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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittees on Military Personnel and Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 11:30 a.m. EST:
Friday, February 3, 2012:
Arlington National Cemetery:
Actions Needed to Ensure Lasting, Positive Changes in Contracting and
Management:
Statement of Belva M. Martin:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
and:
Brian J. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-12-436T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-12-436T, a testimony before the Subcommittees on
Military Personnel and Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington) is the final resting place for
many of our nation’s military servicemembers, their family members,
and others. In June 2010, the Army Inspector General identified
problems at the cemetery, including deficiencies in contracting and
management, burial errors, and a failure to notify next of kin of
errors. In response, the Secretary of the Army issued guidance
creating the position of the Executive Director of the Army National
Cemeteries Program (ANCP) to manage Arlington and requiring changes to
address the deficiencies and improve cemetery operations. In response
to Public Law 111-339, GAO assessed several areas, including (1)
actions taken to improve contract management and oversight, (2) the
Army’s efforts to address identified management deficiencies and
provide information and assistance to families regarding efforts to
detect and correct burial errors, and (3) factors affecting the
feasibility and advisability of transferring jurisdiction for the Army’
s national cemeteries to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The
information in this testimony summarizes GAO’s recent reports on
Arlington contracting (GAO-12-99) and management (GAO-12-105). These
reports are based on, among other things, analyzing guidance,
policies, plans, contract files, and other documentation from the
Army, Arlington, and other organizations and interviews with Army and
VA officials.
What GAO Found:
GAO identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active during
fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011
under which contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on
Arlington’s behalf. These contracts supported cemetery operations,
construction and facility maintenance, and new efforts to enhance
information-technology systems for the automation of burial
operations. The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at
different levels to provide for more effective management and
oversight of contracts, establishing new support relationships,
formalizing policies and procedures, and increasing the use of
dedicated contracting staff to manage and improve its acquisition
processes. However, GAO found that ANCP does not maintain complete
data on its contracts, responsibilities for contracting support are
not yet fully defined, and dedicated contract staffing arrangements
still need to be determined. The success of Arlington’s acquisition
outcomes will depend on continued management focus from ANCP and its
contracting partners to ensure sustained attention to contract
management and institutionalize progress made to date. GAO made three
recommendations to continue improvements in contract management. The
Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred and noted actions in
progress to address these areas.
The Army has taken positive steps and implemented improvements to
address other management deficiencies and to provide information and
assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad
range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for
ensuring accountability over remains and improving its capability to
respond to the public and to families’ inquiries. Nevertheless, the
Army has remaining management challenges in several areas—-managing
information-technology investments, updating workforce plans,
developing an organizational assessment program, coordinating with key
partners, developing a strategic plan, and developing guidance for
providing assistance to families. GAO made six recommendations to help
address these areas. DOD concurred or partially concurred and has
begun to take some corrective actions.
A transfer of jurisdiction for the Army’s two national cemeteries to
VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national
cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal
government. However, several factors may affect the advisability of
making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits,
potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on
Arlington’s unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army
has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved
its management, it may be premature to move forward with a change in
jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement exist that
entail less disruption. GAO identified opportunities for enhancing
collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their
strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national
cemeteries. GAO recommended that the Army and VA develop a mechanism
to formalize collaboration between these organizations. DOD and VA
concurred with this recommendation.
What GAO Recommends:
In the reports, GAO made several recommendations to help Arlington
sustain progress made to date.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-436T[. For more
information, contact Belva Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov
or Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairmen Wilson and Wittman, Ranking Members Davis and Cooper, and
Members of the Subcommittees:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Army's progress in
addressing contracting and management challenges identified at
Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington), opportunities for
collaboration between the Army and the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA), as well as steps remaining to ensure sound management of the
cemetery going forward. Beginning in 2009, the Army's management of
Arlington came under intense scrutiny following the discovery of
burial errors and the identification of serious contracting and other
management deficiencies affecting cemetery operations. In June 2010,
the Army Inspector General (Army IG) reported on numerous deficiencies
and made more than 100 recommendations for corrective action, which
covered a span of issues, including cemetery policies and procedures,
management and training, command structures, information assurance
compliance, and contracting.[Footnote 1] After the Army IG's
inspection findings were released, the Secretary of the Army assigned
new leadership to Arlington, including the new position of Executive
Director of the Army National Cemeteries Program (ANCP),[Footnote 2]
and issued Army Directive 2010-04 requiring a number of changes to
address the identified deficiencies and improve cemetery operations.
[Footnote 3] In the time since these actions, the Army has taken
positive steps to address critical areas and implement improvements,
and we continue to be encouraged by these efforts. However, our work
points to the need for further action to ensure that the positive
changes made thus far are institutionalized and will prove lasting
over the long term.
Our statement today is based on two reports issued on December 15,
2011, as required by Public Law 111-339.[Footnote 4] The first
discusses (1) the number, duration of, and dollar amount spent on
current contracts used to support operations at Arlington and (2) the
extent to which the Army has put processes and procedures in place to
provide for the effective management and oversight of contracts
supporting Arlington.[Footnote 5] The second discusses (1) the Army's
efforts to address identified management deficiencies; (2) the Army's
process for providing information and assistance to families regarding
efforts to detect and correct burial errors; and (3) factors that may
affect the feasibility or advisability of transferring jurisdiction
for the Army's two national cemeteries to VA, as well as issues
related to collaboration between these agencies.[Footnote 6]
For these two reports we conducted work at Arlington and other offices
and agencies within the Department of the Army, including the Military
District of Washington, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, the Army
Contracting Command, the Mission and Installation Contracting Command
(MICC), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), among others. We
also conducted work at VA and contacted veteran service organizations
and private industry associations. We reviewed documents pertaining to
previously identified deficiencies, including the Army IG's 2010
inspection and investigation of Arlington, the results of two follow-
up inspections conducted by the Army IG in 2011, and Army Directive
2010-04. We obtained information from knowledgeable officials about
the steps taken to respond to the Army IG's findings and to implement
the Army's directive. In addition, we analyzed data from contracting
offices and other sources on contracts active during fiscal years 2010
and 2011 and above $100,000 and reviewed contract files; analyzed
guidance, policies, plans, and other documentation from Arlington and
other organizations; and interviewed agency officials to assess
efforts to improve contract management. To identify factors that may
affect the feasibility or advisability of transferring jurisdiction
for the Army's national cemeteries to VA, we reviewed our prior work
on federal government reorganization, reviewed the legislative history
of the National Cemeteries Act of 1973,[Footnote 7] and obtained
pertinent documents and interviewed officials from the Army and VA,
including the Secretary of the Army and VA's Under Secretary for
Memorial Affairs. We conducted this work from March 2011 through
December 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
work. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Management of Arlington Contracts Improved, but Additional Steps Are
Needed to Ensure Continued Progress:
The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different
levels to provide for more effective management and oversight of
contracts supporting Arlington, including improving visibility of
contracts, establishing new support relationships, formalizing
policies and procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated
contracting staff to manage and improve acquisition processes. While
significant progress has been made, we have recommended that the Army
take further action in these areas to ensure continued improvement and
institutionalize progress made to date. These recommendations and the
agency's response are discussed later in this statement.
Arlington does not have its own contracting authority and, as such,
relies on other contracting offices to award and manage contracts on
its behalf. ANCP receives contracting support in one of two main ways,
either by (1) working directly with contracting offices to define
requirements, ensure the appropriate contract vehicle, and provide
contract oversight, or (2) partnering with another program office to
leverage expertise and get help with defining requirements and
providing contract oversight. Those program offices, in turn, use
other contracting arrangements to obtain services and perform work for
Arlington. Using data from multiple sources, we identified 56
contracts and task orders that were active during fiscal year 2010 and
the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 under which these
contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on Arlington's
behalf. These contracts and task orders supported cemetery operations,
such as landscaping, custodial, and guard services; construction and
facility maintenance; and new efforts to enhance information-
technology systems for the automation of burial operations. Figure 1
identifies the contracting relationships, along with the number of
contracts and dollars obligated by contracting office, for the
contracts and task orders we reviewed.
Figure 1: Distribution of Arlington Contracts by Office:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Arlington National Cemetery:
56 contracts and task orders[A];
Contract obligations: $35.2 million[A].
Mission and Installation Contracting Command[B]:
Contract support to Arlington National Cemetery:
Fort Belvoir: 10 contracts;
Contract obligations: $10.7 million;
Fort Myer: 1 contract;
Contract obligations: $135,000.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:
Program support to Arlington National Cemetery;
Contract support to Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation
Management;
Baltimore District: 14 contracts and task orders;
Contract obligations: $4.4 million;
Army Geospatial Center: 2 task orders;
Contract obligations: $1.1 million.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management:
Program support to Arlington National Cemetery;
National Capital Region Contracting Center[B]:
Contract support to Arlington National Cemetery;
Contract support to Army Information Technology Agency;
25 contracts and task orders;
Contract obligations: $16.8 million;
Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization:
Contract support to Army Information Technology Agency;
2 task orders;
Contract obligations: $771,000.
Army Information Technology Agency:
Program support to Arlington National Cemetery.
Army Communications-Electronics Command:
Program support to Army Analytics Group;
1 task order;
Contract obligations: $435,200.
Army Analytics Group:
Program support to Arlington National Cemetery.
Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support:
Contract support to Arlington National Cemetery;
1 contract;
Contract obligations: $878,800.
Source: GAO analysis of FPOS-NG data and contract documents.
[A] Figure represents contracts or task orders active during fiscal
year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 and above
$100,000.
[B] The Mission and Installation Contracting Command as well as the
National Capital Region contracting office are part of the Army
Contracting Command.
[A] Figure represents contracts or task orders active during fiscal
year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 and above
$100,000.
[B] The Mission and Installation Contracting Command as well as the
National Capital Region contracting office are part of the Army
Contracting Command.
[End of figure]
At the time of our review, we found that ANCP did not maintain
complete data on contracts supporting its operations. We have
previously reported that the effective acquisition of services
requires reliable data to enable informed management decisions.
[Footnote 8] Without complete data, ANCP leadership may be without
sufficient information to identify, track, and ensure the effective
management and oversight of its contracts. While we obtained
information on Arlington contracts from various sources, limitations
associated with each of these sources make identifying and tracking
Arlington's contracts as a whole difficult. For example:
* Internal ANCP data. A contract specialist detailed to ANCP in
September 2010 developed and maintained a spreadsheet to identify and
track data for specific contracts covering daily cemetery operations
and maintenance services. Likewise, ANCP resource management staff
maintain a separate spreadsheet that tracks purchase requests and some
associated contracts, as well as the amount of funding provided to
other organizations through the use of military interdepartmental
purchase requests. Neither of these spreadsheets identifies the
specific contracts and obligations associated with Arlington's current
information-technology and construction requirements.
* Existing contract and financial systems. The Federal Procurement
Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) is the primary system used to
track governmentwide contract data, including those for the Department
of Defense (DOD) and the Army. The Arlington funding office
identification number, a unique code that is intended to identify
transactions specific to Arlington, is not consistently used in this
system and, in fact, was used for only 34 of the 56 contracts in our
review. In October 2010 and consistent with a broader Army initiative,
ANCP implemented the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS)
[Footnote 9] to enhance financial management and oversight and to
improve its capability to track expenditures. We found that data in
this system did not identify the specific information-technology
contracts supported by the Army Communications-Electronics Command,
Army Geospatial Center, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems
Support office, and others. Officials at ANCP and at the MICC-Fort
Belvoir stated that they were exploring the use of additional data
resources to assist in tracking Arlington contracts, including the
Virtual Contracting Enterprise, an electronic tool intended to help
enable visibility and analysis of elements of the contracting process.
* Contracting support organizations. We also found that Army
contracting offices had difficulty in readily providing complete and
accurate data to us on Arlington contracts. For example, the National
Capital Region Contracting Center could not provide a complete list of
active contracts supporting Arlington during fiscal years 2010 and
2011 and in some cases did not provide accurate dollar amounts
associated with the contracts it identified. USACE also had difficulty
providing a complete list of active Arlington contracts for this time
frame. The MICC-Fort Belvoir contracting office was able to provide a
complete list of the recently awarded contracts supporting Arlington
with accurate dollar amounts for this time frame, and those data were
supported by similar information from Arlington.
The Army has also taken a number of steps to better align ANCP
contract support with the expertise of its partners. However, some of
the agreements governing these relationships do not yet fully define
roles and responsibilities for contracting support. We have previously
reported that a key factor in improving DOD's service acquisition
outcomes--that is, obtaining the right service, at the right price, in
the right manner--is having defined responsibilities and associated
support structures.[Footnote 10] Going forward, sustained attention on
the part of ANCP and its partners will be important to ensure that
contracts of all types and risk levels are managed effectively. The
following summarizes ongoing efforts in this area:
* ANCP established a new contracting support agreement with the Army
Contracting Command in August 2010. The agreement states that the
command will assign appropriate contracting offices to provide
support, in coordination with ANCP, and will conduct joint periodic
reviews of new and ongoing contract requirements. In April 2011, ANCP
also signed a separate agreement with the MICC, part of the Army
Contracting Command, which outlines additional responsibilities for
providing contracting support to ANCP. While this agreement states
that the MICC, through the Fort Belvoir contracting office, will
provide the full range of contracting support, it does not specify the
types of requirements that will be supported, nor does it specify that
other offices within the command may also do so.
* ANCP signed an updated support agreement with USACE in December
2010, which states that these organizations will coordinate to assign
appropriate offices to provide contracting support and that USACE will
provide periodic joint reviews of ongoing and upcoming requirements.
At the time of our review, USACE officials noted that they were in the
process of finalizing an overarching program management plan with
ANCP, which, if implemented, provides additional detail about the
structure of and roles and responsibilities for support. USACE and
ANCP have also established a Senior Executive Review Group, which
updates the senior leadership at both organizations on the status of
ongoing efforts.
* ANCP has also put agreements in place with the Army Information
Technology Agency (ITA) and the Army Analytics Group, which provide
program support for managing information-technology infrastructure and
enhance operational capabilities. Officials at ANCP decided to
leverage this existing Army expertise, rather than attempting to
develop such capabilities independently as was the case under the
previous Arlington management. For example, the agreement in place
with ITA identifies the services that will be provided to Arlington,
performance metrics against which ITA will be measured, as well as
Arlington's responsibilities. These organizations are also responsible
for managing the use of contracts in support of their efforts;
however, the agreement with ANCP does not specifically address roles
and responsibilities associated with the use and management of these
contracts supporting Arlington requirements. Although officials from
these organizations told us that they currently understand their
responsibilities, without being clearly defined in the existing
agreements, roles and responsibilities may be less clear in the future
when personnel change.
ANCP has developed new internal policies and procedures and improved
training for staff serving as contracting officer's representatives,
and has dedicated additional staff resources to improve contract
management. Many of these efforts were in process at the time of our
review, including decisions on contracting staff needs, and their
success will depend on continued management attention. The following
summarizes our findings in this area:
* Arlington has taken several steps to more formally define its own
internal policies and procedures for contract management. In July
2010, the Executive Director of ANCP issued guidance stating that the
Army Contracting Command and USACE are the only authorized contracting
centers for Arlington. Further, ANCP is continuing efforts to (1)
develop standard operating procedures associated with purchase
requests; (2) develop memorandums for all ANCP employees that outline
principles of the procurement process, as well as training
requirements for contracting officer's representatives; and (3) create
a common location for reference materials and information associated
with Arlington contracts. In May 2011, the Executive Director issued
guidance requiring contracting officer's representative training for
all personnel assigned to perform that role, and at the time of our
review, all of the individuals serving as contracting officer's
representatives had received training for that position.
* ANCP, in coordination with the MICC-Fort Belvoir contracting office
is evaluating staffing requirements to determine the appropriate
number, skill level, and location of contracting personnel. In July
2010, the Army completed a study that assessed Arlington's manpower
requirements and identified the need for three full-time contract
specialist positions. While these positions have not been filled to
date, ANCP's needs have instead been met through the use of staff
provided by the MICC. At the time of our review, the MICC-Fort Belvoir
was providing a total of 10 contracting staff positions in support of
Arlington, 5 of which are funded by ANCP, with the other 5 funded by
the MICC-Fort Belvoir to help ensure adequate support for Arlington
requirements. ANCP officials have identified the need for a more
senior contracting specialist and stated that they intend to request
an update to their staffing allowance for fiscal year 2013 to fill
this new position.
Prior reviews of Arlington have identified numerous issues with
contracts in place prior to the new leadership at ANCP.[Footnote 11]
While our review of similar contracts found common concerns, we also
found that contracts and task orders awarded since June 2010 reflect
improvements in acquisition practices. Our previous contracting-
related work has identified the need to have well-defined
requirements, sound business arrangements (i.e., contracts in place),
and the right oversight mechanisms to ensure positive outcomes. We
found examples of improved documentation, better definition and
consolidation of existing requirements for services supporting daily
cemetery operations, and more specific requirements for contractor
performance. At the time of our review, many of these efforts were
still under way, so while initial steps taken reflect improvement,
their ultimate success is not yet certain.
Army Has Made Progress in Addressing Other Management Deficiencies at
Arlington, but Challenges Remain:
The Army has also taken positive steps and implemented improvements to
address other management deficiencies and to provide information and
assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad
range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for
ensuring accountability over remains, taking actions to better provide
information-assurance, and improving its capability to respond to the
public and to families' inquiries. For example, Arlington officials
have updated and documented the cemetery's chain-of-custody procedures
for remains, to include multiple verification steps by staff members
and the tracking of decedent information through a daily schedule,
electronic databases, and tags affixed to urns and caskets entering
Arlington. Nevertheless, we identified several areas where challenges
remain:
* Managing information-technology investments. Since June 2010, ANCP
has invested in information-technology improvements to correct
existing problems at Arlington and has begun projects to further
enhance the cemetery's information-technology capabilities. However,
these investments and planned improvements are not yet guided by an
enterprise architecture[Footnote 12]--or modernization blueprint. Our
experience has shown that developing this type of architecture can
help minimize risk of developing systems that are duplicative, poorly
integrated, and unnecessarily costly to maintain.[Footnote 13] ANCP is
working to develop an enterprise architecture, and officials told us
in January that they expect the architecture will be finalized in
September 2012. Until the architecture is in place and ANCP's ongoing
and planned information-technology investments are assessed against
that architecture, ANCP lacks assurance that these investments will be
aligned with its future operational environment, increasing the risk
that modernization efforts will not adequately meet the organization's
needs.
* Updating workforce plans. The Army took a number of positive steps
to address deficiencies in its workforce plans, including completing
an initial assessment of its organizational structure in July 2010
after the Army IG found that Arlington was significantly understaffed.
However, ANCP's staffing requirements and business processes have
continued to evolve, and these changes have made that initial
workforce assessment outdated. Since the July 2010 assessment,
officials have identified the need for a number of new positions,
including positions in ANCP's public-affairs office and a new security
and emergency-response group. Additionally, Arlington has revised a
number of its business processes, which could result in a change in
staffing needs. Although ANCP has adjusted its staffing levels to
address emerging requirements, its staffing needs have not been
formally reassessed. Our prior work has demonstrated that this kind of
assessment can improve workforce planning, which can enable an
organization to remain aware of and be prepared for its current and
future needs as an organization. ANCP officials have periodically
updated Arlington's organizational structure as they identify new
requirements, and officials told us in January that they plan to
completely reassess staffing within ANCP in the summer of 2012 to
ensure that it has the staff needed to achieve its goals and
objectives. Until this reassessment is completed and documented, ANCP
lacks assurance that it has the correct number and types of staff
needed to achieve its goals and objectives.
* Developing an organizational assessment program. Since 2009 ANCP has
been the subject of a number of audits and assessments by external
organizations that have reviewed many aspects of its management and
operations, but it has not yet developed its own assessment program
for evaluating and improving cemetery performance on a continuous
basis. Both the Army IG and VA have noted the importance of assessment
programs in identifying and enabling improvements of cemetery
operations to ensure that cemetery standards are met. Further, the
Army has emphasized the importance of maintaining an inspection
program that includes a management tool to identify, prevent, or
eliminate problem areas. At the time of our review, ANCP officials
told us they were in the process of developing an assessment program
and were adapting VA's program to meet the needs of the Army's
national cemeteries. ANCP officials estimated in January that they
will be ready to perform their first self-assessment in late 2012.
Until ANCP institutes an assessment program that includes an ability
to complete a self-assessment of operations and an external assessment
by cemetery subject-matter experts, it is limited in its ability to
evaluate and improve aspects of cemetery performance.
* Coordinating with key partners. While ANCP has improved its
coordination with other Army organizations, we found that it has
encountered challenges in coordinating with key operational partners,
such as the Military District of Washington, the military service
honor guards, and Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall.[Footnote 14]
Officials from these organizations told us that communication and
collaboration with Arlington have improved, but they have encountered
challenges and there are opportunities for continued improvement. For
example, officials from the Military District of Washington and the
military service honor guards indicated that at times they have
experienced difficulties working with Arlington's Interment Scheduling
Branch and provided records showing that from June 24, 2010, through
December 15, 2010, there were at least 27 instances where scheduling
conflicts took place.[Footnote 15] These challenges are due in part to
a lack of written agreements that fully define how these operational
partners will support and interact with Arlington. Our prior work has
found that agencies can derive benefits from enhancing and sustaining
their collaborative efforts by institutionalizing these efforts with
agreements that define common outcomes, establish agreed-upon roles
and responsibilities, identify mechanisms used to monitor and evaluate
collaborative efforts, and enable the organizations to leverage their
resources.[Footnote 16] ANCP has a written agreement in place with
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, but this agreement does not address
the full scope of how these organizations work together. Additionally,
ANCP has drafted, but has not yet signed, a memorandum of agreement
with the Military District of Washington. ANCP has not drafted
memorandums of agreement with the military service honor guards
despite each military service honor guard having its own scheduling
procedure that it implements directly with Arlington and each service
working with Arlington to address operational challenges. ANCP, by
developing memorandums of agreement with its key operational partners,
will be better positioned to ensure effective collaboration with these
organizations and help to minimize future communication and
coordination challenges.
* Developing a strategic plan. Although ANCP officials have been
taking steps to address challenges at Arlington, at the time of our
review they had not adopted a strategic plan aimed at achieving the
cemetery's longer-term goals. An effective strategic plan can help
managers to prioritize goals; identify actions, milestones, and
resource requirements for achieving those goals; and establish
measures for assessing progress and outcomes. Our prior work has shown
that leading organizations prepare strategic plans that define a clear
mission statement, a set of outcome-related goals, and a description
of how the organization intends to achieve those goals.[Footnote 17]
Without a strategic plan, ANCP is not well positioned to ensure that
cemetery improvements are in line with the organizational mission and
achieve desired outcomes. ANCP officials told us during our review
that they were at a point where the immediate crisis at the cemetery
had subsided and they could focus their efforts on implementing their
longer-term goals and priorities. In January, ANCP officials showed us
a newly developed campaign plan. While we have not evaluated this
plan, our preliminary review found that it contains elements of an
effective strategic plan, including expected outcomes and objectives
for the cemetery and related performance metrics and milestones.
* Developing written guidance for providing assistance to families.
After the Army IG issued its findings in June 2010, numerous families
called Arlington to verify the burial locations of their loved ones.
ANCP developed a protocol for investigating these cases and responding
to the families. Our review found that ANCP implemented this protocol,
and we reviewed file documentation for a sample of these cases. In
reviewing the assistance provided by ANCP when a burial error
occurred, we found that ANCP's Executive Director or Chief of Staff
contacted the affected families. ANCP's Executive Director--in
consultation with cemetery officials and affected families--made
decisions on a case-by-case basis about the assistance that was
provided to each family. For instance, some families who lived outside
of the Washington, D.C., area were reimbursed for hotel and travel
costs. However, the factors that were considered when making these
decisions were not documented in a written policy. In its June 2010
report, the Army IG noted in general that the absence of written
policies left Arlington at risk of developing knowledge gaps as
employees leave the cemetery. By developing written guidance that
addresses the cemetery's interactions with families affected by burial
errors, ANCP could identify pertinent DOD and Army regulations and
other guidance that should be considered when making such decisions.
Also, with written guidance the program staff could identify the types
of assistance that can be provided to families. In January, ANCP
provided us with a revised protocol for both agency-identified and
family member-initiated gravesite inquiries. The revised protocol
provides guidance on the cemetery's interactions with the next of kin
and emphasizes the importance of maintaining transparency and open
communication with affected families.
Formal Collaboration between the Army and VA Could Lead to
Improvements across All National Cemeteries:
A transfer of jurisdiction for the Army's two national cemeteries to
VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national
cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal
government. However, we identified several factors that may affect the
advisability of making such a change, including the potential costs
and benefits, potential transition challenges, and the potential
effect on Arlington's unique characteristics. In addition, given that
the Army has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has
improved its management, it may be premature to move forward with a
change in jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement
exist that entail less disruption. During our review, we identified
opportunities for enhancing collaboration between the Army and VA that
could leverage their strengths and potentially lead to improvements at
all national cemeteries.
Transferring cemetery jurisdiction could have both benefits and costs.
Our prior work suggests that government reorganization can provide an
opportunity for greater effectiveness in program management and result
in improved efficiency over the long-term, and can also result in
short-term operational costs.[Footnote 18] At the time of our review,
Army and VA officials told us they were not aware of relevant studies
that may provide insight into the potential benefits and costs of
making a change in cemetery jurisdiction. However, our review
identified areas where VA's and the Army's national cemeteries have
similar, but not identical, needs and have developed independent
capabilities to meet those needs. For example, each agency has its own
staff, processes, and systems for determining burial eligibility and
scheduling and managing burials. While consolidating these
capabilities may result in long-term efficiencies, there could also be
challenges and short-term costs.
Potential transition challenges may arise in transferring cemetery
jurisdiction. Army and VA cemeteries have similar operational
requirements to provide burial services for service members, veterans,
and veterans' family members; however, officials identified areas
where the organizations differ and stated that there could be
transition challenges if VA were to manage Arlington, including
challenges pertaining to the regulatory framework, appropriations
structure, and contracts. For example, Arlington has more restrictive
eligibility criteria for in-ground burials, which has the result of
limiting the number of individuals eligible for burial at the
cemetery. If Arlington cemetery were to be subject to the same
eligibility criteria as VA's cemeteries, the eligibility for in-ground
burials at Arlington would be greatly expanded.[Footnote 19]
Additionally, the Army's national cemeteries are funded through a
different appropriations structure than VA's national cemeteries. If
the Army's national cemeteries were transferred to VA, Congress would
have to choose whether to alter the funding structure currently in
place for Arlington.
Other factors that may affect the advisability of transferring
jurisdiction pertain to the potential effect on Arlington's unique
characteristics. These characteristics include the following:
* Mission and vision statements. The Army and VA have developed their
own mission and vision statements for their national cemeteries that
differ in several ways. Specifically, VA seeks to be a model of
excellence for burials and memorials, while Arlington seeks to be the
nation's premier military cemetery.
* Military honors provided to veterans. The Army and VA have varying
approaches to providing military funeral honors. VA is not responsible
for providing honors to veterans, and VA cemeteries generally are not
involved in helping families obtain military honors from DOD. In
contrast, Arlington provides a range of burial honors depending on
whether an individual is a service member killed in action, a veteran,
or an officer.
* Ceremonies and special events. Arlington hosts a large number of
ceremonies and special events in a given year, some of which may
involve the President of the United States as well as visiting heads
of state. From June 10, 2010, through October 1, 2011, Arlington
hosted more than 3,200 wreath-laying ceremonies, over 70 memorial
ceremonies, and 19 state visits, in addition to Veterans Day and
Memorial Day ceremonies, and also special honors for Corporal Frank
Buckles, the last American servicemember from World War I. VA
officials told us that their cemeteries do not support a similar
volume of ceremonies, and as a result they have less experience in
this area than the Army.
During our review, we found that there are opportunities to expand
collaboration between the Army and VA that could improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of these organizations' cemetery
operations. Our prior work has shown that achieving results for the
nation increasingly requires that federal agencies work together, and
when considering the nation's long-range fiscal challenges, the
federal government must identify ways to deliver results more
efficiently and in a way that is consistent with its limited
resources.[Footnote 20] Since the Army IG issued its findings in June
2010, the Army and VA have taken steps to partner more effectively.
The Army's hiring of several senior VA employees to help manage
Arlington has helped to foster collaboration, and the two agencies
signed a memorandum of understanding that allows ANCP employees to
attend classes at VA's National Training Center.
However, the Army and VA may have opportunities to collaborate and
avoid duplication in other areas that could benefit the operations of
either or both cemetery organizations. For example, the Army and VA
are upgrading or redesigning some of their core information-technology
systems supporting cemetery operations. By continuing to collaborate
in this area, the agencies can better ensure that their information-
technology systems are able to communicate, thereby helping to prevent
operational challenges stemming from a lack of compatibility between
these systems in the future. In addition, each agency may have
specialized capabilities that it could share with the other. VA, for
example, has staff dedicated to determining burial eligibility, and
the Army has an agency that provides geographic-information-system and
global-positioning-system capabilities--technologies that VA officials
said that they are examining for use at VA's national cemeteries.
While the Army and VA have taken steps to improve collaboration, at
the time of our review the agencies had not established a formal
mechanism to identify and analyze issues of shared interest, such as
process improvements, lessons learned, areas for reducing duplication,
and solutions to common problems. VA officials indicated that they
planned to meet with ANCP officials in the second quarter of fiscal
year 2012, with the aim of enhancing collaboration between the two
agencies. Unless the Army and VA collaborate to identify areas where
the agencies can assist each other, they could miss opportunities to
take advantage of each other's strengths--thereby missing chances to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of cemetery operations--and
are at risk of investing in duplicative capabilities.
Summary of Recommendations for Further Improvements at Arlington
National Cemetery:
The success of the Army's efforts to improve contracting and
management at Arlington will depend on continued focus in various
areas. Accordingly, we made a number of recommendations in our
December 2011 reports. In the area of contracting, we recommended that
the Army implement a method to track complete and accurate contract
data, ensure that support agreements clearly identify roles and
responsibilities for contracting, and determine the number and skills
necessary for contracting staff. In its written comments, DOD
partially concurred with these recommendations, agreeing that there is
a need to take actions to address the issues we raised, but indicating
that our recommendations did not adequately capture Army efforts
currently underway. We believe our report reflects the significant
progress made by Arlington and that implementation of our
recommendations will help to institutionalize the positive steps taken
to date.
* With regard to our recommendation to identify and implement a method
to track complete and accurate contact data, DOD noted that Arlington
intends to implement, by April 2012, a methodology based on an
electronic tool which is expected to collect and reconcile information
from a number of existing data systems. Should this methodology
consider the shortcomings within these data systems as identified in
our report, we believe this would satisfy our recommendations.
* DOD noted planned actions, expected for completion by March 2012
that, if implemented, would satisfy the intent of our other two
recommendations.
With regard to other management challenges at Arlington, we
recommended that the Army implement its enterprise architecture and
reassess ongoing and planned information-technology investments;
update its assessment of ANCP's workforce needs; develop and implement
a program for assessing and improving cemetery operations; develop
memorandums of understanding with Arlington's key operational
partners; develop a strategic plan; and develop written guidance to
help determine the types of assistance that will be provided to
families affected by burial errors. DOD fully agreed with our
recommendations that the Army update its assessment of ANCP's
workforce needs and implement a program for assessing and improving
cemetery operations. DOD partially agreed with our other
recommendations. In January, ANCP officials provided us with updates
on its plans to take corrective actions, as discussed in this
statement.
* With regard to implementing an enterprise architecture, DOD stated
that investments made to date in information technology have been
modest and necessary to address critical deficiencies. We recognize
that some vulnerabilities must be expeditiously addressed.
Nevertheless, our prior work shows that organizations increase the
risk that their information-technology investments will not align with
their future operational environment if these investments are not
guided by an approved enterprise architecture.
* Regarding its work with key operational partners, DOD stated that it
recognizes the value of establishing memorandums of agreement and
noted the progress that the Army has made in developing memorandums of
agreement with some of its operational partners. We believe that the
Army should continue to pursue and finalize agreements with key
operational partners that cover the full range of areas where these
organizations must work effectively together.
* With regard to a strategic plan, DOD stated that it was in the
process of developing such a plan. As discussed previously, ANCP
officials in January showed us a newly developed campaign plan that,
based on our preliminary review, contains elements of an effective
strategic plan.
* Regarding written guidance on the factors that the Executive
Director will consider when determining the types of assistance
provided to families affected by burial errors, DOD stated that such
guidance would limit the Executive Director's ability to exercise
leadership and judgment to make an appropriate determination. We
disagree with this view. Our recommendation does not limit the
Executive Director's discretion, which we consider to be an essential
part of ensuring that families receive the assistance they require in
these difficult situations. Our recommendation, if implemented, would
improve visibility into the factors that guide decision making in
these cases.
Finally, we recommended that the Army and VA implement a joint working
group or other such mechanism to enable ANCP and VA's National
Cemetery Administration to collaborate more closely in the future.
Both DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation. As noted, VA
stated that a planning meeting to enhance collaboration is planned for
the second quarter of 2012.
Chairmen Wilson and Wittman, Ranking Members Davis and Cooper, and
Members of the Subcommittees, this completes our prepared statement.
We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at
this time.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Belva Martin,
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, on (202) 512-4841 or
martinb@gao.gov or Brian Lepore, Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, on (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this testimony. Individuals who made key
contributions to this testimony include Brian Mullins, Assistant
Director; Tom Gosling, Assistant Director; Kyler Arnold; Russell
Bryan; George M. Duncan; Kathryn Edelman; Julie Hadley; Kristine
Hassinger; Lina Khan; and Alex Winograd.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] U.S. Army, Inspector General Agency, Special Inspection of
Arlington National Cemetery Final Report (Washington, D.C.: June 2010).
[2] The Executive Director oversees Arlington National Cemetery in
Virginia and the Soldiers' and Airmen's Home National Cemetery in
Washington, D.C.
[3] Army Directive 2010-04, Enhancing the Operations and Oversight of
the Army National Cemeteries Program (June 10, 2010).
[4] Pub. L. No. 111-339 (2010).
[5] GAO, Arlington National Cemetery: Additional Actions Needed to
Continue Improvements in Contract Management, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-99] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15,
2011).
[6] GAO, Arlington National Cemetery: Management Improvements Made,
but a Strategy is Needed to Address Remaining Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-105] (Washington D.C.: Dec. 15,
2011).
[7] Pub. L. No. 93-43.
[8] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve
Service Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-20] (Washington D.C.: Nov., 9,
2006).
[9] GFEBS is intended to improve financial, asset, and real property
management and standardize processes across the Army.
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-20].
[11] For example, see U.S. Army, Inspector General Agency, Special
Inspection of Arlington National Cemetery Final Report (Washington,
D.C.: June 2010) and Army Audit Agency, Contracting Operations in
Support of Arlington National Cemetery: Army Contracting Command
National Capital Region, A-2012-0021-ALC (Alexandria, Va.: 2011).
[12] An enterprise architecture comprises a set of descriptive models
(e.g., diagrams and tables) that define, in business terms and in
technology terms, how an organization operates today, how it intends
to operate in the future, and how it intends to invest in technology
to transition from today's operational environment to that of the
future.
[13] GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government
Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,
2011).
[14] The Military District of Washington coordinates all official
ceremonies at Arlington, including wreath-laying ceremonies and state
funerals. The military services provide burial honors for private
funeral and memorial services, and the Army provides ceremonial
support including the Sentinels at the Tomb of the Unknowns. Joint
Base Myer-Henderson Hall, located adjacent to Arlington, provides
numerous installation-support services to Arlington, including
emergency services and ceremonial support such as facilities, bus
transportation, and traffic control.
[15] Scheduling conflicts included scheduling the wrong honor guard
for a funeral and scheduling funerals during times that the honor
guards had blocked off to enable them to meet their other
responsibilities outside of Arlington.
[16] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[17] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[18] GAO, Federal Land Management: Observations on a Possible Move of
the Forest Service into the Department of the Interior, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-223] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11,
2009).
[19] Burial eligibility at VA's national cemeteries is governed by 38
U.S.C. § 2402 and 38 C.F.R. § 38.620. Burial eligibility at Arlington
is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 2410 and 32 C.F.R. § 553.15.
[20] GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government
Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar, 1,
2011).
[End of section]
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