“What Sheikh Abdullah was really
gambling for… was an independent principality whose continued existence would
be guaranteed by the Indian armed forces and whose solvency was secured by the
Indian treasury. There was, however, no idea of a quid pro quo from his side.
He did not expect to be called to account either in respect of the internal
administration of the state or the utilization of funds supplied to him by the
government of India.”

How prophetic these words penned way back
in 1955 have been! As Indian soldiers shed their blood to protect J&K from
troublemakers of all sorts and as Indian treasury bleeds to keep it solvent,
only to be greeted by chants of “azaadi” from stone-pelting mobs and demands
for “greater autonomy” from local sundries, we realize how farsighted the
author was in warning us that “Sheikh Abdullah stood only for his own
aggrandizement and had no affection for India and no use for her except to the
extent she sub-served his ends.” The Abdullah tribe has multiplied several
times since then, but its DNA remains unchanged.

The author, Pandit Ramchandra Kak, was
prime minister of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir up to 9 August 1947
(succeeded briefly by Janak Singh and later Mehr Chand Mahajan). He left behind
a document that records the devious political games played to transfer
authority over this Hindu-Buddhist kingdom to Muslims, specifically to Sheikh
Abdullah.

Unsurprisingly, the document is barely
known in “secular” India; its only known public copy is in UK. Radha Rajan now presents
this document in full, along with her analysis of the communal political game
played by the Congress leadership in general and Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi
in particular, which has converted Kashmir into a festering sore in India’s
polity.

Pandit Kak’s document traverses
familiar ground, though it does highlight some less known facts. Its chief
merit consists in providing a clear and consistent exposition of the dilemma
faced by the State of J&K over accession to India on the eve of
independence, by a perceptive patriotic powerful insider who was privy to overt
happenings as well as covert machinations in the state, who was in the centre
of the storm facing winds blowing from all directions. It tells us why things
went the way they did and how India could have averted the current impasse. From
the document, Pandit Kak emerges as a man of learning and character, a patriot
who had the courage to suffer for his convictions.

In her comments on selected passages
from the document, Rajan shows that what happened in J&K was not
accidental, but a logical culmination of the attitudes and policies consciously
adopted by Gandhi, Nehru and Congress towards princely states, especially those
with Hindu rulers.

The question of accession to India came
up before J&K twice in less than a year, though in very different
circumstances. Its decision on both occasions was the same, but for different
reasons. Prime Minister Kak and Maharaja Hari Singh concurred in their
conclusions, but not for identical reasons.

Late in 1946, the state was sounded out
by the Government of India on accession to India after the Cabinet Mission had
completed its consultations with the Government of India and Indian leaders in
Delhi. At that time, partition was not the horizon except as a remote
contingency and accession was envisaged only to the newly-to-be-created
Dominion of India.

Pandit Kak tells us that as regards
welding India into a single unit, he was not opposed to accession pure and
simple. But there was a problem: Sheikh Abdullah, Congress leaders’ (especially
Nehru’s) complete identification with him and their refusal to see any other
point of view than his.

Sheikh Abdullah started his political
career in 1931 as one of the two protagonists of Muslim Conference, an
unabashed self-professed communal body. Later, he fell out with the other
protagonist, Ch. Ghulam Abbas, and set up his own outfit, the National
Conference. As Ghulam Abbas managed to get close to Jinnah and the Muslim
League, Sheikh Abdullah approached Pundit Nehru for support. This he received
in ample measure and soon he found himself a leading luminary on the Congress
firmament and President of the All India States’ Peoples Conference.

While paying lip service to Congress
ideals, Abdullah never forgot his original aim and ambition: absolute control
over the state. With the power and prestige of Congress behind him, he started
resorting to coercion and bullying against those who disagreed with him,
including dissident Muslim groups. Some residents of Srinagar were for years
unable to visit other parts of the town for fear of harassment.

A maulvi who favoured the Muslim
Conference was prevented from preaching at the mosque where he and his
forefathers had preached for generations before. Hindus began to live in perpetual
fear. During the so-called Quit Kashmir agitation in 1946, thousands-strong
mobs would surround houses of respectable persons for hours together, terrorise
inmates and hurl stones and filthy abuses, not sparing womenfolk of the house.
For this reason, he was arrested, prosecuted and sentenced to three years of
imprisonment by the state administration.

This was the man backed to the hilt by
Congress and its leaders, right from the beginning. Nehru, Maulana Azad, Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and others visited Kashmir and participated in deliberations
and demonstrations of the National Conference, which often culminated in
violence. After Abdullah’s arrest, Nehru insisted on visiting Srinagar despite
being told that his visit would be most undesirable in the prevailing
circumstances. Nehru was detained in the Dak Bungalow at Muzzaffarabad,
provided all the facilities possible and the state arranged for his return to
Delhi when he so decided. Indeed, after a meeting with Sardar Patel in Mumbai, where
Gandhi also was present, Pandit Kak facilitated Nehru’s visit to Srinagar in
July 1946. Yet, it seems, Nehru never forgave the Maharaja and Pandit Kak for
his detention.

Against this background, it is not
surprising that the decisive factor which influenced Pandit Kak in rejecting
accession was the attitude of the Indian National Congress as regards the
affairs of the state.

Rajan points out that in the attitude
of the Indian National Congress towards princely states, there was nothing
peculiar to J&K. It is strange but true that Congress under Gandhi who
reached out to the likes of Ali brothers, Muslim League, Jinnah and even
Britishers, nurtured undisguised hostility towards princely states and sought
to undermine them on every conceivable occasion. J&K is the best example to
show that this hostility has cost the country dearly.

The issue of accession came up again on
the eve of independence when partition had been agreed upon and princely
states, which were once supposed to regain sovereignty after the lapse of
British Paramountcy, were told to join either India or Pakistan.

J&K again found itself on the horns
of a dilemma. It was Jinnah or Nehru-backed Abdullah. Lord Mountbatten told Kak
“you must consider your geographical position, your political situation and
composition of your population and then decide.” Pandit Kak rejoined “that
means you advise us to accede to Pakistan. It is not possible for us to do
that. And since that is so, we cannot accede to India.”

India was divided on communal lines and
the only rational course of action for any state before deciding on accession
was to ascertain whether its people would support the accession. And with 76
per cent Muslim population, J&K could not be sure of the support of its
people if it acceded to India. Accession to India was also hobbled by
Congress’s infatuation with Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah was in prison at
the time of independence. Top Congress leaders were insisting not merely that
he be released forthwith, but also that a new constitution be drafted for the
state with their advice and power transferred to Sheikh Abdullah. Accession to
Pakistan was ruled out because Kak had no illusions about the nature of Islamic
state that was coming up. In other words, Kashmir would not accede to Pakistan
and could not accede to India.

Pandit Kak met Jinnah who advised him
to join Pakistan and offered favourable terms. However, when Jinnah was told
that J&K’s decision not to accede was final, he said so long as the state
did not accede to India he would not mind if it did not accede to Pakistan. Of
course, he had no intention of honouring this assurance. Less than ten weeks
after its formation, Pakistan invaded J&K.

From Government of India side, V P
Menon, secretary, Ministry of States, had a lengthy discussion with Pandit Kak in
Delhi and it was decided that Menon would pay a visit to Srinagar after 15
August 1947 to discuss the future course of action. Kak, therefore, resolved
that under the given circumstances, it would be ideal for all stakeholders if
J&K became an independent state, maintaining good relations with India and
Pakistan.

Maharaja Hari Singh came to the same
conclusion, though for more grandiose, if irrational, reasons. He was dreaming
not just of remaining independent, but also of ruling over a larger territory.
Fuelling his ambitions was Swami Santdev, part of the assortment of swamis,
gurus, astrologers and others claiming direct communion with the supernatural
collected by Maharaja Hari Singh’s uncle and predecessor Maharaja Pratap Singh.
Such was the influence acquired by the swami on Maharaja that even Pundit Nehru
paid him a visit when he came to Kashmir in 1946.

For all his supposed spirituality, the
swami did not neglect the mundane. He was keen to earn jobs, contracts and
other favours for his large but non-descript followers and constantly made
suggestions to the administration on behalf of his cronies. On most of the
occasions, Kak found it hard to oblige him. The enraged swami started looking
for an opportunity to get rid of the ‘obstinate’ prime minister.

The opportunity came when accession
became a live issue. The Maharaja was convinced that after the departure of the
British, with the potency of swami’s supernatural powers, he would be able to
extend his rule to new areas. In June 1947, he met with rulers of some adjoining
princely states and planned a federation of J&K and some areas now in
Himachal Pradesh. When Maharaja Hari Singh sought Kak’s opinion about his plan,
the latter explained to him that it was a futile and impracticable idea; it was
utterly unrealistic to imagine that forces which had compelled the British to
leave India would allow the creation of a new empire in their midst.

Neither Maharaja nor swami forgave
Pandit Kak for this candid advice, the cold douche he administered to their
towering aspirations. Machinations started to remove him the office. Matters
reached Sardar Patel who asked Kak to convey to the Maharaja that in those
crucial days it was essential that the Maharaja and his Prime Minister pulled
together, and if that was not possible the situation must be brought to an end
immediately. In other words, Maharaja Hari Singh had to choose between swami
and Kak. He chose the swami.

From that point, it was a downhill
journey. On 11 August 1947, Maharaja gave Pandit Kak “permission to retire.” This
was followed by the decapitation of the entire administration. Top officers
including Chief Secretary, Chief of the Army Staff, the IGP, Governor of
Kashmir, Director of Civil Supplies, Chief Engineer and several other important
officers were removed and replaced by people of little or no experience. Sheikh
Abdullah was released in September and lost no time in spreading his tentacles.
These developments disheartened and alarmed the citizenry. The result was that
when Pakistan attacked the state around 22nd October, it was in no position to
counter it. Its helplessness was aggravated by the perfidy of the British
officers and treachery of the Muslim soldiery.

Pandit Kak had to pay a heavy personal
price for his love of truth and candour. Charges of trumpery were forged
against him and he was denied permission to leave the state even though he
feared for this safety. This enabled Sheikh Abdullah to have his revenge when he
paraded Kak and his elder brother through the streets of Srinagar with their
hands tied and residents were asked to shower shit and filth on them. Kak was
pressured to give statement against Maharaja Hari Singh’s rule. But he did not
utter a word against the Maharaja, and later migrated to Kasauli.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can
say that Kak’s idea of an independent state of J&K was not viable. Pakistan
would not let it remain in peace. Given its location, onset of the Cold War and
China’s ambitions, it would have been a hotbed of international intrigues and a
constant source of anxiety to India.

Ideally, J&K should have been fully
integrated into India, just like hundreds of other states, small and big. What
we now have is a halfway house, an arrangement in which India has the worst of
both worlds. For all nationalist objectives, J&K is an alien state - the
steadfast opposition of Sunni Kashmiri politicians to the return of Kashmiri
pundits, establishment of Sainik colonies or even temporary facilities for
Amarnath pilgrims should clinch the issue. However, India has all the
obligations regarding its security and solvency.

Kak’s document tells us how we could
have avoided landing in this position of no rights and all responsibilities. India
could and should have insisted that accession of J&K to India would be on
the same terms as that of any other state. There was no insurmountable reason
why it should be on a different basis. There was no need for India either to
accept Mountbatten’s suggestion to make accession conditional upon a plebiscite
or transfer power to Sheikh Abdullah or agree to a separate constituent
assembly for the state. The Indian army was fighting the state’s battle and the
simplest thing was to set up a military administration as was done subsequently
in Hyderabad. By the time the military operations ended, a lot of things would
have become clear. Then again, there was no need to allow Sheikh Abdullah to
oust Maharaja Hari Singh and elect a new Head of State when the issue was being
debated in the UN Security Council.

The failure of the Indian state to find
a solution to the J&K dispute is rooted in its refusal to face facts. The
two-nation theory was false and pernicious, but after conceding Pakistan, the Congress
lost the moral right to oppose it. The country was divided on communal lines
and the logic of partition has to be accepted. The existence of a large Muslim
population in India does not alter the reality that after the secession of the
Muslim component, what remained was and is Hindu Rashtra.

How could India expect to retain the
valley of Kashmir with a 95 per cent Muslim population contiguous to the
entirely Muslim province of NWFP? Replying to this poser in 1950 by Gordon Walker,
then secretary of state for commonwealth relations, Pandit Kak pointed out that
it was wrong to assume that the status of the valley affects only its residents
and therefore they alone could decide its future. From time immemorial, Kashmir
has been cradle to a vital corpus of Hindu thought and rituals. For that reason,
all Hindus in India and beyond have a stake in the fate of Kashmir. It has
always been part of the Hindu sacred territory (punyabhoomi) and the question of handing it over to those who are
hell bent on destroying its Hindu ethos does not arise.

This book is a sobering, painful
experience for any patriotic Indian. It narrates a sordid tale of historical vicissitudes
and human weaknesses from which no player emerges unscathed. But truth, however
unpalatable, must be faced. Truth alone liberates from bondage of fear, from
folly and its consequences.