This is the Assad regime's military strategy for winning the Syrian civil war

Two men display fingers
painted in the colors of the Syrian flag in front of a huge image
of President Bashar al-Assad during a rally by thousands in March
2011, when dissent that would lead to a civil war
began.Anwar Amro/Getty
Images

The following is an excerpt of the upcoming report from the
Institute for the Study
of Wartitled “An Army in All Corners —
Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria.”

Written by ISW Syria AnalystChristopher
Kozak, this study examines
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s strategy of maintaining armed
outposts throughout the country to frame his claim to a united
and contiguous post-war Syrian state.

Some US policymakers appear to be considering Assad
as the “least worst” option in a country decimated by civil war
and overrun by radical groups including the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS) and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat
al-Nusra. Kozak makes clear that “this outlook is
dangerously flawed.”

Business Insider will
also be running excerpts of the report on April 28th and
29th.

The military campaign of the Syrian regime has been primarily
driven by Assad’s core objective to preserve his rule in a
post-war Syria through a negotiated “political solution.”

However, Assad’s efforts to drive the situation
on the ground in a favorable direction faced a number of key
challenges. The geographic dispersion of regime positions and the
countrywide scope of the Syrian Civil War forced the Assad regime
to prioritize among military fronts in 2014, enabling opposition
forces to advance in multiple locations including Idlib and
Dera’a Provinces.

Salafi-jihadist rebel groups also grew in
strength and coordination in 2014. The regime faced new
challenges on the battlefield as the consolidation of military
strength among Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), Ahrar al-Sham, and other
Salafi-jihadist factions in Syria throughout 2014 enabled
numerous major battlefield victories over the regime in Aleppo,
Idlib, and Dera’a Provinces.

However, these developments also sparked new
opportunities for Assad to align with the international community
by fueling the narrative that the Syrian government faces an
invasion of "terrorists" that poses a transnational threat. Assad
promoted this framing of the conflict in order to reinforce his
own political legitimacy as the only viable alternative to a
failed, jihadist-dominated Syrian state.

Assad likely reasons that by avoiding decisive
defeat and preserving his presence throughout the country, the
insurgency will eventually be depleted as opposition forces grow
increasingly radicalized and alienated from their domestic and
international supporters.

An army 'in all
corners'

The Assad regime
prioritizes maintaining Syrian Arab Army (SAA) presence
throughout Syria in order to frame its claim to a united and
contiguous post-war Syrian state.

Territorial control in
Syria as of March 31, 2015Institute
for the Study of War

President Assad expressly
delineated this policy in his January 2015 interview withForeign Affairs, stating: “If you look at a military map
now, the Syrian army exists in every corner. Not every place; by
every corner, I mean north, south, east, west, and between. If
you didn’t believe in a unified Syria, that Syria can go back to
its previous position, you wouldn’t send the army there as a
government.”

The strategy of
an “army in all corners” is designed to preclude a partitioned
Syria or rump Syrian state from forming. The existence of SAA
formations across Syria also provides President Assad with a
political narrative as the leader of a sovereign and undivided
country. Assad is unable, however, to use his dispersed footprint
to establish security throughout the country in the face of an
active armed opposition.

Assad’s remote
outposts incur risk to his campaign. Their strict defensive
posture and inability to project force into their surroundings
makes them targetable by opposing forces.

A fighter loyal to Syria's President Bashar Al-Assad
hangs his picture as fellow fighters rest by a Syrian national
flag after gaining control of the area in Deir al-Adas, a town
south of Damascus, Daraa countryside on February 10,
2015.Reuters

Limited options for
reinforcement and resupply can leave their garrisons isolated and
vulnerable in the face of concerted offensives. This risk was
brutally demonstrated in July and August 2014 when ISIS militants
overran a series of holdout regime military bases in ar-Raqqa and
Hasaka Provinces, capturing and executing hundreds of SAA
soldiers.

Nevertheless, these strongholds also frequently
withstand enemy attacks, providing the Assad regime with staying
power at little cost.

Dominating the 'Human Terrain'

The Assad regime also seeks to maintain its
control over the Syrian civilian population in
order to bolster its
image as the only legitimate governance structure in the
country.

President Assad has repeatedly stated that the
most critical battle in Syria is the one for the Syrian people.
Assad also detailed this policy in his interview with Foreign
Affairs: “Before talking about winning territory, talk about
winning the hearts and minds and the support of the Syrian
people. That’s what we have won. What’s left is logistical; it’s
technical. That is a matter of time.”

Experts estimate that the Syrian regime controls
between 55 and 72 percent of the Syria’s remaining populace as of
January 2015.The Syrian opposition, on
the other hand, controls less than a third of the country’s
population – affirming President Assad’s boast that “the
communities which embraced terrorists have become very
small.”

Assad did not mention that the remainder of
Syria’s population now lies within areas under the regime’s
control as a deliberate outcome of Assad’s own punitive
depopulation campaigns.

Institute
for the Study of War

This disparity offers the Assad
regime several distinct advantages over rebel forces. Control
over the majority of the surviving Syrian population provides
opportunity to tap manpower reserves to aid the regime’s fight
and also restricts civilians from joining the Syrian opposition.
The regime also benefits from enduring economic activity that
generally no longer exists in rebel-held areas.

Continuous efforts to depopulate opposition-held
zones and consolidate civilians into regime-held areas feed into
the narrative that “the majority of the Syrian people … support
their president.” This argument manipulates Syria’s recent
history and portrays the staying power of Bashar al-Assad and his
government favorably in political negotiations.

Acceptance of this statement at face value risks
legitimizing mass violence against civilians as a tool which
could be used in other conflicts.

Projecting the
regime's legitimacy

The regime uses the
appearance of enduring military and social control in Syria to
bolster domestic and international legitimacy in preparation to
discuss political settlement.

Assad regularly uses “jihadism”
in Syria as an argument to curry international favor. In an
interview conducted on November 28, 2014, President Assad
criticized US-led coalition airstrikes against ISIS in Syria by
insisting that “terrorism cannot be destroyed from the air, and
you cannot achieve results on the ground without land
forces.”

A tank belonging to the
forces loyal to Syria's President Bashar Assad is seen in the
Quneitra city countryside on Sept. 8, 2014 during a battle with
rebels, near the border fence with the Israeli-occupied Golan
Heights.Reuters

Regime officials
regularly promote the SAA as the only realistic force with the
“experience in the field” to counter terrorist groups operating
in Syria, such as JN or ISIS.Assad reaffirmed in a later interview on
January 20, 2015 that this partner “definitely … has to be Syrian
troops.”

In some cases, Assad
backs his claims with force. The Syrian Air Force, for example,
conducted several sorties against the ISIS “capital” of ar-Raqqa
in a move clearly designed to align with the global
anti-terrorism campaign following the launch of anti-ISIS
coalition air raids in Syria on September 22, 2014.

The regime also attempts to maintain vestiges of
democratic processes in order to underscore the claims of
legitimacy made by the Syrian government. The 2014 Syrian
presidential elections were widely upheld by regime officials as
an expression of mass popular support for the Syrian government
despite pervasive indications of fraud and voter
suppression.The Assad regime retains a
“tolerated” internal opposition group, the National Coordination
Committee for Democratic Change (NCCDC), which provides a façade
of political pluralism.

The Assad regime’s political goals generated a
military strategy which remained relatively consistent throughout
2014 and into 2015 despite shifts in battlefield dynamics which
forced the regime to adapt to new circumstances. These shifts
forced the regime to adapt its capabilities frequently, but they
have rarely altered the ways in which regime forces have
attempted to carry out the war.

This resiliency indicates that the Assad regime
possesses a coherent military strategy that has been robust
enough to absorb the pressures of unanticipated events. Assad
likely believes that upholding this clear plan of action while
avoiding unnecessary risks on the battlefield will allow him to
win the war for Syria without an outright military
victory.