U.S. systems unlikely to work in Afghanistan

Thursday

Jul 4, 2013 at 12:01 AM

Editor, the Record:

Editor, the Record:

As a veteran of both the Iraq and Afghan wars, I have oft been asked the simplest of questions upon my return to Stroudsburg: Are we winning? Typically, I am at a loss for a response, as "winning" (in the context of these wars) is such a nebulous term.

In Afghanistan, winning is currently defined as: building capacity of the Afghan government so it is able to effectively provide security, essential services, education and rule of law for its citizens. Finally, we have a concise, well-defined mission. Yet the way we are carrying out this mission is inherently flawed because of the lenses we are using to view what "success" really means.

In short, we are trying to build a little America in the middle of a conservative, tribal nation in southwest Asia. I am currently tasked with advising provincial government leaders in Afghanistan on how to establish and manage budgets for their departments so they can effectively function once we leave. Yet they seem destined to fail because of the systems and metrics we are introducing into their government.

For example, the income tax code being used in Afghanistan is an astonishingly complex 54-page document, most likely written by a Harvard educated lawyer. Why did we introduce a 54-page income tax code for a nation where most citizens cannot read or write? This example is emblematic of the larger issue at hand: We need Afghan solutions for Afghan problems, not U.S. solutions for Afghan problems. Fortunately, our leaders here have bought into this idea, albeit 10 years too late.

"The American Experiment" had 200 years to grow into an open, liberal democracy. Trying to export 200 years of progress to a nation like Afghanistan in such a constricted time frame is a strategy we ought to revisit.