Why David Cameron is wrong about a new "War On Terror"

According to David Cameron, the United Kingdom requires some
"iron resolve" to confront the "terrorist scourge" in Africa. The
aftermath of the raid on a gas compound in eastern Algeria has
reminded Britain's political classes that the world is a dangerous
and unpredictable place.

Terrorism is a feature of the modern world. That has been
apparent for at least 40 years. Any respite from terrorism has only
been brief. Nevertheless, according to Cameron, Britain should
remember that it faces yet another "generational struggle" against
terrorism. If all this seems familiar it is because it is, as many
folk have remarked, all uncannily similar to the speeches Tony
Blair used to make. The Maghreb has replaced the Hindu Kush and the
deserts of northern Mali have superseded the sands of Mesopotamia
but, in most other respects, Cameron's rhetoric is broadly
comparable to Blair's.

Which is another way of observing that far from being a fresh
challenge, the problems of terrorism or Islamic extremism are not
so much new as simply endlessly refreshed. The world is a
difficult, messy place in which violent men plot violent acts. It
was ever thus.

In any case, the French intervention in Mali is not really part
of a "War on Terror" at all. It is, rather, more comparable to
previous French missions in African countries such as Cote d'Ivoire
or Britain's decision to send troops to Sierra Leone. It is, that
is to say, a souped-up police action more than it is a
fully-fledged war. Most importantly, it is also taking place at the
invitation of the Malian government. In none of these respects does
it bear much resemblance to the Afghan or Iraq wars.

The world may be a complicated and difficult place but there is
a limit - especially now Britain's armed forces have been denuded -
to the extent to which it may be policed by Britain, France or even
America. Containing extremism might seem a modest goal but it is
actually quite an ambitious task that, mercifully, is at least more
realistic than supposing such extremism can be wiped from the face
of the earth. Even a successful action is, in the end, not that
different from a game of whack-a-mole: the problem merely
re-emerges elsewhere.

To give the Prime Minister some credit, his statement to the
House of Commons on Monday was a sober and sensitive assessment of
the situation. As he said, "Al Qaeda franchises thrive where there
are weak political institutions, political instability and the
failure to address long-standing political grievances." In other
words: this is less a military problem than a political
conundrum.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to assume that
Afghanistan and Iraq have poisoned all interventionist wells.
International co-operation can make a difference. Though little
heralded in the press, the rate of piracy in the Red Sea and Indian
Ocean has been lowered thanks to a robust international response to
the threat. If the pirates have not been vanquished they have - at
least for now - been suppressed and reduced to mere nuisance
level.

Beating Al-Qaeda and its offshoots is, of course, a more
difficult task. Nevertheless, it need not be considered a doomed
venture. Cameron's statement to the House on Monday was, in
general, sensibly restrained. Hyping the threat does no-one - least
of all politicians - any great favour. On the contrary it raises
the political stakes unnecessarily. The task of suppressing islamic
fundamentalism and reducing its political appeal is not especially
glamorous. It requires great patience, not least since there will
be many failures and most of these will be public failures whereas
any successes are liable to be celebrated in private.

That being so, it makes sense to lower expectations. This is
police work and diplomacy more than it is soldiering. Or, to put it
another way, the military component of any action is useful only to
the extent that it helps build political progress. Failure to do
that means battlefield victories are a useless waste of time, money
and blood.

Mali is not the "frontline" for anything other than Mali's own
problems. Analysts have long known that trouble was brewing in the
sands of the Sahara but, even if we recognise the usefulness of
doing something about that, we should have a restrained and modest
and sober expectation of what may realistically be achieved in the
African desert. That means less talk of "war on terror" and more
attention paid to the unglamorous and difficult work of building
institutions strong enough to stand for themselves. In this at
least, we must hope some lessons have been learned from the past
decade of foreign policy adventurism.

Alex Massie

Alex Massie writes for the Spectator, the Times and the Scotsman and is a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy, the Big Issue and many other publications. He mostly writes about Scottish, British and American politics. And cricket.