Turkey has changed drastically over the last
two decades. The politics of the officially secular republic
are today dominated by the firmly entrenched Justice and Development
Party (AKP); a party with a national following and an unambiguously
Islamist tendency. At the same time, the country is closer than
ever before to being regarded as a member of the European community.
With respect to the Kurdish question, much has happened over
the last two decades that have significantly changed the relationship
between the Turkish state and the Kurdish people, including demands,
concessions, and methods of dialogue. It cannot be disputed that
the Kurdish people living within Turkey’s borders have
more right to the expression of their identity than ever before.
However, just as equally undeniable are the presence a number
of draconian
and selectively enforced laws
remaining in place that effectively restrict the most basic rights.

While for the first time Turkish high officials are
openly expressing their intentions to resolve the unsettled and overdue
Kurdish question, there still remains a lack of will in Turkey both
politically and socially to approach the conflict in an effective and
resolute manner. Each year, deadlines come and go, pivotal events transpire,
and yet no solution that comes close to satisfying all parties involved
in this conflict seems any closer to reality.

Over the last several weeks, a number of developments that
are believed to be a prelude to the Turkish government’s
so-called Kurdish initiative have given some cause for optimism.
The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, issued
an unprecedented statement urging members of society to engage
in discussions and debates in support of the government's
efforts towards solving the Kurdish issue. Additionally,
the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), shunned from
the mainstream political process for years, has been invited
for public discussions on the Kurdish issue with members
of the AKP and the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP);
both refused to meet with the DTP in the past. At the same
time, the very existence of a plan to unveil a Kurdish initiative
has prompted the mainstream Turkish press to address the
Kurdish issue in an uncharacteristically open way.

Ever more subtle yet significant developments with regards
to cultural and political rights have also been taking place.
In the Kurdish stronghold of Diyarbakir, a move by the city’s
provincial council to change the name of the village of ‘Kirkpinar’ back
to its original Kurdish name of ‘Celkaniya’ was
allowed, rather than being blocked by the city’s governor
as was the fate of previous motions. At the same time, an
open discussion is taking place on the possibility of offering
some education in Kurdish language and Kurdish studies.

While one may think that the official and open discussion of
a solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question, including
concrete steps being taken to right some wrongs of the past,
would mean that a peaceful resolution is on the horizon,
it appears that this is not the case. Indeed, the public
debates surrounding the AKP’s Kurdish initiative on
one hand and a roadmap drawn up by the imprisoned Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Ocalan, on the other,
simply serves to show – in very plain view – the
fault lines that still prevent any true solution from being
reached. While the prime minister has made calls for engagement
by virtually all segments of society, the government’s
candid aim to preemptively dismiss the roadmap seems counterproductive
as has been further exemplified by recent public reaction
in the Kurdish region. At the beginning of this month, millions
rallied in predominantly Kurdish city streets to protest
the government’s current approach
to the drawing up of a Kurdish initiative.

Kurdish question, PKK, and recurring state
denial

When Turkey emerged from the ruins of the collapsed Ottoman Empire after
the former died a slow and painful death, denial quickly became a technique
for painting over the significant cracks in the logic of the ideology
underpinning the new Turkish republic. While the Ottomans used religion
as the glue to hold together the various components of their empire,
the new Republic of Turkey would use Turkish identity and nationalism
to establish itself. As a substantial portion of Turkey’s citizens
were Kurdish, and not ethnic Turks, the new republic would need to conveniently
deny the existence of the Kurdish identity, and eventually, this denial
would become a hallmark of Turkish nationalist ideology dedicated to
the unity of the new Republic.

Kurds in Turkey hold signs
that write "peace" and rally against the Turkish government's
refusal to negotiate with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers
Party - Photo Courtesy Ozgur Gundem

When the PKK became a major force, transforming
itself from a small group of leftists into a significant and
very disruptive political and military entity, the Turkish
state added a new facet to its policy of denial with respect
to Turkey’s Kurds, choosing to deny the fact that the
PKK enjoyed grassroots support among the Kurdish population
while trying to convince the Turkish masses and others that
the PKK had minimal popular support and was primarily backed
by foreign actors. The folly of this approach is clear – 30
years after the founding of the PKK, the party remains a powerful
movement and Ocalan is still a potent symbol to many of Turkey’s
Kurds over a decade after his capture.

Turkish denial has entered a new state and
despite groundbreaking changes and the apparent ability of
Turks to address the Kurdish question openly, this denial persists
and manifests itself as the major obstacle to reaching a true
solution to the Kurdish question. The Kurdish question in Turkey
is as old as the Turkish Republic, and owes itself to the aforementioned
denial of Kurdish identity by the Turkish state. Disparity
in development and living standards between the primarily Kurdish
southeast and the rest of the country stoked the flames of
discontent among Turkey’s Kurds.

The PKK emerged as this era’s incarnation of Kurdish
rebellion in Turkey and quickly gained support among disgruntled
Kurds impacted by the injustices virtually mandated by the founding
principles of the Turkish Republic. As the PKK gathered strength
and support, the Turkish state took a paradoxical approach to
explaining the nature of the group. While, on one hand, the PKK
was characterized as a terrorist group backed by foreign actors,
on the other hand, most expressions of Kurdish national identity
were characterized as “separatist” and thus associated
with the PKK. The false assertion by the Turkish state about
expressions of Kurdish identity became something of a self-fulfilling
prophecy, as an increasingly restrictive policy against Kurdish
identity prompted Kurds who still sought to preserve their identity
to move closer towards the PKK.

Past policies and statements from the Turkish establishment
had the perhaps unintended consequence of causing the Kurdish
issue in general and the PKK as a movement to become very much
intertwined with one another in both practice and in the mindset
of Turkish and Kurdish citizens of Turkey.

Despite these realities, while the state is assembling its own
Kurdish initiative, it seems once again that the Kurdish issue
and the PKK are being characterized as two issues that are quite
separate from one another. While ostensibly seeking to solve the
Kurdish question in Turkey, the Turkish government’s attempt
to circumvent the PKK and refusal to address the party directly
is among the most definite flaws that may prevent an effective
solution to the conflict from being reached. Yet again, basic
truths are being ignored for the sake of avoiding the contradiction
of patently false beliefs that are part of the Turkish state’s
rigid ideology.

Ending conflict requires engagement

Exact details of the Turkish government’s Kurdish initiative
are still unknown. However, reactions in the predominantly Kurdish
region to preliminary details and public statements by government
representatives have not been positive thus far. Earlier this
month, thousands of Kurds rallied in Diyarbakir, many of them
waving portraits of Ocalan and PKK flags, calling for peace and
holding signs with slogans such as “We want our roadmap” and “The
counterpart for a democratic solution of the Kurdish question
is in Imrali.” Meanwhile, representatives of the pro-Kurdish
DTP who have strong support in Diyarbakir and throughout the
Kurdish region soundly reject any plans that do not consider
the points laid out by their own so-called democratic initiative.

The Turkish government has already dismissed Ocalan’s
roadmap even before its release, with Turkish President Abdullah
Gul stating that people should “forget about Imrali,” a
reference to the island prison where the PKK leader is currently
being held. Undoubtedly, many Kurds in today’s Turkey,
including some of the democratically-elected political representatives
of the Kurdish people, support Ocalan and look to him for a solution
to the current state of affairs. Protests and rallies along with
complaints of disregard for their own demands are enough to demonstrate
that the Turkish government is not taking the required steps
to engage the most critical people to the process; people that
would most directly be affected by any reform.

It is of great concern that one significant item, an amnesty
for PKK fighters, has already been ruled out by the Turkish state.
While claiming to pursue an end to war, the Turkish government
is reportedly rejecting the idea of giving amnesty to rebels.
Indeed, this shows that decisive steps to address the Kurdish
issue and end conflict are not part of the state’s initiative.
The end of armed confrontations would be perhaps the most crucial
sign of the achievement of a solution to the Kurdish issue. If
the PKK has not been defeated in twenty-five years by Turkey’s
large modern army, then it makes very little sense to believe
that the PKK will cease to exist simply because the state formally
demands that the rebels, still branded as terrorists, should
capitulate.

Overcoming the Political Obstacles

The lack of political will to confront the Kurdish question
with the necessary steps and solve the conflict via diplomacy
is the biggest roadblock on any map to peace in Turkey. Turkey
has fought a brutal war against the PKK for many years. At the
same time, the Turkish state’s harsh restrictions on expressions
of Kurdish identity has made suspicion of and opposition to basic
concessions to the Kurdish people a hallmark of nationalist policy
and a litmus test for patriotism among many Turks. Thus, there
is an unquestionable political risk for any Turkish politician
pondering the idea of promoting reforms relative to the Kurds,
and a political risk of significantly greater magnitude which
would be faced by anyone who might suggest engaging the rebels.
The CHP, Turkey’s oldest political party, has been critical
of the ruling AKP for their evident reluctance to involve the
opinions of all parties in the political process, but for completely
different reasons. Those proposals that the AKP has communicated
have generated a great deal of emotional debate and has prompted
CHP leader Deniz Baykal to protest that it would “pave
the way for separation of the country.”

Citizens in Turkey wave the
Turkish flag and rally against attacks by the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers Party - Photo Courtesy Getty

Furthermore, Ocalan himself remains an extremely
polarizing figure among both Kurds and Turks. For many years,
he was considered Turkey’s most serious threat and most
wanted terrorist, and branded a “baby killer” in
both official and unofficial discourse. His capture elicited
massive celebrations in Turkey. It is not difficult to see
that any political figure
who entertains the idea of engaging Ocalan or even simply acknowledging
his efforts to find a solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question
will face great pressure from the Turkish masses as well as
elements Turkey’s military and political establishments.

Today, more than ever, the Kurdish issue is
acknowledged and, to some extent, addressed in Turkey, and
this in and of itself is certainly a positive development.
At this critical juncture, the specifics of the Kurdish issue
that make a resolution so elusive are more apparent than ever,
not only to Turks and Kurds, but also to the world community
that keenly follows developments in the republic, especially
in light of Turkey’s bid to join the European Union.
It remains to be seen whether or not today’s new circumstances
will bring the Turkish and Kurdish nations any closer to understanding
and a just peace.