06KIEV1639, UKRAINE: DNSA CROUCH’S NATO-THEMED DINNER INCLUDES

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIEV 001639
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2016
TAGS: PRELPGOVPARMUP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: DNSA CROUCH'S NATO-THEMED DINNER INCLUDES
A SPICY SERVING OF RADA COALITION TALK
Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)
Summary and Comment
-------------------
¶1. (C) At an April 19 NATO-themed dinner in honor of Deputy
National Security Adviser Crouch, Defense Minister Hrytsenko
and Foreign Minister Tarasyuk politely disagreed over the
attitudes toward NATO of PM-hopeful Yuliya Tymoshenko, the
Socialist Party, and Party of Regions. They also disagreed
over the best tactics for forging a workable Rada majority
coalition between President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine (OU),
Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT), and the Socialists. Hrytsenko
vouched for Tymoshenko's NATO bone fides and said it was
possible to work with or around the Socialists; Tarasyuk
discounted Tymoshenko's newfound pro-NATO rhetoric and
suggested the ex-PM Yanukovych-led Regions would be easier to
deal with on NATO than the Socialists. Coalition
possibilities rather than foreign and security policies
dominated the discussion. Tarasyuk, who as head of the Rukh
party sits on OU's Political Council, took the party line in
criticizing Tymoshenko and advocating full negotiation of a
programmatic and rules-based coalition agreement before
positions could be discussed. Hrytsenko was more
conciliatory, stressing the need to move beyond the public
posturing and finger pointing that had been the norm since
April 14 and resume direct daily coalition discussions.
Deputy Foreign Minister Buteyko wryly commented that the
ultimate spur to clinch a coalition deal would be having the
clock reach 2345 hours on the 60th and final day for a
coalition government to be formed (i.e., by 60 days after the
new Rada opens its session and the sitting government divests
itself, per the constitution, or as many as 90 days from
today). FM Tarasyuk suggested a government should be formed
by late June; DefMin Hrytsenko thought it would be sooner.
¶2. (C) Comment: It was striking that FM Tarasyuk, who
previously has been an olive-branch wielding proponent of
Orange reconciliation dating back to September 2005 in the
aftermath of the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government,
sounded more like Our Ukraine's leading anti-Tymoshenko voice
Poroshenko in criticizing Tymoshenko and outlining what would
be necessary to make the Orange coalition work. While
Tarasyuk said an Orange coalition would eventually form, his
tone and body language left his sympathies in doubt. In
contrast, Hrytsenko who claimed to be non-partisan (and
formally belongs to no party), clearly leaned in sympathies
toward Tymoshenko and more forcefully made the case for
resolving differences and reaching agreement sooner rather
than later. End summary and comment.
¶3. (SBU) Ambassador hosted a dinner April 19 in honor of
Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security
Adviser J.D. Crouch II. In attendance were Foreign Minister
Borys Tarasyuk, Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and
First Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential representative
for NATO issues Anton Buteyko. Also attending for the U.S.
side were Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for European Affairs Judith Ansley, Director for
Central, Eastern and Northern European Affairs Damon Wilson,
Director for Media and Communications Colby Cooper, Executive
Assistant Brian Naranjo, Embassy acting DATT, and Deputy
Political Counselor (notetaker).
NATO appetizers: Actions, Outreach, and Party Positions
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶4. (C) DNSA Crouch noted that some members of NATO were
skeptical of expansion in general, without reference to the
qualifications of specific aspirant countries. While such
sentiments had not yet reached the depths of Euro-pessimism
that touched the EU, they would affect the dynamics of
consideration of Ukraine's aspirations, particularly if
Ukrainian public sentiment for NATO membership remained low.
Tangible, visible efforts and results were needed to spur
momentum; the U.S. was ready to help. DefMin Hrytsenko
responded that it was up to Ukraine to produce results.
After a nearly continuous election cycle with alternating
parliamentary and presidential elections in 1998, 1999, 2002,
2004, and 2006, Ukraine now had a breathing space of nearly
four years before the next planned election (note:
presidential, in fall 2009). The new government could now
govern and show results, rather than positioning for the next
election.
¶5. (C) DefMin Hrytsenko made a pitch for NATO allies not to
use low Ukrainian public support for NATO as an obstacle to
Ukrainian membership if Ukraine met all performance
standards. FM Tarasyuk mentioned that he had spent the
previous two-and-a-half hours in a meeting with Ukrainian
NGOs talking exclusively about NATO, though the meeting had
KIEV 00001639 002 OF 004
been called to focus on both NATO and EU aspirations.
Tarasyuk had engaged the NGO representatives on how better to
streamline interaction between NGOs and the MFA, MoD, and
Government Committees on European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration, particularly in reinforcing joint
efforts for an
information campaign and outreach to Ukrainian society.
¶6. (C) Hrytsenko stressed that he continued to push forward
on reform and related decisions on an accelerated basis,
without waiting for all the formalities: for example,
recently switching the General Staff to a NATO-compatible
J-staff structure; moving defense resource management along
Robert McNamara lines, rather than the Soviet-style
approaches Ukraine had inherited; signing a strategic airlift
agreement with NATO; self-funding the Ukrainian mission in
Kosovo; offering strategic airlift for NATO support of the
African Union mission in Darfur; and securing a Cabinet of
Ministers decision April 19 to authorize the transfer of
large-caliber ammunition to Iraqi Defense Forces, similar to
the December 2005 decision to transfer equipment used by the
Ukrainian contingent in Iraq to Iraqi authorities. He felt
holding up a decision on possible Ukrainian membership until
Ukraine achieved 50-percent public support for NATO was a
wrong approach. DFM Buteyko said that a positive signal to
Ukraine on MAP (Membership Action Plan) at the April 27-28
Sofia NATO Ministerial would help Ukraine in its domestic
debate on NATO.
¶7. (C) Hrytsenko emphasized that President Yushchenko had
clearly stated that Euro-Atlantic integration was the basis
for Ukrainian foreign policy. Neither Tymoshenko nor
Yanukovych knew much about NATO; both would focus on energy,
social policy, and other domestic issues in a coalition
government. Buteyko was the Government of Ukraine (GOU)'s
interagency coordinator on NATO issues and had just chaired
the first interagency meeting. The MFA and MoD already had
their action plans prepared; the goal was to have a unified
GOU action plan for all ministries drawn up by June, written
in form in the same way a MAP would be structured.
¶8. (C) DNSA Crouch mentioned that ex-PM Tymoshenko, in a
meeting earlier April 19, had made positive statements
regarding NATO and claimed there was little difference
between her position and that of Yushchenko's (septel). FM
Tarasyuk acerbically replied: "She is good at saying things
which turn out to be too good to be true." Looking back at
the early Cabinet meetings under PM Tymoshenko in
February-March 2005, Tarasyuk said, Tymoshenko had urged him,
"Borys, please do not mention NATO." Hrytsenko interjected,
"But she learned from us over the year." Tarasyuk shot back,
"She knows what others expect her to say." DNSA Crouch
observed that Tymoshenko's April 17 AmCham speech may not
have been perfect or complete, but was her best statement yet
on economic policy.
¶9. (C) DNSA Crouch described his NATO-related exchange with
Party of Regions leader Yanukovych, in which he had urged
Yanukovych to keep options open regardless of whether Regions
ended up in opposition or government; there was no need to
turn up the rhetoric that marked the campaign (septel). A
reserved Yanukovych had said little but seemed amenable to
keeping options open. Tarasyuk noted that when Yanukovych
had been PM under Kuchma (November 2002-December 2004),
Regions' Rada faction had voted unanimously in favor of
NATO-related legislation and policies, without reservations;
that applied to the SPDU(o) party of then-Kuchma chief of
staff Medvedchuk as well. Hrytsenko added that it was
fortunate that the SPDU(o) and Natalya Vitrenko's People's
Opposition bloc, which had both run in the March 2006
parliamentary elections primarily on an anti-NATO, pro-Russia
platform, had done poorly and failed to make it over the
three-percent threshold into the next Rada. Crouch asked if
this were due to the NATO issue or other causes. Hrytsenko
judged other factors had been more decisive.
¶10. (C) Tarasyuk suggested that the Socialists were actually
more difficult to deal with on NATO issues than Regions.
Hrytsenko demurred, saying that the Socialists cared most
about economic issues; the Socialists in fact had supported
all necessary reforms and legal measures related to NATO,
including peacekeeping operations, Partnership for Peace,
interoperability, additional Kosovo budget, security sector
reform, and so on. The Socialist problem arose theoretically
in the Rada if a bill appeared too NATO-oriented; Hrytsenko
suggested there were workarounds, and that much progress
could be made over the next two years without a crisis
decision point. In any event, the Socialists would have much
to lose by threatening a walkout, since they had no interest
in returning to the opposition. Tarasyuk said that he had
reached out to a Socialist International and European
Parliament figure and former Polish President Kwasniewski to
KIEV 00001639 003 OF 004
engage Moroz on NATO issues.
¶11. (C) DNSA Crouch asked whether the new government would be
strongly in favor of launching MAP no matter what its
composition. As the U.S. engaged allies, it was important to
know Ukraine's unequivocal intent, particularly if the
government coalition contained parties that were not fully
pro-NATO. Given the skepticism on expansion in general, it
would be important for the new GOU to state clearly that MAP
and membership were definite goals. Hrytsenko said yes.
Tarasyuk grimaced while remaining silent. Hrytsenko said
that the GOU was aware of the reluctance of France to approve
a MAP for Ukraine and would work with central European
friends like Slovakia and Hungary on outreach to skeptics.
Main course: Spicy coalition fare
---------------------------------
¶12. (C) Tarasyuk then switched hats from that of Foreign
Minister to that of a leader of Rukh, one of six parties in
the Our Ukraine (OU) bloc, and a member of OU's seven-person
Political Council. He stated that Yushchenko and the OU
Political Council saw no alternative to an Orange coalition
but were determined to insist on negotiating a policy
document prior to discussion of positions. The Socialists'
three ministers in the Tymoshenko and Yekhanurov governments
in 2005-06 had never challenged Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic
course, making Socialist leader Moroz' insistence during
recent negotiations on striking mention of NATO in the
coalition document all the more strange. Tymoshenko cared
only about becoming Prime Minister, he said; the policy
substance of the coalition document mattered little to her.
Our Ukraine wanted to resolve the potential policy disputes
now, before moving forward with filling positions and forming
the government; otherwise the coalition would collapse in
short order. Tarasyuk identified Yushchenko's red line
issues as NATO, land privatization, and reprivatization.
Tarasyuk suggested there was a workable formula on NATO for
the Socialists: the existing Law on the Fundamentals of
National Security already endorsed NATO and EU membership as
guiding principles.
¶13. (C) Hrytsenko, who
had served as policy planning chief
for Yushchenko's 2004 presidential campaign and prior to that
directed the Razumkov Center, one of Ukraine's leading policy
think tanks, gently disagreed on the wisdom of setting up too
specific economic performance targets in the coalition
document. No Ukrainian leader could meet a proposed 8% GDP
growth target, given looming showdowns with Russia over the
natural gas contract and ballooning social payments. The key
was that Tymoshenko would sign nearly anything OU proposed if
OU would agree on her becoming PM. DNSA Crouch asked
Tarasyuk if OU was prepared to take that step. Without
answering directly, Tarasyuk reverted to the OU standard
line: first, agreement on the policy and rules documents,
then on positions.
¶14. (C) While sorting out policies first was formally a good
procedure, Hrytsenko allowed, current coalition formation
dynamics suggested ulterior agendas were at work. OU leaders
were also thinking about positions. Hrytsenko stated that
those in OU who were pushing for 50 objectives to be included
in the coalition document were the same people who did not
want Tymoshenko as PM. Likewise, Tymoshenko was drawing her
own redlines, stating that she would refuse to work in
government with certain OU figures. Tarasyuk claimed that
the situation was actually worse; while Tymoshenko was
accusing OU of meeting with Regions, OU knew that she had met
with Regions strategist Andriy Klyuyev three times in the
past week. Furthermore, he alleged she was in contact with
Moscow through an SPDU(o) proxy. (Note: This recalls a
similar OU charge brought up consistently since September
2005, in the wake of Tymoshenko's dismissal, when she made a
quick visit to Moscow.)
¶15. (C) Having slammed Tymoshenko as cavorting with Regions
and the Kremlin, Tarasyuk caveated his criticism by stating
that OU was "sincere" in doing its best to create an Orange
coalition. The two main obstacles were personal ambitions
(Tymoshenko) and differences in substance, particularly with
the Socialists on foreign policy. Hrytsenko retorted that
the programmatic differences between the parties were being
exaggerated. Tarasyuk, claiming to be an optimist, predicted
that OU, BYuT and the Socialists would be able to agree on a
program and on who would serve as PM. He added, "I do not
rule out Tymoshenko as PM." OU wanted neither a "white"
coalition with Regions nor Tymoshenko in opposition, he
stressed.
¶16. (C) DNSA Crouch pressed on how OU, BYuT and the
Socialists could move beyond what appeared to be a Ukrainian
KIEV 00001639 004 OF 004
political version of the chicken-and-egg dilemma. DFM
Buteyko wryly commented that the ultimate spur to clinch a
coalition deal would be having the clock reach 2345 on the
60th and final day for a coalition to be formed (note: after
convening of the new Rada, which would put establishment of a
new government potentially into July). Hrytsenko saw two
options: Tarasyuk could convince his skeptical OU colleagues
to accept Tymoshenko as PM, or, less likely, someone could
convince Tymoshenko to accept a technocratic PM on the
grounds that a coalition might collapse later in 2006, which
would leave her out of office and out of the Rada until the
next election.
¶17. (C) The immediate problem, maintained Hrytsenko, was the
lack of any discussion or meetings on a daily basis between
the three parties. Revealing that he had stopped by Our
Ukraine's headquarters on his way to dinner to talk to OU
Chairman and lead negotiator Roman Bezsmertny, Hrytsenko said
that he had advised Bezsmertny to get together with
Tymoshenko outside Kiev informally, for coffee, out of the
public eye, to break the current cycle of the parties using
the media to level charges and accusations, complicating
relations without offering solutions. The lack of any
contact for the past five days (note: since People's Union
Our Ukraine's Executive Council rejected a key part of the
April 13 coalition protocol) was a real problem, Hrytsenko
maintained; there needed to be daily contact and discussion.
¶18. (C) NSC Director Wilson expressed concern that the
Ukrainian detractors of democracy and a Euro-Atlantic course
would benefit from the Orange team falling apart a second
time, reinforcing their case for the need for "stability"
above other considerations. Hrytsenko took issue with the
underlying assumptions. Yanukovych and Regions had not
benefited from the 2005 Orange divorce, he claimed, securing
little more than two-thirds of Yanukovych's 2004 vote (32 to
44 percent) and seeing other parties eat away at their base.
Regions of course awaited the second collapse of Team Orange
and no doubt would seek to pick off votes in the Rada.
Hrytsenko suggested, however, that Tymoshenko herself was
also a master of tactics in this regard, knowing how to use
the influence and power of the PM's office to motivate MPs to
vote. In the aftermath of the loss of criminal immunity for
local and provincial council deputies, Hrytsenko maintained
that regional officials would be far less brave in
challenging central authorities.
¶19. (U) DNSA Crouch cleared this cable.
¶20. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst

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