The archived blog of the Project On Government Oversight (POGO).

Sep 30, 2005

According to sources in Tennessee, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory security people are saying they had POGO investigators under surveillance (on video, no less) the entire time. Had this been a real terrorist attack it’s nice to know that the monitor watchers would have been able to see what caused the disaster.

Something else we’d like to follow up on – the mysterious blue pick up truck. As Danielle wrote Energy Department Secretary Bodman (pdf), the POGO investigators were asked by Oak Ridge security guards if they were driving a blue pick up (they were, in fact, driving a Toyota Camry). So, assuming Oak Ridge isn’t lying about having our boys under surveillance, were the guards actually observing the blue pick up and not the POGO Camry? In fact, when the investigators were finally being escorted to leave, the security guards kept insisting that they go back to “their” pick up truck. The investigators had to actually prove to them that their car keys were to the Camry.

Some Energy officials have claimed that, while on a guided tour of the Oak Ridge National Lab, POGO’s two investigators broke away from their handlers and clandestinely hopped around the Lab stirring up trouble. This is false, as Danielle notes in her detailed letter (pdf). Moreover, the two investigators have a combined age of 134, so they are a wee bit too old for ninja style tactics.

Let’s just say if the Oak Ridge security office can’t handle these grumpy old men, they must not be combat ready.

It can’t autorotate to a safe landing, has no defensive gun, lacks the ability to perform quick evasive combat maneuvers under fire, and can’t descend too quickly or it will go into a dangerous roll. Nonetheless, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft for full rate production on Wednesday.

The DAB’s decision comes on the heels of the latest phase of operational testing by the Pentagon’s top independent testing office, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. DOT&E’s acting director, David Duma, who said the V-22 is operationally "suitable" and "effective." Plans are to purchase 459 V-22's at a cost of more than $50 billion, according to recent estimates.

POGO is concerned that the Pentagon is sending a dangerous aircraft into battle. Although in past tests the V-22 was only considered survivable in a low-threat combat environment, Duma said the V-22 is survivable in up to a medium-threat environment. He upgraded that category because he said the aircraft was quiet and fast in approaching a combat zone, and had a number of modern defensive threat detection systems on board.

However, Duma called for further testing on the aircraft’s ability to maneuver in the heat of battle. "Further testing and tactics development is needed to expand the maneuvering flight envelop as much as possible, and to determine whether there is operational utility in the use of more extreme helicopter-style maneuvering in a high-threat environment," his report said. Although a specific threat level is not noted in the aircraft's formal requirements document, it does say the V-22 "must be capable of performing air combat maneuvers."

The V-22 has a number of challenges and limitations:

• The Deadly Vortex Ring State (VRS). Because it has two large propellers on each side of the aircraft's wings, the V-22 has a unique design challenge unlike other helicopters. When it descends too fast in helicopter mode at a low rate of speed, the aircraft is vulnerable to "VRS-induced power settling," which can result in an "asymmetric loss of lift" that causes the aircraft to roll to one side. When this happens at a low altitude the pilot is unable to recover before ground impact. VRS was determined to have caused an April 2000 crash that killed a four-man aircrew and 15 Marines being transported aboard the aircraft. A subsequent April 2001 review of the V-22 Program by a specially-appointed Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that while VRS is not a "basic flaw" of the V-22, "such a configuration does tend to be unforgiving because of its propensity to roll when certain malfunctions (other than engine failure) occur that affect one side of the propulsion system and not the other."

• Can't Autorotate. One of the more significant formal V-22 military requirements was that the aircraft be able to land safely in helicopter mode without power, a procedure known as autorotation. But after the Marines discovered that the aircraft can not autorotate like most helicopters, it dropped this requirement, claiming such an emergency had a "low probability of occurrence." The autorotation or soft-landing requirement is one that helicopter pilots claim has saved lives on numerous occasions. But even on those rare occasions when power is lost, the new DOT&E report flatly concludes "emergency landings after sudden dual engine failure in the conversion/VTOL (vertical short takeoff and landing) mode below 1,600 feet above the ground are not likely to be survivable."

• No Effective Defensive Weapon System. The V-22 has a formal requirement that it have a defensive gun to protect its crew and occupants. Although there are plans to add a small tail gun – untested so far – at some point in the production process, so far, engineers have been unable to come up with any forward or side window defensive weapon. Many V-22 critics say a tail gun is not widely considered to be an effective weapon for an aircraft landing in a combat zone in helicopter mode.

• No Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Protection. In May 2001, Marines General James Jones told Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that the V-22 "has an NBC capability that helicopters do not have. In other words, it's survivable in a nuclear chemical or chemical and biological environment." This requirement also has since been dropped, however, after the Marines claimed cost, operational problems, and weight limitations prevented the NBC protection. Now, troops will be forced to wear special NBC suits for protection.

• Other challenges. The DOT&E report also notes that other system performance shortfalls remain, including the lack of weather radar and a personnel hoist commonly used during rescue operations. The report also points out that there has only been "limited testing at night of in severe brownout conditions" – swirling dirt, debris, and dust commonly created by the aircraft's two large propellers.

Sep 28, 2005

Yesterday, DefenseTech took a hard wack at the troubled Future Combat Systems (FCS) program to transform the Army into a faster, lighter (and less armored), networked force. The American taxpayer has seen FCS’s price tag balloon from $92 billion to nearly $150 billion (to transform only a third of the Army) while requirements have been dropped and even entire components canceled. And it turns out that:

the Army has now declared that neither the Paladin [artillery] replacement nor any other FCS vehicle is going to fit into a C-130, according to Defense News' Greg Grant. And that "appears to abandon the fundamental rationale for FCS, which was intended to speed Army brigades to combat zones around the world within 96 hours."

Over at Garfield Ridge, the feeling is that FCS lacked all the preconditions for major defense acquisition success from the beginning:

Just a few examples, definitely not all-inclusive:

-- It has to be cheap.

-- All its major milestones must be within the 5- to 6-year Future Year's Defense Program. Any program that won't deploy until after the FYDP means a program that's going to find its money kicked out of the FYDP.

-- Only one, maybe two leap-ahead technologys allowed per program. The rest of the program has to rely on stuff we've already done before, proven technology and concepts.

-- The requirements must be agreed upon by everyone: the warfighter, the program manager, the lead service, the prime contractor, AND the sub-contractors. If any requirements are introduced at a later date, everyone signs up to the new/modified requirement in blood-- none of this creep crap.

-- Consistent specs and standards are a must. If the design calls for a flathead screwdriver, the contractor better understand what a flathead screwdriver looks like.

-- Congress must not care about it. If it hates it, it will cut it and ruin program stability, particularly in the early years where it's needed most. If it loves it, it'll add unneeded money and unrealistic demands on the program. The best programs are always the ones that Congress keeps their noses out of.

-- The program must be small enough to fail.

That last one is probably the most important one of all.

Most of the Pentagon's acquisition trouble in recent years has occurred on programs that are quite simply too big to fail. Either the requirement is one that can't be ignored, thus forcing the development program into a fixed schedule-- never a good idea to do this stuff on a deadline-- or the program reaches a point where so much money has been spent on it that in the event of failure no one wants to cut their losses and try something new. The moment the contractor smells fear on the part of the Pentagon, once it knows no one in the Building has the guts to cancel the program as it goes south, that's when the Pentagon takes it in the wazoo from industry, often willingly.

Not surprising, the buckets of money continue to rain on FCS contractors. Defense Industry Daily notes that Boeing, one of the lead FCS contractors, just received a $219 million increment to its $17 billion contract.

Sep 27, 2005

In the ever growing “The Federal government is turning into the twilight zone” category, we now add this. Low and behold, Michael “Brownie” Brown, who resigned two weeks ago as head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is still on the payroll as a “consultant.” So what can a man, whose expertise is in horses and not disaster response, consult on, exactly? The only thing we can think of is that everything Brown would recommend to FEMA, the agency would do the opposite, thus ensuring stellar performance.

Brown is testifying to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina on Katrina response right now. We hope members of the panel will ask Brown what his current role is at the agency.

The first detailed tally of commitments from federal agencies since Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast four weeks ago shows that more than 15 contracts exceed $100 million, including 5 of $500 million or more. Most of those were for clearing away the trees, homes and cars strewn across the region; purchasing trailers and mobile homes; or providing trucks, ships, buses and planes.

More than 80 percent of the $1.5 billion in contracts signed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency alone were awarded without bidding or with limited competition, government records show, provoking concerns among auditors and government officials about the potential for favoritism or abuse.

TIME magazine puts the pieces together in this week’s edition, showing that Michael Brown, now disgraced former-head of FEMA, was the tip of the unqualified iceberg. Across the board, it would seem that qualified, experienced bureaucrats are getting replaced by political or personal pals – at the expense of American public.

The issue of cronyism is nothing new. Last year, POGO released a report identifying 224 government officials going through the revolving door to work in private industry for one or more of the government’s top 20 contractors. About one-third of those officials were able to influence contracts going to their future employers. The report is here.

In the latest edition of Aftergood's Secrecy News, he notifies us that the 2005 U.S. Army Weapons System Handbook, "a descriptive catalog of dozens of current and near-term weapons systems used by the U.S. Army," has been made available on the FAS website. This set of innocuous basic weapons information used to be publicly accessible on the Army's own website, but was placed behind a password-protected wall several years ago. (Before being made available on the FAS site, you could still get the Handbook, but you had to pay for a copy from the Government Printing Office. If you're in the States, it's $46.00.)

There’s an old saying, “It’s never too early to panic” – but you won’t hear that one over at TSA headquarters.

As GovExec told us this week, Sens. Collins and Lieberman, the chairwoman and ranking member of the homeland security committee, respectively, took exception when current TSA head Kip Hawley called mass transit security “outstanding.”

It appears that everything is still coming up roses at one of the U.S.'s most poorly performing and critical agencies. The four-year old TSA, which has had almost as many directors as Elizabeth Taylor has had husbands, was created to fix the problems that led to 9/11. Not only in aviation security, but other forms of transportation – road, train, maritime.

Last year Rep. John Mica, Republican chairman of an aviation subcommittee, blasted the TSA as a “Soviet style” bureaucracy. Mica used the Soviet comparison to bemoan TSA’s centralized control over America’s 440 airports. But we like to think of it in terms of TSA’s “Everything is All Right, Go About Your Business” attitude…when piles of Inspector General and Government Accountability Office show just the opposite.

Prior to his appointment to the Department of Transportation Mr. Lunner worked in the office of Congressman Amo Houghton (NY-31). He served as Communications Director and later Chief of Staff for Houghton a leading Republican on the House Ways and Means Committee. During this time Lunner coordinated bipartisan congressional retreats that brought together nearly 200 representatives and their families to promote civility and cooperation in Congress (italics are POGO's).

So maybe it is no wonder our nation’s mass transit system is still vulnerable.

We’ve been so busy with Katrina-related work, we forgot to highlight the good news about one of POGO’s previous investigations. And do we ever love it when a plan comes together. After almost 10 years of work (we last blogged about this In July), POGO is happy to report that the Energy Department announced it will begin to remove almost 12 million tons of dangerous materials from the Colorado River’s banks in Utah.

Since the late-1990's, POGO has voiced concerns about the government’s plan to place a cap over the uranium pile rather than move it to a safer location. Capping the pile would have allowed the uranium tailings, located in a 130-acre unlined pile about 750 feet from the Colorado River, to continue to seep into the river, the source of drinking water for more than 25 million residents in California and Arizona and home to several endangered species of fish.

Sep 20, 2005

Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer may not be given his day to testify before Congress about Able Danger and what the Pentagon knew pre-9/11 about Mohamed Atta. According to an unconfirmed source, yesterday the Pentagon revoked Shaffer’s security clearance to prevent him from testifying at a hearing schedule today in Senate Judiciary Committee. Now, the New York Times reports that the Pentagon has shut down the whole hearing by refusing to allow “military officers and intelligence analysts” to testify. Thankfully, Chairman Arlen Specter is standing up this illegal block and will have the hearing anyway. The show down is sure to get juices flowing…as Congress has, inappropriately and for too long, given the Executive Branch carte blanche to decide what information the legislative branch is allowed to see.

The announcement came on the heels of news that one of the witnesses “will testify that he was ordered to destroy 2.5 terabytes of information Able Danger had compiled, which is roughly equivalent to one-fourth of all the printed material in the Library of Congress,” according to a Washington Times editorial. Oops. If this is a coverup, one can only admire how, in Washington, DC bureaucratic actions taken to cover up the scandal are so often far worse than the actual wrongdoing being covered up.

Lt. Shaffer’s security clearance revocation is the latest in a string of retaliatory attacks on him and others involved in the Able Danger scandal that fits to a tee the classic whistleblower retaliation. One thread of the debate rightfully chastises the 9/11 Commission for failing to follow up on the Able Danger allegations. Those of us traveling these circles know that Commission closed its doors to many whistleblowers, refusing to hear their testimony despite a promise to the 9/11 families to hear everyone.

Yet another thread is the untenable position that Congress has put intelligence agency whistleblowers in by refusing to provide them whistleblower protections. If any of the witnesses do testify, they may find themselves jobless with no future prospects, and cheated of their retirement – that was the result for Richard Barlow who refused to lie to Congress about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and later paid the price. Congress can not do its job of overseeing the Executive Branch if employees are not safe bringing forward evidence of corruption.