In the early 1990s cryptography went into a foundational crisis when efficient quantum algorithms were discovered which could break almost all public key encryption schemes known at the time. Since then, a enormous research effort has been invested into basing public key cryptography, and secure computation in general, on problems which are conjectured to be hard even for quantum computers. While this research program has been resoundingly successful, even leading up the way to cryptographic milestones such as fully homomorphic encryption, there are still important cryptographic primitives for which no post-quantum secure protocols are known. Until very recently, one such primitive was 2-message oblivious transfer, a fundamental primitive in the field of secure two- and multi-party computation. I will discuss a novel construction of this primitive from the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption, a lattice-based problem which is known to be as hard as worst-case lattice problems and conjectured to be post-quantum secure. The security of our construction relies on a fundamental Fourier-analytic property of lattices, namely the transference principle: Either a lattice or its dual must have short vectors.