Abstract

This thesis explores the issue of CEO compensation following mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for Chinese firms. The objectives are presented as follows: First, to explore the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As decisions in Chinese firms. Second, to examine the factors influencing the determination of CEO compensation following M&As in Chinese firms. Based on a sample of 10,249 observations for Chinese listed firms and a quantitative research approach, the thesis finds that CEO compensation in Chinese firms ispositively and significantly related to the M&As completion when controlling for factors including firm performance, corporate governance and the CEO political connection. Regarding the determination of CEO compensation following M&As, none of the theories could perfectly explain the determination of CEO compensation following M&As. Some of the results are more consistent with the agency theory that the optimal CEO compensation arrangement is designed to align the interests of shareholders. For example, empirical results show that size and ROA are significantly and positively correlated to CEO compensation following M&As. Some results are more consistent with the managerial power theory. For example, CEO shareholding is significantlypositively correlated to CEO compensation. The result of politically connected CEO is consistent with the managerial power theory combined with resource dependency theory. Specifically, a positive relationship exists between CEOcompensation and CEO political connection.

Item Type:

Thesis

Creators:

Huang, Z.

Date:

August 2016

Rights:

I Zhao Huang, confirm that this work submitted for the degree of PhD in Corporate Governance is my own and is expressed in my own words. Any uses made within it of the works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, equations, figures, text, and tables) are properly acknowledged. A full list of the references used has been included.