TAIWANESE AND MAINLAND CHINESE LEADERS IN HISTORIC ... & THE weakness of the American
leadership class hehe hey "every~body" C's it ...but the Amerikan sheep~ie's

Last week there was a development whose significance will
unfold over the next few years, if not decades, as the leaders of
Communist Mainland China, and Taiwan, met for the first time since
Chairman Mao's Communists drove Chiang Kai-Shek's Khoumintang forces
from the mainland to Taiwan over 60 years ago, in this article shared by
Mr. S.:The leaders of China and Taiwan in a historic meetingWhat's interesting to note here is the approach both countries are
taking toward the nearly insoluble political and economic dilemmas that
each "China" poses toward the other:

But while bilateral trade, investment and tourism have
blossomed – particularly since Ma and his KMT took power in 2008 – there
is deep suspicion on both sides and no progress has been made on any
sort of political settlement.
Beijing still officially considers Taiwan a renegade province that
should be reunified with the mainland. But many Taiwanese see it as
independent and are concerned at China’s growing influence....In order not to offend each other the officials will address to each
other as Mr. Xi and Mr. Ma, rather than Mr. President, one Chinese
government official has said. According to Mr. Ma this meeting will be
promoting peace and probable ways to reduce hostility such as removing
Chinese missiles targeted at Taiwan.

The backdrop to these talks is interesting to ponder, for they come
at a time when America's position and leadership is being challenged on a
multitude of fronts and in a variety of ways. One need only think of
the Russian intervention in Syria, and two of its "technological
messages," with the Russian blackout of communicationns over the entire
country, exposing a key NATO-American technological weakness, and the
Russian cruise missile attacks. The latter cannot be pondered too long
or hard, for not only were the strikes flawlessely executed, but
Russia's message was clear and simple: it can interdict any
American-Western move in central Asia. Nor is the hidden message here to
be forgotten: imagine the vulnerability of American aircraft carriers,
the basis of America's ability to protect the sea lanes and project
American power internationally, to such long-range cruise missile
strikes by Russian(and Chinese)"carrier killers". In other words, there
has been not only a collapse of "unipolarism" in recent months and
years,but also a demonstration of the weakness of the American
leadership class and its ability to protect its assets and allies...... like Taiwan.For that island nation, the pressures, when viewed in this context,
to mend fences with Beijing are immense, as are the risks, which are
almost equal to the risks of not doing so. And for Beijing, the
risks of letting the opportunity slide are also immense, for the only
other way to mend the fence is literally to storm it, and while the
outcome of any one-on-one confrontation is a foregone conclusion, the
mainland Chinese know that it would nonetheless be a bloody and costly
affair. A forcibly reintegrated province would be a long-term source of
internal instability which Beijing can ill-afford.A clue to the seriousness of both sides is afforded by the fact that
both have been willing to forego political protocols and niceties, and
this is a powerful symbolic indicator of what the "two Chinas" may be up
to over the long haul: a willingness to table immediate political
difficulties for the moment, while intricacies of trade, law, and access
to each others markets(of all kinds), may be on the table. It is this
willingness of both sides to table the political question that is
therefore a significant development.So where's the high octane speculation here? How will Taipei and
Beijing resolve over half a century of recriminations and animosity? I
suspect that both will do so in a typically Chinese way, one in which
both sides can win if they play their cards carefully and are not in too
much of a hurry to resolve the outstanding political issues, and one of
the easiest ways for each to do this will be to make common cause,
including the occasional joint communique or position statement, on a
variety of geopolitical issues on which both sides can make
common cause and show intentional agreement. Think of it, perhaps, as a
kind of "honorary" membership for Taiwan in the Shanghai accords-BRICSA
bloc. Expect, too, certain "joint projects" to be proposed and embarked
upon, including joint military exercises for responding to "regional
emergencies," and a major Taiwanese voice in Beijing's "new silk road"
project and its efforts to build a parallel financial clearing
structure; Taipei's financial prowess and expertise would greatly
enhance Beijing's prospects for success, and thus in this one area alone
Beijing and Taipei already have an issue ready to hand on which they
could make common cause to the mutual benefit of both, provided the will
is there to do so.One thing, however, is certain. The recent talks are not a one-off.
They will become more and more frequent, at all levels of
Taiwanese-Mainland interaction. And that means, this is one to watch
carefully.