In 1999, he authored the book, Betrayal of East Pakistan, where he provided his "own true version of the events of that fateful year."[9] On 1 February 2004, Niazi died in Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan .[10]

During this period, the 14th Army had halted the offense against the Japanese Imperial Army at the Battle of Imphal and elsewhere in bitterly fought battles along the Burma front.[11] His valor of actions were commendable and General Slim described his gallantry in a lengthy report to General Headquarters, India, about his judgment of the best course of action.[11] They agreed on Niazi's skill in completely surprising the enemy, his leadership, coolness under fire, and his ability to change tactics, create diversions, extricate his wounded and withdraw his men.[11] At the Burmese front in 1944, Lt. Niazi impressed his superior officers when he commanded a platoon that initiated an offense against the Japanese Imperial Army at the Bauthi-Daung tunnels.[11]

Lt. Niazi's gallantry had impressed his British commanders in the GHQ India and they wanted to award him the Distinguished Service Order, but his rank was not high enough for such a decoration.[11] During the campaign, Brigadier D.F.W. Warren, commanding officer of the 161st Infantry Division of the British Army, gave Niazi the soubriquet "Tiger" for his part in a ferocious fight with the Japanese.[11] After the conflict, the British Government decorated Lt. Niazi with the Military Cross for leadership, judgement, quick thinking and calmness under pressure in action along the border with Burma.[11] On July 11, 1944, his military commission was confirmed as permanent and the new service number was issued as ICO-906.[3]:12[self-published source?]

His career in the army progressed well and continue to climb up to the army grades 1950s as he was decorated with the Sitara-i-Khidmat (lit. Service Star) for his contribution and service with the army.[16] In 1960–64, he was promoted as Brigadier and offered discussion on infiltration tactics at the Command and Staff College.[13] Subsequently, he published an article on infiltration and promoted talks on military-supported local rebellion against the enemy.[13]

Brigadier Niazi went on to participate in the second war with India in 1965 as he went commanding the paratrooper brigade stationed in Sialkot.[17] Initially, he commanded the 5th AK Brigade directing military operations in Indian-held Kashmir but later assumed the command of 14th (Para) Brigade in Zafarwal sector where he gained public notability when he participated in the famous tank battle against the Indian Army which halted the Indian Army troop rotation.[18] His role in a tank battle led him to be decorated with the Hilal-e-Jurat by the President of Pakistan.[18]

Lieutenant-General Niazi volunteered for the transfer to East Pakistan when Lieutenant-General Bahadur Sher Khan declined to the post despite being appointed.[1] There were two more generals who had also refused their postings in East and General Niazi said "yes" without necessarily realizing the risks involved and how to counter them.[1]

After General Tikka Khan had initiated the military crackdown on March 1971, many general officers had declined to be stationed in East despite being appointed and Lieutenant-General Niazi arrived in Dhaka on 4 April 1971 to assume the Eastern Command from Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan.[21] Furthermore, the violent crackdown at the Dhaka University against the intellectuals had turned the East Pakistani people hostile towards the Pakistani military, which made it too tough for General Niazi to overcome the situation.[22] On April 10/11 1971, he headed a meeting of his senior commanders to assessed the situation but, according to the eyewitnesses, he used abusive language aimed at the Bengali rebels that surprised the attendees.[21] From May through August 1971, the Indian Army trained Mukti Bahini led series of counter guerrilla campaigns against the Eastern Command stationed, and General Niazi began taking countermeasures against the Bengali rebellions.[23] By June 1971, he sent the reports on the rebellion and noted that 30,000 insurgents were hurriedly trained by India at the India-East Pakistan border.[23] On August 1971, General Niazi formulated a plan to defend the borders from the advancing Indian Army based on a "fortress concept" which mean converting the border towns and villages into the stronghold.[24]

By September 1971, he was appointed martial law administrator in order to provide his support to Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik who appointed a civilian cabinet.[25] On the issue of violences and bloodsheds, General Niazi had reportedly told his public relations officer and press secretary, Major Siddique Salik, that "we will have to account every single rape and killing when back in (West) Pakistan. God never spares the Tyrant."[26][27]

On October 1971, Niazi lost contacts with the Army GHQ and was virtually independent of controlling the Eastern Command from the central government in Islamabad.[28] On November 1971, General Abdul Hamid Khan, the Chief of Staff, warned him of an eminent Indian attack on East advised him to redeploy the Eastern Command on a tactical and political base ground but this was not need implemented due to shortage of time.[29]:303–304 In a public message, General Niazi was praised by Abdul Hamid Khan saying:"The whole nation is proud of you and you have their full support".[30]

No further orders and clarity was issued in regards to the orders as General Niazi had been caught unaware that the Indian Army planned out to launch a full assault on East Pakistan.[29]:303 On 3 December 1971, the Pakistan Air Force launched the pre-emptive strikes on Indian Air Force bases that officially led to start of the third war with India.[29]:304 According to author Sagar, General Niazi, surprisingly, was not aware of such attack and had no prior knowledge about such attack.[29]:304

Credibility of this claim is given by Niazi's press secretary and public relations officer, then-Major Siddique Salik, who wrote in Witness to Surrender, that Niazi's chief of staff Brigadier Baqir Siddiqi reportedly scolded him of not notifying Niazi and his staff of an aerial attack on India.[31]

When Indian Army soldiers crossed the borders and charged towards the Dacca, General Niazi panicked when he came to realise the real nature of Indian strategy and became frantically nervous when Indian Army successfully penetrated the defence of the East.[29]:304 Niazi's military staff further regretted for not heeding the intelligence warnings issued earlier in a compiled report by Major K.M. Arif, the military intelligence official in Niazi's staff.[32]

According to the testimonies provided by Major-General Farman Ali in the War Enquiry Commission, Niazi's morale collapsed as early as 7 December and cried fanatically over the progress report presented to the Governor Abdul Motaleb.[33]:183 He ultimately blamed Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan of turning the East Pakistanis hostile towards the Government of Pakistan and the creation of the Mukti Bahini.[34] Major accusations were also directed toward Lieutenant-General Yakob Ali Khan, Admiral S.M. Ahsan and Major-General Ali for aggravating the crises but General Niazi had to bear most responsibility for all that happened in the East.[35]:627[self-published source?]

General Niazi, alongside with his deputy Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff, nervously tried reassessing the situation to hold the Indian Army's penetration by directing joint army-navy operations with no success.[36][37] The Pakistani military combat units found themselves involved in a guerrilla war with the Mukti Bahini led under Atul Osmani, and were unprepared and untrained for such warfare.[38]

General Niazi eventually took control of the civilian government and was reportedly received a telegram on 16 December 1971 from President Yahya Khan: "You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds. The nation is proud of you ... You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose ... You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of armed forces personnel, all those from West Pakistan and all loyal elements".[3]:73–74[self-published source?]

During this time, the Special Branch of East Pakistan Police notified Niazi of the joint Indo-Bengali siege of Dhaka as the Eastern Command led by Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora began encircling Dhaka.[40] General Niazi then appealed for a conditional ceasefire to Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora which called for transferring power to elected government but without the surrender of the Eastern Command led by General Niazi.[40] This offer was rejected by Indian Army's Chief of Army Staff General Sam Manekshaw and Manekshaw set a deadline for surrender, and President Yahya Khan considered it as "illegitimate.[14][40] Niazi then once again appealed for a cease-fire, but Manekshaw set a deadline for surrender, failing which Dhaka would come under siege.[14]

Subsequently, the Indian Army began encircling the Dacca and Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora sent a message through Major-General Rafael Jacob that issued an ultimatum to surrender in "30-minutes" time window on 16 December 1971.[41] Lieutenant-General Niazi agreed to surrender and sent a message to General Manekshaw despite many army officers declined to obey although they were legally bound.[42] The Indian Army commanders, Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora, and Major-General Rafael Farj Jacob arrived on Dhaka via helicopter with the surrender documents.[41]

The surrender took place at Ramna Race Course, currently Swadhinota Uddan in Dhaka at local 16:31 on 16 December 1971. Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender and handed over his personal weapon to J.S. Aurora in the presence Indian and Bangladesh force commanders. With Niazi, nearly 90,000 personnel of the Eastern Command surrendered to the joint Indian and Bangladesh Army. It is argued that while the remaining Pakistani forces had the strength to defend Dhaka and Bangladesh, their moral ineptitude and incompetent leadership made any effort at a vigorous defence impossible. [43]

Subsequently, he was placed in solitary confinement for sometime, though he was later released.[45] Being the last to return supported his reputation as a "soldier's general", but did not shield him from the scorn he faced in Pakistan, where he was blamed for the surrender. Bhutto discharged Niazi after stripping him of his military rank, the pension usually accorded to retired soldiers, and his military decorations.[43] His three-star rank was eventually reduced to Major-General, a two-star rank, but was dismissed from the service in July 1975.:144[25]

He was also denied his military pension and medical benefits, though he lodged a strong complain against revoking of his pension.[46] In 1980s, the Ministry of Defence quietly changed the status of "dismissal" to "retirement" but did not restore his rank.[47] The change of order allowed Niazi to seek pension and medical assistance benefits enjoyed by the retired military personnel.[47]

In 1982, Niazi was summoned and confessed at the War Enquiry Commission led by Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman and the Supreme Court of Pakistan on the events involving the secession of East Pakistan on April 1975.[49] The War Commission leveled accusations against him of several kinds of ethical misconduct during his tenure in the East Pakistan. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission opined that General Niazi supervised the Betel leaf and imported paan using the official aircraft, from East Pakistan to Pakistan.[50][50][51]

The War Commission indicted him of corrupt and moral turpitude while noting his bullying of junior officers who would resists his orders.[52] General Niazi tried placing the blames on Yahya administration, his military adviser Maj. Gen. Farman Ali, Admiral S.M. Ahsan, and Lieutenant-General Yakob Ali and the military establishment but the War Commission partially accepted his claims by critically noting that General Niazi was a Supreme Commander of the Eastern Command, and that Niazi was responsible for all that happened in the East."[35]:452[self-published source?] Though he showed no regrets, Niazi refused to accept the responsibility of Breakup of East Pakistan and squarely blamed President Yahya.[53] The War Commission endorsed his claims that President Yahya was to blame but noted that Niazi was the Commander who lost the East.[53]

The War Commission recommended court martial to be held by the Judge Advocate General that would induct Niazi of serious breaches of military disciplines and military code.[33]:185 However, no such court-martial took place but, nonetheless, he was politically maligned and inducted with the war crimes taken place in East Pakistan.[54] Niazi did not accepted the War Commission's inquiries and fact-findings, believing that the War Commission had no understanding of the military matters.[55] Niazi claimed that a court-martial would have besmeared the names of those who later rose to great heights, and that he was being used as a scapegoat.[55]

Political commentators described Niazi's legacy as a mixture of the foolhardy and the ruthless.[51] He was also noted for making audacious statements like: "Dacca will fall only over my dead body".[1] According to Pakistani author, Akbar S. Ahmed, he had even hatched a far-fetched plan to "cross into India and march up the Ganges and capture Delhi and thus link up with Pakistan."[57]

This he called the "Niazi corridor theory" explaining: "It was a corridor that the Quaid-e-Azam demanded and I will obtain it by force of arms".[58] In a plan he presented to the central government in June 1971, he stated in his own words that "I would capture Agartala and a big chunk of Assam, and develop multiple thrusts into Indian Bengal. We would cripple the economy of Calcutta by blowing up bridges and sinking boats and ships in Hooghly River and create panic amongst the civilians. One air raid on Calcutta would set a sea of humanity in motion to get out of Calcutta".[58][59]

A journalist from Dawn had observed him thus: When I last met him on 30 September 1971, at his force headquarters in Kurmitola, he was full of beans.[1]

From the mass of evidence coming before the War Enquiry Commission from witnesses, both civil and military, there is little doubt that Niazi came to acquire a bad reputation in sex matters, and this reputation has been consistent during his postings in Sialkot, Lahore and East Pakistan.[60] The allegations regarding his indulgence in the export of Pan by using or abusing his position in the Eastern Command and as Commander of his command also prima facie appear to be well-founded.[61]