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Sunday, May 21, 2017

Russia Lays a Trap in Syria

By Genevieve Casagrande and Ellen Stockert

Russia seeks to use the establishment of “de-escalation zones” to
reset its operations and constrain U.S. policy options in Syria. Russia,
Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement
to establish four de-escalation zonesin
western Syria on May 4. The agreement intends to preempt the unilateral
establishment of “interim
zones of stability” by the U.S. in Syria. The de-escalation zone agreement has
provided Russia, Iran, and the Bashar al-Assad regime with a period of rest and
refit to refocus their efforts in Eastern Syria, particularly in areas where
the U.S. is leading operations with Syrian rebels. Russia pivoted its air
campaign to focus on ISIS-held terrain in Eastern Syria from May 1 - 18.Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime likely
intend to use the period of de-escalation to disrupt joint U.S.-rebel
operations to push north against ISIS in Homs and Deir ez Zour Provinces, while
bolstering pro-regime advances against ISIS in both central Homs and eastern
Aleppo. Pro-regime forces seized Jirrah Airbase from ISIS in eastern
Aleppo Province on May 13 with Russian air support. Pro-regime forces also
advanced towards a joint rebel-U.S. base at Tanaf in eastern Homs Province
amidst the period of de-escalation. The U.S. responded to the threat against
Tanaf by striking
pro-regime and Iranian-backed militia forces near the base on May 18,
however. Russia
has also used the de-escalation agreement to reshape its deployment
to Syria. Russia claimed to withdraw 30 aircraft from the Bassel al-Assad
International Airport in Latakia Province upon signing the de-escalation
agreement on May 4. The alleged withdrawal does not represent the degradation
of Russian capabilities in Syria, nor does it preclude Russia from conducting
airstrikes. Rather, Russia likely seeks to replace particular air assets with
alternate air frames and capabilities better suited for the next phase of pro-regime
operations in Syria, similar to previous Russian “withdrawals” throughout 2016.
Russia reportedly deployed at least
21 M-30 Howitzers and a new shipment of missiles for the advanced S-400
Surface-to-Air Missile System operated by Russia in Syria in early May. Russia also
deployed at least one A-50U
‘Mainstay’ Aerial Early Warning and Control Aircraft to Bassel al-Assad
International Airport on the Syrian Coast as of May 3. Russia deliberately drove fluctuations in the levels of violence in
rebel-held Syria in order to compel local and international actors to submit to
the Russian-Iranian-Turkish de-escalation zones. Russia escalated and
subsequently tapered its air campaign in Syria prior to the Astana Talks in
Kazakhstan from May 3 – 4, after which Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed the ‘de-escalation zone’agreement.
Prior to the agreement, Russia intensified its air campaign againstmainstream
elements ofthe
Syrian opposition, reliefproviders, and civilian
infrastructure such as hospitals in
Idlib and Hama Provinces from April 26 – 30. However, Russia subsequently halted its air campaign on the proposed de-escalation
zoneson May 1 and shifted its
focus toward ISIS-held terrain in eastern Syria from May 1 - 18. The de-escalation zones provided Russia and
its Iranian allies with a period of reset to recover following heavy losses in
clashes with opposition forces in northern Hama Province throughout April 2017.
Pro-regime forces have meanwhile begun to slowly escalate violence within the
de-escalation zones, repeatedly violating the agreement with artillerystrikes in Dera’a and Hama
Provinces. Russia’s continual use of violence to coerce local and international
actors to accept agreements that primarily serve Russia, Iran, and Syrian
President Bashar al Assad precludes any possibility of a legitimate,
Russian-backed ceasefire agreement in Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting.ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.