The DHCP client (dhclient) could be crashed by a malicious DHCP
server sending an overlong subnet field (CVE-2009-0692).

In theory a malicious DHCP server could exploit the flaw to execute
arbitrary code as root on machines using dhclient to obtain network
settings. Newer distributions (SLES10+, openSUSE) do have buffer
overflow checking that guards against this kind of stack overflow
though. So actual exploitability is rather unlikely.

2) Solution or Work-Around

There is no known workaround, please install the update packages.

3) Special Instructions and Notes

Please restart all running instances of dhclient after the update or
reboot the machine.

4) Package Location and Checksums

The preferred method for installing security updates is to use the YaST
Online Update (YOU) tool. YOU detects which updates are required and
automatically performs the necessary steps to verify and install them.
Alternatively, download the update packages for your distribution manually
and verify their integrity by the methods listed in Section 6 of this
announcement. Then install the packages using the command

rpm -Fhv <file.rpm>

to apply the update, replacing <file.rpm> with the filename of the
downloaded RPM package.

- ruby
- insufficient return value checks for openssl function
OCSP_basic_verify() (CVE-2009-0642) allowed attackers to use
revoked certificates.
- the entropy of DNS identifiers was increased to avoid spoofing
attacks (CVE-2008-3905).
- The code for parsing XML data was vulnerable to a denial of
service bug (CVE-2008-3790).
- An attack on algorithm complexity was possible in function
WEBrick::HTTP::DefaultFileHandler() while parsing HTTP requests
(CVE-2008-3656) as well as by using the regex engine
(CVE-2008-3443) causing high CPU load.
- Ruby's access restriction code (CVE-2008-3655) as well as
safe-level handling using function DL.dlopen() (CVE-2008-3657) and
big decimal handling (CVE-2009-1904) was improved.

SUSE security announcements are published via mailing lists and on Web
sites. The authenticity and integrity of a SUSE security announcement is
guaranteed by a cryptographic signature in each announcement. All SUSE
security announcements are published with a valid signature.

To verify the signature of the announcement, save it as text into a file
and run the command

gpg --verify <file>

replacing <file> with the name of the file where you saved the
announcement. The output for a valid signature looks like:

If the security team's key is not contained in your key ring, you can
import it from the first installation CD. To import the key, use the
command

gpg --import gpg-pubkey-3d25d3d9-36e12d04.asc

- Package authenticity verification:

SUSE update packages are available on many mirror FTP servers all over the
world. While this service is considered valuable and important to the free
and open source software community, the authenticity and the integrity of
a package needs to be verified to ensure that it has not been tampered
with.

The internal rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the
authenticity of an RPM package. Use the command

rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm>

to verify the signature of the package, replacing <file.rpm> with the
filename of the RPM package downloaded. The package is unmodified if it
contains a valid signature from build@xxxxxxx with the key ID 9C800ACA.

This key is automatically imported into the RPM database (on
RPMv4-based distributions) and the gpg key ring of 'root' during
installation. You can also find it on the first installation CD and at
the end of this announcement.

- SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
subscribe:

opensuse-security@xxxxxxxxxxxx
- General Linux and SUSE security discussion.
All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list.
To subscribe, send an e-mail to
<opensuse-security+subscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxx>.

opensuse-security-announce@xxxxxxxxxxxx
- SUSE's announce-only mailing list.
Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list.
To subscribe, send an e-mail to
<opensuse-security-announce+subscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxx>.

The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, the
clear text signature should show proof of the authenticity of the text.

SUSE Linux Products GmbH provides no warranties of any kind whatsoever
with respect to the information contained in this security advisory.