Abstract

[FIRST PARAGRAPHS] The twentieth century saw a vigorous debate over the nature of rights.
Will theorists argued that the function of rights is to allocate domains of
freedom. Interest theorists portrayed rights as defenders of well-being.
Each side declared its conceptual analysis to be closer to an ordinary
understanding of what rights there are, and to an ordinary understanding
of what rights do for rightholders. Neither side could win a decisive
victory, and the debate ended in a standoff.1

This article offers a new analysis of rights. The first half of the article
sets out an analytical framework adequate for explicating all assertions
of rights. This framework is an elaboration of Hohfeld’s, designed around
a template for displaying the often complex internal structures of rights.
Those unfamiliar with Hohfeld’s work should find that the exposition
here presumes no prior knowledge of it. Those who know Hohfeld will
find innovations in how the system is defined and presented. Any theorist
wishing to specify precisely what is at stake within a controversy over
some particular right may find this framework useful.