Wordtrade.com

Review Essays of Academic, Professional &
Technical Books in the Humanities &
Sciences

M. ibn al-'Arabi

Ibn al-'Arabi's Barzakh: The Concept of the Limit and the Relationship between
God and the World by Salman H. Bashier (SUNY: State University of New York
Press) This book explores how Ibn al-'Arabi (1165-1240) used the concept
of barzakh (the Limit) to deal with the philosophical problem of the
relationship between God and the world, a major concept disputed in
ancient and medieval Islamic thought. The term "barzakh" indicates
the activity or actor that differentiates between things and that,
paradoxically, then provides the context of their unity. Author
Salman H. Bashier looks at early thinkers and shows how the
synthetic solutions they developed provided the groundwork for Ibn
al-'Arabi's unique concept of barzakh. Bashier discusses Ibn al-'Arabi's
development of the concept of barzakh ontologically through the
notion of the Third Thing and epistemologically through the notion
of the Perfect Man, and compares Ibn al-'Arabi's vision with
Plato's.

"Salmon H. Bashier has rightly identified the importance of the
concept of the Limit (barzakh), a central theme in Ibn al-'Arabi's
thought, and situates the concept in two new contexts: earlier
Islamic thought as a whole, and the larger Western philosophic
tradition. It is a worthy ambition." —John Walbridge

The Story of Islamic Philosophy: Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Al-'Arabi,
and Others on the Limit Between Naturalism and
Traditionalismby Salman H. Bashier (SUNY:
State University of New York Press) In this innovative
work, Salman H. Bashier challenges traditional views of
Islamic philosophy. While Islamic thought from the
crucial medieval period is often depicted as a
rationalistic elaboration on Aristotelian philosophy and
an attempt to reconcile it with the Muslim religion,
Bashier puts equal emphasis on the influence of Plato's
philosophical mysticism. This shift encourages a new
reading of Islamic intellectual tradition, one in which
boundaries between philosophy, religion, mysticism, and
myth are relaxed. Bashier shows the manner in which
medieval Islamic philosophers reflected on the relation
between philosophy and religion as a problem that is
intrinsic to philosophy and shows how their
deliberations had the effect of redefining the very
limits of their philosophical thought. The problems of
the origin of human beings, human language, and the
world in Islamic philosophy are discussed. Bashier
highlights the importance of Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn
Yaqzan, a landmark work often overlooked by
scholars, and the thought of the great Sufi mystic Ibn
al-Arabi to the mainstream of Islamic philosophy.

Ibn al-'Arabi's Barzakh: The Concept of the Limit and the Relationship between
God and the World by Salman H. Bashier (SUNY: State University of New York
Press) Excerpt: In the year 1562 a Turkish aka came to Istanbul. Six
years later he became the watchman of the sultan's
garden. One day he entered the garden and watched a
musician demonstrating his skills before a group of
people, bringing forth "laments like the nightingale and
passions like a butterfly."' The gathering group
applauded the musician and showed him great respect and
admiration. When he was left alone the aka implored him
to be his instructor in the art of music. The musician
brought forth a plectrum and handed it to the aka, who
locked himself in his room and, day and night, he
practiced his hand. His skill increased so much that
when he was practicing even the shadow of his hand could
not be seen. Exercising his skill for many days and
nights, the aka was eventually overcome by sleep. He saw
in a dream a group of gypsy musicians holding all kinds
of musical instruments and playing sounds that "threw
the universe in tumult." Then after showing the aga
great respect and reverence they said to him, "If you
have liking for our art, if you want to learn it, God
bless you!" The aga turned to his teacher, the musician,
and asked his help in interpreting the dream. The
musician said:

In truth this art is a gypsy art. But they are an
ignorant tribe. What is a note [nagme]? What is time
[zaman]? What is harmony [mulayemet]? What is dissonance
[münaferet]? What is melody [lahn]? What is interval
[bu'd]? What is tone [savt]? What is song [gina]? They
know not. A note is the same as a deliberate producing
of the sound ten. Ten . . . consists of two letters.
When a person produces it with a specific tone, that is
a note. And this is the definition of time. Time is the sound of that
interval between the voicing of the letter ta and the
beginning of the letter nun when a person pronounces the
word ten. In the technical terminology of the science of
music, a tone resembling ten . . . is called a tone.
Harmony is that which is agreeable to nature. Dissonance
is that which is offensive to nature. In the technical
terminology of music, melody means to play the sound of
notes high in some places and low in other places, that
is treble and bass. Interval is what they call the space
between two tones.

Although the art of music is a gypsy one, the gypsies
do not possess knowledge of it. They do not know the
definitions of what music is made of, that is, the
definitions of note, time, harmony, dissonance, melody,
interval, tone, and song. The musician provides liminal
definitions for these terms. For example, the "note" is
defined as a liminal entity that separates between the
ta and the nun. A person may, with many specific tones,
produce the (one) word ten in many different ways. This
depends on the interval that he strikes between the
letters ta and nun, that is, on the sound produced when
a variant interval is specified. Time is identified with
the sound that is the product of striking that interval
or the function of the space that separates between the
two letters. A good musician is one who knows how to
keep to harmony and away from dissonance; is one who
knows how to strike a balance between the two components
(letters) that constitute a specific tone and between
two specific notes in a manner that is agreeable, or not
offensive to nature.

By saying that the gypsies do not know what time is
the musician does not mean that they do not know that
time is the function of the space that separates between
two letters. Acknowledgement of the literal definition
of time does not guarantee real knowledge of it. For,
like the relationship between the ta and the nun, this
knowledge is to remain relatively hidden as long as it
is relatively determined. The moment the relationship is
specified it is no longer the relationship the knowledge
of which is of the musician's real concern. This
knowledge is and remains nonmanifest, even as the
musician who determines it, and is determined by it, is.
This is, in my view, Ibn al-Arabi's mystical knowledge.
In the year 1190 in Cordoba he witnessed a vision: "Know
that when God showed to me and made me contemplate all
the Messengers and prophets of the human species from
Adam down to Muhammad, in a scene [mashhad] in which it
was granted to me to participate at Cordoba in 586, none
of them spoke to me with the exception of Had, who
explained to me the reason for their gathering." Ibn
al-'Arabi does not tell us about the real reason behind
the gathering of the Messengers and the Prophets of God
either in this or in a more detailed account of the same
vision, in which the prophet Had informed him that the
Prophets and Messengers of God had come to visit a
certain man.4 However, as one of his modern biographers
pointed out, Ibn al-Arabi confided the secret of the
gathering to certain disciples of his, who transmitted
it from generation to generation until the mystery was
divulged by Jandi (d. 1330), the commentator on Ibn
al-Arabi's Fusus al-Hikam: The Prophets and the
Messengers assembled to congratulate Ibn al-'Arabi
on being nominated the Seal of Sainthood, the supreme
heir to the Seal of the Prophets.

Ibn al- 'Arabi's notion of the Seal of the Sainthood
has received a considerable amount of discussion by
several of his scholars, the most important of which was
provided by Michel Chodkiewicz. It is also a notion
that has come under serious attacks in both medieval and
in modern times, especially the idea that sainthood
encompasses the divine message (Hullo) and prophecy
(nubuwwa), and that in the person of each prophet the
saint is superior to the prophet.' In the context of
discussing the encounter between Khadir, one of God's
saints, and Moses His prophet, Ibn al-'Arabi emphasizes
that the saint possesses knowledge that is not available
to the prophet:

Imam of the Era, 'Abd al-Qadir, said, "Assemblies of
the prophets! You have been given the title, but we have
been given what you were not given." As for his words,
"You have been given the title," he means that the
ascription of the word prophet has been interdicted to
us, even though the general prophecy pervades the great
ones among the Men. And as for his words, "but we have
been given what you were not given," that is the meaning
of Khadir's words, to whose rectitude and priority in
knowledge of God has given witness. Moses, God's chosen
speaking companion brought near to Him, went to the
trouble of seeking Khadir, even though it is known that
the ulama see Moses as more excellent than Khadir.
Khadir said to him, "0 Moses, I have a knowledge that
God has taught me, and that you do not know." This is
exactly the meaning of (Abd al-Qadir's words, "We have
been given what you were not given."

The knowledge that Khadir knew and Moses did not is
knowledge of non-manifestation. According to Ibn
al-'Arabi, this is the knowledge of the non-manifest
letter waw, which is between the manifest letters kaf
and nun in the divine word kun (be!). The word k[u]n
consists of two manifest letters: kaf (k) and nun (n),
and a nonmanifest letter: waw (u). The word k[u]n,
therefore, represents all that is manifest and
nonmanifest. Thus, it signifies God, the Real, who is
the liminal entity that brings the aspects of
nonmanifestation and manifestation together. It also
signifies the perfect human being, His deputy on earth
and the configuration within which the Real manifests
his words in the outside existence:

He says, Our only word to a thing, when We desire it,
is to say to it "Be!" [kun] [16:40]. Thus He brought
three letters, two of which are manifest—the kaf and the
nun—and one of which [the waw] is non-manifest and
hidden. . .. In this level, the perfect human being
assumes the deputyship of the Real in differentiating
between the prior word and the word that follows it. . .
. The existence [wujud in Chittick] of the letter in
every point of articulation is its being engendered. If
no one engenders it here, then who engenders it?
Inescapably, the one who engenders it is between every
two words or letters so as to give existence to the
second word or the second letter and to attach it to the
first. . . . In speech there is no escape from priority,
posteriority, and order. So also, in the existent
things, which are the entities of the divine words,
there is priority, posteriority, and order. This is made
manifest by the Aeon, and the Aeon is God, according to
an explicit text. The Prophet said, "Do not curse the
Aeon, for God is the Aeon." Within the Aeon, order,
priority, and posteriority become manifest in the
existence [wujud in Chittick] of the cosmos."

Dahr (Aeon) means "time." According to Ibn al-'Arabi,
God applied to himself the word dahr and not zaman in
order to distinguish his ruling property from the ruling
property of the time that is imagined as a straight line
with beginning and end. Instead, God's time is the
Limit, which resembles any point that we may suppose on
the circumference of the circle, and which can be
considered both the beginning and the end of the
circle."' Every point on the circumference of the circle
resembles a limit between a preceding point and a
following one. The circle itself has neither a beginning
nor an end, but on its circumference there can be found
endless points, as there can be found endless beginnings
and ends. Like points on the circumference of the circle
the words of God are infinitely many. But the infinitely
many words of God originate from a single word. That
word is the divine command kun, which consists of two
manifest letters (kaf and nun) and a nonmanifest letter
(waw). God engenders existence or brings his commands
into manifestation by differentiating or setting limits
between the letters or the words that are latent in his
Essence. When God desires to make this affair known, he
speaks within the configuration of the perfect human
being. The perfect human being assumes the deputyship of
the Real in differentiating between the engendered prior
word and the word that follows it.

"Engendered existence," which comes to be through the
divine command kun, translates al-kawn in Arabic. As
William Chittick points out, it is possible that Ibn
al-Arabi means by al-kawn "all that is," which is both
God and the cosmos, and it is also possible that he
means by it "everything other than God." Chittick thinks
that Ibn al-'Arabi has this second meaning in mind. I think, however, that al-kawn may, perhaps
paradoxically, be subject to both interpretations. This,
I think, is what constitutes the definition of Ibn al-
'Arabi's most celebrated as well as most misinterpreted
notion of the Oneness of Being (wandat al-wujud), which
he expresses in terms of unification that is not
exclusive to differentiation. "Unification" is tawhid in
Arabic. As Chittick points out, the grammatical form of
the word involves an active stance of a person toward a
certain object. Chittick writes, "Tawhid does not begin
with unity, since that needs to be established. Rather,
it begins with the recognition of diversity and
difference. The integrated vision that tawhid implies
must be achieved on the basis of recognized
multiplicity."This assertion is different if not
perhaps only apparently from what Sachiko Murata says,
"Undifferentiation and differentiation are often
considered synonymous with the terms
all-comprehensiveness (jam') and dispersion (farq or
tafriqa). As in similar pairs, the relationship is taken
into account, not any absolute value attached to either
side. What is differentiated from one point of view may
be undifferentiated from another point of view.
Undifferentiation is the higher, more powerful, more
luminous, and prior dimension of reality. But it is able
to manifest itself only through differentiation, which
is lower, weaker, darker, and receptive toward its
activity."

Chittick is correct in thinking that being aware of
difference is prior to or a condition for recognizing
unity. However, unification, or, to use Murata's term,
undifferentiation remains in a sense a prior dimension
of reality, since a certain form of unity or identity is
required before any recognition that is based on setting
(rational) limits could be started. At any rate, the two
interpretations can be applied to Ibn al- 'Arabi's
doctrine of the Oneness of Being, which has been subject
to serious misinterpretations both in medieval and
modern times. Abü Affifi, for example, interpreted this
doctrine on the basis of pantheism and in terms
signifying a static unity rather than a dynamic
actuality. In his interpretation, God and the world are
reduced to one ineffective unity in which the element of
variegation is absent. Affifi is aware of the
dialectical element dominating Ibn al-'Arabi's thought."
However, by presenting this dialectical element merely
as a formal principle," he overlooks the most
fundamental notion of Ibn al- 'Arabi's thought, the
notion of actuality that signifies the ceaseless
unfolding of reality and its emergence into ever higher
levels of unity. Consequently, he fails to grasp the
true significance of the notion of paradoxicality
intrinsic to Ibn al-'Arabi's thought, ascribing the
paradoxical expressions in his writings to lack of
philosophical training and his failure to compromise
monotheistic Islam with concessions to pantheism.

Affifi wrote his work in a time in which the emphasis
on rationalism was in its strongest phases." As Phillip
Rosemann points out, in the study of medieval thought
this emphasis was characteristic of the Newscholastic
methodology of research." Rosemann's study of
the history of medieval philosophy raises interesting points, especially regarding the present
increasing interest in emphasizing the mystical
component in medieval thought. Rosemann says that the
Newscholastic stance, which was the dominant paradigm
until about thirty years ago, turned out to be
paradoxical since it adopted the very rationalist
assumptions of the project of modernity, which it set
out to combat. The result was that Newscholasticism
focused its attention on the most rational thinkers of
the Middle Ages and had little interest in medieval
mystics, always favoring the thinkers of Latin Europe
over Arabic and Jewish medieval thinkers. He explains
the death of Newscholasticism as the outcome of a shift
in the present time from the project of modernity, a
shift that was caused by postmodernist emphasis on
otherness and difference. This explains, according to
him, the present day interest in mystical thinkers and
in the mystical features of thinkers who were previously
considered purely rational. This change of paradigm
designates, according to Rosemann, an advance in our
knowledge of the history of medieval philosophy. He
insists, however, that the current postmodernist
paradigm suffers from serious limitations, the most
important of which is that it neglects the element of
unity of the human knowledge and the social order and
exaggerates difference. There is need for a new
interpretation of the history of medieval philosophy, as
this must relax its opting for partiality and difference
by balancing it with serious reconsideration of
wholeness and unity: "Philosophically, it is not enough
to underline the multiplicity of coherent universes of
discourse, analyzing each in and for itself, as this
must inevitably lead to relativism. Relativism is
logically untenable and self-destructive. Hence, we
cannot content ourselves with parts, but rather need to
move on to the whole, in which each of the parts finds
its logical place."

Thus, Rosemann thinks that the postmodern approach of
analycity anc relativism must be replaced by a new
paradigm which gives equal weight to unity and
universality. Among the scholars of Ibn al-Arabi are
those who set in his thought the best potential for
materializing this paradigm. Their voices which speak in
favor of restoring the values of unity and universality
to fragmented mind and world order, begin to sound so
distinct that they sometimes verge on spiritual
devotion. For example, Peter Young writes:

Can it be that this knowledge which was brought down
through Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi has a purpose and future
beyond guiding to completion those who have such an
aptitude to receive, and to pursue their spiritual
destiny? As was said before, an idea that is true is of
great effect. How much more so this idea of ideas, that
existence is an absolute unity and totally present
everywhere without division. Could this idea not become
the real distinction of this age in which we live, its
guiding principle and light with which it moves? If so
it will be the greatest revolution in the general
consciousness that has yet taken place in mankind's
short history.

Both Rosemann's and Young's words seem to be strongly
in favor of unity and universality. We should keep in
mind, however, that what seems to be a clear preference
for unity over difference for those as well as for other
scholars comes partially as a sort of reaction to a long
Western philosophical tradition that has turned its back
on the notion of the metaphysical unity of existence,
and looked at the tendency toward metaphysical unity as
a product of Oriental imagination. With its strong
rationalistic trends Western intellectual tradition has
rejected this tendency and, by doing so, pushed its
rationalistic assumptions to their ultimate limits. What
these thinkers seek is harmony and balance rather than
exaggerating the value of unity in a manner that
completely excludes difference. William Chittick
expresses this point briefly in his introduction to the
Sufi Path of Knowledge: "Somewhere along the line, the
Western intellectual tradition took a wrong turn. . . .
Many important thinkers have concluded that the West
never should have abandoned certain teachings about
reality which it shared with the East. They have turned
to the Oriental traditions in the hope of finding
resources which may help revive what has been lost and
correct the deep psychic and spiritual imbalances of our
civilization. One result of this ongoing search for a
lost intellectual and spiritual heritage has been the
rediscovery of the importance of imagination."

Imagination in Ibn al-'Arabi is an intermediate
reality, the reality of the Limit, or what Ibn al-'Arabi
calls barzakh. Barzakh is a term that represents an
activity or an active entity that differentiates between
two things and (paradoxically) through that very act of
differentiation provides for their unity. Ibn al-
'Arabi's mystical concept of the Limit is contrasted with
Aristotle's, according to which the Limit is the
ultimate part of each thing, or the first part outside
of which no part can be found, or the first part inside
of which all parts exist. Aristotle says also that the
Limit is the essence of each thing, since it is by their
limits that things are known. Ibn al-'Arabi thinks that
the Limit is the essence of each thing as well. But the
Limit, according to him, is the essence of each thing
not in the sense that it is the first or the last part
of a thing, since this partial definition of the Limit
turns it into a duality that consists of two parts, as
one of its parts is identified with one limited thing
and the other part with another limited thing. In this
case, the existence of another limit will be called for
to provide for the unity of the posited duality. This
process can go on indefinitely until we arrive at a
concept of the Limit that meets the two limited things,
between which it differentiates, with two faces that are
one. This will be Ibn al- 'Arabi's paradoxical definition
of the Limit.

Ibn al-'Arabi applies this paradoxical definition of
the Limit to the antinomy" of the relationship between
God and the world, or the antinomy of the
finitude/infinitude of the world. Islamic scholastic
theologians, who thought that the world was limited in
space and in time, and Islamic philosophers, who thought
that the world was limited in space but unlimited in
time, are presented as the holders of the two theses of
the antinomy. In their debate, the theologians and the
philosophers developed in-between solutions to the
antinomy, involving notions that might be considered
precursors to Ibn al- 'Arabi's notion of the Limit. The
Ash'arite theologians, for example, advanced the notion
of the "state" (hal) an intermediate entity between
reality and unreality—a notion that underlined their
theory of the perpetual renewal of the creation of the
world. The Mu'tazilites, for another example, developed
the notion of the "nonexistent thing," (al-ma'dum) that
signifies something between existence and nonexistence.
Among the philosophers, Ibn Sina came out with the
paradoxical conception of the possible-in-itself and
necessary-through-the-other, and Ibn Rushd held a
complementarily thesis, according to which two
different theses or accounts of the same substance
matter may both be true even if their logical
conjunction leads to a flat contradiction. The debate
between the theologians and the philosophers and the
in-between solutions that they had come out with are
presented in chapters 2 and 3.

Ibn Rushd's complementarity thesis is presented as
the culmination of the efforts of the theologians and
the philosophers to solve the problem of the
relationship between God and the world. It is also
introduced in chapter 4 as the background for the
emergence of Ibn al- 'Arabi's conception of the Limit.
The chapter elaborates on the encounter that took place
between Ibn Rushd and Ibn al-'Arabi, the discussion of
which is preceded by another discussion from Ibn al- 'Arabi's
perspective of another encounter that took place,
according to the Qur'an, between Moses and Khadir. In
both discussions the emphasis is laid on the contrast
between the rationalistic and the mystical modes of
thought.

Chapter 5 explores the roots of Ibn al-'Arabi' s
notion of the Limit in the Qur'an and the Islamic
canonical tradition as well as in the Greek
philosophical tradition. It focuses in particular on
Plato's theory of the Forms and, to a certain extent,
identifies the Platonic Form with Ibn al- 'Arabi's
barzakh, the main example of which is the fixed entity
(‘ayn thabita).

Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the ontological
aspect of the barzakh. This aspect is represented
through the notion of the Third Thing, which constitutes
Ibn al-'Arabi's representation of the paradoxical
relationship between God and the world on the
ontological level. Chapter 6 also extends the comparison
between Ibn al-'Arabi and Plato by comparing the
former's introduction of the notion of the Third Thing
with the latter's introduction of the notion of the
Receptacle in Timaeus.

Chapter 7 presents the epistemological aspect of the
Third Thing. This is the Perfect Man (al-insan al-kamil),
the possessor of perfect knowledge and the Supreme Limit
between the Real (al-Haqq) and creation (khalq). The
discussion of the two aspects of the Third Thing, the
ontological and the epistemological, comes to its
conclusion in chapter 8 in the Limit-Situation, a
situation in which the Real and his creation are
represented as abiding in a mutual permeation and active
interpenetration.

Despite its focus on Ibn al-'Arabi's thought and, in
particular, his concept of the Limit, this work attempts
to provide a critical examination of rational
philosophical thought in general. This explains its
concern with examining one of the most recent of the
modern philosophical criticisms to rationalism promoted
by Richard Rorty. Rorty's stand is especially
interesting since it provides comprehensive criticism
not merely of this or that philosophical doctrine but
rather of the whole philosophical enterprise. As I try
to show in chapter 1 (which provides a critical
introduction to Ibn al- 'Arabi' s thought based on the
examination of the shortcomings of the modern
rationalist perspective), Rorty's pragmatist stand
against rational thought bears a significant similarity
to the mystical stand of Ibn al-'Arabi. I attempt to
show, however, that Rorty makes a mistake in abandoning
the search for a universal methodology of knowledge and
in promoting the sort of pragmatic contextualism that
ignores the need for the unity of the human knowledge.
In this work I try to show that, with the help of Ibn
al- 'Arabi's unique methodology of acquiring knowledge,
which is based on his unique concept of the Limit, we
can provide an answer to Rorty's legitimate quest for a
better approach to philosophical problems without
actually having to quit the whole enterprise of the
philosophical search for a unified theory of knowledge.

The Story of Islamic Philosophy: Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Al-'Arabi,
and Others on the Limit Between Naturalism and
Traditionalism by Salman H. Bashier (SUNY:
State University of New York Press) Excerpt:
The story of Islamic philosophy is the story of the
development of the human intellect from the
rationalistic phase, represented in this study by Farah'
(d.950)', to an illuminative phase represented by Ibn
Tufayl (d.1185) and Ibn al-`Arabi (d.1240).2
Illuminative philosophy is based on a model of mystical
illumination that found its best expression in Plato's
Seventh Letter and that is illustrated in Mishkat
al-Anwar (Niche of Lights) by Ghazali (d. 1111) and al-Isharat
wa-al-Tanbihat (Allusions and Intimations) and the
mystical recitals of Ibn Sind (d. 1037) The central
tenet of this model is that following a rigorous and
thorough exercise of the rational faculty, the human
reason reaches a certain limit and is flooded with
light. The thinker whose reason is brought to this liminal situation becomes aware of the limitations of
his rational faculty and the possibility of obtaining
knowledge by means of mystical illumination rather than
mere rational conceptualization. This epistemological
awareness is then extended to a comprehensive, liminal
depiction of the ontological status of the world. Things
in the world acquire an intermediary nature, and the
world as a whole itself becomes a liminal entity between
Truth (haqq) and its existential manifestations (khalq).

In this book, I use Ibn Tufayl's work and the work of
other Islamic thinkers to present the main principles of
illuminative or liminal philosophy, while emphasizing
its special capacity at articulating a synthetic vision
of the naturalistic (or philosophical) and the
traditionalistic (or religious) accounts of the
epistemological and the ontological orders of reality.
Ibn Tufayl was known for his encyclopedic scholarship
and his generous sponsorship of intellectual research,
which is confirmed by the detailed account that Ibn
Rushd (d. 1198)4 provides for the meeting that Ibn
Tufayl arranged between him and the Muwahhid Sultan,
under whose patronage Ibn Rushd wrote commentaries on
Aristotle's corpus. Very little is known about his
personal life, and except for some fragments of poetry,
Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (Alive Son of the Awake) is Ibn Tufayl's
only extant work. The work has been translated into
several languages, including English translations by Simon Ockley (1708) and Lenn Goodman
(1972). Goodman's translation is preceded by a
significant introduction to the text in which he
presents Ibn Tufayl's thought as a unique educational
philosophy and emphasizes the differences between it and
educational philosophies of important Western
intellectuals. Sarni Hawi, whose Islamic Naturalism and
Mysticism is one of the most significant studies of Ibn
Tufayl's work in modern scholarship, follows a seemingly
different strategy: He attempts to show the strong
resemblances between Ibn Tufayl's thought and modern
Western intellectuality. This is despite the fact that
he has interesting things to say, not only in relation
to the shortcomings of the Orientalists' treatment of
Islamic philosophy but also concerning the limitations
of modern philosophical thought in general.' In his
treatment of Hayy, he seems to be struggling between his
desire to apply to his study a strict rationalistic
approach and the fact that he is dealing with a
philosopher-mystic who makes an explicit declaration of
the limitation of rationalistic thought.'

In arguing for the originality of Hayy, Hawi insists
that Ibn Tufayl did not borrow his ideas from Ghazali or
Ibn Sina, and that the utmost that one can infer is
that they had an influence on his thought.' But 'Owl'
infers from Hayy that Ibn Tufayl intended not to follow
Ibn Sind because in his description of the mystical
states (ahwal) in Isharat, Ibn Sind was an imitator.'
Such inferences, needless to say, go against Ibn
Tufayl's own statements, and Hawi seems to be one step
closer to claiming, as Dimitri Gutas and other scholars
did, that in attributing illuminative wisdom to Ibn Sina,
Ibn Tufayl was an inventor of a fiction. Instead, trawl
depicts the difference between Ibn Sind and Ibn Tufayl
in terms of a distinction between a possessor of
theoretical knowledge (nazar) and a possessor of
immediate knowledge (dhawq), which he develops into a
distinction between conceptual apprehensions and dynamic
existential involvement. He finds the parallel to Ibn
Tufayl's existential involvement in Kierkegaard's
dynamic existential breach, which is contrary to the
mediating process of reason. Like Kierkegaard, Ibn
Tufayl teaches us that immediate experience must not be
replaced with an abstraction, that reason has limits,
and that propositional knowledge of the truth is
impossible: "Rationality is not man's only basic
differentia ... Like most existentialists, he strongly
contended that man makes himself, fulfills himself, and
becomes himself in the dynamic act of knowing the
Truth—Necessary Being. Hayy's very nature was a process,
a project to surpass the now and reach the everlasting
eternal."' Thus, Hayy, the existentialist,
realizes that man's nature is more than his reason and,
like the existentialists, he attempts a "hypothetical
destruction of, and universal doubt in, the surrounding
world of tradition and education."

One might wonder how Hawi's existentialist
interpretation can be consistent with his statement that
"Ibn Tufayl's philosophy becomes almost hollow and
indigent if one strips it of its metaphysical locus.'
Hawi's depiction of Ibn Tufayl's existentialistic
literary style, which he contrasts with rigorous logic
in his description of Hayy's attainment of mystical
experience, seems to be in stark opposition to his own
rationalistic depiction of his treatise. Hawi's study
as a whole seems to be divided into two unrelated parts
in which rationalism
and mysticism are presented independently of each other.
His failure to present
a coherent interpretation of Ibn Tufayl's thought stems
from his insistence on
dissociating him from any possible influence by Ibn
Sina, which prevents him
from properly appreciating the significance of the
illuminative account that Ibn Sina introduces in Isharat and that Ibn Tufayl
employs as his basic model of the knowledge of illumination. As we shall see, Ibn Sind provides a liminal depiction of the mystical
states (ahwal) and of the possessor of knowledge, who becomes, like them, a limit between presence
(existence and manifestation) and absence (nonexistence and nonmanifestation)
and a polished mirror facing the Real. In the same vein, Ibn Tufayl
provides a liminal depiction of the transcendent essences (dhawat mufariqa), which
are imaginal reflections of the Real, and Hayy's
essence, which becomes, like them, an imaginal representation of the Real.

In his attempt to show that Hayy is devoid of the
symbolic nature of Ibn Sina's mystical recitals, Hawi
emphasizes that the major part of the treatise consists
of a progressive philosophical argument and that even
the part that leads to the attainment of mystical
enlightenment "is also progressively substantiated by a
full-blooded argument." But he falls short of
explaining how Ibn Tufayl's mystical conclusion is
related to the progression of his logical argument. It
must be admitted, however, that establishing this sort
of relatedness is, in a sense, problematic because it
implies that the passage beyond reason is paradoxical in
the sense that it is itself the result of a rational
necessity. And yet, the recognition of this
paradoxicality, and with it the self-transcendent nature
of the limits of reason, are fundamental principles of
illuminative philosophy. The possessor of reason
recognizes this paradoxicality following a mystical
exercise depicted by Ibn al-'Arabi as an exercise of
fasting, at the consummation of which it is said of the
person who fasts: "The sun has gone down from the world
of the witnessed and risen up in the world of the
intellect ( aql)." As William Chittick points out, Ibn
al- ' Arabi usually renders the word aql as "reason" but
employs "intellect" to designate the illuminated reason
of the Gnostic. Ibn al-'Arabi says: "When the affair
reaches this limit, he gains the divine uplifting beyond
the property of his own nature, and self-disclosure
lifts him up beyond the property of his reflection,
since reflection derives from the property of elemental
nature ... The intellect, in respect of itself,
possesses self-disclosure, so it is lifted up beyond the
low reaches of the natural reflection that accompanies
imagination and takes from sensation and the sensory
thing."" Perhaps the best demonstration of the notion
that reason in respect of itself possesses
self-disclosure can be found in the logic that leads Ibn
al- 'Arabi to his paradoxical concept of the essential
limit, or barzakh.

According to Aristotle, the limit is the ultimate
part and essence of each thing because things are known
by their limits." This is also what Ibn al-'Arabi
thinks: "For distinction occurs through limits, and
knowledge comes to be through distinction." He notices,
however, that the limit not only divides two things but also unifies them. Consequently, the (essential)
limit must possess two faces (to differentiate the two
things) that are one (to provide for their unity): if
the two faces, with which it meets the two things, were
not one, a new limit would be required to differentiate
between them, and knowledge would be impossible."

Ibn al- 'Arabi says that the possessors of unveiling
know the essential limits and stop at them. This
knowledge is difficult to attain because, unlike the
formal limits (al-hudud al-rasmiyya), the essential
limits are difficult to find." As for those who stop at
the formal limits, they are the possessors of belief.
Ibn al-`Arabi associates the formal limits here with the
ordinances of religious law, but he also identifies them
with the limits that rational thinkers employ.' Those
who possess the essential limits in addition to the
formal limits are perfect. Those who possess only the
formal limits are complete but not perfect: "What is
sought is perfection (kamral), not completion (tame*,
for completion lies in creation, but perfection lies in
the benefits that the complete acquires and bestows.
Someone may not gain this degree despite his
completion—for God has given each thing its creation,
and thereby it has been completed, then guided (Q 20:50)
to the acquisition of perfection. He who is guided
reaches perfection, but he who stops with his completion
has been deprived.'

He who is guided is guided to bewilderment (hayra),
considered by Ibn al- `Arabi as one of the highest
stages of knowledge.' Bewilderment is not negative. On
the contrary, bewilderment is essential for realizing
the truth of perfect knowledge. Thus, when the knower is
bewildered, bewilderment is removed from him in
bewilderment. Bewilderment is movement, and movement is
life." Those who stop in their knowledge at the formal
limits, the limits of manifestation or creation, are
complete. In the closure or completion of their
knowledge, however, lies their imperfection because
creation is renewed constantly following the constant
self-disclosure of the Real. Those who are bewildered
transcend the formal limits and connect with the
essential limits, the limits of self-disclosure. They
are the possessors of perfect knowledge, and they become
such by turning themselves into essential
limits—polished mirrors that perfectly reflect the form
of the Real. Despite its simplicity, Mbar bin Hayyan's
story may be useful for illustrating this point: "They
say that in a certain valley there are snakes that can
kill animals instantly by looking into their eyes. They
also say that in this valley there is a great beast
whose eyes are like gulfs. As the snake seeks to kill
it, the beast lifts up its eyes toward the head so that
its sight would not fall on the snake and its eyes
become like pure, polished mirrors. The snake sees
itself in the mirror and dies."

The knower attains live knowledge by turning himself
into a liminal entity that resembles a perfectly
polished mirror. By turning himself into such an entity,
it becomes possible for the knower to see that which
cannot be seen. This is because he sees "with God's
eye," not "through his own eye from behind the veil of
his essence." In his interpretation of the Prophet's
saying, "God has seventy veils of light and darkness,
were He to lift them, the glories of His face would burn away everything that the eyesight of His
creatures perceives," Ibn al- 'Arabi says that the dark
and the luminous veils are the veils of nature and the
reflective knowledges. Through the burning of these
veils, the essences of the Gnostics become one essence
that is identical with God. As for the common people,
the veils are not lifted from them, so that they do not
witness the truth of this unity. The Gnostics must not
divulge this knowledge of unveiling and must take heed
of the Prophet's saying: "Do not bestow wisdom on other
than its folk, lest you wrong it, and do not hold it
back from its folk, lest you wrong them." As I will show
in what follows, what Ibn al- Arabi says here is, in a
sense, a summary of Hayy's and Ibn Tufayl's stories
combined.

In introducing the naturalistic account of Hayy's
birth, Ibn Tufayl presents a tripartite classification
of bodies: transparent bodies that do not reflect light
at all, such as air; dense bodies that reflect light
partially; and bodies that reflect light perfectly, such
as polished mirrors. In correspondence to this
classification, he divides existents into inanimate
objects, in whose form the Spirit, which resembles the
light of the sun, does not leave any traces; plants in
whose form the Spirit leaves some traces; and animals in
whose form, and the form of the human being in
particular, the Spirit leaves a full impression. As the
presence of the form of the Spirit is reinforced in the
form of the human being, its reality eclipses all other
forms and whatever stands in its way. It then resembles
a mirror that reflects on itself and burns everything
else with the glories of its light. Then the form of the
Spirit and the human form are united in a bond that is
"indissoluble not only according to the senses but also
according to reason." The story of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan is
the story of the reestablishment of this bond by
removing the physical and rational veils that stand
between man and his real nature. The story can be
divided into three stages. In the practical stage, Hayy
learns how to remove natural or physical veils. In the
theoretical stage, he learns how to remove rational
veils. In the mystical stage, he learns how to transform
the ultimate veil, his own self, into an essential or
liminal entity that turns on itself and burns everything
else. Then Hayy encounters common religious people and
seeks to "bestow wisdom on other than its folk." Prior
to the description of this encounter, Ibn Tufayl
registers his severe criticism of rationalists who are
confined within the formal limits of their reason, as
religious people are confined within the formal limits
of their religious beliefs. He also learns Hayy's
lesson, as he explains that even as he determined to
write his book, he covered it with "a thin veil and a
light covering, easily pierced by those who are worthy
and too thick for those who are unworthy to penetrate
it."

Hayy may be regarded as the story of the development
of human knowledge. This is different, however, from the
story related in Farabi's Book of Letters in the major
sense that its author refuses to halt at the formal
limits of (Aristotle's) logic. Hayy may also be regarded
as the story of the relation between religion and
philosophy. The problem of this relation, however, must
not be depicted as external to philosophy and as
pertaining merely to the relation between philosophers and religious people, but rather as falling within
the limits of philosophy itself and as constituting a
major incentive for refining or redefining these limits.
This is why this problem cannot find its rather simple
Farabian solution by investing philosophical effort in
convincing religious people that their religious beliefs
are imperfect imitations of philosophical truths. Such a
solution would only bring closure, whereas the story of
philosophy is a story about disclosure.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

Chapter 1. I argue against the views of three
scholars, Dimitri Gutas, George Tarabishi, and Lawrence
Conrad, on Ibn Tufayl's mystical epistemology and the
purpose of writing Hayy. Gutas claims that Ibn Tufayl
misinterprets a certain passage in the prologue to al-Shifa'
, in which Ibn Sind mentions his book on Eastern
philosophy and falsely ascribes to him illuminative
ideas to draw the attention of his readers to his own
work. I do not see an act of misinterpretation here.
Even if we concede that Ibn Sind was no illuminationist,
the most that we can charge Ibn Tufayl with is naively
repeating his words. Ibn Tufayl makes it perfectly clear
that the essence of the knowledge of illumination is not
to be found in Ibn Sina's Shift', which agrees almost
completely with Peripateticism; or in his own work, in
which he revealed whatever he could reveal of its
secrets; or in any book, for that matter. He repeats his
statement several times and in different places in his
work, such that one begins to wonder what makes scholars
freeze on one statement, in which he invites the reader
to seek Ibn Sina's work on Eastern philosophy, and
ignore all the rest.

Ibn Tufayl's special appreciation of Ibn Sind stems
from the fact that after making such a remarkable
advance in Peripateticism, he was still able to make a
declaration to the effect that rationalistic thought is
limited. Gutas's reluctance to give serious
consideration to this declaration is the outcome of his
insistence on making an absolute distinction between
philosophy and mysticism. The portion of his writings in
which Ibn Sind introduces his mystical insights is
insignificant in terms of quantity and the assumption is
that giving serious consideration to his mystical
declaration in this meager portion must be inconsistent
with the overwhelmingly rationalistic part of his work.
Considered from Ibn Tufayl's point of view, however,
this assumption is not only limited but is actually the
root of the extreme rationalistic thought of which he is
especially critical. After all, what is Hayy but such a
long (rational) argument culminating in a mystical
conclusion?

According to his own testimony, Tarabishi became
interested in the study of medieval Islamic philosophy
only after reading Muhammad al-Jabiri's Critique of Arab Reason. Because I make a number of references
to Mill in this book, it will be useful to say a few
words about his work. Several scholars consider Jabiri
to be the first Modern thinker in the Arab world to
provide a serious criticism of Islamic reason. Indeed,
Min's insistence on the significance of the rational
order and the adherence to externalist principles bear a
striking resemblance to the ideals of modern philosophies of the
Enlightenment." According to Jabiri, medieval Islamic
philosophy failed to make any serious change in the
epistemological contents that it inherited from the
Greeks. However, it succeeded in exploiting those
contents for the sake of settling its ideological
conflicts, especially the conflict between philosophy
and religion. Hence, Jabiri thinks that those who, like
the Orientalists, judge Islamic philosophy according to
epistemological standards commit a serious mistake
because from an epistemological point of view, Islamic
philosophy did not possess much of an essence. The
problem of the relation between philosophy and religion
occupied a central place in Islamic philosophy; and
concerning this problem, Muslims were divided into
Eastern and Western schools of thought. The Western
school included thinkers such as Ibn Rushd, Ibn Tufayl,
and Ibn Khaldun, who maintained a view of separation
between philosophy and religion. Those thinkers were in
opposition to the Eastern school, which included
thinkers such as Ibn Sind and Ghazali, who attempted to
establish harmony between philosophy and religion. This
attempt resulted in alienating the Arabic mind from the
path of rationalism. The thinkers of the Western school,
the true philosophers, sought to overcome this
alienation by building a wall that protects
rationalistic philosophy from the esoteric influences of
the irrationalists." Muhammad al-Misbahi concludes Mid's
view by saying that he agreed with the Orientalists'
claim that Islamic reason produced no new philosophical
visions. At the same time, however, he blamed them for
ignoring the fact that Islamic philosophers, by whom he
meant those who belonged to the Western school, did not
occupy themselves with philosophy for its own sake, but
only to use it in resolving their ideological conflicts
and to build a barrier between rationalism and
irrationalism.

In his work, Tarabishi assumes the role of the
skeptic, as he confines himself almost exclusively to
demonstrating inconsistencies in Jabiri's position.
Tarabishi argues that the Western school of philosophy
was not as united as Midi presents it. He actually
considers Ibn Tufayl's work, in which he registers his
special debt to Ibn Sind, as an attack against none
other than the figure of Ibn Rushd and the rationalism
that he represents. A careful examination of Ibn
Tufayl's view on the relation between philosophy and
religion, however, reveals how close it is to Ibn
Rushd's. Rather than lending support for Jabiri's view,
this fact should provide grounds for a more consistent
reading of the principle of Islamic philosophy, and this
is what the present book attempts to do.

Two main views on the purpose of writing Hayy have
been advanced in scholarship. Leon Gauthier argued that
the book is primarily about the relation between
philosophy and religion, and George Hourani argued that
its principal subject is the possibility of the soul's
unaided ascent to philosophical knowledge. Conrad
criticizes both views. His criticism amounts to claiming
that Ibn Tufayl was led to writing Hayy by societal
rather than philosophical considerations. To establish
his view, Conrad sought to reveal what he considered to
be flaws in the logical structure of Ibn Tufayl's work. By doing so,
he sought to throw doubt
not only on Hourani's view, but equally on Gauthier's,
because this is based on the assumption that Ibn Tufayl arrived at the
concluding part of his work by following a perfectly
planned and meticulously executed logical procedure. I
attempt to show that what Conrad considers as flaws in
the logic of Ibn Tufayl's narrative make perfect sense
when examined from a liminal point of view and when
proper consideration is given to the symbolic import of
the treatise.

Chapter 2. Ibn Tufayl's employment of central Sufi
concepts in the introduction to his book aims to
emphasize the element of self-reflexivity intrinsic to
his model of illumination and to reveal an important
fact about the limitation of the use of language in
relation to an experience that defies closure. Ibn
Tufayl describes the seeker of knowledge as a person who
devotes himself (hamim) to obtaining knowledge by
constantly purifying (safyy) the mirror of his heart.
The Safi then becomes one with the state (01), which
resembles the essence of time. This act of
identification gives rise to utterances that "flow from"
the Suffs (shatahat) and that involve a claim for unity
with Truth. This claim is paradoxical. It is a true
claim, because Truth encompasses everything. Once
stated, however, the claim becomes false because no
matter how carefully unity is expressed, negation always
creeps into it with the expression and splits it against
itself. The recognition of this paradoxicality
distinguishes the Sufi not only from those who do not
possess awareness of the limitations of all claims for
Truth, but also from extreme skeptics, who by holding
unlimitation as their final position only impose on
themselves another form of limitation."

Ibn Tufayl states that it was by the study of Ghazali
and Ibn Sines that he could see truth for himself. He
describes Ghazali as a person who was well-versed in ma
'Ilia (knowledge1) and 'dm (knowledge2). Knowledge2 is
related to the world ( 'Nam), whereas knowledge 1 is
related to the transcendent essences that are beyond the
sensible world. To say that Ghazali was well versed in
both knowledges is to say that he possessed both
knowledge of manifestation and knowledge of
nonmanifestation. It is to say that he belonged to the
category of knowers who are in the image of the light of
God, to whom belong both East and West (Q 2:142) and
whose resemblance is an olive tree that is neither of
the East nor of the West (Q 24:35). Ghazal' wrote Niche
of Lights as an interpretation of the Verse of Light (Q
24:35). The presence of Niche in Ibn Tufayl's work is so
strong that, together with his depiction of Ghazali as a
possessor of perfect knowledge, one is tempted to
explain away his stated criticism of him as irrelevant.
The most striking resemblances between Ghazali's Niche
and Ibn Tufayl's Hayy lie in their depiction of the
cosmos as consisting of a hierarchy of light-reflecting
mirrors. This depiction may be traced back to
Neoplatonic influence, but I think that originally the
influence goes back to Plato's Parable of the Cave.

An important feature of the mystical experience as it
is depicted in this parable is the gradual unfolding of
the light of illumination. Despite this graduality, the
experience proves to be painful to the person who is
involved in it. As for the feelings of joy and exultation to which Ibn
Tufayl gives special attention in his description of the experience, they belong to the
person in the state of k intoxication (sukr). In this state, the person
experiences absence,. When he is again present, the
person struggles to regain his former state. Ibn Sind
amply accounts for this gradual struggle to attain
illumination in Isharat, and I attempt to show that a
similar account is present in his mystical recitals of
Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and Salaman and Absal, as well as the
Hermetistic version of Salaman and Absal.

Chapter 3. Ibn Tufayl introduces two accounts of
Hayy's birth: naturalistic and traditionalistic. He opens with a depiction
of the naturalistic account, which describes Hayy's emergence from earth but
interrupts it to add a succinct description of the
traditionalistic account, according to which Hayy is
born to human parents. Then he resumes his discussion of
the naturalistic account with rich scientific details.
Hawi interprets this interruption as Ibn Tufayl's
attempt to conceal his philosophical stand, which he
identifies with naturalism. I argue against his
interpretation.

According to the naturalistic account, Hayy was
generated on an equatorial island, which enjoyed the
most temperate climate, from a portion of earth that was
perfectly balanced to receive the human form. Ibn Tufayl
says also that people on this island were generated from
trees. This is to emphasize the continuity between
natural existents: minerals, plants, and animals. Ibn
Tufayl's depiction of the chain of existents is compared
to Ibn al-'Arabi's and a certain resemblance between the
two thinkers is detected. The major part of the
discussion is devoted to Ibn Arabi's account of his
mystical visions in the Earth of Barzakh, the conditions
of which are similar to the conditions that existed on
the equatorial island in which Hayy was born.

On Earth, natural existents live and speak and,
unlike objects on our earth, they are not subject to
generation and corruption. On it become manifest things
that are judged by the rational proofs to be impossible,
such as the bringing together of the opposites, the
existence of a body in two places, and the subsistence
of an accident in itself. The manifestation of these
things on Earth enables Ibn al- 'Arabi to provide an
interpretation for verses in the Qur'an that the
rational faculties shift from their manifest meanings.
These things become manifest, however, only to the
person who combines knowledge of manifestation ( 'am)
and knowledge of nonmanifestation (arif); that is, the
person who possesses the science of interpretation (ta`bir)
that enables him to cross over ( `ubur) from the world
of sensation to the intelligible world. I use Ibn al-'Arabi's
theory to provide an interpretation of Plato's myth of
spontaneous generation in Republic.

Chapter 4. Upon the culmination of his intellectual
growth, Hayy encounters human society and with this
encounter he connects with the traditionalistic account
of his birth. The exoteric and esoteric aspects of the
human condition are represented here by Salesman and Abseil,
respectively. Although their relationship
is depicted in terms of opposition, I attempt to show
that their positions enjoy
intermediary characteristics. Salesman's involvement in
theological debates with Absal signifies his tendency toward rational
deliberation. Although fear for his religion leads him
eventually to disconnect himself from Absal and adhere
to the dogmatic beliefs of his community, the very
existence of fear indicates an important difference
between him and other members of his community. Absal
tended toward esoteric interpretation. When he
encountered Hayy, however, he also feared that
interaction with him would endanger his religious
beliefs. His fear was alleviated as he recognized that
Hayy did not know language. His decision to teach him
language was based on the hope that his lord would
reward him. Thus, despite his inclination toward
esoteric interpretation, Absal was still subject to the
principles of mass religion, especially fear (of God's
punishment) and hope (for his recompense).

Using Plato's division of the degrees of reality in
the parable of the Divided Line, I present Hayy as
occupying the highest segment in the line. Next to him
comes Absal, followed by Salaman. The (dogmatic) people
of the religious community occupy the lowest segment of
the line and the most distanced from Hayy's, which
explains the intensity of their opposition to his
attempt to convey his illuminative knowledge to them.

Chapter 5. Hayy's reflections on the problem of the
eternity of the world signified a turning point in his
intellectual development.Hayy examined limits between
chains of existence in the world, but now he came to
examine the limits of the world itself. This led him to
thinking about the concept of the infinite and its role
in establishing the arguments for and against the
eternity of the world. I present Aristotle's analysis of
this concept and show its relevance to these arguments.
Ibn Tufayl presented the positions of the philosophers
and the theologians in relation to the problem of the
eternity of the world as balanced. Hawi claims that by
doing so, he attempted to conceal his eternalist
position. I argue against this claim.

Chapter 6. In The Book of Letters, Farabi provides an
account of the development of human thought from the
commencement of the use of language to the time of the
invention of logic by Aristotle. He includes in his
account a discussion of the relation between philosophy
and religion and the role that the philosopher must
assume in establishing harmony between them. There are
important differences between his account and the one
provided by Ibn Tufayl. Ibn Tufayl's hero became
acquainted with the use of language only after he had
exhausted all the stages of the development that Farabi
assigns to his rationalistic philosophers and that
culminate in Aristotle's logic. This is important
because according to Farabi, the universal language of
logic comes afterward and must therefore be considered
prior in significance to ordinary languages. Ibn Tufayl,
however, makes his "silent speaker" employ logic and
then transcend its principles. Thus, he applies to
formal logic the same argument that Farabi applies to
ordinary languages and, by doing so, he endows it, and
the philosopher who adheres to its categories, with a
lesser status.

Another important difference between the two
philosophers lies in their treatment of the relation
between philosophy and religion. Farabi seems to be positive about the chances of the philosopher to
convince believers that what they have in their religion
is only the imitation of higher philosophical truths.
Ibn Tufayl does not share this optimism with Farabi, not
only because of his especially negative view of the
intellectual capacities of dogmatic believers, but also
because of his recognition of the limitations of the
very rationalistic capacity that Farabi considers as
absolute.

Chapter 7. Despite his critical view of Ibn Baja,"
Ibn Tufayl had a special appreciation for his
intellectual capacities. This appreciation stems from
his recognition of the significant contribution that Ibn
Baja made to the principle of illuminative philosophy,
especially in relation to his liminal depiction of the
levels of comprehension. I emphasize the liminal
component in Ibn Bajja's thought and the clear impact
that Plato's "mystical" parables had on it.

Chapter 8. In describing the traditionalist account,
Ibn Tufayl makes an allusion to the (Qur'anic) story of
the Sleepers in the Cave. Aristotle mentions the story
in Physics in the context of discussing the nature of
time. I relate his discussion to Ibn Tufayl's depiction
of the resemblances in which Hayy was involved and in
which he imitated natural time and motion, the unitary
time and the circular motion of the transcendent
essences, and the state of absolute fixity
characteristic of God. In the context of this
discussion, I elaborate on an important incident in
Hayy's life: the discovery of fire. The traditionalistic
account of Hayy's birth bears a clear resemblance to
Moses's birth story. I elaborate on Ibn al-'Arabi's
depiction of the figure of Moses in Fusus al-Hikam,
especially Moses's birth story and his encounter with
the Saint (al-Khadir).

Chapter 9. Gilgamesh is the builder of Uruk's great
walls and the one who plunged into the Absu (sweet
waters) to claim the plant of rejuvenation following his
encounter with Utnapishtim, The-One-Who-Found-Life.
Enkidu is the child of nature, whose creation story
bears a striking resemblance to Adam's. Enkidu was
seduced toward civilized Uruk by a love-priestess. He
and Gilgamesh undertake a series of adventures that
enrage the gods, who determine Enkidu's death. His death
gives birth to Gilgamesh's quest for eternity. Gilgamesh
goes on a long journey, at the end of which he comes
together with Utnapishtim and hears from him the story
of the Flood, which is, like Hayy's, a story about a new
beginning. As Moses failed to obtain the object of his
quest for perfect knowledge in his encounter with al-Khadir,
so Gilgamesh also failed to obtain the object of his
quest in his encounter with Utnapishtim. The main lesson
that we learn from both encounters is that the object of
the mystical quest is one of seeking, not of possessing.

Chapter 10. In the preface to Myths from Mesopotamia,
Stephanie Dalley writes: "A few original contributions
by this translator are included: recognition that the
Tale of Buluqiya in the Arabian Nights is related to the
Epic of Gilgamesh." I consider the recognition that Ibn
al-` Arabi's Chapter 8 of the Futuhat is related to
Buluqiya as one of the original contributions in the
present work. At the same time, I wish to point out that
I have detected a strong resemblance between chapter 8
of the Futuhat and Uthiilidiya, a highly influential work that was mistakenly attributed to Aristotle, and
that I will elaborate on this resemblance in my next
book.

I want to discuss a few points at the close of this
introduction. First, I consider Plato to be one of the
main originators of the liminal notion that I presented
in my book Ibn al- 'Arabi s Barzakh and that I develop
further here. The emphasis on the parable of the Cave
(and the parables that lead to it) must be appreciated
not only in terms of the obvious resemblance between the
story of Plato's enlightened philosopher and Hayy's, but
also in terms of the obvious impact that it had on the
illuminative ideas of other thinkers with whom I deal in
this book. Second, Aristotle's thought is equally
important for the purposes of this book, not only
because of the obvious consideration that the story of
Islamic philosophy cannot be accounted for in isolation
from his philosophy, but especially because of the fact
that Aristotle was perceived in Islamic intellectual
tradition as the thinker who perfected rational thought.
This does not mean that Islamic thinkers believed that
Aristotle was the end of the story. On the contrary, by
pushing rational analysis to its ultimate limit,
Aristotle played a central role in opening the door for
the development of the notion of liminality in Islamic
medieval thought.

Finally, I wish to address a concern that readers of
this book must be aware of, and that is related to the
absence of an elaborate discussion of Suhrawardi's
illuminative thought from this book. My simple response
is that the treatment of such an important and difficult
thinker is beyond the scope of this work.

Ibn Arabî - Time and Cosmology by Mohamed Haj Yousef (Culture and
Civilization in the Middle East: Routledge) is the first comprehensive attempt
to explain Ibn ‘Arabî’s distinctive view of time and its role in the process of
creating the cosmos and its relation with the Creator. By comparing this
original view with modern theories of physics and cosmology, Mohamed Haj Yousef
constructs a new cosmological model that may deepen and extend our understanding
of the world, while potentially solving some of the drawbacks in the current
models such as the historical Zeno's paradoxes of motion and the recent
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox (EPR) that underlines the discrepancies between
Quantum Mechanics and Relativity.

Students of the world's religious traditions, together
with specialists in the history of premodern science and philosophy, are well
aware of the centrality within the scriptures and theologies of the major world
religions, over many centuries, of detailed symbolic accounts of cosmology and
metaphysics (including the intricate problematics of creation) — and of the
crucial role played within each of those religious traditions by corresponding
philosophical and scientific schemas of astronomy and cosmology that often
provided a common language and framework of understanding shared by their
educated elites. In premodern times, this key interpretative function was
particularly important in the case of that complex of Hellenistic philosophic
and cosmological disciplines largely shared by educated proponents of each of
the three Abrahamic faiths. Given today's widespread journalistic stereotypes
about the supposed 'opposition' of science and religion, this book is a salutary
reminder — and an extraordinarily rich and detailed illustration — of the
complex interpenetration of philosophical and scriptural elements throughout the
central traditions of later Islamic thought, prior to the recent scientific
revolutions. At the same time, Dr Haj Yousef's training and expertise as a
modern physicist allow him to suggest, in his provocative final chapter,
intriguing ways in which the earlier cosmological and theological speculations
of Ibn 'Arabi carefully outlined in this study may also parallel very recent
developments and insights in the cosmological theories (especially String
Theory) of modern physics. In that sense, this study provides a more demanding,
Islamic parallel to such recent popular works such as F. Capra's Tao of Physics.

While the prolific Andalusian Sufi writer Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240) is most
widely known today as a mystic and spiritual teacher, his voluminous writings —
and particularly his immense magnum opus, the Meccan Illuminations, which is the
primary source for this study — constantly refer to the insights, theories, and
cosmological schemas of earlier Muslim philosophers and scientists, such as
Avicenna and the popular spiritual treatises of the 'Brethren of Purity' (Ikhwan
al-Safa). For that reason, this book begins with a helpful survey of the
standard theories of cosmology and time found in earlier Hellenistic thinkers,
which were largely taken over into the succeeding traditions of Islamic
philosophy and science. However, the most creative and unfamiliar aspects of Ibn
`Arabi's cosmological ideas — especially his distinctive conception of the
ever-renewed, ongoing and instantaneous nature of the cosmic process of creation
(tajdid al-khalq) — are carefully woven together from what have always been
profoundly mysterious, problematic, and complexly interwoven symbolic
formulations in the Qur'an. Thus the main focus and novel scholarly contribution
of the central chapters of this volume lie in the author's careful unfolding and
clarification of the intended meanings and references of this dense Qur'anic
cosmological symbolism of time and creation, as that multi-dimensional
world-view is systematically expounded in elaborate accounts scattered
throughout several of Ibn `Arabi's major works. Every reader who engages with
this demanding discussion will come away, at the very least, with a heightened
appreciation of the symbolic richness and challenging intellectual dilemmas
posed by this unduly neglected — yet arguably quite central and unavoidable —
dimension of the Qur'an and its metaphysical teachings.

In the penultimate chapter of this study, before taking up possible analogies
to Ibn `Arabi's ideas in modern physics, the author turns to the language of
ontology and to a subject — the paradoxical relations of the divine One and the
many — far more familiar to students of Ibn 'Arabi, or of comparable forms of
thought in earlier Neoplatonism and the metaphysics of other world religions.
Despite the initial unfamiliarity (for non-specialists) of some of Ibn `Arabi's
Qur'anic symbolism and technical terminology here, his approach to conceiving
and intellectually explaining the mysterious relationship between the divine
Source and its infinite manifestations clearly mirrors Plato's classical
dialectical enumeration of the alternative ontological hypothesis outlined in
his Parmenides. Today, of course, no one is used to thinking of those recurrent
metaphysical problems in terms of the theological language of creation. But by
this point Dr Haj Yousef has outlined just how Ibn 'Arabi, by carefully
elaborating the complex literal indications of the Qur'an itself, is able to
illuminate both the temporal and the ontological dimensions of the divine
cosmogonic Origination of all things.

The fascinating 'phenomenology' of the human psychological and experiential
dimensions of this cosmic creative process, we might add, is also the subject of
even more fascinating discussions in Ibn 'Arabi and later Islamic philosophers
(as well as earlier Sufis and mystical thinkers). But the elaboration of that
closely related topic would require another, equally wide-ranging and original
study. So the author has prudently set that related issue aside while focusing
on those dimensions of ontology and time most directly connected with the
analogous approaches of modern theoretical physics that he outlines in his
concluding, more speculative chapter.

This constantly challenging and thought-provoking study is clearly the fruit
of years of research on one of the most difficult subjects to be found in the
writings of one of Islam's most seminal, creative, inspired, and notoriously
difficult thinkers. So even those who may find Ibn `Arabi's language and
speculations difficult to follow will surely come away from their reading with a
heightened appreciation of the relative poverty, thoughtlessness and lack of
sophistication in today's dominant public discourse about religion and science,
and in our prevailing ways of conceiving and approaching these fundamental human
issues of cosmology, ontology and theology. ---James W. Morris, Boston College

Ibn 'Arabi is one of the most prominent figures in Islamic history,
especially in relation to Sufism and Islamic philosophy and theology. In this
book, we want to explore his cosmology and in particular his view of time in
that cosmological context, comparing his approaches to the relevant conclusions
and principles of modern physics whenever possible. We shall see that Ibn 'Arabi
had a unique and comprehensive view of time which has never been discussed by
any other philosopher or scientist, before or even after Ibn 'Arabi. In the
final two chapters, in which we shall discuss some of the ways his novel view of
time and cosmology may be used to build a complete model of the cosmos that may
deepen and extend our understanding of the world, while potentially solving some
of the drawbacks and paradoxes in the current cosmological models of modern
physics.

As we discuss in the opening chapter, there is no doubt that time is one of
the most important issues in physics, cosmology, philosophy and theology, and
hundreds of books and articles have been published in these fields. However,
none of these studies had fully developed Ibn `Arabi's unique view of time in
its cosmological dimensions, although his conception of time is indeed central
to understanding, for example, his controversial theory of the 'oneness of
being'. One possible reason for this relative neglect is the difficult symbolic
language he usually used. Also, he did not discuss this subject at length in any
single place in his extant works — not even in chapters 59, 291 and 390 of the
Futuhat whose titles relate directly to time — so we must piece together his
overall cosmological understanding of time from his scattered treatments in many
works and different contexts within his magnum opus, the Futuhat and other
books. Therefore this book may be considered the first comprehensive attempt to
set forth all the relevant dimensions of time in Ibn `Arabi's wider cosmology
and cosmogony.

In Chapter 2, after briefly discussing the different physical theories and
models of the cosmos, we start by describing Ibn `Arabi's cosmos in some detail.
Then we also give an extensive review of the different philosophical views of
time and its properties from the philosophical and scientific point of view to
show the importance of the subject and relate it to Ibn `Arabi's model. Then, in
Chapter 2, we begin to introduce Ibn `Arabi's general concepts of time and
`days', which are then developed in greater detail in each of the succeeding
chapters.

To start with, Ibn 'Arabi considers time to be a product of our human
'imagination', without any real, separately existing entity. Nevertheless, he
still considers it to be one of the four main constituents of existence. We need
this imagined conception of 'time' to chronologically arrange events and what
for us are the practically defining motions of the celestial orbs and other
physical objects, but for Ibn 'Arabi real existence is attributable only to the
actually existing thing that moves, not to motion nor to time (or space) in
which this motion is observed. Thus lbn 'Arabi distinguishes between two kinds
of time — natural and para-natural — and he explains that they both originate
from the two forces of the soul: the active force and the intellective force,
respectively. Then he explains that this imaginary time is cyclical, circular,
relative, discrete and inhomogeneous. Ibn 'Arabi also gives a precise definition
— drawing on the specific usage of the Qur'an and earlier Arab conceptions of
time — of the day, daytime and night, showing how these definitions are related
to the relative motions of the celestial orbs (including the Earth), where every
orb has its own 'day', and those days are normally measured by our normal
observable day that we count on the Earth.

In Chapter 3 (and also in Chapter 6), we explain the central significance, in
Ibn `Arabi's notion of time and cosmology, of the divine 'Week' of creation, and
we begin to develop some of its interesting consequences. To begin with, Ibn 'Arabi
considers the cosmic, divine Week, rather than the day or any other time unit,
as the main primitive time cycle. Thus he explains how the world is created in
seven (cosmic, divine) 'Days', what happens on each Day, and the underlying
ontological relation between the Week's Days of creation and the seven
fundamental divine Names of Allah. Ibn 'Arabi also shows that all the Days of
this cosmic Week, including the last Day (Saturday), all actually occur in
Saturday, the 'Day of eternity'. This complex understanding of the ever-renewed
divine creation in fact underlies his conception of the genuine unification of
space and time, where the world is created 'in six Days' (from Sunday to Friday)
as space, and then is displayed or manifested on Saturday in the process that we
perceive as time. However, we perceive this complicated process of creation in
Six Days and the subsequent appearance of the world on the seventh Day, we
perceive all this only as one single moment of our normal time. In fact, on the
basis of Qur'anic indications and the corresponding experiential confirmations
of the mystical `knowers' (`urafa') (later explained in Chapter 5), Ibn `Arabi
insists that the entire created world ceases to exist immediately and
intrinsically right after its creation, and that then it is re-created again and
again. For him, this process of divine re-creation happens gradually (in
series), not at once: i.e. it always takes six divine 'Days' to be prepared and
the last Day to manifest. However, we — the creatures — do not witness this
re-creation in six Days, since we Witness the created world only in the seventh
Day (Saturday, which he calls `the Day of eternity'). So the creation of the
world in six Days actually happens every moment, perpetually and recurrently.
Therefore, those first six divine Days are actually the creative origin of space
and not time, which is only the seventh Day. In this novel conception, for the
first time in history, the 'Week', as the basic unit of space-time, will have a
specific and quite essential meaning in physics and cosmology.

Even more important in Ibn `Arabi's conception of time, however, is his
understanding of the 'Day' of creation as a minimum indivisible Day, a kind of
`instant of time' (al-zaman al-fard) that also includes (since it includes all
of creation) the instants of that normal day itself which we live in and divide
into hours, minutes, seconds and so on. In order to explain this initially
paradoxical notion, Ibn 'Arabi introduces — again initially mysterious Qur'anic
on the basis of indications — the different nature and roles of three very
different kinds of compounded days (the 'circulated' days, the 'taken-out' days
and the 'intertwined' days), which highlight the fact that the actual flow of
time is not as uniform and smooth as we feel and imagine. The key concept
underlying these complex developments is that Ibn 'Arabi emphasizes, following
the Qur'an, that only one creative 'event' should be happening on every Day (of
the actual cosmic, divine Days of creation), and not the many different
(temporal and spatial) events that we observe. To reconcile this apparent
contradiction between the unitary Act (and 'instant') of Creation and the
apparent phenomena of spatial and temporal multiplicity, he reconstructs the
normal, observable days that we actually perceive in a special manner that is
complexly grounded in the different divine 'Days' of the actual flow of time. We
shall explain his complex conception of these very different types of days in
detail in Chapter 4.

The principle of perpetual re-creation, one of the more famous elements of
Ibn `Arabi's cosmology and cosmogony, is fully explained in Chapter 5, where we
also take up the related question of Ibn `Arabi's controversial theory of the
`oneness of being'. This theory can be easily understood once we have grasped
his underlying conception of the eternally renewed creation in time. This
comprehensive cosmological vision, when added to his understanding of the actual
flow of time based on the three kinds of days described in Chapter 4, can be
used to build a new unique model of the cosmos. This cosmological model, which
we shall call 'the Single Monad model', is explained in Chapter 6. We shall see
in this chapter that, according to this distinctive perspective on creation, the
manifest world works exactly like a super-computer which — despite its
tremendous speed — can do only one job at a time, where the display on the
computer monitor is analogous to the manifest world: though we appear to see a
complex, continually changing picture on the screen, that complex image is
actually built one pixel at a time by one single electron-beam. This particular
illustration helps us to grasp the actual functioning of Ibn `Arabi's central
conception of the ultimate oneness of being, despite the undeniable visible
multiplicity of the world.

Finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to discussing some of the implications of the
Single Monad model for various related principles of modern physics and
cosmology, including the possibilities of testing such a cosmological model. We
shall discuss in particular some of the known time-related paradoxes in current
models of physics and cosmology, and how they may be resolved according to this
novel view. It can be fairly said that Ibn `Arabi's view of time and the cosmos
is a fruitful concept that potentially bridges the gap between traditional
theological metaphysical views of the world and the contemporary scientific
views that are based on experimental procedures and logic. In addition to
explaining the 'oneness of being' and 'creation in six Days', other important
results of Ibn `Arabi's unique concept of time include the ways it helps to
resolve the famous EPR paradox, thus potentially reconciling the two great
theories of Quantum Mechanics and Relativity in modern physics, how it offers a
new understanding of the historical Zeno's paradoxes, and how it potentially
explains the reason behind quantization, how quantities are either discrete or
continuous.

The Reflective Heart : Discovering Spiritual Intelligence in Ibn 'Arabi's 'Meccan
Illuminations' by James Winston Morris (Fons Vitae)
For centuries Ibn Arabi has been considered the Greatest Master of Islamic
spiritual teaching, but Western readers have only recently had access to his
greatest writings. This introduction to Ibn Arabis Meccan Illuminations
highlights the mysticism and realization of Sufi spiritual life, providing an
intellectually penetrating look without requiring specialized knowledge. The
development of several key themes and modes of reflection in Ibn Arabis
spiritual teachings are explored as are the gradually unfolding meanings that
distinguish this important classical text of Sufi practice.

Morris is one of the foremost scholarly interpreters of al-Shaykh
al-Akbar, "the Greatest Master," working in the English language. Along with
Chittick whose own interpretations of the Meccan Illuminations is slowly
revolutionizing the philosophical contexts for a traditional and intracultural
appreciation of Sufi metaphysics and epistemology. Morris's study consists of
five interconnected essays on central themes of the Meccan openings. The
intricate and deeply interconnected writings of Ibn Al Arabi requires from
interpreters an almost sublime tact and careful attention to detail and subtle
variation in language and tone. Morris is well qualified to speak to these
matters and the result is a volume not only of scholarly depth and purpose but
also an invitation to spiritual and illuminative understanding which is tightly
mirrored in an intellectual and emotional congruence, a visionary appreciation
illuminated by simple gnosis, an intuitive apperception and a cognitive leap
toward ungraspable wholeness. Such is the implications of the reflective heart
as a process of spiritual intelligence. The first essay addresses journeying,
reviewing the Quranic context which is always Shaykh Al Akbar's background text
and source of illuminative travel. Ibn Al Arabi was a traveler who restlessly
made pilgrimage from the West to the East for nearly 20 years before finally
settling down in Damascus. In this travel we have the archetype of the ascent
towards the divine but also of the divine guidance in the happenstance of the
road. On the one hand we have in horizontal axis deployed on the level of our
individual experience of linear time and inner and outer movement, here the
individual souls inner life is detailed with loving attention as in many
classic sufi writings and poetry of stations along a common path of the
pilgrimage caravan. However Ibn Arabi also constantly evokes a vertical
dimension of our spiritual travel the imagery inspired by the hadith on the
Prophet's ascension and night journey in which Ibn Arabi's focus is on
metaphysical transformation and elevation of perspective that takes place as the
voyager's focus of identity shifts from the lower outer directed soul (and it's
taken for granted worlds of society, space and time), through radically
different planes of imagination and absolute spirit, toward its paradoxical
reunion with the divine beloved. Morris reminds us that the Futuhat can be
viewed as an ever more detailed examination of these two contrasting, yet always
simultaneous, perspectives on this single maturing of the soul.

The next essay evokes a listening in its contemplative
nature of purifying the heart, where the heart is what holds living paradoxes
and reconciliation and wonderment. Such purification is necessary for all real,
effective worship and devotion. Listening is an active passivity that allows
the divine meanings to be revealed while also allowing self-assertion to move
towards an eclipse and rest in alert attending to the divine audition.

From the movement of the lore of divine reality where the
soul awakens to the deeper meanings of the recitations and prayers, in the third
essay on seeing, Morris evokes the theophanic imagination where all of reality
opens to the mystic a revelation of divine purpose. Everywhere I turn, I see
His face! Here nothing in human experience, when seen with the eye and heart
of gnosis, is other than divine revelation. From the greatest degradation to
the most sublime bliss all are signs and wonders of the divine presence in the
world now. In the fourth essay, Morris explorers how to discern and integrate
the unitive vision of the divine without falsely inflating the self or
miscasting the divine as a bad actor. However discernment is an eschatological
appreciation of the mystery and end of existence whose root is more in the
timeless than in the end of time and whose reach is more in the peace and unity
of the divine-human actor's heart, than it is in the effort of the human
discernment and creative play. In the fifth and last essay, Morris deals with
returning, that the divine vision is always never complete until the human has
returned to the human world of serventhood to fully appreciate and celebrate,
freely and openly the wonder and joy, but most of all, the secret of divine
unity and revelation.

This whole process is for Morris the nature of spiritual
intelligence, a spiritual intelligence that though designed for and within the
Islamic revelation, also sings to all men and women of faith and gnosis the
profound reality of divine presence in this life in our hearts. In following
Ibn Arabi's own account of the natural order of spiritual development Morris
begins with the initial stages as the spiritual quest in journeying culminating
-- through grace -- in the attainment of the contemplative quietude and peace.
At that point, the purification of the heart begins to focus on the active
refinement of our inner spiritual listening and inspiration. Then that
awakening love and inspired awareness of the divine beauty, the fruit of
effective spiritual listening, needs to be transformed through spiritual seeing
and inspired insight into our uniquely personal, creative manifestations of
right and beautiful action -- that active culmination of spiritual life
eventually leading to the realization of the beatific vision of God. Yet that
active, realized discernment of all the dimensions of spiritual communication
and creativity, Ibn Arabi insists -- echoing all those prophets and messengers
who are their own guides -- turns out to be not the end of the soul's
journeying, but the opening up of further, even wider responsibilities and
challenges. Finally, as always with Ibn Arabi, that realized awareness of our
wider spiritual responsibility, of our intrinsically human servanthood,
culminates in our growing recognition of the inner meanings of the
eschatological symbolism of the Islamic tradition: of that garden, he insists,
which is already visibly present in each theophanic reflection of the polished
heart, and each act of the divine shadowplay of our existence. In this cyclical
perspective each of these developments leads naturally to the next, and -- here
on earth, at least -- we are always unavoidably caught up in each of these
facets of that journey.

At the same time, though Ibn Arabi also persistently
emphasizes that this more visible cycle of spiritual intelligence is also
ultimately -- or at least potentially -- one of ascension. Thus each of these
essays also traces, for its chosen theme, Ibn Arabi's careful elaboration of the
slowly unfolding revelation of ever larger cycles of responsibility, right
action and spiritual vision, already typified and concretely symbolized in the
spiraling ascension -- and epochal returning -- of the prophets own archetypal
night journey. And here again, in Arabi's distinctive language constantly
challenges his readers to relate that initially theoretical elevation to their
own unique journey of discovery. Morris has provided in these essays a profound
series of keys for unlocking the central themes of the Futuhat. One last aspect
of Morris's study is his appreciation of how Ibn Arabi's language shows a deep
appreciation of the natural world and the human condition within it. First
because Ibn Arabi's language itself arises out of such an extraordinary
penetrating and revealing awareness of the deeper structures and meanings of the
Koran and the hadith, it turns out to provide constantly illuminating keys to
understanding and appreciating the inspirations, forms and intentions of a vast
range of Masterworks -- and not simply in poetry and literature -- by the
greatest creative figures throughout all the related fields of the Islamic
humanities, who were themselves shaped and inspired by the lifelong penetration
of those same scriptural sources. The perspectives and principles involved here
are equally central an indispensable for informed appreciation of those artistic
and spiritual masterpieces, and for any lasting effective and spiritually
grounded revival or reconstruction of all fundamental Islamic thought. Next
spiritual intelligence is of course something that is only learned by practice.
In the traditional language of the Sufi patterns, this basic reality was
expressed above all in the untranslatable expression, subha, referring to each
seekers indispensable learning through companionship with a spiritual guide
or master. So readers of these essays, without even focusing explicitly on
those underlying literary, analytical and structural (indeed even political)
mentions of the following discussions, should find -- like so many earlier
students of al-Shaykh al-Akbar-- that the effects of in Arabi's lessons and
insights do carry over into an ever deepening appreciation and more penetrating
understanding of cognate literatures, as well as other forms of spiritual
communication, from any and all of the world's great religious and
civilizational traditions.

The Reflective Heart is about the ways we gradually
discover the deeper significance of all the familiar elements of our everyday
lifenot just those memorable moments we ordinarily view as "spiritual".
Spiritual intelligencethe illuminating interplay of our uniquely individual
experience, reflection, and practiceis at the heart of every world religious
tradition, and Ibn Arabi is renowned for his ability to communicate the
unfolding dimensions of this fundamental human task. His Meccan Illuminations
provide a powerful spiritual mirror for each readers own experiences, while
highlighting those larger perspectives that ultimately give meaning and
direction to our life. In this compelling and insightful book, James Morris
takes us to the spiritual core of the Islamic tradition, as we come to see the
heart as the meeting ground between the Divine and that which is most human in
all of us. Here the heart reveals itself as a dynamic and transformative
faculty, where the discovery of ones own true self is wed to the intimate
knowing of God. ~ Omid Safi, colgate university

No one surpasses James Morris in his ability to make the
most sublime and esoteric subjects intelligible and practicable. Among the many
gifts of this book is that it highlights for our own time the urgent need for
spiritual discernment. ~ Kabir Helminski, threshold society

In The Reflective Heart, James Morris provides numerous
keys for those who would like to open up their hearts to the vast panorama of
spiritual instruction provided by al-Shaykh al-Akbar, "the Greatest Master." No
other book demonstrates so clearly the universality of Ibn Arabis concerns and
their contemporary applicability. A must- read for every serious seeker. ~
William Chittick

One of the great merits of this book is the way in which
this spiritual journey, described with such compelling power through the
illuminations granted to Ibn 'Arabi, is made real for all of us. This work is
the fruit of a remarkable synthesis between scholarly erudition of the highest
calibre and a fundamental orientation towards the spiritual import of Ibn
Arabis teachings, engaging both the academic and the mystic, the scholar and
the seeker. ~ Reza Shahkazemi, London

James W. Morris holds the Sharjah Chair of Islamic Studies
at the University of Exeter (UK), and has taught Islamic and comparative
religious studies at Princeton, Temple, Oberlin, the Sorbonne, and the Institute
of Ismaili Studies in Paris and London.

Ibn Arabi by William Chittick (Makers of the Muslim World: Oneworld
Publications) Bulent Rauf, the inspiration behind the British esoteric school
Beshara, was often quoted as saying Muhyi ad-Din Ibn Arabi is not so much a
person as a meaning. William Chittick who is easily the foremost interpreter of
the greatest Sheik in America, has written several massive studies the ideas of
the Sheik seems to come into agreement with Bulent. Muhyi ad-Din Ibn Arabi
was an encyclopedic writer, whose contribution to the mystical meaning of
Islam and the Qur'an is as central to Islam as the theology of Thomas Aquinas is
foundational for Western Catholicism. However unlike Thomas Aquinas, Muhyi
ad-Din Ibn Arabi has never known such entrenched institutional support. In
fact, about a century after his death, the central tenets of his writings were
subtly and effectively vilified and misrepresented by Ibn Taymiyya, the
spiritual godfather of all literalistic and fundamentalist, authoritarian and
even terrorist forms of Islam.

Muhyi ad-Din Ibn Arabi lived a restless life traveling from
city to city throughout the vast Islamic lands of Spain, North Africa, Egypt,
Arabia, the Middle East, and eventually settling in the last 20 years of his
life in Damascus. There he wrote a vast Quranic commentary called Meccan
Revelations. In this brief introduction to his life and thought, Chittick
attempts to show the cohesive and universal reach of Ibn Arabia mystical
understanding of Islam. There is no doubt that this little book is the best
single brief source about the meaning and purpose of Ibn Arabi's life thought
available in English today. Chittick corrects of the views of previous writers
by presenting the scope and integrity of Ibn Arabi's views on metaphysics,
theology, cosmology, spiritual anthropology, psychology, and jurisprudence.
Topics include the inner meanings of Islamic rituals, the stations of travelers
on the journey to God and in God, the nature of cosmic hierarchy, the spiritual
and ontological meaning of the letters of the Arabic alphabet, the sciences and
braced by each of the 99 names of God, and the significance of the differing
messages of the various profits. In a smaller but much-studied work the
Ringstones of Wisdom, basing himself mostly on Koranic verses and hadiths, Ibn
Arabi shows how each of the 27 prophets from Adam down to moment disclosed in
their own person behavior and prosthetic career the wisdom implied by one of the
divine attributes.

Pioneer Translations of Sheikh al-Akbar's Futuhat al-Makkiya Available
Again

The
Meccan Revelations: Selected texts from the Al-Futuhat al-Makkiya Volume
1 by M. Ibn Arabi, edited by Michel Chodkiewicz, new introduction by James W.
Morris, English translations by William Chittick and James W. Morris (Pir Press)
Perhaps no mystic in the history of the world has delved as deeply into the
inner knowledge that informs our being as did Ibn 'Arabi. He was born into the
cultural and religious crucible of Andalusian Spain in 1165, a place and time in
which Muslim, Jewish and Christian scholars learned from each other and from the
Greek classics that were then being translated and circulated. Drawing from the
most advanced philosophical and metaphysical thinking of his time and from his
extensive knowledge of the religion of Islam, Ibn Arabi created an extraordinary
mystical theosophy that essentially sprang from his own spiritual realization
into the divine unity of existence. Because of the advanced nature of his
teachings, he has been known for 800 years as the Sheikh al-Akbar, or the
Greatest Master. Because of the subtlety of his language and complexity of his
thought, access to Ibn Arabi has always been difficult and translation daunting.
Previously only short extracts were available in English. This volume, the first
of two, contains 22 key chapters of Al-Futuhat al-Makkiya, an
encyclopedic Sufi "summa mystica," on such issues as Ibn Arabi's
doctrine of the Divine Names, the nature of spiritual experience, the end of
time, the resurrection and the stages of the path that lead to sanctity.

Al-Futuhat al-Makkiya soars beyond time, culture and
any particular form of religion. Describing what is fundamental to our humanity,
it is astonishingly universal. Finally, readers in the West have a pioneering
entree into one of the most important, profound works of world literature.

Any
work on the Al-Futuhat al-Makkiya in English is provisional and
exploratory and it will require several generations of scholars and some further
development in philosophical hermeneutics before anything like a coordinated
complete translation could yet be attempted. The importance of this work, and
its future volume two, is that it inaugurated the first systematic exploration
in the West of this profound theosophical encyclopedia.As a result, the years since the first appearance of these translations
have seen an ongoing worldwide transformation-‑in the Islamic world at
least as much as in Western academic and spiritual circles‑in the
understanding and appreciation of the nature and wider significance of Ibn
'Arabi's writings. When ibn Arabis thought is more fully explored and more
widely known its unique contribution to a future global religious plurality and
harmony may become apparent. Ibn Arabi proposes unique formulations of divine
reality which when understood in depth may radically transform world theological
discourse, not only in Islam but also in liberal and conservative Christian and
Jewish hermeneutics.

Pir Press is to be commended in re-issuing this important selection of
chapters from the gargantuan Al-Futuhat al-Makkiya because the French
edition of 1988‑its size, cost and foreign publication made access
difficult in the English‑speaking world from the start, soon became
utterly difficult to get to due to problems at the original publishers.
Generally, for the past decade, only those with ready contact to university
libraries and Islamic research collections have been able to refer directly to
these essential translations. The translators have gone on to provide
significant studies and translations of ibn Arabis work as Morris
summarizes in his new introduction to this partial reprint edition. The second
volume should include Chodkiewicz's original long Introduction to the key themes
and opening chapters of the Al-Futuhat al-Makkiya, as well as outlines
the contents and location, in the overall scheme of the Futuhat and
translations of both the original French chapters.

The
Unlimited Mercifier: The Spiritual Life and Thought of Ibn Arabi by
Stephen Hirtenstein (Anqa and White Cloud) As the first full introduction
written for a general audience about the life and significance of Ibn 'Arabi
(1165-1240), this volume long fills an acute gap in the general literature about
Sufism in English. Ibn Arabi can rightly be regarded as the greatest mystical
thinker in the history of Islam and as might be extrapolated from this study,
perhaps some future global mysticism that is inter-sectarian. In the Islamic
world Ibn 'Arabiis often
referred to honorifically as al-Shaykh al-Akbar (the Greatest Master).

Among the literalists and reactionary legalists in Islam the profound
readings of the Quran and hadith, that is the staple of just about
everything the Shaykh al-Akbar wrote, is regarded with shrewd suspicion, if
not outright hostility and censor. Among a core of Sufis the Shaykh al-Akbars
works have been savored with a relish and delight as often his lengthy
considerations show a nearly unfathomable grasp for the living presence of the
divine in all aspects of life.

Any mystic can find much to ponder in a studied reading of Ibn 'Arabis
texts. For the many Christians and some Jews who are still perhaps unconsciously
swayed by the centuries of anti-Islamic polemic in the west, an astute reading
of Shaykh al-Akbars work should banish many of the silly sectarian ideas that
cling to our ideas about Islam. Muslims themselves are still extreamly divided
over the worth of Shaykh al-Akbars views and common misattributions to him of
pantheism and even incarnationism are still common slurs betraying a willful
misreading of Shaykh al-Akbars ideas.

Though it is unlikely that The
Unlimited Mercifierwill
seriously affect this perennial debate about Shaykh al-Akbars ultimate worth
as a Muslim, Hirtenstein does offer a useful introduction to ibn Arabi that
has not existed in English before. I believe that as scholarly work proceeds on
translating the profound depth of Islam as a spiritual path toward knowing self
and the divine will become more widely appreciated. The perspective of Shaykh
al-Akbar, acknowledged and not, definitely sets the standard of any spiritual
reading of the Quran.

Also in the emerging world spirituality ibn Arabi may yet play an unique
role is forging a link between the monotheisms of the west to the pantheisms and
non-theisms of the east and of a rationalist scientific humanisms of modernity. The
Unlimited Mercifier provides not only an introduction to the life and
ideas of ibn Arabi but without too strong a reading between the lines that
the importance and perennial relevance of Shaykh al-Akbars ideas for emerging
global civilization become apparent. Given this breath I highly recommend this
introduction and eventually a closer consideration of the of Shaykh al-Akbars
works as available in the works reviewed below. Special note of SUFI
PATH OF KNOWLEDGE and SELF-DISCLOSURE
OF GOD by William C. Chittick should be noted by sincere students.

White Cloud Press, in a joint publishing effort with Anqa Publishing in the
United Kingdom, presents the first in a series of books on the life and
teachings of Ibn 'Arabi. Relatively unknown in the West until the 20th century,
he has been revered by Sufi mystics ever since he first burst upon the Islamic
world at the turn of the 13th century. He wrote over 350 books and treatises
that are recognized as classics of world spirituality.

The
Unlimited Mercifieris a new appreciation of Ibn 'Arabi, clarifying the
meanings and relevance of his life and thought. It serves as a thorough
introduction for those new to his work, as well as providing food for
contemplation and further study for those alre! ady familiar with his genius.

Divided into five sections, the book consists of seventeen alternating
chapters of biography and thought. The biographical chapters chart the
historical trajectory of his life, using his own descriptions as well as the
latest research, and are richly illustrated with photographs and maps. Every
second chapter discusses a facet of his thought, demonstrating Ibn 'Arabi's
immediate relevance to our modern era.

Though ibnArabi is usually considered a theosopher
(philosophical mystic) par excellence, one should not overlook his
profound devotional side, well represented in his poetry scattered in his
writings as well as his well regarded Interpreter of Desires, now in The
Seven Days of the Heart by Ibn 'Arabi, translated by Pablo Beneito and
Stephen Hirtenstein (Anqa) we have a translation of Shaykh al-Akbar s own
collection of prayers for the nights and days of the week. This is the first
time these extraordinary and beautiful prayers have been translated into
English. There are fourteen prayers, full of the most astounding expressions of
contemplation and devotion to God. This is a unique spiritual masterpiece that
possesses the quality of being able to speak to people of all walks of life and
belief, across the apparent barrier of many centuries and different cultures.
Despite this growing interest, the prayers that are attributed to him remain
little-known. They provide a glimpse into the real practice of the mystical life
within the Sufi tradition. This is the first time that any of ibn 'Arabi's
prayers have been published in another language. This collection is one of the
most beautiful, having been revered in the Islamic world for centuries. There
are 14 prayers, one for each day and night of the week. Not only are they full
of expressions of contemplation and devotion to God, they also include a depth
of knowledge of Union. As the translators show in their introduction, the very
structure of the prayers is a mode of contemplation, since for Ibn 'Arabi the
weekly cycle itself is sacred.

Stations
Of Desire: Love Elegies From Ibn 'Arabi And New Poems by Michael Sells (Ibis Editions) Among the most
widely read of his works, and certainly his most famous collection of poems, was
his volume of odes, The Translator of Desires (Turjuman al-Ashwaq),
which is regarded as a masterpiece of Arabic and Sufi love poetry. Michael
Sells's Stations of Desire contains the first translations of Ibn 'Arabi's
Turjuman into modern poetic English. Sells, the translator of a highly praised
volume of pre-Islamic qasidas, Desert
Tracings, and the anthology Early
Islamic Mysticism carries into his translations the supple, resonant
quality of the original Arabic, so that the poems come to robust life in
English. In addition to a substantial selection of the odes themselves, Sells
provides an insightful introduction that makes this work accessible to
contemporary readers, as it locates the poems within the history of Arabic
poetics and the tradition of Sufi mysticism. The book also includes a section of
Sells's original poems, which are modeled on the Turjuman and serve as further
commentary to the medieval odes and their extension into the present climate of
poetry.

For background on the Andalusian origins of ibn al-Arabi's Muslim
Spain this massive study is exceptional as the best single source of scholarly assessment
of the era and region. Also it is now quite reasonably priced.

The Legacy of Muslim
Spain 2 Volumes edited by Salma Khadra Jayyusi (Brill) (hardcover) Now
that this major contribution to the history and culture of Andalusian Spain during the
heyday of high medieval Muslim culture is available in a paper edition, this text should
be considered for course work as there is quite simply no other resource like it in
English that attempts to provide a fulsome account of Islam in Spain.
The civilization of medieval Muslim Spain is perhaps the most brilliant and prosperous of
its age and has been essential to the direction which civilization in medieval Europe
took. The Legacy
of Muslim Spain is the first ever in any language to deal in a really comprehensive
manner with all major aspects of Islamic civilization in medieval Spain. Forty-one
international scholars have contributed to the 48 chapters in the areas of history (12
chapters), language and literature (10 chapters), music (1 chapter), art and architecture
(6 chapters), social history and lifestyle (3 chapters), economic history (2 chapters),
philosophy (3 chapters), religious studies (4 chapters), and science, technology, and
agriculture (7 chapters). Includes 16 color and 9 b&w plates, and 6 simple black &
white maps.

Contents Foreword: Salma Khadra Jayyusi History: Mahmoud Makki, The Political
History of al-Andalus (92/711-897/1492). James Dickie, Granada: A Case Study of Arab
Urbanism in Muslim Spain. Robert Hillenbrand, `The Ornament of the World: Medieval Cordoba
as a Cultural Centre. Rafael Valencia, Islamic Seville: Its Political, Social and Cultural
History. Mikel de Epalza, Mozarabs: An Emblematic Christian Minority in Islamic al-Andalus
Margarita Lopez Gomez, The Mozarabs: Worthy Bearers of Islamic Culture. L.P. Harvey, The
Mudejars. Raymond P. Scheindlin, The Jews in Muslim Spain. L.P. Harvey, The Political,
Social and Cultural History of the Moriscos. Madeleine Fletcher, Al-Andalus and North
Africa in the Almohad Ideology. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Mortal Enemies, Invisible Neighbours:
Northerners in Andalusi Eyes. Abbas Hamdani, An Islamic Background to the Voyages of
Discovery. Language and Literature: Pierre Cachia, Andalusi Belles Lettres. Salma Khadra
Jayyusi, Andalusi Poetry: The Golden Period. Salma Khadra Jayyusi, Nature Poetry in
al-Andalus and the Rise of Ibn Khafaja James T. Monroe, Zajal and Muwashshaha:
Hispano-Arabic Poetry and the Romance Tradition. Lois A. Giffen, Ibn Hazm and the Tawq
al-Hamama F. Corriente, Linguistic Interference Between Arabic and the Romance Languages
of the Iberian Peninsula. Dieter Messner, Further Listings and Categorisations of Arabic
Words in Ibero-Romance Languages. Roger Boase, Arab Influences on European Love-Poetry
Maria Rosa Menocal, Al-Andalus and 1492: The Ways of Remembering. Luce Lopez-Baralt, The
Legacy of Islam in Spanish Literature. Music: Owen Wright, Music in Muslim Spain Art and
Architecture: Oleg Grabar, Two Paradoxes in the Islamic Art of the Spanish Peninsula.
Jerrillynn Dodds, The Mudejar Tradition in Architecture. Jerrillynn Dodds, The Arts of
al-Andalus. James Dickie, Space and Volume in Nasrid Architecture. J.C. Burgel, Ecstasy
and Control in Andalusi Art: Steps towards a New Approach. A. Fernandez-Puertas,
Calligraphy in al-Andalus. Social History and Lifestyle Pierre Guichard, The Social
History of Muslim Spain. Maria J. Viguera, Asluhu li 'l-mabuli: On the Social Status of
Andalusi Women. David Waines, The Culinary Culture of al-Andalus. Economic History: Pedro
Chalmeta, An Approximate Picture of the Economy of al-Andalus. Olivia Remie Constable,
Muslim Merchants in Andalusi International Trade. Philosophy: Miguel Cruz Hernandez,
Islamic Thought in the Iberian Peninsula. Jamal al-Din al-bAlawi, The Philosophy of Ibn
Rushd J.C. Burgel, Ibn Tufayl and his Hayy Ibn Yaqzan: A Turning Point in Arabic
Philosophical Writing. Religious Studies: Dominique Urvoy, The bUlamac of al-Andalus.
Manuela Marin, Muslim Religious Practices in al-Andalus (2nd/8th- 4th/10th Centuries).
Maria Isabel Fierro, Heresy in al-Andalus. Claude Addas, Andalusi Mysticism and the Rise
of Ibn bArabi. Science, Technology and Agriculture: J. Vernet, Natural and Technical
Sciences in al-Andalus. Julio Samso, The Exact Sciences in al-Andalus. Thomas F. Glick,
Hydraulic Technology in al-Andalus. Expiracion Garcia Sanchez, Agriculture in Muslim
Spain. Lucie Bolens, The Use of Plants for Dyeing and Clothing. James Dickie, The
Hispano-Arab Garden: Notes towards a Typology. Charles Burnett, The Translating Activity
in Medieval Spain. Margarita Lopez Gomez, Islamic Civilisation in al-Andalus: A Final
Assessment.

This is a epochal translation and original interpretation of ibn al-Arabis
view of himself in relation to Mohammedan Sainthood as he re-conceived it. Like many
mystics of genius Muhyi-l-Din ibn al-Arabi found quite early in his career that his
position in the hierarchy of mystics and minor prophets had a unique significance for the
symbolic development of Islam, that would deepen and completely redefine the most exalted
reaches of Islamic anthropology, philosophy of religion and mysticism. In many ways the
west and the east is still in its infancy in approaching the towering edifice of this
Saints encyclopedic esoteric reworking of Islam, a reworking that may still proffer
unique insights to any future philosophy of religion.

In fact it is only with the advent of philosophical hermeneutics
and the recent turn of philosophy toward religious studies as suggested by de Vries (PHILOSOPHY AND THE
TURN TO RELIGION by Hent de Vries $24.95, paperback, 473 pages, Johns Hopkins
University Press, ISBN: 0801859956) that the preliminary tools and attitudes are now
possible in the academic discourse study of ibn al-Arabis rich and difficult
texts. The rigor of interpretation needed to approach ibn al-Arabis massive
literary output is well understood by western scholars who study him. His writings are
full of detailed learning specific to his time and high religious culture of his time,
full of allusions unique to the Sufi milieu. William Chitticks (see below) works
have contributed to a fuller understanding of this thinker who was all but ignored and
hardly known in the West just two generations ago.

In many ways ibn al-Arabi offers a unique picture of the
inner workings of a mystic because his writings have a autobiographical element to them
that most mystical writings from the medieval period do not. Elmores study is the
first concerted effort to deal in-depth with the meaning of ibn al-Arabis
Andalusian writings, the writings he produced before his hajj and life in Africa
and Asia where his major works were composed. One of the more controversial of
Elmores contributions his reworking of the Saints early life and his
self-conceptions of his mystical station as "Mohammedan Seal of the Saints."
This topic has concerned many Western excursions into the intricate labyrinth of his
thinking. If we understand how ibn al-Arabi thought of himself and what the scope of
his project was then we have a practical key to the enormous reworking of universal Islam,
an esoteric vision that few Sufi schools have ever matched or grasped without seriously
falling in sectarian and ideological simplifications of ibn al-Arabis thought.

The current dean of Akbarian studies in the west, Michel
Chodkiewicz exemplifies a balance between scholarly rigor and pious esteem as encountered
in his SEAL OF
THE SAINTS: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn Arabi (see below).
Elmores study and translation provides a single text focus approach that is likewise
sensitive to development in the Saint's self-definition and the elaboration of his
anthropology. One could say the Elmores ISLAMIC SAINTHOOD IN
THE FULLNESS OF TIME represents first fruits of an historical critical approach to ibn
al-Arabi that attempts to provide a broader cultural as well as biographical context
as background to understanding the saints work as a whole. More specifically Elmore offers
a plethora of minutia in his notes that should advance Akbarian studies in many small but
substantial ways well beyond the competence of this reviewer to consider.

So far we have addressed only a few of the central features of
Elmores 226 page introduction. The major value of this work is in its significant
translation of the Book of the Fabulous Gryphon (Kitab Anqa
Mughrib). Elmore provides this poetic and theosophical work with a clear translation
and plenty of guidance in notes and commentary to provide future considerations of the
saints hierarchy of sainthood much serious attentiveness to continuities and
variations in ibn al-Arabi's thought. All in all ISLAMIC SAINTHOOD IN
THE FULLNESS OF TIME is a major work of scholarship that any serious student of ibn
al-Arabi's theosophy cannot afford to ignore to take issue with.

Excerpt:As we have already noted, the primary and unique subject-matter of the Gryphon
is the revolutionary Sufi notion of walayah as bodied-forth in its supremely
final authority, the Seal of sainthood. This is quite apparent in the first third of the
book (roughly, the first one hundred pages of our translation) and very much so in the
last quarter, but the vast middle portion of material contains only occasional adversions
to the subject, though these few passages are certainly interesting. Generally speaking,
this middle section might best be characterized as a fairly standard Sufi philosophical
"great chain-of-being" cosmogony, with the Islamic Logos, the Haqiqah
al-Muhammadiyah, as the unifying leitmotif and fulcrum upon which the whole system
turns. But in Ibn al-'Arabi's ontology, the cosmic appearance of the Mohammedan Reality,
or prophetic Light (the or/nur of Genesis 1.3) typically heralds the beginning of
anthropogenesis and the emergence of mystic man (the adam of Gen. 1.26):

For [the Reality of] Muhammad (May God bless and keep him!) is a Copy of
[Divine] Reality (nuskhatu Haqq) with marks of distinction, and Adam [sci.,
the human entelechy], in turn, is a Copy from him in entirety; while we, we are a Copy of
them both (Peace be upon them!), and the World, both earthly and heavenly, is a Copy of
us--and there the pens run dry.

The hybrid creature of earth and of Spirit, does man in his essence and destiny
follow the way of the world or the Word of God? The last of all beings from the standpoint
of physical evolution is yet the first as to pristine spiritual perfection, Ibn al-'Arabi
answers. But how can this be? It is because all is cyclic, the last in time becoming the
first, all things ending in their beginning. In the downward cycle the intelligible (al-ma'qal)
becomes the tangible (al-mahsus), and in the return, the ascent, the secrets sown
in the earth must blossom in mystical mneme:

You surely have known the First-arising (al-nash'ah al-'Ia) [sci., the
"natural man"]; Why, then, do you not remember? [Surah LVI:62]

Man is Light and the Light is God. The mere saying of such a thing is worthless
(besides being blasphemous and, apparently, quite false), however, unless we can see and
experience its truth for ourselves (then we will not care about the problems of logic).
But how can truth ever be experienced? The advice that Ibn al-'Arabi gives in the 'Anqa',
is the answer of the religious mind:

Restrict [external] perception (al-basar) and avert [internal]
speculation (al-nazar); restore the Remembrance [of the Names of God] and
struggle to dominate [over your own lower nature] (al-dhikr wa-l-mughalabah);
seek the assistance of reflection and attentiveness (al-fikr wa-l-muraqabah) and
prepare for the acceptance (al-qabul) of that which the Messenger [of
Inspiration] (al-rasul) brings to you. [Do all of this] and you will surely be
informed of that [Answer which you seek] with clarity .

Here we nave a comparatively rare example of the praxis of Ibn al-'Arabi's
mystical anthropology. My purpose in quoting it here is to draw attention to the close
relation between the concepts of man and sainthood in Ibn al-'Arabi's thought. In the
microcosmic "Jewels" section of the 'Anqa', the eighth
Marjanah---devoted to sainthood (as contra-distinguished from prophethood)---follows the
seventh, concerning human existence as both a "mirage" (sarab) and an
"image"/like- (mithl) of God." Now, these symbols are apparently
explicated the Qur'anic verse in which the actions of unbelievers are compared to a desert
mirage which "the thirsty one supposes to be water until he comes to it and finds it
to be nothing, but he finds God in place" (wa-wajada Llaha 'inda-hu)---which Sufis
understood to an: "but he finds God near/with him."

Thus, we could say that the Mohammedan Reality, manifestly prophetic and
typically associated with world-creation and Revelation wahy), is actually no more than
the conceptual corollary of the "mystic", "saintly", or
"perfect" Man (al-insan al-kamil, = Gr., anthropos teleios who
is appropriately framed in the eschatological context of world-destruction and the
Resurrection, expressed in terms of and by authority of mystical inspiration (ilham)
raised to the power of certainty This correlation, however, is not actually spelled out in
ibn Arabi's doctrine, and it seems to me that the two treatments--middle port on portion
of the 'Anqa' (foused on the Mohammedan Reality), on the one hand, and the
beginning and the end of the book, both dealing with the Khatm/Mahdi, on the
other-are, in reality two different compositions grafted together in their present form.

This meticulous historical work examines the fierce controversy over the legacy of Ibn
'Arabi, the great Islamic mystic.

"Knysh has looked at exactly who were the supporters and opponents of Ibn 'Arabi for
several centuries after his death, where they were getting their information, why they
should have taken the position they took, and so forth. The author brings together a lot
of tidbits in the secondary literature that people have not connected, and he does so with
careful attention to the primary texts." -- William C. Chittick

This book investigates the fierce theological controversy over the great Muslim mystical
thinker Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1242). Even during his lifetime, Ibn 'Arabi's conformity with the
letter of the Muslim dogma was called into doubt by many scholars who were suspicious of
the monistic (unitive) tendencies of his metaphysical teaching, of his claims to be the
Prophet's successor and restorer of the true meaning of the Islamic revelation, and of his
allegorical interpretation of the Qur'an.
Following Ibn 'Arabi's death, these misgivings grew into an outright condemnation of his
teachings by a number of influential thirteenth through fifteenth century theologians who
portrayed him as a dangerous heretic bent on undermining the foundations of Islamic faith
and
communal life. In response to these grave accusations, Ibn 'Arabi's advocates praised him
as the greatest saint of Islam who was unjustly slandered by the bigoted and narrow-minded
critics.
As time went on, these conflicting images of the mystical thinker became rallying points
for various political and scholarly factions vying for lucrative religious and
administrative posts and ideological denomination. In thoroughly analyzing the heated
debates around Ibn 'Arabi's ideas throughout the three centuries following his death, this
study brings out discursive strategies and arguments employed by the polemicists, the
hidden agendas they pursued, and the reasons for the striking longevity of the issue in
Islamic literature up to the present day. On the theoretical level, this book reassesses
the validity of such common dichotomies as orthodoxy
versus heresy, mainstream versus mystical interpretations of Islam, and communalism versus
individualism as well as other issues related to the history of Islamic thought.

Alexander D. Knysh is The Sharjah Professor of Islamic Studies, Department of Arabic and
Middle East Studies, University of Exeter, United Kingdom. His studies were mostly
conducted in the former Soviet Union and represent through examination of the documents.

QUEST FOR THE
RED SULPHUR: The Life of Ibn Arabi by Claude Addas ($29.95, paperback, Islamic Texts
Society; ISBN: 0946621454)

This work is undoubtedly a landmark in Ibn Arabi studies and its author's gift of
narrative allied to a consummate understanding of the subject should make this volume
compulsory reading for anyone interested in Islamic mysticism.

This important volume celebrates the 750th anniversary of the death of one of the
world's mystical giants, Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi, known throughout the Muslim world simply as
the Shaykh al-akbar (the greatest teacher). This
text brings together, for the first time, works by eminent scholars and students of the
Shaykh from many different countries. Beside some important essays clarifying distinctive
ideas of the Shaykh, the volume also includes translations of the some of his works.
Recommended.

SUFI PATH OF
KNOWLEDGE: Ibn al-Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination by William C. Chittick ($25.95,
paperback, 544 pages, State University of New York Press; ISBN: 0887068855)

This work is a thorough study of Ibn al-Arabi's thought. The book offers Ibn al-Arabi's
view of spiritual perfection and explains his theology, ontology, epistemology,
hermeneutics, and soteriology. The clear language, unencumbered by methodological jargon,
makes it accessible to those familiar with other spiritual traditions, while its scholarly
precision will appeal to specialists. Chittick stays to close to traditional accounts of
epistemology and ontology so that the deep radicallity of ibn Arabi's thought is somewhat
tamed and made prosaic rather than its profound poetic intimations of reforming
consciousness. In SELF-DISCLOSURE
OF GOD Chittick begins to correct this reliance upon customary forms of thought and
brings us closer to the true ordinary vision of this world class mystic. Essential.

SELF-DISCLOSURE
OF GOD: Principles of Ibn al-Arabi's Cosmology by William C. Chittick ($25.95,
paperback, 544 pages, State University of New York Press; ISBN: 0791434044)

This work represents a major step forward in making available to the Western reader the
enormous riches of Islamic teachings in the fields of cosmology, mystical philosophy,
theology, and spirituality. The book is divided into three parts: the relation between God
and the cosmos, the structure of the cosmos and the nature of the human soul. The
introduction is an excellent summary overview of Ibn Arabi's metaphysics. The rest of the
book contains extensive translations of Ibn Arabi with explanatory commentary. Chittick
continues to refine his approach to the difficult texts of ibn Arabi by appreciating the
flow of his thought rather than continuing to artificially import his ideas into modern
categories. This opens up the poetic dimensions of his religious thought which may
eventually be used as a critique to norms of comparative theology and a more radical
appreciation of traditional metaphysical systems and experience. This work continues to be
the most comprehensive account of ibn Arabi's world class theosophy available in a Western
language. Highly recommended.

IMAGINAL
WORLDS: Ibn al-Arabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity by William C. Chittick
($19.95, paperback, 208 pages, State University of New York Press; ISBN: 079142250X)

This book is an introduction to the thought of Ibn al-Arabi, the most influential
Muslim thinker of the past 600 years, concerning the ultimate destiny of human beings, God
and the cosmos, and the reasons for religious diversity. Explains his concept of human
perfection, the implications of the World of Imagination, and why God's wisdom demands
diversity. It suggests how al-Arabi's teachings
can be used in the modern study of world religions and some of the implications for modern
thought about ultimate values. Solid.

OCEAN WITHOUT
SHORE: Ibn Arabi, the Quran, and the Shariah by Michel Chodkiewicz ($21.95, paperback,
State University of New York Press; ISBN: 0791416267) HARDCOVER

The author shows that Ibn Arabi's writings are grounded in the Quran and Sunnah which
is important as many Muslim's have claimed that his teachings have gone against the spirit
of the Quran.

Behind Abd al-Kader's role of brilliant warrior lay another, that of spiritual master
in the direct lineage of Ibn Arabi. The thirty-nine texts translated here were chosen
because they represent the major themes of his teachings. Many are commentaries on
passages from the writings of Ibn Arabi.

SEAL OF THE
SAINTS: Prophethood and Sainthood in the
Doctrine of Ibn Arabi by Michel Chodkiewicz, translated from the French by Liadain
Sherrard ($55.00, hardcover, Golden Palm, Islamic Texts Society; ISBN: 094662139X)

In recent years a number of important studies have helped acquaint the Western reader
with Ibn 'Arabi's
metaphysics and this process is now greatly enhanced by the present volume in which
Michael Chodkiewicz explores for the first time in depth, the Sufi's 'hagiology' or
teaching about sainthood. Founded on a careful analysis
of the relevant texts, Chodkiewicz's work examines this essential aspect of Ibn 'Arabi's
doctrine of sainthood, defining the nature and function of sainthood, while also
specifying the criteria for a typology of saints based on the notion of prophetic
inheritance. This is by far the best available explanation of the nature of sanctity for
both the practical and the theoretical understanding of ibn 'Arabi's thought and Sufism in
general. It is an extraordinarily good book about an extremely elusive thinker.
Chodkiewicz not only knows the texts remarkably well, but also avoids and rejects certain
errors of perspective common among other scholars, by so doing has brought the study of
ibn 'Arabi into a critical focus.

ALONE WITH THE
ALONE: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi by Henry Corbin, translated
from the French by Ralph Manheim, new Preface by Harold Bloom ($19.95, paperback, 454
pages, 5 plates, 2 in color, Mythos, Princeton University Press; ISBN: 0691058342)
By far one of the epoch making religious studies titles of this century, Corbin not only
introduces ibn al-Arabi to Western readers he also makes intelligible much of visionary
experience in all religious dimensions. It requires some tough reading but is a masterful
account of a still neglected and little appreciated aspect of religious experience.
Generally all of Corbin's works are the best guide to the visionary tradition. Corbin,
like Scholem and Jonas, is remembered as a scholar of genius. He was uniquely equipped not
only to recover Iranian Sufism for the West, but also to defend the principal Western
traditions of esoteric spirituality.
Ibn 'Arabi was one of the great mystics of all time. Through the richness of his personal
experience and the constructive power of his intellect, he made a unique contribution to
Shi'ite Sufism. In this book, which features a powerful new preface by Harold Bloom, Henry
Corbin brings us to the very core of this movement with a penetrating analysis of Ibn
'Arabi's life and doctrines. Corbin begins with a kind of spiritual topography of the
twelfth century, emphasizing the differences between exoteric and esoteric forms of Islam.
He also relates Islamic mysticism to mystical thought in the West.
The remainder of the book is devoted to two complementary essays: on "Sympathy and
Theosophy" and "Creative Imagination and Creative Prayer." A section of
notes and appendices includes original translations of numerous Sufi treatises. Harold
Bloom's preface links Sufi mysticism with Shakespeare's visionary dramas and high
tragedies, such as The Tempest and Hamlet. These works, he writes, intermix the empirical
world with a transcendent element. Bloom shows us that this Shakespearean cosmos is
analogous to Corbin's "Imaginal Realm" of the Sufi's, the place of soul or
souls. Through the richness of Ibn 'Arabi's personal experience and the constructive power
of his intellect, he made a unique contribution to Shi'ite Sufism.

This work was written during the author's later years and was intended to be a
synthesis of his spiritual doctrine. It is probably the most studied of ibn 'Arabi's
writings and in many ways has been a primer in many Sufi schools.

This work is an important glimpse into a neglected subject: the Sufi meditation upon
the meaning of Islamic law. The work will allow a more balanced understanding of Sufism
and will help dispel simplistic stereotypes about alleged opposition between Sufism and
law.

In this translation of a portion of the fiqh section of the Futuhat
al-Makkiyyah, at least two startling key issues emerge. Being startled, in itself, is
the first key. And the second is the 'arabic language' which means that language which the
original audience of the Qur'an understood. Also startling are all the twists and turns,
all the secrets and mysteries, all the bizarre and strange permutation of the original
text.
Although the translation is quite literal and over 300 pages, with careful reading,
special academic preparation is not necessary. This book is a spiritual and intellectual
treat, and a great hope for a more authentic and deep Islamic discourse.

About the Author: Eric Winkel, an expert in Arabic language and Islamic studies, has
taught at several universities in the United States, the Middle East, and Pakistan.

Many contemporary Muslims associate Ibn al-Arabi, the 13th century mystic scholar, with
dangerous, gnostic intentions. While refuting this misconception, this book portrays
al-Arabi as a most direct and literal purveyor of the divine message. The author takes up
the discussion of spiritual-legal fiqh which al-Arabi articulated 700 years ago.
Playing with language and its ambiguities, al-Arabi disturbs the comfort of human-made
religion. According to him, each novel situation presents the spiritual-legal practitioner
with choices, and the determination of appropriate action is the subject of fiqh. This
also encompasses debate about linguistics and the Koran to prophetic practice.

This volume explores various facets of the Islamic search for knowledge. It examines
figures as diverse as Abu Najib al-Suhrawardi and Ibn al-Arabi on the one hand, and Ibn
Battuta and Ibn Jubary on the other. The volume is divided into two main sections, Thought
and Travel, an exciting and stimulating collection with many fresh and vivid insights
about the meaning pf pilgrimage and ritual observance as it relates to the production of
knowledge and meaning.