The Arab Spring in global context

Jan 10, 2012

Fyodor Lukyanov

Much has been written about the Arab Spring
of 2011 and rightly so: no other event in world politics had such wide-ranging
effects both in the region and far beyond.

The process that began in the waning days
of 2010 has toppled regimes in four countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and
Yemen), reinvigorated political Islam, intensified competition among regional
powers both in terms of geopolitical ambitions and the Sunni-Shiite
confrontation, and led to a reevaluation of NATO’s role in the world. Finally,
it has again raised questions about democratization as a means of resolving
problems and the meaning of democracy in the modern world.

The countries at the center of the storm
are not the poorest or least developed, with the exception of Yemen. So, these
upheavals cannot be reduced to strictly economic factors. The authoritarian
regimes in the Middle East, which have remained virtually unchanged since the
middle of the 20th century, were long considered the only model of governance
suitable for the region. However, the changes in the last few decades have made
them look increasingly anachronistic, all the more so since the revolution in
the media has made international experiences available to the Arab masses , not
the overwhelming majority, but a broad enough swathe of society to provoke
change.

Legitimacy is the key issue. It is no
accident that the conservative Gulf monarchies, where power is inherited, were
shaken but unhurt by the Arab Spring, whereas autocratic republics with
formally elected presidents who sought to transfer power to an heir crumbled
under popular discontent.

Islamic political parties have clearly come
out on top in countries that have already held elections (Tunisia and Egypt),
and Islamists are becoming more active in countries that have yet to hold
democratic elections (Libya, Yemen and Syria). This is no surprise; decades of
one-man or at least one-party rule have left no other foundation for building a
new political system.

Democracy can develop further in the Middle
East if secular parties are established in addition to Islamic ones and if the
forces of political Islam are interested in building modern institutions.
Otherwise, the democratic spring will serve only to legitimize a new anti-democratic
model, this time Islamic in nature.

Two oil monarchies, Saudi Arabia and Qatar,
are at the forefront of the struggle for regional leadership. Their efforts
have turned the Arab League, long derided as a club of dictators, into an
instrument of regime change (the only exception being Bahrain, where Saudi
interference helped suppress the Shiite protest movement) and a pretext for
intervention (NATO’s operation in Libya largely succeeded due to Arab support).

The confluence of three processes, great
power rivalry in the region (Riyadh - Tehran), Sunni-Shiite confrontation, and
increasing international concern over the Iranian nuclear program, is changing
the regional context. The risk of military action will increase next year. With
the growing alignment of interests among such diverse countries as Saudi Arabia
and Israel and the upcoming presidential election in the United States, the
prospect of military conflict is rising. The Iranian-Shiite element is moving
to the fore in the struggle over Syria. Arab pressure on the Alawite regime
increasingly resembles a proxy war against an Iranian ally.

NATO’s intervention in Libya showed that
the alliance’s military capability is limited and that the organization itself
has become much less of a monolith. In fact, the bombing of Libya was less a
NATO operation than an example of individual countries pursuing their own
interests. France and Britain gained from their leading role in this campaign,
while the United States used Libya to test a model in which leadership is
relegated to the Europeans when a conflict is primarily their concern.

This year has yielded contradictory results
for the fate of democracy. The invasion of Libya was legally presented as
enforcing a no-fly zone, though in reality its direct aim was regime change.
The bombing in support of Libya’s “democratic forces,” that is, one side in the
civil war, about which nothing was known at the time, went far beyond the
bounds of decency, regardless of what you think about the Gaddafi regime. The
20-year transformation of democracy and humanitarian protection from a noble
idea to a cynical instrument reached its apogee in Libya and largely
discredited these concepts.

Even so, democracy, or rather the desire
for the transition of power and the refusal to accept permanent regimes, has
taken root and spread all over the world. The public in Egypt and Libya
rejected attempts of their leaders to transfer power to heirs. Essentially the
same thing happened in other places, such as Transnistria, where people refused
to vote for their long-standing ruler or Moscow’s choic, and instead backed an
independent candidate. The same phenomenon was seen in Russia, where Vladimir
Putin’s unilateral decision to return to the presidency turned the political
atmosphere against the government.

Attempts to impose democracy produce the
opposite effect but it is impossible to suppress people’s natural desire to
express their political views. This is the result not only of 2011 but of the
20 years since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor-in-Chief of the
Russia in Global Affairs journal – the most authoritative source of expertise
on Russian foreign policy and global developments. He is also a frequent
commentator on international affairs and contributes to various media in the
United States, Europe and China, including academic journals Social Research,
Europe-Asia Studies, Columbia Journal of International Affairs.