Dossier:
Subject born to party members in Leipzig; father was government accountant and mother was deputy chief of local Stasi field station. Subject demonstrated early aptitude for languages and accents, and was thus recruited for espionage training 1/1/1977.

Records are incomplete due to partial 1989 destruction of Stasi archives, but subject is believed to have been initially part of the “Hummelwerke” honeypot program. Subject may have been involved with the Active Measures program (“Trommelbergen”) as early as 1984 at age 14, but had certainly completed all or part of the training by 1989, when all Stasi espionage activities and training were suspended.

It is believed that, sometime between 1983 and 1987, Herr Weissmuller and Frau Weissmuller were denounced to the Stasi for planning to flee to the West. Ordinarily, the act of republikflucht would have been punished with imprisonment or hard labor, but the position of Frau Weissmuller with the Stasi seems to have aggravated the situation. They are not mentioned in official records after July 1987 and appear to have been executed. Information about who denounced them is not available, though analysis has suggested that it may have been their daughter Heidi.

As with many members of the “Trommelbergen” program, the subject disappeared in the chaos following the collapse of the GDR. It is believed that she and her cohort were recruited by the KGB at this point and underwent additional training, though the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 put and end to this. There are records of “Trommelbergen” on the ground in Chechnya in 1996, acting as mercenaries in all but name, but it is unclear if the subject was one of them.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the iron curtain and the massacre of most “Trommelbergen” in the subsequent conflicts, the subject appears to have used the chaos as an opportunity to set herself up as a free agent. She served as an Armenian agent in Baku during the war with Azerbaijan, acted as an agent for first the Croats and later the Serbs in Bosnia, before working for the regime in Belarus for a time. It is unclear if the “Minsk Cache,” intelligence data sold to the United Kingdom in 1998, was provided by the subject, but there is reason to believe it was.

More definite data emerges in 1999, when the subject was again active in Serbia, working as a counterintelligence agent in Kosovo and serving as a middleman in the Chinese purchase of NATO hardware that was shot down by Serbian troops. Upon the war’s end, the subject left Serbian employment with documents that were sold to Dutch intermediaries and eventually proved significant in bringing various Serbian war criminals to justice.

The subject next emerged in Kabul in 2002, among the first intelligence agents to enter the city. She set herself up as a clearinghouse for local information, buying and selling to the highest bidder for cash. The subject was credited with the assassination of Omar Abdul al-Rahid, a Saudi citizen leading a group of foriegn fighters near Kandahar, but found it convenient to leave after the local Taliban posted a bounty. She reemerged in 2005 in Iraq, again serving as a liaison and clearinghouse of information for both the Coalition troops and their insurgent opponents.

In 2008, the subject acquired and sold information relating to North Korea’s arms deals with the fallen Iraqi regime, leading to another bounty on her head and a failed assassination attempt in Doha the following year. This lead to a rapid decamping to Syria, where the al-Assad regime offered her steady employment as a freelance intelligence agent and attaché with the Russian Embassy.

When the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, the subject attempted to take advantage of the situation by acting as an information broker but was trapped in the Siege of Aleppo early in the fighting and earned herself the enmity of both the Assad regime and its opponents. It appears that whatever kinds of deals and betrayals were required to extricate herself from the city burned bridges with virtually every faction in the war. Only by bribing a Kurdish contingent was she able to escape Turkey, and all indications are that the subject remains under a “shoot on sight” order with the Syrian Republican Guard. Though she left the area before the rise of ISIS, intelligence indicates that a similar order exists in territory they control.

As of this writing, the subject has been privy to an incalculable amount of human, material, and signals intelligence. However, they have proven again and again that they will readily desert any cause and betray its trust to the highest bidder. This has the dual effect of making them a Priority V prohibited source and virtually unemployable.

Skills:
Thanks to “Hummelwerke” training, the subject is fluent in German, Russian, English, Arabic, and Chinese. The former three are spoken with a high degree of mastery and subject has undergone additional training to mimic Berlin, Bavarian, Saxon, British, American, Australian, Moscow, and Kiev dialects. Arabic and Chinese are spoken at a lesser mastery level.

As with most former members of the “Trommelbergen,” the subject is capable with most common small arms and selected heavy/indirect fire systems. While this regiment also included a martial arts component, it is believed that the subject was never able to master this to any significant degree and as such prefers firearms or small concealable melee weapons.

Intended to act as saboteurs in the event of war with the West, “Trommelbergen” were trained to use explosives and other means to perform disruptive sabotage. It is believed that the subject retains much of this knowledge.

Due to extensive ground time in Germany, Russia, former Yugoslavia, and the Mideast, it is believed that the subject has a very good command of local custom. In particular, available information suggests that she is very adept at disguising herself as a traditional Muslim using a niqab or abaya.

Verdict:
Subject is a Priority V prohibited source and any contact other than detention is expressly forbidden. Under no circumstances is the subject to be used as an information source, intermediary, or agent. While there are no outstanding arrest warrants in the West, her detention and interrogation is considered to be in the national interest and is therefore pre-authorized, as is the use of extraordinary rendition and enhanced interrogation techniques.