The legal status of the Muslim women (1) in Bangladesh is defined by the principles
of Sharia through Muslim Personal Law along with the general law which is
non-religious and secular in its character. The Muslim personal law covers the
field of marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of children and
inheritance whereas the general law covers the rights under the Constitution,
penal codes, the civil and criminal procedure codes, evidence act etc.

It is necessary to
examine the legal status of the Muslim women in Bangladesh in the context of
these two sets of law as in both cases women are supposedly fortified with
theoretical legal rights, but there is a gulf of difference existing between
theory and its actual application. Most important of all, it must be seen that
some of these laws though excellent in theory prove largely elusive in practice.
The main hurdle that lies in the way of the practical application of the legal
rights of women in Bangladesh is obviously the inherent contradiction of
attitude that permeates the male oriented society considerably supported by
religious beliefs. In this discussion, however, I shall mainly refer to those
statutes or those provisions of a statute which treat men and women
differently.

Matters not covered herein after should be understood to have egalitarian principles
giving women the same rights and obligations as the men. Let us discuss the
legal rights of Muslim women in Bangladesh under the following
heads:

Before going onto specific rights we must know that the large majority of people in
Bangladesh are Muslims and of these most are Hanafi (2) Muslims while an only
small minority of them belong to any other sects. Thus in general when a point
is made about the law relating to Muslims it will be referring to the law which
governs the majority. Therefore, we should note that historically the provisions
we regard as provisions of pure Islamic Law are to a large extent Qur'anic
utterances which were applied to the reformation of the pre-Islamic Arabian
customary law. (Salma Sobhan, p10). According to Fyzee, "The Qur'anic reform
came as a super-structure upon the ancient tribal laws: it corrected many of the
social and economic inequalities then prevalent."(3) Fazlur Rahman also
makes the same point, "Whereas the spirit of the Qur’anic legislation exhibits
an obvious direction towards the progressive embodiment of the fundamental human
values...nonetheless the actual legislation of the Qur'an had partly to accept
the then existing society as a term of reference."(4) We should also note
further that these laws in the sub-continent have been modified in many cases
not only by Statute and by custom but also by case law.

The other
important point to remember is that though Qur'an has immensely improved the
status of women in several directions, society as a whole maintained the
inequalities that still remained. Not only that, though over the course of years
some disparities were modified by different laws, custom has sometimes been
strong enough to militate against the Qur’anic rule of law. There is, therefore,
no reason to suppose that all the rules that we are going to consider were meant
to be definitive for all times. (5) Now let us return to the specific
laws.

1.
Succession and Right to property.

Muslim law of inheritance has two distinct elements, namely, the customs of ancient
Arabia and the rules laid down by the Qur'an and prophet Mohammad. Under the
customary law of pre-Islamic Arabia the women in whatever capacity were excluded
from inheritance. The Qur'an made quite a considerable change of the
position.

According to the Muslim Law there are three kinds of heirs (i) "sharers" who are entitled
to a prescribed share of the inheritance, (ii) "residuaries" who take on
prescribed share, but succeed to the residue left after satisfying the claims of
the sharers, and (iii) "distant kindreds" who are blood relations other than the
sharers and residuaries, and succeed generally in the absence of sharers and
residuaries. In the classification of the heirs, it is important to note that
though the son's son and son's daughter have been made residuary and sharer
respectively, daughter's children have been made distant kindred. (6) The
principles of succession among the sharers and residuaries are two-fold, i. The
nearest in blood relationship excluded the remote one and ii. Whoever is related
to the deceased through any person shall not inherit while the person is living.
(7)

Under the Muslim Law, the wife (or wives taken together) get one-eighth if there is
child, and one fourth if there be no child from the estate of her husband,
though the husband gets exactly double. Mother gets from the estate of her sons
one-sixth when there is child of her son or when there are two or more brothers
or sisters or one brother and one sister of her son, and one third when there is
no child and not more than one brother or sister of her son. On the other hand,
the father gets from the estate of his son one-sixth if there be child of his
son and in the absence of any child of his son, he gets the entire residue after
satisfying other sharers claim, and so on and so forth. (8) It is significant
that the Qur’an has provided that daughter, mother and wife would under all
circumstances be entitled to some share in the inheritance and are not liable to
exclusion from inheritance, but they are not treated at par with their male
counterparts, i.e. son, father and husband and to this extent rules of
inheritance are discriminatory. Women in fact were not given parity in the
matter of their shares and as a general rule, the female is given one-half the
share of the male. Salma Sobhan writes, since "the Koran is to be likened to an
"amending act" rather an exhaustive code... in the changed society there is
little reason to perpetuate this distinction."(9)

The case of sister's
inheritance is equally discriminatory. According to the rule of nearer in
relationship excluding the remoter in relationship, children of a pre-deceased
son or daughter would not inherit if a person died leaving another son. This
often rendered the child or child of pre-deceased child destitute. This
inequity, however, has been removed by Muslim Family Laws ordinance, 1961 (10)
which provides that the children of the predeceased child would inherit the
share which the pre-deceased children would have inherited had he or she been
alive. But the widow of a predeceased son remains as helpless as before as she
does not inherit anything of this ordinance.

2. Marriage, divorce and connected matters.

Marriage in Islam is a contract and every Muslim of sound mind who has attained puberty
may enter into a contract of marriage. (11) Puberty is presumed, in the absence
of evidence, when one reaches the age of 15 years, but this presumption is
refutable. (12)

Until the age of puberty, a minor may be given in
marriage by his or her guardian and though this is in fact against the
provisions of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, such a marriage even under that
Act would not be void. Under the Sharia Hanafi, a girl given in marriage below
the age of puberty can repudiate that marriage after she attained it and up to
the age of 18 provided the marriage was not consummated. By statute puberty is
no longer relevant and girl given in marriage below the age of 16 can repudiate
the marriage either on the attaining of 16 years, or puberty, where she was
married before puberty. Since according to the Sharia a girl is free from
guardianship at puberty and by the time she is 13 this is assumed, the law
presents another anomaly in that a girl can give herself in marriage if she
wishes below the age of 16, if she has attained puberty and the marriage would
be valid though the person officiating and the groom himself where he was over
18 would be liable for punishment under the Child Marriage Restraint
Act.

Salma Sobhan writes, "Though a minor may be given in marriage, no minor may contract
herself in marriage during her minority and any such marriage would be held to
be void (9D.L.R.1957 p.45)

Where a minor has been given in marriage and marriage has been consummated before
puberty such consummation does not operate to deprive the minor of the option to
repudiate after puberty (9 D.L.R.1957 p.45) However there appears no provision
for explaining or informing the minor of this right either at the time of her
marriage or when she attains puberty. It would further appear that even in cases
where a girl was given in marriage before puberty, she attained puberty or say
the age of 14 1/2 years and subsequently the marriage was consummated, she
should have the right under statute to repudiate the marriage after she was 16
provided there were no further acts of consummation between the period of her
16th or 18th years. (8 D.L.R.1956 p.77) (13)

A Muslim male can contract valid marriage with a Muslim as also with a Ketabi (Jew
or Christian). But his marriage with an idolatress will be irregular. On the
other hand, A Muslim woman may not contract a valid marriage with any one else
but a Muslim. A marriage with a Christian or a Jew would be irregular while a
marriage with a Hindu would be invalid (that is any children born would be
illegitimate). It simply means that while a man may marry someone who is not his
"social equal" a woman should be protected against such marriages. A Muslim male
can take four wives at a time, but a Muslim woman cannot take more than one
husband. Even a male marries having already four wives, the fifth marriage is
not void, but only irregular. Though Islamic Law vastly improved the then status
of woman, the idea of woman being a property could not be altogether thrown away
as can be found from the permissibility of plurality of wives. However,
realising the evil effects of and the injustice inherent in the polygamy of men
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance N°. VIII of 1961 Vide Pakistan
Code 1966 Vol.XIV, P.67) was passed. Sec.6 of the Ordinance provides that no
man, during the subsistence of existing marriage, shall contract another
marriage without prior written permission of Arbitration Council and violation
of this provision entails liability of conviction and punishment. The
Arbitration Council while dealing with an application for permission to marry
during the subsistence of a marriage would consider whether the existing wife
consents to such marriage and whether it is necessary and just to grant the
permission. But this legislation failed to produce the desired result because
due to protracted procedure in courts few inclined to bring violations to court
and because the Arbitration Council being manned by males very often were not
un-willing to accord permission on the slightest pretexts. The law did not make
adequate provision to control the discretion of the Arbitration
council.

By Bengal Act N°.1 of 1876 (Vide East Pakistan Code, 1963 Vol. 11. p.71) provision
was made for registration of Muslim marriages, but registration under this Act
was optional. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 made the registration compulsory
and enjoined the Kazi (who solemnises marriage) on pain of punishment to report
solemnisation of marriage to marriage registrar so that the marriage may be
registered. Similar provisions have been made by Muslim Marriages and Divorces
Act, 1974.

One of the essential part of Muslim marriage is "dower" paid or promised to be paid
by the husband to the wife. Dower must not, however be confused with "dowry"
which consists of presents made by father and other relations of the bride and
Muslim Law does not make any provision for payment of dowry. Dower is the sum of
money or other property which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband
in consideration of marriage. (D.F. Mulla, Principles of Mohammedan Law, 17th
Ed.P.277). The amount of dower may be fixed either before or at the time of
marriage of after marriage. The law does not say anything about the quantum of
dower. The amount of dower is generally split into two parts- "prompt dower"
which is payable immediately on demand by the wife and "deferred dower" which is
payable only on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce. In view of the
provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, the entire amount is now to be
treated as "prompt". The claim to dower is not lost even when the marriage is
dissolved by Court at the instance of the wife or when the wife exercises the
right to divorce.

It is in the field of divorce that the most flagrant inequality between husband and
wife exists. The husband has the right of unilateral divorce, for no cause at
all. The wife has no such right, and when her husband exercises his right, the
wife has no redress. The women can have judicial separation on specified grounds
through intervention of Court. The Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961 though has
already provided for arbiters, the arbitration council cannot prevent the talaq
by the husband even if it be highly arbitrary and unjust and can only delay the
action in the hope that some conciliation will result.

The most common mode of divorce by man prevalent in Bangladesh is Bedai Talak
(Irrevocable Divorce) which takes effect immediately without the requirement of
communication to the wife for its validity. The husband pronounces three times
that he divorces his wife and with the third pronouncement the Talak becomes
irrevocable and takes effect on completion of a certain period. This may also be
done by writing on a piece of paper. Once this right was exercised the parties
could not re-marry without the intervention of another marriage, i.e. unless the
wife was married to a third person and then divorced after consummation of the
marriage. (D.F.Mulla, Principles of Mohammedan Law, 17th Ed.) With the
introduction of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961, the position has changed.
Section 7 of the Ordinance provides that Divorce given by the husband shall not
take effect until the husband has given notice of the Divorce to the chairman of
local administrative unit, Union Parishad and ninety days have elapsed after
issuance of the said notice and within the said period the husband can revoke
the Divorce. The husband is also to give a copy of the said notice to the wife.
The Chairman on receipt of the notice would constitute Arbitration Council for
effecting a reconciliation which, if successful, would render the divorce
ineffective. It is an offence not to notify the Chairman about exercise of
Divorce by the husband. The provisions of Sec. 7 of the Ordinance apply mutates
mutandis in case of divorce exercised by the wife and the divorce does not take
effect unless notice thereof is given to the Chairman and 90 days have elapsed
thereafter. The husband can delegate his power of divorce to his unconditionally
or with condition and that is called Talak-e-Tawfeez. When any condition is
stipulated the wife can divorce her husband in the happening of that condition.
Now the divorced parties can remarry without the formality of the marriage with
third party. (Sec7 (6), Muslim Family Laws Ordinance,
1961.)

Muslim marriage can be dissolved by agreement between the husband and wife and it may
take the force of Khula or Mubarrat. In Khula, the marriage is dissolved by an
agreement between the parties for a consideration paid, or to be paid, by the
wife to the husband, it being necessary condition that the desire to separate
should come from the wife. Where desire to the separation is mutual, it is said
to be Mubarat. A wife is entitled to Khula as of right or restoration of what
she had received in consideration of marriage, if she satisfies the conscience
of the court that it will otherwise mean forcing her into a hateful union. As
stated above, a Muslim female does not have the right to divorce in the way a
mal-e has, but she could seek judicial divorce on grounds permitted by Muslim
Law. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 (Act N° VIII of 1939 (Vide
Pakistan Code 1966, Vol.IX, P.716). was passed in order to consolidate and to
clarify those grounds and also to add some new grounds. (15)

A wife is
entitled to obtain a judicial divorce on neglect or failure of the husband to
provide maintenance for two years. But if the wife refuses herself to her
husband without any lawful excuse and deserts her husband, or otherwise
willfully fails to perform her marital duties, she has no right to claim
maintenance and cannot obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground
of nonpayment of maintenance. The fact that the wife is a woman of means would
not be a defence to the claim of judicial divorce for non-payment of
maintenance. A Muslim woman can obtain judicial divorce on any ground recognised
by Muslim Law. Thus a wife is entitled to judicial divorce if the husband brings
false charge of adultery against her unless the husband bonafide retracts the
charge of adultery. To constitute a valid retraction, it must be made before the
commencement of the hearing of the suit, it must be bonafide and there must be
an admission by the husband about making the charge and an unconditional
acknowledgement by him that the charge is false. Incompatibility of temperament
as results in a hateful union has been accepted as a ground for seeking judicial
divorce. Before the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939 apostasy from Islam
of either party operated as a complete and immediate dissolution of marriage.
After passing of the Act, apostasy from Islam of the wife does not dissolve the
marriage (Sec.4 of the Act) while apostasy of the husband dissolves the marriage
immediately. (Mulla.P.305)

3. Maintenance

In accordance with Muslim Law, the father is bound to maintain his daughter until
she is married (Mulla). The fact that the mother has the custody of the daughter
till the latter attains puberty does not relieve the father of his obligation to
maintain the daughter (Mulla). If the father is poor, but the mother is in easy
circumstances, the mother has the obligation to maintain the daughter (Mulla).
But a father is not bound to maintain a daughter who is capable of being
maintained out of her own property. A Muslim mother is entitled to maintenance
from her son if she is poor or if the son is financially solvent (Mulla). A
Muslim husband is bound to maintain his wife so long the wife remains faithful
to him and obeys his reasonable orders. If the wife refuses herself to her
husband without any lawful excuse and deserts her husband or otherwise willfully
fails to perform her marital obligations she has no right to claim maintenance
from the husband. But if the wife refuses to perform her marital obligations on
the failure of the husband to pay the prompt dower the husband will not be
absolved of his liability to maintain his wife (Mulla).

A Muslim woman in the event of divorce is entitled to maintenance by the husband
till the expiry of the period of Iddat (e.i.90 days, and in case of a pregnant
wife till the end of the pregnancy). A Muslim male maintains his daughter as
best as his means permit and a husband also maintains his wife to the best of
his ability so long the relationship remains good, but if the relationship is
estranged, the condition of the wife is very difficult. The social milieu and
cumbersome court procedure made it difficult for the wife to have maintenance
through Court. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 tried to evolve a procedure
through which the wife can easily have her remedy, but it has not produced any
appreciable improvement. The Family Courts Ordinance, 1985, however, has been
promulgated to deal with divorce and related matters and provisions have been
made to dispose the cases of within the shortest time
possible.

A Muslim widow is essentially dependent on her son, for, generally even her share
in the property of her husband remains in the hands of the son and ironically
enough, her fate depends upon the attitude of the daughter-in-law. But if the
widow has no son to depend upon the relations of the husband; her condition in
most cases is miserable.

4.
Guardianship of children

In the matter of guardianship of children, a Muslim woman is definitely at odds.
Under Muslim Law, the mother is entitled only to the custody of the person of
her minor child up to a certain age according to the sex of the child. But she
is not the natural guardian either of the person or property of the child; the
father alone, or if he is dead, his executor is the legal guardian. Salma Sobhan
points out "In Islam a careful distinction is made between being entitled to the
custody of one's children and being their guardian ....... one would be tempted
to compare the difference between these two concepts to the difference between
possession and ownership. In any event, in Muslim Law, the mother is never
entitled to the guardianship of her children.......However, a mother is always
entitled in the first instance to the care and custody of her young children.
Her sons she may keep till they are seven, and her daughters till puberty. The
father is responsible for their maintenance during that period. A mother may
lose custody of her children, particularity her daughters, if she re-marries a
stranger, someone that is, who is not barred to the children by the rule of
consanguinity. These are the basic rules, but they have been modified, not only
by the Guardian and Wards Act, but there is also a fairly substantial amount of
case-law on the subject, which on the whole has been very sane. "(16) It is laid
down by the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 that the courts have stated that these
provisions are for the benefit and protection of the child, and that it is the
courts paramount duty to consider the welfare of the children over the rights of
the parents. (20 D.L.R.1968 P.1). According to Salma Sobhan again "Thus
remarriage of the mother outside the permitted degrees has not been held an
absolute reason for depriving her of the custody of her children. Were the
children having been all along in the custody ceased, it was still considered
advisable to let them continue in her care and control, as the father had
re-married and it was felt that the children's interests would not be so well
looked after by their stepmother. The father is only free from the burden of
maintaining his children where they are being withheld from him illegally. The
mother's poverty is never a sufficient reason to deprive her of her right to the
custody of her children." (Dhaka Law Reports, 1955, 1958, 1964 and Guardian and
Wards Act, 1890.) Under the Guardian and Wards Act, further, a mother can always
apply to the court to be appointed the guardian of her children.

5. Fundamental Rights

In here I shall discuss some of the aspects of the general law, which is
non-religious or secular in nature, the most important of which is the
constitution. Under the Bangladesh Constitution (The Constitution of the
People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972), various provisions exist relating to
women both directly and indirectly. In a section where the state accepts a
fundamental responsibility towards raising the standard of living of the people,
it specifically undertakes responsibility for providing social security to,
inter alia, widows. Another section runs, The state shall take effective
measures to prevent prostitution". Further on it is stated categorically, "All
citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the
law" and also that "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on
grounds of ....sex" and "Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres
of State and Public life", and "No. citizen shall on grounds only
of.....sex..... be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or
condition with regard to any place of public entertainment or resort, or
admission to any educational institution. "There is a further section which
reads, "Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making special
provision in favour of women or children or for the advancement of any backward
section of citizen." In the sections relating to service with the Republic there
are also similar passages securing equal opportunity for all citizens on the one
hand while reserving the right to make special provision in favour of any
backward section of citizens for the purpose of securing them adequate
representation or reserving for members of one sex any class of employment or
office on the ground that is considered by its nature to be unsuited to members
of the opposite sex. Further, in exercise of these provisions, 30 seats of
Parliament were reserved for women members exclusively for a period prescribed
in the constitution.

These provisions are interesting both in that which they say and that which they
imply. According to Salma Sobhan's analysis while all citizens are equal before
the law and entitled to equal protection this does not mean, nor is it meant to
mean that all citizens enjoy equal rights. The State, though, undertakes not to
discriminate against any citizen, and women are categorically assured of
equality is given outside these spheres. Further the right to reserve any job
exclusively for one or other of the sexes because of its nature is a slightly
sinister one. Either a job cannot physically be done by a person or else it is a
matter of X's opinion that such and such a job cannot be done by Y. This may in
fact be no more than a statement that the job ought not to be done by Y. "The
tenor of all these provisions read as a whole makes it obvious that the drafters
of the Constitution could not fail to acknowledge tacitly the fact of the
inequality present in the status of women. To their credit their consciences
were sensitive to the particular vulnerability of widowed women and they show
commendable awareness of the fact that prostitution exists not usually because
of the "weakness" of the prostitute but rather as a means of exploitation by
society.

Yet it would appear to be implied that the vulnerability or
exploitability of women was something inherent to their sex rather than a
commentary on the society itself," writes Salma Sobhan. Women are thus bracketed
with children and "other backward sections of society". The assumption is that
it is women who are backward, not the society in its attitudes towards women.
Thus we may say that the Constitution operates on two assumptions. The first is
that women are in need of greater protection than men. This is not so much for
women are privileged, but because they are weaker. And because of this the
identity of the woman is submerged with the stronger identity of her male
counterpart or guardian. It should be noted that where it appears that the women
are being accorded privileged treatment it results often in the so-called
privilege under-writing a social custom rather than attempting to eradicate
it.

The women are allowed maternity leave in addition to other leave
facilities enjoyed by men in public service. In private employment no employer
shall knowingly employ a woman during the six weeks immediately following her
date of delivery. (Rule 197 of Government Service Rules, Vide East Pakistan
Service Rules; Part-1 P.82 and Sec. 3 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1939 Vide
East Pakistan Code 1962; Vol.VI; P.1). The employer also is bound to pay
maternity benefit at a certain rate according to the Maternity Benefit Act of
1939. But due to want of proper check, these provisions are often violated.
Moreover, the employers feel inclined not to employ women to avoid that extra
cost. Similarly, Acts that every factory employing more than fifty women must
provide for suitable room for use of children of those women (The Factories Act,
1965) and that the Government has been given power to extend this facility to
the plantation labour (The Tea Plantation Labour Ordinance, 1962) have not
proved effective at all.
Looking at how women are treated in Penal Code, let us first consider the Act
regarding abortion (Act N°. XIV of 1860). Under that act whoever (including the
woman herself) voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such
miscarriage be caused in good faith (which now invariably is considered to limit
family size) for the purpose of saving of life of the woman be punishable, and
who commits this offence without the consent of the woman miscarried shall be
liable to higher sentence. It should be noted here that in the recent past
abortion has been "justified" in the name of "menstruation regulation" or
"medical termination of pregnancy" as a birth control measure, and the "good
faith" has changed its connotation from "for the purpose of saving of life of
the woman" to "birth control" and abortion as a free choice of a woman to
terminate her pregnancy has remained socially as well as legally
"undesirable".

Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty and kidnapping and
abduction of woman to compel her to marriage, inducing girl under 18 years of
age to go from any place or to do any act with the intent that such girl may be
forced or seduced to illegal sexual intercourse or importation of girl below 21
years of age for the said purpose selling or otherwise disposing of girl under
18 years of age for prostitution or illicit sexual intercourse and buying or
obtaining possession of such girl for prostitution or illicit sexual intercourse
are offences under the Penal Code Rape is an offence and sexual intercourse with
the wife under 15 years of age without her consent is treated as rape.
Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief in the woman of
lawful marriage or enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent
another man's wife are offences. Adultery and bigamy are also offences, but the
woman involved in the adultery is not liable to punishment. (Act N°XIV of 1860,
Bangladesh Code, 1978 Vol.I). It is interesting to note that when a woman is
accused of an offence, "womanhood" is one of the grounds for release on bail.
Sec.497, Code of Criminal Procedure Vide Pakistan Code 1966 Vol. IV). The
Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance, 11983 and the Dowry
Prohibition Act 1980 have been promulgated to expedite the court procedures and
enhance the punishment, no substantial change, however, in law has been made to
really improve the situation.

On the basis of the above discussion, probably it is a bit too strong to say that
the law actively, in all spheres, denigrates women, but it certainly does not
elevate them. Discussing the law of maintenance of wives under Muslim Law,
Naimuddin Ahmed writes, 2 In Bangladesh, the law, as it is, cannot probably
rescue Muslim wives from, first, being abandoned and then being divorced and
left with a life-time of indigence by arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
husbands." (17) The weakness in the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961 is that not
only is the second marriage not made void, but that the right of unilateral
divorce is not effectively curbed, so that any woman opposing her husband's
remarrying, in a system where there is no alimony for a divorced woman, and
where she will rarely have been given an appropriate education to enable her to
earn her own living, runs the risk of destitution. It is true that the social
attitude contributes to this dismal state of affaires, but the situation can
considerably be improved by reform of law. When the Constitution professes
equality of women with men, the need to review and revise the law to ensure
fundamental rights to equality hardly requires any emphasis. Not only that he
law should be revised, but its enforcement should be made easy, speedy and
similar so that the women can get some benefit out of whatever the law is
offering. Unless the law itself along with the procedure for its enforcement is
changed, the position of Muslim women in Bangladesh will continue to remain
subject to such humiliating condition because of erroneous concept of law, of
women's position in society and also of humanity as a
whole.

It may be mentioned here that the various women's organisations, namely the Mahila
Parishad, Women's Lawyers' Association and the Committee for Resistance to
Violence to Women and Social Injustices are working seriously towards
reformation of Law as well as speedy adjudication of the same. One of the
results of long struggles of women in Bangladesh is the promulgation of the
Family Courts Ordinance, 1985, the Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment)
Ordinance 1983 and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980.

Women are being more
and more conscious about their religious, social, economic, political as well as
legal position and are showing quite a considerable interest in working towards
a more egalitarian and just situation.

End notes

1. 85.47 per cent of the total population in Bangladesh are Muslims according to
the Bangladesh Statistical Year Book 1975- 76, P.29; and Women constitute 48.1
percent, Bangladesh Population Census, 1974 Bulletin 2,
P.1.