Sangram Singh and ors. Vs. Zahar Singh and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation

legalcrystal.com/453061

Subject

Tenancy

Court

Allahabad

Decided On

May-03-1949

Reported in

AIR1949All662

Appellant

Sangram Singh and ors.

Respondent

Zahar Singh and anr.

Excerpt: - .....as the agent on behalf of all the co-sharers in respect of this plot. the suit was, therefore, cognizable by the revenue court, provided the amendment made by the aforesaid act applied to the case.6. now, section 31 of the said act makes the amendments made by the said act retrospective in operation and applicable to all pending suits, appeals and revisions. it is quite clear, therefore, that the amendment applies to the present second appeal.7. in the circumstances, therefore, this appeal must be allowed.8. i, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate court, and restore that of the trial court. the parties, however, shall bear their own costs throughout.

Judgment:

Agarwala, J.

1. This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit filed in the Revenue Court for ejectment of defendants 1 and 2, under Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. The plaintiff alleged that by an agreement between the co-sharers he alone was entitled to eject and settle tenants on plot No. 4559 (old)-4317 (present), that formerly Mt. Sunder Kunwar was the tenant and Kallu was her sub-tenant of the plot, that after Sunder Kunwar's death the plaintiff obtained a decree for ejectment against Kallu, who was ejected. Thereafter, the plaintiff let out the land to one Balwant Singh, but before he could take possession, defendants 1 and 2, who are co-sharers, took possessions without the consent of the plaintiff. He accordingly sued for their ejectment and for damages.

2. The defence of defendants 1 and 2 was that they were not trespassers, but that they were co- sharers, and that they could not be ejected.

3. An issue about the proprietary title of the defendants was referred to the Civil Court, which found that the defendants were co- sharers, but were not in possession as such. The Revenue Court thereupon decreed the suit for ejectment and for Rs. 38-11-2 as damages. The defendants went up in appeal to the lower appellate Court. This appeal was allowed on the ground that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to eject co-sharers. The Court relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in D. N. Rege, Solicitor v. Mohammad Haider : AIR1946All379 . Against this decision the plaintiff has come up in second appeal to this Court.

4. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant relies upon the recent Amending Act, X [10] of 1947. Section 18 of the said Act has amended Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. Under this amendment an explanation has been added by which

A co-sharer In the proprietary rights in a plot of land taking or retaining possession of such plot without the consent of the whole body of co-sharers or of an agent appointed to act on behalf of all of them, shall be deemed to be in possession of such plot otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law within the meaning of this section.

It, therefore, appears that under the law, as amended by this Act, a co-sharer also can now be ejected in a suit under Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. It is urged that the entire body of co-sharers did not file the suit and it has not been shown by the plaintiff that he was an agent appointed to act on behalf of all of them.

5. Now, the lower appellate Court has found that:

It appears that Sangram Singh was, under some arrangement with his other co-sharers, letting out the disputed plot of land to tenants. Mt. Sundar Kunwar was the tenant in occupation of the said plot. The respondent got her ejected. Delivery of possession was taken through Court and the land was let out to one Balwant Singh.

It, therefore, appears that by a private arrangement the plot in suit used to be let out by the plaintiff alone. He was, therefore, acting as the agent on behalf of all the co-sharers in respect of this plot. The suit was, therefore, cognizable by the Revenue Court, provided the amendment made by the aforesaid Act applied to the case.

6. Now, Section 31 of the said Act makes the amendments made by the said Act retrospective in operation and applicable to all pending suits, appeals and revisions. It is quite clear, therefore, that the amendment applies to the present second appeal.

7. In the circumstances, therefore, this appeal must be allowed.

8. I, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate Court, and restore that of the trial Court. The parties, however, shall bear their own costs throughout.