in the Galilee. His invective stirred up a storm of protest in the Knesset.

The underlying message was that an Arab MK should be grateful for

being allowed to take an equal part in Israeli democracy. It was considered

“chutzpa” for an Arab Israeli to criticize the behavior of Israeli authorities

toward Arabs in the Knesset. Against this background, Nathan Alterman

the Israeli poet, whom some erroneously mark “spokesman for the establishment,”criticized those persons who challenged Toubi’s right to serve in the Knesset, while simultaneously criticizing the government and the IDF.

Toubi, wrote Alterman, serves in the Knesset “by right and not by grace

. . . His presence is legal and authorized; it is a basic freedom.” Alterman

went on to chastise those who constantly celebrate the “magnanimity” of

Israeli democracy that allows a non-Jew like Tewfik Toubi to be elected to

parliament and speak his mind freely. “This is the essence of democracy,”

asserted Alterman, “if it is not instinctively understood, then we have no

inkling of what it is about.” It is unlikely that Alterman’s views refl ected

The conversation on which this paper is based, was, as expected, dominated

by Ben-Gurion, who was more passionate about presenting his own

position, and less willing to lend an ear to Toubi’s views. On several occasions,

the conversation came to a conclusion, usually on Toubi’s initiative,

but Ben-Gurion managed to “revive” it by raising new issues or returning

to those only partially discussed.

Toubi claimed repeatedly that, through its policies toward the Israeli

Arabs, the government had lost the chance to use this population as a bridge

for paving over its differences with the Arab world. Ben-Gurion was taken

aback and could only express his skepticism at the feasibility of such an

option. He seemed fixed in the idea, that was prevalent in security circles,

that Israeli Arabs should be regarded as inherently hostile and of questionableloyalty to the state. A clear manifestation of this thinking was given by Issar Harel the head of the secret services, who claimed, during a session of the Knesset’s Foreign Aff airs and Security Committee that, “the vast majority of Israeli Arabs support Arab nationalism,and hope and believe

that [Israel] will eventually be destroyed . . . This includes even quiet, good,

and moderate people . . . [the] Maki [party] appears in the Arab sector as

Ben-Gurion’s attitude throughout most of the conversation was apologetic.

Indeed, he emphasized his awareness that Toubi’s positions “inhibit”

him from being won over to standard Zionist arguments. Ben-Gurion

admitted that, while he had no intention of convincing Toubi of the justifi -

cation of Zionist positions, he would have liked to have been able to facilitate his understanding of them.In fact, Ben-Gurion did just the opposite, and endeavored to prove to Toubi that Zionist policy toward Israeli Arabs was the result of circumstances that prevented Israel from acting diff erently.The two key issues on which Ben-Gurion dwelled were the Military Government in Arab areas, and “right of return” of the 1948 Arab refugees.

that it flouted the principle of civil equality, the bedrock of democracy to

which he was devoted. He explained the unwelcome necessity for military

government in Arab areas as a result of Israel’s precarious security condition since the founding of the state.At the same time he appeared aware

of injustices beyond security needs that were committed against the Arab

sector. Ben-Gurion could only concede that it had been beyond his capacity

to oversee everything that occurred within the framework of the military

government. The impression from reading between the lines is that, while

not totally rejecting the Eshkol cabinet’s decision to cancel the military

government, Ben-Gurion felt the timing was wrong.

With regard to the refugee problem, Ben-Gurion reiterated the official

line that the Palestinians living in the country at the time had not been

evicted from their lands but had left of their own free will. It is diffi cult to

determine whether Ben-Gurion really believed this to be the main reason

for the Arabs’flight or whether he reiterated it out of loyalty to theofficial position that was designed to absolve the government of responsibility for the refugees’ fate.Ben-Gurion did not evade the matter of the outrages suffered by the Palestinians during the 1948 War, especially Dir Yassin.His only defense was that the latter operation had been carried out by “Jewish dissidents” who were not under his full command, and that he personally was ashamed of what happened.The roughout the conversation with Toubi,

he tried to present the Palestinian refugee problem as part of a dynamic

exchange of population between Israel and the Arab world, in which Jewish

“refugees” from Arab countries fled to Israel and Arab refugees from Palestine left for Arab countries.⁹

In the course of the conversation Ben-Gurion severely criticized the

burgeoning Arab radicalism that had perpetuated the Arab-Israeli conflict.

At the same time, however, he expressed satisfaction with this same Arab

radicalism and even with the Arab world’s decision to resort to violence in

order to achieve its objectives. Arab expectations that violent struggle would

lead to the collapse of the state of Israel had resulted in the exact opposite.

Paradoxically, it was this uncompromising position that had prevented a

reconciliation that would have been disastrous to the vital interests of both

the Yishuv [pre-state Jewish community in Palestine] and the state of Israel.

Because of Arab intransigence, the Yishuv had been forced to exercise its full

capacity for progress and construction while increasingly separating itself

from the “Arab sector.” Ben-Gurion listed some of the fortuitous “gains”

produced by Arab rejections—the establishment of Tel Aviv; construction

a Tel Aviv sea port; the expanded borders, the result of the 1949 armistice

lines; and Israeli control over half of Jerusalem.

PROTOCOL OF MEETING BETWEEN MR. DAVID

BEN-GURION AND MR. TEWFIK TOUBI

Ben-Gurion House, Tel-Aviv, October 28, 1966

Ben-Gurion: Many changes have occurred in the Communist Movement.

Things would be a lot different if Lenin were alive today. Lenin had courage

. . . Not that I want to turn him into a non-Communist, heaven forbid. I

would rather not discuss this issue with you, but prefer [to talk about] the