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Iran's Mullahs Have a Vote

By ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

November 24, 2013

Too many American chaise-lounge bombardiers, condemning the substance of the interim nuclear agreement reached with Iran this weekend in Geneva, ignore or dismiss the consequences of the likely price of diplomatic failure—a U.S. attack on Iran. Discussing that daunting prospect as if it were a video game, they use terms like “surgical strike” and “limited military engagement” to suggest that such a U.S.-Iran confrontation would be successful, decisive and over in a hurry. The day after, in their estimation, would look pretty much like the day before. Such strident advocacy ignores one crucial variable—the reaction to an American attack by the Iranian leadership. The mullahs have the decisive vote on what would happen next.

If the United States attacked, Iran would face a decisive and far-reaching choice: Respond in a fashion that sought to avoid escalation of the conflict and maximize its perception in world opinion as the innocent and aggrieved victim of American anti-Islamic aggression, or react in ways that make a prolonged conflict more likely. What enthusiast for bombing Iran can confidently foretell the answer to that question?

It’s easier said than done. In February 2012, Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described Iran as a “rational actor,” and as super-strategist Thomas Schelling has emphasized, “You can sit in your armchair and try to predict how people will behave by asking how you would behave if you had your wits around you.”

But, more or less using that technique, the United States has continually been surprised by the actions of other governments and leaders, including Adolf Hitler in the 1930s, Japan at Pearl Harbor, Fidel Castro during the Bay of Pigs, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the fall of the shah in Iran, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Taliban revival in Afghanistan, Bashar Assad’s ability to remain in power in Syria, and so on. Thus, beware of those who forecast with supreme overconfidence a minimalist reaction by Tehran.

To list possible Iranian reactions—especially in a prolonged clash—is not to predict them but to stress that the United States should be ready to deal with all of them. Nor is this menu meant to support a U.S. policy of containment regarding Iranian nuclear weapons, which would be deeply destabilizing both in the region and globally. As Louis Pasteur observed, “Fortune favors the prepared mind.” An Iranian escalatory ladder might look something like this:

Begin immediately to accelerate, rebuild, disperse and hide its nuclear facilities with even more determination to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to future U.S. attacks, leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors.

Persuade or coerce selected Muslim countries to positively restructure their relations with Iran, taking advantage of anti-American public opinion in the context of the Arab Awakening.

Encourage domestic unrest in Arab nations friendly to the United States.

Publicly advocate and secretly promote violence against American facilities and citizens throughout the Muslim world.

Increase material support for Taliban operations against U.S. forces in Afghanistan and radical Shia terrorism against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in Iraq.

Attack U.S. military and oil installations in the Persian Gulf.

Attack U.S. warships and mine the Gulf, attempt to close the Straits of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil trade passes.

Instigate terrorist actions against U.S. government and commercial targets around the globe, including the U.S. homeland.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, speaking on state TV on March 20, 2012, said all of Iran’s conventional firepower was ready to respond to any attack. “But against an attack by enemies—to defend ourselves either against the U.S. or Zionist regime—we will attack them on the same level that they attack us.” Given Washington’s weak predictive record and the fog of war in conditions of incomplete information, it seems wise for contingency purposes to take Khamenei at his word and then some.

Any responsible American president must do everything prudently possible to avoid such a U.S.-Iran military confrontation, including by rejecting negotiating prescriptions in which Tehran would have to agree to freeze or roll back its domestic enrichment while Washington would offer no relief on sanctions. That would most probably be a recipe for war. This weekend’s result in Geneva should be measured not only against an ideal outcome but also against the alternative of U.S. military conflict with Iran. In that context, this is a deal worth supporting.

Winston Churchill said it best, “The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events…incompetent or arrogant commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant fortune, ugly surprise, awful miscalculations.”

Robert Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was deputy national security adviser for strategic planning and ambassador to India in the George W. Bush administration.