In Evangelist, Anita Evangelist, proceeding in pro per, challenged foreclosure proceedings after her statutory redemption period expired. She filed in state court. Defendants removed the case to federal court. Summary eviction proceedings are continuing in state court.

The thrust of Evangelist’s purportedly self-drafted complaint is that the first of two mortgages on her property was invalid, and that she should be declared the fee simple owner of the property.

The interesting twist in Young is that pro per plaintiff Johnnie Young is all up-to-date on his mortgage payments. No foreclosure is pending. Like Evangelist, Young has two mortgages on his property and seeks to have them declared invalid, leaving him as the fee simple owner of his home.

The common denominator in both cases is the nature of the pro per complaints.

Writing in Evangelist, Berg noted that the complaint, like the complaint in Young and nine other cases, “appear to have come from the same source; they utilize an identical single-spaced ‘courier new’ typeface, and contain the same important-sounding buzz words and legal mumbo jumbo.

“A common theme amongst these suits is that they make nearly incomprehensible allegations about ‘robo-signers,’ ‘demand … quiet title,’ cite sections of the ‘U.C.C.’ allegedly concerning ‘chattel paper,’ obtusely reference violations of ‘REMIC law,’ and make conclusory allegations of ‘fraud’ and ‘silent fraud[.]’ …

“Curiously, the first paragraphs of these complaints identify the plaintiffs as ‘temporarily In Pro Per,’ suggesting the possibility that there may be an as yet unknown attorney acting as the Wizard of Oz, manipulating knobs and levers behind a curtain, and aiding these ‘pro se’ plaintiffs in litigating these cases.”

Motions to dismiss both Young and Evangelist were scheduled for the same day. About a week before the hearings, attorney F. Anthony Lubkin contacted the court, said he would be filing an appearance on Young’s behalf, and asked the court to adjourn the hearing.

The hearings went forward as scheduled. Lubkin filed an appearance in Young. Evangelist appeared and represented herself.

Berg put Evangelist on the stand and point-blank asked her if an attorney helped her prepare her pleadings. She acknowledged that Lubkin represented her in the state-court eviction proceedings.

She denied that she received help from an attorney but when Berg pressed her, she said “that a ‘group of friends’ met and put these ‘pro se’ pleadings together.” Evangelist confirmed that group members included pro per plaintiffs in some of the nine other cases that featured complaints Berg believed had come from the same source.

Lubkin then addressed the court and denied any involvement. Lubkin said that the pro se pleadings were “‘gobbledygook’ (there can be little debate on this point).

“Mr. Lubkin confirmed that he had represented Plaintiff Evangelist in the parallel eviction proceedings, and he also acknowledged knowing several of the other ‘pro se’ plaintiffs identified by the Court. Mr. Lubkin stated that he may be filing appearances in some of their cases in the future.

“Despite his acknowledged acquaintanceship with some of the plaintiffs in these ‘pro se’ cases, and his prior representation of Ms. Evangelist in state court, Mr. Lubkin informed the Court that he did not ghostwrite any pleadings for pro se litigants challenging foreclosures in federal court.”

The judge noted that attorneys who ghostwrite complaints for pro per plaintiffs are behaving unethically and face serve sanctions. They commit professional misconduct when they mislead courts about such matters, or “intentionally file frivolous claims solely for the purpose of delaying mortgage foreclosures.”

Berg didn’t think he was getting the entire story from Evangelist. “It was obvious that Plaintiff did not want to disclose the whole story of where these pleadings came from, even though the most cursory examination of them reveals they are from a common source,” he said.

Although Lubkin was not an attorney of record in Evangelist’s case, Berg said he was sending him a copy of the Evangelist opinion anyway.

Berg then picked apart the claims in the complaint one-by-one, dismissed the case and denied a motion to stay the state-court summary proceedings.

As for the Young case, where Lubkin had filed an appearance, Berg dismissed the case without prejudice so that Lubkin could file a motion to amend the complaint.

And Berg issued a warning to Lubkin.

“The Court notes that, because Mr. Lubkin addressed the Court during the hearing on the motion to dismiss in Evangelist v. Green Tree … and the Court’s order granting the motion to dismiss in that case has been forwarded to Mr. Lubkin, the Court expects that Plaintiff will not advance claims in the Amended Complaint that are similar to those that were dismissed in this case or in the Evangelist case, as such claims are clearly lacking in merit.

“Should similar claims be alleged in any Amended Complaint, the Court will need to consider whether the Amended Complaint is being presented for an improper purpose, such as to cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), which, if proven, could require the imposition of sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).”