This chapter investigates the broader nationalist and political contexts within which names other than Persian Gulf have emerged in the past fifty years and explores the stances archaeologists ...
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This chapter investigates the broader nationalist and political contexts within which names other than Persian Gulf have emerged in the past fifty years and explores the stances archaeologists working in the region have taken in response to these developments. It analyzes the relations between Iran and Arabs in the context of the Persian Gulf and the development of Arab nationalism in the region. This chapter considers the role the archaeological community, especially Western archaeologists, has assumed amid volatile Arab-Iranian relations.Less

The Name Game: The Persian Gulf, Archaeologists, and the Politics of Arab-Iranian Relations

Kamyar Abdi

Published in print: 2008-02-15

This chapter investigates the broader nationalist and political contexts within which names other than Persian Gulf have emerged in the past fifty years and explores the stances archaeologists working in the region have taken in response to these developments. It analyzes the relations between Iran and Arabs in the context of the Persian Gulf and the development of Arab nationalism in the region. This chapter considers the role the archaeological community, especially Western archaeologists, has assumed amid volatile Arab-Iranian relations.

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To ...
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In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.Less

Military and Diplomatic Success in the Persian Gulf War

Spencer D. Bakich

Published in print: 2014-03-20

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.

1989–1990 saw American efforts to co-opt Iraq reach a peak during the administration of George H.W. Bush. That strategy was abandoned, however, after Saddam Hussein, in a desperate bid to solve ...
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1989–1990 saw American efforts to co-opt Iraq reach a peak during the administration of George H.W. Bush. That strategy was abandoned, however, after Saddam Hussein, in a desperate bid to solve economic problems resulting from his eight year war with Iran, invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait in August 1990. Perceiving a direct threat to American control over the flow of oil from the Gulf, the Bush administration soon decided that Iraqi forces must be expelled from Kuwait by whatever means necessary. Having built careful support for this position, Bush launched the Persian Gulf War of 1991, which saw Iraqi forces routed and Kuwaiti sovereignty restored. The Bush administration did not invade Iraq or seek to eliminate Saddam Hussein, however, out of fear that such actions would serve only to empower Iran. They therefore fell back on a policy of sanctions and weapons inspections designed to permanently neutralise the Iraqi threat and, hopefully, to cause Saddam's fall.Less

The Persian Gulf War, 1990–1991

Steven Hurst

Published in print: 2009-10-30

1989–1990 saw American efforts to co-opt Iraq reach a peak during the administration of George H.W. Bush. That strategy was abandoned, however, after Saddam Hussein, in a desperate bid to solve economic problems resulting from his eight year war with Iran, invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait in August 1990. Perceiving a direct threat to American control over the flow of oil from the Gulf, the Bush administration soon decided that Iraqi forces must be expelled from Kuwait by whatever means necessary. Having built careful support for this position, Bush launched the Persian Gulf War of 1991, which saw Iraqi forces routed and Kuwaiti sovereignty restored. The Bush administration did not invade Iraq or seek to eliminate Saddam Hussein, however, out of fear that such actions would serve only to empower Iran. They therefore fell back on a policy of sanctions and weapons inspections designed to permanently neutralise the Iraqi threat and, hopefully, to cause Saddam's fall.

This book examines American policy toward Iraq between 1979 and 2009. In that period American policy evolved through a series of stages: Initially, the Iranian Revolution and fear of an Iranian ...
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This book examines American policy toward Iraq between 1979 and 2009. In that period American policy evolved through a series of stages: Initially, the Iranian Revolution and fear of an Iranian threat to America's regional allies and interests led to a ‘tilt’ toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq that then became a full-blown effort to co-opt Iraq as an American regional proxy. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 then precipitated a policy reversal and propelled Iraq to the status of regional enemy number one. The Bush administration sought to destroy the Iraqi threat in the 1991 Gulf War but left Saddam in power. The Clinton administration then sought to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programmes through the application of sanctions and weapons inspections. Finally, believing containment to have failed, and motivated and empowered by fears generated by the attacks of September 11th 2001, the administration of George W. Bush sought to eliminate the Iraqi threat in the Iraq War of 2003, only to find no weapons of mass destruction and to become mired in a failing effort to transform Iraq into a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. The book explains this policy trajectory in terms of the American effort to restore a regional hegemonic position lost in 1979 and uses a theoretical framework that emphasises the American role in managing the global economy, the centrality of Persian Gulf oil to that role and long-term change in the American political system.Less

The United States and Iraq since 1979 : Hegemony, Oil and War

Steven Hurst

Published in print: 2009-10-30

This book examines American policy toward Iraq between 1979 and 2009. In that period American policy evolved through a series of stages: Initially, the Iranian Revolution and fear of an Iranian threat to America's regional allies and interests led to a ‘tilt’ toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq that then became a full-blown effort to co-opt Iraq as an American regional proxy. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 then precipitated a policy reversal and propelled Iraq to the status of regional enemy number one. The Bush administration sought to destroy the Iraqi threat in the 1991 Gulf War but left Saddam in power. The Clinton administration then sought to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programmes through the application of sanctions and weapons inspections. Finally, believing containment to have failed, and motivated and empowered by fears generated by the attacks of September 11th 2001, the administration of George W. Bush sought to eliminate the Iraqi threat in the Iraq War of 2003, only to find no weapons of mass destruction and to become mired in a failing effort to transform Iraq into a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. The book explains this policy trajectory in terms of the American effort to restore a regional hegemonic position lost in 1979 and uses a theoretical framework that emphasises the American role in managing the global economy, the centrality of Persian Gulf oil to that role and long-term change in the American political system.

After declaring independence in 1971, Bahrain signed a basing agreement with the United States, prompted by external security fears associated with Iran’s desire to annex the tiny island nation. But ...
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After declaring independence in 1971, Bahrain signed a basing agreement with the United States, prompted by external security fears associated with Iran’s desire to annex the tiny island nation. But when the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973 with the U.S. supporting Israel in the war, Bahrainis violently voiced their outrage over the U.S. naval presence. In late 1973, the Bahraini government announced that the U.S. naval basing agreement would be terminated. The U.S. lost its homeport at Jufair, but it was able to negotiate the maintenance of a light footprint including the presence of an administrative support unit for U.S. naval regional logistics. This chapter examines both the domestic security challenges faced by the Khalifas during this period and the politics involved in the homeport expulsion.Less

A Light Footprint in Bahrain

Geoffrey F. Gresh

Published in print: 2015-06-10

After declaring independence in 1971, Bahrain signed a basing agreement with the United States, prompted by external security fears associated with Iran’s desire to annex the tiny island nation. But when the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973 with the U.S. supporting Israel in the war, Bahrainis violently voiced their outrage over the U.S. naval presence. In late 1973, the Bahraini government announced that the U.S. naval basing agreement would be terminated. The U.S. lost its homeport at Jufair, but it was able to negotiate the maintenance of a light footprint including the presence of an administrative support unit for U.S. naval regional logistics. This chapter examines both the domestic security challenges faced by the Khalifas during this period and the politics involved in the homeport expulsion.

This chapter discusses the new conflicts that arose following the end of the Cold War. It was noted that the end of the Cold War appeared to bring a peace dividend to the United States. However, ...
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This chapter discusses the new conflicts that arose following the end of the Cold War. It was noted that the end of the Cold War appeared to bring a peace dividend to the United States. However, Iraqi forces conquered Kuwait shortly after, thus forcing George W. Bush to order U.S. troops back into the Middle East. The chapter looks at the conflict in the Persian Gulf and Noriega, and provides a description of the aerial assault in Iraq and Kuwait. This conflict is better known as the Gulf War, which proved to be an unquestionable triumph for Bush.Less

Peace Elusive

Hal Brands

Published in print: 2008-01-04

This chapter discusses the new conflicts that arose following the end of the Cold War. It was noted that the end of the Cold War appeared to bring a peace dividend to the United States. However, Iraqi forces conquered Kuwait shortly after, thus forcing George W. Bush to order U.S. troops back into the Middle East. The chapter looks at the conflict in the Persian Gulf and Noriega, and provides a description of the aerial assault in Iraq and Kuwait. This conflict is better known as the Gulf War, which proved to be an unquestionable triumph for Bush.

This chapter traces the evolution of Iran from a client to a partner of the United States, from the announcement of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1968 to the end of Nixon’s first ...
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This chapter traces the evolution of Iran from a client to a partner of the United States, from the announcement of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1968 to the end of Nixon’s first term as president in 1972. The shah successfully lobbied the Nixon administration to abandon a policy of balancing Iran and Saudi Arabia as the “twin pillars” of the Gulf and to instead embrace Iran’s regional primacy under the Nixon Doctrine. Drawing on Iranian sources, this chapter reveals that the shah’s actions during the 1969 Shatt al-Arab border crisis between Iran and Iraq nearly sparked a war between the two countries. It also details the Nixon administration’s illegal funneling of American arms to Pakistan via Iran during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War.Less

“Protect Me” : The Nixon Doctrine in the Persian Gulf

Roham Alvandi

Published in print: 2014-06-19

This chapter traces the evolution of Iran from a client to a partner of the United States, from the announcement of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1968 to the end of Nixon’s first term as president in 1972. The shah successfully lobbied the Nixon administration to abandon a policy of balancing Iran and Saudi Arabia as the “twin pillars” of the Gulf and to instead embrace Iran’s regional primacy under the Nixon Doctrine. Drawing on Iranian sources, this chapter reveals that the shah’s actions during the 1969 Shatt al-Arab border crisis between Iran and Iraq nearly sparked a war between the two countries. It also details the Nixon administration’s illegal funneling of American arms to Pakistan via Iran during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War.

Studying security in the Persian Gulf requires a multi-dimensional approach and needs to go beyond state-centered and state-exclusive approaches to security issues. In addition to military, ...
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Studying security in the Persian Gulf requires a multi-dimensional approach and needs to go beyond state-centered and state-exclusive approaches to security issues. In addition to military, diplomatic, and balance of power considerations, elements of human security also need to be examined, particularly perceptions of otherness that lead to sectarian sensibilities. Also important are mutual threat perceptions that foster and perpetuate security dilemma.Less

The Trouble with the Persian Gulf

Mehran Kamrava

Published in print: 2018-05-15

Studying security in the Persian Gulf requires a multi-dimensional approach and needs to go beyond state-centered and state-exclusive approaches to security issues. In addition to military, diplomatic, and balance of power considerations, elements of human security also need to be examined, particularly perceptions of otherness that lead to sectarian sensibilities. Also important are mutual threat perceptions that foster and perpetuate security dilemma.

This chapter examines the foreign policies of six key actors in the Persian Gulf in light of middle power rivalries and sectarian tensions. The actors include Iran and Saudi Arabia, which the chapter ...
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This chapter examines the foreign policies of six key actors in the Persian Gulf in light of middle power rivalries and sectarian tensions. The actors include Iran and Saudi Arabia, which the chapter argues are today perhaps the Middle East’s most significant middle powers, in addition to Turkey of course. There are two other states in the area with aspirations of being middle powers, namely Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, despite their small geographic size and equally small populations.Less

The Belligerents

Mehran Kamrava

Published in print: 2018-05-15

This chapter examines the foreign policies of six key actors in the Persian Gulf in light of middle power rivalries and sectarian tensions. The actors include Iran and Saudi Arabia, which the chapter argues are today perhaps the Middle East’s most significant middle powers, in addition to Turkey of course. There are two other states in the area with aspirations of being middle powers, namely Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, despite their small geographic size and equally small populations.

A number of developments have combined to make the Persian Gulf’s security dilemma intractable and self-sustaining. These have been both structural—a product of the larger geostrategic environment ...
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A number of developments have combined to make the Persian Gulf’s security dilemma intractable and self-sustaining. These have been both structural—a product of the larger geostrategic environment within which the region finds itself—and derived from the policy choices of state actors both within and outside of the region. To begin with, vast geographic discrepancies between much larger, poorer states, alongside small super-rich mini-states have made the Persian Gulf region an enduring conflict zone. The very nature of the phenomenon of security dilemma, namely its self-sustaining and self-perpetuating character, has also been highly consequential. Finally, the region’s security dilemma derives from a basic lack of trust among the actors involved in the region, regardless of whether of not they form alliances over specific issues.Less

The Intractable Security Dilemma

Mehran Kamrava

Published in print: 2018-05-15

A number of developments have combined to make the Persian Gulf’s security dilemma intractable and self-sustaining. These have been both structural—a product of the larger geostrategic environment within which the region finds itself—and derived from the policy choices of state actors both within and outside of the region. To begin with, vast geographic discrepancies between much larger, poorer states, alongside small super-rich mini-states have made the Persian Gulf region an enduring conflict zone. The very nature of the phenomenon of security dilemma, namely its self-sustaining and self-perpetuating character, has also been highly consequential. Finally, the region’s security dilemma derives from a basic lack of trust among the actors involved in the region, regardless of whether of not they form alliances over specific issues.

The advent of recording and broadcast technologies had a profound impact on music making in the Arab Persian Gulf. Unlike many other parts of the world, however, the arrival of mass-mediated music ...
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The advent of recording and broadcast technologies had a profound impact on music making in the Arab Persian Gulf. Unlike many other parts of the world, however, the arrival of mass-mediated music accompanied a period of dramatic economic, social, and political transformation in the region. This chapter presents an overview of mass media technologies, their musical ramifications, and the interplay of music in mass media with concurrent societal developments from the early twentieth century to the present. Although today the Gulf has become synonymous with oil and wealth, the region was very different at the beginning of the twentieth century, when pearling, date farming, and long-distance trade dominated the local economy. Most of the music traditions involved in mass-mediated music in the Gulf are either urban traditions or urban versions of maritime or Bedouin music.Less

Mass Media and Music in the Arab Persian Gulf

Michael Frishkopf

Published in print: 2010-11-15

The advent of recording and broadcast technologies had a profound impact on music making in the Arab Persian Gulf. Unlike many other parts of the world, however, the arrival of mass-mediated music accompanied a period of dramatic economic, social, and political transformation in the region. This chapter presents an overview of mass media technologies, their musical ramifications, and the interplay of music in mass media with concurrent societal developments from the early twentieth century to the present. Although today the Gulf has become synonymous with oil and wealth, the region was very different at the beginning of the twentieth century, when pearling, date farming, and long-distance trade dominated the local economy. Most of the music traditions involved in mass-mediated music in the Gulf are either urban traditions or urban versions of maritime or Bedouin music.

This chapter examines the unilateral American strategy of primacy in the Strait of Hormuz that borders Iran. It begins with a vignette about sea-basing. It notes the historic justification for the ...
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This chapter examines the unilateral American strategy of primacy in the Strait of Hormuz that borders Iran. It begins with a vignette about sea-basing. It notes the historic justification for the Navy’s presence (to ensure the flow of oil to the US and uninterrupted commercial shipping) and describes how American behavior has been, and remains, consistent with that strategy. Then is goes on to note the decline in the importance of those factors – and discusses (paradoxically) why the US continues the strategy (as potential leverage against China which still requires Gulf oil).Less

A Maritime Strategy of Primacy in the Persian Gulf

Simon ReichPeter Dombrowski

Published in print: 2018-01-15

This chapter examines the unilateral American strategy of primacy in the Strait of Hormuz that borders Iran. It begins with a vignette about sea-basing. It notes the historic justification for the Navy’s presence (to ensure the flow of oil to the US and uninterrupted commercial shipping) and describes how American behavior has been, and remains, consistent with that strategy. Then is goes on to note the decline in the importance of those factors – and discusses (paradoxically) why the US continues the strategy (as potential leverage against China which still requires Gulf oil).

Price-Smith argues that US foreign energy policy frequently exhibits a fundamentally illiberal character, and this is particularly true of US military actions taken in the domain of energy. He ...
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Price-Smith argues that US foreign energy policy frequently exhibits a fundamentally illiberal character, and this is particularly true of US military actions taken in the domain of energy. He advances several specific arguments; that material forces exert an enormous (but often ignored) influence on the United States’ security decision making and on its grand strategy; Perceptions and misperceptions regarding the availability of energy (e.g., oil) affect decision making, and may result in deviations from rationality that contribute to the onset of conflicts, such as the United States’ problematic decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Moreover, Price-Smith argues that oil acts as a mechanism that exacerbates the security dilemma in the Persian Gulf. Oil resources serve as a target of aggression, and revenue flows from oil foster militarization and intensify a regional arms race that has sporadically resulted in powerful manifestations of inter-state violence. However, Price-Smith argues against the common wisdom that scarcity of oil will impel conflicts between the Great Powers. Instead, he argues that the Great Powers are pursuing a strategy of asymmetrical conflict against weaker states in the early 21st century, and that this is associated with a desire to attain mastery over energy resources.Less

Oil and International Security

Andrew T. Price-Smith

Published in print: 2015-05-29

Price-Smith argues that US foreign energy policy frequently exhibits a fundamentally illiberal character, and this is particularly true of US military actions taken in the domain of energy. He advances several specific arguments; that material forces exert an enormous (but often ignored) influence on the United States’ security decision making and on its grand strategy; Perceptions and misperceptions regarding the availability of energy (e.g., oil) affect decision making, and may result in deviations from rationality that contribute to the onset of conflicts, such as the United States’ problematic decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Moreover, Price-Smith argues that oil acts as a mechanism that exacerbates the security dilemma in the Persian Gulf. Oil resources serve as a target of aggression, and revenue flows from oil foster militarization and intensify a regional arms race that has sporadically resulted in powerful manifestations of inter-state violence. However, Price-Smith argues against the common wisdom that scarcity of oil will impel conflicts between the Great Powers. Instead, he argues that the Great Powers are pursuing a strategy of asymmetrical conflict against weaker states in the early 21st century, and that this is associated with a desire to attain mastery over energy resources.

Since the early years of the twentieth century, the Persian Gulf has been viewed as a strategically vital waterway, both for the global economy in general and for the continued prosperity of advanced ...
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Since the early years of the twentieth century, the Persian Gulf has been viewed as a strategically vital waterway, both for the global economy in general and for the continued prosperity of advanced economies in particular. In the process, the region has become an arena for the emergence of multiple and often overlapping security challenges, many of them indigenous to the area and many imported from abroad. Up until the 2011 Arab uprisings, most of these security challenges revolved around territorial, political, and military competitions and conflicts within and between actors from the region itself and from the outside. While threats and challenges to human security were also present, they were often overshadowed by more immediate and more tangible threats to territorial sovereignty and those posed by various forms of political and military competition between state actors.Less

Insecurity in the Persian Gulf

Mehran Kamrava

Published in print: 2018-05-15

Since the early years of the twentieth century, the Persian Gulf has been viewed as a strategically vital waterway, both for the global economy in general and for the continued prosperity of advanced economies in particular. In the process, the region has become an arena for the emergence of multiple and often overlapping security challenges, many of them indigenous to the area and many imported from abroad. Up until the 2011 Arab uprisings, most of these security challenges revolved around territorial, political, and military competitions and conflicts within and between actors from the region itself and from the outside. While threats and challenges to human security were also present, they were often overshadowed by more immediate and more tangible threats to territorial sovereignty and those posed by various forms of political and military competition between state actors.

This chapter, together with the next, examine the implementation of the British withdrawal, which in the end accompanied the emergence of the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar in international society. In ...
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This chapter, together with the next, examine the implementation of the British withdrawal, which in the end accompanied the emergence of the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar in international society. In January 1968, nine ‘Protected States’ stood in parallel to each other. Within four years, they had to decide in what shape they were going to become fully-fledged sovereign states. Were the nine going to amalgamate into one, two, three or even four separate entities? Even though the British retreat was decided for short-term domestic reasons, it was to have a more profound – even ‘epochal’ – effect than most could foresee at the time. The Gulf rulers’ initial response to decide their own fate was quick, but ultimately unsuccessful.Less

Dilemmas and delay, 1968–70

Shohei Sato

Published in print: 2016-02-01

This chapter, together with the next, examine the implementation of the British withdrawal, which in the end accompanied the emergence of the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar in international society. In January 1968, nine ‘Protected States’ stood in parallel to each other. Within four years, they had to decide in what shape they were going to become fully-fledged sovereign states. Were the nine going to amalgamate into one, two, three or even four separate entities? Even though the British retreat was decided for short-term domestic reasons, it was to have a more profound – even ‘epochal’ – effect than most could foresee at the time. The Gulf rulers’ initial response to decide their own fate was quick, but ultimately unsuccessful.

Oil is one of the non-renewable resources available on the planet, and its scarcity is inevitable if the supply does not meet the growing demand in the current scenario, and it may even lead to ...
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Oil is one of the non-renewable resources available on the planet, and its scarcity is inevitable if the supply does not meet the growing demand in the current scenario, and it may even lead to “resource wars” among states in the coming years. This chapter considers the regions of the Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, and Pacific Rim and explores why resources have always been great motivators for war. It is also a concern that cooperation rule is the most vital national interest rather than conflict. The later parts of the chapter discuss future oil scarcity and competition; legal status in the oil-rich territory; agreements on pipeline locations and export routes; and new leadership in petroleum politics. The concluding part observes that in order to gain the oil resources and financial and economic benefits, interstate coordination is required, not violent conflict, so it is not worth fighting for oil.Less

Is Oil Worth Fighting For? Evidence from Three Cases

Christopher J. Fettweis

Published in print: 2011-03-18

Oil is one of the non-renewable resources available on the planet, and its scarcity is inevitable if the supply does not meet the growing demand in the current scenario, and it may even lead to “resource wars” among states in the coming years. This chapter considers the regions of the Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, and Pacific Rim and explores why resources have always been great motivators for war. It is also a concern that cooperation rule is the most vital national interest rather than conflict. The later parts of the chapter discuss future oil scarcity and competition; legal status in the oil-rich territory; agreements on pipeline locations and export routes; and new leadership in petroleum politics. The concluding part observes that in order to gain the oil resources and financial and economic benefits, interstate coordination is required, not violent conflict, so it is not worth fighting for oil.

Chapter 8 examines manumission documents created by British imperial authorities in the early twentieth century. It notes that in the Persian Gulf, slaves were freed under Islamic law or by British ...
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Chapter 8 examines manumission documents created by British imperial authorities in the early twentieth century. It notes that in the Persian Gulf, slaves were freed under Islamic law or by British consular officials on allegations of mistreatment. It recounts the life of Sultan bin Aman, an Ethiopian slave first freed by the British in Zanzibar, who traveled to the Persian Gulf and was re-enslaved, then manumitted again by the British. While enslaved, Sultan was permitted to transact business on his own account, and was quite successful until he lost his assets in a shipping accident and was declared bankrupt by an Arab creditors’ committee. He sought a manumission certificate from the British, but it did not help him. The account exposes the broad penumbra between slavery and freedom in the Persian Gulf, the impracticality of piecemeal manumissions, and the legal pluralism regarding Islamic and British laws governing slavery and bankruptcy.Less

Social Mobility in Indian Ocean Slavery : The Strange Career of Sultan bin Aman

Abdul Sheriff

Published in print: 2013-12-17

Chapter 8 examines manumission documents created by British imperial authorities in the early twentieth century. It notes that in the Persian Gulf, slaves were freed under Islamic law or by British consular officials on allegations of mistreatment. It recounts the life of Sultan bin Aman, an Ethiopian slave first freed by the British in Zanzibar, who traveled to the Persian Gulf and was re-enslaved, then manumitted again by the British. While enslaved, Sultan was permitted to transact business on his own account, and was quite successful until he lost his assets in a shipping accident and was declared bankrupt by an Arab creditors’ committee. He sought a manumission certificate from the British, but it did not help him. The account exposes the broad penumbra between slavery and freedom in the Persian Gulf, the impracticality of piecemeal manumissions, and the legal pluralism regarding Islamic and British laws governing slavery and bankruptcy.

The Persian Gulf has always been transnational or “glocal”, but the processes and mechanisms of transnationalization have changed in a way that has resulted in a morphological separation of ports ...
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The Persian Gulf has always been transnational or “glocal”, but the processes and mechanisms of transnationalization have changed in a way that has resulted in a morphological separation of ports from cities; a less integrated regional network of ports; and cities where homogeneity and unity, in terms of identity, class, and citizenship-status, are privileged and differences are rendered as threats that must be neutralized and controlled. This chapter offers a broad comparative perspective on the nature of urban forms and relationships at the beginning and end of the twentieth century in the Persian Gulf. It focuses on urban centers as “port cities” by considering how this form of urbanism has been revoked by and for new technologies, modes of accumulation, and forms of political control. The port cities of Basra, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas are used as examples to illustrate how these different cities have experienced similar, yet dramatic changes in their political economies.Less

From Port Cities to Cities with Ports : Toward a Multiscalar History of Persian Gulf Urbanism in the Twentieth Century

Arang Keshavarzian

Published in print: 2016-12-15

The Persian Gulf has always been transnational or “glocal”, but the processes and mechanisms of transnationalization have changed in a way that has resulted in a morphological separation of ports from cities; a less integrated regional network of ports; and cities where homogeneity and unity, in terms of identity, class, and citizenship-status, are privileged and differences are rendered as threats that must be neutralized and controlled. This chapter offers a broad comparative perspective on the nature of urban forms and relationships at the beginning and end of the twentieth century in the Persian Gulf. It focuses on urban centers as “port cities” by considering how this form of urbanism has been revoked by and for new technologies, modes of accumulation, and forms of political control. The port cities of Basra, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas are used as examples to illustrate how these different cities have experienced similar, yet dramatic changes in their political economies.

Certain Arab cities of the Persian Gulf have emerged as models to which the other cities of Middle East are aspiring. This chapter identifies three ideal types of port cities across the Persian Gulf, ...
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Certain Arab cities of the Persian Gulf have emerged as models to which the other cities of Middle East are aspiring. This chapter identifies three ideal types of port cities across the Persian Gulf, namely company towns, secondary cities, and aspiring global cities. It is argued that the aspiring global cities predominate the life of the entire country and overshadow all other urban formations by being the main recipients of public and private attention and resources. As a consequence, the potential significance of secondary cities and company towns both at home and abroad is impeded due to policy neglect and inadequate resources. In the course of the discussion, this chapter also illustrates that active engagement with and participation in globalization may have propelled these cities into a higher plain of infrastructural development and modern urbanism; but it has also brought massive migration of laborers in search of employment and unsettling levels of demographic imbalance.Less

Contemporary Port Cities in the Persian Gulf : Local Gateways and Global Networks

Mehran Kamrava

Published in print: 2016-12-15

Certain Arab cities of the Persian Gulf have emerged as models to which the other cities of Middle East are aspiring. This chapter identifies three ideal types of port cities across the Persian Gulf, namely company towns, secondary cities, and aspiring global cities. It is argued that the aspiring global cities predominate the life of the entire country and overshadow all other urban formations by being the main recipients of public and private attention and resources. As a consequence, the potential significance of secondary cities and company towns both at home and abroad is impeded due to policy neglect and inadequate resources. In the course of the discussion, this chapter also illustrates that active engagement with and participation in globalization may have propelled these cities into a higher plain of infrastructural development and modern urbanism; but it has also brought massive migration of laborers in search of employment and unsettling levels of demographic imbalance.

Summarizes the central arguments of the books and presents its main thesis, namely that the Persian Gulf’s security arrangements feature a number of dynamics that make it unstable and insecure. These ...
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Summarizes the central arguments of the books and presents its main thesis, namely that the Persian Gulf’s security arrangements feature a number of dynamics that make it unstable and insecure. These include emphasis on hard security and neglect of human security, overreliance on the US as an outside balancer, the pervasiveness of security dilemma, and the wilful actions of regional policymakers.Less

Introduction

Mehran Kamrava

Published in print: 2018-05-15

Summarizes the central arguments of the books and presents its main thesis, namely that the Persian Gulf’s security arrangements feature a number of dynamics that make it unstable and insecure. These include emphasis on hard security and neglect of human security, overreliance on the US as an outside balancer, the pervasiveness of security dilemma, and the wilful actions of regional policymakers.