PHENOMENOLOGY,
PSYCHOLOGY, SCIENCE & HISTORY:A Reading of Kuhn in Light of
Heideggeras a Response to Hoeller's Critique
of Giorgi

byBrent Dean RobbinsDuquesne University

...I would say that at least two options
are open for psychology. Either psychology can understand
itself as a science with a different and broader
interpretation of this (scientific attitude). Or it
can understand itself as another kind of discipline, that
is, as a discipline which organizes its knowledge in another
way. - Robert Romanyshyn
(1978)

The fundamentally human element consists
in the fact that the forms of human behavior must continually
be sought and defined anew and are therefore discovered
in the historical role of man and in the elucidation
of that role; it is history which differentiates the
human being from the animal. - Ernesto Grassi
(1976)

In
Psychology
as a Human Science, Giorgi (1970) argues that a phenomenologically-
oriented human science is an alternative "paradigm" to the current tradition
of natural science psychology. Utilizing Kuhn's (1962) conception of science
as consisting of periods of revolution, which are followed by periods of
"normal science," Giorgi takes up the banner of phenomenological psychology
as a competing "paradigm" for the next period of "normal science" in the
history of psychology. However, as Hoeller (1978-79) has argued, there
seems to be an inherent contradiction between a phenomenological approach
and Kuhn's conception of "normal science." As a result, it becomes necessary
to examine the potential consequences of conceptualizing the possibility
of phenomenological psychology as a "normal science." Along
with other theorists (Hoeller, 1978-79, Rouse, 1981), I will argue that
Kuhn's ontic investigation of science can be enriched in light of Heidegger's
(1927) provisional ontological inquiry in Being and Time. Moreover,
it will be necessary to elucidate how a reading of Kuhn may be approached
differently based on the "later" writings of Heidegger following his "turning"
in the 1930's. Based on this investigation, I will show that, in order
to be truly phenomenological, psychology must arise from an understanding
of human beings as radically social and radically historical. In the spirit
of Heidegger's call to take up "meditative thinking" in response to the
"calculative thinking" which pervades our culture, a phenomenological psychology
may begin to recollect the past as the latent meaning and ground of the
present, and, thereby, open up new future possibilities. Heidegger's understanding
of history can provide the groundwork to build such a psychology in our
technological age. Kuhn's
Structure,
as a center of controversy in contemporary philosophy of science, demonstrates
the value of this type of historical inquiry. However, while Kuhn runs
the risk of being discounted as an "idealist" and "irrationalist," Heidegger's
thought can provide the foundation upon which to shed light on the crisis
of science in our age -- which is, in part, aroused by Kuhn's bold project.
While Giorgi seems somewhat naive to the dangers of conceptualizing phenomenological
psychology as a potential "normal science," it is hoped this investigation
can provide an alternative path for a phenomenological psychology. The following
investigation consists of four major parts:

I. An investigation
of the place of Kuhn's (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
within
the traditional orientations of the philosophy of science; namely, logical
positivism, transcendental idealism, and contemporary scientific realism. II. Following
Rouse's (1982) investigation, I will examine how Kuhn's Structure can be
understood in the light of the "early" Heidegger's (1927) Being and
Time. III. I
will address the question: "Can phenomenological psychology be conceptualized
as a 'paradigm' for 'normal science'?" This question will be addressed
based on a reading of Heidegger's "later" thought; particularly, his understanding
of 'history' (Gestell).
IV. I will offer a critique of Hoeller's (1978-79) understanding of "normal
science" as "inauthentic" and "revolutionary science" as "authentic." Hoeller's
turn to the "authentic/inauthentic" distinction of Heidegger's Being
and Time, I will argue, contradicts his intention to view phenomenological
psychology from the perspective of "later" Heidegger.

I. KUHN'S THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Kuhn's
(1962/1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions grows out of
an effort to approach science from a historical perspective: to discover
how the historian of science can "determine by what man and at what point
in time each contemporary scientific fact, law, and theory was discovered
or invented" (p. 2). Further, the historian must account for the "cogeries
of error, myth, and superstition that have inhibited the more rapid accumulation
of the constituents of the modern scientific text" (p. 2). As Kuhn discovers,
this appears to be an almost impossible project; for, the historian who
relies on the "concept of development-by- accumulation" must inevitably
run into difficulties. Kuhn's entire project is an elaboration of the nature
of these difficulties. Yet, what
could possibly be the alternative to "the concept of development-by- accumulation"?
Here lies one of Kuhn's greatest contributions to the philosophy of science:
His claim that periods of scientific research, called "paradigms," are
"incommensurable." From this claim, Kuhn proceeds to argue that the appearance
of fluid, incremental progress in science is an illusion. Past "paradigms"
are reinterpreted by current "paradigms" to appear as if researchers of
the past had been involved in the same projects as current researchers.
Current historians of science read the past texts of science from the perspective
of their own, dominant paradigm; thus, they view past research as less
competent attempts to disclose the same world. On the contrary, Kuhn claims
that researchers in the past and present paradigms "live in different worlds"
(p. 193). It is essentially this contention that has led many contemporary
philosophers of science (i.e., Suppe, 1977; Scheffler, 1967, 1972; Shapere,
1971; Shimony, 1976; Boyd, 1983) to discount Kuhn as an "idealist" and/or
"irrationalist." Therefore, through an examination of Kuhn's place within
the context of contemporary philosophy of science, it is necessary to demonstrate
how Kuhn's ambiguous use of the term "world," which lies at the heart of
his "theory of world constitution," need not be taken up as "idealist"
in nature (i.e., Kantian) (Hoyningen-Huene, 1990). Suppe
(1981), as cited by Rouse (1981), examines "four principal factors," largely
derived from a commitment to realism, which account for the criticisms
laid upon Kuhn. Suppe first points out that Kuhn belongs in the anti-realist
school of thought, along with the positivists. Thus, Suppe's first criticism
is that "Kuhn extends the positivist's antirealism treatment of theoretical
terms to observation terms as well" (Rouse, 1981, p. 270). Considering
the three traditional approaches to the philosophy of science (consisting,
on the one hand, of the antirealism of logical positivism and transcendental
idealism, and, on the other hand, of contemporary scientific realism),
Suppe uses a process of elimination. If Kuhn is not a logical positivist
nor a realist, he must, therefore, be an idealist. However, while Kuhn's
social constructivism can be taken up from the perspective of idealism,
it will become clear that this is not his intention. Further, a reading
of Kuhn in the light of Heidegger's (1927) provisional ontology in Being
& Time will demonstrate that there is another alternative. Before
this path can be taken, however, it is necessary to demonstrate how Kuhn
differs from the logical positivist school of antirealism. The logical
positivists were empiricists in the tradition of Hume, and acquired the
latter half of its name from Comte's 19th century theory of intellectual
evolution -- as moving from the "theological" to the "metaphysical,"
and, finally, arriving at the "positive." With a radical skepticism which
took almost nothing for granted, the positivists held the banner for a
"seeing is believing" approach to science. In particular, the logical positivists
incorporated the mathematical logic of Frege and Russell as a "subject-neutral
language" in order to provide "mathematically precise and unambiguous meanings"
(Klee, 1997, p. 30). Because the logical positivists did not wish to make
assumptions regarding unobserveable phenomenon, such as causes and effects,
"material conditionals" (derived from mathematical logic) were developed
to "represent external relations between objects, properties, or events
to which formal symbols (material conditionals) referred" (Klee, 1997,
p. 31). For example, the "horseshoe" symbolizes the English equivalent
of "if,...then," wherein, if the former is true, the latter must be true
in all cases. Aside
from these purely mathematical symbols, scientific theories contain "substantive
symbols," of which there are two kinds: Observational terms and theoretical
terms, the former referring to observable objects, properties, or events
and the latter referring to non-observable objects, properties, or events.
This system allowed the logical positivists to set up a way to distinguish
science from pseudo-science by adopting the use of "correspondence rules"
("c- rules"). By defining the meanings of theoretical terms in observational
terms via c-rules, the logical positivists hoped to provide science with
a way to avoid developing fictional entities, such as phlogiston or aether,
and, more generally, to provide a way for science to avoid metaphysical
claims. For the positivists, in short, theoretical entities do not exist
unless they can be shown, via c-rules, to "make a difference to observational
experience" (Klee, 1997, p. 35). Today,
few philosophers of science conform to the logical positivist viewpoint.
The undoing of the logical positivist approach to science is due to its
inability to distinguish between observational and theoretical terms: a
distinction which the conception of the "c-rule" took for granted (Klee,
1997, pp. 41-61). Further, as the Quine-Duhem Thesis demonstrated: "Any
seemingly disconfirming observational evidence can always be accommodated
to any theory" (Klee, 1997, p. 65). In other words, human beings do not
arrive at scientific evidence by merely conforming to the evidence provided
by nature; rather, human beings select which theories to choose according
to "inferential decisions" based on pragmatics (that is, what best fits
in with the current holism of the aggregate of scientific beliefs held
at the time). At least theoretically, at the "limit of scientific inquiry,
(defined by Klee (1997) as "a fictional point in the future when science
has evolved as close to a completed form as it can get without actually
being perfected") no single theory will prevail as the, one true theory.
Instead, the "underdetermination of theory" argument holds that,
instead, "a host of mutually inconsistent but equally adequate (to the
observational evidence) theories" will remain (Duhem, 1982; Quine, 1960,
1961, 1976, 1990; Quine & Ullian, 1970). Returning
to Suppe's criticism of Kuhn: Yes, Kuhn does extend logical positivism's
radical skepticism of theoretical terms to observational terms. Doing so,
Kuhn is simply keeping in step with the currency of contemporary philosophy
of science. Moreover, Suppe's effort to discount Kuhn's antirealism arises
from the motivation of realism to maintain logical positivism's notion
of progress. It follows that Suppe's second objection is that
Kuhn "shortchanges the role of rationality in the growth of scientific
knowledge" (pp. 647-48). However, while Kuhn is calling the traditional
notion of scientific progress into question, it does not follow that his
theory is "irrational." However, it does seem to discover an "irrational"
element at the heart of the entire scientific enterprise. Therefore, in
order to save science from dissolving into a groundless relativism, Suppe
and other realists must argue that Kuhn is an "idealist" who "makes discoverable
how the world really is irrelevant to scientific knowledge" (Suppe, 1977,
p. 648). Aside from logical positivism, Heidegger's existential-phenomenological
conception of human beings as being-in-the-world remains a third alternative
between realism and idealism. Nevertheless, this is an alternative which
Kuhn himself does not take up -- the result being an inherent ambiguity
in his use of the term "world" which, when all is said and done, he resigns
himself to. Kuhn (1962) writes:

In a sense
that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of competing paradigms practice
their trades in different worlds...Practicing in different worlds, the
two groups of scientists
see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction. Again,
that is not to say that they can see anything they please. Both are looking
at the world,
and what they look at has not changed. But in some areas they see different
things, and they
see them in different relations to one another. That is why a law that
cannot even be demonstrated
to one group of scientists may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another.
(p. 150).

Essentially,
Kuhn is saying that scientists of different paradigms live both
in the same world and live in different worlds. Yet, is this not
a contradiction in terms? How can this be possible? Hoyningen-Huene (1990)
points out the two senses of "world" alluded to by Kuhn. The first sense
of the term "world" refers to a world that is "already perceptually and
conceptually subdivided in a certain way" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 129). This is
the world of the "subjective" pole which organizes nature according to
the conceptual structure imposed, a priori, by human beings. The second
sense of the term is, therefore, the "purely object-sided" sense of "world,"
which "is left if one subtracts all these human contributions, all this
perceptual and conceptual structuring from the world in the first sense"
(Hoyningen-Huene, 1990, p. 485). As Hoyningen- Huene (1990) elaborates:
"This world bears, of course, great similarity to Kant's 'thing in itself'
although it is not identical with it" (p. 485). As this analysis shows,
Kuhn's conception of "world," in both senses, runs the risk of falling
prey to a kind of idealism which creates a subject-object dualism, wherein
the "object"-pole remains inaccessible, and, therefore, arbitrary. Kuhn
is left vulnerable to a realist critique which can easily disintegrate
his debate to a vicious circle. As Hoyningen-Huene (1990) elaborates:

...The
attempt to construct a general theory of world constitution leads to an
uncomfortable situation that the means to reach that goal also render its
attainment impossible. The attempt to analyze the constitution
of reality in a general an unbiased way, independently of one's own
idea of reality, seems predestined to fail because one has to use one's
idea of reality - otherwise one never gets started. Once one gets
started, one must necessarily fail. (p. 492).

Here, Hoyningen-Huene,
without apparent recognition, refers to the hermeneutical circle. And it
is just this dillemna that a hermeneutic phenomenology, as provided by
Heidegger, can be of service by recognizing the centrality of interpretation.
To understand, one must interpret. But this need not be a vicious circle.
It means that one must enter the circle in the right way. For Heidegger,
this move is conducted by beginning with one's implicit, "average everyday"
understanding and working through this towards an explicit understanding
of that which, when implicit, remains concealed (Packer & Addison,
1989). And, therefore, it is to Heidegger's (1927) provisional ontological
inquiry in Being and Time that we may turn in order to shed light
on Kuhn's investigation of science. In turn, it will also become possible
to reveal the danger inherent in the realist conception of science.

II. KUHN IN LIGHT OF HEIDEGGER'S BEING &
TIME: A CRITIQUE OF REALISM

"Kuhn is
admittedly an antirealist," writes Rouse (1981): "he explicitly denies
any nontrivial application of a correspondence theory of truth to science,
and rejects realist interpretations of scientific terms, whether observational
or theoretical" (p. 270). However, as argued above, this does not imply
that he is an "idealist." At the core of Kuhn's theory, he speaks to the
problem of how science can gain access to things. For Kuhn, this access
is always via a "paradigm," a socially-constructed project of what counts
as legitimate research and, in turn, what counts as legitimate ends to
that research. The realist, on the other hand, would argue that "in scientific
investigation we have direct and unsullied access to the things themselves"
(p. 270). Yet, to argue against such a direct access to things, Kuhn treads
close to the pitfalls of an epistemology which must explain the "distinction
between an interpretive scheme and the uninterpreted content to which it
is applied" (Rouse, 1981, p. 270). Heidegger, on the other hand, understands
the human beings as already being-in-the-world; therefore, there is no
longer a need to solve the subject-object dilemma. Further, while Heidegger
provides an ontological investigation of Being and Dasein, Kuhn provides
Heidegger with the possibility of generating an ontic interpretation of
science which may follow from his provisional ontology. The investigations
of Kuhn and Heidegger are therefore complementary, and, together, they
provide a means to critique the realist view of science. There
are several realist accounts of science with which to dialogue. However,
Boyd's (1983) particular brand of realism, in my assessment, provides the
greatest challenge. In his defense of scientific realism, Boyd aligns himself
with some aspects of empiricism and constructivism, while discarding other
aspects of these anti-realist arguments. The ground upon which Boyd attacks
both empiricism and constructivism is his argument that "a realistic account
of scientific theories is...the only scientifically plausible explanation
for the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology" (Boyd, p. 207).
Boyd agrees with the empiricist's insistence on grounding evidence on "observables,"
yet he disagrees that "observables" and "non- observables" (the theoretical)
can ever be truly distinguished, nor should they. In this sense, Boyd aligns
himself with the constructivist's critique of empiricism, while discarding
the constructivist's notion of incommensurable paradigms. As opposed to
the constructivist, Boyd argues that theories involve "successive approximations"
to the "truth" (Boyd, p. 203). Therefore, theories involve a progress toward
explaining an independent, external reality. For Boyd
(1983), both the empiricist and the constructivist fail to explain the
instrumental reliability of scientific methodology which:

...can
only be satisfactorily explained on the assumption that the theoretical
claims embodied in the background theories determine those
judgements are relevantly approximately true, and that scientific methodology
acts dialectically so as to produce in the long run an increasingly accurate
theoretical picture of the world. (Boyd, p. 207)

Boyd backs
up his argument by an appeal to "naturalism," in which the senses are understood
as "causally reliable detectors of external objects" (p. 218). Based on
this assumption, Boyd is able to argue that the external reality of nature
imposes itself upon the theory, rather than vice versa. In turn, scientists
continuously mold theories to conform to these impositions. In this way,
Boyd can argue that Kuhn's "revolutions" are not between incommensurable
paradigms. For Boyd, "anomalies," as presented by Kuhn, emerge because
a theory does not conform to a theory-independent world, and, in turn,
a "scientific revolution" involves an adjustment of the theory to better
fit the "real" phenomena of the external world (Boyd, p. 203). Otherwise,
Boyd debates, theories would indeed be arbitrary, and, would not, as they
appear to do, demonstrate such instrumental success (i.e., technology). From a
reading of Heidegger, in the light of Kuhn, it should become apparent that
science
and technology reside within the same underlying framework or "paradigm,"and this, not a correspondence to an independent reality, accounts for
the instrumental reliability of science. Boyd and other realists, who
insist upon a self-evident reality unassumingly play the role of
covertly denying the latent meaning and ground of science and technology.
Essentially, Boyd and his fellow realists provide an account of science
which is a-historical and a-social, and, by doing so, fail to do justice
to the changing nature of human beings, things, and the world. From the
perspective of Heidegger's (1927) Being & Time, Kuhn's (1962)
notion of "normal science" can be understood as science in its "average
everydayness." Heidegger's existential analytic follows the progression
from an analysis of Dasein, the human kind of being, in terms of that which
is "closest" to it: its "average everyday," existentiell, pre-ontological,
pre- thematic, "lived" understanding of itself, towards the hidden meaning
and ground of Dasein's primordial existential structure which lies concealed
in its "everyday" understanding. The "who" of "everyday" Dasein is that
which is closest to Dasein. Yet, proximally and for the most part, one's
own Dasein is not itself. This "who" of everyday Dasein is the "they" (das
Man), which is characterized by "distantiality," "averageness" and
"levelling down" and constitutes "publicness" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 165).
The "they" is both everybody and nobody "to whom every Dasein has already
surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 166).
The "they- self" is the "not itself" of Dasein to be distinguished from
authentic Dasein. Authentic Being- one's-Self, therefore, is an existentiell
modification of the "they" as an essential existentiale, and, therefore,
the former is the more primordial disclosure of Dasein. In order
to understand science in its "average everydayness," it follows, Kuhn begins
his investigation with the topic of "normal science." At least implicitly,
Kuhn understands that any "authentic" disclosure of the practice of science
must be a provisional disclosure of the science of das Man, the
everybody and nobody which constitutes "publicness." From this understanding,
we can concur with Kuhn's view of science as a group project. However,
as Rouse (1982) points out, this should not be mistaken as a "consensus,"
since a "consensus" implies there is an "explicit belief of its members"
(p. 275). On the contrary, the "world" of a "paradigm," within which a
group of scientists practice, remains a "tacit" understanding of the common
project which guides them. Kuhn (1962) writes:

No consensus
(among members of a research community) is required. If scientists... accepted
a sufficient set of standard examples, they could model their own subsequent research
on them without needing to agree about which set of characteristics these examples
made them standard, ,justified their acceptance. (Scientists) agree in
their identification
of a paradigm without actually agreeing on, or attempting to produce, a full interpretation
or rationalization of it (p. 44).

A "normal
science" is able to come to fruition whenever a group of practitioners
are able to take their particular "paradigm for granted." The scientist
is no longer required "to build his field anew, starting from first principles
and justifying the use of each concept introduced" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 20).
The scientist can get down to the busy-work of the "mopping-up operations"
which characterize "normal science" (p. 24). However, this taken-for-grantedness
becomes possible only within a shared understanding of the common research
project. The "puzzle- solving" activity of "normal science" requires that
there be at least a tacit understanding of what counts as a "puzzle" and,
further, what counts as a solution to the puzzle. As Kuhn (1962) writes:

One of
the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion
for choosing problems
that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to to have
solutions. To a great
extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific
or encourage
its members to undertake. Other problems, including many that had previously been standard,
are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline or sometimes as just
too problematic to be worth the time. A paradigm can, for that matter,
even insulate the community
from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle
form, because
they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools
the paradigm supplies.
(p. 37)

As Rouse
(1982) points out, the "paradigm" of a "normal science" is the "common
practice" of a group of researchers, consisting of "community standards
and practices," which "maximize the intelligibility of what is done" (p.
275). No one -- that is, nobody and everybody (das Man) -- specifically
legislates this common practice. It is the way the scientist is as everybody
is in order to make sense of the world. Further, this implicit understanding,
which arises from the ground of the research in a "paradigm," is embedded
in the equipment of the researchers, which constitutes the "referential
context of significance" of the scientific project. That is, this equipment
is "already understood as being usable for some purpose" (Rouse,
1982, p. 272). The physical (instrumentation), methodological, and intellectual
(laws and related theories, disciplinary matrix, shared exemplars) "equipment"
of the researchers gain "significance" as they are encountered within the
context of a "referential totality" -- the "in- order-for-the-sake-of"
which implicitly guides the researcher in her "circumspective" understanding
which always already projects the possibilities of what is and what is
not counted as a "puzzle" to be solved (Rouse, 1982, p. 272). The scientist
is guided by her pre-thematic understanding of the equipment "ready-to-hand"
which "has its own kind of sight (circumspection), by which (her) manipulation
is guided" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 98). The explicit "rules" of a particular
"paradigm," therefore, are part of the "equipment" of the "paradigm." However,
the paradigm itself cannot be reduced to a set of explicit rules. As the
meaning and ground of the explicit rules of a science, a paradigm's "rules"
remain pre-thematic. This "implicit"
or "tacit" understanding of a particular paradigm becomes "explicit" when
there arises a crisis in the practice of research. According to Kuhn, such
crises arise with the appearance of "anomalies" which the paradigm cannot
account for. With the emergence of "anomalies," there are three possible
resolutions: The "normal science" community may develop a resolution, the
problems may be temporarily placed aside, or a new candidate paradigm will
emerge. In each case, the paradigm, which had once been pre-thematic, becomes
thematized. As a result, the "referential context of significance" shines
forth as the "world" which the scientific practitioner is no longer able
to "fall" into. As Rouse (1982) writes:

Whether
our equipment proves inadequate to the task, or the right equipment is
not at our disposal,
or something gets in our way, we become momentarily aware in a new way
of the context
of significance within which we work.The things we work with, which before
we took for granted
and were only aware of circumspectively, now stand out as objects of reflection. (p. 276)

The scientific
practitioner, one might say, is no longer able to flee into the "they-self"
of inauthentic Dasein as "fallen." This phenomenon can be understood according
to Heidegger's (1927) disclosure of Dasein as "care: [Sorge]: "Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the
world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered in the world." Through
his analysis of anxiety, as a state-of-mind which provides the phenomenal
basis for explicitly grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being, Heidegger
reveal's Dasein's Being to itself as care. "Falling,"
explains Heidegger, is a turning-away or fleeing of Dasein into its "they-self."
This turning-away is grounded in anxiety. Anxiety is what makes fear possible.
Yet, unlike fear, in which that which threatens is other than Dasein, anxiety
is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere and
nothing.
In anxiety, Dasein is not threatened by a particular thing or a collection
of objects present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face
of which anxiety is anxious. In anxiety, first and foremost, the world
as world is disclosed as that which one cannot fall into. Heidegger
defined Being-in as "residing alongside" and "Being-familiar with." This
Being-in is understood in the everyday publicness of the "they" as a "Being-at-home,"
a tranquilized self-assurance. However, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings
it back from its absorption in the 'world' as "everyday familiarity collapses."
Thus, Dasein is individualized as Being-in-the- world. Being-in enters
into the existential mode of the "not-at-home" of uncanniness. Thus,
"Being-not-at-home" is the basic kind of Being of Dasein, even though in
an everyday way Dasein falls from this understanding in the tranquilized
"at-homeness" of das Man. From an
existential-ontological viewpoint, uncanniness ("not-at-home") is the more
primordial phenomenon: the hidden meaning and ground of Dasein as fleeing
into the "they" in its everyday concern and solicitude. It is this privative
disclosure of Dasein as "authentic" which makes Kuhn's conception of "extraordinary
science" understandable. With the disclosure of "the referential context
of significance," the scientific practitioner is unable to "fall" into
the "pre- scribed, circumscribed" world of the paradigm she works in (Sipiora,
1991). The scientist is no longer "at home" in the "world" of the paradigm.
As Heidegger would say, the scientist who is immersed in the paradigm (conducting
the "mopping-up" procedures of "normal science") has been tempted into
the lostness of "the they" by the tranquility which disburdens her from
having to face her ownmost potentiality-for-Being. However, unable to "fall"
into the "they," the scientist is no longer caught within the circumspective
concern of the paradigm as a "levelling down" which "glosses over everything
that is original" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 127). New paradigms emerge to compete
with the current paradigm once the current paradigm has, so to speak, shown
its hand. Here we
find the "essential tension" of which Kuhn speaks. On the one hand, the
tradition of "normal science" in a particular paradigm makes progress of
"puzzle-solving" possible by providing a shared intelligibility within
which to work, as a group, in a common scientific project. However, in
order to maintain the canniness of a tranquil "at-home-ness," the paradigm
must conceal its latent meaning and ground. Unlike the puzzles one buys
at the toy store, the puzzles of normal science do not come with explicit
rules. It follows that "the self- interpretation of normal science" is
"inadequate, for normal science conceals (its) vulnerability to disruption
from us" (Rouse, 1982, p. 284). It is only when this disruption, via "anomalies,"
provides a crisis in the paradigm at hand that the "authentic" project
of "extraordinary science" becomes possible. With Kuhn, Heidegger shares
this understanding of a tension between "original discovery and its being
averaged out and covered over." For Heidegger, this constitutes "truth
in its most genuine sense" (Rouse, 1982, p. 276). Yet, as
Kuhn implies, "extraordinary science" is not a goal for which the scientist
strives. During periods of "extraordinary science," science practitioners
turn to philosophy to seek answers to the paradigm crisis. However, writes
Kuhn (1962):

...it is
precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition
to a science. Once a
field has made its transition, critical discourse recurs only at moments
of crisis when the
basis of the field are again in jeopardy. Only when they must choose between competing
theories do scientists behave like philosophers. (p. 6-7)

Indeed,
scientists do not wish to be philosophers, for they are in the business
of science, not philosophy. Therefore, in order to maintain the frame of
the paradigm, the scientist must not "aim at unexpected novelty"
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 35). In a sense, revolutionary science, for the scientist,
is not good business practice. Revolutionary science is messy business.
Therefore, scientists have a vested interest in the avoidance of critical
thinking. The realists,
such as Boyd, fight on the side of tradition, the technocratic thinking
that binds science research and technology in the common project of the
mathematization of nature. In order to do this effectively, the realist
must deny the past; that is, present history as progressive such that the
past understanding of the world is trivialized via an a-historical reading
from the present. Essentially, this is what lies behind Boyd's rejection
of Kuhn's conception of "incommensurability." Therefore, it is to the subject
of history that we must now turn.

III. LATER HEIDEGGER AND HISTORY

Heidegger
(1927/1962) draws a distinction between historiology and history (Geschichte).
To understand this distinction, Heidegger points to the 'historicality'
(Geschichtlichkeit) of Dasein, the human kind of being. For, the
'historicality' of Dasein arises from its temporal structure; that is,
"it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in
the very basis of its Being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 428). Historiology,
as a "science of history," studies the events of the past such that history
is understood as 'thing'-like and in which past events are 'contained.'
The 'past' is understood as "no longer present-at-hand," or as "still present-at-hand"
such that it cannot impact the 'present' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 378). History
(Geschichte), rather than taking up the past as a sequence of events,
is grounded in the "historicality" of Dasein - without which historiology
would not be possible. The essence of history is understood as "destiny,"
a "sending" of Dasein on a path of disclosure of beings as given by Being. In "Letter
on Humanism," Heidegger (1947/1993a) writes:

History
does not take place primarily as a happening. And its happening is not
evanescence. The happening
of history occurs essentially as the destiny of the truth of Being and
from it.
Being comes to destiny in that It, Being, gives itself. But thought in
terms of such destiny this
says: it gives itself and refuses itself simultaneously. (p. 239)

"Destiny,"
as Heidegger understands the term, is understood in light of the "event
of appropriation" (Ereignis). Ereignis is the event in which
Being, as the "it gives," gives beings such that Dasein erupts as the clearing
in which Being can presence. Human beings are called or claimed by Being
to take up things, and, in doing so, are sent on a path of disclosure as
destiny. The way that Being sends human beings has the character of history
such that Being, by presenting beings, allows for a clearing (an epoch,
world of disclosure) for a historical people. Yet, in furnishing beings,
Being withdraws. It both "gives" and "refuses" simultaneously. Heidegger
(1947/1993a) writes:

Man is
not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing
in this "less"; rather,
he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the essential
poverty of the shepherd,
whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation
of Being's
truth. (p. 245)

Heidegger
understands 'truth' as aletheia or "unconcealment." Dasein is 'in
truth' such that Dasein is called or claimed by Being to take up things
in a certain way. In this unconcealment or uncovering, there is also a
covering over, so that Dasein is both in 'truth' and in 'untruth."
Human beings are the "shepherds of Being" in that Being is "needful" of
human beings. How is Being needful of human beings? Human beings are the
clearing of Being, the "there" (Da) with which beings are appropriated
as given by Being. As "ek-sisting," the human being "unfolds essentially
in the throw of Being as the fateful sending" (Heidegger, 1993a, p. 231).
It is this "fateful sending" which is history.Ereignis
is not a specific historical event. In appropriating beings as given
by Being, Dasein is sent on a path of disclosure as an "event" or happening
which is the essence of Dasein as "ek-sisting." Dasein is radically temporal
and it is this "historicality" of Dasein which makes history possible.
Heidegger explicates the three temporal ecstacies of Dasein as the past
(Gewesenheit or the mode of "having been"), present (Gegen-wart
or "waiting-toward") and future (Zu-kunft or "coming-toward"), which
are grounded in the existential of "care" (Sorge). Dasein's Being
as care is its "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside
(entities encountered within the world)" (Heidegger, 1962). From the
Heideggarian perspective of Dasein as radically temporal, history is essentially
futural. Yet, traditionally, history is understood as an actual past. Nevertheless,
from the above explication of Dasein's three temporal ekstases as grounded
in its care structure, understanding is the "being-ahead of itself" which
is the projection of future possibilities. Therefore, Dasein understands
'past' as the "having-been" in terms of its future possibilities. As Heidegger
(1927/1962) explains in Being and Time:

...only
in so far as Dasein is (as the having-been [bin-gewesen] of an 'I'
that is) can it come towards
(zukunftig) itself futurally in such a way that it comes back to
itself. Dasein is, as authentically
having-been, an authentically futural anticipation of one's utmost and
ownmost possibility
coming back, in an understanding way, to one's ownmost having-been. Dasein can only
be what is has been insofar as it is futural. One's already having-been
arises, in a certain
way, from the future. (p. 373)

The authentic
disclosure of the past as having-been is understood as "repetition." From
this concept of "repetition," it becomes possible to lay out Heidegger's
notion of authentic history as destiny. When Being furnishes us with beings,
it withdraws. Heidegger talks of this furnishing of beings by the "it gives"
as a "turning" (kehre), with which there comes about a change in
a historical world. As beings are given to human beings differently, human
beings are called to disclose them differently. As human beings disclose
beings differently, human beings are sent on a course of disclosure. This
unfolding is the destiny which is history. This unfolding is "never a fate
that compels," but calls or claims human beings to take up things within
a finite realm of possibilities (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 330). Therefore,
a taking up of the having-been as "repetition" can be understood as a retrieval
or recovery such that it opens up a future. Authentic history, therefore,
involves a going backward which goes forward such that Dasein takes up
its heritage as a destiny and, by doing so, appropriates its throwness
as its own. This involves a return to the origin to discover the moment
of freedom at the heart of historical necessity. In the
understanding of truth as aletheia or "unconcealment," Dasein is
both in 'truth' and in 'untruth.' With the "event of appropriation," a
particular historical people are claimed to take up beings in a certain
way which both opens up certain possibilities while closing off other possibilities.
This clearing of possibilities is what constitutes the epoch of a certain
historical people. With this "turning," the 'world' changes. Things are
taken up by human beings differently. Therefore, what things mean changes.
Further, as things change, the 'total meaningfulness' of the 'worldhood
of the world' changes. In turn, the human being, as the "there" of the
clearing of Being, also changes. The human being understands herself differently. Based
on this reading of Heidegger, we now have an provisional ontological ground
upon which to understand Kuhn's notion of "incommensurability." In very
concrete ways, Kuhn demonstrates that the "world" changes in particular
periods of science. And it is with this notion that we can begin to understand
the nature of Kuhn's ambiguity over the use of the term "world." The "world"
which remains unchanged for Kuhn is, as Boss (1979) would say, the "world
spanning openness" of the human being who is always already engaged with
the "world" as a Being-in-the-world. Yet, the "world" as the "referential
context of significance" changes with the "turning" of a historical moment
when human beings take up things as given by Being with the "event of appropriation."
Yet, this moment becomes "levelled down" by the "publicness" of "the they."
The "they," as "publicness," disburdens Dasein by providing a "prescribed,
circumscribed Logos" with which Dasein can understand the meaning of Being.
Authentic disclosure, such as with revolutionary science, is always privative:
an existential transformation of the "world" of "the they." As mentioned
above, the disclosive character of "publicness" is characterized by idle
talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Idle talk, as the "circumscribed, prescribed
Logos" of a particular historical epoch, disburdens Dasein of the recognition
of its "uncanniness" as a "thrown Being- in-the-world, which has been delivered
over to itself in its Being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 233). In doing so, idle
talk covers over Dasein's uncanniness as "not-at-home" in the world. Yet,
what has been covered over in idle talk can only be accessed through a
transformation of the covering. Authenticity is always an existential transformation
of the "they." Further, it is through the "they," in which Dasein understands
itself as everybody does, in which beings are taken up in a particular
way. Therefore, authentic history, as a retrieval of the past as having-been
in order to open up a future as being-towards, is a transformation of "publicness." Kuhn's
historical reading of science can be understood as such a transformation,
and this explains why he may be viewed as a threat to the project of "average
everyday" science. To discard Kuhn as an "irrationalist" is, implicitly,
a flight from thinking in order to maintain the framework of science and
technology which, essentially, provides the structure to our "average everyday"
world: how we understand ourselves and things. Yet, at the heart of this
technocratic "they-self," human beings have become alienated. From Heidegger's
understanding of Dasein's "fallenness" into the average everydayness of
the "publicness" as the "they," human beings can be understood as estranged
or alienated. Yet, in this context, alienation should not be understood
as the kind of "alienation" which Marx speaks of. In this sense, Heidegger's
understanding of Dasein as estranged from its ownmost possibilities is
more closely related to the thinking of Freud and Nietzsche's understanding
of the human being as radically de-centered, as unknown or lost to herself.
This alienation is not the alienation of an 'encapsulated ego' which is
estranged from itself by outside influences. "Publicness," as a character
of das Man, is part of the ontological structure of the human kind
of being. Particularly
in Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of "publicness" in a derogatory
way, largely from a position in which his understanding of "publicness"
was developed in full view of our contemporary historical period as technological.
Kuhn's project, in conjunction with this reading of Heidegger, provides
a groundwork from which to discuss science in our modern, technological
age. Yet, the value of Kuhn's historical approach, as read from this perspective,
is that, at its core, it holds a liberatory potential which seems even
to escape Kuhn's grasp. If we take seriously Heidegger's understanding
of history as a retrieval of the having-been such that it opens up future
possibilities, we may make the endeavor to retrieve from Heidegger's thinking
a view of "publicness" and "idle talk" with which we may begin to build
an understanding of science so that, in conclusion, we may address the
question: "Can phenomenological science become a normal science?" I will
wish to argue that, contrary to Hoeller (1978-79) there is an alternative
route to answer this question apart from relying on early Heidegger's distinction
between "inauthenticity" and "authenticity." To relegate phenomenological
psychology to a role of "revolutionary science" as "authentic" is to place
phenomenology in a role which is merely a reactionary role to the status
quo, which, essentially, renders the discipline powerless to develop a
community of practitioners who may begin an alternative human science.
To follow this thought, it is necessary to further articulate how this
"authentic-inauthentic" distinction can be taken up differently from the
perspective of later Heideggarian thought. With the
advent of a historical epoch, human beings take up things differently.
How is it that the human being takes up things? Dasein takes up things
as everybody does, as the "they." Gerede or idle talk is the "prescribed,
circumscribed Logos" of "publicness" with which Dasein understands the
meaning of Being. This "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" provides human
beings with context of a historically given intelligibility, without which
the 'worldhood of the world' as "total meaningfulness" would not be possible.
Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the-world, is always already in a world alongside
things and with others. As "Being-ahead-of-itself," Dasein is ahead of
itself as already in a world. As Being-with, human beings are radically
social. This is the significance of Aristotle's quote from Politics:

Man is
by nature a social animal; an individual who is unsocial naturally and
not accidently is either
beneath our notice of more than human. Society is something in nature that precedes
the individual. Anyone who either cannot lead the common life or is so
self-sufficient as not
to need to, and therefore no partake of society, is either a beast or a
god. (Aristotle,
c. 328 BC)

What does
Aristotle mean when he says that "society...precedes the individual"? Aristotle
is saying that society is not the sum total of an aggregate of individuals,
but that the individual can only be understood privatively. The individual
emerges from the referential context of meaning of the world of her society,
without which she could not survive. Similarly, Nietzsche (1882/1974) wrote
that "truth is the kind error without which a species could not survive"
(p. 172). The 'truth' of which Nietzsche speaks can be understood as the
'truth' of "publicness" which both uncovers and conceals beings as given
by Being. It is a 'truth' which is also an 'untruth' or "error." Yet, without
the intelligibility of the "prescribed, circumscribed Logos," one cannot
survive, unless one is "either a beast or a god." Further, this is also
the "truth" and "untruth" of Kuhn's notion of the "paradigm." Science,
as a society of scientific practitioners, must practice together as a community.
In order to do so, the implicit meaning and ground of the "paradigm" remains
unquestioned so that research may go about its business of "normal science"
without the chaos which would ensue if researchers were required to build
this ground anew with each research project. The "error"
of "publicness" is that it covers over its latent meaning and ground. What
latent meaning and ground? Dasein's "uncanniness" as "not-at-home" as Being-in-the-world!
In Dasein's concernful solicitude as the "they," it becomes tranquilized
in the "at-homeness" of average everydayness, and, in doing so, flees from
its authentic disclosure as being-towards- death. Dasein falls into the
'world' in fleeing from its "uncanniness" as thrown, as delivered over
to Being without being the author of itself; that, as a null basis, Dasein
is its basis. The "idle talk" of "publicness" is essentially death evasive.
It covers over the mystery of Being and the wonder that there is something
rather than nothing. Yet, Gerede can also be understood as a shelter
which preserves the latent meaning and ground, and this can be understood
from Heidegger's understanding of history as the retrieval of heritage
as a destiny. Heidegger
(1947/1993a) writes:

..man is
not only a living creature who possesses language along with other capacities. Rather,
language is the house of Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that
he belongs
to the truth of Being, guarding it. (p. 237).

With
Ereignis,
Being gives us beings. With this giving, human beings are called to take
up things as something, be it as world-gatherers, objects, or as
resources. Human beings, in taking up things as something, appropriates
things in terms of a "logos," the articulation of intelligibility. This
dialogal, hermeneutical event occurs in language as "logos"
which, as the grasping of something as something, sends the human being
on a path of disclosure. "Language," writes Heidegger (1947/1993a), "is
the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself" (p. 230). Language, as
making sense of what is given by Being, involves a constant interpretation.
The language of this event (Ereignis) is the calling bringing into
presence of the "mythos" (Sipiora, 1991). It is "mythos" which is the latent
meaning and ground of the "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" of publicness. It is
from out of this understanding of the relationship between "mythos" and
"logos" that we can begin to understand the meaning of 'culture.' Culture
is the set of shared values, attitudes, customs, and physical objects that
are maintained by a particular historical people. It is a design for living.
This culture is visible as the 'world' of a historical people. How does
this design for living come about? Culture answers the question of existence!
Culture is the way a particular historical people make sense of the givens
of existence by answering the question of existence. Thus, culture and
publicness are interrelated. Publicness is the structure of culture. Thus,
the "mythos" is the latent meaning and ground of the "prescribed, circumscribed
Logos" of a particular culture. Therefore, history (geschichte)
is a "retrieval" of the past which opens up a future as a "retrieval" of
the "mythos" as the latent meaning and ground of the "logos." History
is the resolute taking up of one's heritage as a destiny. It is a
return to origins, to the "turning" when the "it gives" gave things differently,
when human beings took things up differently, and when the world changed.
"Freedom," writes Heidegger (1947/1993b), "is the realm of the destining
that at any given time starts revealing on its way" (p. 330) History, therefore,
is a return to the moment of freedom when things could have been taken
up differently. It is a return to this moment of freedom as an origin;
"the sending that gathers..., that first starts man upon the way of revealing
destining
[Geschick]" from which "the essence of all history [Geschichte]
is determined" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 329). It is with this "turning," with
the event (Ereignis), that the "mythos" of a particular epoch emerges.
The "mythos" is the sending, the latent meaning and ground of the
Gerede
or "circumscribed, prescribed Logos" which emerges from it to create a
new epoch and, with it, a different culture. The "mythos" is different
for each culture. It is also different, in another sense, with each scientific
"paradigm" embedded in the larger "mythos" of a historical people. For
the most part, the "myth" of the scientific paradigm guides the thought
of the scientific community in such a way that it maintains an invisibility.
Scientists find themselves always already in a particular "paradigm" which
guides the practice of their research. As Feyerabend (1981) writes:

The method
of education often consists of some basic myth...Knowing the myth the grown-up
can explain almost everything (or else he can turn to experts for more
detailed understanding).
He is the master of Nature and of Society. He understands themboth and
knows how to interact
with them. However, he is not the master of the myth that guides his
understanding. (p. 163).

The relationship
between gerede and myth are different for each epoch. It is from
this place that we can understand that there are at least two extreme possibilities
for the relationship between gerede and myth. On the one extreme,
we can understand gerede as the 'common sense' of a historical people which
shelters and preserves the 'sensus communis.' In this case, the 'common
sense' serves the purpose of being a container which preserves the 'sensus
communis' so that it can be retrieved. Through the retrieval of the 'sensus
communis,' the community is reoriented through a transformation of the
everydayness of 'common sense' through a ritual recovery. This kind of
ritual recovery, for example, is evident in Eliade's (1957/1959) description
of "religious man" in The Sacred and the Profane. "The time of origin
of a reality," writes Eliade,

-that is,
the time inaugurated by the first appearance of the reality - has a paradigmatic value
and function; that is why man seeks to reactualize it periodically by means
of appropriate
rituals (p. 85).

Through
ritual, a culture allows for an opening in the 'at-homeness' of everydayness
through an existential transformation of everydayness by which 'common
sense' becomes "uncanny" and in which the 'sensus communis' may shine forth
as the latent meaning and ground. Certainly, Eliade (1957/1959) makes this
evident in his descriptions of, for example, the festivals of the Australian
Arunta and the Polynesian people of Tikiopia. At the
other extreme, a historical people may experience the "mythos" as a lack
or as 'unconscious.' In these cases, the 'common sense' of a culture denies
its "mythos" as its latent meaning and ground. The everyday, functional
discourse of the "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" disallows any other
kind of discourse. Yet, there is cost for the culture in doing so. One
of the great lessons of psychoanalysis serves well in elaborating this
cost. Psychoanalysis teaches that the repressed always returns in the form
of symptom. Therefore, we can say that what has been denied in the 'sensus
communis' and the 'mythos' disrupts everydayness as a symptomatic return
of the repressed. Following
the lead of Heidegger, thinkers such as van den Berg (1961, 1970, 1971),
Boss (1994/1979), Romanyshyn (1978, 1982, 1985, 1989), Kugelmann
(1992), Sipiora (1990, 1991, 1994) and Robbins (1997) all agree that the
epoch of our contemporary culture, as a technological age governed by "calculative
thinking," is just such a culture. In our technological age, we deny the
"mythos" as the latent meaning and ground of our functional everydayness.
In turn, we suffer the consequences with symptoms, such as meaninglessness,
boredom, loneliness, fear and depression. We are a society which has forgotten
its heritage as its destiny. In our
technological age, Being presences as the "Enframing" (Gestell).
"The essence of technology is nothing technological," writes Sipiora (1991)
on Heidegger:

...it is
not a product of human making or an activity under human control. Rather
technology - in the
broad and fundamental sense in which Heidegger conceives of it - is a presence
of Being
which provokesthe disclosure of the whole of their beings in terms of their
use value. (p. 241).

The "Enframing"
is the essence of technology which precedes the technological world
of our culture. The "Enframing" is the latent meaning and ground, the "mythos,"
of our "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" as the "calculative thinking"
of "means-end" rationality. Technology is the "mode of revealing" in which
truth, as aletheia, happens in our particular historical epoch (Heidegger,
1993b, p. 319). This 'truth,' as the "Enframing," is the "it gives" which
presents beings as "standing-reserve." It is "the gathering together of
the setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal
the actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve" (Heidegger, 1993b,
p. 325). Yet, this
sending in the mode of "enframing" presents a "supreme danger" (Heidegger,
1993b, p. 332). As we take up things as "standing-reserve" or 'resources,'
we come "to the very brink of a precipitous fall" in which we ourselves
are taken as "standing-reserve" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 332). Yet, at the
same time, we understand ourselves as "lords of the earth." We fail
to see ourselves as claimed by Being. Further, "Enframing blocks the
shining-forth and holding sway of truth" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 333). In
the discourse of "means-end" rationality, everything is reduced to quantifiable
resources, including human beings, and all other kinds of discourse are
disallowed. As a result, our world has become an "unworld," characterized
by a "circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption," which lacks
a human context (Heidegger, 1973, p. 43). We become "homeless" as we are
alienated from the 'essence' of what it means to be human. If we
understand history as a retrieval of the past as "what-is-as-having-been"
which opens up a future as a destiny, we are a culture in desperate need
of history. Yet, history as such has been denied. Historiology has replaced
history as a focus on a succession of actual events. Technological culture
is a-historical. Through the "myth of progress," technology promises power
over all things, including death. Yet, as a result, the past is denied
as the "having-been" which may be "retrieved" in the present as a "waiting-toward"
which opens up a future as "coming-toward." Instead, the present becomes
a mere succession of "nows." The "calculative thinking" of our historical
"logos" denies us the possibility of retrieving our heritage as a destiny.
And it is with Kuhn's conception of "incommensurability" that he intuitively
grasps this denial, and that, in the spirit of Geschichte, he attempts
a retrieval of the past with his historical reading of science. Heidegger
takes a somewhat different approach. For Heidegger, the alternative is
"meditative thinking." The two
characteristics of Heidegger's (1996) "meditative thinking" are "releasement
toward things" and "openness to the mystery." "Releasement toward things"
is a stance toward technology which is both a "yes" and a "no" (Heidegger,
1996, p. 54). We cannot merely stop what we are doing, yet we can "ponder"
the "possible rise of the saving power" of technology through a retrieval
or recollection in which "we watch over it" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 337).
Doing so, we are able to step back from "calculative thinking" and dwell
poetically with the understanding that, as Holderlan wrote: "where the
danger is, grows the saving power also..." (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 340).
"Openness to the mystery" is a move toward the wonderment that there is
something rather than nothing. It is the recognition that technology erupts
from the concealing-revealing presencing of Being as the "it gives" which
gives us beings as "standing- reserve." It is the recognition that we are
not "lords of the earth," but that we are called or claimed by Being to
take up things such that they gather a world. We are the "shepherds of
Being." We recognize that we are finite beings who must listen in to the
call of being so that we might hear the "turning" in which Being sends
us on a path of disclosure as a destiny. Thus, through "meditative thinking,"
we are granted the promise of "a new ground and foundation upon which we
can stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled
by it" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 55). Through "meditative thinking," history
is again made possible. In conclusion,
a genuine history is, essentially, "meditative" thinking, since
it is a thinking which allows for a transformation of "average everydayness."
History is necessary because:

...the
self-interpretation of normal science turns out to be inadequate, for normal
science conceals
this vulnerability to disruption from us. It projects its methods and equipment
as capable
of being extended to solve any problem which it encounters, and its failure
to do so at
any point is unintelligible to it. (Rouse, 1981, p. 284).

By his
appeal to history in order to understanding the social character of modern
science, Kuhn's (1962) Structure, if for only a moment, glances
across the abyss of science and history to the possibility of taking up
the organization of knowledge in a different way. Ultimately, however,
the end goal for Kuhn is normal science. However, a return to the discourse
of scientific thinking is a return to the kind of gerede that, once
again, denies its meaning and ground. Scientific discourse is always "mathematical"
in the sense of its original meaning: "that 'about' things which we really
already know" such that "we do not first get it out of things, but, in
a certain way, we bring it already with us" (Heidegger, 1967, p. 74). Further,
in order to carry out its project, the "calculative thinking" of science,
as the ground of science and technology, denies other forms of discourse,
including history. As I've tried to show, this need not be the only kind
of discourse. Gerede is part of the structure of the human kind
of being. There is no getting rid of it. Yet, we can also imagine the possibility
of a discourse which allows for a ritual recovery of the hidden meaning
and ground; which, as a "referential context of significance," includes
the possibility of transformation.

IV. A RESPONSE TO HOELLER: CAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL
SCIENCE BE A NORMAL SCIENCE?

Hoeller's
(1978-79) critique of Giorgi's appeal to a phenomenological psychology
as a human science relies on Kuhn's notion of "normal science." Hoeller
shows that Giorgi's "major goal is to show that psychology can be both
humanistic and scientific" (p. 168). This, indeed, appears to be the case,
as Giorgi (1970) writes:

...it is
precisely the prejudice that Third Force psychology must be either antiscientific
or nonscientific
that we would like to challenge. Consequently, both the term "human" and the term
"science" are important to us. We would insist upon the relevance of the
termhuman
to those who want to build a psychology of the human person according to
the conception
of science as developed by the natural sciences and who adhere rigidly
to that concept
despite changes in subject matter. We would insist upon the relevance of
science for those
who want to study the humanistic aspects of man without any concern for
method or rigor
whatsoever. (p. xii).

In order
to create a "human science" psychology, Giorgi appeals to a fulfillment
of "the aims of science" (Giorgi, 1970, p. xii). Yet, as Hoeller
so adeptly points out, there is an extreme danger here. This danger, by
now, should be evident based on the above discussion. The term "science"
is charged with the latent meaning of research as the laying out of a blueprint
of nature, which, regardless of its inclusion of mere numbers, is "mathematical"
in character. This danger
becomes even more evident when Giorgi (1970) appeals to Kuhn in order to
support his argument for the taking up of psychology as a "human science."
Giorgi wants to argue that phenomenological psychology, as a "human science,"
should be the next "paradigm" of "normal science" for psychology. He writes:

Perhaps
the clearest way to communicating our intention is to state, in Kuhn's
terms, psychology
needs another paradigm. We feel that the paradigm within which psychology has been
laboring has reached the limits of its usefulness, and that it is time
to find a new paradigm...
(p. 197).

Yet, Giorgi
seems to be naive to the possibility that phenomenological psychology,
as a "normal science," contradicts the notion of the phenomenological method:
"To let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in
which it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 58). Hoeller
(1978-79), therefore, argues that the adoption of phenomenological psychology
as a paradigm of "normal science" would ultimately cease to be phenomenological
or "human" (p. 170). "(It) would have ceased to have the essence of phenomenology,
for it would become all the things it presently aims against" (Hoeller,
1978-79, p. 170). Instead, Hoeller argues that phenomenological psychological
should aim to be "a permanently revolutionary science, which is to say,
according to Heidegger and Kuhn, it would have ceased to be 'science'"
(p. 170). Hoeller
is on the right track, but he does not realize that his argument contains
an inherent contradiction. To appeal to a phenomenological psychology which
is "authentic" as a "revolutionary science," which is therefore opposed
to an "inauthentic" psychology as a "normal science," is to have already
brought it into the frame of the "science" which Hoeller, along with Heidegger
and Kuhn, critiques. The end result is that Hoeller perpetuates the marginalization
of a phenomenological discourse in psychology. He places it in a position
by which, within the "calculative" frame of science and technology, it
becomes relegated to the netherworld of chaos between the "paradigms" of
"normal science" psychology. Hoeller places phenomenological psychology
in a position where it becomes a psychology of mere crisis, rather than
a psychology that allows for the possibility of transformation of its latent
meaning and ground. The "inauthentic-authentic"
distinction belongs to the work of an early Heidegger who, in Being
and Time, revealed the provisional ontology of the human being
of our modern, technological era governed by "calculative thinking." The
derogatory cast of gerede as "inauthentic" belongs to the alienating
discourse of our scientific epoch which denies all other forms of discourse.
As I've demonstrated above, there lies the possibility of another kind
of gerede: a discourse which allows both for a community
to work together at a common project and to engage in a "meditative
thinking" which listens in to the meaning and ground of the "referential
context of significance" which guides their thought. This ideal, not
mere revolutionary science, should be the goal of phenomenological psychology.
And, as I've argued, this must be a phenomenological psychology which understands
the human being as radically social and radically historical. This is also
a phenomenological psychology, in distinction from Hoeller's critique,
which does not cease to be a science, but which holds to the "releasement
toward things" characterized by "meditative thinking." It is both a "yes"
and "no" to science: a human science research, which, "in its successes
and in the indefinitely open possibility of its partial failure, is already
in the truth" (Rouse, 1982, p. 288). In contradistinction, Hoeller proposes
a psychology which holds to the impossible ideal of an a-social psychology
fit only for "a beast or a god."

Robbins,
B. (1997). A story of children's stories: A psychological history of the
emergence of childhood and the literary fairy tale in light of observations
of two children's engagements with stories. Unpublished.

Romanyshyn,
R. (1985). The despotic eye: An illustration of metabletic phenomenology
and its implications. In The changing reality of modern man. (D.
Kruger, Ed.). Pittsburgh: Duquense University Press.