State fretted over Benghazi talking points

As the number of people handling the Benghazi talking points grew, the amount of information the document offered shrank.

Emails and documents released by the White House Wednesday reveal an editing process that valued caution over comprehensiveness as officials worked to remove language that would have assigned blame for the attack or suggested ways the incident could have been prevented. The release also showed that the CIA, and not the State Department, made the decision to scrub references to Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda-linked groups and prior terrorist attacks in the region.

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But the newly public email chains suggest it was the State Department that was most concerned about taking the blame for the attack. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland sought changes to the talking points that would shield the agency — then led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton — from congressional accusations that it had failed to properly secure the post, given the unstable situation in that area.

At one point, Nuland even wrote to a chain of administration officials relaying her concern that the talking points could be used as a cudgel against the State Department.

Here’s how CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, Nuland and the administration’s press officials determined what U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice and members of Congress would say to the media, starting with the Sept. 16 Sunday morning shows:

Friday, Sept. 14, 2:27 p.m.: The first draft of the Benghazi talking points are circulated by the CIA’s Office of Congressional Affairs. It includes language stating that “we do know that Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qa’ida participated in the attack.”

That first draft also cites “initial press reporting” that “linked the attack to Ansar al-Sharia,” an Islamic militia group based in Libya, and said the U.S. could not “rule out that individuals had previously surveilled the US facilities, also contributing to the efficacy of the attacks.”

It describes the attacks as “spontaneously inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the US Consulate and subsequently its annex,” and noted that “on 10 September we warned of social media reports calling for a demonstration in front of the Embassy and that jihadists were threatening to break into the embassy.”

4:20 p.m.: Stephen Preston, the CIA’s general counsel, responds that U.S. officials should avoid making any statements that suggested specific groups were responsible for the attack: “In light of the criminal investigation, we are not to generate statements with assessments as to who did this, etc. — even internally, not to mention for public release.”

4:42 p.m.: In email traffic within the CIA, Morell scrubbed the talking points of the Al Qaeda reference, changing the language to read that the “crowd almost certainly was a mix of individuals from across many sectors of Libyan society. The investigation is on-going as to who is responsible. That being said, we do know that Islamic extremists participated in the violent demonstrations.”

That draft is subsequently shared with Tommy Vietor, then the White House national security spokesman, and Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security adviser.

6:21 p.m.: Vietor adds the word “Cairo” in the bullet point that spoke of the Sept. 10 social media warnings to clarify that they were at the U.S. Embassy in Egypt, not in Libya.

6:41 p.m.: Shawn Turner, the spokesman for Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, softens the language around the social media warning to say “we notified Embassy Cairo of social media reports” calling for a demonstration at the embassy.