Testimony of Professor Michael A. McFaul

StanfordUniversity

“Russia:
Rebuilding the Iron Curtain”

House Committee on Foreign Relations

May 17, 2007

Michael McFaulis the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at
the Hoover Institution, Professor of Political
Science, and Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law,
all at StanfordUniversity. He is also a non-resident
Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
inviting me to appear before your Committee. It is not an assignment, however,
that I do with pleasure.As an eternal
optimist, I have for decades been one of those who believed that Russia could
make the transition from communism to democracy, a development which in turn
would help to integrate Russia into to the West. In the long run, I am still
certain of this eventual outcome. In the short run, however, it is obvious that
President Putin is building a more autocratic regime, an internal process that
in turn has strained Russia’s
relations with the West.

The appropriate policy response to
these new developments is not a return to containment or isolation of Russia. Rather,
a more substantial agenda between the Russian and American governments would
create more permissive conditions for democratic renewal inside Russia. A new American
policy towards Russia must
pursue both – a more ambitious bilateral relationship and in parallel a more
long-term strategy for strengthening Russian civil, political, and economic
societies, which ultimately will be critical forces that push Russia back
onto a democratizing path. As the Bush
and Putin administrations wind down, grand new initiatives in U.S.-Russia
relations are unlikely to unfold in the next two years. New leadership in both
countries in 2008 will open a new window of opportunity to reorient the
bilateral relationship along a more constructive path, which in turn will
provide a more conducive environment for fostering democratic development inside
Russia.

To make the
case for this dual track approach for dealing with Russia, my written testimony
proceeds in four parts. Section one describes the erosion of democracy under
Putin. Section two explains why this more autocratic regime in Russia has not
caused economic growth, produced a more effective state, or made Russian
citizens more content. Section three outlines three false assumptions made by
the Bush Administration about Russia
which have impeded the emergence of a more effective U.S.
policy towards Russia.
Section four offers several concrete policy recommendations for changing the
troubled bilateral relationship.

I. The Erosion of
Russian Democracy.

Seven years
ago, when President Putin first assumed office, Russian observers could engage
in an interesting debate about the future trajectory of Russia’s political system.Already in 2000, there were ominous signs
that Putin aspired to weaken checks on presidential power and eliminate sources
of political and economic opposition.At
the same time, back in 2000, defenders of Putin could posit that some of the
Kremlin’s political reforms were not really antidemocratic, but rather policies
aimed at restoring order and stability, that is necessary corrections in
response to the tumultuous 1990s.

Today, this
debate is over.Among politicians,
academics, and pundits in the United States
and Europe who follow Russian affairs, the
overwhelming majority believe that the Russian regime under Putin is becoming
increasingly autocratic. The debate remains regarding the causes, severity, and
final destination of this autocratic trajectory, but only the most stalwart
defenders of Putin continue to deny the trend line.

Putin did not inherit a
consolidated democracy when he became president in 2000, and he has not
radically violated the 1993 constitution, cancelled elections or arrested
thousands of political opponents.[1]Russia today remains much
freer and more democratic than the Soviet Union.
Yet, the actual democratic content of the formal institutions of Russian
democracy has eroded considerably in the past seven years. Putin has
systematically weakened or destroyed every check on his power, while at the
same time strengthening the state’s ability to violate the constitutional
rights of citizens.

Taming the Independent Media. Putin and his government
initiated a series of successful campaigns against independent media outlets.
When Putin came to power, only three networks had the national reach to really
count in politics—ORT, RTR, and NTV. By running billionaire Boris Berezovsky
out of the country, Putin effectively acquired control of ORT, the channel with
the biggest national audience. RTR was always fully state-owned, so it was even
easier to tame. Controlling the third channel, NTV, proved more difficult since
its owner, Vladimir Gusinsky, decided to fight. But in the end, he too lost not
only NTV but also the daily newspaper Segodnya and the weekly Itogi
when prosecutors pressed charges. NTV’s original team of journalists tried to
make a go of it at two other stations, but eventually failed.Under control of those closely tied to the
Kremlin, the old NTV has gradually come to resemble the other two national
television networks.In 2005, Anatoly
Chubais, a CEO of United Energy System (UES) and a leader in the liberal party
Union of Right Forces (SPS) was compelled to sell his much smaller private
television company, REN TV, to more Kremlin friendly oligarchs. Today, the
Kremlin controls all major national television networks.

In the first few years of Putin’s presidency,
the Kremlin seemed content to control national television networks, the main
source of news for most Russians. Newspapers, webpages, and even regional
television networks were left alone. More recently, however, the reach of the
Kremlin has expanded to derail or interfere with print and web media. Most
major Russian national newspapers have transferred ownership in the last
several years to individuals and companies loyal to the Kremlin.Novaya
Gazeta is the last truly independent national newspaper.On the radio, Ekho Moskvy remains an independent source of news, but even its
future is questionable.

Undermining Federalism. Putin also has weakened the autonomy of
regional governments. Almost immediately after becoming president in 2000,
Putin made reining in Russia’s
regional executives a top priority. He began his campaign to reassert Moscow’s authority by
establishing seven supra-regional districts headed primarily by former generals
and KGB officers. These new super-governors were assigned the task of taking
control of all federal agencies in their jurisdictions, many of which had
developed affinities if not loyalties to regional governments during the
Yeltsin era. These seven representatives of federal executive authority also
investigated governors and presidents of republics as a way of undermining
their autonomy and threatening them into subjugation. Putin also emasculated
the Federation Council, the upper house of Russia’s parliament, by removing
governors and heads of regional legislatures from this chamber and replacing
them with appointed representatives from the regional executive and legislative
branches of government.Regional leaders
who have resisted Putin’s authority have found elections rigged against them.
In the last gubernatorial elections in the Kursk,
Saratov, and Rostov
oblasts, as well as in the presidential races in Chechnya (twice) and Ingushetiya, the removal of the strongest
contenders ensured an outcome favorable to the Kremlin. In September 2004, in a
final blow to Russian federalism, Putin announced his plan to appoint
governors. Putin justified the move as a means to make regional authorities
more accountable and more effective, yet, the overwhelming majority of the
newly appointed governors have been the old governors in place before.

Weakening Parliament. In December 2003, Putin made real
progress in weakening the autonomy of one more institution of Russia’s democratic
system – the parliament. After the 1999 parliamentary election, Putin enjoyed a
majority of support within the Duma.To
make the Duma more compliant, Putin and his administration took advantage of
earlier successes in acquiring control of other political resources (such as
NTV and the backing of governors) to achieve a smashing electoral victory for
the Kremlin’s party, United Russia, in the December 2003 parliamentary
election.United Russia and its allies in the
parliament now control two-thirds of the seats in parliament. In achieving this
outcome, the Kremlin’s greatest asset was Putin’s own popularity, which hovered
around seventy percent during the fall 2003 campaign.Constant, positive coverage of United Russia
leaders (and negative coverage of Communist Party officials) on all of the
Russia’s national television stations, overwhelming financial support from
Russia’s oligarchs, and near unanimous endorsement from Russia’s regional
leaders also contributed to United Russia’s success.For the first time ever, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) issued a critical preliminary report
on Russia’s
1999 parliamentary election, which stressed “the State Duma elections failed to
meet many OSCE and Council of Europe commitments for democratic elections.”[2]

Marginalizing Independent Political Parties.Putin and his administration have weakened
dramatically independent political parties while at the same time strengthening
those parties either created by or very supportive of the Kremlin. The
independent liberal parties, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, and as well
as the largest independent party on the left, the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation are all much weaker today andworking in a much more constrained political
environment than they were during the Yeltsin era.Other independent parties such as the Republican
Party headed by Vladimir Ryzhkov and the Popular Democratic Union headed by former
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov have not even been allowed to register to
participate in elections. Other independent parties and candidates have been
disqualified from participating in several local elections for blatantly
political reasons. For the 2008 presidential election, Ryzhkov and Kasyanov are
two of the opposition’s strongest candidates, yet, neither are likely to be on
the ballot.These independent parties
also face financial constraints as the Kremlin threatens sanctions against
potential backers from the private sectors.Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s imprisonment sent a powerful message to other
businesspeople about the costs of being involved in opposition politics.

At the same time, United Russia – the largest
pro-Kremlin party in the Duma – enjoys frequent television coverage and access
to generous resources.Just Russia – a
Kremlin invention designed to take away vote from the Community Party – also
enjoys state and private sector backing.In the last election cycle, the Kremlin helped to create a nationalist
party, Fatherland, which preformed surprisingly well in the 2003 parliamentary
elections. However, when Fatherland’s leaders began acting as independent
politicians, the Kremlin quickly replaced the leadership and gutted the
organization of it resources, reducing Fatherland today to a marginal political
actor.

Weakening Civil Society.In his second term, Putin has even decided that non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) are a threat to his power. A new law on NGOs now gives the
state numerous ways to harass, weaken and even close down organizations
considered too political. To force independent NGOs to the margins of society,
the Kremlin has devoted massive resources to the creation of stated-sponsored
and state-controlled NGOs. Perhaps most
amazingly, even public assembly is no longer tolerated. Last month, Other
Russia – a coalition of civil society groups and political parties – tried to
organize public meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg.Both meetings were disrupted by the presence
of thousands of police officers and special forces, and hundreds of
demonstrators were arrested.This scale
of repression has not occurred in Russia in the last twenty years.

In his annual address to the
Federation Assembly in April 2007, Putin struck a xenophobic note when he
warned of Western plots to undermine Russian sovereignty. He asserted, “There
is a growing influx of foreign cash used directly to meddle in our domestic
affairs…. Not everyone likes the stable, gradual rise of our country. Some want
to return to the past to rob the people and the state, to plunder natural
resources, and deprive our country of its political and economic independence.”
Putin has matched his rhetoric with actions. His government has tossed out the
Peace Corps, closed down the office of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe in Chechnya, declared persona
non grata the AFL-CIO’s field
representative, Irene Stevenson, in Russia, raided the offices of the Soros
Foundation and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and most recently
forced Internews-Russia to close its offices after accusing its director of
embezzlement.

While weakening these checks on
presidential power, Putin and his administration have not initiated any serious
reforms to strengthen other democratic institutions. Most importantly, Russia’s
judicial system has not become more independent or more professional during the
Putin era. And when major political issues are at stake, courts quickly become
another tool of presidential power as was the case during NTV’s unsuccessful
struggle to remain independent or during the arrest and prosecution of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky.The Russian government has
even pressed for disbarring Karinna Moskalenko, a lawyer who has assisted with
Khodorkovsky’s defense.More generally,
Putin has also increased the role of the Federal Security Service (the FSB, the
successor to the KGB) in governing Russia and arbitrarily wielded the
power of state institutions such as the courts, the tax inspectors and the police
for political ends. The Russian polity evinces considerably less pluralism
today than it did in 2000, and the human rights of individual Russian citizens
are less secure.

II. Autocracy: Necessary Evil in Post-Revolutionary Russia?

Few still
try to describe Putin’s regime as a democracy, but many justify his actions as
a necessary means to other, important ends: economic growth, state capacity, and
citizen satisfaction.Without question,
compared to ten years ago, there are real positive developments in each of
these three categories. And yet, the trend lines in each of these three
categories are not only positive, but a mix of good and bad news. More
importantly, the cause of the positive developments is not growing autocracy.

AThriving Economy?During Putin’s time in power, the
Russian economy has grown tremendously, averaging over a 6.5% percent over the
last seven years.When compared to a
decade of depression in the 1990s, these growth rates are especially
impressive.During this same period, the
Russian government has produced budget surpluses, eradicated foreign debt,
accumulated massive hard currency reserves, and maintained modest rates of
inflation.The stock market is also
booming and foreign direct investment, while still low compared to other
emerging markets, is beginning to rise rapidly compared to the dismal decade
after the collapse of the USSR.Average Russians also have enjoyed a
substantial increase in living standard. Disposal incomes are skyrocketing,
consumer spending is increasing, and unemployment and poverty have declined
dramatically. Russians are wealthier today than ever before.

In his first term, Putin initiated
several important economic policies that in the margins have contributed to
some of the economic success.For
instance, Putin and his government introduced a 13 percent flat tax, a major
reduction in the corporate tax and the creation of a stabilization fund in
which to park much of the windfall revenues from soaring energy prices. These
reforms, however, did not drive economic growth in Russia over the last several years.
Instead, the devaluation of the ruble in August 1998 first jumpstarted Russian
agricultural and industrial production, and then rising energy prices,
beginning in 1999, ultimately fueled Russia’s economic turnaround in this
decade.

To the extent that Putin’s economic
policies contributed at all to economic growth, they did not require
antidemocratic reforms to be implemented.More broadly, it is very difficult to identify a causal relationship
between growing autocracy and economic growth in Russia.The authoritarian contributions to political
stability, and therefore economic growth, are very difficult to isolate from
the more general stabilizing effects of skyrocketing energy revenues, sound
macroeconomic policy and the retirement of an erratic, unhealthy Boris Yeltsin.
Would the Russian economy have grown more slowly had NTV been allowed to
operate as an independent television network? Has Putin’s appointment of
governors (as opposed to their election) produced any positive effect on
regional investment patterns? And most absurdly, how does the detention of
Garry Kasparov and his associates contribute to political stability or economic
growth?

In fact, if the correlation between
growing authoritarianism and economic growth may have been innocuous in the
first part of the decade, there are now signs that a causal relationship does
exist and that it is negative. Most strikingly, Putin and his Kremlin
associates have used their unconstrained political powers to redistribute some
of Russia’s
most valuable properties. The seizure and then reselling of Yukos assets to
state-owned Rosneft was the most egregious act of state-led redistribution,
which not only destroyed value in Russia’s most profitable oil company, but
slowed investment (foreign and domestic) and spurred capital flight. State
pressure also compelled the owners of the private Russian oil company, Sibneft,
to sell their stakes to the state-owned Gazprom in 2005. Royal Dutch Shell also
was pressured to sell a majority share to Gazprom in its Sakhalin-2 project in Siberia. In parallel with other sales, these assets
transfers have transformed a once private and thriving energy sector into a
state-dominated and less efficient part of the Russian economy.[3]
The remaining three private oil producers—LUKoil, TNK-BP and Surgut—all face varying degrees of pressure
to sell out to Putin loyalists. Under the banner of a program called “national
champions”, Putin’s regime also has directed the redistribution of major assets
in aerospace, automobile and heavy machinery industries in a way that reasserts
state control. Ownership is also becoming much more concentrated.

This unconstrained Russian state
also has destroyed Western wealth and discouraged investment by arbitrarily
enforcing environmental regulations against foreign oil investors, shutting out
foreign partners in the development of the Shtokman gas field, and denying a
visa to the largest portfolio investor in Russia, British citizen William
Browder.

During this same period, according
to the Russian think tank INDEM, corruption has increased tenfold, from $31
billion in 2001 to $319 billion in 2005. Russia’s ranking on economic
competitiveness, business friendliness, and transparency have all fallen in
parallel to the rise of autocracy.In
2006, Transparency International ranked Russia
121st out of 163 countries on corruption, putting Russia
between the Philippines and Rwanda.
Russia
ranked 62 out of 125 on the World Economic Forum’s Growth Competitive Index
2006, a fall of nine places compared to 2005. On the World Bank’s "Doing
Business" Index 2006, Russian ranked 96 out of 175.

Despite the rise of this predatory
state and the subsequent decline of secure property rights, the Russian economy
has continued to grow, but mainly because of high world energy prices. And
strikingly, even with Russia’s
resource advantages, Russian growth rates under Putin hover well below the
region’s average. In 2000, the year Putin was elected president, Russia had the second-fastest growing economy in
the post-Soviet space, behind only gas-rich Turkmenistan. In 2005, as shown in
Table 2, Russia fell to 13th
in the region, outpacing only Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan,
both of which were recovering from “color” revolutions.

Table Two

During Putin’s second term, the
government has all but abandoned the pursuit of liberal economic reforms,
because oil revenues have undermined the government’s will for reform. Putin’s
liberal economic advisor Andrei Illarionov resigned in protest, becoming one of
the regime’s most vocal critics.

A more democratic Russia would
have grown even faster. The strengthening of institutions of horizontal
accountability, such as a real opposition party, a genuinely independent media
or a court system not beholden to Kremlin control, would have helped to tame
corruption, secure property rights, and thereby encourage investment and even
more substantial economic growth.

AMoreEffectiveState?There can be no question that the
Russian state under Putin is bigger and is more powerful in certain spheres of
activity.There also can be no question
that Russian citizens perceive the state to be more stable, a condition that
most admire. Yet, is growing autocracy a necessary condition for producing a
more effective state in Russia?Such a relationship is most certainly not
true around the world, as there are dozens of autocracies with very weak
states, and dozens of democracies with very strong states. In the Russian case,
the assumed positive relationship between growing Russian autocracy and
stability is not so apparent. Decision-making within the Russian state has
become more centralized and the size of the state, measured as the number of
federal employees, has nearly doubled from roughly 700,000 employees at the end
of the Brezhnev era to 1.5 million today. But it is not obvious that the
Russian state has become any more effective in providing basic public goods as
a result.[4]
As to security, the most basic good that the state should provide, the number
of terrorist attacks in Russia
has increased substantially in this decade compared to the Yeltsin era. The
second Chechen war is now in its seventh year, with no end in sight, rather
there are signs that the conflict is spreading beyond Chechnya’s
borders. The murder rate in Putin’s Russia has also increased: between
the “anarchic” years of 1995–99, the average annual number of murders was
30,200, while during the “orderly” years of 2000–04 the number was 32,200. In
this decade, Reporters Without Borders has counted 21 journalists murdered in Russia, including in October of last year, Anna
Politkovskaya, Russia’s
most courageous investigative journalist. Russia ranks as one of the most
dangerous places in the world to be a journalist.

More general trends in governance,
as measured by the World Bank, show some positive signs over the last ten
years, especially in regulatory quality and government effectiveness. These
positive trajectories, however, started before
the Putin era. During his time in office, the other World Bank governance indicators
are either flat or negative.

Table 3

Of course, just as giving Putin
credit for Russia’s
growing economy is silly, blaming Putin personally for these negative
governance trends is also unfair. However, if Putin is trying to build a more
effective state, his autocratic reforms do not appear to be contributing to
that goal.

Happier People? The end of communism in the Soviet Union
triggered a level of economic and political dislocation rivaled only by what
transpired in France after
1789 or Russia
in 1917. In addition to trying to create new political and economic
institutions in the wake of communism’s collapse, Russian leaders also faced a
third challenge of defining new borders.Whatever the positive consequences that revolutions generate in the long
run, there is no doubt that they are terrible periods to live through for the
majority in the short run.Inevitably,
all societies enduring revolutionary change eventually yearn for stability.By the end of the 1990s, especially after the
August 1998 financial crash, Russians desperately wanted the revolution to
end.

Putin came along just at the right
time to get credit for ending this revolutionary period.First and foremost, the 1998 financial crash
compelled tight fiscal policy and responsible monetary policy, which in
combination with a devalued ruble and soaring energy prices, finally generated
positive economic growth in Russia
for the first time since independence. Putin had nothing to do with these
policies, but his timing for taking credit for these positive changes was
perfect. He also stepped in as prime minister in the summer of 1999 to take
charge of a weak government and fill in for an ailing president just as Russia was
under attack from Chechen rebels and alleged Chechen terrorists.Putin appeared to take charge of the war,
repelling the Chechen rebels who had invaded neighboring Dagestan and then
ordering Russian soldiers back into Chechnya.

The economy, political stability,
and national security all seemed to be improving with Putin’s arrival as prime
minister and then president. Consequently, Putin’s popularity soared.His approval ratings have hovered above
seventy percent ever since, an accomplishment few elected or unelected leaders can
claim in the seventh year in office. To be sure, Putin’s control of the media
and stifling of the opposition helps enormously in maintaining his positive
ratings.Yet, many other dictators
around the world have the same level of control over their media and political
institutions and yet do not maintain such high approvals ratings. There should
be no doubt that today a greater number of Russian citizens are happier about
their personal well-being and more satisfied with their president than they
were seven years ago.

The sources of Russian stability
and economic growth -- that is, those outcomes most valued by Russian citizens
– have had little to do with growing autocracy. Again, soaring oil prices – a
consequence of the world economy and not Putin’s policies – would have
delivered the same economic windfalls to anyone in the Kremlin at the time and
any kind of regime in place to rule Russia at the time.

Moreover, when public opinion
surveys are examined closely, one sees very strong support for Putin
personally, but much weaker support for his political reforms and
policies.Super majorities still believe
that political leaders should be elected. Initially, most Russian did not
endorse Putin’s decision to appoint, rather then elect, governors. Likewise,
solids majorities value an independent media, checks and balances between
parliament and the president, and a balance of power between federal and local
governments.The word “democracy”
assumed pejorative connotations during the 1990s when the word became
associated with economic depression, state collapse, and in Yeltsin’s second
term, feckless leadership.Consequently,
Russians embrace of democracy as the best political system is low compared to
world averages. Nonetheless, over fifty percent still believe that democracy is
better than any other system of government, while only a third of Russian
citizens disagree.

Two factors explain the gap between
Putin’s personal approval ratings and these lower levels of support for his
policies. First, most Russians do not perceive Putin as rolling back democracy.
After all, the formal institutions of democracy, including elections, are still
in place. Second, democracy is not assigned a high priority for most Russians
today.

III. Erroneous Assumptions of the Bush Administration

For many
years, President Bush and some members of his foreign policy team downplayed
the significance of these anti-democratic trends in Russia.[5]
Three major assumptions shaped the Bush’s Russian policy: (1) Putin’s
anti-democratic moves were a logical and temporary response to the anarchy of
the 1990s, but the long-term trend in governance were still positive; (2) even
if Putin did not share our values, he was a rational pragmatist with whom we
could do business, and (3) Bush’s close personal relationship with Putin could
be leveraged when needed to persuade the Russian president to do the right
thing. To varying degrees, all of these assumptions have now proven to be
erroneous.

Democratic Reform Is a Long and Winding Road.Putin began to weaken democratic institutions
well before President Bush came to office. As a presidential candidate, Bush
recognized these negative developments and criticized the Clinton
Administration for not doing more to recognize and stop these autocratic
trends.[6]Once in office, however, Bush and his closest
Russian advisors changed their tone and adopted (at least rhetorically) a
longer term perspective on Russia’s
political trajectory. Compared to the Soviet Union,
Bush officials argued, Putin’s autocracy innovations look tamed.More generally, it is hard to argue with the
observation that Russians today still enjoy individual freedoms to a degree
well beyond almost all previous generations of Russian citizens.Putin apologists within the Bush administration
also contrasted his “orderly” government with the alleged chaos of the Yeltsin
era. Finally, Putin defenders within the American government emphasized that
democratic reforms take time, just as they did in the United States.

This analysis of Russian internal
affairs was deeply flawed. Democratic reforms do take time. But making such
claims about the long term future should in no way excuse short-term
detours.It was Putin and his policy
preferences – not Yeltsin’s failures, modernization trends, Russian history, or
Russian culture – that determined the shape and scope of Russia’s new
autocratic regime. This outcome was neither predetermined by structural forces
that predated Putin nor is this current interregnum in democratic development a
necessary step towards deeper, more
lasting democracy.Thankfully, this kind
of rationalization for Putin’s policies is no longer part of the Bush
Administration’s analysis. As Condoleezza Rice bluntly and correctly stated
earlier this month, “Everybody around the world, in Europe and the United States, is very concerned about the
internal course that Russia
has taken in recent years.”[7]
One can only wonder if the Administration would have been more effective in
trying to impede autocratic consolidation in Russia had they reached this
conclusion earlier in the decade.

Interests Always Trump Values.While Putin’s systematic dismantling of democratic institutions
gained momentum, Bush and some of his advisors emphasized Putin’s pragmatism in
foreign policy matters.Regarding other
parts of the world, Bush argued that promoting freedom and liberty would make
the United States
safer.Regarding Russia, however, Bush administration officials
presumed that regime type would not affect Russia’s foreign policy behavior.

On some
issues of mutual interest to the United States
and Russia, Russia’s
autocratic drift internally does not seem to have much impact. For instance, Russia’s position on Iran has remained fairly consistent
over the last ten years.Likewise, Russia would have sided against the United States regarding the decision to invade Iraq
no matter who ruled in the Kremlin and what kind of political regime was in
place.

At the same
time, there is a new grand strategy in Russian foreign policy that is
anti-American, anti-Western, non-cooperative, and confrontational.Unlike either Gorbachev or Yeltsin, Putin
understands the world primarily in zero-sum terms, especially when dealing with
the United States.For two decades, integration into the West
was the central objective of Soviet and then Russian foreign policy; making
internal political changes – i.e. democratization – was accepted as the price
of admission into the West’s clubs. Putin has a different approach.Because he does not aspire to mold Russia’s
political system into a Western-style democracy, he cares far less about
Western opinions and Western conditions for membership into Western clubs.
Instead, his framework for understanding the world has more in common with
Khrushchev or Brezhnev than Gorbachev or Yeltsin.As he declared in the annual address to
parliament earlier this year, he believes that the United
States is sending agents into Russia to foment “instability.” In
his speech earlier this month commemorating the Soviet
Union’s victory in World War II, Putin seemed worried about the
rise of another world power intent on dominating the world: “The number of
threats is not decreasing. They are only transforming and changing the guise.
As during the Third Reich era, these new threats show the same contempt for
human life and claims to world exclusiveness and diktat.” These are not the
words of a pragmatic realist, seeking to do deals with American and European
leaders.These are the words of a
paranoid leader, who seems to need external enemies as a means for creating
domestic legitimacy.

Likewise, Russian sanctions against
Georgia, transportation delays of goods and people going into Estonia, and
energy disruption with Ukraine are not components a pragmatic foreign policy,
butrather policies that actually damage
Russian economic interests and international reputation.The rhetoric and actions echo the thinking
and strategies of earlier autocrats who ruled Russia. Such behavior does not
reflect the norms that usually regulate relations between democracies. As
Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves commented, in response to the Russian
decision to halt oil shipments to Baltic Sea ports, attacks on Estonia
government websites, and the physical harassment of Estonia’s ambassador to
Russia by the pro-Kremlin youth group, Nashi, all in reaction to Estonia’s
decision to remove a Soviet era war monument, “It is customary in Europe that
differences, which do, now and then, occur between states, are solved by
diplomats and politicians , not on the streets or by computer attacks.”[8]

The Bush-Putin Friendship.Since
the very first months of his presidency, President Bush made a calculated
decision to try to befriend President Putin.At their very first meeting in Slovenia in June 2001, Bush bent
over backwards to make Putin feel comfortable.That’s when Bush famously looked into Putin’s soul and saw a man he

“to be very straightforward and trustworthy.”[9]Ever since then, Bush and his administration
have touted this close, personal relationship as an indispensable mechanism for
dealing with difficult issues in U.S.-Russia relations.

For outside
observers, the true nature of this presidential friendship is difficult to
assess. What is clear is that Bush has not persuaded his friend Putin to make
any positive steps towards democracy. Regarding international affairs, Putin
pursues polices that he believes serve Russia’s national interests, with
little attention paid to American interests. He most certainly has not done
Bush many favors regarding foreign policy. And Putin’s rhetoric regarding the United States
does not sound very friendly. Perhaps time will reveal that the Bush-Putin
friendship did indeed yield levels of cooperation between the UnitedState
and Russia
that would not have been possible otherwise. To date, however, the public record
supporting such a claim is thin.

IV.A Dual-Track Agenda for Renewal

Some Americans cite the roll back
of democracy inside Russia
and the dismal record of achievement in U.S.-Russia relations over the last
several years to argue for a new policy of containment and isolation towards Russia.This is the wrong conclusion.In the last years of the Bush and Putin
administrations, serious change in the bilateral relationship is unlikely to
occur. Instead, avoiding further confrontation, diffusing rhetorical flurries,
aiding Russia’s embattled
democrats, and confronting Russia’s
bullying of its neighbors must remain the focus.For Congress, pursuing such a policy of
status quo maintenance does not include cutting the Freedom Support Act funding
by 40 percent, as had been recommended by the Bush Administration in the 2008
budget. Instead, Congress should embrace the analysis and policy
recommendations of the “Russian Democracy Act of 2002” (Public Law 107-246, 107th
Congress) and continue to support the development of Russian civil
society.Congress also should provide
increased support to help consolidate democracy in Georgia
and Ukraine.Faltering democracy in either of these two
countries will send a terrible signal to democratic forces throughout the region,
as well as to democrats inside Russia.

New leaders in the Kremlin and the
White House will create an opportunity to start anew.The most effective American strategy to help
slow Russia’s
democratic deterioration is not isolation, containment, or confrontation, but
rather deeper engagement of both the Russian government and Russian
society.The United
States does not have enough leverage over Russia
to influence internal change through coercive means.Only a strategy of linkage is available. A more
substantial agenda at the state-to-state level would create more permissive
conditions for greater Western engagement of Russian society. A new American policy
towards Russia must pursue
both – a more ambitious bilateral relationship and in parallel a more long-term
strategy for strengthening Russian civil, political, and economic societies,
which ultimately will be critical forces that push Russia back onto a democratizing
path.

Towards a Nuclear Free World. Central to rekindling a grander
U.S.-Russian relationship must be a recommitment to the goals of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty: an end to all nuclear weapons. As the first two
nuclear powers and the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, Russia and the United States must provide
international leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world
to the lowest number possible. Accelerating the dismantlement of nuclear
weapons, perhaps even with the aid of a new treaty, would be one way to
generate a new atmosphere of cooperation between Russia and the United States
and help the United States in its quest to discourage proliferation of nuclear
weapons worldwide.A treaty that defined
rules for counting warheads, specified a timetable for dismantlement, included
robust verification procedures, made cuts permanent, and did not allow
demobilized weapons to be put in storage (as is now the practice under the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in Moscow in 2002) would send a
message to the world that the United States is serious about meeting its
obligations specified in Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT).

In addition, Russian and American
officials must commit to a new bilateral agreement, which pledges to
discontinue research and development of new nuclear weapons. Neither the United States nor Russia needs to develop
“mini-nukes” or bunker-busting nuclear weapons, since the deployment of such
systems would increase, however slightly, the probability of using nuclear
weapons.The administration should also
move quickly to expand and accelerate Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR).[10]Special new emphasis should be placed on the
removal of highly enriched uranium from Russian naval systems scheduled for
dismantlement. Almost two decades after
the end of the Cold War, it is simply absurd that American and Russian nuclear
forces remain on hair-trigger alert.This practice must be stopped immediately.

George Shultz, William Perry, Henry
Kissinger and Sam Nunn have articulated a plan for jumpstarting the process of
moving closer towards a nuclear world.[11]The next American president should embrace
their proposal, which could serve as a cornerstone for developing a deeper
strategic relationship with Russia.
A better strategic relationship might also make possible Russian cooperation in
the creation of a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for countries seeking to
exploit nuclear technology for the production of energy. Chairman Lantos
already has introduced legislation, called “The International Nuclear Fuel Bank
Proposal of 2007,” which should be passed immediately.Similar initiatives are needed to create an
internationally organized mechanism for storing spent nuclear fuel.

Missile Defense.President Bush is right to expand ballistic
missile defense systems against a future attack from Iran. He is also right in offering
to develop this defense system with Russia.The Russian negative reaction to the proposed
deployment of interceptors in NATO allies reflects again an irrational,
zero-sum attitude to security issues.This administration and the next American president should continue to
explore ways to cooperate with Russia
on missile defense, since this kind of cooperation can produce more security
for both countries without increasing vulnerabilities to each other.

Economic Integration.Cooperation
on nuclear issues should be the cornerstone of a renewed bilateral relationship
with Russia.
At the same time, a Russia
more integrated into Western economic institutions is more likely to become a
stakeholder in this system.No act would buy the next American president
greater goodwill among Russian state officials and society at large than Russia’s
graduation from the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974.Jackson-Vanik rightly denied Most Favored
Nation status to the Soviet Union due to the
restrictive emigration practices of the time.Certainly some of the human rights problems that Senator Jackson and
Congressman Vanik wanted to address in 1974 remain, but Jackson-Vanik no longer
addresses these new strains of democratic infringements. To underscore the
absence of Cold War thinking in the U.S.,
Congress should graduate Russia
from Jackson-Vanik and thereby allow Russia
to obtain permanent normal trading status with the United States.

To make the right signals about
democracy to human rights activists inside Russia,
the next president should work with Congressional leaders to initiate
legislation to deal with new forms of human rights abuses in Russia today.Specifically, the president should urge
Congress to provide new resources to the Jackson Foundation, a non-profit
organization established with seed money from Congress to continue Jackson’s agenda of promoting of human rights and
religious freedoms in the Soviet Union and then Russia.A better funded Jackson Foundation could make
direct grants to those activists and organizations in Russia that are still
dedicated to the original principles outlined in the 1974 legislation.

Maintain
Democracy Assistance.Paradoxically,
at a time when Russian democracy is eroding, the Bush administration has called
for substantial cuts in its budget for democracy assistance (or what it now
calls “Governing Justly and Democratically”) to Russia, from $43.4 million in FY06
to just $26.2 million proposed for FY08.These requested figures for less are less than what the Bush
administration seeks for democracy assistance in Liberia and Kosovo. At a time when
democracy is under assault, these cuts cannot be justified. How these funds are
spent should be examined closely. After more than a decade of support for
democratic change in Russia
with few measurable results, Congress should initiate a serious assessment of U.S. democracy assistance programs in Russia. But
limited success in the past should not be used an excuse for discontinuing
efforts in the future.

Speak the Truth about Democratic Erosion in Russia.Just weeks before assuming her responsibilities as National Security
Adviser in 2000, Condoleezza Rice wrote about the deleterious consequences of
not speaking honestly about Russia’s
internal problems: “The United
States should not be faulted for trying to
help. But, as the Russian reformer Grigori Yavlinsky has said, the United States
should have ‘told the truth’ about what was happening [inside his country].”
She then attacked “the ‘happy talk’ in which the Clinton administration engaged.”[12]
Dr. Rice’s message is even truer today. The aim of speaking the truth is not to
lecture Putin or try to persuade him to change his ways, but rather to
demonstrate solidarity
with Russian human rights and democracy activists.

Direct personal engagement of
Russian democratic activists also matters. When Ronald Reagan traveled to the Soviet Union in May 1988, he discussed arms control and
regional conflicts with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Yet, Reagan did not
let his friendship and cooperation with Gorbachev overshadowed his other agenda
while in town – human rights. Speaking in Helsinki
the day before entering the Soviet Union for
the first time, Reagan proclaimed that “There is no true international security
without respect for human rights… The greatest creative and moral force in this
world, the greatest hope for survival and success, for peace and happiness, is
human freedom.”During his stay in the
Soviet capital, Reagan echoed this theme in action and words many times,
whether in his speech to students at MoscowStateUniversity
or in a luncheon with nearly a hundred human rights activists at the American
ambassador’s residence.Reagan did not
simply show up for a photo op with these enemies of the Soviet
dictatorship.He ordered that the
ambassador’s finest silverware and linens be used to accord these human rights
activists the same respect that he showed for his Soviet counterpart.American officials must again adopt a similar
strategy of using meetings with Russian democratic and human rights activists
to help elevate attention to their cause and help prevent these brave people
from further harassment from the Russian government.

Increase
Funds for Education andExchanges. Education is the ally of
democracy and democracy is the ally of the United States. The United States must devote greater resources to
developing higher education within Russia and financing the studies of
more Russians at American and Western universities. The United States
has no greater asset for promoting democracy than the example of our own
society.The more Russians who come to
the United States,
the better.Inside Russia, special
emphasis must be placed on promoting public policy schools.Subsidizing internet access and promoting the
study of English within Russia
are two additional powerful tools for promoting democracy within Russia and
integrating Russian society into the West.

Focus on 2008. The 2008 Russian Presidential Election is
the next test of Russian democracy and the last critical milestone in
U.S.-Russian relations for the Bush Administration. The process by which Putin
decides to navigate the scheduled presidential election in 2008 is critical.If Putin steps down after his second term as
the constitution calls for, then Russian democracy has a chance for renewal.
Even if Putin’s chosen successor wins, a competitive presidential election that
occurs on time and under law will help to institutionalize this method for
choosing Russia’s
leaders and raise the stakes for transgressions against the constitution for
aspiring autocrats in the future. If, however, Putin decides to change or
violate the constitution to stay in power, he will undermine his own legitimacy
since solid majorities in Russia
believe that their leaders should be elected.

President
Bush and his administration can do very little to revitalize democratic
institutions weakened by Putin’s rule over the last several years. Bush cannot
establish independent television in Russia,
bring back to life Russia’s
liberal parties, or stop the war in Chechnya.On issues of human rights and democracy, Bush
also lacks the credibility within Russia to act as a moral authority.
However, on the issue of the 2008 elections, this is last time that Bush can
try to use his personal influence with Putin to help convince the Russian
president of the advantages of retirement in 2008.Through private communications, Bush can
emphasize why a peaceful, democratic transition of power in 2008 would cement
Putin’s historical legacy as state builder (however unjustified from our
perspective), while clinging to power beyond his second term would make Putin
look like a typical autocratic thug.

In parallel to this private
campaign with Putin, Bush and his government must also focus attention and
greater resources on those Russian societal actors dedicated to making the 2007
parliamentary election and the 2008 presidential elections free and fair.In particular, American and European funding
sources must provide Russian election monitoring organizations with the means
to place their people at all or most polls, to conduct parallel vote
tabulations (PVT) and to carry out national exit polls.During the 2007-2008 election cycle in Russia, the United
States also must remain unequivocal in supporting the
OSCE’s election observer mission in Russia.

Conclusion

The United
States does not have the power to reverse anti-democratic
trends inside Russia.Russia is too big; Putin is too
powerful. But U.S. officials
must make clear on which side of the fence America stands. In reflecting on
the Cold War era in Europe and Asia in a
speech at the National Endowment for Democracy in 2003, Bush stated, “[We]
provided inspiration for oppressed peoples.In prison camps, in banned union meetings, in clandestine churches, men
and women knew that the whole world was not sharing their own nightmare.They knew of at least one place – a bright
and hopeful land – where freedom was valued and secure. And they prayed that America
would not forget them, or forget the mission to promote liberty around the
world.”[13] Democrats
in Russia are still praying
that we do not forget them and do not abandon our mission to promote liberty everywhere
in the world, including Russia.
Engaging both state and society is the
task for American policymakers.

[1] On
the illiberal elements of Russian democracy before Putin, see Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political
Change from Gorbachev to Putin(Cornell University Press, 2001), chapter nine.

[3] The
chair of Gazprom’s board is Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s friend from St. Petersburg and the
current deputy prime minister. Gazprom’s president is another Putin crony,
Aleksei Miller. The chair of Rosneft’s board is Igor Sechin, Putin’s long-time
aide and KGB comrade.

[4]On Russia’s weak and corrupt state,
see the late Anna Politkovskaya’s, Putin’s
Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy (Metropolitan Books, 2004).

[5] In
the early years of their tenure in office, senior foreign policymakers in the
Bush Administration did not have a shared assessment of internal dynamics
inside Russia.Some senior officials had a more skeptical
view of Putin and his agenda from the very beginning.

[6] For
details see chapter thirteen of James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power
and Purpose: American Policy toward Russia after the Cold War(Washington:
Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

[7]
Rice, as quoted in “Rice ‘Troubled’ by Kremlin’s Concentration of Power,” Reuters, May 10, 2001.

[8]
Ilves, as quoted in Steven Lee Myers, “Friction Between Estonia and Russia
Ignites Protests in Moscow, New York
Times, May 3, 2007, p. A3.

[10] Of
course, metrics for measuring success must be made clear and information about
progress in meeting these goals must be made more readily available. The lack
of access to storage facilities operated by the Russian Ministry of Defense and
the Agency for Atomic Energy (formerly the Ministry of Atomic Energy, Minatom)
has been a real impediment to the deeper development of the Nunn-Lugar program
for safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons.In the summer of 2005, following on the heels
of discussions held by Bush and Putin at their Bratislava
summit in February 2005, the Russian government offered the United States a small number of opportunities to
inspect sites, a step hailed by Senator Lugar on his trip to Russia in
August 2005.To expand these
opportunities further, American officials could lessen Russian suspicions about
American intentions in seeking greater access by giving Russian officials
greater access to American storage facilities.The more transparency, the better.