and its Accountability to the

American Investor
Presented by:
CONGRESS IDENTIFIES A NEED FOR SIPA
SIPC’s MISSION DEFINED IN 1970
Bankruptcies of brokerage houses “may lead to loss of customers’ funds and
securities with an inevitable weakening of confidence in the U.S. securities
markets.”
“lessened confidence has an effect on the entire economy...”
“similar, in many respects, to…the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.”

P.8. 8ep. no. 91-398 (1970)
116 Cona. 8ec. 39343 (1970)
SIPC: UNDERFUNDED AND OVERWHELMED
The Stanford, Petters, and Madoff scandals have revealed that:
SIPC has long ignored its Congressional mandate to protect the investor.
SIPC has consciously elected to underfund itself over the years which has benefited its broker-dealer
membership. From 1995 to 2008, it assessed each member broker-dealer a mere $150 per year for SIPC
coverage. SIPC’s consistent underfunding has now left it incapable of responding to the kind of
brokerage failure it was designed to address.
Trustees have for the first time ever in a SIPA proceeding tried to use “clawback” and re-victimize the
same victims that SIPA intended to protect
If allowed to proceed, all US tax payers will be victimized by “clawback” as billions of dollars in taxes are
refunded while trustees are first in line for payment.
President Nixon signs the SIPA in 1970, proclaiming “This
legislation establishes the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC), a private nonprofit corporation, which
will insure the securities and cash left with brokerage firms
by investors against loss from financial difficulties or failure
of such firms.”
United States. SEC 1971 Annual Report, 37
th
Annual Report.
“In order to restore public confidence in the safety of the
markets, Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970.”
“This legislation, the most important in the securities field in
30 years, established the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation to provide insurance for customer accounts.”
“Customers are now insured.”
United States. SEC 1971 Annual Report, 37
th
Annual Report.
1992 GAO Report
“The major risk that SIPC faces, therefore, is that broker-dealers
will lose or steal customer cash”
“A major SIPC liquidation could damagepublic confidence.”
2000 SEC SIPC Audit - Office of Inspector General
“the Act protects customers whose securities were
misappropriated NEVER PURCHASED or stolen.”
REPEATEDLY IDENTIFYING THE THREAT
United States. GAO 1992 Report to Congressional Requestors, September 1992 GAO/GGD-92-109.
United States. SEC 2000 SIPC Audit, Oversight of Securities Investor Protection Corporation (Audit 301) March 31,2000.
SIPA was enacted in 1970 in order to protect the “legitimate
expectations” of customers of SEC-regulated broker/dealers and to
encourage investment in American securities.
For decades and until now in numerous Ponzi scheme cases, including a
case that went to the Second Circuit, In re New Times Securities Services,
Inc., 371 F. 3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2004), SIPC has recognized that
customers’ “legitimate expectations” are derived from statements and
trade confirmations received from the fraudster and has paid based on
the victims’ last statement.
“The best way to track your brokerage account activity and performance is
to carefully review your statements.”*.
“LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS”
* “Understanding Your Account Statements,” updated 2007, published by SIFMA, SIPC, NASAA
Now SIPC says
150 million Americans can no longer rely on their brokerage
statements.
“LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS”
• SIPC would replace securities that were listed on
falsified account statements
• even if the securities had never been purchased:
In sworn testimony,
Stephen Harbeck,
President & CEO of SIPC,
clarified to the court that:
• If you file within sixty days, you’ll get the securities, without question. Whether --if
they triple in value, you’ll get the securities. . . . Even if they’re not there.
Harbeck:
• Even if they’re not there? Court:
• Correct. Harbeck:
• In other words, if the money was diverted converted… Court:
• And the securities were NEVER PURCHASED. Harbeck:
• Okay. Court:
• And if those positions triple, WE WILL GLADLY GIVE THE PEOPLE THEIR
SECURITIES POSITIONS.
Harbeck:
1ranscrlpL aL 37-39, ln re new 1lmes Securlues Servlces, lnc., no. 00-8178 (8ankr. L.u.n.?. !ulv 28, 2000).
SIPC’s COVERAGE DEFINED
2000 New Times Securities
2000 SEC AUDIT OF SIPC
“Given the rapidly changing securities environment ….evaluate the SIPC
Fund and assessment”
2000 THE STREET - SIPC’S SCROOGELIKE WAYS DRAW SCRUTINY
“SIPC officials say … the $1.1 billion fund is inadequate.”
“INDUSTRY EXPERTS SAY A FUND AS BIG AS $40 BILLION WOULD
BE REQUIRED”
WARNINGS THAT SIPC’s FUND WAS INSUFFICENT
10
United States. GAO 1992 Report to Congressional Requestors, September 1992 GAO/GGD-92-109.
Kowalski, R. 2000 “SIPC’s Scroogelike Ways Draw Scrutiny, theStreet.com,Aug. 7, 2000.
United States. SEC 2000 SIPC Audit, Oversight of Securities Investor Protection Corporation (Audit 301) March 31,2000.
2000 Letter to GAO
From the Energy & Commerce Committee
signed by:
JOHN D. DINGELL
“the adequacy of the SIPC fund is not covered in SEC inspections
or in independent financial statement audits.”
“This program needs a lot of work.”
2003 GAO REPORT
“The SIPC fund was at risk in the case of failure of one or more of
the large securities firms.”
“Even if SIPC were to triple the fund in size, a very large liquidation
could deplete the fund.”
WARNINGS THAT SIPC’S FUND WAS INSUFFICENT
11
United States Cong. House Committee on Energy Commerce, Letter to Acting Chairman SEC and President SIPC June 20, 2000.
United States. GAO 2003 Report to Congressional Requestors, July 2003 GAO-03-811.
WARNINGS THAT SIPC’S FUND WAS INSUFFICENT
12
United States Cong. House Committee on Energy Commerce, Letter to Chairman SEC, President SIPC, and Comptroller US GAO 08/11/ 2003.
MADOFF NEWS BREAKS AND SIPC SCRAMBLES
2009 Reuters
Harbeck said staff from SIPC and the SEC have met to figure out the
best way to settle claims but a formal decision has not been made yet.
"Settling claims in a Ponzi scheme that has gone on for 30 years is
unprecedented" he said.
"I assume that some time within the fairly near future, the trustee, SIPC
and the SEC will agree on a methodology as to how we are going to
help these people …," said Harbeck.”
2009 Congressional Testimony
Harbeck testifies at a House Committee hearing that SIPC was
indeed investor protection (except for market risk) and agreed it
performed an insurance like function.
?ounalal 8. , "Madoñ trustee por|ng over hundreds of c|a|ms: 5IÞC", keuters, !an. 23, 2009.
nouse Comm|uee near|ng, Comm|uee on I|nanc|a| 5erv|ces, "Assesslna Lhe Madoñ Þonzl and Lhe need for 8eaulaLorv 8eform," Ian. 5, 2009.
“SIPC is not now and never was a FDIC-like ‘insurance’
entity.” *
SIPC inserts this change to its website removing any
reference to the word “insurance,” and removes certain
pages from both its website and public archived sites, in the
immediate aftermath of the Madoff fraud.
SIPC CHANGES ITS POSITION
*SLephen Parbeck, SlÞC Þress 8elease, lebruarv 4, 2010
In 1970, Senator Edmund S. Muskie proclaimed, in urging the
prompt enactment of SIPA: “…after this bill is enacted, no American
will lose his savings through a brokerage firm bankruptcy.” (Federal
Broker Dealer Ins. Corporation: Hearing on S2388, 3988 and 3989
before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 95
th
Cong. 10(1970) at 147.)
"The protections that everyone thought were so widespread don't
really fit today's business model," said Steven B. Caruso, a partner at
law firm Maddox Hargett & Caruso.”*
1he prollferauon slnce 1970 of hedae funds, feeder funds, penslon
plans, LrusLs, famllv parLnershlps and slmllar lnvesLmenL vehlcles has
leû vlrLuallv Lhousands of lndlrecL lnvesLors wlLh no safeLv neL
whaLsoever.
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INDIRECT INVESTORS
DISCOVER THEY ARE NOT PROTECTED
15
*Source: Wall SLreeL !ournal, !une 18, 2010
SIPC is trying to change the statutory definition of covered claims and is trying to turn a
victim’s asset (SIPC protection) into a liability (“clawback”), thus shifting the responsibility
from Wall Street to the investor.
THE NUMBERS:
• Hypothetical investor invested $1million in 1988 (20-years ago) and made and withdrew a return of 10% or $100,000 per
year.
• Of the $100,000 per year, 50% was used to pay income taxes and 50% for living expenses.
• Fraud discovered in 2008 and the final account balance was $1million.
• $1million = total taxes paid
• $2million = total withdrawals
HISTORICAL PRECEDENT IN ALL PRIOR SIPC CASES (prior to Madoff):
• Investor has positive “Net Equity” of $1million. ($1m final account balance)
• Investor would receive maximum SIPC protection of $500,000.
SIPC’S NEW MATH:
• Investor has negative “Net Equity” of $1million. ($1 million deposits - $2 million withdrawals)
• Investor owes SIPC $600,000 of “claw back”.
• Note: State laws limit recoupments to anywhere from 2 – 6 years.
SIPC INVOKES “CLAWBACK”
SIPC’s Annual Reports (1995-2008) cumulative.
$70,085,485,470,000 = value of US equities traded in 2008/$816,322 TOTAL SIPC Member Assessments in 2008
Assessments in 2008
From 1995 thru 2008
SIPC assessed each member $150 per year
Only after the fraud was detected did SIPC increase the assessments
to .25% of net operating income.
SIPC WAS UNDERFUNDED:
17
A STUNNING REVIEW OF SIPC ANNUAL MEMBER
ASSESSMENTS
18
ln uS dollars ($'s)
SIPC’s Annual Reports (1995-2008) cumulative.
Congressman Ackerman:
“Which Madoff investors are eligible for their SIPC insurance?”
*

Mary Schapiro, Chairman SEC:
“The tragic truth is there is not enough money available to pay off all
the customer claims.”
*

Congressman Sherman:
“There is no more obvious fraud than someone selling insurance …
that doesn’t have any capital.”
“Any insurance regulator…would close you [SIPC] down in a second”
**
2009 Congress|ona| 1esnmony
SIPC SEEKS TO RELY ON ITS OWN UNDER
FUNDING TO JUSTIFY NON PAYMENT OF CLAIMS
19
*Pouse Commluee Pearlna, Commluee on llnanclal Servlces, ºSLC CverslahL: CurrenL SLaLe and Aaenda" !ulv 14, 2009.
**Pouse Commluee Pearlna, Commluee on llnanclal Servlces, ºAssesslna Lhe Madoñ Þonzl and Lhe need for 8eaulaLorv 8eform," !an. 3, 2009.
PAST TURNS OUT TO BE PROLOGUE
“The agency…is deliberately making it hard for individuals to get their
money back because it wants to protect its members, who are most of the
nation’s brokers.”
“SIPC does what it does because it’s owned by brokerage firms, not the
government.”
2000 The Street
“SIPC…has defined its role so narrowly that it doesn't use enough of its
resources to help victims of broker fraud.”
“doles out lucrative contracts to a handful of lawyers who keep the purse
strings tight when overseeing the liquidation”
“Picard…hired as a trustee on seven liquidations”
“Require brokers to pay more than $150 each annually into the fund. “It's
nothing," says Joe Borg, Alabama's chief securities regulator.”
“Many Unhappy Returns: Ex-Stratton Customers still fighting to recoup $130m,” Newsday, Dec. 20, 1998.
Kowalski, R. 2000 “SIPC’s Scroogelike Ways Draw Scrutiny, theStreet.com,Aug 7, 2000
1998 Newsday
PAST TURNS OUT TO BE PROLOGUE
''They are very aggressive in attempting to prove that investors'
claims do not come within certain legal definitions within the
S.I.P.C. statute. And the loser is the investor.”
“Since 1971, trustees have received $320 million, 37% more than
has been paid to wronged investors.”
“Trustees overseeing the cases have allegiance to the corporation
that appointed them, rather than to wronged investors.”
Morgenson, G. 2000, Investor Beware: Many Holes Weaken Safety Net for Victims of Failed Brokerages, New York Times, Sep. 25, 2000
2000 New ¥ork 1|mes
“SIPC policies and practices may unduly limit the actual protection
afforded customers.”
“Critics argue that SIPC’s main goal has been to protect its industry-
supplied fund rather than to protect customers as contemplated by
SIPA.”
“...significant deficiencies on the part of SIPC and on the part of
SEC that appear to have operated to the detriment of investors.”
“request by Rep. Paul Kanjorski and me asking…to recommend ways
to improve collections and increase reimbursement of victims of
financial schemes.”
2001 Letter to SIPC & SEC ALARM BELLS
From the Energy & Commerce Committee
Signed by:
John D. Dingell:
Ranking Member
Committee on Energy and
Commerce
United States Cong. House Committee on Energy Commerce, Letter to Acting Chairman SEC and President SIPC June 20, 2001
“SIPC should improve its controls over the fees awarded to trustees and their
counsel for the services rendered and their expenses.”
“Since 1996, SIPC has charged each broker-dealer member an annual
assessment of $150.”
2003 GAO Report
MORE ALARM BELLS
''Mr. Dingell said, ''the large number of claims denied…has raised concerns
that SIPC policies may unduly limit the actual protection afforded
customers.””
Representative Paul E. Kanjorski, Democrat of Pennsylvania, ''Both Congress
and the administration must address these concerns and deficiencies
promptly, especially as more Americans than ever -- roughly 50 percent -- are
invested in the stock market.”
“Many Holes Weaken Safety Net for Victims of Failed Brokerages,” The New York Times, Sept. 25, 2000
United States. GAO 2003 Report to Congressional Requestors, July 2003 GAO-03-811.
2001 New ¥ork 1|mes
“[Clawback recoveries] will, with the Court’s approval, be allocated to
the Customer Fund and be subject to a supplemental pro rata
distribution to the remaining over-the-limits customer-claimants and
SIPC, as subrogee for its cash advances to the Trustee to satisfy allowed
customer claims.”
SIPC INTENDS TO CLAWBACK INVESTORS TO
REPAY ITSELF
Aprll 14, 2010, Lhe 1rusLee's 1hlrd lnLerlm 8eporL
Penrlques u., ºproLecuon Chlef SLruaales wlLh Madoñ Clalms", new ?ork 1lmes uecember 8, 2009
“Mr. Harbeck said in an interview…“this is a zero-sum game — a dollar
we give to someone who is not eligible is a dollar we do not have for
someone who is.””
INVESTORS AWAIT PAYMENT, YET SIPC HAS PAID
OUT NEARLY $100 MILLION TO ITS TRUSTEE
In the 18 months from December 2008 through May 2010 the
Trustee and his law firm
have billed SIPC $96.7 million.
*

$1,317,980 a week – the equivalent of 118 years of member
assessments using the 2008 rates.
“[Picard] has worked on at least nine cases…handling more SIPC
liquidations than any other attorney, Harbeck said.”
**
*Aprll 14, 2010, Lhe 1rusLee's 1hlrd lnLerlm 8eporL
** !"#$%&'()*(+,-(./0,1+'()*'(2Madoñ 1rustee Þ|card May 1ake I|ve ¥ears to Þay 8ack Investors," 8|oomberg 3(4+,5+&6(78'(799:(
Rep Scott Garett
• “looking for justice…for their reliance on what government assured them…through this
[SIPC] program”
*

Rep Jackie Speier
• “For 19 years they [brokers] were only paying $150 per year….the insurance product is out
of date.”
*

Rep Ron Klein
• “The SIPC Series rules provide for the classification of the claims in accordance with the
“legitimate expectations” of a customer based on the written transaction confirmations sent
by the broker/dealer to the customer. …let’s follow the law…SIPC has a responsibility to
make sure the law is followed”
*

Rep Michelle Bachmann
• “Mr. Stephen Harbeck, President of the SIPC, recently testified before our Committee that
the SIPC trust fund only has $1.6 billion in funds available”
• “Unfortunately, the SEC actually had this information at its fingertips and did not act.”
**

2009/10 CONGRESSIONAL REACTIONS
Before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises
• Pouse llnanclal Servlces Sub Commluee on CaplLal MarkeL Pearlna, ºAddluonal 8eforms Lo Lhe Securlues lnvesLor ÞroLecuon AcL," SLmL . uec. 9, 2009.
**Pouse llnanclal Servlces Sub Commluee on CaplLal MarkeL Pearlna, ºAssesslna Lhe Madoñ Þonzl and Lhe need for 8eaulaLorv 8eform," SLmL . leb. 4, 2009.
THE MADOFF FRAUD HAS AFFECTED CITIZENS IN
NEARLY EVERY STATE
www.madoñmap.com
There is virtually not a region in America that has not been affected
by the scandal.
Roughly 40% of every dollar SIPC does not pay will be borne by
the US Taxpayer, since refunds will be paid out to victims of the
Madoff fraud instead of SIPC claims.*
SIPC’s refusal to pay claims is shifting the burden of this fraud from
the broker-dealer industry (that funds SIPC) to the US taxpayer, yet
another Wall Street Bailout
SIPC AND THE TRUSTEE’S BEHAVIOR WILL COST
THE US TAXPAYER
*1he $1.2 bllllon of proLecuon LhaL SlÞC ls refuslna Lo pav wlll resulL ln refunds from Lhe uS 1reasurv esumaLed Lo be $480 mllllon.
SIPC ignored all the
warnings
+
They were underfunded
+
They knew it
SIPC is now trying to
change the rules and is
ignoring its Congressional
mission
Rather than assessing its 4,539 members to pay their
obligation,
SIPC, a member-owned not-for-profit group,
continues to victimize the innocent investors it is
mandated to protect.
SIPC and PR firm, The Hastings Group, have
branded victims as “net winners” in order to justify
“claw backs.”
This is unprecedented in a SIPA proceeding.
If the Madoff Fraud were not so large
and SIPC were properly funded, SIPC
would have paid the victims as Congress
intended, as they did in the NEW
TIMES case and other SIPC cases
BEFORE.
Only Congress can force SIPC to
follow the law and the congressional
mandates as set forth in SIPA.
NIAPNI
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
PLEASE CONTACT:
NETWORK FOR INVESTOR ACTION AND
PROTECTION
WWW.INVESTORACTION.ORG
PO BOX 2159
HALESITE, NY 11743
Phone: (800) 323-9250
neLwork for lnvesLor Acuon and ÞroLecuon ls a realsLered 301c4 corporauon