"We have offered to the Socialist countries only standard commercial computers and
these offerings have been in full compliance with the export control and administrative
directives of the Department of Commerce."  William C. Norris, Chairman Control
Data Corporation

To make any progress in developing weapons systems the Soviets must utilize modern
high-speed computers. The computers and the necessary computer technology, both hardware
and software, have come from the West, almost exclusively from the United States.

At the end of the 1950s the United States had about 5,000 computers in
use, while the Soviet Union had only about 120. These Soviet computers, as reported by
well-qualified observers, were technically well behind those of the West and barely out of
the first-generation stage even as late as the 1960s.

In the late fifties the Soviets produced about thirty to forty
BESM-type computers for research and development work on atomic energy and rockets and
missiles. In general, the BESM type has most of the features typical of early U.S.
computers. The original version had 7,000 tubes; the later version had 3,000 tubes and
germanium diodes.

The only Soviet computer in continuous production in the 1960s was the
URAL-I, followed by the URAL-II and URAL-IV modifications of the original model. The
URAL-I has an average speed of 100 operations per second, compared to 2,500 operations per
second on U.S. World War II machines and 15,000 operations per second for large U.S.
machines of the 1950s, and 1-10 million operations per second common in the early 1970s.
Occupying 40 square meters of floor space, URAL-I contains 800 tubes and 3,000 germanium
diodes; its storage units include a magnetic drum of 1,024 cells and a magnetic tape of up
to 40,000 cells  considerably less than U.S. machines of the 1960s. URAL-II and
URAL-IV incorporate slightly improved characteristics. The URAL series is based on U.S.
technology.

Production methods for both the URAL and the BESM computers were the
same as American methods.

Until the mid-1960s direct import of computers from
the United States was heavily restricted by export control regulations. In 1965 only
$5,000 worth of electronic computers and parts were shipped from the United States to the
Soviet Union, and only $2,000 worth in 1966. This changed in 1967. Computer exports
increased to $1,079,000 and a higher rate of export of U.S. electronic computers to the
USSR has been maintained to the present time under constant lobbying pressure from U.S.
businessmen and their trade associations.

The precise amount and nature of U.S. computer sales to the Soviet
Union since World War II is censored, but it is known that after World War II, IBM sales
to the Communist world came "almost entirely from [IBM's] Western European
plants," partly because of U.S. export control restrictions and partly because U.S.
equipment operates on 60 cycles, whereas Russian and European equipment operates on 50
cycles.

American computer sales as opposed to Soviet theft may be traced from
1959 with sale of a Model-802 National-Elliott sold by Elliott Automation, Ltd., of the
United Kingdom. (Elliott Automation is a subsidiary of General Electric in the United
States.) Towards the end of the sixties Soviet purchases of computers were stepped up, and
by late i969 it was estimated that Western computer sales to all of Communist Europe,
including the USSR, were running at $40 million annually, in great part from European
subsidiaries of American companies. In 1964-65 Elliott Automation delia ;red five
Model-503 computers to the USSR, including one for installation in the Moscow Academy of
Sciences. Other General Electric made in Europe machines, for example, a Model-400 made in
France by Compagnie des Machines Bull, were also sold to the USSR.

Olivetti-General Electric of Milan, Italy has been a major supplier of
GE computers in the USSR. In I967 the Olivetti firm delivered $2.4 million worth of
data-processing equipment systems to the USSR in addition to Model-400 and Model-115
machines.

In sum, General Electric from 1959 onwards sold to the Soviet Union
through its European subsidiaries a range of its medium-capacity computers.

Of perhaps even greater significance for the 1960 era were sales by
English Electric, which include third-generation microcircuit computers utilizing Radio
Corporation of America technology. In 1967 English Electric sold to the USSR its System
Four machine with microcircuits; this machine incorporates RCA patent and was similar to
the RCA Spectra-70 series.

The largest single supplier of computers to the USSR has been
International Computers and Tabulation, Ltd. of the United Kingdom, which also licenses
RCA technology, and by 1970 had supplied at least twenty-seven of the thirty-three large
computers then in Russia. In November I969, for example, five of the firm's 1900-series
computers (valued at $12 million) went to the USSR. These large high-speed units with
integrated circuits were, without question, considerably in advance of anything the
Soviets were able to manufacture. Such machines were certainly capable of solving military
and space problems. Indeed, a computer cannot distinguish between civilian and military
problems.

In 1971 the USSR and East European family of general purpose computers
known as the RYAD series was announced. These are based substantially on IBM 360 and 370
computers illegally diverted into the USSR. This had an important effect of making
available to them a tremendous library of computer software that was RYAD compatible.

Dr. Baker has commented on the current RYAD position:

In the area of available manpower, one of the serious problems
afflicting the Soviet economy is the lack of qualified, highly trained, technical people
in the areas of computers and microelectronics. One cause of this is the lack of enough
computing and electronic equipment to train the next generation of scientists and
engineers. They simply don't have enough equipment to allow students sufficient 'hands-on'
practice at an early stage in their education. The Soviets are trying to alleviate this
problem by producing large, for them, numbers of RYAD computers  copies of the U.S.
IBM System 360's and 370's.17

In mid 1983 the Soviets introduced their first personal computer the AGATHA
(a rather curious name for a Russian product).

Produced at Zelenograd, outside Moscow, the Agatha was reversed
engineered from the APPLE II. Specifications are similar to the APPLE and the components
are either Soviet produced from reverse engineered U.S. components or imported and bought
openly or clandestinely in Europe or Japan.

Officials at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences have admitted that the APPLE II served
as a "prototype" for the Soviet Agatha.

In 1985 COCOM set up some new rules for microcomputers and made it
legal to export without license low powered 8-bit computers. Such a machine sells in the
West for $100 to $500.

The response was a flood of computer manufacturers attempting to make
elaborate sales pitches to the multimillion Soviet microcomputer market. If history is any
judge, the Soviets will buy a few thousand and then attempt to reverse engineer and
produce in the Soviet Union. Presumably the microcomputers, although low powered, could
have military applications and indeed this was openly admitted by a major computer
manufacturer (New York Times, February 8, 1985):

Confirmation of military end use comes from unimpeachable sources
 Soviet engineers who have worked on copying or reverse engineering in the Soviet
Union and later defected to the West. These engineers have testified before Congress and
provide firsthand evidence of Soviet military use of our technology. Here is a statement
from Joseph Arkov, who graduated from a Soviet engineering school in 1970 and who now
resides in the United States. Arkov worked in Soviet research installations.

If, for example, a new American computer has been obtained by the
Soviets, they will make a military application of it rather than a civilian
application,"18 and

In my work in the second research installation I had the assignment of copying Western
and Japanese high technology.

Arkov makes the interesting point that the Soviets are now so far behind
technologically that they can no longer just reverse engineer as previously  they
must import even the technology to manufacture high technology:

They do not have the human resources or the fine tuned equipment
required to produce the high technology machinery they try to copy. Once they know what
makes a given piece of machinery work, they find that they do not have the technical
know-how and equipment to produce the product themselves. That is why they want Western
high technology machines that will enable them to produce the products. And the Western
products they desire the most are those produced in the United States. That is why they
want American high technology machines with which they can produce the components for high
technology products.

Under Senate questioning Arkov confirmed that the major application of
our high technology is for military end uses.

Mr. Arkov: Well, the task of copying Western
technology . . . part of their assignment was for military. Is that the question?

Senator Rudman: Yes, let me just follow that up. You spoke in
your prepared statement about the use of sophisticated American computers in various
Soviet military operations, and also about the use of semiconductor technology. There are
those in this country who feel that had we not transferred that technology legally to the
Soviet Union  we sold them certain semiconductor technology and certain
sophisticated computer technology in the late sixties and early seventies  the
Soviets would not have achieved the advantages in missilery which they have made in terms
of the enormous throw weight and precision of their guidance systems. Do you agree with
that assessment? Do you think that the sale of those semiconductors and those computers
has given them a tremendous step forward in their technology in the defense area from your
background and your knowledge?

Mr. Arkov: Yes, I think so. I can't tell exactly. It's
hard to estimate the degree of advantage they got. But they gained there, using American
computers and American semiconductors.19

The 1973 Control Data Corporation technical assistance agreement
with the Soviet Union enabled the Soviets to complete phase one of their semiconductor
manufacturing plant (see Chapter Four).

Highly significant is a comparison of Control Data Corporation's public
argument to the media and Congress with this 1973 agreement and its totally one-sided
presentation of the national security argument.

One can only conclude that some CDC statements are deliberate untruths.
We make this statement by comparing Control Data public statements, particularly those of
Chairman William Norris, with internal documents and agreements with the Soviet Union.
These documents are confidential, but copies are in our possession.

On December 19, 1973 William Norris wrote Congressman Richard T. Hanna
concerning public criticism of the CDC proposal to export advanced Cyber computers to the
USSR.

We extract some statements from the letter (reproduced in full as
Appendix C) and compare it to extracts from CDC internal documents reproduced on pages
61-67. For example,

Norris: We have offered the Socialist countries only standard
commercial computers and these offerings have been in full compliance with the export
control and administrative directives of the Department of Commerce.

Comment: Reference to the 1973 Protocol of Intent between CDC
and the USSR marked CONFIDENTIAL and reproduced here tells a vastly different story.

Norris: Many persons including some of the witnesses before your
Committee mistake the offering for sale of old or even current state of the art hardware
for transfer of advanced technology. This is not unusual because in many cases it is
difficult for those who are not technically well informed to distinguish advanced computer
technology.

Comment: Norris is comparing apples and oranges. What is
"old" or "current" in the United States is far beyond "state of
the art" in the Soviet Union. When Norris was offering a million operations per
second CYBER computer to the Soviets, the run-of-the-mill Soviet technology was in the
order of several thousands of operations per second, and that was on copies of imported
equipment.

If multinational businessmen like William Norris were honestly mistaken
in their information or somewhat shaky in their logic, then perhaps they could be
forgiven. After all, to err is human.

Unfortunately, evidence proves beyond doubt that at least some of these deaf mute
businessmen have deceived both Congress and the American public in an unseemly haste to
make a buck.

We have documentary evidence in the case of Control Data Corporation and its Chairman,
William Norris.

In the following pages we print a series of letters from Control Data
Corporation to a concerned member of the public and contracts betweeen CDC and the Soviet
Union:

* Exhibit A
Letter from American Council for World Freedom to its supporters identifying William
Norris and CDC as exporters of valuable military technology to the Soviets.

* Exhibit B
Reply from William Norris, "Dear Yellow Card Sender," dated May 5, 1978. Note in
particular the paragraph, "While we did sign an agreement for technological
cooperation with the Soviet Union, we have not transferred any computer technology
to them."

* Exhibit C
Full text of cooperation agreement cited by William Norris in Exhibit B.

* Exhibit D
"Letter (Protocol) of Intent" not mentioned by William Norris in Exhibit B, but
which includes precise details of technology to be transferred, in distinct contrast to
the Norris claim, "We have not transferred any computer technology to
them."

Most importantly, it will be seen that Control Data Corporation
transferred a vast range of information and technology to the Soviets, not only on
computers but on manufacturing.

Publisher's Note: At this point the original manuscript contained
actual photo copies of documents. Due to the quality of the copies, the documents were
also reset in full and placed in Appendix D of the original manuscript.

Due to the difficulty of reproducing the documents in an efficient
manner, we will refer anyone wishing to read the documents to Appendix
D.

William Norris, Chairman of Control Data, has a lively
correspondence with Americans anxious to learn his rationale for supporting the Soviet
Union.

We quote below an extract from a letter written by William Norris to an inquirer:

You also made reference [wrote Norris] in your letter to Russia's first
democratic government that was overthrown by the communists. You are incorrect on this
point. There never has been any democracy in Russia  as a matter of fact, the
Russian standard of living today is higher than it was under the tsars. Further, you don't
find a great deal of unhappiness in the Soviet Union over living conditions and the
communist regime for two reasons  (1) they have never know [sic] what democracy is,
and (2) life is better than it used to be.

Here are the errors in the above Norris paragraph:

"There has never been any democracy in Russia."

Incorrect. The Kerensky government from March to November, 1917 was freely elected and
overthrown by the Bolsheviks (with the aid of Western businessmen such as William Norris).

"You don't find a great deal of unhappiness in the Soviet Union over living
conditions."

Incorrect. Mr. Norris should look out the window of his Moscow office at the uniform drab
blocks of apartments. How many families live in one room? How often do several families
live in one apartment? How about the hours spent in food lines, and the limited choice of
consumer goods in a guns-before-butter economy? Just how many individual Russians has Mr.
Norris freely spoken with? Not those of the "nomenklatura," but average Russians
in the street. We venture to guess none at all.

"... standard of living today is higher than under the
tsars."

Take one item  wheat. In 1906 Russia was the world's largest wheat exporter and the
world's largest wheat producer. The climate is the same today as in 1906, yet is used as a
forlorn excuse for Soviet pitiful wheat production. In fact, 80% of Russian bread today is
made from imported wheat, the home-grown is only fit for cattle feed.
Without Western wheat, Russia today would starve. Is that a truly higher standard of
living? Anyway, Russians today don't compare their standards to those of tsarist times but
to the Western world.

William Norris only sees what he wants to see, hears what he wants to
hear, and presumably speaks from these limited impressions of the world.

In conclusion, we can thank Mr. Norris and Control Data Corporation
that Soviet military has been able to break into the electronics based warfare of the late
20th and early 21st century.

CDC fulfilled phase one of the Soviet program for acquisition of
Western semiconductor technology and mass production facilities.

Footnotes:

17United
States Senate, Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and
Soviet Bloc Nations Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 97th
Congress Second Session, May 1982, Washington, D.C., p. 61.

18United
States Senate, Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet
Bloc Nations Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 97th
Congress Second Session, May 1982,
Washington, D.C., p. 27 19 Ibid.