The Water Ethics Network facilitates sharing of experience, ideas, and information about events and activities relating to water ethics. The aim is to bring an awareness of water ethics into the everyday discourse of water policies and management decisions, so that choices about water use and water ecosystem management are consciously informed by values. The network is sponsored by the Water-Culture Institute and the partner organizations listed below.

September 30, 2015

Linking the Red to the Dead Sea: is it truly ethical?

The Red-Dead Sea project (hereafter RDS) aims at linking up both seas,
thus (1) refilling the Dead Sea with seawater from the Red Sea (mostly
desalination brine) over a 180km pipeline, (2) providing desalinated drinking water
on the way and (3) generating hydro-electricity due to over 300m difference in
elevation (the Dead Sea is the lowest place on earth). Beneficiaries are Jordan
and on medium-term Palestine and Israel. RDS infrastructure will be located on
Jordanian grounds, in the Jordan Valley along the border (see Map). “Save the
Dead Sea!” and regional peace building have been major arguments to get
international funding and support.

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Courtesy Arirusila @ wordpress.com

RDS comes at a time when the Dead Sea is losing around 1m per year; drinking
and irrigation water needs increase in parallel to higher energy consumption.
All beneficiaries are facing water stress if not chronic scarcity, Jordan and
Palestine having lower underground and surface water reserves. Overall demand
by far outstrips supply (e.g. Jordan River and basin). The main drivers are
population growth and the sheltering of close to 1 million refugees from Syria and
Iraq. Desalination requires high upfront investments and a steady energy
sources; the latter can only be secured through oil imports or ideally renewable
energy.

Courtesy: Feasibility Study p. 17 @ worldbank.org

Reviewing the original large-scale project from an ethical perspective
invites us to take a closer look at available World Bank reports and mull over
a set of cardinal questions:

1)Are the objectives reasonable
in terms of balancing expected costs against benefits, sustainability and risks?

Expected benefits or “tangibles” are desalinated water and
hydroelectricity. Financial costs are estimated
to reach around USD 11 billion for all RDS-type scenarios. This estimate takes
into account capital, operational and maintenance costs in 2020.

Non-money values

In the final Environmental Assessment and Social Report (ESA), the
non-money value of the Dead Sea is defined according to criteria set by the
World Heritage Organisation. The Sea is “associated with events or living
traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of
outstanding universal significance” (criterion vi); it is an “area of
exceptional beauty and aesthetic importance” (criterion vii); it is an
“outstanding example representing major stages of Earth’s history, including
the record of life” (criterion viii). These criteria are so called
“intangibles” because the market does not value them.

The cost benefit evaluation tackles intangibles by surveying public
opinions, a common practice in environmental economics. The sticking points are
three-fold. First, the survey interviewed around 9000 people in 18 countries.
This probably means that a significant number of interviewees were not familiar
with the Dead Sea and the Jordan Valley’s daily problems, thus fudging their
preferences. Second, only a fraction out of 9000 would reflect the preferences
of local communities living within the project area.

Third and most importantly, the survey revolved around two questions
valuing intangibles:

a)What would you be willing to pay
to stabilize declining Dead Sea levels and prevent further environmental degradation?

b)What would you be willing to
pay to build a symbol of peaceful co-operation in the Middle East?

Total benefits vs intangibles

The aggregated answers to both questions were respectively USD 30 and 11
billion. What does it mean? It means that all interviewees are willing to spend
41 billion to save the Dead Sea and support peace in the Middle East. The main
problem is that estimated intangibles (41 billion!) are recorded as part of
total benefits (See Table infra). This figure
makes up for almost ¾of total benefits, meaning that
the key-objectives of generating water and hydropower, including profits
generated by tourism and the chemical industry amount to only ¼of the total. This approach “inflates” total benefits, but by
deleting intangibles, total benefits fall down to 15 billion! Once adjusted total
benefits represent only 15 billion instead of 57 billion, versus 11 billon
total costs.

Courtesy Feasibility Study p.72 @ worldbank.org

The stabilization of Dead Sea levels is considered a direct positive
benefit, but the promised salvage is not guaranteed. The limit of conveyed Red
Sea water is set at 2000 MCM/year because it must be channelled and “available”
at different heights. Due to pumping cost and network capacity, this amount
will remain a systemic limitation. The working assumption is that at least 1200
MCM are needed to save the Dead Sea annually. This is just enough to halt the
process if everything remains stable within the next 30 years. Over time, more
freshwater will be required as demand grows. In addition,
evaporation rates will rise due to climate change. Realistically, the share of
water going to the Dead Sea could become insufficient as it is increasinglyreallocated for desalination purposes.

Approach to risk assessments

The Feasibility Study highlights two external
risks, namely seismic activity in the region, and potential pipeline damages causing
saltwater intrusion. Moreover, the deterioration of Dead Sea water quality
causing algae bloom constitutes an additionalrisk.Recalling the “heritage site” criterion, the
ESA posits that post-mitigation impact will be “moderate”.So far though, there is no clear-cut evidence
that the Red-Dead mixing regime will be harmless. ESA admits that “because of
the uncertainties regarding these effects, their potential impact on cultural
and natural heritage is considered to be of major significance”.It therefore deems“additional study
from information gained from physical trials”necessary. In other
words, this means that the risks related to RDS are not entirely predictable
and are likely (if not very likely) to damage the Dead Sea and its
surroundings.

Adding to uncertainty, the cost analysis leaves
out identified external risk-related costs. The relationship of risks related
to environmental damages and potential benefits is of critical importance. In
the present case, the costs of risk-occurrence remain unknown. Clearly, it does
not mean that because risks are listed on paper, that these cease to exist in
reality, especially in terms ofdamages to the environment and
reparation costs. In that sense, both principles of sustainability and
precaution constitute weak spots of the RDS feasibility. In this case, it is politically
acknowledged that risks are worth taking. In other words, the costs and
benefits of answering growing energy and water demand, in the context of scarcity,
are considered more important than identified risks and alternative options.

2)Are there other alternatives
available that can offer lower costs, less risks and more sustainability?

The nature of the landscape and external risks identified call, from a
technical perspective, for joint management and cross-border alternatives,
decentralised infrastructure and independent power sources, providing
desalinated water close to national water networks. This would allow for better
maintenance and shorter cost recovery, timely upgrades and adjustments.

Saving the Jordan?

The historical
flow of the Jordan River of about 1,300 MCM/year annually has been
progressively reduced by upstream diversion – mainly by Israel, Jordan and
Syria.The ethical question is; should
efforts focus on the Dead Sea, which is already “dead” or should efforts focus
on the Jordan River, which is very much “alive” but threatened to disappear
completely from the Basin? From an ethical perspective, it would be wise to
concentrate all efforts on the Jordan River, and then try to revive the Dead
Sea. Reviving the Jordan ultimately means saving the Dead Sea because the
Jordan naturally flows into the Dead Sea. Surely, no one will contest that
losing the Jordan (and its aquifer) would be far worse than losing the Dead
Sea.

The “comparison of alternatives” table in the Final Environmental and
Social Assessment compares the costs of each alternative to RDS. The table
explains that the identified benefits of RDS respectively to “stabilize the
dead sea”, “provide water for three beneficiaries” and “generate hydropower”
will not be achieved by saving the Jordan River. Hence, the full range of
benefits such as ecosystem restauration, aquifer replenishment, health gains, and
touristic advantages etc., fall out of the study. Accordingly, the scenario of
the Jordan River’s full restauration is evaluated as “not know; but costly”.
This seems vague and insufficient given that saving the Jordan is one of the
most important alternatives to RDS.

These findings ignore the wealth of options that could provide water and
generate hydropower while saving the Jordan. See for instance the “Jordan
River’s full restauration” scenario as described here by a regional NGOEcoPeaceMiddle East in its “Regional Master Plan for the Sustainable Development of the
Jordan Valley”.

The intangible valuation of restoring the river would bring about
similar or potentially higher results than those obtained for RDS. First, part
of the Jordan’s banks and nearby locations are classified as UNESCO “World
Heritage” sites. Second, the Jordan River is not only related to Christian
baptism, but bears great symbolical meaning for Jewish and Muslims in the
region and around the world. Hence, a “Jordan” vs. “Dead Sea” survey is likely
to see people choose the river over the sea.

Other
alternatives?

The RDS project lifetime calls for other alternatives.In fact, the first drops of desalinated water
will reach the first Jordanian taps in 2020, if there are no delays. By then, scarcity
will be more severe even though a fraction of the required capital investments could
have financed smaller alternatives with shorter implementation time, lower
risks and immediate water or energy outputs.

Even the ESA
report underscores that RDS is not without public concerns. Israeli and
Palestinian communities invited to public hearings worried that other strategic
alternatives, such as the restauration of the Jordan Valley, were being
dismissed too rapidly.

Other interrelated alternatives that could deliver an immediate positive
impact on water availability and bring peace in the region include;

Regulate the chemical industry’s rate of extraction and increase water efficiency in the agricultural and tourism sector.

Reduce water loses within national water carriers and restore the old-aged piping infrastructure in Jordan and Palestine.

Share water equitably along the Jordan and its tributaries e.g. starting with Lake Tiberias (see red pin on the Map) in Israel or the multiple dams build on the Yarmouk River in Syria.

The last option would require joint diplomacy to achieve long-lasting
peace because water is always related to national security in the Middle East.
So far, multiple security deadlocks tremendously impair the much more
sustainable aim of cross-border water sharing. The total cost of these alternatives
could be higher than RDS, but there is no doubt that their benefits, taken
separately or not, would be higher, less risky and more sustainable.

Courtesy Google Map

3)Are information disclosure and
public participation guaranteed at all stages?

The World Bank has made all studies available on its website. Hence, the
public disclosure of background documents is largely fulfilled. However, the
involvement of Palestinian, Israeli and Jordan civil society by the World Bank
and state parties cannot be qualified as progressive. In fact, even though NGOs
and private sectors have expressed their views during public hearings, no
democratic participation mechanism were set up by the beneficiary parties or by
the World Bank.Hence, civil society is not
be included in decision-making.Consultations were limited to public statements and sharing opinions but
did not grant further rights to representatives from civil society and
communities. There is no need to explain that this could potentially back fire
in the future (e.g. civil disobedience, lack of ownership, free riding and non-payment
of tariffs).

Finally, is RDS ethical? In the light of the previous points, it seems
not. This brief review leaves me with two nagging questions. First, can ethics
be sacrificed to provide water and energy in times of scarcity and war? Second,
can ethics exist without democratic participation? Despite the tangible
benefits of the project, it seems that its main shortcomings are mostly the
result of the political deadlock in the region. Hence, instead of strengthening
political peace, decision makers have chosen an ambitious technical substitute.
However, RDS remains potentially unethical in its grand design. It is up to
decision-makers to feel out whether it is the right way to revive the Dead Sea,
or whether efforts should focus on more ethical alternatives.

2 comments:

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