General: I have the honor to make
the following report of the operations of the Cavalry Division, Army of Northern Virginia,
from the time of crossing the Rappahannock on June 16, to July 24, when, having recrossed
the Blue Ridge after the Pennsylvania campaign, our pickets were re-established on the
south bank of the Rappahannock:
After holding in check a cavalry force at least
double our own for months, with a command stretched on the outposts from the Blue Ridge to
the Chesapeake, engaging in numerous hand-to-hand encounters, illustrating the superiority
of southern cavalry, it was with joy that the order of the commanding general to advance
was received by the cavalry. I was instructed by the commanding general to leave a
sufficient force on the Rappahannock to watch the enemy in front, and move the main body
parallel to the Blue Ridge and on Longstreet's right flank, who was to move near the base
of the mountains, through Fauquier and Loudoun Counties.
The position of the enemy as far as known was
as follows: His cavalry massed in Fauquier, principally from Warrenton Springs to
Catlett's Station, with the Twelfth Corps and other infantry supports, the main body of
Hooker's army being in Stafford and Lower Fauquier, hastening to interpose itself between
our main body and Washington, with a corps or two confronting A. P. Hill's corps at
Fredericksburg, having made a lodgment on the south side of the river there, near the
mouth of Deep Run.
I accordingly left the Fifteenth Virginia
Cavalry (Major [C. R.] Collins), W. H. F. Lee's brigade, on the Lower Rappahannock,
cooperating with A. P. Hill, and directed Brigadier-General Hampton to remain with his
brigade on the Rappahannock, in observation of the enemy during the movement of our
forces, and directed also Fitz. Lee's brigade (Col. T. T. Munford temporarily in command)
to cross on the morning of the 15th at Rockford, and take the advance of Longstreet's
column, via Barbee's Cross-Roads, and put Robertson's and w. H. F. Lee's brigades en route
to cross the Rappahannock lower down (at Hinson's Mills), while Jones' brigade followed,
with orders to picket the Aestham River the first day.
The movement was not interrupted the enemy
having disappeared from our front during the night, and our march continued to within a
few miles of Salem, to bivouac for the night. Scouting parties were sent to Warrenton,
where it was ascertained the enemy had withdrawn his forces to Centreville the day
previous.
General Fitz. Lee's brigade, having encamped
near Piedmont, moved on the morning of the 17th (Wednesday), by my direction, toward
Aldie, via Middleburg, with the view, if possible, to hold the gap in Bull Run Mountain as
a screen to Longstreet's movements. W. H. F. Lee's brigade was kept near the plains,
reconnoitering to Thoroughfare Gap, while Robertson's brigade was halted near Rectortown,
to move to the support of either.
I accompanied Fitz. Lee's brigade as far as
Middleburg, where I remained to close up the command, and keep in more ready communication
with the rear. The brigade, moving to Aldie, being much worn and the horses having had
very little food, was halted by its commander near Dover, to close up, and pickets sent
forward to the Aldie Gap. These pickets were soon attacked by the enemy's cavalry,
advancing from the direction of Fairfax, and were driven back on the main body, which took
a position just west of Aldie, on a hill commanding the Snickersville road, but which was
liable to be turned by the road to Middleburg.
Simultaneously with this attack, I was informed
that a large force of the enemy's cavalry was advancing on Middleburg from the direction
of Hopewell. Having only a few pickets and my staff here, I sent orders to Munford to look
out for the road to Middleburg, as by the time my dispatch reached him the enemy would be
in the place, and retiring myself toward Rector's Cross-Roads, I sent orders for Robertson
to march without delay for Middleburg, and Chambliss to take the Salem road to the same
place.
At Aldie ensued one of the most sanguinary
cavalry battles of the war, and at the same time most creditable to our arms and glorious
to the veteran brigade of Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee. They fought most successfully, punishing
the enemy with great severity, and maintaining their position till the dispatch received
from me made it necessary to move farther back, on account of the threatening attitude of
the force at Middleburg. This brigade captured 134 prisoners, among whom were a colonel
and captain, several stand of colors, together with horses, arms, and equipments. A large
number of the enemy's dead, including a colonel, were left on the field.
Brigadier-General Robertson arrived at
Middleburg just at dark. I ordered him to attack the enemy at once, and, with his two
regiments, he drove him handsomely out of the place, and pursued him miles on the Hopewell
road, the force appearing to scatter. He captured a standard and 70 prisoners.
Chambliss' brigade, approaching from that
direction, caught that night and early next morning 160 and several guidons, the colonel
and a small detachment only escaping. It was the First Rhode Island Cavalry. Horses, arms,
and equipments were captured in proportion. Among the captured were included a number of
officers.
Our own loss in Robertson's brigade was slight, excepting Major [James H.] McNeill,
Sixty-third [Fifth] North Carolina Cavalry, whose wound deprived us of the services of a
most valuable officer, and Lieutenant-Colonel [Edward] Cantwell, Fifty-ninth North
Carolina troops [Fourth North Carolina Cavalry], captured.
Major Heros von Borcke, of my staff, being sent
by me with the attacking column, behaved with his usual fine judgment and distinguished
gallantry. Our loss in Fitz. Lee's brigade was heavier, as the fighting was more desperate
and continued. His report, which I hope to forward with this, will state the casualties.
We occupied Middleburg that night, and on the 18th took position around the place with
Robertson's and W. H. F. Lee's brigades, and directed Fitz. Lee's brigade to take position
at Union, on my left, while Jones' brigade was expected to arrive that day.
The enemy soon made such encroachments on our
left that I deemed it requisite to leave Middleburg out of my line of battle, keeping
pickets, however, close to the enemy. Slight skirmishing continued.
A general engagement of cavalry was not sought
by me, because I preferred waiting for the arrival of the cavalry still in rear (Jones'
and Hampton's brigades), and I confined my attention to procuring, through scouts and
reconnoitering parties, information of the enemy's movements.
In one of these, Major Mosby, with his usual
daring, penetrated the enemy's lines, and caught a staff officer of General Hooker, bearer
of dispatches to General Pleasonton, commanding United States cavalry near Aldie. These
dispatches disclosed the fact that Hooker was looking to Aldie with solicitude; that
Pleasonton, with infantry and cavalry, occupied the place, and that a reconnaissance in
force, of cavalry, was meditated toward Warrenton and Culpeper.
I immediately dispatched to General Hampton,
who was coming by way of Warrenton from the direction of Beverly Ford, this intelligence,
and directed him to meet this advance at Warrenton. The captured dispatches also gave the
entire number of divisions, from which we could estimate the approximate strength of the
enemy's army. I therefore concluded in no event to attack with cavalry alone the enemy at
Aldie. As long as he kept within supporting distance of his infantry at that point, my
operations became necessarily defensive, but masking thereby the movement of our main body
by checking the enemy's reconnaissance and by continually threatening attack. Hampton met
the enemy's advance toward Culpeper, at Warrenten, and drove him back without difficulty,
a heavy storm and night intervening to aid the enemy's retreat.
On the 19th, the enemy showed signs of an
advance, and our pickets beyond Middleburg were driven back upon the main body, composed
of Robertson's and W. H. F. Lee's brigades, posted far enough west of the place not to
bring it under fire. The enemy, with a large force of cavalry, advanced, attacking with
dismounted men deployed as infantry. This attack was met in the most determined manner by
these two brigades, which rough roads had already decimated for want of adequate shoeing
facilities, Chambliss commanding Lee's brigade upon the left and Robertson's on the right.
Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee s brigade in the meantime was occupied with the enemy on the
Snickersville turnpike, opposite us. The enemy finally gained possession of a woodland in
front of our line of battle, and while our brave men met and repelled every attempt to
advance from it, yet our charges invariably brought us under a severe carbine fire from
these woods, as well as a fire from the artillery beyond.
Appreciating this difficulty, I withdrew my
command to a more commanding position a half mile to the rear, where we possessed every
advantage, and could more readily debouch for attack. In withdrawing, while riding at my
side, the brave and heroic Major von Borcke received a very severe, and it was thought
fatal, wound in the neck from one of the enemy's sharpshooters, who, from a stone fence a
few hundred yards off, poured a tempest of bullets over us. I will not pause here to
record the praise due this distinguished Prussian.
The enemy did not attack our new position on
the 19th. Jones' brigade came up on the evening of the 19th, and was ordered to the left,
near Union, General Fitz. Lee's brigade being farther to the left, looking out for
Snicker's Gap and the Snickersville pike.
Hampton's brigade arrived on the 20th, too late
to attack the enemy, still in possession of Middleburg. A continuous rain was also an
obstacle to military operations. Skirmishing, however, continued principally on our left,
beyond Goose Creek, where Colonel Rosser, with his regiment (Fifth Virginia Cavalry),
attacked and drove the enemy's force across the stream in handsome style. He was supported
by Brigadier-General Jones with a portion of his brigade.
I was extremely anxious now to attack the enemy
as early as possible, having, since Hampton's arrival, received sufficient re-enforcement
to attack the enemy's cavalry, but the next morning (21st) being the Sabbath, I recognized
my obligation to do no duty other than what was absolutely necessary, and determined, so
far as was in my power, to devote it to rest. Not so the enemy, whose guns about 8 a.m.
showed that he would not observe it. Had I attacked the enemy, I would have encountered,
besides his cavalry, a heavy force of infantry and artillery, and the result would have
been disastrous, no doubt.
Hampton's and Robertson's brigades were moved
to the front to a position previously chosen, of great strength against a force of
ordinary size, or against cavalry alone; but although the enemy's advance was held in
check gallantly and decidedly for a long time, it soon became evident that the enemy,
utterly foiled for days in his attempt to force our lines, had, as usual, brought a heavy
infantry force--part of the Fifth Corps, under General Vincent--to his support, and its
advance was already engaged in conjunction with the cavalry.
I therefore directed General Hampton to
withdraw to the next height whenever his position was hard pressed, and sent orders at
once to Colonel Chambliss and General Jones--the former having informed me that the enemy
was advancing in heavy force in his front--to afford all the resistance possible, and
General Jones to join to his left, and, retiring apace with the main body, to effect a
junction with it at Upperville, where I proposed to make a more determined stand than was
compatible with our forces divided. The commands were from 4 to 6 miles apart.
In retiring from the first position before
Middleburg, one of the pieces of Captain [J. F.] Hart's battery of horse artillery had the
axle broken by one of the enemy's shot, and the piece had to be abandoned, which is the
first piece of my horse artillery which has ever fallen into the enemy's hands. Its full
value was paid in the slaughter it made in the enemy's ranks, and it was well sold.
The next position was on the west bank of Goose
Creek, whence, after receiving the enemy's attack, and after repulsing him with slaughter,
I again withdrew en échelon of regiments in plain view, and under fire of the enemy's
guns. Nothing could exceed the coolness and self-possession of officers and men in these
movements, performing evolutions with a precision under fire that must have wrung the
tribute of admiration from the enemy, even, who dared not trust his cavalry unsupported to
the sabers of such men.
In the meantime, Jones' and W. H. F. Lee's
brigades were hotly engaged with another column of the enemy moving parallel to this, and
were gradually retiring toward Upperville, before reaching which point, however, the enemy
had pressed closely up, so as to render an attempt to effect a junction at Upperville
hazardous to those brigades, and also made it necessary for Hampton's and Robertson's
brigades to move at once to the west side of Upperville, on account of the number of roads
concentrating at that point, so as to favor the enemy's flank movements.
I was anxious on account of the women and
children to avoid a conflict in the village, but the enemy, true to those reckless and
inhuman instincts, sought to take advantage of this disinclination on our part, by
attacking furiously our rear guard. In an instant, the same men who had with so much
coolness retired before the enemy, wheeled about, and with admirable spirit drove back the
enemy, killing, wounding, and capturing a large number. In this, General Hampton's brigade
participated largely and in a brilliant manner. His report, not yet sent in, will no doubt
give full particulars.
After this repulse, which was not followed up,
as the enemy's infantry was known to be in close supporting distance, I withdrew the
command leisurely to the mountain gap west of Upperville.
The enemy attacked Brigadier-General Robertson, bringing up the rear in this movement, and
was handsomely repulsed. The brave and efficient Colonel [P. G. ] Evans, of the
Sixty-third North Carolina troops, was, however, severely, and it was feared fatally,
wounded, his body falling into the hands of the enemy.
Jones' and W. H. F. Lee's brigades joined the
main body near the gap, and positions were taken to dispute any farther advance. The day
was far spent. The enemy did not attack the gap, but appeared to go into camp at
Upperville. In the conflicts on the left, the enemy was roughly handled.
Lieutenant-Colonel [M.] Lewis, Ninth Virginia Cavalry, was very severely, and it was
believed fatally, wounded, and left in the hands of the enemy. The reports of brigade
commanders will show further details of these encounters.
Fitz. Lee's brigade being before Snicker's Gap,
did not participate in these operations. By night, part of Longstreet's corps occupied the
mountain pass, and the cavalry was ordered farther back for rest and refreshment, of which
it was sorely in need, leaving ample pickets in front and on either flank.
When the mist had sufficiently cleared away
next morning, it was evident the enemy was retiring, and the cavalry was ordered up
immediately to the front, to follow. The enemy was pursued to within a short distance of
Aldie, and a number captured. Colonel Rosser, Fifth Virginia Cavalry, having been sent
across from Snickersville early to reconnoiter, contributed very materially to the vigor
of this pursuit. Major [John] Eells, of his regiment, a gallant and meritorious officer,
was killed in a charge upon the enemy near Goose Creek Bridge. Our lines were much farther
advanced than before, and Monday, the 22d, was consumed in their re-establishment.
Our loss in these operations was 65 killed, 279
wounded, and 166 missing. I resumed my own position at Rector's Cross-Roads, and, being in
constant communication with the commanding general, had scouts busily engaged watching and
reporting the enemy's movements, and reporting the same to the commanding general. In this
difficult search, the fearless and indefatigable Major Mosby was particularly active and
efficient. His information was always accurate and reliable.
The enemy retained one army corps (Fifth) at
Aldie, and kept his cavalry near enough to make attack upon the latter productive of no
solid benefits, and I began to look for some other point at which to direct an effective
blow. I submitted to the commanding general the plan of leaving a brigade or so in my
present front, and passing through Hopewell or some other gap in Bull Run Mountains,
attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, and cross into
Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac. The commanding general wrote me,
authorizing this move if I deemed it practicable,-and also what instructions should be
given the officer in command of the two brigades left in front of the enemy. He also
notified me that one column should move via Gettysburg and the other via Carlisle, toward
the Susquehanna, and directed me, after crossing, to proceed with all dispatch to join the
right (Early) of the army in Pennsylvania.
Accordingly, three days' rations were prepared,
and, on the night of the 24th, the following brigades, Hampton's, Fitz. Lee's, and W. H.
F. Lee's, rendezvoused secretly near Salem Depot. We had no wagons or vehicles excepting
six pieces of artillery and caissons and ambulances. Robertson's and Jones' brigades,
under command of the former, were left in observation of the enemy on the usual front,
with full instructions as to following up the enemy in case of withdrawal, and rejoining
our main army. Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee's brigade had to march from north of Snicker's Gap to
the place of rendezvous. This brigade was now for the first time for a month under the
command of its noble brigadier, who, writhing under a painful attack of inflammatory
rheumatism, nevertheless kept with his command until now.
At 1 o'clock at night, the brigades with
noiseless march moved out. This precaution was necessary on account of the enemy's having
possession of Bull Run Mountains, which in the daytime commanded a view of every movement
of consequence in that region. Hancock's corps occupied Thoroughfare Gap.Moving to the
right, we passed through Glasscock's Gap without serious difficulty, and marched for Hay
Market. I had previously sent Major Mosby with some picked men through, to gain the
vicinity of Dranesville, find where a crossing was practicable, and bring intelligence to
me near Gum Springs to-day (25th).
As we neared Hay Market, we found that Hancock
s corps was en route through Hay Market for Gum Springs, his infantry well distributed
through Iris trains. I chose a good position, and opened with artillery on his passing
column with effect, scattering men, wagons, and horses in wild confusion; disabled one of
the enemy's caissons, which he abandoned, and compelled him to advance in order of battle
to compel us to desist.
As Hancock had the right of way on my road, I
sent Fitz. Lee's brigade to Gainesville to reconnoiter, and devoted the remainder of the
day to grazing our horses, the only forage procurable in the country. The best of our
information represented the enemy still at Centreville, Union Mills, and Wolf Run Shoals.
I sent a dispatch to General Lee concerning Hancock's movement, and moved back to
Buckland, to deceive the enemy. It rained heavily that night. To carry out my original
design of passing west of Centreville, would have involved so much detention, on account
of the presence of the enemy, that I determined to cross Bull Run lower down, and strike
through Fairfax for the Potomac the next day. The sequel shows this to have been the only
practicable course. We marched through Brentsville to the vicinity of Wolf Run Shoals, and
had to halt again in order to graze our horses, which hard marching without grain was fast
breaking down. We met no enemy to-day (26th).
On the following morning (27th), having
ascertained that on the night previous the enemy had disappeared entirely from Wolf Run
Shoals, a strongly fortified position on the Occoquan, I marched to that point, and thence
directly for Fairfax Station, sending General Fitz. Lee to the right, to cross by Burke's
Station and effect a junction at Fairfax Court-House, or farther on, according to
circumstances. Fairfax Station had been evacuated the previous day, but near this point
General Hampton's advance regiment had a spirited encounter with and chase after a
detachment of Federal cavalry denominated Scott's Nine Hundred, killing, wounding, and
capturing the greater portion, among them several officers; also horses, arms, and
equipments. The First North Carolina Cavalry lost its major in the first onset--Major
[John H.] Whitaker--an officer of distinction and great value to us.
Reaching Fairfax Court-House, a communication
was received from Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee at Annandale. At these two points, there were
evidences of very recent occupation, but the information was conclusive that the enemy had
left this front entirely, the mobilized army having the day previous moved over toward
Leesburg, while the local had retired to the fortifications near Washington. I had not
heard yet from Major Mosby, but the indications favored my successful passage in rear of
the enemy's army. After a halt of a few hours to rest and refresh the command, which
regaled itself on the stores left by the enemy in the place, the march was resumed for
Dranesville, which point was reached late in the afternoon. The camp-fires of Sedgwick's
(Sixth) corps, just west of the town, were still burning, it having left that morning, and
several of his stragglers were caught. General Hampton's brigade was still in advance, and
was ordered to move directly for Rowser's Ford, on the Potomac, Chambliss' brigade being
held at Dranesville till Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee could close up.
As General Hampton approached the river, he
fortunately met a citizen who had just forded the river, who informed us there were no
pickets on the other side, and that the river was fordable, though 2 feet higher than
usual. Hampton's brigade crossed early in the night, but reported to me that it would be
utterly impossible to cross the artillery at that ford. In this the residents were also
very positive, that vehicles could not cross. A ford lower down was examined, and found
quite as impracticable from quicksand, rocks, and rugged banks. I, however, determined not
to give it up without trial, and before 12 o'clock that night, in spite of the
difficulties, to all appearances insuperable, indomitable energy and resolute
determination triumphed; every piece was brought safely over, and the entire command in
bivouac on Maryland soil. In this success the horse artillery displayed the same untiring
zeal in their laborious toil through mud and water which has distinguished its members in
battle.
The canal, which was now the supplying medium
of Hooker's army, soon received our attention. A lock-gate was broken, and steps taken to
intercept boats. At least a dozen were intercepted, and the next morning several loaded
with troops, negroes, and stores were captured by Colonel Wickham, Fourth Virginia
Cavalry, commanding rear guard. I ascertained that Hooker was on the day previous at
Poolesville, and his army in motion for Frederick.
I realized the importance of joining our army
in Pennsylvania, and resumed the march northward early on the 28th. General Hampton was
sent by Darnestown to Rockville, and the other brigades took the direct route to the same
place. General Hampton encountered small parties of the enemy, which, with a number of
wagons and teams, he captured, and reached Rockville in advance of the main body. The
advance guard of W. H. F. Lee's brigade had a running fight with the Second New York
Cavalry, but the speed of their horses deprived us of the usual results in captures. At
Rockville, General Hampton encountered what he believed to be a large force of the enemy,
and, moving up W. H. F. Lee's brigade quickly to his assistance, I found that the enemy
had already disappeared, having retreated toward the Great Falls.
Rockville was speedily taken possession of.
This place is situated on the direct wagon road from Washington City to Hooker's army,
and, consequently, on his route of communication with Washington after crossing the
Potomac. The telegraph line along it was torn down for miles.
Soon after taking possession, a long train of
wagons approached from the direction of Washington, apparently but slightly guarded. As
soon as our presence was known to those in charge, they attempted to turn the wagons, and
at full speed to escape, but the leading brigade (W. H. F. Lee's) was sent in pursuit. The
farthest wagon was within only 3 or 4 miles of Washington City, the train being about 8
miles long. Not one escaped, though many were upset and broken, so as to require their
being burned. More than one hundred and twenty-five best United States model wagons and
splendid teams with gay caparisons were secured and driven off. The mules and harness of
the broken wagons were also secured.
The capture and securing of this train had for
the time scattered the leading brigade. I calculated that before the next brigade could
march this distance and reach the defenses of Washington, it would be after dark; the
troops there would have had time to march to position to meet attack on this road. To
attack at night with cavalry, particularly unless certain of surprise, would have been
extremely hazardous; to wait till morning, would have lost much time from my march to join
General Lee, without the probability of compensating results. I therefore determined,
after getting the wagons under way, to proceed directly north, so as to cut the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad (now becoming the enemy's main war artery) that night. I found myself
now encumbered by about 400 prisoners, many of whom were officers. I paroled nearly all at
Brookeville that night, and the remainder next day at Cooksville. Among the number, were
Major [James C.] Duane and Captain [Nathaniel] Michler, Engineers, U.S. Army.
At Cooksville, our advance encountered and put to flight a small party of the enemy, and
among the prisoners taken there were some who said they belonged to the "Seven
Hundred Loyal Eastern Shoremen."
Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee reached the railroad soon
after daylight, the march having continued all night. The bridge at Sykesville was burned,
and the track torn up at Hood's Mills, where the main body crossed it. Measures were taken
to intercept trains, but trains ran to the vicinity of the obstruction, took the alarm,
and ran back. The various telegraph lines were likewise cut, and communications of the.
enemy with Washington City thus cut off at every point, and Baltimore threatened. We
remained in possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad nearly all day.
The enemy was ascertained to be moving through
Frederick City northward, and it was important for me to reach our column with as little
delay as possible, to acquaint the commanding general with the nature of the enemy s
movements, as well as to place with his column my cavalry force. The head of the column,
following a ridge road, reached Westminster about 5 p.m. At this place, our advance was
obstinately disputed for a short time by a squadron of the First Delaware Cavalry, but
what were not killed were either captured or saved themselves by precipitate flight. In
this brief engagement, 2 officers of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry (Lieuts. Pierre Gibson
and [John W.] Murray) were killed. Gallant and meritorious, they were noble sacrifices to
the cause. The ladies of the place begged to be allowed to superintend their interment,
and, in accordance with their wishes, the bodies of these young heroes were left in their
charge. The fugitives were pursued a long distance on the Baltimore road, and I afterward
heard created a great panic in that city, impressing the authorities with the belief that
we were just at their heels. Here, for the first time since leaving Rector's Cross-Roads,
we obtained a full supply of forage, but the delay and difficulty of procuring it kept
many of the men up all night. Several flags and one piece of artillery without a carriage
were captured here. The latter was spiked and left behind. We encamped for the night a few
miles beyond the town (Fitz. Lee's brigade in advance), halting the head of the column at
Union Mills, midway between Westminster and Littlestown, on the Gettysburg road. It was
ascertained here that night by scouts that the enemy's cavalry had reached Littlestown
during the night, and encamped.
Early next morning (June 30), we resumed the
march direct by a cross route for Hanover, Pa., W. H. F. Lee's brigade in advance, Hampton
in rear of the wagon train, and Fitz. Lee's brigade moving on the left flank, between
Littlestown and our road.
About 10 a.m. the head of the column reached
Hanover, and found a large column of cavalry passing through, going toward the gap of the
mountains which I intended using. The enemy soon discovered our approach, and made a
demonstration toward attacking us, which was promptly met by a gallant charge by
Chambliss' leading regiment, which not only repulsed the enemy, but drove him pell-mell
through the town with half his numbers, capturing his ambulances and a large number of
prisoners, all of which were brought, safely through to our train, but were closely
followed by the enemy s fresh troops. If my command had been well closed now, this cavalry
column, which we had struck near its rear, would have been at our mercy; but, owing to the
great elongation of the column by reason of the 200 wagons and hilly roads, Hampton was a
long way behind, and Lee was not yet heard from on the left.
In retiring with the prisoners and ambulances,
Lieut. Col. W. H. Payne, Fourth Virginia Cavalry, temporarily in command of the Second
North Carolina Cavalry, was taken prisoner, in a gallant attempt to cut off a body of the
enemy by a flank movement on the town.
The delay in getting up re-enforcements enabled
the enemy to regain possession of the town, by no means desirable for us to hold, as it
was in a valley completely commanded by the heights in our possession, which were soon
crowned by our artillery. Our position was impregnable to cavalry even with so small a
force. We cut the enemy's column in twain. General Fitz. Lee in the meantime fell upon the
rear portion, driving it handsomely, and capturing one of Kilpatrick's staff and many
other prisoners.
Our wagon train was now a subject of serious embarrassment, but I thought, by making a
détour to the right by Jefferson, I could save it. I therefore determined to try it,
particularly as I was satisfied, from every accessible source of information, as well as
from the lapse of time, that the Army of Northern Virginia must be near the Susquehanna.
My numerous skirmishers had greatly diminished--almost exhausted--my supply of ammunition.
I had this immense train in an enemy's country, very near a hostile army, and, besides,
about 400 prisoners, which had accumulated since the paroling at Cooksville. I therefore
had the train closed up in park, and Hampton, arriving in the meantime, engaged the enemy
farther to the right, and finally, with his sharpshooters, dislodged the enemy from the
town, the enemy moving toward our left apparently to reunite his broken column, but
pressing us with dismounted men on our left flank. General Fitz. Lee's brigade was put at
the head of the column, and he was instructed to push on with the train through Jefferson
for York, Pa. and communicate as soon as practicable with our forces. Hampton's brigade
brought up the rear.
We were not molested in our march, which, on
account of the very exposed situation of our flank and the enemy's knowledge of it, was
continued during the night. The night's march over a very dark road was one of peculiar
hardship, owing to loss of rest to both man and horse. After a series of exciting combats
and night marches, it was a severe tax to their endurance. Whole regiments slept in the
saddle, their faithful animals keeping the road unguided. In some instances they fell from
their horses, overcome with physical fatigue and sleepiness.
Reaching Dover, Pa., on the morning of July 1,
I was unable to find our forces. The most I could learn was that General Early had marched
his division in the direction of Shippensburg, which the best information I could get
seemed to indicate as the point of concentration of our troops. After as little rest as
was compatible with the exhausted condition of the command, we pushed on for Carlisle,
where we hoped to find a portion of the army. I arrived before that village, by way of
Dillsburg, in the afternoon. Our rations were entirely out. I desired to levy a
contribution on the inhabitants for rations, but was informed before reaching it that it
was held by a considerable force of militia (infantry and artillery), who were concealed
in the buildings, with the view to entrap me upon my entrance into the town. They were
frustrated in their intention, and although very peaceable in external aspect, I soon
found the information I had received was correct. I disliked to subject the town to the
consequences of attack; at the same time it was essential to us to procure rations. I
therefore directed General Lee to send in a flag of truce, demanding unconditional
surrender or bombardment. This was refused. I placed artillery in position commanding the
town, took possession of the main avenues to the place, and repeated the demand. It was
again refused, and I was forced to the alternative of shelling the place.
Although the houses were used by their
sharpshooters while firing on our men, not a building was fired excepting the United
States cavalry barracks, which were burned by my order, the p]ace having resisted my
advance instead of peaceable surrender, as in the case of General Ewell. General Fitz.
Lee's brigade was charged with the duty of investing the place, the remaining brigades
following at considerable intervals from Dover. Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith was in command of
the forces in Carlisle. The only obstacle to the enforcement of my threat was the scarcity
of artillery ammunition.
The whereabouts of our army was still a
mystery; but, during the night, I received a dispatch from General Lee (in answer to one
sent by Major Venable from Dover, on Early's trail), that the army was at Gettysburg, and
had been engaged on this day (July 1) with the enemy's advance. I instantly dispatched to
Hampton to move 10 miles that night on the road to Gettysburg, and gave orders to the
other brigades, with a view to reaching Gettysburg early the next day, and started myself
that night.
My advance reached Gettysburg July 2, just in
time to thwart a move of the enemy's cavalry upon our rear by way of Hunterstown. after a
fierce engagement, in which Hampton's brigade performed gallant service, a series of
charges compelling the enemy to leave the field and abandon his purpose. I took my
position that day on the York and Heidlersburg roads, on the left wing of the Army of
Northern Virginia.
On the morning of July 3,pursuant to
instructions from the commanding general (the ground along our line of battle being
totally impracticable for cavalry operations), I moved forward to a position to the left
of General Ewell's left, and in advance of it, where a commanding ridge completely
controlled a wide plain of cultivated fields stretching toward Hanover, on the left, and
reaching to the base of the mountain spurs, among which the enemy held position. My
command was increased by the addition of Jenkins' brigade, who here in the presence of the
enemy allowed themselves to be supplied with but 10 rounds of ammunition, although armed
with the most approved Enfield musket. I moved this command and W. H. F. Lee's secretly
through the woods to a position, and hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's rear, but
Hampton's and Fitz. Lee's brigades, which had been ordered to follow me, unfortunately
debouched into the open ground, disclosing the movement, and causing a corresponding
movement of a large force of the enemy's cavalry.
Having been informed that Generals Hampton and
Lee were up, I sent for them to come forward, so that I could show them the situation at a
glance from the elevated ground I held, and arrange for further operations. My message was
so long in finding General Hampton that he never reached me, and General Lee remained. as
it was deemed inadvisable at the time the message was delivered for both to leave their
commands.
Before General Hampton had reached where I was,
the enemy had deployed a heavy line of sharpshooters, and were advancing toward our
position, which was very strong. Our artillery had, however, left the crest, which it was
essential for it to occupy on account of being of too short range to compete with the
longer range guns of the enemy, but I sent orders for its return. Jenkins' brigade was
chiefly employed dismounted, and fought with decided effect until the 10 rounds were
expended, and then retreated, under circumstances of difficulty and exposure which
entailed the loss of valuable men.
The left, where Hampton's and Lee's brigades
were, by this time became heavily engaged as dismounted skirmishers. My plan was to employ
the enemy in front with sharpshooters, and move a command of cavalry upon their left flank
from the position lately held by me, but the falling back of Jenkins' men (that officer
was wounded the day previous, before reporting to me, and his brigade was now commanded by
Colonel [M. J.] Ferguson, Sixteenth Virginia Cavalry) caused a like movement of those on
the left, and the enemy, sending forward a squadron or two, were about to cut off and
capture a portion of our dismounted sharpshooters.
To prevent this, I ordered forward the nearest
cavalry regiment (one of W. H. F. Lee's) quickly to charge this force of cavalry. It was
gallantly done, and about the same time a portion of General Fitz. Lee's command charged
on the left, the First Virginia Cavalry being most conspicuous. In these charges, the
impetuosity of those gallant fellows, after two weeks of hard marching and hard fighting
on short rations, was not only extraordinary, but irresistible. The enemy's masses
vanished before them like grain before the scythe, and that regiment elicited the
admiration of every beholder, and eclipsed the many laurels already won by its gallant
veterans. Their impetuosity carried them too far, and the charge being very much
prolonged, their horses, already jaded by hard marching, failed under it. Their movement
was too rapid to be stopped by couriers, and the enemy perceiving it, were turning upon
them with fresh horses. The First North Carolina Cavalry and Jeff. Davis Legion were sent
to their support, and gradually this hand-to-hand fighting involved the greater portion of
the command till the enemy were driven from the field, which was now raked by their
artillery, posted about three-quarters of a mile off, our officers and men behaving with
the greatest heroism throughout. Our own artillery commanding the same ground, no more
hand-to-hand fighting occurred, but the wounded were removed and the prisoners (a large
number) taken to the rear.
The enemy's loss was unmistakably heavy;
numbers not known. Many of his killed and wounded fell into our hands. That brave and
distinguished officer, Brigadier-General Hampton, was seriously wounded twice in this
engagement. Among the killed was Major [W. G.] Conner, a gallant and efficient officer of
the Jeff. Davis Legion. Several officers and many valuable men were killed and wounded
whose names it is not now in my power to furnish, but which, it is hoped, will be
ultimately furnished in the reports of regimental and brigade commanders.
Notwithstanding the favorable results obtained,
I would have preferred a different method of attack, as already indicated; but I soon saw
that entanglement by the force of circumstances narrated was unavoidable, and determined
to make the best fight possible. General Fitz. Lee was always in the right place, and
contributed his usual conspicuous share to the success of the day. Both he and the gallant
First Virginia begged me (after the hot encounter) to allow them to take the enemy's
battery, but I doubted the practicability of the ground for such a purpose.
During this day's operations, I held such a
position as not only to render Ewell's left entirely secure, where the firing of my
command, mistaken for that of the enemy, caused some apprehension, but commanded a view of
the routes leading to the enemy's rear. Had the enemy's main body been dislodged, as was
confidently hoped and expected, I was in precisely the right position to discover it and
improve the opportunity. I watched keenly and anxiously the indications in his rear for
that purpose, while in the attack which I intended (which was forestalled by our troops
being exposed to view), his cavalry would have separated from the main body, and gave
promise of solid results and advantages.
After dark, I directed a withdrawal to the York
road, as our position was so far advanced as to make it hazardous at night, on account of
the proximity of the enemy's infantry.
During the night of July 3, the commanding
general withdrew the main body to the ridges west of Gettysburg, and sent word to me to
that effect, but his messenger missed me. I repaired to his headquarters during the latter
part of the night, and received instructions as to the new line, and sent, in compliance
therewith, a brigade (Fitz. Lee's) to Cashtown, to protect our trains congregated there.
My cavalry and artillery were somewhat jeopardized before I got back to my command by the
enemy having occupied our late ground before my command could be notified of the change.
None, however, were either lost or captured.
During the 4th, which was quite rainy, written
instructions were received from the commanding general as to the order of march back to
the Potomac, to be undertaken at nightfall. In this order two brigades of cavalry (Baker's
and Hampton's were ordered to move, as heretofore stated, by way of Cashtown, guarding
that flank, bringing up the rear on the road, via Greenwood, to Williamsport, which was
the route designated for the main portion of the wagon trains and ambulances, under the
special charge of Brigadier General Imboden, who had a mixed command of artillery,
infantry, and cavalry (his own).
Previous to these instructions, I had, at the
instance of the commanding general, instructed Brigadier-General Robertson, whose two
brigades (his own and Jones') were now on the right, near Fairfield, Pa., that it was
essentially necessary for him to hold the Jack Mountain passes. These included two
prominent roads-the one north and the other south of Jack Mountain, which is a sort of
peak in the Blue Ridge chain.
In the order of march (retrograde), one corps
(Hill's) preceded everything through the mountain; the baggage and prisoners of war
escorted by another corps. Longstreet's occupied the center, and the third (Ewell's)
brought up the rear. The cavalry was disposed of as follows Two brigades on the Cashtown
road, under General Fitz. Lee, and the remainder (Jenkins' and Chambliss'), under my
immediate command, was directed to proceed by way of Emmitsburg, Md., so as to guard the
other flank.
I dispatched Captain [W. W.] Blackford, Corps
of Engineers, to General Robertson, to inform him of my movement, and direct his
co-operation, as Emmitsburg was in his immediate front, and was probably occupied by the
enemy's cavalry. It was dark before I had passed the extreme right of our line, and,
having to pass through very dense woods, taking by-roads, it soon became so dark that it
was impossible to proceed. We were in danger of losing the command as well as the road. It
was raining, also.
We halted for several hours, when, having
received a good guide, and it becoming more light, the march was resumed, and just at dawn
we entered Emmitsburg. We there learned that a large body of the enemy's cavalry (the
citizens said 15,000, which I knew, of course, was exaggerated) had passed through that
point the afternoon previous, going toward Monterey, one of the passes designated in my
instructions to Brigadier-General Robertson.
I halted for a short time to procure some
rations, and, examining my map, I saw that this force could either attempt to force one of
those gaps, or, foiled in that (as I supposed they would be), it would either turn to the
right and bear off toward Fairfield, where it would meet with like repulse from Hill's or
Longstreet's corps, or, turning to the left before reaching Monterey, would strike across
by Eyler's Gap, toward Hagerstown, and thus seriously threaten that portion of our trains
which, under Imboden, would be passing down the Greencastle pike the next day, and
interpose itself between the main body and its baggage. I did not consider that this force
could seriously annoy any other portion of the command under the order of march
prescribed, particularly as it was believed that those gaps would be held by General
Robertson till he could be re-enforced by the main body. I therefore determined to adhere
to my instructions, and proceed by way of Cavetown, by which I might intercept the enemy
should he pass through Eyler's Gap.
In and around Emmitsburg we captured 60 or 70
prisoners of war, and some valuable hospital stores en route from Frederick to the army.
The march was resumed on the road to Frederick
till we reached a small village called Cooperstown, where our route turned short to the
right. Here I halted the column to feed, as the horses were much fatigued and famished.
The column, after an hour's halt, continued through Harbaugh's Valley, by Zion Church, to
pass the Catoctin Mountain. The road separated before debouching from the mountain, one
fork leading to the left by Smithtown, and the other to the right, bearing more toward
Leitersburg.
I divided my command, in order to make the
passage more certain, Colonel Ferguson, commanding Jenkins' brigade, taking the left road,
and Chambliss' brigade, which I accompanied, the other. Before reaching the western
entrance to this pass, I found it held by the enemy, and had to dismount a large portion
of the command, and fight from crag to crag of the mountains to dislodge the enemy,
already posted.
Our passage was finally forced, and, as my
column emerged from the mountains, it received the fire of the enemy's battery, posted to
the left, on the road to Boonsborough. I ascertained, too, about this time by the firing
that the party on the other route had met with resistance, and sent at once to apprise
Colonel Ferguson of our passage, and directed him, if not already through, to withdraw,
and come by the same route I had followed. Our artillery was soon in position, and a few
fires drove the enemy from his position.
I was told by a citizen that the party I had
just attacked was the cavalry of Kilpatrick, who had claimed to have captured several
thousand prisoners and 400 or 500 wagons from our forces near Monterey; but I was further
informed that not more than 40 wagons accompanied them, and other facts I heard led me to
believe the success was far overrated. About this time, Captain [G. M. ] Emack, Maryland
cavalry, with his arm in a sling, came to us, and reported that he had been in the fight
of the night before, and partially confirmed the statement of the citizen, and informed
me, to my surprise, that a large portion of Ewell's corps trains had preceded the army
through the mountains.
It was nearly night, and I felt it of the first
importance to open communication with the main army, particularly as I was led to believe
that a portion of this force might still be hovering on its flanks. I sent a trusty and
intelligent soldier (Private Robert W. Goode, First Virginia Cavalry) to reach the
commanding general by a route across the country, and relate to him what I knew, as well
as what he might discover en route, and moved toward Leitersburg as soon as Colonel
Ferguson came up, who, although his advance had forced the passage of the gap, upon the
receipt of my dispatch turned back and came by the same route I had taken, thus making an
unnecessary circuit of several miles, and not reaching me till after dark.
Having heard from the commanding general at
Leitersburg about daylight (6 o'clock) next morning, and being satisfied that all of
Kilpatrick's force had gone toward Boonsborough, I immediately, notwithstanding the march
of a greater portion of both the preceding nights, set out toward Boonsborough. Jones'
brigade had now arrived by the route from Fairfield. Soon after night, Brigadier-General
Jones, whose capture had been reported by Captain Emack, came from the direction of
Williamsport, whither he had gone with the portion of the train which escaped. The enemy's
movements had separated him from his command, and he had made a very narrow escape. He
informed me of Imboden's arrival at Williamsport.
Having reached Cavetown, I directed General
Jones to proceed on the Boonsborough road a few miles, and thence proceed to Funkstown,
which point I desired him to hold, covering the eastern front of Hagerstown. Chambliss'
brigade proceeded direct from Leitersburg to Hagerstown, and Robertson's took the same
route, both together a very small command.
Diverging from Jones' line of march at
Cavetown, I proceeded with Jenkins' brigade, by way of Chewsville, toward Hagerstown. Upon
arriving at the former place, it was ascertained that the enemy was nearing Hagerstown
with a large force of cavalry from the direction of Boonsborough, and that Colonel
Chambliss needed reenforcements. Jenkins' brigade was pushed forward, and, arriving before
Hagerstown, found the enemy in possession, and made an attack in flank by this road, Jones
coming up farther to the left, and opening with a few shots of artillery. A small body of
infantry, under Brigadier-General Iverson, also held the north edge of the town, aided by
the cavalry of Robertson and Chambliss. Our operations were here much embarrassed by our
great difficulty in preventing this latter force from mistaking us for the enemy, several
shots striking very near our column. I felt sure that the enemy s designs were directed
against Williamsport, where, I was informed by General Jones, our wagons were congregated
in a narrow space at the foot of the hill, near the river, which was too much swollen to
admit their passage to the south bank. I therefore urged on all side the most vigorous
attack to save our trains at Williamsport. Our force was very perceptibly much smaller
than the enemy's, but by bold front and determined attack, with a reliance on that help
which has never failed me, I hoped to raise the siege of Williamsport, if, as I believed,
that was the real object of the enemy's designs. Hagerstown is 6 miles from Williamsport,
the country between being almost entirely cleared, but intersected by innumerable fences
and ditches. The two places are connected by a lane and perfectly straight macadamized
road. The enemy's dismounted skirmishers fought from street to street, and some time
elapsed before the town was entirely clear, the enemy taking the road first toward
Sharpsburg, but afterward turned to the Williamsport road. Just as the town was cleared, I
heard the sound of artillery at Williamsport.
The cavalry, excepting the two brigades with
General Fitz. Lee, were now pretty well concentrated at Hagerstown, and one column, under
Colonel Chambliss, was pushed directly down the road after the enemy, while Robertson's
two regiments and Jenkins' brigade kept to the left of the road, moving in a parallel
direction with Chambliss. A portion of the Stuart Horse Artillery also accompanied the
movement. The first charge was gallantly executed by the leading brigade (Chambliss'), now
numbering only a few hundred men, the Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia Cavalry participating
with marked gallantry. The column on the flank was now hurried up to attack the enemy in
flank, but the obstacles, such as post and rail fences, delayed its progress so long that
the enemy had time to rally along a crest of rocks and fences, from which he opened with
artillery, raking the road.
Jenkins' brigade was ordered to dismount and
deploy over the difficult ground. This was done with marked effect and boldness,
Lieutenant-Colonel Witcher, as usual, distinguishing himself by his courage and conduct.
The enemy, thus dislodged, was closely pressed by the mounted cavalry, but made one effort
at a counter-charge, which was gallantly met and repulsed by Col. James B. Gordon,
commanding a fragment of the Fifth North Carolina Cavalry, that officer exhibiting under
my eye individual prowess deserving special commendation. The repulse was soon after
converted into a rout by Colonel Lomax's regiment (Eleventh Virginia Cavalry), Jones'
brigade, which now took the road, under the gallant leadership of its colonel, with drawn
sabers, and charged down the turnpike under a fearful fire of artillery.
Lieutenant-Colonel Funsten behaved with
conspicuous gallantry in this charge, and Captain [S.] Winthrop, a volunteer aide of
Lieutenant-General Longstreet, also bore himself most gallantly.
The enemy was now very near Williamsport, and this determined and vigorous attack in rear
soon compelled him to raise the siege of that place, and leave in hasty discomfiture by
the Downsville road. His withdrawal was favored by night, which set in just as we reached
the ridge overlooking Williamsport. An important auxiliary to this attack was rendered by
Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee, who reached the vicinity of Williamsport by the Greencastle road
very opportunely, and participated in the attack with his accustomed spirit.
Great credit is due the command for the
fearless and determined manner in which they rushed upon the enemy and compelled him to
loose his hold upon the main portion of the transportation of the army. Without this
attack, it is certain that our trains would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, for,
while some resistance was made by General Imboden, still, the size and nature of his
command, the peculiar conformation of the ground, overlooked by hills and approached by
six plain roads, go to show conclusively that not even a display of Spartan heroism on the
part of his command could have saved those wagons from the torch of the enemy. I
communicated with him after opening the road, by a lieutenant, whom I met but a short
distance from the town. Officers present with General Im-boden during the attack assure me
I am right in the foregoing opinion. I was apprised when about midway that
Lieutenant-General Longstreet had arrived at Hagerstown.
As a part of the operations of this period, I
will here report that about 60 of the wagons belonging to Lee's brigade, while in the
special charge of General Imboden, en route to Williamsport, near Mer-cersburg, were
captured by the enemy. A court of inquiry has been convened to inquire into the
circumstances of this capture. I therefore forbear animadversion on the subject.
My command bivouacked near Hagerstown, and I
took position that night on the road leading from Hagerstown to Boonsborough.
The next day (July 7), I proceeded to
Downsville, establishing there a portion of Wofford's brigade, sent me for the purpose by
General Longstreet, and posted Jenkins' cavalry brigade on that portion of our front in
advance of the infantry. Robertson's brigade, being small, and the enemy being least
threatening from that direction, was assigned to the north front of Hagerstown, connecting
with General Jones, on the right, on the Cavetown road. The Maryland cavalry was ordered
on the National road and toward Greencastle, on a scout.
On the 8th, the cavalry was thrown forward
toward Boonsborough, advancing on the different roads, in order, by a bold demonstration,
to threaten an advance upon the enemy, and thus cover the retrograde of the main body. The
move was successful, the advance under General Jones encountering the enemy on the
Boonsborough road, at Beaver Creek Bridge, from which point to the verge of Boons-borough
an animated fight ensued, principally on foot, the ground being entirely too soft from
recent rains to operate successfully with cavalry. This contest was participated in in a
very handsome manner by the other brigades (Fitz. Lee's, Hampton's, now commanded by
Baker, and W. H. F. Lee's, commanded by Chambliss) and the Stuart Horse Artillery.
Prisoners taken assured us the main cavalry force of the enemy was in our front, which,
notwithstanding their known superiority in numbers and range of fire-arms, was driven
steadily before us, our brave men, nothing daunted or dispirited by the reverses of the
army, maintaining a predominance of pluck over the enemy calculated to excite the pride
and admiration of beholders. Just as we neared the village, Jenkins' brigade, under
Ferguson, moved up on the Williamsport road, driving the enemy on that flank in such a
manner as to cause him to begin his withdrawal from the village to the mountain pass. His
batteries had been driven away from the hill by the Napoleons of McGregor's battery,
which, for close fighting, evinced this day their great superiority over rifled guns of
greater number.
About this time, I was informed that the enemy
was heavily re-enforced, and that our ammunition, by this protracted engagement, was
nearly exhausted; and, despairing of getting possession of the town, which was completely
commanded by artillery in the mountain gap, and believing that, in compelling the enemy to
act upon the defensive (all that day retreating before us) the desired object had been
fully attained, I began to retire toward Funkstown, excepting Jenkins' brigade, which was
ordered to its former position on the Williamsport road. The enemy, observing this from
his mountain perch, tried to profit by it with a vigorous movement on our heels, but was
foiled. As the last regiment was crossing the bridge over Beaver Creek, a squadron of the
enemy more bold than its comrades galloped forward as if to charge. Steadily a portion of
the First North Carolina Cavalry awaited their arrival within striking distance, but,
before reaching their vicinity, the enemy veered off across the fields, when a Blakely gun
of Chew's battery, advantageously posted on a point, marked their movement, and, although
the squadron moved at a gallop, never did sportsman bring down his bird with more unerring
shot than did that Blakely tell upon that squadron. In vain did it turn to the right and
left. Each shot seemed drawn to the flying target with fatal accuracy, until the enemy,
driven by the shots of the Blakely and followed by shouts of derision of our cavalry,
escaped at full speed over the plain. The command moved leisurely to the vicinity of
Funkstown, and bivouacked for the night.
The fight of the 8th administered a quietus to
the enemy on the 9th, and my command kept the position in front of Funkstown assigned to
it the night before.
The left of our main line of battle now rested
just in rear of Funkstown, on the Antietam, and some infantry and artillery were thrown
forward as a support to the cavalry beyond.
The enemy advanced on the 10th on the
Boonsborough road, and our cavalry was engaged dismounted nearly all day. General Jones
was farther to the left, on the Cavetown road, and the infantry was placed in position
covering Funkstown, with dismounted cavalry on each flank. The enemy's advance was
handsomely repulsed, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Witcher's cavalry, on foot, behind a
stone fence immediately on the left of the turnpike, performed a very gallant part,
standing their ground with unflinching tenacity. On the left, a portion of Fitz. Lee's
brigade, under Captain Wooldridge, Fourth Virginia Cavalry, who handled his skirmishers
with great skill and effect, compelled the enemy's infantry to seek cover in a body of
woods at some distance from our lines.
In this day's operations, the infantry before
mentioned participated very creditably, indeed, in the center, and I regret exceedingly
that I have not the means of knowing the regiments and commanders, so as to mention them
with that particularity to which by their gallantry they are entitled; but their conduct
has no doubt been duly chronicled by their commanders, and laid before the commanding
general, a part of which was under his own eye.
Owing to the great ease with which the position
at Funkstown could be flanked on the right, and, by a secret movement at night, the troops
there cut off, it was deemed prudent to withdraw at night to the west side of the
Antietam, which was accordingly done.
July 11 was not characterized by any general
engagement, excepting that General Fitz. Lee, now on the right, toward Downsville, was
compelled to retire upon the main body; and the main body having assumed a shorter line,
with its left resting on the National road, just west of Hagerstown, Chambliss' brigade
was sent to that flank, and General Fitz. Lee's, also. The enemy made no movement on
Jones' front, embracing the Funkstown and Cavetown roads.
On the 12th, firing began early, and the enemy
having advanced on several roads on Hagerstown, our cavalry forces retired without serious
resistance, and massed on the left of the main body, reaching with heavy outposts the
Conococheague, on the National road. The infantry having already had time to intrench
themselves, it was no longer desirable to defer the enemy's attack.
The 13th was spent in reconnoitering on the
left, Rodes' division occupying the extreme left of our infantry, very near Hagerstown, a
little north of the National road. Cavalry pickets were extended beyond the railroad
leading to Chambersburg, and everything put in readiness to resist the enemy's attack. The
situation of our communications south of the Potomac caused the commanding general to
desire more cavalry on that side, and, accordingly, Brigadier-Gen-eral Jones' brigade (one
of whose regiments, Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, had been left in Jefferson) was detached,
and sent to cover our communication with Winchester. The cavalry on the left consisted now
of Fitz. Lee's, W. H. F. Lee's, Baker's, and Robertson's brigades, the latter being a mere
handful.
On the 13th, skirmishing continued at
intervals, but it appeared that the enemy, instead of attacking, was intrenching himself
in our front, and the commanding general determined to cross the Potomac. The night of the
13th was chosen for this move, and the arduous and difficult task of bringing up the rear
was, as usual, assigned to the cavalry. Just before night (which was unusually rainy), the
cavalry was disposed from right to left, to occupy, dismounted, the trenches of the
infantry at dark, Fitz. Lee's brigade holding the line of Longstreet's corps, Baker's of
Hill's corps, and the remainder of Ewell's corps. A pontoon bridge had been constructed at
Falling Waters, some miles below Williamsport, where Longstreet's and Hill's corps were to
cross, and Ewell's corps was to ford the river at Williamsport, in rear of which last,
after daylight, the cavalry was also to cross, excepting that Fitz. Lee's brigade, should
he find the pontoon bridge clear in time, was to cross at the bridge; otherwise to cross
at the ford at Williamsport.
The operation was successfully performed by the
cavalry. General Fitz. Lee, finding the bridge would not be clear in time for his command,
moved after daylight to the ford, sending two squadrons to cross in rear of the infantry
at the bridge. These squadrons, mistaking Longstreet's rear for the rear of the army on
that route, crossed over in rear of it. General Hill's troops being notified that these
squadrons would follow in his rear, were deceived by some of the enemy's cavalry, who
approached very near, in consequence of their belief that they were our cavalry. Although
this unfortunate mistake deprived us of the lamented General Pettigrew, whom they mortally
wounded, they paid the penalty of their temerity by losing most of their number in killed
or wounded, if the accounts of those who witnessed it are to be credited. The cavalry
crossed at the fords without serious molestation, bringing up the rear on that route by 8
a.m. on the 14th.
To Baker's (late Hampton's) brigade was
assigned the duty of picketing the Potomac from Falling Waters to Hedgesville. The other
brigades were moved back toward Leetown, Robertson's being sent to the fords of the
Shenandoah, where he already had a picket, which, under Captain [L. A.] Johnson, of the
North Carolina cavalry, had handsomely repulsed the enemy in their advance on Ashby's Gap,
inflicting severe loss, with great disparity in numbers.
Harper's Ferry was again in possession of the
enemy, and Colonel Harman, Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, had in an engagement with the enemy
gained a decided success, but was himself captured by his horse falling.
Upon my arrival at the Bower that afternoon
(15th), I learned that a large force of the enemy's cavalry was between Shepherdstown and
Leetown, and determined at once to attack him in order to defeat any designs he might have
in the direction of Martinsburg.
I made disposition accordingly, concentrating
cavalry in his front, and early on the 16th moved Fitz. Lee's brigade down the turnpike,
toward Shepherdstown, supported by Chambliss, who, though quite ill, with that commendabIe
spirit which has always distinguished him, remained at the head of his brigade. Jenkins'
brigade was ordered to advance on the road from Martinsburg toward Shepherdstown, so as by
this combination to expose one of the enemy's flanks, while Jones, now near Charlestown,
was notified of the attack, in order that he might co-operate. No positive orders were
sent him, as his precise locality was not known.
These dispositions having been arranged, I was
about to attack when I received a very urgent message from the commanding general to
repair at once to his headquarters. I therefore committed to Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee the
consummation of my plans, and reported at once to the commanding general, whom I found at
Bunker Hill. Returning in the afternoon, I proceeded to the scene of conflict on the
turnpike, and found that General Fitz. Lee had, with his own and Chambliss' brigades,
driven the enemy steadily to within a mile of Shepherdstown, Jenkins' brigade not having
yet appeared on the left. However, it soon after arrived in Fitz. Lee's rear, and moved up
to his support. The ground was not practicable for cavalry, and the main body was
dismounted, and advanced in line of battle. The enemy retired to a strong position behind
stone fences and barricades, near Colonel [A. R.] Boteler's residence, and it being nearly
dark, obstinately maintained his ground at this last point until dark, to cover his
withdrawal.
Preparations were made to renew the attack vigorously next morning, but daybreak revealed
that the enemy had retired toward Harper's Ferry.
The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was
heavy. We had several killed and wounded, and among the latter Col. James H. Drake, First
Virginia Cavalry, was mortally wounded, dying that night (16th), depriving his regiment of
a brave and zealous leader, and his country of one of her most patriotic defenders.
The commanding general was very desirous of my
moving a large portion of my command at once into Loudoun, but the recent rains had so
swollen the Shenandoah that it was impossible to ford it, and cavalry scouting parties had
to swim their horses over.
In the interval of time from July 16 to the
22d, the enemy made a demonstration on Hedgesville, forcing back Baker's brigade.
Desultory skirmishing was kept up on that front for several days with the enemy, while our
infantry was engaged in tearing up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Martinsburg. Parts
of Jones' brigade were also engaged with the enemy in spirited conflicts not herein
referred to, resulting very creditably to our arms, near Fairfield, Pa., and on the
Cavetown road from Hagerstown, the Sixth and Seventh Virginia Cavalry being particularly
distinguished. Accounts of these will be found in the reports of Brigadier-General Jones
and Colonel Baker.
It soon became apparent that the enemy was
moving upon our right flank, availing himself of the swollen condition of the Shenandoah
to interpose his army, by a march along the east side of the Blue Ridge, between our
present position and Richmond. Longstreet's corps having already moved to counteract this
effort, enough cavalry was sent, under Brigadier-General Robertson, for his advance guard
through Front Royal and Chester Gap, while Baker's brigade was ordered to bring up the
rear of Ewell's corps, which was in rear, and Jones' brigade was ordered to picket the
Lower Shenandoah as long as necessary for the safety of that flank, and then follow the
movement of the army. Fitz. Lee's, W. H. F. Lee's, and Jenkins' brigades, by a forced
march from the vicinity of Leetown, through Millwood, endeavored to reach Manassas Gap, so
as to hold it on the flank of the army, but it was already in possession of the enemy, and
the Shenandoah, still high, in order to be crossed without interfering with the march of
the main army, had to be forded below Front Royal.
The cavalry already mentioned, early on the 23d
reached Chester Gap by a by-path, passing on the army's left, and, with great difficulty
and a forced march, that night bivouacked below Gaines' Cross-Roads, holding the Rockford
road and Warrenton turnpike, on which, near Amissville, the enemy had accumulated a large
force of cavalry.
On the 24th, while moving forward to find the
locality of the enemy, firing was heard toward Newby's Cross-Roads, which was afterward
ascertained to be a portion of the enemy's artillery firing on Hill's column, marching on
the Richmond road. Before the cavalry could reach the scene of action, the enemy had been
driven off by the infantry, and on the 25th the march was continued, and the line of the
Rappahannock resumed.
In taking a retrospect of this campaign, it is
necessary, in order to appreciate the value of the services of the cavalry, to correctly
estimate the amount of labor to be performed, the difficulties to be encountered, and the
very extended sphere of operations, mainly in the enemy's country. In the exercise of the
discretion vested in me by the commanding general, it was deemed practicable to move
entirely in the enemy's rear, intercepting his communications with his base (Washington),
and, inflicting damage upon his rear, to rejoin the army in Pennsylvania in time to
participate in its actual conflicts.
The result abundantly confirms my judgment as
to the practicability as well as utility of the move. The main army, I was advised by the
commanding general, would move in two columns for the Susquehanna. Early commanded the
advance of that one of these columns to the eastward, and I was directed to communicate
with him as early as practicable after crossing the Potomac, and place my command on his
right flank. It was expected I would find him in York. The newspapers of the enemy, my
only source of information, chronicled his arrival there and at Wrightsville, on the
Susquehanna, with great particularity. I therefore moved to join him in that vicinity. The
enemy's army was moving in a direction parallel with me. I was apprised of its arrival at
Taneytown when I was near Hanover, Pa.; but believing, from the lapse of time, that our
army was already in York or at Harrisburg, where it could choose its battle-ground with
the enemy, I hastened to place my command with it. It is believed that, had the corps of
Hill and Longstreet moved on instead of halting near Chambersburg, York could have been
the place of concentration instead of Gettysburg.
This move of my command between the enemy's
seat of government and the army charged with its defense involved serious loss to the
enemy in men and matériel (over 1,000 prisoners having been captured), and spread terror
and consternation to the very gates of the capital. The streets were barricaded for
defense, as also was done in Baltimore on the day following. This move drew the enemy's
overweening force of cavalry, from its aggressive attitude toward our flank near
Williamsport and Hagerstown, to the defense of its own communications, now at my mercy.
The entire Sixth Army Corps, in addition, was sent to intercept me at Westminster,
arriving there the morning I left, which in the result prevented its participation in the
first two days' fight at Gettysburg.
Our trains in transit were thus not only
secured, but it was done in a way that at the same time seriously injured the enemy.
General Meade also detached 4,000 troops, under General French, to escort public property
to Washington from Frederick, a step which certainly would have been unnecessary but for
my presence in his rear, thus weakening his army to that extent. In fact, although in his
own country, he had to make large detachments to protect his rear and baggage. General
Meade also complains that his movements were delayed by the detention of his cavalry in
his rear. He might truthfully have added, by the movement in his rear of a large force of
Confederate cavalry, capturing his trains and cutting all his communications with
Washington.
It is not to be supposed such delay in his
operations could have been so effectually caused by any other disposition of the cavalry.
Moreover, considering York as the point of junction, as I had every reason to believe it
would be, the route I took was quite as direct and more expeditious than the alternate one
proposed, and there is reason to believe on that route that my command would have been
divided up in the different gaps of South Mountain covering our flank, while the enemy, by
concentration upon any one, could have greatly endangered our baggage and ordnance trains
without exposing his own.
It was thought by many that my command could have rendered more service had it been in
advance of the army the first day at Gettysburg, and the commanding general complains of a
want of cavalry on the occasion; but it must be remembered that the cavalry (Jenkins'
brigade) specially selected for advance guard to the army by the commanding general on
account of its geographical location at the time, was available for this purpose, and had
two batteries of horse artillery serving with it. If therefore, the peculiar functions of
cavalry with the army were not satisfactorily performed in the absence of my command, it
should rather be attributed to the fact that Jenkins' brigade was not as efficient as it
ought to have been, and as its numbers (3,800) on leaving Virginia warranted us in
expecting. Even at that time, by its reduction incident to campaign, it numbered far more
than the cavalry which successfully covered Jackson's flank movement at Chancellorsville,
turned back Stoneman from the James, and drove 3,500 cavalry under Averell across the
Rappahannock. Properly handled, such a command should have done everything requisite, and
left nothing to detract by the remotest implication from the brilliant exploits of their
comrades, achieved under circumstances of great hardship and danger.
Arriving at York, I found that General Early
had gone, and it is to be regretted that this officer failed to take any measures by
leaving an intelligent scout to watch for my coming or a patrol to meet me, to acquaint me
with his destination. He had reason to expect me, and had been directed to look out for
me. He heard my guns at Hanover, and correctly conjectured whose they were, but left me no
clew to his destination on leaving York, which would have saved me a long and tedious
march to Carlisle and thence back to Gettysburg. I was informed by citizens that he was
going to Shippensburg.
I still believed that most of our army was
before Harrisburg, and justly regarded a march to Carlisle as the most likely to place me
in communication with the main army. Besides, as a place for rationing my command, now
entirely out, I believed it desirable. The cavalry suffered much in this march, day and
night, from loss of sleep, and the horses from fatigue, and, while in Fairfax, for want of
forage, not even grass being attainable.
In Fauquier, the rough character of the roads
and lack of facilities for shoeing, added to the casualties of every day's battle and
constant wear and tear of man and horse, reduced the command very much in numbers. In this
way some regiments were reduced to less than 100 men; yet, when my command arrived at
Gettysburg, from the accessions which it received from the weak horses left to follow the
command, it took its place in line of battle with a stoutness of heart and firmness of
tread impressing one with the confidence of victory which was astounding, considering the
hardness of the march lately endured.
With an aggregate loss of about 2,200 killed,
wounded, and missing, including the battle of Fleetwood, June 9, we inflicted a loss on
the enemy's cavalry confessedly near 5,000.
Some of the reports of subordinate commanders
are herewith forwarded; others will follow; and it is hoped they will do justice to that
individual prowess for which Confederate soldiery is most noted, and which the limits of
personal observation and this report deprive me of the power of doing.
Appended will be found a statement of
casualties and a map; also a list of non-commissioned officers and privates whose conduct
as bearers of dispatches and otherwise entitle them to favorable mention.
The bravery, heroism, fortitude, and devotion of my command are commended to the special
attention of the commanding general, and are worthy the gratitude of their countrymen.
I desire to mention among the
brigadier-generals one whose enlarged comprehensions of the functions of cavalry, whose
diligent attention to the preservation of its efficiency, and intelligent appreciation and
faithful performance of the duties confided to him, point to as one of the first cavalry
leaders on the continent, and richly entitle him to promotion. I allude to Brig. Gen.
Fitz. Lee.
I cannot here particularize the conduct of the
many officers who deserve special mention of less rank than brigadier-general without
extending my remarks more than would be proper. To my staff collectively, however, I feel
at liberty to express thus officially my grateful appreciation of the zeal, fidelity, and
ability with which they discharged their several duties, and labored to promote the
success of the command.
Maj. Heros von Borcke, assistant adjutant and
inspector general (that gallant officer from Prussia, who so early espoused our cause),
was disabled in Fauquier, so as to deprive me of his valuable services on the expedition,
but it is hoped that the command will not long be deprived of his inspiring presence on
the field.
Maj. Henry B. McClellan, my adjutant-general,
was constantly at my side, and with his intelligence, ready pen, and quick comprehension,
greatly facilitated the discharge of my duties.
The untiring energy, force of character, and
devotion to duty of Maj. A. R. Venable, my inspector-general, and Lieut. G. M. Ryals, C.
S. Army, provost-marshal, deserve my special gratitude and praise.
The same qualities, united to a thorough
knowledge of much of the country, are ascribable to Capt. B. S. White, C. S. Army, who,
though still suffering from a severe wound received at Fleetwood, accompanied the command,
and his services proclaim him an officer of merit and distinction.
Chief Surgeon Eliason; Captain Blackford,
engineer; Captain [John Esten] Cooke, ordnance officer; Lieutenant [Chiswell] Dab-ney,
aide-de-camp; Asst. Engineer F. S. Robertson; Cadet [W. Q.] Hullihen. C. S. Army, and
Lieut. H. Hagan, Virginia Provisional Army, all performed their duties with commendable
zeal and credit.
Major [Norman R.] Fitzhugh, chief, and Capt. J.
M. Hanger, assistant quartermaster, and Maj. W. J. Johnson, chief commissary, discharged
their arduous duties in their usual highly creditable manner.
First Lieut. R. B. Kennon, Provisional Army
Confederate States, temporarily attached, on two different occasions was intrusted with
duties attended with great peril, which he performed in a highly successful and
satisfactory manner--once in testing experimentally at, night an unknown ford on the
Potomac, and again in bearing a dispatch to the commanding general from Emmitsburg.
Grateful to the Giver of all good for the
attainment of such results with such small comparative losses,

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General.