Ameren Illinois vs IBEW , LOCAL UNION 51 - Our side wins!

Ameren IL fired an employee for having a firearm in his vehicle in the company parking lot. Both employer and employee agreed to arbitration. Arbitor agreed with employee, Ameren appealed in Federal District Court, Springfield, Judge Myerscough - who has ruled against our cases 100%. In this case, she is overruled by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals.

This case does not address the Contitutional issue but rules in favor of the employee based on :

Language contained in the preamble of the collective bargaining agreement suspends any part of the CBA that either the company or union believes to conflict with state law. While we would have preferred that the arbitrator cite to that language before applying the Concealed Carry Act to reinstate Knox, the extraordinarily deferential standard of review compels us to uphold the award.

The case wasn't a 2nd Amendment issue, though. It was only about the enforcement of extra-judicial arbitration.

The company fired the employee for violating a workplace violence policy, because of his firearm, legally stored in his car in the company parking lot.

When the employee filed a grievance, both parties agreed to binding arbitration. The arbitrator sided with the employee, stating that the firearm was stored legally under state law.

Not satisfied with the result of the (not so very) "binding" arbitration, the company appealed to Federal District Court, which decided to review the grievance anew ("de novo") and ruled that the company could fire the employee for violating a policy, even if the policy violation was an otherwise legal act.

The employee appealed to Federal Circuit Court, which ruled that the original settlement did not violate the law. Since courts have no power to review grievances settled by arbitration, unless the settlement violated the law, the original settlement was reinstated.

Judicial precedent regarding arbitration: "When an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's 'improvident, even silly factfinding' does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award." [Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey (2001)] In other words, arbitrators aren't judges, therefore they not only don't have to interpret law or follow legal precedent, their reasoning in reaching a settlement doesn't even have to be logically sensible.

In this case, the arbitrator decided (improperly in a legal sense) that state CCL law overrode the company's "no guns" policy. The Circuit Court merely ruled that the arbitrator was not corrupt or otherwise dishonest and that the settlement itself did not violate any law. Therefore it didn't matter that the arbitrator's reasoning wasn't legally correct. It only mattered that the company had agreed to binding arbitration.

So the only way the employee could have possibly won (and the company could have possibly lost) was if the settlement was reached through arbitration rather than lawsuit. The company probably thought it was saving money by agreeing to arbitration rather than a court proceeding. The company gave up a slam dunk to save a few bucks. Then it ended up in court, anyway, and still lost.

The case wasn't a 2nd Amendment issue, though. It was only about the enforcement of extra-judicial arbitration.

The company fired the employee for violating a workplace violence policy, because of his firearm, legally stored in his car in the company parking lot.

When the employee filed a grievance, both parties agreed to binding arbitration. The arbitrator sided with the employee, stating that the firearm was stored legally under state law.

Not satisfied with the result of the (not so very) "binding" arbitration, the company appealed to Federal District Court, which decided to review the grievance anew ("de novo") and ruled that the company could fire the employee for violating a policy, even if the policy violation was an otherwise legal act.

The employee appealed to Federal Circuit Court, which ruled that the original settlement did not violate the law. Since courts have no power to review grievances settled by arbitration, unless the settlement violated the law, the original settlement was reinstated.

Judicial precedent regarding arbitration: "When an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's 'improvident, even silly factfinding' does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award." [Major League Baseball Players a**'n v. Garvey (2001)] In other words, arbitrators aren't judges, therefore they not only don't have to interpret law or follow legal precedent, their reasoning in reaching a settlement doesn't even have to be logically sensible.In this case, the arbitrator decided (improperly in a legal sense) that state CCL law overrode the company's "no guns" policy. The Circuit Court merely ruled that the arbitrator was not corrupt or otherwise dishonest and that the settlement itself did not violate any law. Therefore it didn't matter that the arbitrator's reasoning wasn't legally correct. It only mattered that the company had agreed to binding arbitration.So the only way the employee could have possibly won (and the company could have possibly lost) was if the settlement was reached through arbitration rather than lawsuit. The company probably thought it was saving money by agreeing to arbitration rather than a court proceeding. The company gave up a slam dunk to save a few bucks. Then it ended up in court, anyway, and still lost.It's an enlightening case. It's too bad it isn't a real 2A case, though.

Thanks for the explanation.

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The case wasn't a 2nd Amendment issue, though. It was only about the enforcement of extra-judicial arbitration.The company fired the employee for violating a workplace violence policy, because of his firearm, legally stored in his car in the company parking lot.When the employee filed a grievance, both parties agreed to binding arbitration. The arbitrator sided with the employee, stating that the firearm was stored legally under state law.Not satisfied with the result of the (not so very) "binding" arbitration, the company appealed to Federal District Court, which decided to review the grievance anew ("de novo") and ruled that the company could fire the employee for violating a policy, even if the policy violation was an otherwise legal act.The employee appealed to Federal Circuit Court, which ruled that the original settlement did not violate the law. Since courts have no power to review grievances settled by arbitration, unless the settlement violated the law, the original settlement was reinstated.Judicial precedent regarding arbitration: "When an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's 'improvident, even silly factfinding' does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award." [Major League Baseball Players a**'n v. Garvey (2001)] In other words, arbitrators aren't judges, therefore they not only don't have to interpret law or follow legal precedent, their reasoning in reaching a settlement doesn't even have to be logically sensible.In this case, the arbitrator decided (improperly in a legal sense) that state CCL law overrode the company's "no guns" policy. The Circuit Court merely ruled that the arbitrator was not corrupt or otherwise dishonest and that the settlement itself did not violate any law. Therefore it didn't matter that the arbitrator's reasoning wasn't legally correct. It only mattered that the company had agreed to binding arbitration.So the only way the employee could have possibly won (and the company could have possibly lost) was if the settlement was reached through arbitration rather than lawsuit. The company probably thought it was saving money by agreeing to arbitration rather than a court proceeding. The company gave up a slam dunk to save a few bucks. Then it ended up in court, anyway, and still lost.It's an enlightening case. It's too bad it isn't a real 2A case, though.

This is a very intelligent summarization of the case, excepting your incorrect assumption that the FCCA does not override employment policy. This question was directly answered in floor debate before the bill was ever even called for a vote.

I have not read the case, but I would think that the storage in your personal vehicle provisions of the FCCA overrides their policy. They cannot keep you from lawfully storing a firearm in your personal vehicle; they can only forbid you from carrying on their premises outside of your vehicle. I am getting tired of these liberal, activist judges in District Courts!

It is a crying shame that this plaintiff had to go to the seventh circuit to undo an unlawful decision based not upon the law, but upon this judges political beliefs.

That is the difference between Democrats and Republicans. Republicans appoint judges who will apply the Constitution and the law to the case in an impartial manner, while Democrats appoint judges who will tow the liberal line and come to conclusions based on liberal political beliefs, then find some BS way to rationalize it, Constitution and law be damned.

I'm trying to really dig into this and understand it. Many people are claiming this to be settled case law now, but it doesn't appear to be settled case law to me.

The questions are, does this only apply to employees with similar preambles in their employment agreements? The 7th didnt rule that the employee can store a firearm in the trunk, only that the arbitrators decision is binding.

Does this ruling only apply to local 50 members?

Can an Arbitrator really set case law?

Wouldn't a sign saying no weapons on this property, as per the ruling text, negate the parking lot exemption? That's not my understanding of the FCCL.

P.S. let this also be a warning to everyone, if you wouldn't give someone unrestricted access to your bank account, they probably also don't need to know what you carry.

I'm trying to really dig into this and understand it. Many people are claiming this to be settled case law now, but it doesn't appear to be settled case law to me.

The questions are, does this only apply to employees with similar preambles in their employment agreements? The 7th didnt rule that the employee can store a firearm in the trunk, only that the arbitrators decision is binding.

Does this ruling only apply to local 50 members?

Can an Arbitrator really set case law?

Wouldn't a sign saying no weapons on this property, as per the ruling text, negate the parking lot exemption? That's not my understanding of the FCCL.

P.S. let this also be a warning to everyone, if you wouldn't give someone unrestricted access to your bank account, they probably also don't need to know what you carry.

There have been assertions, in this thread and others, that the FCCA prevents companies from creating "no storing guns in the parking lot" policies, because it is legally allowed to store firearms in any car in any parking lot, except at specific places, like nuclear facilities and state colleges, where the parking lot exemption to GFZs doesn't apply. IMHO the law is the law. Companies can still fire employees for reasons other than breaking the law. I think the argument can be made that, if it's legal to have anything (gun or whatever) in a car driving to a place of work, it's unreasonable to fire someone for having that same thing legally in the same car parked while the driver works. However, the FCCA does not say that, nor was labor law amended to say that. There has been no case law I know that addresses that point.

This court ruling affects only the one arbitration, which effectively affects only the one employee.

Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators cannot set case law. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all. They can, and frequently do, make settlements completely without reference to the merits of the grievance. My father was the Director of Human Resources at a medium size industrial company. He told me the way the arbitrators settled grievances in which he was involved was to look at the last grievance. Whoever lost the last one, company or union, won the next one. The merits of the grievance were irrelevant. I'll say it again. Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all.

Legally, no sign overrides the parking lot exception written into the FCCA, but that's only the firearm law, not the labor law.

Ultimately, this case only affirmed that binding arbitration is binding, a result that had already been established with decades of labor law cases.

IANAL

Edited by Euler, 18 October 2018 - 12:08 PM.

The welfare of the people in particular has always been the alibi of tyrants, and it provides the further advantage of giving the servants of tyranny a good conscience.

I'm trying to really dig into this and understand it. Many people are claiming this to be settled case law now, but it doesn't appear to be settled case law to me.

The questions are, does this only apply to employees with similar preambles in their employment agreements? The 7th didnt rule that the employee can store a firearm in the trunk, only that the arbitrators decision is binding.

Does this ruling only apply to local 50 members?

Can an Arbitrator really set case law?

Wouldn't a sign saying no weapons on this property, as per the ruling text, negate the parking lot exemption? That's not my understanding of the FCCL.

P.S. let this also be a warning to everyone, if you wouldn't give someone unrestricted access to your bank account, they probably also don't need to know what you carry.

There have been assertions, in this thread and others, that the FCCA prevents companies from creating "no storing guns in the parking lot" policies, because it is legally allowed to store firearms in any car in any parking lot, except at specific places, like nuclear facilities and state colleges, where the parking lot exemption to GFZs doesn't apply. IMHO the law is the law. Companies can still fire employees for reasons other than breaking the law. I think the argument can be made that, if it's legal to have anything (gun or whatever) in a car driving to a place of work, it's unreasonable to fire someone for having that same thing legally in the same car parked while the driver works. However, the FCCA does not say that, nor was labor law amended to say that. There has been no case law I know that addresses that point.

This court ruling affects only the one arbitration, which effectively affects only the one employee.

Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators cannot set case law. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all. They can, and frequently do, make settlements completely without reference to the merits of the grievance. My father was the Director of Human Resources at a medium size industrial company. He told me the way the arbitrators settled grievances in which he was involved was to look at the last grievance. Whoever lost the last one, company or union, won the next one. The merits of the grievance were irrelevant. I'll say it again. Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all.

Legally, no sign overrides the parking lot exception written into the FCCA, but that's only the firearm law, not the labor law.

Ultimately, this case only affirmed that binding arbitration is binding, a result that had already been established with decades of labor law cases.

IANAL

See I agree with everything yous aid, and though I wish we were wrong, I don't think we are. Others are out there professing this case law to be settled and I think it's not even close.

I'm trying to really dig into this and understand it. Many people are claiming this to be settled case law now, but it doesn't appear to be settled case law to me.

The questions are, does this only apply to employees with similar preambles in their employment agreements? The 7th didnt rule that the employee can store a firearm in the trunk, only that the arbitrators decision is binding.
Does this ruling only apply to local 50 members?
Can an Arbitrator really set case law?

Wouldn't a sign saying no weapons on this property, as per the ruling text, negate the parking lot exemption? That's not my understanding of the FCCL.
P.S. let this also be a warning to everyone, if you wouldn't give someone unrestricted access to your bank account, they probably also don't need to know what you carry.

It's probably not settled case law. Also, arbitration is not case law.
There have been assertions, in this thread and others, that the FCCA prevents companies from creating "no storing guns in the parking lot" policies, because it is legally allowed to store firearms in any car in any parking lot, except at specific places, like nuclear facilities and state colleges, where the parking lot exemption to GFZs doesn't apply. IMHO the law is the law. Companies can still fire employees for reasons other than breaking the law. I think the argument can be made that, if it's legal to have anything (gun or whatever) in a car driving to a place of work, it's unreasonable to fire someone for having that same thing legally in the same car parked while the driver works. However, the FCCA does not say that, nor was labor law amended to say that. There has been no case law I know that addresses that point.
This court ruling affects only the one arbitration, which effectively affects only the one employee.
Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators cannot set case law. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all. They can, and frequently do, make settlements completely without reference to the merits of the grievance. My father was the Director of Human Resources at a medium size industrial company. He told me the way the arbitrators settled grievances in which he was involved was to look at the last grievance. Whoever lost the last one, company or union, won the next one. The merits of the grievance were irrelevant. I'll say it again. Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all.
Legally, no sign overrides the parking lot exception written into the FCCA, but that's only the firearm law, not the labor law.
Ultimately, this case only affirmed that binding arbitration is binding, a result that had already been established with decades of labor law cases.
IANAL

See I agree with everything yous aid, and though I wish we were wrong, I don't think we are. Others are out there professing this case law to be settled and I think it's not even close.
Anyone else have any other input we may be overlooking?

I agree, the FCCA and labor laws are entirely separate things.

The FCCA provides "safe harbor" for parking areas in 21 of the 23 prohibited categories. It says nothing barring an employer from having company policy prohibiting vehicle storage.

That said, the Illinois Bar Association believes the FCCA trumps company policy in that respect.

Boeing Legal believes the same, which is why Illinois is listed as an exemption from the policy prohibiting firearms anywhere on company property.

“Most gun control arguments miss the point. If all control boils fundamentally to force, how can one resist aggression without equal force? How can a truly “free” state exist if the individual citizen is enslaved to the forceful will of individual or organized aggressors?

I'm trying to really dig into this and understand it. Many people are claiming this to be settled case law now, but it doesn't appear to be settled case law to me.

The questions are, does this only apply to employees with similar preambles in their employment agreements? The 7th didnt rule that the employee can store a firearm in the trunk, only that the arbitrators decision is binding.
Does this ruling only apply to local 50 members?
Can an Arbitrator really set case law?

Wouldn't a sign saying no weapons on this property, as per the ruling text, negate the parking lot exemption? That's not my understanding of the FCCL.
P.S. let this also be a warning to everyone, if you wouldn't give someone unrestricted access to your bank account, they probably also don't need to know what you carry.

It's probably not settled case law. Also, arbitration is not case law.
There have been assertions, in this thread and others, that the FCCA prevents companies from creating "no storing guns in the parking lot" policies, because it is legally allowed to store firearms in any car in any parking lot, except at specific places, like nuclear facilities and state colleges, where the parking lot exemption to GFZs doesn't apply. IMHO the law is the law. Companies can still fire employees for reasons other than breaking the law. I think the argument can be made that, if it's legal to have anything (gun or whatever) in a car driving to a place of work, it's unreasonable to fire someone for having that same thing legally in the same car parked while the driver works. However, the FCCA does not say that, nor was labor law amended to say that. There has been no case law I know that addresses that point.
This court ruling affects only the one arbitration, which effectively affects only the one employee.
Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators cannot set case law. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all. They can, and frequently do, make settlements completely without reference to the merits of the grievance. My father was the Director of Human Resources at a medium size industrial company. He told me the way the arbitrators settled grievances in which he was involved was to look at the last grievance. Whoever lost the last one, company or union, won the next one. The merits of the grievance were irrelevant. I'll say it again. Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all.
Legally, no sign overrides the parking lot exception written into the FCCA, but that's only the firearm law, not the labor law.
Ultimately, this case only affirmed that binding arbitration is binding, a result that had already been established with decades of labor law cases.
IANAL

See I agree with everything yous aid, and though I wish we were wrong, I don't think we are. Others are out there professing this case law to be settled and I think it's not even close.
Anyone else have any other input we may be overlooking?

I agree that this ruling, in no way, decides a thing concerning the FCCA. The only thing that we can glean from this, is that the the arbitrator's interpretation of the law was not challenged by any party, specifically Ameren. They relied solely on the terms of the contract to enforce policy, and did not call into question the legality of the worker's actions outside of that.

To the point of whether or not the law sets up a legal barrier to prohibition by policy, I will briefly mention what I've found in my own quest to answer the question.

There is a "doctrine" followed by the vast majority of at will states called the public policy exception.

Under this exception, an employee is protected from discharge for various reasons, like constitutional rights, discrimination for race, religion, or gender, and statutory rights. It is the statutory rights to which we should pay attention.

The language of the FCCA states "a licensee shall be permitted..." which, I believe from my pedestrian study on the matter, establishes a statutory right for a licensee to store a loaded handgun in a vehicle anywhere in Illinois excepting that which is already governed by federal statute.

This appears to be in line with Rep Phelps response to questioning in floor debate, the ISBA's published position, and ISP's allusion to the right in their current FAQ.

In 1981, one of the broadest definitions of "public policy" was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Palmateer v. International Harvester Company. In this case, Ray Palmateer alleged that he was fired from his job with International Harvester after he provided information to local law enforcement authorities about potential criminal acts by a coworker and indicated that he would assist in any criminal investigation and subsequent trial. The court noted that the traditional employment-at-will rule was grounded in the notion that the employment relationship was based on reciprocal rights, and because an employee was free to end employment at any time for any condition merely by resigning, the employer was entitled to the same right in return. Rejecting this "mutuality theory," the court pointed to the rising number of large corporations that conduct increasingly specialized operations, leading their employees' skills to become more specialized in turn and, hence, less marketable. These changes made it apparent to the court that employer and employee are not on equal footing in terms of bargaining power. Thus, the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine was necessary to create a "proper balance ... between the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out." The Illinois court found that matters of public policy "strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities" and could be defined in the State constitution or statutes. Beyond that, when the constitution and statutes were silent, judicial decisions could also create such policy, the court said in creating a broad scope for its exception. In this case, nothing in the Illinois Constitution or statutes required or permitted an employee to report potential criminal activity by a coworker. However, the court found that public policy favored citizen crime fighters and the exposure of criminal activity. Thus, Palmateer brought an actionable claim for retaliatory discharge.

(bold mine)

It's interesting that Illinois courts lead the nation in broadly interpreting statutes to derive public policy. It's also a bit ironic that concealed carry is one of those policies that could protect an employee under Illinois labor law. The Federal District Court of Central Illinois didn't see it that way in the Ameren case when it ruled for Ameren. I'm not confident things would have favored the employee if the company hadn't agreed to arbitration, so I'd still like to see a court case for a situation specifically like this grievance. All the court cases I saw while trolling around the Internet were about a company retaliating against an employee for assisting law enforcement or for refusing to perform an explicitly illegal act. But at least the employee in the Ameren case would have had a case to make based on Illinois labor law.

Edited by Euler, 19 October 2018 - 12:16 AM.

The welfare of the people in particular has always been the alibi of tyrants, and it provides the further advantage of giving the servants of tyranny a good conscience.

I agree, the FCCA and labor laws are entirely separate things.
The FCCA provides "safe harbor" for parking areas in 21 of the 23 prohibited categories. It says nothing barring an employer from having company policy prohibiting vehicle storage.
That said, the Illinois Bar Association believes the FCCA trumps company policy in that respect.
Boeing Legal believes the same, which is why Illinois is listed as an exemption from the policy prohibiting firearms anywhere on company property.

I can not find anything from Boeing, employee manual, weapon policy, news article, etc... to back this up. Do you happen to have alink? My google-fu is usually strong, but not today.

If it's not available publicly, I can't share it. It's likely only available if logged onto Boeing's network, as I'm unable to access the policies from my phone.

I agree, the FCCA and labor laws are entirely separate things.
The FCCA provides "safe harbor" for parking areas in 21 of the 23 prohibited categories. It says nothing barring an employer from having company policy prohibiting vehicle storage.
That said, the Illinois Bar Association believes the FCCA trumps company policy in that respect.
Boeing Legal believes the same, which is why Illinois is listed as an exemption from the policy prohibiting firearms anywhere on company property.

I can not find anything from Boeing, employee manual, weapon policy, news article, etc... to back this up. Do you happen to have alink? My google-fu is usually strong, but not today.

If it's not available publicly, I can't share it. It's likely only available if logged onto Boeing's network, as I'm unable to access the policies from my phone.

You can take my word for it, though, for what it's worth.

I believe you, but I am writing an article about this subject so can't simply take your word for it I always like to reference sources so there can be no disputes.

I've already sent an email to Boeing, but I am not optimistic I receive a reply.