Milestones: 1969–1976

The South Asia Crisis and the Founding of Bangladesh, 1971

In 1971, an internal crisis in Pakistan resulted in a third war between
India and Pakistan and the
secession of East Pakistan, creating the independent state of
Bangladesh. These events altered the relationship
between the United States and the region.

Last President of a united Pakistan Yahya Khan with President Richard
Nixon. (Richard Nixon Library)

The partition of India in 1947 created West and East Pakistan, two noncontiguous
territories that shared a dominant religion of Islam but were very different in
terms of language, ethnicity and culture. In the 1970 parliamentary elections,
an overwhelming number of East Pakistanis voted for a political party that
advocated autonomy for the East, but it was blocked from governing by the army
and the existing Pakistani government, and its leader was jailed. The resulting
mass protests in the East were brutally suppressed by the Pakistani army, which
caused a massive refugee movement into neighboring India. East Pakistani
guerilla forces, supported by India, fought with the Pakistani Army in the late
autumn of 1971. West Pakistan responded with air attacks on India, resulting in
open war between the two powers beginning on December 3.

The United States faced several dilemmas in how to respond to the crisis. The
regional situation was already complex. India signed a treaty of mutual
assistance with the Soviet Union in August, 1971, and the People’s Republic of
China was friendly to Pakistan and had fought a war with India in 1962. However,
Pakistan was a valuable diplomatic partner, and its government helped the United
States achieve a rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China in the early
1970s. After President Richard Nixon’s visit in 1969, the
U.S. Government had resumed selling Pakistan military equipment, a process that
had been disrupted by the previous 1965 India-Pakistan
War. Washington wished to avoid a second war between Pakistan and
India, but also feared that Pakistan would be greatly weakened if its eastern
province seceded, and so supported Pakistan initially. However, the action
against the mass protests in East Pakistan was well-publicized and widely
condemned, which limited the extent to which the U.S. Government was willing to
help the Pakistani Government prevent the division of its country.

In the end, the United States acted in a somewhat ambiguous manner during the
brief 1971 war. The U.S.S. Enterprise carrier group from
Vietnam moved toward the Bay of Bengal, stopping in Singapore and eventually
reaching Sri Lanka. This action signaled to the Soviet Union and China that it
was possible that the United States would assist Pakistan. However, by not
ordering direct intervention, the United States also conveyed to both India and
Pakistan the message that the U.S. commitment to intervention in South Asia had
limits. This ambiguity would produce negative results for U.S. influence in the
region.

India’s relationship with the Soviet Union ensured that the United Nations would
not intervene, and helped deter China from opening a second conflict on India’s
northern border. Defeated on both fronts, Pakistan was forced to accede to the
establishment of an independent Bangladesh in place of East Pakistan. Bangladesh
was admitted to the United Nations in 1974.

These developments resulted in a decline in U.S. influence in South Asia and
India’s emergence as the most significant power on the subcontinent. U.S.
prestige was damaged in both nations, in Pakistan for failing to help prevent
the loss of East Pakistan and in India for supporting the brutality of the
Pakistani regime’s actions in what became Bangladesh. In contrast, the Soviet
relationship with India became stronger, a fact that took on greater
significance with India’s rise to prominence in the region. In the long run, the
1971 war increased competition between India and Pakistan, forcing the United
States to maintain its focus on regional developments.