As Part Two of a Guide to American Immigration Politics, this
post provides background to Part One (130202.) We start from how
the immigration issue arose in late 2012 after the November 2012
election, providing more leads to both media commentary and
academic analysis. Then we sketch the complexity of the immigration
issue, which includes economic, identity, and security aspects.
Finally we note the historical development of academic approaches
to American immigration politics: from self-congratulatory to
self-critical to more neutrally analytical. As usual, readers are
invited to proceed only as far as their interests take them.

(Recent progress in academic scholarship on immigration politics
has been so extraordinary that we include many references to it.
For the current best general political science introduction to
American immigration politics, see Daniel J. Tichenor
2002Dividing lines : The politics of immigration control in
America. Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press, 378
pages.)

LATE 2012 1

The 2012 election put immigration squarely onto the Washington
agenda of both parties (see Ronald Brownstein 121207 “Immigration
reform is back on the agenda” at nationaljournal.com.)

Partisan tactics 1.1

The 2012 election warned the Republican party that, if it wants
to win the presidency in the future, it must moderate the harsh
anti-immigrant stance that radical Republicans imposed on the party
and presidential candidate in 2012, contributing greatly to
Romney’s loss. Even quite conservative Republicans quickly
concluded that their party must adopt a more constructive attitude
toward immigration reform. However, a problem soon emerged:
Republicans could not agree on what reforms to pursue (Seung Min
Kim 121130 “Immigration unity hits Hill reality” at
politico.com).

Even former president George W. Bush made a rare public
intervention, at a conference on immigration at his presidential
library in Dallas. Famous for his moderate stance on immigration,
Bush advised Republicans to help reform immigration in “a
benevolent spirit” that recognized immigrants’ contributions to
America. At the same time, several different kinds of Republican
conservatives – religious, police, and business – held a strategy
session in Washington on how to reform immigration. (See Julia
Preston 121204 “Praising immigrants, Bush leads conservative appeal
for G.O.P. to soften tone” at nytimes.com.)

As for specifics, soon after the election two Republican
senators proposed an alternative to Democratic proposals for how to
treat young people illegally brought to the USA as children by
parents. If the undocumented young people went to college or joined
the military, the USA would offer them a path to legal status – but
NOT to full citizenship. That nicely avoided radical Republican
objections to “amnesty,” but did not much appeal to Latinos.
Nevertheless, it illustrates a possibility for compromise in coming
negotiations, since Obama himself sometimes uses the phrase “path
to legal status,” though usually interpreting that as “to
citizenship.” Significantly, both of these senators retired at the
end of 2012, and so will not pay any political price to radical
Republicans for being among the earliest Republicans to make such a
“moderate” proposal! (David Welna 121127 “ 'Achieve Act' A
Republican answer to Dream Act” at npr.org.) Many radical
Republicans continue to maintain that Republicans have little to
gain by trying to appease immigrants, who will continue to vote for
Democrats, regardless.

Meanwhile, the 2012 election strengthened Democratic resolve and
capacity to reform immigration, reminding Democrats that they must
deliver some of what they promised Latinos in 2008: “comprehensive”
reform that would make the lives of undocumented immigrants easier,
even though requiring them eventually to abide by American
immigration laws. (Julia Preston 121130 “Young immigrants say it’s
Obama’s time to act” at nytimes.com.) Democrats were unable to
deliver that during Obama’s first term, due to the hesitancy of
both moderate Democrats and moderate Republicans in the face of
adamant radical Republican opposition to anything that could be
interpreted as “amnesty” for “illegals.”

Immediately after the 2012 election, Obama vowed to proceed
(Julia Preston 121114 “Obama expresses confidence in early action
on immigration” on The Caucus at nytimes.com). In the legislature,
moderates from both sides seized the initiative. (Sean Sullivan
121111 “Sen. Chuck Schumer says he’s restarting immigration reform
talks with Sen. Graham” on The Fix at washingtonpost.com.) Hispanic
supporters of Obama launched an organization to mobilize Hispanics
to support – and perhaps also to force Obama to pursue? –
comprehensive immigration reform (Anna Palmer and Carrie Budoff
Brown 121203 “Hispanic mega-donors eye immigration” at
politico.com.)

In the USA, immigration is a matter largely reserved to the
national government. Nevertheless, in recent decades, immigration
has also become a major issue in subnational American politics.
Successive battles in successive states and localities illuminate
the partisan dynamics of the issue. Here, as usual, California was
in the vanguard, long since demonstrating where anti-immigrant
policies can leave Republicans. In the 1990s, conservative
Republicans in California (with some Democratic support) passed
extremely harsh anti-immigrant state legislation – so harsh that it
was overturned by federal courts. That harshness drove Latinos in
California into overwhelming support for Democrats, making
California now an overwhelmingly Democratic state. Recently
Arizona, Alabama, and Georgia have also passed anti-immigrant state
legislation. Those states will not turn Democratic anytime soon,
but their actions harmed Republicans nationally in the 2012
election. (See Peter Schrag 121207 “Immigration reform: The
California lesson” at scabee.com. On local immigration politics
more generally, see Monica W. Varsanyi ed. 2010 Taking local
control: Immigration policy activism in U.S. cities and
states. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 308
pages.)

Reform strategies 1.2

Evidently, during his first term, Obama’s strategy for
eventually achieving immigration reform has been to over-perform at
guaranteeing border security so that opponents of reform can’t use
border insecurity as an excuse not to make progress on other
aspects of reform. Obama has deported even more “illegals” than did
his predecessor Bush, who claimed to be tough on border security.
Meanwhile, overall, Obama frames immigration reform as economically
necessary for America as a whole. He wants to improve legal
procedures for providing American farmers and manufacturers with
the labor they need, while holding those employers accountable for
not hiring illegal migrants. Obama downplays identity goals as
divisive, though affirming the values of family and education.

A dilemma for all players was whether to pursue “comprehensive
reform” in the hopes of achieving a “grand bargain,” or to tackle
issues one at a time. Obama has favored comprehensive reform, but
has taken some piecemeal measures such as – before the election –
shifting enforcement AWAY from undocumented young people. Some
Republicans raised other piecemeal issues, such as granting visas
to immigrants who achieve educational credentials in areas of
expertise that American employers need. Many Republicans advocated
treating immigration issues one at a time, and some still do –
evidently to limit the scope and nature of eventual reforms.
Nevertheless, so far, Obama has largely prevailed, and most reform
proposals being drafted are comprehensive. (For an excellent
interview with Latino strategists, see Gabriel Arana 121207 “What’s
next for immigration reform?” at prospect.org.)

Like most major issues, immigration has a “policy regime”: the
set of interests and issues, institutions and individuals, that
tend to be activated whenever immigration issues come up. Thus
current attempts at reform immigration will replay some aspects of
earlier attempts. Obama’s efforts to reform immigration during his
second term will to some extent echo his failed efforts at reform
during his first term, such as endorsing Schumer-Graham proposals,
as he did in November 2010. Current politics will still reflect
those of Bush’s failed attempt to reform immigration during HIS
second term, an attempt that was scuttled by radical Republicans in
the House of Representatives. Current politics will also reflect
the contradictions under the 1990s Clinton administration, when
Republicans ultimately failed to restrict immigrant flows but
succeeded in restricting immigrant rights. Current immigration
politics even reflect dynamics going back to Reagan: Negatively,
current attempts are determined not to repeat a blanket “amnesty”
for those already in the USA illegally; positively, current
attempts recognize the need to prevent “illegals” from accumulating
yet again, both by allowing legal entry and by preventing illegal
entry. (For astute commentary on the immigration politics of the
past several presidencies, see Philip Kretsedemas 2012The
immigration crucible: Transforming race, nation, and the limits of
the law. New York NY: Columbia University Press, 213
pages.)

What all of these scenarios share in
common is a clash between congressional representatives pressured
by the restrictionist demands of their constituents (and national
lobby groups) and an executive office facing pressure from
immigrant rights constituencies (which can include foreign
governments, employers who rely on migrant labor, and the advocacy
networks of immigrant communities). In these situations, neoliberal
administrations have tended to make decisions that do not impede
the free flow of migration but that also contain overtures to both
pro-and anti-immigration constituencies. (Kretsedemas 65)

These contradictory imperatives of immigration politics produce
political paradox. Contrary to public perceptions, recent
Democratic administrations have actually been tougher on border
control and immigration enforcement than recent Republican
administrations. For example, the Bush administration
ostentatiously expanded border patrols, but reduced actual
apprehensions, even as the number of undocumented migrants in the
USA rose! Conversely Obama, ostensibly progressive on immigration
matters in principle, has been surprisingly conservative in
practice (for example, the deportations). (See again Kretsedemas
62-68 and 139-144).

Policy packages 1.3

Thus several recent American presidents, regardless of party,
have striven toward quite similar packages of immigration reforms.
Those packages were all “centrist” in the sense of containing
“something for everyone.” Obama’s White House web site succinctly
states the four major elements he considers necessary forFixing
the immigration system for America’s 21st century
economy (under whitehouse.gov/issues).

Obama’s four elements are as follows. First, “responsibility by
the federal government to secure our borders” (external enforcement
of security). Second, “accountability for businesses that break the
law by undermining American workers and exploiting undocumented
workers” (internal enforcement of security goals and economic
rights). Third, “strengthening our economic competitiveness by
creating a legal immigration system that reflects our values and
diverse needs (identity and economy). Fourth, “responsibility for
people who are living in the United States illegally”
(security).

Others of diverse ideologies are advancing almost identical
packages. For example – in Arizona of all places – a non-partisan
group of employers recommended: Security increases
on the border, Account for unauthorized immigrants
through earned legalization, Necessary increases
in lawful immigration and work vias, and
Employment sanctions and other reforms (Posted by
Alex Nowrasteh 121206 “A SANE immigration reform proposal” at
cato-at-liberty.org, an ultra-conservative libertarian
thinktank!)

ISSUE COMPLEXITY 2

As we have seen, immigration can involve all three main policy
sectors: security, economy, and identity. Moreover, it also can
involve all three main policy levels: supranational (external
security, flows across borders), national (macroeconomy, American
identity), and subnational (states and localities). The national
government’s own priority may shift between sectors and levels,
shifting domestic preoccupations with it. The interplay of the many
specific issues involved makes and unmakes diverse political
coalitions.

(A masterful account of the interplay of these alternative
framings of immigration politics in the course of American history
is Aristide Zolberg 2006A nation by design: Immigration policy
in the fashioning of America. New York NY: Russell Sage
Foundation and Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 658 pages.
On the interplay of identity and economy, see also Carolyn Wong
2006 Lobbying for inclusion: Rights politics and the making of
immigration policy. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press,
255 pages. On shifts in sovereignty concerns, see

Cheryl Shanks 2001 Immigration and the politics of American
sovereignty, 1890-1990. Ann Arbor MI: The University of
Michigan Press, 390 pages.)

Economy 2.1

In the most practical terms, immigration involves ECONOMIC
issues: employers wanting unskilled cheap labor, unskilled migrants
wanting fair jobs, American workers wanting to protect THEIR jobs,
and American taxpayers debating whether immigrants constitute a net
gain (labor, entrepreneurship) or a net drain (education, welfare)
for local economies. (Usually they provide a net gain.) Immigrants
come to find jobs and usually the USA has mostly allowed them in,
either formally or informally. On the one hand, the USA does make
explicit provision for legal entrance of needed labor. On the other
hand, usually the USA has not prevented needed labor from working
illegally (except occasionally, when there was more labor than
needed). This informal accommodation has resulted from an odd
alliance of employers and migrants (both of whom strongly want more
immigration) against average public opinion (which would prefer
less immigration but seldom mobilizes to limit it). Until the last
quarter of the twentieth century, this accommodation amounted to a
relatively simple de facto laissez-faire policy toward immigration
under a classically liberal economic regime. However, one can
interpret developments since around 1975 as part of a “neoliberal”
restructuring that maintains the economic free flow of labor by
contriving to prevent politically necessary restrictionist measures
from actually having much effect ((Kretsedemas, particularly
62-68).

In any case, at least in the American Southwest, basically
immigration rises or falls depending on the rate of growth of the
American economy and consequent demand for labor, regardless of
ostensible national policy. In the last few years, because of the
Great Recession, illegal immigrants crossing the Mexican border
have become fewer and fewer, at least temporarily. This makes it is
somewhat paradoxical that, at the same time, illegal immigration
has become a hotter and hotter political issue across more and more
of the American South.

Identity 2.2

Part of the explanation is that immigration also involves
IDENTITY issues: white European-Americans protecting their
traditions and values against non-white Americans hoping to assert
theirs. Evidently such white defensiveness reacts less to current
overall flows of new immigrants and more to the total stock already
deposited by previous flows, particularly to the resulting
concentration of immigrants in particular localities. Identity
issues can be heartfelt: For example, even in the most casual
conversations, older white Southern Californians will volunteer
that they resent the presence of so many Latinos and the prevalence
of so much Spanish in their localities. Such identity grievances
pose a constant temptation to conservative politicians willing to
embrace nativism in order to mobilize voters. Conversely, some
liberal commentators regard the innovations in identity being made
by immigrants themselves – the construction of new “trans-national”
identities – as harbingers of a future more globalized world in
which even nation-states take their national borders less
seriously.

(Most attention to identity implies that individuals are likely
to favor RESTRICTIVE immigration policies. For an argument that, in
the long run, the ideological identities of liberal democratic
states favor EXPANSIONIST immigration policiessee Gary Freeman 1995
“Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states” in
International migration review 26,4 (Winter), 881-902. He
distinguishes three groups of liberal democratic states and
identifies their differences on immigration. See also the
accompanying critique by Rogers Brubaker. Tichenor 2002 addresses
the interplay of liberal, republican, and inegalitarian ideologies
in the history of American immigration policy. On emerging
transnationalism, see Anne McNevin 2011Contesting citizenship :
Irregular migrants and new frontiers of the political. New
York, NY : Columbia University Press, 223 pages. Another
sophisticated analysis of transnationalism – employing the critical
perspectives of Foucault and Agamben – is Kathleen Arnold
2011American immigration after 1996 : the shifting ground of
political inclusion, University Park PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 182 pages.)

Security 2.3

Increasingly, in recent years, immigration has also involved
SECURITY issues: maintaining law-and-order both along national
borders and within the interior. Classically whites have feared
that immigrants bring crime into their localities. (In urban areas,
ethnic gangs can certainly be a problem but, as individuals,
immigrants actually commit crimes at a lower rate than established
residents.) Such fears are now reinforced by the need to prevent
the entrance into the USA of drug dealers or even terrorists.
Again, undoubtedly those are real problems. Nevertheless, some
liberal critics of the resulting “securitization” of immigration
policy view the security measures taken to solve security problems
as mostly producing still more insecurity, leading to more
measures, and so on. “External enforcement” strategies of trying
to stop illegal entrants at the border don’t work: The border is
long and much of it is not adequately patrolled, so migrants always
find some way to get in, albeit at increasing risk to themselves.
“Internal enforcement” is more feasible: requiring employers to
ascertain – using government-provided databases – whether
prospective workers are legal or not and then punishing employers
who hire workers who are “out of status.” However, this too
increases insecurity, among both workers and employers, both of
whom may be caught in a government enforcement raid.

(For the critique of securitization, see Ariane Chebel
d'Appollonia 2012 Frontiers of fear : Immigration and
insecurity in the United States and Europe. Ithaca NY: Cornell
University Press, 320 pages. On the personal insecurities of the
migrants themselves, see Deirdre Moloney 2012 National
insecurities : Immigrants and U.S. deportation policy since
1882, Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 315
pages. For a grounding of identity and economic aspects in security
concerns, see Mikhail A. Alexseev 2006 Immigration phobia and
the security dilemma : Russia, Europe, and the United States,
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 286 pages. On including
identity aspects in security analyses, see Christopher Rudolph 2006
National security and immigration : Policy development in the
United States and Western Europe since 1945, Stanford CA:
Stanford University Press, 268 pages.)

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 3

Historically, from the point of view of Europeans, North America
had vast resources and sparse population. So immigration has always
been constitutive of America: demographically, economically,
culturally, and politically. Historically, North America has always
needed immigrant labor. So governments have usually allowed a
substantial number of immigrants legal entry. This was particularly
so from about 1870-1920 and again, to a lesser extent, since about
1970. Nevertheless, the USA has always placed some restrictions on
immigration, particularly from about 1920 to about 1970. Moreover
the USA has often been reluctant to extend social, cultural, and
political rights to immigrant labor.

Broadly speaking, postwar American academic accounts of American
immigration have progressed through three interpretations: what I
will call mid-twentieth century CLASSIC COMPLACENCY, late twentieth
century REVISIONIST CRITIQUE, and early-twenty-first century
“HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM.”

Classic complacency 3.1

In the mid-twentieth century, the mainstream postwar account of
American immigration history recognized the struggles of
immigrants, but celebrated America as a “melting pot” that welcomed
them and helped them succeed. The old identities of immigrants
were melted down and forged into a new American identity. This
account regards all of this as a mostly “natural” social process,
with little state intervention. The simpler version was that
immigrants were “assimilated” to
“Americanism”: America’s foundational culture, which notionally was
religious but liberal. A more complex version was that immigrants
were, one might say, “alloyed” into a
continually evolving and increasingly multi-cultural American
mainstream.

Certainly both of those processes have occurred, and continue.
Moreover, in comparative perspective, the relative success of those
processes in the USA has been exceptional: How many other countries
have truly incorporated alien nationalities into their own national
identity, and continue to do so? If this involved some
difficulties, that should come as little surprise. However, in
American politics of immigration, a basic dynamic has been to
forget the difficulties with past waves of immigrants, in order to
emphasize difficulties with the current wave of immigrants.
Repeatedly American immigration politics has started from an
assumption that the current batch of immigrants is particularly –
even uniquely – problematic. Currently the problematic batch are
Latinos. (Asians are now mostly welcome.)

More recent academic approaches to past immigration politics
have become more critical. Younger generations of the general
public are becoming more accepting of immigrants and
multiculturalism. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the somewhat
restrictive informal “terms” of that acceptance. Mainstream
American public discourse is happy to embrace immigrants and
celebrate their success, so long as they confirm the continuing
efficacy of “the American Dream”: starting with nothing and
achieving success through hard work. That is how Obama presented
himself. So too several of the current rising stars within the
Republican party (Marco Rubio of Florida, Bobby Jindal of
Louisiana, Ted Cruz of Texas). On the other hand, perhaps not
surprisingly, even very intelligent mainstream American media still
do NOT welcome immigrant rants against the injustices immigrants
have suffered and the iniquities of mainstream immigration policies
and practices.

Revisionist critique 3.2

By the late twentieth century, a revisionist academic account of
American immigration history emphasized the extent to which earlier
settlers RESISTED later immigration and stressed how SELECTIVE
American immigration policy has been. This account pays close
attention to the actual immigration practices of the American
state, but regards those policies as largely the outcome of popular
politics. The key actors were the earliest settlers, the white
Anglo-Saxon Protestant males who early established the terms on
which later immigrants could be admitted and assimilated. The most
fundamental category was RACE: non whites were problematic (above
all black slaves, but also Latino migrant labor). ETHNICITY also
mattered: The original settlers greatly preferred Western and
Northern Europeans (Germanic and Scandinavian) to Southern and
Eastern Europeans (Italians and Poles). RELIGION was also
important: non-Protestants were problematic (Catholics, Jews, now
Muslims). This may seem gratuitous prejudice, but the original
Protestant settlers emerged out of murderous geopolitical struggles
in Europe between Protestants and Catholics. Even GENDER is
problematic: women have been more vulnerable to exclusion or
deportation than men. (On the interaction of gender with race and
other categories, see again Deirdre Moloney 2012 National
insecurities : immigrants and U.S. deportation policy since
1882, Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 315
pages.)

Again, these difficulties should come as little surprise –
certainly not to Chinese, who arrived on the wrong side of all
these dichotomies! Most of these biases in American immigration
policy have long been identified and critiqued by those affected by
them (e.g., Ronald Takaki 1993A different mirror : A history of
multicultural America, Boston MA: Little, Brown, 508 pages.)
However, the authoritative statement of this revisionist critique
that finally went mainstream – because based on exhaustive research
on the guidelines actually used by American immigration authorities
– is Rogers Smith 1999Civic ideals: Conflicting visions of
citizenship in U.S. history New Haven CT: Yale University
Press, 719 pages.)

Historical institutionalism 3.3

In the early twenty-first century, “historical
institutionalists” within American political science are finally
bringing their approach to the topic of immigration politics. The
HISTORICAL part of their slogan demands that an account of a
current policy domain situate it in the entire history of that
policy domain and its role in overall American political
development. The INSTITUTIONAL part of their slogan shifts
attention away from societal influences and toward the relatively
autonomous role of “the state” (i.e., national government) and its
institutions, which to some extent pursue their own objectives.
These include foreign policy objectives that have little to do with
domestic political pressures about immigration. Moreover, not only
different national states, but also different levels of American
government, may have different objectives. Overall, by the late
twentieth century, immigration policy emerges increasingly NOT from
diffuse mass sentiment but rather from the interplay of
“centralized state actors, organized social groups, and policy
experts” (Tichenor 14).

(On American immigration policy as an aspect of foreign policy,
see Donna R. Gabaccia 2012 Foreign relations : American
immigration in global perspective. Princeton N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 271 pages.) For comparative perspective, see
again Christopher Rudolph 2006 National security and
immigration: Policy development in the United States and Western
Europe since 1945. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 268
pages. Rudolph says state security interests include defense,
wealth, and stability.

In institutionalist accounts, successive American political
regimes produced the immigration policies to which contemporaneous
“institutional and ideological orderings” were prone (Tichenor
2002). Americans even got mostly the immigration policies that
their governments imposed. In this last vein, historical
institutionalists and others have recently called attention to the
growing role of Executive Orders and Judicial Review in shaping
current American immigration policy. The executive branch has
always had a legitimate concern for national security, recently
heightened by the threat of international terrorism, of course.
That concern has resulted in increasing assertions by the executive
of authority to decide immigration policy, not only without
consulting other branches or the public, but sometimes even without
informing them of the result! Meanwhile, in the judicial branch,
immigration courts are taking over a rising proportion of
enforcements of deportation from the border patrol. (See
Kretsedemas 47-72 and 140-141.)

A further current effort by American scholars is to put American
immigration policy into comparative and global perspective. There
has long been a strong literature on immigration politics in
Western Europe and on comparison of Europe with the USA. (See a
succinct essay by James Hollifield, “The politics of immigration
and the rise of the migration state: Comparative and historical
perspectives,” in Reed Ueda ed. 2006 A companion to American
immigration, Malden MA and Oxford UK: Blackwell, 570 pages, at
pages 132-158.)

总访问量：博主简介

韦爱德Edwin A. Winckler (韦爱德) is an American political scientist (Harvard BA, MA, and PhD) who has taught mostly in the sociology departments at Columbia and Harvard. He has been researching China for a half century, publishing books about Taiwan’s political economy (Sharpe, 1988), China’s post-Mao reforms (Rienner, 1999), and China’s population policy (Stanford, 2005, with Susan Greenhalgh). Recently he has begun also explaining American politics to Chinese. So the purpose of this Blog is to call attention to the best American media commentary on current American politics and to relate that to the best recent American academic scholarship on American politics. Winckler’s long-term institutional base remains the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University in New York City. However he and his research have now retreated to picturesque rural Central New York.