The
Trap of Universalizing Reason

(Paper for the EBEN
Conference 2010 at Queen Mary University London)

A
modernist
attack

In the
summer and autumn of 1964 Jacques Derrida published the article Violence et Métaphysique. In that
article he responds to the book Totality and Infinity by
Emmanuel
Levinas, which had appeared in 1961. The tenor of Derrida’s article was
that
what Levinas wants to do in his book is actually impossible.

In Totality
and Infinity Levinas stresses that there is something
like the experience of infinity, particularly in the appearance for us
of the
surprising Other, which for that reason he writes with capital O. In
order to
designate that experience he takes recourse to rather unusual terms. He
speaks
about the ‘Face’, about the ‘Discourse’ and about the encounter with
the
‘absolute Otherness’ of the other.

Levinas
knows very well that these words do not fit into common
language. The language of these remarkable words, he says, “does not
belong
among the relations that could appear through the structures of formal
logic;
it is contact across a distance, relation with the non-touchable,
across a
void” (1991: 172).

At
another place he makes clear that the phenomenon he wants to express
in language is too big for language.“[E]x-pression does not manifest
the
presence of being by referring from the sign to the signified;(…)Signs
are a
mute language, a language impeded” (1991: 181, 182). These citations
show that
Levinas was quite aware of the difficult task he set himself in Totality and Infinity and that he knows
very well that language is not well suited to describe the experience
of the
other. But he insists that this observation does not invalidate the
experience
itself. Besides, he says, he disposes of nothing but just language to
treat his
theme.

To
this view Derrida
responds with a very severe and strictly logical argument. According to
Derrida
language determines our entire horizon. Language is our alpha and
omega, and it
does not allow us to do what Levinas wants: to point to something
outside
language. Derrida for instance pinpoints the violation by Levinas of
the
(linguistic) law of non-contradiction in Levinas’ use of the word
‘exteriority’, which for Levinas indicates something beyond the
totality of the
language. Derrida replies: “Why do we still have to use the word
‘exteriority’
to indicate a non-spatial relationship? Language cannot but refer to
space. The
crossing-outs of Levinas are in vain” (1967: 165). Because of this kind
of
levinasian inconsistencies Derrida denies Levinas the right to use
language as
he does.

Levinas,
according to Derrida, gets entangled in his own endeavours. For
he uses ontological language while indeed he wants to describe
something which
is beyond ontology. Derrida points out to him that paradox or
impossibility.

Levinas’ response

Levinas has been quite upset
by this modernist attack by Derrida. And subsequently he began to place
different accents. In Otherwise than Being (first published in
1974)for
example, he emphasizes less the completely unexpected and surprising
nature of
the appearance of the other. He is more inclined there to speak in
essentialist
terms, such as the designation of the subject as ‘being-for-the-other’,
which
implies a being-prepared-already for the appearance of the other. And
thus a
more stable, a priori existing essence which fits better into the
common use of
language.

By taking this position
Levinas went part of the way to meet Derrida, who believes that human
existence
only takes off starting with the abstract generalities of the logos.
Indeed,
according to Derrida, these enable us to anticipate phenomena, and thus
experiences, including the encounter with the other. Because the logos
is
already familiar with ‘otherness’ as a concept, it has protected itself
forever
against every absolutely surprising call, says Derrida. And Levinas let
himself
be influenced by these remarks. By describing – on instigation of
Derrida – his
favorite phenomena increasingly in terms of essences and stability, he
wrote
the surprise out of his work. This explains how Levinas could become an
easy
prey for followers who see him as the champion of the order of
universal
ontological goodness.

So,
in a way, the effect
of Derrida’s attack was contrarily: the unexpected, the infinite was
treated
more and more in terms of a stable identity, be it the identity of
the-one-for-the-other.
Paradoxically enough we thus got more essentialism and ontological
language.

Universalism

Why
allowed Levinas this to
happen? Why didn’t he point more emphatically to the fact that already
in Totality and Infinity he was well aware
of the complexities and limitations of language and that, therefore,
Derrida
did not come up with something surprisingly new? Why didn’t he launch a
counter-attack, as for example Hillary Putnam – forty years later - did?

Putman,
in his book Ethics without
ontology (2004) sides with Levinas against Derrida. Inthe first chapter (p. 24) Putnam approvingly
quotes from Totality and Infinity a
passage in which Levinas extricates ethics from the ontological web of
references and interpretations. Putnam formulates as follows what he
likes in
this move: “For Levinas, the
irreducible foundation of ethics is my immediate recognition,
when
confronted with a suffering fellow human being, that I have an
obligation to do something”. So he stresses in Levinas the kind of
immediacy
for which Derrida had attacked him, precisely because that immediacy is
contrary to the endless web of references which Derrida believes in.

Putnam’s
objection against Derrida is not that the latter showed us the
web of endless associations of significations and the importance of
interpretation. But he does criticize him for subjecting everything
to
the laws of interpretation and thus not leaving any space for immediate
experience. “Deconstructionists
claim that all perception and thought involve interpretation, and that
every
interpretation is susceptible to still further interpretation” (p.
115). In
other words: the observation that in some cases interpretation is
needed does
not mean that it is needed in all cases. “Derridian critique is sometimes
in place. The important thing is to perceive when a text could
be read
“deconstructively” and when this is not the way a text should
be read”
(p. 120).

To
return to my question: why did Levinas himself not respond to Derrida
in this way?

I
think it has been too difficult for Levinas to say: sometimes this
phenomenon (i.e. the Face) occurs, and sometimes it does not. It does
so with
some people and it does not with other people. I think he cóuld
not say so,
because in his view of philosophy, which by the way is many people’s
view,
philosophy must speak about things fundamental in the sense of always
present,
even when hidden or ignored. For, if philosophy does not lay bare
generally
valid patterns, according to that view, it is no longer philosophy.
This is the
way Levinas must have conceived of philosophy, otherwise he would not
have
arrived at concepts like for instance a universal structure of the
subject,
prior to everything else and applicable to everybody. He was wayward
enough to
digress from common philosophical discourse if he wanted to. But
apparently he
wanted to keep using these classical philosophical words ‘always’ and
‘everybody’.

As
much as they are avidly cherished by many Levinas fans. For example
by Michael Morgan in his book Discovering Levinas, when he says
(p. 306)
that the face-to-face in Levinas has a certain cognitive character, by
which he
means a certain universality. Or when he confronts (p. 307) the unicity
of
being this or that person, having his or her indivual features and
roles, with
the universality of being responsible, always accused and obsessed.

I
think that to talk about unicity and then to fill it up in a generally
covering way by saying ‘Everyone is always already summoned by the
other’ is
contradictory. In my view a suchlike statement lacks, from the start,
respect
for the otherness of the other, precisely by claiming universality.

In
order to avoid this kind of consequences of his theory, Levinas
should have blocked the tendency to universalize. I wish Levinas had
said: the
encounter with the Other occurs with some people, not with others. I
wish that
because I dislike the pedantic tone with which Levinas and many of his
fans
say that
the subject’s structure (so every subject’s structure) is:
being-for-the-other; and that, when people don’t recognize that, they
are
simply not that far yet.

Workshops

Apart from my dislike of
pedantry, I would wish that for another reason. That reason is that, in
the
workshops I give on this issue, I note that people may genuinely not
recognize
the phenomenon Levinas talks about. In those workshops I explore the
experiences participants have had (or had not) of the Face of the other
as
Levinas describes it. The main question is: does it occur you let
yourself be
whistled back by the grief of another person at the moment you intruded
too
much upon him or her? In treating this question it appears in the
workshops
that some participants do recognize the phenomenon indeed – even very
emphatically sometimes – and other participants do not recognize it at
all. The
only appropriate response to this observation, in my view, is the
conclusion
that the phenomenon of the Face is not universal. Which may leave
unshattered
the idea that – when it does occur – it is an important phenomenon.

Levinas did not want to
draw that conclusion. And, to be honest, I note in the workshops that
participants don’t like a suchlike conclusion either. An unpredictable
phenomenon which occurs sometimes and sometimes does not, that’s not
what we
want to get at. Apparently in all of us the notion is deeply anchored
that
things are worth while to be discussed only when we can use universally
valid
terms.

Apart from this human
attachment to universality the rejection of contingently occuring
phenomena
could have to do with the way in which our knowledge institutes are
organized.
Namely in the form of stable, permanent institutes, with corresponding
truth
pretensions. Institutions which receive a lot of money and are
concerned that
the flow of money may come to a halt if they don’t return enough
certainty.

But the phenomenon of the
Face is elusive, because it appears now here, then there. By claiming
universality one squeezes life out of the reflection about this
phenomenon,
which means: out of ethics. That could explain why we end up with
lifeless
ethical codes. Universal but empty.

For that reason I would
say: if philosophy and ethics have to talk about universals and
things-always-present because otherwise, according to the
definition, there is no
question
of philosophy and ethics; let us then discuss the phenomenon of being
touched
by the other’s face outside the context of philosophy and ethics.