Television Network Strategy Research Paper

For our final project in Advanced Business Strategy at the Kellogg School of Management, my team looked at several components of NBCU's TV strategy in light of the Comcast acquisition. This portion of the paper examines the strategy for television channel ownership and finds that a diversified portfolio is ideal.

Transcript of "Television Network Strategy Research Paper"

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MGMT943 – Advanced Business Strategy Kellogg School of Management Orlando O’Neill NBCU TV: Executive Summary In December 2009, General Electric and Comcast Corporation announced that after months of negotiations, they had reached an agreement to form a unique entertainment company through a new joint venture. Per the agreement, General Electric agreed to sell NBC Universal to Comcast, which will manage the company as the majority stakeholder.1 The new company, if approved by the FCC, will be the third largest television company, behind Disney and Viacom,2 and control a diverse set of well-­‐known cable and broadcast television networks, including NBC, Telemundo, SyFy, and the Golf Channel. The company will be capable of acquiring, producing, and promoting content that can be delivered to audiences in about 200 countries via cable, internet, and mobile platforms provided by Comcast.3 The new company will shake up the television industry, which is characterized by fierce competition for viewers that exhibit unpredictable, ever-­‐changing tastes and have a vast array of entertainment options, including books, videogames, and the internet. Furthermore, the industry is still trying to determine the best way to navigate in an increasingly dynamic environment that is witnessing the emerging prominence of new forms of distribution, based primarily on broadband and mobile internet access. These digital distribution channels could threaten existing business models; much in the same way that digital audio has impacted the music industry. It is under these circumstances that we have examined four aspects of NBC Universal’s strategy in an effort to provide recommendations for the organization going forward. 1. Online Strategy – 2. Broadcast Station Strategy – 3. Television Network Strategy – In this section, we examined if NBC Universal should have more or less cable or broadcast television networks. The primary analyses looks at audience trends to determine the strategy that will best position NBC to grow its audience share. This is important because advertising revenue, which contributes a significant portion of net income, is closely linked to audience sizes. Furthermore, the section touches upon how the relationships between the different channels should be structured. 4. Type of Content – (3 of the 4 sections have been removed because they represent work performed by my teammates that I don’t have the right to distribute)

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Chapter 3 – Television Network Strategy Summary In response to consumer trends in the industry, NBC should add to its portfolio of cable networks, either through the acquisition or creation of new networks. Audiences continue to shift from broadcast to cable television, and there is no indication that this trend will slow down or reverse any time soon. An expanded offering in the cable market will provide the company with more avenues to air tailored content capable of attracting specific segments of the fragmenting audience. Furthermore, by continuing to organize the networks in a commonly-­‐owned chain structure, NBC will have a better chance of realizing the full benefits of this strategy. Audience Fragmentation For the past 30 years, the average Nielsen ratings, which are based on audience sizes, of the top television shows have been steadily declining. This trend has persisted even as the size of the market has continued to grow both in terms of the number of television households and the average time spent watching television in each household. The decline can be directly attributed to the increasing array of content and distribution options, first on the existing broadcast networks and then on the emerging cable networks. This effect is often referred to as “audience fragmentation,” and it is particularly troubling given its impact on advertising and syndication revenues, which are both dependent on a network’s ability to attract audiences to its programming. NBC can offset the impact of audience fragmentation by using cable networks to air content tailored to specific target segments, such as male boys aged 9-­‐14 or science fiction fans. These segments can be thoroughly studied via marketing research to gain a better understanding of their preferences and habits in order to improve the company’s ability to create content that will be better accepted by the audiences. This in turn could lead to more shows reaching syndication, which provides a major source of revenue. In terms of advertising revenue, the portfolio of networks will allow NBC to deliver more value to advertisers by positioning advertising on the right channels, in the right programs, for the right audience, and at the right price. This strategy, which is widely used by major competitors in the cable market, including Viacom and Disney, depends on the ability to air “niche” programming, making it less suitable for broadcast networks. Factors favoring consolidation Due to the unique nature and “brand promise” of cable television networks, companies must continue to invest large amounts of capital to expand their content libraries with relevant material for each network and attract audiences to that content via advertising. This reduces the ability to realize savings by sharing content or advertising across networks, implying that these costs will continue to increase for incumbents. Unsurprisingly, both expenditures are in the billions for cable television companies, such as Viacom, which spent ~$3.6 billion on content and advertising in 2009, accounting for 67% of total annual expenses, and NBC, which has ~$9 billion in programming commitments as of 2009. The effectiveness of advertising in attracting audiences for new shows and incumbents’ willingness to invest large amounts into it causes the industry to favor consolidation, which is evident by the leading companies’ network portfolios. Consolidation is also favored by the back-­‐end savings that can be achieved in areas such as broadcasting equipment. Relationship Structure In order to realize the full benefits from this strategy, NBC must own the networks. Any other arrangement could undermine the company’s incentive to spend the requisite amounts necessary to advertise the content aired on those networks. Furthermore, a well-­‐developed brand, such as MTV, can Page|2

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be extremely valuable in the industry both for attracting audiences and launching “sister” networks, but it would be difficult to quantitatively measure an owners’ performance in managing the brand. Lastly, a strong, independent network would have the incentive to deal directly with third parties in order to maximize its revenue by removing the middle man. This would reduce NBC’s ability to leverage that network to its advantage when managing relationships with other companies, such as advertisers. SOURCES 1. Arango, Tim. (2009). G.E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go to Comcast. Retrieved on June 3, 2010, from the New York Times website at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/business/media/04nbc.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss . 2. Comcast. (2010). A Valuable Portfolio of Profitable Cable Channels. Retrieved on May 12, 2010, from the GE website at http://www.ge.com/newnbcu/. 3. Comcast. (2010). A Partnership Fact Sheet. Retrieved on May 12, 2010, from the GE website at http://www.ge.com/newnbcu/. Page|3

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NBCU TV: Detailed Chapters Chapter 3 -­‐ Television Network Strategy In order to remain competitive in the industry, NBC should add to its portfolio of cable networks, which will include amongst others E!, SyFy, Oxygen, and USA, the top cable channel by primetime rating.1 This will provide the company with several benefits for managing revenue, costs, and programming. By continuing to organize these relationships as a commonly-­‐owned chain structure, NBC will have a better chance of ensuring the realization of these benefits. Owning a broad portfolio of networks will help NBC react to changing market conditions that threaten traditional revenue models. In particular, as consumers are provided with an increasing array of options for consuming media, audience fragmentation continues to reduce the size of television show audiences. During the last 30 years, the average Nielsen Ratings, a proxy for total audience size, of the top annual television programs have been steadily decreasing, with top programs now drawing less than 50% of the audience size that was once possible (Exhibit 1).2 As can be seen in the chart below, the decline has been relatively parallel on both ends of the spectrum, so audience cannibalization appears to be due to an outside factor, which we will show to be the growing availability of alternate programming. Exhibit 1 Average Nielsen Ratings of #1 and #30 Ranked Program 40 Average Nielsen RaEng 30 20 10 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 #1 Nielsen Raung #30 Nielsen Raung The average Nielsen Rating for the top show is projected to continue decreasing by ~2.7% annually with a 95% confidence interval of {-­‐3.24%, -­‐2.14%}, signifying smaller audiences for even the most popular shows. This estimate was arrived at by taking a semi-­‐log regression of the average Nielsen rating for the top show every season by year, with 1980 serving as the base. The resulting equation is below. LN(Avg NiRating for Top Program) = 3.436 – 0.027*(Current_Year -­‐ 1980) After correcting for the log bias, the average Nielsen Rating of the top show in 2010 should fall between 11.83 and 16.46. The rating of the top shows for the weeks of April 25, 2010, the NCAA Basketball Championships, and May 3, 2010, Dancing with the Stars, was 14.2 and 12.5 respectively.3 This is in line with the estimates based on the regression equation, though these are only point samples, not full-­‐season averages. Page|4

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The regression points to a continuing decline in audience sizes in the near future, a notion that is further corroborated by the two ratings samples taken this year. Given that this projection is based on past data, it is impossible to accurately predict how long it will remain valid. External factors, such as the programming strategies employed by media companies, may accelerate, decelerate, or reverse the decline. Before accepting the increasing number of options as the source of the declining audience sizes, there are two other possible explanations that must be considered: 1) a decline in the total number of television households and 2) an increase in the popularity of substitutes, such as videogames or books. Data released by the Nielsen Company refutes the validity of both of these alternate explanations. According to the company’s estimates, the number of television households continues to increase, though this last year saw “the smallest increase in the last 10 years” (Exhibit 2).4 Exhibit 2 Estimated Number of U.S. Television Households On the point of substitutes, the data shows that television remains a very popular American pastime. The average amount of time per day spent watching television is at the highest level ever recorded and has been increasing for the past decade (Exhibit 3).5 Exhibit 3 Average Daily Television Viewing Page|5

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The increase in television households and average viewing per day implies that audience fragmentation is indeed a result of increasing options, both in terms of programming content and distribution. The fragmenting audiences are increasingly finding their way to basic cable offerings. Exhibit 46 below, which was generated from Nielsen Ratings data, shows the increasing percentage of households that are tuning in to basic cable during primetime, which has long been considered the most critical block of programming. Exhibit 4 Primetime Viewing Audiences by Households From this data, primetime viewership for broadcast networks is projected to continue decreasing at a rate of about 2.3% with a 95% confidence interval of {-­‐2.6%, -­‐2.0%}. This projection is in line with the 2.7% decline calculated above for the ratings of the top individual programs, which continue to be dominated by broadcast network shows that can attract larger audiences. Primetime viewership is projected to increase at a rate of about 10.2% with a 95% confidence interval of {8.8%, 11.6%}. As before, these estimates were calculated by taking semi-­‐log regressions of the data, with 1984 serving as the base, and yielded the following equations. LN(Primetime HH Rating for Network Affiliates) = 3.8 -­‐ 0.023*(Current_Year -­‐ 1984) LN(Primetime HH Rating for Ad/Basic Cable) = 1.65 + 0.102*(Current_Year -­‐ 1984) Broadcast network television continues to be a successful medium for live programming7, such as major sporting events like the Superbowl, which continues to attract larger audiences.8 Therefore, NBC should hold on to its broadcast networks, but going forward, it should focus any channel expansion in the cable television market. If the viewership trends continue to hold, then cable will eventually provide the most attractive opportunity for attracting audiences to new programming. Audience fragmentation is particularly troubling given its impact on both advertising revenue, which has historically been tied to a program’s audience size, and licensing revenue, which is contingent upon a show airing for three to four seasons. Both sources of revenue help offset the high cost of acquiring and producing new programming. For example, NBC’s cost to produce one hour of primetime programming for a drama can reach $4 million9. At Viacom, annual programming and production costs were $2.95 Page|6

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billion in 2009, accounting for 74% of the company’s operating expenses;10 at CBS, annual programming and production costs of $5.9 billion accounts for 68% of the company’s annual operating expenses;11 and at NBC, the company has programming commitments totaling $8.9 billion as of 2009.12 Cable channels offer attractive incentives that can help mitigate the impact of audience fragmentation on the bottom line, including targeted audiences and two main sources of revenue. Cable channels have the benefit of earning revenue through both advertising and subscription fees. Although the subscription fees may be small, the resulting revenue can be substantial when factored across a large subscriber base. At CBS, which owns the cable networks Showtime and CBS College Sports Network, cable revenue accounted for 10% of total revenue in 2009, and their affiliate and subscription fees increased by 13% to $1.46 billion.11 After the merger between NBCU and Comcast, cable channels will provide 82% of new joint venture’s operating cash flow.13 Unlike broadcast networks, which have to air programming that appeals to a wide range of audiences, cable channels can make specific “brand promises” to target specific audiences. For example, when a viewer tunes in to SyFy or Oxygen, they know that they can expect a certain type of programming, such as “Stonehenge Apocalypse” or “DinoShark.”14 Viacom, Disney, and TimeWarner are known to position channels to target certain demographic groups. Viacom’s annual report states that Our media networks properties target key audiences considered particularly attractive to advertisers. For example, MTV targets teen and young adult demographics, Nickelodean targets kids and their families and BET targets African-­‐American audiences.10 Audience segmentation makes producing content that appeals to the audience and has a better chance of reaching syndication less of a gamble, since the audience segment can be better understood and catered to in a process akin to marketing’s Segment-­‐Target-­‐Position. That same framework suggests that creating popular programming on broadcast television will continue to be a difficult, unpredictable task because of the challenge of trying to be “all things to all people.” In the event that one channel suffers due to unsuccessful programming, the other cable channels in the portfolio can buffer it until new programming can be produced to turn it around. For example, the 2009 GE Annual Report states that “lower earnings in our broadcast television business ($02 billion) were partially offset by the gain related to AETN ($06 billion) and higher earnings in cable ($02 billion).”12 The targeted audiences that cable channels draw can also improve the value of those channels to advertisers, which have steadily increased their annual cable advertising expenditures (Exhibit 5).15 Exhibit 5 Annual National Television Advertising Expenditures Page|7

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40,000 Ad Expenditures (Billions) 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Network Broadcast TV Nauonal Syndicauon Nauonal Cable TV Although the size of the audience is still an important consideration for advertising decisions, advertisers also emphasize the type of audience that can be reached. In Disney’s annual report the company states that for its television networks, The ability to sell time for commercial announcements and the rates received are primarily dependent on the size and nature of the audience that the network can deliver to the advertiser as well as overall advertiser demand for time on network broadcasts. This might explain why the recent decision by the president of Turner Entertainment Networks, Steve Koonin, to hire Conan O’Brien in an effort to target a “youthful audience” has already caused two advertisers to take the “the unusual step of calling Koonin at home to make sure there would be room for them on OBriens show.”16 CBS has identified this benefit as a threat in its annual report, which states “more television options increase competition for viewers and competitors targeting programming to narrowly defined audiences may gain an advantage over the Company for television advertising and subscribing revenues.”11 The last piece of evidence favoring an expansion in cable channel ownership has to do with the long-­‐run industry structure analysis for the television industry. This analysis favors consolidation given the effectiveness of advertising in the industry. The cost of entry, F, for starting a television channel is high, but even if that decreases and the market size continues to grow in the future, advertising will continue to buoy the cost to enter competitively. Networks must spend money on advertising, which plays a critical and expensive role, every year to promote the channel and new programming to attract audiences for the shows. Viacom, one of the largest cable channel owners that relies on cable channel revenues to the same extent as the proposed NBCU/Comcast venture, spent $1.3 billion (24% of total annual expenses) on advertising in 2009, and that represents a decrease over the $1.6 billion it spent during each of the two prior years.10 Hulu’s Superbowl advertisement in 2009 is a testament to the effectiveness of this advertising. After airing the ad, “viewership on the video Web site surged 55 percent to 7.8 million in February.”17 Although Hulu is in a different role as an online video distributor, there are similarities in its competitive environment that allow a comparison to be drawn; in particular, Hulu competes with a number of other companies, including YouTube, for viewers through advertising and content. A similar example is available in SyFY’s extensive marketing campaign for a new television series that was able to acquire a 1.5 million pre-­‐premier audience for the pilot.18 Page|8

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Now that the case has been made for owning more cable channels, the next step is to address why ownership is a better option for structuring those affiliations than contracts or other agreements. This section provides a cursory treatment of the subject mainly focused on the benefits of ownership identified below in Exhibit 6, where the items have been grouped into broad categories and ordered by perceived importance. This discussion should be considered a starting point for further analysis. Exhibit 6 Pros and Cons of Cable Network Ownership PROS CONS FINANCIALS FINANCIALS Acquire all advertising and subscription Acquire all expenses and liabilities revenue Protection against consolidation Risk overpaying for the network Production scale economies Potential for network to eventually fail PROGRAMMING PROGRAMMING Brand Ownership Require programming to fill the networks schedule Full benefit of advertising and programming Need to track consumer preferences for expenses multiple groups Control over program scheduling Increased possibility of fines, bad publicity, etc. Increased utilization of content library COMPANY MANAGEMENT More touch points to track consumer Complexity of managing a larger company preferences RELATIONSHIPS Increased need for skilled managers, staff, etc More leverage over content producers Increased scrutiny More leverage over multi-­‐channel video Risk diluting brand strength with central service providers management Opportunity for bundled advertising deals Risk that employees will “just sort of relax” There are financial incentives that can only be exploited through ownership of additional cable networks. First and foremost, NBC gains all of the network’s subscription and advertising revenue, which is a valuable source of the funding necessary to continue operations. As was discussed above, cable channels benefit from having two sources of revenue, advertising and subscriptions fees. For example, the cable networks that Disney owns “derive a majority of their revenues from fees charged to cable, satellite and telecommunications service providers.”19 If NBC structured the relationship contractually, it is uncertain how much of this revenue NBC could negotiate for from an independently-­‐owned network. By owning cable networks, NBC will protect itself from similar expansion by other companies that is likely to occur given the industry characteristics favoring consolidation. If NBC maintains a static portfolio of channels, it may see its audience share and related revenue decline from audience fragmentation to the point that its ability to operate is significantly compromised. This could easily lead into a self-­‐reinforcing cycle where lower revenue makes it difficult to produce and acquire the programming necessary to attract and retain audiences, resulting in a cyclical decline in audience share and revenue. This threat is acknowledged by multiple companies in their annual reports, such as Disney’s statement that Page|9

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The success of our businesses depends on our ability to consistently create and distribute filmed entertainment, broadcast and cable programming, online material, electronic games, theme park attractions, hotels and other resort facilities and consumer products that meet the changing preferences of the broad consumer market. Finally, there are production scale economies that a company can exploit by having multiple networks because “once you air one channel, you can distribute a lot of channels cheaply.”7 This includes operational cost efficiencies, such as shared resources, and other back-­‐end savings, including shared access to the content library. When NBC purchases a network, it not only acquires the channels, but more importantly, it acquires the associated brands, which can be used to create affiliated channels where excess, similar content can be placed, such as the MTV or Disney channels, to enhance its value to the company. Developing a brand is an expensive undertaking, but once established, it can be a valuable resource to attract audiences and “lift” associated content. If NBC allowed its channels to be independently owned, it would be difficult to ensure that the owner maintained a consistent brand given the incentive to air popular shows, regardless of their characteristics or source. Furthermore, the independent network may not possess the capital necessary to build up its brand relative to competitors. In this situation, NBC would want to advertise its programming to improve ratings, but that could ultimately have negatives consequences. Any advertising by NBC would have the potential to improve the brand strength of the independently-­‐owned network. This would make the network more attractive to competitors and increase its bargaining leverage when it comes time to renegotiate the relationship. By owning the networks, NBC ensures that it is the primary benefactor from its expenses in advertising and programming. Given that production and programming costs are the largest operating expenses for media companies, there is a strong incentive to capitalize on that programming as much as possible. One way to do this is to place the programs in attractive time slots that are more likely to result in a larger audience. Scheduling can ultimately lead to the success or failure of a season for a network. Fred Silverman, who served as president of NBC for a brief period of time, was known for his skill in “the art of scheduling –counterprogramming, stunting, lead-­‐ins and lead-­‐outs.”20 Unless NBC owns the channels that it contributes content to, it will have to negotiate for the best timeslots. An independently-­‐owned channel would have the incentive to maximize the benefits it receives for these limited timeslots to the detriment of NBC. If one of NBC’s shows becomes a hit on that network, it may have leverage over NBC based on the timeslot requirement during any renegotiations depending on how the contract is structured. NBC would have incentives to keep the show from being moved into a less attractive timeslot, such as the “Friday Night Death Slot.”21 Control of the programming schedules also provides NBC with the opportunity to utilize more of its content library. Networks spend a large amount of money to build and expand a content library, and there is always a possibility that they may have to incur losses from write-­‐downs on the value of this content over time. CBS, which earns a substantial portion of its revenue from licensing, states that “if the content of its television programming library ceases to be widely accepted by audiences or is not continuously replenished with popular content, the Companys revenues could be adversely affected.”11 NBC is exposed to the same risk given its programming commitments detailed earlier and its existing library. This should place a sense of urgency on the company to utilize content while it is still relevant. Finally, by owning cable networks, NBC gains an advantage in managing its external dependences with advertisers, content producers, and multi-­‐channel video service providers. In the television industry, Page|10

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“competition for popular programming that is licensed from third parties is intense.”11 Contracts with top content producers, and even television stars, for shows may require guaranteed commitments to purchase additional programming,20 which is relatively cheap to offer when a company already owns multiple channels that all have programming needs. NBC could also use its ownership of popular channels as bargaining chips in its negotiations with service providers. These negotiations occasionally lead to disputes, where the provider threatens to drop a channel in order to gain more attractive fee agreements, as is currently the case with Dish and The Weather Channel, which is partially owned by NBC.22 If its affiliations with the other networks were contractual, it would be much harder to use them as bargaining chips because the service provider would just as easily be able to negotiate independently with those networks, which would have strong incentives to ensure the provider continues carrying their channel to protect revenues. Page|11

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SOURCES 1. Federal Communications Commission. (2009). 13th Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming. Top 20 Programming Services by Prime Time Rating, Table C-­‐6, 197. Retrieved on April 25, 2010, from the FCC website at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-­‐07-­‐206A1.pdf. 2. Brooks, Tim and Earle Marsh. The Complete Directory to Primetime Network and Cable TV Shows: 1946-­‐Present (9th Edition). New York: Ballantine Books, 2007. 3. Nielsen Wire Blog. (2010). Weekly TV Ratings. Retrieved on April 25, 2010, and May 15, 2010, from the Nielsen Wire website at http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/weekly-­‐tv-­‐ratings/. 4. Nielsen Wire Blog. (2009). 114.9 Million U.S. Television Homes Estimated for 2009-­‐2010 Season. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from the Nielsen Wire website at http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/media_entertainment/1149-­‐million-­‐us-­‐television-­‐homes-­‐ estimated-­‐for-­‐2009-­‐2010-­‐season/. 5. Nielsen Wire Blog. (2009). Average TV Viewing for 2008-­‐09 TV Season at All-­‐Time High. Retrieved on April 25, 2010, from the Nielsen Wire website at http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/media_entertainment/average-­‐tv-­‐viewing-­‐for-­‐2008-­‐09-­‐tv-­‐ season-­‐at-­‐all-­‐time-­‐high/. 6. Gorman, Bill. (2008). Updated: Where Did The Primetime Broadcast Audience Go?. Retrieved on April 15, 2010, from the TV By The Numbers website at http://tvbythenumbers.com/2008/12/03/updated-­‐where-­‐did-­‐the-­‐primetime-­‐broadcast-­‐ audience-­‐go/9079. 7. NBC Universal employee. Telephone Interview. May 5, 2010. 8. Gorman, Bill. (2009). Superbowl TV Ratings. Retrieved on June 5, 2010, from the TV By The Numbers website at http://tvbythenumbers.com/2009/01/18/historical-­‐super-­‐bowl-­‐tv-­‐ ratings/11044. 9. Comcast and NBC. (2010). The Comcast/NBCU Transaction and Online Video Distribution, 20. Retrieved on May 11, 2010, from http://www.comcast.com/nbcutransaction/pdfs/ISRAEL%20KATZ%20-­‐ %20Public%20Version%20Stamp%20In.pdf. 10. Viacom. (2010). Form 10-­‐K: 2009 Annual Report. Retrieved on May 11, 2010, from http://phx.corporate-­‐ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=85242&p=irol-­‐sec. 11. CBS Corporation. (2010). Form 10-­‐K: 2009 Annual Report. Retrieved on April 27, 2010, from http://investors.cbscorporation.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=99462&p=irol-­‐sec. 12. General Electric. (2010). Form 10-­‐K: 2009 Annual Report. Retrieved on April 25, 2010, from http://www.ge.com/ar2009/downloads.html. 13. Comcast. (2010). A Valuable Portfolio of Profitable Cable Channels. Retrieved on May 12, 2010, from the GE website at http://www.ge.com/newnbcu/. 14. SyFY. (2010). Catalog of SyFY Original Movies. Retrieved on May 23, 2010, from http://www.syfy.com/movies/originals/. 15. Magna Global. TV Basics: Television Ad Expenditure Components. Retrieved on June 5, 2010, from the Television Bureau of Advertising website at http://www.tvb.org/nav/build_frameset.aspx. 16. Bauder, David. (2010). Steve Koonin: The Man Who Lured Conan To TBS (And Now Gets Fan Mail For It). Retrieved on May 10, 2010, from the Huffington Post website at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/10/steve-­‐koonin-­‐the-­‐man-­‐who-­‐_n_569821.html. 17. Albanesius, Chloe. (2009). Hulu Jumps in February, Thanks to Super Bowl. Retrieved on May 14, 2010, from the PC Mag website at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2343547,00.asp. Page|12