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After Syria, Trump Should Clean out His National Security Bureaucracy

President Donald Trump has at last rediscovered his core foreign
policy beliefs and ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Syria. Right on cue, official Washington had a collective mental
breakdown. Neocons committed to war, progressives targeting Trump,
and centrists determined to dominate the world unleashed an orgy of
shrieking and caterwauling. The horrifying collective scream, a la
artist Edvard Munch, continued for days.

Trump’s decision should have surprised no one. As a
candidate, he shocked the Republican Party establishment by
criticizing George W. Bush’s disastrous decision to invade
Iraq and urging a quick exit from Afghanistan. As president, he
inflamed the bipartisan War Party’s fears by denouncing
America’s costly alliances with wealthy industrialized
states. And to almost everyone’s consternation, he said he
wanted U.S. personnel out of Syria. Once the Islamic State was
defeated, he explained, Americans should come home.

How shocking. How naïve. How outrageous.

The president’s own appointees, the “adult”
foreign policy advisors he surrounded himself with, disagreed with
him on almost all of this—not just micromanaging the Middle
East, but subsidizing Europeans in NATO, underwriting South Korea,
and negotiating with North Korea. His aides played him at every
turn, adding allies, sending more men and materiel to defend
foreign states, and expanding commitments in the Middle East.

They’re undermining his
positions and pursuing their own agendas. John Bolton should be the
first to go.

Last spring, the president talked of leaving Syria “very
soon.” But the American military stayed. Indeed, three months
ago, National Security Advisor John Bolton announced an entirely
new mission: “We’re not going to leave as long as
Iranian troops are outside Iranian borders and that includes
Iranian proxies and militias.”

That was chutzpah on a breathtaking scale. It meant effectively
that the U.S. was entitled to invade and dismember nations, back
aggressive wars begun by others, and scatter bases and deployments
around the world. Since Damascus and Tehran have no reason to stop
cooperating—indeed, America’s presence makes outside
support even more important for the Assad regime—Bolton was
effectively planning a permanent presence, one that could bring
American forces into contact with Russian, Syrian, and Turkish
forces, as well as Iranians. As the Assad government consolidates
its victory in the civil war, it inevitably will push into Kurdish
territories in the north. That would have forced the small American
garrison there to either yield ground or become a formal combatant
in another Middle Eastern civil war.

The latter could have turned into a major confrontation.
Damascus is backed by Russia and might be supported by Ankara,
which would prefer to see the border controlled by Syrian than
Kurdish forces. Moreover, the Kurds, under threat from Turkey, are
not likely to divert forces to contain Iranians moving with the
permission of the Damascus government. Better to cut a deal with
Assad that minimizes the Turks than be Washington’s
catspaw.

The Pentagon initially appeared reluctant to accept this new
objective. At the time, Brigadier General Scott Benedict told the
House Armed Services Committee: “In Syria, our role is to
defeat ISIS. That’s it.” However, the State Department
envoy on Syria, Jim Jeffrey, began adding Iran to his sales pitch.
So did Brian Hook, State’s representative handling the
undeclared diplomatic war on Iran, who said the goal was “to
remove all forces under Iranian control from Syria.”

Apparently this direct insubordination came to a head in a phone
call between President Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan. “Why are you still there?” the latter asked
Trump, who turned to Bolton. The national security advisor was on
the call, but could offer no satisfactory explanation.

Perhaps at that moment, the president realized that only a
direct order could enforce his policy. Otherwise his staffers would
continue to pursue their militaristic ends. That determination
apparently triggered the long-expected resignation of Defense
Secretary Jim Mattis, who deserves respect but was a charter member
of the hawkish cabal around the president. He dissented from them
only on ending the nuclear agreement with Iran.

Still in place is Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who so far has
proven to be a bit more malleable though still hostile to the
president’s agenda. He is an inveterate hawk, including
toward Tehran, which he insists must surrender to both the U.S. and
Saudi Arabia as part of any negotiation. He’s adopted the
anti-Iran agenda in Syria as his own. His department offered no new
approach to Russia over Ukraine, instead steadily increasing
sanctions, without effect, on Moscow. At least Pompeo attempted to
pursue discussions with North Korea, though he was certainly
reluctant about it.

Most dangerous is Bolton. He publicly advocated war with both
Iran and North Korea before his appointment, and his strategy in
Syria risked conflict with several nations. He’s demonstrated
that he has no compunctions about defying the president, crafting
policies that contradict the latter’s directives. Indeed,
Bolton is well-positioned to undermine even obvious successes, such
as the peaceful opening with North Korea.

Supporting appointments to State and the National Security
Council have been equally problematic. Candidate Trump criticized
the bipartisan War Party, thereby appealing to heartland patriots
who wonder why their relatives, friends, and neighbors have been
dying in endless wars that have begotten nothing but more wars. Yet
President Trump has surrounded himself with neocons, inveterate
hawks, and ivory tower warriors. With virtually no aides around him
who believe in his policies or were even willing to implement them,
he looked like a George Bush/Barack Obama retread. The only
certainty, beyond his stream of dramatic tweets, appeared to be
that Americans would continue dying in wars throughout his
presidency.

However, Trump took charge when he insisted on holding the
summit with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Now U.S. forces are
set to come home from Syria, and it appears that he may reduce or
even eliminate the garrison in Afghanistan, where Americans have
been fighting for more than 17 years. Perhaps he also will
reconsider U.S. support for the Saudis and Emiratis in Yemen.

Trump should use Secretary Mattis’s departure as an
opportunity to refashion his national security team. Who is to
succeed Mattis at the Pentagon? Deputy Secretary Patrick Shanahan
appears to have the inside track. But former Navy secretary and
senator Jim Webb deserves consideration. Or perhaps it’s time
for a second round for former senator Chuck Hagel, who opposed the
Gulf war and backed dialog with Iran. Defense needs someone willing
to challenge the Pentagon’s thinking and practices. Best
would be a civilian who won’t be captured by the bureaucracy,
one who understands that he or she faces a tough fight against
advocates of perpetual war.

Next to go should be Bolton. There are many potential
replacements who believe in a more restrained role for America. One
who has been mentioned as a potential national security advisor in
the past is retired Army colonel and respected security analyst
Douglas Macgregor.

Equally important, though somewhat less urgent, is finding a new
secretary of state. Although Pompeo has not so ostentatiously
undermined his boss, he appears to oppose every effort by the
president to end a war, drop a security commitment, or ease a
conflict. Pompeo’s enthusiasm for negotiation with Kim
Jong-un and Vladimir Putin is clearly lagging. While the secretary
might not engage in open sabotage, his determination to take a
confrontational approach everywhere except when explicitly ordered
to do otherwise badly undermines Trump’s policies.

Who to appoint? Perhaps Tennessee’s John Duncan, the last
Republican congressman who opposed the Iraq war and who retired
this year after decades of patriotic service. There are a handful
of active legislators who could serve with distinction as well,
though their departures would be a significant loss on Capitol
Hill: Senator Rand Paul and Representatives Justin Amash and Walter
Jones, for instance.

Once the top officials have been replaced, the process should
continue downwards. Those appointed don’t need to be
thoroughgoing Trumpists, of whom there are few. Rather, the
president needs people generally supportive of his vision of a less
embattled and entangled America: subordinates, not insubordinates.
Then he will be less likely to find himself in embarrassing
positions where his appointees create their own aggressive policies
contrary to his expressed desires.

Trump has finally insisted on being Trump, but Syria must only
be the start. He needs to fill his administration with allies, not
adversaries. Only then will his “America First” policy
actually put America first.