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Ward and brown_family_law_sept_2013_vol_43_pp1181-1186_

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Reprinted from Family Law Journal September, 2013, Vol 43, Pages 1181-1186
DECISION-MAKING WITHIN A CHILD'S TIMEFRAME: A RESPONSE
Harriet Ward, Research Professor and Director of the Centre for Child and Family Research,
Loughborough University
Rebecca Brown, Senior research associate at the Centre for Child and Family Research,
Loughborough University
Decision-making within a Child's Timeframe (R Brown and H Ward, Working Paper 16
(Childhood Wellbeing Research Centre (2012)) is an overview of research evidence, funded
by the Department for Education with support from the Family Justice Council in response to
the Family Justice Review recommendation for consistent training and development for
family justice professionals, including greater emphasis on child development. The overview
summarises the recent research evidence, which shows how abuse and neglect can impact
on early childhood development and considers how timeframes for responses by local
authorities and courts are often inconsistent with those for children. It is not intended as a
summary of evidence to be drawn upon in making judicial decisions but as a resource to
underpin the judicial training programme. To this end, a second edition was published in
2013 with an additional chapter providing training materials.
In the August issue of Family Law at p 1053 Edward Lloyd-Jones summarised a seminar
based on a critique of this overview. At least three versions of this critique, produced for
different audiences, have been widely distributed as unpublished papers: D Wastell and S
White, ‘The child's timeframe: what the neuroscience really says', (unpublished, 2013); S
White, D Wastell, B Featherstone and K Morris, ‘Briefing document: Decision-Making Within
a Child's Timeframe' (R Brown and H Ward, 2013) – an academic analysis, unpublished; S
White and D Wastell, ‘A response to R Brown and H Ward, Decision-Making Within a Child's
Timeframe', (DFE, 2013, unpublished). None of these is published in a peer-reviewed
academic journal where external oversight is offered by an editor or referees.
The critique of Brown and Ward is linked to others produced by this group, the most heavily
publicised being: D Wastell and S White, (2012) ‘Blinded by neuroscience: social policy, the
family and the infant brain', Families, Relationships and Societies, 1(3): 397–414. These
papers, in our opinion, make considerable use of emotive language; however, in this article
we assert and focus on two other issues: their major and systematic misrepresentation of the
research findings and our account of them and also their selective use of evidence to prove
their case that the neuroscience is too weak and too flawed to provide a sufficient basis for
policy and practice. Our aim has been to produce a sound evidence base to support practice
and we do not believe that these papers identify serious flaws in it.
Given the gravity of the claims made, we feel duty bound to respond, as well as we can, to
not always fully explicit assertions about our report. We will first clarify and restate its key
messages and then respond to the specific points captured in Lloyd-Jones' summary. A key
point to note at the outset is that the academic governance of Brown and Ward was
consistent with that required of such research reports: it was overseen by a steering group,
and was then peer-reviewed by three independent academics, all of professorial status and
each with expertise in a relevant field (early years, law and neuroscience). Peer ….

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in training family justice professionals, most of whom will not have had a formal research
background. We did not rely on text books and summary papers to produce this review but we
did draw the readers' attention to a selection of such publications that provide an accessible
(and readable) way into the sometimes complicated literature. Indeed, at the request of the
steering group, we also simplified some of the language of the original draft in order to ensure
that it would be readily understood. Elsewhere Wastell and White (2013) claim that Brown and
Ward (2012) represents ‘a simplified version of the neuroscience' (p 10); that is precisely what
we were commissioned to do. Wastell and White's claim that some of the summary papers
come from campaigning organisations implies that Brown and Ward (2012) have been biased
by an ideological orientation. They focus their critique explicitly on the series of short working
papers produced by the Center on the Developing Child, based at Harvard University. They
state:
‘The Harvard Center synthesises selective samples of neuroscientific studies; although linked
with Harvard University, a cursory visit to the website reveals a campaigning ethos, rather
than a centre for objective science. So it is unsurprising that the Center assembles studies
and produces reports which serve an a priori agenda. The egregious titles of some of its
reports rather give the game away: ‘Building the Brain's Air Traffic Control System' provides
one lurid example. The key players are ubiquitous figures in the early interventionist project;
Shonkoff (its chair) is a veteran campaigner.' (Wastell, White and Lorek, 2013, pp 51–52).
The Center on the Developing Child was established by academics who are experts in the
field of neuroscience. The purpose of the site is to ensure that the findings of a deeply
complex science are disseminated clearly and appropriately to practitioners and policy
makers. The scientists involved are at the top of their field and their research is published in
the most prestigious journals. To describe this site as ‘selective', ‘campaigning', ‘a priori' and
‘lurid' is a travesty; no doubt Harvard will be dealing appropriately with these allegations.
3. ‘The conflation of statistical significance and predictive validity; statistical
significance merely means that an observed result is not a chance finding; it does not
imply the level of predictive power for practical application.' (p 1054)
Ward and Brown (2012) does not conflate statistical significance and predictive validity. Our
report summarises evidence taken from meta-analyses and systematic reviews, both of which
represent the highest level of evidence, primarily because they involve the use of a rigorous
methodology for identifying and synthesising all of the available research findings on a
particular topic. Much of the evidence in these reviews is epidemiological in nature and is
therefore on the whole observational and thereby correlational. Such correlational evidence
does not show causation but it is the best that it is possible to obtain in many areas and forms
the basis, for example, of our understanding about the relationship between poverty and poor
health. The aim of such evidence is not to predict outcomes but to identify consistent patterns
and relationships. Once there is sufficient evidence available from such correlational studies,
they are summarised in the type of meta-analyses and systematic reviews on which we drew,
which is then used for the purpose of policymaking (see M Marmot, Fair Society, Healthy
Lives (The Marmot Review, 2010)).
This is in contrast to the White and Wastell (2012) paper ‘Blinded by neuroscience' in which
the authors have picked just one of the many systematic reviews on the neuroscience (E
McCory, S A De Brito, and E Viding, ‘The link between child abuse and psychopathology: a
review of neurobiological and genetic research' (2012) Journal of the Royal Society of
Medicine, 105:151–6), extracted those elements that support their case and ignored others,
and in so doing have, in our opinion, misrepresented to the reader the overall findings of that
review and the wider evidence. Similarly, they quote the Belsky and de Haan (2011) statement
to support their claim that the knowledge base is insufficiently established: ‘the study …

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6. ‘The repeated claim that emotional abuse is more serious than either physical or
sexual abuse seemed perverse to the professors: where was the evidence for that,
indeed for the existence of such abuse as a well-defined category? The authors seemed
unconcerned about the elevation of such a category to take precedence over other forms
of abuse. Another “slippery but potent” concept was Shonkoff's tautological notion of
“toxic stress”.' (p 1054)
The extensive evidence concerning the existence and consequences of emotional abuse is
summarised by Barlow and Schrader McMillan ( Safeguarding Children from Emotional
Maltreatment(Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2010), at pp 20–36). Some researchers consider this
to be the most damaging of all forms of maltreatment in early childhood because the perpetrator
is almost always the primary caregiver and their behaviour represents a direct negation of the
child's need for safety, love, belonging and self-esteem (see D Ivaniec, ‘An overview of
emotional maltreatment and failure to thrive' (1997) Child Abuse Review, 6: 370–388). We did
not claim that it is more serious than other forms of abuse throughout childhood, and we did not
recommend that emotional abuse be given precedence over other forms of abuse. And as to
Shonkoff's supposedly tautological notion of ‘toxic stress', the supporting evidence was
published in the highly prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association (JP Shonkoff,
WT Boyce, BS McEwen, ‘Neuroscience, molecular biology and the childhood roots of health
disparities. Building a new framework for health promotion and disease prevention',
(2009) JAMA 301(21): 2252–2259), which we think speaks for itself.
CONCLUSION
Wastell and White's papers are not academic analyses of research data. They claim that Ward
and Brown (2012) is ‘designed to prop up a moral mission' (Wastell and White, 2013, p 10): the
mission being the current government agenda on adoption and the care system which they
apparently view as an attack on the vulnerable and the poor. We too have challenged
government policies that focus on adoption and other forms of care without also strengthening
support for families and addressing the factors that render abuse and therefore separation more
likely (see H Ward, ‘Again the most vulnerable suffer' and ‘Taking children into care can only be
a sticking-plaster solution' The Guardian, 7 September 2012 and 21 November 2012
respectively:http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/sep/07/again-the-most-vulnerable-
suffer; http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/nov/21/taking-children-care-sticking-plaster-
solution). Like our critics we are well aware that current neurobiological research could be
misrepresented to inform policies that may damage families (for instance by feeding into the
political discourse about ‘strivers and skivers'). However, it is not appropriate to attempt to
discredit research because it could be misused in this way.
Lloyd-Jones states at p 1055 that:
‘The permanent removal of a child from his birth family is one of the most draconian actions of
the state with life-long consequences. Surely we as a society have a responsibility to our most
vulnerable children to ensure that such momentous decisions are made in a timely manner on
the basis of the best available evidence'.
The decision of the Family Justice Board to commission the training that is underpinned by our
rigorous overview of the evidence should enable this to happen. In the meantime it is, in our
opinion, incumbent upon White and Wastell to produce a scholarly and evidence-based critique
of the neuroscientific and related research, which would involve them systematically reviewing
the evidence. They also need to provide an alternative explanation for those questions that the
neuroscientific research helps us understand, such as why some children may find it difficult to
control anger and frustration and why some who are placed for adoption may fail to develop
secure attachments with loving parents. Recent research provides conclusive evidence of the
damaging consequences to children's life chances of delayed decisions in cases where
significant harm is an issue (see C Davies and H Ward, Safeguarding Children Across
Services (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2012)). It should be of concern to us all that ….