Military

Further Reading

Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128

TESTIMONY ON
POST-WAR IRAQ
BY
DOUGLAS J. FEITH
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

15 MAY 2003

Post-War Reconstruction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you about the work of the
Defense Department and the U.S. Government to put a free Iraq on its feet and
headed toward stable, democratic government.

Combat operations to liberate Iraq moved speedily. From their start to the
fall of Baghdad was a period of three weeks. Less than five weeks have elapsed
since Baghdad fell. Stability operations are underway throughout Iraq. Much
work remains to be done before the coalitions military victory can be confirmed
as a strategic victory.

As President Bush has announced, major combat operations in Iraq have ended.
The Coalition continues to encounter attacks from scattered, small elements that
remain loyal to the former regime. Coalition forces are proceeding with
so-called Sensitive Site Exploitation, working their way down a list of hundreds
of locations that may contain materiel or information relating to chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons. Our forces are rounding up, more or less daily,
regime leadership figures on our most-wanted list and are collecting information
on the Saddam Hussein regime's ties to terrorist activity.

Meanwhile, the Coalition has the responsibility for the time being to
administer Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people. The Coalition is providing
humanitarian relief, organizing basic services, working to establish security
and creating the conditions for the liberated Iraqis to organize a new
government for themselves.

Some Reflections on the War

Before entering more deeply into the post-war issues, Id like to spend a
moment on the war itself. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said, military commanders
and historians will study this war with care for many years. I think they will
find much in the planning and execution that was innovative, courageous and
successful.

Some noteworthy points:

Coalition forces began the ground war before the major air campaign. This
gave us a degree of tactical surprise under circumstances in which strategic
surprise was clearly impossible.

Our forces demonstrated flexibility. They were able to adjust to bad news
 for example, General Franks re-routed the Fourth Infantry Division after the
Turkish Parliament refused to allow it to stage from Turkey.

We used special operations forces to forestall particularly worrisome
Iraqi options, such as missile attacks on Israel and sabotage of the southern
oil fields and oil terminals.

Our forces advanced rapidly into Baghdad to take advantage of  indeed to
accelerate  the quick-paced collapse of Saddams regime.

And we used time-sensitive intelligence to attack high-value targets
virtually instantly.

All in all, General Franks and his team developed a plan that was careful and
detailed with scope for daring, adjustment and improvisation. It was a plan
that reflected the essence of our new defense strategy, the acknowledgement that
our intelligence is always and inevitably imperfect, that the future is
uncertain and that we must plan to be surprised. General Franks plan allowed
coalition forces to exploit opportunities rapidly, as they presented themselves.

I expect that historians will long debate the extent to which the plan helped
us avoid many of the horribles that we foresaw with concern (for example,
large-scale refugee flows across Iraqs borders and Iraqi use of chemical or
biological weapons). Whatever the historians conclusions on these difficult
questions of cause and effect, however, we can be confident that they will judge
the thought and action of General Franks and of the Central Command as a
favorable reflection on the brains, skill and character of the U.S. armed
forces.

Post-war Objectives in Iraq

Now that major combat operations in Iraq are over, our policy
goals remain:

First, continue to demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the
United States and its coalition partners aspire to liberate the Iraqis and not
to occupy or control them or their economic resources.

Second, eliminate Iraqs chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear
program, the related delivery systems, and the related research and production
facilities.

Third, eliminate Iraqs terrorist infrastructure. A key element of U.S.
strategy in the global war on terrorism is exploiting the information about
terrorist networks that the coalition acquires through our military and law
enforcement actions.

Fourth, safeguard Iraqs territorial unity.

Fifth, reconstruct the economic and political systems, putting Iraq on a
path to become a prosperous and free country. The U.S. and its coalition
partners share with many Iraqis the hope that their country will enjoy the
rule of law and other institutions of democracy under a broad-based government
that represents the various parts of Iraqi society.

We are pursuing these goals with a two-part determination: a
commitment to stay and a commitment to leave.

That is, a commitment to stay as long as required to achieve these
objectives. We did not take military action in Iraq just to leave a mess
behind for the Iraqi people to clean up without our lending a helping hand.
That would ill serve the Iraqis, the world and ourselves.

But the United States and our coalition partners have a commitment to
leave as soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people.

When Iraqi officials are in a position to shoulder their countrys
responsibilities, when they have in place the necessary political and other
structures to provide food, security and the other necessities, the coalition
will have a strong interest in seeing them run their own affairs. It is our
interest to hasten the day when Iraq can become a proud, independent and
respected member of the community of the worlds free countries.

We are encouraging contributions and participation from around
the world  from coalition partners, non-governmental organizations, the UN and
other international organizations and others. We aim to transfer as much
authority as possible, as soon as possible, to the Iraqis themselves. But the
United States will not try to foist burdens onto those who are not in a position
to carry them.

The Coalition Provisional Authority

When he declared Iraqs liberation, General Franks, as Commander
of the Coalition Forces, announced the creation of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA). The CPA serves, in effect, as a government pending the Iraqi
peoples creation of a new government. General Franks was initially the head of
the CPA.

Last week, the President named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to be
his Envoy to Iraq and put him in charge of all civilian U.S. personnel in Iraq,
including the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). On
Tuesday, May 13th, Secretary Rumsfeld appointed Mr. Bremer as the head of the
CPA, with the title of Administrator.

It is distressing to see news reports to the effect that Mr.
Bremers appointment reflects dissatisfaction with the work of Jay Garner, the
director of ORHA. These reports are false. Starting in late January, Jay
Garner created ORHA from scratch, staffed it from a dozen or so offices of the
US Government, from our coalition partners and from the private sector and got
it deployed first to Kuwait and then, within weeks, to Baghdad, had ORHA manage
the distribution of humanitarian assistance and began the process of building
the new Iraq both physically and politically. The job was immense, the
conditions difficult in the extreme, the time short and the achievements, as I
shall discuss in some detail, have been substantial. Jay Garner has done superb
work and deserves admiration and gratitude.

I would like to help set the record straight here: Secretary
Rumsfeld decided in January to ask Jay Garner to organize the post-war planning
office in the Pentagon. I made the first call to Jay to ask if he would
undertake the assignment. In that call, I explained that the director of that
office would build on the various post-war planning efforts that had been
underway for months throughout the U.S. government. We conceived of the office
as expeditionary in nature  the idea was that it would comprise the people
who would, in the event of war, deploy to Iraq as soon as possible to form the
nucleus of the staff of the coalitions post-conflict administration.

In that first call, I explained
to Jay Garner that the director of the post-war planning office might or might
not deploy to Iraq and, in any case, the intention was that a senior civilian
administrator would be appointed in Iraq after the major combat phase and that
the post-war planning office (which became known as ORHA) would report to that
administrator. Mr. Bremers appointment fulfilled that original intention.
People unfamiliar with this background have unfortunately misinterpreted events
in a way that is unjust to a fine man.

Now I would like to turn to the work the Coalition Provisional
Authority has just begun, as Iraq emerges from its long period of tyranny.

Humanitarian problems exist, primarily in the areas of
electricity and water supply, but the overall situation is not desperate. The
war caused much less damage than many expected  the major problems derive from
the sad state of the pre-war infrastructure, and from post-war violence by
Baathists and ordinary criminals. The Coalition has managed to avert the
humanitarian crisis through a combination of unprecedented interagency planning
and preparation and the skill of our combat forces. In recent press remarks,
ICRC President Kellenberger, just back from Iraq, confirmed that there is not
now a humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

It is useful to put our recovery efforts in Iraq in perspective. Iraq is a
country that had been run into the ground by decades of systematic oppression
and misrule. Even before the war:

Only 60% of Iraqis had reliable access to safe drinking water

10 of Al Basrahs 21 potable water treatment facilities were not
functional.

70% of sewage treatment plants were in urgent need of repair and 500,000
metric tons of raw or partially treated sewage was discharged into the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers  Iraqs water supply.

23% of children under 5 suffered from malnutrition.

Iraqs electrical power system (critical to its water system) was
operating at half of its capacity.

80% of 25,000 schools were in poor condition  with an average of one book
per six students.

60% of the population is wholly dependent on the UN oil-for-food program
for subsistence.

The Coalition and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
are working to return all sectors of Iraqi life to the pre-war baseline, and
then to put Iraq on a trajectory toward sustained improvement.

Security is the sine qua non for relief and recovery efforts. It is
the Coalitions highest priority. There has already been progress. Over half
of Iraqs provinces, including Baghdad, have been declared permissive.
Throughout Iraq, the Coalition is screening and paying local police officers and
often participating in joint patrols to address security concerns. We are
bringing in international police advisors to do retraining and are reopening
courts. We are also working with the Iraqi governmental ministries and local
leadership to reestablish a degree of Iraqi oversight and supervision of
security.

There is no food crisis in Iraq. This happy fact is to the credit of the US
Government, Coalition and international donations and the resumption of the
oil-for-food distribution system. The Coalition and ORHA are working with the
UN World Food Program to reestablish nationwide food basket distributions. Over
one million MT of food is enroute to Iraq and is to arrive in the next month.

The water system in Baghdad is operating at 60% of pre-war levels and efforts
continue to improve on this. Much of the rest of Iraq is at or near pre-war
conditions. Increasing attention is being paid to sanitation issues in order to
prevent disease outbreaks. Serious illness (even cholera) was common before
this war.

The electrical power system throughout Iraq was dilapidated and unreliable
before the war. Coalition experts have done heroic work getting the system back
on line. The North and South have more reliable electric service than before
the war; and in Baghdad progress is being made every day. In Baghdad we reached
50% electricity coverage on 24 April and are closing in on repair of the 400KV
ring around Baghdad, expected to be complete by 15 May.

There is no health crisis in Iraq. The concern is security of hospital
facilities and reestablishment of the Ministry of Health and civil
administration. Coalition partners initially provided support through field
hospitals; we are now moving toward an adopt-a-hospital approach. ORHA is
working to reestablish the Ministry of Health and there is active trilateral
cooperation on health issues among ORHA, the World Health Organization and the
reemerging Iraqi Ministry of Health.

The Coalition and ORHA are working to identify appropriate persons to
reestablish key ministries and providing ministry advisors and logistical
support. Over 550,000 civil servants have received emergency payments, this
should double by next week. ORHA is researching appropriate salary payments,
which will follow in due course.

There have been no widespread human rights abuses since the war. There have
been some property disputes and forced evictions in the North. The Coalition
and ORHA are addressing this issue with Kurdish leadership, local leadership,
and through reverse evictions where appropriate. There is an international
fact-finding team in the region to investigate this issue and to develop a
process for property dispute resolution. The Coalition and ORHA are also
working out policies and procedures regarding mass graves.

In summary, we have averted a humanitarian crisis in Iraq and are now working
to improve Iraqi life in all sectors. ORHA has grown into an interagency
coalition team. It has accomplished much good, transforming itself, in the
midst of a war, from a bright idea into an organization of hundreds of people
doing practical work throughout Iraq, with impressive professionalism. Much
however, remains to be done.

The Iraqi Political Situation

Ultimately, strategic success in Iraq requires that we lay the
political groundwork for a free and representative government that will
establish the rule of law and respect the rights of the members of all of Iraqs
ethnic and religious groups. Given Iraqs long history of tyranny, one must
expect that the political situation will remain volatile for some time and that
the first steps toward representative government will be unsteady. But there
are grounds for hope.

Although many feared that, without a strongman, Iraq would tend
to disintegrate, we have not seen any such tendency. Among all Iraqis  Kurds
and Arabs, Sunni and Shia, as well as the members of the smaller minorities 
there has been an acceptance of the idea of a unified Iraq. To head off ethnic
conflict in areas where the Saddam Hussein regime had imposed a forced Arabization,
we are preparing to adjudicate property claims in an orderly manner.

Some Iranian-influenced groups have called for a theocracy on the
Teheran model. But it appears that popular support for clerical rule is narrow,
even among the Shia population. The Shia tradition does not favor clerical
rule  the Khomeiniites in Iran were innovators in this regard. And their
experiment has not produced widespread prosperity, freedom or happiness in
Iran. The Iranian models appeal in Iraq is further reduced by the cultural
divide between Persians and Arabs.

In restarting Iraqi government operations, we have faced the
question of the extent to which we should keep in power former officials who
know how to run the administrative machinery. Some have suggested that we must
be willing to deal with the former Baathist power structure to obtain the
technical competence needed to keep the wheels of government turning.

We have rejected such advice. Our policy is De-Baathification
 that is, the disestablishment of the Baath party, the elimination of its
structures, and the removal of its high-ranking members from positions of
authority in Iraq. This process is now underway, and, as it proceeds, the
people of Iraq will be assured that their way forward will not be blocked by the
remnants of the Baathist apparatus that tyrannized them for decades.

Iraqi Interim Authority

We are working towards the establishment of an Iraqi Interim
Authority, which will assume increasingly great responsibility for the
administration of the country. This Interim Authority will draw from all of
Iraqs religious and ethnic groups and will provide a way for Iraqis to begin
immediately to participate in their countrys economic and political
reconstruction. We expect the Authority will include not only the members of
the Free Iraqi groups that have fought Saddams rule and the independents among
the expatriate community, but will also draw from local leaders who have been
working on the creation of a new, free Iraq. As more Iraqis feel free to
express their views, more will emerge who can be a part of this leadership.

Over time, the Interim Authority is to take control of an increasing number
of administrative functions. But its most important responsibility will be to
design the process for creating a new Iraqi government, for example, by setting
up local elections and drafting a new constitution and new laws. This is a
process that foreigners cannot direct; it must be a process owned by Iraqis.
Our task is to create the conditions, including the security conditions, in
which they can formulate a process and then pick their leaders freely. An
Interim Authority will be a bridge from the initial administration of basic
services to an eventual government that represents the Iraqi people.

Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction

As noted, coalition forces have operations underway to identify,
secure, exploit and dismantle Iraqi WMD capabilities, facilities and
stockpiles. This is a huge undertaking and we are in the early stages of this
effort.

We have found evidence of the WMD programs, but we have a long
way to go before we can gain a complete understanding of them. As we noted in
connection with the UN inspection process, there is no way that we can find WMD
materials that have been hidden unless those involved in the program tell us
where to look.

We have detained many major figures involved in the WMD programs,
including Mrs. Ammash (Mrs. Anthrax) from the biological warfare program and Dr.
Taha (Dr. Germ) from the chemical warfare program. We are beginning to question
them. Daily we round up more individuals who held high positions in Saddams
regime, and we are confident we will find many other key scientists and
technical personnel.

Of the roughly 600 WMD sites we currently know about, we have
only searched about 20%. And we are learning about new sites every day.

I am confident that we will eventually be able to piece together a fairly
complete account of Iraqs WMD programs  but the process will take months and
perhaps years.

It is important that we succeed in re-directing some of Iraqs dual-use
capability and its scientific and managerial talent to legitimate, civilian
activities in a new Iraq.

Clearly, this will not be a mission that falls entirely to the U.S. military
forces. Other U.S. government personnel, including those within the DoD, the
Department of Energys laboratory system, and in other government agencies can
contribute.

Coalition partners, including many NATO Allies, have nuclear, chemical and
biological defense-related capabilities and expertise that are playing a role.
So too will the new Iraqi government. It bears stressing: The task of
accounting for and eliminating all nuclear, chemical and biological stockpiles,
facilities and infrastructure will take time.

Oil Infrastructure

The United States and its coalition partners face the necessity
of repairing Iraqs oil infrastructure. Saddam Husseins regime allowed the oil
infrastructure to decay while building lavish palaces with Iraqs revenue. A
great deal of repair work is underway to ensure the safe resumption of
operations at oil facilities after war-related stoppage.

The oil sector is Iraqs primary source of funding. The United
States is committed to ensuring that Iraqs oil resources remain under national
control, with the proceeds made available to support Iraqis in all parts of the
country. No one ethnic or religious group will be allowed to claim exclusive
rights to any part of the oil resources or infrastructure. In other words, all
of Iraqs oil belongs to all the people of Iraq.

Iraqi oil operations are being run by an Interim Management Team headed by
Thamir Ghadban, who was a senior Oil Ministry official under the former regime.
Other Iraqis are assisting Ghadban. And Ghadban is being advised in his efforts
by Phillip Carroll, a former American oil executive, and Fadhil Othman, the
former head of Iraqs State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), the chairman and
vice chairman of an advisory team that will be filled out soon with other Iraqi
and non-Iraqi experts. We are helping as we can, but the Iraqis have in the
past demonstrated skill in operating their energy infrastructure in the face of
adversity, and that record continues up to today.

In fact, the main oil problem we are facing now is different from what we
feared before the war. Then, we anticipated destruction of Iraqis energy
facilities and a long-time loss of Iraqs oil production. But coalition force
seized key Iraqs petroleum and gas facilities in the south at the wars outset
and prevented Saddams regime from destroying them. Some oil wells were set on
fire, and we found substantial explosives in the southern oil facilities that
Saddams forces did not manage to use. We also captured the oil fields in the
north largely in tact.

We now face the challenges of success. With oil production at only 125,000
barrels/day, out of a prewar production of 2.5 million barrels/day, there
already is a dearth of spare capacity to store crude oil and fuel oil (a
byproduct of the refining process). With the current constipation of the
system, as it is, Iraq cannot produce much more oil or refine much more gasoline
without approaching its maximum limit of storage. This has led to shortages of
both gasoline and propane, and we have been forced to import both products into
a country that, as you know, is rich in natural gas and petroleum.

The resolution that Britain, Spain and the U.S. have introduced
in the UN Security Council would relieve this problem. It envisions the
resumption of oil exports, and provides that the revenues be deposited in a new
fund in the Iraqi Central Bank, with transparency provided to the world by
independent auditors and international advisory board. The revenues could then
be used for the benefit of the Iraqi people at the direction of the Coalition
Provisional Authority.

Funding of the Reconstruction

The ultimate costs of reconstruction in Iraq are difficult to estimate. As I
have said, many of the problems that we face there are the result of 30 years of
tyranny, corruption and mismanagement. War damage was relatively small-scale.

There are a number of funding sources to help Iraq. There is $1.7 billion in
formerly frozen Iraqi government assets in the US that the U.S Government vested
by Presidential order. In addition, about $700 million in state or regime owned
cash has so far been seized and brought under U.S. control in accordance with
the laws of war. This money is also available to be used for the benefit of the
Iraqi people.

Once Iraqi oil exports resume, the proceeds will be available.

Under the terms of the UN Security Council resolution proposed by the U.S.,
the UK and Spain, assets from two additional sources would be placed in the
Iraqi Assistance Fund:

-- The proposed resolution calls on other countries to place in the Fund
any Iraqi government assets, or assets that have been removed from Iraq by
Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former regime, held in their
countries.

-- The proposed resolution also provides that the uncommitted balance in
the UNs Oil For Food escrow account (amounting to approximately $3 billion)
be turned over to the Fund.

There have been public pledges from the international community of over $1.2
billion. The donations are for the food, health, agriculture, and security
sectors. We anticipate additional contributions as well.

Finally, Congress has also appropriated approximately $2.5 billion for
reconstruction efforts. There are also additional authorities that we can draw
from if needed, such as the Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund, which can
be used for repairing damage to the oil facilities in Iraq.

The Coalition to Win the Peace

We have won the war in Iraq. We are committed to winning the
peace.

The United States is not acting alone. We have worked with a
coalition in prosecuting the war and we have a broad coalition that is
contributing to stability operations and reconstruction. We are working also
with the United Nations and various non-governmental organizations. And, of
paramount importance, we are working with Iraqis who are eager to create for
themselves a government that will secure their freedom, build democratic
institutions and threaten neither the Iraqi people, their neighbors or others
with tyranny, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction or aggression.