Unfortunately, Indians do not like knowing the truth. And I have a dislike for living in a fool's paradise. Like INSAS - lovely weapon for a firing range damn accurate and reliable to make a nice grouping, but I never carried anything other than a Czech Vz 58 in valley. Was not interested in learning to strip it down in microseconds to unjam it

Why I hate DPSUs? Because in name of indigenisation they have robbed us ... the ToT for BFSR of Polish origin was achieved. The original Battery of Polish BFSR lasts for X hours in snow environs in winters. BEL fabricated battery lasts Y ... and X >>>> Y. Now for Y, I need a generator running at 70% of a period of 24 hours, authorised? at 6% of the day!!!!

'F-16 and F-18 will come by end of 2016, BELIEVE ME, really please, just believe me'​

train.

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The following is what I said. The delay was due to MP strongly batting for Tejas and pushing the SE tender process to delay the foreign fighter procurement. Now that MP has been replaced with NS, things are moving very quickly. NS has asked IAF to present a plan to mitigate the issue related to falling squadrons (Re: quick induction of F-16s). Both additional RAFALEs and F-16s are expected to be part of the IAF proposal. The current negotiations are centered around a direct F-16 deal without going through the tender process. F-16s would be a G2G deal while Gripen would follow SP/MII model.

The indigenously made single-engine fighter Tejas, now 30 years in the making, isn't yet good enough to protect the Indian skies on its own. This is what the Indian Air Force (IAF) has gently but firmly told the Narendra Modi-led NDA government.

The government recently told the IAF to scrap its plans of acquiring single-engine fighters through the "Make In India" route and instead go for the totally homemade Tejas.

There are only two proven single-engine fighters. They are the JAS 39 Gripen, a single-engine multi-role fighter manufactured by the Swedish aerospace company Saab, and the US-made F-16, manufactured by Lockheed Martin. While the USA has been applying diplomatic pressure on India to go for the F-16s, former defence minister Manohar Parrikar's Sweden visit in 2016 indicated that India was also considering the Gripen.

The Modi government is keen to reduce India's dependence on foreign defence platforms and wants to create a defence manufacturing hub in India. Parrikar, during his short but eventful tenure, ensured that the IAF agreed to induct the homemade fighter, and to be fair, Tejas has received the support of the forces, especially the IAF, which has agreed to buy 123 Tejas fighters, though not fighting fit yet.

India's quest for a home-grown fighter

What the Modi government is doing now has been tried earlier too. Tejas isn't India's first homemade fighter.

Charged by the Nehruvian vision of industrial and economic self-reliance, the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) - a defence public sector unit (PSU) that now produces the Tejas - had produced the twin engine HF-24 Marut, India's first indigenous fighter-bomber in the 1960s. Work for the Marut began in mid-1950s. Kurt Tank, who had designed the Fockë-Wulf-190 - one of the top performing German fighters during World War II - was persuaded by Jawaharlal Nehru to take over the responsibility of making the Marut.

The first fighter was handed over to IAF's Dagger Squadron on April 1, 1967. The Marut proved its mettle in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. Two squadrons of the Marut would fly more than 300 combat sorties during the fortnight-long hostilities between India and Pakistan. Not a single Marut was shot down or damaged by the enemy. By the mid-1970s, the fighter had reached 70 per cent indigenisation. A total of 147 Marut fighters were built before they were decommissioned in the 1980s.

However, the Marut was under-powered and proved too expensive to maintain. And like the Marut, the Tejas too has technical limitations.

The homemade dream and the problems therein

According to those who have given the best years of their life to the IAF, the Tejas is small, nimble, and unique, but it has its share of problems as well.

The Tejas requires more man-hours to maintain, cannot carry as much ordnance as its counterparts and most importantly, cannot fly as far as the others in a single sortie. Other single-engine fighters can be effective over a radius of over 500km whereas the Tejas can do just 300km. The radius of action of the Tejas is far smaller, making it less effective.

Balancing the short-, medium- and long-term needs of India

The IAF's firm rejection is based on the short- and medium-term need to build capabilities to deal with threats from either Pakistan or China or both. The number of fighter aircraft IAF has is dwindling steadily. It will lose another 11 fighter squadrons by 2019-20, bringing the total strength down to 22 fighter squadrons.

Lack of spares and poor serviceability of fighter aircraft means a further drop in number of fighters for operational task on a given day.

In contrast, Pakistan has between 24 and 27 squadrons and is now inducting the Chinese-made J-17 fighters. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (Air Force) has about 3,000 fighters. However, the entire fleet of fighters of neither Pakistan nor China are new or up-to-the-mark. But numbers do matter if these outdated, old and new fighters of Pakistan and China can be deployed in a concentrated manner in a given theatre. Clearly, the IAF's refusal to go only for homemade fighter aircraft is driven by its anxiety "to do the job".

The government's decision to go for the homemade fighters is driven by a slightly different perspective. It aims to make India a manufacturing hub - including defence - in the long term. Giving up on the homemade Marut in the 1980s wasn't the best decision. But, hindsight always gives wisdom. A developing country with competing needs would definitely invest more on food, health and education than funding weapons programmes. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former head of Pakistan, who was later hanged, once famously remarked "we will eat grass" but will build a nuclear bomb. Pakistan did build the bomb but, in the process, became a textbook example of a failed state.

We, as a nation, decided to invest more on IITs and medical colleges, roads, dams, agriculture, and airports and thereby building a composite and progressive India. There have been slips and the job could have been done better, but over the years, the Indian economy has emerged strong and resilient.

So, who is wrong and what is the way forward?

In the day and age of instant food, Any Time Money, and quick gratification, problems or difficult questions necessarily require binary answers - right or wrong. Unfortunately, in this case there is neither a right nor a wrong answer.

Both the IAF and government are right and wrong. The IAF, because of the nature of job at hand, is looking at the immediate scenario and wants to be prepared. Similarly, by insisting on the homemade fighter, the government too wants to be prepared for the long-term.

Perhaps what Nehru did in the 1950s is the way forward. Just as Nehru hired Kurt Tank for the Marut, India can hire another expert to fine-tune the Tejas. India today can well afford to do that. And, in the interim, India can also well afford to buy few more fighter aircraft through the "Make In India" route to fill the gaps.

Let's not give up on the Tejas but let us also give our air warriors what they want so that they can do their job.

I was going to write a more detailed report and bore you and others to death. But due to paucity of time, I am going to do a bullet:

Every security decision made by India was a political decision. There is never a military decision over hardware positioned in the same segment when you are the customer and not the producer.

Both US and USSR wooed India after independence. The reason was because of NAM and it's 120 member nations. That Nehru had visible influence over most, is a well recorded fact.

If you look at the IAF acquisitions at this time and equipement being flown (B-24J Bombers (US)), C-119 Fairchild (US), Ouragans (French), Sikorsky S-55 etc, you shall find that the Indians had access to Western Technologies for use. (the US aid between 1954-64 was to the tune of US $10 Billion, this is to actually put straight the distorted anti-US narrative that has been propagated historically)

2 major things occurred at this time - a) Pakistan offered it's territory and airspace for a 'fight to check the spread of communism' into Indian Subcontinent & b) The apparent bonhomie between PRC and Nehru's India in the run up to, during and in the aftermath of the Korean War. A specific irritant was the Indian opposition to the UN GA Resolution dated 01 Feb 1951 branding China as an aggressor in the Korean Conflict, support to calls for China to be made the UN Security Council member instead of ROC as a permanent member led to India being blacklisted under the US Battle Act of 1953

From the point above, it did not help that the basic tenet of the NAM - that of non-imposition of type of governance for any nation, found echo with the Warsaw Pact and USSR. This led to NAM invariably positioning itself so as to appear aligned to the Warsaw Pact instead of appearing neutral.

The socialistic model of Indian economy, as also Nikita Khrushchev's India visit of 1955, further dented Indian image.

The deteriorating relationship of India with PRC, the Pakistani strengthening by US aid and access to technology and the Pakistani jostling led to the next phase of political considerations driving Indian decisions.

The increased bonhomie between USSR and PRC through the 1950s, the 'distraction' of USSR in the Cuban Missile Crisis (they had cautioned PRC against using force against India over boundary issue in 1959) leading to a 'tacit understanding' over a quid pro quo wherein in exchange for PRC protecting 'USSR's flank' it could launch a limited war to teach India a lesson, was reached and the subsequent confrontation with India after signing a pact with Pakistan (the Sino-Pak Treaty of 1961) - created for India a situation wherein only the Western Nations were willing to help India out with immediate deliveries of supplies and intervention if need be.

The apparent impassive approach of USSR at that time, did India in.

This resulted in India shifting towards Western sources for supplies to hedge itself. But the unwillingness of US to consider India over an ally of 16 years and running (Pakistan a member of Baghdad Pact at the time) again forced India to look to the only source willing to consider giving help in the aftermath of the 1962 debacle - USSR. (this is with reference to F-104 request and induction of Mig-21)

The 1965 war was another situation wherein India was again rudely shocked into changing itself. That the situation improved drastcially for India post the famous Soviet-PRC divide, is a well known fact.

The diplomatic maneuvers that saw ROC (Republic of China) be replaced by PRC at the UN Security Council with active support of US and NATO countries (till then only Albania was faithfully forwarding proposal yearly to recognize PRC as legitimate representative of China instead of ROC as a permanent member of the Security Council) and increased bonhomie between Pakistan (a dictatorship)-US-PRC (a communist) again reoriented Indian choices.

Mind you, all this has to be read in conjunction with the valiant efforts of Mr Dalip Singh Saund, who fought for a pro-India approach in an increasingly anti-India Congress (due to the actions of Nehru, but ofcourse)

In 1970s, under Jimmy Carter in US and Indira Gandhi in India (she had already made her mark in 1971 and did so again in 1974, by conducting the PNE) as also Morarji Desai led Janata Government, there was an upswing in US-India relationship. By the end of the decade and due to concomitant 'Afghan Crisis' this upswing resulted in a realignment.

You have to be aware that the so called 'Indira Doctrine' was meant not only for US, but also was aimed at ensuring that the USSR was out of the IOR too. Towards that end, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not palatable for Indira Gandhi and indeed she refused to endorse it or give it any kind of support even during the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in March 1980. 2 months later, the USSR offered a deal to India - T-72s, BMPs, an option on T-80 (as was being developed at the time) and Naval Combatants, partly to offset this Indian approach and partly to ensure adequate 'pressure' on Pakistan which was being supplied with cutting edge technology in terms of F-16s, Harpoon Missiles and AIM-9s to name a few.

It was this approach, coupled to the threat of Soviet entry into Indian Sub-continent being de-stabilising for the region (as found to be true) and a threat for India in terms of both USSR and US, and the criticism India received at the NAM summit in that year, that made Indira Gandhi offset the 'dependence' on Soviets and re-align a security policy according to the diplomatic and political requirement of the day.

This became the year when an Indian team went to carry out evaluation of TOW missiles, US tried to sell C-130 to India and one US firm withdrew from biding for Arjun project due to delays and exasperatingly slow pace of negotiations. Carter removed restriction on supply of equipment for a guidance system to be installed on Jaguar Aircraft and permitted two shipments of enriched uranium to Tarapur facility.

In 1984, transfer of super computers and technology for digitalisation and improvement in C2I for Armed Forces began along with transfer of GE F404 engines for Project LCA, NV devices and, LM 2500 Gas Turbines etc

This shifting trend in the relationship, is purely to be seen with respect to the political requirement of India at the time. Whenever any equipment is purchased, the GoI spells out to the armed forces what it can and what it can not have. Plain and simple.

Now for the specific case of Mirage 2000 and Mig 29. There was an attempt by the Soviets (please recall that Soviets offered cutting edge technology to India in lesser lag time only in the aftermath to a decided Indian shift towards sourcing equipment from West Germany, Sweden, France and UK (US was looked at with suspicion due to being unreliable as having seen in 1956 Suez, and 1965 Indo-Pak conflicts) in attempt to diversify, reduce dependence on Soviets in light of their moves which were detrimental to Indian security interests and in light of the experience of the 1962 USSR 'tacit quid pro quo' with China and lastly, to gain access to technology, a field which was being led by the West and Soviets were clearly trailing and unwilling to offer the technology. The only incentive was that the Soviets offered a rouble-rupee exchange and India was willing to maintain it's force levels by that mechanism yet diversiy and go for advanced tech which was being offered by Western European nations at the time.

It is in that context that you have to read the Indian decision to go for an Aircraft carrier (Virat), two squadrons of Sea Harriers, Sea Kings, Sea Eagle Missiles and Type 1500 German Subs from Western Source.

The involvement of Messerschmitt--Boelkow-Blohm for preliminary designing work and Dassault in 1987 for LCA, the involvement of West German firms in Arjun and the ALH program, is an indicator of the deliberate attempt in late 70s and throughout 80s, undertaken by the Indians to wean away from the Soviet dependency.

Towards this end, the Mirage 2000 deal was specifically derailed by the visit of Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov in March 1982 with 70 member delegation including 31 Admirals and Generals. This was undertaken on a two week notice, previously unheard of and the proposals made then will help you understand what actually transpired.

Ustinov specifically showed anxiety over Indian attempts at diversifying to Western sources and assured unmatched access and pricing for Soviet products. He also gave an assurance of cutting down time for delivery, a tardiness inherent to the Soviet delivery since forever. Additionally, he offered the carrot of Mig-27 co-production and development, reviewed discussions on delivery of nuclear powered submarines (note the 's' behind the word? And only 01 Charlie came K-43), disparaged the Mirage 2000s and Milan ATGM, offered Kashin Class Destroyers, Su-22 Attack Aircrafts, SA-9 SAMs and licensed production of Mig-25s. Il-76s, Tu-142s, Mi-26s and coproduction was offered again on BMP (BMP 2 this time) to counter proposal of Mirage 2000 and Hawk/Alphajets and IVK-91 tanks from Sweden along with potential purchase of wheeled ICVs.

Strangly, USSR had earlier refused to give Mi-26 (citing developmental process and own priority), Mig-29s (again hesitancy had been shown on similar lines) and 10 Tin Shield Early Warning Radars, (refused earlier on same reasons )

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Bro, you are correct on these aspects. But Bofors changed this.

Except for political/strategic deals, like the Virat from your time or Gorky of this time, the govt has stopped interfering in deals that are led by tenders. As the govt said, tenders will be the first priority of the govt. FMS type deals will happen only if tenders are not possible. And the govt won't interfere in tenders, it's all done by committees. The army does paper trials, followed by field trials, then shortlist, then they open bids to determine L1 and a committee takes over negotiations. After the negotiations are over, only then will the govt come in, for either approval or disapproval, which is mostly determined by the funds available.

The fact is there was nothing stopping us from going for M-2000 and Mig-29 production save for funds.

Also, no, funds is something we don't have. And this is the primary reason:

You will notice that the exchange rate was stable in the 60s and 70s, then it got screwed up from the mid 80s to the late 90s. You are confusing politics with money, we simply didn't have money. Today, we are crying about the exchange rate climbing from 45 to 68. Imagine back in the 80s and 90s when it climbed from 10 to 45, that's mindbogglingly insane.

Our currency actually became stable only in 1999. That made pursuing the MKI and MRCA simultaneously possible. Look at the period between 2000 and 2011. During this time our procurement was first class. We bought hundreds of MKI, we bought the Hawk, we bought T-90, P-8, Phalcon, Pilatus, Scorpenes, Arihant, C-17, C-130, Gorky, Akula, Kolkata, Shivalik so on and so forth, the list is endless. From 2000 to 2011 there was no end to all the defence deals we signed.

But the minute the economy started going down, the last 5 years in particular, defence deals dried up. We are still paying for stuff we bought the last decade. What have we bought in the last 5 years, you tell me? We should have at least signed the MMRCA, but we didn't, not enough money to sustain the program. Except for the 36 Rafales and some Apache, there was nothing of note purchased in the last 5 years. We didn't even have money for mid air refuelers. Normally, we should have been able to purchase a Rafale GTG sized deal every year in comparison to our defence budget.

And now, the govt is in fixer-upper mode. They need to bring the economy back on track, once we achieve 8-9% growth, we will go back to the kind of purchases we made back from 2000 onwards. You can expect our exchange rate to be stable or it may even strengthen over the next 10-15 years. Post 2020 you will once against start seeing Rafale GTG sized deals being signed every year, maybe much bigger than the Rafale deal. The pick up in modernization is already starting with the new P-17A and Talwar class frigates deals.

If it wasn't for our economic troubles, we would have had a M-2000 and Mig-29 production line through the 90s instead of having a lost decade. Politics didn't give us the lost decade, our economy did.

Since 2012, the only new weapons we bought are the Apache and Rafale, that's it. The cumulative total over 5 years is barely over $10B. That's peanuts. Compare that to the MKI deal or Scorpene deal which were so much bigger compared to the size of our defence budget.

Economic growth is the main driver of defence expansion, politics is simply a backseat driver.

If you take a look around the rest of the forum, you will see that 'source' based news are pretty hot. Why shouldn't our media have some of that fun.

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A reason why i wont take these news easily. Our media is a good sellout for a few bucks of money. If anyone can actually ask them who is the source they will tell an retired guy who has inside information and retired 10s of years ago

Except for political/strategic deals, like the Virat from your time or Gorky of this time, the govt has stopped interfering in deals that are led by tenders. As the govt said, tenders will be the first priority of the govt. FMS type deals will happen only if tenders are not possible. And the govt won't interfere in tenders, it's all done by committees. The army does paper trials, followed by field trials, then shortlist, then they open bids to determine L1 and a committee takes over negotiations. After the negotiations are over, only then will the govt come in, for either approval or disapproval, which is mostly determined by the funds available.

The fact is there was nothing stopping us from going for M-2000 and Mig-29 production save for funds.

Also, no, funds is something we don't have. And this is the primary reason:

You will notice that the exchange rate was stable in the 60s and 70s, then it got screwed up from the mid 80s to the late 90s. You are confusing politics with money, we simply didn't have money. Today, we are crying about the exchange rate climbing from 45 to 68. Imagine back in the 80s and 90s when it climbed from 10 to 45, that's mindbogglingly insane.

Our currency actually became stable only in 1999. That made pursuing the MKI and MRCA simultaneously possible. Look at the period between 2000 and 2011. During this time our procurement was first class. We bought hundreds of MKI, we bought the Hawk, we bought T-90, P-8, Phalcon, Pilatus, Scorpenes, Arihant, C-17, C-130, Gorky, Akula, Kolkata, Shivalik so on and so forth, the list is endless. From 2000 to 2011 there was no end to all the defence deals we signed.

But the minute the economy started going down, the last 5 years in particular, defence deals dried up. We are still paying for stuff we bought the last decade. What have we bought in the last 5 years, you tell me? We should have at least signed the MMRCA, but we didn't, not enough money to sustain the program. Except for the 36 Rafales and some Apache, there was nothing of note purchased in the last 5 years. We didn't even have money for mid air refuelers. Normally, we should have been able to purchase a Rafale GTG sized deal every year in comparison to our defence budget.

And now, the govt is in fixer-upper mode. They need to bring the economy back on track, once we achieve 8-9% growth, we will go back to the kind of purchases we made back from 2000 onwards. You can expect our exchange rate to be stable or it may even strengthen over the next 10-15 years. Post 2020 you will once against start seeing Rafale GTG sized deals being signed every year, maybe much bigger than the Rafale deal. The pick up in modernization is already starting with the new P-17A and Talwar class frigates deals.

If it wasn't for our economic troubles, we would have had a M-2000 and Mig-29 production line through the 90s instead of having a lost decade. Politics didn't give us the lost decade, our economy did.

Since 2012, the only new weapons we bought are the Apache and Rafale, that's it. The cumulative total over 5 years is barely over $10B. That's peanuts. Compare that to the MKI deal or Scorpene deal which were so much bigger compared to the size of our defence budget.

Economic growth is the main driver of defence expansion, politics is simply a backseat driver.

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I will answer this in a few days. Am working on something to further drive in the point that politics will decide the procurement as economics drive the overall paradigm for us

Not finalised. Tejas may head for a death. Project LCA will see repositioning as a meaningful technology base in Private Sector perhaps.

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That is what the IAF needs.

With Tejas out of the way and back in the labs the IAF can finally get a real LCA with genuine combat capabilities such as F-16 or Gripen but Gripen has a poor chance compared to F-16 B70 which is imminent but sadly will take time like all defence matters.

Except for political/strategic deals, like the Virat from your time or Gorky of this time, the govt has stopped interfering in deals that are led by tenders. As the govt said, tenders will be the first priority of the govt. FMS type deals will happen only if tenders are not possible. And the govt won't interfere in tenders, it's all done by committees. The army does paper trials, followed by field trials, then shortlist, then they open bids to determine L1 and a committee takes over negotiations. After the negotiations are over, only then will the govt come in, for either approval or disapproval, which is mostly determined by the funds available.

The fact is there was nothing stopping us from going for M-2000 and Mig-29 production save for funds.

Also, no, funds is something we don't have. And this is the primary reason:

You will notice that the exchange rate was stable in the 60s and 70s, then it got screwed up from the mid 80s to the late 90s. You are confusing politics with money, we simply didn't have money. Today, we are crying about the exchange rate climbing from 45 to 68. Imagine back in the 80s and 90s when it climbed from 10 to 45, that's mindbogglingly insane.

Our currency actually became stable only in 1999. That made pursuing the MKI and MRCA simultaneously possible. Look at the period between 2000 and 2011. During this time our procurement was first class. We bought hundreds of MKI, we bought the Hawk, we bought T-90, P-8, Phalcon, Pilatus, Scorpenes, Arihant, C-17, C-130, Gorky, Akula, Kolkata, Shivalik so on and so forth, the list is endless. From 2000 to 2011 there was no end to all the defence deals we signed.

But the minute the economy started going down, the last 5 years in particular, defence deals dried up. We are still paying for stuff we bought the last decade. What have we bought in the last 5 years, you tell me? We should have at least signed the MMRCA, but we didn't, not enough money to sustain the program. Except for the 36 Rafales and some Apache, there was nothing of note purchased in the last 5 years. We didn't even have money for mid air refuelers. Normally, we should have been able to purchase a Rafale GTG sized deal every year in comparison to our defence budget.

And now, the govt is in fixer-upper mode. They need to bring the economy back on track, once we achieve 8-9% growth, we will go back to the kind of purchases we made back from 2000 onwards. You can expect our exchange rate to be stable or it may even strengthen over the next 10-15 years. Post 2020 you will once against start seeing Rafale GTG sized deals being signed every year, maybe much bigger than the Rafale deal. The pick up in modernization is already starting with the new P-17A and Talwar class frigates deals.

If it wasn't for our economic troubles, we would have had a M-2000 and Mig-29 production line through the 90s instead of having a lost decade. Politics didn't give us the lost decade, our economy did.

Since 2012, the only new weapons we bought are the Apache and Rafale, that's it. The cumulative total over 5 years is barely over $10B. That's peanuts. Compare that to the MKI deal or Scorpene deal which were so much bigger compared to the size of our defence budget.

Economic growth is the main driver of defence expansion, politics is simply a backseat driver.

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Ok, I will now give you only 01 Hint.

Ustinov also proposed production line for SS 21 Scarab (or the OTR 21 Tochka missile ) along with the other proposals of Su22/Mig27 etc etc earlier mentioned