The dissenting views regarding Iraq's weapons programs in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, and the cautionary notes sounded by intelligence analysts at the Energy and State departments regarding nuclear matters, and the Air Force's concern regarding Iraq's unmanned aerial vehicle program all fell on willfully deaf ears. In contrast, the CIA's analysis of terrorism, which found only weak connections between Iraq and al Qaeda, elicited considerable questioning from policymakers. Undoubtedly, this was because the administration's decision to invade Iraq had already been made.

[...]

The responsibility for problems related to prewar intelligence regarding Iraq should not be confined to intelligence analysts at the CIA but should extend to policymakers as well -- particularly those at the Defense and State departments, the National Security Council, and the White House.

Likewise, the same parties must be held accountable for the color-coded, duct-tape fakery behind the terrorism alerts that Tom Ridge is told to trot out whenever it's politically expedient.