Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Ankara's Shift towards Iraqi Kurdistan

KRG president Barzani and Turkish PM Erdogan

Guest contributor, Caitlin Scuderi, a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA, and a former Boren Fellow, has conducted extensive research in Turkey.

Given Turkey’s problems with its own Kurdish population,
Ankara’s shifting sentiments toward Iraqi Kurdistan might seem perplexing.
After all, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has been systematically stepping
up its terrorist activities in Turkey over the past 20 months. Between June 2011 and November 2012, at least
870 people were killed as a result of PKK violence.[1]

Despite this uptick in violence, Ankara has moved to
establish an ever stronger relationship with the semi-autonomous Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG), while simultaneously stoking the fire in its relationship
with the central government in Baghdad. What has prompted Ankara to develop a closer relationship
with Arbil?

There are several factors that have precipitated the change
in Turkey’s policy towards the KRG. First, there is the ongoing conflict between Turkey
and Iraq. Since the two states took different stances over Syria when it erupted
into civil conflict, the tension between them has been mounting.

These tensions were intensified when Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi on
terrorism charges.[2]
Hashimi sought refuge in Turkey, and when Ankara refused to extradite him,[3]
the relationship sunk to a new low. As Ankara continues to align itself with Arbil,
Baghdad has accused Turkey of unwarranted meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs
and has insisted that Turkey is refusing to extradite Hashimi with the intention
of provoking sectarian tensions.[4]

On top of the mounting conflict with Iraq, Turkey has
pursued closer relations with the KRG because it is an ally with Ankara against
the PKK. In response to Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition, Syrian
Prime Minister Bashar al-Assad effectively nodded to the Democratic Union Party
(PYD), the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, allowing them to operate in the region
without constraints by the regime. In addition to Syria, intelligence reports
indicate that Iran has been providing aid to the PKK in the form of shelter and
logistical support.[5]

The KRG, on the other hand, has long been a supporter of
Ankara in its quest against PKK terrorist activity. By banning pro-PKK
political parties, arresting PKK politicians, and closely monitoring PKK
activity in the region, the KRG has aligned itself with Ankara as it moves
forward in its anti-terror strategy.[6]

Perhaps the most important factor driving the closer ties
between Arbil and Ankara has been Turkey’s energy strategy. Currently, Turkey
obtains the overwhelming majority of its energy from Russia and Iran.[7]

Although historically Turkey has maintained good trade
relations with both countries, a number of factors have pushed Turkey to
attempt to diversify its energy suppliers. First, the latest wave of sanctions
on Iran has increased the costs for energy importers. Second, Turkey’s economy
has been growing at an increasingly rapid rate in recent years and its energy
demand is subsequently increasing as well.Finally, the ongoing conflict in Syria, and Turkey’s support of the
opposition, combined with the state’s reliance on Russia and Iran for energy,
leaves it in a potentially constrained diplomatic position.

Because of these reasons, the idea of closer ties with the
energy-rich KRG is appealing to Ankara. Iraq’s three Kurdish majority
governorates (provinces) sit atop significant and largely untapped oil and gas
reserves. In May 2012, Ankara and the KRG agreed to build one gas and two oil
pipelines directly from the Kurdistan region of Iraq to Turkey, bypassing areas
controlled by Baghdad.

In response, Baghdad threatened to veto the project. KRG
officials successfully held their ground.They pointed to the fact that Baghdad has failed to fulfill its
obligations as stipulated in the current revenue sharing agreement. The Iraqi
central government is required to share 17 percent of all oil revenue with the
KRG and to pay the costs of energy exploration projects in the region. Neither
of these conditions, according to the KRG, had been met by Baghdad.[8]

As Turkey and the KRG move closer to each other
diplomatically, it shouldn’t be assumed that the relationship will proceed
without obstacles. First, considerable distrust still exists between Ankara and
Arbil. From Ankara’s perspective, PKK
camps still exist in the KRG’s territory.

Conversely, Arbil knows that if it moves to quickly or too
closely in developing ties to Ankara, it
could provoke hostile action from Iran. The two actors also seem to have
different ideas when it comes to the future of Turkey-PKK relations. While the
KRG has made it clear that it wants Ankara to launch a dialogue with the PKK, it
is questionable whether this is a real possibility as Turkey approaches its
first-ever direct presidential election scheduled for 2014.[9]
In an effort to fortify his base of support, it is likely that Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan will feel compelled to enhance his nationalist credentials,
which will likely entail a staunch anti-PKK posture.

Politics aside, there are clear economic incentives for
Ankara and Arbil to pursue a closer relationship. For the KRG, exporting oil
and natural gas through Turkey rather than through Baghdad ensures much broader
access to the global economy. Turkey is much more politically stable and has
many more trade relationships to which the KRG could gain access compared to those
available to Baghdad.

Ankara has much to gain economically as well. By importing oil
and natural gas from the KRG directly into Turkey, the state has a huge
opportunity for further development projects that will be economically lucrative.

Whether the relationship between Ankara and Arbil will
continue to move forward without incident remains unclear. What is certain,
however, is that the relationship will continue to be affected by “neighborhood
effects,” specifically those including Syria, Iran, and of course, Iraq. In order to move forward in concert, both
Turkey and the KRG must remain cognizant of the relationships with their
neighbors and pursue avenues that allow for the deepening of their dyadic
relationship without sacrificing ties with other states in the region.

About Me

Eric Davis is Executive Director, MA Program in Political Science - Concentration in United Nations and Global Policy Studies, Professor of Political Science and the former director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA. He is author of CHALLENGING COLONIALISM: BANK MISR AND EGYPTIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1920-1941 (Princeton University Press, 1983; Institute for Arab Development, Beirut, 1986, and Dar al-Sharook, Cairo, 2009); STATECRAFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OIL, HISTORICAL MEMORY AND POPULAR CULTURE (University Presses of Florida, 1993); MEMORIES OF STATE: POLITICS, HISTORY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN MODERN IRAQ (University of California Press, 2005; Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 2008; and the forthcoming, TAKING DEMOCRACY SERIOUSLY IN IRAQ (Cambridge University Press). Currently, he is writing a book on the Islamic State and the changing modalities of terrorism in the Middle East. He can be contacted at davis@polisci.rutgers.edu and @NewMidEast