Since the interim agreement with Iran over its nuclear weapons program last November, there has been a mainstream dearth of reporting concerning the prospect of Iranian proliferation in the Middle East. The most recent announcement by Itai Brun, Israel's senior military intelligence analyst, that Iran has upheld its side of the nuclear deal has largely gone unreported by CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. However, while these mainstream titans have been sleeping, Clifford May may has met this piece of what should be celebrated news with a criticism of American diplomatic efforts with Iran. For the purposes of this post, I will be addressing four arguments posited by May: First, that the Iranian nuclear deal is analogous with the North Korean nuclear deal. Second, the Syrian red line debacle has severely impacted Iran's calculus on reaching the weaponization precipice. Third, Iran's release of hostages stemmed out of fear that Reagan would utilize military strikes if the did not comply with our negotiation demands. Fourth, American support of the Palestinian Unity government will impact their nuclear calculus.

North Korean Nuclear ProliferationIn his harangue of American diplomatic efforts with Iran, May draws parallels with North Korea and Iran. May argues that much like Bush's attempt at preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Obama will fail to prevent Iran's nuclear machinations from reaching fruition, due to our lack of a credible deterrent. However, this is an incorrect comparison for three reasons. First, no organization closely monitored the freeze of North Korea's plutonium enrichment program following the Agreed Framework negotiations. North Korea consistently worked against verification efforts, resulting in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting in 1996 that it had been unable to verify their declarations. By 2000, the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohammed El Baradei, stated that little had been gleaned by the Agency since the initial agreement in 1994, because of uncooperative behavior on behalf of the DPRK. In stark contrast, Iran has worked closely with the IAEA on verification efforts, more so than either Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong-Il. In fact, the IAEA has been able to verify the initial declarations made by Iran over its nuclear stockpile. Secondly, Iran and North Korea are two separate nations, with two very different views on international engagement. Iran is a cosmopolitan nation that has a history of international engagement since the 1990s, whereas North Korea is a hermit nation that has formal, close relations with no nations outside of China and perhaps Russia. Their respective security situations--outside of being an enemy of America--are also different: the foremost concern of North Korea is maintaining internal security, whereas Iran is primarily concerned with establishing a sphere of influence within the Middle East. Finally, the failures of both the Agreed Framework and Six Power Talks were not because of an excess of "carrots", but a lack thereof. What May fails to realize is that immediately after the Agreed Framework, America began to heavily sanction North Korea over its missile program. This helped to sour the deal, reducing North Korean incentive to cooperate with the United States and international community. Thus, the resulting decade saw tensions ebb and flow, until a crisis in 2002 over North Korean uranium enrichment ultimately led to the Six Power Talks. In 2005, North Korea declared that it would forgo the development of nuclear weapons in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, immediately after this, America decided to increase sanctions, which once again reduced the impetus for North Korea to comply with expectations. To put it this way, North Korea presumably agreed to international pressures because it expected to achieve increased economic security. When this did not happen, what reason did North Korea's leadership have to continue playing along with American demands? None--because we established a precedent in which we would increase pressure, regardless if they complied or not.

It's also important to remember that America's previous military attempt to rescue the hostages, Operation Eagle Claw, was a massive failure. So it wouldn't make sense for Iran to believe that outcome would be any different under Reagan as opposed to Carter--neither were responsible with crafting military operations, their main role as Commander-in-Chief is create policy goals for the military to reach and sanction operations. Even with Reagan's plans to beef up security spending, the Iranian hostage crisis did not make up a major plank in his 1980 presidential platform, he instead emphasized the need for a strong nation defense against the Soviet Union and advocated for a shift to supply side economics. Therefore, it's questionable that Reagan's election played a significant role in Iran's calculus.

America's Support of the Palestinian UnityContrary to what May asserted, America will not be using its tax dollars to fund Hamas. Both Hamas and Fateh have agreed that the unity government will not be composed of Hamas members, but rather independent technocrats until elections can be held. Given the massive unpopularity of Hamas in Gaza, it's unlikely that they will be able to establish a monopoly on influence in Palestine's new government. Therefore, this would represent a step towards deradicalization in Gaza and undermine Iran's influence there. Instead of Hamas controlling all political operations within the territory, the significantly more moderate and less violent Fatah party will have shared power. Furthermore, it's not as if America is throwing its political weight behind Hamas. John Kerry stated that funding will be based on the actions of the Palestinian Unity government. This is a perfectly valid position to take: we're neither preemptively increasing our support of Palestine nor condemning it to failure. Instead, we are proceeding normally. If Israel's security is substantially diminished by this development, then we can easily pull back our funding of the government.

Of course, all of this presumes that a unity government will, in fact, stay erected. Fatah and Hamas entities have agreed upon establishing a unity government in the past. However, plans always fall through. My guess would be that Hamas recognizes the threat it presents to its power hold in Gaza. But with conditions deteriorating, relations with Iran dwindling, and internal unrest increasing, they very well may believe that they must give up some power in order to retain any at all. The Syrian Red Line DebacleOut of all the arguments made by May, this easily holds the most weight. Last summer, America failed to go through with a red line we set against Assad: to not cross the chemical threshold. While I myself believe that it was a stupid position to take in the first place, it does not change our original threat to utilize force against Assad should he deploy chemical weapons.

However, credibility is situational, not categorical. The actions of a nation in one situation do not necessarily reflect its willingness to take action in another. Take the Cuban missile crisis. Following our successful gamble, no one in Washington suddenly questioned the Soviet Union's willingness to respond against American aggression in Berlin. Not every crisis or transgression rates the same to countries, and chemical weapons use in Syria is no different. For the United States, upholding the Convention on Chemical Weapons is a low priority. In the 1980s, we aided Saddam Hussein in the manufacturing of chemical weapons to use against Iran, and then subsequently gave him the tactical intelligence to effectively employ them. Syria's chemical weapons has never been a major issue for the American foreign policy establishment: we've never put in place massive sanctions on Syria for its arsenal, never held meetings to dismantle infrastructure (prior to the August attacks, at least), or launched cyber attacks to dismantle Syrian chemical weapons infrastructure. Unlike Syria, Congress is out for blood in regards to Iran's nuclear program. Senators from both parties have tried to undercut American diplomatic efforts in order to place even more stringent sanctions against Iran. The is very little doubt that congress would impede Obama's attempts to strike Iran. All of this signals a much stronger resolve to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Iranian government, because the stakes of nuclear proliferation are significantly higher than that of chemical weapons use.

America's nuclear arsenal has come under scrutiny over the past year. Since last summer, the United States Air Force has been embroiled in scandal after scandal involving our nuclear corps. Not only have our airmenfailed readiness tests, but Air Force leaders have actively covered up these deficiencies. It's become increasingly apparent that our nuclear forces are suffering from atrophy; after all, the Cold War ended over two decades ago. In the 21st century, there is seemingly no reason to maintain such a large nuclear force, or so the argument goes. Nuclear weapons have a very limited role in conventional warfare. America has a no first strike policy--which has been maintained by all but the craziest of policy makers--and middle weight threats such as Iran or North Korea can be decimated with a few nuclear weapons. Even China and Russia could be completely taken out with a reduced nuclear arsenal. So it would seem more pertinent to divert resources away from our nuclear arsenal, and instead focus on increasing the size of forces that would prove to be more useful on the battlefield. The Navy barely escaped efforts to reduce its carrier force to ten vessels, while the Marine Corps is struggling to deploy forces 65 nautical miles from shore.

However, what critics miss is the political value nuclear weapons present. Military force is merely a means to a political end. Success on the battlefield is irrelevant should our political gains not be fulfilled, and look no further than the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars to see evidence of this fact. Just because nuclear weapons don't afford a commander with increased tactical options in most situations, doesn't mean that a large arsenal is a poor investment.

Despite the costs, America's nuclear arsenal serves as both a deterrent and reassurance. Our nuclear triad ensures that it would be impossible for either China or Russia to destroy America's secondary response capability, for example. But operational effectiveness aside, size partially signals intent. Both allies and adversaries gauge American intent by delving into the force structure of our nuclear forces. No doubt, it is improbable (I'd even say impossible) that Iran or China would doubt American resolve to reciprocate nuclear blows should either decide to launch a salvo of ICBMs at our large cities. However, it is not implausible for both our adversaries and allies to question our commitment to enforce the nuclear umbrella if we begin to dismantle crucial nuclear infrastructure.

Both the Middle East and Pacific are in fragile situations right now. Regardless of if they have an active program or not, Iran's nuclear capabilities are stoking security fears in umbrella covered nations like Saudi Arabia. Both South Korea and Japan fear an increasingly aggressive China and nuclear capable North Korea. All three aforementioned allies sit close to passing the nuclear precipice, which is a product of fears that America's commitment to nuclear assurances may begin to wane. Our response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, which is hardly a close ally, has already brought up questions of American resolve to respond to aggression against Asian nations that rely on us for security. If our allies begin fretting over American action in a nation that holds very little significance to their own security interests, it's very plausible that they will take steps towards proliferation should they see us defund a program deemed vital to their very existence. As Sean Varner noted on American nuclear policy, "Tokyo could be forced to make the least miserable choice out of a list of bad options. Unsure of the U.S. deterrent while Pyongyang and Beijing grow more provocative would be unacceptable." While Saudi Arabia has begun to negotiate nuclear arms deals with Pakistan should Iran develop a nuclear weapon, signaling that the House of Saud already questions our commitments as they stand.

Even during the height of our post-Cold War dominance, Taiwan nearly developed a nuclear weapon because Taipei suspected a lack of American intent to respond if they were ever invaded by China. Today, both Saudi Arabia and Japan have begun to inch closer towards weaponizing their nuclear weapons due to our decline in relative influence globally. Should we begin to alter our nuclear disposition, then allies may be incentivized to develop their own nuclear weapons. Given that we are much less likely to preemptively use nuclear weapons to protect an ally from a perceived threat than they are for themselves, increasing the number of weapons holders would prove to subsequently increase the chances of a nuclear war quite significantly. And aside from that, it puts America in an awkward position when our close allies ignore the stipulations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Therefore, regardless of austerity and battlefield relevancy, America's nuclear arsenal should be here to stay.