The Militant Myth

On Saturday morning, I appeared on Fox News to discuss whether militants in Pakistan could recruit among the millions of flood victims. The story began with a statement made by US Senator John Kerry, the first American official to visit the flood-hit areas, â€œWe donâ€™t want additional jihadists (and) extremists coming out of a crisis.â€ The idea that the human tragedy in Pakistan is a â€œfrightening opening for the Talibanâ€ is not yet substantiated but certainly makes for sensational news. We should remember that the Taliban is and has never been a charitable organization. The Taliban does not have a social services institute, and instead, boasts of enforcing and providing justice and order in the form of Qazi courts (i.e., harsh interpretation of Shariah law).

While American security may be linked to Pakistanâ€™s future, the militant myth serves Pakistanâ€™s political elite all too well.The message of militants moving into grief-stricken areas is largely being propagated by the Pakistani Government. This past week, at a United Nations donor meeting, Pakistanâ€™s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureishi stated â€œThe massive upheaval caused by the floods and the economic losses suffered by the millions of Pakistanis must be addressed urgently. We cannot allow this catastrophe to become an opportunity for the terrorists." Pakistanâ€™s President Asif Ali Zardari makes a similar argument. In his visit to flood-hit areas with Kerry, Zardari said at a joint press conference, â€œThe children could be put in camps to be trained as the terrorists of tomorrow.â€

There is little truth to these arguments. So why make them? In reality, Pakistan needs increased aid to rise above its latest crisis of crises. By invoking the rise of the militant mafia, Pakistan can woo America into donating millions more. Pakistan can convince the international aid community that it cannot survive without its support. But more aid to the Pakistani government is met with great skepticism and suspicion.

Many ordinary Pakistanis fear that aid will fall into the pockets of corrupt, inept politicians, and are thus expressing rage and resentment against the civilian elite. In a Pakistani blog called Chup! (Hush in Urdu), one blogger harshly states:

Dear Pakistani government, your response to the disaster in Pakistan has been atrocious. As a Pakistani citizen, one who is peddling like mad to drum up funds to send back home, I am disgusted with your political pot shots, your disinterest in your own people, and your lip service to something unfolding in front of your eyes. Everyone has pledged aid â€“ even Afghanistan â€“ who barely has anything right now. If every leader who defaulted on their loans or didnâ€™t pay taxes actually dug into their pockets, maybe the rest of the world wouldnâ€™t be calling us selfish beggars.

A DAWN newspaper opinion piece on Sunday by Ardeshir Cowasjeeâ€”who invited me into his well-guarded home in Karachiâ€”offers his view:

Knowing that much of the aid money channeled through government agencies will be siphoned off to private pockets, international donors, foreign governments and local citizens are extremely reluctant to give to official channels. Voluntary groups like the Edhi Foundation, Citizensâ€™ Foundation (US tax benefits for donations), Omar Asghar Khan Foundation, and many other organizations are faring better as they, along with the military, are mobilizing their networks around the country to get food and other help to the flood-affected.
Prime Minister Gilani, honestly admitting that his government is dishonest and totally untrustworthy, agreeing with Mian Nawaz Sharif, proposed a government-sponsored body to be run by non-political figures with credibility who will see that the money that trickles in goes to those it is meant for. It has not been allowed to take off. This incompetent, ill prepared, uninspiring and non-visionary leadership gifted to us through a dubious â€˜dealâ€™ is all we have â€” we have no option but to lump it until someone or something comes to the rescue of this miserable country.

If Islamabad is concerned with militant madness, then it should focus on improving and strengthening its civilian capacity. After all, a government deemed unable and unfit to provide basic social services to its population is considered a failed state by the Fund for Peace which manages the Failed States Index 2010.

To overcome the human disaster, ordinary Pakistanis are doing what they can to help those in needâ€”as they did in the aftermath of the October 8, 2005 earthquake in Pakistan-held Kashmir. Then, trucks of supplies were collected for the victims trapped in the mountains. But the challenge was twofold: lack of access to victims and accusations of stolen or wasted donor money by the Pakistani government.

In recent conversations with senior Pakistani commanders, the military still considers the civilian government to be out-of-touch with reality. So why does an unpopular President continue to hold power? As one commander said to me in private, â€œWe are waiting for the civilians to create a mess inside Pakistan so that the military will look like the better option for governance.â€ As Pakistanâ€™s history has previously shown, in civilian chaos and confusion may come military might.

However, neither the military nor civilians in power have proven capable of servicing those in need. The earthquake in Kashmir is a prime example. Over the past two years, I have visited the refugee camps in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Kashmir. The same women greet me. One is now pregnant. Another still complains of wanting a blood transfusion but has no money to afford it.

The womenâ€™s greatest need is medical care. â€œWe need a doctor,â€ they say. But most female doctors will not leave their hospitals and clinics in Islamabad, the capital city, to take the dangerous trek to Kashmir to offer once-a-week services to the poor. Other local Pakistani NGOâ€™s seem stretched for resources or have other areas they operate in.

While the women of the tents do receive a stipend from the government and have access to a nearby hospital, many argue that it is not enough. â€œCan you feed a family of four with the money we receive? We canâ€™t even afford a decent education for our children or the kind of medical treatment we desperately need.â€

Five years after the earthquake, most women complain of living as refugees when the government promised them low-income housing. â€œI used to have a home,â€ said an older woman, â€œnow I have this tent. How long should I live like this? Itâ€™s inhuman.â€

In the current flood disaster, it will take more than five years to stabilize the country. And that is obviously not the only challenge Pakistan faces, as Aaron Manneâ€™s piece highlights on August 17th.

The good news is that the Pakistani government acknowledges the threat by militant groups. An assessment released by the countryâ€™s intelligence agency reveals that domestic militancy poses a greater threat to the country than India.

But while the Pakistani elite remains concerned, they also applaud the efforts of religious charities, some of whom are tied to terrorist organizations. So which story are we to believe? Should we be alarmed by the freedom of mobility and safe haven that front charities enjoy in Pakistan? If so, then Pakistan needs to underline its policy against militants and those connected to it. Civilian elites need to stop using the â€œmilitant mythâ€ to garner public sympathy and support for the flood victims. Rather, the government should focus on restoring the publicâ€™s confidence in the countryâ€™s ability to lead and deliver goods at this time of crisis.

S D Pradhan, 23 August 2010, 04:09 AM ISTThe recently published ISI's assessment in the Wall Street Journal leaked by a senior ISI official, which concludes that a "two-thirds likelihood a major threat to the state coming from militants rather than from India or elsewhere," appears to be a well crafted stratagem to ensure continued inflow of US aid without any criticism in the US congress as also to counter charges that the US aid is misused to develop the Pak Army's capabilities against India.

Some of the Pak analysts have commented which give credence to this assessment. Talat Masood, a retired general and an analyst on security matters, stated that the assessment is based on the awareness that some of its previous friends have become its sworn enemies. Another analyst Imtiaz Gul similarly remarked that "many of the militant groups that the Pakistani military worked with in the past have now turned against them". However others like Ayesha Siddiqa suspect it to be a part of a game plan. Siddiqa have remarked that" there are games within games".

Since this assessment reflects the ground realities, it is logical to conclude that the Pak intelligence agency has changed its stance. Some articles in the media have highlighted that for the first time in 63 years, the ISI has determined that a majority of threats come from the Islamist militants rather than India or elsewhere. However, an examination of two related dimensions suggests that there had been no change in the ISI's objectives.

The first dimension relates to the ISI's activities towards India that would provide indicators that in the Pakistani perception its homegrown terrorists have overtaken the Indian Army as the greatest threat to its national security. Statements of politico-military nature by top Pakistani leadership continue to reflect a high degree of antipathy towards India. In fact, the anti-India statements have become shriller. In February 2010, Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani , the Pak Army averred that" the Pak Army remains an India centric institution and this reality would not change in any significant way till the Kashmir issue and the water disputes are resolved." Since Sharm El Sheikh joint statement, Pak leadership has been increasingly harping on the allegation that India was assisting the Baluchi insurgents. The Pak Interior Minister, Rahman Malik went further and blamed India of not only assisting the insurgents in Baluchistan but also for destabilizing FATA as well as for involvement in Lahore terrorist attacks in March 2010.

The views of Kayani are of utmost importance as he in the capacity of head of the Pak Army determines Pakistan's India policy. Kayani appears to be a true disciple of one of his predecessors Mirza Aslam Beg. The latter, who is known to be articulating the policies of the Pak Army, had systematized the use of terrorism as an instrument to deal with India during his tenure. Even in his recent articles he continues to put emphasis that Kashmir remains the unfinished agenda of the partition. More important was his view on Afghanistan. During his tenure as the Army Chief, Beg provided maximum articulation to the concept of strategic depth. This doctrine calls for the need for dispersal of Pakistan's military assets in Afghanistan, well beyond the reach of India's military offensive capabilities. This aspect of the doctrine became clear during the Pak Army exercise called Zarb-e-Momin. Keeping this concept in view, Kayani during his tenure as the ISI chief began to oppose forcefully the Indian presence in Afghanistan. The attacks on the Indians have substantially increased since 2004 and the Pak proxy war has been extended to Afghanistan. The current reports suggest increased use of Taliban and networks of Hekmatyar and Haqqani as also Lashker-e-Toiba against Indians by ISI. In fact there are no indicators to suggest that the Pak Establishment has given up the policy of using terrorism as an instrument against India.

In recent months, assiduous efforts have been made by pak Establishment to pressurize the Karzai government to accept the Taliban and Islamist groups to form the part of the power structure and remove those who oppose this move with the objective of removing Indian influence in Afghanistan. In the last few months, the ISI chief Ahmad Shuja Pasha had been shuttling between Kabul and Islamabad to pressurize Karzai. In the last month, Kayani himself went to Kabul. This followed the sacking of Amrullah Saleh, Karzai's security chief and Hanif Atmer, head of the interior ministry, who were not willing to tow the Pak line of accommodating the Taliban elements.

In addition, the Pak Army continues to acquire weapons which can be used only against India and not against terrorists. In view of the above, it would be unrealistic to assume that Pakistan Army and ISI could have downgraded the threat from India. The Pak Army, which is using the threat from India to remain in a dominant position, is doing its best to keep it in the sharper focus of the Pakistanis. The impact of this policy is that in Pakistani nationalism is equated with anti Indian sentiments.

The second dimension relates to the possibility of a group of officers in ISI holding an independent and contrary view from that of the top ISI and Pak Army leadership. Since the ISI is mainly manned at the top level by the officials drawn from the armed forces, such a possibility appears highly unlikely as they are likely to follow the line of the Pak Army and the ISI. This agency, which is involved in the collection of intelligence, has no separate unit to make an objective strategic assessment. In fact, from the intelligence documents prepared by the ISI that have become available, it is clear that the ISI assessments reflect extreme hard-line views against India.
The moot question is why ISI made such an assessment and then leaked it to the media. From the analysis of the available evidence, the reasons behind this act can be understood clearly. Of late, the US had increased the pressure on the Pakistan to give due attention to the terrorists operating from the Pakistan - Afghanistan region and stop supporting the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements. Soon after the failed attempt to attack the Time square, the US had given a stern warning to Pakistan on the support to terrorists. Prior to the US-Pak Strategic dialogue, several experts cautioned the US Congress on the growing nexus between the ISI and terrorists. Marvin G Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute-a Washington based research organization pointed out that despite ban on the LeT, the outfit was allowed to function with impunity and the ISI continued to consider the terror group as an asset. Liza Curtis of the Heritage foundation that the presence of Hafiz Md Saeed at public rallies, which were attended by Pak ministers as well, suggested continued nexus between ISI and LeT. Another analyst Ashley J Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment pointed out that ISI was providing intelligence to LeT for selected targets.

The US officials too had been pointing out the continued close nexus between the ISI and the terrorists and for over projecting unnecessarily threat from India. The former Director National Intelligence Adm. Blair said that the Pak Establishment and the ISI continue to support the Taliban to maintain its strategic depth against. In May 2010, the US administration asked Pakistan to shun India centric policy. Last month, the US officials more frequently spoke on the continued nexus of Pak intelligence agency with the terrorists. On 22nd July, Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, highlighted the nexus between the ISI and terrorists as the real problem. The next day Michael Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, stated that the overall strategic approach of the ISI needed to be fundamentally changed. Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, during her visit to Pakistan had pointed out that elements in the Pak Establishment knew the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden. More recently, Elizabeth Byrs, UN spokesperson of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs rightly pointed out that the reason for not being able to arrange sufficient funds for the relief work in Pakistan was its image deficit. The US President had faced problems in getting the clearance for $ 59 bn for war funding after the Wikileaks expose. The Pak linkages with the terrorists were criticized.

The above appears to have brought home the fact to the Pak Establishment that to continue to get aid from US without criticism, it was necessary at least to project that Pakistan was changing its threat perception. Pakistan knows it pretty well that the US would continue to support Pakistan because of its strategic interests, yet a hint of change in the Pak priorities of threats could reduce the criticism in the US Congress. Hence, an intelligence assessment to meet the requirement got prepared and was quickly leaked to the press. To give credence to this assessment, the Pak Ambassador in US Husain Haqqani was made to state that" Islamabad's pro-occupation with India that came in the way of its doing more to show its commitment to fighting terror". Without a directive from the top, the diplomat could not have taken a line that was contrary to the Pak Army chief's stated policy.