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Page 1

CHAPTER

I. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in
particular of that of Rome

II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to
which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged

III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the
creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic
was made more perfect

IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and
Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful

V. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer
in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and
whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who
seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions

VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive
such a Government as would have composed the differences
between the Commons and the Senate

VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there
must exist the right to accuse

VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth
as the power to accuse is useful

IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth,
or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely
new basis, must be the work of one Man

X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom
or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny
deserves blame

XI. Of the Religion of the Romans

XII. That it is of much moment to make account
of Religion; and that
Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein,
has been ruined

XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion
in giving institutions to their City; in carrying
out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults

XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices
to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing
the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard
them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished

XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their
broken fortunes, had recourse to Religion

XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a
Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly
preserve that freedom

XVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom
can hardly preserve it

XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt
City may be preserved, or not existing may be created

XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may
maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no
Kingdom can stand a second

XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant
Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered
Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant
Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended

XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince
or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army

XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the
three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii

XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole
fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength;
for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful

Page 2

XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide
rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never
set off deserts against misdeeds

XXV. That he who would reform the institutions
of a free State, must retain at least the semblance
of old ways

XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province
of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything
new

XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly
good or wholly bad

XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less
ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians

XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more
ungrateful

XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid
the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen
may escape being undone by it

XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished
with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss
resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance
or want of judgment, were not punished at all

XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not
defer benefits until they are forced to yield them

XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against
a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to
meet it with violence

XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did
good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that
it is, not those powers which are given by the free
suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious
Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious
to a State

XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in
Rome, although brought about by the free and open
suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties
of that Republic

XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher
offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower

XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian
Law: and how it is a great source of disorder
in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient
usage with stringent retrospective effect

XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and
undecided; and that the course they may take depends
more on Necessity than Choice

XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen
to befall different Nations

XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome,
and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among
other matters it is shown how the same causes may
lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth

XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from
leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from
a humble

XLII. How easily men become corrupted

XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make
good and resolute
Soldiers

XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without
a head: and that we should not with the same
breath threaten and ask leave

XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in
the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made:
and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City
is most hurtful to the Governor

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XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition
to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and
then to injure others

XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in
generalities, in particulars they judge truly

XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed
on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive
that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless
and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree
noble and good

XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their
beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing
such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities
which at the first have been in subjection will find
this almost impossible

L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should
have power to bring the Government of a City to a
stay

LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity,
should seem to be done by choice

LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen
who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no
safer method, nor less open to objection, than to
forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance
himself

LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show
of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin;
and that large hopes and brave promises easily move
them

LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great
man may use to restrain an excited Multitude

LV. That the Government is easily carried on
in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted:
and that a Princedom is impossible where equality
prevails, and a Republic where it does not

LVI. That when great calamities are about to
befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage,
and seers arise who foretell them

LVII. That the People are strong collectively,
but individually weak

LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant
than a Prince

LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most
trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or
those we make with Princes

LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies
in Rome were given without respect to Age

BOOK II.

PREFACE

I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more
due to Valour or to Fortune

II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend,
and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom

III. That Rome became great by destroying the
Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting
Strangers to the rights of Citizenship

IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods
for extending their power

V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening
of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the memory of
the past

Page 4

X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not
the sinews of War

XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with
a Prince who has reputation rather than strength

XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is
better to anticipate or to await it

XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes
rather by Fraud than by
Force

XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can
subdue Pride by Humility

XV. That weak States are always dubious in their
resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful

XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely
from the methods of ancient Warfare

XVII. What importance the Armies of the present
day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly
received opinion concerning it be just

XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the
example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot
Soldiers of more account than Horse

XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States
and such as follow not the valiant methods of the
Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement

XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics
who resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms

XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the
Romans sent a Praetor; nor there, until four hundred
years after they began to make war

XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge
amiss

XXIII. That in chastising then Subjects when
circumstances required it the Romans always avoided
half measures

XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more
harm than good

XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against
itself, must not think to get possession of it through
its divisions

XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against
him who uses them, without yielding him any advantage

XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should
be content to have obtained a victory; for, commonly,
when they are not, their victory turns to defeat

XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances,
whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince
or Commonwealth

XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men
when she would not have them hinder her designs

XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths
do not buy Friendships with money, but with their
valour and the fame of then prowess

XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men

XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession
of Towns

XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains
of their Armies with the fullest Powers

BOOK III.

I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must
often be brought back to its beginnings

Page 5

II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly

III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom
we must slay the Sons of
Brutus

IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom
while those live whom he has deprived of it

V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom

VI. Of Conspiracies

VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude,
and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made
without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood

VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth,
must give heed to its character and condition

IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must
change with the times

X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy
forces it on him at all hazards

XI. That one who has to contend with many, though
he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand
their first onset

XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to
make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and
to relieve his Enemy from that necessity

XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant
Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with
a weak Captain

XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange
and unexpected Sights or Sounds

XV. That one and not many should head an Army;
and why it is disadvantageous to have more leaders
than one

XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is
sought after whereas in quiet times it is not the
most deserving but those who are recommended by wealth
or connection who are most in favour

XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then
send him to fill an important Office or Command

XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain
to be able to forestall the designs of his adversary

XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary
for controlling a Multitude

XX. How one humane act availed more with the
men of Falerii than all the might of the Roman Arms

XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a
course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the
same results in Italy which the other achieved in
Spain

XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus
and the gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both
the same Glory

XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome

XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to
Servitude

XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many
other Roman Citizens

XXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States

XXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and
how it is a false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection
they must be kept divided

XXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what
its Citizens are about; since often the seeds of a
Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds

XXIX. That the faults of a People are due to
its Prince

Page 6

XXX. That a Citizen who seeks by his personal
influence to render signal service to his Country,
must first stand clear of Envy. How a City should
prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy

XXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve
through every change the same spirit and bearing

XXXII. Of the methods which some have used to
make Peace impossible

XXXIII. That to insure victory in battle, you
must inspire your soldiers with confidence in one
another and in you

XXXIV. By what reports, rumours, or surmises
the Citizens of a Republic are led to favour a fellow-citizen:
and whether the Magistracies are bestowed with better
judgment by a People or by a Prince

XXXV. Of the danger incurred in being the first
to recommend new measures; and that the more unusual
the measures, the greater the danger

XXXVI. Why it has been and still may be affirmed
of the Gauls, that at the beginning of a fray they
are more than Men, but afterwards less than Women

XXXVII. Whether a general engagement should be
preceded by skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we
may get knowledge of a new Enemy

XXXVIII. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom
his Soldiers can confide

XXXIX. That a Captain should have good knowledge
of Places

XL. That Fraud is fair in War

XLI. That our Country is to be defended by Honour
or by Dishonour, and in either way is well defended

XLII. That Promises made on compulsion are not
to be observed

XLIII. That Men born in the same Province retain
through all times nearly the same character

XLIV. That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood
and Daring often succeed

XLV. Whether in battle it is better to await
and repel the enemy’s attack, or to anticipate
it by an impetuous onset

XLVI. How the Characteristics of Families come
to be perpetuated

XLVII. That love of his Country should lead a
good Citizen to forget private wrongs

XLVIII. That on finding an Enemy make what seems
a grave blunder we should suspect some fraud to lurk
behind

XLIX. That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom
has constant need of new Ordinances. Of the services
in respect of which Quintius Fabius received the surname
of Maximus

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

TO

ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI

Health.

I send you a gift, which if it answers ill the obligations
I owe you, is at any rate the greatest which Niccolo
Machiavelli has it in his power to offer. For
in it I have expressed whatever I have learned, or
have observed for myself during a long experience
and constant study of human affairs. And since
neither you nor any other can expect more at my hands,
you cannot complain if I have not given you more.

Page 7

You may indeed lament the poverty of my wit, since
what I have to say is but poorly said; and tax the
weakness of my judgment, which on many points may
have erred in its conclusions. But granting all
this, I know not which of us is less beholden to the
other: I to you, who have forced me to write
what of myself I never should have written; or you
to me, who have written what can give you no content.

Take this, however, in the spirit in which all that
comes from a friend should be taken, in respect whereof
we always look more to the intention of the giver
than to the quality of the gift. And, believe
me, that in one thing only I find satisfaction, namely,
in knowing that while in many matters I may have made
mistakes, at least I have not been mistaken in choosing
you before all others as the persons to whom I dedicate
these Discourses; both because I seem to myself, in
doing so, to have shown a little gratitude for kindness
received, and at the same time to have departed from
the hackneyed custom which leads many authors to inscribe
their works to some Prince, and blinded by hopes of
favour or reward, to praise him as possessed of every
virtue; whereas with more reason they might reproach
him as contaminated with every shameful vice.

To avoid which error I have chosen, not those who
are but those who from their infinite merits deserve
to be Princes; not such persons as have it in their
power to load me with honours, wealth, and preferment,
but such as though they lack the power, have all the
will to do so. For men, if they would judge justly,
should esteem those who are, and not those whose means
enable them to be generous; and in like manner those
who know how to govern kingdoms, rather than those
who possess the government without such knowledge.
For Historians award higher praise to Hiero of Syracuse
when in a private station than to Perseus the Macedonian
when a King affirming that while the former lacked
nothing that a Prince should have save the name, the
latter had nothing of the King but the kingdom.

Make the most, therefore, of this good or this evil,
as you may esteem it, which you have brought upon
yourselves; and should you persist in the mistake
of thinking my opinions worthy your attention, I shall
not fail to proceed with the rest of the History in
the manner promised in my Preface. Farewell.

DISCOURSES

ON THE FIRST DECADE OF

TitusLivius.

BOOK I.

* * * *
*

PREFACE.

Page 8

Albeit the jealous temper of mankind, ever more disposed
to censure than to praise the work of others, has
constantly made the pursuit of new methods and systems
no less perilous than the search after unknown lands
and seas; nevertheless, prompted by that desire which
nature has implanted in me, fearlessly to undertake
whatsoever I think offers a common benefit to all,
I enter on a path which, being hitherto untrodden
by any, though it involve me in trouble and fatigue,
may yet win me thanks from those who judge my efforts
in a friendly spirit. And although my feeble
discernment, my slender experience of current affairs,
and imperfect knowledge of ancient events, render these
efforts of mine defective and of no great utility,
they may at least open the way to some other, who,
with better parts and sounder reasoning and judgment,
shall carry out my design; whereby, if I gain no credit,
at all events I ought to incur no blame.

When I see antiquity held in such reverence, that
to omit other instances, the mere fragment of some
ancient statue is often bought at a great price, in
order that the purchaser may keep it by him to adorn
his house, or to have it copied by those who take
delight in this art; and how these, again, strive
with all their skill to imitate it in their various
works; and when, on the other hand, I find those noble
labours which history shows to have been wrought on
behalf of the monarchies and republics of old times,
by kings, captains, citizens, lawgivers, and others
who have toiled for the good of their country, rather
admired than followed, nay, so absolutely renounced
by every one that not a trace of that antique worth
is now left among us, I cannot but at once marvel
and grieve; at this inconsistency; and all the more
because I perceive that, in civil disputes between
citizens, and in the bodily disorders into which men
fall, recourse is always had to the decisions and
remedies, pronounced or prescribed by the ancients.

For the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered
by the ancient jurisconsults, which, being reduced
to a system, teach the jurisconsults of our own times
how to determine; while the healing art is simply
the recorded experience of the old physicians, on which
our modern physicians found their practice. And
yet, in giving laws to a commonwealth, in maintaining
States and governing kingdoms, in organizing armies
and conducting wars, in dealing with subject nations,
and in extending a State’s dominions, we find
no prince, no republic, no captain, and no citizen
who resorts to the example of the ancients.

This I persuade myself is due, not so much to the
feebleness to which the present methods of education
have brought the world, or to the injury which a pervading
apathy has wrought in many provinces and cities of
Christendom, as to the want of a right intelligence
of History, which renders men incapable in reading
it to extract its true meaning or to relish its flavour.
Whence it happens that by far the greater number of
those who read History, take pleasure in following
the variety of incidents which it presents, without
a thought to imitate them; judging such imitation
to be not only difficult but impossible; as though
the heavens, the sun, the elements, and man himself
were no longer the same as they formerly were as regards
motion, order, and power.

Page 9

Desiring to rescue men from this error, I have thought
fit to note down with respect to all those books of
Titus Livius which have escaped the malignity of Time,
whatever seems to me essential to a right understanding
of ancient and modern affairs; so that any who shall
read these remarks of mine, may reap from them that
profit for the sake of which a knowledge of History
is to be sought. And although the task be arduous,
still, with the help of those at whose instance I assumed
the burthen, I hope to carry it forward so far, that
another shall have no long way to go to bring it to
its destination.

CHAPTER I.—­Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular
of that of Rome.

No one who reads how the city of Rome had its beginning,
who were its founders, and what its ordinances and
laws, will marvel that so much excellence was maintained
in it through many ages, or that it grew afterwards
to be so great an Empire.

And, first, as touching its origin, I say, that all
cities have been founded either by the people of the
country in which they stand, or by strangers.
Cities have their origins in the former of these two
ways when the inhabitants of a country find that they
cannot live securely if they live dispersed in many
and small societies, each of them unable, whether
from its situation or its slender numbers, to stand
alone against the attacks of its enemies; on whose
approach there is no time left to unite for defence
without abandoning many strongholds, and thus becoming
an easy prey to the invader. To escape which dangers,
whether of their own motion or at the instance of
some of greater authority among them, they restrict
themselves to dwell together in certain places, which
they think will be more convenient to live in and easier
to defend.

Among many cities taking their origin in this way
were Athens and Venice; the former of which, for reasons
like those just now mentioned, was built by a scattered
population under the direction of Theseus. To
escape the wars which, on the decay of the Roman Empire
daily renewed in Italy by the arrival of fresh hordes
of Barbarians, numerous refugees, sheltering in certain
little islands in a corner of the Adriatic Sea, gave
beginning to Venice; where, without any recognized
leader to direct them, they agreed to live together
under such laws as they thought best suited to maintain
them. And by reason of the prolonged tranquility
which their position secured, they being protected
by the narrow sea and by the circumstance that the
tribes who then harassed Italy had no ships wherewith
to molest them, they were able from very small beginnings
to attain to that greatness they now enjoy.

Page 10

In the second case, namely of a city being founded
by strangers, the settlers are either wholly independent,
or they are controlled by others, as where colonies
are sent forth either by a prince or by a republic,
to relieve their countries of an excessive population,
or to defend newly acquired territories which it is
sought to secure at small cost. Of this sort
many cities were settled by the Romans, and in all
parts of their dominions. It may also happen that
such cities are founded by a prince merely to add
to his renown, without any intention on his part to
dwell there, as Alexandria was built by Alexander the
Great. Cities like these, not having had their
beginning in freedom, seldom make such progress as
to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms.

The city of Florence belongs to that class of towns
which has not been independent from the first; for
whether we ascribe its origin to the soldiers of Sylla,
or, as some have conjectured, to the mountaineers of
Fiesole (who, emboldened by the long peace which prevailed
throughout the world during the reign of Octavianus,
came down to occupy the plain on the banks of the
Arno), in either case, it was founded under the auspices
of Rome nor could, at first, make other progress than
was permitted by the grace of the sovereign State.

The origin of cities may be said to be independent
when a people, either by themselves or under some
prince, are constrained by famine, pestilence, or
war to leave their native land and seek a new habitation.
Settlers of this sort either establish themselves in
cities which they find ready to their hand in the
countries of which they take possession, as did Moses;
or they build new ones, as did AEneas. It is in
this last case that the merits of a founder and the
good fortune of the city founded are best seen; and
this good fortune will be more or less remarkable
according to the greater or less capacity of him who
gives the city its beginning.

The capacity of a founder is known in two ways:
by his choice of a site, or by the laws which he frames.
And since men act either of necessity or from choice,
and merit may seem greater where choice is more restricted,
we have to consider whether it may not be well to choose
a sterile district as the site of a new city, in order
that the inhabitants, being constrained to industry,
and less corrupted by ease, may live in closer union,
finding less cause for division in the poverty of their
land; as was the case in Ragusa, and in many other
cities built in similar situations. Such a choice
were certainly the wisest and the most advantageous,
could men be content to enjoy what is their own without
seeking to lord it over others. But since to be
safe they must be strong, they are compelled avoid
these barren districts, and to plant themselves in
more fertile regions; where, the fruitfulness of the
soil enabling them to increase and multiply, they
may defend themselves against any who attack them,
and overthrow any who would withstand their power.

Page 11

And as for that languor which the situation might
breed, care must be had that hardships which the site
does not enforce, shall be enforced by the laws; and
that the example of those wise nations be imitated,
who, inhabiting most fruitful and delightful countries,
and such as were likely to rear a listless and effeminate
race, unfit for all manly exercises, in order to obviate
the mischief wrought by the amenity and relaxing influence
of the soil and climate, subjected all who were to
serve as soldiers to the severest training; whence
it came that better soldiers were raised in these
countries than in others by nature rugged and barren.
Such, of old, was the kingdom of the Egyptians, which,
though of all lands the most bountiful, yet, by the
severe training which its laws enforced, produced
most valiant soldiers, who, had their names not been
lost in antiquity, might be thought to deserve more
praise than Alexander the Great and many besides, whose
memory is still fresh in men’s minds. And
even in recent times, any one contemplating the kingdom
of the Soldan, and the military order of the Mamelukes
before they were destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk,
must have seen how carefully they trained their soldiers
in every kind of warlike exercise; showing thereby
how much they dreaded that indolence to which their
genial soil and climate might have disposed them, unless
neutralized by strenuous laws. I say, then, that
it is a prudent choice to found your city in a fertile
region when the effects of that fertility are duly
balanced by the restraint of the laws.

When Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown
by founding a city, Dinocrates the architect came
and showed him how he might build it on Mount Athos,
which not only offered a strong position, but could
be handled that the city built there might present
a semblance of the human form, which would be a thing
strange and striking, and worthy of so great a monarch.
But on Alexander asking how the inhabitants were to
live, Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of
that. Whereupon, Alexander laughed, and leaving
Mount Athos as it stood, built Alexandria; where,
the fruitfulness of the soil, and the vicinity of the
Nile and the sea, might attract many to take up their
abode.

To him, therefore, who inquires into the origin of
Rome, if he assign its beginning to AEneas, it will
seem to be of those cities which were founded by strangers
if to Romulus, then of those founded by the natives
of the country. But in whichever class we place
it, it will be seen to have had its beginning in freedom,
and not in subjection to another State. It will
be seen, too, as hereafter shall be noted, how strict
was the discipline which the laws instituted by Romulus,
Numa, and its other founders made compulsory upon
it; so that neither its fertility, the proximity of
the sea, the number of its victories, nor the extent
of its dominion, could for many centuries corrupt
it, but, on the contrary, maintained it replete with
such virtues as were never matched in any other commonwealth.

Page 12

And because the things done by Rome, and which Titus
Livius has celebrated, were effected at home or abroad
by public or by private wisdom, I shall begin by treating,
and noting the consequences of those things done at
home in accordance with the public voice, which seem
most to merit attention; and to this object the whole
of this first Book or first Part of my Discourses,
shall be directed.

CHAPTER II.—­Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them
the Roman Commonwealth belonged.

I forego all discussion concerning those cities which
at the outset have been dependent upon others, and
shall speak only of those which from their earliest
beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign
control, being governed from the first as pleased themselves,
whether as republics or as princedoms.

These as they have had different origins, so likewise
have had different laws and institutions. For
to some at their very first commencement, or not long
after, laws have been given by a single legislator,
and all at one time; like those given by Lycurgus
to the Spartans; while to others they have been given
at different times, as need rose or accident determined;
as in the case of Rome. That republic, indeed,
may be called happy, whose lot has been to have a
founder so prudent as to provide for it laws under
which it can continue to live securely, without need
to amend them; as we find Sparta preserving hers for
eight hundred years, without deterioration and without
any dangerous disturbance. On the other hand,
some measure of unhappiness attaches to the State which,
not having yielded itself once for all into the hands
of a single wise legislator, is obliged to recast
its institutions for itself; and of such States, by
far the most unhappy is that which is furthest removed
from a sound system of government, by which I mean
that its institutions lie wholly outside the path
which might lead it to a true and perfect end.
For it is scarcely possible that a State in this position
can ever, by any chance, set itself to rights, whereas
another whose institutions are imperfect, if it have
made a good beginning and such as admits of its amendment,
may in the course of events arrive at perfection.
It is certain, however, that such States can never
be reformed without great risk; for, as a rule, men
will accept no new law altering the institutions of
their State, unless the necessity for such a change
be demonstrated; and since this necessity cannot arise
without danger, the State may easily be overthrown
before the new order of things is established.
In proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence,
which was reformed in the year 1502, in consequence
of the affair of Arezzo, but was ruined in 1512, in
consequence of the affair of Prato.

Page 13

Desiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the
government of Rome, and to ascertain the accidental
circumstances which brought it to its perfection,
I say, as has been said before by many who have written
of Governments, that of these there are three forms,
known by the names Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy,
and that those who give its institutions to a State
have recourse to one or other of these three, according
as it suits their purpose. Other, and, as many
have thought, wiser teachers, will have it, that there
are altogether six forms of government, three of them
utterly bad, the other three good in themselves, but
so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become
hurtful. The good are the three above named; the
bad, three others dependent upon these, and each so
like that to which it is related, that it is easy
to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other.
For a Monarchy readily becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy
an Oligarchy, while a Democracy tends to degenerate
into Anarchy. So that if the founder of a State
should establish any one of these three forms of Government,
he establishes it for a short time only, since no
precaution he may take can prevent it from sliding
into its contrary, by reason of the close resemblance
which, in this case, the virtue bears to the vice.

These diversities in the form of Government spring
up among men by chance. For in the beginning
of the world, its inhabitants, being few in number,
for a time lived scattered after the fashion of beasts;
but afterwards, as they increased and multiplied,
gathered themselves into societies, and, the better
to protect themselves, began to seek who among them
was the strongest and of the highest courage, to whom,
making him their head, they tendered obedience.
Next arose the knowledge of such things as are honourable
and good, as opposed to those which are bad and shameful.
For observing that when a man wronged his benefactor,
hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy
for the other, and that the ungrateful were blamed,
while those who showed gratitude were honoured, and
reflecting that the wrongs they saw done to others
might be done to themselves, to escape these they
resorted to making laws and fixing punishments against
any who should transgress them; and in this way grew
the recognition of Justice. Whence it came that
afterwards, in choosing their rulers, men no longer
looked about for the strongest, but for him who was
the most prudent and the most just.

But, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary
and no longer elective, hereditary sovereigns began
to degenerate from their ancestors, and, quitting
worthy courses, took up the notion that princes had
nothing to do but to surpass the rest of the world
in sumptuous display and wantonness, and whatever
else ministers to pleasure so that the prince coming
to be hated, and therefore to feel fear, and passing
from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon

Page 14

sprang up. Forthwith there began movements to
overthrow the prince, and plots and conspiracies against
him undertaken not by those who were weak, or afraid
for themselves, but by such as being conspicuous for
their birth, courage, wealth, and station, could not
tolerate the shameful life of the tyrant. The
multitude, following the lead of these powerful men,
took up arms against the prince and, he being got rid
of, obeyed these others as their liberators; who,
on their part, holding in hatred the name of sole
ruler, formed themselves into a government and at first,
while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh,
observed the laws they themselves made, and postponing
personal advantage to the common welfare, administered
affairs both publicly and privately with the utmost
diligence and zeal. But this government passing,
afterwards, to their descendants who, never having
been taught in the school of Adversity, knew nothing
of the vicissitudes of Fortune, these not choosing
to rest content with mere civil equality, but abandoning
themselves to avarice, ambition, and lust, converted,
without respect to civil rights what had been a government
of the best into a government of the few; and so very
soon met with the same fate as the tyrant.

For the multitude loathing its rulers, lent itself
to any who ventured, in whatever way, to attack them;
when some one man speedily arose who with the aid
of the people overthrew them. But the recollection
of the tyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands
being still fresh in the minds of the people, who
therefore felt no desire to restore the monarchy,
they had recourse to a popular government, which they
established on such a footing that neither king nor
nobles had any place in it. And because all governments
inspire respect at the first, this government also
lasted for a while, but not for long, and seldom after
the generation which brought it into existence had
died out. For, suddenly, liberty passed into
license, wherein neither private worth nor public
authority was respected, but, every one living as he
liked, a thousand wrongs were done daily. Whereupon,
whether driven by necessity, or on the suggestion
of some wiser man among them and to escape anarchy,
the people reverted to a monarchy, from which, step
by step, in the manner and for the causes already
assigned, they came round once more to license.
For this is the circle revolving within which all States
are and have been governed; although in the same State
the same forms of Government rarely repeat themselves,
because hardly any State can have such vitality as
to pass through such a cycle more than once, and still
together. For it may be expected that in some
sea of disaster, when a State must always be wanting
prudent counsels and in strength, it will become subject
to some neighbouring and better-governed State; though
assuming this not to happen, it might well pass for
an indefinite period from one of these forms of government
to another.

Page 15

I say, then, that all these six forms of government
are pernicious—­the three good kinds, from
their brief duration the three bad, from their inherent
badness. Wise legislators therefore, knowing these
defects, and avoiding each of these forms in its simplicity,
have made choice of a form which shares in the qualities
of all the first three, and which they judge to be
more stable and lasting than any of these separately.
For where we have a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a
democracy existing together in the same city, each
of the three serves as a check upon the other.

Among those who have earned special praise by devising
a constitution of this nature, was Lycurgus, who so
framed the laws of Sparta as to assign their proper
functions to kings, nobles, and commons; and in this
way established a government, which, to his great
glory and to the peace and tranquility of his country,
lasted for more than eight hundred years. The
contrary, however, happened in the case of Solon; who
by the turn he gave to the institutions of Athens,
created there a purely democratic government, of such
brief duration, that I himself lived to witness the
beginning of the despotism of Pisistratus. And
although, forty years later, the heirs of Pisistratus
were driven out, and Athens recovered her freedom,
nevertheless because she reverted to the same form
government as had been established by Solon, she could
maintain it for only a hundred years more; for though
to preserve it, many ordinances were passed for repressing
the ambition of the great and the turbulence of the
people, against which Solon had not provided, still,
since neither the monarchic nor the aristocratic element
was given a place in her constitution, Athens, as
compared with Sparta, had but a short life.

But let us now turn to Rome, which city, although
she had no Lycurgus to give her from the first such
a constitution as would preserve her long in freedom,
through a series of accidents, caused by the contests
between the commons and the senate, obtained by chance
what the foresight of her founders failed to provide.
So that Fortune, if she bestowed not her first favours
on Rome, bestowed her second; because, although the
original institutions of this city were defective,
still they lay not outside the true path which could
bring them to perfection. For Romulus and the
other kings made many and good laws, and such as were
not incompatible with freedom; but because they sought
to found a kingdom and not a commonwealth, when the
city became free many things were found wanting which
in the interest of liberty it was necessary to supply,
since these kings had not supplied them. And although
the kings of Rome lost their sovereignty, in the manner
and for the causes mentioned above, nevertheless those
who drove them out, by at once creating two consuls
to take their place, preserved in Rome the regal authority
while banishing from it the regal throne, so that as
both senate and consuls were included in that republic,
it in fact possessed two of the elements above enumerated,
to wit, the monarchic and the aristocratic.

Page 16

It then only remained to assign its place to the popular
element, and the Roman nobles growing insolent from
causes which shall be noticed hereafter, the commons
against them, when, not to lose the whole of their
power, they were forced to concede a share to the people;
while with the share which remained, the senate and
consuls retained so much authority that they still
held their own place in the republic. In this
way the tribunes of the people came to be created,
after whose creation the stability of the State was
much augmented, since each the three forms of government
had now its due influence allowed it. And such
was the good fortune of Rome that although her government
passed from the kings to the nobles, and from these
to the people, by the steps and for the reasons noticed
above, still the entire authority of the kingly element
was not sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the
nobles, nor were the nobles divested of their authority
to bestow it on the commons; but three, blending together,
made up a perfect State; which perfection, as shall
be fully shown in the next two Chapters, was reached
through the dissensions of the commons and the senate.

CHAPTER III.—­Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of
Tribunes of the People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect.

They who lay the foundations of a State and furnish
it with laws must, as is shown by all who have treated
of civil government, and by examples of which history
is full, assume that ’all men are bad, and will
always, when they have free field, give loose to their
evil inclinations; and that if these for a while remain
hidden, it is owing to some secret cause, which, from
our having no contrary experience, we do not recognize
at once, but which is afterwards revealed by Time,
of whom we speak as the father of all truth.

In Rome, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, it seemed
as though the closest union prevailed between the
senate and the commons, and that the nobles, laying
aside their natural arrogance, had learned so to sympathize
with the people as to have become supportable by all,
even of the humblest rank. This dissimulation
remained undetected, and its causes concealed, while
the Tarquins lived; for the nobles dreading the Tarquins,
and fearing that the people, if they used them ill,
might take part against them, treated them with kindness.
But no sooner were the Tarquins got rid of, and the
nobles thus relieved of their fears, when they began
to spit forth against the commons all the venom which
before they had kept in their breasts, offending and
insulting them in every way they could; confirming
what I have observed already, that men never behave
well unless compelled, and that whenever they are free
to act as they please, and are under no restraint
everything falls at once into confusion and disorder.
Wherefore it has been said that as poverty and hunger
are needed to make men industrious, so laws are needed
to make them good. When we do well without laws,
laws are not needed; but when good customs are absent,
laws are at once required.

Page 17

On the extinction of the Tarquins, therefore, the
dread of whom had kept the nobles in check, some new
safeguard had to be contrived, which should effect
the same result as had been effected by the Tarquins
while they lived. Accordingly, after much uproar
and confusion, and much danger of violence ensuing
between the commons and the nobles, to insure the
safety of the former, tribunes were created, and were
invested with such station and authority as always
afterwards enabled them to stand between the people
and the senate, and to resist the insolence of the
nobles.

CHAPTER IV.—­That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of
Rome, made Rome free and powerful.

Touching those tumults which prevailed in Rome from
the extinction of the Tarquins to the creation of
the tribunes the discussion of which I have no wish
to avoid, and as to certain other matters of a like
nature, I desire to say something in opposition to
the opinion of many who assert that Rome was a turbulent
city, and had fallen into utter disorder, that had
not her good fortune and military prowess made amends
for other defects, she would have been inferior to
every other republic.

I cannot indeed deny that the good fortune and the
armies of Rome were the causes of her empire; yet
it certainly seems to me that those holding this opinion
fail to perceive, that in a State where there are
good soldiers there must be good order, and, generally
speaking, good fortune. And looking to the other
circumstances of this city, I affirm that those who
condemn these dissensions between the nobles and the
commons, condemn what was the prime cause of Rome becoming
free; and give more heed to the tumult and uproar
wherewith these dissensions were attended, than to
the good results which followed from them; not reflecting
that while in every republic there are two conflicting
factions, that of the people and that of the nobles,
it is in this conflict that all laws favourable to
freedom have their origin, as may readily be seen
to have been the case in Rome. For from the time
of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, a period of
over three hundred years, the tumults in Rome seldom
gave occasion to punishment by exile, and very seldom
to bloodshed. So that we cannot truly declare
those tumults to have been disastrous, or that republic
to have been disorderly, which during all that time,
on account of her internal broils, banished no more
than eight or ten of her citizens, put very few to
death, and rarely inflicted money penalties.
Nor can we reasonably pronounce that city ill-governed
wherein we find so many instances of virtue; for virtuous
actions have their origin in right training, right
training in wise laws, and wise laws in these very
tumults which many would thoughtlessly condemn.
For he who looks well to the results of these tumults
will find that they did not lead to banishments, nor
to violence hurtful to the common good, but to laws

Page 18

and ordinances beneficial to the public liberty.
And should any object that the behaviour of the Romans
was extravagant and outrageous; that for the assembled
people to be heard shouting against the senate, the
senate against the people; for the whole commons to
be seen rushing wildly through the streets, closing
their shops, and quitting the town, were things which
might well affright him even who only reads of them;
it may be answered, that the inhabitants of all cities,
more especially of cities which seek to make use of
the people in matters of importance, have their own
ways of giving expression to their wishes; among which
the city of Rome had the custom, that when its people
sought to have a law passed they followed one or another
of those courses mentioned above, or else refused to
be enrolled as soldiers when, to pacify them, something
of their demands had to be conceded. But the
demands of a free people are hurtful to freedom, since
they originate either in being oppressed, or in the
fear that they are about to be so. When this
fear is groundless, it finds its remedy in public
meetings, wherein some worthy person may come forward
and show the people by argument that they are deceiving
themselves. For though they be ignorant, the
people are not therefore, as Cicero says, incapable
of being taught the truth, but are readily convinced
when it is told them by one in whose honesty they
can trust.

We should, therefore, be careful how we censure the
government of Rome, and should reflect that all the
great results effected by that republic, could not
have come about without good cause. And if the
popular tumults led the creation of the tribunes,
they merit all praise; since these magistrates not
only gave its due influence to the popular voice in
the government, but also acted as the guardians of
Roman freedom, as shall be clearly shown in the following
Chapter.

Chapter V.—­Whether the Guardianship
of public Freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons
or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire
Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater
cause of Commotions.

Of the provisions made by wise founders of republics,
one of the most necessary is for the creation of a
guardianship of liberty; for according as this is
placed in good or bad hands, the freedom of the State
will be more or less lasting. And because in every
republic we find the two parties of nobles and commons,
the question arises, to which of these two this guardianship
can most safely be entrusted. Among the Lacedaemonians
of old, as now with the Venetians, it was placed in
the hands of the nobles, but with the Romans it was
vested in the commons. We have, therefore, to
determine which of these States made the wiser choice.
If we look to reasons, something is to be said on both
sides of the question; though were we to look to results,
we should have to pronounce in favour of the nobles,
inasmuch as the liberty of Sparta and Venice has had
a longer life than that of Rome.

Page 19

As touching reasons, it may be pleaded for the Roman
method, that they are most fit to have charge of a
thing, who least desire to pervert it to their own
ends. And, doubtless, if we examine the aims which
the nobles and the commons respectively set before
them, we shall find in the former a great desire to
dominate, in the latter merely a desire not to be
dominated over, and hence a greater attachment to freedom,
since they have less to gain than the others by destroying
it. Wherefore, when the commons are put forward
as the defenders of liberty, they may be expected
to take better care of it, and, as they have no desire
to tamper with it themselves, to be less apt to suffer
others to do so.

On the other hand, he who defends the method followed
by the Spartans and Venetians, may urge, that by confiding
this guardianship to the nobles, two desirable ends
are served: first, that from being allowed to
retain in their own hands a weapon which makes them
the stronger party in the State, the ambition of this
class is more fully satisfied; and, second, that an
authority is withdrawn from the unstable multitude
which as used by them is likely to lead to endless
disputes and tumults, and to drive the nobles into
dangerous and desperate courses. In instance
whereof might be cited the case of Rome itself, wherein
the tribunes of the people being vested with this
authority, not content to have one consul a plebeian,
insisted on having both; and afterwards laid claim
to the censorship, the praetorship and all the other
magistracies in the city. Nor was this enough
for them, but, carried away by the same factious spirit,
they began after a time to pay court to such men as
they thought able to attack the nobility, and so gave
occasion to the rise of Marius and the overthrow of
Rome.

Wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question
well, might hesitate which party he should choose
as the guardian of public liberty, being uncertain
which class is more mischievous in a commonwealth,
that which would acquire what it has not, or that
which would keep the authority which it has already.
But, on the whole, on a careful balance of arguments
we may sum up thus:—­Either we have to deal
with a republic eager like Rome to extend its power,
or with one content merely to maintain itself; in
the former case it is necessary to do in all things
as Rome did; in the latter, for the reasons and in
the manner to be shown in the following Chapter, we
may imitate Venice and Sparta.

But reverting to the question which class of citizens
is more mischievous in a republic, those who seek
to acquire or those who fear to lose what they have
acquired already, I note that when Marcus Menenius
and Marcus Fulvius, both of them men of plebeian birth,
were made the one dictator, the other master of the
knights, that they might inquire into certain plots
against Rome contrived in Capua, they had at the same
time authority given them by the people to investigate

Page 20

whether, in Rome itself, irregular and corrupt practices
had been used to obtain the consulship and other honours
of the city. The nobles suspecting that the powers
thus conferred were to be turned against them, everywhere
gave out that if honours had been sought by any by
irregular and unworthy means, it was not by them,
but by the plebeians, who, with neither birth nor
merit to recommend them, had need to resort to corruption.
And more particularly they accused the dictator himself.
And so telling was the effect of these charges, that
Menenius, after haranguing the people and complaining
to them of the calumnies circulated against him, laid
down his dictatorship, and submitted himself to whatever
judgment might be passed upon him. When his cause
came to be tried he was acquitted; but at the hearing
it was much debated, whether he who would retain power
or he who would acquire it, is the more dangerous
citizen; the desires of both being likely to lead
to the greatest disorders.

Nevertheless, I believe that, as a rule, disorders
are more commonly occasioned by those seeking to preserve
power, because in them the fear of loss breeds the
same passions as are felt by those seeking to acquire;
since men never think they hold what they have securely,
unless when they are gaining something new from others.
It is also to be said that their position enables
them to operate changes with less effort and greater
efficacy. Further, it may be added, that their
corrupt and insolent behaviour inflames the minds
of those who have nothing, with the desire to have;
either for the sake of punishing their adversaries
by despoiling them, or to obtain for themselves a share
of those riches and honours which they see the others
abuse.

Chaptervi.—­Whether it was
possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as
would have composed the Differences between the Commons
and the Senate.

I have spoken above of the effects produced in Rome
by the controversies between the commons and the senate.
Now, as these lasted down to the time of the Gracchi,
when they brought about the overthrow of freedom,
some may think it matter for regret that Rome should
not have achieved the great things she did, without
being torn by such disputes. Wherefore, it seems
to me worth while to consider whether the government
of Rome could ever have been constituted in such a
way as to prevent like controversies.

In making this inquiry we must first look to those
republics which have enjoyed freedom for a great while,
undisturbed by any violent contentions or tumults,
and see what their government was, and whether it
would have been possible to introduce it into Rome.
Of such republics we have an example in ancient times
in Sparta, in modern times in Venice, of both which
States I have already made mention. Sparta created
for herself a government consisting of a king and a
limited senate. Venice has made no distinction
in the titles of her rulers, all qualified to take

Page 21

part in her government being classed under the one
designation of “Gentlemen,” an arrangement
due rather to chance than to the foresight of those
who gave this State its constitution. For many
persons, from causes already noticed, seeking shelter
on these rocks on which Venice now stands, after they
had so multiplied that if they were to continue to
live together it became necessary for them to frame
laws, established a form of government; and assembling
often in their councils to consult for the interests
of their city, when it seemed to them that their numbers
were sufficient for political existence, they closed
the entrance to civil rights against all who came
afterwards to live there, not allowing them to take
any part in the management of affairs. And when
in course of time there came to be many citizens excluded
from the government, to add to the importance of the
governing body, they named these “Gentlemen”
(gentiluomini), the others “Plebeians”
(popolani). And this distinction could
grow up and maintain itself without causing disturbance;
for as at the time of its origin, whosoever then lived
in Venice was made one of the governing body, none
had reason to complain; while those who came to live
there afterwards, finding the government in a completed
form, had neither ground nor opportunity to object.
No ground, because nothing was taken from them; and
no opportunity, because those in authority kept them
under control, and never employed them in affairs
in which they could acquire importance. Besides
which, they who came later to dwell in Venice were
not so numerous as to destroy all proportion between
the governors and the governed; the number of the
“Gentlemen” being as great as, or greater
than that of the “Plebeians.” For
these reasons, therefore, it was possible for Venice
to make her constitution what it is, and to maintain
it without divisions.

Sparta, again, being governed, as I have said, by
a king and a limited senate, was able to maintain
herself for the long period she did, because, from
the country being thinly inhabited and further influx
of population forbidden, and from the laws of Lycurgus
(the observance whereof removed all ground of disturbance)
being held in high esteem, the citizens were able
to continue long in unity. For Lycurgus having
by his laws established in Sparta great equality as
to property, but less equality as to rank, there prevailed
there an equal poverty; and the commons were less
ambitious, because the offices of the State, which
were held to their exclusion, were confined to a few;
and because the nobles never by harsh treatment aroused
in them any desire to usurp these offices. And
this was due to the Spartan kings, who, being appointed
to that dignity for life, and placed in the midst of
this nobility, had no stronger support to their authority
than in defending the people against injustice.
Whence it resulted that as the people neither feared
nor coveted the power which they did not possess, the

Page 22

conflicts which might have arisen between them and
the nobles were escaped, together with the causes
which would have led to them; and in this way they
were able to live long united. But of this unity
in Sparta there were two chief causes: one, the
fewness of its inhabitants, which allowed of their
being governed by a few; the other, that by denying
foreigners admission into their country, the people
had less occasion to become corrupted, and never so
increased in numbers as to prove troublesome to their
few rulers.

Weighing all which circumstances, we see that to have
kept Rome in the same tranquility wherein these republics
were kept, one of two courses must have been followed
by her legislators; for either, like the Venetians,
they must have refrained from employing the commons
in war, or else, like the Spartans, they must have
closed their country to foreigners. Whereas,
in both particulars, they did the opposite, arming
the commons and increasing their number, and thus affording
endless occasions for disorder. And had the Roman
commonwealth grown to be more tranquil, this inconvenience
would have resulted, that it must at the same time
have grown weaker, since the road would have been closed
to that greatness to which it came, for in removing
the causes of her tumults, Rome must have interfered
with the causes of her growth.

And he who looks carefully into the matter will find,
that in all human affairs, we cannot rid ourselves
of one inconvenience without running into another.
So that if you would have your people numerous and
warlike, to the end that with their aid you may establish
a great empire, you will have them of such a sort
as you cannot afterwards control at your pleasure;
while should you keep them few and unwarlike, to the
end that you may govern them easily, you will be unable,
should you extend your dominions, to preserve them,
and will become so contemptible as to be the prey
of any who attack you. For which reason in all
our deliberations we ought to consider where we are
likely to encounter least inconvenience, and accept
that as the course to be preferred, since we shall
never find any line of action entirely free from disadvantage.

Rome might, therefore, following the example of Sparta,
have created a king for life and a senate of limited
numbers, but desiring to become a great empire, she
could not, like Sparta, have restricted the number
of her citizens. So that to have created a king
for life and a limited senate had been of little service
to her.

Were any one, therefore, about to found a wholly new
republic, he would have to consider whether he desired
it to increase as Rome did in territory and dominion,
or to continue within narrow limits. In the former
case he would have to shape its constitution as nearly
as possible on the pattern of the Roman, leaving room
for dissensions and popular tumults, for without a
great and warlike population no republic can ever
increase, or increasing maintain itself. In the

Page 23

second case he might give his republic a constitution
like that of Venice or Sparta; but since extension
is the ruin of such republics, the legislator would
have to provide in every possible way against the State
which he had founded making any additions to its territories.
For these, when superimposed upon a feeble republic,
are sure to be fatal to it: as we see to have
been the case with Sparta and Venice, the former of
which, after subjugating nearly all Greece, on sustaining
a trifling reverse, betrayed the insufficiency of
her foundations, for when, after the revolt of Thebes
under Pelopidas, other cities also rebelled, the Spartan
kingdom was utterly overthrown. Venice in like
manner, after gaining possession of a great portion
of Italy (most of it not by her arms but by her wealth
and subtlety), when her strength was put to the proof,
lost all in one pitched battle.

I can well believe, then, that to found a republic
which shall long endure, the best plan may be to give
it internal institutions like those of Sparta or Venice;
placing it in a naturally strong situation, and so
fortifying it that none can expect to get the better
of it easily, yet, at the same time, not making it
so great as to be formidable to its neighbours; since
by taking these precautions, it might long enjoy its
independence. For there are two causes which lead
to wars being made against a republic; one, your desire
to be its master, the other the fear lest it should
master you; both of which dangers the precaution indicated
will go far to remove. For if, as we are to assume,
this republic be well prepared for defence, and consequently
difficult of attack, it will seldom or never happen
that any one will form the design to attack it, and
while it keeps within its own boundaries, and is seen
from experience not to be influenced by ambition, no
one will be led, out of fear for himself, to make
war upon it, more particularly when its laws and constitution
forbid its extension. And were it possible to
maintain things in this equilibrium, I veritably believe
that herein would be found the true form of political
life, and the true tranquility of a republic.
But all human affairs being in movement, and incapable
of remaining as they are, they must either rise or
fall; and to many conclusions to which we are not
led by reason, we are brought by necessity. So
that when we have given institutions to a State on
the footing that it is to maintain itself without
enlargement, should necessity require its enlargement,
its foundations will be cut from below it, and its
downfall quickly ensue. On the other hand, were
a republic so favoured by Heaven as to lie under no
necessity of making war, the result of this ease would
be to make it effeminate and divided which two evils
together, and each by itself, would insure its ruin.
And since it is impossible, as I believe, to bring
about an equilibrium, or to adhere strictly to the
mean path, we must, in arranging our republic, consider
what is the more honourable course for it to take,
and so contrive that even if necessity compel its
enlargement, it may be able to keep what it gains.

Page 24

But returning to the point first raised, I believe
it necessary for us to follow the method of the Romans
and not that of the other republics, for I know of
no middle way. We must, consequently, put up with
those dissensions which arise between commons and
senate, looking on them as evils which cannot be escaped
if we would arrive at the greatness of Rome.

In connection with the arguments here used to prove
that the authority of the tribunes was essential in
Rome to the guardianship of freedom, we may naturally
go on to show what advantages result to a republic
from the power of impeachment; which, together with
others, was conferred upon the tribunes; a subject
to be noticed in the following Chapter.

CHAPTER VII.—­That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the
Right to accuse.

To those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians
of public freedom, no more useful or necessary authority
can be given than the power to accuse, either before
the people, or before some council or tribunal, those
citizens who in any way have offended against the liberty
of their country.

A law of this kind has two effects most beneficial
to a State: first, that the citizens from
fear of being accused, do not engage in attempts hurtful
to the State, or doing so, are put down at once and
without respect of persons: and next,
that a vent is given for the escape of all those evil
humours which, from whatever cause, gather in cities
against particular citizens; for unless an outlet be
duly provided for these by the laws, they flow into
irregular channels and overwhelm the State. There
is nothing, therefore, which contributes so much to
the stability and permanence of a State, as to take
care that the fermentation of these disturbing humours
be supplied by operation of law with a recognized
outlet. This might be shown by many examples,
but by none so clearly as by that of Coriolanus related
by Livius, where he tells us, that at a time when
the Roman nobles were angry with the plebeians (thinking
that the appointment of tribunes for their protection
had made them too powerful), it happened that Rome
was visited by a grievous famine, to meet which the
senate sent to Sicily for corn. But Coriolanus,
hating the commons, sought to persuade the senate
that now was the time to punish them, and to deprive
them of the authority which they had usurped to the
prejudice of the nobles, by withholding the distribution
of corn, and so suffering them to perish of hunger.
Which advice of his coming to the ears of the people,
kindled them to such fury against him, that they would
have slain him as he left the Senate House, had not
the tribunes cited him to appear and answer before
them to a formal charge.

Page 25

In respect of this incident I repeat what I have just
now said, how useful and necessary it is for republics
to provide by their laws a channel by which the displeasure
of the multitude against a single citizen may find
a vent. For when none such is regularly provided,
recourse will be had to irregular channels, and these
will assuredly lead to much worse results. For
when a citizen is borne down by the operation or the
ordinary laws, even though he be wronged, little or
no disturbance is occasioned to the state: the
injury he suffers not being wrought by private violence,
nor by foreign force, which are the causes of the
overthrow of free institutions, but by public authority
and in accordance with public ordinances, which, having
definite limits set them, are not likely to pass beyond
these so as to endanger the commonwealth. For
proof of which I am content to rest on this old example
of Coriolanus, since all may see what a disaster it
would have been for Rome had he been violently put
to death by the people. For, as between citizen
and citizen, a wrong would have been done affording
ground for fear, fear would have sought defence, defence
have led to faction, faction to divisions in the State,
and these to its ruin. But the matter being taken
up by those whose office it was to deal with it, all
the evils which must have followed had it been left
in private hands were escaped.

In Florence, on the other hand, and in our own days,
we have seen what violent commotions follow when the
people cannot show their displeasure against particular
citizens in a form recognized by the laws, in the
instance of Francesco Valori, at one time looked upon
as the foremost citizen of our republic. But
many thinking him ambitious, and likely from his high
spirit and daring to overstep the limits of civil freedom,
and there being no way to oppose him save by setting
up an adverse faction, the result was, that, apprehending
irregular attacks, he sought to gain partisans for
his support; while his opponents, on their side, having
no course open to them of which the laws approved,
resorted to courses of which the laws did not approve,
and, at last, to open violence. And as his influence
had to be attacked by unlawful methods, these were
attended by injury not to him only, but to many other
noble citizens; whereas, could he have been met by
constitutional restraints, his power might have been
broken without injury to any save himself. I
might also cite from our Florentine history the fall
of Piero Soderini, which had no other cause than there
not being in our republic any law under which powerful
and ambitious citizens can be impeached. For to
form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be
tried, eight judges only are not enough; the judges
must be numerous, because a few will always do the
will of a few. But had there been proper methods
for obtaining redress, either the people would have
impeached Piero if he was guilty, and thus have given

Page 26

vent to their displeasure without calling in the Spanish
army; or if he was innocent, would not have ventured,
through fear of being accused themselves, to have taken
proceedings against him. So that in either case
the bitter spirit which was the cause of all the disorder
would have had an end. Wherefore, when we find
one of the parties in a State calling in a foreign
power, we may safely conclude that it is because the
defective laws of that State provide no escape for
those malignant humours which are natural to men;
which can best be done by arranging for an impeachment
before a sufficient number of judges, and by giving
countenance to this procedure. This was so well
contrived in Rome that in spite of the perpetual struggle
maintained between the commons and the senate, neither
the senate nor the commons, nor any single citizen,
ever sought redress at the hands of a foreign power;
for having a remedy at home, there was no need to
seek one abroad.

Although the examples above cited be proof sufficient
of what I affirm, I desire to adduce one other, recorded
by Titus Livius in his history, where he relates that
a sister of Aruns having been violated by a Lucumo
of Clusium, the chief of the Etruscan towns, Aruns
being unable, from the interest of her ravisher, to
avenge her, betook himself to the Gauls who ruled
in the province we now name Lombardy, and besought
them to come with an armed force to Clusium; showing
them how with advantage to themselves they might avenge
his wrongs. Now, had Aruns seen that he could
have had redress through the laws of his country, he
never would have resorted to these Barbarians for
help.

But as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic,
so calumny, on the other hand, is useless and hurtful,
as in the following Chapter I shall proceed to show.

CHAPTER VIII.—­That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the
power to accuse is useful.

Such were the services rendered to Rome by Furius
Camillus in rescuing her from the oppression of the
Gauls, that no Roman, however high his degree or station,
held it derogatory to yield place to him, save only
Manlius Capitolinus, who could not brook such glory
and distinction being given to another. For he
thought that in saving the Capitol, he had himself
done as much as Camillus to preserve Rome, and that
in respect of his other warlike achievements he was
no whit behind him. So that, bursting with jealousy,
and unable to remain at rest by reason of the other’s
renown, and seeing no way to sow discord among the
Fathers, he set himself to spread abroad sinister
reports among the commons; throwing out, among other
charges, that the treasure collected to be given to
the Gauls, but which, afterwards, was withheld, had
been embezzled by certain citizens, and if recovered
might be turned to public uses in relieving the people
from taxes or from private debts. These assertions

Page 27

so prevailed with the commons that they began to hold
meetings and to raise what tumults they liked throughout
the city. But this displeasing the senate, and
the matter appearing to them grave and dangerous,
they appointed a dictator to inquire into it, and to
restrain the attacks of Manlius. The dictator,
forthwith, caused Manlius to be cited before him;
and these two were thus brought face to face in the
presence of the whole city, the dictator surrounded
by the nobles, and Manlius by the commons. The
latter, being desired to say with whom the treasure
of which he had spoken was to be found, since the senate
were as anxious to know this as the commons, made
no direct reply, but answered evasively that it was
needless to tell them what they already knew.
Whereupon the dictator ordered him to prison.

In this passage we are taught how hateful a thing
is calumny in all free States, as, indeed, in every
society, and how we must neglect no means which may
serve to check it. And there can be no more effectual
means for checking calumny than by affording ample
facilities for impeachment, which is as useful in
a commonwealth as the other is pernicious. And
between them there is this difference, that calumny
needs neither witness, nor circumstantial proof to
establish it, so that any man may be calumniated by
any other; but not impeached; since impeachment demands
that there be substantive charges made, and trustworthy
evidence to support them. Again, it is before
the magistrates, the people, or the courts of justice
that men are impeached; but in the streets and market
places that they are calumniated. Calumny, therefore,
is most rife in that State wherein impeachment is
least practised, and the laws least favour it.
For which reasons the legislator should so shape the
laws of his State that it shall be possible therein
to impeach any of its citizens without fear or favour;
and, after duly providing for this, should visit calumniators
with the sharpest punishments. Those punished
will have no cause to complain, since it was in their
power to have impeached openly where they have secretly
calumniated. Where this is not seen to, grave
disorders will always ensue. For calumnies sting
without disabling; and those who are stung being more
moved by hatred of their detractors than by fear of
the things they say against them, seek revenge.

This matter, as we have said, was well arranged for
in Rome, but has always been badly regulated in our
city of Florence. And as the Roman ordinances
with regard to it were productive of much good, so
the want of them in Florence has bred much mischief.
For any one reading the history of our city may perceive,
how many calumnies have at all times been aimed against
those of its citizens who have taken a leading part
in its affairs. Thus, of one it would be said
that he had plundered the public treasury, of another,
that he had failed in some enterprise because he had
been bribed; of a third, that this or the other disaster

Page 28

had originated in his ambition. Hence hatred sprung
up on every side, and hatred growing to division,
these led to factions, and these again to ruin.
But had there existed in Florence some procedure whereby
citizens might have been impeached, and calumniators
punished, numberless disorders which have taken there
would have been prevented. For citizens who were
impeached, whether condemned or acquitted, would have
had no power to injure the State; and they would have
been impeached far seldomer than they have been calumniated;
for calumny, as I have said already, is an easier
matter than impeachment.

Some, indeed, have made use of calumny as a means
for raising themselves to power, and have found their
advantage in traducing eminent citizens who withstood
their designs; for by taking the part of the people,
and confirming them in their ill-opinion of these
great men, they made them their friends. Of this,
though I could give many instances, I shall content
myself with one. At the siege of Lucca the Florentine
army was commanded by Messer Giovanni Guicciardini,
as its commissary, through whose bad generalship or
ill-fortune the town was not taken. But whatever
the cause of this failure, Messer Giovanni had the
blame; and the rumour ran that he had been bribed
by the people of Lucca. Which calumny being fostered
by his enemies, brought Messer Giovanni to very verge
of despair; and though to clear himself he would willingly
have given himself up to the Captain of Justice he
found he could not, there being no provision in the
laws of the republic which allowed of his doing so.
Hence arose the bitterest hostility between the friends
of Messer Giovanni, who were mostly of the old nobility
(grandi), and those who sought to reform the
government of Florence; and from this and the like
causes, the affair grew to such dimensions as to bring
about the downfall of our republic.

Manlius Capitolinus, then, was a calumniator, not
an accuser; and in their treatment of him the Romans
showed how calumniators should be dealt with; by which
I mean, that they should be forced to become accusers;
and if their accusation be proved true, should be rewarded,
or at least not punished, but if proved false should
be punished as Manlius was.

CHAPTER IX.—­That to give new Institutions
to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old Institutions
on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one
Man.

It may perhaps be thought that I should not have got
so far into the history of Rome, without some mention
of those who gave that city its institutions, and
saying something of these institutions themselves,
so far as they relate to religion and war. As
I have no wish to keep those who would know my views
on these matters in suspense, I say at once, that
to many it might seem of evil omen that the founder
of a civil government like Romulus, should first have
slain his brother, and afterwards have consented to
the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, whom he had

Page 29

chosen to be his colleague in the kingship; since his
countrymen, if moved by ambition and lust of power
to inflict like injuries on any who opposed their
designs, might plead the example of their prince.
This view would be a reasonable one were we to disregard
the object which led Romulus to put those men to death.
But we must take it as a rule to which there are very
few if any exceptions, that no commonwealth or kingdom
ever has salutary institutions given it from the first
or has its institutions recast in an entirely new
mould, unless by a single person. On the contrary,
it must be from one man that it receives its institutions
at first, and upon one man that all similar reconstruction
must depend. For this reason the wise founder
of a commonwealth who seeks to benefit not himself
only, or the line of his descendants, but his State
and country, must endeavour to acquire an absolute
and undivided authority. And none who is wise
will ever blame any action, however extraordinary
and irregular, which serves to lay the foundation
of a kingdom or to establish a republic. For although
the act condemn the doer, the end may justify him;
and when, as in the case of Romulus, the end is good,
it will always excuse the means; since it is he who
does violence with intent to injure, not he who does
it with the design to secure tranquility, who merits
blame. Such a person ought however to be so prudent
and moderate as to avoid transmitting the absolute
authority he acquires, as an inheritance to another;
for as men are, by nature, more prone to evil than
to good, a successor may turn to ambitious ends the
power which his predecessor has used to promote worthy
ends. Moreover, though it be one man that must
give a State its institutions, once given they are
not so likely to last long resting for support on
the shoulders of one man only, as when entrusted to
the care of many, and when it is the business of many
to maintain them. For though the multitude be
unfit to set a State in order, since they cannot,
by reason of the divisions which prevail among them,
agree wherein the true well-being of the State lies,
yet when they have once been taught the truth, they
never will consent to abandon it. And that Romulus,
though he put his brother to death, is yet of those
who are to be pardoned, since what he did was done
for the common good and not from personal ambition,
is shown by his at once creating a senate, with whom
he took counsel, and in accordance with whose voice
he determined. And whosoever shall well examine
the authority which Romulus reserved to himself, will
find that he reserved nothing beyond the command of
the army when war was resolved on, and the right to
assemble the senate. This is seen later, on Rome
becoming free by the expulsion of the Tarquins, when
the Romans altered none of their ancient institutions
save in appointing two consuls for a year instead of
a king for life; for this proves that all the original
institutions of that city were more in conformity
with a free and constitutional government, than with
an absolute and despotic one.

Page 30

In support of what has been said above, I might cite
innumerable instances, as of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon,
and other founders of kingdoms and commonwealths,
who, from the full powers given them, were enabled
to shape their laws to the public advantage; but passing
over these examples, as of common notoriety, I take
one, not indeed so famous, but which merits the attention
of all who desire to frame wise laws. Agis, King
of Sparta, desiring to bring back his countrymen to
those limits within which the laws of Lycurgus had
held them, because he thought that, from having somewhat
deviated from them, his city had lost much of its
ancient virtue and, consequently much of its strength
and power, was, at the very outset of his attempts,
slain by the Spartan Ephori, as one who sought to
make himself a tyrant. But Cleomenes coming after
him in the kingdom, and, on reading the notes and
writings which he found of Agis wherein his designs
and intentions were explained, being stirred by the
same desire, perceived that he could not confer this
benefit on his country unless he obtained sole power.
For he saw that the ambition of others made it impossible
for him to do what was useful for many against the
will of a few. Wherefore, finding fit occasion,
he caused the Ephori and all others likely to throw
obstacles in his way, to be put to death; after which,
he completely renewed the laws of Lycurgus. And
the result of his measures would have been to give
fresh life to Sparta, and to gain for himself a renown
not inferior to that of Lycurgus, had it not been
for the power of the Macedonians and the weakness of
the other Greek States. For while engaged with
these reforms, he was attacked by the Macedonians,
and being by himself no match for them, and having
none to whom he could turn for help, he was overpowered;
and his plans, though wise and praiseworthy, were
never brought to perfection.

All which circumstances considered, I conclude that
he who gives new institutions to a State must stand
alone; and that for the deaths of Remus and Tatius,
Romulus is to be excused rather than blamed.

CHAPTER X.—­That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or
Commonwealth merits Praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves Blame.

Of all who are praised they are praised the most,
who are the authors and founders of religions.
After whom come the founders of kingdoms and commonwealths.
Next to these, they have the greatest name who as
commanders of armies have added to their own dominions
or those of their country. After these, again,
are ranked men of letters, who being of various shades
of merit are celebrated each in his degree. To
all others, whose number is infinite, is ascribed
that measure of praise to which his profession or
occupation entitles him. And, conversely, all
who contribute to the overthrow of religion, or to
the ruin of kingdoms and commonwealths, all who are
foes to letters and to the arts which confer honour
and benefit on the human race (among whom I reckon
the impious, the cruel, the ignorant, the indolent,
the base and the worthless), are held in infamy and
detestation.

Page 31

No one, whether he be wise or foolish, bad or good,
if asked to choose between these two kinds of men,
will ever be found to withhold praise from what deserves
praise, or blame from what is to be blamed. And
yet almost all, deceived by a false good and a false
glory, allow themselves either ignorantly or wilfully
to follow in the footsteps such as deserve blame rather
than praise; and, have it in their power to establish,
to their lasting renown, a commonwealth or kingdom,
turn aside to create a tyranny without a thought how
much they thereby lose in name, fame, security, tranquility,
and peace of mind; and in name how much infamy, scorn,
danger, and disquiet they are? But were they to
read history, and turn to profit the lessons of the
past, it seems impossible that those living in a republic
as private citizens, should not prefer their native
city, to play the part of Scipio rather of Caesar;
or that those who by good fortune or merit have risen
to be rulers, should not seek rather to resemble Agesilaus,
Timoleon, and Dion, than to Nabis, Phalaris and Dionysius;
since they would see how the latter are loaded with
infamy, while the former have been extolled beyond
bounds. They would see, too, how Timoleon and
others like him, had as great authority in their country
as Dionysius or Phalaris in theirs, while enjoying
far greater security. Nor let any one finding
Caesar celebrated by a crowd of writers, be misled
by his glory; for those who praise him have been corrupted
by good fortune, and overawed by the greatness of that
empire which, being governed in his name, would not
suffer any to speak their minds openly concerning
him. But let him who desires to know how historians
would have written of Caesar had they been free to
declare their thoughts mark what they say of Catiline,
than whom Caesar is more hateful, in proportion as
he who does is more to be condemned than he who only
desires to do evil. Let him see also what praises
they lavish upon Brutus, because being unable, out
of respect for his power, to reproach Caesar, they
magnify his enemy. And if he who has become prince
in any State will but reflect, how, after Rome was
made an empire, far greater praise was earned those
emperors who lived within the laws, and worthily,
than by those who lived in the contrary way, he will
see that Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus
and Marcus had no need of praetorian cohorts, or of
countless legions to guard them, but were defended
by their own good lives, the good-will of their subjects,
and the attachment of the senate. In like manner
he will perceive in the case of Caligula, Nero, Vitellius,
and ever so many more of those evil emperors, that
all the armies of the east and of the west were of
no avail to protect them from the enemies whom their
bad and depraved lives raised up against them.
And were the history of these emperors rightly studied,
it would be a sufficient lesson to any prince how to
distinguish the paths which lead to honour and safety

Page 32

from those which end in shame and insecurity.
For of the twenty-six emperors from Caesar to Maximinus,
sixteen came to a violent, ten only to a natural death;
and though one or two of those who died by violence
may have been good princes, as Galba or Pertinax,
they met their fate in consequence of that corruption
which their predecessors had left behind in the army.
And if among those who died a natural death, there
be found some bad emperors, like Severus, it is to
be ascribed to their signal good fortune and to their
great abilities, advantages seldom found united in
the same man. From the study this history we may
also learn how a good government is to be established;
for while all the emperors who succeeded to the throne
by birth, except Titus, were bad, all were good who
succeeded by adoption; as in the case of the five from
Nerva to Marcus. But so soon as the empire fell
once more to the heirs by birth, its ruin recommenced.

Let a prince therefore look to that period which extends
from Nerva to Marcus, and contrast it with that which
went before and that which came after, and then let
him say in which of them he would wish to have been
born or to have reigned. For during these times
in which good men governed, he will see the prince
secure in the midst of happy subjects, and the whole
world filled with peace and justice. He will find
the senate maintaining its authority, the magistrates
enjoying their honours, rich citizens their wealth,
rank and merit held in respect, ease and content everywhere
prevailing, rancour, licence corruption and ambition
everywhere quenched, and that golden age restored in
which every one might hold and support what opinions
he pleased. He will see, in short, the world
triumphing, the sovereign honoured and revered, the
people animated with love, and rejoicing in their security.
But should he turn to examine the times of the other
emperors, he will find them wasted by battles, torn
by seditions, cruel alike in war and peace; many princes
perishing by the sword; many wars foreign and domestic;
Italy overwhelmed with unheard-of disasters; her towns
destroyed and plundered; Rome burned; the Capitol
razed to the ground by Roman citizens; the ancient
temples desolated; the ceremonies of religion corrupted;
the cities rank with adultery; the seas covered with
exiles and the islands polluted with blood. He
will see outrage follow outrage; rank, riches, honours,
and, above all, virtue imputed as mortal crimes; informers
rewarded; slaves bribed to betray their masters, freedmen
their patrons, and those who were without enemies brought
to destruction by their friends; and then he will
know the true nature of the debt which Rome, Italy,
and the world owe to Caesar; and if he possess a spark
of human feeling, will turn from the example of those
evil times, and kindle with a consuming passion to
imitate those which were good.

Page 33

And in truth the prince who seeks for worldly glory
should desire to be the ruler of a corrupt city; not
that, like Caesar, he may destroy it, but that, like
Romulus, he may restore it; since man cannot hope
for, nor Heaven offer any better opportunity of fame.
Were it indeed necessary in giving a constitution
to a State to forfeit its sovereignty, the prince
who, to retain his station, should withhold a constitution,
might plead excuse; but for him who in giving a constitution
can still retain his sovereignty, no excuse is to be
made.

Let those therefore to whom Heaven has afforded this
opportunity, remember that two courses lie open to
them; one which will render them secure while they
live and glorious when they die; another which exposes
them to continual difficulties in life, and condemns
them to eternal infamy after death.

CHAPTER XI.—­Of the Religion of the Romans.

Though Rome had Romulus for her first founder, and
as a daughter owed him her being and nurture, nevertheless,
when the institutions of Romulus were seen by Heaven
to be insufficient for so great a State, the Roman
senate were moved to choose Numa Pompilius as his successor,
that he might look to all matters which Romulus had
neglected. He finding the people fierce and turbulent,
and desiring with the help of the peaceful arts to
bring them to order and obedience, called in the aid
of religion as essential to the maintenance of civil
society, and gave it such a form, that for many ages
God was nowhere so much feared as in that republic.
The effect of this was to render easy any enterprise
in which the senate or great men of Rome thought fit
to engage. And whosoever pays heed to an infinity
of actions performed, sometimes by the Roman people
collectively, often by single citizens, will see, that
esteeming the power of God beyond that of man, they
dreaded far more to violate their oath than to transgress
the laws; as is clearly shown by the examples of Scipio
and of Manlius Torquatus. For after the defeat
of the Romans by Hannibal at Cannae, many citizens
meeting together, resolved, in their terror and dismay,
to abandon Italy and seek refuge in Sicily. But
Scipio, getting word of this, went among them, and
menacing them with his naked sword, made them swear
never to abandon their country. Again, when Lucius
Manlius was accused by the tribune Marcus Pomponius,
before the day fixed for trial, Titus Manlius, afterwards
named Torquatus, son to Lucius, went to seek this
Marcus, and threatening him with death if he did not
withdraw the charge against his father, compelled
him to swear compliance; and he, through fear, having
sworn, kept his oath. In the first of these two
instances, therefore, citizens whom love of their
country and its laws could not have retained in Italy,
were kept there by the oath forced upon them; and in
the second, the tribune Marcus, to keep his oath,
laid aside the hatred he bore the father, and overlooked
the injury done him by the son, and his own dishonour.
And this from no other cause than the religion which
Numa had impressed upon this city.

Page 34

And it will be plain to any one who carefully studies
Roman History, how much religion helped in disciplining
the army, in uniting the people, in keeping good men
good, and putting bad men to shame; so that had it
to be decided to which prince, Romulus or Numa, Rome
owed the greater debt, I think the balance must turn
in favour of Numa; for when religion is once established
you may readily bring in arms; but where you have arms
without religion it is not easy afterwards to bring
in religion. We see, too, that while Romulus
in order to create a senate, and to establish his
other ordinances civil and military, needed no support
from Divine authority, this was very necessary to
Numa, who feigned to have intercourse with a Nymph
by whose advice he was guided in counselling the people.
And this, because desiring to introduce in Rome new
and untried institutions, he feared that his own authority
might not effect his end. Nor, indeed, has any
attempt ever been made to introduce unusual laws among
a people, without resorting to Divine authority, since
without such sanction they never would have been accepted.
For the wise recognize many things to be good which
do not bear such reasons on the face of them as command
their acceptance by others; wherefore, wise men who
would obviate these difficulties, have recourse to
Divine aid. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, and
thus have done many besides who have had the same
end in view.

The Romans, accordingly, admiring the prudence and
virtues of Numa, assented to all the measures which
he recommended. This, however, is to be said,
that the circumstance of these times being deeply tinctured
with religious feeling, and of the men with whom he
had to deal being rude and ignorant, gave Numa better
facility to carry out his plans, as enabling him to
mould his subjects readily to any new impression.
And, doubtless, he who should seek at the present day
to form a new commonwealth, would find the task easier
among a race of simple mountaineers, than among the
dwellers in cities where society is corrupt; as the
sculptor can more easily carve a fair statue from a
rough block, than from the block which has been badly
shaped out by another. But taking all this into
account, I maintain that the religion introduced by
Numa was one of the chief causes of the prosperity
of Rome, since it gave rise to good ordinances, which
in turn brought with them good fortune, and with good
fortune, happy issues to whatsoever was undertaken.

And as the observance of the ordinances of religion
is the cause of the greatness of a State, so their
neglect is the occasion of its decline; since a kingdom
without the fear of God must either fall to pieces,
or must be maintained by the fear of some prince who
supplies that influence not supplied by religion.
But since the lives of princes are short, the life
of this prince, also, and with it his influence, must
soon come to an end; whence it happens that a kingdom
which rests wholly on the qualities of its prince,
lasts for a brief time only; because these qualities,
terminating with his life, are rarely renewed in his
successor. For as Dante wisely says:—­

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“Seldom through the boughs doth
human worth renew itself; for such the will of Him
who gives it, that to Him we may ascribe it."[1]

It follows, therefore, that the safety of a commonwealth
or kingdom lies, not in its having a ruler who governs
it prudently while he lives, but in having one who
so orders things, that when he dies, the State may
still maintain itself. And though it be easier
to impose new institutions or a new faith on rude
and simple men, it is not therefore impossible to
persuade their adoption by men who are civilized, and
who do not think themselves rude. The people of
Florence do not esteem themselves rude or ignorant,
and yet were persuaded by the Friar Girolamo Savonarola
that he spoke with God. Whether in this he said
truth or no, I take not on me to pronounce, since of
so great a man we must speak with reverence; but this
I do say, that very many believed him without having
witnessed anything extraordinary to warrant their
belief; his life, his doctrines, the matter whereof
he treated, being sufficient to enlist their faith.

Let no man, therefore, lose heart from thinking that
he cannot do what others have done before him; for,
as I said in my Preface, men are born, and live, and
die, always in accordance with the same rules.

CHAPTER XII.—­That it is of much moment
to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through
the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been
ruined.

Princes and commonwealths that would save themselves
from growing corrupted, should before all things keep
uncorrupted the rites and ceremonies of religion,
and always hold them in reverence; since we can have
no surer sign of the decay of a province than to see
Divine worship held therein in contempt. This
is easily understood when it is seen on what foundation
that religion rests in which a man is born. For
every religion has its root in certain fundamental
ordinances peculiar to itself.

The religion of the Gentiles had its beginning in
the responses of the oracles and in the prognostics
of the augurs and soothsayers. All their other
ceremonies and observances depended upon these; because
men naturally believed that the God who could forecast
their future weal or woe, could also bring them to
pass. Wherefore the temples, the prayers, the
sacrifices, and all the other rites of their worship,
had their origin in this, that the oracles of Delos,
of Dodona, and others celebrated in antiquity, held
the world admiring and devout. But, afterwards,
when these oracles began to shape their answers to
suit the interests of powerful men, and their impostures
to be seen through by the multitude, men grew incredulous
and ready to overturn every sacred institution.
For which reason, the rulers of kingdoms and commonwealths
should maintain the foundations of the faith which

Page 36

they hold; since thus it will be easy for them to
keep their country religious, and, consequently, virtuous
and united. To which end they should countenance
and further whatsoever tells in favour of religion,
even should they think it untrue; and the wiser they
are, and the better they are acquainted with natural
causes, the more ought they to do so. It is from
this course having been followed by the wise, that
the miracles celebrated even in false religions, have
come to be held in repute; for from whatever source
they spring, discreet men will extol them, whose authority
afterwards gives them currency everywhere.

These miracles were common enough in Rome, and among
others this was believed, that when the Roman soldiers
were sacking the city of Veii, certain of them entered
the temple of Juno and spoke to the statue of the
goddess, saying, “Wilt thou come with us to
Rome?” when to some it seemed that she inclined
her head in assent, and to others that they heard
her answer, “Yea.” For these
men being filled with religious awe (which Titus Livius
shows us by the circumstance that, in entering the
temple, they entered devoutly, reverently, and without
tumult), persuaded themselves they heard that answer
to their question, which, perhaps, they had formed
beforehand in their minds. But their faith and
belief were wholly approved of and confirmed by Camillus
and by the other chief men of the city.

Had religion been maintained among the princes of
Christendom on the footing on which it was established
by its Founder, the Christian States and republics
had been far more united and far more prosperous than
they now are; nor can we have surer proof of its decay
than in witnessing how those countries which are the
nearest neighbours of the Roman Church, the head of
our faith, have less devoutness than any others; so
that any one who considers its earliest beginnings
and observes how widely different is its present practice,
might well believe its ruin or its chastisement to
be close at hand.

But since some are of opinion that the welfare of
Italy depends upon the Church of Rome, I desire to
put forward certain arguments which occur to me against
that view, and shall adduce two very strong ones, which,
to my mind, admit of no answer. The first is,
that, through the ill example of the Roman Court,
the country has lost all religious feeling and devoutness,
a loss which draws after it infinite mischiefs and
disorders; for as the presence of religion implies
every excellence, so the contrary is involved in its
absence. To the Church, therefore, and to the
priests, we Italians owe this first debt, that through
them we have become wicked and irreligious. And
a still greater debt we owe them for what is the immediate
cause of our ruin, namely, that by the Church our
country is kept divided. For no country was ever
united or prosperous which did not yield obedience
to some one prince or commonwealth, as has been the

Page 37

case with France and Spain. And the Church is
the sole cause why Italy stands on a different footing,
and is subject to no one king or commonwealth.
For though she holds here her seat, and exerts her
temporal authority, she has never yet gained strength
and courage to seize upon the entire country, or make
herself supreme; yet never has been so weak that when
in fear of losing her temporal dominion, she could
not call in some foreign potentate to aid her against
any Italian State by which she was overmatched.
Of which we find many instances, both in early times,
as when by the intervention of Charles the Great she
drove the Lombards, who had made themselves masters
of nearly the whole country, out of Italy; and also
in recent times, as when, with the help of France,
she first stripped the Venetians of their territories,
and then, with the help of the Swiss, expelled the
French.

The Church, therefore, never being powerful enough
herself to take possession of the entire country,
while, at the same time, preventing any one else from
doing so, has made it impossible to bring Italy under
one head; and has been the cause of her always living
subject to many princes or rulers, by whom she has
been brought to such division and weakness as to have
become a prey, not to Barbarian kings only, but to
any who have thought fit to attack her. For this,
I say, we Italians have none to thank but the Church.
And were any man powerful enough to transplant the
Court of Rome, with all the authority it now wields
over the rest of Italy, into the territories of the
Swiss (the only people who at this day, both as regards
religion and military discipline, live like the ancients,)
he would have clear proof of the truth of what I affirm,
and would find that the corrupt manners of that Court
had, in a little while, wrought greater mischief in
these territories than any other disaster which could
ever befall them.

CHAPTER XIII.—­Of the use the Romans
made of Religion in giving Institutions to their City,
in carrying out their Enterprises, and in quelling
Tumults.

Here it seems to me not out of place to cite instances
of the Romans seeking assistance from religion in
reforming their institutions and in carrying out their
warlike designs. And although many such are related
by Titus Livius, I content myself with mentioning the
following only: The Romans having appointed tribunes
with consular powers, all of them, save one, plebeians,
it so chanced that in that very year they were visited
by plague and famine, accompanied by many strange portents.
Taking occasion from this, the nobles, at the next
creation of tribunes, gave out that the gods were
angry with Rome for lowering the majesty of her government,
nor could be appeased but by the choice of tribunes
being restored to a fair footing. Whereupon the
people, smitten with religious awe, chose all the
tribunes from the nobles. Again, at the siege
of Veii, we find the Roman commanders making use of

Page 38

religion to keep the minds of their men well disposed
towards that enterprise. For when, in the last
year of the siege, the soldiers, disgusted with their
protracted service, began to clamour to be led back
to Rome, on the Alban lake suddenly rising to an uncommon
height, it was found that the oracles at Delphi and
elsewhere had foretold that Veii should fall that
year in which the Alban lake overflowed. The hope
of near victory thus excited in the minds of the soldiers,
led them to put up with the weariness of the war,
and to continue in arms; until, on Camillus being
named dictator, Veii was taken after a ten years’
siege. In these cases, therefore, we see religion,
wisely used, assist in the reduction of this city,
and in restoring the tribuneship to the nobles; neither
of which ends could well have been effected without
it.

One other example bearing on the same subject I must
not omit. Constant disturbances were occasioned
in Rome by the tribune Terentillus, who, for reasons
to be noticed in their place, sought to pass a certain
law. The nobles, in their efforts to baffle him,
had recourse to religion, which they sought to turn
to account in two ways. For first they caused
the Sibylline books to be searched, and a feigned answer
returned, that in that year the city ran great risk
of losing its freedom through civil discord; which
fraud, although exposed by the tribunes, nevertheless
aroused such alarm in the minds of the commons that
they slackened in their support of their leaders.
Their other contrivance was as follows: A certain
Appius Herdonius, at the head of a band of slaves and
outlaws, to the lumber of four thousand, having seized
the Capitol by night, an alarm was spread that were
the Equians and Volscians, those perpetual enemies
of the Roman name, then to attack the city, they might
succeed in taking it. And when, in spite of this,
the tribunes stubbornly persisted in their efforts
to pass the law, declaring the act of Herdonius to
be a device of the nobles and no real danger.
Publius Rubetius, a citizen of weight and authority,
came forth from the Senate House, and in words partly
friendly and partly menacing, showed them the peril
in which the city stood, and that their demands were
unseasonable; and spoke to such effect that the commons
bound themselves by oath to stand by the consul; in
fulfilment of which engagement they aided the consul,
Publius Valerius, to carry the Capitol by assault.
But Valerius being slain in the attack, Titus Quintius
was at once appointed in his place, who, to leave
the people no breathing time, nor suffer their thoughts
to revert to the Terentillian law, ordered them to
quit Rome and march against the Volscians; declaring
them bound to follow him by virtue of the oath they
had sworn not to desert the consul. And though
the tribunes withstood him, contending that the oath
had been sworn to the dead consul and not to Quintius,
yet the people under the influence of religious awe,

Page 39

chose rather to obey the consul than believe the tribunes.
And Titus Livius commends their behaviour when he says:
“That neglect of the gods which now prevails,
had not then made its way nor was it then the practice
for every man to interpret his oath, or the laws,
to suit his private ends.” The tribunes
accordingly, fearing to lose their entire ascendency,
consented to obey the consul, and to refrain for a
year from moving in the matter of the Terentillian
law; while the consuls, on their part, undertook that
for a year the commons should not be called forth
to war. And thus, with the help of religion,
the senate were able to overcome a difficulty which
they never could have overcome without it.

CHAPTER XIV.—­That the Romans interpreted
the Auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent
show of observing the Rites of Religion even when
forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted
Religion they punished.

Auguries were not only, as we have shown above, a
main foundation of the old religion of the Gentiles,
but were also the cause of the prosperity of the Roman
commonwealth. Accordingly, the Romans gave more
heed to these than to any other of their observances;
resorting to them in their consular comitia; in undertaking
new enterprises; in calling out their armies; in going
into battle; and, in short, in every business of importance,
whether civil or military. Nor would they ever
set forth on any warlike expedition, until they had
satisfied their soldiers that the gods had promised
them victory.

Among other means of declaring the auguries, they
had in their armies a class of soothsayers, named
by them pullarii, whom, when they desired to
give battle, they would ask to take the auspices, which
they did by observing the behaviour of fowls.
If the fowls pecked, the engagement was begun with
a favourable omen. If they refused, battle was
declined. Nevertheless, when it was plain on
the face of it that a certain course had to be taken,
they take it at all hazards, even though the auspices
were adverse; contriving, however, to manage matters
so adroitly as not to appear to throw any slight on
religion; as was done by the consul Papirius in the
great battle he fought with the Samnites wherein that
nation was finally broken and overthrown. For
Papirius being encamped over against the Samnites,
and perceiving that he fought, victory was certain,
and consequently being eager to engage, desired the
omens to be taken. The fowls refused to peck;
but the chief soothsayer observing the eagerness of
the soldiers to fight and the confidence felt both
by them and by their captain, not to deprive the army
of such an opportunity of glory, reported to the consul
that the auspices were favourable. Whereupon
Papirius began to array his army for battle. But
some among the soothsayers having divulged to certain
of the soldiers that the fowls had not pecked, this
was told to Spurius Papirius, the nephew of the consul,

Page 40

who reporting it to his uncle, the latter straightway
bade him mind his own business, for that so far as
he himself and the army were concerned, the auspices
were fair; and if the soothsayer had lied, the consequences
were on his head. And that the event might accord
with the prognostics, he commanded his officers to
place the soothsayers in front of the battle.
It so chanced that as they advanced against the enemy,
the chief soothsayer was killed by a spear thrown by
a Roman soldier; which, the consul hearing of, said,
“All goes well, and as the Gods would have
it, for by the death of this liar the army is purged
of blame and absolved from whatever displeasure these
may have conceived against it.” And
contriving, in this way to make his designs tally
with the auspices, he joined battle, without the army
knowing that the ordinances of religion had in any
degree been disregarded.

But an opposite course was taken by Appius Pulcher,
in Sicily, in the first Carthaginian war. For
desiring to join battle, he bade the soothsayers take
the auspices, and on their announcing that the fowls
refused to feed, he answered, “Let us see,
then, whether they will drink,” and, so
saying, caused them to be thrown into the sea.
After which he fought and was defeated. For this
he was condemned at Rome, while Papirius was honoured;
not so much because the one had gained while the other
had lost a battle, as because in their treatment of
the auspices the one had behaved discreetly, the other
with rashness. And, in truth, the sole object
of this system of taking the auspices was to insure
the army joining battle with that confidence of success
which constantly leads to victory; a device followed
not by the Romans only, but by foreign nations as
well; of which I shall give an example in the following
Chapter.

CHAPTER XV.—­How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken
Fortunes, had recourse to Religion.

The Samnites, who before had met with many defeats
at the hands of the Romans, were at last decisively
routed by them in Etruria, where their armies were
cut to pieces and their commanders slain. And
because their allies also, such as the Etruscans,
the Umbrians, and the Gauls, were likewise vanquished,
they “could now no longer” as Livius
tells us, “either trust to their own strength
or to foreign aid; yet, for all that, would not cease
from hostilities, nor resign themselves to forfeit
the liberty which they had unsuccessfully defended,
preferring new defeats to an inglorious submission._”
They resolved, therefore, to make a final effort;
and as they knew that victory was only to be secured
by inspiring their soldiers with a stubborn courage,
to which end nothing could help so much as religion,
at the instance of their high priest, Ovius Paccius,
they revived an ancient sacrificial rite performed
by them in the manner following. After offering

Page 41

solemn sacrifice they caused all the captains of their
armies, standing between the slain victims and the
smoking altars, to swear never to abandon the war.
They then summoned the common soldiers, one by one,
and before the same altars, and surrounded by a ring
of many centurions with drawn swords, first bound
them by oath never to reveal what they might see or
hear; and then, after imprecating the Divine wrath,
and reciting the most terrible incantations, made
them vow and swear to the gods, as they would not
have a curse light on their race and offspring, to
follow wherever their captains led, never to turn
back from battle, and to put any they saw turn back
to death. Some who in their terror declined to
swear, were forthwith slain by the centurions.
The rest, warned by their cruel fate, complied.
Assembling thereafter to the number of forty thousand,
one-half of whom, to render their appearance of unusual
splendour were clad in white, with plumes and crests
over their helmets, they took up their ground in the
neighbourhood of Aquilonia. But Papirius, being
sent against them, bade his soldiers be of good cheer,
telling them “that feathers made no wounds,
and that a Roman spear would pierce a painted shield;”
and to lessen the effect which the oath taken by the
Samnites had upon the minds of the Romans, he said
that such an oath must rather distract than strengthen
those bound by it, since they had to fear, at once,
their enemies, their comrades, and their Gods.
In the battle which ensued, the Samnites were routed,
any firmness lent them by religion or by the oath
they had sworn, being balanced by the Roman valour,
and the terror inspired by past defeats. Still
we see that, in their own judgment, they had no other
refuge to which to turn, nor other remedy for restoring
their broken hopes; and this is strong testimony to
the spirit which religion rightly used can arouse.

Some of the incidents which I have now been considering
may be thought to relate rather to the foreign than
to the domestic affairs of Rome, which last alone
form the proper subject of this Book; nevertheless
since the matter connects itself with one of the most
important institutions of the Roman republic, I have
thought it convenient to notice it here, so as not
to divide the subject and be obliged to return to
it hereafter.

CHAPTER XVI.—­That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by
any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that Freedom.

Should a people accustomed to live under a prince
by any accident become free, as did the Romans on
the expulsion of the Tarquins, we know from numberless
instances recorded in ancient history, how hard it
will be for it to maintain that freedom. And
this is no more than we might expect. For a people
in such circumstances may be likened to the wild animal
which, though destined by nature to roam at large in
the woods, has been reared in the cage and in constant

Page 42

confinement and which, should it chance to be set
free in the open country, being unused to find its
own food, and unfamiliar with the coverts where it
might lie concealed, falls a prey to the first who
seeks to recapture it. Even thus it fares with
the people which has been accustomed to be governed
by others; since ignorant how to act by itself either
for attack or defence, and neither knowing foreign
princes nor being known of them, it is speedily brought
back under the yoke, and often under a heavier yoke
than that from which it has just freed its neck.
These difficulties will be met with, even where the
great body of the citizens has not become wholly corrupted;
but where the corruption is complete, freedom, as
shall presently be shown, is not merely fleeting but
impossible. Wherefore my remarks are to be taken
as applying to those States only wherein corruption
has as yet made no great progress, and in which there
is more that is sound than unsound.

To the difficulties above noticed, another has to
be added, which is, that a State in becoming free
makes for itself bitter enemies but not warm friends.
All become its bitter enemies who, drawing their support
from the wealth of the tyrant, flourished under his
government. For these men, when the causes which
made them powerful are withdrawn, can no longer live
contented, but are one and all impelled to attempt
the restoration of the tyranny in hopes of regaining
their former importance. On the other hand, as
I have said, the State which becomes free does not
gain for itself warm friends. For a free government
bestows its honours and rewards in accordance with
certain fixed rules, and on considerations of merit,
without which none is honoured or rewarded. But
when a man obtains only those honours or rewards which
he seems to himself to deserve, he will never admit
that he is under any obligation to those who bestow
them. Moreover the common benefits that all derive
from a free government, which consist in the power
to enjoy what is our own, openly and undisturbed,
in having to feel no anxiety for the honour of wife
or child, nor any fear for personal safety, are hardly
recognized by men while they still possess them, since
none will ever confess obligation to him who merely
refrains from injury. For these reasons, I repeat,
a State which has recently become free, is likely
to have bitter enemies and no warm friends.

Now, to meet these difficulties and their attendant
disorders, there is no more potent, effectual, wholesome,
and necessary remedy than to slay the sons of Brutus.
They, as the historian tells us, were along with other
young Romans led to conspire against their country,
simply because the unusual privileges which they had
enjoyed under the kings, were withheld under the consuls;
so that to them it seemed as though the freedom of
the people implied their servitude. Any one, therefore,
who undertakes to control a people, either as their
prince or as the head of a commonwealth, and does

Page 43

not make sure work with all who are hostile to his
new institutions, founds a government which cannot
last long. Undoubtedly those princes are to be
reckoned unhappy, who, to secure their position, are
forced to advance by unusual and irregular paths,
and with the people for their enemies. For while
he who has to deal with a few adversaries only, can
easily and without much or serious difficulty secure
himself, he who has an entire people against him can
never feel safe and the greater the severity he uses
the weaker his authority becomes; so that his best
course is to strive to make the people his friends.

But since these views may seem to conflict with what
I have said above, treating there of a republic and
here of a prince, that I may not have to return to
the subject again, I will in this place discuss it
briefly. Speaking, then of those princes who
have become the tyrants of their country, I say that
the prince who seeks to gain over an unfriendly people
should first of all examine what it is the people really
desire, and he will always find that they desire two
things: first, to be revenged upon those who
are the cause of their servitude; and second, to regain
their freedom. The first of these desires the
prince can gratify wholly, the second in part.
As regards the former, we have an instance exactly
in point. Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, being
in exile, it so happened that on a feud arising between
the commons and the nobles of that city, the latter,
perceiving they were weaker than their adversaries,
began to look with favour on Clearchus, and conspiring
with him, in opposition to the popular voice recalled
him to Heraclea and deprived the people of their freedom.
Clearchus finding himself thus placed between the
arrogance of the nobles, whom he could in no way either
satisfy or correct, and the fury of the people, who
could not put up with the loss of their freedom, resolved
to rid himself at a stroke from the harassment of
the nobles and recommend himself to the people.
Wherefore, watching his opportunity, he caused all
the nobles to be put to death, and thus, to the extreme
delight of the people, satisfied one of those desires
by which they are possessed, namely, the desire for
vengeance.

As for the other desire of the people, namely, to
recover their freedom, the prince, since he never
can content them in this, should examine what the
causes are which make them long to be free; and he
will find a very few of them desiring freedom that
they may obtain power, but all the rest, whose number
is countless, only desiring it that they may live
securely. For in all republics, whatever the form
of their government, barely forty or fifty citizens
have any place in the direction of affairs; who, from
their number being so small, can easily be reckoned
with, either by making away with them, or by allowing
them such a share of honours as, looking to their
position, may reasonably content them. All those
others whose sole aim it is to live safely, are well

Page 44

contented where the prince enacts such laws and ordinances
as provide for the general security, while they establish
his own authority; and when he does this, and the
people see that nothing induces him to violate these
laws, they soon begin to live happily and without anxiety.
Of this we have an example in the kingdom of France,
which enjoys perfect security from this cause alone,
that its kings are bound to compliance with an infinity
of laws upon which the well-being of the whole people
depends. And he who gave this State its constitution
allowed its kings to do as they pleased as regards
arms and money; but provided that as regards everything
else they should not interfere save as the laws might
direct. Those rulers, therefore, who omit to
provide sufficiently for the safety of their government
at the outset, must, like the Romans, do so on the
first occasion which offers; and whoever lets the occasion
slip, will repent too late of not having acted as
he should. The Romans, however, being still uncorrupted
at the time when they recovered their freedom, were
able, after slaying the sons of Brutus and getting
rid of the Tarquins, to maintain it with all those
safeguards and remedies which we have elsewhere considered.
But had they already become corrupted, no remedy could
have been found, either in Rome or out of it, by which
their freedom could have been secured; as I shall show
in the following Chapter.

I believe that if her kings had not been expelled,
Rome must very soon have become a weak and inconsiderable
State. For seeing to what a pitch of corruption
these kings had come, we may conjecture that if two
or three more like reigns had followed, and the taint
spread from the head to the members, so soon as the
latter became infected, cure would have been hopeless.
But from the head being removed while the trunk was
still sound, it was not difficult for the Romans to
return to a free and constitutional government.

It may be assumed, however, as most certain, that
a corrupted city living under a prince can never recover
its freedom, even were the prince and all his line
to be exterminated. For in such a city it must
necessarily happen that one prince will be replaced
by another, and that things will never settle down
until a new lord be established; unless, indeed, the
combined goodness and valour of some one citizen should
maintain freedom, which, even then, will endure only
for his lifetime; as happened twice in Syracuse, first
under the rule of Dion, and again under that of Timoleon,
whose virtues while they lived kept their city free,
but on whose death it fell once more under a tyranny.

Page 45

But the strongest example that can be given is that
of Rome, which on the expulsion of the Tarquins was
able at once to seize on liberty and to maintain it;
yet, on the deaths of Caesar, Caligula, and Nero, and
on the extinction of the Julian line, was not only
unable to establish her freedom, but did not even
venture a step in that direction. Results so
opposite arising in one and the same city can only
be accounted for by this, that in the time of the
Tarquins the Roman people were not yet corrupted,
but in these later times had become utterly corrupt.
For on the first occasion, nothing more was needed
to prepare and determine them to shake off their kings,
than that they should be bound by oath to suffer no
king ever again to reign in Rome; whereas, afterwards,
the authority and austere virtue of Brutus, backed
by all the legions of the East, could not rouse them
to maintain their hold of that freedom, which he,
following in the footsteps of the first Brutus, had
won for them; and this because of the corruption wherewith
the people had been infected by the Marian faction,
whereof Caesar becoming head, was able so to blind
the multitude that it saw not the yoke under which
it was about to lay its neck.

Though this example of Rome be more complete than
any other, I desire to instance likewise, to the same
effect, certain peoples well known in our own days;
and I maintain that no change, however grave or violent,
could ever restore freedom to Naples or Milan, because
in these States the entire body of the people has
grown corrupted. And so we find that Milan, although
desirous to return to a free form of government, on
the death of Filippo Visconti, had neither the force
nor the skill needed to preserve it.

Most fortunate, therefore, was it for Rome that her
kings grew corrupt soon, so as to be driven out before
the taint of their corruption had reached the vitals
of the city. For it was because these were sound
that the endless commotions which took place in Rome,
so far from being hurtful, were, from their object
being good, beneficial to the commonwealth. From
which we may draw this inference, that where the body
of the people is still sound, tumults and other like
disorders do little hurt, but that where it has become
corrupted, laws, however well devised, are of no advantage,
unless imposed by some one whose paramount authority
causes them to be observed until the community be once
more restored to a sound and healthy condition.

Whether this has ever happened I know not, nor whether
it ever can happen. For we see, as I have said
a little way back, that a city which owing to its
pervading corruption has once begun to decline, if
it is to recover at all, must be saved not by the
excellence of the people collectively, but of some
one man then living among them, on whose death it
at once relapses into its former plight; as happened
with Thebes, in which the virtue of Epaminondas made
it possible while he lived to preserve the form of

Page 46

a free Government, but which fell again on his death
into its old disorders; the reason being that hardly
any ruler lives so long as to have time to accustom
to right methods a city which has long been accustomed
to wrong. Wherefore, unless things be put on a
sound footing by some one ruler who lives to a very
advanced age, or by two virtuous rulers succeeding
one another, the city upon their death at once falls
back into ruin; or, if it be preserved, must be so
by incurring great risks, and at the cost of much
blood. For the corruption I speak of, is wholly
incompatible with a free government, because it results
from an inequality which pervades the State and can
only be removed by employing unusual and very violent
remedies, such as few are willing or know how to employ,
as in another place I shall more fully explain.

CHAPTER XVIII.—­How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be
preserved, or not existing may be created.

I think it neither out of place, nor inconsistent
with what has been said above, to consider whether
a free government existing in a corrupt city can be
maintained, or, not existing, can be introduced.
And on this head I say that it is very difficult to
bring about either of these results, and next to impossible
to lay down rules as to how it may be done; because
the measures to be taken must vary with the degree
of corruption which prevails.

Nevertheless, since it is well to reason things out,
I will not pass this matter by, but will assume, in
the first place, the case of a very corrupt city,
and then take the case of one in which corruption has
reached a still greater height; but where corruption
is universal, no laws or institutions will ever have
force to restrain it. Because as good customs
stand in need of good laws for their support, so laws,
that they may be respected, stand in need of good
customs. Moreover, the laws and institutions
established in a republic at its beginning, when men
were good, are no longer suitable when they have become
bad; but while the laws of a city are altered to suit
its circumstances, its institutions rarely or never
change; whence it results that the introduction of
new laws is of no avail, because the institutions,
remaining unchanged, corrupt them.

And to make this plainer, I say that in Rome it was
first of all the institutions of the State, and next
the laws as enforced by the magistrates, which kept
the citizens under control. The institutions
of the State consisted in the authority of the people,
the senate, the tribunes, and the consuls; in the
methods of choosing and appointing magistrates; and
in the arrangements for passing laws. These institutions
changed little, if at all, with circumstances.
But the laws by which the people were controlled,
as for instance the law relating to adultery, the
sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at elections,
and many others, were altered as the citizens grew
more and more corrupted. Hence, the institutions
of the State remaining the same although from the
corruption of the people no longer suitable, amendments
in the laws could not keep men good, though they might
have proved very useful if at the time when they were
made the institutions had likewise been reformed.

Page 47

That its original institutions are no longer adapted
to a city that has become corrupted, is plainly seen
in two matters of great moment, I mean in the appointment
of magistrates and in the passing of laws. For
the Roman people conferred the consulship and other
great offices of their State on none save those who
sought them; which was a good institution at first,
because then none sought these offices save those who
thought themselves worthy of them, and to be rejected
was held disgraceful; so that, to be deemed worthy,
all were on their best behaviour. But in a corrupted
city this institution grew to be most mischievous.
For it was no longer those of greatest worth, but
those who had most influence, who sought the magistracies;
while all who were without influence, however deserving,
refrained through fear. This untoward result was
not reached all at once, but like other similar results,
by gradual steps. For after subduing Africa and
Asia, and reducing nearly the whole of Greece to submission,
the Romans became perfectly assured of their freedom,
and seemed to themselves no longer to have any enemy
whom they had cause to fear. But this security
and the weakness of their adversaries led them in
conferring the consulship, no longer to look to merit,
but only to favour, selecting for the office those
who knew best how to pay court to them, not those
who knew best how to vanquish their enemies. And
afterwards, instead of selecting those who were best
liked, they came to select those who had most influence;
and in this way, from the imperfection of their institutions,
good men came to be wholly excluded.

Again, as to making laws, any of the tribunes and
certain others of the magistrates were entitled to
submit laws to the people; but before these were passed
it was open to every citizen to speak either for or
against them. This was a good system so long
as the citizens were good, since it is always well
that every man should be able to propose what he thinks
may be of use to his country, and that all should be
allowed to express their views with regard to his
proposal; so that the people, having heard all, may
resolve on what is best. But when the people grew
depraved, this became a very mischievous institution;
for then it was only the powerful who proposed laws,
and these not in the interest of public freedom but
of their own authority; and because, through fear,
none durst speak against the laws they proposed, the
people were either deceived or forced into voting
their own destruction.

In order, therefore, that Rome after she had become
corrupted might still preserve her freedom, it was
necessary that, as in the course of events she had
made new laws, so likewise she should frame new institutions,
since different institutions and ordinances are needed
in a corrupt State from those which suit a State which
is not corrupted; for where the matter is wholly dissimilar,
the form cannot be similar.

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But since old institutions must either be reformed
all at once, as soon as they are seen to be no longer
expedient, or else gradually, as the imperfection
of each is recognized, I say that each of these two
courses is all but impossible. For to effect
a gradual reform requires a sagacious man who can
discern mischief while it is still remote and in the
germ. But it may well happen that no such person
is found in a city; or that, if found, he is unable
to persuade others of what he is himself persuaded.
For men used to live in one way are loath to leave
it for another, especially when they are not brought
face to face with the evil against which they should
guard, and only have it indicated to them by conjecture.
And as for a sudden reform of institutions which are
seen by all to be no longer good, I say that defects
which are easily discerned are not easily corrected,
because for their correction it is not enough to use
ordinary means, these being in themselves insufficient;
but recourse must be had to extraordinary means, such
as violence and arms; and, as a preliminary, you must
become prince of the city, and be able to deal with
it at your pleasure. But since the restoration
of a State to new political life presupposes a good
man, and to become prince of a city by violence presupposes
a bad man, it can, consequently, very seldom happen
that, although the end be good, a good man will be
found ready to become a prince by evil ways, or that
a bad man having become a prince will be disposed
to act virtuously, or think of turning to good account
his ill-acquired authority.

From all these causes comes the difficulty, or rather
the impossibility, which a corrupted city finds in
maintaining an existing free government, or in establishing
a new one. So that had we to establish or maintain
a government in that city, it would be necessary to
give it a monarchical, rather than a popular form,
in order that men too arrogant to be restrained by
the laws, might in some measure be kept in check by
a power almost absolute; since to attempt to make
them good otherwise would be a very cruel or a wholly
futile endeavour. This, as I have said, was the
method followed by Cleomenes; and if he, that he might
stand alone, put to death the Ephori; and if Romulus,
with a like object, put to death his brother and Titus
Tatius the Sabine, and if both afterwards made good
use of the authority they thus acquired, it is nevertheless
to be remembered that it was because neither Cleomenes
nor Romulus had to deal with so corrupt a people as
that of which I am now speaking, that they were able
to effect their ends and to give a fair colour to
their acts.

CHAPTER XIX.—­After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself:
but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second.

Page 49

When we contemplate the excellent qualities of Romulus,
Numa, and Tullus, the first three kings of Rome, and
note the methods which they followed, we recognize
the extreme good fortune of that city in having her
first king fierce and warlike, her second peaceful
and religious, and her third, like the first, of a
high spirit and more disposed to war than to peace.
For it was essential for Rome that almost at the outset
of her career, a ruler should be found to lay the foundations
of her civil life; but, after that had been done,
it was necessary that her rulers should return to
the virtues of Romulus, since otherwise the city must
have grown feeble, and become a prey to her neighbours.

And here we may note that a prince who succeeds to
another of superior valour, may reign on by virtue
of his predecessor’s merits, and reap the fruits
of his labours; but if he live to a great age, or if
he be followed by another who is wanting in the qualities
of the first, that then the kingdom must necessarily
dwindle. Conversely, when two consecutive princes
are of rare excellence, we commonly find them achieving
results which win for them enduring renown. David,
for example, not only surpassed in learning and judgment,
but was so valiant in arms that, after conquering
and subduing all his neighbours, he left to his young
son Solomon a tranquil State, which the latter, though
unskilled in the arts of war, could maintain by the
arts of peace, and thus happily enjoy the inheritance
of his father’s valour. But Solomon could
not transmit this inheritance to his son Rehoboam,
who neither resembling his grandfather in valour,
nor his father in good fortune, with difficulty made
good his right to a sixth part of the kingdom.
In like manner Bajazet, sultan of the Turks, though
a man of peace rather than of war, was able to enjoy
the labours of Mahomet his father, who, like David,
having subdued his neighbours, left his son a kingdom
so safely established that it could easily be retained
by him by peaceful arts. But had Selim, son to
Bajazet, been like his father, and not like his grandfather,
the Turkish monarchy must have been overthrown; as
it is, he seems likely to outdo the fame of his grandsire.

I affirm it to be proved by these examples, that after
a valiant prince a feeble prince may maintain himself;
but that no kingdom can stand when two feeble princes
follow in succession, unless, as in the case of France,
it be supported by its ancient ordinances. By
feeble princes, I mean such as are not valiant in
war. And, to put the matter shortly, it may be
said, that the great valour of Romulus left Numa a
period of many years within which to govern Rome by
peaceful arts; that after Numa came Tullus, who renewed
by his courage the fame of Romulus; and that he in
turn was succeeded by Ancus, a prince so gifted by
nature that he could equally avail himself of the
methods of peace or war; who setting himself at first
to pursue the former, when he found that his neighbours

Page 50

judged him to be effeminate, and therefore held him
in slight esteem, understood that to preserve Rome
he must resort to arms and resemble Romulus rather
than Numa. From whose example every ruler of a
State may learn that a prince like Numa will hold
or lose his power according as fortune and circumstances
befriend him; but that the prince who resembles Romulus,
and like him is fortified with foresight and arms,
will hold his State whatever befall, unless deprived
of it by some stubborn and irresistible force.
For we may reckon with certainty that if Rome had
not had for her third king one who knew how to restore
her credit by deeds of valour, she could not, or at
any rate not without great difficulty, have afterwards
held her ground, nor could ever have achieved the
great exploits she did.

And for these reasons Rome, while she lived under
her kings, was in constant danger of destruction through
a king who might be weak or bad.

CHAPTER XX.—­That the consecutive Reigns
of two valiant Princes produce great results:
and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of
a Succession of valiant Rulers by whom their Power
and Growth are rapidly extended.

When Rome had driven out her kings, she was freed
from those dangers to which, as I have said, she was
exposed by the possible succession of a weak or wicked
prince. For the chief share in the government
then devolved upon the consuls, who took their authority
not by inheritance, nor yet by craft or by ambitious
violence, but by the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens,
and were always men of signal worth; by whose valour
and good fortune Rome being constantly aided, was able
to reach the height of her greatness in the same number
of years as she had lived under her kings. And
since we find that two successive reigns of valiant
princes, as of Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander,
suffice to conquer the world, this ought to be still
easier for a commonwealth, which has it in its power
to choose, not two excellent rulers only, but an endless
number in succession. And in every well ordered
commonwealth provision will be made for a succession
of this sort.

CHAPTER XXI.—­That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a
Commonwealth to be without a national Army.

Those princes and republics of the present day who
lack forces of their own, whether for attack or defence,
should take shame to themselves, and should be convinced
by the example of Tullus, that their deficiency does
not arise from want of men fit for warlike enterprises,
but from their own fault in not knowing how to make
their subjects good soldiers. For after Rome
had been at peace for forty years, Tullus, succeeding
to the kingdom, found not a single Roman who had ever
been in battle. Nevertheless when he made up
his mind to enter on a war, it never occurred to him
to have recourse to the Samnites, or the Etruscans,

Page 51

or to any other of the neighbouring nations accustomed
to arms, but he resolved, like the prudent prince
he was, to rely on his own countrymen. And such
was his ability that, under his rule, the people very
soon became admirable soldiers. For nothing is
more true than that where a country, having men, lacks
soldiers, it results from some fault in its ruler,
and not from any defect in the situation or climate.
Of this we have a very recent instance. Every
one knows, how, only the other day, the King of England
invaded the realm of France with an army raised wholly
from among his own people, although from his country
having been at peace for thirty years, he had neither
men nor officers who had ever looked an enemy in the
face. Nevertheless, he did not hesitate with such
troops as he had, to attack a kingdom well provided
with officers and excellent soldiers who had been
constantly under arms in the Italian wars. And
this was possible through the prudence of the English
king and the wise ordinances of his kingdom, which
never in time of peace relaxes its warlike discipline.
So too, in old times, Pelopidas and Epaminondas the
Thebans, after they had freed Thebes from her tyrants,
and rescued her from thraldom to Sparta, finding themselves
in a city used to servitude and surrounded by an effeminate
people, scrupled not, so great was their courage,
to furnish these with arms, and go forth with them
to meet and to conquer the Spartan forces on the field.
And he who relates this, observes, that these two
captains very soon showed that warriors are not bred
in Lacedaemon alone, but in every country where men
are found, if only some one arise among them who knows
how to direct them to arms; as we see Tullus knew
how to direct the Romans. Nor could Virgil better
express this opinion, or show by fitter words that
he was convinced of its truth than, when he says:—­

CHAPTER XXII.—­What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman
Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii.

It was agreed between Tullus king of Rome, and Metius
king of Alba, that the nation whose champions were
victorious in combat should rule over the other.
The three Alban Curiatii were slain; one of the Roman
Horatii survived. Whereupon the Alban king with
all his people became subject to the Romans.
The surviving Horatius returning victorious to Rome,
and meeting his sister, wife to one of the dead Curiatii,
bewailing the death of her husband, slew her; and
being tried for this crime, was, after much contention,
liberated, rather on the entreaties of his father
than for his own deserts.

Page 52

Herein three points are to be noted. First,
that we should never peril our whole fortunes on the
success of only a part of our forces. Second,
that in a well-governed State, merit should never be
allowed to balance crime. And third, that
those are never wise covenants which we cannot or
should not expect to be observed. Now, for a State
to be enslaved is so terrible a calamity that it ought
never to have been supposed possible that either of
these kings or nations would rest content under a
slavery resulting from the defeat of three only of
their number. And so it appeared to Metius; for
although on the victory of the Roman champions, he
at once confessed himself vanquished, and promised
obedience; nevertheless, in the very first expedition
which he and Tullus undertook jointly against the
people of Veii, we find him seeking to circumvent
the Roman, as though perceiving too late the rash part
he had played.

This is enough to say of the third point which I noted
as deserving attention. Of the other two I shall
speak in the next two Chapters.

CHAPTER XXIII.—­That we should never
hazard our whole Fortunes where we put not forth our
entire Strength; for which reason to guard a Defile
is often hurtful.

It was never judged a prudent course to peril your
whole fortunes where you put not forth your whole
strength; as may happen in more ways than one.
One of these ways was that taken by Tullus and Metius,
when each staked the existence of his country and
the credit of his army on the valour and good fortune
of three only of his soldiers, that being an utterly
insignificant fraction of the force at his disposal.
For neither of these kings reflected that all the
labours of their predecessors in framing such institutions
for their States, as might, with the aid of the citizens
themselves, maintain them long in freedom, were rendered
futile, when the power to ruin all was left in the
hands of so small a number. No rasher step, therefore,
could have been taken, than was taken by these kings.

A like risk is almost always incurred by those who,
on the approach of an enemy, resolve to defend some
place of strength, or to guard the defiles by which
their country is entered. For unless room be found
in this place of strength for almost all your army,
the attempt to hold it will almost always prove hurtful.
If you can find room, it will be right to defend your
strong places; but if these be difficult of access,
and you cannot there keep your entire force together,
the effort to defend is mischievous. I come to
this conclusion from observing the example of those
who, although their territories be enclosed by mountains
and precipices, have not, on being attacked by powerful
enemies, attempted to fight on the mountains or in
the defiles, but have advanced beyond them to meet
their foes; or, if unwilling to advance, have awaited
attack behind their mountains, on level and not on
broken ground. The reason of which is, as I have

Page 53

above explained, that many men cannot be assembled
in these strong places for their defence; partly because
a large number of men cannot long subsist there, and
partly because such places being narrow and confined,
afford room for a few only; so that no enemy can there
be withstood, who comes in force to the attack; which
he can easily do, his design being to pass on and not
to make a stay; whereas he who stands on the defensive
cannot do so in force, because, from not knowing when
the enemy may enter the confined and sterile tracts
of which I speak, he may have to lodge himself there
for a long time. But should you lose some pass
which you had reckoned on holding, and on the defence
of which your country and army have relied, there
commonly follows such panic among your people and among
the troops which remain to you, that you are vanquished
without opportunity given for any display of valour,
and lose everything without bringing all your resources
into play.

Every one has heard with what difficulty Hannibal
crossed the Alps which divide France from Lombardy,
and afterwards those which separate Lombardy from
Tuscany. Nevertheless the Romans awaited him,
in the first instance on the banks of the Ticino,
in the second on the plain of Arezzo, preferring to
be defeated on ground which at least gave them a chance
of victory, to leading their army into mountain fastnesses
where it was likely to be destroyed by the mere difficulties
of the ground. And any who read history with
attention will find, that very few capable commanders
have attempted to hold passes of this nature, as well
for the reasons already given, as because to close
them all were impossible. For mountains, like
plains, are traversed not only by well-known and frequented
roads, but also by many by-ways, which, though unknown
to strangers, are familiar to the people of the country,
under whose guidance you may always, and in spite
of any opposition, be easily conducted to whatever
point you please. Of this we have a recent instance
in the events of the year 1515. For when Francis
I. of France resolved on invading Italy in order to
recover the province of Lombardy, those hostile to
his attempt looked mainly to the Swiss, who it was
hoped would stop him in passing through their mountains.
But this hope was disappointed by the event.
For leaving on one side two or three defiles which
were guarded by the Swiss, the king advanced by another
unknown pass, and was in Italy and upon his enemies
before they knew. Whereupon they fled terror-stricken
into Milan; while the whole population of Lombardy,
finding themselves deceived in their expectation that
the French would be detained in the mountains, went
over to their side.

CHAPTER XXIV.—­That well-ordered States
always provide Rewards and Punishments for their Citizens;
and never set off Deserts against Misdeeds.

Page 54

The valour of Horatius in vanquishing the Curiatii
deserved the highest reward. But in slaying his
sister he had been guilty of a heinous crime.
And so displeasing to the Romans was an outrage of
this nature, that although his services were so great
and so recent, they brought him to trial for his life.
To one looking at it carelessly, this might seem an
instance of popular ingratitude, but he who considers
the matter more closely, and examines with sounder
judgment what the ordinances of a State should be,
will rather blame the Roman people for acquitting
Horatius than for putting him on his trial. And
this because no well-ordered State ever strikes a
balance between the services of its citizens and their
misdeeds; but appointing rewards for good actions and
punishment for bad, when it has rewarded a man for
acting well, will afterwards, should he act ill, chastise
him, without regard to his former deserts. When
these ordinances are duly observed, a city will live
long in freedom, but when they are neglected, it must
soon come to ruin. For when a citizen has rendered
some splendid service to his country, if to the distinction
which his action in itself confers, were added an
over-weening confidence that any crime he might thenceforth
commit would pass unpunished, he would soon become
so arrogant that no civil bonds could restrain him.

Still, while we would have punishment terrible to
wrongdoers, it is essential that good actions should
be rewarded, as we see to have been the case in Rome.
For even where a republic is poor, and has but little
to give, it ought not to withhold that little; since
a gift, however small, bestowed as a reward for services
however great, will always be esteemed most honourable
and precious by him who receives it. The story
of Horatius Cocles and that of Mutius Scaevola are
well known: how the one withstood the enemy on
the bridge while it was being cut down, and the other
thrust his hand into the fire in punishment of the
mistake made when he sought the life of Porsenna the
Etruscan king. To each of these two, in requital
of their splendid deeds, two ploughgates only of the
public land were given. Another famous story is
that of Manlius Capitolinus, to whom, for having saved
the Capitol from the besieging Gauls, a small measure
of meal was given by each of those who were shut up
with him during the siege. Which recompense, in
proportion to the wealth of the citizens of Rome at
that time, was thought ample; so that afterwards,
when Manlius, moved by jealousy and malice, sought
to arouse sedition in Rome, and to gain over the people
to his cause, they without regard to his past services
threw him headlong from that Capitol in saving which
he had formerly gained so great a renown.

CHAPTER XXV.—­That he who would reform the Institutions of a free
State, must retain at least the semblance of old Ways.

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Whoever takes upon him to reform the government of
a city, must, if his measures are to be well received
and carried out with general approval, preserve at
least the semblance of existing methods, so as not
to appear to the people to have made any change in
the old order of things; although, in truth, the new
ordinances differ altogether from those which they
replace. For when this is attended to, the mass
of mankind accept what seems as what is; nay, are
often touched more nearly by appearances than by realities.

This tendency being recognized by the Romans at the
very outset of their civil freedom, when they appointed
two consuls in place of a single king, they would
not permit the consuls to have more than twelve lictors,
in order that the old number of the king’s attendants
might not be exceeded. Again, there being solemnized
every year in Rome a sacrificial rite which could
only be performed by the king in person, that the
people might not be led by the absence of the king
to remark the want of any ancient observance, a priest
was appointed for the due celebration of this rite,
to whom was given the name of Rex sacrificulus,
and who was placed under the orders of the chief priest.
In this way the people were contented, and had no occasion
from any defect in the solemnities to desire the return
of their kings. Like precautions should be used
by all who would put an end to the old government
of a city and substitute new and free institutions.
For since novelty disturbs men’s minds, we should
seek in the changes we make to preserve as far as
possible what is ancient, so that if the new magistrates
differ from the old in number, in authority, or in
the duration of their office, they shall at least
retain the old names.

This, I say, should be seen to by him who would establish
a constitutional government, whether in the form of
a commonwealth or of a kingdom. But he who would
create an absolute government of the kind which political
writers term a tyranny, must renew everything, as shall
be explained in the following Chapter.

CHAPTER XXVI.—­A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken
Possession, ought to make Everything new.

Whosoever becomes prince of a city or State, more
especially if his position be so insecure that he
cannot resort to constitutional government either
in the form of a republic or a monarchy, will find
that the best way to preserve his princedom is to renew
the whole institutions of that State; that is to say,
to create new magistracies with new names, confer
new powers, and employ new men, and like David when
he became king, exalt the humble and depress the great,
“filling the hungry with good things, and
sending the rich empty away.” Moreover,
he must pull down existing towns and rebuild them,
removing their inhabitants from one place to another;
and, in short, leave nothing in the country as he
found it; so that there shall be neither rank, nor
condition, nor honour, nor wealth which its possessor
can refer to any but to him. And he must take
example from Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander,
who by means such as these, from being a petty prince
became monarch of all Greece; and of whom it was written
that he shifted men from province to province as a
shepherd moves his flocks from one pasture to another.

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These indeed are most cruel expedients, contrary not
merely to every Christian, but to every civilized
rule of conduct, and such as every man should shun,
choosing rather to lead a private life than to be a
king on terms so hurtful to mankind. But he who
will not keep to the fair path of virtue, must to
maintain himself enter this path of evil. Men,
however, not knowing how to be wholly good or wholly
bad, choose for themselves certain middle ways, which
of all others are the most pernicious, as shall be
shown by an instance in the following Chapter.

CHAPTER XXVII.—­That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly
bad.

When in the year 1505, Pope Julius II. went to Bologna
to expel from that city the family of the Bentivogli,
who had been princes there for over a hundred years,
it was also in his mind, as a part of the general
design he had planned against all those lords who had
usurped Church lands, to remove Giovanpagolo Baglioni,
tyrant of Perugia. And coming to Perugia with
this intention and resolve, of which all men knew,
he would not wait to enter the town with a force sufficient
for his protection, but entered it unattended by troops,
although Giovanpagolo was there with a great company
of soldiers whom he had assembled for his defence.
And thus, urged on by that impetuosity which stamped
all his actions, accompanied only by his body-guard,
he committed himself into the hands of his enemy,
whom he forthwith carried away with him, leaving a
governor behind to hold the town for the Church.
All prudent men who were with the Pope remarked on
his temerity, and on the pusillanimity of Giovanpagolo;
nor could they conjecture why the latter had not, to
his eternal glory, availed himself of this opportunity
for crushing his enemy, and at the same time enriching
himself with plunder, the Pope being attended by the
whole College of Cardinals with all their luxurious
equipage. For it could not be supposed that he
was withheld by any promptings of goodness or scruples
of conscience; because in the breast of a profligate
living in incest with his sister, and who to obtain
the princedom had put his nephews and kinsmen to death,
no virtuous impulse could prevail. So that the
only inference to be drawn was, that men know not
how to be splendidly wicked or wholly good, and shrink
in consequence from such crimes as are stamped with
an inherent greatness or disclose a nobility of nature.
For which reason Giovanpagolo, who thought nothing
of incurring the guilt of incest, or of murdering
his kinsmen, could not, or more truly durst not, avail
himself of a fair occasion to do a deed which all would
have admired; which would have won for him a deathless
fame as the first to teach the prelates how little
those who live and reign as they do are to be esteemed;
and which would have displayed a greatness far transcending
any infamy or danger that could attach to it.

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CHAPTER XXVIII.—­Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to
their Citizens than were the Athenians.

In the histories of all republics we meet with instances
of some sort of ingratitude to their great citizens,
but fewer in the history of Rome than of Athens, or
indeed of any other republic. Searching for the
cause of this, I am persuaded that, so far as regards
Rome and Athens, it was due to the Romans having had
less occasion than the Athenians to look upon their
fellow-citizens with suspicion For, from the expulsion
of her kings down to the times of Sylla and Marius,
the liberty of Rome was never subverted by any one
of her citizens; so that there never was in that city
grave cause for distrusting any man, and in consequence
making him the victim of inconsiderate injustice.
The reverse was notoriously the case with Athens;
for that city, having, at a time when she was most
flourishing, been deprived of her freedom by Pisistratus
under a false show of good-will, remembering, after
she regained her liberty, her former bondage and all
the wrongs she had endured, became the relentless
chastiser, not of offences only on the part of her
citizens, but even of the shadow of an offence.
Hence the banishment and death of so many excellent
men, and hence the law of ostracism, and all those
other violent measures which from time to time during
the history of that city were directed against her
foremost citizens. For this is most true which
is asserted by the writers on civil government, that
a people which has recovered its freedom, bites more
fiercely than one which has always preserved it.

And any who shall weigh well what has been said, will
not condemn Athens in this matter, nor commend Rome,
but refer all to the necessity arising out of the
different conditions prevailing in the two States.
For careful reflection will show that had Rome been
deprived of her freedom as Athens was, she would not
have been a whit more tender to her citizens.
This we may reasonably infer from remarking what, after
the expulsion of the kings, befell Collatinus and
Publius Valerius; the former of whom, though he had
taken part in the liberation of Rome, was sent into
exile for no other reason than that he bore the name
of Tarquin; while the sole ground of suspicion against
the latter, and what almost led to his banishment,
was his having built a house upon the Caelian hill.
Seeing how harsh and suspicious Rome was in these two
instances, we may surmise that she would have shown
the same ingratitude as Athens, had she, like Athens,
been wronged by her citizens at an early stage of
her growth, and before she had attained to the fulness
of her strength.

That I may not have to return to this question of
ingratitude, I shall say all that remains to be said
about it in my next Chapter.

CHAPTER XXIX.—­Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful.

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In connection with what has been said above, it seems
proper to consider whether more notable instances
of ingratitude are supplied by princes or peoples.
And, to go to the root of the matter, I affirm that
this vice of ingratitude has its source either in
avarice or in suspicion. For a prince or people
when they have sent forth a captain on some important
enterprise, by succeeding in which he earns a great
name, are bound in return to reward him; and if moved
by avarice and covetousness they fail to do so, or
if, instead of rewarding, they wrong and disgrace him,
they commit an error which is not only without excuse,
but brings with it undying infamy. And, in fact,
we find many princes who have sinned in this way,
for the cause given by Cornelius Tacitus when he says,
that “men are readier to pay back injuries
than benefits, since to requite a benefit is felt
to be a burthen, to return an injury a gain."[1]

When, however, reward is withheld, or, to speak more
correctly, where offence is given, not from avarice
but from suspicion, the prince or people may deserve
some excuse; and we read of many instances of ingratitude
proceeding from this cause. For the captain who
by his valour has won new dominions for his prince,
since while overcoming his enemies, he at the same
time covers himself with glory and enriches his soldiers,
must needs acquire such credit with his own followers,
and with the enemy, and also with the subjects of
his prince, as cannot be wholly agreeable to the master
who sent him forth. And since men are by nature
ambitious as well as jealous, and none loves to set
a limit to his fortunes, the suspicion which at once
lays hold of the prince when he sees his captain victorious,
is sure to be inflamed by some arrogant act or word
of the captain himself. So that the prince will
be unable to think of anything but how to secure himself;
and to this end will contrive how he may put his captain
to death, or at any rate deprive him of the credit
he has gained with the army and among the people; doing
all he can to show that the victory was not won by
his valour, but by good fortune, or by the cowardice
of the enemy, or by the skill and prudence of those
commanders who were with him at this or the other
battle.

After Vespasian, who was then in Judaea, had been
proclaimed emperor by his army, Antonius Primus, who
commanded another army in Illyria, adopted his cause,
and marching into Italy against Vitellius who had
been proclaimed emperor in Rome, courageously defeated
two armies under that prince, and occupied Rome; so
that Mutianus, who was sent thither by Vespasian,
found everything done to his hand, and all difficulties
surmounted by the valour of Antonius. But all
the reward which Antonius had for his pains, was,
that Mutianus forthwith deprived him of his command
of the army, and by degrees diminished his authority
in Rome till none was left him. Thereupon Antonius
went to join Vespasian, who was still in Asia; by

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whom he was so coldly received and so little considered,
that in despair he put himself to death. And of
cases like this, history is full. Every man living
at the present hour knows with what zeal and courage
Gonsalvo of Cordova, while conducting the war in Naples
against the French, conquered and subdued that kingdom
for his master Ferdinand of Aragon; and how his services
were requited by Ferdinand coming from Aragon to Naples,
and first of all depriving him of the command of the
army, afterwards of the fortresses, and finally carrying
him back with him to Spain, where soon after he died
in disgrace.

This jealousy, then, is so natural to princes, that
they cannot guard themselves against it, nor show
gratitude to those who serving under their standard
have gained great victories and made great conquests
on their behalf. And if it be impossible for
princes to free their minds from such suspicions,
there is nothing strange or surprising that a people
should be unable to do so. For as a city living
under free institutions has two ends always before
it, namely to acquire liberty and to preserve it,
it must of necessity be led by its excessive passion
for liberty to make mistakes in the pursuit of both
these objects. Of the mistakes it commits in
the effort to acquire liberty, I shall speak, hereafter,
in the proper place. Of mistakes committed in
the endeavour to preserve liberty are to be noted,
the injuring those citizens who ought to be rewarded,
and the suspecting those who should be trusted.
Now, although in a State which has grown corrupt these
errors occasion great evils, and commonly lead to
a tyranny, as happened in Rome when Caesar took by
force what ingratitude had denied him, they are nevertheless
the cause of much good in the republic which has not
been corrupted, since they prolong the duration of
its free institutions, and make men, through fear
of punishment, better and less ambitious. Of all
peoples possessed of great power, the Romans, for the
reasons I have given, have undoubtedly been the least
ungrateful, since we have no other instance of their
ingratitude to cite, save that of Scipio. For
both Coriolanus and Camillus were banished on account
of the wrongs which they inflicted on the commons;
and though the former was not forgiven because he
constantly retained ill will against the people, the
latter was not only recalled, but for the rest of his
life honoured as a prince. But the ingratitude
shown towards Scipio arose from the suspicion wherewith
the citizens came to regard him, which they had not
felt in the case of the others, and which was occasioned
by the greatness of the enemy whom he had overthrown,
the fame he had won by prevailing in so dangerous
and protracted a war, the suddenness of his victories,
and, finally, the favour which his youth, together
with his prudence and his other memorable qualities
had gained for him. These qualities were, in
truth, so remarkable that the very magistrates, not

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to speak of others, stood in awe of his authority,
a circumstance displeasing to prudent citizens, as
before unheard of in Rome. In short, his whole
bearing and character were so much out of the common,
that even the elder Cato, so celebrated for his austere
virtue, was the first to declare against him, saying
that no city could be deemed free which contained
a citizen who was feared by the magistrates. And
since, in this instance, the Romans followed the opinion
of Cato, they merit that excuse which, as I have said
already, should be extended to the prince or people
who are ungrateful through suspicion.

In conclusion it is to be said that while this vice
of ingratitude has its origin either in avarice or
in suspicion, commonwealths are rarely led into it
by avarice, and far seldomer than princes by suspicion,
having, as shall presently be shown, far less reason
than princes for suspecting.

CHAPTER XXX.—­How Princes and Commonwealths
may avoid the vice of Ingratitude; and how a Captain
or Citizen may escape being undone by it.

That he may not be tormented by suspicion, nor show
ungrateful, a prince should go himself on his wars
as the Roman emperors did at first, as the Turk does
now, and, in short, as all valiant princes have done
and do. For when it is the prince himself who
conquers, the glory and the gain are all his own;
but when he is absent, since the glory is another’s,
it will seem to the prince that he profits nothing
by the gain, unless that glory be quenched which he
knew not how to win for himself; and when he thus
becomes ungrateful and unjust, doubtless his loss is
greater than his gain. To the prince, therefore,
who, either through indolence or from want of foresight,
sends forth a captain to conduct his wars while he
himself remains inactive at home, I have no advice
to offer which he does not already know. But
I would counsel the captain whom he sends, since I
am sure that he can never escape the attacks of ingratitude,
to follow one or other of two courses, and either
quit his command at once after a victory, and place
himself in the hands of his prince, while carefully
abstaining from every vainglorious or ambitious act,
so that the prince, being relieved from all suspicion,
may be disposed to reward, or at any rate not to injure
him; or else, should he think it inexpedient for him
to act in this way, to take boldly the contrary course,
and fearlessly to follow out all such measures as he
thinks will secure for himself, and not for his prince,
whatever he has gained; conciliating the good-will
of his soldiers and fellow-citizens, forming new friendships
with neighbouring potentates, placing his own adherents
in fortified towns, corrupting the chief officers of
his army and getting rid of those whom he fails to
corrupt, and by all similar means endeavouring to

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punish his master for the ingratitude which he looks
for at his hands. These are the only two courses
open; but since, as I said before, men know not how
to be wholly good or wholly bad, it will never happen
that after a victory a captain will quit his army and
conduct himself modestly, nor yet that he will venture
to use those hardy methods which have in them some
strain of greatness; and so, remaining undecided,
he will be crushed while he still wavers and doubts.

A commonwealth desiring to avoid the vice of ingratitude
is, as compared with a prince, at this disadvantage,
that while a prince can go himself on his expeditions,
the commonwealth must send some one of its citizens.
As a remedy, I would recommend that course being adopted
which was followed by the Roman republic in order
to be less ungrateful than others, having its origin
in the nature of the Roman government. For the
whole city, nobles and commons alike, taking part in
her wars, there were always found in Rome at every
stage of her history, so many valiant and successful
soldiers, that by reason of their number, and from
one acting as a check upon another, the nation had
never ground to be jealous of any one man among them;
while they, on their part, lived uprightly, and were
careful to betray no sign of ambition, nor give the
people the least cause to distrust them as ambitious;
so that he obtained most glory from his dictatorship
who was first to lay it down. Which conduct,
as it excited no suspicion, could occasion no ingratitude.

We see, then, that the commonwealth which would have
no cause to be ungrateful, must act as Rome did; and
that the citizen who would escape ingratitude, must
observe those precautions which were observed by Roman
citizens.

CHAPTER XXXI.—­That the Roman Captains
were never punished with extreme severity for Misconduct;
and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through
their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished
at all.

The Romans were not only, as has been said above,
less ungrateful than other republics, but were also
more lenient and more considerate than others in punishing
the captains of their armies. For if these erred
of set purpose, they chastised them with gentleness;
while if they erred through ignorance, so far from
punishing, they even honoured and rewarded them.
And this conduct was well considered. For as they
judged it of the utmost moment, that those in command
of their armies should, in all they had to do, have
their minds undisturbed and free from external anxieties,
they would not add further difficulty and danger to
a task in itself both dangerous and difficult, lest
none should ever be found to act with valour.
For supposing them to be sending forth an army against
Philip of Macedon in Greece or against Hannibal in
Italy, or against any other enemy at whose hands they
had already sustained reverses, the captain in command
of that expedition would be weighted with all the

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grave and important cares which attend such enterprises.
But if to all these cares, had been added the example
of Roman generals crucified or otherwise put to death
for having lost battles, it would have been impossible
for a commander surrounded by so many causes for anxiety
to have acted with vigour and decision. For which
reason, and because they thought that to such persons
the mere ignominy of defeat was in itself punishment
enough, they would not dishearten their generals by
inflicting on them any heavier penalty.

Of errors committed not through ignorance, the following
is an instance. Sergius and Virginius were engaged
in the siege of Veii, each being in command of a division
of the army, and while Sergius was set to guard against
the approach of the Etruscans, it fell to Virginius
to watch the town. But Sergius being attacked
by the Faliscans and other tribes, chose rather to
be defeated and routed than ask aid from Virginius,
who, on his part, awaiting the humiliation of his
rival, was willing to see his country dishonoured
and an army destroyed, sooner than go unasked to his
relief. This was notable misconduct, and likely,
unless both offenders were punished, to bring discredit
on the Roman name. But whereas another republic
would have punished these men with death, the Romans
were content to inflict only a money fine: not
because the offence did not in itself deserve severe
handling, but because they were unwilling, for the
reasons already given, to depart in this instance
from their ancient practice.

Of errors committed through ignorance we have no better
example than in the case of Varro, through whose rashness
the Romans were defeated by Hannibal at Cannae, where
the republic well-nigh lost its liberty. But
because he had acted through ignorance and with no
evil design, they not only refrained from punishing
him, but even treated him with distinction; the whole
senate going forth to meet him on his return to Rome,
and as they could not thank him for having fought,
thanking him for having come back, and for not having
despaired of the fortunes his country.

Again, when Papirius Cursor would have had Fabius
put to death, because, contrary to his orders, he
had fought with the Samnites, among the reasons pleaded
by the father of Fabius against the persistency of
the dictator, he urged that never on the occasion
of the defeat of any of their captains had the Romans
done what Papirius desired them to do on the occasion
of a victory.

CHAPTER XXXII.—­That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay
conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties.

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The Romans found it for their advantage to be generous
to the commons at a season of danger, when Porsenna
came to attack Rome and restore the Tarquins.
For the senate, apprehending that the people might
choose rather to take back their kings than to support
a war, secured their adherence by relieving them of
the duty on salt and of all their other burthens;
saying that “the poor did enough for the common
welfare in rearing their offspring.” In
return for which indulgence the commons were content
to undergo war, siege, and famine. Let no one
however, relying on this example, delay conciliating
the people till danger has actually come; or, if he
do, let him not hope to have the same good fortune
as the Romans. For the mass of the people will
consider that they have to thank not him, but his
enemies, and that there is ground to fear that when
the danger has passed away, he will take back what
he gave under compulsion, and, therefore, that to
him they lie under no obligation. And the reason
why the course followed by the Romans succeeded, was
that the State was still new and unsettled. Besides
which, the people knew that laws had already been passed
in their favour, as, for instance, the law allowing
an appeal to the tribunes, and could therefore persuade
themselves that the benefits granted them proceeded
from the good-will entertained towards them by the
senate, and were not due merely to the approach of
an enemy. Moreover, the memory of their kings,
by whom they had in many ways been wronged and ill-treated,
was still fresh in their minds. But since like
conditions seldom recur, it can only rarely happen
that like remedies are useful. Wherefore, all,
whether princes or republics, who hold the reins of
government, ought to think beforehand of the adverse
times which may await them, and of what help they
may then stand in need; and ought so to live with their
people as they would think right were they suffering
under any calamity. And, whosoever, whether prince
or republic, but prince more especially, behaves otherwise,
and believes that after the event and when danger is
upon him he will be able to win men over by benefits,
deceives himself, and will not merely fail to maintain
his place, but will even precipitate his downfall.

CHAPTER XXXIII.—­When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State,
it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence.

As Rome grew in fame, power, and dominion, her neighbours,
who at first had taken no heed to the injury which
this new republic might do them, began too late to
see their mistake, and desiring to remedy what should
have been remedied before, combined against her to
the number of forty nations. Whereupon the Romans,
resorting to a method usual with them in seasons of
peril, appointed a dictator; that is, gave power to
one man to decide without advice, and carry out his
resolves without appeal. Which expedient, as
it then enabled them to overcome the dangers by which
they were threatened, so always afterwards proved most
serviceable, when, at any time during the growth of
their power, difficulties arose to embarrass their
republic.

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In connection with this league against Rome we have
first to note, that when a mischief which springs
up either in or against a republic, and whether occasioned
by internal or external causes, has grown to such
proportions that it begins to fill the whole community
with alarm, it is a far safer course to temporize
with it than to attempt to quell it by violence.
For commonly those who make this attempt only add fuel
to the flame, and hasten the impending ruin.
Such disorders arise in a republic more often from
internal causes than external, either through some
citizen being suffered to acquire undue influence,
or from the corruption of some institution of that
republic, which had once been the life and sinew of
its freedom; and from this corruption being allowed
to gain such head that the attempt to check it is
more dangerous than to let it be. And it is all
the harder to recognize these disorders in their beginning,
because it seems natural to men to look with favour
on the beginnings of things. Favour of this sort,
more than by anything else, is attracted by those
actions which seem to have in them a quality of greatness,
or which are performed by the young. For when
in a republic some young man is seen to come forward
endowed with rare excellence, the eyes of all the
citizens are at once turned upon him, and all, without
distinction, concur to do him honour; so that if he
have one spark of ambition, the advantages which he
has from nature, together with those he takes from
this favourable disposition of men’s minds,
raise him to such a pitch of power, that when the citizens
at last see their mistake it is almost impossible
for them to correct it; and when they do what they
can to oppose his influence the only result is to
extend it. Of this I might cite numerous examples,
but shall content myself with one relating to our
own city.

Cosimo de’ Medici, to whom the house of the
Medici in Florence owes the origin of its fortunes,
acquired so great a name from the favour wherewith
his own prudence and the blindness of others invested
him, that coming to be held in awe by the government,
his fellow-citizens deemed it dangerous to offend
him, but still more dangerous to let him alone.
Nicolo da Uzzano, his cotemporary, who was accounted
well versed in all civil affairs, but who had made
a first mistake in not discerning the dangers which
might grow from the rising influence of Cosimo, would
never while he lived, permit a second mistake to be
made in attempting to crush him; judging that such
an attempt would be the ruin of the State, as in truth
it proved after his death. For some who survived
him, disregarding his counsels, combined against Cosimo
and banished him from Florence. And so it came
about that the partisans of Cosimo, angry at the wrong
done him, soon afterwards recalled him and made him
prince of the republic, a dignity he never would have
reached but for this open opposition. The very
same thing happened in Rome in the case of Caesar.
For his services having gained him the good-will of
Pompey and other citizens, their favour was presently
turned to fear, as Cicero testifies where he says
that “it was late that Pompey began to fear Caesar.”
This fear led men to think of remedies, and the remedies
to which they resorted accelerated the destruction
of the republic.

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I say, then, that since it is difficult to recognize
these disorders in their beginning, because of the
false impressions which things produce at the first,
it is a wiser course when they become known, to temporize
with them than to oppose them; for when you temporize,
either they die out of themselves, or at any rate
the injury they do is deferred. And the prince
who would suppress such disorders or oppose himself
to their force and onset, must always be on his guard,
lest he help where he would hinder, retard when he
would advance, and drown the plant he thinks to water.
He must therefore study well the symptoms of the disease;
and, if he believe himself equal to the cure, grapple
with it fearlessly; if not, he must let it be, and
not attempt to treat it in any way. For, otherwise,
it will fare with him as it fared with those neighbours
of Rome, for whom it would have been safer, after that
city had grown to be so great, to have sought to soothe
and restrain her by peaceful arts, than to provoke
her by open war to contrive new means of attack and
new methods of defence. For this league had no
other effect than to make the Romans more united and
resolute than before, and to bethink themselves of
new expedients whereby their power was still more
rapidly advanced; among which was the creation of a
dictator; for this innovation not only enabled them
to surmount the dangers which then threatened them,
but was afterwards the means of escaping infinite
calamities into which, without it, the republic must
have fallen.

CHAPTER XXXIV.—­That the authority of
the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic:
and that it is not those Powers which are given by
the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious
Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious
to a State.

Those citizens who first devised a dictatorship for
Rome have been blamed by certain writers, as though
this had been the cause of the tyranny afterwards
established there. For these authors allege that
the first tyrant of Rome governed it with the title
of Dictator, and that, but for the existence of the
office, Caesar could never have cloaked his usurpation
under a constitutional name. He who first took
up this opinion had not well considered the matter,
and his conclusion has been accepted without good
ground. For it was not the name nor office of
Dictator which brought Rome to servitude, but the influence
which certain of her citizens were able to assume
from the prolongation of their term of power; so that
even had the name of Dictator been wanting in Rome,
some other had been found to serve their ends, since
power may readily give titles, but not titles power.
We find, accordingly, that while the dictatorship
was conferred in conformity with public ordinances,
and not through personal influence, it was constantly
beneficial to the city. For it is the magistracies
created and the powers usurped in unconstitutional
ways that hurt a republic, not those which conform

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to ordinary rule; so that in Rome, through the whole
period of her history, we never find a dictator who
acted otherwise than well for the republic. For
which there were the plainest reasons. In the
first place, to enable a citizen to work harm and to
acquire undue authority, many circumstances must be
present which never can be present in a State which
is not corrupted. For such a citizen must be
exceedingly rich, and must have many retainers and
partisans, whom he cannot have where the laws are
strictly observed, and who, if he had them, would
occasion so much alarm, that the free suffrage of the
people would seldom be in his favour. In the
second place, the dictator was not created for life,
but for a fixed term, and only to meet the emergency
for which he was appointed. Power was indeed given
him to determine by himself what measures the exigency
demanded; to do what he had to do without consultation;
and to punish without appeal. But he had no authority
to do anything to the prejudice of the State, as it
would have been to deprive the senate or the people
of their privileges, to subvert the ancient institutions
of the city, or introduce new. So that taking
into account the brief time for which his office lasted,
its limited authority, and the circumstance that the
Roman people were still uncorrupted, it was impossible
for him to overstep the just limits of his power so
as to injure the city; and in fact we find that he
was always useful to it.

And, in truth, among the institutions of Rome, this
of the dictatorship deserves our special admiration,
and to be linked with the chief causes of her greatness;
for without some such safeguard a city can hardly
pass unharmed through extraordinary dangers. Because
as the ordinary institutions of a commonwealth work
but slowly, no council and no magistrate having authority
to act in everything alone, but in most matters one
standing in need of the other, and time being required
to reconcile their differences, the remedies which
they provide are most dangerous when they have to
be applied in cases which do not brook delay.
For which reason, every republic ought to have some
resource of this nature provided by its constitution;
as we find that the Republic of Venice, one of the
best of those now existing, has in cases of urgent
danger reserved authority to a few of her citizens,
if agreed among themselves, to determine without further
consultation what course is to be followed. When
a republic is not provided with some safeguard such
as this, either it must be ruined by observing constitutional
forms, or else, to save it, these must be broken through.
But in a republic nothing should be left to be effected
by irregular methods, because, although for the time
the irregularity may be useful, the example will nevertheless
be pernicious, as giving rise to a practice of violating
the laws for good ends, under colour of which they
may afterwards be violated for ends which are not
good. For which reason, that can never become
a perfect republic wherein every contingency has not
been foreseen and provided for by the laws, and the
method of dealing with it defined. To sum up,
therefore, I say that those republics which cannot
in sudden emergencies resort either to a dictator or
to some similar authority, will, when the danger is
serious, always be undone.

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We may note, moreover, how prudently the Romans, in
introducing this new office, contrived the conditions
under which it was to be exercised. For perceiving
that the appointment of a dictator involved something
of humiliation for the consuls, who, from being the
heads of the State, were reduced to render obedience
like every one else, and anticipating that this might
give offence, they determined that the power to appoint
should rest with the consuls, thinking that when the
occasion came when Rome should have need of this regal
authority, they would have the consuls acting willingly
and feeling the less aggrieved from the appointment
being in their own hands. For those wounds or
other injuries which a man inflicts upon himself by
choice, and of his own free will, pain him far less
than those inflicted by another. Nevertheless,
in the later days of the republic the Romans were
wont to entrust this power to a consul instead of
to a dictator, using the formula, Videat CONSUL
ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat.

But to return to the matter in hand, I say briefly,
that when the neighbours of Rome sought to crush her,
they led her to take measures not merely for her readier
defence, but such as enabled her to attack them with
a stronger force, with better skill, and with an undivided
command.

CHAPTER XXXV—­Why the Creation of the
Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the
free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful
to the Liberties of that Republic

The fact of those ten citizens who were chosen by
the Roman people to make laws for Rome, in time becoming
her tyrants and depriving her of her freedom, may
seem contrary to what I have said above, namely that
it is the authority which is violently usurped, and
not that conferred by the free suffrages of the people
which is injurious to a republic. Here, however,
we have to take into account both the mode in which,
and the term for which authority is given. Where
authority is unrestricted and is conferred for a long
term, meaning by that for a year or more, it is always
attended with danger, and its results will be good
or bad according as the men are good or bad to whom
it is committed. Now when we compare the authority
of the Ten with that possessed by the dictator, we
see that the power placed in the hands of the former
was out of all proportion greater than that entrusted
to the latter. For when a dictator was appointed
there still remained the tribunes, the consuls, and
the senate, all of them invested with authority of
which the dictator could not deprive them. For
even if he could have taken his consulship from one
man, or his status as a senator from another, he could
not abolish the senatorial rank nor pass new laws.
So that the senate, the consuls, and the tribunes
continuing to exist with undiminished authority were
a check upon him and kept him in the right road.
But on the creation of the Ten, the opposite of all

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this took place. For on their appointment, consuls
and tribunes were swept away, and express powers were
given to the new magistrates to make laws and do whatever
else they thought fit, with the entire authority of
the whole Roman people. So that finding themselves
alone without consuls or tribunes to control them,
and with no appeal against them to the people, and
thus there being none to keep a watch upon them, and
further being stimulated by the ambition of Appius,
in the second year of their office they began to wax
insolent.

Let it be noted, therefore, that when it is said that
authority given by the public vote is never hurtful
to any commonwealth, it is assumed that the people
will never be led to confer that authority without
due limitations, or for other than a reasonable term.
Should they, however either from being deceived or
otherwise blinded, be induced to bestow authority
imprudently, as the Romans bestowed it on the Ten,
it will always fare with them as with the Romans.
And this may readily be understood on reflecting what
causes operated to keep the dictator good, what to
make the Ten bad, and by observing how those republics
which have been accounted well governed, have acted
when conferring authority for an extended period,
as the Spartans on their kings and the Venetians on
their doges; for it will be seen that in both these
instances the authority was controlled by checks which
made it impossible for it to be abused. But where
an uncontrolled authority is given, no security is
afforded by the circumstance that the body of the people
is not corrupted; for in the briefest possible time
absolute authority will make a people corrupt, and
obtain for itself friends and partisans. Nor
will it be any hindrance to him in whom such authority
is vested, that he is poor and without connections,
for wealth and every other advantage will quickly
follow, as shall be shown more fully when we discuss
the appointment of the Ten.

CHAPTER XXXVI.—­That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a
Commonwealth should not disdain the lower.

Under the consuls M. Fabius and Cn. Manlius,
the Romans had a memorable victory in a battle fought
with the Veientines and the Etruscans, in which Q.
Fabius, brother of the consul, who had himself been
consul the year before, was slain. This event
may lead us to remark how well the methods followed
by the city of Rome were suited to increase her power,
and how great a mistake is made by other republics
in departing from them. For, eager as the Romans
were in the pursuit of glory, they never esteemed
it a dishonour to obey one whom before they had commanded,
or to find themselves serving in the ranks of an army
which once they had led. This usage, however,
is opposed to the ideas, the rules, and the practice
which prevail at the present day, as, for instance,
in Venice, where the notion still obtains that a citizen

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who has filled a great office should be ashamed to
accept a less; and where the State itself permits
him to decline it. This course, assuming it to
lend lustre to individual citizens, is plainly to
the disadvantage of the community, which has reason
to hope more from, and to trust more to, the citizen
who descends from a high office to fill a lower, than
him who rises from a low office to fill a high one;
for in the latter no confidence can reasonably be
placed, unless he be seen to have others about him
of such credit and worth that it may be hoped their
wise counsels and influence will correct his inexperience.
But had the usage which prevails in Venice and in
other modern commonwealths and kingdoms, prevailed
in Rome whereby he who had once been consul was never
afterwards to go with the army except as consul, numberless
results must have followed detrimental to the free
institutions of that city; as well from the mistakes
which the inexperience of new men would have occasioned,
as because from their ambition having a freer course,
and from their having none near them in whose presence
they might fear to do amiss, they would have grown
less scrupulous; and in this way the public service
must have suffered grave harm.

CHAPTER XXXVII.—­Of the Mischief bred
in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a
great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass
a Law opposed to ancient Usage and with stringent
retrospective Effect.

It has been said by ancient writers that to be pinched
by adversity or pampered by prosperity is the common
lot of men, and that in whichever way they are acted
upon the result is the same. For when no longer
urged to war on one another by necessity, they are
urged by ambition, which has such dominion in their
hearts that it never leaves them to whatsoever heights
they climb. For nature has so ordered it that
while they desire everything, it is impossible for
them to have everything, and thus their desires being
always in excess of their capacity to gratify them,
they remain constantly dissatisfied and discontented.
And hence the vicissitudes in human affairs.
For some seeking to enlarge their possessions, and
some to keep what they have got, wars and enmities
ensue, from which result the ruin of one country and
the growth of another.

I am led to these reflections from observing that
the commons of Rome were not content to secure themselves
against the nobles by the creation of tribunes, a
measure to which they were driven by necessity, but
after effecting this, forthwith entered upon an ambitious
contest with the nobles, seeking to share with them
what all men most esteem, namely, their honours and
their wealth. Hence was bred that disorder from
which sprang the feuds relating to the Agrarian Laws,
and which led in the end to the downfall of the Roman
republic. And although it should be the object
of every well-governed commonwealth to make the State
rich and keep individual citizens poor it must be

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allowed that in the matter of this law the city of
Rome was to blame; whether for having passed it at
first in such a shape as to require it to be continually
recast; or for having postponed it so long that its
retrospective effect was the occasion of tumult; or
else, because, although rightly framed at first, it
had come in its operation to be perverted. But
in whatever way it happened, so it was, that this
law was never spoken of in Rome without the whole
city being convulsed.

The law itself embraced two principal provisions.
By one it was enacted that no citizen should possess
more than a fixed number of acres of land; by the
other that all lands taken from the enemy should be
distributed among the whole people. A twofold
blow was thus aimed at the nobles; since all who possessed
more land than the law allowed, as most of the nobles
did, fell to be deprived of it; while by dividing the
lands of the enemy among the whole people, the road
to wealth was closed. These two grounds of offence
being given to a powerful class, to whom it appeared
that by resisting the law they did a service to the
State, the whole city, as I have said, was thrown into
an uproar on the mere mention of its name. The
nobles indeed sought to temporize, and to prevail
by patience and address; sometimes calling out the
army, sometimes opposing another tribune to the one
who was promoting the law, and sometimes coming to
a compromise by sending a colony into the lands which
were to be divided; as was done in the case of the
territory of Antium, whither, on a dispute concerning
the law having arisen, settlers were sent from Rome,
and the land made over to them. In speaking of
which colony Titus Livius makes the notable remark,
that hardly any one in Rome could be got to take part
in it, so much readier were the commons to indulge
in covetous schemes at home, than to realize them by
leaving it.

The ill humour engendered by this contest continued
to prevail until the Romans began to carry their arms
into the remoter parts of Italy and to countries beyond
its shores; after which it seemed for a time to slumber—­and
this, because the lands held by the enemies of Rome,
out of sight of her citizens and too remote to be
conveniently cultivated, came to be less desired.
Whereupon the Romans grew less eager to punish their
enemies by dividing their lands, and were content,
when they deprived any city of its territory, to send
colonists to occupy it. For causes such as these,
the measure remained in abeyance down to the time of
the Gracchi; but being by them revived, finally overthrew
the liberty of Rome. For as it found the power
of its adversaries doubled, such a flame of hatred
was kindled between commons and senate, that, regardless
of all civil restraints, they resorted to arms and
bloodshed. And as the public magistrates were
powerless to provide a remedy, each of the two factions
having no longer any hopes from them, resolved to do
what it could for itself, and to set up a chief for

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its own protection. On reaching this stage of
tumult and disorder, the commons lent their influence
to Marius, making him four times consul; whose authority,
lasting thus long, and with very brief intervals, became
so firmly rooted that he was able to make himself
consul other three times. Against this scourge,
the nobles, lacking other defence, set themselves
to favour Sylla, and placing him at the head of their
faction, entered on the civil wars; wherein, after
much blood had been spilt, and after many changes
of fortune, they got the better of their adversaries.
But afterwards, in the time of Caesar and Pompey,
the distemper broke out afresh; for Caesar heading
the Marian party, and Pompey, that of Sylla, and war
ensuing, the victory remained with Caesar, who was
the first tyrant in Rome; after whose time that city
was never again free. Such, therefore, was the
beginning and such the end of the Agrarian Law.

But since it has elsewhere been said that the struggle
between the commons and senate of Rome preserved her
liberties, as giving rise to laws favourable to freedom,
it might seem that the consequences of the Agrarian
Law are opposed to that view. I am not, however,
led to alter my opinion on this account; for I maintain
that the ambition of the great is so pernicious that
unless controlled and counteracted in a variety of
ways, it will always reduce a city to speedy ruin.
So that if the controversy over the Agrarian Laws
took three hundred years to bring Rome to slavery,
she would in all likelihood have been brought to slavery
in a far shorter time, had not the commons, by means
of this law, and by other demands, constantly restrained
the ambition of the nobles.

We may also learn from this contest how much more
men value wealth than honours; for in the matter of
honours, the Roman nobles always gave way to the commons
without any extraordinary resistance; but when it came
to be a question of property, so stubborn were they
in its defence, that the commons to effect their ends
had to resort to those irregular methods which have
been described above. Of which irregularities
the prime movers were the Gracchi, whose motives are
more to be commended than their measures; since to
pass a law with stringent retrospective effect, in
order to remove an abuse of long standing in a republic,
is an unwise step, and one which, as I have already
shown at length, can have no other result than to
accelerate the mischief to which the abuse leads;
whereas, if you temporize, either the abuse develops
more slowly, or else, in course of time, and before
it comes to a head, dies out of itself.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.—­That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and
that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice.

A terrible pestilence breaking out in Rome seemed
to the Equians and Volscians to offer a fit opportunity
for crushing her. The two nations, therefore,
assembling a great army, attacked the Latins and Hernicians
and laid waste their country. Whereupon the Latins
and Hernicians were forced to make their case known
to the Romans, and to ask to be defended by them.
The Romans, who were sorely afflicted by the pestilence,
answered that they must look to their own defence,
and with their own forces, since Rome was in no position
to succour them.

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Here we recognize the prudence and magnanimity of
the Roman senate, and how at all times, and in all
changes of fortune, they assumed the responsibility
of determining the course their country should take;
and were not ashamed, when necessary, to decide on
a course contrary to that which was usual with them,
or which they had decided to follow on some other
occasion. I say this because on other occasions
this same senate had forbidden these nations to defend
themselves; and a less prudent assembly might have
thought it lowered their credit to withdraw that prohibition.
But the Roman senate always took a sound view of things,
and always accepted the least hurtful course as the
best. So that, although it was distasteful to
them not to be able to defend their subjects, and
equally distasteful—­both for the reasons
given, and for others which may be understood—­that
their subjects should take up arms in their absence,
nevertheless knowing that these must have recourse
to arms in any case, since the enemy was upon them,
they took an honourable course in deciding that what
had to be done should be done with their leave, lest
men driven to disobey by necessity should come afterwards
to disobey from choice. And although this may
seem the course which every republic ought reasonably
to follow, nevertheless weak and badly-advised republics
cannot make up their minds to follow it, not knowing
how to do themselves honour in like extremities.

After Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and forced Bologna
to yield to his terms, desiring to return to Rome
through Tuscany, he sent one of his people to Florence
to ask leave for himself and his army to pass.
A council was held in Florence to consider how this
request should be dealt with, but no one was favourable
to the leave asked for being granted. Wherein
the Roman method was not followed. For as the
Duke had a very strong force with him, while the Florentines
were so bare of troops that they could not have prevented
his passage, it would have been far more for their
credit that he should seem to pass with their consent,
than that he should pass in spite of them; because,
while discredit had to be incurred either way, they
would have incurred less by acceding to his demand.

But of all courses the worst for a weak State is to
be irresolute; for then whatever it does will seem
to be done under compulsion, so that if by chance
it should do anything well, this will be set down to
necessity and not to prudence. Of this I shall
cite two other instances happening in our own times,
and in our own country. In the year 1500, King
Louis of France, after recovering Milan, being desirous
to restore Pisa to the Florentines, so as to obtain
payment from them of the fifty thousand ducats which
they had promised him on the restitution being completed,
sent troops to Pisa under M. Beaumont, in whom, though
a Frenchman, the Florentines put much trust.
Beaumont accordingly took up his position with his

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forces between Cascina and Pisa, to be in readiness
to attack the town. After he had been there for
some days making arrangements for the assault, envoys
came to him from Pisa offering to surrender their
city to the French if a promise were given in the king’s
name, not to hand it over to the Florentines until
four months had run. This condition was absolutely
rejected by the Florentines, and the siege being proceeded
with, they were forced to retire with disgrace.
Now the proposal of the Pisans was rejected by the
Florentines for no other reason than that they distrusted
the good faith of the King, into whose hands their
weakness obliged them to commit themselves, and did
not reflect how much more it was for their interest
that, by obtaining entrance into Pisa, he should have
it in his power to restore the town to them, or, failing
to restore it, should at once disclose his designs,
than that remaining outside he should put them off
with promises for which they had to pay. It would
therefore have been a far better course for the Florentines
to have agreed to Beaumont taking possession on whatever
terms.

This was seen afterwards by experience in the year
1502, when, on the revolt of Arezzo, M. Imbalt was
sent by the King of France with French troops to assist
the Florentines. For when he got near Arezzo,
and began to negotiate with the Aretines, who, like
the Pisans, were willing to surrender their town on
terms, the acceptance of these terms was strongly
disapproved in Florence; which Imbalt learning, and
thinking that the Florentines were acting with little
sense, he took the entire settlement of conditions
into his own hands, and, without consulting the Florentine
commissioners, concluded an arrangement to his own
satisfaction, in execution of which he entered Arezzo
with his army. And he let the Florentines know
that he thought them fools and ignorant of the ways
of the world; since if they desired to have Arezzo,
they could signify their wishes to the King, who would
be much better able to give it them when he had his
soldiers inside, than when he had them outside the
town. Nevertheless, in Florence they never ceased
to blame and abuse M. Imbalt, until at last they came
to see that if Beaumont had acted in the same way,
they would have got possession Of Pisa as well as of
Arezzo.

Applying what has been said to the matter in hand,
we find that irresolute republics, unless upon compulsion,
never follow wise courses; for wherever there is room
for doubt, their weakness will not suffer them to
come to any resolve; so that unless their doubts be
overcome by some superior force which impels them
forward, they remain always in suspense.

CHAPTER XXXIX.—­That often the same Accidents are seen to befall
different Nations.

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Any one comparing the present with the past will soon
perceive that in all cities and in all nations there
prevail the same desires and passions as always have
prevailed; for which reason it should be an easy matter
for him who carefully examines past events, to foresee
those which are about to happen in any republic, and
to apply such remedies as the ancients have used in
like cases; or finding none which have been used by
them, to strike out new ones, such as they might have
used in similar circumstances. But these lessons
being neglected or not understood by readers, or,
if understood by them, being unknown to rulers, it
follows that the same disorders are common to all times.

In the year 1494 the Republic of Florence, having
lost a portion of its territories, including Pisa
and other towns, was forced to make war against those
who had taken possession of them, who being powerful,
it followed that great sums were spent on these wars
to little purpose. This large expenditure had
to be met by heavy taxes which gave occasion to numberless
complaints on the part of the people; and inasmuch
as the war was conducted by a council of ten citizens,
who were styled “the Ten of the War,”
the multitude began to regard these with displeasure,
as though they were the cause of the war and of the
consequent expenditure; and at last persuaded themselves
that if they got rid of this magistracy there would
be an end to the war. Wherefore when the magistracy
of “the Ten” should have been renewed,
the people did not renew it, but, suffering it to
lapse, entrusted their affairs to the “Signory.”
This course was most pernicious, since not only did
it fail to put an end to the war, as the people expected
it would, but by setting aside men who had conducted
it with prudence, led to such mishaps that not Pisa
only, but Arezzo also, and many other towns besides
were lost to Florence. Whereupon, the people
recognizing their mistake, and that the evil was in
the disease and not in the physician, reinstated the
magistracy of the Ten.

Similar dissatisfaction grew up in Rome against the
consular authority. For the people seeing one
war follow another, and that they were never allowed
to rest, when they should have ascribed this to the
ambition of neighbouring nations who desired their
overthrow, ascribed it to the ambition of the nobles,
who, as they believed, being unable to wreak their
hatred against them within the city, where they were
protected by the power of the tribunes, sought to
lead them outside the city, where they were under
the authority of the consuls, that they might crush
them where they were without help. In which belief
they thought it necessary either to get rid of the
consuls altogether, or so to restrict their powers
as to leave them no authority over the people, either
in the city or out of it.

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The first who attempted to pass a law to this effect
was the tribune Terentillus, who proposed that a committee
of five should be named to consider and regulate the
power of the consuls. This roused the anger of
the nobles, to whom it seemed that the greatness of
their authority was about to set for ever, and that
no part would be left them in the administration of
the republic. Such, however, was the obstinacy
of the tribunes, that they succeeded in abolishing
the consular title, nor were satisfied until, after
other changes, it was resolved that, in room of consuls,
tribunes should be appointed with consular powers;
so much greater was their hatred of the name than
of the thing. For a long time matters remained
on this footing; till eventually, the commons, discovering
their mistake, resumed the appointment of consuls in
the same way as the Florentines reverted to “the
Ten of the War.”

CHAPTER XL.—­Of the creation of the Decemvirate
in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein
among other Matters is shown how the same Causes may
lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth.

It being my desire to treat fully of those disorders
which arose in Rome on the creation of the decemvirate,
I think it not amiss first of all to relate what took
place at the time of that creation, and then to discuss
those circumstances attending it which seem most to
deserve notice. These are numerous, and should
be well considered, both by those who would maintain
the liberties of a commonwealth and by those who would
subvert them. For in the course of our inquiry
it will be seen that many mistakes prejudicial to
freedom were made by the senate and people, and that
many were likewise made by Appius, the chief decemvir,
prejudicial to that tyranny which it was his aim to
establish in Rome.

After much controversy and wrangling between the commons
and the nobles as to the framing of new laws by which
the freedom of Rome might be better secured, Spurius
Posthumius and two other citizens were, by general
consent, despatched to Athens to procure copies of
the laws which Solon had drawn up for the Athenians,
to the end that these might serve as a groundwork
for the laws of Rome. On their return, the next
step was to depute certain persons to examine these
laws and to draft the new code. For which purpose
a commission consisting of ten members, among whom
was Appius Claudius, a crafty and ambitious citizen,
was appointed for a year; and that the commissioners
in framing their laws might act without fear or favour,
all the other magistracies, and in particular the
consulate and tribuneship, were suspended, and the
appeal to the people discontinued; so that the decemvirs
came to be absolute in Rome. Very soon the whole
authority of the commissioners came to be centred
in Appius, owing to the favour in which he was held
by the commons. For although before he had been
regarded as the cruel persecutor of the people, he
now showed himself so conciliatory in his bearing
that men wondered at the sudden change in his character
and disposition.

Page 76

This set of commissioners, then, behaved discreetly,
being attended by no more than twelve lictors, walking
in front of that decemvir whom the rest put forward
as their chief; and though vested with absolute authority,
yet when a Roman citizen had to be tried for murder,
they cited him before the people and caused him to
be judged by them. Their laws they wrote upon
ten tables, but before signing them they exposed them
publicly, that every one might read and consider them,
and if any defect were discovered in them, it might
be corrected before they were finally passed.
At this juncture Appius caused it to be notified throughout
the city that were two other tables added to these
ten, the laws would be complete; hoping that under
this belief the people would consent to continue the
decemvirate for another year. This consent the
people willingly gave, partly to prevent the consuls
being reinstated, and partly because they thought
they could hold their ground without the aid of the
tribunes, who, as has already been said, were the judges
in criminal cases.

On it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate,
all the nobles set to canvass for the office, Appius
among the foremost; and such cordiality did he display
towards the commons while seeking their votes, that
the other candidates, “unable to persuade
themselves that so much affability on the part of
so proud a man was wholly disinterested,”
began to suspect him; but fearing to oppose him openly,
sought to circumvent him, by putting him forward,
though the youngest of them all, to declare to the
people the names of the proposed decemvirs; thinking
that he would not venture to name himself, that being
an unusual course in Rome, and held discreditable.
“But what they meant as a hindrance, he turned
to account,” by proposing, to the surprise
and displeasure of the whole nobility, his own name
first, and then nominating nine others on whose support
he thought he could depend.

The new appointments, which were to last for a year,
having been made, Appius soon let both commons and
nobles know the mistake they had committed, for throwing
off the mask, he allowed his innate arrogance to appear,
and speedily infected his colleagues with the same
spirit; who, to overawe the people and the senate,
instead of twelve lictors, appointed one hundred and
twenty. For a time their measures were directed
against high and low alike; but presently they began
to intrigue with the senate, and to attack the commons;
and if any of the latter, on being harshly used by
one decemvir, ventured to appeal to another, he was
worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance.
The commons, on discovering their error, began in their
despair to turn their eyes towards the nobles, “and
to look for a breeze of freedom from that very quarter
whence fearing slavery they had brought the republic
to its present straits.” To the nobles the
sufferings of the commons were not displeasing, from
the hope “that disgusted with the existing
state of affairs, they too might come to desire the
restoration of the consuls.”

Page 77

When the year for which the decemvirs were appointed
at last came to an end, the two additional tables
of the law were ready, but had not yet been published.
This was made a pretext by them for prolonging their
magistracy, which they took measures to retain by force,
gathering round them for this purpose a retinue of
young noblemen, whom they enriched with the goods
of those citizens whom they had condemned. “Corrupted
by which gifts, these youths came to prefer selfish
licence to public freedom.”

It happened that at this time the Sabines and Volscians
began to stir up a war against Rome, and it was during
the alarm thereby occasioned that the decemvirs were
first made aware how weak was their position.
For without the senate they could take no warlike
measures, while by assembling the senate they seemed
to put an end to their own authority. Nevertheless,
being driven to it by necessity, they took this latter
course. When the senate met, many of the senators,
but particularly Valerius and Horatius, inveighed
against the insolence of the decemvirs, whose power
would forthwith have been cut short, had not the senate
through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise
their authority. For they thought that were the
decemvirs to lay down office of their own free will,
tribunes might not be reappointed. Wherefore they
decided for war, and sent forth the armies under command
of certain of the decemvirs. But Appius remaining
behind to govern the city, it so fell out that he
became enamoured of Virginia, and that when he sought
to lay violent hands upon her, Virginius, her father,
to save her from dishonour, slew her. Thereupon
followed tumults in Rome, and mutiny among the soldiers,
who, making common cause with the rest of the plebeians,
betook themselves to the Sacred Hill, and there remained
until the decemvirs laid down their office; when tribunes
and consuls being once more appointed, Rome was restored
to her ancient freedom.

In these events we note, first of all, that the pernicious
step of creating this tyranny in Rome was due to the
same causes which commonly give rise to tyrannies
in cities; namely, the excessive love of the people
for liberty, and the passionate eagerness of the nobles
to govern. For when they cannot agree to pass
some measure favourable to freedom, one faction or
the other sets itself to support some one man, and
a tyranny at once springs up. Both parties in
Rome consented to the creation of the decemvirs, and
to their exercising unrestricted powers, from the
desire which the one had to put an end to the consular
name, and the other to abolish the authority of the
tribunes. When, on the appointment of the decemvirate,
it seemed to the commons that Appius had become favourable
to their cause, and was ready to attack the nobles,
they inclined to support him. But when a people
is led to commit this error of lending its support
to some one man, in order that he may attack those
whom it holds in hatred, if he only be prudent he will
inevitably become the tyrant of that city. For
he will wait until, with the support of the people,
he can deal a fatal blow to the nobles, and will never
set himself to oppress the people until the nobles
have been rooted out. But when that time comes,
the people, although they recognize their servitude,
will have none to whom they can turn for help.

Page 78

Had this method, which has been followed by all who
have successfully established tyrannies in republics,
been followed by Appius, his power would have been
more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly
opposite course, he could not have acted more unwisely
than he did. For in his eagerness to grasp the
tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to those who were
in fact conferring it, and who could have maintained
him in it; and he destroyed those who were his friends,
while he sought friendship from those from whom he
could not have it. For although it be the desire
of the nobles to tyrannize, that section of them which
finds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile
to the tyrant, who can never succeed in gaining over
the entire body of the nobles by reason of their greed
and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours or
wealth enough to satisfy them all.

In abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with
the nobles, Appius committed a manifest mistake, as
well for the reasons above given, as because to hold
a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be
stronger than he against whom it is used. Whence
it happens that those tyrants who have the mass of
the people for their friends and the nobles for their
enemies, are more secure than those who have the people
for their enemies and the nobles for their friends;
because in the former case their authority has the
stronger support. For with such support a ruler
can maintain himself by the internal strength of his
State, as did Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked
by the Romans and by the whole of Greece; for making
sure work with the nobles, who were few in number,
and having the people on his side, he was able with
their assistance to defend himself; which he could
not have done had they been against him. But
in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant has few friends,
its internal strength will not avail him for its defence,
and he will have to seek aid from without in one of
three shapes. For either he must hire foreign
guards to defend his person; or he must arm the peasantry,
so that they may play the part which ought to be played
by the citizens; or he must league with powerful neighbours
for his defence. He who follows these methods
and observes them well, may contrive to save himself,
though he has the people for his enemy. But Appius
could not follow the plan of gaining over the peasantry,
since in Rome they and the people were one. And
what he might have done he knew not how to do, and
so was ruined at the very outset.

In creating the decemvirate, therefore, both the senate
and the people made grave mistakes. For although,
as already explained, when speaking of the dictatorship,
it is those magistrates who make themselves, and not
those made by the votes of the people, that are hurtful
to freedom; nevertheless the people, in creating magistrates
ought to take such precautions as will make it difficult
for these to become bad. But the Romans when

Page 79

they ought to have set a check on the decemvirs in
order to keep them good, dispensed with it, making
them the sole magistrates of Rome, and setting aside
all others; and this from the excessive desire of
the senate to get rid of the tribunes, and of the commons
to get rid of the consuls; by which objects both were
so blinded as to fall into all the disorders which
ensued. For, as King Ferrando was wont to say,
men often behave like certain of the smaller birds,
which are so intent on the prey to which nature incites
them, that they discern not the eagle hovering overhead
for their destruction.

In this Discourse then the mistakes made by the Roman
people in their efforts to preserve their freedom
and the mistakes made by Appius in his endeavour to
obtain the tyranny, have, as I proposed at the outset,
been plainly shown.

CHAPTER XLI.—­That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to
severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble.

Among the crafty devices used by Appius to aid him
in maintaining his authority, this, of suddenly passing
from one character to the other extreme, was of no
small prejudice to him. For his fraud in pretending
to the commons to be well disposed towards them, was
happily contrived; as were also the means he took
to bring about the reappointment of the decemvirate.
Most skilful, too, was his audacity in nominating himself
contrary to the expectation of the nobles, and in proposing
colleagues on whom he could depend to carry out his
ends. But, as I have said already, it was not
happily contrived that, after doing all this, he should
suddenly turn round, and from being the friend, reveal
himself the enemy of the people; haughty instead of
humane; cruel instead of kindly; and make this change
so rapidly as to leave himself no shadow of excuse,
but compel all to recognize the doubleness of his nature.
For he who has once seemed good, should he afterwards
choose, for his own ends, to become bad, ought to
change by slow degrees, and as opportunity serves;
so that before his altered nature strip him of old
favour, he may have gained for himself an equal share
of new, and thus his influence suffer no diminution.
For otherwise, being at once unmasked and friendless,
he is undone:

CHAPTER XLII.—­How easily Men become corrupted.

In this matter of the decemvirate we may likewise
note the ease wherewith men become corrupted, and
how completely, although born good and well brought
up, they change their nature. For we see how favourably
disposed the youths whom Appius gathered round him
became towards his tyranny, in return for the trifling
benefits which they drew from it; and how Quintus
Fabius, one of the second decemvirate and a most worthy
man, blinded by a little ambition, and misled by the
evil counsels of Appius, abandoning his fair fame,
betook himself to most unworthy courses, and grew
like his master.

Page 80

Careful consideration of this should make those who
frame laws for commonwealths and kingdoms more alive
to the necessity of placing restraints on men’s
evil appetites, and depriving them of all hope of
doing wrong with impunity.

CHAPTER XLIII.—­That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and
resolute Soldiers.

From what has been touched upon above, we are also
led to remark how wide is the difference between an
army which, having no ground for discontent, fights
in its own cause, and one which, being discontented,
fights to satisfy the ambition of others. For
whereas the Romans were always victorious under the
consuls, under the decemvirs they were always defeated.
This helps us to understand why it is that mercenary
troops are worthless; namely, that they have no incitement
to keep them true to you beyond the pittance which
you pay them, which neither is nor can be a sufficient
motive for such fidelity and devotion as would make
them willing to die in your behalf. But in those
armies in which there exists not such an attachment
towards him for whom they fight as makes them devoted
to his cause, there never will be valour enough to
withstand an enemy if only he be a little brave.
And since such attachment and devotion cannot be looked
for from any save your own subjects, you must, if
you would preserve your dominions, or maintain your
commonwealth or kingdom, arm the natives of your country;
as we see to have been done by all those who have
achieved great things in war.

Under the decemvirs the ancient valour of the Roman
soldiers had in no degree abated; yet, because they
were no longer animated by the same good will, they
did not exert themselves as they were wont. But
so soon as the decemvirate came to an end, and the
soldiers began once more to fight as free men, the
old spirit was reawakened, and, as a consequence,
their enterprises, according to former usage, were
brought to a successful close.

CHAPTER XLIV.—­That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that
we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave.

When Virginia died by her father’s hand, the
commons of Rome withdrew under arms to the Sacred
Hill. Whereupon the senate sent messengers to
demand by what sanction they had deserted their commanders
and assembled there in arms. And in such reverence
was the authority of the senate held, that the commons,
lacking leaders, durst make no reply. “Not,”
says Titus Livius, “that they were at a loss
what to answer, but because they had none to answer
for them;” words which clearly show how helpless
a thing is the multitude when without a head.

Page 81

This defect was perceived by Virginius, at whose instance
twenty military tribunes were appointed by the commons
to be their spokesmen with the senate, and to negotiate
terms; who, having asked that Valerius and Horatius
might be sent to them, to whom their wishes would be
made known, these declined to go until the decemvirs
had laid down their office. When this was done,
and Valerius and Horatius came to the hill where the
commons were assembled, the latter demanded that tribunes
of the people should be appointed; that in future
there should be an appeal to the people from the magistrates
of whatever degree; and that all the decemvirs should
be given up to them to be burned alive. Valerius
and Horatius approved the first two demands, but rejected
the last as inhuman; telling the commons that “they
were rushing into that very cruelty which they themselves
had condemned in others;” and counselling them
to say nothing about the decemvirs, but to be satisfied
to regain their own power and authority; since thus
the way would be open to them for obtaining every
redress.

Here we see plainly how foolish and unwise it is to
ask a thing and with the same breath to say, “I
desire this that I may inflict an injury.”
For we should never declare our intention beforehand,
but watch for every opportunity to carry it out.
So that it is enough to ask another for his weapons,
without adding, “With these I purpose to destroy
you;” for when once you have secured his weapons,
you can use them afterwards as you please.

CHAPTER XLV.—­That it is of evil example,
especially in the Maker of a Law, not to observe the
Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of
injustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor.

Terms having been adjusted, and the old order of things
restored in Rome, Virginius cited Appius to defend
himself before the people; and on his appearing attended
by many of the nobles, ordered him to be led to prison.
Whereupon Appius began to cry out and appeal to the
people. But Virginius told him that he was unworthy
to be allowed that appeal which he had himself done
away with, or to have that people whom he had wronged
for his protectors. Appius rejoined, that the
people should not set at nought that right of appeal
which they themselves had insisted on with so much
zeal. Nevertheless, he was dragged to prison,
and before the day of trial slew himself. Now,
though the wicked life of Appius merited every punishment,
still it was impolitic to violate the laws, more particularly
a law which had only just been passed; for nothing,
I think, is of worse example in a republic, than to
make a law and not to keep it; and most of all, when
he who breaks is he that made it.

Page 82

After the year 1494, the city of Florence reformed
its government with the help of the Friar Girolamo
Savonarola, whose writings declare his learning, his
wisdom, and the excellence of his heart. Among
other ordinances for the safety of the citizens, he
caused a law to be passed, allowing an appeal to the
people from the sentences pronounced by “the
Eight” and by the “Signory” in trials
for State offences; a law he had long contended for,
and carried at last with great difficulty. It
so happened that a very short time after it was passed,
five citizens were condemned to death by the “Signory”
for State offences, and that when they sought to appeal
to the people they were not permitted to do so, and
the law was violated. This, more than any other
mischance, helped to lessen the credit of the Friar;
since if his law of appeal was salutary, he should
have caused it to be observed; if useless, he ought
not to have promoted it. And his inconsistency
was the more remarked, because in all the sermons
which he preached after the law was broken, he never
either blamed or excused the person who had broken
it, as though unwilling to condemn, while unable to
justify what suited his purposes. This, as betraying
the ambitious and partial turn of his mind, took from
his reputation and exposed him to much obloquy.

Another thing which greatly hurts a government is
to keep alive bitter feelings in men’s minds
by often renewed attacks on individuals, as was done
in Rome after the decemvirate was put an end to.
For each of the decemvirs, and other citizens besides,
were at different times accused and condemned, so
that the greatest alarm was spread through the whole
body of the nobles, who came to believe that these
prosecutions would never cease until their entire
order was exterminated. And this must have led
to grave mischief had not Marcus Duilius the tribune
provided against it, by an edict which forbade every
one, for the period of a year, citing or accusing
any Roman citizen, an ordinance which had the effect
of reassuring the whole nobility. Here we see
how hurtful it is for a prince or commonwealth to
keep the minds of their subjects in constant alarm
and suspense by continually renewed punishments and
violence. And, in truth, no course can be more
pernicious. For men who are in fear for their
safety will seize on every opportunity for securing
themselves against the dangers which surround them,
and will grow at once more daring, and less scrupulous
in resorting to new courses. For these reasons
we should either altogether avoid inflicting injury,
or should inflict every injury at a stroke, and then
seek to reassure men’s minds and suffer them
to settle down and rest.

CHAPTER XLVI.—­That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another,
seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others.

Page 83

As the commons of Rome on recovering their freedom
were restored to their former position—­nay,
to one still stronger since many new laws had been
passed which confirmed and extended their authority,—­it
might reasonably have been hoped that Rome would for
a time remain at rest. The event, however, showed
the contrary, for from day to day there arose in that
city new tumults and fresh dissensions. And since
the causes which brought this about have been most
judiciously set forth by Titus Livius, it seems to
me much to the purpose to cite his own words when he
says, that “whenever either the commons or the
nobles were humble, the others grew haughty; so that
if the commons kept within due bounds, the young nobles
began to inflict injuries upon them, against which
the tribunes, who were themselves made the objects
of outrage, were little able to give redress; while
the nobles on their part, although they could not
close their eyes to the ill behaviour of their young
men, were yet well pleased that if excesses were to
be committed, they should be committed by their own
faction, and not by the commons. Thus the desire
to secure its own liberty prompted each faction to
make itself strong enough to oppress the other.
For this is the common course of things, that in seeking
to escape cause for fear, men come to give others cause
to be afraid by inflicting on them those wrongs from
which they strive to relieve themselves; as though
the choice lay between injuring and being injured.”

Herein, among other things, we perceive in what ways
commonwealths are overthrown, and how men climb from
one ambition to another; and recognize the truth of
those words which Sallust puts in the mouth of Caesar,
that “all ill actions have their origin in
fair beginnings.” [1] For, as I have said
already, the ambitious citizen in a commonwealth seeks
at the outset to secure himself against injury, not
only at the hands of private persons, but also of the
magistrates; to effect which he endeavours to gain
himself friends. These he obtains by means honourable
in appearance, either by supplying them with money
or protecting them against the powerful. And
because such conduct seems praiseworthy, every one
is readily deceived by it, and consequently no remedy
is applied. Pursuing these methods without hindrance,
this man presently comes to be so powerful that private
citizens begin to fear him, and the magistrates to
treat him with respect. But when he has advanced
thus far on the road to power without encountering
opposition, he has reached a point at which it is
most dangerous to cope with him; it being dangerous,
as I have before explained, to contend with a disorder
which has already made progress in a city. Nevertheless,
when he has brought things to this pass, you must
either endeavour to crush him, at the risk of immediate
ruin, or else, unless death or some like accident
interpose, you incur inevitable slavery by letting
him alone. For when, as I have said, it has come
to this that the citizens and even the magistrates
fear to offend him and his friends, little further
effort will afterwards be needed to enable him to proscribe
and ruin whom he pleases.

Page 84

A republic ought, therefore, to provide by its ordinances
that none of its citizens shall, under colour of doing
good, have it in their power to do evil, but shall
be suffered to acquire such influence only as may
aid and not injure freedom. How this may be done,
shall presently be explained.

CHAPTER XLVII.—­That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in
Particulars they judge truly.

The commons of Rome having, as I have said, grown
disgusted with the consular name, and desiring either
that men of plebeian birth should be admitted to the
office or its authority be restricted, the nobles,
to prevent its degradation in either of these two
ways, proposed a middle course, whereby four tribunes,
who might either be plebeians or nobles, were to be
created with consular authority. This compromise
satisfied the commons, who thought they would thus
get rid of the consulship, and secure the highest
offices of the State for their own order. But
here a circumstance happened worth noting. When
the four tribunes came to be chosen, the people, who
had it in their power to choose all from the commons,
chose all from the nobles. With respect to which
election Titus Livius observes, that “the
result showed that the people when declaring their
honest judgment after controversy was over, were governed
by a different spirit from that which had inspired
them while contending for their liberties and for
a share in public honours.” The reason
for this I believe to be, that men deceive themselves
more readily in generals than in particulars.
To the commons of Rome it seemed, in the abstract,
that they had every right to be admitted to the consulship,
since their party in the city was the more numerous,
since they bore the greater share of danger in their
wars, and since it was they who by their valour kept
Rome free and made her powerful. And because it
appeared to them, as I have said, that their desire
was a reasonable one, they were resolved to satisfy
it at all hazards. But when they had to form a
particular judgment on the men of their own party,
they recognized their defects, and decided that individually
no one of them was deserving of what, collectively,
they seemed entitled to; and being ashamed of them,
turned to bestow their honours on those who deserved
them. Of which decision Titus Livius, speaking
with due admiration, says, “Where shall we
now find in any one man, that modesty, moderation,
and magnanimity which were then common to the entire
people?”

Page 85

As confirming what I have said, I shall cite another
noteworthy incident, which occurred in Capua after
the rout of the Romans by Hannibal at Cannae.
For all Italy being convulsed by that defeat, Capua
too was threatened with civil tumult, through the hatred
which prevailed between her people and senate.
But Pacuvius Calavius, who at this time filled the
office of chief magistrate, perceiving the danger,
took upon himself to reconcile the contending factions.
With this object he assembled the Senate and pointed
out to them the hatred in which they were held by
the people, and the risk they ran of being put to death
by them, and of the city, now that the Romans were
in distress, being given up to Hannibal. But
he added that, were they to consent to leave the matter
with him, he thought he could contrive to reconcile
them; in the meanwhile, however, he must shut them
up in the palace, that, by putting it in the power
of the people to punish them, he might secure their
safety.

The senate consenting to this proposal, he shut them
up in the palace, and summoning the people to a public
meeting, told them the time had at last come for them
to trample on the insolence of the nobles, and requite
the wrongs suffered at their hands; for he had them
all safe under bolt and bar; but, as he supposed they
did not wish the city to remain without rulers, it
was fit, before putting the old senators to death,
they should appoint others in their room. Wherefore
he had thrown the names of all the old senators into
a bag, and would now proceed to draw them out one
by one, and as they were drawn would cause them to
be put to death, so soon as a successor was found
for each. When the first name he drew was declared,
there arose a great uproar among the people, all crying
out against the cruelty, pride, and arrogance of that
senator whose name it was. But on Pacuvius desiring
them to propose a substitute, the meeting was quieted,
and after a brief pause one of the commons was nominated.
No sooner, however, was his name mentioned than one
began to whistle, another to laugh, some jeering at
him in one way and some in another. And the same
thing happening in every case, each and all of those
nominated were judged unworthy of senatorial rank.
Whereupon Pacuvius, profiting by the opportunity, said,
“Since you are agreed that the city would be
badly off without a senate, but are not agreed whom
to appoint in the room of the old senators, it will,
perhaps, be well for you to be reconciled to them;
for the fear into which they have been thrown must
have so subdued them, that you are sure to find in
them that affability which hitherto you have looked
for in vain.” This proposal being agreed
to, a reconciliation followed between the two orders;
the commons having seen their error so soon as they
were obliged to come to particulars.

Page 86

A people therefore is apt to err in judging of things
and their accidents in the abstract, but on becoming
acquainted with particulars, speedily discovers its
mistakes. In the year 1494, when her greatest
citizens were banished from Florence, and no regular
government any longer existed there, but a spirit
of licence prevailed, and matters went continually
from bad to worse, many Florentines perceiving the
decay of their city, and discerning no other cause
for it, blamed the ambition of this or the other powerful
citizen, who, they thought, was fomenting these disorders
with a view to establish a government to his own liking,
and to rob them of their liberties. Those who
thought thus, would hang about the arcades and public
squares, maligning many citizens, and giving it to
be understood that if ever they found themselves in
the Signory, they would expose the designs of these
citizens and have them punished. From time to
time it happened that one or another of those who
used this language rose to be of the chief magistracy,
and so soon as he obtained this advancement, and saw
things nearer, became aware whence the disorders I
have spoken of really came, the dangers attending
them, and the difficulty in dealing with them; and
recognizing that they were the growth of the times,
and not occasioned by particular men, suddenly altered
his views and conduct; a nearer knowledge of facts
freeing him from the false impressions he had been
led into on a general view of affairs. But those
who had heard him speak as a private citizen, when
they saw him remain inactive after he was made a magistrate,
believed that this arose not from his having obtained
any better knowledge of things, but from his having
been cajoled or corrupted by the great. And this
happening with many men and often, it came to be a
proverb among the people, that “men had one
mind in the market-place, another in the palace.”

Reflecting on what has been said, we see how quickly
men’s eyes may be opened, if knowing that they
deceive themselves in generalities, we can find a
way to make them pass to particulars; as Pacuvius did
in the case of the Capuans, and the senate in the
case of Rome. Nor do I believe that any prudent
man need shrink from the judgment of the people in
questions relating to particulars, as, for instance,
in the distribution of honours and dignities.
For in such matters only, the people are either never
mistaken, or at any rate far seldomer than a small
number of persons would be, were the distribution
entrusted to them.

It seems to me, however, not out of place to notice
in the following Chapter, a method employed by the
Roman senate to enlighten the people in making this
distribution.

CHAPTER XLVIII.—­He who would not have
an Office bestowed on some worthless or wicked Person,
should contrive that it be solicited by one who is
utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is
in the highest degree noble and good.

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Whenever the senate saw a likelihood of the tribunes
with consular powers being chosen exclusively from
the commons, it took one or other of two ways,—­either
by causing the office to be solicited by the most
distinguished among the citizens; or else, to confess
the truth, by bribing some base and ignoble fellow
to fasten himself on to those other plebeians of better
quality who were seeking the office, and become a
candidate conjointly with them. The latter device
made the people ashamed to give, the former ashamed
to refuse.

This confirms what I said in my last Chapter, as to
the people deceiving themselves in generalities but
not in particulars.

CHAPTER XLIX.—­That if Cities which,
like Rome, had their beginning in Freedom, have had
difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve
their Freedom, Cities which at the first have been
in Subjection will find this almost impossible.

How hard it is in founding a commonwealth to provide
it with all the laws needed to maintain its freedom,
is well seen from the history of the Roman Republic.
For although ordinances were given it first by Romulus,
then by Numa, afterwards by Tullus Hostilius and Servius,
and lastly by the Ten created for the express purpose,
nevertheless, in the actual government of Rome new
needs were continually developed, to meet which, new
ordinances had constantly to be devised; as in the
creation of the censors, who were one of the chief
means by which Rome was kept free during the whole
period of her constitutional government. For as
the censors became the arbiters of morals in Rome,
it was very much owing to them that the progress of
the Romans towards corruption was retarded. And
though, at the first creation of the office, a mistake
was doubtless made in fixing its term at five years,
this was corrected not long after by the wisdom of
the dictator Mamercus, who passed a law reducing it
to eighteen months; a change which the censors then
in office took in such ill part, that they deprived
Mamercus of his rank as a senator. This step
was much blamed both by the commons and the Fathers;
still, as our History does not record that Mamercus
obtained any redress, we must infer either that the
Historian has omitted something, or that on this head
the laws of Rome were defective; since it is never
well that the laws of a commonwealth should suffer
a citizen to incur irremediable wrong because he promotes
a measure favourable to freedom.

But returning to the matter under consideration, we
have, in connection with the creation of this new
office, to note, that if those cities which, as was
the case with Rome, have had their beginning in freedom,
and have by themselves maintained that freedom, have
experienced great difficulty in framing good laws
for the preservation of their liberties, it is little
to be wondered at that cities which at the first were
dependent, should find it not difficult merely but
impossible so to shape their ordinances as to enable

Page 88

them to live free and undisturbed. This difficulty
we see to have arisen in the case of Florence, which,
being subject at first to the power of Rome and subsequently
to that of other rulers, remained long in servitude,
taking no thought for herself; and even afterwards,
when she could breathe more freely and began to frame
her own laws, these, since they were blended with ancient
ordinances which were bad, could not themselves be
good; and thus for the two hundred years of which
we have trustworthy record, our city has gone on patching
her institutions, without ever possessing a government
in respect of which she could truly be termed a commonwealth.

The difficulties which have been felt in Florence
are the same as have been felt in all cities which
have had a like origin; and although, repeatedly,
by the free and public votes of her citizens, ample
authority has been given to a few of their number to
reform her constitution, no alteration of general
utility has ever been introduced, but only such as
forwarded the interests of the party to which those
commissioned to make changes belonged. This, instead
of order, has occasioned the greatest disorder in
our city.

But to come to particulars, I say, that among other
matters which have to be considered by the founder
of a commonwealth, is the question into whose hands
should be committed the power of life and death over
its citizens’ This was well seen to in Rome,
where, as a rule, there was a right of appeal to the
people, but where, on any urgent case arising in which
it might have been dangerous to delay the execution
of a judicial sentence, recourse could be had to a
dictator with powers to execute justice at once; a
remedy, however, never resorted to save in cases of
extremity. But Florence, and other cities having
a like origin, committed this power into the hands
of a foreigner, whom they styled Captain, and as he
was open to be corrupted by powerful citizens this
was a pernicious course. Altering this arrangement
afterwards in consequence of changes in their government,
they appointed eight citizens to discharge the office
of Captain. But this, for a reason already mentioned,
namely that a few will always be governed by the will
of a few and these the most powerful, was a change
from bad to worse.

The city of Venice has guarded herself against a like
danger. For in Venice ten citizens are appointed
with power to punish any man without appeal; and because,
although possessing the requisite authority, this
number might not be sufficient to insure the punishment
of the powerful, in addition to their council of Ten,
they have also constituted a council of Forty, and
have further provided that the council of the “Pregai,”
which is their supreme council, shall have authority
to chastise powerful offenders. So that, unless
an accuser be wanting, a tribunal is never wanting
in Venice to keep powerful citizens in check.

But when we see how in Rome, with ordinances of her
own imposing, and with so many and so wise legislators,
fresh occasion arose from day to day for framing new
laws favourable to freedom, it is not to be wondered
at that, in other cities less happy in their beginnings,
difficulties should have sprung up which no ordinances
could remedy.

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CHAPTER L.—­That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have
power to bring the Government of a City to a stay.

T.Q. CINCINNATUS and Cn. Julius Mento being
consuls of Rome, and being at variance with one another,
brought the whole business of the city to a stay;
which the senate perceiving, were moved to create a
dictator to do what, by reason of their differences,
the consuls would not. But though opposed to
one another in everything else, the consuls were of
one mind in resisting the appointment of a dictator;
so that the senate had no remedy left them but to
seek the help of the tribunes, who, supported by their
authority, forced the consuls to yield.

Here we have to note, first, the usefulness of the
tribunes’ authority in checking the ambitious
designs, not only of the nobles against the commons,
but also of one section of the nobles against another;
and next, that in no city ought things ever to be
so ordered that it rests with a few to decide on matters,
which, if the ordinary business of the State is to
proceed at all, must be carried out. Wherefore,
if you grant authority to a council to distribute
honours and offices, or to a magistrate to administer
any branch of public business, you must either impose
an obligation that the duty confided shall be performed,
or ordain that, on failure to perform, another may
and shall do what has to be done. Otherwise such
an arrangement will be found defective and dangerous;
as would have been the case in Rome, had it not been
possible to oppose the authority of the tribunes to
the obstinacy of the consuls.

In the Venetian Republic, the great council distributes
honours and offices. But more than once it has
happened that the council, whether from ill-humour
or from being badly advised, has declined to appoint
successors either to the magistrates of the city or
to those administering the government abroad.
This gave rise to the greatest confusion and disorder;
for, on a sudden, both the city itself and the subject
provinces found themselves deprived of their lawful
governors; nor could any redress be had until the
majority of the council were pacified or undeceived.
And this disorder must have brought the city to a
bad end, had not provision been made against its recurrence
by certain of the wiser citizens, who, finding a fit
opportunity, passed a law that no magistracy, whether
within or without the city, should ever be deemed
to have been vacated until it was filled up by the
appointment of a successor. In this way the council
was deprived of its facilities for stopping public
business to the danger of the State.

CHAPTER LI.—­What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem
to be done by Choice.

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In all their actions, even in those which are matters
of necessity rather than choice, prudent men will
endeavour so to conduct themselves as to conciliate
good-will. This species of prudence was well exercised
by the Roman senate when they resolved to grant pay
from the public purse to soldiers on active service,
who, before, had served at their own charges.
For perceiving that under the old system they could
maintain no war of any duration, and, consequently,
could not undertake a siege or lead an army to any
distance from home, and finding it necessary to be
able to do both, they decided on granting the pay I
have spoken of. But this, which they could not
help doing, they did in such a way as to earn the
thanks of the people, by whom the concession was so
well received that all Rome was intoxicated with delight.
For it seemed to them a boon beyond any they could
have ventured to hope for, or have dreamed of demanding.
And although the tribunes sought to make light of
the benefit, by showing the people that their burthens
would be increased rather than diminished by it, since
taxes would have to be imposed out of which the soldier’s
stipend might be paid, they could not persuade them
to regard the measure otherwise than with gratitude;
which was further increased by the manner in which
the senate distributed the taxes, imposing on the
nobles all the heavier and greater, and those which
had to be paid first.

CHAPTER LII.—­That to check the arrogance
of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State,
there is no safer Method, or less open to objection,
than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks
to advance himself.

It has been seen in the preceding chapter how much
credit the nobles gained with the commons by a show
of good-will towards them, not only in providing for
their military pay, but also in adjusting taxation.
Had the senate constantly adhered to methods like
these, they would have put an end to all disturbances
in Rome, and have deprived the tribunes of the credit
they had with the people, and of the influence thence
arising. For in truth, in a commonwealth, and
especially in one which has become corrupted, there
is no better, or easier, or less objectionable way
of opposing the ambition of any citizen, than to anticipate
him in those paths by which he is seen to be advancing
to the ends he has in view. This plan, had it
been followed by the enemies of Cosimo de’ Medici,
would have proved a far more useful course for them
than to banish him from Florence; since if those citizens
who opposed him had adopted his methods for gaining
over the people, they would have succeeded, without
violence or tumult, in taking his most effective weapon
from his hands.

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The influence acquired in Florence by Piero Soderini
was entirely due to his skill in securing the affections
of the people, since in this way he obtained among
them a name for loving the liberties of the commonwealth.
And truly, for those citizens who envied his greatness
it would have been both easier and more honourable,
and at the same time far less dangerous and hurtful
to the State, to forestall him in those measures by
which he was growing powerful, than to oppose him in
such a manner that his overthrow must bring with it
the ruin of the entire republic. For had they,
as they might easily have done, deprived him of the
weapons which made him formidable, they could then
have withstood him in all the councils, and in all
public deliberations, without either being suspected
or feared. And should any rejoin that, if the
citizens who hated Piero Soderini committed an error
in not being beforehand with him in those ways whereby
he came to have influence with the people, Piero himself
erred in like manner, in not anticipating his enemies
in those methods whereby they grew formidable to him;
I answer that Piero is to be excused, both because
it would have been difficult for him to have so acted,
and because for him such a course would not have been
honourable. For the paths wherein his danger
lay were those which favoured the Medici, and it was
by these that his enemies attacked him, and in the
end overthrew him. But these paths Piero could
not pursue without dishonour, since he could not,
if he was to preserve his fair fame, have joined in
destroying that liberty which he had been put forward
to defend. Moreover, since favours to the Medicean
party could not have been rendered secretly and once
for all, they would have been most dangerous for Piero,
who, had he shown himself friendly to the Medici,
must have become suspected and hated by the people;
in which case his enemies would have had still better
opportunities than before for his destruction.

Men ought therefore to look to the risks and dangers
of any course which lies before them, nor engage in
it when it is plain that the dangers outweigh the
advantages, even though they be advised by others that
it is the most expedient way to take. Should
they act otherwise, it will fare with them as with
Tullius, who, in seeking to diminish the power of
Marcus Antonius, added to it. For Antonius, who
had been declared an enemy by the senate, having got
together a strong force, mostly made up of veterans
who had shared the fortunes of Caesar, Tullius counselled
the senate to invest Octavianus with full authority,
and to send him against Antonius with the consuls
and the army; affirming, that so soon as those veterans
who had served with Caesar saw the face of him who
was Caesar’s nephew and had assumed his name,
they would rally to his side and desert Antonius,
who might easily be crushed when thus left bare of
support.

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But the reverse of all this happened. For Antonius
persuaded Octavianus to take part with him, and to
throw over Tullius and the senate. And this brought
about the ruin of the senate, a result which might
easily have been foreseen. For remembering the
influence of that great captain, who, after overthrowing
all opponents, had seized on sovereign power in Rome,
the senate should have turned a deaf ear to the persuasions
of Tullius, nor ever have believed it possible that
from Caesar’s heir, or from soldiers who had
followed Caesar, they could look for anything that
consisted with the name of Freedom.

CHAPTER LIII.—­That the People, deceived
by a false show of Advantage, often desire what would
be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave Promises
easily move them.

When Veii fell, the commons of Rome took up the notion
that it would be to the advantage of their city were
half their number to go and dwell there. For
they argued that as Veii lay in a fertile country and
was a well-built city, a moiety of the Roman people
might in this way be enriched; while, by reason of
its vicinity to Rome, the management of civil affairs
would in no degree be affected. To the senate,
however, and the wiser among the citizens, the scheme
appeared so rash and mischievous that they publicly
declared they would die sooner than consent to it.
The controversy continuing, the commons grew so inflamed
against the senate that violence and bloodshed must
have ensued; had not the senate for their protection
put forward certain old and esteemed citizens, respect
for whom restrained the populace and put a stop to
their violence.

Two points are here to be noted. First, that
a people deceived by a false show of advantage will
often labour for its own destruction; and, unless
convinced by some one whom it trusts, that the course
on which it is bent is pernicious, and that some other
is to be preferred, will bring infinite danger and
injury upon the State. And should it so happen,
as sometimes is the case, that from having been deceived
before, either by men or by events, there is none
in whom the people trust, their ruin is inevitable.
As to which Dante, in his treatise “De Monarchia,”
observes that the people will often raise the cry,
“Flourish our death and perish our life."[1]
From which distrust it arises that often in republics
the right course is not followed; as when Venice,
as has been related, on being attacked by many enemies,
could not, until her ruin was complete, resolve to
make friends with any one of them by restoring those
territories she had taken from them, on account of
which war had been declared and a league of princes
formed against her.

Page 93

In considering what courses it is easy, and what it
is difficult to persuade a people to follow, this
distinction may be drawn: Either what you would
persuade them to, presents on the face of it a semblance
of gain or loss, or it seems a spirited course or
a base one. When any proposal submitted to the
people holds out promise of advantage, or seems to
them a spirited course to take, though loss lie hid
behind, nay, though the ruin of their country be involved
in it, they will always be easily led to adopt it;
whereas it will always be difficult to persuade the
adoption of such courses as wear the appearance of
disgrace or loss, even though safety and advantage
be bound up with them. The truth of what I say
is confirmed by numberless examples both Roman and
foreign, modern and ancient. Hence grew the ill
opinion entertained in Rome of Fabius Maximus, who
could never persuade the people that it behoved them
to proceed warily in their conflict with Hannibal,
and withstand his onset without fighting. For
this the people thought a base course, not discerning
the advantage resulting from it, which Fabius could
by no argument make plain to them. And so blinded
are men in favour of what seems a spirited course,
that although the Romans had already committed the
blunder of permitting Varro, master of the knights
to Fabius, to join battle contrary to the latter’s
desire, whereby the army must have been destroyed
had not Fabius by his prudence saved it, this lesson
was not enough; for afterwards they appointed this
Varro to be consul, for no other reason than that
he gave out, in the streets and market-places, that
he would make an end of Hannibal as soon as leave
was given him to do so. Whence came the battle
and defeat of Cannae, and well-nigh the destruction
of Rome.

Another example taken from Roman history may be cited
to the same effect. After Hannibal had maintained
himself for eight or ten years in Italy, during which
time the whole country had been deluged with Roman
blood, a certain Marcus Centenius Penula, a man of
mean origin, but who had held some post in the army,
came forward and proposed to the senate that were
leave given him to raise a force of volunteers in any
part of Italy he pleased, he would speedily deliver
Hannibal into their hands, alive or dead. To
the senate this man’s offer seemed a rash one;
but reflecting that were they to refuse it, and were
the people afterwards to hear that it had been made,
tumults, ill will, and resentment against them would
result, they granted the permission asked; choosing
rather to risk the lives of all who might follow Penula,
than to excite fresh discontent on the part of the
people, to whom they knew that such a proposal would
be welcome, and that it would be very hard to dissuade
them from it. And so this adventurer, marching
forth with an undisciplined and disorderly rabble
to meet Hannibal, was, with all his followers, defeated
and slain in the very first encounter.

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In Greece, likewise, and in the city of Athens, that
most grave and prudent statesman, Nicias, could not
convince the people that the proposal to go and attack
Sicily was disadvantageous; and the expedition being
resolved on, contrary to his advice and to the wishes
of the wiser among the citizens, resulted in the overthrow
of the Athenian power. Scipio, on being appointed
consul, asked that the province of Africa might be
awarded to him, promising that he would utterly efface
Carthage; and when the senate, on the advice of Fabius,
refused his request, he threatened to submit the matter
to the people as very well knowing that to the people
such proposals are always acceptable.

I might cite other instances to the same effect from
the history of our own city, as when Messer Ercole
Bentivoglio and Antonio Giacomini, being in joint
command of the Florentine armies, after defeating Bartolommeo
d’Alviano at San Vincenzo, proceeded to invest
Pisa. For this enterprise was resolved on by
the people in consequence of the brave promises of
Messer Ercole; and though many wise citizens disapproved
of it, they could do nothing to prevent it, being
carried away by the popular will, which took its rise
in the assurances of their captain.

I say, then, that there is no readier way to bring
about the ruin of a republic, when the power is in
the hands of the people, than to suggest daring courses
for their adoption. For wherever the people have
a voice, such proposals will always be well received,
nor will those persons who are opposed to them be
able to apply any remedy. And as this occasions
the ruin of States, it likewise, and even more frequently,
occasions the private ruin of those to whom the execution
of these proposals is committed; because the people
anticipating victory, do not when there comes defeat
ascribe it to the short means or ill fortune of the
commander, but to his cowardice and incapacity; and
commonly either put him to death, or imprison or banish
him; as was done in the case of numberless Carthaginian
generals and of many Athenian, no successes they might
previously have obtained availing them anything; for
all past services are cancelled by a present loss.
And so it happened with our Antonio Giacomini, who
not succeeding as the people had expected, and as
he had promised, in taking Pisa, fell into such discredit
with the people, that notwithstanding his countless
past services, his life was spared rather by the compassion
of those in authority than through any movement of
the citizens in his behalf.

[Footnote 1: “Viva la sua morte e muoia
la sua vita.” The quotation does not
seem to be from the “De Monarchia.”]

CHAPTER LIV.—­Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to
restrain an excited Multitude.

The next noteworthy point in the passage referred
to in the foregoing Chapter is, that nothing tends
so much to restrain an excited multitude as the reverence
felt for some grave person, clothed with authority,
who stands forward to oppose them. For not without
reason has Virgil said—­

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“If then, by chance, some reverend chief
appear,
Known for his deeds and for his virtues dear,
Silent they wait his words and bend a listening
ear."[1]

He therefore who commands an army or governs a city
wherein tumult shall have broken out, ought to assume
the noblest and bravest bearing he can, and clothe
himself with all the ensigns of his station, that he
may make himself more revered. It is not many
years since Florence was divided into two factions,
the Frateschi and Arrabbiati, as they
were named, and these coming to open violence, the
Frateschi, among whom was Pagolo Antonio Soderini,
a citizen of great reputation in these days, were
worsted. In the course of these disturbances the
people coming with arms in their hands to plunder
the house of Soderini, his brother Messer Francesco,
then bishop of Volterra and now cardinal, who happened
to be dwelling there, so soon as he heard the uproar
and saw the crowd, putting on his best apparel and
over it his episcopal robes, went forth to meet the
armed multitude, and by his words and mien brought
them to a stay; and for many days his behaviour was
commended by the whole city. The inference from
all which is, that there is no surer or more necessary
restraint on the violence of an unruly multitude, than
the presence of some one whose character and bearing
command respect.

But to return once more to the passage we are considering,
we see how stubbornly the people clung to this scheme
of transplanting themselves to Veii, thinking it for
their advantage, and not discerning the mischief really
involved in it; so that in addition to the many dissensions
which it occasioned, actual violence must have followed,
had not the senate with the aid of certain grave and
reverend citizens repressed the popular fury.

CHAPTER LV.—­That Government is easily
carried on in a City wherein the body of the People
is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible
where Equality prevails, and a Republic where it does
not.

Though what we have to fear or hope from cities that
have grown corrupted has already been discussed, still
I think it not out of place to notice a resolution
passed by the senate touching the vow which Camillus
made to Apollo of a tenth of the spoil taken from the
Veientines. For this spoil having fallen into
the hands of the people, the senate, being unable
by other means to get any account of it, passed an
edict that every man should publicly offer one tenth
part of what he had taken. And although this
edict was not carried out, from the senate having
afterwards followed a different course, whereby, to
the content of the people, the claim of Apollo was
otherwise satisfied, we nevertheless see from their
having entertained such a proposal, how completely

Page 96

the senate trusted to the honesty of the people, when
they assumed that no one would withhold any part of
what the edict commanded him to give; on the other
hand, we see that it never occurred to the people
that they might evade the law by giving less than was
due, their only thought being to free themselves from
the law by openly manifesting their displeasure.
This example, together with many others already noticed,
shows how much virtue and how profound a feeling of
religion prevailed among the Roman people, and how
much good was to be expected from them. And,
in truth, in the country where virtue like this does
not exist, no good can be looked for, as we should
look for it in vain in provinces which at the present
day are seen to be corrupted; as Italy is beyond all
others, though, in some degree, France and Spain are
similarly tainted. In which last two countries,
if we see not so many disorders spring up as we see
daily springing up in Italy, this is not so much due
to the superior virtue of their inhabitants (who, to
say truth, fall far short of our countrymen), as to
their being governed by a king who keeps them united,
not merely by his personal qualities, but also by
the laws and ordinances of the realm which are still
maintained with vigour. In Germany, however,
we do see signal excellence and a devout religious
spirit prevail among the people, giving rise to the
many free States which there maintain themselves, with
such strict observance of their laws that none, either
within or without their walls, dare encroach on them.

That among this last-named people a great share of
the ancient excellence does in truth still flourish,
I shall show by an example similar to that which I
have above related of the senate and people of Rome.
It is customary with the German Free States when they
have to expend any large sum of money on the public
account, for their magistrates or councils having
authority given them in that behalf, to impose a rate
of one or two in the hundred on every man’s estate;
which rate being fixed, every man, in conformity with
the laws of the city, presents himself before the
collectors of the impost, and having first made oath
to pay the amount justly due, throws into a chest provided
for the purpose what he conscientiously believes it
fair for him to pay, of which payment none is witness
save himself. From this fact it may be gathered
what honesty and religion still prevail among this
people. For we must assume that each pays his
just share, since otherwise the impost would not yield
the sum which, with reference to former imposts, it
was estimated to yield; whereby the fraud would be
detected, and thereupon some other method for raising
money have to be resorted to.

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At the present time this virtue is the more to be
admired, because it seems to have survived in this
province only. That it has survived there may
be ascribed to two circumstances: first,
that the natives have little communication with their
neighbours, neither visiting them in their countries
nor being visited by them; being content to use such
commodities, and subsist on such food, and to wear
garments of such materials as their own land supplies;
so that all occasion for intercourse, and every cause
of corruption is removed. For living after this
fashion, they have not learned the manners of the French,
the Italians, or the Spaniards, which three nations
together are the corruption of the world. The
second cause is, that these republics in which
a free and pure government is maintained will not suffer
any of their citizens either to be, or to live as
gentlemen; but on the contrary, while preserving a
strict equality among themselves, are bitterly hostile
to all those gentlemen and lords who dwell in their
neighbourhood; so that if by chance any of these fall
into their hands, they put them to death, as the chief
promoters of corruption and the origin of all disorders.

But to make plain what I mean when I speak of gentlemen,
I say that those are so to be styled who live in opulence
and idleness on the revenues of their estates, without
concerning themselves with the cultivation of these
estates, or incurring any other fatigue for their
support. Such persons are very mischievous in
every republic or country. But even more mischievous
are they who, besides the estates I have spoken of,
are lords of strongholds and castles, and have vassals
and retainers who render them obedience. Of these
two classes of men the kingdom of Naples, the country
round Rome, Romagna, and Lombardy are full; and hence
it happens that in these provinces no commonwealth
or free form of government has ever existed; because
men of this sort are the sworn foes to all free institutions.

And since to plant a commonwealth in provinces which
are in this condition were impossible, if these are
to be reformed at all, it can only be by some one
man who is able there to establish a kingdom; the
reason being that when the body of the people is grown
so corrupted that the laws are powerless to control
it, there must in addition to the laws be introduced
a stronger force, to wit, the regal, which by its
absolute and unrestricted authority may curb the excessive
ambition and corruption of the great. This opinion
may be supported by the example of Tuscany, in which
within a narrow compass of territory there have long
existed the three republics of Florence, Lucca, and
Siena, while the other cities of that province, although
to a certain extent dependent, still show by their
spirit and by their institutions that they preserve,
or at any rate desire to preserve, their freedom:
and this because there are in Tuscany no lords possessed
of strongholds, and few or no gentlemen, but so complete
an equality prevails, that a prudent statesman, well
acquainted with the history of the free States of
antiquity, might easily introduce free institutions.
Such, however, has been the unhappiness of this our
country, that, up to the present hour, it has never
produced any man with the power and knowledge which
would have enabled him to act in this way.

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From what has been said, it follows, that he who would
found a commonwealth in a country wherein there are
many gentlemen, cannot do so unless he first gets
rid of them; and that he who would found a monarchy
or princedom in a country wherein great equality prevails,
will never succeed, unless he raise above the level
of that equality many persons of a restless and ambitious
temperament, whom he must make gentlemen not in name
merely but in reality, by conferring on them castles
and lands, supplying them with riches, and providing
them with retainers; that with these gentlemen around
him, and with their help, he may maintain his power,
while they through him may gratify their ambition;
all others being constrained to endure a yoke, which
force and force alone imposes on them. For when
in this way there comes to be a proportion between
him who uses force and him against whom it is used,
each stands fixed in his own station.

But to found a commonwealth in a country suited for
a kingdom, or a kingdom in a country suited to be
a commonwealth, requires so rare a combination of
intelligence and power, that though many engage in
the attempt, few are found to succeed. For the
greatness of the undertaking quickly daunts them,
and so obstructs their advance they break down at
the very outset. The case of the Venetian Republic,
wherein none save gentlemen are permitted to hold
any public office, does, doubtless, seem opposed to
this opinion of mine that where there are gentlemen
it is impossible to found a commonwealth. But
it may be answered that the case of Venice is not
in truth an instance to the contrary; since the gentlemen
of Venice are gentlemen rather in name than in reality,
inasmuch as they draw no great revenues from lands,
their wealth consisting chiefly in merchandise and
chattels, and not one of them possessing a castle
or enjoying any feudal authority. For in Venice
this name of gentleman is a title of honour and dignity,
and does not depend on any of those circumstances
in respect of which the name is given in other States.
But as in other States the different ranks and classes
are divided under different names, so in Venice we
have the division into gentlemen (gentiluomini)
and plebeians (popolani), it being understood
that the former hold, or have the right to hold all
situations of honour, from which the latter are entirely
excluded. And in Venice this occasions no disturbance,
for reasons which I have already explained.

Let a commonwealth, then, be constituted in the country
where a great equality is found or has been made;
and, conversely, let a princedom be constituted where
great inequality prevails. Otherwise what is
constituted will be discordant in itself, and without
stability.

CHAPTER LVI.—­That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or
Country, Signs are seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell them.

Page 99

Whence it happens I know not, but it is seen from
examples both ancient and recent, that no grave calamity
has ever befallen any city or country which has not
been foretold by vision, by augury, by portent, or
by some other Heaven-sent sign. And not to travel
too far afield for evidence of this, every one knows
that long before the invasion of Italy by Charles
VIII. of France, his coming was foretold by the friar
Girolamo Savonarola; and how, throughout the whole
of Tuscany, the rumour ran that over Arezzo horsemen
had been seen fighting in the air. And who is
there who has not heard that before the death of the
elder Lorenzo de’ Medici, the highest pinnacle
of the cathedral was rent by a thunderbolt, to the
great injury of the building? Or who, again, but
knows that shortly before Piero Soderini, whom the
people of Florence had made gonfalonier for life,
was deprived of his office and banished, the palace
itself was struck by lightning?

Other instances might be cited, which, not to be tedious,
I shall omit, and mention only a circumstance which
Titus Livius tells us preceded the invasion of the
Gauls. For he relates how a certain plebeian named
Marcus Ceditius reported to the senate that as he passed
by night along the Via Nova, he heard a voice louder
than mortal, bidding him warn the magistrates that
the Gauls were on their way to Rome.

The causes of such manifestations ought, I think,
to be inquired into and explained by some one who
has a knowledge, which I have not, of causes natural
and supernatural. It may, however, be, as certain
wise men say, that the air is filled with intelligent
beings, to whom it is given to forecast future events;
who, taking pity upon men, warn them beforehand by
these signs to prepare for what awaits them. Be
this as it may, certain it is that such warnings are
given, and that always after them new and strange
disasters befall nations.

CHAPTER LVII.—­That the People are strong collectively, but
individually weak.

After the ruin brought on their country by the invasion
of the Gauls, many of the Romans went to dwell in
Veii, in opposition to the edicts and commands of
the senate, who, to correct this mischief, publicly
ordained that within a time fixed, and under penalties
stated, all should return to live in Rome. The
persons against whom these proclamations were directed
at first derided them; but, when the time came for
them to be obeyed, all obeyed them. And Titus
Livius observes that, “although bold enough
collectively, each separately, fearing to be punished,
made his submission.” And indeed the
temper of the multitude in such cases, cannot be better
described than in this passage. For often a people
will be open-mouthed in condemning the decrees of
their prince, but afterwards, when they have to look
punishment in the face, putting no trust in one another,
they hasten to comply. Wherefore, if you be in

Page 100

a position to keep the people well-disposed towards
you when they already are so, or to prevent them injuring
you in case they be ill-disposed, it is clearly of
little moment whether the feelings with which they
profess to regard you, be favourable or no. This
applies to all unfriendliness on the part of a people,
whencesoever it proceed, excepting only the resentment
felt by them on being deprived either of liberty,
or of a prince whom they love and who still survives.
For the hostile temper produced by these two causes
is more to be feared than any beside, and demands measures
of extreme severity to correct it. The other
untoward humours of the multitude, should there be
no powerful chief to foster them, are easily dealt
with; because, while on the one hand there is nothing
more terrible than an uncontrolled and headless mob,
on the other, there is nothing feebler. For though
it be furnished with arms it is easily subdued, if
you have some place of strength wherein to shelter
from its first onset. For when its first fury
has somewhat abated, and each man sees that he has
to return to his own house, all begin to lose heart
and to take thought how to insure their personal safety,
whether by flight or by submission. For which
reason a multitude stirred in this way, if it would
avoid dangers such as I speak of, must at once appoint
a head from among its own numbers, who may control
it, keep it united, and provide for its defence; as
did the commons of Rome when, after the death of Virginia,
they quitted the city, and for their protection created
twenty tribunes from among themselves. Unless
this be done, what Titus Livius has observed in the
passage cited, will always prove true, namely, that
a multitude is strong while it holds together, but
so soon as each of those who compose it begins to
think of his own private danger, it becomes weak and
contemptible.

CHAPTER LVIII.—­That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince

That “nothing is more fickle and inconstant
than the multitude” is affirmed not by Titus
Livius only, but by all other historians, in whose
chronicles of human actions we often find the multitude
condemning some citizen to death, and afterwards lamenting
him and grieving greatly for his loss, as the Romans
grieved and lamented for Manlius Capitolinus, whom
they had themselves condemned to die. In relating
which circumstance our author observes “In
a short time the people, having no longer cause to
fear him, began to deplore his death” And
elsewhere, when speaking of what took place in Syracuse
after the murder of Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero,
he says, “It is the nature of the multitude
to be an abject slave, or a domineering master”

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It may be that in attempting to defend a cause, which,
as I have said, all writers are agreed to condemn,
I take upon me a task so hard and difficult that I
shall either have to relinquish it with shame or pursue
it with opprobrium. Be that as it may, I neither
do, nor ever shall judge it a fault, to support opinion
by arguments, where it is not sought to impose them
by violence or authority I maintain, then, that this
infirmity with which historians tax the multitude,
may with equal reason be charged against every individual
man, but most of all against princes, since all who
are not controlled by the laws, will commit the very
same faults as are committed by an uncontrolled multitude.
Proof whereof were easy, since of all the many princes
existing, or who have existed, few indeed are or have
been either wise or good.

I speak of such princes as have had it in their power
to break the reins by which they are controlled, among
whom I do not reckon those kings who reigned in Egypt
in the most remote antiquity when that country was
governed in conformity with its laws; nor do I include
those kings who reigned in Sparta, nor those who in
our own times reign in France, which kingdom, more
than any other whereof we have knowledge at the present
day, is under the government of its laws. For
kings who live, as these do, subject to constitutional
restraint, are not to be counted when we have to consider
each man’s proper nature, and to see whether
he resembles the multitude. For to draw a comparison
with such princes as these, we must take the case
of a multitude controlled as they are, and regulated
by the laws, when we shall find it to possess the same
virtues which we see in them, and neither conducting
itself as an abject slave nor as a domineering master.

Such was the people of Rome, who, while the commonwealth
continued uncorrupted, never either served abjectly
nor domineered haughtily; but, on the contrary, by
means of their magistrates and their ordinances, maintained
their place, and when forced to put forth their strength
against some powerful citizen, as in the case of Manlius,
the decemvirs, and others who sought to oppress them,
did so; but when it was necessary for the public welfare
to yield obedience to the dictator or consuls, obeyed.
And if the Roman people mourned the loss of the dead
Manlius, it is no wonder; for they mourned his virtues,
which had been of such a sort that their memory stirred
the regret of all, and would have had power to produce
the same feelings even in a prince; all writers being
agreed that excellence is praised and admired even
by its enemies. But if Manlius when he was so
greatly mourned, could have risen once more from the
dead, the Roman people would have pronounced the same
sentence against him which they pronounced when they
led him forth from the prison-house, and straightway
condemned him to die. And in like manner we see
that princes, accounted wise, have put men to death,
and afterwards greatly lamented them, as Alexander
mourned for Clitus and others of his friends, and
Herod for Mariamne.

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But what our historian says of the multitude, he says
not of a multitude which like the people of Rome is
controlled by the laws, but of an uncontrolled multitude
like the Syracusans, who were guilty of all these
crimes which infuriated and ungoverned men commit,
and which were equally committed by Alexander and
Herod in the cases mentioned. Wherefore the nature
of a multitude is no more to be blamed than the nature
of princes, since both equally err when they can do
so without regard to consequences. Of which many
instances, besides those already given, might be cited
from the history of the Roman emperors, and of other
princes and tyrants, in whose lives we find such inconstancy
and fickleness, as we might look in vain for in a
people.

I maintain, therefore, contrary to the common opinion
which avers that a people when they have the management
of affairs are changeable, fickle, and ungrateful,
that these faults exist not in them otherwise than
as they exist in individual princes; so that were any
to accuse both princes and peoples, the charge might
be true, but that to make exception in favour of princes
is a mistake; for a people in command, if it be duly
restrained, will have the same prudence and the same
gratitude as a prince has, or even more, however wise
he may be reckoned; and a prince on the other hand,
if freed from the control of the laws, will be more
ungrateful, fickle, and short-sighted than a people.
And further, I say that any difference in their methods
of acting results not from any difference in their
nature, that being the same in both, or, if there
be advantage on either side, the advantage resting
with the people, but from their having more or less
respect for the laws under which each lives.
And whosoever attentively considers the history of
the Roman people, may see that for four hundred years
they never relaxed in their hatred of the regal name,
and were constantly devoted to the glory and welfare
of their country, and will find numberless proofs
given by them of their consistency in both particulars.
And should any allege against me the ingratitude they
showed to Scipio, I reply by what has already been
said at length on that head, where I proved that peoples
are less ungrateful than princes. But as for
prudence and stability of purpose, I affirm that a
people is more prudent, more stable, and of better
judgment than a prince. Nor is it without reason
that the voice of the people has been likened to the
voice of God; for we see that wide-spread beliefs fulfil
themselves, and bring about marvellous results, so
as to have the appearance of presaging by some occult
quality either weal or woe. Again, as to the
justice of their opinions on public affairs, seldom
find that after hearing two speakers of equal ability
urging them in opposite directions, they do not adopt
the sounder view, or are unable to decide on the truth
of what they hear. And if, as I have said, a people
errs in adopting courses which appear to it bold and
advantageous, princes will likewise err when their
passions are touched, as is far oftener the case with
them than with a people.

Page 103

We see, too, that in the choice of magistrates a people
will choose far more honestly than a prince; so that
while you shall never persuade a people that it is
advantageous to confer dignities on the infamous and
profligate, a prince may readily, and in a thousand
ways, be drawn to do so. Again, it may be seen
that a people, when once they have come to hold a
thing in abhorrence, remain for many ages of the same
mind; which we do not find happen with princes.
For the truth of both of which assertions the Roman
people are my sufficient witness, who, in the course
of so many hundred years, and in so many elections
of consuls and tribunes, never made four appointments
of which they had reason to repent; and, as I have
said, so detested the name of king, that no obligation
they might be under to any citizen who affected that
name, could shield him from the appointed penalty.

Further, we find that those cities wherein the government
is in the hands of the people, in a very short space
of time, make marvellous progress, far exceeding that
made by cities which have been always ruled by princes;
as Rome grew after the expulsion of her kings, and
Athens after she freed herself from Pisistratus; and
this we can ascribe to no other cause than that the
rule of a people is better than the rule of a prince.

Nor would I have it thought that anything our historian
may have affirmed in the passage cited, or elsewhere,
controverts these my opinions. For if all the
glories and all the defects both of peoples and of
princes be carefully weighed, it will appear that both
for goodness and for glory a people is to be preferred.
And if princes surpass peoples in the work of legislation,
in shaping civil institutions, in moulding statutes,
and framing new ordinances, so far do the latter surpass
the former in maintaining what has once been established,
as to merit no less praise than they.

And to state the sum of the whole matter shortly,
I say that popular governments have endured for long
periods in the same way as the governments of princes,
and that both have need to be regulated by the laws;
because the prince who can do what he pleases is a
madman, and the people which can do as it pleases
is never wise. If, then, we assume the case of
a prince bound, and of a people chained down by the
laws, greater virtue will appear in the people than
in the prince; while if we assume the case of each
of them freed from all control, it will be seen that
the people commits fewer errors than the prince, and
less serious errors, and such as admit of readier
cure. For a turbulent and unruly people may be
spoken to by a good man, and readily brought back to
good ways; but none can speak to a wicked prince,
nor any remedy be found against him but by the sword.
And from this we may infer which of the two suffers
from the worse disease; for if the disease of the people
may be healed by words, while that of the prince must
be dealt with by the sword, there is none but will
judge that evil to be the greater which demands the
more violent remedy.

Page 104

When a people is absolutely uncontrolled, it is not
so much the follies which it commits or the evil which
it actually does that excites alarm, as the mischief
which may thence result, since in such disorders it
becomes possible for a tyrant to spring up. But
with a wicked prince the contrary is the case; for
we dread present ill, and place our hopes in the future,
persuading ourselves that the evil life of the prince
may bring about our freedom. So that there is
this distinction between the two, that with the one
we fear what is, with the other what is likely to
be. Again, the cruelties of a people are turned
against him who it fears will encroach upon the common
rights, but the cruelties of the prince against those
who he fears may assert those rights.

The prejudice which is entertained against the people
arises from this, that any man may speak ill of them
openly and fearlessly, even when the government is
in their hands; whereas princes are always spoken of
with a thousand reserves and a constant eye to consequences.

But since the subject suggests it, it seems to me
not out of place to consider what alliances we can
most trust, whether those made with commonwealths
or those made with princes.

CHAPTER LIX.—­To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether
those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes.

Since leagues and alliances are every day entered
into by one prince with another, or by one commonwealth
with another, and as conventions and treaties are
concluded in like manner between princes and commonwealths,
it seems to me proper to inquire whether the faith
of a commonwealth or that of a prince is the more
stable and the safer to count on. All things
considered, I am disposed to believe that in most
cases they are alike, though in some they differ.
Of one thing, however, I am convinced, namely, that
engagements made under duress will never be observed
either by prince or by commonwealth; and that if menaced
with the loss of their territories, both the one and
the other will break faith with you and treat you
with ingratitude. Demetrius, who was named the
“City-taker,” had conferred numberless
benefits upon the Athenians; but when, afterwards,
on being defeated by his enemies, he sought shelter
in Athens, as being a friendly city and under obligations
to him, it was refused him; a circumstance which grieved
him far more than the loss of his soldiers and army
had done. Pompey, in like manner, when routed
by Caesar in Thessaly, fled for refuge to Ptolemy in
Egypt, who formerly had been restored by him to his
kingdom; by whom he was put to death. In both
these instances the same causes were at work, although
the inhumanity and the wrong inflicted were less in
the case of the commonwealth than of the prince.
Still, wherever there is fear, the want of faith will
be the same.

Page 105

And even if there be found a commonwealth or prince
who, in order to keep faith, will submit to be ruined,
this is seen to result from a like cause. For,
as to the prince, it may easily happen that he is friend
to a powerful sovereign, whom, though he be at the
time without means to defend him, he may presently
hope to see restored to his dominions; or it may be
that having linked his fortunes with another’s,
he despairs of finding either faith or friendship
from the enemies of his ally, as was the case with
those Neapolitan princes who espoused the interests
of France. As to commonwealths, an instance similar
to that of the princes last named, is that of Saguntum
in Spain, which awaited ruin in adhering to the fortunes
of Rome. A like course was also followed by Florence
when, in the year 1512, she stood steadfastly by the
cause of the French. And taking everything into
account, I believe that in cases of urgency, we shall
find a certain degree of stability sooner in commonwealths
than in princes. For though commonwealths be like-minded
with princes, and influenced by the same passions,
the circumstance that their movements must be slower,
makes it harder for them to resolve than it is for
a prince, for which reason they will be less ready
to break faith.

And since leagues and alliances are broken for the
sake of certain advantages, in this respect also,
commonwealths observe their engagements far more faithfully
than princes; for abundant examples might be cited
of a very slight advantage having caused a prince to
break faith, and of a very great advantage having failed
to induce a commonwealth to do so. Of this we
have an instance in the proposal made to the Athenians
by Themistocles, when he told them at a public meeting
that he had certain advice to offer which would prove
of great advantage to their city, but the nature of
which he could not disclose to them, lest it should
become generally known, when the opportunity for acting
upon it would be lost. Whereupon the Athenians
named Aristides to receive his communication, and
to act upon it as he thought fit. To him, accordingly,
Themistocles showed how the navy of united Greece,
for the safety of which the Athenians stood pledged,
was so situated that they might either gain it over
or destroy it, and thus make themselves absolute masters
of the whole country. Aristides reporting to the
Athenians that the course proposed by Themistocles
was extremely advantageous but extremely dishonourable,
the people utterly refused to entertain it. But
Philip of Macedon would not have so acted, nor any
of those other princes who have sought and found more
profit in breaking faith than in any other way.

As to engagements broken off on the pretext that they
have not been observed by the other side, I say nothing,
since that is a matter of everyday occurrence, and
I am speaking here only of those engagements which
are broken off on extraordinary grounds; but in this
respect, likewise, I believe that commonwealths offend
less than princes, and are therefore more to be trusted.

Page 106

CHAPTER LX.—­That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome
were given without respect to Age.

It is seen in the course of the Roman history that,
after the consulship was thrown open to the commons,
the republic conceded this dignity to all its citizens,
without distinction either of age or blood; nay, that
in this matter respect for age was never made a ground
for preference among the Romans, whose constant aim
it was to discover excellence whether existing in
old or young. To this we have the testimony of
Valerius Corvinus, himself made consul in his twenty-fourth
year, who, in addressing his soldiers, said of the
consulship that it was “the reward not of
birth but of desert.”

Whether the course thus followed by the Romans was
well judged or not, is a question on which much might
be said. The concession as to blood, however,
was made under necessity, and as I have observed on
another occasion, the same necessity which obtained
in Rome, will be found to obtain in every other city
which desires to achieve the results which Rome achieved.
For you cannot subject men to hardships unless you
hold out rewards, nor can you without danger deprive
them of those rewards whereof you have held out hopes.
It was consequently necessary to extend, betimes,
to the commons the hope of obtaining the consulship,
on which hope they fed themselves for a while, without
actually realizing it. But afterwards the hope
alone was not enough, and it had to be satisfied.
For while cities which do not employ men of plebeian
birth in any of those undertakings wherein glory is
to be gained, as we have seen was the case with Venice,
may treat these men as they please, those other cities
which desire to do as Rome did, cannot make this distinction.
And if there is to be no distinction in respect of
blood, nothing can be pleaded for a distinction in
respect of age. On the contrary, that distinction
must of necessity cease to be observed. For where
a young man is appointed to a post which requires the
prudence which are is supposed to bring, it must be,
since the choice rests with the people, that he is
thus advanced in consideration of some noble action
which he has performed; but when a young man is of
such excellence as to have made a name for himself
by some signal achievement, it were much to the detriment
of his city were it unable at once to make use of
him, but had to wait until he had grown old, and had
lost, with youth, that alacrity and vigour by which
his country might have profited; as Rome profited
by the services of Valerius Corvinus, of Scipio, of
Pompey, and of many others who triumphed while yet
very young.

BOOK II.

* * * *
*

PREFACE.

Page 107

Men do always, but not always with reason, commend
the past and condemn the present, and are so much
the partisans of what has been, as not merely to cry
up those times which are known to them only from the
records left by historians, but also, when they grow
old, to extol the days in which they remember their
youth to have been spent. And although this preference
of theirs be in most instances a mistaken one, I can
see that there are many causes to account for it;
chief of which I take to be that in respect of things
long gone by we perceive not the whole truth, those
circumstances that would detract from the credit of
the past being for the most part hidden from us, while
all that gives it lustre is magnified and embellished.
For the generality of writers render this tribute
to the good fortune of conquerors, that to make their
achievements seem more splendid, they not merely exaggerate
the great things they have done, but also lend such
a colour to the actions of their enemies, that any
one born afterwards, whether in the conquering or
in the conquered country, has cause to marvel at these
men and these times, and is constrained to praise
and love them beyond all others.

Again, men being moved to hatred either by fear or
envy, these two most powerful causes of dislike are
cancelled in respect of things which are past, because
what is past can neither do us hurt, nor afford occasion
for envy. The contrary, however, is the case with
the things we see, and in which we take part; for
in these, from our complete acquaintance with them,
no part of them being hidden from us, we recognize,
along with much that is good, much that displeases
us, and so are forced to pronounce them far inferior
to the old, although in truth they deserve far greater
praise and admiration. I speak not, here, of what
relates to the arts, which have such distinction inherent
in them, that time can give or take from them but
little of the glory which they merit of themselves.
I speak of the lives and manners of men, touching which
the grounds for judging are not so clear.

I repeat, then, that it is true that this habit of
blaming and praising obtains, but not always true
that it is wrong applied. For sometimes it will
happen that this judgment is just; because, as human
affairs are in constant movement, it must be that
they either rise or fall. Wherefore, we may see
a city or province furnished with free institutions
by some great and wise founder, flourish for a while
through his merits, and advance steadily on the path
of improvement. Any one born therein at that
time would be in the wrong to praise the past more
than the present, and his error would be occasioned
by the causes already noticed. But any one born
afterwards in that city or province when the time
has come for it to fall away from its former felicity,
would not be mistaken in praising the past.

Page 108

When I consider how this happens, I am persuaded that
the world, remaining continually the same, has in
it a constant quantity of good and evil; but that
this good and this evil shift about from one country
to another, as we know that in ancient times empire
shifted from one nation to another, according as the
manners of these nations changed, the world, as a
whole, continuing as before, and the only difference
being that, whereas at first Assyria was made the seat
of its excellence, this was afterwards placed in Media,
then in Persia, until at last it was transferred to
Italy and Rome. And although after the Roman
Empire, none has followed which has endured, or in
which the world has centred its whole excellence,
we nevertheless find that excellence diffused among
many valiant nations, the kingdom of the Franks, for
example, that of the Turks, that of the Soldan, and
the States of Germany at the present day; and shared
at an earlier time by that sect of the Saracens who
performed so many great achievements and gained so
wide a dominion, after destroying the Roman Empire
in the East.

In all these countries, therefore, after the decline
of the Roman power, and among all these races, there
existed, and in some part of them there yet exists,
that excellence which alone is to be desired and justly
to be praised. Wherefore, if any man being born
in one of these countries should exalt past times
over present, he might be mistaken; but any who, living
at the present day in Italy or Greece, has not in Italy
become an ultramontane or in Greece a Turk, has reason
to complain of his own times, and to commend those
others, in which there were many things which made
them admirable; whereas, now, no regard being had to
religion, to laws, or to arms, but all being tarnished
with every sort of shame, there is nothing to redeem
the age from the last extremity of wretchedness, ignominy,
and disgrace. And the vices of our age are the
more odious in that they are practised by those who
sit on the judgment seat, govern the State, and demand
public reverence.

But, returning to the matter in hand, it may be said,
that if the judgment of men be at fault in pronouncing
whether the present age or the past is the better
in respect of things whereof, by reason of their antiquity,
they cannot have the same perfect knowledge which they
have of their own times, it ought not to be at fault
in old men when they compare the days of their youth
with those of their maturity, both of which have been
alike seen and known by them. This were indeed
true, if men at all periods of their lives judged
of things in the same way, and were constantly influenced
by the same desires; but since they alter, the times,
although they alter not, cannot but seem different
to those who have other desires, other pleasures,
and other ways of viewing things in their old age
from those they had in their youth. For since,
when they grow old, men lose in bodily strength but
gain in wisdom and discernment, it must needs be that
those things which in their youth seemed to them tolerable
and good, should in their old age appear intolerable
and evil. And whereas they should ascribe this
to their judgment, they lay the blame upon the times.

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But, further, since the desires of men are insatiable,
Nature prompting them to desire all things and Fortune
permitting them to enjoy but few, there results a
constant discontent in their minds, and a loathing
of what they possess, prompting them to find fault
with the present, praise the past, and long for the
future, even though they be not moved thereto by any
reasonable cause.

I know not, therefore, whether I may not deserve to
be reckoned in the number of those who thus deceive
themselves, if, in these Discourses of mine, I render
excessive praise to the ancient times of the Romans
while I censure our own. And, indeed, were not
the excellence which then prevailed and the corruption
which prevails now clearer than the sun, I should
proceed more guardedly in what I have to say, from
fear lest in accusing others I should myself fall
into this self-deception. But since the thing
is so plain that every one sees it, I shall be bold
to speak freely all I think, both of old times and
of new, in order that the minds of the young who happen
to read these my writings, may be led to shun modern
examples, and be prepared to follow those set by antiquity
whenever chance affords the opportunity. For it
is the duty of every good man to teach others those
wholesome lessons which the malice of Time or of Fortune
has not permitted him to put in practice; to the end,
that out of many who have the knowledge, some one better
loved by Heaven may be found able to carry them out.

Having spoken, then, in the foregoing Book of the
various methods followed by the Romans in regulating
the domestic affairs of their city, in this I shall
speak of what was done by them to spread their Empire.

CHAPTER I.—­Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to
Valour or to Fortune.

Many authors, and among others that most grave historian
Plutarch, have thought that in acquiring their empire
the Romans were more beholden to their good fortune
than to their valour; and besides other reasons which
they give for this opinion, they affirm it to be proved
by the admission of the Romans themselves, since their
having erected more temples to Fortune than to any
other deity, shows that it was to her that they ascribed
their success. It would seem, too, that Titus
Livius was of the same mind, since he very seldom
puts a speech into the mouth of any Roman in which
he discourses of valour, wherein he does not also make
mention of Fortune. This, however, is an opinion
with which I can in no way concur, and which, I take
it, cannot be made good. For if no commonwealth
has ever been found to grow like the Roman, it is because
none was ever found so well fitted by its institutions
to make that growth. For by the valour of her
armies she spread her empire, while by her conduct
of affairs, and by other methods peculiar to herself
and devised by her first founder, she was able to
keep what she acquired, as shall be fully shown in
many of the following Discourses.

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The writers to whom I have referred assert that it
was owing to their good fortune and not to their prudence
that the Romans never had two great wars on their
hands at once; as, for instance, that they waged no
wars with the Latins until they had not merely overcome
the Samnites, but undertook in their defence the war
on which they then entered; nor ever fought with the
Etruscans until they had subjugated the Latins, and
had almost worn out the Samnites by frequent defeats;
whereas, had any two of these powers, while yet fresh
and unexhausted, united together, it may easily be
believed that the ruin of the Roman Republic must have
followed. But to whatsoever cause we ascribe it,
it never so chanced that the Romans engaged in two
great wars at the same time. On the contrary,
it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one
war, another was extinguished; or that on the termination
of one, another broke out. And this we may plainly
see from the order in which their wars succeeded one
another.

For, omitting those waged by them before their city
was taken by the Gauls, we find that during their
struggle with the Equians and the Volscians, and while
these two nations continued strong, no others rose
against them. On these being subdued, there broke
out the war with the Samnites; and although before
the close of that contest the Latin nations had begun
to rebel against Rome, nevertheless, when their rebellion
came to a head, the Samnites were in league with Rome,
and helped her with their army to quell the presumption
of the rebels; on whose defeat the war with Samnium
was renewed.

When the strength of Samnium had been drained by repeated
reverses, there followed the war with the Etruscans;
which ended, the Samnites were once more stirred to
activity by the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy.
When he, too, had been defeated, and sent back to Greece,
Rome entered on her first war with the Carthaginians;
which was no sooner over than all the Gallic nations
on both sides of the Alps combined against the Romans,
by whom, in the battle fought between Populonia and
Pisa, where now stands the fortress of San Vincenzo,
they were at last routed with tremendous slaughter.

This war ended, for twenty years together the Romans
were engaged in no contest of importance, their only
adversaries being the Ligurians, and the remnant of
the Gallic tribes who occupied Lombardy; and on this
footing things continued down to the second Carthaginian
war, which for sixteen years kept the whole of Italy
in a blaze. This too being brought to a most
glorious termination, there followed the Macedonian
war, at the close of which succeeded the war with
Antiochus and Asia. These subdued, there remained
not in the whole world, king or people who either
singly or together could withstand the power of Rome.

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But even before this last victory, any one observing
the order of these wars, and the method in which they
were conducted, must have recognized not only the
good fortune of the Romans, but also their extraordinary
valour and prudence. And were any one to search
for the causes of this good fortune, he would have
little difficulty in finding them, since nothing is
more certain than that when a potentate has attained
so great a reputation that every neighbouring prince
or people is afraid to engage him single-handed, and
stands in awe of him, none will ever venture to attack
him, unless driven to do so by necessity; so that
it will almost rest on his will to make war as he likes
on any of his neighbours, while he studiously maintains
peace with the rest; who, on their part, whether through
fear of his power, or deceived by the methods he takes
to dull their vigilance, are easily kept quiet.
Distant powers, in the mean time, who have no intercourse
with either, treat the matter as too remote to concern
them in any way; and abiding in this error until the
conflagration approaches their own doors, on its arrival
have no resource for its extinction, save in their
own strength, which, as their enemy has by that time
become exceedingly powerful, no longer suffices.

I forbear to relate how the Samnites stood looking
on while the Romans were subjugating the Equians and
the Volscians; and, to avoid being prolix, shall content
myself with the single instance of the Carthaginians,
who, at the time when the Romans were contending with
the Samnites and Etruscans, were possessed of great
power and held in high repute, being already masters
of the whole of Africa together with Sicily and Sardinia,
besides occupying territory in various parts of Spain.
And because their empire was so great, and at such
a distance from the Roman frontier, they were never
led to think of attacking the Romans or of lending
assistance to the Etruscans or Samnites. On the
contrary, they behaved towards the Romans as men behave
towards those whom they see prosper, rather taking
their part and courting their friendship. Nor
did they discover their mistake until the Romans, after
subduing all the intervening nations, began to assail
their power both in Spain and Sicily. What happened
in the case of the Carthaginians, happened also in
the case of the Gauls, of Philip of Macedon, and of
Antiochus, each of whom, while Rome was engaged with
another of them, believed that other would have the
advantage, and that there would be time enough to
provide for their own safety, whether by making peace
or war. It seems to me, therefore, that the same
good fortune which, in this respect, attended the
Romans, might be shared by all princes acting as they
did, and of a valour equal to theirs.

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As bearing on this point, it might have been proper
for me to show what methods were followed by the Romans
in entering the territories of other nations, had
I not already spoken of this at length in my Treatise
on Princedoms, wherein the whole subject is discussed.
Here it is enough to say briefly, that in a new province
they always sought for some friend who should be to
them as a ladder whereby to climb, a door through
which to pass, or an instrument wherewith to keep their
hold. Thus we see them effect their entrance
into Samnium through the Capuans, into Etruria through
the Camertines, into Sicily through the Mamertines,
into Spain through the Saguntans, into Africa through
Massinissa, into Greece through the Etolians, into
Asia through Eumenes and other princes, into Gaul
through the Massilians and Eduans; and, in like manner,
never without similar assistance in their efforts whether
to acquire provinces or to keep them.

The nations who carefully attend to this precaution
will be seen to stand in less need of Fortune’s
help than others who neglect it. But that all
may clearly understand how much more the Romans were
aided by valour than by Fortune in acquiring their
empire, I shall in the following Chapter consider
the character of those nations with whom they had
to contend, and show how stubborn these were in defending
their freedom.

CHAPTER II.—­With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how
stubborn these were in defending their Freedom.

In subduing the countries round about them, and certain
of the more distant provinces, nothing gave the Romans
so much trouble, as the love which in those days many
nations bore to freedom, defending it with such obstinacy
as could not have been overcome save by a surpassing
valour. For we know by numberless instances,
what perils these nations were ready to face in their
efforts to maintain or recover their freedom, and
what vengeance they took against those who deprived
them of it. We know, too, from history, what
hurt a people or city suffers from servitude.
And though, at the present day, there is but one province
which can be said to contain within it free cities,
we find that formerly these abounded everywhere.
For we learn that in the ancient times of which I
speak, from the mountains which divide Tuscany from
Lombardy down to the extreme point of Italy, there
dwelt numerous free nations, such as the Etruscans,
the Romans, and the Samnites, besides many others in
other parts of the Peninsula. Nor do we ever
read of there being any kings over them, except those
who reigned in Rome, and Porsenna, king of Etruria.
How the line of this last-named prince came to be extinguished,
history does not inform us; but it is clear that at
the time when the Romans went to besiege Veii, Etruria
was free, and so greatly rejoiced in her freedom,
and so detested the regal name, that when the Veientines,
who for their defence had created a king in Veii, sought
aid from the Etruscans against Rome, these, after
much deliberation resolved to lend them no help while
they continued to live under a king; judging it useless
to defend a country given over to servitude by its
inhabitants.

Page 113

It is easy to understand whence this love of liberty
arises among nations, for we know by experience that
States have never signally increased, either as to
dominion or wealth, except where they have lived under
a free government. And truly it is strange to
think to what a pitch of greatness Athens came during
the hundred years after she had freed herself from
the despotism of Pisistratus; and far stranger to
contemplate the marvellous growth which Rome made after
freeing herself from her kings. The cause, however,
is not far to seek, since it is the well-being, not
of individuals, but of the community which makes a
State great; and, without question, this universal
well-being is nowhere secured save in a republic.
For a republic will do whatsoever makes for its interest;
and though its measures prove hurtful to this man or
to that, there are so many whom they benefit, that
these are able to carry them out, in spite of the
resistance of the few whom they injure.

But the contrary happens in the case of a prince;
for, as a rule, what helps him hurts the State, and
what helps the State hurts him; so that whenever a
tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free,
the least evil which can befall that city is to make
no further progress, nor ever increase in power or
wealth; but in most cases, if not in all, it will
be its fate to go back. Or should there chance
to arise in it some able tyrant who extends his dominions
by his valour and skill in arms, the advantage which
results is to himself only, and not to the State;
since he can bestow no honours on those of the citizens
over whom he tyrannizes who have shown themselves
good and valiant, lest afterwards he should have cause
to fear them. Nor can he make those cities which
he acquires, subject or tributary to the city over
which he rules; because to make this city powerful
is not for his interest, which lies in keeping it
so divided that each town and province may separately
recognize him alone as its master. In this way
he only, and not his country, is the gainer by his
conquests. And if any one desire to have this
view confirmed by numberless other proofs, let him
look into Xenophon’s treatise De Tirannide.

No wonder, then, that the nations of antiquity pursued
tyrants with such relentless hatred, and so passionately
loved freedom that its very name was dear to them,
as was seen when Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero the
Syracusan, was put to death in Syracuse. For when
word of his death reached the army, which lay encamped
not far off, at first it was greatly moved, and eager
to take up arms against the murderers. But on
hearing the cry of liberty shouted in the streets of
Syracuse, quieted at once by the name, it laid aside
its resentment against those who had slain the tyrant,
and fell to consider how a free government might be
provided for the city.

Page 114

Nor is it to be wondered at that the ancient nations
took terrible vengeance on those who deprived them
of their freedom; of which, though there be many instances,
I mean only to cite one which happened in the city
of Corcyra at the time of the Peloponnesian war.
For Greece being divided into two factions, one of
which sided with the Athenians, the other with the
Spartans, it resulted that many of its cities were
divided against themselves, some of the citizens seeking
the friendship of Sparta and some of Athens.
In the aforesaid city of Corcyra, the nobles getting
the upper hand, deprived the commons of their freedom;
these, however, recovering themselves with the help
of the Athenians, laid hold of the entire body of
the nobles, and cast them into a prison large enough
to contain them all, whence they brought them forth
by eight or ten at a time, pretending that they were
to be sent to different places into banishment, whereas,
in fact, they put them to death with many circumstances
of cruelty. Those who were left, learning what
was going on, resolved to do their utmost to escape
this ignominious death, and arming themselves with
what weapons they could find, defended the door of
their prison against all who sought to enter; till
the people, hearing the tumult and rushing in haste
to the prison, dragged down the roof, and smothered
the prisoners in the ruins. Many other horrible
and atrocious cruelties likewise perpetrated in Greece,
show it to be true that a lost freedom is avenged with
more ferocity than a threatened freedom is defended.

When I consider whence it happened that the nations
of antiquity were so much more zealous in their love
of liberty than those of the present day, I am led
to believe that it arose from the same cause which
makes the present generation of men less vigorous
and daring than those of ancient times, namely the
difference of the training of the present day from
that of earlier ages; and this, again, arises from
the different character of the religions then and
now prevailing. For our religion, having revealed
to us the truth and the true path, teaches us to make
little account of worldly glory; whereas, the Gentiles,
greatly esteeming it, and placing therein their highest
good, displayed a greater fierceness in their actions.

This we may gather from many of their customs, beginning
with their sacrificial rites, which were of much magnificence
as compared with the simplicity of our worship, though
that be not without a certain dignity of its own,
refined rather than splendid, and far removed from
any tincture of ferocity or violence. In the
religious ceremonies of the ancients neither pomp
nor splendour were wanting; but to these was joined
the ordinance of sacrifice, giving occasion to much
bloodshed and cruelty. For in its celebration
many beasts were slaughtered, and this being a cruel
spectacle imparted a cruel temper to the worshippers.
Moreover, under the old religions none obtained divine

Page 115

honours save those who were loaded with worldly glory,
such as captains of armies and rulers of cities; whereas
our religion glorifies men of a humble and contemplative,
rather than of an active life. Accordingly, while
the highest good of the old religions consisted in
magnanimity, bodily strength, and all those other
qualities which make men brave, our religion places
it in humility, lowliness, and contempt for the things
of this world; or if it ever calls upon us to be brave,
it is that we should be brave to suffer rather than
to do.

This manner of life, therefore, seems to have made
the world feebler, and to have given it over as a
prey to wicked men to deal with as they please; since
the mass of mankind, in the hope of being received
into Paradise, think more how to bear injuries than
how to avenge them. But should it seem that the
world has grown effeminate and Heaven laid aside her
arms, this assuredly results from the baseness of those
who have interpreted our religion to accord with indolence
and ease rather than with valour. For were we
to remember that religion permits the exaltation and
defence of our country, we would see it to be our duty
to love and honour it, and would strive to be able
and ready to defend it.

This training, therefore, and these most false interpretations
are the causes why, in the world of the present day,
we find no longer the numerous commonwealths which
were found of old; and in consequence, that we see
not now among the nations that love of freedom which
prevailed then; though, at the same time, I am persuaded
that one cause of this change has been, that the Roman
Empire by its arms and power put an end to all the
free States and free institutions of antiquity.
For although the power of Rome fell afterwards into
decay, these States could never recover their strength
or resume their former mode of government, save in
a very few districts of the Empire.

But, be this as it may, certain it is that in every
country of the world, even the least considerable,
the Romans found a league of well-armed republics,
most resolute in the defence of their freedom, whom
it is clear they never could have subdued had they
not been endowed with the rarest and most astonishing
valour. To cite a single instance, I shall take
the case of the Samnites who, strange as it may now
seem, were on the admission of Titus Livius himself,
so powerful and so steadfast in arms, as to be able
to withstand the Romans down to the consulship of
Papirius Cursor, son to the first Papirius, a period
of six and forty years, in spite of numerous defeats,
the loss of many of their towns, and the great slaughter
which overtook them everywhere throughout their country.
And this is the more remarkable when we see that country,
which once contained so many noble cities, and supported
so great a population, now almost uninhabited; and
reflect that it formerly enjoyed a government and
possessed resources making its conquest impossible
to less than Roman valour.

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There is no difficulty, therefore, in determining
whence that ancient greatness and this modern decay
have arisen, since they can be traced to the free
life formerly prevailing and to the servitude which
prevails now. For all countries and provinces
which enjoy complete freedom, make, as I have said,
most rapid progress. Because, from marriage being
less restricted in these countries, and more sought
after, we find there a greater population; every man
being disposed to beget as many children as he thinks
he can rear, when he has no anxiety lest they should
be deprived of their patrimony, and knows not only
that they are born to freedom and not to slavery,
but that they may rise by their merit to be the first
men of their country. In such States, accordingly,
we see wealth multiply, both that which comes from
agriculture and that which comes from manufactures.
For all love to gather riches and to add to their
possessions when their enjoyment of them is not likely
to be disturbed. And hence it happens that the
citizens of such States vie with one another in whatever
tends to promote public or private well-being; in
both of which, consequently, there is a wonderful growth.

But the contrary of all this takes place in those
countries which live in servitude, and the more oppressive
their servitude, the more they fall short of the good
which all desire. And the hardest of all hard
servitudes is that wherein one commonwealth is subjected
to another. First, because it is more lasting,
and there is less hope to escape from it; and, second,
because every commonwealth seeks to add to its own
strength by weakening and enfeebling all beside.
A prince who gets the better of you will not treat
you after this fashion, unless he be a barbarian like
those eastern despots who lay countries waste and
destroy the labours of civilization; but if influenced
by the ordinary promptings of humanity, will, as a
rule, regard all his subject States with equal favour,
and suffer them to pursue their usual employments,
and retain almost all their ancient institutions, so
that if they flourish not as free States might, they
do not dwindle as States that are enslaved; by which
I mean enslaved by a stranger, for of that other slavery
to which they may be reduced by one of their own citizens,
I have already spoken.

Whoever, therefore, shall well consider what has been
said above, will not be astonished at the power possessed
by the Samnites while they were still free, nor at
the weakness into which they fell when they were subjugated.
Of which change in their fortunes Livius often reminds
us, and particularly in connection with the war with
Hannibal, where he relates that the Samnites, being
ill-treated by a Roman legion quartered at Nola, sent
legates to Hannibal to ask his aid; who in laying their
case before him told him, that with their own soldiers
and captains they had fought single handed against
the Romans for a hundred years, and had more than
once withstood two consuls and two consular armies;
but had now fallen so low, that they were scarce able
to defend themselves against one poor legion.

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CHAPTER III.—­That Rome became great
by destroying the Cities which lay round about her,
and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of
Citizenship.

“Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis”—­Meanwhile
Rome grows on the ruins of Alba. They who
would have their city become a great empire, must
endeavour by every means to fill it with inhabitants;
for without a numerous population no city can ever
succeed in growing powerful. This may be effected
in two ways, by gentleness or by force. By gentleness,
when you offer a safe and open path to all strangers
who may wish to come and dwell in your city, so as
to encourage them to come there of their own accord;
by force, when after destroying neighbouring towns,
you transplant their inhabitants to live in yours.
Both of these methods were practised by Rome, and
with such success, that in the time of her sixth king
there dwelt within her walls eighty thousand citizens
fit to bear arms. For the Romans loved to follow
the methods of the skilful husbandman, who, to insure
a plant growing big and yielding and maturing its
fruit, cuts off the first shoots it sends out, that
the strength remaining in the stem, it may in due
season put forth new and more vigorous and more fruitful
branches. And that this was a right and a necessary
course for Rome to take for establishing and extending
her empire, is proved by the example of Sparta and
Athens, which, although exceedingly well-armed States,
and regulated by excellent laws, never reached the
same greatness as the Roman Republic; though the latter,
to all appearance, was more turbulent and disorderly
than they, and, so far as laws went, not so perfectly
governed. For this we can offer no other explanation
than that already given. For by augmenting the
numbers of her citizens in both the ways named, Rome
was soon able to place two hundred and eighty thousand
men under arms; while neither Sparta nor Athens could
ever muster more than twenty thousand; and this, not
because the situation of these countries was less advantageous
than that of Rome, but simply from the difference
in the methods they followed.

For Lycurgus, the founder of the Spartan Republic,
thinking nothing so likely to relax his laws as an
admixture of new citizens, did all he could to prevent
intercourse with strangers; with which object, besides
refusing these the right to marry, the right of citizenship,
and all such other social rights as induce men to
become members of a community, he ordained that in
this republic of his the only money current should
be of leather, so that none might be tempted to repair
thither to trade or to carry on any art.

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Under such circumstances the number of the inhabitants
of that State could never much increase. For
as all our actions imitate nature, and it is neither
natural nor possible that a puny stem should carry
a great branch, so a small republic cannot assume
control over cities or countries stronger than herself;
or, doing so, will resemble the tree whose boughs
being greater than its trunk, are supported with difficulty,
and snapped by every gust of wind. As it proved
with Sparta. For after she had spread her dominion
over all the cities of Greece, no sooner did Thebes
rebel than all the others rebelled likewise, and the
trunk was left stripped of its boughs. But this
could not have happened with Rome, whose stem was
mighty enough to bear any branch with ease.

It was, therefore, by adding to her population, and
by, adopting certain other methods presently to be
noticed, that Rome became so great and powerful.
And this is well expressed by Titus Livius, in the
words, “Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis.”

CHAPTER IV.—­That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for
extending their Power.

Any one who has read ancient history with attention,
must have observed that three methods have been used
by republics for extending their power. One of
these, followed by the old Etruscans, is to form a
confederation of many States, wherein none has precedence
over the rest in authority or rank, and each allows
the others to share its acquisitions; as do the States
of the Swiss League in our days, and as the Achaians
and Etolians did in Greece in earlier times. And
because the Etruscans were opposed to the Romans in
many wars, that I may give a clearer notion of this
method of theirs, I shall enlarge a little in my account
of the Etruscan people.

In Italy, before the Romans became supreme, the Etruscans
were very powerful, both by sea and land; and although
we have no separate history of their affairs, we have
some slight records left us of them, and some indications
of their greatness. We know, for instance, that
they planted a colony, to which they gave the name
of Hadria, on the coast of the upper sea; which colony
became so renowned that it lent its name to the sea
itself, which to this day by the Latins is called the
Hadriatic. We know, too, that their arms were
obeyed from the Tiber to the foot of the mountains
which enclose the greater part of the Italian peninsula;
although, two hundred years before Rome grew to any
great strength, they had lost their supremacy in the
province now known as Lombardy, of which the French
had possessed themselves. For that people, whether
driven by necessity, or attracted by the excellence
of the fruits, and still more of the wine of Italy,
came there under their chief, Bellovesus; and after
defeating and expelling the inhabitants of the country,
settled themselves therein, and there built many cities;
calling the district Gallia, after the name they then
bore: and this territory they retained until
they were subdued by the Romans.

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These Etruscans, therefore, living with one another
on a footing of complete equality, when they sought
to extend their power, followed that first method
of which I have just now spoken. Their State was
made up of twelve cities, among which were Chiusi,
Veii, Friuli, Arezzo, Volterra, and the like, and
their government was conducted in the form of a league.
They could not, however, extend their conquests beyond
Italy; while even within the limits of Italy, much
territory remained unoccupied by them for reasons
presently to be noticed.

The second method is to provide yourself with allies
or companions, taking heed, however, to retain in
your own hands the chief command, the seat of government,
and the titular supremacy. This was the method
followed by the Romans.

The third method is to hold other States in direct
subjection to you, and not merely associated with
you as companions; and this was the plan pursued by
the Spartans and Athenians.

Of these three methods, the last is wholly useless,
as was seen in the case of the two States named, which
came to ruin from no other cause than that they had
acquired a dominion greater than they could maintain.
For to undertake to govern cities by force, especially
such cities as have been used to live in freedom,
is a difficult and arduous task, in which you never
can succeed without an army and that a great one.
But to have such an army you must needs have associates
who will help to swell the numbers of your own citizens.
And because Athens and Sparta neglected this precaution,
whatever they did was done in vain; whereas Rome,
which offers an instance of the second of the methods
we are considering, by attending to this precaution
reached a power that had no limit. And as she
alone has lived in this way, so she alone has attained
to this pitch of power. For joining with herself
many States throughout Italy as her companions, who
in most respects lived with her on a footing of equality,
while, as has been noted, always reserving to herself
the seat of empire and the titular command, it came
about that these States, without being aware of it,
by their own efforts, and with their own blood, wrought
out their own enslavement.

For when Rome began to send armies out of Italy, for
the purpose of reducing foreign kingdoms to provinces,
and of subjugating nations who, being used to live
under kings, were not impatient of her yoke, and who,
receiving Roman governors, and having been conquered
by armies bearing the Roman name, recognized no masters
save the Romans, those companions of Rome who dwelt
in Italy suddenly found themselves surrounded by Roman
subjects, and weighed down by the greatness of the
Roman power; and when at last they came to perceive
the mistake in which they had been living, it was
too late to remedy it, so vast was the authority which
Rome had then obtained over foreign countries, and
so great the resources which she possessed within
herself; having by this time grown to be the mightiest

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and best-armed of States. So that although these
her companions sought to avenge their wrongs by conspiring
against her, they were soon defeated in the attempt,
and remained in a worse plight than before, since
they too became subjects and no longer associates.
This method, then, as I have said, was followed by
the Romans alone; but no other plan can be pursued
by a republic which desires to extend its power; experience
having shown none other so safe and certain.

The method which consists in forming leagues, of which
I have spoken above as having been adopted by the
Etruscans, the Achaians, and the Etolians of old,
and in our own days by the Swiss, is the next best
after that followed by the Romans, for as in this way
there can be no great extension of power, two advantages
result: first, that you do not readily involve
yourself in war; and, second, that you can easily
preserve any little acquisition which you may make.
The reason why you cannot greatly extend your power
is, that as your league is made up of separate States
with distinct seats of government, it is difficult
for these to consult and resolve in concert.
The same causes make these States careless to enlarge
their territories; because acquisitions which have
to be shared among many communities are less thought
of than those made by a single republic which looks
to enjoy them all to itself. Again, since leagues
govern through general councils, they must needs be
slower in resolving than a nation dwelling within one
frontier.

Moreover, we find from experience that this method
has certain fixed limits beyond which there is no
instance of its ever having passed; by which I mean
that some twelve or fourteen communities may league
themselves together, but will never seek to pass beyond
that limit: for after associating themselves
in such numbers as seem to them to secure their safety
against all besides, they desire no further extension
of their power, partly because no necessity compels
them to extend, and partly because, for the reasons
already given, they would find no profit in extending.
For were they to seek extension they would have to
follow one of two courses: either continuing
to admit new members to their league, whose number
must lead to confusion; or else making subjects, a
course which they will avoid since they will see difficulty
in making them, and no great good in having them.
Wherefore, when their number has so increased that
their safety seems secured, they have recourse to two
expedients: either receiving other States under
their protection and engaging for their defence (in
which way they obtain money from various quarters
which they can easily distribute among themselves);
or else hiring themselves out as soldiers to foreign
States, and drawing pay from this or the other prince
who employs them to carry out his enterprises; as
we see done by the Swiss at the present day, and as
we read was done in ancient times by certain of those
nations whom we have named above. To which we

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have a witness in Titus Livius, who relates that when
Philip of Macedon came to treat with Titus Quintius
Flamininus, and while terms were being discussed in
the presence of a certain Etolian captain, this man
coming to words with Philip, the latter taunted him
with greed and bad faith; telling him that the Etolians
were not ashamed to draw pay from one side, and then
send their men to serve on the other; so that often
the banner of Etolia might be seen displayed in two
hostile camps.

We see, therefore, that the method of proceeding by
leagues has always been of the same character, and
has led always to the same results. We see, likewise,
that the method which proceeds by reducing States to
direct subjection has constantly proved a weak one,
and produced insignificant gains; and that whenever
these gains have passed a certain limit, ruin has
ensued. And if the latter of these two methods
be of little utility among armed States, among those
that are unarmed, as is now the case with the republics
of Italy, it is worse than useless. We may conclude,
therefore, that the true method was that followed by
the Romans; which is the more remarkable as we find
none who adopted it before they did, and none who
have followed it since. As for leagues, I know
of no nations who have had recourse to them in recent
times except the Swiss and the Suevians.

But to bring my remarks on this head to an end, I
affirm that all the various methods followed by the
Romans in conducting their affairs, whether foreign
or domestic, so far from being imitated in our day,
have been held of no account, some pronouncing them
to be mere fables, some thinking them impracticable,
others out of place and unprofitable; and so, abiding
in this ignorance, we rest a prey to all who have chosen
to invade our country. But should it seem difficult
to tread in the footsteps of the Romans, it ought
not to appear so hard, especially for us Tuscans,
to imitate the Tuscans of antiquity, who if, from the
causes already assigned, they failed to establish
an empire like that of Rome, succeeded in acquiring
in Italy that degree of power which their method of
acting allowed, and which they long preserved in security,
with the greatest renown in arms and government, and
the highest reputation for manners and religion.
This power and this glory of theirs were first impaired
by the Gauls, and afterwards extinguished by the Romans,
and so utterly extinguished, that of the Etruscan
Empire, so splendid two thousand years ago, we have
at the present day barely a record. This it is
which has led me to inquire whence this oblivion of
things arises, a question of which I shall treat in
the following Chapter.

CHAPTER V.—­That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of
Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the Memory of the Past.

To those philosophers who will have it that the world
has existed from all eternity, it were, I think, a
good answer, that if what they say be true we ought
to have record of a longer period than five thousand
years; did it not appear that the memory of past times
is blotted out by a variety of causes, some referable
to men, and some to Heaven.

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Among the causes which have a human origin are the
changes in sects and tongues; because when a new sect,
that is to say a new religion, comes up, its first
endeavour, in order to give itself reputation, is to
efface the old; and should it so happen that the founders
of the new religion speak another tongue, this may
readily be effected. This we know from observing
the methods which Christianity has followed in dealing
with the religion of the Gentiles, for we find that
it has abolished all the rites and ordinances of that
worship, and obliterated every trace of the ancient
belief. True, it has not succeeded in utterly
blotting out our knowledge of things done by the famous
men who held that belief; and this because the propagators
of the new faith, retaining the Latin tongue, were
constrained to use it in writing the new law; for
could they have written this in a new tongue, we may
infer, having regard to their other persecutions,
that no record whatever would have survived to us
of past events. For any one who reads of the methods
followed by Saint Gregory and the other heads of the
Christian religion, will perceive with what animosity
they pursued all ancient memorials; burning the works
of poets and historians; breaking images; and destroying
whatsoever else afforded any trace of antiquity.
So that if to this persecution a new language had
been joined, it must soon have been found that everything
was forgotten.

We may believe, therefore, that what Christianity
has sought to effect against the sect of the Gentiles,
was actually effected by that sect against the religion
which preceded theirs; and that, from the repeated
changes of belief which have taken place in the course
of five or six thousand years, the memory of what
happened at a remote date has perished, or, if any
trace of it remain, has come to be regarded as a fable
to which no credit is due; like the Chronicle of Diodorus
Siculus, which, professing to give an account of the
events of forty or fifty thousand years, is held,
and I believe justly, a lying tale.

As for the causes of oblivion which we may refer to
Heaven, they are those which make havoc of the human
race, and reduce the population of certain parts of
the world to a very small number. This happens
by plague, famine, or flood, of which three the last
is the most hurtful, as well because it is the most
universal, as because those saved are generally rude
and ignorant mountaineers, who possessing no knowledge
of antiquity themselves, can impart none to those
who come after them. Or if among the survivors
there chance to be one possessed of such knowledge,
to give himself consequence and credit, he will conceal
and pervert it to suit his private ends, so that to
his posterity there will remain only so much as he
may have been pleased to communicate, and no more.

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That these floods, plagues, and famines do in fact
happen, I see no reason to doubt, both because we
find all histories full of them, and recognize their
effect in this oblivion of the past, and also because
it is reasonable that such things should happen.
For as when much superfluous matter has gathered in
simple bodies, nature makes repeated efforts to remove
and purge it away, thereby promoting the health of
these bodies, so likewise as regards that composite
body the human race, when every province of the world
so teems with inhabitants that they can neither subsist
where they are nor remove elsewhere, every region being
equally crowded and over-peopled, and when human craft
and wickedness have reached their highest pitch, it
must needs come about that the world will purge herself
in one or another of these three ways, to the end
that men, becoming few and contrite, may amend their
lives and live with more convenience.

Etruria, then, as has been said above, was at one
time powerful, abounding in piety and valour, practising
her own customs, and speaking her own tongue; but
all this was effaced by the power of Rome, so that,
as I have observed already, nothing is left of her
but the memory of a name.

CHAPTER VI.—­Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making War.

Having treated of the methods followed by the Romans
for increasing their power, we shall now go on to
consider those which they used in making war; and
in all they did we shall find how wisely they turned
aside from the common path in order to render their
progress to supreme greatness easy.

Whosoever makes war, whether from policy or ambition,
means to acquire and to hold what he acquires, and
to carry on the war he has undertaken in such a manner
that it shall enrich and not impoverish his native
country and State. It is necessary, therefore,
whether for acquiring or holding, to consider how
cost may be avoided, and everything done most advantageously
for the public welfare. But whoever would effect
all this, must take the course and follow the methods
of the Romans; which consisted, first of all, in making
their wars, as the French say, great and short.
For entering the field with strong armies, they brought
to a speedy conclusion whatever wars they had with
the Latins, the Samnites, or the Etruscans.

And if we take note of all the wars in which they
were engaged, from the foundation of their city down
to the siege of Veii, all will be seen to have been
quickly ended some in twenty, some in ten, and some
in no more than six days. And this was their
wont: So soon as war was declared they would
go forth with their armies to meet the enemy and at
once deliver battle. The enemy, on being routed,
to save their country from pillage, very soon came
to terms, when the Romans would take from them certain
portions of their territory. These they either
assigned to particular persons, or made the seat of

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a colony, which being settled on the confines of the
conquered country served as a defence to the Roman
frontier, to the advantage both of the colonists who
had these lands given them, and of the Roman people
whose borders were thus guarded at no expense to themselves.
And no other system of defence could have been at
once so safe, so strong, and so effectual. For
while the enemy were not actually in the field, this
guard was sufficient; and when they came out in force
to overwhelm the colony, the Romans also went forth
in strength and gave them battle; and getting the
better of them, imposed harder terms than before,
and so returned home. And in this way they came
gradually to establish their name abroad, and to add
to their power.

These methods they continued to employ until they
changed their system of warfare, which they did during
the siege of Veii; when to enable them to carry on
a prolonged war, they passed a law for the payment
of their soldiers, whom, up to that time they had
not paid, nor needed to pay, because till then their
wars had been of brief duration. Nevertheless,
while allowing pay to their soldiers that they might
thus wage longer wars, and keep their armies longer
in the field when employed on distant enterprises,
they never departed from their old plan of bringing
their campaigns to as speedy an end as place and circumstances
allowed, nor ever ceased to plant colonies.

Their custom of terminating their wars with despatch,
besides being natural to the Romans, was strengthened
by the ambition of their consuls, who, being appointed
for twelve months only, six of which they had to spend
in the city, were eager to bring their wars to an end
as rapidly as they could, that they might enjoy the
honours of a triumph. The usage of planting colonies
was recommended by the great advantage and convenience
which resulted from it. In dealing with the spoils
of warfare their practice, no doubt, in a measure
changed, so that in this respect they were not afterwards
so liberal as they were at first; partly, because
liberality did not seem so necessary when their soldiers
were in receipt of pay; and, partly, because the spoils
themselves being greater than before, they thought
by their help so to enrich the public treasury as
to be able to carry on their wars without taxing the
city; and, in fact, by pursuing this course the public
revenues were soon greatly augmented. The methods
thus followed by the Romans in dividing plunder and
in planting colonies had, accordingly, this result,
that whereas other less prudent princes and republics
are impoverished by war, Rome was enriched by it;
nay, so far was the system carried, that no consul
could hope for a triumph unless he brought back with
him for the public treasury much gold and silver and
spoils of every kind.

By methods such as these, at one time bringing their
wars to a rapid conclusion by invasion and actual
defeat, at another wearing out an enemy by protracted
hostilities, and again by concluding peace on advantageous
terms, the Romans continually grew richer and more
powerful.

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CHAPTER VII.—­Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to each
Colonist.

It would, I think, be difficult to fix with certainty
how much land the Romans allotted to each colonist,
for my belief is that they gave more or less according
to the character of the country to which they sent
them. We may, however, be sure that in every instance,
and to whatever country they were sent, the quantity
of land assigned was not very large: first, because,
these colonists being sent to guard the newly acquired
country, by giving little land it became possible to
send more men; and second because, as the Romans lived
frugally at home, it is unreasonable to suppose that
they should wish their countrymen to be too well off
abroad. And Titus Livius tells us that on the
capture of Veii, the Romans sent thither a colony,
allotting to each colonist three jugera and seven
unciae of land, which, according to our measurement
would be something under two acres.

Besides the above reasons, the Romans may likely enough
have thought that it was not so much the quantity
of the land allotted as its careful cultivation that
would make it suffice. It is very necessary, however,
that every colony should have common pasturage where
all may send their cattle to graze, as well as woods
where they may cut fuel; for without such conveniences
no colony can maintain itself.

Having spoken above of the methods followed by the
Romans in making war, and related how the Etruscans
were attacked by the Gauls, it seems to me not foreign
to these topics to explain that of wars there are two
kinds. One kind of war has its origin in the
ambition of princes or republics who seek to extend
their dominions. Such were the wars waged by
Alexander the Great, and by the Romans, and such are
those which we see every day carried on by one potentate
against another. Wars of this sort have their
dangers, but do not utterly extirpate the inhabitants
of a country; what the conqueror seeks being merely
the submission of the conquered people, whom, generally
speaking, he suffers to retain their laws, and always
their houses and goods.

The other species of war is when an entire people,
with all the families of which it is made up, being
driven out by famine or defeat, removes from its former
seat, and goes in search of a new abode and a new
country, not simply with the view to establish dominion
over it, but to possess it as its own, and to expel
or exterminate the former inhabitants. Of this
most terrible and cruel species of warfare Sallust
speaks at the end of his history of the war with Jugurtha,
where in mentioning that after the defeat of Jugurtha
the movement of the Gauls into Italy began to be noticed,
he observes that “in the wars of the Romans

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with other nations the struggle was for mastery; but
that always in their wars with the Gauls the struggle
on both sides was for life.” For a
prince or commonwealth, when attacking another State,
will be content to rid themselves of those only who
are at the head of affairs; but an entire people,
set in motion in the manner described, must destroy
all who oppose them, since their object is to subsist
on that whereon those whom they invade have hitherto
subsisted.

The Romans had to pass through three of these desperate
wars; the first being that in which their city was
actually captured by those Gauls who, as already mentioned,
had previously taken Lombardy from the Etruscans and
made it their seat, and for whose invasion Titus Livius
has assigned two causes. First, that they were
attracted, as I have said before, by the fruitful
soil and by the wine of Italy which they had not in
Gaul; second, that their population having multiplied
so greatly that they could no longer find wherewithal
to live on at home, the princes of their land decided
that certain of their number should go forth to seek
a new abode; and so deciding, chose as leaders of those
who were to go, two Gaulish chiefs, Bellovesus and
Siccovesus; the former of whom came into Italy while
the latter passed into Spain. From the immigration
under Bellovesus resulted the occupation of Lombardy,
and, subsequently, the first war of the Gauls with
Rome. At a later date, and after the close of
the first war with Carthage, came the second Gallic
invasion, when more than two hundred thousand Gauls
perished in battle between Piombino and Pisa.
The third of these wars broke out on the descent into
Italy of the Todi and Cimbri, who, after defeating
several Roman armies, were themselves defeated by
Marius.

In these three most dangerous contests the arms of
Rome prevailed; but no ordinary valour was needed
for their success. For we see afterwards, when
the spirit of the Romans had declined, and their armies
had lost their former excellence, their supremacy
was overthrown by men of the same race, that is to
say by the Goths, the Vandals, and others like them,
who spread themselves over the whole of the Western
Empire.

Nations such as these, quit, as I have said, their
native land, when forced by famine, or by defeat in
domestic wars, to seek a new habitation elsewhere.
When those thus driven forth are in large numbers,
they violently invade the territories of other nations,
slaughtering the inhabitants, seizing on their possessions,
founding new kingdoms, and giving new names to provinces;
as was done by Moses, and by those tribes who overran
the Roman Empire. For the new names which we find
in Italy and elsewhere, have no other origin than
in their having been given by these new occupants;
as when the countries formerly known as Gallia Cisalpina
and Gallia Transalpina took the names of Lombardy and
France, from the Lombards and the Franks who settled
themselves there. In the same way Sclavonia was
formerly known as Illyria, Hungary as Pannonia, and
England as Britain; while many other provinces which
it would be tedious to enumerate, have similarly changed
their designations; as when the name Judaea was given
by Moses to that part of Syria of which he took possession.

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And since I have said above that nations such as those
I have been describing, are often driven by wars from
their ancestral homes, and forced to seek a new country
elsewhere, I shall cite the instance of the Maurusians,
a people who anciently dwelt in Syria, but hearing
of the inroad of the Hebrews, and thinking themselves
unable to resist them, chose rather to seek safety
in flight than to perish with their country in a vain
effort to defend it. For which reason, removing
with their families, they went to Africa, where, after
driving out the native inhabitants, they took up their
abode; and although they could not defend their own
country, were able to possess themselves of a country
belonging to others. And Procopius, who writes
the history of the war which Belisarius conducted
against those Vandals who seized on Africa, relates,
that on certain pillars standing in places where the
Maurusians once dwelt, he had read inscriptions in
these words: “We Maurusians who fled
before Joshua, the robber, the son of Nun;"[1]
giving us to know the cause of their quitting Syria.
Be this as it may, nations thus driven forth by a
supreme necessity, are, if they be in great number,
in the highest degree dangerous, and cannot be successfully
withstood except by a people who excel in arms.

When those constrained to abandon their homes are
not in large numbers, they are not so dangerous as
the nations of whom I have been speaking, since they
cannot use the same violence, but must trust to their
address to procure them a habitation; and, after procuring
it, must live with their neighbours as friends and
companions, as we find AEneas, Dido, the Massilians,
and others like them to have lived; all of whom contrived
to maintain themselves in the districts in which they
settled, by securing the good will of the neighbouring
nations.

Almost all the great emigrations of nations have been
and continue to be from the cold and barren region
of Scythia, because from the population there being
excessive, and the soil ill able to support them, they
are forced to quit their home, many causes operating
to drive them forth and none to keep them back.
And if, for the last five hundred years, it has not
happened that any of these nations has actually overrun
another country, there are various reasons to account
for it. First, the great clearance which that
region made of its inhabitants during the decline
of the Roman Empire, when more than thirty nations
issued from it in succession; and next, the circumstance
that the countries of Germany and Hungary, whence
also these nations came, are now so much improved that
men can live there in comfort, and consequently are
not constrained to shift their habitations. Besides
which, since these countries are occupied by a very
warlike race, they serve as a sort of bulwark to keep
back the neighbouring Scythians, who for this reason
do not venture to attack them, nor attempt to force
a passage. Nevertheless, movements on a great
scale have oftentimes been begun by the Tartars, and
been at once withstood by the Hungarians and Poles,
whose frequent boast it is, that but for them, Italy
and the Church would more than once have felt the
weight of the Tartar arms.

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CHAPTER IX.—­Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between
States.

The occasion which led to war between the Romans and
Samnites, who for long had been in league with one
another, is of common occurrence in all powerful States,
being either brought about by accident, or else purposely
contrived by some one who would set war a-foot.
As between the Romans and the Samnites, the occasion
of war was accidental. For in making war upon
the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the
Samnites had no thought of involving themselves with
the Romans. But the Campanians being overpowered,
and, contrary to the expectation of Romans and Samnites
alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the Romans, on whose
protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour
them as dependants, and to accept a war which, it
seemed to them, they could not with honour decline.
For though they might have thought it unreasonable
to be called on to defend the Campanians as friends
against their own friends the Samnites, it seemed
to them shameful not to defend them as subjects, or
as a people who had placed themselves under their
protection. For they reasoned that to decline
their defence would close the gate against all others
who at any future time might desire to submit themselves
to their power. And, accordingly, since glory
and empire, and not peace, were the ends which they
always had in view, it became impossible for them
to refuse this protectorship.

A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war
with the Carthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed
by the Romans of the citizens of Messina in Sicily,
and this likewise came about by chance. But the
second war with Carthage was not the result of chance.
For Hannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the
Saguntans, who were the friends of Rome in Spain,
not from any desire to injure them, but in order to
set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity
of engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into
Italy. This method of picking a quarrel is constantly
resorted to by powerful States when they are bound
by scruples of honour or like considerations.
For if I desire to make war on a prince with whom
I am under an ancient and binding treaty, I shall
find some colour or pretext for attacking the friend
of that prince, very well knowing that when I attack
his friend, either the prince will resent it, when
my scheme for engaging him in war will be realized;
or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or baseness
in not defending one who is under his protection will
be made apparent; either of which alternatives will
discredit him, and further my designs.

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We are to note, therefore, in connection with this
submission of the Campanians, what has just now been
said as to provoking another power to war; and also
the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to
its own defence, is prepared to go all lengths to
ruin its assailant,—­that remedy being to
give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects
for its defender; as the Campanians gave themselves
up to the Romans, and as the Florentines gave themselves
up to King Robert of Naples, who, after refusing to
defend them as his friends against Castruccio of Lucca
by whom they were hard pressed, defended them as his
subjects.

CHAPTER X.—­That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the
Sinews of War.

Since any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but
cannot at his pleasure bring it to a close, a prince
before he engages in any warlike enterprise ought
to measure his strength and govern himself accordingly.
But he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself
as to his strength, which he will always do, if he
measure it by money, by advantage of position, or
by the good-will of his subjects, while he is unprovided
with an army of his own. These are things which
may swell your strength but do not constitute it,
being in themselves null and of no avail without an
army on which you can depend.

Without such an army no amount of money will meet
your wants, the natural strength of your country will
not protect you, and the fidelity and attachment of
your subjects will not endure, since it is impossible
that they should continue true to you when you cannot
defend them. Lakes, and mountains, and the most
inaccessible strongholds, where valiant defenders
are wanting, become no better than the level plain;
and money, so far from being a safeguard, is more likely
to leave you a prey to your enemy; since nothing can
be falser than the vulgar opinion which affirms it
to be the sinews of war.

This opinion is put forward by Quintus Curtius, where,
in speaking of the war between Antipater the Macedonian
and the King of Sparta, he relates that the latter,
from want of money, was constrained to give battle
and was defeated; whereas, could he have put off fighting
for a few days the news of Alexander’s death
would have reached Greece, and he might have had a
victory without a battle. But lacking money, and
fearing that on that account his soldiers might desert
him, he was forced to hazard an engagement. It
was for this reason that Quintus Curtius declared
money to be the sinews of war, a maxim every day cited
and acted upon by princes less wise than they should
be. For building upon this, they think it enough
for their defence to have laid up great treasures;
not reflecting that were great treasures all that is
needed for victory, Darius of old had conquered Alexander,
the Greeks the Romans, and in our own times Charles
of Burgundy the Swiss; while the pope and the Florentines
together would have had little difficulty in defeating
Francesco Maria, nephew of Pope Julius II., in the
recent war of Urbino; and yet, in every one of these
instances, the victory remained with him who held
the sinews of war to consist, not in money, but in
good soldiers.

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Croesus, king of Lydia, after showing Solon the Athenian
much besides, at last displayed to him the boundless
riches of his treasure-house, and asked him what he
thought of his power. Whereupon Solon answered
that he thought him no whit more powerful in respect
of these treasures, for as war is made with iron and
not with gold, another coming with more iron might
carry off his gold. After the death of Alexander
the Great a tribe of Gauls, passing through Greece
on their way into Asia, sent envoys to the King of
Macedonia to treat for terms of accord; when the king,
to dismay them by a display of his resources, showed
them great store of gold and silver. But these
barbarians, when they saw all this wealth, in their
greed to possess it, though before they had looked
on peace as settled, broke off negotiations; and thus
the king was ruined by those very treasures he had
amassed for his defence. In like manner, not
many years ago, the Venetians, with a full treasury,
lost their whole dominions without deriving the least
advantage from their wealth.

I maintain, therefore, that it is not gold, as is
vulgarly supposed, that is the sinews of war, but
good soldiers; or while gold by itself will not gain
you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you
gold. Had the Romans chosen to make war with
gold rather than with iron all the treasures of the
earth would not have sufficed them having regard to
the greatness of their enterprises and the difficulties
they had to overcome in carrying them out. But
making their wars with iron they never felt any want
of gold; for those who stood in fear of them brought
gold into their camp.

And supposing it true that the Spartan king was forced
by lack of money to risk the chances of a battle,
it only fared with him in respect of money as it has
often fared with others from other causes; since we
see that where an army is in such straits for want
of victual that it must either fight or perish by
famine, it will always fight, as being the more honourable
course and that on which fortune may in some way smile.
So, too, it has often happened that a captain, seeing
his enemy about to be reinforced, has been obliged
either to trust to fortune and at once deliver battle,
or else, waiting till the reinforcement is complete,
to fight then, whether he will or no, and at whatever
disadvantage. We find also, as in the case of
Hasdrubal when beset, in the March of Ancona, at once
by Claudius Nero and by the other Roman consul, that
a captain, when he must either fight or fly, will
always fight, since it will seem to him that by this
course, however hazardous, he has at least a chance
of victory, while by the other his ruin is certain.

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There are many circumstances, therefore, which may
force a captain to give battle contrary to his intention,
among which the want of money may sometimes be one.
But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be the
sinews of war, any more than those other things from
the want of which men are reduced to the same necessity.
Once more, therefore, I repeat that not gold but good
soldiers constitute the sinews of war. Money,
indeed, is most necessary in a secondary place; but
this necessity good soldiers will always be able to
supply, since it is as impossible that good soldiers
should lack money, as that money by itself should secure
good soldiers. And that what I say is true is
shown by countless passages in history. When
Pericles persuaded the Athenians to declare war against
the whole Peloponnesus, assuring them that their dexterity,
aided by their wealth, was sure to bring them off victorious,
the Athenians, though for a while they prospered in
this war, in the end were overpowered, the prudent
counsels and good soldiers of Sparta proving more
than a match for the dexterity and wealth of Athens.
But, indeed, there can be no better witness to the
truth of my contention than Titus Livius himself.
For in that passage of his history wherein he discusses
whether if Alexander the Great had invaded Italy, he
would have succeeded in vanquishing the Romans, three
things are noted by him as essential to success in
war; to wit, many and good soldiers, prudent captains,
and favourable fortune; and after examining whether
the Romans or Alexander would have had the advantage
in each of these three particulars, he arrives at
his conclusion without any mention of money.

The Campanians, therefore, when asked by the Sidicinians
to arm in their behalf, must have measured their strength
by wealth and not by soldiers; for after declaring
in their favour and suffering two defeats, to save
themselves they were obliged to become tributary to
Rome.

CHAPTER XI.—­That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has
Reputation rather than Strength.

To mark the mistake made by the Sidicinians in trusting
to the protection of the Campanians, and by the Campanians
in supposing themselves able to protect the Sidicinians,
Titus Livius could not have expressed himself in apter
words than by saying, that “the Campanians
rather lent their name to the Sidicinians than furnished
any substantial aid towards their defence.”

Here we have to note that alliances with princes who
from dwelling at a distance have no facility, or who
from their own embarrassments, or from other causes,
have no ability to render aid, afford rather reputation
than protection to those who put their trust in them.
As was the case in our own times with the Florentines,
when, in the year 1479, they were attacked by the
Pope and the King of Naples. For being friends
of the French king they drew from that friendship
more reputation than help. The same would be
the case with that prince who should engage in any
enterprise in reliance on the Emperor Maximilian, his
being one of those friendships which, in the words
of our historian, nomen magis quam praesidium adferunt.

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On this occasion, therefore, the Campanians were misled
by imagining themselves stronger than they really
were. For often, from defect of judgment, men
take upon them to defend others, when they have neither
skill nor ability to defend themselves. Of which
we have a further instance in the Tarentines, who,
when the Roman and Samnite armies were already drawn
up against one another for battle, sent messengers
to the Roman consul to acquaint him that they desired
peace between the two nations, and would themselves
declare war against whichsoever of the two first began
hostilities. The consul, laughing at their threats,
in the presence of the messengers, ordered the signal
for battle to sound, and bade his army advance to
meet the enemy; showing the Tarentines by acts rather
than words what answer he thought their message deserved.

Having spoken in the present Chapter of unwise courses
followed by princes for defending others, I shall
speak in the next, of the methods they follow in defending
themselves.

CHAPTER XII.—­Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to
anticipate or to await it.

I have often heard it disputed by men well versed
in military affairs, whether, when there are two princes
of nearly equal strength, and the bolder of the two
proclaims war upon the other, it is better for that
other to await attack within his own frontier, or to
march into the enemy’s country and fight him
there; and I have heard reasons given in favour of
each of these courses.

They who maintain that an enemy should be attacked
in his own country, cite the advice given by Croesus
to Cyrus, when the latter had come to the frontiers
of the Massagetae to make war on that people.
For word being sent by Tomyris their queen that Cyrus
might, at his pleasure, either enter her dominions,
where she would await him, or else allow her to come
and meet him; and the matter being debated, Croesus,
contrary to the opinion of other advisers, counselled
Cyrus to go forward and meet the queen, urging that
were he to defeat her at a distance from her kingdom,
he might not be able to take it from her, since she
would have time to repair her strength; whereas, were
he to defeat her within her own dominions, he could
follow her up on her flight, and, without giving her
time to recover herself, deprive her of her State.
They cite also the advice given by Hannibal to Antiochus,
when the latter was meditating a war on the Romans.
For Hannibal told him that the Romans could not be
vanquished except in Italy, where an invader might
turn to account the arms and resources of their friends,
whereas any one making war upon them out of Italy,
and leaving that country in their hands, would leave
them an unfailing source whence to draw whatever reinforcement
they might need; and finally, he told him, that the
Romans might more easily be deprived of Rome than
of their empire, and of Italy more easily than of
any of their other provinces. They likewise instance
Agathocles, who, being unequal to support a war at
home, invaded the Carthaginians, by whom he was being
attacked, and reduced them to sue for peace.
They also cite Scipio, who to shift the war from Italy,
carried it into Africa.

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Those who hold a contrary opinion contend that to
have your enemy at a disadvantage you must get him
away from his home, alleging the case of the Athenians,
who while they carried on the war at their convenience
in their own territory, retained their superiority;
but when they quitted that territory, and went with
their armies to Sicily, lost their freedom. They
cite also the fable of the poets wherein it is figured
that Antaeus, king of Libya, being assailed by the
Egyptian Hercules, could not be overcome while he
awaited his adversary within the bounds of his own
kingdom; but so soon as he was withdrawn from these
by the craft of Hercules, lost his kingdom and his
life. Whence the fable runs that Antaeus, being
son to the goddess Earth, when thrown to the ground
drew fresh strength from the Earth, his mother; and
that Hercules, perceiving this, held him up away from
the Earth.

Recent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this
view. Every one knows how Ferrando, king of Naples,
was in his day accounted a most wise prince; and how
two years before his death there came a rumour that
Charles VIII of France was meditating an attack upon
him; and how, after making great preparations for
his defence, he sickened; and being on the point of
death, among other counsels left his son Alfonso this
advice, that nothing in the world should tempt him
to pass out of his own territory, but to await the
enemy within his frontier, and with his forces unimpaired;
a warning disregarded by Alfonso, who sent into Romagna
an army, which he lost, and with it his whole dominions,
without a battle.

Other arguments on both sides of the question in addition
to those already noticed, are as follows: He
who attacks shows higher courage than he who stands
on his defence, and this gives his army greater confidence.
Moreover, by attacking your enemy you deprive him of
many opportunities for using his resources, since
he can receive no aid from subjects who have been
stripped of their possessions; and when an enemy is
at his gates, a prince must be careful how he levies
money and imposes taxes; so that, as Hannibal said,
the springs which enable a country to support a war
come to be dried up. Again, the soldiers of an
invader, finding themselves in a foreign land, are
under a stronger necessity to fight, and necessity,
as has often been said, is the parent of valour.

On the other hand, it may be argued that there are
many advantages to be gained by awaiting the attack
of your enemy. For without putting yourself much
about, you may harass him by intercepting his supplies,
whether of victual or of whatsoever else an army stands
in need: from your better knowledge of the country
you can impede his movements; and because men muster
more willingly to defend their homes than to go on
distant expeditions, you can meet him with more numerous
forces, if defeated you can more easily repair your
strength, because the bulk of your army, finding shelter

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at hand, will be able to save itself, and your reserves
will have no distance to come. In this way you
can use your whole strength without risking your entire
fortunes; whereas, in leaving your country, you risk
your entire fortunes, without putting forth your whole
strength. Nay, we find that to weaken an adversary
still further, some have suffered him to make a march
of several days into their country, and then to capture
certain of their towns, that by leaving garrisons
in these, he might reduce the numbers of his army,
and so be attacked at greater disadvantage.

But now to speak my own mind on the matter, I think
we should make this distinction. Either you have
your country strongly defended, as the Romans had
and the Swiss have theirs, or, like the Carthaginians
of old and the King of France and the Italians at
the present day, you have it undefended. In the
latter case you must keep the enemy at a distance
from your country, for as your strength lies not in
men but in money, whenever the supply of money is
cut off you are undone, and nothing so soon cuts off
this supply as a war of invasion. Of which we
have example in the Carthaginians, who, while their
country was free from invasion, were able by means
of their great revenues to carry on war in Italy against
the Romans, but when they were invaded could not defend
themselves even against Agathocles. The Florentines,
in like manner, could make no head against Castruccio,
lord of Lucca, when he attacked them in their own
country; and to obtain protection, were compelled
to yield themselves up to King Robert of Naples.
And yet, after Castruccio’s death, these same
Florentines were bold enough to attack the Duke of
Milan in his own country, and strong enough to strip
him of his dominions. Such valour did they display
in distant wars, such weakness in those that were
near.

But when a country is armed as Rome was and Switzerland
now is, the closer you press it, the harder it is
to subdue; because such States can assemble a stronger
force to resist attack than for attacking others.
Nor does the great authority of Hannibal move me in
this instance, since resentment and his own advantage
might lead him to speak as he spoke to Antiochus.
For had the Romans suffered in Gaul, and within the
same space of time, those three defeats at the hands
of Hannibal which they suffered in Italy, it must
have made an end of them; since they could not have
turned the remnants of their armies to account as they
did in Italy, not having the same opportunity for
repairing their strength; nor could they have met
their enemy with such numerous armies. For we
never find them sending forth a force of more than
fifty thousand men for the invasion of any province;
whereas, in defending their own country against the
inroad of the Gauls at the end of the first Carthaginian
war, we hear of them bringing some eighteen hundred
thousand men into the field; and their failure to
vanquish the Gauls in Lombardy as they had vanquished

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those in Tuscany arose from their inability to lead
a great force so far against a numerous enemy, or
to encounter him with the same advantages. In
Germany the Cimbrians routed a Roman army who had
there no means to repair their disaster; but when they
came into Italy, the Romans could collect their whole
strength, and destroy them. Out of their native
country, whence they can bring no more than thirty
or forty thousand men, the Swiss may readily be defeated;
but in their own country, where they can assemble
a hundred thousand, they are well-nigh invincible.

In conclusion, therefore, I repeat that the prince
who has his people armed and trained for war, should
always await a great and dangerous war at home, and
never go forth to meet it. But that he whose subjects
are unarmed, and whose country is not habituated to
war, should always carry the war to as great a distance
as he can from home. For in this way each will
defend himself in the best manner his means admit.

CHAPTER XIII.—­That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by
Fraud than by Force.

I hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever
rise to great place from small beginnings without
using fraud or force, unless, indeed, they be given,
or take by inheritance the place to which some other
has already come. Force, however, will never
suffice by itself to effect this end, while fraud
often will, as any one may plainly see who reads the
lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles of Sicily, and
many others like them, who from the lowest or, at
any rate, from very low beginnings, rose either to
sovereignty or to the highest command.

This necessity for using deceit is taught by Xenophon
in his life of Cyrus; for the very first expedition
on which Cyrus is sent, against the King of Armenia,
is seen to teem with fraud; and it is by fraud, and
not by force, that he is represented as having acquired
his kingdom; so that the only inference to be drawn
from his conduct, as Xenophon describes it, is, that
the prince who would accomplish great things must have
learned how to deceive. Xenophon, moreover, represents
his hero as deceiving his maternal grandsire Cyaxares,
king of the Medians, in a variety of ways; giving
it to be understood that without such deceit he could
not have reached the greatness to which he came.
Nor do I believe that any man born to humble fortunes
can be shown to have attained great station, by sheer
and open force, whereas this has often been effected
by mere fraud, such as that used by Giovanni Galeazzo
to deprive his uncle Bernabo of the State and government
of Lombardy.

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The same arts which princes are constrained to use
at the outset of their career, must also be used by
commonwealths, until they have grown powerful enough
to dispense with them and trust to strength alone.
And because Rome at all times, whether from chance
or choice, followed all such methods as are necessary
to attain greatness, in this also she was not behindhand.
And, to begin with, she could have used no greater
fraud than was involved in her method above noticed,
of making for herself companions; since under this
name she made for herself subjects, for such the Latins
and the other surrounding nations, in fact, became.
For availing herself at first of their arms to subdue
neighbouring countries and gain herself reputation
as a State, her power was so much increased by these
conquests that there was none whom she could not overcome.
But the Latins never knew that they were enslaved until
they saw the Samnites twice routed and forced to make
terms. This success, while it added greatly to
the fame of the Romans among princes at a distance,
who were thereby made familiar with the Roman name
though not with the Roman arms, bred at the same time
jealousy and distrust among those who, like the Latins,
both saw and felt these arms; and such were the effects
of this jealousy and distrust, that not the Latins
only but all the Roman colonies in Latium, along with
the Campanians whom a little while before the Romans
had defended leagued themselves together against the
authority of Rome. This war was set on foot by
the Latins in the manner in which, as I have already
explained, most wars are begun, not by directly attacking
the Romans, but by defending the Sidicinians against
the Samnites who were making war upon them with the
permission of the Romans. And that it was from
their having found out the crafty policy of the Romans
that the Latins were led to take this step, is plain
from the words which Titus Livius puts in the mouth
of Annius Setinus the Latin praetor, who, in addressing
the Latin council, is made to say, “For if
even now we can put up with slavery under the disguise
of an equal alliance, etc”

We see, therefore, that the Romans, from the time
they first began to extend their power, were not unfamiliar
with the art of deceiving, an art always necessary
for those who would mount to great heights from low
beginnings; and which is the less to be condemned when,
as in the case of the Romans, it is skilfully concealed.

CHAPTER XIV.—­That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by
Humility.

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You shall often find that humility is not merely of
no service to you, but is even hurtful, especially
when used in dealing with insolent men, who, through
envy or other like cause, have conceived hatred against
you. Proof whereof is supplied by our historian
where he explains the causes of this war between the
Romans and the Latins. For on the Samnites complaining
to the Romans that the Latins had attacked them, the
Romans, desiring not to give the Latins ground of offence,
would not forbid them proceeding with the war.
But the endeavour to avoid giving offence to the Latins
only served to increase their confidence, and led
them the sooner to declare their hostility. Of
which we have evidence in the language used by the
same Latin Praetor, Annius Setinus, at the aforesaid
council, when he said:—­“You have
tried their patience by refusing them, soldiers.
Who doubts but that they are offended? Still
they have put up with the affront. They have heard
that we are assembling an army against their allies
the Samnites; and yet they have not stirred from their
city. Whence this astonishing forbearance, but
from their knowing our strength and their own weakness?”
Which words give us clearly to understand how much
the patience of the Romans increased the arrogance
of the Latins.

A prince, therefore, should never stoop from his dignity,
nor should he if he would have credit for any concession
make it voluntarily, unless he be able or believe
himself able to withhold it. For almost always
when matters have come to such a pass that you cannot
give way with credit it is better that a thing be
taken from you by force than yielded through fear
of force. For if you yield through fear and to
escape war, the chances are that you do not escape
it; since he to whom, out of manifest cowardice you
make this concession, will not rest content, but will
endeavour to wring further concessions from you, and
making less account of you, will only be the more
kindled against you. At the same time you will
find your friends less zealous on your behalf, since
to them you will appear either weak or cowardly.
But if, so soon as the designs of your enemy are disclosed,
you at once prepare to resist though your strength
be inferior to his, he will begin to think more of
you, other neighbouring princes will think more; and
many will be willing to assist you, on seeing you
take up arms, who, had you relinquished hope and abandoned
yourself to despair, would never have stirred a finger
to save you.

The above is to be understood as applying where you
have a single adversary only; but should you have
several, it will always be a prudent course, even
after war has been declared, to restore to some one
of their number something you have of his, so as to
regain his friendship and detach him from the others
who have leagued themselves against you.

CHAPTER XV.—­That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and
that tardy Resolves are always hurtful.

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Touching this very matter, and with regard to these
earliest beginnings of war between the Latins and
the Romans, it may be noted, that in all our deliberations
it behoves us to come quickly to a definite resolve,
and not to remain always in dubiety and suspense.
This is plainly seen in connection with the council
convened by the Latins when they thought to separate
themselves from the Romans. For the Romans suspecting
the hostile humour wherewith the Latins were infected,
in order to learn how things really stood, and see
whether they could not win back the malcontents without
recourse to arms, gave them to know that they must
send eight of their citizens to Rome, as they had occasion
to consult with them. On receiving which message
the Latins, knowing that they had done many things
contrary to the wishes of the Romans, called a council
to determine who of their number should be sent, and
to instruct them what they were to say. But Annius,
their praetor, being present in the council when these
matters were being discussed, told them “that
he thought it of far greater moment for them to consider
what they were to do than what they were to say; for
when their resolves were formed, it would be easy
to clothe them in fit words.” This,
in truth, was sound advice and such as every prince
and republic should lay to heart. Because, where
there is doubt and uncertainty as to what we may decide
on doing, we know not how to suit our words to our
conduct; whereas, with our minds made up, and the
course we are to follow fixed, it is an easy matter
to find words to declare our resolves. I have
noticed this point the more readily, because I have
often found such uncertainty hinder the public business
of our own republic, to its detriment and discredit.
And in all matters of difficulty, wherein courage is
needed for resolving, this uncertainty will always
be met with, whenever those who have to deliberate
and decide are weak.

Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those
which are late and tardy, especially when they have
to be made in behalf of a friend. For from their
lateness they help none, and hurt ourselves. Tardy
resolves are due to want of spirit or want of strength,
or to the perversity of those who have to determine,
who being moved by a secret desire to overthrow the
government, or to carry out some selfish purpose of
their own, suffer no decision to be come to, but only
thwart and hinder. Whereas, good citizens, even
when they see the popular mind to be bent on dangerous
courses, will never oppose the adoption of a fixed
plan, more particularly in matters which do not brook
delay.

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After Hieronymus, the Syracusan tyrant, was put to
death, there being at that time a great war between
the Romans and the Carthaginians, the citizens of
Syracuse fell to disputing among themselves with which
nation they should take part; and so fierce grew the
controversy between the partisans of the two alliances,
that no course could be agreed on, and they took part
with neither; until Apollonides, one of the foremost
of the Syracusan citizens, told them in a speech replete
with wisdom, that neither those who inclined to hold
by the Romans, nor those who chose rather to side
with the Carthaginians, were deserving of blame; but
that what was utterly to be condemned was doubt and
delay in taking one side or other; for from such uncertainty
he clearly foresaw the ruin of their republic; whereas,
by taking a decided course, whatever it might be,
some good might come. Now Titus Livius could not
show more clearly than he does in this passage, the
mischief which results from resting in suspense.
He shows it, likewise, in the case of the Lavinians,
of whom he relates, that being urged by the Latins
to aid them against Rome, they were so long in making
up their minds, that when the army which they at last
sent to succour the Latins was issuing from their
gates, word came that the Latins were defeated.
Whereupon Millionius, their praetor, said, “With
the Romans this short march will cost us dear.”
But had the Lavinians resolved at once either to grant
aid or to refuse it, taking a latter course they would
not have given offence to the Romans, taking the former,
and rendering timely help, they and the Latins together
might have had a victory. But by delay they stood
to lose in every way, as the event showed.

This example, had it been remembered by the Florentines,
might have saved them from all that loss and vexation
which they underwent at the hands of the French, at
the time King Louis XII. of France came into Italy
against Lodovico, duke of Milan. For when Louis
first proposed to pass through Tuscany he met with
no objection from the Florentines, whose envoys at
his court arranged with him that they should stand
neutral, while the king, on his arrival in Italy, was
to maintain their government and take them under his
protection; a month’s time being allowed the
republic to ratify these terms. But certain persons,
who, in their folly, favoured the cause of Lodovico,
delayed this ratification until the king was already
on the eve of victory; when the Florentines suddenly
becoming eager to ratify, the king would not accept
their ratification, perceiving their consent to be
given under constraint and not of their own good-will.
This cost the city of Florence dear, and went near
to lose her freedom, whereof she was afterwards deprived
on another like occasion. And the course taken
by the Florentines was the more to be blamed in that
it was of no sort of service to Duke Lodovico, who,
had he been victorious, would have shown the Florentines
many more signs of his displeasure than did the king.

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Although the hurt which results to republics from
weakness of this sort has already been discussed in
another Chapter, nevertheless, since an opportunity
offered for touching upon it again, I have willingly
availed myself of it, because to me it seems a matter
of which republics like ours should take special heed.

CHAPTER XVI.—­That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the
methods of ancient Warfare.

In all their wars with other nations, the most momentous
battle ever fought by the Romans, was that which they
fought with the Latins when Torquatus and Decius were
consuls. For it may well be believed that as
by the loss of that battle the Latins became subject
to the Romans, so the Romans had they not prevailed
must have become subject to the Latins. And Titus
Livius is of this opinion, since he represents the
armies as exactly equal in every respect, in discipline
and in valour, in numbers and in obstinacy, the only
difference he draws being, that of the two armies
the Romans had the more capable commanders. We
find, however, two circumstances occurring in the
conduct of this battle, the like of which never happened
before, and seldom since, namely, that to give steadiness
to the minds of their soldiers, and render them obedient
to the word of command and resolute to fight, one of
the consuls put himself, and the other his son, to
death.

The equality which Titus Livius declares to have prevailed
in these two armies, arose from this, that having
long served together they used the same language,
discipline, and arms; that in disposing their men for
battle they followed the same system; and that the
divisions and officers of their armies bore the same
names. It was necessary, therefore, that as they
were of equal strength and valour, something extraordinary
should take place to render the courage of the one
army more stubborn and unflinching than that of the
other, it being on this stubbornness, as I have already
said, that victory depends. For while this temper
is maintained in the minds of the combatants they will
never turn their backs on their foe. And that
it might endure longer in the minds of the Romans
than of the Latins, partly chance, and partly the
valour of the consuls caused it to fall out that Torquatus
slew his son, and Decius died by his own hand.

In pointing out this equality of strength, Titus Livius
takes occasion to explain the whole system followed
by the Romans in the ordering of their armies and
in disposing them for battle; and as he has treated
the subject at length, I need not go over the same
ground, and shall touch only on what I judge in it
most to deserve attention, but, being overlooked by
all the captains of our times, has led to disorder
in many armies and in many battles.

Page 141

From this passage of Titus Livius, then, we learn
that the Roman army had three principal divisions,
or battalions as we might now call them, of which
they named the first hastati, the second principes,
and the third triarii, to each of which cavalry
were attached. In arraying an army for battle
they set the hastati in front. Directly
behind them, in the second rank, they placed the principes;
and in the third rank of the same column, the triarii.
The cavalry of each of these three divisions they
disposed to the right and left of the division to which
it belonged; and to these companies of horse, from
their form and position, they gave the name wings
(alae), from their appearing like the two wings
of the main body of the army. The first division,
the hastati, which was in front, they drew
up in close order to enable it to withstand and repulse
the enemy. The second division, the principes,
since it was not to be engaged from the beginning,
but was meant to succour the first in case that were
driven in, was not formed in close order but kept
in open file, so that it might receive the other into
its ranks whenever it was broken and forced to retire.
The third division, that, namely, of the triarii,
had its ranks still more open than those of the second,
so that, if occasion required, it might receive the
first two divisions of the hastati and principes.
These divisions, therefore, being drawn up in this
order, the engagement began, and if the hastati
were overpowered and driven back, they retired within
the loose ranks of the principes, when both
these divisions, being thus united into one, renewed
the conflict. If these, again, were routed and
forced back, they retreated within the open ranks
of the triarii, and all three divisions, forming
into one, once more renewed the fight, in which, if
they were overpowered, since they had no further means
of recruiting their strength, they lost the battle.
And because whenever this last division, of the triarii,
had to be employed, the army was in jeopardy, there
arose the proverb, “Res redacta est ad triarios,”
equivalent to our expression of playing a last
stake.

The captains of our day, as they have abandoned all
the other customs of antiquity, and pay no heed to
any part of the ancient discipline, so also have discarded
this method of disposing their men, though it was
one of no small utility. For to insure the defeat
of a commander who so arranges his forces as to be
able thrice during an engagement to renew his strength,
Fortune must thrice declare against him, and he must
be matched with an adversary able three times over
to defeat him; whereas he whose sole chance of success
lies in his surviving the first onset, as is the case
with all the armies of Christendom at the present day,
may easily be vanquished, since any slight mishap,
and the least failure in the steadiness of his men,
may deprive him of victory.

Page 142

And what takes from our armies the capacity to renew
their strength is, that provision is now no longer
made for one division being received into the ranks
of another, which happens because at present an army
is arranged for battle in one or other of two imperfect
methods. For either its divisions are placed
side by side, so as to form a line of great width
but of no depth or solidity; or if, to strengthen it,
it be drawn up in columns after the fashion of the
Roman armies, should the front line be broken, no
provision having been made for its being received by
the second, it is thrown into complete disorder, and
both divisions fall to pieces. For if the front
line be driven back, it jostles the second, if the
second line endeavour to advance, the first stands
in its way: and thus, the first driving against
the second, and the second against the third, such
confusion follows that often the most trifling accident
will cause the ruin of an entire army.

At the battle of Ravenna, where M. de Foix, the French
commander, was slain, although according to modern
notions this was a well-fought field, both the French
and the Spanish armies were drawn up in the first
of the faulty methods above described; that is to say,
each army advanced with the whole of its battalions
side by side, so that each presented a single front
much wider than deep; this being always the plan followed
by modern armies when, as at Ravenna, the ground is
open. For knowing the disorder they fall into
on retreat, forming themselves in a single line, they
endeavour, as I have said, as much as possible to
escape confusion by extending their front. But
where the ground confines them they fall at once into
the disorder spoken of, without an effort to prevent
it.

Troops traversing an enemy’s country, whether
to pillage or carry out any other operation of war,
are liable to fall into the same disorder; and at
S. Regolo in the Pisan territory, and at other places
where the Florentines were beaten by the Pisans during
the war which followed on the revolt of Pisa after
the coming of Charles of France into Italy, our defeat
was due to no other cause than the behaviour of our
own cavalry, who being posted in front, and being
repulsed by the enemy, fell back on the infantry and
threw them into confusion, whereupon the whole army
took to flight; and Messer Ciriaco del Borgo, the veteran
leader of the Florentine foot, has often declared
in my presence that he had never been routed by any
cavalry save those who were fighting on his side.
For which reason the Swiss, who are the greatest proficients
in modern warfare, when serving with the French, make
it their first care to place themselves on their flank,
so that the cavalry of their friends, if repulsed,
may not throw them into disorder.

But although these matters seem easy to understand
and not difficult to put in practice, none has yet
been found among the commanders of our times, who
attempted to imitate the ancients or to correct the
moderns. For although these also have a tripartite
division of their armies into van-guard, main-body,
and rear-guard, the only use they make of it is in
giving orders when their men are in quarters; whereas
on active service it rarely happens that all divisions
are not equally exposed to the same onset.

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And because many, to excuse their ignorance, will
have it that the destructive fire of artillery forbids
our employing at the present day many of the tactics
used by the ancients, I will discuss this question
in the following Chapter, and examine whether artillery
does in fact prevent us from using the valiant methods
of antiquity.

CHAPTER XVII.—­What importance the Armies
of the present day should allow to Artillery; and
whether the commonly received opinion concerning it
be just.

Looking to the number of pitched battles, or what
are termed by the French journees, and by the
Italians fatti d’arme, fought by the
Romans at divers times, I am led further to examine
the generally received opinion, that had artillery
been in use in their day, the Romans would not have
been allowed, or at least not with the same ease, to
subjugate provinces and make other nations their tributaries,
and could never have spread their power in the astonishing
way they did. For it is said that by reason of
these fire-arms men can no longer use or display their
personal valour as they could of old; that there is
greater difficulty now than there was in former times
in joining battle; that the tactics followed then
cannot be followed now; and that in time all warfare
must resolve itself into a question of artillery.

Judging it not out of place to inquire whether these
opinions are sound, and how far artillery has added
to or taken from the strength of armies, and whether
its use lessens or increases the opportunities for
a good captain to behave valiantly, I shall at once
address myself to the first of the averments noticed
above, namely, that the armies of the ancient Romans
could not have made the conquests they did, had artillery
then been in use.

To this I answer by saying that, since war is made
for purposes either of offence or defence, we have
first to see in which of these two kinds of warfare
artillery gives the greater advantage or inflicts the
greater hurt. Now, though something might be
said both ways, I nevertheless believe that artillery
is beyond comparison more hurtful to him who stands
on the defensive than to him who attacks. For
he who defends himself must either do so in a town
or in a fortified camp. If within a town, either
the town will be a small one, as fortified towns commonly
are, or it will be a great one. In the former
case, he who is on the defensive is at once undone.
For such is the shock of artillery that there is no
wall so strong that in a few days it will not batter
down, when, unless those within have ample room to
withdraw behind covering works and trenches, they
must be beaten; it being impossible for them to resist
the assault of an enemy who forces an entrance through
the breaches in their walls. Nor will any artillery
a defender may have be of any service to him; since
it is an established axiom that where men are able
to advance in numbers and rapidly, artillery is powerless
to check them.

Page 144

For this reason, in storming towns the furious assaults
of the northern nations prove irresistible, whereas
the attacks of our Italian troops, who do not rush
on in force, but advance to the assault in small knots
of skirmishers (scaramouches, as they are fitly
named), may easily be withstood. Those who advance
in such loose order, and with so little spirit, against
a breach covered by artillery, advance to certain
destruction, and as against them artillery is useful.
But when the assailants swarm to the breach so massed
together that one pushes on another, unless they be
brought to a stand by ditches and earthworks, they
penetrate everywhere, and no artillery has any effect
to keep them back; and though some must fall, yet
not so many as to prevent a victory.

The frequent success of the northern nations in storming
towns, and more particularly the recovery of Brescia
by the French, is proof sufficient of the truth of
what I say. For the town of Brescia rising against
the French while the citadel still held out, the Venetians,
to meet any attack which might be made from the citadel
upon the town, ranged guns along the whole line of
road which led from the one to the other, planting
them in front, and in flank, and wherever else they
could be brought to bear. Of all which M. de
Foix making no account, dismounted with his men-at-arms
from horseback, and, advancing with them on foot through
the midst of the batteries, took the town; nor do we
learn that he sustained any considerable loss from
the enemy’s fire. So that, as I have said,
he who has to defend himself in a small town, when
his walls are battered down and he has no room to
retire behind other works, and has only his artillery
to trust to, is at once undone.

But even where the town you defend is a great one,
so that you have room to fall back behind new works,
artillery is still, by a long way, more useful for
the assailant than for the defender. For to enable
your artillery to do any hurt to those without, you
must raise yourself with it above the level of the
ground, since, if you remain on the level, the enemy,
by erecting any low mound or earth-work, can so secure
himself that it will be impossible for you to touch
him. But in raising yourself above the level
of the ground, whether by extending yourself along
the gallery of the walls, or otherwise, you are exposed
to two disadvantages; for, first, you cannot there
bring into position guns of the same size or range
as he who is without can bring to bear against you,
since it is impossible to work large guns in a confined
space; and, secondly, although you should succeed
in getting your guns into position, you cannot construct
such strong and solid works for their protection as
those can who are outside, and on level ground, and
who have all the room and every other advantage which
they could desire. It is consequently impossible
for him who defends a town to maintain his guns in
position at any considerable height, when those who

Page 145

are outside have much and powerful artillery; while,
if he place it lower, it becomes, as has been explained,
to a great extent useless. So that in the end
the defence of the city has to be effected, as in ancient
times, by hand to hand fighting, or else by means
of the smaller kinds of fire-arms, from which if the
defender derive some slight advantage, it is balanced
by the injury he sustains from the great artillery
of his enemy, whereby the walls of the city are battered
down and almost buried in their ditches; so that when
it comes once more to an encounter at close quarters,
by reason of his walls being demolished and his ditches
filled up, the defender is now at a far greater disadvantage
than he was formerly. Wherefore I repeat that
these arms are infinitely more useful for him who
attacks a town than for him who defends it.

As to the remaining method, which consists in your
taking up your position in an entrenched camp, where
you need not fight unless you please, and unless you
have the advantage, I say that this method commonly
affords you no greater facility for avoiding an engagement
than the ancients had; nay, that sometimes, owing
to the use of artillery, you are worse off than they
were. For if the enemy fall suddenly upon you,
and have some slight advantage (as may readily be the
case from his being on higher ground, or from your
works on his arrival being still incomplete so that
you are not wholly sheltered by them), forthwith, and
without your being able to prevent him, he dislodges
you, and you are forced to quit your defences and
deliver battle: as happened to the Spaniards
at the battle of Ravenna. For having posted themselves
between the river Ronco and an earthwork, from their
not having carried this work high enough, and from
the French having a slight advantage of ground, they
were forced by the fire of the latter to quit their
entrenchments come to an engagement.

But assuming the ground you have chosen for your camp
to be, as it always should, higher than that occupied
by the enemy, and your works to be complete and sufficient,
so that from your position and preparations the enemy
dare not attack you, recourse will then be had to the
very same methods as were resorted to in ancient times
when an army was so posted that it could not be assailed;
that is to say, your country will be wasted, cities
friendly to you besieged or stormed, and your supplies
intercepted; until you are forced, at last, of necessity
to quit your camp and to fight a pitched battle, in
which, as will presently appear, artillery will be
of little service to you.

If we consider, therefore, for what ends the Romans
made wars, and that attack and not defence was the
object of almost all their campaigns, it will be clear,
if what I have said be true, that they would have had
still greater advantage, and might have achieved their
conquests with even greater ease, had artillery been
in use in their times.

Page 146

And as to the second complaint, that by reason of
artillery men can no longer display their valour as
they could in ancient days, I admit it to be true
that when they have to expose themselves a few at a
time, men run more risks now than formerly; as when
they have to scale a town or perform some similar
exploit, in which they are not massed together but
must advance singly and one behind another. It
is true, also, that Captains and commanders of armies
are subjected to a greater risk of being killed now
than of old, since they an be reached everywhere by
the enemy’s fire; and it is no protection to
them to be with those of their men who are furthest
from the enemy, or to be surrounded by the bravest
of their guards. Still, we do not often find either
of these two dangers occasioning extraordinary loss.
For towns strongly fortified are not attacked by escalade,
nor will the assailing army advance against them in
weak numbers; but will endeavour, as in ancient times,
to reduce them by regular siege. And even in
the case of towns attacked by storm, the dangers are
not so very much greater now than they were formerly;
for in those old days also, the defenders of towns
were not without warlike engines, which if less terrible
in their operation, had, so far as killing goes, much
the same effect. And as for the deaths of captains
and leaders of companies, it may be said that during
the last twenty-four years of war in Italy, we have
had fewer instances of such deaths than might be found
in a period of ten years of ancient warfare.
For excepting the Count Lodovico della Mirandola, who
fell at Ferrara, when the Venetians a few years ago
attacked that city, and the Duke de Nemours, slain
at Cirignuola, we have no instance of any commander
being killed by artillery. For, at Ravenna, M.
de Foix died by steel and not by shot. Wherefore
I say that if men no longer perform deeds of individual
prowess, it results not so much from the use of artillery,
as from the faulty discipline and weakness of our armies,
which being collectively without valour cannot display
it in particular instances.

As to the third assertion, that armies can no longer
be brought to engage one another, and that war will
soon come to be carried on wholly with artillery,
I maintain that this allegation is utterly untrue,
and will always be so held by those who are willing
in handling their troops to follow the usages of ancient
valour. For whosoever would have a good army
must train it, either by real or by mimic warfare,
to approach the enemy, to come within sword-thrust,
and to grapple with him; and must rely more on foot
soldiers than on horse, for reasons presently to be
explained. But when you trust to your foot-soldiers,
and to the methods already indicated, artillery becomes
powerless to harm you. For foot-soldiers, in
approaching an enemy, can with more ease escape the
fire of his artillery than in ancient times they could
have avoided a charge of elephants or of scythed chariots,

Page 147

or any other of those strange contrivances which had
to be encountered by the Romans, and against which
they always devised some remedy. And, certainly,
as against artillery, their remedy would have been
easier, by as much as the time during which artillery
can do hurt is shorter than the time during which
elephants and chariots could. For by these you
were thrown into disorder after battle joined, whereas
artillery harasses you only before you engage; a danger
which infantry can easily escape, either by advancing
so as to be covered by the inequalities of the ground,
or by lying down while the firing continues; nay,
we find from experience that even these precautions
may be dispensed with, especially as against great
artillery, which can hardly be levelled with such precision
that its fire shall not either pass over your head
from the range being too high, or fall short from
its being too low.

So soon, however, as the engagement is begun, it is
perfectly clear that neither small nor great artillery
can harm you any longer; since, if the enemy have
his artillerymen in front, you take them; if in rear,
they will injure him before they injure you; and if
in flank, they can never fire so effectively as to
prevent your closing, with the result already explained.
Nor does this admit of much dispute, since we have
proof of it in the case of the Swiss at Novara, in
the year 1513, when, with neither guns nor cavalry,
they advanced against the French army, who had fortified
themselves with artillery behind entrenchments, and
routed them without suffering the slightest check
from their fire. In further explanation whereof
it is to be noted, that to work artillery effectively
it should be protected by walls, by ditches, or by
earth-works; and that whenever, from being left without
such protection it has to be defended by men, as happens
in pitched battles and engagements in the open field,
it is either taken or otherwise becomes useless.
Nor can it be employed on the flank of an army, save
in the manner in which the ancients made use of their
warlike engines, which they moved out from their columns
that they might be worked without inconvenience, but
withdrew within them when driven back by cavalry or
other troops. He who looks for any further advantage
from artillery does not rightly understand its nature,
and trusts to what is most likely to deceive him.
For although the Turk, using artillery, has gained
victories over the Soldan and the Sofi, the only advantage
he has had from it has been the terror into which
the horses of the enemy, unused to such sounds, are
thrown by the roar of the guns.

And now, to bring these remarks to a conclusion, I
say briefly that, employed by an army wherein there
is some strain of the ancient valour, artillery is
useful; but employed otherwise, against a brave adversary,
is utterly useless.

CHAPTER XVIII.—­That the authority of
the Romans and the example of ancient Warfare should
make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse.

Page 148

By many arguments and instances it can be clearly
established that in their military enterprises the
Romans set far more store on their infantry than on
their cavalry, and trusted to the former to carry out
all the chief objects which their armies were meant
to effect. Among many other examples of this,
we may notice the great battle which they fought with
the Latins near the lake Regillus, where to steady
their wavering ranks they made their horsemen dismount,
and renewing the combat on foot obtained a victory.
Here we see plainly that the Romans had more confidence
in themselves when they fought on foot than when they
fought on horseback. The same expedient was resorted
to by them in many of their other battles, and always
in their sorest need they found it their surest stay.

Nor are we to condemn the practice in deference to
the opinion of Hannibal, who, at the battle of Cannae,
on seeing the consuls make the horsemen dismount,
said scoffingly, “Better still had they delivered
their knights to me in chains.” For though
this saying came from the mouth of a most excellent
soldier, still, if we are to regard authority, we
ought rather to follow the authority of a commonwealth
like Rome, and of the many great captains who served
her, than that of Hannibal alone. But, apart
from authority, there are manifest reasons to bear
out what I say. For a man may go on foot into
many places where a horse cannot go; men can be taught
to keep rank, and if thrown into disorder to recover
form; whereas, it is difficult to keep horses in line,
and impossible if once they be thrown into disorder
to reform them. Moreover we find that with horses
as with men, some have little courage and some much;
and that often a spirited horse is ridden by a faint-hearted
rider, or a dull horse by a courageous rider, and
that in whatever way such disparity is caused, confusion
and disorder result. Again, infantry, when drawn
up in column, can easily break and is not easily broken
by cavalry. This is vouched, not only by many
ancient and many modern instances, but also by the
authority of those who lay down rules for the government
of States, who show that at first wars were carried
on by mounted soldiers, because the methods for arraying
infantry were not yet understood, but that so soon
as these were discovered, the superiority of foot
over horse was at once recognized. In saying this,
I would not have it supposed that horsemen are not
of the greatest use in armies, whether for purposes
of observation, for harrying and laying waste the
enemy’s country, for pursuing a retreating foe
or helping to repulse his cavalry. But the substance
and sinew of an army, and that part of it which ought
constantly to be most considered, should always be
the infantry. And among sins of the Italian princes
who have made their country the slave of foreigners,
there is none worse than that they have held these
arms in contempt, and turned their whole attention
to mounted troops.

Page 149

This error is due to the craft of our captains and
to the ignorance of our rulers. For the control
of the armies of Italy for the last five and twenty
years resting in the hands of men, who, as having no
lands of their own, may be looked on as mere soldiers
of fortune, these fell forthwith on contriving how
they might maintain their credit by being supplied
with the arms which the princes of the country were
without. And as they had no subjects of their
own of whom they could make use, and could not obtain
constant employment and pay for a large number of
foot-soldiers, and as a small number would have given
them no importance, they had recourse to horsemen.
For a condottiere drawing pay for two or three
hundred horsemen was maintained by them in the highest
credit, and yet the cost was not too great to be met
by the princes who employed him. And to effect
their object with more ease, and increase their credit
still further, these adventurers would allow no merit
or favour to be due to foot-soldiers, but claimed all
for their horsemen. And to such a length was
this bad system carried, that in the very greatest
army only the smallest sprinkling of infantry was to
be found. This, together with many other ill
practices which accompanied it, has so weakened the
militia of Italy, that the country has easily been
trampled upon by all the nations of the North.

That it is a mistake to make more account of cavalry
than of infantry, may be still more clearly seen from
another example taken from Roman history. The
Romans being engaged on the siege of Sora, a troop
of horse a sally from the town to attack their camp;
when the Roman master of the knights advancing with
his own horsemen to give them battle, it so chanced
that, at the very first onset, the leaders on both
sides were slain. Both parties being thus left
without commanders, and the combat, nevertheless,
continuing, the Romans thinking thereby to have the
advantage of their adversaries, alighted from horseback,
obliging the enemy’s cavalry, in order to defend
themselves, to do the like. The result was that
the Romans had the victory. Now there could be
no stronger instance than this to show the superiority
of foot over horse. For while in other battles
the Roman cavalry were made by their consuls to dismount
in order to succour their infantry who were in distress
and in need of such aid, on this occasion they dismounted,
not to succour their infantry, nor to encounter an
enemy contending on foot, but because they saw that
though they could not prevail against the enemy fighting
as horsemen against horsemen, on foot they readily
might. And from this I conclude that foot-soldiers,
if rightly handled, can hardly be beaten except by
other soldiers fighting on foot.

Page 150

With very few cavalry, but with a considerable force
of infantry, the Roman commanders, Crassus and Marcus
Antonius, each for many days together overran the
territories of the Parthians, although opposed by
the countless horsemen of that nation. Crassus,
indeed, with the greater part of his army, was left
there dead, and Antonius only saved himself by his
valour; but even in the extremities to which the Romans
were then brought, see how greatly superior foot-soldiers
are to horse. For though fighting in an open
country, far from the sea-coast, and cut off from
his supplies, Antonius proved himself a valiant soldier
in the judgment even of the Parthians themselves,
the whole strength of whose cavalry never ventured
to attack the columns of his army. And though
Crassus perished there, any one who reads attentively
the account of his expedition must see that he was
rather outwitted than defeated, and that even when
his condition was desperate, the Parthians durst not
close with him, but effected his destruction by hanging
continually on the flanks of his army, and intercepting
his supplies, while cajoling him with promises which
they never kept.

It might, I grant, be harder to demonstrate this great
superiority of foot over horse, had we not very many
modern examples affording the clearest proof of it.
For instance, at the battle of Novara, of which we
have already spoken, nine thousand Swiss foot were
seen to attack ten thousand cavalry together with
an equal number of infantry, and to defeat them; the
cavalry being powerless to injure them, while of the
infantry, who were mostly Gascons, and badly disciplined,
they made no account. On another occasion we
have seen twenty-six thousand Swiss march on Milan
to attack Francis I. of France, who had with him twenty
thousand men-at-arms, forty thousand foot, and a hundred
pieces of artillery; and although they were not victorious
as at Novara, they nevertheless fought valiantly for
two days together, and, in the end, though beaten,
were able to bring off half their number. With
foot-soldiers only Marcus Attilius Regulus ventured
to oppose himself, not to cavalry merely, but to elephants;
and if the attempt failed it does not follow that
he was not justified by the valour of his men in believing
them equal to surmount this danger.

I repeat, therefore, that to prevail against well-disciplined
infantry, you must meet them with infantry disciplined
still better, and that otherwise you advance to certain
destruction. In the time of Filippo Visconti,
Duke of Milan, some sixteen thousand Swiss made a descent
on Lombardy, whereupon the Duke, who at that time
had Il Carmagnola as his captain, sent him with six
thousand men-at-arms and a slender following of foot-soldiers
to meet them. Not knowing their manner of fighting,
Carmagnola fell upon them with his horsemen, expecting
to put them at once to rout; but finding them immovable,
after losing many of his men he withdrew. But,

Page 151

being a most wise captain, and skilful in devising
new remedies to meet unwonted dangers, after reinforcing
his company he again advanced to the attack; and when
about to engage made all his men-at-arms dismount,
and placing them in front of his foot-soldiers, fell
once more upon the Swiss, who could then no longer
withstand him. For his men, being on foot and
well armed, easily penetrated the Swiss ranks without
hurt to themselves; and getting among them, had no
difficulty in cutting them down, so that of the entire
army of the Swiss those only escaped who were spared
by his humanity.

Of this difference in the efficiency of these two
kinds of troops, many I believe are aware; but such
is the unhappiness and perversity of the times in
which we live, that neither ancient nor modern examples,
nor even the consciousness of error, can move our
present princes to amend their ways, or convince them
that to restore credit to the arms of a State or province,
it is necessary to revive this branch of their militia
also, to keep it near them, to make much of it, and
to give it life, that in return, it may give back
life and reputation to them. But as they have
departed from all those other methods already spoken
of, so have they departed from this, and with this
result, that to them the acquisition of territory
is rather a loss than a gain, as presently shall be
shown.

CHAPTER XIX.—­That Acquisitions made
by ill-governed States and such as follow not the
valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their
Ruin than to their Aggrandizement.

To these false opinions, founded on the pernicious
example first set by the present corrupt age, we owe
it, that no man thinks of departing from the methods
which are in use. It had been impossible, for
instance, some thirty years ago, to persuade an Italian
that ten thousand foot-soldiers could, on plain ground,
attack ten thousand cavalry together with an equal
number of infantry; and not merely attack, but defeat
them; as we saw done by the Swiss at that battle of
Novara, to which I have already referred so often.
For although history abounds in similar examples,
none would have believed them, or, believing them,
would have said that nowadays men are so much better
armed, that a squadron of cavalry could shatter a
rock, to say nothing of a column of infantry.
With such false pleas would they have belied their
judgment, taking no account that with a very scanty
force of foot-soldiers, Lucullus routed a hundred and
fifty thousand of the cavalry of Tigranes, among whom
were a body of horsemen very nearly resembling our
own men-at-arms. Now, however, this error is
demonstrated by the example of the northern nations.

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And since what history teaches as to the superiority
of foot-soldiers is thus proved to be true, men ought
likewise to believe that the other methods practised
by the ancients are in like manner salutary and useful.
And were this once accepted, both princes and commonwealths
would make fewer blunders than they do, would be stronger
to resist sudden attack, and would no longer place
their sole hope of safety in flight; while those who
take in hand to provide a State with new institutions
would know better what direction to give them, whether
in the way of extending or merely of preserving; and
would see that to augment the numbers of their citizens,
to assume other States as companions rather than reduce
them to subjection, to send out colonies for the defence
of acquired territories, to hold their spoils at the
credit of the common stock, to overcome enemies by
inroads and pitched battles rather than by sieges,
to enrich the public purse, keep down private wealth,
and zealously, to maintain all military exercises,
are the true ways to aggrandize a State and to extend
its empire. Or if these methods for adding to
their power are not to their mind, let them remember
that acquisitions made in any other way are the ruin
of republics, and so set bounds to their ambition,
wisely regulating the internal government of their
country by suitable laws and ordinances, forbidding
extension, and looking only to defence, and taking
heed that their defences are in good order, as do
those republics of Germany which live and for long
have lived, in freedom.

And yet, as I have said on another occasion, when
speaking of the difference between the methods suitable
for acquiring and those suitable for maintaining,
it is impossible for a republic to remain long in the
peaceful enjoyment of freedom within a restricted frontier.
For should it forbear from molesting others, others
are not likely to refrain from molesting it; whence
must grow at once the desire and the necessity to
make acquisitions; or should no enemies be found abroad,
they will be found at home, for this seems to be incidental
to all great States. And if the free States of
Germany are, and have long been able to maintain themselves
on their present footing, this arises from certain
conditions peculiar to that country, and to be found
nowhere else, without which these communities could
not go on living as they do.

The district of Germany of which I speak was formerly
subject to the Roman Empire, in the same way as France
and Spain; but on the decline of the Empire, and when
its very name came to be limited to this one province,
its more powerful cities taking advantage of the weakness
and necessities of the Emperors, began to free themselves
by buying from them their liberty, subject to the
payment of a trifling yearly tribute; until, gradually,
all the cities which held directly from the Emperor,
and were not subject to any intermediate lord, had,
in like manner, purchased their freedom. While
this went on, it so happened that certain communities
subject to the Duke of Austria, among which were Friburg,
the people of Schweitz, and the like, rose in rebellion
against him, and meeting at the outset with good success,
by degrees acquired such accession of strength that
so far from returning under the Austrian yoke, they
are become formidable to all their neighbours These
are the States which we now name Swiss.

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Germany is, consequently, divided between the Swiss,
the communities which take the name of Free Towns,
the Princes, and the Emperor; and the reason why,
amid so many conflicting interests, wars do not break
out, or breaking out are of short continuance, is
the reverence in which all hold this symbol of the
Imperial authority. For although the Emperor be
without strength of his own, he has nevertheless such
credit with all these others that he alone can keep
them united, and, interposing as mediator, can speedily
repress by his influence any dissensions among them.

The greatest and most protracted wars which have taken
place in this country have been those between the
Swiss and the Duke of Austria; and although for many
years past the Empire and the dukedom of Austria have
been united in the same man, he has always failed to
subdue the stubbornness of the Swiss, who are never
to be brought to terms save by force. Nor has
the rest of Germany lent the Emperor much assistance
in his wars with the Swiss, the Free Towns being little
disposed to attack others whose desire is to live
as they themselves do, in freedom; while the Princes
of the Empire either are so poor that they cannot,
or from jealousy of the power of the Emperor will
not, take part with him against them.

These communities, therefore, abide contented within
their narrow confines, because, having regard to the
Imperial authority, they have no occasion to desire
greater; and are at the same time obliged to live in
unity within their walls, because an enemy is always
at hand, and ready to take advantage of their divisions
to effect an entrance. But were the circumstances
of the country other than they are these communities
would be forced to make attempts to extend their dominions,
and be constrained to relinquish their present peaceful
mode of life. And since the same conditions are
not found elsewhere, other nations cannot adopt this
way of living, but are compelled to extend their power
either by means of leagues, or else by the methods
used by the Romans; and any one who should act otherwise
would find not safety but rather death and destruction.
For since in a thousand ways, and from causes innumerable,
conquests are surrounded with dangers, it may well
happen that in adding to our dominions, we add nothing
to our strength; but whosoever increases not his strength
while he adds to his dominions, must needs be ruined.
He who is impoverished by his wars, even should he
come off victorious, can add nothing to his strength,
since he spends more than he gains, as the Venetians
and Florentines have done. For Venice has been
far feebler since she acquired Lombardy, and Florence
since she acquired Tuscany, than when the one was
content to be mistress of the seas, and the other
of the lands lying within six miles from her walls.
And this from their eagerness to acquire without knowing
what way to take. For which ignorance these States
are the more to be blamed in proportion as there is
less to excuse them; since they had seen what methods
were used by the Romans, and could have followed in
their footsteps; whereas the Romans, without any example
set them, were able by their own prudence to shape
a course for themselves.

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But even to well-governed States, their conquests
may chance to occasion much harm; as when some city
or province is acquired abounding in luxury and delights,
by whose manners the conqueror becomes infected; as
happened first to the Romans, and afterwards to Hannibal
on taking possession of Capua. And had Capua
been at such a distance from Rome that a ready remedy
could not have been applied to the disorders of the
soldiery, or had Rome herself been in any degree tainted
with corruption, this acquisition had certainly proved
her ruin. To which Titus Livius bears witness
when he says, “Most mischievous at this time
to our military discipline was Capua; for ministering
to all delights, she turned away the corrupted minds
of our soldiers from the remembrance of their country.”
And, truly, cities and provinces like this, avenge
themselves on their conquerors without blood or blow;
since by infecting them with their own evil customs
they prepare them for defeat at the hands of any assailant.
Nor could the subject have been better handled than
by Juvenal, where he says in his Satires, that into
the hearts of the Romans, through their conquests
in foreign lands, foreign manners found their way;
and in place of frugality and other admirable virtues—­

“Came luxury more mortal than the sword,
And settling down, avenged a vanquished world."[1]

And if their conquests were like to be fatal to the
Romans at a time when they were still animated by
great virtue and prudence, how must it fare with those
who follow methods altogether different from theirs,
and who, to crown their other errors of which we have
already said enough, resort to auxiliary and mercenary
arms, bringing upon themselves those dangers whereof
mention shall be made in the Chapter following.

CHAPTER XX.—­Of the Dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort
to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms.

Had I not already, in another treatise, enlarged on
the inutility of mercenary and auxiliary, and on the
usefulness of national arms, I should dwell on these
matters in the present Discourse more at length than
it is my design to do. For having given the subject
very full consideration elsewhere, here I would be
brief. Still when I find Titus Livius supplying
a complete example of what we have to look for from
auxiliaries, by whom I mean troops sent to our assistance
by some other prince or ruler, paid by him and under
officers by him appointed, it is not fit that I should
pass it by in silence.

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It is related, then, by our historian, that the Romans,
after defeating on two different occasions armies
of the Samnites with forces sent by them to succour
the Capuans, whom they thus relieved from the war which
the Samnites Were waging against them, being desirious
to return to Rome, left behind two legions to defend
the Capuans, that the latter might not, from being
altogether deprived of their protection, once more
become a prey to the Samnites. But these two legions,
rotting in idleness began to take such delight therein,
that forgetful of their country and the reverence
due to the senate, they resolved to seize by violence
the city they had been left to guard by their valour.
For to them it seemed that the citizens of Capua were
unworthy to enjoy advantages which they knew not how
to defend. The Romans, however, getting timely
notice of this design, at once met and defeated it,
in the manner to be more fully noticed when I come
to treat of conspiracies.

Once more then, I repeat, that of all the various
kinds of troops, auxiliaries are the most pernicious,
because the prince or republic resorting to them for
aid has no authority over them, the only person who
possesses such authority being he who sends them.
For, as I have said, auxiliary troops are those sent
to your assistance by some other potentate, under
his own flag, under his own officers, and in his own
pay, as were the legions sent by the Romans to Capua.
Such troops, if victorious, will for the most part
plunder him by whom, as well as him against whom,
they are hired to fight; and this they do, sometimes
at the instigation of the potentate who sends them,
sometimes for ambitious ends of their own. It
was not the purpose of the Romans to violate the league
and treaty which they had made with Capua; but to their
soldiers it seemed so easy a matter to master the
Capuans, that they were readily led into this plot
for depriving them of their town and territories.
Many other examples might be given to the same effect,
but it is enough to mention besides this instance,
that of the people of Regium, who were deprived of
their city and of their lives by another Roman legion
sent for their protection.

Princes and republics, therefore, should resort to
any other expedient for the defence of their States
sooner than call in hired auxiliaries, when they have
to rest their entire hopes of safety on them; since
any accord or terms, however hard, which you may make
with your enemy, will be carefully studied and current
events well considered, it will be seen that for one
who has succeeded with such assistance, hundreds have
been betrayed. Nor, in truth, can any better
opportunity for usurping a city or province present
itself to an ambitious prince or commonwealth, than
to be asked to send an army for its defence. On
the other hand, he who is so greedy of conquest as
to summon such help, not for purposes of defence but
in order to attack others, seeks to have what he can

Page 156

never hold and is most likely to be taken from him
by the very person who helps him to gain it.
Yet such is the perversity of men that, to gratify
the desire of the moment, they shut their eyes to those
ills which must speedily ensue and are no more moved
by example in this matter than in all those others
of which I have spoken; for were they moved by these
examples they would see that the more disposed they
are to deal generously with their neighbours, and
the more averse they are to usurp authority over them,
the readier will these be to throw themselves into
their arms; as will at once appear from the case of
the Capuans.

CHAPTER XXI.—­That Capua was the first
City to which the Romans sent a Praetor; nor there,
until four hundred years after they began to make
War.

The great difference between the methods followed
by the ancient Romans in adding to their dominions,
and those used for that purpose by the States of the
present time, has now been sufficiently discussed.
It has been seen, too how in dealing with the cities
which they did not think fit to destroy, and even
with those which had made their submission not as
companions but as subjects, it was customary with the
Romans to permit them to live on under their own laws,
without imposing any outward sign of dependence, merely
binding them to certain conditions, or complying with
which they were maintained in their former dignity
and importance. We know, further, that the same
methods continued to be followed by the Romans until
they passed beyond the confines of Italy, and began
to reduce foreign kingdoms and States to provinces:
as plainly appears in the fact that Capua was the
first city to which they sent a praetor, and him from
no motive of ambition, but at the request of the Capuans
themselves who, living at variance with one another,
thought it necessary to have a Roman citizen in their
town who might restore unity and good order among
them. Influenced by this example, and urged by
the same need, the people of Antium were the next
to ask that they too might have a praetor given them;
touching which request and in connection with which
new method of governing, Titus Livius observes, “that
not the arms only but also the laws of Rome now began
to exert an influence;” showing how much
the course thus followed by the Romans promoted the
growth of their authority.

For those cities, more especially, which have been
used to freedom or to be governed by their own citizens,
rest far better satisfied with a government which
they do not see, even though it involve something of
oppression, than with one which standing constantly
before their eyes, seems every day to reproach them
with the disgrace of servitude. And to the prince
there is another advantage in this method of government,
namely, that as the judges and magistrates who administer
the laws civil and criminal within these cities, are
not under his control, no decision of theirs can throw

Page 157

responsibility or discredit upon him; so that he thus
escapes many occasions of calumny and hatred.
Of the truth whereof, besides the ancient instances
which might be noted, we have a recent example here
in Italy. For Genoa, as every one knows, has many
times been occupied by the French king, who always,
until lately, sent thither a French governor to rule
in his name. Recently, however, not from choice
but of necessity, he has permitted the town to be self-governed
under a Genoese ruler; and any one who had to decide
which of these two methods of governing gives the
greater security to the king’s authority and
the greater content to the people themselves, would
assuredly have to pronounce in favour of the latter.

Men, moreover, in proportion as they see you averse
to usurp authority over them, grow the readier to
surrender themselves into your hands; and fear you
less on the score of their freedom, when they find
you acting towards them with consideration and kindness.
It was the display of these qualities that moved the
Capuans to ask the Romans for a praetor; for had the
Romans betrayed the least eagerness to send them one,
they would at once have conceived jealousy and grown
estranged.

But why turn for examples to Capua and Rome, when
we have them close at hand in Tuscany and Florence?
Who is there but knows what a time it is since the
city of Pistoja submitted of her own accord to the
Florentine supremacy? Who, again, but knows the
animosity which down to the present day exists between
Florence and the cities of Pisa, Lucca, and Siena?
This difference of feeling does not arise from the
citizens of Pistoja valuing their freedom less than
the citizens of these other towns or thinking themselves
inferior to them, but from the Florentines having
always acted towards the former as brothers, towards
the latter as foes. This it was that led the
Pistojans to come voluntarily under our authority
while the others have done and do all in their power
to escape it. For there seems no reason to doubt,
that if Florence, instead of exasperating these neighbours
of hers, had sought to win them over, either by entering
into league with them or by lending them assistance,
she would at this hour have been mistress of Tuscany.
Not that I would be understood to maintain that recourse
is never to be had to force and to arms, but that
these are only to be used in the last resort, and when
all other remedies are unavailing.

CHAPTER XXII.—­That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss.

Page 158

How falsely men often judge of things, they who are
present at their deliberations have constant occasion
to know. For in many matters, unless these deliberations
be guided by men of great parts, the conclusions come
to are certain to be wrong. And because in corrupt
republics, and especially in quiet times, either through
jealousy or from other like causes, men of great ability
are often obliged to stand aloof, it follows that
measures not good in themselves are by a common error
judged to be good, or are promoted by those who seek
public favour rather than the public advantage.
Mistakes of this sort are found out afterwards in
seasons of adversity, when recourse must be had to
those persons who in peaceful times had been, as it
were, forgotten, as shall hereafter in its proper
place be more fully explained. Cases, moreover,
arise in which those who have little experience of
affairs are sure to be misled, from the matters with
which they have to deal being attended by many deceptive
appearances such as lead men to believe whatsoever
they are minded to believe.

These remarks I make with reference to the false hopes
which the Latins, after being defeated by the Romans,
were led to form on the persuasion of their praetor
Numitius, and also with reference to what was believed
by many a few years ago, when Francis, king of France,
came to recover Milan from the Swiss. For Francis
of Angouleme, succeeding on the death of Louis XII.
to the throne of France, and desiring to recover for
that realm the Duchy of Milan, on which, some years
before, the Swiss had seized at the instance of Pope
Julius, sought for allies in Italy to second him in
his attempt; and besides the Venetians, who had already
been gained over by King Louis, endeavoured to secure
the aid of the Florentines and Pope Leo X.; thinking
that were he to succeed in getting these others to
take part with him, his enterprise would be easier.
For the forces of the Spanish king were then in Lombardy,
and the army of the Emperor at Verona.

Pope Leo, however, did not fall in with the wishes
of Francis, being, it is said, persuaded by his advisers
that his best course was to stand neutral. For
they urged that it was not for the advantage of the
Church to have powerful strangers, whether French
or Swiss, in Italy; but that to restore the country
to its ancient freedom, it must be delivered from
the yoke of both. And since to conquer both, whether
singly or together, was impossible, it was to be desired
that the one should overthrow the other, after which
the Church with her friends might fall upon the victor.
And it was averred that no better opportunity for carrying
out this design could ever be found than then presented
itself; for both the French and the Swiss were in
the field; while the Pope had his troops in readiness
to appear on the Lombard frontier and in the vicinity
of the two armies, where, under colour of watching
his own interests, he could easily keep them until
the opposed hosts came to an engagement; when, as
both armies were full of courage, their encounter might
be expected to be a bloody one, and likely to leave
the victor so weakened that it would be easy for the
Pope to attack and defeat him; and so, to his own
great glory, remain master of Lombardy and supreme
throughout Italy.

Page 159

How baseless this expectation was, was seen from the
event. For the Swiss being routed after a protracted
combat, the troops of the Pope and Spain, so far from
venturing to attack the conqueror, prepared for flight;
nor would flight have saved them, had not the humanity
or indifference of the king withheld him from pursuing
his victory, and disposed him to make terms with the
Church.

The arguments put forward by the Pope’s advisers
had a certain show of reason in their favour, which
looked at from a distance seemed plausible enough;
but were in reality wholly contrary to truth; since
it rarely happens that the captain who wins a victory
loses any great number of his men, his loss being
in battle only, and not in flight. For in the
heat of battle, while men stand face to face, but few
fall, chiefly because such combats do not last long;
and even when they do last, and many of the victorious
army are slain, so splendid is the reputation which
attends a victory, and so great the terror it inspires,
as far to outweigh any loss the victor suffers by
the slaughter of his soldiers; so that an enemy who,
trusting to find him weakened, should then venture
to attack him, would soon be taught his mistake, unless
strong enough to give him battle at any time, before
his victory as well as after. For in that case
he might, as fortune and valour should determine, either
win or lose; though, even then, the army which had
first fought and won would have an advantage.
And this we know for a truth from what befell the
Latins in consequence of the mistake made by Numitius
their praetor, and their blindness in believing him.
For when they had already suffered defeat at the hands
of the Romans, Numitius caused it to be proclaimed
throughout the whole country of Latium, that now was
the time to fall upon the enemy, exhausted by a struggle
in which they were victorious only in name, while
in reality suffering all those ills which attend defeat,
and who might easily be crushed by any fresh force
brought against them. Whereupon the Latins believed
him, and getting together a new army, were forthwith
routed with such loss as always awaits those who listen
to like counsels.

CHAPTER XXIII.—­That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances
required it the Romans always avoided half-measures.

“Such was now the state of affairs in Latium,
that peace and war seemed alike intolerable.”
No worse calamity can befall a prince or commonwealth
than to be reduced to such straits that they can neither
accept peace nor support war; as is the case with those
whom it would ruin to conclude peace on the terms
offered, while war obliges them either to yield themselves
a spoil to their allies, or remain a prey to their
foes. To this grievous alternative are men led
by evil counsels and unwise courses, and, as already
said, from not rightly measuring their strength.
For the commonwealth or prince who has rightly measured

Page 160

his strength, can hardly be brought so low as were
the Latins, who made war with the Romans when they
should have made terms, and made terms when they should
have made war, and so mismanaged everything that the
friendship and the enmity of Rome were alike fatal.
Whence it came that, in the first place, they were
defeated and broken by Manlius Torquatus, and afterwards
utterly subdued by Camillus; who, when he had forced
them to surrender at discretion to the Roman arms,
and had placed garrisons in all their towns, and taken
hostages from all, returned to Rome and reported to
the senate that the whole of Latium now lay at their
mercy.

And because the sentence then passed by the senate
is memorable, and worthy to be studied by princes
that it may be imitated by them on like occasion,
I shall cite the exact words which Livius puts into
the mouth of Camillus, as confirming what I have already
said touching the methods used by the Romans to extend
their power, and as showing how in chastising their
subjects they always avoided half-measures and took
a decided course. For government consists in nothing
else than in so controlling your subjects that it
shall neither be in their power nor for their interest
to harm you. And this is effected either by making
such sure work with them as puts it out of their power
to do you injury, or else by so loading them with
benefits that it would be folly in them to seek to
alter their condition. All which is implied first
in the measures proposed by Camillus, and next in
the resolutions passed on these proposals by the senate.
The words of Camillus were as follows: “The
immortal gods have made you so entirely masters in
the matter you are now considering, thatit
lies with you to pronounce whether Latium shall or
shall not longer exist. So far as the Latins are
concerned, you can secure a lasting peace either by
clemency or by severity. Would you deal harshly
with those whom you have conquered and who have given
themselves into your hands, you can blot out the whole
Latin nation. Would you, after the fashion of
our ancestors, increase the strength of Rome by admitting
the vanquished to the rights of citizenship, here you
have opportunity to do so, and with the greatest glory
to yourselves. That, assuredly, is the strongest
government which they rejoice in who obey it.
Now, then, is your time, while the minds of all are
bent on what is about to happen, to obtain an ascendency
over them, either by punishment or by benefits.”

Upon this motion the senate resolved, in accordance
with the advice given by the consul, to take the case
of each city separately, and either destroy utterly
or else treat with tenderness all the more important
of the Latin towns. To those cities they dealt
with leniently, they granted exemptions and privileges,
conferring upon them the rights of citizenship, and
securing their welfare in every particular. The
others they razed to the ground, and planting colonies

Page 161

in their room, either removed the inhabitants to Rome,
or so scattered and dispersed them that neither by
arms nor by counsels was it ever again in their power
to inflict hurt. For, as I have said already,
the Romans never, in matters of moment, resorted to
half-measures. And the sentence which they then
pronounced should be a pattern for all rulers, and
ought to have been followed by the Florentines when,
in the year 1502, Arezzo and all the Val di Chiana
rose in revolt. For had they followed it, they
would have established their authority on a surer footing,
and added much to the greatness of their city by securing
for it those lands which are needed to supply it with
the necessaries of life. But pursuing that half-hearted
policy which is most mischievous in executing justice,
some of the Aretines they outlawed, some they condemned
to death, and all they deprived of their dignities
and ancient importance in their town, while leaving
the town itself untouched. And if in the councils
then held any Florentine recommended that Arezzo should
be dismantled, they who thought themselves wiser than
their fellows objected, that to do so would be little
to the honour of our republic, since it would look
as though she lacked strength to hold it. Reasons
like this are of a sort which seem sound, but are
not really so; for, by the same rule, no parricide
should be put to death, nor any other malefactor, however
atrocious his crimes; because, forsooth, it would be
discreditable to the ruler to appear unequal to the
control of a single criminal. They who hold such
opinions fail to see that when men individually, or
entire cities collectively, offend against the State,
the prince for his own safety, and as a warning to
others, has no alternative but to make an end of them;
and that true honour lies in being able and in knowing
how to chastise such offenders, and not in incurring
endless dangers in the effort to retain them.
For the prince who does not chastise offenders in
a way that puts it out of their power to offend again,
is accounted unwise or worthless.

How necessary it was for the Romans to execute Justice
against the Latins, is further seen from the course
took with the men of Privernum. And here the
text of Livius suggests two points for our attention:
first, as already noted, that a subjugated people is
either to be caressed or crushed; and second, how
much it is for our advantage to maintain a manly bearing,
and to speak the truth fearlessly in the presence
of the wise. For the senate being met to determine
the fate of the citizens of Privernum, who after rebelling
had been reduced to submission by the Roman arms,
certain of these citizens were sent by their countrymen
to plead for pardon. When these had come into
the presence of the senate, one of them was asked
by a senator, “What punishment he thought
his fellow citizens deserved?” To which he
of Privernum answered, “Such punishment as
they deserve who deem themselves worthy of freedom.”

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“But,” said the consul, “should
we remit your punishment, what sort of peace can we
hope to have with you?” To which the other
replied, “If granted on fair terms, a firm
and lasting peace; if on unfair, a peace of brief duration.”
Upon this, though many of the senators were displeased,
the wiser among them declared “that they
had heard the voice of freedom and manhood, and would
never believe that the man or people who so spoke ought
to remain longer than was needful in a position which
gave them cause for shame; since that was a safe peace
which was accepted willingly; whereas good faith could
not be looked for where it was sought to impose servitude.”
So saying, they decided that the people of Privernum
should be admitted to Roman citizenship, with all
the rights and privileges thereto appertaining; declaring
that “men whose only thought was for freedom,
were indeed worthy to be Romans.” So pleasing
was this true and high answer to generous minds, while
any other must have seemed at once false and shameful.
And they who judge otherwise of men, and of those men,
especially, who have been used to be free, or so to
think themselves, are mistaken; and are led through
their mistake to adopt courses unprofitable for themselves
and affording no content to others. Whence, the
frequent rebellions and the downfall of States.

But, returning to our subject, I conclude, as well
from this instance of Privernum, as from the measures
followed with the Latins, that when we have to pass
sentence upon powerful States accustomed to live in
freedom, we must either destroy them utterly, or else
treat them with much indulgence; and that any other
course we may take with them will be unprofitable.
But most carefully should we avoid, as of all courses
the most pernicious, such half-measures as were followed
by the Samnites when they had the Romans shut up in
the Caudine Forks, and would not listen to the counsels
of the old man who urged them either to send their
captives away with every honourable attention, or else
put them all to death; but adopted a middle course,
and after disarming them and making them pass under
the yoke, suffered them to depart at once disgraced
and angered. And no long time after, they found
to their sorrow that the old man’s warning was
true, and that the course they had themselves chosen
was calamitous; as shall, hereafter, in its place be
shown.

CHAPTER XXIV.—­That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than
Good

To the wise men of our day it may seem an oversight
on the part of the Romans, that, when they sought
to protect themselves against the men of Latium and
Privernum, it never occurred to them to build strongholds
in their cities to be a curb upon them, and insure
their fidelity, especially when we remember the Florentine
saying which these same wise men often quote, to the
effect that Pisa and other like cities must be held

Page 163

by fortresses Doubtless, had those old Romans been
like-minded with our modern sages, they would not
have neglected to build themselves fortresses, but
because they far surpassed them in courage, sense,
and vigour, they refrained. And while Rome retained
her freedom, and adhered to her own wise ordinances
and wholesome usages, she never built a single fortress
with the view to hold any city or province, though,
sometimes, she may have suffered those to stand which
she found already built.

Looking, therefore, to the course followed by the
Romans in this particular, and to that adopted by
our modern rulers, it seems proper to consider whether
or not it is advisable to build fortresses, and whether
they are more likely to help or to hurt him who builds
them In the first place, then, we are to remember
that fortresses are built either as a defence against
foreign foes or against subjects In the former case,
I pronounce them unnecessary, in the latter mischievous.
And to state the reasons why in the latter case they
are mischievous, I say that when princes or republics
are afraid of their subjects and in fear lest they
rebel, this must proceed from knowing that their subjects
hate them, which hatred in its turn results from their
own ill conduct, and that again from their thinking
themselves able to rule their subjects by mere force,
or from their governing with little prudence.
Now one of the causes which lead them to suppose that
they can rule by mere force, is this very circumstance
of their people having these fortresses on their backs
So that the conduct which breeds hatred is itself mainly
occasioned by these princes or republics being possessed
of fortresses, which, if this be true, are really
far more hurtful than useful First, because, as has
been said already, they render a ruler bolder and more
violent in his bearing towards his subjects, and, next,
because they do not in reality afford him that security
which he believes them to give For all those methods
of violence and coercion which may be used to keep
a people under, resolve themselves into two; since
either like the Romans you must always have it in
your power to bring a strong army into the field,
or else you must dissipate, destroy, and disunite the
subject people, and so divide and scatter them that
they can never again combine to injure you For should
you merely strip them of their wealth, spoliatis
arma supersunt, arms still remain to them, or if
you deprive them of their weapons, furor arma ministrat,
rage will supply them, if you put their chiefs to
death and continue to maltreat the rest, heads will
renew themselves like those Hydra; while, if you build
fortresses, these may serve in time of peace to make
you bolder in outraging your subjects, but in time
of war they will prove wholly useless, since they
will be attacked at once by foes both foreign and domestic,
whom together it will be impossible for you to resist.
And if ever fortresses were useless they are so at
the present day, by reason of the invention of artillery,
against the fury of which, as I have shown already,
a petty fortress which affords no room for retreat
behind fresh works, cannot be defended.

Page 164

But to go deeper into the matter, I say, either you
are a prince seeking by means of these fortresses
to hold the people of your city in check; or you are
a prince, or it may be a republic, desirous to control
some city which you have gained in war. To the
prince I would say, that, for the reasons already
given, nothing can be more unserviceable than a fortress
as a restraint upon your subjects, since it only makes
you the readier to oppress them, and less scrupulous
how you do so; while it is this very oppression which
moves them to destroy you, and so kindles their hatred,
that the fortress, which is the cause of all the mischief,
is powerless to protect you. A wise and good prince,
therefore, that he may continue good, and give no
occasion or encouragement to his descendants to become
evil, will never build a fortress, to the end that
neither he nor they may ever be led to trust to it
rather than to the good-will of their subjects.
And if Francesco Sforza, who was accounted a wise
ruler, on becoming Duke of Milan erected a fortress
in that city, I say that herein he was unwise, and
that the event has shown the building of this fortress
to have been hurtful and not helpful to his heirs.
For thinking that by its aid they could behave as badly
as they liked to their citizens and subjects, and
yet be secure, they refrained from no sort of violence
or oppression, until, becoming beyond measure odious,
they lost their State as soon as an enemy attacked
it. Nor was this fortress, which in peace had
occasioned them much hurt, any defence or of any service
them in war. For had they being without it, through
thoughtlessness, treated their subjects inhumanely,
they must soon have discovered and withdrawn from
their danger; and might, thereafter, with no other
help than that of attached subjects, have withstood
the attacks of the French far more successfully than
they could with their fortress, but with subjects
whom they had estranged.

And, in truth, fortresses are unserviceable in every
way, since they may be lost either by the treachery
of those to whom you commit their defence, or by the
overwhelming strength of an assailant, or else by
famine. And where you seek to recover a State
which you have lost, and in which only the fortress
remains to you, if that fortress is to be of any service
or assistance to you, you must have an army wherewith
to attack the enemy who has driven you out. But
with such an army you might succeed in recovering
your State as readily without a fortress as with one;
nay, perhaps, even more readily, since your subjects,
had you not used them ill, from the overweening confidence
your fortress gave you, might then have felt better
disposed towards you. And the event shows that
in times of adversity this very fortress of Milan has
been of no advantage whatever, either to the Sforzas
or to the French; but, on the contrary, has brought
ruin on both, because, trusting to it, they did not
turn their thoughts to nobler methods for preserving

Page 165

that State. Guido Ubaldo, duke of Urbino and
son to Duke Federigo, who in his day was a warrior
of much renown, but who was driven from his dominions
by Cesare Borgia, son to Pope Alexander VI., when
afterwards, by a sudden stroke of good fortune, he
was restored to the dukedom caused all the fortresses
of the country to be dismantled, judging them to be
hurtful. For as he was beloved by his subjects,
so far as they were concerned he had no need for fortresses;
while, as against foreign enemies, he saw he could
not defend them, since this would have required an
army kept constantly in the field. For which
reasons he made them be razed to the ground.

When Pope Julius II. had driven the Bentivogli from
Bologna, after erecting a citadel in that town, he
caused the people to be cruelly oppressed by his governor;
whereupon, the people rebelled, and he forthwith lost
the citadel; so that his citadel, and the oppressions
to which it led, were of less service to him than
different behaviour on his part had been. When
Niccolo da Castello, the ancestor of the Vitelli,
returned to his country out of exile, he straightway
pulled down the two fortresses built there by Pope
Sixtus IV., perceiving that it was not by fortresses,
but by the good-will of the people, that he could
be maintained in his government.

But the most recent, and in all respects most noteworthy
instance, and that which best demonstrates the futility
of building, and the advantage of destroying fortresses,
is what happened only the other day in Genoa.
Every one knows how, in 1507, Genoa rose in rebellion
against Louis XII. of France, who came in person and
with all his forces to recover it; and after recovering
it built there a citadel stronger than any before
known, being, both from its position and from every
other circumstance, most inaccessible to attack.
For standing on the extremity of a hill, named by
the Genoese Codefa, which juts out into the sea, it
commanded the whole harbour and the greater part of
the town. But, afterwards, in the year 1512,
when the French were driven out of Italy, the Genoese,
in spite of this citadel, again rebelled, and Ottaviano
Fregoso assuming the government, after the greatest
efforts, continued over a period of sixteen months,
at last succeeded in reducing the citadel by famine.
By all it was believed that he would retain it as
a rock of refuge in case of any reverse of fortune,
and by some he was advised to do so; but he, being
a truly wise ruler, and knowing well that it is by
the attachment of their subjects and not by the strength
of their fortifications that princes are maintained
in their governments, dismantled this citadel; and
founding his authority, not upon material defences,
but on his own valour and prudence, kept and still
keeps it. And whereas, formerly, a force of a
thousand foot-soldiers could effect a change in the
government of Genoa, the enemies of Ottaviano have
assailed him with ten thousand, without being able
to harm him.

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Here, then, we see that, while to dismantle this fortress
occasioned Ottaviano no loss, its construction gave
the French king no sort of advantage. For when
he could come into Italy with an army, he could recover
Genoa, though he had no citadel there; but when he
could not come with an army, it was not in his power
to hold the city by means of the citadel. Moreover
it was costly for the king to build, and shameful
for him to lose this fortress; while for Ottaviano
it was glorious to take, and advantageous to destroy
it.

Let us turn now to those republics which build fortresses
not within their own territories, but in towns whereof
they have taken possession. And if the above
example of France and Genoa suffice not to show the
futility of this course, that of Florence and Pisa
ought, I think, to be conclusive. For in erecting
fortresses to hold Pisa, the Florentines failed to
perceive that a city which had always been openly hostile
to them, which had lived in freedom, and which could
cloak rebellion under the name of liberty, must, if
it were to be retained at all, be retained by those
methods which were used by the Romans, and either be
made a companion or be destroyed. Of how little
service these Pisan fortresses were, was seen on the
coming of Charles VIII. of France into Italy, to whom,
whether through the treachery of their defenders or
from fear of worse evils, they were at once delivered
up; whereas, had there been no fortresses in Pisa,
the Florentines would not have looked to them as the
means whereby the town was to be held; the king could
not by their assistance have taken the town from the
Florentines; and the methods whereby it had previously
been preserved might, in all likelihood, have continued
sufficient to preserve it; and, at any rate, had served
that end no worse than the fortresses.

These, then, are the conclusions to which I come,
namely, that fortresses built to hold your own country
under are hurtful, and that those built to retain
acquired territories are useless; and I am content
to rely on the example of the Romans, who in the towns
they sought to hold by the strong hand, rather pulled
down fortresses than built them. And if any,
to controvert these views of mine, were to cite the
case of Tarentum in ancient times, or of Brescia in
recent, as towns which when they rebelled were recovered
by means of their citadels; I answer, that for the
recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus was sent at the
end of a year with an army strong enough to retake
it even had there been no fortress there; and that
although he availed himself of the fortress for the
recovery of the town, he might, without it, have resorted
to other means which would have brought about the
same result. Nor do I see of what service a citadel
can be said to be, when to recover the city you must
employ a consular army under a Fabius Maximus.
But that the Romans would, in any case, have recovered
Tarentum, is plain from what happened at Capua, where
there was no citadel, and which they retook, simply
by the valour of their soldiers.

Page 167

Again, as regards Brescia, I say that the circumstances
attending the revolt of that town were such as occur
but seldom, namely, that the citadel remaining in
your hands after the defection of the city, you should
happen to have a great army nigh at hand, as the French
had theirs on this occasion. For M. de Foix being
in command of the king’s forces at Bologna,
on hearing of the loss of Brescia, marched thither
without an hour’s delay, and reaching Brescia
in three days, retook the town with the help of the
citadel. But here, again, we see that, to be
of any service, the citadel of Brescia had to be succoured
by a de Foix, and by that French army which in three
days’ time marched to its relief. So that
this instance cannot be considered conclusive as against
others of a contrary tendency. For, in the course
of recent wars, many fortresses have been taken and
retaken, with the same variety of fortune with which
open country has been acquired or lost; and this not
only in Lombardy, but also in Romagna, in the kingdom
of Naples, and in all parts of Italy.

And, further, touching the erection of fortresses
as a defence against foreign enemies, I say that such
defences are not needed by the prince or people who
possess a good army; while for those who do not possess
a good army, they are useless. For good armies
without fortresses are in themselves a sufficient
defence: whereas, fortresses without good armies
avail nothing. And this we see in the case of
those nations which have been thought to excel both
in their government and otherwise, as, for instance,
the Romans and the Spartans. For while the Romans
would build no fortresses, the Spartans not merely
abstained from building them, but would not even suffer
their cities to be enclosed with walls; desiring to
be protected by their own valour only, and by no other
defence. So that when a Spartan was asked by
an Athenian what he thought of the walls of Athens,
he answered “that they were fine walls if meant
to hold women only.”

If a prince who has a good army has likewise, on the
sea-front of his dominions, some fortress strong enough
to keep an enemy in check for a few days, until he
gets his forces together, this, though not necessary,
may sometimes be for his advantage. But for a
prince who is without a strong army to have fortresses
erected throughout his territories, or upon his frontier,
is either useless or hurtful, since they may readily
be lost and then turned against him; or, supposing
them so strong that the enemy is unable to take them
by assault, he may leave them behind, and so render
them wholly unprofitable. For a brave army, unless
stoutly met, enters an enemy’s country without
regard to the towns or fortified places it leaves
in its rear, as we read of happening in ancient times,
and have seen done by Francesco Maria della Rovere,
who no long while ago, when he marched against Urbino,
made little of leaving ten hostile cities behind him.

Page 168

The prince, therefore, who can bring together a strong
army can do without building fortresses, while he
who has not a strong army ought not to build them,
but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he
dwells, and keep it well stored with supplies, and
its inhabitants well affected, so that he may resist
attack till an accord be agreed on, or he be relieved
by foreign aid. All other expedients are costly
in time of peace, and in war useless.

Whoever carefully weighs all that has now been said
will perceive, that the Romans, as they were most
prudent in all their other methods, so also showed
their wisdom in the measures they took with the men
of Latium and Privernum, when, without ever thinking
of fortresses, they sought security in bolder and
more sagacious courses.

CHAPTER XXV.—­That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must
not think to get possession of it through its Divisions.

Violent dissensions breaking out in Rome between the
commons and the nobles, it appeared to the Veientines
and Etruscans that now was their time to deal a fatal
blow to the Roman supremacy. Accordingly, they
assembled an army and invaded the territories of Rome.
The senate sent Caius Manlius and Marcus Fabius to
meet them, whose forces encamping close by the Veientines,
the latter ceased not to reproach and vilify the Roman
name with every sort of taunt and abuse, and so incensed
the Romans by their unmeasured insolence that, from
being divided they became reconciled, and giving the
enemy battle, broke and defeated them. Here,
again, we see, what has already been noted, how prone
men are to adopt wrong courses, and how often they
miss their object when they think to secure it.
The Veientines imagined that they could conquer the
Romans by attacking them while they were at feud among
themselves; but this very attack reunited the Romans
and brought ruin on their assailants. For the
causes of division in a commonwealth are, for the
most part, ease and tranquillity, while the causes
of union are fear and war. Wherefore, had the
Veientines been wise, the more divided they saw Rome
to be, the more should they have sought to avoid war
with her, and endeavoured to gain an advantage over
her by peaceful arts. And the best way to effect
this in a divided city lies in gaining the confidence
of both factions, and in mediating between them as
arbiter so long as they do not come to blows; but
when they resort to open violence, then to render
some tardy aid to the weaker side, so as to plunge
them deeper in hostilities, wherein both may exhaust
their forces without being led by your putting forth
an excess of strength to suspect you of a desire to
ruin them and remain their master. Where this
is well managed, it will almost always happen that
you succeed in effecting the object you propose to
yourself.

Page 169

The city of Pistoja, as I have said already in connection
with another matter, was won over to the Florentine
republic by no other artifice than this. For
the town being split by factions, the Florentines,
by now favouring one side and now the other, without
incurring the suspicions of either, brought both to
such extremities that, wearied out with their harassed
life, they threw themselves at last of their own accord
into the arms of Florence. The city of Siena,
again, has never made any change in her government
which has had the support of the Florentines, save
when that support has been slight and insignificant;
for whenever the interference of Florence has been
marked and decided, it has had the effect of uniting
all parties in support of things as they stood.

One other instance I shall add to those already given.
Oftener than once Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan,
relying on their divisions, set wars on foot against
the Florentines, and always without success; so that,
in lamenting over these failures, he was wont to complain
that the mad humours of the Florentines had cost him
two millions of gold, without his having anything
to show for it. The Veientines and Etruscans,
therefore, as I have said already, were misled by false
hopes, and in the end were routed by the Romans in
a single pitched battle; and any who should look hereafter
to prevail on like grounds and by similar means against
a divided people, will always find themselves deceived.

CHAPTER XXVI.—­That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses
them, without yielding him any Advantage.

To abstain from threats and injurious language, is,
methinks, one of the wisest precautions a man can
use. For abuse and menace take nothing from the
strength of an adversary; the latter only making him
more cautious, while the former inflames his hatred
against you, and leads him to consider more diligently
how he may cause you hurt.

This is seen from the example of the Veientines, of
whom I spoke in the last Chapter, who, to the injury
of war against the Romans, added those verbal injuries
from which all prudent commanders should compel their
soldiers to refrain. For these are injuries which
stir and kindle your enemy to vengeance, and yet,
as has been said, in no way disable him from doing
you hurt; so that, in truth, they are weapons which
wound those who use them. Of this we find a notable
instance in Asia, in connection with the siege of
Amida. For Gabade, the Persian general, after
besieging this town for a great while, wearied out
at last by its protracted defence, determined on withdrawing
his army; and had actually begun to strike his camp,
when the whole inhabitants of the place, elated by
their success, came out upon the walls to taunt and
upbraid their enemies with their cowardice and meanness
of spirit, and to load them with every kind of abuse.
Stung by these insults, Gabade, changing his resolution,

Page 170

renewed the siege with such fury that in a few days
he stormed and sacked the town. And the very same
thing befell the Veientines, who, not content, as
we have seen, to make war on the Romans with arms,
must needs assail them with foul reproaches, advancing
to the palisade of their camp to revile them, and
molesting them more with their tongues than with their
swords, until the Roman soldiers, who at first were
most unwilling to fight, forced the consuls to lead
them to the attack. Whereupon, the Veientines,
like those others of whom mention has just now been
made, had to pay the penalty of their insolence.

Wise captains of armies, therefore, and prudent governors
of cities, should take all fit precautions to prevent
such insults and reproaches from being used by their
soldiers and subjects, either amongst themselves or
against an enemy. For when directed against an
enemy they lead to the mischiefs above noticed, while
still worse consequences may follow from our not preventing
them among ourselves by such measures as sensible
rulers have always taken for that purpose.

The legions who were left behind for the protection
of Capua having, as shall in its place be told, conspired
against the Capuans, their conspiracy led to a mutiny,
which was presently suppressed by Valerius Corvinus;
when, as one of the conditions on which the mutineers
made their submission, it was declared that whosoever
should thereafter upbraid any soldier of these legions
with having taken part in this mutiny, should be visited
with the severest punishment. So likewise, when
Tiberius Gracchus was appointed, during the war with
Hannibal, to command a body of slaves, whom the Romans
in their straits for soldiers had furnished with arms,
one of his first acts was to pass an order making
it death for any to reproach his men with their servile
origin. So mischievous a thing did the Romans
esteem it to use insulting words to others, or to
taunt them with their shame. Whether this be done
in sport or earnest, nothing vexes men more, or rouses
them to fiercer indignation; “for the biting
jest which flavours too much of truth, leaves always
behind it a rankling memory."[1]

CHAPTER XXVII.—­That prudent Princes
and Republics should be content to have obtained a
Victory; for, commonly, when they are not, theft-Victory
turns to Defeat.

The use of dishonouring language towards an enemy
is mostly caused by an insolent humour, bred by victory
or the false hope of it, whereby men are oftentimes
led not only to speak, but also to act amiss.
For such false hopes, when they gain an entry into
men’s minds, cause them to overrun their goal,
and to miss opportunities for securing a certain good,
on the chance of obtaining some thing better, but uncertain.
And this, being a matter that deserves attention,
because in deceiving themselves men often injure their
country, I desire to illustrate it by particular instances,
ancient and recent, since mere argument might not
place it in so clear a light.

Page 171

After routing the Romans at Cannae, Hannibal sent
messengers to Carthage to announce his victory, and
to ask support. A debate arising in the Carthaginian
senate as to what was to be done, Hanno, an aged and
wise citizen, advised that they should prudently take
advantage of their victory to make peace with the
Romans, while as conquerors they might have it on
favourable terms, and not wait to make it after a defeat;
since it should be their object to show the Romans
that they were strong enough to fight them, but not
to peril the victory they had won in the hope of winning
a greater. This advice was not followed by the
Carthaginian senate, but its wisdom was well seen later,
when the opportunity to act upon it was gone.

When the whole East had been overrun by Alexander
of Macedon, the citizens of Tyre (then at the height
of its renown, and very strong from being built, like
Venice, in the sea), recognizing his greatness, sent
ambassadors to him to say that they desired to be his
good servants, and to yield him all obedience, yet
could not consent to receive either him or his soldiers
within their walls. Whereupon, Alexander, displeased
that a single city should venture to close its gates
against him to whom all the rest of the world had
thrown theirs open, repulsed the Tyrians, and rejecting
their overtures set to work to besiege their town.
But as it stood on the water, and was well stored
with victual and all other munitions needed for its
defence, after four months had gone, Alexander, perceiving
that he was wasting more time in an inglorious attempt
to reduce this one city than had sufficed for most
of his other conquests, resolved to offer terms to
the Tyrians, and to make them those concessions which
they themselves had asked. But they, puffed up
by their success, not merely refused the terms offered,
but put to death the envoy sent to propose them.
Enraged by this, Alexander renewed the siege, and
with such vigour, that he took and destroyed the city,
and either slew or made slaves of its inhabitants.

In the year 1512, a Spanish army entered the Florentine
territory, with the object of restoring the Medici
to Florence, and of levying a subsidy from the town;
having been summoned thither by certain of the citizens,
who had promised them that so soon as they appeared
within the Florentine confines they would arm in their
behalf. But when the Spaniards had come into
the plain of the Arno, and none declared in their
favour, being in sore need of supplies, they offered
to make terms. This offer the people of Florence
in their pride rejected, and so gave occasion for
the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the Florentine
Republic.

Page 172

A prince, therefore, who is attacked by an enemy much
more powerful than himself, can make no greater mistake
than to refuse to treat, especially when overtures
are made to him; for however poor the terms offered
may be, they are sure to contain some conditions advantageous
for him who accepts them, and which he may construe
as a partial success. For which reason it ought
to have been enough for the citizens of Tyre that
Alexander was brought to accept terms which he had
at first rejected; and they should have esteemed it
a sufficient triumph that, by their resistance in
arms, they had forced so great a warrior to bow to
their will. And, in like manner, it should have
been a sufficient victory for the Florentines that
the Spaniards had in part yielded to their wishes,
and abated something of their own demands, the purport
of which was to change the government of Florence,
to sever her from her allegiance to France, and, further,
to obtain money from her. For if of these three
objects the Spaniards had succeeded in securing the
last two, while the Florentines maintained the integrity
of their government, a fair share of honour and contentment
would have fallen to each. And while preserving
their political existence, the Florentines should have
made small account of the other two conditions; nor
ought they, even with the possibility and almost certainty
of greater advantages before them, to have left matters
in any degree to the arbitration of Fortune, by pushing
things to extremes, and incurring risks which no prudent
man should incur, unless compelled by necessity.

Hannibal, when recalled by the Carthaginians from
Italy, where for sixteen years he had covered himself
with glory, to the defence of his native country,
found on his arrival that Hasdrubal and Syphax had
been defeated, the kingdom of Numidia lost, and Carthage
confined within the limits of her walls, and left
without other resource save in him and his army.
Perceiving, therefore, that this was the last stake
his country had to play, and not choosing to hazard
it until he had tried every other expedient, he felt
no shame to sue for peace, judging that in peace rather
than in war lay the best hope of safety for his country.
But, when peace was refused him, no fear of defeat
deterred him from battle, being resolved either to
conquer, if conquer he might, or if he must fall,
to fall gloriously. Now, if a commander so valiant
as Hannibal, at the head of an unconquered army, was
willing to sue for peace rather than appeal to battle
when he saw that by defeat his country must be enslaved,
what course ought to be followed by another commander,
less valiant and with less experience than he?
But men labour under this infirmity, that they know
not where to set bounds to their hopes, and building
on these without otherwise measuring their strength,
rush headlong on destruction.

CHAPTER XXVIII.—­That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether
public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth.

Page 173

Certain Gauls coming to attack Etruria, and more particularly
Clusium its chief city, the citizens of Clusium sought
aid from Rome; whereupon the Romans sent the three
Fabii, as envoys to these Gauls, to notify to them,
in the name of the Roman people, that they must refrain
from making war on the Etruscans. From what befell
the Romans in connection with this embassy, we see
clearly how far men may be carried in resenting an
affront. For these envoys arriving at the very
moment when the Gauls and Etruscans were about to
join battle, being readier at deeds than words, took
part with the Etruscans and fought in their foremost
ranks. Whence it came that the Gauls recognizing
the Roman envoys, turned against the Romans all the
hatred which before they had felt for the Etruscans;
and grew still more incensed when on making complaint
to the Roman senate, through their ambassador, of the
wrong done them, and demanding that the Fabii should
be given up to them in atonement for their offence,
not merely were the offenders not given up or punished
in any way, but, on the contrary, when the comitia
met were created tribunes with consular powers.
But when the Gauls found these men honoured who deserved
to be chastised, they concluded that what had happened
had been done by way of slight and insult to them,
and, burning with fury and resentment, hastened forward
to attack Rome, which they took with the exception
of the Capitol.

Now this disaster overtook the Romans entirely from
their disregard of justice. For their envoys,
who had violated the law of nations, and had therefore
deserved punishment, they had on the contrary treated
with honour. And this should make us reflect,
how carefully all princes and commonwealths ought
to refrain from committing like wrongs, not only against
communities, but also against particular men.
For if a man be deeply wronged, either by a private
hand or by a public officer, and be not avenged to
his satisfaction, if he live in a republic, he will
seek to avenge himself, though in doing so he bring
ruin on his country; or if he live under a prince,
and be of a resolute and haughty spirit, he will never
rest until he has wreaked his resentment against the
prince, though he knows it may cost him dear.
Whereof we have no finer or truer example than in
the death of Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander.
For Pausanias, a handsome and high-born youth belonging
to Philip’s court, having been most foully and
cruelly dishonoured by Attalus, one of the foremost
men of the royal household, repeatedly complained to
Philip of the outrage; who for a while put him off
with promises of vengeance, but in the end, so far
from avenging him, promoted Attalus to be governor
of the province of Greece. Whereupon, Pausanias,
seeing his enemy honoured and not punished, turned
all his resentment from him who had outraged, against
him who had not avenged him, and on the morning of
the day fixed for the marriage of Philip’s daughter
to Alexander of Epirus, while Philip walked between
the two Alexanders, his son and his son-in-law, towards
the temple to celebrate the nuptials, he slew him.

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This instance nearly resembles that of the Roman envoys;
and offers a warning to all rulers never to think
so lightly of any man as to suppose, that when wrong
upon wrong has been done him, he will not bethink
himself of revenge, however great the danger he runs,
or the punishment he thereby brings upon himself.

CHAPTER XXIX.—­That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would
not have them hinder her Designs.

If we note well the course of human affairs, we shall
often find things come about and accidents befall,
against which it seems to be the will of Heaven that
men should not provide. And if this were the case
even in Rome, so renowned for her valour, religion,
and wise ordinances, we need not wonder if it be far
more common in other cities and provinces wherein
these safeguards are wanting.

Having here a notable opportunity to show how Heaven
influences men’s actions, Titus Livius turns
it to account, and treats the subject at large and
in pregnant words, where he says, that since it was
Heaven’s will, for ends of its own, that the
Romans should feel its power, it first of all caused
these Fabii, who were sent as envoys to the Gauls,
to act amiss, and then by their misconduct stirred
up the Gauls to make war on Rome; and, lastly, so
ordered matters that nothing worthy of their name
was done by the Romans to withstand their attack.
For it was fore-ordained by Heaven that Camillus,
who alone could supply the remedy to so mighty an
evil, should be banished to Ardea; and again, that
the citizens, who had often created a dictator to meet
attacks of the Volscians and other neighbouring hostile
nations, should fail to do so when the Gauls were
marching upon Rome. Moreover, the army which the
Romans got together was but a weak one, since they
used no signal effort to make it strong; nay, were
so dilatory in arming that they were barely in time
to meet the enemy at the river Allia, though no more
than ten miles distant from Rome. Here, again,
the Roman tribunes pitched their camp without observing
any of the usual precautions, attending neither to
the choice of ground, nor to surround themselves with
trench or Palisade, nor to avail themselves of any
other aid, human or Divine. In ordering their
army for battle, moreover, disposed it in weak columns,
and these far apart: so that neither men nor officers
accomplished anything worthy of the Roman discipline.
The battle was bloodless for the Romans fled before
they were attacked; most of them retreating to Veii,
the rest to Rome, where, without turning aside to visit
their homes, they made straight for the Capitol.

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Meanwhile, the senate, so far from bethinking themselves
how they might defend the city, did not even attend
to closing the gates; and while some of them made
their escape from Rome, others entered the Capitol
along with those who sought shelter there. It
was only in the defence of the Capitol that any method
was observed, measures being taken to prevent it being
crowded with useless numbers, and all the victual which
could be got, being brought into it to enable it to
stand a siege. Of the women, the children, and
the men whose years unfitted them for service, the
most part fled for refuge to the neighbouring towns,
the rest remained in Rome a prey to the invaders;
so that no one who had heard of the achievements of
the Romans in past years, on being told of what took
place on this occasion, could have believed that it
was of the same people that things so contrary were
related.

Wherefore, Titus Livius, after setting forth all these
disorders, concludes with the words, “So
far does Fortune darken men’s minds when she
would not have her ascendency gainsaid.”
Nor could any juster observation be made. And
hence it is that those who experience the extremes
whether of good or of evil fortune, are, commonly,
little deserving either of praise or blame; since
it is apparent that it is from Heaven having afforded
them, or denied them opportunities for acting worthily,
that they have been brought to their greatness or to
their undoing. Fortune, doubtless, when she seeks
to effect great ends, will often choose as her instrument
a man of such sense and worth that he can recognize
the opportunities which she holds out to him; and,
in like manner, when she desires to bring about great
calamities, will put forward such men as will of themselves
contribute to that result. And all who stand
in her way, she either removes by death, or deprives
of the means of effecting good. And it is well
seen in the passage we are considering, how Fortune,
to aggrandize Rome, and raise her to the height she
reached, judged it necessary, as shall be more fully
shown in the following Book, to humble her; yet would
not have her utterly undone. For which reason
we find her causing Camillus to be banished, but not
put to death; suffering Rome to be taken, but not the
Capitol; and bringing it to pass that, while the Romans
took no wise precaution for the defence of their city,
they neglected none in defending their citadel.
That Rome might be taken, Fortune caused the mass of
the army, after the rout at the Allia, to direct its
flight to Veii, thus withdrawing the means wherewith
the city might have been defended; but while thus
disposing matters, she at the same time prepared all
the needful steps for its recovery, in bringing an
almost entire Roman array to Veii, and Camillus to
Ardea, so that a great force might be assembled for
the rescue of their country, under a captain in no
way compromised by previous reverses, but, on the
contrary, in the enjoyment of an untarnished renown.

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I might cite many modern instances to confirm these
opinions, but since enough has been said to convince
any fair mind, I pass them over. But once more
I repeat what, from all history, may be seen to be
most true, that men may aid Fortune, but not withstand
her; may interweave their threads with her web, but
cannot break it But, for all that, they must never
lose heart, since not knowing what their end is to
be, and moving towards it by cross-roads and untravelled
paths, they have always room for hope, and ought never
to abandon it, whatsoever befalls, and into whatsoever
straits they come.

CHAPTER XXX.—­That really powerful Princes
and, Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with Money,
but with their Valour and the Fame of their Prowess.

When besieged in the Capitol, the Romans although
expecting succour from Veii and from Camillus, nevertheless,
being straitened by famine, entered into an agreement
to buy off the Gauls with gold But at the very moment
when, in pursuance of this agreement, the gold was
being weighed out, Camillus came up with his army.
This, says our historian, was contrived by Fortune,
“that the Romans might not live thereafter
as men ransomed for a price,” and the matter
is noteworthy, not only with reference to this particular
occasion, but also as it bears on the methods generally
followed by this republic. For we never find Rome
seeking to acquire towns, or to purchase peace with
money, but always confiding in her own warlike valour,
which could not, I believe, be said of any other republic.

Now, one of the tests whereby to gauge the strength
of any State, is to observe on what terms it lives
with its neighbours: for when it so carries itself
that, to secure its friendship, its neighbours pay
it tribute, this is a sure sign of its strength, but
when its neighbours, though of less reputation, receive
payments from it, this is a clear proof of its weakness
In the course of the Roman history we read how the
Massilians, the Eduans, the Rhodians, Hiero of Syracuse,
the Kings Eumenes and Massinissa, all of them neighbours
to the Roman frontiers, in order to secure the friendship
of Rome, submitted to imposts and tribute whenever
Rome had need of them, asking no return save her protection.
But with a weak State we find the reverse of all this
happening And, to begin with our own republic of Florence,
we know that in times past, when she was at the height
of her renown, there was never a lordling of Romagna
who had not a subsidy from her, to say nothing of
what she paid to the Perugians, to the Castellans,
and to all her other neighbours But had our city been
armed and strong, the direct contrary would have been
the case, for, to obtain her protection, all would
have poured money into her lap, not seeking to sell
their friendship but to purchase hers.

Page 177

Nor are the Florentines the only people who have lived
on this dishonourable footing The Venetians have done
the same, nay, the King of France himself, for all
his great dominions, lives tributary to the Swiss
and to the King of England; and this because the French
king and the others named, with a view to escape dangers
rather imaginary than real, have disarmed their subjects;
seeking to reap a present gain by wringing money from
them, rather than follow a course which would secure
their own safety and the lasting welfare of their country.
Which ill-practices of theirs, though they quiet things
for a time, must in the end exhaust their resources,
and give rise in seasons of danger to incurable mischief
and disorder. It would be tedious to count up
how often in the course of their wars, the Florentines,
the Venetians, and the kingdom of France have had
to ransom themselves from their enemies, and to submit
to an ignominy to which, once only, the Romans were
very near being subjected. It would be tedious,
too, to recite how many towns have been bought by
the Florentines and by the Venetians, which, afterwards,
have only been a trouble to them, from their not knowing
how to defend with iron what they had won with gold.
While the Romans continued free they adhered to this
more generous and noble method, but when they came
under the emperors, and these, again, began to deteriorate,
and to love the shade rather than the sunshine, they
also took to purchasing peace, now from the Parthians,
now from the Germans, and at other times from other
neighbouring nations. And this was the beginning
of the decline of their great empire.

Such are the evils that befall when you withhold arms
from your subjects; and this course is attended by
the still greater disadvantage, that the closer an
enemy presses you the weaker he finds you. For
any one who follows the evil methods of which I speak,
must, in order to support troops whom he thinks can
be trusted to keep off his enemies, be very exacting
in his dealings with those of his subjects who dwell
in the heart of his dominions; since, to widen the
interval between himself and his enemies, he must
subsidize those princes and peoples who adjoin his
frontiers. States maintained on this footing may
make a little resistance on their confines; but when
these are passed by the enemy no further defence remains.
Those who pursue such methods as these seem not to
perceive that they are opposed to reason and common
sense. For the heart and vital parts of the body,
not the extremities, are those which we should keep
guarded, since we may live on without the latter, but
must die if the former be hurt. But the States
of which I speak, leaving the heart undefended, defend
only the hands and feet. The mischief which has
thus been, and is at this day wrought in Florence is
plain enough to see. For so soon as an enemy
penetrates within her frontiers, and approaches her
heart, all is over with her. And the same was

Page 178

witnessed a few years ago in the case of the Venetians,
whose city, had it not been girdled by the sea, must
then have found its end. In France, indeed, a
like result has not been seen so often, she being so
great a kingdom as to have few enemies mightier than
herself. Nevertheless, when the English invaded
France in the year 1513, the whole kingdom tottered;
and the King himself, as well as every one else, had
to own that a single defeat might have cost him his
dominions.

But with the Romans the reverse of all this took place.
For the nearer an enemy approached Rome, the more
completely he found her armed for resistance; and
accordingly we see that on the occasion of Hannibal’s
invasion of Italy, the Romans, after three defeats,
and after the slaughter of so many of their captains
and soldiers, were still able, not merely to withstand
the invader, but even, in the end, to come off victorious.
This we may ascribe to the heart being well guarded,
while the extremities were but little heeded.
For the strength of Rome rested on the Roman people
themselves, on the Latin league, on the confederate
towns of Italy, and on her colonies, from all of which
sources she drew so numerous an army, as enabled her
to subdue the whole world and to keep it in subjection.

The truth of what I say may be further seen from the
question put by Hanno the Carthaginian to the messengers
sent to Carthage by Hannibal after his victory at
Cannae. For when these were vaunting the achievements
of Hannibal, they were asked by Hanno whether any one
had come forward on behalf of the Romans to propose
terms of peace, and whether any town of the Latin
league or of the colonized districts had revolted
from the Romans. And when to both inquiries the
envoys answered, “No,” Hanno observed
that the war was no nearer an end than on the day
it was begun.

We can understand, therefore, as well from what has
now been said, as from what I have often said before,
how great a difference there is between the methods
followed by the republics of the present times, and
those followed by the republics of antiquity; and why
it is that we see every day astounding losses alternate
with extraordinary gains. For where men are weak,
Fortune shows herself strong; and because she changes,
States and Governments change with her; and will continue
to change, until some one arise, who, following reverently
the example of the ancients, shall so control her,
that she shall not have opportunity with every revolution
of the sun to display anew the greatness of her power.

CHAPTER XXXI.—­Of the Danger of trusting banished Men.

Page 179

The danger of trusting those who are in exile from
their own country, being one to which the rulers of
States are often exposed, may, I think, be fitly considered
in these Discourses; and I notice it the more willingly,
because I am able to illustrate it by a memorable instance
which Titus Livius, though with another purpose, relates
in his history. When Alexander the Great passed
with his army into Asia, his brother-in-law and uncle,
Alexander of Epirus, came with another army into Italy,
being invited thither by the banished Lucanians, who
gave him to believe that, with their aid, he might
get possession of the whole of that country.
But when, confiding in the promises of these exiles,
and fed by the hopes they held out to him, he came
into Italy, they put him to death, their fellow-citizens
having offered to restore them to their country upon
this condition. It behoves us, therefore, to
remember how empty are the promises, and how doubtful
the faith, of men in banishment from their native
land. For as to their faith, it may be assumed
that whenever they can effect their return by other
means than yours, notwithstanding any covenants they
may have made with you, they will throw you over,
and take part with their countrymen. And as for
the empty promises and delusive hopes which they set
before you, so extreme is their desire to return home
that they naturally believe many things which are
untrue, and designedly misrepresent many others; so
that between their beliefs and what they say they
believe, they fill you with false impressions, on
which if you build, your labour is in vain, and you
are led to engage in enterprises from which nothing
but ruin can result.

To this instance of Alexander I shall add only one
other, that, namely, of Themistocles the Athenian,
who, being proclaimed a traitor, fled into Asia to
Darius, to whom he made such lavish promises if he
would only attack Greece, that he induced him to undertake
the enterprise. But afterwards, when he could
not fulfil what he had promised, either from shame,
or through fear of punishment, he poisoned himself.
But, if such a mistake as this was made by a man like
Themistocles, we may reckon that mistakes still greater
will be made by those who, being of a feebler nature,
suffer themselves to be more completely swayed by their
feelings and wishes Wherefore, let a prince be careful
how he embarks in any enterprise on the representations
of an exile; for otherwise, he is likely either to
be put to shame, or to incur the gravest calamities.

Because towns are sometimes, though seldom, taken
by craft, through secret practices had with their
inhabitants, I think it not out of place to discuss
the matter in the following Chapter, wherein I shall
likewise show in how many ways the Romans were wont
to make such acquisitions.

CHAPTER XXXII.—­In how many Ways the Romans gained Possession of
Towns.

Page 180

Turning their thoughts wholly to arms, the Romans
always conducted their military enterprises in the
most advantageous way, both as to cost and every other
circumstance of war. For which reason they avoided
attempting towns by siege, judging the expense and
inconvenience of this method of carrying on war greatly
to outweigh any advantage to be gained by it.
Accordingly, they thought it better and more for their
interest to reduce towns in any other way than this;
and in all those years during which they were constantly
engaged in wars we find very few instances of their
proceeding by siege.

For the capture of towns, therefore, they trusted
either to assault or to surrender. Assaults were
effected either by open force, or by force and stratagem
combined. When a town was assailed by open force,
the walls were stormed without being breached, and
the assailants were said “aggredi urbem corona,”
because they encircled the city with their entire
strength and kept up an attack on all sides. In
this way they often succeeded in carrying towns, and
even great towns, at a first onset, as when Scipio
took new Carthage in Spain. But when they failed
to carry a town by storm, they set themselves to breach
the walls with battering rams and other warlike engines;
or they dug mines so as to obtain an entrance within
the walls, this being the method followed in taking
Veii; or else, to be on a level with the defenders,
they erected towers of timber or threw up mounds of
earth against the outside of the walls so as to reach
the top.

Of these methods of attack, the first, wherein the
city was entirely surrounded, exposed the defenders
to more sudden perils and left them more doubtful
remedies. For while it was necessary for them
to have a sufficient force at all points, it might
happen that the forces at their disposal were not
numerous enough to be everywhere at once, or to relieve
one another. Or if their numbers were sufficient,
they might not all be equally resolute in standing
their ground, and their failure at any one point involved
a general defeat. Consequently, as I have said,
this method of attack was often successful. But
when it did not succeed at the first, it was rarely
renewed, being a method dangerous to the attacking
army, which having to secure itself along an extended
line, was left everywhere too weak to resist a sally
made from the town; nay, of itself, was apt to fall
into confusion and disorder. This method of attack,
therefore, could be attempted once only and by way
of surprise.

Against breaches in the walls the defence was, as
at the present day, to throw up new works; while mines
were met by counter-mines, in which the enemy were
either withstood at the point of the sword, or baffled
by some other warlike contrivance; as by filling casks
with feathers, which, being set on fire and placed
in the mine, choked out the assailants by their smoke
and stench. Where towers were employed for the
attack, the defenders sought to destroy them with fire;
and where mounds of earth were thrown up against the
walls, they would dig holes at the base of the wall
against which the mound rested, and carry off the earth
which the enemy were heaping up; which, being removed
from within as fast as it was thrown up from without,
the mound made no progress.

Page 181

None of these methods of attack can long be persisted
in and the assailant, if unsuccessful, must either
strike his camp and seek victory in some other direction,
as Scipio did when he invaded Africa and, after failing
in the attempt to storm Utica, withdrew from his attack
on that town and turned his strength against the Carthaginian
army in the field; or else recourse must be had to
regular siege, as by the Romans at Veii, Capua, Carthage,
Jerusalem, and divers other cities which they reduced
in this way.

The capture of towns by stratagem combined with force
is effected, as by the Romans at Palaeopolis, through
a secret understanding with some within the walls.
Many attempts of this sort have been made, both by
the Romans and by others, but few successfully, because
the least hindrance disarranges the plan of action,
and because such hindrances are very likely to occur.
For either the plot is discovered before it can be
carried out, as it readily may, whether from treachery
on the part of those to whom it has been communicated,
or from the difficulties which attend its inception,
the preliminary arrangements having to be made with
the enemy and with persons with whom it is not permitted,
save under some pretext or other, to hold intercourse;
or if it be not discovered while it is being contrived,
a thousand difficulties will still be met with in
its execution. For if you arrive either before
or after the appointed time, all is ruined. The
faintest sound, as of the cackling of the geese in
the Capitol, the least departure from some ordinary
routine, the most trifling mistake or error, mars the
whole enterprise. Add to which, the darkness
of night lends further terror to the perils of such
undertakings; while the great majority of those engaged
in them, having no knowledge of the district or places
into which they are brought, are bewildered and disconcerted
by the least mishap, and put to flight by every imaginary
danger. In secret nocturnal enterprises of this
sort, no man was ever more successful than Aratus of
Sicyon, although in any encounter by day there never
was a more arrant coward. This we must suppose
due rather to some special and occult quality inherent
in the man, than to success being naturally to be
looked for in the like attempts. Such enterprises,
accordingly, are often planned, but few are put into
execution, and fewer still with success.

When cities are acquired by surrender, the surrender
is either voluntary or under compulsion; voluntary,
when the citizens appeal to you for protection against
some threatened danger from without, as Capua submitted
to the Romans; or where they are moved by a desire
to be better governed, and are attracted by the good
government which he to whom they surrender is seen
exercising over others who have placed themselves
in his hands; as was the case with the Rhodians, the
Massilians, and others who for like causes gave themselves
up to the Roman people. Compulsory surrenders
take place, either as the result of a protracted siege,
like those we have spoken of above; or from the country
being continually wasted by incursions, forays, and
similar severities, to escape which a city makes its
submission.

Page 182

Of the methods which have been noticed, the Romans,
in preference to all others, used this last; and for
four hundred and fifty years made it their aim to
wear out their neighbours by invasion and by defeat
in the open field, while endeavouring, as I have elsewhere
said, to establish their influence over them by treaties
and conventions. It was to this method of warfare
therefore that they always mainly trusted, because,
after trying all others, they found none so free from
inconvenience and disadvantage—­the procedure
by siege involving expense and delay, that by assault,
difficulty and danger, and that by secret practice,
uncertainty and doubt. They found, likewise, that
while in subduing one obstinate city by siege many
years might be wasted, a kingdom might be gained in
a single day by the defeat of a hostile army in the
field.

CHAPTER XXXIII.—­That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their Armies
with the fullest Powers.

In reading this History of Titus Livius with a view
to profit by it, I think that all the methods of conduct
followed by the Roman people and senate merit attention.
And among other things fit to be considered, it should
be noted, with how ample an authority they sent forth
their consuls, their dictators, and the other captains
of their armies, all of whom we find clothed with
the fullest powers: no other prerogative being
reserved to itself by the senate save that of declaring
war and making peace, while everything else was left
to the discretion and determination of the consul.
For so soon as the people and senate had resolved
on war, for instance on a war against the Latins, they
threw all further responsibility upon the consul,
who might fight or decline battle as he pleased, and
attack this or the other city as he thought fit.

That this was so, is seen in many instances, and especially
from what happened during an expedition made against
the Etruscans. For the consul Fabius having routed
that people near Sutrium, and thinking to pass onward
through the Ciminian forest into Etruria, so far from
seeking the advice of the senate, gave them no hint
whatever of his design, although for its execution
the war had to be carried into a new, difficult, and
dangerous country. We have further witness to
the same effect, in the action taken in respect of
this enterprise by the senate, who being informed
of the victory obtained by Fabius, and apprehending
that he might decide to pass onward through the aforesaid
forest, and deeming it inexpedient that he should
incur risk by attempting this invasion, sent two messengers
to warn him not to enter Etruria. These messengers,
however, did not come up with the consul until he had
already made his way into that country and gained
a second victory; when, instead of opposing his further
advance, they returned to Rome to announce his good
fortune and the glory which he had won.

Page 183

Whoever, therefore, shall well consider the character
of the authority whereof I speak, will see that it
was most wisely accorded; since had it been the wish
of the senate that a consul, in conducting a war, should
proceed step by step as they might direct him, this
must have made him at once less cautious and more
dilatory; because the credit of victory would not
then have seemed to be wholly his own, but shared by
the senate on whose advice he acted. Besides
which, the senate must have taken upon itself the
task of advising on matters which it could not possibly
understand; for although it might contain among its
members all who were most versed in military affairs,
still, since these men were not on the spot, and were
ignorant of many particulars which, if they were to
give sound advice, it was necessary for them to know,
they must in advising have made numberless mistakes.
For these reasons they desired that the consul should
act on his own responsibility, and that the honours
of success should be wholly his; judging that the love
of fame would act on him at once as a spur and as
a curb, making him do whatever he had to do well.

This matter I have the rather dwelt upon because I
observe that our modern republics, such as the Venetian
and the Florentine, view it in a different light;
so that when their captains, commissaries, or provedditori
have a single gun to place in position, the authorities
at home must be informed and consulted; a course deserving
the same approval as is due to all those other methods
of theirs, which, one with another, have brought Italy
to her present condition.

BOOK III.

* * * *
*

CHAPTER I.—­For a Sect or Commonwealth
to last long, it must often be brought back to its
Beginnings.

Doubtless, all the things of this world have a limit
set to their duration; yet those of them the bodies
whereof have not been suffered to grow disordered,
but have been so cared for that either no change at
all has been wrought in them, or, if any, a change
for the better and not for the worse, will run that
course which Heaven has in a general way appointed
them. And since I am now speaking of mixed bodies,
for States and Sects are so to be regarded, I say
that for them these are wholesome changes which bring
them back to their first beginnings.

Those States consequently stand surest and endure
longest which, either by the operation of their institutions
can renew themselves, or come to be renewed by accident
apart from any design. Nothing, however, can be
clearer than that unless thus renewed these bodies
do not last. Now the way to renew them is, as
I have said, to bring them back to their beginnings,
since all beginnings of sects, commonwealths, or kingdoms
must needs have in them a certain excellence, by virtue
of which they gain their first reputation and make
their first growth. But because in progress of
time this excellence becomes corrupted, unless something
be done to restore it to what it was at first, these
bodies necessarily decay; for as the physicians tell
us in speaking of the human body, “Something
or other is daily added which sooner or later will
require treatment."[1]

Page 184

As regards commonwealths, this return to the point
of departure is brought about either by extrinsic
accident or by intrinsic foresight. As to the
first, we have seen how it was necessary that Rome
should be taken by the Gauls, that being thus in a
manner reborn, she might recover life and vigour,
and resume the observances of religion and justice
which she had suffered to grow rusted by neglect.
This is well seen from those passages of Livius wherein
he tells us that when the Roman army was ’sent
forth against the Gauls, and again when tribunes were
created with consular authority, no religious rites
whatever were celebrated, and wherein he further relates
how the Romans not only failed to punish the three
Fabii, who contrary to the law of nations had fought
against the Gauls, but even clothed them with honour.
For, from these instances, we may well infer that
the rest of the wise ordinances instituted by Romulus,
and the other prudent kings, had begun to be held
of less account than they deserved, and less than was
essential for the maintenance of good government.

And therefore it was that Rome was visited by this
calamity from without, to the end that all her ordinances
might be reformed, and the people taught that it behoved
them not only to maintain religion and justice, but
also to esteem their worthy citizens, and to prize
their virtues beyond any advantages of which they
themselves might seem to have been deprived at their
instance. And this, we find, was just the effect
produced. For no sooner was the city retaken,
than all the ordinances of the old religion were at
once restored; the Fabii, who had fought in violation
of the law of nations, were punished; and the worth
and excellence of Camillus so fully recognized, that
the senate and the whole people, laying all jealousies
aside, once more committed to him the entire charge
of public affairs.

It is necessary then, as I have said already, that
where men dwell together in a regulated society, they
be often reminded of those ordinances in conformity
with which they ought to live, either by something
inherent in these, or else by some external accident.
A reminder is given in the former of these two ways,
either by the passing of some law whereby the members
of the society are brought to an account; or else
by some man of rare worth arising among them, whose
virtuous life and example have the same effect as a
law. In a Commonwealth, accordingly, this end
is served either by the virtues of some one of its
citizens, or by the operation of its institutions.

The institutions whereby the Roman Commonwealth was
led back to its starting point, were the tribuneship
of the people and the censorship, together with all
those laws which were passed to check the insolence
and ambition of its citizens. Such institutions,
however, require fresh life to be infused into them
by the worth of some one man who fearlessly devotes
himself to give them effect in opposition to the power
of those who set them at defiance.

Page 185

Of the laws being thus reinforced in Rome, before
its capture by the Gauls, we have notable examples
in the deaths of the sons of Brutus, of the Decemvirs,
and of Manlius Frumentarius; and after its capture,
in the deaths of Manlius Capitolinus, and of the son
of Manlius Torquatus in the prosecution of his master
of the knights by Papirius Cursor, and in the impeachment
of the Scipios. Such examples as these, being
signal and extraordinary, had the effect, whenever
they took place, of bringing men back to the true
standard of right; but when they came to be of rarer
occurrence, they left men more leisure to grow corrupted,
and were attended by greater danger and disturbance.
Wherefore, between one and another of these vindications
of the laws, no more than ten years, at most, ought
to intervene; because after that time men begin to
change their manners and to disregard the laws; and
if nothing occur to recall the idea of punishment,
and unless fear resume its hold on their minds, so
many offenders suddenly spring up together that it
is impossible to punish them without danger.
And to this purport it used to be said by those who
ruled Florence from the year 1434 to 1494, that their
government could hardly be maintained unless it was
renewed every five years; by which they meant that
it was necessary for them to arouse the same terror
and alarm in men’s minds, as they inspired when
they first assumed the government, and when all who
offended against their authority were signally chastised.
For when the recollection of such chastisement has
died out, men are emboldened to engage in new designs,
and to speak ill of their rulers; for which the only
remedy is to restore things to what they were at first.

A republic may, likewise, be brought back to its original
form, without recourse to ordinances for enforcing
justice, by the mere virtues of a single citizen,
by reason that these virtues are of such influence
and authority that good men love to imitate them,
and bad men are ashamed to depart from them.
Those to whom Rome owed most for services of this
sort, were Horatius Cocles, Mutius Scaevola, the two
Decii, Atilius Regulus, and divers others, whose rare
excellence and generous example wrought for their
city almost the same results as might have been effected
by ordinances and laws. And if to these instances
of individual worth had been added, every ten years,
some signal enforcement of justice, it would have
been impossible for Rome ever to have grown corrupted.
But when both of these incitements to virtuous behavior
began to recur less frequently, corruption spread,
and after the time of Atilius Regulus, no like example
was again witnessed. For though the two Catos
came later, so great an interval had elapsed before
the elder Cato appeared, and again, so long a period
intervened between him and the younger, and these
two, moreover, stood so much alone, that it was impossible
for them, by their influence, to work any important
change; more especially for the younger, who found
Rome so much corrupted that he could do nothing to
improve his fellow-citizens.

Page 186

This is enough to say concerning commonwealths, but
as regards sects, we see from the instance of our
own religion that here too a like renewal is needed.
For had not this religion of ours been brought back
to its original condition by Saint Francis and Saint
Dominick, it must soon have been utterly extinguished.
They, however, by their voluntary poverty, and by
their imitation of the life of Christ, rekindled in
the minds of men the dying flame of faith; and by
the efficacious rules which they established averted
from our Church that ruin which the ill lives of its
prelates and heads must otherwise have brought upon
it. For living in poverty, and gaining great
authority with the people by confessing them and preaching
to them, they got them to believe that it is evil
to speak ill even of what is evil; and that it is good
to be obedient to rulers, who, if they do amiss, may
be left to the judgment of God. By which teaching
these rulers are encouraged to behave as badly as
they can, having no fear of punishments which they
neither see nor credit. Nevertheless, it is this
renewal which has maintained, and still maintains,
our religion.

Kingdoms also stand in need of a like renewal, and
to have their laws restored to their former force;
and we see how, by attending to this, the kingdom
of France has profited. For that kingdom, more
than any other, lies under the control of its laws
and ordinances, which are maintained by its parliaments,
and more especially by the parliament of Paris, from
which last they derive fresh vigour whenever they have
to be enforced against any prince of the realm; for
this assembly pronounces sentence even against the
king himself. Heretofore this parliament has
maintained its name as the fearless champion of the
laws against the nobles of the land; but should it
ever at any future time suffer wrongs to pass unpunished,
and should offences multiply, either these will have
to be corrected with great disturbance to the State,
or the kingdom itself must fall to pieces.

This, then, is our conclusion—­that nothing
is so necessary in any society, be it a religious
sect, a kingdom, or a commonwealth, as to restore
to it that reputation which it had at first, and to
see that it is provided either with wholesome laws,
or with good men whose actions may effect the same
ends, without need to resort to external force.
For although this last may sometimes, as in the case
of Rome, afford an efficacious remedy, it is too hazardous
a remedy to make us ever wish to employ it.

And that all may understand how much the actions of
particular citizens helped to make Rome great, and
how many admirable results they wrought in that city,
I shall now proceed to set them forth and examine them;
with which survey this Third Book of mine, and last
division of the First Decade of Titus Livius, shall
be brought to a close. But, although great and
notable actions were done by the Roman kings, nevertheless,
since history has treated of these at much length,
here I shall pass them over, and say no more about
these princes, save as regards certain things done
by them with an eye to their private interest.
I shall begin, therefore, with Brutus, the father
of Roman freedom.

Page 187

CHAPTER II.—­That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly.

Never did any man by the most splendid achievements
gain for himself so great a name for wisdom and prudence
as is justly due to Junius Brutus for feigning to
be a fool. And although Titus Livius mentions
one cause only as having led him to assume this part,
namely, that he might live more securely and look
after his patrimony; yet on considering his behavior
we may believe that in counterfeiting folly it was
also his object to escape notice, and so find better
convenience to overthrow the kings, and to free his
country whenever an occasion offered. That this
was in his mind is seen first of all from the interpretation
he gave to the oracle of Apollo, when, to render the
gods favourable to his designs, he pretended to stumble,
and secretly kissed his mother earth; and, again,
from this, that on the death of Lucretia, though her
father, her husband, and others of her kinsmen were
present, he was the first to draw the dagger from
her wound, and bind the bystanders by oath never more
to suffer king to reign in Rome.

From his example all who are discontented with their
prince are taught, first of all, to measure, and to
weigh their strength, and if they find themselves
strong enough to disclose their hostility and proclaim
open war, then to take that course as at once the
nobler and less dangerous; but, if too weak to make
open war, then sedulously to court the favour of the
prince, using to that end all such methods as they
may judge needful, adapting themselves to his pleasures,
and showing delight in whatever they see him delight
in. Such an intimacy, in the first place, enables
you to live securely, and permits you, without incurring
any risk, to share the happy fortunes of the prince,
while it affords you every facility for carrying out
your plans. Some, no doubt, will tell you that
you should not stand so near the prince as to be involved
in his downfall; nor yet at such a distance that when
he falls you shall be too far off to use the occasion
for rising on his ruin. But although this mean
course, could we only follow it, were certainly the
best, yet, since I believe it to be impracticable,
we must resort to the methods above indicated, and
either keep altogether aloof, or else cleave closely
to the prince. Whosoever does otherwise, if he
be of great station, lives in constant peril; nor
will it avail him to say, “I concern myself
with nothing; I covet neither honours nor preferment;
my sole wish is to live a quiet and peaceful life.”
For such excuses, though they be listened to, are
not accepted; nor can any man of great position, however
much and sincerely he desire it, elect to live this
life of tranquillity since his professions will not
be believed; so that although he might be contented
to be let alone, others will not suffer him to be
so. Wherefore, like Brutus, men must feign folly;
and to play the part effectively, and so as to please
their prince, must say, do, see, and praise things
contrary to their inclinations.

Page 188

But now, having spoken of the prudence shown by Brutus
when he sought to recover the freedom of Rome, let
us next speak of the severity which he used to maintain
it.

CHAPTER III.—­That to preserve a newly acquired Freedom we must slay
the Sons of Brutus.

The severity used by Brutus in preserving for Rome
the freedom he had won for her, was not less necessary
than useful. The spectacle of a father sitting
on the judgment, and not merely sentencing his own
sons to death, but being himself present at their
execution, affords an example rare in history.
But those who study the records of ancient times will
understand, that after a change in the form of a government,
whether it be from a commonwealth to a tyranny or from
a tyranny to a commonwealth, those who are hostile
to the new order of things must always be visited
with signal punishment. So that he who sets up
as a tyrant and slays not Brutus, and he who creates
a free government and slays not the sons of Brutus,
can never maintain himself long. But since I
have elsewhere treated of this matter at large, I shall
merely refer to what has there been said concerning
it, and shall cite here one instance only, happening
in our own days, and memorable in the history of our
country.

I speak of Piero Soderini, who thought by his patience
and goodness to overcome the very same temper which
prompted the sons of Brutus to revert to the old government,
and who failed in the endeavour. For although
his sagacity should have taught him the necessity,
while chance and the ambition of those who attacked
him furnished him with the opportunity of making an
end of them, he never could resolve to strike the
blow; and not merely believed himself able to subdue
disaffection by patience and kindness, and to mitigate
the enmity of particular men by the rewards he held
out to them, but also persuaded himself, and often
declared in the presence of his friends, that he could
not confront opposition openly, nor crush his adversaries,
without assuming extraordinary powers and passing
laws destructive of civil equality; which measures,
although not afterward used by him for tyrannical ends,
would so alarm the community, that after his death
they would never again consent to appoint a Gonfalonier
for life, an office which he judged it essential both
to maintain and strengthen. Now although these
scruples of his were wise and good, we ought never
out of regard for what is good, to suffer an evil
to run its course, since it may well happen that the
evil will prevail over the good. And Piero should
have believed that as his acts and intentions were
to be judged by results, he might, if he lived and
if fortune befriended him, have made it clear to all,
that what he did was done to preserve his country,
and not from personal ambition; and he might have
so contrived matters that no successor of his could
ever turn to bad ends the means which he had used
for good ends. But he was misled by a preconceived
opinion, and failed to understand that ill-will is
not to be vanquished by time nor propitiated by favours.
And, so, from not knowing how to resemble Brutus,
he lost power, and fame, and was driven an exile from
his country.

Page 189

That it is as hard a matter to preserve a princedom
as it is to preserve a commonwealth, will be shown
in the Chapter following.

CHAPTER IV.—­That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those
live whom he has deprived of it.

From what befell the elder Tarquin at the hands of
the sons of Ancus, and Servius Tullius at the hands
of Tarquin the Proud, we see what an arduous and perilous
course it is to strip a king of his kingdom and yet
suffer him to live on, hoping to conciliate him by
benefits. We see, too, how the elder Tarquin
was ruined by his belief that he held the kingdom
by a just title, since it had been given him by the
people and confirmed to him by the senate, never suspecting
that the sons of Ancus would be so stirred by resentment
that it would be impossible to content them with what
contented all the rest of Rome. Servius Tullius
again, was ruined through believing that he could
conciliate the sons of Ancus by loading them with
favours.

By the fate of the first of these kings every prince
may be warned that he can never live securely in his
princedom so long as those from whom he has taken
it survive; while the fate of the second should remind
all rulers that old injuries are not to be healed
by subsequent benefits, and least of all when the
new benefit is less in degree than the injury suffered.
And, truly, Servius was wanting in wisdom when he imagined
that the sons of Tarquin would contentedly resign themselves
to be the sons-in-law of one whom they thought should
be their subject. For the desire to reign is
so prevailing a passion, that it penetrates the minds
not only of those who are rightful heirs, but also
of those who are not; as happened with the wife of
the younger Tarquin, who was daughter to Servius,
but who, possessed by this madness, and setting at
naught all filial duty, incited her husband to take
her father’s kingdom, and with it his life;
so much nobler did she esteem it to be a queen than
the daughter of a king. But while the elder Tarquin
and Servius Tullius lost the kingdom from not knowing
how to secure themselves against those whom they had
deprived of it, the younger Tarquin lost it from not
observing the ordinances of the old kings, as shall
be shown in the following Chapter.

CHAPTER V.—­How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom.

Tarquin the Proud, when he had put Servius Tullius
to death, inasmuch as the latter left no heirs, took
secure possession of the kingdom, having nothing to
fear from any of those dangers which had stood in the
way of his predecessors. And although the means
whereby he made himself king were hateful and monstrous,
nevertheless, had he adhered to the ancient ordinances
of the earlier kings, he might have been endured, nor
would he have aroused both senate and people to combine
against him and deprive him of his government.

Page 190

It was not, therefore, because his son Sextus violated
Lucretia that Tarquin was driven out, but because he
himself had violated the laws of the kingdom, and governed
as a tyrant, stripping the senate of all authority,
and bringing everything under his own control.
For all business which formerly had been transacted
in public, and with the sanction of the senate, he
caused to be transacted in his palace, on his own
responsibility, and to the displeasure of every one
else, and so very soon deprived Rome of whatever freedom
she had enjoyed under her other kings.

Nor was it enough for him to have the Fathers his
enemies, but he must needs also kindle the commons
against him, wearing them out with mere mechanic labours,
very different from the enterprises in which they had
been employed by his predecessors; so that when Rome
overflowed with instances of his cruelty and pride,
he had already disposed the minds of all the citizens
to rebel whenever they found the opportunity.
Wherefore, had not occasion offered in the violence
done to Lucretia, some other had soon been found to
bring about the same result. But had Tarquin
lived like the other kings, when Sextus his son committed
that outrage, Brutus and Collatinus would have had
recourse to him to punish the offender, and not to
the commons of Rome. And hence let princes learn
that from the hour they first violate those laws, customs,
and usages under which men have lived for a great
while, they begin to weaken the foundations of their
authority. And should they, after they have been
stripped of that authority, ever grow wise enough to
see how easily princedoms are preserved by those who
are content to follow prudent counsels, the sense
of their loss will grieve them far more, and condemn
them to a worse punishment than any they suffer at
the hands of others. For it is far easier to
be loved by good men than by bad, and to obey the
laws than to seek to control them.

And to learn what means they must use to retain their
authority, they have only to take example by the conduct
of good princes, such as Timoleon of Corinth, Aratus
of Sicyone, and the like, in whose lives they will
find such security and content, both on the side of
the ruler and the ruled, as ought to stir them with
the desire to imitate them, which, for the reasons
already given, it is easy for them to do. For
men, when they are well governed, ask no more, nor
look for further freedom; as was the case with the
peoples governed by the two whom I have named, whom
they constrained to continue their rulers while they
lived, though both of them sought repeatedly to return
to private life.

But because, in this and the two preceding Chapters,
I have noticed the ill-will which arose against the
kings, the plots contrived by the sons of Brutus against
their country, and those directed against the elder
Tarquin and Servius Tullius, it seems to me not out
of place to discourse of these matters more at length
in the following Chapter, as deserving the attention
both of princes and private citizens.

Page 191

CHAPTER VI.—­Of Conspiracies.

It were an omission not to say something on the subject
of conspiracies, these being a source of much danger
both to princes and to private men. For we see
that many more princes have lost their lives and states
through these than in open warfare; power to wage open
war upon a prince being conceded to few, whereas power
to conspire against him is denied to none. On
the other hand, since conspiracies are attended at
every stage by difficulties and dangers, no more hazardous
or desperate undertakings can be engaged in by any
private citizen; whence it comes that while many conspiracies
are planned, few effect their object. Wherefore,
to put princes on their guard against these dangers,
and to make subjects more cautious how they take part
in them, and rather learn to live content under whatever
government fortune has assigned them, I shall treat
of them at length, without omitting any noteworthy
circumstance which may serve for the instruction of
either. Though, indeed, this is a golden sentence
Of Cornelius Tacitus, wherein he says that “the
past should have our reverence, the present our obedience,
and that we should wish for good princes, but put up
with any."[1] For assuredly whosoever does otherwise
is likely to bring ruin both on himself and on his
country.

But, to go deeper into the matter, we have first of
all to examine against whom conspiracies are directed;
and we shall find that men conspire either against
their country or their prince; and it is of these
two kinds of conspiracy that at present I desire to
speak. For of conspiracies which have for their
object the surrender of cities to enemies who are
besieging them, and of all others contrived for like
ends, I have already said enough.

First, then, I shall treat of those conspiracies which
are directed against a prince, and begin by inquiring
into their causes, which are manifold, but of which
one is more momentous than all the rest; I mean, the
being hated by the whole community. For it may
reasonably be assumed, that when a prince has drawn
upon himself this universal hatred, he must also have
given special offence to particular men, which they
will be eager to avenge. And this eagerness will
be augmented by the feeling of general ill-will which
the prince is seen to have incurred. A prince
ought, therefore, to avoid this load of public hatred.
How he is to do so I need not stop here to explain,
having discussed the matter already in another place;
but if he can guard against this, offence given to
particular men will expose him to but few attacks.
One reason being, that there are few men who think
so much of an injury done them as to run great risks
to revenge it; another, that assuming them to have
both the disposition and the courage to avenge themselves,
they are restrained by the universal favour which they
see entertained towards the prince.

Page 192

Injuries are either to a man’s life, to his
property, or to his honour. As regards the first,
they who threaten injuries to life incur more danger
than they who actually inflict them; or rather, while
great danger is incurred in threatening, none at all
is incurred from inflicting such injuries. For
the dead are past thinking of revenge; and those who
survive, for the most part leave such thoughts to the
dead. But he whose life is threatened, finding
himself forced by necessity either to do or suffer,
becomes a man most dangerous to the prince, as shall
be fully explained hereafter.

After menaces to life, injuries to property and honour
stir men more than any others, and of these a Prince
has most to beware. For he can never strip a
man so bare of his possessions as not to leave him
some weapon wherewith to redress his wrongs, nor ever
so far dishonour him as to quell the stubborn spirit
which prompts revenge. Of all dishonours those
done to the women of a household are the worst; after
which come such personal indignities as nerved the
arm of Pausanias against Philip of Macedon, and of
many another against other princes; and, in our own
days, it was no other reason that moved Giulio Belanti
to conspire against Pandolfo, lord of Siena, than
that Pandolfo, who had given him his daughter to wife,
afterwards took her from him, as presently shall be
told. Chief among the causes which led the Pazzi
to conspire against the Medici, was the law passed
by the latter depriving them of the inheritance of
Giovanni Bonromei.

Another most powerful motive to conspire against a
prince is the desire men feel to free their country
from a usurper. This it was which impelled Brutus
and Cassius to conspire against Caesar, and countless
others against such tyrants as Phalaris, Dionysius,
and the like. Against this humour no tyrant can
guard, except by laying down his tyranny; which as
none will do, few escape an unhappy end. Whence
the verses of Juvenal:—­

“Few tyrants die a peaceful death, and
few
The kings who visit Proserpine’s dread
lord,
Unscathed by wounds and blood."[2]

Great, as I have said already, are the dangers which
men run in conspiring; for at all times they are in
peril, whether in contriving, in executing, or after
execution. And since in conspiracies either many
are engaged, or one only (for although it cannot properly
be said of one man that he conspires,
there may exist in him the fixed resolve to put the
prince to death), it is only the solitary plotter who
escapes the first of these three stages of danger.
For he runs no risk before executing his design, since
as he imparts it to none, there is none to bring it
to the ear of the prince. A deliberate resolve
like this may be conceived by a person in any rank
of life, high or low, base or noble, and whether or
no he be the familiar of his prince. For every
one must, at some time or other, have leave to speak
to the prince, and whoever has this leave has opportunity

Page 193

to accomplish his design. Pausanias, of whom
we have made mention so often, slew Philip of Macedon
as he walked between his son and his son-in-law to
the temple, surrounded by a thousand armed guards.
Pausanias indeed was noble, and known to the prince,
but Ferdinand of Spain was stabbed in the neck by a
poor and miserable Spaniard; and though the wound
was not mortal, it sufficed to show that neither courage
nor opportunity were wanting to the would-be-assassin.
A Dervish, or Turkish priest, drew his scimitar on
Bajazet, father of the Sultan now reigning, and if
he did not wound him, it was from no lack either of
daring or of opportunity. And I believe that
there are many who in their minds desire the deed,
no punishment or danger attending the mere wish, though
there be but few who dare do it. For since few
or none who venture, escape death, few are willing
to go forward to certain destruction.

But to pass from these solitary attempts to those
in which several are engaged, I affirm it to be shown
by history that all such plots have been contrived
by men of great station, or by those who have been
on terms of close intimacy with the prince, since
no others, not being downright madmen, would ever
think of conspiring. For men of humble rank,
and such as are not the intimates of their prince,
are neither fed by the hopes nor possessed of the
opportunities essential for such attempts. Because,
in the first place, men of low degree will never find
any to keep faith with them, none being moved to join
in their schemes by those expectations which encourage
men to run great risks; wherefore, so soon as their
design has been imparted to two or three, they are
betrayed and ruined. Or, assuming them fortunate
enough to have no traitor of their number, they will
be so hampered in the execution of their plot by the
want of easy access to the prince, that they are sure
to perish in the mere attempt. For if even men
of great position, who have ready access to the prince,
succumb to the difficulties which I shall presently
notice, those difficulties must be infinitely increased
in the case of men who are without these advantages.
And because when life and property are at stake men
are not utterly reckless, on perceiving themselves
to be weak they grow cautious, and though cursing
the tyrant in their hearts, are content to endure him,
and to wait until some one of higher station than
they, comes forward to redress their wrongs.
So that should we ever find these weaklings attempting
anything, we may commend their courage rather than
their prudence.

We see, however, that the great majority of conspirators
have been persons of position and the familiars of
their prince, and that their plots have been as often
the consequence of excessive indulgence as of excessive
injury; as when Perennius conspired against Commodus,
Plautianus against Severus, and Sejanus against Tiberius;
all of whom had been raised by their masters to such
wealth, honours, and dignities, that nothing seemed
wanting to their authority save the imperial name.
That they might not lack this also, they fell to conspiring
against their prince; but in every instance their
conspiracies had the end which their ingratitude deserved.

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The only instance in recent times of such attempts
succeeding, is the conspiracy of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano
against Messer Piero Gambacorti, lord of Pisa.
For Jacopo, who had been bred and brought up by Piero,
and loaded by him with honours, deprived him of his
State. Similar to this, in our own days, was
the conspiracy of Coppola against King Ferdinand of
Aragon. For Coppola had reached such a pitch of
power that he seemed to himself to have everything
but sovereignty; in seeking to obtain which he lost
his life; though if any plot entered into by a man
of great position could be expected to succeed, this
certainly might, being contrived, as we may say, by
another king, and by one who had the amplest opportunities
for its accomplishment. But that lust of power
which blinds men to dangers darkened the minds of those
to whom the execution of the scheme was committed;
who, had they only known how to add prudence to their
villainy, could hardly have missed their aim.

The prince, therefore, who would guard himself against
plots, ought more to fear those men to whom he has
been too indulgent, than those to whom he has done
great wrongs. For the latter lack opportunities
which the former have in abundance; and the moving
cause is equally strong in both, lust of power being
at least as strong a passion as lust of revenge.
Wherefore, a prince should entrust his friends with
so much authority only as leaves a certain interval
between his position and theirs; that between the
two something be still left them to desire. Otherwise
it will be strange if he do not fare like those princes
who have been named above.

But to return from this digression, I say, that having
shown it to be necessary that conspirators should
be men of great station, and such as have ready access
to the prince, we have next to consider what have been
the results of their plots, and to trace the causes
which have made them succeed or fail. Now, as
I have said already, we find that conspiracies are
attended by danger at three stages: before during,
and after their execution; for which reason very few
of them have had a happy issue; it being next to impossible
to surmount all these different dangers successfully.
And to begin with those which are incurred beforehand,
and which are graver than all the rest, I say that
he must be both very prudent and very fortunate who,
when contriving a conspiracy, does not suffer his
secret to be discovered.

Conspiracies are discovered either by disclosures
made, or by conjecture. Disclosures are made
through the treachery or folly of those to whom you
communicate your design. Treachery is to be looked
for, because you can impart your plans only to such
persons as you believe ready to face death on your
behalf, or to those who are discontented with the
prince. Of men whom you can trust thus implicitly,
one or two may be found; but when you have to open
your designs to many, they cannot all be of this nature;

Page 195

and their goodwill towards you must be extreme if
they are not daunted by the danger and by fear of punishment.
Moreover men commonly deceive themselves in respect
of the love which they imagine others bear them, nor
can ever be sure of it until they have put it to the
proof. But to make proof of it in a matter like
this is very perilous; and even if you have proved
it already, and found it true in some other dangerous
trial, you cannot assume that there will be the same
fidelity here, since this far transcends every other
kind of danger. Again, if you gauge a man’s
fidelity by his discontent with the prince, you may
easily deceive yourself; for so soon as you have taken
this discontented man into your confidence, you have
supplied him with the means whereby he may become
contented; so that either his hatred of the prince
must be great indeed, or your influence over him extraordinary,
if it keep him faithful. Hence it comes that so
many conspiracies have been discovered and crushed
in their earliest stage, and that when the secret
is preserved among many accomplices for any length
of time, it is looked on as a miracle; as in the case
of the conspiracy of Piso against Nero, and, in our
own days, in that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and
Giuliano de’ Medici; which last, though more
than fifty persons were privy to it, was not discovered
until it came to be carried out.

Conspiracies are disclosed through the imprudence
of a conspirator when he talks so indiscreetly that
some servant, or other person not in the plot, overhears
him; as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, when
treating with the envoys of Tarquin, were overheard
by a slave, who became their accuser; or else through
your own weakness in imparting your secret to some
woman or boy whom you love, or to some other such
light person; as when Dymnus, who was one of those
who conspired with Philotas against Alexander the
Great, revealed the plot to Nicomachus, a youth whom
he loved, who at once told Cebalinus, and Cebalinus
the king.

Of discoveries by conjecture we have an instance in
the conspiracy of Piso against Nero; for Scaevinus,
one of the conspirators, the day before he was to
kill Nero, made his will, liberated all his slaves
and gave them money, and bade Milichus, his freedman,
sharpen his old rusty dagger, and have bandages ready
for binding up wounds. From all which preparations
Milichus conjecturing what work was in hand, accused
Scaevinus before Nero; whereupon Scaevinus was arrested,
and with him Natalis, another of the conspirators,
who the day before had been seen to speak with him
for a long time in private; and when the two differed
in their account of what then passed between them,
they were put to the torture and forced to confess
the truth. In this way the conspiracy was brought
to light, to the ruin of all concerned.

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Against these causes of the discovery of conspiracies
it is impossible so to guard as that either through
treachery, want of caution, or levity, the secret
shall not be found out, whenever more than three or
four persons are privy to it. And whenever more
than one conspirator is arrested, the plot is certain
to be detected, because no two persons can perfectly
agree in a false account of what has passed between
them. If only one be taken, should he be a man
of resolute courage, he may refuse to implicate his
comrades; but they on their part must have no less
courage, to stay quiet where they are, and not betray
themselves by flight; for if courage be absent anywhere,
whether in him who is taken or in those still at large,
the conspiracy is revealed. And what is related
by Titus Livius as having happened in the conspiracy
against Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, is most extraordinary,
namely, that on the capture of one of the conspirators,
named Theodorus, he, with great fortitude, withheld
the names of all his accomplices, and accused friends
of the tyrant; while his companions, on their part,
trusted so completely in his courage, that not one
of them quitted Syracuse or showed any sign of fear.

All these dangers, therefore, which attend the contrivance
of a plot, must be passed through before you come
to its execution; or if you would escape them, you
must observe the following precautions: Your first
and surest, nay, to say truth, your only safeguard,
is to leave your accomplices no time to accuse you;
for which reason you must impart the affair to them,
only at the moment when you mean it to be carried out,
and not before. Those who have followed this course
have wholly escaped the preliminary dangers of conspiracies,
and, generally speaking, the others also; indeed,
I may say that they have all succeeded, and that it
is open to every prudent man to act as they did.
It will be enough to give two instances of plots effected
in this way. Nelematus, unable to endure the
tyranny of Aristotimus, despot of Epirus, assembling
many of his friends and kinsmen in his house, exhorted
them to free their country; and when some of them
asked for time to consider and mature their plans,
he bade his slaves close the doors, and told those
assembled that unless they swore to go at once and
do as he directed he would make them over to Aristotimus
as prisoners. Alarmed by his threats, they bound
themselves by a solemn oath, and going forth at once
and without delay, successfully carried out his bidding.
A certain Magus having fraudulently usurped the throne
of Persia; Ortanes, a grandee of that realm, discovering
the fraud, disclosed it to six others of the chief
nobility, telling them that it behoved them to free
the kingdom from the tyranny of this impostor.
And when some among them asked for time, Darius, who
was one of the six summoned by Ortanes, stood up and
said, “Either we go at once to do this deed,
or I go to the Magus to accuse you all.”

Page 197

Whereupon, all rising together, without time given
to any to change his mind, they went forth and succeeded
in effecting their end. Not unlike these instances
was the plan taken by the Etolians to rid themselves
of Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, to whom, under pretence
of succouring him, they sent Alasamenes, their fellow-citizen,
with two hundred foot soldiers and thirty horsemen.
For they imparted their real design to Alasamenes
only, charging the rest, under pain of exile, to obey
him in whatever he commanded. Alasamenes repaired
to Sparta, and never divulged his commission till
the time came for executing it; and so succeeded in
putting Nabis to death.

It was, therefore, by the precautions they observed,
that the persons of whom I have just now spoken escaped
all those perils that attend the contrivance of conspiracies;
and any following their example may expect the like
good fortune. And that all may learn to do as
they did I shall notice the case of Piso, of which
mention has before been made. By reason of his
rank, his reputation, and the intimate terms on which
he lived with Nero, who trusted him without reserve,
and would often come to his garden to sup with him,
Piso was able to gain the friendship of many persons
of spirit and courage, and well fitted in every way
to take part in his plot against the emperor, which,
under these circumstances, might easily have been
carried out. For when Nero came to his garden,
Piso could readily have communicated his design to
those friends of his, and with suitable words have
encouraged them to do what, in fact, they would not
have had time to withdraw from, and was certain to
succeed. And were we to examine all similar attempts,
it would be seen that there are few which might not
have been effected in the manner shown. But since
most men are very ignorant of practical affairs, they
commit the gravest blunders, especially in matters
which lie, as this does, a little way out of the beaten
track.

Wherefore, the contriver of a plot ought never, if
he can help it, to communicate his design until the
moment when it is to be executed; or if he must communicate
it, then to some one man only, with whom he has long
been intimate, and whom he knows to be moved by the
same feelings as himself. To find one such person
is far easier than to find several, and, at the same
time, involves less risk; for though this one man play
you false, you are not left altogether without resource,
as you are when your accomplices are numerous.
For I have heard it shrewdly said that to one man
you may impart anything, since, unless you have been
led to commit yourself by writing, your denial will
go as far as his assertion. Shun writing, therefore,
as you would a rock, for there is nothing so damning
as a letter under your own hand.

Page 198

Plautianus, desiring to procure the deaths of the
Emperor Severus and his son Caracalla, intrusted the
business to the tribune Saturninus, who, being more
disposed to betray than obey Plautianus, but at the
same time afraid that, if it came to laying a charge,
Plautianus might be believed sooner than he, asked
him for a written authority, that his commission might
be credited. Blinded by ambition, Plautianus complied,
and forthwith was accused by Saturninus and found guilty;
whereas, but for that written warrant, together with
other corroborating proofs, he must have escaped by
his bold denial of the charge. Against the testimony
of a single witness, you have thus some defence, unless
convicted by your own handwriting, or by other circumstantial
proof against which you must guard. A woman,
named Epicharis, who had formerly been a mistress
of Nero, was privy to Piso’s conspiracy, and
thinking it might be useful to have the help of a
certain captain of triremes whom Nero had among his
body-guards, she acquainted him with the plot, but
not with the names of the plotters. This fellow,
turning traitor, and accusing Epicharis to Nero, so
stoutly did she deny the charge, that Nero, confounded
by her effrontery, let her go.

In imparting a plot to a single person there are,
therefore, two risks: one, that he may come forward
of his own accord to accuse you; the other, that if
arrested on suspicion, or on some proof of his guilt,
he may, on being convicted, in the hope to escape
punishment, betray you. But in neither of these
dangers are you left without a defence; since you
may meet the one by ascribing the charge to the malice
of your accuser, and the other by alleging that the
witness his been forced by torture to say what is
untrue. The wisest course, however, is to impart
your design to none, but to act like those who have
been mentioned above; or if you impart it, then to
one only: for although even in this course there
be a certain degree of danger, it is far less than
when many are admitted to your confidence.

A case nearly resembling that just now noticed, is
where an emergency, so urgent as to leave you no time
to provide otherwise for your safety, constrains you
to do to a prince what you see him minded to do to
you. A necessity of this sort leads almost always
to the end desired, as two instances may suffice to
show. Among the closest friends and intimates
of the Emperor Commodus, were two captains of the pretorian
guards, Letus and Electus, while among the most favoured
of his distresses was a certain Martia. But because
these three often reproved him for his manner of living,
as disgraceful to himself and to his station, he resolved
to rid himself of them; and so wrote their names, along
with those of certain others whom he meant should
be put to death the next night, in a list which he
placed under the pillow of his bed. But on his
going to bathe, a boy, who was a favourite of his,
while playing about his room and on his bed, found
the list, and coming out of the chamber with it in
his hand, was met by Martia, who took it from him,
and on reading it and finding what it contained, sent
for Letus and Electus. And all three recognizing
the danger in which they stood, resolved to be beforehand
with the tyrant, and losing no time, murdered him that
very night.

Page 199

The Emperor Caracalla, being with his armies in Mesopotamia,
had with him Macrinus, who was more of a statesman
than a soldier, as his prefect. But because princes
who are not themselves good are always afraid lest
others treat them as they deserve, Caracalla wrote
to his friend Maternianus in Rome to learn from the
astrologers whether any man had ambitious designs
upon the empire, and to send him word. Maternianus,
accordingly, wrote back that such designs were entertained
by Macrinus. But this letter, ere it reached the
emperor, fell into the hands of Macrinus, who, seeing
when he read it that he must either put Caracalla
to death before further letters arrived from Rome,
or else die himself, committed the business to a centurion,
named Martialis, whom he trusted, and whose brother
had been slain by Caracalla a few days before, who
succeeded in killing the emperor.

We see, therefore, that an urgency which leaves no
room for delay has almost the same results as the
method already noticed as followed by Nelematus of
Epirus. We see, too, what I remarked almost at
the outset of this Discourse, that the threats of
princes expose them to greater danger than the wrongs
they actually inflict, and lead to more active conspiracies:
and, therefore, that a prince should be careful not
to threaten; since men are either to be treated kindly
or else got rid of, but never brought to such a pass
that they have to choose between slaying and being
slain.

As to the dangers attending the execution of plots,
these result either from some change made in the plan,
or from a failure in courage on the part of him who
is to carry it out; or else from some mistake he falls
into through want of foresight, or from his not giving
the affair its finishing stroke, as when some are
left alive whom it was meant to put to death.
Now, nothing causes so much disturbance and hindrance
in human affairs, as to be forced, at a moment’s
notice and without time allowed for reflection, to
vary your plan of action and adopt a different one
from that fixed on at the first. And if such changes
cause confusion anywhere, it is in matters appertaining
to war, and in enterprises of the kind we are now
speaking of; for in such affairs as these, there is
nothing so essential as that men be prepared to do
the exact thing intrusted to them. But when men
have for many days together turned their whole thoughts
to doing a thing in a certain way and in a certain
order, and the way and order are suddenly altered,
it is impossible but that they should be disconcerted
and the whole scheme ruined. For which reason,
it is far better to do everything in accordance with
the preconcerted plan, though it be seen to be attended
with some disadvantages, than, in order to escape
these, to involve yourself in an infinity of dangers.
And this will happen when you depart from your original
design without time given to form a new one. For
when time is given you may manage as you please.

Page 200

The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano
de’ Medici is well known. The scheme agreed
on was to give a banquet to the Cardinal S. Giorgio,
at which the brothers should be put to death.
To each of the conspirators a part was assigned:
to one the murder, to another the seizure of the palace,
while a third was to ride through the streets and
call on the people to free themselves. But it
so chanced that at a time when the Pazzi, the Medici,
and the Cardinal were all assembled in the cathedral
church of Florence to hear High Mass, it became known
that Giuliano would not be present at the banquet;
whereupon the conspirators, laying their heads together,
resolved to do in church what they were to have done
elsewhere. This, however, deranged the whole
scheme. For Giovambattista of Montesecco, would
have no hand in the murder if it was to be done in
a church; and the whole distribution of parts had
in consequence to be changed; when, as those to whom
the new parts were assigned had no time allowed them
to nerve their minds to their new tasks, they managed
matters so badly that they were overpowered in their
attempt.

Courage fails a conspirator either from his own poorness
of spirit, or from his being overcome by some feeling
of reverence. For such majesty and awe attend
the person of a prince, that it may well happen that
he softens or dismays his executioners. When
Caius Marius was taken by the people of Minturnum,
the slave sent in to slay him, overawed by the bearing
of the man, and by the memories which his name called
up, became unnerved, and powerless to perform his
office. And if this influence was exercised by
one who was a prisoner, and in chains, and overwhelmed
by adverse fortune, how much more must reverence be
inspired by a prince who is free and uncontrolled,
surrounded by his retinue and by all the pomp and
splendour of his station; whose dignity confounds,
and whose graciousness conciliates.

Certain persons conspiring against Sitalces, king
of Thrace, fixed a day for his murder, and assembled
at the place appointed, whither the king had already
come. Yet none of them raised a hand to harm him,
and all departed without attempting anything against
him or knowing why they refrained; each blaming the
others. And more than once the same folly was
repeated, until the plot getting wind, they were taken
and punished for what they might have done, yet durst
not do.

Two brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara, conspired
against him, employing as their tool a certain priest
named Giennes, a singing-man in the service of the
Duke. He, at their request, repeatedly brought
the Duke into their company, so that they had full
opportunity to make away with him. Yet neither
of them ever ventured to strike the blow; till at
last, their scheme being discovered, they paid the
penalty of their combined cowardice and temerity.
Such irresolution can only have arisen from their
being overawed by the majesty of the prince, or touched
by his graciousness.

Page 201

In the execution of conspiracies, therefore, errors
and mishaps arise from a failure of prudence or courage
to which all are subject, when, losing self-control,
they are led in their bewilderment to do and say what
they ought not. That men are thus confounded,
and thrown off their balance, could not be better
shown than in the words of Titus Livius, where he
describes the behaviour of Alasamenes the Etolian,
at the time when he resolved on the death of Nabis
the Spartan, of whom I have spoken before. For
when the time to act came, and he had disclosed to
his followers what they had to do, Livius represents
him as “collecting his thoughts which had
grown confused by dwelling on so desperate an enterprise.”
For it is impossible for any one, though of the most
steadfast temper and used to the sight of death and
to handle deadly weapons, not to be perturbed at such
a moment. For which reason we should on such
occasions choose for our tools those who have had
experience in similar affairs, and trust no others
though reputed of the truest courage. For in
these grave undertakings, no one who is without such
experience, however bold and resolute, is to be trusted.

The confusion of which I speak may either cause you
to drop your weapon from your hand, or to use words
which will have the same results. Quintianus
being commanded by Lucilla, sister of Commodus, to
slay him, lay in wait for him at the entrance of the
amphitheatre, and rushing upon him with a drawn dagger,
cried out, “The senate sends you this;”
which words caused him to be seized before his blow
descended. In like manner Messer Antonio of Volterra,
who as we have elsewhere seen was told off to kill
Lorenzo de’ Medici, exclaimed as he approached
him, “Ah traitor!” and this exclamation
proved the salvation of Lorenzo and the ruin of that
conspiracy.

For the reasons now given, a conspiracy against a
single ruler may readily break down in its execution;
but a conspiracy against two rulers is not only difficult,
but so hazardous that its success is almost hopeless.
For to effect like actions, at the same time, in different
places, is well-nigh impossible; nor can they be effected
at different times, if you would not have one counteract
another. So that if conspiracy against a single
ruler be imprudent and dangerous, to conspire against
two, is in the last degree fool-hardy and desperate.
And were it not for the respect in which I hold the
historian, I could not credit as possible what Herodian
relates of Plautianus, namely, that he committed to
the centurion Saturninus the task of slaying single-handed
both Severus and Caracalla, they dwelling in different
places; for the thing is so opposed to reason that
on no other authority could I be induced to accept
it as true.

Page 202

Certain young Athenians conspired against Diocles
and Hippias, tyrants of Athens. Diocles they
slew; but Hippias, making his escape, avenged him.
Chion and Leonidas of Heraclea, disciples of Plato,
conspired against the despots Clearchus and Satirus.
Clearchus fell, but Satirus survived and avenged him.
The Pazzi, of whom we have spoken so often, succeeded
in murdering Giuliano only. From such conspiracies,
therefore, as are directed against more heads than
one, all should abstain; for no good is to be got
from them, whether for ourselves, for our country,
or for any one else. On the contrary, when those
conspired against escape, they become harsher and
more unsufferable than before, as, in the examples
given, Florence, Athens, and Heraclea had cause to
know. True it is that the conspiracy contrived
by Pelopidas for the liberation of his country, had
to encounter every conceivable hindrance, and yet had
the happiest end. For Pelopidas had to deal, not
with two tyrants only, but with ten; and so far from
having their confidence, could not, being an outlaw,
even approach them. And yet he succeeded in coming
to Thebes, in putting the tyrants to death, and in
freeing his country. But whatever he did was
done with the aid of one of the counsellors of the
tyrants, a certain Charon, through whom he had all
facilities for executing his design. Let none,
however, take this case as a pattern; for that it
was in truth a desperate attempt, and its success a
marvel, was and is the opinion of all historians,
who speak of it as a thing altogether extraordinary
and unexampled.

The execution of a plot may be frustrated by some
groundless alarm or unforeseen mischance occurring
at the very moment when the scheme is to be carried
out. On the morning on which Brutus and his confederates
were to slay Caesar, it so happened that Caesar talked
for a great while with Cneus Pompilius Lenas, one
of the conspirators; which some of the others observing,
were in terror that Pompilius was divulging the conspiracy
to Caesar; whose life they would therefore have attempted
then and there, without waiting his arrival in the
senate house, had they not been reassured by seeing
that when the conference ended he showed no sign of
unusual emotion. False alarms of this sort are
to be taken into account and allowed for, all the
more that they are easily raised. For he who
has not a clear conscience is apt to assume that others
are speaking of him. A word used with a wholly
different purpose, may throw his mind off its balance
and lead him to fancy that reference is intended to
the matter he is engaged on, and cause him either
to betray the conspiracy by flight, or to derange
its execution by anticipating the time fixed.
And the more there are privy to the conspiracy, the
likelier is this to happen.

Page 203

As to the mischances which may befall, since these
are unforeseen, they can only be instanced by examples
which may make men more cautious. Giulio Belanti
of Siena, of whom I have spoken before, from the hate
he bore Pandolfo Petrucci, who had given him his daughter
to wife and afterwards taken her from him, resolved
to murder him, and thus chose his time. Almost
every day Pandolfo went to visit a sick kinsman, passing
the house of Giulio on the way, who, remarking this,
took measures to have his accomplices ready in his
house to kill Pandolfo as he passed. Wherefore,
placing the rest armed within the doorway, one he
stationed at a window to give the signal of Pandolfo’s
approach. It so happened however, that as he
came nigh the house, and after the look-out had given
the signal, Pandolfo fell in with a friend who stopped
him to converse; when some of those with him, going
on in advance, saw and heard the gleam and clash of
weapons, and so discovered the ambuscade; whereby
Pandolfo was saved, while Giulio with his companions
had to fly from Siena. This plot accordingly
was marred, and Giulio’s schemes baulked, in
consequence of a chance meeting. Against such
accidents, since they are out of the common course
of things, no provision can be made. Still it
is very necessary to take into account all that may
happen, and devise what remedies you can.

It now only remains for us to consider those dangers
which follow after the execution of a plot. These
in fact resolve themselves into one, namely, that
some should survive who will avenge the death of the
murdered prince. The part of avenger is likely
to be assumed by a son, a brother, or other kinsman
of the deceased, who in the ordinary course of events
might have looked to succeed to the princedom.
And such persons are suffered to live, either from
inadvertence, or from some of the causes noted already,
as when Giovann’ Andrea of Lampognano, with the
help of his companions, put to death the Duke of Milan.
For the son and two brothers of the Duke, who survived
him, were able to avenge his death. In cases
like this, indeed, the conspirators may be held excused,
since there is nothing they can do to help themselves.
But when from carelessness and want of due caution
some one is allowed to live whose death ought to have
been secured, there is no excuse. Certain conspirators,
after murdering the lord, Count Girolamo of Forli,
made prisoners of his wife and of his children who
were still very young. By thinking they could
not be safe unless they got possession of the citadel,
which the governor refused to surrender, they obtained
a promise from Madonna Caterina, for so the Countess
was named, that on their permitting her to enter the
citadel she would cause it to be given up to them,
her children in the mean time remaining with them as
hostages. On which undertaking they suffered her
to enter the citadel. But no sooner had she got
inside than she fell to upbraid them from the walls
with the murder of her husband, and to threaten them
with every kind of vengeance; and to show them how
little store she set upon her children, told them
scoffingly that she knew how others could be got.
In the end, the rebels having no leader to advise
them, and perceiving too late the error into which
they had been betrayed, had to pay the penalty of
their rashness by perpetual banishment.

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But of all the dangers which may follow on the execution
of a plot, none is so much or so justly to be feared
as that the people should be well affected to the
prince whom you have put to death. For against
this danger conspirators have no resource which can
ensure their safety. Of this we have example
in the case of Caesar, who as he had the love of the
Roman people was by them avenged; for they it was who,
by driving out the conspirators from Rome, were the
cause that all of them, at different times and in
different places, came to violent ends.

Conspiracies against their country are less danger
for those who take part in them than conspiracies
against princes; since there is less risk beforehand,
and though there be the same danger in their execution,
there is none afterwards. Beforehand, the risks
are few, because a citizen may use means for obtaining
power without betraying his wishes or designs to any;
and unless his course be arrested, his designs are
likely enough to succeed; nay, though laws be passed
to restrain him, he may strike out a new path.
This is to be understood of a commonwealth which has
to some degree become corrupted; for in one wherein
there is no taint of corruption, there being no soil
in which evil seed can grow, such designs will never
suggest themselves to any citizen.

In a commonwealth, therefore, a citizen may by many
means and in many ways aspire to the princedom without
risking destruction, both because republics are slower
than princes are to take alarm, are less suspicious
and consequently less cautious, and because they look
with greater reverence upon their great citizens,
who are in this way rendered bolder and more reckless
in attacking them. Any one who has read Sallust’s
account of the conspiracy of Catiline, must remember
how, when that conspiracy was discovered, Catiline
not only remained in Rome, but even made his appearance
in the senatehouse, where he was suffered to address
the senate in the most insulting terms,—­so
scrupulous was that city in protecting the liberty
of all its citizens. Nay, even after he had left
Rome and placed himself at the head of his army, Lentulus
and his other accomplices would not have been imprisoned,
had not letters been found upon them clearly establishing
their guilt. Hanno, the foremost citizen of Carthage,
aspiring to absolute power, on the occasion of the
marriage of a daughter contrived a plot for administering
poison to the whole senate and so making himself prince.
The scheme being discovered, the senate took no steps
against him beyond passing a law to limit the expense
of banquets and marriage ceremonies. So great
was the respect they paid to his quality.

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True, the execution of a plot against your
country is attended with greater difficulty and danger,
since it seldom happens that, in conspiring against
so many, your own resources are sufficient by themselves;
for it is not every one who, like Caesar, Agathocles,
or Cleomenes, is at the head of an army, so as to
be able at a stroke, and by open force to make himself
master of his country. To such as these, doubtless,
the path is safe and easy enough; but others who have
not such an assembled force ready at their command,
must effect their ends either by stratagem and fraud,
or with the help of foreign troops. Of such stratagems
and frauds we have an instance in the case of Pisistratus
the Athenian, who after defeating the Megarians and
thereby gaining the favour of his fellow-citizens,
showed himself to them one morning covered with wounds
and blood, declaring that he had been thus outraged
through the jealousy of the nobles, and asking that
he might have an armed guard assigned for his protection.
With the authority which this lent him, he easily
rose to such a pitch of power as to become tyrant
of Athens. In like manner Pandolfo Petrucci, on
his return with the other exiles to Siena, was appointed
the command of the public guard, as a mere office
of routine which others had declined. Very soon,
however, this armed force gave him so much importance
that he became the supreme ruler of the State.
And many others have followed other plans and methods,
and in the course of time, and without incurring danger,
have achieved their aim.

Conspirators against their country, whether trusting
to their own forces or to foreign aid, have had more
or less success in proportion as they have been favoured
by Fortune. Catiline, of whom we spoke just now,
was overthrown. Hanno, who has also been mentioned,
failing to accomplish his object by poison, armed
his partisans to the number of many thousands; but
both he and they came to an ill end. On the other
hand, certain citizens of Thebes conspiring to become
its tyrants, summoned a Spartan army to their assistance,
and usurped the absolute control of the city.
In short, if we examine all the conspiracies which
men have engaged in against their country, we shall
find that few or none have been quelled in their inception,
but that all have either succeeded, or have broken
down in their execution. Once executed, they entail
no further risks beyond those implied in the nature
of a princedom. For the man who becomes a tyrant
incurs all the natural and ordinary dangers in which
a tyranny involves him, and has no remedies against
them save those of which I have already spoken.

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This is all that occurs to me to say on the subject
of conspiracies. If I have noticed those which
have been carried out with the sword rather than those
wherein poison has been the instrument, it is because,
generally speaking, the method of proceeding is the
same in both. It is true, nevertheless, that
conspiracies which are to be carried out by poison
are, by reason of their uncertainty, attended by greater
danger. For since fewer opportunities offer for
their execution, you must have an understanding with
persons who can command opportunities. But it
is dangerous to have to depend on others. Again,
many causes may hinder a poisoned draught from proving
mortal; as when the murderers of Commodus, on his
vomiting the poison given him, had to strangle him.

Princes, then, have no worse enemy than conspiracy,
for when a conspiracy is formed against them, it either
carries them off, or discredits them: since,
if it succeeds, they die; while, if it be discovered,
and the conspirators be put to death themselves, it
will always be believed that the whole affair has
been trumped up by the prince that he might glut his
greed and cruelty with the goods and blood of those
whom he has made away with. Let me not, however,
forget to warn the prince or commonwealth against
whom a conspiracy is directed, that on getting word
of it, and before taking any steps to punish it, they
endeavour, as far as they can, to ascertain its character,
and after carefully weighing the strength of the conspirators
with their own, on finding it preponderate, never
suffer their knowledge of the plot to appear until
they are ready with a force sufficient to crush it.
For otherwise, to disclose their knowledge will only
give the signal for their destruction. They must
strive therefore to seem unconscious of what is going
on; for conspirators who see themselves detected are
driven forward by necessity and will stick at nothing.
Of this precaution we have an example in Roman history,
when the officers of the two legions, who, as has
already been mentioned, were left behind to defend
the Capuans from the Samnites, conspired together against
the Capuans. For on rumours of this conspiracy
reaching Rome, Rutilius the new consul was charged
to see to it; who, not to excite the suspicions of
the conspirators, publicly gave out that by order of
the senate the Capuan legions were continued in their
station. The conspirators believing this, and
thinking they would have ample time to execute their
plans, made no effort to hasten matters, but remained
at their ease, until they found that the consul was
moving one of the two legions to a distance from the
other. This arousing their suspicion, led them
to disclose their designs and endeavour to carry them
out.

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Now, we could have no more instructive example than
this in whatever way we look at it. For it shows
how slow men are to move in those matters wherein
time seems of little importance, and how active they
become when necessity urges them. Nor can a prince
or commonwealth desiring for their own ends to retard
the execution of a conspiracy, use any more effectual
means to do so, than by artfully holding out to the
conspirators some special opportunity as likely soon
to present itself; awaiting which, and believing they
have time and to spare for what they have to do, they
will afford that prince or commonwealth all the leisure
needed to prepare for their punishment. Whosoever
neglects these precautions hastens his own destruction,
as happened with the Duke of Athens, and with Guglielmo
de’ Pazzi. For the Duke, who had made himself
tyrant of Florence, on learning that he was being conspired
against, without further inquiry into the matter,
caused one of the conspirators to be seized; whereupon
the rest at once armed themselves and deprived him
of his government. Guglielmo, again, being commissary
in the Val di Chiana in the year 1501, and learning
that a conspiracy was being hatched in Arezzo to take
the town from the Florentines and give it over to
the Vitelli, repaired thither with all haste; and without
providing himself with the necessary forces or giving
a thought to the strength of the conspirators, on
the advice of the bishop, his son, had one of them
arrested. Which becoming known to the others,
they forthwith rushed to arms, and taking the town
from the Florentines, made Guglielmo their prisoner.
Where, however, conspiracies are weak, they may and
should be put down without scruple or hesitation.

Two methods, somewhat opposed to one another, which
have occasionally been followed in dealing with conspiracies,
are in no way to be commended. One of these was
that adopted by the Duke of Athens, of whom I have
just now spoken, who to have it thought that he confided
in the goodwill of the Florentines, caused a certain
man who gave information of a plot against him, to
be put to death. The other was that followed
by Dion the Syracusan, who, to sound the intentions
of one whom he suspected, arranged with Calippus,
whom he trusted, to pretend to get up a conspiracy
against him. Neither of these tyrants reaped any
advantage from the course he followed. For the
one discouraged informers and gave heart to those
who were disposed to conspire, the other prepared an
easy road to his own death, or rather was prime mover
in a conspiracy against himself. As the event
showed. For Calippus having free leave to plot
against Dion, plotted to such effect, that he deprived
him at once of his State and life.

CHAPTER VII.—­Why it is that changes
from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom,
are sometimes made without Bloodshed, but at other
times reek with Blood.

Page 208

Since we find from history that in the countless changes
which have been made from freedom to servitude and
from servitude to freedom, sometimes an infinite multitude
have perished, while at others not a soul has suffered
(as when Rome made her change from kings to consuls,
on which occasion none was banished save Tarquin,
and no harm was done to any other), it may perhaps
be asked, how it happens that of these revolutions,
some have been attended by bloodshed and others not.

The answer I take to be this. The government
which suffers change either has or has not had its
beginning in violence. And since the government
which has its beginning in violence must start by inflicting
injuries on many, it must needs happen that on its
downfall those who were injured will desire to avenge
themselves; from which desire for vengeance the slaughter
and death of many will result. But when a government
originates with, and derives its authority from the
whole community, there is no reason why the community,
if it withdraw that authority, should seek to injure
any except the prince from whom it withdraws it.
Now the government of Rome was of this nature, and
the expulsion of the Tarquins took place in this way.
Of a like character was the government of the Medici
in Florence, and, accordingly, upon their overthrow
in the year 1494, no injury was done to any save themselves.

In such cases, therefore, the changes I speak of do
not occasion any very great danger. But the changes
wrought by men who have wrongs to revenge, are always
of a most dangerous kind, and such, to say the least,
as may well cause dismay in the minds of those who
read of them. But since history abounds with
instances of such changes I need say no more about
them.

CHAPTER VIII.—­That he who would effect Changes in a Commonwealth, must
give heed to its Character and Condition

I have said before that a bad citizen cannot work
grave mischief in a commonwealth which has not become
corrupted. This opinion is not only supported
by the arguments already advanced, but is further confirmed
by the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus.
For Spurius, being ambitious, and desiring to obtain
extraordinary authority in Rome, and to win over the
people by loading them with benefits (as, for instance,
by selling them those lands which the Romans had taken
from the Hernici,) his designs were seen through by
the senate, and laid him under such suspicion, that
when in haranguing the people he offered them the
money realized by the sale of the grain brought from
Sicily at the public expense, they would have none
of it, believing that he offered it as the price of
their freedom. Now, had the people been corrupted,
they would not have refused this bribe, but would
have opened rather than closed the way to the tyranny.

Page 209

The example of Manlius is still more striking.
For in his case we see what excellent gifts both of
mind and body, and what splendid services to his country
were afterwards cancelled by that shameful eagerness
to reign which we find bred in him by his jealousy
of the honours paid Camillus. For so darkened
did his mind become, that without reflecting what
were the institutions to which Rome was accustomed,
or testing the material he had to work on, when he
would have seen that it was still unfit to be moulded
to evil ends, he set himself to stir up tumults against
the senate and against the laws of his country.

And herein we recognize the excellence of this city
of Rome, and of the materials whereof it was composed.
For although the nobles were wont to stand up stoutly
for one another, not one of them stirred to succour
Manlius, and not one of his kinsfolk made any effort
on his behalf, so that although it was customary,
in the case of other accused persons, for their friends
to put on black and sordid raiment, with all the other
outward signs of grief, in order to excite pity for
the accused, none was seen to do any of these things
for Manlius. Even the tribunes of the people,
though constantly ready to promote whatever courses
seemed to favour the popular cause, and the more vehemently
the more they seemed to make against the nobles, in
this instance sided with the nobles to put down the
common enemy. Nay the very people themselves,
keenly alive to their own interests, and well disposed
towards any attempt to damage the nobles, though they
showed Manlius many proofs of their regard, nevertheless,
when he was cited by the tribunes to appear before
them and submit his cause for their decision, assumed
the part of judges and not of defenders, and without
scruple or hesitation sentenced him to die. Wherefore,
I think, that there is no example in the whole Roman
history which serves so well as this to demonstrate
the virtues of all ranks in that republic. For
not a man in the whole city bestirred himself to shield
a citizen endowed with every great quality, and who,
both publicly and privately, had done so much that
deserved praise. But in all, the love of country
outweighed every other thought, and all looked less
to his past deserts than to the dangers which his present
conduct threatened; from which to relieve themselves
they put him to death. “Such,”
says Livius, “was the fate of a man worthy
our admiration had he not been born in a free State.”

And here two points should be noted. The first,
that glory is to be sought by different methods in
a corrupt city, and in one which still preserves its
freedom. The second, which hardly differs from
the first, that in their actions, and especially in
matters of moment, men must have regard to times and
circumstances and adapt themselves thereto. For
those persons who from an unwise choice, or from natural
inclination, run counter to the times will for the

Page 210

most part live unhappily, and find all they undertake
issue in failure; whereas those who accommodate themselves
to the times are fortunate and successful. And
from the passage cited we may plainly infer, that
had Manlius lived in the days of Marius and Sylla,
when the body of the State had become corrupted, so
that he could have impressed it with the stamp of his
ambition, he might have had the same success as they
had, and as those others had who after them aspired
to absolute power; and, conversely, that if Sylla and
Marius had lived in the days of Manlius, they must
have broken down at the very beginning of their attempts.

For one man, by mischievous arts and measures, may
easily prepare the ground for the universal corruption
of a city; but no one man in his lifetime can carry
that corruption so far, as himself to reap the harvest;
or granting that one man’s life might be long
enough for this purpose, it would be impossible for
him, having regard to the ordinary habits of men,
who grow impatient and cannot long forego the gratification
of their desires, to wait until the corruption was
complete. Moreover, men deceive themselves in
respect of their own affairs, and most of all in respect
of those on which they are most bent; so that either
from impatience or from self-deception, they rush
upon undertakings for which the time is not ripe, and
so come to an ill end. Wherefore to obtain absolute
authority in a commonwealth and to destroy its liberties,
you must find the body of the State already corrupted,
and corrupted by a gradual wasting continued from generation
to generation; which, indeed, takes place necessarily,
unless, as has been already explained, the State be
often reinforced by good examples, or brought back
to its first beginnings by wise laws.

Manlius, therefore, would have been a rare and renowned
man had he been born in a corrupt city; and from his
example we see that citizens seeking to introduce
changes in the form of their government, whether in
favour of liberty or despotism, ought to consider what
materials they have to deal with, and then judge of
the difficulty of their task. For it is no less
arduous and dangerous to attempt to free a people disposed
to live in servitude, than to enslave a people who
desire to live free.

And because it has been said above, that in their
actions men must take into account the character of
the times in which they live, and guide themselves
accordingly, I shall treat this point more fully in
the following Chapter.

CHAPTER IX.—­That to enjoy constant good Fortune we must change with
the Times.

I have repeatedly noted that the good or bad fortune
of men depends on whether their methods of acting
accord with the character of the times. For we
see that in what they do some men act impulsively,
others warily and with caution. And because,
from inability to preserve the just mean, they in
both of these ways overstep the true limit, they commit
mistakes in one direction or the other. He, however,
will make fewest mistakes, and may expect to prosper
most, who, while following the course to which nature
inclines him, finds, as I have said, his method of
acting in accordance with the times in which he lives.

Page 211

All know that in his command of the Roman armies,
Fabius Maximus displayed a prudence and caution very
different from the audacity and hardihood natural
to his countrymen; and it was his good fortune that
his methods suited with the times. For Hannibal
coming into Italy in all the flush of youth and recent
success, having already by two defeats stripped Rome
of her best soldiers and filled her with dismay, nothing
could have been more fortunate for that republic than
to find a general able, by his deliberateness and
caution, to keep the enemy at bay. Nor, on the
other hand, could Fabius have fallen upon times better
suited to the methods which he used, and by which
he crowned himself with glory. That he acted
in accordance with his natural bent, and not from a
reasoned choice, we may gather from this, that when
Scipio, to bring the war to an end, proposed to pass
with his army into Africa, Fabius, unable to depart
from his characteristic methods and habits, strenuously
opposed him; so that had it rested with him, Hannibal
might never have left Italy. For he perceived
not that the times had changed, and that with them
it was necessary to change the methods of prosecuting
the war. Had Fabius, therefore, been King of
Rome, he might well have caused the war to end unhappily,
not knowing how to accommodate his methods to the
change in the times. As it was, he lived in a
commonwealth in which there were many citizens, and
many different dispositions; and which as it produced
a Fabius, excellent at a time when it was necessary
to protract hostilities, so also, afterwards gave
birth to a Scipio, at a time suited to bring them
to a successful close.

And hence it comes that a commonwealth endures longer,
and has a more sustained good fortune than a princedom,
because from the diversity in the characters of its
citizens, it can adapt itself better than a prince
can to the diversity of times. For, as I have
said before, a man accustomed to follow one method,
will never alter it; whence it must needs happen that
when times change so as no longer to accord with his
method, he will be ruined. Piero Soderini, of
whom I have already spoken, was guided in all his
actions by patience and gentleness, and he and his
country prospered while the times were in harmony with
these methods. But, afterwards, when a time came
when it behoved him to have done with patience and
gentleness, he knew not how to drop them, and was
ruined together with his country. Pope Julius
II., throughout the whole of his pontificate, was
governed by impulse and passion, and because the times
were in perfect accord, all his undertakings prospered.
But had other times come requiring other qualities,
he could not have escaped destruction, since he could
not have changed his methods nor his habitual line
of conduct.

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As to why such changes are impossible, two reasons
may be given. One is that we cannot act in opposition
to the bent of our nature. The other, that when
a man has been very successful while following a particular
method, he can never be convinced that it is for his
advantage to try some other. And hence it results
that a man’s fortunes vary, because times change
and he does not change with them. So, too, with
commonwealths, which, as we have already shown at length,
are ruined from not altering their institutions to
suit the times. And commonwealths are slower
to change than princes are, changes costing them more
effort; because occasions must be waited for which
shall stir the whole community, and it is not enough
that a single citizen alters his method of acting.

But since I have made mention of Fabius Maximus who
wore out Hannibal by keeping him at bay, I think it
opportune to consider in the following Chapter whether
a general who desires to engage his enemy at all risks,
can be prevented by that enemy from doing so.

CHAPTER X.—­That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy forces
it on him at all risks.

“Cneius Sulpitius when appointed dictator
against the Gauls, being unwilling to tempt Fortune
by attacking an enemy whom delay and a disadvantageous
position would every day render weaker, protracted
the war.”

When a mistake is made of a sort that all or most
men are likely to fall into, I think it not amiss
to mark it again and again with disapproval.
Wherefore, although I have already shown repeatedly
how in affairs of moment the actions of the moderns
conform not to those of antiquity, still it seems
to me not superfluous, in this place, to say the same
thing once more. For if in any particular the
moderns have deviated from the methods of the ancients,
it is especially in their methods of warfare, wherein
not one of those rules formerly so much esteemed is
now attended to. And this because both princes
and commonwealths have devolved the charge of such
matters upon others, and, to escape danger, have kept
aloof from all military service; so that although one
or another of the princes of our times may occasionally
be seen present in person with his army, we are not
therefore to expect from him any further praiseworthy
behaviour. For even where such personages take
part in any warlike enterprise, they do so out of
ostentation and from no nobler motive; though doubtless
from sometimes seeing their soldiers face to face,
and from retaining to themselves the title of command,
they are likely to make fewer blunders than we find
made by republics, and most of all by the republics
of Italy, which though altogether dependent upon others,
and themselves utterly ignorant of everything relating
to warfare, do yet, that they may figure as the commanders
of their armies, take upon them to direct their movements,
and in doing so commit countless mistakes; some of
which have been considered elsewhere but one is of
such importance as to deserve notice here.

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When these sluggard princes or effeminate republics
send forth any of their Captains, it seems to them
that the wisest instruction they can give him is to
charge him on no account to give battle, but, on the
contrary, to do what he can to avoid fighting.
Wherein they imagine themselves to imitate the prudence
of Fabius Maximus, who by protracting the war with
Hannibal, saved the Roman commonwealth; not perceiving
that in most instances such advice to a captain is
either useless or hurtful. For the truth of the
matter is, that a captain who would keep the field,
cannot decline battle when his adversary forces it
on him at all hazards. So that the instruction
to avoid battle is but tantamount to saying, “You
shall engage when it pleases your enemy, and not when
it suits yourself.” For if you would keep
the field and yet avoid battle, the only safe course
is to interpose a distance of at least fifty miles
between you and your enemy, and afterwards to maintain
so vigilant a look-out, that should he advance you
will have time to make your retreat. Another
method is to shut yourself up in some town. But
both of these methods are extremely disadvantageous.
For by following the former, you leave your country
a prey to the enemy, and a valiant prince would far
sooner risk the chances of battle than prolong a war
in a manner so disastrous to his subjects; while by
adopting the latter method, and shutting yourself
up in a town with your army, there is manifest danger
of your being besieged, and presently reduced by famine
and forced to surrender. Wherefore it is most
mischievous to seek to avoid battle in either of these
two ways.

To intrench yourself in a strong position, as Fabius
was wont to do, is a good method when your army is
so formidable that the enemy dare not advance to attack
you in your intrenchments; yet it cannot truly be said
that Fabius avoided battle, but rather that he sought
to give battle where he could do so with advantage.
For had Hannibal desired to fight, Fabius would have
waited for him and fought him. But Hannibal never
dared to engage him on his own ground. So that
an engagement was avoided as much by Hannibal as by
Fabius, since if either had been minded to fight at
all hazards the other would have been constrained to
take one of three courses, that is to say, one or
other of the two just now mentioned, or else to retreat.
The truth of this is confirmed by numberless examples,
and more particularly by what happened in the war
waged by the Romans against Philip of Macedon, the
father of Perseus. For Philip being invaded by
the Romans, resolved not to give them battle; and
to avoid battle, sought at first to do as Fabius had
done in Italy, posting himself on the summit of a
hill, where he intrenched himself strongly, thinking
that the Romans would not venture to attack him there.
But they advancing and attacking him in his intrenchments,
drove him from his position; when, unable to make further
resistance, he fled with the greater part of his army,
and was only saved from utter destruction by the difficulty
of the ground, which made it impossible for the Romans
to pursue him.

Page 214

Philip, therefore, who had no mind to fight, encamping
too near the Romans, was forced to fly; and learning
from this experience that to escape fighting it was
not enough for him to intrench himself on a hill,
yet not choosing to shut himself up in a walled town,
he was constrained to take the other alternative of
keeping at a distance of many miles from the Roman
legions. Accordingly, when the Romans entered
one province, he betook himself to another, and when
they left a province he entered it. But perceiving
that by protracting the war in this way, his condition
grew constantly worse, while his subjects suffered
grievously, now from his own troops, at another time
from those of the enemy, he at last resolved to hazard
battle, and so came to a regular engagement with the
Romans.

It is for your interest, therefore, not to fight,
when you possess the same advantages as Fabius, or
as Cneius Sulpitius had; in other words, when your
army is so formidable in itself that the enemy dare
not attack you in your intrenchments, and although
he has got within your territory has yet gained no
footing there, and suffers in consequence from the
want of necessary supplies. In such circumstances
delay is useful, for the reasons assigned by Titus
Livius when speaking of Sulpitius. In no other
circumstances, however, can an engagement be avoided
without dishonour or danger. For to retire as
Philip did, is nothing else than defeat; and the disgrace
is greater in proportion as your valour has been less
put to the proof. And if Philip was lucky enough
to escape, another, not similarly favoured by the
nature of the ground, might not have the same good
fortune.

That Hannibal was not a master in the arts of warfare
there is none will venture to maintain. Wherefore,
when he had to encounter Scipio in Africa, it may
be assumed that had he seen any advantage in prolonging
the war he would have done so; and, possibly, being
a skilful captain and in command of a valiant army,
he might have been able to do what Fabius did in Italy.
But since he took not that course, we may infer that
he was moved by sufficient reasons. For the captain
who has got an army together, and perceives that from
want of money or friends he cannot maintain it long,
must be a mere madman if he do not at once, and before
his army melts away, try the fortunes of battle; since
he is certain to lose by delay, while by fighting
he may chance to succeed. And there is this also
to be kept in view, that we must strive, even if we
be defeated, to gain glory; and that more glory is
to be won in being beaten by force, than in a defeat
from any other cause. And this we may suppose
to have weighed with Hannibal. On the other hand,
supposing Hannibal to have declined battle, Scipio,
even if he had lacked courage to follow him up and
attack him in his intrenched camp, would not have
suffered thereby; for as he had defeated Syphax, and
got possession of many of the African towns, he could
have rested where he was in the same security and
with the same convenience as if he had been in Italy.
But this was not the case with Hannibal when he had
to encounter Fabius, nor with the Gauls when they
were opposed to Sulpitius.

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Least of all can he decline battle who invades with
his army the country of another; for seeking to enter
his enemy’s country, he must fight whenever
the enemy comes forward to meet him; and is under still
greater necessity to fight, if he undertake the siege
of any town. As happened in our own day with
Duke Charles of Burgundy, who, when beleaguering Morat,
a town of the Swiss, was by them attacked and routed;
or as happened with the French army encamped against
Novara, which was in like manner defeated by the Swiss.

CHAPTER XI.—­That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker
than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset.

The power exercised in Rome by the tribunes of the
people was great, and, as I have repeatedly explained,
was necessary, since otherwise there would have been
no check on the ambition of the nobles, and the commonwealth
must have grown corrupted far sooner than it did.
But because, as I have said elsewhere, there is in
everything a latent evil peculiar to it, giving rise
to new mischances, it becomes necessary to provide
against these by new ordinances. The authority
of the tribunes, therefore, being insolently asserted
so as to become formidable to the nobility and to
the entire city, disorders dangerous to the liberty
of the State must thence have resulted, had not a
method been devised by Appius Claudius for controlling
the ambition of the tribunes. This was, to secure
that there should always be one of their number timid,
or venal, or else a lover of the general good, who
could be influenced to oppose the rest whenever these
sought to pass any measure contrary to the wishes
of the senate. This remedy was a great restraint
on the excessive authority of the tribunes, and on
many occasions proved serviceable to Rome.

I am led by this circumstance to remark, that when
many powerful persons are united against one, who,
although no match for the others collectively, is
also powerful, the chances are more in favour of this
single and less I powerful person, than of the many
who together are much stronger. For setting aside
an infinity of accidents which can be turned to better
account by one than by many, it will always happen
that, by exercising a little dexterity, the one will
be able to divide the many, and weaken the force which
was strong while it was united. In proof whereof,
I shall not refer to ancient examples, though many
such might be cited, but content myself with certain
modern instances taken from the events of our own
times.

In the year 1484, all Italy combined against the Venetians,
who finding their position desperate, and being unable
to keep their army any longer in the field, bribed
Signer Lodovico, who then governed Milan, and so succeeded
in effecting a settlement, whereby they not only recovered
the towns they had lost, but also obtained for themselves
a part of the territories of Ferrara; so that those
were by peace the gainers, who in war had been the
losers. Not many years ago the whole world was
banded together against France; but before the war
came to a close, Spain breaking with the confederates
and entering into a separate treaty with France, the
other members of the league also, were presently forced
to make terms.

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Wherefore we may always assume when we see a war set
on foot by many against one, that this one, if he
have strength to withstand the first shock, and can
temporize and wait his opportunity, is certain to
prevail. But unless he can do this he runs a thousand
dangers: as did the Venetians in the year 1508,
who, could they have temporized with the French, and
so got time to conciliate some of those who had combined
against them, might have escaped the ruin which then
overtook them. But not possessing such a strong
army as would have enabled them to temporize with
their enemies, and consequently not having the time
needed for gaining any to their side, they were undone.
Yet we know that the Pope, as soon as he had obtained
what he wanted, made friends with them, and that Spain
did the like; and that both the one and the other
of these powers would gladly have saved the Lombard
territory for themselves, nor would, if they could
have helped it, have left it to France, so as to augment
her influence in Italy.

The Venetians, therefore, should have given up a part
to save the rest; and had they done so at a time when
the surrender would not have seemed to be made under
compulsion, and before any step had been taken in the
direction of war, it would have been a most prudent
course; although discreditable and probably of little
avail after war had been begun. But until the
war broke out, few of the Venetian citizens recognized
the danger, fewer still the remedy, and none ventured
to prescribe it.

But to return to the point whence we started, I say
that the same safeguard for their country which the
Roman senate found against the ambition of the tribunes
in their number, is within the reach of the prince
who is attacked by many adversaries, if he only know
to use prudently those methods which promote division.

CHAPTER XII.—­A prudent Captain will
do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers
to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity.

Elsewhere I have noted how greatly men are governed
in what they do by Necessity, and how much of their
renown is due to her guidance, so that it has even
been said by some philosophers, that the hands and
tongues of men, the two noblest instruments of their
fame, would never have worked to perfection, nor have
brought their labours to that pitch of excellence
we see them to have reached, had they not been impelled
by this cause. The captains of antiquity, therefore,
knowing the virtues of this necessity, and seeing
the steadfast courage which it gave their soldiers
in battle, spared no effort to bring their armies under
its influence, while using all their address to loosen
its hold upon their enemies. For which reason,
they would often leave open to an adversary some way
which they might have closed, and close against their
own men some way they might have left open.

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Whosoever, therefore, would have a city defend itself
stubbornly, or an army fight resolutely in the field,
must before all things endeavour to impress the minds
of those whom he commands with the belief that no
other course is open to them. In like manner a
prudent captain who undertakes the attack of a city,
will measure the ease or difficulty of his enterprise,
by knowing and considering the nature of the necessity
which compels the inhabitants to defend it; and where
he finds that necessity to be strong, he may infer
that his task will be difficult, but if otherwise,
that it will be easy.

And hence it happens that cities are harder to be
recovered after a revolt than to be taken for the
first time. Because on a first attack, having
no occasion to fear punishment, since they have given
no ground of offence, they readily surrender; but
when they have revolted, they know that they have
given ground of offence, and, fearing punishment,
are not so easily brought under. A like stubbornness
grows from the natural hostility with which princes
or republics who are neighbours regard one another;
which again is caused by the desire to dominate over
those who live near, or from jealousy of their power.
This is more particularly the case with republics,
as in Tuscany for example; for contention and rivalry
have always made, and always will make it extremely
hard for one republic to bring another into subjection.
And for this reason any one who considers attentively
who are the neighbours of Florence, and who of Venice,
will not marvel so much as some have done, that Florence
should have spent more than Venice on her wars and
gained less; since this results entirely from the Venetians
finding their neighbouring towns less obstinate in
their resistance than the Florentines theirs.
For all the towns in the neighbourhood of Venice have
been used to live under princes and not in freedom;
and those who are used to servitude commonly think
little of changing masters, nay are often eager for
the change. In this way Venice, though she has
had more powerful neighbours than Florence, has been
able, from finding their towns less stubborn, to subdue
them more easily than the latter, surrounded exclusively
by free cities, has had it in her power to do.

But, to return to the matter in hand, the captain
who attacks a town should use what care he can, not
to drive the defenders to extremities, lest he render
them stubborn; but when they fear punishment should
promise them pardon, and when they fear for their freedom
should assure them that he has no designs against
the common welfare, but only against a few ambitious
men in their city; for such assurances have often
smoothed the way to the surrender of towns. And
although pretexts of this sort are easily seen through,
especially by the wise, the mass of the people are
often beguiled by them, because desiring present tranquillity,
they shut their eyes to the snares hidden behind these
specious promises. By means such as these, therefore,

Page 218

cities innumerable have been brought into subjection,
as recently was the case with Florence. The ruin
of Crassus and his army was similarly caused:
for although he himself saw through the empty promises
of the Parthians, as meant only to blind the Roman
soldiers to the necessity of defending themselves,
yet he could not keep his men steadfast, they, as we
clearly gather in reading the life of this captain,
being deceived by the offers of peace held out to
them by their enemies.

On the other hand, when the Samnites, who, at the
instance of a few ambitious men, and in violation
of the terms of the truce made with them, had overrun
and pillaged lands belonging to the allies of Rome,
afterwards sent envoys to Rome to implore peace, offering
to restore whatever they had taken, and to surrender
the authors of these injuries and outrages as prisoners,
and these offers were rejected by the Romans, and
the envoys returned to Samnium bringing with them no
hope of an adjustment, Claudius Pontius, who then
commanded the army of the Samnites, showed them in
a remarkable speech, that the Romans desired war at
all hazards, and declared that, although for the sake
of his country he wished for peace, necessity constrained
him to prepare for war; telling them “that
was a just war which could not be escaped, and those
arms sacred in which lay their only hopes.”
And building on this necessity, he raised in the minds
of his soldiers a confident expectation of success.
That I may not have to revert to this matter again,
it will be convenient to notice here those examples
from Roman history which most merit attention.
When Caius Manilius was in command of the legions
encamped against Veii, a division of the Veientine
army having got within the Roman intrenchments, Manilius
ran forward with a company of his men to defend them,
and, to prevent the escape of the Veientines, guarded
all the approaches to the camp. The Veientines
finding themselves thus shut in, began to fight with
such fury that they slew Manilius, and would have
destroyed all the rest of the Roman army, had not
the prudence of one of the tribunes opened a way for
the Veientines to retreat. Here we see that so
long as necessity compelled, the Veientines fought
most fiercely, but on finding a path opened for escape,
preferred flight to combat. On another occasion
when the Volscians and Equians passed with their armies
across the Roman frontier, the consuls were sent out
to oppose them, and an engagement ensued. It
so happened that when the combat was at its height,
the army of the Volscians, commanded by Vectius Mescius,
suddenly found themselves shut in between their own
camp, which a division of the Romans had occupied,
and the body of the Roman army; when seeing that they
must either perish or cut a way for themselves with
their swords, Vectius said to them, “Come
on, my men, here is no wall or rampart to be scaled:
we fight man with man; in valour we are their equals,
and necessity, that last and mightiest weapon, gives
us the advantage.” Here, then, necessity
is spoken of by Titus Livius as the last and mightiest
weapon.

Page 219

Camillus, the wisest and most prudent of all the Roman
commanders, when he had got within the town of Veii
with his army, to make its surrender easier and not
to drive its inhabitants to desperation, called out
to his men, so that the Veientines might hear, to
spare all whom they found unarmed. Whereupon
the defenders throwing away their weapons, the town
was taken almost without bloodshed. And this device
was afterwards followed by many other captains.

CHAPTER XIII.—­Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a
weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain.

Coriolanus being banished from Rome betook himself
to the Volscians, and when he had got together an
army wherewith to avenge himself on his countrymen,
came back to Rome; yet, again withdrew, not constrained
to retire by the might of the Roman arms, but out
of reverence for his mother. From this incident,
says Titus Livius, we may learn that the spread of
the Roman power was due more to the valour of her captains
than of her soldiers. For before this the Volscians
had always been routed, and only grew successful when
Coriolanus became their captain.

But though Livius be of this opinion, there are many
passages in his history to show that the Roman soldiers,
even when left without leaders, often performed astonishing
feats of valour, nay, sometimes maintained better
discipline and fought with greater spirit after their
consuls were slain than they had before. For
example, the army under the Scipios in Spain, after
its two leaders had fallen, was able by its valour
not merely to secure its own safety, but to overcome
the enemy and preserve the province for the Roman
Republic. So that to state the case fairly, we
find many instances in which the valour of the soldiers
alone gained the day, as well as many in which success
was wholly due to the excellence of the captain.
From which it may be inferred that the one stands
in need of the other.

And here the question suggests itself: which
is the more formidable, a good army badly led, or
a good captain commanding an indifferent army; though,
were we to adopt the opinion of Caesar on this head,
we ought lightly to esteem both. For when Caesar
went to Spain against Afranius and Petreius, who were
there in command of a strong army, he made little
account of them, saying, “that he went to
fight an army without a captain,” indicating
thereby the weakness of these generals. And,
conversely, when he went to encounter Pompeius in Thessaly,
he said, “I go against a captain without
an army."[1]

Page 220

A further question may also be raised, whether it
is easier for a good captain to make a good army,
or for a good army to make a good captain. As
to this it might be thought there was barely room for
doubt, since it ought to be far easier for many who
are good to find one who is good or teach him to become
so, than for one who is good to find or make many
good. Lucullus when sent against Mithridates was
wholly without experience in war: but his brave
army, which was provided with many excellent officers,
speedily taught him to be a good captain. On the
other hand, when the Romans, being badly off for soldiers,
armed a number of slaves and gave them over to be
drilled by Sempronius Gracchus, he in a short time
made them into a serviceable army. So too, as
I have already mentioned, Pelopidas and Epaminondas
after rescuing Thebes, their native city, from Spartan
thraldom, in a short time made such valiant soldiers
of the Theban peasantry, as to be able with their
aid not only to withstand, but even to defeat the Spartan
armies. So that the question may seem to be equally
balanced, excellence on one side generally finding
excellence on the other.

A good army, however, when left without a good leader,
as the Macedonian army was on the death of Alexander,
or as those veterans were who had fought in the civil
wars, is apt to grow restless and turbulent.
Wherefore I am convinced that it is better to trust
to the captain who has time allowed him to discipline
his men, and means wherewith to equip them, than to
a tumultuary host with a chance leader of its own
choosing. But twofold is the merit and twofold
the glory of those captains who not only have had
to subdue their enemies, but also before encountering
them to organize and discipline their forces.
This, however, is a task requiring qualities so seldom
combined, that were many of those captains who now
enjoy a great name with the world, called on to perform
it, they would be much less thought of than they are.

CHAPTER XIV.—­Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and
unexpected Sights or Sounds.

That the disorder occasioned by strange and unexpected
sights or sounds may have momentous consequences in
combat, might be shown by many instances, but by none
better than by what befell in the battle fought between
the Romans and the Volscians, when Quintius, the Roman
general, seeing one wing of his army begin to waver,
shouted aloud to his men to stand firm, for the other
wing was already victorious. Which words of his
giving confidence to his own troops and striking the
enemy with dismay won him the battle. But if
a cry like this, produce great effect on a well disciplined
army, far greater must be its effect on one which
is ill disciplined and disorderly. For by such
a wind the whole mass will be moved, as I shall show
by a well-known instance happening in our own times.

Page 221

A few years ago the city of Perugia was split into
the two factions of the Baglioni and the Oddi, the
former holding the government, the latter being in
exile. The Oddeschi, however, with the help of
friends, having got together an armed force which
they lodged in villages of their own near Perugia,
obtained, by the favour of some of their party, an
entrance into the city by night, and moving forward
without discovery, came as far as the public square.
And as all the streets of Perugia are barred with
chains drawn across them at their corners, the Oddeschi
had in front of them a man who carried an iron hammer
wherewith to break the fastenings of the chains so
that horsemen might pass. When the only chain
remaining unbroken was that which closed the public
square, the alarm having now been given, the hammerman
was so impeded by the crowd pressing behind him that
he could not raise his arm to strike freely.
Whereupon, to get more room for his work, he called
aloud to the others to stand back; and the word back
passing from rank to rank those furthest off began
to run, and, presently, the others also, with such
precipitancy, that they fell into utter disorder.
In this way, and from this trifling circumstance,
the attempt of the Oddeschi came to nothing.

Here we may note that discipline is needed in an army,
not so much to enable it to fight according to a settled
order, as that it may not be thrown into confusion
by every insignificant accident. For a tumultuary
host is useless in war, simply because every word,
or cry, or sound, may throw it into a panic and cause
it to fly. Wherefore it behoves a good captain
to provide that certain fixed persons shall receive
his orders and pass them on to the rest, and to accustom
his soldiers to look to these persons, and to them
only, to be informed what his orders are. For
whenever this precaution is neglected the gravest mishaps
are constantly seen to ensue.

As regards strange and unexpected sights, every captain
should endeavour while his army is actually engaged
with the enemy, to effect some such feint or diversion
as will encourage his own men and dismay his adversary
since this of all things that can happen is the likeliest
to ensure victory. In evidence whereof we may
cite the example of Cneius Sulpitius, the Roman dictator,
who, when about to give battle to the Gauls, after
arming his sutlers and camp followers, mounted them
on mules and other beasts of burden, furnished them
with spears and banners to look like cavalry, and
placing them behind a hill, ordered them on a given
signal, when the fight was at the hottest, to appear
and show themselves to the enemy. All which being
carried out as he had arranged, threw the Gauls into
such alarm, that they lost the battle.

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A good captain, therefore, has two things to see to:
first, to contrive how by some sudden surprise he
may throw his enemy into confusion; and next, to be
prepared should the enemy use a like stratagem against
him to discover and defeat it; as the stratagem of
Semiramis was defeated by the King of India.
For Semiramis seeing that this king had elephants
in great numbers, to dismay him by showing that she,
too, was well supplied, caused the skins of many oxen
and buffaloes to be sewn together in the shape of
elephants and placed upon camels and sent to the front.
But the trick being detected by the king, turned out
not only useless but hurtful to its contriver.
In a battle which the Dictator Mamercus fought against
the people of Fidenae, the latter, to strike terror
into the minds of the Romans, contrived that while
the combat raged a number of soldiers should issue
from Fidenae bearing lances tipped with fire, thinking
that the Romans, disturbed by so strange a sight,
would be thrown into confusion.

We are to note, however, with regard to such contrivances,
that if they are to serve any useful end, they should
be formidable as well as seem so; for
when they menace a real danger, their weak points are
not so soon discerned. When they have more of
pretence than reality, it will be well either to dispense
with them altogether, or resorting to them, to keep
them, like the muleteers of Sulpitius, in the background,
so that they be not too readily found out. For
any weakness inherent in them is soon discovered if
they be brought near, when, as happened with the elephants
of Semiramis and the fiery spears of the men of Fidenae,
they do harm rather than good. For although by
this last-mentioned device the Romans at the first
were somewhat disconcerted, so soon as the dictator
came up and began to chide them, asking if they were
not ashamed to fly like bees from smoke, and calling
on them to turn on their enemy, and “with
her own flames efface that Fidenae whom their benefits
could not conciliate,” they took courage;
so that the device proved of no service to its contrivers,
who were vanquished in the battle.

CHAPTER XV.—­That one and not many should head an Army: and why it is
harmful to have more Leaders than one.

The men of Fidenae rising against the colonists whom
the Romans had settled among them, and putting them
to the sword, the Romans to avenge the insult appointed
four tribunes with consular powers: one of whom
they retained to see to the defence of Rome, while
the other three were sent against the Fidenati and
the Veientines. But these three falling out among
themselves, and being divided in their counsels, returned
from their mission with discredit though not with
loss. Of which discredit they were themselves
the cause. That they sustained no loss was due
to the valour of their soldiers But the senate perceiving
the source of the mischief, to the end that one man
might put to rights what three had thrown into confusion,
resorted to the appointment of a dictator.

Page 223

Here we see the disadvantage of having several leaders
in one army or in a town which has to defend itself.
And the case could not be put in clearer words than
by Titus Livius, where he says, “The three
tribunes with consular authority gave proof how hurtful
it is in war to have many leaders; for each forming
a different opinion, and each abiding by his own,
they threw opportunities in the way of their enemies.”
And though this example suffice by itself to show
the disadvantage in war of divided commands, to make
the matter still plainer I shall cite two further
instances, one ancient and one modern.

In the year 1500, Louis XII. of France, after recovering
Milan, sent troops to restore Pisa to the Florentines,
Giovambattista Ridolfi and Luca d’Antonio Albizzi
going with them as commissaries. Now, because
Giovambattista had a great name, and was older than
Luca, the latter left the whole management of everything
to him; and although he did not show his jealousy
of him by opposing him, he betrayed it by his silence,
and by being so careless and indifferent about everything,
that he gave no help in the business of the siege
either by word or deed, just as though he had been
a person of no account. But when, in consequence
of an accident, Giovambattista had to return to Florence,
all this was changed; for Luca, remaining in sole
charge, behaved with the greatest courage, prudence,
and zeal, all which qualities had been hidden while
he held a joint command. Further to bear me out
I shall again borrow the words of Titus Livius, who,
in relating how when Quintius and Agrippa his colleague
were sent by the Romans against the Equians, Agrippa
contrived that the conduct of the war should rest with
Quintius, observes, “Most wholesome is it
that in affairs of great moment, supreme authority
be vested in one man.” Very different, however,
is the course followed by the republics and princes
of our own days, who, thinking to be better served,
are used to appoint several captains or commissioners
to fill one command; a practice giving rise to so much
confusion, that were we seeking for the causes of the
overthrow of the French and Italian armies in recent
times, we should find this to be the most active of
any.

Rightly, therefore, may we conclude that in sending
forth an army upon service, it is wiser to entrust
it to one man of ordinary prudence, than to two of
great parts but with a divided command.

CHAPTER XVI.—­That in Times of Difficulty
true Worth is sought after; whereas in quiet Times
it is not the most deserving, but those who are recommended
by Wealth or Connection who are most in favour.

Page 224

It always has happened and always will, that the great
and admirable men of a republic are neglected in peaceful
times; because at such seasons many citizens are found,
who, envying the reputation these men have justly
earned, seek to be regarded not merely as their equals
but as their superiors. Touching this there is
a notable passage in Thucydides, the Greek historian,
where he tells how the republic of Athens coming victorious
out of the Peloponessian war, wherein she had bridled
the pride of Sparta, and brought almost the whole
of Greece under her authority, was encouraged by the
greatness of her renown to propose to herself the
conquest of Sicily. In Athens this scheme was
much debated, Alcibiades and certain others who had
the public welfare very little in their thoughts,
but who hoped that the enterprise, were they placed
in command, might minister to their fame, recommending
that it should be undertaken. Nicias, on the
other hand, one of the best esteemed of the Athenian
citizens, was against it, and in addressing the people,
gave it as the strongest reason for trusting his advice,
that in advising them not to engage in this war, he
urged what was not for his own advantage; for he knew
that while Athens remained at peace numberless citizens
were ready to take precedence of him: whereas,
were war declared, he was certain that none would
rank before him or even be looked upon as his equal.

Here we see that in tranquil times republics are subject
to the infirmity of lightly esteeming their worthiest
citizens. And this offends these persons for
two reasons: first, because they are not given
the place they deserve; and second, because they see
unworthy men and of abilities inferior to their own,
as much or more considered than they. Injustice
such as this has caused the ruin of many republics.
For citizens who find themselves undeservedly slighted,
and perceive the cause to be that the times are tranquil
and not troubled, will strive to change the times
by stirring up wars hurtful to the public welfare.
When I look for remedies for this state of things,
I find two: first, to keep the citizens poor,
so that wealth without worth shall corrupt neither
them nor others; second, to be so prepared for war
as always to be ready to make war; for then there
will always be a need for worthy citizens, as was
the case in Rome in early times. For as Rome constantly
kept her armies in the field, there was constant opportunity
for men to display their valour, nor was it possible
to deprive a deserving man of his post and give it
to another who was not deserving. Or if ever this
were done by inadvertency, or by way of experiment,
there forthwith resulted such disorder and danger,
that the city at once retraced its steps and reverted
to the true path. But other republics which are
not regulated on the same plan, and make war only
when driven to it by necessity, cannot help committing
this injustice, nay, will constantly run into it,

Page 225

when, if the great citizen who finds himself slighted
be vindictive, and have some credit and following
in the city, disorder will always ensue. And
though Rome escaped this danger for a time, she too,
as has elsewhere been said, having no longer, after
she had conquered Carthage and Antiochus, any fear
of war, came to think she might commit her armies
to whom she would, making less account of the valour
of her captains than of those other qualities which
gain favour with the people. Accordingly we find
Paulus Emilius rejected oftener than once when he
sought the consulship; nor, in fact, obtaining it until
the Macedonian war broke out, which, being judged
a formidable business, was by the voice of the whole
city committed to his management. After the year
1494 our city of Florence was involved in a series
of wars, in conducting which none of our citizens
had any success until chance threw the command into
the hands of one who showed us how an army should be
led. This was Antonio Giacomini, and so long as
there were dangerous wars on foot, all rivalry on
the part of other citizens was suspended; and whenever
a captain or commissary had to be appointed he was
unopposed. But when a war came to be undertaken,
as to the issue of which no misgivings were felt,
and which promised both honour and preferment, so
numerous were the competitors for command, that three
commissaries having to be chosen to conduct the siege
of Pisa, Antonio was left out; and though it cannot
with certainty be shown that any harm resulted to
our republic from his not having been sent on this
enterprise, we may reasonably conjecture that such
was indeed the case. For as the people of Pisa
were then without means either for subsistence or
defence, it may be believed that had Antonio been there
he would have reduced them to such extremities as
would have forced them to surrender at discretion
to the Florentines. But Pisa being besieged by
captains who knew neither how to blockade nor how
to storm it, held out so long, that the Florentines,
who should have reduced it by force, were obliged
to buy its submission. Neglect like this might
well move Antonio to resentment; and he must needs
have been both very patient and very forgiving if
he felt no desire to revenge himself when he could,
by the ruin of the city or by injuries to individual
citizens. But a republic should beware not to
rouse such feelings, as I shall show in the following
Chapter.

CHAPTER XVII.—­That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to
fill an important Office or Command.

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A republic should think twice before appointing to
an important command a citizen who has sustained notable
wrong at the hands of his fellow-citizens. Claudius
Nero, quitting the army with which he was opposing
Hannibal, went with a part of his forces into the March
of Ancona, designing to join the other consul there,
and after joining him to attack Hasdrubal before he
came up with his brother. Now Claudius had previously
commanded against Hasdrubal in Spain, and after driving
him with his army into such a position that it seemed
he must either fight at a disadvantage or perish by
famine, had been outwitted by his adversary, who,
while diverting his attention with proposals of terms,
contrived to slip through his hands and rob him of
the opportunity for effecting his destruction.
This becoming known in Rome brought Claudius into
so much discredit both with the senate and people,
that to his great mortification and displeasure, he
was slightingly spoken of by the whole city.
But being afterwards made consul and sent to oppose
Hannibal, he took the course mentioned above, which
was in itself so hazardous that all Rome was filled
with doubt and anxiety until tidings came of Hasdrubal’s
defeat. When subsequently asked why he had played
so dangerous a game, wherein without urgent necessity
he had staked the very existence of Rome, Claudius
answered, he had done so because he knew that were
he to succeed he would recover whatever credit he had
lost in Spain; while if he failed, and his attempt
had an untoward issue, he would be revenged on that
city and On those citizens who had so ungratefully
and indiscreetly wronged him.

But if resentment for an offence like this so deeply
moved a Roman citizen at a time when Rome was still
uncorrupted, we should consider how it may act on
the citizen of a State not constituted as Rome then
was. And because there is no certain remedy we
can apply to such disorders when they arise in republics,
it follows that it is impossible to establish a republic
which shall endure always; since in a thousand unforeseen
ways ruin may overtake it.

CHAPTER XVIII.—­That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able
to forestall the designs of his Adversary.

It was a saying of Epaminondas the Theban that nothing
was so useful and necessary for a commander as to
be able to see through the intentions and designs
of his adversary. And because it is hard to come
at this knowledge directly, the more credit is due
to him who reaches it by conjecture. Yet sometimes
it is easier to fathom an enemy’s designs than
to construe his actions; and not so much those actions
which are done at a distance from us, as those done
in our presence and under our very eyes. For
instance, it has often happened that when a battle
has lasted till nightfall, the winner has believed
himself the loser, and the loser has believed himself
the winner and that this mistake has led him who made

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it to follow a course hurtful to himself. It was
from a mistake of this sort, that Brutus and Cassius
lost the battle of Philippi. For though Brutus
was victorious with his wing of the army Cassius, whose
wing was beaten, believed the entire army to be defeated,
and under this belief gave way to despair and slew
himself. So too, in our own days, in the battle
fought by Francis, king of France, with the Swiss at
Santa Cecilia in Lombardy, when night fell, those
of the Swiss who remained unbroken, not knowing that
the rest had been routed and slain, thought they had
the victory; and so believing would not retreat, but,
remaining on the field, renewed the combat the following
morning to their great disadvantage. Nor were
they the only sufferers from their mistake, since
the armies of the Pope and of Spain were also misled
by it, and well-nigh brought to destruction.
For on the false report of a victory they crossed
the Po, and had they only advanced a little further
must have been made prisoners by the victorious French.

An instance is recorded of a like mistake having been
made in the camps both of the Romans and of the Equians.
For the Consul Sempronius being in command against
the Equians, and giving the enemy battle, the engagement
lasted with varying success till nightfall, when as
both armies had suffered what was almost a defeat,
neither returned to their camp, but each drew off
to the neighboring hills where they thought they would
be safer. The Romans separated into two divisions,
one of which with the consul, the other with the centurion
Tempanius by whose valour the army had that day been
saved from utter rout. At daybreak the consul,
without waiting for further tidings of the enemy, made
straight for Rome; and the Equians, in like manner,
withdrew to their own country. For as each supposed
the other to be victorious, neither thought much of
leaving their camp to be plundered by the enemy.
It so chanced, however, that Tempanius, who was himself
retreating with the second division of the Roman army,
fell in with certain wounded Equians, from whom he
learned that their commanders had fled, abandoning
their camp; on hearing which, he at once returned
to the Roman camp and secured it, and then, after
sacking the camp of the Equians, went back victorious
to Rome. His success, as we see, turned entirely
on his being the first to be informed of the enemy’s
condition. And here we are to note that it may
often happen that both the one and the other of two
opposed armies shall fall into the same disorder, and
be reduced to the same straits; in which case, that
which soonest detects the other’s distress is
sure to come off best.

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I shall give an instance of this which occurred recently
in our own country. In the year 1498, when the
Florentines had a great army in the territory of Pisa
and had closely invested the town, the Venetians, who
had undertaken its protection, seeing no other way
to save it, resolved to make a diversion in its favour
by attacking the territories of the Florentines in
another quarter. Wherefore, having assembled a
strong force, they entered Tuscany by the Val di Lamona,
and seizing on the village of Marradi, besieged the
stronghold of Castiglione which stands on the height
above it. Getting word of this, the Florentines
sought to relieve Marradi, without weakening the army
which lay round Pisa. They accordingly raised
a new levy of foot-soldiers, and equipped a fresh
squadron of horse, which they despatched to Marradi
under the joint command of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano,
lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio of Marciano.
These troops taking up their position on the hill above
Marradi, the Venetians withdrew from the investment
of Castiglione and lodged themselves in the village.
But when the two armies had confronted one another
for several days, both began to suffer sorely from
want of victuals and other necessaries, and neither
of them daring to attack the other, or knowing to
what extremities the other was reduced, both simultaneously
resolved to strike their camps the following morning,
and to retreat, the Venetians towards Berzighella and
Faenza, the Florentines towards Casaglia and the Mugello.
But at daybreak, when both armies had begun to remove
their baggage, it so happened that an old woman, whose
years and poverty permitted her to pass unnoticed,
leaving the village of Marradi, came to the Florentine
camp, where were certain of her kinsfolk whom she
desired to visit. Learning from her that the
Venetians were in retreat, the Florentine commanders
took courage, and changing their plan, went in pursuit
of the enemy as though they had dislodged them, sending
word to Florence that they had repulsed the Venetians
and gained a victory. But in truth this victory
was wholly due to their having notice of the enemy’s
movements before the latter had notice of theirs.
For had that notice been given to the Venetians first,
it would have wrought against us the same results as
it actually wrought for us.

CHAPTER XIX.—­Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for
controlling a Multitude.

The Roman Republic was distracted by the feuds of
the nobles and commons. Nevertheless, on war
breaking out, Quintius and Appius Claudius were sent
forth in command of Roman armies. From his harshness
and severity to his soldiers, Appius was so ill obeyed
by them, that after sustaining what almost amounted
to a defeat, he had to resign his command. Quintius,
on the contrary, by kindly and humane treatment, kept
his men obedient and returned victorious to Rome.
From this it might seem that to govern a large body
of men, it is better to be humane than haughty, and
kindly rather than severe.

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And yet Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other authors
are agreed, pronounces a contrary opinion where he
says, “In governing a multitude it avails
more to punish than to be compliant."[1] If it
be asked how these opposite views can be reconciled,
I answer that you exercise authority either over men
used to regard you as their equal, or over men who
have always been subject to you. When those over
whom you exercise authority are your equals, you cannot
trust wholly to punishment or to that severity of
which Tacitus speaks. And since in Rome itself
the commons had equal weight with the nobles, none
appointed their captain for a time only, could control
them by using harshness and severity. Accordingly
we find that those Roman captains who gained the love
of their soldiers and were considerate of them, often
achieved greater results than those who made themselves
feared by them in an unusual degree, unless, like
Manlius Torquatus, these last were endowed with consummate
valour. But he who has to govern subjects such
as those of whom Tacitus speaks, to prevent their
growing insolent and trampling upon him by reason
of his too great easiness, must resort to punishment
rather than to compliance. Still, to escape hatred,
punishment should be moderate in degree, for to make
himself hated is never for the interest of any prince.
And to escape hatred, a prince has chiefly to guard
against tampering with the property of any of his subjects;
for where nothing is to be gained by it, no prince
will desire to shed blood, unless, as seldom happens,
constrained to do so by necessity. But where
advantage is to be gained thereby, blood will always
flow, and neither the desire to shed it, nor causes
for shedding it will ever be wanting, as I have fully
shown when discussing this subject in another treatise.

Quintius therefore was more deserving of praise than
Appius. Nevertheless the opinion of Tacitus,
duly restricted and not understood as applying to
a case like that of Appius, merits approval. But
since I have spoken of punishment and indulgence,
it seems not out of place to show how a single act
of humanity availed more than arms with the citizens
of Falerii.

CHAPTER XX.—­How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii,
than all the might of the Roman Arms.

When the besieging army of the Romans lay round Falerii,
the master of a school wherein the best-born youths
of the city were taught, thinking to curry favour
with Camillus and the Romans, came forth from the town
with these boys, on pretence of giving them exercise,
and bringing them into the camp where Camillus was,
presented them to him, saying, “To ransom
these that city would yield itself into your hands.”
Camillus, however, not only rejected this offer, but
causing the schoolmaster to be stripped and his hands
tied behind him, gave each of the boys a scourge,
and bade them lead the fellow back to the town scourging
him as they went. When the citizens of Falerii
heard of this, so much were they pleased with the
humanity and integrity of Camillus, that they resolved
to surrender their town to him without further defence.

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This authentic instance may lead us to believe that
a humane and kindly action may sometimes touch men’s
minds more nearly than a harsh and cruel one; and
that those cities and provinces into which the instruments
and engines of war, with every other violence to which
men resort, have failed to force a way, may be thrown
open to a single act of tenderness, mercy, chastity,
or generosity. Whereof history supplies us with
many examples besides the one which I have just now
noticed. For we find that when the arms of Rome
were powerless to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy, he was
moved to depart by the generosity of Fabritius in
disclosing to him the proposal which his slave had
made the Romans to poison him. Again, we read
how Scipio gained less reputation in Spain by the
capture of New Carthage, than by his virtue in restoring
a young and beautiful wife unviolated to her husband;
the fame of which action won him the love of the whole
province. We see, too, how much this generous
temper is esteemed by a people in its great men; and
how much it is praised by historians and by those
who write the lives of princes, as well as by those
who lay down rules of human conduct. Among whom
Xenophon has taken great pains to show what honours,
and victories, and how fair a fame accrued to Cyrus
from his being kindly and gracious, without taint
of pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any other of those
vices which cast a stain upon men’s lives.

And yet when we note that Hannibal, by methods wholly
opposite to these, achieved splendid victories and
a great renown, I think I am bound to say something
in my next Chapter as to how this happened.

CHAPTER XXI.—­How it happened that Hannibal
pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio,
wrought the same results in Italy which the other
achieved in Spain.

Some, I suspect, may marvel to find a captain, taking
a contrary course, nevertheless arrive at the same
ends as those who have pursued the methods above spoken
of; since it must seem as though success did not depend
on the causes I have named; nay, that if glory and
fame are to be won in other ways, these causes neither
add to our strength nor advance our fortunes.
Wherefore, to make my meaning plain, and not to part
company with the men of whom I have been speaking,
I say, that as, on the one hand, we see Scipio enter
Spain, and by his humane and generous conduct at once
secure the good-will of the province, and the admiration
and reverence of its inhabitants, so on the other hand,
we see Hannibal enter Italy, and by methods wholly
opposite, to wit, by violence and rapine, by cruelty
and treachery of every kind, effect in that country
the very same results. For all the States of Italy
revolted in his favour, and all the Italian nations
ranged themselves on his side.

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When we seek to know why this was, several reasons
present themselves, the first being that men so passionately
love change, that, commonly speaking, those who are
well off are as eager for it as those who are badly
off: for as already has been said with truth,
men are pampered by prosperity, soured by adversity.
This love of change, therefore, makes them open the
door to any one who puts himself at the head of new
movements in their country, and if he be a foreigner
they adopt his cause, if a fellow-countryman they
gather round him and become his partisans and supporters;
so that whatever methods he may there use, he will
succeed in making great progress. Moreover, men
being moved by two chief passions, love and fear,
he who makes himself feared commands with no less
authority than he who makes himself loved; nay, as
a rule, is followed and obeyed more implicitly than
the other. It matters little, however, which
of these two ways a captain chooses to follow, provided
he be of transcendent valour, and has thereby won for
himself a great name For when, like Hannibal or Scipio,
a man is very valiant, this quality will cloak any
error he may commit in seeking either to be too much
loved or too much feared. Yet from each of these
two tendencies, grave mischiefs, and such as lead
to the ruin of a prince, may arise. For he who
would be greatly loved, if he swerve ever so little
from the right road, becomes contemptible; while he
who would be greatly feared, if he go a jot too far,
incurs hatred. And since it is impossible, our
nature not allowing it, to adhere to the exact mean,
it is essential that any excess should be balanced
by an exceeding valour, as it was in Hannibal and
Scipio. And yet we find that even they, while
they were exalted by the methods they followed, were
also injured by them. How they were exalted has
been shown. The injury which Scipio suffered was,
that in Spain his soldiers, in concert with certain
of his allies, rose against him, for no other reason
than that they stood in no fear of him. For men
are so restless, that if ever so small a door be opened
to their ambition, they forthwith forget all the love
they have borne their prince in return for his graciousness
and goodness, as did these soldiers and allies of
Scipio; when, to correct the mischief, he was forced
to use something of a cruelty foreign to his nature.

As to Hannibal, we cannot point to any particular
instance wherein his cruelty or want of faith are
seen to have been directly hurtful to him; but we
may well believe that Naples and other towns which
remained loyal to the Roman people, did so by reason
of the dread which his character inspired. This,
however, is abundantly clear, that his inhumanity made
him more detested by the Romans than any other enemy
they ever had; so that while to Pyrrhus, in Italy
with his army, they gave up the traitor who offered
to poison him, Hannibal, even when disarmed and a fugitive,
they never forgave, until they had compassed his death.

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To Hannibal, therefore, from his being accounted impious,
perfidious, and cruel, these disadvantages resulted;
but, on the other hand, there accrued to him one great
gain, noticed with admiration by all historians, namely,
that in his army, although made up of men of every
race and country, no dissensions ever broke out among
the soldiers themselves, nor any mutiny against their
leader. This we can only ascribe to the awe which
his character inspired, which together with the great
name his valour had won for him, had the effect of
keeping his soldiers quiet and united. I repeat,
therefore, that it is of little moment which method
a captain may follow if he be endowed with such valour
as will bear him out in the course which he adopts.
For, as I have said, there are disadvantages incident
to both methods unless corrected by extraordinary
valour.

And now, since I have spoken of Scipio and Hannibal,
the former of whom by praiseworthy, the latter by
odious qualities, effected the same results, I must
not, I think, omit to notice the characters of two
Roman citizens, who by different, yet both by honourable
methods, obtained a like glory.

Chapter XXII.—­That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the
gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory.

There lived in Rome, at the same time, two excellent
captains, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus,
equal in their triumphs and in their renown, and in
the valour which in obtaining these they had displayed
against the enemy; but who in the conduct of their
armies and treatment of their soldiers, followed very
different methods. For Manlius, in his command,
resorted to every kind of severity, never sparing his
men fatigue, nor remitting punishment; while Valerius,
on the contrary, treated them with all kindness and
consideration, and was easy and familiar in his intercourse
with them. So that while the one, to secure the
obedience of his soldiers, put his own son to death,
the other never dealt harshly with any man. Yet,
for all this diversity in their modes of acting, each
had the same success against the enemy, and each obtained
the same advantages both for the republic and for himself.
For no soldier of theirs ever flinched in battle,
or rose in mutiny against them, or in any particular
opposed their will; though the commands of Manlius
were of such severity that any order of excessive rigour
came to be spoken of as a Manlian order.

Here, then, we have to consider first of all why Manlius
was obliged to use such severity; next, why Valerius
could behave so humanely; thirdly, how it was that
these opposite methods had the same results; and lastly,
which of the two methods it is better and more useful
for us to follow. Now, if we well examine the
character of Manlius from the moment when Titus Livius
first begins to make mention of him, we shall find
him to have been endowed with a rare vigour both of

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mind and body, dutiful in his behaviour to his father
and to his country, and most reverent to his superiors.
All which we see in his slaying the Gaul, in his defence
of his father against the tribune, and in the words
in which, before going forth to fight the Gaul, he
addressed the consul, when he said, “Although
assured of victory, never will I without thy bidding
engage an enemy.” But when such a man as
this attains to command, he looks to find all others
like himself; his dauntless spirit prompts him to engage
in daring enterprises, and to insist on their being
carried out. And this is certain, that where
things hard to execute are ordered to be done, the
order must be enforced with sternness, since, otherwise,
it will be disobeyed.

And here be it noted that if you would be obeyed you
must know how to command, and that they alone have
this knowledge who have measured their power to enforce,
with the willingness of others to yield obedience;
and who issue their orders when they find these conditions
combining, but, otherwise, abstain. Wherefore,
a wise man was wont to say that to hold a republic
by force, there must be a proportion between him who
uses the force and him against whom it is used; and
that while this proportion obtains the force will
operate; but that when he who suffers is stronger
than he who uses the force, we may expect to see it
brought to an end at any moment.

But returning to the matter in hand, I say that to
command things hard of execution, requires hardness
in him who gives the command, and that a man of this
temper and who issues such commands, cannot look to
enforce them by gentleness. He who is not of
such a temper must be careful not to impose tasks
of extraordinary difficulty, but may use his natural
gentleness in imposing such as are ordinary. For
common punishments are not imputed to the prince,
but to the laws and ordinances which he has to administer.

We must believe, therefore, that Manlius was constrained
to act with severity by the unusual character of the
commands which his natural disposition prompted him
to issue. Such commands are useful in a republic,
as restoring its ordinances to their original efficacy
and excellence. And were a republic, as I have
before observed, fortunate enough to come frequently
under the influence of men who, by their example,
reinforce its laws, and not only retard its progress
towards corruption, but bring it back to its first
perfection, it might endure for ever.

Manlius, therefore, was of those who by the severity
of their commands maintained the military discipline
of Rome; urged thereto, in the first place, by his
natural temper, and next by the desire that whatever
he was minded to command should be done. Valerius,
on the other hand, could afford to act humanely, because
for him it was enough if all were done which in a
Roman army it was customary to do. And, since
the customs of that army were good customs, they sufficed

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to gain him honour, while at the same time their maintenance
cost him no effort, nor threw on him the burthen of
punishing transgressors; as well because there were
none who trangressed, as because had there been any,
they would, as I have said, have imputed their punishment
to the ordinary rules of discipline, and not to the
severity of their commander. In this way Valerius
had room to exercise that humane disposition which
enabled him at once to gain influence over his soldiers
and to content them. Hence it was that both these
captains obtaining the same obedience, could, while
following different methods, arrive at the same ends.
Those, however, who seek to imitate them may chance
to fall into the errors of which I have already spoken,
in connection with Hannibal and Scipio, as breeding
contempt or hatred, and which are only to be corrected
by the presence of extraordinary valour, and not otherwise.

It rests now to determine which of these two methods
is the more to be commended. This, I take it,
is matter of dispute, since both methods have their
advocates. Those writers, however, who have laid
down rules for the conduct of princes, describe a
character approaching more nearly to that of Valerius
than to that of Manlius; and Xenophon, whom I have
already cited, while giving many instances of the humanity
of Cyrus, conforms closely to what Livius tells us
of Valerius. For Valerius being made consul against
the Samnites, on the eve of battle spoke to his men
with the same kindliness with which he always treated
them; and Livius, after telling us what he said, remarks
of him: “Never was there a leader more
familiar with his men; cheerfully sharing with the
meanest among them every hardship and fatigue.
Even in the military games, wherein those of the same
rank were wont to make trial of their strength or
swiftness, he would good-naturedly take a part, nor
disdain any adversary who offered; meeting victory
or defeat with an unruffled temper and an unchanged
countenance. When called on to act, his bounty
and generosity never fell short. When he had to
speak, he was as mindful of the feelings of others
as of his own dignity. And, what more than anything
else secures the popular favour, he maintained when
exercising his magistracies the same bearing he had
worn in seeking them.”

Of Manlius also, Titus Livius speaks in like honourable
terms, pointing out that his severity in putting his
son to death brought the Roman army to that pitch
of discipline which enabled it to prevail against the
Latins, nay, he goes so far in his praises that after
describing the whole order of the battle, comparing
the strength of both armies, and showing all the dangers
the Romans ran, and the difficulties they had to surmount,
he winds up by saying, that it was the valour of Manlius
which alone gained for them this great victory, and
that whichever side had Manlius for its leader must
have won the day. So that weighing all that the
historians tell us of these two captains, it might
be difficult to decide between them.

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Nevertheless, not to leave the question entirely open,
I say, that for a citizen living under a republic,
I think the conduct of Manlius more deserving of praise
and less dangerous in its consequences. For methods
like his tend only to the public good and in no way
subserve private ends. He who shows himself harsh
and stern at all times and to all men alike, and is
seen to care only for the common welfare, will never
gain himself partisans, since this is not the way
to win personal friends, to whom, as I said before,
the name of partisans is given. For a republic,
therefore, no line of conduct could be more useful
or more to be desired than this, because in following
it the public interest is not neglected, and no room
is given to suspect personal ambition.

But the contrary holds as to the methods followed
by Valerius. For though the public service they
render be the same, misgivings must needs arise that
the personal good-will which, in the course of a prolonged
command, a captain obtains from his soldiers, may lead
to consequences fatal to the public liberty.
And if this was not found to happen in the case of
Valerius, it was because the minds of the Roman people
were not yet corrupted, and because they had never
remained for a long time and continuously under his
command.

Had we, however, like Xenophon, to consider what is
most for the interest of a prince, we should have
to give up Manlius and hold by Valerius; for, undoubtedly,
a prince should strive to gain the love of his soldiers
and subjects, as well as their obedience. The
latter he can secure by discipline and by his reputation
for valour. But for the former he will be indebted
to his affability, kindliness, gentleness, and all
those other like qualities which were possessed by
Valerius, and which are described by Xenophon as existing
in Cyrus. That a prince should be personally
loved and have his army wholly devoted to him is consistent
with the character of his government; but that this
should happen to a person of private station does
not consist with his position as a citizen who has
to live in conformity with the laws and in subordination
to the magistrates. We read in the early annals
of the Venetian Republic, that once, on the return
of the fleet, a dispute broke out between the sailors
and the people, resulting in tumults and armed violence
which neither the efforts of the public officers,
the respect felt for particular citizens, nor the authority
of the magistrates could quell. But on a certain
gentleman, who the year before had been in command
of these sailors, showing himself among them, straightway,
from the love they bore him, they submitted to his
authority and withdrew from the fray. Which deference
on their part aroused such jealousy and suspicion
in the minds of the Venetian senators that very soon
after they got rid of this gentleman, either by death
or exile.

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The sum of the matter, therefore, is, that the methods
followed by Valerius are useful in a prince, but pernicious
in a private citizen, both for his country and for
himself, for his country, because such methods pave
the way to a tyranny; for himself, because his fellow-citizens,
growing suspicious of his conduct, are constrained
to protect themselves to his hurt. And conversely,
I maintain, that the methods of Manlius, while hurtful
in a prince are useful in a citizen, and in the highest
degree for his country; and, moreover, seldom give
offence, unless the hatred caused by his severity be
augmented by the jealousy which the fame of his other
virtues inspires: a matter now to be considered
in connection with the banishment of Camillas.

CHAPTER XXIII.—­Why Camillus was banished from Rome.

It has been shown above how methods like those of
Valerius are hurtful to the citizen who employs them
and to his country, while methods like those of Manlius
are advantageous for a man’s country, though
sometimes they be hurtful to the man himself.
This is well seen in the example of Camillus, whose
bearing more nearly resembled that of Manlius than
that of Valerius, so that Titus Livius, in speaking
of him, says, “His virtues were at once hated
and admired by his soldiers.” What gained
him their admiration was his care for their safety,
his prudence, his magnanimity, and the good order
he maintained in conducting and commanding them.
What made him hated was his being more stern to punish
than bountiful to reward; and Livius instances the
following circumstances as giving rise to this hatred.
First, his having applied the money got by the sale
of the goods of the Veientines to public purposes,
and not divided it along with the rest of the spoils.
Second, his having, on the occasion of his triumph,
caused his chariot to be drawn by four white horses,
seeking in his pride, men said, to make himself the
equal of the sun god. And, third, his having vowed
to Apollo a tenth of the Veientine plunder, which,
if he was to fulfil his vow, he had to recover from
his soldiers, into whose hands it had already come.

Herein we may well and readily discern what causes
tend to make a prince hateful to his people; the chief
whereof is the depriving them of some advantage.
And this is a matter of much importance. For when
a man is deprived of what is in itself useful, he
never forgets it, and every trifling occasion recalls
it to his mind; and because such occasions recur daily,
he is every day reminded of his loss. Another
error which we are here taught to guard against, is
the appearing haughty and proud, than which nothing
is more distasteful to a people, and most of all to
a free people; for although such pride and haughtiness
do them no hurt, they nevertheless hold in detestation
any who display these qualities. Every show of
pride, therefore, a prince should shun as he would
a rock, since to invite hatred without resulting advantage
were utterly rash and futile.

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CHAPTER XXIV.—­That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude.

If we well examine the course of Roman history, we
shall find two causes leading to the break-up of that
republic: one, the dissensions which arose in
connection with the agrarian laws; the other, the prolongation
of commands. For had these matters been rightly
understood from the first, and due remedies applied,
the freedom of Rome had been far more lasting, and,
possibly, less disturbed. And although, as touching
the prolongation of commands, we never find any tumult
breaking out in Rome on that account, we do in fact
discern how much harm was done to the city by the
ascendency which certain of its citizens thereby gained.
This mischief indeed would not have arisen, if other
citizens whose period of office was extended had been
as good and wise as Lucius Quintius, whose virtue
affords a notable example. For terms of accord
having been settled between the senate and commons
of Rome, the latter, thinking their tribunes well
able to withstand the ambition of the nobles, prolonged
their authority for a year. Whereupon, the senate,
not to be outdone by the commons, proposed, out of
rivalry, to extend the consulship of Quintius.
He, however, refused absolutely to lend himself to
their designs, and insisted on their appointing new
consuls, telling them that they should seek to discredit
evil examples, not add to them by setting worse.
Had this prudence and virtue of his been shared by
all the citizens of Rome, the practice of prolonging
the terms of civil offices would not have been suffered
to establish itself, nor have led to the kindred practice
of extending the term of military commands, which
in progress of time effected the ruin of their republic.

The first military commander whose term was extended,
was Publius Philo; for when his consulship was about
to expire, he being then engaged in the siege of Palaeopolis,
the senate, seeing he had the victory in his hands,
would not displace him by a successor, but appointed
him Proconsul, which office he was the first
to hold. Now, although in thus acting the senate
did what they thought best for the public good, nevertheless
it was this act of theirs that in time brought Rome
to slavery. For the further the Romans carried
their arms, the more necessary it seemed to them to
grant similar extensions of command, and the oftener
they, in fact, did so. This gave rise to two disadvantages:
first that a smaller number of men were trained to
command; second, that by the long continuance of his
command a captain gained so much influence and ascendency
over his soldiers that in time they came to hold the
senate of no account, and looked only to him.
This it was, that enabled Sylla and Marius to find
adherents ready to follow them even to the public
detriment, and enabled Caesar to overthrow the liberties
of his country; whereas, had the Romans never prolonged
the period of authority, whether civil or military,
though they might have taken longer to build up their
empire, they certainly had been later in incurring
servitude.

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CHAPTER XXV.—­Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman
Citizens.

Elsewhere I have shown that no ordinance is of such
advantage to a commonwealth, as one which enforces
poverty on its citizens. And although it does
not appear what particular law it was that had this
operation in Rome (especially since we know the agrarian
law to have been stubbornly resisted), we find, as
a fact, that four hundred years after the city was
founded, great poverty still prevailed there; and
may assume that nothing helped so much to produce this
result as the knowledge that the path to honours and
preferment was closed to none, and that merit was
sought after wheresoever it was to be found; for this
manner of conferring honours made riches the less courted.
In proof whereof I shall cite one instance only.

When the consul Minutius was beset in his camp by
the Equians, the Roman people were filled with such
alarm lest their army should be destroyed, that they
appointed a dictator, always their last stay in seasons
of peril. Their choice fell on Lucius Quintius
Cincinnatus, who at the time was living on his small
farm of little more than four acres, which he tilled
with his own hand. The story is nobly told by
Titus Livius where he says: “This is
worth listening to by those who contemn all things
human as compared with riches, and think that glory
and excellence can have no place unless accompanied
by lavish wealth.” Cincinnatus, then, was
ploughing in his little field, when there arrived from
Rome the messengers sent by the senate to tell him
he had been made dictator, and inform him of the dangers
which threatened the Republic. Putting on his
gown, he hastened to Rome, and getting together an
army, marched to deliver Minutius. But when he
had defeated and spoiled the enemy, and released Minutius,
he would not suffer the army he had rescued to participate
in the spoils, saying, “I will not have you
share in the plunder of those to whom you had so nearly
fallen a prey.” Minutius he deprived of
his consulship, and reduced to be a subaltern, in which
rank he bade him remain till he had learned how to
command. And before this he had made Lucius Tarquininus,
although forced by his poverty to serve on foot, his
master of the knights.

Here, then, we see what honour was paid in Rome to
poverty, and how four acres of land sufficed to support
so good and great a man as Cincinnatus. We find
the same Poverty still prevailing in the time of Marcus
Regulus, who when serving with the army in Africa sought
leave of senate to return home that he might look
after his farm which his labourers had suffered to
run to waste. Here again we learn two things
worthy our attention: first, the poverty of these
men and their contentment under it, and how their
sole study was to gain renown from war, leaving all
its advantages to the State. For had they thought
of enriching themselves by war, it had given them

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little concern that their fields were running to waste
Further, we have to remark the magnanimity of these
citizens, who when placed at the head of armies surpassed
all princes in the loftiness of their spirit, who
cared neither for king nor for commonwealth, and whom
nothing could daunt or dismay; but who, on returning
to private life, became once more so humble, so frugal,
so careful of their slender means, and so submissive
to the magistrates and reverential to their superiors,
that it might seem impossible for the human mind to
undergo so violent a change.

This poverty prevailed down to the days of Paulus
Emilius, almost the last happy days for this republic
wherein a citizen, while enriching Rome by his triumphs,
himself remained poor. And yet so greatly was
poverty still esteemed at this time, that when Paulus,
in conferring rewards on those who had behaved well
in the war, presented his own son-in-law with a silver
cup, it was the first vessel of silver ever seen in
his house.

I might run on to a great length pointing out how
much better are the fruits of poverty than those of
riches, and how poverty has brought cities, provinces,
and nations to honour, while riches have wrought their
ruin, had not this subject been often treated by others.

CHAPTER XXVI.—­How Women are a cause of the ruin of States.

A feud broke out in Ardea touching the marriage of
an heiress, whose hand was sought at the same time
by two suitors, the one of plebeian, the other of
noble birth. For her father being dead, her guardian
wished her to wed the plebeian, her mother the noble.
And so hot grew the dispute that resort was had to
arms, the whole nobility siding with their fellow-noble,
and all the plebeians with the plebeian. The latter
faction being worsted, left the town, and sent to the
Volscians for help; whereupon, the nobles sought help
from Rome. The Volscians were first in the field,
and on their arrival encamped round Ardea. The
Romans, coming up later, shut in the Volscians between
themselves and the town, and, reducing them by famine,
forced them to surrender at discretion. They
then entered Ardea, and putting all the ringleaders
in this dispute to the sword, composed the disorders
of the city.

In connection with this affair there are several points
to be noted. And in the first place we see how
women have been the occasion of many divisions and
calamities in States, and have wrought great harm to
rulers; as when, according to our historian, the violence
done to Lucretia drove the Tarquins from their kingdom,
and that done to Virginia broke the power of the decemvirs.
And among the chief causes which Aristotle assigns
for the downfall of tyrants are the wrongs done by
them to their subjects in respect of their women, whether
by adultery, rape, or other like injury to their honour,
as has been sufficiently noticed in the Chapter wherein
we treated “of Conspiracies”

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I say, then, that neither absolute princes nor the
rulers of free States should underrate the importance
of matter, but take heed to the disorders which it
may breed and provide against them while remedies can
still be used without discredit to themselves or to
their governments And this should have been done by
the rulers of Ardea who by suffering the rivalry between
their citizens to come to a head, promoted their divisions,
and when they sought to reunite them had to summon
foreign help, than which nothing sooner leads to servitude.

But now let us turn to another subject which merits
attention, namely, the means whereby divided cities
may be reunited; and of this I propose to speak in
the following Chapter.

CHAPTER XXVII.

How a divided City may be reunited, and how it
is a false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection
they must be kept divided.

From the example of the Roman consuls who reconciled
the citizens of Ardea, we are taught the method whereby
the feuds of a divided city may be composed, namely,
by putting the ringleaders of the disturbances to
death; and that no other remedy should be used.
Three courses, indeed, are open to you, since you
may either put to death, as these consuls did, or
banish, or bind the citizens to live at peace with
one another, taking security for their good behaviour.
Of which three ways the last is the most hurtful,
the most uncertain, and the least effectual; because
when much blood has been shed, or other like outrage
done, it cannot be that a peace imposed on compulsion
should endure between men who are every day brought
face to face with one another; for since fresh cause
of contention may at any moment result from their meeting,
it will be impossible for them to refrain from mutual
injury. Of this we could have no better instance
than in the city of Pistoja.

Fifteen years ago this city was divided between the
Panciatichi and Cancellieri, as indeed it still continues,
the only difference being that then they were in arms,
whereas, now, they have laid them aside. After
much controversy and wrangling, these factions would
presently proceed to bloodshed, to pulling down houses,
plundering property, and all the other violent courses
usual in divided cities. The Florentines, with
whom it lay to compose these feuds, strove for a long
time to do so by using the third of the methods mentioned;
but when this only led to increased tumult and disorder,
losing patience, they decided to try the second method
and get rid of the ringleaders of both factions by
imprisoning some and banishing others. In this
way a sort of settlement was arrived at, which continues
in operation up to the present hour. There can
be no question, however, that the first of the methods
named would have been the surest. But because
extreme measures have in them an element of greatness
and nobility, a weak republic, so far from knowing

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how to use this first method, can with difficulty be
brought to employ even the second. This, as I
said at the beginning, is the kind of blunder made
by the princes of our times when they have to decide
on matters of moment, from their not considering how
those men acted who in ancient days had to determine
under like conditions. For the weakness of the
present race of men (the result of their enfeebling
education and their ignorance of affairs), makes them
regard the methods followed by the ancients as partly
inhuman and partly impracticable. Accordingly,
they have their own newfangled ways of looking at things,
wholly at variance with the true, as when the sages
of our city, some time since, pronounced that Pistoja
was to be held by feuds and Pisa by fortresses,
not perceiving how useless each of these methods is
in itself.

Having spoken of fortresses already at some length,
I shall not further refer to them here, but shall
consider the futility of trying to hold subject cities
by keeping them divided. In the first place, it
is impossible for the ruling power, whether prince
or republic, to be friends with both factions.
For wherever there is division, it is human nature
to take a side, and to favour one party more than another.
But if one party in a subject city be unfriendly to
you, the consequence will be that you will lose that
city so soon as you are involved in war, since it
is impossible for you to hold a city where you have
enemies both within and without. Should the ruling
power be a republic, there is nothing so likely to
corrupt its citizens and sow dissension among them,
as having to control a divided city. For as each
faction in that city will seek support and endeavour
to make friends in a variety of corrupt ways, two
very serious evils will result: first, that the
governed city will never be contented with its governors,
since there can be no good government where you often
change its form, adapting yourself to the humours
now of one party and now of another; and next, that
the factious spirit of the subject city is certain
to infect your own republic. To which Biondo
testifies, when, in speaking of the citizens of Florence
and Pistoja, he says, “In seeking to unite
Pistoja the Florentines themselves fell out."[1]
It is easy, therefore, to understand how much mischief
attends on such divisions. In the year 1501, when
we lost Arezzo, and when all the Val di Tevere and
Val di Chiana were occupied by the Vitelli and by
Duke Valentino, a certain M. de Lant was sent by the
King of France to cause the whole of the lost towns
to be restored to the Florentines; who finding in
all these towns men who came to him claiming to be
of the party of the Marnocco[2], greatly blamed
this distinction, observing, that if in France any
of the king’s subjects were to say that he was
of the king’s party, he would be punished; since
the expression would imply that there was a party hostile
to the king, whereas it was his majesty’s desire
that all his subjects should be his friends and live
united without any distinction of party. But all
these mistaken methods and opinions originate in the
weakness of rulers, who, seeing that they cannot hold
their States by their own strength and valour, have
recourse to like devices; which, if now and then in
tranquil times they prove of some slight assistance
to them, in times of danger are shown to be worthless.

Page 242

CHAPTER XXVIII.

That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens
are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie
hidden under a semblance of generous deeds.

The granaries of Rome not sufficing to meet a famine
with which the city was visited, a certain Spurius
Melius, a very wealthy citizen for these days, privately
laid in a supply of corn wherewith to feed the people
at his own expense; gaining thereby such general favour
with the commons, that the senate, apprehending that
his bounty might have dangerous consequences, in order
to crush him before he grew too powerful, appointed
a dictator to deal with him and caused him to be put
to death.

Here we have to note that actions which seem good
in themselves and unlikely to occasion harm to any
one, very often become hurtful, nay, unless corrected
in time, most dangerous for a republic. And to
treat the matter with greater fulness, I say, that
while a republic can never maintain itself long, or
manage its affairs to advantage, without citizens
of good reputation, on the other hand the credit enjoyed
by particular citizens often leads to the establishment
of a tyranny. For which reasons, and that things
may take a safe course, it should be so arranged that
a citizen shall have credit only for such behaviour
as benefits, and not for such as injures the State
and its liberties. We must therefore examine
by what ways credit is acquired. These, briefly,
are two, public or secret. Public, when a citizen
gains a great name by advising well or by acting still
better for the common advantage. To credit of
this sort we should open a wide door, holding out rewards
both for good counsels and for good actions, so that
he who renders such services may be at once honoured
and satisfied. Reputation acquired honestly and
openly by such means as these can never be dangerous.
But credit acquired by secret practices, which is
the other method spoken of, is most perilous and prejudicial.
Of such secret practices may be instanced, acts of
kindness done to this or the other citizen in lending
him money, in assisting him to marry his daughters,
in defending him against the magistrates, and in conferring
such other private favours as gain men devoted adherents,
and encourage them after they have obtained such support,
to corrupt the institutions of the State and to violate
its laws.

A well-governed republic, therefore, ought, as I have
said, to throw wide the door to all who seek public
favour by open courses, and to close it against any
who would ingratiate themselves by underhand means.
And this we find was done in Rome. For the Roman
republic, as a reward to any citizen who served it
well, ordained triumphs and all the other honours
which it had to bestow; while against those who sought

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to aggrandize themselves by secret intrigues, it ordained
accusations and impeachment; and when, from the people
being blinded by a false show of benevolence, these
proved insufficient, it provided for a dictator, who
with regal authority might bring to bounds any who
had strayed beyond them, as instanced in the case
of Spurius Melius. And if conduct like his be
ever suffered to pass unchastised, it may well be the
ruin of a republic, for men when they have such examples
set them are not easily led back into the right path.

CHAPTER XXIX.—­That the Faults of a People are due to its Prince.

Let no prince complain of the faults committed by
a people under his control; since these must be ascribed
either to his negligence, or to his being himself
blemished by similar defects. And were any one
to consider what peoples in our own times have been
most given to robbery and other like offences, he
would find that they have only copied their rulers,
who have themselves been of a like nature. Romagna,
before those lords who ruled it were driven out by
Pope Alexander VI., was a nursery of all the worst
crimes, the slightest occasion giving rise to wholesale
rapine and murder. This resulted from the wickedness
of these lords, and not, as they asserted, from the
evil disposition of their subjects. For these
princes being poor, yet choosing to live as though
they were rich, were forced to resort to cruelties
innumerable and practised in divers ways; and among
other shameful devices contrived by them to extort
money, they would pass laws prohibiting certain acts,
and then be the first to give occasion for breaking
them; nor would they chastise offenders until they
saw many involved in the same offence; when they fell
to punishing, not from any zeal for the laws which
they had made, but out of greed to realize the penalty.
Whence flowed many mischiefs, and more particularly
this, that the people being impoverished, but not
corrected, sought to make good their injuries at the
expense of others weaker than themselves. And
thus there sprang up all those evils spoken of above,
whereof the prince is the true cause.

The truth of what I say is confirmed by Titus Livius
where he relates how the Roman envoys, who were conveying
the spoils of the Veientines as an offering to Apollo,
were seized and brought on shore by the corsairs of
the Lipari islands in Sicily; when Timasitheus, the
prince of these islands, on learning the nature of
the offering, its destination, and by whom sent, though
himself of Lipari, behaved as a Roman might, showing
his people what sacrilege it would be to intercept
such a gift, and speaking to such purpose that by
general consent the envoys were suffered to proceed
upon their voyage, taking all their possessions with
them. With reference to which incident the historian
observes: “The multitude, who always
take their colour from their ruler, were filled by
Timasitheus with a religious awe.” And to
like purport we find it said by Lorenzo de’
Medici:—­

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“A prince’s acts his people imitate;
For on their lord the eyes of all men wait."[1]

CHAPTER XXX.—­That a Citizen who seeks
by his personal influence to render signal service
to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy.
How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach
of an Enemy.

When the Roman senate learned that all Etruria was
assembled in arms to march against Rome, and that
the Latins and Hernicians, who before had been the
friends of the Romans, had ranged themselves with the
Volscians the ancient enemies of the Roman name, they
foresaw that a perilous contest awaited them.
But because Camillus was at that time tribune with
consular authority they thought all might be managed
without the appointment of a dictator, provided the
other tribunes, his colleagues would agree to his
assuming the sole direction of affairs. This they
willingly did; “nor,” says Titus
Livius, “did they account anything as taken
from their own dignity which was added to his.”

On receiving their promise of obedience, Camillus
gave orders that three armies should be enrolled.
Of the first, which was to be directed against the
Etruscans, he himself assumed command. The command
of the second, which he meant to remain near Rome
and meet any movement of the Latins and Hernicians,
he gave to Quintius Servilius. The third army,
which he designed for the protection of the city, and
the defence of the gates and Curia, he entrusted to
Lucius Quintius. And he further directed, that
Horatius, one of his colleagues, should furnish supplies
of arms, and corn, and of all else needful in time
of war. Finally he put forward his colleague
Cornelius to preside in the senate and public council,
that from day to day he might advise what should be
done. For in those times these tribunes were
ready either to command or obey as the welfare of
their country might require.

We may gather from this passage how a brave and prudent
man should act, how much good he may effect, and how
serviceable he may be to his country, when by the
force of his character and worth he succeeds in extinguishing
envy. For this often disables men from acting
to the best advantage, not permitting them to obtain
that authority which it is essential they should have
in matters of importance. Now, envy may be extinguished
in one or other of two ways: first, by the approach
of some flagrant danger, whereby seeing themselves
like to be overwhelmed, all forego their own private
ambition and lend a willing obedience to him who counts
on his valour to rescue them. As in the case of
Camillas, who from having given many proofs of surpassing
ability, and from having been three times dictator
and always exercised the office for the public good
and not for his private advantage, had brought men
to fear nothing from his advancement; while his fame
and reputation made it no shame for them to recognize
him as their superior. Wisely, therefore, does
Titus Livius use concerning him the words which I
have cited.

Page 245

The other way in which envy may be extinguished, is
by the death, whether by violence or in the ordinary
course of nature, of those who have been your rivals
in the pursuit of fame or power, and who seeing you
better esteemed than themselves, could never acquiesce
in your superiority or put up with it in patience.
For when these men have been brought up in a corrupt
city, where their training is little likely to improve
them, nothing that can happen will induce them to withdraw
their pretensions; nay, to have their own way and
satisfy their perverse humour, they will be content
to look on while their country is ruined. For
envy such as this there is no cure save by the death
of those of whom it has taken possession. And
when fortune so befriends a great man that his rivals
are removed from his path by a natural death, his glory
is established without scandal or offence, since he
is then able to display his great qualities unhindered.
But when fortune is not thus propitious to him, he
must contrive other means to rid himself of rivals,
and must do so successfully before he can accomplish
anything. Any one who reads with intelligence
the lessons of Holy Writ, will remember how Moses,
to give effect to his laws and ordinances, was constrained
to put to death an endless number of those who out
of mere envy withstood his designs. The necessity
of this course was well understood by the Friar Girolamo
Savonarola, and by the Gonfalonier Piero Soderini.
But the former could not comply with it, because, as
a friar, he himself lacked the needful authority; while
those of his followers who might have exercised that
authority, did not rightly comprehend his teaching.
This, however, was no fault of his; for his sermons
are full of invectives and attacks against “the
wise of this world,” that being the name
he gave to envious rivals and to all who opposed his
reforms. As for Piero Soderini, he was possessed
by the belief that in time and with favourable fortune
he could allay envy by gentleness-and by benefits
conferred on particular men; for as he was still in
the prime of life, and in the fresh enjoyment of that
good-will which his character and opinions had gained
for him, he thought to get the better of all who out
of jealousy opposed him, without giving occasion for
tumult, violence, or disorder; not knowing how time
stays not, worth suffices not, fortune shifts, and
malice will not be won over by any benefit Wherefore,
because they could not or knew not how to vanquish
this envy, the two whom I have named came to their
downfall.

Another point to be noted in the passage we are considering,
is the careful provision made by Camillus for the
safety of Rome both within and without the city.
And, truly, not without reason do wise historians,
like our author, set forth certain events with much
minuteness and detail, to the end that those who come
after may learn how to protect themselves in like
dangers. Further, we have to note that there is

Page 246

no more hazardous or less useful defence than one
conducted without method or system. This is shown
in Camillus causing a third army to be enrolled that
it might be left in Rome for the protection of the
city. Many persons, doubtless, both then and
now, would esteem this precaution superfluous, thinking
that as the Romans were a warlike people and constantly
under arms, there could be no occasion for a special
levy, and that it was time enough to arm when the
need came. But Camillus, and any other equally
prudent captain would be of the same mind, judged
otherwise, not permitting the multitude to take up
arms unless they were to be bound by the rules and
discipline of military service. Let him, therefore,
who is called on to defend a city, taking example by
Camillus, before all things avoid placing arms in the
hands of an undisciplined multitude, but first of
all select and enroll those whom he proposes to arm,
so that they may be wholly governed by him as to where
they shall assemble and whither they shall march; and
then let him direct those who are not enrolled, to
abide every man in his own house for its defence.
Whosoever observes this method in a city which is
attacked, will be able to defend it with ease; but
whosoever disregards it, and follows not the example
of Camillus, shall never succeed.

CHAPTER XXXI.—­That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through
every change the same Spirit and Bearing.

Among other high sayings which our historian ascribes
to Camillus, as showing of what stuff a truly great
man should be made, he puts in his mouth the words,
“My courage came not with my dictatorship
nor went with my exile;” for by these words
we are taught that a great man is constantly the same
through all vicissitudes of Fortune; so that although
she change, now exalting, now depressing, he remains
unchanged, and retains always a mind so unmoved, and
in such complete accordance with his nature as declares
to all that over him Fortune has no dominion.

Very different is the behaviour of those weak-minded
mortals who, puffed up and intoxicated with their
success, ascribe all their felicity to virtues which
they never knew, and thus grow hateful and insupportable
to all around them. Whence also the changes in
their fortunes. For whenever they have to look
adversity in the face, they suddenly pass to the other
extreme, becoming abject and base. And thus it
happens that feeble-minded princes, when they fall
into difficulties, think rather of flight than of
defence, because, having made bad use of their prosperity,
they are wholly unprepared to defend themselves.

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The same merits and defects which I say are found
in individual men, are likewise found in republics,
whereof we have example in the case of Rome and of
Venice. For no reverse of fortune ever broke the
spirit of the Roman people, nor did any success ever
unduly elate them; as we see plainly after their defeat
at Cannae, and after the victory they had over Antiochus.
For the defeat at Cannae, although most momentous,
being the third they had met with, no whit daunted
them; so that they continued to send forth armies,
refused to ransom prisoners as contrary to their custom,
and despatched no envoy to Hannibal or to Carthage
to sue for peace; but without ever looking back on
past humiliations, thought always of war, though in
such straits for soldiers that they had to arm their
old men and slaves. Which facts being made known
to Hanno the Carthaginian, he, as I have already related,
warned the Carthaginian senate not to lay too much
stress upon their victory. Here, therefore, we
see that in times of adversity the Romans were neither
cast down nor dismayed. On the other hand, no
prosperity ever made them arrogant. Before fighting
the battle wherein he was finally routed, Antiochus
sent messengers to Scipio to treat for an accord;
when Scipio offered peace on condition that he withdrew
at once into Syria, leaving all his other dominions
to be dealt with by the Romans as they thought fit.
Antiochus refusing these terms, fought and was defeated,
and again sent envoys to Scipio, enjoining them to
accept whatever conditions the victor might be pleased
to impose. But Scipio proposed no different terms
from those he had offered before saying that “the
Romans, as they lost not heart on defeat, so waxed
not insolent with success.”

The contrary of all this is seen in the behaviour
of the Venetians, who thinking their good fortune
due to valour of which they were devoid, in their
pride addressed the French king as “Son of St.
Mark;” and making no account of the Church,
and no longer restricting their ambition to the limits
of Italy, came to dream of founding an empire like
the Roman. But afterwards, when their good fortune
deserted them, and they met at Vaila a half-defeat
at the hands of the French king, they lost their whole
dominions, not altogether from revolt, but mainly by
a base and abject surrender to the Pope and the King
of Spain. Nay, so low did they stoop as to send
ambassadors to the Emperor offering to become his
tributaries, and to write letters to the Pope, full
of submission and servility, in order to move his
compassion. To such abasement were they brought
in four days’ time by what was in reality only
a half-defeat. For on their flight after the
battle of Vaila only about a half of their forces
were engaged, and one of their two provedditori escaped
to Verona with five and twenty thousand men, horse
and foot. So that had there been a spark of valour
in Venice, or any soundness in her military system,
she might easily have renewed her armies, and again

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confronting fortune have stood prepared either to
conquer, or, if she must fall, to fall more gloriously;
and at any rate might have obtained for herself more
honourable terms. But a pusillanimous spirit,
occasioned by the defects of her ordinances in so
far as they relate to war, caused her to lose at once
her courage and her dominions. And so will it
always happen with those who behave like the Venetians.
For when men grow insolent in good fortune, and abject
inn evil, the fault lies in themselves and in the
character of their training, which, when slight and
frivolous, assimilates them to itself; but when otherwise,
makes them of another temper, and giving them better
acquaintance with the world, causes them to be less
disheartened by misfortunes and less elated by success.

And while this is true of individual men, it holds
good also of a concourse of men living together in
one republic, who will arrive at that measure of perfection
which the institutions of their State permit.
And although I have already said on another occasion
that a good militia is the foundation of all States,
and where that is wanting there can neither be good
laws, nor aught else that is good, it seems to me not
superfluous to say the same again; because in reading
this history of Titus Livius the necessity of such
a foundation is made apparent in every page.
It is likewise shown that no army can be good unless
it be thoroughly trained and exercised, and that this
can only be the case with an army raised from your
own subjects. For as a State is not and cannot
always be at war, you must have opportunity to train
your army in times of peace; but this, having regard
to the cost, you can only have in respect of your
own subjects.

When Camillus, as already related, went forth to meet
the Etruscans, his soldiers on seeing the great army
of their enemy, were filled with fear, thinking themselves
too to withstand its onset. This untoward disposition
being reported to Camillus, he showed himself to his
men and by visiting their tents, and conversing with
this and the other among them, was able to remove
their misgivings; and, finally, without other word
of command, he bade them “each do his part
as he had learned and been accustomed.”
Now, any one who well considers the methods followed
by Camillus, and the words spoken by him to encourage
his soldiers to face their enemy, will perceive that
these words and methods could never have been used
with an army which had not been trained and disciplined
in time of peace as well as of war. For no captain
can trust to untrained soldiers or look for good service
at their hands; nay, though he were another Hannibal,
with such troops his defeat were certain. For,
as a captain cannot be present everywhere while a battle
is being fought, unless he have taken all measures
beforehand to render his men of the same temper as
himself, and have made sure that they perfectly understand
his orders and arrangements, he will inevitably be
destroyed.

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When a city therefore is armed and trained as Rome
was, and when its citizens have daily opportunity,
both singly and together, to make trial of their valour
and learn what fortune can effect, it will always
happen, that at all times, and whether circumstances
be adverse or favourable, they will remain of unaltered
courage and preserve the same noble bearing.
But when its citizens are unpractised in arms, and
trust not to their own valour but wholly to the arbitration
of Fortune, they will change their temper as she changes,
and offer always the same example of behaviour as
was given by the Venetians.

CHAPTER XXXII.—­Of the methods which some have used to make Peace
impossible.

The towns of Caere and Velitrae, two of her own colonies,
revolted from Rome in expectation of being protected
by the Latins. But the Latins being routed and
all hopes of help from that quarter at an end, many
of the townsmen recommended that envoys should be sent
to Rome to make their peace with the senate.
This proposal, however, was defeated by those who
had been the prime movers of the revolt, who, fearing
that the whole punishment might fall on their heads,
to put a stop to any talk of an adjustment, incited
the multitude to take up arms and make a foray into
the Roman territory.

And, in truth, when it is desired that a prince or
people should banish from their minds every thought
of reconciliation, there is no surer or more effectual
plan than to incite them to inflict grave wrong on
him with whom you would not have them be reconciled;
for, then, the fear of that punishment which they
will seem to themselves to have deserved, will always
keep them apart. At the close of the first war
waged by the Romans against Carthage, the soldiers
who had served under the Carthaginians in Sardinia
and Sicily, upon peace being proclaimed, returned
to Africa; where, being dissatisfied with their pay,
they mutinied against the Carthaginians, and choosing
two of their number, Mato and Spendio, to be their
leaders, seized and sacked many towns subject to Carthage.
The Carthaginians, being loath to use force until
they had tried all other methods for bringing them
to reason, sent Hasdrubal, their fellow-citizen, to
mediate with them, thinking that from formerly having
commanded them he might be able to exercise some influence
over them. But on his arrival, Spendio and Mato,
to extinguish any hope these mutineers might have
had of making peace with Carthage, and so leave them
no alternative but war, persuaded them that their best
course was to put Hasdrubal, with all the other Carthaginian
citizens whom they had taken prisoners, to death.
Whereupon, they not only put them to death, but first
subjected them to an infinity of tortures; crowning
their wickedness by a proclamation to the effect that
every Carthaginian who might thereafter fall into
their hands should meet a like fate. This advice,
therefore, and its consummation had the effect of
rendering these mutineers relentless and inveterate
in their hostility to the Carthaginians.

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CHAPTER XXXIII.—­That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your
Men with confidence in one another and in you.

To insure an army being victorious in battle you must
inspire it with the conviction that it is certain
to prevail. The causes which give it this confidence
are its being well armed and disciplined, and the
soldiers knowing one another. These conditions
are only to be found united in soldiers born and bred
in the same country.

It is likewise essential that the army should think
so well of its captain as to trust implicitly to his
prudence; which it will always do if it see him careful
of its welfare, attentive to discipline, brave in
battle, and otherwise supporting well and honourably
the dignity of his position. These conditions
he fulfils when, while punishing faults, he does not
needlessly harass his men, keeps his word with them,
shows them that the path to victory is easy, and conceals
from them, or makes light of things which seen from
a distance might appear to threaten danger. The
observance of these precautions will give an army great
confidence, and such confidence leads to victory.

This confidence the Romans were wont to inspire in
the minds of their soldiers by the aid of religion;
and accordingly their consuls were appointed, their
armies were enrolled, their soldiers marched forth,
and their battles were begun, only when the auguries
and auspices were favourable; and without attending
to all these observances no prudent captain would
ever engage in combat; knowing that unless his soldiers
were first assured that the gods were on their side,
he might readily suffer defeat. But if any consul
or other leader ever joined battle contrary to the
auspices, the Romans would punish him, as they did
Claudius Pulcher.

The truth of what I affirm is plainly seen from the
whole course of the Roman history, but is more particularly
established by the words which Livius puts into the
mouth of Appius Claudius, who, when complaining to
the people of the insolence of the tribunes, and taxing
them with having caused the corruption of the auspices
and other rites of religion, is made to say, “And
now they would strip even religion of its authority.
For what matters it, they will tell you, that the fowls
refuse to peck, or come slowly from the coop, or that
a cock has crowed? These are small matters doubtless;
but it was by not contemning such small matters as
these, that our forefathers built up this great republic.”
And, indeed, in these small matters lies a power which
keeps men united and of good courage, which is of
itself the chief condition of success.

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But the observances of religion must be accompanied
by valour, for otherwise they can nothing avail.
The men of Praneste, leading forth their army against
the Romans, took up their position near the river
Allia, on the very spot where the Romans had been routed
by the Gauls, selecting this ground that it might
inspire their own side with confidence, and dishearten
their enemies with the unhappy memories which it recalled
But although, for the reasons already noted, this was
a course which promised success, the result nevertheless
showed that true valour is not to be daunted by trifling
disadvantages. And this the historian well expresses
by the words he puts in the mouth of the dictator
as spoken to his master of the knights “See
how these fellows, in encamping on the banks of the
Allia, have chosen their ground in reliance upon fortune.
Do you, therefore, relying on discipline and valour,
fall upon then centre.” For true valour,
tight discipline, and the feeling of security gained
by repeated victories, are not to be counteracted
by things of no real moment, dismayed by empty terrors,
or quelled by a solitary mishap. As was well seen
when the two Manlii, being consuls in command against
the Volscians, rashly allowed a part of their army
to go out foraging, and both those who went out and
those who stayed behind found themselves attacked
at the same moment For from this danger they were
saved by the courage of the soldiers, and not by the
foresight of the consuls. With regard to which
occurrence Titus Livius observes, “Even without
a leader the steadfast valour of the soldiers was
maintained.”

Here I must not omit to notice the device practised
by Fabius to give his army confidence, when he led
it for the first time into Etruria. For judging
such encouragement to be especially needed by his men,
since they were entering an unknown country to encounter
a new foe, he addressed them before they joined battle,
and, after reciting many reasons for expecting a victory,
told them, that “he could have mentioned
other favourable circumstances making victory certain,
had it not been dangerous to disclose them.”
And as this device was dexterously used it merits
imitation.

CHAPTER XXXIV.—­By what reports, rumours,
or surmises the Citizens of a Republic are led to
favour a Fellow-citizen: and-whether the Magistracies
are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by
a Prince.

I have elsewhere related how Titus Manlius, afterwards
named Torquatus, rescued his father from the charge
laid against him by Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the
people. And though the means he took to effect
this were somewhat violent and irregular, so pleasing
to everyone were his filial piety and affection, that
not only did he escape rebuke, but when military tribunes
had to be appointed his name was second on the list
of those chosen. To explain his good fortune,
it will, I think, be useful to consider what are the
methods followed by the citizens of a republic in
estimating the character of those on whom they bestow
honours, so as to see whether what I have already
said on this head be true, namely, that a people is
more discriminating in awarding honours than a prince.

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I say, then, that in conferring honours and offices,
the people, when it has no knowledge of a man from
his public career, follows the estimate given of him
by the general voice, and by common report; or else
is guided by some prepossession or preconceived opinion
which it has adopted concerning him. Such impressions
are formed either from consideration of a man’s
descent (it being assumed, until the contrary appears,
that where his ancestors have been great and distinguished
citizens their descendant will resemble them), or else
from regard to his manners and habits; and nothing
can be more in his favour than that he frequents the
company of the grave and virtuous, and such as are
generally reputed wise. For as we can have no
better clue to a man’s character than the company
he keeps, he who frequents worthy company deservedly
obtains a good name, since there can hardly fail to
be some similarity between himself and his associates.
Sometimes, however, the popular estimate of a man
is founded on some remarkable and noteworthy action,
though not of public moment, in which he has acquitted
himself well. And of all the three causes which
create a prepossession in a man’s favour, none
is so effectual as this last. For the presumption
that he will resemble his ancestors and kinsmen is
so often misleading, that men are slow to trust and
quick to discard it, unless confirmed by the personal
worth of him of whom they are judging.

The criterion of character afforded by a man’s
manners and conversation is a safer guide than the
presumption of inherited excellence, but is far inferior
to that afforded by his actions; for until he has given
actual proof of his worth, his credit is built on mere
opinion, which may readily change. But this third
mode of judging, which originates in and rests upon
his actions, at once gives him a name which can only
be destroyed by his afterwards doing many actions
of a contrary nature. Those therefore who live
in a republic should conform to this third criterion,
and endeavour, as did many of the Roman youth, to make
their start in life with some extraordinary achievement,
either by promoting a law conducive to the general
well-being, or by accusing some powerful citizen as
a transgressor of the laws, or by performing some similar
new and notable action which cannot fail to be much
spoken of.

Actions like this are necessary not only to lay a
foundation for your fame, but also to maintain and
extend it. To which end, they must continually
be renewed, as we find done by Titus Manlius throughout
the whole course of his life. For after winning
his earliest renown by his bold and singular defence
of his father, when some years had passed he fought
his famous duel with the Gaul, from whom, when he had
slain him, he took the twisted golden collar which
gave him the name of Torquatus. Nor was this
the last of his remarkable actions, for at a later
period, when he was of ripe years, he caused his own

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son to be put to death, because he had fought without
leave, although successfully. Which three actions
gained for him at the time a greater name, and have
made him more renowned through after ages than all
his triumphs and victories, though of these he had
as large a share as fell to the lot of any other Roman.
The explanation of which is, that while in his victories
Manlius had many who resembled him, in these particular
actions he stood almost or entirely alone.

So, too, with the elder Scipio, all whose victories
together did not obtain for him so much reputation,
as did his rescue, while he was yet young, of his
father at the Ticino, and his undaunted bearing after
the rout at Cannae, when with his naked sword he constrained
a number of the Roman youth to swear never to abandon
their country, as some among them had before been
minded to do. It was these two actions, therefore,
which laid the foundation of his future fame and paved
the way for his triumphs in Spain and Africa.
And the fair esteem in which men held him, was still
further heightened when in Spain he restored a daughter
to her father, a wife to her husband.

Nor is it only the citizen who seeks reputation as
leading to civil honours, who must act in this way;
the prince who would maintain his credit in his princedom
must do likewise; since nothing helps so much to make
a prince esteemed as to give signal proofs of his worth,
whether by words or by deeds which tend to promote
the public good, and show him to be so magnanimous,
generous, and just, that he may well pass into a proverb
among his subjects. But to return to the point
whence I digressed, I say that if a people, when they
first confer honours on a fellow-citizen, rest their
judgment on any one of the three circumstances above-mentioned,
they build on a reasonable foundation; but, when many
instances of noble conduct have made a man favourably
known, that the foundation is still better, since then
there is hardly room for mistake. I speak merely
of those honours which are bestowed on a man at the
outset of his career, before he has come to be known
by continued proof, or is found to have passed from
one kind of conduct to another and dissimilar kind,
and I maintain that in such cases, so far as erroneous
judgments or corrupt motives are concerned, a people
will always commit fewer mistakes than a prince.

But since a people may happen to be deceived as regards
the character, reputation, and actions of a man, thinking
them better or greater than in truth they are, an
error a prince is less likely to fall into from his
being informed and warned by his advisers, in order
that the people may not lack similar advice, wise
founders of republics have provided, that when the
highest dignities of the State, to which it would be
dangerous to appoint incapable men, have to be filled
up, and it appears that some incapable man is the
object of the popular choice, it shall be lawful and
accounted honourable for any citizen to declare in

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the public assemblies the defects of the favoured
candidate, that the people, being made acquainted
therewith, may be better able to judge of his fitness.
That this was the practice in Rome we have proof in
the speech made by Fabius Maximus to the people during
the second Punic war, when in the appointment of consuls
public favour leaned towards Titus Ottacilius.
For Fabius judging him unequal to the duties of the
consulship at such a crisis, spoke against him and
pointed out his insufficiency, and so prevented his
appointment, turning the popular favour towards another
who deserved it more.

In the choice of its magistrates, therefore, a people
judges of those among whom it has to choose, in accordance
with the surest indications it can get; and when it
can be advised as princes are, makes fewer mistakes
than they. But the citizen who would make a beginning
by gaining the good-will of the people, must, to obtain
it, perform, like Titus Manlius, some noteworthy action.

CHAPTER XXXV.—­Of the Danger incurred
in being the first to recommend new Measures; and
that the more unusual the Measures the greater the
Danger.

How perilous a thing it is to put one’s self
at the head of changes whereby many are affected,
how difficult to guide and bring them to perfection,
and when perfected to maintain them, were too wide
and arduous a subject to be treated here. Wherefore
I reserve it for a fitter occasion, and shall now
speak only of those dangers which are incurred by
the citizens of a republic or by the counsellors of
a prince in being the first to promote some grave
and important measure in such manner that the whole
responsibility attending it rests with them. For
as men judge of things by their results, any evil which
ensues from such measures will be imputed to their
author. And although if good ensue he will be
applauded, nevertheless in matters of this kind, what
a man may gain is as nothing to what he may lose.

Selim, the present sultan, or Grand Turk as he is
called, being in readiness, as some who come from
his country relate, to set forth on an expedition
against Egypt and Syria, was urged by one of his bashaws
whom he had stationed on the confines of Persia, to
make war upon the Sofi. In compliance with which
advice he went on this new enterprise with a vast
army. But coming to a great plain, wherein were
many deserts and few streams, and encountering the
same difficulties as in ancient times had proved the
ruin of many Roman armies, he suffered so much from
pestilence and famine, that, although victorious in
battle, he lost a great part of his men. This
so enraged him against the bashaw on whose advice
he had acted, that he forthwith put him to death.

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In like manner, we read of many citizens who having
strenuously promoted various measures were banished
when these turned out badly. Certain citizens
of Rome, for instance, were very active in forwarding
a law allowing the appointment of a plebeian to be
consul. This law passing, it so happened that
the first plebeian consul who went forth with the
armies was routed; and had it not been that the party
in whose behalf the law was made was extremely powerful,
its promoters would have fared badly. It is plain
therefore that the counsellors whether of a republic
or of a prince stand in this dilemma, that if they
do not conscientiously advise whatsoever they think
advantageous for their city or prince, they fail in
their duty; if they do advise it, they risk their
places and their lives; all men being subject to this
infirmity of judging advice by the event.

When I consider in what way this reproach or this
danger may best be escaped, I find no other remedy
to recommend than that in giving advice you proceed
discreetly not identifying yourself in a special manner
with the measure you would see carried out, but offering
your opinion without heat, and supporting it temperately
and modestly, so that if the prince or city follow
it, they shall do so of their own good-will, and not
seem to be dragged into it by your importunity.
When you act thus, neither prince nor people can reasonably
bear you a grudge in respect of the advice given by
you, since that advice was not adopted contrary to
the general opinion. For your danger lies in
many having opposed you, who afterwards, should your
advice prove hurtful, combine to ruin you. And
although in taking this course you fall short of the
glory which is earned by him who stands alone against
many in urging some measure which succeeds, you have
nevertheless two advantages to make up for it:
first, that you escape danger; and second, that when
you have temperately stated your views, and when,
in consequence of opposition, your advice has not
been taken, should other counsels prevail and mischief
come of them, your credit will be vastly enhanced.
And although credit gained at the cost of misfortune
to your prince or city cannot be matter of rejoicing,
still it is something to be taken into account.

On this head, then, I know of no other advice to offer.
For that you should be silent and express no opinion
at all, were a course hurtful for your prince or city,
and which would not absolve you from danger, since
you would soon grow to be suspected, when it might
fare with you as with the friend of Perseus the Macedonian
king. For Perseus being defeated by Paulus Emilius,
and making his escape with a few companions, it happened
that one of them, in reviewing the past, began to point
out to the king many mistakes which he had made and
which had been his ruin. Whereupon Perseus turning
upon him said, “Traitor, hast thou waited
till now when there is no remedy to tell me these things?”
and so saying, slew him with his own hand. Such
was the penalty incurred by one who was silent when
he should have spoken, and who spoke when he should
have been silent; and who found no escape from danger
in having refrained from giving advice. Wherefore,
I believe, that the course which I have recommended
should be observed and followed.

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CHAPTER XXXVI.—­Why it has been and still
may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at the beginning
of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less
than Women.

The bravery of the Gaul who on the banks of the Anio
challenged any among the Romans to fight with him,
and the combat that thereupon ensued between him and
Titus Manlius, remind me of what Titus Livius oftener
than once observes in his history, that “at
the beginning of a fray the Gauls are more than men,
but ere it is ended show themselves less than women.”

Touching the cause of this, many are content to believe
that such is their nature, which, indeed, I take to
be true; but we are not, therefore, to assume that
the natural temper which makes them brave at the outset,
may not be so trained and regulated as to keep them
brave to the end. And, to prove this, I say,
that armies are of three kinds. In one of these
you have discipline with bravery and valour as its
consequence. Such was the Roman army, which is
shown by all historians to have maintained excellent
discipline as the result of constant military training.
And because in a well-disciplined army none must do
anything save by rule, we find that in the Roman army,
from which as it conquered the world all others should
take example, none either eat, or slept, or bought,
or sold, or did anything else, whether in his military
or in his private capacity, without orders from the
consul. Those armies which do otherwise are not
true armies, and if ever they have any success, it
is owing to the fury and impetuosity of their onset
and not to trained and steady valour. But of
this impetuosity and fury, trained valour, when occasion
requires, will make use; nor will any danger daunt
it or cause it to lose heart, its courage being kept
alive by its discipline, and its confidence fed by
the hope of victory which never fails it while that
discipline is maintained.

But the contrary happens with armies of the second
sort, those, namely, which have impetuosity without
discipline, as was the case with the Gauls whose courage
in a protracted conflict gradually wore away; so that
unless they succeeded in their first attack, the impetuosity
to which they trusted, having no support from disciplined
valour, soon cooled; when, as they had nothing else
to depend on, their efforts ceased. The Romans,
on the other hand, being less disquieted in danger
by reason of their perfect discipline, and never losing
hope, fought steadily and stubbornly to the last,
and with the same courage at the end as at the outset;
nay, growing heated by the conflict, only became the
fiercer the longer it was continued.

In armies of the third sort both natural spirit and
trained valour are wanting; and to this class belong
the Italian armies of our own times, of which it may
be affirmed that they are absolutely worthless, never
obtaining a victory, save when, by some accident, the
enemy they encounter takes to flight. But since
we have daily proofs of this absence of valour, it
were needless to set forth particular instances of
it.

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That all, however, may know on the testimony of Titus
Livius what methods a good army should take, and what
are taken by a bad army, I shall cite the words he
represents Papirius Cursor to have used when urging
that Fabius, his master of the knights, should be punished
for disobedience, and denouncing the consequences
which would ensue were he absolved, saying:—­“Let
neither God nor man be held in reverence; let the
orders of captains and the Divine auspices be alike
disregarded; let a vagrant soldiery range without
leave through the country of friend or foe; reckless
of their military oath, let them disband at their
pleasure; let them forsake their deserted standards,
and neither rally nor disperse at the word of command;
let them fight when they choose, by day or by night,
with or without advantage of ground, with or without
the bidding of their leader, neither maintaining their
ranks nor observing the order of battle; and let
our armies, from being a solemn and consecrated company,
grow to resemble some dark and fortuitous gathering
of cut-throats._” With this passage before us,
it is easy to pronounce whether the armies of our
times be “a dark and fortuitous gathering,”
or “a solemn and consecrated company;”
nay, how far they fall short of anything worthy to
be called an army, possessing neither the impetuous
but disciplined valour of the Romans, nor even the
mere undisciplined impetuosity of the Gauls.

CHAPTER XXXVII.—­Whether a general engagement
should be preceded by skirmishes; and how, avoiding
these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy.

Besides all the other difficulties which hinder men
from bringing anything to its utmost perfection, it
appears, as I have already observed, that in close
vicinity to every good is found also an evil, so apt
to grow up along with it that it is hardly possible
to have the one without accepting the other.
This we see in all human affairs, and the result is,
that unless fortune aid us to overcome this natural
and common disadvantage, we never arrive at any excellence.
I am reminded of this by the combat between Titus
Manlius and the Gaul, concerning which Livius writes
that it “determined the issue of the entire
war; since the Gauls, abandoning their camp, hastily
withdrew to the country about Tivoli, whence they
presently passed into Campania.”

It may be said, therefore, on the one hand, that a
prudent captain ought absolutely to refrain from all
those operations which, while of trifling moment in
themselves, may possibly produce an ill effect on his
army. Now, to engage in a combat wherein you
risk your whole fortunes without putting forth your
entire strength, is, as I observed before, when condemning
the defence of a country by guarding its defiles, an
utterly foolhardy course. On the other hand,
it is to be said that a prudent captain, when he has
to meet a new and redoubtable adversary, ought, before
coming to a general engagement, to accustom his men
by skirmishes and passages of arms, to the quality
of their enemy; that they may learn to know him, and
how to deal with him, and so free themselves from the
feeling of dread which his name and fame inspire.

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This for a captain is a matter of the very greatest
importance, and one which it might be almost fatal
for him to neglect, since to risk a pitched battle
without first giving your soldiers such opportunities
to know their enemy and shake off their fear of him,
is to rush on certain destruction. When Valerius
Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their armies
against the Samnites, these being new adversaries with
whom up to that time they had not measured their strength,
Titus Livius tells us that before giving battle he
made his men make trial of the enemy in several unimportant
skirmishes, “lest they should be dismayed
by a new foe and a new method of warfare.”
Nevertheless, there is very great danger that, if
your soldiers get the worst in these encounters, their
alarm and self-distrust may be increased, and a result
follow contrary to that intended, namely, that you
dispirit where you meant to reassure.

This, therefore, is one of those cases in which the
evil lies so nigh the good, and both are so mixed
up together that you may readily lay hold of the one
when you think to grasp the other. And with regard
to this I say, that a good captain should do what
he can that nothing happen which might discourage
his men, nor is there anything so likely to discourage
them as to begin with a defeat. For which reason
skirmishes are, as a rule, to be avoided, and only
to be allowed where you fight to great advantage and
with a certainty of victory. In like manner,
no attempt should be made to defend the passes leading
into your country unless your whole army can co-operate;
nor are any towns to be defended save those whose
loss necessarily involves your ruin. And as to
those towns which you do defend, you must so arrange,
both in respect of the garrison within and the army
without, that in the event of a siege your whole forces
can be employed. All other towns you must leave
undefended. For, provided your army be kept together,
you do not, in losing what you voluntarily abandon,
forfeit your military reputation, or sacrifice your
hopes of final success. But when you lose what
it was your purpose, and what all know it was your
purpose to hold, you suffer a real loss and injury,
and, like the Gauls on the defeat of their champion,
you are ruined by a mishap of no moment in itself.

Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus, a great
soldier in his day, and of a great name, on being
invaded by the Romans, laid waste and relinquished
much of his territory which he thought he could not
defend; rightly judging it more hurtful to his reputation
to lose territory after an attempt to defend it, than
to abandon it to the enemy as something he cared little
to retain. So, likewise, after the battle of
Cannae, when their affairs were at their worst, the
Romans refused aid to many subject and protected States,
charging them to defend themselves as best they could.
And this is a better course than to undertake to defend
and then to fail; for by refusing to defend, you lose
only your friend; whereas in failing, you not only
lose your friend, but weaken yourself.

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But to return to the matter in hand, I affirm, that
even when a captain is constrained by inexperience
of his enemy to make trial of him by means of skirmishes,
he ought first to see that he has so much the advantage
that he runs no risk of defeat; or else, and this is
his better course, he must do as Marius did when sent
against the Cimbrians, a very courageous people who
were laying Italy waste, and by their fierceness and
numbers, and from the fact of their having already
routed a Roman army, spreading terror wherever they
came. For before fighting a decisive battle,
Marius judged it necessary to do something to lessen
the dread in which these enemies were held by his army;
and being a prudent commander, he, on several occasions,
posted his men at points where the Cimbrians must
pass, that seeing and growing familiar with their
appearance, while themselves in safety and within the
shelter of their intrenched camp, and finding them
to be a mere disorderly rabble, encumbered with baggage,
and either without weapons, or with none that were
formidable, they might at last assume courage and grow
eager to engage them in battle. The part thus
prudently taken by Marius, should be carefully imitated
by others who would escape the dangers above spoken
of and not have to betake themselves like the Gauls
to a disgraceful flight, on sustaining some trifling
defeat.

But since in this Discourse I have referred by name
to Valerius Corvinus, in my next Chapter I shall cite
his words to show what manner of man a captain ought
to be.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.—­Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers
can confide.

Valerius Corvinus, as I have said already, was sent
in command of an army against the Samnites, who were
then new enemies to Rome. Wherefore, to reassure
his soldiers and familiarize them with their adversaries,
he made them engage with them in various unimportant
passages of arms. But not thinking this enough,
he resolved before delivering battle to address his
men, and by reminding them of their valour and his
own, to make it plain how little they should esteem
such enemies. And from the words which Titus
Livius puts in his mouth we may gather what manner
of man the captain ought to be in whom an army will
put its trust. For he makes him say:—­“Bear
ye also this in mind under whose conduct and auspices
you are about to fight, and whether he whom you are
to obey be great only in exhorting, bold only in words,
and all unpractised in arms; or whether he be one
who himself knows how to use his spear, to march before
the eagles, and play his part in the thickest of the
fight. Soldiers! I would have you follow
my deeds and not my words, and look to me for example
rather than for commands; for with this right hand
I have won for myself three consulships, and an unsurpassed
renown.” Which words rightly understood
give every one to know what he must do to merit a
captain’s rank. And if any man obtain it
by other means, he will soon discover that advancement
due to chance or intrigue rather takes away than brings
reputation, since it is men who give lustre to titles
and not titles to men.

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From what has been said it will likewise be understood
that if great captains when matched against an unfamiliar
foe have had to resort to unusual methods for reassuring
the minds even of veteran soldiers, much more will
it be necessary for them to use all their address when
in command of a raw and untried army which has never
before looked an enemy in the face. For if an
unfamiliar adversary inspire terror even in a veteran
army, how much greater must be the terror which any
army will inspire in the minds of untrained men.
And yet we often find all these difficulties overcome
by the supreme prudence of a great captain like the
Roman Gracchus or the Theban Epaminondas, of whom I
have before spoken, who with untried troops defeated
the most practised veterans. And the method they
are said to have followed was to train their men for
some months in mimic warfare, so as to accustom them
to discipline and obedience, after which they employed
them with complete confidence on actual service.

No man, therefore, of warlike genius, need despair
of creating a good army if only he have the men; for
the prince who has many subjects and yet lacks soldiers,
has only to thank his own inertness and want of foresight,
and must not complain of the cowardice of his people.

CHAPTER XXXIX.—­That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places.

Among other qualifications essential in a good captain
is a knowledge, both general and particular, of places
and countries, for without such knowledge it is impossible
for him to carry out any enterprise in the best way.
And while practice is needed for perfection in every
art, in this it is needed in the highest degree.
Such practice, or particular knowledge as it may be
termed, is sooner acquired in the chase than in any
other exercise; and, accordingly, we find it said by
ancient historians that those heroes who, in their
day, ruled the world, were bred in the woods and trained
to the chase; for this exercise not merely gives the
knowledge I speak of, but teaches countless other lessons
needful in war. And Xenophon in his life of Cyrus
tells us, that Cyrus, on his expedition against the
King of Armenia, when assigning to each of his followers
the part he was to perform, reminded them that the
enterprise on which they were engaged, differed little
from one of those hunting expeditions on which they
had gone so often in his company; likening those who
were to lie in ambush in the mountains, to the men
sent to spread the toils on the hill-tops; and those
who were to overrun the plain, to the beaters whose
business it is to start the game from its lair that
it may be driven into the toils. Now, this is
related to show how, in the opinion of Xenophon, the
chase is a mimic representation of war, and therefore
to be esteemed by the great as useful and honourable.

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Nor can that knowledge of countries which I have spoken
of as necessary in a commander, be obtained in any
convenient way except by the chase. For he who
joins therein gains a special acquaintance with the
character of the country in which it is followed;
and he who has made himself specially familiar with
one district, will afterwards readily understand the
character of any strange country into which he comes.
For all countries, and the districts of which they
are made up, have a certain resemblance to one another,
so that from a knowledge of one we can pass easily
to the knowledge of another. He therefore who
is without such practical acquaintance with some one
country, can only with difficulty, and after a long
time, obtain a knowledge of another, while he who
possesses it can take in at a glance how this plain
spreads, how that mountain slopes, whither that valley
winds, and all other like particulars in respect of
which he has already acquired a certain familiarity.

The truth of what I affirm is shown by Titus Livius
in the case of Publius Decius, who, being military
tribune in the army which the consul Cornelius led
against the Samnites, when the consul advanced into
a defile where the Roman army were like to be shut
in by the enemy, perceiving the great danger they
ran, and noting, as Livius relates, a hill which rose
by a steep ascent and overhung the enemy’s camp,
and which, though hard of access for heavy-armed troops,
presented little difficulty to troops lightly armed,
turned to the consul and said:—­“Seest
thou, Aulus Cornelius, yonder height over above the
enemy, which they have been blind enough to neglect?
There, were we manfully to seize it, might we find
the citadel of our hopes and of our safety.”
Whereupon, he was sent by the consul with three thousand
men to secure the height, and so saved the Roman army.
And as it was part of his plan to make his own escape
and carry off his men safely under shelter of night,
Livius represents him as saying to his soldiers:—­“Come
with me, that, while daylight still serves, we may
learn where the enemy have posted their guards, and
by what exit we may issue hence.” Accordingly,
putting on the cloak of a common soldier, lest the
enemy should observe that an officer was making his
rounds he surveyed their camp in all directions.

Now any one who carefully studies the whole of this
passage, must perceive how useful and necessary it
is for a captain to know the nature of places, which
knowledge had Decius not possessed he could not have
decided that it would be for the advantage of the Roman
army to occupy this hill; nor could he have judged
from a distance whether the hill was accessible or
no; and when he reached the summit and desired to return
to the consul, since he was surrounded on all sides
by the enemy, he never could have distinguished the
path it was safe for him to take, from those guarded
by the foe. For all which reasons it was absolutely
essential that Decius should have that thorough knowledge
which enabled him by gaining possession of this hill
to save the Roman army, and to discover a path whereby,
in the event of his being attacked, he and his followers
might escape.

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CHAPTER XL.—­That Fraud is fair in War.

Although in all other affairs it be hateful to use
fraud, in the operations of war it is praiseworthy
and glorious; so that he who gets the better of his
enemy by fraud, is as much extolled as he who prevails
by force. This appears in the judgments passed
by such as have written of the lives of great warriors,
who praise Hannibal and those other captains who have
been most noted for acting in this way. But since
we may read of many instances of such frauds, I shall
not cite them here. This, however, I desire to
say, that I would not have it understood that any
fraud is glorious which leads you to break your plighted
word, or to depart from covenants to which you have
agreed; for though to do so may sometimes gain you
territory and power, it can never, as I have said
elsewhere, gain you glory.

The fraud, then, which I here speak of is that employed
against an enemy who places no trust in you, and is
wholly directed to military operations, such as the
stratagem of Hannibal at the Lake of Thrasymene, when
he feigned flight in order to draw the Roman consul
and his army into an ambuscade; or when to escape
from the hands of Fabius Maximus he fastened lights
to the horns of his oxen. Similar to the above
was the deceit practised by Pontius the Samnite commander
to inveigle the Roman army into the Caudine Forks.
For after he had drawn up his forces behind the hills,
he sent out a number of his soldiers, disguised as
herdsmen, to drive great herds of cattle across the
plain; who being captured by the Romans, and interrogated
as to where the Samnite army was, all of them, as
they had been taught by Pontius, agreed in saying that
it had gone to besiege Nocera: which being believed
by the consuls, led them to advance within the Caudine
Valley, where no sooner were they come than they were
beset by the Samnites. And the victory thus won
by a fraud would have been most glorious for Pontius
had he but taken the advice of his father Herennius,
who urged that the Romans should either be set at
liberty unconditionally, or all be put to death; but
that a mean course “which neither gains friends
nor gets rid of foes” should be avoided.
And this was sound advice, for, as has already been
shown, in affairs of moment a mean course is always
hurtful.

CHAPTER XLI.—­That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by
Dishonour; and in either way is well defended.

The consuls together with the whole Roman army fell,
as I have related, into the hands of the Samnites,
who imposed on them the most ignominious terms, insisting
that they should be stripped of their arms, and pass
under the yoke before they were allowed to return to
Rome. The consuls being astounded by the harshness
of these conditions and the whole army overwhelmed
with dismay, Lucius Lentulus, the Roman lieutenant,

Page 263

stood forward and said, that in his opinion they ought
to decline no course whereby their country might be
saved; and that as the very existence of Rome depended
on the preservation of her army, that army must be
saved at any sacrifice, for whether the means be honourable
or ignominious, all is well done that is done for
the defence of our country. And he said that
were her army preserved, Rome, in course of time, might
wipe out the disgrace; but if her army were destroyed,
however gloriously it might perish, Rome and her freedom
would perish with it. In the event his counsel
was followed.

Now this incident deserves to be noted and pondered
over by every citizen who is called on to advise his
country; for when the entire safety of our country
is at stake, no consideration of what is just or unjust,
merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful, must intervene.
On the contrary, every other consideration being set
aside, that course alone must be taken which preserves
the existence of the country and maintains its liberty.
And this course we find followed by the people of
France, both in their words and in their actions, with
the view of supporting the dignity of their king and
the integrity of their kingdom; for there is no remark
they listen to with more impatience than that this
or the other course is disgraceful to the king.
For their king, they say, can incur no disgrace by
any resolve he may take, whether it turn out well
or ill; and whether it succeed or fail, all maintain
that he has acted as a king should.

CHAPTER XLII.—­That Promises made on Compulsion are not to be
observed.

When, after being subjected to this disgrace, the
consuls returned to Rome with their disarmed legions,
Spurius Posthumius, himself one of the consuls, was
the first to contend in the senate that the terms made
in the Caudine Valley were not to be observed.
For he argued that the Roman people were not bound
by them, though he himself doubtless was, together
with all the others who had promised peace; wherefore,
if the people desired to set themselves free from
every engagement, he and all the rest who had given
this promise must be made over as prisoners into the
hands of the Samnites. And so steadfastly did
he hold to this opinion, that the senate were content
to adopt it, and sending him and the rest as prisoners
back to Samnium, protested to the Samnites that the
peace was not binding. And so kind was Fortune
to Posthumius on this occasion, that the Samnites
would not keep him as a prisoner, and that on his
return to Rome, notwithstanding his defeat, he was
held in higher honour by the Romans than the victorious
Pontius by his countrymen.

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Here two points are to be noted; first, that glory
may be won by any action; for although, commonly,
it follow upon victory, it may also follow on defeat,
if this defeat be seen to have happened through no
fault of yours, or if, directly after, you perform
some valiant action which cancels it. The other
point to be noted is that there is no disgrace in
not observing promises wrung from you by force; for
promises thus extorted when they affect the public
welfare will always be broken so soon as the pressure
under which they were made is withdrawn, and that,
too, without shame on the part of him who breaks them;
of which we read many instances in history, and find
them constantly occurring at the present day.
Nay, as between princes, not only are such compulsory
promises broken when the force which extorted them
is removed, but all other promises as well, are in
like manner disregarded when the causes which led
to them no longer operate.

Whether this is a thing to be commended or no, and
whether such methods ought or ought not to be followed
by princes, has already been considered by me in my
“Treatise of the Prince” wherefore
I say no more on that subject here.

CHAPTER XLIII.—­That Men born in the same Province retain through all
Times nearly the same Character.

The wise are wont to say, and not without reason or
at random, that he who would forecast what is about
to happen should look to what has been; since all
human events, whether present or to come, have their
exact counterpart in the past. And this, because
these events are brought about by men, whose passions
and dispositions remaining in all ages the same naturally
give rise to the same effects; although, doubtless,
the operation of these causes takes a higher form,
now in one province, and now in another, according
to the character of the training wherein the inhabitants
of these provinces acquire their way of life.

Another aid towards judging of the future by the past,
is to observe how the same nation long retains the
same customs, remaining constantly covetous or deceitful,
or similarly stamped by some one vice or virtue.
Any one reading the past history of our city of Florence,
and noting what has recently befallen it, will find
the French and German nations overflowing with avarice,
pride, cruelty, and perfidy, all of which four vices
have at divers times wrought much harm to our city.
As an instance of their perfidy, every one knows how
often payments of money were made to Charles VIII.
of France, in return for which he engaged to restore
the fortresses of Pisa, yet never did restore them,
manifesting thereby his bad faith and grasping avarice.
Or, to pass from these very recent events, all may
have heard of what happened in the war in which the
Florentines were involved with the Visconti, dukes
of Milan, when Florence, being left without other
resource, resolved to invite the emperor into Italy,

Page 265

that she might be assisted by his name and power in
her struggle with Lombardy. The emperor promised
to come with a strong army to take part against the
Visconti and to protect Florence from them, on condition
that the Florentines paid him a hundred thousand ducats
on his setting out, and another hundred thousand on
his arrival in Italy; to which terms the Florentines
agreed. But although he then received payment
of the first instalment and, afterwards, on reaching
Verona, of the second, he turned back from the expedition
without effecting anything, alleging as his excuse
that he was stopped by certain persons who had failed
to fulfil their engagements. But if Florence
had not been urged by passion or overcome by necessity,
or had she read of and understood the ancient usages
of the barbarians, she would neither on this, nor
on many other occasions, have been deceived by them,
seeing that these nations have always been of the same
character, and have always, in all circumstances, and
with all men alike, used the same methods. For
in ancient times we find them behaving after the same
fashion to the Etruscans, who, when overpowered by
the Romans, by whom they had been repeatedly routed
and put to flight, perceiving that they could not
stand without help, entered into a compact with the
Gauls dwelling in the parts of Italy south of the Alps,
to pay them a certain sum if they would unite with
them in a campaign against the Romans. But the
Gauls, after taking their money, refused to arm on
their behalf, alleging that they had not been paid
to make war on the enemies of the Etruscans, but only
to refrain from pillaging their lands. And thus
the people of Etruria, through the avarice and perfidy
of the Gauls, were at once defrauded of their money
and disappointed of the help which they had counted
on obtaining.

From which two instances of the Etruscans in ancient
times and of the Florentines in recent, we may see
that barbaric races have constantly followed the same
methods, and may easily draw our conclusions as to
how far princes should trust them.

When attacked by the Romans, the Samnites as they
could not without help stand against them in the field,
resolved to leave garrisons in the towns of Samnium,
and to pass with their main army into Etruria, that
country being then at truce with Rome, and thus ascertain
whether their actual presence in arms might not move
the Etruscans to renew hostilities against Rome, which
they had refused to renew when invited through envoys.
During the negotiations which, on this occasion, passed
between the two nations, the Samnites in explaining
the chief causes that led them to take up arms, used
the memorable words—­“they had
risen because peace is a heavier burthen for slaves
than war for freemen” In the end, partly
by their persuasions, and partly by the presence of
their army, they induced the Etruscans to join forces
with them.

Page 266

Here we are to note that when a prince would obtain
something from another, he ought, if the occasion
allow, to leave him no time to deliberate, but should
so contrive that the other may see the need of resolving
at once; as he will, if he perceive that refusal or
delay in complying with what is asked of him, will
draw upon him a sudden and dangerous resentment.

This method we have seen employed with good effect
in our own times by Pope Julius II. in dealing with
France, and by M. de Foix, the general of the French
king, in dealing with the Marquis of Mantua. For
Pope Julius desiring to expel the Bentivogli from
Bologna, and thinking that for this purpose he needed
the help of French troops, and to have the Venetians
neutral, after sounding both and receiving from both
hesitating and ambiguous answers, determined to make
both fall in with his views, by giving them no time
to oppose him; and so, setting forth from Rome with
as strong a force as he could get together, he marched
on Bologna, sending word to the Venetians that they
must stand aloof, and to the King of France to send
him troops. The result was that in the brief
time allowed them, neither of the two powers could
make up their mind to thwart him; and knowing that
refusal or delay would be violently resented by the
Pope, they yielded to his demands, the king sending
him soldiers and the Venetians maintaining neutrality.

M. de Foix, again, being with the king’s army
in Bologna when word came that Brescia had risen,
could not rest till he had recovered that town.
But, to get there he had to choose between two routes,
one long and circuitous leading through the territories
of the king, the other short and direct. In taking
the latter route, however, not only would he have
to pass through the dominions of the Marquis of Mantua,
but also to make his way into these through the lakes
and marshes wherewith that country abounds, by following
an embanked road, closed and guarded by the marquis
with forts and other defensive works. Resolving,
nevertheless, to take the shortest road at all hazards,
he waited till his men were already on their march
before signifying to the marquis that he desired leave
to pass through his country, so that no time might
be left him to deliberate. Taken aback by the
unexpected demand, the marquis gave the leave sought,
which he never would have given had De Foix acted with
less impetuosity. For he was in league with the
Venetians and with the Pope, and had a son in the
hands of the latter; all which circumstances would
have afforded him fair pretexts for refusal. But
carried away by the suddenness and urgency of the
demand, he yielded. And in like manner the Etruscans
yielded to the instances of the Samnites, the presence
of whose army decided them to renew hostilities which
before they had declined to renew.

CHAPTER XLV.—­Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the
Enemy’s attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset.

Page 267

Decius and Fabius, the Roman consuls, were each of
them in command of a separate army, one directed against
the Samnites, the other against the Etruscans:
and as both delivered battle, we have to pronounce,
in respect of the two engagements, which commander
followed the better method. Decius attacked his
enemy at once with the utmost fury and with his whole
strength. Fabius was content, at first, merely
to maintain his ground; for judging that more was
to be gained by a later attack, he reserved his forces
for a final effort, when the ardour of the enemy had
cooled and his energy spent itself. The event
showed Fabius to be more successful in his tactics
than Decius, who being exhausted by his first onset,
and seeing his ranks begin to waver, to secure by death
the glory he could no longer hope from victory, followed
the example set him by his father, and sacrificed
himself to save the Roman legions. Word whereof
being brought to Fabius, he, to gain, while he yet
lived, as much honour as the other had earned by his
death, pushed forward all the troops he had reserved
for his final effort, and so obtained an unexampled
victory. Whence we see that of the two methods,
that of Fabius was the safer and the more deserving
our imitation.

CHAPTER XLVI.—­How the Characteristics of Families come to be
perpetuated.

Manners and institutions differing in different cities,
seem here to produce a harder and there a softer race;
and a like difference may also be discerned in the
character of different families in the same city.
And while this holds good of all cities, we have many
instances of it in reading the history of Rome.
For we find the Manlii always stern and stubborn;
the Valerii kindly and courteous; the Claudii haughty
and ambitious; and many families besides similarly
distinguished from one another by their peculiar qualities.

These qualities we cannot refer wholly to the blood,
for that must change as a result of repeated intermarriages,
but must ascribe rather to the different training
and education given in different families. For
much turns on whether a child of tender years hears
a thing well or ill spoken of, since this must needs
make an impression on him whereby his whole conduct
in after life will be influenced. Were it otherwise
we should not have found the whole family of the Claudii
moved by the desires and stirred by the passions which
Titus Livius notes in many of them, and more especially
in one holding the office of censor, who, when his
colleague laid down his magistracy, as the law prescribed,
at the end of eighteen months, would not resign, maintaining
that he was entitled to hold the office for five years
in accordance with the original law by which the censorship
was regulated. And although his refusal gave
occasion to much controversy, and bred great tumult
and disturbance, no means could be found to depose
him from his office, which he persisted in retaining
in opposition to the will of the entire commons and
a majority of the senate. And any who shall read
the speech made against him by Publius Sempronius,
tribune of the people, will find therein all the Claudian
insolence exposed, and will recognize the docility
and good temper shown by the body of the citizens in
respecting the laws and institutions of their country.

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CHAPTER XLVII.—­That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to
forget private Wrongs.

While commanding as consul against the Samnites, Manlius
was wounded in a skirmish. His army being thereby
endangered, the senate judged it expedient to send
Papirius Cursor as dictator to supply his place.
But as it was necessary that the dictator should be
nominated by Fabius, the other consul, who was with
the army in Etruria, and as a doubt was felt that
he might refuse to nominate Papirius, who was his enemy,
the senate sent two messengers to entreat him to lay
aside private animosity, and make the nomination which
the public interest required. Moved by love of
his country Fabius did as he was asked, although by
his silence, and by many other signs, he gave it to
be known that compliance was distasteful. From
his conduct at this juncture all who would be thought
good citizens should take example.

CHAPTER XLVIII.—­That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave
blunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind.

The consul having gone to Rome to perform certain
ceremonial rites, and Fulvius being left in charge
of the Roman army in Etruria, the Etruscans, to see
whether they could not circumvent the new commander,
planting an ambush not far from the Roman camp, sent
forward soldiers disguised as shepherds driving large
flocks of sheep so as to pass in sight of the Roman
army. These pretended shepherds coming close to
the wall of his camp, Fulvius, marvelling at what appeared
to him unaccountable audacity, hit upon a device whereby
the artifice of the Etruscans was detected and their
design defeated.

Here it seems proper to note that the captain of an
army ought not to build on what seems a manifest blunder
on the part of an enemy; for as men are unlikely to
act with conspicuous want of caution, it will commonly
be found that this blunder is cover to a fraud.
And yet, so blinded are men’s minds by their
eagerness for victory, that they look only to what
appears on the surface.

After defeating the Romans on the Allia, the Gauls,
hastening on to Rome, found the gates of the city
left open and unguarded. But fearing some stratagem,
and being unable to believe that the Romans could be
so foolish and cowardly as to abandon their city,
they waited during the whole of that day and the following
night outside the gates, without daring to enter.
In the year 1508, when the Florentines Avere engaged
in besieging Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo, a citizen of
that town, happening to be taken prisoner, was released
on his promise to procure the surrender to the Florentines
of one of the gates of the city. Afterwards, on
pretence of arranging for the execution of this surrender,
he came repeatedly to confer with those whom the Florentine
commissaries had deputed to treat with him, coming
not secretly but openly, and accompanied by other

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citizens of Pisa, whom he caused to stand aside while
he conversed with the Florentines. From all which
circumstances his duplicity might have been suspected,
since, had he meant to do as he had engaged, it was
most unlikely that he should be negotiating so openly.
But the desire to recover possession of Pisa so blinded
the Florentines that they allowed themselves to be
conducted under his guidance to the Lucca Gate, where,
through his treachery, but to their own disgrace,
they lost a large number of their men and officers.

CHAPTER XLIX.—­That a Commonwealth to
preserve its Freedom has constant need of new Ordinances.
Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius
received the surname of Maximus.

It must happen, as I have already said, in every great
city, that disorders needing the care of the physician
continually spring up; and the graver these disorders
are, the greater will be the skill needed for their
treatment. And if ever in any city, most assuredly
in Rome, we see these disorders assume strange and
unexpected shapes. As when it appeared that all
the Roman wives had conspired to murder their husbands,
many of them being found to have actually administered
poison, and many others to have drugs in readiness
for the purpose.

Of like nature was the conspiracy of the Bacchanals,
discovered at the time of the Macedonian war, wherein
many thousands, both men and women, were implicated,
and which, had it not been found out, or had the Romans
not been accustomed to deal with large bodies of offenders,
must have proved perilous for their city. And,
indeed, if the greatness of the Roman Republic were
not declared by countless other signs, as well as by
the manner in which it caused its laws to be observed,
it might be seen in the character of the punishments
which it inflicted against wrong-doers. For in
vindicating justice, it would not scruple or hesitate
to put a whole legion to death, to depopulate an entire
city, or send eight or ten thousand men at a time
into banishment, subject to the most stringent conditions,
which had to be observed, not by one of these exiles
only, but by all. As in the case of those soldiers
who fought unsuccessfully at Cannae, who were banished
to Sicily, subject to the condition that they should
not harbour in towns, and should all eat standing.

But the most formidable of all their punishments was
that whereby one man out of every ten in an entire
army was chosen by lot to be put to death. For
correcting a great body of men no more effectual means
could be devised; because, when a multitude have offended
and the ringleaders are not known, all cannot be punished,
their number being too great; while to punish some
only, and leave the rest unpunished, were unjust to
those punished and an encouragement to those passed
over to offend again. But where you put to death
a tenth chosen by lot, where all equally deserve death,
he who is punished will blame his unlucky fortune,
while he who escapes will be afraid that another time
the lot may be his, and for that reason will be careful
how he repeats his offence. The poisoners and
the Bacchanals, therefore, were punished as their
crimes deserved.

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Although disorders like these occasion mischievous
results in a commonwealth, still they are not fatal,
since almost always there is time to correct them.
But no time is given in the case of disorders in the
State itself, which unless they be treated by some
wise citizen, will always bring a city to destruction.
From the readiness wherewith the Romans conferred
the right of citizenship on foreigners, there came
to be so many new citizens in Rome, and possessed of
so large a share of the suffrage, that the government
itself began to alter, forsaking those courses which
it was accustomed to follow, and growing estranged
from the men to whom it had before looked for guidance.
Which being observed by Quintius Fabius when censor,
he caused all those new citizens to be classed in
four Tribes, that being reduced within this
narrow limit they might not have it in their power
to corrupt the entire State. And this was a wisely
contrived measure, for, without introducing any violent
change, it supplied a convenient remedy, and one so
acceptable to the republic as to gain for Fabius the
well-deserved name of Maximus.