In the past, American Constitutional safeguards on free speech seemed to me sufficient to allow ID to win the day provided it could prove its case. Of that I’m no longer so sure (not that it can’t prove its case, but of the Constitutional safeguards).

Remember Dover, Dr.Dr.WAD? The big opportunity for ID to prove its case? You know, the one you ran away from?

Although, as I recall, your speech wasn't free. It had a price tag on it, and you didn't even speak.

Prof. Dembski is right to bring this up. In the Thirties most nice, modest people did nothing. Is this déjŕ vu? Could it be the Thirties all over again?

Today a thick anti-right-wing-Christian (and anti-right-wing-Israeli-”settler”) fog saturates the air, much like the virulent anti-Semitism of the Thirties. Then it was biology—a Darwinian inspired racism. Now it’s nihilism—which again you can trace directly back to that same source—you dare make any truth claims today and you will be hated passionately.

But I’m not saying anything about Darwin’s intentions—it’s the universal acid with which he is credited that has erased meaning and morals from the academy and the world.

All the time now we see traditionalists bewildered when they make some logical argument and are met with anything but. I don’t think it’s that our postmodernist critics simply sizzle with evil, rather they have been taught that there is no logic, no truth, no purpose, and that language is a only political tool and that feelings and power and prestige are all that matter.

Yes, O’Leary, let’s face it and fight back before it is too late.

--------------"Random mutations, if they are truly random, will affect, and potentially damage, any aspect of the organism, [...]Thus, a realistic [computer] simulation [of evolution] would allow the program, OS, and hardware to be affected in a random fashion." GilDodgen, Frilly shirt owner

It seem to me an important questions is: Maxvell’s demon does violate or does not violate SLoT? Just here not all commenters agree. In my opinion Maxvell’s demon can be considered in two main senses: (1) a machine, an artificial system (one-way filter); (2) a thermodynamic metaphor of intelligence.

(1) Maxvell’s demon as a machine. But there are many kinds of machines, and then we have again to distinguish.

(A) Maxvell’s demon as a mechanical-thermo machine. In this case I agree with Monastyrski #71 when says “the decrease in entropy caused by the intelligent demon is more than compensated for by an increase in the demon’s own entropy”. SLoT is not violated.

(B) Maxvell’s demon as a computer. If the Maxvell’s demon is a computer for which the Landauer’s principle is involved, according to givemeabreak #75, there is no increase of entropy because computation per se does not consume energy. SLoT is violated.

(2) Maxvell’s demon as intelligence. But what is intelligence in the first place? This is one of the above fundamental and difficult questions. Without knowing what intelligence is how can we to speak about Maxvell’s demon, which is one of its symbols? Intelligence can be considered in two main senses: (A) physical intelligence; (B) pure intelligence or metaphysical intelligence.

(A) If intelligence is a physical agent then energy is involved. SLoT is not violated.

(B) If intelligence is a metaphysical entity then no energy is involved. SLoT is violated.

This is a sensible summary of his options. He is still wrong on 1B, and trivially so. Landauer's principle is a consequence of the 2nd law of thermodynamics. If something works in accordance with Landauer's principle, it isn't going to violate the 2nd law. The total entropy of the system gas + demon will be the same or increase.

Here is Charles H. Bennett, a computation theorist from IBM, explaining what Landauer's principle is about (emphasis mine):

Quote

In his classic 1961 paper [2], Rolf Landauer attempted to apply thermodynamic reasoning to digital computers. Paralleling the fruitful distinction in statistical physics between macroscopic and microscopic degrees of freedom, he noted that some of a computer’s degrees of freedom are used to encode the logical state of the computation, and these ”information bearing” degrees of freedom (IBDF) are by design sufficiently robust that, within limits, the computer’s logical (i.e. digital) state evolves deterministically as a function of its initial value, regardless of small fluctuations or variations in the environment or in the computer’s other non-information bearing degrees of freedom (NIBDF). While a computer as a whole (including its power supply and other parts of its environment), may be viewed as a closed system obeying reversible laws of motion (Hamiltonian or, more properly for a quantum system, unitary dynamics), Landauer noted that the logical state often evolves irreversibly, with two or more distinct logical states having a single logical successor. Therefore, because Hamiltonian/unitary dynamics conserves (fine-grained) entropy, the entropy decrease of the IBDF during a logically irreversible operation must be compensated by an equal or greater entropy increase in the NIBDF and environment. This is Landauer’s principle.

Earman and Norton have pointed out with some justice that Landauer’s principle appears both unnecessary and insufficient as an exorcism Maxwell’s demon, because if the Demon is a thermodynamic system already governed by the Second Law, no further supposition about information and entropy is needed to save the Second Law. On the other hand, if the Demon is not assumed to obey the Second Law, no supposition about the entropy cost of information processing can save the Second Law from the Demon.

I would nevertheless argue that Landauer’s principle serves an important pedagogic purpose of helping students avoid a misconception that many people have fallen into during the 20’th century, including giants like von Neumann, Gabor, and Brillouin and even, perhaps, Szilard. This is the informal belief that there is an intrinsic cost of order kT for every elementary act of information processing, e.g. the acquisition of information by measurement, or the copying of information from one storage medium into another, or the execution of a logic operation by a computer, regardless of the act’s logical reversibility or irreversibility. In particular, the great success of the quantum theory of radiation in the early 20’th century led Gabor and Brillouin to seek an exorcism of the Demon based on a presumed cost of information acquisition, which in turn they attributed to the energy cost of a thermal photon, or in the case of Gabor’s high-compression Szilard engine [16], to the cost of recreating a static radiation field localized to one end of a long cylinder, into which the molecule would wander to trigger the power stroke. Landauer’s principle, while perhaps obvious in retrospect, makes it clear that information processing and acquisition have no intrinsic, irreducible thermodynamic cost, whereas the seemingly humble act of information destruction does have a cost, exactly sufficient to save the Second Law from the Demon.

So options 1A, 1B, and 2A are in accord with the 2nd law of thermodynamics. The only construct violating it is 2B (pure, metaphysical intelligence). OK, I suppose.

A yellow banana is evidence that all ravens are black. Why? Because “all ravens are black” is logically equivalent to “all non-black things are non-ravens.”

*Slaps forehead.*

You just flunked basic philosophy of science, Coppedge.

ETA: WTF is it with creationists and bananas anyway?

--------------I wouldn't be bothered reading about the selfish gene because it has never been identified. -- Denyse O'Leary, professional moronAgain "how much". I don't think that's a good way to be quantitative.-- gpuccio

The demon cannot violate SLoT every time he types or sorts a molecule or whatever.

[snip]

--------------I wouldn't be bothered reading about the selfish gene because it has never been identified. -- Denyse O'Leary, professional moronAgain "how much". I don't think that's a good way to be quantitative.-- gpuccio

Even though I am not a creationist by any reasonable definition, I sometimes get pegged as the local gap tooth creationist moron. (But then I don’t have gaps in my teeth either. Check unretouched photos.)

As the best gap tooth they could come up with, a local TV station interviewed me about “superstition” the other day.

The issue turned out to be superstition related to numbers. Were they hoping I’d fall in?

Look, guys, numbers here are assigned on a strict directional rota. If the number bugs you so much, move.

Don’t mess up the street directory for everyone else. Paramedics, fire chiefs, police chiefs, et cetera, might need a directory they can make sense of. You might be glad for that yourself one day.

Sensible answers so far. I am sure the TV people were disappointed.

Well, turns out Denyse saved her best answer for an off-camera presentation:

Quote

Anyway, I didn’t get a chance to say this on the program so I will now: No numbers are evil or unlucky. All numbers are – in my view – created by God to march in a strict series or else a discoverable* series, and that is what makes mathematics possible. And mathematics is evidence for design, not superstition.

re #74Actually there are some very interesting exceptions to the second law:it should be noted that, counter-intuitive to materialistic thought, a computer does not consume energy during computation and will only consume energy when information is erased from it. This counter-intuitive fact is formally known as Landauer?s Principle.

Really? I would have guessed that a computer would use energy whenever a bit flips to whichever state (0 or 1) uses more energy than the other state. "Erasing" information is ambiguous - the bits in a section of memory can be zeroed, set to all one's, or replaced by some pattern, and the energy requirement of doing so depends on which option is used.

re #74Actually there are some very interesting exceptions to the second law:it should be noted that, counter-intuitive to materialistic thought, a computer does not consume energy during computation and will only consume energy when information is erased from it. This counter-intuitive fact is formally known as Landauer?s Principle.

Really? I would have guessed that a computer would use energy whenever a bit flips to whichever state (0 or 1) uses more energy than the other state. "Erasing" information is ambiguous - the bits in a section of memory can be zeroed, set to all one's, or replaced by some pattern, and the energy requirement of doing so depends on which option is used.

Henry

Ignore the bafflegab batshit77/givemeabreak version. What it is is that, in principle, computational operations can be performed in such a way that total entropy doesn't increase. It doesn't decrease either, though, so no SLoT violation. Also, this doesn't apply to any actual device. They all generate waste heat. It's a purely theoretical notion. There's also a combination of this with Maxwell's Demon: if you were sorting the molecules by way of reversible computational operations and you had an infinite amount of storage space, then you might be able to violate SLoT. But here's the thing. Well, besides the diffiiculty in acquiring an infinitely large memory. Anyway: Landauer's Principle is derived from the 2nd Law. As olegt said, it's a consequence of it, so there's something pretty fishy about using LP to violate it. I mean, if LP+Demon is correct, then the 2nd Law is wrong...but then what's the basis for LP?

ETA:

Disclaimer: I am not a physicist, so, you know, potential wrongness and all that jazz.

--------------I wouldn't be bothered reading about the selfish gene because it has never been identified. -- Denyse O'Leary, professional moronAgain "how much". I don't think that's a good way to be quantitative.-- gpuccio

Hey, now batshit77's back under his regular nom de tard. WTF? It's disturbing to think givemeabreak might just be a batshit77 admirer with a penchant for plagiarism.

--------------I wouldn't be bothered reading about the selfish gene because it has never been identified. -- Denyse O'Leary, professional moronAgain "how much". I don't think that's a good way to be quantitative.-- gpuccio

A yellow banana is evidence that all ravens are black. Why? Because “all ravens are black” is logically equivalent to “all non-black things are non-ravens.”

*Slaps forehead.*

You just flunked basic philosophy of science, Coppedge.

ETA: WTF is it with creationists and bananas anyway?

I agree that Coppedge is a tard, but on this particular issue (the famous raven paradox of Carl Hempel) his position is defensible.

Imagine that you find yourself transported to a universe that contains five objects (besides yourself). Apart from their number, you know nothing about the objects a priori.

The first object you encounter is a black raven. The second is a red apple. The third is a black raven. Every raven you've seen so far is black, so you hypothesize that all ravens in this universe are black.

Is your hypothesis correct? Well, there are only two objects left in this universe that you haven't already examined. If either one of them is a non-black raven, then your hypothesis is wrong.

You encounter object #4. I suspect we all agree that if object #4 is a black raven, then the hypothesis is strengthened. However, if object #4 turns out to be a yellow banana, then the hypothesis is also strengthened. Why? Because before we examined object #4, there were two objects -- object #4 and object #5 -- that could have turned out to be non-black ravens, thus disconfirming our hypothesis. After we see that object #4 is a banana, there is only one object left -- object #5 -- that might be a non-black raven. It is now less likely that our hypothesis is wrong. In other words, the hypothesis is strengthened.

Why does our intuition recoil from this conclusion? It's because in our universe, there are many more non-ravens than ravens. Encountering a black raven therefore strengthens the hypothesis far more than encountering a non-black non-raven, such as a yellow banana. Nevertheless, our hypothesis is strengthened in both cases.

--------------And the set of natural numbers is also the set that starts at 0 and goes to the largest number. -- Joe G

A yellow banana is evidence that all ravens are black. Why? Because “all ravens are black” is logically equivalent to “all non-black things are non-ravens.”

*Slaps forehead.*

You just flunked basic philosophy of science, Coppedge.

ETA: WTF is it with creationists and bananas anyway?

I agree that Coppedge is a tard, but on this particular issue (the famous raven paradox of Carl Hempel) his position is defensible.

Imagine that you find yourself transported to a universe that contains five objects (besides yourself). Apart from their number, you know nothing about the objects a priori.

The first object you encounter is a black raven. The second is a red apple. The third is a black raven. Every raven you've seen so far is black, so you hypothesize that all ravens in this universe are black.

Is your hypothesis correct? Well, there are only two objects left in this universe that you haven't already examined. If either one of them is a non-black raven, then your hypothesis is wrong.

You encounter object #4. I suspect we all agree that if object #4 is a black raven, then the hypothesis is strengthened. However, if object #4 turns out to be a yellow banana, then the hypothesis is also strengthened. Why? Because before we examined object #4, there were two objects -- object #4 and object #5 -- that could have turned out to be non-black ravens, thus disconfirming our hypothesis. After we see that object #4 is a banana, there is only one object left -- object #5 -- that might be a non-black raven. It is now less likely that our hypothesis is wrong. In other words, the hypothesis is strengthened.

Why does our intuition recoil from this conclusion? It's because in our universe, there are many more non-ravens than ravens. Encountering a black raven therefore strengthens the hypothesis far more than encountering a non-black non-raven, such as a yellow banana. Nevertheless, our hypothesis is strengthened in both cases.

Not sure I agree, mainly because I'm uncomfortable with the kind of casual probabilistic language getting rubbed up against logical statements.

If I translate this kind of logical statement into set theory and helpful Venn diagrams and such, I know U, the universe of discourse, from the beginning. I don't discover U gradually.

Futher, it seems to buy into a certain definition of probability. I didn't give this too much thought, so feel free to disagree.

A yellow banana is evidence that all ravens are black. Why? Because “all ravens are black” is logically equivalent to “all non-black things are non-ravens.”

*Slaps forehead.*

You just flunked basic philosophy of science, Coppedge.

ETA: WTF is it with creationists and bananas anyway?

I agree that Coppedge is a tard, but on this issue (the famous raven paradox of Carl Hempel) his position is defensible.

Imagine that you find yourself transported to a universe that contains five objects (besides yourself). Apart from their number, you know nothing about the objects a priori.

The first object you encounter is a black raven. The second is a red apple. The third is a black raven. Every raven you've seen so far is black, so you hypothesize that all ravens in this universe are black.

Is your hypothesis correct? Well, there are only two objects left in this universe that you haven't already examined. If either one of them is a non-black raven, then your hypothesis is wrong.

You encounter object #4. I suspect we all agree that if object #4 is a black raven, then the hypothesis is strengthened. However, if object #4 turns out to be a yellow banana, then the hypothesis is also strengthened. Why? Because before we examined object #4, there were two objects -- object #4 and object #5 -- that could have turned out to be non-black ravens, thus disconfirming our hypothesis. After we see that object #4 is a banana, there is only one object left -- object #5 -- that might be a non-black raven. It is now less likely that our hypothesis is wrong. In other words, the hypothesis is strengthened.

Why does our intuition recoil from this conclusion? It's because in our universe, there are many more non-ravens than ravens. Encountering a black raven therefore strengthens the hypothesis far more than encountering a non-black non-raven, such as a yellow banana. Nevertheless, our hypothesis is strengthened in both cases.

My issue is not that this is wrong, but that in his post, it's basically an irrelevance introduced only so that he can imply that this is what all the evidence for evolution amounts to: the observation of a non-black object by raven-watchers. He's not actually discussing it, or giving any indication that he even understands it other than superficially (not that I've deeply considered it myself). Like, the fact that, oh, fucking everything else in science can be "argued" against by dragging that out. That or he's just a propagandizing prick and hopes nobody notices. To me, it just reads as something he thinks is all "intellectual" that really sticks it to the evolutionists.

He also claims that the falsification criterion was formulated as a result of Hempel's paradox (or at least, he makes it sound that way):

Quote

The fallacy of affirming the consequent inherent in such evidential claims was the reason for Popper offering falsification as a criterion for science.

Sure, in formulating falsification, Popper did deal with the same kind of statements that are involved in the Raven paradox, but he wasn't actually dealing with the paradox itself (probably because, you know, Hempel hadn't written about it yet). Not that Coppedge cares, even if he knows, because it's just an excuse to give this dead horse a couple more good, solid whacks with the tardbat:

Quote

But evolution is so slippery, it cannot be falsified, either.

So, that fucker still flunks.

--------------I wouldn't be bothered reading about the selfish gene because it has never been identified. -- Denyse O'Leary, professional moronAgain "how much". I don't think that's a good way to be quantitative.-- gpuccio

A yellow banana is evidence that all ravens are black. Why? Because “all ravens are black” is logically equivalent to “all non-black things are non-ravens.”

*Slaps forehead.*

You just flunked basic philosophy of science, Coppedge.

ETA: WTF is it with creationists and bananas anyway?

I agree that Coppedge is a tard, but on this issue (the famous raven paradox of Carl Hempel) his position is defensible.

Imagine that you find yourself transported to a universe that contains five objects (besides yourself). Apart from their number, you know nothing about the objects a priori.

The first object you encounter is a black raven. The second is a red apple. The third is a black raven. Every raven you've seen so far is black, so you hypothesize that all ravens in this universe are black.

Is your hypothesis correct? Well, there are only two objects left in this universe that you haven't already examined. If either one of them is a non-black raven, then your hypothesis is wrong.

You encounter object #4. I suspect we all agree that if object #4 is a black raven, then the hypothesis is strengthened. However, if object #4 turns out to be a yellow banana, then the hypothesis is also strengthened. Why? Because before we examined object #4, there were two objects -- object #4 and object #5 -- that could have turned out to be non-black ravens, thus disconfirming our hypothesis. After we see that object #4 is a banana, there is only one object left -- object #5 -- that might be a non-black raven. It is now less likely that our hypothesis is wrong. In other words, the hypothesis is strengthened.

Why does our intuition recoil from this conclusion? It's because in our universe, there are many more non-ravens than ravens. Encountering a black raven therefore strengthens the hypothesis far more than encountering a non-black non-raven, such as a yellow banana. Nevertheless, our hypothesis is strengthened in both cases.

My issue is not that this is wrong, but that in his post, it's basically an irrelevance introduced only so that he can imply that this is what all the evidence for evolution amounts to: the observation of a non-black object by raven-watchers. He's not actually discussing it, or giving any indication that he even understands it other than superficially (not that I've deeply considered it myself). Like, the fact that, oh, fucking everything else in science can be "argued" against by dragging that out. That or he's just a propagandizing prick and hopes nobody notices. To me, it just reads as something he thinks is all "intellectual" that really sticks it to the evolutionists.

He also claims that the falsification criterion was formulated as a result of Hempel's paradox (or at least, he makes it sound that way):

Quote

The fallacy of affirming the consequent inherent in such evidential claims was the reason for Popper offering falsification as a criterion for science.

Sure, in formulating falsification, Popper did deal with the same kind of statements that are involved in the Raven paradox, but he wasn't actually dealing with the paradox itself (probably because, you know, Hempel hadn't written about it yet). Not that Coppedge cares, even if he knows, because it's just an excuse to give this dead horse a couple more good, solid whacks with the tardbat:

Quote

But evolution is so slippery, it cannot be falsified, either.

So, that fucker still flunks.

Yes, the rest of his comment is crap, which is why I agreed without hesitation that Coppedge is a tard. I just think he happens to be right about the raven paradox.

--------------And the set of natural numbers is also the set that starts at 0 and goes to the largest number. -- Joe G

Not sure I agree, mainly because I'm uncomfortable with the kind of casual probabilistic language getting rubbed up against logical statements.

If I translate this kind of logical statement into set theory and helpful Venn diagrams and such, I know U, the universe of discourse, from the beginning. I don't discover U gradually.

Futher, it seems to buy into a certain definition of probability. I didn't give this too much thought, so feel free to disagree.

This is all very much related to the problem of induction and the Bayesian/frequentist debate over the meaning of probability.

If ravenhood and blackness are well-defined, then the hypothesis "all ravens are black" is either true or false. However (and this is the problem of induction), the only way to establish the hypothesis with certainty is to examine every object in the universe and to observe that none of them are non-black ravens.

Because we can't observe every object in the universe, this kind of certainty is impossible for us. We therefore consider some hypotheses to be more likely than others, depending on the evidence we've accumulated so far, but we don't claim absolute certainty for any of them.

This leads to the Bayesian view of probability as a reflection of our uncertainty. We say "Homer is probably at Moe's Tavern" even though he's either there or he isn't. What we're really saying, in effect, is "I'd be willing to bet that Homer is at Moe's Tavern right now." Likewise, it is either absolutely true or false that all ravens are black. When we say that "it's probably true that all ravens are black", we mean that we'd be surprised to discover that our hypothesis is false, given what we've observed so far.

As we make observations and gather information, we revise our estimates of these probabilities.

Viewing probabilities in this Bayesian sense, it is true (and sensible) that when we observe a black raven, we consider it as supporting the hypothesis that all ravens are black. But by the same Bayesian logic, observing a yellow banana also provides positive support for the hypothesis. It just provides much less support than the raven observation, for the reasons I gave in my earlier comment.

--------------And the set of natural numbers is also the set that starts at 0 and goes to the largest number. -- Joe G

Shouldn't one only be concerned with Ravens? We don't know the number of entities in the universe so finding a yellow banana does not increase the knowledge of the distribution of ravens vs remaining entities.

If we know the universe consists of N<inf objects, and we don't know what proportion of those objects are ravens, then it is true that observing a yellow banana is evidence supporting the proposition that all ravens are black. However, if we know the proportion of objects in the universe that are ravens, then observing a yellow banana is not evidence. But since we are unlikely to know the proportion of ravens, it's reasonable to accept that a yellow banana adds evidence to the black raven hypothesis. Of course, if N is large - and it is very large - observing a yellow banana has almost no effect at all on our posterior (O(1/N))

--------------After much reflection I finally realized that the best way to describe the cause of the universe is: the great I AM.

If we know the universe consists of N<inf objects, and we don't know what proportion of those objects are ravens, then it is true that observing a yellow banana is evidence supporting the proposition that all ravens are black. However, if we know the proportion of objects in the universe that are ravens, then observing a yellow banana is not evidence. But since we are unlikely to know the proportion of ravens, it's reasonable to accept that a yellow banana adds evidence to the black raven hypothesis. Of course, if N is large - and it is very large - observing a yellow banana has almost no effect at all on our posterior (O(1/N))

We don't know the number of entities in the universe so finding a yellow banana does not increase the knowledge of the distribution of ravens vs remaining entities.

The logic still holds even if the number is unknown.

Suppose you have a dump truck full of marbles. You have no idea how many marbles are in the hopper, but you know that it is some large positive integer N. You remove and examine ten marbles, noting that four of them are blue. All four of the blue marbles are cracked, so you hypothesize that every blue marble is cracked.

At this point you know that there are N - 10 marbles left in the truck, even though you don't know what N is. That means there are N - 10 opportunities for your hypothesis to be falsified. If a single one of those N - 10 marbles is a non-cracked blue marble, then your hypothesis is wrong.

You grab another marble, which turns out to be red and non-cracked. Does this support your hypothesis? Yes, because now there are only N - 11 opportunities for disconfirmation. It is slightly less likely (in the Bayesian sense) that your hypothesis will be disconfirmed -- in other words, your hypothesis has been strengthened.

All of this remains true for any large integer N. The case where N is infinite is left as an exercise for the reader.

ETA: I see Raevmo, the Eurosnob, beat me to it.

--------------And the set of natural numbers is also the set that starts at 0 and goes to the largest number. -- Joe G

However, if we know the proportion of objects in the universe that are ravens, then observing a yellow banana is not evidence.

I disagree with that part of your comment. (USA! USA! USA!)

If we don't know the number of objects in the universe (or more precisely, if we can't state an upper bound on the number), then knowing the proportion that are ravens does not help.

[pedantry]Suppose you know that exactly 1.00% of objects in the universe are ravens, and that you've already observed 1000 objects, 10 of which were black ravens. Then the following must be true:

1) The number of objects in the universe is 1000 + 100x, where x is either 0 or some positive integer.

2) The number of ravens in the universe is 10 + x.

Now suppose you encounter a previously unobserved yellow banana. That means x must be greater than or equal to 1, which means there must be at least 1100 objects in the universe, at least 11 of which are ravens. In turn, this means that there is at least one raven you haven't previously observed. That raven might turn out to be non-black.

Thus, observing a yellow banana means (in this case) that it is less likely that all ravens are black.[/pedantry]

--------------And the set of natural numbers is also the set that starts at 0 and goes to the largest number. -- Joe G

Why am I 'post-Darwinian'? Because I have been card-carrying evolutionist. Today, I am skeptical of macroevolutionary theory as scientific truth. However, my skepticism to the 'central dogma' Darwinism is not based on accounts of the creation of sacred texts. Was serious and conflicting account of the debate that occurs within the walls and in the scientific literature for many years about the inadequacy of the epistemic general theory of evolution. I have been atheist Marxist-Leninist. Today, I no longer have blind faith in atheism. I no longer believe in the literal interpretation of the dogmas of Darwin accepted a priori and ideologically defended tooth and nail by scientific Nomenklatura. Science gave me this conviction. I learned at university: as a scientific theory is not supported by evidence, it must be revised or simply discarded. I'm post-Darwinian me anticipating the imminent and impending rupture paradigm in evolutionary biology. Time to say goodbye to Darwin. Master, PhD in History of Science - PUC-SP.

Also kinda the Brazilian Gil "I used to be an atheist. Srsly. I was!" Dodgen.

--------------I wouldn't be bothered reading about the selfish gene because it has never been identified. -- Denyse O'Leary, professional moronAgain "how much". I don't think that's a good way to be quantitative.-- gpuccio