{
"@context": "http://schema.org",
"@type": "Collection",
"@id": "https://doi.org/10.14275/2465-2334/20163.bos",
"identifier": {
"@type": "PropertyValue",
"propertyID": "DOI",
"value": "https://doi.org/10.14275/2465-2334/20163.bos"
},
"url": "http://argumenta.uniss.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Argumenta-21-Boscolo-and-Pravato-True-but-also-not-true.pdf",
"additionalType": "Article",
"name": "True but also not true",
"author": [
{
"name": "Stefano Boscolo",
"givenName": "Stefano",
"familyName": "Boscolo",
"@type": "Person"
},
{
"name": "Giulia Pravato",
"givenName": "Giulia",
"familyName": "Pravato",
"@type": "Person"
}
],
"description": "We present three ways of expressing a possible interpretative uncertainty of the truth predicate: ambiguity, context-sensitivity and semantic indeterminacy. Next, we examine Kölbel (2008)’s pluralist view that “true” is ambiguous between a substantialist concept and a deflationist concept, and that it is ambiguous as the word “dog” is between “male dog” and “canine”. Our main goal is to show that Kölbel’s thesis does not withstand empirical scrutiny in the sense that “true” fails most of the well-established tests for ambiguity (conjunction-reduction, contradiction, and ellipsis). In addition, we reformulate Kölbel’s thesis by saying that “true” may be context-sensitive between a substantialist concept and a deflationist concept, and then we run Cappelen and Lepore (2004)’s inter-contextual disquotation test in order to show that “true” does not display that sort of context-sensitivity. In conclusion, we offer a diagnosis of Kölbel’s thesis failure, and advance some possible developments.",
"keywords": "Amibiguity, Context-sensitivity, Pluralism, Truth",
"inLanguage": "eng",
"datePublished": "2016",
"publisher": {
"@type": "Organization",
"name": "Università degli studi di Sassari"
}
}