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Eturbonewsreports that, at 1:50 pm on 29 October 2018, a female suicide bomber, most likely Tunisia’s first (Muir Analytics is conducting research to confirm), detonated her explosives on the pedestrian walkway on Habib Bourguiba Avenue between the Municipal Theater of Tunis and the El Hana International Tunis hotel. The hotel did not suffer damage. The apparent target of the bomber was a police checkpoint that was next to a police van. Brinkwire reported that Tunisian Interior Minister Hichem Fourati said the detonation injured 15 police officers and five civilians.

(Muir Analytics conducted a photographic and video analysis to pinpoint the apparent seat of the blast. If additional data causes this to change, Muir Analytics will adjust its analysis. The Mirrorhas a photograph of the deceased bomber – pixilated as to blur the woman’s wounds – lying directly in front of the El Hana hotel. Specifically, it is the second photo in the article with the title, “Forensic officers carry out an investigation after the blast.” The building in the background is the hotel. More, STL News has an Associated Press photo of the bomber laying near a long, rectangular tree planter, which are the only type of tree planter that flank the sides of the pedestrian walkway on Habib Bourguiba avenue. These key analytical data points, among others, support the estimated blast location).

Al Jazeera described the explosive device as a “handmade grenade,” and that pictures of the bomber showed an intact body of a “veiled woman who appeared to be dead wearing dark trousers, a pink top and a short dark jacket.” The wounds she suffered appeared on her stomach and left hip.

Al Arabiya sent reporters to the home of the bomber in Sidi Alouane town, Mahdia Governorate, along the east coast of Tunisia. Her name was Mona Guebla (also spelled, Mouna Kebla). Her parents said she was quiet, single, a dedicated student, and exhibited no outward signs of Islamist jihadist ideology. The Tunisian government said she was not on any terrorist watch list.

Some pundits have suggested Guebla’s attack on the police might have been motivated by her inability to find a job, which might have pushed her into radical Islamism.

The Tunisian government said the attack was an isolated incident.

Youssef Chahed, Tunisia’s Prime Minister, denounced the attack. He moreover said that the Tunisian population had to rally to the cause of counterterrorism and help prevent such attacks: “Far from being exclusive to the security apparatus, the fight against terrorism remains a responsibility for all Tunisian people.”

In 2015, ISIS staged punishing attacks on tourists at the Bardo Museum in Tunis and at the Riu Imperial Marhaba Hotel in Sousse. Muir Analytics covered these attacks here, here, and here. Smaller attacks preceded and followed these more spectacular operations. Since then, the government launched counter terror operations that forced Islamist jihadist cells into hiding, and the movement became an insurgency (a rural based movement that is trying to overthrow the government) where radicals and government forces clash on occasion, mostly in the countryside. Militants ambushed and killed six police in July 2018, for example. Small contingents of foreign forces, including US Special Operations Forces, are supporting Tunisia in this fight.

Insurgent and terror cells in Tunisia are largely, but not exclusively, comprised of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian branch, the Uqba ibn Nafaa Battalion (KUBN), and various factions of ISIS.

Hassine Dimassi, political analyst at Sousse University, said of the suicide bombing, “One lesson to gather is that we need to strengthen the intelligence apparatus. Extremists seem to have lost momentum recently, and that’s when they resort to this kind of action to mark their presence taking advantage of a loosening of grip on security forces.”

This suicide bombing follows scores of news outlets running stories heralding British and international tourists returning to Tunisia after the deadly Sousse hotel attack chased them away and caused a two-year collapse of the tourism-hotel sector. Similar types of stories ran just after the much more destructive Bardo Museum attack in 2015, and then the Sousse hotel attack followed months later.

There have been at least five terror operations in Tunisia in the past few years where the attackers either blew themselves up via suicide bombs or conducted raids where they intentionally fought to the death as the 2008 Mumbai terrorists did.

There are three takeaways here. First, tactically, the attack was a marginal success regarding destruction. Despite the high number of wounded – which cannot be dismissed – no one but the bomber was killed, and buildings and vehicles were not destroyed or severely damaged. The bomber’s device apparently used a small amount of explosives or a weak compound. The technical indication is that the bombmaker had minimal skill sets. An experienced bombmaker probably would have built a more destructive device, especially since the delivery was by suicide bomber.

Second, several data points strongly suggest this was an Islamist jihadist motivated operation.

Because this was a suicide bomb operation, the bomber was truly dedicated, and her handlers were as well. Given that the main hostile groups in Tunisia are Islamist jihadist, and because these groups are prone to suicide attacks, Islamist jihadism was the likely ideological driver in this case.

Since the primary target set was the Tunisian police, and since the secondary target set was civilians in a public/tourist space, these two factors support the supposition that this was done by Islamist jihadists. Attacking police serves to undermine the state’s ability to maintain law and order, which undermines confidence in the government. Attacking civilians in a public/tourist space produces shock, horror, and injures both Tunisia’s tourist economy and its and local economy. These are end goals of Tunisia’s Islamist jihadist insurgent/terror movements.

Using women as suicide bombers is a growing trend, especially, but not exclusively, with ISIS. For years before the arrival of ISIS, the biggest streams of female suicide bombers came from Palestinian groups attacking Israel, or widows of Chechnyan fighters attacking Russia. ISIS, however, has surged the use of women in successful terror attacks (and several failed operations) in Southeast Asia in the past 12 plus months. It is likely ISIS or al Qaeda did the same in Tunis.

Third, because Tunisia’s insurgency is fully functional, and because it still has a demonstrated ability to attack urban tourist targets, Tunisia’s tourist sector remains at risk. This includes the hotel sector. This is true despite Tunisia’s increase of security in urban and tourist areas. Using female suicide bombers (or fighters) widens terrorist options in attacking such targets. Moreover, just because there has not been a major, punishing attack on tourists and local civilians in Tunisia since 2015 does not mean these movements are defeated or completely at bay. ISIS and al Qaeda are continually operating in country, and they are patient and methodical. And, since PM Chahed said in a public announcement said that it was the responsibility of the entire population to help the government prevent terrorism, the government is saying, without reservation, that it is facing an insurgency, and it is attempting to harness the population to serve as added eyes and ears to report on such threats before they come to fruition.

The war in the Philippines by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), has heated up over the last many months, and more violence is to come unless the NPA suffers a death blow, or unless on/off again peace talks actually achieve traction. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) have widened patrols, dragnets, and investigations targeting key CPP and NPA personnel. The CPP has increased its political activism, and the NPA has intensified attacks on civilian and military/police targets.

CPP-NPA origins

The current communist movement in the Philippines has its origins in the Hukbalahap (aka, “Huks”) communist rebellion in the post WW II era. This movement was defeated, but chronic socio-economic problems and government illegitimacy issues persisted (pockets of illegitimacy, not total illegitimacy), and a communist resurgence, via the CPP, happened in 1968. The NPA formed in 1969. In the 1980s, the CPP had a peak of 30,000 members, and the NPA had up to 26,000 fighters.

The CPP-NPA’s longstanding mission has been to: a) overthrow the Philippine government, b) establish a communist state, and, c) purge the country of “imperialist” U.S. influence. Their method is Maoist people’s war where the population is mobilized as both a political juggernaut and an army against the state. The CPP-NPA war has killed as many as 40,000 people since it began.

CPP-NPA current status

Because of long running government counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and reduced popular support, the NPA currently has an estimated 3,000 – 5,000 fighters, says various reporting. The movement remain tenacious, however. The CPP has infiltrated the government and society, and it has some degree of support because of the previously mentioned socio-economic and government legitimacy issues, including widespread corruption.

ABS-CBN News reports that in 2017, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte concluded that the CPP-NPA had abandoned its most radical goals, and was instead attempting to form a coalition government with Manila, which caused him to cease peace talks in November. Power sharing with a Maoist political party touting Maoist goals is unacceptable to the president and his government. Indicators of this strategic shift resulted from the CPP-NPA proposing domestic reform programs such as their Comprehensive Agreement on Socio-Economic Reforms (CASER) plan while also continuing to bomb, assassinate, raid, and torch businesses, and also pressure the government to release hundreds of CPP-NPA prisoners.

This is a far place from when President Duterte first took office. At that time, he not only sought peace talks with the communists, he offered some to serve in his cabinet. A left leaning populist, he is roughly paralleling the policies of former President Ramon Magsaysay (1953-57) who also served as Secretary of Defense (1950-53). Aside from dramatically increasing the efficiency and professionalism of the AFP’s COIN against the communists, Magsaysay also tackled government corruption and poverty, thereby increasing government legitimacy in the process. As a result of all these factors, the Huks were defeated.

GMA News says that one of the initial keys to CPP-NPA peace talks was the personal relationship Duterte had with CPP founder Joma Sison, now living in the Netherlands. Sison was one of Duterte’s college professors and a mentor. Because of continued CPP-NPA operations, however, particularly during the ISIS-related Maute Group’s bloody seizure and occupation of Marawi, their relationship deteriorated, and they now despise each other and trade verbal barbs in the press. The specter of their public feud is made more sensational by Duterte’s frequently outlandish verbal style.

Recent political maneuvering

Because of the communists’ violent operations, says the Inquirer, Duterte on 5 December 2017 issued a decree labeling the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization. While the Supreme Court has to make it official, the decree will be acted on, nevertheless.

Rappler reports that the terrorist designation came after the government asserted the communists had committed 385 atrocities in Mindanao, which resulted in 41 military and security personnel killed, along with 23 civilians, including a 4-month-old infant. The government, moreover, cited 59 arson incidents in Mindanao alone, resulting in $38.4 million in damages.

The NPA has been active for well over a decade, as demonstrated by its raids on major commercial mining operations in October 2011, so its capacity for violence is not new. Its increased operational tempo, tenacity, and political warfare rhetoric have dramatically increased since 2017, however. Below are select examples:

4 February 2018, Sison claimed, “The NPA in 17 regions has actually the capacity of knocking out at least one AFP soldier every day per region. That eliminates at least 510 enemy troops or some five companies every month.That translates to the elimination of some 60 companies or 20 basic battalions every year.”

22 March 2018, the AFP confirmed that the NPA’s “Sparu” assassination squads had been reactivated. Sparu stands for Special Partisan Unit, and they have been referred to by some defense commentators as “sparrow” squads. Philippine National Police Chief Director General Ronald dela Rosa said most of the units are operating in Northern Mindanao, Davao Region, Soccsksargen, and Caraga. There were 56 Sparu-related incidents in 2017 and nine as of spring 2018.

26 April 2018, in Lupon, Davao Oriental, the NPA’s 6th Pulang Bagani Company ambushed a platoon of the Philippine Army’s 28th Infantry Battalion. The NPA said after the ambush, the Army retaliated by firing artillery at civilian farms and houses in San Isidro and Likop in Mati City.

28 April 2018, the NPA carried out three operations: 1) in Barangay Marayag in Lupon town, the NPA’s Comval-Davao Gulf Sub-Regional Command attacked the Army’s 28th Infantry Battalion; 2) in Barangay Marayag in Lupon town, it attacked the army’s 72nd Infantry Battalion, and, 3) on the Compostela Valley-Davao Oriental national highway, it set up a mobile checkpoint looking for anti-communist elements.

10 May 2018, a five-man team of the NPA’s Leonardo Panaligan Command set fire to a six-wheeler truck at Barangay Magallon Cadre in Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, as farm workers were unloading fertilizer from it. Damage was estimated at $14,995.31.

11 May 2018, the NPA assassinated Roland Gonzales of Sitio Balunggay in Barangay Guinpana-an, Moises Padilla town. The NPA accused Gonzales of being associated with the assassination of a local communist leader, Jerry Turga. The Sun Starsays that there have been 26 political killings in Negros in 2018.

21 May 2018 an IED exploded in Sitio Patawon, Barangay Cabuyuan, Mabini, Compostela Valley, wounding five Philippine Army troopers of the 46th Infantry Battalion. They were on a blocking force mission in support of a larger sweep operation when the explosion happened. The army suspected the culprits were the NPA’s Milisyang Bayan, Guerilla Front 2, Sub-Regional Committee 2 of the greater Southern Mindanao Regional Committee.

30 May 2018, 26 fighters from the NPA’s Pulang Bagani Command 8 raided Adam’s Haven Mountain Resort in Barangay Ompao in the town of Tarragona and torched equipment and infrastructure there, including a power generator, an electric steel cutter, and a multicab vehicle. The NPA said the owner had failed to pay them “taxes,” which are actually extortion fees. Damage done amounted to $11,246.48.

1 June 2018, an assassination team of the NPA’s Pulang Bagani Company 4 and Section Committee 3 shot and killed Datu Laurelio Tilacan while traveling to his farm in Bollukan village in Laak town, Compostela Valley province. Tilacan was of the Ata-Manobo tribe. Authorities believe he and other assassinated Ata-Manobo tribal leaders have been murdered because they would not join/support the NPA.

29 November 2017, government forces received intelligence on an NPA convoy moving through the Nasugbu area of Batangas, and they set up checkpoints to capture their quarry. The communists opened fire at a checkpoint between the villages of Aga and Kaylaway on the Tagaytay-Nasugbu highway. This resulted in a several-kilometer chase and rolling shootout, which ended with 15 fighters and high-level leadership killed – specifically, officials of the NPA’s Western Batangas Command.

31 January 2018, as a result of a surveillance mission, Philippine forces captured a top CPP official, 69-year old Rafael Baylosis, and an aide in Quezon City, Manila. Both were reportedly armed with .45 cal. pistols. Baylosis was on secondment to the communist front group, the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, as a consultant and lawyer at the time of capture, and his detention sent shockwaves through the communist movement.

6 March 2018, 188 NPA rebels of the Far South Mindanao Region, including its deputy secretary and spokesman, attended a surrender ceremony at AFP Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City. These and other NPA surrenders turned themselves in to the government in January and February. These followed over 500 NPA personnel who had earlier surrendered in several batches.

9 March 2018, the government released its 600-person NPA terror list.

7 April 2018, two ex-NPA fighters joined the Philippine Army’s 1st Infantry Division (aka, Team Tabak, or Tabak Division), which specializes in COIN and counter terror in Western Mindanao. The ex-NPA troopers are part of a class of 736 new, diverse soldiers of Christian and Muslim faiths, plus several ethnic groups such as persons from the Subanen tribe native to the Zamboanga Peninsula.

15 April 2018, acting on local intelligence, troopers of the Philippines Army’s 75th Infantry Battalion raided an NPA camp in Barangay Bunawan Brook in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, and recovered the following: a rifle grenade, an M-14 rifle, an AK-47, ammunition, six IEDs, six blasting caps, three radio batteries, 315 pieces (presumably “chubs” or “sticks”) of Super Dyne explosives (a rock cutting compound), 450 meters of electrical wire, a multi-media projector, a generator, 28 gallons of rice, medical supplies, and military uniforms.

20 May 2018, the Sun Star reported that Director General Oscar Albayalde, Chief of the PNP, ordered police in Negros Occidental to increase physical security of infrastructure and vulnerable civilian areas to protect against NPA attacks throughout the province. Police are also slated to undergo paramilitary training to upgrade their combat capabilities. Chief Albayalde also told police to widen their community outreach programs and engage in dialogue with the CPP-NPA and its supporters to reduce violence in the area.

30 May 2018, based on local intelligence, the Philippine Army’s 15th Infantry Battalion captured senior NPA tax collector, Bobby Pedro of the Armando Sumayang Jr. Command, in Ilog, Negros Occidental. He had in his possession a 9mm pistol, propaganda documents, cash, and a cell phone.

31 May 2018, police arrested NPA finance committee chief of Mindanao (Komisyon Mindanao), Nerita de Castro, in the Emenville Subdivision, Ambago village. She was also Acting Secretary of the Regional White Area Committee of North Eastern Mindanao. De Castro recently took over the post on the heels of the arrest of her predecessor, Leonida Guao, on 2 February 2018. Lieutenant General Benjamin Madrigal, Jr., AFP Eastern Mindanao Command Chief, said of the arrest: “The Command commends the inter-agency effort and the cooperation of the communities. Indeed, we can go after high ranking personalities of the NPA terrorist group and accomplish our tasks easily if we continue to put our acts together. This accomplishment will have an impact in our effort to bring peace in our communities.”

There are six takeaways here. First – and this has been the case for many years – the NPA has highly effective tactical and operational prowess. It can execute full spectrum insurgent and terror operations such as bombings, ambushes, raids, and assassinations. It has excellent logistics, communications, intelligence, and financial abilities. As evidenced by its sophisticated command structure, the NPA is highly organized and has wide geographic reach throughout the Philippines. It is a force to be reckoned with.

Second, having said the above, because of the multitude of senior leadership arrested, the NPA is suffering badly from a lack of operational security. This could be from compromised communications channels, or deteriorating relations with the local populace, or government informants in the midst of their ranks, or all of these. As a consequence, and also because of point three below, the CPP-NPA threat to eliminate “20 basic battalions every year” is highly unlikely to happen.

Third, based on their successful capture of multiple NPA top officials and effectual military operations, Philippine security forces have dramatically increased the effectiveness of their intelligence and Direct Action capabilities. The many impressive government operations mentioned above would not have been possible, otherwise. The government goal of reducing NPA numbers by half in 2018 is a tall order, but not impossible.

Fourth, because Police Chief Albayalde has urged upgrades in PNP capabilities and community outreach, and because Lieutenant General Madrigal has stated that the government’s inter-agency effort and local communities needed to continue cooperating – and “get their acts together” – the indication is that the government’s COIN against the CPP-NPA is not a solid, countrywide program, yet. The inference is that this process needs to expand and mature to show continued and amplified results.

Fifth, because both the Philippine government and the CPP-NPA have decisively declared that war is the method they will use to settle their differences, and because both sides have committed forces in the field and aggressively engaged in combat, this war will continue into the foreseeable future, unless peace talks actually happen and achieve traction.

Sixth, because the Philippine government has to date committed effective COIN methods and resources to this war, and because it appears to be improving these methods and resources, the ever-shrinking communists’ ranks puts the CPP-NPA at a disadvantage. Adding to this, while President Duterte appears outlandish to many in the international community, his Magsaysay-type programs and attitude – minus Magsaysay’s polish – have earned him tremendous political capital, domestically. Through this, he is able to counter some of the ideological planks of the CPP-NPA movement. The surrender of hundreds of NPA fighters and supporters adds credence to this supposition. The communist movement is feeling extreme pressure.

What then, happens next? Several things might happen. As stated, the war could easily continue on its current track for the near and intermediate term. While the government has the upper hand, the NPA does have several thousand fighters, and it has its high capabilities and excellent organization. Government victory is not assured.

On the other hand, if the CPP-NPA continues to be pressured by the government’s COIN operations, it might begin to reduce its focus on combat and start to lean toward political methods, as the CASER program and related issues suggest.

At the same time, if a more radical cell of the CPP-NPA becomes incensed by these developments, such a cell could launch dramatic attacks on the government and its security forces in non-combat areas. It could also move more toward terrorism and seek to punish the Philippine population with terror attacks on civilian targets, possibly even tourist targets. While this would be an extreme deviation from current NPA targeting, the arson operation against the Adam’s Haven Mountain Resort in Barangay Ompao demonstrates, at the very least, that the NPA has tourist site targeting proclivities. And it does kill civilians.

Peace talks, then, would likely have a welcome cooling effect on the Philippines’ intensifying communist war.

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The Islamist jihadist war in Egypt increased in intensity throughout 2017. As many as 11 groups, including al Qaeda and ISIS Wilayat Sinai (“ISIS Sinai State,” or “ISIS Province,”) stepped up operations against both security and civilian targets, plunging the country deeper into violence. The government intensified its military and law enforcement operations in insurgent areas, which included raids on enemy hideouts. The following incidents from the first week of the New Year, coupled with major attacks from 2017, demonstrate Egypt’s threat situation heading into 2018.

The BBC reports that on 4 January, the Egyptian Army’s “Law Enforcement Forces” staged a joint operation with the Egyptian Air Force against two Islamist hideouts in central Sinai that killed two militants and arrested two others. Security forces also seized a motorcycle, a four-wheeled vehicle, and what has been described as “large amounts of narcotics.” This operation is but one of many that has been carried out with increased frequency since early 2015.

On the same day, reports the Egypt Independent, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced that Egypt’s existing State of Emergency would be continued into the New Year, pending a yes vote by two thirds of the House of Representatives. The renewed security law is slated to begin on Friday, 13 January 2018. The legislation gives the government extra security powers in its fight against Islamist insurgents, such as longer than normal detention times for captured suspects.

On 2 January, the Egyptian government hanged four militants found guilty of a 2014 attack on military cadets in Kafr el-Sheikh. Just prior to this hanging, the government executed as many as 15 Islamist militants for an attack in 2013 that killed eight soldiers.

On 1 January, The Houstonian reports that Egyptian police had arrested more than 12 foreigners and a few locals involved in an Islamist plot against local and regional targets. The foreigners included Arabs from Tunisia and Syria, two Belgians, nine French citizens, and one American.

These smaller incidents are happening in the wake of scores of larger attacks on civilian targets throughout 2017. Some of these include:

9 April 2017, Palm Sunday, an ISIS suicide bomber attacked St. George’s Church in Tanta, and another bomber attacked St. Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in Alexandria. Combined casualty rates were 45 killed and 126 wounded.

26 May 2017, up to 10 ISIS gunmen staged a roadside ambush in Minya Governorate against a convoy of three vehicles carrying Coptic Christians to the Monastery of Saint Samuel the Confessor. The attack killed as many as 28 and wounded 22. The casualties included women and children. Some of the Coptics were executed when they refused to convert to Islam.

14 July 2017, Abdel-Rahman Shaaban, an ISIS follower, swam from a public beach to a resort beach in Hurghada and initiated a stabbing attack, screaming at “you infidels” as he did so. He killed three and wounded four. All the victims were women. Two of the dead were German, and one was Czech. The rest were German and Armenian. A similar attack was carried out in the same town at the Bella Vista Hotel and Resort on 12 January 2016.

24 November 2017, 40 ISIS gunmen raided the al-Rawda mosque in al-Rawda town, Sinai, during Friday prayers. The al-Rawda is a Sufi mosque, and before the attack, ISIS militants had warned Sufis not to cooperate with the government against local Islamist jihadists who are highly active in the Sinai area. ISIS, who are radical Sunnis, also detest Sufis, who they see as heretic. At any rate, in the course of the melee, the attackers exploded at least three vehicle bombs, which blocked escape routes of those fleeing. They then fired RPGs and assault rifles at the congregation. They also fired on first responders, including ambulances, from specially designated ambush points. The attack killed 311 and wounded 122.

29 December 2017, an ISIS gunman in Helwan attacked the St. Menas Coptic Orthodox Church, plus a nearby shop, killing 11 and wounding about the same number. Authorities killed the attacker before he could use the explosives he brought with him.

To add to Egypt’s fluid situation, on 4 January, ISIS’ Wilayat Sinai declared war on Hamas over its arrests of multiple Islamist jihadist operatives in Gaza over the past year. ISIS was also perturbed at Hamas not being able to stop President Donald Trump moving the US embassy to Jerusalem. World News Israel said ISIS told its followers: “Never surrender to them [Hamas.] Use explosives, silenced pistols, and sticky bombs. Bomb their courts and their security locations, for these are the pillars of tyranny that prop up its throne.”

There are five takeaways here. First, Egypt’s Islamist jihadist war, which began in 2011 but massively picked up momentum with the ousting of Mohamed Morsi’s Islamist government on 2 July 2013, is now in full swing. Since then, scores of different Islamist groups have attacked government and civilian targets in the Sinai area and in cities such as Alexandria and areas around Cairo.

Second, the insurgents’ tactics have been effective against both civilian and government targets. They have no qualms about using military style raids against civilian targets, for example. In fact, they prefer these methods because they result in exceedingly high casualty rates, as the Sufi mosque attack demonstrates.

Third, the civilian targeting in the above cases illustrates the following:

Sufis are attacked in order to:

Deter them from providing the government with local counterinsurgency support

“Purify” the Muslim community in Egypt

Rally and inspire ISIS’s Islamist base

Coptic Christians are attacked in order to:

“Purify” Egypt of “impure” religions

Increase the propensity of a religious war pitting Christians against Muslims

Rally ISIS’s Islamist base

The Hurghada resort was attacked in order to:

Deter foreigners and their “impure” Western ways from visiting Egypt

Severely injure Egypt’s tourist economy

Spread terror amongst the international community and reinforce the bloody reputation of ISIS

All these attack methods and desired effects are standard operating procedure for the Islamist jihadist way of war all over the world. Moreover, in February 2017, ISIS called for attacks on Christians in Egypt, and they have made good on that call.

Fourth, if the government does not increase the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency operations in 2018, Egypt will become a more robust war zone. If left unchecked, ISIS and its allies will be in a position to add to the ongoing Islamist wars in North and West Africa, and they will certainly be positioned to open up a new front against Israel if they chose to do so. Declaring war on Hamas can be perceived as a first step toward this end.

Finally, if ISIS gains momentum in Egypt, it might very well try to establish some kind of caliphate base there in 2018.

Looking ahead, President Sisi has vowed to increase the harshness of government operations against the Islamists, which will draw the ire of international Islamist groups. Because ISIS and its cohorts are exceedingly vicious, however, the Egyptian government will respond in kind. This is part and parcel the way of war in the Middle East. On the other hand, if the government is able to:

Wage a counter Islamist jihadist ideological war;

Use intelligence-driven, focused kinetic operations;

Protect the populations that are targeted by the jihadists – especially those providing intelligence and support to the government…

ISIS’ attack on the Ariana Grande concert in Manchester on 22 May was particularly heinous because it specifically targeted teen and pre-teen girls. It represents some of the most twisted and hateful ideology known to mankind: Islamist jihadism (IJ). Obviously, this was not the first IJ attack on an entertainment or hospitality venue. Nor did it achieve the highest casualty count. But are we aware of how often these types of attacks happen? The following statistics from 2016 – 22 May 2017 help explain the threat and clarify the capabilities and intentions of IJ groups, particularly regarding entertainment/hospitality venues. It is a wakeup call.

To briefly clarify, the following data and analyses apply to IJ attacks only. Select target locations here include entertainment, food/beverage, lodging, and sports venues. Religious structures and shopping sites such as daily markets and malls were excluded.

Timeline: From January 2016 – 22 May 2017, there were 20 IJ attacks on entertainment/hospitality venues around the world. There were at least 17 attacks in 2016, and there have been as many as three so far in 2017. Statistically, this translates to nearly one every month, a solid operational tempo. For this short time period, the trend line is down, but the casualty rates are beginning to creep up (see below).

Casualties: The total number of casualties for this IJ target set during this timeframe was 357 killed, and 1,094 wounded. In military terms, this equals about two companies and a reinforced battalion, respectively. Comparatively, there were multi-day periods during major WW II battles where US forces sustained such casualty rates. But in this ongoing Islamist war, these are civilian casualties, they are spread out over about a year and a half’s time, and they are global. They have a slow, erosionary, and significant impact on society. Over time, such attacks lower societal morale, cause a loss of faith in government and security forces, trigger ethnic and religious tension, increase internal government friction, and divert government spending. These are classic irregular war effects. It is war by attrition, war by exhaustion.

Global attack geography: Geographically, IJ terrorists spread out their attacks on entertainment/hospitality venues during the established timeframe. Europe, Asia, and Africa each suffered five such attacks. In the Americas, there were three, and in the Middle East, there were two. So this is not simply a “Middle East or Muslim problem” that is “over there.” It is global, and it is certainly happening in the West and in developed countries.

Country attack geography: The above geographic conclusions are further bolstered by the data on attacks by country. The US suffered three (Orlando, Florida; Seaside Park, New Jersey; and Columbus, Ohio.) Germany, France, and Somalia each suffered two. Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Thailand, Turkey, and the UK each had one.

Overall tactics applied: IJ terrorists used three types of tactics on entertainment/hospitality venues during the 2016 – 22 May 2017-time period: raids, attacks using explosives, and vehicular homicide.

Raid tactics: Raids consisted of either a single person or a group attacking a location and then escaping or fighting to the death. It takes audacity and the willingness to murder scores of civilians face-to-face to raid an entertainment/hospitality venue.

In seven cases, groups did the attacking, and in four cases, individuals did. The latter, when firearms are involved, are more commonly known as “active shooter” situations.

The 12 June 2016 attack on the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, is a prime example of the latter. Here, a single shooter raided the venue with a semi-automatic rifle, killing 49 and wounding 53.

The 15 January 2016 raid on the Cappuccino restaurant and Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, is an example of a “classic” terrorist raid. Here, as many as six members of AQIM (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) armed with assault rifles and explosives raided the aforementioned cafe and hotel, killing 30 and wounding 56. They also set the hotel on fire.

In most raids, the attackers used firearms and/or a combination of firearms and explosives, like a car bomb and AK-47s. For example, the 1 June 2016 raid on the Ambassador Hotel by a small squad of AK-47 wielding, al Shabaab terrorists began with a massive car bomb. The casualty rate was 13 killed and 40 wounded.

In three raid cases in the given timeframe, however, the terrorists just used edged weapons, like knives and machetes.

As an example, on 12 February 2016, an Islamist jihadist acting alone attacked the Nazareth Restaurant and Deli in Columbus, Ohio, with a machete, injuring four before police shot him. The 1 July 2016 raid on the Holey Artisan Bakery (restaurant) in Dhaka, Bangladesh, however, is also typical. Here, five ISIS-related terrorists took over the venue with firearms, explosives, and knives. Firmly in control, the terrorists methodically slaughtered scores of hostages over several hours until security forces stormed the establishment. The final casualty rate was 20 killed and 50 wounded.

Explosives tactics: Attacks with explosives consisted of suicide bombers, hidden/planted bombs, a two stage bombing that included a vehicle bomb, and a grenade attack. Planted bombs require tradecraft skillsets regarding circumventing/tricking security and surreptitious placement of an explosive device. Suicide bombs require much less. Grenade attacks require speed in the attack and egress.

An example of a grenade attack comes from Kuala Lumpur. Here, on 28 June 2016, two ISIS terrorists on a motorcycle drove up to the Movida night club/sports bar – much of which is open to the street – and hurled in a grenade before speeding off. No one was killed by the blast, but eight were wounded.

Regarding bombings, and besides the Manchester case, on 24 July 2016, a suicide bomber attacked Eugens Weinstube (Eugene’s Wine Bar) in Ansbach, Germany, next to an ongoing music festival, injuring 15.

Vehicular tactics: Vehicular homicides used cars, vans, or trucks to plow through crowds of people. Vehicles and pedestrians, then – two elements common to every society on earth – are all that is needed; that and a murderous ideology. It is a relatively new tactic, and it can achieve high casualty rates. In fact, of all 20 cases cited here, a vehicle attack – the Bastille Day attack in Nice, France – achieved the highest casualty rate: 87 killed, and 434 wounded. (Usually, the street where this attack occurred, the Promenade des Anglais, is a normal street, but at the time of this attack, it had been turned into a festival venue, so it was included in the attack data.)

The broader tactical analysis for all these attacks is this: it is not just the tactic, but also the target, that dictates casualty rates.

Targeting: As for targeting – the person or thing that terrorists want to destroy – there were five cases of attacks on food/beverage venues, four cases of attacks on lodging (one case involved two hotels in a single attack), and two cases of attacks on combined lodging-food/beverage venues. There were three cases of attacks on night clubs/bars, and three cases of attacks on urban common areas like boardwalks and promenades. Examples of the latter include the attack in Nice and the pipe bomb attack on the boardwalk in Seaside Park, New Jersey, during a Marine Corps charity race, which injured no one.

As for the rest of the targets attacked during the 2016 – 22 May 2017 timeframe, there were two attacks on stadiums, and one attack on a museum.

Hotels and restaurants are popular targets in part because civilians in these places are contained in defined spaces, and to terrorists, attacking them is like shooting fish in a barrel. These places are moreover high traffic areas and are regularly full, so the opportunity for attack is nearly always present. The other venues, like stadiums, are packed with civilians on a less frequent basis, and even average event security can dissuade at least some terrorism, so attacks on these places has been less frequent.

Kill rates by venue and tactic: As stated, casualty rates not only depended on the tactic used, but the civilian capacity of the venue – as in, was it packed with unsuspecting people at the time of the attack? Above are the top five attacks that reaped the most number of killed during the 2016 – 22 May 2017 timeframe. Manchester was number six.

Conclusion – understand the tactics, but also master their ideology

The attack on the Manchester Arena was not uncommon regarding the venue itself. (The mass targeting of young girls was, however.) IJ terrorists see entertainment/hospitality locales as high payoff targets, and they will continue attacking them. Their goal in attacking these and other civilian establishments is to break down their targeted societies slowly but surely, and exhaust them into some kind of politico-religious compromise and/or submission, even if it is incrementally over a long period of time.

Additionally, IJ groups might squabble and even kill each other – the temporary ISIS vs. al Qaeda fight in Syria, for example – but they are increasingly seeing their war as united in politico-religious ideology and global end goals. Many nation states, on the other hand, largely see terrorist attacks in general as singular incidents carried out by cells on a per-country basis. The United States is a classic example. It has scores of national security professionals and multitudes of pundits who see terrorism in this regard. Additionally, causing nation state governments to argue amongst themselves – to politically devour themselves – is an effects-based aspect of this strategy, and it is effective. The political fallout and finger pointing after each entertainment/hospitality attack demonstrates this point.

Strategically, allowing such attacks to go unchecked only empowers IJ groups to do more. Simply absorbing these types of attacks and accepting them as “the new norm” is folly as well, not to mention malpractice. Doing so fails to understand the multiple, profound impacts of irregular warfare.

By the time the US entered the Vietnam War in earnest in 1965, for example, communist assassins were already staging about 1,000 assassinations a year throughout South Vietnam. They targeted government civilian administrators, police officers, staunch civilian supporters of the southern government, etc. Society had already been destabilized, and simply fighting the communists with military force was not enough. There needed to be dramatically enhanced intelligence to identify and neutralize the enemy, heightened physical security, and, most importantly, counter political warfare. It was political ideology, after all, that drove the communist assassins to kill.

What is happening around the world now is similar. But instead of a single country like Vietnam, it is global. Tackling this threat requires a full understanding not only of the enemy’s tactics and violent strategy as demonstrated here, but their ideological intentions as well. It took ideology for the Manchester terrorists to build and deploy a suicide bomb against little girls. Aside from improved security across a wide spectrum, it will take a massive counter ideology campaign to help defeat this threat.

The terrorists first detonated a small device at 2:50 pm (other reports say 2:30 pm) 100 meters in front of the store’s main entrance where the parking lot meets the main highway, Nong Chik Road.

Alert Big C security guardslocked down the building immediately after the first blast. They also noticed, as did several shoppers, a pickup truck suspiciously parked too close to the main entrance of the store, so they ushered shoppers to the rear of the building. Minutes later, the main device in the pickup truck exploded.

Blast damage from the main device was severe. Photographs from The Nation show heavy destruction to the façade of the store and the interior of the building that was closest to the seat of the blast. Steel ceiling beams were mangled, multitudes of parked motorbikes were destroyed, glass windows were completely shattered, and fires dotted the property. Concrete load bearing columns, on the other hand, appeared structurally sound.

Big C officials estimated full cleanup and repairs would take at least four weeks. Initial financial damage estimates were $869,817, but remodeling, lost business, and increased security costs could send this figure to over $1 million.

The police investigation into the bombing quickly revealed that the owner of the pickup truck, a canvas worker, was lured to the Ban Mai village mosque (Nong Chik district, Pattani) under the pretense of setting up a tent. Instead, insurgents abducted, tortured, and then executed the man. The bombers then used the victim’s photo ID and truck to access the Big C’s parking lot, which is tightly monitored by CCTV. At least one of the bombers’ faces was captured on CCTV, which helped speed the investigation along.

Regarding the bombs, investigators ascertained that the first device’s explosive compound was gunpowder. It was a timed device, encased in a blue plastic container, and powered by 1.5 and 9-volt batteries, says the Bangkok Post.

Police say the pickup truck bomb was encased in two cooking gas cylinders, one 4 kg, and one 15 kg. Investigators also found a radio-controlled detonation device and a timer. The explosive compound appears to have been gunpowder. It seems that a flammable liquid in a yellow petrol type container was attached to the bomb. Steel rod fragments were also discovered. The entire device weighed approximately 100 kgs.

Authorities say the bombers in this case were part of the same group that had carried out similar attacks in the area, including the bombing of the Southern View Hotel and scores of tourist sites in mid-southern Thailand in August 2016. Muir Analytics covered these attacks here, here, and here.

The accused killer of the canvas worker was supposed to be a reformed insurgent who participated in the “Bring People Home” amnesty-program, which is now under review, said Army Colonel Peerawach Saengthong.

A major Muslim organization in Thailand, the Sheikhul Islam Office, published an open letter condemning the attack.

There are seven takeaways here. First, the two stage bombing, colloquially known as a “double tap,” is a popular and effective tactic of the southern Thai insurgency (and other insurgent/terrorist groups around the globe.) Other notable occasions where the Thai insurgents have used this tactic include, but are not limited to:

The Southern View Hotel, Pattani, 23 August 2016

The CS Pattani Hotel, Pattani, 17 March 2008

The Marina and Riviera Hotels, Narathiwat, 31 December 2007 (New Years Eve)

Second, the insurgency has attacked Big Cs before – including the Pattani Big C – indicating that they are standard on the movement’s target list. Attacking them reaps sensational headlines. Past Big C attacks include:

September 2006, Hat Yai

August 2005, Pattani

March 2012, Pattani

Third, this bombing was meant to kill as many civilians as possible. The small device was meant to draw people out of the store, either as spectators to the scene of the small blast, or as panicked shoppers fleeing the violence. The main device was positioned in a prearranged killing zone and was meant to slice through a crowd. The large size of this device, the flammable liquid, and the severe blast damage done to the store all reinforce the intention of causing a massive kill.

Fourth, the desired mass kill here and the torture/murder of the canvas worker signify anger, rage, bloodlust, and dehumanization of civilians. The group that harbors this psychosis has a taste for killing and will continue until stopped by security forces.

Fifth, the professionalism and cool headedness of the Big C’s security staff kept at least 20 civilians from being killed outright and perhaps 40 or more from being severely wounded.

Sixth, while no counterinsurgency initiatives proceed flawlessly, the breakdown in the intelligence-police chain of command highlighted by National Police Chief Chakthip and the defects in the “Bring People Home” program highlighted by Army Colonel Peerawach indicate weaknesses in some of the government’s counterinsurgency efforts. Whereas amnesty programs are complex, and ill meaning actors will occasionally penetrate them, the intelligence-police chain of command, after 13+ years of warfare, should be operating more efficiently.

Finally, this bombing is but one more example of increasingly audacious attacks on civilian targets, and more can be expected. The presumed responsible party, the BRN or one of its splinters/rogue elements, has seemingly grown weary of its insurgency efforts of setting up a shadow government and engaging in “armed politics” at the local and provincial levels. After over a decade of warfare, it has not produced the desired end goal of secession and statehood. Lashing out against the population via audacious terrorist tactics, or “violent communication,” is this group’s solution to the impasse. This is a strategy used by ISIS as well.­­

The ELN is a Marxist insurgent group that formed in 1964. It seeks to overthrow the government of Colombia and replace it with a communist regime. It has approximately 1,500 fighters. A decade ago, it had over 5,000. The ELN makes liberal use of terrorist tactics.

The ELN and the government entered into peace negotiations on 7 February 2017. This comes on the heels of similar and more promising peace negotiations between the government and Colombia’s biggest insurgent group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) that have actually seen some FARC units disarm and reject violence.

Regarding the ELN’s violence against corporations, Gran Colombia Gold, on 27 February, announced it was suing the government of Colombia for $700 million over “difficulties” maintaining its mining operations. It blamed illegal miners and attacks by the ELN. The company specifically said the insurgent group had “obstructed projects in the Antioquia region” throughout 2016.

Canada-based Gran Colombia Gold mines gold and silver. Its main geographic focus is Colombia where it runs the largest underground gold and silver mines in country via its Segovia (Antioquia department) and Marmato (Caldas department) operations.

As a result of these pipeline attacks, says Bloomberg Quint, Ecopetrol, on 15 February, had to declare a “force majeure” and halt oil exports. In layman’s terms, a force majeure absolves a company from fulfilling its business obligations due to “an act of God,” or unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the company in question.

The ELN has increased operations as of late. On 19 February, it claimed responsibility for a major bombing in Bogota in La Macarena neighborhood just down the street from the city’s main bullfighting ring. The blast killed one, a police officer, and wounded 26. The City Paper Bogota reports that the ELN said it specifically targeted the Mobile Anti-Disturbance Squadron (ESMAD) because it had put down “social protests.”

On 16 February, the ELN bombed the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline in El Carmen (Norte de Santander department), which is near the Venezuelan border, reports Business Insider. The attack temporarily shut down the pipeline, and an insurgent minefield hindered repair operations. On the same day, the ELN kidnapped the father of a local town mayor.

On 14 February, the ELN ambushed a military patrol on the Bogotá-Villavicencio highway in eastern Colombia, wounding two.

There are four takeaways here. First, despite pursuing peace talks and its reduced manpower, the ELN maintains its destructive capabilities and ideological motivation for attacking security, infrastructure, and civilian targets. It is not a significantly weakened organization.

Second, the ELN appears to have adopted a “talk-fight” strategy where it engages in peace talks and simultaneously continues its attacks in order to pressure the government to deliver favorable negotiating terms. Both insurgent and conventional forces have made liberal use of the talk-fight strategy throughout history. Communist forces in particular have used it to good effect; the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, for example.

Third, the corporate shutdowns mentioned here are not surprising given that these companies are operating in a decades-old low intensity conflict zone where thousands have been killed. If anything, it brings into question the business and legal logic of Gran Colombia Gold’s lawsuit and Ecopetrol’s force majeure. It is difficult to comprehend why any company would assume their operations would function normally in such hostile conditions. No government can protect all businesses from highly experienced insurgent armies. In this environment, no action by the ELN should be considered an “act of God.” It is a war zone, and this group has been carrying out these types of attacks for decades.

Fourth, if any legal term applies here, it is “totality of circumstances,” which essentially means, when referring to violent areas, that attacks happen so often that a corporation should take the responsibility to protect itself, and also that it should absorb at least some of the legal and financial downside should attacks happen.

Looking ahead, the ELN is most likely to continue its talk-fight strategy unless the government ceases peace talks and concentrates massively increased and sustained operations against the insurgents. If the ELN receives favorable negotiating terms up front, it might curb or halt its violence until it becomes useful to pressure the government again. Having said this, the ELN has been fervently dedicated to Marxism since the 1960s, and it is an organization steeped in generations of warfare. For these reasons, the ELN could break off peace negotiations at any time.

Companies seeking to do business in Colombia should take note of the situation of these three companies and weigh the costs of doing business in country, which should include a robust security program, relevant legal expertise, and added insurance.

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The Jakarta Globe reports that at 9:00 am on 27 February in Bandung, West Java, a terrorist detonated a bomb next to a park (Pandawa Park,) injuring no one.

As a pack of school kids chased him shouting, “terrorist!,” the bomber made his way to the Arjuna subdistrict government administrative office while laughing at the kids and taunting them with a knife along the way, says Kompas.com. Once in the Arjuna office, all staff escaped, and the terrorist began to set the second floor offices on fire. He shouted at civilians who accosted him, rejected negotiating attempts by police, and demanded that Indonesia’s main counter terror force, Densus 88, release its Islamist prisoners.

Yayat, say police, is also a former terrorist convict, having served two years in prison beginning in 2012 for Islamist terrorist training and related activities in Aceh.

The police are investigating eyewitness accounts that assert that Yayat had an accomplice at the beginning of the attack.

Regarding the bomb, police said it was contained in a pressure cooker, a tactic that both al Qaeda and ISIS have propagated in their online magazines and forums. It was used to great affect in the 15 April 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings. There is no word yet on the compound used, but investigators found copious bomb making materials at Yayat’s home, says Tempo.co.

There are four takeaways here. First, this attack is a continuation of ISIS’ Indonesia campaign, which picked up momentum via a string of small attacks and failed attack attempts in 2016. Muir Analytics reported on them here.

Second, this attack, like others in 2016, was oddly ineffectual. Yayat’s bomb, apparently a low power device, did not seem to target any specific people or a building. On the other hand, he certainly attacked the Arjuna subdistrict office, and he clearly meant to extort the government for release of his terrorist comrades from captivity. Yayat’s actions and words demonstrated that he was a clear and present danger to Indonesian society, but he did not massacre the civilians around him when indeed he could have. This might be a sign that some members of ISIS-related groups are trying to avoid civilian casualties and instead focus on government targets. These groups need society’s support to survive and flourish.

As an aside, there is commentary suggesting that Yayat, despite the deradicalization programs he went through in prison, were none too effective, and that he had trouble reintegrating back into society. If true, his attack might have partly been a “suicide by cop” scenario.

Third, it is significant that Bandung civilians (including high school students,) a) chased the bomber, b) accosted the bomber, and c) secured his motorcycle and ID card, all as the attack was unfolding. These actions were not only brave, they prove that the Indonesian government has successfully mobilized parts of the civilian population to reject Islamist jihadi ideology and act against it as an extension of law enforcement. This is artful counterinsurgency methodology.

Fourth, the fact that the Bandung police were able to both secure the scene and inject its SWAT force into the melee so quickly indicates a high state of counter terrorism readiness on behalf of the state. The entire operation was finished in less than two hours.

Regarding assessments, Muir Analytics’ January 2017 prognostication posted here remains relevant. In short, ISIS related groups are likely to continue small and frequent attacks while attempting intermittent punishing and sensational attacks in order to remain relevant. Yayat’s seemingly timid attitude toward civilian casualties should not be taken as ISIS’ modus operandi. It tried to carry out Bali style attacks in 2016, which would have killed scores of civilians. It will try again.

The Indonesian government will need to continually improve upon its largely successful counter terror and counterinsurgency strategies to keep this from happening. Fervently attacking the Islamist jihadi ideology will be necessary in 2017.

In the final months of 2016, there was a flurry of ISIS-related activity in Indonesia, including, but not limited to, the following:

On 28 August in Medan, Sumatra, a man burst into a Catholic church and stabbed a priest who was leading a service, and then attempted to explode his suicide vest, which failed to detonate properly. Time magazine reports that the priest sustained minor injuries to his arm. Churchgoers subdued the attacker and discovered a pipe bomb and an axe on his person. The attacker’s backpack had an ISIS flag on it along with a note that said, “I love al-Baghdadi,” referring to the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

On 20 October in Jakarta, ABC News and SBS reported that a man placed an ISIS sticker on a traffic police kiosk and then threw a pipe bomb at police manning the post. After the device failed to detonate, the man then attacked officers with a machete, injuring three, including a local police chief. The police shot and killed the attacker. A sweep of the scene found a pipe bomb nearby. Authorities said that the man was affiliated with the radical Islamist group, Daulah Islam (also written as “Daulah Islamiyyah,”) which means “Islamic State.”

On 13 November at 10:20 am in Samarinda, East Kalimantan province, Time magazine reports that a man wearing a “jihad way of life” t-shirt and who was previously convicted of Islamist jihadist terrorism threw a Molotov cocktail at the Oikume Church. The attack killed a child and wounded three others. Authorities tracked down the perpetrator and arrested him and four cohorts for aiding in the attack and for being associated with ISIS.

Additionally, just after the Buddhist temple attack, a bomb threat apparently made by a woman was called into the Paroki Gembala Baik (Good Shepard) Catholic church in Kota Batu, East Java.

On 26 November in Jakarta, police arrested a man named Rio Priatna Wibawa for attempting to bomb multiple targets in Indonesia in support of the Rohingya cause in Myanmar. Rio’s targets included the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta. Rio is alleged to have received guidance and funding from Indonesian ISIS leader Bahrun Naim, who is currently based in Syria. Rio reportedly had a large cache of explosives, including RDX, TNT, HMTD, and possibly TATP. Authorities say that Rio’s cache could have been used to build a bomb more powerful than the 2002 Bali bomb that killed 202 and wounded 209. (This bombing entailed a small device in a nightclub, and a larger one, 2,250 pounds, in a van on the street.)

On 10 December, authorities rounded up a three-person, Bahrun-linked terror cell planning an attack on the changing of the guard at the Presidential Palace in Jakarta. Their plan included using a woman as a suicide bomber, which would have been a first for Indonesia. Police said they were hunting for two more accomplices at the time of the arrest.

On 20 December in Jakarta’s popular tourist district, Ubud (a sub-district of Kedewatan,) a bomb in a backpack was found near a food stall in Jakarta, reports Time magazine. The crude bomb was built of “explosives, fireworks, pipes and nails,” and an ordnance disposal team safely detonated it. The backpack was stolen from a Dutch tourist. A food stall owner discovered the device. A note was found in the backpack with the word “bomb” written on it. (Several news outlets report that, because the device contained fireworks, it must have been a non-threatening incident. Because the police reported that it also contained “low grade explosives,” however, and because the police detonated the device, this was probably a viable bombing attempt. If it were simply a bag of fireworks, the police would have just secured the bag and emptied its contents. Muir Analytics suspects that this bombing attempt was linked to the other Islamist attacks, primarily because there have been multiple such attacks and attempts as of late. Moreover, the government would have pinned this bombing on a non-Islamist jihadist party if it were the case in order to reduce the image of the country being a hotbed of ISIS activity. For example, police on 27 December were quick to blame a possible Islamist bombing attempt in Magelang, Central Java, on an employment dispute involving the leader of the Ponpes Islamic boarding school.)

On 21 December in Tangerang, a city 16 miles west of Jakarta, police counterterrorism unit Densus 88 killed three terrorists and arrested a fourth in a firefight at a militant safe house. Police evacuated the neighborhood after the melee upon discovering multiple bombs on site. Authorities said the bombs were part of a Christmas and/or New Year’s Eve attack plot in Jakarta. They also said this cell was connected to the suicide bomb plot reported on 18 December, thereby making it an ISIS-related incident.

There are seven key takeaways here. First, the terrorists mentioned here, whether coordinated or not, demonstrated good organizational capacity and high motivational fervor. They carried out or attempted a total of nine operations in five months, which is an adequate operational tempo for a relatively new terrorist initiative.

Second, despite the adequate tempo, their overall effectiveness was low. Of these nine operations, only four were executed. Of those not executed, one was foiled in the field, and four were thwarted in the plotting phases. The terrorists were not able to inflict high casualties, though the casualties were still odious. One person was killed, and seven were wounded.

Fourth, tactically, these terrorists relied heavily on explosives. Of the nine operations mentioned here, seven involved explosives, and two involved arson. (It is likely that some of the foiled plots might have involved raids such as the 14 January 2016 attack in Jakarta analyzed by Muir Analytics here.)

Fifth, despite their reliance on explosives, the terrorists’ bombing expertise appears minimal because of at least three failed detonations.

Sixth, the targeting regimen of these terrorists clearly falls in line with traditional Islamist jihadist methodologies, particularly in Indonesia, aimed at destabilizing society and rallying like-minded religious zealots. Three targets entailed religious cleansing (two churches and a Buddhist temple,) at least three targets included the government (the police, the Presidential Palace, and the Myanmar embassy,) and two targets were purely civilian.

Seventh, the Indonesian government has demonstrated considerable counterterror expertise by keeping these ISIS-related operations to a minimum. The fact that the police were able to detect and foil the more ambitious Bali-like plots is highly significant.

Looking forward, in 2017, ISIS in Indonesia will attempt to increase its operations. It needs to correct its low performance record in order to remain relevant, and there is no indication that its motivational fervor has decreased. In fact, it has increased, and not just in Indonesia, but in Southeast Asia, overall. At the same time, Indonesian society writ large has continually rejected Islamist jihad, a key reason the Muslim majority nation has never fallen to a radical clique.

Regarding tactics, because of their lack of success in 2016, and because of the high-powered explosives cache discovered in November, ISIS-related cells can be expected to increase, or attempt to increase, 1) operational security, 2) bombing expertise, and 3) destructive capacity. Using women as bombers and/or fighters, as attempted twice in December 2016, remains a possibility. A widening of tactics beyond bombings is possible as well. This might include hard hitting and highly destructive Mumbai type raids, and/or a more professional version of the 14 January 2016 Jakarta attack. ISIS’ targeting regimen, wide as it is, will probably continue on its present course.

As an aside, it is entirely possible that, because of the many failings mentioned here, ISIS in Indonesia might abandon its ambitious, urban operations for smaller, rural attacks in order to build up more tactical expertise and increase its ideological following. This would represent a Mao-like “countryside first strategy,” which might allow the organization to mature under less pressure from Indonesia’s security forces.

If the Indonesian government stays with the ISIS attack curve as it has been doing, or if it gets ahead of it – which requires added intelligence operations and increased physical security – then protection from more hard-hitting ISIS operations is possible.