The above Pashto couplet points to the fate of the ancient Pashtun nation stretched between Oxusin the north and Indus in the south andreflecting historic trade and invasion routs. The battle between the former Silk-istan and current Pipeline-istan is now determining the Pashtun destiny.Pashtuns are the superpower of egalitarian conscience and a culture of resistance. In such capacity they have been fighting against militarilysuperior (super)powers reflecting humankind inherent desire to be free.Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1980-88) characterized the Afghan resistance against the fomer Soviet “Evil Empire”as “man’s highest inspiration for freedom.” Also, he praised the former Mujahedinas “the moral equal of our Founding Fahters .” But in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy the war in Afghanistan has been, to a great extent, put forth asa war for human rights of the Afghan people, namelyto liberate them from the oppressionof Taliban and the majority Pashtuns. Some nine years prior tothe disaster of September 11, 2001, “CIA World Factbook” (a type of “finished intelligence”) had reduced statistics of the majority Pashtuns in Afghanistan. We shall go to the roots of thiscorrupt strategy. I am very thankful to Dr. Daud Miraki and Dr. Zaman Stanizai for their suggestions and constructive criticism of the rough draft of this writing.

Introduction

The independent nature of the Pashtun people had unavoidable consequences for the Pashtun Nation. Their spirit of self-determination has collided with the colonial powers of the past and with the imperial powers of today.

With approximately 60 million in Afghanistan and on the other side of the British- imposed Durand Line (1893), current Pakistan, it is a potent force that has made the global powers with local and regional agendas nervous. Consequently, throughout history, the enemies of Pashtuns have conspired to undermine them by suppressing them directly or used local minorities to do their bidding.In the 20th century, when a charismatic King, Amanullah Khan (1919-29) led Afghanistan, British conspired and used a local bandit of minority Tajik background (Bacha Saqaw: the son of water carrier)to undermine independent Pashtun rule and the promise of progress on the horizon effectively elevating Afghanistan from underdevelopment.

Sixtyyears later in 1992, Afghanistan suffered from another Saqawi (by connotation, Saqawi is synonymous with chaos, anarchy): After the demise of the Soviet installed regime, Afghan minorities of the Northern Alliance embarked on a wicked campaign of fabrication and lies. The Massoud-Rabani regime destroyed the UN transitional plan and created an anarchy, a state of disorder and lawlessness thatwas called “The Second Saqawi” (Samsor Afghan).They inherited an anti-Pashtun initiative from the former Soviet Union that had a peace accord with Ahmad Shah Massoud (See Richardson).Massoud might have attempted to undermine Pashtun demographics during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Hence, when the government of Burhanudin Rabani and his protégé Commander Ahamd Shah Massoud came to power in 1992, a more scrupulous and malicious campaign was launched to fundamentally change the demographic landscape of the Pashtun people in official records.

This malicious and hateful campaign consisted of using the government apparatus to undermine Pashtun majority status by fabricating statistics and sharing them with international organizations including the CIA World Factbook. This wicked yet strategic plan intended to cement the position of Afghan minorities in any future geopolitical dealing. Hence, in October of 2001, when the US invaded Afghanistan, the custodians of the post-1992 Tajik-led government, the Northern Alliance served the US’s interest and used those fabricated statistics that it secured during their reign (1992-1996) to make their case.

The deliberate undertaking by the Massoud-Rabani regime (April 1992-September 1996) to downgrade majority Pashtun demographics was immediately reflected in CIA World Factbook (July 1992).What was the purpose of this tactic? This pursuit is deeply rooted in the nature of Soviet/Russian design, which backed minority ethnic politics to override national politics in Afghanistan.A U.S.-educated and prolific socio-political analyst of Afghan descent Dr. Stanizai has succinctly explained the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan.

I will organize his approach in six steps.

STEP ONE: The Soviets/Russians focusedon the debasing of “the most resistant” of the ethnic groups; namely, the majority Pashtuns because they were usually the leading group in the Afghan armed forces, a majority among the Afghan resistance organizations, and “the cultural core of Afghanistan’s ‘national’ identity”.To clarify his statement, Dr. Stanizai writes that the “uncompromising” resistance commander Zabihullah Mujahed was “the only” non-Pashtun, whom the Soviets “wanted dead” and whose unyielding position “may have done him in”.

STEP TWO: The Soviets/Russians worked on curtailing the numerical strength of the Pashtun population: They stepped uptheir military operations and aerial bombardments of the Pashtun areas in the south, while leaving the non-Pashtun areas in “relative calm” and“virtually intact”. Indeed, at one point, the Soviets contemplated the idea of “moving the capital” from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif in the north, the second largest Afghan city, “replacing Kandahar, which laid in ruins”.

STEP THREE:In 1989 the Soviet forces retreated beyond the northern borders of Afghanistan, due to two realities on the ground:They pulled back only “after making sure” that (a) theresistant Pashtuns had been “weakenedsufficiently”, and they would not be pursued into Central Asia (as the then U.S. President George H. Bush pursued “a rapprochement with a kinder and gentler declining” Soviet Russia).

STEP FOUR:The non-Pashtun minorities in the north were organized in the Northern Alliance (originally named: Supervisory Council of the Northern Regions= shora-e nezar-e safahat-e shamal). This was a unified minority front to fight against“all aspects of the Pashtun life”.Dr. Stanizai writes that “thus on the eve of the centennial” of thecolonial Durand Treaty that had divided Afghanistan in 1893, “a deep chasm was created in the ethno-linguistic mosaic”of Afghanistan.

STEP FIVE:Supported by the Sovietsduring the resistance and their staunch former Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal’sgenerals, the Northern Alliance leaderMassoud claimed victory in Kabul in Apil of 1992and replaced Karmal’s successor Dr. Najibullah, an ethnic Pashtun.Massoudattributed his triumph to the Northern Alliance, to which Karmal ethnically belonged. This gesture was symbolic in the ethnic political arena organized around “Tajik supremacy” while undermining, targeting and depriving the Pashtun majority. The Northern Alliance under the leadership of Massoud was implementing “the ‘anybody-but-Pashtun’ agenda”. Massoud forced President Sebghatullah Mujadidi, a figurehead, out of office after two months and replaced him with Borhanoddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik.

STEP SIX:

With the onset of the Tajik-centered government installed and run by the Massoud-Rabbani team, a deliberate anti-Pashtun campaign began with the explicit goal of defrauding Pashtuns of their identity, using the State apparatus and institutions. Using bureaucratic fraud and coercion, large segment of Pashtuns inside Afghanistan and returning refugees from Pashtunkhwa (former NWFP: 1901-2010) were given new national identity cards that identified them as Tajiks.This was part of a calculated campaign to undermine the majority status of Pashtuns and fraudulently increased the percentage of Tajiks.Other ethnic minorities targeted Pashtuns violently by terrorizing them.For example, Hazara forces targeted Pashtun homes and violated Pashtun families until they were forcefully evicted from their homes, particularly in the 3rd and 4th districts of Kabul. Similarly, Uzbek militia looted homes in the predominantly Pashtun districts of the city until Pashtuns abandoned their homes and became refugees inside and outside the country. At the “national” level, “the ethnic cleansing campaigns began in the north”, where entire Pashtun villages were depopulated through campaigns of terror.Also, for further information on Massoud’s links to Soviets/Russians ,see U.S. thorough and trustworthy expert on Afghanistan, author, and journalist Richardson, who traveled to Afghanistan in 1986, 1987, 1990,1991and 1997.

Consequently, the Tajik led government of Massoud-Rabbaniconcocted new census aimed at distorting the ground realities of Afghan society by reducing Pashtuns from nearly 60% to 38% and increaseing the proportion of Tajiks from 12% to 25%.The Kabul regime disseminated these figures to international organizations as official data ( Stanizai receivedthis information from the late Afghan academician Abdul Shakur Rashad (1921-2004), whose private home-based library was looted by Northern Alliance warlords).Soon these fabricated population figureswere reflected in the CIA World Factbook (July 1992) and most probably from this source to the National Geographic World Atlas and the World Almanac, among other publications. The CIA even sent CDs of the above data to Russian libraries (an Afghan living in Russia reported about this information in printed Afghan media in Western Europe. Zirakyar). For more information about the above six steps, consult Stanizai, “From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan”. Electronic version: December 16, 2009. http://www.stanizai.org/[November 15, 2012].Stanizai is a sharp political analyst in Afghan and Islamic affairs.

Today( April 25, 2013), I received an important write up by Richardson, who is not in reality a “Pashtun Ghost Writer”, but a resourceful and honest American journalist, author and expert on the issues of Afghanistan. The anti-Pashtun plot discussed in Talooqan conference of 2003 might have been running parallel to theCIA’s statistics that reduced majority Pashtuns to the largest minority in Afghanistan (Talooqan is the capital of the Takhar province in northern Afghanistan).This plan reminds us of the former Soviet leader Brezhnev’s scheme to divide Afghanistan in 1981. The Talooqan plan was forged by American private imperialism and Russia, the successor of former social imperialism.The late Burhanuddin Rabani, the former Tajik president of the civil war period (1992-96), participated in the Talooqan conference. “The anti-Pashtun orientation of the Bush Administration financed and fueled the conference, which was reported to have cost $75 million dollars.” At the Talooqan conference of 2003“were present all factions of the Northern Alliance accompanied by an ever-present throng of Communist generals,” but the majority Pashtuns “were denied representation” in the above conference. (Richardson, April 25, 2013).

According to CIA, its own "CIA World Factbook” is one of the three types of “finished

intelligence”, which means “the final product of intelligence cycle”, which in turnis the process by which information is (a) received, (b) refined( “analyzed and interpreted”) into intelligence and (c) presented to policymakers.The other two types offinished intelligence are “The President’s Daily Brief” and the “National Intelligence Estimates”.Former intelligence officer Robert L. Suettinger relates thatNational Intelligence Estimates (NIE) “necessarilyhave to devolve into a realm of speculation”. The October 2002prewar intelligenceaboutIraq’s weapons of mass destruction soon became nothing more than the “mashroom cloud” of lies. After this war, however, U.S. and British leaders justified their action by focusing on the character of Saddam Hussein rather than on the evidence for his capabilities. British leader Churchill mentioned to Soviet leader Stalin at the Teheran Conference in 1943: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”

Social and Political Science Professor and President of American Political Science Association (2001) Robert Jervis wrote: “All too often…intelligence estimates tell us more about interests and foreign policy preferences of powerful groups in government than it does about what the other side’s intentions and capabilities are.”

In context of “the clash of civilizations”, the CIA’s statistics for Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups can be interpreted.

The following table presents the estimated statistics of Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups from 1981 to 2012.From 1992, the percentage of Pashtuns and their language was significantly lowered in the CIA World Factbook. The year 1992, when the CIA lowered the Pashtuns’ statistics, their attempt coincided with the onset of pro-Tajik regime of Massuod and Rabani in Afghanistan, which destroyed the UN transitional plan.

Afghan Demographics in CIA World Factbook 1981-2012

YearEthnic Group Percentage LanguagePercentageTotal Population

EstimatesEstimatesEstimates

کالقوميسلنېژبـنئسلنېټولوګړي

1981(1360) Pashtuns50%Pashto50%15,193,000

Tajiks25% Farsi(Persian) 35%

Hazaras9% Uzbeki,Turkmeni11%

Uzbeks 9% all other languages4%

All others7%

1990(1369)Pashtuns50% Pashto 50%15,862,293

Tajiks 25% Farsi 35%

Hazaras 12%-15% Uzbeki,Turkmeni11%

Uzbeks9%all other languages4%

All others3%-4%

1991(1370) Same as above Same as above 16,450,304

1992(1371)Pashtuns 38% Pashto35%16,095,664

Tajiks25%Farsi50%

Hazaras19%Uzbaki,Turkmeni11%

Uzbeks 6%all other languages4%

All others 12%

2001(1381) Pashtuns38% Pashto 35%26,813,057

Tajiks 25% Farsi50%

Hazaras 19% Uzbaki,Turkmeni11%

Uzbaks 6%all other languages4%

All others8%

2006-2012Pashtuns 42%Pashto 35%(31,056,997;

(1385-1391)Tajiks 27% Farsi(Persian) 50% 31,889,923;

Hazaras 9% Uzbeki & Turkmeni 11%32,738,376;

Uzbeks9% all other languages 4%33,609,937;

All others 13% …………………………. 29,835,392;

July 2012 estimates…. 30,419,928).

Data collected and organized from the “CIA World Factbook” by RahmatZirakyar

Now, the question is justifiable whether the reduction of Pashtun statisticsinthe “CIA World Factbook”(1992-2012 ) is self-serving, a mask for U.S support for minority rule in Afghanistan following the 911 catastrophe?

Shedding Light on CIA World Factbook Statistics for Afghanistan

It is important to mention that ethnic divisiveness was first used by Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 18th and 19th century as a vehicle for dividing and conquering. During their occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979-Febraury 1989), the Soviets tried to lower statistical significance of the majority Pashtuns in their country. The purpose of this politics was to prepare Afghanistan for partition. To achieve this goal, the Soviet military operations tremendously debased and dehumanized Pashtuns while recruiting non-Pashtun Massoud, Dostam and others to facilitate the transition of northern tier of Afghanistan into the Soviet system. There were two probable ways for the realization of this design: Via partition of Afghanistan or its eventual annexation to Central Asian Soviet republics, where Afghan Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen have ethnic kinsmen.

The name of Afghan communist Babrak Karmal (1929-1996) is synonymous with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). In his era (1979-1986), a campaign for population census was launched to manipulate Pashtun population statistics. To effortlessly manipulate the demographic realities, most of the time this question was asked:“In which language are you fluent?” ( ba kodam lesan mosalat asted?).

بهکداملسانمسلطاستید

(Private information shared with me by a member of the Central Committee of the then ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Zirakyar).

Since many Pashtuns are able to speak Pashto as well as Dari, their answers reflecting confidence in both languages were manipulated to mask the true size of the Pashtun people and falsely elevate Tajik percentage in the country. This way, the pro-Soviet Karmal’s census crew camouflaged the ethnic identity o Pashtuns. Generals of the Karmal faction sided with Ahmad Shah Massoud and helped him to consolidate power in Kabul in April of 1992 whereby effectively neutralizing the U.N. transition plan.Consequently, this maneuvering coalition along ethnic and linguistic lines led to the “Second Saqawi”:anarchy and the civil war (1992-1996).

It is important to know that the academic landscape of international relations and global politics faced certain fundamental morphological transformation. After all, the Soviet Union was on its deathbed and a new reformulation had to emerge to both make sense of the emerging changes and serve as forecasts for future policy formulations. Hence, soon after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February of 1989, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”(1990) by Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern History Bernard Lewis and “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993- expanded to a book in 1996) by renowned Political Scientist Professor Huntington) emerged.Generally, the West discovered Islam (officially radical Islam) as the “New Communism”. In context of such political mentality, CIA World Factbook statistics for Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups can be interpreted.

The CIA World Factbook is published each year in the month of July. As we know, the anti-Pashtun Northern Alliance came to power in Kabul inthe month of April 1992. In less than threemonths after this event, the CIA World Factbook was published in the month of July, in which the statistics of majority ethnic Pashtuns were considerablyreduced from 50 percent to 38 percent and those of their language from 50 percentage to 35 percent. I want to explain thisissue:For the first time in 1992, The CIA World Factbook considerably lowered the statistical significance of Pashtuns.(Zirakyar, 2009;and Richardson, 2009, p.275).

What is the purpose of inflating the population size of non-Pashtun minorities while downgrading the majority Pashtun demographics? The lasting and enduring relations between CIA and Northern Alliance suggest that both of them needed each other’s cooperation in reducing Pashtun ethnic and linguistic statistics. This deliberate and self-serving undertaking by the CIA to lower Pashtun socio-linguistic data is indicative of a public relations ploy for a world-wide support for an unjust war, which was packagedas a just war: to free the majority (minority non-Pashtuns) from the so-called oppression of the minority (majority Pashtuns). This statistical-psychological operation helped Washington to disenfranchise and alienate the majority Pashtuns. Hence, the CIA World Factbook reduced the size of Pashtun population in Afghanistan from majority Pashtuns to the largest ethnic group in their country.

Two reliable Afghan scholars whose names need not be disclosed told me (Zirakyar) that three men were “involved” (dakheel) in the process of reducing Pashtun statistics: Two (R.F. and E.E) are non-Pashtun Afghans holding PhD’s in linguistics, and the third one (T.F.) is a U.S. expert on Afghanistan with good ties to “Zal” (Zalmay Kh.). From the two non-Pashtun Afghan linguists one is a translator and teacher in a U.S. military establishment,and the other was a high-ranking politician in previous Afghan governments. Both of them had maintained very good relations with Massoud-Rabbani regime in Kabul (April 1992-September 1996). Once again, this information substantiates my assertion that the CIA and the Massoud-Rabbani regime needed each other’s cooperation to decrease the majority Pashtun demographics. Massoud and his acolytes hated Pashtuns, particularly their language Pashto because it has the substance for the national identity of Afghanistan as a state and as a country. A Pashto proverb says: “Don’t kill the beggar, just take away his begging bowl.”

ملنګمهوژنه،کچکـولورنهواخـله

Colonialism not only controls colonized people through administrators of the dominant colonial culture but indirectly by using subservient members of the colonized culture. Colonialism and imperialism areconsiderably similar and each energizes the other: Their motive is to exploit the colonized or controlled nations. Massoud served as dues ex machina in the Soviet, Iranianand Americanpolitical agenda in Afghanistan.

A U.S.-born Eric Margolisis a veteran journalist, writer and “Eisenhower Republican,” whowrites mainly about the Middle East, South Asia and Islam. He came to the conclusion in 2009 that America cannot establish peace and stability in Afghanistan unless the majority Pashtuns (“55%”) are “enfranchised”, namely “dealing directly with Taliban”,who are “part of the Pashtun people”.

The following tabulation presents the ethnic and linguistic statistics presented by the late Afghan Academician Abdul Shakur Rashad as a reaction to the false demographics published in the CIA “Word Factbook” only three months after the onset of pro-Tajik regime, in July 1992.

In the second row of theabove table, the last name of German-speaking Austrian expert on Afghanistan is misspelled (Clumborg). Its correct spelling is Klimburg. Max Klimburg holds graduate degrees in Art History and Ethnology. His book waspublished in 1966 with thiscompletetitle “Afghanistan: Das Land im historischen Spannungsfeld Mittelasiens”.I am very sure that this is the book quoted in the above table. Now, I will turn to other western sources dealing with Afghan demographics.

Estimates of Afghan Ethnic Statistics Presented in Other Western Sources

Gul Janan Sarif indicated in his dissertation thesis (1972) that from 11-12 million Afghans circa nine million have Pashto as mother language.H.F. Schurmannestimated( 1962) that Pashtuns make up at least half of the Afghan population. Similarly, D.N. Wilber (1962) figured that Pashtuns make up 50%-60% of the Afghan population. According toArea Handbook for Afghanistan (4th edition, 1973),from 16 million Afghans “over 8” millions are Pashtuns.According to. Magnus and Naby (1998), the Pashtuns “form the most important and probably the most numerous ethnic group in Afghanistan….the standard estimate is that 40 to 50 percent of the [Afghan] population is” Pashtuns (p.12).Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. III (1992) estimates that Pashtuns “constituted from 50 to 60 percent of the population of prewar Afghanistan . Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996 ) wrote that Pashtuns “comprise the largest group, 54% of the total population.” The official languagesof Afghanistan are Pashto and Dari “or Persian” that are “spoken by 52% and 30% of the population respectively.”Fareed Zakaria, the host of CNN’s important foreign affairs show (GPS), was discussing with Peter Galbraith (former U.N. Representative to Afghanistan). Here Zakariaspoke of “majority Pashtuns, 50%”. April 11, 2010). Arnold was a U.S. intelligence officer assigned to Afghanistan, Germany, Sweden, Burma, Japan, and England. He retired in 1979. In his book (1983, P. 2), Arnold wrote thatPashto is “the native tongue of about 55 percent of the population. Nevertheless, Arnold is pointing outto a prevailing and strange linguistic reality in Afghanistan: “Oddly, although Pashtuns comprise over half the population, their language is not the dominant one.”

Nyrop and Seekins (2001/ Electronic Version) statedthatmost population statistics in Afghanistan arefounded on estimates. The first and“most scientific demographic survey” wasimplementedin Afghanistan in 1972-1974 by the State University of New York for the United States Agency for International Development (AID), in cooperation with the then Afghan government.This survey declared a settled population of 10.8 million. However, it did not report the nomadic population, which was “separately estimated at slightly more than 1 million” (p.99).On the same page we can read that the Afghan population estimatein 1995 amounted to 18.4 million.A few pages later we can easily decipher anotherpopulation estimate in 1996: “approximately” 40% of Afghans were Pashtuns, successively followed by25.3% Tjiks,18% Hazaras, 6.3% Uzbeks, 2.5% Turkmen, while other ethnic groups totaled to 7.9% including 1% Qizilbash (p. 104). Now, take a look at another population size of Pashtuns in 1995 on the same page: “The largest and traditionally most politically powerful ethnic group” of Pashtunsreached in 1995 “an estimated 10.1 million…”(p.104). If we divide this estimated number by the estimated total population number, the result for Pashtun population size shall be nearly 55%, unless it is an error committed bythe authors/editors (Nyrop and Seekins)? 10,100,000/18,400,000=0.5489=55% Pashtuns.

Even U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks (June 2000-July 2003) who led the invasion of Afghanistanin 2001 andthe invasion of Iraq in 2003, spoke of “majority Pashtuns” (see below).

Let’s take a look at a few French sources. According toEncylopedia de L’Agora (2013):Pashtunsmake up38% and their language Pashto35% , Tajiksare (25%),and “perse afghan” (Dari ) 50%, Hazaras are19%, Turkmens are 11%. As reported by Le petit Larousse (2011): Pashtunsare 40% and Tajiks are 30%.As stated in Larousse Encyclopedique (2007): Pashtunsamount to 40%. Pursuant to ONG show (Tomorrow’s Afghanistan) created in 2001: Pashtunsconstitute 40%), Tajiks 32%, Hazaras 9%. In keeping with Atlas Economique Mondial (2000), Pashtuns consist of 38%, Tajiks 25%, and Hazaras 14% of the Afghan population. I am very thankful to Dr. Osman Rostar Taraki for sharing the above French data with me (March 13, 2013).

The French statistics for Afghan ethnic composition need to be scrutinized. They illustrate the French government’s strong inclination toward an anti-Pashtun group and its so-called “legendary” commander Massoud. We caneasily identify resemblance between the above French and CIA’s statistics aboutthe Afghan ethnic and linguistic structure. The reason is that former colonial France and current imperial U.S.A. have a common denominator for the realization oftheir national interests: thepolitical puppet Ahmad Shah Massoud. He had the courageto auction the independence, sovereignty and territorialintegrity of Afghanistan to colonial and imperial powers (Soviet Union, Russia, France, and U.S.A.) and Persian-speaking Iran without any discrimination.

I assume that after 1992British and German sources might have followed the CIA’s template for theAfghan socio-linguistic composition.

To refute the cooked up statistics, I need to present the Wak Foundation for Afghanistan’s comprehensive study and data. Until now, this research and survey project has produced the most authoritative and authentic document on the ethnic composition of Afghanistan.

Wak Foundation’s Statistics for AfghanEthnic and Linguistic Groups

For the record,“The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan" is a six-year survey and research project ( April 1991- July 1996). It was conducted by the then Peshawar/Pashtunkhwa-based Wak–Foundation for Afghanistan which was published in 1998 (1377 Solar Hijri). This self-funding organization is Research and Implementation Institute for Afghanistan’sRehabilitation, Development and Drug Control Programmes.Engineer Mohammad Enam Wak is the Founder and President of the Wak Foundation for Afghanistan (I will be using here its short form: Wak Foundation). He is of Tarin-Pashtun heritage born in 1954 inSorkhrod of Nangarhar province and graduated from the Geology Department at the Kabul University in Afghanistan. Enam Wak is the author of several publications in his mother language Pashto. While working in Iran, his two books were published there in Farsi (Persian). To refute the cooked up statistics, I need to present the Wak Foundation for comprehensive study and data for Afghanistan.

Until now, this research and survey project has produced the most authoritative and authentic document on the ethnic composition of Afghanistan.In 2012The Aryana Encyclopedia (da aryana daieratul ma’aref) in Kabul printed(p. 455) ethnic statistics that are matching with those published by the Wak Foundationin (1998= 1377 Solar A.H.): Pashtun (62.73%), Tajik(12.38%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbeks (6.10%), Turkmen (2.69%), etc. Mrs. Soraya Popal, who is currently the President of the Academy of Sciences in Kabul, had declared the above statistics in the House of Representative of Afghanistan (wolasi jarga). Below is the Pashtotext published in the Aryana Encyclopedia:

The survey of Wak Foundation has credibility for the detailed and meticulous efforts; familiarity with the cultural nuances and socio-ethnic organization of the Afghan society; and the time spent achieving results.

Consultations with Afghan scholars, intellectuals, dignitaries,former civil servants, teachers, and religious and tribal leaders took place. These discussions broadened the survey staff members’ horizon to respect the socio-cultural norms of local communities, as the circumstances may require. Also, they were trained by experts.Besides, preliminary survey was conducted in early 1991 among refugee population residing in Iran( Tehran and Mashad), Peshawar, and Quetta. Similar exploratory interviews were run with knowledgeable people in large cities of Afghanistan in early 1991. This survey started with zone and extended down to the village.The actual survey in Afghanistan was mainly conducted on the district (wolaswali) level while in some locations on the village level (May 1991-September1996). During the actual survey, some of its field members went to Russia and Central Asian countries in 1995 . Their mission was to verify with Afghans there the data of the preliminary survey conducted in Afghanistan’s northernprovinces. “Some of the interviews” conducted in central Asian countries “obliged” the Wak Foundation to “repeat the survey in some”of the northern provinces of Afghanistan like Baghlan, Samagan and Balkh.“A few districts in these provinces” were reexamined in early 1996.Nancy Hatch Dupree, the wife of the lateU.S. distinguished expert on Afghanistan Professor Louis Dupree, wrote in her endorsement of the Wak Foundation project about the Afghan ethnic composition:“Rarely have Afghans taken an interest in this bewildering subject”.Therefore, she complimented Wak for “ being a pioneer in this essential endeavour” (11 June 1998, University Town, Peshawar). A short version of this 255-page book in Pashto was published in Englishin July of 1999 in Peshawar, and its final draft was “edited” by Nancy H. Dupree.

Attempt to Kill Mohammad Enam Wak, June 1, 2000

The effectiveness of the Wak Foundation became a threat to the conspirators of both the Massoud-Rabani regime in Kabul and the Punjabi-run government of Pakistan. To destroy this important institution at its core, they might have hand in the attempt to assassinate the founder and president of the Wak Foundation.

Following the Pashto version of The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan (1998), its compact English version was published in July of 1999. A third book published by Wak was Federalism in Afghanistan (2000), in which he discussed the unification of Pashtuns on both sides of the illegal, invalidand immoral Durand Line of 1893. Peshawar-basedAfghan sources believed that these three book hadunsettled the Pakistani intelligence and Massoud. Theleader of the Northern Alliance Massoud could not tolerate (a) the Pashtun identity of Afghanistan, (b) the Pashtun ethnic statistics in Afghanistan (62.73%) and (c)the need for Pashtun unification. The Pakistani intelligence servicewas agitated by the argument of Pashtun unification. In light of suchpositions, one can argue that the decision to assassinate Enam Wak was triggered by the above three books. Leaving his home for work, Eanm Wak was repeatedly shot in the front of the exit door of his residence in Peshawar by unidentified gunmen on June 1, 2000:twice in the left arm and once in the abdomen (Wak saw two men at the two front corners of his residence). After

being released from the hospital, he took refuge in Norway.

The probability of Massoud involvement in the attempted assassination of Wak is more likely than the Pakistani Intelligence service since Massoud had to gain a lot more from his death than the Pakistani Intelligence. Moreover, Pakistani Intelligence has professional assassins and they make sure the targeted person does not survive. The fact that Wak survived points to the culprits wanting to dissipate expeditiously in order to avoid capture by localpolice. Had it been the Pakistani Intelligence, they would have made sure to finish him before departing the scene of the crime since they had no reason to worry about capture.

Wak Foundation Criticizing Previous Population Statistics

Due to the fact that the Afghan society is heterogeneous, Wak Foundationhas

First, the previouspopulation statistics did not distinguish betweenethnic and language groups in Afghanistan:For example,Persian (Farsi, Dari)-speakingethnic Pashtuns in Herat were counted as Tajiks.Farsi-speakingHazaras areethnically Hazaras, not Tajiks. Althoughmembers ofthe Afghanroyal family wereusing the Afghan version of Persian (Dari), they were not called Tajiks, but Mohammadzai Pashtuns. The Pashtun society is predominantly tribal, in which the identity is secured mainly by ethnicity (qaum).If we compare the Afghan society to an orange, then language is the skin of the orange, not the independent parts (tribes) within its skin.

Determining the ethnic percentage in Afghanistan by mixing language identity with ethnic identity caused problems for determining ethnic identity. This means that Tajik is not an ethnic identity, but a default linguistic identity.Consequently,Pashtuns, who couldor did not speak Pashto, were counted as Tajiks.Farsi/Dari speaking Pashtuns lost their cultural/languageidentity by 7.73%to Tajiks: Pashtuns are ethnically 62.73% of the total Afghan population. However, linguistically/culturallythey are 55%. Nevertheless, Pashtuns made up ethnically as well as culturally the majority ofthe total Afghan population (17,918,454) in 1996, the year of the completion ofthe Wak Foundation’s survey.

Second, smaller ethno-religious minorities like Ismailite Tajiks and Shiite Qizelbash are counted with Hazaras. This, in turn, increased the number of Hazara group. U.S. anthropologist and expert on Afghanistan Louis Durpree (1929-1989) deemed Taimanisas part of Aimaqs; however, they are originally Pashtuns, not Aimaqs.Most of the Farsibans (Farsi-speaking people) in Herat are Pashtuns while some of them areAimaqs.

Third, mixing language with ethnicity is not appropriate for counting the population of Afghanistan. Precisely, Afghan Persian (Dari) is the mother tongue of Tajiks; however, it does not mean that all Persian-speaking Afghans areof Tajik heritage. The question in this state of affairs is this: Why non-Tajik Afghans prefer to speak Persian (Dari)? The main reason for this situation is that Dari/Farsi was the language of the court, bureaucracy, business, the press, as well as mostly the language of education.

Fourth, Pashto language was suffering from social prestige because the ethnically Pashtun royaland ruling family did not try to learn, readspeak and write in Pashto. Hence, Pashto became a neglected, second class national language. If the King and his family members do not communicate in Pashto, why should the prime minister, ministers of departments, university professors, parliamentarians, generals, diplomats, governors, media, business… and the general public use Pashto as the medium of communication. Practically, Pashto speakers could not aspire to position of power in Afghanistan without learning, writing and speaking Dari/Farsi(Persian). In fact, Pashto was precluded from social prestige and blocked from the sphere of political economy. Pashto urgently needed and needs a top-down solution to achieve social prestige. This will enable Pashtoto become a productive partner in the framework ofpolitical economy. Pashtun poet-philosopher Gul-Pacha Ulfat (1909-1977) had expressed his thought in a couplet on the diminishing social status of Pashto:

People communicate in the language used in the government

When will Pashto become the language of the government

سراوکاردخلکودیدژبېدسرکارسرهکلهبهغـریــبهپـښتوژبهدسـرکارشــي

Fifth, Dari was the main language of education and press. Most schools and all institutions ofhigher education were taught in Dari. Also, Dari was part of the religious curriculum in mosques and madrasas: The 13th centuryPersian writer and poet Saadi Shirazi’stwo books (Bostan=theOrchard, and Golistan= the Rose) were organized about his Sufi, social and moral thoughts, and for this reason they have been taught in mosques. Today’s Iran (since 1935),former “Persia” and its language “Farsi” (Persian) have always been internationally known as “Persian”, not Irani.As a powerful neighbor, Iran has had a deep cultural influence in Afghanistan. To adjust them to the Iranian cultural ideals, the western cultural exports were “mostly filtered, refined and conditioned.”Practically, Dari was compulsory for all government employees in Afghanistan.Pashtuns and other non-Tajik ethnic groups that were going to Kabul to study and/or to do business, had no other choice but to speak Farsi-Dari. The prominent newspaper “Anis” was published in Dari. There was no girl school for Pashto-speaking population in Kabul. There were only two high schools in Kabul where the teaching language was Pashto: Khoshal Baba Lycee and Rahman Baba Lycee.“Royal court without Pashto means the death of Pashtuns” (be Pashto arg da Pashtano marg dai, Zirakyar). For an analysis of the importance of language, see Zirakyar (December 2010).

Languages not only serve as the means of communication, but also they are the medium of influence, power and identity-especially in a politically organized community (nation state). As long as there are nation states, there will be national interests and national languages. Languages are fundamental to cultural and national identity. The future of humanity depends on both the cultural identity and the cultural diversity. See Zirakyar (Language from Adam to Present, December 2010= Linda 1389 Solar A.H.).

Ethnicity-Based Percentage of Major Ethnic Groups in Seven Afghan Regions

RegionsPashtunsTajiks HazarasUzbeks

Northern 684,532148,191253,756 765,708

30%6% 11% 33%

North-Eastern711,194981,80789,605 283,916

33%45%4% 13%

North-Western1,115,037154,91227,1666,071

59% 8%1%0%

Eastern 1,994,275 18,2378790

90% 1% 0 0

East-Central 2,907,405 912,454 1,000,49537,388

58%18%20% 1%

Southern2,047,679 2,812 239,959 447

87% 0% 10% 0%

Nomads 1,780,000

89%0%0%0%

Total 11,240,122 2,218,413 1,611,8601,093,530

62.73%12.38%9% 6.10%

ConsiderableMinorities TotalSmall Minorities

AimaqsTurkmen Grand Total

1,305 378,797 2,232,28961,3452,293,634

0%17% 97%3%

35,149 2,101,67171,285 2,172,956

2% 97% 3%

478,825 49,046 1,831,057 53,053 1,884,110

25% 3%97%3%

2,013,391 200,462 2,213,853

91%9%

18,694 4,876,436 119,535 4,995,971

0%98% 2%

2,290,89767,033 2,357,930

97%3%

1,780,000220,0002,000,000

89%11%

480,130 481,686 17,125,741792,713 17,918,454

2.68%2.69% 95.58%4.42%

Now,I shall shed somelight on the characteristics of the leaders of theNorthern Alliance:

WhoAretheMajor Players in the Northern Alliance?

It is important to also point out and establish the credibility of the leaders of the Northern Alliance as their malicious exercise in indecency in regards toPashtuns’demographicmanipulation is indicative of their character. The following write-up and quotes are of the U.S. officials assessing the main figures of the Northern Alliance.

Two days after the 9/11 tragedy (during the National Security Council meeting on September 13, 2001), President George W. Bush wanted to knowfrom the CIA leadershipabout the individual Northern Alliance leaders? Cofer Black (Director of Counterterrorism Center at CIA) said: “One key [Northern] Alliance general, Abdurrashid Dostum, had been on everyone’s payroll-Russia, Iran and Pakistan.” (Quoted in Bob Woodward, 2002, p. 53). Woodward knew from DIA’s “ highly classified memo”, which “in large part blamed General Fahim, essentially calling him a wimp who would talk and talk, then not show up for battle.” (Ibid. 268). CIA’s Director Tenet said at the National Security Council’s above meeting that “with the CIA teams and tons of money, the [Northern] Alliance could be brought together into a cohesive fighting force.” (Ibid., p. 51).

According to Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command Lt. General Michael DeLong, Northern Alliance’s major commanders (Dostam, Khalili, Faheem, and Ismael Khan) were “fighting andkilling without remorse” and this “was a way of life for them”. General DeLong adds that “each having personally killed to fifty men”, andafter the 911 catastrophe they would be “theoretically” the generalsfighting in Afghanistan for the Commander-in-Chiefof the U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks. (DeLong with NoahLukeman 2004, pp. 24-47).Also, General Tommy Frankswas aware of the fact that “northern factions fighting against majority Pashtuns” would create another civil war in Afghanistan. (Franks quoted in Berntsen,2005, pp 289-92). Berntsen, who was CIA’s field commander in Afghanistan, informs us abouthis experience withthe Northern Alliance as follows:“ I know from my experience that Persians and their Afghan cousins are all carpet salesman at heart.”By implication, Berntsen believedthat the commanders of Northern Alliance would sell Afghanistan like a carpet.On October 30, 2001, Commander-in Chief of the U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks arrived in Tashkent, where Fahim and his treasury ministerAref were waiting for him. Shortlybefore the meeting, Tommy Franks said to the CIA agent Berntsen: “Time to discuss the price of rugs” with the two Northern Alliance leaders. When Fahim wanted more money, Franks call this try “Bullshit”! (General Tommy Franks (2004, pp 309-311). All the facts, ideas and assumptions presented here shall lead to the following conclusion.

Conclusion

For all their geopolitical games,colonialism and imperialism have been relying on minorities. The Northern Alliance in Afghanistanunder the leadership of “Great” Ahmad Shah Massoud is an example par excellence.U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had said that “In politics, nothing ever happens by accident. If happened, you can bet it was planned that way.” (Quoted inMoore and Slater, 2003, p. 323). Rooseveltcame from an aristocratic and political family, was Harvard law student, corporate lawyer, State Senator, Assistant Secretary of Navy, Governor of New York, and he wasthe only U.S. President to be elected four times (1932-45). In addition,he led his country through difficult times: the Great Depression and the World War II (1941-1945).

Roosevelt killed two birds with one stone:His war was good for defeating both the depression and Hitler. Based on President Roosevelt’s extensive political experience, I cannot but to agree with his aforementioned statement. His wisdom, judgment and political maturity, as expressed in his statement, are reinforcing my thesis:Since 1992 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has deliberately lowered the socio-linguistic statistics of the resistant majority Pashtuns while it has inflated the ethnic and linguistic population size of the Afghan minorities mostly subservient to the U.S. government’s imperial needs. The anti-Pashtun Northern Alliance under the leadership of Massoud had played the samerole for the realization of the Soviet/Russianinterests in Afghanistan. Practically, he was the fifth column of foreign powers to undermine the Afghan nation’s solidarity.

CIA’s estimates for ethnic and linguistic statistics in Afghanistan are not without serious consequences for majority Pashtuns, whose demographics had been reduced since July of 1992, the year in which the pro-Tajik Massoud-Rabani team grabbed power in Kabul with the help of Communist generals belonging to the very pro-Soviet BabrakKarmal’s faction.TheCIA’s estimates for Afghan demographicswill be used to determine quotas for a new privileged but client elite in Afghanistan. For example, a non-Pashtun Afghan-American familiar with the campusof the Stanford University in California informed me in mid-2012 that among the students from Afghanistan therewas an “irrelevant minority” (“ta’dad-e nachiz”) ofPashtun heritage.

However, even if the current regime in Kabul issues electronic Identity Cards, the probability of corruption and fraud could be very high as the current regime is effectively controlled by the lieutenants of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud (see below attachment).The electronic cards need to be prepared and administered when foreign forces and the Northern Alliance do not controlthe current regime in Kabul. Then, the problem of socio-linguistic statistics can be resolved through electronic identity cards. However, the current colonial, mercenary and multi-dimensional corrupt regime is unable to issue electronic national identity cards.A legitimate, honorable and trustworthy national government will have the capacity to issue such cards. These cards shall include: (1)both parts of identity: ethnicity and language;(2) they shall be finger printed; and (3)the biographical data on the card shall be machine/computer readable; Forillustration purposes, I suggest the following design:

AFG8KR, RE-PN9ZSF93837456

Name: Zalanda Samsor

Gender: Female

Nationality: Afghan

Ethnicity:Pashtun,Hazara, etc

Language: Pashto, Turkmani, Uzbaki, etc.

Mother Language: Pashto, Degani, etc.

Father: Sambal Redai

Born: 1352(1973) in Asmar, Kunar

AFG stands for Afghan; 8 is the number assigned to Kunar province, KR stands for

Kunar province; 9 is the number assigned to the neighboring province Nangarhar; RE stands for Region East; PN stands for Pashtun; and ZSF stands for Zalanda Samsor, Female.

Attachment under Scrutiny

Below see “tazkera” (Identity Card) for Afghans presented by the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the puppet regime in Kabul.The heading of the ID card is printed in

Darionly although article 16 ofthe colonial constitution of the Kabul regime mentions Pashto first and Dari second as the formal languages of the state.Other information on the ID cardis printed first in Dari followed by Pashto translation. I discovered four errors in the Pashto text:

These defects exemplify not only negligence but also the intention to damage the social and political statusof Pashto language, which has the home-grown energy for the national identity of Afghanistan. Also, the word “wagarri” hardly represent the meaning of “atba’ ” (citizens). The word “Wagarri” means people (wolas, khalk).

I do not like the word “taba’” (singular for citizen) and “atba’ ” (plural for citizens).The wordtaba’impliespassivity, dependency and submission; however,the words “hewadwal” (citizen)and its plural (“hewadwalan”) imply political participation, responsibilityand the ownership of the country, not of a city, district, or province.

Berntsen, Gary,Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaida, 2005).

CIA World Factbook(1981-2012 = 1360-1391 Solar Hijri).

DeLong, Michaelwith Noah Lukeman, Inside the CentCom: The Unvanished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 20004).

Derbyshire, J.D. and Jan Derbyshire (Political Systems of the World. First published in 1989 by W & R Chambers. Second edition-revised and expanded-published in the United Kingdom 1996 by Helicon Publishing Ltd. First published in the USA in 1996 by St. Martin’s Press in New York.

Wak, Mohammad Enam, The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan: A Six-year Survey and Research project: 1991- July 1996.Peshawar, Pashtunkhwa (Sapi’s Center for Pashto Research and Development), 1998= 1377 A.H. (In Pashto). Its compact English version was published in Peshawar, Pashtunkhwa (Khatiz Organization for Rehabilitation, July 1999).

Wilber, D.N., Afghanistan: Its people, its society, its culture, 1962.

Woodward, Bob, Bush at War, Simon and Schuster, 2002.

Zakaria,Fareed, the host of “Global Public Square” program at CNN (April 11, 2010) was discussing with Peter Galbraith (former U.N. Representative to Afghanistan).