The argument for additional monetary action is straightforward. By law, the Fed is supposed to aim for maximum employment and stable prices. But the unemployment rate is 8.2 percent — a good two percentage points above what even the most pessimistic members say is its sustainable level. Moreover, the spate of disappointing data and the deepening crisis in Europe make continued weakness all too likely.

What about the arguments against further action? I don’t think they are convincing enough to win the debate.

I agree that we need more effective fiscal and housing policies. But neither is likely to happen, at least not before the presidential election. As a result, the Fed is the only plausible source of immediate help for the American economy. It was set up as an independent body precisely so that somebody can do what’s right when politicians can’t or won’t.

I find a related argument even more frustrating: that the Fed shouldn’t act because Congress wouldn’t like it and might retaliate. This argument exposes the important truth that the Fed is only as independent as Congress lets it be.

But it also raises a key question: what are Fed policy makers saving their independence for? If rescuing millions of Americans from the torment of unemployment isn’t a reason to risk their independence, what is?

In 1958, when the Fed was taking an unpopular stand to fight inflation, a very wise Fed chairman, William McChesney Martin, said this: “If the System should lose its independence in the process of fighting for sound money, that would indeed be a great feather in its cap and ultimately its success would be great.” The current Fed chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, should add the phrase “and full employment” after “sound money,” and paste that line on his bathroom mirror.

Furthermore, most analyses suggest that the main determinant of inflation is the state of the economy. With continuing high unemployment at home and slowing growth abroad, inflation seems more likely to fall than to rise. And there’s no evidence that a modest relaxation of the Fed’s vigilance could cause inflation to jump suddenly. Inflation is likely to rise only if the economy takes off — an outcome to pray for, not fear.

More fundamentally, the Fed’s dual mandate doesn’t say it should care about unemployment only so long as inflation is at or below the target. It’s supposed to care about both equally. If inflation is at the target and unemployment is way above, it’s sensible to risk a little inflation to bring down unemployment.

Beyond worrying that expansionary action might cause some inflationary pain, many Fed officials argue that the benefits, in terms of reduced unemployment, are likely to be small.

On this topic, there’s a severe disconnect between central bankers and academic monetary economists. As Laurence Ball of Johns Hopkins University discussed in a recent paper, Mr. Bernanke epitomizes the two very different views. As an academic, he mocked the Bank of Japan for its claim in the 1990s that it was helpless in the face of persistent economic weakness. He detailed all the ways that a central bank could help an economy even when its benchmark interest rate was zero.

Yet, as Fed chairman, he has seemed to side with those who say the Fed’s tools are limited right now. Professor Ball suggests that Mr. Bernanke’s change of view was a result of peer pressure and groupthink among his Fed colleagues.

The academic literature shows that monetary policy can be very effective at reducing unemployment in situations like ours. In the recovery from the Great Depression, for example, aggressive expansion of the money supply played a large role in lowering the real cost of borrowing and in spurring growth.

After the Fed has pushed interest rates down to zero, its main remaining tool is communications. It can affect expectations of future growth and inflation, which can have powerful effects on consumer spending and business investment today. But to have a big impact, the monetary actions need to be bold — and pursued with gusto. In an earlier column, I discussed one of economists’ favorite examples of such a policy: setting a target for the path of nominal gross domestic product.

If the Fed doesn’t want to do something as drastic as adopting a new operating procedure, it could at least make any smaller actions it takes more effective. The previous rounds of quantitative easing may have done little to improve expectations because their size and duration were limited in advance. If the Fed does another round, it should leave the overall size and end date unspecified. Or, better yet, the ultimate scale and timing could be tied to the goals the Fed wants to achieve.

Likewise, the Fed’s statement about the federal funds rate has seemed almost intended to undermine any positive confidence effects. It says the Fed expects a low rate through late 2014, which is supposed to give people hope. But the low rate is then justified by invoking continued weakness in the economy, which is likely to make people want to hide under the covers.

Instead, the policy-making committee could adopt the proposal of Charles Evans, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, that the Fed pledge to keep rates near zero until unemployment is down to 7 percent or inflation has risen to 3 percent. Such conditional guidance assures people that the Fed will keep at the job until unemployment is down or the toll on inflation becomes unacceptable.

The Fed meeting will be the first for two new governors, Jerome H. Powell and Jeremy C. Stein. It would be a great time to confront some of the faulty arguments being made against aggressive Fed action. For all our sakes, I hope Mr. Powell and Mr. Stein jump right in.

Christina D. Romer is an economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and was the chairwoman of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers.

A version of this article appears in print on June 10, 2012, on page BU6 of the New York edition with the headline: It’s Time for the Fed To Lead the Fight. Order Reprints|Today's Paper|Subscribe