Brit-
ish, doubtless, were fully adequate to this work.
They were greatly superior to the Boers, but
not, I think, to a N degree much exceeding that
which any prudent military man would esti-
Up07i the Prestige of the British Empire 67
mate as absolutely necessary for such a task ;
considering, that is, the character and extent
of the country, the length of the communica-
tions, and the general difficulties inherent in
all invasions.
I fail, therefore, to see that the ultimate
results up to the fall of Pretoria, and during
the subsequent disintegration of the Boer
forces under continued pressure, are so unsatis-
factory as in any way to constitute a reason for
that diminution of credit which we call loss of
prestige. During the operations which thus
terminated, that is, during the process that pro-
duced the results, there occurred numerous in-
cidents; some attended by success, some by
grave disaster. The latter chiefly require
notice, for they are the food for criticism.
The advance towards Kimberley was brought
sharply to a standstill ; the fact being marked
by the slaughter at Magersfontein, which we
may say ought not to have been. It was not,
however, the particular repulse that constituted
the check, but the want of numbers, which
showed that the advance had been premature.
Almost simultaneously came the defeat at
Colenso, which postponed the relief of Lady-
68 The Influence of the South African War
smith; and upon these two rebuffs followed
the strain of national endurance, through the
two months of painful uncertainty as to
whether the isolated British garrisons could
hold out.
Now, I hold no brief to defend the advance
on either line at the moment chosen. But I
do feel very strongly that it is unreasonable to
judge military operations carried on by repre-
sentative governments on merely military
grounds, leaving out of account the absolute
necessity of convincing the people represented.
The American General Grant certainly did
not lack self-dependence or firmness, nor did
his subordinate, Sherman, lack eminent military
characteristics and acquirements; yet when
Sherman remonstrated against the movement
round Vicksburg, in 1863, on very sound mili-
tary grounds of communications, Grant replied
that to fall back to a new base for a secure line
of communications would so dishearten the
nation " that bases of supplies would be of no
use ; neither men to hold them nor supplies to
be put in them would be furnished." The con-
clusion was perhaps extreme, but the remark
has value. In countries where the voice of
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 69
the people is mighty it cannot be disregarded,
nor can the soldier so separate his military
convictions from the popular sentiment as to
neglect it wholly. To the utmost possible ex-
tent he doubtless should act on strict military
reason. Disastrous as the determination ap-
peared to be for a time, I have always ap-
plauded Whites holding on to Ladysmith, nor
have I been able greatly to condemn the risk
taken in remaining at Dundee until the neces-
sity of evacuation was not only seen but dem-
onstrated. For the same reason I hesitate to
criticise Methuen's advance to the Modder,
though it was shown to be premature by the
long delay necessary after Magersfontein.
In brief, therefore, while the attempts at ad-
vance may have been premature, militarily con-
sidered, they were almost unavoidable under
the imperfectly understood difficulties of re-
lieving Kimberley and Ladysmith. To hold
advanced positions, and to push advance, were
inevitable, if only to demonstrate the difficulties
and the need of more men ; yet to see the
effort of a great empire blocked by two small
republics inevitably affected prestige. Failure,
until redeemed, cannot but do so ; but, in fact,
jo The Influence of the South African War
there was no occasion for disheartenment had
the circumstances been intelligently appre-
ciated. I am not aware that in these main
operations, up to the standstill in December,
there was anything that impeached the general
military character of the army. Mistakes in
generalship I think there were. These affect the
reputation of the general, but they should not
that of the nation. Experience is universal
that a very large percentage, probably a ma-
jority, of able men, men of high promise both
in character and acquirement, break down in
chief command. The South African war is
not in this respect different from others. I
know that in our Civil War we had bitter disap-
pointments ; and I believe that Dupont, who
surrendered somewhat ignominiously at Baylen,
in 1808, had stood very high in the esteem of
Napoleon himself. Nevertheless, for lack of
this correct appreciation, a merely personal
defect is carried to the losing balance of na-
tional prestige.
There were, however, in both advances inci-
dents of a character which have since too often
recurred not to reflect upon the reputation of
the army. Passing over questions involving
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 7 1
the Commander-in-Chief, as being too essen-
tially personal to warrant general conclusions,
the inference prompted by the battle of Co-
lenso, by the deadly surprise at Magersfontein,
and by many subsequent episodes, is unques-
tionably that of inadequacy, or of remissness
in subordinate duties, which cannot be recon-
ciled with reasonable requirements of efficiency.
Taken singly, any one incident may be due to
unexpected causes, or to some one person ;
but the impression produced — and in speak-
ing of prestige I necessarily deal with impres-
sions — by the numerous surprises, and some
surrenders, is that of a proportion of incom-
petency in the grades of subordinate officers
too large to be creditably accounted for. I
have even heard surrenders attributed to decay
in the fighting quality of the race ; than which
imputation none can be more injurious to
military prestige. This has appeared to me
nothing short of absurd, in view of the abun-
dance of good fighting that has been done ;
and we Americans, as a nation courageous and
warlike, but not military, have had experience
enough of panic in troops badly officered to
dismiss peremptorily any such suggestion. For
J 2 The Influence of the South African War
such discreditable episodes, however, the only
one alternative solution is incompetent leader-
ship; and when it is remembered that the
leaders in these small affairs are the subordi-
nates, and sometimes the principal subordi-
nates, in large operations, the impression of
dangerous unsoundness in the main body is
deepened. In contemplating the question of
their own acquirements, officers should re-
member that failure on their part must thus
react upon their troops at times, even to the
accusation of cowardice. I confess that while
I think the prevalent impression of incompe-
tency among officers exaggerated, it does not
seem to me unfounded. It errs by neglect to
take due account of the mass of good work
done ; but that is always the case with such
criticism, and the loss of prestige which it
asserts is not without reason in fact, though
immoderate in terms.
If this be so, the defect is precisely one that
would be conspicuously felt when the war
passed into its second stage, and on both sides
took the form of wide dissemination in small
bodies, which, however united in some general
scheme, were locally self-dependent. This
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 73
multiplication of small commands necessarily
multiplies the chance of inefficiency betraying
itself, and not improbably accounts for some
mischances. On the other hand, a constant
sifting process goes on, and dearly bought
experience will remedy this evil. I have no
doubt that the efficiency of the force under
Lord Kitchener is double now what it was a
year ago, both by such process of elimination
and by the increase of facility which constant
practice bestows even upon those previously
well-equipped. There can scarcely be a cor-
responding gain to the Boers, who already
possessed the particular local aptitudes which
the British have had to acquire. Of this the
makers of prestige have probably taken too
little account.
Equally do they fail to take account of the
grave difficulties which should qualify the sur-
face impressions produced by the mere pro-
longation of the trouble. The British Army
in South Africa during eighteen months, practi-
cally since the fall of Pretoria, has been engaged
in a task analogous to that of which the United
States Army during the past century has had
large experience. Setting aside the savagery
74 The Influence of the South African War
in the practices of North American Indians,
the Boers have much in common with them, as
combatants. To the adaptation of methods to
environment which distinguishes both, as it
does natives usually, they have further brought
the brain capacity of the white man ; and instead
of the tribal tradition of the Indian, they have
that of a known common history and of a
national existence, which, although excessively
loose and unorganized, furnishes a certain bond
of cohesion. Concert of action and persistence
are thereby attainable to a degree impossible to
the Indians, ever prone to disintegration, and*
fickle with the fickleness of the savage. In
scope of design and intelligence of direction
there is also no comparison. Let it be added
that in both cases the methods of fighting are
not external habits, assumed like a change of
garments, or superinduced as training upon
a recruit, but the outgrowth of surrounding
circumstances and everyday life ; an evolution
rather than a system, and marked therefore with
a spontaneity, a facility, and a readiness, not to
be attained offhand by imitators. As well might
a coat be expected to rival the skin in adapting
itself to the form and movements of the body.
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 7 5
Forces of this character, acting within their
usual environment, and unimpeded by consider-
ations common to men of complex civilization,
possess a power of injury and an elusiveness
which are enormous ; to be matched only by
their powerlessness for good, and for self-
initiated progress in the civil order. To meet
the conditions in South Africa — which, though
not unparalleled in kind are perhaps unpre-
cedented in degree, because the brains of white
men are utilizing the capacities and immunities
of the savage — are needed both adequate
methods, probably somewhat original in char-
acter, and also familiarity with the particular
circumstances which practice alone confers.
In this also, and for this reason, Kitchener's
command must be much more competent now
than it possibly could be a twelvemonth ago.
Some very bad blunders are doubtless charge-
able against the management of British detach-
ments in the early and more regular part of the
war — blunders against which the training of
the officers should have been sufficient preven-
tion ; but I cannot see so much discredit, as
the apparent loss of prestige would imply, in
the mere fact that a final blow has not yet been
j6 The Influence of the South African War
dealt to the novel and irregular resistance now
encountered. The task is one historically and
proverbially difficult. I am not an expert in
knowledge of our Indian wars; but I have
greatly misunderstood what has been said and
written, if the most successful methods there
applied have not been the joint product of prac-
tice and of that species of mental effort which
corresponds to invention in industrial life, — a
happy thought occurring to an individual whose
mind is absorbed in overcoming difficulties
with which he has made a thorough experi-
mental acquaintance. 1 The history of our
Indian hostilities is not without its record of
grave perplexities, of bafflement, or of occasional
appalling disaster; and in the present case,
upon a fair balancing of achievement against
1 To Lord Kitchener, thus pondering, and driven by experiment
from one expedient to another, there came the solution of the block-
house system. The problem before him, and the underlying prin-
ciple of the plan adopted, have been thus described since the peace.
i( An army largely immobile," partly from natural characteristics and
partly from the absolute necessity of hovering near railway lines, to
the protection of which it was tied, " had to cope with one entirely
mobile. He used his immobile troops to form artificial frontiers n
(the blockhouse lines) "against which the enemy could be driven.
It was a heavy task, but he had found the solution, and the Boers
were quick to recognize the fact. They saw in the blockhouse line
and the drive the end of their struggle, which depended all through
upon unlimited power of evasion." — London Times> July 12, 1902.
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 77
difficulty, I should find ground for increase of
hope rather than for diminution of prestige.
The man in the street, I fear, judges differently,
and his judgment is prestige.
Upon the whole, therefore, while I can see
abundant room for criticism of detail, I do not
in the military record find cause to warrant
loss of prestige. The main defect of the aver-
age British officer — that he is not what the
French call instruit, nor even disposed to be-
come so — has been his trouble historically and
always ; and it is emphasized now by an enforce-
ment of systematic training in continental
armies, and by the United States in their mili-
tary academy, with which the British authorities
are not inclined to comply, either in army or
navy. The successes of Great Britain in other
times have been attained under this disadvan-
tage. To meet difficulties as they arise, instead
of by foresight, to learn by hard experience
rather than by reflection or premeditation, are
national traits ; just as is contempt for consti-
tutions which are made instead of evolved.
Personally, if I must choose, I prefer the knowl-
edge given by experience, the acquirements of
growth to those of formulated instruction ;
78 The Influence of the South African War
but I see no reason why one should exclude
the other, to the injury of both. The British
officer might possess more knowledge, more
reading, more grasp of precedent and principle,
without injuring his adaptability. The stu-
dent's lamp has its part as well as the football
field or the cricket ground in equipping an
officer.
So much for contemplating the reasonable in-
fluence upon military prestige of what has so far
occurred and now exists in South African condi-
tions. Upon the broader question of present
prestige of the Empire I cannot enlarge, and
will limit myself to a brief enumeration of exist-
ing factors as they appear to me, with an esti-
mate of the consequent real status of the Empire
among the Powers of the world.
First among symptoms is one which, to my
mind, gives immeasurable assurance of national
power — the sure guarantee of prestige — and
that is the progress towards unanimity in the
nation, centring round the idea of Imperialism,
and finding an immediate impetus in the South
African problem. Whatever the faults of a
Government, or the failures of an army, a unan-
imous and sustained national spirit is the vital
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 79
force, of which prestige is at best but the out-
ward sign and faint reflection. The increase
of unanimity throughout the Empire is wit-
nessed both by the movement of the Colonies,
and by the rejection of the disintegrating ten-
dency in the Liberal party by its younger and
abler members, to whom the future belongs.
Imperialism has shown itself an idea capable of
quickening national self-consciousness, of be-
stowing strength of purpose, and of receiving
indefinite expansion.
Again, the sea-power of the Empire still
stands pre-eminent. I do not here consider
the accuracy of the many allegations made, of
failure on the part of the Government to main-
tain necessary progress. Even if these be true,
no irreparable harm has yet been done. The
Imperial movement of the Colonies, in con-
tributing to the war, is greatly contributive to
sea-power. By strengthening the Imperial
tie, it gives assurance of local support in many
seas — the bases — which sea-power requires;
while the military effort, and the experience
gained by the colonial troops engaged, render
the defence and security of these local bases
much more solid than ever before, because
80 The Influence of the South African War
dependent upon men experienced in warfare.
The foundations are surer.
Again, closely connected with this last con-
sideration is the inevitable superior efficiency of
the army at large, Imperial as well as colonial,
consequent on this protracted experience of war.
I made this remark twenty months ago to an
American audience, which I believed to be
impressed with the idea of lost prestige, and
forgetful of this prolonged warlike practice,
obvious as its effect upon efficiency should be.
The comment rests now on an even wider
and firmer basis than when first uttered. The
British army, including colonial contingents,
is to-day, to the number of over 200,000 men, a
vastly more useful instrument than it could
have been two years ago; and this gain will
last for at least a decade, as a matter of inter-
national calculation, just as the disbanded but
tempered forces of the United States remained
after the Civil War.
The Confederation of the Empire, whatever
shape that may ultimately, if ever, attain, has
doubtless been furthered, not hindered, by the
war. Community of sentiment and community
of action have both been fostered. I would
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 8 1
not speak with exaggeration, nor overlook the
immense difficulties in maintaining community
of interest and of aim between political entities
so widely scattered as the component parts of
the Empire. The work is one of time, of tact,
and labor. I say only that the war has furth-
ered it, and most justly; for from the point
of view of the British Islands alone — the
Imperial idea apart — the war, so far from be-
ing selfish, has been self-sacrificing. It is the
Empire, not the Mother Country, that is most
interested in this comparatively ex-centric and
remote dependency.
In development of power, both local and
general, therefore, I believe the war to have
strengthened materially the British Empire,
and I believe it has likewise given renewed and
increased force to the spirit of union, of con-
centration upon great ideals, without which
material strength runs to waste. As an im-
mediate result, I look for the establishment
of a group of South African communities, in
which the English tradition of law and liberty
will henceforth prevail, partly by force of con-
quest, partly because of its inherent fitness to
survive. Of this eminent inherent fitness the
6
82 The Influence of the South African War
United States of America gives the most signal
illustration, because, though so heterogeneous
in the composition of its population, the Eng-
lish tongue and the English tradition overbear
all competitors, reconcile in themselves all
rivalries, and sustain themselves in directive
control; modified doubtless, but not weakened,
by the variety of foreign influences to which
they are subjected.
With these obvious gains — development of
Imperial purpose, strengthening of Imperial
ties, broadening and confirming the bases of
sea-power, increase of military efficiency, dem-
onstrated capacity to send and to sustain
200,000 men on active service, for two years,
6000 miles from home — I do not believe the
international prestige of Great Britain has
sunk in foreign Cabinets, however it may be
reckoned in the streets and cafes of foreign
cities. Against this, in order to support a
charge of loss of prestige, is set the weary pro-
longation of the war. Men need not deceive
themselves ; there is here no even balance.
The gain outweighs the loss. I unfeignedly
wish that the w r ar, with its sorrows and sus-
pense, might end ; but it remains true, sad
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 83
though the argument is, that the more com-
pletely the Boer exhausts himself now, the
more convinced and the more final will his
submission necessarily be.
I have not thought it incumbent upon me,
or even becoming, to enter into discussion of
the vexed question concerning the manage-
ment of the later stage of the war by the
Home Government. The conduct of a par-
ticular government, like that of a particular
general, gives no assured indication of national
worth, unless its efficiency or inefficiency pro-
ceeds, clearly and inevitably, from causes in-
trinsically national ; as from a close division
in national sentiment, or failure in material
resources. There is no sign of such division
or such failure at the present time; rather the
contrary. Whatever the fault or merit of the
present Government, challenged as I know it
to be by many of its own followers as well as
by the Opposition, the point considered in this
paper is not the deserts of a group of individ-
uals, but the real power of the nation, on which
its prestige should depend. It will be retorted
that this begs the question, that the nation
cannot put forth its power without the neces-
84 The Influence of the South African War
sary and adequate instrument which a Govern-
ment is intended to supply, and which, it is
urged, this Government does not. The argu-
ment, I think, is exaggerated. Governments
may do more or less ; they may impede or
facilitate; but they cannot prevent the exertion
of the national will. That they have not done
so in this instance is assured — -to me — by
the very recent assertion, resting on the ven-
erated authority of Lord Roberts, that " Lord
Kitchener, in whom we all have implicit con-
fidence, has never made one single demand for
men, for horses, or for stores, that has not been
immediately complied with." This result is
quite compatible with much error, delay, and
extravagance; but nevertheless it is the main
point secured. The nation does well to be
watchful and exacting, for in the wretched
plight to which the regular party Opposition
is reduced, voluntary organization or individual
criticism must supply the corrective of super-
vision, without which officials never, and private
individuals rarely, do their best; but when Lord
Roberts can say what he has it is clear that
much has been done, even though the most
may not have been. Loss of prestige, worth
Upon the Prestige of the British Empire 85
considering, will come when the nation loses
heart.
This article, as first penned in November,
1 90 1, ended here. As it opened with comment
upon the fundamental primary definition of the
word " prestige," let us now, nearly a year later,
recur to the secondary accepted meaning, as
given by authorities. " Prestige is the moral
influence which past successes, as the pledge
and promise of future ones, breed." The
British war in South Africa, esteemed by many
to be of doubtful outcome when I first wrote,
has since been carried to a victorious issue. It
is now a past success ; can it be considered to
carry pledge and promise for the future ? A
correct answer must depend upon due con-
sideration of conditions. A year ago belief in
the final result, now realized, rested upon an
intellectual appreciation of the decisive facts
then attainable, reinforced by a reference to the
historical teaching of British warfare in the
past. Putting aside the particular merit of
individuals, as foreign to the general estimate,
success in the present instance, as on former
occasions, has been due to national tenacity,
86 The Influence of the South African War
and ultimate aptitude to meet conditions as
they arise, combined with the essential justice
of the national contention. It has been gained
despite a certain degree of unreadiness and
inadequacy at the outset, which cannot be pro-
nounced wholly excusable. Great Britain has
won, as she has before, by national endurance,
supported by superior resources, and strength-
ened by the felt goodness of her cause around
which determination could harden. In these
substantial strong qualities of national charac-
ter, the foundations of her prestige are seen to
be the same that they were a year ago, and
have commonly been in the past. Another
demonstration has been added ; but her people
may hope that she will not further tempt for-
tune by failing to correct practical deficiencies
which have been revealed.
MOTIVES TO IMPERIAL
FEDERATION
MOTIVES TO IMPERIAL
FEDERATION
March, 1902.
WITHIN the last twenty years Great
Britain has passed through two crises
which should appeal strongly to the attention
and intelligence — if not also to the practical
sympathy — of Americans. Not only have
they an analogy to problems we ourselves have
met and solved in the course of our national
existence, but the result to which they
tend, by confirming the power of the British
Empire, will probably strengthen likewise the
external policy of the United States during the
next generation. Interest, due in any case,
is emphasized by the fact that the issue at
stake has been the same in both these momen-
tous instances. Under all superficial divergen-
ces and misleading appearances, the real ques-
tion about Ireland and about South Africa has
been, " Shall Great Britain exist as an Empire,
90 Motives to Imperial Federation
or shall it fall to pieces by a series of willing
or tolerated secessions ? " As Joseph said to
Pharaoh concerning the two visions of the lean
kine and the blasted ears, — the dream is one.
The impetus given to Imperial Federation by
the South African war, the striking root
downward and bearing fruit upward of the
imperial idea, has doubtless been immense ;
but the moment really decisive of the Em-
pire's future — as an Empire — is to be
sought in the period when Mr. Parnell's effort
at disruption obtained the support of Mr.
Gladstone. That was the critical instant,
which determined both that the conception
should come to the birth, and that, being born,
it should not be strangled in its cradle.
An impressive article published in 1885, on
the eve of the general election which resulted
in that disastrous stroke of policy, Mr. Glad-
stone's Irish Bill, both foretold its coming and,
in a spirit of prophecy, perhaps not fully con-
scious of the scope of its utterance, predicted
likewise the inevitable revulsion of the nation
from a foreign policy marked by constant
feebleness and repeated disgrace, as well as
from an economical propaganda which, what-
Motives to Imperial Federation 9 1
ever its possible fitness to a future yet distant,
had too far outrun the general sentiment of the
people to be practicable. The foreign policy
— summed up in the words of Candahar,
Majuba, Suakim, Khartoum, and Gordon —
was identified by the writer with the name of
Mr. Gladstone ; the economical programme
with that of Mr. Chamberlain. Neither the
one nor the other was longer acceptable. The
issue indicated, and since fulfilled, was the
abatement of interest in internal changes and
the concentration of national sentiment upon
external policy.
It needed only the announcement of Mr.
Gladstone's Irish Bill of 1886 to precipitate the
conclusion, for which men's minds were already
prepared. The Irish measure, in form a matter
of arrangement internal to the United King-
dom, was in essence one of which the gravest
bearing was upon external policy ; for in prin-
ciple it involved the dissolution of the Empire.
It is to the undying honor and distinction of
Mr. Chamberlain that he quickly recognized
the issue, and decided without hesitation that
the existence of the nation and of the Empire,
in undiminished power, involved the interests
92 Motives to Imperial Federation
of every class of the community, and therefore
utterly exceeded in immediate importance all
projects of social readjustment. Subordinating
to the general welfare the objects with which
he had been most closely associated, he sep-
arated himself from the party of his lifelong
allegiance, wherein lay the best hope of accom-
plishing his social programme, and thenceforth
has given pre-eminence to the imperial interests
which he saw threatened. This postponement
of political objects involved a sacrifice of per-
sonal ambition, to be appreciated only by recall-
ing the conditions of that time. The same
astute observer, writing but a year later, when
the momentous step had been taken, derided its
finality. " Mr. Chamberlain is the obvious suc-
cessor of Mr. Gladstone in leadership of the
democracy. It is idle to suppose he would
sacrifice this prospect for the sake of taking
a subordinate position in a Conservative or
even a Coalition Ministry. Sooner or later the
logic of facts must separate him from his present
associates. . . .His assistance to Unionists
is welcome as long as it lasts. Of its essence,
however, it is transitory. Mr. Chamberlain
will return to the Liberal fold, probably at no
Motives to Imperial Federation 93
remote date." The logic of one great thought,
Imperial Unity, the exclusive leading of the
single eye, has falsified these predictions ; but
it is only fair to accept their measurement
of what Mr. Chamberlain surrendered by his
act.
It is to be apprehended that the recent
striking outburst of blended national and impe-
rial sentiments in Great Britain and her colonies,
the display of unified enthusiasm sweeping over
the various quarters of the Empire, has been an
unpleasant surprise to the world at large. In
it has been recognized the strong bond of
national feeling, oneness of origin and blood,
joined to and inspiring the imperial conviction
which involves a fundamental unity of policy.
If, in the union of the two, deed answered to
word, if success followed upon attempt, a power
nothing short of new had arisen in the world.
The fluttering conception of twenty years ago
had become a reality ; incipient, perhaps, but
with what a possible future ! To this, doubt-
less, has been due in great part the correspond-
ing unanimity of denunciation on the Continent.
An unexpected manifestation of power and reso-
lution has elicited an echoing outcry from disap-
94 Motives to Imperial Federation
pointed anticipation. It is not quite thirty
years (1874) since a foreign naval captain
remarked to me that in his belief England was
a " colosse a pieds d'argile." This impression
was general. The phrase voiced a wish as
well as a thought; and it may be said that
then there was much to justify the implied
prophecy, whether it took the shape of a hope or
a fear, prompted by dislike or by affection. The
tendency of the great money-getting era of
trade and material prosperity, of exclusive
devotion to purely commercial ideas, of the
prevalence of strictly national, internal, domes-
tic interests over colonial sympathies and impe-
rial ambitions, was then culminating to its
decline ; and one looked in vain for the appear-
ance of higher aspirations and broader views,
bearing promise of a fresh spring to national
life. A down grade seemed at hand.
After the long supremacy of the dollars-
and-cents standards of policy, which arose and
flourished in the middle of the nineteenth
century, to languish and droop with its clos-
ing decades, experience is refreshed, and hope
stimulated, by the sight of two great peoples,
who speak the same tongue and inherit the
Motives to Imperial Federation 95
same tradition, casting aside considerations of
mere monetary cost and abandoning them-
selves to the domination of a lofty ideal.
This the United States did in 1861 under the
tremendous impetus exerted by the simple
words " The Union," which, cherished almost
to idolatry by the boyhood of the North dur-
ing preceding generations, — as the writer well
remembers, — lifted the nation to its feet as one
man when disruption threatened. The Union
was to us a personification, devotion to which
probably afforded the nearest approach to per-
sonal loyalty that the spirit of our institutions
warrants. Again, although to a less degree,
in the Philippines matter, where no such com-
manding motive or long tradition exists to
inspire, there is nevertheless to be found,
surely disengaging itself from the confused
tumult of impressions inevitable upon deci-
sions taken in the heat of pressing action, the
deep conviction, widespread among the people,
that here is no mere question of gain or loss,
of land or money, but one of moral responsi-
bility. Upon us has devolved, by an inevitable
sequence of causes, responsibility to our con-
science for an assemblage of peoples in moral
96 Motives to Imperial Federation
and political childhood ; and responsibility
further to the world at large, and to history,
— the supreme earthly judge of men's actions,
— for our course in the emergency thrust upon
us. As such, the United States has accepted
the burden. Its duties are not to be dis-
charged by throwing them overboard, or by
wrapping our political talent in a napkin for
our own national security and ease.
The noble record of Great Britain in Egypt
during the past twenty years, justly considered,
gives inspiration and direction to our purposes
for the Philippines. External conditions are
doubtless most diverse; but, if the informing
spirit be the same, it will adapt itself to the
circumstances, and the good-will find the way
to manifest itself in the damp lowlands and
mountains of the islands as surely as in the
dry Nile Valley. Here the example has been
set us for encouragement; and to cavilers at
the integrity of our purpose, or at the advantage
of our efforts to a subject people, we have but
to cite Egypt, which, like the Philippines, and
but a few years before them, is emerging from
a long period of oppression, to advance through
national childhood to such measure of self-
Motives to Imperial Federation 97
administration as its people may prove fit
for.
As regards the question of federal union, the
priority of experience is reversed. However
great the difference of conditions here pre-
sented to the British Empire and to America, —
and it is at least greater than the diversity be-
tween the Philippines and Egypt, — the United
States has been first to find a solution. The
American colonies began their attempt under
the difficulty of mutual alienation, due to long
standing tradition, and with interests differing
probably more radically than those which now
exist between the several English-speaking
parts of the British Empire. Despite this
serious initial obstacle, the thirteen original
States, aided later by those afterwards consti-
tuted, worked out the problem of union through
a prolonged period of perplexity, anxiety, re-
pulsion, and dissension. The final achievement
has been so complete that the men of to-day
have almost lost the very memory of the ante-
cedent travail, and of the narrow margin by
which ruin was more than once escaped. Here,
as in Egypt, but with more vital issues, there is
the cheering example of success; wrung in this
7
H
98 Motives to Imperial Federation
instance out of the jaws of imminent failure.
Hence, while the difference of circumstances
surrounding the problem of Imperial Federa-
tion precludes in great measure any advantage
of precedents to be found in the historic path
by which the American communities made
their way to union, it may safely be argued
that, if the informing spirit of desire be present,
the adequate motives to a closer imperial bond
recognized, the questions of form and method
will be solved in the one case as they have
been in the other. In both, the purpose and
end is the same : to assure unified, or imperial,
external action, by the means of an adequate
organ, common to all, while preserving the in-
dependence of the several parts in their in-
ternal affairs. Whatever the particular solution
appropriate to either, both present the diffi-
culty of reconciling in practical working two
principles/which in terms appear contradictory,
whereas in fact they may prove complementary.
Questions of such difficult character do not
recommend themselves to practical mankind
as political conundrums, in answering which
the satisfaction of the intellect is its own suffi-
cient reward. They are not accepted by men
Motives to Imperial Federation 99
as recreations, but are forced upon them by
urgency. They must supply their own ade-
quate motive, and propose their own reasonable
end, or they receive no attention. Only by
motives most grave, by danger most pressing,
by inconveniences serious in the present and
threatening to be intolerable in the future,
were the American States first driven into a
combination, imperfect and often grudging.
From this, still under the pressure of renewed
urgency, they advanced into a union more per-
fect in form but still sadly lacking in unity,
either of understanding or sentiment, until,
finally, to avert dismemberment, physical force
itself had to be exerted by those who had come
not only to believe in the Union, but by long
unquestioning devotion to love it supremely.
Mutual jealousy, quite as much as mutual
love, characterized the first efforts of the States
at association. As feeling grew kinder and
warmer, divergence of interest and of political
ideals still tended to preserve and to promote
the element of repulsion, as was shown in the
debates on the acceptance of the present Con-
stitution, and in many incidents of checkered
national life through two generations. Ulti-
LofC.
i oo Motives to Imperial Federation
mately, translated into broader action, from
individual States to groups of States, the last
manifestation of the disruptive tendency took on
a sectional form, upon a scale so large that the
ensuing war was in character rather international
than " civil/' as it has been commonly styled.
With one exception, there does not exist
among the different bodies which should com-
pose a federal Empire of Great Britain the
traditional alienation which hampered the
movement of the American States in their first
efforts towards union. The exception, of
course, is Ireland. Practically regarded, it is
impossible for a military man, or a statesman
with appreciation of military conditions, to
look at the map and not perceive that the am-
bition of Irish separatists, if realized, would be
even more threatening to the national life of
Great Britain than the secession of the South
was to that of the American Union. It would
be deadlier, also, to imperial aspirations ; for
Ireland, by geographical position, lies across
and controls the communications of Great
Britain with all the outside world, save only
that considerable, but far from preponderant,
portion which borders the North Sea and the
Motives to Imperial Federation 101
Baltic. Independent and hostile, it would
manacle Great Britain, which at present is, and
for years to come must remain, by long odds
the most powerful member of the federation, if
that take form. The Irish question, therefore,
is vitally important, not to Great Britain only,
but to the colonies. The considerations that
swayed the mind of the Union in the Civil
War apply with peculiar force to the connec-
tion between Great Britain and Ireland. And
let it be distinctly noted that the geographical
relation of Ireland to Great Britain imposes as
indispensable a political relation which would
be fatal to any scheme of federation between
the mother country and the remote great col-
onies. The legislative supremacy of the British
parliament, against the assertion of which the
American colonists revolted, and which to-day
would be found intolerable in exercise in Can-
ada and Australia, cannot be yielded in the
case of an island where independent action
might very well be attended with fatal conse-
quences to its partner. The instrument for
such action, in the shape of an independent
parliament, could not safely be trusted even to
avowed friends.
102 Motives to Imperial Federation
The constant lightening of control by the
mother country, and the concession of substan-
tial self-government, have removed from the
problem before Great Britain and her colonies
the initial disadvantage under which the Amer-
ican States drew together ; but, on the other
hand, the idea of Imperial Federation long
awaited the impulse which they received, first
from a common extreme danger, and afterwards
from their close contact with one another,
which emphasized the general injury that
mutual independence and inconsiderate action
were daily causing. It is not fanciful to say
that, as the common dangers to the American
colonies from the power of Great Britain, which
was to them irresistible unless they combined,
supplied the first motive to effectual association ;
so the needed impulse, urgent if not imperative,
was found by the members of the British Em-
pire in the danger and threatened oppression
of one of their number by alien blood. The
feeling of nationality, the sentiment of one
blood and one political tradition, wrought pow-
erfully in support of imperial action in South
Africa ; and it is a commonplace that action
intensifies sentiment.
Motives to Imperial Federation 103
When the American colonists united in form,
however defective, they had made a large prac-
tical step towards the sentiment of union, which
as a constraining force is even stronger than
interest. In that which has been well named
" the critical period " of American history, be-
tween the War of Independence and the adop-
tion of the Constitution, the love of the Union
showed itself forcibly in the utterances even of
those who dreaded union on the terms proposed.
When we consider the narrow majorities by
which these were accepted, it is easy to believe
that only the realization in act of the first union,
that of the Confederacy, made possible the
second, — the federal Union. When the British
colonies and the mother country, three years
ago, rose together in defence of a threatened
brother and child, translating into action an
idea nascent but as yet weak in its grasp of
men's affections, they also advanced a first
stage, the most important stage, in the direc-
tion of a further unity, under such ultimate
form as their particular relations may de-
mand. The analogy of the two cases is per-
fectly real. The idea of union was not new
to Americans before their Revolution. On
104 Motives to Imperial Federation
the contrary, its advantages were obvious ;
but all attempts prompted by manifest in-
terest fell abortive, until pressure was sup-
plied by the Stamp Act and its train of
incidents. The legislation of the Transvaal,
supplemented by the Afrikander Bond, has
fulfilled the same office in the history of Impe-
rial Federation ; unless, indeed, a prior claim
to that honor be established for Mr. Parnell.
Not the conception nor yet tentative theories
were wanting ; but languid inclination had to
be quickened into stirring life by contact with
pressing occasion.
Two successive dangers, Ireland and South
Africa, have thus contributed to the onward
movement of imperialism in Great Britain.
They have indicated a need and furnished a
motive. The first gave birth to aspiration, con-
scious and definite, towards a higher form of
imperial development; corresponding in anal-
ogy, though by no means necessarily in outward
resemblance, to the " more perfect union " of
the once loosely combined American States.
The second emphasized the wisdom of such a
policy by a concrete example of its advantages.
Aspiration, having found its opportunity, was
Motives to Imperial Federation 105
translated into action ; and action in turn rein-
forces and stimulates aspiration by demonstra-
tion, and by its powerful effect upon sentiment,
the great motive force of humanity. Happily,
too, for the general impulse, the illustration of
advantage has been afforded in one of the great
colonies, where national self-existence, entire
independence of outside control, and exemption
from the exposure attendant upon an imperial
war, might have a preponderant hold upon
men's minds. The specific utility of the impe-
rial connection to the large secondary members
was shown ; for the menace to one of them
came from a State which, though in form in-
ternal to the Empire, was in fact and power
external as w r ell as alien.
Similar conditions may well arise elsewhere,
with extreme increase of danger to one of the
great colonies, if severed by independence from
the support of the British navy. Canada,
doubtless, whatever she might lose otherwise,
would find territorial immunity in the policy of
the United States, avowed in the Monroe
Doctrine, — as applicable to her as to South
America ; but to South Africa, Australia, and
New Zealand, local difficulties, — such as those
io6 Motives to Imperial Federation
of the Transvaal, and of New Guinea twenty
years ago, — would, in the absence of the impe-
rial bond, assume a very different aspect if
incurred with a powerful European naval State.
These instances also bring into conspicuous
evidence the general truth that sea power, the
material strength and bond of an Empire the
component parts of which are separated by
thousands of miles of ocean, is equally essen-
tial to the individual security of the several
members. Imperial Federation, in action, will
manifest itself pre-eminently along ocean and
naval lines.
At present the large colonies, while retain-
ing their hold upon the support of the Empire,
to the power of which they in turn can con-
tribute much, substantially control all that
relates to their internal affairs. Taxation,
regulation of commerce, the purse and the
sword, are in their own hands. Were they to
become immediately independent, no jar would
be felt in the continuance of the local adminis-
tration. The appointment of the governors
by the Crown, may, if choice be judicious,
materially help to maintain the reality, as it
does the form, of political attachment to the
Motives to Imperial Federation 107
mother country; but the actual government
is parliamentary, and assumption of independ-
ence would not necessarily involve any serious
modification of institutions. Further, in two
out of the three large aggregations of colonial
communities, in Canada and in Australia, there
exists now a federal compact, by which bodies
but a few years ago politically separate, linked
only by common allegiance to Great Britain,
are united into one State. British South
Africa still remains an assemblage of colonies,
with particular local and domestic difficulties
of their own, on which it is inopportune here
to enlarge.
These are the present political conditions of
the principal factors of which an Imperial
Federation, if realized, will be composed. It
seems inevitable, however, that, when the re-
sistance of the Boers shall have ended, some
form of union will be requisite to insure the
dominance of British political ideas and tradi-
tions throughout the mass of South African
colonists; for in such community of sentiment
a federal union of the Empire must find the
homogeneousness without which it will be but
a vain word. The term nation, it is said,
io8 Motives to Imperial Federation
applies primarily to community of blood ; but
I question whether a closer bond is not to be
found in inherited acceptance, inborn and in-
bred, of the same political ideas, fundamental
laws, and habits of thought, which regulate the
relations and intercourse between man and
man, and constitute congeniality. If to these
a common tongue be added, environment will
have done more to promote unity than it is in
the power of mere blood to effect.
It may fairly be questioned whether the
phrase Imperial Federation is not something
of a misnomer, altogether too broad in its im-
plication. It has obtained currency ; and in
a general way is understood with as much pre-
cision as is perhaps attainable in the present
inchoate stage of the idea involved. Are all
parts of the present Empire to be admitted as
component States in the Federation? Take
India as the crucial instance, on account of
its extent and population, extremely important
elements in state existence ; is its constitution,
racial, social, and political, such that it could
be admitted at the present time as one of
several self-governing communities, under the
federation of which the affairs of the Federal
Motives to Imperial Federation 109
State, the interests common to all, and the
external policy of the whole, could be adminis-
tered ? Can India be properly described as a
State? Without statehood a community can
be a member of an Empire, as a dependency,
but it can scarcely be a member of a federation.
Logomachies, when nothing more, are un-
profitable ; but in attempting the solution of
such a problem, difficult both on the intellectual
and the practical sides, accuracy of expression
demands closeness of thought, and is rewarded
by increased clearness of vision as to the exact
nature of the object desired. I do not propose
myself to pursue the interrogatory I have sug-
gested; but apparently the aim of those who
desire federation, the importance of which is
to me undeniable, should not be so much a
federated Empire — is not that a contradiction
in terms? — as a federal State, or kingdom,
composed of some half-dozen principal mem-
bers, substantially homogeneous in their prin-
ciples of government. To this system would
remain attached a huge dominion of subordi-
nate communities, differing much between
themselves in size and importance, as well as
in blood, institutions, and social development,
1 1 o Motives to Imperial Federation
and linked together only by the common rule
of the Federal State, as they now are by that
of the United Kingdom. The Federal King-
dom and the dependencies, taken together, and
in their respective relations of governing and
governed, would compose the Empire.
It is such rule and control over peoples not
yet fully fitted to go alone that in strictness
of phrase constitute Empire. Empire is not
a particular form of government. It is a fact,
independent of particular methods. The Re-
public of the United States, already a federal
State, has found itself by the impulse and
sequence of events in just this position of
Empire ; charged with the responsibility of
subordinate communities which it would be
impossible now to admit to statehood in the
federation. Against this condition of empire
— actual and inevitable — -from which there
has been, and is, no escape at once honorable
and safe, a small minority of Americans have
revolted violently. They regard it as destruc-
tive of cherished formulas, political maxims,
which are identified with and accurately ex-
press the principles of our own national exist-
ence and growth, and therefore are assumed,
Motives to Imperial Federation 1 1 1
inconsequently, to apply equally to races en-
tirely different in antecedents and in present
development. Words and phrases, however,
war hopelessly against facts with which they
are inconsistent; nor is there any more curious
instance than this of veritable and futile log-
omachy. To more practical Americans, thus
committed despite themselves to imperialism
after federation, it is impressive to watch a
converse process ; to see a consolidated king-
dom, a unified State, possessed of an already
existing Empire, feeling its way to perpetuation
and intension of power by means of federation
with those members of its present empire which
are homogeneous to itself.
Imperialism, the extension of national au-
thority over alien communities, is a dominant
note in the world-politics of to-day. Compara-
tively a newcomer, it already contends for pre-
eminence with commercial ambition, to which
also it ministers. This out-reaching of an
imperialistic arm by all the greater nations,
whether voluntary or compelled by circum-
stances, constitutes and summarizes the motive
to a closer union than that which now exists
between the members of the British Empire.
ii2 Motives to Imperial Federation
In the past, Ireland and the Transvaal have
given impulsion ; the present and the future
have further reason, no less imperious. The
conditions have ceased under which inde-
pendence might conceivably be more advan-
tageous to the larger colonies. If ever true, it
is no longer so that the colonial tie brings
them no compensative advantage for exposure
in war. They are now surrounded by ambitions
and confronted by navies which till recently
did not exist. Once war meant to them only
incidental injury; now it may well mean per-
manent mutilation to a colony thrown by in-
dependence upon its own resources. Not
now, if ever, much less now than ever before,
can colonial interests be viewed as separate
from the politics of Europe and America. In
peace as in war, in peace to avert war, or to
stay trespass which armed power alone can
restrain, each colony now needs the strong arm
of the mother country's fleet to sustain its local
strength. According to the circumstances,
such support may be given either immediately
in colonial waters, or by diversion, in Europe
or elsewhere, keeping the enemy's battleships
remote. In one way or the other it is indis-
Motives to Imperial Federation 113
pensable. With it the colony will be — not
invulnerable, perhaps, but — invincible ; with-
out it, immunity can be insured only by the
maintenance of a local navy approaching equal-
ity with those of Europe.
The greater European powers are now colo-
nially present in several quarters of the globe,
and there renew through their colonies the
contact and collision of interests which have
marked European history. The histories of
Australasia and South Africa, possibly of Can-
ada also, are yet to make. Colonial jealousies
in turn are transmitted back to the mother
countries, and there give rise to diplomatic
friction perhaps more dangerous, certainly
more frequent, than do questions purely Euro-
Dean. In the latter, rulers meet facts of terri-
torial tenure so founded in popular acceptance
and mutual jealousies as to give little expec-
tation of facile modification by resort to war.
In newer countries, as the history of North
America witnesses, the undetermined condi-
tions which exist, and the resultant unrest in
men's minds, predispose colonists to jealousies
which readily find or give provocation ; and
strife is promoted by the comparative ease with
i'i4 Motives to Imperial Federation
which great territories may change masters
through the fortune of war, as Canada and
India, for instance, passed from France to
Great Britain in the eighteenth century. In
our own day, the political future of the vast
tract known as British South Africa is being
decided by a war that has found its origin in
colonial friction, but to the successful issue of
which imperial intervention and sea power
were essential. The consequences to Great-
Britain and her colonies of failure in this case,
and the possibilities inherent in the proximity
of German East and Southwest Africa, illus-
trate further the contingencies with which the
present and the future of the British Empire
will have to deal.
This reliance of the colonies upon the
mother nation finds its correlative in the fact
that European States in turn rest upon their
colonies for maintenance in necessary activities.
They can no longer extend freely within their
own continent, nor there find adequate markets
for their ever increasing production ; yet, in
order that they may securely expand elsewhere,
they must have local support in the several
quarters whither their energies reach. This
Motives to Imperial Federation 1 1 5
interaction of mother countries and colonies,
their reciprocal dependence and importance,
are decisive facts, to which development and
organization should be given. For local se-
curity, or for the assertion of external rights or
interests, the colonies cannot as yet dispense
with the material force of the home govern-
ment. Without it they are unequal to a con-
flict, necessarily in the main naval, with any
one of three or four foreign nations whose
colonial possessions are near them. A Euro-
pean fleet, on the other hand, must rely upon
local bases of action far more than in the days
when coal renewal was not a question. For
this, isolated fortified stations, like Bermuda
and Gibraltar, may be most useful from unique
geographical situation ; but in intrinsic value
they do not compare with positions which have
behind them a loyal continent, with extensive
social and commercial organization, such as
Canada, Australia, and South Africa afford.
This reciprocal service and utility constitute
the chief general and common interest in which
the motive to Imperial Federation at present
lies. It is not alone, but it is paramount, and
will, I think, be found to embrace all the many
1 1 6 Motives to Imperial Federation
minor interests which now, and in peace, tend
to union; for it defends them, and in defending
perpetuates. It is essentially an interest of
general defence imposed by novel and growing
world-conditions. It must be recognized as
covering, not only the local welfare of each and
all the parts, but also the communications be-
tween them, chiefly by sea, which may, and in
large measure do, lie remote from any one of
the federation. The several members, and the
highways between them, together make one
whole, to the maintenance of which each even
now contributes. The object of federation is
to promote the security of this imperial system
and its development on firmer lines. To the
general acceptance of this fact of a supreme
common interest must be added on all hands a
hearty disposition to subordinate local interests
to the general welfare, when they clash. Just
here, of course, arises the difficulty of realizing
any federation, especially in its early stages ;
later, like everything possessed of inherent
usefulness, federation gains strength by its hold
upon mens affections. The difficulty is very
real, for not only does each member naturally
exaggerate its own claims, but it also tends to
Motives to Imperial Federation 1 1
/
disregard the needs of others, of which it has
not immediate experience. Out of touch, out
of mind, is the evil genius of all federative
efforts, to be expelled only by the superior
influence of a dominating affection for the tie
of union, through experience of its benefits.
In the order of logical sequence, federation
finds its origin and motive force in a common
interest, which is the first impulse in the direc-
tion of the desired object. The next step is to
recognize clearly what is this object, this goal
of attainment, by reaching which the admitted
interest shall be subserved. The object, I sup-
pose, is to provide the several members with
an organism, an instrument common to all,
which shall be specifically efficient in the main-
tenance of the common interests, and inopera-
tive towards strictly individual concerns. This
object is loosely styled Imperial Federation,
but its particular form and the method of
attainment are yet indeterminate. The form
of an instrument, and the method of its fabri-
cation, though dictated by the use for which it
is designed, are in process distinct from it.
The States of the American Union, for example,
having recognized certain common interests,
1 1 8 Motives to Imperial Federation
formed the common object of making a special
provision for the care of those specific interests
and of none others. The particular method,
— adapted subsequently to the recognition of
interest and object, — was a central govern-
ment fully equipped with executive, legislative,
and judicial functions. This form suited them,
but most probably may not suit the conditions
of the British Empire, the members of which
at present seem in the position of having rec-
ognized, somewhat imperfectly, a community
of interest. Thence has arisen a desire, vague
and somewhat feeble, for an object, an instru-
ment, they see not yet just what, to which
the common interest may be solely intrusted.
When minds are definitely settled on these two
points, that they have the interest and need
the instrument, thinking men will sooner or
later evolve methods. In a recent excursion
into that realm of unfulfilled prophecy, the
magazines of twenty years ago, I found affirmed
the hopelessness of Australian federation. Fol-
lowing by a few numbers, perhaps elicited by
this, Sir Henry Parkes stated that all the more
thoughtful men in Australia had thought out
in one form or another the question of federa-
Motives to Imperial Federation 1 1 9
tion. The result in Australia is now before us.
Imperial Federation is doubtless a problem
very different in kind, but not necessarily more
hopeless. The need being recognized, individ-
uals will frame methods, from the discussion
of which feasible measures will result. Interest
is the foundation of the whole; the object is
the building to be raised thereon, the plan of
which depends upon the needs of those who
shall use it. The interest, again, is self-
existent; whether men like it or not, there it
is ; the object — union in some form — is a
matter of voluntary acceptance and purposeful
effort on the part of those interested. The
method by which the object is to be attained is
the last in the mental processes.
The contrivance of methods requires close
detailed knowledge of the political conditions
of the several parts, to be attained only by
prolonged personal contact. A foreigner of
reasonable modesty will here forbear sug-
gestion, but may with less presumption con-
sider some of the obvious circumstances which
make the object more or less desirable, and
the methods of its attainment more or less
intricate.
1 20 Motives to Imperial Federation
From the wide dispersion of the principal
members it is evident that each one, by acqui-
escing in any federal bond, enters into such
new relations with its fellows as involve a
policy external to itself, additional to that
already existing towards distinctly foreign na-
tions. Internal affairs remain in the hands of
each one; foreign relations continue unaltered;
but superimposed upon both come relations to
one another on the part of communities geo-
graphically far apart, and heretofore practically
severed, save for the loose tie now uniting
them to the mother country. These relations
are new and are external; their maintenance
involves an established politic action — policy
— distinctly external. Moreover, whatever the
nature of the federal bond, there is conceded
to it a certain amount of the virtually entire
independence previously enjoyed. This will
be true of Great Britain as well as of the
colonies. At the present writing, in the ab-
sence of any federal union, the mother country
has entire management of the foreign policy
of the Empire. Concern for the interests of
the colonies, regard to their possible action in
case of serious discontent with particular meas-
Motives to Imperial Federation 1 2 1
ures, certainly and necessarily modify the de-
cisions of the British Cabinet. In this way the
colonies possess influence; but influence is
different from power, less assured in exercise,
and less dignified in recognition. Colonial in-
terests, as affected by foreign relations, not only
are not in the hands of the colonists, but they
have no constitutional voice in determining
them. In this chiefly their dependency now
consists ; and Sir Henry Parkes, whose ideal
of Australian independence was not severance
from the Empire, but entrance upon a due
share in the government of a united Empire,
avowed his conviction that there was no pos-
sibility of permanent contentment with the
status of dependency. Deprecating separate
independence, he defined the only alternative
to be " sharing on equal terms in all the glory
of the Empire." The precision of this phrase
is in one respect noteworthy. It does not
demand an equal share, but a share " on equal
terms." This not only admits, but prescribes,
that the power constitutionally exercised by
each member shall bear some proportion to
the strength contributed by it to the whole.
Otherwise there is no equality.
122 Motives to Imperial Federation
Here, apparently, whatever the method
adopted, there will have to be concession on
the part of Great Britain. Constitutional re-
straint upon her present unlimited control of
the foreign policy of the Empire, by some clear
voting power on the part of the other mem-
bers, would seem an inevitable concomitant of
federation. In return, evidently, the colonies
by acquiring a voice in the determination of
foreign policy would incur a proportionate ob-
ligation to bear the burdens necessary to its
enforcement. In place of the purely volun-
tary and unregulated assistance now given,
there must be accepted a compulsory and de-
terminate contribution to the general defence.
The amounts may be fixed at the first by an
agreement to which all the parties may be
voluntary participants ; but, unless the federa-
tion is to be periodically renewable at choice,
— a most unsatisfactory arrangement, — its
terms must provide the means for readjust-
ment of obligations, as the several parties ad-
vance in strength, at rates probably unequal.
This is, in effect, entrusting the power of taxa-
tion to a central organ established by the federal
Constitution. Unless acceptance of this reap-
Motives to Imperial Federation 1 2 3
portionment of burdens, as provided for by the
terms of federation, is obligatory upon every
member, the federation carries in its constitu-
tion the seeds of decay. It is doomed from
its birth ; for not only is each member at lib-
erty to withdraw, but the sense of that liberty
will continually sap the sentiment for union
which supplies the spirit of federation, as mu-
tual interest does its body.
We meet here clearly an initial difficulty in
the inequality of population and resources
among the members of the supposed federa-
tion. I assume that these would be the United
Kingdom, the Dominion of Canada, the Aus-
tralian Commonwealth, New Zealand, and the
group of South African colonies, as yet un-
combined. These, at least, would be the prin-
cipal pillars of the federated Empire. Among
them the United Kingdom is now so greatly
preponderant, upon any ordinary basis of com-
parison, as to outweigh all the others put
together. As in the case of the province of
Holland among the seven United Netherlands,
this is in effect a cohesive force now, but it
evidently introduces a grave difficulty in the
way of formal federation. Shall the colonies
1 24 Motives to Imperial Federation
put themselves under bonds to any central
body, in which their total voice is outweighed
by the vote of the home country? Could
Great Britain accept an arrangement like that
of the first American confederacy, where each
State, large and small, had one vote ? Is there
any feasible combination of these two alterna-
tives, such as is to-day presented by the national
legislature of the United States ?
It is needless to insist upon the practical
difficulty as to method. Evidently, to over-
come it, motive must be strong. We must
fall back upon the common interest which
points the way to the common object, leaving
to the ingenuity of those directly concerned,
or to evolution, — perhaps to both, — the de-
termination of means. The common interest
demands increased mutual support throughout
the Empire, in view of the new conditions of
the world which have transferred the rivalries
and the needs of Europe to colonial and other
foreign regions. The object is to reach some
working arrangement, by which the several
contributions of the various parts of the Em-
pire to the general support and defence may
be not only determined but enforced. In
Motives to Imperial Federation 125
peace things may drift along as they are ;
but Imperial Federation is needed for prob-
able emergencies, to combine military prep-
aration, to avert war by evident readiness, or
to meet it if it come. It requires, therefore,
the power of the sword and the purse, guar-
anteed by something more binding than the
voluntary action from time to time of the in-
dividual communities composing it. For sus-
tained effort Imperial Federation will be
impotent, unless at the very least the several
members are willing to accept a fixed burden,
periodically determined by some competent
body, external to all, but in the constitution
of which each, of course, has a voice. The
experience of the United States goes farther.
They found it not sufficient to determine in a
lump amount the proportion due from each
member; effective union, efficiency for the
defence of the whole, was not obtained until
power was given to the central government,—
not merely to fix the quotas in men and money
of the several States, — but to lay and to exact
taxes upon the citizens of all the States, pass-
ing over the State governments directly to in-
dividual men. The power refused by them to
126 Motives to Imperial Federation
the British Parliament was deliberately, for the
sake of union, granted to the Congress of the
United States, in which the States and their
citizens were severally represented.
This it will be seen was a question of
method. Its adoption resulted from long,
bitter experience. Only so, and hardly so, was
it conceded. It was the final step in the prog-
ress to union. Like its predecessors, it was ex-
torted by dire emergency. This imparted the
motive ; bringing men to desire, as a political
object, the organism, the scheme, which out
of the States framed the Nation and started it
on the road to success. To the American mo-
tive geographical nearness contributed much ;
for the different communities could not help
seeing the injury all were receiving from their
mutual indifference or antagonism. The mem-
bers of the British Empire are in this less
fortunate. Their remoteness makes less evi-
dent the interaction of conditions and events.
That the suffering of one member involves
injury to each, because of its effect upon the
whole, becomes less easy to realize. Motive
thereby becomes less clear and less imperative.
The impulse to form an object, and to grapple
Motives to Imperial Federation 127
with the difficulties of method which impede
its accomplishment, is weakened.
Still, the motives are there. Let each mem-
ber of the Empire consider, for instance, what
it would mean to the general welfare to have
an independent and hostile Ireland lying across
the access of Great Britain to the outer world.
What would the weakening of the chief mem-
ber of the Empire be to every other ? What
would a conquered and hostile South Africa
have meant to Australia? and beyond Aus-
tralia, to British influence in the Far East ?
Can decay of British influence in China be
seen with equanimity by Canada, with its Pa-
cific seaboard ? For the same reason it cannot
be indifferent to Canada whether the British
navy and commerce, in war, find their way to
the Farther East through the Mediterranean,
or be forced to the long Cape route. It is,
therefore, matter of interest to her, and to
Australia, if a hostile naval power be firmly
based on the Persian Gulf. In a way, these
are internal questions. They are so imme-
diately, with reference to the Empire at large ;
but it is easy to see that their determination
affects powerfully, possibly even vitally, the
128 Motives to Imperial Federation
external and foreign relations of the whole and
of each part. One member has just been
saved from destruction by the combined effort
of all, supported by the supreme sea power of
the mother country. This result, too, is in-
ternal to the Empire ; but is it not also of vast
importance to its external security and foreign
policy? What has made the Transvaal so
formidable to the adjoining colonies and to the
Empire ? It is because not only was the pop-
ulation hostile, but the hostility was organized,
armed, and equipped, under the shield of com-
plete self-government. Had Ireland been con-
ceded the substance of Mr. Gladstone's bill, or
should she hereafter attain it, would not her
power of mischief, in case, <%£ foreign war,
make such demands upon the presence of the
British navy as seriously to lessen l ifs ability to
protect commercial routes and colonies ? She
is to the United Kingdom what the Transvaal
has been to South Africa. The consideration
shows both how important the status of Ire-
land is to the colonies, and how much, by the
development of their own forces, relieving the
navy of the United Kingdom, they can con-
tribute to its security, and thereby to that of
Motives to Imperial Federation 129
the commercial routes, which is the common
interest of all.
In the question of foreign relations are con-
spicuously to be seen the advantages of federa-
tion, which on the internal side is not without
its drawbacks. Its look is distinctively out-
ward, recognizing that there conditions have
undergone decisive change. It faces the world,
and sees that to do so with success it must
show a united body. For that purpose it seeks
to find a means, an organ, in which and by
which union may be established and main-
tained. For that purpose it must be willing to
endure the internal sacrifices, the inevitable
concessions of individual independence, and
the burdens of additional expense. For these
concessions on either hand there will be com-
pensation. The colonies by entering upon
a share in determining the foreign policy of
the whole, gain wider scope of action, elevation
of idea, increased dignity of existence, and state
equality with the United Kingdom, actual in
kind, partial in degree ; an equality resembling,
doubtless, in principle that of the lower house
of the United States, where the representation
for all the States is the same in character, but
9
1 30 Motives to Imperial Federation
in voting power proportioned to the respective
populations. Individual colonists would claim
and find imperial careers, as the interests and
obligations of their native land gained ever
increasing expansion in the general growth
and interaction of the Empire. To Sir Henry
Parkes this seemed, for Australia, a higher
destiny than independence ; he called it " a
rightful share in what may be a more glorious
rule than mankind has ever yet seen."
It is not to be denied that superficially,
perhaps by force of tradition, the benefit of
federation seems chiefly to inure to the mother
country. This impression probably derives
from the old idea of state property, underlying
the colonial relation. Under such a concep-
tion, the benefit of the owner of this estate,
the mother country, was naturally the primary
object in administration. The subordination
of the colony was not merely in political con-
nection, but in economical treatment. This
was admitted by the American colonists, who,
though they rebelled promptly at commercial
regulation by tariff, for the raising of imperial
revenue, as being indirect taxation, acquiesced
in regulation which alleged the benefit of
Motives to Imperial Federation 1 3 1
imperial trade as a whole, though they suffered
by it.
Such conditions, however, have passed away;
and after the temporary domination of the
contrary belief, that colonies are of little or no
advantage, it is now recognized that in the
mutual relation there is reciprocity of benefit,
even though there be not equality. Colonies
trade more readily with the mother country
than with others ; and the capital of the latter,
other things being equal, seeks investment more
readily, with greater feeling of security, in com-
munities kindred in political and legal tradition,
and of a common allegiance. The question of
military and naval reciprocity of usefulness has
been touched on. To this is to be added
the wider and grander sphere open to the
colonies, as communities and as individuals,
when closer relations gain them increasing
entry, and opportunity for activity, in the inter-
nal administration and foreign policy of a great
established State like the United Kingdom. In
the present threatening and doubtful question
of the future of China are the elements of a
world-conflict, in which the British navy is one
of the largest among several determinative
132 Motives to Imperial Federation
factors. Its strength can be supported and
enlarged by the conditions attendant upon
federation, and the colonies can thus share in
both the benefits and the distinction of influence
upon great political issues ; but what of weight
or of prestige can they there display, if severally
independent ? They may receive the benefit of
the open door, but not the self-contentment of
self-help. Self-dependence, as distinct from
nominal independence, is to be found in federa-
tion, not in separation. As time passes, it can
hardly fail that the premier and government of
the Australian federation will be greater in
position and wider in activities than the cor-
responding officials of the several states; and
in like manner a man will be larger in his own
eye and that of the world as a citizen of
Australia, than as belonging to a particular
division of the Commonwealth. The federation
of the United States exalted irresistibly the
name American far beyond all local designa-
tions. So Imperial Federation will dignify and
enlarge each State and each citizen that enters
its fold.
Imperial Federation proposes a partnership
in which a number of younger and poorer
Motives to Imperial Federation 133
members are admitted into a long standing
wealthy firm. This simile is doubtless not an
exhaustive statement; but there can be little
doubt that it is sufficiently just to show where
the preponderance of benefit will for the time
fall. The expenditure of the United Kingdom
on the South African w r ar offers a concrete
example of this truth, doubly impressive to
those who, like the writer, see in this instance
great imperial obligation but little material
interest, save the greatest of all,- — the preser-
vation of the Empire. On the other hand, in
view of the spreading collision of interests
throughout the world, it is hard to over-value
the advantage of healthy, attached, self-govern-
ing colonies to a European country of to-day.
Blessed is the State that has its quiver full of
them. Under such conditions, and with the
motives to union that have been presented, it is
petty to fasten attention on comparative benefit
to the exclusion of mutual benefit. Not by
such grudging spirit are great ideas realized,
or great ends compassed. Sentiment, imagina-
tion, aspiration, the satisfaction of the rational
and moral faculties in some object better than
bread alone, — all must find a part in a worthy
1 34 Motives to Imperial Federation
motive; not to the exclusion of reasonable
interests, but to their ennoblement by marriage
to loftier aims, seeking gratification in wider
activities. Like individuals, nations and em-
pires have souls as well as bodies. Great and
beneficent achievement ministers to worthier
contentment than the filling of the pocket.
Finally, the broadening and strengthening of
British power by the progress of Imperial
Federation is necessarily an object of profound
interest to Americans. In many quarters it
will find deep sympathy ; in others, perhaps,
jealousy may be manifested. For this there is
no good cause. The American Commonwealth
and the British Empire have had many jars in
the past, the memory of which has not wholly
disappeared; but more and more clearly are
coming into view the permanent conditions
that from the first have existed, but until now
have been overlaid and buried by the wreckage
of past collisions and disputes. In language,
law, and political traditions there is fundamen-
tal identity ; and in blood also, though to some
extent differentiated in each by foreign admix-
ture. Coincidently with these, there is a clearly
defined and wide belt of geographical separa-
Motives to Imperial Federation 135
tion between their several spheres, — save the
one common boundary between Canada and
the United States. These constitute perma-
nent factors, tending on the one hand to pro-
mote understanding, and on the other to avert
misunderstandings. To reinforce these, there
is rapidly arising a community of commercial
interests and of righteous ideals in the Far
East. In proportion to the hold which abiding
factors such as these have upon the mind of
the statesman, will be the light he finds to
thread his way through the passing perplexities
of revolving years. The tactical changes of
front and redistribution of arrangements, which
the incidental progress of events necessitates
from time to time, will lack intelligence, cohe-
rence, and firmness, unless governed by con-
stant reference to the things which cannot be
shaken, and which bear to policy the same
relation that the eternal principles of strategy
do to the conduct of war.
CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING
THE DISPOSITION OF NAVIES
CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING
THE DISPOSITION OF NAVIES
May, 1902.
WE have the highest military authority for
saying that " War is a business of posi-
tions " ; a definition which includes necessarily
not only the selection of positions to be taken,
with the reasonings, or necessities, which dic-
tate the choice, but further also the assignment
of proportionate force to the several points
occupied. All this is embraced in the easy
phrase, " The distribution of the fleet." In
these words, therefore, ought to be involved, by
necessary implication, an antecedent apprecia-
tion of the political, commercial, and military
exigencies of the State in the event of possible
wars ; for the dispositions of peace should bear
a close relation to the contingency of war. All
three elements form a part of the subject-matter
for consideration, for each is an essential factor
in national life. Logically separable, in prac-
140 Considerations Governing
tice the political, commercial, and military
needs are so intertwined that their mutual
interaction constitutes one problem. The fre-
quent statement that generals in the field have
no account to take of political considerations,
conveys, along with a partial truth, a most mis-
leading inference. Applied even to military
and naval leaders, it errs by lack of qualifica-
tion ; but for the statesman, under whom the
soldier or seaman acts, the political as well as
the military conditions must influence, must at
times control, and even reverse, decision.
The choice of situations, localities, to be held
as bases of operations, is governed by considera-
tions of geographical position, military strength,
and natural resources, which endure from age
to age; a permanence which justifies the ex-
pense of adequate fortification. The distribu-
tion of mobile force, military or naval, is
subject to greater variation, owing to changes
of circumstances. Nevertheless, at any one
historical moment, of peace or war, this ques-
tion also admits of an appropriate fixed deter-
mination, general in outline, but not therefore
necessarily vague. This conclusion should be
the outcome of weighing the possible dangers
The Disposition of Navies 141
of the State, and all the various factors — po-
litical, commercial, and military — which affect
national welfare. The disposition thence
adopted should be the one which will best
expedite the several readjustments and combi-
nations that may be necessitated by the out-
break of various particular wars, which may
happen with this or that possible enemy. Such
modification of arrangements can be predicated
with reasonable certainty for a measurable
period in advance. The decision thus reached
may be called the "strategic " solution, because
dependent upon ascertainable factors, relatively
permanent, of all which it takes account ; and
because also it is accepted, consciously and of
purpose, as preliminary to the probable great
movements of war, present or prospective.
In the particular cases that afterwards arise
from time to time, and of which the outbreak of
war may itself be one, the unforeseen, the unex-
pected, begins to come into operation. This is
one of the inevitable accompaniments of war-
fare. The meeting of these new conditions,
by suitable changes *of plan, is temporary in
character, varying possibly from day to day ;
but it will generally be found that the more
142 Considerations Governing
comprehensive has been the previous strategic
study, and the more its just forecasts have con-
trolled the primary disposition, ■ — the distribu-
tion of force, — the more certainly and readily
will this lend itself to the shifting incidents of
hostilities. These movements bear to the fun-
damental general dispositions the relations
which tactics have to strategy. In them, on
occasions, one or two of the leading considera-
tions which have each had their full weight in
the original dispositions, may have to be momen-
tarily subordinated to the more pressing demand
of a third. In war, generally and naturally,
military exigencies have preponderant weight;
but even in war the safety of a great convoy,
or of a commercial strategic centre, may at a
given instant be of more consequence than a
particular military gain. So political condi-
tions may rightly be allowed at times to over-
weigh military prudence, or to control military
activity. This is eminently true, for, after all,
war is political action. The old phrase, " The
cannon is the last argument of kings," nlay now
be paraphrased, "War is the last argument of
diplomacy." Its purpose is to compass political
results, where peaceful methods have failed ;
The Disposition of Navies 143
and while undoubtedly, as war, the game should
be played in accordance with the well-estab-
lished principles of the art, yet, as a means to
an end, it must consent to momentary modifi-
cations, in accepting which a well-balanced
mind admits that the means are less than the
end, and must be subjected to it.
The question between military and political
considerations is therefore one of proportion,
varying from time to time as attendant circum-
stances change. As regards the commercial
factor, never before in the history of the w 7 orld
has it been so inextricably commingled with
politics. The interdependence of nations for
the necessities and luxuries of life have been
marvellously increased by the growth of pop-
ulation and the habits of comfort contracted
by the peoples of Europe and America through
a century of comparative peace, broken only by
wars which, though gigantic in scale, have been
too short in duration to affect seriously com-
mercial relations. The unmolested course of
commerce, reacting upon itself, has contributed
also to its own rapid development, a result fur-
thered by the prevalence of a purely economi-
cal conception of national greatness during the
144 Considerations Governing
larger part of the century. This, with the vast
increase in rapidity of communication, has mul-
tiplied and strengthened the bonds knitting the
interests of nations to one another, till the
whole now forms an articulated system, not
only of prodigious size and activity, but of an
excessive sensitiveness, unequalled in former
ages. National nerves are exasperated by the
delicacy of financial situations, and national
resistance to hardship is sapped by generations
that have known war only by the battlefield,
not in the prolonged endurance of privation and
straitness extending through years and reach-
ing every class of the community. The preser-
vation of commercial and financial interests
constitutes now a political consideration of the
first importance, making for peace and deter-
ring from war; a fact well worthy of observa-
tion by those who would exempt maritime com-
mercial intercourse from the operations of naval
war, under the illusory plea of protecting pri-
vate property at sea. Ships and cargoes in
transit upon the sea are private property in
only one point of view, and that the narrowest
Internationally considered, they are national
wealth engaged in reproducing and multiplying
The Disposition of Navies 145
itself, to the intensification of the national
power, and that by the most effective process ;
for it relieves the nation from feeding upon itself,
and makes the whole outer world contribute to
its support. It is therefore a most proper
object of attack; more humane, and more con-
ducive to the objects of war, than the slaughter
of men. A great check on war would be re-
moved by assuring immunity to a nation's sea-
borne trade, the life-blood of its power, the
assurer of its credit, the purveyor of its comfort.
This is the more necessary to observe, be-
cause, while commerce thus on the one hand
deters from war, on the other hand it engenders
conflict, fostering ambitions and strifes which
tend towards armed collision. Thus it has
continuously been from the beginning of sea
power. A conspicuous instance was afforded
by the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth
century. There were other causes of dissatis-
faction between the two nations, but commer-
cial jealousies, rivalry for the opening markets
of the newly discovered hemispheres, and for
the carrying trade of the world, was the under-
lying national, as distinguished from the purely
governmental motive, which inspired the fierce
146 Considerations Governing
struggle. Blood was indeed shed, in profusion ;
but it was the suppression of maritime com-
merce that caused the grass to grow in the
streets of Amsterdam, and brought the Dutch
Republic to its knees. This too, it was, that
sapped the vital force of Napoleon's Empire,
despite the huge tributes exacted by him from
the conquered states of Europe, external to his
own dominions. The commerce of our day
has brought up children, nourished popula-
tions, which now turn upon the mother, cry-
ing for bread. " The place is too strait for
us ; give place where we can sell more." The
provision of markets for the production of an
ever-increasing number of inhabitants is a lead-
ing political problem of the day, the solution
of which is sought by methods commercial and
methods political, so essentially combative, so
offensive and defensive in character, that direct
military action would be only a development
of them, a direct consequent ; not a breach of
continuity in spirit, however it might be in
form. As the interaction of commerce and
finance shows a unity in the modern civilized
world, so does the struggle for new markets,
and for predominance in old, reveal the unsub-
The Disposition of Navies 147
dued diversity. Here every state is for itself ;
and in every great state the look for the desired
object is outward, just as it was in the days
when England and Holland fought over the
Spice Islands and the other worlds newly
opening before them. Beyond the seas, now
as then, are to be found regions scantily pop-
ulated where can be built up communities with
wants to be supplied ; while elsewhere are teem-
ing populations who may be led or manipulated
to recognize necessities of which they have be-
fore been ignorant, and stimulated to provide
for them through a higher development of their
resources, either by themselves, or, preferably,
through the exploitation of foreigners.
We are yet but at the beginning of this
marked movement, much as has been done
in the way of partition and appropriation
within the last twenty years. The regions —
chiefly in Africa — which the Powers of Europe
have divided by mutual consent, if not to mut-
ual satisfaction, await the gradual process of
utilization of their natural resources and con-
sequent increase of inhabitants, the producers
and consumers of a commerce yet to be in the
distant future. The degree and rate of this
148 Considerations Governing
development must depend upon the special
aptitudes of the self-constituted owners, whose
needs meantime are immediate. Their eyes
therefore turn necessarily for the moment to
quarters where the presence of a population
already abundant provides at once, not only
numerous buyers and sellers, but the raw ma-
terial of labor, by which, under suitable
direction and with foreign capital, the present
production may be multiplied. It is not too
much to say that, in order further to promote
this commercial action, existing political tenure
is being assailed ; that the endeavor is to
supplant it, as hindering the commercial, or
possibly the purely military or political ambi-
tions of the intruder. Commercial enterprise
is never so secure, nor so untrammelled, as
under its own flag; and when the present
owner is obstructive by temperament, as China
is, the impulse to overbear its political action
by display of force tends to become ungovern-
able. At all events the fact is notorious ; nor
can it be seriously doubted that in several other
parts of the globe aggression is only deterred
by the avowed or understood policy of a power-
ful opponent, not by the strength of the present
The Disposition af Navies 149
possessor. This is the significance of the new
Anglo-Japanese agreement, and also of the
more venerable Monroe Doctrine of the United
States, though that is applicable in another
quarter. The parties to either of these poli-
cies is interested in the success of the other.
It seems demonstrable, therefore, that as
commerce is the engrossing and predominant
interest of the world to-day, so, in consequence
of its acquired expansion, oversea commerce,
over-sea political acquisition, and maritime
commercial routes are now the primary ob-
jects of external policy among nations. The
instrument for the maintenance of policy di-
rected upon these objects is the Navy of the
several States; for, whatever influence we at-
tribute to moral ideas, which I have no wish
to undervalue, it is certain that, while right
rests upon them for its sanction, it depends
upon force for adequate assertion against the
too numerous, individuals or communities, who
either disregard moral sanctions, or reason
amiss concerning them.
Further, it is evident that for the moment
neither South America nor Africa is an imme-
diate object of far-reaching commercial ambi-
150 Considerations Governing
tion, to be compassed by political action.
Whatever the future may have in store for
them, a variety of incidents have relegated
them for the time to a position of secondary
interest. Attention has centred upon the
Pacific generally, and upon the future of China
particularly. The present distribution of navies
indicates this; for while largely a matter of
tradition and routine, nevertheless the assign-
ment of force follows the changes of political
circumstances, and undergoes gradual modi-
fications, which reflect the conscious or un-
conscious sense of the nation that things are
different. It is not insignificant that the pre-
ponderant French fleet is now in the Mediter-
ranean, whereas it once was in the Atlantic
ports ; and memories which stretch a genera-
tion back can appreciate the fact and the
meaning of the diminution of British force on
the east and west coasts of America, as also
of the increase of Russian battleship force in
China seas. Interests have shifted.
Directly connected with these new centres
of interest in the Far East, inseparable from
them in fact or in policy, are the commercial
routes which lead to them. For the commerce
The Disposition of Navies 151
and navies of Europe this route is by the Med-
iterranean and the Suez Canal This is the
line of communication to the objective of in-
terest The base of all operation, political or
military, — so far as the two are separable, — is
in the mother countries. These — the base,
the objective, and the communications — are
the conditions of the problem by which the
distribution of naval force is ultimately to be
determined. It is to be remarked, however,
that while the dominant factor of the three is
the line of communication between base and ob-
jective, the precise point or section of this upon
which control rests, and on which mobile force
must be directed, is not necessarily always the
same. The distribution of force must have
regard to possible changes of dispositions, as
the conditions of a war vary.
Every war has two aspects, the defensive
and the offensive, to each of which there is
a corresponding factor of activity. There is
something to gain, the offensive ; there is some-
thing to lose, the defensive. The ears of men,
especially of the uninstructed, are more readily
and sympathetically open to the demands of
the latter. It appeals to the conservatism
152 Considerations Governing
which is dominant in the well-to-do, and to the
widespread timidity which hesitates to take any
risk for the sake of a probable though uncertain
gain. The sentiment is entirely respectable in
itself, and more than respectable when its power
is exercised against breach of the peace for other
than the gravest motives — for any mere lucre
of gain. But its limitations must be under-
stood. A sound defensive scheme, sustaining
the bases of the national force, is the founda-
tion upon which war rests ; but who lays a
foundation without intending a superstructure?
The offensive element in warfare is the super-
structure, the end and aim for which the de-
fensive exists, and apart from which it is to all
purposes of war worse than useless. When
war has been accepted as necessary, success
means nothing short of victory; and victory
must be sought by offensive measures, and by
them only can be insured. " Being in, bear
it, that the opposer may be ware of thee." No
mere defensive attitude or action avails to such
end. Whatever the particular mode of offen-
sive action adopted, whether it be direct mili-
tary attack, or the national exhaustion of the
opponent by cutting off the sources of national
The Disposition of Navies 153
well-being, whatsoever method may be chosen,
offence, injury, weakening of the foe, to anni-
hilation if need be, must be the guiding pur-
pose of the belligerent. Success will certainly
attend him who drives his adversary into the
position of the defensive and keeps him there.
Offence therefore dominates, but it does not
exclude. The necessity for defence remains
obligatory, though subordinate. The two are
complementary. It is only in the reversal of
roles, by which priority of importance is as-
signed to the defensive, that ultimate defeat is
involved. Nor is this all. Though opposed
in idea and separable in method of action, cir-
cumstances not infrequently have permitted
the union of the two in a single general plan
of campaign, which protects at the same time
that it attacks. " Fitz James's blade was sword
and shield." Of this the system of blockades by
the British Navy during the Napoleonic wars
was a marked example. Thrust up against the
ports of France, and lining her coasts, they
covered — shielded — the operations of their
own commerce and cruisers in every sea;
while at the same time, crossing swords, as
it were, with the fleets within, ever on guard,
154 Considerations Governing
ready to attack, should the enemy give an
opening by quitting the shelter of his ports,
they frustrated his efforts at a combination of
his squadrons by which alone he could hope
to reverse conditions. All this was defensive ;
but the same operation cut the sinews of the
enemy's power by depriving him of sea-borne
commerce, and promoted the reduction of his
colonies. Both these were measures of offence ;
and both, it may be added, were directed upon
the national communications, the sources of
national well-being. The means was one, the
effect two-fold.
It is evident also that offensive action de-
pends for energy upon the security of the
several places whence its resources are drawn.
These are appropriately called "bases," for
they are the foundations — more exactly, per-
haps, the roots — severed from which vigor
yields to paralysis. Still more immediately
disastrous would be the destruction or capture
of the base itself. Therefore, whether it be
the home country in general, the centre of
the national power, or the narrower localities
where are concentrated the materials of war-
fare in a particular region, the base, by its
The Disposition of Navies 1 5 5
need of protection, represents distinctively the
defensive element in any campaign. It must
be secured at all hazards ; though, at the same
time, be it clearly said, by recourse to means
which shall least fetter the movements of the
offensive factor — the mobile force, army or
navy. On the other hand, the objective repre-
sents with at least equal exclusiveness the
offensive element; there, put it at the least,
preponderance over the enemy, not yet exist-
ent, is to be established by force. The mere
effort to get from the base to the objective is
an offensive movement ; but the ground inter-
vening between the two is of more complex
character. Here, on the line of communica-
tions, offence and defence blend. Here the
belligerent whose precautions secure suitable
permanent positions, the defensive element,
and to them assign proportionate mobile force,
the offensive factor, sufficient by superiority to
overpower his opponent, maintains, by so far
and insomuch, his freedom and power of action
at the distant final objective ; for he controls
for his own use the indispensable artery
through which the national life-blood courses
to the distant fleet, and by the same act he
156 Considerations Governing
closes it to his enemy. Thus again offence
and defence meet, each contributing its due
share of effect, unified in method and result by
an accurate choice of the field of exertion, of
that section of the line of communications
where power needs to be mainly exerted.
In purely land warfare the relative strength
of the opponents manifests itself in the length
of the line of communications each permits itself;
the distance, that is, which it ventures to ad-
vance from its base towards the enemy. The
necessary aim of both is superiority at the point
of contact, to be maintained either by actual
preponderance of numbers, or else by a combi-
nation of inferior numbers with advantageous
position. The original strength of each evi-
dently affects the distance that he can thus
advance, for the line of communication behind
him must be secured by part of his forces,
because upon it he depends for almost daily
supplies. The weaker therefore can go least
distance, and may even be compelled to remain
behind the home frontier, — a bare defensive,
— yielding the other the moral and material
advantage of the offensive. But commonly, in
land war, each adversary has his own line of
The Disposition of Navies 1 5 7
communication, which is behind him with re-
spect to his opponent ; each being in a some-
what literal sense opposite, as well as opposed,
to the other, and the common objective, to be
held by the one or carried by the other, lying
between them. The strategic aim of both is to
menace, or even to sever permanently, the
other's communications ; for if they are imme-
diately threatened he must retreat, and if sun-
dered he must surrender. Either result is
better obtained by this means than by the
resort to fighting, for it saves bloodshed, and
therefore economizes power for the purpose of
further progress.
Maritime war has its analogy to these con-
ditions, but it ordinarily reproduces them with
a modification peculiar to itself. In it the bel-
ligerents are not usually on opposite sides of
the common objective — though they may be so
— but proceed towards it by lines that in gen-
eral direction are parallel, or convergent, and
may even be identical. England and France
lie side by side, and have waged many mari-
time wars; but while there have been excep-
tions, as Gibraltar and Minorca, or when the
command of the Channel was in dispute, the
158 Considerations Governing
general rule has been that the scene of opera-
tions was far distant from both, and that both
have approached it by substantially the same
route. When the prospective theatre of war is
reached, the fleet there depends partly upon
secondary local bases of supplies, but ultimately
upon the home country, which has continually
to renew the local deposits, sending stores for-
ward from time to time- over the same paths
that the fleets themselves travelled. The secu-
rity of those sea-roads is therefore essential
and the dependence of the fleets upon them
for supplies of every kind — pre-eminently of
coal — -reproduces the land problem of commu-
nications in a specialized form. The two have
to contest the one line of communications vital
to both. It becomes therefore itself an objec-
tive, and all the more important because the
security of military communications entails in
equal measure that of the nation's commerce.
In broad generalization, the maritime line of
communications is the ocean itself, an open
plain, limited by no necessary highways, such
as the land has to redeem from the obstacles
which encumber it, and largely devoid of the
advantages of position that the conformation
The Disposition of Navies 159
of ground may afford in a shore battlefield.
In so far control depends upon superior num-
bers only, and the give and take which history
records, where disparity has not been great, has
gone far to falsify the frequent assertion that
the ocean acknowledges but one mistress; but
as the sea-road draws near a coast, the armed
vessels that assail or protect are facilitated in
their task if the shore affords them harbors
of refuge and supply. A ship that has to go
but fifty miles to reach her field of operation
will do in the course of a year the work of
several ships that have to go five hundred.
Fortified naval depots at suitable points there-
fore increase numerical force by multiplying it,
quite as the possession of strategic points, or
the lay of the ground of a battlefield, supply
numerical deficiencies.
Hence appears the singular strategic — and,
because strategic, commercial — interest of a
narrow or landlocked sea, which is multiplied
manifold when it forms an essential link in an
important maritime route. Many widely diver-
gent tracks may be traced on the ocean's un-
wrinkled brow; but specifically the one military
line of communications between any two points
160 Considerations Governing
of its surface is that which is decisively the
shortest. The measure of force between op-
ponents in such a case depends therefore not
only upon superiority at the objective point,
but upon control of that particular line of
communications; for so only can superiority
be maintained. The belligerent who, for any
disadvantage of numbers, or from inferiority
of strength as contrasted with the combined
numbers and position of his opponent, cannot
sustain his dominant hold there is already
worsted.
To this consideration is due the supreme
importance of the Mediterranean in the present
conditions of the communications and policies
of the world. From the commercial point of
view it is much the shortest, and therefore the
principal, sea route between Europe and the
Farther East. At the present time very nearly
one-third of the home trade, the exports and
imports, of Great Britain originates in or passes
through the Mediterranean ; and the single port
of Marseilles handles a similar proportion of
all the sea-borne commerce of France. From
the military standpoint, the same fact of short-
ness, combined with the number and rivalry
The Disposition of Navies 1 6 1
of national tenures established throughout its
area, constitutes it the most vital and critical
link in an interior line between two regions of
the gravest international concern. In one of
these, in Europe, are situated the bases, the
home dominions, of the European Powers con-
cerned, and in the other the present chief
objective of external interest to all nations of
to-day — that Farther East and western Pacific
upon which so many events have conspired
recently to fasten the anxious attention of the
world.
The Mediterranean therefore becomes neces-
sarily the centre around which must revolve
the strategic distribution of European navies.
It does not follow, indeed, that the distribution
of peace reproduces the dispositions for war; but
it must look to them, and rest upon the com-
prehension of them. The decisive point of
action in case of war must be recognized and
preparation made accordingly ; not only by the
establishment of suitable positions, which is the
naval strategy of peace, but by a distinct rela-
tion settled between the numbers and distri-
bution of vessels needed in war and those
maintained in peace. The Mediterranean will
ii
1 62 Considerations Governing
be either the seat of one dominant control,
reaching thence in all directions, owning a sin-
gle mistress, or it will be the scene of continual
struggle. Here offence and defence will meet
and blend in their general manifestation of
mobile force and fortified stations. Elsewhere
the one or the other will have its distinct
sphere of predominance. The home waters
and their approaches will be the scene of
national defence in the strictest and most
exclusive sense; but it will be defence that
exists for the foundation, upon which reposes
the struggle for, or the control of, the Mediter-
ranean. The distant East, in whatever spot
there hostilities may rage, will represent, will
be, the offensive sphere ; but the determination
of the result, in case of prolongation of war,
will depend upon control of the Mediterranean.
In the degree to which that is insured defence
will find the test of its adequacy, and offence
the measure of its efficiency.
In this combination of the offensive and
defensive factors the Mediterranean presents
an analogy to the military conditions of insu-
lar states, such as Great Britain and Japan,
in which the problem of national defence
The Disposition of Navies 163
becomes closely identified with offensive action.
Security, which is simply defence in its com-
pleted result, depends for them upon control
of the sea, which can be assured only by the
offensive action of the national fleet. Its pre-
dominance over that of the enemy is sword
and shield. It is a singular advantage to have
the national policy in the matter of military
development and dispositions so far simplified
and unified as it is by this consideration. It
much more than compensates for the double
line of communications open to a continental
state, the two strings to its bow, by its double
frontiers of sea and land ; for with the two
frontiers there is double exposure as well as
double utility. They require two-fold protective
action, dissipating the energies of the nation by
dividing them between two distinct objects, to
the injury of both.
An insular state, which alone can be purely
maritime, therefore contemplates war from a
position of antecedent probable superiority
from the two-fold concentration of its policy;
defence and offence being closely identified,
and energy, if exerted judiciously, being fixed
upon the increase of naval force to the clear
164 Considerations Governing
subordination of that more narrowly styled
military. The conditions tend to minimize
the division of effort between offensive and
defensive purpose, and, by greater comparative
development of the fleet, to supply a larger
margin of disposable numbers in order to con-
stitute a mobile superiority at a particular
point of the general field. Such a decisive
local superiority at the critical point of action
is the chief end of the military art, alike in
tactics and strategy. Hence it is clear that an
insular state, if attentive to the conditions that
should dictate its policy, is inevitably led to
possess a superiority in that particular kind of
force, the mobility of which enables it most
readily to project its power to the more distant
quarters of the earth, and also to change its
point of application at will with unequalled
rapidity.
The general considerations that have been
advanced concern all the great European na-
tions, in so far as they look outside their own
continent, and to maritime expansion, for the
extension of national influence and power ; but
the effect upon the action of each differs neces-
sarily according to their several conditions.
The Disposition of Navies 165
The problem of sea-defence, for instance, relates
primarily to the protection of the national com-
merce everywhere, and specifically as it draws
near the home ports ; serious attack upon the
coast, or upon the ports themselves, being a
secondary consideration, because little likely to
befall a nation able to extend its power far
enough to sea to protect its merchant ships.
From this point of view the position of Ger-
many is embarrassed at once by the fact that
she has, as regards the world at large, but one
coast-line. To and from this all her sea com-
merce must go; either passing the English
Channel, flanked for three hundred miles by
France on the one side and England on the
other, or else going north about by the Orkneys,
a most inconvenient circuit, and obtaining but
imperfect shelter from recourse to this deflected
route. Holland, in her ancient wars with Eng-
land, when the two were fairly matched in
point of numbers, had dire experience of this
false position, though her navy was little inferior
in numbers to that of her opponent. This is
another exemplification of the truth that dis-
tance is a factor equivalent to a certain number
of ships. Sea-defence for Germany, in case of
1 66 Considerations Governing
war with France or England, means established
naval predominance at least in the North Sea ;
nor can it be considered complete unless ex-
tended through the Channel and as far as
Great Britain will have to project hers into
the Atlantic. This is Germany's initial dis-
advantage of position, to be overcome only
by adequate superiority of numbers; and it
receives little compensation from the security of
her Baltic trade, and the facility for closing that
sea to her enemies. In fact, Great Britain,
whose North Sea trade is but one-fourth of her
total, lies to Germany as Ireland does to Great
Britain, flanking both routes to the Atlantic ;
but the great development of the British sea-
coast, its numerous ports and ample internal
communications, strengthen that element of
sea-defence which consists in abundant access
to harbors of refuge.
For the Baltic Powers, which comprise all
the maritime States east of Germany, the com-
mercial drawback of the Orkney route is a little
less than for Hamburg and Bremen, in that the
exit from the Baltic is nearly equidistant from
the north and south extremities of England ;
nevertheless the excess in distance over the Chan-
The Disposition of Navies 167
nel route remains very considerable. The initial
naval disadvantage is in no wise diminished.
For all the communities east of the Straits of
Dover it remains true that in war commerce is
paralyzed, and all the resultant consequences
of impaired national strength entailed, unless
decisive control of the North Sea is established.
That effected, there is security for commerce by
the northern passage ; but this alone is mere
defence. Offence, exerted anywhere on the
globe, requires a surplusage of force, over that
required to hold the North Sea, sufficient to
extend and maintain itself west of the British
Islands. In case of war with either of the
Channel Powers, this means, as between the
two opponents, that the eastern belligerent has
to guard a long line of communications, and
maintain distant positions, against an antagonist
resting on a central position, with interior lines,
able to strike at choice at either wing of
the enemy's extended front. The relation
which the English Channel, with its branch
the Irish Sea, bears to the North Sea and the
Atlantic — that of an interior position — is the
same which the Mediterranean bears to the
Atlantic and the Indian Sea ; nor is it merely
1 68 Considerations Governing
fanciful to trace in the passage round the north
of Scotland an analogy to that by the Cape of
Good Hope. It is a reproduction in miniature.
The conditions are similar, the scale different.
What the one is to a war whose scene is the
north of Europe, the other is to operations by
European Powers in Eastern Asia.
To protract such a situation is intolerable to
the purse and morale of the belligerent who has
the disadvantage of position. This of course
leads us straight back to the fundamental prin-
ciples of all naval war, namely, that defence is
insured only by offence, and that the one de-
cisive objective of the offensive is the enemy's
organized force, his battle-fleet. Therefore, in
the event of a war between one of the Chan-
nel Powers, and one or more of those to the
eastward, the control of the North Sea must be
at once decided. For the eastern State it is a
matter of obvious immediate necessity, of com-
mercial self-preservation. For the western
State the offensive motive is equally impera-
tive; but for Great Britain there is defensive
need as well. Her Empire imposes such a
development of naval force as makes it eco-
nomically impracticable to maintain an army
The Disposition of Navies 169
as large as those of the Continent. Security
against invasion depends therefore upon the
fleet. Postponing more distant interests, she
must here concentrate an indisputable supe-
riority. It is, however, inconceivable that
against any one Power Great Britain should
not be able here to exert from the first a pre-
ponderance which would effectually cover all
her remoter possessions. Only an economical
decadence, which would of itself destroy her
position among nations, could bring her so to
forego the initial advantage she has, in the
fact that for her offence and defence meet and
are fulfilled in one factor, the command of the
sea. History has conclusively demonstrated
the inability of a state with even a single con-
tinental frontier to compete in naval develop-
ment with one that is insular, although of
smaller population and resources. A coalition
of Powers may indeed affect the balance. As
a rule, however, a single state against a coali-
tion holds the interior position, the concen-
trated force ; and while calculation should
rightly take account of possibilities, it should
beware of permitting imagination too free sway
in presenting its pictures. Were the eastern
i jo Considerations Governing
Powers to combine they might prevent Great
Britain's use of the North Sea for the safe
passage of her merchant shipping; but even
so she would but lose commercially the whole
of a trade, the greater part of which disappears
by the mere fact of war. Invasion is not pos-
sible, unless her fleet can be wholly disabled
from appearing in that sea. From her geo-
graphical position, she still holds her gates
open to the outer world, which maintains three-
fourths of her commerce in peace.
As Great Britain, however, turns her eyes
from the North and Baltic Seas, which in
respect to her relations to the world at large
may justly be called her rear, she finds con-
ditions confronting her similar to those which
position entails upon her eastern neighbors.
Here, however, a comparison is to be made.
The North Sea is small, its coast-line con-
tracted, the entrance to the Baltic a mere
strait. Naval preponderance once established,
the lines of transit, especially where they draw
near the land, are easily watched. Doubtless,
access to the British Islands from the Atlantic,
if less confined by geographical surroundings,
is constricted by the very necessity of approach-
The Disposition of Navies 1 7 1
ing at all ; but a preponderant fleet maintained
by Great Britain to the south-west, in the pro-
longation of the Channel, will not only secure
merchant shipping within its own cruising-
ground, but can extend its support by outlying
cruisers over a great area in every direction.
A fleet thus in local superiority imposes upon
cruisers from the nearest possible enemy —
France — a long circuit to reach the northern
approaches of the islands, where they will
arrive more or less depleted of coal, and in
danger from ships of their own class resting on
the nearer ports of Scotland or Ireland. Su-
periority in numbers is here again counterbal-
anced by advantage of position. Vessels of
any other country, south or east, are evidently
under still greater drawbacks.
As all the Atlantic routes and Mediterranean
trade converge upon the Channel, this must
be, as it always has been, among the most im-
portant stations of the British Navy. In the
general scheme its office is essentially defence.
It protects the economical processes which
sustain national endurance, and thus secures
the foundation on which the vi^'or of war
rests. But its scope must be sanely conceived.
172 Considerations Governing
Imaginative expectation and imaginative alarms
must equally be avoided ; for both tend to
exaggerate the development of defensive dispo-
sitions at the expense of offensive power. En-
tire immunity for commerce must not be
anticipated, nor should an occasional severe
blow be allowed to force from panic concessions
which calm reason rejects. Inconvenience and
injury are to be expected, and must be borne
in order that the grasp upon the determining
points of war may not be relaxed. It will be
the natural policy of an enemy to intensify
anxiety about the Channel, to retain or divert
thither force which were better placed elsewhere.
By the size of her navy and by her geographical
situation France is the most formidable mari-
time enemy of Great Britain, and therefore sup-
plies the test to which British dispositions must
be brought; but it is probable that in war, as
now in peace, France must keep the larger part
of her fleet in the Mediterranean. Since the
days of Napoleon she has given hostages to for-
tune in the acquisition of her possessions on the
African continent and beyond Suez. Her po-
sition in the Mediterranean has become to her
not only a matter of national sentiment, which
The Disposition of Navies 173
it long has been, but a question of military
importance much greater than when Corsica
was all she owned there. It is most unlikely
that Brest and Cherbourg combined will in
our day regain the relative importance of the
former alone, a century ago.
In view of this, and barring the case of a
coalition, I conceive that the battle-ships of the
British Channel Fleet would not need to out-
number those of France in the near waters by
more than enough to keep actually at sea a
force equal to hers. A surplus for reliefs would
constitute a reserve for superiority; that is all.
The great preponderance required is in the
cruisers, who are covered in their operations
by the battle-fleet ; the mere presence of the
latter with an adequate scouting system se-
cures them from molestation. Two classes
of cruisers are needed, with distinct functions ;
those which protect commerce by the strong
hand and constant movement, and those that
keep the battle-fleet informed of the enemy's
actions. It is clear that the close watching of
hostile ports, an operation strictly tactical, has
undergone marked changes of conditions since
the old days. The ability to go to sea and
174 Considerations Governing
steer any course under any conditions of wind,
and the possibilities of the torpedo-boat, exag-
gerated though these probably have been in
anticipation, are the two most decisive new
factors. To them are to be added the range
of coast guns, which keeps scouts at a much
greater distance than formerly, and the impos-
sibility now of detecting intentions which once
might be inferred from the conditions of masts
and sails.
On the other hand the sphere of effec-
tiveness has been immensely increased for
the scout by the power to move at will, and
latterly by the wireless telegraphy. With high
speed and large numbers, it should be possible
to sweep the surroundings of any port so thor-
oughly as to make the chance of undetected
escape very small, while the transmission of
the essential facts — the enemy's force and
the direction taken — is even more certain
than detection. A lookout ship to-day will
not see an enemy going off south with a fresh
fair breeze, which is for herself a head wind to
reach her own fleet a hundred miles to the
northward. She may not need even to steam
to the main body ; but, telephoning the news,
The Disposition of Navies 1 75
she will seek to keep the enemy in sight, gath-
ering round her for the same work all of her
own class within reach of her electric voice.
True, an enemy may double on his track, or
otherwise ultimately elude ; but the test so
imposed on military sagacity and inference is
no greater than it formerly was. The data
are different ; the problem of the same class.
Where can he go fruitfully? A raid? Well,
a raid, above all a maritime raid, is only a raid ;
a black eye, if you will, but not a bullet in the
heart, nor yet a broken leg. To join another
fleet ? That is sound, and demands action ;
but the British battle-fleet having immediate
notice, and a fair probability of more informa-
tion, should not be long behind. There is at
all events no perplexity exceeding that with
which men of former times dealt successfully.
In the same way, and by the same methods, it
should be possible to cover an extensive cir-
cumference to seaward so effectively that a
merchant vessel reaching any point thereof
would be substantially secure up to the home
port.
The battle-fleet would be the tactical centre
upon which both systems of scouts would rest.
176 Considerations Governing
To close-watch a port to-day requires vessels
swifter than the battle-ships within, and
stronger in the aggregate than their cruiser
force. The former then cannot overtake to
capture, nor outrun to elude; and the latter,
which may overtake, cannot drive off their
post, nor successfully fight, because inferior
in strength. Add to the qualities thus de-
fined sufficient numbers to watch by night
the arc of a circle of five miles radius, of which
the port is the centre, and you have disposi-
tions extremely effective against an enemy's
getting away unperceived. The vessels nearest
in are individually so small that the loss
of one by torpedo is militarily immaterial ;
moreover, the chances will by no means all
be with the torpedo-boat. The battle-fleet, a
hundred or two miles distant it may be, and
in a different position every night, is as safe
from torpedo attack as ingenuity can place it.
Between it and the inside scouts are the
armored cruisers, faster than the hostile bat-
tle-fleet, stronger than the hostile cruisers.
These are tactical dispositions fit for to-day;
and in essence they reproduce those of St.
Vincent before Brest, and his placing of
The Disposition of Navies 177
Nelson at Cadiz with an inshore squadron, a
century ago. " A squadron of frigates and cut-
ters plying day and night in the opening of the
Goulet; five ships-of-the-line anchored about
ten miles outside ; and outside of them again
three of-the-line under sail." The main body,
the battle-fleet of that time, was from twenty-
five to forty miles distant, — the equivalent in
time of not less than a hundred miles to-day.
Keeping in consideration these same waters,
the office and function of the Channel Fleet
may be better realized by regarding the battle-
ships as the centre, from which depart the dis-
positions for watching, not only the enemy's
port, but also the huge area to seaward which
it is desired to patrol efficiently for the security
of the national commerce. Take a radius of
two hundred miles; to it corresponds a semi-
circle of six hundred, all within Marconi
range of the centre. The battle-fleet never
separates. On the far circumference move the
lighter and swifter cruisers ; those least able to
resist, if surprised by an enemy, but also the
best able to escape, and the loss of one of which
is inconsiderable, as of the inner cruisers off
the port. Between them and the fleet are the
178 Considerations Governing
heavier cruisers, somewhat dispersed, in very
open order, but in mutual touch, with a squad-
ron organization and a plan of concentration,
if by mischance an enemy's division come upon
one of them unawares. Let us suppose, under
such a danger, they are one hundred miles from
the central body. It moves out at twelve miles
an hour, they in at fifteen. Within four hours
the force is united, save the light cruisers.
These, as in all ages, must in large measure look
out for themselves, and can do so very well.
Granting, as required by the hypothesis,
equality in battle-ships and a large prepon-
derance in cruisers, — not an unreasonable de-
mand upon an insular state, — it seems to me
that for an essentially defensive function there
is here a fairly reliable, systematized, working
disposition. It provides a semi-circumference
of six hundred miles, upon reaching any point
of which a merchant ship is secure for the rest
of her homeward journey. While maintained,
the national frontier is by so much advanced,
and the area of greatest exposure for the mer-
chant fleet equally reduced. Outside this,
cruising as formerly practised can extend very
far a protection, which, if less in degree, is still
The Disposition of Navies 179
considerable. For this purpose, in my own
judgment, and I think by the verdict of his-
tory, dissociated single ships are less efficient
than cruiser-squadrons, such as were illustrated
by the deeds of Jean Bart and Pellew. One
such, a half-dozen strong, west of Finisterre,
and another west of Scotland, each under a
competent chief authorized to move at discre-
tion over a fairly wide area, beyond the baili-
wick of the commander-in-chief, would keep
enemies at a respectful distance from much
more ground than he actually occupies; for
it is to be remembered that the opponent's
imagination of danger is as fruitful as one's
own.
In conception, this scheme is purely defen-
sive. Incidentally, if opportunity offer to in-
jure the enemy it will of course be embraced,
but the controlling object is to remove the
danger to home commerce by neutralizing the
enemy's fleet. To this end numbers and force
are calculated. This done, the next step is to
consider the Mediterranean from the obvious
and inevitable military point of view that it is
the one and only central position, the assured
control of which gives an interior line of opera-
180 Considerations Governing
tions from the western coast of Europe to the
eastern waters of Asia. To have assured safety
to the home seas and seaboard is little, except
as a means to further action ; for, if to build
without a foundation is disastrous, to lay
foundations and not to be able to build
is impotent, and that is the case where dis-
proportioned care is given to mere defensive
arrangements. The power secured and stored
at home must be continually transmitted to
the distant scene of operations, here assumed,
on account of the known conditions of world
politics, to be the western Pacific, which, under
varying local designations, washes the shores
of the Farther East.
It has been said that in the Mediterranean,
as the principal link in the long chain of
communications, defence and offence blend.
Moreover, since control here means assured
quickest transmission of reinforcements and
supplies in either direction, it follows that,
while preponderance in battle-ship force is
essential in the Far East, where if war occurs
the operations will be offensive, such predom-
inance in the Mediterranean, equally essential
in kind, must be much greater in degree. In
The Disposition of Navies 1 8 1
fact, the offensive fleet in the Eastern Seas and
the defensive fleet in the Channel are the two
wings, or flanks, of a long front of operations,
the due security of both of which depends upon
the assured tenure of the central position.
Naturally, therefore, the Mediterranean fleet,
having to support both, possibly even to de-
tach hurriedly to one or the other, has in it-
self that combination of defensive and offen-
sive character which ordinarily inheres in sea
communications as such.
If this assertion be accepted in general state-
ment, it will be fortified by a brief considera-
tion of permanent conditions; with which it
is further essential to associate as present tem-
porary factors the existing alliances between
France and Russia, Great Britain and Japan.
The Triple Alliance, of the renewal of which
we are assured, does not contemplate among
its objects any one that is directly affected by
the control of the Mediterranean. Should an
individual member engage in war having its
scene there, it would be as a power untram-
melled by this previous engagement.
History and physical conformation have
constituted unique strategic conditions in the
1 82 Considerations Governing
Mediterranean. To history is due the exist-
ing tenure of positions, the bases, of varying
intrinsic value, and held with varying degrees
of power and firmness by several nations in
several quarters. To examine these minutely
and weigh their respective values as an ele-
ment of strategic effect would be indeed essen-
tial to the particular planning of a naval cam-
paign, or to the proper determination of the
distribution of naval force, with a view to the
combinations open to one's self or the enemy;
but a paper dealing with general conditions
may leave such detailed considerations to those
immediately concerned. It must be sufficient
to note the eminently central position of Malta,
the unique position of Gibraltar, and the ex-
centric situation of Toulon relatively to the
great trade route. By conformation the Med-
iterranean has, besides the artificial canal, —
the frailest and most doubtful part of the chain,
— at least three straits of the utmost decisive
importance, because there is to them no alter-
native passage by which vessels can leave the
sea, or move from one part of it to another.
In the Caribbean Sea, which is a kind of Med-
iterranean, the multiplicity of islands and pas-
The Disposition of Navies 183
sages reduces many of them to inconsequence,
and qualifies markedly the effect of even the
most important; but, in the Mediterranean,
the Dardanelles, Gibraltar, and the belt of
water separating the toe of Italy from Cape
Bon in Africa, constitute three points of transit
which cannot be evaded. It is true that in the
last the situation of the island of Sicily allows
vessels to go on its either side; but the sur-
rounding conditions are such that it is scarcely
possible for a fleet to pass undetected by an
adversary making due use of his scouts.
These physical peculiarities, conjointly with
the positions specified, are the permanent fea-
tures, which must underlie and control all
strategic plans of Mediterranean Powers, among
whom Russia must be inferentially included.
Geographically, Great Britain is an intruder
in the Mediterranean. Her presence there at
all, in territorial tenure, is distinctively military.
This is witnessed also by the character of her
particular possessions. Nowhere does the vital
energy of sea power appear more conspicu-
ously, as self-expansive and self-dependent.
To its historical manifestation is due the acqui-
sitions which make the strength of her present
184 Considerations Governing
position; but, as in history, so now, sea power
itself must continue to sustain that which it
begat. The habitual distribution of the war-
ships of the United Kingdom must provide for
a decisive predominance here, upon occasion
arising, over any probable combination of
enemies. Such provision has [to take account
not only of the total force of hostile divisions
within and without the Mediterranean, but of
movements intended to transfer one or more
from or to that sea from other scenes of opera-
tions. Prevention of these attempts is a ques-
tion, not of numbers chiefly, but of position,
of stations assigned, of distribution. Predom-
inance, to be militarily effectual, means not
only an aggregate superiority to the enemy
united, but ability to frustrate, before accom-
plishment, concentrations which might give
him a local superiority anywhere. This is a
question of positions more even than of num-
bers. In the Mediterranean, as the great
centre, these two factors must receive such
mutual adjustment as shall outweigh the com-
bination of them on the part of the adversary.
Where one is defective the other must be in-
creased. The need is the more emphatic when
The Disposition of Navies 185
the nation itself is external and distant from
the sea, while possible antagonists, as Russia
and France, are territorially contiguous ; for
it can scarcely be expected that the Russian
Black Sea fleet would not force its way through
the Dardanelles upon urgent occasion.
Evidently, too, Japan cannot in the near
future contribute directly to maintain Great
Britain in the Mediterranean. On the con-
trary, the declarations of Russia and France
make plain that, if war arise, Japan must be
supported in the Far East by her ally against
a coalition, the uncertain element of which is
the force that France will feel able to spare
from her scattered, exposed interests. Russia
labors under no such distraction ; her single-
ness of eye is shown by the fact that the more
efficient, and by far the larger part, of her so-
called Baltic fleet is now in the waters of China.
In numbers and force she has there a sub-
stantial naval equality with Japan, but under
a disadvantage of position like that of Great
Britain in the Mediterranean, in being remote
from the centre of her power, imperfectly based,
as yet, upon local resources, and with home
communications by the shortest route gravely
1 86 Considerations Governing
*
uncertain. Under these circumstances the
decided step she has taken in the reinforcement
of her Eastern Navy, carries the political in-
ference that she for the present means to seek
her desired access to unfrozen waters in East-
ern Asia, preferably to the Mediterranean or the
Persian Gulf. Having in view local difficulties
and antagonistic interests elsewhere, this con-
clusion was probably inevitable; but its evident
acceptance is notable.
For Great Britain it is also most opportune ;
and this raises a further question, attractive to
speculative minds, viz.: whether the Anglo-
Japanese agreement has had upon Russia a
stimulating or a deterrent effect ? If it has in-
creased her determination to utilize her present
advantages, as represented in Port Arthur and
its railroad, it would be in the direct line of
a sound British policy ; for it fixes the rea-
sonable satisfaction of Russia's indisputable
needs in a region remote from the greater in-
terests of Great Britain, yet where attempts
at undue predominance will elicit the active
resistance of many competitors, intent upon
their own equally indisputable rights. The
gathering of the eagles on the coasts of China
The Disposition of Navies 187
is manifest to the dullest eye. But should the
alliance have the contrary effect of checking
Russian development in that direction, her
irrepressible tendency to the sea is necessarily
thrown upon a quarter — the Levant or Persia
— more distinctly ominous, and where, in the
last named at least, Great Britain would find
no natural supporter, enlisted by similarity of
interest. The concentration of Russian ships
in the East, taken in connection with the gen-
eral trend of events there, is, however, as clear
an indication of policy as can well be given.
In connection with the substantial numerical
equality of Japan and Russia is to be taken,
as one of the ascertained existing conditions,
instituted so recently as to have a possi-
ble political significance, the reorganization
of the French divisions beyond Suez into a
single command, and the numbers thereto
assigned. It is not to be supposed that this
new disposition has been adopted without con-
sideration of the new combinations indicated
by the Anglo-Japanese treaty. It may even be
in direct consequence. The relative strengths
of this extensive eastern command and of the
French Mediterranean fleet should in close
1 88 Considerations Governing
measure reflect the official consciousness of the
general naval situation, and of the power of
France to give support to her recognized ally ;
directly in the East, and indirectly by military
influence exerted upon the Mediterranean.
Supposing Great Britain, on the other hand,
to have made provision for the defensive con-
trol of the approaches to her home ports, how
will she, and how can she, assure the joint
ascendency of herself and her ally in the Farther
East, the scene of the offensive, and her own
single preponderance in the Mediterranean,
the main link in the communications? These
are the two intricate factors for consideration,
calling for plans and movements not primarily
defensive but offensive in scope. For France
and for Great Britain, as a party to an alliance,
the question is urgent, "How far can I go,
how much spare from the Mediterranean to
the East? In assisting my ally there, unless
I bring him predominance, or at least nearly
an equality, I waste my substance, little help-
ing him. If paralyzed in the Mediterranean,
thrown on a mere defensive, my force in the
East is practically cut off. Like a besieged
garrison, it may endure till relieved ; but the
The Disposition of Navies 189
situation is critical while it lasts, and carries
imminent possibilities of disaster."
In approaching a military subject of this
character it is necessary first and for all to
disabuse the mind of the idea that a scheme
can be devised, a disposition imagined, by
which all risk is eliminated. Such an attrac-
tive condition of absolute security, if realized,
would eliminate all war along with its risks. A
British distribution, most proper for the Medi-
terranean alone, may entail the danger that a
hostile body may escape into the Atlantic, may
unite with the Brest and Cherbourg divisions
against the Channel Fleet, and overwhelm the
latter. True ; but imagination must work both
ways. It may also be that the escape cannot
but be known at Gibraltar, telegraphed to
England, and the fleet warned betimes so that
the reserve ships, which give it a superiority to
either detachment of the enemy, might join,
and that its scouts, stationed as previously
suggested, would gain for it the two hours of
time needed to deal decisively with one division
before the other turns up. These probabilities,
known to the enemy, affect his actions just as
ones own risks move one's self. Listen to Nel-
190 Considerations Governing
son contemplating just this contingency. " If
the Ferrol squadron joins the Toulon, they will
much outnumber us, but in that case I shall
never lose sight of them, and Pellew " (from
before Ferrol) " will soon be after them." But
he adds, confirmatory of the need of numerous
scouts, then as now, " I at this moment want
ten frigates or sloops, when I believe neither
the Ferrol or Toulon squadron could escape
me." By this, I understand, is clearly inti-
mated that he could look out both ways, in-
tercept the first comer, frustrate the junction,
and beat them in detail. If not before the
action, Pellew would arrive in time to repair
Nelson's losses and restore equality. The
change in modern conditions would favor the
modern Pellew more than the adversary.
So again disturbing political possibilities
must be reasonably viewed. It may be that
the whole Continent not only dislikes Great
Britain, but would willingly combine for her
military destruction ; and that, if war begin,
such a combination may come to pass. It may
be; but this at least is certain, that interest,
not liking, will decide so grave a matter.
In the calculation of final issues, of national
The Disposition of Navies 191
expenditure, of profit and loss, of relative na-
tional predominance resulting from a supposed
success, I incline to think that Imperial Feder-
ation will be a far less difficult achievement than
framing such a coalition. If the two dual alli-
ances, the mutual opposition of which is appar-
ent, come to blows, Germany may see it to her
interest to strike hands with Russia and France;
but it seems to me it would be so much more
her interest to let them exhaust themselves, to
the relief of her two flanks, that I find it diffi-
cult to believe she would not herself so view
the question. There is one qualifying consid-
eration. Germany cannot but wish a modifica-
tion in the effect exerted upon her maritime
routes by the position of Great Britain, already
noted. As geographical situation cannot be
changed, the only modification possible is the
decrease of Great Britain's power by the les-
sening of her fleet. But, grant that object
gained by such coalition, what remains? A
Channel dominated by the French Navy no
longer checked by the British ; whereas with
the latter as an ally the Channel would be
almost as safe as the Kiel canal. If this re-
mark is sound, it is but an illustration of the
192 Considerations Governing
choice of difficulties presented by attempts to
change permanent conditions by artificial com-
binations. As a matter of fact, no single power
in Europe, save possibly Russia, is individually
so weighty as to see without apprehension the
effective elimination of any one factor in the
present balance of power. The combined posi-
tion and numbers of Russia do give her a great
defensive security in her present tenures.
Admitting the Mediterranean to be distinc-
tively and pre-eminently the crucial feature in
any strategic scheme that contemplates Europe
and the Farther East as the chief factors of
interest, the positions before enumerated, in
conjunction with the relative forces of the fleets,
constitute the initial strategic situation. As-
suming, as is very possible, that the decisive
predominance, local or general, desired by either
party, does not yet exist, the attempt of each
must be to reach some preponderance by play-
ing the game of war ; by such applied pressure
or strategic movements as shall procure a deci-
sive momentary preponderance in some quarter,
the due use of which, by the injury done the
enemy, shall establish a permanent and decisive
superiority. This is the one object of war sci-
The Disposition of Navies 193
entifically — or better, artistically — - considered.
The nation that begins with the stronger fleet
should initiate some offensive action, with the
object of compelling the enemy to fight. This
the latter cannot do, unless already in adequate
strength at some one point, except by under-
taking to combine his divided forces so as to
effect a concentration in some quarter. The
movements necessary to accomplish this are
the opportunity of the offensive, to strike the
converging divisions before their junction gives
the desired local superiority. Herein is the
skill ; herein also the chance, the unexpected,
the risk, which the best authorities tell us are
inseparable from war, and constitute much of
its opportunity as of its danger.
How shall the superior fleet exercise the
needed compulsion ? Ships cannot invade ter-
ritory, unless there be unprotected navigable
rivers. The stronger navy therefore cannot
carry war beyond the sea-coast, home to the
heart of the enemy, unless indeed its nation in
addition to controlling the sea, can transport
an overpowering force of troops. Of this the
Transvaal war offers an illustration. Possibly,
a disabling blow to the British fleet by the
13
194 Considerations Governing
navy of one of the great continental armies
might present a somewhat similar instance ; but
when the British fleet is thus enfeebled, Great
Britain will be exposed to the conditions which
it must be her own first effort, with her supreme
navy, to impose on an opponent. Under such
circumstances, there will be no need for an
enemy to land an invading host on British soil.
The interception of commerce at a half-dozen
of the principal ports will do the work as surely,
if less directly. Similarly, while the British
Navy is what it is, the destruction of an enemy's
commerce, not only by scattered cruisers at
sea, hut by a systematized, coherent effort
directed against his ports and coasts, both
home and colonial, must be the means of in-
flicting such distress and loss as shall compel
his fleet to fight ; or, if it still refuse, shall sap
endurance by suffering and extenuation.
To effect this requires a battle-fleet superior
in the aggregate to the one immediately op-
posed to it by at least so many ships as shall
suffice to allow a constant system of reliefs.
The battle-fleet is the solid nucleus of power.
From it radiates the system of cruisers by
which the trade blockade is maintained in
The Disposition of Navies 195
technical, and as far as may be, in actual, effi-
ciency. In case of hostilities with France, for
example, the blockade of a principal commer-
cial port, like Havre or Marseille, may be sus-
tained in local efficiency by cruisers ; but the
security of these, and consequently the main-
tenance of the blockade, will depend upon such
proximity of the battle-fleet as will prevent the
French divisions at Cherbourg, Brest, or Toulon,
from attacking them, except at great risk of
being compelled to an engagement which it is
presumably the specific aim of the British fleet
to force. " Not blockade but battle is my aim,"
said Nelson : " on the sea alone we hope to
realize the hopes and expectations of our coun-
try." A successful battle in any one quarter
clears up the whole situation ; that is, in pro-
portion to the results obtained. This qualifi-
cation is always to be borne in mind by a
victorious admiral ; for the general relief to his
nation will correspond to the use made by him
of the particular advantage gained. More or
fewer of his ships will be liberated from their
previous tasks, and can reinforce the station
where the most assured predominance is desired.
This by our analysis is the Mediterranean.
196 Considerations Governing
History has more than once shown how
severe a compulsion may be exerted over an
extensive coast by proper dispositions. Where
a formidable, though inferior, navy lies in the
ports of the blockaded state, the position and
management of the battle-fleet, on either side,
is the critical military problem. The task of the
cruisers is simple, if arduous ; to keep near the
port assigned them, to hold their ground against
equals, to escape capture by superior force. The
battle-fleet must be so placed as effectually to
cover the cruisers from the enemy's fleet, with-
out unduly exposing itself ; above all to torpedo
attack. It must be on hand, not only to fight,
but to chase to advantage, to make strategic
movements, perhaps extensive in range, at short
notice. War is a business of positions. Its posi-
tion, suitably chosen, by supporting the cruiser
force, covers the approaches of the national com-
merce, and also maintains both the commercial
blockade and the close watch of the military
ports. It may be noted that the commer-
cial blockade is offensive in design, to injure
the enemy and compel him to fight, while
the other specified functions of the vessels
are defensive. We therefore have here again
The Disposition of Navies 197
a combination of the two purposes in a single
disposition.
For some time to come nations distinctively
European must depend upon the Mediterra-
nean as their principal military route to the
Far East. In the present condition of the
Siberian railroad, Russia shares this common
lot. While the other States have no land route
whatever, hers is still so imperfect as not to
constitute a valid substitute. Moreover, what-
ever resources of moderate bulk may be locally
accumulated, — coal, provisions, ammunition,
and stores of various kinds, — reinforcements
of vessels, or reliefs to ships disabled by service
or in battle can go only by sea. Guns beyond
a certain calibre are in like case. Every con-
sideration emphasizes the importance of the
Mediterranean. To it the Red Sea is simply
an annex, the military status of which will be
determined by that of its greater neighbor,
qualified in some measure by the tenure of
Egypt and Aden.
On the farther side of the isthmus, the naval
operations throughout Eastern seas will depend
for sustained vigor upon contact militarily
maintained with the Mediterranean, and
198 Considerations Governing
through that with home. In these days of
cables, the decisive importance of Malta to
India, recognized by Nelson and his contem-
poraries, is affirmed with quadruple force of
the sea in which Malta is perhaps the most
conspicuously important naval position. Rein-
forcements sent by the Cape, whether west or
east, can always be anticipated at either end of
the road by the Power which holds the interior
line.
As regards special dispositions for the East-
ern seas, embracing under that name all from
Suez to Japan, the same factors — numbers and
position — dictate distribution. To a central
position, if such there be, must be assigned
numbers adequate to immediate superiority, in
order to control commercial routes, and to
operate against the enemy whose approximate
force and position are known. Such assign-
ment keeps in view, necessarily, the possibilities
of receiving reinforcements from the Mediter-
ranean, or having to send them to China. Cey-
lon, for example, if otherwise suitable, is nearly
midway between Suez and Hong-Kong; in
round numbers, 3000 miles from each. Such
a position favors a force of battle-ships as
The Disposition of Navies 199
an advanced squadron from the Mediterranean,
and would be a provision against a mishap at
the canal interrupting reinforcements eastward.
Position, with its two functions of distance and
resources; there is nothing more prominent
than these in Napoleons analysis of a military
situation. Numbers go, as it were, without
saying. Where the power was his he multiplied
them ; but he always remembered that position
multiplies spontaneously. He who has but
half-way to go does double work. This is the
privilege of central position.
The question of the Eastern seas introduces
naturally the consideration of what the great
self-governing colonies can do, not only for
their own immediate security, and that of their
trade, but for the general fabric of Imperial
naval action, in the coherence of which they
will find far greater assurance than in merely
local effort. The prime naval considerations
for them are that the British Channel Fleet
should adequately protect the commerce and
shores of the British Islands, and that the
Mediterranean Fleet should insure uninter-
rupted transit for trade and for reinforcements.
These effected and maintained, there will be
200 Considerations Governing
no danger to their territory; and little to their
trade except from single cruisers, which will
have a precarious subsistence as compared
with their own, based upon large self-support-
ing political communities. Australasia, how-
ever, can undoubtedly supply a very important
factor, that will go far to fortify the whole
British position in the Far East. A continent
in itself, with a thriving population, and willing,
apparently, to contribute to the general naval
welfare, let it frame its schemes and base its
estimates on sound lines, both naval and im-
perial ; naval, by allowing due weight to battle
force; imperial, by contemplating the whole,
and recognizing that local safety is not always
best found in local precaution. There is a
military sense, in which it is true that he who
loses his life shall save it.
In the Eastern seas, Australia and China
mark the ' extremities of two long lines, the
junction of which is near India; let us say, for
sake of specificness, Ceylon. They are off-
shoots, each, of one branch, the root of which
under present conditions, is the English Chan-
nel, and the trunk the Mediterranean. Now it
is the nature of extremities to be exposed. To
The Disposition of Navies 20 r
this our feet, hands, and ears bear witness, as
does the military aphorism about salients ; but
while local protection has its value in these
several cases, the general vigor and sustenance
of the organism as a whole is the truer de-
pendence. To apply this simile: it appears
to me that the waters from Suez eastward
should be regarded as a military whole, vitally
connected with the system to the westward,
but liable to temporary interruption at the
Canal, against which precaution must be had.
This recognizes at once the usual dependence
upon the Channel and the Mediterranean, and
the coincident necessity of providing for inde-
pendent existence on emergency. In the na-
ture of things there must be a big detachment
east of Suez ; the chance of its being momen-
tarily cut off there is not so bad as its being
stalled on the other side, dependent on the
Cape route to reach the scene. But for the
same reason that the Mediterranean and Malta
are strategically eminent, because central, (as is
likewise the Channel with reference to the
North Sea and Atlantic), the permanent stra-
tegic centre of the Eastern seas is not by
position in China, nor yet in Australia. It is
202 Considerations Governing
to be found rather at a point which, approxi-
mately equidistant from both, is also equi-
distant from the Mediterranean and the East.
Permanent, I say; not as ignoring that the
force which there finds its centre may have
to remove, and long to remain, at one extrem-
ity or another of the many radii thence issu-
ing, but because there it is best placed to
move in the shortest time in any one of the
several directions. That from the same centre
it best protects the general commercial inter-
ests is evident from an examination of the
maps and of commercial returns.
Whether the essential unity of scope in naval
action east of Suez should receive recognition
by embracing Australia, China, and India,
under one general command, with local sub-
ordinates, is a question administrative as well
as strategic. As military policy it has a good
side; for commanders previously independent
do not always accept ungrudgingly the intrusion
of a superior because of emergency of war.
Military sensitiveness cannot prudently be left
out of calculations. There would be benefit
also in emphasizing in public consciousness the
essential unity of mill tary considerations, which
The Disposition of Navies 203
should dominate the dispositions of the fleet.
Non-professional — and even military — minds
need the habit of regarding local and general
interests in their true relations and proportions.
Unless such correct appreciation exist, it is
hard to silence the clamor for a simple local
security, which is apparent but not real, because
founded on a subdivision and dissemination of
force essentially contrary to sound military
principle. What Australasia needs is not her
petty fraction of the Imperial navy, a squadron
assigned to her in perpetual presence, but an
organization of naval force which constitutes a
firm grasp of the universal naval situation.
Thus danger is kept remote ; but, if it should
approach, there is insured within reaching dis-
tance an adequate force to repel it betimes.
There may, however, be fairly demanded the
guarantee for the fleet's action, in a develop-
ment of local dock-yard facilities and other
resources which shall insure its maintenance in
full efficiency if it have to come.
In this essential principle other colonies
should acquiesce. The essence of the matter
is that local security does not necessarily, nor
usually, depend upon the constant local presence
204 Considerations Governing
of a protector, ship or squadron, but upon gen-
eral dispositions. As was said to and of Rod-
ney, " Unless men take the great line, as you
do, and consider the King's whole dominions
as under their care, the enemy must find us
unprepared somewhere. It is impossible to
have a superior fleet in every part."
It is impossible ; and it is unnecessary, grant-
ing the aggregate superiority at which Great
Britain now aims. In the question of the dis-
position of force three principal elements are
distinguishable in the permanent factors which
we classify under the general head of " posi-
tion." These are, the recognition of central
positions, of interior lines — which means,
briefly, shorter lines — and provision of abun-
dant local dock-yard equipment in its widest
sense. These furnish the broad outline, the
skeleton of the arrangement. They consti-
tute, so to say, the qualitative result of the
analysis which underlies the whole calcula-
tion. Add to it the quantitative estimate of
the interests at stake, the dangers at hand,
the advantages of position, in the several
quarters, and you reach the assignment of
numbers, which shall make the dry bones
The Disposition of Navies 205
live with all the energy of flesh and blood in a
healthy body ; where each member is supported,
not by a local congestion of vitality, but by the
vigor of the central organs which circulate
nourishment to each in proportion to its
needs.
THE PERSIAN GULF AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THE PERSIAN GULF AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
June, 1902.
THE American whom above all others
his countrymen delight to honor, more
even to-day than a century ago, as his sober
wisdom and unselfish patriotism stand in
stronger relief on the clear horizon of the past,
when he took leave of public life, cautioned
his fellow-citizens of that day against " perma-
nent inveterate antipathies against particular
nations." In uttering this warning, to which
he added certain obvious corollaries as to the
effect of prejudice, sympathetic as well as anti-
pathetic, upon action, Washington had vividly
in mind American conditions, both present
and past, of which he had had bitter official
experience. His own people had then divided,
and was still farther dividing, in sentiment and
utterance, upon lines of sympathy for and
against Great Britain and France. Impas-
14
210 The Persian Gulf and
sioned feeling and fervent speech were doing
the deadly work he deplored, in setting man
against man, and to some extent section
against section, upon issues which were at
least not purely of American interest Harm-
ful at any time, such an opposition of mis-
placed emotions was peculiarly dangerous then,
when the still recent union under the Consti-
tution of 1789 had not yet had time to obliter-
ate the colonial habits of thought, to which the
common term " American " loomed far less
large, and was far less dear, than the local
appellations of the several States. This in-
spired Washington's further very serious and,
to use his own word, " affectionate " counsels
against the spirit of faction and disunion,
which, though not confined to our political
community, presented special perils to one but
lately organized.
Nor w 7 as it only against immediate instances
of inveterate national antipathies that Wash-
ington uttered his warning. These served
him merely as pointed illustrations. He based
his counsels, as advice to be sound must ever
be based, upon permanent general principles.
International relations, he said, were not de-
International Relations 211
termined, and should not be determined, by
sympathy, but by justice and by interest. Jus-
tice of course first. However onerous and
unsatisfactory, "let existing engagements be
observed in their genuine sense." Beyond this,
" keep constantly in view that 't is folly in one
nation to look for disinterested favors from
another; that it must pay with a portion of
its independence for whatever it may accept
under that character; that by acceptance it
may place itself in the condition of having
given equivalent for nominal favors, and yet
of being reproached with ingratitude for not
giving more."
Here again, in this slightly veiled allusion
to the French alliance, was indicated the in-
trusion of bias into international relations.
The help extended by France to the American
struggle for independence was indeed real ;
but as a favor, though given that coloring, it
was purely nominal. Yet upon it, so regarded,
were based extravagant claims, not only for
American sympathy, but for American active
support in the early days of the French Revo-
lution. Sight was lost of the notorious fact,
that, however disinterested the action of indi-
2 1 2 The Persian Gulf and
vidual Frenchmen, the French government,
with proper regard to the interests of its own
nation, had simply utilized the revolt of the
colonies to renew its old struggle with Great
Britain under favorable conditions. A large
number of Americans, treasuring the then
recent occasions of bitter hostility to Great
Britain, responded vehemently; another numer-
ous party, alienated by republican excesses in
France, and seeing a truer ideal of liberty in
British institutions, recoiled with equal vigor.
At a moment when every consideration of ex-
pediency dictated political detachment, to the
intensification of national life, by pruning
superfluous activitives and concentrating vital
force upon internal consolidation and develop-
ment, a vast motive power of passion and
prejudice was aroused, misdirecting national
energy into channels where it not merely ran
to waste but corroded the foundations of the
Union. On one side and the other, the ideals
of national duty and policy became confused
with the names of foreign peoples, leading to
a bitterness of antagonism that prolonged
through a generation the immaturity of the
affection uniting the States ; maintaining an
International Relations 2 1
3
internal weakness which manifested itself re-
currently with each fresh cause of variance,
and entailed continued feebleness of external
influence until it disappeared forever in the
agonies of civil war.
It will doubtless be argued that there is now
general recognition that reasoned interest,
controlled by justice, is the true regulator of
state policy. Possibly; but does practice
coincide ? Is national calmness or harmony
undisturbed, national force unweakened, by
sympathies and antipathies which, however
otherwise justified, have no proper place in
perturbing international conduct ? The foster-
ing of an internal spirit of faction is not the
only evil effect on national judgment that may
arise from extra-national repulsions or attrac-
tions. The immediate evil of disruption, which
then threatened the United States, is indeed
not imminent for political communities of long-
standing consolidation ; but even into them
prepossession indulged for or against other
peoples, as such, introduces a motive which
is to national efficiency what a morbid growth
is to the health of the body. The functions
are vitiated, vision impaired, and movement
214 The Persian Gulf and
undecided or misdirected; perhaps both. A
tendency arises to seek the solution of diffi-
culties in artificial and sometimes complicated
international arrangements, contemplating an
indefinite future, instead of in simple national
procedure meeting each new situation as it
develops, governed by a settled general national
policy. The latter course may at times incur
the reproach of inconsistency through the in-
evitable necessity of conforming particular
measures to unforeseen emergencies ; but it
may none the less remain most truly consistent
in its fixed regard to a few evident leading
conditions for which permanency may be pre-
dicated. Washington, a man wise with the
wisdom that comes of observation in practical
life, phrased this for his countrymen, in the
connection already quoted, in the words, " Con-
sulting the natural course of things, forcing
nothing ; " or, as an American experienced in
political campaigning once said to me, " Never
contrive an opportunity."
Nothing is more fruitful of that frequent
charge of bad faith among nations than the
attempt to substitute the artificial for the
natural. When subsequent experience shows
International Relations 2 1 5
that interest has been elaborately sacrificed
because imperfectly comprehended or wholly
misunderstood, popular revulsion ultimately
exerts over rulers an influence that is compul-
sive in proportion to the urgency of the situa-
tion. It does not follow from this that a
nation, as such, has premeditated bad faith, or
wilfully accepts it. Nations are not cynical,
though individual statesmen have been. There
need be no attempt to justify breach of en-
gagement ; but it is a very partial view of facts
not to recognize that the greater fault lies with
those who made a situation which could not
be perpetuated, because contrary to the nature
of things. Such action should be accepted as
a warning that international arrangements can
be regarded as sound only when they conform
to substantial conditions, relatively at least
permanent. If this caution be observed, na-
tional policy may through long periods be as
enduring as national characteristics admit-
tedly are. National . character abides, though
nations under impulse are often inconstant.
So may national policy, though on occasion
fluctuating, or even vacillating, be really con-
stant; but to be so it must conform to the
216 The Persian Gulf and
nature of things, consulting — not resisting- —
their course.
If this be so as regards general policy, it fol-
lows that successive questions, as they arise,
should be viewed in their relation to that gen-
eral policy, which it must be assumed is con-
sciously realized in its broad outlines by the
governments of the day. Of such questions
the prospective status of Persia and the Per-
sian Gulf now forms one, in the consideration
of two or three of the great world powers. In
their regard to it, and to the various interests
or enterprises centring around it, how far are
they guided by the natural tendency of things ?
How far are they seeking to interject artificial
arrangements, forced ambitions ? What is to
be said, from this point of view, of the pro-
posed activities, the various theories of action,
suggested political compromises, that here find
their origin ? As the phrase " world politics "
more and more expresses a reality of these lat-
ter days, the more necessary does it become to
consider each of the several centres of interest
as not separate, but having relations to the
whole ; as contributory to a general balance
of constitution, to the health of which it is
International Relations 2 1 7
essential to work according to nature, not
contrary to it.
In the general economy of the world, irre-
spective of political tenures, present or pos-
sible, the Persian Gulf is one terminus of a
prospective interoceanic railroad. The track
of this, as determined by typographical con-
siderations, will take in great part a course
over which, at one period and another of his-
tory, commerce between the East and West has
travelled. Though itself artificial, it will follow
a road so far conforming to the nature of things
that it has earned in the past the name of the
Highway of Nations. The railroad will be one
link, as the Persian Gulf is another, in a chain
of communication between East and West,
alternative to the all-water route by the Suez
Canal and the Red Sea. This new line will
have over the one now existing the advantage,
which rail travel always has over that by water,
of greater specific rapidity. It will therefore
serve particularly for the transport of passen-
gers, mails, and lighter freights. On the other
hand, for bulk of transport, meaning thereby
not merely articles singly of great weight or
size, but the aggregate amounts of freight that
2 1 8 The Persian Gulf and
can be carried in a given time, water will al-
ways possess an immense and irreversible ad-
vantage over land transport for equal distances.
This follows directly from the fact that a rail-
road is essentially narrow. Even with four
tracks, it admits of but two trains proceeding
abreast in the same direction ; whereas natural
water ways as a rule permit ships, individually
of greater capacity than any single train, to go
forward in numbers practically unlimited. A
water route is, as it were, a road with number-
less tracks. For these reasons, and on account
of the first cost of construction, water trans-
port has a lasting comparative cheapness,
which so far as can be foreseen will secure to
it forever a commercial superiority over that
by land. It is also, for large quantities, much
more rapid ; for, though a train can carry its
proper load faster than a vessel can, the closely
restricted number of trains that can proceed
at once, as compared to the numerous vessels,
enables the latter in a given time, practically
simultaneously, to deliver a bulk of material
utterly beyond the power of the road.
Commercially, therefore, the railroad system,
or systems, and their branches, which shall find
International Relations 2 1 9
their terminus at the Persian Gulf, begin at a
great disadvantage towards the Suez route, con-
sidered as a line of commercial communication
between two seas, or between the two conti-
nents, Asia and Europe. This, the broad
general result, is, however, only one aspect of
the relations to world politics. A railroad, as
all know, develops the country through which
it passes. This means that it there increases
existing interests, and creates new ones. Of
these it, and through it its owners, become the
fostering and controlling centre. Because of
this effect, railroads possess a marked local
commercial influence; and commercial influ-
ence, especially in these days, and in regions
where government is weak or remiss, readily
becomes political. It is in measure compelled
to political action, to protect its varied interests.
Furthermore, railroads serve to expedite not
only the movement of commerce but the move-
ment of troops. They have therefore military
significance, as well as commercial and politi-
cal. This is a commonplace, upon which it is
needless to insist beyond recalling that it in-
heres in all railroads as such, and therefore in
the one under consideration. Finally, while
2 20 The Persian Gulf and
all parts of a commercial route, by land or by
sea, have a certain value, supreme importance
is accumulated at the termini, the points of
arrival or of departure. The operations of
commerce, — receipt, distribution, or transship-
ment, — are there multiplied many fold. This
concentration makes them singularly the ob-
jects of forcible interference, and consequently
attributes to them an importance which is
military or naval, according to the locality.
This at present is the particular bearing of
the Persian Gulf upon world politics. It is
closely analogous to that of Port Arthur, which
has preceded it so shortly as not yet to be
fairly out of sight, as a matter of international
heartburnings. Upon the control of it will
rest the functioning of the prospective rail-
road itself regarded either as a through line
of communication, or as a maintainer of local
industries by the access it affords them to
wider markets. Not only the prosperity of
the railroad itself is at stake. The commer-
cial interests that depend upon it, those of the
country through which it runs and to which it
immediately ministers, and those of many other
regions, as producers or consumers, are in-
International Relations 221
volved in the political and military status of
the Persian Gulf.
Whose affair then is this, intrinsically so im-
portant? Not that of all the world, for though
all the world may be interested, more or less,
directly or indirectly, it by no means follows
that it is everybody's particular responsibility.
By established rule and justice, the determina-
tion belongs primarily to those immediately on
the spot, in actual possession. Unhappily, the
powers that border the Persian Gulf, Persia
itself, Turkey, and some minor Arabian com-
munities, are unable to give either the commer-
cial or the military security that the situation
will require. Under their tutelage alone, with-
out stronger foundations underlying, stability
cannot be maintained, either by equilibrium or
by predominance. In such circumstances, and
when occasion arises, the responsibility natu-
rally devolves, as for other derelicts of fortune,
upon the next of kin, the nearest in place or
interest. If they, too, fail, then the more re-
motely concerned derive both claim and duty.
The general welfare of the world, as that of
particular communities, will be most surely
advanced by each one doing that which he
222 The Persian Gulf and
finds to his hand to do, whether by direct
charge received from due authority, or by in-
heritance, or from the mere fact of neighbor-
hood, which has given to the word " neighbor "
that consecrated association, with the sound of
which we are all familiar, though we too nar-
rowly conceive the range of its privilege and
its duty.
From the fact of propinquity, of geographi-
cal nearness, or of direct political interest, it is
easy to see that Great Britain and Russia are
the two States which from existing circum-
stances are most immediately and deeply con-
cerned ; nor, when the several circumstances
are closely analyzed and duly weighed, does
there to my mind seem room to doubt that to
the former falls first to say whether she will
discharge the duty, or let it go to another.
Let there be here interposed, however, the
word of caution, before quoted, concerning the
natural course of things, lest I should seem
fairly chargeable with the disposition, unwise
as well as unjust, to favor needless or prema-
ture intervention. It may well to-day be a
duty not to do that which to-morrow will find
incumbent. Opportunity is not to be created,
International Relations 223
but to be awaited till it appear in the form of
necessity, or at the least of clear and justifiable
expediency. Consulting the natural order of
things, forcing nothing, means at least invin-
cible patience as well as sleepless vigilance;
and vigilance includes necessarily readiness,
for he only is truly awake who is careful to
prepare.
I have said that an analysis of the circum-
stances shows that Great Britain, in the evi-
dent failure of Turkey and Persia, is the
nation first — that is, most — concerned. She
is so not only in her own right and that of her
own people, but in the yet more binding one
of imperial obligation to a great and politically
helpless ward of the Empire ; to India and its
teeming population. In her own right and
duty she is, as regards the establishment and
maintenance of order, in actual possession, hav-
ing discharged this office to the Gulf for several
generations. Doubtless, here as in Egypt, now
that the constructive work has been done, she
might find others who would willingly relieve
her of the burden of maintenance; but as re-
gards such transfer, the decision of acceptance
would rest, by general custom, with the present
224 The Persian Gulf and
possessor. To her the question is one not
merely of convenience, but of duty, arising
from and closely involved with existing con-
ditions, which are the more imperative because
they are plants of mature growth, with roots
deep struck and closely intertwined in the soil
of a past history.
These conditions are doubtless manifold, but
in last analysis they are substantially three.
First, her security in India, which would be
materially affected by an adverse change in
political control of the Gulf; secondly, the
safety of the great sea route, commercial and
military, to India and the farther East, on which
British shipping is still actually the chief trav-
eller, though with a notable comparative dim-
inution that demands national attention; and,
thirdly, the economic and commercial welfare
of India, which can act politically only through
the Empire, a dependence which greatly en-
hances obligation. The control of the Persian
Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval
potentiality, a "fleet in being ,, there, based upon
a strong military port, would reproduce the re-
lations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the
Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes
International Relations 225
to the farther East, to India, and to Australia,
the last two actually internal to the Empire,
regarded as a political system; and although
at present Great Britain unquestionably could
check such a fleet, so placed, by a division of
her own, it might well require a detachment
large enough to affect seriously the general
strength of her naval position. On the other
hand, India, considered in regard to her par-
ticular necessities, apart from the general in-
terests of the Empire, may justly demand that
there be secured to her untrammelled inter-
course with Mesopotamia and Persia. She
has a fair claim also to any incidental ad-
vantage attendant upon the through land
communication that can be assured by polit-
ical foresight, obtaining a position favorable
to the negotiations of the future. It is noto-
rious, for instance, that most nations, and
Russia pre-eminently, adopt a highly protec-
tive or exclusive policy towards foreign in-
dustries. Applied to what is now Persia, this
would be a direct injury to India, which, even
under the present backward conditions of the
inhabitants and of communications, carries on
a large part of the Persian trade, as might
15
226 The Persian Gulf and
naturally be expected from the nearness of the
two countries. The same is doubtless true of
her relations with Mesopotamia, though the
absence of reliable customs returns prevents
positive statements. For securing these nat-
ural rights of India, British naval predomi-
nance in the Gulf, unfettered by bases there
belonging to possibly hostile foreign powers,
would be a political factor of considerable in-
fluence ; but it is incompatible with the estab-
lishment of foreign arsenals.
Further, purely naval control is for this
purpose a very imperfect instrument, unless
supported and reinforced by the shores on
which it acts. It is necessary therefore to
attach the inhabitants to the same interests
by the extension and consolidation of com-
mercial relations, the promotion of which con-
sequently should be the aim of the government
The acquisition of territory is one thing, which
may properly be rejected as probably inexpe-
dient; and certainly unjust when not impera-
tive. It is quite another matter to secure
popular confidence and support by mutual use-
fulness. Whatever the merits of free trade as
a system, suited to these or those national
International Relations 227
circumstances, it probably carries with it a
defect of its qualities in inducing too great
apathy towards the exertion of governmental
action in trade matters. Non-interference,
laissez-faire, may easily degenerate from a con-
servative principle to an indolent attitude of
mind, and then it is politically vicious. The
universal existence and the nature of a consular
service testify to the close relationship between
trade and government, a relationship that is
in some measure at least one of mutual de-
pendence. A certain forecast of the future,
a preparation of the way by smoothing of ob-
stacles, a discernment of opportunity, — which
is quite different from creating it, — a recog-
nition of the natural course of things at the
instant when it may be taken at the flood,
these are natural functions of a competent
consular body. To it belongs also the estab-
lishment of international relations through the
medium of personal intercourse, so strongly
operative in public matters even in states of
European civilization, among statesmen whose
business is to look below the surface, and
beyond the individual, to the substantial and
permanent issues at stake. Much more is it
228 The Persian Gulf and
influential among peoples where statesmanship
is chiefly a matter of personal interest or bias,
consequently short sighted and unstable, and
where local confidence and prestige are domi-
nant factors in sustaining policy. There the
flag, if illustrated in a well-organized consular
service, may well be the forerunner of trade
as well as its necessary complement.
At the present time the trade of Persia is
divided chiefly between Great Britain and India
on the one hand, and Russia on the other.
As would be expected from their relative posi-
tions, the northern part falls to Russia, the
southern to her principal rival in Asia. The
one therefore is essentially a land trade, the
other maritime. From these respective char-
acteristics, the one naturally induces govern-
mental intervention, to promote the facility of
communications, to which the land by its varied
and refractory surface presents continual ob-
stacles. The other finds its royal highway of
the sea ever clear and open, a condition which
ministers to the natural conservatism and ac-
quired principle of non-interference which dis-
tinguish Great Britain. By the disposition
of all living things to grow, the spheres of the
International Relations 229
two tend continually to approach. The mo-
ment of contact may well be indefinitely dis-
tant, but the circumstances which shall attend
its arrival are already forming; and when it
comes it may be, as now in China, the signal of
an antagonism, the result of which will depend
upon the facts of political position on the one
side or the other. Russia not unnaturally
looks to her continuous territory and popula-
tion, behind the scene of possible contest, as
the assurance of her own permanent predom-
inance and eventual exclusive influence. It
may be so ; but not necessarily until a future
so far distant as to be utterly beyond the range
of our possible vision, and between which and
us lie many chapters of unknowable changes.
If confronted by a solid political organism,
resting immediately upon commercial interests,
and ultimately upon naval control of the Gulf
and the armed forces of Great Britain, backed
by her colonies and India, it must be long
before the northern impulse can overcome the
resistance. The physical difficulties of the
land route contrasted with the level path of
the sea, the narrowness of rail carriage as com-
pared with the broad highway of the ocean,
230 The Persian Gulf and
more than compensate for the apparent shorter
distance and delusive continuity of the land.
The energies of Russia also must long be
absorbed by other necessary pre-occupations,
notably the far superior importance of de-
veloped and consolidated access, by Siberia
and Manchuria, to North China seas and the
Pacific, the great immediate centres of world
interest. There is therefore no need to hasten
things in their natural course, but equally there
is no justification for neglecting to note and
improve them ; to quote Washington again,
" diffusing and diversifying by gentle means
the streams of commerce," which will gradually
nurse the future into vigorous life.
Both Persia and China are being swept irre-
sistibly into the general movement of the world,
from which they have so long stood apart.
Both have a momentous future of uncertain
issue, but that of China is evidently more
immediately imminent. This is the natural
course which things are at present following.
Persia has still a time of waiting. The indi-
cations also are that Russia, consciously or
intuitively, thus reads the conditions. By far-
sighted sagacity, or through continued yield-
International Relations 231
ings to the successive leadings of the moment,
she has now extended her great effort towards
sustained communication with ever-open water
to the farther East. The Siberian railroad, by
which she hopes to assure it, passes through
territory that is wholly her own by ancient
tenure ; while through recent generations
she has prepared its security by her steady
progress southward in Central Asia and Tur-
kestan. The establishment of orderly gov-
ernment in those regions relieves the flank
of the route from predatory dangers, which
under the feeble adminstration of Turkey will
constitute one of the elements of difficulty for
the projected railroad in the Euphrates valley.
The Siberian road throughout its whole course
is unassailable by any external power, until
within a very short distance of the coast ter-
minus. Its military safety being thus absolute,
its maintenance, and the development of its
carrying power, essential to the Russian posi-
tion in the farther East, are questions simply
of money. Money, however, will be needed in
such quantities that the imperative require-
ments must postpone further effective move-
ment to the southward or westward ; for effec-
232 The Persian Gulf and
tive movement means developed communica-
tions, consolidated and sustained. These are
expensive, and in sound policy should not be
attempted on a grand scale in two directions
at the same time ; unless indeed the resources
in money and labor are so great as to justify
their dissemination. That this is not the case
the notorious condition of the Siberian road
gives reason to believe.
Water communication with the external
world, through an unimpeded seaboard of her
own, is Russia's greatest present want. For
this object, to what extent would she benefit
commercially by access to the Persian Gulf,
as compared with the China seas? Putting
out of consideration China itself, with the
nearer shores of the Pacific, as to which the
better situation of Manchuria cannot be ques-
tioned, Russia is there much closer also to the
Americas and to the entire Pacific. Australia
is substantially equidistant from the Persian
Gulf and from Port Arthur; the balance
favoring the latter. Only Southern Asia and
Africa can be said to be nearer to the Gulf.
Europe and Atlantic America are now reached,
and ever must be reached, commercially, by
International Relations 233
Russia, from the Black Sea or the Baltic.
From the standpoint of military advantage, a
Russian naval division in the Persian Gulf,
although unquestionably a menace to the trade
route from Suez to the East, would be most
ex-centrically placed as regards all Russia's
greatest interests. It is for these reasons that
I have elsewhere said that the good of Russia
presents no motive for Great Britain to con-
cede a position so extremely injurious to her-
self and her dependencies.
The question of the Persian Gulf, and of
South Persia in connection with it, though not
yet immediately urgent, is clearly visible upon
the horizon of the distant future. It becomes,
therefore, and in so far, a matter for present
reflection, the guiding principle of which should
be its relation to India, and to the farther East.
This again is governed by the strategic con-
sideration already presented in the remark that
movement, advance, to be effective and sus-
tained, requires communications to be coherent
and consolidated. The Russian communica-
tion by land, though still inadequately devel-
oped, is thus secure, militarily. Throughout
its length there exists no near-by point held
234 The Persian Gulf and
by an enemy able to interrupt it by a serious
blow. The significance of such a condition
will be realized forcibly by contrasting it with
the military exposure of another great trans-
continental line, the Canadian Pacific. In the
farther East Great Britain, like Russia, holds
an advanced position, chiefly commercial, but
consequently military also, the communications
of which are by water. These have not, and
probably never can have, any military security
comparable to that of the Siberian railway.
Their safety must depend upon sustained ex-
ertion of mobile force, resting upon secure
bases, ready for instant and constant action.
It is needless to insist upon the difficulty of
such a situation ; it has been made the subject
of recent and abundant comment. But if thus
onerous now, all the more reason that the
burden should not be increased by the gratu-
itous step of consenting, upon any terms of
treaty, any forced infringement of the natural
condition of things, to the establishment of
a new source of danger analogous to those
already existing in Cadiz, Toulon, the Darda-
nelles, and so on. Concession in the Persian
Gulf, whether by positive formal arrangement,
International Relations 235
or by simple neglect of the local commercial
interests which now underlie political and mili-
tary control, will imperil Great Britain's naval
situation in the farther East, her political posi-
tion in India, her commercial interests in both,
and the imperial tie between herself and
Australasia.
So far from yielding here, it appears to me
that the signs of the times, as outlined above,
point seriously to the advisability of concentrat-
ing attention, preparation of the understanding
at least, upon that portion of the Suez route
to the farther East which lies between Aden
and Singapore. In this the Persian Gulf is a
very prominent consideration. It is not neces-
sary that material preparation should far fore-
stall imminent necessity ; but the preparation of
thought which we call recognition, and appre-
ciation, costs the Treasury nothing, and saves
it much by the quiet anticipation of contin-
gencies, and provision against them. It tends
to prevent inopportune concessions, and the
negligences which arise from ignorance of
facts, or failure to comprehend their relations
to one another. The South African War and
the twenty preceding years give recent warn-
236 The Persian Gulf and
ing. Foreign affairs, as well as military, need
their general staff. Besides its bearing upon
the Suez route, the Gulf has a very special
relation to the Euphrates valley, and any road
passing through it from the Levant ; and this
relation is shared by South Persia, because of
the political effect of its tenure upon the con-
trol of the Gulf. There is here concentrated
therefore commercial and political influence
upon both of the two routes, that by land and
that by water, from the Mediterranean to India
and to the East beyond. There is no occasion
in the nature of things that Great Britain, either
by concession or compulsion, should share with
another State the control which she now has
here ; but in order to retain it she needs not
only to keep the particular protective relations
already established with minor local rulers, but
further to develop and fortify her commercial
interests and political prestige in South Persia
and adjacent Mesopotamia. This means not
only, nor chiefly, increase of exchange of pro-
ducts. It means also partnership, public or
private, in the system of communications, anal-
ogous in idea, and if need be even in extent,
to Disraeli's purchase of the Suez canal shares.
International Relations 237
The attitude of the United States Government
towards the projected Panama Canal affords a
further suggestive illustration. As towards
the farther East, South Persia is in fact the
logical next step beyond Egypt; though it
does not follow that the connection therewith
is to be the same. Correlative to this com-
mercial and political progress, goes the neces-
sity of local provision for naval activity when
required. The middle East, if I may adopt
a term which I have not seen, will some day
need its Malta, as well as its Gibraltar; it
does not follow that either will be in the Gulf.
Naval force has the quality of mobility which
carries with it the privilege of temporary ab-
sences; but it needs to find on every scene of
operation established bases of refit, of supply,
and, in case of disaster, of security. The
British Navy should have the facility to con-
centrate in force, if occasion arise, about Aden,
India, and the Gulf.
In summary : Relatively to Europe the far-
ther East is an advanced post of international
activities, of very great and immediate impor-
tance ; but from the military point of view, to
which as yet commercial security has to be re-
238 The Persian Gulf and
ferred, the question of communications, of the
routes of travel, underlies all others and must
be kept carefully and predominantly in mind.
Russia has her own road, by land, unshared
with any other. To the rest of Europe, and
to Russia when she chooses, there exists now
the sea route by Suez, which is, and probably
must remain, supreme to all others. Alterna-
tive to it, in part of the way, the future will
doubtless bring railways. These, however, on
account of the greater cheapness of water car-
riage, will pretty surely do their principal
through business in expediting special transit
between the two seas — the Mediterranean and
the Indian Ocean. They will in this respect
maintain merely an express and fast freight
traffic. Between them and the Suez route
there will be the perennial conflict between
land and water transport, between natural and
artificial conditions, in which the victory is
likely to rest, as heretofore, with nature's own
highway, the sea. But, however that prove, the
beginning and the end, the termini, of both
routes, land and sea, so far as they compete,
will be substantially the same : the Levant Sea,
the Straits of Bab-el- Mandeb and the Persian
International Relations 239
Gulf. It is too much to ask of international
compliancy that Europe should accept the
single control of both terminal regions by the
same State, especially where no defined claim
now exists, as is the case in Levantine Turkey ;
but equally, where a single government can
show a long prescription of useful action, of
predominant influence, and of political primacy
locally recognized in important quarters, as
Great Britain can, there is no reason why she
should be expected to abandon these advan-
tages, except as the result of war, if a rival
think that result will repay the cost.
There is not to be seen in the nature of
things any evidence, or any tendency, which
indicates the probability that Great Britain
may be forced to yield to compulsion, actual
or threatened, concessions of present right
which it is inexpedient that she should grant
voluntarily. It is upon such probability, con-
ceived to be imminent, that are based pro-
posals of arrangement, or compromise, that I
cannot but think excessively artificial, and
disregardful of permanent conditions. They
surmise, as a necessary postulate, hostile com-
binations of two or more States, against which,
240 The Persian Gulf and
by a curious intellectual prepossession, no prob-
able counterpoise is discernible. As a matter
of fact, founded upon present territorial posi-
tions, there is in the nature of things no real,
no enduring, antagonism concerning the Per-
sian Gulf, except between Great Britain and
Russia. It is not to the interest of any third
State to interfere between these two, or to dis-
turb — much less to destroy — the local bal-
ance of power which now exists between them
and can probably be maintained. As regards
its particular interests, the hands of any third
State will be not more, but less, free, should
that balance yield to the decisive predominance
of one of the two throughout the regions in-
volved. Nor can a third State expect to re-
store equilibrium, if lost, by itself taking the
place of the one that has gone under. It is
only necessary to consider the solidity, extent,
and long standing, of the local control now
wielded by Russia and Great Britain, together
with the land power of the one and the sea
power of the other, to see the hopelessness of
any substitute for either in its own sphere.
The two systems are not dead, but living ; not
machines, but organisms; not merely founded,
International Relations 24 1
but rooted, in past history and present condi-
tions. What the rest of the world needs, what
world politics requires, is that here, as in Asia
immediately to the eastward, there should be
political and military equipoise, not predomi-
nance. The interests of other States are eco-
nomical ; freedom of transit and of traffic, the
open door. The very problem now troubling
nations in the Levant and China is how to
establish, — and only afterwards to maintain,
— conditions which are already established
and have now only to be maintained about
the land approaches to the Persian Gulf.
There is therefore, no sound inducement for
another State to waste strength here. It can
be used better elsewhere. When substantial
equilibrium thus exists, a slight effort will
suffice to obtain from either party a considera-
tion which in the case of distinct predomi-
nance, or exclusive tenure, might require a
full display of national power. Doubtless,
many in Great Britain, and also in America,
are convinced that one third State, the German
Empire, is restlessly intent, not only upon
economical and maritime development, which
is not to be contested by other than econom-
16
242 The Persian Gulf and
ical weapons, but also upon self-assertive ag-
gression with a view to territorial aggrandize-
ment in more than one part of the world; and
notably in this particular quarter. A conces-
sion has been granted to German capitalists to
extend the railway, which now ends at Konieh,
to Bagdad, passing through the Euphrates val-
ley. The necessary outlet to this is the Persian
Gulf. Such concession, when realized in con-
struction, carries with it a national investment,
an economical interest, which, though in private
ownership, inevitably entails political interest.
It justifies public backing by its own govern-
ment, in countries where, as in Turkey, private
right is secure only when it has national force
behind it. It is for this very reason that Great
Britain, having already political interest in the
Persian Gulf, should encourage British capital
to develop communications thence with the in-
terior in Persia and in Mesopotamia, as strength-
ening her political claim to consideration, and
excluding that of possible antagonists. The
German road would thus find its terminus in
a British system; a not unusual international
relation. German enterprise has in anticipation
established German political hold upon Asia
International Relations 243
Minor and Mesopotamia. As expectation
passes into realization Germany will acquire
local political importance and influence ; a
right, sanctioned by the rules of intercourse
with Oriental nations, to have her voice heard
in many local matters, as affecting the interests
of her subjects who are thus engaged in devel-
oping the country.
What effect will this have upon Germany's
political and military position, relatively to
Russia and Great Britain, which, from near-
ness or from the commercial ubiquity of their
citizens, are also politically interested ? Under
present conditions Germany, whose nearest port
is in the North Sea, has assumed a political
burden at a point from which she is far more
remote than Russia, and her sea approach to
which is before the face of the much greater
navy of Great Britain. There is in this nothing
to prevent the just assertion of her right, no
necessary cause of quarrel, — far from it ; but
also there is nothing menacing. Germany has
simply introduced another factor into a problem
as yet unsolved, that of the ultimate political
status of several provinces of the Turkish Em-
pire, — Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia.
244 The Persian Gulf and
As I have elsewhere said, I believe that her
appearance there is a step towards a right
final solution; that from the necessary com-
mon interest of Germany and Great Britain
in the Suez route to the farther East, be-
cause the commerce of both depends upon
its security, the two cannot but work together
to secure here a political development which
will consolidate their respective naval posi-
tions in the Levant.
This seems to me an absolute permanent
condition, consistent with a certain amount of
mutual jealousy and political wrangling, and
with unlimited commercial rivalry, but never-
theless determinative of substantial co-opera-
tion. The mass of Russia is so vast, her
ambitions so pronounced, and she is so near
at hand, that the Suez route needs precisely
that kind of protection against her which
Russia herself has given to the Siberian road
by the regularization of the provinces south of
it. Whatever the particular form local admin-
istration may ultimately assume, it is impera-
tive upon the Teutonic States to see that their
water route to the East is not imperilled by
naval stations flanking it, whether in the Le-
International Relations 245
vant or in the Persian Gulf. Bein^ them-
selves far distant, dependent upon naval power
simply, it is essential that they constitute a polit-
ical pre-occupation favorable to themselves in
the Asian provinces of Turkey and in Southern
Persia. In Egypt and in Aden Great Britain
has already done much. Germany, in building
a Mesopotamian railway, the continuation of
that already working in Asia Minor, contrib-
utes to the same end. That Russia looks upon
the enterprise with disfavor is a testimony,
conscious or unconscious, to its tendency.
These also seem to me permanent consid-
erations. Not less so, having reference to the
anxiety felt by some in Great Britain as to
the intentions of Germany, is the general situ-
ation of the latter in European politics. There
is certainly an impression in America, which
I share, that Great Britain for various reasons
has been tending to lose ground in economical
and commercial matters. Whether this be a
passing phase, or a symptom of more serious
trouble, time must show. Should it prove per-
manent, and Germany at the same time gain
upon her continuously, as for some years past
she has been doing, the relative positions of
246 The Persian Gulf 'and
the two as sea powers may be seriously modi-
fied. The danger appears to exist ; and if so
the watchmen of the British press should cry
aloud and spare not until all classes of their
community realize it in its fundamental signifi-
cance. Military precautions, and the condi-
tions upon which they rest, have been the main
motive of this paper; but these, while they
have their own great and peremptory impor-
tance, cannot in our day, from the point of
view of instructed statesmanship, office-holding
or other, be considered as primary. War has
ceased to be the natural, or even normal, con-
dition of nations, and military considerations
are simply accessory and subordinate to the
other greater interests, economical and com-
mercial, which they assure and so subserve.
In this article itself, turning as it does on mili-
tary discussion, the starting point and founda-
tion is the necessity to secure commerce, by
political measures conducive to military, or
naval, strength. This order is that of actual
relative importance to the nation of the three
elements — commercial, political, military.
It is evident, however, that these primary
matters, although they underlie this argument,
International Relations 247
are otherwise outside it. For the rest, as
regards the general military strength, and in
particular the sea power, of the two countries,
nothing can overthrow the one permanent
advantage that Great Britain enjoys in being
insular. Germany, should she realize her ut-
most ambitions, even expanding to the Med-
iterranean, must remain a continental State,
in immediate contact with powerful rivals.
Historically, no nation hitherto has been able
under such conditions to establish a supreme
sea power. Of this France is the historical
example. On the other hand, regarded in her-
self alone, apart from rivals, Germany cannot,
as the United States could not, exert the in-
tense internal effort now required for political
consolidation and economical development co-
incidently with an equal expansive effort. The
one may succeed the other, as in our case and
in that of Great Britain, where the expansion
of the eighteenth century followed and de-
pended on the unifying action of the seven-
teenth; but, until internal coherence is secured,
external expansion cannot adequately progress.
One weakens the other. Though correlative,
they are not co-operative.
248 The Persia7i Gulf and
The ambition of Germany so to develop her
fleet as to secure commercial transit of the
North Sea, which washes her entire maritime
frontier, is a national aspiration in itself de-
serving of entire sympathy. Towards all other
States except Great Britain it is within the
compass of reasonable expectation. As towards
Great Britain it is, under present economical
conditions, impossible ; for Great Britain, being
insular, must maintain continuously supreme
the navy upon which her all depends, and
moreover, as I pointed out in a recent paper,
by geographical position she lies across and
flanks every sea route by which Germany
reaches the outer world. This condition is
permanent, removable only by the friendship
or destruction of the British power. Of the
two the friendship will be the cheaper and more
efficacious; for it is needed not in home waters
only but in those distant regions which we have
been considering. The naval power of Great
Britain is just as real a factor in the future of
Germany in the distant East as every thinking
American must recognize it to be in our own
external policy. That such a force should be
paid for, and must necessarily be maintained,
International Relations 249
by another people, whose every interest will
prompt them to use it in the general lines of
our own advantage, is a political consideration
as valuable as it is essentially permanent. In
the matter of exertion of force it accords abso-
lutely with the nature of things. As for eco-
nomical rivalry, let it be confined to its own
methods, eschewing force.
In saying these things I may seem to ignore
the bitter temper, openly and even outra-
geously shown by the German people towards
Great Britain in these last three years. I do
not forget it. Human nature being what it
is, the dangerous effect of such conditions
upon international relations is undeniable. It
is ever present to my reflections upon the
political future. The exhibition is utterly de-
plorable, for it can serve no good end, and if
it continue will prevent a co-operation among
the three Teutonic States which all need, but
Germany most of all; for the respective ex-
ternal interests of the United States and Great
Britain — together with Japan — have so much
in common, and so little that is antagonistic,
that substantial, though informal, co-operation
is inevitable.
250 The Persian Gulf and
This hostility constitutes an element in the
political situation which should be taken into
account, and carefully watched. Nevertheless,
the permanent conditions, above summarized,
will through a future beyond our possible pres-
ent foresight retain Germany in a position of
naval numerical inferiority to Great Britain,
as regards both mobile force and the essential
naval stations which the latter has acquired
during two centuries of maritime activity.
These conditions, by their inevitable logic,
ought ultimately to overcome a sentiment which
has no good ground for existence, and which
betrays the national interest. Should it, how-
ever, endure, the permanent facts are too strong
for it to do more than dash harmlessly against
them. Awaiting either event, may not the
people of Great Britain on their part, without
relaxing vigilance or ignoring truths, accept
Washington's warning, which we Americans
at least have by no means outgrown, against
a permanent inveterate antipathies against par-
ticular nations. 5> They have cause for anger;
but anger disturbs the judgment, and I think
in some measure is doing so in this instance.
This particular antipathy is yet young, let it
International Relations 251
not harden into maturity. In the great politi-
cal questions which for some time to come will
concentrate the external regard of nations and
statesmen, the natural desires of Russia, rea-
sonable and unreasonable, are contrary to those
of Germany as well as of Great Britain. It is
to her clear interest that they remain alienated.
Such conditions should on the one hand prompt
an earnest effort for a balanced and concilia-
tory adjustment on all sides; but on the other,
their essential permanence, if it be as I think,
demands a recognition which would show itself
in the extrusion of everything resembling pas-
sion, and in the settlement of national purpose
on the firm ground of essential facts, instead
of the uncertain foundation of any artificial
agreement which contravenes them.
THE MILITARY RULE OF
OBEDIENCE
THE MILITARY RULE OF
OBEDIENCE
January, 1902.
THE military duty of obedience may be re-
garded either as a rule or a principle, for
it is both. The rule derives from the principle.
It is the principle defined in precise and man-
datory terms, as a law is the expression of the
general will of the community, formulated by
the Legislature for the governance and control
of individuals. The difficulty of such formula-
tion, however, as that of definition generally, is
well known, and has found proverbial recogni-
tion in phrases indicating that statutes, even
w T hen framed with great care by experienced
hands, are very liable to offer loop-holes through
which the observance of them may be escaped.
It is no less difficult to define the military rule of
obedience, without on the one hand constitut-
ing fetters, which would neutralize intelligence
and palsy individuality in a sphere and at in-
256 The Military Rule of Obedience
stants where both are pre-eminently needed, or,
on the other hand, permitting a license which
in practice would degenerate into anarchy. It
is not a sufficient solution to so knotty and
dangerous a question to damn obedience to
orders, as a rugged veteran will occasionally be
heard to suggest ; while, on the other extreme,
the saying of that eminent disciplinarian, Lord
St. Vincent, " The whole of discipline is con-
tained in the word 'obedience,'" though safer in
practice, is perhaps too absolute in its assertion.
The matter at stake is too intricate for such
Gordian solutions. It is also too important at
once to the individual officer and to the nation,
the conduct of whose armed forces may at crit-
ical moments depend upon a correct under-
standing. In many instances, perhaps in the
large majority, the propriety of literal obedience
is plainly evident; in a few the inexpediency,
folly, or impossibility of such compliance is for
obvious reasons equally clear ; but there never-
theless remain a number of cases, not merely
possible, but copiously exemplified by history,
which present seripus difficulty. In these an
officer finds himself confronted with condi-
tions that make a large demand upon his moral
The Military Rule of Obedience 257
courage as well as upon his judgment. His
judgment then can be safely guided, and his
resolution supported, only by a mastery of prin-
ciples. No mere rule will here suffice. Mili-
tary obedience when in subordinate post, and
military initiative when in independent com-
mand, untrammelled by orders and free to fol-
low the guidance of one's own judgment, are
both governed by principles, the appreciation
of which is the only sure light to one's foot-
steps. To them recurrence must be had in
doubtful positions, where precise precedent and
formal definition are wanting; in short, when
rules, however good in general use, fail to apply.
It does not hence follow that rules, terse and
positive embodiments of principles, such as
that of obedience, are mostly useless because
essentially narrow and unelastic. That all
rules have exceptions is proverbial ; and mili-
tary rules are probably more liable to exceptions
than most others, because of the emergency
that characterizes war and the vast variety of
situations to which a rule has to be adapted.
No one proposes on these accounts to disre-
gard rules utterly. It is evident, however,
that an officer who undertakes to violate the
17
258 The Military Rule of Obedience
fundamental rule of obedience, upon the strict
observance of which depends in general the
success of combined operations, and who sub-
stitutes his own initiative for the directions of
his superior, assumes a risk which urgently
imposes a comprehension of the principles,
upon which respectively rest both the rule of
obedience and the rules of war.
It may be asserted, as perhaps the most ten-
able general definition of the principle upon
which the rule of obedience rests, that the
spirit of obedience, as distinguished from its
letter, consists in faithfully forwarding the
general object to which the officer's particular
command is contributing. This finds expres-
sion in the well-known directive maxim, " March
to the sound of the guns." In doubtful cases,
however, - — and by doubtful I mean cases where
action other than that prescribed in the orders
seems expedient, — liberty of judgment is con-
ditioned by the officers acquaintance with the
plans of his superior. If his knowledge is im-
perfect, or altogether lacking, the doing that
which at the moment seems wise to himself
may be to defeat a much more important ob-
ject, or to dissolve the bonds of a combined
The Military Rule of Obedience 259
movement to which his co-operation is essen-
tial. If, under such circumstances of igno-
rance, resting only upon his own sagacity or
surmises, he errs either in his reading of his
commander's general purpose, or in his de-
cision as to his own action, and through such
error disobeys, he cannot complain if he re-
ceive censure or punishment. He has violated
a recognized rule without adequate reason.
The rectitude of his intentions may clear him
of moral blame, though not necessarily even so;
for the duty of obedience is not merely military,
but moral. It is not an arbitrary rule, but one
essential and fundamental ; the expression of a
principle without which military organization
would go to pieces, and military success be impos-
sible. Consequently, even where the individual
purpose may be demonstrably honest, not wil-
ful, blame adheres and punishment may follow,
according to the measure of the delinquency,
though that be due to nothing worse than per-
sonal incompetency. Does this seem hard
measure ? It may be replied, in what pursuit
is this not so? What is the profession, physi-
cian, lawyer, or Wall Street, in which a trans-
gression of instructions by an inferior, or a
260 The Military Rule of Obedience
departure from recognized methods, when not
justified by the conditions, escapes punishment,
either at the hand of events or of his employer?
Is " I thought so," or " I did my best," accepted
there as an excuse for disobedience ?
In the question of military obedience there
is therefore involved both a rule and a prin-
ciple. In dealing with the matter I shall have
to consider both, but I have advisedly chosen
the rule for the heading of this article ; for, as
I have said before, the rule has the force of a
law, a law positive in existing enactment, and
a law traditional in the settled practice of the
military professions, as well as in numerous
precedents established by competent author-
ities. To go behind a law to the principle
underlying it, to recognize a higher law than
the law explicit, is a very delicate matter for a
man in any position ; and it is therefore the
rule of obedience, rather than the general prin-
ciple upon which it rests, that most closely
touches an officer in military responsibility.
Under what conditions is it permissible to dis-
regard orders, or, even more positively, to act
contrary to them? What is the real test of
propriety, which differentiates one act of dis-
The Military Rule of Obedience 261
obedience from another of the same apparent
character ? Is one's own sense of right, one's
own good intention, the justifying factor?
What judge, however, in such a case is com-
petent to penetrate through the faulty act, if
such it be, to the hidden good purpose of the
heart ? What claim have military men to ex-
emption from the general rule of law, that in-
tention, which cannot be seen, must be inferred
from attendant circumstances, which can ? If
conduct, upon an impartial review of the con-
ditions at the moment of action, is shown to
be palpably wrong, by what right can alleged
intention, "error of judgment " as it is styled,
be invoked to justify an offender ? Is there no
such thing as malpractice, professionally guilty,
though possibly morally innocent ? Is profes-
sional incompetence, translated into action and
injurious to others, never worse than an error
of judgment? Mistakes, doubtless, all men are
liable to; the fact is proverbial; but the justi-
fication of a decision proved by the event to be
mistaken rests not upon the intention of the per-
son making it, but upon a judicial review of the
circumstances surrounding the decision, which
shall prove that, under the conditions known
262 The Military Rule of Obedience
at the moment, it was correct, or at least the
most favored by probabilities. If this be
true, as I hold it is, in the case even of a man
in independent command, much more is the
responsibility weighty when action, intrinsi-
cally faulty, is taken in disobedience of orders.
The mere enunciation of the queries in the
last paragraph will suggest to most that we
have here before us no simple question of yea
and nay. In fact, no clear-cut absolute reply,
no vade mecum for pocket use, can be furnished
defining just when and how, in all cases, a man
is justified in disobedience, nor even when he
is justified by blind obedience; although the
balance of professional judgment must always
incline in favor of the latter alternative.
When a doubt arises, as it frequently does,
between strict compliance with an order and
the disregard of it, in whole or in part, the
officer is called upon to decide a question of pro-
fessional conduct. Personal judgment neces-
sarily enters as a factor, but only one of many ;
and, to be trusted, it needs to be judgment
illuminated by professional knowledge and for-
tified by reflection. Short of that, it is not a
safe counsellor, and has no claim to consider-
The Military Rule of Obedience 263
ation if cited before a court of final appeal.
The officer at the moment should consider
himself, as he in fact is, a judge deciding upon
a case liable to be called up to a superior court,
before which his conclusion has no claim to
respect because it is his personal opinion, but
only so far as it is supported by the evidence
before him. There is, of course, the necessary
reservation that the final judgment upon him-
self, for his professional conduct as involved in
his decision, will be rendered upon the facts
accessible to him, and not upon those not then
to be known, though afterwards apparent.
Unless qualified by these grave consider-
ations, the phrase "error of judgment," so
facilely used, is misleading to popular under-
standing. Not only so; it is pregnant of
serious consequences to the issues of war and
to individuals influenced by it. It is necessary
to realize that some errors of judgment are
inexcusable, because inconsistent with recog-
nized standards ; and that disobedience of
orders is on its face a fault, a disregard of a
settled standard, of an established rule, of such
general application that upon the person who
commits it rests the burden of proving that
264 The Military Rule of Obedience
the circumstances commanded his action. The
presumption, in the case of disobedience, is not
innocence, but guilt. Mere rule though it be,
in its narrow construction and rigid framework,
the rule of implicit and entire obedience rests
upon reasons so sound that its infringement
in action can rarely be condoned, when not
thoroughly approved. Nothing can be more
disastrous than to trifle with the corner stone,
upon which rests the structure of coherent,
unified action. The admission into the mili-
tary mind of anything approaching irreverence
for the spirit of military obedience, or levity
as regards the letter of the rule in which it
is embodied, is the begetter of confusion, and
that, in turn, is the forerunner of defeat. To
sit loose to this obligation weakens the sense
of responsibility, upon the due realization of
which rests not merely literal obedience, but
intelligent and deserving disobedience in the
occasional circumstances which call for that.
The recognition of responsibility by the indi-
vidual, the consciousness that serious regard to
it is governing his determinations, is the best
moral equipment that a man can have to en-
able him to sustain the burden of violating
The Military Rule of Obedience 265
instructions, deliberately undertaken upon his
own judgment. It is the mens conscia recti
in a serious problem of action.
The mental equipment is another matter,
but it, as well as the moral, are necessary to
full professional competency for such occasions.
Upon the hypothesis now before us, the rule,
absolute in general, seems not to apply. To
meet the difficulty with sound discretion, on
which to base the defence of his action what-
ever its issue may prove, the officer will need
an adequate realization of all the conditions
before him, and a power of appreciating the
military situation as thus constituted. This
power depends in part upon native aptitude;
but it requires also a knowledge of the practice
of war, a broad and ripened acquaintance with
the principles and precedents controlling the
conduct of military operations, which is by no
means so widely diffused as may, perhaps, be
thought. Without this, disobedience is a haz-
ardous undertaking; but, when so equipped,
an officer may with considerable confidence
permit himself to depart from the letter of his
instructions in order to fulfil their spirit. Con-
fidence, I say deliberately; for in the majority
266 The Military Rule of Obedience
of such instances he will receive intelligent
and generous consideration.
In such instances it is not just that the pro-
priety of the act should be judged by the
event ; and it is not true that it will be, as a
cheap sneer would have it. Success undoubt-
edly often covers mistakes ; for human nature
is on the whole generous, or at least good-
tempered. It is willing to forgive faults which
it can afford to forget; but failure does not
with any equal certainty entail condemna-
tion, for again mankind is generous, and no-
where more so than in dealing with military
men. Even though mishap ensue, where an
officer can show preponderant military reasons
for departure from orders, he can anticipate
from his superiors intelligent comprehension
and acquittal, which the public will confirm
on their finding ; but, while this is so, let none
be rash enough to anticipate immunity on the
score of error of judgment, when it can be
demonstrated that with the data before him a
man who knew his business would have de-
cided otherwise. s
Actions that fly in the face of ascertainable
fact, or of well-settled military principles, are
The Military Rule of Obedience 267
not to be excused as merely errors of judg-
ment. They are something more, and worse.
A man is just as much responsible for an error
of judgment which results from his own neglect
to inform himself, or his lack of professional
knowledge, as he is for any other misdoing.
What is amiss here is not judgment, but con-
duct. Such errors when they take shape in
action, whether of commission or omission, are
misconduct. They have a standing, as acts,
external to and independent of the person com-
mitting them, just as murder has a standing as
a crime quite independent of its association
with the individual criminal. As killing is not
always murder, but depends for its character
upon the attendant circumstances, so a par-
ticular unfortunate military movement is not
always misconduct Circumstances may be
proved to justify it. In neither case, however,
is it the judgment of the person concerned that
determines conduct to have been good or bad.
It is the circumstances, passed upon by judges
other than himself, and referred to recognized
standards. Personal defects may be considered
in extenuation, or they may not; their title to
indulgence is small where they are due to per-
268 The Military Rule of Obedience
sonal fault or neglect, present or in the past,
or to professional incompetency.
If so much as is here claimed be allowed to
the military duty of obedience, it is desirable
to pass in review the considerations from which
such weighty obligations are supposed to de-
rive. Tradition and acceptance, in most men
irreflective, have built up an imposing fabric
of power, cemented by the habit of rigid, and
in the last resort of even blind, submission to
superior authority, which, in exhibition and ex-
ercise, is directly and immediately personal,
though legal in derivation. It will be useful
to test the foundations upon which this struc-
ture rests, and the necessity, in order to main-
tain it, of a moral code so foreign to the
customary personal independence of the gen-
eral citizen. Or, if a more vital simile be
desired for an organization so instinct with
life and regulated movement as a well-consti-
tuted military body, let us seek the root, the
energizing power of which has evolved, de-
veloped, and continues to quicken, military
efficiency in all its ramifications, whether in
administrative methods or in the principles
governing the conduct of war in open cam-
The Military Rule of Obedience 269
paign. What we here possess we have through
tradition. Can it give an account of itself?
The value of tradition to the social body is
immense. The veneration for practices, or for
authority, consecrated by long acceptance, has
a reserve of strength which cannot be speedily
obtained by any novel device. Respect for the
old customs is planted deep in the hearts, as
well as in the intelligence, of all inheritors of
English-speaking polity. From the very rea-
son of this profound influence over men, tra-
ditions need from time to time to be brought
to the touchstone, by reference to principle, in
order to know whether they are still accordant
with the ideas in which their origin is found ;
or whether, the ideas themselves being already
outgrown, the tradition no longer represents a
living present, but only a dead past. Is the
duty of military obedience in either of these
cases? Does the tradition, set forth by the
rule, still embody the essential spirit of the
principle once involved? Is the principle it-
self still alive and applicable as of old ?
The question is far from needless, for the
contest between the letter and the spirit is
constant here, as in many spheres of action.
2 jo The Military Rule of Obedience
I am inclined to believe that on shore, among
soldiers, the letter has tended to have the up-
per hand, and with seamen the spirit, due prob-
ably to the more frequent removal of the latter
from the presence of an immediate superior,
throwing them thus upon their own initiative.
Naval biography and history, and military his-
tory as far as my limited reading goes, seem to
support this opinion. No man wrestled with
the question more vigorously than Nelson ;
none found greater exasperation than he did
in the too often successful opposition of the
letter to the demands of his impetuous spirit
for co-operation, addressed to men over whom
he had not immediate control ; none was more
generous in his attitude to subordinates who
overrode or overpassed his own orders, pro-
vided he saw in their acts the intelligent and
honest will to forward his purposes. Obedi-
ence he certainly required ; but he recognized
that, given a capable and zealous man, better
work would usually be had by permitting a
certain elasticity of initiative, provided it was
accompanied by accurate knowledge of his
general wishes. These he was always most
careful to impart; in nothing was he more
The Military Rule of Obedience 271
precise or particular. If he allowed large lib-
erty in the letter, he expected close observance
of, nay, rather, participation in, the spirit of his
ideas. He was not tolerant of incapacity, nor
would he for a moment bear wilful disregard of
his plans. When considerations of high policy
entertained by himself were crossed by Sidney
Smith, his language became peremptory. " As
this is in strict opposition to my opinion, which
is never to suffer any one individtial Frenchman
to quit Egypt, I strictly charge and command
you never to give any French ship or man leave
to quit Egypt." The italics are his own ; and
he adds again, as though distrustful still : " You
are to put my orders in force, not on any pre-
tence to permit a single Frenchman to leave
Egypt." The severity of the tone sufficiently
proves his disposition to enforce the strictest
rule, where necessary to control individuals ;
but a more liberal reliance upon principle, in
preference to rule, was his habit. None, it
may be added, illustrated more copiously than
he, when a junior, the obedience of the spirit
and the disobedience of the letter. His prac-
tice was in this consistent in all stages of his
career. Unfortunately, the example may tempt
272 The Military Rule of Obedie7ice
smaller men to follow where their heads are
not steady enough to keep their feet.
Of course, thinking and feeling thus, he gave
frequent expression to his views, and these,
coming from a man of his military genius, are
often very illuminative. There is one such
that is singularly applicable to our present
purpose, of searching for the underlying prin-
ciple which governs the duty and observance
of obedience, and determines its absolute neces-
sity to all military action. " I find few think
as I do, but to obey orders is all perfection.
What would my superiors direct, did they
know what is passing under my nose? To
serve my King and to destroy the French I
consider as the great order of all, from which
little ones spring, and if one of these little ones
militate against it, I go back to obey the great
order."
Carefully analyzed, there is much that is
instructive in these words. First of all, it will
be observed that the obedience commended is
that of the spirit, compliant with general known
views. Again, justification of local disobedi-
ence also rests upon this compliance with the
spirit, applied to the attendant circumstances.
The Military Rule of Obedience 273
This tacitly admits, of course, that the circum-
stances must be adequate in order to justify
disobedience. It is, however, deeply significant
and monitory that the particular sentences
quoted were elicited by censure from the Ad-
miralty for disobedience, in the only instance,
among many similar liberties of action, in
which Nelson failed to establish that circum-
stances did warrant, or rather did require, him
to traverse his instructions. Even he, in the
very height of his glory, with reputation, capa-
city, and zeal, all established beyond question,
could not trifle with literal obedience, on the
strength of his own judgment, where, upon
a calm review of all the facts, the circumstances
failed to justify him. He himself, in the ex-
asperation of self-vindication, fell into the facile
perversion of thought, concerning error of
judgment. " I am so confident of the upright-
ness of my intention, that, with all respect, I
submit myself to the judgment of my supe-
riors." " Although a military tribunal may
think me criminal, the world will approve my
conduct"
What Nelson here meant by " the world"
may be doubtful ; but it is impossible that the
18
274 The Military Rule of Obedience
verdict of history to-day will not affirm the
propriety of the Admiralty's rebuke a century
ago. The facts, briefly stated, were these.
The Commander-in-Chief of the whole Medi-
terranean had sent orders to Nelson, his subor-
dinate, to detach a certain part of his force
from Naples to Minorca, which he considered
endangered. Nelson, anticipating the case,
had argued, to quote his own words, " Should
such an order come, it would be a cause for
some consideration whether Minorca is to be
risked, or the two kingdoms of Naples and
Sicily. I rather think my decision would be
to risk the former;" and he deliberately dis-
obeyed, resting on this opinion of his own.
His error, however induced, is dear enough.
The Commander-in-Chief was charged with
the safety of the whole field, Naples as well as
Minorca, with many other cases needless to
specify. It was his business, and his responsi-
bility, to co-ordinate all in a general plan of
offence and defence; in order to carry out
which he had need to count upon the certain
movement of all parts of his command in obedi-
ence to his directions. Refusal in any one
part might throw all out of gear. Nelson's
The Military Rule of Obedience 275
particular district, was, simply and broadly, Na-
ples and the Eastern Mediterranean. Within
these limits he had full discretion, subject to
the general orders of his superior, and his
information as to his policy; but when he
undertook to act upon his own estimate of the
relative value of Minorca and Naples, he went
outside the trust and the powers committed
to him, and invaded the province which be-
longed to the Commander-in-Chief alone. His
erroneous judgment, or as he styles it, " The
uprightness of my intentions," being translated
into overt act, became misconduct, and as such
was censured by the Admiralty. " Their Lord-
ships do not see sufficient reason to justify
your having disobeyed the orders you had re-
ceived from your commanding officer, or hav-
ing left Minorca exposed to the risk of being
attacked without having any naval force to
protect it."
It is perhaps expedient to observe, as tend-
ing to confirm a general truth which cannot be
too seriously insisted upon, that this unwar-
rantable action was something more than a
breach of necessary discipline, by a man of too
assured position and importance to be sum-
276 The Military Rule of Obedience
marily treated, and who therefore should have
been doubly careful of the strict propriety of
his course. It was also most unfair to the
Commander-in-Chief, in its possible conse-
quences. In case of mishap, the public, less
clear-sighted ordinarily than the administration,
because more easily moved by appearances,
would have sought the first victim of its dis-
pleasure in the superior, who had not the same
support of past brilliant achievement to fall
back on that Nelson had. Nor can it, I think,
upon a more detailed examination of the cir-
cumstances than is here expedient, be doubted
that very serious national disaster was possible,
though actually no harm resulted from this
breach of discipline.
A previous instance of disobedience on the
part of a junior admiral, less than three years
before, met with very different measure. Lord
St. Vincent, then Sir John Jervis, commanded
the British fleet in the Mediterranean in 1 796.
Scarcity of provisions compelled him to order
one of his lieutenants, Rear- Admiral Mann, to
take half a dozen ships-of-the-line to Gibraltar,
there to fill up, and to rejoin him in Corsica
as soon as possible. On his way down, about
The Military Rule of Obedience 277
October 1, Mann met and was chased by a
Spanish fleet of nineteen sail, on their way to
Toulon to join the French navy there; Spain
having very lately declared war. He escaped,
and reached Gibraltar; but on arrival there
called a council of war, and upon its advice
determined not to carry out his orders to re-
join Jervis. Instead, dominated by the fear
of possible consequences, which governed his
judgment, he took his division to England.
An error of judgment? Yes, according to
the common phrase, which the present writer
accepted from unchallenged tradition, until
forced by reflection to recognize that "error
of judgment" was being invoked to cover
many acts, very different in their military
character.
Mark the result. Because the junction of
the Spanish navy to the French gravely im-
perilled Jervis with fifteen ships in Corsica,
Mann judged expedient to leave him in the
lurch, instead of obeying his orders and taking
back the seven he had with him. Jervis, in
perplexed uncertainty, hung on till the last
moment, diminishing the rations of his men
to one-third of the daily allowance, doubting
278 The Military Rule of Obedience
and wondering, unwilling to depart lest he
should expose Mann's seven, as Mann was ex-
posing his fifteen. He was, besides, confident
that, if the junction were effected in Corsica,
twenty-two ships, such as he would then have,
would " make their way " through the out-
numbering Spaniards " in every direction ; "
that is, " would cut them to pieces." So much
for the opportunity lost, as Jervis judged it;
in which agreed the opinion of Nelson, who
was with him. We have also the sober meas-
ured judgment of Collingwood on the same
occasion. " We waited with the utmost im-
patience for Admiral Mann, whose junction
at one time seemed absolutely necessary to our
safety." As for Mann, the Admiralty showed
their appreciation of his judgment by steps
which proved that they considered his conduct
at fault. A cutting rebuke was administered.
" Their lordships feel the greatest regret that
you should have been induced to return to
England with the squadron under your orders,
under the circumstances in which you were
placed." " The circumstances " which gov-
erned his judgment did not justify his conduct.
He was deprived at once of his command, and
The Military Rule of Obedience 279
appears never to have been employed afloat
again.
Occurring in so high quarters, and being on
so large a scale, these instances show more
forcibly than usual what the necessity is, what
the root, whence spring the principle, the rule,
and the duty — all three — of military obedi-
ence. Where many wills have to act to one
end, unity of effort, effective co-operation,
needs not only to exist, but to be guaranteed
by the strongest possible sanctions. The many
wills need to become one will ; the many
persons, in many quarters, simply the rep-
resentatives, in the best sense, of the one
person, in whom the united action of the whole
finds source and energy. Lord St. Vincent's
maxim, " The whole of discipline is contained
in the one word ' obedience, ' " may be correctly
paraphrased, " The whole of military action is
contained in the one word ' unity.' ,: Obedience
and unity are only different manifestations of
the same principle. The one is the principle
in will, the other in act. The one characterizes
the conduct of persons, the other the conduct
of operations. Obedience ensures that the
members of the military body, often far apart,
280 The Military Rule of Obedience
will obey the one commander with the accuracy
and vigor with which the muscles of an athlete
obey his will.
In the conduct of war, what is concentration,
the necessity of which is universally granted,
but essential unity? When, for purposes of
the war, concentration yields momentarily to
expansion, then all the movements and dis-
positions of the forces must be governed by
reference to easy concentration, to unity of
action. The moment this consideration is
violated, unity is sacrificed, and conduct has
become misconduct; nor does it matter, in
justification of a plain violation of principle,
that the misconduct is due to an error of judg-
ment. If circumstances knowable at the time
justify, judgment has not been at fault; if they
do not, the man should have known better.
This necessity to keep unity in view is ex-
pressed by one of Napoleon -s pithy phrases :
" The art of war consists in proper distribu-
tions, to disseminate in order to exist, and to
concentrate in order to fight." Again he says,
" War is a business of positions," and he illus-
trates the maxim by an example of positions
of dissemination, so taken that the scattered
The Military Rule of Obedience 281
bodies can with certainty and in the briefest
period unite at a common centre, in case of
threatened attack, or for an intended move-
ment of offence.
In all this there is, of course, much that
finds close analogies in civil life, and no doubt
much light might be thrown on the rule of
military obedience by a comparative examina-
tion of other callings. But the peculiarity of
war, for which alone the military professions
exist, to meet or to avert it, is that men are in
the constant presence of power actively and
malevolently intent upon injuring them, by any
means of surprise or superiority of force that
can be contrived. Therefore the need to have
every moment in hand, and upon occasion
to exert, all the means at ones command, to
counteract the enemy, to overthrow his de-
signs, to crush himself, to do so with the ut-
most speed and certainty, weighs heavier in
war than in more tranquil pursuits. War is
face to face continually, not with misfortune
only but with catastrophe; and that not of
gradual approach or partial, but sudden and
irremediable.
For these weighty reasons, all available re-
282 The Military Rule of Obedience
sources to forestall such result, and to destroy
the enemy upon whom it depends, need to be
utilized and put forth in the most effective and
promptest manner. This means that exertions
in all parts must be instant upon the word of
command, and in unison ; united in movement
and united in weight. Velocity and weight
are the factors of momentum in armed colli-
sion as in any other, and both the rapidity and
the force of an intended blow depend upon
unity of impulse and simultaneous impact, in
bodies of men as well as in projectiles. What
else is the conceded value of movement in
mass than concentrated movement, the weight
of several bodies effectively joined into one ?
To frame the plan, to initiate and control the
movement, to give to it direction, combination,
and impulse, to sustain its energy, is the duty
of one man, upon whom in the last analysis
depends the unity of thought and act which
inspires and vivifies the whole ; but the trans-
mission of the impulse and energy throughout
the mass, so that the oneness of the head is
realized in the unity of the whole, is ensured
by the military rule of obedience, and by that
only. Obedience is the cement of the struc-
The Military Rule of Obedience 283
ture; or, more worthily understood in the spirit,
apart from which a word is but dead, it is the
life-blood of the organism. In short, the rule
of obedience is simply the expression of that
one among the military virtues upon which all
the others depend, in order that the exertion of
their powers may not breed confusion, which is
the precursor of disaster, but may accomplish
decisive results, approaching perfection in pro-
portion as co-operation has been exact.
ADMIRAL SAMPSON
ADMIRAL SAMPSON
May, 1902.
AS a matter of mere retrospect, there can
be few officers now in the navy whose
recollections of the late Admiral Sampson go
back as far as my own. Although a few
months his junior in age, I belonged to the
class at the Naval Academy which was two
years ahead of his ; and consequently, at the
time of his entrance, I was able to regard new-
comers with something of that feeling of de-
tached superiority which is apt to characterize
the attitude of older collegians toward fresh-
men. Whatever of distinction between the
two exists in the nature of things is, of course,
emphasized at a military school, where the
want of uniform and difference of carriage
betray at a glance any affectation of com-
posure, with which a stranger may try to con-
ceal the fact that he is in an unaccustomed
position and knows it. At that date — 1S57
— the body of midshipmen, as they were then
288 Admiral Sampson
styled, were organized for purposes of drill
and messing on the same basis as the ship's
company of a naval vessel of the day, in small
groups of sixteen to twenty in number, called
gun's crews. To each of these was assigned,
in the battery which figured as a ship's deck,
a gun of the type then common in the navy, a
thirty-two pounder; and at the head of each
were two captains, called first and second,
taken from the two older classes. I was
second captain of the gun to which Sampson
was assigned, and my earliest sight of him was
toward the end of September, when the whole
Academy assembled for the first muster of the
year, the conspicuous incident of the ail-round
shakedown with which the annual course began.
It is, perhaps, characteristic of the person-
ality of the man, that even then, under all the
awkward disadvantage of a novice, he made
such an impression upon me that I can at
this moment see his face as I did then, and
as vividly. Memory plays strange tricks ; and
her methods of selecting what she is pleased
to retain defy systematization, or unqualified
approval. The trivial sticks, the important
escapes ; at least we often so estimate its ac-
Admiral Sampson 289
tion. In this case I do not mean in the least
to convey the idea that I then recognized, con-
sciously, that the person before me was one of
superior intellect or character, marked though
Sampson afterward proved to be in both those
respects. Nevertheless, I do find it noticeable,
in the light of his subsequent career, that he,
and he alone, of all the youths then about me,
has left an abiding remembrance. I had a
hard wrestle with my recollections a few days
ago to recall who was the first captain of that
crew. I got him at last; but memory is ob-
stinate in refusing me the names or faces of
the men who sat on my right and left hand at
mess during the eight following months which
made the academic year of study. Sampson
alone of the whole group has stuck.
Although I did not then, nor for long after-
ward, analyze the reason for this arrest of atten-
tion, which forced memory to take hold and
pigeon-hole a portrait for future reference, I
incline to think that it was due to the unusual
inquisitive interest he showed in all that was
going on. This trait was carried into his sub-
sequent professional life as a whole. It was
the necessary complement to his very excep-
19
290 Admiral Sampson
tional intellectual capacity, without which his
natural abilities might have been wasted, as
have been those of so many other gifted men
in all callings. The average raw boy, in his
then position of entrance to the Academy,
yields passively, and with a certain sense of
subjection, to the impulse of those above him.
He does what he is told, asks no questions, and
gradually learns by familiarity what he has to
know and to do. Commonly, too, he acts thus
through life. He goes through his round, do-
ing his duty ; for, if he learns nothing else, that
at least the navy drives thoroughly home, and
from that lesson the personnel of the service
becomes the thoroughly reliable instrument it
always has proved on demand. For average
results the motive is sufficient. But the desire
for personal advancement is stifled by the rule
of promotion by seniority; and consequently
the only stimulus in peace, to exertion beyond
the simple line of duty, is the influence of a
lively interest in matters professional for their
own sake. This creates initiative and sustains
energy, thus becoming a productive force for
personal improvement, as well as for naval prog-
ress. This Sampson had, and to it he owed
Admiral Sampson 2 9 1
the advance and eminence which constitute
the self-made man. Yet he was entirely with-
out the aggressive self-assertion which is often
the unpleasant accompaniment of those who
realize that they owe their fortunes to them-
selves. There was in him an inherent mod-
esty and simplicity, through which there
transpired no evidence of consciousness that
he had made himself more than others. In
all my intercourse with him he never gave any
indication of knowing that he was a man of
mark ; and as he rested contentedly in the
sense of duty done, for its own sake and its
own interest, so he never sought other ap-
proval than his own. He had none of the
tricks of the popularity hunter, and he suffered
for it.
In the very small beginnings of his introduc-
tion to naval life, at our first meeting, Samp-
son began as he afterwards continued ; putting
me through a searching series of questions
concerning the matters around him. He
clearly, if unconsciously, intended not to wait
till knowledge came to him of itself, if he could
compel it to hasten. I should not call him
handsome, as I remember him then, though
292 Admiral Sampson
the elements of the singular good looks that
he possessed in early manhood were all there
— an unusually fine complexion, delicate, reg-
ular features, and brown eyes remarkable both
in shape and color. The .smooth, round face
struck me as over small, and the beauty which
in his prime was thoroughly masculine, seemed
then wanting in strength — a singular misread-
ing. He had just about as much — or as little
— carriage and bearing as the ordinary country
lad of his age, emphasized by a loose mixed
suit, ready-made and ill-fitting. He owed,
therefore, nothing to adventitious external cir-
cumstances. The figure, which soon after
broadened and gathered erectness and firm-
ness, gave then an impression of slightness
amounting to fragility, which was pathetically
recalled to me by the shrunken aspect notice-
able after the Spanish War, when prolonged
frail health and incipient decay had wasted
the vigorous frame I had once known, and
set on him the mark of death's approach. I
remember also that his manner in questioning
was not only interested, but eager, affecting the
play of the face ; in this differing from the im-
pression usually conveyed by him in mature
Admiral Sampson 293
life, which was one of too great quiescence.
This was really an evidence of temperamental
calmness, of self-composure, not of indifference,
for he was susceptible of strong feeling, and at
times exhibited it ; but commonly his features,
though little open to criticism otherwise, were
too statuesque and unemotional.
To one with a prophet's eye, the conjunction
of the raw country lad who was questioning me
with the scene surrounding him would have
constituted an artistic epitome of our naval
history, past and future. The material of naval
war was then on the eve of an epoch of transi-
tion, in which he was to play a part so promi-
nent as to associate him continuously with its
entire progress. The guns and carriages among
which we stood, and the implements with
which they were served, differed little in size
and nothing in method from those with which
the War of 181 2 had been fought. There was
then being introduced a new class of cannon,
resembling the old in type, but exaggerated in
size and improved in manufacture, with some
scientifically calculated modifications in form,
and with new methods of handling. The partic-
ular effective feature of these, however, was the
294 Admiral Sampson
throwing of explosive shells instead of solid shot.
With them mainly the Civil War was to be
fought; but their designer, the most prominent
ordnance officer then in the navy, still rejected
the project of rifling great guns, as being need-
less for sea warfare. " Those who mean fight-
ing," he was reported to have said, " will come
within smooth-bore range ; " an unconscious
plagiarism upon Nelson, who was indifferent
to improvements in sighting, on the avowed
ground that it was better to go so near the
enemy that you could not miss. The other
considerations which compelled the accept-
ance of the rifle, — notably sustained velocity
and penetrative force, — were then little ac-
counted of ; for the armoring of ships was
in an uncertain infancy. The turret system,
soon to play so great a part, was yet a germ
in the thought of its inventor, unknown to the
professional world.
It will easily be understood that after our
first interview the difference of classes be-
tween us prevented any growth of intimacy,
beyond the occasional and entirely routine
association of the drill ground; and there, as
silence was the rule for all except necessary
Admiral Sampson 295
orders, acquaintance could scarcely make fur-
ther way. We saw little or nothing of each
other, save in the most casual manner, up to
the time of my graduation in 1859. He re-
mained until 1 86 1, the outbreak of the Civil
War, when he graduated in due course ; the
war not having the effect upon his class, which
it did on some that followed, of shortening
their time at the Academy in response to the
urgent demand of the service for more young
officers. His career throughout was in scholar-
ship most distinguished ; giving, withal, that
assurance of force of character as well as in-
tellectual capacity which led to his long iden-
tification with the Academy in after years.
First as an assistant, afterwards as the head
of one of the scientific departments, ultimately
as superintendent, no naval officer has been
more broadly associated with it, or made a
more marked impression. He declined de-
cisively, however, to entertain a proposal made
to him, to remain as permanent head of the
department which he successfully administered
from time to time. There was much that was
tempting in an offer, which would substitute,
for the family partings incidental to a naval
296 Admiral Sampson
career, a comfortable fixed home and steady
congenial employment ; but in speaking of it
to me he alleged his unwillingness to be sev-
ered from immediate association with the pro-
fession of his education and friendships. As
it was, his constant returns to the same sphere
of duty were, like his other conspicuous em-
ployments, one part of the unexpressed tribute,
the tribute in act rather than word, which the
service paid to his merits. Not that words
were wanting; but men spoke them among
themselves, rather than to him or to the pub-
lic. The professional recognition which fol-
lowed him, and still follows, was largely
silent ; but I believe it was, and is, as com-
petent and instructed as it is positive and even
enthusiastic.
Of this I am, perhaps, the better judge, in
that my own personal knowledge of him is
chiefly at second hand, not direct. I am rather
a witness to general reputation than an eye-
witness of conduct or character. Though I
knew him well, and met him often, and so had
occasion by experience to corroborate the gen-
eral estimate, we were rarely associated, and
never closely. Intimacy never existed between
Admiral Sampson 297
us, and there was no chance for me thus to
form that prepossession of esteem which I had
ample occasion to note among those who had
seen him in active service. Officers who
had been under his command afloat spoke of
him with a warmth of admiration and confi-
dence, the sincerity of which was too obvious
for doubt To those who, like myself, learned in
this way how he was regarded by the men who
had been best situated to observe him, there
was little surprise at the eminent character-
istics shown by him during the late war; nor
had there been antecedently any fear whether
the Navy Department was exercising sound
judgment and discretion in selecting him for
the position he held. His very remarkable
fitness for particular duties, which had to be
discharged on shore, had kept him decidedly
below the average in the amount of what is
technically rated as " sea-service ; " but that
which he did left no apprehension among those
who saw him that the habit of the student or
administrator had swamped the faculties of the
sea officer. He was to add another example
to the list of those who have proved by their
deeds, that the professional capacity of the sea-
298 Admiral Sampson
man is at least as much a matter of intelligence
as of uninterrupted practice, and that, once
acquired, it is very like other habits, easily
resumed after intermission, and quickly re-
stored when a little rusty.
Prominent among the aptitudes of the com-
petent commander, however, are certain moral
faculties which are not acquired by practice,
though they may by it be improved and en-
larged; gifts from Nature, who in such matters
knows nothing of impartiality* It was upon
these traits in Sampson that men seemed in-
stinctively to dwell, and by them chiefly to be
impressed. Their estimates were not reached
as a matter of analysis, but were received by
incidental familiarity and daily observation of
the man. As I met his reputation from time
to time in conversation with men, in their opin-
ions and anecdotes, as I knew him by what
they thought and quoted about him, there
formed gradually in my mind a conception of
his professional character which the event has
proved to be substantially correct. The more
naval history and biography are read, the more
do they confirm to us the assurance that in
successful leaders there are certain essential
Admiral Sampson 299
qualities, the absence of which in a particular
man may remain long undetected, like a flaw
beneath the surface of metal, but under strain
is suddenly revealed, to the disappointment
and dismay of those who had hopes of him.
No one has phrased this experience better than
Lord St. Vincent, in the words, " Responsibility
is the test of a man's courage." Not that
many men who here fail are not brave enough
physically; but that, for those who emerge
unbroken from this trial, there remains none
severer. It is the extreme proof of endurance,
active and passive. A frequent and familiar
indication of succumbing under it is the ina-
bility to sleep, which has been the prelude of
many failures.
It was upon this characteristic, and upon
the qualities accessory to it, that there was
consensus of opinion in Sampson's case. How-
ever differing otherwise in details, all agreed in
the conclusion that upon him responsibility sat
easily ; that anxiety did not overrun the due
bounds of reasonable, though watchful, pre-
caution ; that he could rest with quiet mind
in the certainty that all had been done which
reason could prescribe, untroubled by fears of
300 Admiral Sampson
improbable, though not impossible, eventuali-
ties. To this is closely allied the very essen-
tial power to take necessary risk for adequate
ends, a thing almost impossible to a man upon
whom responsibility weighs unduly. This was
finely, though unconsciously, illustrated in his
orders for the blockade of Santiago. " The
end to be attained justifies the risk of torpedo
attack, and that risk must be taken. The
escape of the Spanish squadron at this junc-
ture would be a serious blow to our prestige,
and to a speedy end of the war." To one who
has listened, as I have, to one of his gallant
captains telling, in laughing earnest, the num-
ber of torpedo-boats imagination discovered in
one of the early nights of the Havana blockade,
these words mean more than they will, perhaps,
convey to a layman. It is in this danger, in
its anxiety even more than in its actuality, — in
its moral effect, — that the naval profession
recognizes one of the greatest difficulties of a
modern blockade. A distinguished British
admiral has said that he believed but a small
proportion of captains could long endure the
nightly strain. Sampson assumed it without
hesitation, though not without assiduous pre-
Admiral Sampson 30 1
caution, as is shown by the numerous orders
issued by him to perfect the methods. The
danger was shared by many ; the responsibility
of the means, which effectually prevented the
enemy from coming out by night, and so con-
fusing the movements of our squadron, was his
alone.
It is evident that this professional faculty
was part of his natural equipment, and it mani-
fested itself in his personal daily life. In con-
versation, ordinarily, there was nothing more
noticeable than a certain impassivity of manner
that was readily mistaken for indifference or
lack of response. This at times gave offence,
particularly in his later years, when bodily
weakness imparted lassitude to his speech.
But when consulting him on a matter of inter-
est to another, one found that he had carefully
followed what was said, giving both thought
and sympathy to the discussion ; while in mat-
ters that primarily concerned himself he was
in all outward semblance, and I believe inter-
nally, just as quiet and untroubled as about
the most trivial external detail. I remember
meeting him the day after the monitor " Pa-
tapsco " was sunk by a submarine mine off
302 Admiral Sampson
Charleston, a personal experience which would
have made many men nervous as well as care-
ful about torpedoes in after life. With her
small reserve of buoyancy, a torpedoed monitor
went from under the men on deck with some-
thing of the suddenness of the drop of a gallows,
and Sampson, who was keeping watch on the
turret roof, described his experience as step-
ping from it into the water. Nevertheless,
when I saw him, he was as unaffectedly and
without effort imperturbed as though nothing
remarkable had occurred. Quite consistent
with this observation of my own is the account
given of him off Santiago by his flag-captain,
Chadwick, in an admirably sympathetic sketch
contributed after the admiral's death to the
New York Evening Post " He usually had
a chair upon the quarter-deck until about ten
in the evening, when he turned in and slept
soundly, unless called for something important,
until six in the morning. His calm, equable
temperament carried him through the night
without any of the sleeplessness usually asso-
ciated with the mental strain of great respon-
sibilities."
In his conduct of a war command, however,
Admiral Sampson 303
there was not to be found any of the lethargy
or sluggishness which might, perhaps, be in-
ferred from this unmoved exterior. Mental
activity and enterprise suffered nothing, but
rather gained, from a composure of spirit which
preserved all his other faculties from derange-
ment, insuring the full utilization of the
abundant intelligence, extensive professional
knowledge, and vivid interest in his work, by
which he w r as characterized. It is true that
apathy is the defect of this quality of compos-
ure, and in military biography has often been
found to accompany it. During the Civil War
there was an amusing anecdote of a certain
commanding officer in a particular incident.
" Was he composed ? " it was asked. " Oh, yes !
he was perfectly composed," was the reply;
" but he had n't the faintest idea of what ought
to be done." Sampson's professional character
was here well balanced. It was only in the
matter of personal ambition, of self-assertion,
or self-vindication, that his reticent calmness
entailed an inaction, which, though dignified,
and preservative of his own self-respect as of
the esteem of his comrades, did not save him
from suffering keenly when he thought himself
304 Admiral Sampson
unworthily treated. He consulted me on one
occasion as to how far it would become him to
take action that had been suggested for his
benefit. I told him that while I heartily wished
him all the good that was at stake, I believed
the particular step would be injurious to the
navy. He expressed no decision to me then
or afterwards ; but I thought I read assent in
his eyes, and I know that he went no farther
in the matter.
The opening acts of a war drama, especially
after a long period of peace, are necessarily
characterized by a considerable tension of
feeling among the actors, which seeks natural
relief in immediate action. So big a deed as
war calls clamorously for something to be done,
and speedily. Probably few appreciate in this
light how great was Dewey's privilege in the
opportunity, so consonant to his personal qual-
ities, and of which he so admirably availed
himself, overriding all consideration of hazards,
to strike at once at the enemy's fleet at its
anchorage. Upon Sampson fell the more
arduous trial of prolonged expectancy, in un-
avoidable attendance upon the enemy's move-
ments, which he could only by indirection force
Admiral Sampson 305
or control ; submitting to the necessity of not
attempting to enter a harbor like Santiago, or
risking on mine fields the armored ships which
were the nation's most important diplomatic
asset at that moment. In this he had no
choice. The orders of the Government were
positive, though his own opinion coincided
with them. No man was more fitted by tem-
perament than he to bear this strain, without
disturbance of judgment or inconsiderateness
of act. The tension which he felt in common
with others manifested itself in sustained
energy, rising indeed on necessary occasion to
impetuosity, but characterized rather by the con-
tinuous and increasing stringency of methods
adopted to meet a sortie by the enemy. In
the strong professional admiration I have felt
for his conduct of operations in every respect,
as soon as the appearance of the enemy's fleet
had really defined the situation, it has been to
me a matter of satisfaction that my judgment
differed decisively from his own in two pre-
liminary matters: his wish to attack the sea
defences of Havana, and the expediency of his
movement against Porto Rico, undertaken in
the hope that on arrival he would find Cervera
20
306 Admiral Sampson
there. Soon after the war I criticised the latter
step in the pages of McClures Magazine, draw-
ing from him a warm remonstrance on what he
considered an inadequate appreciation of his
reasons. Whether he or I was right in this
is to me immaterial, compared with the fact
that it gives me assurance of my own impar-
tiality in the profound admiration I have felt
for all his dispositions and actions, without ex-
ception that I can recall, from the time he
knew the enemy to be on this side.
The methods of the Santiago blockade are
now commonly understood, but their precise
military merit has scarcely been adequately
appreciated. By them, as appears from the
Spanish telegrams published since the war,
Sampson compelled the enemy to accept battle
on the terms they considered most disadvan-
tageous. Many may remember the classical
story of the leader who cried to his opponent,
" If you be the great commander men say, why
don't you come down and fight me ? " and re-
ceived the pertinent reply, " If you be the gen-
eral you claim to be, why don't you make me
come down and fight you ? " This summarizes
in effect the credit due to Sampson. On June
Admiral Sampson 307
26, just a week before the battle, the Spanish
authorities at Madrid and Havana had decided
that the surrender of the squadron in Santiago,
or its destruction there by its own officers,
would be more injurious to their cause than its
destruction in battle, and they held that, by
"choosing a dark night and favorable oppor-
tunity while part of the enemy's ships are with-
drawn," there was a fair chance of eluding the
United States fleet. Cervera replied that to
go out " at night was more perilous than in
daytime, on account of the hostile ships being
closer inshore." After the war, he explained
at length, in a letter dated October 7, 1898:
" At night the enemy remained in the imme-
diate vicinity of the harbor entrance. They
always had one ship less than a mile distant,
constantly illuminating the entrance; and as
though this were not enough, they had other
smaller vessels still nearer, and steamboats
(launches) close to the headlands of the en-
trance. Once in a while the latter would ex-
change musketry fire with our forces. Under
these circumstances it was absolutely impossi-
ble to go out at night, because in this narrow
channel, illuminated by a dazzling light, we
308 Admiral Sampson
could not have followed the channel. But
even supposing we had succeeded in going out,
before the first ship was outside we should
have been seen and covered from the very first
with the concentrated fire of the whole squad-
ron." These details will be found to corres-
pond with Sampson's published orders.
The thoroughness of the blockade after
Sampson's arrival determined the detention of
Cervera in Santiago till our army arrived. To
use an expression of one of the American cap-
tains, it " put the lid on Cervera's coffin." After
the army came, the same measure determined
the destruction of the squadron if it attempted
to escape ; for it decided the time and condi-
tions under which the battle would be fought,
when on July i, the further land defence be-
ing considered practically hopeless, a peremp-
tory order to sail was given to Cervera. The
forcing of the enemy to action under these dis-
advantageous conditions was the great decisive
feature of the campaign from start to finish.
The skill with which advantage was taken
of all the possibilities of the situation was char-
acteristic of Sampson's deliberate painstaking
energy. No less characteristic, indicative of
Admiral Sampson
309
the sustained purpose which rises of its own
force to impetuosity, when impetuosity is
needed, was his urgent repeated telegram to
the Department for its sanction to go to San-
tiago with only two ships, dropping the slower
but powerful battle-ship " Indiana," when news
was received that Commodore Schley felt it
necessary to bring back his squadron to
Key West for coal. For once he betrayed
impatience at the apparent delay of the De-
partment, although it replied the same day.
It was a flash of the fire that burned within
him unremittingly, but with regulated fervor ;
a token of the entire absorption in his duties
which was the groundwork of his professional
character. Disregardful of all but the necessity
of success, he was heedless of personal danger,
and daring in professional risk. The mastery
which the service had over his interest and
affections, united to entire self-mastery in
temper and under responsibility, insured his
eminence as an officer, which history will
unquestionably recognize and affirm.
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