My latest for FireDogLake. For even more confirmation that the Feds aren’t interested in bank accountability, regardless of the State half of the task force’s intentions, see Congressman Brad Miller on why he’s not the task force Executive Director and Richard Eskow on the obviousness of the problem.

For example, Attorney General Eric Schneiderman penned a Daily News Op-Ed in which he pitches “More than 50 attorneys, investigators and analysts have already been deployed to support our investigations, with many more on the way” as somehow adequate to deliver on that “down payment” promise when the Savings and Loan crisis took over 1,000 and Enron alone took over 100. Not only hasn’t the federal government corroborated AG Schneiderman’s claim of “many more on the way”; “many more” than 50+ doesn’t sound like anywhere near the 1,000+ needed to approach the ballpark of accountability.

A whistleblower who exposed systemic fraud by Countrywide mortgage lenders called on the Department of Justice on Wednesday to prosecute her former colleagues, if not with fraud, then with covering it up.

“If there is insufficient legal evidence to convict these executives of what we believe are obvious crimes, then the federal government should refocus,” Eileen Foster, a former Countrywide fraud investigations chief, told an audience at the National Press Club gathered to honor her and five others for their truth-telling.

“Overwhelming evidence of perjury, witness tampering and obstruction of justice exist in the numerous claims, court filings and trial and investigative transcripts,” Foster said. She herself was fired after reporting that falsified income documentation and faked signatures had been used to steer borrowers into bad mortgages.

For the next couple of weeks, I’m one of the David Dayen subs at FireDogLake–no one person could fill his shoes–and this post ran there earlier today. This version is slightly updated but essentially the same.

One way to see the double standard at the heart of the foreclosure fraud—one set of laws for the bailed out banks, one for the rest of us—is to focus on the role of notaries public, and then consider that role in light of what our Supreme Court said about notaries in 1984, in a case called Bernal v. Fainter, Secretary of State of Texas.

First, let’s recap the role of notaries in the foreclosure fraud crisis: Notaries are the people who verify that someone actually is who they say they are when that person signs a document. Because banks and their agents industrialized “Document Execution” as part of their foreclosure business model, notaries did not do their jobs. Notaries’ failure to verify identities has been so complete that many people will sign as one person, say, “Linda Green.” Notaries have also been told to sign documents using one name, and then notarize their own “surrogate” signature. “Well, what’s the big deal?” bank defenders say. Beyond the fact that there’s no “business convenience” exception to following the rule of law, consider Bernal.

Bernal involved Texas’s requirement that all notaries be citizens; lawful permanent resident aliens need not apply. Bernal challenged the Constitutionality for the citizenship requirement. To rule on the question, the Court had to consider what notaries did, and whether or not what notaries did was so political, so central to representative democracy, that limiting being a notary to citizens was rational. In finding that notaries were important but not political officers of the state, the Court made some observations of note.

The Obama Administration worked for months on a deal that would have let America’s biggest banks off the hook for a crime wave of runaway mortgage fraud. All they had to do in return was pledge a negligible sum of money, to be paid by their shareholders and not themselves, and which they would dispense themselves. In return, crooked bankers received immunity from prosecution – and even from investigation.

After the deal came under attack from a number of its allies, the Administration settled with the banks anyway. But it promised millions of wronged homeowners – and the nation as a whole – that it would move “aggressively” to investigate criminal misdeeds and prosecute bankers and anyone else who broke the law.

That was then, this is now. Two and half months later the Administration hasn’t even started to take the inadequate steps it promised it would take. The clock is running out on the statute of limitations and there’s no sign that the Administration has lifted a finger to investigate criminal bankers.

What we have learned so far: Whenever dealing with the banks and or with the government, they are from the same mold. We cannot tell any difference.

This “mortgage task force group” thing is also NO Different than that MERS system…There are no employees!

NY Daily News-

On March 9 — 45 days after the speech and 30 days after the announcement — we met with Schneiderman in New York City and asked him for an update. He had just returned from Washington, where he had been personally looking for office space. As of that date, he had no office, no phones, no staff and no executive director. None of the 55 staff members promised by Holder had materialized. On April 2, we bumped into Schneiderman on a train leaving Washington for New York and learned that the situation was the same.

Tuesday, calls to the Justice Department’s switchboard requesting to be connected with the working group produced the answer, “I really don’t know where to send you.” After being transferred to the attorney general’s office and asking for a phone number for the working group, the answer was, “I’m not aware of one.”

The promises of the President have led to little or no concrete action.

On Thursday, April 5th U.S. District Court Judge Rosemary M. Collyer announced she had decided to sign off on the ”$25 billion” Mortgage Settlement. By “announced”, I mean she signed the consent orders all our major law enforcers and the biggest bankers had agreed to, and entered them into the record. Judge Collyer didn’t actually say anything about the deal. She didn’t let anyone else say anything, either: she didn’t hold a public hearing on the deal.

In acting silently, Judge Collyer not only okayed the deal’s lousy terms, which institutionalize servicer theft and foreclosure fraud, she reinforced the incredibly poor public process that’s kept the enforcement fraud at the heart of the deal hidden. Deliberately hidden.

Magical Misdirection

To understand just how deceptive “our” government and “our” law enforcers have been with us…

Nothing from the consent judgment entered into court in the $25B foreclosure settlement may constitute “evidence against Defendant.”

WSJ-

The settlement was announced in February and filed in court as a consent judgment last month. Judge Rosemary Collyer approved the landmark settlement on Wednesday. The signed order was filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The pact will offer reductions in loan principal and other assistance to qualifying homeowners. The largest portion of the aid, valued at $17 billion, goes to borrowers at risk of foreclosure. Banks will pay $5 billion in fines, including nearly $1 billion to the Federal Housing Administration.

Why wasn’t this review done prior to any settlement? Because they never began any investigation.

DealBook-

The nation’s biggest banks may have put the huge $25 billion settlement over bad foreclosure practices behind them, but that doesn’t mean their mortgage troubles are over.

A separate review — this time by independent consultants on behalf of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency — flagged more than 138,000 cases for possible flaws in the foreclosure process at the nation’s largest mortgage servicers. Those include foreclosures involved with the so-called robo-signing scandal, in which bank representatives churned through hundreds of documents a day in foreclosure proceedings without reviewing them for accuracy.

The mortgage settlement signed by 49 states and every Federal law enforcer allows the rampant foreclosure fraud currently choking our courts to continue unabated. Yes, I realize the pretty language of Exhibit A promises the banks will completely overhaul their standard operating procedures and totally clean up their acts. Promises are empty if they’re not honored, and worthless if not enforceable.

We know Bailed-Out Bankers’ promises are empty, so what matters is if the agreement is enforceable. And when it comes to all things foreclosure fraud, the enforcement provisions are laughable. But before I detail why, let’s be clear: I’m not being hyperbolic. The bankers running and profiting most from our bailed-out banks are totally dishonest when dealing with the public, and their promises are meaningless.

Lets not confuse the word “Flaw” with “Fraud”…There is a major difference!

HW-

John Walsh, acting Comptroller of the Currency, said the recent $25 billion mortgage servicing settlement reached between the big banks and state attorneys general does not conflict or double-up on requirements servicers have to follow in consent agreements banks signed with the OCC and other regulators last year.

In 2010, regulators, including the OCC, examined 14 large federally regulated mortgage servicers and thrifts.

Last year, the agencies issued enforcement orders against all 14 institutions forcing them to take steps to review their foreclosure review processes and to offer aid to borrowers who suffered from flawed foreclosure practices.

If the top five mortgage servicers begin to abuse bond investors under the foreclosure settlement write-downs, the attorneys general would consider some protections, according to Iowa AG Tom Miller.

Miller faced down banking executives and analysts during a panel at the REthink Symposium Thursday. The $25 billion settlement signed in March forces servicers to meet roughly $10 billion in principal reductions, which could swell higher because in some instances the full dollar written down will not be credited.

Servicers will get full credit for reducing principal on loans they hold on their own portfolio but receive 45 cents for every dollar written down on mortgages held in private securities.

“To try principal reduction in a targeted way and find out if it works is good for the housing market,” Miller said. “We know what (the banks’) plans are. Two have said they wouldn’t do write-downs on private securities. But we could have some discussions about something to reassure investors.”

Let’s be clear why there’s a mortgage deal: the banks broke the law. Several laws in fact, in ways that appear criminal as well as civil. Limiting their liability is the only reason the banks did a deal.

In this post I’m going to look at what the banks could be held liable for; how much liability “their” money persuaded law enforcers to ignore will be the next post. But one important kind of peace has not been bought: criminal. So as I detail the wrong doing exposed by the deal, I highlight the crimes our law enforcers seem to allege the bankers committed. After all, a liability release isn’t simply what it says, it’s what law enforcers do with their remaining freedom to act. If crimes were committed, and indictments don’t follow, the release is much broader than its text.

The consent agreements the bailed-out bankers (B.O.B.s), the feds and the states are largely as had been promised. One big surprise, however, is that the B.O.B.s would now be allowed to systematically overcharge borrowers and steal their homes. Seriously. Who cares about $1 million or $5 million penalties if horrible damage can be inflicted without punishment?

To see what I’m talking about, you need to look at Exhibit E-1. (It’s in all the consent agreements; here’s Chase‘s.) Exhibit E-1 is a 14 page table titled “Servicing Standards Quarterly Compliance Metrics.” That is, it’s a table that details what, precisely, law enforcers will check to make sure that the B.O.B.s are meeting the very pretty servicing standards in the deal. (See Exhibit A)

(Note: You may want to print out table E-1 while reading this, or at least keep it open in another browser window; what I have to say may be hard to believe and you’ll want to be able to double check that I’m telling you the truth.)

Now, the table doesn’t come right out and say, ‘we, the federal and state governments of the United States of America do hereby bless the institutionalization of servicer abuse,’ but it should. To understand why, you need to keep your eye on how the table’s columns are defined. For most issues, the critical columns are C “Loan Level Tolerance for Error” and D “Threshold Error Rate.” Later I’ll talk about the problems in Column F, the “Test Questions.”

The never ending settlement… because those in DC are doing their best to make sure their bankers are A-OK.

Reuters-

Mortgage-backed securities investors who are convinced that banks intend to shift the cost of the $25 billion national mortgage settlement onto their shoulders are “evaluating their legal options,” according to Chris Katopis, executive director of the Association of Mortgage Investors (and a former clerk on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals). The private investors, as I’ve reported, are outraged at the terms of the settlement, which sets no limit on the percentage of securitized mortgages the settling banks — Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Ally Financial — are permitted to modify to reach their $17 billion target for reducing the principal balance owed by struggling borrowers. Mortgage-backed noteholders believe the deal terms encourage banks to write down investor-owned first liens, rather than second lien mortgages in bank-owned portfolios. That incentive, they say, shifts the cost of the deal from the banks to mortgage-backed bondholders.

Their argument is gaining traction. The New York Times editorialized Sunday on the bank-friendly details of …

The surprising tale that I will attempt to pen in this blog entry has a very familiar cast of characters; the Obama Administration, the Housing Bubble, “Toxic Mortgages”, and Too Big To Fail “TBTF” Banks among others. While the headline of TBTF banks in a $25bil mortgage settlement is known to many, the underlying details of the settlement are less known and quite appalling when you pull back the covers.

The wounds on past and present homeowners are still fresh from the housing crisis. As Jonathan Laing points out in this weekend’s Barron’s cover story, “five million of the country’s 76million mortgage holders have lost their homes to foreclosure or lender ordered short sales since 2006, and an estimated 14million more own more on their homes than their properties are currently worth. In all, some $7.4 trillion in homeowners’ equity has been destroyed according to Mark Zandi…”

Cries for Accountability

While blame deserves to be cast upon numerous parties for the housing bubble, Americans have rightly called for accountability on the TBTF banks. Accountability for what? Among other faults, robo-signing became prevalent among TBTF banks as they forged mortgage documents in order to ensure proper paperwork was done to foreclose on properties.

Details of the $25bil Settlement (in the words of HUD) & Public Lauding

Last week was a big one for the banks. On Monday, the foreclosure settlement between the big banks and federal and state officials was filed in federal court, and it is now awaiting a judge’s all-but-certain approval. On Tuesday, the Federal Reserve announced the much-anticipated results of the latest round of bank stress tests.

How did the banks do on both? Pretty well, thank you — and better than homeowners and American taxpayers.

That is not only unfair, given banks’ huge culpability in the mortgage bubble and financial meltdown. It also means that homeowners and the economy still need more relief, and that the banks, without more meaningful punishment, will not be deterred from the next round of misbehavior.

Sadly, that’s what this “deal” does. This “deal” is a hybrid contract and term sheet, with all the crucial, operational aspects of compliance unresolved. A smallish to-be-dealt-with-later item is the timing for implementing the servicing standards. The biggie is the Work Plans; those have not been negotiated at all.

Yes, part of compliance has been finalized; the metrics, and the basic enforcement structure. But it’s not enough to have metrics; you also need processes for gathering the metric data and computing the results. Similarly you need more than a structure for enforcement; you need how-to details. The not-yet-existing Work Plan will cover all that. Worse, the negotiations will happen while the clock is ticking on the deal.

March 15 (Bloomberg Law) — The $25 billion mortgage settlement between lenders and state attorneys general won’t help nearly as many people as its touted to, Neil Barofsky, the former Special US Treasury Department Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), tells Bloomberg Law’s Lee Pacchia. He’s joined by Matthew Stoller, a fellow at the Roosevelt Insitute, who says the government and banks delayed filing details of the settlement to give investors less time to challenge the deal in court.

I’ve been going over the mortgage settlement documents over the past few days – a lot has been released, with many implications. There is plenty to criticize. Subprime Shakeout has a great summary, and David Dayen has done a wonderful job going through the nitty gritty. Abigail Field has a spectacular review of the problems with the servicing standards. I’ll make a few criticisms of my own below. But I think the most interesting parts of the document release were the HUD Inspector General reports on the five banks and the DOJ complaint. What these prove is what we’ve always known – the law enforcement community knew exactly what these banks were doing. DOJ simply chose not to prosecute. There was intent to defraud, fraud, and frankly, according to HUD.

In fact, it’s not clear that the past tense is the correct tense to use. The Wells Fargo report is particularly interesting on that last point. Take it away, HUD OIG (italics are mine).

At the time of our review, affidavits continued to be processed by these same signers, who may not have been qualified, and these signers may not have adequately verified certain figures because they accessed a computer screen of data showing a compilation of figures instead of verifying the data against the information through review of the books and records kept in the regular course of business by the institution.