20 Years of Leading Analysis

War and Peace in the Caucasus

The emergence of the new states of the Caucasus has been strained by territorial disputes. Conflicts smolder in Chechnya, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Terrorism and extremism have spread into the region from neighboring Middle East and Central Asia. Islam has emerged as a factor of public life. Caspian oil and its transit routes to the West have become the object of rivalry between major powers. How these challenges are met will determine the security outlook for Russia, Europe, and, in part, the United States.

For over two decades, no one in the West felt the need for regulating Russia’s relations with NATO. The lesson of the Napoleonic wars about the need to integrate a former adversary—which was forgotten after WWI—has been forgotten again.

The Ukraine crisis has opened up a period of intense geopolitical competition, rivalry, and even confrontation between Russia and the West. The area of competition is again Eastern Europe; only this time, further to the east of its Cold War namesake.

It has been clear from the beginning that the Sochi Olympics would be a likely target for the terrorists. The contest between the terrorists and the forces of the Russian state is one contest that Russia absolutely must win.

Russia is demanding to be treated as an equal partner in its relationship with the EU, but Brussels had long ignored this shift, and EU-Russian relations have stagnated as a result. It is time for a fundamental rethink of the EU’s Russia policy.

With revolutions across the Arab world, Russia’s chances for strengthening its position in the region look increasingly slim. The Kremlin must change course and ensure that its approach to the Middle East and Islamists reflects post–Arab Spring realities.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power, Russia has substantial leverage in the post-Soviet space and is the EU's most important neighbor. However, in the coming decades Russia will face serious internal and international challenges.

Today, unprecedented challenges from without and within threaten to reverse the progress toward the safe, secure, undivided Euro-Atlantic world hoped for in the wake of the Cold War. To overcome that future, a twenty-first-century problem demands a twenty-first-century solution.

One of the fundamental impediments to molding the Euro-Atlantic nations into a more unified and workable security community is the lingering distrust that poisons too many of the region’s key relationships.

Israel’s interests in the Caucasus have three principal dimensions: strategically, as a means of encircling Iran; in the mid-term, as a zone of energy supplies; and in a short-term, as a market for selling high tech arms and ammunition.

Recently the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has drawn the attention of both Turkish and world media. However, current activities around the “Armenian question” failed to create solid ground for real compromise between the two states.

The political fallout of the horrible murders in Gyumri will not result in a strategic re-orientation by Armenia away from Russia. However, it will undermine public support for Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and his government.

Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus, is now firmly entrenched in Russian politics at the federal-level, and it appears that he is there to stay, because Putin and Kadyrov really need each other.

Russia and South Ossetia are about to sign a “Treaty of Alliance and Integration.” However, normalization of relations with Georgia is impossible as long as Moscow continues to strengthen its grip on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2014 was a year of crisis. Ebola, ISIS, and Donbas are now part of the global lexicon. Eurasia Outlook experts weigh in on how crises on Russia’s periphery affected the country, and what these developments mean for Moscow in 2015.

The terrorist attack that shook Grozny during the night of December 4 has put in question the authorities’ ability to control the situation in the North Caucasus, even in the seemingly stable Chechen Republic.

There is so far no evidence that the two suspects in the Boston bombings had direct links with any known terrorist organizations in the region. Most likely, the overall environment was conducive to their radicalization.

Turkey is attempting to position itself as a more than a regional power, with activity in all its neighboring regions. It remains to be seen, however, whether Turkey has enough forces to be present in so many places.

The Arab Spring has more in common with events in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s than Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. The impact of events in the Middle East for states outside the region will depend on the legitimacy and adaptability of their regimes.

Russia and Turkey share many important interests, providing them with opportunities for valuable collaboration and cooperation in their common neighborhood, which stretches from the South Caucasus and the Levant to Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Russia-EU relations are of a technical rather than strategic character nowadays. A parallel functioning of the EU and the Eurasian Union would lead to more debate about strategic vision of Europe and the Eurasian continent.

Following a successful transition to democracy and a period of unprecedented growth, Georgia now serves as a model for democratic development. However, the country also faces substantial criticism concerning its respect for domestic civil liberties.

Islam is increasingly becoming a factor in the politics of the wider Caucasus region, as Azerbaijan experiences a growth of religion in politics and Turkey and Iran compete for Islamic influence on their neighbors.

Two issues—military reform and interethnic relations in the Russian Federation—seem to have grabbed the most public attention since the Soviet collapse. They have had a big impact on Russia’s public and political life over the last twenty years, and affect the foundations for the country’s future development.

Israel’s interests in the Caucasus have three principal dimensions: strategically, as a means of encircling Iran; in the mid-term, as a zone of energy supplies; and in a short-term, as a market for selling high tech arms and ammunition.

Recently the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has drawn the attention of both Turkish and world media. However, current activities around the “Armenian question” failed to create solid ground for real compromise between the two states.

The political fallout of the horrible murders in Gyumri will not result in a strategic re-orientation by Armenia away from Russia. However, it will undermine public support for Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and his government.

Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus, is now firmly entrenched in Russian politics at the federal-level, and it appears that he is there to stay, because Putin and Kadyrov really need each other.

Russia and South Ossetia are about to sign a “Treaty of Alliance and Integration.” However, normalization of relations with Georgia is impossible as long as Moscow continues to strengthen its grip on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2014 was a year of crisis. Ebola, ISIS, and Donbas are now part of the global lexicon. Eurasia Outlook experts weigh in on how crises on Russia’s periphery affected the country, and what these developments mean for Moscow in 2015.

For over two decades, no one in the West felt the need for regulating Russia’s relations with NATO. The lesson of the Napoleonic wars about the need to integrate a former adversary—which was forgotten after WWI—has been forgotten again.

Malashenko is the chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Religion, Society, and Security Program. He also taught at the Higher School of Economics from 2007 to 2008 and was a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations from 2000 to 2006.