But What Is Lacan’s Symbolic Order?

by
Robert Silhol

October 5, 2009

This essay eplicates each of the terms contained in Lacan’s concept ofthe symbolic order. And relates these terms to the central concept of « lack » in Lacan’s Freudian terminology.

article

I know‚ Lacan is difficult to read . Even though some of his «
Seminars » have remained quite legible‚ we are not always sure we
understand what was said in them. It is therefore safer to maintain
that Lacan is a very difficult author.

But I think there were reasons for this and‚ to begin with‚ what must
me acknowledged is the fact that Freud introduced us to a world for
which there was no word‚ or at least no « signified‚ » before him. I
am of course referring to what is unconscious in us‚ and to
the epistemological break which the creation of psychoanalysis
represents. Can one speak of what is not conscious in us‚ and if so
can it still be called unconscious? (This is indeed the subject of
some lessons in Lacan’s Seminar XVIII‚ « D’un discours
qui ne serait pas du semblant. »‚ 1971) Indeed‚ dealing with
such new concepts is no easy task‚ and we must not be surprised if
the meaning of these new words more than once seems very vague to us.
(1)

One of the consequences of this discovery that there is much in us
which escapes consciousness is that communication is not as simple as
we may think it is. As an analyst‚ Lacan didn’t believe that what he
had to say to his Wednesday audience could be understood and accepted
without a necessary working through. In a word‚ just as an analyst
requests his or her patients’collaboration‚ Lacan‚ very
psychoanalytically‚ requested the collaboration of his audience and
chose therefore to express himself like a poet‚ leaving his listeners
or his readers to painfully construct their own meaning ( there is no
other !). And because of the way he had of coming relentlessly back
and forth to the same themes and demonstrations‚ of the way he had of
« encircling » the difficult and sometimes hardly acceptable ideas he
was developing‚ he hoped that some coherence would eventually emerge
from his discourse.

A poet‚ then‚ that is to say a practitioner of the metaphor-and it
could be mathematical—‚ but a disciple of Freud also‚ which means
that he spent his scientific life ceaselessly improving his models.
And this naturally constitutes another difficulty for his readers.
Indeed‚ Lacan’s active career as a theoretician extended over some
thirty years‚ and this explains why some of the concepts he worked
with had their meaning modified over the years. Some terms or notions
never varied‚ it is true‚ terms like « unconscious »‚ « castration »
and even « phallus »‚ all received from Freud‚ but others‚ of Lacan’s
own coining‚ as « Other » with a capital letter (Autre) or «
jouissance »‚ had their signified altered‚ while the well-known signifiant‚ signifier‚ may be said to convey a rather
indefinite meaning unless one decides it simply stands for « sign »
or « symbol »‚ which is not quite‚ I think‚ a correct interpretation.

I am conscious‚ of course‚ that reading is always an interpretation
and that‚ to a certain extent‚ misunderstanding is unavoidable‚ but
we may stand a better chance of understanding what Lacan was trying
to communicate if we always carefully replace the words he pronounced
within their proper context‚ that is to say if we consider their
place within the theoretical progress his work taken as a whole
represents.

Among the terms that frequently recur in Lacan’s discourse‚ «
Symbolic Order » may appear so simple and obvious that one may think
it hardly deserves a specific debate. And yet‚ what seems at first
like a general statement about the importance of symbolism is far
from being as simple as it looks and I am not surprised it has given
rise to so many misunderstandings.

I

« Symbolique‚ » the first half of the phrase‚ does not
appear to be the term which poses much of a problem : we can say that
its signified is simple and unambiguous enough‚ even though the
question of representation‚ it is true‚ happens to be an essential
topic in any philosophical debate.

With « Ordre‚ » however‚ things are not so simple. To begin
with‚ it might be interesting to note that the very first meaning of
the expression « Symbolic order » ha apparently little to do
withpsychoanalysis. We are indeed reminded that Lacan
first borrowed it from the ethnological findings and writings of
Claude Levi-Strauss. A primal law organizes‚ regulates exchanges
between the families observed by the anthropologist : « I have
received a bride‚ or a bridegroom‚ I owe a daugther‚ or a son .»
Order‚ here‚ means rule‚ the way exchanges have to be arranged : I
have received‚ I owe... ; I have a debt. This law defines a passage
obligé in the social group studied‚ and it is what must have
attracted Lacan’s attention in the first place : something which has
to do with determination‚ the discovery of a structure‚ of a
particular law which governs social behavior and much more. I
interpret this interest in structure on the part of Lacan as a
manifestation of his wish to give psychoanalysis a scientific status.
At this stage of his research‚ « order » expresses a desire for
scientific certainty.

II

But of course‚ when thinking of exchange it is not too difficult to
bring what takes place between mother and child into the picture.
This‚ particularly in the Fifties‚ with Melanie Klein‚ was the main
concern of Object Relation theory. The mother is the Great Giver‚ the
great provider‚ at least at first‚ and the consequence of her absence
is naturally something that must be taken into consideration
seriously.

[...] in the plus/minus oppositon‚ presence and absence‚ we already
have‚ virtually‚ the
origin‚ the birth‚ the possibility‚ the fundamental condition of a
symbolic order. (LeSéminaire IV‚ 68. My translation.)

Order‚ here‚ can undoubtledly be given a specific signified-and in
passing we shall note the insistence— ; to the first meaning already
marked out-determination-we can now add a second : representation. In
short‚ and one naturally remembers Freud’s grand child and his game
with the reel‚ the fact that the mother can be represented in her
absence introduces us to the field of language where things are
replaced by signs. Quite simply‚ the « symbolic order ‚» now (1956)‚
denotes the domain where symbols are used‚ or‚ to put it more
strongly‚ the fact that one can only express oneself « symbolically
». But what was said earlier about determination is not forgotten :

It’s only from the moment of entrance of the subject into an order
which preexists to
all that happens to him‚ events‚ satisfactions‚ disappoinments‚ that
all in which he
approaches his experience [...] falls into an order‚ is articulated‚
takes its meaning‚ and
can be analyzed. (Le Séminaire IV‚ 102.)

The synthesis is clear and complete. We are now dealing with an
already established symbolic order and this does correspond to the «
Law »‚ as was the case with the findings of anthropology‚ and at
the same time to language‚ for linguistics deals with
representation. Humans speak‚ that is to say use signs‚ in short
symbolize. As human subjects separated from the
world-out-there-Lacan says submitted to the « real »‚ to the mother
as power—‚ the world of objects‚ we can nevertheless‚ and
do‚ represent it. In fact‚ there is no other way of dealing
with the « unattainable » real. This first structure is well-known :
on one side the sign‚ on the other the referent‚ and between them an
insuperable space‚ a gap which can only be bridged symbolically
(Winnicott). After Levi-Strauss‚ Saussure and the linguists. Never
mind if Lacan’s linguistics was only « de la linguisterie »as he himself pointed out. We have here a structure which he will
never forsake‚ a fundamental element of his system. For there is
more‚ and Saussure and his sign articulated into signified and
signifier (which in passing I take to have nothing to do with Freud’s
« manifest » and « latent thoughts‚ » with the added remark that this
is a distinction which is not always made clearly enough by Lacan
himself !) cannot but ring a bell for the psychoanalyst‚ for this is
a structure which equally applies to the dream‚ to language and to
literature...not to speak of the concept of unconscious ! As we know‚
it is easy to go from the structure of language‚ which as we have
just seen is the structure of representation‚ to the structure of the
metaphor. Metaphor and metonymy very much resemble what Freud
discovered in the functioning of our dreams : condensation and
displacement (Jakobson). It is here that the findings of the linguist
become particularly useful to the psychoanalyst : because several
signifeds can correspond to a single signifier we can play with
language‚ use‚ that is‚ a given signifier to carry a meaning‚ a
signified‚ which‚ because of the ambiguity‚ will remain concealed
while being secretly expressed : I can say « table » aloud and be
inhabited by the unconscious desire of thinking « bed » (love?)‚ or
perhaps « operation table » (castration‚ destruction). The same
structure applies to our slips of the tongue or to parapraxis. We can
make fun of Lacan’s jargon in sentences such as : « The subject’s
secret lies in the signifying chain‚» but we must realize there is
nothing wrong‚ from the point of view of logic‚ with such a
statement.

Much more could be said-and much more has been written already-about
the relationship between Freud’s discovery and language ; let it
suffice here to repeat that the symbolic nature of language‚ the fact
that humans do give a name to things (the sign‚ as
mentioned above‚ on one side and the referent on the other) and the
fact also that ‚ without knowing it‚ they can name what is
repressed‚ what is hidden to their conscious self‚ constitutes them
into a particular group of beings. « Ca parle » : as in our
dreams‚ what was not intelligible before Freud can now be given
meaning through the interpretation of what symbolically manifests itself‚ at last « latent thoughts » are
made accessible‚ and this applies to discourse also. We are indeed
endowed with such a power of representation ‚ but this faculty of
adding a signifier to a signified in order to make a sign—because of
the slippery nature of the signified‚ which is the individual mark of
each subject—‚ entails our submission to a symbolic order‚ that is to
say to an order of things where what we say cannot be reduced to its
« manifest » meaning‚ « surface » at best and often screen‚ and
always carries more (unconscious) meaning than we consciouly think.
Thus can a concealed‚ « repressed » meaning suddenly be revealed (as
when a slip of the tongue is successfully understood) or on the
contrary remain secret‚ as in our dreams until they are analyzed. In
the end‚ Lacan’s perhaps most famous formula can be understood
without too much difficulty and we can agree with him that the
unconscious is structured like a language.

III

Which brings to the foreground the notion of separation. For indeed‚
the unconscious subject of which psychoanalysis speaks is
quite simply the separated being that I am : the infant separated
from its mother at birth‚ the human being for whom the
world-out-there will never be more than a representation—something
which always has to be interpreted—‚ the boy who (anatomically) will
never be a girl or the girl who will never be a boy‚ the image in the
mirror‚ finally‚ which tells me that this face‚ this body‚ whole and
in one piece‚ is me but remains all the same an image only and shall
never represent a subject‚ the reflection‚ in a word‚ of the
incomplete being that I am‚ for if the image tells me I am‚ and this
is Descartes‚ it cannot tell me-without a psychoanalytic
interpretation— who or what‚ as a subject‚ I am‚ and this is Freud
and Lacan.

It is because such incompleteness is inacceptable that it is
represented-so to speak—in a way that denies its very existence while
realistically focussing on the many instances in life where we are
seen to be lacking something. I do not think the concept of
unconscious can ever be understood properly if we do not bear in mind
such a fact : it all begins with this lack‚ « le manque »
for which a reassuring ‚ if paradoxically anxiogenetic‚
representation has to be found : better crave for the impossible‚
hanker after ideals‚ call it fusion if you like‚ than the nothingness
of the world-out-there from which as a subject I am for ever
separated.

This difficult concept of the lack is of course at the heart of
Freud’s discovery‚ even though‚ more of a clinician than a
philosopher at first‚ he never expressed himself with the words of
the metaphysician‚ simply contenting himself with speaking of the bar
between Cs and Ucs. This‚ however‚ was dramatic enough ! And there
were many practical reasons to introduce such a paradigm‚ if only
because the object the infant misses most in the first years of its
life is the mother‚ the mother’s body from which we were « cut » at
birth.

The structure‚ of course‚ is the same : an infant and a lost
object ‚ but because we cannot yet say « a subject and the
representation of what has been lost ‚ » this loss can be expressed
in more ways than one‚ and this is where the difference between the
sexes comes into the picture and makes matters a little more
difficult for us.

In « The Dialectic of frustration ‚ » which is the fourth lesson in Séminaire IV‚ in a subtle‚ and I think convincing‚
discussion‚ Lacan‚ for about ten pages‚ describes the child’s entry
into the symbolic order (the mother has now become real because she
can refuse to give‚ and it is the object that is now symbolic‚
entering « the connotation presence-absence »). The conditions for
the formation of a symbolic order are therefore fulfilled‚ and it is
true that the discussion could be brought to an end here‚ except that
at this point another lack is introduced into the debate and will
henceforth become the central point of interest. Justified or not‚
the shift is obvious in Lacan’s text:

Let us now ask the question from quite a different starting point
[à partir d’un tout
autrepoint de départ].( Le Séminaire IV‚ 70)

Following the Freud of 1935‚ Lacan chose to direct his attention to
an imaginary object which he defined as essentially missing : the
phallus. Not that he refused to take notice of that other lack
clearly exemplified in the infant’s demand not to be separated from
its mother‚ as we have just seen‚ but in the end‚ he does seem to
have considered it as secondary. We have moved from :

the subject misses something or someone

to :

an object is missing. (2)

Privilege is therefore given to sexual difference and to the concept
of castration. In Lacan’s work on Object relation theory‚ this theme
is soon introduced :

Castration is essentially related to a symbolic order [...]

The connexion between castration and the symbolic order is made
palpable [mise enévidence] by what we have said so far‚ and also by this
simple remark-for Freud
from the very beginning‚ castration is attached to the central
position given to the
Oedipus complex [...] (61)

Then Lacan goes on discussing what he calls « frustration »‚ bringing
back the mother‚ and woman‚ into the picture‚ in a demonstration that
is much nearer his reflection on language than one might think at
first. We all know that one of the theoretical steps which followed
the discovery of the Oedipus complex by Freud concerned the
difference between the sexes. In 1935‚ for instance‚ he discusses the
relationship of the daughter and of the son to the father‚ pointing
out how different their demands are : where the little girl will ask
for a baby‚ the little boy will ask for the permission to use his own
sexual organ (a permission which‚ in some cases‚ may not be so easy
to obtain). We have therefore moved from an « order » which defines
the law according to which children‚ young men and women‚ are to be
exchanged‚ to an « order » to which humans are submitted and which
describes them as capable of representation‚ and we have now finally
come to the point where representation is given a particular content‚
to the point where what is represented is an imaginary object‚ the phallus namely or‚ in other words‚ what is missing.
Considering ‘what is missing’‚ Lacan writes :

Freud tells us for his part that woman has‚ among what she misses as
essential objects
[au nombre de ses manques d’objetsessentiels]‚ the
phallus‚ and that this is very
closely connected with her relationship to the child. (70)

Quite simply‚ the object-and I mean the object of Object relation
theory—‚ be it breast or mother’s body‚ has now been changed and has
become what the mother desires. Where she was at first seen as the
one who can give or refuse‚ she is now the one who asks‚ asks the
child to replace what she misses. But what she misses is only imaginary‚ Lacan insists on this‚ and it may help us-it has
helped me-to accept his theory more easily.

Naturally‚ males also suffer from a lack; only‚ they have the
possibility of making use of a signifier which will help them to deny
they are incomplete‚ which of course they are‚ as all humans. It is
of this (false) claim that women are deprived. For the lack from
which men suffer is not in the end so different from that of women
(fathers also ask their children to « complete » them)‚ and for
instance they can be said to suffer from the impossibility of having
an ideal sexual organ‚ an organ moreover which is under a permanent
threat (castration)‚ but when it comes to symbolization‚ there is a
difference. Lacan does acknowledge the similitude (although I think
he should have said « penis » and not phallus here) :

Let’s not forget‚ indeed‚ that the phallus of the little boy is not
much more vaillant
than the little girl’s. (193)

But because the object we are now discussing amounts to the
possibility of signifying‚ amounts to the way women and men signify‚
symbolize‚ « our starting point has to be the existence of an
imaginary phallus. » (190)

And imaginary is the key word‚ needless to say‚ for we are
here speaking of language‚ that is to say‚ and I prefer the
expression : of representation. In a word‚ we represent what we are
missing. It is true that Lacan may seem to overdo it in the way he
gives this « phallus » the leading role‚ almost the only role in
fact. But there is little doubt that as a clinician‚ like Freud‚ he
has come across the domineering role of the fear of castration in us.
The insistence on the imaginary nature of the phallus will help us to
accept the ambiguity of the statement‚ for indeed it all starts with
a discovery about anatomy. And at least we understand how the
phallus‚ this imaginary object of desire‚ can be considered as a
signifier‚ un signifiant.

For in fact‚ this lack we are talking about when we speak of women‚
we know quite
well [nous sommes déjà avertis] it is not a real lack. This
phallus‚ everybody knows
they can have of it [chacun sait qu’elles peuvent en avoir]‚
they have them [elles lesont‚ les phallus]‚ and on top of this they produce them‚
they make boys‚ those
phallusbearers [phallophores]. (191)

True‚ in this short homage to women‚ the formutlation‚ however
apologetic‚ may seem more awkward than properly poetic: they can have
« of it »‚ they have « them » remain vague‚ difficult to translate‚
but what matters to me here is the insistence on the fact that we are
dealing with an imaginary object. As we have just seen‚ the « problem
» is not so much sexual difference as such as the fact that males are
provided with a particular signifier

Of course‚ straight away‚ one may object and add: « And the breast‚
and the round belly of the mother to be‚ aren’t these also signifiers
? » No doubt‚ these are signifiers also‚ but as signifiers they come
into existence later in life‚ after the discovery of sexual
difference. (Also‚ as I pointed out above‚ the analyst only deals
with what he or she hears from patients‚ and for the time being these
belong to a culture which was until recently-and still is in
reality-dominated by a patriarchal order.) In the end‚ though‚
essentially‚ what must be taken into consideration is the importance
of what is genital for humans. That it should have been naturally
selected as an area which provides symbols is not really surprising.

If‚ according to what she says‚ it is much more difficult for the
woman than for the boy
to enter the reality of what takes place in the area of the uterus or
of the vagina in the
dialectic of a desire that can satisfy her‚ it is indeed because she
has to go through
something with which she has a different relationship than the man‚
that is to say‚
because of what she lacks [par ce dont elle manque]‚ that is
to say the phallus. (190)

It is now easy to see how totally Object relation theory has been
reversed‚ subverted perhaps even : what it was in the power of the
mother to give or to refuse has now become what she asks. But we can
also see how perfectly the liaison between language and sex
difference has been achieved : an essential element of exchange
between mother and child has been added to psychoanalytical theory.
This does not mean we should altogether set aside what happens betwen
child and mother in the domain of nurturing‚ of giving‚ but the
phallus as an imaginary object does radically change the situation :
it adds a new and essential determination to what takes place in the
making of a subject.

In short‚ what is symbolical in the « order »I have just
described—organization and injunction—is the particular
request the mother makes to the child.

Which causes me to disqualify an interpretation often made of the
mother’s place in the parental couple according to lacanian theory.
Although‚ it is true‚ it was not too difficult to misread the aspect
of the theory which defines the mother as primarily wanting as
resulting in a hierarchy between males and females. What was new in
the theory was that the mother was no longer the Great Giver-and I
would like to specify « the great giver only »—and had now become the
one who asked‚ while the apparently all powerful father is the one
from whom one expects a gift : a baby or a working penis. My
argument‚ here‚ rests on two points : first‚ this was half a
century ago and it may have seemed necessary at the time to
complete Oject relation theory‚ add (3) something to it or
perhaps even to subvert it‚ following Freud’s footsteps in the
enterprise (see Lacan’s comment on the case of Little Hans in Séminaire IV). The second argument‚ which proceeds from the
first‚ is that sexual difference cannot be denied‚ no more than the
fear of castration‚ and had to be taken into consideration.

IV

In his insistence on the importance of the phallus‚ however-an
insistence which will appear quite necessary if we simply accept to
look around us—‚ Lacan seems to have overlooked the necessity of
insisting also on the proper « lack » of fathers. If only because « Pater semper incertus »—until recently at any rate—‚ the
father is at a disadvatage and cannot be certain he is the true
begetter. Much more could be said on this subject‚ and for instance
that the possibility exists of a primal jealousy on the part of men
who are not the ones to give life to the child. A necessary condition
to conception‚ no doubt‚ the role of the father is not a sufficient
one. The phallus as an ideal image-an image is always «
ideal »‚ I know‚ not really real except as a representation‚ but we
have to insist on the ideality here-may have its raison
d’être for the simple reason that no conception can be achieved
without erection‚ as by the way it cannot either be complete without
a womb‚ but I do not think it can in any way be used as an
argument to sustain the existence of a hierarchy between the sexes.
Once again‚ this is the reason why Lacan insists on the phallus as
being only imaginary in the unconscious desire of the mother.

So much‚ then‚ for the possible misreading of Lacan’s phrase about «
order ». But it is true that the expression remains so vague and
general that it can easily lead to misinterpretation. What is
certain‚ however‚ is that the bearer of the penis-not the phallus‚
needless to say-is also the one in the parental couple who‚ by his «
No » after the birth of the child is instrumental in the separation
between infant and mother‚ when the infant comes out of its fusion
with maternal omnipotence. « There are three of us now »‚ the voice
says‚ and to the mother : « Thou shalt not ‘reincorporate’ your
‘product’ ». This primal « weaning » creates the possibility for a
subject to exist‚ is in fact the necessary condition of its
existence. At the heart of the infant’s entry into an order which
symbolically defines its place and status‚ the father is the great «
interdictor »‚ the one who prohibits‚ and for the little boy he comes
into action twice since he will soon forbid sexual union with the
mother.

At this point‚ however‚ and for the second time‚ there appears the
possibility of another misinterpretation of the word « order » in
Lacan’s formula. Because Lacan does not always clearly distinguish
the two roles of the « prohibiting » father and often switches
without warning from the first function-of separation-to the
second-of prohibition and castration—one may fail to see the adequacy
of his expression « Name-of-the-father » when thinking of the
triangular situation‚ and repproach him with having forgotten that
for the little girl the mother also has a prohibiting role. Thus this
recourse to the father and his name may not be such a good way to
describe the triangular scene and may remain confusing. In the end‚ I
find it safer to read his phrase—which as we remarked he gives as
equivalent for « symbolic order »—as simply standing for the freudian
bar. For indeed‚ Lacan does equate the Name-of-the Father with
castration-and here the play upon Nom and Non‚ so
easy in French‚ makes complete sense-‚ which brings us back to the
utter radicality of the freudian discovery of an insuperable gap
between conscious and unconscious and of the fundamental
incompleteness of the human being‚ male or female.

*

Was Lacan’s phrase ‘too vague and too general’ to be of any interest
? Meaningless because it carried so many meanings? Or was it on the
contrary a perfect epitome of what Freud had discovered and expressed
beautifully in his graphic formula Cs/Ucs?

The begining of an answer might be found in yet another meaning which
Lacan’s phrase incites me to formulate. As an object‚ constituted as
such by the « symbolic order »‚ I depend on an Other and on
a given order which was itself determined by « a regular succession
of generations »
(398).

If the psychoanalytic experience has taught us anything‚ it is that
any interhuman
relationship is founded on an investiture which comes from the Other.
This Other
is already in us from the very beginning under the form of the
unconscious‚ but
nothing in our own development can come into existence if not through
a constellation
which implies the absolute Other as locus of the spoken word
[comme siège de laparole]. (372)

This was half a century ago‚ we must remember‚ and still remained
vague; but twenty years later‚ the « seminar » in which Lacan spoke
of Joyce‚ LeSéminaire XXIII‚ found him giving a
more precise definition of what he meant by Other and it was a way of
repeating his phrase about generations. What may have been an
interrogation about determination addressed to the work of
Claude Levi-Strauss in the years of the beginning now comes to the
forefront ; I take it to have finally become Lacan’s most open
preoccupation.

In 1975‚ he may have had a good time playing with his « knots »on his
own‚ but his perhaps not so successful pedagogical game was quite
meaningful all the same‚ as we can judge today. ( 4 ) Thus‚
from Freud to Levi-Strauss‚ to Saussure‚ to Lacan‚ and to Freud we
have come full circle—a « return to Freud » as the formula goes—‚ and
in the process‚ already implied in freudian theory no doubt‚ a
question has come to light which prompts us to ask what kind of an
object the child was for the parent.

NOTES

I have dealt with the concept of unconscious and with Freud’s paper on
the subject in : « Freud on ‘Repression’ and on the ‘Unconscious’ »‚ Literature and Psychoanalysis‚ ISPA‚ Lisbon‚ Portugal‚ 2008‚
79-90.

From this point of view‚ page 68 in Le
Séminaire IV‚ which deals with the relationship between the symbolic and the real‚ is essential.

In this page‚ could the insistence on « presence and
absence »‚ and on « the opposition minus/plus »‚ which discusses the
infant mother relationship and which I have quoted earlier‚ be
interpreted‚ because of this very insistence‚ as perhaps a sign of an
unconscious refusal to give the mother all her due? It is a
question.

As obvious as the fantasmatic dimension of my
reading‚ or of the original text‚ may seem-« to complete‚ » « to add
»—it in no way alters the correctness of the observation.