The Trump administration is feuding with Erdogan's government over American pastor Andrew Brunson. But behind the particulars of this case, there's also a new geopolitical reality to reckon with.

August 9, 2018

Sanctioning another NATO ally is a remarkable move. As such,
the Trump administration’s sanctions on Turkey’s justice and interior ministers
last week, over the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson, increased
fears about the unraveling of a formerly strong alliance. Meetings between
senior U.S. and Turkish officials in Washington on Wednesday failed
to resolve the matter. U.S.–Turkish relations appear broken, with little
prospects of repair—a new geopolitical reality.

Once upon a time, Turkey and the United States enjoyed a close
partnership. Even when various issues, such as a divided Cyprus, caused
frustration from time to time, the United States relied on Ankara and, particularly, Incirlik,
a military base in southern Turkey. The U.S. helped to construct Incirlik in
1955, which served as a key airbase in the region during the Cold War and after,
particularly during the first Gulf War in 1991. Turkey depended on U.S. aid.

The rift between Turkey and the United States started in 2003, after
George W. Bush invaded Iraq, which sits on Turkey’s southeastern border. The
ensuing chaos and war affected the entire region, Turkey included. Relations improved
temporarily when Barack Obama took office in 2008. The U.S. president landed in
Ankara on his second international trip, making Turkey his first destination in
the Middle East. Obama initially embraced then Prime Minister (now president) Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and his government as a “model” for other Arab countries undergoing
protests in 2011. But that relationship deteriorated as the Syrian civil war on
Turkey’s border (and associated refugee crisis) worsened, while Erdogan faced nationwide
government protests and corruption allegations.

Ankara’s ties to Washington have further eroded due to longstanding tension over a Turkish cleric living in exile in Pennsylvania—Fetullah Gulen. Once close collaborators, Gulen and Erodgan started to drift
apart in 2010, after differences on how to deal with Israel following the
attack on a Turkish flotilla. The relationship quickly turned nasty, with
Erdogan accusing Gulen and his followers of releasing tapes that exposed corrupt
practices in 2013. The Erdogan government held Gulen and his followers
responsible for engineering an attempted coup in July 2016, and has demanded
that the United States hand Gulen over.

Security is another issue. The United States has gravitated to the
Syrian Kurds, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), in the fight against the
Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq. The YPG has long fought ISIS—and has,
in certain instances, succeeded. Unfortunately, Turkey does not look kindly on the
YPG or the Kurds in general. The Kurds are Turkey’s largest minority and have
long had tensions with the Turkish state over rights, which erupted in a war in southeast Turkey in the 1980s. Ankara fears that the Kurds will form an
autonomous region along the Turkish border and catalyze Turkey’s Kurds to
breakaway territory from Turkey. Earlier this year, Turkey attacked YPG forces
in Syria and actually occupied the Syrian city of Afrin.

Ankara seemed originally to believe that President Trump,
who owns properties in Turkey, would represent a reset in U.S.–Turkish
relations. Indeed, in Brussels last month Trump remarked that he liked Erdogan
and gave him a fist bump. That bromance was short.

Enter Brunson. In 2016, following a failed coup, Erdogan’s
government began a large-scale crackdown on dissent. In the aftermath, Brunson
was one of many arrested and accused of espionage and terrorism—of being in
league with the Muslim Gulenists.

The current U.S.–Turkish feud feeds political narratives in
both countries. Backing Brunson plays to the American president’s base—all the
more conspicuously so given that NASA scientist Serkan Golge, a dual
Turkish–U.S. citizen, is also being held in Turkey, serving out a
seven-and-a-half-year sentence for charges similar to those being brought
against Brunson. Golge is Muslim, unlike Brunson, whom Trump has called
“a great Christian” and “innocent man of faith.” The Trump administration has
said nothing about Golge’s detention.

The resistance to letting the pastor go plays similarly for
Erdogan: Turkey’s economy has been declining. Inflation is up, and the central
bank predicts a rise in food prices. These sanctions are perfect diversions and props for Erdogan to use to show how “outside” forces are plotting to ruin
Turkey.

The
fundamental reality is that Turkey is not as vulnerable to American actions as
it once was.

But ultimately, the current conflict reflects a larger shift
in orientation. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s troubling consolidation
of power in the past year, the spat over Brunson is likely only the beginning
of a series of conflicts, in which the United States will have little leverage or
bargaining power. Turkey’s economy is in bad shape, and the sanctions
since last week have caused the Turkish lira to fall still further; but the
fundamental reality is that Turkey is not as vulnerable to American actions as
it once was. The European Union is Turkey’s main trading partner, with $84.7
billion in exports. Trade between the United States and Turkey, by comparison, amounts
to only $9 billion. Foreign investors in Turkey also tend to be European, not
American. U.S. foreign direct investment inflows are exceeded
also by the Gulf countries.

As Trump alienates Europe, Turkey has used the opportunity
to renew relations with its neighbors. The abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal
is certainly a unifying point between Brussels and Ankara. Both capitals are
eager to keep the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA)—alive, with Iranian oil accounting for nearly
half of all Turkish imports in the first half of 2018. At Angela Merkel’s
invitation, Erdogan will pay a state visit to Germany in September. Meanwhile, Erdogan
is organizing a summit with France, Germany, and Russia to discuss Syria. He
has also restored relations with The Netherlands, which had gone
off the rails last year.

It is unlikely that the United States and Turkey will
resolve their differences anytime soon. But given Turkey’s geostrategic
location—in the backyard of Russia, and bordering Iraq, Iran, and Syria—the
United States has an interest in maintaining the relationship. Turkey, meanwhile, does
not need to add to its economic woes. The hope, at this point, is that as both
Erdogan and Trump play to their bases, they’ll refrain from actions that would
be hard to walk back from without embarrassment to either leader’s large ego. Despite
the shifts of recent decades, the United States and Turkey still need each other. And
the temporary political benefits domestically probably don’t outweigh that.

Elmira Bayrasli is the CEO and co-founder of Foreign Policy Interrupted and a professor at Bard College’s Globalization and International Affairs Program.