Danny Russel

08/06/2014

T.J. Pempel is Jack M. Forcey Professor of Political Science at the University of California-Berkeley, where he served as director of the Institute of East Asian Studies from 2002 until 2006. Before moving to Berkeley, he was at the University of Washington at Seattle, where he was the Boeing Professor of International Studies in the Jackson School of International Studies and an adjunct professor in Political Science. From 1972 to 1991, he was on the faculty at Cornell University; he was also Director of Cornell's East Asia Program. Professor Pempel's research and teaching focus on comparative politics, political economy, contemporary Japan, and Asian regionalism. His recent books include Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, and Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Does Japan exercising the right of collective self-defense amount to a dramatic shift, or one more incremental step toward Japan ‘normalizing’ security policy?

PEMPEL: I see two changes taking place under Prime Minister Abe. First: There are the security changes, and the gradual expansion of the interpretation of what the Self Defense Forces can do. This is very much part of changes that can be traced back at least to Prime Minister Koizumi, and in some ways probably all the way back to Nakasone. The decision to send SDF forces into Iraq; the decision to provide logistical support to the US in Afghanistan through vessel refueling; raising the status of the Defense Agency into a full-fledged ministry. These are all part of a series of logical, incremental changes that involve a larger role for the SDF.

Secondly, however, is that all of these changes are packed by Abe in an ideological wrapping paper involving reinterpretations of history.

This creates a problem. Abe is promoting the logical exercising of the right of collective self-defense at the same time that he is challenging the 1995 Murayama Statement on World War II responsibility, and the 1993 Kono Statement on Comfort Women. This creates a good deal of push-back from the Japanese public. It also generates a great deal of animosity in South Korea, and plays into the Chinese leadership’s efforts to legitimize the Communist Party by painting Japan as a resurgent military power.

Things would have gone a lot easier with regard to collective self-defense had Abe been focusing on the economy, delivering economic benefits, and treating collective self-defense as just one more effort to enhance Japan’s regional role as both an economic and military power. But Abe has been vehement in challenging Article 9, and dismissing the Constitution as an American document jammed down the throats of Japanese, which amounted to “victor’s justice.” All of this has made it very hard for the public, and the region as a whole, to accept any changes in collective self-defense, because it looks as if the change is part of a much broader nationalist package.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The Obama Administration was unusually vocal in supporting the Abe government’s adoption of collective self-defense, which likely gave a boost to Abe’s efforts. But Abe has contributed to worsening relations with Seoul, he won’t rule out another visit to Yasukuni, and he has yet to deliver on the TPP trade talks. Was it wise for the US to back Abe in this way?

PEMPEL: It reflects the internal ambivalence of the US on how to deal with China, and how to deal with the region. I am simplifying a bit, but in effect, the Pentagon sees the issues of security in East Asia through the lens of the military shift in power, the rise of Chinese military expenditures, and the threat from North Korea. For the Pentagon to support collective self-defense is very logical. It is great from their standpoint. They assume this will mean closer cooperation in defense and security planning between the SDF and the US, all of which bolsters the capacity of the US military in East Asia. There is no indication right now that Japan is likely to go in any direction other than the direction the Pentagon favors. That may be different at some point down the road, but for now, that is one side of the American reaction to China.

The flip side stems from US business and economic interests, which say that China’s growth is important, and the US should focus on further integration of the two economies. Those voices have been a bit drowned out, as the Pentagon has focused so intensely on the Chinese military challenge. This has gained priority, which has helped Abe to get an endorsement from the US on collective self-defense.

Simultaneously, because of the ideological wrapping paper Abe has placed around collective self-defense, the change really handicaps relations with South Korea, which is really problematic for the US. Korean President Park Geun-hye does not want anything to do with Abe. She is very animated by Abe’s challenges to the Kono Statement and the comfort women issue. That plays well with her domestic politics. And it gives China’s President Xi Jinping a chance to keep distance from Japan as well.

We have seen a freezing of the trilateral meetings between the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea that had been going on for quite a while. The discussion of a possible free trade area among the three has fallen flat. Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye have been dancing in the same room together, if not quite doing a sexy salsa together.

In some respects, Abe is pushing South Korea in a direction that the US is not very happy with.

The ideal for the US would be: Abe focuses on Japan’s economy, Japan slides gradually into a more expanded collective self-defense posture, but says very nice things to the other American allies in the region, and has a much more active role in Asian regional institutions, like the East Asia Summit. But Abe is not playing what I think would be the ideal American strategic game.

DISPATCH JAPAN: To what extent do you think it was inevitable that Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense?

PEMPEL: I am not a strong believer in inevitabilities, but the trend was certainly there since the end of the Cold War for Japan to take on an increasing role for its Self Defense Forces. The reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow for exercising the right of collective self-defense is a watershed moment that might not have needed to take on the drama that it did.

I think Japan could have slid into a de facto exercising of the collective self-defense right. The public might have been more willing to accept that. Abe chose to get on a bull horn. He originally proposed a revision of the Constitution but ran into push-back. He switched to reinterpreting Article 9, and began to push for a change in the traditional interpretation handed down by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). He put his own guy in charge of the CLB to help shift the traditional interpretation.

In my view, all of this unnecessarily sent up red flags, saying: “Look everyone. We are making a major change.” I think many of these changes could have moved along gradually.

Under Koizumi, for example, there was a greater degree of collective planning between the SDF and I Corps, the unit of the US Army that would play an important command role in the event of a contingency in the region. I Corps has since moved its headquarters from Ft. Lewis in Washington state to Camp Zama in Tokyo. This enhanced the interactive planning capabilities of the US and the SDF.

No one got terribly animated about this.

But Abe is firmly committed to a complete reinterpretation of Japan’s role in World War II, of what he sees as “victor’s justice” that treated Japan unfairly at the end of the war. He’s opposed to the current Constitution because it was written by Americans and, in his view, imposed on Japan.

For Abe, these are deep ideological commitments. Reinterpreting Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense is just part of a much larger goal. In his gut, Abe thinks the first thing Japan must do is overcome its sense of having done something wrong in World War II, and to rebuild a sense of patriotism.

Abe made a big public splash about collective self-defense because it is part of his aim to end what he calls the “postwar regime,” and restore Japan to its rightful role as a major player in regional and perhaps even global security affairs.

Collective self-defense itself could have been adopted more gradually through ongoing, incremental steps to reinterpret and expand the definition of what the SDF can do.

But Abe wanted to make it a very big, public issue. He’s done that, probably to his detriment politically.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Right. Polls show that the Japanese public, at best, is ambivalent about the exercising of collective self-defense. A majority remains opposed.

PEMPEL: It depends on how the polls are conducted, and interpreted. Sankei polls pose questions in a way designed to make it seem the public is supportive of Abe. Asahi and Mainichi generally formulate their poll questions differently. That said, it is clear the public is not rallying around Abe on the collective self-defense issue, in contrast to the way the public rallied behind the promises of Abenomics. When Abe first came back to office in late 2012, the public rallied behind him as he talked about economics. The initial enthusiasm seemed to boost the stock market. Consumption went up.

But then it began to seem that Abenomics had stalled because of the failure to deliver on structural reform, known as the “third arrow.” Abe did not focus on economics in the way he said he would. Instead, he was equally interested in promoting defense and security issues, and “historical revisionism” issues.

The public began to realize that Abe’s agenda was much more complicated than getting the economy going again. They’ve come to realize that while they would have liked a better economy, they are not quite sure Abe is really the guy to deliver it. And they are not sure that other items Abe is pushing are things they want to embrace.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do you expect collective self-defense to affect SDF roles and missions?

PEMPEL: My sense is that the new policy will not make a whole lot of difference for SDF operations, at least in the short –to-medium term. The SDF has its long term plans and strategies with respect to increased coordination with the US, the equipment it plans to buy, and increased participation in regional security exercises with other Asian nations.

I don’t think we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the missions the SDF takes on.

There certainly is no indication that the SDF budget is going to be radically ramped up to enhance its roles and missions.

We may see a lot of subtle things that are actually quite important. There may be a lot more coordinated interaction between the American military and the SDF. There could be coordinated joint flights, or joint naval operations in contested areas.

But I don’t see this as a fundamental shift. For example, I don’t think we are going to see six MSDF vessels steaming into areas around the Senkakus, guns ready to fire at Chinese fishing boats, or Chinese oceanographic exploration vessels, or anything of that sort.

What they have been doing up to now is likely to be a predictor of what they will be doing over the next 3-5 years.

DISPATCH JAPAN: My sense is that US commanders are mainly concerned about a Korean contingency, and that integration of information systems is the priority. For example, joint monitoring of North Korean submarines and aircraft.

PEMPEL: That would all be to the good. I don’t think Japan should be a pacifist Switzerland of the East, totally docile in the midst of an increasingly challenging security environment in the region.

It should very much be in the purview of the SDF to deal with immediate challenges or threats, such as North Korean aircraft or missiles, without having to go through the legislature. We can all remember the ridiculous arguments that some made in Japan that in the midst of a crisis – even an attack on Japan – the SDF would still have to abide by municipal regulations, such as transport vehicles having to stop at red lights.

Clearly, the military has to be able to respond to a crisis in a timely, immediate fashion.

But I share the concerns that many have voiced about the deterioration of Japan-ROK relations, and the trilateral US-Japan-ROK relationship.

Abe is also not helping US strategy to engage China while also hedging against China. With China, Abe paints things much too simplistically black and white. I don’t think he has even a remotely nuanced view of China. Right now, he sees China as an enemy, and a convenient tool to try to mobilize domestic support against growing Chinese military capabilities. He is not doing a very good job of integrating Japan-China cooperation on things like the environment, trade and investment, humanitarian relief operations, or other areas of common interest.

He sees China simply as a threat, and is appealing to the public in this way, which is an approach that sorely lacks nuance.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you expect to happen between Tokyo and Seoul?

PEMPEL: On some level, Abe understands that Japan has to get along with South Korea. He has constantly been talking about the importance of meeting with Park Geun-hye. But he doesn’t seem to realize that she does not want to meet just to meet. She has a very clear sense of who Abe is in the world of nationalist and revisionist politics in Japan, and what he has been doing that is very provocative to Korea. I think Abe is tone-deaf about this. It conflicts with his world view, what he thinks happened in World War II, and all the good things he thinks Japan did for Korea in the colonial era. They have very different views of history.

Abe wants reconciliation with Korea on his terms. To be fair, Park Geun-hye wants it on her terms. But I think her terms are a little less unreasonable than his are sometimes.

To the extent that Abe cannot acknowledge the role of the military in the comfort women system, he makes it very difficult for relations with Seoul to improve.

We all know that the history of prewar Japan is very complicated, and there are pluses and minuses. But Abe does not want to see any of the minuses.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any movement toward improvement?

PEMPEL: Not much. I spoke with Assistant Secretary Danny Russel the other day, and it is safe to say that Secretary of State Kerry really wants to see improvement in Japan-Korea relations. But brokering a deal between Japan and Korea at this point would be only slightly easier than brokering a deal between Hamas and Israel.

Right now, Park does not see the need for closer ties with Japan if that would mean somehow acceding to Abe’s view of history.

Things might be different if Abe were to stay away from Yasukuni for one year. It would even be better if he were to make a formal statement that he will not go there so long as he is prime minister. It would also help if he were to reassert the Murayama Statement and the Kono Statement, in effect to show significant accommodation to a Korean perspective, which I think is a more correct interpretation of Japan in the prewar war period. If we were to see Abe act in this way, I could see a visit between Abe and Park taking place.

But as of now, the conditions are not conducive to that happening. I don’t think an Abe-Park meeting is going to happen until Abe shows some real signs of shifting.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you think Abe is up to with Pyongyang?

PEMPEL: I think Abe, at least in part, is sending a message to Seoul that Japan can do some things with the North that Seoul may not like, and that Japan does not have to be confined by Seoul’s approach to the North. Abe used the abductee issue, even prior to his first term as prime minister, as a vehicle for mobilizing Japanese domestic support against any kind of normalization of relations with North Korea. Abe helped make the abductee issue a real thorn in the Six-Party Talks regarding the North’s nuclear weapons program.

I always thought Abe was over-playing the abductee issue. I never got the sense that there was hard and fast evidence that supported Japan’s position that Megumi was alive, or that there were hundreds of Japanese kidnapped.

For Abe to make this shift indicates something very different is going on.

North Korea is also the only country with UN membership with which Japan does not have diplomatic relations. The Foreign Ministry has long been pushing for some kind of improvement in ties with Pyongyang.

It is also a way for Abe to challenge China, which is the major player in North Korea. Beijing is not very happy with Pyongyang, but China has continued to pump money into North Korea, and remains Pyongyang’s only friend. Improved Japan-North Korea relations would send a message to Beijing that Pyongyang has other options than total dependence on China.

This is logically connected to Abe’s efforts to work with Russia. If Abe could make progress on the Northern Islands dispute, and resolve the abductee issue, he is going to look very good inside Japan.

This complicates things for the US. Washington continues to try to isolate Russia, and even though Japan has imposed sanctions, Abe has not closed the door to pursuing Japan-Russia talks. And with North Korea, the US priority very much remains denuclearization, with tough sanctions playing an important role.

Japan is clearly going off on its own with respect to Russia and North Korea, as far as the US is concerned.

The Obama Administration has a fairly nuanced view of how the pieces in East Asia have to be moved to enhance stability. This means multiple tools, part military, part hedging, part engagement.

Abe is much less nuanced.

He seems to think that Japan improving ties with North Korea and Russia will tweak the noses of Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye, and in his view that would be a good thing.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe seems to really want to meet Xi Jinping.

PEMPEL: Yes, he wants the meeting. He wants to be seen within the region and the global community as the guy who is somehow actively solving various diplomatic problems.

I don’t see it as being in Xi’s interest to meet Abe at this time. Japan is a great foil for Xi within his domestic political circumstance. The internet just explodes inside China every time Japan does something outlandish, such as a prime minister visiting Yasukuni, or a politician or textbook challenging the veracity of the Nanjing Massacre.

Xi is doing his best to develop a nuanced relationship with South Korea.

For different reasons, Xi and Park are convinced that Abe provides them a very convenient foil against which to play domestic politics, and to improve the China-ROK relationship.

I do not see a Xi-Abe meeting in the short-term. The economic ties between Japan and China will not be sufficient for Xi to give up the card of portraying Japan as hostile.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The irony is that on a tactical level, collective self-defense will enhance the operational effectiveness of the alliance. But strategically, it can be argued that Abe really complicates US strategy in the region.

PEMPEL: That’s right. Collective self-defense is not happening in isolation. Under Abe, the policy emerged as part of his revisionist view of history, and his nationalist perspective on Japan’s future. For Abe, it is part of a package, which makes it much more complicated in the region.

Militarily, collective self-defense is a very good idea, and is a logical extension of the direction Japan has been moving in for quite some time. But because Abe has put the policy in a heavily-ideological wrapping paper, it is a hard package for South Korea and China, and for much of the Japanese public, to accept.

04/29/2013

Mark
Lippert, the assistant secretary of defense for Asia and one of President
Barack Obama’s closest friends, was close by Chuck Hagel today when the US
defense secretary met in Washington with his Japanese counterpart, Defense
Minister Itsunori Onodera.

In a few
days, Lippert will still be at Hagel’s side, but no longer as head of the Pentagon’s
Asia shop. Hagel announced 10-days ago that he had asked Lippert to be his
chief of staff, a move widely-seen in Washington as beneficial to the
Administration because it should ensure smooth communication between the White
House and the Pentagon. The move takes effect on May 1.

Lippert
is not only close to Obama, but came to know Hagel well when Obama and Hagel
formed a strong bond while serving together in the US Senate.

But what
of the Administration’s much-ballyhooed “rebalancing” of US strategic posture
toward Asia? Who is running that show?

Lippert’s
move to the Pentagon’s front office leaves two of the Administration’s top
three Asia policy positions empty. Earlier this year, the influential Kurt
Campbell departed after four years as assistant secretary of State for East
Asia, and he has yet to be replaced.

At the
National Security Council, the senior director for Asia, Danny Russel, is on loan from
the State Department, and is reportedly in the running to be Campbell’s
replacement. That would seemingly solve one problem but create another: a
vacancy at the NSC, which is arguably the most influential of the three
Asia-related posts in an administration that tends to centralize
decision-making in the White House.

Some
analysts argue that these vacancies are not all that important because the core
of the Administration’s Asia policy – the “rebalancing” – is set in stone, and
run from the very top by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and President
Obama himself. Both the Pentagon and State Department have highly-competent staffs
in the respective Asia shops, fully capable of managing day-to-day affairs.
And, largely because of heightened
tensions with North Korea, high-ranking Administration officials, including Secretary
of State John Kerry, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, and Joint Chiefs
of Staff Chairman General Martin Dempsey, recently have spent considerable time
in region.

Others
warn that the effectiveness of policy in Asia is tied to the credibility with
which senior American officials named to top Asia policy posts are viewed by
governments in the region. From this standpoint, the Obama administration is
falling woefully short by leaving key positions unfilled.

Take the
recent alarming deterioration in relations between two key US allies in East
Asia, Japan and South Korea. Critics, of which there are many, argue that Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has unnecessarily exacerbated the tensions by encouraging
visits by Japanese law-makers to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and with his
accompanying nationalist rhetoric.

The
State Department was sufficiently disturbed that it recently summonsed a
diplomat from Japan’s Embassy in Washington to informally register the
Administration’s concern.

Still,
it remains unclear if Abe is fully aware of the unhappiness in Washington,
which has led to a lot of discussion among Asia specialists that the
Administration would be wise to use quiet but firm diplomatic means to ensure
that the message gets directly to Abe and his inner circle. That, in turn,
raises the question of who in the Obama Administration would have the
“political juice” to effectively deliver the message.

One
former government official who remains in close contact with Asia Hands in the
administration says: “Strong communication through private channels is really
needed, but I can’t think of who a credible interlocutor would be for Tokyo,
especially since Lippert is moving up and out of the Asia business. The
Administration has clearly not invested in relationships in Tokyo that put them
inside the political decision-making loop.”

When
relations with Tokyo are running smoothly, there is usually a senior official
at the NSC, the State Department, or the Pentagon who is in daily contact with
the Chief Cabinet Secretary, or a deputy chief cabinet secretary, in Tokyo,
ensuring that messages at the highest level travel back-and-forth unhindered.
That is not the case right now.

At the
Pentagon, it’s widely believed that the acting assistant secretary for Asia,
Peter Lavoy, will be nominated as Lippert’s permanent successor. Lavoy, who is
a South Asia specialist, is highly-respected for his professionalism and
expertise. But he is not considered a heavyweight in policy-making circles.

At
State, the nomination of Russel as Campbell’s permanent replacement is now considered
a foregone conclusion, though Secretary of State Kerry is reportedly resisting
White House pressure, hoping instead to name his own person. Russel, who has
been with the Obama NSC from the beginning, has been senior director for Asia
since 2011, and is favored by President Obama’s inner circle.

A move
by Russel to State would not be problem-free. While highly-respected for his
expertise, especially in Japan and Korean affairs, Russel is said by numerous
Foreign Service colleagues to be very political, with a knack for forming tight
bonds with political appointees. His presence as chief of the East Asia bureau
could create an awkward working situation with the bureau’s top career
specialist, Jim Zumwalt. Also a Japan and Korea expert, Zumwalt is technically senior
to Russel within the Foreign Service.

Moreover,
with Caroline Kennedy reportedly in line to be the next US Ambassador to Japan,
the US Embassy in Tokyo would need a strong deputy chief of mission. Reports
are already circulating at State that Zumwalt could be asked, for the “benefit
of the Service,” to return to Tokyo as DCM.

(After the initial publication of this report, Mr. Zumwalt forwarded the following comment: "We have an extremely competent DCM in Tokyo: Kurt Tong.
He is doing a great job, and we have every confidence that he will help the new
Ambassador to Japan get off to a strong start. I have no plans to leave
my present job in Washington.")

Meanwhile,
a Russel move to the State Department would open up the top Asia spot at the
NSC. National Security advisor Tom Donilon presumably would want to name a
strong, trusted person to that key post. Within the tight fraternity of Asia
specialists in Washington, it is anyone’s guess who that might be.

09/23/2011

It may be too soon to raise any diplomatic red flags, but there are troubling signs of potentially serious tension emerging between Washington and Tokyo over stalled plans to construct a new US Marine facility in Okinawa.

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda held a briefing for reporters earlier today (Friday), and denied reports that President Barack Obama had pressed for “results” on the new facility, set to be built in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa as a replacement for the existing US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been targeted for closure for well over a decade. Obama and Noda met on Wednesday, while both were in New York for the UN General Assembly.

During the briefing, Noda was asked directly whether Obama had spoken of expected “results.” He responded first with a gesture, tilting his head to indicate disagreement with the question, and then said: “We explained our position. We made clear our plan to move forward on the agreement reached by the two governments, and I explained that we will reduce the burden on Okinawa, and that we have to work hard to not fix the status quo of Futenma’s continuing operation, and that we will talk to Okinawa with a sincere heart. Then we received an answer: ‘We are looking forward to progress.’”

Noda was pressed by another reporter, who quoted a US official – Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell – as having said Obama “made very clear” that “we need to see results.” Again, Noda denied this, saying: “I think the answer was: ‘We are looking forward to progress.’”

Here’s the problem: The reporter quoted Campbell accurately. In a press briefing held Wednesday following the Noda-Obama meeting, Campbell had this to say about the exchanges concerning Futenma: “We all acknowledged the challenges associated with Futenma replacement. But I think both sides understand that we’re approaching a period where we need to see results, and that was made very clear by the President.”

At the press briefing, Campbell was joined by Danny Russel, the top White House aide for Asia, who added: “On the issue of Futenma, Prime Minister Noda brought the President up to date on the Noda government position and strategy for moving forward on Futenma’s replacement facility, and both leaders shared the view that this is a priority and that there’s a great deal of important work that needs to be done. So the emphasis is on common ground and on a common effort to achieve our common goals.”

Complicating the situation is that a top Japanese official who briefed reporters after the Noda-Obama meeting indicated that Obama said that “results” are needed and that he hopes to see “progress.”

This may seem a bit of tedious, if not petty, diplomatic nuance. But it was less than two years ago that a disagreement over the content of an exchange between President Obama and then-Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama over the very same Futenma issue sparked one of the more tense incidents between the two countries in the postwar period. At the time, Hatoyama urged Obama to “trust me,” that Tokyo would try to find a resolution to the Futenma embroilment as soon as possible. But when Hatoyama later indicated that this was not necessarily a commitment to implement the existing bilateral accord to construct the replacement facility at Henoko, Hillary Clinton took the highly-unusual step of summoning Japan’s ambassador, Ichiro Fujisaki, for a dressing-down at the State Department – in the midst of a blizzard that had otherwise crippled Washington.

At the time, the incident severely frayed trust between the White House and the Kantei, and the subsequent chilly treatment accorded Hatoyama by Washington contributed to the demise of his cabinet a few months later.

THE VIEW FROM TOKYO: What’s on Noda’s mind? Japanese officials interpreted Obama’s demeanor in the New York meeting as unusually business-like. One official who was inside the meeting reports that Obama began with a systematic listing of those bilateral issues that need a quick resolution. That was followed by the Campbell-Russel press conference, the tone of which also took Japanese officials by surprise. Correctly or not, they say they detected a hardening of Campbell’s stance, in sharp contrast to what they saw as deliberate State Department efforts to play down the Futenma issue since Hatoyama’s 2010 resignation.

Noda’s comments came on the heels of a statement by Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa that conveyed no small hint of irritation at the perceived hectoring tone of Campbell’s remarks. “When it comes to the Okinawa issue,” Ichikawa told reporters in Tokyo on Thursday, “both sides carry responsibility. It would be awkward if the two sides were to not show an attitude of working together in a harmonious manner.” Ichikawa is already on record saying that the Noda government, while committed to the Henoko plan, has no intention of imposing a deadline on talks with Okinawa aimed at winning acquiescence.

Noda and Ichikawa each have personal motivations that could help explain their respective comments following the talks with Obama. Every prime minister of Japan wants to demonstrate the ability to skillfully manage the critical US-Japan alliance, so the last perception Noda wants to take hold is that he is being pushed around by Washington. And Ichikawa, who is close to Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) power broker Ichiro Ozawa, sympathizes with the view that Japan should be more forthright in expressing disagreements with Washington.

But beyond Noda and Ichikawa, a much broader array of Japanese foreign policy and political leaders are aware that the Pentagon and the White House are encountering serious obstacles to implanting the US side of the bilateral deal for Marine base realignment on Okinawa and Guam. Key members of the US Senate – Democrats Carl Levin and Jim Webb, and Republican John McCain -- have raised both budgetary and strategic concerns about the realignment plan, which could cost upwards of $20 billion. The Senate’s Appropriations Defense Subcommittee has already moved to strip the 2012 Defense budget of $155 million for construction programs on Guam designed to help pave the way for the transfer of some 8,000 Marines and family members from Okinawa.

Since Hatoyama’s resignation, the DPJ overall has been determined to allow no light between the US and Japanese sides on the Futenma issue, lest the party’s leader suffer a fate similar to that of the ex-prime minister.

Awareness of troubles on the American side has apparently allowed to seep out some of the repressed frustration in Tokyo with US demands to move ahead with the Futenma replacement project despite seemingly insurmountable opposition on Okinawa.

The Pentagon and White House have, until recently, pretended to ignore Congressional opposition to the Okinawa base realignment plan. The entire plan was initially scheduled for completion by 2014, but the two sides earlier this year acknowledged the obvious by stating the deadline would not be met. The US has placed blame for implementation delays squarely on Tokyo’s inability to overcome opposition on Okinawa, even though rising costs and construction delays on Guam have been equally responsible.

During his recent confirmation hearings to be the new deputy defense secretary, Ashton Carter received extensive briefings from Senator Levin, who chairs the powerful Armed Services Committee, and Senator Webb, who chairs the Asia subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. Webb in particular explained to Carter that overtures to alter the Okinawa base realignment plan will have to come from Washington, since Tokyo will be reluctant to risk antagonizing the US by indicating a weakening of support for the existing bilateral agreement.

WASHINGTON MISSING AN OPPORTUNITY: It’s unclear how much of the briefing material received by Carter has made it up to President Obama. In any case, part of the apparent White House impatience stems from a desire for Japan to be fully in tune with a strategic vision for East Asia that President Obama hopes to highlight during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hawaii in November. Part of that involves the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks, which Campbell emphasized during his New York press briefing are intended more as a strategic rather than a mere trade policy. Noda has indicated personal support for TPP, but there is no consensus yet in Japan about whether to fully participate. And part of the vision involves the US and Japan standing shoulder-to-should on alliance and regional security issues, something that is made more difficult the longer the Futenma controversy persists.

Ironically, impending major reductions in US defense spending, including likely cutbacks in overseas basing as well as personnel reductions, will almost surely impact the US force structure and basing arrangements in East Asia, including Okinawa. That could provide a face-saving chance for the US to propose a rethinking of the current plan for base realignment on Okinawa.

Unless that happens, the tension in the alliance over Okinawa that seems to be reemerging will only grow.