An excerpt from the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 2012 Annual Report listing the locations of surveillance cameras throughout the district as well as every activation of the Department’s Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) that occurred in 2012

The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) outlined in this manual are to ensure that this department is prepared to respond effectively and efficiently in accordance with applicable law and District of Columbia policy to any unlawful conduct occurring in the context of First Amendment assemblies. These SOP’s incorporate revisions to the manner in which the Metropolitan Police Department responds to demonstrations and other assemblies on District of Columbia public space that the District has implemented in resolving litigation. This manual also reflects measures mandated by the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004.

Since 2007 an unknown subject has sent more than 360 letters containing a white, powder substance to various government officials, public schools and other locations. In May, 2011 20 letters were delivered to public schools in Washington, DC. Over the past two days similar letters have been received in Washington, DC; New York, New York; Dallas, Texas and Enfield, Connecticut.

A series of “white powder letters” have been received this afternoon at several District of Columbia schools. First responders are responding to the locations and taking appropriate action. Three of the locations have already been cleared. The letters are identical to white powder letters received by District schools in October 2010 and are believed to contain a harmless white power.

In a the New York State court, a NYPD officer was questioned by the defense attorney regarding statements he had posted on his Facebook webpage that portrayed him as a rogue cop. At the conclusion of his testimony, what should have been a slam-dunk “ex-con with a gun” case, resulted in an acquittal for the defendant because of the reasonable doubt created by the officer’s own postings on Facebook and MySpace. In other words, his own website statements were used to impeach him. Convictions rest on the credibility of the officer(s). The defense strategy was to show the jury that what the officer writes about himself on social network websites is how he “really” conducts police work. The suspect in this case claimed that the officer used excessive force on him and broke three ribs. The suspect went on to allege that when the police officer realized that he would have to explain the broken ribs, he “planted” a stolen 9mm Beretta on the suspect and charged him with the offense.

Recently, alcoholic energy drinks have been making national headlines related to multiple hospitalizations for alcohol poisoning among college students. These hospitalizations have resulted in several universities banning the alcoholic energy drinks from campuses. Lawmakers in several states, including New York, have sought to ban the drinks, though no legislation has passed yet. These drinks mix alcohol with caffeine. Alcoholic energy products are marketed to look like energy drinks on grocery shelves, but can pack a real alcoholic punch. Four Loko is a popular brand, but not the only alcoholic energy drink under scrutiny. In the case of Four Loko, the 23.5-ounce drink is 12 percent alcohol and roughly equivalent to drinking five 12-ounce beers. The drink also has about a cup’s worth of coffee, according to the manufacturer. There’s a very common misconception that if you drink caffeine with an alcoholic beverage the stimulant effect of the caffeine counteracts the depressant effect of the alcohol and that is not true.

The Los Angeles Joint Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (LAJRIC) distributed a public safety bulletin on an emerging suicide method using helium and an “exit hood.” Helium suicides are still relatively rare however, in the last several years, information about the use of helium as a certain, fast, and painless suicide method has spread on the Internet and in various suicide handbooks. First responders have encountered helium suicides and other variations of this suicide method using chemicals which are hazardous to first responders in the District or National Capitol Region. The WRTAC is issuing the below information for situational awareness and investigative purposes only.

In the event of a catastrophic incident or threat to the National Capital Region (NCR), the significant federal presence would both necessitate and complicate a robust response. In order to facilitate the coordination that would be required for the integration of federal, state, and local response efforts, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) have compiled this draft NCR Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN) of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions. For planning purposes, a catastrophic incident is defined in the National Response Framework as any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, which results in an extraordinary level of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

This document institutes the necessary steps for compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) implementation plan. This document further ensures that The District of Columbia’s Emergency Operations Plan complies with the NIMS; individual domestic incident management; and emergency prevention, preparedness, recovery and mitigation activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist regional counter-terrorism task forces and municipal or local municipalities.

The Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) is an emergency preparedness project intended to prepare 72 major metropolitan areas for an aerosolized anthrax terrorist attack covering a large geographic region and the subsequent need to provide prophylactic medication to the affected population. The National Capital Region (NCR) has been identified as a location to implement this initiative. This document outlines necessary and supplemental components that enable the rapid distribution of prophylaxis to large populations.