Chief
Government Negotiator, Minister Aung Min and Deputy Commander-in-Chief
of the Tatmadaw, General Soe Win, at peace talks with the Restoration
Council of Shan State in Kengtung, 19 May 2012.

The current Myanmar Peace Process is both quite unprecedented and
spectacular. Thirteen ceasefire agreements were signed within a period
of a year – a remarkable achievement. It is also the first time in fifty
years that any Government of Myanmar has seriously attempted to resolve
the ethnic problem that has plagued the nation since independence in
1948.

In the 1990s, ceasefire agreements were made with various ethnic
armed groups but only the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) had a
written and signed document that promised a political dialogue once an
elected government was installed. All others were informal ‘gentlemen’s
agreements’ with the intelligence service that were sealed with a
handshake.

The other differences with the 1990s are not only the fact that the
agreements are committed to paper, but that they are widely reported, to
the extent that sometimes the conflict partners seem to be negotiating
via the media. The process has also attracted international attention
and involvement, and the President himself is officially leading the
negotiations as Chair of the National or Union Peacemaking Committee.
The 1990s were also known for their shady deals which even condoned
illegal activity in exchange for loyalty to the regime. The groups
signing ceasefire agreements today are given facilitation to form
business enterprises to keep their troops fed and clothed, but their
businesses have to conform to the law.

The establishment of a Myanmar Peace Centre within a year, to be a
one-stop service centre for the international community wanting to
support the peace process, and to help the government carry out its
tasks of peacemaking, is also no mean feat.

However, for all its positive achievements, the process is still
flawed. The most serious complaint from the ethnic groups is that both
the President and his Chief Negotiator seem to believe that the core
problem is economic. They seem to think that the economic development of
ethnic regions will solve the problem. While economic development and
job opportunities are important factors, the core problem is political.

Secondly, the President and various government spokespersons have
talked about the ethnic armed groups giving up their arms, forming
political parties, contesting the elections, and once in parliament,
amending the constitution. This seems to be the government’s idea of a
political dialogue to amend the constitution. This is practically
impossible and unacceptable to the ethnic groups. To disarm in 2-3 years
without any political settlement beforehand is out of the question.
Even if an ideal settlement were made, the groups have no guarantee that
they will be elected, and once elected, how will they make any
amendments in a parliament dominated by the military? A political
dialogue, if there is going to be one, has to be extra-parliamentary. It
would then be the government’s responsibility to amend the constitution
accordingly. Given its +90% control of the current parliament, this
should be easy.

Thirdly, the government’s approach is personal and informal. Much is
made of the President’s goodwill and sincerity. Minister Aung Min goes
out of his way to demonstrate his personal commitment and tends to agree
to any proposal to demonstrate his flexibility and willingness to
engage. The ethnic groups are, however, concerned as to whether they are
negotiating with the institution of government or with an individual.
The experience of the KIO serves to illustrate the concern. The KIO
Ceasefire Agreement in 1994 was signed by General Khin Nyunt, the
Intelligence Chief, who later became Prime Minister before he was purged
in 2004. In 2009, that agreement was ignored by Senior-General Than
Shwe when the KIO was told to transform itself into a Border Guard Force
(basically surrender) without any discussion, before the 2010
elections. When the KIO refused, the Tatmadaw launched its offensive in
June 2011. Prior to and during the attacks, ex-general and USDP Member
of Parliament Aung Thaung tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a new
ceasefire with the KIO. In May 2012, Minister Aung Min took over all
negotiations as the Vice-Chair of the Union Peacemaking Working
Committee. When the KIO referred to proposals they had made to Aung
Thaung, Minister Aung Min had no knowledge of them, and the KIO had to
begin from scratch. The ethnic groups want a formal process that will be
honoured by successive governments. They do not want to have to
re-negotiate every time there is a change.

Fourthly, the process to date has been one-sided and top down. The
Government has dictated what the process will look like and what can be
discussed when. The scheduling of talks is tied to Minister Aung Min’s
priorities and availability. The ethnic groups feel that as conflict
partners, they need to be able to jointly negotiate a process and a
timetable.

Fifthly, while the international community has been able to channel
its support to the Government for the peace process through the Myanmar
Peace Centre, a similar channel does not exist for the ethnic
nationalities, putting them at a disadvantage. A mechanism for such
support is needed. However, the ethnic nationalities have to shoulder
some of the blame for not being able to pull together and articulate
their common needs. That said, the Working Group for Ethnic Coordination
is now beginning to function more effectively.

Recent statements by both the Government and ethnic representatives
about negotiations for a ‘Framework Agreement’ for a political dialogue
are encouraging. An early agreement on a ‘Framework’ will definitely put
the Myanmar Peace Process on a firmer footing.

End.

Development of the Myanmar Peace Process

30 March 2011 – In his inaugural speech, President U Thein Sein
stated that his top priority is to build national unity by addressing
the decades of armed conflicts with the ethnic nationalities caused by
dogmatism, sectarian strife and racism.
18 August 2011 – The Government of Myanmar offered to hold peace
talks with the ethnic nationalities armed groups. It was also announced
that it would be a three-step process:

- State Level – Ceasefire Talks, - National Level – Talks, and - Political Dialogue. Many assume that this will be a ‘Panglong-type’ Conference.

Note: It was never clearly defined as to
what constitutes state and national-level talks and how such talks
differ from a political dialogue. In all cases, the negotiators on both
sides at both the state and national-level were the same. The only
difference seemed to have been that state-level talks were held in state
capitals and State Chief Ministers participated. National-level talks
were to be held in Naypyitaw. However, the last CNF national-level talks
were held in Yangon and the Chin State Chief Minister also
participated. In terms of substance, the topics discussed at
national-level talks did not differ from state-level talks. Both levels
of talks included political issues which makes it difficult to see how
they differ from a political dialogue. There also does not seem to be
any consistency as to who gets to meet the President, the
Commander-in-Chief, the Parliamentary Speaker U Thura Shwe Mann, or NLD
leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. These meetings seem to be organized as a
favour by Minister U Aung Min.

23 August 2011 – The Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House, National
Parliament) established the National Races Affairs & Internal Peace
Making Committee to be headed by USDP Member of Parliament ex-general U
Thein Zaw.

1 September 2011 – The Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House, National
Parliament) established the National Races Affairs & Domestic Peace
Committee headed by U San Tun.

Note: The roles of the Parliamentary
Committees were never clearly defined. Two distinct Government
negotiating teams that had nothing to do with the parliament emerged.
There was no clear formal demarcation as to which team would negotiate
with which group. It seemed to depend on who had personal contact with
whom. Rather than working together, the two Government teams also seemed
to have been in competition. One team was led by ex-generals and USDP
MPs, U Aung Thaung and U Thein Zaw, who primary conducted negotiations
with the Kachin Independence Organization, and other groups that
previously had ceasefire agreement with the SPDC regime (with the
exception of ALP). The second team was led by President U Thein Sein’s
envoy, Minister for Rail Transportation ex-Major General U Aung Min.

Karen National Union led by General Officer Commanding the Karen National Liberation Army, General Mutu Sae Po.

Karenni National Progress Party led by Commander-in-Chief General Be Htoo.

Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army South led by Chair and Commander-in-Chief Lieut-General Sao Yawd Serk.

Subsequently, 13 ceasefire agreements were signed with the following organizations:

Date

GoM Negotiator

Organization

Armed men

Leader

Level

3 Nov 2011

Aung Thaung & Thein Zaw

DKBA (Kalo Htoo Baw)

5,000

Saw Lah Pwe

State

2 Dec 2011

Aung Min

RCSS/SSA-S

7,000

Lieut-Gen Sao Yawd Serk

State

6 Sep 2011

Aung Thaung & Thein Zaw

UWSA

30,000

Pao Yu Chang

State

7 Sep 2011

Aung Thaung & Thein Zaw

NDAA

2,000

Sai Lern

State

6 Jan 2012

Aung Min

CNF

100

Dr Zaleithang

State

28 Jan 2012

Aung Min

KNU

5,000

Gen Tamalabaw

State

28 Jan 2012

Aung Thaung & Thein Zaw

SSPP/ SSA-N

1,000

Gen Sao Parng Fa

State

7 Feb 2012

Aung Thaung & Thein Zaw

KNU/ KNLA Peace Council

500

Maj-Gen Htein Maung

State

1 Mar 2012

Aung Min

NMSP

1,500

Nai Taw Mon

State

7 Mar 2012

Aung Min

KNPP

1,000

Abel Tweed

State

5 Apr 2012

Aung Thaung & Thein Zaw

ALP

100

Rey Khaing

State

9 Apr 2012

Aung Thaung & Thein Zaw

NSCN-K

1,000

Khaplang

State

27 Jun 2012

Aung Min

PNLO

10

Hkun Okker

State

9 Dec 2012

Aung Min

CNF

100

Dr Zaleithang

National

3 May 2012 – The Government of Myanmar consolidated its peace-making
efforts by establishing the National or Union Peacemaking Committee
headed by President U Thein Sein and a 52-member Union Peacemaking
Working Committee headed by Vice-President Dr Sai Mauk Hkam (an ethnic
Shan). Minister U Aung Min is a Vice-Chair of the Union Peacemaking
Working Committee, as are Deputy Commander-in-Chief Gen Soe Win and the
Chair of the Pyithu Hluttaw Peacemaking Committee, U Thein Zaw.

26 October 2012 – The President established the Myanmar Peace Centre.

Note: - Ostensibly the MPC is a neutral
centre to promote peace. It has hired independent experts and analysts
to assist in the peace process. But the Presidential decree establishing
the MPC, put it under the authority of President’s Office Minister Aung
Min (formerly Rail Transportation). Given this set-up, it is more of a
super-Ministry. However, since the MPC is also to be a one-stop service
centre for the international community supporting the peace process, a
super-Ministry may be the only way it can fulfil this role. It,
therefore, behoves everybody including the MPC itself to recognize that
it is neither independent nor neutral. End.