Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign
Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign
Relations series that documents the most important issues in the
foreign policy of Presidents Richard M.
Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries presents a comprehensive
documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of both
Presidents. This specific volume documents the U.S. negotiations in Paris with
the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam from August 1969 to December
1973.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XLII

Consisting primarily of the memoranda of conversation between the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A.
Kissinger, and North Vietnamese Politburo Member and Special Adviser to the North Vietnamese
Delegation, Le Duc Tho (except for a
small number of occasions when senior North Vietnamese diplomat Xuan Thuy substituted for Tho), this volume focuses on the negotiations
that led to the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, and on post-Accords
meetings in 1973 (February, May, June, and December) between Kissinger and Tho. Except for the Hanoi round of meetings in February 1973,
all the meetings took place in Paris.

Presented chronologically, the documents in this volume—memoranda of conversation
recording the meetings—show, among other things: 1) the evolution of the U.S.
and North Vietnamese positions in the negotiations, 2) how the parties reached
agreement on the Accords, also called the agreement or the settlement, and 3)
how the Accords failed to lead to a stable cease-fire or to a political
settlement of the conflict.

The negotiations comprised 68 meetings in 27 rounds, from August 4, 1969, to
December 20, 1973, with each negotiating round consisting of a meeting or
meetings in Paris (except for one round in Hanoi) between Kissinger and his opposite number, usually
Le Duc Tho. Initially, a meeting
round generally meant a single meeting on a single day. From October 1972,
however, each round tended to have five or more meetings except the last one
which contained two sessions. Appendix 1 at the end of the volume lists the date
and major participants of each meeting.

The negotiations following the signing of the peace agreement trace the course
and dynamics of the unraveling of the Paris Peace Ac[Page VIII]cords. The first round took place in Hanoi in February
1973, as Kissinger conducted his
long-discussed visit to the North Vietnamese capital in order to begin the work
of implementing the accords. As fighting continued almost unabated and the
enforcement mechanisms for the accords became increasingly ineffectual, the two
sides met again in May-June 1973 to reaffirm the accords and attempt to
establish a stable peace. This effort failed as well, leading to the final
session on December 20, 1973.

The principle of document selection for this volume was straightforward: include
the transcripts of all of Kissinger’s
meetings with the North Vietnamese discussing a negotiated end to the war. In
addition to the negotiating record presented by the memoranda of conversation,
the volume includes two significant additions to the official documentary record
of these protracted negotiations. Appendix 2 consists of the agreement reached
by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho as they concluded their marathon
round of negotiations on October 17, 1972. This agreement did not come into
effect, however, as it was quickly rejected by South Vietnamese President
Nguyen Van Thieu, who refused to
accept its major terms. More negotiations followed, which ultimately resulted in
the occasion of the Paris Peace Accords, formally known as the Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam, initialed by Kissinger and Le
Duc Tho on January 23, 1973, and formally signed by
representatives of the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government on January 27.
The accords consist of an agreement, four attached protocols, and a number of
understandings negotiated and agreed to by Kissinger and Le Duc
Tho. While the agreement and protocols were published at the time, by
agreement of the two parties, the understandings were not published, and were
meant to remain secret. The final texts of several of these understandings are
printed in Appendix 3.

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon
Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records
Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). He also wishes to
acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for
allowing access to [Page IX]the Nixon Presidential
recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that
access. Furthermore, the editor acknowledges the care and professionalism with
which Historian’s Office staff has handled the copy and technical editing and
the declassification review.

Additionally, he wishes to thank the following individuals—Merle Pribbenow, David
Geyer, Melissa Heddon, and Stephen Randolph—for critical contributions to this
compilation.

Many who research, write, and, as in this case, prepare documentary histories on
the Vietnam War are indebted to Merle Pribbenow—none more so than this editor.
Pribbenow possesses an expert knowledge of: the Vietnamese language; the history
of Vietnamese Communism; and the larger history of the Vietnam War. For this
volume he fielded the editor’s numerous questions about the enemy side,
questions whose answers allowed the editor to avoid missteps. More importantly,
Pribbenow made available his translations of message traffic between the Politburo in Hanoi and Le Duc Tho in Paris, and translations of
relevant enemy memoirs, histories, monographs, and official reports. Excerpts
from these translations appear in the compilation’s footnotes, and there add
breadth and depth to understanding the enemy side in these complex negotiations
and, therefore, albeit indirectly, the U.S. side as well.

Former colleague, David Geyer, now Chief of the Europe Division, in 2010 saw this
improbable project not only as probable but necessary and in subsequent
discussions helped give it shape. Additionally, he and William Burr, Senior
Analyst at the National Security Archive, made substantive contributions to
compiling a comprehensive list of Kissinger’s 1969-1973 meetings with the North Vietnamese, a task
more challenging than one might suppose. Geyer also took time from his own
research at the Nixon Presidential Library to obtain transcripts of several
memoranda of conversation missing from the editor’s collection.

Archivist extraordinaire at the Nixon Presidential Library in California, Melissa
Heddon in 2010-2011 and 2015-2017 made it possible for the editor to conduct
research important to the project long distance.

The editor also wishes to thank Rita Baker, Mandy A. Chalou, Vickie Ettleman, and
Matthew R.G. Regan who carried out their challenging copy and technical editing
duties with commendable skill.

Last but certainly not least, The Historian, Stephen Randolph, from mid-2013 on,
provided the indispensable high-level support necessary to see the volume
through to publication.

John M. Carland collected the documents, made the selections, and annotated the
documents, under the supervision of Adam Howard, the [Page X]General Editor of the series. Jonathan Turner assisted on the
compilation of the front matter. Stephen Randolph, The Historian, and Kathleen
B. Rasmussen reviewed the volume. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification
review, under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification and
Publishing Division.