"(1) A landlord may enter into the tenant's dwelling unit or any
portion of the premises under the tenant's exclusive control in order to
inspect the premises, make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations,
alterations or improvements, supply necessary or agreed services, or exhibit
the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants,
workers or contractors. The landlord's right of access is limited as follows:

"* * * * *

"(e) * * * [U]nless there is an agreement between the landlord and
the tenant to the contrary regarding a specific entry, the landlord shall give
the tenant at least 24 hours' actual notice of the intent of the landlord to
enter and the landlord may enter only at reasonable times. The landlord
may not enter if the tenant, after receiving the landlord's notice, denies
consent to enter. The tenant must assert this denial of consent by giving
actual notice of the denial to the landlord or the landlord's agent or by
attaching a written notice of the denial in a secure manner to the main
entrance to that portion of the premises or dwelling unit of which the tenant
has exclusive control, prior to or at the time of the landlord's attempt to
enter.

"(2) A landlord shall not abuse the right of access or use it to harass
the tenant. A tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent from the
landlord to enter."

On its face, the statute prescribes a minimum period of notice: 24 hours. The statute
expresses no maximum time limitation on the effectiveness of the notice. The only
limitations on a landlord's right of entry following the minimum period of notice are: (1)
that the tenant has the right to withhold consent, if exercised reasonably; and (2) the
landlord may not unreasonably exercise the right of entry.

Defendants acknowledge that the statute, on its face, includes no particular
time limitation for the exercise of a landlord's right of entry. They nevertheless insist that
we should imply such a limitation based on the context of the statute. They observe that,
under ORS 90.322(1)(c) (1997), if a tenant requests repairs or maintenance, the landlord
is authorized to enter the premises, but the authorization "expires after seven days, unless
the repairs are in progress and the landlord is making reasonable effort to complete the
repairs in a timely manner." According to defendants:

"This strongly suggests that when the landlord wants the access, the
duration of effectiveness of the landlord's notice should not be longer than
seven (7) days as well. There is no cogent argument that the landlord's
notice should be good for any longer than seven days, much less that such
notice should be good forever."

What subsection (1)(c) strongly suggests, however, is that, when the
legislature wants to impose a limitation on the effectiveness of a right of entry, it knows
how to do so. The fact is that the language that appears in subsection (1)(c) does not
appear elsewhere in the statute.

In the alternative, defendants argue that, even if RNI's notices of entry were
adequate, RNI was not permitted to enter their premises, because the installation and
reading of water meters is not included in the list of activities for which a landlord
lawfully may obtain access. The statute, however, permits a landlord to enter a tenant's
premises to make "alterations or improvements" or to "supply necessary or agreed
services." We reject the argument without further discussion.

Defendants next argue that the trial court erred in dismissing Counts 2 and 3
because there was undisputed evidence that they had exercised their right to object. As to
the installation of meters, defendants point to the undisputed evidence that both Rau and
Dirks had telephoned RNI and EBS, respectively, to complain about the installation of
water meters. As to the reading of the meters, defendants rely on the undisputed evidence
that the secretary of the tenants' association delivered to RNI their written denials of
access.

We begin with the evidence of the denial of access to install the water
meters. We will not disturb the trial court's findings if there is any evidence to support
them. Illingworth v. Bushong, 297 Or 675, 694, 688 P2d 379 (1984). RNI argues, as it
did below, that defendants actually did not deny access; rather, they merely complained
about the installation of the meters to charge them for water and sewer service. That is,
indeed, what defendants said; at least, that is how the trial court reasonably could have
construed their testimony. We conclude that there is evidence to support the trial court's
decision as to the installation of the water meters.

We turn to the evidence of the denial of access to read the meters. Again,
we examine the record for any evidence to support the trial court's findings. Id. The
evidence is uncontradicted that, at least by September 1, 1998, defendants had provided
written notice to RNI of their denial of access to their premises. There is, however, no
such uncontradicted evidence that RNI entered their property to read the meters after
receipt of the notice. Defendants point to the testimony of Rau that he received water
bills every month following the installation of the meters. His actual testimony, however,
was somewhat more equivocal. He stated, "I'm not going to state that I've received one
each month." Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that, simply because bills were
sent, they were based on meter readings. It is not unreasonable to infer that, after the
notice of denial access, such bills could have been based on average prior usage. In any
event, it is not clear from the testimony that EBS continued to bill for water service after
RNI decided simply to raise the rent in lieu of requiring the tenants to pay for their own
water service. Finally, there is the matter of credibility. Generally, the trier of fact is the
exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses. Bend Tarp and Liner, Inc. v. Bundy, 154
Or App 372, 378 n 4, 961 P2d 857 (1998). In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that
the trial court was completely without a basis for rejecting defendants' claims of abuse of
access. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing Counts 2 and 3
of defendants' RLTA counterclaim.

Defendants advance other assignments of error, but we reject them without
discussion.

Affirmed.

1. In 1999, the legislature amended the statute in ways that do not affect the
outcome of this appeal.