Table of Contents

Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger: “Possible Responses to Enemy Activity in South Vietnam” (1969)

Agenda and Testimony of William Colby (1970)

Quang Nam Province: Phoenix/Phung Hoang Briefing (1970)

Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources

Secondary Sources

About the Author

Fritz Fischer is a Professor of History and Director of History Education at the University of Northern Colorado. He is the 1998 recipient of the College of Arts and Sciences award for outstanding teaching and the recipient of the Mortar Board Outstanding Teacher Award in 2003 and 2006.

The Tet Offensive

A Complicated Story Simplified

The Tet Offensive has become enshrined as THE turning point of the American war in Vietnam. Secondary school textbooks, whether written for students at the most introductory level or designed for AP students, argue that the Tet Offensive was the turning point of the war. Most American history textbooks use the actual phrase “turning point” in reference to the Tet Offensive and put the term in bold letters or use this phrase as a sub-chapter heading. The textbooks also argue that the war after Tet was characterized by little more than a tapering off of American involvement.

The aftermath of “Tet” did indeed contribute to a shock to the American political system and new thinking about the war effort. In framing the Tet Offensive in this way, however, the texts ignore key changes in military and political prosecution of the war, critically important facts and significant ideas related to the war. Such omissions distort the story of Vietnam in such a way as to make it difficult for students to understand the relationship of the Vietnam experience to the history of American involvement in the rest of the world, both before the Vietnam War and in events since.

The Role of the Tet Offensive in the Narrative

The extent and the fury of these attacks initially took the US military and their South Vietnamese allies off guard

The Tet Offensive was indeed significant in the story of Vietnam. In an attempt to bring the war to a swift conclusion and to foment a general uprising in the south, the Viet Cong (actually the “NLF,” National Liberation Front, known to the U.S. as the “VC”) and the North Vietnamese Army organized a series of surprise attacks throughout South Vietnam during the celebration of the Vietnamese New Year (Tet) in late January, 1968. The extent and the fury of these attacks initially took the US military and their South Vietnamese allies off guard, belying the argument being made to the American public that there was “light at the end of the tunnel,” that the war was soon to be won.

Footage of the U.S. embassy staff in retreat on the very embassy grounds and photographs of executions on the streets (see Primary Source “South Vietnamese Officer Executes a Viet Cong Prisoner” Photograph [1968]) contributed to a sense that Tet signaled a final failure of the American strategy. Appropriately, all the textbooks discuss this sense of psychological defeat as well as the significant political fallout, most especially Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to run for re-election.

Textbooks typically discuss the argument currently accepted by most historians that Tet represented a military defeat for the Viet Cong. Yet the textbooks also lead the reader to the conclusion that Tet led the U.S. to turn from one way of war, the U.S. attempt to “win,” to another, the U.S. decision leave.

The War After 1968

None of the secondary school textbooks discuss the Vietnam War itself during the remaining 10 months of 1968, and few discuss the war at all in 1969 or early 1970. All begin with a new chapter after the U.S. election of 1968.

Richard Nixon becomes merely the caretaker of this attenuated effort

In the American Anthem (Holt/Rienhart Winston), the main idea of the next chapter is “President Nixon eventually ended U.S. involvement in Vietnam.” The post–Tet chapter in U.S. History (Prentice Hall) is entitled “The War’s End and Impact.” In the American Journey (McGraw Hill), the main idea in the post 1968 section is that “Nixon took steps to bring American forces home and end the war in Vietnam.” All of the books focus on Nixon’s call for “Peace with Honor” and his policy of “Vietnamization,” a policy designed to decrease U.S. troop numbers while increasing the number of soldiers in the South Vietnamese military.

In the overall narrative of Vietnam, the U.S. involvement is characterized by a steady build-up before Tet, the turning point of Tet and then a winding down after Tet. Richard Nixon becomes merely the caretaker of this attenuated effort, and it thus appears to the reader as if nothing much happened in Vietnam after Tet. Not only is such a narrative overly simplistic, it ignores critically important events, ideas, and historical changes that need to be taught as central aspects of the Vietnam War.

The traditional narrative that Tet was only the beginning of the end is too simplistic

After Tet, American soldiers still fought in Vietnam for a full five years. This is longer than the duration of any other war in U.S. history except the American Revolution and, not coincidentally, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just under half the deaths suffered by U.S. forces in the entire Vietnam War were suffered after Tet, meaning they were suffered after the narrative suggests the war was winding down (see Primary Source Combat Area Casualties [1998]).

Interestingly, one textbook, The Americans (McDougall) includes a chart that shows that more ordnance was dropped on the enemy by U.S. forces in the time period AFTER Tet than in all of World War II on both fronts. Ironically, this chart is included in the post-1968 section under the title “The End of the War and its Legacy.” If all that happened in the April 1968-1973 period was to end the war in Vietnam, why would so many bombs have been dropped? If Nixon’s only real policy was “Vietnamization,” why would so many U.S. troops have been killed? And if everything after Tet was merely the conclusion of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, why would so many significant historical events have happened in this time period?

Clearly, although Tet was important, the traditional narrative that it was only the beginning of the end is too simplistic. The story of Tet and its part in the greater narrative is instead one of “confusion, controversy and indeterminacy.”

For example, many of the textbooks argue or at least imply that Tet led to the peace movement and the peace movement, starting in April 1968, led to the end of the war. U.S. History (Prentice Hall) begins its post-Tet chapter (“The War’s End and it’s Impact”) under the picture of a peace march, leaving the impression of a clear connection.

Yet those in charge of the military after 1968 (Richard Nixon and the military leaders on the ground) had a very different view. Nixon believed that “Tet so thinned the NLF presence in the countryside as to provide a basis for successful pacification managed by American advisors" (see Primary Source Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger: “Possible Responses to Enemy Activity in South Vietnam” [1969]). According to historian Lewis Sorley, the American military leadership believed that “the fighting wasn’t over, but the war was won in 1970.” Something quite different was happening than a full-scale retreat from the war caused by a Tet-induced peace movement.

Military Policy

That "something" was a military policy initiated after Tet in 1968 that was wholeheartedly endorsed by Richard Nixon: the policy of “pacification.” According to Ronald Spector in After Tet, “developments in South Vietnam (in the April-December 1968 period) were far more important in shaping the course of the war for the next five years than anything done in Washington during February and March" (see Primary Source Agenda and Testimony of William Colby [1970]).

It did change the method of warfare

During this time period, the U.S. helped to fashion “Operation Phoenix,” a counterinsurgency program to be carried out by the South Vietnamese armed forces with the training, support, and advice of the U.S. military. This program called for the “neutralization” of NLF forces in the countryside and often resulted in the kidnapping, imprisonment, and assassination of suspected insurgents. “Operation Phoenix” and its attendant political work in the countryside served as the lynchpin of U.S. policy from 1968-1973 (see Primary Source Quang Nam Province: Phoenix/Phung Hoang Briefing [1970]).

None of the textbooks mention pacification or Operation Phoenix, an omission that needs to be remedied. Combined with use of American technological force in the form of strategic bombing and the mining of harbors, this policy of counterinsurgency was designed to force the North Vietnamese to bargain and result in a new kind of American victory.

There is more to the story, and it is the story of pacification and counterinsurgency

Historians and policy analysts debate the effectiveness of this policy, but there is no question that Nixon and the military leadership believed in it. Tet did not cause the war to wind down. It did change the method of warfare, moving away from Westmoreland’s tactics of “search and destroy” towards a late 20th-century version of counterinsurgency.

Expanding the Narrative

It is important to move beyond the traditional and overly simplistic narrative of Vietnam that includes Tet as the turning point towards a “winding down” of the war. All of the textbooks mention My Lai and the invasion of Cambodia in their sections after Tet, but how are students to understand these events if they are in a section about retreat from the war? Why would the U.S. escalate the scope and brutality of the war if it was merely ending?

There is more to the story, and it is the story of pacification and counterinsurgency. And this story is critical in the larger story of U.S. history. It connects to a long story of U.S. interaction with the rest of the world, from involvement in the Filipino-American war to the 21st century wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Vietnam as a story is always subsumed into a story of the 1960s rather than standing alone as an example of U.S. involvement in the rest of the world. WWI and WWII are not presented in the textbooks this way…why is Vietnam? Tet might have indeed been a turning point, but in a much different and more complex way than presented in the textbooks. And this more complicated, engaging, and frightening story needs to be taught if students today are going to understand more completely the wars they themselves might be asked to fight.

Annotation

This has become for many the iconic vision of the confusion and failure of the U.S. adventure in Vietnam. It depicts the Chief of the South Vietnamese national police force, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, summarily executing a suspected Viet Cong insurgent on the streets of Saigon during the Tet offensive. Eddie Adams won the Pulitzer Prize for this shot. Such seemingly gratuitous violence, splashed across the American media during the month of the Tet Offensive, convinced many American leaders, including President Johnson, that the war was a dangerous lost cause. Such beliefs contributed to the argument that Tet was the beginning of the end of U.S. involvement, despite the fact that the war lasted five more grueling and bloody years for American soldiers.

Primary Source(s)

Combat Area Casualties (1998)

Annotation

This chart shows the number of deaths recorded each year of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The chart records those who actually died each year, although some of the deaths occurred after the year in which the soldier was wounded. Nevertheless, the chart is noteworthy because it displays the large number of U.S. soldiers who died after the Tet Offensive, the vast majority of whom became casualties after the Tet Offensive.

Primary Source(s)

Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger: “Possible Responses to Enemy Activity in South Vietnam” (1969)

Annotation

The Nixon Library is in the midst of declassifying and digitizing a number of fascinating and interesting documents, a number of which pertain to Nixon’s policies towards Vietnam. This is a memo written by then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to President Nixon on March 4, 1969, a full year after the Tet Offensive. Kissinger passes along a second memo written by Melvin Laird that suggests “countermeasures” to be taken to thwart North Vietnamese actions. The memo defends the “high level of effort” being used against the enemy.

Primary Source(s)

Excerpt fromMemorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger:
March 4, 1969
Top Secret
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
From: Henry A. Kissenger
Subject: Possible Response to Enemy Activity in South Vietnam

Attached is a memorandum from Mel Laird summarizing his views on the nature of the North Vietnamese offensive and his appraisal on counter-actions which might be undertaken.
Mel is anxious that you have this memorandum to his departure for Europe.

Attachment(Note: see link in the "Citation" section for the full, declassified, typed memo.)

Agenda and Testimony of William Colby (1970)

Annotation

Texas Tech University has collected a treasure trove of primary sources from the Vietnam War in its “Vietnam Center and Archive.” This document is testimony from William Colby, the Director of CORDS, “Civil Operations and Development Support” in February of 1970 (two years after Tet). CORDS was the central bureaucracy responsible for directing all counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, including the Phoenix program. This testimony argues that the U.S. and South Vietnamese have been “increasing their understanding of and forging the tools necessary to fight on several levels of the people’s war.” It is not accidental that Colby later became a central figure in American international policymaking, including service as Director of the CIA. For classroom use, excerpts from page 1, 2, 5; 13-14; 17-19 work well. Pagination refers to document page numbers, not PDF pagination.

Primary Source(s)

OPENING STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR W.E. COLBY FOR THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 17 FEBRUARY 1970(page 1)
Mr. Chairman:
The leaders of the North Vietnam call the conflict in Vietnam a People's War. They saw it as a new technique of war, one which would enable them to win despite greater military power on the side of the government and its allies. They believed they could seize control of the population and pull it from under the government structure, causing its collapse. For a time, it looked as though they might be correct. Their power steadily built up during the organizational phase of their effort during the late 1950's through the guerrilla period of the early 1960's to the stage in late 1964 when they sent North Vietnamese units to prepare a final assault on the centers of government authority. They scenario was interrupted, however, when American combat forces entered in mid-1965 to keep final victory from their grasp.

Since 1965, the Vietnamese and American Governments have been increasing their understanding of and forging the tools necessary to fight on the several levels of a people's war. The organizational tools were developed , the personnel were indoctrinated and the strategy outlined by which such a war must be conducted. This was a gradual process to which many Vietnamese, Americans and other nationals contributed. The process is by no means complete. Even more important, much of the execution of the program on the ground still lies ahead and setbacks will occur. However, the fundamentals have been identified and the program is well launched. As a result, the war called a People's War by the Communists is being increasingly waged by the Vietnamese people,

(page 2)
defending themselves against Communist attack, terror and subversion and at the same time building a better future of their own choosing.
What I will describe is only a part of our effort to bring the war in Vietnam to an end. President Nixon has clearly set the policy which the program I will describe supports. The President has stated three ways by which our participation in the war can be reduced; negotiations, a reduction of violence by Hanoi, and a strengthening of the Vietnamese Government and the people, which we call Vietnamization. The program I will describe falls under the last. Its objective is an increase in South Vietnam's capacity to defend itself, thereby permitting a reduction of American participation in the war. The lessons we have learned in Vietnam can increase Vietnam's ability to defend itself.

The program is called Pacification and Development by the Government of Vietnam. It operates behind the shield of furnished by another aspect of our efforts in Vietnam, the military operations of the Vietnamese and allied armies. However bold, however well conceived, however logical this program, it has been amply proven that it cannot be effective unless hostile regiments and divisions are kept away. At the same time, however, we have found that their absence does not thereby produce peace nor offer political fulfillment to the people. While armies can repel armies, and can assist in the consolidation of security, the very power, organization and procedures, which are essential in large-scale combat make it difficult for them to fight on all the levels of the People's War. Thus additional tactics and techniques had to be developed to fight on these levels. Pacification and Development is this necessary counterpart to the military efforts of our forces in this new kind of war.

(page 5)
One of the major lessons about the People's War has been the key role the infrastructure play in it. This Communist apparatus has been operating in Vietnam for many years and is well practices in covert techniques. To fight the war on this level, the government developed a special program called PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX. The government has publicized the need for this effort to protect the people against terrorism and has called upon all the citizens to assist by providing information, and they are doing so.

Since this is a sophisticated and experienced enemy, experts are also needed to combat it. Thus the PHOENIX program started in mid-1968 to bring together police, the military and other government organizations to contribute knowledge and act against this enemy infrastructure. It secures information about the enemy organization, identifies the individuals who make it up and conducts operations against them. These operations might consist of two policemen walking down the street to arrest an individual revealed as a member of the enemy apparatus or they might involve a three battalion attack on a jungle hideout for a district or province committee. As a result of this program, members of this apparatus are captured, turn themselves in as ralliers or are killed in fire fights. More needs to be done for this program to be fully effective, but the government has a high priority on it. Our own government provides advisory assistance and support to this internal security program through the police, the administration, the information, services and the intelligence services. This is similar to our support of the military effort against the North Vietnamese battalions and Viet Cong guerrilla groups through the Vietnamese military forces.

(page 13-14)
In addition to these advisory teams, there are two special groups of personnel who participate in the pacification mission. Some of these are in Mobile Advisory Teams, or MATs. These are Army teams of two officers and three NCCs whose job is to live, work with the assist in the improvement of Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons. Another type of team involved in similar work is the US Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon or CAP. This consists of a squad of US Marines lead by their Squad Leader, assigned to work with a Vietnamese Popular Force platoon, living in the same area, patrolling and generally helping them with their job and to improve their performance. There are 353 MAT teams which include approximately 2,000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen. Both of these teams are used in certain areas for a period, with a special emphasis on upgrading the local Regional or Popular Force units with which they are working. When they reach a satisfactory position, the team is moved to another area to repeat the process with another unit. The planning, of course, is that they will gradually complete this job of upgrading and that the program will then be phased out, leaving the Vietnamese local force unit to continue without direct American involvement.

These are the American personnel who work directly in the pacification program and with CORDS. In addition, of course, many American units conduct pacification activities in their assigned areas. You have recently hear of the activities of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province. This is matched by a number of other American units which collaborate directly with Regional and Popular Force units to increase the effectiveness of these units and improve the territorial security of the area. The pacification program also profits from the many projects carried out by US units in the form of Civic

Action, many doctors from the Army, Navy and Air Force serve on special teams in province hospitals, and the Navy Seabees carry out many programs which both support pacification and train Vietnamese in skills for the future.
The funding of the CORDS operation comes from four sources, DOD's and AID's appropriations, AID's counterpart funds generated by imports, and the GVN's own budget from taxes, customs, and deficit financing. The greater portion of the expenditures by both the US and the GVN is used for the territorial forces and the police, with AID supporting development and refugee programs. Both the US and GVN have substantially increased their investments in pacification over the past several years, which is certainly a major reason for its improvement. The 1970 contributions are:
DOD $729 million
AID $48 million
Counterpart $114 million (equivalent)
GVN $627 million (equivalent)

As can be seen, in funding as in personnel, CORDS is an integration of the programs of several agencies. It was designed to meet a new situation on the ground and it cuts across many of our familiar civil-military or departmental distinctions. It has been called a Rube Goldberg creation and I suppose in many respects it is. The key point, however, is that it is working and that it works with the Vietnamese.
Because it is the relationship with the Vietnamese which will decide whether the program will work or fail, it cannot be American. Americans can assist the Vietnamese temporarily and can help them take over the full program. Our resources are important. Our imagination and our energy are also important. But we must address these to helping Vietnamese to do the job themselves. This process will be described in detail by the officers who are accompanying me:

(page 17-19)
. . . The enemy began a People's War of Insurgency and ended by conducting primarily a North Vietnamese Army invasion. The Government and its allies first tried to meet the attack with conventional forces and tactics but are now utilizing all the techniques and programs of a People's War.

As a result of this long process, in early 1970 the change in the countryside is there to be seen. Except in one or two areas, the large enemy battalions, regiments and divisions are in the border sanctuaries. The roads are open to many markets and, from the air, tin roofs sparkle throughout the countryside where families are once again tilling their long-abandoned farms. We have statistical measures of all of these changes, imperfect but the best we could develop. But the real difference can only be experienced by driving on the roads, visiting the markets, and by talking to a 12-year-old schoolgirl who informs you that she is again attending school in her village after a three year period in which none existed. A friend once complained that the pacification program does not produce dramatic results. from day to day it does not, but the difference in Vietnam from Tet of 1968 is certainly dramatic to the Vietnamese peasant.

There is more work to be done. At night there are still guerrillas in Vietnam, and the roads open in the day are deserted and dark, occasionally criss-crossed by contending local forces. The grenades still go off in the theaters or tea shops as the terrorist demonstrates his continued presence. Some officials have by no means caught the spirit of the village community and endeavor to assert their old Mandarinal privileges of dictation from above. There are still refugees and others whose lives have been blighted by the war who must be helped to a decent place in society. Most of all, North Vietnamese divisions are over the border or in jungle redoubts, and prepare for other sallies against South Vietnam.
At the beginning of 1970, however, there is a vast difference in the situation. The government is organized to conduct a People's War and is showing the leadership and drive to create a better and safer society for its citizens. Its 1970 Pacification and Development Plan is in many respects more venturesome and ambitious than the 1969 plan. Its key lies in consolidation of the admittedly thin layer of security established in many areas. It also sets high goals in political, economic and social development, not all of which may be reachable. In response to its leadership and its politics, however, its citizens are beginning to participate in self defense, self government and self development. And the Army has repelled North Vietnamese assaults at Bu Prang and Ben Het. It is by no means inevitable that this process must be reflected in new kinds of action in every hamlet and village in the land. This process has begun, but the future will include some dark days and even some local disasters. I believe, however, that a satisfactory outcome can be achieved so the Vietnamese people will have a free choice as to their future.
The outcome will depend more and more upon Vietnamese leadership upon Vietnamese commitment and even upon Vietnamese resources. We Americans have played a substantial role in learning about this new kind of war, but one of the lessons is that it must be waged by the people and not merely the government of Vietnam. The American contribution is personnel and in resources will gradually reduce, to be replaced by full mobilization of people willing to sacrifice to remain free and to carry out the programs to make these sacrifices meaningful.

The Vietnamese people and government are shouldering more of the load today than they did last year, and their plans and programs envisage a greater effort tomorrow. This is true in the military field; it is also true in the field of pacification and development. The lessons learned and applied about this new form of war are making the Vietnamese effort pay greater dividends in terms of local security, political support and hopes for peace. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the future of this program and of Vietnam, nor do I offer any pat solutions to difficult situations. I prefer to rely upon the determination of the Vietnamese people and government and of the Americans who are now assisting them to take over this job. I am privileged to present to you today several representative Americans with this determination, and I invite you to hear from them what we have learned about the Peoples' War and how it must be fought.

Quang Nam Province: Phoenix/Phung Hoang Briefing (1970)

Annotation

This document can also be found in the collections of the Texas Tech “Vietnam Center and Archive.” It is a fascinating, formerly classified evaluation of the actions of the Phoenix program in a province of Vietnam from November of 1970. The document describes the “neutralization” of 5,000 Viet Cong members in Quang Nam province. It also includes a number of detailed recommendations on how the South Vietnamese might improve counterinsurgency and police programs in the province. Almost three years after Tet, the U.S. remained heavily interested in and invested in the counterinsurgency programs in South Vietnam.

For classroom use, excerpts from pages 6-11 work well. Pagination refers to the PDF pages since there is no pagination in the document.

Primary Source(s)

DECLASSIFIEDCONFIDENTIAL
Contents on the Quang Nam Phung Hoang to be presented orally by the PSA

I. Introduction:
This briefing is addressed toward the Phung Hoang Program in Quang Nam Province; its strengths, weaknesses and recommendations for improvement. In support of this briefing, I have for you two staff studies concerning the transfer of responsibility for the attack on the VCI from the military police, and a summation of the status of the VCI program coordinator, and the other by the advisor to the national police.

II. Discussion:A. Status of the Phung Hoang1. General
The apparatus of the Phung Hoang (PIOCC and DIOCC's) has not achieved the goal that its name impies, IE, to be an Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center for the attack on the infrastructure. In most cases, the formal organization of the Phung Hoang have become repositories of information, useful for studies, but much like an archive. Often there is a failure to react to intelligence, or to develop the systemic pursuit of the VCI that the programs invisions.

2. Command Emphasis
The Heads of Vietnamese Agencies and military chiefs seem often not to understand or be interested in the program. The latter is not surprising in light of recent discoveries of fairly high level VC penetration of GVN agencies. Aside from that, Vietnamese agencies, perhaps as legacy of the French, are organized vertically with little impetus to communicate laterally at the lower levels. It is the objective of Phung Hoang to establish lateral lines of communications at the district and province level, in order to coordinate and exchange information while it is still timely. This runs contrary to the grain of Vietnamese organizations and experience, and it is little wonder that the Phung Hoang has not performed up to expectations in that regard. Official GVN declarations of support for the program are sincere, but follow up province and district chiefs and heads of agencies is spotty. Forceful leadership in this amalgamated organization is a basic necessity, but too often strong leaders are lacking that could make the system work.

3. Personnel
In most cases, the Vietnamese agencies have assigned competent personnel to work in the formal organizations of the Phung Hoang, but they are in need of more training. The U.S. Officers assigned to districts as Phoenix Coordinators are young with little intelligence experience. Only two of the eight District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC) Coordinators presently assigned in Quang Nam Province have had an intelligence assignment prior to their assignment to Vietnam. Most of them carry an MOS/9303, combat intelligence. Since the task of the DIOCC Coordinator is a dual one, IE, assisting the subsector S-2 in both military and political order of battle, an MOS/9301 is appropriate. However, the task of tracking VCI involves areas not normally expected of an officer trained in combat intelligence, and approximates the training given to a counter-intelligence officer, MOS/9666. Recent officer replacements have had language training, a positive factor for any advisor. What the junior officers at district level lack in experience and training is somewhat compensated for in enthusiasm and inventiveness. These qualities are extremely important in Vietnam where close control and uniformity of action is neither possible nor desirable. The newly assigned intelligence NCO's have a college education, and nearly all have a one year course in the Vietnamese language. The NCO's (many of them are still E-4's) carry a 975 MOS, counter-intelligence specialist. This compliments the training of the officer assigned as DIOCC coordinator, thereby adequately covering both military and political order of battle.

B. STRENGTHS:1. My intelligence officers tell me that even with the obvious shortcomings of the Phung Hoang Program, that lateral communications at province and district level have improved considerably since 1967. There is vastly improved flow of information, much of it due to the Phung Hoang Program.

2. the Phung Hoang has succeeded in mobilizing a large number of agencies in the attack on the VCI, heretofore indifferent to the threat or unable to participate in the attack.

3. The Phung Hoang Program has assisted in an understanding of the VCI threat as a common problem and initiated the beginnings of a coordinated attack against it.

4. Statistically, and visibly, the Phung Hoang Program has contributed to reducing the number of VCI and improved security. Over 5000 VCI have been neutralized in Quang Nam since the program's beginning in 1968. VC rice and tax collections are down, VC propaganda activities reduced, VC communications made more difficult, VC education and medical services reduced, and the VC legal system largely curtailed.

5. Recent specific examples of Phung Hoang successes include: HIEU NHOM DISTRICT DIOCC, 3 Nov 70, captured one PW, and in reacting to information provided by the PW, the DIOCC captured 37 VCI in Cam Ha village, thus effectively neutralizing the bulk of the VCI in that village. HIEU DUC DISTRICT DIOCC, 14-15 Nov 70, a DIOCC directed ambush succeeded in killing the VC security chief of Hoa Luong village and a female commoliason cadre, and wounding one VC security cadre. HIEU DUC DISTRICT DIOCC, 17 Nov 70, a second DIOCC directed ambush set up near the home of the security chief of Hoa Hung village was successful in killing the security chief and a supply cadre. DIEN BAN DISTRICT DIOCC, two successful roll-up operations were conducted in the past two months, however both were the result of an original chance capture, and not specific targeting. QUANG NAM PROVINCE, Jan to Nov 1970, averaging over 220 VCI neutralizations per month, the highest in the country, the majority being captured and rallied rather than killed. Specific targeting operations account for approximately 30% of all neutralizations in Que Son District.

C.WEAKNESSES:1. Cooperation between agencies in the attack on the VCI is incomplete and forced, and competition between agencies is occasionally encouraged.

2. GVM Command emphasis generally lacks follow-up. This results in inconsistant and spotty performance, with high points of activity immediately following the application of command emphasis.

3. Specific targeting ranges from fair to poor, with general targeting accounting for most neutralization.

4. There is a lack of aggressiveness in pursuing leads, levying EEI (Essential Elements of Information), and operational follow-up on good intelligence.

5. There is a lack of an aggressive DIOCC reaction arm. National Police Field Force (NPFF) units are limited as to methods and areas of permissable operation by guarantees made to Field Force Members on recruitment.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS:1. that GVM command emphasis be manifested by assigning the best possible people to the Phung Hoang Organization.

2. That one responsible individual be designated to run the DIOCC/PIOCC with sufficient rank (either police or military) to insure compliance to all orders without the necessity of channeling orders through agency heads.

3. that the administrative support (office supplies and money) now furnished by Phoenix to the formal Phung Hoang apparatus be phased-out, and an existing Vietnamese agency be tasked with providing that support.

4. That the police field force be modified to provide the district Phung Hoang apparatus with an effective reaction arm:

A. The NPF be placed directly under the control of the day-to-day chief of the DIOCC (see recommendation #2), without the requirement to channel all orders through he district police chief.
B. Revise the rules governing the NPFF to lift the limitations on their use.
C. Interogate the NPFF and the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.
D. Equip the NPFF with the hardwar (radios to net with military radios, weapons) leadership, and training (esspecially for Heliborne operations) to make them capable of operating anywhere in the province.

III. SUMMARY
That concludes my briefing, the question of police vs military control of the Phung Hoang Program and Apparatus is covered in detail in the two staff studies included in the briefing folder.

Secondary Source Annotated Bibliography

Ahern, Thomas, Jr., Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010. A history of counterinsurgency in Vietnam from a CIA “insider.”

Allison, William Thomas. The Tet Offensive: A Brief History with Documents. New York: Routledge, 2008. A general overview of Tet with important primary source documents.

Gilbert, Mark Jason and William Head, eds., The Tet Offensive. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. An edited collection that examines Tet from a number of different perspectives.

Oberdorfer, Don. Tet! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2001. This book presents the strongest argument for Tet as the turning point in the war.

Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988. The now-classic examination of the confusion and frustration facing American counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam.

Sorely, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam New York: Harcourt, 2007.Sorely offers a sympathetic treatment of U.S. policy after Tet, presenting a controversial argument that not only were the years after Tet important, they also provided a model that should have won the war.

Spector, Ronald H. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Vintage, 1994. One of the earliest works to examine U.S. policy after the Tet Offensive in any detail.

Willbanks, James. The Tet Offensive: A Concise History. New York: Columbia UP, 2007. A short yet complete and authoritative history of Tet.

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