Abstract : This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF's role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a notional air component commander's campaign planning organization and describes the individual branch's responsibilities and products. The largest implication of this notional organization is the requirement to possess a strategy cell with immediate, direct, and continual access to the JFACC, to develop an overall framework for the rest of the combat planning organization. Using this notional planning organization as a template, this study also examines CENTAF's current combat planning staff. The conclusion is that although CENTAF has made inroads into improving the efficiency or 'doing things right' of campaign planning, they still need to improve the effectiveness or 'doing the right things' of their efforts. The final section of this study examines several solutions to this shortfall and concludes that the mission of developing operational-level airpower strategies should remain at the air component commands.