April/2018

Israel70 | Young Voices: time for the decision of the century in the West Bank

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Rob Pinfold is a Neubauer Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University and a PhD Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London. His research primarily addresses Israeli security policy and the broader theoretical question of why states occupy and withdraw from territory.

Predicting the imminent demise of the nation is somewhat of a national sport in Israel. On both the Left and Right, politicians frame a broad spectrum of issues – from the cost of living to the Iranian nuclear programme – as existential threats, while the ‘securitisation’ of contentious issues is widespread. Does this national hysteria represent a modern projection of thousands of years of historical persecution? Or are these existential fears well-founded, resulting from Israel’s precarious situation in a troubled region? The answer, of course, is a bit of both.

At first glance, the ever-present doom-mongering that permeates political discourse in Israel bears no relation to reality. Israel boasts over eight million citizens, uninterrupted democratic governance and a thriving, free-market economy. Against the regional backdrop of the Arab Spring and the incessant bloodletting of the Syrian civil war, Israeli domestic disputes appear trivial. Beginning life a little over a hundred years ago as an insignificant neighbourhood on uninhabited sand dunes, Tel Aviv is now an international city, spearheading Israel’s ‘hi-tech’ revolution, whilst Jerusalem, the city that has permeated Jewish prayers for thousands of years, is a thriving, multi-ethnic metropolis.

Yet Israeli defence policy remains characterised by conservatism, caution and maintenance of the status quo. Since the June 1967 ‘Six-Day War’, no government has managed to extricate itself from the problem and geographical space ambiguously referred to within Israel as ‘the territories’. Faced with questions as to Israel’s long-term goals in the West Bank, governments have often shunted the most divisive policy issue in modern Jewish history onto the next generation.

How can this governmental inertia be explained? On the one hand, Israel has genuine and legitimate security interests in the West Bank. But digging a little deeper – beyond arguments about defensible borders, rockets and settlements – reveals a much more dangerous domestic divide, bubbling below the securitised discourse.

Israel’s policy in the West Bank has long remained stagnant, because questions about the state’s goals and presence there are the by-products of a bitter struggle within civil society. Ultimately, this incessant struggle concerns questions of identity, values and organising principles within Israel itself. For seventy years, Israel has muddled through without coherently answering these questions; the continued occupation of the West Bank is but a symptom of this reality. The dilemma of the West Bank is therefore as much a domestic issue as it is a foreign policy dispute, concerning fundamental questions about the definition of Zionism. Though a broad spectrum of views exist regarding an end-game scenario for the West Bank, these can be dichotomised into two competing perspectives.

The first perspective advocates a fundamental reorganisation of Israeli society. Supporters advocate that a Jewish state should inherently prioritise maximum sovereignty throughout the Land of Israel, regardless of the presence and views of its non-Jewish inhabitants. In the West Bank, this would necessitate either indefinite denial of human rights to millions of Palestinians and therefore the end of Israel’s democratic constitution, or the end of Israel as a Jewish state. Supporters of this scenario (the one-state solution) often advocate an enhanced role for religion within Israel, a more aggressive security policy and less reliance on the West.

The second perspective concerns the belief that Jewish statehood requires the preservation of a Jewish majority and a democratic state, at the expense of territorial maximalism (the two-state solution). If Israel were to leave the majority of the West Bank, a Jewish majority within Israel itself would be cemented. This policy would help ensure the continuation of the domestic liberal order and a clear pro-Western foreign orientation. This perspective has long been the preference of a majority of Israelis and the international community, yet has been under severe strain, particularly following the 2005 ‘disengagement’ and the deeply flawed Oslo Process.

It is this divide – not socio-economic status, race or religious affiliation – that constitutes the most salient and dangerous threat to contemporary Israel. Each perspective projects a totally different normative vision of Zionism and an incorrigible, existential threat to the other. In between these extremes sits most of the Jewish Israeli electorate, whom often express a preference for the status quo: de facto if not de jure maximalism through occupation and a Jewish majority within Israel itself. The policy of indecision has been bolstered by the unexpected tenacity of the occupation, defying hyperbolic supporters of the two-state solution, who emphasised its unsustainability. Thrown into this mix is an increasingly agitated and polarised young electorate: centrist Israel is slowly disappearing, as young Israelis gravitate towards polar political opposites. Tired of business as usual, young voters are increasingly united in their belief that something needs to change, yet are divided on questions of an end-game scenario like never before.

History suggests that a status quo rarely remains static for long. Pro-annexation bills are increasingly prevalent in the Knesset, whilst the Palestinians and the international community will not tolerate indefinite occupation. Whatever Israel does next in the West Bank, there will be no going back. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly talked about imposing the so-called ‘deal of the century’ on Israel and the Palestinians. But too much is at stake for any external actor to impose a solution. Thus, Israeli decision-makers cannot continue to defer the twin dilemma of final-status questions in the West Bank and delineations of domestic order within Israel. This ‘decision of the century’ cannot be ignored for another seventy years.

To briefly address this section above: “either indefinite denial of human rights to millions of Palestinians and therefore the end of Israel’s democratic constitution, or the end of Israel as a Jewish state.”

If there are human rights being denied in the area of the Palestinian Authority, that is the responsibility of the Authority. If you mean political rights, like the right to vote, well, that, too, is Abbas’ problem. If you mean the right to establish an independent state in all the area that Jordan had occupied in 1948, illegally, then that would behoove negotiations. Since Abbas basically refuses to talk to Netanyahu – after refusing several offers of nigh almost 100% of the territory he demands from Olmert and Livni and by Arafat from Clinton and Barak previously – again, the ball is in Abbas’ court. And if there would be no terror, no incitement, then the security requirement which make life admittedly difficult for local Arabs-called-Palestinians would be lessened and poof! human rights become an almost non-problem. Of course, if you mean the human rights of Jews, who, during 1920-1948, underwent a violent murderous campaign of ethnic cleansing pursued by Arabs-then-not-called-Palestinians and some 20,000 were forced to move out of homes, some centuries old, well, now you are reaching a level of moral analysis that one could respect.

As for that democracy issue, if the percentage of Arabs in pre-67 Israel rises to, say, 25%, what then? Is that a “threat”? Would you get nervous and suggest a withdrawal from parts of the Galilee? Or from the northern Negev? At what percentage point does one fidget? One need be consistent in one’s thinking to be an analyst. Yes? Or, perhaps, one’s demography figures are simply wrong? Maybe there is not a true demographic problem?

In any case, the security needs for Israel’s survival and future existence and thriving simply cannot include an independent second Arab state in Palestine. Human rights can be solved and as for political one, let’s see how autonomy, condominium or confederation paradigms will work for a few years.

Reading your retort one can only conclude that you have shamefully ignored the brutal Israel apartheid control over all Palestinians living in the West Bank. In other words there is “indefinite denial of human rights” on the part of Israel which takes place on a daily basis.

Israel carries ou inhuman acts in the OPT ; Israel denies liberty of persons and carries out arbitrary acts and detention of Palestinians which includes administrative detention imposed without charge or trial.

Regarding the right to establish a state in all of the West Bank the Palestinians rightfully and legally are entitled to an independent state free of Israel control i that territory. Not the crumbs from the table that you make reference to.

Your reference to “incitement and terror” is also off the mark. Israel is the illegal occupier of all of the West Bank and East Jerusalem and as such this became a cause for encouragement on the part of the Palestinians to evict the illegal Israeli presence.

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