01978cam a22002657 4500001000700000003000500007005001700012008004100029100001900070245017000089260006600259490004200325500001500367520084700382530006101229538007201290538003601362690008101398700001901479700002001498710004201518830007701560856003801637856003701675w18153NBER20180524140220.0180524s2012 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aCurrie, Janet.10aUsing Audit Studies to Test for Physician Induced Demandh[electronic resource]:bThe Case of Antibiotic Abuse in China /cJanet Currie, Wanchuan Lin, Juanjuan Meng. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc2012.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w18153 aJune 2012.3 aThe overuse of medical services including antibiotics is often blamed on Physician Induced Demand. But since this theory is about physician motivations, it is difficult to test. We conduct an audit study in which physician financial incentives, beliefs about what patients want, and desires to reciprocate for a small gift are systematically varied. We find that all of these treatments reduce antibiotics prescriptions, suggesting that antibiotics abuse in China is not driven by patients actively demanding antibiotics, by physicians believing that patients want antibiotics, or by physicians believing that antibiotics are in the best interests of their patients, but is largely driven by financial incentives. Our results also show that physician behavior can be significantly influenced by the receipt of a token gift, such as a pen. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web. 7aI11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets2Journal of Economic Literature class.1 aLin, Wanchuan.1 aMeng, Juanjuan.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w18153.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w1815341uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18153