With the growth of Gulen schools worldwide. We had requests from around the world to start a second blog on the Gulen Turkish Schools worldwide. From Mexico to Iraq, and Africa to Afghanistan we will post the news stories and as usual amuse you at the same time. To contrast and compare we invite you to http://www.gulencharterschoolsUSA.blogspot.com http://www.charterschoolwatchdog.com http://www.charterschoolscandals.blogspot.com

Gulen Schools Worldwide

Restore the Ottoman Caliphate. Disclaimer: if some videos are down this is the result of Gulen censorship which filed a fake copyright infringement to UTUBE.

Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Parents are being informed of a plan to make The Warriner
School and two primaries an academy, sponsored by a Turkish-backed
organisation.

The primary schools are Sibford and Hornton. Parents have
been sent letters by Warriner head teacher Dr Annabel Kay and chair of
governors Mandy Morris extolling the virtues of the plan and an open meeting
was held to answer questions.

The organisations involved, BAU Foundation and Mentora
Academies Trust, are new and were only accepted and registered with the
Department for Education (DfE) in August.

If the schools leave Oxfordshire County Council – the
local education authority (LEA) – they will be funded centrally. It is not
known how much the allowance will be but the Mentora Academies Trust will give
the academy a ‘token’ £150,000 a year and it is understood the academy would be
better off.

Dr Kay, an unpaid director of the BAU Foundation, said:
“This is an exciting opportunity to access national best
practice to support all our schools in providing the very best outcomes for all
our children.

“The directors are a group of highly-skilled people who
want to work with us to be the very best we can.”

Academies organise and pay for their own management and
administration with input from their sponsor and can reorganise pay scales and
conditions to suit their priorities.

The Turkish national flag and a poster of Atatürk are
seen hanging on a school building on the first day of school on September 16,
2013. (Ozan Kose/AFP/Getty Images)

At the NATO headquarters in Brussels, a Turkish diplomat greeted a passing
delegation in his mother tongue. “They are Albanian diplomats. They are the F
type,” he told me. By “F type,” he meant that they were graduates of the
schools in Albania run by followers of Fethullah Gülen, Turkey’s most
influential cleric.

Many Gülen-affiliated schools were established in the post-Cold War period,
particularly in the Balkans and Central Asia, and later in Africa. At home, the
Turkish secular system has long been suspicious of the movement’s religiosity,
and has always kept a close eye on the Gülenists.

Nervous about the growing strength of political Islam, Turkey’s fiercely
secular military-judicial elites embarked on a massive purge of the Gülenists
following the military coup of 1997, which unseated the Turkish Republic’s
first Islamist-led government. Gülen, who took refuge in the United States, was
tried in absentia on charges of seeking to overthrow Turkey’s secular
order.

But while Gülenists and their schools outlived the secularist grip on power,
the movement is again coming under pressure, this time from Erdoğan’s
conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. Today, some of the
educational institutions run by Gülen’s followers are facing closure by the
very Islamist government the movement has long supported.

The Gülen movement contributed to the consolidation of AKP governance as the
two joined hands to eliminate a common foe: Turkey’s Kemalist, staunchly
secularist military-judicial tutelage system. While the AKP government turned a
blind eye to the growing dominance of Gülenists in key institutions, the
movement helped the AKP eliminate their enemies. Gülenist institutions, such as
their media outlets, supported the controversial Ergenekon case that landed
hundreds of military officials and journalists perceived to be supporting the
old “Kemalist” order in jail, having been convicted of plotting to topple the
AKP government.

While the weakening of the old actors suited the interests of Erdoğan’s
party, the Gülenists’ perceived abuse of power and infiltration of the
judiciary and police started to alarm the AKP. Many trace the beginning of the
falling-out to the government’s move to strengthen the National Intelligence
Agency (MIT) against the police department. Erdoğan appointed one of his
closest aids, Hakan Fidan, to head the MIT in 2010.

The power struggle was laid bare for the first time when a court summoned
Fidan for questioning in early 2012 over talks with the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK). Many in Turkey felt that the Gülen movement was targeting
Erdoğan and displaying its discontent with the government’s policy toward the
Kurdish issue.

As the main foe had been eliminated with the military under civilian control
and their former civilian supporters discredited, “the partnership is over,”
wrote journalist Ahmet Hakan.

The struggle has now entered a new phase after the AKP government decided to
target the Gülenists’power base, the so-called prep schools that provide
private courses to high school students to help them pass their university
exams. They not only generate financial resources, but also serve as a
recruiting ground for new followers.

Speculation abounds as to why Erdoğan has gone for this potentially risky
move against the Gülenists, especially ahead of local and general elections
that will take place in 2014 and 2015 respectively.

Showing increasing signs of authoritarianism, Erdoğan no longer has an
appetite for sharing his power, let alone allowing any other power center to
interfere with his way of governing.

Although it is a large network that controls major business, trade and
publishing activities, the lack of transparency and the loose organizational
structure of the Gülen movement make it hard to assess its influence on Turkish
society. But Erdoğan must have calculated that the movement’s clout is smaller
than what is being projected by Gülenist media outlets.

In his gamble, Erdoğan is relying on his own support base and the extremely
low probability of the Gülen movement’s supporters turning to other political
parties, like the Republican People’s Party or the Nationalist Movement Party,
which they see as the remnants of the old Kemalist system.

The local elections in March next year will give an indication of where the
struggle will lead. Some believe that there will be a temporary ceasefire until
after the local elections and that the contention will flare up with the
presidential elections, which are scheduled to take place in the summer.

Since Erdoğan is expected to run for the presidency, the Gülen movement
might also want to show its strength by boycotting the local elections. A
significant loss of votes for the AKP in the local elections might force the
prime minister to mend fences with the Gülenists if he wants to secure the
presidency.

All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The
Majalla magazine.
About the writer, Barcin Yinanc

Barçın
Yinanç started her career in journalism in 1990 at Milliyet
Daily, one of Turkey's major newspapers. She worked as a diplomatic
reporter covering Turkish foreign policy issues, Turkey–EU relations,
transatlantic ties and regional developments from the Middle East to the
Caucasus. In 2001, she became a television reporter for CNN Türk, later
becoming a program editor for the same channel. She is currently a columnist
for the English-language newspaper Hürriyet Daily News.
She lives in Istanbul.

Since its election in 2002, the
ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), under the leadership of
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has transformed Turkey. The reforms
initiated by this conservative government with Islamic roots have amounted to a
passive revolution—they have profoundly altered Turkish society, modernized its
institutions, and strengthened its economy, which is now the sixteenth-largest
in the world in terms of GDP.

Yet it would be a mistake to
attribute the many successes that have enhanced Turkey’s role as a major
regional and international player to AKP leadership alone. Erdoğan’s government
has enjoyed support from a number of political organizations as well as from
influential religious and social forces within Turkey. The most invaluable, but
also the hardest to assess, is a movement that plays a fundamental role in
Turkey’s social and religious life: the Gülen
movement of Fethullah Gülen, referred to by the terms cemaat or hizmet.

The AKP and the Gülen movement
established an alliance in 2002 based on a common desire to push back the
central role of the military in the country and create a new, more
conservative, and more Muslim Turkey. Each brought different skills to the
task—Erdoğan and his AKP colleagues were experienced in political activism and
electoral politics, while the Gülen movement used education and social activism
to promote its objectives. This alliance was not without disagreements, but
until recently common interests outweighed differences.

During the past few months, however,
tensions have deepened between Erdoğan and the Gülenists in the realms of both
domestic and foreign policy, causing speculation that the alliance is headed
for a fundamental break. There can be no doubt that rifts have emerged over a
variety of issues, from the rising power of the Gülen movement to the
increasingly authoritarian actions of the prime minister. But talk of a
complete break may well be premature.

The
Gülen Movement

Fethullah Gülen emerged as a
religious authority in Turkey in the 1970s, and little by little he became the
spiritual leader of a vast community that now boasts an estimated 3 million
sympathizers. Gülen, who moved to the United States in 1999, encourages his
disciples to become modern, moderate Muslims. An adherent of free markets, he
champions the Islamic faith and the spirit of capitalism. He is also a
nationalist, seeking to boost Turkey’s influence and prestige abroad.

Gülen relies heavily on education to
transmit his ideas, and he has formed a network of hundreds
of schools and businesses worldwide. This
network is active on every continent, including in the United States, where
his sympathizers run approximately 130 charter schools, mainly
in Texas.

He focuses his efforts on educating
new generations and promoting the emergence of elites who are simultaneously
pious, modern, patriotic, committed to globalization, and comfortable with
economic success. Like the Jesuits and other missionaries who trained Turkey’s
republican, Kemalist elites to value secularism and follow a Western path
through the schools they founded at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Gülen
aspires to use education to help forge new generation of Anatolian,
conservative elites (or counterelites) that might play a key role in creating a
modern, more openly Islamic Turkey.

For this reason, Gülenists have
always given great importance to the training of elites. As far back as 1998, a
study on relations between Turkey and the Turkic republics of Central Asia,
where Gülen’s schools represented the best of Turkish policy in the region,
showed that Central
Asian students who were trained at Turkish police academies returned to
Central Asia very familiar with Gülen’s religious and social ideas.

After emerging from Gülen’s schools,
many of these elites have assumed key positions within the Turkish
administration. Gülen’s disciples are influential in key institutional
bureaucracies and the media. Many hold important positions in the state apparatus,
the judiciary, the educational system, and key sectors of the Turkish economy.
While the movement’s representatives do not deny the presence of sympathizers
within state structures, they insist that this is not the result of any
strategy to infiltrate the state apparatus and instead point to the fact that
these educated individuals have reached high ranks in the civil service thanks
to their work ethic and perseverance.

Political
Influence

Indeed, the Gülen movement is quick
to emphasize that it is essentially religious and social, not political. In
practice, however, Gülen’s community is interested in politics. But it must
refrain from coming across as partisan, which could divide its members, many of
whom are attracted to Gülen’s religious discourse rather than to his ideas and
political initiatives.

Still, over time the presence of
Gülen’s disciples in the state apparatus has given the movement a significant
amount of political influence, a development that may have contributed to the
AKP’s desire to form an alliance. After coming to power, the AKP offered
Gülen’s community its political and, especially, its symbolic backing, publicly
supporting his educational initiatives in Turkey and abroad. In exchange, the
AKP benefited from the social connectedness of Gülen’s movement and from the
support of the media outlets with which the movement enjoys a close
relationship.

And the alliance was based on more
than just pragmatic concerns. The AKP and the Gülen movement also share the
same social base—the rising Anatolian middle classes, which are morally
conservative, economically market-oriented, and open to globalization. In
addition, the religious conservatism of the AKP and the Gülen movement is
directed against a common enemy: the Turkish army and the bureaucracy, which
are dominated by the Kemalist intelligentsia. This has created an unwritten
pact between the two groups, bolstering their complementarity.

Gülenists have been
uncharacteristically active in the public debate on a new Turkish constitution,
advocating for a political system that is more parliamentarian than
presidential. The movement has also organized conferences and discussions in
Turkey and abroad through its prestigious Abant Platform, which aims to
strengthen democracy through dialogue.

Growing
Tensions

For nearly ten years, the alliance
between the AKP and the Gülen movement—natural and spontaneous, for the most
part—has functioned well, but it is now showing increasing fragility,
exacerbated by changes in the conditions and the sociopolitical context that
initially gave rise to it. Indeed, the raison d’être for this alliance—the
vital need for both groups to protect themselves against the Kemalist
apparatus, embodied in particular by the army—is gradually disappearing. With
support from the Gülenists, the ruling AKP has considerably reduced the role
and power of the army, which no longer enjoys the political prerogatives that
made it even recently the true power in the country. A host of other factors
have also contributed to growing tensions, and the diametrically opposed
temperaments of the two leaders—Erdoğan is impetuous and hot-tempered, and
Gülen is prophetically calm—do not facilitate dialogue.

The first rift between the AKP and
the Gülen movement was in the foreign policy arena. As prime minister, Erdoğan
has cooled relations between Turkey and Israel for political, strategic, and
ideological reasons. A crisis broke out between the two countries in May 2010
when a Turkish relief organization attempted to send a flotilla of humanitarian
aid to Gaza in defiance of the Israeli government’s blockade of the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli navy boarded several ships of the flotilla, including the Turkish
MV Mavi Marmara, and faced resistance from the activists aboard. Nine
activists, including eight Turkish nationals, were killed.

Gülen publicly disapproved of the
Turkish NGO’s initiative to break the Israeli blockade. He criticized
the Turkish government for supporting it and distanced himself from the
prime minister’s anti-Israel rhetoric. Indeed, Gülen’s community has always
refrained from strongly criticizing Israel, in part because doing so would run
counter to the ecumenical, interreligious discourse that has contributed to the
movement’s global success. This stance also reflects the fact that the Gülen
movement has a strong presence in the United States, where it enjoys backing
from many friends of Israel, and this powerful American support reinforces its influence.

Gülen’s disapproval may also reflect
the fact that the NGO that organized the flotilla, the Foundation for Human
Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief, was close to the AKP and to some
extent in competition with the Gülen movement’s own activities in the social
sector.

On the domestic front, the two
organizations have begun to clash with more frequency. The Turkish media report
that the AKP government is increasingly annoyed and concerned that its
decisionmaking power and sovereignty are being challenged by the growing
influence of Gülen’s community on all government structures as well as on the
police, judiciary, and public education system. But unlike the secular
opposition, which responds vehemently to what the media call the infiltration
of state structures by Gülen’s disciples, the AKP has reacted with restraint to
avoid publicizing the emerging rivalry at the heart of the state.

Wednesday, November 6, 2013

NB: See the updates below, this gets much worse. This started out as a
relatively routine post on Islamist infiltration of public institutions until a
bit more digging uncovered just how insidious the rot is. Toronto Police
Services Chief Bill Blair sits on the advisory board of the Gulen Movement's
Intercultural Dialogue Institute. The Founder of the Gulen Movement Fethullah
Gülen is a rabid anti-Semite. The Ontario Government has gifted 500K of your
money to help build this anti-semitic organization's Ottawa headquarters and our
Minister of Citizenship & Immigration is happy to break bread with them. Our
political class is comprised of useful idiots.***

The Gulen movement has among it's primary goals the
Islamization of Turkey and the Turkish Islamization of the Muslim diaspora :
"M. Hakan Yavuz, a Turkish professor at the University of Utah and astute
observer of the Gülen movement, states that "its main goal has been the
Islamization of Turkish society." Bayram Balci, another Turkish scholar who has
studied the Gülen schools, said, "Fethullah's aim is the Islamization of Turkish
nationality and the Turkification of Islam in foreign countries."Much
more prominent in the US, the Gulen Movement has come under fire for its system
of charter schools which have received federal funding to establish what are
essentially Islamic madrassas: "Americans may not realize it yet, but
Turkey’s regression from a secular democracy into an Islamic state may be based
on an educational movement that has also taken root in America. Imam Fethullah
Gülen and his Gülen Movement (GM) have had enormous
influence in setting the increasingly Islamist agenda of Turkey’s ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP). Much of this is due to GM’s vast empire of media
entities, financial institutions, banks and business organizations."

More on the Gulen Movement:Protesters want
Turkish Islamic cleric ousted - "The protesters repeated earlier
accusations against Gülen, arguing that he is connected to the government now
leading Turkey and is seeking to Islamicize the country. Speakers also discussed
charter schools affiliated with the movement across the U.S. and said Gülen is
using American tax money to spread his message.

Umit Dikkaya came from
New York City and joined friends. She wore a shirt proclaiming that she is proud
to be from Turkey. “We’re here to expose the reality about this Gülen movement,”
she
said."

"Dani Rodrik and Pınar Doğan, two Harvard-based scholars, have uncovered
some of Gülen’s writings
on Jews which should give pause for thought about where the shadowy preacher
truly stands. From their “Balyoz Davası ve Gerçekler” (“Sledgehammer Case and
Facts”) blog:

Even though they have lived in exile here and there and have
led an almost nomadic existence, Jews have been able to maintain their racial
characteristics with almost no loss. Moreover, the Jewish tribe is very
intelligent. This intelligent tribe has put forth many things throughout history
in the name of science and thought. But these have always been offered in the
form of poisoned honey and have been presented to the world as such. For
instance, Karl Marx is a Jew; the communism he developed looks like a good
alternative to capitalism at first sight, but in essence it is a deathly poison
mixed in honey… Jews will maintain their existence until the apocalypse. And
shortly before the apocalypse, their mission of acting as the coil spring for
humanity’s progress will come to an end, and they will prepare their end with
their own hands.

Their incurable enmity to Islam and Muslims
aside, these people, which look with scorn upon even their own prophets and
killed many among them, will finally end up in the position of Nazis and will
look for a place to hide in the four corners of the earth. Nevertheless, since
dwelling on the true causes and motives related to this topic will both oppose
the business of truth and result in raising undue passions, we shall let this
pass for the moment. Yes, until Islam comes to be represented to the desired
extent, it seems like luck will favor the Jews for
some time still.

Sadly Toronto Police Services Chief Bill
Blair sits on the Advisory Board of the Gulen Movement's Toronto
Branch, the Intercultural Dialogue Institute as do many other
local Grandees. For the record here's the Gulen Movement's Canadian web
site listing
the offices of the Intercultural Dialogue Institute across Canada. This
proves, once again, that our political class are know nothing useful idiots of
the Islamists.

As always our politicians are quick to make Kissy Face
with Islamists: Iftar with Hon. Chris Alexander, Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration

Unbelievable: The Ontario Trillium
Foundation contributed $500,000.00 of your tax dollars to the construction of
the Gulen Movement's Ottawa Offices!

The Intercultural Dialogue
Institute building will be a reality by July 2013. The Institute will be a
centre to foster cultural understanding and dialogue amongst ethnic groups by
offering educational, social, and youth programs to people from diverse
communities. It will provide essential services for newcomers to settle in
Canadian society and move into the workforce.

The project will cost about
three million dollars. Thanks to the Ontario Trillium Foundation for their
contribution of $500,000 as the Community
Capital Fund.

Somalilandsun
- At the star of the month the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was the target
of a suicide car-bombing. A Turkish policeman lost his life in the attack and
three others were wounded. The extremist movement al-Shabaab (The Youth), an
off-shoot of al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the attack.

The
attack raised a number of questions about why the Turks had been targeted.
For several years now, Ankara has played a very important role in attempts to
alleviate the human tragedy in Somalia caused by the civil war and drought.
So what could have enraged the assailants? What is the message they were
trying to send to Turkish decision-makers?

1.
Attacks in Somalia and the Turks.

An
examination of the security record in Somalia over the past year and a half
reveals that this is not the first attack targeting Turks. The recent report
of the UN Secretary-General's office, S/2013/326 issued on 13 May 2013 shows
that one of the Turkish aid convoys was attacked by a vehicle driven by a
suicide bomber. In October of last year, Mustafa Haşimi, head of Africa
operations in TIKA (the Turkish International Aid Agency), was attacked by
armed militias in central Somalia near the town of Galkayo and slightly
wounded. According to Somali media, there had been fierce clashes between the
militia and units attached to the Puntland police escorting the TIKA
official. During the clashes one of the militants was killed and three others
were wounded. Earlier still, in March 2012, Muhtar Abu Zubayir, the leader of
the al-Shabaab movement attacked the Turkish state in a recorded message he
sent out via a radio station, accusing Ankara of being the gateway through
which Western colonialism enters Somalia. Sheikh Mahmud Ragi (Ali Tayri), the
official spokesman for al-Shabaab threatened to carry out more attacks on
Turkish diplomats.

These
incidents are evidence that Turkey's Somalia policy has now entered a new
stage, and that the turmoil inside the country and its repercussions abroad
will have adverse consequences on Turkey's work in the country. Ever since
the Somali state went bankrupt at the start of the 1990s it has experienced a
series of complex security challenges. Security, political, tribal, clan, and
religious issues are entangled with one another, and a steady rise in foreign
involvement has further complicated the picture.

Bearing
this complexity in mind enables us to better understand the remarks of
Mohammed Mirsel Sheikh, Somalia's ambassador to Turkey, to the Anatolia
Agency in Ankara earlier this month. The Somali ambassador alluded to the
confused state of affairs in his country when heremarked that "the
machinery of the state is weak in Somalia, including its security
apparatus." The ambassador continued, "the fact that al-Shahaab
al-Mujahidin has claimed responsibility for the attack on the Turkish embassy
in Mogadishu is not by itself sufficient. It is essential that we work
together with the Turkish government to identify those responsible for the
attack."

2.
The Turkish-Somali Military Agreement: A Turning Point?

The
attacks on Turks appear to have started early in 2012. The attacks have not
been continuous but appear to be occurring at intervals and, as such, are
reminiscent of the attacks on the African forces in Somalia. In addition to
the strategic aspect of Somalia's relations with Turkey, it's important to
remember that after the war with Kenya and before the recent attack on the
Turkish Embassy, al-Shahaab had itself been subject to attacks in the areas
of southern Somalia that it controlled. [1]During al-Shabaab's war with
Kenya, the Somali government had also been involved, despite an initial
delay. In order to strengthen the combat capabilities of the weak Somali
government forces, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a military training agreement
on 13 April of last year. It included training programs, exchanges, visits,
and discussions between the Turkish and Somali armies. There's little doubt
that the al-Shabaab movement blames its defeats (particularly the loss of
Kismayo Harbour in September 2012) on the foreign powers which had fought
directly against it and those who were indirectly involved by training Somali
government forces. Turkey falls into this latter category.

The
war waged against al-Shahaab by Kenya, Africa, and the Somali government
forces came onto the international agenda at the same time as the Arab
Spring. Libya's former leader, Muammar Gaddafi devoted a lot of effort in his
final years to playing a key role in Somalia and channelling weapons to the
various factions and groups there. Eritrea has also been accused of arming
various Somali groups, among them al-Shabaab, though it has persistently
denied these accusations. Nevertheless, Eritrea's president Isaias Afewerki lost
his biggest ally when Gaddafi was overthrown and now finds himself facing a
much bigger challenge.

The
clashes taking place in the Middle East have been strikingly reflected in the
Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. [2] Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and
Israel all regard this region asimportant to their national security. There
have been a lot of reports published recently which mention a gradual
increase in Iran's presence in the area, in parallel with the crisis in Yemen
and escalating Western opposition to Teheran. Indeed, Iran has been accused
many times of supplying weaponry to al-Shabaab by sea. Leaving aside the
veracity of the accusations, and regardless of whether the Somali government
currentlyappears more stable than it did in previous years, Somalia is a
prime candidate for an arena where increasing tensions from regional and
international conflicts will be expressed.

3.
Oil? Now What?

Somalia
has recently witnessed a number of important developments with economic and
strategic consequences. From the start of last year, there have been
increasing signs that international petroleum and natural gas companies have
renewed their interests in Somalia. Reports indicate that Somalia has rich
reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and uranium. If this is the case, Somalia
could become one of the world's largest energy producers. However these
developments have led American, Italian, and British companies to compete and
jockey for position, much like they did in the 1990s. There are those who
argue that this competition was responsible for the failure of
"OperationHope", the joint U.S.-UN intervention in Somalia of the
early 1990s. There are accusations that Italy had supported Muhammed Farah
Aidid, the clan leader who was the main enemy of the American military. As
Somalia's former colonial master, Rome argues that Washington knew nothing
about the social fabric and tribal structure of Somalia, claiming that this
was the cause of the mission's failure. More recently, in October 2012, the
government of Somaliland (the territory which unilaterally proclaimed its
independence from Somalia in the early 1990s) signed an agreement with
General Energy. Turkey has since also joined the line of investors interested
in Somalia.

There
are other questions which could be asked about the details mentioned above.
Is the Turkish government aware of all these complications in Somalia? Does
it have the capability to deal with increasing attacks on Turkish targets and
interests in the country? In Turkish role, was it only targeted at the need
for humanitarian assistance- maybe it was done in way that it worked for a
political stability that helped the interests of oil companies and
traditional powers be in Somalia or Horn of Africa-? It appears that Turkish
decision-makers are feeling the need to review their regional policy, partly
with regard to checking the degree of acceptance for their roles in Somalia
and partly to further their understanding of tribal and political relations
in the country and their impact upon its domestic and foreign policies. The
military forces now being trained for the benefit of the Somali state could
quickly turn into an anti-government force if political and tribal interests
prevailed over loyalty to the state. They could even also turn against the
foreign country training them. What applies to the Somali government is
equally applicable to al-Shabaab: all these armed groups are either being
organized within the government or splitting off from it—depending on their
interests and their tribal links. This fact creates potential internal and
regional weaknesses which reflect the fluctuations already mentioned.
Therefore, Turkish decision-makers determining Somalia policy should take
these weaknesses into consideration.

From the Sabaha region,
which overlooks Sanaa from the west and constitutes a vital outlet to the port
of Al-Hudaydah on the Red Sea, the Ottoman (Turkish) armies invaded Sanaa twice
to tighten their grip on it — in 1538 and again in 1849. Perhaps it was there
that the commanders of both armies paused to take a first look at a national
capital that they were about to turn into merely another capital for a new
Ottoman vilayet (administrative division).

About This Article

Summary :

Turkish
influence in Yemen, which has continued since Ottoman times, has proven to be
a divisive topic among the Yemeni public.

Today, in that same
region, a new tall building stands alone on the eastern side of Mount Asser,
with a huge sign on which is written “International Turkish School of Sanaa.”

This school stands
witness to the long history of Yemeni-Turkish relations, which is perhaps the
longest-standing between any two countries in the world, despite their
differences.

Naser Taha
Mustafa, director of the Yemeni president’s office and former head of the
Syndicate of Yemeni Journalists, said on his personal Facebook page that while
his grandfather was Turkish, that has not had a negative effect on how he has
been treated and regarded as a national Yemeni figure. Hundreds of Turks who
stayed in Yemen after the departure of Turkish troops from Sanaa in 1918 were
integrated into the highly tolerant Yemeni society, in the wake of Turkey’s
defeat in World War I.

Just as some Turkish
descendants are government officials, some old Turkish buildings are still
being used by the Yemeni government. The headquarters of the Yemeni army’s high
command uses an old Turkish building that was renovated and expanded. A Turkish
monument that faces the western gate of the building was erected three years
ago, standing witness to a relationship founded on common religion.

In Yemen, you can still
hear an old man talking about heroic adventures and stories of wars against the
Turks. At the same time, however, his elderly wife will still be wearing
Turkish-style dress that was popular for a while in Sanaa, yet is now only
common among old women resisting change.

Moreover, some words in
the local Sanaa dialect have Turkish roots such as kindara, which
means shoes. Salta, a traditional Yemeni dish that is still very
popular, was the food of choice among the Turkish army decades ago.

The topic isn't simply
about history. Even Turkey's current affairs resonate in Yemen and have their
pros and cons. Yemenis became divided between supporters and opponents of
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamic government as a result of
the government’s response to the Taksim Square protests in June. The rift soon
widened as a result of the Egyptian army’s ouster of President Mohammed Morsi,
a member of the Muslim Brotherhood strongly backed by Erdogan.

Any discussion of
Turkish-Yemeni relations cannot overlook the historical memory between an
invader and a country occupied by the power of weapons, even if spreading Islam
was the pretext under which Turkey invaded Yemen. Such justification is
illogical, because Yemenis adopted Islam decades before Turkey; it then spread
throughout the country and citizens did not stray from their religion. Thus,
there was no reason for the Ottoman Empire to impose Islam on Yemenis.

Turkey: weapons
and jihadists

Whenever Turkey is
mentioned today in Yemen, the first word that comes to mind is “weapons,” in
reference to the multiple [illegal] weapons deals that were revealed
during the past two years, before smugglers were able to succeed in bringing
weapons into Yemen. These arms include thousands of pieces manufactured in
Turkey. At the same time, other deals coming from Iran to Yemen were unveiled,
although neither country claimed responsibility. Moreover, “Turkish pistols”
have become popular in Yemen among those who are accustomed to carrying
personal weapons.

Despite the contradiction
between the Turkish and Iranian positions in Yemen and the region in general,
Saudi media outlets have accused Turkey of cooperating with Iran and Qatar to
smuggle arms to Yemen.

According to the Saudi daily Al-Sharq, “Turkey has recently appeared as a
strong player — alongside Qatar, Iran and Israel — and has managed to
coordinate with Qatar and share several important roles in smuggling arms to
Yemen through the same networks that have been active for many years in the
western part of the country.”

However, these
accusations are not necessarily accurate, and come in the framework of Saudi
Arabia’s disputes with Ankara regarding their differences in position toward the Muslim Brotherhood —
which Riyadh publicly regards as an enemy. Yet, what is certain and constant is
that Turkish arms are being smuggled to Yemen through huge deals, whether in
the framework of regional coordination with those countries or without. Turkish
President Abdullah Gul objected to Iran’s meddling in Yemen when he visited Sanaa
less than a year ago, and expressed his shock at the actions of some countries
trying to derail Yemen’s security and unity. Moreover, he confirmed that no
force can take away Yemen’s unity, security and stability, and Turkey does not
even want to hear of such thing.

Turkey’s supervision and
support of the recruitment of Yemeni militants, with the cooperation of Yemen’s
Muslim Brotherhood, was mentioned by local Yemeni newspapers at the time.
Moreover, Al-Sharq mentioned earlier that a Turkish
intelligence group is in Yemen to oversee the process of sending militants
from the Muslim Brotherhood to Turkey, to prepare them and take them to Syria
to fight against President Bashar al-Assad's regime. The newspaper also stated
that Turkish Airlines has added several direct flights from Yemen to Ankara to
transport militants. While the transport of militants used to happen
individually before, there are now large groups going there with the Yemeni
authorities' knowledge.

Turkey and the
Yemeni spring

During the mandate of
former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Turkey worked on renovating and
maintaining archaeological buildings that go back to the era of the Ottoman
occupation of Yemen. Moreover, Turkey expanded its horizons of cooperation with
Yemen, and its annual exports to the latter reached into the millions of dollars. The Turkish president visited Sanaa
and gave Yemenis unprecedented emotional praise by saying, “Merely the
mention of Yemen in Turkey causes Turks to get shivers down their spines. All
Arab countries are our friends, but Turks know Yemen very well because of their
shared history and beautiful memories.”

Yemenis remained
impressed by the ruling experience of the Islamists in Turkey, until Ankara
revealed its public support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which led the
revolutions of the Arab Spring in several countries, including Yemen. Thus, the
position of Yemenis toward Turkey changed in line with their position on these
revolutions and on the Muslim Brotherhood’s takeover of power in several
countries.

When Turkey announced its
support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen and opened its hospitals to treat
wounded members of the group, as well as when Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2011)
and Muslim Brotherhood member Tawakkol Karman was granted Turkish citizenship,
the country’s popularity increased among the Muslim Brotherhood and their
supporters in Yemen — to the point that Karman announced she was more proud of her Turkish nationality
than her Nobel Peace Prize. On the other hand, Ankara’s antagonism to other
parties — whether supporting the former regime or opposing the Muslim
Brotherhood — intensified, especially after the increased mutual visits between
officials of the two countries and the strictness of Ankara’s opposing position
to Assad’s regime in Syria and the new authority in Egypt. These latter
positions constitute the main reason behind the division of the Yemeni street
regarding these parties, whether collectively or individually.

Erdogan’s four-finger salute — which became the motto of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, and was soon adopted by hundreds of thousands around the
world — is also widely spread in Yemen. Pro-Turkey Yemeni parties have
announced their stances in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood, based on Turkey’s
policies in Egypt and Syria.

Turkey in the
Yemeni school curriculum

For decades, Yemeni
ninth-graders studied detailed chapters on the bloody and cruel reign of the
Ottoman Empire in Yemen and its unfair taxation system.

However, another
educational program was established in Yemen and lasted from the 1970s until
2001 when former President Saleh canceled it. It was called the scientific
institute program and was funded by the state budget. The program was run by
the Muslim Brotherhood, which developed its curriculum, presenting the Ottoman
era as the "Ottoman conquest of Yemen." Students were taught that the
conquest was to promote and spread the Islamic caliphate. It was not about
colonialism or invasion — the term conquest refers to the rule of the Islamic
state in non-Muslim countries for the purpose of spreading Islam, whether by
means of war or peace.

There was a significant
difference between these institutes and public schools in terms of what
students were taught about Ottoman Turkey. Public school textbooks were much
more thorough when it came to this topic.

The Turkish
school in Sanaa

Nearly half a decade ago,
the Turkish Embassy opened a private school in Sanaa, which now has branches in
Taizz and Aden. Two years ago, the school acquired its own building on the
western entrance to Sanaa, through which Turkish armies had entered, setting
the stage for its centuries-long rule.

Hundreds of Yemeni
students enrolled in this school. Some of them visited Turkey within the
framework of the school's program to spread and promote Turkish culture. For
three years, the school has been sponsoring a science contest for students in
Sanaa. The contest includes three subjects, yet excludes history, perhaps due
to the Turks’ sensitivity to this subject. Also, Turkey has recently started to
grant Yemeni students scholarships to various Turkish universities.

It seems that the history
of foreign influence in Yemen is playing out once again. While today the conflict
of power between Turkey and Iran has been reflected on the situation in Yemen,
both countries had colonial rule in Yemen.

The Persians — during the
era of the Sassanid Empire — invaded Yemen in the sixth century, while the
Ottoman Empire conquered Yemen 10 centuries later in the early 16th century.
Ottoman rule lasted until the end of World War I, and thus is fresher in the
minds of Yemenis than those of the Persians.

The coalition between
domestic conflicting parties and regional conflicting parties — which are seen
as extensions of the former — has strongly provoked a sense of nationalism
among Yemenis. Yet, Yemenis are well aware that this coalition will affect
Yemenis alone in the future — whether those who studied in the Houthi sessions
in Saada, those who graduated from the Turkish school in Sanaa or those who
stood on the fence between both sides.

The combination of
religion and politics, which characterizes current foreign intervention in
Yemen, threatens Yemeni social peace more than anything else — even more than
nuclear weapons. This is true because while this intervention is led from the
outside, its repercussions will have a major effect within the Yemeni borders
alone.

Farea al-Muslimi is a Yemeni youth activist, writer and
freelancer. His work has appeared in The
National, Foreign Policy, As Safir and many other regional and
international media outlets. On Twitter: @AlMuslimi

Tuesday, July 16, 2013

Turkish Americans protest at Gulen's compound in Saylorsburg, PA.
They stood their ground with concerned American Teachers, parents and citizens
They want to warn Ameirca of the dangers of harboring a criminal that must stand
charges in Turkey for disrupting a secular government. The reason for Gulen fleeing
to the USA and seeking asylum and living as a recluse in seclusion.
Gulen's Empire is estimated at $25 Billion

Our fellow Americans, We as Turkish-Americans are here to warn you about this very dangerous man! This man is an extremist Islamist with intentions of spreading Sharia Law all over the world. We know! And we are here to warn you and expose him!

When living in Turkey, Gulen was a staunch enemy of secularism. He pushed for an authoritarian Islamic state. In fact, a Wikileaks wire reveals how Istanbul Chief Rabbi Ishak Haleva tried to warn USA of this man’s activities, saying he is a “radical Islamist” whose moderate message cloaks a more sinister and radical agenda.

After Gulen fled Turkey in 1998, upon being charged with seeking to overthrow the secular Turkish government to replace it with an Islamic Republic, he was able to secure a visa to move to USA.

How did he receive his residency status while he was ‘wanted’ by the –then- Turkish Government? This is still a mystery. Now, this man owns and operates charter schools in USA –through various foundations- despite the fact his Madrasas were outlawed in countries like Russia and Uzbekistan. His schools were under investigation in the Netherlands. Plus, the origin of his immense wealth, which he used to open and operate these schools all over the world, is unclear. Who is behind him?

On July 13, Turkish Americans and anyone who believes in secular democracy and human rights are getting together to protest him, in front of his home in Pennsylvania! The protest will be peaceful and our message is clear, the USA should not shelter or host a dangerous man like this while we are fighting extremists all over the world. War on terror should start at home!

PROGRAM: 1- USA and Turkish National Anthems 2- A moment of silence for our Turkish friends who died fighting these extremists in Turkey and for anyone who died on war on terror. And for the heroes who fought for the secular Turkish Republic, Ataturk and his comrades in arms. 3-10th year anthem 4-Reading and disbursement of the statement 5-Information on Fetullah Gulen 6-Finish and goodbyes

A new school
building has been launched under the umbrella of Chad-Turkish Educational
Institutions active in the central African country Chad, saved from the brink
of revolution in early May. In attendance of the grand opening of the school
founded by the deceased philanthropist Ahmet Guner from Duzce (a province in
Turkey) in the capital N'Djamena were Chad's prime minister Joseph Djimrangar,
minister of education Abdelkerim SeidBauche, Turkey's ambassador to Chad Ahmet
Kavas, the founder Guner's son Murat Guner and a crowded group of guests.

PM
Dadnadji arrived at the school launched in a critical period, which witnessed a
revolution attempt foiled by the state, under high security measures. Chad
police department took extensive security measures in the area surrounding the
ceremony venue.

Following the
national anthems of both countries, the president of International Chad
Educational Institutions Huseyin Serce noted that their educational initiatives
kicked off with only 17 students in 2001 have been continuously growing ever
since and added all they seek is to offer a higher quality education to Chad.

Murat Gungor, on
the other hand, recalling his father couldn't live up to see the school's
opening said they, as children of Ahmet Guner, will definitely continue the
services handed down to them.Next, Turkish Ambassador Ahmet Kavas noted these
educational activities are investments for future bilateral relations. The
minister of education Abdelkerim Seid Bauche alike said bilateral relations in
the future will be shaped by today's ongoing efforts performed in education. He
further said Chad-Turkish schools function as bridges between the two countries
and they greatly appreciates the schools' activities.

Following the
remarks, PM Dadnadji cut the ribbon of the building with 430-student capacity.
The construction launched in 2011 cost approximately 3 million dollar. As the
most modern education institution in Chad, the school comprises library and
language classrooms alongside the computer and science labs. Dominated by local
teachers, the academic staff offers Arabic, French, Turkish and English
courses. The poem performance by a little Chad student and the local guests in
their traditional clothes added color to the ceremony.

Managers of
Gaziantep based Caliskan Group and South Africa based Sumo Coal, brothers
Israfil and Semsettin Caliskan, have constructed a 500-student capacity school
in Pretoria, the managerial capital of South Africa. The inauguration of Star
College was performed by the minister of education of Gauteng province, Barbara
Creecy, in an opening ceremony hosted by a former Fenerbahce midfielder Johan
Moshoe.

The
ceremony started by Moshoe with Turkish jokes. Moshoe, who is currently the
coach of Star College soccer team, talked about his love of Turkey, where he
spent his 11 years. Students sang Turkish songs and dance show of little ones
received great applause from the audience.

After offering his
gratitude to Turkish investors for donating a large education complex to the
capital, Mosheo invited Fatih Caliskan who was representing his father Israfil
Caliskan, and Semsettin Caliskan to the stage. Greecy presented Caliskan brothers
with a plaque of appreciation, and said: First of all, I would like to thank
you very much for gifting us with this magnificent building. I would like to
thank Ufuk [Horizon] Education Foundation who has opened 8 education centers in
South Africa. The school that we are inaugurating now will be a flagship of
others. But I hope that it will not be the last one and you will open more
schools. Turkish schools do not only provide students with just an academic
education they also prepare students for the society by not neglecting
important aspects of education such as sports, personal development, family and
adaptation to social life, and universal code of ethics. Turkish schools
successfully educate out kids on topics of great importance to us such as math,
science, and technology. In this respect, they serve as a model for education
in South Africa. We have sent a delegation to Turkey to study your method of
education.

Following the
opening ceremony, the guests were served with delicacies from Turkish cuisine.

Disclaimer: The original article is in Turkish. Slight deviations
from the original meaning may have occurred due to the difficulties in
translating phrases and idioms. PII volunteers translated the article.

Footnote: This list is already over 7 years old and the Gulen Schools have increased in number AND CONTROVERSY.

In 2005, prominent Turkish news magazine Yeni Aktuel published an article (in
Turkish) entitled "Gulen's Educational Empire." It can be viewed at
the Haber10 website.
In this article, a tally is given of Gulen schools outside of Turkey. The schools
are not named, but their number is listed by country. A translation of this
list is given below.

Note that a number of Gulen charter schools were already in operation in the
U.S. in 2005 (see the Perimeter
Primate blogger's timeline), but are not counted in this list. It is
unclear whether Yeni Aktuel simply did not know of their existence, or if their
omission was a "courtesy" to the Gulen Movement.

It is often said that the Gulen schools in Russia were closed, but the mention
on this list of 6 schools in the Russian Federation is consistent with our
observations that Gulen schools are in operation in that country. The closure
was temporary, as confirmed in the doctoral dissertation of Mustafa Gokhan
Sahin (Florida International University, 2010).

The mention of one school in Uzbekistan is also noteworthy. The Department of
State's religious
freedom article on Uzbekistan (accessed Dec 2012) says that all
"Turkish schools" (referring to Gulen schools) were closed in 1999.
Several other sources refer to this closure; Radio
Free Europe/ Radio Liberty wrote that "In 1999, Tashkent closed all Turkish lyceums after its
relationship with Ankara turned sour." However, a Today's Zaman article of Jan
19, 2011 reports the closure of the Tashkent Ulugbek International
School. Most likely this is the one school referred to in Yeni Aktuel's list.

There has been substantial expansion of the international school network since
2005.