A submission by the Attorney-General and Communications departments (pdf) sheds further light on this veto power, noting it would only be enacted in "rare circumstances" where security concerns could not be adequately resolved by the cable operator.

It was considered more likely that the powers would enable "potential security concerns relating to the installation of submarine telecommunications cables to be identified and addressed where possible, in consultation with the applicant, at an early stage prior to the construction of the infrastructure."

The Attorney-General's assessment of cable projects would in turn rely on a security assessment conducted by ASIO.

"A security assessment by ASIO would form the basis of consideration by the Attorney-General whether to exercise his or her power to direct the ACMA to not grant a permit," the departments noted.

"That is, the Attorney-General would only exercise the power where an adverse or qualified security assessment is issued by ASIO."

Operators stung by an adverse ASIO assessment could apply for a merits review of the security agency's decision.

The Government also appeared to rule out blurring the lines of the Senate inquiry to scope the threat posed by security agencies themselves using subsea cable infrastructure to eavesdrop.

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