The effort to establish an incontestable proof for libertarianism as a universal human ethic is an immense undertaking and one that (to avoid any possible false anticipation) will not be accomplished in this short essay. We can also suggest that even if a libertarian scholar was to arrive at such a thesis it is unlikely that he would attract the attention and rejuvenation of political philosophy that, say, John Rawls did upon publication of his A Theory of Justice, an inherently statist work that found natural admirers amongst those interested in promoting the cause of the state. In this essay we will outline some important considerations that may help towards establishing libertarianism as the universal, human ethic.

The first consideration, and one that the present author is yet to see in print, is why should the burden of proof be on libertarians to establish their case? Doubtless it is the task of those who posit a particular political or ethical theory to justify their propositions, but too often in this kind of debate, democratic government is seen to be the natural, neutral or perhaps “default” position, with libertarians striving to promote something new and exciting, like a novel invention or a method that must be proven to be right before we could possibly envisage accepting it (although it seems as though we are never allowed to have it tried and tested). However, the case is, arguably, the other way round. Liberty – the freedom of each individual as an independent moral agent free from interference – is the natural, default status of human beings, as will become clear from our analysis below. It requires only negative action on the part of every individual human – the abstinence from physical invasion of the person or property of another. Anything else, however, requires a positive, conscious choice to disturb this peaceful situation and to interfere, physically, with somebody else. Those proposing such a positive course of action should surely be required to prove their case ahead of those who argue for retention of the natural state of affairs? Indeed, the difficulty of establishing a case for libertarianism does not result in the case for government being any stronger and at the very least proponents of the latter should be prepared to justify their positions as well. Often in these debates the libertarian is presented with a smorgasbord of issues and is required to explain how each and every one of them would be dealt with in a libertarian society and produce a just outcome; for some reason, the slightest weakness, the slightest inability of the libertarian to explain how a single issue, however minor, would be handled better in a libertarian society is taken as conclusive proof that libertarianism must be discarded, regardless of the finesse of the argument before that point. This is nothing but intellectual sloth, or rather a preference to bask in the comfortable status quo rather than confront formidable questions. It may be difficult to argue for the rights to self-ownership and private property, but it is much more difficult to propose that a select few should be able to override self-ownership and private property; that a select few need not earn their living by serving others through voluntary trade but can, instead, confiscate it; that the select few can enact laws and edicts with no regard to any primary rationale whatsoever; that the select few can establish massive, compulsory monopolies over whole industries such as transport and healthcare; that this little elite can accumulate debt that exceeds the productive capacity of the planet; that it can spend this borrowed money on invading and bombing civilians in foreign countries in conflicts that are not its concern. This side of the debate cannot be ignored. Now, to be sure, not all statists agree that these are legitimate things for the government to do and would wilfully deplore them in concert with libertarians (although much of this would be a criticism of that which government does, as opposed to the libertarian view that opposes government per se). But this demonstrates that the status quo is not the default option and opponents of libertarianism must be prepared to establish their own philosophies as being superior to libertarianism rather than simply dismissing one that they do not share.

The second consideration, and one that has been raised in previous essays, is the presuppositions of those who attempt to promote ethical theories of society. The characteristic of humans that distinguishes them from animals or unconscious matter is that they make voluntary choices to devote means towards ends, rather than simply relying upon instinct or the inertia of other matter. These voluntary choices are the substance of moral enquiry – because of the fact of scarcity, humans must choose between competing ends to which means could be devoted. An ethical theory informs the human of which ends he should pursue and which he should not with the means available. Without voluntary choice arising from scarcity moral theories would be redundant – total abundance would mean that every end is already fulfilled and hence moral theories would have no information to provide, and without voluntary choice moral theories would have no effect upon an action because the individual cannot change its outcome. Thus any being that makes voluntary choices is deemed to be a moral agent – the being to whom a moral theory applies. A theory of intrapersonal morality would concern only how moral agents should make choices in relation to amoral agents – those who have no voluntary choice such as dead matter, or objects. The moral question is “what is a good thing for this person to do with this object?” and not “what is a good thing for this person and for this object?” There is no such thing as moral rights arising in the form of dead matter and any moral enquiry concerns wholly the best ends for this individual human to pursue vis-à-vis that matter. With interpersonal morality, however, the question changes as now we are concerned about what is good for one actor and what is good for another in their relations between them. An interpersonal ethical theory accounts for not only the best ends of the one actor but also those of the other; thus, there arises the language of reciprocal rights and obligations that we possess and owe, respectively, to each other. As we noted, the essence of being human is that voluntary choices are completed through actions which are physical manifestations, making physical changes to the matter that is in the world and that this is the criterion of moral agency. If one person’s voluntary action, therefore, physically restrains or interferes with the person or property of another then what is the result? What happens when one person uses force against the person or property of another? Simply that this latter person is now prevented from making voluntary choices that result in actions devoted towards ends that he desires. Rather, his action is now forcibly directed, like a mere object, to the fulfilment of the ends of another individual. He therefore loses his characteristic as a moral agent and, worse still, as a human being entirely. For the very characteristic that makes him human – voluntary choice – has now been denied to him. What follows, therefore, is that any ethical theory that relies upon the force may be a perfectly applicable ethical theory to the individual actor doing the forcing – it may be perfectly acceptable if it is presented as a theory of what this one person should, treating every other human in the world as mere objects for his use. But if it is presented as an ethical theory of society then something is surely amiss – for how can such a theory apply to a society of humans, who, by virtue of that definition, each have independent moral agency making voluntary actions motivated by voluntary choices, when the substance of that theory denies them this very characteristic? It is no answer to this charge that, as humans, we have a reciprocal obligation to submit to the force of a person who may be said to have the “right to force”. Such an obligation does not make sense because an obligation presupposes the voluntary choice to carry out the substance of that obligation. If one is forced, however, there is no obligation at all – like a tree blowing in the wind it simply happens. Furthermore, the threat of force resulting in seemingly voluntary compliance is indistinguishable from force because there is no genuine choice – the same outcome will always result regardless of the victim’s choice to either carry out the forced ends voluntarily or to submit to violence. Moreover, neither does so-called “democratic oversight” of the enforcers – through, say, popular elections of the government – make any difference. In the first place, the answer of democratic oversight to seemingly despotic and autocratic propositions is reminiscent of the response of the socialists to Mises’ theory of economic calculation under socialism – in order to try and get around a very real problem faced by their theory they have to make socialism look like a market through various contrived devices such as bureaucrats “playing” entrepreneurs with money bestowed on them by the state – which raises the question of why not just adopt the market anyway instead of an inferior version of it? In just the same way here democracy lends a veneer to tyrannous and collectivist theories in order to make them look more free so that people are really “volunteering” to government edicts – which equally raises the question of why just not adopt genuine liberty? Regardless of this, however, democracy does not convey any genuine voluntary control to the individual. Rather, it conveys it to a majority of individuals. Any ethical social theory legitimated by democracy is not, therefore, a genuine human ethic but rather an ethic of the majority. Anyone in the minority is still forcibly subjected to ends that they do not want. Furthermore, this control by the majority would only be present in direct democratic systems where you get to vote on every individual issue. However, in so-called representative democracy, the political system under which most of us are languishing in the world today, the majority merely chooses the decision makers out of a carefully screened list once every four or five years – and there is no compulsion upon these leaders to carry out their manifesto commitments or electoral promises. The majority may have chosen the leaders but there is no guarantee that they would voluntarily submit to that which these leaders would decide to do once in office. Neither also does the fact that the tyranny may be partial rather than absolute save any collectivist social theory. For example, the government may forcibly confiscate 40% of your income in taxes; 60% of it is still yours to do with what you like as a free and independent human being (subject to all the myriad of government restrictions and regulations, of course). More specifically, the government does not regulate when you make a cup of coffee, or go to the toilet, or watch the television, or do your laundry. In other words there is still a very significant part of our lives in which collectivist ethical theories still allow us to be independent moral agents. However, this is only because the government has decided to leave you alone in these activities. If I had a working horse and I let it wander to any corner of the paddock that it wanted, sleep when it wanted, drink water when it wanted, none of this would change the fact that the horse is still entirely mine to dispose of as I wish. Indeed I might only allow these unilateral actions on the part of the horse because it makes it more pliable to being forced to work at a later date. In the same vein, most collectivist theories, absent some vague or waffling commitment to “fairness”, “equality” and so on, do not posit the substantive choices that should be made under their aegis – they merely advocate the procedural, political set up for making them. There is no reason why, in principle, government could not confiscate all or a larger chunk of your income, or actually regulate how often you go to the toilet or what you decide to wear. The de facto result of democracy is that it has seemingly legitimated any action of the government whatsoever, with democratic governments having made far more inroads to personal liberty of which ancient monarchs could only have dreamed. Substantive freedom under collectivism is based more upon what the populace is willing to bear rather than anything inherent in the ethical theory that informs it.

This proposition – that any theory that does not permit complete individual freedom can never be a genuine human ethic and therefore is, by its own standards, contradictory is not, of course, a watertight theory. It would, for example, have nothing to say to a person who did not wish to present his theory as a social theory and only cares about subjecting other people to the ends that he desires – in other words, a tyrant in the extreme. And indeed, just as a horse may need to be cajoled in working for you, so too may the tyrant pay lip service to espousing an ethical theory of society that works for everyone in order to placate the population, whereas privately he has concluded that only his ends really matter1. Nevertheless, it is certainly an important realisation whenever confronting someone who proposes such a theory. For if he is proposing a genuine theory of society then his theory is contradictory. If he is not, then his tyranny is simply revealed for what it really is and his true ends, to subject everyone else to his desires, will be laid bare for all to see. It is not likely that response to such a theory would contain an overwhelming degree of enthusiasm.

1This is arguably the shortcoming of Hans Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, which relies upon the premise that ethical propositions must be determined by argument. Does this bind the person who doesn’t argue, or playfully argues only to cajole or placate while having already unilaterally concluded ethical propositions in his own mind?

A current recurring debate within the libertarian movement is that between so-called “thin” and “thick” libertarianism, the belief that libertarianism concerns only self-ownership and private property (or at least their derivative non-aggression) on the one hand (“thin”) or whether there are certain other moral imperatives or ends that are, at the very least, part of the libertarian spirit and serve to strengthen its message or, at most, are necessary for its cause (“thick”). In providing a contribution to this debate it is important to understand the place of libertarianism within two things; first, within the wider category of moral philosophy; and second, within the place of the personal ethics of individual libertarians.

Libertarianism and Moral Philosophy

Addressing the first question, it will be argued here that any concept of “thick” libertarianism misunderstands the fact that the purpose of libertarianism is not to espouse a positive theory of interpersonal morality; rather it is to preserve the character of individuals as moral agents to ensure that such theories are possible in the first place.

Questions of morality arise because humans face the constant and ceaseless condition of scarcity. Humans must prioritise the ends that they seek to fulfil as they lack sufficient means with which to satisfy all of them together. Moral considerations arise to inform this prioritisation and would be absent if it was not necessary. If every fulfilment could be achieved without the need of choice then morality would serve no purpose as every possible end would instantaneously be gratified. The necessity of choice, however, requires a means for informing that choice, a way to determine the best outcome that can be achieved with the means available. The result of any choice is an action that has a real physical effect upon the condition of the means, the matter which is the object of the action. A part of the universe is changed physically from serving one end to serving another.

We can think of morality as consisting of two parts or categories. The first part is unilateral or intra-personal and arises where you have a single, desiring, choosing and acting human surrounded only by dead and unconscious matter. Any choice that the human makes will result in an action that will have a physical effect upon at least part of this unconscious matter, for example an apple that is eaten or a piece of wood that is used for a fire or to build a house. Morality, in this instance, will inform the acting human how he should best serve his ends with the means available but there is no reciprocal relationship that arises between the human and the matter around him. Possessing no desire, choice, or action of their own and with their entire condition and motion subject solely to the laws of physics and chemistry, these external entities cannot be described as moral agents and are owed no moral obligation, nor do they possess any moral rights. Moral imperatives may serve to create boundaries upon that which you may do with a certain piece of unconscious matter, but this will entail no reciprocal moral burdens and benefits vis-à-vis that matter1. The second part of morality is bilateral or inter-personal and arises between two or many desiring, choosing and acting beings, all of whom may run into conflicts of scarcity as they seek to fulfil their individually valued ends with the means available, including their own bodies. Not only is someone else’s body inhabited by a conscious and end-seeking being, but the dead and unconscious matter around us may now also be claimed by someone else in order to fulfil that person’s ends and not ours. Hence we have moral rights and obligations that spring up between the acting beings in order to avoid or otherwise resolve these conflicts. There are two sub-divisions to this morality. First is the realm of physical enforcement of moral ends – what we might call violent enforcement. One human being may bring about his end by subjecting another to force or violence. The result of this is that one human’s ends are gained at the expense of another’s. This subdivision is the primary preoccupation of political philosophy – which moral norms may be enforced physically and what are the boundaries of that enforcement? The second sub-division is the realm of non-physical or non-violent enforcement of moral ends – those norms that may only be enforced by persuasion, cajoling, association or non-association, and so on. Furthermore, morality is used to serve as a benchmark or a standard of judgment of moral beings. We apply certain moral codes to other people’s behaviour in order to judge whether they have behaved morally or are, indeed, good and moral persons or evil scoundrels. This straddles both of the categories of morality we just outlined – we make judgments of people’s behaviour both in regard to unconscious matter (i.e. what they might do when alone, in their own home etc.) and of their behaviour towards other people. We may then modify our own behaviour in response to what we see in them – either embracing or befriending them if they are morally good or otherwise attempting to enforce our moral code if we believe them to be morally bad.

Libertarianism, thinly conceived, perfectly preserves these categories in order to provide a foundation for wider moral theory. The critical aspect of all moral agency is that an individual moral being retains the freedom to choose and to act upon his choice. Any physical restraint results in that person not being able to bring about his chosen ends, and any action of his that is compelled by force is not one that he has chosen. In other words the individual would cease to remain as a moral being at all. Libertarianism places only the rights to self-ownership and private property over unconscious matter that is previously unowned (or voluntarily transferred) within the realm of violently enforced inter-personal morality. Any person may repel any invasion of his body or property physically in order to preserve his character as a moral agent. Libertarianism’s sole preoccupation with this fact ensures that this bedrock is firmly established so that we can then go on to develop further theories of intrapersonal and interpersonal morality, to make prescriptions about people should behave, and to make judgments about the behaviour that they do make.

Let us consider, as an example, a proposition of interpersonal morality – that a person should give some of his earnings to the poor. A libertarian would state that this moral proposition would not be violently enforceable and the person would have to choose to donate his money. Such a moral proposition only makes sense when you apply the libertarian foundation of self-ownership and private property, preserving the individual’s character as a moral agent. The proposition concerns how the individual should freely choose to behave in relation to others, and having so behaved we can then make judgments about his moral character. If, on the other hand, it is proposed that the person should be forced to donate his earnings to the poor then this proposition ceases to concern the choice of the individual at all. By enforcing the imperative violently the individual ceases to have any input into the action and is treated simply like a piece of dead matter, such as a hammer or plank of wood – an unconscious tool for the furtherance of other people’s ends. However, the subtle intellectual change that has occurred is that the proposition is no longer a proposition of interpersonal morality. It is, rather, a proposition of intrapersonal morality directed at the enforcing agent, such as the tax collector or bureaucrat. It is not in any way instructing the taxed individual how to behave at all; rather it is instructing his enforcer to take money from him and do X, Y or Z with it. We cannot in any way judge the behaviour of the taxed individual as being “moral” or “immoral”; having no participation in the decision we cannot say that he is a better or worse being as a result. The only person we can judge is the enforcer and whether he behaved morally or immorally by taking the money. What we realise therefore is that any theory of interpersonal morality that enforces its decrees by violence is not a theory of interpersonal theory in any way at all. It simply a theory of intrapersonal morality for the rulers, concerning only how those in positions of power should act unilaterally, treating all other human beings as dead, unconscious tools to be exploited for whatever ends the theory sees fit. Such a theory can never be a theory of society; it preserves only the moral agency of the leader or the controller, degrading all other humans to the level of expendable resources. Indeed, many moral propositions in public and political discourse today are not directed at the individuals in society but are, rather, are directed at government: “Government should do more to help the poor; government should build more houses; government should do more to curb fossil fuel use; government should provide a better education for my children, etc.” Only the rulers are required to make moral decisions and moral choices while the rest of us are reduced to the level of pets, to be worked, fed and watered but otherwise absolved from any responsibility for what we do. Moreover none of this changes simply because the rulers are democratically elected or, from time to time, the previous minority becomes the majority and the previous rulers may switch places with some of the previously ruled. It simply means that the propositions are directed at functional positions (Prime Minister, President, Congressman, etc.) rather than at specific, unchanging individuals.

It should be equally clear that nothing about such theories relying on force and the propositions that derive from them can make a more “moral” or “good” society for we can only judge a person’s behaviour when he is free to act. When he is forced to act or to not act then we can make no moral judgment of his action whatsoever, just as we cannot say whether a tree is behaving morally or immorally when it shakes in the wind. Indeed, as history has demonstrated amply, the more likely result is a moral degradation of the populace – laziness and lack of motivation caused by the bitterness and resentment at being forced to achieve someone else’s ends, and corruption and black marketing when there are any attempts to circumvent them.

It is this crucial recognition that libertarianism, thinly conceived, has to offer, and why it is becoming so attractive as the failure of government and forced rule becomes more obvious each and every day. Thin libertarianism may have nothing to say whatsoever on any positive moral and political theories. Rather, when those theories advocate violent enforcement, libertarianism, in effect, says “Stop!” Slow down, back track, and understand that for any coherent theory of interpersonal morality you need to preserve self-ownership and private property. Given that this recognition is so desperately lacking, any positive ends that are built upon libertarianism as a superstructure through any “thickening” of its concept is likely to distract from its vital core. In the short term this is likely to dilute the distinction between libertarianism and all other political theories (whether they be conservative or progressive) that has made it so successful – possibly leading to the subsuming of libertarianism as a branch of those political traditions. In the long term, there is the danger that any moral superstructure that is built on top of the foundation of non-aggression will come to jettison the crucial foundation itself. This is arguably what happened to classical liberalism, resulting in its transformation into the statist liberalism we know today2. However, our argument here does not simply concern strategy – that which is necessary for preserving libertarianism, or that which may be best in persuading people of the virtues of a free society and attracting them to the libertarian cause. Rather, the recognition of the preservation of individuals’ moral agency before any further positive, interpersonal moral theory is developed is absolutely essential for conceptual clarity and libertarianism’s place as the bedrock of interpersonal moral theory is required intellectually and not just practically.

We might also point out that there appear to be no positive ends and values that flow self-evidently from self-ownership and private property, or from their derivative, the non-aggression principle. Rather, any such ends and values that are advanced by the individual “thick” libertarian tend to concern that individual’s own personal philosophical preoccupations, such individuals including those with very strong libertarian and scholarly credentials3. It is difficult to see how such varying ends and values flow self-evidently from the same principle. More likely the individual “thickest” identifies the state as the roadblock towards the achievement of his own personal, societal ideals and so he advocates freedom. But he then makes the mistaken leap of tying those ideals – that which he wishes to accomplish through freedom – to freedom itself. We do not mean to suggest, of course, that there is no purpose or importance in debating which values and ends are likely to prevail in a free society, or over those which may assist the libertarian cause (as we shall proceed to do below). But such a debate has nothing per se to do with libertarianism’s place in the sphere of moral and political theory.

Libertarianism and Personal Morality

Addressing now the second aspect of libertarianism – that of its place within the moral outlook of the individual libertarian – it is sufficient, for a person in his capacity as a libertarian, to recognise only private property and self-ownership and to not develop any further moral superstructure upon those foundations. But in his capacity as a human being who must take his place in society we have to stress that such a limitation is woefully inadequate. Libertarianism only states that each and every person should be able to act free from physical incursion. It does not go on to say how he should choose to act, which decisions he should make in allocating the scarce means at his disposal. The consistent libertarian who claimed that self-ownership and private property are the only moral considerations would, in fact, never act at all as he would possess no ends to strive for and no values of which he would seek fulfilment. Rather we all as human beings have values, choices that we believe are right and choices that we believe are wrong, and we all seek to make the right choices and criticise those who do not. Libertarians can probably be forgiven for not having, thus far, emphasised their personal moral theories alongside their libertarian credentials. The violence and destruction wrought by the state has given us plenty to concentrate on. Nevertheless, such a development and espousal of a personal moral theory is critical from both a strategic as well as an intellectual point of view. Not only is it possible for someone who abides strictly by the non-aggression principle to be a thoroughly rotten and unpleasant individual, but the greatest danger lies in the fact that libertarians, by refusing to interfere violently in certain peaceful but morally repugnant ends, may be misinterpreted as going further and actively condoning and praising such behaviour. Simply because we collectively, in our capacity as libertarians, have nothing to say about non-violent actions and choices may result in us appearing as the “anything goes” crowd, failing to address the genuine and heartfelt moral concerns of people we hope to persuade of the virtues of a free society. It is often not sufficient for people to hear that loose abstractions such as “the market” or “private charity” will, for example, suffice to take care of the poor, even if we demonstrate their superiority in doing so. Rather, with any moral issue we are presented, we must be prepared to take a personal moral stance. Our only difference is that we would not violently enforce that stance but would, rather, seek to promote it non-violently and to persuade people to make what we think would be the right choice. It is, therefore, perfectly commendable to state, for example, that people should not be forced to give to the poor but that it would be a good thing for them to choose to do so; or to state that no one should violently stop another person from taking drugs but that to do so would be a morally bad choice and that we would not wish to associate with those people; or to state that you can’t stop a person from making racist comments but you would think that such a person is an ignorant and repugnant bigot. Or, of course, you might conclude the opposite if you can persuasively argue your case. What is important is that you engage with the issue and do not stop short at merely analysing an action or end as non-violent and then having nothing more to say. But the views that you espouse will not be made in your capacity as a libertarian – libertarianism only forming the bedrock of your moral outlook – but as a choosing, desiring, valuing and acting human being who takes his place in society. Nevertheless, the more you build your personal moral views upon a libertarian bedrock, the stronger that bedrock becomes by demonstrating conclusively that libertarians as human beings are not morally vacuous but can, indeed, hold a flourishing and well-developed positive moral theory that addresses the moral concerns of everyone else in society. Indeed, summing up what we have concluded in this section, we might say that a “thick” conception of libertarianism would serve to undermine and destroy it both intellectually and practically; whereas libertarians possessing an otherwise “thick” and engaging supra-libertarian moral outlook separate from but compatible with libertarianism, would very much promote it.

Morality and Religion in a Free Society

One of our conclusions above was that even though a debate concerning which values and ends are likely to prevail in a free society has nothing to do with libertarianism’s place in the sphere of moral and political theory, there is still some purpose and merit in venturing to speculate upon whether, in a world that was completely free from government force and compulsion and which was founded upon the institutions of self-ownership and private property, these facts in and of themselves would encourage a general supra-libertarian morality in a particular direction. For example, if left to their own devices, would that very fact cause people be more likely to create a world of inclusion, non-discrimination based upon race, gender, sexual orientation, etc., would it be secular or religious, multi-cultural or strictly divided, and so on? Would it be a world in which drugs and recreational substance use is widespread or is it more likely to encourage restraint and conservatism in such use? Would it be a world of close connections of family and friendship or would there be more “free love” and sexual experimentation? Even though as a matter of pure logic, libertarianism is compatible with any moral theory so long as the ends posited by that theory do not invade the private property of anyone else, it is submitted that, in practice, it is not likely to work out that way and that we can expect at least a certain kind of supra-libertarian moral order to exist by virtue of the fact that a society is founded upon the institution of private property. What follows is the author’s speculation upon what kind of order this will be.

The foundation of this speculation is the observation that wherever human freedom has been unshackled and free enterprise has been allowed to pursue whatever ends it chooses with relatively less molestation, individuals have chosen to engage in processes that increase their material prosperity ahead of simply sitting around day dreaming and enjoying endless leisure time. The capacity for energy and enterprise has increased, the division of labour has widened and the material standard of living has risen. This may partly be implied in the logic of action itself as increased freedom leads to greater or more successful action and is therefore, likely to result in more actions and more improvement. It is also the case that fulfilment of more ethereal needs such as spirituality, rejuvenation, relaxation, meditation, and so on can only come about once material needs have been satisfied so that even if one was to pursue the former the latter would have to be conquered first. Nevertheless, it is an empirical observation and there has never been any strict requirement for individuals to choose to engage in production rather than simply extending their leisure time4. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the creation of a free society would lead to expansion of the division of labour, the accumulation of capital, an increase in production, and of the material standard of living.

What we can note about this fact is that those who, in a free society, accumulate income and wealth and hence possess a greater ability to direct economic resources are those who serve the needs of consumers. At the level of the capitalist-entrepreneurs, therefore, this will require a number of different qualities: the patience and low time preference to accumulate capital; good judgment, foresight and prudence in directing that capital to where it is most needed; empathy and understanding of one’s customers; and the sociability and communicability required to engage and motivate contractors, colleagues, and employees. The capitalist-entrepreneurs in turn will look for employees who are hard-working, educated, reliable, trustworthy and the employees will therefore seek to spend their money on consumers’ goods that will nurture, within them, these qualities. In other words serving the needs of others and the qualities and characteristics required to do so are ends that would be encouraged by the adoption of a free society. Resources therefore will accumulate in the hands of those who display these qualities and would disappear from the hands of those who do not; qualities and characteristics that harm or otherwise interfere with one’s ability to serve others – laziness, high time preference, a lack of empathetic understanding, unreliability, and on so – will be discouraged and are likely to diminish. While, therefore, it is possible for persons to engage in endless leisure time and spend their entire day indulging in activities such as drinking, drug-taking and having sex, the resources available for them to do so will be limited and they are likely to be excluded from all prospects of increasing those resources as the habits in which they indulge are antithetical to any method of doing so (i.e. serving others) on the free market.

Second, is a free society likely to be non-discriminatory, and inclusive of all genders, races, religious beliefs, sexual orientations, and so on, or will it be highly segregated and exclusive? We can speculate that there will be two outcomes to this question rather than one. First, in the impersonal and arm’s length dealings of the marketplace, it is likely that all factors that are not relevant to one’s ability to serve the needs of others will be excluded from consideration. If I buy a sweater from a shop it is not likely to make any difference to me whether it was made by a man or a woman, by a white or a black, by a gay or a straight, by a pious Christian or a devil-worshipper. I am so far removed from the complex chain of production that any prejudice or preference I might have in this sweater being made by someone of a particular creed or colour is likely to recede drastically. If consumers do not care about a worker’s personal qualities other than his/her ability to serve the consumer’s ends then neither may capitalist-entrepreneurs do so in the chain of production as they are forced to adhere to their customers’ wishes. If I am looking to hire an employee for my enterprise, the costs of excluding the best person for the job based on some discriminatory ground will mean that I fail to keep up with my competition and will lose money faster. It is true that certain industries will serve different types of people and that certain personal qualities are likely to make one more adept at serving the needs of people who are similar to you. Christians may be better at investing in, producing, marketing and serving specific goods that are desired by other Christians; gay men may be the best people to do the same for gay men, and so on. And people of certain genders, races or cultures may be attracted to certain types of employment ahead of others. It might also be true that a person feels more comfortable if the precise person who serves them at the front line is someone of their ilk – the familiarity of a similar person perhaps helping to grease the wheels of commerce if empathy, advice or understanding is needed to assist a person with his purchase. But all of this only produces an outcome that better serves the needs of consumers and is not based on race, gender, or sexual orientation per se. If a pious, heterosexual woman could develop, market and serve products to gay men better than other gay men could then she would receive their custom and gay male vendors would not. Furthermore, in the vast array of production of goods that are common to all or most of us and are not produced for a specific category of person, any kind of discrimination in the chain of production is likely to diminish as we will always go to the people who can provide those goods at the lowest cost. Freedom under the division of labour does not require everyone to like or love everyone else, or for everyone to be liked or loved; it only requires you to serve them and the skills that each person can offer in this regard are likely to trump any other factors when it comes to the question of inclusion or exclusion. Our second possible outcome, however, might be slightly different. In the area of personal or familiar relations – as opposed to the arm’s length and impersonal relations of the marketplace – discrimination and exclusion may become more, rather than less intense. Although it is possible for the inclusion of the marketplace to encourage and foster a blending of different people – after all, if you work in the same factory, shop or office as someone of a different race or culture, there is the possibility or even the likelihood, that you will become friends simply through the opportunity of contact – on the whole, people tend to prefer the comfort of familiarity, similarity and uniformity. Individual residential areas and communities, therefore, might be internally homogenous and will cater only to the needs of the type of person living there, even though those communities will be happy to trade with others of a different type in the marketplace. This is not to imply, of course, that each different community will actively hate any other and can only barely stand to engage in mutual trade. Rather, it is likely to be a cordial, peaceful and even friendly co-existence. All we are suggesting is that when it comes to a matter of highest preference people are likely to opt for those who are similar to them in their personal and family relationships – such a preference not requiring you to hate anyone who is not similar. In any case, this entire speculation may be wrong and perhaps people will choose to mix more in their personal relationships as well as in their professional. The beauty of the market is that as we do not force anyone to adhere to a certain set of principles then we do not know the precise outcome; all we know is that that which results is the outcome that will satisfy everybody as far as possible.

The third consideration is related to the previous two. As there is no welfare state in a free society and nobody will have the right to violently wrestle resources from anyone else in the event of unemployment or need, the cultivation of personal relationships becomes relatively more important as there may come a day when we will need to rely upon those relationships if we are in dire need. We can speculate, therefore, that the institutions of family and friendship will strengthen in a free society. Such institutions will seek to include those who are trustworthy, reliable, sociable and responsible and will exclude those who are deceitful, unreliable, unfriendly and selfish. There is also likely to be less “free love” and sexual promiscuity in favour of longer term relationships and marriage that produce children, the latter being those upon whom you can rely when you reach old age and infirmity. Furthermore, as there will be no state-supported child rearing in a free society, only those who accumulate enough wealth by serving the needs of others will be able to afford to raise children. Although some of the qualities necessary for serving the needs of others that are inherent in the parent may be passed on genetically (so that people lacking those qualities will simply cease to be born in significant numbers), even if they are not then the parents are likely to foster the qualities in their children that made them, the parents, successful. Moreover, given that the parents will one day die and wish to leave their wealth to their children they are likely to require the reassurance that the fruits of their life’s work is being left to decent, responsible hands. They are not likely to be content to leave their wealth to a lazy, ill-educated drug addict.

What we have hypothesised, therefore, is that a free society, in which everyone must possess the ability to serve the needs of consumers in order to attract income and wealth, is likely to result in a cultivation of the qualities necessary for doing so, such a cultivation producing a relatively “conservative” (with a small “c”) society. This society will discriminate less on the bases of gender, race, colour, etc. but rather upon the specifically chosen behaviour of free individuals. Those who behave in accordance with ways that serve the needs of consumer and develop the characteristics necessary for doing so will be included. Those who do not are likely to be excluded. We must emphasise, however, that nothing of what we have said requires an individual libertarian to support or promote these ends. Only if people turn down the path of increasing their material welfare and expanding the division of labour would qualities and values necessary for serving others become prominent and our speculation is based only upon the fact that this is the choice that has been made in the past. It is possible for the individual libertarian to advocate a different choice and for free individuals to make it.

One final interesting question concerns the place of religion and religious worship in a free society. Religion has always fundamentally concerned three questions – why we are here; how we got here; and what we should do now that we are here. The pondering of these questions and the result of a shared belief as to their answers among individuals is, of course, logically compatible with libertarianism so long as its practice is peaceful and voluntary. However, the inability of early thought to separate phenomena from purposeful intent resulted in the fact that these questions have not been addressed with mutual exclusivity. Why we are here has been ascribed to the purposeful desire of one or more deities; how we got here was a result of that deity’s action; and it followed, therefore, that what we should do while we are here was to bow to that deity’s commands. Therefore, given the deep-seated need in the human psyche to fill the void that is left by these problems and the resulting imperatives that may be dispensed, whoever has been able to provide the gateway to these answers has enjoyed an immense amount of power – tell people where they came from and how it was done then you can tell people what they should do. Religion has therefore always attracted to its ranks the greedy and the power hungry and it is no accident that it has, throughout much of history, been aligned with the state – limited not just to established churches, but to the extent that the king or emperor himself was elevated to the rank of a God. Although early Christianity and the Thomist emphasis on the natural law diminished this welding for a time, the Protestant Reformation and the rejection, by John Calvin and Martin Luther, of reasoned ethics served to make religion once more a tool of, rather than a controlling force over, absolute rulers. Furthermore, religious wars and crusades have often been wars of power and control rather than strictly over the question of belief. Much of the history of religion has therefore been distinctly anti-libertarian. These days, of course, the development of scientific knowledge has stepped in to answer the puzzle of how we got here, which has served, for many people, to sever any connection between the cause of the universe and any moral imperatives they may face in their daily lives. However, there are two severe limitations to this. First, a knowledge of the natural sciences itself posits no moral theory and, other than agreeing that the pursuit of truth is a good and valuable thing, scientists can offer no moral guidance. They might be able to tell you what will happen when a man has sexual intercourse with a woman, and they could describe the shock you would get if you were to put your fingers into a power socket; but they will not, as a result of their discipline alone, be able to tell you why you should or should not do these things. Rather than replacing religious imperatives, the secularity encouraged by science has, rather, left an empty vacuum. Indeed, knowledge derived from scientific research has been used for some horrendously evil ends as well as good. Secondly the purpose of science is to trace the effects of phenomena back to their ultimate cause; yet the human mind is not able, in the physical and logical dimension it inhabits, to comprehend the concept of an ultimate cause. Every cause that we discover in turn becomes another effect whose existence and characteristics must be ascribed to some further cause that must be investigated. The concept of God is an attempt to deal with this teleological problem; we ascribe to God abilities and characteristics that defy normal explanation, yet our image of him – as a distinct consciousness, a father-figure, etc. – couches these characteristics in a manner that we can understand. Indeed, one of the frequent objections to the existence of God pronounced by atheists – “why are there so many Gods and which one is the right God?” – is perhaps not as interesting as the question as to why they are all so similar. Nearly always they are paternalistic humanoids, they are responsible for all creation and all life and they are the dispensers – if not always the practitioners – of morality. Rather than there being many different Gods, different cultures and traditions have ascribed broadly similar characteristics, varying only in their own cultural idiosyncrasies, to what is roughly the same being in order to create a giant metaphor for things that we do not and perhaps cannot ever understand. Science, or anything else, has not yet provided a sufficient alternative answer to this problem. Indeed, the existence of God is not viewed by believers as a strictly scientific problem like any other. The tools of science – the laws of physics and the laws of logic – are themselves part of the very phenomenon under investigation – creation – and are subject to God’s will. As tools for explaining their creator they therefore appear hopelessly blunt, if not, completely inadequate. None of this, of course, is meant to condone belief and condemn non-belief, or vice versa. Rather it is an attempt to explain why people hold the beliefs that they do.

Having said all of this, what can we conclude about religion and libertarianism? It is difficult to say whether a free society will encourage or discourage religious practice. What we can be certain of, however, is that it will continue to be a very strong force in the world, probably for a long time. There is clearly a need somewhere in the human psyche, possessed by a great many individuals, to ponder the origins of the universe, not just the how, where and the when but the why. Given our inability to meet these needs we can be sure that a libertarian world will have to find some way to deal with religion. Whether this will be mere accommodation, opposition, or embracing will be dependent upon whether religion in turn neutrally respects, is opposed to, or actively supports libertarian principles. There are one or two arguable reasons for at least an accommodation. First, there are many libertarian imperatives, rules, parables and examples in religious texts. The Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount, for instance, contain some strong libertarian imperatives and the remainder is not avowedly unlibertarian. There is no reason why, in a libertarian world, religions should not emphasise a more libertarian bedrock for their further moral teachings. Secondly, religion would be expected to dissolve its historical marriage to power and the state, a dissolution that may not occur easily. Yet so too will everyone else have to do the same – bureaucrats, politicians, favoured corporations, and so on. Nobody will be able to latch onto and use the mantle of the state to pursue their ends. There is no reason why religious people should find this more difficult than anyone else. Given that a libertarian world is unlikely to appear unless a majority of the citizenry come to believe in the justice of libertarianism, congregations themselves should already have embraced the libertarian mind-set. Finally, we may consider the problem of so-called religious extremism, the sort of extremism that wishes to destroy or violently repress anything contrary to its teachings. Particularly, at this time, we might as well mention the dominant issue of Islamic fundamentalism that fuels terrorism. Whatever political system is adopted and whatever the view of the majority of people with regards to their rights and obligations towards others, there will always be fundamentalists, radicals, extremists, zealots and revolutionaries in just the same way as there will always be murderers, rapists, thieves and fraudsters. Many of these will, from any common standard, be lunatics, nutcases or simply deluded fools. Left to their own devices, as they would be in a libertarian world, these people would simply be a bare minority of loners who are unable to spread their views, with any violent attempt to accomplish their aims simply being classified as criminal behaviour like any other. The only reason that Islamic religious extremists who encourage terrorism and violence gain any traction whatsoever is because the foreign policy of the United States and its allies pours fuel onto the fire of what they are saying. The behaviour of Western governments – bombing civilians, invading sovereign countries, spreading a secular democracy – lends plausibility to religious extremism as both an explanation of and a solution for a very real and unwanted foreign incursion. With State power eliminated in a libertarian world, this problem would not exist and such religious extremism would be without a vehicle for motivation.

Conclusion

Summing up everything we have said, libertarianism, thinly conceived, is necessary to form the foundation of wider moral theory. Libertarianism is, therefore, not “thick”. Libertarians, themselves, however, must, in their capacity as human beings have a “thick” moral outlook, that outlook not being a part of libertarianism per se but built upon its firm foundations of self-ownership and private property and seeking to strengthen those foundations through non-violent enforcement. We can, though, speculate that a certain moral order may unfold in a society based upon self-ownership and private property if free individuals choose to expand their material well-being and widen the division of labour. That order is likely to emphasise roughly “conservative” values and while it is not possible to say whether religion is encouraged or discouraged by such an order we can conclude that it is likely to occupy a prominent place.

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1Moral considerations may, of course, arise out of concerns for the welfare of the matter – for example, whether the act of a human being may legitimately cause an animal (a non-actor) pain and suffering. But such considerations only concern whether it is good for the human to be the initiator of the animal’s experience of pain and do not create any reciprocal moral rights in the animal.

3Walter Block identifies a number of prominent libertarians who draw either right wing or left wing conclusions from libertarian foundations. See Walter Block, Libertarianism is unique; it belongs neither to the right nor the left: a critique of the views of Long, Holcombe, and Baden on the left, Hoppe, Feser and Paul on the right” Journal of Libertarian Studies; Vol. 22: 127–70.

4Those who hark back to the pre-industrial era seem to assume that this is how blissful and care-free life used to be, overlooking the fact that the need to provide enough food alone necessitated back breaking amounts of work.

There are several important considerations that are deeply lacking in discourse on moral philosophy. In particular, sharper focus on the reasons why moral questions arise in the first place, the scope of both their enquiry plus the latter’s consequential resolution would aid clearer thought when considering important questions. Part one of this set of three essays will elaborate the conditions or circumstances that are necessary for moral rules to arise; part two will focus on the ethics of violence and part three on the same within the sphere of non-violence. All of the essays will concentrate on moral rules that arise between individual beings (that is moral obligations that are owed to others rather than what is simply “good” for oneself). While an exhaustive treatment of the entire subject would require one or many book-length works the concepts that are outlined here will in particular seek to overcome the notion that anything that is morally “good” should be promoted by the Government and/or that anything that is morally “bad” should be restricted or prevented by the Government.

Morality in the Universe

The matter in the universe finds itself in an array of different conditions, or states of being. We may call each condition in which matter can be arranged an end. In order for an end to be brought into being it requires an action. For an example, an end may be a state of quenched thirst. The action would be drinking a glass of water. (One might also say that the condition of the status quo is brought about by the action of abstaining from interference). All such ends brought about by actions must be done so through means, in this case, the glass, the tap, the water and my labour.

Morality is the discipline that seeks to advocate norms that govern these conditions. Moral rules are prescriptive, seeking to determine which ends should be brought about. Why then does morality arise or, more precisely, what elements must be present in order for ends through actions with means to be regulated?

The Morally Discriminating Being

If ends in the universe are to be regulated by a set of moral norms then it follows that there must some being that will do this – some being must be able to categorise the various conditions as morally good or morally bad (or as any shade of grey in between). What type of being is this?

If matter is dead or unconscious then it is obvious that not even the thought processes necessary for moral determination are present. If the universe consisted solely of such matter then there would be no being in existence that would have the ability to even raise the moral questions let alone ponder their resolution. A universe populated by unconscious matter would consist neither of moral ends nor immoral ends but simply of uncategorised events. However large or small, nothing would be good or bad, pleasurable or painful, inspiring or depressing, virtuous or repugnant. Moral determination therefore requires the conscious ability to discriminate between the ends of actions – to decide which ends are good or bad. In short, they need to be valued. Indeed the very essence of morality is determining which ends should be valued higher than others (or not at all).

However, having the ability to evaluate ends is insufficient – there must also be the impetus to do so. Why would a being have the desire to rank some ends as valuable and others as not? Why does the conflict between what are good ends are what are bad ends exist?

In the first place we could suggest that it is because the universe is one of logical contradiction where one cannot enjoy end A and end not-A at the same time – for example, one cannot be simultaneously thirsty and quenched, hot and cold, inside and outside, in lightness and darkness. Combinations of ends can interfere with each other to render the other ends impossible or seriously impaired. One of the great fields of moral philosophy, that of pain, is easily understood – it is very difficult for other ends to co-exist with a situation of pain. Strictly, therefore, by “good” and “bad” ends we simply mean more or less desirable. Such desire would not exist if all ends could be enjoyed contemporaneously, for there could be no such thing as good or bad. Each end could be enjoyed to its fullest and would have no interference with any other end. There is therefore a conflict between ends. The conflict forces the being to make a choice and by virtue of having to make a choice we can say that the being lives in a world of scarcity1.

But this is not enough however. For as we have already stated, ends must be brought about through actions which require means. By stating that we cannot bring apparently conflicting ends into being are we not in fact saying that we lack the means to do so? The means are the physical tools used by an action to bring an end into being. If there are no means there can be no action and with no action there is no end. Ergo, no means and no end. This also applies to apparently contradictory means, as isn’t it at least conceivable that one day the means might exist to create what today appear to be inconceivable ends?

However the scarcity of means goes much further than the inability to produce apparently contradictory ends. For means are scarce because they can only be directed towards a finite number of ends. Indeed the quality of ends may be non-contradictory and could exist harmoniously with each other but the means to fulfil them all may not be present. The valuing, desiring, and determining being, the moral discriminator, therefore allocates means to the most valued end first, then to the second etc., with ends being unfulfilled at the point where means are extinguished.

We start to see, therefore, that morality arises because of conflicts caused by the scarcity of means. Indeed, moral rules solely aim at what should be done with means. A wide array of possible moral norms – you should not steal, you should not have promiscuous sex, a parent should take care of his/her child, and so on – are stated either in the form “X action should not occur” or “Y end should not be brought about”. But such prescriptions are not aiming at the end as such they are aiming at the means. All of these rules seek to prohibit or restrict ends because they are the not the most appropriate use of the means available. In short, that there are “better” or more highly valued ends towards which the scarce means should be directed.

In sum, a morally discriminating being is one that ranks ends in order to resolve conflicts arising from scarcity of means. By virtue of this ability to rank ends we might also say that the morally discriminating being is the one to whom moral obligations are owed, or, more precisely they are the recipients of the moral benefit. If morality seeks to regulate conditions then the results of this will be what these beings experience.

It is not necessary for the morally discriminating being to be able to control actions that bring about conditions in the universe, that is they needn’t be able to use means to act to bring about ends. A totally paralysed individual, for example, may express discriminating thoughts and values without an ability to bring them into being. Nevertheless these will just be mere thoughts and judgments in the absence of anything further. For one may ponder all day the way one wants conditions to be but if no being has the ability to bring them about through controlling actions then these thoughts are mere mind games – it will be impossible for them to be elevated to the category of norms. For this, we need the morally responsible being to arise.

Moral Responsibility

It should be obvious again that unconscious matter cannot be deemed to have moral responsibility. If morality is to resolve conflicts over competing ends then the being itself must be able to be the initiator of the actions that bring about these ends, i.e. the actions must be chosen. Matter must be able to decide whether to act in a certain way or not but the action of unconscious matter is determined wholly by nature and is regular, predictable and quantifiable. A norm stating that it is immoral for water, when tipped out of a glass, to fall to the ground would be nonsensical as the water has neither the desire to choose nor the ability to do otherwise. It simply behaves according to the laws of physics. Unconscious matter cannot, therefore, be regulated by moral norms.

The actions of conscious matter, however, are determined by that very same consciousness – the action of a human being, for instance is the result of its thinking2. If I move an object from one side of the room to another it is because my mind has chosen that this action should be performed rather than an alternative action. I could equally have chosen not to do so. Conscious actions are therefore not dependent upon external stimuli nor are they reducible to a set of concrete or quantifiable scientific laws – they originate wholly within the mind of the acting being.

We may illustrate further the differences between unconscious matter and conscious matter. The former always behaves in the same way under the same set of circumstances on different occasions. Water will always boil at 100 degrees Celsius at normal atmospheric pressure; it cannot choose to remain un-boiled. The same conscious being however might choose to behave the same or behave differently under the same set of circumstances on different occasions. For example if a robber marches in to a crowded shopping mall and shoots a gun I might dash under a table. If it happens on a second occasion I might choose to do the same thing or I might choose to confront the robber, perhaps buoyed up by my experience of the previous occasion.

Unconscious matter will also behave in the same way under the same set of circumstances on the same occasion as that of other matter of the same ilk. One litre of water will behave in the same way as another litre of water when they are together under the same conditions. However, one conscious being will not always act in the same way as another at the same time. If we take the robber example again I and others might dash under the table but further people present may confront the robber, some may go to seek external help, some will rush to protect children, etc. Precisely what is done and by whom, the content of the action of each, cannot be reduced to a set of scientific laws but is instead dependent on the individual’s own desires and choices.

The morally responsible being therefore must be one that controls its actions, the actions resulting in one of a choice of ends, the choice being made necessary because of the fact of scarcity of means. Indeed the whole purpose of morality is to govern which actions should be chosen. It is this choice leading to control over means that are used in actions to create ends that begat moral responsibility.

Finally we must say that the morally responsible being is the one that owes moral obligations or bears the moral burden. It is its actions that bring about conditions that morality seeks to regulate and are, in turn, experienced by those beings with moral discrimination.

Combinations of Moral Discrimination and Moral Responsibility

As moral responsibility is ascribed to the same fact as moral discrimination – that of choice between ends governing actions through means – it follows that a morally responsible being will also always be a morally discriminating one. The reverse, however, need not be true. It is quite possible for a morally discriminating being – one to whom moral obligations are owed – to be devoid of moral responsibility. Physically paralysed persons again, for example, may possess a mind capable of desire, value and choice but lack the ability to bring about these values. Nevertheless we may still regard them as being holders of moral rights3. How precisely these rights and obligations come to be owed and held and by whom and between whom is what we shall turn to next.

Moral Rules and Society

Let us imagine several hypothetical types of universe in which moral rules – the norms that resolve conflicts arising from scarcity of means – might be determined. All of these universes are fictitious but they will help us to isolate and understand the elements of the universe as it is that are necessary for morality to come about.

As we have already outlined a universe consisting entirely of unconscious matter would yield no moral rules. With no morally discriminating being the reason for morality arising in the first place – the problem of scarcity – is non-existent. Matter may collide in attempts to occupy the same space but all conflicts will be resolved purely by the laws of physics and nobody will be there to say whether the resulting conditions are better or worse. With no such discrimination between conflicting ends there will be no moral rules.

Similarly a universe containing only one or more morally discriminating beings but no morally responsible beings would yield nothing; in such a universe we now have beings that may feel the conflict of scarcity in their minds. But their values, whatever they may be, are unable to express themselves through action that results in changed ends. There is, therefore, no scope for any morality to be put into practice. Any musing on the ends that should be brought about would simply be an intellectual game rather than a blueprint for regulating the condition of the universe.

Next, let us consider a universe of a single, lone, morally responsible being (who is, as we stated above, also a morally discriminating one). No matter at all exists apart from this being, indeed we might even say that he is the universe. We therefore now have a being who both feels the conflict of scarcity and has the ability to resolve these conflicts by choosing ends through action but he is the only thing out there. How will morality arise here, if at all?

Such loneliness for the conscious being entails that there is no other matter existing outside of itself. All ends and means concern only and are of only itself. All conflicts arising from scarcity can concern only itself, or are made with reference to itself – indeed they will all arise because the being needs to decide what to do with itself. Further any truth or realisation that it could perceive would concern solely itself as there is no other matter on which such a perception could be formed. Although the being would be subject to physical laws there would, on the other hand, be nothing approaching a sphere of morality that could be divorced from the being’s own desires, evaluations and choices. The entire universe of the being would revolve only around these elements; there are no other considerations that would either prevent or promote these elements in determining how the being should resolve conflicts of scarcity. Furthermore any resolution of the conflict that the being takes through action will only affect itself for there is no other matter that can be changed as the result of one of the these actions. In this type of universe, therefore, morality, in seeking to resolve the being’s conflicts of scarcity, will relate entirely to the being’s preferences, choices and actions that can and only will ever affect conditions concerning itself and conditions arising from itself. Every conflict originates from the being’s own matter, every choice will be made by him, every action will be made by him also, all means will consist of him and, finally, every end will affect only him. Whether we can sensibly conceive of morality that is divorced from what the being actually does prefer, choose and act upon as opposed to that which it should is a puzzle the reader might like to consider. But for the purposes of this essay we shall conclude that morality seeks to solve conflicts that arise between various beings or between various “collections” of matter. Questions of morality are therefore social questions and moral rules are social rules.

Let us therefore turn to the universe where there is still one morally responsible being (the “moral agent”) present but there now exists matter that is external to the being. In such a universe there is now a frame of reference outside of the matter of the being so that there is something other than considerations concerning the being’s own self that will affect and afflict its choices concerning the resolution of conflicts arising from scarcity. How does a moral agent come to know the content of these moral rules?

Where all external matter is unconscious neither moral discrimination nor moral responsibility can be ascribed to such matter as we have stated. It follows that this matter cares not which conditions prevail in the universe nor does it have the ability to change them. Conflicts regarding scarcity will arise slightly differently, however. For the state of the external matter is itself a condition of the universe that the moral agent will form values concerning and hence the status of the external matter itself then is a source of conflict. For example, a rock may occupy the space that the moral agent wishes to occupy or a piece of fruit may be hanging from a tree. If the moral agent desires to occupy the rock’s space or eat the fruit the rock must be moved and the fruit must be plucked from the tree and consumed. Owing to the scarcity of means external matter cannot be in both of its stated conditions simultaneously – the rock cannot be into two places and the fruit cannot be both hanging from the tree and consumed. Or, there may be another delicious fruit hanging from a different tree but the moral agent has the means to pick only one of them and has to choose which. However, these conflicts, the choice between alternatives, exist solely in the mind of the moral agent, not in the external matter. Possessing no desires and choices of its own this matter is simply there; the original condition that it is in upon the entry to the scene of the moral agent is governed by physics and will remain so absent any intervention by the moral agent. Where a conflict forms in the mind of the moral agent, therefore, where he would prefer the condition of external matter to be different, there is still no external frame of reference to establish precisely why he should prefer this (or not). Conflicts in this universe will only be solved, therefore, by the agent allocating means to his most highly valued ends first and bringing these about through action4.

Our final fictitious universe is one where there is a single morally responsible being and one or many morally discriminating beings. Here, for the first time, we have a being who can choose means, ends and actions in the universe the results of which will be valued by other beings. Here we have the first glimmer of morality being able to arise in this universe, for conflicts now do not solely arise as autistic problems in the mind of a single being but exist vis-à-vis separate beings. Indeed, a greater degree of scarcity exists in this universe as each may wish to have the same means devoted to different ends. A universe of many morally discriminating beings therefore suffers from interpersonal scarcity.

However we have to conclude that morality simply will not arise in this universe. For how is the morally responsible being supposed to be able to distinguish between unconscious matter and matter that is discriminating but unable to control its actions? A characteristic of beings that value but can bear no moral responsibility is that their actions are determined entirely by the laws of physics. their behaviour and responses to stimuli will be exactly the same as unconscious matter. There is no way therefore that the moral agent can know whether he is supposed to proceed with a certain action with moral responsibility or whether he can solely reflect on his own values and choices as they actually are. The situation is akin to rocks secretly being able to value – do we owe moral obligations to rocks simply because of this? An answer in the affirmative would be an absurdity. No moral agent would ever be able to act in relation to other matter at all on the grounds that it “might” be able to think and, faced, with this quandary, would quickly perish.

Our final scenario, and the one that really exists, is where there is more than one morally responsible being in existence. But even here special conditions must exist. It should be obvious that the existence alone of other beings is insufficient; in order to be accounted for the being must be aware of this existence. As we said before, morality is prompted by conflict. Totally independent existence from all other beings would still yield nothing that was outside of and separate from the moral agent’s own existence and conflicts arising from scarcity will remain within this sphere. The same could be true where there is a mutual awareness between morally responsible beings yet this awareness is innocuous – as long as no conflict arises in the minds of the moral agents the scope of morality will still be that of the agent and its actions that will concern only itself.

The next step, therefore, is for conflicts arising from scarcity to arise between moral agents – that is that they each independently desire, value, choose and act, but that one agent’s actions can’t co-exist with another’s because of the fact of scarcity of means. Morality is therefore necessarily dependent upon the existence of multiple moral agents who engage in conflicts resulting from scarcity. It seeks to answer these conflicts by determining in whose favour the conflict should be determined. The “winner” will have a moral right that he can enforce against the “loser” who in turn bears the moral obligation. The result is formulated in typical discourse as the “winner” should be able to do X whereas the loser should not be able to do X; or the “loser” should do Y for the “winner”, etc.5 However, as we elaborated above, the conflict arises because of means. The moral prescription therefore takes effect as awarding a moral right to one party over means, whereas the other has a moral obligation not to interfere with these means.

Conclusion

We have, therefore, fully elaborated the necessary preconditions for morality to arise in the universe. In short, the universe must be populated by two or more beings who devote scarce means through actions towards ends. Conflicts arising because of the scarcity of means between individuals begat moral norms.

In the next two parts we shall look at specific conflicts that will arise between moral agents. Part two will concentrate on the moral norms that are violently enforceable and part three on those are not. In each case, what will be suggested is that a rationally derived body of ethics exists to govern human interaction.

1The problem of pain is one that illustrates the logical quagmire in which one might end up by trying to too hard to conceive of a universe without scarcity. We might say that pain itself is a product of scarcity – that it is a physiological warning system that alerts the “sufferer” to the fact that he is proceeding on a course of action that will extinguish his ability to pursue ends, i.e. he is in the process of damaging and perhaps killing his body. It is possible to suggest, therefore, that in a non-scarce world pain would not exist. But if pain doesn’t exist then it too becomes scarce and so the non-scarce universe does not come about.

2By this we mean the content of actions as opposed to their form which are subject to the laws of praxeology.

3The precise classification of existing beings is beyond the scope of this essay; the difficult question of children or of those adults with impaired mental or physical capabilities, not to mention the distinction between certain types of animals – mere single cell organisms and the higher primates, for example – will not be dealt with here. Our aim is to determine the prerequisites of moral beings, not to analyse who or what actually possesses them.

4It might be asserted that conflicts arising from scarcity will be resolved by “technical considerations” only, i.e. by what can be done as opposed to what should be done. For example, if a moral agent wishes to stand where a rock is then the matter will be decided by whether the moral agent can, in fact, move the rock. However the reason why technical considerations arise at all is because means are scarce, i.e. the means to move the rock are lacking. To suggest, therefore, that technical considerations will resolve conflicts arising from scarcity is to argue that scarcity will resolve scarcity. The entire problem is precisely which out of a whole myriad of technical possibilities can means be best devoted? Resolution of this can only fall back on the agent’s own values and choices in this type of universe.

5The terms “winner” and “loser” are used here with extreme caution. He who holds the moral right does not necessarily command any greater virtue, talent or supremacy compared to he who holds the moral obligation. Rather as we shall see in a later essay there is at least a category of moral rights and moral obligations that are universal, applying to all situations at all times. Everyone therefore has the potential to be a “winner” or “loser” depending upon the facts of the specific instance. Furthermore, the term “enforced” is also used with the want for a better term – one of the biggest problems that will be clarified in the next part is where it is morally permissible for violence to arise between individuals. Not all moral rights can be violently enforced.