Shofar FTP Archive File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-14.01

Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-14.01
Last-Modified: 1999/09/13
[Page 136]
FOURTEENTH DAY
THURSDAY, 6th DECEMBER, 1945
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request
from the defendants' Counsel that the trial should be
adjourned at Christmas for a period of three weeks. The
Tribunal is aware of the many interests which must be
considered in a trial of this complexity and magnitude, and,
as the trial must inevitably last for a considerable time,
the Tribunal considers that it is not only in the interest
of the defendants and their counsel but of every one
concerned in the trial that there should be a recess. On the
whole it seems best to take that recess at Christmas rather
than at a later date when the prosecution's case has been
completed. The Tribunal will therefore rise for the
Christmas week and over the 1st January. It will not sit
after the session on Thursday, 20th December, and will sit
again on Wednesday, 2nd January.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff,
to note the American objection to the adjournment for the
benefit of the defendants.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the
Tribunal, the Tribunal will return to Part 3 of that
document book, in which I included the documents relating to
the earlier discussions between the German and Polish
Government on the question of Danzig. Those discussions, the
Tribunal will remember, started almost immediately after the
Munich crisis in September, 1938, and started, in the first
place, as cautious and friendly discussions until the
remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March
of the following year.
I would refer the Tribunal to the first document in that
part, TC-73, No. 44. That is a document, taken from the
Official Polish White Book, which I put in as Exhibit GB
27(a). It gives an account of a luncheon which took place at
the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on the 2Sth October, where
Ribbentrop saw M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Germany:
"In a conversation of the 24th October, over a luncheon
at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was
present, von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a
general settlement of issues (Gesamtlosung) between
Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig
with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the
retention of railway and economic facilities there.
Poland would agree to the building of an extra-
territorial motor road and a railway line across
Pomorze. In exchange, von Ribbentrop mentioned the
possibility of an extension of the Polish-German
Agreement by twenty-five years, and a guarantee of
Polish-German frontiers."
I do not think I need read the following lines. I go to the
last but one paragraph:
"Finally, I said to M. Lipski that I wished to warn von
Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an
agreement involving the reunion
[Page 137]
of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by
promising to communicate the substance of this
conversation to you."
I would emphasise the submission of the prosecution as to
this part of the case, and that is that the whole question
of Danzig was indeed, as Hitler himself said, no question at
all. Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, a so-called
justification, not for the seizure of Danzig, but for the
invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland, and we see it
starting now. As we progress with the story it will become
ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi Government
were really aiming at, only providing themselves with some
kind of crisis which would produce some kind of
justification for walking into the rest of Poland.
I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken
from the Polish White Book, TC-73, No. 45, which will be
Exhibit GB 27(b). TC-73 will be the Polish White Book, which
I shall put in later. That document sets out the
instructions that M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave
to M. Lipski to hand to the German Government, in reply to
the suggestion put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on
the 24th October. I need not read the first page. The
history of Polish-German relationship is set out, and the
needs of Poland in respect of Danzig are emphasised. I turn
to the second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph 6:
"In the circumstances, in the understanding of the
Polish Government, the Danzig question is governed by
two factors: the right of the German population of the
city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and
development; and the fact that in all matters
appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected
with Poland. Apart from the national character of the
majority of the population, everything in Danzig is
definitely bound up with Poland."
It then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the existing
statute, and I pass to Paragraph 7:
"Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration,
and desiring to achieve the stabilisation of relations
by way of a friendly understanding with the Government
of the German Reich, the Polish Government proposes the
replacement of the League of Nations guarantee, and its
prerogatives, by a bilateral Polish-German Agreement.
This Agreement should guarantee the existence of the
Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national
and cultural life to its German majority, and also
should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the
complications involved in such a system, the Polish
Government must state that any other solution, and in
particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into
the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This
would not only take the form of local difficulties, but
also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German
understanding in all its aspects."
And then finally in Paragraph 8:
"In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I
am ready to have final conversations personally with the
governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary,
however, that you should first present the principles to
which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not
end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the
future."
The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely
successful from the German point of view. They had put
forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the
Reich, which they might well have known would have
[Page 138]
been unacceptable. It was unacceptable, and the Polish
Government had warned the Nazi Government that it would be.
They had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had
not agreed, which is exactly what the German Government had
hoped. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to the
Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been
accomplished.
Shortly afterwards, within a week or so of that taking
place, after the Polish Government had offered to enter into
discussions with the German Government, we find another top
secret order, issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, signed by the defendant Keitel. It goes to the
O.K.H., O.K.M., and O.K.W. and it is headed "The First
Supplement to the Instruction dated the 21st October, 1938":-
"The Fuehrer has ordered:
Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the
instructions of 21st October, 1938, preparations are
also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be
occupied by German troops by surprise.
The preparations will be made on the following basis:
Condition is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig,
exploiting a politically favourable situation, not a war
against Poland."
We remember, of course, that at that moment the remainder of
Czechoslovakia had not been seized and therefore they were
not ready to go to war with Poland. That document does show
how the German Government answered the proposal to enter
into discussions. That is C-137 and will become GB 33
On the 5th January, 1939, M. Beck had a conversation with
Hitler. It is unnecessary to read the first part of that
document, which is the next in the Tribunal's book, TC73, No-
48, which will become Exhibit GB 34. In the first part of
that conversation, of which that document is an account,
Hitler offers to answer any questions. He says he has always
followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He
discusses the Danzig question and emphasises that, in the
German view, it must sooner or later return to Germany. I
quote the last but one paragraph of that page:
"M. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very
difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's
suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and
that the whole Polish opinion, and not only people
thinking politically, but the widest spheres of Polish
society, were particularly sensitive on this matter.
In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve
this problem it would be necessary to try to find
something quite new, some new form, for which he used
the term 'Korperschaft', which on the one hand would
safeguard the interests of the German population, and on
the other the Polish interests. In addition, the
Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at
ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig, and
nothing would be done to render difficult the situation
of the Polish Government."
The Tribunal will remember that in the very last document we
looked at, on the 24th November, orders had already been
received, or issued, for preparations to be made for the
occupation of Danzig by surprise; yet here he is assuring
the Polish Minister that there is to be no fait accompli and
he can be quite at his ease.
[Page 139]
I turn to the next step, Document TC-73, No. 49, which will
become Exhibit GB 35, a conversation between M. Beck and
Ribbentrop, on the day after the one to which I have just
referred between Beck and Hitler.
"M. Beck asked Ribbentrop -"
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the
last conversation took place in the presence of the
defendant Ribbentrop?
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very obliged to you.
No, I did not. As I say, it was on the next day, the 6th
January. The date in actual fact does not appear on the copy
I have got in my book. It does appear in the White Book
itself.
"M. Beck asked Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that
whereas previously, after all his conversations and
contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling
optimistic, today, for the first time, he was in a
pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig
question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he
saw no possibility whatever of agreement."
I emphasise this last paragraph:
"In answer Ribbentrop once more emphasised that Germany
was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their
policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further
building up of friendly relations. It was necessary to
seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as
would respect the rights and interests of the two
parties concerned."
The defendant Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with
that one expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same
month, January, 1939, some fortnight or three weeks later,
he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of which an
extract is set out in Document 2530-PS, which will become
Exhibit GB 36:
"In accordance with the resolute will of the German
National Leader, the continual progress and
consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and
Poland, based upon the existing agreement between us,
constitute an essential element in German foreign
policy. The political foresight, and the principles
worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides
to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a
guarantee that all other problems arising in the course
of the future evolution of events will also be solved in
the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and
understanding of the rightful interests of both sides.
Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future
with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual
relations."
And even so, the Nazi Government must have been still
anxious that the Poles were beginning to sit up-your
Lordship will remember the expression " sit up " used in the
note to the Fuehrer-and to assume they would be the next in
turn, because on the 30th January, Hitler again spoke in the
Reichstag, and gave further assurances of their good faith.
That document, that extract, was read by the Attorney
General in his address, and therefore I only put it in now
as an exhibit. That is Document TC-73, No- 57, which will
become Exhibit GB 37.
That, then, brings us up to the March, 1939, seizure of the
remainder of Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
If the Tribunal will now pass to the next part, Part IV, of
that document book, I had intended to refer to three
documents where Hitler and Jodl
[Page 140]
were setting out the advantages gained through the seizure
of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will
remember that Mr. Alderman, in his closing remarks yesterday
morning, dealt very fully with that matter, showing what
advantages they did gain by that seizure and showing on the
chart that he had on the wall, the immense strengthening of
the German position against Poland. Therefore, I leave that
matter. The documents are already in evidence, and if the
Tribunal should wish to refer to them, they are to be found
in their correct order in the story in that document book.
As soon as that occupation had been completed, within a week
of marching into the rest of Czechoslovakia, the heat was
beginning to be turned on against Poland.
If the Tribunal would pass to Document TC-73, which is about
half-way through that document book - it follows after
Jodl's lecture, which is a long document - TC-73, Number 61.
It is headed "Official documents concerning Polish-German
Relations."
THE PRESIDENT: Does it come after TC-72?
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: It comes after L-172.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 1397, I am told it is.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, that is correct. It
does not actually show the page number, but that is at the
bottom of the page. I am sorry, these are not numbered.
THE PRESIDENT: I have got it now.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: This will be Exhibit GB
38.
On the 21st March, M. Beck again saw Ribbentrop, and the
nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper
than the one that had been held a little time back at the
Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden.
"I saw Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked
me to call in order to discuss Polish-German relations
in their entirety.
He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw student's
demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit." - I think I
can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which
commences with "Further".
"Further, Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at
Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which
Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's
frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the
incorporation of Danzig into the Reich. He said that
there had been further conversations between you and him
in Warsaw" - that is, of course, between him and M.
Beck.
"He said that there had been further conversations
between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that
you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of
accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand
that all this had made an unfavourable impression on the
Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive
reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions.
Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor, only
yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in
favour of good relations with Poland, and had expressed
a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the
subject of our mutual relations. Ribbentrop indicated
that he was under the impression that difficulties
arising between us were also due to some
misunderstanding
[Page 141]
of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be
considered on a higher plane. In his opinion, our two
States were dependent on each other."
I think it unnecessary that I should read the next page.
Briefly, Ribbentrop emphasises the German argument as to why
Danzig should return to the Reich; and I turn to the first
paragraph on the following page.
"I stated" - that is M. Lipski - "I stated that now,
during the settlement of the Czechoslovakian question,
there was no understanding whatever between us. The
Czech issue was already hard enough for the Polish
public to swallow, for, despite our disputes over the
Czechs -
THE PRESIDENT: "With the Czechs."
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon.
"-with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people.
But in regard to Slovakia, the position was far worse. I
emphasised our community of race, language and religion,
and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement
of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with
Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street
could not understand why the Reich had assumed the
protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed
against Poland. I said emphatically that this question
was a serious blow to our relations.
Ribbentrop reflected for a moment, and then answered
that this could be discussed.
I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a
conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop
remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few
days to talk the matter over. He advised that the talk
should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come
to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his
offers.
Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about
his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.
Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys
on the latter's return from Rome, and that they had
discussed the Memel question, which called for a
solution."
That conversation took place on the 21st March. It was not
very long before the world knew what the solution to Memel
was. On the next day German Armed Forces marched in.

This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.

As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.