Indonesia's transition to the "New
Order" in the mid-1960s, ousted the country's first
president, Sukarno after 22
years in the position. One of the most tumultuous periods in the
country's modern history, it was the commencement of Suharto's 32-year
presidency.

Described as the great dalang ("puppet master"), Sukarno drew
power from balancing the opposing and increasingly antagonistic
forces of the army and Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI). By 1965, the PKI extensively penetrated all levels of
government and gained influence at the expense of the army.[1] The
army had become divided between a PKI-allied left-wing, and a
right-wing courted by Western countries.

On September 30, 1965 six of the military's most senior officers
were executed in an action (generally labeled an "attempted coup")
by the so-called 30 September Movement, a group
from within the armed forces. Within a few hours, Major General
Suharto mobilized forces under his command and took control of
Jakarta. Anti-communists, initially following the army's lead, went
on a
violent purge of communists throughout the country, killing an
estimated half million people and destroying the PKI, which was
officially blamed for the crisis.[2][3]

The politically weakened Sukarno was out-manoeuvred and forced
to transfer key political and military powers to General Suharto,
who had become head of the armed forces. In March 1967, the
Indonesian parliament (MPRS) named General Suharto acting
president. He was formally appointed president one year later.
Sukarno lived under virtual house arrest until his death in 1970.
In contrast to the stormy nationalism, revolutionary rhetoric, and
economic failure that characterised the early 1960s under the
left-leaning Sukarno, Suharto's pro-Western "New Order" stabilised
the economy and created a strong central government.[4] Widely
praised for economic development, the "New Order" years were also
condemned for its human rights record and corruption.[5]
According to Friend, "instead of filling [Indonesians'] stomachs,
[Sukarno] tried to inflame their imaginations..." whereas Suharto
went on to "...cultivate full bellies and empty spirits".[6]

From the late 1950s, political conflict and economic
deterioration worsened. By the mid-1960s, the cash-strapped
government had to scrap critical public sector subsidies, estimates
put annual inflation at 500-1,000%, export revenues were shrinking,
infrastructure crumbling, and factories were operating at minimal
capacity with negligible investment. Severe poverty and hunger were
widespread, and Sukarno led his country in a military confrontation
with Malaysia whilst stepping up revolutionary and anti-western
rhetoric.[7]

Described as the great dalang ("puppet master"),
President Sukarno's position came to depend on balancing the
opposing and increasingly hostile forces of the army and Communist Party of
Indonesia (PKI). His anti-imperial ideology saw Indonesia
increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and then communist
China. By 1965 at the height of the Cold War, the PKI penetrated all levels of
government extensively. With the support of Sukarno and the air
force, the party gained increasing influence at the expense of the
army, thus ensuring the army's enmity.[8] By late
1965, the army was divided between a left-wing faction allied with
the PKI, and a right-wing faction that was being courted by the
United States.[9]

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Military
split

These same policies, however, won Sukarno few friends and many
enemies in the Western nations. These especially included the United States and
United
Kingdom, whose investors were increasingly angered by Sukarno's
nationalization of mineral,
agricultural, and energy assets. In need of Indonesian allies in
its Cold War against the
Soviet Union, the United States cultivated a number of ties with
officers of the military through exchanges and arms deals. This
fostered a split in the military's ranks, with the United States
and others backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction
overlapping with the Communist Party of Indonesia.

When Sukarno rejected food aid from USAID, thereby exacerbating
famine conditions, the right-wing military adopted regional command
structure through which it could smuggle staple commodities to win
the loyalty of the rural population. In an attempt to curtail the
right-wing military's increasing power, the Communist Party of
Indonesia and the left-wing military formed a number of peasant and
other mass organizations.

Indonesia–Malaysia
confrontation

In 1963, a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against
the newly formed Federation of
Malaysia was announced by the Sukarno regime. This further
exacerbated the split between the left-wing and right-wing military
factions, with the left-wing faction and the Communist Party taking
part in guerrilla raids on the border with Malaysia, while the
right-wing faction was largely absent from the conflict (whether by
choice or orders of Sukarno is not clear).

The Confrontation further encouraged the West to seek ways to
topple Sukarno, viewed as a growing threat to Southeast Asian
regional stability (as with North Vietnam under the Domino Theory). The deepening of the armed
conflict, coming close to all-out warfare by 1965, both increased
popular dissatisfaction with the Sukarno regime and strengthened
the hand of the right-wing generals whose forces were still close
to the center of power in Jakarta.

The collapse of Guided
Democracy

30
September Movement

As Major General, Suharto (at right, foreground) attends
funeral for assassinated generals 5 October 1965. (Photo by the
Department of Information, Indonesia)

On the night of 30 September-1 October 1965 six senior army
generals were kidnapped and executed in Jakarta by a battalion of
soldiers from the Presidential Guard in an "attempted coup." The
left faction among the top generals was wiped out, including the
powerful Army Chief of Staff, Ahmad Yani. Around 2,000 troops from coup
group occupied three sides of Merdeka Square, and commanded the
Presidential Palace, radio station, and telecommunications centre,
but did not occupy the east side, site of Kostrad headquarters.[10]
Calling themselves the "30 September Movement", the group
announced on radio around 7am that they were trying to stop a
military coup backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) that was planned to remove Sukarno from power.[10]

They claimed to have arrested several generals belonging to a
conspiracy, the "Council of Generals", that had plotted a military
coup against the government of President Sukarno. They further
alleged that this coup was to take place on "Army Day" (October 5)
with the backing of the CIA, and that the Council would then
install themselves as a military junta.[11][12]
Furthermore, the soldiers proclaimed the establishment of a
"Revolutionary Council" consisting of various well-known military
officers and civilian leaders that would be the highest authority
in Indonesia. Additionally, they declared President Sukarno's
Dwikora Cabinet as invalid ("demisioner").[13]

According to one chief conspirator Lieut-Col Latief, the Palace
Guards had not attempted to kill or capture Major General Suharto,
commander of Kostrad (Komando Strategi dan Cadangan TNI
Angkatan Darat - the Army Strategic and Reserves Command), because
he was considered a Sukarno loyalist.[14]
Suharto, along with the surviving General Nasution, made the
counter-allegation that the G30S was a rebellious movement that
sought to replace President Sukarno's government with a Communist
government. Upon hearing of the radio announcement, Suharto and
Nasution began consolidating their forces, successfully gaining the
loyalty of Jakarta Garrison Commander Maj-Gen Umar Wirahadikusumah
and Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, the commander of army special
forces RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat - Army's
Para-Commando Regiment).

During the evening of October 1, RPKAD soldiers recaptured RRI
and Telecommunications Building without any resistance as the rebel
soldiers had retreated back to Halim Base. RPKAD forces proceeded
to attack Halim Perdanakusumah AF Base on the morning of October 2,
but was stopped by the rebel soldiers in a fierce gunbattle in
which several fatalities were inflicted on both sides. A direct
order from President Sukarno managed to secure the surrender of the
rebel soldiers by noon, after which Suhartoist forces occupied the
base. On 3 October, the generals' bodies were discovered at Halim
and on 5 October (Armed Forces Day) a large public funeral was
held.[15]

Internal military
power-struggle

The killing of the generals saw influence in the army fall to
those more willing to stand up to Sukarno and the army's enemies on
the left.[16] After
the assassinations of those generals, the highest ranking officer
in the Indonesian military, and third highest in the overall
chain-of-command, was Defense Minister and Armed Forces
Chief-of-Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, a member of
the right-wing camp. On 2 October, Suharto accepted Sukarno's order
for him to take control of the army, but on the condition that
Suharto personally have authority to restore order and security.
The 1 November formation of Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan
Keamanan dan Keteriban, or Operational Command for the
Restoration of Security and Order), formalised this authority.[15]
However, on October 5 Sukarno moved to promote Maj. Gen. Pranoto
Reksosamudra, considered a Sukarno-loyalist, to Army
Chief-of-Staff.

After the promotion, The New York Times reported
that an unnamed Western "diplomatic report" alleged that Pranoto
was a former member of the PKI. Pranoto's alleged communism, as
well as his timely promotion, led them to promote the view that the
PKI and Sukarno conspired to assassinate the generals to
consolidate their grip on power.[17]

In the aftermath of the assassinations, however, Major Gen.
Suharto and his KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserves) units were
closest to Jakarta. By default, Suharto became the field general in
charge of prosecution of the G30S. Later, at the insistence of Gen.
Abdul
Haris Nasution, Pranoto was removed and Suharto was promoted to
Army Chief-of-Staff on October 14, 1965.[18]

Anti-communist purge

In early October, a military propaganda campaign began to sweep
the country, successfully convincing both Indonesian and
international audiences that it was a Communist coup, and that the
murders were cowardly atrocities against Indonesian heroes.[19
] The 30 September Movement was called
Gestapu (from Gerakan September Tigapuluh, "30
September Movement"). The Army, acting on orders by Suharto and
supervised by Nasution, began a campaign of agitation and
incitement to violence among Indonesian civilians aimed at the
Communist community and toward President Sukarno himself. The PKI's
denials of involvement had little effect.[20] The
regime was quickly destabilised, with the Army the only force left
to maintain order[21].

The installation of Suharto as Army Chief-of-Staff established
the right-wing faction's dominance of the Indonesian Army's
command. In addition to the PKI, this faction was also hostile
toward Sukarno-loyalists, and the Chinese (both Chinese Indonesians as well as expatriates
from the People's Republic of
China).

At the funeral of Nasution's daughter Irma, Navy commander
Admiral Martadinata gave Muslim leaders the signal to attack
Communists. On 8 October, the PKI head office was ransacked and
burned to the ground while firefighters stood by idly.[22]
They then marched demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party.
The homes of senior party figures, including PKI chairman D.N.
Aidit and Lukman and Nyoto were also torched. The
army led campaign to purge Indonesian society, government and armed
forces of the communist party and other leftist organisations.
Leading PKI members were immediately arrested, some summarily
executed.[19
]

On October 18, a declaration was read over the army-controlled
radio stations, banning the Communist Party of Indonesia. The ban
included the party itself, and its youth and women's wings, peasant
associations, intellectual and student groups, and the SOBSI union.
At the time, it was not clear whether this ban applied only to
Jakarta (by then controlled by the Army), or the whole Republic of
Indonesia. However, the ban was soon used as a pretext for the
Indonesian Army to go throughout the country carrying out extrajudicial punishments, including mass
arrest and summary
executions, against suspected leftists and Sukarno loyalists.
As the violence spread, Sukarno issued orders to try and stop it,
but he was ignored. He also refused to blame the PKI for the coup,
let alone ban it as the Army demanded. However, although Suharto
and Nasution were increasingly suspicious about Sukarno's role in
the affair, the Army was reluctant to confront the president
directly because of his still widespread popularity[22].

Beginning in later October 1965, and feeding off pent-up
communal hatreds, the Indonesian army and its civilian allies
(especially Muslim vigilante groups) began to kill actual and
suspected[15]
members and associates of the PKI. The killings started in the
capital Jakarta, spread to
Central and East Java, and later Bali. Although killings occurred
across Indonesia, the worst were in PKI strongholds of Central
Java, East Java, Bali, and northern Sumatra.[23] The
massacres reached their peak over the remainder of the year before
subsiding in the early months of 1966.[24] The
estimates of the death toll of the violence range from over 100,000
to 3 million, but most scholars accept a figure of around
500,000.[25] Many
others were also imprisoned and for the next ten years people were
still being imprisoned as suspects. It is thought that as many as
1.5m were imprisoned at one stage or another.[26] As a
result of the purge, one of Sukarno's three pillars of support, the
Indonesian Communist Party, had been effectively eliminated by the
other two, the military and political Islam.

Demonstrations

In October 1965, students in Jakarta formed KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia,
Indonesian Students Action Front), which called for the banning of
the PKI.[27]
It was soon joined by a host of similar organizations made up of
high school students, workers, artists and laborers and the like.
Other targets for the demonstrators were rising prices and
government inefficiency[22].
They also demonstrated against Subandrio, the foreign minister and head of
the BPI intelligence agency and the number two man in the
government[12].

On 10 January 1966, demonstrators, including KAMI, demonstrated
in front of the Provisional legislature and announced what became
known as the Three Demands of the People (Tritura):

In February 1966, as anti-communist demonstrations continued,
Sukarno tried to placate Suharto by promoting him. On February 21,
he tried to regain the initiative by announcing a new cabinet,
which included former Air Force chief Omar Dhani, who had
issued a statement on October 1, 1965 initially supporting the
coup. More provocatively still, Sukarno fired General Nasution from
his cabinet post. The new cabinet immediately became known as the
Gespatu cabinet, after the acronym coined by the military for the
30 September Movement[22].

Two days after the announcement, a huge crowd attempted to storm
the presidential palace. The next day, while the new cabinet was
being inaugurated, soldiers from the presidential guard opened fire
on a crowd in front of the palace, killing student protester Arif
Rachman Hakim, who was turned into a martyr and given a hero's
funeral the following day[22][27].

On 8 March 1966, students managed to ransack the foreign
ministry, and held it for five hours. They daubed slogans , one
accusing Subandrio of murdering the generals, and drew graffiti
showing Subandrio as a Pekingese dog (a reference to his perceived
closeness to communist China) or hanging from gallows[22].

Sukarno then planned a three-day series of meetings to restore
his authority. The first, on 10 March, involved the leaders of
political parties. He managed to persuade them to sign a
declaration warning against the undermining of presidential
authority by student demonstrations. The second stage was a cabinet
meeting planned for 11 March. However, as this meeting was
underway, word reached Sukarno that unidentified troops were
surrounding the palace. Sukarno left the palace in haste for Bogor, where later that night, he
signed the Supersemar
document transferring authority to restore order to Major General
Suharto. Suharto acted quickly. One 12 March he banned the PKI. The
same day, there was a "show of force" by the Army in the streets of
Jakarta, which was watched by cheering crowds[22].
On 18 March, Subandrio and 14 other ministers were arrested.,
including third deputy prime minister Chairul Saleh. That night, the radio
announced that the ministers were in "protective custody"[22].

Political
maneuvering

General Suharto is officially sworn in as Indonesia's second
president on 27 March 1968 (Photo by the Department of Information,
Indonesia)

On 27 March, the new cabinet lineup, agreed between Suharto and
Sukarno, was announced. It included the key figures of Suharto
himself as interim deputy prime minister for security and defense
affairs, tasked with preventing the resurgence of communism, the
Sultan of Yogyakarta Sri Sultan
Hamengkubuwono IX as deputy prime minister for economic,
financial and development affairs, tasked with solving the nation's
economic problems and Adam
Malik as deputy prime minister for social and political
affairs, whose job it would be to manage foreign policy [22][28].

On 24 April 1966, Suharto gave a speech to members of the Indonesian National Party in
which he spoke of the "three deviations" that would have to be
corrected by the youth of the country in cooperation with the Armed
Forces. These were:

The extreme-left radicalism of the PKI and its efforts to
impose a class struggle on the Indonesian people;

Political opportunism motivated by personal gain led and
exploited by the "puppetmasters" of the Indonesian Central
Intelligence Board (BPI), at the time led by Sukarno ally Subandrio;

Economic adventurism, resulting in the deliberate creation of
economic chaos.[29]

The new regime turned away from China and began moves to end the
Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, in defiance of Sukarno's
wishes[22].

Meanwhile, Suharto and his allies continued to purge state
institutions of Sukarno loyalists. The Tjakrabirawa palace guard
was disbanded, and following further student demonstrations in
front of the legislature building on 2 May, the leadership of the
Mutual Cooperation House of Representatives (DPR-GR) was replaced
and Sukarnoist and pro-communist members were suspended from the
DPR-GR and the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS),
the supreme lawmaking body. Pro-Suharto replacements were
appointed[11][22].

A session of the MPRS was scheduled to open 12 May, but
eventually began on 20 June and continued until 5 July. One of its
first actions was to appoint General Nasution as chairman. It
then set about dismantling the apparatus Sukarno had built around
himself. It passed several decrees, one of which was the
ratification of the Supersemar, thus making revocation of it
almost impossible. It also ratified the banning of the PKI and the
teaching of Marxist ideology, instructed Suharto to form a new
cabinet, called on Sukarno to provide an explanation for the
economic and political situation in the nation and stripped him of
the title "president for life". It also passed a decree stating
that if the president was unable to carry out his duties, the
holder of the Supersemar would assume the presidency.[22][27]

The new cabinet, announced by Sukarno on 20 June, was led by a
five-man presidium headed by Suharto, and including Malik and Sri
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. It saw the dismissal of more Sukarno
loyalists.

On 11 August, a peace treaty was signed, formerly ending the
Konfrontasi. Indonesian announced it would rejoin the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
and the United
Nations. It released political prisoners and paid compensation
to the British and American governments for the damage caused to
their diplomatic buildings during the demonstrations of the Sukarno
era.

On 17 August, in his annual independence day speech, Sukarno
claimed that Indonesian was not about to recognize Malaysia nor
rejoin the UN. He also stated that he had not transferred power to
Suharto. This provoked an angry reaction in the form of
demonstrations, and Indonesian did indeed rejoin the UN in
September, participating in the General Assembly on 28
September[27].
Meanwhile, criticism from demonstrators became increasingly
vociferous and personal, and there were calls for him to be out on
trial.

On 10 January 1967, Sukarno wrote to the MPRS, enclosing a
document known as Nawaksara giving his version of the
events surrounding the 30 September Movement. In it, he said the
kidnappings and murders of the generals had been a "complete
surprise" to him, and that he alone was not responsible for the
nation's moral and economic problems. This led to demonstrators
calling for Sukarno to be hanged[22]

The MPRS leadership met on 21 January and concluded that Sukarno
had failed to fulfill his constitutional obligations. In a
resolution passed on 9 February, the DPR-GR rejected the
Nawaksara and asked the MPRS to convene a special
session.[27]

On 12 March 1967, the special session began. After heated
debates, it agreed to strip Sukarno of his power. On 12 March,
Suharto was appointed acting president. Sukarno went into de
facohouse
arrest in Bogor. A year later, on 27 March 1968, another
session of the MPRS appointed Suharto the second president of
Indonesia[27].

General Nasution was believed to have launched his own bid for
power on December 16, 1965, when he won appointment to the Supreme
Operations Command, and gained a grip over the traditionally
civilian-held portion of the military hierarchy. It was reported
that Nasution would have preferred forming a military junta to replace Sukarno[30].
(New York Times, December 16, 1965.)

Consequences

Anti-Chinese
laws

While resentment toward Chinese
Indonesians by indigenous Indonesians-descended peoples of the
archipelago dated back to the Dutch East Indies era, the New Order
instigated anti-Chinese legislation following the quashing of the
Communists. Stereotypes of the Chinese as disproportionately
affluent and greedy were common throughout the time (both in
Indonesia as well as Malaysia), but with the anti-Communist
hysteria, the association of the Chinese Indonesians with the People's Republic of China
caused them to also be viewed as a communist fifth column.

Indonesia's hitherto friendly diplomatic relations with mainland
China were severed, and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta burnt down
by a mob. New legislation included the banning of Chinese language
signs on shops and other buildings, and the closure of Chinese
language schools, adoption of "Indonesian" sounding names, and
limits on Buddhist temple construction.

Military
rule

The liquidation and banning of the Communist Party eliminated
one of the largest political parties in Indonesia. It had placed
third in a 1955 election. It was also among the largest Communist
Parties in the Comintern, at an estimated 3 million members.
Along with the subsequent efforts by Suharto to wrest power from
Sukarno by purging loyalists from the parliament, civilian
government in Indonesia was effectively put to an end by the coup
countermeasures.

In the place of civilian rule, a new system of military rule
took hold, based on set-aside seats in the Parliament as well as
the dwifungsi
(dual function) doctrine of the military, in taking the roles of
both soldiers and administrators. The political parties not banned
outright were consolidated into a single party, the Party of the
Functional Groups (Indonesian: Partai Golongan Karya), more commonly
known as Golkar. Though
Suharto would later allow for the formation of two non-Golkar
parties, these were kept weak during his regime.

Rise of
Islamism

The purging of two secularist parties, the Nationalists and the
Communists, had a notable side effect of giving greater space for
the development of Islamism in Indonesia. This included liberal,
conservative, and extremist groups practicing Islam in
Indonesia. It widely believed by observers of Indonesian
history and politics that Suharto's forces whipped up
anti-Communist sentiment in part by exploiting conservative
Muslims' fears of "godless" Communism to instigate a jihad against the leftists.

As for more mainstream groups, conservative Islamic groups
(called the "Central Axis") became a prop of the regime for some
time after the change of regime. Liberal Islamic groups, on the
other hand, are believed to have defected during the wave of
protests before the Indonesian Revolution of 1998.

Improved ties with the
West

The change in regime brought a shift in policy that allowed USAID and other
relief agencies to operate within the country. Suharto would open
Indonesia's economy by divesting state owned companies, and Western
nations in particular were encouraged to invest and take control of
many of the mining and construction interests in Indonesia. The
result was stabilisation of the economy and the alleviation of
absolute poverty and famine
conditions that had resulted from shortfalls in the rice supply and
Sukarno's reluctance to take Western aid.

As a result of his elimination of the communists, Suharto would
come to be seen as a pro-Western and anti-Communist. An
ongoing military and diplomatic relationship between the Indonesia
and the Western powers was cemented, leading to American, British,
and Australian arms sales and training of military personnel.

Revelations and
mysteries

Four decades later, questions remain about the veracity of
accounts of the events both leading up to and during the 30
September Movement provided by the Western governments and by
Suharto. The ousting of the Suharto regime and beginning of the
Reformation period in Indonesia and the end of the Cold War for the
Western governments has allowed greater freedom of information, leading
to a significant process of historical revisionism as well
as the formation of conspiracy
theories around the events of September 1965. Still, mysteries
remain over the time period.

Beginning in 1990, American diplomats divulged to the Washington Post and other media
outlets that they had compiled lists of Indonesian "communist
operatives" had turned over as many as 5,000 names to military and
intelligence loyal to Suharto. American journalist Kathy Kadane
revealed the extent of the secret American support of some of the
massacres of 1965-66 that allowed Suharto to seize the Presidency.
She interviewed many former US officials and CIA members, who spoke
of compiled lists of PKI operatives, which the Americans ticked off
as the victims were killed or captured. They worked closely with
the British who were keen to protect their interests in Malaysia.
Sir Andrew Gilchrist cabled the Foreign Office in London saying:
"…a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary
to effective change". The PKI had won some popular support from the
poor, it was this popularity, rather than any armed insurgency that
alarmed the American government. Like Vietnam in the North,
Indonesia might 'go communist'. (San Francisco Examiner
May 20, 1990)

In 2001, the National Security Archive at
George Washington
University obtained several internal documents of the U.S.
Department of State, bolstering the ambassadors' claims of American
collaboration with Suharto. However, the National Security Archive
claims that communications between Department of State and the
Central Intelligence Agency have been heavily redacted. A U.S.
State Department cable indicates US government support for the
military.[31]

References

General
references

"Army in Jakarta Imposes a Ban on Communists." New York Times. 19 October 1965

Blum, William. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA
Interventions Since World War II, Black Rose, 1998,
pp. 193-198 ISBN 1-56751-052-3

^
868. Ref: Embtel 852./2/ /2/In telegram 852, October 5, 0405Z, the
Embassy reported on the implications of the unsuccessful September
30 coup, suggesting that Army had an opportunity to move against
the PKI. The Embassy stated, "it's now or never" and estimated that
the "agony of ridding Indonesia of the effects of Sukarno and
NASAKOM has begun," but it would be wrong "to assume process will
be over easily or quickly." (Ibid.)

Events of the past few days have put PKI and pro-Communist
elements very much on defensive and they may embolden army at long
last to act effectively against Communists.

At same time we seem to be witnessing what may be the passing
of power from Sukarno's hands to a figure or figures whose identity
is yet unknown, possibly bringing changes in national policy and
posture in its wake.

Right now, our key problem is if we can help shape developments
to our advantage, bearing in mind that events will largely follow
their own course as determined by basic forces far beyond our
capability to control.

Following guidelines may supply part of the answer to what our
posture should be:

Avoid overt involvement as power struggle unfolds.

Covertly, however, indicate clearly to key people in army such
as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we
can, while at same time conveying to them our assumption that we
should avoid appearance of involvement or interference in any
way,.

Maintain and if possible extend our contact with military.

Avoid moves that might be interpreted as note of no confidence
in army (such as precipitately moving out our dependents or cutting
staff).

Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this
priority effort is perhaps most needed immediate assistance we can
give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it as
solely or largely US effort). US National
Archives, RG 59 Records of Department of State; cable no. 868,
ref: Embtel 852, Oct 5 1965.[1]

Shadow Play -
Website accompanying a 2002 PBS documentary on Indonesia, with emphasis
on the Suharto-era and the transition from New Order to
Reformation.

Tiger Tales:
Indonesia - Website accompanying a 2002 BBC World
Service radio documentary on Indonesia, focusing on early
Suharto era. Features interviews with Indonesian generals and
victims of the regime. Program is available in streaming RealAudio
format.