The paper presents a quantitative politico-economic analysis of the present and future CAP-reform induced under different policy scenarios regarding a potential EU-enlargement and future WTO-agreements. Theoretically, the analysis is based on a political exchange model suggested by Henning (2000). Main results are: (i) Both present and future CAP-reforms are significantly biased by the political influence of farmer?s lobby. (ii) In quantitative terms an EU-enlargement would induce a much stronger shift in the future CAP when compared to increased WTO-restrictions. Generally, induced CAP-reforms imply a significant lower level of protection and a lower support of multifunctional services of the agricultural sector. (iii) The timing of the reform is important, given the fact that induced CAP-reforms would be supported by a qualified majority within the EU-15, but within the EU-25 these reforms would be defeated by coalition of the new Eastern European member states using their common veto-power. (iv) The majority of political actors within the EU-15 including both politicians and interest groups evaluate induced CAP-reforms negatively in comparison to the status quo, while from society?s perspective these imply a positive shift of total economic welfare within EU-15.