As Lebanon descended into chaos in 1986, the Syrian government made the decision to reimpose its hegemonic influences over the fractured nation. Reestablishing control over many areas which they had previously occupied prior to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Syrian military managed to install order on the streets of Beirut. Damascus invited Western governments bring their consulates back to Beirut, promised to ensure the security of these institutions, and began working to secure the release of Western citizens held captive by terrorist organization. During and this time period, scholars often used the term Pax Syriana to describe the Syrian government's various efforts to ensure tranquility in Lebanon. Today, Syria plays an even more important role in the dynamics of Middle Eastern security: since the beginning of its civil war, the nation has become a petri dish for terrorism to flourish in. Emboldened by its successes in the nation, the Islamic State has spread into Iraq. Population migrations have place tremendous pressure on nations like Lebanon and Jordan. Even Israel is beginning to feel its security become threatened, as al-Nusra purportedly controls the Quneitra border crossing and has been attacking parts of the Golan Heights. With Syria as the epicenter for a transnational wave of insecurity, it has become clear that Western nations must act to preserve regional stability by ensuring Assad's victory over non-Kurdish areas of his country. Peace in Syria means peace by Syria.

No doubt, Bashar al-Assad is a brutal thug who has perpetrated a wide score of reprehensible atrocities against his own citizens. He has close ties with the Iranian government, with his government acting as a leg in Iran's dream of pursuing regional hegemony. However, when faced with an increasingly complex situation which continues to deteriorate on a daily basis, the United States must decide between an unattainable ideal, a bearable reality, or an intolerable onslaught of unmanageable instability which tugs at structures underpinning the fragile stability of many Middle Eastern nations.Think back to Reagan's time in office. By no means will I lionize him as the best president in American history, but his Middle Eastern policy was one of off shore balancing. Instead of directly intervening with American forces, Reagan sought to create a balance of power between Arab powers and Iran. Saving U.S. military forces to only intervene when situations demanded their presence, such as Operation Earnest Will to ensure freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, America funneled weapons and information to dubious dictators. Most notably, Saddam during the extent of his war with Iran. The one instance where we deployed U.S. forces to conduct operations operations became Reagan's greatest regret. No, the 1980s did not see a Middle East which reflected American values in earnest. But neither was it an insufferable menace. The threat of Communist influence was effectively neutered, Israel's security was secure as nations quarreled among themselves, and the U.S. Navy ensured that oil continued to flow unimpeded.

Perhaps we ought to return to this policy, thereby recognizing limits to American influence. We cannot force an idea upon a people; we cannot verify the motivations of every group; we cannot spread democracy by the sword. But we can support actors who support our long term interests. No doubt, some of these actors will possess certain traits we value as a society, and we should jump at the chance to back them politically, economically, and military. The Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq exemplifies a quasi-state which expounds democratic virtues and holds a mutual interest in blunting the expansion of the Islamic State and al-Nusra. Others, however, do not share our moral ideals, but rather our security goals. Assad, for his brusque methods, is potentially a security partner falling under this umbrella.

We don't necessarily have to give him advanced weapon systems, either. Our goal should be to ensure a very long, slow, grinding victory which takes many years and weakens Assad. The end result would actually be less Iranian influence emanating from the country, as the governing body in Damascus would be less powerful. U.S. intelligence agencies could provide intelligence support to Assad, allowing him to more effectively combat groups in the nation. Our efforts ought to be primarily focused on providing him with information about al-Nusra, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups. We've already begun to this, too. According to the International Business Times, we've been supplying Assad with information about the whereabouts of Islamic State leaders. Though it may be difficult logistically, we should attempt to expand our intelligence operations in Syria to include information about other terrorist organizations as well.

Granted, we can identify three problems with this partnership: First, Assad's regime is close to Tehran. Iran has gone to great lengths to ensure that their ally remains afloat. Iran's 'Black Navy' of oil tankers have bypassed Western sanctions and fueled the Syrian war machine. By large, this shipments have been pro bono. The Hezbollah proxy has pushed hard to secure Syrian positions in the country and is easily one of the most effective combat forces in the country right now. Iran recognizes that Syria will not pay them back fully, but their role in Iranian strategy is indispensable. Likely, their relationship will emerge stronger from the ashes of conflict if Assad wins. Nations tend to reciprocate good deeds with more good deeds As Kevin Hagan noted in his Naval Post Graduate thesis, reciprocity is a powerful element in international affairs. It's unlikely Syria will simply forget the support Iran lent, they'll repay that in whatever way they can.

However, even if Assad wins the civil war, it's very likely that he'll be weakened for at least the near future. His efforts will be concentrated in dealing with a low level insurgency which will inevitably remain. An insurgency rarely ends with one decisive military victory. Insurgencies are resilient. The death of a rebellion is prolonged, with its dying gasps lasting years. As Ben Connable wrote in 2010, the average insurgency lasts ten years. This fact highlights why Western governments ought to support Assad. They do not end when one belligerent is defeated The post-government segment of civil conflict sees temporary alliances crumble as competing groups seek to fill the power vacuum created by the despot's fall. Even the Free Syrian Army and Syrian Revolutionary Front lack the numbers to establish stability across the entire nation.

Simply giving the mantle to a pro-Western government doesn't ensure stability. See Libya, which despite U.S. funding and support, still struggles to contend with internal forces resisting its rule. Islamist militants have seized Tripoli's major airport anddemanded that the government be replaced with the previous national congress, which contained an Islamist majority. There isn't much reason to believe that Syria, which features even less coordination among rebel groups, will end much differently. U.S. security practitioners have noted this. General Martin Dempsey, who serves as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has resisted Congressional efforts to provide support for rebel groups. During Congressional testimony, he stated that there weren't any groups which could truly benefit our interests if funded. As Americans, we tend to idealize the power of revolution because our own ended quite successfully. But most uprisings throughout history are either crushed or usher in an even worse force.

The second issue Western governments face by supporting Assad is potential backlash by Kurdish elements. Relieving pressure on Assad could strain our relationship with a phenomenal ally. However, there are two ways to remedy this. First, we can withhold information about Kurdish groups in Syria. Secondly, we can fund them (I am not entirely sure why Dempsy is against supporting Kurdish groups, even if they do suffer from internal divisions). We know the Kurds can act as a counter weight to Iranian influence, and we also know they are capable of governance. Therefore, we don't have to necessarily allow Assad to win over these areas. They can remain functionally independent, while Assad retains enough control over the rest of the country to prevent the creation of terrorist quasi-states.

Finally, the third issue faced by Western governments is a propaganda loss. Western support of a dictator is bound to create anti-American sediment in many Syrians. It's understandable, too. I cannot blame a young Syrian for joining a transnational terrorist movement if he sees American support of a brutal despot oppressing his people. However, at the same time, the threat of recruitment will be offset by the diminished threat groups will pose if they are driven out by Syria. As Caleb has told me in private conversations, Iraq will be hard pressed to defeat the Islamic State so long as their logistical base remains in Syria. Cutting off the Islamic State at its root will detrimentally affect their other operations elsewhere, including Iraq.

Assad, whether we like him or not, remains Syria's best bet for stability. If his regime collapses, then the only entity capable of fighting terrorist organizations disappears from the fight.. Our motto in Syria must not be regime change or democracy. It has to be Pax Syriana.

This picture released by NATO shows Russian weapons and troops inside eastern Ukraine

From Havana to Tehran to Pyongyang, the United States has often touted the effectiveness of economic sanctions in isolating an unfriendly government from the world. Such sanctions, which vary in their scope and their implementation, are intended to reprimand hostile action and also serve as a deterrent for continued hostile action. Whether or not you judge sanctions in the above mentioned cases as instances of success or failure, the limitations of these measures has become apparent this year with one particular country: Russia.

Following the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine in March, as well as with allegations that Russia has supported rebel elements in east Ukraine, the United States and the European Union implemented financial sanctions on Russian elite. The type of sanctions should well be noted. These freeze the assets of some top Russians but do not go as far, say, the sanctions on Iran, which have crippled Iranian industries, particularly in its energy exports. West and central Europe rely too much on Russian energy exports (and Russia is significantly stronger than Iran) for such wide-ranging sanctions to be a feasible course of action.

Are Sanctions Working?According to United States President Barack Obama, these sanctions “are working as intended." If one uses the sample definition of sanctions I used above -- that they reprimand and deter -- this does not appear to be the reality.

Certainly, they have had some effect on Russia’s economy. Oleg Zasov of the Russian economic ministry noted recently that “the economy is close to recession.” However, a great deal of that stems from Russian defiance: in response to the sanctions imposed on it by the United States and the European Union, Russia banned Western food imports. While this Russian-made component does not explain entirely the reduction in economic growth, the fact is, the Russian ban can be turned off assuming a political desire to do so. Yes, ending the ban will not blunt the sanctions -- but higher energy prices moving into the winter and increasing turmoil in the Middle East will.

Increased Russian Involvement in Ukraine:At the same time as the mixed results on Russia’s economy, the very incident that the sanctions are meant to reprimand Russia over has gotten worse, and Russia steadily increased its involvement. Rather than convince Russia to drop its support of rebel forces fighting the Ukrainian government, Russia has expanded its support.

Speaking at an emergency meeting in Kiev, Ukraine’s capital, the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said, “Columns of heavy artillery, huge loads of arms and regular Russian servicemen came to the territory of Ukraine from Russia through the uncontrolled border area.” So not only has Russia maintained its cooperation with rebel troops -- even after those same rebels may well have downed flight MH17 using Russian weapons -- but it has gone so far as to enter Ukraine outright.

There’s certainly the argument that these latest revelations that Russia has entered Ukraine directly are misleading. Russia, for one, denies any intervention in Ukraine while many analysts would suggest that Russia has already been deploying troops to the country. However, the fact is, sanctions have evidently not stopped Russia from such behavior. The intent of the sanctions was to give a clear message to Russia to leave. This did not happen.

Russian Defiance:Beyond Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated its defiance. Russian warplanes violated American air defense zones near Alaska 16 times in the span of 10 days earlier in the month. Several days ago, Finland, a member of the European Union, alleges that Russian aircraft violated its airspace. In what way here was Russia reprimanded or deterred?

But alas, perhaps the sanctions have convinced the Russian public that their President, Vladimir Putin, should not be warmongering. These sanctions must have. Unfortunately, they did not. Last year, prior to this conflict kicking off, Russian approval of Mr. Putin was at 54%, a very low figure for him. In July, Gallup polling found that 83% of Russians approve of the job Mr. Putin is doing. Some of that approval does come from Russian state-owned media spinning the news into a way that benefits the government. But those same apparatuses were in place last year, when approval was low, so they are not a guarantor of complete support.

Conclusion:What I am suggesting here is that, if you want to send Russia a strong message of disapproval of its actions and warn it from further aggression, these weak sanctions are not the answer. In fact, they may have made things worse -- what concern does the West instill in Russia with these asset freezes? A concern over particular oligarch’s private fortunes stashed away in Western banks, but no more.

On August 21st, 2013 the world witnessed the deadliest use of chemical weapons since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980's. Rockets, generally agreed upon by analysts, were fired from Assad regime positions near Damascus, Syria. The rockets, which contained the nerve agent sarin, killed anywhere from 200 to nearly 1,500 people; the majority of whom were civilians.

The above map details the surrounding area of Damascus and the affected areas of the chemical attacks. For the next few days after the attacks, the Syrian regime continued to shell the affected areas with conventional weapons, seemingly in an attempt to cover up their use of chemical weapons. The UN was eventually granted access to the affected areas to conduct research on the use of the chemical weapons; they ended up confirming the use of sarin. Also in the days after, several Western intelligence agencies reported that they have confirmed that the Assad regime was indeed the culprit. After more and more evidence was starting to mount regarding the validity of the use of chemical weapons, the United States considered military action, but eventually backed down in the face of aRussian-brokered agreement to destroy Syria's chemical weapon stockpiles.

Backing Down: The backing down from the United States of military action came in the face of a supposed "red line" set forth by President Obama. In August of 2012, Obama said this of Syria and the Assad regime: "In a situation this volatile, I wouldn’t say that I am absolutely confident. What I’m saying is we’re monitoring that situation very carefully. We have put together a range of contingency plans. We have communicated in no uncertain terms with every player in the region that that’s a red line for us and that there would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculations significantly."

A year later and his red line was crossed--and way more than once. And a year on from then, the United States has still yet to either punish the Assad regime or get significantly involved in aiding the Syrian opposition. The consequences of doing so has only exacerbated the situation inside Syria (and one could argue inside Iraq with how the events in Syria allowed ISIS to grow strong enough to take on Iraq), hurt relations with Arab allies (like how the US was allegedly left in the dark about joint Egypt-UAE airstrikes in Libya), and have left us with several possible bad outcomes regarding the war in Syria.

Conclusion: One year on and no one has gone punished for their crimes committed last August. The war in Syria is still at a stalemate. The United States, as of the publishing of this post, has yet to conduct any significant military action inside Syria targeting either the Assad regime or even the Islamic State--although there are reports that the US may strike the latter inside Syria soon.

As we go forward, we should all remember those innocent lives lost on that fateful day in August of 2013. We should all also never forget those innocent lives lost everyday as a result of the chaos in Syria. Innocents are dying every single day at the hands of either Assad or the Islamic State and hardly anything is being done to help the people of Syria. We should also remember that reports of chemical attacks committed by the regime continue to happen.

While everyday, ordinary citizens do not influence military or foreign policy, you can, however, still help those people suffering as a result of the war in the Syria. Below are links to several charitable organizations that directly help those affected by the civil war. Please help and donate to one (or more) of these organizations.

The Internet has brought humanity all kinds of unique opportunities to connect with one another in sometimes very distant places and learn information. Thanks to real-time news, it is now possible to hear about events happening a world away as they unfold. For a blogger such as myself, nearly unlimited access to news and information is a perfect dream. Search engines like Google and social media like Twitter allow me to get accurate pictures of the big crises.

Along the way, and what many including myself take for granted, is the work done by the reporters and journalists, some free-lance and some with big organizations, to bring all that information to my very fingertips -- at the cost of no personal discomfort to me. Many of them, on the other hand, put their lives at risk every day to obtain just another tiny piece of the puzzle. Those journalists in such places as the Gaza Strip, Donetsk, Baghdad, (insert name of more conflict zones here) all have one thing in common: the desire to inform the world of what they see transpiring. They walk around armed with only a camera and their mobile phone, and often travel to meet some of the most dangerous people on this planet, for the sole purpose of keeping you and me in the know. I cannot name many people willing to do that.

One such man who was willing was James Foley, a 40 year old American photojournalist. Mr. Foley, a freelance reporter, had been on tours with American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, but wanted to do even more. In 2011, he went to Libya because he want to get the facts straight about the war transpiring between rebel militias and the government of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. There, he was captured by forces loyal to Colonel Qaddafi and held for six weeks along with other journalists.

Even so, Mr. Foley was not deterred. The Libyan conflict ended in 2011, but the Syrian civil war was just starting up -- and that’s where Mr. Foley decided to go. The easy way would have been to quit reporting from conflict zones. It’s much safer that way, but Mr. Foley was having none of that. He wanted to bring people the facts, and thus went to Syria, the most dangerous country in the world for reporters. There, he wrote a number of articles detailing his insight following interviews with Syrians. He put out a number of videos and even helped raise money for an ambulance in Aleppo, one of the hardest hit cities in the country.

On November 22, 2012, Mr. Foley was captured again, taken by unknown gunmen as he left an Internet cafe in Syria. He was held for well over 600 days until August 19th, 2014, when the Islamic State, a ruthless Islamic extremist organization that operates out of Iraq and Syria, aired a video of his execution.

When I heard the news, I was filled with a mix of anger and immense sadness. It truly struck me at that point just how little I really pay attention to those whose detailed analysis I interpret for publications and blog posts. Certainly I wish safety on all of them, but it is so easy to read their work and think nothing more of it. To think not of the ones who could easily have passed just trying to write the article I scrolled through quickly to see what was happening. For those of us who do that, we do some of the bravest people on this planet a giant disservice. Mr. Foley is not the first journalist to be killed in a war zone, nor will he be the last -- and this is a fact that all conflict reporters know very well. Mr. Foley himself knew it too, for one of his colleagues was shot right in front of him and left for dead by Colonel Qaddafi’s men in Libya. Yet they continue on anyway. It is a testament to their strength and their dedication that they do so.

Us, the readers, the absorbers of knowledge, do not do enough to show our appreciation for reporters in conflict zones. After all, most of the time all we see is a name at the top or bottom of an article or video. I challenge you, you who may read this blog post, to change that. As I said, the Internet has made connecting with people easier than ever before. Take advantage of that and give back a little. Those who report in conflict zones give up a comfortable life to live in some of the worst places in the planet. The least we can do is take a moment to go on social media and other connectivity mediums to express our gratitude.

These men and women will always be a paragon of courage, and James Foley is a shining example.

- Kyle

We here at The Line of Steel would like to send out our deepest condolences to the family of James Foley. He was truly an inspiration to all of us.

In a video posted online, the Islamic State has executed via decapitation an American reporter who was reportedly seized in Syria in 2012. In the video, the Islamic State blames the recent US military airstrikes in Iraq against the IS for their reason of beheading. The captive, James Foley, makes an obviously scripted statement saying that his brother should leave the US military and that he wishes he was not an American.

Next, the mujahid in black standing next to him also makes a statement. The jihadist speaks in a broken British accent and again blames President Obama for their actions. After his statement, he quickly cuts off the head of Mr. Foley. He then puts the head atop of the body.

In another part of the video, they show that they hold a second American and threaten to do the same if the United States does not stop bombing Iraq. The English translation in a tweet is shown below:

Orange Jumpsuits: In the video, the two captives are dressed in orange jumpsuits. This is almost undoubtedly a reference to Guantanamo Bay prison captives. The late-amir of IS's predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, also dressed the American Nick Berg in similar fashion before executing him. Knowing how revered Zarqawi is to the IS, this move could also be paying homage to him as well.

This is also almost undoubtedly signalling a stronger stance against the United States. Until now, their stance on the United States has been rhetorical at best. In the wake of this atrocity, the Islamic State could begin to kidnap more Americans in the region and either do the same as Mr. Foley or hold them captive for leverage. It is unclear if the Islamic State has the capabilities to conduct a terrorist attack outside the boundaries of Iraq and Syria, but active plotting could potentially begin to happen (if not already).

Like their former brethren in al-Qaeda, the Islamic State spends most of theirtime and resources stoking local or regional insurgencies and chaos. For al-Qaeda, only a small amount of their operations are dedicated to external operations. This is in part due to their desire to gain territory. As Thomas Joscelyn puts it, "they [al-Qaeda] are political revolutionaries". As IS follows the very same ideology, it stands to reason that that assessment fits the IS as well--like how they declared a Caliphate.

Just like how AQAP can manage both waging an insurgency and conducting terrorist attacks on the United States (albeit unsuccessfully) or the Pakistani Taliban doing the same, it is also rational to think the IS can do the same. Some analysts and journalists like to write this threat off as nonsense quoting how busy or preoccupied the IS is in Syria or Iraq. But, would that logic not fit AQAP or the TTP? Both are very busy in fighting their respective enemies, but yet both have found the time to (unsuccessfully) conduct acts of terror on the United States.

Conclusion: Similar to how al-Qaeda sometimes shifts resources to external operations as needed, the Islamic State could potentially do the same. In this move of execution, it is definitely a message that they are not afraid to kill Americans; that they most definitely consider us an enemy and even a potential target. By committing this heinous crime, they are directly challenging President Obama; however, this should come as even more of a reason (like there even needed to be another with their countless crimes against people in both Iraq and Syria) to defeating the Islamic State and not backing down to their demands.

-- Caleb

Note: Out of respect to Mr. Foley's family, we have chosen not to link to the video on LiveLeak or show pictures of his unfortunate death. Out of respect to Mr. Sotloff's family (the second captive), we have removed the image from the embeded tweet above. We still, however, left the English translation from the tweet.

Typically, this blog focuses on matters of an international nature. However, the recent events in Saint Louis, Missouri--my home town--have illustrated the extent to which American law enforcement has become militarized across the nation. Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Micheal Brown, his death has acted as catalyst for outrage against racist and militaristic procedures commonly enacted by police departments across the nation.

Institutionalized RacismPolice officers have widely implemented policies which disproportionately affect African Americans and other people of color. For example, Caucasians and African Americans are just as likely to possess marijuana. Yet, black males are far more likely to be stopped and arrested for illicit possession of the drug. 50% of SWAT raids--which have become ubiquitous in the post 9/11 era--target people of color, and are primarily conducted in response to drug violations or to serve warrants. According to Time magazine, only 7% of SWAT deployments were made in response to hostage or barricade situations.

Moreover, officers have been held unaccountable for their actions throughout the years, especially in cases where violence is unnecessarily used against black males. Perhaps the greatest example of such institutional racism existing so blatantly in our police departments is present in the death of Eric Garner. Following the asphyxiation of Garner, who was recorded pleading for his life, the NYC Police Commissioner issued a statement in which he posited that video taping police officers constituted interference. No condemnation of the officers' actions, an update on the investigation, or pledge to institute more oversight. Rather, he criticized a system which creates accountability in an officer's interactions with local citizens.

There is no excuse for Anonymous to release the private information of city employees, or for residents to loot and vandalize. But recognize the underlying conditions which have created such violence in Ferguson. When people lose faith in the system which serves them, the creation and perpetuation of radicalism occurs. People are mad because of systemic repression, something that continues to persist decades after Martin Luther King marched on Washington.

Currently, we don't know what happened between the unnamed police officer and Brown. Even if preliminary evidence suggests that the unlawful use of deadly force was used, we will not be given the whole picture until the FBI completes its investigation. But, to a certain extent, that is irrelevant. What's more pertinent is that Ferguson residents have no reason to believe that Darren Wilson was justified in his actions. When governments are responsible for undermining the health of society, it ought to not surprise us when citizens cease to hold faith in their honesty and effectiveness. As the authorities lose their grip on legitimacy, social break down and disorder begin to creep up the spine of society. Therefore, reformation of these institutions is paramount in increasing their overall ability to serve communities across our nation.

Current Pentagon programs such as 1033 have funneled weapons to departments across the nation. Law enforcement entities in peaceful suburbs suddenly have the ability to impose martial law and put into action de facto military occupations. Take the Boston Bombings last year. County Sheriffs and local cops were transformed into a freightening force capable of massive destruction. Under the pretext of national security, officers began searching the house of citizens without affiliations to Tsarnaev or his compatriots (granted, while the searches were technically voluntary, it's rather hard to say no when a SWAT team is leveling guns at you face.) Unsurprisingly, in a post-9/11 era, militarizing equipment carries the added effect of militarizing their actions. The essence of policing is radically altered when it occurs through the sight of an assault rifle.

However, reinventing the way officers view their community is necessary as well. Increasingly, the warrior's ethos has been drilled into the minds of police officers. The notion of a community being their charge is supplanted with paranoia of their city's population. Such a mentality has created the perception within officers that their city is tantamount to the streets of Fallujah. The physical mutation of an officer's arsenal is coupled with a psychological overhaul which prepares him to use it as he sees fit. Perhaps the most terrifying aspect of this warrior paradigm is that an officer is constantly equipped with it. Even if legislation were to substantially reduce the amount of arms that departments possess, changing current mentalities is extremely difficult. This requires bottom-top, grass root movements to change how departments operate on a community and state level. Recognizing the importance of legislation on a local level is one way citizens can reform their local and state governments. Next you go to the polls, don't gloss over local issues--chances are, they could affect you.

Accountability and ReformThe first step in changing racist and militaristic policies is to accept they exist. The second is to begin pushing for more oversight of police actions. Body cameras have vastly expanded the ability of citizens to ensure that officers are not abusing their authority. In Rialto, California, the local city council passed an ordinance requiring officers to wear cameras. Since the implementation of the policy, an 88% drop in complaints and a 60% drop in the use of force by officers occurred. Furthermore, removing internal norms which allow for officers to abuse citizens with near impunity need to be removed as well. It's quite common for authorities to turn a blind eye to abuses as they occur, necessitating more civilian supervision of internal investigations. In high profile cases such as the Micheal Brown shooting, bringing in an outside agency to preside over an investigation can go a long way in constructing legitimacy with a disenfranchised population.

ConclusionIf we admit that law enforcement is a legitimate function of the state, then standing by while they are pervaded with racist and militaristic conceptions of policing is to support the oppressive utilization of force. Citizens hold a vested interest in ensuring that institutions responsible for their safety are using constitutionally sanctioned and proportional responses to criminality. As militarization and racism increasingly garner our attention in the media, we ought to take advantage of the momentum created by outrage to push for legislative reform to structural flaws in our law enforcement entities.

With the world’s strongest and most advanced military, the United States is often tempted to use force to solve issues around the globe, with the idea being that the problem (whatever it is) will be resolved if only the United States would throw soldiers at it. As the United States expands its presence in Iraq following the gains of the Islamic State, it should resist such temptations.

Power of the United States:When you’re the most powerful country on the planet, you often want to show the world that rather than let others start getting ideas that your strength or will to fight is wasting away. You want to send would-be challengers the message that there is no wiggle room to usurp your authority. There is nothing inherently flawed in this approach if you’re the best military, provided you are fighting the right battles, not just every battle that comes your way. Sometimes, clouded by the strength of the military and the confidence of the generals, leaders will find themselves goaded into believing that each situation they look at is a direct threat that needs to be quashed.

The United States spends the most of any country on defense and many of the top competitors in terms of expenditure are American allies. NATO’s 2014 defense spending accounts for 56% of global expenditure – meaning that America and its allies are the best armed. From such a position of power, it can be tempting to utilize that power to solve world problems, even those that do not directly threaten United States interests or the interests of its allies.

An Example in Libya: As an example, consider the case of Libya. NATO, of which the United States is a major part, through a United Nations mandate was tasked with “enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone and protecting civilians and civilian populated areas.” This was a humanitarian operation meant to protect civilians, but it ended up becoming a full-fledged campaign to remove Colonel Qaddafi from power. President Obama stated as much recently by referencing American “participation in the coalition that overthrew Qaddafi in Libya” in an interview with the New York Times’ Thomas Friedman. The campaign in Libya was one-sided – there was shoddy enforcement of the arms embargo and NATO read “protecting civilians” as “actively coordinate with rebel armies to launch offensive strikes on Colonel Qaddafi’s armies.” One such strike paved the way for Colonel Qaddafi’s capture by militias, where he was summarily executed extra-judicially.

Removing Colonel Qaddafi was likely taken because he was seen as a nuisance, even though he had complied with threats to abandon nuclear ambitions. He was not at all a real threat to any NATO members

One can hardly cite Libya as a success, despite the fact that NATO easily was able to overthrow Colonel Qaddafi. When one looks at Libya today, he sees a country plagued by a weak central government and with militias running rampant throughout the countryside. Guns from the former regime have been smuggled out and fueled fighting across the region. The lesson the United States has inferred from this campaign has been the wrong one: Mr. Obama believes that the failure is in the decision to not send in troops on the ground. Certainly, it would seem, they could maintain the security necessary to ensure that the resulting government would be stable.

That’s untrue. There is no real history of democracy in Libya, and the last way to implement one from scratch is by the sword. That’s why nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan has proved tricky, despite years of American involvement. Troops in Libya would have exacerbated the problem and probably drawn more extremists to the area. Don’t believe me? Look at Iraq. Prior to the 2003 invasion, there were few extremist networks. As rumors built up of an American attack, extremists flocked to the country, not to save the government but to sow mayhem in the aftermath. Libya, with extremists abound even before the NATO air campaign, would have been the same way with American troops on the ground – creating another area for the United States to get bogged down in. Some will argue that, without any involvement, the country would devolve into what Syria is now. Chances are, if there had been no involvement, Colonel Qaddafi would have proven victorious and returned the country to the status quo (stability).

Application in Iraq:What I’m suggesting here is that military might seemed like a good idea, but turned out to be a bad one. I write this now because it is crucial to remember when examining the United States’ response to the Islamic State. The crisis in Iraq differs from the crisis that was in Libya, but they both bear the stamp of humanitarian action that can turn into all-out military action.

The United States has thus far launched air strikes against the Islamic State and toyed with scenarios to rescue trapped Yezidis on the mountains – possibly even with a ground maneuver that could involve American advisers. There are plenty who are watching this situation unfold that bring up the familiar talk: If the United States would only send in the cavalry, the crisis would be over.

Mission creep appears to already be setting in, but this is the wrong call to make. The Islamic State is dangerous yes, and given an opportunity would probably go after the United States. But going in boots on the ground would be a mistake. An invasion could not touch the Islamic State’s havens in Syria, but it would certainly give them a major boost in credibility (which is already high given their recent gains) and fuel their impressive propaganda. American troops cannot, and should not, seek to be the glue that holds together a failing Iraqi state. If that country is to dissolve, it is for Iraqis to decide.

Many look at the Islamic State’s territory as potentially as threatening to the United States as the al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan was pre-2001. Not so. Al-Qaida had few existential threats while plotting in Afghanistan for the 9/11 terror attacks. The Islamic State by contrast is at war with virtually every combatant in the area, providing for it very little breathing room to go after a country half a world away, no matter how much at odds it is with American policy and values.

Conclusion: When I’ve presented this argument, the very first critique I hear is “So you recommend we do nothing in the face of the Islamic State?” – this argument troubles me, for the discourse of American foreign policy is apparently at a point where not going all in on a military campaign constitutes doing nothing at all. Not the case. I recognize the wisdom in not letting the Islamic State fester (I have written posts saying explicitly that sitting idly is a terrible strategy) for it has proved that it has at least short-term sustainability and the ability to expand, but I believe there are other, more suitable options that the United States can employ that will defeat the Islamic State in the long run. Viable solutions are often borne of deft diplomacy and smart engagement, not blind force.

-- Kyle

Disclaimer: The post above may not necessarily reflect the opinions of The Line of Steel.

Despite the recent events in Iraq and Syria, a lot has also been happening in Yemen. Above is a video released by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) media wing, al-Malahim, which showcases a highly coordinated assault in what appears to be a Yemeni military outpost in Hadhramawt province. In the video is a speech by an AQAP ideologue and/or fighter, a segment showing them "casing" the outpost, and then the aforementioned assault. The assault, itself, appeared to be undertaken by experienced fighters due to the obvious flanking maneuver shown at the start of the fight, postures of the fighters and the overall tenacity of the firefight.

But that is just the beginning.

Background on AQAP: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was formed in 2009 after the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al-Qaeda merged together. Before this, however, Yemen was a ripe area for jihadists. During the Soviet War in Afghanistan, thousands of Yemeni's went off to fight the Russian forces. Also during the 1980's, thousands of Yemeni's who had returned from Afghanistan were utilized by then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh to fight the communist forces of South Yemen.

In 1992, al-Qaeda, as an organization, conducted their first ever terrorist attack in none other than Aden, Yemen. The attack was meant to kill American soldiers in Aden who were waiting to go to Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope. While no Americans were killed, it did kill an Australian and a Yemeni. In 2000, al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) conducted a terrorist attack on the USS Cole, which killed seventeen sailors. In 2002, the United States conducted their first drone strike by targeting the then-leader of AQY, Abu Ali al-Harithi. Jumping forward to 2006, twenty-three AQY members escaped from a prison in Sana'a, Yemen. These twenty-three included several future high-ranking members, including the now-amir Nasir al-Wuhayshi.

It should be noted that Osama bin Laden, himself, had ancestral roots in Yemen. According to the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project, bin Laden said this in 2003: “Areas most in need of liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen."; as well as saying:“Youth of Islam…especially in the neighboring countries and Yemen: You must roll up your sleeves [and] prepare for jihad.” It is important to note because specifically namedropping (twice) highlights that bin Laden is condoning the jihad in Yemen, as well as legitimatizing it. Role in the AQ Network:AQAP plays an important role within the al-Qaeda network. The group, as described by the United States government, is the most active al-Qaeda branch in targeting the United States. In 2009, Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab (better known as the "Underwear Bomber") attempted to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight via a bomb located in his underwear. In 2010, AQAP again tried to strike in the homeland; this time it was on a cargo plane in Chicago that arrived from Yemen. Yet again in 2012, they tried to bomb another plane with an "experimental bomb"; this plot was thankfully foiled in time. Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the now-amir of AQAP, also serves as thegeneral manager of the entirety of the al-Qaeda Network. This puts him at an extremely important position in the network, as the role(s) of the GM includes: "coordinating military and media activities, and communicating with al Qaeda's "regions," or affiliates, as well as allies such as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban". So this means that Nasir al-Wuhayshi is in charge of overseeing military and media activities of the various different groups within the network, as well as communicating and interacting with the various regional heads.

AQAP also plays an important role in propaganda efforts, with their various productions and series under al-Malahim. Before he was killed in a drone strike, US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki was a heavily influential propagandist and recruiter for AQAP. Him, along with another American Samir Khan, published the "Inspire" magazine. The magazine was said to have been influential in the radicalization of Faisal Shahzad, the person respsonsible for the failed Tehrik-e-Taliban plot to bomb Times Square in New York City. The Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Hassan, was in frequent communication with al-Awlaki, and the latter played a large part in the former's radicalization. AQAP's ability to radicalize individuals via online propaganda efforts and influential ideologues continues to be a grave threat to the United States, as the Boston Bombers were also heavily influenced by the Inspire magazine.

Future: With the instability in Yemen continuing, AQAP will still be able to capitalize on the fact to expand control and conduct more and more terrorist attacks in Yemen. Just today, an IED planted by AQAP went off in Lahj, which killed thirteen people. According to the Long War Journal, a twitter account affiliated with AQAP said that the bombing was intended for the Yemeni Popular Committees. However, some local officials also claimed that the IED was planted close to the residency of the governor of Lahj.

We can expect to see more bombings like today, more assaults like shown in the video, more raids on Houthi and Yemeni military outposts/targets, and potentially for more plots and attacks on the United States and/or its interests. Despite numerous drone strikes in Yemen, the group has shown to be very resilient, much like al-Qaeda general command. They are still able to conduct business as usual, still able to kill innocent people in Yemen, still able to export expertise, training, financing and advice to various al-Qaeda affiliates across the globe, and still able to plot attacks against the United States.

Conclusion: With everything happening in regards to the Islamic State, we should not underestimate or even write off the threats posed by al-Qaeda and their many regional branches. This should be even more evident if AQ feels they need to launch another big attack to try and regain some influence lost to the Islamic State. However, as Thomas Joscelyn and Daveed Gartenstien-Ross points out, "It is Zawahiri's organization, not the Islamic State, that will most likely pose the top jihadist threat to the United States and other Western countries in three to five years. Despite its rapid gains, the Islamic State is already showing its weaknesses -- notably in its failure to attract a deep network outside Iraq and Syria and its propensity to alienate potential partners through its brutality and refusal to compromise".

I haven't posted in awhile, so it feels good to be back on the blog! --Thomas

Many commentators have speculated on the intent of Chinese foreign policy in the 21st Century. Some, like Robert Kaplan, argue that Chinese irredentism will define their long term goals for decades to come. Others say that China has rather innocuous intentions for its role in Asia. However, the primary concern for Chinese policy makers in the near future will be ensuring domestic harmony is maintained. Increasing instability in Xinjiang, pro-democracy demonstrations, frustration with corruption, access to the internet, and the threat of economic stagnation all loom ominously over China. Such challenges have prompted a balancing act by Chinese leaders to reform its political and economic institutions while simultaneously ensuring that the power of China's Communist Party is retained. The Third Plenum, which occurred last fall, outlined China's reformation strategy. First, leaders have reduced the role of government in certain areas of the economy. Namely, resource allocation is being placed in the hands of the free market. Secondly, the central government has begun to identify and prosecute corrupt officials across all levels of government (which has somewhat ironically reduced their recruitment pool). Yet for all the unprecedented levels of "hands off" policies and officials indicted with corruption charges, a much more sinister element is playing into China's internal security strategy. While officials recognize the need to relieve pressure in some areas, they also intend to couple their PR strategies with more empowered internal security structures. Through a multifaceted approach, PRC leaders are centralizing and normalizing institutional procedures to cope with the threat networks pose to hierarchical structures in an informationalized age.

Shoring up bordersThe past year has seen increased activity in a "problem zone" for Chinese leaders: Xinjiang. The province is the epitome of social dissonance. On one hand, you have the hordes of Han Chinese sent in by Communist leaders to pacify the province through demographic superiority. On the other, there exists a proudly defiant Uyghur population which tightly holds onto religious, cultural and political beliefs despite decades of Chinese occupation. Two completely opposite sides to an ever important province forthe Chinese government. Unlike their Tibetian counterparts, Uyghur dissidents have taken it upon themselves to use violence upon China as opposed to "passive" resistance. Thus far, their measures have largely been relegated to knife attacks against train stations. However, a car bomb that exploded in Tiananmen Square last October was attributed to Uyghur terrorists by the Chinese government.

Increasingly, China has become worried about Uyghurs flowing through the Chinese-Pakistani border. Uyghur terrorist organizations such as the Eastern Turkmenistan Islamic Movement are often based in Pakistan, but remain committed to independence from the auspices of China. Much to the frustration of Chinese officials, Pakistan's commitment to the Sino-Pakistani counterterrorism relationship has been similar to its partnership with America. Half-heartedly, Pakistan conducts token raids against terrorist groups identified by Chinese intelligence operations. Oftentimes, Chinese policymakers run into issues with Pakistan alerting groups before raids occur. So despite internal policing in Xinjiang, Uyghur insurgents still flow through borders along Pakistan, necessitating increased focus on pacifying the province.

However, while Pakistan is the primary hub for Uyghur insurgents, the small border shared between China and Afghanistan is also becoming increasingly important to Chinese leaders. The Wakhan Corridor connecting the two nations is largely inhospitable, making border control difficult. Hence, China's stake in Afghanistan's post-2014 future. While America's Asian presence has typically been construed by analysts as a challenge to Chinese interests, a small troop presence left by the United States as laid out by the Bilateral Security Agreement would ultimately benefit stability in Xinjiang. Therein lies China's impetus for participating in negotiations between American and Afghan leaders. Continued US commitment to security in Afghanistan would act as a buffer between Xinjiang-bound insurgents seeking to traverse the Tajikistan-Afghan border in order to reach the Wakhan and China. Given Afghanistan's importance to Chinese security, it would not be surprising if China attempted to partially fill the void if American forces withdrew. Not only because a crumbling Afghan government would lack the capability to secure the Wakhan corridor, but because another power may fill the void in place of China. Both Pakistan and India would facilitate or ignore insurgency groups hostile to Chinese rule in Xinjiang. While measures implemented by China would not include the deployment of combat forces, a growth in intelligence sharing, arms sales, and financial aid could occur. Beijing's primary goal would be to draw Afghanistan into its own sphere of influence, as opposed to either India's or Pakistan's.

Cracking Skulls, Taking NamesIn order to quell unrest, China has launched a massive crackdown within Xinjiang. Details are still coming out of the woodwork, which are few and far between due to heavy restrictions China places on media access to the region, but so far it appears as if the Uyghur population has suffered heavily under Chinese policing. Ramadan, for example, has been banned by Chinese politicians in Xinjiang. Students at Kashgar Normal University were forced to eat lunch with their professors and kept in class until they drank 1/4 of a water bottle. Some initiatives have even been framed with positive titles. 'Project Beauty' literally sends out gun-toting 'fashion' police officers to man check points and detain women whose dress is too Islamic. The heavy handedness of China's policies has reinforced its image as a colonizer, as opposed to an inclusive government seeking to cooperate with Uyghur concerns. The resulting negation of Chinese propaganda efforts has led to an ideological defeat for China. Like many repressive strategies, the utilization of security instruments against indigenous populations without broad societal engagement has served to increase tensions.

However, because governments adjacent to Xinjiang have very little sympathy for the Uyghur cause, a large insurgency has been unable to develop. Even Pakistan, which shelters many groups, has showed little interest in truly provoking Chinese leaders by heavily supplying Uyghur militants. This could be one reason why many terrorist attacks only feature knives, militant groups lack sufficient armaments to launch military attacks against well-equipped Chinese paramilitary forces. The risk of losing any weapons is too high compared to the gain, so knives are used instead. The lack of weapons Kyrgyz forces found on Uyghur militants underscores this possibility. Following the end of combat, soldiers found that only one member had a weapon. If this is the case, then aforementioned border control and isolation strategies by China are likely working.

Alternatively, much of the unrest could be spontaneous riots that occur from rapidly forming and horizontally-structured groups angered by restrictive rules regarding religion. In other words, hierarchical terrorist organizations such as the Eastern Turkmenistan Islamic Movement are not responsible for the majority of attacks. However, Nuramet Sumet, the mastermind behind the recent Elixku Township attack, did have connections with ETIM. Therefore, it's very possible that terrorist groups are at the very least fomenting, if not planning, these attacks. So far, I'm more inclined to believe that unrest in Xinjiang is primarily caused by preexisting organizations taking advantage of tensions as opposed to unorganized rioters.

Outside of hostility in Xinjiang, China still has to contend with other forces within its borders. CCTV cameras cover almost every inch of public life in cities. Demonstrations are quickly suppressed, with police officers promptly whisking protesters away to detainment facilities in armored cars. Though state television frequently likes to divert focus on foreign threats such as the United States and Japan, much of it is smokescreen to maintain nationalism. Chinese leaders are cognizant of their nation's history. As Henry Kissinger points out in On China, Chinese history is cyclical. A central authority claims the 'mandate from heaven' and rules for a period of time, but ultimately collapses as internal dissatisfaction with the reigning entity grows. After a period of disunity, a different authority rises to unify the country.

Historically, China's greatest enemy is itself. Chinese citizens expect their government to reflect the exceptional nature of their culture*. If it fails to fulfill that, then the right to govern is subsequently revoked. The creation of a National Security Council, which is focused primarily on internal security, best reflects the ongoing efforts of leaders to centralize and increase the ability of the government to police its population. With economic growth slowing and an increasing housing bubble becoming more apparent, Chinese leaders have steadily increased internal security expenditures in order to deal with potential uprisings, protests, or revolutions which may occur in times of hardship.

The Great Wall of China--Internet EditionInformation is power. As General Mattis once remarked, an individual with education is even more dangerous than a Marine and his rifle (Blasphemy against the Corps?) Like the Pentagon, China has kept a close eye on unfolding instability in the Arab world. While causes of the Arab Spring are certainly not mypotic, widespread dissemination of information played a crucial role in fomenting and organizing unrest. As such, China has taken to tightening the rope around internet access. Internet rumors spread across popular social media sites like Weibo have been met with arrests, for example. Meanwhile, China has begun implementing stricter rules regarding apps in order to curb 'terrorism.' Notice, however, that these policies are not just applied to Xinjiang, but all of China. There is a present concern that volatility could spread across the nation, with social media tools acting as a force multiplier for divergent political thought. So called efforts to diminish "cultural pollution" effectively ban foreign dramas and TV shows--which may carry explicit or implicit political messages which contradict the Communist Party.

The "Great Firewall of China" (aka Golden Shield Project) enables Chinese leaders to manipulate the flow of information within the country. For example, a citizen searching "democracy" would likely run into cute characters telling them that they shouldn't be thinking about such crazy notions or simply a page with no results shown. Of course, bypassing the wall is certainly possible. Internet users can utilize Tor obfsproxy bundles in conjunction with private obfsproxies, though the Golden Shield actively seeks out the TLS fingerprints of Tor's proxy servers in order to shut them down. Alternatives include the use of steganography, packet fragmentation, and various proxy programs. However, regardless of circumvention methods, the government has succeeded in denying access to restricted materials for the majority of its citizens.

ConclusionThough undergoing reforms to its political and economic policies, internal security mechanisms are being strengthened in order to deal with widespread or isolated incidents of unrest as they pop up. Border control, internal policing capability, and information restriction are all being used as tools to ensure that the state's control is not challenged in the near future.

Notes*Chinese and American culture are quite similar in that both claim to be exceptional. The primary difference is that China tends to internalize its exceptionalism, whereas America actively exports it. Hence, the disparate foreign policies of our two nations throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

Grey = Territory Controlled by the Islamic State; Red = Territory Controlled by the Iraqi Government; Yellow = Territory Controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government. This is correct as of August 2014.

Thanks to its rapid expansion across the Middle East, the Islamic State, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has become a hot topic in the news. Its goal of creating a new Caliphate has captured the focus of governments around the world as they scramble to figure out how the Islamic State threatens them and how they can mitigate that threat. For all the talk, however, scarce little has been done to stop the Islamic State from its goal.

This past week, the Islamic State has made gains on opposite sides of its dominion, pushing into Lebanon even as it displaces Yazidis in Iraq from the area around Sinjar. Even amid reports of retreats from several villages in eastern Syria and positions near Mosul, these gains are significant in their own respects.

Push into Lebanon: Invading Lebanon, should such happen outright, would drag Lebanon further into the Syrian conflict and provide the Islamic State the potential for a greater pool of fighters. Anger over sectarian violence perpetuated by Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, has been rife in some Sunni neighborhoods in Lebanon, and with the Lebanese party Hezbollah playing a direct role in assisting Mr. Assad, Lebanese Sunnis with a taste for revenge may see their opportunity by joining the Islamic State. Even if they do not go voluntarily, the Islamic State has shown its penchant for conscripting young men, sometimes forcibly, anyway. The Islamic State has demonstrated it is a master of manipulating sectarian warfare through its Iraqi campaign and it may seek to replicate that success in Lebanon. Though the circumstances are different (a lot of Islamic State fighters are native Iraqi), the appetite is there. However, it should be noted that the al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda's official group in Syria, has a much larger presence in Lebanon than the Islamic State. The two have also been fighting alongside together in Arsal: Read more here.

Establishing a presence in Lebanon would be a massive propaganda boost for the Islamic State, so it makes sense for the group to go for it – the more land the Islamic State can claim to dominate, the greater its appeal to extremists worldwide becomes. Lebanon is just another piece in the goal of expanding the Caliphate. Other short term pieces include countries like Jordan, where the Islamic State is likely infiltrating sympathizers in alongside refugees to stir up trouble. What better way to convert people into believers of Mr. Baghdadi’s cause than to show the Islamic State still gaining land even as international powers try to craft a way to stop it? Even countries as far away asIndonesia are worried that the Islamic State could inspire renewed extremism.

The push into Lebanon can aid the Islamic State in terms of manpower and propaganda. The takeover of Sinjar aids it in another way. While the Islamic State is risking a massive counteraction by regional powers through displacing Yazidis into nearby mountains where they lack the means to survive, the Islamic State has gained a strategic victory in the fighting west of Mosul.

Capturing the Mosul Dam: Crucially, the extremist group has reportedly taken control of the country’s largest hydroelectric dam, giving it far more leverage over Mosul and even the country. Dislodging it from the dam can prove tricky, for excessive damage to the dam could cause “catastrophic” flooding according to a US report.

Taking the Mosul Dam is part of a familiar strategy of the Islamic State’s. The extremist group has constantly sought to contest energy sources, like oil fields, and major areas of transit by capturing highways. Decisive defeats against an enemy army can win a war, but against an Iraqi army that has chosen to retreat rather than fight (and in truth is far larger than the Islamic State and so theoretically should be able to win a direct battle), the Islamic State can win the war by capturing strategic locations to constrict the Iraqi government rather than running around looking for an army to butt heads with. It can also bolster its coffers in the process, adding on to its ability to fund itself through internal production. If nothing else, say a major counter-offensive were to occur, the Islamic State now at least has more bargaining chips with which to strengthen its case.

Conclusion: In the early days of the invasion of Mosul, the Islamic State’s doom seemed like a given. If not to occur at the hands of any number of regional governments and militias that oppose the organization, the wisdom was that the extremist group would collapse due to internal inadequacy. I have constantly supported the narrative that there is evidence to suggest that the Islamic State’s grip is tenuous, but that its downfall is anything but certain. These recent advances confirm that, if left largely to its own devices, the Islamic State will only grow stronger rather than weaker