When Lee and Grant fought each other, the exchange rate in killed and wounded was dramatically in Lee's favour. – Phil Andrade, 8-5, 2:33 a.m.

But the entire time Grant and Lee confronted each other, Grant Was attacking, so of course his army would absorb higher casualties. I do not think the respective number of casualties is a good metric for comparing the generalship of these two excellent generals.

--Charlie Richards

Generally true during Overland. However, in The Wilderness, Lee was also on the offensive....although arguably not to the same degree as Grant. But the disparity in casualties at The Wilderness is quite sizeable....to a degree that would suggest that the disparity cannot simply be explained away by saying that Grant was on the offensive

Steve

--Steve Clements

Agreed...and, more than that, there was a much more fatal incidence in the casualty list suffered by Grant.

The most meticulous research into the AoNV loss in the Wilderness reveals that Lee's casualties were indeed heavy...just over eleven thousand. By the time the died of wounds are factored in, it' apparent that a little less than two thousand of these were killed or would die of their wounds....well under one fifth of the total casualty list. Lee himself remarked in an official dispatch that the number killed was not large, but that he had lost many wounded...of whom most were slight cases, because the battle had not offered much chance to use artillery.

Grant, on the other hand, suffered not only much heavier casualties - 17,666 by official count - but , for a number of reasons, the proportion of these who died was significantly higher. Only 2,246 were confirmed as killed....but there were many missing, and the fires in the woods claimed many lives. It appears from research into regimental rolls that the actual number of deaths was close to double the number posted as killed...pretty well one quarter of the total casualty list were men who perished.

This battle was surely one of the most horrific of all.

Regards, Phil

---------------"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

You know I've never tried to expunge slavery or racism from the record of the Confederacy I just don't base how I view the Confederacy and reach conclusions as the major or only factors. You know even a broken clock is right twice a day and there can be points of truth in any argument not matter how wrong or disagreeable the cause.

My argument about Pillow is based on three facts, the profiteering and score settling of the W Tenn Cav present, the striking of the Flag and the fact that 4 USCT multiple eyewitness testified they saw executed while trying to surrender survived the battle, one who survived Andersonville, one who died from wounds in a Union hospital, one hung for desertion by the Union and one who just walked away from a Union hospital and years later was granted a pension.

You cited a Union policy that stopped both exchange and parole and I showed that both weren't stopped and I will add that when the Confederacy started enlisting Negro troops in early 65 the exchange program didn't restart. The point in time when both do stop is when Grant takes overall command. I'd also like to point out the value to the Union of highlighting that Confederate policy even if they aren't carrying it out both politically and militarily. I also have to ask wouldn't such a stated policy inspire USCT and the white officers who commanded them to avoid surrender and in many cases prefer death fighting to surrender?

---------------A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country."to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"

You know I've never tried to expunge slavery or racism from the record of the Confederacy I just don't base how I view the Confederacy and reach conclusions as the major or only factors.

Well, that is certainly one of the areas of greatest difference in our interpretations of the Civil War. Slavery was the bedrock upon which the Confederacy was founded. The more one discounts slavery as "a factor," the further one strays from the truth.

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My argument about Pillow is based on three facts, the profiteering and score settling of the W Tenn Cav present, the striking of the Flag and the fact that 4 USCT multiple eyewitness testified they saw executed while trying to surrender survived the battle,

Well, lets look at them one by one:

As for the 13th Tennessee Cavalry, I don't share your antipathy. The Unit was composed of a combination of Tennessee Unionists, as well as former Confederates who had switched sides. In every regiment in every army in every war, there are some scoundrels and liars. I don't doubt that the 13th Tennessee Cavalry had its share. But I fail to see how that would negate the fact that a massacre took place. Even conceding the fact that the Union took advantage of the massacre for propaganda purposes, that doesn't change the fact that many Negro Union troops were shot down by Confederate soldiers while trying to surrender.

As for the striking of the flag, the Union troops fled from the parapets in a rout, and most officers were dead or wounded, so the failure to strike the flag does not prove much of anything. As regards those Union troops still armed and actually fighting, they would have been fair game. But soldiers attempting to surrender are not fair game, and shooting them down is murder. In every battle, men surrendered based upon the situation they found themselves in as individuals, without regard to whether their Unit was still flying its flag. And their surrender was almost universally accepted, by both sides, without regard to whether flags were struck or flying. It is not that Confederate troops continued fighting that is the basis of the charge, but that they needlessly murdered Negro Union troops who were trying to surrender.

As for the four Negro Union troops who testified to the massacre, no one ever claimed, even at the time, that the Confederates massacred ALL of the Negro Union troops. Approximately 35 percent of the Negro Union troops survived. (Compared to the approximately 69% of the white Union troops surviving.) That doesn't change the fate of those who were shot down in cold blood.

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You cited a Union policy that stopped both exchange and parole and I showed that both weren't stopped

Well, let’s go back to your original assertion that set us off on this side track: ”If Grant didn't plan attrition as at least a fallback plan then why does he stop the POW exchange before Overland starts and refuses to restart it.” That argument does not follow, as it was not Grant who stopped prisoner exchanges. The Union policy against prisoner exchanges was Lincoln’s policy, responding to official Confederate policy that captured Negro Union troops would not be treated as prisoners of war, and would not be exchanged. There were unofficial deviations from this policy on both sides, but the policies remained in effect, and large scale prisoner exchanges had stopped by August of 1863. So it wasn’t Grant, but Lincoln who stopped prisoner exchanges, and he did so in an effort to protect captured Negro Union troops from the announced official policy of the Confederacy.

The halt in the Wilderness was due to the expected slow pace of the army’s trains.Humphreys commented that the decision to remain in the Wilderness on 4 May was justified.” It was not practicable, however, to get over all the great trains on the 4th, nor was it expected, as the order of movement shows.”

I have trouble with this...as you wrote, the army's trains were expected to be slow. So, by definition, their "slowness" was not a surprise. Despite this "slowness", to the best of my knowledge, the plans written up by Humphreys (on around the 1st or 2nd of May??), as Meade's chief of staff, had the head of the army clearing The Wilderness on the 4th. Despite the fact that the everyone knew that the wagons would be slow.

Is your Humphreys' quotation taken from his "The Virginia Campaign 1864 & 1865"?

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Humphreys gave no indication that Hancock's attack was directed by Grant.

I didn't say "directed". I said that the attack on the morning of the 6th was Grant's "plan". Certainly, Grant (as usual) did not bother himself with the specific details of the broad plan. However, from memory, along with being late...and letting his men make breakfast before engaging the enemy, Burnside asked and received (partial) permission for a "late" start. I think that the permission for the late start came from Grant (it was at least an hour's delay vs. Grant's original plan for the IX corps). But as usual, I stand to be corrected.

But slavery isn't the main or only factor in the decision process of each and every individual who served the Confederacy on each and every decision made as individuals or as representatives of the Confederacy.

The commander of the 13th became overall commander early in the fight when the Fort commander went down. Who they were and what they had been doing factors in to their willingness to surrender. Given that multiple reports state that members of Bell's Brigade from the area held a trial and hanged the commander on the way back to Confederate lines proves he had a dam good reason not to surrender.

The eyewitness accounts I've read describe a close in hand to hand fight in which one man might be trying to surrender when the men on each side were still trying to fight. That some when trying to accept surrender were fired on some who tried to surrender then continued the fight. That some continued to fight because the flag was still flying no matter the situation. To the above I add the common sense interpretation that the stated policy of the Confederacy dissuaded the USCT from considering surrender and influenced them to continue the fight long after the issues was decided and add in what the members of the 13th believed they would receive at the hands of Bell's Brigade and there is plenty of incentive to fight to the death rather than surrender.

Every witness that testified under oath gave the names of one or more of the four I mention as being executed while trying to surrender before his eyes. A bit of a coincidence don't you think?

But the announced official policy of the Confederacy wasn't put into effect and troops captured at Ark Post and Island Number 10 are fighting at Chickamauga and troops captured and paroled at Vicksburg are fighting at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Hell Stephan Lee is being promoted to Major General and commands a Corps in the Confederacy's last hurrah but he was captured at Vicksburg. Deviations are one thing but this is a whole hell of a lot more. It doesn't stop until Grant takes overall command on direct orders from Grant.

I can get access to the article you posted the NPS says it a problem on their side of the server.

---------------A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country."to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"

The halt in the Wilderness was due to the expected slow pace of the army’s trains.Humphreys commented that the decision to remain in the Wilderness on 4 May was justified.” It was not practicable, however, to get over all the great trains on the 4th, nor was it expected, as the order of movement shows.”

I have trouble with this...as you wrote, the army's trains were expected to be slow. So, by definition, their "slowness" was not a surprise. Despite this "slowness", to the best of my knowledge, the plans written up by Humphreys (on around the 1st or 2nd of May??), as Meade's chief of staff, had the head of the army clearing The Wilderness on the 4th. Despite the fact that the everyone knew that the wagons would be slow.Is your Humphreys' quotation taken from his "The Virginia Campaign 1864 & 1865"?

Humphreys didn’t indicate that his plan called for the trains to be out of the Wilderness on day one.”The first project was adopted, and the order of movement was prepared by me in conformity to it. The order for continuing the movement on the 5th of May, issued on the evening of the 4th, also conformed to it, but owing to indications of the enemy's movement on the 4th, the order of march was partial only, and held in view the probability of a general engagement on that day.”

The movement order dated 2 May did not indicate when the trains would exit the Wilderness.

Possibly he was covering for Meade, or himself.Yes, the account came from Humphreys’ VA Campaign 64, 65 .

The trains did have a 3600 man guard.

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Humphreys gave no indication that Hancock's attack was directed by Grant.

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I didn't say "directed". I said that the attack on the morning of the 6th was Grant's "plan". Certainly, Grant (as usual) did not bother himself with the specific details of the broad plan. However, from memory, along with being late...and letting his men make breakfast before engaging the enemy, Burnside asked and received (partial) permission for a "late" start. I think that the permission for the late start came from Grant (it was at least an hour's delay vs. Grant's original plan for the IX corps). But as usual, I stand to be corrected.s.c.Steve Clements

The strategy was Grant’s but Humphreys wrote the plan, and Meade was in tactical command.Yes, I used the word “directed” but if it was Grant’s plan, didn’t he direct it?I certainly didn’t intend to change your meaning.

My point was that, according to Humphreys, it was Meade who ordered Hancock’s attack.One of Humphreys’ purposes, as I see it, was to make it clear that Meade was in tactical command during the campaign, to counter the impression that it was Grant.As the CoS he would have known who was calling the shots.

”But General Grant says, in his report of July 22, 1865, upon the operations of the armies of the United States from the date of his appointment as Lieutenant-General to the close of the war, "I may here state that commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him."”(Humphreys, VA Campaign)

Humphreys didn’t indicate that his plan called for the trains to be out of the Wilderness on day one.

At the beginning of Chapter Two of his book, Humphreys differentiated between "fighting trains" (carrying ammunition?) that accompanied the troops and the balance of the supply trains.

Yes, it would be unrealistic for the "supply trains" (not the fighting trains) to exit the Wilderness in one days' march, but if these trains were properly guarded, that would not be a huge issue....what was important, was to get a sizable amount of Meade' infantry out of the Wilderness.

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The trains did have a 3600 man guard.

second page of chapter two: "They were covered by the cavalry, and had an infantry guard of 1200 men from each infantry corps."

Given that Wilson's small (two brigades) cavalry division had its hands full guarding Meade's right flank (and managed to NOT guard the Orange Plank or the Orange Turnpike roads, the roads that Hill and Ewell, respectively, used to attack the flank of the AoP), it would appear that Sheridan/Meade's decision to send the other two cavalry divisions off on a wild goose chase might have been behind Meade's decision to bed down in The Wilderness, instead of pushing on through.

Humphreys noted that the head of the II corps arrived at Chancellorsville by 10:00 a.m. of the 4th. And that the entire corps, including the trains moving with the troops, were at the designated halting place by 1:00.

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Yes, I used the word “directed” but if it was Grant’s plan, didn’t he direct it?

Grant didn't "direct" much of anything during Overland. Maybe he needed to do a little more "directing"....which might have made him realize that his allowance for "fog" and "slippage" was insufficient.

I recognize that a Lt. General cannot be at the front lines, directing traffic....but Grant may well have been a little too distant for the AoP's good.

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I certainly didn’t intend to change your meaning

Whether you intended to "change" my meaning or not, you certainly did. But no harm, no foul.

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One of Humphreys’ purposes, as I see it, was to make it clear that Meade was in tactical command during the campaign, to counter the impression that it was Grant.

Although I would never accuse Humphreys of being a Meade apologist....I do think that he attempted to put Meade in a favourable light. Having read his book, I am guessing that Humphreys did resent Grant's presence, if only just a little. That would only be human....

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My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him."

I agree that this was generally true. But they were general in the sense of: "move the II corps from the right, march it, all night, behind the V corps, and then attack at 4:00 a.m.". How that was accomplished was up to Meade. But Grant did a lot more than just say "go after Lee". He had very definite ideas about "how" Meade was going to go after Lee.

I recognize that a Lt. General cannot be at the front lines, directing traffic....but Grant may well have been a little too distant for the AoP's good.

The ”HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES”, should not have been located ”In Field, near Wilderness Tavern, Va.,”Grant’s HQ, despite his distaste for Washington, should have had his HQ there.

He may have indicated his faith in Meade, but his having to attempt to command all US armies from in the field near Meade’s HQ indicates otherwise, and created an awkward, to say the least, and inefficient situation.That entire issue was on Grant.

Isn’t your statement an indictment of Meade’s ability?

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My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him."

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I agree that this was generally true. But they were general in the sense of: "move the II corps from the right, march it, all night, behind the V corps, and then attack at 4:00 a.m.". How that was accomplished was up to Meade. But Grant did a lot more than just say "go after Lee". He had very definite ideas about "how" Meade was going to go after Lee.s.c.--Steve Clements

Where do we find this plan of Grant’s you’ve been refering to?

What do you mean ”in the sense of”?Those are very specific instructions, so where does Meade go to get a “sense of” those instructions in order to execute them?

In reviewing the OR I am not seeing any specific instructions from Grant to Meade.”If any opportunity presents itself for pitching into a part of Lees army, do so without giving time for disposition.”(Grant to Meade, 5 May, 0824)

During the evening of 5 May:”Soon after we had risen from the table and left the mess-tent, Meade walked over from his headquarters, and he and the general-in-chief seated themselves by the camp-fire, and talked over the events of the day and the plans for the morrow.”And:” The plan agreed upon that night for the coming struggle was as follows: Hancock and Wadsworth were to make an attack on Hill at 4:30 A. M., SO as to strike him if possible before Longstreet could arrive to reinforce him. Burnside, who would arrive early in the morning with three divisions, was to send one division (Stevenson's) to Hancock, and to put the other two divisions between Wadsworth and Warren's other divisions, and attack Hill in flank, or at least obliquely, while Warren and Sedgwick were to attack along their fronts, inflict all the damage they could, and keep the troops opposed to them from reinforcing Hill and Longstreet.”(Porter, Campaigning with Grant)

According to Humphreys:” As soon as the fighting ceased in the evening of the 5th, General Hancock, General Warren, and General Sedgwick were ordered to attack punctually at five o'clock the next morning.”

”HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 5, 18649 p. m. (Received 10 p. in.) Major-General Hancock: You are required to renew the attack at 4.30 o’clock to-morrow morning, keeping a sharp lookout on your left. Your right will be relieved by an attack made at the same time by General Wadsworth’s division and by two divisions of General Burnsides corps. GEO G. MEADE,Major-General. General Getty is under your command. “

There is nothing specific as to exactly who proposed that plan, Meade or Grant, only that Grant must have approved it.I would think that Meade would have had a better understanding of the situation than Grant.Did Grant ask Meade what his plan was for the following day, or did he explain to Meade what he wanted Meade to do the following day?Was to attack or not to attack an issue?

Meade later held a meeting with his corps commanders regarding the next day’s plan and, based on it, made a recommendation to Grant to delay the attack time.Grant agreed to delay the start one half hour.

”HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, In Field, near Wilderness Tavern, Va., May 5, 1864. Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac: GENERAL: I am directed by the lieutenant-general commanding to say that you may change the hour of attack to 5 o’clock, as he is afraid that if delayed until 6 o’clock the enemy will take the initiative, which he desires specially to avoid. General Burnside is directed to bring up General Willcox’s division with his other troops if they can possibly be spared, and will probably bring them. I am, general, your obedient servant, W. R. ROWLEY, Lieutenant-Colonel and Military Secretary.

Not necessarily. At least not by me…. However, it does tend to suggest that Grant felt that he needed to “ride herd” on the AoP and its generals. So yes, Grant’s “actions” could be taken as an indictment of Meade’s ability.

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Where do we find this plan of Grant’s you’ve been refering to?

Well, I wasn’t consciously thinking of it …. But it (II corps marching all night, going from the right of the V corps to the left…and then attacking at 4:00) does strongly resemble what the II corps did, in fact, do on May 12th (the attack at the “Angle”).

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What do you mean ”in the sense of”?

This was the type of broad stroke “plan of action” that Grant laid out….how the II corps (as an example) actually got to their jump off point was left to Meade and the respective corps commanders.

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” The plan agreed upon that night for the coming struggle was as follows: Hancock and Wadsworth were to make an attack on Hill at 4:30 A. M., SO as to strike him if possible before Longstreet could arrive to reinforce him. Burnside, who would arrive early in the morning with three divisions, was to send one division (Stevenson's) to Hancock, and to put the other two divisions between Wadsworth and Warren's other divisions, and attack Hill in flank, or at least obliquely, while Warren and Sedgwick were to attack along their fronts, inflict all the damage they could, and keep the troops opposed to them from reinforcing Hill and Longstreet.”(Porter, Campaigning with Grant)

I am not really sure what point you are attempting to make…is it that the attack on the a.m. of the 6th was initiated by Meade, and not by Grant?

Pages 264 to 267, Rhea, “The Battle of the Wilderness”, argues pretty strongly that the plan for the attack on the a.m. of the 6th was Grant’s. Yes, coordinated by Meade. But the plan was clearly initiated by Grant.

As per the Porter quotation referenced above, it was Grant’s desire that the attack start at 4:30. As you noted in your post, Meade asked that the attack be delayed until 6:00 a.m. (Rhea argues that Meade asked for the delay because Meade and his generals believed that Burnside would be late, and that there was no way the IX corps would make the 4:30 start time). On page 267, Rhea details how Grant refused to move the attack to 6:00, but did give Meade an extra half hour leeway i.e. 5:00 a.m.

On page 264, on several occasions, Rhea refers to the 5:00 a.m. attack of the 6th as “Grant’s plan”. On page 265, it is Grant who orders Burnside to move two divisions at 2:00 a.m.

Given how paranoid (in retrospect, rightfully so) Meade was about Longstreet's corps hitting Hancock's left flank, how on earth did the rail line south of Hancock's left flank remain undiscovered (or at least ignored) by Meade and company. On the morning of the 6th, Meade had Barlow's division, plus one or two other brigades (under the command of Gibbon), kept from Hancock's 5:00 a.m. attack on Hill's two badly mauled divisions. Those Union brigades were left behind, and on Hancock's southern flank, specifically to avoid what in fact did happen with Longstreet's four brigade flank attack.

Doubly so, given that Meade never gave up looking for Pickett. After Hancock's initial success, headquarters knew that prisoners had been taken from Field's and Kershaw's divisions .... Pickett wasn't accounted for (largely cuz he was 100 miles south at the time....). Plus I don't think that Anderson's division had yet been accounted for. So Hancock/Meade et al continued to be sensitive about that flank....and yet Sorrel (sp?) was able to march four brigades right past Hancock's flank....where were Barlow and Gibbon? How was this allowed to happen?

But the announced official policy of the Confederacy wasn't put into effect and troops captured at Ark Post and Island Number 10 are fighting at Chickamauga and troops captured and paroled at Vicksburg are fighting at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Hell Stephan Lee is being promoted to Major General and commands a Corps in the Confederacy's last hurrah but he was captured at Vicksburg. Deviations are one thing but this is a whole hell of a lot more. It doesn't stop until Grant takes overall command on direct orders from Grant.

I can get access to the article you posted the NPS says it a problem on their side of the server. --John R. Price

John,

If you haven't already, you might want to try it again. I just did and it worked fine. [Read More]

Lee was able to thwart most Union maneuvers in the campaign, forcing some costly fights. However, Grant's efforts ultimately moved the Union closer to victory. The Union suffered (perhaps unnecessarily) heavy losses, but Lee suffered heavy losses too and was far less able to afford them.

In the biggest sense, Grant led his forces in a way appropriate to the situation (strong numerical and logistical advantages) and goal at hand (push Lee back and batter him). It could be said that Lee should have done more (here and throughout the war) to preserve his forces because they were largely irreplacable. Every time he suffered losses anywhere near those of the Union, it was a net loss for him.