Abortion and Personhood:
Historical and Comparative Notes

by Dr. David L. Perry

People today who
identify themselves with one of the world's major faiths (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism
etc.) are often unaware that their tradition may not always have affirmed a uniform or
consistent position on the morality of abortion. Even the Catholic popes through the
centuries have not agreed among themselves on whether abortion ought to be equated with
homicide at every stage of pregnancy. On the other hand, the Catholic Church (like
many other religious denominations) has generally opposed the intentional killing of
innocent persons. Thus the question of whether the human embryo or fetus is a
person is very significant, since if it is regarded as a person from conception or from
some later developmental stage of pregnancy, killing it will only be allowed in very grave
circumstances, and sometimes not even then (according to some authorities).

There are no
passages in the Bible specifically mentioning induced abortion, but a case stated in Exodus
21:22-24 (Old Testament) is pertinent: "When, in the course of a brawl, a man knocks
against a pregnant woman so that she has a miscarriage but suffers no further injury, then
the offender must pay whatever fine the woman's husband demands after assessment. But
where injury ensues [i.e. to the woman], you are to give life for life...wound for
wound." Compare the monetary fine for causing miscarriage with the penalty of capital
punishment for many other offenses, as noted e.g. in Exodus 21:12, 15 & 17:
"Whoever strikes another man and kills him must be put to death.... Whoever strikes
his father or mother must be put to death.... Whoever curses his father or his mother
shall be put to death." The comparison suggests that the ancient Hebrews did not
consider the fetus to have the same moral status as a person. (Rachels 67)

In subsequent Jewish
ethics, although human life was said to be only fully present from birth,
embryonic and fetal life (or "potential" life) was valued, so abortion was only
permitted for weighty reasons. Traditionally, only threats to the mother's life or
physical health (or her psychological health, according to a minority view) were
sufficient; permission might be granted in cases of serious fetal abnormalities, not from
a direct assessment of the child's prospective suffering or quality of life, but in regard
to the suffering a mother would feel concerning her child's condition. On the other hand,
traditional Jewish legal scholars believed that most women would not obey a civil law
prohibiting abortion, and thus they hesitated to recommend such a law. (Biale)

Aristotle,
in Politics, book VII, ch. 16, reflected the acceptance of abortion in ancient
Greek society: "...[W]hen couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured
before sense and life have begun." In On the Soul, he distinguished between a)
the nutritive/vegetative soul, characteristic of plants, b) the sensitive soul, which many
animals have, and c) the intellectual/rational soul, which human beings have (alone among
the animals, in his view). He believed that the human embryo/fetus first develops a), then
b), then c). In Natural History, book VII, ch. 3, Aristotle claimed that male
fetuses took on recognizably human form around 40 days gestation, females around 80-90
days. (This is empirically bogus, of course, but conveniently supported his belief that
men are more rational than women.) Aristotle's views were later cited by many Christian
writers, notably Thomas Aquinas.

In ancient Greek and
Roman societies, not only abortion but even infanticide of deformed newborns was
permitted. By contrast, many early Christians categorically opposed
abortion. The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, a Christian
document written ca. 150, stated, "You shall not kill the fetus by abortion or
destroy the infant already born." Athenagoras of Athens, defending
the nonviolent ways of Christians to the Roman emperor in 177, wrote, "We call it
murder and say it will be accountable to God if women use instruments to procure
abortion." He referred to the fetus as "a living creature...an object of God's
care." Tertullian of Carthage wrote in Apologetics (ca.
200), "With us, murder is forbidden once for all. We are not permitted to destroy
even the fetus in the womb." (Hurst 6-7) In On the Soul (ca. 210), Tertullian
cited the following biblical texts in his arguments against abortion: Jeremiah 1:4-5:
"Now the word of the Lord came to me saying, 'Before I formed you in the womb I knew
you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the
nations.'" Luke 1:41-44: "When Elizabeth [the mother of John the Baptist] heard
the greeting of Mary [the mother of Jesus], the babe leaped in her womb; and Elizabeth
[exclaimed], 'Blessed are you among women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb.... For
when the voice of your greeting came to my ears, the babe in my womb leaped for
joy.'" However, Tertullian thought that abortion should be permitted when necessary
to save the mother's life (i.e., therapeutic).

Basil of
Caesarea wrote in a letter to Amphilochius (374), "She who has deliberately destroyed
a fetus has to pay the penalty of murder [ten years' penance]. And there is no exact
inquiry among us as to whether the fetus was formed or unformed." Jerome,
who translated the Bible into Latin, Epistle 22 (ca. 400): "Others drink
potions to ensure sterility and are guilty of murdering a human being not yet conceived
[?]. Some, when they learn they are with child through sin, practice abortion by the use
of drugs. Frequently, they die themselves and are brought before the rulers of the lower
world guilty of three crimes: suicide, adultery against Christ, and murder of an unborn
child." (Hurst 7)

By the fifth century,
however, one begins to see a more complex set of Christian ideas on abortion. Augustine,
Bishop of Hippo, wrote in On Exodus (ca. 415) that early abortion should not be
regarded "as homicide, for there cannot be a living soul in a body that lacks
sensation due to its not yet being fully formed." Augustine believed that
"hominization" took place at forty days after conception for males and eighty
days for females. This view has been termed "delayed hominization" or
"mediate animation," in contrast to "immediate animation/hominization"
where the human soul is thought to exist from conception. However, in another work, On
Marriage and Lust, Augustine condemned both abortion and contraception as immoral,
since they permit sexual intercourse to occur without procreation, which he (like earlier
Stoic philosophers) thought to be its only "natural" purpose. (Dombrowski; Hurst
8)

Some Christians have
considered abortion worse than murder:

When Saint Fulgentius
of the sixth century was asked when the stain [of original sin] attaches to the person, he
replied that it begins with conception. Hence the concern with allowing the fetus to be
brought to term so that it can be baptized; otherwise it is condemned to death in both
worlds, making abortion clearly worse than murder. It must accordingly be said that when
Catholics reputedly decide to 'let the mother die' rather than allow an abortion, they are
not at all being cruel, merely consistent with a logical concern. The mother has been
presumably baptized as an infant; let her die and 'go to her reward.' But let the child be
brought to term and baptized and saved from perdition. So sincere is this concern that
theologians at the Sorbonne in the nineteenth century invented a baptismal syringe,
wherewith to baptize a fetus in utero in the event of a spontaneous abortion, a
miscarriage. (Feldman 386)

(Personally, I find it
impossible to reconcile the Christian affirmation of God as compassionate with the belief
that God would condemn an unbaptized fetus or infant to hell. But I digress.)

Islam has
traditionally regarded "personhood" as something acquired prior to birth,
although Muslims have not always agreed as to when that occurs. Several medieval Muslim
authorities mentioned "ensoulment" occurring at 120 days of gestation, or about
four months into a pregnancy. (It's unclear why 120 days would be significant, though it
may have been based on "quickening," or the first movement of the fetus in the
womb that's noticeable to the mother.) At any rate, after that point abortion was
considered homicide. But even when consensus existed on that point, authorities disagreed
as to whether abortion was permissible prior to ensoulment. Some thought it was, while
others opposed early abortion because the embryo would otherwise become ensouled. (Rahman)

For most traditional Hindu
authorities, conception marks the point of a soul's rebirth from a previous life, so
abortion at any stage of pregnancy is thought to be morally equivalent to killing a
person. Some Hindu traditions put the onset of personhood at three to five months
gestation, though. (Crawford ch. 1)

Many Christians in the
medieval period apparently believed in delayed hominization. The Teaching of an
Irish Synod, i.e., Christian clergy (ca. 675): "The penance for homicide
is seven years on bread and water.... The penance for the destruction of the embryo of a
child in the mother's womb [early abortion?] is three and a half years. The penance for
the destruction of flesh and spirit [late abortion?] is seven and a half years on bread
and water.... The penance for a mother's destruction of her own child [infanticide?] is
twelve years on bread and water...." Bede of England, Penitential
(ca. 725): "A mother who kills her child before the fortieth day [of gestation] shall
do penance for one year. If it is after the child has become alive, [she shall do penance]
as a murderer. But it makes a great difference whether a poor woman does it on account of
the great difficulty of supporting [the child], or a prostitute for the sake of concealing
her wickedness." (Bede does not explain, though, whether the woman's motive in
obtaining abortion is more important than the stage of pregnancy in which it's performed.)
Another Irish penitential text, ca. 800: "A woman who causes miscarriage of that
which she has conceived, after it has become established in the womb, three years and
one-half of penance. If the flesh has formed, it is seven years. If the soul has entered
it, fourteen years of penance." Pope Innocent III and Pope
Gregory IX (ca. 1200) considered abortion to be homicide only when the fetus is
"formed." (Hurst 10-11) This is rather startling, given that many 20th-century
Catholics tend to assume that the Vatican has always affirmed "immediate
animation."

Thomas Aquinas,
On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, book II, ch. 89, reflected the influence of
Aristotle's views on human development: "The vegetative soul, which comes first, when
the embryo lives the life of a plant, is corrupted, and is succeeded by a more perfect
soul, which is both nutritive and sensitive, and then the embryo lives an animal life; and
when this is corrupted, it is succeeded by the rational soul introduced from without
[i.e., by God]." This "delayed hominization" view was confirmed as Catholic
dogma by the Council of Vienne in 1312, and has never been officially repudiated by the
Vatican. (Hurst 12; Rachels 68)

John of Naples
(1315) used "delayed hominization" to justify early abortions when necessary to
save the life of the mother. (Hurst 16-17) It's not clear, though, why he did not approve
of non-therapeutic abortions in the early stages of pregnancy. Perhaps he agreed with
Augustine that like contraceptives they frustrate the "natural purpose" of sex.

Antonius de Cordoba
and Tomas Sanchez in the 16th century, and Alphonsus Ligouri
in the 18th, argued that abortion was acceptable as long as it was the
"accidental" or "unintended" consequence of treatment necessary to
save the mother's life. (Hurst 17) Their approach suggests the "theory of double
effect," where a bad result is permitted as long as it is unintended (even if
foreseen) and proportionate to a good, intended result. Presumably for these three
writers, in cases of therapeutic abortion the stage of pregnancy was morally irrelevant.

Pope Sixtus V,
in Effraenatum (1588), declared contraception and abortion at any stage of
pregnancy, whether the fetus was "animated or not animated, formed or unformed,"
to be homicide, a mortal sin, and grounds for excommunication. But in 1591, Pope
Gregory XIV in Sedes Apostolica recommended "where no homicide or no
animated fetus is involved, not to punish more strictly than the sacred canons or civil
legislation does." (Hurst 15)

In the 17th century,
physicians Thomas Fienus of Louvain and Paolo Zacchia of
Rome claimed that a rational soul existed from the moment of conception (Hurst 15-16),
apparently because they erroneously thought they'd seen fully formed human shapes in early
embryos while peering through their primitive microscopes. Their claims reflected an old
belief that a rational soul could not be present until a physical human form was prepared
to receive it. But they influenced the Vatican to lean toward "immediate
hominization." (Rachels 68)

In 1701, Pope Clement
XI instituted the feast of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, the mother of
Jesus. Mary was said to have received sanctifying grace in her soul at the moment she was
conceived, which obviously meant that she had a soul at conception. This led many
Catholics to think that everyone else must have a soul at conception, too, though by this
point Aquinas's distinctions between various kinds of souls had been forgotten.

In 1864, a Jesuit theologian
named Jean Gury wrote that although an early fetus was not ensouled, it
would be just as wrong to kill a potential human being as it would to kill an actual one
(though it's not obvious how a potential human being could be "killed.")
Thus, even though he accepted the delayed hominization view, he opposed abortion during
all stages of pregnancy. Immediate hominization and a total ban on abortion were
declared by Pope Pius IX in 1869 and written into the Code of
Canon Law in 1917. (Hurst 16 & 19)

Pope Pius XI,
in Christian Marriage (1930), made it clear that the Vatican opposes all direct
abortions, even those necessary to save the lives of women:

. . . [N]o reason, however
grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become
conformable to nature and morally good. Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined
primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately
frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature and commit a deed which is
shameful and intrinsically vicious. . . . But another very grave crime is to be noted,
Venerable Brethren, which regards the taking of the life of the offspring hidden in the
mother's womb. Some wish it to be allowed and left to the will of the father or the
mother; others say it is unlawful unless there are weighty reasons which they call by the
name of medical, social, or eugenic 'indication.' Because this matter falls under the
penal laws of the state by which the destruction of the offspring begotten but unborn is
forbidden, these people demand that the 'indication,' which in one form or another they
defend, be recognized as such by the public law and in no way penalized. There are those,
moreover, who ask that the public authorities provide aid for these death-dealing
operations, a thing which, sad to say, everyone knows is of very frequent occurrence in
some places. As to the 'medical and therapeutic indication' to which, using their own
words, we have made reference, Venerable Brethren, however much we may pity the mother
whose health and even life is gravely imperiled in the performance of the duty allotted to
her by nature, nevertheless what could ever be a sufficient reason for excusing in any way
the direct murder of the innocent? This is precisely what we are dealing with here.
Whether inflicted upon the mother or upon the child, it is against the precept of God and
the law of nature: 'Thou shalt not kill.' The life of each is equally sacred, and no one
has the power, not even the public authority, to destroy it. It is of no use to appeal to
the right of taking away life for here it is a question of the innocent, whereas that
right has regard only to the guilty; nor is there here question of defense by bloodshed
against an unjust aggressor (for who would call an innocent child an unjust aggressor?);
again there is no question here of what is called the 'law of extreme necessity' which
could even extend to the direct killing of the innocent. Upright and skilful doctors
strive most praiseworthily to guard and preserve the lives of both mother and child; on
the contrary, those show themselves most unworthy of the noble medical profession who
encompass the death of one or the other, through a pretense at practicing medicine or
through motives of misguided pity.

Similar views have been
expressed by Pope Paul VI in Human Life (1968), the Vatican's Declaration
on Abortion (1974), and Pope John Paul II in The Gospel of Life
(1993).

In most countries today where
the Roman Catholic Church is dominant, direct abortion is prohibited by law. The Vatican
permits only two cases of "indirect" abortion: in ectopic pregnancy, where the
embryo implants in the fallopian tube instead of the uterus; and when the uterus itself
becomes cancerous. Even though the fetus dies if the tube or uterus is removed, the
Vatican regards the death of the fetus as not directly intended, hence permissible
(Callahan). Vatican policies also apply to Catholic hospitals in the U.S.

In English and
American common law prior to the 19th century, abortion was not a crime prior to
"quickening," the first movement of the fetus in utero to be felt by the
mother, occurring usually between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy. (Quickening
apparently has little legal significance today, though it may still have moral
significance for some people.)

From roughly 1865 to 1960,
many American states enacted legal restrictions on abortion. During the 1960s, about a
third of the states liberalized their laws. But in 25 states as recently as 1972, abortion
was only permitted when necessary to preserve the mother's life. (Rosenfield and Kunins
130ff.)

Decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade (1973) and subsequent cases established
women's constitutional right to obtain abortions. The Court refused to grant fetuses
the status of legal persons at any stage of pregnancy, but it also claimed that states
have a "compelling interest" in the life of the fetus once it becomes viable.
States must permit "therapeutic" abortions (those needed to preserve
women's lives and health) at every stage of pregnancy. They must also permit
"elective" abortions prior to viability, but may restrict them after that point.
(Most but not all states restrict late-term elective abortions.) Beginning in
1976, the U.S. Congress prohibited Medicaid funding of abortions for poor women, except in
cases of rape, incest, or threat to the mother's life. That law has been upheld by
the Supreme Court. (Shapiro)

In 1981, the First
International Conference on Islamic Medicine was held in Kuwait. As a result of that
conference, the Islamic Code of Medical Ethics was written. In
contrast to the "delayed animation" view in traditional Islam, this Code
regards the human embryo from the moment of conception as a complete human being deserving
protection. In many Muslim countries today, abortion is only permitted to save the
mother's life.

Given traditional opposition
to abortion in Hinduism, it may be surprising that contemporary law in India
is fairly liberal. Abortion is permitted not only when the mother's life is endangered,
but also in cases of rape (out of concern for the mother's anguish and mental health),
fetal deformity (compassion for the child's physical or mental suffering), and
contraceptive failure (anguish of unwanted pregnancy for the woman). (Crawford ch. 1)

Consider how Aristotle and
other proponents of delayed hominization might interpret the following recent findings in neuroscience:

Synapses are what form the
overwhelming number of connections between nerves. Since the functions of the brain depend
almost exclusively on the ability of nerve cells to communicate with each other, synapses
are also key to understanding the brain. . . . The cells that will eventually be part of
the cerebral cortex [the higher brain, the foundation of human consciousness] begin
forming in the seven-week embryo. . . . They migrate to positions in what will eventually
be the cortex, where they build up in layers. . . . Before synapses are formed, the fetal
brain is just a collection of nerve cells. The fetus is incapable of awareness or
volition. . . . [The] burst of synapse formation [between 25 and 32 weeks gestation] marks
the period during which the brain is transformed from a collection of individual cells
into a connected machine capable of carrying out human thought. . . . [B]efore the wiring
up of the cortex, the fetus is simply incapable of feeling anything, including pain. . . .
[S]ignals may be sent by the nerves, but there is simply nothing to receive them. They
stop at the brain stem for the simple reason that there is nowhere else for them to go.
(Morowitz and Trefil 112-113, 116-117, and 158-159)

Today in the U.S., 91% of all
abortions occur within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, 98% within 15 weeks, and 99.9%
within 27 weeks. (Alan Guttmacher Institute) A full-term pregnancy lasts 40 weeks.

When performed by qualified
physicians, abortions today are more than 10 times safer to women than giving birth.
(Rosenfeld and Kunins 135) By contrast, every year at least 75,000 women die
from unsanitary abortions in countries where they're illegal. (Crossette)

Consider: If persons
(having a prima facie right to life) were said to exist from a certain stage or
point in physical development, what would be the corresponding stage or point when it
would be sensible to declare persons to be dead? If conception,
e.g., were regarded as a sufficient condition for personhood, why would whole-brain death
be sufficient to declare a person dead? If viability were a
necessary condition for being a person, would persons die when they became completely
dependent on life-sustaining technologies? When we attempt to develop a
"metaphysic" of persons, it becomes clear that neither conception nor viability
(nor birth, for that matter) mark a sensible beginning point.

On the other hand, if the capacity
for consciousness is a necessary condition for personhood, and hence necessary to
having interests and rights (as I believe Steinbock and others have persuasively shown),
then early abortion cannot credibly be equated with murder. This criterion would
also seem to imply that individuals in persistent vegetative states should be considered
dead, since they have permanently lost the capacity for consciousness (Cranford and
Smith).

If late-term fetuses were
regarded as persons, would that entail a complete prohibition of late-term abortions?
Perhaps not, if therapeutic abortion can be construed as killing in self-defense
(English). This would also suggest that the traditional moral belief that it is
always immoral to intentionally kill an innocent person would have to be qualified.

In most human cultures until
recently, the interests and rights of women were given very little weight. Women
were often regarded as the property of their fathers or husbands rather than as autonomous
persons. Women could rarely refuse to have sex with their husbands or to bear
children. Single women who became pregnant due to rape or were too poor to raise
children were unable on those grounds alone to obtain approval from most religious
authorities for abortions.

Today, we rightly react with
outrage to such violations of women's rights, dignity and well-being. Even many
people who disapprove of abortions nonetheless support the legal right of women to obtain
them, in part because the consequences for women when abortion is illegal are often
deadly.

Many pregnancies are
avoidable, of course. Some couples who aren't ready to rear children have sex anyway
without using contraceptives. That's irresponsible. There is every reason to
advocate and practice responsible sex to avoid unwanted pregnancies. But there is no
convincing moral reason to deny women their legal right to abortion. Women must be
trusted to make responsible decisions about their own pregnancies. They are right to
resent and oppose efforts to take that choice away from them.