When we compare October 6-7 with November 1

At a moment when the possibility of Kobane’s fall to IS(IS) was high, during the demonstrations on October 6-7 to protest the government’s lack of action to help the Kobane resistance directly or indirectly, over 40 people died due to street clashes. The other day, on November 1, as part of the International Solidarity with Kobane Day, there were nationwide demonstrations but no significant incidences of violence took place. When I compare these two moments, the following points stand out:

Public order and PKK:
Both what happened on October 6-7 and what happened on November 1 show that Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s principle advisor Etyen Mahçupyan’s statement that “Public order in the region is under PKK’s control, not the government’s. That is why the prime minister is putting emphasis on public order” is quite to-the-point. It is indeed seen that the Kurdish Political Movement (PKK) has the power and the mechanisms to control public order to a large extent even though this control is not absolute. However, it would not be accurate to hold the KPM solely responsible for the fact that there were incidents on October 6-7 while nothing happened on November 1. If the government acted differently on these two occasions, the opposite scenario would have played out both on October 6-7 and on November 1.

Dialogue instead of show of power:
The incidents of October 6-7 took place at a critical moment when the government and the KPM had a disagreement, which resulted in a stubborn insistence of show of power by both sides. However when it was realized that beyond a certain point this showdown would not be beneficial for either side, both sides stepped on the brake and the clashes subsided. That is, November 1 was without incident because both sides learned their lessons from October 6-7.

The need for HDP:
The government, in order to come through the unpredicted incidents of October 6-7 with minimum harm to itself, targeted HDP and Selahattin Demirtaş. It was to such a degree that they even disseminated the speculative conclusion that what happened on October 6-7 was part of a conspiracy by HDP and Qandil against Abdullah Öcalan. However, Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan completely rejected these speculations. And November 1 proved that trying to divide the KPM in general and trying to eliminate HDP in particular is wrong and, of course, impossible.

PKK has (for now) abandoned its Hezbollah mistake:
One of the striking aspects of October 6-7 was the tension that made people fear that the PKK-Hezbollah confrontation in early 1990s might start afresh. So much so that Hezbollah supporters were on alert fearing that there might be further attacks towards them on November 1. In the end nothing happened, however the possibility of a PKK-Hezbollah clash is not completely out of the questions either. It does not look like PKK/KCK is willing to make a statement that will pacify Hezbollah. Moreover, third parties who desire a clash between the two keep provoking them. For example, we have observed that Hezbollah supporters are surprised to see increased outside sympathizers recently.

The resolution process would not go smoothly with the Turkish media:
We all know how the media treated the October 6-7 incidents. Both the supporters and the opponents of the government exaggerated the incidents out of proportion and directly or indirectly questioned the future of the resolution process. It is not surprising that the same media’s assessment of November 1 was to the effect of something like “what was feared did not happen”; however, it is sad and worrisome. Without doubt, what happened on October 6-7 led some into despair about the future of the resolution process. In contrast to it, however, isn’t it obvious that what happened on November 1 is encouraging about the future of the resolution process?