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Friday, March 9, 2018

Russia’s Multi-Front Campaign in Ukraine

By Franklin Holcomb, Emily Markee, and ISW's Russia-Ukraine Team

Russia is intensifying its multifaceted campaign to destabilize Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections. The Kremlin is leveraging various political and economic tools to complement its ongoing military operations in Eastern Ukraine.[1] Russia has recently expanded its operations to spread ethnic tensions in Western Ukraine in order to drive wedges between Ukraine and its partners in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin also engineered the Russian energy company Gazprom’s vindictive and abrupt disruption in natural gas supply to Ukraine.

Ukraine simultaneously faces its own internal challenges amidst stalling efforts to establish an independent anti-corruption court and other government reforms. The Kremlin will exploit the resultant domestic and international frustrations over the pace of reforms. Russia will escalate its subversive activities over the next year in order to remove the pro-Western government led by President Petro Poroshenko and empower populists and pro-Russia factions. The U.S. must take a clear stance supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and partner more closely with Kyiv to support the passage of key reforms and counter Russian subversion.

The Kremlin intensified its destabilization campaign in Western
Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s partnerships in Eastern Europe.Ukrainian officials accusedKremlin-backed groups of attacking the Transcarpathian Hungarian
Cultural Center in Uzhgorod, Zakharpatiya Oblast on February 4 and 27 to inflame
local and regional tensions.[2] Zakharpatiya Oblast
Governor Hennadiy Moskal accused the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of
recruiting nationalists to conduct the attacks in Uzhgorod in coordination with
intelligence operatives based in Russian-occupied Transnistria in Moldova.[3]Poland detained two
suspects connected to the attack on February 4.[4] The suspects are
reportedly tied to the far-right Polish ‘Falanga’ movement, and had fought
alongside the Russian-backed separatist Donetsk
and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics in Eastern Ukraine.[5] These attacks against
minorities are part of a wider campaign by Russia to undermine Ukraine’s relationships
with Poland and Hungary. Ukrainian authorities previously arrested individuals
reportedly connected to the defunct pro-Russia Party of Regions in Ukraine who
attempted to destroy a Hungarian monument in Zakharpatiya Oblast in October 2017.[6]Ukrainian and Polish
government sources have also accused Russia of attempting to drive a wedge
between the two nations by orchestrating anti-Polish protests in Ukraine as
well as attacks against Polish monuments and government buildings.[7] The Kremlin will further
enflame ethnic tensions over the coming year to fracture Ukraine and drive
wedges between Kyiv and its neighbors in Eastern Europe.

Nationalist Hungarian President
Viktor Orban has exploited the Kremlin’s subversion campaign in Western Ukraine
to strengthen his own domestic support ahead of Hungary’s April 8 general elections.Orban - who holds a close relationship with Russia - has boosted
his nationalist credentials by deliberately escalating tensions with Ukraine.[8] Hungary revived its
narrative that Hungarians in Ukraine are under attack from Ukrainian
nationalists on March 1.[9] Hungarian organizations
in Western Ukraine initially agreed with official statements accusing
non-Ukrainians of conducting the attack in Zakharpatiya Oblast on February 27
before switching their narrative to accusing Kyiv of allowing “extremists to
strengthen their positions” amidst an alleged “anti-Hungarian campaign” in
Ukrainian media.[10] These statements mirror similar narratives peddled by the Kremlin. Hungarian
groups further escalated tensions by calling for the OSCE to establish a monitoring
office in Western Ukraine on March 7.[11] Orban has sustained a belligerent stance against Kyiv’s decision to require schoolchildren in Ukraine to learn both
Ukrainian and their native language since September 2017.[12] Hungary has also attempted
to stall Ukraine’s cooperation with Western institutions such as NATO and the
EU.[13] Orban’s efforts support
Russia’s ongoing campaign in Western Ukraine to drive social cleavages that
prevent Ukraine’s integration with the West. Orban likely assesses that this
escalation will help him gain electoral support. Orban’s Fidesz Party lost the
mayoral race in traditionally pro-Fidesz Homdezovasarhely in Southern Hungary on
February 25.[14] Orban will thus continue to fuel this crisis for political gain unless his
international partners encourage him to de-escalate tensions with Ukraine.

The Kremlin continued its tradition of leveraging
energy as a foreign policy weapon against Ukraine.Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom
abruptly disrupted
the delivery of natural gas to Ukraine on 01 March in response to a February 28
judicial ruling against Gazprom in favor of Ukrainian energy corporation
Naftogaz.[15] Gazprom had been found to owe $2.56 billion to Naftogaz in a dispute over
supply disruptions to Ukraine by the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.[16]Ukraine immediately signed an agreement with Polish energy corporation PNGiG,
stabilizing its energy supply after a week of turmoil.[17] Naftogaz CEO Andriy Kobolyev
emphasized that “yet another attempt to use gas as a weapon” failed and warned
the EU to “consider this case when making their final decision” on Russia’s
NordStream 2 Pipeline.[18] Polish and Latvian officials have repeatedly warned against the threats posed
to Europe by the NordStream 2 Pipeline.[19] Gazprom’s decision to cut the natural gas supply to Ukraine reinforces Russia’s
long-standing strategy to use energy as a weapon against other countries. The
U.S. should encourage its European partners to consider Gazprom’s actions
against Ukraine before deciding to expand energy ties to Russia through the
NordStream 2 and TurkStream pipelines.

The Government of Ukraine’s commitment to reform is simultaneously
wavering at the time when it is most required. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s government is at risk of
failing to approve the creation of an independent anti-corruption court in line
with standards set by the IMF and EU.[20] The IMF, EU, and
Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) have repeatedly stressed the
importance of choosing independent judges for the court via the Public Council
of International Experts.[21]The Ukrainian Parliament
has nonetheless relegated the council to a de-facto advisory role, undermining
the court’s ability to maintain its independence from the Government of Ukraine.[22] Poroshenko asserted
that “Ukraine did not do reforms for the IMF [but rather] for the Ukrainian
people” and emphasized his government’s success in enacting other important
reforms on March 6.[23] The U.S. and its
partners must recognize the important progress achieved thus far on reform in Ukraine
but sustain pressure on Kyiv to establish an independent anti-corruption court
in line with EU, IMF, and NABU recommendations. If Kyiv fails to do so, it will
likely fuel public frustration, lose a much-needed tranche of financial support
from the IMF, frustrate its international partners, and empower pro-Russia and
populist factions in the 2019 elections.

The U.S. and its partners must be willing to both support
Ukraine against Russian subversion and simultaneously challenge Kyiv to
meet its own reform obligations. The
U.S. has taken key steps to support Ukraine, including most recently authorizing
the sale of Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile Systems to the Armed Forces of
Ukraine.[24] U.S. military support
will help Ukraine defend itself from the Armed Forces of
Russia and its proxy
forces in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. also extended sanctions on Russia for its
ongoing invasion of Eastern Ukraine.[25] The U.S. nonetheless must recognize the multi-faceted nature of Moscow’s
campaign against Kyiv, which includes many political and economic, in addition
to military, components. The Kremlin will intensify this subversion campaign over
the next twelve months before Ukraine’s March 2019 parliamentary and presidential
elections. The U.S. must focus its efforts over the next year on enabling
effective counter-intelligence operations and tangible reforms in Kyiv lest the
coming elections result in a windfall for populist and pro-Russia forces in
Ukraine.

[2] [“Statement
of the MFA of Ukraine in connection with the arson premises of the Society of
Hungarian culture in Transcarpathia,”] Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2018, http://mfa.gov(.)ua/ua/press-center/comments/8532-zajavamzs-ukrajini

[“Internal Security Agency detained Poles suspected of
trying to set fire to the building of the association of Hungarian culture in
Ukraine,”] wiadomosci.onet.pl, February
27, 2018, https://wiadomosci.onet(.)pl/swiat/abw-zatrzymala-polakow-podejrzanych-o-probe-podpalenia-budynkustowarzyszeniakultury/yw1mdfj?utm_source=wiadomosci_viasg&utm_medium=nitro&utm_campaign=allonet_nitro_new&srcc=ucs&utm_v=2

[5] “Putin’s
Falanga: meet the Polish neo-fascists who tried to burn down a Hungarian center
in Ukraine,” euromaidanpress.com,
March 5, 2018, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2018/03/05/the-falanga-group-in-poland-whos-really-behind-the-arson-attacks-on-hungarian-associations-in-uzhhorod/

[10] Olena Babakova, “Putin’s
Falanga: meet the Polish neo-fascists who tried to burn down a Hungarian center
in Ukraine,” euromaidanpress.com, March
5, 2018, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2018/03/05/the-falanga-group-in-poland-whos-really-behind-the-arson-attacks-on-hungarian-associations-in-uzhhorod/ ; [“In the Hungarian
association, I am convinced that their office was not blown up by Ukrainians,”]
euro-integration.com, February 27,
2018, http://www.eurointegration(.)com.ua/news/2018/02/27/7078133/ “Brenzovych sees the
anti-Hungarian campaign in the Ukrainian media as the cause of the incident in
the KMKSZ office,” uzhgorod.in, March
1, 2018, http://uzhgorod(.)in/en/news/2018/mart/brenzovych_sees_the_anti_hungarian_campaign_in_the_ukrainian_media_as_the_cause_of_the_incident_in_the_kmksz_office

[21] “Ukraine Moves Closer To
Anticorruption Court, But Doubts Remain,” RFE/RL,
March 1, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-anticorruption-court-passes-first-reading/29070605.html
; “Successful
anti-corruption fight is impossible without the establishment of the
Anti-Corruption Court — Artem Sytnyk,” National
Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, February 22, 2018, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/successful-anti-corruption-fight-impossible-without-establishment-anti-corruption-court-artem
; “Attempts to limit the
independence of the NABU will cause irreversible consequences for the fight
against corruption in Ukraine,” National
Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, December 7, 2017, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/attempts-limit-independence-nabu-will-cause-irreversible-consequences-fight-against; “In 26 out of 86 NABU’s
proceedings the trials have not started yet,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, September 11,
2017, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/26-out-86-nabus-proceedings-trials-have-not-started-yet
; ; “IMF mission supports functional independence
of NABU,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau
of Ukraine, November 11, 2016, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/imf-mission-supports-functional-independence-nabu

[23] “President in an
interview to Financial Times: We do reforms not for the IMF, but for the
Ukrainian people,” Office of the
President of Ukraine, March 6, 2018, http://www.president.gov(.)ua/en/news/mi-robimo-reformi-ne-dlya-mvf-dlya-ukrayinciv-prezident-v-in-46182

[25] “Executive Order on the
President’s Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Ukraine,” The White House, March 2, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-presidents-continuation-national-emergency-respect-ukraine/