QUESTION: Ari, does the President stand by all the
statements he made in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq to the
American people?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think you've heard what the President has
said about the State of the Union remarks, about whether Iraq did or
did not seek uranium from Africa. Other than that, of course the
President does. And even on that, that is --

QUESTION: And you still think he'll find --

MR. FLEISCHER: -- even on that, that is a judgment that the
President has made in hindsight, knowing now what we did not know at
the time of the State of the Union. And the President, in retrospect,
would not have included that remark in the State of the Union speech,
as you know.

QUESTION: He still thinks that Saddam Hussein wanted
to become a nuclear power and was trying to get uranium and you will
find the weapons of mass destruction?

QUESTION: Ari, Dr. Rice said yesterday that the
British still believe the intelligence that Iraq was trying to buy
uranium from Africa. Does the United States think that that
intelligence is correct?

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, that is what the British have said.
The British stand by their reporting. They have sources on their
reporting that we do not have on our reporting, which is not unusual in
the intelligence community. The British stand by it and the British
intelligence services are very respected.

QUESTION: Do we, independently, think that the
British intelligence is right or wrong, or do we just not know?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think this remains an issue about did Iraq
seek uranium in Africa, an issue that very well may be true. We don't
know if it's true -- but nobody, but nobody, can say it is wrong. And,
therefore, the judgment the White House has made is that it should not
have risen to the level of the Presidential State of the Union
address.

QUESTION: What do you know about the sourcing of the
British report? There's some idea that it came from Italian and/or
French sources.

MR. FLEISCHER: As Dr. Rice said on the shows yesterday, we
do not know the sourcing of the British report.

QUESTION: I don't quite understand why -- a couple of
points -- why White House officials are clinging to the idea that it
may not be wrong, we just can't prove that it's right. I mean, what's
the burden of proof here? Does this information not have the kind of
presumption of being not true until proven correct?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, I think that when you look at Iraq's
history, Iraq, of course, did pursue weapons of mass destruction,
biological weapons. They had biological weapons prior to the war.
Chemical weapons, same thing, they had chemical weapons prior to the
war.

The third piece of the weapons of mass destruction story is
nuclear. There can be no doubt in anybody's mind that Iraq pursued
nuclear weaponry prior to the war. We had never said Iraq had nuclear
weapons the way we have said that they had biological and chemical
weapons. They had two weapons of mass destruction in a general sense,
biological and chemical, and we fear they were seeking to reconstitute
their nuclear program. All in all, not the type of actions a nation
that is seeking to comply with United Nations resolutions should
undertake.

On the nuclear issue, there is a long, documented piece of
evidence, of history, showing Iraqi attempts to acquire the means to
produce nuclear weapons. I remind you that Israel took military action
to take out an Iraqi nuclear facility. Had they not done that, it's
likely that Iraq would have had nuclear weapons by the 1991 Gulf War.

Iraq, as you know, has uranium that could have been used to make
nuclear weapons. Where did they get the uranium and when? Iraq
possesses, currently under IAEA safeguards, under lock and key, at the
Tuwaitha facility inside Iraq, uranium that they got from Africa, from
Niger, in Africa, in the early 1980s.

In 1991, after the Gulf War ended we realized that Iraq was much
closer to getting nuclear weapons than any of the international
community or experts thoughts. Flash forward then to the late 1990s,
this, then, became the source of what the CIA concluded in their
national intelligence estimate: there were reports that Iraq was
continuing its bad behavior. They had done it before. It would not
surprise people if they continued to do it again, or they sought to
acquire nuclear weapons -- I'm sorry, or they sought to acquire uranium
in the production of nuclear weapons.

This is the history of Iraq. It is this history based on the
reporting from 1990s that led the CIA to that conclusion that Iraq was
seeking uranium. And that's how it made it into the speech.

QUESTION: Let me follow-up on one point, this is a
President who prides himself on straight talk and accountability, and,

yet, he has yet to express that he is upset about the fact that
this intelligence became unreliable, something that passed his lips in
the State of the Union Address, nor has he said who or whether anybody
should be held accountable. Instead, this White House, from the
President to the National Security Advisor, have, in a rather nuanced
way, blamed the CIA and let it go at that.

MR. FLEISCHER: No, I assure you the President is not
pleased. The President, of course, would not be pleased if he said
something in the State of the Union that may or may not have been true
and should not have risen to his level. There's no question about
that. Everybody has acknowledged that.

But this is also a President who keeps his eye on what really
counts and on the bigger picture. Nobody, but nobody, thinks the
United States went to war with Iraq because Saddam Hussein may or may
not have pursued uranium from Africa. We went to war because Saddam
Hussein had chemical weapons, had biological weapons and was, indeed,
seeking to reconstitute a nuclear program -- whether it did or did not
involve uranium coming from Africa. That's, in the scheme of things, a
minor element in the judgment that was made in the events that led up
to war. And that's why the President has approached it in the manner
that he has.

QUESTION: Let me follow on one point. Can you answer
the question that the President has still declined to answer, which is,
should somebody be held accountable for this mistake?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think the officials have already been held
accountable, and you've seen statements come out that have acknowledged
that the vetting process did not work that the way that it should
have. This administration has been very direct and forthright about
it. That has already taken place.

QUESTION: Ari, can I just come back to this idea of
you saying it wasn't a central reason for the war -- which may be true,
but it was certainly used to buttress the case and build a case that it
was urgent that Saddam Hussein be dealt with as quickly as possible.
Take it in the whole, when you look at the lack of discovery of weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq, the fact that the intelligence surrounding
its alleged purchase of uranium in Africa was erroneous, does that not
speak to the idea that there wasn't a sense of urgency to go after Iraq
and you could have waited, you could have built a bigger coalition to
go in?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, I think again and again, the fact that
the United Nations and the international community concluded that
Saddam Hussein had unaccounted for botulin, VX, sarin, nerve agent,
chemical and biological weapons that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons
to reconstitution if they could. I think if you look at all those
factors in the post-9/11 world, the only conclusion a President can
reach is that this country needs to be protected from the threats that
Saddam Hussein presents to our country. And that's exactly what the
President said in his repeated public statements.

QUESTION: But taken in the whole, is it not true that
there wasn't this sense of urgency to deal with Saddam Hussein that
this White House presented?

MR. FLEISCHER: Again, they were seeking to reconstitute
their nuclear program whether they got the uranium from Africa or from
somewhere else. The fact of the matter is whether they sought it from
Africa or didn't seek it from Africa doesn't change the fact that they
were seeking to reconstitute a nuclear program. The fact that they had
biological weapons made them a threat. The fact that they had chemical
weapons made them a threat. And that's why this President did the
right thing and led our nation to war to remove the threat.

QUESTION: You referred to it, Ari, as a minor
element, but it was important enough to delete in the October speech, a
reference to this.

MR. FLEISCHER: A reference to what?

QUESTION: A reference to Iraq's alleged attempt to
get the uranium from Niger. In that case, the CIA Director asked Mr.
Hadley to delete it, and it was deleted. Should that not have raised
all kinds of red flags come January, when a similar reference pops up
in the speech? Should not Mr. Hadley or someone from the White House
made sure to check this out with the CIA?

MR. FLEISCHER: It was a different reference in the State of
the Union speech.

QUESTION: Well, it was similar.

MR. FLEISCHER: But it was different. And it's similar in
the fact that it's Iraq and Iraq pursuing weapons -- that's similar, of
course. What is dramatically and markedly different and makes the
Cincinnati speech different from the State of the Union speech, is the
Cincinnati speech had a sentence in it about Iraq pursuing a specific
quantity of weapons from one country -- Niger. The Director of Central
Intelligence suggested to the White House that that statement should be
removed. It was removed.

The State of the Union address had different language, and it was
that Iraq is pursuing uranium, seeking uranium from Africa. That's
because there was additional reporting from the CIA, separate and apart
from Niger, naming other countries where they believed it was possible
that Saddam was seeking uranium. So it's an apple in Cincinnati and an
orange in the State of the Union. The two do not compare that
directly.

QUESTION: Well, but it's an African country versus
Africa. I'm just saying, should that not have raised red flags for
someone in the White House to double check?

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, that's why it was double-checked. And
this is where we have acknowledged that the vetting process didn't
work. Now, what did work was the vetting process in Cincinnati. And
that's why the sentence specific to Niger with a specific quantity was
taken out. But the broader statement about seeking uranium from Africa
was vetted through the CIA. And the vetting process as it took place
in Cincinnati did not take place for the State of the Union, and we've
acknowledged that that is regrettable. But, again, over one issue of
did he or did he not seek uranium from Africa, not whether Saddam
Hussein was a threat and he needed to be removed.

QUESTION: What steps are you taking to improve the
vetting process, Ari?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think it's safe to say that everybody
involved in the vetting process already knows that this process has to
be improved. Nobody wants to go through this once more, of course. A
State of the Union is one of the most important speeches a President
can give. And I think everybody involved has learned the lessons from
this.

QUESTION: Ari, two questions related to this. First,
when you say the vetting process didn't take place in the State of the
Union, we know that there were conversations -- Dr. Rice has said so --
between the CIA and Bob Joseph here at the NSC, about what was
contained in the State of the Union line. And there were conversations
back and forth about what it could and could not say. So is it that
there wasn't a vetting a process, or was it that the vetting process,
itself, failed to convey --

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, of course there was a vetting
process. But the vetting process in this case didn't work the way it
did in the Cincinnati case, even though the language was decidedly
different. And this is why Director Tenet said the President had every
reason to believe that the text of the State of the Union presented to
him was sound.

QUESTION: The follow-up to that is, if I understand
your reconstruction of events right, you have a CIA that is nervous
about a specific reference in the Cincinnati speech, puts that specific
back into the NIE three weeks later. You go ahead to the State of the
Union and you get a general comment drawn from the NIE --

MR. FLEISCHER: Based on additional information from the
NIE.

QUESTION: All that information is in the NIE. And
then a week later you have Secretary Powell show up at the United
Nations with no reference to it at all, because all of that information
as described by the President is suspect. Are you telling us that the
CIA changed their assessment during that time three times?

MR. FLEISCHER: No. I'm saying to you that the CIA, if they
had said, take out the reference to seeking uranium from Africa, it
would have been taken out, not because it necessarily was inaccurate,
because it wasn't conclusive enough to rise to the Presidential level.

Now, Secretary Powell, of course --

QUESTION: It was conclusive enough for the NIE.

MR. FLEISCHER: That's correct. That's why it was written
into the early drafts of the speeches, because it was conclusive enough
for the NIE.

QUESTION: So something that's in the NIE is not
conclusive enough for a State of the Union speech? The NIE is a
classified document going to all of Congress.

MR. FLEISCHER: That's why the line was said, because it was
in the NIE. That's exactly why.

QUESTION: But it should not have been in the NIE, is
what you're now saying to us?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think that's a question that the CIA
evaluates over time. And the NIE said it conclusively and that is why
it rose to the level where it could be considered as part of the State
of the Union, because it originated with the CIA's inter-agency process
of the national intelligence estimate.

QUESTION: Ari, to follow-up on his question, the
apple was a reference in a draft to the October speech to a specific
quantity of uranium from Niger.

To take another apple, the draft of the State of the Union speech
-- according to Dr. Rice's briefing on the plane on Friday -- included
references to quantity and place, and we were told that that was Niger,
they were taken out.

MR. FLEISCHER: She was referring to Cincinnati in that. I
talked to her afterwards, and she was referring to Cincinnati when she
said that.

QUESTION: When she said that on the plane?

MR. FLEISCHER: Yes.

QUESTION: Wow, that wasn't clear at all.

MR. FLEISCHER: Cincinnati. Because all the Presidential,
the State of the Union always referred to -- always -- referred to
seeking uranium from Africa. It did not have the same Cincinnati
line.

QUESTION: So despite that red flag, this idea came
back in draft of the State of the Union. You just said it was because
it was contained in the NIE. The NIE had a footnote saying this
information was highly dubious. Who on the President's staff would let
him say something that the State Department had said was highly
dubious?

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, keep in mind, again, the process of a
national intelligence estimate. There are six agencies in the United
States government all involved in the intelligence community that put
together the national intelligence estimate. It can be often a
footnoted document where one of the six agencies will say, we have
questions about it, this information may or may not be accurate.
Unanimity is not always the standard for an NIE. It is an inter-agency
process that lends itself to consensus -- in this case, consensus from
five of the six agencies involved.

We've been very up front, and the State Department looked at it and
they came to a different conclusion. All of the rest of the entities
that looked at it came to a different conclusion from State, which I
think also is reflective of why Secretary Powell, who works the closest
with the State Department employees, did not include it.

QUESTION: You told Steve that people have learned
lessons from this. What are the lessons they've learned? And what
changes have been made to the vetting process, which you said was --

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I think that, frankly, as David
pointed out, the speech was vetted, it was sent to all the relevant
agencies, and I think it's going to happen in every future speech, as
people are going to make certain that they do their due diligence with
each and every sentence of every Presidential address, so that
everything is made sure is as accurate as is possible.

QUESTION: Coming back to the British. The White
House is saying that what the President said was technically accurate,
because the British are standing by their intelligence on this issue.
And they haven't shared with you who their sources are. But why not --
it's not uncommon for the British and the United States to share their
intelligence information, especially on an issue with this kind of
profile.

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, that's a question that I can't
answer. That's a question that has to be addressed to British
officials.

QUESTION: Has it been asked?

MR. FLEISCHER: But, again, it's not uncommon in the
intelligence community for different intelligence services to have
their sources. And they, in order to obtain information from those
sources say, your information, your name or who you are, will not be
discussed with anybody. That's often how people keep their sources --
as reporters well know.

QUESTION: Is this not a top priority, though, for the
White House to get this information? This is the U.S.'s key ally on
Iraq, and considering the fact that it's such a high profile

question --

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, given the fact that the Iraqi regime
is no more and they are not going to be seeking uranium from anybody,
no, it's not a high priority to find out who the source of the British
government is, because the threat no longer exists.

QUESTION: Well, if the threat no longer exists, then
why are you worried about -- why are they worried about -- why are you
worried about asking them to compromise sources that no longer matter?

MR. FLEISCHER: I'm saying that that's often the reason that
people give. But this administration has already dealt with the threat
that comes from Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass
destruction, which, after all, is what this was all about. The notion
that because Iraq may or may not have been seeking uranium from Africa
undermines the case for going to war with Saddam Hussein, ignores the
fact that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons, chemical weapons. And
that was a threat to the United States. And that's why this President
took that action -- whether or not he sought uranium from Africa.

QUESTION: On the Iraq question, when did the
administration first learn of doubts about the information about
Niger?

MR. FLEISCHER: In terms of the forged documents, that was
revealed by the IAEA in March of 2003. And that's the key element on
the Niger issue. But, you know, if you take a look at Director Tenet's
statement about Niger, there's some interesting information in there.
Director Tenet, when he talks about the former ambassador's mission to
Niger, and then he reported back to the CIA on what he found when he
went there --

QUESTION: When was his mission?

MR. FLEISCHER: He reported -- when was his mission to
Niger? I don't have the date when he went. But when the former
ambassador went to Niger, he reported back that officials in Niger
denied that they had any contracts with Iraq. They said they did not
sign any contracts with Iraq. But in Director Tenet's statement, it
also reads that the former official who the ambassador met with, the
former Prime Minister of Niger, interpreted an Iraqi overture as an
attempt to discuss uranium sales. So there still is reporting that
they attempted to discuss -- that Iraqis attempted to discuss uranium
sales in Niger.

QUESTION: But there were doubts about the
authenticity of this before the IAEA came out, because there were
doubts in the America intelligence community.

MR. FLEISCHER: What Director Tenet related pertaining to
the Cincinnati speech was that it should come out because there was
only one source for it. Not that it was wrong, but there was only one
source for it.

QUESTION: Right. So what I'm saying is that at that
time officials knew that this was shaky because there was only one
source, which is a pretty thin read to base a Presidential statement
on. So did they forget -- between October and January, did they forget
in the weeks in there when they --

MR. FLEISCHER: No, you're missing the point I've said
earlier about in addition to Niger, Africa is a large continent that
has more than one country. There was reporting that there were other
countries on the continent that Iraq may have been pursuing uranium
from. Whether those reports turn out to be true or not, we do not
know. The point is. the information in Cincinnati was specific to one
country. The information in the State of the Union was much broader
than that, about the continent. And given the fact that this is where
Iraq did, indeed, as the world knows, get a portion of its uranium from
before, it's not a statement that could be without merit. In fact, it
could be.

QUESTION: So you're saying the State of the Union was
not specifically referring to Niger, it was referring to other
countries?

MR. FLEISCHER: That's why the President said, Africa. And
that was also because the NIE, in addition to the reference to Niger,
talked about other countries in Africa, too.

QUESTION: Was that U.S. intelligence information or
information from other intelligence services?

MR. FLEISCHER: You'd have to ask the Agency.

QUESTION: Ari, you've said that you didn't
necessarily need this Africa information in order to make the assertion
that Iraq was trying to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. If
it was a side issue, who was it in the administration that was pushing
so hard to have this in the speech?

MR. FLEISCHER: It's a question of, the President was making
the case to the American people about the threat that Saddam Hussein
presented. This is one piece of a much broader threat. And I don't
think you can say there was any person seeking to make the case. It's
an ongoing case that was made, and the case was made.

QUESTION: But you had this taken out of the October
speech,

and --

MR. FLEISCHER: No, this was not taken out of the October
speech.

QUESTION: You had the Niger stuff taken out of the
October speech.

MR. FLEISCHER: That's correct.

QUESTION: You said, yourself, right, just a few
minutes ago, that the reference to the other African nations may or may
or may not prove to be true. You don't know. And, yet, you made a
broad accusation of the continent of Africa selling uranium to Iraq
based on what, something that you, to this day, do not know, may or may
not be true.

MR. FLEISCHER: Based on the NIE.

QUESTION: Okay, fine. But why, if there's that -- so
much uncertainty about the information, why was there so much effort to
find a way to carefully craft the sentence, the key being, hang it on
the British, not the CIA, to make it accurate. Why go through all
these hoops to include it?

MR. FLEISCHER: The reason the British were cited is because
the British had a public document. We often refer to public documents,
as opposed to classified information. How many times from this podium
have you heard me say that I don't discuss classified information or
intelligence information? The British report was public, that's why we
discussed the British report. it was based on a public document.

Now, we've said it went through the vetting process, and that's
exactly how it worked.

QUESTION: But Dr. Rice made clear yesterday in her
Sunday talk shows that what made the sentence technically accurate was
that it was cited to the British -- not the CIA, not the U.S., that it
was cited to the British. So you all went --

MR. FLEISCHER: And the British stand by it.

QUESTION: Well, that's true. But you all went
through a lot of hoops to try to get this into the speech. Why?

MR. FLEISCHER: Because this was information that was
relevant to the case about whether Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
program. It was part of the argument that the President was making
based on biological weapons, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: But it didn't matter that you had --

MR. FLEISCHER: And the sentence immediately before it,
Jeanne -- do you remember what the sentence was immediately before the
statement about Niger?

QUESTION: No.

MR. FLEISCHER: It was that Iraq is seeking five different
ways to enrich its uranium. It was a broad statement and then the
President made the specific reference to Niger. And he made it because
that's what the intelligence showed at that time, and we've been very
up front in saying since then that it should not have risen to the
President's level.

You're asking, why did it rise to the President's level. The
answer is it shouldn't.

QUESTION: I'm asking why did somebody want it in the
speech so badly?

MR. FLEISCHER: Because it was based on reporting; we had
reason to believe the reporting was accurate.

QUESTION: Just one last follow-up. Because of all of
this, there are all kinds of new questions being raised on Capitol
Hill about the broader justification for the war. Speaking of chemical
and biological weapons from the podium today you repeatedly assert that
he had chemical and biological weapons. The question is, we can't find
them, so how can we make it such a blanket assertion that he, indeed,
had them.

These are -- all these questions are being dredged up again on
Capitol Hill. How much of a problem is that for you guys to run back
through all of this, and why can't we find them, or why do you continue
to assert that he had them if we can't find them?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think the administration asserts it for
the same reasons that Senator Lieberman asserted it in 1998, and that
Senator Graham asserted that they had biological or chemical weapons as
well. And why a variety of CIA directors prior to Director Tenet, and
why the Clinton administration said it.

It's because -- and the international community concluded that
Saddam Hussein had not accounted for the huge stocks of sarin gas and
VX and anthrax that he previously had; knowing that the used chemical
weapons against his own people. That's why we've asserted it, because
all the reporting indicates that it is true.

QUESTION: Right. But do you now acknowledge it may
turn out to be not true, since we can't find them?

MR. FLEISCHER: No. It's exactly what Secretary Rumsfeld
said yesterday, that we have confidence, still, that it will be found.
No question, that is what we believe.

QUESTION: Ari, you've continued to defend the
statement in the State of the Union speech about Africa and uranium,
even while saying in hindsight it shouldn't have risen to the level of
a Presidential speech, by saying, nobody can prove it's not true and
another government still stands by it, although they won't share their
sources with us.

Shouldn't the level of proof be higher for a Presidential speech,
especially one by a President who's making a case to the American
people for taking them to war?

MR. FLEISCHER: Sure. Sure. And that's why we have said
this should not have risen to the level of a Presidential speech.

QUESTION: Well, then why do you continue to defend
the statement at all? Why --

MR. FLEISCHER: Because of the notion that what the
President said is wrong, that the President included erroneous
information in the State of the Union. There have been a series of
allegations made that are unsupportable allegations. What we have said
is -- you know, of course, based on the fact that Iraq did, indeed, get
its uranium from Africa, from Niger in the early 1980s, what we've said
is these statements may be true, they may not be true. It's part of
the intelligence mosaic. Yet, this should not have risen to the level
of Presidential speech.

QUESTION: But you're trying to have it both ways.
You're saying it shouldn't have been in the speech, but it still may be
true. But you really don't know. Why don't you simply retract and
withdraw the statement?

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, we said it should not have been in the
State of the Union.

QUESTION: But you're still trying to suggest that it
may be true in the end.

MR. FLEISCHER: That's because in the face of allegations
that it was false, I think it's important for people to have a
realistic understanding of Iraq's attempts to pursue nuclear weapons;
and in the pursuit of nuclear weapons, they needed uranium, they had
only a limited amount of uranium from inside Iraq; they needed to get
uranium from somewhere; they previously had a history of getting it
from Africa; and the reporting at the time indicated that there were
suspicions they were getting it from Africa, indeed.

QUESTION: The bottom line is, though, that you don't
know for certain one way or not?

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, former U.N. Inspector David Kaye is
leading the effort inside Iraq. He has an ever-growing team of
personnel who are working for him, both in the military and in terms of
the experts who have the information. They are meeting with mid-level
Iraqi officials who were involved in the program. And I remind you
about the finding of the Iraqi nuclear scientist who had nuclear
components buried in his yard.

Now, I think it's rather odd for an individual to walk out of a top
secret facility where they have nuclear components and bring equipment
home with him. That's not exactly standard behavior in a dictatorial
regime. It looked like they had something to hide. They hid it. The
scientist hid it in his garden. It's been discovered. You have to ask
yourself why would a scientist with nuclear knowledge hide nuclear
materials in his garden. This is part of what's already been found.

The likely thinking is, Iraq was preparing for the day, which
almost took place in the late 1990s, when sanctions were lifted, and
this scientist knew where his equipment was. I remind you also, that
Iraq, in the run-up to the war, was supposed to declare all its nuclear
programs. They failed to declare the information that was known to be
hidden in this scientist's backyard.

QUESTION: Ari, you keep talking about the vetting
process. But before the vetting process ever took place, someone here
in the White House decided to put that claim into the State of the
Union, despite warnings from the CIA and despite warnings from the
State Department. Those are the facts. That being the case, doesn't
the White House take any responsibility for that statement whatsoever?

MR. FLEISCHER: The statement went through the regular
inter-agency process based on a document that was produced, deemed to
be reliable, called the national intelligence estimate, where five of
the six agencies had an opinion about whether it should be in there or
not. So it was based on solid reporting, solid research by people here
in the White House. That's why it was included in drafts. That's the
exact purpose of drafts. And the drafts were provided to the Central
Intelligence Agency and the other agencies. And the inter-agency
process begins where they're reviewed. And some information falls
out. Some information stays in. That's exactly how a vetting process
should work.

QUESTION: You had at least some warning. You put it
in anyway. Do you take responsibility?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, the warning was about a different
topic. The warning was about, as I said earlier, information specific
to one country with a specific quantity. There were other reporting
about other countries in Africa that led to the broader statement about
him pursuing uranium from Africa, which is a statement that also has
much history attached to it, given the fact that this is where Saddam,
indeed, got his uranium from before.

QUESTION: Let me ask you one other question. The
centrifuge argument wound up not being totally legitimate.

MR. FLEISCHER: It's a matter of dispute, just as Secretary
Powell said at the United Nations.

QUESTION: This is under dispute. What evidence is
left, public evidence is left that the White House can point to that
Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program?

MR. FLEISCHER: I'm glad you asked me that. Let me tell
you. In addition to the long-standing ambitions that Iraq had to
procure nuclear weapons, in addition to the fact that they had a
nuclear facility that had to be destroyed by Israel before it was
actually able to come onto line, in addition to the fact that the
international community concluded that Iraq was much closer to
possessing nuclear weapons during the Gulf War, in addition to the fact
that we underestimated -- not overestimated, but underestimated -- how
close they were in the early 1990s, we have seen, since the sanctions
were imposed on Iraq, Iraq do the following events: they had an
indigenous production overt and covert procurement of uranium
compounds, they had development of multiple indigenous uranium
enrichment capabilities, they had the intent to divert research reactor
fuel and a crash program to produce a nuclear weapon, they had limited
production and separation of plutonium for weapons research at their
facilities, they had weaponization research and development of
dedicated facilities aimed at producing a missile-deliverable weapon.
And, of course, we all saw it on TV, how many meetings did Saddam
Hussein have with his nuclear scientists? Why did he retain the group
that he called the Nuclear Mujahideen if he did not have an intention
of working on a nuclear program?

So I turn it around: why would anybody think that a leader as
brutal as Saddam Hussein would not pursue weapons of mass destruction,
of biological and chemical, and then say, but I'm not interested in
nuclear. That's not plausible, that's not credible.

QUESTION: Another question on the President's style,
it's no secret that he likes to be direct and to the point. And you
said, you can assure us that the President isn't pleased about this
latest uranium discussion. Why haven't we heard from him directly?

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, you know one of the things that I
reflect on when I leave the White House is what kind of a manager and
what kind of a leader is President Bush. And I want to talk about that
a little bit later. But one of the things managers do to inspire good,
hard work among their staff is if something goes wrong, they deal with
it. They deal with it at the various levels. But they don't need to
engage in any type of public process when work doesn't go the way
people sometimes want it to go.

That's sometimes how good managers lead people, and lead people
through positive inspiration.

QUESTION: But this is a serious enough issue that we
would -- I mean, I'm sure everyone in this room would like to hear his
comments on this.

MR. FLEISCHER: And the President commented on it numerous
times on the trip to Africa when he was asked about it. But if you're
saying, if you were a manager and a worker for you did something for
you that you didn't like, maybe you would go public and say something
about that worker.

That might be your style. It's not the President's style.

QUESTION: But also you said that the threat of
weapons of mass destruction no longer exists. I guess, are you saying,
then, that you're 100 percent certain that those weapons of mass
destruction have not been transferred to another nation that might be
unfriendly to the United States?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, I refer you to exactly what Secretary
Rumsfeld said on the topic yesterday. We're confident that we are
going to find the weapons. And, again -- and I've always said this,
there's nothing concrete I can report about whether or not any weapons
were transferred.

QUESTION: But how can you make such a blanket
statement, the threat no longer exists, if you don't know --

MR. FLEISCHER: For the same --

QUESTION: And you don't know -- you don't even know
whether Saddam Hussein is dead or alive?

MR. FLEISCHER: For the same reasons I answered the question
when you asked it a week ago and two weeks and three weeks ago, because
the regime no longer exists, we're confident the regime will no longer
use those weapons.

QUESTION: But another regime might use those weapons
if they've been transferred --

MR. FLEISCHER: And I've indicated to you that we have no
concrete reporting about whether any of the weapons left the borders of
Iraq.

QUESTION: But you can't have a concrete saying that
it's not a threat if you don't have a concrete reporting that weapons
haven't been transferred --

MR. FLEISCHER: The threat is from the regime.

QUESTION: Ari, were you able to ascertain whether
this Niger-Iraq issue came up this morning in the President's meeting
with Director Tenet?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, and I typically would not ask what took
place at a CIA briefing on the information the President gets in his
Presidential daily briefing.

QUESTION: So there's basically nothing you could tell
us about what transpired there to give us any indication whether the
President --

MR. FLEISCHER: I think, frankly, you've heard it all.

QUESTION: One more thing. There is a perception, at
least, that in this issue that the CIA acquiesced to the NSA, and did
not raise -- and that it did raise red flags, but then basically
withdrew whatever their objections were. Is that accurate?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think it's fair to say that both
institutions have very dedicated professionals who are expert at what
they do, and they will typically talk about the mosaic that is before
them and have discussions about what that mosaic means and what it
indicates. And I think you have strong people in both agencies, in the
White House as well as the CIA, and this is how they do their jobs.
They share information, they try to come to conclusions.

QUESTION: So they did not acquiesce in any way, in
the way you look at it?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, I think what didn't take place is the
vetting process could have led to somebody saying, take it out. That
did not take place.

QUESTION: I'm still not clear about something we
discussed this morning. George Tenet said in his statement on Friday
that he had raised the issues -- the issues that were addressed in the
State of the Union address, he said, several times, with White House
officials, that it had been raised. And, yet, Dr. Rice said, if there
were questions about the quality of the intelligence underlying the
charge that she wasn't aware of them and neither was the President.
How is that possible?

MR. FLEISCHER: It speaks for itself. I think you have to
ask the CIA about that. They had concerns that they brought to the
attention of the British government, but it was not brought to the
attention of the White House.

QUESTION: But George Tenet said specifically they did
raise it. He said, several times, with White House officials. Are you
saying it didn't rise to --

MR. FLEISCHER: You know, I have his statement here. And he
referred, as you said this morning, to the fragmentary intelligence.
But I don't see the reference that you're making.