I understand. It was my understanding that the various bilateral monies the federal government is transferring to provinces and territories will help in some of that project development.

Let me emphasize the point that, with the projects that come forward through the infrastructure bank, the intent is to have no special support or push through the normal regulatory or environmental process. Whatever the respective process of the jurisdiction is, it will be ensured that those will be followed very closely. Sometimes those are lengthy, rigorous, and at times costly, but there's no intent for any special expediting.

What I was starting to say is that the context of that deficit also applies to our electricity industry, in that up until 2030, just to replace what we have now has been estimated at $350 billion, but it's going to be a bigger bill. That's number one.

Also, we have to send every single rate request through a regulator, which means that one of the risks is getting every cent of that $350 billion through regulation.

Third, the problem is that, when we go to the regulator with innovation pilots, usually they get turned down because overwhelmingly the regulator is trying to keep costs down, which we feel is absolutely legitimate. However, then when our industry goes to the federal and provincial governments, they tell us we're not innovating enough.

I'm not actually asking about the instrument, with respect. I am asking what the risk is, because you used the term “de-risk” about a dozen times in your submission. It's not clear to me what exactly the risk is that you are trying to de-risk. If I could give you an example, is it that these projects could go over cost?

No. I'll give you an example. What we said in our submission was that we think we should utilize all those financing opportunities available. For example, one of our members, Nova Scotia Power, under Emera, supported by a loan guarantee of the federal government, was able to have this Maritime link going from Churchill Falls and linking Newfoundland for the first time to the North American grid. It was a $1.3-billion project. Without loan guarantees from the federal government that provide the spark plug, such projects don't normally happen—

We do that all the time. All we're saying is that sometimes, particularly in smaller communities, you can't do the transformative things all through the rate base. Therefore, the government has to have a mixed tool box to also use the tax base to overcome the limits of a rate base.

The reason this is important is that earlier Ms. Watts was trying to ascertain what this bank would do that can't already be done. Mr. Campbell was very honest. He said that it is a tool to underwrite. Underwriting means that the person whose name it is written under is responsible for the risk. This is a $35-billion taxpayer-funded underwriter, which means that the taxpayer will be responsible in the event that there are cost overruns or revenue shortfalls. The only difference, the only thing new in this is that we are nationalizing, not privatizing actually but nationalizing, something that's currently private.

In the event that Mr. Marchi's clients, whom he represents, go over budget without a loan guarantee, the lender loses that money. However, under this new proposal, the taxpayers lose the money because they would be the underwriter, according to Mr. Campbell. That's what we have here that's new, a gigantic nationalization of the financial risk of infrastructure projects.

Under the status quo, municipalities can sign fixed-price contracts with builders. If those builders go over budget, they eat the extra cost, unless they have a loan guarantee from the government, in which case the taxpayer would pick up that cost. In my riding, a builder went bankrupt while he was building a bridge. The good news is that there was a private guarantor who picked up the cost and finished the project at no extra cost to taxpayers. A loan guarantee from the taxpayer would have transferred that risk back onto the government.

I have a very direct question for Mr. Campbell. If a company takes a loan to build infrastructure, receives a loan guarantee, and defaults on the loan and there is a default loss—that is, any collateral left is sold and there is still loss—