Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic

Table of Contents

1. The logical connection of categories2. The form of this connection is progressively modified3. The dialectic is a process of reconstruction4. Which takes place by alternate production and removal of contradictions5. An objection to this raised by Hartmann6. In what sense the dialectic may be said to be objective7. The imperfection of finite things does not involve, for Hegel, the objective reality of the dialectic as a process8. The dialectic does not violate the law of contradiction9. The importance of the idea of negation is only secondary10. The relation of the dialectic to ordinary thought11. Hartmann’s criticisms of this relation12. The same continued13. The dialectic must prove its validity to the understanding14. The relation of the dialectic to experience15. The relation of the dialectic to experience further defined16. The basis upon which the dialectic works is the nature of experience17. The postulate which it assumes is the validity of the category of Being18. And the denial of this postulate is contradictory19. The argument of the dialectic is transcendental20. The epistemological result of the dialectic21. The negative effects of this22. Its positive effects23. We are not entitled to consider pure thought as independent of experience24. The relation of Hegel’s epistemology to Kant’s25. The ontological result of the dialectic – ambiguity of the phrase26. Hegel’s deduction of Nature and Spirit from the Logic27. This deduction does not treat pure thought as independent of experience28. The importance of the ontological result of the dialectic29. Comparison of Hegel with his immediate predecessors in philosophy

A.

31. Trendelenburg’s view that the dialectic is per se sterile, and gains its advance by illegitimate appeals to experience32. The errors involved in this view33-43. Passages from the Encyclopaedia bearing on this view44. The true relation of the dialectic to experience is not made clear by Hegel45. Reasons for this46. Hegel’s assertion that the dialectic is without presupposition

B.

47. The relation of the Absolute Idea to experience48. The Absolute Idea transcends contingency, but not immediacy49. Hegel’s definition of the Absolute Idea

C.

50. Professor Seth’s view as to the ontological claims of the dialectic51. Hegel’s description of the transition from Logic to Nature and Spirit52. The interpretation placed on this by Professor Seth53. Who confuses two charges – that Hegel tried to synthetically deduce Nature and Spirit from thought, and that he tried to deduce Existence from Essence54. But the first of these does not involve the second55. Hegel would have been wrong in trying to do the first56. But the arguments in support of the theory that he did try are untenable57. And Hegel says himself that his deduction is of a different nature58. There is a deduction, but it is not purely synthetic59. The treatment of Contingency in the Logic as bearing on this question60. The second charge – deducing Existence from Essence. We cannot do this61. But if the deduction of Nature and Spirit is purely analytic, this second charge must fall to the ground62. The meaning of the phrase “absolute” as used by Hegel of his own philosophy63. Hegel’s treatment of Kant’s objections to the ontological argument64. It depends on the different definitions of God adopted by Hegel and Kant65. Professor Seth’s assertion that Hegel depreciates the individual66. And that his Absolute Spirit is a mere abstraction

A.

68. Mr Balfour’s criticism of transcendental arguments69. Which rests on a confusion of the different senses in which we may be said to be conscious of an element in experience70. The same subject continued71. The justification of the Reason to the Understanding. The longing for the Absolute is not merely ethical or emotional72. The Understanding demands a complete explanation of the universe73. Which it cannot itself supply74. Since many of its categories lead to contradictions75. And this must lead to scepticism; not, as Hartmann suggests, to separation between thought and being76. The Reason can supply such an explanation77. Which the Understanding must therefore accept78. The Understanding and the Reason are not separate and unconnected faculties

B.

79. We are justified in assuming the validity of the category of Being as a starting-point80. As to the process – first from a synthesis to the new thesis81. The process from thesis to antithesis. Neither sterile nor empirical82. The consideration of the categories in detail is impossible here83. The process from thesis and antithesis to synthesis84. Hartmann’s objection to the possibility of this 85. Trendelenburg’s objection that the dialectic is merely a history of subjective knowledge86. But, although it only retraces abstractions, it gives new knowledge87. And reverses the order of explanation current in science88. Nor is it merely a process of subjective thought89. The dialectic does not displace the finite sciences, but does not depend on them90. Though an advanced state of the finite sciences may be an aid in discovering the dialectic91. The idea of Motion – according to Trendelenburg introduced empirically in the category of Becoming92. But in reality it is deducible by pure thought93. Nor does Becoming specially involve time or space94. Nor is it, if taken correctly, much more concrete than Being

C.

95. The ontological validity of the dialectic. The denial of the thing-in-itself is justifiable96. Mr Schiller’s objection that thought may be inadequate to reality97. Unjustifiable, since reality itself can only be known to us by thought98. Transition from Logic to Nature and Spirit99. Thought can never be self-subsistent, but must have a given datum100. The transition might have been made differently. Importance of this101. Lotze’s criticism of “the identity of Thought and Being.” Ambiguity of this phrase102. Lotze seems to take it as meaning that Being is identical with what is thought about Being103. In this sense Hegel did not hold the doctrine104. He held it in the sense that Being is identical with what it thinks: – perhaps he was mistaken105. The essence of Idealism is the assertion that Being is rational, not that it is Thought

A.

107. Hegel’s own expressions on this subject108. As the process continues the categories become less stable and self-contained109. And the antithesis marks an advance from the thesis110. This second change is connected with the first111. The first is explicitly mentioned by Hegel. The second is not112. The change seems to be continuous from category to category113. Such a change in the method of the dialectic is antecedently probable114. And it is antecedently probable that it will be continuous115. The change consists in combining the search for completeness and the search for harmony, which were originally separate stages116. Hence the change does not destroy the validity of the process117. The subordinate importance of negation in the dialectic is thus made still clearer than before

B.

118. Hegel asserts that the dialectic process is an adequate analysis of the Absolute Idea119. But this we now see reasons to doubt120. Hegel’s own premises lead us, on this point, to reject his conclusion121. The dialectic thus becomes, in a sense, subjective122. Owing to an inevitable characteristic of our thought123. It does not give a fully adequate account of its own nature124. This does not diminish its power of demonstrating that the Absolute Idea alone is completely valid of reality125. Nor of determining the relative truth of the different categories126. Nor are we left ignorant of the nature of the Absolute Idea127. The essential and unessential elements in the process128. The dialectic process may be looked on as primarily continuous. This is confirmed by the inequality of the subdivisions of the Logic129. And by the possibility of discovering direct dialectic connection between divisions which are not the lowest130. The effect of this with regard to any error in the detail of the dialectic

C.

131. The triad of Logic, Nature, and Spirit132. This transition is made by a triad of the Notion-type133. But it could be made by a triad of the Being-type134. This confirms the view taken above of the change of method135. The alternative adopted by Hegel was on the whole the best136. But the other has some advantages137. Which Hegel’s does not share138. The same continued139. Conclusion

A.

140. Difficulties in the way of taking the development of the dialectic in time as ultimately real141. Such a process in time must be finite in length142. And the question would arise: Why did it begin where it did?143. Which cannot be avoided by referring it to a timeless basis144. Nor by the suggestion that time only begins when change begins145. Nor by arguing that the idea of finite time cannot be contradictory, since that of infinite time is impossible146. We must rather suppose that the idea of time is not ultimate147. The lower stages of the dialectic cannot exist by themselves, since they are contradictory148. And we saw above that the dialectic must be a process of reconstruction149. Hegel’s own language is against the theory of development in time

B.

150. But the rejection of this theory involves that the universe is now perfect151. Which involves us again in serious difficulties152. Hegel’s answer that evil is a delusion is unsatisfactory153. Since on his theory a delusion could never be completely rational154. The suggestion that the universe is perfect sub specie aeternitatis155. It is more effective than Hegel’s own answer156. And must not be confounded with the theory that imperfections of the parts disappear in the whole157. But it was not Hegel’s own view – nor will it solve the difficulty158. Which seems to be insoluble159. And naturally so, since it is, in fact, the problem of the origin of evil

C.

160. Can any other theory extricate us from the difficulties which are involved in the assertion that the universe is eternally perfect?161. Not the theory that it is fundamentally irrational162. An absolute dualism is impossible163. And, if possible, would not solve the difficulty, supposing one side predominated164. Or supposing both were exactly balanced165. We should succeed no better with the theory that reality is totally indifferent to reason166. Or indifferent to the higher categories167. And to take refuge in scepticism proves equally impossible168. Our difficulty does not arise from a reductio ad absurdum169. And we have no more right to reject the dialectic than we have to reject the arguments against it170. We may hope for a synthesis of the opposed positions171. Since they are opposed as contraries, not as contradictories172. But we do not know of what nature such a synthesis could be, nor have we any positive evidence for its existence173. We should have such evidence if we knew that the detail of the dialectic were correct throughout174. Conclusion175-178. Note on Mr Schiller’s paper “The Metaphysics of the Time-Process”

A.

179. Hegel makes the highest stage in the nature of Spirit to be Philosophy180. His account of this181. Philosophy must be considered to be merely a state of knowledge182. Philosophy, as we have it at present, is clearly not adequate for this position183. And Hegel never attempted to deduce facts from the nature of pure thought184. Nor will it suffice to make philosophy end by proving the necessity of philosophy185. Taking a wider meaning of philosophy – we shall never be able to dispense with immediate data186. But a perfect system of knowledge is conceivable, in which contingency vanishes187. Such an ideal is remote, but not contradictory188. It would leave no question unanswered, except Why is the universe as a whole what it is? – which is an unmeaning question

B.

189. Even such knowledge, however, is not a complete expression of Spirit190. For volition is not reducible to knowledge191. Though both of them may perhaps be synthesised in a higher unity192. Nor are pleasure and pain reducible to knowledge193. Though, like volition, they are inseparable from it194. But can knowledge, as such, be even part of the true nature of Spirit?195. It postulates complete unity and differentiation between subject and object196. The This in knowledge197. Which is essential to knowledge, and which knowledge must always regard as alien198. The This prevents knowledge reaching complete unity and differentiation199. Thus knowledge can never express quite adequately the harmony of the universe200. Nor does the possibility of self-knowledge get over the difficulty201. This defect is the reason why we cannot cease to ask, Why is the universe as a whole what it is? – though we know the question to be unmeaning202. We find some support for this view in the Logic203. Since philosophy there comes under the subordinate category of Cognition204. Hegel’s treatment of the last stages of the Philosophy of Spirit is imperfect205. Philosophy should rather be part of the antithesis – not the synthesis206. Conclusion

207. Introductory208. The application of the dialectic to determine the nature of ultimate reality209. The practical importance of this210. The application of the dialectic to the interpretation of the facts round us211. This is the part of Hegel’s system which is now most generally received 212. But it seems doubtful if it is valid213. The first difficulty – we cannot recognise theses, antitheses, or syntheses, except in relation to one another214. Thus we shall require points independently fixed to begin from or end at. We have such in the Logic215. But not in the applications of the Logic216. The terms of which, till seen in relation to each other, only differ quantitatively217. The initial point of the Philosophy of Nature, and the final point of the Philosophy of Spirit, are exceptions218. Attempts to fix the extreme points in the Philosophies of Nature, Spirit, and Religion,219. in the History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Law220. and in the Philosophy of History. A criticism by Lotze221. The reason of the exceptions mentioned in Section 217222. The second difficulty. In Religion, History, Law, and Philosophy, the dialectic process is affected by external influences223. And, in another manner, in Nature and Spirit224. We know that there is a dialectic process in facts, but are unable to trace it225. The third difficulty. The extent and intricacy of the subject-matter226. These difficulties can be avoided by taking abstract qualities, rather than actual facts, as the terms of our dialectic227. As in Hegel’s treatment of Innocence, Sin, and Virtue228. Or of the conception of Dying to live229. But the main practical interest of philosophy lies in upholding the abstract assertion that reality is rational and righteous230. For this cannot be done at all, except by philosophy231. Nor is this view unduly abstract