Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War

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Enemy tactics were sound and well-executed. Contrary to the popularconception of the enemy as "a screaming horde," the NK and CC Forces werewell-coordinated fighting machines. Enemy attacks showed considerable priorplanning and good judgment for the most part.... Tactics employed were similar to Western tactics; especially, the oldPatton adage of "holding them by the nose and kicking them in the pants."Envelopments were widely used. It is believed that air superiority, fire-power, andmobility of the UN Forces provided the difference between the two forces.Defensively, the enemy used the same tactics, on the whole, as UNForces; namely, that of trading terrain in an effort to gain time and inflictmaximum losses on the opposition.18Communist soldiers did not get to rotate home after a few months on the line likethe Americans did. They either fought and survived, or they died, so those who wereveterans had much experience to draw on. The NKPA was known for outstandingcamouflage discipline, brought on as a necessity to avoid being spotted from the air.Both his positions and his personnel were very difficult to see if not silhouetted by askyline, or in some other manner breaching that camouflage discipline. "They havebeen forced to perfect this skill as a direct result of a lack of air support."19The NKPA enemy used counterattacks extensively and according to his doctrine."North Korean defensive doctrine holds that only a well-timed and determinedcounterattack can achieve eventual victory in a defensive situation. Commanders ofsmaller subordinate units are therefore encouraged to launch continuous small-scalecounterattacks against penetrations in their sector. . . ." The counterattacks were "anintegral part of their defensive system and were used for various purposes: (1) to blunt* Headquarters EUSAK, "Enemy Tactics," 128.19 U. S. IX Corps, "Enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Doctrine," 6.