Dimensions of Comprehension Diversity

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This annex to Comprehension of Appropriateness presents some
evidence for the variety of preferred modes of comprehension which must necessarily be
honoured by any appropriate new mode of socio-economic organization, if only to avoid
being eventually undermined by one of them.

(a) Frames of mind : multiple intelligences

A measure of intelligence may be considered as a measure of the individuals capacity to
process information. There is a long held theory that there is a single measurable
intelligence scale along which each individual can be assessed to derive an
'intelligence quotient'. As part of the recent Project on Human Potential of the
Harvard Graduate School of Education, Howard Gardner has reviewed a considerable body of
evidence which questions the validity of this theory (25). He argues that the tests do not
measure what they purport to, and are valid only for a small Western middle-class
minority. This raises the question as to whether the prevailing concept of what
constitutes meaningful 'information' about any new mode of socio-economic
organization is not subject to similar distortion.

Gardner proceeds to demonstrate that there is persuasive evidence for the existence of
several relatively autonomous human intellectual competences which he calls 'human
intelligences' or 'frames of mind'. The exact nature of and breadth of each
intellectual 'frame' has not so far been satisfactorily established, nor has the
precise number of such intelligences been determined. It is however possible to
demonstrate that several such intelligences exist, common to many cultures, each with its
own patterns of development and brain activity, and each different in kind from the
others. Gardner points out that the many previous efforts to establish independent
intelligences have been unconvincing, chiefly because they rely on only one or, at the
most, two lines of evidence.

Gardner presents evidence for the following distinct forms of intelligence:

linguistic intelligence, including: a sensitivity to the meaning of words and
their subtle shades of difference; a sensitivity to the order among words and the rules
governing such order; a sensitivity to the sounds, rhythms, inflections and meters of
words; and a sensitivity to the different functions of language, namely its potential for
exciting, convincing, stimulating, conveying information, or simply providing pleasure.
Strangely however he makes no mention of competence in languages other than the mother
tongue.

musical intelligence, including: sensitivity to pitch (or melody); sensitivity to
rhythm, namely the organization of pitch over time; and sensitivity to timbre or the
characteristic qualities of a tone.

logico-mathematical intelligence, including: sensitivity to possibilities of
ordering and reordering objects, assessing their quantity; sensitivity to the actions that
can be performed on objects, the relations that obtain among those actions, the statements
(or propositions) that can be made about actual or potential actions, and the
relationships among those statements.

spatial intelligence, including: capacities to perceive the visualworld
accurately, to perform transformations and modifications upon initial perceptions, and to
re-create aspects of visual experience, even in the absence of physical stimuli.

bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, including: the ability to use one's body in
highly differentiated and skilled ways, for expressive as well as goal-directed purposes;
the capacity to work skillfully with objects, both those involving delicate movements of
the fingers and those involving complex movements of the body. (Gardner points out that
the tendency to denigrate physical skills, in contrast to skills of the mind, is a Western
academic bias not necessarily characteristic of other cultures).

personal intelligences, including: access to one's own feeling life and the
capacity to affect discriminations among those feelings, to label them, to enmesh them in
symbolic codes, to draw upon them as a means of understanding and guiding behaviour; the
ability to notice and make distinctions among other individuals, especially among their
moods, temperaments, motivations and intentions.

Gardner stresses that different forms of intelligence may be more readily accepted in
different cultures. Whilst at the same time recognizing that although the logico-
mathematical form may predominate in the West (which claims to have originated it), it is
nevertheless present in tribal cultures (such as the Kalahari Bushman) in somewhat
disguised forms.

Within this context the notion of intelligence that he advances involves the existence
of one or more information-processing operations or mechanisms which can deal with
specific kinds of input. He suggests that human intelligence might be defined as a neural
mechanism or computational system which is genetically programmed to be activated or
'triggered' by certain kinds of internally or externally presented information.
(25, p. 64). The operations of these mechanisms may be considered autonomous, without the
'modules' being yoked together. He points out that exponents of this modular
view do not react favourably to the notion of a central information-processing mechanism
that decides which module to invoke (25, p.55).

(b) Axes of bias

A well-defined characteristic of academic debate is the tendency for different schools
of thought to emerge in relation to a topic cluster. Debate within each school of thought
develops through unemotional arguments reflecting the best of the scholarly style. In
debate between schools or between disciplines, however, where there is a lesser degree of
commonality of the conceptual frameworks (or none at all), the arguments formulated within
one framework tend to appear more emotional and as less well-founded or even irrational
from another. The kinds of information supplied from one framework are then suspect or
unacceptable to those operating in an alternative framework and are therefore ignored, to
the extent possible. This problem has been explored by the philosopher W T Jones (26)
concerned at the tendency for debates around certain topics to remain static and to fail
to develop over long periods of time. In particular he noted the tendency for certain
positions to be maintained (reflecting a particular framework) despite an abundance of
information concerning the validity of some alternative position. To clarify this
situation, he demonstrates that the discontinuities can be described in terms of the
different positions of the participants (or schools of thought) on seven pre-rational axes
of bias. These differences are reflected in aesthetical, theoretical, value, life-style,
policy, and action preferences, as well as in the preferred style of discussion. Any
difference between people in position 'along' anaxis gives rise to discontinuity
which it is difficult to handle within a rational frame of reference. The axes identified
by Jones are:

Order vs disorder, namely the range between a preference for fluidity, muddle,
chaos, etc. and a preference for system, structure, conceptual clarity, etc.

Static vs dynamic, namely the range between a preference for fluidity, muddle,
chaos, etc. and a preference for movement, for explanation in genetic and process terms,
etc.

Continuity vs discreteness, namely the range between a preference for wholeness,
unity, etc and a preference for discreteness, plurality, diversity, etc.

Inner vs outer, namely the range between a preference for being able to project
oneself into the objects of one's experience (to experience them as one experiences
oneself), and a preference for a relatively external, objective relation to them.

Sharp focus vs soft focus, namely the range between a preference for clear,
direct experience and a preference for threshold experiences which are felt to be
saturated with more meaning than is immediately present.

This world vs other world, namely the range between a preference for belief in
the spatio-temporal world as self-explanatory and a preference for belief that it is not
self-explanatory (but can only be comprehended in the light of other factors and frames of
reference).

Spontaneity vs process, namely the range between a preference for chance,
freedom, accident, etc and a preference for explanations subject laws and definable
processes.

(c) Epistemological mindscapes

In a series of articles, Magoroh Maruyama has studied patterns of cognition,
perception, conceptualization, design, planning and decision processes (18, 19, 27, 28).
His central concern is the role of epistemological types, especially as they affect
cross-disciplinary, cross-professional, cross-paradigm and cross-cultural communications.
In contrasting his own work with that of previous research in this area, he distinguishes
two traditional approaches: the psychological and psychoanalytical bases of individual
differences in patterns of cognition, and the cultural and social differences as
determined by sociologists and anthropologists.

Maruyama notes the various terms that have been used to describe such patterns, none of
which has proved satisfactory: models, logics, paradigms, epistemologies. To these might
be added Kenneth Boulding's 'image' (29). In Maruyama's more recent work he
favours 'mindscapes'. He provides a very valuable summary of these different
exercises in 'paradigmatology' and their relation to social organization.
Although he no longer favours the term, he defined paradigmatology as the 'science of
structures of reasoning' whether between disciplines, professions, cultures or
individuals (19). He notes that the 'problem of communication between different
structures of reasoning had not been raised until recently', since scholars tended
either to advocate their own approach or describe that of others. Contributing to this
neglect is the fact that the choice between logics is based on factors which are beyond
and independent of any logic.

Although he carefully emphasizes that there are many possible mindscapes or paradigms,
Maruyama argues that 'for practical purposes' it is useful to distinguish four
main types (19, p. 6). He stresses that these are not meant to be either mutually
exclusive nor exhaustive and warns that any attempt at separating them into
non-overlapping categories 'is itself a victim of a paradigm which assumes that the
universe consists of non- overlapping categories' (19, p. 142). Over the years he has
continued to struggle with the same attributes, grouping them first into three types (27),
extended to four (18), then to five (27) and now seemingly stabilized at four again (28).

The four types are:

H-mindscape (homogenistic, hierarchical, classificational): Parts are
subordinated to the whole, with subcategories neatly grouped into supercategories. The
strongest, or the majority, dominate at the expense of the weak or of any minorities.
Belief in existence of the one truth applicable to all (e.g. whether values, policies,
problems, priorities, etc.). Logic is deductive and axiomatic demanding sequential
reasoning. Cause-effect relations may be deterministic or probabilistic.

I-mindscape (heterogenistic, individualistic, random): Only individuals are real,
even when aggregated into society. Emphasis on self-sufficiency, independence and
individual values. Design favours the random, the capricious and the unexpected.
Scheduling and planning are to be avoided. Non-random events are improbable. Each question
has its own answer; there are no universal principles.

S-mindscape (heterogenistic, interactive, homeostatic): Society consists of
heterogeneous individuals who interact non-hierarchically to mutual advantage. Mutual
dependency. Differences are desirable and contribute to the harmony of the whole.
Maintenance of the natural equilibrium. Values are interrelated and cannot be
rank-ordered. Avoidance of repetition. Causal loops. Categories not mutually exclusive.
Objectivity is less useful than 'cross-subjectivity' or multiple viewpoints.
Meaning is context dependent.

The above descriptions are brief summaries of extensive listings of characteristics in
relation to overall social philosophy, ethics, decision-making, design, social activity,
perception of environment, human values, choice of alternatives, religion, causality,
logic, knowledge, and cosmology (18, 19, 28). Maruyama considers that the influence of
such 'pure' types predominates in certain cultures, although in practice the
types are quite mixed. Thus the H-type predominates in European, Hindu and Islamic
cultures. The I-type develops in certain individuals, such as those of existentialist
philosophy. The S-type is characteristic of Chinese, Hopi, and Balinese cultures. The
G-type predominates in the African Mandenka culture, for example. H, S. and G
characteristics can be distinguished in different streams of Japanese culture.

Maruyama has recently (28) compared his four types with an extensive survey of
epistemological data grouped by O J Harvey into four 'systems' (20).

System I: (a) High absolutism, closedness of beliefs, high evaluativeness, high
positive dependence on representatives of institutional authority, high identification
with social roles and status position, high conventionality, high ethnocentrism.

System II: (b) Deep feelings of uncertainty, distrust of authority, rejection of
socially approved guidelines to action accompanied by lack of alternative referents,
psychological vacuum, rebellion against social prescriptions, avoidance of dependency on
God and tradition.

System III: (c) Manipulation of people through dependency upon them, fairly high
skills in effecting desired outcomes in his world through the techniques of having others
do it for him, some autonomous internal standards especially in social sphere, some
positive ties to the prevailing social norms.

System IV: (d) High perceived self-worth despite momentary frustrations and
deviation from the normative, highly differentiated and integrated cognitive structure,
flexible, creative and relative in thought and action, internal standards that are
independent of external criteria, in some cases coinciding with social definitions and in
other cases not.

The two authors find that they agree on three types and differ on the nature of the
fourth (which Jungian's would presumably consider as corresponding to a partially
'repressed function' they have in common). It is much to be regretted that such
surveys have not explored the epistemologies in 'developing' countries to a
greater degree, nor the extent to which different epistemologies are co-present in the
same culture, group, individual or life-cycle. Such work would contribute to further
understanding of information based on different epistemologies is underused within other
epistemological frameworks.

(d) Modal preferences: facets of an appropriate mode

As noted above, the absence of systematic research makes it difficult to clarify the
effects of culture on information processing and the implications for any preferred mode
of socio-economic organization. A number of practical dimensions of the problem have been
reviewed in a series of studies by Edward T Hall (31, 32, 33, 34) and in a seminal review
by Andreas Fuglesang (35). Bearing in mind the intimate relationship between culture and
language, the matter may be explored by using comparative research on cultures as an
indication of the dimension of the problem. Particularly fruitful in this respect is a
study by Geert Hofstede : Culture's Consequences; international differences in
work-related values (36). This 'explores differences in thinking and social action
that exist between members of 40 different modern nations'.

He argues that people carry 'mental programs' which are developed in the
family and early childhood and reinforced in the schools and organizations of their
respective cultures.

The data used for the empirical part of the research was extracted from an existing
database of the results of surveys within subsidiaries of a large high technology
multinational corporation --which might otherwise be assumed to constitute a fairly
homogeneous set. The survey was held twice, in 1968 and in 1972, producing a total of over
116,000 questionnaires. This was supplemented by additional data from people on management
courses unrelated to that corporation. Hofstede argues that thedifferences demonstrated in
the study 'have profound consequences for the validity of the transfer of theories
and working methods from one country to another' (36, p. 12). This suggests
associated consequences for the use of information generated in other countries. The
findings are interpreted on behalf of policy makers in national, but especially in
international and multinational organizations, who are confronted with the problems of
collaboration of members of their staff carrying different culturally influenced mental
programs. The question is whether the implications of this study can be used to offer
further insights on the use of information in different cultures, and hence on the manner
in which any new mode of socio-economic organization might be articulated.

Hofstede isolated four main dimensions on which country cultures differ:

power distance, namely the attitude to human inequality. The index
developed grouped information on perceptions of an organizational superior's style,
colleagues' fear to disagree with the superior, and the type of decision-making that
subordinates prefer in a superior. This clearly has implications for the way in which any
new mode could be credibly implemented and managed within any particular culture.

uncertainty avoidance, namely the tolerance for uncertainty which
determines choices of technology, rules and rituals to cope with it in organizations. The
index developed grouped information on rule orientation, employment stability and stress.
This clearly has implications for the degree to which plannin is perceived as helpful or
rather as an intolerable constraint (a 'colonization of the future').

individualism, namely the relationship between the individual and the
collectivity which prevails in a given society, especially as reflected in the way people
choose to live and work together. The index distinguises between the importance attached
to personal life and the importance attached to organizational determination of life style
and orientation. This clearly has implications for any group's willingness to act in the
interests of the community as a whole rather than to further its own interests.

masculinity, namely the extent to which the biological differences between
the sexes should or should not have implications for social activities that are
transferred by socialization in families, schools, peer groups and through the media. The
index developed measures the extent to which people endorse goals more popular with men or
with women. This could well have implications for the manner in which a community deals
with major differences and potentially polarized situations.

Hofstede presents an integration of these four dimensions (see Figures 5 and 6). The
values of the four indices for the 40 countries are used to form clusters of countries
with similar index profiles. The four dimensions satisfy Kluckhohn's criteria for
universal categories of culture. Hofstede argues that they describe basic problems of
humanity with which every society has to cope, although for each of them there is not just
one possible answer, but a range of possible answers. He recognizes that the set of
dimensions is not necessarily exhaustive.

Of special interest in terms of this paper is that Hofstede indicates, for each of the
four dimensions, the consequences for:

political systems

religious life and philosophical and ideological thinking

organizations.

In so doing he comes very close to rendering explicit the implications for information
processing and any new mode of socio-economic organization. An attempt at rendering these
implications explicit is made in Annex 3. This suggests how Hofstede's four dimensions
might be interpreted to throw light on the information processing differences between
cultures which would determine how any such new mode might be perceived and received.

Hofstede's approach has served as the point of departure for research at the National
Bureau for Professional Training in the Ivory Coast aimed at determining management and
organizational models appropriate to African cultures. Henry Bourgoin, Director of the
Bureau, in a study entitled 'L'Afrique Malade du Management' (37) notes, in
reviewing the forms of management used in African through the colonial period to the
present period of 'occidental management' that:

In a section entitled 'Des modéles bien à nous', Bourgoin considers that
valid organizational models invented by African societies must be discovered by research
into the traditional political systems adopted by African people.