That sa.msaarais nirvaa.nais a major tenet of Mahaayaanaphilosophy."Nothingofsa.msaarais differentfromnirvaa.na, nothingof nirvaa.nais

different from sa.msaara.That
which is the limit of nirvaa.nais also the
limit of sa^msaara;thereis not the slightest difference between the
two."[1] And

yet there must be some differencebetweenthem, for otherwiseno distinctionwouldhave been madeand there would be no need for two words to describethe same state.So Naagaarjuna also distinguishesthem:
"Thatwhich, takenas causalor
dependent, isthe processofbeingbornandpassingon,
is, taken noncausally and beyond all dependence, declared to be nirvaa.na."[2] There
is only one reality this world, right here but this world may be experiencedin two different ways.Sa.msaara is the "relative" world as

(Chandrakiirti: "Nirvaa.naor Realityis
that which is absolvedof all
thought-construction"), but which Yogaacaaraneverthelesssometimescalls
"Mind"or "Buddhanature,"
and so forth.

But if, as Buddhismclaims, thereneverwas an "I, "howcan"I" experiencedualistically?The answer, ofcourse, is that"I"donotexperiencedualistically;thesenseofdualityisonlyan
illusion, sinceallexperienceis
andalwayswas nondual.However, this
only raises the question in a

differentform:
if nothowdoesthedelusionof
duality originate(since Buddhism"turns aside" all such questionsabout first causes), then how is this

delusion of
duality perpetuated? Since we are told it is possibleto overcomethesenseof
dualityand attain or,moreprecisely,
realize-nirvaa.na, what

obstructs the experience of nonduality?

The purpose of this paper is to outline an
answer to that question. It seems to me that there are three main factors which constitute"the processof being

bornandpassingon,"
twoofwhich
cravingand conceptualizing are well-known.What is not so well understoodis the relationbetweenthemand their relationwithathirdfactorwhichNaagaarjuna
identifies-causality.The interaction of
these three factorsworkstosustainthesenseofduality.

Avidyaa, ignorance, is nota separatefactorbut
a generic term for their interaction.

I

Craving, ta^nhaa, isthemostobviousfactor,
since the Buddha's Second Truth identifiesit
as the cause of our dukkha (dissatisfaction). Fundamentally,

the problemof cravingis
notsensualdesirebut attachment in
general, whether to sense-experience or to "mental events." How does such
attachment generate the DavidLoy is a SeniorTutor with the Department ofPhilosophyatthe National
University of Singapore. This paperis part
of his doctoraldissertation tobesubmittedtotheNationalUniversityof Singapore.PhilosophyEastandWest33,no.4
(October 1983). Sense of duality? Does not the conceptof attachment presupposeduality
an"I"whichis
necessaryin order to cling to something?
The Yogaacaara answer is that the tendency of nondual Mind to "freeze" or
"fix itself" gives rise to the distinction between subject and object:
"that-which-is-grasped"becomesreified intoan objective"thing"and "that-which-grasps"becomesthe
"self."Here the mutual
interdependence of subjectandobjectis
obvious: therecan be no

"that-which-grasps"without
"that-which-is-grasped." But it is claimed that this dualismis delusory, for there is no real distinctionbetweenthe
content of

consciousnessandconsciousnessitself."When
cognitionno longerapprehendsan
object, thenit stands fully in [nondual]
consciousness-only, because wherethereis nothingto
graspthereis no more grasping. The absence of an object results in the absencealsoof
a subject, and notmerelyin that grasping."[3] Nirvaa.na, ofcourse, is "theendof
craving" and therefore the end of such grasping. "The tendenciesto treat objectand subjectas distinct and
real entities are forsaken, and consciousnessis
establishedin justthe truenatureof one'sown[nondual] consciousness."[4]

Sotheproblemofcravingisnot"moral" (whateverthatcouldmean) but epistemological: it distorts
"my" perception of the world.

II

But suchattachmentseemslimitedto
whatis immediatelypresented."I"can"graspat"a particular
appearance only because that appearance is now appearing.How can I grasp at somethingthat
is not presentany more? In such a case, the
ability tore-present" an appearancewill
be beneficial.It

givesme
a way of retaining"it"and referringto "it." It enables "grasping at a distance."Hence the advantageof a system of re-presentation that is, a

language.

But thisis alsothe originof a problem.The fundamentaldifficultywithcravingisthatit generates a sense of duality "I"
desire that "thing" which, more fundamentally, I already am.The problem of re-presentation is that it widens
the gulf between the "I" and the "object."I re-presenta particular

"object"by
callingit, say, an "urg." This
enables me to referto the "object"evenwhenit does not immediately appear.But when the appearance is again

problemis that, the more successfullya systemof
representationfunctions, the more likelywe are to confusethe representationwith the
appearance.So

tathataa, the
"thusness"qualityof thingsas
they really are, is subjected to vitarka, conceptualizing, and to vikalpa, falseimaginings, whichfilterand

distortsenseexperience;weareurgedto"cutthrough"
this "fog of concepts" if we want to realize the true nature of the world.Mahaayaanaemphasizes
this problem of conceptualizing more than Theravaada, which emphasizescraving generally.In fact this is the source of much of the

Praj^naapaaramitaasuutrasmay
be understoodas an attempt to avoid that
pitfall.

Butthereis a seriousconfusionin the above
analysis. It is not the case that the presented world is divided up into grasped"objects"which we later

re-present; rather, we divide up
the world the way we do (that is, learn to noticewhat
is present) with a system of representation. John Searle, a contemporary

philosopher of
language, explains this well: I am not saying the language creates reality. Far from it.Rather, I am saying that what counts as reality is
a matterof thecategoriesthatwe impose on the world; and those categories are
for the mostpartlinguistic.Andfurthermore:whenwe
experiencetheworldweexperienceitthrough linguisticcategoriesthathelptoshapethe experiences themselves.The world doesn't come to us alreadysliced up into objectsand experience: what countsasan
objectis alreadya functionof
our systemof representation, andhowwe
perceivethe world in our experiences is
influenced by that system of representation. The mistake is to suppose that the
applicationof languageto theworldconsistsof
attachinglabelsto objectsthat
are, so to speak, self-identifying.On my
view, the world dividesthe way we divide it,
and our main way of dividing things up is in language. Our concept of reality is a matter
of our linguistic categories. [5]

"our system of representation."Searle
and Kant both doubtthatitispossibletoexperience "things-in-themselves,"butthecontemporaryview

seemsto leavethe door open in a way that Kant did not: Is it
possibleto get behindlanguage? Is that not what occursin meditation, when one "lets go" of

all ideas and concepts?

That this contemporaryWesternview
of language is consistentwith Buddhist
teachings may be seen by lookingattheBuddhistanalysisofperception.

Variousschoolsdivideup theact
of apperception intoa differentnumberof
stages(eventhe five skandhas may be interpreted as one such version), but

fundamentallytheyagreeaboutthe
natureof the process. This is ummarizedby Conzeinto"three levelsoftheapperceptionof stimuli," towhich"three
kinds of `sign' correspond the sign as (1) an objectof attention, as (2) a basis for recognition, andas (3) an occasionforentrancement."Inthe

first stage, one turns towards a stimulus;attention
is directed to a "bare" percept. In the second stage, what has been perceivedis recognized, "as a sign of its beingsuch and sucha partof the universeof discourse, andofhabituallyperceivedandnamed things." So the "bare"
percept is now recognized as a girl, or table, or whatever,withallits connotations.These connotationsare elaboratedinthe thirdstage,
which"is markedby the emotional and volitionaladjustmentto
the `sign'."[6] In the case of a girl, I may be attractedby her and so try to get to know her.

This wholesequenceusuallyoccursso
quickly that we are not able to distinguish one stage from another;hence we take it to be onesimplementalevent: "seeinga prettygirl."
Consequently, we are normallynever aware of
what it is liketo experiencejust the firststage, for we never have experiencedjustthatbyitself.So
philosophersasdifferentasWittgensteinand

philosophical programme which is gradually worked out overthecenturiesintheAbhidharmaandthe
Praj~naapaaramitaa.`Hedoesnotseizeonits appearanceasmanor woman, or itsappearanceas attractive, etc.,
which makes it onto a basis for the defilingpassions.But he stops at what is actually

seen.' He
seizesonlyon thatwhichis really there.[7]

TheclaimofBuddhism,andmostIndian philosophy, is that "that which
is reallythere"is very differentfrom what we would normallythink
it

to be.The Yogaacaara view is that,
contrary to whatConze writes, I can let go
of the seizing," too that is,the"I"canbeletgo
andwhatisthenexperiencedis the original thing-in-itself, nondual
"Buddhanature."

One might thereforeconclude that thinking(and language),becausetheydistortperception,have solely the negativefunctionof
obscuringreality;

activitymustbe"transcended."Nothingis
to be rejected, but its actualnaturemustbe
clarified. The linkagebetween perceptionand conceptionis a problem that has two sides. Just as concepts veil the true nature of
percepts, so perceptionsalso obscure the
true nature of thought.When the
thought-forming activity of the mind is used solely or primarily as a system of
representation, something fundamental aboutthe
nature of thinking is concealed. Just as there isnondualperception,sotheremustbenondual

thinking bothof which must be radicallydifferent fromourdualisticwayofunderstandingthem.

Mahaayaana
calls our usual representationalthinking
vij~naanaand distinguishesit from praj~naa, which is defined as that
knowledgein which the known, the knower,andtheactofknowledgeareone.The
etymologiesof the wordsarerevealing:
theyboth sharethe samerootj~naa, "to know," but the vi prefixinvij~naana(andinvi-kalpa,vi-tarka)

knower from the known. The pra- of praj~naa
signifies "to spring up (by itself)" evidentlyreferring to a more spontaneousand
creative thinkingin which the thoughtnolongerseemsto
be theproductofa subject(which, ofcourse,
itneverwas), butis experienced as
arising from a deeper, nondual source. Insuchknowingthethoughtandthatwhichis conscious of the thought are one.

ThesecondandthirdofConze'sstagesof apperceptionaresubjectiveinterpretationsbased uponthe
first.The second, recognition, is part of
what we have called conceptualizing theapplication
of our system ofrepresentationtowhat
is immediatelyperceived.The third, our emotional and volitionalresponse, willgenerallybesome expressionof craving.It is importantto seehowthese
two work together. In order to crave something, I mustbeableto distinguishtheobjectofmy
cravingfrom otherthings, and in order for this to bedonemostsuccessfully, language asystemof
Representation is necessary.It may be
possible for me to crave a particulartaste
without being able toidentifyit,butithelpsenormouslyifIcan
represent that flavor as "chocolate." The vast number of possible conceptualdistinctionscan thereby increase and
refine our cravings.This does not mean that
craving is dependent upon our concept-formation; the Buddhist view is the opposite: that
our system of representation is at the mercy of our desires, and in factevolvedinordertohelpussatisfyand elaborate them.The motivation behind the particular way in which we "divide up"
the world through language (hencetransformingnirvaa.na into sa.msaara) is,
fundamentally, our craving. In this way Wittgensteinand Searleturnout to havebeenright:wedonotfirstperceptually"pickout"
objectsand onlylatername
themand cravethem; rather, we learn to noticethem
by namingthem, and the motivationbehind that naming was originally the assistanceit gave in satisfyingdesires.(This
is not contradictoryto the Buddhist view of
perception discussedabove,forwhatisimportanttothe
Buddhist is that the associationof
perceptionwith cravingandconceptualizingcanbebroken.) So a childlearnsto cry"Mama!" in orderto be fed or comforted.Perhaps this can be stated more strongly: through
language I become consciousof thatis, am abletorepresentto"myself"desireswhichotherwise remain
"unconscious."

III

The thirdfactorwhich polarizesnondualinto
dualisticexperienceis causality.Inasmuch as any connectionbetweentwobitsof experiencecan be interpretedas causal,
causalitymaybethemost fundementalof the three;in thisway Schopenhauer was ableto reduceKant'stwelvecategoriesto a single one. For both Kant and Schopenhauer,
causality cannot be predicated of things-in-themselves, because it is part of what we
superimposeupon the noumenal world in order
to experience itphenomenally.

Naagaarjuna agrees: The universe viewed as
a whole is the Absolute[nirvaa.na], viewed as a process it is the
phenomenal [sa.msaara].Having regard to
causes and conditions,we have the phenomenalworld;this
same worldwhen causesand conditions are disregarded, it is called the
Absolute.[8] Thisisgenerallytheviewofthosewho distinguish between Appearance and
Reality: Causality is the way we relateone
objector event to another in the phenomenalworld, but it cannot be predicated of Reality
itself. In fact, the category of causality first becomes necessary because we phenomenallydistinguishbetweenone thingandanother;insofar
as we then perceivethe world as a collectionof separate objectsand occurrences, we mustthendeterminetheirrelationshipstoeach
other.If andwhenwe experiencetheworldas a "Whole," thereis nosuchnecessity, asNietzsche

pointed out:

Causeand effect: sucha dualityprobably never occurs inrealitythere
standsbeforeus a continuumof whichwe isolatea
coupleof pieces; justaswealwaysperceiveamovementonlyas
isolatedpoints, thereforedo not really see it but infer it.... An intellect
which saw cause and effect as a continuumand
not, as we do, as a capricious divisionandfragmentation, whichsaw the fluxof events would reject the concept of cause and effect

and deny all
conditionality.

One shouldmake use of "cause"and
"effect"as pure conceptsonly,
that is to say, as conventional fictionsforthepurposesofdesignationand communication, not forexplanation.In thean sich [Kant's"things-in-themselves"]there is nothing of "causalconnection,"of"necessity,"or "psychologicalunfreedom."There is no following of effect after cause. No
laws hold.It is we alone who have invented
the causes, the after-one-anothers, the for-one-anothers, therelations, the constraint, the number,thelaw,thefreedom,theground,the purpose.[9]

The well-knownproblem with Kant's metaphysic is that, while
agreeingthat causalityis a phenomenal category,healsoillegitimatelyinferredthat

things-in-themselvesmustbethecauseofour
phenomenal appearances. Nor can be easily escape this difficulty, for withoutsome such viewthereis no reasontopostulatetheexistenceof things-in-themselvesat all, since he believedthey cannot in principle ever be directly
experienced. The

Mahayanaviewis not subjectto eithercriticism, since"things-in-themselves" theAbsolute in Naagaarjuna's quotation just given
areexperienced immediatelyupon the cessationof appropriation ordependence that is, of attachment.Furthermore, the viewthat realityis actuallynon-dualavoidsthe
error of postulatinga Reality
"behind"Appearance; rather,Realityis"within"Appearance or,more precisely,
the Realitythat is soughtis Appearance itself, but not, of course,
appearance as we normally understand it. From this perspective, it is our usual
"common sense" view in which we distinguishbetween material objects and their appearanceto us that is (asBerkeleyrealized)guiltyofmetaphysically

Kant, of course, wasrespondingto
theproblem with causality that Hume had
pointed out. To say that one eventcausesanotheris
to assumea necessary

connection between the two, but such
necessity is not somethingwe caneverobserveor inferfromthe eventsthemselves;we can concludeonly that there seemsto bea constantconjunction.Theideaof necessary connection is something we
superimpose upon oursense-perceptions.Hume'sviewisthatthis arises due to the constant association of
ideas, that we eventuallynotice the
connectionbetweenevents and then come to expect it. But Kant and
others sincehim havepointedout
thatour mindsarenot so passive: we

instinctively look for try to make causal
relations between events.

Naagaarjunawould agree that causalconnections
are somethingthat we superimposeupon the world we experience henceoneof
thewayswe"transform"
nirvaa.nainto sa^msaara.This appliesnot only to relationsbetween
perceptionsbut also to relations between
thoughts. Objectively,exploringtherelationshipsbetweenthoughts
results in logic;subjectively,theapparentconnectionbetween thoughts is an essential aspect of
our sense of self. But this link, like the self, is an illusion:

Sowithformerthoughts,
laterthoughts,and thoughtsin between: the thoughts follow one another without being linked together.
Each one is absolutely tranquil.[10]

In the exercise of our thinkingfaculty, let the pastbedead.Ifweallowourthoughts,past,
present, andfuture, to linkup in a series, we put ourselvesunder restraint.On the other hand, if we never let the mind attachto anything, we shall gain liberation.[11]

Thegeneralproblemwithmakingcausal
connectionsis that in so doingwe never experience the thing-in-itself(tathataa) wholly, becauseonlypart of the mind is perceivingit;the
rest is busy relating it to something else.Of
course, insofar as objectsareperceivedasdistinct, theymustbe

Heidegger'sconcept of zuhanden[13] ("utensils"; Greek,pragmata)ishelpfulhere:Inourusual day-to-day living what we immediatelyexperience are not objectsjust "simplythere" but utensilsto be

used in various ways.I do not perceive the pen I am writingwithas
it is in itselfbecauseI am busy utilizing it to writedownwords, and the paperIwrite upon is not perceivedin its full presence but also just utilized as
somethingto write words upon; the tableis utilizedas
somethingto supportthe paper;the
chairas that which supportsme, and so forth.Heideggerconcludesthatweimmediately experiencethe world as a "totality of
destinations" (purposes)whichultimatelyrefersbacktome.

Vorhanden,objectsjust"lyingthere, "area derivativecategory dependentupon
zuhanden, for we becomeaware of objectsas zuhandenonly
when they fail or are not where they should be, or as something unexpected that "gets
in the way"; so, for example, I will experience my pen as vorhanden only when it runs
out of ink and perhapsnot eventhen: for I may see

it then as a utensilwhose utensilityis that it is something to be thrown away into the rubbish bin.

The fact that we normallyexperiencethingsin this way fits perfectlywith the Buddhistview thatwe do not experiencethingsas
they are becausewe

viewthemcausally.But thereare
two significant differences between Heidegger and the Buddhistattitude.First,
in Buddhism the "totality

of destination"doesnotreferbackto me, it is "me";that is, the tendencyto treat things in this way (partof our sa.mskaaras) constitutesthe sense

ofself,oranimportantpartofit.Second, Heideggerviewsvorhandenasderivativefrom zuhanden;he saw his
projectin Beingand Time as

overcoming the error (prevailing since
Parmenides) of basinga metaphysicsuponvorhanden.The Buddhist view,aswesawinConze'sthreelevelsof apperception, is that the primarycategoryis
"thatwhichisactuallygiven, "uponwhichcraving, conceptualizing,andcausalitybuild except,the Buddhistagrees,forthefactthatusuallythe
variousprocessesoccur so quicklythat we are not able to distinguish between them.

Why do we tend to see objectscausally, that is, asutensils? Thisis obviousenough: insofaras I crave, I will need to manipulatethe worldin
order

to obtain what I want.To manipulaterequires us to think causally: what causalfactorwill lead to the
desiredeffect?Infact,thedesireforsuch

manipulationmay be seen as the rootof the concept of causality:

Theideaof causehas
itsrootsin purposive activityand is
employedin the first instance when we are
concernedto produce or to prevent something.

To discoverthecauseof somethingis to discover what has to be attestedby our activityin order to
produceor to prevent that thing;but once the word

first, that the world(the true world, nirvaa.na) is empty of
predication;this is essentiallythe point alreadymade aboutconceptualizingasobscuring

tathataa.Second, `sunyataameans
dharmanairaatmya, that thereis not anything`in' the worldthat has any self-nature, becauseall
thingsare conditioned by each other and
hence are relative.So Naagaarjuna

interpreted pratiityasamutpaada, the law
of dependent origination, as showingtheinterdependenceof all things presumably, as their causalinterdependence.

This seems inconsistentwith our view that causality is merely
thought-expectation, part of the subjective filterwhichinterpretswhatisimmediately
experienced.

Butthereisno
contradiction.Theessential interdependenceofallphenomenadoesnotmean
causality, in the sense that we and Nowell-Smith have meant, whichisrootedinpurposiveactivityto
attainsomethingdesiredorto preventsomething
disliked.Thatsenseis temporaland linear: some specificcauseAwillproduceeffectB.This presupposes experiencing the world as a
collection of separatedobjects;
causalityexplainstheir relationship, and our understanding of
their interactionis usedto obtainoneobjectand
not another.`Sunyataa as complete
interdependence means that there are no objectsand
hence no linear causal relations between objects. Dharma-nairaamyaimplies that the world, as Nietzsche pointed out,
is a continuum. We may isolate a couple of pieces, designate them as objects and try to
determinetheir causal relationship;but in fact thereare no such isolatedpieces;there is only a holistic flux of events.All particularsare simply momentary appearances, empty forms that the continuum takesin its constanttransformation.Each form is
emptybecauseit hasno natureof itsown:
it is simplywhatthe wholecontinuumis doingat
this placeat this moment.The other side of the coin is that becauseeach formis
emptyit is the complete manifestationoftheentirecontinuum.Each particular contains and manifests the whole.Hua-yen expressesthis insightwith the analogyof Indra's infinite net: at each interstice is a
jewel which may be said to be empty becauseit
simplyreflectsall the other jewels;but it may also be said to contain all the others.Thus our cosmos is symbolizedas an infinitelyrepeated interrelationshipamong
all its members eachone of which encompasses
and expresses all the others.This is very
different from our moreusual linearand temporalconceptionof causality; Jung'sconceptofsynchronicity
"an a causal connecting principle" is closer.[15]

threefactorshave beenidentified:craving,
conceptualizing, and causality. The relations between cravingandtheothertwohavebeendiscussed: insofarasIcrave, Iwillneedtodistinguish conceptuallythe objectsI
crave, and I will relate to objects causallyin
order to obtain that which is craved. To complete the triangle, we must look at the
relation between conceptualizing and causality.What
remainsto be seenis how causalityis builtinto language itself.

Earlier, Searlewasquotedto pointoutthat namingis
not justa matterof pinninglabelson objects that are self-identifying. "The
world doesn't

cometousalreadyslicedupintoobjectsand experiences: whatcountsas
an object is alreadya function of our system
of representation,and how we

perceivethe world in our experiencesis influenced by that systemof representation."So, in naming, I do not first see a thing and then
decide to call it a "door," for example; to callit a "door"is howwe learn to pick it out and notice it. We divideup the worldand come to see it as a collectionof
objects

by givingnamesto thoseobjects.But now we must take a furtherstep.How
doesnaming"mean"? The conclusionofrecentphilosopherssuch as
Wittgensteinisthatwecannotunderstandhow language functionsuntil we see its connectionwith our behavior.Languageis an integral part of
a way oflife, andtheonlywaywe
havetodetermine whetheraperson"understands"certainlanguage patternsisbyobservinghisbehavior.A person understandsthe meaningof
"door" not by being able to give us a verbaldefinition, but by being able to use it in the appropriate way for going in
and coming out. So to understand that "that" is a door includes understanding
the To understandthat"that"is "a door"is thusto definemyrelationshipwith"that";theconcept
"door" itself is enough to identify the place of that thing in my vorhanden
system of utensils.As soon as I recognizesomethingas"apieceofchalk,"
my causal relationshipwith it is
established: It is to be used for writing on a blackboard. At that point, I willusuallyput
it in its "place"and then pay no
moreattentionto it untilI need to writeon the blackboard.Of course, otherrecognitionsare more emotionallycharged, such as identifyingparticular forms as "cigarette"(if one is addicted to tobacco) or"aprettygirl";insuchcasesmypossible

relationshipswith these objectsare more obviously defined in terms of cravings.

So causality is built into language. Names
do not simply cover things like a blanket of snow resting on the roof of a house.Learning a language is learning

to make causal
connections, learning to see the world asacollectionofutensilsusedinorderto
accomplishcertainends.Naming,intheactof

picking out objects, also determines how we relate to them.Inthisway,craving,
conceptualizing,and causalitywork togetherto sustaina sense of self
"in"an objectiveworld.If
"I" want to experience the "world-in-itself," allthreemustbe overcome. The "thing-in-itself"
tathataa must be realized

to be distinctfromanycravingforit,
frommy representationofit,andfromwhatevercausal
associations it may have for me.For only
then can I

11. From the PlatformSuutra of the Sixth Patriarch, chapter IV:
"Samaadhi and Praj~naa."

12. This view of causality is intimately
related to a differentway of understandingtime.Causality
requiresthat the past become the present;that

is, that past causes determinepresenteffects.
To deny causality is to deny this also. Pastthingsare in the past and do not go there from the
present, and presentthingsare in the present,
and do notgo therefromthe
past....Rivers which
compete with each other to cover the land do not flow.The `wandering air' that blows about is not moving. (Seng-chao, Chao Lun)

Dogen later elaborated on this: we shouldnot take the viewthatwhatis

latterlyasheswas formerlyfirewood.What we shouldunderstandisthat,accordingtothe
doctrineofBuddhism,firewoodstaysatthepositionof firewood. Thereare formerand later stages,
but these stages are clearly cut.We do not consider that winter becomes spring or that
spring becomes summer. (Shobogenzo, fascicle 1)

13. BeingandTime,III;"TheWorldhoodofthe World", 15.

14. P. H. Nowell-Smith, "Causality or
Causation".

15. Thelinkbetween the two
Mahaayaana meanings of `suunyataa otherwise an obscure relationship is that by eliminating
thought constructions we