Risks of the strike reflex

Unions must rethink this war on the government's core policy agenda – it is no ordinary employer

It was a lost opportunity for unions when they didn't follow up on Brendan Barber's 2010 speech critiquing the cuts agenda. Photograph: Geoff Moore / Rex Features Geoff Moore / Rex Features/Geoff Moore / Rex Features

There are certain reflex actions that kick in for the trade union movement as soon as the Conservative party wins an election. First, the rhetoric is turned up to max. Then the demonstrations get organised. And sooner or later strikes are called. When the Conservative party takes office with a very long list of spending cuts in its back pocket, the reflex actions respond even more quickly than usual.

The problem with reflexes, though, is that they don't much involve the brain. The unions have in effect declared war on the government's core policy agenda without any consideration of whether they can actually win. Or what the consequences of loss might be. The unions believe that the strike weapon is their ultimate power – a weapon that regularly brings employers to the negotiating table to accede to union demands.

But the government is no ordinary employer. Not only does it have the weapons of legislative, regulatory and media power at its fingertips, it also cannot be seen to lose this battle. David Cameron and George Osborne know they risk losing their biggest advantage over Labour – their economic credibility – if they significantly water down any aspect of the cuts programme in the face of strong-arm union tactics. It would blast a hole through Osborne's argument that dedication to fiscal probity must be resolute and unswerving.

So the government may just about tolerate one or two days of co-ordinated industrial action, but if the momentum behind wider and longer strikes grows, the full might of the media will undoubtedly be employed to swing public opinion firmly against the unions.

And this is the weakness of the union position, and where lack of strategic thinking shows. Unions tend to overestimate the power of their industrial muscle and underestimate the importance of public opinion. So the highest profile union leaders trot out the line that not a single cut is necessary. This position is so incredible to most of the public that it provides no basis on which to build a broad coalition that could persuade the government to revise its plans in the face of pressure from the group with the real power – the electorate.

Nor could the "not a single cut" demand ever be achieved. None of the main parties is remotely committed to such a policy. And the consequences for the UK's financial standing would be so severe that the result would simply be cuts imposed by outside bodies.

The stakes for the unions are very high now. The government has been crystal clear about how it will punish the unions if they let the strikes escalate. New legislation will be crafted to further tighten Britain's already restrictive labour laws, making it close to impossible to go on strike. An emboldened coalition may also restrict union freedom to recruit members or make political donations. If the unions think parliament or the wider public will defend them against such a move they are deluded.

One day unions may recognise that they threw away an opportunity to force the coalition on to the back foot in September 2010. That was when Brendan Barber, the TUC general secretary, made a speech critiquing the cuts agenda that genuinely shaped public debate. The speech won plaudits from usually hostile columnists for voicing the concerns of a public increasingly nervous about the impact of cuts. In effect he gave the unions a chance to influence broad opinion. Since then resources have been poured into demonstrations and strike ballots that either leave most of the public cold or actively alienate them.

It is possible that the unions could rethink their approach once the strike on 30 June is out of the way, but controlling one's deepest reflexes is never easy.