[Congressional Record: November 14, 2000 (Senate)]
[Page S11538-S11544]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr14no00-125]
COUNTERTERRORISM ACT OF 2000
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Judiciary
Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. 3205 and,
further, the Senate proceed to its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report the bill by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 3205) to enhance the capability of the United
States to deter, prevent, thwart, and respond to
international acts of terrorism against United States
nationals and interests.
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Amendment No. 4358
Mr. WARNER. Senators Kyl and Feinstein have an amendment at the desk,
and I ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Kyl, for
himself and Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered
4358.
The amendment is as follows:
In section 2(a), strike paragraph (3) and insert the
following:
(3) Seventeen United States sailors were killed in the
attack, and thirty-nine were injured.
In section 2(b)(1), strike ``take immediate actions'' and
insert ``continue to take strong and effective actions''.
In section 3, strike paragraph (8) and redesignate
paragraphs (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13) as paragraphs (8),
(9), (10), (11) and (12), respectively.
In section 3(10), as so redesignated, strike ``There are 28
organizations'' and all that follows through the end and
insert the following: ``There are currently 29 FTOs. The
National Commission on Terrorism recommended that the
Secretary of State ensure that the list of FTO designations
is credible and updated regularly.''.
[[Page S11539]]
In section 3(12), as so redesignated, strike ``Such
controls were designed to prevent accidents, not theft.''.
In section 7(c)(1), strike subparagraphs (A) and (B) and
insert the following:
(A) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and
the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
(B) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services,
International Relations, and the Judiciary and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
In section 9(a), strike ``the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives'' and insert
``the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives''.
In section 10(a), strike ``Congress'' and insert ``the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives''.
In section 12(a)(2)(A), insert after ``the Secretary of
Defense,'' the following: ``the Secretary of Health and Human
Services,''.
In 12(a), add after paragraph (3) the following:
(4) The Attorney General shall consult with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services in preparing any recommendations
under paragraph (2)(B), and shall include in the report under
paragraph (1) a detailed description of the methodology and
criteria used to define and determine the types and classes
of pathogens covered by such recommendations.
In section 12(b), add at the end the following: ``The
report shall include a detailed description of the
methodology and criteria used to define and determine the
types and classes of pathogens covered by the report.''.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, Senators Kyl and Feinstein introduced S.
3205, the Counterterrorism Act of 2000, on October 12, 2000. They base
their bill on recommendations made in a report called ``Countering the
Changing Threat of International Terrorism,'' issued on June 5, 2000 by
the National Commission on Terrorism chaired by former Ambassador L.
Paul Bremer III and Maurice Sonnenberg. The sponsors seek to have the
Senate consider and pass the bill unanimously without hearings on its
legislative language, without Committee consideration, without Senate
debate and without amendment. In my efforts to be supportive of them I
have shared with them concerns I have had about earlier versions of
this legislation. In light of the improvements and corrections that the
sponsors have now made, I am pleased to remove my objection to passage
of the bill. I commend the sponsors for heeding constructive comments
to improve the bill.
At the outset, I note that I have worked to help Senator Kyl clear a
number of matters of importance to him in this Congress. Most recently,
the Senate passed on November 19, 1999, S. 692, the Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act, and on September 28, 2000, repassed S. 704, the
Federal Prisoner Health Care Copayment Act. Moreover, in the past few
months, we have worked together to confirm three more judges for
Arizona.
In past Congresses, I have also worked closely with Senator Kyl. For
example, in the 104th Congress, Senators Kyl, Grassley and I worked
together to enact the National Information Infrastructure Protection
Act. This law increased protection under federal criminal law for both
government and private computers, and addressed the emerging problem of
computer-age blackmail in which a criminal threatens to harm or shut
down a computer system unless certain extortion demands are met.
The NII Protection Act that I worked on with Senator Kyl was intended
to help law enforcement better address the problem of computer crime,
in which cyber attacks are an important component. The Bremer-
Sonnenberg Commission noted that, ``[r]easonable experts have published
sobering scenarios about the potential impact of a successful cyber
attack on the United States. Already, hackers and criminals have
exploited some of our vulnerabilities.'' In short, the Commission found
that, ``cyber security is a matter of grave importance.''
As technology advances, the Congress must remain vigilant to ensure
that our laws remain up to date and our local, State and federal law
enforcement resources are up to the job posed by new technological
challenges. That is why I have continued to work over this Congress
with the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and Senator Schumer on S.
2448, which the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously reported
favorably on October 5th for consideration by the Senate as the
Internet Security Act amendment on another bill. This legislation would
make changes to the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse statute and
provide significant new resources to federal law enforcement for
forensic computer crime work.
I have also been pleased to work with Senator DeWine on S. 1314, the
Computer Crime Enforcement Act, to help provide the necessary funding
for training and equipment for state and local law enforcement to deal
with computer crimes. The Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously
reported this bill favorably to the Senate on September 21, 2000.
Although he is not a cosponsor of these bills, I appreciate Senator
Kyl's support for both S. 2448 and S. 1314 as those bills moved through
Committee. These complementary pieces of legislation reflect twin-track
progress against computer crime: More tools at the federal level and
more resources for local computer crime enforcement.
In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee has considered and
reported unanimously on May 18, 2000, S. 2089, the Counterintelligence
Reform Act, which I was pleased to cosponsor with Senators Specter,
Torricelli, and others. Senator Kyl did not cosponsor this bill.
The Counterintelligence Reform Act is intended to improve the
coordination within and among federal agencies investigating and
prosecuting espionage cases and other cases affecting national
security. Specifically, this legislation amends the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to state explicitly that past activities
of a target may be considered in determining whether there is probable
cause to believe that the target of electronic surveillance is an
``agent of a foreign power.'' This particular provision appears to
address a criticism subsequently raised in the Bremer-Sonnenberg
Commission report that the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review,
which is the Justice Department unit responsible for preparing and
presenting FISA applications to the FISA court, ``does not generally
consider the past activities of the surveillance target relevant in
determining whether the FISA probable cause test is met.''
The Bremer-Sonnenberg Commission report recommended that ``the
Attorney General should substantially expand'' OIPR in order ``[t]o
ensure timely review of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
applications.'' I concur with this recommendation. In fact, even before
the Commission report was released and during Judiciary Committee
consideration of S. 2089, I offered an amendment to S. 2089, which was
approved by the Judiciary Committee, that would authorize an increase
in the budget for OIPR from its current funding level of $4,084,000 to
$7,000,000 for FY 2001, with increases up to $8,000,000 over the
following two years, for expanded personnel and technology resources.
The Select Committee on Intelligence also approved this budget increase
for OIPR upon consideration of S. 2089, which subsequently was passed
by the Congress as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act, S. 2507.
Recently, the Congress passed as part of the conference report on the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, H.R. 3244, the Justice for Victims
of Terrorism Act with an amendment that Senator Feinstein and I
authored dealing with support for victims of international terrorism.
Senator Kyl did not cosponsor this amendment. This amendment is
intended to enable the Office for Victims of Crime to provide more
immediate and effective assistance to Americans who are victims of
terrorism abroad--Americans like those killed or injured in the embassy
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and in the Pan Am 103 bombing over
Lockerbie, Scotland. These victims deserve help, and the Leahy-
Feinstein amendment will permit the Office for Victims of Crime
to serve these victims better by expanding the types of assistance for
which the VOCA emergency reserve fund may be used, and the range of
organizations to which assistance may be provided. The amendment allows
OVC greater flexibility in
[[Page S11540]]
using existing reserve funds to assist victims of terrorism abroad,
including the victims of the Lockerbie and embassy bombings.
This provision will also authorize OVC to raise the cap on the VOCA
emergency reserve fund from $50 million to $100 million, so that the
fund is large enough to cover the extraordinary costs that would be
incurred if a terrorist act caused massive casualties, and to replenish
the reserve fund with unobligated funds from its other grant programs.
At the same time, the provision will simplify the presently-
authorized system of using VOCA funds to provide victim compensation to
American victims of terrorism abroad, by permitting OVC to establish
and operate an international crime victim compensation program. This
program will, in addition, cover foreign nationals who are employees of
any American government institution targeted for terrorist attack. The
source of funding is the VOCA emergency reserve fund, which we
authorized in an amendment I offered to the 1996 Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act.
The Leahy-Feinstein provision also clarifies that deposits into the
Crime Victims Fund remain available for intended uses under VOCA when
not expended immediately.
As is apparent from the work we have done both in this Congress and
in prior Congresses, we all share the interest and concern of the
sponsors of S. 3205 in protecting our national security from the threat
and risks posed by terrorists determined to harm this country and its
citizens and helping victims of terrorist acts. Yet, I have been
concerned that earlier versions of this bill posed serious
constitutional problems and risks to important civil liberties we hold
dear. Unlike the secret holds that often stop good bills from passing
often for no good reason, I have had no secret holds on S. 3205 or
earlier versions of this legislation. On the contrary, when asked, I
have made no secret about the concerns I had with this legislation.
An earlier version of this legislation, which Senator Kyl tried to
move as part of the Intelligence Authorization bill, S. 2507, prompted
a firestorm of controversy from civil liberties and human rights
organizations, as well as the Department of Justice. For example, the
Department of Justice opposed the amendment on myriad grounds,
including that (1) the provision amending the wiretap statute to permit
law enforcement officers to share foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence information obtained under a title III wiretap with
the intelligence community ``could have significant implications for
prosecutions and the discovery process in litigation''; (2) the
provision giving the FBI sixty days to report on the feasibility of
establishing a dissemination center within the FBI on international
terrorism raised sufficiently significant issues that ``do not avail
themselves of resolution in this very short time frame''; (3) the
provision requiring the creation of a task force to disrupt the
fundraising activities of international terrorist organizations would
impose a ``rigid, statutory mandate" that ``would interfere with the
need for flexibility in tailoring enforcement strategies and mechanisms
to fit the enforcement needs of the particular moment''; and (4) the
provision requiring the Attorney General to make legislative language
recommendations on matters relating to biological pathogens were
``invalid under the Recommendations Clause'' and ``interferes with the
President's efforts to formulate and present his own recommendations
and proposals and to control the policy agenda of his Administration.''
Similarly, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Center for
National Security Studies and the American Civil Liberties Union,
described in detail their concerns that ``provisions in the Act pose
grave threats to constitutional rights.''
I shared many of the concerns of those organizations and the Justice
Department, and note that the version of S. 3205 that we consider today
addresses those concerns with substantial revisions to the original
legislation. For example, no longer does the bill require a change in
the wiretap statute allowing the permissive disclosure of information
obtained in a title III wiretap to the intelligence agencies. No longer
does the bill direct the Central Intelligence Agency to make
legislative recommendations to enhance the recruitment of terrorist
informants, without any countervailing considerations. Instead, the
bill now requests a more balanced picture of the policy considerations
that prompted the 1995 guidelines on the use of terrorists as
informants and the limitations that may be necessary to assure that the
United States does not encourage human rights abuse abroad.
After the bill was introduced, I first advised the sponsors of the
bill and then the Senate about the remaining areas of concern that
should be fixed in the bill before Senate passage.
In this regard, I note that Senator Kyl suggested to the Senate on
October 25th that if the Justice Department was satisfied with his
legislation, I or my staff had earlier indicated that I would be
satisfied. I respect the expertise of the Department of Justice and the
many fine lawyers and public servants who work there and, where
appropriate, seek out their views, as do many Members. That does not
mean that I always share the views of the Department of Justice or
follow the Department's preferred course and recommendations without
exercising my own independent judgment. I would never represent that if
the Justice Department were satisfied with his bill, I would
automatically defer to their view. Furthermore, my staff has advised me
that no such representation was ever made.
I am pleased that the further corrections to and refinements of this
bill have now been made and that the version of the bill that the
Senate is now being asked to consider and pass has been improved.
First, the bill now contains the correct numbers of sailors killed and
injured in the sense of the Congress concerning the tragic bombing
attack on the U.S.S. Cole. I believe that each of the 17 sailors killed
and 39 sailors injured deserve recognition and that the full scope of
the attack should be properly reflected in this Senate bill. I commend
the sponsors of the bill for correcting this part of the bill.
Second, the sense of the Congress originally urged the United States
Government to ``take immediate actions to investigate rapidly the
unprovoked attack on the'' U.S.S. Cole, without acknowledging the fact
that such immediate action has been taken. In fact, the Navy began
immediate investigative steps shortly after the attack occurred, and
the FBI established a presence on the ground and began investigating
within 24 hours. The Director himself went to Yemen to guide this
investigation. That investigation is active and ongoing, and no Senate
bill should reflect differently, as this one originally did. The
corrected bill now urges the government ``to continue to take strong
and effective actions'' to investigate this attack. I commend the
Administration for the swift and immediate actions it has taken to
investigate this attack and the strong statements made by the President
making clear that no stone will be left unturned to find the criminals
who planned this bloody attack.
Third, the ``Findings'' section of this bill contained several
factual errors or inaccuracies that are now corrected. For example, the
original bill stated that there are ``38 organizations'' designated as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) when there are currently 29,
which has been corrected. The original bill stated that ``current
practice is to update the list of FTOs every two years'' when in fact
the statute requires redesignation of FTOs every two years. This
statement has been corrected. The original bill stated that current
controls on the transfer and possession of biological pathogens were
``designed to prevent accidents, not theft,'' which according to the
Justice Department is simply not accurate. This inaccurate statement
has been eliminated.
Fourth, the original bill required reports on issues within the
jurisdiction of the Senate Judiciary Committee without any direction
that those reports be submitted to that Committee. For example, section
9 of the bill required the FBI to submit to the Select Committees on
Intelligence of the Senate and the House a feasibility report on
establishing a new capability within the FBI for the dissemination of
law enforcement information to the Intelligence community. My
suggestion that these reports also be required to
[[Page S11541]]
be submitted to the Judiciary Committees has been adopted.
Fifth, the bill requires reports, with recommendations for
appropriate legislative or regulation changes, by the Attorney General
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services on safeguarding
biological pathogens at research labs, pharmaceutical companies and
other facilities in the United States. No definition of ``biological
pathogen'' is included in the bill and the scope of these reports could
therefore cover a vast array of biological materials. To address this
concern over the potentially broad focus of this provision, the bill
has been amended to include a direction to the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to define and determine the type
and classes of pathogens that should be covered by any recommendations.
Finally, the bill would require reimbursement for professional
liability insurance for law enforcement officers performing official
counterterrorism duties and for intelligence officials performing such
duties outside the United States. I scoured the record in vain for
explanatory statements by the sponsors of this bill about their views
on the need for this provision. Current law curiously provides for
payments of only half the costs of professional liability insurance for
law enforcement officers and federal judges to cover the costs of legal
liability for damages resulting from any tortious act, error of
omission while in the performance of the employee's duties and the
costs of legal representation in connection with any administrative or
judicial proceeding relating to such act, error or omission. 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 5941 prec. note. The Bremer-Sonnenberg Commission report
recommended that the Congress amend current law to mandate full
reimbursement of the costs of personal liability insurance for FBI and
CIA counterterrorism agents. In light of this explanation, I am
prepared to proceed while noting that this is an area that deserves
more comprehensive review. The same reasons for providing full
reimbursement for counterterrorism officers may apply to other law
enforcement and intelligence officers.
The bill has been greatly improved since its first iteration, and I
am pleased to withdraw my objection.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 4358) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent the bill be read a third time and
passed, as amended, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table,
and any statements relating to this bill be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The bill (S. 3205), as amended, was read the third time and passed,
as follows:
S. 3205
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Counterterrorism Act of
2000''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. COLE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On October 12, 2000, the United States naval vessel
U.S.S. Cole was attacked in Aden, Yemen.
(2) The attack occurred while the U.S.S. Cole was
refueling, and was unprovoked.
(3) Seventeen United States sailors were killed in the
attack, and thirty-nine were injured.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States Government should--
(1) continue to take strong and effective actions to
investigate rapidly the unprovoked attack on the United
States naval vessel U.S.S. Cole;
(2) ensure that the perpetrators of this cowardly act are
swiftly brought to justice; and
(3) take appropriate actions to protect from terrorist
attack all other members and units of the United States Armed
Forces that are deployed overseas.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Commission on National Security in the 21st
Century, chaired by former Senators Hart and Rudman,
concluded that ``[s]tates, terrorists, and other disaffected
groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass
disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die
on American soil, possibly in large number.''.
(2) United States counterterrorism efforts must be improved
to meet the evolving threat of international terrorism
against United States nationals and interests. The bipartisan
National Commission of Terrorism chaired by Ambassador Paul
Bremer and Maurice Sonnenberg was mandated by Congress to
evaluate current United States policy and make
recommendations on improvements. This Act stems from the
findings and recommendations of that Commission.
(3) The face of terrorism has changed significantly over
the last 25 years. With the fall of the Soviet Union, many
state-sponsored terrorist groups have been replaced by more
loosely knit organizations with varying motives. These
transnational terrorist networks are more difficult to track
and penetrate than state sponsored terrorist groups, and
their actions are more difficult to predict.
(4) State support of terrorism has not disappeared. Despite
political change in Iran, the country continues to be the
foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world. In April
2000, the Department of State issued ``Patterns of Global
Terrorism'', which provides a detailed account of Iran's
continued support of terrorism.
(5) According to the report of the National Commission on
Terrorism, there are indications of Iranian involvement in
the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi
Arabia, in which 19 United States soldiers were killed and
more than 500 injured. In October 1999, President Clinton
officially requested cooperation from Iran in the
investigation of the bombing. Thus far, Iran has not
responded to this request.
(6) Terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal. A growing
number of terrorist attacks are designed to kill the maximum
number of people. Although conventional explosives have
remained the weapon of choice, terrorist groups are investing
in the acquisition of unconventional weapons such as nuclear,
chemical, and biological agents.
(7) Syria was placed on the first list of state-sponsors of
terrorism by the United States Government in 1979, due to its
long history of using terrorism to advance its interests.
Syria continues to support terrorist training and logistics.
(8) According to the National Commission on Terrorism, the
1995 guidelines of the Central Intelligence Agency on the use
of terrorists as informants set up complex procedures for
seeking approval to recruit as informants terrorists who have
been involved in human rights violations. That Commission
found that these guidelines have inhibited the recruitment of
essential, if sometimes unsavory, terrorist informants. As a
result, that Commission concluded that the United States has
relied too heavily on foreign intelligence services in
attempting to uncover information about terrorist
organizations.
(9) No other country, much less any subnational
organization, can match United States scientific and
technological prowess (including quality control) in
biotechnology and pharmaceutical production, electronics,
computer science, and other pursuits that could help overcome
and defeat the technologies used by future terrorists.
(10) Currently, the United States focuses its efforts to
discourage private financial support to terrorists on
prosecutions under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132) and
the amendments made by that Act. Under an amendment made by
that Act, section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1189) requires the Secretary of State to designate
groups that threaten United States interests and security as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). There are currently
29 FTOs. The National Commission on Terrorism recommended
that the Secretary of State ensure that the list of FTO
designations is credible and updated regularly.
(11) It is in the interest of the United States that the
Federal Government take a broader approach to cutting off the
flow of financial support for terrorism from within the
United States. Anyone providing to terrorist organizations
funds that he or she knows will be used to support terrorist
acts should be prosecuted under all relevant statutes,
including statutes addressing money laundering, conspiracy,
and tax or fraud violations. In addition, Federal agencies
such as the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the
Internet Revenue Service and the Customs Service should be
better utilized to thwart terrorist fundraising. Such
activities should not violate constitutional rights and
values.
(12) Current controls on the transfer and possession of
biological pathogens that could be used in biological weapons
are inadequate. Controls on the equipment needed to turn such
pathogens into weapons are virtually nonexistent. The
National Commission on Terrorism concluded that the standards
for the storage, transport, and handling of biological
pathogens should be as rigorous as the current standards for
the physical protection and security of critical nuclear
materials.
SEC. 4. SYRIA.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should
keep Syria on the list of countries who sponsor terrorism
until Syria--
(1) shuts down training camps and other terrorist support
facilities in Syrian-controlled territory; and
(2) prohibits financial or other support of terrorists
through Syrian-controlled territory.
[[Page S11542]]
SEC. 5. IRAN.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should
keep Iran on the list of countries who sponsor terrorism, and
make no concessions to Iran, until Iran--
(1) demonstrates that it has stopped supporting terrorism;
and
(2) cooperates fully with the United States in the
investigation into the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers
complex in Saudi Arabia.
SEC. 6. GUIDELINES ON RECRUITMENT OF TERRORIST INFORMANTS.
(a) Report on Guidelines.--Not later than six months after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress, including the
Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, a report on the Director's response to the
findings of the National Commission on Terrorism regarding
the recruitment of terrorist informants.
(b) Report Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall
set forth the following:
(1) A detailed response to the findings referred to in that
subsection, and a detailed description of any other policy
considerations that prompted the 1995 guidelines of the
Central Intelligence Agency on the use of terrorists as
informants.
(2) Recommendations, if any, for legislation to enhance the
recruitment of terrorist informants, including any
limitations that may be necessary to assure that the United
States does not encourage human rights abuse abroad.
SEC. 7. REVIEW OF AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES TO ADDRESS
CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS.
(a) Review Required.--The Attorney General shall conduct a
review of the legal authority of various Federal agencies,
including the Department of Defense, to respond to, and to
prevent, pre-empt, detect, and interdict, catastrophic
terrorist attacks.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the review
conducted under subsection (a). The report shall include any
recommendations that the Attorney General considers
appropriate, including recommendations whether additional
legal authority for particular Federal agencies is advisable
in order to enhance the capability of the Federal Government
to respond to, and to prevent, pre-empt, detect, and
interdict, catastrophic terrorist attacks.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the following:
(A) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and
the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
(B) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services,
International Relations, and the Judiciary and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Catastrophic terrorist attack.--The term ``catastrophic
terrorist attack'' means a terrorist attack against the
United States perpetrated by a state, substate, or nonstate
actor that involves mass casualties or the use of a weapon of
mass destruction.
SEC. 8. LONG-TERM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO ADDRESS
CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) there has not been sufficient emphasis on long-term
research and development on technologies useful in fighting
terrorism; and
(2) the United States should make better use of its
considerable accomplishments in science and technology to
prevent or address terrorist attacks in the future,
particularly attacks involving chemical, biological, or
nuclear agents.
(b) Establishment of Program.--Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall establish a comprehensive program (including a
comprehensive set of requirements for the program) of long-
term research and development relating to science and
technology necessary to prevent, pre-empt, detect, interdict,
and respond to catastrophic terrorist attacks.
(c) Report on Proposed Program.--Not later than 30 days
before the commencement of the program required by subsection
(b), the President shall submit to Congress a report on the
program. The report on the program shall include the
following:
(1) A description of the proposed organization and mission
of the program.
(2) A description of the current capabilities of the
Federal Government to rapidly identify and contain an attack
in the United States involving chemical or biological agents,
including any proposals for future enhancements of such
capabilities that the President considers appropriate.
(d) Catastrophic Terrorist Attack Defined.--In this
section, the term ``catastrophic terrorist attack'' means a
terrorist attack against the United States perpetrated by a
state, substate, or nonstate actor that involves mass
casualties or the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
SEC. 9. DISSEMINATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION TO THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Report on Establishment of Intelligence Reporting
Function.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a
report on the feasibility of establishing within the Bureau a
comprehensive intelligence reporting function having the
responsibility for disseminating among the elements of the
intelligence community information collected and assembled by
the Bureau on international terrorism and other national
security matters.
(b) Report Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of the requirements applicable to the
creation of the function referred to in that subsection,
including the funding required for the function.
(2) A discussion of the legal and policy issues, including
any reasonable restrictions on the sharing of information and
the potential effects on open criminal investigations,
associated with disseminating to the elements of the
intelligence community law enforcement information relating
to international terrorism and other national security
matters.
SEC. 10. DISCLOSURE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF CERTAIN
INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED BY INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS.
(a) Report on Authorities Relating to Sharing of Criminal
Wiretap Information.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives a report on the legal authorities
that govern the sharing of criminal wiretap information under
relevant United States laws, including section 104 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4). The report
shall include--
(1) a description of the type of information that can be
shared by the Department of Justice or other United States
law enforcement agencies with elements of the United States
intelligence community, including a description of all such
information that the Department of Justice or other such law
enforcement agencies currently share with elements of the
United States intelligence community and the legal
limitations if any, that apply to the use of such information
by elements of the intelligence community; and
(2) recommendations, if any, for such legislative language
as the President considers appropriate to improve the
capability of the Department of Justice, or other law
enforcement agencies, to share foreign intelligence
information or counterintelligence information with elements
of the United States intelligence community on matters such
as counterterrorism.
(b) Definitions.--As used in this section, the terms
``foreign intelligence'' and ``counterintelligence'' have the
meanings given those terms in paragraphs (2) and (3),
respectively, of section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).
SEC. 11. JOINT TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FUNDRAISING.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that--
(1) many terrorist groups secretly solicit and exploit the
resources of international nongovernmental organizations,
companies, and wealthy individuals;
(2) the Federal Government could do more to utilize all the
tools available to the Federal Government to prevent, deter,
and disrupt the fundraising activities of international
terrorist organizations; and
(3) the employment of any such tools to combat terrorism
must not violate speech, association, and equal protection
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
(b) Establishment of Joint Task Force.--Not later than six
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall establish a joint task force for purposes of
developing and implementing a broad approach toward
discouraging the fundraising activities of international
terrorist organizations. The approach shall utilize all
criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions available under
Federal law, including sanctions for money laundering, tax
and fraud violations, and conspiracy. The approach shall not
infringe upon constitutional and civil rights in the United
States.
(c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the joint task force established under
subsection (b) shall submit to Congress a report on the
activities of the joint task force. The report shall include
any findings and recommendations (including recommendations
for modifications of United States law or policy) that the
joint task force considers appropriate regarding United
States efforts to thwart the fundraising activities of
international terrorist organizations while protecting
constitutional and civil rights in the United States.
SEC. 12. IMPROVEMENT OF CONTROLS ON PATHOGENS AND EQUIPMENT
FOR PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
(a) Report on Improvement of Controls.--(1) Not later than
one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report on the
means of improving United States controls of biological
pathogens and the equipment necessary to develop, produce, or
deliver biological weapons.
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(2) Subject to paragraph (3), the report under paragraph
(1) should include the following:
(A) A list of the equipment identified by the Attorney
General, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of
Central Intelligence, other appropriate Federal officials,
and other appropriate members of public and private
organizations, as critical to the development, production, or
delivery of biological weapons.
(B) Recommendations, if any, for such legislative language
as the Attorney General considers appropriate to make illegal
the possession of the biological pathogens by anyone who is
not properly certified for the possession of such pathogens,
or for other than a legitimate purpose.
(C) Recommendations, if any, for such legislative language
as the Attorney General considers appropriate to control the
domestic sale and transfer of the equipment identified under
subparagraph (A), including any appropriate steps to track,
tag, or otherwise mark or monitor such equipment.
(3) The recommendations of the Attorney General under
paragraph (2) shall take into consideration the impact of
additional controls on legitimate industrial or medical
activities, and shall include an assessment of the economic
and scientific effects of such controls on such activities.
(4) The Attorney General shall consult with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services in preparing any recommendations
under paragraph (2)(B), and shall include in the report under
paragraph (1) a detailed description of the methodology and
criteria used to define and determine the types and classes
of pathogens covered by such recommendations.
(b) Improved Security of Facilities.--Not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with
other appropriate Federal officials and appropriate members
of public and private organizations, shall submit to Congress
a report with detailed analysis and recommendations for
appropriate regulations, or modifications to current law, to
enhance the standards for the physical protection and
security of the biological pathogens described in subsection
(a) at research laboratories and other facilities in the
United States that create, possess, handle, store, or
transport such pathogens in order to protect against the
theft or other diversion for illegitimate purposes of such
pathogens from such laboratories and facilities. The report
shall include a detailed description of the methodology and
criteria used to define and determine the types and classes
of pathogens covered by the report.
SEC. 13. REIMBURSEMENT OF PERSONNEL PERFORMING
COUNTERTERRORISM DUTIES FOR PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE.
(a) Requirement for Full Reimbursement.--(1)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to
paragraph (2), the head of an agency employing a qualified
employee shall reimburse the qualified employee for the costs
incurred by the qualified employee for professional liability
insurance.
(2) Reimbursement of a qualified employee under paragraph
(1) shall be contingent on the submission by the qualified
employee to the head of the agency concerned of such
information or documentation as the head of the agency
concerned shall require.
(3) Amounts for reimbursements under paragraph (1) shall be
derived from amounts available to the agency concerned for
salaries and expenses.
(b) Qualified Employee.--For purposes of this section, the
term ``qualified employee'' means an employee of an agency
whose position is that of--
(1) a law enforcement officer performing official
counterterrorism duties; or
(2) an official of an element of the intelligence community
performing official counterterrorism duties outside the
United States.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any Executive
agency, as that term is defined in section 105 of title 5,
United States Code, and includes any agency of the
Legislative Branch of Government.
(2) Element of the intelligence community.--The term
``element of the intelligence community'' means any element
of the intelligence community specified or designated under
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)).
(3) Law enforcement officer; professional liability
insurance.--The terms ``law enforcement officer'' and
``professional liability insurance'' have the meanings given
those terms in section 636(c) of the Treasury, Postal
Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1997 (5
U.S.C. prec. 5941 note).
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today the Senate passed by unanimous
consent important legislation Senator Kyl and I sponsored that seeks to
improve the United States' ability to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks. This bill, S. 3205, the Counterterrorism Act of 2000--together
with a Kyl-Feinstein amendment making a few technical changes--
implements major recommendations from a bipartisan, blue-ribbon
commission on terrorism.
Let me describe what the bill would do. First, it urges that the U.S.
government continue to take strong and effective actions to investigate
the recent attack on the U.S.S. Cole and ensure that the perpetrators
are brought to justice. The assault on the Cole is the worst against
the U.S. military since the bombing of an Air Force barracks in Saudi
Arabia killed 19 airmen in 1996. It is also the worst attack on a Navy
ship since an Iraqi missile struck an American guided-missile frigate
in 1987, killing 37 sailors.
Second, the bill requires the Department of Justice to review legal
authority of federal agencies responsible for responding to a
catastrophic terrorist attack and determine whether additional legal
authority is necessary.
Third, the bill requires the president to establish a program for
long-term research and development to counter catastrophic terrorist
attacks and submit a report to Congress on this program. It also
expresses the sense of Congress that there should be more long-term
research and development in this area.
Fourth, the bill mandates that the attorney general issue a report on
how to improve U.S. controls on biological pathogens and the equipment
necessary to produce biological weapons, and requires the Health &
Human Services secretary to issue a report on any appropriate actions
that should be taken to protect against unlawful diversion of
pathogens.
Fifth, the bill requires that the president establish a joint task
force to develop a broad approach toward discouraging the fundraising
activities of international terrorist organizations and that the task
force issue a report.
Sixth, the bill requires the FBI to report on whether it can set up a
central mechanism to distribute intelligence information it gleans
about international terrorists to other members of the intelligence
community.
Seventh, the bill directs the president to review the type of
information shared by U.S. law enforcement agencies and intelligence
agencies as well as legal limitations on the sharing of this
information. The president shall provide any recommendations regarding
the sharing of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information
between such agencies.
Eighth, the bill mandates that the CIA shall issue a report
responding to the Commission on Terrorism's finding that the CIA should
scrap a internal classified guideline requiring CIA agents to get
approval from headquarters before recruiting unsavory individuals to
act as informants about terrorism.
Ninth, the bill expresses the Sense of Congress that Syria and Iran
should remain on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism.
Finally, the bill would ensure that federal counterintelligence
personnel be fully reimbursed for buying insurance they purchase to
protect themselves from liability if they are sued for their officially
authorized activities. Currently, the government reimburses federal
criminal law enforcement officers, supervisors, and management
officials for one-half of their insurance expenses. These individuals
purchase professional liability insurance because government
representation may not be available to them.
However, FBI special agents and CIA officers who do counterterrorism
work may not be reimbursed at all when they buy such insurance. This is
particularly unfortunate because counterterrorism work is so risky--
especially when the work occurs overseas. There can be few more
dangerous tasks than infiltrating a terrorist cell in, say, Yemen or
Afghanistan.
The Kyl-Feinstein Counterterrorism Act of 2000 is not a panacea for
the problem of terrorism. Rather, it seeks to implement a number of
specific improvements to our counterterrorism policy unanimously
suggested by the Commission on Terrorism, a bipartisan group of
experts.
The bill also lays the groundwork for a number of further
improvements. We will be revisiting many of the issues covered by the
bill in the next Congress once we receive more detailed information and
recommendations from the Executive Branch. I look forward to working
with my colleagues in Congress and with the next Administration to
implement S. 3205.
I believe that we need to take strong action to combat terrorism.
There is no question that terrorist attacks will
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continue and that they will become more deadly. Terrorists today often
act out of a visceral hatred of the U.S. or the West and seek to wreak
maximum destruction and kill as many people as possible.
At the same time, I believe that our counterterrorism policy must be
conducted in a way that remains consistent with our democratic values
and our commitment to an open, free society.
In many ways, the Kyl-Feinstein Counterterrorism Act of 2000 is a
counterpart bill to the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act that
recently passed the Senate 95 to 0. That legislation, which I
cosponsored, will make it easier for American victims of terrorism
abroad to collect court-awarded compensation and ensure that the state
sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their crimes.
While I strongly support assisting terrorist victims, I also believe
that we need to do more to prevent Americans from becoming victims of
terrorism in the first place. Thus, I am glad that the Senate has acted
to pass S. 3205 with such dispatch. It is crucial to act now before
terrorists strike again, killing and injuring more Americans and
leaving more families grieving. I urge the House to pass S. 3205 before
we adjourn.
In conclusion, I want to thank my good friend Senator Kyl for his
tireless efforts to get this bill passed. His work, as always, has been
invaluable.
I also thank my other colleagues for their assistance in helping us
pass this bill. I know Senator Leahy, for instance, initially had a
number of concerns with the legislation. I am grateful for the time he
spent working through these issues with us, and I am glad that we can
move this bill forward unanimously.
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