Excerpt: Commerce's Reinsch on Multilateral Export Controls

(U.S. needs to build export-control consensus, he says) (1020)
Under Secretary of Commerce William Reinsch says that the United
States must approach consensus on export-control policy itself before
it can exert more influence on other countries' policies.
"The recent legislative debate revealed the differences among us are
wide," Reinsch said, "and these differences do not provide a firm
basis for U.S. leadership at this time."
Reinsch made the comment in April 12 testimony before the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee.
The main subject of Reinsch's testimony was the Wassenaar Arrangement,
the 33-member regime for controlling exports of advanced technology
and conventional armaments to rogue states and areas of instability.
It succeeded the much more powerful Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).
He told the committee to forget about suggestions for reviving COCOM
or its forceful provision that allowed any member to block another's
proposed export.
"COCOM was a valuable tool for NATO in the Cold War," he said, "but it
is gone and cannot be resurrected."
Reinsch said the United States must recognize that it cannot persuade
most other Wassenaar members to follow a number of unilateral U.S.
export controls and trade sanctions.
He said the United States should instead try to pursue more
initiatives in areas of agreement with other Wassenaar members.
For example, the United States proposes that other governments use
broad authority to block any exports to destinations designated as
posing a weapons proliferation threat even if the export items are not
specifically prohibited in any control list. The United States itself
uses such a "catch-all" provision.
Reinsch said the United States must reduce the number of items subject
to export controls, concentrating on those that are controllable and
critical to advanced military capabilities.
"This adjustment would put us in a better position to seek foreign
cooperation with our national licensing decisions," he said.
Reinsch also said the export-control community should continue
pressing China to join Wassenaar and the other multilateral regimes
that aim to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Following is an excerpt from Reinsch's testimony as submitted for the
committee's record:
(begin text)
Where Do We Go Next
The Wassenaar Arrangement has a strong record of success in bringing
new parties to observe the international norms of export controls and
nonproliferation and in reducing sales of arms to dangerous places.
Wassenaar provides the structure that could let us address the export
control issues that have proved the most troubling over the past
several years. I would like to conclude by listing a few issues and
actions which the U.S. could consider as we move ahead in this
difficult area.
First, we need to recognize that much of the debate in the United
States over export controls is out of sync with the rest of the
industrialized world. This reflects in part larger differences over
security policies, threat perceptions or transatlantic cooperation,
but it forms a crucial backdrop to improving multilateral controls.
But I hope we all agree that unless controls are multilateral they
will have, except in a very few cases, questionable benefit for
national security while putting our economic strength at risk.
Second, we need to continue to consult with our allies and with other
regime members on the scope for cooperation in improving controls. For
conventional arms and related dual-use equipment, it may be less than
we would wish. In particular, we must bear in mind that others will
not adopt our sanctions policies. Related to that, we should continue
our efforts to promote adoption of "catch-all" controls by our regime
partners in order to ensure that adequate authority exists for
controlling a wide range of technology to specific end users of
concern.
Third, in the context of Wassenaar, we need to refocus the list of
dual-use controlled items on those that are controllable and critical
to advanced military capabilities. The globalization of technology
poses new challenges for U.S. security and limits the utility of
export controls. Both the Wassenaar Arrangement and our own national
export controls need to be adjusted in light of this, and this
adjustment would put us in a better position to seek foreign
cooperation with our national licensing decisions. We need to do a
better job reconciling our domestic and multilateral controls.
Fourth, we need to give up the myth of COCOM [Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls]. COCOM was a valuable tool for NATO
in the Cold War, but it is gone and cannot be resurrected.
Fifth, we need to continue efforts to get China to participate in
multilateral regimes such as Wassenaar. To do this, China will need to
make progress in adhering to the international norms for
nonproliferation and arms sales.
We must continue our efforts to encourage non-members to adhere to
regime standards. The Department of Commerce, working closely with the
State Department, has worked with the countries of the former Soviet
Union and Warsaw Pact to develop comprehensive and effective export
control systems. We have often found that even in cases where these
governments are willing to take hard steps to keep items out of the
hands of unreliable parties, they do not have the practical means or
legal basis to do so. We have had some success encouraging them to
take all the necessary steps, including adopting the control lists of
the multilateral regimes, to allow them to adhere to the objectives of
the regimes, but more needs to be done.
Finally, we need to continue to work towards a national consensus, or
as close as we can get to consensus, in our own national discussions
over export controls. The recent legislative debate revealed the
differences among us are wide, and these differences do not provide a
firm basis for U.S. leadership at this time.
The Wassenaar Arrangement is good place to start this effort and a
good place to test our chances for success. If we can make the
Wassenaar Arrangement work better, we will enhance both national and
international security.
(end excerpt)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)