Measures to control communicable diseases are
not limited to biological approaches. Individuals known or suspected of
being contagious may be subjected to civil confinement (isolation, quarantine,
and compulsory hospitalization) and criminal punishment for knowing or
willful exposure to disease. Society’s methods of coping with epidemics,
therefore, include separation of contagious persons from the rest of the
population and punishment for engaging in risk behaviors.
We like to think that these are thoughtful
public policies based solely on the sciences of public health and medicine.
But the history of infectious disease control teaches a different lesson.
Feelings about infectious disease are sometimes visceral—founded on fear,
stereotype, and enmity. Individuals with disease are blamed for epidemics,
viewed as vectors of infection rather than persons in need of care and
support. During various times in history disfavored populations became
targets of coercion—e.g., racial or religious minorities, commercial sex
workers, injecting drug users, and gay men. Animus toward those with infectious
disease can be confounded with deep-seated prejudices against marginalized
communities.
Even when the exercise of compulsory powers
is necessary to prevent the transmission of infectious disease, it is important
to consider the effects on individual freedom and dignity. Infectious disease
control powers are among society’s most coercive measures. Civil confinement
and criminal punishment deprive individuals of their liberty. In a democratic
society, therefore, these coercive powers should be carefully justified.
We have to balance the public health interests of society against the freedom
of the individual.
Personal control measures also raise important
issues of justice when they are directed against unpopular individuals
or groups. Public health powers, like all benefits and burdens in society,
need to be allocated fairly. Power exercised in an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner is problematic. Recall the discussion of Jew Ho v. Williamson
in chapter 7 where San Francisco health officials quarantined an area of
the city where the Chinese American community lived. The city exempted
specific homes within the quarantine area that belonged to non-Asians.
Decisions about whether to use compulsory
powers, and against which groups, are often influenced by social fears
and political pressure. It is difficult to exaggerate the dread caused
by disease epidemics and the destabilizing effects on people and their
communities. The public places intense political pressure on elected representatives
to “do something” to protect the populace. The exercise of compulsory powers
represents the most visible expression of government’s determination
to act decisively, whether or not there is sufficient scientific evidence
of effectiveness.
Epidemics, and society’s response, can also
powerfully affect business interests and the economy. A public health decision
that a disease outbreak is caused by contaminated meat or fruit can devastate
an industry. In the late 1990s, for example, North America experienced
a major outbreak of cyclosporiasis (a parasitic disease that causes gastroenteritis).
Public health agencies preliminarily announced that strawberries may have
been a vehicle of infection, but later concluded that the source actually
was raspberries. Both industries experienced a substantial loss of trade
(Herwaldt et al. 1997; Osterholm 1997). Decisions to impose quarantines
can also have significant economic effects, with commerce to, and from,
the quarantined area significantly impeded.
The authors in this chapter discuss the history
of infectious disease control, the legal powers and limits, and the influence
of society, politics, and economics. This chapter begins with the most
ancient and enduring response to communicable disease— crude separation
of the sick from the healthy.

Public health authorities possess three overlapping
powers of detention: isolation of known infectious persons, quarantine
of healthy persons exposed to disease, and civil commitment (compulsory
hospitalization) for care and treatment. (See the definitions of these
three forms of detention in chapter 8 of the companion text). These powers,
in one form or another, have persisted since the origin of human civilization.

A. The History of Quarantine

The prominent Yale historian David F. Musto
(1986) offers this description of early attempts to ward off infectious
diseases:

In ancient times citizens noted that occasionally a disease
that had appeared in a distant locale was then sweeping toward them from
neighboring villages, or that after a ship from a foreign land reached
shore with ill persons aboard, people residing in the port city would take
ill. Such temporal sequences cannot be ignored and, if the illness is a
serious one, fears escalate as the illness comes closer. Knowing the cause
of an illness or its mode of transmission provides some rational approach
to interrupting the spread of the disease. Prior to the nineteenth century,
however, those were unknowns, and so civil authorities were left with whatever
means seemed reasonable in the wisdom of the time to fight the spread of
diseases. Protective measures were based upon what we would now consider
erroneous explanations for contagion. From this era of scant knowledge
comes the origin of the familiar word we use to designate attempts to isolate
the sick or contagious from the healthy. “Quarantine.”

For a discussion of the historical origins of the term “quarantine,” see
Tandy (1923) and Clemow (1929), reproduced in the Reader website.
In the selection below, J. M. Eager describes the ancient practices. The
reading is taken from an informative report commissioned by the United
States Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service. Many excellent books
and articles discuss civil confinement in relation to specific diseases
such as tuberculosis (TB) (Rothman 1994), venereal disease (Brandt 1987),
and cholera (Rosenberg 1962).

J. M. Eager, "The Early History of Quarantine: Origin of Sanitary
Measures Directed Against Yellow Fever"Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1903

. . .The history of quarantine is closely interwoven
with that of medicine in general and of shipping. . . . The story of the
beginnings of quarantine is associated particularly with the epidemiology
of leprosy, pest, and syphilis. Cholera and yellow fever were later considerations.
. . .

Leprosy and Land Quarantines

The first quarantines of which any mention
is made in literature were land quarantines used as a protection against
leprosy. The ancients regarded this disease as of African origin, and Lucretius
states positively that it first came from Egypt. In the Old Testament the
first indications are found of precautions taken against contagious maladies.
Leviticus, Numbers, and the First Book of' Samuel give directions
for the sequestration of lepers, first in the desert, then outside the
camp, and afterwards without the walls of Jerusalem. In these books the
inspection of persons for the detection of leprosy is detailed. Persons
afflicted with skin diseases were directed to present themselves before
the priests. An observation of each case was made, and, according to minutely
described symptoms, isolation of the patients was ordered for a prescribed
period.
The crusaders on their arrival outside the
walls of Jerusalem found lazarettoes still in existence, and after taking
the city from the Mussulmans sent all contagious maladies to these isolated
places. The name Hospital of St. Lazarus was given to the place of sequestration.
Returning to Europe, the members of the military expeditions brought back
with them not only numerous diseases, but also the word “lazaretto,” as
applied to a place for the isolation of the victims of communicable maladies.
As a result lazarettoes were built outside the gates of nearly all the
principal cities of Europe. Leprosy itself had, however, been introduced
into Europe many centuries earlier. It is spoken of as a foreign disease
by the earlier Greek and Latin writers. . . .
Lepers were not strictly confined to the leper
houses. They were, however, required to wear a special costume, to limit
their walks to certain roads, to give warning of their approach by sounding
a clapper, and to forbear communicating with healthy persons and drinking
from or bathing in any running stream.

Pest and Early Views of Etiology

By the word pest is understood not only bubonic
plague, but the different epidemic diseases, whatever they may have been,
that were formerly included under that term. . . . The word plague as well
as pest was given by ancient medical writers to any epidemic disease that
wrought in extensive destruction of life. . . . Throughout all this extensive
period notions and practices relating to public sanitation were being evolved
in accordance with the prevalent tenets of causation. . . .
[The author discusses the various theories
of the etiology of disease ranging from spiritual causes and corruption
of the soil or water to the theory of contagion, including the views of
Hippocrates, Galen, and Fracastoro].

Maritime Quarantine

Maritime quarantine originated in connection
with the Levantine trade. Its early history is associated with that of
shipping in the Mediterranean, especially with that of the traffic of Venice,
Genoa, and Marseille. . . . As has been seen, the practice of isolation
was first applied against communicable disease by the Hebrews, but the
Lazarettoes, it appears, were little used in connection with foreign trade,
leaving out of the question commerce by sea. In the exchange of commodities
with foreign countries the Hebrews were largely dependent on the Phoenicians
and Arabs. Had the Jews been active in outside commerce, we should probably
read in the Old Testament of sanitary laws applicable to caravans and vessels.
. . .

Early Maritime Sanitary Laws

The Venetians were, it is generally admitted,
the first to make provision for maritime sanitation. As far back as the
year 1000 there were overseers of public health, but at first the office
was not a permanent one. The incumbents were appointed to serve during
the prevalence of an epidemic only. The first information we have of this
kind of public office is under date of 1348, when Nicolaus Venerio, Marinus
Querino, and Paulus Belegno (their Christian names given in the Latin of
the text) were appointed overseers of public health. These officers were
authorized to spend public money for the purpose of isolating infected
ships, goods, and persons at an island of the lagoon. A medical man was
stationed with the sick. As a later result of these arrangements, the first
thoroughly constituted maritime quarantine station of which there is historical
record was established in 1403 on the island of Santa Maria di Nazareth,
at Venice. . . .
Neighboring States engaged in commerce in the Mediterranean speedily
followed the example of Venice. . . . It was not until 1459 that a public
bureau of sanitation existed in the Republic of Venice. In that year officers,
called conservators of sanitation, were regularly appointed. . . .
During all this period land quarantines were
in operation at times of pest. Offenses against quarantine, both land and
maritime, were severely punished. Pietro Follerio, a great Neapolitan jurisconsult
of the sixteenth century, mentions whipping, the mill, exile, and death
as penalties for infringement of sanitary regulations. . . . Torture, long
service in the galleys, and work among the sick in a pest hospital are
named among the penalties. . . .

Bills of Health

Sanitary bulletins were incident to quarantines
and cordons. They were so called because they were stamped with the “bollo”
or seal of the authority issuing them. When the system of sanitary bulletins
was fully developed these patients, in their connection with ships, were
designated as clean, when beyond suspicion; touched, when from a noninfected
place in active communication with infected places; suspicious, without
sickness aboard, but having received goods from places or from ships or
caravans from places where pest prevailed; and dirty, when from a place
where disease existed.
. . . Prior to 1300 there is a good record
in a rubric of the statutes of the city of Urbino, Italy, in which, referring
to precautions against pest, it is written that no person shall leave the
gate of the city without a proper bulletin, and that, to this end, watch
shall be kept day and night at the city gates and walls. During the pest
at Naples, in the year 1557, citizens, usually merchants, were stationed
at the gates of the city to examine bills of health. Corruption and lack
of diligence on the part of these persons were punishable by death. Sentinels,
some on foot and some on horseback, made a patrol about the city walls
to prevent clandestine entrance. Bills of health to be acceptable had to
be stamped with the seal of the university of the place from which the
traveler came. They gave not only the day but the hour of departure, together
with a description of the traveler. Sanitary bulletins were also issued
to accompany merchandise, but in times of severe pest all articles except
aromatics and medicaments were considered suspicious. . . .

Further History of Quarantine

Without touching on quarantine in America,
which is another and interesting story, it is profitable to take a view
of the further history of quarantine in Europe. Following the discovery
by Anthony van Leeuwenhoek, in 1675, of bacteria, called by him "animalcules,"
there
was a wide belief in the casual connection of microscopic creatures
with disease, a belief supported by the doctrine of living contagion enunciated
by Marcus Antonius Plenciz, of Vienna, in 1762, but it was without marked
effect on quarantine procedure. The theory, in fact, lost hold on the public
and medical minds to such an extent that in the early part of the nineteenth
century the doctrine of a living contagion was looked upon as an absurd
assumption. It was not until the middle of the last century, following
the investigations of Pasteur, Pollender, and Bavaine, that quarantine
practice became established on its modern scientific basis.
[The author discusses quarantine procedure
in Europe in the eighteenth century].
The international sanitary conferences at
Paris in 1851 and 1852, in which participated the different European powers
having interests in the Mediterranean, marked the close of the old regime
of quarantine. . . . England was not signatory. [Lax] [r]egulations were
adopted . . . , it being admitted that the efficacy of many measures formerly
practiced was doubtful or negative, science having proclaimed that, for
the most part, pestilential maladies are not contagious. This surprising
declaration was followed by a revolution in quarantine methods on the Continent
and resulted in the general adoption of practices based on the limited
communicability of epidemic diseases. These changes, with which the early
history of quarantine closes, were brought into effect at the beginning
of the new era, during which the doctrine of specific living causes of
epidemic diseases have been built up on the substantial basis of experimental
medicine.

B. Judicial Review of Civil Confinement: The Early Cases

As the excerpt by Eager illustrates, the practice
of quarantine pre-dates the founding of the republic and continues to modern
times. For a discussion of quarantine law in the United States see Parmet
(1985) and Merritt (1986). In the early twentieth century, the courts adopted
a permissive approach to quarantine, as the following two state supreme
court decisions illustrate. Both cases reveal stereotypical attitudes based
on gender and race.

Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909)

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Decided August 19, 1909.

Judge ALDRICH delivered the opinion of the court.

[The city of Aiken, South Carolina found that
Mary Kirk had contagious leprosy and required her to be isolated in the
city hospital for infectious diseases. Kirk claimed that although she had
leprosy, she was not dangerous to the community. Additionally, she
complained that the hospital where she was to be placed was really a “pesthouse,
coarse and comfortless” and used for “incarcerating negroes having small-pox
and other dangerous infectious diseases.” She further objected to her isolation
because of the odors coming from the city dumping ground near the hospital.
She was granted a temporary injunction. The Board of Health appealed, claiming
that she was a danger to community, that they had sought measures to improve
the hospital and would eventually provide a private cottage for her, and
that the city dump was located nearby but did not contain foul deposits.]
Municipal boards of health . . . are to be
considered as deriving their authority to isolate infected persons from
. . . from section 1099 of the Civil Code, which provides:

The said board of health shall have power and it shall be their
duty to make and enforce all needful rules and regulations to prevent the
introduction and spread of infectious or contagious diseases by the regulation
of intercourse with infected places, by the arrest, separation, and treatment
of infected persons, and persons who shall have been exposed to any contagious
or infectious diseases, . . . They shall also have power, with the consent
of the town or city council, in case of the prevalence of any contagious
or infectious diseases within the town or city, to establish one or more
hospitals and to make provisions and regulations for the management of
the same. . . .

The principles of constitutional law governing
health regulations by statute and municipal ordinance may be thus stated:
First. Statutes and ordinances requiring the
removal or destruction of property or the isolation of infected persons,
when necessary for the protection of the public health, do not violate
the constitutional guaranty of the right of the enjoyment of liberty and
property, because neither the right to liberty nor the right of property
extends to the use of liberty or property to the injury of others. . .
.The individual has no more right to the freedom of spreading disease by
carrying contagion on his person, than he has to produce disease by maintaining
his property in a noisome condition.
Second. The state must of necessity lodge
the power somewhere to ascertain, in the first instance, and act with promptness,
when the public health is endangered by the unhealthful condition of the
person or the property of the individual; and the creation by legislative
authority of boards of health, with the discretion lodged in them of summary
inquiry and action, is a reasonable exercise of the police power. . . .
Third. Arbitrary power over persons and property
could not be conferred on a board of health, and no attempt is made in
the Constitution or statutes to confer such power. . . . It is always implied
that the power conferred to interfere with these personal rights is limited
by public necessity. From this it follows that boards of health may not
deprive any person of his property or his liberty, unless the deprivation
is . . . reasonably necessary to the public health; and such inquiry must
include notice to the person whose property or liberty is involved, and
the opportunity to him to be heard, unless the emergency appears to be
so great that such notice and hearing could be had only at the peril of
the public safety.
Fourth. To the end that personal liberty and
property may be protected against invasion not essential to the public
health—not required by public necessity—the regulations and proceedings
of boards of health are subject to judicial review, by an action for damages
or for injunction or other appropriate proceeding, according to the circumstances.
In passing upon such regulations and proceedings, the courts consider,
first, whether interference with personal liberty or property was reasonably
necessary to the public health, and, second, if the means used and the
extent of the interference were reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose to be attained.
Fifth. . . . [T]he courts must determine whether
there is any real relation between the preservation of the public health
and the legislative enactment, or the regulations and proceedings of boards
of health under authority of the statute. If the statute or the regulations
made or the proceedings taken under it are not reasonably appropriate to
the end in view, the necessity for curtailment of individual liberty, which
is essential to the validity of such statutes and regulations and proceedings,
is wanting, and the courts must declare them invalid, as violative of constitutional
right. . . .
In applying these principles, it is to be
borne in mind that the case under consideration is unusual, imposing upon
the Aiken board of health a delicate and unpleasant duty. Miss Kirk is
not only a lady of refinement, highly esteemed in the community, but she
is quite advanced in years. The proceedings of the board show clearly their
solicitude to treat Miss Kirk with courtesy and consideration. . . .
That Miss Kirk is afflicted with anaesthetic
leprosy contracted while engaged in missionary work in Brazil is admitted.
While there is a strong showing that the anaesthetic form of the disease
is only slightly contagious, when the distressing nature of the malady
is regarded, it is manifest that the board were well within their duty
in requiring the victim of it to be isolated. The case then turns on whether,
under the principles above stated, . . . the manner of the isolation was
so clearly beyond what was necessary to the public protection that the
court ought to enjoin it as arbitrary. . . . [T]here is hardly any danger
of contagion from Miss Kirk, except by touch, or at least close personal
association. What is more important than these opinions is the uncontroverted
fact that Miss Kirk has for many years lived in the city of Aiken, attended
church services, taught in the Sunday school, mingled freely with the people
in social life, resting on the opinion of Dr. Hutchinson, a distinguished
London specialist, that her disease was not contagious, and in all that
time there has been nothing to indicate that she has imparted the disease
to any other person. Was there any necessity to send such a patient to
the pesthouse? The board of health had established a strict quarantine
of her dwelling, and there was no evidence that Miss Kirk had made any
effort to violate it. The maintenance of this quarantine, we cannot doubt,
afforded complete protection to the public. It is true the board could
not be expected to maintain a permanent quarantine of a house in the heart
of the city of Aiken; but the city council had agreed to build for the
purpose of isolation a comfortable cottage outside of the city limits,
which could have been completed in a short time.
There is some conflict in the affidavits as
to the condition of the pesthouse; but it is not denied that it is a structure
of four small rooms in a row, with no piazzas, used heretofore for the
isolation of negroes with smallpox, situated within a hundred yards of
the place where the trash of the city, except its offensive offal, is collected
and burned. The smoke from this pile is blown through the house. The board
of health, it is true, have made it less uncomfortable by painting and
some other work; but, with this improvement, we are forced to the conclusion
that even temporary isolation in such a place would be a serious affliction
and peril to an elderly lady, enfeebled by disease, and accustomed to the
comforts of life. Nothing but necessity would justify the board of health
in requiring it, and we think . . . there was no good reason to conclude
that such necessity existed. . . .

Ex parte Company, 139 N.E. 204 (Ohio 1922)

Supreme Court of Ohio

Decided December 5, 1922.

Judge CLARK delivered the opinion of the court.

[Defendants Martha Company and Irene Irvin
were arrested, on separate occasions, on the charge of violating §
13031-13 of the Ohio General Code (including prostitution, lewdness and
assignation). While in custody, both were found to have sexually transmitted
diseases (syphilis and gonorrhea). The commissioner of health of
the city of Akron confined them in their detention home under a quarantine
for approximately two months (the time necessary to render each noninfectious
through treatment). The defendants filed writs of habeas corpus to
protest that their detention violated their constitutional right to due
process. Refusing the writs, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the
state statute permitting the detention of the defendants as a legitimate
exercise of the state’s police powers.]
Regulation 2 of the Sanitary Code . . . named,
classified, and declared dangerous to the public health certain diseases
and disabilities, and included in class 'B,' of such designated diseases,
those known as chancroid, gonorrhea, and syphilis. Regulation 18 of the
Sanitary Code declares such diseases to be contagious, infectious, communicable,
and dangerous to the public health. Regulation 23 empowers the health commissioner
of each city to make examination of persons reasonably suspected of having
a venereal disease. All known prostitutes and persons associating with
them shall be considered as reasonably suspected of having a venereal disease.
Regulation 24 provides that the health commissioner may quarantine any
person who has, or is reasonably suspected of having, a venereal disease,
whenever in his opinion quarantine is necessary for the protection of the
public health. . . .
The right of the state through the exercise
of its police power to subject persons and property to reasonable and proper
restraints in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the state is no longer open to question. In the American constitutional
system the power to establish the necessary police regulations has been
left with the several states. . . . The regulations here under consideration,
if otherwise lawful, are not in conflict with any provision of the federal
or state Constitutions.
It is urged that the Sanitary Code, and the
particular regulations in question, are in opposition to and violative
of subsection c of § 13031-17 [which states]. . . as follows:

Any person charged with a violation of § 13031-13 of the
General Code, shall, upon the order of the court having jurisdiction of
such case, be subjected to examination to determine if such person is infected
with a venereal disease. . . . No person charged with a violation of §
13031-13 of the General Code shall be discharged from custody, paroled
or placed on probation if he or she has a venereal disease in an infective
stage unless the court having jurisdiction shall be assured that such person
will continue medical treatment until cured or rendered noninfectious.

In the cases here considered it is to be observed
that both of the petitioners were charged with violations of § 13031-13.
Regulation 24 provides that such infected persons shall be subject to quarantine.
The statutory provision is that such infected persons shall not be discharged
from custody, paroled, or placed on probation. No inconsistency is found
as between the regulations complained of and the provisions of subsection
c of § 13031-17. In either event quarantine is established. Quarantine
in the sense herein used means detention to the point of preserving the
infected person from contact with others. The power to so quarantine in
proper case and reasonable way is not open to question. It is exercised
by the state and the subdivisions of the state daily. The protection of
the health and lives of the public is paramount, and those who by conduct
and association contract such disease as makes them a menace to the health
and morals of the community must submit to such regulation as will protect
the public. . . .
The right to quarantine by exclusion has been
upheld in the recent case of Zucht v. King [(excerpted in chapter 12)].
. . .
It is our conclusion that the provisions of
§§ 1232, 1234, 1235, and 1236, General Code, creating a state
department of health, a public health council, and authorizing such public
health council “to make and amend sanitary regulations to be of general
application throughout the state,” and to provide for the certification,
publication, and enforcement of such regulations, is a lawful and valid
exercise of legislative power. . . .

* * *

The Ohio Supreme Court did not appear unduly
concerned with whether Martha Company actually had a venereal disease.
It upheld a quarantine regulation that “all known prostitutes and people
associated with them shall be considered as reasonably suspected of having
a venereal disease.” “Suspect conduct and association” were deemed
sufficient to justify imposing control measures. An Illinois court accepted
similarly unfounded assumptions: “suspected” prostitutes were considered
“natural subjects and carriers of venereal disease,” making it “logical
and natural that suspicion be cast upon them.” People ex rel. Baker v.
Strautz, 54 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ill. 1944).

C. Judicial Review of Civil Confinement: Modern Standards

Although modern public health authorities exercise
compulsory powers much less frequently, they sometimes still detain persons
with infectious disease. The Gillis W. Long Hansen’s Disease Center, called
the “Louisiana Leper Home” or “Carville,” closed as recently as 1998. The
Center was used as a place of residence and treatment of persons with leprosy
(Jauhar 1998). Additionally, many states still maintain places for the
treatment of TB (Gasner et al 1999; Oscherwitz et al. 1997). Edward W.
Campion (1999), an editor of the New England Journal of Medicine,
comments on the use of legal action, including mandatory detention, in
New York City to control multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB):

To be effective, TB-control programs must be able to get nearly
every patient to complete the full course of antituberculosis-drug therapy,
but full compliance with a multidrug regimen lasting for months is notoriously
difficult. Even with directly controlled therapy, which is now used widely,
patients sometimes stop cooperating or just disappear. In response to the
resurgence of TB in New York City, the commissioner of health was given
added powers, including the power to detain patients, not only while they
were infectious but also, if necessary, until they completed a full course
of treatment. Sending patients to a locked facility for treatment is an
extreme measure, and the threat to civil liberties is particularly serious
since most of the patients likely to receive such orders are impoverished
and powerless. . . .
Over a period of two years there were more than 8000 patients with
active TB, and legal orders to complete treatment were issued to only about
4 percent. Most of those patients had alcoholism or used illicit drugs.
Many had histories of homelessness or imprisonment, and most had left hospitals
against medical advice in the past. More than half the orders issued were
simply for directly observed therapy in the community. But 139 people were
detained for treatment of TB, and most of these patients were kept on the
secure ward of a hospital for about six months. The special ward has exercise
and recreation facilities and is not a prison, but patients are forced
to live there, away from their neighborhoods and families. As one of these
patients described it, a major hardship of mandatory confinement is “being
bored like an oyster.”

How would the modern courts review public health practices such as the
detention of persons with TB? The judiciary uses a heightened standard
of review, but still almost invariably upholds the exercise of public health
powers. The Supreme Court in an analogous context, held that civil commitment
of the mentally ill constitutes a “massive curtailment of liberty.” Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). To justify confinement the courts probably
would require the state to demonstrate a substantial interest in preventing
the spread of disease; a well-targeted intervention that was not over-inclusive;
and that loss of liberty was the least restrictive alternative.
The modern courts are also process-oriented
and would undoubtedly require fair procedures before permitting civil confinement.
As the Supreme Court recognized, “there can be no doubt that involuntary
commitment to a mental hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual
for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish
without due process of law.” O' Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580
(1975) (Berger, C.J., concurring). In Greene v. Edwards (excerpted
in chapter 7) the West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that there is little
difference between loss of liberty for mental health reasons and loss of
liberty for public health rationales. Persons with an infectious disease,
therefore, are entitled to similar procedural protections as persons with
mental illness facing civil commitment, including the right to counsel
and a hearing. Such rigorous procedural protections are justified by the
fundamental invasion of liberty occasioned by long-term detention; the
serious implications of erroneously finding a person dangerous; and the
value of procedures in accurately determining the complex facts which are
important to predicting future dangerous behavior (see discussion of Mathews
v. Eldridge in chapter 7).
In the following case, a New York trial court
authorizes the isolation of a person with TB. Notice that the court
is deferential to public health authorities, but insists that the state
must have a substantial public health interest and afford the individual
a fair process. See New York v. Franklin, 205 A.D.2d 469 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994) (upholding isolation to prevent the spread of MDR-TB, but only
after finding that it was the least restrictive alternative).

City of New York v. Antoinette R., 630 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1995)

Supreme Court, Queens County

Decided April 21, 1995.

Judge McGANN delivered the opinion of the court.

[The city health commissioner sought enforcement
of order requiring forcible detention in a hospital setting of a person
(Antoinette R.) with active, infectious TB. The purpose of the detention
was to allow for completion of appropriate regime of medical treatment.
The court found in favor of detention despite evidence regarding Antoinette’s
recent cooperation in adhering to voluntary treatment regime].
Due to a resurgence of TB, New York City recently
revised the Health Code to permit the detention of individuals infected
with TB who have demonstrated an inability to voluntarily comply with appropriate
medical treatment. Thus, effective April 29, 1993, New York City Health
Code § 11.47 was amended to give the Commissioner of Health the authority
to issue an order for the removal or detention in a hospital or other treatment
facility of a person who has active TB. The prerequisite for an order is
that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the person's past or present
behavior, that the individual cannot be relied upon to participate in or
complete an appropriate prescribed course of medication or, if necessary,
follow required contagion precautions for TB. Such behavior may include
the refusal or failure to take medication or to complete treatment for
tuberculosis, to keep appointments for the treatment of TB, or a disregard
for contagion precautions.
The statute provides certain due process safeguards
when detention is ordered. For example, there are requirements for an appraisal
of the risk posed to others and a review of less restrictive alternatives
which were attempted or considered. Furthermore, there must be a court
review within five days at the patient's request, and court review within
sixty days and at ninety-day intervals thereafter. The detainee also has
the right to counsel, to have counsel provided, and to have friends or
relatives notified. . . .
When [TB] initially becomes active, it is
often highly infectious, that is, capable of being transmitted to others.
A person with infectious TB can normally be rendered non-infectious within
days to weeks. Thereafter, the individual must continue to take a full
course of medication, generally for six to nine months, to cure the active
TB. If a patient stops taking the appropriate medication before the expiration
of these six to nine months, however, that patient will likely become infectious
again. Moreover, when the medical regime is interrupted, and the TB resurges
in an infectious state, the organisms in the individual's system may eventually
mutate and become resistant to the original drugs prescribed. The more
times medication is suspended, the more likely is the chance of developing
a strain of TB which is resistant to drugs.
These multi-drug resistant [(MDR)] strains of TB stay infectious and
active over longer periods of time and therefore require long-term treatment
with more toxic drugs. By comparison, the standard treatment for non-resistant
TB consists of administering two drugs, isoniazid and rifampin, for approximately
six months until the patient is cured. The cure rate for those completing
this treatment is considered 100%. MDR-TB, on the other hand, is resistant
to these drugs and to as many as seven other antibiotics. To obtain a cure
rate of 60% or less, toxic drugs must be maintained over a minimum period
of eighteen to twenty-four months. . . . The most critical characteristic
of these MDR strains is that they are capable of being transmitted directly
to others during the infectious stage. . . .
The Board recognized that the failure of a
TB patient to complete an effective course of therapy creates the likelihood
of relapse and facilitates development of drug resistant strains of the
disease. The Board therefore decreed that the refusal or failure of TB
patients, whether or not infectious, to complete a course of anti-TB therapy
creates a significant threat to the public health. Accordingly, the New
York City Health Code was amended to allow the Commissioner to issue orders
of detention [through] . . . an application to the court for enforcement
. . . [based on] clear and convincing evidence [of] the particularized
circumstances constituting the necessity for the detention. . . .
The [Commissioner’s] request for enforcement
of the order . . . is granted. The [Commissioner] has demonstrated
through clear and convincing evidence the respondent's inability to comply
with a prescribed course of medication in a less restrictive environment.
. . . [Antoinette R.] has repeatedly sought medical treatment for the infectious
stages of the disease and has consistently withdrawn from medical treatment
once symptoms abate. She has also exhibited a pattern of behavior which
is consistent with one who does not understand the full import of her condition
nor the risks she poses to others, both the public and her family. On the
contrary, she has repeatedly tried to hide the history of her condition
from medical personnel. Although the court is sympathetic to the fact that
she has recently undergone an epiphany of sorts, there is nothing in the
record which would indicate that once she leaves the controlled setting
of the hospital she would have the self-discipline to continue her cooperation.
Moreover, her past behavior and lack of compliance with outpatient treatment
when her listed residence was her mother's house, makes it all the more
difficult to have confidence that her mother's good intentions will prevail
over the respondent's inclinations to avoid treatments. In any event, the
court will reevaluate the progress of the respondent's ability to cooperate
in a less restrictive setting during its next review of the order in ninety
days.
Accordingly, [Antoinette R.] shall continue
to be detained in a hospital setting until [she] . . . has completed an
appropriate course of medication for TB, or a change in circumstances indicates
that the respondent can be relied upon to complete the prescribed course
of medication without being in detention. . . .

* * *

During the first decades of the HIV/AIDS epidemic,
commentators urged public health authorities to employ their powers of
detention. See, e.g., Buckley (1986); Grutsch & Robertson (1986). At
least two forms of detention could have been used: status-based,
applying to all persons with HIV infection or AIDS and behavior-based,
applying only to persons with HIV/AIDS who engage in specified high-risk
behaviors. A status-based program would have been highly impractical, potentially
affecting hundreds of thousands of Americans. A behavior-based program
would have granted public health authorities wide discretion, enabling
them to target vulnerable groups such as gay men or commercial sex workers.
What are the principal arguments, for and against, isolation of persons
living with HIV/AIDS? For a discussion, see Bayer and Fairchild-Carrino
(1993); Sullivan and Field (1988); Gostin (1989).

II. The Criminal Law: Knowing or Willful Exposure to Infection

Jennifer Frey, "Nushawn’s Girls"Washington Post, June 1, 1999, at C2

It has been two years since Andrea last gave
herself to Nushawn Williams. She has traded the drugs and the parties and
the jail cells for a room in her mother's middle-class house. Her belly
is eight months swollen. . .
Andrea—who asked that her last name not be
revealed—is 19 now, and she has a new boyfriend named Angel, and they are
thrilled to have a baby on the way. She is happy, after a lifetime of unhappiness.
And she is furious. Furious at [Nushawn] Williams, the man who infected
her—and 12 other young women in rural Chautauqua County [New York]—with
HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Furious that he received only a 4-to-12-year
sentence for his actions. Furious at herself for taking the risks she took
with a drug dealer from Brooklyn, a man she never even loved. "If I could
take back one moment in my life," she says, "it would be the moment I laid
eyes on him.". . .

[Andrea] became one of "Nushawn's girls," as
the young women now are commonly known here. Nushawn's girls: Four have
had babies, two more—including Andrea—are pregnant, and none are sick yet,
unless you count the sickness that is regret. The youngest was 13 when
she met Williams, the oldest in her mid-twenties. Andrea was 17. He wooed
her the way he wooed many of the others: He bought her nice presents. He
told her she had pretty eyes. He took her to parties. He let her move in.
He also treated her like a possession, according
to Andrea, slapping her around if she so much as went to the store for
a soda without his permission. Andrea says, "I hated having sex with him."
She says he had sex with other women while she was with him. Still, she
stayed for a while. Because it was exciting. Because he made her feel special,
if only for a moment.
"There are Nushawns in every city waiting
for girls like Andrea," says her mother, Wendy. "This is about frustrated
lives festering with all sorts of problems. Once you are hopeless, and
have no more dreams, then you don't give a damn about what you do to yourself.
You live for the moment." . . .
When the Williams story made national, news
in October 1997, it became, as one AIDS educator described it, "a teachable
moment." What happened here was supposed to serve as proof that AIDS can
happen to anyone, anywhere. . . .
This, then, is a story not just about Jamestown
[in Chautauqua County] but about the legacy of AIDS. What Jamestown can
show is that—no matter the place, no matter the people—AIDS still brings
denial, displacement and blame.
It was Oct. 27, 1997, when Richard Berke,
the county health commissioner, held a news conference to announce to the
world that Chautauqua County had been home to a one-man HIV epidemic named
Nushawn Williams. In this county of 141,000, there had been just 60 reported
cases of full-blown AIDS since 1981. So when several teenage girls popped
up HIV-positive in a short period of time, the health department took notice.
It took a while to trace them back to Williams.
He used so many aliases—Face, Shyteek, Headteck, Shoe—that it wasn't until
Berke got to the sixth girl that he realized the connection. It's a connection
he probably couldn't have made if Chautauqua were a bigger county, with
more clinics and more HIV cases and more counselors. It's a place where
Berke didn't have to walk more than few hundred yards to talk to the judge
who let him publicly reveal Williams's HIV status by deeming Williams a
“public health risk.”
So Berke held his news conference. Officials
papered the county with posters bearing Williams's likeness and the message
“Health Alert.” And chaos hit. . . .More than 1,400 individuals-many of
them teenagers-flocked to local clinics for testing. . . .
Williams had identified 48 sexual partners
to Chautauqua County health officials. Of those 48, 41 were eventually
tested. Thirteen turned up positive—seven infected by Williams before he
knew his own HIV status, according to Berke, and the other six afterward.
One man also is believed to have been infected by one of those women. And
one baby, thus far, has been born with HIV. . . .
The information about [Nushawn’s girls] is
sketchy. . . . “They probably fit the profile of the people we've been
having trouble reaching all along,” Berke says. “Because of the chaos in
their own lives—kids who are up all night, alcohol, abuse, all kinds of
situations—the message may not be making it. Or the message may be making
it, but it's not all that relevant to their life.” . . .
Then there are the babies. Four born, two
on the way. [O]ne who has tested HIV-
positive. . .
It's not so amazing to Heather Watts, a medical
officer at the National Institutes of Health who specializes in pediatric
and maternal AIDS and has treated numerous pregnant women who are HIV-positive.
Watts says that the average rate of infection from mother to child is 25
percent, but that it can be reduced to 5 to 8 percent with proper drug
treatments, and in cases like Andrea's, where the mother has a low level
of the virus in her blood, it can be as low as
2 percent.
"Many make informed decisions," Watts says.
"I think it's analogous to genetic diseases before we had the more sophisticated
tests. It's a powerful pull, the desire to procreate. People take risks."
Ask Andrea why she wants a child and she says,
"In case I get sick." Ask her to
elaborate and she says, "You know, so I have something to leave behind."
Mostly though, Andrea refuses to talk about the possibility of getting
full-blown AIDS.
Her denial is not uncommon. Two of the other
young women have stopped taking their medication. One cut off contact with
her doctors after she had a baby, and the baby tested negative . . . .
There were a few concrete changes that came
out of what happened here. Youth outreach Programs were formed and a daylong
teen summit held, and there are plans for a teen center. People no longer
go through the back basement door to get to AIDS Community Services in
the old mansion at Fifth and Main streets. AIDS is no longer a secret here.
But it's still a curse. . . .
Much energy has been directed toward passing
laws that will make it easier to punish the Nushawn Williamses of the world
(Williams pleaded guilty to one count of statutory rape and one count of
reckless endangerment). . . .
This is the legacy of AIDS: People may say,
“AIDS can happen to anyone," but deep inside they're still thinking, “It
can't happen to me." There's always a way to make it about someone else.
Gays. Drug users. People who hang out with gays and drug users. Blacks
and Hispanics in big-city ghettos. White trash. . . .

* * *

There is a powerful appeal in using the criminal
law to prosecute individuals who knowingly or willfully risk transmission
of an infectious disease. The public views individuals who engage in this
behavior as morally blameworthy and supports criminal sanctions for aberrant
and irresponsible conduct. The criminal law deters risk behavior and sets
a clear standard for behaviors that society will not tolerate.
The criminal law is backward-looking, concerned
with punishing individuals for dangerous acts that have already occurred.
Civil confinement, on the other hand, is forward-looking, concerned with
avoiding risk behavior that may occur in the future. Many scholars believe
that the criminal law is clearer and more objective than civil detention.
Whereas civil confinement often uses broad standards, such as “dangerousness,”
the criminal law must specify the behavior that is prohibited. Whereas
“dangerousness” need only be proved by clear and convincing evidence, each
element of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Whereas the
period of civil confinement is indefinite, the period of criminal confinement
is usually finite and proportionate to the gravity of the offense.
There are two kinds of charges that can be
filed against persons who risk transmission of an infectious disease: traditional
crimes of violence and public health offences. This section discusses each
of these aspects of the criminal law and concludes with a critique, arguing
that criminal prosecutions often can be both unfair and ineffective as
a public health intervention.

A. Traditional Crimes of Violence

The traditional crimes of violence that can
be read to apply to the transmission of an infectious disease are homicide
(actual and attempted) and assault. Murder prosecutions resulting from
transmission of an infectious disease are very rare because they require
the death of the victim. Infectious diseases often do not result in death
and, if they do, the length of time from infection to death usually precludes
prosecution. Additionally, homicide requires proof of causation and it
may be difficult to demonstrate that the person contracted the infection
from the defendant.
Prosecutions for attempted murder also should
be rare and difficult to prove. As Professors Kathleen Sullivan and Martha
Field (1988) observe, “having sex or sharing needles is a highly indirect
modus operandi for the person whose purpose is to kill.” Nevertheless,
attempted homicide charges have been brought for a broad range of conduct.
The criminal law uses a subjective standard
for criminal attempts so that if the facts are as the person believes them
to be, it is an offense. This is important in the infectious disease context
because a person could be convicted of attempted murder if his intent is
to kill, regardless of whether the method used poses a significant risk
of transmission. Under this theory, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld
the conviction for attempted murder of a person with HIV for splattering
emergency workers with his blood. See State v. Haines below. Other
courts have upheld convictions for attempted murder for other low risks
such as biting and spitting. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1993); Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tx. Ct. App. 1992).
A simple assault is a purposeful, knowing,
or reckless causing of bodily injury. Defendants with infectious diseases
who engage in harmful behavior, such as biting or throwing body fluids
have been convicted of assault instead of attempted murder. The crime becomes
aggravated assault if the person causes a “serious” bodily injury or uses
a “deadly weapon.” In United States v. Sturgis, excerpted below,
a federal court of appeals upholds the conviction of an inmate for aggravated
assault, holding that teeth, under certain circumstances, can constitute
a deadly weapon. See also United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163
(8th Cir. 1988).

State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)

Indiana Court of Appeals

Decided October 31, 1989.

Judge BUCHANAN delivered the opinion of the court.

On August 6, 1987, in Lafayette, Indiana, two
police officers went to Haines’ apartment in response to a possible suicide.
The officers found Haines face down in blood, unconscious, with both writs
slashed and bleeding. Haines then stood and ran towards one officer, Dennis,
screaming that he should be left to die because he had AIDS. The police
officers tried to subdue him, but Haines continued to fight and stated
he would “give it to him” and “use his wounds” as he jerked his arms, causing
blood to go into the officers mouth and eyes. He repeatedly yelled
that he had AIDS and could not deal with it and would make Dennis deal
with it.
Haines also struggled with emergency medical
technicians, threatening to infect them with AIDS and continued to spit,
bite, scratch and grab the personnel until several were bleeding from scratches
and scrapes on their arms and hands. Upon arrival to the hospital, Haines
was still kicking, screaming, throwing blood and spitting and again announced
he had AIDS and was going to show everyone else what it was like to have
the disease and die, again biting a personnel.
Haines’ homosexual [partner] recalled that
a doctor had informed Haines that he had the virus, and Haines told him
he knew it was a fatal disease and at the time warned medical staff not
to touch him because he was diseased.
Haines was charged with three counts of attempted
murder. At trial, medical experts testified that the virus could be transmitted
through blood, tears, and saliva. They also observed that policemen, firemen,
and other emergency personnel are generally at risk when they are exposed
to body products. One medical expert observed that Dennis was definitely
exposed to the HIV virus and others acknowledged that exposure of infected
blood to the eyes and the mouth is dangerous, and that it is easier for
the virus to enter the blood stream if there is a cut in the skin. . .
.
[The State of Indiana appeals from the trial
court's grant of Haines’ motion for judgment on the evidence, claiming
that the trial judge erred in vacating the jury's verdicts of three counts
of attempted murder and entering judgments of conviction as to three counts
of battery, a class D felony. The State also alleges that the trial court
erred in excluding the testimony of two physicians].
The only issue before us is whether the trial
court erred in granting Haines' motion for judgment on the evidence vacating
the three counts of attempted murder. . . . When the trial judge sentenced
Haines on February 2, 1988, he made this statement:

“I believe my decision in this case was made easier by the
State's decision to not introduce any medical expert scientific evidence.
. . .
The State believed that the disease known as AIDS was irrelevant to
its burden of proof; that only the intent or state of mind of the defendant
was relevant. I disagree with that. All of us know that the conduct of
spitting, throwing blood and biting cannot under normal circumstances constitute
a step, substantial or otherwise, in causing the death of another person,
regardless of the intent of the defendant. More has to be shown, more has
to be proven, in my judgment. And the more in this case was that the conduct
had to be coupled with a disease, a disease which by definition is inextricably
based in science and medicine. . . .
[I]n this case, the State took the position that everyone has heard
of AIDS; that everybody has read about the disease of AIDS;
and that everyone knows that this disease can be lethal or that it is lethal;
that AIDS, if you will, is as common a killer as a gun or a knife, which
by their very nature are deadly weapons.
All of the medical evidence . . . shows conclusively that this medical
condition and what it means is not very clear. And this is especially true
when the [u]ncontroverted evidence in this case was that the defendant
did not, in fact, have what the doctors consider a AIDS [sic]; but, having
instead, as set out in the charges that were filed in this case, an AIDS
Related Complex, which is a preliminary stage of the disease of AIDS. .
. . There was no medical expert evidence that the person with ARC or AIDS
can kill another by transmitting bodily fluids as alleged in this case.
And there was no medical evidence from any of the evidence that the defendant
had any reason to believe that he could transmit his condition to others
by transmitting bodily fluids as are alleged in this case. . . . I find
that the State failed in its burden of establishing that the defendant
had a medical disease of ARC as alleged, that ARC can lead to AIDS, that
AIDS or ARC is a disease that can be or is lethal and that spitting, biting
or throwing blood at the victims is a method of transmitting AIDS or ARC.
. . ."

Record at 699-703 (emphasis supplied). . . .
Contrary to Haines' contention that the evidence
did not support a reasonable inference that his conduct amounted to a substantial
step toward murder, the record reflects otherwise. At trial, it was definitely
established that Haines carried the AIDS virus, was aware of the infection,
believed it to be fatal, and intended to inflict others with the disease
by spitting, biting, scratching, and throwing blood. His biological warfare
with those attempting to help him is akin to a sinking ship firing on its
rescuers. . . .
[T]he State was not required to prove that
Haines' conduct could actually have killed. It was only necessary for the
State to show that Haines did all that he believed necessary to bring about
an intended result, regardless of what was actually possible.
Haines repeatedly announced that he had AIDS and desired to infect and
kill others. At the hospital, Haines was expressly told by doctors that
biting, spitting, and throwing blood was endangering others. . . .
[S]ome jurisdictions provide for the dismissal
of a charge or reduction in sentence on the basis of "inherent impossibility"
if the defendant's conduct was so inherently unlikely to result or culminate
in the commission of a crime, inasmuch as neither the conduct nor the action
taken would present a public danger. . . .
While we have found no Indiana case directly
on point, the evidence presented at trial renders any defense of inherent
impossibility inapplicable in this case. . . . In addition to Haines' belief
that he could infect others there was testimony by physicians that the
virus may be transmitted through the exchange of bodily fluids. It was
apparent that the victims were exposed to the AIDS virus as a result of
Haines' conduct. Ernest Drucker, an epidemiologist, knew of at least one
case involving a health-care worker who became infected when a tube of
blood containing the virus exploded, and the contaminated blood splashed
on her skin and into her eyes and mouth. . . . Paul Balson, a professor
of medicine at Louisiana State, testified that infection through "skin
to skin" contact is possible, and that risk of infection exists when blood
is splattered into the eyes or other mucous membranes. . . .
From the evidence in the record before us
we can only conclude that Haines had knowledge of his disease and that
he unrelentingly and unequivocally sought to kill the persons helping him
by infecting them with AIDS, and that he took a substantial step towards
killing them by his conduct believing that he could do so, all of which
was more than a mere tenuous, theoretical, or speculative "chance" of transmitting
the disease. From all of the evidence before the jury it could have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that Haines took a substantial step toward the
commission of murder. . . .
The trial court's judgment is reversed with
instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict and resentence Haines accordingly.

* * *

State v. Haines is a difficult and troubling
case. The jury returned a verdict of attempted murder in under 60 minutes,
viewing Mr. Haines as morally blameworthy. Another way to see this case
is that Mr. Haines was making a “cry for help.” He had just attempted suicide
and was in despair over the diagnosis of AIDS, which at the time was an
invariably fatal disease. Mr. Haines asked the emergency workers to leave
him alone and let him “die from AIDS.” His behavior, while highly concerning,
was unlikely to have transmitted the infection. In these circumstances,
did Mr. Haines deserve criminal punishment and would use of the criminal
law in these kinds of cases deter others from risk behavior?

United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784 (4th Cir. 1995)

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided February 21, 1995.

Judge WILKINSON delivered the opinion of the court.

Jeffrey Wayne Sturgis appeals his conviction for
assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) . . . . Sturgis,
who is HIV positive, bit two correctional officers who were attempting
to restrain him during an altercation at the Lorton Reformatory. We conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to establish Sturgis' intent to harm the
correctional officers. The question of whether Sturgis' teeth qualified
as a dangerous weapon was also one of fact for the jury. Here the jury
could reasonably have concluded that Sturgis used his mouth and teeth as
a "dangerous weapon" during the incident. Accordingly, we affirm Sturgis'
conviction.
On July 15, 1993, Jeffrey Wayne Sturgis went
to Lorton Reformatory in Virginia to visit an inmate and upon entering
was required to . . . submit to a search of his person and belongings .
. . . During the search, one officer discovered a foreign object in Sturgis’
pants. Upon questioning, Sturgis declared he wanted to end the search and
forego the visit. He then took the object from his pants and placed it
in his mouth. Suspicious that Sturgis had contraband, one officer tried
to force his jaws open to retrieve the object. Sturgis began to struggle
and finally spit out the object (pink bubble gum) and as the officer tried
to retrieve the object Sturgis attacked him by biting him on the thumb,
causing bleeding. As the struggle escalated, more officers tried
to help restrain Sturgis, who was kicking and flailing and eventually bit
another officer on the arm with substantial bleeding. Once subdued, Sturgis
was then transferred to DeWitt Army Hospital for treatment and observation
(for fear that he had actually swallowed narcotics).
While at the hospital, Sturgis continued to
be combative by struggling, shouting, biting, spitting and threatening
the medical personnel trying to treat him. He was told to stop because
he was HIV positive but he stated he knew of his condition and was trying
to infect the staff.
Sturgis' stomach was pumped at the hospital.
Although no foreign objects were found, a drug screen revealed traces of
cocaine and marijuana in his bloodstream. A blood test performed at DeWitt
Army Hospital also confirmed Sturgis' HIV positive status. . . .
At Sturgis' trial, the government presented
medical records compiled while Sturgis was an inmate at Lorton. Those records
contained eight references to Sturgis' HIV positive status and indicated
that he had been informed of that status in 1991. The United States also
offered expert testimony to establish that HIV, which is found in human
saliva, can be transmitted through a bite. . . .
Sturgis . . . insisted that he was unaware
of his HIV positive status until counsel informed him of the results of
the test taken at DeWitt Army Hospital in July of 1993. . . .
Conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon
under 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) requires proof of (1) an assault, (2) with
a dangerous weapon, (3) with intent to do bodily harm. . . .
Sturgis claims that the evidence fails to
establish that he acted with the requisite intent to do bodily harm to
the correctional officers. Rather, he maintains that he acted wholly in
self-defense. . . . [T]he evidence amply establishes Sturgis' intent
to inflict harm. The record demonstrates that Sturgis acted in a violent
and aggressive manner throughout the confrontation with the correctional
officers and continued to kick, scream, and thrash about even after being
taken to DeWitt Army Hospital. . . . Moreover, Sturgis' own statements,
specifically his threats against the medical personnel who treated him,
indicate that he was aware he was infected with HIV and wanted to infect
others. Finally, evidence that Sturgis held each of the bites on the correctional
officers for several seconds indicates intent to inflict serious bodily
harm, not merely to defend himself from attack.
We next address whether Sturgis' use of his
teeth to bite the correctional officers amounted to use of a "dangerous
weapon." . . . [W]hat constitutes a dangerous weapon depends not on the
object's intrinsic character but on its capacity, given "the manner of
its use," to endanger life or inflict serious physical harm. United States
v. Johnson, 324 F.2d 264, 266 (4th Cir.1963). In United States v. Moore,
846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.1988), the Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion:
"Almost any weapon, as used or attempted to be used, may endanger life
or inflict great bodily harm; as such, in appropriate circumstances,
it may be a dangerous and deadly weapon." Id. at 1166. Thus an object need
not be inherently dangerous to be a dangerous weapon. Rather, innocuous
objects or instruments may become capable of inflicting serious injury
when put to assaultive use. . . .
[T]eeth may also be a dangerous weapon if
they are employed as such. . . . Parts of the human body have been held
dangerous weapons under circumstances in which the body part was employed
to inflict death or serious physical injury. . . . Here a jury could reasonably
have concluded that Sturgis' use of his teeth to inflict potentially lethal
bite wounds amounted to use of a dangerous weapon. . . .
Finally, there is at least a substantial possibility
that HIV, which causes AIDS, can be transmitted via a human bite. . . .
Sturgis' attack may not only have inflicted serious injury on the officers
but endangered their lives as well.
In sum, the jury could have found that the
wounds inflicted by Sturgis' teeth were in essence indistinguishable from
punctures caused by a knife or an ice pick. The assertion that human teeth
can never qualify as a dangerous weapon ignores the harm to those on whom
these bites were inflicted. . . . For the foregoing reasons, Sturgis' conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

* * *

Certainly, persons who engage in assaultive
behavior deserve criminal punishment. However, should individuals
be convicted of more serious offenses (e.g., assault with a deadly weapon)
because of their infectious state? From a public health perspective
the answer may be “no” because prevention of negligible risks would be
a low priority. From a criminal justice perspective, are persons with infectious
disease more culpable if they engage in assaultive behavior knowing there
is a small possibility of transmitting the infection?

B. Public Health Offenses

Despite the spate of prosecutions for traditional
crimes of violence, the mental elements of “purpose” or “knowledge” can
be difficult to prove. Partly in frustration with the difficulty of proof,
and partly in response to political pressure, legislatures have sought
other avenues to criminalize the risk of transmission. Infectious disease
statutes create public health offenses that vary from state to state. A
few states have broad provisions that criminally punish behavior that risks
transmission of any contagious disease. Most statutes, however, create
“disease-specific” offenses that were often enacted in waves in response
to public misapprehensions about epidemics of the day. In the early twentieth
century states enacted statutes directed to TB, followed by STDs, and,
in the latter part of the century, HIV/AIDS.
Public health offenses can differ depending
on the state, but they often contain the following elements: (i) knowledge
of an infectious condition (e.g., the person tests positive for an STD
or HIV); (ii) behavior risking transmission of the infection (e.g., sexual
intercourse or sharing drug injection equipment); and (iii) failure to
disclose the risk to partners or contacts. While most STD and TB statutes
have mild sanctions, many HIV statutes are highly punitive. Courts have
upheld the constitutionality of HIV-specific statutes against challenges
based on vagueness, overbreadth, and the absence of a mens rea or specific
intent requirement, as the following case illustrates.
Public health offenses can have advantages
over traditional crimes of violence, making them much easier to prosecute.
If narrowly written, they can be more precise than the traditional criminal
law: individuals are forewarned of the prohibited behaviors and prosecutors
are vested with less discretion. Society may also value public health offenses
because they declare a public interest in responsible behavior and encourage
disclosure to persons at risk of infection. Despite these benefits, are
public health offenses useful prevention strategies? Are they likely to
deter high risk behavior? Alternatively, is it possible that they may create
the wrong incentive? Consider the possibility that persons at risk
may be better off not knowing their serologic status because only those
who are aware of their status can be prosecuted. Additionally, by creating
a specific offense legislatures implicitly invite the interest of police,
prosecutors, and the apparatus of the criminal justice system. Does this
create a problem of potentially intrusive surveillance and selective enforcement?
Whether society should resort to the criminal
law when a person risks transmission of an infectious disease depends on
the severity of the case prosecuted. Think about the preferred public policy
response to the following four scenarios involving persons with infectious
conditions. In Case 1, the person truly intends to kill and uses a means
reasonably calculated to achieve that end (e.g., a father who injects his
son with a contaminated needle to avoid paying child support). In Case
2, the person acts with reckless disregard for life such as the person
in Chautauqua County who hid his HIV status from multiple sexual partners.
In Case 3, the person engages in epidemiologically low risks such as biting,
spiting, or donating blood. Finally, in Case 4, the person engages in epidemiologically
higher risks, but the behavior is common among the population (e.g., failure
to inform a sexual partner of the risk of infection). In discussing these
scenarios, inquire whether prosecution would achieve its traditional goals:
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.

* * *

In the previous two chapters, we thought about
interventions to control infectious disease—biological approaches and deprivations
of liberty. The final chapters of this Reader explore the major
challenges facing the field of public health this century, as well as provide
case studies for important problems facing our society—emerging infectious
diseases, bioterrorism, and public health genetics.