Except in the case of documents with numbered
paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been
omitted, diamonds (♦) are used to indicate the omission of one or
more paragraphs.

Chapter XXV:

From the Beaches to Paris in Northern France

With this chapter the focus shifts from high-level planning,
questions of policy, and intergovernmental wrangling to the scene of the
battlefield. How did the carefully laid plans work? This question can best be
answered by the officers and men in the field, for in all military operations,
including civil affairs, the "battle is the payoff."

In liberated western Europe civil affairs were a command
responsibility and each commander was responsible within the area of his
jurisdiction. In the American headquarters, down to and including corps, the
civil affairs staffs were organized as a fifth section of the General Staff. The
operating unit was the civil affairs detachment.1These detachments were
assigned to the principal cities and towns in the combat zone and operated
through acceptable heads of the local civil government, except in rare cases
where military necessity required more direct control. Their area of
jurisdiction was so defined that the entire territory in the military zone was
covered. Civil affairs detachments normally remained in the area to which
originally assigned, reverting to Corps, Army, and Communications Zone control
as the rear boundaries moved forward. To get a picture of what actually
happened, therefore, it is necessary to examine the reports by Army Groups,
Armies, and Corps, as well as records of detachments and personal accounts.

In a talk to civil affairs officers just before D-day,
General Eisenhower had asked them to remember above all else that they were
soldiers, "just as modern as radar and just as important to the command."
Although their main job was to get the rear areas organized, they had to be on
the scene early if they were to do their job well and be of maximum assistance
in the battle. The first documents in this chapter detail the experience of
three officers who went in on D-day with the airborne forces. Civil affairs
problems in the beachhead phase were vastly simplified by the fact that the
landings were made in a rich agricultural area that contained no large towns.
The main activities of the civil affairs officers were establishing contact with
the mayors of various small communities, assisting in traffic regulations, and
arranging for the care and feeding of refugees. As the area of operations
broadened an immense variety of duties fell upon them but the burden was eased
by the energy and initiative of the French in taking over civil administration.

The first large city to be liberated was Cherbourg. Officers
in Allied headquarters who referred to Cherbourg as the "most important port in
the world" hardly exaggerated, for this city was the pivot around

[721]

which the whole supply build-up was expected to swing. The
first breach in the fortifications was made on 25 June; street fighting
continued through the 26th; and by the 27th the last of the enemy strongholds
surrendered. On the heels of the combat troops, Civil Affairs Detachment AIAI
moved into town, set up headquarters in the Chamber of Commerce, and went to
work. A reasonably complete picture of what a civil affairs detachment did in an
important city is revealed in a detailed report of Detachment AIAI, here
included. Though conditions in the various cities or towns were never exactly
alike, the problems faced by other Civil Affairs detachments followed the same
general pattern.

In the minds of the civil affairs staff officers at SHAEF and
at Twelfth Army Group, Paris loomed as the greatest challenge to be encountered
in civil affairs. Staff officers expected that the population of approximately
4,000,000 would have to be fed for the first ten days very largely from imported
supplies. They assumed that the inhabitants would be covered with lice,
underfed, and suffering from rickets and tuberculosis. Food riots by an armed population were considered likely. Accordingly,
elaborate preparations were made to meet such emergencies. When officers of G-5,
Twelfth Army Group, entered the city on 25 August 1944, they reported that the
populace appeared well-disciplined, in normal health, and reasonably well fed.
Thousands were about on bicycles. With the exception of a food shortage, extreme
emergencies did not arise, and in Paris, as elsewhere, the French showed
initiative in restoring civil administration.

During the first three months civil affairs for the most part
enjoyed smooth sailing. However, as the armies broadened their fronts and moved
toward the German frontiers in the fall months, serious difficulties began to
arise. The liberation of large territories uncovered large numbers of refugees
and displaced persons who had to be housed, fed, and transported (see Chapter
XXX). Furthermore, deliveries of civilian supplies began to run behind (see
Chapter XXXII). But these were merely the beginnings of problems that would
develop more acutely in countries beyond the borders of France.

1. On 23 May 1944, pursuant to orders, the undersigned left
Bristol for Leicester, England, to join the 82nd Airborne Division, on TD, as a
detail of Civil Affairs officers....

2. Thereafter, the undersigned made careful studies of the
probable Civil Affairs activities to be encountered in the operational area
assigned to the division in France....

3. At 1852 hours on the evening of 6 June 1944, the glider contingent moved
out from Greenham's Common. Each of the undersigned was assigned to a
different glider but all three were near each other in the formation, the total
of which was approximately 150 gliders. The glider numbers were 32 (Major
Deutsch), 34 (Lt. Colonel Thurmond) and 38 (Captain Knecht). Gliders No. 32 and
34 contained 1/4 % ton trucks and trailers in addition to personnel, and glider No.
38 was personnel only.

4. The formation of the glider column consumed nearly an hour
after which it headed across the English Channel. Shortly after 2100 hours the
column crossed the coast line of France over the Utah beach and headed westward.
At about 212o hours, the gliders were subjected to heavy anti-aircraft fire and
almost immediately

[722]

thereafter were released from the towing planes.

5. The experience of each of the three gliders in landing was almost
identically the same as that of the others. All three crashed in small adjoining
fields within the German lines.

6. Enemy fire on the occupants of the gliders
took place the moment the landing had been effected and continued thereafter.
Captain Knecht who was in the personnel glider (No. 38) and the other occupants
of that glider immediately took to a ditch on one side of their field. Colonel
Thurmond and Major Deutsch, in gliders No. 32 and 34 respectively, despite
injuries sustained in the landings, assisted at once in the release of the
vehicles from the gliders. All three gliders had been practically demolished in
the landings. Colonel Thurmond and Major Deutsch managed to get together.
Colonel Thurmond thereupon headed a reconnaissance party with personnel of
his glider to locate a CP to which an effort was made to effect a rendezvous.
Colonel Thurmond borrowed a vehicle from an officer of the 4th Infantry Division
and made a reconnaissance of other nearby gliders, assisting their injured
personnel in getting to the rendezvous.

7. In the meantime, Major Deutsch gathered as much as
possible of the nearby personnel which had come in his and other gliders and,
under cover of hedges, ditches and other natural obstructions, made their way to
a nearby farmyard. There, a patrol was established to protect the area, and to
bring in the wounded and injured, pending word to be sent by Colonel Thurmond as
to the final rendezvous.

8. At the same time, Captain Knecht proceeded on a
reconnaissance from his position and, under fire, managed to locate the farmyard
just mentioned. He then returned to the ditch where the remaining personnel of
his glider were waiting, and brought them back to the farmyard.

9. Shortly thereafter, word came from Colonel Thurmond that a
tentative rendezvous had been established near the CP of a Battalion of the 4th
Infantry, at the cross-roads a short distance from Blosville. The group at the
farmyard thereupon proceeded by jeep and on foot, under guide of friendly
civilians, to the rendezvous established by Colonel Thurmond. The enemy fire had
remained continuous but was somewhat less intense. The wounded were carried in
the vehicles taken from the gliders.

12. Colonel Thurmond received a severe contusion of his left
knee and laceration of the left knee and both hands when his glider crashed. He
was given first-aid treatment at an 8th Infantry aid station that night, and was
treated again the next morning at a medical station of the 82d
Airborne Division. Captain Knecht received slight injuries to his hands and
knees. Major Deutsch received severe injuries to his chest and back, which were
later revealed to have consisted of fractured ribs and a strained back.

13. On the next morning it was found that the bivouac in
question was still surrounded by the enemy, within range of small arms, and
efforts were made to reach division headquarters by radio. Division
headquarters, which was also surrounded, sent out reconnaissance, and the entire
day was consumed in moving from one place to another in an effort to consolidate
the positions. The detachment moved into no less than six positions during the
day, constantly under fire and constantly seeking the protection of ditches,
hedges and foxholes. At about I9oo hours that evening it was determined that the
detachment could be saved only by getting it through to division headquarters
somehow. A reconnaissance group was sent across to lead the detachment by
secondary roads. A part of the way was along the main road in the vicinity of
the Chef du Pont, which was under intense small arms fire. . . . The movement
through this portion of the enemy line was finally successful, and the column
reached division headquarters shortly after 2100 hours that night, having twice
crossed the enemy line within less than 24 hours.

15. On the following day and thereafter the situation
improved. Firm contact was established with the 4th Division and later with the
90th Division....

17. The Provost Marshal requested assistance, and Captain
Knecht from that point forward aided the Provost Marshal in traffic regulation,
and in the processing of prisoners who were coming in in far greater numbers
than had been anticipated.

18. The regular Civil Affairs officer of the division, while
assuming responsibility for Civil Affairs, was largely engaged in matters
connected with G-2 then of apparently paramount importance. Colonel Thurmond
thereupon performed such essential Civil Affairs duties as the situation
required, working in close co-operation with the division Civil Affairs officer.
Among these matters were the procurement of civilian labor for grave digging;
the contacting of Mayors of various small communities; arranging for prompt
burial of civilians and the disposition of cattle killed during the combat
activities; arranging for the clearance of bombs and grenades from a hospital at
Ste.-Mere-Eglise so that it might be occupied by medical or other detach-

[723]

ments having need for the building; informing division
ordnance detachment of the location of enemy ammunition; obtaining and turning
over to G-2 enemy records located at Chef du Pont. In addition, Colonel Thurmond
and the regular division Civil Affairs officer located the billet of the German
Lieutenant General who had commanded the 91st German Division and who had been
killed in action. The records found in the billet, of great importance and
considerable volume, were promptly reported to G-2 and by them to Corps Hq. for
handling.

19. At the request of G-1, Colonel Thurmond assisted in
locating bodies of paratroops in the vicinity of Ste.-Mere-Eglise for the
Quartermaster. When the Civil Affairs detachment for Ste.-Mere-Eglise arrived,
Colonel Thurmond immediately made contact with it, and advised and consulted
with them from time to time; thereafter assisting in its functions. Colonel
Thurmond was of particular assistance to the detachment in the handling of
refugees from other towns in the combat area. When the town of Cretteville was
taken by the 82nd Division on the morning of 8 June 1944, Colonel Thurmond and the division Civil Affairs officer immediately entered the town and
conferred with the Mayor. Arrangements were made for the feeding and care of
refugees. A ceremony was held raising the French Tricolour. The signal section
made photographs of this ceremony.

20. Major Deutsch's injuries prevented his extensive
participation in direct Civil Affairs activities. However, he assisted in the
interrogation of prisoners to determine conditions in local communities from
which they had come. He interrogated civilians, and ordered the internment of
two whose activities in behalf of, or at least in cooperation with, the enemy
seemed clear. He assisted in obtaining data as to missing troops evacuated prior
to the setting-up of division clearing stations; and he consulted from time to
time with Colonel Thurmond and the other Civil Affairs officers on their
activities, giving such help as he could.

21. On 13 June the undersigned moved forward with a portion
of division headquarters to an advance CP just west of Picauville, again
practically up to the front line, where the area was again subjected to enemy
land and aerial fire. Pursuant to orders, Captain Knecht had returned to Army Hq
on 12 June and Colonel Thurmond and Major Deutsch returned on the evening of 14 June 1944.
♦ ♦ ♦

23. It is the conclusion of the undersigned that Civil
Affairs activities in an airborne division are obviously more limited in scope
than in a regular infantry division. As a rule, an airborne division finds
itself in territory less densely populated than others. Further, during the
early stages, the airborne division is ordinarily engaged in combat of such a
nature, that Civil Affairs activities are considerably curtailed. Further, the
time during which an airborne division operates is limited. It comes in early,
performs its mission, and is withdrawn, ordinarily, within a short time. On the
other hand, except for the factors above mentioned, Civil Affairs operations in
an airborne division are practically the same as those in an infantry division,
once landings have been effected and consolidated. The problems of communities
captured by airborne infantry are sometimes even greater than those of
communities taken by regular infantry, because of the nature of the attack
itself.
♦ ♦ ♦

1. The policy of the Supreme Commander is that instructions
to the Civil population in operation OVERLORD will be issued, where possible, by
the civil authorities in accordance with the requirements of commanders, and
conveyed to these civil authorities through the Civil Affairs Staff. Only if
there is complete breakdown of civil administration will ordinances be published
in the name of the Supreme Commander, and then only when he has authorized this
to be done.

3. The Supreme Commander will issue initially only two proclamations:
(a) A general proclamation
(b) A proclamation relating to currency
Copies of (a) have been issued to Officers Commanding Civil
Affairs Detachments with authority to promulgate them without further
instructions. Copies of (b) are in the process of being issued.

4. Commanders will require certain notices for display in the
forward areas covering such matters as:
(a) Curfew
(b) Blackout
(c) Prohibition of movement on the road.
(d) Prohibition of use of cameras and binoculars.
(e) Surrender of arms and ammunition.

Suitable notices, which can be handed to the local
authorities for signature and issue, have been distributed to officers
commanding Civil

The Senior Civil Affairs Officer, First U.S. Army, arrived
ashore on Omaha Beach 2200 hours 9 June, accompanied by the Governmental
Agencies and Public Safety officer. CA Detachment D7Gi, attached to the Special
Engineer Brigade for lift and duty, arrived ashore 2100 hours, 9 June, and was assigned to duty at Omaha Beach. Each
division and corps ashore in the First Army had members of their CA Staffs
present with their respective headquarters.

Three members of the CA, Staff, FUSA, attached for lift and
CA duties to the 82nd Airborne Division, landed near Ste.-Mere-Eglise about 2200
on D Day. This was the first instance of participation by Civil Affairs in an
air-borne invasion.

In his initial reconnaissance on landing at Omaha Beach, the
Army SCAO found that the state of law and order was satisfactory. About go per
cent of the normal population was present, and civilian casualties were
estimated at not over 2 per cent.

CA Detachments were placed as follows on 11 June:

D3BI

Isigny and Grandcamp

D5BI

Trevieres

D6BI

Ste.-Mere-Eglise

Action was taken to deputize civilians and build up a larger
police force. On II June, the Army SCAO requested that Civil Affairs Detachments
be placed on a high transport priority so as to be immediately available for
assignment as soon as towns had been captured from the enemy.

On 12 June, CA Detachment C2BI was placed at Carentan. The
same day, the Supply Echelon, CA Section FUSA, arrived on the Continent, with 12
officers. Two French liaison officers also reported that day. . . . On 13 June,
the Army SCAO briefed officers of the Sections on the general situation, and a
schedule of visits was arranged whereby every CA Detachment and Staff would be
visited daily, and the entire zone of operations would be surveyed at frequent
intervals by headquarters specialist officers.

On 13 June, the Army SCAO and the Governmental Agencies and
Public Safety Officer conferred with the CA Office, 2nd British Army, on the general situation, with special emphasis on milling, police, and civil administration, all centered at Bayeux. ♦ ♦ ♦

By direction of the Army SCAO, a general survey was made of
the supply situation, soon after the arrival of the Supply Echelon on the
Continent. Apart from medical supplies, flour and soap were found to be the only
major shortages in the Army area. The 2nd British Army agreed to make flour
available through normal French channels. Request was made of the 21st Army
Group to place butter on the free list, due to the surplus of dairy products in
the lodgment area. It was also proposed to the 21st Army Group that supplies of
canned milk in the allocation to Utah beach be cancelled, and 340 tons of flour
be substituted.

Soon after the landing of the Supply Echelon, a limitation of 6 kilometers
was placed on travel without permit, and the mayors were urged to increase
civilian police forces. After contacting G-2 on security measures, the Naval
Liaison Officer presented to the Naval Officer in Charge recommendations for
reestablishing the fishing industry, an important element in the peacetime
economic life of many towns in Normandy. ♦ ♦ ♦

On 17 June, the Army SCAO directed attention of the 21st Army Group to the fact that officers
sponsored by General de Gaulle had assumed authority in Bayeux, and that the
previous sous-prefect had been deposed from office. [See Chapter XXI V, Section
3-] As this was not within the First Army area, and on advice of Brigadier
Lewis, CAO Second British Army, who had jurisdiction at Bayeux, no positive
action was taken in regard to posters and proclamations, either placing or
displacing them. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ Thus the situation in the beachhead proved relatively
simple, and did not present any severe problems. There was ample food, few
refugees, and no administration problems within the small area concerned. There
was, however, almost at once the question of looting to deal with. It was very
bad in the early stages, and had never been covered entirely satisfactorily.
Another question that arose early on the beachhead was the different attitudes
adopted by the Divisional Commanders about the evacuation of the civilian
population from their Divisional Areas. Divisions that have been under the
command of the Canadian Army have been particularly in-

[725]

sistent on the clearing of their areas, maintaining that casualties from
stray shots are often caused by enemy snipers in civilian clothes. ♦ ♦ ♦

(2)
Sewage disposal in all communities is by flush
toilets emptying to sumps, or by privies emptying into sumps. In most places,
before combat operations began, sumps were customarily emptied every two weeks.
This service was conducted by the "honey cart" system, managed by an individual
known as a "vidangeur," and efforts are now under way to restore this service.
Most sumps were cleaned recently, and at present there is no acute problem or
emergency. Where water for flushing toilets has been discontinued, due to
damaged water mains, water is brought in hand containers. Contents of "honey
carts" are reported to have been buried, although some use as field fertilizer
is probable. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ Approximately fifteen detachments are now [30 June] in
operation. All are 'D' except for a 'O' at Carentan and an 'A' at Cherbourg.
Without exception the detachments are too big for the problems presented. Where
one officer could do the job, four are present. Result is a general disposition
to magnify the problem, make work, and undertake functions which are not a
proper CA responsibility. No serious consequences are expected as the First Army
has carefully drilled each detachment on the basic policy of reliance on the
French. When the detachments operate rather than 'liaise,' it is in connection
with military questions, as with the detachment commander who personally set
about de-booby-trapping his town. Survivors will in any event benefit from the
field experience. * *

FRENCH AT FIRST VIEW ALLIED CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENTS WITH SUSPICION
[Monograph on 2d British Army Relationships With the French
Civil Administration, Jun-Jul 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, 8987/457]

♦ ♦ ♦ General de Gaulle landed in France [14 June], addressed a
meeting in the market square in Bayeux, and left behind him for the Region of
Rouen a Civil Commissioner, M. Coulet, and a Military Commander, Col. P. de
Chevigne. No notification of their arrival was given to Second Army, and the
first the SCAO knew of their presence was when he met Col. de Chevigne standing
in the road by a broken down car near Army headquarters. . . .1

... M. Coulet appeared suspicious of Civil Affairs, and
studiously avoided the use of the term in all correspondence and conversation.
It seemed that on instructions, presumably from Gen. de Gaulle, his primary
concern was to assert the sovereign rights of France. Once, however, he had had an opportunity of seeing for himself how Civil
Affairs detachments were functioning in the field, and of finding out that the
Allies had no intention of interfering unnecessarily in the French
responsibility for civil administration, he became most co-operative, though it
was always necessary to avoid any suggestion of an infringement of French
rights. By 19 June, M. Coulet felt that he was in a position to draft
instructions to all Maires [mayors], laying down the general principles to be
followed in the reception to be given by them to Allied demands. These
instructions, submitted to Second Army on 19 June and printed and issued by 6
July 44 dealt in particular with the following points:

(a) That Allied authorities would require Maires to take
certain police measure such as the posting of notices concerning restriction of
movement, surrender of firearms, or the times of blackout, etc. These measures
were necessary for operational reasons, and Maires were to comply without
hesitation. If any requests appeared unreasonable, the matter could be referred
to the Sous-Prefect; but this was not to be allowed to interfere with the prompt
execution of the order. As these notices were to be signed by the local

[726]

Maires themselves, and not by the military commander, and as
the procedure came within the framework of the French laws of Etat de Siege, this marked a considerable advance in the development of a
legal and administrative understanding between M. Coulet and the Allied forces.

(b) That Maires should be prepared to cooperate with Military
Commanders in the compulsory evacuation of women and children from areas within
3 kms of the front line in the event of a temporary stabilization of operations.
This evacuation should not involve great hardship, as most of the people
concerned could find accommodation with friends or relatives nearby, and in any
case they could return to their homes after a few days.

(c) The question of the disposal of captured enemy material
was brought to the attention of the Maires. ♦ ♦ ♦

FRENCH MILITARY COURTS ESTABLISHED
[Monograph on 2dBr Army Relationships With the French Civil
Administration, Jun-Jul 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5]

♦ ♦ ♦ On 16 June, Col. de Chevigne published a decree
establishing a Military Tribunal for the Region of Rouen to sit in Bayeux or
such other places later found more convenient for the purpose. It was not
intended that these Military Tribunals should take the place of the normal civil
courts. In fact it was planned that the civil courts should deal with all normal
matters, and that the Tribunals should be confined to dealing with cases of an
exemplary nature, or to cases where the security of the French State or Allied
Military interests were concerned. In addition to hearing cases concerning
Allied Military interests it was intended that the Tribunal should deal with
charges for [sic]looting of French property by French nationals, and at
a later stage, when evidence was more complete, with cases concerning
collaborationists.

The Tribunal Militaire was never convened as such, but was
replaced by the Tribunal aux Armees, established by Arrête No. 59 dated 2 July
44, which served the same purpose. This court first sat in Cherbourg early in
July, and tried several cases of looting and one of treason and espionage. The
Tribunal aux Armees had jurisdiction within the zone of deployment of the Allied
Armies and was to move forward with them as the situation might require.

In order that there should be full co-operation between the
Tribunals and the Allied Armies, it was agreed that a liaison officer should be
appointed by Second Army, and be attached to 202 CA Detachment at Bayeux, where he would be in close touch
with the Court. This officer was to attend all cases which concerned military
interests; give all necessary assistance to the French judicial authorities in
the preparation of any prosecutions instigated by Allied Military authorities,
or affecting military security; endeavour to obtain through the appropriate
military channels the presence of all military witnesses, and be present during
the giving of evidence to ensure that security was not jeopardized; and to
arrange for travel permits to be issued to enable all civilian witnesses to
attend, when they were required.

Once the general principle of the establishment of these
tribunals had been agreed, it became necessary to reach a decision upon a number
of smaller points. In a letter from the SCAO to the Brigadier "A/Q," Second
Army, dated 22 June, reference is made to a conference held on 19 June and
attended by the SCAO and M. Coulet.
2 ♦ ♦ ♦

At the beginning of July the Inspector General of Justice
Militaire, Brig-Gen. P. Mounier, paid a visit to the liberated area to see for
himself how the legal administration was being carried on. In addition to the
setting up of the Military Tribunes already set up by Col. de Chevigne, it was
his intention to consider the advisability of establishing mobile Courts to be
attached to Allied formations, and move with them to establish courts of justice
as new territory was uncovered. The need for these mobile courts never arose. ♦ ♦ ♦

THESE PEOPLE TERRIFY ME
[Analysis Sheet, 18 Jun 44, Summarizing an Article in the
Sunday Pictorial (London) by Rex North on His Impressions of the French
Attitude Toward the Allies in Normandy,
3 SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 300, 21 AGp
(Br), CA Sec]

♦ ♦ ♦ I thought I should be sitting here on the beaches of
France reporting the war, but I am forced to the conclusion that there is
another and possibly even more important story to write today.

It is a grave and disturbing story; of a people

[727]

who are divided among themselves-and divided to a large extent against us.

Soberly and factually I must set it down. Six out of ten of
the people over here distrust and detest us, and I have carefully checked the
figure. Further, more than half seem to be allies of the Germans so that it is
impossible to tell who, if any of them, are our friends.

For, like so many others, I expected everyone to fete our
victorious forces as they came in. Instead, I have spent a week wondering where
the next French bullet was coming from.

I expected to find a starved, oppressed country that would
cry out for arms and for the right to stand up and fight with our armies of
liberation.

Instead over half the French I met in Normandy had no wish to
be liberated. Men on street corners-wearing German field grey trousers, let me
add-turned their backs on me. Others just happened to spit at that moment.

Once I thought that all we had to do was to beat the Germans
with our armies. Now-frightening thought that it is-I know there is a problem
just as urgent.

Somehow we have got to get these men and women of France on
our side. Somehow we must reach these people with the message that we are not
bombing and blasting their cities just to save ourselves. As it is, I must
confess that the attitude of these people to our cause terrifies me. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ It is considered that articles of this kind [see
document immediately preceding] may seriously prejudice the relations between
troops and civilians at the present time and diminish the degree of cooperation
which we look for from local authorities.

The information in the possession of this branch, which is
believed to be representative, does not confirm North's conclusions. Taking into
account the dour and undemonstrative nature of the Norman, our reception has
been friendly and the degree of cooperation afforded by local officials most
satisfactory. That the population generally is anti-German and pro Allied is
beyond doubt. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. M. Coulet and Col. de Chevigne . . . having been appointed
by General de Gaulle, may therefore be considered to be officials of the FCNL.
They are both under General Koenig, who is under General Eisenhower, and for
this reason the Supreme Commander is in fact in full control of the Civil
Administration in the liberated territory.

3. There is little doubt that M. Coulet has received
instructions from the FCNL of the policy which he is to pursue, but there are no
indications so far that he is not prepared to cooperate in every way with the
Allied authorities or that he is likely to take any deliberate action which
would prejudice operations.

4. This rather anomalous situation must be accepted and made
to work particularly as negotiations between British and US Governments with the
French are in progress. There is much to be said for the French authorities
relieving us, to the greatest possible extent that operations permit, of all
French civil administration. It is important that all Civil Affairs officers
should realize that it is not possible at this stage to give a precise
definition of the position of M. Coulet in the civil administration and that
they should exercise tact and vigilance to ensure smooth working and operational
requirements being met. In order to avoid any misunderstanding during the
present phase, M. Coulet should be invited to submit for discussion any notice
or proclamation which he finds necessary to publish on any subject which may be
controversial.

3. The question of Civil Affairs authority in Normandy did
not reach a precipitation point for several reasons. (I) There was no disorder
among the populace. (2) Local government was well in hand and continued to
function. (3) All French mayors and lesser officials displayed a willingness to
act in accordance with the wishes of the army, and made no effort to determine
whether a wish

[728]

was a suggestion or order. (4) And no incident arose which
was of sufficient importance to bring about a show-down on the question of
authority. ♦ ♦ ♦

THERE WAS LITTLE DIRECT ACTION: CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS WORKED
THROUGH FRENCH OFFICIALS
[Beesley, Memo on Observations in Normandy (Br Sector) 27 Jul 44]

4. Civil Affairs performed primarily as a liaison function.
Due to the fact that its authority was not clarified before entering the area,
there was a tendency to avoid responsibility. This was true at every civil
affairs level, and even caused some embarrassment at the detachment level. For
example, detachment leaders could issue or refuse to issue travel passes. Yet,
in the case of a refusal, a person could walk out of the CA office and proceed
to his destination without a pass. In many instances CA officers were asked to
settle property disputes, close public houses, remove suspects from office, and
take action against undesirable persons. Such cases were usually referred to the
mayors, the Sub-Prefect, or the gendarmerie, and CA acted merely as a clearing
house. Such "buck passing" was expedient, if not a prestige-builder.

However, it should be mentioned that while early refugee
problems were almost entirely met by the local government, it could not hope to
continue without physical aid. By D plus 30 some detachments were already giving
assistance. Where urban areas are liberated much more will be needed.

Another CA function of growing importance was the making of
surveys on food supplies, industries, abandoned German property, transportation,
etc. Due to the fact that detachments covered every area, had reliable contacts,
their own transportation and quick communication with the higher levels, civil
affairs was an efficient information source.

5. Looting by soldiers was a constant complaint reaching CA.
Orders to detachments were to report, but not investigate, complaints. It was
hoped that the severe punishments being meted out would lessen these complaints.

FRENCH SHOW EFFICIENCY AND INITIATIVE IN RESTORING LOCAL GOVERNMENT
[AAR,
G-5, Third Army, ch. 3, sec. 6, Gen Bd]

♦ ♦ ♦ As rapidly as conditions permitted the French assumed
responsibility at all levels of government. On 6 August, the French Military

Commander of the 10th Military Region issued a proclamation,
under the Law of the State of Siege, ordering that no arrests be made in the
Department of Ille-et-Vilaine except for flagrant offences, without the mandate
of the Military Authority for the 10th Military Region. Thus the Provisional
Government quickly asserted its authority over the area involved. The practical
value of the action to Civil Affairs and the Army lay in the prompt exercise of
jurisdiction by the French over offences which concerned the security of the
Allied forces. The action also clarified the position of Les Forces
Francaises Interieures (FFI), already recognized as a component part of the
Allied forces, and increased their activity and aid to the Civil Affairs
Detachments.4 Soon, throughout the Army Zone, "FFI" members were assisting in
traffic control and public safety functions. They gave information of enemy
stragglers and concentrations, enemy supplies, native collaborationists, which
was forwarded by Civil Affairs to proper Army authorities.

On the civil side, Regional Commissioners (Commissaires
Regionaux de la Republique) exercised the powers given under the Laws of the
State of Siege, and the power to appoint and remove officials, an end desired by
Supreme Headquarters policy. The Prefect, Sous-Prefect, and Mayor of Rennes . .
. and the mayors at Kinan . . . and Fougeres . . .were removed.

French officials at all levels with whom Civil Affairs
Detachments were required to deal, quickly resumed ordinary functions, and
demonstrated initiative in meeting extraordinary problems. Public safety,
relief, money and banking required a minimum of aid and supervision by Civil
Affairs personnel. The movement and care of refugees, anticipated as a difficult
problem, was satisfactorily handled by local officials and agencies in the main.

The early announcement of Civil Affairs objectives and the
tact and judgment displayed by Civil Affairs personnel played an important part
in reassuring the French as to Allied aims and in encouraging the resurgence of
French authority in civil administration. The presence of Civil Affairs officers
gave prestige and strength to established French officials. It also provided a
means of liaison, through which Allied policies could be conveyed to French
authorities and local needs made known to the Army. When needs were made known,
appropriate action was taken. For example, an Army order was issued on 16 Au-

1. In Normandy the Allies, up to late July, were living in a
honeymoon period. To put it another way, they had a credit in favor at the bank.
The Allied landings were long expected and the uppermost emotional feeling was a
sense of relief and optimism over the Allied successes and joy at the thought of
coming freedom. Nor have the Normans been fundamentally disappointed in this matter since the landings. By D + 45, the
great majority of them in the Cotentin Peninsula were still looking at the
Allies through rosetinted glasses. But our future policy and conduct will
determine how inexhaustible the bank balance is.

3. So far as food is concerned, much will depend on our
future methods in dealing with the black market and the effectiveness of the
rationing system, for food is a problem uppermost in the Norman's consciousness.
At present the Allies have been helped by the impossibility of exporting the
expendable goods in Normandy.

4. At all costs the Allies must avoid being likened to the Germans in their
requisitioning procedures. This appears to be an important field for future
propaganda directives. ♦ ♦ ♦

Continuing their offensive, U.S. forces, after their
beachhead landings, began their drive for Cherbourg. As combat troops uncovered
French towns in the Cherbourg Peninsula, they were followed by Civil Affairs
Detachments, who took up their duties, in many instances under enemy fire,
following receipt of instructions from Corps and Division Civil Affairs Staff
officers. Grandcamp, Isigny, Carentan, Montebourg, Valognes, Barfleur, St.
Vaast, Ste-Mere-Eglise, Bricquebec, St.-Pierre-Eglise, and Cherbourg-in these,
and other towns Civil Affairs Detachments put to a practical test their
schooling in the United States and England.

Though no two towns presented exactly the same conditions,
the problems facing Civil Affairs Detachments followed the same general pattern.
These included the care of refugees, reestablishment of local government,
provision of emergency supplies for the needy, public health and sanitation
surveys, organization of auxiliary police, the issuance of passes for necessary
civilian travel, procuring of labor for the Army, assistance to the Army in its
relations with the civil population, and restoring to as nearly normal as
possible the life of the community. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Detachment landed at Utah Beach on the evening of June
14, D plus 8 and that night reported to Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) of
VII U.S. Corps, First Army. The detachment comprised eight officers (3 U.S. and
5 Br) two warrant officers (U.S.), one navy officer (U.S.) attached, one French
Liaison officer and ten enlisted men (all U.S.). The remainder, ten officers and
twelve enlisted men, had been left behind with the intention of following at a
later date.

From June 14 until the morning of 22nd the detachment
remained at VII Corps Hq. From the afternoon of 22 June until entry into
Cherbourg on the 27th they were attached to 9th Div. Hq. During this period
every opportunity was

[730]

taken to collect as much information as possible regarding
the situation in Cherbourg including the personalities involved, the food
situation, economic position, population, administration, etc. Consequently when
the detachment arrived in the city they had a very fair idea of what they would
be likely to encounter. On the 27th the detachment moved into the town on the
heels of the combat troops, set up their headquarters in the Chamber of Commerce
and went to work.

A meeting with the Mayor and all the principal officials of
the city took place that same day and each section of the detachment made the
acquaintance of his opposite number on the municipal administration.

An interesting ceremony took place in the Place Napoleon on
the 27th when [Major] General [J. Lawton] Collins, VII Corps Commander attended
by his divisional commanders, greeted the Mayor and other officials and
presented a Tricolor flag which the detachment had made from the parachutes of
U.S. paratroopers.

On the 28th the rear party arrived bringing the detachment up
to full strength. The first week involved largely a question of obtaining
detailed particulars of the state of the various town services and bringing
order out of the chaos. Generally the city was only about 25% damaged by the
bombardment. The water supply was not functioning and was the first and most
urgent repair required. The police were functioning to a limited extent and
there was no real breakdown of law and order although individual cases of
looting were reported during the first few days. Sufficient food was available
for all for at least 30 days. The population had dwindled to some 5,000 out of a
peacetime population of 38,000. Included were staunch patriots who wished to be
on hand to witness the liberation they had long prayed for, town officials,
young riffraff, and a large number of foreigners who had been left behind by the
departing Germans.

The water was restored by the 3rd of July. The Mayor, M.
Renault and his staff, the police and the officials of the Ravitaillement
General, Ponts et Chaussées were all at their posts while the leading bankers,
legal and other officials quickly returned and gave wholehearted cooperation to
the detachment.

The only person who was dispossessed by the French during
these early days was the Sous-Prefect, M. Bourdin who had been appointed by
Vichy. He called on the 28th to render his compliments and respect to the detachment on the grounds that
although he had been ordered to leave, "honor compelled him to greet the new
authority." M. Coulet (Regional Commissaire) arrived in the city June 29th and
spoke to the assembled population, in the main square. Other leaders were M.
Gresselin (Resistance Group) and Capt. Schuman. The Provisional government was
accepted by all with enthusiasm as being the only possible solution; at any rate
for the time being. Considerable enthusiasm always greeted any mention of the
name of General de Gaulle.

The enormous stock of captured food stocks in the arsenal
presented a somewhat formidable problem as some were perishable. Much of this
was handed over to combat troops of the 4th Division and later the detachment
had orders to distribute the balance through the Ravitaillement General which
was duly carried out.

During the first phase some of the difficulties arose from
the continual change of command. The detachment came in under 29th Regt. of 9th
Division, during the day the 4th Division took over to be succeeded by foist
Airborne Division, later by 1st Army direct, then ADSEC, followed by 4th Port,
then Area Command No. 1, which became Cherbourg Command. This succession of
higher unit commanders led very naturally to lack of continuity in military
policy and therefore a constant change of orders.

As Cherbourg was the first large city and port liberated, a
constant stream of visitors, including many high ranking Generals, called at the
detachment office. There were many reports. This was to some extent unavoidable
but a close check on officers allowed to travel would have cut down the
overflowing procession which taxed the energy and time, particularly, of the
C.O. and his deputy.

The U.S. Navy and the French Naval and Military authorities
were quickly on the scene and the C.O. of the detachment was instrumental in
introducing all the principal persons concerned to the U.S. Army authorities and
diplomatically smoothing over many difficulties. A feature of the Civil Affairs
work was the task of acting as liaison between all authorities of all
nationalities, both military and civil, not always a strictly Civil Affairs job.

On 3rd July the local paper, "La Presse Cherbourgeoise" was
published, the first French newspaper to be printed in Free France. On the 4th
the Stars and Stripes was published from Cherbourg as a continental edition. The
Omnia Cin-

[731]

ema was opened ceremoniously on July 5th by a speech by the
Mayor and an American Officer and the playing of the three National Anthems.
This cinema hadn't been opened to the public since 1939 as it had been used
exclusively by German troops. Radio Cherbourg started to operate and was at once
a complete success. The equipment was not really sufficient for the job but the
keenness and enthusiasm of the operating staff overcame all difficulties and the
service was most highly appreciated by all the inhabitants. In addition to local
"Avis" this radio-station relayed the BBC (London) (French) and ABSIE programs.
Speeches by local personages were given and the C.O. of the detachment recorded
a speech which was broadcast.

On the 7th July the town received a visit from General Koenig
and the Detachment Commander attended a luncheon party given in the General's
honor. On the 7th the Law Courts were reopened in ceremony and on the 8th two
alleged spies were tried and condemned to a long term of imprisonment.

On the 9th displays were given by PAD and the city fire
service and the detachment officers responsible for these activities reported
most favorably on the efficiency shown. During this period considerable progress
had been made by each section of the detachment and the normal life of the city
was quickly being restored.

A very difficult problem was that of accommodation. Many
people were returning to the city and a large number of troops were being
brought in. The Town Mayor did not arrive until ten days after the capture and
during this period property was acquired irregularly. The acquisition of
important property in the city was a matter which required very tactful
handling. The largest store was that of Rattis and it was required by the Army
for a Red Cross Club for colored troops. Considerable negotiation was necessary
to persuade the proprietor to release these premises voluntarily. The services
of the detachment were instrumental in effecting a satisfactory conclusion to
this negotiation.

The army also wished to requisition the factory known as the
Usine du Maupas for use as an APO and distribution center. It was felt that the
use of the factory in its proper function as a manufactory of agricultural
implements far outweighed the army requirement. It also contained a foundry and
saw mills and many excellent machines. This view prevailed and the detachment
was able to save the factory from the army use.

Lt. Guidicelli of the French Navy had been killed in action when leading a
party of American troops in an attack on the arsenal. His brave action will
be remembered as one of the most heroic incidents in the struggle for Cherbourg
and his funeral was attended by the C.O. of the detachment and other officers.

The delay in giving full recognition to the Provisional Govt.
gave rise to many difficulties at the detachment level. As an example of this it
may be mentioned the uncertainty at first of acceptance of the new currency.
Another trouble was the question of postage stamps. A suggestion to overprint
the "Petain" head by the "Lorraine Cross" was vetoed and eventually orders came
to continue the use of the Main stamp pending new issues.

Fishing was at first prohibited, but on the 26th July this
rule was relaxed and the boats were permitted to fish under certain
restrictions.
Civil transportation during the whole period under review was most
inadequate.

A new Sous-Prefect, M. Leviandier, had been appointed and a
new Prefect, M. Edouard Lebas. Our relations with both these men were extremely
cordial and they came to rely upon the detachment for advice on many matters. M.
Coulet, the Regional Prefect, also looked to the C.O. for information and advice
and expressed his opinion that the Cherbourg C. A. detachment was a model one.
The prefect had taken his quarters temporarily in Cherbourg pending the
liberation of his departmental seat at St. L6. As it happened, owing to the
demolition of St. Lo, he didn't go there but instead set up his office later at
Coutances.

The 14th July (Bastille day) was celebrated by a programme
which, if not up to prewar scale, was perhaps more impressive by reason of the
circumstances. It was naturally the first to be celebrated since 1939. Salvos of artillery and ringing of church bells took place at intervals during the
day. In the afternoon a big parade assembled in the Place Napoleon made up of
French military, Naval and civilian services, U.S. Army Units and British RAF
and Army. This parade marched to the public garden to the Memorial of Dead. It
was accompanied by M. Coulet, Admiral [George Thierry] d'Argenlieu, and all the
notables of the city. The C.O. and deputy also took part in this parade. The
memorial speeches were made by M. Bouchet (Resistance Group), Admiral
d'Argenlieu, M. Coulet, Colonel Howley, C.O. of the detachment and others. Next
on the programme was the renaming of the "Place Petain" to the "Place General de
Gaulle." This was performed by the Mayor, M. Renault. A concert was held in the
Municipal Theatre and the programme included

[732]

many of the old songs and tunes of France which had been prohibited for four
years.

On 20 July there was a formal opening of the First American
Red Cross club on French soil. Mr. [Harvey D.1 Gibson, a director of the Red
Cross, opened the club and the Mayor spoke and presented a tricolor flag. The
club is in the rue Albert-Mahieu, which had been prepared by the Germans for a
similar purpose but never used.

In all these social activities the detachment and
particularly the Commanding Officer, played an important role. The task of
coordinating the Civil and Military and Naval authorities and ensuring that the
pride and susceptibility of all parties were safeguarded was not a light
undertaking.

On July 15 M. d'Astiere [de la Vifierie d'Astier], the
Minister of the Interior paid a formal visit to the city and the Commanding
Officer and Deputy attended a ceremony in the Hotel-de-Ville welcoming this
important minister.

On the 29th July the Commanding Officer and deputy were
invited to the Prefecture Maritime to meet the Minister de la Marine, M. [Louis]
Jacquinot. They were most cordially received and discussed general matters of
interest at some length. With the open recognition of the Provisional Government
of France by President Roosevelt, much of the hesitance and delay in many
matters was removed.

In Public Health, an important event was the turning over of
the Pasteur Hospital to the French civil authority. The hospital had been
occupied by the Germans exclusively during their occupation. In addition a
number of beds were reserved for the French at the Maritime Hospital. The
opening of the Pasteur was commemorated in a very pleasant social ceremony on
July 21st at which the C.O. and deputy, health, and relief officers of the
detachment attended. The city's health was generally good, no epidemics were
reported.

In the first few days of August the cantons of
Beaumont-Hague, Octeville and St. Pierre-Eglise were handed over to the
detachment so that the three "D" detachments concerned could be relieved. An
officer and an enlisted man were sent to each place and within a fortnight it
was found possible to close these offices entirely.

Functional Work

Detachment AIAI was organized into twelve specialty sections.
These served as a sort of Special Staff to the commanding officer, but they were
also operational. The twelve sections for the Cherbourg operations were: Supply, Civil Defense, Public Safety, Public Health, Public
Utilities, Public Works, Finance, Legal, Relief, Economics and Labor,
Communications and Transportation. Some of these sections had strictly Civil
Affairs duties such as Relief. Others, such as Supply, had also military duties
connected with the normal functioning of the detachment. Thus, the officer in
charge of Supply was also S-4. Most officers actually wore two hats, one
connected with the work of the detachment, the other representing a military
function in the normal life of the detachment.

In accordance with policy set down for operations in France
by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, civil administration was
left to the French themselves. At the same time the Civil Affairs detachment
kept close tabs on the workings of the civilian authorities, for further SHAEF
directive ordered: "If initial recourse to French authorities fails, such
executive action as the security of the Allied Forces or the success of the
military operations. may require is authorized."

The Civil Affairs officers and enlisted men took a direct
part in several civilian functions that became quite important directly for the
success of military operations, such as billeting and recruitment of civilian
labor. But even in these Civil Affairs detachment was able to remain in the
background officially.

The Legal Section, on its arrival in Cherbourg, found the
courts closed and the officials gone. An immediate search brought forth a
temporary Juge de Paix, the Procureur de la Republique and the Juge
d'Instruction. Archives, furniture and lawbooks of the several courts were
brought back from Valognes. The officers of the Tribunal Militaire were sworn in
on 6 July, and two days later the first spy case in liberated France was heard,
with life imprisonment at hard labor the eventual fate of the two defendants.
The Tribunal d'Arrondissement opened on 7 July and the Conseil de Prud'homme on
26 July, giving Cherbourg a full legal organization.

In addition to getting civilian courts running, the legal
Civil Affairs officers advised military officials in the city of the legal
implications of various acts. On the basis of their experience in Cherbourg they
recommended that higher Civil Affairs headquarters give supplementary
information on the French laws of requisition and booty, and that unit
commanders receive directives and explanations of policy dealing particularly
with real and personal property.

The Cherbourg railway system, put in running order within two
weeks after the capture of the city, was used overwhelmingly by the military

[733]

for port clearance. However, following requests from
civilians to he permitted to travel on the road, an agreement was reached
between Second Military Railway Service and Civil Affairs transportation
officers whereby all requests for civilian travel were passed upon by Civil
Affairs headquarters.

Electrical power was limited by a shortage of coal. More
important, military traffic was heavy on the streets where the street car tracks
existed, and military officials were loath to permit any potential interference
by street cars. Civil Affairs officers did contend, though, that resumption of
street car service would benefit the working population that came in from the
outskirts of Cherbourg to work in and about the port. Similarly, no attempt was
made to revive the motor bus service that formerly connected Cherbourg with the
neighboring peninsula district because of the ban on civilian travel beyond six
kilometers and the conservation of fuel.

A census of all civilian motor vehicles in Cherbourg was
immediately directed by Civil Affairs headquarters to he undertaken by the
Service de Repartition de Fret, an organization set up for that specific purpose
within the Ponts et Chaussees. This organization eventually took care of the
entire motor problem, distributing permits to circulate, receiving demands for
transportation, coordinating and arranging loads, distributing fuel, controlling
a vehicle pool, and allocating vehicles for the use of essential services such
as the Ravitaillement General, Civil Defense, and the First Service.

As of 1 August, 450 pleasure vehicles had sought registration
permits to circulate in the entire Manche district, along with 218 light trucks,
111 heavy trucks, and 18 passenger buses. Of these vehicles, 75.4 per cent used
gasoline, 19.8 per cent produced gas, 2.6 per cent alcohol, and 2.2 per cent
diesel fuel. In the main it was the pleasure cars that burned gasoline.
Discovery of a large number of vehicles abandoned by the Todt Organization and
then looted of wheels, tires, and other parts, prompted Lt. Colonel Edward J.
Gully to recommend that in the future all abandoned vehicles be removed to a
civilian pool as soon as possible.

Major Shepherd, fiscal officer for the detachment, was joined 29 June by Captain Thorndike, and the two
jointly shared the job of getting Cherbourg's financial affairs in order. In the
city were found a branch office of the Banque de France, branch offices of four
of the principal Paris banks, a branch office of a provincial bank, the head
office of a Banque Populaire, and a large savings bank. Separation from head offices still in
German-held cities in some cases hampered efforts to resume banking operations,
but by the end of July only one bank was not operating completely normal and
even that one was open several days each week.

The local office of the Banque de France, which along with
the largest commercial bank in the city, had been the only banking houses in
Cherbourg to remain open during the occupation, had on hand 100,000,000 francs.
Another equal sum had been placed for safe-keeping in the vaults of a Valognes
bank that had been demolished by air attack during the battle for the peninsula.
A detail of German prisoners-of war, guarded by French gendarmes, searched
through the debris for three days and recovered this currency, which was brought
back to Cherbourg. These assets served to provide sufficient currency for all
early business purposes in the city. Postal officials borrowed enough money to
handle money orders, while the Banque de France resources were also tapped to
permit a special relief payment of 750 francs to all whose jobs had been lost in
one way or another because of hostilities and who were unable to find work for a
three week period. The Recette des Finances, the national government finance
office, also made funds available to the Caisse Departmentale des Assurances
Sociales so that social insurance benefits could start on 17 July.

Re-establishment of communications in Cherbourg involved a
special problem of international relations during time of war, with some of the
French unable to understand why Americans who come in as liberators occasionally
imposed more rigorous restrictions than had the German oppressors. Sometimes
they failed to realize the difference between the relatively peaceful occupation
by the Germans and the intensive work of the Americans necessary in establishing
a huge supply base.

Although the local phone system, on which the Germans had
permitted 1,000 civilian lines, was found in good shape on arrival of the
Americans, the Signal Corps froze all telephones. On 16 July the Signal Corps
announced its intention of taking over the local switchboard at the Place Divette,
but gave permission for installation of a smaller board of 100 lines for
civilian use. A week later installation of a second 100 lines was authorized. Captain Alan H. Westervelt, who handled
communications affairs for Civil Affairs, pointing out that all phone
communication in the northern part of the Cotentin Peninsula depended upon a service at Cherbourg, recom-

[734]

mended on the basis of his experience that communications
problems be treated on area-wide basis. He suggested that in the future at least
10 per cent of local telephone facilities be reserved for civilian use.

During the first week after the fall of Cherbourg, military
officials authorized reopening of local postal service for postcards and
unsealed letters, including Cherbourg and its suburban area. However, the
difficulty of postage stamps interfered and postal service did not start until
18 July. Permission to extend the service down the Cotentin Peninsula to Isigny
on the east and to La Haye-du-Puits on the west was granted 24 July, although it
was restricted to official correspondence of the French Government at first.

Public Safety activities in Cherbourg and surrounding area
kept many of the detachment officers busy. The city and metropolitan area of
Cherbourg with a total normal population of 80,000 was policed by four separate
police bodies, each functioning independently, the Police Surete Nationale, the
Gendarmerie Nationale, the Gendarmerie Maritime, and the Renseignements
Generaux.

The detachment entered the town at approximately 1400 hrs. 27th June 1944. Apart from incidental shooting by isolated enemy troops fighting had ceased.
The town itself was not badly damaged, but most of the
houses, shops, etc., had been broken open-many by the few remaining French for
the purpose of looting-others by the fighting troops during the processing of
cleaning up.
Apparently on the 23rd June 1944 the Germans published a
proclamation ordering the civilian population to evacuate the town, nominating
the routes Cherbourg-Briquebec and Cherbourg-Les Pieux as those to be used.

Most of the inhabitants left the town and the civil police
were used to shepherd the evacuees along the roads. It is estimated about 2,000
civilians did not obey the order and remained in the town; these took shelter in
the cellars of their houses, shelters, etc.

From the inquiries made it is quite definite that immediately
the Germans surrendered a large number of the inhabitants started on a
systematic looting of premises, both those formerly occupied by Germans and
those of evacuated French families; quite a large amount of the huge stocks of
German liquor stored in the town found its way into civilian hands and the
remaining civil police did not effectively interfere.

In connection with the capture of the town, an official ceremony was arranged
for 1600 hours, and it was following this ceremony contact was made with the
four chief officers of the police bodies and the following proclamations submitted to the mayor for his signature:

No Proclamation restricting travel had been received, so
arrangements were made for a supply to be printed locally. These were posted
later.

Prior briefing proved to be invaluable as far as details
regarding the town was concerned. It is suggested that directives affecting
sections should be collated and issued sectionally. Many Public Safety
Directives were contained on one copy of a communication affecting three or four
sections. Detachments should also be supplied with a form setting out various
heads under which information is required. This would considerably simplify the
submitting of information and returns.

A conference was held with C.I.C. prior to entering the town.
Vulnerable points to be guarded were selected and request sent to military
commander to provide personnel.

In respect of large towns, the following suggestion is submitted for
consideration:

Civil Affairs Public Safety Officers, Provost Marshal, and
C.I.C. should operate as a team with joint prior briefing, and the team should
be retained in the town for a reasonable period. In Cherbourg the Provost
changed repeatedly, with the result there was a consequent lack of coordination.
The C.I.C. team remained static with the result coordination and cooperation
have been excellent.

One of the major problems was the removal of property,
particularly furniture, by both French civilians and members of the Allied
Forces. This occurred in respect of premises occupied by Germans and French
alike. Large scale removals were carried out by units of the Allied Forces without requisition and it did cause considerable unfavorable comment
from the French.

At request of Civil Affairs, an order was issued by the
military commander prohibiting the removal of any property without written
authority.

It is suggested that in all cases immediately a town is
occupied an order should be issued prohibiting any removal without written
authority. Such order also to be applied to civil population

[735]

(through mayor). The authority for removal in respect of
military should be given by the requisitioning officer and for civilians by the
mayor.

For the first 14 days, at the request of the military
commander, all billeting was handled by Civil Affairs Public Safety. This proved
to be a big problem, particularly as practically no records were available at
the Mairie. Troops poured into the town and there was no time to complete a
census of available accommodations. Nor did any French machinery exist to carry
out such a census.

The Public Safety team obtained details of the masonry of
buildings previously occupied by the Germans and units who made application to
Civil Affairs were accommodated. Many units, however, occupied premises without
reference to Civil Affairs or anyone, with the result in many cases the houses
of French families were wrongly taken over. This necessitated the units
concerned making a change of billets which they could have avoided had they
contacted Civil Affairs.

Civil Affairs can undoubtedly render great assistance to any
billeting officer and where no military billeting machinery is available, they
can effectively handle it.

In Cherbourg considerable quantities of valuable material
left by the Germans was found. It is impossible to make a complete collection of
all such property in the early days. It is, therefore, suggested that an order
be issued to all military personnel requesting details of any property found in
premises to be forwarded to a central authority. This could be Civil Affairs,
who would be responsible for collating a list. Military personnel desiring
material for urgent work would then be directed to inquire at the Clearing House
to see if such items were available in the town. Copies of the town lists could
be forwarded to a Regional Clearing House, thus collecting details of available
property in the whole area.

Only one senior police officer was removed from office, the
officer being the Chief of the Gendarmerie Maritime. His removal was effected
entirely by the French. Civil Affairs was never officially informed of his
removal, although it was widely rumored in the town he was to be removed a week
before definite action was taken. It is considered that it would have been the
proper course for Civil Affairs to have been notified of the removal.

Very few instances of hair-cutting of collaborationists
occurred in the area, the police being asked to take active steps to prevent
this type of primitive punishment. One heard plenty of expressions by the French
people that some sort of punishment should be given to the large number of women
who lived on intimate terms with the Germans, and they were quick to note that the same women were
soon on intimate terms with the Allied services. On the whole, however, this
situation was accepted philosophically, the French summing it up with the
expression "La femme est internationale."

Under the French law, brothels are licensed by the police,
the girls being subject to a weekly inspection by a medical officer. In addition
licenses are issued to girls who carry on prostitution outside the brothels. It
will thus be readily seen that although one might have four licensed brothels,
there can legally be many others with individual prostitutes. All the licensed
prostitutes are subjected to a weekly medical examination. The brothels were
immediately placed "off limits" to Allied troops.

A proclamation restricting the civil population to six
kilometer limit from Cherbourg was issued. Great difficulties were experienced
in effectively enforcing this, chiefly on account of the numerous roads and
by-lanes leading from the town.

Six joint control points with military and civil police were
established on main roads leading into the town. These functioned with varying
degrees of effectiveness, lack of police personnel in the country districts
being one big disadvantage.

Military drivers were the chief cause for breaches of travel
restrictions being responsible for bringing civilians into the town without
permits. An order, actively enforced by military police forbidding the picking
up of civilians not in possession of a travel permit, would have solved most of
the problems.

In order to enforce the order, spot check points were set up
in the busy parts of the city, the location and time being varied daily. These
checks proved to be the most effective means of picking up undesirable visitors
to the town. Any detained were not released until cleared by C.I.C.

The most practical and effective movement control check
undoubtedly is for Control Points to be established on all main roads to town at
approximately 6 kilometers from the boundary. Mobile patrols working between the
control points outside should definitely be joint military and civil.

Permits to travel, etc., were made out and vetted by the
civil police, all applications being made to them. The forms were then submitted
to Civil Affairs Public Safety, who signed them after consultation with C.I.C.
Signed forms were then returned to the police for issue to the person concerned.
This method proved to be the most satisfactory as it avoided large numbers
collecting at the Civil Affairs Office and made the issue and refusal appear to
be primarily a French concern.

[736]

Certain prohibited areas, such as the arsenal and military
installations, were established. Difficulty was then experienced by essential
civilian workers, such as electricity employees, etc., in obtaining entry. In
consultation with the military commander and Provost a "pass" was prepared by
Civil Affairs and issued to all employees, who had been checked by C.I.C. and
local police.

A military traffic scheme was instituted by the Provost
without any consultation with Civil Affairs or the Civil authorities, with the
result that signs indicating One Way Streets were erected in English only, in
many instances in the opposite direction to an existing French One Way sign.
M.P.'s were surprised and indignant that the French were not conforming to the
military traffic system.

As is obviously important, the French civil authority must be
consulted on traffic schemes and signs should be erected in French and English
and continental traffic signs used as far as possible.

Immediately after the Germans left the district there seemed
to be no shortage of petrol amongst the French civilians. Everyone who possessed
a car was soon on the road with it. Undoubtedly the petrol had been left behind
by the Germans and quickly appropriated by the French.

A vehicle permit was instituted in Cherbourg, but it is
essential effectively to control motor transport for a regional permit to be
issued.

It is essential in all areas to effect an immediate round up
of all aliens with C.I.C. and civil police. Cherbourg being a center of the Todt
Organization had large numbers of aliens and the problem of rounding them up was
not an easy one, particularly as military units were anxious to employ many of
them and did, in fact, employ them.

It is a fairly simple matter to collect the alien population
of an area but once collected there must be some clear-cut policy and method of
dealing with them.

In Cherbourg all persons detained were taken to a pound where
they were screened by the C.I.C. in conjunction with the French military
security police.

Certain classes were released but the majority were passed on to other camps, which had been set up.

The machinery for the registration of the civilian population was set up in Cherbourg shortly after
occupation, but in view of the large number of evacuees returning to the city
daily, it was decided advisable to delay this until the registration of the whole Department could be effected. Arrangements were
made to effect the registration in conjunction with the next issue of Food Ration Cards.

Great difficulty was experienced in dealing with persons who
offended against the proclamation, curfew, travel, etc., particularly travel.
Proclamations were issued by individual mayors. Thus a person arriving in
Cherbourg from, say, Valognes violated the proclamation of Valognes and could
not be dealt with in Cherbourg. The proclamation, as printed, did not provide a
penalty and it is doubtful if there was any power to deal with offenders. This
was the view of the French Administration. This matter was eventually put right
by a regional proclamation from the regional commissioner. A further
proclamation was made empowering the police to fine offenders on the spot. While
not being in favor of this system of dealing with offenders, it was certainly
the answer as far as Cherbourg was concerned. The fine was fixed at 15 francs.
This system helped considerably in preventing undue breaches and was a speedy
way of dealing with offenders.

The order on possession of arms was rigidly enforced. No
person was allowed to possess arms unless a member of the Armed Forces or
Uniformed Police. The carrying of arms by the Resistance group was stopped, and
a percentage of the group, after checking, were enrolled in the Police Surete.
They proved to be very satisfactory. There were no incidents of disturbances
among the civil population.

In Cherbourg, Public Safety was fortunate in obtaining the
services of a Gendarme sergeant, who spoke English fluently. He was thus able to
act as liaison officer: his services were invaluable. All letters, reports,
statements, etc., coming from the French were written in French only. Therefore,
in order to pass copies to the various military departments concerned, chiefly
the Provost Branch, it was necessary to have them translated: as the complaints
were numerous, this proved a problem. The average French person who speaks
English and is a good interpreter is not a good translator and difficulty was
experienced in this direction.

All important buildings in the town were carefully checked by
the engineers for booby traps, time bombs, etc., but nothing was found. There was no indication that the Germans left any booby traps in the city.

There was one prison in Cherbourg. At the time of occupation
it housed 66 prisoners, the French estimation of the capacity being 100 Arrests
continued to be made and the persons were put into the same prison with the
result

[737]

at one time it was found to contain 168; a bad case of
overcrowding and considerable lack of staff. The matter was taken up with the
French officials and eventually the Naval authorities agreed to release the
maritime prison for civilian use. This new prison provided facilities for
segregation of prisoners and a far more humane standard of accommodation.

Under German occupation the black market flourished but
following the Allied occupation prices dropped and, apart from some trafficking
in clothing, there were no black market transactions which seriously affected
the economic life of the community.

Conclusion:

In conclusion the work of the detachment may be summarized as follows:

The civil authorities and inhabitants of Cherbourg were in a
state of confusion and bewilderment following the battle. The detachment gave
them a feeling of security and a sense of direction. In the technical field they
brought to bear their individual ability and qualifications to overcome the
difficulties consequent on the damage created by battle and the German
occupation.

They immediately brought about law and order and reorganized
the essential services. The detachment acted as a buffer between civilians and
the army ensuring that the former had a fair deal and also that the army secured
whatever was essential for the military effort.

The diplomatic handling of problems which affected all
branches of the civilian organization and the military, both U.S. and French,
was a major part of their duties and was carried through to the
satisfaction of all parties-no mean feat in the uncertain political situation
which at first prevailed.

All the city officials gave the greatest co-operation
possible and the main problem involved co-ordination with the military. The
Germans had occupied the city under peaceful conditions and our occupation was
under quite different circumstances.

All these differences were quite obvious to the great
majority of thinking French people. The comparison however with the German
occupation was always an ever present fact which the detachment had to bear in
mind in all its dealings. However, it is sufficient proof of the detachment's
ability to state that when the time came for them to hand over their work,
genuine regret and even concern was expressed by all leading civilian and
military authorities. They all felt they had lost a friend.

Throughout, the work of the French Liaison officers was
beyond praise-they filled a most important role as liaison with the civilian
officials and were indispensable, particularly in matters requiring diplomatic
handling and delicate negotiation.

Finally the joint American and British mixture was an
unqualified success-all worked together harmoniously regardless of rank and
nationality.

The overall SHAEF and lower echelon planning before "D" Day
was found accurate, helpful and entirely practical. The correctness of the Civil
Affairs setup from a broad view was obvious.

f. The period was one of continuous preparation, planning,
and coordination of Civil Affairs activities for the establishment of law and
order and the alleviation of the supply situation in Paris. When it became
evident, about 10 August, that Paris would be liberated earlier than was
contemplated under the 'OVERLORD' plan, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force established a stockpile of food and medical supplies for the
relief of the city; and assigned to this Headquarters six specialists to assist
in preparing a relief plan for Paris. Such a plan was prepared
and approved by the Army Group Commander. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. Serious problems will exist with respect to the feeding of the civilian
population on the capture

[738]

of Paris. This is to summarize for you the initial
arrangements which are being or have been made by this headquarters in the
matter.

2. It is estimated that on our entry, the food stocks in the
city of Paris will be practically negligible. Moreover, it is anticipated that,
in order to avoid disease and unrest, it will be necessary to feed practically
one hundred per cent of the population from stocks, either imported or brought
by military transport into the Paris area from other liberated portions of
France, such as Normandy and Brittany. The estimated population of the Paris
area thus affected is 3,800,000. French authorities in London place it as high
as 5,000,000. Emergency feeding should not fall below 1,200 calories.

3. Conversations have been taking place with the French
authorities in London and their representatives, with the appropriate authority
to act, are being sent to Normandy in the course of the next day or so; at the
same time, officers from this headquarters, fully conversant with the problem,
have been sent over to your headquarters to assist in all ways possible.

4. Briefly, the problem appears to be largely one of
transportation of needed supplies. It is considered that in France today you
have sufficient stocks to tide over the initial difficulties, particularly as it
should not he necessary to distribute any material quantity of imported supplies
in Normandy, and because of the indigenous foodstocks available in Brittany.
However, as a precautionary measure, arrangements have been made to stockpile 1o
days of Paris requirements of food and medical supplies near Southhampton or
Bristol so that they can be called forward by you if required. In addition, a
certain portion has been so located as to be available for movement by air. This
arrangement will be completed by 2o August. Details of the above have been
forwarded to your Civil Affairs staff through Technical channels....

5. a. From the information available at this headquarters, it
appears that little assistance with transportation, except local distribution in
Paris itself, can be expected from the French, owing to a complete lack of
serviceable transportation resources.
b. There are in the United Kingdom at the present time
approximately two thousand (2000 15-cwt trucks, with one-ton trailers, which are
being allocated to your forces. Arrangements are being made to have these trucks
and trailers made ready for immediate shipment and are subject to your call.
c. In addition, approximately three hundred (300) three-ton trucks are being made available to you for immediate shipment
if needed.
d. Details of these arrangements have been forwarded to your
Civil Affairs staff through technical channels.

6. The French are making arrangements to provide the necessary drivers for
these trucks in France. Discussions are also taking place with regard to the
conditions upon which you will turn the trucks over to the French, and you will
be informed of these as early as possible.
♦ ♦ ♦

1. To provide for the emergency requirements of food and
medical supplies for Paris and immediate vicinity, the total population being
estimated at approximately 4,000,000

2. The period of emergency is estimated at 45 days, and is divided into two
phases:
a. The initial emergency phase: 10 days.
b. The secondary phase: 35 days.

During the initial phase, due to the expected disruption of
civilian services and depletion of food stocks, the total burden for the supply
of the population will be a military responsibility. During the secondary phase,
indigenous supplies will become increasingly available to meet requirements,
provided sufficient power and transport are available. By the end of the 45-day
period, the French Central Government authority is expected to take over the
entire responsibility of supplying the Paris region. ♦ ♦ ♦

III. Requirements.

I. Supplies.
a. On the basis of present information, it is assumed that
the supply of food available in Paris at the moment of liberation will not last
for more than 48 hours. The probable disruption resulting from military
operations will prevent the normal flow to Paris of any substantial amounts of
food during the first 10 days.
b. It is estimated that 2,400 tons of supplies per day will
be required to maintain the prevailing ration scale during the first 10 days.
c. It is estimated an average of 1,000 tons per day will be
required during the secondary phase of 35 days.
d. In the event initial surveys indicate that a net saving in
transportation can be achieved by substituting coal for other supplies, this sub-

[739]

stitution will be accomplished within the over-all transportation estimates.

2. Transportation.
a. The fullest practicable use will be made of Civil Affairs
transport as it becomes available. In the event that such transport has not been
placed in service sufficiently in advance of the liberation of Paris, the
estimated maximum motor transport requirements from military sources will be as
follows:
(1) For stockpiling in forward areas, 56,000 tons to be moved 120 miles.
(2) For movement from forward stockpiles to Paris during
initial emergency period of 10 days, 2,400 tons per day to be moved 100 miles.
(3) For movement from forward stockpiles to Paris during
secondary period of 35 days, 1,000 tons per day to be moved 100 miles.
b. The above estimates do not allow for possible reduction of
motor transport by use of rail and waterways facilities or movements by air.

IV.
Resources.

I. Supplies.
a. Imported Supplies.
(1) At the present time, stockpiles of CA supplies available
in the U.S. area amount to approximately 6,000 tons. It is expected that by 3o
August this will have been brought to 10,000 tons, under normal movement
schedule.
(2) A stockpile of 23,000 tons is now earmarked in a port in
Southern England for CA supplies. It has been requested that this stockpile be
moved to this shore, under an accelerated schedule, by 30 August.
(3) The DCCAO, 21 Army Group, states that in an emergency he
can provide from Civil Affairs imported stocks in the British zone the following
food supplies:

Item

Net Tons

Biscuits

170 (perhaps mere)

Canned Meats

400

Lard

30

Pulses

650

Sugar

130

Chocolate

80

Milk

80

Wheat and Flour

1,000

Total

2,540

b. Indigenous Resources:
(1) The immediate vicinity of Paris produces substantial amounts of
truck-gardening supplies, which should begin to move into the city by local
transport after the initial emergency period of 10 days.
(2) In addition, considerable resources in wheat, meat,
potatoes, dairy products and vegetables will be available in the nearby regions
and uncovered areas. Certain processing supplies, equipment and transport will
be required to make these indigenous supplies available for the Paris region
after the initial emergency phase.
(3) The above estimates covering indigenous resources are
based on the assumption that the French central and regional authorities will
discharge their responsibilities effectively.

2. Transportation.
a. CA Resources.
(1) 185 3-ton trucks (British type), originally allocated for
fire-fighting, are available in the U.K. It has been requested that these be
delivered to Communications Zone by 30 August.
(2) 1500 3/4-ton trucks and 1500 1-ton trailers have been
allocated to the U.S. zone to be turned over to the French civil authorities for
the transportation and distribution of CA supplies. These vehicles have been
phased in at the rate of 160 per day beginning 25 Aug.
(3) 21 Army Group state that they can transfer to temporary
use in the U.S. zone 250 3-ton lorries now on hand. Also 440 15-cwt trucks and
440 1-ton trailers that are to be delivered at an early date. They cannot
furnish drivers. Also that excess beach capacity exists in the British area and
15,000 tons storage space in Caen.
(4) Preliminary arrangements have been made for the movement by air lift of
3,000 tons of CA supplies to Paris. It is anticipated that this air lift will
proceed at the rate of 1,000 tons per day, and may begin on the
second day following liberation.
(5) It is not anticipated that a substantial number of
captured enemy vehicles can be efficiently utilized for the movement of CA
supplies.
(6) On the basis of present information, no reliance may be
placed on availability of local French vehicles for the movement of CA supplies
during the emergency period.

V. Internal Distribution in Paris Area.

1. Supplies will be delivered to six central distribution
points in Paris, to be determined after detailed study.

2. It is expected that the present organization of the
Ravitaillement General will insure distribution down to the consumer through the
Arrondissement systems and commercial channels.

[740]

3. The present ration cards will be continued in use until
such time as it is possible to replace them with new coupons.
It is not planned to allow any immediate increase in the present official
ration scale.

VI. Public Health.

1. Available information indicates that certain communicable
diseases, especially diphtheria, typhoid and scarlet fever, will require strict
control measures. Owing to the scarcity of soap, a high degree of louse
infestation will probably be found, and skin diseases will be prevalent.

2. Minimum requirements to meet public health problems are
included in the 10-day emergency reserve now stockpiled in the U.K. for Paris,
amounting to 53 tons; and an additional 518 gross tons of medical supplies for
the secondary period.

VII. Public Safety.

1. Primary responsibilities for Public Safety measures in
Paris will be assumed by the French authorities.

2. Coordination has been initiated in order to insure that French authorities
will:
a. Take necessary steps for maintenance of law and order in the Paris region.
b. Insure security of supplies in transit and at points of distribution
within Paris.

VIII. Paris CA Detachment.

1. A reinforced detachment has been charged with CA
operations in Paris. Adequate reinforcements will be provided to deal with
problems of Displaced Persons, Fiscal matters, and other special problems.

IX. Responsibilities.

1. G-5, this Headquarters, will:
a. Arrange necessary coordination with French National
Authorities prior to the liberation of Paris.
b. Provide suitable detachments and specialist personnel for
initial Civil Affairs operations in Paris.

2. The Commanding General, First Army, is charged with the
initial conduct of Civil Affairs activities in Paris; and will effect the
necessary coordination with the Commanding General, Communications Zone, to
insure:
a. The provision of essential supplies for the civil population.
b. The transfer to the Communications Zone at the earliest
practicable time of administrative and operational responsibility for Civil
Affairs activities in Paris.

3. The Commanding General, Communications Zone, will:
a. Move necessary relief supplies to suitable distribution points in Paris.
b. Effect necessary coordination with Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force, 21 Army Group, and other interested headquarters and
agencies, for the shipment of Civil Affairs relief supplies to Paris by sea,
air, rail, and motor transport.
c. Coordinate and arrange the organization and operation of
French Civil Motor Transport Units, including provision of uniforms, rations,
and other necessary supplies while operating under U.S. military control.
d. Provide for the taking over of such Civil Affairs
detachments and personnel as may have been detailed by the Commanding General,
First Army, and made available for subsequent activities under the
Communications Zone; and assure the arrival in Paris at the earliest practicable
time of such additional Civil Affairs personnel and equipment as may be
necessary for the effective conduct of Civil Affairs operations.

4. Any requirements which cannot be met from resources of the
Communications Zone, or through coordination with Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force, 21 Army Group, and other available sources, without
jeopardizing the military effort, will be referred to the Commanding General,
Twelfth Army Group, for decision as to whether the requirements will be
fulfilled at the cost of the military effort.

1. Inasmuch as Paris is the Capital of France and is a city
particularly well organized for administration, the Civil Affairs responsibility
for Paris is less than has been assumed previously.

2. General Koenig is to be the military Governor of the city
and as such is responsible for the administration thereof. Your Detachment
Commanding Officers may well be told that their services are at his disposal.
They will also be told that they are not to take aggressive action except in
immediate or striking emergency. They are to survey and report on Civil Affairs
matters, particularly as it pertains to public safety and public welfare, food
and medical supplies, to you. The Commanding Officers will be careful to place
themselves in a condition so that they can function in an emergency and carry
out their full

[741]

responsibilities. All of the action taken must be with an
idea that the First Army and you will not retain responsibility for more than
several days.

1. The French Government is responsible for the production,
processing, collection and delivery of indigenous food products to Paris. It is
their responsibility to see that farm products are harvested, transported to the
flour mills, creameries, slaughterhouses, etc., for processing, thence, to
collection points selected and maintained by them, and on into Paris in
balanced, daily deliveries.

2. It is the responsibility of Civil Affairs to maintain
liaison with French officials and to assist them in accomplishment of these
objectives to the end that necessity for imports by Allied forces of food to
feed Paris and transport needs, shall be reduced to a minimum.

3. Base Section Commanders will be responsible for assisting
the French officials in the production, harvesting, processing, collecting and
delivery of these indigenous food products for feeding Paris during the
emergency period.

4. The producing areas whence these indigenous food supplies
will come cover a large territory and are widely dispersed. Available transport
and power facilities are drastically limited. It is imperative that the
collection and distribution from all these areas of indigenous food be
co-ordinated in order to get maximum deliveries at the right time and to reduce
need of transport facilities.

5. Areas of responsibility of Civil Affairs should be
enlarged to include specified areas so delineated that no hiatus area exist
within the over-all jurisdiction. These detachments will be advised by G-5 of
the respective commands of the scope, purpose and procedure of this plan and in
all matters necessary for its successful accomplishment, and they and G-5 will
keep the coordinating officer in their area fully advised at all times. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. General Situation:
a. City is scarcely damaged. Great enthusiasm over
liberation. De Gaulle wildly acclaimed as he walked from Arc de Triomphe to
Notre Dame on afternoon of 26 August. Effervescence of people could get out of
hand if food situation should become more critical. Police forces seem
insufficient to control populace in event of widespread disorder, although many
can be seen, appearing well-disciplined and presenting neat appearance.
b. As de Gaulle reached Cathedral, bursts of fire came from
snipers in areas. Sniping continues intermittently throughout city and FFI are
shooting indiscriminately at snipers in most sections of city. If sniping is not
soon checked, this may lead to indiscriminate reprisals.
c. Last organized German resistance ceased at 1430 hours on
25 August as remaining elements holding out in various public buildings
surrendered. Great damage was caused by incendiaries during a light raid night
26-27 August. Industrial areas Southwest of City suffered greatly. Visit on
the spot showed no adequate civil defense or fire fighting organization
functioning.
d. Vichy incumbents in key central and municipal offices were
removed on Saturday 19 August by FFI who seized control of city as bulk of
German garrison was withdrawn. Personnel removed has been jailed pending trial
and replaced by appointees of the Resistance, presumably approved by de Gaulle
although some difficulty may well arise when Algiers groups arrive to take over
functions of central government.
e. People seem in normal health and standard of dress is
satisfactory. Individual cars in small number driven by officials; more cars in
hands of FFI; solve trucks on the streets. Thousands of bicycles being used by
populace for private transport.

2. Supply Situation:
a. High Officials, who appear competent and straightforward,
submitted following information in the course of several conferences held with
U.S. representatives:

[742]

(1) Flour in sufficient quantity to last through Monday, 28
August. Small arrivals from nearby areas. . . .
(2) Miscellaneous food supplies, including substitutes, are
held in sufficient quantities to last about 7 days on present reduced ration
scale.
(3) Some meat available and cattle being brought on hoof to the city.

b. Public Utilities and Services:
(1) Electricity. Enough coal is available to last 1o days
with go minutes per day for general consumption and to provide minimum allotment
for utilities (water system, sewage, telephone, hospitals, police). It is
expected that by end of 10 day period, power lines to Southern hydraulic plants
will be restored. If this is done, enough power will be brought to the city to
provide minimum requirements as above, plus operation of subway to 60% capacity.
Water system operates with coal at a rate of 210 tons per day and present
reserve will last two months. Should lines not be in working condition in 10
days, daily supply of 500 tons diesel and 500 tons of coal will be required to
operate on minimum basis as above (alternative 1300 tons of coal per day).
(2) Gas. None available and need is urgent as 80% of
population cooks by gas. 25,000 tons of coke on hand. This can be used to
manufacture gas if Diesel oil is supplied. To provide 1 hour of gas per day for
one month, 25,000 tons of coke on hand plus goo0 tons of Diesel oil will
suffice. Unless immediate relief is provided, gas mains will fast deteriorate
and several weeks will be required to restore system to working order.
(3) Milling Facilities. Flour mill at Corbelli is undamaged
and has a milling capacity of 700 tons per day.
(4) Coal. French officials emphasize that unless substantial
supply of coal can be obtained from Northern mines, or from other sources, by
one month from now, the entire situation with respect to coal must be seriously
examined and immediate emergency measures adopted. ♦ ♦ ♦

Saturday morning, Brig. Gen. Pleas Rogers with Lt. Col. Robert [M.1 Hamilton,
his G-5, remained in the lobby of the Hotel Louvre, demanding that I
report to them. Brig. Gen. Rogers was at some future date to assume command of
Seine Base Section, ComZ. I spent those hours searching for billets, getting my
men placed out of the street fighting. I went to the Hotel Louvre at 2 o'clock.
Gen. Rogers gave me a skinning and demanded that I assist him immediately in
locating adequate quarters for himself and his staff. I explained that I had
been busy in the exercise of my duty and that the handling of real estate was
done by the Engineer Section. That I was empowered to take care of Civil Affairs
needs because the Real Estate Section had not yet arrived.

The General accused me of looking out for only CA interests
and demanded that I do the same for him. I explained that I could accept his
direct orders only after I was released from V Corps. General Rogers would
listen to none of this. I called Colonel [William J.] Morony, G-5 of V Corps,
introduced him to Gen. Rogers, and said that Col. Morony was my boss and I would
do what he said. Col. Morony suggested it would be all right to give Gen. Rogers
a note of introduction to the Prefect of Police, who, it was assumed, could
requisition buildings for the American Army. ♦ ♦ ♦

It was my definite understanding that I was in command of 23
Civil Affairs Detachments, that we were to be responsible for Civil Affairs in
Paris, as we had been in Cherbourg. It was my overall understanding that I would
be responsible to some CG, who would have, as advisor, a G-5But that the CG,
though exercising general responsibility for Civil Affairs, would not actually
participate in the Civil Affairs Operations themselves.

Gen. Rogers considered that he was responsible for actual
Civil Affairs operations in Paris at all times. Relations between the CG of
Seine Section and CA were continually strained because the CG felt that we were
encroaching on his program. ♦ ♦ ♦

The skinnings and misunderstandings grew out of a conflict in
our instruction. Seine Section and all members of its Staff thought Civil
Affairs responsible only for introducing them for first contacts; after that,
they carried on their affairs direct. We believed it our duty to direct civil
affairs for the benefit of the Military, in accordance with directives we had
received. It was our belief, and it had proved correct in Cherbourg, that the CG
to whom we were attached would be happy if the Civil problems were taken off his
hands. We thought this would also prove true in Paris, where we assumed the
chief interests

[743]

of ComZ would be getting petrol and food supplies up to our
army. This apparently was not true. From the start, the CG called conferences
with French authorities, particularly on food. The Provost Marshal contacted the
police, not only on problems dealing with soldiers, but any police problem which
interested him. ♦ ♦ ♦

AFTER SOME WAITING CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS GO TO WORK
[Interv With Howley, 27 Feb 45]

♦ ♦ ♦ Monday morning, all Special Sections were at Hq. The
arrondissement Det's were out in their districts. The Section Heads were
impatient. Everyone wanted to get to work. But we had received orders from Col.
Gunn, G-5, 1st Army, that we were not to operate. We were to be like the
American Regular Army in peace time, ready. And we were to operate only if
requested to do so by General Koenig, French Military Governor of Paris.

In a place where street fighting was still taking place,
where the French Govt. was still not completely organized or only partly
organized on a local basis, in a city where everything pointed to the need for a
Civil Affairs job, it seemed inconsistent that we should be sitting around with
an organization of 136 officers and 220 EM, doing nothing. I talked with Col. La
Roque, my senior French Liaison Officer, and asked him if Gen. Koenig knew we
were doing nothing. He contacted Gen. Koenig and within a hour reported that
Gen. Koenig said we were to operate as we operated at Cherbourg. The message
was: "Tell Howley and his gang to get to work."

My staff and I were known to Gen. Koenig. We had already
proved that we were not Military Government in disguise, that we were genuine
Civil Affairs. We had specialists in utilities, police, finance, supply, and we
were willing and able to help the French. Within 20 minutes of Gen. Koenig's
request, all functions of Civil Affairs in Paris were in operation. We contacted
French authorities, we asked how we could help, we gave professional advice
where wanted, we stressed the great friendship between the Allies and the
French. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ Plenty of black market operations were taking place in
the city. At the foot of the Eiffel Tower, American troops were known to be
selling American foods, gasoline, and other stuff to French civilians. Such activities were growing in scope and
spreading to the Arrondissements. The matter was reported by my Police Officer
to the French police. They were reluctant to interfere with activities of
American soldiers, perhaps because the few police who did interfere were beaten
up. The matter was then reported to Seine Section and more MP's were brought in.
Black marketing of American supplies was curtailed and forced underground. ♦ ♦ ♦

CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS WORK THEMSELVES OUT OF A JOB
[Interv With Howley, 27 Feb 45]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Police Section, under Major Palfrey, British, did a
bang-up job. Most of the heads of the local police department, 22,800 men, were
not professionals. M. Louize, the Prefect of Police had been Representative
Governor of Corsica. He was a man of skill and ability, but he did not know the
administrative details of running a large police force. He was so appreciative
of our help that he placed one member of his force, a M. Roche, on permanent
duty at our headquarters for liaison work.

Other special functions helped the French, depending upon the
need. In the case of Legal, no aid was required. ♦ ♦ ♦

Within a very short time (3 weeks), except for Supply, my
Civil Affairs units were working themselves out of a job. This was entirely in
accordance with our policy of letting the French do it. Some sections were doing
little or no work except to report daily activities. Legal, Economics & Labor,
Fiscal, Pubic Health, Utilities, Communication, and Transportation were marking
time. ♦ ♦ ♦

... The only thing we had to do in Paris was to bring in
supplies. Even then they might have avoided starvation without our being there. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. Preliminary planning for the relief of Paris has been
under constant revision throughout the current operation in accordance with:
a. Intelligence reports received.
b. Experience in areas first uncovered.
c. Analyses of indigenous food supplies, transportation facilities, and
civilian organization.

2. Advance planning culminated in an order to the major Headquarters
concerned, issued by

[744]

the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, 22 August 1944.

3. The plan referred to above was put into operation
immediately following the liberation of Paris, and is being carried out, at the
present time, with modifications in accordance with the situation as found to
exist in Paris. A copy of a report on conditions in Paris to the Chief of Staff, Twelfth Army Group, dated 27 August 1944, is attached hereto [see above].

4. The situation with respect to the delivery and disposition
of relief supplies to the civilian population of Paris is as follows:

Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, has authorized the
import of 2400 tons per day of Civil Affairs supplies into Paris. 1500 tons
daily of this are authorized at the expense of the military effort. The 1500
tons are now being loaded in the Communications Zone, and first delivery of that
amount from the U.S. zone should be made on Friday, I September. Meanwhile, the
British are delivering approximately 500 tons per day, and the U.S. supplies
landed at the Orleans Airport are being transported to Paris by military convoy
at the rate of 500 tons per day. French civilian vehicles have started
deliveries of indigenous resources to Paris. It is estimated that deliveries on
Tuesday and Wednesday, 29 and 3o August, will amount to 500 tons per day.
Efforts are being directed to expediting the movement of French indigenous
resources and captured German supplies (released for Civil Affairs use) to
Paris. 12 U.S. officers, Agricultural Specialists, have been assigned from a
Specialist Pool to the job of assisting local French authorities in locating and
arranging transportation to Paris for these supplies. These officers are working
under the supervision and co-ordination of Communications Zone Agricultural
Specialists. . . . It is estimated that on Monday, 28 August, 900 tons of Civil
Affairs supplies and 500 tons of indigenous supplies were delivered, and on
Tuesday 1000 tons of Civil Affairs supplies and 500 tons of indigenous supplies.

Daily improvements being shown in most of the above
classifications, with 2500 tons of potatoes reported having reached Chartres
from Rennes on the railroads yesterday. All CA foods unloaded in Paris to
midnight 1 Sept; 2800 tons from 21 Army Group; 1400 tons from Airlift; 88 tons
miscellaneous. In addition, the first group of 50 3/4-ton trucks with I ton
trailers arrived in Paris from beaches with food, others reported on way. ♦ ♦ ♦

For your information and guidance, the following letter, dated 28 August 1944, has been received from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations:

"1. Paris and environs has been designated by Supreme
Headquarters as within the U.S. zone of operation.

"2. Effective 1200 hours, 28 August 1944, the Seine Section,
Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, is designated as the sole
U.S. agency for administration of Paris and environs, in accordance with the
terms of the agreement concluded between the French Committee of National Liberation and the United Kingdom and the United States on
25 August 1944. ♦ ♦ ♦

THE FRENCH SEEK CO-OPERATION IN ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM
[Aide-mémoire, 12 May 44, Dealing With High Pay of
American Troops, inclosed in Ltr, Monnet to McCloy, 12 May 44, CAD files, 112.4
(3-13-43) (1)]

The French authorities in North Africa have on several occasions . . .
pointed out that it was important, both on psychological and economic grounds, that
the troops should not make full and indiscriminate use of the very high
purchasing power which the conversion of their pay into francs gave them in a
country where most goods were in short supply.

The Allied Army will be confronted with the

[745]

same problems in France, but on a much larger scale and in a
more acute way. . . . The American Government is fully aware of the extremely
precarious state of the French economy at this time. Four years of occupation
have stripped the country of most of the consumer goods; there are no stocks of
any kind, the population is underfed, every commodity is in short supply. On the
other hand, the pay of the American troops converted into francs is out of
proportion with the standard wages in the country. The daily allowance of an
American private converted into francs at the present rate of exchange is higher
than the daily salary of a French skilled worker; but whereas the worker has to
live on his salary, the American soldier gets free lodging, food and clothing
from the army, and will therefore have at his disposal in France a very high
purchasing power on a market where there are few goods to buy.

The consequence will inevitably be a rise in prices and an
increase of black market operations. ♦ ♦ ♦

The French Committee of National Liberation wishes,
therefore, to draw the most serious attention of the War Department to this
important matter and suggest for its consideration the advisability of taking
the following measures:

1. The daily allowance convertible into francs should, during
the first months of liberation, and until such time as supplies may then become
available, be limited to as low a figure as possible;

2. Appropriate instructions should be given by the Commander
in Chief to prevent individual buying of food products by the troops;

3. The American troops should not be allowed to bring into
France American currency and use or exchange it for their own private purchases.

♦ ♦ ♦ a. The decision to use special supplemental French
Currency, equal in value to the French Metropolitan currency, and to fix rates
of exchange favorable to France, was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Washington, after collaboration with the State Departments of the countries
concerned. The exchange rate of 49.5663 francs to the dollar or 200 francs to
the pound sterling, which was announced prior to D Day, was an official rate
only for the purpose of exchanging dollar and sterling currency in the possession
of troops and of fixing the troop pay scales in francs. This rate of exchange
was favorable to France, and bore little relation to the actual relative values
of the currencies, which under the circumstances could hardly have been
accurately determined. If yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority
notes had been used, it would have been necessary to have fixed rates of
exchange which would have been official for all purposes. This would have given
rise, from time to time, to pressures to change the rates as economic and other
factors changed. Initially, the rate probably would have been nearer to 200-I than 50-I, as established for military purposes. It was the opinion of many qualified observers in the
field of economics that extreme inflation probably would have followed. Such
inflation would have injured the French people, already suffering from the
effects of four years of German occupation, and probably would have necessitated
the closing of French banks and the declaration of a general moratorium, with
consequent impediment to the Allied military operations. The wisdom of the
policy adopted has been questioned mainly on the ground that Allied troops have
not received full value for the money they have spent in France. Since personal
expenditures by troops have been only for items which cannot he classed as
essential and consistently have involved only a small fraction of their earned
pay, the loss to them appears to have been of small moment compared to the
undeniable advantages that accrued from the avoidance of inflation. Certainly
this was true during the period of active military operations. ♦ ♦ ♦

We have given a great deal of study to the question of
inflationary effects of spending of Allied Troops overseas and have formulated a
considerable program on the matter.... Following quotation from memorandum on
this problem gives essence of program undertaken:

1. Facilities in American Army for voluntary allotments,
remittances, savings deposits, purchase of war bonds and insurance and at post
exchanges, quartermaster stores etc., have resulted in U.S. Army personnel
spending only small fraction of their pay in foreign theater in which they
are....

[746]

2. Special Services is planning to extend its recreational
facilities for Army personnel and to facilitate the establishment of civilian
concessionaires at army posts. Army exchange service is planning an extended
service and will include extensive line of souvenirs, including souvenirs
acquired in liberated areas. . .

3. A public relations and educational campaign is being
conducted to make troops understand harmful effect of their spending on economy
of countries which we are liberating and the desirability of their saving money
for postwar activities.

4. Orders have been issued by SHAEF prohibiting troops from
making any local purchases for individual use (including food in restaurants). .
. .

6. In view of the rate of exchange which has been fixed for
French franc, prices in France are likely to be comparatively high and this
together with the shortage of goods will discourage purchase by Army personnel. ♦ ♦ ♦

The report on SCAEF's program to limit the inflationary
effect of military operations, sent with your letter of 8 June 1944, reflects
that a fine job is being done.
7

In fact, your consideration of the problems involved is so
thorough that we can acid nothing new to your program. However, it may be that
the War Department can give you some assistance in its implementation.

If you have not already done so I suggest that full
information regarding these plans be made available through Headquarters, SCAEF,
to the French authorities with whom contact is maintained. This is most
important from two angles, the first being that no anti-inflationary program can
succeed without full cooperation between the troops and the indigenous
authorities. Secondly, there is bound to be some inflation during our
occupation, and we should make as clear a record as possible to prevent later
claims by the French or by others that inflation is brought on solely by the
troops' spending and that we have failed to take all proper steps to prevent
inflation.

The request of the French that we limit the amount of pay
given to troops is not possible to grant, not only because it would affect
adversely the morale of troops, but also because it would be unlawful.
In order to clarify this point we requested a legal opinion from the Judge
Advocate General, who has advised us that compulsory withholding of soldiers'
pay under the circumstances cited would be in violation of federal law. ♦ ♦ ♦

We have been able to ascertain the facts regarding the
monetary and economic situation in liberated Normandy....
... All evidence points in the direction that fears which
may have been expressed by French authorities of inflation being augmented by
the presence of large numbers of Allied troops whose purchasing power could not
be sufficiently controlled, is not supported by the facts found in the region
itself. ...

Insofar as fiscal matters are concerned, the impact of the
Allied invasion on the French economy has been well controlled. . . . The plans
prepared have been well implemented and the regulations or orders issued have
been observed in such a manner as to reflect credit upon Allied Forces in the
area.

The facts found lead to these inescapable conclusions:
a. Expenditures of Allied Forces and individual troops have
been relatively small, and have not contributed to inflation.
b. Plans to encourage savings have been successful....
c. The tendency of prices, both legal maximum and actual
prices, has been notably downward since liberation.
d. Black markets have ceased to exist in all commodities
except a very few. . . . Such black markets as continue to exist (e.g. tobacco,
coffee, gasoline, and sugar are not patronized by and are not due to the
presence of Allied Forces. ♦ ♦ ♦

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER FEELS HE, IS BEING CHEATED
[Extract from Memo, Chief Finance Branch, 31 Dec 44, Attachment to Memo From
Lt Col Hilliard to Hilldring,

12 Jan 45, CAD files, 123.7(12-19-44) sec. 2]

♦ ♦ ♦ A general feeling exists that military personnel,
particularly those stationed in Paris or those utilizing Paris as a "leave
center," are the victims of extreme financial injustice because

[747]

of the franc rate of exchange. This considered to be the result of:
a. The prices charged for alcoholic beverages and luxury items.
b. Soldiers who do not know the country often go to places
that are normally much more expensive than they could frequent at home.
c. The knowledge that illegal or black market transactions in
foreign exchanges are being effected at rates far more advantageous to the
holder of dollars/sterling than the official rates.
d. Too much ill considered publicity concerning the rate.
e. The feeling of a portion of the military that it has
"liberated" France and has "something coming" as a result.
f. The high prices of merchandise in shop windows which
leaves an impression even though the items are not desired by the
observer or can not be legally purchased.
g. Stories about cheap prices in France before the war.
h. The observing of heavy spending in public places, such as
night clubs, by French civilians which can not be matched by military personnel. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. The complaints of American soldiers serving in France
relative to adverse effect upon local purchasing power of official rate of
exchange at which their unalloted pay is disbursed in French francs, have shown
an intensity which cannot be disregarded by the War Department, which have won
strong Congressional support and which, on the grounds of troop morale, as well
as of public relations, demand that positive measures should be initiated by the
War Department with a view to alleviating the cause of such complaints.

2. The fundamental basis of soldiers' complaints is that the
exchange rate of approximately fifty (50) francs to the dollar used in payroll
conversions is grossly out of line, both with the relative internal purchasing
power of the franc, and with rates paid for dollars on currency black markets
which have ranged from one hundred twenty-five (125) to two hundred twenty-five
(225) francs to the dollar. .. .

3. In the financial planning of cross-channel invasion operations it was
considered by the United States and British governments that the ultimate
responsibility for fixing rates of exchange for the metropolitan French franc
rested with the French Committee of National Liberation. The Committee advised
the Allied governments that it desired to maintain the same rates which had been
set for the franc in French North Africa at the Casablanca Conference with the
approval of the President and the British Prime Minister. It was agreed by the
Allied authorities, prior to D Day, to use the rates desired by the French
Committee of two hundred (200) francs to the pound, and forty-nine point five six six three (49.5663) francs to the dollar (based on the sterling-dollar
rate of £1=$4.035....

4. All available evidence indicates that in terms of its
relative internal purchasing power the French franc is highly overvalued at the
present official rate of exchange . . . the present rates ... represent a
devaluation of only about twelve and one-half (12V2) per cent. On the other
hand, . . . the indications are that the present internal purchasing power of
the franc has declined on the average of something like seventy per cent....

6. Since it is our soldiers in France who are chiefly affected by the present
dollar-franc rate of exchange, the War Department has a primary concern in
initiating action designed to afford a measure of relief. ♦ ♦ ♦

THE FRENCH AGREE ON A PROGRAM TO AFFORD THE SOLDIER RELIEF
FROM THE UNFAVORABLE RATE OF EXCHANGE
[Paraphrase of State Dept Msg, 18 May 45, signed Grew, CAD files, 112.5 (3-13-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 20114]

When Pleven was here he talked with officers of the War and
Treasury Departments about questions touching the welfare of U.S. troops in
France, especially the trouble created by the unfavorable franc-dollar exchange
rate. They in principle agreed upon a plan aimed at furnishing more
entertainment facilities and non-rationed commodities for the troops at special terms. Col. Carl
Pforzheimer, a delegate of the War Department, is going directly to Paris to
consult with U.S. troops in France and the provisional Government so that an
agreement may be put through for alleviating the situation which has caused
numberless complaints by soldiers and which might produce considerable friction
while the redeployment period continues if it is not solved. Colonel Pforzheimer
intends to visit the Embassy after he gets to Paris and will tell you how his
talks progress.

1. Advance elements of Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force Mission (France) now established Hotel Crillon, Place de la
Concorde, Paris. Function of Mission is as follows:
A. To safeguard Supreme Commander's interests in France.
B. To represent Supreme Commander's requirements to de facto French
authority.
C. To act as channel through which de facto French
authority raises matters with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
D. To be the authorising agency for contact by all personnel
of Allied Commands under this Headquarters with French authorities.

2. Head of Mission is Major General [John T.] Lewis (United
States); Deputy Head Major General Redman (British).

PROPOSAL TO CREATE A ZONE OF THE INTERIOR
[Ltr, Eisenhower to Gen of the French Army Juin, 13 Oct 44, SHAEF files, 371,
Fr, vol. 1]

♦ ♦ ♦ At the time when the agreements of 25th August were
being negotiated, it was thought essential to make certain reservations to
ensure the implementation of all measures, considered necessary by me, for the
successful conduct of operations, since we could not foresee the conditions
which would prevail in the liberated territories of France. However, thanks to
the effectiveness of the French Administration, the powers reserved to the
Supreme Commander in the Forward Zone have not been invoked.

The result has been that the Allied Expeditionary Force and
the French National Authority have worked on the basis of the liberated portions
of France being, in effect, a Zone of the Interior. As you know, the French
Administration has, as soon as territory was liberated, begun to exercise its
functions and has provided the Allied Expeditionary Force with military
facilities as required.

Progressing, therefore, along the path of our close
collaboration, I am of the opinion that the French Government should now declare
formally that a Zone of the Interior exists in an area of France,
mutually agreed between us.
8 The area of the Zone of the Interior suggested in
your letter should, it is thought, include all territory within the Eastern
boundaries of the following departments: Seine-Inferieure, Oise, Seine-et-Marne,
Yonne, Nievre, Saone-et-Loire, Rhone (complete and including Lyon), Ardeche and
Gard. The extent of this Zone will be increased as operations progress, early
consideration is being given to the departments of Drome, Vaucluse,
Bouches-du-Rhône and Var.

There is, I believe, no need to draw up a detailed list of
all these matters which our present working arrangement embraces. Indeed, we can
ill afford the time which such a laborious work would entail. The continuance of
our present degree of collaboration should obviate this formality.

To ensure the successful progress of operations, the
facilities at present afforded to the Allied Expeditionary Force by the French
must continue as was foreseen in the provisions of Article 5 of the Agreement.
But as rapidly as military considerations permit, these facilities will be
handed back for civil administration and use. ♦ ♦ ♦

From the military point of view the existence of a strong
central authority in France is essential particularly in view of the difficult
economic and supply situation which faces us this winter. The only French
authority with whom we can deal is the present Council of Ministers and we urge
that

[749]

every support be given to it including formal recognition as
the provisional government of France.

It would be helpful if the announcement of American
recognition could be made simultaneously with the announcement of the Zone of
Interior. We anticipate the latter announcement will be made within a few days....

A ZONE OF THE INTERIOR IS CREATED BUT THE CHANGE IS NOMINAL
[Msg, SHAEF to CCS, 21 Oct 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2, CM-IN
19627]

1. Agreement is about to be reached with the de facto
French national authorities for establishment of a zone of the interior in
France....

3. Practical effect of this development will be more nominal
than actual. It will however enhance the prestige of the Provisional Government
and will impress upon the French people that the facilities allowed to the
Allied Expeditionary Forces are freely given as a part of the French war effort.
Since French have already exercised a large degree of administrative control in
liberated areas, we have not adopted the formal attitude provided for in the
agreement of 25 August and are endeavoring to avoid invoking the safeguards of Article 5 of that agreement so far as possible.
10

4. Subsequent announcements will be made from time to time
either extending the zone of the interior to the east or creating military zones
within the present zones of interior, as for example, around the Bay of Biscay
ports.

Details of agreement with French authorities for
establishment of the Zone of Interior . . . have been concluded and a decree
prepared which will be signed and go into effect as soon as General de Gaulle
returns to Paris, probably Monday, October 23, 1944. ♦ ♦ ♦