Monday, 30 September 2013

Today the following video was posted online by the Syrian Islamic Front

The video shows a brief statement on what the video shows, followed by the confession of one of the men involved

0:08 unnamed man: An Assad’s criminal gang was caught in Idlib. It was sent by the Militrary Security Branch (one of Assad’s various security apparatuses) and was planning to set a number of car bombs in the liberated areas in northern Idlib. They were taken to the Sharia Court. The car bombs were to be put near mosques. The truck bomb was detonated in a remote area.

0:15 I am Alaa’ Muhammed al-Basha (علاء محمد الباشا) from the town of Binnish (بنش). The Military Security Branch in Idilib tempted us by money and gave each one of us SYP 100.000 to park a Kia truck bomb near a mosque in al-Dana (الدانة). The truck was loaded with more than three tons of explosives. (He mentions the same number on the plate of the truck)

0:51 the cameraman explains how the
explosives were hidden in a box made of metal plates and that the
truck looks empty.2:10 he shows the fuse2:35 the truck bomb will be detonated
because it was too difficult to defuse the bomb.

This incident follows another reported series of arrests in the town of Morek (مورك) near Hama on September 24th where it was claimed three men were arrested planting the following devices in an attempt to kill opposition commanders (source)

The use of IEDs by the Syrian army seems to have become increasingly widespread in the past year, with a number of examples being posted online (see here), and it's not the first time a car bomb has been allegedly used to target a mosque, with this example from July 2012. As always, it should be made clear it's difficult to independently verify the claims made the the opposition in these circumstances.

Thursday, 26 September 2013

One claim that's been constantly repeated by people attempting to prove the Syrian military was not responsible for the August 21st Sarin attack is that the Syrian military would never use trucks with non-military colours. This claim is a response to the following videos and pictures, that appears to show the same type of munition linked to the August 21st Sarin attack being launched. As always, it should be noted that the type of munition used has at least two variants, and possible a third, larger, high explosive variant

These photographs and videos from Damascus and Aleppo claim to show the Syrian army using these truck mounted weapons, but the argument has been that these are clearly non-military vehicles, something only the Syrian opposition uses. While it's true the Syrian opposition mounts plenty of different weapons on trucks of various shapes and sizes, it's certainly not true that only the Syrian opposition uses non-military trucks in this way. The following video is from a missile test in the Summer of 2012, where a variety of missiles and rockets were launched from the 155th brigade base

As we can see in the video, there's clearly trucks with non-military colour schemes being used to launch large rockets or missiles

The same missile test was also broadcast on State TV, with images of the same vehicles

So it's pretty clear the claim that only the Syrian opposition uses trucks with non-military colours is an inaccurate statement. In fact, it's not that unusual, as these photos from an Iranian military parade shows (source)

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

Wednesday, 25 September 2013

Earlier this week an article was published by Al Akhbar, Questions Plague UN Report on Syria, making a number of claims about the UN report, including "There is not a single environmental sample in Moadamiyah that tested positive for Sarin." and "It is scientifically improbable that survivors would test that highly for exposure to Sarin without a single trace of environmental evidence testing positive for the chemical agent.". This is then used to claim that the 140mm artillery rockets fired at Moadamiyah were not carrying Sarin, as widely reported, and that the trajectory of these rockets, as per the UN report, which crosses over with the trajectory of other rockets fired at Eastern Ghouta over the Syrian army’s Republican Guard 104th Brigade base, is indicative of nothing, as the munitions did not contain Sarin.

One of the chemical weapon experts quoted in the article is Dan Kaszeta, who has responded to the article with a FAQ he's published online.

Q: The article claims "not a single environmental sample in Moadamiyah that tested positive for Sarin." - What is your reaction to this?
I consider this statement to be a misleading half-truth that “cherry picks” from the UN report. It is true in respect to the fact that no actual Sarin was found in the 13 environmental samples taken from Moadamiyah. But the samples show DIMP, IMPA, and MPA, all of which are strong indicators of Sarin. The environmental samples are clear indicators that Sarin was used because of the clear presence of chemicals that are clearly decomposition products (IMPA, MPA) and impurities (DIMP), all of which persist longer in the environment than Sarin itself.

There are several plausible reasons why the UN team did not collect a sample of actual Sarin at the Moadamiyah. Any or all of the following explanatory or contributory factors may have applied to this circumstance:

The 140mm rocket alleged to have been used in Moadamiyah is patently smaller than the devices used elsewhere. Therefore, there it would carry far less chemical agent than larger devices. There may have been less Sarin to find at each individual site where the 140mm rocket was used.

The UN report states that they did not find the actual warhead. Their photos are of the rocket section, not the agent-carrying portion of the rocket.

The lack of a payload-carrying section indicates to me that the explosive bursting charge of the rocket functioned as intended. The US Army used approximately a 3.3:1 ratio by weight of Sarin to conventional explosive in the US’s closest analogue to the 140mm rocket, the M55 115mm rocket. As a Soviet-designed 140mm rocket carried approx. 2.2 kg of Sarin, a comparable ratio would indicate an explosive charge of 650-700 grams of explosive. From my own direct experience with explosives in my military and law enforcement training, such a quantity would shred the rocket’s warhead section into small fragments. As metal fragments are a likely place to collect a Sarin sample, the fragments at Moadamiyah may have been too small to locate or indeed too small to contain an effective sample of the agent.

A fully effective and efficient explosive dissemination of a 140mm rocket carrying Sarin would create an aerosol of finely divided droplets, with little or no pooling or puddles of Sarin, making it harder to find a trace of actual Sarin. This factor presumes that the munition efficiency (the percentage of Sarin dispensed as an aerosol to create rapid effects) of the 140mm rocket is higher than that of the larger system used elsewhere. Based on my knowledge of chemical weapons design, I believe this to be the case.

If the location in Moadamiyah under investigation had been exposure to more ventilation, more moisture, or both, the evaporation and degradation of Sarin would have been increased relative to other locations. With the information available to me, I cannot know whether this was the case or not.

Q: The same article claims "It is scientifically improbable that survivors would test that highly for exposure to Sarin without a single trace of environmental evidence testing positive for the chemical agent." How do you answer this question?

This is an untrue statement unsupported by the facts. The statement appears to betray an ignorance of the relationship of Sarin to its degradation products. As I state above Sarin degrades into IMPA and/or MPFA. IMPA is a direct daughter compound of Sarin.

Q: The article also states that sarin can last "for months, sometimes years in the environment." Could you clarify the situation where that would be the case?

The persistence (or not) of Sarin in the environment depends on numerous variables. The fate of Sarin in the environment is effected by evaporation, hydrolysis, and thermal decomposition. I will address each in turn:

Evaporation. Sarin has a non-trivial vapor pressure and a relatively low “latent heat of vaporization” (the energy required to go from liquid state to vapor state) at normal temperatures. Therefore, Sarin is a volatile liquid, and it will evaporate into the air if given the chance to do so. In open contact with the air, Sarin liquid cannot be expected to last for more than a few hours. 30 minutes at 15º C is stated by one German authority. In situation where the liquid Sarin is trapped and not exposed to air, it may persist for some time.

Hydrolyis. Sarin will decompose into IMPA or MPFA in contact with moisture. Sarin not in contact with moisture, such as humidity in the air or soil, will last longer.

Sarin without direct contact with air or water or extreme heat simply has less means to evaporate or degrade. Sarin trapped in a way where it has no access to air or water will significantly increase its persistence in the environment. In addition, liquid Sarin absorbs into some surfaces. I find samples 27 and 28 particularly revealing, as they are from window seals/gaskets. This is exactly where I would look for Sarin.

Q: Would you agree with the UN's claim on page 5 of the report that "The environmental, chemical and medical samples we have collected provide clear and compelling evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent Sarin were used in Ein Tarma, Moadamiyah and Zamalka in the Ghouta area of Damascus."?

Yes. I believe that the environmental samples are conclusive. The medical evidence is somewhat less conclusive in my mind, but only because the methodology by which the samples were analyzed is not clearly stated.

Q: Considering the evidence in the UN report, do you agree with the articles conclusion that the 140mm artillery rockets fired at Moadamiyah did not contain Sarin?

I do not agree with this conclusion. I can think of no other reason to account for the presence of DIMP and IMPA at the scene.

Q: The article quotes you as saying "environmental and medical evidence cannot conceivably be considered a scientifically or statistically accurate sample of the population of affected victims. It would be considered scientifically unsound to draw widespread conclusions based simply on this sample." Could you expand on what you mean here?

The only point I am making with that statement is that the sample population of 36 individuals is too small to be considered statistically adequate to represent the entire population of thousands of people affected by the attacks. It is just too small a slice of the theoretical data set to allow one to draw widespread conclusions about the whole incident. A statistician could shed more light on the science behind this, as it has been over 20 years since my last statistics class.

My statement should not be taken to mean that we cannot learn from the data collected on the 36 people. Nor should my original statement be taken as a statement that I do not believe Sarin was used. As I state in my earlier report, I firmly believe Sarin was used, based on the evidence of the UN Report. My statement just means we can’t apply those particular findings based on 36 people to the broader population of many thousands with any expectation of accuracy.

Q: The same article also highlights you're concerns over the mixture of symptoms not matching that of past sarin attacks; "Is it possible that we are looking at exposure to multiple causes of injury? Were some of the examined victims exposed to other things in addition to Sarin? I am not stating that Sarin was not used. It clearly was. My point is that it is either not behaving as we have understood it in the past or that other factors were at work in addition to Sarin" Could you expand on that point?

The point I was trying to make is as follows: One logical explanation behind the diverse and variegated signs and symptoms noted in the report may be the fact that we are looking at exposure to more than one thing. In simpler terms, did other chemicals cause injury in addition to Sarin.

There are numerous ways in which this could be the case. One possibility is widespread presence of smoke and other respiratory irritants. One theory I would like to explore is binary chemical weapons.

A binary chemical weapon is one that combines several components to create the chemical agent desired, generally by mixing the two chemicals in flight on the way to the target. Both the US and Soviet Union developed this technique during the Cold War. For example, a binary weapon could create Sarin. One excellent example of this was the M687 artillery shell developed by the US Army. The M687 was designed to combine two canisters mid flight after being fired from a 155mm howitzer. One canister contained DF (Methylphosphonic difluoride – see above) while the other canister contained a mix of isopropyl alcohol and isopropyl amine. The two canisters would mix to create Sarin. The actual success of inflight mixing was very difficult to achieve and was the result of much research, development, and test firing both with simulant chemicals and live agents.

My theory is that the larger 330-360mm rocket may have been designed as a binary agent to combine chemicals to create Sarin. However, the ‘dark art’ of perfecting the inflight mixing may not have been learned by its designers. In such a case, the device would disseminate a mix of chemicals upon impact or detonation. Some Sarin would be created, but an awful lot of precursors would be present. None of these precursors are pleasant substances and their general proclivity to cause respiratory and eye irritation could explain the relatively ubiquitous but generic respiratory and eye symptoms. In addition, the presence of MPFA at the locations tied to the larger rocket, but not the smaller rocket, could support this theory. This is because MPFA is a direct decomposition product of DF, the Sarin binary component.

Q: Wouldn’t the attackers just mix up the chemicals, THEN pour them into the rocket?

There’s no theoretical reason why that couldn’t happen. It’s just that it seems a dim idea to do it that way. Taking dangerous chemicals and mixing them in open air to create an even more dangerous chemical, which would evaporate and cause a downwind hazard seems like a difficult thing to get soldiers to do, and that’s speaking in my capacity as a former Chemical Corps Officer. Anyone forced to do do would probably rush and make mistakes or do a poor job of it. Mixing binary components before putting them both in the weapon would negate all of the advantages of having a binary weapon in the first place. Using pure, unitary agent would achieve much higher efficiency at the same or lower (non-trivial) level of danger to the troops handling the agent. I see little point in a binary system that isn’t an in-flight mixing technique.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

Tuesday, 24 September 2013

Since publishing my last post, Evidence Of The Syrian Army Using Munitions Linked To The August 21st Sarin Attack, which examined evidence of the high explosive variant of the munition linked to the August 21st Sarin attack (which I've dubbed UMLACAs) being fired from Mezzeh Airbase in Damascus, I've being searching through videos from the surrounding area, searching for more examples of the rockets being fired from the airbase. What I've found are six videos from December 2012 and January 2013 showing the launchers for the UMLACAs in operation inside Mezzeh Airbase, clear evidence that the Syrian military had the equipment required to launch the munitions linked to the August 21st Sarin attack.

The following video, posted on December 23rd 2012, shows the clearest view of the munition being launched

The below image shows the clearest view of the munition, and I've adjusted the levels on the image to make the shape as clear as possible.

As you can see this matches the unusual shape of the UMLACA. Below we see the launcher

This twin barreled launcher appears to be of the same type photographed in Aleppo in November 2012, shown below, with the second picture showing it apparently loaded with an UMLACA

We get a much clearer view of the launcher in the next two videos from Mezzeh airbase

Another two videos show what appears to be the same vehicle launching rockets from Mezzeh Airbase

With a sixth video showing a launcher with the same launch profile seen in the above videos

It seems there's an ever increasing body of evidence confirming the Syrian government are capable of launching the rockets used in the August 21st attack, and that they've been using those launchers since at least November 2012. These videos are from one location in Damascus, but we know there's at least one video showing an UMLACA launch from Qadam railway station in Damascus, so it might be time to revisit some old videos showing rocket launches, and giving them an extra close look.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

Since the UN report into the August 21st sarin attack confirmed the use of a previously unknown munition in the attack, which I had previously named the UMLACA (more details here), there's been a lot of debate about whether or not the Syrian army has such a munition. There's been multiple videos of the munitions posted online by the Syrian opposition, and they've been consistently described as being fired by Syrian government forces. From those videos, I've been able to identify at least two types of these munitions, one type linked to the August 21st sarin attack and past alleged chemical attacks, and a second, high explosive, type.

The following video from Daraya, Damascus, published on Decemeber 29th 2012, was highlighted by @hesbol on a blog post attempting to discern the range of the UMLACA. It shows what seems to be a high explosive version of the UMLACA being launched and detonating

As the camera tracks the flight of the UMLACA it's very distinct outline can be clearly seen

In the video it's claimed that the munitions are fired from Mezzeh airbase, and it's actually possible to confirm they are coming from the direction of Mezzeh airbase. At the start of the video we see the launch, and the outline of the hills behind it.

Using Google Earth we can position the virtual camera facing north from Daraya, looking towards Mezzeh airbase, and it's clear the topography matches what we see in the video

The structure at the top of the hill is the HQ of Maher al-Assad's 4th division, which can be seen here on Wikimapia. A report from the Institute for the Study of War examining the situation in Damascus in December 2012, shows that the area north of Daraya, including Mezzeh airbase, and the 4th division terrain to the north, were under the control of the Syrian army, and it seems, from what we can see in the above video, that the UMLACA was fired by Syrian government forces. This not only shows the Syrian army have been using the munitions, but they've been using them since December 2012.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

Mint Press News incorrectly used my byline for an article it published on August 29, 2013 alleging chemical weapons usage by Syrian rebels. Despite my repeated requests, made directly and through legal counsel, they have not been willing to issue a retraction stating that I was not the author. Yahya Ababneh is the sole reporter and author of the Mint Press News piece. To date, Mint Press News has refused to act professionally or honestly in regards to disclosing the actual authorship and sources for this story.
I did not travel to Syria, have any discussions with Syrian rebels, or do any other reporting on which the article is based. The article is not based on my personal observations and should not be given credence based on my journalistic reputation. Also, it is false and misleading to attribute comments made in the story as if they were my own statements.

After that statement was issued Sharmine Narwani claimed she had been sent the following email by Dale Gavlak

Basically I helped Yahya Ababneh, who traveled to Gouta, to write what he saw and heard. He mainly met with rebels, of course, the father of one of the rebels killed and doctors treating victims in the area. He has traveled to Syria numerous times. As you know Mint Press News is more of an advocacy journalism site and it seems to be the most likely to publish such a piece.

This, and other queries, resulted in Dale Gavlak publishing another statement based on a statement from her lawyers

Dale Gavlak has sought to make a public statement from the beginning of this incident and now is able to do so.

Email correspondence between Ms. Gavlak and Mint Press News that began on August 29 and ended on September 2 clearly show that from the beginning Ms. Gavlak identified the author of the story as Yahya Ababneh, a Jordanian journalist. She also made clear that only his name should appear on the byline and the story was submitted only in his name. She served as an editor of Ababneh’s material in English as he normally writes in Arabic. She did not travel to Syria and could not corroborate his account.

Dale Gavlak specifically stated in an email dated August 29 "Pls find the Syria story I mentioned uploaded on Google Docs. This should go under Yahya Ababneh's byline. I helped him write up his story but he should get all the credit for this."

Ms. Gavlak supplied the requested bio information on Mr. Ababneh later that day and had further communications with Mint Press News’ Mnar Muhawesh about the author's background. There was no communication by Mint Press News to Ms. Gavlak that it intended to use her byline. Ms. Muhawesh took this action unilaterally and without Ms. Gavlak's permission.

After seeing that her name was attached to the article, Dale Gavlak demanded her name be removed. However, Ms. Muhawesh stated: "We will not be removing your name from the byline as this is an existential issue for MintPress and an issue of credibility as this will appear as though we are lying."

Mint Press News rejected further demands by Dale Gavlak and her legal counsel to have her name removed. Her public statement explains her position.

By Mnar Muhawesh, executive director and editor at large for MintPress News

Statement:

Thank you for reaching out to me in regards to statements made by Dale Gavlak alleging MintPress for incorrectly attributing our exclusive report titled: “Syrians in Goutha claim Saudi-supplied rebels behind chemical attacks.”Gavlak pitched this story to MintPress on August 28th and informed her editors and myself that her colleague Yahya Ababneh was on the ground in Syria. She said Ababneh conducted interviews with rebels, their family members, Ghouta residents and doctors that informed him through various interviews that the Saudis had supplied the rebels with chemical weapons and that rebel fighters handled the weapons improperly setting off the explosions.

When Yahya had returned and shared the information with her, she stated that she confirmed with several colleagues and Jordanian government officials that the Saudis have been supplying rebels with chemical weapons, but as her email states, she says they refused to go on the record.

Gavlak wrote the article in it’s entirety as well as conducted the research. She filed her article on August 29th and was published on the same day.

Dale is under mounting pressure for writing this article by third parties. She notified MintPress editors and myself on August 30th and 31st via email and phone call, that third parties were placing immense amounts of pressure on her over the article and were threatening to end her career over it. She went on to tell us that she believes this third party was under pressure from the head of the Saudi Intelligence Prince Bandar himself, who is alleged in the article of supplying the rebels with chemical weapons.

On August 30th, Dale asked MintPress to remove her name completely from the byline because she stated that her career and reputation was at risk. She continued to say that these third parties were demanding her to disassociate herself from the article or these parties would end her career.

On August 31st, I notified Dale through email that I would add a clarification that she was the writer and researcher for the article and that Yahya was the reporter on the ground, but did let Gavlak know that we would not remove her name as this would violate the ethics of journalism.
We are aware of the tremendous pressure that Dale and some of our other journalists are facing as a result of this story, and we are under the same pressure as a result to discredit the story. We are unwilling to succumb to those pressures for MintPress holds itself to the highest journalistic ethics and reporting standards.

Yahya has recently notified me that the Saudi embassy contacted him and threatened to end his career if he did a follow up story on who carried out the most recent chemical weapons attack and demanded that he stop doing media interviews in regards to the subject.

We hold Dale Gavlak in the highest esteem and sympathize with her for the pressure she is receiving, but removing her name from the story would not be honest journalism and therefore, as stated before, we are not willing to remove her name from the article.

We are prepared and may release all emails and communications made between MintPress and Dale Gavlak, and even Yahya to provide further evidence of what was provided to you in this statement.

Elsewhere, Brian Whitaker published the article, Yahya Ababneh exposed, where he identified another name Yahya Ababneh was posting online with, Yan Barakat, and a very interesting comment posted by him on a Peter Hitchens column before the Mint Press article was submitted, highlighting one key passage about Yahya's/Yan's trip that was left out of the Mint Press article

The war is coming soon. Jordan was threatened by the Syrian government this time.

Who used the chemical weapons?

The answer is neither the Syrian regime, nor the rebels. This is the game of Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi intelligence chief. He gave these weapons to the rebels via tunnels but they did not have enough information about them. Almost all of the rebels handling the weapons were killed because they used them incorrectly.

Many people inside the village were really angry with Jabhat Al Nazrah (an Al Qaeda associate in Syria).

The Assad regime so far has not let anyone from the UN visit the village to investigate. I will not be surprised if the Assad regime will use this case to support its situation in the eyes of Russia and Iran. The first country who suggested to fight Assad was France and Saudi Arabia were ready to pay for the weapons.

The Assad regime will get his army ready with many Iranian soldiers. Some old men arrived in Damascus from Russia and one of them became friends with me. He told me that they have evidence that it was the rebels who used the weapons.

The US people will pay the price again.

No one cares about the children who were killed in this way. The people are really concerned about who used the chemical weapons in Syria. If in these days it is believed that Assad used chemical weapons, then there will be a devastating war including the USA, France, Britain and Arab countries. After some years when they have paid the price to kill the Syrian people, they will say that they are sorry but it was actually Al Qaeda who deployed the weapons. Already they know that this is the game of Bandar bin Sultan.

Laura Rozen spoke to Dale Gavlak about this

Spoke briefly with Dale Gavlak. She said she knows Yahya Ababneh under that name thru mutual friends, thought he uses Yan Barakat for FB 1/2
— Laura Rozen (@lrozen) September 22, 2013

Saturday, 21 September 2013

Following yesterday's statement from Dale Gavlak on an article published by Mint Press she claims wrongly used her name in the byline, I've now received the following email from Dale based on a statement from her lawyer further clarifying the situation.

Dale Gavlak has sought to make a public statement from the beginning of this incident and now is able to do so.

Email correspondence between Ms. Gavlak and Mint Press News that began on August 29 and ended on September 2 clearly show that from the beginning Ms. Gavlak identified the author of the story as Yahya Ababneh, a Jordanian journalist. She also made clear that only his name should appear on the byline and the story was submitted only in his name. She served as an editor of Ababneh’s material in English as he normally writes in Arabic. She did not travel to Syria and could not corroborate his account.

Dale Gavlak specifically stated in an email dated August 29 "Pls find the Syria story I mentioned uploaded on Google Docs. This should go under Yahya Ababneh's byline. I helped him write up his story but he should get all the credit for this."

Ms. Gavlak supplied the requested bio information on Mr. Ababneh later that day and had further communications with Mint Press News’ Mnar Muhawesh about the author's background. There was no communication by Mint Press News to Ms. Gavlak that it intended to use her byline. Ms. Muhawesh took this action unilaterally and without Ms. Gavlak's permission.

After seeing that her name was attached to the article, Dale Gavlak demanded her name be removed. However, Ms. Muhawesh stated: "We will not be removing your name from the byline as this is an existential issue for MintPress and an issue of credibility as this will appear as though we are lying."

Mint Press News rejected further demands by Dale Gavlak and her legal counsel to have her name removed. Her public statement explains her position.

Dale Gavlak has now sent me the following statement about the article.

Mint Press News incorrectly used my byline for an article it published on August 29, 2013 alleging chemical weapons usage by Syrian rebels. Despite my repeated requests, made directly and through legal counsel, they have not been willing to issue a retraction stating that I was not the author. Yahya Ababneh is the sole reporter and author of the Mint Press News piece. To date, Mint Press News has refused to act professionally or honestly in regards to disclosing the actual authorship and sources for this story.

I did not travel to Syria, have any discussions with Syrian rebels, or do any other reporting on which the article is based. The article is not based on my personal observations and should not be given credence based on my journalistic reputation. Also, it is false and misleading to attribute comments made in the story as if they were my own statements.

Dale Gavlak contacted me using an email address used in previous correspondence, relating to this article.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

Wednesday, 18 September 2013

Early yesterday morning I received an email pointing me to three videos that had been posted on LiveLeak, claiming to show the Syrian opposition group launching the August 21st sarin attack. I posted the videos on my blog, and highlighted the dubious nature of the videos. Having spent the last two years examining videos from the Syria conflict on a daily basis, these videos appear suspicious for a number of reasons I detail on my blog post, and are totally unverifiable.

This has not stopped Russia Today using the credibility of my blog to give credence to this videos. This is a transcript of their 10am BST broadcast

Thabang Motsei - ......Meanwhile a prominent Syrian blogger known as Black Moses has posted footage allegedly showing chemical weapons being used by rebels. Let's get the details from our correspondent Paul Scott here in the studio. "Paul Scott - The blogger is a staunch critic of Damascus and a staunch critic of President Bashar al Assad's regime and in the past he has monitored all sorts of news sources and claims and counter claims emerging from the Syrian Civil War to use it as a stick to beat the Assad Government with and implicate Assad in all sorts of atrocities. But it is interesting now that he has posted a video on this blog that suggests that it actually could be the Syrian Opposition that had been using these chemical weapons. It represent a slight shift in focus from what the narrative that the blog has been taking in recent weeks.Thabang Motsei - So this Brown Moses that we were talking about what are experts saying where the rebels could have obtained these chemicals from.

The later 11am broadcast also uses my blog to give credence to these dubious videos

To be absolutely clear, I do not consider these videos to be reliable evidence of anything. They came from irregular sources, and are filmed in a way not consistent with videos posted previously by Liwa al-Islam, among other issues. I do not support Russia Today's use of the credibility of my work to prop up videos I consider to be highly dubious. I believe all credible evidence points to the Syrian military being responsible for the August 21st attack, and have produced large amounts of work examining the evidence that supports that conclusion, which can be found here.

If you wish to contact me with further questions on this matter please email me at brownmoses@gmail.com

Since the UN report into the sarin attacks on August 21st linked two munitions to the attack, there's been various claims made about who could have been responsible. The New York Times summarises a number of key pieces of information that points towards the Syrian military being responsible here, and for my own part, I've stated I've never seen either of the munitions used, the M14 140mm artillery rocket, and the munition I named the UMLACA, in the hands of the Syrian opposition.

In response to that statement a number of people and organisations have claimed that the opposition actually does have 140mm rockets. One example is from this piece from Press TV, 5 lies invented to spin UN report on Syria

Chemical weapons were delivered with munitions not used by rebels: This claim includes referencing "Syria watcher" Eliot Higgins also known as "Brown Moses," a UK-based armchair observer of the Syrian crisis who has been documenting weapons used throughout the conflict on his blog.
While Higgins explains these particularly larger diameter rockets (140mm and 330mm) have not been seen (by him) in the hands of terrorists operating within and along Syria's borders, older posts of his show rockets similar in construction and operation, but smaller, most certainly in the hands of the militants.

Despite what the author may have been told in the past, size does matter, especially when it comes to IDing munitions. He no doubts refers to the sort of videos now being used to prove the opposition have 140mm artillery rockets, and here's a couple of the examples I've been sent

These, and similar videos, have been cited by a number of people as evidence that the opposition could have launched 140mm rockets. The problem with this theory is, neither of these are the types of launchers that could fire 140mm rockets. The top video shows the Type-63 multiple rocket launcher, which launches 107mm rockets, and the bottom video shows the Croatian RAK-12 multiple rocket launcher, which fires 128mm rockets. There's also been a number of DIY rocket launchers shown in opposition videos, but I've never seen evidence of 140mm rockets fired from those either. One thing that would stand out right way about 140mm rockets is the number of nozzles on the rear of the rocket. Unlike many other types of rockets, they have 10 nozzles, so they are pretty easy to spot. Evidence may exist, and if it does I'd love to see it, but I've yet to see any.

So, to say the presence of 107mm and 128mm rockets in the opposition's arsenal means they also have 140mm rockets is deeply flawed logic. It's also important to note that the BM-14 launcher looks quite different from the above launchers. The main difference is four more barrels

Something that's pretty easy to spot.

I'd also highly recommend watching the following video, published before the report, discussing the munitions used, in particular the M14 140mm artillery rocket.

In particular I recommend watching the section on the "179" marking found on the remains in Damascus, from 6:18 onwards, which details it's origin in the former Soviet Union. More details of the origin of the munitions in Siberia can be found here.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

Monday, 16 September 2013

This morning I was sent an email directing me to links to 3 videos posted on LiveLeak. The same videos were also posted on YouTube, with the following description

September 15. Kurdish Peshmerga killed three Syrian terrorists on border. They found cell phone in pocket. Night bombing video there. Terrorists on video wear gas masks. Video was shot August 21. One terrorist name it Storm operation.

The men in the video claim to be Liwa al-Islam, and the many flags in the video are also marked Liwa al-Islam. In the videos they are shown to launch the same unusual munitions (I've dubbed UMLACAs) used in the August 21st sarin attack.

Obviously, this is meant to be proof that Liwa al-Islam were responsible for the August 21st attack, but there's a lot about it that seems dubious.

First of all the video quality is awful, so it's very difficult to make out a lot of details. It's also rather odd it's so dark when August 21st was a full moon, and there's no lights in the city visible. Apart from that, there's three things the videos seem designed to really push, that the UMLACAs are being used, it's August 21st (repeated on each of the videos), and it's Liwa al-Islam. They don't just say they are Liwa al-Islam, but everything is draped in Islamic black standards with Liwa al-Islam written on it

A look though YouTube channels used by Liwa al-Islam, here and here, doesn't seem to show videos where they've draped black flags over the weapons they are using, as seen in these new videos, and the new videos also don't appear to have the Liwa al-Islam logo anywhere, which they do seem to like plastering all over their equipment. It's also a bit odd they'd cover everything with the logo, yet film it using such a poor quality camera.

It's interesting that they are also using a D-30 howitzer, a weapon that's not been identified as being used in the attack, yet they still feel the need to wear gas masks around it (apart from the cameraman, who can be heard clearly, unhindered by a mask in all videos), and there's no sign of the BM-14 multiple rocket launcher that has been linked to the attack

The videos were also uploaded to brand new YouTube and LiveLeak accounts, something they have in common with previous dubious videos, including this video claiming to show a rebel group using chemical weapons to kill a rabbit (reposted here to another channel)

It's not the only thing the rabbit video has in common with the new videos. In the rabbit video it's stated at 6:44 that the name of the group is the "Reeh Sarsar" (Cold Wind) Chemical Battalion, with the flag on the wall showing the same name. As I noted in the above transcript, the third video calls the Operation "Reeh Sarsar" (Cold Wind), exactly the same name as the group in the rabbit video.

Update Liwa al-Islam has issued a statement in response to these videos

In the Name of God; the Most Compassionate; the Merciful
“Thus was the Truth vindicated and that which they were doing was made vain. Thus were they there defeated and brought low.” – the holy Quran
Further on statement no. 75/34-13, on the massacre by chemical weapons in Gouta on August 21, 2013, we state the following:
The terrorist Assad regime has fabricated videos showing people wearing masks and firing D-30 artillery and rockets. Voices in the video state that the incident took place on August 21st. The Assad regime has put a banner on which was written, in a strange way, the name “Liwa al-Islam”. These fabricated videos were circulated online and handed over to western media in order to incriminate Liwa al-Islam. The position of Liwa al-Islam is summed up in the following points:

Those videos were not published on our official channels. They are thus forged and completely fake.

Liwa al-Islam does not have the kind of artillery shown in the videos. Only the Assad regime has this capability. Furthermore, this kind of artillery cannot in any way carry warhead that might be filled with chemical weapons.

Only the Assad regime has chemical weapons in Syria. Assad admitted to that by agreeing to turn over his stockpile of chemical weapons to the international community. The UN team report, moreover, confirmed the rockets used in the attacks on August 21st were launched from regime-controlled areas.

In the targeted areas in Gouta, there was a battalion affiliated with Liwa al-Islam. Ten soldiers of this battalion were killed and around 50 were injured.

The regime has also fabricated a video showing members of Liwa al-Islam beheading soldiers. We stress that this is a mere cheap lie. Liwa al-Islam denounces this kind of behavior, and it is not part of its policy to execute detainees.

Liwa al-Islam pledges to continue the fight to rid the country of the filthy terrorist regime. We will not be weakened by videos faked by those who have the blood of innocent people on their hands and those who used chemical weapons against innocent civilians. We will continue the fight until we bring the criminals to justice. Liwa al-Islam emphasizes that any political solution that does not involve accountability for crimes against the Syrian people is completely unacceptable. The world has forgotten all crimes by the Assad regime and focused only on the use of chemical weapons. When the international community makes a deal with Assad to eliminate his stockpile of chemical weapons and then hands him a certificate of good conduct, which puts him in a position to freely continue killing with other means, it becomes a partner in Assad’s murderous crimes.

“Might belongeth to Allah and to His messenger and the believers.” - the holy Quran

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

In light of today's report from the UN confirming the use of sarin in the August 21st attacks in Damascus, I thought I'd take a look at the open source evidence of who is responsible. I'll be looking at evidence that's freely available for anyone to examine, rather than what German spy boats may or may not of heard, or intelligence reports that tell us they have evidence, but don't actually show the evidence. As always, evidence does not automatically equal proof, so it's up to you to decide if this information proves one side or the other was responsible.
Two munitions have been linked to the attack, the M14 140mm artillery rocket, and a munition I've previously referred to as the UMLACA (Unidentified Munition Linked to Alleged Chemical Attacks).

M14 140mm artillery rocket

UMLACA

The UN inspectors have now linked both munitions to the chemical attacks, so the question is, who used them? In the 18 months I've been studying the arms and munitions in the conflict I have never seen either type of munition used by the opposition. The opposition has rocket artillery, for example the 107mm Type-63 multiple rocket launcher and the Croatian 128mm RAK-12, but I've never seen any sign of the 140mm systems (such as the BM-14) that would be used to launch the M14 artillery rocket. More details on the M14, and it's origins, are in this video from RUSI

As with the M14, there's no evidence the Syrian opposition has access to, or have used, the UMLACA.
Since January 2013, a number of photographs and videos of these munitions have been published by opposition activists, who have consistently claimed these were fired by government forces. The first video, posted from Daraya, Damascus on January 4th 2013, doesn't even link the munition to a chemical attack, and through the last 3 weeks of investigations on the munition, I've established there are at least two types of this munition; the type linked to the August 21st attack and other alleged chemical attacks, and a high explosive type, which I examine in this post.

It's important to note that the UMLACA has also been recorded at the scene of at least one other chemical attack, including one in Adra, Damascus, on August 5th, which I detail here. Another video, from June 11th, also filmed in Adra, shows the remains of an UMLACA that's described as a "chemical rocket", although it's not specified which alleged chemical attack it was linked to. Considering the new information presented in today's UN report, it seems worth re-examining some of the earlier allegations of chemical attacks in Syria.

One thing that must be stressed, is that the UMLACA is a munition that's never been seen in any other conflict, and it's origins are somewhat of a mystery. This has led some people to claim the munition could have been constructed by the opposition, and one popular video shows what's claimed to be a chemical munition being used by the opposition, with some even claimed it's the UMLACA, even though it's clearly a totally different design

The above video is what's known as a "Hell Cannon", a popular mortar type weapon used by the Syrian opposition. I've gone into more details about the Hell Cannon, and why it's not a chemical weapon, as some people have claimed, here, but there is one other aspect of it I want to explore in relation to the UMLACAs.
As I've said before, some people have claimed the UMLACA could be a DIY munition manufactured by the opposition, but by examining the construction of both the Hell Cannon and the UMLACA I think it's clear there's a very significant difference in the quality and complexity of construction.

When the Hell Cannon first appeared in May 2013, it was accompanied by a release of a promotional video showing the construction of the weapon, shown below

In this video we can see the most complex part of the system is the launching platform, with the munition itself being not much more than a gas cylinder welded onto a metal pole, with fins added. The gas cylinder warhead is then filled with fertilizer based explosive, and fitted with a simple impact fuze. The launching platform is pretty simple, just a mortar tube with the rest of the construction desgined to give it stability. The following video, published on August 5th, shows ammunition for the Hell Cannon being produced

The design has had a slight improvement, with extendable tail fins added, and large numbers of the munitions being produced. If these were all chemical weapons then it's pretty clear someone would have noticed by now, and this really demonstrates how basic the design of these munitions are, something that's reflected in pretty much all the munitions produced by the opposition.

Over the past three weeks I've been collecting detailed photographs of the UMLACA, trying to make sense of how it's put together, and how it works. What's become clear is the UMLACA is far much more than just a barrel on a rocket. Human Rights Watch's report on August 21st included a diagram of the UMLACA I helped produce, shown below

There's a lot of details that point to this being more sophisticated that the gas cylinders on a stick, for example, way in which the warhead appears to be designed to come apart. There's clues to this in the various videos and photographs of the remains of the munition. The following images are taken from 4 different UMLACAs, showing the remains of the outer shell of the warhead

You'll note that they've consistently split in exactly the same way, right down the length of the warhead, apparently pre-weakened to break open that way. Another example is the rocket itself, as the below video of the high explosive variant of the UMLACA demonstrates, the housing for the rocket, which the tail fins are attached to, has been manufactured separately, and tightly fitted over the rocket, with fixtures added to the end so it can firmly attach to the base of the warhead (40 seconds onwards)

These are just a couple of examples of the design quality of the munition, demonstrating this is something that's beyond anything the opposition has manufactured themselves, strongly indicating this is something that's been manufactured by the Syrian military, or one of it's allies. More examination of the construction of the munition can be found here.

There's also a number of videos and images showing what appears to be there munitions, or variants, being used by government forces. This first video shows what appears to be a larger version of the same munition being loaded into a launcher, and launched

This video claims to show one of the munitions launched from the government controlled Qadam railway station in Damascus

The below screenshots of the video clearly shows the profile of the rocket matching the unusual profile of the UMLACA

It was also possible to find the precise location of one of the munitions fired, and deduce it was fired from the north, the same direction as the 155th brigade missile base, and related sites (detailed here).

This is the evidence that the Syrian government was capable of the attack, and had a history of using the munitions linked to the attack. As for evidence of Syrian opposition responsibility, that appears rather thin on the ground. You have claims the attacks were faked, the victims being Alawite hostages from Latakia, that were somehow driven through hundreds of miles of contested and government controlled territory to Damascus. There's claims that this was some sort of accident involving Saudi supplied chemical weapons, which fails to explain how one incident could effect two separate areas. Other claims centre around the opposition having sarin, based off reports in Turkey in May, where it was reported Jabhat al-Nusra members were arrested with sarin. The "sarin" was later reported to be anti-freeze, and only this week some of the members are being prosecuted for trying to make sarin, having only a shopping list of ingredients, rather than actual sarin. It seems to me, that compared to the evidence of government responsibility for the attacks, the evidence of opposition responsibility seems very poor.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.