ON THE QUESTION OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIEAND THE ENLIGHTENED
GENTRY

March 1, 1948

[This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China.]

The Chinese revolution at the present stage is in its character a revolution
against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad
masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. By the broad
masses of the people is meant all those who are oppressed, injured or fettered
by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, namely, workers, peasants,
soldiers, intellectuals, businessmen and other patriots, as clearly stated
in the Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army of October
1947.[1] In the manifesto "intellectuals" means
all intellectuals who are persecuted and fettered. "Businessmen" means all
the national bourgeois who are persecuted and fettered, that is, the middle
and petty bourgeois. "Other patriots" refers primarily to the enlightened
gentry. The Chinese revolution at the present stage is a revolution in which
all these people form a united front against imperialism, feudalism and
bureaucrat-capitalism and in which the working people are the main body.
By working people are meant all those engaged in manual labour (such as workers,
peasants, handicraftsmen, etc.) as well as those engaged in mental labour
who are close to those engaged in manual labour and are not exploiters but
are exploited. The aim of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is
to overthrow the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism
and to establish a new-democratic republic of the broad masses of the people
with the working people as the main force; its aim is not to abolish capitalism
in general.

We should not abandon the enlightened gentry who co-operated with us in the
past and continue to co-operate with us at present, who approve of the struggle
against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek and who approve of the land
reform. Take, for instance, people like Liu Shao-pai of the Shansi-Suiyuan
Border Region and Li Ting-ming of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Region.[2]Since they gave us considerable help
in the hard times during and after the War of Resistance Against Japan and
did not obstruct or oppose the land reform when we were carrying it out,
we should continue the policy of uniting with them. But uniting with them
does not mean treating them as a force that determines the character of the
Chinese revolution. The forces that determine the character of a revolution
are the chief enemies on the one side and the chief revolutionaries on the
other. At present our chief enemies are imperialism, feudalism and
bureaucrat-capitalism, while the main forces in our struggle against these
enemies are the people engaged in manual and mental labour, who make up 90
per cent of the country's population. And this determines that our revolution
at the present stage is a new-democratic, a people's democratic revolution
in character and is different from a socialist revolution such as the October
Revolution.

The few right-wingers among the national bourgeoisie who attach themselves
to imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and oppose the people's
democratic revolution are also enemies of the revolution, while the left-wingers
among the national bourgeoisie who attach themselves to the working people
and oppose the reactionaries are also revolutionaries, as are the few enlightened
gentry who have broken away from the feudal class. But the former are not
the main body of the enemy any more than the latter are the main body among
the revolutionaries; neither is a force that determines the character of
the revolution. The national bourgeoisie is a class which is politically
very weak and vacillating. But the majority of its members may either join
the people's democratic revolution or take a neutral stand, because they
too are persecuted and fettered by imperialism, feudalism and
bureaucrat-capitalism. They are part of the broad masses of the people but
not the main body, nor are they a force that determines the character of
the revolution. However, because they are important economically and may
either join in the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek
or remain neutral in that struggle, it is possible and necessary for us to
unite with them. Before the birth of the Communist Party of China, the Kuomintang
headed by Sun Yat-sen represented the national bourgeoisie and acted as the
leader of the Chinese revolution of that time (a non-thorough democratic
revolution of the old type). But after the Communist Party of China was born
and demonstrated its ability, the Kuomintang could no longer be the leader
of the Chinese revolution (a new-democratic revolution). The national bourgeoisie
joined the 1924-27 revolutionary movement[3] and during
the years 1927-31 (before the September 18th Incident of 1931) quite a few
of them sided with the reaction under Chiang Kai-shek. But one must not on
this account think that we should not have tried during that period to win
over the national bourgeoisie politically or to protect it economically,
or that our ultra-Left policy towards the national bourgeoisie was not
adventurist. On the contrary, in that period our policy should still have
been to protect the national bourgeoisie and win it over so as to enable
us to concentrate our efforts on fighting the chief enemies. In the period
of the War of Resistance the national bourgeoisie was a participant in the
war, wavering between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. At the present
stage the majority of the national bourgeoisie has a growing hatred of the
United States and Chiang Kai-shek; its left-wingers attach themselves to
the Communist Party and its right-wingers to the Kuomintang, while its middle
elements take a hesitant, wait-and-see attitude between the two parties.
These circumstances make it necessary and possible for us to win over the
majority of the national bourgeoisie and isolate the minority. To achieve
this aim, we should be prudent in dealing with the economic position of this
class and in principle should adopt a blanket policy of protection. Otherwise
we shall commit political errors.

The enlightened gentry are individual landlords and rich peasants with democratic
leanings. Such people have contradictions with bureaucrat-capitalism and
imperialism and to a certain extent also with the feudal landlords and rich
peasants. We unite with them not because they are a political force to be
reckoned with nor because they are of any economic importance (their feudal
landholdings should be handed over with their consent to the peasants for
distribution) but because they gave us considerable help politically during
the War of Resistance and during the struggle against the United States and
Chiang Kai-shek. During the period of land reform, it will help the land
reform throughout the country if some of the enlightened gentry favour it.
In particular, it will help win over the intellectuals (most of whom come
from landlord or rich peasant families), the national bourgeoisie (most of
whom have ties with the land) and the enlightened gentry throughout the country
(who number several hundred thousand) and help isolate the chief enemy of
the Chinese revolution, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries. It is precisely
because they have this role that the enlightened gentry also constitute an
element in the revolutionary united front against imperialism, feudalism
and bureaucrat-capitalism; therefore, attention must also be paid to the
question of uniting with them. During the period of the War of Resistance,
what we required of the enlightened gentry was that they should favour resistance
against Japan, favour democracy (not be anti-Communist) and favour reduction
of rent and interest; at the present stage, what we require of them is that
they favour the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, favour
democracy (not be anti-Communist) and favour the land reform. If they can
meet these requirements, we should unite with them without exception and
while uniting with them educate them.

NOTES

1. See the first of the eight policies listed in "Manifesto
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", p. 150 of this volume.

2. Liu Shao-pai, an enlightened landlord of the Shansi-Suiyuan
Border Region, had been elected Vice-Chairman of the Provisional Council
of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. Li Ting-ming, an enlightened landlord
of northern Shensi Province had been elected Vice-Chairman of the
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

3. See "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory
in the War of Resistance Against Japan", Note 10, p. 25 of this volume.