195. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of
State0

Paris, December 16, 1963, 10 p.m.

Secto 25. Eyes only for the President.1 Accompanied by
Bohlen and Tyler I had about forty minutes with
De Gaulle this morning. Also
present were Couve de Murville, Alphand and de la Grandville who served
as interpreter.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects, including Southeast
Asia.]

I then reverted to the subject of the Communist world and relations
between the Soviet Union and China. I said we were concerned at the
evidence of Chinese militancy—one aspect of the dispute with the Soviet
Union—and that in our talks at Warsaw they were insistent that we should
give up Formosa. There had also been the Indian attack and we felt that
Hanoi and Peking together had blocked the implementation of the Laotian
accords. There was also some evidence that the Chinese were stimulating
Sukarno in his present courses of action; they were active in Latin
America, particularly with Castro; and finally Chou En-lai was at present in Africa.
We felt it important that Peking not be given any impression that any
such policy would pay dividends. I mentioned that we had been very glad
to hear that France had no intention of recognizing China2 but felt it was worthwhile keeping in
contact on such developments. De
Gaulle then made rather a long statement that with the
Chinese-Soviet dispute the Soviets seemed to have calmed down while
Peking was taking on “as a trial gallop” the task of promoting
revolution, but he doubted if they would be any more successful than the
Soviets had been except in Eastern Europe where the armies controlled.
He said the question was how the West could turn this to its advantage,
whether it was best to leave China alone completely or have certain
contacts. He felt that such contacts had helped in the past with Soviet
Russia. I replied I could not see much evidence of our influence in our
contacts with the Soviets and I had felt that the change in Soviet
attitude was due to the confrontation with military power in the West,
possibly increased by the [Page 410]attitude of their own people and from the Eastern European countries.
After all Moscow had been the most dangerous on Berlin and Cuba.
Furthermore there had been no signs that the contacts with Peking such
as the extremely friendly ones on the part of India and more informal
ones on the part of Japan had had any effect on the Chinese. I told him
I thought it would be a great mistake to let the Chinese or their
Communist allies get any idea that such policies paid off.

De Gaulle agreed that the Soviets
had been the more dangerous of the two but questioned whether they would
not have been more so if we allowed them to “stew in their own juice”,
offering no alternative except war. He felt that the contacts had
certainly not been unuseful. He agreed that Indias and Japans contacts
had not changed the Chinese very much, but after all these were “poor”
countries which had little to offer China whereas if at some time in the
future the West might be in a position to establish relations with China
this might be another story.

I pointed out that in Warsaw in nine years of contacts we had seen no
interest insofar as Chinese trying to improve relations except at the
cost of abandonment of Formosa. De
Gaulle significantly said that Formosa would have to be
sacrificed by the West (by implication in any agreement with the
ChiComs).

In order to button down the French position further I inquired of
De Gaulle whether he had any
judgment as to the timing of any relationship with ChiComs and how far
in the future this was to be since I understood that France was thinking
of diplomatic relations for the future. De
Gaulle said he could not answer this since it was a
question for the future, and it depended on others and not France alone,
but wished to assure me “as Secretary of State” that they would talk to
the U.S. before any action was taken.

The conversation concluded with a mutual agreement to keep in touch on
matters of the Soviet Union and particularly in regard to the
Sino-Soviet dispute; and an exchange of amenities including a personal
message of regards and good will to you.

President Lyndon B. Johnson;
President Kennedy was
assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22.↩

Reference is to a conversation on November 5
between De Gaulle and
Ambassador Bohlen, reported
in telegram 2222 from Paris, November 5. When Bohlen asked De Gaulle about his views on
Communist China, he replied that he had no intention of proceeding
with any such step as diplomatic relations “at this time” but that
he thought “sooner or later” some relationships would have to be
worked out. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM)↩