In England, all grants of aids by parliament begin in the
house of commons. Of that house, this is an ancient, and,
now, an indisputable privilege. With regard to it, the commons
are so jealous, that, over money bills, they will not
suffer the other house to exert any powers, except simply
those of concurrence or rejection. From the lords, no alteration
or amendment will be received on this delicate
subject. The constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania
have, on this head, adopted the parliamentary law
of England in part; but they have not adopted it altogether.
They have directed, that money bills shall originate
in the house of representatives; but they have directed
also, that the senate may propose amendments in these, as
well as in other bills. It will be proper to investigate the
reasons of each part of the direction. This will best be
done by tracing the matter historically, and attending to
the difference between the institution of the house of lords
in England, and that of the senates of the United States
and Pennsylvania.

During a considerable time after the establishment of
the house of commons as a separate branch of the legislature,
it appears, that the members of that house were, with
regard to taxes and assessments, governed altogether by
the instructions, which they received from their constituents.
Each county and borough seems to have directed its
representatives, concerning the amount of the rates to
which they might give their assent. By adding together the
sums contained in those particular directions, it was easy
to ascertain, in the house of commons, the sum total,
which the commonalty of the kingdom were willing to
grant. To the extent of this sum, the commons conceived
themselves empowered and directed to go; but no farther.

According to this mode of proceeding, the imposition of
taxes produced no interchange of communication between
the two houses of parliament. To introduce a money bill,
or an amendment to a money bill, into the house of
lords--to deliberate upon the bill or amendment in that
house--after agreeing to it there, to submit it to the deliberation
of the house of commons--all this would have
been perfectly nugatory. Let us suppose, that the bill or
amendment had undergone the most full and careful examination
in the house of lords, who, acting only for
themselves, could examine it under every aspect, unfettered
by exteriour direction and control: let us suppose it
then transmitted to the house of commons, for their concurrence:
what could the house of commons do? They
could not deliberate upon the bill or the amendment: they
could only compare it with their instructions: if they found
it consistent with them, they could give, if inconsistent,
they must refuse, their consent. The only course, therefore,
in which this business could be transacted, was, that
the commons should begin by mentioning the sum, which
they were empowered to grant, and that what they proposed
should be sent to the house of lords, who, upon all
the circumstances, might deliberate and judge for themselves.

In this manner, and for these reasons, the house of
commons became possessed of this important privilege,
which is now justly regarded by them, as one of the
strongest pillars of their freedom and power. Once possessed
of this privilege, they were far from relinquishing
it, when the first reasons for its possession had ceased.
Other reasons, stronger than the first, succeeded to them.
In the flux of time and things, the revenue and influence
of the crown became so great, and the property of the
peerage, considered with relation to the general property
of the kingdom, became comparatively so small, that it was
judged unwise to permit that body to model, or even to
alter, the general system of taxation. This is the aspect,
under which this subject was viewed in the lecture, to
which I have alluded; and I will not repeat now what was
observed then.

From this short historical deduction, it appears, that the
provision, which we now consider, is far from being so important
here, as it is in England. In the United States and
in Pennsylvania, both houses of the legislature draw their
authority, either immediately, or, at least, not remotely,
from the same common fountain. In England, one of the
houses acts entirely in its private and separate right.

But though this regulation is by no means so necessary
here, as it is in England; yet it may have its use, so far as
it has been adopted into our constitutions. Our houses of
representatives are much more numerous than our senates:
the members of the former are chosen much more
frequently, than are the members of the latter. For these
reasons, an information more local and minute may be expected
in the houses of representatives, than can be expected
in the senates. This minute and local information
will be of service, in suggesting and in collecting materials
for the laws of revenue. After those materials are collected
and prepared, the wisdom and the patriotism of both
houses will be employed in forming them into a proper
system.