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Sunday, May 1, 2016

Sadr Attempts a De-facto Coup in Iraq

By Patrick Martin, Emily Anagnostos, and Rachel Bessette

Key Take-Away: Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr is attempting
to launch a de-facto coup against Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi. The
Sadrist Trend’s protests in the Green Zone constitute an attempt to seize
control of the government process and limit the ability of the government to
physically access the Green Zone. Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr have stormed
the Green Zone and the parliament building and they are refusing to leave. Some
members are setting up tents, indicating that Sadrists will attempt a sit-in in
the Green Zone itself. The Sadrists have not mobilized formal military forces. They
have, however, prevented Iraqi leaders from accessing government buildings and
forced members of the Council of Representatives (CoR) to leave the Green Zone,
attacking several of them as they left. Sadrist demonstrators in the
predominantly Shi’a southern provinces have also stormed offices of the rival
Dawa Party, to which PM Abadi and former PM Nouri al-Maliki belong. There is
potential for intra-Shi’a violence; security forces and Iranian proxy militias,
rivals to the Sadrist Trend, deployed to Baghdad’s southern belts to secure the
area during the commemoration of the death of the Imam al-Kadhim, a major Shi’a
holiday. Meanwhile, security forces could clash with demonstrators or attempt
to forcibly evict them from public spaces. This could also lead to further
instability, while the possibility of an attempted ISIS attack against either
pilgrims or demonstrators remains high.

ISW has tracked developments leading up to this state of
affairs. Additional source materials can be accessed here.

The Council of Representatives (CoR) was scheduled to
convene on April
30 in the presence of PM Abadi in order to continue voting on candidates
for the cabinet reshuffle. A CoR member from the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq’s (ISCI) political party, Mowatin, stated that PM Abadi would announce the
change of five
more ministers in the session for the Ministries of Oil, Trade, Industry,
Transportation, and Construction. However, the session failed to meet quorum.
The Sadrist Trend-affiliated Ahrar Bloc and the Kurdistan Alliance blocs did
not attend the session, nor did any of the members of the rump
parliament, the opposition
bloc within the CoR dominated by supporters of former Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki, PM Abadi’s rival, and the leader of the Wataniya Bloc, Iyad Allawi. The
Sadrist Al-Ahrar Bloc boycotted
the session, claiming that the cabinet reforms were being pursued along
partisan quota lines. Meanwhile, the Kurdish
parties claimed that they supported the reforms but rejected the change of
any Kurdish ministers in the Cabinet, as they have demanded throughout the
reform process. When the session failed to make quorum, CoR Speaker Salim
al-Juburi initially postponed
the session for two hours to allow CoR members to arrive. Juburi soon announced
that the session would be postponed
until May 10, attributing the lack of quorum to the closure of roads in Baghdad
due to security protocol surrounding the commemoration of the Imam al-Kadhim, a
major Shi’a holiday, in Baghdad.

In response, Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced
that he and the Sadrist Trend would suspend
participating in political action for two months. Sadr has been supportive of
PM Abadi’s reforms in the past. Specifically, Sadr and PM Abadi have supported
the creation of a technocratic government. PM Abadi has submitted on multiple
occasions a list of technocrats as nominations for the new cabinet. Only five
out of 22 were selected during the
April 26 CoR session.

Sadrists Storm the Green Zone and the CoR Building

Sadr has since raised the stakes. He stated in a televised
speech that he was “waiting
for the great popular uprising and the major revolution to stop the march
of the corrupt.” His followers stormed the Green Zone, prompted by his statement.
Shortly before the start of the rioting, Sadr reportedly met with Grand
Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, the supreme religious authority in Iraq. The details of the
meeting are not clear, but Sistani may have sought to restrain Sadr and
forestall any outsized response. Alternatively, Sadr may have informed the
Najaf religious establishment of his plans. In either case, the meeting, if it
did take place, was important, but Sadr likely did not coordinate the Green
Zone storming with the religious establishment.

The Sadrist riot devolved into violence. Sadrists stormed the
Green Zone and later the parliament building and damaged the main CoR assembly
hall. They did
not appear to clash with the Kurdish force assigned to protect the CoR.
Sadrist demonstrators also attacked the head of the Fadhila Bloc, Ammar
Tuamah, as he exited the area, along with Aram
Sheikh Muhammad, the Kurdish Deputy CoR Speaker. Kurdish media reported that
Kurdish CoR members Ila Talabani, Erez Abdullah, Ribawar Taha, Rankin Abdullah,
and two others were trapped inside CoR building by rioters, but were evacuated by senior Sadrist Trend
member Hakim al-Zamili, though his presence did not stop Sadrists from assaulting Ila Talabani’s
vehicle. CoR Speaker Juburi strongly denounced
attacks on CoR members. The violence forced PM Abadi and Speaker Juburi to
evacuate temporarily. However, PM Abadi later returned under the heavy
protection of his security detail and the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) to inspect
the damage the rioters caused to the CoR building.

[Above: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi inspects
damage done by rioting Sadrists to the Council of Representatives main room
on April 30.]

Sadr likely intended for the demonstrators to storm the
Green Zone and the CoR building. He had stated this intent in a speech on February
26 in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, warning that the Iraqi people would storm
the Green Zone if reforms failed. On April 29, Kadhim al-Issawi, Sadr’s
security chief, ominously warned that “They continue to impose on your will. Tomorrow is the
date. If they do not respond, then destiny is in your hands. (Approximate
translation)” Pro-Sadr social media also warned on April 29 that they were “off
to the Green [Zone], we will depart shortly.” An aspect of the April 30
riot was therefore planned.

Security Forces Respond

Security forces have made no move to evict the
demonstrators. In fact, a source in Sadr’s office stated that Sadr’s militia
forces were coordinating with the security forces to control
the demonstrations. Although the joint Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and
Sadrist force began moving
protesters out of the CoR building, they have not evicted them from the
Green Zone. Sadr also appears to be keeping his hundreds of supporters in the Green
Zone, where they have amassed in force, particularly around the Grand
Celebration Square. Sadr’s supporters also freely collapsed
blast walls around the Green Zone as part of the riot. Previously, Baghdad
Operations Command (BOC) forces neglected to control Sadrist demonstrators on
March 18, allowing large numbers of them to approach
the Green Zone for the beginning of the first sit-in in front of the Green Zone
gates.

The crisis has sparked panic among the government and
political blocs outside of the Sadrist Trend. President Fuad Masoum called for
an emergency
meeting of the three presidencies – Masoum, Speaker Juburi, and PM Abadi – on
May 1 along with the leaders of political blocs to find a solution to the
crisis. The leaders of the pan-Shi’a political formation of the National
Alliance, meanwhile, met at the home of National Alliance chairman Ibrahim
al-Jaafari, a pro-Iranian figure who is a possible candidate for the
premiership, to discuss solutions to the crisis. Speaker Juburi has reportedly contacted
the heads of political blocs to find a solution. PM Abadi strongly demanded
that demonstrators
not encroach on public or private property or on the grounds of state
institutions, but reaffirmed the right of peaceful demonstrations. He also reassured
Iraq that the situation was under the control of the security forces.

Sadrists Riot in the Green Zone

Over the course of Saturday evening, the security forces
have attempted to control the situation with mixed success. Prior to the
storming of the Green Zone, the security forces closed the entrances to the
city and declared a state of
emergency. They did not move against the demonstrators. Later in the
evening, the situation changed. Security forces completely
closed al-Hasnein Square and al-Hasnein Bridge south of the Green Zone in
the upscale Jadiriyah neighborhood. Reports also emerged that security forces used
tear gas and “heavy
gunfire” at demonstrators near the July
14 Suspension Bridge south of the Green Zone. BOC spokesperson Brig. Gen.
Saad Maan stated that security forces are authorized
to use force to deter attacks on property and civilians.

The Sadrist demonstrators stated a variety of
demands consistent with their nationalist platform. Some were expectedly
anti-American. There were isolated incidents of damaging
American flags. Sadr himself called Vice President Joe Biden’s visit on
April 28 “suspicious”
and requested that the government avoid receiving any similar visits. In
addition, many demonstrators called for expelling Iran, chanting “Iran,
out, out!” as well as denunciations
of Qassim Suleimani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) – Quds Force and Iran’s foremost powerbroker in the region. Other chants
attacked Iranian proxy leader Qais al-Khazali, one of Muqtada’s rivals; former
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki;
and Hanan al-Fatlawi, one of Maliki’s most vocal allies within the CoR and a
prominent leader of the rump parliament movement. These calls indicate
frustration with pro-Iranian elements in the government and a rejection of
Iranian attempts to mediate a solution.

Meanwhile, Sadr’s supporters in smaller numbers began
rioting across the southern provinces, specifically targeting the Dawa Party of
Nouri al-Maliki. The governor of Karbala,
a Dawa Party member, reportedly fled the area following Sadrist demonstrators’ storming of the
Karbala government building. Other reports claimed that Sadrists stormed
the headquarters
of the Dawa Party in al-Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar Province and al-Diwaniyah in
al-Qadisiyah Province, removing and smashing
pictures of Maliki. Sadrists also stormed the headquarters of the Fadhila
Bloc in Diwaniyah and the Diwaniyah government building before heading to
the ISCI headquarters. Security forces in Muthanna and Maysan Provinces,
meanwhile, went
into high alert and emphasized the protection of party facilities. Instability
in the south, an area that does not have a strong ISF presence, will stretch
the security forces even thinner and provide additional opportunities for
instability and violence.

[Above: Sadrist demonstrators attack a Dawa Party
headquarters in Diwaniyah and tear down a poster of Dawa Party leader and
former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on April 30.]

Security Threats

The security situation in Baghdad could deteriorate further if
the demonstrations do not de-escalate, as many Popular Mobilization members
were withdrawing to Baghdad to conduct clearing operations in the southern
Baghdad Belts area to address a growing ISIS threat in the area. The Defense
Ministry had announced, with very poor timing, the start of clearing
operations against ISIS cells in areas south of Baghdad led by the 17th
Iraqi Army (IA) Division, a formation currently tasked with providing security
in Baghdad and the surrounding belts area, with the participation of Popular
Mobilization fighters. These areas south of Baghdad, including northern Babil
Province, have recently experienced a deteriorated security situation due to
ISIS attacks, particularly following the detonation of a massive Vehicle-borne
Improvises Explosive Device (VBIED)
on March 6 that killed at least 60 people and wounded at least 70 others, and
several attempted attacks over
the past week. Several Iranian proxy militias, including the Badr
Organization and Kata’ib
Sayyid al-Shuhada, deployed to the southern Baghdad Belts area for the
operation, though Badr
Organization political bloc leader Qassim al-Araji stated that the forces
were only for the clearing operation and would not enter Baghdad, collide with
demonstrators, or involve themselves in intra-Shi’a fighting. However, one
unconfirmed report posted pictures and suggested that Federal Police, the
Golden Division, and Iranian proxy militia Kata’ib Hezbollah were in the area “in case of
an emergency.”

Meanwhile, there is a risk of an ISIS attack on Sadrist
demonstrators. Thousands of Shi’a pilgrims have been entering Baghdad to
commemorate the death of the Imam al-Kadhim, a major Shi’a holiday falling on
May 3. This had already prompted the security forces to restrict access in many
areas of Baghdad.
ISIS had already taken advantage of the situation by launching a VBIED attack in the predominantly
Shi’a Nahrawan area, southeast of Baghdad, on April 30 prior to the start of
the demonstrations, killing at least 23 people and wounding at least 48 others.
Other attacks included IED
attacks on April 29 targeting pilgrims at a railway station south of
Baghdad, though the attack was foiled. If security continues to deteriorate,
then the demonstrations could stretch the security forces thin and expose the
civilian population to an ISIS spectacular attack.

The security operation south of Baghdad appeared to be
targeted at clearing ISIS from the area in order to protect pilgrims. However,
the concentration of militia and security forces coincides dangerously with the
start of the Sadrist demonstrations. The presence of Iraqi Shi’a militias,
specifically Iranian proxy rivals of Sadr, in the Baghdad area is extremely
dangerous. There is a high potential for violence between Iranian-backed
militias and Sadrist security details and protesters if they encounter one
another. Iran will likely order its proxies to avoid engaging with Sadrist
elements in order to prevent a further escalation of the situation, but violence
remains a possibility. Violence could also occur between the Sadrists and party
elements, security forces, or militias in the southern provinces if
demonstrators continue to attack party facilities and government buildings.

Implications

While the Sadrists dispersed to some extent as the night
wore on, some set up tents in the Green
Zone, signaling a likely sit-in at Grand Celebration Square. Sadr’s office
stated that demonstrations would “wash
away” the political quotas system and corruption from the government, and
his call for a “popular
uprising” is threatening to Iraq’s stability. Sadr could keep his supporters in
the Green Zone and further compromise the area’s security while pressuring the
political blocs to bend to his will and vote in a technocratic cabinet. However,
the political blocs’ resistance to abandoning their control of their cabinet
seats is making the political situation untenable. Sadr may continue to
obstruct the work of the government until he can secure a full cabinet
reshuffle. However, the other political blocs, and Maliki in particular, may
try and retaliate. They may try and convince PM Abadi to unleash the security
forces on the Sadrist demonstrators in order to re-establish order, a scenario
that could see Sadrists clashing violently with the ISF. Worse, party-linked or
Iranian proxy militias could begin clashing with Sadrists, particularly if the
demonstrators continue to try and attack party headquarters in the southern
provinces.

The three presidencies – PM Abadi, Speaker Juburi, and
President Masoum – are slated to meet on May 1 with political bloc leaders to
find a solution to the crisis. It is unclear if the Sadrist Trend will join,
but Sadr is likely to try and use the force of the demonstrations to muscle
concessions out of PM Abadi and the political blocs. Sadr will likely call off
his supporters for another CoR session at some point, but he is unlikely to
withdraw his supporters from the Green Zone without concrete concessions. The
political crisis is likely to continue, and security threats remain potent. Meanwhile,
the Sadrist opposition to U.S., as well as Iranian, participation in any
attempt to mediate the political crisis will limit the U.S.’s ability to
influence events, as the Sadrists could become even more agitated if the U.S.
conducts high profile outreach against their wishes. Meanwhile, the Sadrists’
fierce opposition to Maliki and the Dawa Party threatens to further undermine
the country’s stability; Maliki is unlikely to back down from the challenge
that Sadr has issued and may find a way to retaliate, possibly through force or
by massing his own, admittedly smaller, cadre of supporters in
counter-protests.

It is unclear if Maliki will be able to use a judicial
ruling to his advantage; although Maliki has been able to force the judiciary
to rule in his favor during crises, it has remained distant during recent
events. Notably, the judiciary issued a statement on April 18 that it would
not rule on the events of the CoR, including on the constitutionality of
CoR sessions. This indicates that it was not willing to expose itself with a
controversial statement in favor of Maliki’s supporters within the rump
parliament movement. A judicial ruling thus remains a diminished, though still
possible, method of retaliation by Maliki against Sadr.

The situation is unstable enough to put the U.S. Embassy on
alert, and the U.S. must prepare a contingency plan in case the situation
spirals out of control. Iraq’s political crisis has reached dangerous new
heights that pose a serious threat to the stability of the government, and in
the worst case scenario could also threaten U.S. forces. Negotiations will
continue among political leaders and the current unrest is likely to reduce as
the initial rioting burns out. Nevertheless, if the political blocs cannot come
to an agreement, or if violence or an ISIS spectacular attack against the
demonstrators occurs, the situation could collapse even further. The U.S. must
be prepared for the worst case scenario that sees the political crisis leading
to violence in Baghdad and the potential collapse of PM Abadi’s government and
deploy diplomatic or military assets in order to mitigate the possibility of an
even more disastrous state of affairs.