freedom

The problem of justice, one of the key problems of contemporary political philosophy, is reconsidered in the light of a new paradigm: Otfried Höffe’s theory of transcendental exchange. The main research question is how this theory influences our understanding of the ways of formation of just moral and legal grounds in contemporary society. In order to understand justice adequately, it is important to regard it as personal responsibility, deeply related to attitudes of solidarity and recognition. There is an attempt to fuse moral and material grounds of social existence in order to overcome social injustice. Freedom and justice are rooted in the living world and are based on formal norms and procedures of morality and law. This gives us methodological grounds for understanding Höffe’s philosophy of political justice, which regards freedom and justice as the main conditions of human existence.

Societies create cultural models in order to maintain their identity. They constitute a reflection of values and symbols to which they are the most attached. In Russia, there has been a dispute about cultural identity for a long time. During Vladimir Putin’s presidency, when the liberal idea was devalued, a serious debate about the future of Russia was commenced. In contrast to Russia, Poland has always emphasized its European roots and identity of its culture with the Western culture. Comparative studies of the two cultures lead to the conclusion that significant differences are views of: man, freedom and the state. The definition of man in a given culture is associated with the worldview. In Russian culture it has been formulated on the basis of monastic practice and experience of Church Fathers. Hesychasm and deification – are the basis of the Orthodox anthropology. In the contemporary Russian culture one can observe the revival of hesychasm, which stems from the life practice. Latin anthropology was formed under the influence of Saint Augustine’s Confessions. According to Augustine, man is dust and only his „self ”, the person, is endowed with „existence, consciousness and will”. Augustine was the first Latin theologian, who pointed out the historical subjectivity of an individual. Therefore, the European thought identified man with historical ones: the state, nation and economics. The issue of a person’s freedom is the basic issue of Western anthropology. Man perceived himself as an autonomous entity that exists thanks to the autonomous intellect and respects the rights of others adhering to the same principles. Freedom in Orthodox culture is understood as inner freedom from external determinants Saint Augustine formulated a number of problems which are the basis of the Western understanding of the state. The specificity of understanding Augustine’s state is associated with the belief that people are sinful and it has an impact on the state system. Russian state doctrine is connected with Byzantine heritage. The idea of Moscow the Third Rome is a continuation of Byzantine diarchy. The contemporary Russian state thought says that liberal democracy and internationalism are unfamiliar to Russian culture. It finds it necessary to return to the ideocratic country and calls for recovering from the Russian disease of self-consciousness – “occidentalistic rootlessness”.

The notion of „socialism” in political thought of Alexis de Tocqueville

The article presents an analysis of an original conception of socialism outlined in the works of Alexis de Tocqueville. The author begins with a brief presentation of historical context in which the views of French thinker were shaped, referring to his experiences from the period of the July Revolution of 1830 and the February Revolution of 1848. The author goes on to detailed analysis of his definition of socialism, making an indispensable reference to his republican conception of freedom and the role of a citizen in democracy. Finally, the author looks at Tocquevillian vision of genesis of socialist ideas, associated by him with anxiety, which democratic system inevitably generates.

Terrorism is harmful to democratic governments and societies. In addition to the visible and the direct effects of attacks on bystanders, aim bombers are undermining democratic values, including the weakening of confidence in state institutions and laws that regulate their functioning. As a result of the use of violence can permanently give birth to create a socio-political divisions, antagonize certain entities and groups, and thus provoke conflicts thus destroying the existing compromises, agreements or arrangements between the parties concerned. In matters of international terrorism it is not only a challenge for the rule of law, but because it also applies to relations between states, poses a serious threat to security and stability.

In the present paper the author considers a challenge to libertarianism posed by G.A. Cohen. The charge issued by Cohen says that libertarianism defines freedom in terms of justice and justice in terms of freedom. The paper deals with an aspect of this charge as expressed by one of Cohen’s thought experiments according to which it is not the case that the answer to the question whether person B forces person A to do φ depends on whether person B’s actions are legitimate or not. Employing the Hohfeldian analysis of fundamental jural conceptions, the author demonstrates that if person B’s actions are legitimate, then making person A to do φ cannot, at pains of contradiction, be considered forcing. If person B is at a liberty to make person A to do φ, then person B cannot at the same time and in the same respect be at duty not to make person A to do φ. Yet, this is exactly what would follow if we adopted the stance that person B’s legitimate actions force person A to do φ. If they forced person A, then the expenditure of whatever labour needed to do φ would not be a voluntary expenditure and thereby would constitute a violation of person A’s rights to this labour. However, if person A’s rights were violated by person B’s actions, then via Hohfeldian Correlativity Axiom person B would have to be at duty not to undertake these actions. Yet, the whole reasoning started from the assumption that person B is at liberty to undertake them.