Afghan refugees are beginning to return to Afghanistan. These returning refugees are creating new problems for Afghanistan as many are landless and therefore crowd the major cities, especially Kabul. Efforts to identify land for the returnees has floundered because of corruption and red tape. In addition, single Afghan men are being forcefully expelled from Iran and Europe creating new tensions. Refugees began fleeing Afghanistan in the 1980s as a result of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 and the war of resistance that followed. After the Soviet withdrawal in in 1989 some refugees began to return, but the Soviet occupation was soon followed by a major civil war in1992 when the mujahideen took control of Kabul and more refugees fled. This was followed by rule of the Taliban from 1996 to 2001. Although some refugees had begun to return during this period, the war waged against the Taliban government by the Northern Alliance and other groups forced more Afghans to flee.

Returning Refugees

Now refugees are beginning to return in larger numbers. Over the past three decades over 6 million refugees have returned. (IOM-UNHCR, 2017) Much of this repatriation took place between 2002 and 2008 in the years after the defeat of the Taliban government when the future of Afghanistan appeared optimistic. Most of these returning refugees were from Iran and Pakistan, and many participated in the UNHCR volunteer repatriation program (Duenwald, 2017). In a country with a population of just over 30 million, these returning refugees constitute over 20 percent of the population of Afghanistan. While there are some success stories, in general the returnees have negatively impacted Afghan society, placing a large burden on the infrastructure of a country that was already stretched thin (UN News ,2018).

Not only has the flow of refugees returning increased, but the demographic characteristics of these new returnees have changed as well. The refugees returning before 2008 were largely in family groups or in some cases whole villages. (Reliefweb, 2018) Now many of the returnees are young single men who do not want to return to Afghanistan but are being deported from Iran or Europe. (Constable, 2018). While the earlier returnees from Pakistan were mostly ethnic Pashtuns, most of the new returnees, especially those from Iran and Europe, are Hazara and Tajiks, minorities in Afghanistan. (Feroz, 2016) The reintegration of these new returnees presents new challenges for Afghanistan. Most do not want to be back in Afghanistan and will re-migrate to Europe or Iran as soon as possible.

Land Ownership Disputes

A major challenges in reintegrating returning refugees is land rights and property ownership. Many of the refugees have been out of Afghanistan for over 30 years, and in many cases while they were away their property, including buildings and land, has been taken over by others. In some cases, their property may have been sold and resold several times. In an agrarian society such as Afghanistan, where over 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas, land ownership, or the tenant rights to farm, are closely linked to economic security, political power, and social status. Without land, Afghans cannot support themselves. (Bjelica, 2016)

The illegal occupation of land, land seizures, the unsanctioned use of land for pasture by Kuchis (pastoral nomads), and the use of land for illegal poppy production by warlords and anti-government elements are common causes of conflict, both within and between families, tribes, ethnic groups, warlords, armed opposition groups, and the government. (NAMA, 2015) With the high population growth and the massive return of refugees, the demand for arable land has risen steeply since 2001, increasing land value and fueling conflict over land ownership and use. (UNAMA, 2015)

Since refugees may have fled without written deeds or documents, or in many cases never had legal documents in the first place, written documentation of land ownership is often missing. In addition, since most Afghans cannot read or write, documentation of land ownership is often unwritten, part of the family or village oral history. It is estimated that at least 50 percent of Afghanistan land ownership is not formalized; no one knows who owns what (Deschamps 2009).

As a result, land ownership disputes within families were common in Afghanistan even before the refugee repatriation crisis. Claims and disputes can take years to resolve. As a result, many returning refugee families do not even bother to reclaim their land or property, especially where powerful warlords or rich elites have confiscated the land. (UNAMA, 2015)

Solving the land problem in Afghanistan has not been easy. Afghanistan has layers of incompatible and confusing laws, regulations, and governmental decrees dealing with land ownership and use. In addition, various governments have given land to political and military elites, or illegally seized lands without regard to prior title. These conflicting laws, regulations, seizures and practices provide a confusing myriad of competing obligations and rights concerning land ownership, use, and access. (Deschamps, 2009)

In addition, the governmental judicial system is corrupt and ineffective, and therefore distrusted and avoided by most Afghans. It has been estimated that over 80 percent of the land dispute cases end up in the traditional dispute resolution system, that is, in local jirgas or shuras(Deschamps 2009). These traditional non-governmental court systems can often be effective, especially since they have more creditability with the people than the governmental court system, however, they have their inherent biases. For one, as with many Afghan systems, they discriminate against women and minorities, Because of the high casualty rate among men in the last 30 years there are a disproportionate number of women head of households. According to Islamic Sharia law, women do not have the same right to family land or property as male heads of households.(UNAMA, 2014)

Land ownership is therefore an important aspect of the reintegration of the refugee and IDP population. Several agencies have attempted to assist in creating an equitable and functional land arbitration system. The Norwegian Refugee Council, along with other groups, has established the Information Counseling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) program to assist returning refugees, IDPs, and other Afghans, in resolving their land or property disputes. This program has trained thousands of government judges on legal procedure. However, it is not yet clear that this and other efforts to reform the judicial system has had a positive result (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015).

Finding Land: The Land Allocation Scheme

Many returning Afghan refugees are landless and do not have land or property claims. In 2003, UNHCR estimated that 41 percent of returnees had no homes or land, and another 26 percent owned farms or houses, but had found these destroyed or damaged beyond repair on their return (UNHCR, 2003). To address the situation of landlessness, the Government of Afghanistan established the Refugee, Returnee, and Internally Displaced Persons Plan as a part of the Afghan National Development Strategy (2008-2013). In this plan the Afghan government, with the support of the United States and other allies, committed to provide access to land and land ownership to returning refugees and IDPs. A central part of this plan is the Land Allocation Scheme (LAS) established in 2005 as part of Presidential Decree 104, to redistribute intact and uncultivated government land to returnees and Internally displaced people.(UNAMA, 2015)

The Land Allocation Scheme seemed like a good idea, but was overwhelmed by Afghan bureaucracy and corruption. The Land Allocation Scheme created over 39 sites in various parts of Afghanistan. Each site was designed to hold several thousand families. In total over 300,000 plots of land was identified for distribution to returning refugees or internally displace peoples (IDP). By the end of 2017 only about 14,000 plots had been distributed, leaving over 285,000 plots still available for distribution. However, only about 25 percent of those given land actually paid for the plots and lived on the purchased land. (UNAMA, 2015) In addition, of those returning refugees or IDPs who were given land in this program, over 80 percent ended up abandoning the land due to the lack of employment opportunities and inadequate basic services such as schools or hospitals (UNAMA, 2015).

Why has the plan for giving land to returning refugees or IDPs not been successful? One problem is that corrupt government officials have confiscated much of the land dedicated to this project for their own gains. (UNAMA, 2015) According to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report on land grabbing, a governor of a province, not named, sold the land himself to IDPs and returning refugees, rather than giving them the land outright. Often land distribution is based on friendship or patronage. In Herat, for instance, the municipal land commission gave the 14,000 plots of land to cronies in the government and only 850 plots to returning refugees or IDPs. (UNAMA, 2015)

In addition, the process by which returning refugees or IDPs can apply for land is extremely complicated. To register for the land allocation scheme the applicant must first provide a voluntary repatriation form provided by UNHCR and which is given upon arriving in Afghanistan. But many returnees did not receive this form unless they came through official UNHCR channels. In addition, applicants must produce, a tazkera (ID document that most Afghans carry), and proof of landlessness, certifying that the applicant, or a relative, does not own any land or a house. The document proving landlessness is very difficult to get and usually requires bribes.(UNAMA, 2015)

The whole process of applying for land can take years. The process involves six stages, a total of 63 separate steps, each requiring signatures and approval by various authorities. In step two, for instance, the Minister of Refugees and Repatriation himself must review and approve every application. This approval process is a set up to extract bribes. Most applicants understand that approval is going to cost them about 20,000 Afghanis, or about 300 dollars, in bribes. (UNAMA, 2015)

There are sites where this land distribution plan has worked. In Sheikh Mersin, a Land Allocation Scheme site in Nangarhar Province near Jalalabad, there has been partially success. This settlement houses about 2,500 families, mostly Pashtun refugees from Pakistan. The settlement has been successful in part because it includes a school, running water, and other needed facilities. Land Allocation Schemes in other areas have not worked as well. The Land Allocation Scheme site near Adkhoy in Faryab province did not have drinking water and was far from an urban center. There was no work, no schools, no hospital. As a result, no one stayed. (Red Cross, 2018)

The most interesting LAS is Aliceghan, the name a combination of Alice, for Alice Springs in Australia, and Ghan for Afghan. Aliceghan was built with the assistance of the Australian government, in part to be a place to which Afghan refugees in Australian could return. The Afghan government provided land in the District of Qarabagh, about 50 kilometers north of Kabul city in the Shamali plain. The site was settled in 2002, with the projected population to be about 60 percent Qizilbash, a Persian speaking Shia minority from Kabul, and the rest Pashtun. Originally targeted for 15,000 inhabitants, by 2011 only about 200 remained. And, of course, not a single Afghan refugee from Australia was known to have returned to Afghanistan to inhabit the settlement. The lack of a viable water system, no electricity, no jobs in the area, and the lack of a school or medical clinic led to the location’s failure. (Healy , 2011)

Urban Displacement

A large number of refugees are not returning to their area of origin, but instead are migrating to areas in or near major cities, mostly Kabul. The reasons are many: Insecurity in their home provinces; lack of linkages to their families and communities following decades of as refugees living outside of Afghanistan; family growth, making return impossible due to already high pressure on land occupancy and use; the absence of adequate education and health facilities in rural locations; and the lack of livelihood opportunities for many of the returnees.

Because Afghan cities, especially Kabul, do not have the facilities to house this many returnees, many end up living in cramped conditions, either with relatives or in sprawling spontaneous settlement in makeshift shelters or in disused buildings.

As a result, Kabul’s population has tripled since 2001 and is growing at an estimated 150,000 people per year. A city, which not too long ago had a population of around 500,000, now houses over 5 million people (Afghan Population, 2018). The official population of Kabul is listed at 3.8 million, but many people are living in unofficial residences and are therefore not counted. It is estimated that about 80 percent of Kabul residents live in unplanned informal settlements taking up about 70 percent of the city’s area (Norwegian Refugee Council 2018). These informal settlements are often located on governmental or disputed land. The returnees and IDPs moving to Kabul are squatting on land without legal possession, making them vulnerable to corruption. Informal taxation, or extortion, schemes have developed, with lucrative benefits to slumlords.

The New Returnees

Beginning April 3rd of 2017, Pakistan renewed its efforts to send the Afghans home (Hashim, 2018) and in the last year Iran has also become much more aggressive in deporting Afghans. (Zahid, 2017) On October 2, 2016 the EU signed an agreement with Afghanistan called the Joint Way Forward, to deport an unlimited number of Afghans back to Afghanistan.(Shea, 2017) This was part of $15.2 billion aid package for Afghanistan. While the European Union countries have granted asylum status to some Afghan refugees, they have also identified many Afghan as “economic migrants”, rather than “political refugees”, who are therefore not entitled to political asylum. (Shea, 2017)

Whereas the earlier returnees were largely in family or even village groupings, the new returnees are mostly single men who left Afghanistan to find work. (Majidi, 2016) As a result, reintegrating these returnees has been, and will continue to be, especially difficult. Most of the Afghans going to Iran or to Europe are looking for a better economic future. Afghanistan’s economy is fragile and clearly unable to support the high numbers of returning refugees.

Many of the Afghan refugees forcefully repatriated from Europe or Iran have incurred large debts. Even though Iran is a neighboring country, travelling to Iran requires money. Some Afghans attempt to get to Iran on their own, which involves crossing the Iranian border at night in rural areas, but in most cases, migrants turn to smugglers. Smugglers charge about 45,000 Afghanis, or about $700, to smuggle a person into Iran, and it may take several attempts. In some cases, these smugglers are actually affiliated with Iranian employers who recruit the Afghans as laborers. In other cases, the Iranian bosses may pay for the passage of an Afghan laborer to Iran to be recouped against wages once in Iran, creating a situation of bonded labor. Majidi, 2016)

Getting to Europe, which many Afghans are now trying to do, requires considerably more money, often 600,000 or 700,000 Afghanis, or about 10,000 dollars.(Majidi, 2016) t is also much more dangerous. To get the money for their journey to Iran or Europe, in a country with no proper banking system, Afghans seeking to migrate must borrow from immediate family or relatives. This informal relative-based banking system is common in Afghanistan and is used for other purposes as well, including building a house, or for treatment of a sick child, and is paid back according to traditional methods. To put it into dollars, the family of a young man trying to migrate to Europe may have borrowed as much as $10,000 in a country where the average month salary is $30. This is an incredible debt for a family, but if the Afghan migrant is successful in getting to Iran, or even better to Europe, they can make this amount of money fairly quickly and repay the loan. (Shuja, 2016) However, if they are caught and returned to Afghanistan, they are less likely to be able to repay this debt. Therefore, if they are deported back to Afghanistan from Europe or Iran, they often return empty-handed and become a burden on their family. Their only solution is to leave for Iran or Europe again.

Interviews conducted by the Norwegian Refugee Council with Afghan men who have been deported from Europe or Iran report that there is nothing for them to do in Afghanistan (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2018). Some have acquired skills or work experiences abroad for which there is no place in Afghanistan. With no job or opportunity, and with a large debt, many returnees leave for Europe again.

Conclusion

The repatriation and reintegration of refugees poses many problems for Afghanistan. One of the important issues is land ownership. Many of the refugees have been out of the country for decades and, in some cases, others have occupied their property. Since Afghans generally distrust the governmental court system, many take their property dispute to local jirgas or shuras.Some NGOs have attempted to train local judges in proper legal procedure, but progress is limited. An additional problem is the crowding of returning refugees in Afghan cities, mainly Kabul. Large sections of Kabul where returning refugees are forced to live are illegal settlements without facilities, water, or proper sanitation. Finally, Afghanistan faces the problem of a new wave of returning refugees, different than those who returned earlier. Many of these new returnees are being deported from the country of refuge, especially Iran and Europe. These returnees are mostly single men. They and their families have often borrowed large sums of money from relatives or others to finance their travels. These returnees do not want to return and many leave as soon as possible. They are restless and dissatisfied with the current situation in Afghanistan. (Shuja, 2016)

PUL-I-ALAM, Afghanistan — Ordered to investigate an airstrike by American warplanes that killed at least 17 Afghan men on Tuesday, Afghan and American investigators have reached starkly different conclusions about the identity of the victims.

The bombing, just south of the Afghan capital, set off the latest dispute over the human toll of American bombing in the country.

The Afghan investigation was up-close and gruesomely personal. As Zer Gul, a local police commander, sorted through the body parts at the scene, in the Azra District of Logar Province, he concluded that nearly all the victims were police officers under his command, along with a few volunteers who were allies of the police force. He recognized the uniforms they wore, he said, but he also knew some of his own men by body parts he could identify.

“Anyone who denies any police were killed are liars and rumormongers,” Mr. Gul said in an interview on Wednesday. “Definitely American forces bombed our front line and 12 police were killed here and five more were killed on another outpost. They bombed our lines instead of the Taliban’s lines.”

The American investigation was both high tech and at a distance, based on camera footage from coalition warplanes flying above the area, which is about 20 miles south of the provincial capital, Pul-i-Alam. American officials did not dispute that the airstrike had happened — just who the victims were.

Lt. Col. Martin L. O’Donnell, a spokesman for the American military in Afghanistan, said in a statement on Thursday: “Following a review of footage from the strike conducted by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan in support of Afghan operations and in defense of Afghan forces in Azra district, Logar province, August 7, we have determined that no Afghan security force members were killed.”

“Our determination is also supported,” Colonel O’Donnell continued, “by firsthand accounts from Afghan security force leaders and members present during the incident, who confirmed those firing upon them were Taliban members.”

So far, however, no Afghan official has emerged to agree with the American assertion — to publicly state that the airstrikes did not kill police officers — although some claimed that Taliban fighters were killed as well.

Afghan officials who agreed that members of the police force were among the victims included Shamshad Larawai, the spokesman for the governor of Logar Province; the Azra District governor, Hamidullah (who uses only one name); Mr. Gul, the local police commander at the scene; a provincial councilman, Abdul Wali, who is from Azra; and Nasrat Rahimi, the deputy spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior, which is in charge of the country’s police force.

“Our forces made a tactical retreat and called for air support,” Mr. Rahimi said. “Fighting continued and when airstrikes were conducted by Resolute Support, they hit our police which resulted in the killing of nine police and injuries of 14 others,” he said shortly after the airstrike, before the complete death toll was known. Mr. Rahimi also said 30 Taliban insurgents were killed.

Resolute Support is the name of the American-led coalition’s mission in Afghanistan.

A tribal elder, Abdul Sattar, speaking by telephone from the Azra District, his voice breaking into sobs, said local residents were incensed at the government and their American allies. “We could only find one intact body,” he said. “For the rest of them we buried just body parts.”

Asked about the assertions of Afghan police and local officials, Colonel O’Donnell said that American officials had talked to Afghan National Army officials in the area, including the Fourth Brigade and the 203rd Corps, who were responsible for calling in the airstrike, and that the officers said the airstrike did not kill any policemen. “If the reports from the ground are accurate, these casualties did not come from this strike, it didn’t come from us,” he said.

Officers of the Afghan National Army, however, said in interviews that police officers were killed in the American airstrike. “There was a misunderstanding, a group of local police and uprisers was bombed by American aircraft,” Gen. Abdul Raziq, commander of the Afghan National Army’s Fourth Brigade, said in an interview Friday. “Nine local police were martyred as a result of the bombardment and four more were killed in an outpost.” Uprisers are unpaid volunteers who help fight the Taliban.

Maj. Mohammad Farooq, the acting spokesman for the 203rd Corps, also said on Friday that policemen were killed in an American bombardment, but he put the death toll at three.

American officials had no explanation for the contradictory accounts offered by Afghan officials in the area. But the military spokesman, Colonel O’Donnell, said the aerial photography was clear. “The footage clearly depicts an attack on an Afghan security force observation post by a group of fighting-aged males using multiple heavy weapons and tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the Taliban from an open position on a ridgeline above the observation post,” he said.

Before the strikes, he said, “both the enemy and friendly locations were verified and cleared by Afghan security forces on the ground, through the regional coordination center, which is located with the 203rd Corps operations center, prior to the strike.” That center includes both American and Afghan military officials. He confirmed, however, that no American forward air-controller was on the ground to direct the airstrike, as would normally be the case if American ground forces were involved.

The episode on Tuesday was the latest in a series of cases in which the outcomes of American airstrikes were disputed, and occurred as the tempo of coalition air actions in support of their Afghan allies has risen sharply. With only about 14,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan — compared with 140,000 at the peak of the deployment — most of the ground operations are being conducted by Afghan forces, whose air force is small and poorly equipped.

In the first six months of this year, United States forces dropped more than 3,000 bombs across Afghanistan, nearly double the number for the same period last year and more than five times as many as the number for the first half of 2016.

For this same six-month period, the United Nations documented a 52 percent increase in civilian deaths from airstrikes compared with the first half of 2017.

On Friday, Colonel O’Donnell said that the American investigation of the July 19 airstrike in Kunduz had been closed after determining that there were no civilian casualties. “After carefully considering all relevant and reasonably available information, which included a review of the Afghan government’s report of findings, our investigation found no credible information to corroborate the allegations,” he said.

Aerial video footage showed a single bomb dropped on two homes where the Taliban had been firing from for more than an hour, he said, and the firing stopped as soon as the bomb was dropped.

The American military spokesman said that no Afghans had come forward to document any civilian deaths, and the only complaints received were two that documented damage to homes and one injured person.

A New York Times reporter at the scene, however, was given a list of the names of all 14 fatalities from the same extended family. The list was provided by family members and verified by government officials and the Kunduz hospital, where 12 of the dead were taken. The victims included five women, seven children aged 2 to 14, and two men, a father and an uncle to the children.

Told about that, Colonel O’Donnell said, “When we’re presented with any credible evidence, if something is provided to us we will take a look at it.”

]]>http://dawatmedia.com/afghanistan/were-victims-friend-or-foe-u-s-airstrike-leads-to-new-dispute-with-afghan-allies/feed/0Making Sense of Russia’s Involvement in Afghanistanhttp://dawatmedia.com/afghanistan/making-sense-of-russias-involvement-in-afghanistan/
http://dawatmedia.com/afghanistan/making-sense-of-russias-involvement-in-afghanistan/#respondSat, 04 Aug 2018 20:34:28 +0000http://dawatmedia.com/?p=1922There are plenty of reasons to seriously examine Russia’s role in Afghanistan, but what do many analysts miss?

Much of the current analysis of Russia’s involvement in Afghanistan and engagement with the Taliban has come out of an unfortunate formula. First, Afghanistan is reduced to an arena in which external great powers jockey for influence and power. U.S. government statements about Russian support for the Taliban are then accepted at face value without parsing what exactly is being communicated. Russian denials are then assumed to evidence Russian involvement and, finally, assumed to prove that Russia aims to undermine the United States abroad.

There are plenty of reasons to seriously examine Russia’s role in Afghanistan, but too many articles fail to ask questions fundamental to making sense of Moscow’s aims. By refusing to closely scrutinize the facts on the ground, the role of China, and the logic of U.S. policy, the authors of many pieces can claim expertise but never be held accountable for their analysis. Russia is certainly an adversarial power for Washington, but Afghanistan deserves more than talking points from an aerial view.

The Origin of the Claim

The initial public fears of a deepening ties between Russia and the Taliban date back to early 2016 when Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, stated that “Taliban interests objectively coincide with ours.” Both Moscow and the Taliban perceive the Islamic State (ISIS) and its local branch (Islamic State-Khorasan Province, or ISKP) as an enemy and Russia would rather see a stable government in Afghanistan with whom it can negotiate over issues such as drug trafficking and regional integration initiatives.

By working with the Taliban, Moscow could give life to what it saw as stunted negotiations for a political settlement to the conflict between the Taliban and the government in Kabul, as well as gaining a military partner interested in fighting ISKP on the ground. The Taliban had launched a winter offensive going into 2016, a move aimed at gaining bargaining leverage for potential peace talks. Later in February, Moscow delivered 10,000 automatic rifles to Kabul for Afghanistan’s security services, per existing agreements. Russia was clearly engaging both sides politically, but more comfortable openly offering military aid, however small, to Kabul.

The general consensus between Kabul and the U.S. military in 2016 appeared to be that Russia was largely offering political support and engagement. However, many were concerned about meetings between Russia and Tajikistan assumed to have implications for Afghanistan’s northernmost provinces. It’s worth noting that any state with a stake in the region would logically have established some kind of contact with the Taliban and Russia was not exceptional in this regard.

From Political Ties to Arms

The discourse shifted in March 2017. At a hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Curtis Scaparrotti said, “I’ve seen the influence of Russia of late — increased influence in terms of association and perhaps even supply to the Taliban.” Scaparrotti did not elaborate on the comment, but Taliban officials continued to insist that Russia’s contacts remained political. The general’s written testimony did not touch on Russian activities in Afghanistan and Russian officials continued to deny the veracity of such claims.

By April, an anonymous U.S. military source in Kabul suggested Russia had increased arms shipments to the Taliban over the previous 18 months and General John Nicholson, U.S. commander of Resolute Support, would only say that he “would not refute” the claim that Russia in fact doing so. More precisely, he said that “we continue to get reports of this assistance.” In other words, there was never a formal confirmation, but indefinite statements designed to cultivate the appearance that it was the case. U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis added that any arms shipments into Afghanistan would be in violation of international law.

The media in the United States largely accepted this line. In August 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump elaborated what was charitably described as a strategy for Afghanistan. Really, he committed the United States to seeking his own “peace with honor” in the same vein as the Nixon administration in Vietnam. There would be no withdrawal and the administration was authorizing the deployment of over 3,000 more troops and changing the rules of engagement. There would be no timetable for withdrawal.

This context can’t be ignored when considering the narrative around Russian involvement arming the Taliban. At an October hearing with the House Armed Services Committee, Mattis clarified that he wanted to see more evidence of Russian involvement shipping arms to the Taliban because what he’d seen “doesn’t make sense.” General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added that “with the Russians, I don’t think we have specificity on support for the Taliban.”

No major report since last October has emerged confirming that Russia is, in fact, arming the Taliban. But the story lives on due to basic misconceptions and analytic failings. First, little scrutiny is applied when Taliban, or other non-Taliban local leaders, claim the Taliban are being armed by Russia. They have their own interests in stoking the story, namely the appearance of broader international support or as a means of demanding more arms and financial aid from the United States via Kabul.

Second, Taliban fighters could come into possession of Russian weapons for various reasons beyond Moscow’s control. Weapons given to Kabul’s security services could easily end up in Taliban hands after a battle. Weapons from the Soviet period still circulate around the country. Arms can be smuggled across borders from Central Asian states or Iran as well without official sanction from Russian authorities. Chinese knockoffs could also be used. CNN footage from mid-2017 showing Taliban fighters with Russian weapons was likely explained by these factors. Mattis’ reticence to assign blame deserves more attention, as does the challenge of Afghanistan’s porous borders.

Finally, the assumption that Russia is the problem conveniently serves other policy ends for the United States. Namely, the U.S. presence is increasingly predicated on countering China in Eurasia and maintaining military assets near Iran — but neither of these motivations are politically expedient to iterate clearly.

China’s Growing Role

In January 2018, General Dawlat Waziri – an Afghan official – told Fergana News that an agreement had been reached with Beijing in December for China to finance the construction of a military base in Badakhshan. The Afghan officials quoted cited China’s concerns about radicalized Uyghurs crossing the border as well as other cross-border terrorist threats to Xinjiang. China vehemently denied any such agreement existed. Officials in Kabul continued to insist that the agreement was real, putting Beijing in an uncomfortable position.

The Taliban launched an attack in Kabul itself at the beginning of February. The United States responded in Badakhshan province by using a B-52 to drop a record 24 precision-guided munitions on Taliban camps and positions. The B-52 strike was, in large part, a signal to any outside partner, including China, that the United States ultimately has the most firepower to secure and police the border region as needed.

China has since begun trilateral talks with Pakistan and Afghanistan to encourage the Taliban to negotiate for peace. The diplomatic initiative parallels deepening security ties to Tajikistan, namely in the form of financing border outposts and an intelligence sharing agreement last year that drew Moscow’s attention. In March, the International Crisis Group released a report claiming that China had built a military installation in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan, a sparsely populated, incredibly poor region covering half of Tajikistan’s territory. China’s rationale was straightforward: if you can’t build a base in Badakhshan, Gorno-Badakhshan isn’t a bad backup location.

In April, Moscow reiterated its commitment to sustain security ties and strengthen Tajikistan’s border security per arms agreements reached last December. This subtle back-and-forth continued through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s largely empty summit in China this June. Then Russia launched training exerciseswith Tajikistan in mid-July in Gorno-Badakhshan, a break with standard exercise protocol to remind Beijing that Moscow remains the primary external security guarantor for Dushanbe.

Through these twists and turns, China has become one of the primary policy drivers behind moves made by both the United States and Russia despite rhetoric from both countries frequently designed to mask motivations and concerns as much as flag them. Issues pertaining to cross-border threats, stability, and a peace process cannot be separated from Afghanistan’s neighbors. The trouble is that thanks to U.S. strategy, all other regional actors are forced to hedge, address their security concerns, or else prevent an unacceptable outcome for their interests.

The Prestige Fallacy

Discussions of Russian-American strategic tensions and dynamics in Afghanistan fall prey to a twin “prestige fallacy.” Analyses of Russian foreign policy underpinned by the assumption that it wants to project its great power status are frequently facile attempts to explain state behavior on the basis of optics and psychology rather than material interest.

Russia exaggerates the extent to which ISIS is operating in Afghanistan for several reasons. First, the Taliban’s goals are ultimately national. Moscow doesn’t care who’s in power so long as it has a stable, unified state with which it can negotiate over its security concerns. An end to fighting in Afghanistan and a neutralization of the threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations requires border control. Border control requires peace of some kind.

Second, Russia’s domestic anti-terrorism operations and intervention in Syria have created new security threats with regard to ISIS and transnational actors. Whether or not it’s productive and entirely warranted, Russia wants to have a say in security outcomes in Afghanistan because of its porous borders and the possible arrival of extremists from elsewhere. Though it remains an exceptional event, ISIS claimed responsibility for the deaths of four cyclists in Tajikistan in an apparent attack.

In the case of the United States, the inverse problem persists. Russia’s policy is linked not only to perceptions, but to an assumed anti-American agenda. The agenda may exist, but the strategy – or lack thereof – employed by the United States in Afghanistan has had numerous effects and implications for external actors and neighboring states with stakes in the outcome. “Prestige” and a focus on appearances without questioning the efficacy of U.S. strategy creates an incomplete picture as to why Moscow and other states have acted as they have.

A Multilateral Issue

Washington has the financial and military resources to act unilaterally in Afghanistan without too much concern for other stakeholders. To underscore the point, a study carried out by Neta C. Crawford of Brown University last year found that post-9/11 wars and military operations had cost taxpayers more than $5.6 trillion since 2000, when estimated future costs for veterans are included. This preponderance of resources has enabled an utter failure to set a realistic strategy, most recently revealed by word that U.S. forces would once again focus on securing urban centers in a never ending back-and-forth over territory with the Taliban.

Structurally, there cannot be peace without a multilateral process that engages states Washington would rather ignore or else fight. Iran, in particular, has a legitimate security interest in supporting the Taliban. It’s surrounded by U.S. military assets, has been and is again being heavily sanctioned, and knows there’s a considerable lobby seeking the collapse of its regime. Asymmetrical means such as providing arms to a group fighting the United States in a neighboring state make sense.

Pakistan has an explicit interest in preventing a strong state from forming in Afghanistan lest it align with India. Now that China is Pakistan’s biggest economic partner and has a growing array of investments and economic ties across Central Asia, it’s a player as well. Russia needs to maintain a role in Afghanistan for the sake of its regional influence and is using the limited means it has to do so just as smaller states like Uzbekistan offer new leadership.

By choosing to pressure Pakistan and steadily escalate tensions with Iran, Washington has all but guaranteed that other actors respond as they have. That may mean trying to provide for their own security by deepening political ties with the Taliban. The fact is that many statements from U.S. military officials on Russia’s role in Afghanistan are consciously opaque because they really concern Iran. Therein lies the great tragedy of U.S. policy: unilateralist escalation has replaced diplomacy. Russia, Iran, Pakistan, China, and the Taliban all have interests too. They can’t be ignored without serious consequences. One of them is forever war in Afghanistan.

Nicholas Trickett holds an M.A. in Eurasian studies through the European University at St. Petersburg with a focus on energy security and Russian foreign policy. He is an associate scholar at FPRI and Editor-in-Chief of BMB Russia.

WASHINGTON — President Donald Trump’s impatience with the 17-year-old war in Afghanistan has prompted U.S. diplomats and commanders to gamble on a bid to kick-start peace negotiations, including holding direct talks with the Taliban, current and former U.S. officials told NBC News.

The outreach represents the most serious diplomatic effort to end the war in five years but comes at a time when the Taliban is in a position of relative strength on the battlefield, firmly entrenched in rural districts with U.S.-backed Afghan forces unable to turn the tide despite ramped-up American bombing.

Afghan government officials remain concerned that the U.S. could appear desperate for a peace settlement, allowing the Taliban to squeeze concessions from a superpower fatigued with a grinding war that has settled into a stalemate.

“There’s a danger that the Taliban will smell weakness,” one foreign diplomat told NBC News.

Trump’s impulsive nature, along with his openly expressed doubts about the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, has injected a sense of urgency among senior officials and military officers. The last diplomatic attempt to end the war ended in abject failure in 2013, amid acrimony between Afghanistan’s then-President Hamid Karzai and U.S. officials.

Although Trump reluctantly approved the deployment of several thousand additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan last year, he remains skeptical about keeping the 15,000-strong force in place. With no clear military victory in sight, U.S. officials are worried the president could abruptly pull the plug on the mission without advance warning.

“Just because he signed on to this policy in August, most of the people who work for him have no trust and confidence that he’ll stick to his policies,” said a former senior U.S. official familiar with administration discussions, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

As a result, the administration is now focused on a high-risk diplomatic wager to end the conflict. Spearheaded by Alice Wells, the senior State Department official overseeing South Asia, the diplomacy has featured a series of conversations with major powers in the region as well as contacts with Taliban representatives at venues outside of Afghanistan.

Although the U.S. has maintained a channel to the Taliban over the years, the discussions have become more frequent, more high-level and more ambitious, former U.S. officials and foreign diplomats said. However, the talks are still portrayed as preliminary, designed to set the conditions for an eventual negotiation between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

A senior Afghan Taliban official offered a similar description, saying the meetings are not formal negotiations but are meant to find a way to hold “fruitful and results-oriented peace talks in the future.”

The most recent meeting took place within the past week in the Qatari capital of Doha, with Wells leading the U.S. delegation, foreign diplomats said. Taliban sources say meetings have also taken place in the United Arab Emirates.

“We have held a number of meetings with U.S. officials in the past, but never found them this serious for peace talks with us,” the Taliban source said. “They conveyed to us a 100 percent green light for peace talks and we decided to meet again very soon.”

The former number three-ranking official at the State Department, Thomas Shannon, who helped shape U.S. policy for the region in Trump’s first year in office, acknowledged the U.S. dialogue with the Taliban and suggested that the insurgents appear more open to peace talks than in the past.

“Our own engagement with the Taliban has indicated an interest and willingness on their part,” Shannon said at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21.

Shannon also credited Afghan President Ashraf Ghani with creating the conditions for possible peace talks and for rallying other governments — including Islamic countries — to the cause.

He said he was not ready to say he was optimistic, but cited positive signs, like a three-day cease-fire last month, that could eventually produce momentum toward peace or at least a winding down of the war.

“I think we are in a position in which there are possibilities and potential out there for political resolutions,” said Shannon, who retired from the diplomatic service in February.

“One thing was very positive, that we noticed U.S. authorities seemed very eager to meet again and again to bring peace to Afghanistan.”

Describing the most recent round of talks, the senior Taliban official said the meeting “took place in a very friendly environment and the two sides carefully listened to each other’s demands and proposals for future negotiations.”

“They wanted us to announce a cease-fire soon after the beginning of the peace process, which we refused,” he added. “However, we agreed to meet again somewhere in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar or somewhere else.”

He said the meeting was at a high level and lower-ranking Taliban representatives in the Qatar-based office were not invited to it.

“Our Qatar office is like a post office and it is not authorized to make important decisions or hold high-level meetings without the approval of the leadership council,” he said. The Taliban will now discuss the proposals in its leadership council meeting and will make decisions for future talks with the U.S., he said.

“One thing was very positive, that we noticed U.S. authorities seemed very eager to meet again and again to bring peace to Afghanistan,” he added.

The U.S. side queried the Taliban about its interest in having a role in a future Afghan government, and also discussed the possibility of suspending U.S. military operations in a particular province while peace talks took place, the Taliban official said.

NBC News could not confirm details of the Taliban official’s account of the discussions.

The Trump administration has neither confirmed nor denied the discussions with the Taliban but has acknowledged Wells led a U.S. delegation to Qatar a week ago. A State Department spokesperson reiterated the U.S. administration’s standard public stance, telling NBC News that “any negotiations over the political future of Afghanistan will be between the Taliban and Afghan government.‎”

Administration officials are keenly aware that any direct outreach to the Taliban runs the risk of alienating their partners in the Afghan government. Anxious to avoid a repeat of the distrust that plagued America’s relationship with former Afghan President Karzai, U.S. officials and military officers are going out of their way to keep current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in the loop and fully briefed on their talks with the Taliban.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.Rahmat Gul / AP file

“President Karzai thought we were hiding things from him, that we never gave him full readouts,” the former U.S. official said.

“With Ghani, we have a much different relationship. Everything we’ve done, we’ve told the Afghans about it beforehand.”

When media coverage of last month’s temporary cease-fire portrayed the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, as the mastermind behind the deal, his office promptly issued a statement rejecting that account.

Afghan officials — and other foreign governments — had privately protested to the Trump administration that the news reports could damage Ghani’s political position, especially as some of his domestic rivals are critical of any U.S. talks with the Taliban and of Ghani’s offers to negotiate without preconditions.

To reassure Kabul, U.S. officials have discussed potential arrangements designed to ensure the Afghan government is not shut out of any negotiations and plays the lead role in hammering out a peace deal with its Taliban foes. One scenario would have the U.S. speak to the Taliban as a first step, with the discussions quickly followed up by talks between Afghan government officials and Taliban leaders, former officials said.

It is also possible a third party, perhaps Saudi Arabia or a United Nations envoy, could act as a mediator for the talks, former officials and foreign diplomats said. The Taliban has long refused offers to negotiate with the Afghan government and has instead demanded direct talks with the U.S. to push for the full withdrawal of American forces from the country.

“The Taliban see us as the big prize. They’ve always been asking for direct talks with the United States,” one former U.S. diplomat said.

Apart from Trump’s outlook and desire to see U.S. troops depart, several current and former U.S. officials believe other factors are in play that could present a chance at forging genuine peace negotiations. The three-day cease-fire last month exposed weary foot soldiers in the Taliban insurgency who embraced the chance to venture into towns and snap selfies with Afghan police. And unlike under the Obama administration, the U.S. has set no exit date for American troops while continuing to hammer the Taliban from the air, making it difficult for the insurgents to stage major ground offensives or to simply wait out the U.S.

White House officials, who had been initially wary of the diplomatic push, have endorsed the effort while insisting the U.S. not be seen as overly eager in its dealings with the insurgents, former officials said. Senior U.S. military leaders, who were less enthusiastic for diplomacy when President Barack Obama was in office, have also enthusiastically backed the effort. And in contrast to the previous administration that saw bitter internal battles over Afghan policy pitting the American ambassador against top commanders, senior U.S. diplomats, military officers and White House officials are working in a coherent way and are not bogged down in disputes.

One country that could hold the key to any peace process is neighboring Pakistan, which helped create the Taliban and has remained its key patron, much to the frustration of the U.S. and Afghan governments. Wells has held extensive talks with the Pakistan government and military to urge them to play an active role and help persuade the Taliban to enter into formal negotiations with the Afghan government.

So far, Islamabad has yet to play a constructive role in fostering peace talks, despite repeated appeals from Washington. But it has not sought to sabotage the fledgling diplomacy either, current and former officials said.

Dan De Luce and Courtney Kube reported from Washington, Mushtaq Yusufzai from Peshawar, Pakistan, and F. Brinley Bruton from London.

SHEBERGHAN, Afghanistan — The top commander of the Islamic State in northern Afghanistan stood behind a lectern decorated with the shield of the Afghan government’s powerful intelligence agency.

On his left was the police general in charge of the province. Arrayed behind him was an assortment of other dignitaries: police, army, political figures. An attendant put a bottle of mineral water nearby, in case the intense heat made the commander thirsty.

This is how the Islamic State commander, Maulavi Habib ul-Rahman, began his “imprisonment” on Thursday. Along with 250 of his fighters, Mr. Rahman had surrendered the day before to the Afghan government in the northern province of Jowzjan, to avoid being captured by the Taliban.

He thanked his hosts and, in a scolding tone, warned them to stick to the deal they had just made. “Provide us with personal security as well as stay loyal to the commitments made between us so it prepares the ground for others who fight against the government to join the peace process,” Mr. Rahman demanded from the dais.

Peace process? Officially, Mr. Rahman, another Islamic State commander, hundreds of fighters and 20 relatives traveling with them were prisoners who had turned themselves in to the government to avoid imminent capture by Taliban insurgents who had conducted a monthlong offensiveagainst them.

Other insurgents have joined the government side through a formal peace process open to those not accused of human rights abuses, but that is not a possibility with the Islamic State, officials insisted.

“They surrendered to Afghan forces — they did not join the peace process. These are two different things,” said Gen. Faqir Mohammad Jawzjani, the provincial police chief, who shared the podium with Mr. Rahman.

If they were prisoners, however, it was hard to tell. The government arranged for them to stay in a guesthouse in the provincial capital of Sheberghan. Guards were posted around it not to keep the insurgents in, but to keep their potential enemies out, according to the provincial governor. Although the fighters were disarmed, they were allowed to keep their cellphones and other personal possessions.

In the guesthouse, the Islamic State fighters celebrated their good fortune, hugging and slapping one another on the back. One of their commanders, Mufti Nemat, wearing in a pink shalwar kameez and a knockoff of an Apple watch and holding a satellite phone, fielded calls steadily between giving interviews.

The police said that about 100 of the prisoners were younger than 18. Many young fighters were stunned to see journalists and officials without beards, and loudly denounced them as “infidels.”

Some of the police officers were angry. “Why didn’t we just let the Taliban kill them, instead of treating them like honored guests?” one officer said.

At their peak, the ISIS fighters in northern Afghanistan numbered as many as 500 followers of Qari Hekmatullah, until he was killed in an American airstrike in April. Mr. Rahman and Mr. Nemat, who are brothers-in-law, then emerged as the leaders of the group.

Mr. Nemat bemoaned what he described as a “fake news” climate around their decision to go over to the government side. “We believe that the U.S. supports the Taliban,” he said. “Everyone is against us. Every side puts pressure on us: the Afghan government, the Taliban and also the people. The whole world is against us.”

Mr. Nemat said he joined the Islamic State because he believed in the group’s ideology, which he felt was closer to Afghan values than that of the Taliban or the government. Mr. Nemat, Mr. Rahman and their followers previously fought on the side of the Taliban and the government before joining the Islamic State in 2016.

“We want other people to accept our ideas with their hearts, not by force,” Mr. Nemat said. “There is no need to force people to accept us.”

Maulavi Habib ul-Rahman, center, a top ISIS commander, demanded that officials “provide us with personal security.” They were given guards.CreditNajim Rahim/The New York Times

The dubious nature of the Islamic State surrender has proved a propaganda bonanza for the Taliban, which began an offensive with thousands of fighters about a month ago to wipe out the Islamic State group in the north. All of their fighters have now surrendered, been captured by the Taliban or been killed, according to Mr. Nemat, as well as government and Taliban spokesmen.

Much was made by the Taliban and by the government’s critics here of the mode of the Islamic State prisoners’ arrival in Sheberghan. They were ferried from the battlefield in Afghan Army helicopters, avoiding a potentially dangerous journey on the roads.

Mr. Nemat, was nervously defiant, saying: “The Afghan government promised they wouldn’t punish us. The Afghan government must save my life and provide me with security.” He insisted his commanders and their followers were guilty of nothing other than fighting on the battlefield. “I am ready to go to court if there is any proof against me,” he said.

Lines had already started forming outside the provincial police headquarters, with people offering such proof. General Jawzjani said 50 complaints had been received by Thursday: “On every complaint, the fighters will be questioned and investigated.”

The complainants included Yar Mohammad, 53, a farmer from the Darzab district of Jowzjan Province, where the Islamic State fighters had their stronghold in the north. On July 24, he said, his pregnant niece, Noria, was shot to death by Mr. Rahman and Mr. Nemat’s group of fighters while she was visiting the doctor. Five months earlier, his cousin Barakatullah was beheaded by them on suspicion of supporting the government.

“ISIS fighters killed more than 100 people in Darzab,” Mr. Mohammad said. “The government has to prosecute these killers.” The Islamic State is more commonly known in Afghanistan as ISIS or Daesh.

After watching television footage of the prisoners being fed rice pilaf with meat and vegetables and bottled water, Abdul Hamid, 52, was infuriated. Along with some 10,000 other people over the past two years, he had fled Darzab to a squalid life as a displaced person in Sheberghan, where meat is an unimaginable luxury.

“We lost everything to Daesh, and now the government sends helicopters for them from Kabul and brings them here and gives them rice and meat and mineral water, and provides them with security, and we are not even able to find food,” he railed.

The governor of the province, Lutfullah Azizi, said any crimes would not be overlooked. “We welcome them if they accept Afghan law,” he said. “But those who committed crimes, if there is any documentation or proven complaint against them, they will be punished.” He added that “hundreds” of complaints had been lodged against them during their years in power.

Many of the Islamic State’s crimes are well documented in their own Facebook and WhatsApp posts, with videos of them burning opponents alive, stoning people to death, training children as fighters, and shooting bound prisoners.

They also took credit previously for the killings of six workers from the International Committee for the Red Cross last year, an atrocity that was part of the reason the Red Cross has suspended much of its operations in northern Afghanistan.

On April 15, “they beheaded a 12-year-old child on an allegation of cooperating with local police,” said Baz Mohammad Dawar, 32, also a refugee from Darzab. “They committed hundreds of crimes including raping women and girls, enslaving women, killing and beheading.

“People will not let this go. They killed too many of their sons, and stole so much of their livestock, there will be huge protests if the government does not punish them.”

The Islamic State still has a major pocket of fighters in the southern part of Nangarhar Province, in eastern Afghanistan, but concerted attacks on them by American and Afghan special forces, backed up by airstrikes, have greatly reduced their presence in that area. In recent months, they have concentrated instead on launching suicide attacks on lightly defended civilian targets.

An official with the National Directorate of Security, the powerful intelligence agency, said the Islamic State group would be in for a surprise once they were transferred to the custody of the N.D.S. in Kabul.

“We don’t do peace with ISIS,” he said. “ISIS is an international terror group. We don’t make peace with terrorists.”

]]>http://dawatmedia.com/afghanistan/are-isis-fighters-prisoners-or-honored-guests-of-the-afghan-government/feed/0The Trump Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum- by: Siddieq Noorzoyhttp://dawatmedia.com/articles/the-trump-tariffs-on-steel-and-aluminum-by-siddieq-noorzoy/
http://dawatmedia.com/articles/the-trump-tariffs-on-steel-and-aluminum-by-siddieq-noorzoy/#respondThu, 02 Aug 2018 22:06:20 +0000http://dawatmedia.com/?p=1886Despite many objections by members of his own party, the Republican Party to the earlier reports that President Donald Trump

was going to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum and much concerns by US trading partners around the world

President Trump announced a 25% tariff on steel imports and 10% on aluminum, while giving Canada and Mexico exemptions.

The argument for the tariffs used was ‘national security’ in the framework of “America First”. When the reports came out

on March 8, 2018, the many strong objections from many sources to the tariffs had been ignored by the Administration.

Then it was to the markets to react. Thus, the clearest signal of displeasure was that within the hour of the announcement

the Dow Jones Industrial Index fell by 300 points creating concerns among stock market traders that a trade war may follow

with China and even with European Union.

Historically the arguments for the protection of domestic industries through tariffs or quotas are not seen as legitimate except in the case of infant industries

where domestic firms are just starting and they argue they need protection from foreign competition until they mature. The arguments

made by the Trump Administration for imposing the tariffs are not in this category since these industries are highly mature and open competition in

trade benefit other domestic industries that use steel and aluminum such as the auto industry which was not happy about the tariffs since

their costs will rise. Consumers will pay more for many products and no new investment is expected to take place in the steel and aluminum

industries in the US. And the threat from other nations following with their own tariffs will, if followed, will reduce world trade and reduce national income

and employment all around as happened in the 1930’s when the US imposed the Smoot-Hawley tariff of June 1932 during the Hoover Administration

with the notion to fight off the depression and high unemployment. Retaliations followed, US trade shrank and depression worsened.

All the arguments thus far made by the Trump Administration and others have been based on the concept of comparative static efficiently

where it has been argued that tariff protection raises the output and employment in the protected industry. This goes back to 1792 in the US when

Alexander Hamilton made an argument for tariffs for US industries. The argument became later known as the tariff argument for infant industry.

It is of interest to note that the stock price of US steel declined in the stock market following the tariff announcement. This may be taking as a signal by

the market that the announced increase in steel tariffs may lead to decreases in efficiency and productivity and decline in profits thus the falling interest by stock investors.

The Dynamic Arguments

All along tariff arguments have been based on comparative statistics where things are held constant for comparisons, which ignored the dynamic nature of events

and the arguments in a dynamic competitive world and the fact that we work in a changing world which cannot be held constant.

Building a theoretical model around these concepts some time ago, and an econometric model to capture the theory it was argued that losses in competitive market forces work in ways

that increases in tariffs will lead to losses of productivity and output and decreases In tariffs are expected to lead to gains in productivity through gains in efficiency

and thus lead to greater output. The available statistical data for testing these arguments were confined to the case of reducing tariffs during the Kennedy Rounds of tariff reductions in 1967-72.

Taking statistical data for 40 Canadian products-industries and in another study taking 100 products-industries for the US for this period the argument for the dynamic tariff changes were tested.

The results largely supported the dynamic theoretical arguments that reductions in tariffs had resulted in gains in efficiency, productivity, and output for the period of tariff reductions.

Steel and steel products were included among the Canadian industries and aluminum and steel were included among the US sample of statistical data.

The study with the Canadian data was published in the article:

Tariff Reductions and Gains in Efficiency: Some Evidence from Canadian Data, Economics Letters, ( North Holland) March 1979, pp. 51-57.

Two other studieson the topic with US data are: Tariffs, Production Patterns and the Gains from Trade, Research Paper No. 79-2, Department of Economics, University of Alberta

President Trump signed a memorandum Thursday directing the U.S. Trade Representative to impose an estimated $50 billion in tariffs on China, which will go into effect in at least 45 days.

“We have spoken to China and we are in the midst of a very large negotiation,” Mr. Trump said. “We will see where it takes us. In the meantime, we are sending a Section 301 action.”

Mr. Trump said he has asked Chinese officials to immediately reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China by $100 billion.

Mr. Trump also made news at the end of the event, when he told reporters he still wants to testify before special counsel Robert Mueller.

“Yes,” Mr. Trump said, according to the White House press pool. “I would like to.”

The tariffs will target what White House trade adviser Peter Navarro described on a conference call with reporters as China’s market distorting and “discriminatory practices” to steal American intellectual property and unfair technology transfers.

Deputy director of the National Economic Council Everett Eissenstat, who was also on the call, said that USTR will publish a “long list” of proposed Chinese imports within 15 days. A notice and comment period will then open up for stakeholder input.

The Treasury department has until 60 days from memorandum’s signing to submit recommendations for a final list of tariffs.

The tariffs, senior officials say, will be designed to offset “the gains that the Chinese have received through unfair trade practices.”

The memorandum will also direct the Treasury department to make recommendations on restrictions to Chinese investments to the President within 60 days. While the tariffs will be imposed unilaterally, Eissenstat also said that Mr. Trump will direct the World Trade organization to “address China’s discriminatory licensing practices.”

White House officials did not specify which products will be targeted by the tariffs but the stock market opened lower on on Thursday morning with investors worried that Mr. Trump’s actions will trigger retaliatory actions from China.

The Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday that China is already preparing measures to hit back at the U.S. by targeting U.S. agricultural exports like soybeans and hogs.

Navarro claimed the administration has tried “very, very hard to work with the Chinese.

“Trump did his due diligence in inviting the Chinese to the Mar-a-Lago process and engaged and we went all the way to August trying to resolve these issues through dialogues,” Navarro told reporters.

On Monday, Wal-Mart, Target, Macy’s, Best Buy and other major retailers released a letter urging the President not to impose tariffs on China arguing that they could “punish American working families with higher prices on household basics like clothing, shoes, electronics, and home goods.

The U.S. Chamber of commerce also pushed back back in a statement over the weekend to say that tariffs are “damaging taxes on American consumers.”

A White House official said that while stakeholder input is “important and valued,” dialogue with the Chinese over the past 15 years has been fruitless.

“China has been well aware of these concerns for many many years so the president has decided that now is the time to take decisive actions,” the official said.

U.S. trade representative announces there will be investment restrictions on China

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer announced there will be some investment restrictions on China, related to intellectual property rights issues.

]]>http://dawatmedia.com/articles/the-trump-tariffs-on-steel-and-aluminum-by-siddieq-noorzoy/feed/0Building on Afghanistan’s Fleeting Ceasefirehttp://dawatmedia.com/afghanistan/building-on-afghanistans-fleeting-ceasefire/
http://dawatmedia.com/afghanistan/building-on-afghanistans-fleeting-ceasefire/#respondThu, 19 Jul 2018 16:45:21 +0000http://dawatmedia.com/?p=1882The end-of-Ramadan truce in Afghanistan was brief but encouraging, demonstrating that both Afghan government soldiers and the Taliban rank and file will respect ceasefire orders from above. Both sides, alongside the U.S., should now seize the opportunity to edge closer to meaningful talks about peace.

What’s new? The Afghan government, international forces, and Taliban insurgents all observed a temporary ceasefire during the Eid al-Fitr holiday. The truce was unprecedented in Afghanistan’s long war, brought a remarkable decline in violence and prompted scenes of joy across the country, often involving government and Taliban forces celebrating together.

Why does it matter? The truce demonstrated that leaders on both sides exert significant control over their forces, which is important given that neither side had trusted their opponent’s cohesion. The festivities showed the enormous appetite among Afghans, including some combatants, for peace. Both these factors bode well for a future peace process.

What should be done? Washington should empower an envoy to speak to the Taliban and clarify that U.S. troops could leave Afghanistan were the movement and the Afghan government to sign a peace deal broadly acceptable in Afghan society. Taliban leaders should drop their refusal to talk to the Afghan government and engage Kabul.

Executive Summary

For three days over the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Afghanistan witnessed an historic ceasefire by the main parties to its decades-long and ever bloodier conflict. A steep drop in violence brought a brief sense of normalcy to Afghans exhausted by war and prompted countrywide festivities. The truce proved there is a strong domestic constituency for peace. It also revealed coherence in the chain of command among both the Afghan security forces and the Taliban, as unit leaders, though often taken aback by the order to stop fighting, overwhelmingly complied. All sides should seize the opening to move toward peace. President Ashraf Ghani already has offered unconditional talks with the Taliban. The U.S. government, which reports suggest is now ready to speak directly to insurgent leaders, should empower an envoy to do so and should make clear, including publicly, that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan would be on the table were a peace deal broadly acceptable in Afghan society signed between insurgents and the Afghan government. The Taliban should enter peace talks with President Ghani’s government.

The Eid truce led to a dramatic reduction in bloodshed. There were two notable exceptions, both of them strikes claimed by the small Islamic State (ISIS) branch in Afghanistan. These attacks did little to dampen celebrations, however. Government and Taliban fighters hugged each other, took selfies, sang and danced together, and exchanged flowers and gifts. As they reconciled, albeit temporarily, they often were mobbed by cheering crowds of flag-waving civilians. Tens of thousands of Afghans crossed battle lines to visit friends and kin. The merriment was restrained in the north and other places where fear of the Taliban is greatest. But most of the country, particularly areas that suffer the worst violence, saw scenes of joy and optimism unknown for years.

The coherence of both sides during the detente, especially in an insurgency often portrayed as fractured, augurs well for future peace talks.

The Taliban resumed fighting after Eid, despite an offer by President Ghani to extend the ceasefire. But though short-lived, the truce was instructive for future peace efforts. The outburst of celebration showed the depth of most Afghans’ yearning for an end to the war. Government and Taliban foot soldiers and commanders could be heard expressing their appreciation for the respite from battle. Their intermingling went some way toward debunking the notion that the war is defined by an insurmountable ideological divide. The Taliban’s internal deliberations on the truce revealed a lobby for peace and compromise within the movement itself.

Most crucially, the ceasefire showed that leaders on both sides can enforce an order. While neither prepared their forces for the truce, both – the Afghan government and the U.S. and other international forces, on the one hand, and the Taliban, on the other – showed impressive discipline. Both refrained from exploiting a moment of vulnerability with surprise attacks. A three-day truce during Eid is, of course, a far cry from a political settlement involving major compromises with enemies. Still, the coherence of both sides during the detente, especially in an insurgency often portrayed as fractured, augurs well for future peace talks.

Progress toward such talks has long been deadlocked. Successive Afghan governments have expressed their willingness to speak to insurgent leaders. Most recently, President Ghani offered to do so without preconditions – a bold step, given that some of his top officials only recently dismissed the Taliban as a disparate bunch of terrorists. The Taliban, however, have always insisted on direct talks with the U.S., which they view as their primary foe. In the past, the U.S. has rejected the idea that it is a party to the conflict, believing that Afghans should resolve their differences themselves, and has refused to discuss the question of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. But that stance appears to have evolved. U.S. officials’ statements, media reports and Crisis Group’s own research suggest that Washington is ready to take the important and welcome step of speaking directly to the Taliban and putting the issue of a U.S. troop withdrawal on the table. All sides should build on the momentum created by the Eid ceasefire and these latest developments:

The U.S. should open a formal channel to the Taliban leadership. Washington could empower an envoy to speak directly with counterparts in the Taliban’s political office in Doha, as well as Kabul and regional capitals. The U.S. also should explicitly put the withdrawal of U.S. and other international forces on the table, including in public statements. It should, however, make clear that an agreement on the nature of and timeline for such a drawdown would be part of, or contingent upon, a settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government that is broadly acceptable in Afghan society.

The Taliban leadership should accept talks with the Afghan government. If the ceasefire illustrated the Taliban’s coherence, it showed, too, that President Ghani controls the Afghan forces against which the Taliban is mostly engaged in day-to-day fighting and which suffer far more casualties than their U.S. counterparts. Taliban leaders would also have to recognise that any agreement for international forces’ withdrawal hinges on a wider peace deal, likely including national and local power-sharing arrangements, security sector reform and a process for rewriting the Afghan constitution.

All sides could take confidence-building steps including, potentially, further ceasefires, prisoner exchanges or greater transparency in coordination between Kabul and insurgents in delivering basic services in Taliban-controlled areas. All parties should maintain the more measured tone they adopted in their rhetoric during the ceasefire.

The Eid truce has shown war-weary Afghans, including combatants, what peace might bring. It comes alongside other signs of movement, first President Ghani’s offer of unconditional talks with the Taliban and then signs that Washington is willing to speak directly to Taliban leaders and broach the troop withdrawal issue. Direct U.S.-Taliban talks are no panacea. The Taliban may still reject engagement with Kabul, at least initially, and even if it accepts intra-Afghan talks, such talks would mark only the start of a long and difficult road toward a settlement amenable to all major Afghan factions and broader Afghan society. But the U.S. speaking directly to the Taliban is the best bet for getting to those negotiations and kickstarting a long-overdue peace process.

Kabul/Brussels, 19 July 2018

I.Introduction

The war in Afghanistan, pitting Afghan government forces and a U.S.-led international coalition against an increasingly potent Taliban insurgency, has escalated steadily over recent years.The first half of 2018 has seen new heights of violence, with the Taliban controlling, influencing or contesting some 44 per cent of districts across the country and launching an unprecedented number of attacks.Yet for three days in June, over the Eid al-Fitr holiday, both sides ordered their respective forces to stand down. The ceasefire, unprecedented since the Taliban’s ouster from Kabul in 2001, saw a remarkable decline in levels of bloodshed and prompted celebrations across the country. It proved only a fleeting respite, as fighting resumed shortly afterward. Nonetheless, it could give fresh momentum to efforts to find a peaceful settlement to Afghanistan’s brutal war.

This report examines how the truce came about, what motivated both sides to participate and why the Taliban refused to prolong it, despite a unilateral extension from President Ashraf Ghani. It draws lessons from the ceasefire for efforts to nudge the two sides toward peace talks and lays out steps that they, and particularly U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, can take to build on the momentum. It is informed by Crisis Group’s observations during travels around three provinces west and south of Kabul during the Eid holiday and interviews with Afghan government officials, including senior members of Ghani’s government, civilians in urban and rural areas, and a wide range of sources within the insurgency.

II.How Did the Ceasefire Happen?

Alongside an intensification in hostilities since the beginning of 2018, there has been a marked increase in peace overtures from both sides of the conflict.In late February, President Ashraf Ghani unexpectedly offered peace talks with the Taliban. At a conference with major foreign partners, he approved a joint declaration stating that they “collectively agree that direct talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban – without any preconditions and without the threats of violence – constitute the most viable way to end the ongoing agony of the Afghan people”.Ghani’s February declaration was an important opening to talks. It also signalled a pivot of sorts: leading figures in his administration had argued over the preceding months that the insurgent leaders were too hardline and the Taliban too fragmented to make any such gambit worthwhile.

As for the Taliban, it published three statements in February 2018 calling for peace talks, including a direct letter “to the American people”.The movement’s response to President Ghani’s offer of peace talks that same month also suggested a subtle change in tack. In the past, the Taliban had swiftly rejected any Afghan government calls for talks. It has long asserted its desire to speak exclusively to the U.S., which it regards as its chief antagonist, not the government.This time, however, the insurgent leaders remained silent. While privately Taliban officials dismissed the proposal as “nothing new”, the movement stopped short of publicly spurning Ghani’s offer.When the president reiterated it in late March, at a conference in the Uzbek capital Tashkent, many observers interpreted the Taliban’s continued silence as a sign that the movement was deliberating internally about whether to make a positive reply.

In May, Ghani reportedly discussed with General John Nicholson, commander of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in the country, an even more dramatic gesture: a unilateral ceasefire, on the occasion of the upcoming Eid al-Fitr holiday.Some Afghan government officials apparently voiced reservations, saying there was insufficient time to assess security implications.Yet on 7 July Ghani, to the surprise of some Afghan army commanders, announced an eight-day halt in offensive operations against the Taliban during the festive season.The U.S. military pledged to honour the ceasefire, while continuing operations against the small affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS) in eastern Afghanistan.Western and regional diplomats commended Ghani’s initiative, which reportedly reflected months of dialogue between Kabul and its foreign allies about how to end the war.This put additional pressure on the Taliban leadership, caught off guard by Ghani’s gesture, to respond.

That the Taliban leadership framed the ceasefire as a gesture to allow celebrations of the religious holiday seems to have minimised risks of explicit opposition.

The notion of announcing their own ceasefire was not wholly unfamiliar to the Taliban. Some mid-level Taliban political advisers had floated it over the past winter as a unilateral move the movement could initiate to demonstrate their interest in peace. At the time, insurgent leaders decided a ceasefire would be too risky, notably because it could be misinterpreted as an outcome of U.S. military pressure or cited by U.S. officials as yet another instance of Afghanistan “turning a corner”.

Ghani’s initiative confronted the Taliban with a more vexing dilemma. Governments, including those of Iran, China, and Russia as well as Western powers, applauded the president’s truce offer and some encouraged the Taliban to reciprocate; Afghans themselves also overwhelmingly welcomed the government’s ceasefire.Moreover, Ghani’s gesture was perfectly timed: it coincided with one of the country’s most important religious holidays, Eid al-Fitr, a period after Ramadan fasting when Muslims are required to resolve disputes and during which the Taliban had scaled back attacks in the past. A small group of pragmatic Taliban officials lobbied the insurgent leadership to respond positively. Their argument that the movement needed to change its image as purely a “war machine” reportedly carried weight in internal deliberations.They also made the case that a successful ceasefire could usefully demonstrate the movement’s coherence and its leaders’ ability to enforce a truce.

Others took credit. In particular, Pakistani officials subsequently asserted that they had nudged the Taliban toward a ceasefire. U.S. diplomats hinted that they had encouraged Pakistan to play such a role.According to some reports, Pakistan agreed to pressure the Taliban in exchange for the U.S. killing of Mullah Fazlullah, the Pakistani Taliban leader, in an airstrike.Senior Afghan officials initially accepted Pakistan’s claims but later concluded that the Taliban’s declaration was driven by dynamics within the insurgency.Interlocutors familiar with the Afghan Taliban’s deliberations likewise assert that the decision to pause hostilities had no link to Pakistani pressure.Indeed, suggestions that Pakistan’s influence was decisive arguably made the Taliban leadership more intransigent, as they sought to counter the impression they were under Islamabad’s thumb.

Also contrary to early speculation, Taliban sources maintain the decision was not preceded by extensive consultations with insurgent commanders or military heavyweights.Deliberations reportedly were limited to leadership circles, including a number of Taliban figures who often provide substantive input on political decisions. The Taliban leadership then moved quickly, with the help of senior members responsible for media relations, to issue a statement on 9 June declaring their own ceasefire. The Taliban’s truce suspended operations against Afghan forces for three days. The pause did not extend to foreign forces, but attacks on international troops were minimal; the Taliban claimed a small symbolic operation on 15 June as they shelled the largest U.S. base in Afghanistan, Bagram Airfield north of Kabul.

Many senior movement members, as well as commanders across the country, reportedly were surprised when they awoke to the announcement.A handful of commanders grumbled about the ceasefire or the way it was announced.But their misgivings, which often related to either the commanders’ belief that the insurgency was on the front foot, with little need to compromise, or to their distrust of enemy intentions, were quickly subsumed by the broader consensus. Crisis Group had access to audio recordings of a number of military heavyweights, including commanders in the Haqqani network – a faction responsible for some of the Taliban’s bloodiest attacks – that suggest they only learned of the declaration after its announcement.But even those who were startled mostly expressed support.That the Taliban leadership framed the ceasefire as a gesture to allow celebrations of the religious holiday seems to have minimised risks of explicit opposition.

III.Jubilation as the Guns Fall (Mostly) Silent

The three-day Eid al-Fitr holiday always occasions a slowdown in the war, as fighters return home from the battlefields to spend time with their families. But this year’s drop was dramatic: according to some monitors, security incidents were down by as much as two thirds compared with previous Eid holidays.The decline was steepest during the three days of the Taliban’s ceasefire, from the evening of 14 June to sunset on 17 June.In an ordinary weekend, Afghans across the country suffer through more than 100 incidents, from bombings to assassinations and clashes. During the Eid weekend, such incidents reportedly numbered in the single digits.

Moreover, the perpetrators were different. On an average day, the war between the Taliban and pro-government forces accounts for more than 95 per cent of violent incidents in Afghanistan. During the ceasefire, however, the Taliban did not contribute much to the tally. Criminal gangs and pro-government militias skirmished over personal disputes. Civilians were injured in gunfire let off in end-of-Ramadan exuberance. The local ISIS affiliate appears to have committed the most serious violations. On 16 and 17 June, suicide bombers attacked gatherings that were celebrating the ceasefire, killing at least 48 people. The strikes killed Taliban and Afghan security forces, underlining that ISIS sees both as their enemy.

With people trying to impress on the warring parties how badly Afghans want peace, participation in Eid festivities was a form of civic activism.

But these attacks did not dispel the jubilation in streets across much of the country. In many areas the festivities involved Taliban fighters and Afghan soldiers sipping tea, telling jokes and even joining each other in traditional dances, while singing Afghan patriotic songs. Raucous crowds hailed the scenes of reconciliation, fleeting as it may have been. Families that had been torn apart by a long war reunited. Women and children attended the revelries, in contrast with previous Eid holidays during which families avoided crowds because they feared bombings. Under the circumstances, with people trying to impress on the warring parties how badly Afghans want peace, participation in Eid festivities was a form of civic activism. People with no background in such activism turned out.

Such scenes were not limited to cities and towns. Even contested areas along the front lines, typically impassable due to running battles between Afghan forces and insurgents, turned into venues for both sides to mark the Eid holiday.Celebrations were quieter in the north and other parts of the country dominated by non-Pashtuns wariest of the Taliban. Some better-educated urbanites were sceptical.But most of Afghanistan, and particularly the most war-ravaged regions, was gripped by euphoria.

A common theme in the ceasefire celebrations was suspicion, shared on both sides, that outsiders fuel the war. Many soldiers and Taliban fighters, when asked why they fought if they evidently intermingled so easily, blamed either foreigners (by which government troops meant interlopers backing the Taliban, primarily Pakistanis) or “Americans” (insurgent shorthand for not only the U.S. but also other Western forces).

Not all politicians welcomed the celebrations, although only a few prominent figures said so out loud. Former Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh became a leading critic, warning of a “Taliban Tet offensive” and “mass infiltration”.On the insurgent side, some Taliban commanders and ideologues condemned the fraternisation as a betrayal of thousands of martyrs, accusing foot soldiers of being too friendly during the ceasefire.

These voices, while a minority, reflected divergent perspectives within the Taliban regarding their “internal enemy”, the term they use to designate Afghan government forces. For many Taliban, Afghan soldiers are enemies primarily because they shield foreign troops from attack; in the absence of a foreign presence, in other words, reconciliation would be possible. Insurgent hardliners, in contrast, view the Afghan army’s affiliation with the government as sufficient reason for animosity, and thus consider mingling with them to be treachery.Overall, however, a majority on both sides expressed support for the ceasefire. Even Atta Mohammad Noor, a former Northern Alliance commander with a long history of battling the Taliban, now an opposition politician and Tajik powerbroker, backed the truce and called for its extension.

IV.The Taliban’s Refusal to Extend the Ceasefire

As the end of the ceasefire approached, pressure mounted on the Taliban leadership to extend it. On 16 June, President Ghani prolonged the government’s truce, subsequently specifying that the extension would last for ten days. Ghani offered medical assistance to wounded Taliban and family visits to insurgent prisoners. Other Afghan leaders called on the Taliban to reciprocate, while many ordinary Afghans held out hope for a prolonged period of calm, wishing that popular backing for the Eid ceasefire would persuade insurgent leaders.As peace demonstrators from southern Helmand province marched hundreds of kilometres from their home province to Kabul, hundreds of supporters gathered along their route to amplify their calls for a halt to the violence.International actors, including the UN, echoed calls to maintain the ceasefire.In parts of Afghanistan, even senior Taliban field commanders reportedly pushed their leaders for an extension.

These appeals fell on deaf ears. Although the demands triggered discussions within the Taliban’s top ranks, on the whole the leadership opposed an extension. Taliban sources advance several reasons. First, they felt that prolonging the ceasefire would not have brought the movement closer to its core goals: withdrawal of foreign forces and establishment of a new government that meets its standards of Islamic rule.This sentiment was reflected on the battlefield. A commander said: “We have not fought for nothing all these years. We are not going to give up our jihad merely because some people are demanding it”.He dismissed calls to extend the ceasefire as tantamount to asking for unilateral Taliban concessions without reciprocal steps from either the government or the U.S.

Taliban leaders insisted their three-day Eid ceasefire was a unilateral decision, justified not by Ghani’s own proclamation but by the religious holiday.

Second, Taliban leaders did not want to appear to be succumbing to pressure. Indeed, they insisted their three-day Eid ceasefire was a unilateral decision, justified not by Ghani’s own proclamation but by the religious holiday. Portraying a continuation of the ceasefire as an equally unilateral move would have been harder. Some feared that the U.S. and Afghan governments would interpret a Taliban decision to maintain the ceasefire as the result of expanded U.S. military operations. Movement leaders were determined to avoid that perception. That Pakistani officials had claimed credit for the Taliban’s ceasefire provided further disincentive, insofar as insurgent leaders consistently strive to rebut any suggestion that Islamabad controls them.

Third was the issue of Taliban unity. An extended ceasefire – as opposed to the three-day truce – would have required Taliban leaders to consult more extensively among the membership, especially with field commanders and hardline ideologues. They worried that making such a decision without proper consultation could prompt a backlash. Deliberations also would have taken time and, even if disagreements eventually were ironed out, they risked puncturing the image of coherence projected during the ceasefire itself. True, some Taliban commanders had called for an extension and the enthusiasm with which many fighters had embraced the truce suggested they might have favoured one, too. In that sense, deciding against prolonging the ceasefire also might have carried the risk of dissent. But, whether logically or not, Taliban leaders appear to have viewed a return to fighting as less likely to incite controversy within insurgent ranks.

Fourth, Taliban leaders based outside the country might not have fully appreciated the power of pro-peace popular sentiment, as they did not witness first-hand what was happening on the ground.

A final reason for the leadership’s decision likely was more prosaic: extending the ceasefire would arguably have allowed candidates for forthcoming parliamentary and district council elections, scheduled for October, to visit their constituencies in Taliban-held areas. That opportunity would have run contrary to the movement’s objectives of disrupting this year’s vote and precipitating a political crisis.

V.The Ceasefire’s Implications

The three-day truce was instructive for potential future peace efforts. Perhaps the most fundamental takeaway is that both leaderships exercise control over their respective rank and file, thereby (largely) putting to rest questions about the two sides’ cohesion.

That Taliban leaders were able to enforce a major political decision throughout the movement is particularly noteworthy. Of course, a three-day truce during Eid is nothing like a permanent peace deal. Whether Taliban leaders could exert similar authority in the event of a settlement that involved compromise with other parts of Afghan society is unknown; indeed, its choice not to extend the ceasefire appears to have been at least partly motivated by concern that doing so would reveal friction within the movement. Still, even Afghan officials who have long rejected the notion of a single Taliban movement now recognise that its leaders enjoy a firm grip on the insurgency.Some northern opposition groups have reached the same conclusion.President Ghani himself tacitly acknowledged as much in a recent article published in The New YorkTimes.

As seen, battlefield commanders were unprepared for the order from their leadership but complied quickly. This course of events underscored both the leaders’ authority and the influence of official Taliban channels, whether statements from spokesmen posted on the movement’s main website or information relayed on WhatsApp and other messaging applications. Even members who questioned the logic behind the ceasefire respected their leaders’ decision.Negligible breakdowns of command-and-control within the insurgency did occur – as they did among pro-government forces. But the commanders’ and foot soldiers’ overall compliance suggest that the Taliban leadership would be a credible partner in a future peace process.

The cheering throngs in towns and villages across the country illustrated the strength of the domestic constituency for peace.

If the ceasefire revealed much about the war’s protagonists, the cheering throngs in towns and villages across the country also illustrated the strength of the domestic constituency for peace. The yearning for an end to war was apparent not only among Afghans living in rural areas riven by fighting and in towns and cities targeted by Taliban strikes. It also was evident within both the armed forces’ and the insurgency’s ranks, with fighters on front lines greeting the truce as enthusiastically as civilians.

Popular support for the ceasefire created an environment of mutual trust and restraint that enabled both sides’ combatants to celebrate together – often while bearing arms. The scenes included amiable encounters between figures notorious for their penchant for violence or their deep mutual animosity.If anything, the two sides displayed a degree of tolerance and understanding that exceeded their leaders’ instructions by allowing each other to enter their respective areas of control with their guns. The outpouring of joy may have helped dissuade Taliban units from abusing the ceasefire by launching attacks in towns or cities. Likewise, it may have deterred Afghan officers from ordering the ambush or arrest of those who did temporarily surrender their weapons before entering towns or crossing battle lines. And it may have persuaded anti-Taliban leaders who see them as irreconcilable terrorists not to criticise the truce.

Another lesson is that some Pakistan-based Taliban leaders appear to have difficulty reading fast-moving dynamics on the ground. As a result, they run the risk of adhering to hardline positions out of tune not only with public sentiment but also with their own rank and file. That said, it still appears unlikely that the movement will splinter. Some government officials have suggested resuscitating previous – unsuccessful – efforts to reintegrate individual insurgents or field commanders as opposed to pursuing talks with the Taliban leadership.Certainly, Taliban fighters appeared easy-going as they chatted with their adversaries. Many are tired of fighting. Local ceasefires or informal deals between insurgent commanders and local officials may even be feasible; if those can alleviate human suffering they should be supported.

But banking that a groundswell of such deals could push insurgent leaders toward negotiations or even circumvent the need for engaging them at all would likely be a mistake. Crisis Group’s research suggests that without a green light from their leaders, most likely in the context of a wider settlement, most insurgent foot soldiers and commanders, even those that might have hoped for a ceasefire extension, will not abandon fighting.Indeed, Taliban attacks resumed on 17 June at precisely the hour declared by the leadership as the end of the ceasefire, illustrating its ability to issue an effective call to arms across much of the country.

The ceasefire also underscored that the war is not driven primarily by ideology. Leaders on both sides, and indeed people across society, hold highly divergent visions of how Afghanistan ought to be ruled. But the celebrations suggested that combatants potentially could respect each other as fellow Afghans and Muslims who favour a sovereign, indivisible country.

A final lesson might be drawn from the parties’ unscripted reactions to how the ceasefire played out. Nobody on either side seemed to know what would happen next. Within the Taliban in particular, many insurgents appear to have rejoiced in the pause and fraternised with their erstwhile enemy in ways that even they did not expect. Should a credible peace process commence, reactions likewise might surprise. Indeed, even aspects of the Taliban’s ideology, often considered static, could be influenced by such a process.

VI.Kickstarting Peace Talks

Powerful factors militate against peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban control or contest more territory and conduct more attacks than at any time since 2001, putting unprecedented strain on the government. Forthcoming elections, scheduled for October and likely to be contentious, give the movement even less reason to compromise. Both sides deeply mistrust each other. Powerbrokers across the board are vested in the war economy.International and regional politics are thornier than at any time since 2001, as U.S. relations with Russia, Iran and Pakistan deteriorate and hostility mounts among Gulf powers.

The ceasefire has set a precedent, however. It has bolstered confidence in both sides’ ability to halt hostilities and offered war-weary Afghans, including combatants, a glimpse of what the conflict’s end might bring. Activists, some senior government officials and even pro-Taliban circles call for a repeat during the next major holiday, Eid al-Adha, which starts around 21 August.Whether or not another truce transpires, the June ceasefire should propel all sides to reinvigorate efforts to end the war.

President Ghani has offered a bold vision of how to advance intra-Afghan dialogue. He has pledged to talk to insurgent leaders without preconditions and at a location of their choosing.The Afghan government also has opened a dialogue with the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, aiming to involve Gulf powers in future peace talks.While Ghani’s public overtures have not explicitly put on the table the issues of most interest to the Taliban – the presence of foreign forces and the reconfiguration of the political order – Western and Afghan officials now quietly assert that talks could broach those questions.Indeed, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in a 16 June statement expressing support for Ghani’s offer of peace talks, noted that those talks “by necessity would include a discussion of the role of international actors and forces”.

These steps represent significant change and are enormously positive. What they do not do is surmount what long has been a chief obstacle: on the one hand, the Taliban’s determination to talk to the U.S. and refusal to engage the Afghan government; and, on the other, Washington’s implicit rejection that it is a party to the conflict. Taliban leaders have not publicly rebuffed the government’s offers of talks this year, but they persist in calling for bilateral talks with Washington as an initial step.

A meaningful peace process almost certainly will require a U.S. initiative to break this deadlock.

Whatever its final format, a meaningful peace process almost certainly will require a U.S. initiative to break this deadlock. Washington will likely need to open a formal line of communication to the insurgent leadership, even as it reassures the government and other Afghan powerbrokers that it will not undermine the authority or sovereignty of the Afghan government or precipitously withdraw its forces and funding.

There is precedent. Behind-the-scenes contacts between U.S. officials and Taliban representatives in the movement’s Doha office started in 2010, during President Barack Obama’s second term. They yielded some results, notably the May 2014 release of Bowe Bergdahl, a U.S. soldier held hostage by the Taliban, in exchange for the release of five insurgent leaders from Guantanamo – thereby showing that the Doha team spoke for, and could deliver concessions on behalf of the movement’s leadership.But those talks failed to develop into a wider peace process, due in large part to core disagreements over the nature and format of talks.In 2016, a series of trilateral meetings took place among U.S. and Afghan officials and Taliban representatives in Doha, though these broke down before making much progress, largely for the same reasons.Informal contacts at various levels reportedly continue, but not in a structured manner or with the objective of ending the war.

In this light, Washington’s apparent willingness to speak directly to Taliban representatives, captured in a New York Times article on 16 July 2018 and confirmed through Crisis Group’s own research, is a critical and welcome step forward.To stand the best chance of moving toward a broader peace process, the U.S. should appoint a truly empowered envoy to conduct formal if exploratory talks. This idea has been floated for some months by U.S. officials, who see the envoy shuttling between Kabul, the Taliban and regional governments.

The envoy, whom the White House should clearly signal speaks on its behalf, should initially talk to the Taliban about issues at the heart of the U.S. war with the insurgent group.From the U.S. side the main problem would be transnational militants’ use of Taliban-controlled areas as safe havens; from the Taliban’s, the presence of U.S. and allied foreign forces. The U.S. would, in other words, put the issue of troop withdrawals on the table. Statements by senior U.S. officials, including Secretary Pompeo, suggest that doing so is not out of the question. Moreover, a withdrawal over time appears largely in tune with the inclinations of President Donald Trump himself.

To address the legitimate concerns of the Afghan government and its domestic allies, the U.S. should convey to the Taliban and the Afghan public that any understanding on a troop drawdown could only take place as part of an agreement between the Taliban and the government, or once such a deal is in place. In any case, as long as the war persists, so, too, will safe havens and opportunities for transnational militants.

The main point of contact – or in the Taliban’s own words, its “exclusive avenue” for negotiations – is its office in Doha.Afghan and U.S. officials at times express frustration that the office wields insufficient clout with the senior Taliban leadership. But attempting to bypass the Taliban’s own hierarchy would be a mistake, potentially fuelling their suspicions and make them more resistant to talks. For now, it follows, the U.S. should work through the Doha office, unless signals to proceed otherwise emerge from the Taliban leadership itself.

In turn, the Taliban should also empower its envoys in Doha to negotiate substantively. The movement would have to accept that in return for bilateral talks with the U.S. it would have to negotiate with the Afghan government. Refusing to do so would represent a failure by the insurgent leadership to heed important lessons of the ceasefire: that Kabul controls the Afghan forces battling in its name; and that U.S. and other international forces also complied with Ghani’s ceasefire order.

The Taliban would have to accept that any agreement on a timeline for a U.S. force withdrawal would need to be tied to or at least contingent upon a wider peace deal.

The Taliban also would have to accept, even if implicitly, that any agreement on a timeline for a U.S. force withdrawal would need to be tied to or at least contingent upon a wider peace deal. Such a deal would likely have to include at least agreement on national and local power-sharing arrangements, security sector reform and a process for rewriting the Afghan constitution. In the event of a settlement, it would not be unthinkable for the Taliban to accept a residual U.S. troop presence, or at least U.S. support in containing militants opposed to the agreement, including potential Taliban splinter groups and ISIS.In private, Taliban leaders suggest they may also need foreign support during the transition to help stabilise the country economically and politically.

Preliminary U.S.-Taliban talks, with Washington putting a future U.S. military withdrawal on the table, are unlikely to be a cure-all. The Taliban may initially reject future talks with the Afghan government, holding out hope of dealing solely with the U.S. or the disparate Afghan factions in pro-government enclaves. There is also a risk that an initiative by the U.S. will prompt spoilers on both sides to launch spectacular attacks, street demonstrations or other actions that would stall negotiations.

Still, direct U.S.-Taliban talks offer the best hope of breaking the deadlock. Besides, such talks could yield dividends even if the Taliban initially reject intra-Afghan talks. The U.S. formalising a line of communication to insurgent leaders and putting the withdrawal of its forces on the table could strengthen the hand of those elements within the Taliban who are more inclined toward peace. It could undercut hardliners’ claims that they are fighting an implacable foreign foe set on occupying Afghanistan forever. While some insurgents might see a U.S. declaration that it would withdraw forces as a sign the U.S. is tiring and thus as reason to fight on, the clarification by Washington that its forces’ departure would hinge on a wider settlement would keep such perceptions in check.

Reassuring regional powers of Washington’s intention to leave would be useful, too. While most fear a sudden U.S. departure, none want a permanent presence. Making clear that the exit of U.S. forces is in the cards would undercut one rationale for neighbours to back insurgents in the hope of deterring the U.S. from staying. Lastly, signalling that U.S. troop commitments are not open-ended could galvanise anti-Taliban factions to contemplate a future that includes sharing power with insurgents. Besides, for the U.S. the cost of empowering an envoy and making clear that an eventual troop withdrawal is on the table would be minimal. Afghan and U.S. operations against the insurgency would continue apace, albeit possibly calibrated based on how talks progress.

All sides could take confidence-building steps in this context. These might include, for example, further ceasefires or they could relate to prisoner releases or basic service delivery. In exchange for the Taliban’s release of captive Afghan soldiers over Eid, for example, the government could consider freeing more insurgent prisoners; the Taliban should then reciprocate by letting go more detainees. Insurgent leaders also might be more transparent about cooperation with government and aid agencies delivering health and education programs and other support to rural districts in its control; and the government could officially endorse daily negotiations that already occur among the Taliban, Afghan officials and non-government aid workers along these lines (such a step would involve neither side relinquishing its territorial claims).Negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban certainly should not be contingent on such steps. But the Eid ceasefire creates space for measures that could foster an atmosphere of cooperation between the two sides.

Both sides also should rethink some of their rhetoric. The Taliban should curb talk about toppling the government by force; the government should limit references to the insurgency as disparate bands of terrorists. The U.S. could publicly acknowledge positive moves taken by the Taliban, however small. Secretary Pompeo’s statement on 16 June was a step in the right direction: “If Afghans can pray together, their leaders can talk together and resolve their differences”.

VII.Conclusion

Despite the enormous obstacles that remain to peace in Afghanistan, the parties to the conflict have edged closer to meaningful talks over the past decade and a half. In 2001, the U.S. excluded Taliban leaders from the Afghan political order when laying its foundations at the Bonn conference.Successive generations of U.S. officials have softened that position, starting with the concession that former Taliban could avoid prosecution if they surrender, then offering talks with preconditions, including that the Taliban commit to disarm and accept the constitution.President Obama shifted toward mentioning acceptable outcomes of talks instead of asserting preconditions for them, but despite setting a date for the withdrawal of most U.S. forces, showed no readiness to actually speak to the Taliban about drawing down.Statements by U.S. and Afghan officials since June 2018 and media reports in mid-July suggest President Trump’s administration might be ready to drop this reservation while also opening a formal channel to the insurgency.

The Afghan government’s position has evolved, too. Former president Karzai often obstructed direct U.S.-Taliban talks.President Ghani initially framed the war as a bilateral issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan and, when his early attempts at rapprochement with Islamabad ran aground, members of his administration gave up on peacemaking. In 2017, those officials portrayed the war as a generational struggle against militants so radicalised that they would never make peace and so fragmented that their leadership cannot promise an end to violence.This position was a recipe for endless bloodshed, and Ghani was right to set out along a different path in early 2018, with his offers of unconditional talks and his unilateral ceasefire.

That the Taliban accepted a ceasefire hints at changes within the insurgency’s opaque leadership and the presence in the movement’s ranks of a lobby for reconciliation.

That the Taliban accepted a ceasefire, if only for three days, also hints at changes within the insurgency’s opaque leadership and the presence in the movement’s ranks of a lobby for reconciliation. The behind-the-scenes thinking described in this paper would have been hard to imagine in previous years. Still more surprising was the wellspring of enthusiasm for peace among front-line Taliban commanders, previously assumed to be more rigid than their leaders. Some within the Taliban even speculate that a future peace deal could leave current Afghan institutions largely untouched, including the security sector, although with significant reforms and integration of armed Taliban into the security forces.

If all sides have moved closer to a real conversation about peace, clearly a gulf remains. Direct U.S.-Taliban talks may not immediately yield an agreement from insurgents to speak to the Afghan government, which they have long portrayed as a stooge of foreign powers. Many insurgents still believe they could end the war in conversation with the U.S. alone; bucking that sentiment could take time.

Moreover, even were intra-Afghan talks to start, forging agreement among Afghan armed factions and society at large on the sharing of power and resources as well as on a new political order will be extraordinarily difficult. Bringing along neighbours and other relevant powers at a time of acute divisions among them – and between some of them and the U.S. – will pose yet another set of obstacles. Indeed, it is unclear whether such a deal could be hammered out at another Bonn-style conference or, instead, would require more incremental steps.Certainly both the pro- and anti-government sides would need to think hard about who speaks on their behalf in negotiations. Broad representation would be needed on both sides, incorporating hardline factions that might otherwise play spoilers.

The immediate challenge, however, is getting to a peace process. A U.S. initiative and offer of formal if exploratory talks with insurgents is the best bet for doing so. The extraordinary scenes of celebration prompted by the Eid ceasefire makes this moment auspicious for such a gesture.

General my friend, who seems to have not ended up in exile so soon, in one and a half years, waiting for a chance to use it as a political pressure on the government, until it came to the arrest of the system system. [sighs]
This general has been standing against everything that has been against the interests of tbạrsẖ, but it is time to prefer national interests. The General knows that his demands are to avoid the government’s interrogation and the freedom of the leader of the people’s rising forces, but the government has a mḵlfy̰t to offer satisfying response. For the first vice president, the president is required to be monitored by the national interests, not to adhere to the emotional statement of making national unity and meaningless alarms by zy̰rdstạnsẖ.

General Abdul Rashid my friend and the Lord of the knowledge of two vice president ghani met in turkey. This meeting was done about a year later, and both sides spoke to the current state in the country.
He is a member of the afghan government, who has been in exile. One present is a satisfying answer to the protests in the north of the country and the second is also the freedom of al-Din Al-din ghiasari, his special representative for faryab province and the warlord’s

For more than a year, he did a lot to earn the same stance. From the political struggle and the formation of the coalition under the name of the rescue of Afghanistan to the lobby among the people and the country that has no
General Abdul Rashid, my friend, was the first vice president of the country during a personal history that proved his position in the field of politics and military. The support of the people made him a successful political face until the moment the moral problem became excuses and changed everything. The General’s expectation of the same beginning was that his country supporters, especially turkey, would stand in his back, but everything did not adapt to him, and turkey gave the great national interests to the interests of his lineage and put the general aside This is the result of higher pressure than the afghan government level.

However, the first vice president of the republic is once again in front of the people’s protests in the north of the country, and in the clause of the system system, the government is sensitive to
That the general said, the government should present to the wishes and protests of people in the north of the country, it is logical because the government has never given any logical response.
But his second desire is to be the freedom of Nizam Al-din ghiasari, because the government has the right to arrest and interrogate those who are against national interests, what is true in the existence of Mr.

General Abdul Rashid my friend knows that the law is beyond all and its sovereignty is in favor of all people. The arrest of ghiasari has a political and political reason, and not a gạmy̰st to weaken certain group The rule of law is known that deary is far away from his homeland.
General my friend, who seems to have not ended up in exile so soon, in one and a half years, waiting for a chance to use it as a political pressure on the government, until it came to the arrest of the system system. [sighs]

This general has been standing against everything that has been against the interests of tbạrsẖ, but it is time to prefer national interests. The General knows that his demands are to avoid the government’s interrogation and the freedom of the leader of the people’s rising forces, but the government has a mḵlfy̰t to offer satisfying response. For the first vice president, the president is required to be monitored by the national interests, not to adhere to the emotional statement of making national unity and meaningless alarms by zy̰rdstạnsẖ.

It is better to end the exile of his risked and return to the homeland to be part of the problem, the end of this exile is to give the law and its sovereignty, but his person sees some obstacles on the way back to the country
It was not the outer support of the exterior, the b in particular security and mṣwwny̰t and the possibility of questioning the government from reasons that general prefer to live in Ankara This is all caused by day to day in isolation, and now he is abusing the arrest of people’s uprising in faryab province.

It comes from the situation that the possibility of the return of general Abdul Rashid my friend is not in the vicinity unless he wants The Government of the country is not the way to return him, and it is better to end the excuses

One of the greatest matters to remember about Daod Khan Shaheed was his keen interest in developing the Afghan economy to reduce reliance on foreign assistance.

The formulation of sound foundations for the economic and social sectors ( healthcare , education in particular) and creating a robust economy for the overall

development of Afghanistan were his aims. Two publications that came out during his presidency are important in this regard:

1) The two volume First Seven Year Plan 1976/77-1982/84. Volume I had detail discussions and Volume II was full of statistical data about the economy and the plan.

2) The publication of Mineral Resources of Afghanistan in 1975 which consisted of extensive surveys of all mineral wealth of Afghanistan.

I presented the details of this plan and discussed them at the annual meeting of the Middle East Association North America in November 1977

Daod Khan Shaheed

In New York and this was widely circulated. The review and discussion of the First Seven Year Plan are published in my recent book , The Afghan Economy During the Soviet War , April, 2016, chapter 3, ( the book is listed on Amazon, among other web sites ).

It is a great tragedy that this plan was not implemented due to the communist coup de tat of April, 1978 and then the Soviet invasion of December 1979 which brought much death and destruction.

The Seven year Plan had a general overall framework and plans for the major sectors of the Afghan economy in agriculture, manufacturing, service sector,

international trade, and rural development, as well as, for mineral development, and the transportation sector including a proposal for a railroad from Kabul to Islam Qala at the Iranian border. For more details see the review. There was a land reform policy in the agriculture sector and plans for heavy industries such as steel, petrochemicals and oil refinery in the manufacturing sector.

The book on the Mineral Resources of Afghanistan , has 419 pages and maps of mineral locations. It presented more than 1300 mineral resources including the much discussed metallic mineral Lithium which was discovered in 44 places throughout Afghanistan. It is very strange that since the US and British invasion of October 7, 2001 much has been said

about the existing of rich mineral resources of Afghanistan for the US to exploit creating the impression that these discoveries were made after the invasion.

But seldom one reads that these discoveries were made decades before and there were national Afghan plans for their development under the First Seven Year Plan, which Shaheed Doad Khan had launched. The US Geological Surveys since the invasion has remapped these earlier findings with maps with more details. There are reports by Afghans that some of these minerals are exploited illegally and taken out of Afghanistan by foreign forces. According to several Afghans Afghan TV stations have shown some of these reports especially around Musa Qala area in Helmand.

A summary of the mineral resources of Afghanistan is presented in Chapter 7, Table 3 of my book, The Afghan Economy During the Soviet War. This Table condenses the wealth of discoveries in numbers and kinds of minerals.

I hope these pieces of information help us appreciate the period of Daod Khan Shaheed as we remember the history of our beloved Afghanistan. Both of these important books belong in any library dedicated to Daod Khan Shaheed. We have a proud history of independence, and self-reliance which can be resuscitated once the war and occupation are ended.

In 1958 Daod Khan and Dr. Yusef had come to the US for generating support for Afghanistan. When they came to the Bay Area a number of us students at UC Berkeley went to visit them at the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco. In his talk Doad Khan made a statement which I have not forgotten. He said ‘throughout history Afghanistan has spent much of its resources to keep the country independent, and now we

must think about development of Afghanistan also’. This statement seemed to have been directed particularly at us as students working in different fields of knowledge. Afghanistan is in need of leadership to get the country out of war, crime and corruption, and occupation, the longest in the history of Afghanistan for the past 17 years. The goals for independence, self-reliance, economic development based on the resources of Afghanistan and eliminating corruption and crime and justice for all Afghans cannot be achieved under occupation and interferences by foreign countries in the affairs of Afghanistan. The country had a practicing democracy through the jerga system and parliamentary elections. The so called imported ‘democracy’ where votes are bought with foreign money was never acceptable and this points to something else that the US and other occupation forces do not understand rendering their policies a failure.

The US withdrawal from nuclear agreement in May 2018, with severe economic sanctions and a new strategy by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to force the Iranian regime into changing its behaviour, has put Tehran in a state of deadlock and uncertainty.

Pompeo placed 12 conditions before the Iranian regime, each of which is considered a “glass of poisoned wine”.

Those conditions include announcement of details related to military nuclear program, stopping uranium enrichment and ending the quest for nuclear technology, providing access to international inspectors into military and non-military sites without any limitations and halting the development of their ballistic missiles program.

The conditions also include stopping support to hostage-taking and supporting terrorism, ending their involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, withdrawing from Syria and Yemen, halting all Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Quds Corps’ destabilizing activities in the Middle East and across the globe, and improving human rights situation inside Iran.

These conditions hit the core of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy and any change would lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime. The continuation of this policy is also impossible and longer providing any benefits to Tehran. As a result, the Iranian regime is now in a stalemate.

The speech delivered by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei marking the death anniversary of regime founder Ruhollah Khomeini, was Iran’s official reaction to the new US strategy. The options left for the regime include isolating itself by refusing to accept US’ terms, or negotiate.

One possibility is that Iranian regime will choose to buy time by postponing for two months the acceptance of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) bill in which financial connections with individuals and terrorist groups are prohibited hoping that world’s policy may change. This tactic definitely cannot be a permanent solution.

On the other side, there are strong factors against the regime – internal isolation due to severe social dissatisfaction; the presence of a powerful and influential opposition that is planning to hold a major convention on June 30 in Paris in support of the Iranian people’s uprising for regime change as the only possible alternative; economic bankruptcy and severe sanctions; global isolation and crises within the sovereignty, and the fact that the Iranian regime is in a far different position than North Korea to negotiate with US.

On the passing of a bill the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has been sending a green signal so far to MPs for voting in favor of FATF Convention. But the so-called conservatives in and outside the Parliament are saying that the approval of FATF Convention means the path of financial assistance and support of terrorist factions such as Hezbollah and Hamas by Iranian regime will be closed.

The only hope left for the Iranian regime was a lifeline from the European Union. Yet, with the withdrawal of large European and global companies from Iran, this hope is long vanished. With the implementation of US sanctions effective in November 2018, the Iranian regime has two choices that both render the same results.

A recent report published in Le Monde, says the current situation in “the Iranian government is fragile against American pressure” and “in recent months, there have been tension and excitement in the streets of Iran.” In fact, due to the waves of unprecedented protests in dozens of cities at the start of this year, a red light is flashing.

Regarding to the predicted tensions in months going forward, Le Monde added: “On June 6, Ali Akbar Salehi, director of Iran’s nuclear program, in a live TV program from Natanz, opened a new centrifuge center. Salehi stated this operation did not violate Iran’s obligations under the nuclear agreement.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei greets crowds in the city of Mashhad for a celebration of Noruz on March 21, 2018. (AFP)

Range of responses

Former US Ambassador to the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, wrote in a recent article in The Washington Post: “The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and a subsequent speech by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have engendered a range of responses: Some welcomed the new hard line, but most expressed concern and criticism. Critics have accused the administration of calling for war or regime change; others have denounced its strategy as unrealistic.

“In actuality, though, the Trump administration’s approach has a reasonable chance of succeeding with Iran. A key point that seems to have been overlooked by many of the commentators is that the Trump administration has indicated a willingness to enter into negotiations, even as it escalates pressure against Iran through sanctions… Trump’s pressure tactics likely won’t bring Iran to its knees or facilitate the overthrow of the regime in the foreseeable future – but his approach might bring the Iranians to the negotiating table,” he wrote.

Former Iranian MP, Qassem Shole Sadi said in a recent interview with Radio France International: “All of Iran’s options will lead to its crumbling. The people have reached their tolerance limit. Poverty is breaking their backs.”

“Both options will result in the regime’s inevitable crumbling. Violence in the face of anger and popular protests is no longer effective and even the slightest reform will lead to a change in the Iranian regime’s nature.” Shole Sadi added. Tehran has continuously taken advantage of the international community’s policy of engagement and appeasement. However, it is utterly terrified of a firm policy.

Trump’s firm stance is forcing Europe to follow the US strategy. The Iranian regime, fearing frustration, is said to have started secret talks with the United States. There is also a huge argument within the regime for negotiation with the US. Under pressure from economic sanctions and widespread social protests, the Iranian regime will come to its knees and the people will not allow it to rise again.