April 17, 2006

The (July 7) INR Memo

by emptywheel

Thanks to John Casper for alerting me to a NY Sun article on the INR memo, complete with INR memo attached and check out this file (thanks to William) that includes the INR analyst's notes. The article itself is a piece of work. Josh Gerstein claims that, since almost every paragraph in the memo is marked with some kind of classification, there is no way for a reader to understand that Plame's identity was classified. Even though it pretends to be refuting a WSJ article from last year that first broke the news that the paragraph with Plame's name was marked "secret," it basically supports precisely the WSJ point, that the information was marked as secret.

Update: I'm totally mistaken. As William points out, the two documents appear to be the June 10 and the July 7 versions of the memo. The June 10 one had to have been declassified at an earlier time; neither Fingar nor Silver are still in those positions. And the one difference noted here, at least, is the mention of an INR analyst (who I'm guessing to be the Iran nuclear analyst mentioned frequently in the SSCI Report) has been removed in the July 7 version.

The Return of the Loquacious Luskin

The real straw man constructed in the article, though, comes courtesy of Robert Luskin.

An attorney representing a White House official under scrutiny in
the investigation said yesterday that the broader context of the
document undercuts the idea of a deliberate campaign to expose Ms.
Plame.

"It's something that people got very excited about," the lawyer,
Robert Luskin, said about the earlier reports on the memo. "The fact
that the whole memo was marked this way further substantiates that
nobody involved in discussions of her or her role in sending Mr. Wilson
had the slightest inkling she was in classified status."

[snip]

Mr. Luskin, who represents President Bush's top political aide, Karl
Rove, said Mr. Rove did not see the memo at the time it was issued.

Luskin would like to argue that, since this memo doesn't make Plame's status clear, there couldn't have been a deliberate leak of Plame's identity. He would like you to believe (as he or some other mysterious leaker would have liked you to believe last summer) that the memo is the only source of Plame's identity. At the same time, though, Luskin repeats (and amends, in curious fashion--by "at the time it was issued," does Rove mean June 2003, or July?) Rove's denials that he ever saw the memo.

Well, that's kind of the point, isn't it? There were other ways to find out about Plame that were much more revealing than this memo. As I pointed out, absolutely correctly, nine months ago, the memo couldn't have been the sole source of Novak's leak, because it didn't reveal Plame's identity. Glad to see these folks just now catching up.

In fact, you could argue that this memo exonerates Armitage (if he is the mysterious Mr. X) but not Rove. This is a State document. We know Armitage saw it in July. It has been alleged (with questionable justification, IMO) that Armitage saw it in June. But if he did learn of Plame, he likely learned of it from the INR analyst's notes (we now learn the INR analyst is Douglas Rohn), which apparently didn't reveal Plame's status either. (Note, this accords perfectly with Woodward's version, which has Mr. X telling about Plame's role in WMD, but not her covert status.) So if Armitage found out Plame's identity from these materials, then he--as Luskin points out--might not have realized Plame was covert. Rove, on the other hand, has apparently testified he learned of Plame's identity in some other fashion. Which makes it possible that he learned she was covert in the process.

The Memo

But on to the memo. The description leaked to the AP's diplomatic writer a year ago seems to be largely accurate:

The
memo said Wilson's wife worked for the CIA and suggested her husband go
to Niger because he had contacts there and had served as an American
diplomat in Africa. However, the official said the memo did not say she
worked undercover for the spy agency nor did it identify her as Valerie
Plame, which was her maiden name and cover name at the CIA.

[snip]

The
former State Department official stressed the memo focused on Wilson's
trip and the State Department intelligence bureau's disagreement with
the White House's claim about Iraq trying to get nuclear material. He
said the fact that the CIA officer and Wilson were husband and wife was
largely an incidental reference.

Plame -- who is referred to by her married name, Valerie Wilson, in the
memo -- is mentioned in the second paragraph of the three-page
document, which was written on June 10, 2003, by an analyst in the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), according
to a source who described the memo to The Washington Post.

[snip]

Almost all of the memo is devoted to describing why State Department
intelligence experts did not believe claims that Saddam Hussein had in
the recent past sought to purchase uranium from Niger. Only two
sentences in the seven-sentence paragraph mention Wilson's wife.

[snip]

The memo was drafted June 10, 2003, for Undersecretary of State Marc
Grossman, who asked to be brought up to date on INR's opposition to the
White House view that Hussein was trying to buy uranium in Africa.

[snip]

On July 6, 2003, shortly after Wilson went public on NBC's "Meet the
Press" and in The Post and the New York Times discussing his trip to
Niger, the INR director at the time, Carl W. Ford Jr., was asked to
explain Wilson's statements for Powell, according to sources familiar
with the events. He went back and reprinted the June 10 memo but
changed the addressee from Grossman to Powell.

Though it appears that the first paragraph of the declassified memo may have been added in response to Wilson's op-ed:

This memo summarizes what we have been able to discover about the role that Ambassador Joe Wilson played in the Niger/Iraq uranium story, especially the allegations that INR played a role in his early 2002 trip to Niger and the (non) dissemination of reporting on what he learned. What follows is based on our paper and electronic files; we are confident that these records and the recollections of person involved at the margin are basically accurate but one INR staff member who was most involved is not here (he has been reassigned to REDACTED to guide us through the files and emails. What is clear, however, is that INR was not Ambassador Wilson's point of contact in either the Department or the Intelligence Community, INR did not meet with Wilson after his trip and did not receive any information on his trip and what he learned except what appears to be his reporting cable (his name is not mentioned) disseminated throughout the intelligence and policy communities by CIA. The reporting we have from his trip makes no mention of documents, fraudulent or otherwise.

California Rep. Jane Harman, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence
Committee, has asked the State Department for two different versions of
the memo from its bureau of intelligence and research that discussed
Plame, a congressional aide said.

Update: In fact, if the Pincus/VandeHei article cited below is correct, then there are significant changes from the June 10 release. It's description of the content appears correct. But the details it provides about the Plame mentions are not accurate to this memo.

The Redactions

What is most interesting to me about the memo are the redactions. Best as I can guess from the context, here are the things redacted from the memo:

Information about the genesis of Wilson's trip, particularly details about the February 19 meeting

Details on what appears to be a description of the Italian intelligence report on the forgeries

Details about how the Niger forgeries arrived in the US, which we know to have come through the Nonproliferation office of then-Bolton's department

Details logically leading from the forgeries up to the December 2002 fact sheet, which was developed in Bolton's office by the Non-Proliferation special assistant, and which served to publicize the Niger claims internationally

One bit of information relating to the cable reporting on Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick's and General Fulford's meeting with President Tandja earlier the in 2002

Items 2 and 5 seem to be sources and methods issues. The details about Wilson's trip may relate to Cheney's initial request and to operational details arranged with Wilson at the February 19 meeting. Though, if the Pincus/VandeHei article is completely accurate, then the redaction necessarily includes another reference to Plame; that article specifies, "Only two
sentences in the seven-sentence paragraph mention Wilson's wife." But only one mention of Plame and only four sentences appear in the non-redacted part of that passage. Another possibility, of course, is that this passage got changed in the second draft. Again, if the Pincus/VandeHei article is correct, the Plame mentions appear on the second page of the memo. Which would mean a significant chunk of information has been removed.

Finally, the other two redactions serve to hide John Bolton's and his staff's involvement in Niger intelligence.

Now the presence of two mentions of Bolton's office is significant. I speculated last year that the INR memo would include just these two mentions of Bolton's office's involvement. As I pointed out then, State had hidden Bolton's role in these documents--particularly the fact sheet--before. Most significantly, the presence of two passages relating to Bolton that remain sensitive enough to classify makes it quite likely that Bolton was offered an opportunity to vet this memo. As I suggested last year,

More importantly, if Bolton was involved in the production of the
document, it might mean that he was battling with INR over what to
include. At the least, I suspect Bolton would have tried to remove any
mention and responsibility for the Iraq fact sheet, as someone at State
did for him in September 2002. But it might mean Bolton pushed to
include other details or a particular spin in the memo. And keep in
mind that Fred Fleitz probably knew Valerie Plame and her clandestine
status from his other home at WINPAC.

That is, the inclusion of Bolton's office in this memo, and the continued sensitivity accorded his involvement, increases the likelihood that his office was involved in its production. Which may suggest a range of nefarious involvement by Bolton or Fred Fleitz or David Wurmser.

The Niger Forgeries

Finally, this memo is interesting for the description it gives of the INR reaction to the Niger forgeries. It includes the following descriptions:

These documents, which were sent to Washington via REDACTED Department channels, were not adequately analyzed until much later and were judged to be fraudulent.

[snip]

On January 12, 2003, INR, "expressed concerns to the CIA that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries." The conclusion may, however, have been reached and communicated for the first time somewhat earlier: the record is not clear on this point.

Compare that with these details from the SSCI.

(U) Immediately after receiving the documents, the INR Iraq
nuclear analyst e-mailed IC colleagues offering to provide the
documents at a previously planned meeting of the Nuclear Interdiction
Action Group (NIAG) the following day. The analyst, apparently already
suspicious of the validity of the documents noted in his e-mail,
"you'll note that it bears a funky Emb. of Niger stamp (to make it look
official, I guess)."

(U) The INR Iraq nuclear analyst told Committee staff
that the thing that stood out immediately about the documents was that
a companion document - a document included with the Niger documents
that did not relate to uranium - mentioned some type of military
campaign against major world powers. The members of the alleged
military campaign included both Iraq and Iran, and was, according to
the documents, being orchestrated through the Nigerien Embassy in Rome,
which all struck the analyst as "completely implausible." Because the
stamp on this document matched the stamp on the uranium document, the
analyst thought that all of the documents were likely suspect. The
analyst was unaware at the time of any formatting problems with the
documents or inconsistencies with the names or dates.

(U) On October 16, 2002, INR made copies of the
documents available at the NIAG meeting for attendees, including
representatives from the CIA, DIA, DOE and NSA. Because the analyst who
offered to provide the documents was on leave, the office's senior
analyst provided the documents. She cannot recall how she made the
documents available, but analysts from several agencies, including the
DIA, NSA and DOE, did pick up copies at that meeting. None of the four
CIA representatives recall picking up the documents, however, during
the CIA Inspector General's investigation of this issue, copies of the
documents were found in the DO's CPD vault. It appears that a CPD
representative did pick up the documents at the NIAG meeting, but after
returning to the office, filed them without any further distribution.

[snip]

(U) On January 13, 2003, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst sent an
e-mail to several IC analysts outlining his reasoning why, "the uranium
purchase agreement probably is a hoax." He indicated that one of the
documents that purported to be an agreement for a joint military
campaign, including both Iraq and Iran, was so ridiculous that it was
"clearly a forgery." Because this document had the same alleged stamps
for the Nigerien Embassy in Rome as the uranium documents, the analyst
concluded "that the uranium purchase agreement probably is a forgery."
When the CIA analyst received the e-mail, he realized that WINPAC did
not have copies of the documents and requested copies from INR. CIA
received copies of the foreign language documents on January 16, 2003.

Both versions, of course, avoid all description of what that Iraq nuclear analyst (who is a different INR analyst, btw, than the guy who attended the February 19 meeting with Joe Wilson) was doing about the forgeries between the time he received them and the time he insisted to the CIA that they were BS. But the SSCI makes clear that that analyst suspected immediately that the documents were BS. The State Department's own review document is not only less exact--"the record is not clear"--but it avoids all mention of the INR analyst's initial, very skeptical response.

In other words, even the State Department's internal review buries the very early INR skepticism about those forgeries.

Update: The Analyst's Notes

Just a few more details after reviewing the secret bits the Sun was trying to hide.

First, the cover memo, which appears to be dated June 10, 2003, appears to have been drafted by Neil Silver, cleared by Beth Frisa, and approved by Thomas Fingar. No mention of Carl Ford (who, as we saw in his Bolton testimony, was pretty skeptical about Bolton).

I have described how Beth Frisa backed off criticism of Bolton in her testimony during his nomination hearings. And Fingar has since gotten a very significant promotion, to the National Intelligence Council Chairman (he is rumored to have ties to Condi, but you could also argue, fairly, that since INR was right on most matters leading up to Iraq, and since Negroponte has long-held ties to State, the promotion is logical). Neil Silver, at least in his Bolton testimony, seemed fairly balanced.

Other than that, the most interesting parts of the secret bits reinforce Wilson's story that he learned details from the SISMI intelligence. Rohn's notes explain:

The alleged contract between Niger and Iraq says that Niger will sell Iraq 500 tons of Uranium in two tranches per year. INR explained that would mean somewhere between one sixth and one eighth of the total output of the two mines and that twice a year 25 semi tractor trailers loads of yellow cake would have to be driven down roads where one seldom sees even a bush taxi. In other words, it would be very hard to hide such a shipment.

When the idea of moving the stuff across the desert to Sudan (???) was broached INR responded that while it is not difficult to drive across much of the hard packed flat desert terrain, there are many problems including heat up to 130 degrees F, wear and tear on the vehicles, water, fuel and drifting sand that would make such a trip difficult in the extreme.

Apparently no one in the CIA has ever watched Lawrence of Arabia. From his tone, Rohn apparently thought these guys were wacko, just completely unaware of the realities of African geography.

Speaking of ignorance, I meant to point out above the title of the CIA report on Wilson's trip:

Nigerian, not Nigerien. It could be a simple spelling or transcription error, an error I'm sure I've made a lot over the course of my blogging on this affair. Or it could be that the people who took Wilson's report had absolutely no knowledge of Niger.

Comments

emptywheel,

You're misreading the document I found. It is the original June 10 memo (with the Feb 19, 2002 meeting notes attached). I believe that first page is related to the declassification process. You can actually compare the July 7 version with the June 10 version side by side. So far, the only difference I've found is that Ford removed the part about one analyst being on leave.

Holy shit. That analyst mention is HUGE. That's almost certainly the Iraq nuclear analyst (who was on leave when the Iraq forgeries were passed out). Note he is not named.

This has, from time to time, been speculated to be John Kokal who died in a mysterious suicide at precisely the time the INR memo was first leaked and when the SSCI was fighting over documents, in November 2003.

Ockham and emptywheel -- you two are having a conversation here that's flying way over my head. I've looked at the two versions. I see the different cover sheet. I see the different initials (can't read them in either case). I'm missing how any of it's "HUGE." Huge because Fingar is on the cover sheet and he's gone now? There's no date on the cover sheet--what's to say it isn't as old as the rest of the papers? Or is "Approved INR/PDAS Thomas Fingar" supposed to mean he approved of the declassification redactions recently?

We have two copies of the INR memo. I knew there were two copies from the Jane Harman quote. But I've always expected there to be substantive differences between the two.

Instead, there are only two differences:

Someone besides Carl Ford signed his initials on one of these memos--without even trying to make it look real; I'm guessing it was Fingar, on the June 10 version, who became acting Assistant Secretary of INR after Ford resigned on October 3, 2003. Also, Ford was having health problems, so it may be that he was just absent around June 10 when this was finalized

The mention of an analyst has been removed; I'm guessing that this analyst is the Iraq nuclear analyst mentioned in the later parts of the memo and mentioned repeatedly in the SSCI

So far, no big deal.

Add in this bit. The June 10 version of this was declassified at some earlier time--I'm guessing after October 3, 2003, but before whenever Fingar and Silver moved on (at different times in 2005, I think; both are still in their roles when the testify on the Bolton nomination). We don't know if they're portraying the declassification to be current or not, because the Sun didn't want to publish it. But in any case, the June 10 version had already been declassified (note Fingar has his INR title, not his NIC title) before this declassification.

Thing is, if I'm right and the second analyst is the Iraq nuclear analyst, he was still around in July 2003. He was apparently interviewed by SSCI at least once (though there are several redacted caveats surrounding his mention in the SSCI).

Then there's the fact that the narratives have always described the INR analyst notes being attached to the July 7 version and not on the June 10 version.

Then, finally, there's the discrepancy between the Pincus leak and what we're looking at. It may be that Pincus' sources were just plain wrong. But it's worth noting.

So there's something funny about these two INR memos, beyond just the detail of the INR analyst being removed.

The current person in charge of SPM (Strategic, Proliferation, and Miltiary) is Douglas Spelman. And the title Fingar has listed, PDAS, is Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, which was his role throughout the run-up to war. Looking for his details after Ford left; I don't remember whether he was officially made Assistant Secretary.

A minor point perhaps, but there is one more page on the NYSun web site that does not show up (at least on my computer). It is the cover memo for the July 7 version: http://www.nysun.com/pics/31062_2_0.jpg

This one is approved by a William Wood rather than Thomas Fingar and also has one more line -- Distro: S, D, P, PA

Also - this may be more important - Cecil Turner, commenting on Tom Maguire's blog, noted there may be some significant redactions that have not been marked with boxes. Specifically, it looks like the word "TOP" has been deleted from the space before "SECRET" in many places (though not the appended 2/19 memo). Before paragraph 4, there is a one-letter space between the opening parenthesis and the letter "S", where a "T" has probably been removed.

I think CT is correct. One reason - note the presence of an underlined leading space before "Secret" in several places. Unlike underlined trailing spaces which are common with word processors, that's not something that is likely to happen by accident.

Wheel, honestly I think you're doing fine. I'm just coming up against some of my own limits in terms of keeping all the pieces in my head at once. It's a little frustrating, because I would have been very good at the puzzle aspect of this about twenty-five years ago. But I'm still keenly interested and hoping to make a surprisingly vital contribution at some point and really am coming to Vegas.

Good catch. I think you're right. This doc was orginally Top Secret, but for whatever reason, the declassification authority is trying to hide that info (and I should note, not doing it in a way consistent with FOIA, as there are no exemptions given for the redaction).

Also, there is a HUGE white space between SECRET and ORCON,NOFORN. My limited research into classification markings indicates that these may be sensitive compartamentalized information markings that are missing. Interestingly enough, the fact that the doc is marked ORCON means that it had enough info on sensitive sources and methods that its dissemination needed to be controlled by the originating authority (presumably INR in this case).

The only place that I could see being top secret is in, interestingly enough, the entirely unredacted fourth paragraph that details the info about the NIE. There is clearly some white space before the S (and also a bunch before the ORCON too). This, I would submit is the SCI that only certain people would have been cleared to see. Presumably this is because it relates to the NIE and to the Italian Secret service (sources and methods, and the overall sensitivity of the NIE).

What is strange though, is that the paragraph about Valerie is not given the same sort of SCI control. Which suggests to me that just knowing she worked at CIA and was Joe Wilson's wife wasn't enough to blow her cover. And that Rove found out about it some other way. It just brings us back to the big question, where did Novak get "Valerie Plame" from?

But at the same time I'm struck by the differences between the Pincus article and this memo. If we buy the Pincus article, then either more information appears in the first paragraph (pushing the Plame mention onto the second page) or the redacted portion of the second paragraph has been greatly shortened, and one metion of Plame has been removed. Either someone gave Pincus a whole lot of very specific, almost but not quite correct information (they got the second paragraph right, but not the page on which Plame appears, and possibly not the right number of mentions of Plame or sentences), or this has been altered.

Add in the fact that Ford didn't sign off on both of these, and something's very fishy.

On January 12, 2003, INR, "expressed concerns to the CIA that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries."

(U) On January 13, 2003, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst sent an e-mail to several IC analysts outlining his reasoning why, "the uranium purchase agreement probably is a hoax."

CIA received copies of the foreign language documents on January 16, 2003.

Yet Bush used this bogus info in the SOTU on Jan 28th? WTF? Didn't they claim at one point they didn't have copies of the documents until March, after we started bombing Iraq? Clearly, this analyst saw them, since the "funky Emb. of Niger stamp" is mentioned.

This may be common knowledge to those of you following this closer than I've been (I'm trying!) but I'm amazed how clumsy this administration's lies are, once someone bothers to look at them.

BTW, I'd never heard of John Kokal before today. How the hell could the media have ignored that story?

The more I read about this case the more confused I get. That's not a complaint about the writing here (or the other fine blogs studying this), it's just that every time the pieces start to fall into place, there's a whole 'nuther hunk of bs to figure out what to do with.

I am both confused and, mostly, unilluminated by the documents published today, so I'm happy to hear I am confused on the following point. But I was thinking that while I've yet to get much added insight from the documents, it's interesting to see where this whole mess may have started, and in particular with the ambiguity in the INR analyst's notes, not just the "apparently convened," which is already doubly ambiguous thanks to the "apparently" and thanks to the fact that "convened" can mean both "organized" and just "called to order" (or even "covered preliminaries before the real meeting"), but on top of that the "with the idea that" which can be read as Valerie Wilson's idea or rather the more general point or idea of the meeting. In fact, I read it the latter way. But obviously it was read the former way.

But then, thanks to pollyusa, I noticed that the quotation of the INR analyst's notes in the SSCI report is significantly different from what we've got, and irons out precisely that latter ambiguity. What is the deal with that? The INR analyst's notes appended to the INR memo that we got today reads:

Meeting apparently convened by Valerie Wilson, a CIA WMD managerial typ and the wife of Amb. Joe Wilson, with the idea that the agency and the larger USG could dispatch Joe to Niger to use his contacts there to sort out the Niger/Iraq uranium sale question.

The SSCI report p. 40 has this, with internal quotation:

An INR analyst's notes indicate that the meeting was "apparently convened by [the former ambassador's] wife who had the idea to dispatch [him] to use his contacts to sort out the Iraq-Niger uranium issue."

Similarly, the quotation from the INR analyst's notes further down on 40 differs slightly but significantly from what we got today, leaving out "complete" before "control" in describing the French's control over the entire (a word that is also absent) process.

But the point is that unless this is some other document, it appears that the SSCI simply and flatly misrepresented the INR analyst's notes to make it seem more definitive that it was Plame's idea to dispatch her husband.

the "with the idea that" which can be read as Valerie Wilson's idea or rather the more general point or idea of the meeting. In fact, I read it the latter way. But obviously it was read the former way.

Yeah, I think it was probably meant to be read as the the latter (the more general point or idea of the meeting), but the SSCI not only actually misquotes the INR anaylists meeting notes but does it is a way that could total change the intended meaning.

I looked up convened as well... the word ambiguous was invented for words like this, add apparently and as you put it so well it becomes doubly ambiguous.

Good catch on the other mis-representation of the INR meeting noted in the SSCI report. Certainly interesting.

Side note, I always wondered if Libby wanted Miller to source him as a "hill staffer" hoping that people would think the leaks came from the SSCI investigation which began in June 2003.

I'm not an expert, and I'm not sure this is helpful, but to add to viget and tortoise.

I found this off the document (not sure if obsolete by now): "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information"
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid17.htm There's a list of several markings and their definitions that could be in that redact at the top and bottom of each page.

"10.1 "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR" (ORCON)"

And particular interest to me relating to Cheney's ability to declassify is 10.1.4.

"10.1.4 As this (ORCON)is the most restrictive marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to ensure that 1) that it is only applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and, 2) timely review of requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This marking may be abbreviated "ORCON" or "OC.""

Also:
""NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN)"

It looks like some of that space after "secret" is for "control systems/codewords" as per the Guide to Marking Documents

IMO the thing the SSCI most egregiously left out was Rohn's incredulity that they thought Niger would ship 10 trucks of uranium across Sudan. It's really a testament to how desperate those in CIA were to make this float--and how much they ignored basic logic to make their case.

2. The analyst notes, Notes - Niger/Iraq uranium Meeting CIA, 2/19/06, attached to the INR memo were probably written in the same time period as the INR memo.

3. Jeff is probably exactly right here

I take it the INR analyst (Rohn or whatever) wrote up these notes, possibly on the occasion of the generation of this very memo, but was not present in June or July 2003 to contribute more actively to the understanding the INR memo was supposed to produce.

I think the original CIA claim:

the agency officer identified as talking about Plame's alleged role in arranging Wilson's trip could not have attended the meeting.12/26/03 WaPo

probably refered to Ford as Jeff suggested. Whoever talked to Allen and Milbank probably were told that Carl Ford was the author of the INR memo. I'm guessing that the CIA source for the WaPo article hadn't actually seen the INR memo but was told that Ford was the author. Note the way the quote is phrased, "the agency officer identified as talking about Plame's alleged role".

Note that in the 12/26/03 article the quote refers to "the agency [INR] officer" not the INR analyst

Here are the accounts in the press regarding the INR analyst.

The NYT has it this way

The memorandum was prepared at the State Department, relying on notes by an analyst who was involved in meetings in early 2002NYT 7/16/05

Pincus has it this way in his 7/21/05 article, maybe at this point Pincus was only hearing about the body of the INR memo and not the attached analyst's notes.

The material in the memo about Wilson's wife was based on notes taken by an INR analyst who attended a Feb. 19, 2002, meeting at the CIA where Wilson's intelligence-gathering trip to Niger was discussed.WaPo 7/21/05

Pincus puts the author of the Notes - Niger/Iraq uranium Meeting CIA, 2/19/06 at the meeting in the 10/18/05 article.

Attached to the letter were the notes from the INR analyst who had attended the sessionWaPo 10/18/05

The LA Times article

After a June 12 Washington Post story made reference to the Niger uranium inquiry, Armitage asked intelligence officers in the State Department for more information. He was forwarded a copy of a memo classified "Secret" that included a description of Wilson's trip for the CIA, his findings, a brief description of the origin of the trip and a reference to "Wilson's wife."

The memo was kept in a safe at the State Department along with notes from an analyst who attended the CIA meeting at which Wilson was suggested for the Niger assignment.LA Times 8/25/05

This is an interesting aside, the 7/20/05 AP has this on the INR memo

The June 2003 memo had not gone higher than Grossman until Wilson's op-ed column for The New York TimesAP 7/20/05

If true then Armitage didn't see the memo until well after Woodward was told. However the LA Times article quoted above indicates that Armitage recieved the INR memo in mid June 2003.

One last point...where did the NY Sun get Rohn's name? It doesn't appear on the attachment.

Ok one thing more.. It is great to be able to actually link to something when I reference the INR Memo, simple pleasures.

You asked if the INR Memo was decribed differently in any other articles, I ran across this, Pincus is less specific here.

The letter to Grossman discussed the reasons the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) did not believe the intelligence, which originated from foreign sources, was accurate. It had a paragraph near the beginning, marked "(S)," meaning it was classified secret, describing a meeting at the CIA in February 2002, attended by another INR analyst, where Plame introduced her husband as the person who was to go to Niger.WaPo 10/18/05

My mistake on the next thread (the cover letters are original, not declassification related) supports the idea that Armitage did not receive the INR memo until July. The June 10 does not include any distribution list. But the July 7 includes S (Powell), D (Armitage), P (Grossman), PA (Boucher).

But then, that claim in the LATimes was never very well sourced (it wasn't a quote, and the whole article was multiply sourced) and the one earlier article referencing Armitage didn't make that claim. Someone who sounds like Armitage, though, did say they were arguing about this for quite a while and therefore knew via other means.