I am delighted to present here the 2004 report on the monitoring and testing of cattle, sheep and goats for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) in the European Union.

Since the start of an expanded monitoring programme on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in 2001, more than 41 million cattle have been tested, in addition to those tested as BSE suspects. The surveillance involves active monitoring of healthy slaughtered cattle, risk animals such as fallen stock and cattle with an epidemiological link to known BSE cases. It ensures that no BSE cases are slaughtered for human consumption, thus further increasing the safety of beef. In addition, the monitoring provides a reliable insight into the prevalence and evolution of BSE in the Member States.

The monitoring programme in bovine animals in 2004 was very similar to the programme in 2002 and 2003 in the former 15 Member States, allowing comparisons between both years within the same target group (e.g. healthy slaughtered cattle) and within the same age group. Overall, the BSE situation has improved considerably, showing the effect of measures taken in the past. However, given the long incubation period of BSE it will take many years still before we can hope for a complete eradication of BSE.

Ten new Member States entered the European Union on 1 May 2004. I am most pleased that this report demonstrates that these Member States have started an extensive monitoring long before their accession and that the prevalence of BSE, if present, in these Member States is low. I also welcome very much the results forwarded from Bulgaria, a candidate country, and Norway.

The report furthermore summarises the results of TSE monitoring in small ruminants in 2004. The recent confirmationofBSEinagoatunderlinestheneedforsurveillanceinsmallruminants. Considerable efforts were already carried out by Member States and further increased in February 2005 in order to obtain a clear view on BSE prevalence in small ruminants by an extended monitoring programme.

I would like to thank all Member States for making this report possible. Our combined efforts have enhanced the understanding of the epidemiology of TSEs. They also provide a solid basis for the determination of the future direction of our policies to protect animal and human health.

I hope that this report will provide useful data to all interested parties.

Robert MadelinDirector General

snip...

1. Summary

In 2004, a total of 11.049.822 bovine, 312.803 ovine and 36.115 caprine animals were tested in the EU in the framework of the TSE monitoring programme. 865 bovine, 2.663 ovine and 398 caprine animals turned out positive.

1.478.650 risk bovine animals and 9.551.469 healthy animals slaughtered for human consumption were tested by rapid tests. 3.207 bovine animals were tested in the framework of passive surveillance (animals reported as BSE suspects by the farmer or the veterinary practitioner and subject to laboratory examination). In addition, 16.496 animals were tested in the framework of culling of animals with an epidemiological connection to a BSE case. 80 % of positive cases were detected by the active monitoring (testing of risk animals, healthy slaughtered and culled cattle) and 20 % were detected by passive surveillance. BSE cases were found in all Member States except Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Finland and Sweden. The number of BSE cases and the overall prevalence in tested animals decreased by respectively 37 % and 38 % in 2004 compared to 2003. The decrease was similar in both risk and healthy animals. These reductions and the increasing age of positive cases indicate that measures taken in the past are having some effect.

310.146 ovine animals were tested by active monitoring, while 2.667 were animals reported as TSE suspects and therefore subjected to laboratory examination. In caprine animals, the numbers of tests in the respective groups were 35.082 (active monitoring) and 1.033 (TSE suspects). Respectively 3.506 and 57 TSE cases in sheep and goats confirmedbetween1998and2004weresubjected to discriminatory testing. By such testing, BSE was detected in 1 goat slaughtered in France in 2002. The information on the genotypes of both TSE positive and random sampled sheep is a major tool to decide how to progress in TSE eradication programs in these animals.

In addition to the Member States, Bulgaria and Norway forwarded information on the TSE testing of bovine, ovine and caprine animals.

IN comparison, the USA only tested to August 2001 some 12,500 cattle in the history of all BSE/TSE testing in the USA. since then, the June 2004 enhanced bse surveillance program was a sham as well, with some 9,200 rapid tests on cattle only being with the least reliable test, the IHC, the same test that DID NOT confirm the TEXAS mad cow that Johanns tried to cover up without testing for 7+ months, until the Honorable Phyllis Fong made them retest and CONFIRM the TEXAS MAD COW. you know the rest of the story where then the next suspect BSE mad cow case was negated by the fact that the tissue sample could not be confirmed by WB due to the sample being treated with a preservative. NOT to mention the 'one that got away', the other TEXAS mad cow that they just decided not to test at all, you remember, the stumbling and staggering cow. IT took until the later part of the year 2005 for the USA to gets it BSE testing protocols correct and or up to standards. I have my doubts about the program still, and so do others. Johanns and DeHaven should resign or be fired. BUT, with this administration, they both will probably be promoted for exposing just about ever person in America to the mad cow agent through nothing more than shear greed to save the industry at all cost. ALL 500,000+ BSE/TSE test to date from the 'june 2004 enhanced bse/tse surveillance program' are meaningless. IT proves nothing. THE complete program should be scraped and the testing should be done over, except this time with proper BSE/TSE testing protocols. THEY are only fooling themselves. ...TSS

The BSE enhanced surveillance program involves the use of a rapid screening test, followed by confirmatory testing for any samples that come back "inconclusive." The weekly summary below captures all rapid tests conducted as part of the enhanced surveillance effort. It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. Of those 9,200 routine tests, one test returned a non-definitive result on July 27, 2005. That sample underwent additional testing at NVSL, as well as at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, and results were negative.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html

Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755

USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623

Statement by Chief Veterinary Medical Officer John Clifford Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test ResultsJuly 27, 2005Late yesterday, we received non-definitive test results on an animal sampled as part of a voluntary extension of our enhanced BSE surveillance program. USDA is conducting further testing at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames , Iowa , in consultation with experts from the international reference laboratory in Weybridge , England . We are also sending samples from this animal to the Weybridge laboratory for further testing. It is important to note that this animal poses no threat to our food supply because it did not enter the human food or animal feed chains.

The sample was submitted to us by a private veterinarian. As an extension of our enhanced surveillance program, accredited private veterinarians, who often visit farms in remote areas, collect samples when warranted. The sample in question today was taken from a cow that was at least 12 years of age and experienced complications during calving. The veterinarian treated the sample with a preservative, which readies it for testing using the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test —an internationally recognized confirmatory test for BSE. Neither the rapid screening test nor the Western blot confirmatory test can be conducted on a sample that has been preserved.

Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending on the “slice” of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional “slices” of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.

I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal.

Regardless of the outcome of the further testing, I want to emphasize that human and animal health in the United States are protected by a system of interlocking safeguards. The most important of these is the ban on specified risk materials from the food supply and the Food and Drug Administration’s feed ban. And by any measure, the incidence of BSE in this country is extremely low. Our enhanced surveillance program is designed to provide information about the level of prevalence of BSE in the United States . We are extremely gratified that to date, all sectors of the cattle industry have cooperated in this program by submitting samples from more than 419,000 animals from the highest risk populations. To date, only one animal has tested positive for the disease as part of the surveillance program. These interlocking safeguards continue to protect our food supply.

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

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http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html

now that's one heck of a BSE/TSE mad cow surveillance program isn't it?...not seems that we have been told since 8/4/97 that everything was put into place to stop this agent in the USA. sealed borders, no feeding of ruminants to ruminants (including cows), testing protocols all set up. yet we find that none of this was true. and they still hang on the the Harvard BSE risk assessent that was terribly flawed, proven so by a peer review board of TSE experts, and they still hang on to the UK/BSE/nvCJD only theory, when we all know the diagnostic criteria for differentiating between nvCJD and sCJD has been wrong from the beginning. just look at the farmers that had bse in there herds that died from sCJD. we were told that if another farmer died from sCJD (this after the 2nd case), that great concern should be taken. well, the fourth farmer died from sCJD and the simply covered that up too. nothing became of it. the same old song-and-dance BSeee lived on $$$ God save the industry at all cost, including human health;

CJD FARMERS WIFE 1989

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/10/13007001.pdf

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/10/13003001.pdf

20 year old died from sCJD in USA in 1980 and a 16 yearold in 1981. A 19 year old died from sCJD inFrance in 1985. There is no evidence of an iatrogeniccause for those cases....

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/10/04004001.pdf

cover-up of 4th farm worker ???

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/10/23006001.pdf

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/10/20006001.pdf

CONFIRMATION OF CJD IN FOURTH FARMER

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/11/03008001.pdf

now story changes from;

SEAC concluded that, if the fourth case were confirmed, it would beworrying, especially as all four farmers with CJD would have had BSEcases on their farms.

to;

This is not unexpected...

was another farmer expected?

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/11/13010001.pdf

4th farmer, and 1st teenager

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1996/02/27003001.pdf

2. snip...Over a 5 year period, which is the time period on which the advicefrom Professor Smith and Dr. Gore was based, and assuming apopulation of 120,000 dairy farm workers, and an annual incidenceof 1 per million cases of CJD in the general population, aDAIRY FARM WORKER IS 5 TIMES MORE LIKELY THANan individual in the general population to develop CJD. Using theactual current annual incidence of CJD in the UK of 0.7 permillion, this figure becomes 7.5 TIMES.

3. You will recall that the advice provided by Professor Smith in1993 and by Dr. Gore this month used the sub-population of dairyfarm workers who had had a case of BSE on their farms -63,000, which is approximately half the number of dairy farmworkers - as a denominator. If the above sums are repeated usingthis denominator population, taking an annual incidence in the generalpopulation of 1 per million the observed rate in this sub-populationis 10 TIMES, and taking an annual incidence of 0.7 per million,IT IS 15 TIMES (THE ''WORST CASE'' SCENARIO) thanthat in the general population...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/01/31004001.pdf

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 25, AUGUST 1995

snip...

To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed compounders.

To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets through adverse publicity.

To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders, notably by maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make any changes which may be required.

snip...

THE FUTURE

4..........

MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at handling potentially explosive issues.

5. Tests _may_ show that ruminant feeds have been sold which contain illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive test results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.

6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct linkage between feed milling _practices_ and actual BSE cases, the more likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. ...

SEE full text ;

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/24002001.pdf

InterpretationThe regular coexistence of multiple PrPSc types in patients with CJD casts doubts on the validity of electrophoretic PrPSc mobilities as surrogates for prion strains, and questions the rational basis of current CJD classifications.

what i been saying for years, that the diagnostic criteria differentiating between the nvCJD (i.e. 'the chosen ones') and the sCJD (i.e. 'the forgotten ones') has been terribly flawed from the beginning. ....

IN light of Asante/Collinge et al findings that BSE transmission to the129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that isindistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe Deslys* et al, that The agent responsiblefor French iatrogenic growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control isvery different from vCJD but is similar to that found in one case ofsporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie isolate;

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1

Characterization of two distinct prion strainsderived from bovine spongiform encephalopathytransmissions to inbred mice

http://vir.sgmjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/85/8/2471

ALL animals for human/animal consumption must be tested for TSE.

ALL human TSEs must be made reportable Nationally and Internationally, OF ALL AGES...TSS