Training the Afghan police - Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium

Training the Afghan police - Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium

A senior serving soldier reveals how the Afghan policemen in Helmand are often a danger to the British forces they work with

We went out to Helmand to mentor the Afghan National Police without understanding the level they were at. We thought we would be arresting people,
helping them to police efficiently. Instead we were literally training them how to point a gun on the ranges, and telling them why you should not stop
cars and demand "taxes".

Most of them were corrupt and took drugs, particularly opium. The lads would go into police stations at night and they would be stoned; sometimes they
would fire indiscriminately at nothing.

They had no understanding of the basics of what it means to be a policeman. We expected to be teaching adults at a certain level and then realised we
would be changing nappies. Give them 20 rounds and they will hit the target once.

The first time I saw them I realised that they had almost no training; some of them had very little ability. Their uniforms were dirty and didn't
fit. Their weapon-cleaning was non-existent.

They certainly didn't have a concept of being upstanding members of the community. They had no loyalty, esprit de corps or cameraderie. That should
have been incorporated in their training. They did have pride – because of the power and status they felt.

How do you train this band of idiots and turn them into a force to be reckoned with if they have no sense of loyalty, no sense of belonging?

The biggest problem was that we didn't know who we were getting. There were no security checks – they were literally allowed to come into the
compound and we had to rely on the local chief of police, who recruited them. We kept a close eye on them because we didn't know or trust them – it
was for our own security.

Perhaps half of them genuinely wanted to try to make the community safe: they had the right intention but the attention span of gnats. Twenty would
turn up one day, none the next, then 15, then suddenly a new face would appear.

It was difficult just getting them to a basic level, to do things like man a post. They would take drugs, go to sleep, leave their post, have sex with
each other. Very few were vigilant or alert.

When we went out of camp to do stop-and-searches, we became sitting ducks – nothing more than bodyguards or babysitters while they worked.

British troops felt extremely vulnerable. If they were going out on patrol they didn't tell the Afghans where, so they couldn't pass on the
information – they didn't want improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid in the area. They didn't trust them one bit.

There was an operation involving the Brits and the Afghan National Army to clear Nad-e-Ali, and it cost lives. The police were left at checkpoints,
but within 48 hours all the checkpoints had been overrun or the police just buggered off. As soon as the ground was won it was lost again.

The Afghan army are a lot more switched on. They have started to stand up for themselves. But the police have not had the same investment. There is no
point in pushing the army through to clear ground if you leave a void behind with the police.

Lives get lost for nothing.

The Afghan police are very good at understanding the environment and if the atmospherics have changed because they are local: they know the area and
the people. They are also good at spotting IEDs, although some just pick them up and walk off with them, or put them into the back of their
vehicle.

Progress is being made, but it is extremely slow. I am convinced that a lot of money has been wasted and people have lost their lives unnecessarily
because it was for a political end, and not a military decision. The British Army has been pushed into doing something it should not be. This type of
mentoring role could be fulfilled by our Ministry of Defence police or civilian coppers (in a secure compound).

A lot could be done without putting British soldiers' lives at risk. They should recruit the right Afghans, security check them, pay them regularly
and train them properly – at least three months out of the area – all before the squaddie ever gets to see them.

Afghan villagers tell depressing stories of corrupt officials in Afghanistan’s national police force, stopping innocent civilians and looting them of
their possessions. Urban and rural residents alike point to the “brutal” nature of these untrained men in uniform, terrorizing the local population
while exerting direct control over much-needed resources. Instances of sexual assault and rape are commonplace, according to Mohammad Gul, an elder
in the village of Pankela where British troops have recently expanded their offensive:

“If the boys were out in the fields, the police would come and rape them…you can go to any police base and you will see these boys. They hold them
until they are finished with them and then let the child go.”

Such horrific descriptions are especially difficult to accept, considering the fact that western troops were tasked with training, equipping, and
teaching Afghans how to become effective and law-abiding public servants.

With widespread instances of rape, looting, and beating towards the very same people they are supposed to protect, members of the Afghan national
police are behaving more like petty criminals than legitimate servicemen. These crimes against humanity have reached to such an extent that Taliban
militants are cheered on by local Afghan villagers…a development that U.S. troops should be deeply concerned about. As this same elderly villager
comments, “We were happy (after the Taliban arrived). The Taliban never bothered us. If the police come back and behave the same way, we will
support the Taliban to drive them out.”