SOME NOTES ON THE DEBATE IN
PSYCHOLOGY
ALLAN R. ANDREWS*

From: JASA 19 (June
1967): 50-52.The recent debate concerning the criticism of
contemporary psychology and the proposal of a new approach carried on in JASA by
Finch1 and Mecherikoff and Walker2 is unfortunate, yet necessary.

It is necessary because it reflects the tenor of contemporary theorizing and the so-called clash between
experimentalists" and "clinicians". It is unfortunate
because, on both sides, it reflects a lack of understanding and awareness of the opposing point of view; an
attitude that also characterized much of the contemporary psychological scene.

Several points
can be noted affirmatively in a
quick survey of the Mecherikoff and Walker article.
The authors are correct in criticizing Finch for his
misplaced emphasis on Descartes and Hegel in the
light of what "logical positivism" means to the contemporary experimental psychologist. John Locke or
Rudolf Carnap would better represent the experimentalist's precursors. They further point out that Finch
does indeed make a straw man attack on Behavior
theory via Watson and Freud, neither of whom are
staunchly defended by either Behaviorist or current
psychoanalysts. Both, to be sure, are strongly revered
in their respective camps, but both are heavily modified in the formulations of contemporary theorists. It
is true also that Finch makes an unguarded transition
from psychology to psychotherapy, perhaps unaware
of the experimentalist's tendency to pounce on such
transfer as "illegitimate" and "unscientific". Any graduate student in Psychology could have served warning
about this attempt, for it has become a comical anomaly, in most universities, to pursue research in
psychotherapy outside the limits of counter-conditioning or
other learning theoretical paradigms.

On the other hand, several points should be made
in defense of Finch. While I do not wish to engage in
thinking another man's thoughts and errantly defending his intentions, I believe a careful reading of Finch
makes it clear that he does not reduce the issue to "...a choice which psychology must
make",3 but
rather he suggests very succinctly that "a more comprehensive approach seems
necessary".4 The misunderstanding comes because Finch believes the existential
approach looks more promising for the Christian, while

*Allan R. Andrews is a Graduate assistant in the Department
of Psychology, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Mecherikoff and Walker see in psychology as a natural science the more profitable path to follow.

In this paper I hope to present a few valid reasons
for agreeing with the temperament expressed by Finch while showing that the path of Mecherikoff and
Walker, though perhaps not a "Procrustean bed", and assuredly of great value to the study of man, is committed, by definition, to a truncated view of human
nature. In this effort I shall repeatedly direct attention to a very readable recent publication entitled,
Humanistic Viewpoints in Psychology, edited by Frank T. Severin5, which does the great service of collecting the
disjointed viewpoints that have been heretofore making sporadic appearances in the psychological literature.

The basic presupposition of Mecherikoff and Walker is that psychology is a natural science. They are careful to emphasize this point, though they are careful
also to skirt the serious debate that centers on this very point. It is traditional to include psychology in the
social sciences, but in actual academic procedure the discipline is modeled after physics and treated as a natural science. It is this very basic issue which needs to be clarified, for it is not at all clear that the scientific method as applied in physics is applicable to the
social sciences. Mecherikoff and Walker make the point that "other natural sciences may also be so crit
icized (i.e., as Finch has done)
",6
but the very word "other" which they employ does not square with the basic issue, namely, is the data-base of
psychology amenable to the methods of natural science?

It is at this juncture that Finch's discussion of
Descartes and Hegel may have relevance, though he
would better have mentioned Skinner, Spence or Hull, for the problem of the
experimenters involvement in his experiment (i.e., what Finch calls eliminating the
very subject data under study, viz., the knower himself) is a real problem. It amounts to giving a precise
definition of psychology, the usual one being, the science of behavior. Is the experimenter, in his laboratory
performing an experiment, a unit of behavior, and as such a valid unit of study for psychology? Is the experimenter eliminated from consideration when he is
observing the operant behavior of a pigeon? The answer to this question will help define psychology. Carl
Rogers, framing the question as "Persons or Science?",7 says of the experimenter, if he is to be a good
scientist, he immerses himself in the relevant experience, . . ."
We might ask, does psychology study man in his
uniqueness, his individuality, his human being-ness, his
personal reality, or does it limit itself to the study of
man in vitro? The phenomenological approach to the
data ordinarily considered to be the data of psychology; what Finch calls a "logos of the human psyche";
is much more encompassing than the discipline modeled after physics. in physics, man, by definition, is
objectified from the data of his discipline, but can this
be true in psychology?

Considering the humanness of physicists, Severin
points out that "Einstein, Heisenberg, and other twentieth century physicists . . . have been forced to the
realization that a scientist arrives at his theory speculatively".9 Rogers concurs with the generalization that
".
. . throughout the use of such rigorous and impersonal methods, the important choices are all made subjectively by the
scientist".10 This then is also the bulk
of Finch's plea to "Recognize the limitations of the
scientific method, derive from it all the information
possible, but under no circumstances limit the subject
of knowledge to its methodology".11

It is significant that Mecberikoff and Walker do
not address themselves to the Finch discussion of the
spirit. They criticize Finch's view as "a proposition unconnected to specific procedures for testing its validity or applying it in
practice",12 but this is precisely the
fault of viewing psychology as a natural science and
imposing the scientific method. It says, in effect, that
what lies outside the verification of the senses is not
real. Here is the contemporary carry-over of logical
positivism and Watsonian Behaviorism; it eliminates
from its data-corpus man in his loving, dreaming, hoping, creating, hating, fearing, dying and his praying.
Along the lines of a more comprehensive definition of
psychology, Abraham Maslow writes, "my definition of a psychologist is broad but specific
...
those - and
only those - who are interested in developing a truer,
clearer, more empirical conception of human nature".13
He goes even further by laying down lines for the
discipline to follow, "Psychology should turn more frequently to the study of philosophy, of science, of aesthetics, and especially of ethics and
values".14

Mecherikoff and Walker provide (themselves) what
may be the most pertinent criticism of psychology as
a natural science. They emphasize that "it is important
to note that psychology as a natural science cannot (nor
does it attempt to) comprehend the full stature of man".15 This is the key to a definition of psychology,
for in its dogmatic, mechanistic, sense-bound empincism, psychology as a natural science does indeed attempt to comprehend the full stature of man and the
classic outworkings of such assumptions are found in
B. F. Skinner's novel, Walden T
wo.16
Granted, Skinner
does not speak for all psychologists, but his narrow
definition of scientific psychology is widespread. The
irony of the experimentalist's rigid position is noted by
Adrian van Kaam, "to declare that only those propositions of psychologists make sense
which can be experimentally verified is one of the most sweeping assumptions one can think of because it contains a definite and irrevocable judgment concerning all possibilities of human knowledge and their relationship to
what is knowable".17

The behavior theorists of contemporary psychology have insisted, like Mecherikoff and Walker, that
psychology be defined as the science of behavior. This
definition, however, needs careful examination. When
considering the word "behavior" there are not only
problems of inclusion of the experimenter but also
the implicit assumption that one can approach specifically human behavior with the inherited subject-object
model of the natural sciences. These problems are
closely related, to be sure, and are the topics of a very
important work by Stephan Strasser, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.18
Strasser argues that it is
of the nature of the human sciences (which includes
psychology) to operate from a subject-subject model
with the experimenter acting, not as a "disinterested
spectator", but as an "understanding witness".19

The accepted definition also tends to delimit the
definition of science by reducing it to a certain methodology. If one allows, however, for defining science as
a systematic discipline there is provision for the possibility of an empirical human science; a human science
which avoids the reductionistic, objectivistic approach
that follows the model of the natural sciences. The
growing existential emphasis in contemporary psychology, when properly understood, is not a sell-out to
Sartre, but is rather a disciplined approach to the
study of man.20

Finch, with interests in the applied branch of the
field, is not cautious in his discussion and Mecherikoff
and Walker are quick to question his alignment of
psychotherapy and psychology. The attitude that would
prohibit such a transition would prefer that psychotherapy be carried on in the manner of Wolpe's technique of reciprocal inhibition, which is a therapeutic
extension of the subject-object approach and a strongly manipulative procedure. It is of the very warp and
woof of clinical psychology to be involved in research
with an n of one. Furthermore, it is this one-to-one
relationship which must essentially be considered a
subject-subject relationship rather than one of subjectobject. Granted, Wolpe's method effects its "cures", it
is, neverthless, founded in the implicit view of man
which says "to understand this world, one must be
like unto it - objective, impersonal, mathematical, precise".21 Such a world simply does not exist for the
clinician and his human subjects. It is from the clinic
that most of the existential literature found its impetus, and there is a growing tendency to note that
the clinician is more of an artist than a scientist, but
such a labeling does not eliminate him from consideration as a disciplined
psychologist.22

It must be affirmed that in a discipine which deals
with the problems of human love, hate, creativity,
anxiety, etc., one cannot dismiss clinical psychology as
unscientific simply because it does not fit into a specific research paradigm. The work of Viktor Frankl
and his Vienna Polyklinik, together with the phenomenological work of the Lexington, Kentucky group stand
as examples of a rigorously defined scientific approach
to the problems of psychotherapy, existing outside the
objectivist attitude. While Finch may have made an
unwary transition, the greater error lies with Mecherikoff and Walker who exhibit the widespread closedmindedness of the objectivist orientation by questioning the status of psychotherapeutic research.

While these notes are not the place for an extensive treatment of the phenomenological-existential approach, several observations are pertinent to the debate under consideration.

First, the so-called "third approach", while it is
indeed heavily critical of much of traditional psychology, recognizes the value of such a differential approach and feels that many insights can be gained for
the human sciences via the current research trends.
Secondly, it recognizes the dangers of a pure subjectivism with which it, at times, seems closely aligned.
van Kaam summarizes the matter thusly,

The assumptions of phenomenological-existential psychologists are of as great a variety as those
of the positivistic psychologists. . . . They are the
counterpart in psychology of the new assumptions
of the quantum physicists and existential philosophers. Becoming, creativity, growth, self-actualization are terms which more or less indicate in which
direction these assumptions are developing.23

The goal of the human sciences is an understanding of
the human person through rigorous, disciplined study
of the experiential, behavioral relations of man as apprehended by other persons.

For the Christian there is the ever present danger
that such a human science will develop outside the
consideration of a man's relationship to God. The current trend is one which builds its structure on the insights pertaining to human nature which are gathered
from the existential philosophers. Tension for the Christian will arise when these insights are in direct opposition to the Biblical perspective to which he is committed. Nevertheless, the avenue which the trend is
taking seems much more aligned in its analysis to a
view that would emerge from a Biblical anthropology.

These notes seek to consider the points of contention between Finch1 and Mecherikoff and
Walker2 as
they reflect the situation in contemporary psychology.
While not in full agreement with Finch, they seek to
counter some of the criticisms made by Mecberikoff
and Walker by examining the definition of psychology
as the science of behavior. This examination attempts
to show that Mecherikoff and Walker err in the direction of an objectivist and therefore truncated view of
man. These notes further seek to defend psychotherapy
as a science with a subject-subject corpus of data and
points to the insights of the rising phenomenological-existential trend as a possible heuristic stimulus for a
psychological theory based on a biblical anthropology.