NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEW: TERMS OF REFERENCE

In order to permit the President to consider a full range of options on all policy issues
relating to nuclear weapons, a Nuclear Policy Review will be conducted. This effort should be
completed in three months' time and organized as follows:

The National Security Advisor is responsible for insuring that the review is
conducted pursuant to these terms of reference and that the steps specified herein are
carried out as intended.

A study in response to these terms of reference shall be conducted by an inter-agency
task force chaired by a senior representative of the National Security Adviser and
involving senior officials from other agencies, including the Departments of State,
Defense and Energy, the Joint Staff, ACDA, CIA, Science Advisor to the President,
OMB, as well as the NSC. At the conclusion of the study, the task force will issue a
Report.

The task force shall have an associated staff composed of personnel detailed full-time
from the aforementioned agencies for three months (or until the study's completion).
These staff members, as well as the task force personnel, shall be issued all
appropriate clearances, to include those for the SIOP, consistent with the needs of
this study.

The task force should consult throughout the course of its work with outside experts,
including retired senior military officers. It should also review reports by private
groups including the Canberra Commission, which was sponsored by the Australian
government.

The Report of the task force will present all options that it believes are serious
alternatives meriting the consideration of the President and his principal advisors.
The range of options presented should include: 1) current policy and the other
options described below; 2) options endorsed by any participating agency; and 3)
options suggested by the experts groups and private reports even if no government
agency supports them. The costs and gains of implementing each option, as
perceived by the concerned agencies, should be presented, but no formal statements
of agency positions should be included in the Report.

The NSC will assemble an outside group of experts who shall be grouped into teams
supporting the nuclear postures outlined below. Each team shall produce a report
making the case for the posture that it favors and explaining the drawbacks, as it sees
them, of the other postures.

The completed Report, along with the advocacy documents prepared by the experts
teams, should be vetted by the Deputies Committee of the NSC to insure that it
includes a full range of issues and options with a fair and complete statement of the
pros and cons of each alternative.

After the Report is viewed by the Deputies, but before it is presented to the Principals
and to the President, an unclassified version should be prepared and released so that
the President can have the benefit of congressional and public views as well as the
view of other governments in considering the alternatives presented.

In order to permit the President and his principal advisers to address nuclear policy issues in
a comprehensive way, the proposed study should examine each of the following questions and any
others that the task force believes needs to be considered. In each case the Report should provide
background on the issues and then present a series of options with a statement of the pros and cons of
each.

1. Describe options relating to the alert posture of U.S. nuclear forces. Options
discussed should combine three elements:

a. the dependence of U.S. forces on warning, basing synergies, and rapid
decision making for survival

b. the viability of non-operational postures

c. effect of U.S. readiness levels on Russian forces, and the attendant
operationally induced risks

2. The options to be discussed should include:

a. status quo

b. an alert posture which maximizes survivability and ensures the capacity for a
deliberate, controlled, retaliatory attack

c. a non-operational posture which maximizes the safety, surety, and
transparency of U.S. nuclear options in a cooperative, negotiated, verifiable
international regime and which takes all nuclear forces off alert and separates
weapons from their delivery systems to the degree possible

3. Background information to be provided:

a. current operational practices, including the time to reinstate a combat-ready
posture from the day-to-day "de-targeted" condition

b. the types and quantities of warning necessary to ensure the survival of U.S.
forces

c. the time needed to re-mate weapons to their launchers if weapons are
physically separated from the launchers

d. estimates of the operational readiness and safety of Russian nuclear forces

e. for each strategic system, the problems and steps that can be taken to
overcome them which would permit the system to be maintained in a non-alert status and to have the warheads separated from the delivery systems

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. the implications for deterrence and operational capabilities

b. the impact on the ability of the President to order a use of nuclear weapons,
and to retain flexibility of action

c. the impact on the risk of nuclear accidents and other dangers, including
unauthorized or preemptive attacks for the United States and other operators
of nuclear weapons. (Discuss likely Russian responses in terms of the
operational status of Russian nuclear forces.)

d. the implications for arms control, including the verifiability, transparency,
and feasibility of alternatives

1. Describe options relating to negotiations on force size, deployments, and total
arsenals of nuclear weapons and fissionable material, first with Russia and then with
all of the nuclear weapons states. Options discussed should combine these elements:

a. USG statement about its objectives in arms control for the nuclear weapons
states

b. timing of USG statement and willingness to negotiate in relation to Russian
ratification of START II

c. if, when, and under what conditions the other nuclear weapons states should
be brought into the negotiations

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. immediate negotiation (i.e., prior to START II ratification by Duma) of a
framework agreement for START III - which would provide for a reduction
to 1,000 missiles with limits on warheads and fissionable material - and
prompt negotiation of such a treaty as soon as START II is ratified

c. negotiations among the five nuclear weapons states to end production of
weapons-grade fissionable material, to store nuclear warheads only on their
own territory, and to reduce weapons to no more than 100 for each nuclear
weapons state

3. Background information to be provided:

a. current USG position on negotiating further reductions and rationale for this
position

b. position of the Russian government and the other nuclear weapons states

c. difficulties the Russians face in adhering to START II limitations with no
further reductions in U.S. strategic forces

d. the status of other international arms control agreements (NPT, CTBT,
MTCR, CWC, BWC, Australia Group)

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. implications for deterrence of deliberate and inadvertent nuclear attacks

b. consequences for overall U.S. relations with Russia and other nuclear
weapons states

c. effects on non-proliferation efforts

d. costs

e. relationship between any contemplated new agreement and existing
international arms control efforts

1. Describe options relating to states which have or might seek to acquire nuclear
weapons including states that have not signed the NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan),
current aspiring states (Iraq, Iran, North Korea), and states that might decide in the
future to acquire nuclear weapons. Options discussed should be limited to
comprehensive measures aimed at all such states (policies and programs directed at
specific states are beyond the scope of this Nuclear Policy Review).

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. a comprehensive set of additional arms control measures aimed at
strengthening the international norm against non-proliferation

3. Background information to be provided:

a. current status and likely developments in the nuclear weapons program of all
potential nuclear states

b. current USG objectives regarding the nuclear program of each potential
nuclear state and programs to pursue those objectives

c. views of the other nuclear weapons states on what should be done to deal
with this set of states

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. the likelihood of success in gaining the necessary international support for
the option

b. the likely impact on the nuclear weapons program of each undeclared and
potential nuclear weapons state

1. Describe options relating to the U.S. arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Options
discussed should combine these elements:

a. what stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons should be maintained

b. what the USG should say about its stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and
its use of such weapons

c. what nuclear weapons, if any, would be stored outside of U.S. territory

d. what arms control agreements bilaterally with Russia or with the other four
nuclear weapons states the USG should seek to negotiate regarding
stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons and their storage only on the territory
of the particular nuclear weapons state

2. The options to be discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. substantial reductions of tactical nuclear weapons coupled with a public
announcement and an offer to the Russians to negotiate an agreement to
eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from the arsenals of both nations

c. withdrawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and
negotiation of an agreement among the nuclear weapons states to store
nuclear weapons only on their own territory

d. options c and d combined

3. Background information to be provided:

a. the current status of the tactical nuclear arsenal of the United States,
including the number of weapons, where they are stored, and plans for their
use

b. the current tactical nuclear arsenal of Russia

c. verification issues relating to any agreement to limit or abolish tactical
nuclear weapons or to limit their storage to designated areas

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option, assess:

a. the consequences for deterrence of nuclear attacks on U.S. military forces
stationed or conducting military operations abroad

b. the consequences for deterrence of nuclear attacks on U.S. allies

c. consequences for deterrence of biological or chemical attacks and the degree
to which strategic nuclear forces can play a role if the United States decides
to rely in whole or in part on nuclear threats to deter CB attacks

1. Describe options relating to assurances by the five nuclear weapons states - acting
through the Security Council - to states that adhere to the NPT that the nuclear
weapons states will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against them, and that the
international community will come to their assistance if such threats are used by one
of the nuclear weapons states or by any other state. Options discussed should
combine these elements:

a. specific terms of additional negative assurance to be provided

b. specific terms of additional positive assurances to be provided

c. steps to be taken to increase the credibility of the assurances and the
likelihood that commitments will be honored

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. unequivocal assurances by the five nuclear weapons states that they will not
threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against any state that is a party to the
NPT unless that state uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons, and that any
state party to the NPT threatened with the use of nuclear weapons by any
other state will receive the support of the international community in
deterring such threats and responding to any use of nuclear weapons against
their territory

c. no first use declaration by the United States combined with an effort to
negotiate such an agreement among the five nuclear weapons states

3. Background information to be provided:

a. current collective negative and positive assurances provided by the nuclear
weapons states or by the Security Council

b. precise terms of current USG negative and positive security assurances and a
chronology of such assurances by successive administrations beginning with
the Johnson administration, as well as assurances offered bilaterally to
particular states (e.g. Ukraine)

c. precise terms of assurances offered by the other nuclear weapons states

d. requests for such assurances from potential nuclear weapons states

e. current U.S. planning for the initiation of tactical nuclear weapons

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. consequences for deterrence of conventional attacks by countries receiving
such assurances

b. the impact on proliferation, including assessment of impact on each near or
new nuclear nation

c. the impact on overall relations with Russia and China as well as with France
and the United Kingdom

d. the effect on the likelihood of threats or use of nuclear weapons by the other
four nuclear weapons states or other undeclared nuclear weapons states