"Aircraft Accident Analysis: Final Reports" by James Walters and Robert Sumwalt

After a report on two 757 accidents where the pilots relied too heavily on the FMC (Birgenair 301 and Aeroperu 603).

"The automation that has been designed into the aircraft is incredibly reliable. So much so that pilots (or for that matter, operators of any dependable automated system) tend to become complacent, relying on the system to perform as it always has. That can lead to a reduced awareness of the functional and operational status of the system and reduced effectiveness of the operator. Paradoxically, as technology improves, once simple tasks can become much more complex. Previously straightforward problems become harder to analyze and their solutions can become less evident.

The pilot will always be the final link in the safety chain. But to be successful in the future, the basic flying skills inherited from Orville Wright must not be replaced, only augmented, with effective technology management."

Pretty cool quote I thought I'd share. Even in flight simulation, I always try to keep situational awareness and be prepared to disengage A/P and A/T and grab the stick. Really cool book.

Posted onPost created on
September 17 2016 18:29 ET by Remy Mermelstein

One of my big gripes about Airbus aircraft is the FBW, and to an extent w/ 777, although it seems Boeing cockpits less **automated** than Airbus anyways, but the point is - no matter what your flying, where you are flying, or the circumstances a pilot should be trained first in flying the plane the old fashion way with the rudder, and stick and manual controls. Computers help us, help airlines save money, time, etc...but a pilot is the ultimate controller. Agree 100% w/ the statement. Also I think this is a HUGE reason for the crash of Air France 442 that crashed in the Atlantic. As experienced pilots showed in the simulations after, if the pilots on board had ignored all the warnings and the lights and sirens and just flown the plane manually there would be a good chance they would be around today. It was a stall situation, and they could have gotten out of it. Instead, they were trained to follow the lists for failures, follow the warnings, and forget the **flying**. They were trained more in how to use a computer than how to fly the plane they were on.

Both crews had information overload and were flying at night over the water so they had no visual reference, similar circumstances to AF447. The Aeroperu pilots had warnings that were telling them that they were overspeeding, stalling, too low all at once, and altimeter issues so they began to mistrust their instruments. All in all it comes down to training, SOP, CRM, and experience. US1549 and Air Transat 236 both had highly experienced pilots onboard with excellent CRM while Asiana 214 and AF447 both had a complete breakdown in CRM despite having experienced pilots onboard.

The Aeroperu crew had it really bad because they did not have airpseed indications, no reliable altitude, or vertical speed indications coupled with no visual references at all outside. ATC arranged for a Boeing 707 to takeoff and try to guide the stricken airliner back but the 757 crashed before the 707 could takeoff, the cause was tape over the static ports which was missed by one of the crew during his walk around. According to the final report the radio altimeter was functioning and issuing valid indications but the crew in their confusion either did not see it or did not trust it.

The Aeroperu crew had it really bad because they did not have airpseed indications, no reliable altitude, or vertical speed indications coupled with no visual references at all outside. ATC arranged for a Boeing 707 to takeoff and try to guide the stricken airliner back but the 757 crashed before the 707 could takeoff, the cause was tape over the static ports which was missed by one of the crew during his walk around. According to the final report the radio altimeter was functioning and issuing valid indications but the crew in their confusion either did not see it or did not trust it.

I saw the Documentary of that crash and I could say having both STall, and Overspeed warnings happening at once with no visual cue and overload of information, Felt real bad for their situation with no reliable altitude and wondering if pulling up would induce stall or overspeed. I wonder what I would do what to trust just a sad situation.

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