TLATELOLCO MASSACRE: DECLASSIFIED U.S. DOCUMENTS ON MEXICO AND THE EVENTS OF 1968

By Kate Doyle

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 10

Washington, D.C. –
Mexico's tragedy unfolded on the night of October 2, 1968, when a student demonstration ended in a storm of bullets in
La Plaza de las Tres Culturas at Tlatelolco, Mexico City. The extent of the violence stunned the country.
When the shooting stopped, hundreds of people lay dead or wounded, as Army and police forces seized surviving protesters
and dragged them away. Although months of nation-wide student strikes had prompted an increasingly hard-line response from
the Diaz Ordaz regime, no one was prepared for the bloodbath that Tlatelolco became. More shocking still was the cover-up that
kicked in as soon as the smoke cleared. Eye-witnesses to the killings pointed to the President's "security" forces, who
entered the plaza bristling with weapons, backed by armored vehicles. But the government pointed back, claiming that
extremists and Communist agitators had initiated the violence. Who was responsible for Tlatelolco? The Mexican people
have been demanding an answer ever since.

Thirty years later, the Tlatelolco massacre has grown large in Mexican memory, and lingers still. It is Mexico's Tiananmen Square,
Mexico's Kent State: when the pact between the government and the people began to come apart and Mexico's
extended political crisis began.

To commemorate this thirtieth anniversary, the National Security Archive has assembled a collection of some of our most
interesting and richly-detailed documents about Tlatelolco, many recently released in response to the Archive's Freedom
of Information Act requests, all obtained from the secret archives of the CIA, FBI, Defense Department, the embassy in
Mexico City and the White House. The records provide a vivid glimpse inside U.S. perceptions of Mexico at the time,
and discuss in frank terms many of the most sensitive aspects of the Tlatelolco massacre which continue to be debated
today: the political goals of the protesting students, the extent of Communist influence, Diaz Ordaz's response, and the
role of the Mexican military in helping to crush the demonstrations.

But while the declassified U.S. documents reveal new details about Tlatelolco, perhaps most important is the challenge
their release poses to Mexico today. Thirty years after the massacre, the Mexican government continues to deny its
people basic facts about what happened -- refusing to open Army and police records to public scrutiny on the grounds of
"national security," denying Congress the right to hear testimony by agents of the state who were present at Tlatelolco.
The valiant investigative efforts by reporters, scholars, historians, and an official congressional committee have helped
clarify the events of 1968 enormously. But Mexico's secret archives are also critical for a full understanding of Tlatelolco --
and until they are opened, doubts about the truth of the Tlatelolco massacre will linger on.

THE DOCUMENTS

In preparation for a visit to Mexico City by Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the CIA issues a special
assessment of security conditions in Mexico. Written several months before the first serious wave of
student demonstrations began, the document describes the country as a model of stability, with President
Diaz Ordaz firmly in control and a ruling party which "virtually monopolizes Mexican politics."

When students launch a series of country-wide protests in July, initial U.S. reporting out of Mexico alerts
Washington to several issues that come up again and again in subsequent documents: the potential danger
posed by the strikes to the Olympic Games, their political significance, and the role of the "international"
left. This CIA analysis discusses Cuban influence on a student strike at the University of Veracruz.
Demonstrators seek to disrupt the Olympic games, although the PRI electoral fraud in local and
gubernatorial elections also may serve as cause for further unrest.

Mexican authorities claim to have "solid evidence" that the Mexican Communist Party, with Soviet
complicity, engineered the July 26 riot. The U.S. Embassy does not have corroborating evidence, but
suggests that Moscow may have ordered riot to counteract impact of events in the Czechoslovakia.

The July 26 riot provides a classic example of Communist agitation techniques. Document questions
Mexican claims of Soviet complicity, however, as USSR does not want to undermine its good relations
with Mexico.

Report provides a chronological account of Mexican military involvement in disbanding student protests in
Mexico City during the week of July 29. While the report states that the military performed "creditably," it
also notes some charges of "over-reaction," such as the alleged "hazing" of students inside one school. The
Mexican Government denies reports that 4 students were killed during the disturbances. Generals Mazon
and Ballasteros head a special military "Task Force" to deal with the situation of unrest.

Document 6: CIA Weekly Review, Mexican Government in a Quandary Over Student
Crisis, August 23, 1968, Top Secret

CIA says the Mexican Government may be underestimating students’ ability to continue large-scale,
disciplined demonstrations. The present impasse is due to the Government's belief that a) giving in to
students would invite further demands and b) ignoring situation most likely will lead to further disruption.
Document claims that Communist youths are involved in the crisis. CIA says that further violent outbreaks
can be expected.

Rostow reports to President Johnson that the Mexican Government's conciliatory strategy has not quelled
student disturbances, and a return to a "get-tough, no-nonsense posture" is inevitable. Rostow claims that
while the violence is not likely to affect Diaz Ordaz's administration, it will no doubt affect the Olympics in
a negative manner.

While the Mexican Government has made minor concessions to protesting students, the approach of the
Olympics will most likely lead the Diaz Ordaz administration to meet further demonstrations with very
tough measures.

Cable states that students are increasingly organized, and able to exercise some influence on national
affairs. The Mexican Government has not been unified in action against the protesters, and President Diaz
Ordaz continues to avoid becoming personally involved. While no hard evidence exists that Cubans or
Soviets masterminded the student demonstrations, the Mexican Government continues to inspire such
rumors. Cable concludes that "the old order is passing" and the PRI has lost control over public behavior.

CIA refers to the Mexican Government's "behind the scenes maneuvering to divide the students," including
efforts by the officially-inspired "committee of the authentic student body" to quash future student strikes.

Report states that Mexican Army troops were again employed to disperse protesting students, from 8/28
into the month of September. The period marked the first known involvement of troops from outside
Mexico City, indicating the increasing seriousness of the matter. The September 18 occupation of UNAM
also indicates that the position of the Mexican Government is hardening.

CIA expresses concerns about security conditions in Mexico and suggests that Nixon cancel his plans to
visit Mexico during the Olympics. If he does go, the CIA document warns, Mexican security forces would
have hard time protecting him, and "anti-U.S. extremists" would cause "some nasty incidents."

Document discusses potential threats to the Olympic games. These include individual US citizens with
histories of subversive activity and anti-Castro Cubans, who are expected to try and harass Cuban athletes
during the games. The FBI urges that information about potential subversives be provided to the U.S. and
Mexican Governments.

CIA concludes that recent student unrest was sparked by domestic conditions. Cuban and Soviet
involvement was limited to moral and some financial support. The FBI reports Communist/Trotskyist
groups formed the Olympia Brigade, a "shock group" which allegedly initiated the shooting at Tlatelolco
on 10/2.

To protect U.S. athletes during the Olympics, the FBI must establish a liaison in the U.S. Embassy for
channeling information to U.S. Olympic team officials regarding safety concerns. Cable emphasizes the
necessity of concealing the FBI's role to avoid jeopardizing ongoing FBI operations in Mexico.

CIA addresses issues raised by FBI sources and concludes a) no evidence exists of significant foreign
influence in riots, b) external influences included moral support and some financial support, but not the
supply of weapons, and c) the Trotskyist "Brigada Olympia" was developed with the intentions of
interfering with the Olympic games.

The U.S. Embassy states that, contrary to official Mexican reports, direct foreign involvement in the
student uprisings has been "essentially negligible." Rather, newer and more extreme student elements are
responsible for the continued unrest and riots such as that which occurred at Tlatelolco on 10/2. The
Mexican Government has increased military pressure with the intention of seizing the leaders of the
extremist student groups. Document states that the foreign influence argument has been used by the
Mexican Government to divert attention away from deep local problems.

Report provides a chronological account of the Army's role in controlling student uprisings from 9/24
through 10/18. With regards to Tlatelolco, report states that on 9/30, troops withdrew from the UNAM
campus, which they had occupied since 9/18. Also on 9/30, the Mexican Defense Minister instructed
military zone commanders throughout the country to move against student disturbances "without waiting
for instructions." Report provides a key overview of the events of 10/2 at Tlatelolco and the days
immediately following.

Following the close of the Olympic games and the expected return of students to classes, the Mexican
military expects a resurgence in student protest activity. To counter possible future violence, the military is
training two special 1,500-man units, one of which carries the name "Brigada Olympia."

Gen. José Hernández Toledo, wounded at Tlatelolco, is recovering at a Mexican military hospital. A
source tells the DIA that the Mexican Army "had taken good care" of the 18 foreigners (including some
Cubans) involved in the events at Tlatelolco. When asked to clarify, the source said "good care" meant
detention.

Although it is unclear whether students will continue the strike, this document suggests that the "new left"
(extremists) within the student movement seek to prolong the unrest and continue their provocations
against the Mexican Government. Mexican officials are preparing for future violence.

According to this draft analysis of student unrest in Latin America, the disorders in Mexico are the worst in
the hemisphere. The continued violence demonstrates a deep and widespread dissatisfaction with the
Government of Mexico, and has severely damaged Mexico’s reputation as being the "most stable and
progressive country in Latin America."

As students return to classes, the "authentic context" to student strikes is becoming clear: the
demonstrations of 1968 represent a strong warning to the Government of Mexico. Although Mexican
officials claimed "outside agitation" was the basis of the unrest, document states that most reports linking
the student movement to subversion remain unsubstantiated. Finally, document states that the events at
Tlatelolco caused severe political damage to the Mexican Government.

Generals Ballesteros Prieto and Luis Gutierrez Oropeza are both out of favor with the Minister of Defense
because they ignored his orders to keep troops out of Tlatelolco. According to source, soldiers were merely
supposed to surround students and observe with the intention of confining the demonstrators to that part of
the city.