In the years that followed the 11 September, NATO has chosen a pragmatic approach to the fight against terrorism. The result has been a series of substantial counterterrorism activities.
Creation
In the years following the Second World War, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union; reflected in particular by the takeover of governments by the communist parties in the Eastern European countries and the support provided by the Soviets to Communist partisans in Greece and separatist movements in Iran, is seen by Western leaders as a potential threat to peace and stability in Europe. This situation encouraged France and the United Kingdom to conclude the Dunkirk Treaty (1947), providing a common defense in case of aggression.

The refusal of the Soviet Union and its allies to sign the Marshall Plan lead the Western countries to sign the Brussels Treaty (1948), collective security pact, which is extended to the United States and Canada after the blockade of Berlin (1948), to give birth to a permanent organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in 1949.

Definition
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which constitutes the legal and contractual basis of the Atlantic Alliance, was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington.

The first signatory countries were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the United States, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952, West Germany joined in 1955 and Spain in 1982. In 1990, reunified Germany succeeded Germany in within NATO. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have become members of NATO in 1999. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became members of NATO in 2004.

Albania and Croatia joined NATO in 2009, and lastly, Montenegro in 2017.

Purpose
NATO’s preamble states that the purpose of the commitment undertaken is to promote the common values ??of its signatories and to unite their efforts to ensure collective defense. It consists of 14 articles, including the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 1) and a mechanism of discord when one of the members of the alliance sees its security threatened (Article 4). Its most important provision, contained in Article 5, states that “the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered as an attack directed against all the parties, and accordingly, they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of self-defense, individual or collective, recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, assist the party or parties so attacked by taking, individually and in agreement with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain security in the area of North Atlantic “.

Did NATO play a significant role in the combat of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks? And how did its role evolve after the NATO’s New Policy Guidelines on counterterrorism in 2012?

CHAPTER I
Evolution of the Transnational Terrorist Threat
Today, terrorism has turned out to be more scattered, decentralized, and multifaceted. In a word, it has turned out to be intricate. One can embrace techniques and motive to make a distinction among national and universal terrorism and still not have the capacity to characterize a solitary system to catch all parts of the challenge. As an immediate result of al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States, NATO’s inclusion with countering terrorism has concentrated on its global measurement, above national efforts, and beyond national borders.

A long time before the destruction of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, specialists agreed that there was no more a worldwide system run specifically by al Qaeda. Because of the achievements in upsetting its administration and system, al Qaeda operations are progressively reliant on local franchises, for example, in Yemen, Somalia, the Middle East, and North Africa. While conceivably decreasing the extension and reach of al Qaeda’s movement, this development can’t be viewed as a vital triumph. A scattered al Qaeda network turns out to be harder to bind.
Its leadership diminishes in impact but spreads in numbers. Cutting edges turn out to be more obscured and terrorist’s strategies differentiate and mix. Terrorism turns into a central strategy incorporated by states and non-state performing artists inside the “new” classification of “hybrid” threats.

On the operational and strategic side, five interconnected patterns affirm a development of the terrorists’ system and usual methodology: the built-up association between terrorist organizations, radical gatherings, and worldwide organized crime; the rise of homegrown terrorists; dependence on complex financing components; utilization of sophisticated propaganda; and access to advanced innovations with unconventional high effect operations.
The developing nexus among terrorist associations, agitators, and international crime is perhaps the starkest update that national and universal actors can’t manage terrorism in watertight compartments.

Law and Military enforcement operations turn out to be a piece of a continuum in the counterterrorism response. Terrorism and illicit exercises converge to fund their associations’ operations. Particularly, the connection between terrorism and drug trafficking is a notable worry, with associations extending from South America to West and North Africa, Europe, the Balkans, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. Among others, these exercises and associations give terrorists more extensive self-sufficiency, making them less reliant on external support countries, lessening the span and use of any universal response.
Other than financial help, it is the operational collaboration between these different terrorist associations that are generally troubling. Experience, lessons, and training learned are frequently shared between these gatherings to enhance strategies, procedures, and materiel. This phenomenon is especially present in ungoverned spaces, which are utilized by non-state performing actors to build up training camps and develop operational capacity. Ungoverned or under administered spaces attract criminal gatherings, insurgents, and terrorists alike, and states harboring such terrorists are either reluctant or unfit to disturb or meddle with the gatherings’ activities, though claiming sovereignty before international law. The exploitation of this “sovereignty gap” presents expanding dangers to the universal network because of the quick creation of communications as the historical backdrop of Afghanistan under Taliban rules.
Over the years, another developing concern has been the rise of homegrown terrorists.
In the expressions of Lucio Caracciolo, “terrorists don’t have to come to us. They already are among us.” Homegrown terrorists may extend from solitary wolf people to self-enrolled, self-prepared, and self-executing groups with few or no associations to a worldwide conspiracy, to categories living in a specific nation who have trained with and kept up contacts with the al Qaeda system, lastly to al Qaeda “sleeper cells” willing to lead medium-or long-term activities in a specific country.

Terrorists are hard to recognize, identify, and stop. The way that they participate in suicide assaults involves more prominent worry to national governments. Their danger is similarly low, however, their effect on people’s psyche is high. Through isolated, disconnected, low technology, and low-cost movements, terrorists accomplish disturbing societal impacts well beyond their immediate victims. Stressed neighborhoods lose trust in the specific experts responsible for their assurance, the rhetoric becomes polarized, and escalating resentment fuels terrorist recruitment.

The developing nexus between terrorism and organized crime offers terrorist organizations new and alternative financing opportunities. While notable outcomes have been accomplished in countering terrorism because of the expansion of bilateral and multinational collaboration of law implementation offices and organizations, the suppression of financing channels traceable to terrorist bunches remains difficult because of their continuous technical development and distribution.

In parallel, to confront the national and global reaction and keep up help and mobilization, the volume of al Qaeda’s correspondences have expanded. There are currently a huge number of Web locales, in numerous dialects, dedicated to “virtual proselytism”. Terrorist bunches have deserted old tape or DVD production and the utilization of the Internet to radicalize their devotees around the world and educate them on the methods for violence.

Nonetheless, as innovation is advancing and ending up more accessible, the terrorist threat to the cyberspace is additionally expanding. In a video exhibited by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, al Qaeda requires an “electronic jihad,” encouraging “covert mujahidin” to dispatch cyber-attacks against American basic infrastructure.
In this regard, al Qaeda’s longstanding enthusiasm for securing weapons of mass decimation (WMDs), particularly of a chemical, biology, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) nature, is additionally notable.

With terrorism progressively globalized and crossover, solidarity and comprehensive methods turn into the key ideal models for all counterterrorism performing actors. International terrorist systems exploit national and international legal loopholes and operational gray areas. In a field as unique as counterterrorism, efforts ought to be participated in collective strengthening courses, beyond political entrenchments and doctrinal limits.

In the decade that followed the 9/11 attack, NATO demonstrated its capacity to add to the international fight against terrorism. Aware of its advantages and commands, NATO has succeeded in identifying its added value to specific aspects of the terrorism challenge. The outcome has been a progression of considerable counterterrorism exercises whose effect has been reduced by the absence of a concurred strategy characterizing NATO’s legitimate place among international counterterrorism actors.

CHAPTER II
NATO and the fight against terrorism
The role of NATO in the fight against terrorism is above all to protect people. Often, acts of terrorism are pure and simple indiscriminate acts perpetrated in a blind manner. The Alliance’s actions add significant value to efforts to ensure that everyone lives in safety, without fear of terrorism.
NATO offers the international community a unique range of means for the fight against terrorism. First, it provides a permanent framework for consultation that translates discussions into concrete decisions. It then translates decisions into effective measures, which can rely on unmatched military capabilities. Finally, NATO has a considerable number of cooperation links with many partners.

Terrorism knows no boundaries and only a broad international coalition can meet the challenge of terrorism in all its aspects (political, military, economic, legal, and financial). NATO collaborates with a number of international organizations as well as with countries that share the Allies’ determination to face the threat of terrorism.

The Allies had already expressed their concerns about terrorism in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 1999. However, the shock of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 put terrorism at the top of the agenda of NATO. The day after the attacks, the Allies invoked for the first time the collective defense clause of NATO’s founding treaty (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). Soon after, the Alliance conducted its first active military operation outside Europe, helping to ensure the security of US airspace. Allied ships were then deployed to the Mediterranean as part of a counter-terrorism mission. Finally, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, leading for the first time an operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

Since then, the fight against terrorism has become an essential part of almost all NATO activities. Every day, the Alliance is responding to the challenge of terrorism. The Allied troops are helping the Afghan government to ensure that the country can never again serve as a training ground for terrorists. Allied ships patrol the Mediterranean. The intelligence community in the Alliance shares vital information. Scientists from NATO member countries are developing new technologies to combat specific terrorist threats. Experts also perform exercises and exchange data that can save lives.

All NATO activities in the fight against terrorism, including operations, are fully in accordance with international law, including human rights standards and humanitarian requirements.

Operations
In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, new or existing NATO operations began to play a role in the fight against terrorism.

Patrols in the United States
To help the United States after the September 11 attacks, NATO deployed Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to protect US territory. This allowed the US authorities to free up resources to carry out their campaign in Afghanistan, where the Taliban regime was home to al-Qaeda, which had organized the attacks against the United States. Operation Eagle Assist, took place from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002 as the first anti-terror operation. With Operation Active Endeavor, a second anti-terror operation, it was part of a package of measures taken after 9/11 by NATO at request from the United States.

Protecting the future of Afghanistan
Afghanistan is an essential theater in the fight against terrorism. NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the 2003.

ISAF assists the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in extending its authority throughout the country and maintaining security in order to help eliminate the conditions for the rise of terrorism.

The long-term goal of NATO is to enable Afghans to ensure the security of their country and their people. ISAF is helping Afghan authorities develop their security structures, define and respond to reconstruction needs, and train and strengthen Afghan national security forces.
Forces directed by NATO will remain in Afghanistan as long as the Afghan government deems it necessary. NATO is helping the Afghan government bring the Afghan National Army to a sufficient operational level by providing mentoring and liaison teams. These teams contribute to training and deploy in operations with an advisory role.

In addition to contributing to the strengthening of Afghan security forces and institutions, ISAF also supports activities in other areas critical to the future development of the country, which should prevent terrorists from using, again, Afghanistan as a base. ISAF’s activities are part of broader efforts by the international community to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan.

NATO and ISAF cooperate closely with other international organizations and other stakeholders. It is indeed essential to coordinate civilian and military assistance as part of a comprehensive approach. ISAF is also working to improve the security environment at the regional level by working with Pakistan, a key neighbor of Afghanistan who has a vital role to play in the fight against terrorism. Practical cooperation between the military is developed through a tripartite commission composed of Afghan and Pakistani officials and representatives of ISAF.

Fighting terrorism in the Balkans
In addition, NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are taking action against terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda.

In December 2004, a European Union force was tasked with maintaining security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking over from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). However, NATO has maintained a smaller military headquarters in Sarajevo, which continues to support the fight against terrorism, in parallel with its main mission of assisting Bosnia and Herzegovina in its reform process of defense.

Ensuring the security of major public events
NATO helps, upon request, to ensure the security of major public events such as the summits of the Alliance in Riga in 2006, and the Greek Olympic Games in 2004.
For the Greek Olympic Games, NATO brought together a unique set of air, land and sea assets. AWACS aircraft have monitored air traffic, and an operational force of the Multinational NATO Protection Battalion for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Agents has been deployed. Along with the naval forces and the Greek Coast Guard, the elements of Active Endeavor Operation have contributed to ensuring maritime security during the Olympic Games, by carrying out surveillance operations, ensuring a presence and carrying out cooperative ships in international waters surrounding the Greek peninsula.

Capabilities
At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO leaders have launched a series of initiatives to enhance cooperation and adopt the Alliance’s military capabilities to deal with terrorist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

They adopted a set of terrorism-related measures:
• A new military concept for the defense against terrorism
• A Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism
• Five Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense initiatives: a deployable CBRN agent analysis laboratory, an CBRN incident response team, a virtual center of excellence for CBRN weapons defense, a NATO stock of defenses against biological and chemical agents, and an epidemiological surveillance system;
• Provisions for the protection of civilian populations;
• Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)
• NATO response force (NRF), a multinational force composed of land, air, sea, and Special Forces elements that be deployed quickly to ensure operations wherever needed.

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, Allied leaders endorsed a broader set of measures to strengthen the Alliance’s contribution to the fight against terrorism, including the creation of the Defense against Terrorism (DAT) Program of Work (POW). They agreed to improve the sharing of intelligence data by reviewing NATO’s current intelligence structures.

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, Allied saw that “terrorism…and the spread of weapons of mass destruction is likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years.”
At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, and with the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO completed its intellectual and political evolution towards the question of terrorism. Terrorism has become a “direct threat to the citizens of NATO countries and to international stability and prosperity, more broadly”. The collective defense for a collective security is a must, which opens for NATO new perspectives in countering terrorism and places the new emphasis on the need to define the alliance’s role and contributions.

Cooperation with Partners
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the fight against terrorism has become one of NATO’s main lines of cooperation with non-member countries. In the days following the attacks, the partner countries joined the Allies in condemning the attacks, in meetings of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

The EAPC member states adopted the PAP-T, attempting to make all the efforts to suppress and stop all terrorist actions in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1373. However, this plan stated the need to coordinate the efforts on national, regional, sub-regional and international levels to empower a global response to the terrorist threat on international security.

NATO and Russia outlined shared perspectives on key security questions to be tended through a practical cooperation. The fight against piracy and counterterrorism was a further issue examined in NATO-Russia Council (NCR) cooperation. A NATO-Russia Action Plan on terrorism developed in 2004 and updated in 2010 based on the Joint Review and approved by the NRC Foreign Ministers meeting on April 15, 2011, in Berlin.

Cooperation with other partner countries takes place within the framework of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). Launched at the Prague Summit in November 2002, this plan sets a framework for consultation, practical cooperation and sharing of expertise in this area. It helps to improve intelligence sharing and cooperation in areas such as border security, counterterrorism exercises, and training, or developing capabilities to improve the preparation of the civilian and military sectors and its ability to manage the consequences of possible terrorist attacks.

The fight against terrorism is also an important part of NATO’s Enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia.
In this Dialogue, the Alliance sees that Europe’s security is related to the stability and security in the Mediterranean. For this, the aim of the Mediterranean Dialogue is to cooperate and achieve a mutual understanding in order to contribute to stability, peace, and security.

Cooperation with other international organizations
The threat of terrorism requires a comprehensive and multiform response, coordinated between different organizations.

The United Nations has a global and leading role to play, as demonstrated, for example, by Security Council Resolution 1373.

NATO stands ready to support the activities of the United Nations, and actively contributes to the work of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee.

NATO is also working with other international organizations to step up efforts to fight terrorism. It seeks to deepen cooperation with the European Union (EU) in this area, which has included the exchange of civil emergency planning capacity lists between the two organizations.

NATO regularly holds consultations with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on terrorism-related issues. They cooperate on the political and operational levels in a range of areas including conflict resolution, border security, a proliferation of arms and weapons, arms control, promoting for peace and security agenda, counter-terrorism, and addressing emerging security challenges.

CHAPTER III
The historical backdrop of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will state that the first, and only time NATO has called upon its Article 5 collective defense clause was on September 12, 2001, after a terrorist attack on one of its individuals. However, until the agreement on the New Policy Guidelines on counterterrorism on May 20, 2012, by NATO Heads of State and Government, NATO did not have an agreed policy to characterize its role and command in countering terrorism.

NATO’s New Policy Guidelines
NATO’s reaction to terrorism has been shaped by the 11 September attack, which provoked Allies to dispatch Operation Active Endeavor, to adopt the Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism and to start different ability and institutional changes.

Through the Alliance Strategic Concept, Allies chose to review NATO’s approach to deal with counterterrorism and to improve both the political and the military parts of NATO’s commitment to national and global efforts.

Allies perceive that most counter-terrorism instruments of NATO’s general way to deal with terrorism remain essentially with national citizen and judicial experts. Partners recognize that other International Organizations have more capacities that could upgrade Allies’ efforts in fighting terrorism.

Improved coordination, clear directions and cohesion of efforts and activities will empower NATO to utilize its resources more viable.

According to the Chicago Summit in 2012 the:
Aim
The aim of these policy guidelines is to:
Provide strategic and risk-informed direction to the counter-terrorism activities ongoing across the Alliance as part of NATO’s core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.

Identify the principles to which the Alliance adheres.

Identify key areas in which the Alliance will undertake initiatives to enhance the prevention of and resilience to acts of terrorism with a focus on improved awareness of the threat, adequate capabilities to address it and engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

Following the adoption of these Policy Guidelines, an Action Plan for Implementation will be developed.

Principles
Compliance with International Law: NATO will continue to act in accordance with international law, the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, International Conventions and Protocols against terrorism and relevant UN Resolutions provide the framework for all national and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism, including those conducted by the Alliance.

NATO’s Support to Allies: Individual NATO members have primary responsibility for the protection of their populations and territories against terrorism. Cooperation through NATO can enhance Allies’ efforts to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. NATO, upon request, may support these efforts.

Non-Duplication and Complementarity: NATO will promote complementarity with and avoid unnecessary duplication of existing efforts by individual nations or other International Organizations. NATO will seek to coordinate and leverage its expertise and resources and will focus on targeted programs where it can contribute to and/or reinforce the actions of Allied nations and other international actors, as appropriate.

Key Areas
NATO, as an international organization, has unique assets and capabilities that can support Allied efforts in the fight against terrorism. As set out in the aim of these Policy Guidelines, NATO will contribute more effectively to the prevention of terrorism and increase resilience to acts of terrorism. To this end, the Alliance will coordinate and consolidate its counter-terrorism efforts and focus on three main areas, awareness, capabilities, and engagement.

Awareness: NATO will ensure shared awareness of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities among Allies through consultations, enhanced sharing of intelligence, continuous strategic analysis, and assessments in support of national authorities. This will enable Allies and the Alliance to prepare effectively and to take possible mitigating action in the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks. NATO will also promote a common understanding of its counter-terrorism role as part of a broader international effort through engagement and strategic communications.

Capabilities: NATO has acquired much valuable expertise in countering asymmetric threats and in responding to terrorism. NATO’s work on airspace security, air defense, maritime security, and response to CBRN, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and protection of critical infrastructure is well established. The Alliance will strive to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats, based on the level of ambition as defined in the Political Guidance. It will do so by considering capability developments, innovative technologies and methods that address asymmetric threats in a more comprehensive and informed way, including through the Defense against Terrorism Program of Work. NATO will also strive to maintain its operational capacity and capitalize on the lessons learned in operations, including experience gained through Special Operations Forces. Training, education, and exercises based on different threat scenarios will continue to improve interoperability by assimilating lessons learned and best practices. These capabilities may also be offered to Allies in support of civil emergency planning and the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly as it may relate to counter-terrorism, as requested.

Engagement: The challenge of terrorism requires a holistic approach by the international community, involving a wide range of instruments. To enhance Allies’ security, NATO will continue to engage with partner countries and other international actors in countering terrorism. The Alliance will strengthen its outreach to and cooperation with partner countries as well as international and regional organizations, in particular, the UN, EU, and OSCE, in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, to promote common understanding of the terrorist threat and to leverage the full potential of each stakeholder engaged in the global counter-terrorism effort. NATO will enhance consultations and ensure a more systematic approach to practical cooperation with partner countries using existing mechanisms, including scientific cooperation on technological innovation for improved security. Particular emphasis will be placed on raising awareness, capacity building, civil emergency planning, and crisis management in order to respond to specific needs of partner countries and Allied interests. This will advance partners’ preparedness and protection as well as their identification of vulnerabilities and gaps and help partner countries to fight terrorism more effectively themselves. Counter-terrorism training, education, and support for capacity-building will be consistent with the objectives and priorities of NATO’s policy on partnerships.

NATO’s Response
The North Atlantic Council will guide NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts and implementation of these Policy Guidelines. The Terrorism Task Force will report on an annual basis on the implementation of these Policy Guidelines.

NATO will maintain flexibility as to how to counter terrorism, playing a leading or supporting role as required. Allies’ capabilities represent an essential component of a potential response to terrorism. Collective defense remains subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).