Preparing for the worst

Shock. Disbelief. Anger. Nationalistic fervour. The moods ran the gauntlet in Pakistan’s ruling circles as it faced the grim challenge wrought by the Mumbai attacks.

One of the most keenly debated events has been the statement of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in which he referred to the foreign fingerprints on these attacks and resolved to talk tough with India’s neighbours. Pakistan’s foreign office, half of whose experts were in India along with Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, did not miss the “uncharacteristically harsh tone in which the Indian prime minister expressed himself”.

The other angle of the speech that came under scrutiny was the promptness with which Manmohan came on air and spoke in definitive terms about the culprits. “Some of us did see it in the light of the political pressure that the Mumbai attacks had put on Manmohan’s Government, and that too in an election year.

PM Gilani (centre) with Nawaz Sharif (2nd from left), Fazl-Ur-Rehman (second from right), and Chaudhary Shujaat Hussa in (right) at an all-party meetHowever, there was a part of the statement that was not directed at the people of India, but specifically towards the international community with regard to India’s assessment of where the attacks came from. To us this was the heart of the matter,” said a foreign office source.

There is little evidence to suggest that the assessments of the events in India had been exchanged between Pakistan’s institutions. The army high command watched much of the Mumbai attacks from their offices, while the intelligence apparatus was deputed to “monitor every single word” on the attacks.

Intelligence sources admit that other than television there was little they had to “determine who and what would have caused the attacks”. Preliminary reports, according to these sources, did, however, suggest that the attacks were “very sophisticated and those who were using the weapons were trained hands”. A significant portion of the reports was devoted to the “internal groups’ involvement and the role of Indian Mujahideen led by Abdul Subhan Qureshi alias Tauqeer. “The man is known as the Indian bin Laden and has two groups (Akhwan and Ansar) under his command,” says one report.

More significantly, these reports, that were sent to the Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani, President Asif Ali Zardari, and Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, also included the possibility of “sharp reprisals from India in case further attacks were to unfold elsewhere in the country”. The reports recommended a state of high alert on the border, recommending all-time vigil by the air force. It was in the light of these reports that the Pakistan Army chose to send a message that in case tensions mount on the eastern border the entire focus would shift to that area leaving the war against terrorism on the western border in tatters.

“This message was sent out essentially to the US to pre-empt the possibility of a sharp escalation in military tensions. From the results we can say that it did work,” said a senior military official. The US intervention was, however, heavily predicated on the assurance from Pakistan of “full cooperation in investigations”. It is unclear whether at this point a full exchange of notes took place between the presidency and the GHQ. In all probability it did not happen. And that was the reason that a public statement by Gilani about the visit of the ISI director-general to India had to be retracted.

Military sources deny that this issue caused a spat between the army and the Government. “Yes the commitment was given, but it was the foreign office that later suggested that the DG ISI’s presence at this point in time in India involved the problem of his diplomatic immunity. This factor forced the change in stance,” said a senior military source.

These initial fumbles seem to have now settled down into more organised decision-making. The President, army chief and prime minister have been holding late night meetings where daily briefings are given and notes exchanged and coordinated. It was this effort that led to the call for an all-parties conference on national security where politicians of all hues extended unqualified support to the Government. But in practical terms, nationalist rhetoric does not materially change the situation much. Sources close to Zardari say that the Mumbai attack has created a nightmare scenario for his Government. “We can sense the pressure mount on Pakistan from all sides,” said a Zardari aide.

This pressure stems from a feeling that the hawks in the US administration might seize this opportunity to build a case for de-nuclearising Pakistan. The sequence of this fear is that India might coordinate aerial strikes with the US on terror targets in urban areas, forcing Pakistan to rattle its nuclear saber. “That is the point where the US would invoke the right of pre-emptive strike against Pakistan’s nuclear installations, extending NATO support to India. Pakistan could be presented with the option of either facing a three-dimensional nuclear strike or rolling back its nuclear programme,” says a senior military official. That might sound far-fetched, but it is one measure of how taut nerves are in Islamabad.

It is a result of this informal but regular coordination that Zardari has taken a stand on the list of 20 persons wanted by India that is consistent with Pakistan’s standard position: no evidence, no processing the request. This puts Zardari on a tightrope: to be seen as cooperating with India but sticking to his stance in the domestic arena.