08TBILISI1241, IDP RETURNEES TO GALI FACE CHALLENGES BEYOND

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001241
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/CARC, PRM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PRELPGOVPHUMGG
SUBJECT: IDP RETURNEES TO GALI FACE CHALLENGES BEYOND
SECURITY
REF: TBILISI 2146
¶1. Summary and Comment: Poloff traveled to the largely
ethnic-Georgian Gali district of the breakaway Republic of
Abkhazia June 23-25 to learn more about the lives of Georgian
internally displaced persons (IDPs) who had returned to their
homes. Many of the estimated 40,000 IDPs who have returned to
Gali depend on subsistence agriculture, hazelnut and mandarin
farming, and small-scale trading of everyday goods. They
have either returned to their own homes or have moved into
the home of a relative, though many of the homes in the
region have been destroyed. Many of the IDPs that remain
displaced inside Georgia proper have not returned because of
a combination of factors: their homes were destroyed during
the war, lack of economic opportunities, safety, and ongoing
Abkhaz hostility to the return of ethnic Georgians north of
Gali. UN police stationed in Gali report that crime rates
dropped last year, though there are still seasonal spikes in
crime during the hazelnut harvest in October.
¶2. Summary and Comment continued: Many of the ethnic
Georgians who fled Gali during the war returned within a few
years, only to flee again when hostilities resumed in 1998.
President Saakashvili's disbanding of the Georgian
government-backed paramilitary groups following his election
in 2003 and an extensive demining program (partially funded
by the USG) along the Inguri river vastly improved the
security situation in Gali, paving the way for large-scale
return of IDPs there. The United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that approximately 40,000 IDPs
have returned since 2003. The timely return of the remaining
230,000 IDPs remains a key priority for the Georgian
government, though creating the conditions for safe and
voluntary return will be a challenge. The Abkhaz remain
strongly opposed to IDP return north of Gali out of concern
they will become a minority in their own "country." Property
disputes, lack of housing, decaying infrastructure and a
stagnant, corrupt economy point to millions of dollars and
years of rehabilitation before most would be willing to call
Abkhazia home again. End Summary and Comment.
Many IDPs have limited options
------------------------------
¶3. Poloff spoke with IDPs on both sides of the conflict
zone, both returnees and those still displaced, to get an
accurate picture of conditions for each group. Many of the
IDPs originally from Gali live in Zugdidi, on the Georgian
side of the conflict zone, surviving on a 27 lari (USD 19) a
month stipend from the Georgian government. Most
occasionally return to visit relatives, mainly grandparents,
living in Gali, but otherwise stay on the Georgian side
living in remote, dilapidated collective centers or renting
rooms from local families. Those fortunate enough to have
arable land in Gali (but remain wary of returning
permanently) migrate each summer to tend to their hazelnut
and mandarin crops, returning to Zugdidi during the winter.
Many other IDPs have found themselves stuck between having
land to farm but no home in Gali or having a home (usually a
collective housing center) in Georgia but no land or work.
IDPs who have returned to their homes in Gali manage to
survive by selling hazelnuts and mandarins, or by small scale
trading of goods from Georgia. These returnees nevertheless
face daily harassment, bureaucratic obstacles and high and
often arbitrary taxes and fines imposed by Abkhaz officials.
¶4. The "Tea Plantation" collective center is a twenty minute
drive from Zugdidi, remotely located atop a hill at the end
of a long, winding dirt road. Approximately 85 IDPs live in
dorms with drooping roofs and warped floors that formerly
served as homes for workers at the plantation. The
plantation, which is no longer operating, was privatized by
the Georgian government three years ago, though no one knows
what plans the new owner has for the complex. IDPs living
here are thus stuck in decrepit two-story dorms, crumbling
from age and neglect, because no one is willing to invest
money into their repair out of fear that once the repairs are
finished, the owner will kick the IDPs out and sell the
property for a profit. The plantation's remote location
makes it difficult for the IDPs living there to find work in
Zugdidi, and all the families we spoke with relied
exclusively on their 27 lari/month stipend, renting land from
locals to grow food crops. A few IDPs from the collective
center have returned to Gali, but the majority cannot because
they have no place to go. Several saw their houses burned
down during the war, while others from Ochimchire and further
north said Abkhaz legal restrictions and general hostility to
Georgians has kept them away.
Abkhaz bureaucratic harassment
------------------------------
TBILISI 00001241 002 OF 003
¶5. According to the UN human rights office in Gali, IDP
returnees are regularly harassed by local Abkhaz
administration o
fficials, border guards and customs
officials, though in practice this seems more prevalent in
the town of Gali and north toward Ochimchire. The UN human
rights officer, Ryszard Komenda, characterized this
harassment as more ethnic discrimination than physical
intimidation and threats of violence. Much of the harassment
exists to make everyday life a chore for ethnic Georgians who
have returned - forcing them to return 2-3 times to
government offices to complete routine paperwork, imposing
arbitrary taxes on goods bought and sold, and subjecting
those crossing administrative borders to lengthy questioning
and demands for bribes. Zugdidi residents deal with frequent
closings of the main bridge over the Inguri river and are
often forced to pay bribes as high as 1000 rubles (USD 40)
each time they cross.
¶6. The 2005 Abkhaz citizenship law added another layer to
this official harassment, making it much harder for ethnic
Georgians living in Gali to conduct routine business without
an Abkhaz "passport." Gali residents cannot open a bank
account, (legally) own property or travel beyond Gali without
one. The Gali district is the last district in Abkhazia to
undergo the Abkhaz passportization process, which began there
in March 2008. Komenda said there has not been much interest
from IDP returnees in getting passports because they do not
see any real benefits to gaining Abkhaz citizenship, nor has
there been much pressure (yet) from Abkhaz authorities to
force the issue. He noted that while they issue as many as
400 new Abkhaz passports a week in Gagra, only four had been
issued in Gali over the past few months. It is widely
thought that de-facto president Bagapsh will push for more
Gali residents to have passports by the end of the year, so
they can vote in the upcoming 2009 'presidential' elections
(note: Gali residents' support is widely thought to have
secured Bagapsh's victory in the 2004 election. Gali
residents can skirt the passport law by signing a
(non-binding) waiver "renouncing" their Georgian citizenship,
which allows them to keep their Georgian passport, though not
many have done so, perhaps out of concern that they will lose
their IDP stipends paid by the Georgian government. End note).
Southern Gali
-------------
¶7. Abkhaz checkpoints and harassment by de-facto officials
does not seem to be as pervasive in the southern part of Gali
district, where ethnic Georgians can cross over into Georgia
without having to cross the Inguri river. Poloff spoke with
returnees from the villages of Otobaya and Nabakevi,
recipients of UNHCR small business grants. Several of the
returnees we spoke with had used the grants to set up small
roadside kiosks, selling products purchased in Georgia.
Others purchased dairy cows or seeds for growing crops.
Nearly all supplemented their meager incomes by selling
hazelnuts and mandarins, which grow in abundance in the
region. Zurab, a returnee in the village of Otobaya, used
UNHCR's USD 300 grant to build a small roadside kiosk, where
he sells staples such as flour, sugar, oil, gum, and
cigarettes purchased in Georgia. Despite the recent
escalation of tension between Georgia and Abkhazia, he said
he felt safe and has had no problems transporting goods
across the administrative boundary. He also said he harvests
between 300-400 kg of hazelnuts each year, selling them for
about 3 lari/kg (about USD 2/kg), and netting between
750-1050 lari (USD 528-740) after paying taxes to Abkhaz
de-facto authorities.
¶8. Most returnees are not as fortunate as Zurab, however. A
UNHCR official noted that most families sell their hazelnut
crops a year or more in advance to make ends meet, and
harvest yields vary considerably. Taxes levied by the
de-facto authorities are often arbitrary and steep. While
Zurab said he paid only about 80 lari (USD 56) in taxes on
his hazelnuts, some villages, particularly those north of
Gali, are forced to pay a tax of 100-120kg of hazelnuts to
the de-facto authorities. Those who have small hazelnut
groves or a bad harvest are forced to buy nuts on the open
market to pay the tax.
UN: Crime not a serious problem in Gali
---------------------------------------
¶9. The UN police observers stationed in Gali-Zugdidi noted
that crime in Gali and Ochimchre was "not that bad"
considering the size of the population (Note: this
conversation took place before the recent string of bombings
in Abkhazia, including the blast at a Gali cafe that killed
an off-duty UN interpreter. End note). They said that out
of a population of 95,000, they report between 2-8 crimes per
TBILISI 00001241 003 OF 003
month, mostly robberies or bride kidnappings. They
characterized Georgian media reporting on the criminal
situation in Gali as exaggerated, and the crimes that are
reported are often ethnic Georgians targeting other ethnic
Georgians. Because of the depressed economy and relative
poverty of the population, there is not much to steal, save
mandarins and hazelnuts - harvest season is when they see the
largest spikes in criminal activity. They noted that Abkhaz
police are largely corrupt and unprofessional, showing almost
no interest in UN police training programs. They also
assessed the feasibility of a joint Georgian-Abkhaz police
force to be remote at best, given the inherent mistrust
between the sides and the vast gap in professional standards
between the two police forces.
TEFFT

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