Although no one can predict exactly how Díaz-Canel will
respond to these challenges, there is no denying that change is on the horizon.
The United States and other outside actors will not determine the nature or the
timing of these changes. They can, however, create a climate in which reform is
easier. Strategies of U.S. engagement that recognize Cuban sovereignty and
resist calling for regime change will reduce the risks to Díaz-Canel of
undertaking more significant changes.

There is a fine line between caution and passivity, but this
line is one the United States must successfully walk. There will be strong
resistance to a foreign presence, and the possibility of blowback is very real.
The United States can and must play a role in Cuban democratization, but it
cannot create it.

The policy of the United States toward Cuba has been remarkably
consistent for decades, but has never achieved its stated goals, namely regime change
and democratization. There is no way to predict when a political opening will
occur, and it is highly unlikely the United States will be the motor of change,
but we have laid out the optimal ways of addressing regime change when it
occurs. The most effective responses will be constructive, measured, and
multilateral, but active. These are not terms usually associated with U.S.
policy toward Cuba, but they are central to a new post-Castro relationship.

The United States government is terrible at learning from past foreign policy mistakes. Our policy toward Cuba has almost always been an abject failure, not only not achieving its goals but actually making us worse off and even harming our own national security. Forgive the cliche, but this is literally an historic moment in Cuban politics and we seem poised to screw it up, perhaps even via tweets.