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THICK CONCEPTS, REFLECTION,
AND THE LOSS OF ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE
by
Francis J. Pryor V
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PHILOSOPHY)
December 2009
Copyright 2009 Francis J. Pryor V

My dissertation defends two controversial and seemingly incompatible theses, both drawn from the moral philosophy of Bernard Williams. The first is that a type of ethical knowledge is possible. The second is that such knowledge can be undermined by certain forms of critical reflection. Both of these claims are tied closely to the possibility of there being (what are sometimes called) ‘thick’ ethical concepts: ethical concepts whose application is guided by users’ perceptions of acts and situations, and which can also guide their actions, by providing them with practical reasons of various sorts. The knowledge that comes with the disposition to actively use a thick concept is that certain defeasible practical reasons follow from the facts of a situation which determine whether such a concept should apply.; In Chapters 1 and 2, I critically discuss several views as to how we should understand the nature of thick concepts, and consider, in particular, the question of whether the factual characteristics associated with a thick concept are logically independent of the practical and evaluative reasons that such a concept is thought to give rise to. I argue that they are not. In Chapter 3, I develop an account of why this is so, focusing on how such concepts come to be developed in the first place. Their development, I claim, is driven by antecedent interests that a group has in regulating social interactions. Certain characteristics of acts and individuals are selected by a group for special recognition, be it positive or negative, because encouraging or discouraging such characteristics accords with other interests and concerns that group has. These antecedent interests have an explanatory role to play both in the selection of the factual characteristic, and in the practical status granted it. Because of this, thick concepts cannot be properly understood without a grasp of the reasons why such characteristics were selected for recognition.; In Chapter 4, I explain and defend Bernard Williams’ claim that, although thick concepts can provide a type of ethical knowledge, such knowledge is not of an objective subject matter. Here I defend Williams’ views on objectivity against the criticism that this position amounts to an objectionable form of metaphysical realism. In contrast, I argue that Williams’ idea of an objective subject matter should not be construed in realist terms at all, but rather as something importantly related to whether we can explain why certain judgments are correct or erroneous in a manner that is neither vacuous nor inherently question-begging. Finally, in Chapter 5, I return to the account of thick concepts started in Chapter 3, and defend Williams claim that the knowledge these concepts provide can indeed be undermined by critical reflection. The knowledge under a thick concept can be undermined when the capacity for believing the judgments involving that concept is lost. Reflective questions on whether a thick concept is the right or best one to use (as a means for regulating social interactions) cannot be answered affirmatively in a non-vacuous, non-question begging way, and an awareness of this can erode one’s confidence in the judgments which deploy that concept. I end the dissertation by considering the more positive role that critical reflection has in Williams’ thought, as something that serves a desire for transparency in the reasons why a group accepts or identifies with the use of a thick concept as an appropriate means for regulating social life.

THICK CONCEPTS, REFLECTION,
AND THE LOSS OF ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE
by
Francis J. Pryor V
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PHILOSOPHY)
December 2009
Copyright 2009 Francis J. Pryor V