Mrs. Stewart, plaintiff-appellee, fell down in the lobby of an
office building owned and maintained by Daben Realty Co., Inc.
(Daben). A jury awarded her $47,000.00 for her injuries. Daben
appeals, contending (1) the evidence of negligence is
insufficient, and (2) that it was error to exclude the proffered
testimony of an expert concerning the result of co-efficient-of-friction
tests he had made. We affirm.

The evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the
injured plaintiff-appellee establish the following facts:

On the date of the accident, July 23, 1965, defendant-appellant
Daben's entire office building was under lease to the United
States Department of Agriculture, or more particularly the Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation of which Mrs. Stewart was an employee.
Her place of work was Room 105 of the leased building at 311
West Washington Street,

Indianapolis. Room 105 was on the ground floor and opened directly
into the lobby. There was a door between the lobby and the said
office room but no threshold or similar structural feature separated
the lobby floor from the office floor. Both floors were covered
with square asphalt tile of undisclosed size. The lobby floor
was waxed and polished to a high sheen. The floor just inside
the doorway of Room 105 was dirty, spotty, gritty and sticky.
It was cleaned and waxed much less often than the lobby floor.

On the day of the accident Mrs. Stewart was 59 years of age,
had no physical deformities and was in good health. She was wearing
two year old sandal type shoes with one and one-quarter inch
shaped heels (bigger at the top and tapered at the bottom). Her
fall occurred at approximately 4:30 P.M. as she was leaving work
carrying mail (6-8 envelopes), her purse, sunglasses and a pair
of shoes in a sack. She described her fall thusly:

"I stepped out from our part of the office, and I don't think
I ever took that second step even. The first step and both feet
were out and I fell on my hip."

It was stipulated that Daben, pursuant to the provisions of the
lease, was obligated to maintain all the floors throughout the
buildings.

The only evidence that the lobby itself was improperly waxed is
its description by plaintiff's witnesses as being shiny, slick,
highly polished, and expressions to that general effect. Were
we persuaded by defendant's contention that only the lobby floor's
condition is an issue in this case we would be inclined to hold
that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a jury finding
of negligence. But we are not so persuaded. We hold that the
jury was entitled to consider the condition of the lobby floor
and the condition of the floor in the doorway of Room 105
from which the plaintiff took the step in which plaintiff
said "both feet went out and I fell on my hip."

With respect to the condition of the floor in the office doorway
defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to
warrant a jury finding that it was dirty, spotty and gritty.
What defendant challenges is its relevance. In its reply brief
defendant analyzes some sixteen cases cited by plaintiff and
reaches this Conclusion:

"In all of the above cases where an invitee fell on a spot which
was different from the surrounding floor area, the evidence
demonstrated that the spot was one of excessive wax or oil, or
even a foreign substance such as water, or was a spot caused
by the particular defendant's improper application of wax or
oil, or its failure to follow proper instructions on floor maintenance.
To the contrary in the case at bar, the floor area which plaintiff
described as being dirty, spotty, and gritty, was not the area
where plaintiff fell. She fell in the lobby area with which she
was quite familiar. The lobby floor area, separated from plaintiff's
office area by the entrance door, was not an area where plaintiff
had reason to expect a condition of one kind but was met by another."

To the extent that the foregoing comment suggests that plaintiff
may have been contributorily negligent it is outside
defendant's assignment of errors (i.e., the specifications
of the motion to correct errors) which went only to the sufficiency
of the evidence of defendant's negligence.

The only reason we find in defendant's argument for excluding
the doorway area from the area where plaintiff fell is that the
lobby floor area was separated from the office area by the door.
What difference that opened door makes to the person who steps
from the gritty doorway onto the highly polished lobby area is
not pointed out. But if it was relevant, the jury was also entitled
to consider the fact that the two areas were covered by the same
asphalt tile material and that there was no threshold separating
the two spaces.

"At the Conclusion of the game, she arose and took four or five
steps across the floor, whereupon, to use her words as a witness,
'my left foot flew right straight out in front of me. I felt
the ball of it hit something slick and it flew right straight
out in front of me * * * and when I came to the realization of
what happened I was on the floor. * * * flat on my back, * *
*.' She observed the floor around her; it was more shiny than
the rest.

"We have heretofore recognized that waxing of a floor
is not negligence per se.
Stephens v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
7 Cir., 212 F. 2d 260.
However, waxing of a floor, within the holding in
Stephens,
means a proper waxing. It does not encompass an application of wax
lacking uniformity in distribution, which results in inconspicuous
slick spots upon which an ordinary careful walker might slip.
The jury might reasonably have found from the evidence introduced
by plaintiff in this case that the waxing had been done in a
negligent manner and that as a proximate result thereof plaintiff fell
while exercising ordinary care." (298 F. 2d at 47.)

Bearing in mind that plaintiff's contributory negligence
is not here in issue and that the polished condition of the
lobby floor was not inconspicuous, we believe the federal court of
appeals' comments are nevertheless applicable here. The jury
could reasonably have found that, as compared to the floor whence
plaintiff stepped into the lobby, the tile onto which she
stepped was slick and that because of that contrast there was
a dangerous lack of uniformity in the maintenance of the
floor over which plaintiff was required to walk going to
and from her place of work.

The second issue is presented by this specification of error
in defendant's motion to correct errors:

"4. Error committed by the Court during trial in refusing to
permit defendant's expert witness, William A. SerVaas, to testify as
to the results of his tests for coefficient of friction conducted
on the surface of defendant's floor under like or similar circumstances
existing at the time the plaintiff allegedly fell on defendant's
floor."

Nowhere in the motion nor in appellant's brief is the question
or the plaintiff's objection set out, either in substance of
verbatim.

Trial Rule 59(B) requires that "[t]he statement of claimed errors
[in the motion to correct errors] shall be specific rather than
general. . . ." This rule, we believe, preserves the pre-existing
case law requirement that:

"'In order to preserve for review the refusal of the court to
permit a witness to answer a question on direct examination,
the motion for new trial must show the question, the objection,
and the offer to prove what evidence would have been given by
the witness in answer to the question.'
Blackard v. Monarch's, etc. Inc.
(1961), 131 Ind. App. 514, 521, 169 N.E.2d 735, 97
A.L.R. 2d 1255."
City of South Bend v. Fink
(1966), 139 Ind. App. 282, 288, 219 N.E.2d 441, 445.

Appellant's failure to comply with the rule results in nothing
being presented to us for review. But we may note that appellant's
argument fails to convince us, as it apparently failed to convince
the trial Judge, that the condition of the floor at the time
the tests were made was substantially similar to its
condition at the time of the fall, some five and one-half
years earlier. Whatever may have been
the form of the question, we are satisfied the court did not
err in refusing to allow it to be answered.