The Georgia State Supreme Court has unanimously upheld a $40 million award to the family of a four-year-old boy killed in 2012 when the 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee in which he was riding was rear-ended and burst into flames, Chrysler Group LLC v. Walden, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 154 (3/15/18).

In 2015, the jury returned a verdict of nearly $150 million in favor of the parents, but the trial court suggested a remittitur to $40 million, which was accepted by the plaintiffs. The Jeep’s fuel tank had been placed near the back of the vehicle, which plaintiffs said made it vulnerable to rear-end collisions. Four-year-old Remington Walden was a rear seat passenger who was trapped in the Jeep and burned to death.

The Supreme Court said that “evidence showed that Chrysler had long known that mounting a gas tank behind the rear axle was dangerous. Evidence also showed that Chrysler’s placement of the gas tank behind the rear axle was contrary to industry trends, which favored placing tanks in front of the rear axle.”

Fiat Chrysler lawyers contended that the fire did not cause boy’s death, but blamed the driver of the pick-up truck that rear ended the Jeep. On appeal, the defendant contended it was prejudicial to allow testimony about Chief Executive Sergio Marchionne’s compensation, which totaled more than $68 million, into evidence at trial. They also denied there was a safety issue and claimed the vehicles were no more dangerous than comparable SUVs built at the time. However, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has linked more than 50 deaths to the Jeep fuel-tank issue.

Fiat Chrysler had to recall 1.56 million 2002-07 Jeep Liberty and 1993-2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee SUVs in June 2013 to address fire risks and they agreed to install trailer hitches to protect the gas tanks. The recall and a “customer satisfaction campaign” that covered the Jeep in the fatal Georgia crash occurred after CEO Marchionne held private talks with senior government officials in 2013.

The Supreme Court concluded “not that compensation evidence is always admissible to show the bias of an employee witness, or that it is never admissible, but that such evidence is subject to the Rule 403 analysis weighing the evidence’s unfair prejudice against its probative value.” And, “because Chrysler did not raise a Rule 403 objection to the compensation evidence at issue” the Court concluded “that under the particular circumstances of this case—where the jury’s evaluation of the bias and credibility of Chrysler’s CEO were central to the allegations in the case because the CEO was alleged to have specifically interjected himself in a federal safety investigation to the detriment of the plaintiffs—we cannot say that the prejudicial effect of the evidence so far outweighed its probative value that its admission was clear and obvious reversible error.”

Therefore, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the rationale of the Court of Appeals, it affirmed its judgment, and upheld the $40 million award.

Jean Dedmon had sued for injuries she sustained in a car accident, and attached the bills from her hospital and doctors to her complaint. While the case was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its opinion in West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corporation, 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014), and held that based upon the specific provisions of Tennessee’s hospital lien statutes, T.C.A. §§ 29-22-101-107, the hospital’s lien was limited to the discounted amounts paid by the patients’ insurance companies.

After West, the defendants in Dedmon argued that the West decision also changed the law in Tennessee for all cases involving personal injuries, contending that personal injury plaintiffs who have insurance can no longer use the full medical bills to prove their medical expenses. The trial court agreed and limited the plaintiffs’ proof on medical expenses to the discounted payments the hospital and doctors had contractually agreed to accept from Mrs. Dedmon’s insurance company.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court, holding that West does not apply in personal injury cases outside the context of the lien statute, Dedmon v. Steelman, 2016 LEXIS 386 (Tenn. App. 2016). However, while plaintiffs who have insurance can use full, undiscounted medical bills to prove medical expenses, the Court of Appeals also said that defendants could use discounted insurance payments to prove that the undiscounted bills were not reasonable. That, of course, opens the door to collateral source evidence.

The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that its holding in West was not intended to apply to all personal injury cases, but reversed the Court of Appeals on the collateral source issue, holding that insurance payments and other benefits received by plaintiffs that do not come from the defendant (benefits that come from “collateral sources”), may not be used to reduce the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court explained that Tennessee has always followed the collateral source rule, and that it prevents defendants from telling juries about plaintiffs’ insurance and other such benefits. So, after a thorough review, the Supreme Court declined to alter existing law in Tennessee, and held that the collateral source rule applies. Therefore, the plaintiffs may introduce evidence of Mrs. Dedmon’s full, undiscounted medical bills as proof of her reasonable medical expenses, and the defendants may not introduce the discounted rates paid by Mrs. Dedmon’s insurance company for any purpose. The defendants can use other evidence to show that the full medical expenses are not reasonable, however, as long as that evidence does not violate the collateral source rule.

One very interesting point made by the Court was: “it is evident that medical expenses cannot be valued in the same way one would value a house or a car,” since “health care services are highly regulated and rates are skewed by countless factors, only one of which is insurance.” The Court concluded that there is no reason to believe that discounted insurance rates are a more accurate way to determine the value of medical services.

The bottom line: While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the collateral source rule is imperfect, it remains the law in Tennessee.

As we look forward to cooler weather this fall, we should be reminded we are more likely to encounter fog on our highways. Fog is prevalent in areas where moisture is abundant, such our southern rivers and lakes. However, fog can occur anywhere. Abundant condensation nuclei enhances the formation of fog. Fog may form (1) by cooling air to its dew point, or (2) by adding moisture to air near the ground. Fog can also be be prevalent in industrial areas where byproducts of combustion provide a high concentration of these nuclei. Fog often develops along I-75 and other roads close to the Hiwassee River in Tennessee, near Bowater and Arch/Olin Chemical. Be careful.

Although the circumstances were unusual, the Tennessee Supreme has clarified that under Tennessee law a wrongful death claim did not belong to the decedent, but passed to decedent’s husband upon her death, Linda Beard v. James William Branson and Trinity Hospital, L.L.C. The husband had filed a pro se wrongful death malpractice lawsuit shortly before the one-year statute of limitations lapsed. After expiration of the limitations period, he retained an attorney and filed an amended complaint. The decedent was also survived by two daughters. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing that the husband’s initial pro se complaint was filed in a representative capacity on behalf of the decedent and the other statutory beneficiaries and that it was, therefore, void ab initio. They contended that the amended complaint could not relate back to the date of the initial complaint, and the lawsuit was therefore time-barred. The trial court denied the summary judgment motions and held a jury trial where the jury found both defendants liable and awarded damages. The Court of Appeals had reversed and held that the claim belonged to the decedent and therefore the husband could not file a lawsuit without a lawyer.

This all started back in 2004, when Ruth Hartley was admitted to Trinity Hospital in Erin, Tennessee for elective colon surgery. She developed complications from the surgery and died. It is a sad commentary on our judicial system that this case has gone on for 13 years. A unanimous Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Tennessee’s wrongful death statutes, the decedent’s right of action “pass[es] to” the surviving spouse upon the decedent’s death, and the surviving spouse asserts the right of action for the benefit of himself and other beneficiaries. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106, reversing the Court of Appeals, but sending the case back to the intermediate appellate court for consideration of other issues.

The opinion by Justice Holly Kirby is recommended reading, as she discusses Tennessee’s confusing statutory wrongful death scheme, which she describes as “a hybrid between the survival and wrongful death statutes, resulting in a statutory scheme with a ‘split personality.'”

Typically, many laws passed by the Georgia legislature take effect July 1st. This year, the only substantive change affecting some civil lawsuits is a minor change to the venue provisions of the State Tort Claims Act. Senate Bill 126 amended the Code section relating to venue for tort actions against the State by adding certain specifications. Currently, under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28, tort actions against the state must be brought in the state or superior court of the county where the loss occurred; SB 126 requires that tort actions against the state be brought in the state or superior court of the county where the tort that gave rise to the loss occurred. The bill also codified longstanding case law indicating that wrongful death actions against the state may be brought in the county where the tort giving rise to the loss occurred or the county where the decedent died. This bill resulted from the State’s concern that a 2015 case interpreted the “where the loss occurred” to allow plaintiffs to file tort claims act cases in any county where they experienced symptoms from the injuries sustained in the incident giving rise to the tort claim or in any county where they incurred medical bills for the injury. The new provisions only affect causes of action filed on or after July 1, 2017.

Here is the full text of the amended statute, § 50-21-28:

“All tort actions against the state under this article shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the tort giving rise to the loss occurred; provided, however, that, wrongful death actions may be brought in the county wherein the tort giving rise to the loss occurred or the county wherein the decedent died, and provided, further, that in any case in which an officer or employee of the state may be included as a defendant in his or her individual capacity, the action may be brought in the county of residence of such officer or employee. All actions against the state for losses sustained in any other state shall be brought in the county of residence of any officer or employee residing in this state upon whose actions or omissions the claim against the state is based.”

For over two years, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has been considering requiring trucking companies to carry more liability insurance to protect the public. Unfortunately, under the Trump administration, FMCSA has just withdrawn its November 28, 2014 advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning financial responsibility for motor carriers, freight forwarders, and brokers. FMCSA is authorized to establish minimum levels of financial responsibility for motor carriers at or above the minimum levels set by Congress. In the ANPRM, FMCSA sought public comment on whether to exercise its discretion to increase the minimum levels of financial responsibility, and, if so, to what levels. Currently motor carriers, i.e. trucking companies, only have to carry $750,000 of liability insurance. The agency was considering increasing the minimum limits to as much as $5,000,000. FMCSA now claims that after reviewing all public comments to the ANPRM, it has determined that it has insufficient data or information to support moving forward with a rulemaking proposal, at this time. That means they have bowed to political and lobbying pressure from the trucking industry and backed down, leaving the motoring public at risk from financially irresponsible operators who cause catastrophic wrecks.

The Georgia Supreme Court has held that an arbitration clause signed by the decedent (or by a person having power-of-attorney for the decedent) in a nursing home case is enforceable and requires the decedent’s wrongful-death beneficiaries to arbitrate their claims, United Health Services v. Norton, S16G1143 (3/6/17). The Court of Appeals had held otherwise, 336 Ga. App. 51, 55 (Ga. App. 2016) and got reversed. The Supreme Court reasoned that a wrongful death action is a derivative claim and is subject to any defenses that would have been good against the decedent.

Arbitration clauses, governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, are common in the admissions paperwork at nursing homes, often signed without question by the patient or the person holding a power of attorney for the patient.

In the Norton case a person with a power of attorney signed the admitting papers for the patient, including an arbitration clause with the following language:

“This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and bind the Patient/Resident and the Healthcare Center, their successors, assigns, and intended and incidental beneficiaries…. The term “Patient/Resident” shall include the Patient/Resident, his or her guardian, attorney-in-fact, agent, sponsor, representative, or any person whose claim is derived through or on behalf of the Patient/Resident, including, in addition to those already listed in this Paragraph, any parent, spouse, child, executor, administrator, heir, or survivor entitled to bring a wrongful death claim.”

Patients and family are typically not thinking of bringing wrongful death lawsuits against the nursing they are trusting to provide care, but the nursing homes are, and the Supreme Court has now held that the clause was binding on the deceased’s family members. Arbitration is an expensive and burdensome process that can now supersede the constitutional right to trial by jury.

Any lawyers who prepare powers of attorney and/or advance directives should consider including the following language (or something similar) to sidestep this unfortunate ruling:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Power of Attorney, my Agent does not have the authority to waive my right to a jury trial or my right to assert in any forum any claim I may have or a claim that may relate to me, such as a claim for personal injury or wrongful death. My Agent has no authority to enter into any agreement under which I am required to enter arbitration or any other proceeding, binding or otherwise.

Truckers came by the thousands from all across the country, pulling into into the Petro Stopping Center, a 24-hour truck stop off Interstate 285 in Atlanta, where they could find coffee and CB radios, tires and a tattoo shop, and a chiropractor, known as “Dr. Tony.” Dr. Anthony Lefteris got federally certified in 2014 to conduct the DOT medical exams that truckers must pass to get their commercial driver’s license (CDL). Lefteris is alleged to have completed nearly as many exams in an hour as a typical federally certified examiner did in a month. In less than three years, he issued more than 6,500 certificates of good health to truckers from 43 states! But they appear to have been falsified.

An anonymous tip from a trucker led to Lefteris’s arrest in December and he now faces criminal charges of falsifying documents filed with a federal agency. All his bogus DOT cards have been revoked by FMCSA, and this could have repercussions throughout the industry, as those drivers may have been operating commercial vehicles illegally.

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Issued the Following Public Notice December 28, 2016:

On December 1, 2016, a Criminal Complaint in the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia, was issued against Anthony Lefteris, Doctor of Chiropractic (D.C.), National Registry of Certified Medical Examiners (“National Registry”) No. 8343724872, of Atlanta, Georgia. Dr. Lefteris was charged with Making False Statements, in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 1001; and Making a False Entry in U.S. Department of Transportation’s Records with the Intent to Impede and Influence the Proper Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation, in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 1519.

The investigation initiated by the U.S. Department of Transportation determined that while listed as a Certified Medical Examiner on the National Registry, Dr. Lefteris conducted a number of medical certification examinations that far exceeded a reasonable number of examinations. An undercover investigation conducted by the Georgia Department of Public Safety revealed that the purported medical examinations conducted by Dr. Lefteris at a truck stop in Atlanta, Georgia, exhibited a pattern whereby the examination was incomplete, required tests were not performed and information on the medical examination form was falsified.

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) removed Dr. Lefteris from the National Registry on December 2, 2016.

USDOT/FMCSA intends to revoke all certificates issued by Dr. Lefteris to commercial motor vehicle operators within the past two years.

FMCSA offices nationwide are presently working with State Driver’s Licensing Agencies to obtain the contact information for all affected drivers. FMCSA is contacting these drivers and informing them that they have THIRTY DAYS to obtain a Medical Examiner’s Certificate from a Medical Examiner with valid certification on the National Registry.

Drivers and carriers with further questions should contact USDOT/FMCSA via email at FMCSAMedical@dot.gov

Mid-South Super Lawyers, a publication of Thomson Reuters, has once again recognized Patrick Cruise and Hu Hamilton as Super Lawyers in the plaintiff’s personal injury practice in Tennessee. Only eight attorneys in the Chattanooga area have earned such recognition, and The Hamilton Firm LLC is proud to have two of them serving our clients, as our firm strives to reach the highest levels of advocacy and professionalism in the pursuit of justice for our clients. Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high-degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The selection process includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations. Hu Hamilton is also named as a Georgia Super Lawyer for plaintiff’s personal injury.

A motor carrier engaged in interstate commerce and subject to Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR) must have minimum liability coverage of $750,000. The insurer must provide a MCS-90 endorsement to the liability policy, and that endorsement is supposed to be filed with FMCSA.

In Grange Indemnity Insurance Company v. Burns, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 365, decided June 23rd, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an MCS-90 endorsement attached to a commercial auto policy did not provide additional insurance coverage to the trucking company even though it was registered as an interstate motor carrier.

The trucking company, J. B. Trucking, was insured under a Grange Indemnity commercial auto insurance policy with limits of only $350,000.00. But the policy also contained an MCS-90 endorsement (with minimum coverage of $750,000.00 for nonhazardous materials). The plaintiff was injured as result of their driver’s negligence, resulting in a jury verdict of $3.3 million, but the Court of Appeals limited the plaintiff’s recovery from the insurance proceeds to $350,000, holding that the crash occurred during an intrastate delivery (involving nonhazardous materials), as opposed to during an interstate trip, and therefore the MCS-90 endorsement did not provide coverage.

The Court found that it was undisputed that the truck driver, Franks “was engaged in a trip involving purely intrastate commerce and that he was transporting nonhazardous commodities. Franks picked up a box truck in Monroe, Georgia, and drove the truck to Norcross, Georgia, where he picked up a load of “sales papers” and delivered them to a paper company in Newnan, Georgia. The sales papers were manufactured in Georgia and were destined for end users located in Georgia. While he was on his way from Newnan to Monroe to return the empty box truck, Franks struck the vehicle Burns was driving.”

The plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that once an MCS-90 endorsement is issued to a registered interstate carrier, the endorsement should apply regardless of whether a “specific trip” is intrastate or interstate. Burns argued that a Georgia citizen injured by an interstate motor carrier conducting intrastate commerce of nonhazardous materials at the time of an accident should be given the same amount of protection as a citizen injured by the same truck, owned by the same carrier, and covered by the same insurance policy, but whose cargo may be destined for another state. Burns argued that the MCS-90 endorsement should apply to all J. B. Trucking trips because J. B. Trucking was registered as an “interstate” carrier and J. B. Trucking had on many other occasions been involved in interstate trips.

There is a split of authority on this issue nationwide, as there are other courts which have held that the MCS-90 endorsement will apply to interstate and intrastate accidents (involving nonhazardous materials). Those courts rejected the “trip specific” approach, which focuses on the character of the shipment itself as interstate or intrastate, and instead based their decision on the fact that the FMCSA had jurisdiction over all of the interstate carrier’s trips, regardless of destination. Some courts have also held that based on public policy considerations, the MSC-90 should apply because the endorsement was designed to protect members of the general public injured by interstate carriers, regardless of the carrier’s destination on a particular trip. The public policy underlying the MCS-90 is to provide a safety net to members of the public injured as a result of negligent operation of tractor trailers used in interstate commerce. Its primary purpose is to assure injured members of the public are able to obtain judgments from negligent authorized interstate carriers. See Reliance National Insurance Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12901 (S.D.N.Y.) and Heron v. Transportation Casualty Insurance Co., 274 Va. 534 (Va. 2007).