Materials of an International Seminar
Civil society and social development

Sergey KLIMOV
CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES (ON THE BASIS OF FRANCE'S TRACK RECORDS )

To my mind the civil control over the Armed Forces is one of the most critical
aspects of the problem in question. What is important is that it comes with
the military culture and the issues should be taken together. I consider it
appropriate to see what France's experience is in this field.
There are three sublevels in the structure of the military culture: the Armed
Forces military culture, military culture of the state and military culture
of society. These are three logical stages of the military culture development,
if considered genetically. Therefore, on the one hand, the military culture
is the backbone component, the core of the military culture system as a whole.
On the other - the state and society, developing and transforming, begin operating
as the subjects of the military culture and render the Armed Forces culture
as their object.
In past, a potential of war determined the relations between the three cultures
in France. With no military threats to worry about, the society tended to
shift off the military load first of all by reducing military spendings. Being
a daughter of the politics, the military system was nevertheless seen by politicos
as a threat. But as soon as some danger came from abroad they would radically
change their attitude. And again as the danger reduced the politicians would
loose interest to the military issues. This is probably why the French lost
in Sedane in 1871 and why they were defeated in 1940.
The wars of the past could not destroy life on the Planet in the face of a
huge number of deaths and great shortage of resources. New weapons have greatly
changed the situation. The global catastrophe is a real threat now and it
has emphasized the humanitarian component of the military culture system that
incorporates the society, state and Armed Forces sections. It is here that
civil control should be implemented.
On the threshold of a new millennium, society tends to avert and neutralise
conflicts by the use of force and this requires great changes to be made in
the military culture of the Armed Forces. France believes that since long
ago there has been no evident threat to its territorial and political integrity.
However, the tasks have become even harder to accomplish. The French experts
say that it is vital now to contribute to the security in Europe and the Mediterranean
as well as to ensure the implementation of the international law. These tasks
including peacekeeping operations in the world's flash points, anti-terrorism
efforts, immigration control etc. are vital for Russia, too. The wide range
of tasks leads to the strengthening of relations between the military cultures
of society and the Armed Forces. It appears evident that the Armed Forces
have to become more transparent.
Like any other social processes, the military culture cannot be a given system
formed at one go. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Jean Joresse
said that the French people was not interested in the military issues. It
got used to be passive. The military problems had been resolved mostly by
officers just like the religion was the fief of the priests and the administrative
issues - the fief of the authorities. However, as the years had been passing
the French had become aware of the necessity to be involved in the national
defence. In 1932, General de Gaulle made a statement that became the logo
of the French military reform. "We ought to build armed forces not according
to our customs but to our requirements," he said.
We will not take a thorough consideration of where the supporters and opponents
of the professional armed forces stood. The only thing that is worth mentioning
here is that the discussion was not long. The public was not fully involved
in the formation or the professional army. The main role was played here by
President Chirac. In 1996, he announced transition to a professional system.
The 1962 reform marked the transition from the era of conventional wars to
the era of nuclear deterrence, while the 1996 reform led the French Armed
Forces to the 21st century. An important trend is evident here: the president
as the C-in-C makes the defence issue the top priority of his policy.
Russia made an attempt to modernize its Armed Forces in 1996 as well. Unfortunately,
Decree 722 of the Russian President was not fulfilled. We can list a good
many reasons why it failed, but I do not think it is the right place and time
to discuss the issue.
I would like to take note of the fact that the military culture directly relies
on the military model. There is no doubt that the transition to the professional
model will make the military culture development more dynamic. It is sure
to cover all subjects of civil control.