B. BAGHDAD 1733
Classified By: Senior Adviser Thomas Krajeski for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. Summary: (C) Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih (Kurd,
PUK) told Senior Adviser Krajeski on June 8 that he was
unhappy with United Nations Mission to Iraq (UNAMI)'s Phase I
reports on Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs), provided by
UNAMI to the Presidency Council, Prime Minister and Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister on June 5 (ref b).
He called the methodology "too broad" and not what he
expected, questioned the inclusion of Akre district and some
specific conclusions and said that he thought the reports
were too biased towards Sunni Arabs. Barham said the Kurdish
side was developing a response to UNAMI, but was hopeful that
while the Kurds would criticize the report, they would not
pull support entirely from UNAMI's technical assistance. End
Summary.
2. (C) Salih asked why Akre district was included in UNAMI's
initial four reports when Article 53A of the Transitional
Administrative Law was adopted into the Iraqi Constitution
and Akre lies above the "green line" (recognized by the
article), the line of Kurdish control as of March 19, 2003.
He claimed that he did not know Akre was to be included in
the initial reports until a week ago. Senior Adviser said
UNAMI had planned its inclusion for months now and consulted
with interlocutors about it. Salih wondered how the disputed
territories were chosen, arguing that Akre is not disputed by
anyone.
3. (C) Salih said that UNAMI Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG) Staffan de Mistura had entered into
areas not under what he understood to be UNAMI's mandate,
including (land) claims issues. He continued that perhaps
"everyone" (presumably the 3 2) should be gathered together
to agree to UNAMI's methodology. He noted that the reports
contain scant mention of historical injustices against the
Kurds, no mention of terrorists in the disputed areas and no
mention of the good role that Peshmerga forces are playing in
these areas. Parsing the reports further, Salih said that
the issue of Kirkuk has been a keen one since 1974, not since
2003 as the "chapeau" report notes. He said he thought
subjective judgments had been made by UNAMI on who did what,
and that a dispassionate formula was needed to resolve the
issue.
4. (C) DPM Salih asked why the Mahkmour report wrote about
not including the Sunni Arab-dominated Qaraj sub-district
into the KRG, while the Mandali report did not recommend that
the Kurdish-dominated northern Mandali join the KRG, while
the south remained in Diyala. He said the report is too
biased towards Sunni Arabs. "The report is stupid," Salih
said, though he stated that plans to recommend to the Kurdish
leadership to not pull out of the UNAMI process. He noted,
however, that "it might be difficult" convincing the other
leaders. Salih said he had thought UNAMI would only propose
an overarching modality for how the GOI and KRG should decide
the issue, such as referenda. He said he thinks the Kurdish
leadership will want to know what Phase III looks like (on
the status of Kirkuk) before deciding what to do now.
5. (C) Arguing that this is a constitutional issue, the DPM
said the Kurdish interest in UNAMI's work was in its
provision of technical data as a reference point. Salih
repeated that the likely decision by the Kurdish side will be
to criticize the report but not close the door completely on
UNAMI's work. However, "five and a half years on, (Kurdish)
patience needs to be rewarded," Salih stressed, noting that
if the disputed territories issue takes too long, it will
unravel the Iraqi government. "We are losing everything by
being too nice," Salih continued. Salih said leaving Kirkuk
in the GOI cannot be defended, given historic injustices. He
offered that the Kurdish leadership could provide assurances
regarding existing oil fields in Kirkuk even without a
hydrocarbons law, which might help negative reaction if
Kirkuk joined the KRG. Salih said that the Kurdistan
National Assembly might want to debate and vote on these
initial UNAMI reports, which he worried would create a
"political football."
6. (C) On the language proposed to include a provision in the
draft provincial elections law to elect the Kirkuk Provincial
Council along power-sharing lines, Salih said he told Vice
President Hashimi that if it is done in Kirkuk, it should be
done in Baghdad, or for that matter, all over Iraq.
Returning to the UNAMI reports, the DPM called them "fluff,"
and said that there was too much detail included,
particularly on minorities and whether they are Kurds or not.
The DPM also said that the protection of the Christian
minority is very important, and the KRG can help. The Kurds
BAGHDAD 00001743 002 OF 002
would prefer that UNAMI advise the GOI on the modality to use
in the decision-making, such as a referendum, and not get
into so many details on a district-by-district basis. "The
focus is too broad," he continued, but repeated that the
process is probably salvageable.
7. (C) Comment: Salih seemed to be most upset about UNAMI's
background comments -- he lamented several times that mention
of Barzani family disputes with the Zebari tribe in Akre
were unhelpful and provocative -- and its flawed, in his
view, methodologies. His surprise at the inclusion of Akre
district in the report was disingenuous, at least. UNAMI had
pre-briefed all four reports, including Akre, with
representitives of all parties. Salih was either misinformed
by underlings, or he had forgotten that Akre was part of
Phase One. His criticism of UNAMI's points on Mandali were
his only substantive objection, and those are subject to
negotiation by the GOI and KRG, as is every point in the
report. End Comment.
BUTENIS

Raw content

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001743
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IZ
SUBJECT: DPM BARHAM SALIH CALLS UNAMI REPORTS "STUPID"
REF: A. BAGHDAD OI EMAIL JUNE 7
B. BAGHDAD 1733
Classified By: Senior Adviser Thomas Krajeski for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. Summary: (C) Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih (Kurd,
PUK) told Senior Adviser Krajeski on June 8 that he was
unhappy with United Nations Mission to Iraq (UNAMI)'s Phase I
reports on Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs), provided by
UNAMI to the Presidency Council, Prime Minister and Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister on June 5 (ref b).
He called the methodology "too broad" and not what he
expected, questioned the inclusion of Akre district and some
specific conclusions and said that he thought the reports
were too biased towards Sunni Arabs. Barham said the Kurdish
side was developing a response to UNAMI, but was hopeful that
while the Kurds would criticize the report, they would not
pull support entirely from UNAMI's technical assistance. End
Summary.
2. (C) Salih asked why Akre district was included in UNAMI's
initial four reports when Article 53A of the Transitional
Administrative Law was adopted into the Iraqi Constitution
and Akre lies above the "green line" (recognized by the
article), the line of Kurdish control as of March 19, 2003.
He claimed that he did not know Akre was to be included in
the initial reports until a week ago. Senior Adviser said
UNAMI had planned its inclusion for months now and consulted
with interlocutors about it. Salih wondered how the disputed
territories were chosen, arguing that Akre is not disputed by
anyone.
3. (C) Salih said that UNAMI Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG) Staffan de Mistura had entered into
areas not under what he understood to be UNAMI's mandate,
including (land) claims issues. He continued that perhaps
"everyone" (presumably the 3 2) should be gathered together
to agree to UNAMI's methodology. He noted that the reports
contain scant mention of historical injustices against the
Kurds, no mention of terrorists in the disputed areas and no
mention of the good role that Peshmerga forces are playing in
these areas. Parsing the reports further, Salih said that
the issue of Kirkuk has been a keen one since 1974, not since
2003 as the "chapeau" report notes. He said he thought
subjective judgments had been made by UNAMI on who did what,
and that a dispassionate formula was needed to resolve the
issue.
4. (C) DPM Salih asked why the Mahkmour report wrote about
not including the Sunni Arab-dominated Qaraj sub-district
into the KRG, while the Mandali report did not recommend that
the Kurdish-dominated northern Mandali join the KRG, while
the south remained in Diyala. He said the report is too
biased towards Sunni Arabs. "The report is stupid," Salih
said, though he stated that plans to recommend to the Kurdish
leadership to not pull out of the UNAMI process. He noted,
however, that "it might be difficult" convincing the other
leaders. Salih said he had thought UNAMI would only propose
an overarching modality for how the GOI and KRG should decide
the issue, such as referenda. He said he thinks the Kurdish
leadership will want to know what Phase III looks like (on
the status of Kirkuk) before deciding what to do now.
5. (C) Arguing that this is a constitutional issue, the DPM
said the Kurdish interest in UNAMI's work was in its
provision of technical data as a reference point. Salih
repeated that the likely decision by the Kurdish side will be
to criticize the report but not close the door completely on
UNAMI's work. However, "five and a half years on, (Kurdish)
patience needs to be rewarded," Salih stressed, noting that
if the disputed territories issue takes too long, it will
unravel the Iraqi government. "We are losing everything by
being too nice," Salih continued. Salih said leaving Kirkuk
in the GOI cannot be defended, given historic injustices. He
offered that the Kurdish leadership could provide assurances
regarding existing oil fields in Kirkuk even without a
hydrocarbons law, which might help negative reaction if
Kirkuk joined the KRG. Salih said that the Kurdistan
National Assembly might want to debate and vote on these
initial UNAMI reports, which he worried would create a
"political football."
6. (C) On the language proposed to include a provision in the
draft provincial elections law to elect the Kirkuk Provincial
Council along power-sharing lines, Salih said he told Vice
President Hashimi that if it is done in Kirkuk, it should be
done in Baghdad, or for that matter, all over Iraq.
Returning to the UNAMI reports, the DPM called them "fluff,"
and said that there was too much detail included,
particularly on minorities and whether they are Kurds or not.
The DPM also said that the protection of the Christian
minority is very important, and the KRG can help. The Kurds
BAGHDAD 00001743 002 OF 002
would prefer that UNAMI advise the GOI on the modality to use
in the decision-making, such as a referendum, and not get
into so many details on a district-by-district basis. "The
focus is too broad," he continued, but repeated that the
process is probably salvageable.
7. (C) Comment: Salih seemed to be most upset about UNAMI's
background comments -- he lamented several times that mention
of Barzani family disputes with the Zebari tribe in Akre
were unhelpful and provocative -- and its flawed, in his
view, methodologies. His surprise at the inclusion of Akre
district in the report was disingenuous, at least. UNAMI had
pre-briefed all four reports, including Akre, with
representitives of all parties. Salih was either misinformed
by underlings, or he had forgotten that Akre was part of
Phase One. His criticism of UNAMI's points on Mandali were
his only substantive objection, and those are subject to
negotiation by the GOI and KRG, as is every point in the
report. End Comment.
BUTENIS