Striking at Assad Carries Opportunities, and Risks, for Trump, de David E. Sanger no New York Times, notou que “During last year’s campaign, Mr. Trump argued strenuously that Mr. Obama’s decision at the time was a symbol of American weakness that should never be repeated. In that respect, the attack on Thursday night was almost preordained”. A seguir destacou alguns dos riscos desta decisão: “The first risk is that his gambit with Mr. Putin fails. The Russian leader may have strongly preferred Mr. Trump to his rival, Hillary Clinton, in the election. But Mr. Putin is not likely to enter into an agreement that threatens his influence over Syria, and thus his main foothold in the Middle East. Syria is home to Russia’s main military base outside its own borders. A second risk is that Mr. Trump, in taking a shot at Mr. Assad, undercuts his own main goal in the region: defeating the Islamic State.”

History has served up a rare second chance on Assad, um texto de Richard Haass, presidente do Council on Foreign Relations dos Estados Unidos no Financial Times e que, mesmo tendo sido escrito antes do ataque da madrugada de ontem, tem algumas considerações bem interessantes. Por exemplo quando argumenta que o ataque com armas químicas levado a cabo pelo regime sírio não pode ficar sem resposta: “Why Mr Assad chose to order such a strike now, at a time when his domestic position looked unassailable and just days after the Trump administration signalled it had accepted the reality of his rule, is something of a mystery. It may be that he is not as confident of his position as outsiders judged, or possibly that he wanted to discourage anyone opposing his taking control of territory liberated from Isis. It is important that he not be allowed to escape without paying a price. The norm against the use of chemical or any weapon of mass destruction was weakened by global inaction four years ago. It is essential that it be strengthened now, not just for the future of Syria, but also because policies will be influenced in both Tehran and Pyongyang by what is decided and done here.”

Syria Policy After the Chemical Attacks, de Sam Heller na Foreign Affairs, um texto cuja ideia central é que “Stopping the Gas, Not Toppling Assad, Should Be the Goal”. Algo que é defendido em nome de uma política que filiaríamos na escola “realista”: “It is a myth that more concerted pressure on the regime will convince it to negotiate a settlement that amounts to its own demise. The Syrian government can be limited geographically—its perimeter can expand or contract—but within those bounds, there is no realistic way to reform it or merge it with appealing elements of the opposition. What the United States could do is run over both Iran and Russia and, through unilateral military action, gravely weaken or destroy the Assad regime. But if it did, al Qaeda–type jihadists and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) would be the insurgent forces best positioned to capitalize on the regime's demise. Tearing down the Assad regime now would throw the most populous parts of Syria into chaos, a vortex of militia violence that would empower jihadists and drive millions of refugees into Syria’s already weakened and destabilized neighbors.”

What the Syria Strikes Mean, de Walter Russel Mead, entre outros, na The American Interest, onde os autores fazem uma referência ao facto de, ao confronter Putin, Trump ter tirado argumentos a muitos dos seus adversários – “It will be interesting to see how the “Manchurian candidate” narrative about the President fares going forward”. Quanto ao essencial, defendem que “the strike was being read for what it is: a demonstration that this Administration is less reluctant to use force than the one that preceded it. And though Russia was the big power most directly challenged by the strike, Putin was perhaps not even the primary intended recipient of the message. The strikes occurred just as President Trump was having dinner with Xi Jinping of China, and, according to AFP, Trump delivered the news to Xi personally. The subtext was unmistakeable: Get serious about North Korea; our recent threats were not idle. Don Corleone himself couldn’t have set a better table.”

Donald Trump strikes at Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, But what happens next?, uma análise da The Economist onde se sublinha que ainda falta clareza à política externa do Estados Unidos, nomeadamente o que pretende fazer na Síria: “The question now is what happens next. Rex Tillerson, Mr Trump’s hitherto almost invisible secretary of state, is due to meet Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, in Moscow next week. Mr Tillerson has accused Russia of either being “complicit” in the attack or “incompetent” in its inability to restrain its ally. Only a few days ago, Mr Trump’s officials were signalling that it was no longer an aim of the administration to remove Mr Assad from power as a prerequisite for a deal to end the war in Syria, which has claimed perhaps half a million lives. Has Mr Trump changed his mind? Or, having slapped Mr Assad on the wrist and warned the Russians that he cannot act with impunity, will America continue to stand back from the peace negotiations? Confusingly, Mr Tillerson said, after the attack, that policy toward Syria has not changed.”

Trump enforces the ‘red line’ on chemical weapons, de David Ignatius no Washington Post, onde este faz um paralelo com a atitude dos Estados Unidos antes da entrada na I Guerra Mundial: “American interventionism is our best and worst national trait. Historically, until 1941, the United States was a reluctant warrior, fearful of foreign entanglement. Thursday marked the 100th anniversary of America’s entry into World War I, a conflict that still drips with senseless, dutiful killing. The young men of Europe had been slaughtering each other since 1914, but on the other side of the Atlantic it was “America First” until Congress backed Woodrow Wilson and declared war on April 6, 1917.”