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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001506
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PGOVPRELKG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ OPPOSITION MOVING AHEAD WITH NOVEMBER 2
REF: A. BISHKEK 1423
¶B. BISHKEK 1333
¶C. BISHKEK 1316
¶D. BISHKEK 796
¶E. BISHKEK 626
BISHKEK 00001506 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kyrgyz opposition, led by the "For
Reforms" movement, is moving ahead with plans for a mass
rally against the government in Bishkek on November 2.
Opposition leaders say that they will protest in front of the
Kyrgyz White House for an "indefinite" period, until
President Bakiyev either accedes to their demands for reform
or resigns. Talks between the President and opposition on
October 21 broke down in a dispute over logistics, though
opposition leaders tell us there is still a (small) chance
for compromise at a second effort to hold a meeting October
¶27. President Bakiyev will also speak in Parliament on
October 30 about the current political situation and his
proposal for constitutional reform. But a week away from the
planned rally, the rhetoric remains sharp, and neither side
appears to be backing down. Protest organizers have secured
tents and other supplies, and the law enforcement agencies
are planning for crowd control.
¶2. (C) In the run-up to similar protests last April (Ref E)
and May (Ref D), heated rhetoric and the fear of violence
continued right up to the time of the rallies, both of which
were brief and ended peacefully. This time, however,
organizers claim to be better prepared to continue their
protest. We are concerned that events could slip out of
control if adequate preparations are not made to assure that
the rally -- and the reaction to it -- remain non-violent.
Again this time, we are reaching out to all parties --
government, opposition, and law enforcement -- to push for
continued dialogue on needed reform, and to deliver a message
that any protest should remain lawful and non-violent. We
are also coordinating with like-minded embassies in Bishkek
to deliver a consistent message ahead of November 2. Post
will hold an EAC October 30 to assess the security risks.
END SUMMARY.
¶3. (C) A week away from the opposition's planned November 2
protest, we have been meeting with government officials,
protest organizers, law enforcement and security officials,
and other embassies to assess the situation. We have heard a
range of views about what may happen on November 2, and a
range of estimates about how many protesters will show up
(anywhere from 7000 to 35,000). In meetings with DAS
Feigenbaum October 17 and 18, protest organizers Almaz
Atambayev and MP Omurbek Tekebayev blamed President Bakiyev
for provoking the current crisis by monopolizing power and
criminalizing the government, and said they thought the
government might use force against the rally (septel).
Ministry of Interior officials have said that they were
prepared for the rally, but they would not order force
against the protesters. Everyone seems to agree that the
situation is fluid.
Prime Minster Kulov
-------------------
¶4. (C) Prime Minister Kulov told the Ambassador October 25
that the current political situation was unpredictable. The
Parliament and opposition politicians had been scared into
action by the matryoshka scandal (Ref C), which they saw as a
"shot across the bow" by the government, but they but they
had articulated clear goals. The real question was power.
The opposition pushed for constitutional reform; he agreed,
and that is why he had submitted a draft constitution for
consideration. The opposition also had wanted him to
denounce President Bakiyev, and this he would not do. He
characterized For Reforms leaders MP Azimbek Beknazarov as
BISHKEK 00001506 002.2 OF 004
"dangerous," Almaz Atambayev as a "revolutionary," and MP
Melis Eshimkanov as relatively "more sober." Kulov said he
told President Bakiyev that the north-south divide was the
most serious issue facing the country, but the problem could
be fixed through constitutional reform that limited
concentration of power.
¶5. (C) Asked whether he thought the demonstration would
remain peaceful, Kulov said did not exclude the possibility
of a "provocation," but was hopeful that it could be avoided.
While the protesters did not need permission to stage their
rally, erecting tents and yurts on the main square without
permission could create problems. He said he had counseled
the President and the Mayor of Bishkek not to organize any
counter demonstrations ("anti-meeting"). He said he also
warned the opposition that if November 2 led to "anarchy,"
the government might turn to the CSTO for consultations.
Kulov was hopeful that the appearance of Bakiyev and the
government at Parliament on October 30 could help defuse the
situation.
SNB Chairman Sutalinov
----------------------
¶6. (C) SNB Chairman Maj. Gen. Murat Sutalinov told the
Ambassador October 26 said he was taking the November 2
protest very seriously, and was concerned that there could be
trouble. He said that there "definitely" would be no
permission granted to erect yurts and tents, and if the
protesters did so, that would be reason for the police to
move in. He thought that up to 7000 protesters might show
up, many of them paid to be there. He also thought that the
opposition might not be able to control the masses, and that
those coming from outside Bishkek might start looting. He
was scathing about the opposition leaders ("brigands and
agitators"), and he added that a "cycle of revolution" would
not be good for the country. That said, he pledged that his
forces would not take "the first mis-step."
Deputy Interior Minister Suvanaliyev
------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Deputy Interior Minister Maj. Gen. Omurbek Suvanaliyev
spoke frankly and was strongly supportive of the
demonstrators, critical of Bakiyev, and expressed high hopes
that PM Kulov would emerge as the arbiter of compromise. He
told the DCM October 26 that, following the Aksy events of
2002 (in which six civilian protesters were killed, and
low-level militia felt they were blamed), the militia would
"never" fire on the public. Suvanaliyev claimed there was a
consensus "at the highest levels" not to use force against
the demonstrators. For example, Suvanaliyev said he
personally will order that the militia not be armed. Their
job will be to maintain order and, he added, "to protect the
protesters." He downplayed the risk of a provocation by
third parties, but he was concerned that after three or four
days on the square, some protesters might try to storm the
White House over the weekend of November 4-5. In that event,
he could not guarantee how the presidential security service
and National Guard, who will be protecting the White House,
might react. He predicted the opposition could easily put
30,000 people on the streets on November 2.
MP Melis Eshimkanov
-------------------
¶8. (C) Opposition MP and For Reforms leader Melis Eshimkanov
told us October 25 that the situation was in deadlock, with
the opposition and government speaking different languages.
He said that Bakiyev had failed to fulfill his promises on
reform, and that he had brought the country to the situation
in which it was "without law." The matryoshka scandal (Ref
C) had exhausted the patience of the opposition, and Bakiyev
had brushed off their efforts at negotiation. Eshimkanov
BISHKEK 00001506 003.2 OF 004
estimated that 15,000 -- but maybe as many as 35,000 -- would
turn out on November 2. For Reforms had raised money to
provide food and shelter, but people would be coming out of
principle. Eshimkanov said that rally would be lawful, and
they would not storm the White House. While they were
prepared to carry on indefinitely, Eshimkanov thought that
the situation would resolve itself within 2-3 days, as the
opposition had two trump cards. First, Prime Minister Kulov
had promised that he would support the November 2 rally if
the President did not make serious compromises. Second,
Eshimkanov estimated that up to 60 percent of the law
enforcement, defense, and security personnel were "fed up"
with the present government. Eshimkanov said that For
Reforms was discussing security arrangements with law
enforcement officials and local business owners, but he
worried that some "extremists" might take advantage of the
situation to cause trouble. Eshimkanov said that the
opposition also planned to rally at the state television
studios, demanding airtime to address the nation, and he
thought that a clash there was possible.
MP Temir Sariyev
----------------
¶9. (C) For Reforms leader MP Temir Sariyev told us October 26
that Bakiyev was not just stalling reforms, he was
aggressively putting pressure on those who disagreed with
him, including politicians and the media. Sariyev urged the
international community to speak out in favor of
constitutional reform and media freedom. Sariyev said that
Bakiyev's appearance in Parliament on October 30 offered a
chance to convince him to undertake reforms, but if it turned
out to be just a "monologue," then the rally would go
forward. Sariyev predicted that up to 30,000 from different
regions, but mainly the north, would turn out on November 2.
For Reforms planned to ask for television time to convey
their demands to the nation. Sariyev said they were
concerned about possible provocations and planned looting,
but they were meeting with local business owners and were
organizing security patrols to help maintain order during the
rally. Sariyev said that contrary to rumors being spread by
the government, For Reforms had no plans to seize the White
House and it would keep the protest peaceful.
MP Alisher Sabirov
------------------
¶10. (C) Independent MP Alisher Sabirov predicted that each
For Reforms leader would be able to turn out about 1000
people from his district, for a total crowd of 8-10,000 on
November 2. He said the opposition was preparing for a
drawn-out rally, as it has collected approximately 1000
sleeping bags and a large number of tents. He thought that
people were getting worried about the demonstration (some,
according to Sabirov, were arming themselves in case the
demonstration got out of hand), but Sabirov was confident
that nothing would happen on November 2. Much like the run
up to April 29, he believed that both sides would concede to
some of each other's "demands," and move on from there.
Unlike last spring, Sabirov thought that the preparations for
November 2 were disorganized and lack the finances needed to
"motivate" people to appear on Ala-too Square. Sabirov said
the authorities were doing what they could to ease the
situation, such as trying to meet with opposition leaders.
Sabirov said that the constant threat of removing the current
government from power is destabilizing. He thought that the
country should focus more upon the economy and social welfare
of the people.
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C) Although the situation remains fluid in the run-up to
November 2, it appears likely there will be several thousand
BISHKEK 00001506 004.2 OF 004
demonstrators from around the country who will stay through
the weekend, hoping to at least force concessions on reform
from Bakiyev. The Ministry of Interior is not preparing the
police for a violent confrontation; many in the opposition
say the police are on their side. While other security
organizations more loyal to Bakiyev may be tempted to provoke
violence, their options are limited in that they lack
sufficient numbers to deal with large crowds. Some
demonstrators may also seek a confrontation, and there exists
a risk that a small incident could spin out of control and
lead to violence. While we judge this risk to be small at
this time, this is a country where the politics is anything
but predictable.
YOVANOVITCH