Many scholars have concluded that the Americans were slow to react to the ideological void in postwar Germany. They note that the Soviets were much quicker off the mark, because they knew what they wanted to accomplish: the integration of Germany into their sphere of influence and the establishment of a soviet-style government. Moreover, they had a large cadre of trusted Germans, who had escaped to the Soviet Union for political reasons, who now became their willing collaborators. Moreover, the Soviet occupiers did not seem to be bothered too much by an individual’s past political affinities, but rather were more interested in what that person might be willing to do for them now. One need only look at their courting of the famous conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic, Wilhelm Furtwängler, to recognize that they did not struggle with the same matters of political purity that the Americans did.

The British, on the other hand, were far more pragmatic in their approach and were willing to make deals, if not with the Devil then certainly with some of his henchmen, just to keep Germany functioning, so as not to drawn too much energy away from rebuilding their own devastated country. As noted earlier, the French, according to American sources, were too busy trying to exact reparations from their zone to pay too much attention to this aspect of their occupation of Germany.

Those in charge of the vetting process in the American Zone, however, continued to try and improve their processes. To this end, Major Bertram Schaffner and Thomas Frank visited the British their counterpart between the 12th and 15th of May 1946 and submitted a report on 16 May 1946 to the Chief of the Intelligence Section Alfred Toombs.[1]

The British organization was known as the German Personnel Research Branch and was under the control of the Intelligence Group of the Control Commission for Germany (British Element). It was located at Bad Oeynhausen and was under the overall command of Wing Commander O.A. Oeser. The report indicates that the organization consisted of a president of the board, a psychiatrist, an administrative officer, two testing officers, four psychological assistants, 8 secretaries, and 15 enlisted men, in all, 32 personnel. It is often indicated that the ICD’s complement was much larger than that of British organization, as in Toby Thacker’s assertion that the ICD had 1700 officers at its disposal,[2] while a British Military Government report suggests that the British Personnel Research Branch only had 16 officers working for it.[3] However, at least in the case of the vetting process, the American organization complained that the British employed far more people than the Americans. This may well be related to how the statistics were compiled and one should trust the assessment of Schaffner and Frank in this particular case.

The report indicates that the British assessment center investigated 12 candidates per week, who all arrived on Monday afternoon and would then leave on the following Friday morning. The Friday afternoon was reserved for staff meetings in order to discuss results of individual tests and to make decisions on each interviewee, with reports being written by the President and the psychiatrist on Saturday. In comparing the two vetting sections, it is noteworthy that the British unit processed fewer individuals than the Americans on a weekly basis and also spent more time with each applicant.

Schaffner and Franks carefully outline how each of the applicants is processed. It starts with all of the candidates being welcomed with a speech on Monday afternoon delivered by the President. In this talk the aims of the center were explained and the staff is introduced to the candidates. Following this, the candidates were then asked to fill out a 19 page highly detailed questionnaire, which dealt with their political background and the political activities of their parents and their nearest relatives. On Tuesday morning, each candidate was asked to provide a five-minute oral resume of his background and professional life. This was done with everyone, including all of the staff, present. Following these initial introductions, parts one, two, and three of the written intelligence test were administered. The first part was called “matrix,” which was a nonverbal test, which used visual pattern completion problems. The second part dealt with reasoning. It was used to test the higher intelligence ranges in deduction, synthesis, and analysis. The third part was a written word association test. Following this, a fourth test was administered, which was an oral word association test. This was often replaced with the Thematic Apperception Test in the case of younger candidates. The fifth and final test of the morning was a self-description by the candidate, first as his best friend would see him, and then as a strong critic would see him.

After Tuesday's lunch the candidates were divided into two groups. The first group began with individual studies; these included a political interview and a psychiatric interview of about one and half hours each. It is also noted that the President and the psychiatrist interviewed approximately four candidates each on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. The second group had its individual studies in the latter half of the period. While the first group was being individually studied, the second group went ahead with further group tests. The first of these was a group discussion over a 90 minute time period. The groups were asked to spend approximately 30 minutes discussing each of three topics: personal happiness, relationship of family and state, and Germany's contribution to European reconstruction. After this, each of the candidates was asked to give an impromptu talk or “lecturette” without any preparation. These talks would last five minutes and were on special assignments, for example “a school superintendent addresses his teachers on corporal punishment, a chief of police addresses policemen on black market activities.”[4]

What followed was a sociological questionnaire. This questionnaire attempted to elicit as much information as possible about a candidate’s fundamental political trends and social outlook. They then conducted a “miniature interrogation,” in which one of the candidates would interview another for approximately 20 minutes in the presence of the staff, in order to obtain information about the candidate’s personal interests, special hobbies, and recreational activities. The purpose of this interview was to evaluate a candidate's ability to conduct an interview. However, it also provided valuable information about the one being interviewed. All of this was then followed by the so-called “protest test.” Here, the individuals were asked to imagine themselves in a difficult situation and to defend their position in the face of stern, unsympathetic criticism and frustrating behavior on the part of the examiners. This was followed by a “group-planning test.” One of the groups is asked to formulate a solution to a problem in county administration based upon letters, statistics, and a map of the county concerned. The next test was a team negotiation test, in which one of the groups was asked to represent a local German government committee and the other to represent the British military government detachment. They were to work out a solution to a problem, which was presented in the form of legal briefs.

Following all of this, the entire group undertook a mutual evaluation. The candidates were asked to rate one another in terms of: leadership qualities, reliability, and friendship worthiness. After all of this the candidates received a concluding talk and were encouraged to ask questions or make suggestions. The candidates left the center at 10 o'clock on Friday morning. Finally, a board meeting was held. During the board meeting, each of the candidates was discussed and final recommendations were decided upon.

The report notes that there were some similarities between the ICD screening center and the procedures used at Assessment Ctr., #1, the official name of the facility visited by the Americans. The aims of the two groups and the standards employed were identical. It also indicates that the political/sociological, and psychological/psychiatric division of how the candidates were studied was also the same. Moreover, there was a general correspondence in how intelligence tests were administered. In addition, the sociological questionnaire resembled the “incomplete sentences” test of the ICD screening center and the “mutual evaluation test” was essentially the same as the ICD's “sociometric” test.

There were, however, differences between how the British and the Americans operated their screening centers. In the case of the British assessment center, it offered its services to all of the divisions of the Military Government and the Control Commission. It was noted that many of the assessment center’s candidates came from government agencies, such as the Reichspost and the Reichsbahn. From this, one can conclude that less emphasis was placed on selecting publishers.

It was also noted that the assessment center seems to be adequately staffed. This point emphasized the dissatisfaction on the part of Major Schaffner with the staffing of the ICD screening center. The report also notes that the British assessment center placed relatively less emphasis on the political study of the candidate and more on the psychological study of the candidate. Moreover, the British center relied on a larger number of procedures, administered by a larger staff and took into consideration the conclusions and appraisals of at least 6 different observers in coming to its final assessment. This, Schaffner and Frank concluded, led to a greater objectivity in reaching its appraisals.

They also noted a high degree of organization and specialization of functions within the assessment center. They saw this as lending greater formality to the process of vetting candidates, as opposed to the greater flexibility of the ICD screening center. They saw this as creating a process to which a greater number of assistants could be trained and an adequate number of replacements could be insured for departing staff members. It was also noted that, due to its larger staff, the assessment center could also engage in research and follow-up projects. Notably, the assessment center also employed what were called “lay analysts” rather than psychiatrists with medical training. The use of “lay” personnel ensured that a larger staff was available to the center.

The report also included two samples of the reports written by the President in regard to unidentified candidates, though one might also conclude that the reports were simply examples of what the British Assessment Centre considered to be ideal candidates.

One of the candidates was classified as white and the other as black. It is also noteworthy that the British also used a five-point scale, but did not necessarily associated color with their assessments, with the exception of an individual candidate’s testing in regard to psychological authoritarianism.

In the case of the acceptable candidate, he and his parents had joined the SPD in 1929 and had been staunch supporters of the party. The applicant had served initially as a youth leader and then from 1933 to 1936 an editor of an illegal newspaper in Hanover. He and his parents had been arrested in 1936 and he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, of which he had served 8 years and 8 months. Of the more than eight years of imprisonment, four and a half were spent in solitary confinement.

As far as his personality is concerned, he was considered highly intelligent with a high ethical and moral standard, but also not inflexible in his thinking. He was described as having a broad range of interests and was considered to be humanitarian in his thinking. Where they did find fault was in his emotional state, which was not surprising considering his imprisonment. The applicant was judged to being prone to slight hysteria and showed occasional irritability, sharpness, and obstinacy towards others. Though he had, in their opinion, only average leadership skills, he was recommended “as unconditionally suitable for employment at any level, and as a man who can make a most valuable contribution to the democratic reconstruction of Germany.”

In this particular case, one should note that most likely the US vetting process would not have been as enthusiastic. Even though he had a remarkable record and appropriate experience, his time in prison, especially the time spent in solitary confinement would have allowed him a “White B” categorization at best. Very often, the Americans rejected individuals with this sort of background, because they felt that they were unpredictable in terms of dealing with others, a trait that this individual apparently clearly exhibited. In addition, if they were granted a license, it would suggest that they either be watched closely, or paired with another applicant, who might mitigate the original applicant’s emotional shortcomings.

The second example was of an applicant who was clearly unacceptable. He had been an Obertruppenführer in the Stahlhelm from 1932-1935. When the Stahlhelm became part of the SA, he accepted the rank of Rottenführer, but left in 1938. Moreover, he joined the NSdAP in 1936 and claimed to have been a convinced Nazi until 1938, when “he claims to have become more critical.” Even so, he remained a trusted member until the end of the war.

As far as the personality of this applicant was concerned, the British assessors found him to be rather jolly and perky. However, below the façade, the investigators found what they thought was a rigid reactionary, who was contemptuous of the feelings of others and that he was a “complete menace.” They also found him to be an opportunist at heart. The assessment was as brief as it was blunt: “This man is highly dangerous and should not be employed at any level or in any circumstances.”

The report written by Schaffner and Frank outlines the GPRB at work and does not go into the guiding philosophy that lay behind its establishment and operation.

The Americans, however, could be considered the idealists amongst the Allies. One is left with the impression that they wanted to get it right. OMGUS was committed to a meticulous screening out of undesirables from the publishing industry and tried to apply “scientific” principles to their practices, as will be demonstrated in the following pages. It was a practice that continued until May of 1949.[5]

In general, the task of examining Germans was carried out by local ICD units. At this stage, candidates for media related positions in the US zone were required to fill out personal history questionnaires, the Fragebogen. This was followed by supplementary interrogations of the candidate and his or her present and past associates. Some interviews, usually termed “vetting”, were also undertaken by the denazification staff of the ICD.

According to the ICD’s history, all important editors and executives received special attention. After a candidate was investigated within the context of his or her own community, it was compared with the records of the Nazi Party members in Berlin, as well against the files of the RKK held by the BDC. All those who had worked in any of the media industries in Nazis Germany were required to belong to one branch of this organization. These files held detailed dossiers on the careers of many of the RKK’s members. Cross-referencing these files in conjunction with the statements given on the Fragebogen allowed the ICD to determine the truthfulness of the candidate and determine whether the Nazis had actually regarded an applicant, who may have denied affiliation with the Nazi Party, as a loyal party member.

While practices may have varied somewhat, Felix Reichmann provided a a slightly more detailed outline of the basics of the procedure in The Publisher’s Weekly in November of 1946:

The applicant had to file three Military Government questionnaires and three detailed business and personal questionnaires with Publications Control. After a thorough and comprehensive interview by an official of Publications Control the applicant had to submit a publishing program for one year worked out in specific titles. Then the whole file was transmitted to Intelligence Branch, which again interviewed the applicant and his references. If both branches agreed that the applicant was eligible for a publisher's license a recommendation to this effect was submitted to the Commanding Officer of the Information Control Division. If Berlin Headquarters concurred with the opinion of the Land, a license was issued.[6]

It should be noted that membership in one of the branches of the Reichskulturkammer did not mean that an individual could not be given a “White A” designation. What they were looking for was the basic honesty of the individual they were considering.

A close relationship was maintained between the Denazification Section, the Public Safety Branch, and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). It was a consistent policy of ICD to grant no licenses without prior clearance with these two agencies. In no case was any German to be employed in an ICD-sponsored enterprise against the recommendation of either Public Safety or CIC.

When the study of a candidate's record was completed, a decision was reached as to his eligibility for employment and his name was placed on one of the following lists:

a. If his political record was clean, his name was placed on “White” list (A), and he was considered eligible for a leading position in any of the information fields for which he was professionally qualified.

b. If investigation disclosed that he was a member of minor affiliated Nazi Party organizations, but had not collaborated actively with the Nazis, his name was placed on “White” list (B), which qualified him for certain types of leading positions, but in a probationary status.

c. If he was considered a less desirable person, his name was placed on “Grey” list (C, acceptable), which qualified him for employment with German information services, but not in policy-making, executive, or creative positions.

d. If he was a Nazi Party member who held only nominal membership, his name was placed on “Grey” list (C, unacceptable), which restricted him to employment at ordinary labor.

e. If he had held high office in the Party, or in any of its affiliated organizations, or had shown himself an active Nazi, his name was placed on the “Black” list (D), which prevented him from being employed in any capacity.

High standards of personnel selection were maintained by ICD despite differences of opinion, some within ICD itself. Media sections, eager to carry out their mission of restoring German information services, sometimes supported the candidacy of a key person in their own field who possessed desired professional qualifications, but whose political record was subject to criticism. Seldom, however, did the Intelligence Section temper its judgment with expediency, and as a result of this strong policy, information services were sometimes criticized for not using the ablest Germans available.

It was not until the ICD Screening Center was established at Bad Orb in October 1945,121 that it became possible to select with certainty the most desirable individuals for key positions within German information media. The Screening Center, utilizing the services of a psychiatrist, a political interrogator, and a psychologist,122 subjected German applicants to comprehensive political and psychological examinations which went far beyond the normal Fragebogen or questionnaire type of denazification scrutiny. Judgment was made not only of the candidate's political reliability, but also of his basic personality profile insofar as it helped evaluate his democratic potential. His stay at the Screening Center normally lasted three days during which time he was subjected to six types of examination. On completion of the tests, members of the staff compared their findings and made recommendations as to the employability of the applicant. In some instances, persons acceptable for their political reliability were rejected because of undesirable character traits.

In the closing weeks of 1945, redeployment of U.S. Army personnel so drastically reduced the servicing staff that the Screening Center was abandoned as a fixed institution, and the staff specialists were therefore organized into travelling teams to conduct denazification examinations on a modified scale in the U.S. zone, using Munich as a headquarters. The Screening Center was re-established at Bad Homburg in the Spring of 1946, and continued to operate through 30 June 1946.

Passing the stringent test of character and receiving a license from the proper authorities did not mean that careful scrutiny did not continue. Each individual publisher was required to police himself in regard to what was published under the following guidelines set by the Military Government, which forbade the following topics:

1.Criticism of the Allied Government and interference with the Military Government.

2.Racial or Religious discriminations.

3.Propagation of militaristic ideas including Pan-Germanism and German Imperialism.

4.National-socialistic or related völkisch ideas.

5.Fascist or anti-democratic ideas.

In Reichmann’s description one finds the innocuous line “the whole file was transmitted to Intelligence Branch which again interviewed the applicant and his references.” However, the intelligence interviews were more than simple consultations. In fact, the intelligence interviews spoken of took three days, or even a week, to complete and involved the potential licensees being isolated at one of the camps set aside for the vetting Germans for ICD purposes. The American installation was located at Bad Orb.

The first potential licensees went through the Bad Orb facility on November 6, 1945. Archival documents indicate that the ICD continually tried to improve their ability to identify those who were and were not suitable for licensed functions under the Military Government. In an evaluation of the ICD screening center written sometime after February 17, 1946, recommendations are taken from both officers running the program and potential licensees.[7]

Some of the responses received from the candidates might be considered overly obsequious. One of those interviewed simply identified as Dr. S., stated that he had a high regard for the knowledgeable staff and “could have stayed there 3 weeks, rather than just 3 days.”[8] Dr. S. also made further comment in regard to the IQ tests administered during the interview process, suggesting that vocational item be included to ensure that those licensed were technically able to produce that which the ICD expected of them. Suspicion is cast on the his motives for wanting to stay longer by a later interviewee, an entertainer identified as G., who pointed out that he appreciated the food and accommodations, which were better than the average German experienced in everyday life.[9]

Initially, the interview caused tremendous anxiety among many of the candidates. Boehling points out that for many the first contact people usually had with the ICD was when they were being licensed or censored.[10] A Mr. P. was an early candidate that went through the facility, when the candidates were not told the purpose of the excursion they were asked to take. They “were merely asked to take a trip of three days duration.”[11] He commented on the clever way in which he was being questioned. The interrogators would, for example, engage him in a discussion about philosophy. He noted that he was impressed with the way in which the conversation was led in such a way that the interrogators could feel out his attitudes about society and human relations. The approach was generally friendly. Mr. G, who had been questioned by a Dr. Levy and Mr. Bernard, did not at all feel that he was before an examining committee, but that the approach likened that of a conversation between friends. While this was the general trend, Mr. P. reports that as he was preparing to leave, he was questioned a final time along the “old police lines.” The report indicates that this was indeed the case and was used as a demonstration using two of the applicants in order to determine how reliable the results of the previous three days of interrogation had been.

The reports generated by the vetting process also reveal how some of the officers in the ICD felt about how the whole denazification process was functioning. A First Lieutenant Paul E. Moeller, who was an intelligence officer attached to the Military Government in Bavaria, felt that “mental nazidom must rate on par – at least – with proved Party membership.”[12] He went on to say that the ICD’s vetting process was able to add this layer to the official denazification process, should the Military Government issue that directive. Clearly, the ICD felt that their process held their applicants to a higher standard.

While at Bad Orb, candidates were subjected to an impressive array of psychological tests. These tests often determined whether an individual received a license or not. At some time around February 1946 a report entitled “Contribution of Psychiatric and Psychological Study to the ICD Screening Center” was written.[13] At this point fewer than 50 candidates had been processed. The case studies presented, 25 in total, amounted to a little more than 50% of the total number of applicants. The goals of the psychiatric and psychological tests were specific:

1.Determination of mental status. This was considered a deciding factor in six of the 25 case studies. It was considered more important than the political reliability of a candidate.

2.Determination of personality structure. This was intended to keep those characters out of office who were authoritarian, militaristic, domineering, brutal, or intriguers etc. The concern was that such characters would perpetuate a psychology that was sympathetic to power politics and aggressive wars. It was intended to favour those who had broad sympathies, tolerated criticism and were generally “democratic” in the sense of respecting their fellow men. It was noted that the reason some of the candidates had been classified as “White” was due to questions related to the fitness of their personality. This was the case in 8 of the 25 case studies.

3.Determination of Nazi and anti-Nazi status. The ICD was aware that some of the candidates would attempt to simulate anti-Nazi attitudes. The problem was that they often had no concrete evidence. They determined that they could learn a great deal from individuals in relation to this from a study of their childhood history and personality through the use of special attitude tests. These tests often decided the issue or confirmed or challenged assumptions made as a result of political analysis of the applicants. All of the individuals in the case studies were seen as examples of this.

4.Determination of special capacities or incapacities. In certain candidates special qualifications of leadership, originality, or what was simply called “superior endowment” were brought to the attention of the referring agents. Such candidates were marked as especially useful. Of course, the lack of these capacities or inadequate intelligence was likewise determined. Of the 25 case studies 7 were seen as example of this being significant.

5.Evidence. The psychiatric studies were also to assist in determining the reliability of statements made by the candidates. Seven of the 25 individuals represented in the study were there to determine the voracity of the applicant’s previous statements.[14]

Of the 25 case studies, the professions break down as follows: 8 Publishers, 5 Theatre Directors, 5 Radio Engineers, 5 Film Directors or Producers, 2 Actors or Entertainers.

The abstracts of the case studies reveal some interesting findings on the part of the psychiatrists and psychologists of Bad Orb. For example, one of the publishers had a number of doubtful points on his political record and appeared to collaborate with the Nazis in order to maintain ownership of his publishing company. He, however, gave a favourable impression overall. The psychological assessment was said to have revealed a very passive personality that was never able to withstand any requirement of a despotic father.[15] Though he was inwardly antagonistic toward authority, he could not be relied upon to withstand any pressure. This served to confirm that he had made concessions to the Party and had collaborated. His application was rejected on both political and personal grounds. Another publisher was recommended for a license even though it appeared that he had exploited “the Jewish situation through ownership of a Jewish movie studio.” The political portion of the interrogation revealed that no exploitation had occurred, which was confirmed by the psychiatric study. In fact, it was discovered that he would make an ideal candidate for the ICD. The questionable ethics were simply overlooked in this case. A questionable past was not always held against an individual as will be seen later.

A further publisher was in a somewhat unique situation. He was found to be an ardent anti-Nazi. He had been severely beaten by the SA in 1933 and it was found that he still suffered from disturbances of his equilibrium and confusion in thinking as a result.[16] The recommendation was that the license be granted but that he be given special guidance in his work.

The inability to work with others was deemed a liability for a further publisher. While he had engaged in some questionable activities in the past, this alone was not sufficient to deny him a license. However, the ICD did not wish to encourage “one-man shows” too often.

The psychiatric diagnosis of individual applicants was also often decisive in that it was used to explain the actions of some who appeared to have an otherwise clear record. This was the case with an applicant who had initially served as the Chief Engineer of a radio station. The problem was that he had taken out a membership in the SA, though he had apparently taken no active role in the organization and had received no special advantage from the Nazi Party. He was, however, able to prove that he had rendered assistance to a resistance group. The psychiatric report found strong anxiety states in the individual. It concluded that he took out membership in the SA due to having been in a panicky phase and then later tried to undo the damage. Politically, he was recognized as “Black”, but with the caveat that it was only in a “technical” sense. He was refused the license as Chief Engineer, but was recommended for an assistant technical job. This was a task that could be performed by someone classified as “Grey Acceptable” and not “Black”. It is apparent that the ICD was somewhat pragmatic in its approach to licensing and it may be the case that the tightness of the process is questionable, despite the officially strong stance taken by the Head of Intelligence, Toombs.

Once the candidates passed through Bad Orb and were granted licenses, it was not the end of the examination. Scrutiny of the licensees continued for some time after. In some of the case it was noted that they should be watched or “helped” once licensed. “Helped” was often used in a euphemistic manner to indicate that a candidate could not be fully trusted, but might prove helpful to the cause. A statement such as this does not necessarily mean that it was actively watched on a continual basis, but, in at least one of the cases, it more than an idle threat.

There was significant doubt about the reliability of an applicant, who wanted to produce films in Germany. He had lived and prospered in Italy and France for seven years and then returned to Germany. He had worked as a “cutter”[17] and was not considered to have had any influence on the final product coming out of the UFA studios. He had passed the political portion of the examination. However, the psychiatric portion of the exam revealed that he was “rather unstable, immature, and not to be trusted in a leading position.” He was thus recommended for an assistant’s job. At the end of the abstract a parenthetical note is included which states, “Conclusion verified by later observation” and indication that he had been kept under close observation upon taking up his position.[18]

Documents reveal that actual practice may, in some instances, have been more rigorous than described in the histories. ICD documentation clearly states that although an individual may have been cleared and officially denazified by the Spruchkammer, the ICD could still deny the individual clearance to work in any of the areas under its control.[19] On the other hand, in some instances the ICD seemed to go to considerable lengths in justifying the inclusion of a candidate they might consider particularly useful.

There were other motivations for including or excluding candidates from the ranks of licensed publishers. Some of this had to do with the positive rather than negative goals of the ICD. Negative goals would be those that involved keeping publishers out who might attack Military Government policies or publish militaristic materials. Positive goals would involve the publication of works that would support the “democratic” and anti-Nazi education of the German people. Thus there was a large grey area of material that might be considered harmless enough, but of no particular help in moving the political goals of the ICD forward. The tolerance given to these potential publishers came to an end with the shortage of paper. A November 16, 1945 report written by Heinz Berggruen and R.B. Redlich on nine potential licensees who had submitted insufficient publishing plans explains that of these nine, three did not submit a list of titles and were rejected immediately. [20] A further five were found to have programs that had little more than titles of very limited value. Of the nine only one was found to have a particularly ambitious publishing plan. Heinrich Ledig of Stuttgart proposed to revive the well-known Rowohlt Verlag. However, even with this application it was thought that “no particular effort has been made to search for books and other materials that will fit the present needs.” In the end, Ledig managed to get the enterprise off the ground. In total, the Ledig application included 29 titles. Some of the samples provided in the report include:

In the end perhaps the final deciding factor was the usefulness of the works an individual wanted to publish. That is, if they did not demonstrate that they would help inculcate the ideas of collective guilt, denazification, or demilitarization they were not high priorities.

[10] Boehling 392-393. She, however, uses a poor example of this when she mentions Andersch and Richter in this context. Both of them had been groomed by the prisoner of war training program in the United States.

[20] NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 140. Heinz Berggruen had emigrated to the United States from Wilmersdorf in 1936. He was a friend of Picasso and a renowned art collector. In 1944 he returned to Europe as an American Soldier. He was initially stationed in Berlin and then was transferred to Munich. Shortly thereafter he was one of the founding employees of UNESCO.

[21] An American author who had spent considerable time in Germany and Austria in his youth. Many of his novels were indeed translated into German between 1946 and 1954.

[22] He went on to become a theatre critic, but did not enjoy much success as a writer. He also edited a work entitled Heldenkampfe der Kaiserschützen1914-1918 : nach berichten von Mitkämpfern bearbeitet im Ministerium für Landesverteidigung.