This Tuesday, an article in Zimbabwe newspaper the Herald floated the idea that a unity government led by President Robert Mugabe might be the best way to break the political logjam which continues to paralyse the country. When queried about the piece, deputy information minister Bright Matonga categorically denied that the unity idea represented the official Zanu-PF position, and he went on to say that Zanu-PF had no need to form a government of national unity, now or in the future. (And the Herald today carries an article reflecting this official view.)

Matonga's claim that this article had no state sanction, and the implication that the piece represented an independent point of view, has a hollow ring. The Herald, from Rhodesian days to the present, has always been a state mouthpiece, and more so since 2000. Although the Herald is often derided, and with good reason, for the puerile propaganda stories which make up the bulk of its content, it does have two redeeming qualities for those who have the patience to wade through the dross. First, it is occasionally a useful social commentator, and second, it is a platform for articulating state policy. Most, if not all, the text which appears in the Herald is carefully scrutinised and given the state seal of approval before it is published.

So, it's unlikely that this week's "government of national unity" piece came without the state's imprimatur. It is probably a trial balloon, by which the state is sending a message to the MDC, that Zanu-PF could consider a unity government - if it happens on their terms.

Why would Zanu-PF be mooting the idea of a coalition? After all, in terms of power politics, Zanu-PF certainly has the upper hand right now. It has nullified the MDC victory in the March poll; it has a monopoly on violence; the military is clearly in charge; and Robert Mugabe has no intention of stepping down. The MDC cannot take, or share, power without the state and the army's say-so. In terms of the domestic situation, the state is still running the show.

Or is it? The world continues to fixate on the electoral process, and with good reason; but, in some ways, the election is now irrelevant. The process has been so corrupted in the past three weeks, and people have become so disillusioned by the unprecedented levels of fraud, that no one will believe the recount verdicts; and few would vote in a run-off. What matters now, domestically, is the internal balance of power, and how it has shifted.

The post 2000 state-military-business complex remains, but the military has overtly become first among equals in the grouping, with the civilian element of the party now very much subordinated. It is the military elites that, in real terms, are running Zimbabwe, but there is a growing concern among elements of both the ruling party and the military that using force to rule cannot be a long-term solution to the crisis. The MDC and Morgan Tsvangirai showed that they have enormous support within Zimbabwe, and while state violence may compel opposition activists to go underground, the continuing crisis will continue to garner internal and external support for the opposition, whether that opposition is the MDC or other groups.

Regionally and internationally, the balance of power regarding Zimbabwe is changing. President Mbeki will remain the lead figure on Zimbabwe - for now. But he is facing increasing pressure from his own party and a new generation of regional leaders, to be more forceful. The Chinese arms shipment to Zimbabwe has been deeply embarrassing for Mbeki and China, while the SADC, for all its public support for Mugabe, has used the opportunity to show what they really think of his regime. It has also revealed the strength of regional civil society and the grassroots, as the Zimbabwe crisis devolves from being a state-centric issue to an issue of people power.

The Herald piece may well be a tacit recognition by the state that the ruling elite and the opposition are in equilibrium. The state can use force and violence to brutalise citizens into compliance, and to marginalise the opposition; but force is a tactic, not a long-term strategy. It's a short-term solution, and one which fuels the chronic crisis. The opposition lacks "hard" power, but it has enormous symbolic and moral power, which increases incrementally as more violence is used, and the economy continues to fragment. (In some ways, the MDC has a similar power relationship to that which the ANC had to the National party and the SADF in the days of apartheid.)

In addition, it is likely that elements within Zanu-PF are increasingly uneasy about their usurpation by the military, and may themselves be looking for the demilitarisation of the party. The unity offer could thus be the "carrot" to the MDC, and one which complements the "stick" of violence. Zanu-PF is not offering a Kenya solution, of a coalition government, with a modicum of power-sharing. Rather, what is being hinted at is more of a 1987 Unity Accord type of settlement between Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF, and Joshua Nkomo's Zapu. This was less a political merger than an incorporation of Zapu by Zanu; and Robert Mugabe would still be president.

The article is thus also a tacit appeal to the MDC to move away from electoralism, and discuss hard politics - the politics of possible power-sharing. No one will be performing cartwheels: it's impossible to say if the unity idea represents the state in its entirety, or factions within Zanu-PF; the MDC will be suspicious, and rightly so.

But the reality is this: just as the state's options are reducing, so too are the MDC's. Both sides certainly feel that time is on their side: Zanu-PF feels that its monopoly of force will break the MDC and Tsvangirai; the opposition, in turn, feels that the economy and international pressure and possible intervention will break Zanu-PF. But time is on neither's side. Of this you can be sure: behind the scenes, no one is ruling out anything, especially the idea of a unity accord.