I read all that, and that's fine, but now I'm left wondering what you would say is in between an electron and a neutron. If spacetime is only a relationship, rather than some directly (albeit with tools) observable phenomena of something, then it seems like we have gaps of existence, i.e. nonexistence, throughout the universe.
It would be like a propagating wave. Or maybe stretching. But then at some point it probably gets absurd, the smaller scale you get. The article that Grames linked about zero point energy gives some idea of how a true vacuum is (plausibly and up for debate) literally impossible, without assuming some material medium.

You were basically saying that all things that exist have a location, but not all locations have things. ("Thing" stated loosely):
"BUT it is not true that every "there" needs to be occupied."
What I don't get is your claim that there could be locations without things. If that were true, you would need to consider spacetime as something conceptual or representational (i.e., is a construct).

Does it really need to be thought of as a relationship though? I mean, wouldn't it still be fair to consider it physical, in the same way that information is physical, and exists independently of any conceptual operation? This would mean that being physical depends upon a "there", or must be grounded to something possibly measurable (spacetime is measurable in principle). Not that I mean occupying space, occupying space implies matter; I'm saying that matter is not the only kind of physical thing.
My earlier thought was how atoms are mostly empty of matter. We don't say that there is nothing between the electron and neutron, except to say that there is nothing we can touch. I know that although the position of an electron can only be estimated with a probability, because of the uncertainty principle for things of that small a magnitude, there is some phenomena going on in the entire spread of where electrons could go. That might be an electric field, or other kind of field, which isn't matter, but observable and physical.
My angle here is partly psychology. In terms of observing the world and the mental operations that go on in your brain at the neural level, space and time are unified. Your hippocampus processes space and time in the same way and in the same sense. For sure, the existence of a mental operation doesn't therefore mean that the conceptual representation itself is physical. But I can explore the idea. If space and time can be observed as one, even if we don't have absolute certainty what happens at a specific space and time, then I don't think there can observations without something physical. Uncertainty is baked into quantum mechanics, that's where limits of understanding can occur. But it looks like spacetime isn't near the quantum level, both for physics and psychology. It's really at or near the perceptual level, so perceptual evidence is fair.
As one of the earlier posts said, the OP just sounds like a reformulation of relativity.
The premise is that all physically real things are measurable in principle. The issue I have is an informationless location, spacetime that cannot be measured in principle. And of course, I question if spacetime should be thought of as a relationship. We might agree, but the precision I want is very difficult to express.
I've only recently really started to dive into quantum mechanics, so there might be some errors in there.

It would be like ether, and would basically be classical physics in all contexts.
The problem I think is assuming that space is "empty" (SL addresses this I think). Maybe empty of matter, but that doesn't mean nothing is there. What is there? I don't know enough about quantum mechanics to say, but there is something physical everywhere, and every where.
But even if there is no room to move as in your counterfactual example, couldn't everything move together? Things could swap places, or momentum could transfer. That's what classical physics would say probably before quantum mechanics. So in a way, yes, there has to be something non-tangible going on, except it would be because we need to account for how things are so dynamic.

I agree that there is a proper nationalism (and I am curious to explore the implications of that), but it looks clear to me that fascism has a sense of improper nationalism, with an irrational concern for tradition - which is not precluded from nationalism. Tradition is present in fascism, but not in communism, and that's a pretty big difference. The reason seems to be different conceptualizations of how the world could and ought to be. We could argue about whether Nazis should be categorized as socialists, but does the book talk about Italian fascism, or American eugenics? Neither seemed imperialistic, although they were certainly concerned about identity politics. This is the last thought I had on it, next time I bring it up, I plan to have read the book already.

I'm not trying to go by what people call themselves. Certainly, there is a similarity, as I mentioned, but calling a fascist and a communist both socialists seems to miss the differences that matter; I think it's fair to distinguish between nation-oriented collectivism and international-collectivism. If there's just socialism, we would miss a lot about how they pose different types of threats.
A variable that underlies nationalism could be the extent that a nation may demand following tradition within that nation, which could be vary to the absolute overthrow of tradition (Maoist China in the Cultural Revolution), to Nazis trying to assert and emphasize traditions of German society. How nationalism was defined in the first page of the thread doesn't seem to preclude tradition put in a light that overlooks either the way tradition changes or can prove useful. But, I might have to read the book, which I plan to read in a few months.
I bought up aesthetics not in terms of just propaganda, clothing style or simply using symbols. I'm not sure to what extent aesthetic outlooks and specific aesthetic points of view come through for communism, and socialism in general (leaving aside for now if fascism should be included in there), although I know it's there. But with fascism, a lot of it looks like a collectivist mutation of 19th century Romanticism, raising tradition itself to be the ideal that Romantic art should portray. Germany did that, Italy did that, Russia didn't. I think there's enough of a difference in aesthetic philosophy to stand for something really fundamentally different. Or at least, it better describes how fascism evolves, but not nearly as well for what I mean by socialism, and thus justification enough to keep them in separate categories within collectivism.

But what you changed I think is a fundamental difference. The "your country here" part is exactly why I'm saying "socialist" just doesn't work. My disagreement is taxonomic though - collectivist makes more sense, as a genus, and the species would be whichever specific version of narrative used to identify "the enemy". Something like that. I'm not seeing the value of labeling it socialist.
But I'm not trying to label it as primarily "nationalist" either. I'm suggesting that Nazi-ism is a form of nationalism taken to an irrational degree, with minimal similarity to socialism qua socialism. I think the question becomes: is nationalism a continuum where it can be either rational or irrational, or if it is simply a dimension of good political philosophy where "irrational nationalism" is a contradiction.
How would you address my claims though about the different aesthetics between the two? I find them to be very important differences that you seem to overlook.

This is a confusing way to talk about it.
First off, it is fair to consider information a part of physical reality, much like how light is part of physical reality, or color, or taste (information can't be called an object,. but it is physical) To call consciousness and other mental phenomena as mental is just to say that they are internal processes of information processing. Color is not a thing you "put onto" objects; flavors are not "put onto" objects. Mental content is not a distinct form of existence, and fundamentally unique compared to anything else that exists - it's just a type of information. So asking what they consist of doesn't make sense. The mind (consciousness) is an action, and action don't really "consist of" anything. What does running consist of? But there are physical parts to the degree that you, the entity, need physical components (more specifically, tangible components) to do anything.

It is a component in the same way that sight is. It is not a distinct type of object.
Metaphysically fundamental.
Consciousness isn't reduced to something physical any more than running is reduced to something physical. So in that way, consciousness is not reducible because it's an activity that the entire entity does - not merely a sufficient degree of neural activation. To be sure, a certain degree of neural activation is necessary for consciousness, except that doesn't mean that consciousness is nothing but neural activation.
See SL's post.

Not with certainty, but enough that I'm skeptical of what you said.
I don't know what you mean "born in socialist theory". In what sense? The only connection I can even think of is Hegel. Fascism's philosophical standpoint is different, resembling a distortion of Romantic era nationalism more than anything (e.g., Wagner). The whole political structure is different, the symbolism is different.

That fascism doesn't really seem to be a type of socialism, so something can't be socialist and fascist. That's fine if you mean lowercase 's' socialism as a description (focusing on the collective good), but not as a specific political philosophy. The only similarity I see is collectivism, and that would be a better word to use.
Maybe I can phrase what I'm thinking in a different way. Do you think nationalism can go too far? Do you think it's something that you can have too much of (kind of like you can't have too much of a virtue like independence), or something you try to strike a balance about (like kindness versus sternness maybe).

Doesn't this contradict what you said another thread, that fascism is pretty close to manifesting in the US? And part of your evidence for that were parallels with Weimar Germany which we all know eventually led to Nazi Germany.

I didn't say that a physical entity is "nothing but" physicality. "Physical-mental" is a redundancy. Any entity is the things it does. It's fine to be redundant for emphasis, but that's it. I'm not sure what you're trying to point out.

Take this from Grames, which I agree with:
"Binswanger is correct to argue against a version of reductionism that would deny consciousness exists. But to investigate the physiological nature of brains (human or animal) to identify what actions of consciousness are and how they occur is not reductionist. Binswanger is wrong to adopt the dualist premise that consciousness is one of the fundamental ontological components of the universe, literally a yet to be discovered substance."
All I mean to say is that anything that is real is in some way itself physical, or an aspect of something physical. So I'm not just saying hylomorphism where mental things exist as a mental substance or exist as distinct mental things, even if they are dependent on distinct physical things or physical substance. I'm saying that the only kind of thing that exists (in terms of fundamental ontological components) is physical.
Switching the context to internal mental events does not change anything. I don't see why it would. You observe internal actions, you observe external actions. They are actions just the same.