Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Shumaker,
Judge; and Huspeni, Judge.*

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KLAPHAKE, Judge

Appellant
Schnaut Deante Currie appeals from his conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1(b), 2(b) (2004), arguing that the district
court erred by refusing to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless
search of his automobile. Because police
had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity that permitted
expansion of the search beyond the initial stop, we affirm.

D E C I S I O N

Warrantless searches are considered to be per se
unreasonable under both U. S. Const. amend. IV and Minn. Const. art. I, § 10,
subject to a few exceptions. This court
reviews de novo the district court’s pretrial order regarding suppression of
evidence to determine whether the district court erred as a matter of law in
making its decision. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359
(Minn. 2004).

Police may make a limited investigative stop if they have
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal
activity, and the reasonable suspicion is based on more than a whim or a
hunch. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). The United States Supreme Court has
determined that an individual committing even a minor criminal offense in the
presence of an officer may be arrested and searched. See
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557
(2001). The Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, has construed the Minnesota Constitution as offering greater
protection than the United States Constitution for such searches. State
v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Minn. 2005). Thus, “the scope and duration of a traffic
stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop.” State v.
Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003).
Each expansion of a stop beyond the original purpose must be justified
by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of additional criminal activity. Burbach,
706 N.W.2d at 488. The reviewing court
determines whether the police had a reasonable justification to make or expand a
stop based on the totality of the circumstances. Id.
at 488-89.

Generally, police may not conduct a full search of a
driver or vehicle during a routine stop for a minor traffic offense. See,
e.g., Fort, 660 N.W.2d at 419; State
v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 1998). But

[a] protective search of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be
placed or hidden, is permissible if the officer possesses a reasonable belief,
based on specific and articulable facts, that the suspect is dangerous and may
gain immediate control of a weapon.

State v. Waddell, 655 N.W.2d 803, 810 (Minn. 2003). In allowing this expansion of the scope of a
stop, this court relied on Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), where the United States
Supreme Court held that police may search an automobile upon the reasonable and
articulable belief that the suspect is dangerous and could gain immediate control
of a weapon. Id. at 1049, 103 S. Ct. at 3481.
The Supreme Court concluded that even if a suspect has been removed from
the vehicle, a search may be based on the reasonable belief that the suspect
poses a danger if permitted to reenter the vehicle. Id.
at 1050-52, 103 S. Ct. at 3481-82.

Police initially stopped appellant for traffic
violations, which generally limits the grounds for search and seizure of the
suspect. See, e.g., Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365 (“[W]e conclude that the
lack of a driver’s license, by itself, is not a reasonable basis for confining
a driver in a squad car’s locked back seat when the driver is stopped for a
minor traffic offense”); Varnado, 582
N.W.2d at 891 (same). On the other hand,
the initial traffic violation was minor in both Askerooth (failure to stop at a stop sign) and Varnado (cracked windshield).
Here, police observed an escalating series of traffic violations,
including equipment violations, failing to signal a turn, driving at 50 miles
per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour-zone, failing to stop at two stop signs, and
accelerating over speed bumps. This conduct
is more serious than a minor driving violation.
Cf. State v. George, 557
N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1997) (noting that “very few drivers can traverse any
appreciable distance without violating some traffic regulation”). Thus, the number of violations raised a heightened
degree of suspicion in the officers observing the conduct.

Three officers testified that they directed a spotlight
on appellant’s vehicle as they pulled it over, and they observed him make
movements that suggested he was either concealing something or removing
something from a hiding place. This
conduct supports their decision to remove appellant and his passengers from the
car, frisk them, and place them in squad cars or handcuff them. This conduct also supports their reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle could contain weapons or contraband, permitting them
to search the car in the interest of officer safety.

The closer question is whether it was reasonable for
police, in the person of Officer Smith, to conduct what was essentially a
second search. By the time Smith
arrived, the officers who had been on the scene earlier had searched the car. Smith, who recognized one passenger as a known
gang member, glanced at the open door and noted what appeared to be an
alteration of the armrest/door handle area, which aroused his suspicion enough
to gently move the armrest, causing a gun to fall out.

While this is a close case, each incremental step
escalating the stop is supported by additional facts based on police observation. We conclude that these observations supported
the further intrusions and that the district court did not err by refusing to
suppress the evidence discovered by police.

Pro se Issues

Appellant raises a number of
issues in a pro se brief filed with the court.
Appellant appears to raise a sufficiency of the evidence argument,
stating that the photographs presented to the court were inaccurate, raising
some factual discrepancies, and arguing that the gun had no fingerprints. Once a defendant has proceeded to trial on
stipulated facts in order to challenge a suppression issue, he may not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
State v. Busse, 644 N.W.2d 79,
88-89 (Minn. 2002).

Appellant also insists that the squad car that originally
stopped him should have been equipped with video, basing his claim on Minn.
Stat. § 626.9517 (2006), which permits the commissioner of public safety to
make grants to put video equipment in squad cars for a racial profiling
study. Police testified that the squad car
did not contain video equipment; there is no legal requirement that squad cars
be equipped with video equipment.