To test theories, we derive the observable implications of each theory and compare these to the data we see in reality. So, what do we observe in reality? Look at committee medians compared to the floor median (do they look close or they outliers?) Results: somewhat inconclusive (some committees seem to be outliers, others seem pretty representative) Spatial model: Basic model considers only simple-majority voting. In congress other features may be important. A good theory of lawmaking should explain gridlock, why moderates are often frustrated, why prez’s launch fewer policy initiatives the longer they are in office Pivotal politics model: Pivotal politics theory (Krehbiel) says that two modifications are need to realistically model congressional voting: the filibuster option in the senate, the presidential veto. Krehbiel’s theory ignores some relevant actors (political parties, committees)

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Unformatted text preview: Same undimensional spatial setup: mediam voter (m), filibuster pivot (f), veto pivot (v), president (p), status quo (q). ---[f-----m-----v]-----*p--- Gridlock region is b/w f and v. When the stat quo lies in this region, it cant be moved even if a majority of legislators want to. Krehbiel always assumes the president is conservative (cuz hes a faggot). For a liberal like Obama, just switch / swap everything. If youre moving b/w V and P towards the median, V becomes the veto pivot, the 67 th most liberal member. If he supports president, no veto, if he supports other peeps, veto! Gridlock when policy is between f and v. Why are moderates frustrated? They will not get what they want if its always in gridlock region. (Hey majority of congress wants to move policy, but we cant do it [because its still in the gridlock region])....
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