National Guard needs adequate funding

Sept. 11, 2001 was an abrupt and heinous wake up call for America, the National Guard and the Army Reserve.

It was a no-notice transformation for the all-volunteer force - a call to arms and an immediate transition to an operational reserve for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. The all-volunteer force has been in unchartered waters as we prosecute a long war.

Looking back provides some insight as we look to the future of the all-volunteer force. In looking back, it is important to review the crux of the Total Force policy.

The Total Force policy, as I envisioned from the start in 1972, was that the active, Guard and Reserve forces would share in worldwide mission requirements, resource allocations and force structure. It was expected that all three components would be equipped and trained to the same standards.

Today's transition from a strategic to an operational reserve has dramatically altered the resource requirements for Guard and Reserve personnel and equipment.

The all-volunteer force has proved to be exceptionally valuable and can be sustained with better health care, wages, equipment and training. Critical to the future of the all-volunteer force are the citizen soldiers and air personnel, both men and women, who make up the National Guard and Reserves.

The days of questioning whether the Guard, with its dual state and federal mission, can perform a given mission are long past. The only questions today are whether the nation wants the Guard and Reserve to perform their missions and whether the nation will provide the resources to do so.

The present budget being considered in Congress does not do so.

The use of the Guard and Reserve as part of the operational force is mandatory, not a choice. The dual status National Guard, with both a state and federal mission, lacks the necessary equipment and other resources necessary to fulfill the assigned tasks.

I have watched with interest the debate over funding the war in Iraq. A critical issue that may be lost in the discussion is the lack of resources for the Guard and the Reserve and diminution of readiness as they return to their states and local communities from Iraq and Afghanistan.

I am concerned that the active component leadership does not adequately incorporate these requirements into the defense planning and budgeting processes.

The lack of resources translates into a lack of capability. The capabilities that the National Guard provides to the governors are integral to maintaining law and order and consequence management after a natural disaster or terrorist attack.

The lessons of Hurricane Katrina help identify the military capabilities that governors need to respond.

Most of the capabilities required - aviation, engineering, security, and so on - serve a dual purpose: supporting the federal and state mission.

The chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, has been telling all who will listen that the Guard (both Army and Air) requires $2 billion to address the immediate shortfall in dual use equipment for domestic response.

In recent testimony to the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, it was made clear that the Guard and Reserve are today not the ready force they were even three years ago.

The shortfalls exist that add up to over $40 billion to provide the equipment and training to be able to respond to our national defense requirements as well as our homeland security requirements.

The equipment problems have reached epidemic levels, particularly in the Army.

Nearly 90% of the Army National Guard has less than half the equipment they need to respond to a national crisis.

Almost 9 out of 10 Army National Guard units that are not serving in Iraq or Afghanistan have less than half the equipment they need to respond to a domestic crisis.

This is true of the National Guard and Reserve units returning from Iraq and Afghanistan as well. Fewer than 45% of the Air National Guard units have the equipment they need to deploy - the first time such a shortfall in equipment readiness has occurred in the past 35 years.

The Air Reserve is experiencing a similar shortfall. The Air Guard and the Air Reserve have flown over 80% of the supply missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The equipment is badly in need of overhaul or replacement.

The other components leading to the diminution of readiness, in addition to equipment, are quality people and training. The training component is broken for many Army National Guard units who have left their unit equipment in Iraq.

The Kansas National Guard, for example, reports that about 16% of its equipment deployed will not return.

Similar concerns were heard from other governors and the adjutant generals, the senior military Guard officer in each state and territory.

Senior Guard and Reserve officials cite that quality training on the same equipment that they fight with is significant to retention and recruitment in the all-volunteer force.

Both defense department and Congress must address full-time manning for necessary Guard and Reserve billets. The current full-time manning levels are based on a strategic reserve plan that no longer applies. For example, the Army only funds 55% of the validated full-time staffing requirements of the Army Guard.

The Guard and Reserve have been working with Congress to increase staffing levels pragmatically. The present plan is outdated and not supportive of the operational reality.

The National Guard and Reserve are truly a great asset and an important part of our total military force.

They are vital not only to our security, but also to carry out the commitments this country has made in our multilateral and bilateral treaty agreements.

We either pay up or reduce our commitments around the world.

Everyone wants to support our servicemen and women - here is an opportunity to do so.

Supporting the troops is not following the line of prohibition of recruiting at some of our high schools and universities throughout the country.

Melvin R. Laird served as a Republican House member from Wisconsin from 1953 to 1969 and as secretary of defense from 1969 to 1973.