The secret is now disclosed, and it is discovered to be a
dread that the boasted state sovereignties will, under this
system, be disrobed of part of their power. Before I go
into the examination of this point, let me ask one important
question: Upon what principle is it contended that the
sovereign power resides in the state governments? The
honorable gentleman has said truly, that there can be no
subordinate sovereignty. Now if there can not, my position
is, that the sovereignty resides in the people. They have
not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions
of power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare.
This constitution stands upon this broad principle. I
know very well, Sir, that the people have hitherto been
shut out of the federal government, but it is not meant
that they should any longer be dispossessed of their rights.
In order to recognize this leading principle, the proposed
system sets out with a declaration that its existence depends
upon the supreme authority of the people alone.
We have heard much about a consolidated government. I
wish the honorable gentleman would condescend to give
us a definition of what he meant by it. I think this the
more necessary, because I apprehend that the term, in the
numerous times it has been used, has not always been used
in the same sense. It may be said, and I believe it has been
said, that a consolidated government is such as will absorb
and destroy the governments of the several States. If it is
taken in this view, the plan before us is not a consolidated
government, as I showed on a former day, and may, if
necessary, show further on some future occasion. On the
other hand, if it is meant that the general government will
take from the state governments their power in some particulars,
it is confessed and evident that this will be its operation
and effect.

When the principle is once settled that the people are
the source of authority, the consequence is that they may
take from the subordinate governments powers with which
they have hitherto trusted them, and place those powers
in the general government, if it is thought that there they
will be productive of more good. They can distribute one
portion of power to the more contracted circle called State
governments: they can also furnish another proportion to
the government of the United States. Who will undertake
to say as a state officer that the people may not give to the
general government what powers and for what purposes
they please? how comes it, Sir, that these State governments
dictate to their superiors?--to the majesty of the
people? When I say the majesty of the people, I mean the
thing, and not a mere compliment to them. The honorable
gentleman went a step further and said that the State governments
were kept out of this government altogether.
The truth is, and it is a leading principle in this system,
that not the States only but the people also shall be here
represented. And if this is a crime, I confess the general
government is chargeable with it; but I have no idea that
a safe system of power in the government, sufficient to
manage the general interest of the United States, could be
drawn from any other source or rested in any other authority
than that of the people at large, and I consider this
authority as the rock on which this structure will stand. If
this principle is unfounded, the system must fall. If honorable
gentlemen, before they undertake to oppose this
principle, will show that the people have parted with their
power to the State governments, then I confess I cannot
support this constitution.

[4 Dec.]

It is repeated, with confidence, "that this is not a federal
government, but a complete one, with legislative, executive
and judicial powers: it is a consolidating government." I
have already mentioned the misuse of the term; I wish the
gentleman would indulge us with his definition of the
word. If, when he says it is a consolidation, he means so
far as relates to the general objects of the union--so far it
was intended to be a consolidation, and on such a consolidation,
perhaps, our very existence, as a nation, depends.
If, on the other hand (as something which has been said
seems to indicate) he (Mr. Findley) means that it will absorb
the governments of the individual States, so far is this
position from being admitted, that it is unanswerably controverted.
The existence of the State government, is one
of the most prominent features of this system. With regard
to those purposes which are allowed to be for the general
welfare of the union, I think it no objection to this plan,
that we are told it is a complete government. I think it no
objection, that it is alleged the government will possess legislative,
executive and judicial powers. Should it have only
legislative authority? We have had examples enough of
such a government, to deter us from continuing it. Shall
Congress any longer continue to make requisitions from
the several States, to be treated sometimes with silent, and
sometimes with declared contempt? For what purpose give
the power to make laws, unless they are to be executed?
and if they are to be executed, the executive and judicial
powers will necessarily be engaged in the business.

Do we wish a return of those insurrections and tumults
to which a sister State was lately exposed? or a government
of such insufficiency as the present is found to be? Let me,
Sir, mention one circumstance in the recollection of every
honorable gentleman who hears me. To the determination
of Congress are submitted all disputes between States, concerning
boundary, jurisdiction, or right of soil. In consequence
of this power, after much altercation, expense of
time, and considerable expense of money, this State was
successful enough to obtain a decree in her favor, in a difference
then subsisting between her and Connecticut; but
what was the consequence? the Congress had no power to
carry the decree into execution. Hence the distraction and
animosity, which have ever since prevailed, and still continue [Volume 1, Page 266]
in that part of the country. Ought the government
then to remain any longer incomplete? I hope not; no person
can be so insensible to the lessons of experience as to
desire it.

It is brought as an objection "that there will be a rivalship
between the State governments and the general government;
on each side endeavors will be made to increase
power."

Let us examine a little into this subject. The gentlemen
tell you, Sir, that they expect the States will not possess any
power. But I think there is reason to draw a different conclusion.
Under this system their respectability and power
will increase with that of the general government. I believe
their happiness and security will increase in a still greater
proportion. Let us attend a moment to the situation of this
country: it is a maxim of every government, and it ought
to be a maxim with us, that the increase of numbers increases
the dignity, the security, and the respectability of
all governments; it is the first command given by the Deity
to man, increase and multiply; this applies with peculiar
force to this country, the smaller part of whose territory is
yet inhabited. We are representatives, Sir, not merely of
the present age, but of future times; nor merely of the
territory along the sea coast, but of regions immensely extended
westward. We should fill, as fast as possible, this
extensive country, with men who shall live happy, free and
secure. To accomplish this great end ought to be the leading
view of all our patriots and statesmen. But how is it to
be accomplished, but by establishing peace and harmony
among ourselves, and dignity and respectability among
foreign nations? By these means, we may draw numbers
from the other side of the Atlantic, in addition to the natural
sources of population. Can either of these objects be
attained without a protecting head? When we examine history,
we shall find an important fact, and almost the only
fact, which will apply to all confederacies.

They have all fallen to pieces, and have not absorbed the
subordinate governments.

In order to keep republics together they must have a
strong binding force, which must be either external or internal.
The situation of this country shows, that no foreign
force can press us together; the bonds of our union ought
therefore to be indissolubly strong.

The power of the States, I apprehend, will increase with
the population, and the happiness of their inhabitants.
Unless we can establish a character abroad, we shall be unhappy
from foreign restraints, or internal violence. These
reasons, I think, prove sufficiently the necessity of having
a federal head. Under it the advantages enjoyed by the
whole union would be participated by every State. I wish
honorable gentlemen would think not only of themselves,
not only of the present age, but of others, and of future
times.

It has been said, "that the State governments will not be
able to make head against the general government;" but it
might be said with more propriety, that the general government
will not be able to maintain the powers given it
against the encroachments and combined attacks of the
State governments. They possess some particular advantages,
from which the general government is restrained.
By this system, there is a provision made in the constitution,
that no senator or representative shall be appointed
to any civil office under the authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof
shall have been increased, during the time for which he
was elected; and no person holding any office under the
United States can be a member of either house; but there
is no similar security against State influence, as a representative
may enjoy places and even sinecures under the State
governments. On which side is the door most open to corruption?
If a person in the legislature is to be influenced
by an office, the general government can give him none
unless he vacate his seat. When the influence of office
comes from the State government, he can retain his seat
and salary too. But it is added, under this head, "that State
governments will lose the attachment of the people, by losing
the power of conferring advantages, and that the people
will not be at the expense of keeping them up." Perhaps
the State governments have already become so
expensive as to alarm the gentlemen on that head. I am
told that the civil list of this State amounted to £40,000, in
one year. Under the proposed government, I think it
would be possible to obtain in Pennsylvania every advantage
we now possess, with a civil list that shall not exceed
one-third of that sum.

How differently the same thing is talked of, if it be a
favorite or otherwise! When advantages to an officer are
to be derived from the general government, we hear them
mentioned by the name of bribery, but when we are told
of the State governments losing the power of conferring
advantages, by the disposal of offices, it is said they will
lose the attachment of the people. What is in one instance
corruption and bribery, is in another the power of conferring
advantages.

We are informed that "the State elections will be ill attended,
and that the State governments will become mere
boards of electors." Those who have a due regard for their
country, will discharge their duty, and attend; but those
who are brought only from interest or persuasion had better
stay away; the public will not suffer any disadvantage
from their absence. But the honest citizen, who knows the
value of the privilege, will undoubtedly attend, to secure
the man of his choice. The power and business of the State
legislatures relates to the great objects of life, liberty and
property; the same are also objects of the general government.

Certainly the citizens of America will be as tenacious in
the one instance as in the other. They will be interested,
and I hope will exert themselves, to secure their rights not
only from being injured by the State governments, but also
from being injured by the general government.

[11 Dec.]

We are next told, by the honorable gentlemen in opposition
(as indeed we have been from the beginning of the
debates in this convention, to the conclusion of their
speeches yesterday) that this is a consolidated government,
and will abolish the State governments. Definitions of a [Volume 1, Page 267]
consolidated government have been called for; the gentlemen
gave us what they termed definitions, but it does not
seem, to me at least, that they have as yet expressed clear
ideas upon that subject. I will endeavor to state their different
ideas upon this point.

The gentlemen from Westmoreland (Mr. Findley) when
speaking on this subject, says, that he means by a consolidation,
that government which puts the thirteen States
into one.

The honorable gentleman from Fayette (Mr. Smilie)
gives you this definition: "What I mean by a consolidated
government, is one that will transfer the sovereignty from
the State governments to the general government."

The honorable member from Cumberland (Mr. Whitehill)
instead of giving you a definition, sir, tells you again,
that "it is consolidated government, and we have proved it
so."

These, I think, sir, are the different descriptions given
us of a consolidated government. As to the first, that it is
a consolidated government, that puts the thirteen United
States into one; if it is meant, that the general government
will destroy the governments of the States, I will admit that
such a government would not suit the people of America:
It would be improper for this country, because it could not
be proportioned to its extent on the principles of freedom.
But that description does not apply to the system before
you. This, instead of placing the State governments in
jeopardy, is founded on their existence. On this principle,
its organization depends; it must stand or fall, as the State
governments are secured or ruined. Therefore, though
this may be a very proper description of a consolidating
government, yet it must be disregarded as inapplicable to
the proposed constitution. It is not treated with decency,
when such insinuations are offered against it.

The honorable gentleman (Mr. Smilie) tells you, that a
consolidating government "is one that will transfer the
sovereignty from the State governments to the general
government." Under this system, the sovereignty is not in
the possession of the State governments, therefore it cannot
be transferred from them to the general government.
So that in no point of view of this definition, can we discover
that it applies to the present system.

In the exercise of its powers will be insured the exercise
of their powers to the State government; it will insure
peace and stability to them; their strength will increase
with its strength, their growth will extend with its growth.

Indeed, narrow minds, and some such there are in every
government--narrow minds, and intriguing spirits--will
be active in sowing dissentions and promoting discord between
them. But those whose understandings and whose
hearts are good enough to pursue the general welfare, will
find, that what is the interest of the whole, must, on the
great scale, be the interest of every part. It will be the duty
of a State, as of an individual, to sacrifice her own convenience
to the general good of the Union.