Viewpoint

The sociological eye means looking at things for what they are, as best we can given the blinders of interest and ideology, of cliché and ritualized belief. It is not an individual enterprise. Chaining our efforts together as a long-term network of theorists and researchers improves one’s own sociological vision, provided we make the effort. The sociological eye holds up a periscope above the tides of political and intellectual partisanship, spying out the patterns of social life in every direction.

Sunday, November 13, 2016

The civil war in
Syria has now killed a quarter of a million people, and driven 4 million people
to foreign countries where they wait hopelessly in the limbo of refugee camps.
Half the people who remain in Syria are homeless. Out of a population once estimated
at 18 million,about
three-quarters have lost everything.

This
self-destructive war began in 2011 in the Arab Spring, imitating popular
demonstrations elsewhere in the region that temporarily brought down authoritarian
governments. But these were tipping-point revolutions, winning by contagious
mass enthusiasm that brought a segment of the regime's forces over to the
revolutionary side. Tipping points work best when the action is concentrated in
a capital city. But where struggles are dispersed, the regime fights back and
battles take place across the country, the moment when a few army leaders can
settle things by switching sides has passed. Concentration favors short and
relatively bloodless transitions; dispersion creates lengthy civil wars.

Syria had two big metropolitan
areas, each about 2.5 million. While fighting developed in Damascus in the
south, Aleppo in the north initially tried to stay out of it. But neutrals soon
become victims as conflict escalates. Rebels turned from peaceful
demonstrations to guerrilla tactics. Since guerrillas depend on hiding in the
civilian population, they made places like Aleppo into battlegrounds. Civilians
were hit both by guerrillas weapons and by the regime's counter-attacks. The
cycle of atrocities had begun, each side motivated by hatred and revenge for
what the other side did to them. In the atmosphere of polarization, neutrals
are condemned as no better than enemies. This helps explain the callous
disregard for the millions whose livelihood is destroyed in somebody else's
fight.

What can the rest of
the world do?The spontaneous
sentiment in a world of mass communications is to support the good guys and
help defeat the bad guys. The problem is that in this kind of war the good guys
turn into bad guys too. Guerrilla war is intrinsically messy, and
anti-guerrilla war carried out by air power tends to destroy everything on the
battlefield, no matter who happens to live there.

Outside intervention
makes things worse.A civil war
that would wind down by running out of resources is kept going artificially,
when outside regimes send in weapons and fighters to their favorite factions.
Ideological wars are particularly vicious, since an ideology recruits the most
dedicated believers.Today this is
most obviously militant Islam, but the same destructiveness has been seen for
ideological volunteers fighting for fascism, communism or democracy, as in the
Spanish civil war of the 1930s.

And multi-sided
conflicts are most difficult to settle. A two-sided war has a clear termination
point. But three, four, five or more factions, especially when they have
independent bases and external allies, make an intrinsically unstable
situation, where the weakening of some factions opens up opportunities for
others to form. This is chaos in the technical sense of the term; the system
does not stabilize if one faction is destroyed, it just gives rise to further
conflicts.

In such a
configuration, the rise of something like ISIS was predictable. Its potential
destruction will not end the instability. Syria was not simply democratizers
vs. Assad's regime; but Sunnis, Shi'ites and sub-factions (Alawites, Druze),
and Christians; Arabs and Kurds; plus tribal alliances. Superimposed on this
are the outside interventions, some motivated by religious sympathies, others
by geopolitical aggrandizement.High-minded outsiders like the US are not exempt; whether our motive is
fostering democracy, countering terrorism, or just acting like a Great Power,
we add one more source of fuel for the fire.

Is there any
realistic solution?Hobbes
proposed, apropos of the English civil war of the 1640s, that any strong regime
is preferable to endless fighting of everyone-against-everyone-else.It is hardest to see this at the
outset, when everyone is enthusiastic for their cause and sure they will win.
But once a conflict has been going on long enough, many people realize that the
fighting is worse than whatever we were fighting about. This is certainly the
case in a civil war like Syria that has been going on for almost six years and
destroyed three-quarters of the country.

The emergence of a
sentiment for peace ushers in the most difficult phase of political conflict:
the peace movement opposed by the hard-liners. There are hard-liners in
different factions, but united in the emotion that their sacrifices should not
be in vain, that they must continue to fight because victory by the enemy is
unthinkable. The new axis of conflict becomes victory at any cost, against
peace while there still is something to be saved.

Hobbes' solution in
Syria would be to let the Assad regime win. None of the fanatical religious
factions would bring a stable government; the Assad regime at least has
protected minorities like Christians. This solution would be unpalatable to
many, especially to outsiders who have other concerns than the plight of the
Syrian population. This includes politicians in the U.S. who don't want to look
weak, and whose only idea is to throw more military force into the chaos. A
really courageous diplomatic move, allying the US and Russia to end the war
with an Assad victory, would save lives. The alternatives are to go on
destroying what is left of Syria, and generating even more of a refugee crisis.

A U.S. general in
Vietnam, after obliterating a village, said that in order to save the place it
was necessary to destroy it.Can
we learn enough from history to stop following this kind of thinking?

Tuesday, November 1, 2016

I
argued there are four kinds of charisma (frontstage charisma, backstage
charisma, success-magic, and reputational charisma); the more kinds you have,
the more charismatic you are; but there are other kinds of political leadership
and charisma does not always or even typically win elections.

Of the
four kinds of charisma, the most easily visible are front-stage charisma as an
inspiring public speaker, recruiting followers dedicated to a mission; and
being known for a string of successes.

As a
measure of public appeal, look at the percentage of popular vote won by all
major candidates for president from 1828 through 2012, from Andrew Jackson to
Barack Obama. I will leave aside, for the moment, the earlier elections from
1788 to 1824,since these were
essentially indirect elections by state legislatures.

Home run records and popular
vote records

If we
followed the changing record for presidents winning the highest percentage of
voters-- in the same way we can follow the record for home runs in a season--
it would look like this:

Andrew Jackson 182856.0%
of the vote

(since Jackson’s record wasn’t broken until
1904, I will insert in parentheses some other players who had very good years:
)

(Andrew
Jackson 183254.2%)

(Abraham
Lincoln 186455.0%)

(Ulysses
S. Grant 187255.6%)

Teddy Roosevelt 190456.4%-- new record

Warren G. Harding 1920
60.3%-- new record

(Calvin
Coolidge 192454.0%)

(Herbert
Hoover 192858.2%)

(Franklin
D. Roosevelt 1932 57.4%)

Franklin D. Roosevelt 193660.8%-- new record

(FDR 194054.7%)

(Dwight
D. Eisenhower 195255.2%)

(Eisenhower
195657.4%)

Lyndon Johnson 196461.1%-- new record

(Richard
M. Nixon197260.7%)

(Ronald
Reagan 198458.8%)

Since
Reagan, no one has come close to the record. The highest have been G.H.W. Bush
1988 (53.4%) and Obama 2008 (52.9%). In three recent elections, no one broke
50% (a return to the fragmented politics of the mid-1800s). [Update November 2016: make that four recent elections.]

There
are some surprises. No matter how great you are, charismatic, victorious, or
likeable, you never get as many as 2 out of 3 people to vote for you, at least
not in the United States.In the
47 elections from 1828 to 2012, only 4 times someone cracked the ceiling of
60%. In fact, getting 54% of the vote was done only 16 times (out of 112 major
candidates); it is like hitting 50 home runs or batting .350.

Is
getting a high vote percentage a mark of charisma?Some of the undoubtedly charismatic presidents were record-holders--
Jackson, Teddy Roosevelt, FDR--- and a couple of other charismatic leaders are
high on the list (Lincoln hitting 55%; Reagan hitting 58.8%).But Lyndon Johnson, who holds the
current record at 61.1%, was not charismatic. And the president who smashed
Teddy Roosevelt’s record at 60.3% was Warren G. Harding in 1920-- an astounding
surprise, since Harding went on to become one of the most scandal-ridden and
ineffective presidents. (In his previous career, it is true, he was regarded as
a great orator.)If Andrew Jackson
is the Babe Ruth of American presidential sluggers, Harding was the Roger
Maris-- a record with an asterisk. We all breathed a sign of relief when the
home run record was smashed by a real slugger like Mark McGwire or Barry Bonds--
in politics, it was FDR, who proved it was no fluke by beating the 54% mark 3
times. (Jackson and Eisenhower was the only other persons to do it twice.)

And
there were up-and-down politicians like Richard Nixon, who had one great year--
60.7% in 1972-- but who lost other elections and won in 1968 with 43.4%.Calvin Coolidge was the opposite of
charismatic, but he is on the list (barely at the cut-off point of 54.0%).Herbert Hoover was briefly second
highest all-time (58.2% in 1928), then went on to take one of the worst defeats
in his match-up against FDR. (He also did exactly the wrong things in dealing
with the Great Depression of 1929.)

Charisma
can help win elections, but it isn’t essential even for winning big. Some
charismatic politicians either were defeated repeatedly (Henry Clay, William
Jennings Bryan, each three times), or scraped into office (JFK and Woodrow
Wilson never cracked 50% of the popular vote).

Other
things are involved in winning elections, notably who your opponent is, and
whether something dramatically good or bad happens near election time. Nixon’s
nearly record-breaking victory in 1972 happened against a little-known anti-war
candidate (George McGovern). How Warren G. Harding dominated in 1920 seems
mysterious, but it was apparently a backlash against Woodrow Wilson taking the
U.S. intoWorld War I after
promising not to; and then campaigning for a League of Nations and a
nation-state for every ethnic group, which made him a charismatic figure in
Europe during 1918-19, but played badly at home. Some popularity happens on the
rebound or as a continuation of somebody else. Eisenhower’s popularity in 1952
and 1956 came as he succeeded a very unpopular president (Truman’s ratings had
fallen to a record-low 22% in 1952; and Ike went on to end the Korean War
deadlock that brought Truman down).LBJ’s record-setting victory in 1964 came as he stepped into Kennedy’s
shoes after the emotion-grabbing assassination, and proceededin a wave of legislation in 1964 to do
everything JFK had promised but didn’t carry out. LBJ’s popularity ratings
started high but slid downhill continuously during the Vietnam War, enough so
that this political pro recognized it was time to bail out on running for
re-election.

Popularity ratings highs and
lows

Since
the 1940s, we have standardized popularity polls. Gallup polls ask the question
of whether you approve of how the president is handling his job. This isn’t
exactly a measure of charisma, since it doesn’t tap into that
I’d-follow-him-anywhere quality of the symbolic leader.Charisma is not a personality trait but
an emotional relationship between a person who represents a principled ideal
and a group of dedicated followers.

Presidential
approval ratings respond to emotional events, but these peaks are very
unstable. Here are the highest ratings:

90%
approval for George W. Bush, mid-September 2001 (right after the 9/11 attack).

89%
for George H.W. Bush, early March 1991 (right after victory in the 4-day Gulf
War).

84%
for Franklin Roosevelt, January 1942 (a month after Pearl Harbor and
declaration of war against Japan).

83%
for John F. Kennedy, May 1961 (just after the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion
of Cuba).

These
are called rally-round-the-flag ratings. The nation comes together around the
presidential symbol immediately after a dramatic conflict event. It isn’t
necessarily a victory; 3 of the top 5 ratings happened after we were attacked
or defeated.

The
peaks come from the emotional effect of outside events, not from the
individual. George W. Bush’s rating was 51% in early September, just before the
9/11/01 attacks. Harry Truman’s rating dropped to the low 30s in 1946, bounced
up and down in the mid-levels, and bottomed out at 22% in February 1952, during
the bogged-down Korean War. George H.W. Bush’s ratings shot up from the mid-50s
in late 1990 to 89% with the Gulf War, but dropped 60 points in the
year-and-a-half that followed.George W. Bush fell from 90% on a downward path to the low 30s in 2007
and 19% in the financial crash of October 2008.

FDR
and JFK, on the other hand, maintained quite high ratings throughout their
terms in office (JFK averaged 70%, FDR 63%). This is probably an effect of
charisma, since these were charismatic speakers who inspired many idealistic
followers.

Other
peaks for non-crisis presidents were 79% for Lyndon Johnson, immediately after
taking over for Kennedy-- an overflow of JFK adulation in the period of
national mourning. Dwight Eisenhower had 79% in December 1956, just after he
had won his second term. Since Eisenhower was not a charismatic speaker or
personality, this shows more of a good feeling or likeability rating. Ike’s
average ratings in office were 65%, next highest to JFK’s 70.1%.

Approval
ratings are a mixed measure, a melange of sudden events, likeability, and
charisma. Is there anything else we can do with these polls? It would be nice
if we had a series of questions across all the presidents asking, does this
person represent an ideal you are dedicated to? Are you anX-follower, equivalent to a follower of
Jesus or Joan of Arc?

So who
had the highest floor? JFK never dropped below 56%.FDR’s floor, and Eisenhower’s, were next at 48%.The only president whose floor never
went below 50% was one of the three most charismatic presidents of modern
times. (Since there were no polls of this sort before 1937, we don’t know about
Teddy Roosevelt; but he did lose an election in 1912, coming in impressively
second on a third party ticket.)

One
conclusion is that charisma is never universal. Nearest to it are the momentary
events that stir everyone into public rituals like putting out flags that
proliferated during September-to-November 2001, but even these peaks never get
above 83-90% of the population. Looking at it the other direction, even very
unpopular moments for presidents leave about a quarter of the population supporting
them. These are the hard core base that anyone successful on the national stage
acquires. Charisma is what adds to that base and pulls one’s public reputation
up to a solid majority, unshakeable even in bad times.

Politics
is a process of conflict, a struggle between opposing factions. This is
especially true in a democracy, where popular elections regularly mobilize
people both to support and to reject. Democracy is a good breeding-grounds for
charisma, but we should not expect it to produce unanimity.

And
this is what we see in presidential elections. Getting 56% to 61% of the vote is as high as it gets.

All 44 U.S. presidents from
1788 to 2016

We can
divide them in 3 groups:

I. the
first 7 presidents from George Washington to Andrew Jackson: the founding
network

II.
the 18 presidents from 1837 to 1901: mostly mediocre except for Lincoln

I. The first 7 presidents are the famous
names of American history: Washington-- Adams-- Jefferson-- Madison-- Monroe--
John Quincy Adams-- Jackson. But being famous is not the same as being
charismatic. Of the 7, only 2 were charismatic: Jackson strongly so, Jefferson
in a milder version.

George
Washington was certainly revered.He was elected twice, unopposed, by the electoral college that was not
selected by popular vote. He did not have front-stage charisma: he was not
famous for making speeches or stirring up emotional crowds. He had no
success-magic; his record as a general was mainly a string of defeats and
retreats; the key battles of the Revolutionary War were won by others. What
Washington did was hold the Continental Army together through bad times until
the British finally gave up their costly effort to hang onto the colonies. In
the chaos of the loose Confederation, Washington led the movement for a
Constitutional Convention, presided over it, and saw it through-- with the
assistance of a strong team, most of whom also became presidents.

Personally,
he was known for great dignity and dedication. Did this amount to back-stage
charisma? He impressed people in personal contact, although he did not always
get his way, as in asking the Continental Congress for money. His reputation
grew in the period of constitution-making, and he became an icon, his picture
in every patriotic home. Score Washington un-charismatic on most counts--
demonstrating that charisma is not the only way to become an icon.

John
Adams was more of a political organizer, on the northern end of the
Massachusetts/Virginia coalition that made the new nation. He negotiated peace
with Britain in 1782 and served as a key diplomat. Un-charismatic, but an
important coalition-maker rewarded as Washington’s vice president and successor.

Thomas
Jefferson was the best-known of the Virginia politicians. He became known, not
so much for speeches but for his writings criticizing British rule, which made
him Virginia’s member on the Committee of Correspondence organizing the
colonies into revolt. His eloquence got him chosen to write the Declaration of
Independence. He was minister to France, America’s most important ally, and
Washington’s secretary of state. Jefferson was among the first to see the new
direction of politics, resigning from the cabinet to oppose Hamilton’s
policies, then running against John Adams with a new Democratic-Republican
party. Jefferson led the emergence of political parties, creating the first
nation-wide network to campaign for electoral votes. This made him widely
popular, not just as a hero of the Revolution, but by actively stirring up
public support. He was famed as the spokesman for decentralized democracy and
for the Louisiana Purchase, the first big territorial expansion of the U.S. and
a result of his diplomatic experience. Jefferson’s charismatic reputation came
less from swaying crowds than from circulating written ideology, from a new
style of political organizing, and spectacular diplomatic successes.

James
Madison was a political negotiator and coalition-builder. Agreeing with
Washington on the need for a stronger union than the disastrous Articles of
Confederation, Madison’s plan became the basis for discussion at the 1787
Constitutional Convention. He campaigned for it by writing pamphlets-- the main
form of political communication at the time. The Federalist papers were an act of coalition, written by Madison
together with Hamilton and John Jay, even though they would become political
enemies in the new government. A member of Jefferson’s political team, he
became his secretary of state and successor, winning re-election even though
the War of 1812 was going badly at the time.

James
Monroe was primarily a diplomat and loyal team member. An officer in
Washington’s army, Monroe learned law as an aide to Jefferson, then followed
him as minister to France, and negotiated the Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon.
He became Madison’s secretary of state and secretary of war. After belated
victory against the British in 1815, Monroe won the elections of 1816 and 1820
with virtually no opposition, the opposing Federalist party (which was
anti-France and pro-British) having collapsed. His most famous achievement, the
“Monroe Doctrine,” was actually formulated by his secretary of state, John
Quincy Adams. It made a principle out of U.S. success in keeping European
states out of the continent, extending the project to Latin America where a
series of revolts against Spain were breaking out as the Napoleonic wars
disrupted distant colonial rulers. (Monroe took advantage by purchasing Florida
from Spain in 1819.) Jefferson and his successors, although militarily weak,
played on the advantages of their French alliance to expand territorially;
meanwhile settlers and Indian-fighters were moving west anyway. The whole team
became cloaked in an aura of national success.

John
Quincy Adams was a lifelong diplomat. He accompanied his father on European
missions in the 1780s; and served every president as minister to European
states. As Madison’s secretary of state, Adams purchased Florida and improved
relations with Britain. Following
the usual succession, Adams ran for president in 1824, and was defeated by
Andrew Jackson in the popular vote; but since no one had a majority of the
electoral college, the election was thrown in the House of Representatives,
where political deals made Adams president. Regarding himself as old-school
gentleman above politics, Adams made no effort to deal with Congress or to
dispense patronage, and was overwhelmingly defeated by Jackson in 1828. John Quincy
Adams worked quietly behind the scenes and was uncharismatic in every respect.
He considered himself a failure as president.

Andrew
Jackson was the first really charismatic American politician. A long-time
frontiersman and Indian fighter, he became famous by defeating the British in
1815 at the Battle of New Orleans. His new form of party politics was like
Jefferson on steroids. He brought class conflict out into the open, campaigning
as the people’s choice against the rich elites of the East. The 1828 election
was the end of the founding network that had handed on the torch of office for
40 years.

It
also was a transition to a new style of campaigning. By 1840 it consisted of
marches festooned with banners, wagons with brass bands (“bandwagons”), slogans
endlessly repeated, the whole baby-kissing ritual that has endured down through
the television era. Jackson had frontstage charisma that his predecessors
lacked, in part because electioneering was becoming a big noisy public ritual.
Combine this with a contentious ideology, and the ingredients were there for a
president expected to turn things upside down. This Jackson did, above all by
instituting an all-out spoils system for federal offices. This too enhanced
political enthusiasm and Jackson’s reputation as a man of the people rather
than the established elite.

Bottom
line on the founding network: they were uncharismatic because they didn’t need
to be. They got power by circulating writings among the high-literate class and
building the country by skilled diplomacy. The new electioneering style came in
with the prestige of wider democracy, which also set off a demand to
manufacture charisma and hero-worship. With paradoxical results, as we shall
see.

II. The 18 presidents from 1837 to 1901 are
remarkable for lack of charisma.

From
Van Buren to McKinley, there is only one strongly charismatic president,
Abraham Lincoln. Only 3 ever won two consecutive terms (Lincoln, Grant, and
McKinley--the latter two distinctly uncharismatic). Two died in office of
natural causes; 3 were assassinated; 4 were not even renominated by their own
party; another 2 were defeated for re-election; 4 declined to run again,
declaring themselves exhausted or disillusioned with the office. In other
words, 15 out of 18 could not generate enough popularity or success to keep on
going.

Leaving
Lincoln aside, few of the rest had any kind of charisma. Five presidents
(William Henry Harrison, Taylor, Grant, Hayes, Garfield) were former generals,
nominated as war heroes rising above divisive political issues; none did well
in office. Grant’s administrations were full of corruption scandals, though he
won reelection on the prestige of his Civil War victories; but even as a
general, Grant was quietly persistent rather than charismatic.

Only 3
presidents had frontstage charisma, in the form of great speech-making.
Lincoln, of course, but the rest of the list is surprising. James Polk was
known as a star orator in Tennessee politics, an avid follower of Andrew
Jackson, whose seat he occupied in Congress. He attempted to evade the
increasingly divisive slavery issue by a platform of national expansion. Polk
bluffed a war with Britain to settle claims to the Oregon territory, then
invaded Mexico to acquire the rest of the continent all the way to California.
Despite his success, the Mexican War was opposed by principled northerners, and
a split among Polk’s own Democrats over slavery left him so exhausted that he
died 3 months after leaving office at the age of 54.

Andrew
Johnson has the historical reputation as one of the worst presidents, as the
first to be impeached (although acquitted). In fact, Johnson was unusually
courageous. He was the only one of 22 southern senators who refused to leave
the Union, whereupon he was almost lynched by outraged Virginians. Lincoln gave
him an administrative job and added him to the ticket in 1864, as a gesture of
reconciliation towards the South. After Lincoln’s assassination, Johnson
attempted to continue Lincoln’s policy of leniency, but he was sharply attacked
by the Republican majority in Congress who wanted a punitive reconstruction.
Early in his career, Johnson had been another Jacksonian populist, known as a
fiery stump speaker. Having both charisma and courage of his principles did not
save him from ignominious failure; in fact his courage contributed to it, since
he refused to maneuver politically, and he lacked the key requisite of
charismatic leadership, an admiring audience.

Cleveland,
who won two terms separated by a defeat (followed by winning the rematch), had
the reputation as a reformer, taking on the corrupt Tammany Hall machine in New
York, then pushing for civil service reform at the Federal level. This was
obviously a political opportunity, since so many administrations had gone through
scandal, and presidents found themselves besieged by office-seekers who
sometimes shot them when disappointed. He was one of the few presidents to ride
out a sex scandal, admitting to fathering an illegitimate child, and then
beating the opponent who made the charge-- Blaine, equally tarred with the
reputation as a corrupt machine politician. Defeated for office in the 1888
election, Cleveland declared there was “no happier man in the United States.”

The
most charismatic speaker of the entire period ran for president three times and
lost all of them: William Jennings Bryan. Known as the silver-tongued orator of
the prairie, Bryan was defeated twice by McKinley over banking interests versus
cheap money for farmers. McKinley had strong establishment and machine politics
backing, and projected an image of dignified respectability that prevailed over
the tub-thumping of Bryan’s raucous campaigns.

Putting
it all together, frontstage charisma paid off in political success for only
two: Lincoln and Polk. Both paid the price; Polk retired exhausted from
political infighting; Lincoln was assassinated.

What
brought them down is emblematic of the entire period. There were too many
contentious issues and deep-rooted factions: class conflict, banking issues, slavery,
territorial expansion, the spoils system. That is why so many presidential
candidates were compromise candidates nominated after lengthy convention
balloting, or were disowned by their own party. A charismatic speaker on
matters of principle might seize the public imagination of one segment, but
could rarely win the presidency or carry out his program when in office.
Inability to generate really sweeping charisma was built into the divisive
structure.

Lincoln,
who had great skills as a negotiator and coalition-builder, to go along with
his oratory, was alone in coming out of it with a towering reputation. His
martyrdom helped. In fact, we can date the moment when Lincoln became adulated
by huge numbers of people: late April 1865. His body was taken home from
Washington to be buried in Springfield, Illinois. It was a distance of 700
miles, but the train route covered 1700, snaking back and forth so that
millions of people could stand by the tracks to witness the procession. It took
13 days. It was probably the biggest funeral ritual ever, and had all the
successful ingredients: people assembled, united in focusing their attention on
one thing, welling up with one common emotion intensified by each other. The
result was turning a man into a symbol, a sacred object representing the
solidarity of the nation.

III. The 19 presidents from 1901 to 2016.
This is the era of statistics and surveys, and we have already seen its high
and low points.

Three
presidents were charismatic speakers and public heroes (Teddy Roosevelt,
Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy), although only two had a record of successes;
JFK’s program was largely carried out by his uncharismatic successor, Lyndon
Johnson. Eisenhower, although uncharismatic, was unusually popular. Reagan,
quite successful in his program (though correspondingly disliked by the
ideological opposition), also was near the peak in voter support, although his
popularity floor was lower than the others. Obama, known as a charismatic
speaker, was an ineffective politician. His peak popularity rating (not
unusually high at 69%) was just after his inauguration in 2009. His floor was a
mediocre 37%, and his average approval 47% (a figure beaten by 10 of the last
13 presidents).

Overall,
6 of 29 modern elections were won by strongly charismatic leaders (Teddy Roosevelt,
FDR, JFK); another 4 elections were won by well-liked but uncharismatic
figures, Eisenhower and Reagan.About 80% of the time, an uncharismatic person wins the presidency.

References

In
addition to the standard sources, see:

On the
struggle to expand the voting franchise in the U.S. from the 1780s to the
1840s:

Chilton
Williamson, 1960. American Suffrage from
Property to Democracy.