A blog of Bridge Environment, updated weekly on Thursdays, travel permitting.
Bridge Environment seeks to catalyze a cultural shift in how our society addresses environmental issues. We provide relevant and unbiased advice to any interested party, and also work to educate scientists, policy makers, and the public on how to have a more informative dialog over environmental issues.

Thursday, January 31, 2013

Have you heard
that all marine fisheries are doomed? After a study he published with
co-authors in 2006, Boris Worm, a professor at Dalhousie University, claimed
“if the long-term trend continues, all fish and seafood species are projected
to collapse within my lifetime -- by 2048.” Anyone who has paid any attention
to news reports over the past decade will realize this claim is not the first
or the only that fisheries management is failing, although it may be the most
extreme.

Don’t believe
everything you hear. Some of these doom and gloom pronouncements may have
elements of truth in them, but they all do a disservice to fisheries management
because they seem to suggest that there is a right answer, usually a plea for a
general decrease in fishing pressure or a call for a specific technique, most
often a closed fishing area. In today’s blog, I hope to convince you that there
is no such thing as a right answer, but that there is an effective process for
coming up with good solutions. I’m sure it won’t surprise you that this process
does not include doom and gloom pronouncements. Instead, it focuses on two
inherent attributes of fisheries: their uncertainty and the differences of
opinion among stakeholders on objectives.

The key to
uncertainty is recognizing and characterizing it in terms that are relevant to
stakeholders and policy-makers. I have already discussed uncertainty
extensively and encourage you to review previous blog postings if this subject
is of interest. Today I will focus on conflicting objectives. To start, I need
to reiterate a point from the
rocket science approach to fisheries. When setting catch limits, rarely can
I give advice about the implications of an annual quota in isolation. A
seemingly irresponsibly high quota might end up meeting the economic needs and
be part of a sustainable plan if it is paired with commitments to set low
quotas in the future. Conversely, many seemingly reasonable quotas may be wildly
irresponsible if the quota will remain the same in subsequent years even if
there is evidence of stock decline. In short, to understand the implications of
fisheries quotas, we need to analyze the whole system.

There are a few
key objectives that come up in the design of most quota-setting systems. Let’s start
with two fairly simple ones—high catches versus constant catches—and simplify
matters by assuming that we have exceptional information so that there is no
uncertainty. Even in this simple case, small-scale and large-scale fishing groups
are likely to have distinct objectives. The small-scale operations probably
have a greater need for regular catches on a daily, weekly, or at least monthly
basis. Subsistence fishers, those who catch food for their households, would be
a good example. By contrast, a large corporate fishing operation may be in a
position to weather ups and downs in catches even over months or years. In
general, constancy of catches is beneficial to all fishing-related businesses,
from the fishermen themselves, who have better economic conditions with consistent
income, to restaurants and fish markets, which benefit from having a consistent
supply of seafood. Nevertheless, fishing operations will vary in their
tolerance of catches that vary from one month or one year to the next, and the
size of the operation will influence that tolerance.

Recall from the blog
that compared fish, water, and methane that we can think of many
environmental systems as a stock and a flow. We have choices for the target
stock level (in this case, number of fish left in the ocean) and the
characteristics of the flow (in this case the shape of our quota-setting policy
combined with the productivity of the fish stock). These policy options can be
represented in a diamond shape, which when used properly can be a fisheries
manager’s best friend. Like the gemstone diamond, this one has color. We can
represent performance based on a given objective, ranging from high performance
in green to poor performance in red. The colors change across the surface of
the diamond, call that its cut. When it comes to average catches, we get best
performance from fisheries that have intermediate stock levels (Fig. 1). Too
few fish and the population will suffer from a lack of reproductive output. Too
many fish and much of the potential productivity will be “lost” to the
ecosystem. When we consider that the productivity of a stock varies from one
year to the next, it turns out that highly responsive policies provide higher
average catches than more constant ones because they keep the population from
drifting even temporarily to sizes that would be less productive (again, Fig.
1). The details of how quickly performance drops and the exact location of the
peak—the color and cut of the diamond—will vary based on ecological factors,
but the general attributes are consistent across fisheries.

Fig. 2--Diamond of constant catch performance.

Constant catches respond very differently to various policies. This
objective is influenced exclusively by the flow properties, as shown in Fig. 2.
Note that the best policies for average catches are the worst for constancy. We
could find some happy medium somewhere near the middle of the diamond. However,
because fishing operations have different tolerances for unpredictable catches,
they will not agree on where this happy medium lies. Smaller scale operations,
which require regular catch and income, will prefer policies pretty far to the
left while larger scale operations will want somewhat more responsive policies
because they are willing to trade off some fluctuations in catches in order to
catch more fish overall.

In real-life,
the situation is more complicated. We have groups that care about the ecosystem
function of the fish population. These groups include conservation
organizations as well as people who have an interest in other aspects of the
same ecosystem, for example fishing operations that target a predator of the
fish in question. When we consider ecosystem function, a high stock will be of
paramount importance (Fig. 3, top). This conflicts with the high catch
performance because the productivity that is “lost” to the ecosystem as far as
catches are concerned provides benefits elsewhere. Although less important,
natural flows (neither too high nor too low) will be best for maintaining
ecosystem services (Fig. 3, top). Once again, the nuances of these performance
results, the color and cut of this diamond, will vary depending on ecological
conditions.

Uncertainty also
plays a key role. The performances in terms of average and constancy of catch,
above, are based on the assumption that we know the long-term productivity of
the stock. In reality, the majority of stocks lack even an educated estimate of
productivity. For the rest, the estimates range from moderately to highly
uncertain. The most recent two blog posts have made the point that
sustainability can be achieved, even in the face of uncertainty, through
responsive management, light fishing (and thus a high stock size), or a
combination of both. Thus, the sustainability of various fisheries policies
drops from a peak on the upper right portion of the policy diamond to a minimum
on the bottom left (Fig. 3, bottom). Sustainability affects everyone who has an
interest in fisheries, but once again this diamond’s color and cut depend on social,
economic, and ecological characteristics.

Together, these
four objectives: high catches, constant catches, ecosystem functions, and
sustainability, capture the majority of concerns various groups have about quota-setting
policies. Unfortunately, they give conflicting advice. The right answer will differ
among groups depending on their social and economic circumstances and how much
they value each of these objectives. Thus, we do a disservice anytime we
present a ‘right’ answer. Doing so is simply a way of justifying one’s own
preference by treating it as if it was an objective finding of science. We can
do better by presenting the trade-offs to everyone involved in the management
arena. These diamonds do exactly that. When interest groups are better informed
about the consequences of long-term policies, like quota-setting rules, they
will have more investment in their design and application. Of equal importance,
when groups are more informed about the trade-offs that their opponents face,
they are more likely to work constructively and devise long-lasting solutions.

Thursday, January 24, 2013

Last week, I
wrote about successful
and sustainable fisheries management as conducted by indigenous tribes in the
Lower Klamath River basin in northern California. The evidence suggests
that these groups maintained sustainable salmon catches and a stable human population
by limiting their consumption of salmon. From a societal perspective, there was
most likely a positive feedback loop at play. Stable catches led to predictable
food sources and trade goods, which in turn allowed people to plan for and
develop strong and stable institutions. At the same time, strong and stable
institutions must have been necessary to enforce fishing practices that to the
self-discipline that let so many salmon escape. I didn’t mention this last
week, but these tribes believed that the giant redwood trees in the area were
embodiments of their ancestors’ spirits and kept an eye on them to make sure
they behaved well. Enforcement was also severe. In the same way that stable catches promoted the
development of strong institutions, strong institutions promoted stable catches.

King Kamehameha of Hawaii

The situation was similar in pre-European-contact Hawaii. Complex
regulations were made by rulers and their spiritually-associated fisheries
managers, called konohiki.
Regulations limited catches in certain areas or closed certain fisheries based on
a wide range of rationales, including: early indications of a developing
shortage, an approaching feast and its food requirements, and access by the
powerful to rich fishing grounds. In concert, these regulations aided
sustainability through responsiveness to early signs of depletion and by
limiting consumption, the
two paths to sustainability discussed last week. Like the California tribes
and their salmon fishery, Hawaiians bolstered the fisheries rules through
regulations and strict enforcement (a common punishment for fisheries
violations was being thrown off a cliff to one’s death). Once again, stable
fisheries promoted strong social institutions and those strong institutions
promoted stable fisheries.

Cuba serves as a
modern example. Strong institutions there have led to unusually healthy marine
environments (although not without ongoing problems), a
phenomenon described by Jaws author
Peter Benchley. Religion is not a part of their system, but an
authoritarian government surely has contributed.

San hunter

This brings up the fascinating question: do we need authoritarian
rule to have a sustainable environment? There are examples of people who
managed natural resources without social hierarchies. The San (Bushmen) of the
Kalahari Desert and aborigines of Australia both have classless societies
without the concepts of ownership, and have lived in balance with their natural
environments for millennia. However, they are not necessarily good examples for
us to follow. Both societies are severely limited by water supply and many of
their cultural practices are centered around finding and sharing water during
droughts. Their social systems, including clan-based matching for marriages,
promotes reliance on each other for support when scarcity hits one area but not
another. Trade already promotes the spread of risk across areas in our modern
society, plus our environmental issues are increasingly global and so not ones
we can address by making the world more interconnected.

I leave this
blog with a question to you, interested reader (or two): can we address the
environmental challenges of our time with our modern institutions? On a global
level, the United Nations lacks much authority. In an increasing number of
countries, governments are turning to democracy, which usually lacks the sort
of authoritarian structure that was used to good effect in northern California,
Hawaii, and Cuba. Nevertheless, I hold hopes in two somewhat conflicting
directions. I have faith in the ability for resource users to grasp the
challenges we face and embrace proactive solutions. This is a major emphasis of
our work at Bridge Environment.
I also believe we could move in a direction of stronger environmental
institutions. It seems to me there would be significant costs of doing so, but
that environmental crises may prompt us to move in this more authoritarian
direction. I would rather see us move towards co-management with involved
resource users, but recognize that the second would be preferable to
devastation. I hope to hear your thoughts on the matter.

Thursday, January 17, 2013

I have
previously described the insight
for fisheries that comes from rocket science, in the form of missile guidance
systems. Unlike many fisheries, missile guidance systems identify a clear
target, monitor progress towards hitting the target, and, most importantly,
make decisive corrections the minute evidence suggests the trajectory is off.
The decisive corrections are the biggest difference between missile guidance
and fisheries management systems.

The
benefit of decisive adjustments is robustness, the quality that for me defines sustainability.
Fisheries managed in this manner can sustain healthy stocks and productive
catches even when scientific information is highly uncertain or even wildly
optimistic. The
cost of decisive adjustments is unpredictable catches. Certain fishing
operations might be able to weather days, months, or even years of low catch
quotas, when environmental conditions or inadvertent excessive catches drive
the stock below target levels. However, most fishing operations, including subsistence,
artisanal, and small-scale commercial fleets as well as processors and
distribution chains, have a strong preference for predictable catches. For
them, an alternative path to sustainability is to set conservative catch
quotas, which need not be adjusted so decisively.

The above
conclusions about fisheries are based on theory. It would be reassuring if
there were some evidence that these approaches work to sustain real-world
fisheries. Such evidence is tricky to obtain. True proof of sustainability
would require centuries, or at least many decades, of consistent management
practices during which time fisheries remained healthy. Modern fisheries are
not suitable for this analysis because of major technological advancements and
the paucity of traditional management systems (meaning that current management
is inconsistent with practices from even the recent past). Fortunately, there
are traditional cultures where we know something of their fisheries management
practices and whether they sustained healthy fisheries. In these cases, we do
have evidence that spans centuries to test the concept of rocket science-based
fisheries management.

Not all
indigenous people were conservation-minded stewards of their natural resources.
There are many cases of extinction that can be attributed to overhunting, and
some cases where entire societies collapsed, most likely from resource use that
failed to recognize limitations or failed to adapt to changes in those
limitations. Collapse:
How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, a thoughtful book by Jared
Diamond, details many such cases.

My favorite example of a society which clearly succeeded is the collection
of indigenous tribes that lived along the Lower Klamath River in northern
California. Their success is described in detail by Arthur McEvoy in The
Fisherman’s Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850-1980,
and under-read gem for anyone interested in fisheries. The tribes sustained
healthy salmon fisheries for centuries, and salmon was their principle food
source. The strength and splendor of their culture was something to behold,
from ornate art to a stable and invincible society. Unable to conquer them, the
U.S. Government offered them unusually beneficial treaty terms for Native
American tribes, terms that give them substantial say today over water use
throughout the entire Klamath River Basin.

Studies of
indigenous tribes in what is now the State of California show an interesting
pattern. Salmon and acorns (and the deer they supported) were the staple food throughout
the State prior to European contact, and there is a strong correlation between the
supply of these resources and the pre-contact human population density. In most
of the State, the human population was in balance with the available resources.
Two groups were exceptions to this rule. One lived along the Santa Barbara
Channel, where the human population was unusually dense due to the southerly aspect
of the coast, which provides sheltered and reliable access to marine fisheries
and thus an additional food source. The other groups lived in the Lower
Klamath, and maintained human populations that were smaller than what the
resources could provide.

This was no small feat. In the sciences of ecology and economics, the
norm is for populations to fully utilize resources. Nature and people thrive
when they can and, in doing so, tend to use up what is available. Maintaining a
smaller human population would require purposeful underutilization of
resources. The specifics of traditional fisheries management in the Lower
Klamath included exclusive use of a large fishing weir to catch salmon. The
construction of the weir did not begin until after the salmon run started and a
priest had blessed it, a process that took 10 days. The weir was then
dismantled after 10 days of fishing. Salmon that passed through before or after
the weir was in operation escaped upstream. These practices meant that salmon
truly was underutilized.

Recall that this
strategy is one of the two options to achieve sustainability. And did it
succeed! The tribes of the Lower Klamath developed their strength and splendor primarily
off of healthy salmon runs managed sustainably for centuries. Their purposeful “waste”
of fishing opportunities led to great benefits to society, and serve as proof
that a rocket science-based framework can lead to healthy and well-managed
fisheries. The feat of the Lower Klamath tribes was even more notable because
they managed these salmon runs without the use of formal science. In contrast,
we regularly sidestep managing data-poor fisheries under the belief that data
is necessary to manage. Clearly we can do better, and a rocket science-based
approach will be crucial.