Tagged: EU law

On the 24th of September the CJEU delivered its judgement in the Demirkan case. Ms Demirkan, a Turkish national, had requested a short-term tourist Visa to German authorities to go and visit her stepfather, a German national. However, since the German authorities rejected her request, Ms Demirkan attacked the decision arguing that on the basis of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol to the EU–Turkey Association Agreement she was entitled to enter Germany without a Visa because at the time of the conclusion of the Additional Protocol -1970- Turkish nationals did not need a Visa to enter Germany as tourists. On the basis of Ms Demirkan’s claim, the referring court in Berlin addressed two questions to the CJEU. First, it asked whether article 41(1) of the Additional protocol containing the ‘stand-still’ clause on restrictions related to the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services included the passive reception of services. Secondly, the referring court asked the CJEU whether a tourist traveling to visit family could be considered as a passive recipient of services when the purpose of traveling is personal and not economical. Continue reading →

Ever since Prof. Sebastian Thrun’s historic feat of attracting more than 150,000 students to his Massive Open Online Course on artificial intelligence two years ago, MOOCs have started to shake up the landscape and minds of higher education. In a kind of “gold rush”, academics want to join this remarkable development, and companies are being founded to provide platforms for such ventures, predominantly in the US, but also more recently in Europe. Beyond subjects closer to technology, such as computer science or engineering, the social sciences and humanities have also come to feel the potential and attraction of MOOCs. Continue reading →

On the 5th of June 2012, the Court of Justice of the EU (hereafter ‘CJEU’) delivered an important judgment in the field of European State aid law on the very notion of State aid and the application of the private investor test to situations where a priori a private investor could not adopt the same behaviour as the State. To put things in context, it will be recalled that the private investor test is normally used in order to determine whether a public company has been granted an advantage within the meaning of Article 107 TFUE, by comparing the behaviour of the State with that of a private investor operating in normal market conditions. It was settled case-law (see notably the case-law quoted by the Court at point 79 of its judgment) however that, when the State acts as a public authority (by using its fiscal prerogatives for example), this test cannot be applied as there is no private investor to which the State can be compared to.

For the first time with this EDF judgment, the CJEU attempts to set criteria in order to distinguish between the State acting as shareholder and the State exercising public power.

The principle of mutual confidence is a fundamental aspect of EU law. It implies that Member States should have trust in one another when implementing EU law. So, in Hedley Lomas (Case C-5/94, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd.) the United Kingdom could not prohibit the export of live sheep to Spain because it did not trust the Spanish authorities in applying EU rules on animal welfare. The only thing the UK was allowed to do was either to start an infringement procedure according to article 259 TFEU or complain with the Commission.

In the recent case N. S.(Case C-411/10 N. S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department et M. E. and Others), concerning transfers of a asylum seekers to Greece, the Court made a caveat to that principle.

It held:

At issue here is the raison d’être of the European Union and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, the Common European Asylum System, based on mutual confidence and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights.

(…)

By contrast, if there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, of asylum seekers transferred to the territory of that Member State, the transfer would be incompatible with that provision.

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The case law of Court on individual standing for review of legality of measures of general application has faced criticism over the years for being too strict. Applicants had to fulfill the conditions contained in the (in)famous Plaumann judgment: an act of general application had to affect ‘them by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee of a decision’ (the Plaumann formula).

It has been very difficult for individuals who wish to challenge EU measures of general application to satisfy this test. Article 230 EC has now been amended with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

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The European Law Blog aims to highlight, and comment on, current developments in EU case law and legislation. Our posts are short comments on judgments and legislation and are intended for anyone who wishes to stay informed on EU law. We hope you will enjoy our posts!

Share this:

The European Law Blog aims to highlight, and comment on, current developments in EU case law and legislation. Our posts are short comments on judgments and legislation and are intended for anyone who wishes to stay informed on EU law. We hope you will enjoy our posts!