Political espionage and government intervention

“To govern is to choose,” John F. Kennedy famously declared. And when governments intervene in markets, they inevitably choose to favor some business forms over others.

Sometimes this is obvious, as when a local government considers a regulation which conspicuously privileges one type of operator at the expense of another. Sometimes this is less-obvious, as when a licensing regime raises barriers to entry, privileging incumbent firms at the expense of those that might enter the market.

Sometimes the privilege is nearly hidden. Last year, I wrote about laws banning old-fashioned incandescent light bulbs. NPR’s Peter Overby had reported that major light bulb manufacturers actually liked the ban and spent money lobbying to maintain it. Why would a firm possibly want to limit its options? After all, it can make curly-Q light bulbs whether the old kind are legal or not. The answer seems to be that the ban benefited large, established firms because it kept customers from buying the older, cheaper alternative bulbs from rivals who weren’t as good at making the newfangled kind.

The point is that it is nearly impossible to formulate an intervention that treats all firms equally. Even a flat rate tax will fall more heavily on small firms because they lack the compliance resources that the big ones have. It goes without saying that this tendency is even greater when interventions violate generality.

When government policy can make or break a business, you can bet that the business will take an interest in policy. Very large sums of money are at stake when a city council considers a new regulation, when Congress considers requiring customers to buy a certain product, or when the FDA considers approving a new drug. It should come as no surprise, then, that some enterprising folks have set up firms that specialize in reading the tea leaves of government policy. These firms help their clients predict what new rules, regulations, taxes, subsidies, etc. might be coming down the pike. And firms are willing to pay pretty hefty sums for these prognostications, especially when policy is difficult to predict (as, for example, when it turns on the arbitrary beliefs of certain regulators).

Brody Mullins and Susan Pulliam write about just such a firm in a fascinating article in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal.

Naturally, lawmakers take a dim view of this activity. Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) wants these “political intelligence specialists” to disclose their clients, activities, and fees: “We ought to know who these people are that seek political and economic espionage,” he says.

I have another idea. Rather than regulate the firms that are trying to figure out whom government is going to punish and whom it is going to privilege, why not eliminate discriminatory government policy? Why not limit government intervention in the market? And why not ensure that policy turns on predictable rules rather than arbitrary decisions?

If government cannot privilege some and punish others, then insider information will be worth next to nothing. If government interventions are limited, then firms will not live or die at the whim of politicians and regulators. And if policy is predictable and rational, share prices will reflect policy expectations, and there will be no way to profit from insider information.

If to govern is to choose some business forms over others, then sometimes the best option is not to govern and to let people choose for themselves.