George M. Low, Team Leader, NASA Transition Team, to
Mr. Richard Fairbanks, Director, Transition Resources and Development
Group, December 19, 1980, with attached: "Report of the Transition
Team, National Aeronautics and Space Administration."

[Editorial Headnote: The transition team assembled to advise
President-elect Ronald Reagan on space issues consisted of individuals
with long experience in the field, both within and outside of
NASA. It was chaired by George M. Low, who had left NASA in 1976
after a long career to become President of the Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, Troy, New York. The team's report provided a detailed
set of recommendations and actions for the incoming administration.
A copy of this report is available in the NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington,
DC.]

December 19, 1980

Mr. Richard Fairbanks, Director

Transition Resources and Development Group

1726 M Street, NW

Washington, DC 20270

Dear Mr. Fairbanks:

I am pleased to submit the report of the transition team for the
National Aeronautics and-Space Administration (NASA). We hope
you will find that it presents a balanced view of the status of
the agency, its problems, strengths, end potentials. Team members
received full cooperation from NASA officials. Our group worked
together well, with frequent unanimity on identification and resolution
of issues.

Recognizing that many members have been involved in the past with
space programs, the team was particularly sensitive to its appearance
of a pro-space bias. Members worked hard to prepare an objective
report, with minimal personal advocacy. Team members have asked,
however, that in this letter I emphasize our view that NASA and
its civil space program represent an opportunity for positive
accomplishment by the Reagan administration. In contrast with
many government agencies that are mired in seemingly insoluble
controversy, NASA can be many things in the future--the best in
American accomplishment and inspiration for citizens.

We are pleased to have had the opportunity to aid the new administration
and trust that our report will serve you and the next NASA Administrator
well. The members of the team and I will be happy to provide additional
consultation should it be needed.

Sincerely,

George M. Low

Team Leader

NASA Transition Team . . .

[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Overview

In 1958 the people of the United States set out to lead the world
in space. By 1970 they had achieved their goal. Men walked on
the moon, scientific satellites opened new windows to the universe,
and communications satellites and new technologies brought economic
return. With these came new knowledge and ideas, a sense of pride,
and national prestige.

In 1980, by contrast, United States leadership and preeminence
are seriously threatened and measurably eroded. The Soviet Union
has established an essentially permanent manned presence in space,
and is using this presence to meet economic, military, and foreign
policy goals. Japan is broadcasting directly from space to individual
homes and business, and France is moving ahead of the United States
in preparing to reap the economic benefits of satellite resource
observation. Ironically, U.S. commercial enterprises are turning
to France to launch their satellites. In space science, the United
States has decided to forego the rare opportunity to visit Halley's
comet in 1986, yet the Soviet Union, the European Space Agency,
and Japan are all planning such a venture.

Technically, it is within our means to reestablish U.S. preeminence
in space. The civil space program and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration offer a number of options to carry out
the purpose and direction of U.S. aeronautics and space activities.
These options are examined in this report in full recognition
of the need for fiscal restraint in the immediate future.

B. The U.S. Aeronautics and Space Program in 1980

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created
in 1958 by the National Aeronautics and Space Act (PL 85-568),
largely as a response to the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union.

The Act declared that it is the policy of the United States that
activities in space be developed to peaceful purposes for the
benefit of all mankind, and that these activities (except those
primarily associated with the defense of the United States) should
be the responsibility of a civilian agency. [2] This agency--NASA--was
chartered to carry out significant programs in aeronautics, space
science, space technology and applications, and manned space flight.

In 1961, the President challenged the nation to land men on the
Moon by the end of that decade. The Apollo project not only made
the United States preeminent in space technology, but also instilled
a sense of pride in the American people. Apollo's success was
due to a long term commitment; adequate and stable financial support;
a technological partnership among government, industry and universities;
and disciplined managers drawn from within and outside the government.

Also in the past two decades, automated spacecraft explored Mercury,
Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, while telescopes above the earth's
atmosphere gave us new eyes to learn about our universe--the strange
world of pulsars, quasars and black holes. The result was a new
understanding of the past, present, and future of our total environment.

In the meantime, communications satellites have spawned an entire
new industry, weather satellites can warn us of storms, and remote
sensing satellites offer tremendous economic potential from assessing
and managing the earth's resources.

At the end of 1980 we are on the eve of the launch of Columbia,
the first Space Shuttle, and its promise to provide a multiplicity
of benefits--in science, in exploration, in terrestrial applications,
and in the security of our nation--from easy access to this new
ocean of space.

C. Aeronautics

Since 1915 NASA (and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics) has been the world leader in aeronautical research.
At NASA's laboratories are many of the national facilities and
technical experts necessary to continue progress in the rapidly
advancing field of aviation. NASA is also at the focal point of
a unique partnership among industry, universities, the Department
of Defense, and NASA itself that has been responsible for U.S.
preeminence in aeronautics.

Built on the foundation of this research and technology base,
the U.S. aviation industry employs about 1,000,000 Americans,
ranks second largest among U.S. manufacturing employers, contributes
more than any other manufacturing industry to the U.S. balance
of trade, and has replaced agriculture as first in net trade contribution.

Continued advancements in research and technology are essential
if the U.S. aviation industry is to remain a viable competitor
in the world market.

D. The Space Program and U.S. Policy

In recent years the United States has lost its competitive edge
in the world, militarily, commercially, and economically, [3]
and our competition with the Soviet Union has taken on a new dimension.

The Soviet Union recognizes that science and technology are major
factors in that competition. The nation that is strong in science
and technology has the foundation to be strong in all other areas
and will be perceived as a world leader.

Aeronautics and space can be major factors in our technological
strength. They demand the very best in engineering, because the
consequences of mistakes are great: the crash of an aircraft,
or the complete failure of a spaceship.

A viable aviation industry and a strong space program are important
visible elements in our international competition. Beyond these
fundamental points, the United States civil space program, unlike
many other government programs and agencies, has significant actual
and potential impact on U.S. policy. Although some elements of
the program have been so utilized, their potential in U.S. policy
remains largely unrecognized and unrealized. The major factors
are as follows:

1. National Pride and Prestige

National pride is how we view ourselves. Without a national sense
of purpose and identity, national pride ebbs and flows in accordance
with short-term events. The Iranian hostage situation and the
abortive rescue mission have done harm to our national pride quite
out of proportion to our true abilities as a nation. On the other
hand, the recent Voyager visit to Saturn, reported by an enthusiastic
press, made a significant contribution to our sense of self-worth.
The space program has characteristics of American historic self-image:
a sense of purpose; a pioneering spirit of exploration, discovery,
and adventure; a challenge of frontiers and goals; a recognition
of individual contributions and team efforts; and a firm sense
of innovation and leadership.

National prestige is how others view us, the global perception
of this country's intellectual, scientific, technological, and
organizational capabilities. In recent history, the space program
has been the unique positive factor in this regard. The Apollo
exploration of the Moon restored our image in the post-Sputnik
years, and the Voyager exploration of Saturn was a bright spot
in an otherwise gloomy period of dwindling world recognition.
With space programs we are a nation of the present and the future,
while in the eyes of the world we become outward and forward looking.

2. Economics and Space Technology

A vigorous space program has provided many technological challenges
to our nation. Efforts such as Apollo, Voyager, and the Space
Shuttle have involved challenges and risks far more significant
than those of short-term technological needs.

Meeting these challenges has resulted in a "technological
push" to American industry, fostering significant innovation
in [4] a wide range of high technology fields such as electronics,
computers, science, aviation, communications and biomedicine.
The return on the space investment is higher productivity, and
greater competitiveness in the world market.

The space program also returns direct dividends, as in the field
of satellite communications. The potential economic returns from
satellite exploration for earth's resources are great.

3. Scientific Knowledge and Inspiration for the Nation's Youth

U.S. leadership in the scientific exploration of space has provided
new knowledge about the earth and the universe, thus forming the
basis for applied research and development--a significant factor
in our society and economy.

The exploration of space has provided an inspirational focus for
large numbers of young people who have become students of engineering
and science. At a time when there is a shortage of technically
trained people, when the U.S. productive vitality depends on the
application of science, the space program could help attract young
people into these fields.

4. Relation to U.S. Foreign Policy

Aspects of the civil space program can serve as instruments to
develop and further U.S. foreign policy objectives. Not only can
the space program contribute to how this country is viewed in
the eyes of the world, but cooperative space activities, such
as the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-Soyuz mission and European Space Agency
payloads on the Space Shuttle, are important to other countries.
Technology associated with the space program has resulted in strong
economic and technological interaction with developed countries,
as well as in important aid to underdeveloped countries, particularly
in the areas of communications and resource exploration.

E. Observations

At the end of 1980 the U.S. civil space program stands at a crossroads.
The United States has invested in a great capability for space
exploration and applications, a capability that provides benefits
in national pride and prestige, in science and technology, in
the inspiration of young people, in foreign policy, and in economic
gain.

Now this capability is waning. NASA and the space program are
without clear purpose or direction. . . .

[39]

VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIOMS

NASA represents an important investment by the United States in
aeronautics and space. The agency's programs have provided, and
continue to offer, benefits in science and technology, in national
pride and prestige, in foreign policy, and in economic gain. However,
in recent years the agency has been underfunded, without purpose
or direction. The new administration finds NASA at a crossroads,
with possible moves toward either retrenchment or growth. The
transition team has examined ten major areas and various options
for dealing with them. For each issue, the team has made recommendations
as follows:

A. Presidential statement of purpose of the U.S. civil space
program [pages 5-7]

It is recommended:

1. That the President recognize the importance of the U.S. space
program at an early date (e.g., the inaugural address) without
yet making a commitment.

2. That the purpose and direction of the U.S. space effort be
defined, and that a commitment to a viable space program be articulated
by the President at a timely opportunity, such as the first flight
of the Shuttle in the spring of 1981. (N.B. A viable space program
could be smaller than, equal to, or larger than the present one,
but it must have purpose and direction.)

B. NASA as an organization [pages 8-11]

1. The NASA Administrator

It is recommended that the President select a politically experienced
and strong manager as NASA Administrator, that he reestablish
the Administrator's role as that of principal advisor on civil
space matters, and that he be accessible to the Administrator
as necessary.

2. Management capability

It is recommended that the Administrator, working either within
the agency or with an outside group, assess NASA's vitality and
discipline in management of complex projects, and make changes
necessary to effect improvements.

3. Staffing

It is recommended that the dual problem of bringing experienced
people from industry into governnent, and of [40] attracting bright
young engineers and scientists into government service be addressed
immediately, for the government as a whole and for NASA in particular.

4. The size of NASA

It is recommended that the question of whether or not NASA needs
all its field centers be addressed as soon as the purpose of the
aeronautics and space program is defined.

C. Space policy and conflict resolution [pages 12-16]

It is recommended that space policy development and conflict resolution
be assigned to the NASA Administrator or special ad hoc groups
as the need arises; and that consideration be given to a permanent
space policy board for this purpose.

D. The civil space program and national policy [pages 14-15]

It is recommended that the administration develop an unequivocal
statement of national space policy and an organizational framework
that promotes economic exploitation of our capabilities and uses
space to further our international goals.

In the area of remote sensing, the administration should undertake
the development of an integrated civil program.

In foreign policy, the administration should develop procedures
for the Department of State and other government agencies, together
with industry, to employ space technology to further foreign policy
objectives.

E. Space Shuttle flight readiness [pages 16-17)

It is recommended that:

1. The NASA Administrator schedule immediate briefings and reviews,
with NASA and contractor personnel, to become familiar with the
Shuttle and its problems.

2. The Administrator obtain a formal assessment of Shuttle readiness
from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.

3. The Administrator seek the advice (outside the regular review
process), of the knowledgeable outside experts.

1. That existing plans for initial Shuttle operations, retention
of expendable launch vehicles for the time being, and transfer
of payloads to the Shuttle, be allowed to stand.

2. That at an appropriate time after the first flight (or flights)
of the Shuttle, the President direct the Administrator of NASA
to address the issues of Shuttle enhancement, continued Shuttle
production, and expendable launch vehicle production; and to resolve
them in the best interest of the United States, taking into account
all users--commercial, civilian, government, DOD, and foreign.

G. The transfer from research and development to operations
[pages 20-22]

It is recommended:

1. That the question of operational management of remote sensing
satellite systems be addressed on an urgent basis (see section
on "The Civil Space Program and National Policy").

2. That consideration be given to turning the operation of expendable
launch vehicles over to a government agency other than NASA or
to a private commercial organization in the next year.

3. That long term Space Shuttle operations be addressed only after
some flight experience with the Shuttle is in hand.

H. Aeronautics [pages 23-24]

It is recommended that NASA's traditional role of research and
technology support to civil and military aviation be reaffirmed,
and perhaps even strengthened, to help stem the loss of U.S. leadership
in aviation.

I. NASA's role in areas other than aeronautics and space
[pages 25-26]

It is recommended that NASA's future role in non-aeronautics and
non-space activities be confined to assistance to other agencies
as requested for limited periods of time only, using cost reimbursements
as possible, and that current long term commitments in other areas
be eventually moved from NASA.

[42] J. Personnel [pages 27-30]

It is recommended that the new NASA Administrator review the situation
of reemployed annuitants at an early date with the view of terminating
the employment of many of them. . . .