Conor Kostick, “Iuvenes and the First Crusade (1096–99): Knights in Search of Glory?” The Journal of Military History 73 #2 (April 2009): 369-392

The epitome of the medieval warrior, the hero of the chanson, the glorious competitor in the sports of the tournament, was the iuvenis: a knight not necessarily 'young' in age, but rather, young in his career. When the early medieval historians of the First Crusade (1096–1099) are read with regard to their use of this term, it becomes clear that they saw a distinct grouping of iuvenes as being present on the crusade. These knights, despite a certain recklessness and indiscipline, were portrayed as playing an important military role in the Christian army.

Irving W. Levinson, “A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War,” The Journal of Military History 73 #2 (April 2009): 393-416

The 1846–48 conflict between the United States and Mexico was the first U.S. war in which military victory over the foe’s conventional army and successful resistance to partisan attacks failed to produce the desired political outcome. Only by subsequently providing assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups of Mexico could the United States obtain a peace treaty legitimizing the conquest of Mexican territory. In this regard, the war stands as a precursor to challenges the United States would encounter in subsequent conflicts of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries.

Roy A. Prete. “Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning,” The Journal of Military History 73 #2 (April 2009): 417-448

This paper examines the origins of the Battle of the Somme within the context of French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre’s effort to coordinate Allied military operations in 1916 and to mount a combined Anglo-French offensive on the Western Front. The French chose a joint operation on the Somme, in which they would play the major role, as a means of leading the British into battle. But a major British attritional operation preceding the offensive was dropped, and ironically, the French Army bore the brunt of Allied wastage in the German attack at Verdun until the Somme offensive began on 1 July 1916.

Following the Armistice and Kaiser Wilhelm II’s abdication in November 1918, Allied and Associated Powers leaders grappled with the Central Powers’ responsibility for “war guilt.” Among those placing the blame squarely on the German Kaiser was a former U.S. senator, Colonel Luke Lea, who actively pursued an unsanctioned personal task: seizing Wilhelm as a war criminal. Recently discovered documentation sheds new light on Lea’s mission to transport the Kaiser from a Dutch castle for a trial before the Paris Peace Conference. Lea’s “amazingly indiscreet” plan complements and broadly compares to similar views shared by senior Allied leaders at the end of World War I.

Christopher Mann, “Combined Operations, the Commandos, and Norway, 1941–1944,” The Journal of Military History 73 #2 (April 2009): 471-495

The Combined Operations organisation and British Army and Royal Marine Commandos conducted three large-scale raids against the Norwegian coast in 1941 and a series of smaller operations in 1942 and 1943. This article examines the reasons for the shifts in British raiding policy during this period and places the Norwegian raids in their wider strategic context. Although these raids had little material consequence and were conducted on the periphery of the main theatres of operations, they proved beneficial in terms of experience gained in triservice operations and the subsequent overcommitment of German resources to Norway in response.

Kaushik Roy, “Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II,” The Journal of Military History 73 #2 (April 2009): 497-529

The British colonial regime in India was heavily dependent on the Indian Army, whose rank and file were Indians but whose officers were British. Despite the apathy of the Indian populace and the hostility of the Indian political parties, the Indian Army remained loyal to its colonial masters during World War II. This article examines the extent of that loyalty and the reasons behind it. Focusing principally on the Indian units that fought in Burma, it analyzes combat motivation and loyalty throughout the war. The article also considers the British elite’s concern about the Indian soldiers’ loyalty and whether it would change during postwar demobilization.

David I. Goldman, “The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969,” The Journal of Military History 73 #2 (April 2009): 531-569

In 1969 President Richard Nixon took the unprecedented step of unilaterally eliminating an entire class of weapons, biological warfare agents, and retaining only a defensive research program. He also limited the nation’s chemical weapons efforts to retaliation. Little research has been done into the policy review that led to the decisions, particularly the role of the Army, which oversaw the programs. Using recently declassified documents, this article analyzes the history behind the policy changes. It illustrates as well that the Army was cut out of the review, but that its mismanagement of the programs was, ironically, a key factor in their demise. It also shows that many in the service’s leadership actually came to support Nixon’s moves.

Jefferson Davis is credited with authoring an offensive-defensive Confederate strategy. This pillar of Civil War historiography is incorrect, having been derived from a misunderstanding of the levels of policy and war, and the misreading of scant primary source documentation.

Jefferson Davis evaluated the Confederacy’s national resources and capabilities and decided that in order to win its independence the Confederacy was going to have to fight mostly on the strategic defensive. Davis maintained mostly a defensive outlook throughout the Civil War but shifted to strategic offensives a few times when he believed or was persuaded that an exceptional offensive was likely to contribute to winning independence. During and after the war Davis called his strategic approach the “offensive-defensive.” Although it is a cumbersome term, the “offensive-defensive” strategy remains a valid phrase to describe the strategy Davis used to conduct of the war.

Dr. Stoker’s Rejoinder, 608-610

Dr. Dawson’s Rejoinder, 611-613Reviews:Warlord: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874-1945, by Carlo D'Este, reviewed by Raymond Callahan and by David French, 621-623

War Horse: A History of the Military Horse and Rider, by Louis A. DiMarco, reviewed by Catharine R. Franklin, 624-625

A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon’s Anabasis, by John W. I. Lee, reviewed by Tim Rood, 625-626

The History of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century, introduction, translation, and annotations by Alice-Mary Talbot and Denis F. Sullivan with assistance of George T. Dennis and Stamatina Grath, reviewed by Glenn Bugh, 628-629

Invasion and Insurrection: Security, Defense, and War in the Delaware Valley 1621-1815, by Jeffery M. Dorwart, reviewed by Michael Adelberg, 629-631

War in England 1642-1649, by Barbara Donagan, reviewed by Charles Carlton, 631-632

The Furie of the Ordnance: Artillery in the English Civil War, by Stephen Bull, reviewed by Charles Esdaile, 632-633

Russia, 1762-1825: Military Power, the State and the People, by Janet M. Hartley, reviewed by Alexander Mikaberidze, 634-635

Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782, by Jim Piecuch, reviewed by Robert M. Calhoon, 635-637

Napoleon’s Wars: An International History 1803-1815, by Charles Esdaile, reviewed by Michael V. Leggiere, 637-639

Albuera 1811: The Bloodiest Battle of the Peninsular War, by Guy Dempsey, reviewed by James R. Arnold, 639-641

The Road to St. Helena: Napoleon after Waterloo, by J. David Markham, reviewed by Thomas D. Morgan, 641-642

Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, by Jon Tetsuro Sumida, reviewed by John Shy, 642-644

Chief of Staff: The Principal Officers behind History’s Great Commanders, Vol. I: Napoleonic Wars to World War I; Vol. 2: World War II to Korea and Vietnam, edited by David T. Zabecki, reviewed by David Emery, 644-645

The Spirit of Resistance: The Life of SOE Agent Harry Peulevé DSO MC, by Nigel Perrin, reviewed by Rita Kramer, 684-685

Defeat and Triumph: The Story of a Controversial Allied Invasion and French Rebirth, by Stephen Sussna, reviewed by Stephen A. Bourque, 685-686

Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Volume II: 1946-2006, by Norman Polmar, reviewed by Jeffrey G. Barlow, 686-687

Technology and the American Way of War since 1945, by Thomas G. Mahnken, reviewed by Kenneth P. Werrell, 687-689

General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War, by Henry G. Gole, reviewed by Peter Maslowski, 689-690

The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War, by Ingo Trauschweizer, reviewed by Sean N. Kalic, 690-692

Grunts : The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam, by Kyle Longley, reviewed by Peter Brush, 692-693

The Last Crusade: Americanism and the Islamic Reformation, by Michael A. Palmer and Unmodern Men in the Modern World: Radical Islam, Terrorism, and the War on Modernity, by Michael J. Mazarr, reviewed by David M. Witty, 693-695