Five years into the war in Iraq, it’s clear that Shinseki was right when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, three weeks before the war, that securing Iraq and establishing peace would require “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers.”

But the nasty truth is, the Pentagon didn’t have and still doesn’t have that many troops to commit to Iraq. At the time of Shinseki’s statement — which Pentagon civilian leaders disputed — the Army estimated that it could deploy, at the most, 293,000 of the roughly 490,000 soldiers on active duty. The rest were already committed to places like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Korea and the Sinai.

And for a long conflict, the goal is to have no more than one-third of the force deployed at once: One unit recovering from deployment, one unit deployed and one unit training and preparing to deploy.

That’s why 12-month tours became 15 months, thousands of soldiers found their enlistments extended under “stop-loss,” individuals and units have returned for second, third and even fourth tours and most National Guard and Reserve members found themselves called up for duty. (At times, as much as 37 percent of the total force in Iraq was Guard and Reserve.)

In fact, military insiders admit that the much-vaunted “surge” of about 30,000 troops was not based on how many troops really were needed, but on how many were available.

There is broad agreement that today’s military is too small to handle the missions of today and tomorrow.

And if you ask most people in uniform today, they’ll say it’s all the fault of the Clinton administration’s military cuts.

Blaming Clinton has also been a theme of Republicans dating back to the 2000 election and into this year’s election campaign.

But if you look at annual active duty end strengths, it becomes clear that Clinton only continued cuts that began under George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney:

Equally significant, the biggest cuts for the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps came during G.H.W. Bush budgets. Only Clinton’s Navy cuts exceeded Bush’s military cuts, even though Clinton had twice as many years in office.

“End strength” is one-day snapshot — the number of military personnel actually in uniform on the last day of each fiscal year, Sept. 30.

Because the fiscal year begins on Oct. 1, a president comes into office inheriting the final fiscal year budget of his predecessor and typically is unable to make major changes.

The above charts show actual active duty end strength, according to Department of Defense figures. There are two measures of end strength: authorized and actual.

Authorized end strength is the number of people each service is allowed to have by law, set forth in annual congressional authorizations. Actual end strength is just what it sounds like: the number of people actually in a given service on Sept. 30.

Each service is allowed to exceed its authorized end strength by up to 2 percent during peacetime. The president can waive the 2-percent cap during wartime and did shortly after 9/11; since then, the Air Force and Navy have been required to reduce manpower to meet lower authorized end strengths than they had in 2001.

What? Lower end strengths?

Yes; despite the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-terrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa and increased concerns about countries like Iran and North Korea, the Air Force and Navy have been required to downsize to free up budget money for the wars and manpower increases for the Army and Marine Corps.

In fact, the actual total active duty military end strength for Sept. 30, 2007 is smaller than when George W. Bush took office — and the smallest end strength since at least 1950, the earliest year for which the Pentagon has published numbers.

Don’t believe it? Take a look at the official Pentagon numbers in the charts below:

(These numbers differ from those in the military deaths tables in a previous entry for two reasons: 1. They are based on active duty service members only and do not include Guard and Reserve, and 2. They are fiscal year end strengths (Sept. 30) while the fatality numbers are from calendar years (Jan. 1 through Dec. 31.))

So does Clinton get a pass on the too-small military?

Of course not — he continued the downsizing envisioned by G.H.W. Bush and Cheney, but tweaked it based on the Bottom-Up Review his first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, conducted in 1993.

The BUP “projected a reduced force structure still capable of fighting and winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts. Forces would include 10 active Army divisions; 11 carrier battle groups, 45 to 55 attack submarines, and about 345 ships; 5 active Marine brigades; and 13 active and 7 reserve Air Force fighter wings. The report also called for additional prepositioned equipment and airlift/sealift capacity, improved anti-armor and precision-guided munitions, and enhanced Army National Guard combat brigade readiness.”

And Clinton continued downsizing while deploying forces to Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo and the “no-fly zones” in Northern and Southern Iraq and for numerous humanitarian relief operations, putting increased stress on both active duty and reserve members.

G.H.W. Bush and Cheney made deep cuts and laid out a five-year plan to cut more. Clinton and his defense secretaries continued to cut while increasing the military’s workload – its OpsTempo – while underfunding maintenance and replacement of aging equipment. Democratic and Republican-controlled congresses kept budgets tight while tacking on expensive weapons systems that military leaders didn’t ask for.

And we, the public, stood by and let it happen.

So just how small is today’s military, historically?

About 43 percent smaller than during the peak size in 1966, during the Vietnam War. And the Army is just over a third of its peak Vietnam size, reached in 1968.

Perhaps more significant, both the total force and the Army are about two-thirds the size they were during the worst years of the “hollow force” following Vietnam:

Regardless of who deserves how much blame for a “too small” military, the next administration faces one of two choices: Dramatically increase the military budget, for manpower, weapons and equipment — or dramatically reduce the military’s missions.