Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security

Iranian Nuclear Programs

█ K. LEE LERNER

In his 2002 State of the Union speech, United States President George W.
Bush labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as rogue nations that constituted
an "axis of evil" seeking to develop weapons of mass
destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons).

Late in 2002, reports began to circulate in the press that Iran had taken
steps to accelerate an already active nuclear program that could develop
nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has
a right to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, subject to
oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A development
of nuclear weapons by Iran, however, would violate nuclear
non-proliferation treaties.

Initial reports of Iranian nuclear program development by the National
Council of Resistance of Iran, a private group that paid for their own
intelligence estimates—including satellite imagery—gained
influence because of the group's track record about supplying
verifiable and reliable information regarding Iran's nuclear
program. Western intelligence agencies soon confirmed the validity of the
physical evidence of activity at Iranian nuclear facilities.

In December, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher argued that
satellite imagery depicting the covering of buildings at the Natanz site
indicated that Iran was building "a secret underground site where
it could produce fissile material."

Iran quickly denied any attempt to develop nuclear weapons of mass
destruction. Iranian officials asserted that the building programs
underway at the suspected facilities were designed to expand Iran's
ability to produce electrical energy. In particular, Iranian officials
denied that its first nuclear plant—a reactor facility under
construction at Bushehr, an Iranian town near the Persian Gulf
Coast—would be equipped to produce weapons grade uranium.
Iran's development of the facility at Bushehr (allegedly a
1,000-megawatt reactor) was supported by equipment and technical
assistance from Russia.

In January, 2003, Iran announced its intention to develop a nuclear fuel
program. Iran announced the mining of uranium and the adaptation of
facilities, including the Natanz nuclear facility under construction, so
that they could process ore into fissionable fuel for nuclear power
plants. Iranian opposition groups and Western intelligence services argue
that the nuclear fuel program could easily be extended to produce weapons
grade fuel. The Iranian decision to produce its own fuels was chilling to
Western intelligence services because it would eliminate the protections
afforded by Russian demands to return spent fuel initially supplied for
Iranian reactors.

Although Russian sales and support of nuclear materials and reactor
equipment to Iran was well known, evidence of additional international
interests in the Iranian program surfaced when the National Council of
Resistance of Iran provided evidence that Chinese nuclear scientists and
engineers were sighted at a uranium mine near Saghand. Chinese and North
Korean scientists and engineers were reportedly involved in the
development of uranium enrichment capability at a site near Isfahan. There
were also allegations of centrifuge facility construction near Tehran.

The events in Iran signaled a change in the pace of Iranian nuclear
program development that might allow Iran to construct an operational
nuclear weapon by 2004 or 2005.

Concerned that Iran was attempting to accelerate its nuclear programs in
such a way as to facilitate nuclear weapon development—especially
while world attention was focused on events in Iraq and North
Korea—IAEA inspectors requested additional access to inspect
Iranian facilities. IAEA requests were initially denied. Iranian officials
also initially declined to elaborate the intended uses of a facility in
Kashan.

In February, 2003, IAEA inspectors, including IAEA chief inspector Mohamed
El Baradei, were permitted to visit several new Iranian nuclear sites
suspected of being able to enrich uranium for potential weapons use.
Inspectors were also to make inquiries regarding the status of processing
equipment located at Natanz and Arak (a heavy-water production facility)
and to ask Iranian officials to accept regular monitoring of Iranian
nuclear programs.

Satellite imagery indicated buried facilities near Natanz, and
ground-based reports indicated the assembly of more than 150 centrifuges
near the Natanz facility nearing operational capability to process uranium
gas into nuclear fuel capable of undergoing fission. Parts for additional
facilities were also reportedly near the Natanz site. Iran admitted to
IAEA officials the construction of a plant to convert uranium into UF6
(uranium hexafluoride)—a gaseous form of uranium used in
centrifuges.

Western intelligence scientists and analysts predicted that if Iran built
its projected 5000 centrifuges, it could produce enough fuel each year for
several nuclear weapons. United States officials briefed on IAEA reports
from Iran expressed surprise at the advanced state of Iranian nuclear
development. Several officials described Iran as being years ahead of
prior projections and much closer to having nuclear weapons capability
than previously estimated.

The United States has imposed sanctions against Russian companies and
attempted to exert diplomatic pressure on Russia, Ukraine, and China, in
an effort to prevent Iranian acquisition of sensitive nuclear technologies
and equipment. Despite these efforts, intelligence sources predict that
Iran's current nuclear program infrastructure will soon support the
development of uranium-based weapons.