Dear Mr. President: I have read your letter of
March fifteenth1 with great interest. I appreciate your full and
frank expression of your views on problems of deep concern to both of
our countries. I know that you would want me to respond with equal
candor.

China occupies a special place in the hearts of the American people. No
news could give Americans greater joy than to learn that, after thirteen
long years of suffering, the people of mainland China have freed
themselves from Communist oppression. Our hopes for the early liberation
of the Chinese people, however, cannot be permitted to cloud our
judgment of what is possible or to lead us into ill-considered actions
that would not work, would end only in disaster for you and might
precipitate a situation that neither of us want.

Despite the arguments set forth so cogently in your letter, I do not
believe that we possess sufficient information to make firm judgments on
vital questions such as the will and ability of the Chinese people to
rise up successfully against their Communist masters. Also, I do not see
how, given the long and close association of our two Governments and the
Treaty and related agreements which bind us, the United States
Government could be absolved from responsibility for actions which your
Government might take against the Communist-held mainland.

Under these circumstances, the United States Government must exercise
care in concerting with your Government on a program of action against
the Chinese Communists. We can and will continue to work closely with
you in checking the expansion of Chinese Communist political and
diplomatic influence and in supporting the international position and
influence of the Republic of China. We can and will continue to [Page 360]give you needed assistance in
your most important effort to create on Taiwan a model of dynamic
economic development in contrast to the misery and stagnation prevailing
under Communist rule on the mainland.2 And, I need
scarcely add, we will without question honor our defensive commitments
under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Given our present estimate of the
situation, however, we cannot acquiesce in military action against the
China mainland.

It was in order to facilitate close consultations on the entire range of
problems of common concern to China and the United States that I
appointed a man of such unusual professional qualifications as my
Ambassador in Taipei. Although regrettably Admiral Kirk will not be able to return to his post for
reasons of health, I have asked another outstanding Naval Officer to
succeed him. I hope that you will feel free to exchange views with
Admiral Wright in a spirit of
utmost frankness and trust, so that we can maintain the high degree of
cooperation needed to cope successfully with the problems and dangers
that lie ahead. Admiral Wright
enjoys my complete confidence and has direct access to me at all times
on either a formal or an informal basis.

As a final personal note, I should like to say that I fully understand
and appreciate your feeling of sorrow as you contemplate the bitter fate
that has temporarily befallen the greater part of the Chinese nation. I
also share your faith that, true to their long and glorious history, the
Chinese people will one day overcome their present oppressors and take
their proper leading place in the community of free nations.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

John
Kennedy

Source:
Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204,
Chinese Officials Correspondence with Kennedy/Johnson. Top Secret;
Eyes Only. Drafted by Yager.
The draft was sent to Bundy with a covering
memorandum of April 4 from Acting Department of State Executive
Secretary William B. Connett, Jr., stating that it reflected an
April 3 discussion in Bundys office. (Ibid.)
The letter was transmitted in telegram 659 to Taipei, April 12,
which stated that a parallel message from McCone to Chiang Ching-kuo was being sent [text not declassified]. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Kennedy) Clough reported in telegram 764,
April 18, that both letters were delivered that day. (Ibid.) A draft
message from McCone to
Chiang Ching-kuo is in the
Kennedy Library, National
Security Files, Countries Series, China Subjects, Chiang Kai-shek
Correspondence.↩

Chiangs letter argued that growing unrest on
the mainland and the deepening rift between Mao and Khrushchev created an unprecedented
opportunity and urged consultation on a plan to give his government
“adequate support for the deliverance of our compatriots from
despotic rule.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence:
Lot 66 D 204, Chinese Officials Correspondence with Kennedy/Johnson) See the
Supplement.↩

In
telegram 754 from Taipei, April 15, Clough expressed concern at the lack of any
reference to continued U.S. support for the GRC armed forces and commented that the implication
that U.S. support might be terminated could intensify
Chiangs view that he must act soon.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Kennedy) Telegram 664 to Taipei, April 15, replied
that no such implication was intended, and Clough could so inform Chiang Kai-shek. (Ibid.) In telegram
764, cited in the source note above, Clough reported that he had informed Foreign
Minister Shen and Chiang Ching-kuo.↩