This year was the 30th anniversary of the "Yom Kippur War"
that began on Yom Kippur and ended after Succos. At the time,
the Israeli military was basking in the glow of their big
victory only six years earlier in the Six Day War. They got a
rude shock. Still, their concerns were not always focused on
the grave threats at hand. This past summer private tapes
made by officers and commanders were released that showed
what was going on behind the scenes. It proves again, to
those who need proof, what is the true nature of the
IDF.

"Do a periscope check. Restock the biological-chemical
warfare equipment. You've been authorized to mobilize part of
the battle formation. Mobilizing the 204th Brigade has not
been authorized . . . Position wolves. Prepare entire
Precious Light apparatus and Light Beam at outposts and
Sunray and arm them."

Thirty years ago, on the morning of Yom Kippur 5737 (1973),
slight movement could be detected in the IDF. Intelligence
sent grave warnings. The Russian advisors were evacuating
Port Said and Alexandria. Equipment was being transported
from Egypt to Libya. Five Egyptian army divisions opened a
front, including infantry, air force and armored divisions.
Lieutenant Colonel Shay Tamari, an intelligence officer at
the Southern Command headquarters, passed on a warning based
on "a report from a very good source."

The Tapes That Could Not Be Made Public

If only . . . If only the Israelis--drunk with glory since
the War of 5727 (1967) and who even published articles
proving Israel was no less than a regional superpower--had
acted according to the original plans . . . If only they had
prepared to activate the Precious Light plan, the entire Suez
Canal would have gone up in flames. The plan called for
Israel to pump in large quantities of fuel, flood the canal
and set it on fire. In that case how would the Yom Kippur War
have proceeded?

During this year's summer news doldrums of August, the
Israeli press began raising many questions about what took
place thirty years ago during the terrible war in which
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said, "Here goes our Third
Temple." That was the war that burst the IDF's big bubble of
inflated pride. Or perhaps we should say put a few holes in
it.

A great deal can be said about the way the Yom Kippur War was
run and what occupied the attention of many Israeli banner
wavers at a time when a great peril loomed over the State of
Israel--questions still asked to this day. What recently
brought both of Israel's leading newspapers, Yediot
Achronot and Ma'ariv, to simultaneously publish
the transcripts of radio communications during the war?

"These reports are not new," says historian Dr. Uri
Millstein. "This information was published ten years ago in
my book Krisa Velekcha (A Crisis and its
Lessons) in 1993. In that book I published in detail all
that took place during the first three days of the war.
Everything recently reported already appears in the book."

But there is one piece of information that does not appear in
the book: the source of the radio exchanges. "Ten years ago
it would have been inconceivable to publish such a thing,"
says Dr. Millstein. "It is prohibited to reveal the tapes of
radio devices in times of war. The prohibition, according to
the law, remains in place for 50 years after the time of the
event. It is permitted to publish information but it cannot
be from a classified source and the tapes are classified
material."

Yet the contents of the tapes did make their way into the
papers. "The big newspapers are not afraid of anyone,"
explains Dr. Millstein.

The tapes contain exchanges between the Southern Command,
particularly then Southern Command General Shmuel Gonen
(known by his nickname Gorodish), and the division
commanders. "Not every company commander can speak with the
general," explains Dr. Millstein. "The general has his own
communications network."

How is it that Yediot and Ma'ariv uncovered the
sources for the two separate sets of tapes at exactly the
same time?

"I can only speculate that one of the newspapers began to
work on the material from one of the sources and it became
known to the other newspaper, which rushed to do the same."
Thus the two major newspapers were in a battle as well,
although it pales in comparison to the private battle between
the generals during the Yom Kippur War as recorded on the
tapes.

In the eye of the storm was--and is--Gonen, who began to
document the course of the war when fighting broke out.
According to Amir Porat, his close friend who served as his
radio operator at the time and made recordings of
conversations, Gonen realized he was encountering a historic
event of phenomenal proportions. He even realized he was
about to get caught up in a historic dispute. And to protect
himself, with the help of the female soldiers on his staff
and his personal assistants, he transcribed every word on the
communications system of the Southern Command during the war.
What was the army general's chief concern during a time of
imminent danger to the State of Israel? Saving his own
hide.

He had good cause for fear, but for some reason he was
convinced he was right and entrusted the tapes to Amir Porat
who was with him in the war room, and to a few other close
associates.

In addition to the tapes, Gonen kept various well-preserved
handwritten and typed documents. Thus the action was
documented in an authentic manner and the voices on the tapes
make those harrowing days come to life.

On that fateful Yom Kippur of 5734, David Elazar, then chief
of staff, and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan were woken up at
4:00 am. "Syria and Egypt are about to launch an all-out war
against Israel," the two men at the top of the Israeli
defense hierarchy were told.

On the Southern Command communications network the events
were described by Lieutenant Colonel Tamari, who said, "I am
passing on information that something big could take place
today. Be more vigilant about the shrapnel vests and helmets
. . . biological- chemical warfare preparedness. Increased
anti-aircraft alertness at front line and rear bases."

Delusions of Grandeur

His remarks seem understated, reflecting the prevailing
attitude at the time. "IDF heads were slow to understand the
events taking place in October 1973," says Dr. Millstein.

The Israeli high command was internally fragmented, writes
Dr. Millstein in his book. When war broke out on the
afternoon of Yom Kippur they were not just surprised, they
were dumbfounded. "The methodical brainwashing that had
descended upon Israeli society and on the IDF since the Six
Day War at least, established as axiomatic that Ha'am
Hayosheiv Betzion had a professional and superior
military . . . This axiom worked to the enemy's advantage in
a process of deceit and/or corruption of the army culture and
denied them the ability to confront surprise and pressure
conditions."

In other words the army was enthralled by the glory it had
built for itself and did not wise up to the flow of
events.

"Along a front of at least 160 km [100 miles] along the Suez
front," reads an article in Ma'ariv, "only 450 combat
soldiers were positioned, divided into 16 strongholds active
on the Bar Lev line." These forces had to confront an attack
consisting of five Egyptian divisions equipped with 1,000
tanks, 2,000 artillery guns and Soviet ground-to-air missile
launchers in addition to Sager missiles, which hit hard at
the Israeli Air Force and IDF tanks. According to
intelligence reports, the war was scheduled to break out at
6:00 p.m. The Egyptians failed to adhere to the plan and
launched the attack four hours earlier. The image comes
across clearly in Ma'ariv transcripts of reports
radioed at 2:05 p.m.

"The Egyptians bombed the area of the 184th Battalion at Tasa
. . . The Egyptians bombed Tasa and Maftzach . . . Egyptian
tanks mounted the ramps [on the west bank of the Suez Canal]
and have opened fire on us . . . They are shooting at Milano
and Mezach [names of strongholds on the Bar Lev line] . . .
An aerial attack on Sharam. Antiaircraft activated . . .
Shelling on Chashiva [the Southern Command war room] . . .
Egyptians crossing south to Chizayon [name of a stronghold] .
. . Pressure on the strongholds. Gunfire battles under way.
Reports of Egyptian infiltration at Agam Chemer Hakatan . . .
Attempts to cross opposite all of the strongholds. No more
forces in the sector. At Mifreket [name of stronghold] there
was an Egyptian crossing. No wireless communication with
Orcal [name of a stronghold]. Eight tanks totally taken out
of commission at Budapest [name of a stronghold]. Two of our
tanks located at Budapest. One in operation. One barrel [i.e.
artillery gun] out of commission at Budapest . . . Nisan
under infantry attack . . . Movement on the Jidi Road. One
hundred Egyptians are mounting Lituf. At Chizayon the attack
was repelled. Many dead and wounded."

Egyptian soldiers came streaming across the Suez Canal and
planted Egyptian flags on the eastern bank. The IDF was
stunned. The firepower the Egyptians demonstrated, their
fighting ability, the combination of artillery, air force,
ground troops and tanks did not fit the image of boots
scattered across the Sinai Desert engraved in the Israeli
consciousness as an emblem of Arab military capability.

Oil Fields in Flames

A great cry went out from the strongholds. "Bring in the
planes!" shouted the soldiers under siege, who were convinced
the Israeli Air Force was capable of anything. But the air
force was engaged in the North and the handful of planes that
went south found it very difficult to operate in the presence
of the Egyptian antiaircraft batteries. Egyptian Migs also
caught the Israelis by surprise, demonstrating improved
fighting ability.

"Request air force assistance the length of the northern
sector," came an officer's voice over the radio. "Egyptians
present at Mifreket, Lachtzanit and Milano Aleph . . .
Lachtzanit and Mifreket overtaken. Request aerial assistance
urgently in the northern sector and in . . . No contact with
Budapest and Orcal . . . In the southern sector the situation
is good, except for an incursion onto the Jidi Road. No
incursions at central [sector]. At northern [sector] the
situation is bad. The strongholds have been captured."

The dismal account goes on. "The fuel tank at Baliam [oil
field] was hit . . . There are a lot of places on fire . . .
They hit the middle of the [oil]field at Patriko. The entire
flow must be stopped and people have to be evacuated from the
drilling rigs . . . Ignite the biggest farm . . . They are
taking people off the towers [i.e. drilling platforms] in the
middle of the sea . . . They hit the oil, not known with
what. The most important field."

The Second Day

On the second day of the war the reserve forces called up
late were still stuck on the way to the Sinai Desert. Hopes
were hanging primarily on the arrival of two reserve
divisions: one under General Sharon and the other under
General Aden. And as if there was not enough panic already,
somebody sent an erroneous report that the Egyptians were
using chemical weapons. "In the area of Miftzach they have
activated gasses, put on masks . . . Possibility of gas
attack in the southern sector. Request planes in the area of
Lituf [and] Miftzach immediately . . . .Request air . . .
Communications problems at Um Chashiva . . . The planes are
being obstructed . . . In the area of Miftzach there appear
to be chemical substances . . . Request discontinuation of
electronic fighting for a while. This may be interrupting
communications with the planes . . . Baran will reach Baluza
in another 40 minutes with 40 tanks. In southern [sector] the
situation is difficult. Many of the tanks are damaged. The
situation in central [sector] is hazy. Tank incursion,
unknown how many. In northern [sector], except for
Lachtzanit, they are maintaining all of the strongholds. Arik
will not be arriving until this evening."

"I need Benny," comes a repeated cry over the radio. Benny
was the commander of the air force, on which all hopes were
hanging. Only at 11:07 in the morning does the voice of
General Sharon come onto the communications network for the
first time. "I am located in Refidim," reports Sharon, who
traveled in a civilian van commandeered in Ashkelon.

The situation at the strongholds was worsening. The vast
majority of them were encircled by Egyptian forces. Moshe
Dayan appears at the southern front and Sharon tells him via
radio he will arrive at Tzeilon in another hour. Gonen, who
notified Dayan of the massive Egyptian assault, gets a
lukewarm response. "There might be air [force assistance],
but only in the morning."

Entangled in the Net

"There was no national leadership to put the military command
in its place," says Dr. Millstein. "Golda Meir and her
coterie were incapable of leading a nation at war. They
immediately established a covenant of failure." He says this
clique invested all of its energy into ensuring its political
future and silencing criticism. "They acted like an animal
caught in a trap with no escape, entangling itself in the
net."

This metaphor also very aptly describes the conduct of
Southern Command Chief Shmuel Gonen, who was accused of
mismanaging the southern front.

Gonen was new to the post. He had not yet familiarized
himself with the area under his control or the command
hierarchy. He was a harsh and irascible man who worked on his
image from the very start and was unable to rein in Sharon
and Aden, who were both more experienced and seasoned
generals than he. The real war among the generals must be
viewed from Gonen's limited viewpoint.

"Gorodish [Gonen] was blamed for all of the failures," says
Dr. Millstein. "He took the communications networks of the
Southern Command and decoded them. He handed out the
transcript to all kinds of people, and I was one of them."

Gonen really did perform poorly, but he was not the only one.
At first the top brass was in a state of euphoria. "A sickly
euphoria," he writes in his book. This sense was "an advance
at the expense of victory."

With their distorted perception of reality they believed they
would rout the enemy swiftly, tie on some more laurels and
reach a forced peace agreement with the Arabs following the
big victory they were anticipating. They envisioned an Israel
stretching from the oilfields of Abu Rodes to the springs of
Mt. Hermon. The Lebanese border, some army commanders held,
would lie at the southern bank of the Litani River. For two
days they felt the intoxication of power based entirely on
illusion and sobered up only on Monday afternoon, the 8th of
October.

"We were not mentally prepared for the war," explained then-
Colonel Amnon Reshef after the war to the author of a
biography of General Mendler, who was killed during the
fighting." The atmosphere of tranquility sank too deep into
our consciousness . . . Even when two thousand artillery guns
opened fire, a grasp of the facts still did not penetrate our
skulls. We still did not believe it was war."

Not that early warning signs were lacking. In fact there were
plenty- -for weeks. Yet despite the signs, intelligence
warnings and high- alert declarations the Israelis were
caught in "a total and stunning surprise."

Five days before the war broke out, writes Dr. Millstein, on
the 1st of October, at 5:15 am Mendler wrote in his journal:
"Fantastic. Intelligence [says] war tomorrow. There goes my
replacement!" [Apparently he was to be replaced shortly
thereafter.]

The strongholds were already given up for lost. Dayan, who
was the first to sober up to reality, went to the opposite
extreme. "The strongholds can't be counted on," he said. "It
would be a pity if you try to break your way in. If there is
a stronghold that has held out [in the fighting], then fine.
And if not, let its personnel filter out at night. Leave the
wounded to fall into captivity. Have the fit ones try to
cross the lines, and on their own. I prefer to do this at
night."

According to Dayan's assessment the situation in the north
was far graver since the relatively large geographical
distance between the Suez Canal and the State of Israel was
lacking in the north. "Clearly priority will be given to
Deganiot, Tiberius and the Jordan Valley," he said over the
radio. "Sinai is not so important. Twenty kilometers more, 40
less . . . "

Yet those kilometers contained human beings, soldiers who
were killed or captured. Some of the prisoners were murdered
by the Egyptians while their hands and feet were tied. The
preference for the north was kept secret as "ministerial
advice" according to Dayan. At this stage Dayan already told
General Ze'evi (Ghandi), "This is the destruction of the
Third Temple." The euphoria quickly turned into despair.

Valuable time was lost, people were killed and the Egyptians
tightened their stranglehold. At this point General Sharon
entered the picture. Until just a short time earlier Sharon
had been a general in the Southern Command and he knew the
territory like the back of his hand. He had retired only
recently. He was placed under the command of the younger
Gonen but did not excel in following orders. "Where's Arik?"
Gonen kept asking over the radio.

Even back then, Sharon retained his right to remain silent.
When he finally managed to contact Sharon, Gonen ordered him
to capture a bridge and destroy the armored units at Masrek,
the code name for Mezach. Sharon replied, "Got it. What I
wanted to tell you was that according to your intelligence
there is no bridge there."

The pressure kept mounting. Gonen spoke crudely to his
underlings. Sharon tried to assist the personnel at the
strongholds to escape. Meanwhile Gonen adhered to Dayan's
"ministerial advice" to let them fall into captivity.

On the morning of the third day of the war, General Aden
launched a counterattack. According to the early reports Aden
was succeeding in the battle. Sharon received an order to
advance and capture one of the Egyptian bridges over the
Suez. Then reports came in that Aden was running into
trouble. Sharon was ordered to backtrack and move north to
assist him. The Egyptians seized the positions Sharon had
managed to capture.

Sharon began to feel the army was sinking in the mud. "I
think there is a way to get out of this situation," he
said.

Something on the southern front was not working properly,
namely relations between Gonen and Sharon. At this stage it
was decided to make a change in the command structure of the
southern front. After the failed counterattack, Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan met with Chief of Staff David Elazar in
the command bunker at Um Chashiva. This visit is documented
in the tapes kept by Gonen's personal radio operator, Yitzhak
Rubinstein.

Apparently there were two radio operators who kept tapes,
which turned out to be quite convenient for the two major
Israeli newspapers. Amir Porat provided his to Ma'ariv
and Rubinstein gave his to Yediot Acharonot.

The Yediot report contains the taped record of a
special meeting held on the night between the 8th and 9th of
October in the command bunker at Um Chashiva. "The tremendous
stress of the previous days is evident in everyone
[present]," reads the article. "The three division
commanders, Sharon, Bern and Mendler, were blackened,
sweating, dirty, bleary-eyed and most of all, frustrated.
None of them had any good news."

Dayan admitted that during the three days of the war he had
not reported to the government about what was taking place.
On the way back he decided Gonen had to be replaced. "He's
not yet fit for command," said Dayan. "He doesn't have the
open mind needed to take the initiative in command."

Friction among the commanders soon became apparent. The
commanding officer was supposed to be Gonen, but Sharon
decided his moves on his own. Sharon said of Gonen, "I call
in to headquarters and ask for the general. They tell me he's
asleep."

He had already formulated a plan for crossing the canal.
Gonen demanded he gather his forces in accordance with the
counterattack plan outlined at the Southern Command
headquarters and which was not to Sharon's liking. "I ordered
Arik to stop. The answer was that he was not attacking. [But]
the attack continued."

The Southern Command received reinforcements. The Mezach
stronghold fell on Shabbos, the 13th of October, surrendering
to the Egyptians in collaboration with the Red Cross and in
front of the news cameras. Thus the first combat soldiers
were taken prisoner in full view of the media, carrying with
them the sefer Torah kept at Mezach. Years later the
sefer Torah was returned to Israel.

The Turning Point

The turning point in the war Dayan thought was lost arrived
on Sunday, the 14th of October. Unfortunately the term
chasdei Shomayim is not part of the Israeli lexicon.
The Egyptians had essentially no obstacles to prevent them
from making their way up to Israel, but they failed to see
the door was left wide open for an advance. Instead they dug
in right on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. Noting their
flawed tactics, General Bar Lev said over the radio, "The
Egyptians are going back to being Egyptians."

And the Israelis remained Israelis. This was the stage at
which they began to seriously discuss a plan to cross the
canal. After nightfall a plan was worked out to send two
divisions--Sharon's and Aden's--across the canal in the area
of Dawar Suar. Lieutenant Colonel Tamari summarized the plan
over the radio, "The plan is for the Southern Command to
cross the Suez Canal in the area of Dawar Suar, take over the
open space between the wadis, destroy the enemy in the open
space and conquer the town of Suez. Command forces will be on
standby to press forward westward toward Cairo. Southern
Command will prevent further Egyptian advance into Sinai and
will force the Egyptian forces to the east of the canal to
surrender and will destroy them."

On the way to the crossing, differences of opinion arose
between Sharon and the other generals. The crossing itself
began around midnight of October 16th. "Aquarium," Sharon
said to Gonen over the radio, meaning the paratroopers were
in boats on the water. Within minutes another announcement
came in: "Acapulco." This meant they were encountering no
resistance by the enemy. But this message turned out to be
somewhat hasty.

During the crossing Bar Lev says of Sharon, "When Arik
cleaned up the bridgehead, our forces were at Amat and
Missouri [names of roads]. But the gentleman [i.e. Sharon]
began to mount an attack and the Egyptians, in their way,
crawled back down. And now Chugger and Spider are immobile
and messed up . . . "

The generals exchanged words over the communications network
freely, as if they were on vacation. "I'm shocked by your
conversations," said the Chief of Staff. "You're saying
absolutely everything!"

Eventually they managed to lay an Israeli bridge across the
canal, turning the situation around, but the difficult war
was not yet over.

In the middle of the crossing, Gonen and Sharon had a major
confrontation. Sharon claimed Gonen was not giving him room
to act while Gonen claimed Sharon was violating his orders.
That night Sharon asserted that the maximum fighting force
possible should traverse the canal, saying expanding the
bridgehead was less important, and kept demanding Gonen send
him more and more forces. But Gonen, contending Sharon did
not need this amount of force, denied his request.

According to the transcripts, Gonen preferred to see the
crossing fail so the victory wreaths would not be laid on
Sharon's head. Thus the generals argued in the middle of
battle at the expense of thousands of combat soldiers who
paid with their blood.

Disputes began to be felt more after two weeks of combat.
Sharon received orders to go to Missouri, where he demanded
permission to cut off the Egyptian supply lines and move
north with tanks. The tanks in use were upgraded T-54s, the
model used by Egypt, taken as booty during the Six-Day War to
operate on the other side of the canal in order to deceive
the Egyptians. Gonen repeated his orders to go to Missouri.
Sharon repeated that this would be a mistake. He was forced
to go to Missouri, the attack there failed and Sharon
complained to the Defense Minister. At night he refused to
reinforce Missouri. Gonen ordered him to send forces and he
said, "No!"

"That's refusal to carry out orders," said Gonen over the
radio.

"Don't bother me with that stuff," retorted Sharon.

It would be too exhausting to trace all the developments of
the war that ended with a high number of casualties, but also
with the miraculous defeat of the Egyptians and the Syrians.
After the war another front opened: The question of who would
be the fall guy. Gonen was the obvious choice, alongside the
Chief of Staff.

Gonen a Broken Man

And that's just what happened. Gorodish acted like someone
caught in a trap. He tried to explain to whoever was willing
to listen that he had been done a terrible injustice. He
never came to terms with his meteoric fall from grace.

In Jerusalem a group of friends met in the home of Chaim
Wertheimer, Gonen's friend since childhood who had gone
through plenty of battles with him. "Call up our old
friends," Gonen said.

"Gorodish felt all alone," says Wertheimer. "He was an
isolated man with no political backing. He knew everybody has
this kind of backing and that he lacked it."

Furthermore, admits Wertheimer, he had very few friends. "He
acquired enemies. For example, he decided to wage a battle
against the high number of road accidents in the army in his
time. He succeeded and brought down the percentage of
accidents by army drivers almost to zero. But he did it in a
cruel manner. Very hard- handedly. The slightest infraction
would send the driver to jail."

"True," said Gonen during the social gathering at
Wertheimer's house, "I didn't think there would be a war,
just like the others. I thought it would be an exercise."

Among other things Gorodish told his friends only one of
Israel's spies in Egypt reported "there was going to be
something serious." The general perception was that the
Egyptians were merely planning an exercise.

"When it became apparent, before Yom Kippur, that this was
not an exercise, I asked them to call up the reserves. Golda
didn't want to. `It's not certain,' she said. I did the best
I could and asked that reinforcements be sent. They didn't
send any. I asked them to send planes to attack the
Egyptians, but they didn't arrive. The idea was that it was
not so pressing, the south. [In] the north it was pressing.
`Make ready to stop the Egyptians,' they told me, `but don't
take any action that will endanger the soldiers.'"

Chaim Wertheimer sees Gorodish's real failure as a flawed
character. "They offered to let him switch with Sharon and to
let him manage the Southern Command. He should have jumped at
this idea and grabbed onto it with both hands. After all he
was new in the [Southern] Command and did not know it at all.
But he was incapable of such a thing. He was incapable of
retreat, to admit Sharon was better than him. That was his
big mistake."

Gonen's main contention was that "everyone thought that way
[i.e. that the Arabs posed no threat] and they tagged it all
on me."

When he requested reinforcements he received Bar Lev, the man
behind the concept of the strongholds. After the gathering at
his house Wertheimer did not see his childhood friend
anymore. "He broke down completely," he says. "He did not
have the sense to step off to the side, to let the matters
sink and die down, and then come back. He was constantly
banging his head against a brick wall. In order to make
money, a lot of money, and to launch a campaign to clear his
name in Israel, he went to Africa to deal in diamonds. It was
a field in which he was not talented and was unfamiliar. He
died there."

Wertheimer knew Gorodish when the two were cheder boys
living in Meah Shearim. "He had a large family," he recalls.
"They lived in poverty. A room two meters long and two meters
wide filled with mattresses. Everyone would sleep there.
During the day the mattresses were stacked up. At night they
were spread out and took up the entire floor."

Later the two fought side by side in the Palmach and in the
IDF. Gorodish managed to climb the rungs of the military
ladder and won acclaim in the Six Day War. Since then he
believed his abilities were almost unlimited and dreamed of
becoming Chief of Staff.

But he never learned how to back down and take a step back.
"Clear out of the area," Dayan told him. "I don't want a
general to get taken prisoner."

"I'm not budging from here," retorted Gorodish in his typical
style.

Later he formed strong feelings of resentment toward Dayan,
who managed to survive the Yom Kippur War without having to
pay a price, although he was more responsible than anyone
else for the failures. This hatred cast a pall over his life.
He planned to shoot Dayan himself and even went to a firing
range to practice.