Given the rising tide of
Islamisation in Muslim countries and its call for wider recognition of Shari'a
as the primary legal basis of Muslim nations, concerns about Shari'a's conflict
with human rights standards must be addressed. Such conflict and tension between
historical formations of Shari'a and modern standards of human rights is readily
illustrated by the situation of women in Muslim countries
today.

The status and rights of
women are a major human rights concern in all parts of the world: women are
consistently oppressed, discriminated against, and denied their rightful
equality with men. Although the situation has recently improved in some
developed countries, I believe that it is by no means satisfactory anywhere in
the world today.

The present focus on Muslim
violations of the human rights of women does not mean that these are peculiar to
the Muslim world. As a Muslim, however, I am particularly concerned with the
situation in the Muslim world and wish to contribute to its
improvements.

The discussion is organized
in terms of the status and rights of Muslim women in the private sphere,
particularly within the family, and in public fora, in relation to access to
work and particularly in public affairs. This classification is recommended for
the Muslim context because the personal law aspects of Shari'a, family law and
inheritance, have been applied much more consistently than the public law
doctrines. The status and rights of women in private life have always been
significantly influenced by Shari'a regardless of the extent of Islamization of
the public debate.

A. Shari'a
and the Human Rights of Women

This part begins with a
brief survey of the general principles and rules of Shari'a which are likely to
have a negative impact on the status and rights of women. This includes general
principles which affect the socialization of both men and women and the
orientation of society at large as well as legal rules in the formal sense. The
most important principle of Shari'a influencing the status and rights of women
is the notion of qawama. Qawama has its origin in verse 4:34 of the Koran
which states that:

"Men have qawama
(guardianship and authority) over women because of the advantage they (men) have
over them (women) and because they (men) spend their property in supporting them
(women)".

According to Shari'a
interpretations of this verse, men as a group are the guardians of and are
superior to women as a group, and the men of a particular family are the
guardians of and are superior to the women of that family.

This
notion of general and specific qawama has had far reaching consequences
for the status and rights of women in both the private and public domains. For
example, Shari'a provides that women are disqualified from holding general
public office, which involves the exercise of authority over men, because, in
keeping with verse 4:34 of the Qur'an men are entitled to exercise authority
over women and not the reverse.

Another general principle
of Shari’a which has broad implications for the status and rights of Muslim
women is the notion of al-hijab, the veil. This means more than requiring women
to cover their bodies and faces in public. Several verses can be quoted to
illustrate how Islam controls women's dress mode, movement and life outside the
home. Verse 24:31 of the Qur'an states that:

"And say
to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their
modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what
(must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veil over their
bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers,
their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers or their brothers' sons or
their sisters' sons or their women…"

Furthermore, verse 33:33
states that:

"…And stay quietly in your
houses, and make not a dazzling display, like that of the former Times of
Ignorance; …"

Verse 33:59 requires women
to:

"…cast their garments over
their persons (when abroad): that is most convenient, that they should be known
(as such) and not molested".

According to the
interpretations of the above, women are supposed to stay at home and not leave
it except when required to by urgent necessity. When they are permitted to
venture beyond their home, they must do so with their bodies and faces covered.
Al-hijab tends to reinforce women's inability to hold public office and
restricts their access to public life. They are not supposed to participate in
public life, because they must not mix with men even in public
places.

In addition to these
general limitations on the rights of women under Shari'a, there are a number of
specific rules in private and public law that discriminate against women and
highlight women's general inferiority and inequality. In family law for example,
men have the right to marry up to four wives and the power to exercise complete
control over them during marriage, to the extent of punishing them for
disobedience if the men deem that to be necessary. In contrast, the co-wives are
supposed to submit to their husband's will and endure his punishments. While a
husband is entitled to divorce any of his wives at will, a wife is not entitled
to divorce, except by judicial order on very specific and limited ground.
Another private law feature of discrimination is found in the law of
inheritance, where the general rule is that women are entitled to half the share
of men.

While a husband is entitled
to divorce any of his wives at will, a wife is not entitled to divorce, except
by judicial order on very specific and limited ground.

In
addition to their general inferiority under the principle of qawama and
lack of access to public life as a consequence of the notion of alhijab,
women are subjected to further specific limitations in the public domain. For
instance, in the administration of justice, Shari'a holds women to be
incompetent witnesses in serious criminal offenses regardless of their knowledge
of the facts. In civil cases where a woman's testimony is accepted, it takes two
women to make a single witness. Diya, monetary compensation to be paid to
victims of violent crimes or to their surviving kin, is less for female victims
than it is for male victims.

The private and public
aspects of Shari'a overlap and interact. The general principles of qawama
and al-hijab operate at the public as well as the private levels.
Public law discrimination against women emphasizes their inferiority at home.
The inferior status and rights of women in private law justify discrimination
against them in public life. These overlapping and interacting principles and
rules play an extremely significant role in the socialization of both women and
men. Notions of women's inferiority are deeply embedded in the character and
attitudes of both women and men from early childhood.

This
does not mean that the whole of Shari'a has had a negative impact on the status
and rights of women. Relatively early on, Shari'a granted women certain rights
of equality which were not achieved by women in other legal systems until
recently. For example, from the very beginning, Shari'a guaranteed a woman's
independent legal personality to own and dispose of property in her own right on
equal footing with men, and secured for women certain minimum rights in family
law and inheritance long before other legal systems recognized similar
rights.

These theoretical rights
under Shari'a, however, may not be realized in practice. Other Shari'a rules may
hamper or inhibit women from exercising these rights in some societies.
According to one author, Pastner, "while legally recognized as economic persons
to whom property is transmitted, Muslim women are constrained from acting out
economic roles because of other legal, as well as ideological, components of
Muslim female status". Customary practice in certain rural Muslim communities
denies women their rightful inheritance under Shari'a. While strict application
of Shari'a would improve the status and rights of women in comparison to
customary practice in these situations, the position of women under Shari'a
would nevertheless fall short of the standards set by international human rights
instruments.

This is Shari'a doctrine as
it is understood by the vast majority of Muslims today. Significant
possibilities exist for reform, but to undertake such reforms effectively, we
must be clear on what Shari'a is rather than what it can or ought to be. Some
Muslim feminists emphasize the positive aspects of Shari'a while overlooking the
negative aspects. Others restrict their analysis to the Qur'an, and select only
verses favoring the status of women while overlooking other parts and failing to
take into account the ways in which the parts they select have been interpreted
by the Shari'a jurists. Neither approach is satisfactory. Shari'a is a complex
and integrated whole and must be perceived as such.

The
status and rights of Muslim women are affected by the negative as well as the
positive aspects of Shari'a. In fact, its negative aspects may receive greater
emphasis than its positive aspects in some Muslim societies today. Moreover,
Shari'a jurists have developed specific jurisprudential techniques which control
and limit the prospects of reform within the framework of
Shari'a.

As will be explained in the
final section on Islamic reform and human rights, modernist Muslims may need to
challenge and change those techniques before they can implement significant
reforms.

B. Muslim Women at
Home

The human rights of Muslim
women have been directly and continuously affected within the family by Shari'a,
because its relevant aspects have remained in force under the legal systems of
the vast majority of Muslim countries. This control which Shari'a exercises over
the private realm of the home and family is so entrenched, and its violation of
human rights so clear, that it may explain in part why some Muslim countries
refuse to ratify the relevant human rights instruments or at least enter
reservations on their obligations under certain human rights
treaties.

For example, Egypt is one
of the very few Muslim countries to have ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979. It
entered, however, a reservation to Article 16 of the Convention which provides
for the equality of men and women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations during the marriage and upon its dissolution. The Egyptian reservation
specifically stated that since these matters were governed by Shari'a, Egypt had
to derogate from its obligations under the Convention.

The
Shari'a personal law enforced in Iran is not significantly different from that
prevailing in Sunni countries like Egypt except for the additional affront to
the human dignity of women and the serious violation of their human rights
caused by the institution of mut'a or temporary marriage, peculiar to Shi'a
jurisprudence. According to this type of marriage, a man is entitled to take as
many "temporary wives" as he can afford in addition to his four "permanent
wives". In contrast to regular marriage which is contracted theoretically for
life, mut'a marriage is contracted for a specific period of time, in terms of
years, months, days or perhaps even hours.

In addition to the
discrimination and humiliation this type of "marriage" causes to the unfortunate
temporary "wife", it demeans all women and degrades the institution of marriage
itself. Despite these and many other extremely serious social and human rights
implications of this type of "marriage", it is still practiced in Iran
today.

Some Muslim countries have
introduced limited reforms in the family law field. These appear to be more
likely to survive traditionalist and fundamentalist backlash than the Iranian
ones discussed above, because of their modest nature. The 1979 amendments to the
personal law of Egypt "were carefully formulated to forestall any unnecessary
confrontation with conservative religious elements. These amendments maintained
the husband's rights of unilateral divorce and polygamy while seeking to balance
those rights by some procedural and financial guarantees for the wife. In
Pakistan, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 introduced some reforms.
Among other measures, it instituted a network of Arbitration Councils to deal
with divorce, polygamy and maintenance of wives. Now, the written permission of
the Arbitration Council is required before a married man can take another
wife.

These reforms are only
small steps toward redressing human rights objections to the status of women
under Shari'a, and yet they are criticized by traditionalist and fundamental
groups as un-Islamic. The repeal of the Iranian reforms and the threat of
revision of the Egyptian and Pakistani reforms suggest (to one author) the need
to use legitimate Islamic methodology in rendering such reforms. I agree with
this recommendation and add that the reforms must also go far enough to
guarantee the full human rights of women in family and inheritance
law.

C. Muslim Women in Public
Life

A similar and perhaps more
drastic conflict exists between reformist and conservative trends in relation to
the status and rights of women in the public domain. Unlike personal law
matters, where Shari'a was never displaced by secular law, in most Muslim
countries, constitutional, criminal and other public law matters have come to be
based on secular, mainly Western, legal concepts and institutions. Consequently,
the struggle over Islamization of public law has been concerned with the
reestablishment of Shari'a where it has been absent for decades, or at least
since the creation of the modern Muslim nation states in the first half of the
twentieth century. In terms of women's rights, the struggle shall determine
whether women can keep the degree of equality and rights in public life they
have achieved under secular constitutions and laws.

In
Pakistan, for example, the 1973 Constitution dealt with fundamental questions in
relation to the role of Islam in constitutional and other public affairs.
However, such issues are rarely finally resolved by constitutional provisions.
In fact, constitutional guarantees clearly did little to settle questions
pertaining to the status and rights of women in Pakistan.

Article
25 (2) of the 1973 Constitution prohibits discrimination based solely on gender.
Article 27 (1) outlaws discrimination against qualified candidates for federal
service solely on the basis of gender. Among the Principles of State Policy,
Article 34 states that:

"Steps shall be taken to
ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national
life".

The 1973 Constitution also
provides for universal adult suffrage and reserves a certain number of seats for
women in the National Assembly and regional assemblies in addition to their
right to compete for non-reserved seats. Unfortunately these provisions have
been contested and their practical value diminished in variety of
ways.

The Council of Islamic
Ideology was one of the institutional mechanisms that tended to diminish the
value of constitutional protections for women's rights. According to Article 230
(1) (c) of the 1973 Constitution, this Council is authorized to "make
recommendations as to the measures for bringing existing laws into conformity
with the Injunctions of Islam and the stages by which such measures should be
brought into effect. This mandate was taken seriously throughout the Zia ul-Haq
period during which the Council played an active role in the implementation of
policies of Islamization.

One component of the new
Education Policy adopted by Zia's regime in 1978 was the progressive segregation
of men and women in higher education and the establishment of separate women's
universities. As one observer commented:

"Such an eventuality could
not but have disastrous repercussions on both women's higher education and their
career opportunities. At a time when women were breaking ground in new fields –
for instance, engineering, town planning, architecture, aeronautics – a women's
university could not possibly offer these subjects to the few pioneers then
undertaking them in a co-educational institution". (Hussain, The Struggle of
Women in the National Development of Pakistan, in Muslim Women 198,
210-211)

Pakistani women have been
concerned with the implications of the policy of Islamization for their careers
and successfully have protested against encroachments on their role in public
life. Zia ul-Haq's regime did show some sensitivity to protests and demands by
women's organizations. He appointed the first female cabinet secretary in
Pakistan's history, and later appointed a female minister of
state.

In 1979 he established a
Women's Division within his cabinet whose activities included co-sponsoring of a
conference which recommended the elimination of stereotyping of women in
textbooks, the projection of a more responsible and positive image of women in
national life, and greater representation of women in educational administration
and policy-making. In response to protests by the All Pakistan Women's
Association and seventeen other women's groups against instructions by the
Minister of Information restricting the appearance of female models in
commercial advertising, Zia's regime declared that it "had no intention
whatsoever to debar them (women) from taking an active part in national
affairs”.

With the election of
Benazir Bhutto as the first female Prime Minister of Pakistan, one expected more
action in support of women's right to public life. Nevertheless, one must not
underestimate the power of the proponents of Shari'a in Pakistan or any other
Muslim country. Neither women's organizations nor politicians can afford to
disregard or downplay the Islamic factor. Numerous studies show that a variety
of economic and social factors contribute to the current status and rights of
women in the Muslim world and to their own perceptions of and reactions to their
situation. But these studies also emphasize, in one way or another, the Islamic
dimensions of these same factors.

The Islamization slogan
appears to have aroused considerable excitement and enthusiasm in Pakistan. Even
the Pakistan People's Party, presently in power after the death of Zia ul-Haq,
has declared its commitment to Islamization policy and continues to compete with
the Islamic parties in this regard. But there are problems, as one observer
noted:

The matter, however,
becomes complicated and contentious when an attempt is made to translate the
slogan into actual policies. Not much imagination is required to realize that
the vision of an Islamic social order entertained by the Ulema (Ulama,
traditional religious scholars) differs radically from that envisaged by
educated and articulate women. But even Sunni politicians of the
religious-oriented parties are by no means unanimous in their conception of an
Islamic state.

This comment applies
throughout the Muslim world, including Iran where differences exist among Shi'a
politicians. Educated women and other modernist segments of society may not be
able to articulate their vision of an Islamic state in terms of Shari'a, because
aspects of Shari'a are incompatible with certain concepts and institutions which
these groups take for granted, including the protection of all human rights. To
the extent that efforts for the protection and promotion of human rights in the
Muslim world must take into account the Islamic dimension of the political and
sociological situation in Muslim countries, a modernist conception of Islam in
needed.

Islamic Reform and Human
Rights

I have referred several
times to the need for Islamic reform to protect and promote human rights in the
Muslim world. Such reforms must be sufficient to resolve human rights problems
with Shari'a while maintaining legitimacy from the Islamic point of view. On the
one hand, it is futile to advocate reforms which are unlikely to be acceptable
to Muslims as satisfying the religious criteria of Islamic
reform.

Islamic reform needs must
be based on the Qur'an and Sunna, the primary source of Islam. Although Muslims
believe that the Qur'an is the literal and final word of God, and Sunna are the
traditions of his final Prophet, they also appreciate that these sources have to
be understood and applied through human interpretation and action. As I have
pointed out above, these sources have been interpreted by the founding jurists
of Shari'a and applied throughout Muslim history. Because those interpretations
were developed by Muslim jurists in the past, it should be possible for modern
jurists to advance alternative interpretations of the Qur'an and
Sunna.

An Adequate Reform
Methodology

I have elsewhere argued
extensively for this position and advanced a specific reform methodology which I
believe would achieve the necessary degree of reform. The basic premise of my
position, based on the word of the late Sudanese Muslim reformer Ustadh Mahmoud
Mohammed Taha, is that the Shari'a reflects a historically-conditioned
interpretation of Islamic scriptures in the sense that the founding jurists had
to understand those sources in accordance with their own social, economic, and
political circumstances.

In relation to the status
and rights of women, for example, equality between men and women in the eighth
and ninth centuries in the Middle East, or anywhere else at the time, would have
been inconceivable and impracticable. It was therefore natural and indeed
inevitable that Muslim jurists would understand the relevant texts of the Qur'an
and Sunna as confirming rather than repudiating the realities of the
day.

In interpreting the primary
sources of Islamic in their historical context, the founding jurists of Shari'a
tended not only to understand the Qur'an and Sunna as confirming existing social
attitudes and institutions, but also to emphasize certain texts and "enact" them
into Shari'a while de-emphasising other texts or interpreting them in ways
consistent with what they believed to be the intent and purpose of the sources.
Working with the same primary sources, modern Muslim jurists might shift
emphasis from one class of texts to the other, and interpret the previously
enacted texts in ways consistent with a new understanding of what is believed to
be the intent and purpose of the sources.

This new understanding
would be informed by contemporary social, economic and political circumstances
in the same way that the "old" understanding on which Shari'a jurists acted was
informed by the then prevailing circumstances. The new understanding would
qualify for Islamic legitimacy, in my view, if it is based on specific texts in
opposing the application of other texts, and can be shown to be in accordance
with the Qur'an and Sunna as a whole.

For example, the general
principle of qawama, the guardianship and authority of men over women under
Shari'a, is based on verse 4:34 of the Qur'an quoted earlier. This verse
presents qawama as a consequence of two conditions: men's advantage over and
financial support of women.

The fact that men are
generally physically stronger than most women is not relevant in modern times
where the rule of law prevails over physical might. Moreover, modern
circumstances are making the economic independence of women from men more
readily realized and appreciated. In other words, neither of the conditions -
advantages of physical might or earning power - set by verse 4:34 as the
justification for the qawama of men over women is tenable
today.

Neither of the conditions
or advantages of physical might or earning power-set by verse 4:34 as the
justification for the qawama of men over women is tenable
today.

The fundamental position of
the modern human rights movement is that all human beings are equal in worth and
dignity, regardless of gender, religion, or race. This position can be
substantiated by the Qur'an and other Islamic sources, as understood under the
radically transformed circumstances of the day. For example, in numerous verses
the Qur'an speaks of honor and dignity for "humankind" and "children of Adam",
without distinction as to race, color, gender, or religion. By drawing on these
sources and being willing to set aside archaic and dated interpretations of
other sources, we can provide Islamic legitimacy for the full range of human
rights for women.

Similarly numerous verses
in the Qur'an provide for freedom of choice and non-compulsion in religious
belief and conscience. These verses have been either de-emphasized as having
been "overruled" by other verses which were understood to legitimize coercion.
Women's and human rights organizations could therefore rely on those verses of
the Qur'an which extol freedom of religion rather than those that legitimize
religious coercion. For example, verse 9:29 of the Qur'an was taken as the
foundation of the whole of dhimma, and its consequent discrimination
against non-Muslims.

Relying on those verses
which extol freedom of religion rather than those that legitimize religious
coercion, one can argue that the dhimma system should no longer be part
of Islamic law and that complete equality should be assured regardless of
religion or belief.

The same argument can be
used to abolish all negative legal consequences of apostasy as inconsistent with
the Islamic principle of freedom of religion.

Reference has been made to
the possible need to challenge some jurisprudential techniques of Shari'a in
order to implement the necessary degree of reform. One of the main mechanisms
for development and reform within the framework of Shari'a is
ijtihad-independent juristic reasoning to provide for new principles and
rules of Shari'a in situations on which the Qur'an and Sunna were silent. By
virtue of its rationale and textual support, ijtihad was not supposed to
be exercised in any matter governed by clear and categorical texts of Qur'an
and/or Sunna because that would amount to substituting juristic reasoning for
the fundamental sources of Islam. According to the prevailing view in Shari'a,
ijtihad should not be exercised even in matters settled through
ijma, (consensus).

Some of the problematic
aspects of Shari'a identified in this Article, however, are based on clear and
categorical texts of Qur'an and Sunna. To achieve the necessary degree of
reform, I would therefore suggest that the scope of ijtihadbe expanded to enable modern Muslim
jurists not only to change rules settled through ijma, but also to
substitute previously enacted texts with other, more general, texts of Qur'an
and Sunna despite the categorical nature of the prior texts. This proposal is
not radical as it may seem because the proposed new rule would also be based on
the Qur'an or Sunna, albeit on a new interpretation of the text. For example,
the above-mentioned categorical verse 9:29 regulating the status of non-Muslims
would be superseded by the more general verses providing for freedom of religion
and inherent dignity of all human beings without distinction as to faith or
belief.

I believe that the choice
of texts to be implemented as modern Islamic Shari'a is systematic and not
arbitrary; it is based on the timing and circumstances of revelation as well as
the relationship of the text to the themes and objectives of Islam as a whole.
Moreover, I maintain that the proposed reinterpretation is consistent with
normal Arabic usage and apparent sense of the text. It is neither contrived nor
strained. The ultimate test of legitimacy and efficacy is, of course, acceptance
and implementation by Muslims throughout the world.

Prospects for Acceptance and Likely Impact of the
Proposed Reform

In addition to this
methodology's own Islamic legitimacy and cohesion, at least two main factors are
likely to affect the acceptance and implementation of this or any other reform.
It must be timely, addressing urgent concerns and issues facing Muslim
societies, and it must be disseminated and discussed in Muslim countries. I
believe that my proposal will be acceptable to Muslim peoples if offered in an
effective and organized manner. Paradoxical as it may seem, I suspect that the
proposal may face difficulties of dissemination and discussion precisely because
it is timely.

This proposal is timely
because Muslims throughout the world are sensitive to charges that their
religious law and cultural traditions permit and legitimize human rights
violations; hence the efforts of contemporary Muslim authors to dispel such
allegations. Governments of Muslim countries, like many other governments
formally subscribe to international human rights instruments because, in my
view, they find the human rights idea an important legitimizing force both at
home and abroad. Moreover, as explained earlier, many emerging women's
organizations and modernist forces are now asserting and articulating their
demands for justice and equality in terms of international human rights
standards.

Nevertheless, the proposed
reform will probably be resisted because it challenges the vested interests of
powerful forces in the Muslim world and may upset male-dominated traditional
political and social institutions. These forces probably will try to restrict
opportunities for a genuine consideration of this reform methodology. It is
equally likely that they will attempt to obstruct its acceptance and
implementation in the name of Islamic orthodoxy. Proponents of Shari'a will also
resist it because it challenges their view of the good Muslim society and the
ideal Islamic state.

Consequently, the
acceptance and implementation of this reform methodology will involve a
political struggle within Muslim nations as part of a larger general struggle
for human rights.

I would recommend this
proposal to participants in that struggle who champion the cause of justice and
equality for women and non-Muslims, and freedom of belief and expression in the
Muslim world. Given the extreme importance of Islamic legitimacy in Muslim
societies, I urge human rights advocates to claim the Islamic platform and not
concede it to the traditionalist and fundamentalist forces in their societies. I
would also invite outside supporters of Muslim human rights advocates to express
their support with due sensitivity and genuine concern for Islamic legitimacy in
the Muslim world.

As I have tried to show
throughout this Article, the problematic aspects of Shari'a are not the sole
underlying causes of human rights violations in the Muslim world. Other
extra-Islamic structural and socio-economic factors also contribute to human
rights problems. But the primary objectives of this Article have
been:

(1) to address the extent
to which Shari'a-related factors contribute to human rights violations in the
Muslim world; and

(2) to propose a way of
overcoming that particular dimension of the status of human rights in the Muslim
world.

Conclusion

This Article began with the
general premise that human rights violations reflect the lack or weakness of
cultural legitimacy of international standards in a particular society. In
accordance with this premise, because Shari'a, as the accepted version of the
law of Islam, is inconsistent with certain human rights, those rights probably
will be violated in the Muslim world, regardless of formal participation in
international human rights instruments. This is likely to occur even if Shari'a
is not constituted as the formal legal system of the country in question. As a
religious and ethical code, Shari'a has far-reaching political and social
influence, irrespective of its official legal status in Muslim countries. The
evidence reviewed above from case studies of several Muslim countries
illustrates Shari'a's extensive influence under very different cultural and
legal conditions.

Therefore, because Muslim
countries are more likely to honor those human rights standards which have
Islamic legitimacy, human rights advocates should struggle to have their
interpretations of the scriptural imperatives of Islam accepted as valid and
appropriate for application today. Authority for this re-intepretive activity
comes from the fact that contemporary majority perspectives on Shari'a are not
necessarily the only valid interpretations of the scriptural imperatives of
Islam, a fact which was recognized by some modernist Muslim reformers.
Unfortunately, little has been done so far to develop a comprehensive reform
methodology. In terms of human rights concerns there has been little effort to
reconcile Islamic law with fundamental human rights, especially in relation to
women and non-Muslims. Reform efforts have so far been confined to the family
law area, and even there they have tended to be inadequate and open to reversal.
A much more comprehensive and effective reform methodology is required to
provide genuine and lasting Islamic legitimacy for human rights in the Muslim
countries.

In the final part of this
Article, I have explained briefly what I believe to be an adequate Islamic
reform methodology aimed at achieving greater legitimacy for human rights in the
Muslim world. As indicated in that section, however, this methodology does not
offer an easy or quick solution to all human rights problems. In fact, strong
resistance can be expected not only from those with vested interest in the
status quo, but also from some of the beneficiaries of the proposed reforms. For
example, some educated women are Islamic fundamentalists. Nor do I suggest that
reformulating Shari'a alone will alleviate all human rights violations. Economic
and other factors and forces must also be addressed. Yet, the extent of
observance of human rights standards in any country is affected by prevailing
attitudes and conceptions regarding who is a human being entitled to the full
range of human rights. In the Muslim context, these attitudes and conceptions
are significantly influenced by commonly held views concerning the scriptural
imperatives of Islam.

Rethinking these scriptural
imperatives is therefore one critical strategy for advancing human rights in
Muslim countries. Human rights advocates have few allies in most parts of the
world, including almost all Muslim countries. They need to enlist the support of
powerful cultural and religious forces. Support will come if they look for it in
an intelligent and sensitive manner.