WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE – TAPES E08005-E08008 MARSHALL SHULMAN

Vance’s Comprehensive Arms Control Proposal

Interviewer:

MR. SHULMAN, WERE YOU INVOLVED IN THE DECISION MAKING THAT
LED TO THE PROPOSAL THAT SECRETARY VANCE CARRIED TO MOSCOW IN MARCH OF
'77?

Shulman:

I was only peripherally involved in the decision...uh...on
the March 1977 proposal. I was working for Cyrus Vance and I was a
consultant to him but the main locus of decision-making was in the
White House.

Interviewer:

WHEN YOU HEARD THAT SECRETARY VANCE WOULD CARRY A PROPOSAL
FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS, WHAT WERE YOUR THOUGHTS? DID YOU ADVISE HIM ON HOW THE
SOVIETS MIGHT REACT TO THIS?

Shulman:

Well, we learned the President's decision only uh, the night
before our departure for Moscow. And, when I heard it, uh, I recall sitting
on the edge of my be... bed in the middle of my packing thinking that this
was going to be a fruitless trip. Because it was quite evident that
the...the so-called comprehensive proposal, uh, would not be negotiable and
that the sole function of that would be to evoke a negative response from
the Soviets. The alternative proposal that had been under consideration uh,
was one that built upon the previous discussions with the Russians at
Vladivostok with the addition of provisions to uh, provide for two elements
that hadn't been included in the Vladivostok agreement. One having to do
with limits on the backfire bombers and the other with the uh, cruise
missiles...imitations. That was embodied as a fall back position, but the
President's final decision was to make the comprehensive proposal the main
initial presentation to the Soviets.

Interviewer:

WHAT HAPPENED IN MOSCOW? DID SECRETARY VANCE MAKE THIS
PROPOSAL FIRST? OR DID GROMYKO MAKE A PROPOSAL FIRST?

Shulman:

Uh, no. It was the United States who spoke first. Uh, after
the initial meetings and the pleasantries were over, uh, we as the visitors
were invited to make the initial presentation. And, the secretary did as
instructed to lay out the comprehensive proposal. Now, the Soviets had not
been prepared for that, uh, except with one curious exception. Uh, that was
that uh, while the delegation was in the air on the way to Moscow, there had
been held a background press briefing in Washington...uh, which announced
what the substance of the US position was going to be. That was just a day
before our arrival of course. And the Soviets were ...surprised by that, and
then when the secretary laid out the proposal as had been foreshadowed in
the background briefing, their reaction was one of anger. But they had
anticipated on everything they had heard out of Washington before that time.
That was that uh, the US was prepared to build upon Vladivostok.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS VANCE'S REACTION TO THE SOVIET ANGER?

Shulman:

Well...Vance's expectation was that he would make an honest
try as instructed to lay the comprehensive proposal on the table. Uh, his
expectations that the Soviets would respond to it productively were not very
high. But h...his expectation was that after that had been done, if the
Soviets responded with a kind of a "No, but..." response, essentially,
taking objections to that position and then making an effort to come back to
Vladivostok, that he would ha...be able then, to uh, negotiate on the basis
of the fallback position. Which was the one that he anticipated uh, would be
more likely to be productive. However, written into his instructions were
the, was an injunction that before he moved to his fallback position, he
would uh, be obliged to go back to the President and get explicit approval
for that step.

Interviewer:

THIS PROPOSAL BORE SOME RESEMBLANCE TO THAT WHICH RICHARD
PERLE AND SENATOR JACKSON HAD ADVISED THE PRESIDENT IN FEBRUARY. WHAT DID
YOU THINK OF THAT ADVICE? WHAT DID YOU THINK THEIR MOTIVE WAS?

Shulman:

The comprehensive proposal was really a scissors and paste
job...put together of a series of earlier American positions. The main
thrust of which was to try to get a reduction in the Soviet heavy missiles
which was thought to be a main source of security concern to the United
States. Without, however, uh, providing for comparable proposed reductions
in other aspects of our fore structure that would make it an equitable
proposal. So it...it seemed fairly clear, the outset, that this was not
going to commend itself as a...as a basis of negotiations. I wouldn't want
to speculate about the motivation of the people who put it forward. The
impression I had at the time was that the comprehensive proposal as it stood
was not going to be productive and would appear to the Russians as a
proposal that was not intended to be productive. It was intended to evoke a
negative response on their part and not only to forestall negotiations, but
to create a propaganda situation that would be, that put them in the
position of being the ones to say no to negotiations. And that's how they
saw it. They thought it was a quite a deliberate effort on the part of the
United States to evoke a negative response.

Concern over Soviet Heavy Missiles

Interviewer:

WAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET HEAVY
MISSILES AND THE GENERAL SOVIET BUILDUP IN THE SEVENTIES? HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN
THAT?

Shulman:

How do I explain the...the fact that the Soviets built up
their heavy missiles or that there was a reaction to it in the United
States?

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION THAT LED THEM TO
BUILD UP THESE HEAVY MISSILES THAT WE FOUND THREATENING?

Shulman:

Well bear in mind, this was a period in the middle to late
seventies...when the Soviets had been coming through...a period of strategic
inferiority, uh, for a long time. And, beginning around the turn of the
decade, from about '69 to '70, uh, it's hard to say with precision just when
it was the Soviets approached a condition that could generally be described
as parity. They began to have a sufficient arsenal of weapons and now
particularly with their heavy missiles, uh, that uh, would have a powerful
deterrent effect on the United States. Now, in a sense, the Soviet capacity
to target the United States really dated back from the fifties. But not in
comparable numbers to that which the United States had. But beginning around
the beginning of the decade of...the '70s, they began to have something that
could be described as parity. It was clear to them that their heavy
missiles, particularly as they...uh, began to put multiple warheads on them,
uh, were a concern to us. And in a...in a general sense, it can be said that
a weapon that intimidates the other side has a deterrent function and this
was the cheapies...cheapest, easiest, most available way of achieving that
effect on their part. Now, it was shortsighted on their part too because as so often had happened in the
past, efforts that they made to overcome their inferiority were carried
forward with such a lack of measure, that it then appeared threatening. And
it...it tended to galvanize our defense efforts, which then in the long run,
made them worse off than they were before. Oh, their...their approach was
myopic as
was ours. I mean, both sides, in a way, carried forward
their weapons programs without very much regard for what would be the
reaction of the other side and then would we be better off or not in the
light of what they would do in response. That was the case for example, with
our decision to merv...to put multiple warheads on our missiles. In the long
run, it turned out to be a disadvantage for us. But in the short-run, in the
myopic view, it looked like an initial advantage. Similarly, from the Soviet
point of view, building up their heavy missiles beyond the level that
appeared to us to be a plausible plateau for strategic parity...in turn
galvanized our own weapons programs.

Interviewer:

BUT IT GAVE RISE TO A CONCERN THAT OUR LAND-BASED MISSILE
FORCE WOULD BE VULNERABLE. DID YOU SHARE THAT CONCERN?

Shulman:

Well it...it was a proper m...matter of concern. The
question is, what is a proportionate view of it? Uh, obviously we had to be
concerned of the fact that the Soviet heavy missiles with all their multiple
warheads, could do a lot of damage, uh, to our fixed base, land-based,
fixed-sight land-based missiles, which were at that time the titans and the
minutemen. Um...but... it...it...seemed to me in the kind of exchange of
ratios that were discussed in the, all the horrible scenarios that could be
evoked — that these tended to leave out of account the fact that our forces
structures were different. In the case of the United States, only about a
quarter of our strategic weapons were in land-based missiles and we had
the...the bombers and the submarine based missiles, which were not affected
by these calculations. So that in addition to the uncertainties about
reliability about how accurate the Soviet missiles would be and how many
they would actually take out and what we would have left after an attack on
a land based missiles. There was in addition to that, what we would be able
to do with our bombers and with our submarines which seemed to me to be — to
make the calculations of the window of vulnerability extremely
implausible.

Interviewer:

SOME PEOPLE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE
THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE BY APPEARING TO BE SUPERIOR. AREN'T THESE
PERCEPTIONS IMPORTANT?

Shulman:

Well it...Mr. Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in one famous
decision referred to the parade of imaginary horribles. Now there are all
kinds of scenarios you can write uh, in this game of possible exchanges. And
among the scenarios that were discussed would be one in which the Soviets
would let fly a few missiles and would show us what they could do,
intimidate us and cause us not to evoke our deterrent response because of
the fear that then the Soviets would have so many in reserve that they would
blast our cities. Now, all these depended upon rather fine calculations on
the Soviet side that this...this could be kept in control and the exchanges
would be rather precisely defined...which... uh, has never been the case in
the fog of war. Uh, the, all these fine calculations tend to go out the
window. For one thing, there's imperfect knowledge of what is happening and
there's imperfect command and control. So that it seemed to me uh...that
although this is theoretically conceivable, it was not among the practical
concerns that we needed to take into account in planning our security
policy. That it would have required on the Soviet a reckless disregard of
probabilities that would border on irrationality, and that hasn't been the
case in Soviet behavior in these matters. Their behavior has been rather
cautious and rather prudent. And even back in the time of Stalin before they
had this big capability, they, even when they aggressive, they were
prudent. Uh, so it seemed to me that that was not really high on the list of
probabilities. In a way, I suppose the problem for a nation in a security
policy is a lot like that of an individual deciding how much insurance to
take out. The only difference is...that if you take out more insurance than
you may need, the only effect is that it's expensive...it may bankrupt you.
From a national point of view, if you...try to take account of every
conceivable contingency, and you respond to it by your own buildup, what you
do is to precipitate response on the other side, which in turn complicates
your own security...policy. So that is why you have to apply some common
sense -- plausibility to the scenarios that you're concerned about.

Interviewer:

PEOPLE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY ISSUES IN THE LATTER
PART OF THE '70s. WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT HOW BEST TO MEET THEM?

Shulman:

Well it...it seemed to be self-evident...uh, in that
period...that the...the most prudent course for us was to try to stabilize a
deterrent balance at moderate levels... that...it...that unsatisfactory as a
peace that rests upon mutual deterrence is, it conjures up all kinds of
awesome...uh... problems for a political leadership. But it was the best
assurance we had... of stability. The fact was that we had both by that
time, in the '70s, reached a point where if...if an attack came from either
side, that the retaliation would be destructive to the originating side and
in the end, both countries would be destroyed with a fraction of weapons we
already have at that time. Now that basic fact and the sturdiness of that
deterrent balance, sturdiness in the sense that it wasn't really dependent
upon small fluctuations in, or disparities in particular categories, whether
in megatonnage or in accuracy or in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles
or in numbers of uh, warheads or in ranges, or any of the dozen or so
attributes, by which you can measure the strategic balance, that the
fluctuations in those, that is, the disparities on the two sides, didn't
significantly alter the practical outcome which was that with many fewer
weapons on both sides, the practical consequence would be the same. That is,
the dis...the destruction of both countries in the event of hostilities
however it originated. Now that gives a certain sturdiness to the situation,
which it seems to me, we ought to have recognized and that the purpose of
our negotiation would be to seek to strengthen our security by getting a
stable balance uh, mutual deterrence at rather moderate levels...levels
below what we had then and m...stable emphasized in that case means that the
systems would be relatively invulnerable so that they wouldn't be exposed to
a first attack and therefore wouldn't put our political leadership under the
pressure of having to respond to ambiguous data...of the fear that our
weapons would be destroyed, that we couldn't use them if we didn't respond
promptly or preemptively. That is, trying to anticipate an attack. That's
what makes for a trigger-happiness in the situation. So it seemed to me that
the — what...uh...the.. the path that more...more directly would assure our
security would be to try to make our systems as stable, that is, as
relatively invulnerable as possible, and to negotiate a balance at moderate
levels.

[END OF TAPE E08005]

Interviewer:

WHAT ABOUT THE MX, WHEN THE DEEP REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL
FAILED, DIDN'T WE HAVE TO MEET THE SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES WITH A HEAVY
MISSILE OF OUR OWN?

Shulman:

Well the...the deep proposals...uh...that is, the
comprehensive proposal that it's called uh, failed in March '77, and we
didn't get back into negotiations as I recall until about May of the year in
uh, Geneva negotiations. Now there were a number of uh, sources of...concern
that led to the MX. One of them was, the idea that if the Soviets had a uh,
capability of attacking our fixed-sight land bis... based missiles, we
should have a comparable capability against the Soviets. And that meant
having a heavy missile that was uh, accurate and had the yield uh, that
could be silo busting on the Soviet side as well. So, some people were
interested in the MX as a system that would have a
comparable silo busting capability. Others were interested in it as an
offset or a bargaining chip. It was also defended in the Congress as a
bargaining chip. Now, ah, during that those months, the middle part of '77
and into '78, our initial proposal to the Russians was for SALT II, was that
there showed...should be no new land based missiles. And after a time the
Soviets accepted that proposal. But by that time, uh, the Joint Chiefs
wanted to pr...preserve the possibility of going to the MX, it was still in
the development phase, but they wanted to keep the right to do it. So we
were obliged to go back to the Soviet Union, withdraw the earlier proposal
that they had accepted, and substitute for it a proposal that there should
be only one new uh, fixed sight land-based missile...which they did in time.
And our purpose then, was to protect the possibility of deploying the
MX.

Soviet Expansion and Linkage with Arms Control

Interviewer:

WHAT WERE THE SOVIETS DOING IN ETHOPIA?

Shulman:

Well, in 1978, or so, the Soviets were presented with a...a
problem...in that there previously strong position in Somalia with uh, which
included...a worrisome uh, element from our point of view of its, the uh,
naval base that went with it...uh, was complicated by the fact that...that
uh...h...hold this for just a minute. I have a block about uh…

Interviewer:

MENGISTOU?

Shulman:

Mengistu, yeah. Alright. Uh, that Mengistu —

Interviewer:

START AGAIN. THERE WAS CONCERN IN '78 ABOUT SOVIET
ACTIVITIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. WHAT WERE THEY DOING THERE?

Shulman:

Well the ...Soviets initially were very active in
Somalia...and we were concerned about the naval base that gave them, and
uh...Siad Barre was a fairly unpredictable figure, didn't know whether they
were simply taking advantage of the local opportunity or whether their
ambitions ran more strongly. But then the position changed as Mengistu uh,
took a very strong turn against the United States. He kicked out our Peace
Corps as I remember it and other representatives and we were pressing him
rather hard on the violation of human rights. And he then turned to the
Soviet Union. They tried for a while to develop their contacts with Mengistu
in Ethiopia without losing the contacts they had with Siad Barre. Very
difficult thing to do. It's like the fable in Aesop of the...uh.. was it the
fox that dropped the grapes he had in his mouth because of the larger uh,
group of grapes he saw reflected in the lake and lost them both. Uh, but in
this case, the Soviets didn't lose them both, but what happened is that
their responses to Mengistu's overtures, uh, cost them their support with
Siad Barre — Somalia, who then turned to the United States to see what
support he could get from us. And...Ethiopia was, of course, a much larger
prize — larger, more powerful, geographically more interesting.

Interviewer:

WHAT DID IT SAY ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS, THEIR BEING THERE, SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS PART OF A GRAND DESIGN.

Shulman:

That's right. The... the two major schools of
interpretation were those who saw it as part of a grand design with arrows
uh, pointing uh...in a pincher style, first of all to cut off the flow of
oil to the Red Sea and the other as access to the heart of Africa. And
there'd still been the uncertainties left over from the
sixties about what was going to happen in the old Congo and the Katanga
uh, unrest in the Congo with its resources, which the Soviets, back in
the sixties had not been able to capitalize on because of the...their
logistic weakness. Now, by now, their logistic weakness had been
considerably repaired and once they entered into an arrangement with
Mengistu, their logistics were impressive. They were able to transfer a
large number of forces and material and particularly they were able to move
over many of the Cuban forces that had previously been in Angola into
Ethiopia. And, that led some people to argue that there was an arch of
crisis. That this was an area, uh, as...that was part of a strategic design
to move into, to take over all of northern and central Africa as well as
the Persian Gulf. The alternative interpretation was that it was primarily a
response to local opportunities. That what created the opportunity for them
in Angola was essentially the collapse of the Portuguese empire which they
hadn't planned, uh, but which they were prepared to take advantage of it.
What created their opportunity in Ethiopia was that Mengistu, now, turned to
them and invited them in. And that there policy was dictated not so much by
strategic grand design, but simply by an opportunist...opportunistic
response to the local situations as they unfolded.

Interviewer:

YOU OBVIOUSLY SHARED THE SECOND VIEW.

Shulman:

Yes.

Interviewer:

IS IT STILL NOT A MATTER OF CONCERN AND HOW DO YOU MEET?
WHAT DOES IT MEAN IN TERMS OF POLICY? HOW DO YOU MEET THIS CONCERN?

Shulman:

Well if you accept the...the uh, view that the Soviets were
responding to particular opportunities as they unfolded, the appropriate
response is to make sure that those opportunities don't present themselves
to the Soviet Union. That is, you react to the local situation in a way that
is responsive to the particularities of the situation. If, on the other
hand, you see this as part of a grand design, then you re...prepare to
respond centrally, I mean it's either it's Dulles' massive retaliation or
some other response to the center on the grounds that they're held back to
take over the world and that the response at the periphery is not
significant. So you lead to quite different policy conclusions.

Interviewer:

RESPONDING TO THE CENTRE MEANS RESPONDING –

Shulman:

To Moscow. Sure. I mean, that was essentially the Dulles'
notion of the massive retaliation. And indeed there was talk in those terms
too that was revived...by those who saw this as a general arch of
crisis.

Interviewer:

WOULD THE PEOPLE ON THE COMMITTEE OF THE PRESENT DANGER
HAVE SUBSCRIBED TO THE GRAND DESIGN?

Shulman:

Yes, I think that was essentially part of their view...that
the Soviet Union was still...bent on world conquests and that they...they
had the to takeover continent after continent and that this was the
interpretation of their actions in Angola and Ethiopia, just as in 1950, it
had led people who thought in those terms to see the attack on Korea, on
South Korea as being the opening of a world wide offensive rather than to
see it in local terms.

Interviewer:

PEOPLE WHO SHARE THE GRAND DESIGN VIEW WHAT DOES THIS LEAD
TO IN TERMS OF HOW YOU DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS?

Shulman:

Well the...the view of the Soviets as committed...

Interviewer:

I'M SORRY COULD YOU START THAT AGAIN.

Shulman:

The view of the Soviets as committed to a grand design
leading to world conquest flow, first of all, from the premises about the
Soviet Union that it is inherently committed to aggression because of its
nature, because of its...its imperial past, that goes back to Byzantium,
with the overlay of the Marxist/Leninist ideology which commits it to world
conquest and that a system that is so constituted cannot be stopped
that...as long as the system remains what it is. Therefore, what follows
from that is a prescription for American policy which is primary design to
change the system, to undermine it, to weaken it, to force it to contract
and...and perhaps to collapse from overstrain. It leads to confrontational
and pressure policies. Now if on the other hand, you see Soviet policy as
interested in expanding its influence, uh, as safe and prudent opportunities
present themselves for that, but subject to containment, as stopping when
the prospect of expansion is not very great, then you — quite different
policy implications flow from it. It's the containment policy which are used that if you can make it unproductive or dangerous for them to expand
militarily, that they accept that as they have done. And in fact, our
experience with containment has been that where it has been applied with
reasonable intelligence and judiciousness, it has worked. And in fact, the
evolution of Soviet policy over the years, over the seventy odd years since
the revolution... does demonstrate that their expansionism is not unlimited.
That it is subject to the local calculus of risks and gains in particular
situations. And if those opportunities are not promising, that then they do
in fact stop. And that leads to very different policy conclusions. That...
in turn leads, first of all, the most important lesson that flows from that
is that it is important to pay attention to the particularities of the local
area. What are the susceptibilities? What are the causes of the unrest?
The...the causes of the unrest are not primarily created by the Soviet
Union, though they're exploited by the Soviet Union once they exist. But
that means we have to pay attention to local forces, local political culture
and the history of it. Which we haven't done very well. Partly because we're
woefully ignorant of local cultures and we get into situations as in Vietnam
or in Iran or Central America without knowing a great deal about the local
factors and, but tending to look at them solely as counters in an East-West
competition...

Interviewer:

BRESZINSKY WANTED A MILITARISTIC APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT AGREE WITH THAT
APPROACH?

Shulman:

Well bear in mind what was happening during that period.
Uh, during the...oh, period I would guess dated from about '78 or so on to
the end of that administration, this is a period of gathering right wing
tide in America. And some people in our political life, both within the
administration and the country as a whole, were anxious not to be outflanked
on the right, and were reflecting that uh, somewhere more milit...somewhat
more militant approach to to the policy of the Soviet Union... including a
more militant posture. Partly stemming from a different analysis, analysis
about Soviet intentions, and partly with an eye on the domestic political
scene...and that was a major dividing point in American politics in that
period between those who felt it was necessary for the administration to
show muscle in order to head off the attack from the right, and those who
thought that this stem from a wrong analysis about the Soviet problem and
headed toward unproductive policies toward the Soviet Union.

Interviewer:

BRESZINSKY WRITES THAT SALT LIES BURIED IN THE SANDS OF...
THAT IF WE HAD TAKEN A STRONGER STAND THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT NOT HAVE
APPEARED WEAK AND IT MIGHT HAVE SAVED SALT. DO YOU THINK HE WAS INTERESTED
IN SAVING SALT? WHAT WERE HIS PRIORITIES?

Shulman:

I'll leave his...him to speak about his own priorities.
Um...but it was the case that...Salt had uh...a...a rather weak constituency
in the United States, and that the administration had made the Panama Canal
a first priority in point of time. That in fact, it had...uh.. weakened
potential support for Salt. On the part of senators who faced an increasing
...increasingly nationalistic constituency at home, it would have taken
concerted national leadership to have created a constituency for Salt, to
have created an awareness in minds of the American people that their
security was better served by a negotiated balance in the nuclear field than
by an effort to regain and maintain a superiority. Uh, and in the absence of
that kind of leadership Salt was vulnerable to a succession of problems.
Whatever came along in the relationship uh, weakened it. Uh, for example,
the...the case of the Soviet brigade in Cuba in the fall of 1979 where there
was information that a combat brigade was in Cuba which immediately caused
ah... a stir in the country. It was seen as a thumb in the eye of the United
States. It led Frank Church who had a very difficult campaign back home, and
at that time, the chairman of the foreign relations committee, to say that we
couldn't go forward with the ratification of Salt until that situation had
been made acceptable. Now it turned out to be a comic opera episode because
uh, as we later got around to examining the evidence we had, it was pretty
clear that this was something that had dated back to 1964, that it was not
new, that had not greatly changed, it wasn't really a combat brigade, except
the fact that it, we s...saw that it wasn't a training brigade, it wasn't a
medical brigade, so by definition, it must be a combat brigade. Wasn't
necessarily a brigade, but it was the only form of headquarters that was of
that appropriate size. So, it was used essentially to knock out the
possibility of ratification. So which was already very tenuous. It is
uncertain whether it would have passed. In my judgment, uh, there was not
any realistic prospect for the ratification of Salt...by that time...by late
September, October of 1979. It is a mistake to say, as many people do, that
it was the invasion of Afghanistan...that prevented the ratification of
Salt. I think by the time Afghanistan came at the very end of '79, the
prospect for any ratification of Salt was...uh, nil.

[END OF TAPE E08006]

Interviewer:

MR. SHULMAN, WHAT FOLLOWS FROM THE TWO DIFFERENT
PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS IN TERMS OF HOW WE DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS,
WHETHER WE CAN DEAL WITH THEM, NEGOTIATE WITH THEM AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR
STRATEGIC ARSENALS.

Shulman:

Well, there's a logical pro...progression in a sense, from
the kinds of assumptions you make about the Soviet Union, its intentions,
purposes and the kind of policies that follow from it. And just for
simplicity sake, let's divide them into two major streams, although in fact,
there are many positions in between. One view, essentially, is that the
Soviet Union is by nature intractably hostile; committed both by its history
of expansion, dating back to Byzantium and to intractably of the
colored, the whole continent red...uh, to world conquest. And, then with an
overlay of Marxist/Leninist ideology, which reinforces that aspiration world
conquest. Now, if that is your view and that the Soviet... uh, Union is
first of all inherently committed to aggression; inherently because of the
nature its institutions, because its leadership requires aggression and
expansion in order to stay in power, because it believes in a
Marxist/Leninist ultimate triumph of communism world over, whatever reason.
Then the policy that flows from that is to uh, be stronger than they are and
to compel them to capitulate in the negotiations, to compel them to contract
from their exposed positions, and ultimately to uh, excite and arouse a
revolutionary potential within the country that will result in a change of
system, on the grounds that it is not feasible for us to live with a system
that is that committed to aggression and hostility. And it implies that no
accommodation arrangements, no negotiations can be fruitful. Neither on
moderating tensions or certainly not on managing the nuclear competition
through arms control. Because by definition, arms control uh... wouldn't
work with a system that is that committed to aggression. Therefore, the
policy that flows from that view, essentially one of pressure, one of
confrontation, one of seeking to achieve our superior...our security through
superiority rather than trying to stabilize a deterrent. That's one set of
views, which has not always been articulated clearly, but is implicit.
Sometimes expressed in a hidden agenda that is underlying policy at various
times. Sometimes justified by other actions, by some of the...the things
that the Soviets do in the effort to expand their influence where they can
or through their human rights violations or their actions against eastern
Europe or Afghanistan or whatever. Uh, and that has been a strain that has
been fairly strongly represented in American thinking since the very
beginning of relations, although sometimes its stronger than others,
sometimes its obscured by the rhetoric that we take which doesn't always
openly acknowledge that as our purpose. The alternative view is that the, to acknowledge that the Soviet Union is seeking to expand its influence,
that it is a nation that has come on the scene belatedly as a great power,
and is seeking to find a place for itself as a great power, and its coming
up against the configuration of power around the world as it seeks to
increase its influence. But that it does so, essentially opportunistically,
that it responds to targets of opportunity, which it doesn't create, but
which it then seeks to exploit. Opportunities that are thrown out by the
decolonization, as in the collapse of the Portuguese Empire, or the other
colonial holdings...or other local sources of upheaval, which it tries to
play upon. But it, that it does so, with some prudence, some caution, and
that it ...it seeks to avoid the direct involvement of its own forces in a
competition with the United States, where it can. And that means that it is
susceptible to containment, which also has been another thread that has run
through our policy. That where we have created local strength and
confidence, as in Western Europe after the war, then the prospect of Soviet
games diminishes and they are quite prudent about recognizing that fact. So
the policy that flows from that view is that it is possible, first of all,
to deal with the potential local opportunities in a constructive way so that
they don't offer an invitation of Soviets to move in to exploit them. That
is is possible in...dealing with the nuclear weapons to work toward a
stabilized moderate level of deterrent balance, which is less dangerous for
both countries, and that that is more in our security interest than in
unregulated pursuit of superiority. And, also, that there has been an
evolutionary process in the Soviet development, that in fact, the Soviet
Union has been increasingly pragmatic in the pursuit of its nation state
interest. And that that evolutionary process is one that is subject in some
degree, to what we do, to the way we shape the options that they have, so
that it lies within our possibility of a combination of firmness, but also
of possibilities for negotiation, which can cause the relationship to
evolve, over long periods time, perhaps over decades, to one that is
somewhat less dangerous than the present confrontation is.

Interviewer:

BUT IN AFRICA, WAS IT THE POLICY OF THE STATE
DEPARTMENT TO LINK SOVIET BEHAVIOUR WITH THE ARMS TALKS?

Shulman:

No. The...the prevailing view...I think in the State
Department, and in parts of the government, but not uniformly, uh, had been
that if we have an interest in trying to stabilize the nuclear military
competition, that isn't an unequal interest, that's one that's felt on both
sides. That doesn't give us the leverage to compel a change in Soviet
behavior in other fields in order to get an agreement. That an agreement
would have to be equitable in itself and that that should be carried forward
without regard to other aspects of the relationship. Now, that that has,
however, several qualifications. One is, that uh, everyone recognizes, that
the political climate in this country, that a...affects the prospect of
ratification is inevitably affected by other aspects of the relationship. So
it would be a mistake to be too purist about it, and to say that arms
control negotiations can be carried forward with total disregard of what
happens say, in aggressive action in some areas, or in egregious violations
of human rights. But that that is a matter that, not so much a principle, but
a political fact. The other factor that has to qualify somewhat is
that...uh, there is the possibility for leverage and linkage in regard to
the economic aspect of the relationship. There there is an imbalance in the
degree of interest in the two sides. So, it is possible, in...reasonable
ways, in discrete ways, to make an expansion of economic trade between the
two countries...dependent upon some modicum of restraint and responsibility
in Soviet behavior. Now, it then becomes a question of...uh, to what you
want to link that. In some cases, we have linked it to the emigration of
Jews. In other cases, we have sought to link it to...the... Soviet behavior
in Third World countries; to the flow of Soviet weapons into troubled areas,
or the...uh, supply of aircraft or the stimulation of violent responses in
local areas. Though there is a question of judgment...of whether we should
use the... link the expansion to economic trade, to changes in Soviet
behavior in one area and another. But the predominant view was, that that
could not be done with regard to arms control. That that ought to have a
separable...finite boundary that's based upon equitability in the
negotiations.

Interviewer:

BUT WHAT FLOWS FROM THAT IS THAT IF YOU MAKE IT CLEAR YOU'RE
NOT GOING TO LINK, THAT YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO PUBLICLY SPEAK OUT ABOUT SOVIET
BEHAVIOUR IF YOU'RE UNHAPPY ABOUT IT.

Shulman:

Certainly.

Interviewer:

ONE DOESN'T HAVE THE SENSE THAT SECRETARY VANCE REALLY
SPOKE OUT ABOUT AFRICA. OR DID HE JUST—

Shulman:

Oh, he did, I mean... The Secretary
had very strong interests about the negotiations then going on, about
Namibia...He was very active in trying to negotiate—

Interviewer:

NO, BUT ABOUT THE SOVIET-CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, ONE DOESN'T
HAVE A SENSE THAT HE SPOKE OUT STRONGLY ABOUT THAT.

Shulman:

Oh, he did, but he wasn't making it a condition...for the
negotiations on arms control. He was trying to make the point that...uh,
there should be restraint in what the Soviets or the Cubans did there. And,
in fact, in—through diplomatic channels, he did precisely that. Now I... I
can recall several occasions in which he called in the Soviet
Ambassador...and warned, for example, that the... if the Ethiopian troops
would cross the border into Somalia, that that would have undesirable
consequences, would lead us to increase the flow of our aid to in Somalia.
And, as a result, the Soviets did not cross the border. And another occasion
leading up to that, he also sent a similar warning...to the Soviets and
through them to Mengistu... that if there were large scale massacre in
the Ogaden as the Ethiopian forces came back through that area, that we
would regard that as a very serious matter. And, it did exercise some
restraint on the behavior of the Ethiopians in that case. So it, he was
concerned. He did act on it. But, what he did not do, is to say that that
...uh, should be a barrier to negotiations... negotiations on arms
control.

Interviewer:

WHEN THE PRESIDENT SPOKE UP IN THE SPRING OF '78 AND SAID
THAT THE SOVIET ACTIVITIES COULD AFFECT RATIFICATION, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
WOULD MAKE A LINKAGE, EVEN THOUGH IT'S NOT THE OFFICIAL POLICY. THERE'S A
REPORT THAT YOU TOLD AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN THAT THIS WAS JUST FOR
DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. DID YOU SEE DOBRYNIN ABOUT...

Shulman:

I saw him many times. I don't recall a particular
conversation. But the line of thought, I...would have uh, tried to project
to him, or to try to persuade him of the strength of American public concern
and of the fact that...um, the...uh... American people were very concerned
with what the Soviets were doing and that everything that happened, as a
matter of practical fact, not as a matter of principle, but a matter of
practical fact, made...it that much more difficult to negotiate and get
ratified the arms control negotiations. It was not, I don't know whether it
was the implication of your question, but it was not... uh, a matter of
saying, you know, disregard this. This is for domestic conception. But as a
matter of trying to make him understand the nature of domestic
politics.

Interviewer:

IN MAY 31 OF '78, VANCE MET WITH GROMYKO AND TOLD HIM THE
DOWNTURN IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS WAS DUE TO SOVIET ACTIONS. DID YOU AGREE
WITH THAT ASSESSMENT?

Shulman:

Well, without a doubt. During that long period when
the...the Soviets were hoping that what had been called detente during the
Nixon-Kissinger period would be in their words, "irreversible". It was
fairly clear that they tended to minimize the affects on the United
States, the things that they themselves were doing...in Angola,
Ethiopia...human rights field...and ultimately in Afghanistan. I don't think
the Soviets clearly understood that uh...the...the actions that they felt
free to take in the Third World, would be bound to affect their relations
with us. They had the illusion that uh...those could be
compartmentalized...and we made an effort to persuade them that uh,
that...h...their adventures in the Third World would have its cost. I think
that's a lesson there, they have begun to learn since that time. But, during
that period, uh, they were not prepared to hear it...

U.S. Normalizes Relations with China

Interviewer:

IT SEEMED TO BE THAT WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET
GEOPOLITICAL MOVES, AND SO WE MADE ONE OF OUR OWN WITH CHINA. WHAT WAS THE
STATE DEPARTMENT'S OF THE PURPOSE OF NORMALIZATION WITH CHINA? WAS IT TO
INTIMIDATE THE SOVIETS?

Shulman:

Well the primary purpose...uh, of the moves toward
China...within the State Department, were that we had somewhat separable
problems, uh, though similar with both the Soviet Union and China, and that
it made sense for us to try to normalize our relations with China, on its
own grounds, on its merits. Now there were others who saw it primarily as a
China card. That is, as an instrument that could exert some compellents on
the Soviet Union. And sometimes it was used by people who didn't favor an
improvement relations with China. Others who saw it as a way of bringing
pressure on the Soviets to im...make them capitulate. Urn, so there were
different motives for moving this way. Now, the Soviets
understood that we were preparing to move toward normalization relations,
and they indicated they would accept that. What they were concerned about
is, the possibility that there might flow from that, uh, efforts to develop
military collaboration between ourselves and China. And they had nightmares
about that. They could see a possibility emerging over a period of time in
which the vast resources and people of China could be combined with the
industrial might of Japan and the technological advantages of the United
States. That would create a very serious strategic imbalance for them. And
that was their nightmare; their apprehension. Which was played upon by those
who felt it was useful to...use the Chinese, not... just in their own the
merits of an improved US-Chinese relationship, but as a card against the
Soviet Union. That was illustrated, I think, in...I believe it was December
1978...when we were negotiating in Geneva with the Soviets. Um, some of the
last elements to be resolved in Salt. And, when we thought it had been all
wrapped up, and even plans had been exchanged privately, secretly for a
possible visit by Brezhnev to Washington... to sign the Treaty, the...the
next January. Then there came overnight the word that Deng Xiaoping had
been invited to the United States, at about the same time that we had been
discussing for a Brezhnev visit, and that collapsed those
negotiations, because the Soviets saw it as directed against
them.

Interviewer:

WE COULDN'T CONTROL THE TIMING OF THE VISIT, COULD
WE?

[END OF TAPE E08007]

Interviewer:

IF THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING GEOPOLITICAL GAINS THEN WHY
SHOULDN'T WE WITH CHINA? WHAT'S WRONG WITH OUR DOING THE SAME THING THAT
THEY'RE DOING?

Shulman:

Well, the...there's certainly nothing wrong about the two
countries competing for influence. Um, I think it's probably wrong to say
the Soviets were making great geopolitical games. It seems to me, especially
in retrospect, that um... the widespread impression at that time that the
Soviets were, you know, expanding their influence wildly, is greatly
exaggerated. In retrospect, their losses in that period, uh, were
substantial too. And their gains were fairly limited. It's not at all clear
uh, that they gained places of importance and of reasonable permanence. The
possible exception of Cuba at that...in that period. But, certainly there is
no reason why the United States shouldn't advance its interest when it
can...uh, in responsible ways. And it, that includes the effort to put the
relationship with China onto a more productive footing. The question is, how
you do it and why you do it. And as... as it so often happens in politics,
different people get behind something like for different reasons. I think
that's true of the Human Rights Campaign. It was supported by people for
different reasons. And the normalization of relations with China was
also supported by different people for different reasons. Some were-really wanted normalization relations. Some who wanted to
use it primarily...as a club against the...the Russians. And they... the
difficulty with that...action... is that it arouses apprehensions and
sometimes produces results that are different than what you expect. If you
start with the assumption that coercive measures can have productive effect
on the Russians, i... it's likely to make them more compliant, to make
concessions, to...cry uncle. That often tends to get us into
trouble...because their characteristic response is to become more bellicose,
more intransigent, to stiffen their spine, as it would us...in our reaction
to that kind of a...threatening behavior ultimatums—would also be to become
more defiant rather than to become more compliant.

Interviewer:

BRZEZINSKI SAYS THAT HE WANTED TO HAVE THE NORMALIZATION
RELATIONS WITH CHINA BEFORE WE ENTERED INTO THE FINAL SALT NEGOTIATIONS OR
PREVIEW SIGNING. DOES THAT MAKE SENSE? IT WAS DELIBERATE ON HIS PART. IS
THERE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THAT? THE INTERESTING THING IS, ALL OUR CONCERNS
ABOUT THE MOVES IN AFRICA, THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT MOVES IN CHINA. NEGOTIATIONS
STILL WENT ON, IT STILL GOT SIGNED. IT MAY HAVE HAPPENED IN JUNE RATHER THAN
DECEMBER OR JANUARY. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?

Shulman:

Well the...clearly the normalization relationship with
China was a desirable thing to do. But as I say, it...it depends, first of
all, on uh...why you're doing it. Whether it is part of an independent
pursuit of a...an interest in United States or whether you're doing it in
order to influence the negotiations with the Russians. If the latter, then
that is apt to be, and was, counterproductive.

Interviewer:

HOW WAS IT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?

Shulman:

In that it delayed the negotiations and it made for
a...uh...greater apprehension on the Soviet side about what we were after.
In fact, those negotiations with the Russians were protracted. They were
quite dilatory. Time and again, we came very close to negotiations and they
were obliged to introduce new elements into it, And that...what that
reflected was the fact that the American government was not as strongly
committed to uh, an effort to stabilize the nuclear military competition
through negotiations, as uh, it was committed to other things. There w...was
I think, divided council within the US government and certainly in the
American people. And in the Congress...about whether that was our objective.
So that, I don't think anyone can say, that we gave the highest priority to
the effort to try to negotiate a stabilization of the nuclear military
competition...

Interviewer:

THERE WAS A TREATY. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT ABOUT THE TREATY?
WHY IS IT—

Shulman:

The treaty was intended to be a...a step in the process
toward a more substantial limitations. The treaty itself was obliged to have
fairly high ceilings. Primarily because uh, the American administration was
convinced that unless we had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we
would stand no chance of...of ratification, And in order to get that
support, it had to embrace the existing programs of the United States. So
that instead of cutting back, it built upon existing programs and sought to limit expansion beyond that. In itself,
therefore, it...it had only limited benefits. It had some benefits, but they
were not as...as much of an assurance of our security as they might have
been. Unless, it was to lead to a follow on negotiations to SALT III. And
that was what would have given it the great importance. But even so, uh, by
limiting some aspects of the Soviet expansion at a time when they had the
capability of expanding even still further, of putting more warheads on
their heavy missiles and so on, limiting the total number of their heavy
missiles, it did accomplish something useful. As is testified by the fact,
that even those who attacked the Salt Treaty in the 1980 presidential
campaign, nevertheless, for several years afterwards, or at least, six years
afterwards, continued to regard those limits as in our interest.

Soviet Union in Afghanistan

Interviewer:

WHY DO YOU THINK THE SOVIETS MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN?

Shulman:

What seemed to be fairly clear was that um, they regarded
the situation as having been unsatisfactory from the time of the takeover in
April '78. And they saw the takeover by a divided communist party, and an
incompetent communist party as being a disaster. They had a fairly good
working relationship before that with Daode, who though he was ideologically
far from them, he accepted the facts of life. And accepted non-alignment,
and they were fairly secure. When the communist party took over in the area,
what it did through incompetence and through its ideology... its ideological
commitment—it aroused all the latent sources of opposition in the country.
It led to active insurgency, by at least eight or nine of the major groups
for diverse reasons—some religious, some nationalistic. And the result of
that was, that the government in Kabul was very much weakened and the
Soviets had apprehension that it would be taken over by a hostile
government—either a militant Islamic group or a group influenced by the
Chinese or the Americans or the Egyptians, Pakistanis. And...in 1979, what
they saw was the gradual, melting away of the Afghan army, which went down
from ninety-thousand to forty-five thousand in the course of the year. In spite of the fact that Soviets had by this time about
forty-five hundred military advisers in the country. And they felt that if things continued as they were, particularly after
Taraki died, was killed, really, and his place was taken by Amin, who was a
fairly independent minded man, though a Marxist... uh... that the country
would simply go downhill and that Kabul would come into the hands of a
hostile government. I think that there...this was the primary concern that
led them to take the drastic, and in my view, the indefensible step, of
sending in their own troops and replacing Amin with Babrak Karmal, man of
their own choosing.

Interviewer:

It WASN'T THE GRAND DESIGN AT WORK?

Shulman:

I didn't see it as such. And I don't now. I mean, the only
thing that could be said in defense of that was that it brought them perhaps five hundred miles closer... to the
Straits of... But that would only be useful if they could feel secure about
the air bases, which they never really have been able to feel.

Interviewer:

YOU SAT NEXT TO VANCE IN THE SALT HEARINGS, AND HE BEGAN
HIS TESTIMONY BY SAYING, "I REJECT THE NOTION THAT UNILATERAL RESTRAINT AND
WEAPONS PROGRAMS IS A WAY TO ENHANCE OUR SECURITY. I ALSO STATE TO YOU MY
STRONGLY HELD BELIEF THAT THE US MUST NOT PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO
OBTAIN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY." WAS THIS A CHANGE IN HIS VIEWS? HE SEEMED TO BE
DISASSOCIATING HIMSELF FROM THE WARNKE POSITION, EARLIER.

Shulman:

Well, there...there's the difference between saying that we
ought conduct our defense policy rationally in terms of our own interest,
regardless of what the Russians do. And those who were
making the argument, sentimentally, that we ought to make reductions in the
hope that the Soviets then, out of good will, will make comparable
reductions. That was what Vance was rejecting. He didn't mean to say that we
ought uh, to be building up simply in order to compel the Soviets/act. That
we ought to be rational in what we do in our own policy. But his...his
thrust was that there was a basis of common interest here. That, despite all
our differences, despite the differences in the two societies, two political
systems; the one area in which there was an overlapping common interest was
in trying to manage the nuclear weapons competition, in such a way they
didn't blow us up. And on that, he felt, the basis of self interest was
strong enough so that we could get negotiations that would be both in their
interests and ours. That was his major commitment.

SALT I

Interviewer:

YOU TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SENATE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN MARCH '69. WHAT WAS YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW THE
SOVIETS WOULD VIEW OUR DEPLOYMENT OF AN ABM SYSTEM?

Shulman:

Well, we had been trying to persuade the Soviets uh, since
about the early sixties, uh, that it was shortsighted of either country to
try to deploy an effective ABM system. First of all, because the c...the
level of technology was such then that the systems would not be very
effective, would be expensive. But mostly, because the sole consequence of
that kind of deployment would be to lead the other side to increase its
offensive capabilities. I was involved then in negotiations between the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences,
the defense scientists. That was our main channel into the Soviet
leadership. And, in time, by about 1967, '68, the Soviets began to realize
the validity of that reasoning. And that was what led them in the course of
negotiations that started in November of '69, culminated in the SALT I
Treaty, in...May of '72, to accept the proposition that the ABM systems
would be not only of limited value...in defending their own country, but
would have the effect of stimulating an offensive competition between the
two countries.

Interviewer:

WHY DO YOU THINK THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR DETENTE AND
FOR ARMS CONTROL TALKS?

Shulman:

This was a fairly long evolving process in the Soviet
Union. You...it dates back at least to 1955 and the first efforts by
Khrushchev to loosen the Stalinist mold and to try to establish
communication with the Western world, as he did in Geneva in 1955 and then
as he did in that very important speech before the twentieth party congress
in February 1956. What he reflected then was the realization that the
Stalinist mold on the country was dysfunctional. That it was holding the
country back in its economic development, and that it was shortsighted—that
it simply had the effect of galvanizing the Western world militarily, and
that it was more important at that stage, to concentrate on building up the
Soviet economy and that could best be done by a policy of reduced tension
with the Western world. And that was what led him in '55 to go to Geneva to
the meeting with Eisenhower and in 1955 to sign the Austrian Peace
Treaty...1956 to make a speech, 1959 to make his trip to the United States.
Though, that was a process that was beginning then...he was not able to
carry it out...fully, I mean, because of resistance, because of his own
ineptitude perhaps. That process was resumed thirty years later by Andropov
who saw the same necessities, tried to move the country into more
reasonable direction, and then was carried forward still further by
Gorbachev.—

Interviewer:

THIS IS A PROGRAM ON THE SALT I. WHY WERE THEY WILLING TO
NEGOTIATE WITH NIXON IN '69?

Shulman:

Becau.. first because they understood that the...the programs
that they had for the defense of the country, through ABM systems, were not
going to be productive, were going to counterproductive in fact through
stimulating the offensive systems on the other side, as they did do. I mean,
in many ways we can trace our own MIRV program back to
our reaction to their first mine in that period. Thirdly, that economically,
whatever prospect they might have for productive economic relations with the
United States would depend upon a relationship of moderated tension. This
was the theme that he...projected at the 20th Party Congress that, from a
strategic point of view...point of view, political strategy, it made sense
for the Soviet Union to try for peaceful coexistence. Not just as a
temporary tactic, like a boxers' clinch but as a long-term political
strategy. And he began to express a realization that it would avail them
very little to make political gains if the effect were to create a scorched
earth. A destruction that would flow from nuclear weapons. It was the
beginning of an understanding of the implication of nuclear weapons—that one
can see that was to have a long term evolving effect on Soviet military
thinking. Just beginning in that period.

Interviewer:

HOW DID THEY FEEL ABOUT DEALING WITH NIXON? THE OLD
ANTI-COMMUNIST HIMSELF?

Shulman:

It was an important lesson for them... because they
learned that here was a man with impeccable anti-communist credentials who
nevertheless, was realistic in the negotiations and whom they could deal
with. And uh, they came to have a healthy respect for his...what they called
his realism in the negotiations.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NIXON-KISSINGER
APPROACH TO MOSCOW AND THAT OF OTHER PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS?

Shulman:

It was more pragmatic, uh, than ideological. I mean, the
very fact that someone who...who had such a strong anti-communist record as
Richard Nixon had should nevertheless recognize a self-interest in trying to
stabilize the nuclear military competition, uh, was a very important
development in American policy.