The just
war tradition and most versions of just war theory begin with the elements of a
decision to go to war and conclude when one side declares victory[1].These considerations are generally called jus ad bellum (justice before war) and jus in bello (justice during war).The assumption underlying most versions of
just war theory is a world of Wesphalian-style nation-states, in which a war is
declared, fought, and finished with a set of peace-talks and eventually war
crimes trials.The model for such a conflict
was World War II in Europe, but the problem is that modern warfare does not
follow this pattern.A declaration of
victory over the government does not entail the end of conflict in an area, nor
does bringing down a government entail the end of moral responsibilities in the
area.

The purpose
of this paper is to extendprima facie just war theoryto include justice after the war or jus post bellum. This is part of a
larger project which includes a re-formulation of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello
principles based on Ross’ prima facie
duties framework.The project also
includes the formulation of a set of ethical principles concerning the time
before jus ad bellum as well as the
application of all the principles to the classic problem of a supreme emergency
situation.[2]

Like
Walzer’s original project in Just and
Unjust Wars, this is a project about applied ethics.As Walzer says,

This is a book of practical morality.The study of judgments and justifications in
the real world moves us closer, perhaps, to the most profound questions of
moral philosophy, but it does not require direct engagement with those
questions.Indeed, philosophers who seek
such an engagement often miss the immediacies of political and moral
controversy and provide little help to men and women faced with hard
choices.For the moment, at least,
practical morality is detached from its foundations, and we must act as if that
separation were a possible (since it is actual) condition of moral life.[3]

The larger purpose of my project is
to create a framework for use by the men and women faced with the hard choices
in time of war.It is for this reason
that I decided to use Ross’ prima facie
duties framework, as Ross’ central concern was about the nature of the
choices and duties of the ‘plain man’.AsRoss says,

When a plain man fulfills a promise because he
thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that the does so with no thought of
its total consequences, still less with any opinion that these are likely to be
the best possible….What makes him think it is right to act in a certain way is
the fact that he has promised to do so – that and, usually, nothing more.[4]

The plan
for this paper is to begin by summarizing current thinking on post-conflict
responsibilities.I will then apply prima facie duties to current jus post bellum principles.In so doing I will explain Ross’ theory and
the general means of applying prima facie
duties to just war theory.I will
then apply Rossian principles to post-conflict ethics.

Current thinking on jus post bellum

Although
the duties after war have only recently (if they have been at all) been
included in the just war tradition, the restoration of the American south after
the U.S. Civil war, as well as the significant effort at reconstruction after
World War II are evidence that the end of the war has not traditionally been
the end of the moral duties concerning the war.Efforts at reconstruction can be justified on both practical and moral
grounds, and it has historically been the case that the U.S. has provided
assistance to areas in which its wars have been fought.Critics would say that those efforts have a
selfish motive, in that they are intended to buy alliances with the newly
sovereign states.It is also clear that
such reconstruction is not required by the traditional just war theory, thus
there is a need for an extension of the just war tradition to cover
post-conflict duties.

Camilla
Bosanquet summarized the literature on justice after the war in a paper for
ISME 07.[5]In her paper she summarizes the work of
Orend, Bass, Walzer and others and arrives at seven elements necessary to
justice after war.This section will
begin with a summary of Bosanquet’s version of jus post bellum duties, as they are the current thinking on the
problem of moral obligations after war.I will continue by noting some places in which Bosanquet and her
predecessors could have been more complete and by re-interpreting jus post bellum principles in light of prima facie duties.

In Refining Jus Post Bellum, Bosanquet
traces the development thinking on post-conflict responsibilities.As a general principle, she makes a
distinction between recommendations for actions following particular conflicts
and the development of broader principles that should govern all post-conflict
situations.The goal of her paper is to
focus on the broader theoretical principles.

Situating
her work in the just war tradition, Bosanquet says,

If Schuck suggested his principles “as a start”,
then I offer my criteria “as a continuation” and recognize that further work
will likely be required.Each criterion
reflects or expands upon thoughts of others;I believe that this formulation of jus
post bellum criteria goes some way toward bringing previous efforts into
harmony.[7]

In this section I will summarize
Bosanquet’s criteria and in the following section I will positionin them within
the prima facie duties.

Bosanquet’s
seven jus post bellum criteria are:
1) rights vindication, 2) publicity, 3) honorable intention, 4) protection, 5)
rehabilitation, 6) justice, 7) restoration.[8]
She bases her criteria on a wide variety of thinkers, beginning with Schuck and
extending to significant figures such as Orend and Walzer.For this reason, I will take her criteria as
an accurate picture of the current thinking about jus post bellum.

The
principle of rights vindication,
“requires a reversal of the aggression that prompted parties to resort to arms
in self-defense or the defense of others.”[9]The central idea is that after the war is
fought, the warring parties must insure that the just cause for the war becomes
reality.

Publicity is the broad responsibility for
the victors to include the residents of the area in decisions that impact
them.Beginning with the terms of peace
and the plans for reconstruction and continuing to the end of occupation, the
requirement of publicity reinforces the rights of the people to have input into
the policies that shape their future.As
applicable, the requirement of publicity entails the requirement to solicit
input about policies and to even facilitate debate about the options for
reconstruction.

In order to
fulfill the criterion of honorable
intention, parties must pursue their stated post bellum objectives with a good will.Bosanquet is quick to point out that actions
demonstrate honorable intentions, and thus actions such as honoring the human
rights of the vanquished and respect for former combatants are required.Long-term actions that demonstrate honorable intention
include both limiting occupation and refusing material benefit.[10]

The
criterion of protection includes
providing security measures and general care for those in the vanquished
area.Furthermore, the long-term
responsibility for the victors may include rehabilitation of the environment
and other measures to insure the long-term security against those who may
exploit the lack of natural resources in the immediate area.[11]

The move
from protection to the restoration of peace, security and sovereignty is
required by the criterion of rehabilitation.The most basic responsibility is to rebuild
both the physical and political, social and economic infrastructure.During rehabilitation, those doing the work
must insist on adherence to the norms supporting human rights.Reversal of aggression, punishment of the
aggressor and measures to deter future aggression are key elements to the
principle of rehabilitation.Rehabilitation does not, and should not, require the installation of any
particular political system as a means of repressing future aggression.[12]

While some
just war theorists think that thoughtful and well-planned demilitarization is
the final requirement of rehabilitation, Bosanquet places it in the criterion
of justice.This is because she places war crimes trials
and punishment, reparations and public assignment of blame and condemnation in
this category as well.In doing so,
Bosanquet includes the following caveat, “I argue that the principle of justice
obliges post bellum parties to
consider all available means for punishment and deterrence alongside the unique
circumstances, needs, and objectives of both the vanquished and the
victimized.”[13]Thus, if it is the case that achieving
complete justice prolongs the conflict or if the vanquished and victimized
choose to decline war trials, justice may be sacrificed for peace or the wishes
of the victim.

The final jus post bellum criterion is restoration.This is the obligation to see that the
rehabilitated nation is sovereign and has a place in the international
community.This criterion is the
culmination of all jus post bellum
activities.Bosanquet agrees with Walzer
that it is not sufficient to restore the nation to its pre-war status, but
rather the nation must be in what they call “restoration plus” status, so that
it can avoid the problems that caused the conflict in the first place.[14]

Criticism of the current thinking on just post bellum
duties

While
Bosanquet was on the right track when she decided to stick to theory instead of
focusing on particular post-conflict situations, the criteria she suggests
could use some improvement.One problem
is that the criteria themselves are not based on an underlying ethical theory,
and thus if they come into conflict there is no means to resolve the conflict.Second, the criteria include something like a
duty for those doing the reconstruction to have a good attitude.This is distinct from the other criteria she
articulates, as it cannot be measured or verified.Finally, the criteria she articulates are
sometimes redundant and at other times they are not strong enough.Resolving some of these broader criticisms
results in other, more specific, differences between my principles and those
articulated by Bosanquet.

A prima facie duties version of
jus post bellum

The balance
of this paper is an argument in favor of a set of jus post bellum principles based on Rossian prima facie duties.It will
begin with a synopsis of Ross’s ethical theory and an explanation of how they
can generally be applied to just war theory.It will then apply prima facie
duties to the problem of post-conflict ethics, thus creating a prima facie version of jus post bellum.

Ross’ Prima Facie duties and a Just War Theory based
on Prima Facie duties[15]

W.D. Ross,
in The Right and the Good, creates a
pluralistic system of prima facie duties.Among those duties are the duties of
non-injury and beneficence.Ross says,
of these prima facie duties, “there
is nothing arbitrary about these prima
facie duties.Each rests on a
definite circumstance which cannot seriously be held to be without moral
significance.”[16]Ross continues on to name these duties,
saying that the list is not necessarily complete or final.

Ross tells
us that the duties can be classified according to previous actions of ourselves
(fidelity and reparation), or others (gratitude).They can also arise from the possibility of
improving the lives of others (beneficence) or ourselves (self-improvement).The primary negative duty is one of
‘non-injury’, which Ross tells us is distinct from beneficence, as it is of
“more stringent character.”[17]Still other duties can be traced to “…the
fact or possibility of a distribution of happiness (or of the means thereto)
which is not in accordance with the merit of the persons concerned; in such
cases there arises a duty to upset or prevent such a distribution.These are the duties of justice.”[18]Ross’ version of justice is most easily
applied to cases of unfair distribution of economic goods.

The nature of Ross’ system
of pluralistic duties is such that there is no hierarchy of duties.[19]There is no pre-determined ranking of duties
that would put beneficence over fidelity or any other possible
combination.On the theoretical level,
each good is equal to all others and in a given context the final duty could be
to take action that places one duty above another.[20]In support of the plurality of prima facie duties Ross tells us, “…no
act is ever, in virtue of falling under some general description, necessarily
actually right; its rightness depends on its whole nature and not on any
element in it.”[21]Ross is telling us that there is no abstract
way of determining a right action; rather each action’s rightness depends on
its context.

Ross
reasons that in order to decide on a final duty, we must use our own practical
reason.While Ross’ method for resolving
conflicts is left vague in The Right and
the Good, it does include the requirement that we use our own judgment or
intuition in order to decide on a final duty in any given situation.[22]Finally, when a Rossian prima facie duty is overridden, it isn’t the case that the duty
actually goes away.For example, when
the duty of fidelity is overridden, the residue of the duty remains and the
person for whom a promise was broken deserves an explanation of the reason
behind the broken promise.[23]

Just war theory as an application of prima facie
duties

Understanding
just war theory in terms of Rossian prima
facie duties continues a project started by Childress in his 1978 article Just War Theories:The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities and
Functions of the Criteria. Childress intended to show that the most
important justification for just war theory concerned instances in which the
duty not to injure was overridden.[24]Childress progressed by explaining each of
the traditional just war principles in terms of overriding the duty not to
injure. As Childress phrases it, “just war criteria can be illuminated by the
language of prima-facie obligations and the content
of the particular obligations (not to injure or kill others) that the
justification of war must override.”[25]

Childress
establishes the groundwork for a theoretical framework for the commonly held
set of just war norms.Once fleshed out,
this framework will increase the coherence of just war norms and provide a
context for just war theorists to pay attention to, “numerous issues, including
the bases, interrelations, and functions of their criteria”.[26]
Childress’ stated goal was not to establish a substantive theory of just war;
rather his goal was to, “…show that just-war criteria are important and even
indispensable moral standards apart from any particular theory of justice.They are explicable, I have argued, by
reference to the notion of prima facie duties and, specifically, to the prima
facie duty not to injure or kill”.[27]

As
part of his project, Childress articulates the underlying assumption that war
ought to be a rule-governed activity and that it ought not be considered merely
an extension of politics.[28]This is a key assumption, as the relatively
low number of rules in political interactions leads to the maxim, ‘all’s fair
in love and war’ and the maxim that ‘war is hell’.Both of these maxims implicitly deny the idea
that those waging war can and should adhere to a set of principles that can
decrease the hellish nature of war.

In times of
war the ethical challenge is justifying overriding the prima facie duty of non-injury.As part of his project, Childress explains each tenet of just war theory
in the context of Rossian prima facie
duties, thus creating a framework in which a requirement for going to war is a
creating the justification for overriding non-injury.[29]The question of how to act in any particular
situation or conflict is one of actual duty, in which the person making the
decision weighs the decision in terms of competing prima facie duties and comes to a conclusion.Although Childress explains each of the just
war criteria individually, his analysis of the just war tradition does not vary
significantly from the commonly accepted elements articulated by others.His explication does introduce one important
theme and two supporting themes as a result of being grounded in prima facie duties.

The
important theme is more of an articulation of the significant evidence concerning
the way in which the overridden duty of non-injury influences many aspects of
just war criteria.Nearly every aspect
of just war theory is influenced by the idea that the default position is
non-injury and every aspect of war ought to be conducted with the underlying
value of reducing injury.[30]

In support
of this theme, while discussing the principle requiring a reasonable hope of
success, Childress introduces the requirement that at least some of a nation’s prima facie duties be achieved by going
to war.[31]In his discussion of the requirement for a
formal declaration of war, Childress introduces the requirement that a
government provide public explanation and justification for its decision to
depart from the default position of keeping the peace.[32]

Overall,
Childress makes it very clear that the overridden duty of non-injury shapes
just war criteria and thus shapes the actions of war.The general idea is that even in situations
when the duty of non-injury must be overridden, it’s residue remains and even
necessary acts of war should be as compatible as possible with the overridden
duty.Childress also allows for remorse
concerning war, saying that remorse is often an appropriate response to the
decision to override a duty.

Another
significant element of Childress’ project is the requirement for actors in
wartime to explain or report on their actions after the fact.[33]Much in the same way someone owes an
explanation as to why one prima facie duty
overrides another, actors in international conflicts owe an explanation of the
decision to override non-injury.

My larger
project is an extension of Childress’ project.The central idea is that there are a variety of possible duties that
could cause non-injury to be overridden.As a result, the commonly accepted principles of just war theory become
criteria by which the decision to override non-injury can be considered and
later justified or explained and as such. This means that the just war criteria
function as an application of Rossian prima
facie duties.If the decision to go
to war is made in accord with the conditions for just war, then they can access
modes of reasoning and decision making available under the prima facie duties. As a result, they are acting in accord with the
prima facie duties.If it is the case that the set of just war
criteria are an application of prima
facie duties, then the just war criteria are subject to the same kinds of
calculations, situational judgments and reflexive equilibrium as the main body
of prima facie duties.When applied to warfare, this means that a
soldier faced with a moral decision can ethically take the context of his
decision into account when determining his next action.[34]
Finally, the structure of Rossian prima
facie duties requires an explanation after the fact.This element would remain within a prima facie set of just war criteria,
thus preserving the reflection and reporting requirement useful in improving
both military and moral practice.

An important question to ask for any proposed
revision is whether or not it contradicts well-accepted thinking in the field?[35]It is important to begin by noting that
Walzer often speaks in terms of rights and duties.According to Orend, “Walzer talks like this
when he stresses that rights are “overridden” in a supreme emergency,
presumably by the “highest values” of shared and just communal existence.”[36]Further, Walzer’s own chapter on supreme
emergencies has a section titled “Overriding the Rules of War”, in which he
outlines the logic of Churchill’s decision to override the principle of
discrimination in order to win the war against Nazi Germany.[37]Finally, Walzer explicitly discusses
overriding the rules of war in a manner similar to that of prima facie duties when he says:

But there are moments when the rules can and perhaps
have to be overridden.They have to be
overridden precisely because they have not been suspended.And overriding the rules leaves guilt behind,
as a recognition of the enormity of what we have done and a commitment not to
make our actions into an easy precedent for the future.[38]

It seems fair to say that there
seems to be ample evidence on this point, although including a lot more would
detract from the focus of the paper.Suffice it to say that Walzer’s underlying ethical principles are not
incompatible with Rossian prima facie
duties.

Just war principles resemble prima facie duties

When just
war principles are established as an application of prima facie duties, they do not become actual duties until the time
they must be acted upon.So, following
the logic of prima facie duties, they
are all binding in theory.An actual
duty is formed when a situation arises that requires action.If two or more duties conflict, one duty must
override the other and an explanation and justification of that decision will
be expected.

Just war
principles are similar to prima facie duties
because when they become actual duties, each principle could be overridden by one or more of the other principles.It is an important caveat to note that each
just war principle is so important that deciding to wage war with one of the
principles overridden requires an extraordinarily strong justification.This is because the set of just war
principles, as a group, function as a restriction on instances of overriding the
principle of non-injury, thus going to war without one of those principles in
place requires an even stronger justification.So, instead of the optimal war being one in which each just war
principle is fulfilled, this is the default situation and the extraordinarily
rare just war is one in which one just war principle overrides another.

The
remainder of this paper will develop a coherent, consistent and concise set of
principles for the time after war that are an application of Rossian prima facie duties, and thus can access
the same methods for resolving conflicts between the principles.Because these principles are the final
extension of a set of conflict ethics that begins with consideration of
pre-conflict ethics and ends with jus
post bellum, these principles also access the thinking and reasoning behind
the other parts of the theory.

Prima Facie duties and jus post bellum principles

The time
after cessation of formal hostilities is morally more ambiguous than fighting
the war itself.Instead of attempting to
win military battles while preventing harm to innocents and your own troops,
the victor now has the duty to complete the complex duties necessary to restore
physical, social and political infrastructure so that the area can become
sovereign.Jus ad bellum and jus in
bello principles are necessary to justify overriding the principle of
non-injury.Jus post bellum principles must justify the decision of the victor
to override the principle of self-improvement, which would entail the victor simply
exploiting the area of the conflict and then leaving the residents to deal with
the results.It is also the case that
the specifics of jus post bellum are,
in essence, an extension of the duty to create a just peace.[39]

In the most
general ways, a prima facie account
of jus post bellum principles is an
application of all of Ross’ duties.Fidelity is involved when promises about
reconstruction are made in order to negotiate for peace, as well as the promise
to implicit in the principle of just cause, i.e. the promise to stop fighting
when there is no longer a just cause.[40]The duty to see to reparations is perhaps the most obvious duty, as the guiding
principle underlying jus post bellum principles
is the idea that the victor contributed to damaging the community, has the
resources to repair that damage and thus has a duty to fix that damage.[41]Gratitude
might reasonably be expected from those who benefit from the
reconstruction.Justice plays a role both in the legal sense and in the sense that
reconstruction ought to both be done fairly and result in a just society.Beneficence
is clearly a goal in reconstruction activities, because the end result should
be to improve the lives of people most directly impacted by the war.Since the victors can make their lives better
post-war, they clearly should do so.The
duty of non-injury is clearly still applicable, as the transition
between active fighting and post-war reconstruction does not entail the
elimination of the prior duties.It is
also the case that reconstruction activities ought not result in injury to the
people deserving help.Perhaps the most
controversial duty in this case is the duty of self-improvement.Although
self-improvement ought not be a motive for war and it ought not be a primary or
even secondary motive in reconstruction, as long as the deals made are mutually
beneficial it isn’t unreasonable to see situations in which self-improvement is
permissible by those doing the reconstruction.[42]
Less controversial is the idea that the victor has a duty to facilitate the
vanquished in their efforts at self-improvement.

Although
the general idea of reconstruction is a clear application of prima facie duties, in a post-conflict
situation, there is also a specific set of post-conflict duties.Those duties are, physical security, human rights, input, restoration-plus and
independence.Just as thejus ad
bellum and jus in bello
principles are applications ofRossian prima facie duties, jus post bellum are also applications of prima facie duties.Although
all the prima facie duties play a role, the central goals of all
parties in this time period are to support the duties of reparations and
beneficence.The long-term goal is to
increase the likelihood that the people in the area will be able to fulfill
their own prima facie duties.

Similar to jus ad bellum and jus
in bello duties based on prima facie
duties, jus post bellum duties are,
in theory,simultaneously binding.Along the same lines, it is the goal that all
duties be simultaneously satisfied.If
one duty must be overridden in favor or another when the final duty is acted
upon, a justification is required.This
clause is necessary because these theoretical duties are only significant in
the context of a real post-conflict situation, so their implementation relies
on the judgment of people in that situation.

Finally,
these duties are in approximate chronological order beginning with the duties
that are usually most pressing immediately after the cessation of
hostilities.This order is not binding
and there may be good reasons to alter the order, depending on the
circumstances.

Bonsaquant’s
jus post bellum criterion of
“honorable intention” is really more of a necessary condition that is binding
on all parties, I’ll call this condition a helpful
attitude.The condition of a helpful
attitude is similar to the prima faciejus ad bellum duty of competent
authority, as both are requirements for the implementation of the other duties.[43]Demonstration of a helpful attitude falls most clearly on the representatives of the
victorious nation in the post-conflict territory.In the most general terms, this means that
there needs to be an attitude shift on behalf of all parties from conflict to
cooperation.Area residents and
defeated soldiers demonstrate their helpful attitude by providing knowledge of
the area and culture that will make reconstruction easier.The victors demonstrate a helpful attitude by
working to fulfill all other jus post
bellum duties.They also do so by
limiting their occupation and not exploiting natural resources.

The
victor’s first duty is to create physical
security.The duty of security is an
application of the prima facie duty
of non-injury.In this case the duty is
to act prevent injury from violence, economic depravation or the environment.
In the most general terms, all parties ought to be secure from physical harm
and have the basic necessities for life.This duty is akin to first-aid or disaster relief in that the solutions
are not permanent and should not be considered long-term.It may be the case that achieving security
requires de-militarization, or at least de-activation of combat units.

The second
duty is to facilitate the reinstatement of human
rights.Generally, the most just
cause for war is a substantial violation of human rights.Thus, establishing and guaranteeing human
rights is a fundamental requirement of post-conflict situations.Supporting human rights is an extension of
the jus ad bellum condition of a just
cause and forms the basis of the promise made when declaring war.As a result, the prima facie duty of fidelity is one of the duties being
applied.The other duty, and the more
persuasive duty, is the duty of beneficence.Underlying the jus ad bellum
principles is an implicit promise that the post-conflict conditions in the area
will be better.The key element of this
promise is an improvement in human rights.This is an extension of an argument made by McMahon that the most
important just war principle is the principle of the just cause – he argues
that a continuing just cause is the only reason to continue fighting.[44]

An
important sub-category of human rights is the right to self-governance.In the case of a post-conflict area, this
includes the right of area residents to give input concerning the long-term rehabilitation of the area.While the specific means and mechanisms for
input will vary, those doing the rehabilitation have a duty to seek extensive
input from the citizens of the area.This input may come in the form of informal conversations, public
debates or any other means to insure that rehabilitation plans are appropriate
and practical for the people who will be living in the area.It should be noted that the input ought not
be limited to the details of physical rehabilitation, but rather needs to
extend to the social, political and economic rehabilitation necessary for an
area to move from post-conflict dependence to independence.

Restoration-plus is the third jus post bellum duty.As Bosanquet argues, it isn’t sufficient to
return the area to the conditions before the conflict, rather the area should
be improved in order to prevent future wars.[45]The duty of restoration-plus is based on the prima facie duty of reparation, fixing
what you broke.This is a slight
variation on the Rossian duty, as fulfilling it does not imply that the action
taken was wrong.[46]Rather, the idea is that the victor had a
significant role in ‘breaking’ the area, they have the means to repair the
area, and thus they ought to do so.The
general idea is that, taking input from the area residents into consideration,
the victor ought to repair the physical infrastructure, clean up the
environment and facilitate the development of the social, political and
economic organizations that will lead to the area’s independence.

In terms of
economic development, I partially disagree with Walzer when he argues that the
victor ought not profit from the restoration of a post-conflict area.While I agree that it is wrong to exploit an
area under reconstruction, some level of profit-making is inevitable as
contractors and other private businesses are often the most efficient means to
complete restoration.Further, making
mutually beneficial economic arrangements ought not be excluded, especially if
the newly independent government approves those deals.This is one way that the citizens of the
victorious nation can have some of the costs of war recovered and is an
application of the prima facie duty
of self-improvement.

Included in
the concept of restoration-plus is a duty to facilitate individual
self-improvement for area citizens and former soldiers.This may include vocational training,
physical rehabilitation, the development of new economic opportunities and
markets, establishing or reestablishing educational institutions and building a
healthcare infrastructure to care for soldiers and civilians wounded in the
war.It may also be the case that the
victor incurs a long-term commitment to funding the educational and healthcare
organizations and a commitment to participating in the long-term economic
activities of the area.

Further, it
seems that this is one area in which the victor has duties at home as
well.Every soldier involved in fighting
the war faces the challenge of transition from combat to civilian life,
including those returning after winning a war.Among the highest priorities of the victorious nation should be the
care, rehabilitation and integration of their own returning soldiers.This includes a commitment to providing the
highest quality of education and healthcare benefits.

I agree
with Bosanquet that it ought not be the case that the victor establishes their
preferred form of government in an attempt to prevent future conflicts, rather
the form of government is one of the essential elements that should be covered
in input from the community. [47]
Depending on the circumstances, a temporary government may be put in place, but
only if it is needed to continue physical security and to facilitate input from
the citizens of the area.

Input from
the community should determine the form and extent of post-conflict justice.It may be the case that the community desires war crimes trials or other
means of punishing those who committed war crimes.It is also the case that war crimes trials
and truth and reconciliation tribunals have a limited record of success in
actually solving problems or achieving justice.It may be the case that a safe and restored
community realizes that the mechanisms of justice will open new wounds without
the likelihood ofresolving
problems.In either case, I disagree
with Iasiello who argues that an international tribunal is necessary to
facilitate justice.[48]Rather the wishes of the area residents
ought to be respected and if the consensus is that international help is
necessary then it ought to be provided.

The final jus post bellum duty is the duty to
insure that the post-conflict area becomes independent.This independence includes the ability to do
international trade, the organizations necessary to participate in
international exchanges as well as participate in world governance.The transition to independence is a clear
example of the victor facilitating the development of one of the area’s prima facie duties, in this case it is
the duty of self-improvement.International relations both benefit the country and tend to diffuse
future conflicts.

In
conclusion, while there is considerable work to be done in this area, extending
the prima facie just war principles
to jus post bellum considerations
creates a coherent set of principles to govern conflict and its aftermath.

[6] Bosanquet’s article is an
excellent summary and analysis of the development of the jus post bellum criteria.For this reason, I am using her principles as a starting point and will
not summarize her analysis of other jus
post bellum thinkers

[15] Here I am using “theory” to
mean a fleshed-out version of the just war tradition based on a broader ethical
theory.The broader project is a
complete just war theory based on Ross’ prima
facie duties.

[34]Kahl, C. (2006). "How
We Fight." Foreign Affairs85(6).While it seems as if this
change may cause some problems within military organizations, it isn’t far from
current training in the U.S. military. Kahl’s article provides ample evidence
that values training, with a few notable and well-publicized exceptions, has
created soldiers who tend to consider their duties as soldiers when making
decisions both on the battlefield and in other areas of their professional
lives.

[35] By way of defining “major
thinking” it is fair to say that Walzer has been quite influential, both in
civilian and military settings.Just and Unjust Wars is assigned as a
central text in courses across the spectrum of higher education, including US
military universities.Also, in a
conversation in Lincoln, NE in November 2006, Walzer and I discussed the
general idea of a prima facie ethics
of warfare.Walzer was generally
positive about the project.

[36]Orend, B. (2001). "Just
and Lawful Conduct in War:Reflections
on Michael Walzer." Law and Philosophy20.27.

[39] A just peace is a standard
requirement of jus ad bellum.In the justice before the war reasoning, the
requirement is that a war cannot be fought unless it could result in a just peace, i.e. a peace that does not require
continuous violence to maintain.

[41] This is a bit different
from Ross’ original formulation, as Ross implies that the duty to reparations
is only a result of actions done by the person, butin post-conflict ethics, it is generally the
case that the victor should repair all the damage, not just the damage they
caused themselves.

[42] Here I’m thinking about a
situation in which one country has a high demand for a product and the country
they are reconstructing has an ability to make that product.Why not have a mutually beneficial trade deal?Conversely, if the country doing the
reconstruction has an industry that will benefit from the market in the newly
reconstructed country, why not develop that market and the connection between
the two countries?

[43] The details are in my
explication of a prima facie duties
based jus ad bellum.