Friday, 28 June 2013

In New
Delhi today, recently appointed US Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, James Dobbins, discussed the situation in Afghanistan and the stalled
Taliban dialogue in Qatar with the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Satinder Lambah, and with Foreign Secretary Ranjan
Mathai. On Tuesday, Ambassador Dobbins had met Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif and army chief, General Pervez Kayani in Islamabad.

Both
Afghanistan and India have criticized the US-Taliban dialogue. On Jun 19,
Karzai lashed out at the US after the Taliban inaugurated its new political
office in Qatar with a plaque saying “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”,
and the white flag and
national anthem of the former Taliban government.

Dobbins is
learnt to have told Lambah and Mathai that the Taliban violated the conditions
of the talks by invoking the symbology of the former Taliban state. He claims
that the US objected even before Karzai did, and the Qatar government quickly
removed the offending flags and plaques.

According
to Dobbins, the conditions accepted by the Taliban for opening the office in
Qatar --- viz. no propaganda; no fund-raising; only political activities --- were
specified in a diplomatic note that had been carefully negotiated over the
preceding year and a half.

The
dialogue, says Dobbins, is in limbo. With the Taliban representatives in Qatar viewing
these restrictions as a setback for their image, they have referred back to the
Taliban leadership about whether to continue talks.

Speaking to
Business Standard, Dobbins said: “Having over-reached during the opening of the
office, the Taliban have suffered a setback. Will they continue the dialogue?
We don’t know, but we are not placing any early deadlines. Let them decide.
There is clearly some debate within the Taliban between hard liners and those
who are inclined to negotiate. Some at least realize that, despite whatever
happens on the battlefield, things have changed too much in Afghanistan for there
to be any return to the 2001 situation. And the Taliban would hope to gain
legitimacy through negotiations with the United States.”

Asked whether there is certainty that genuine Taliban
representatives have arrived for the talks in Qatar, Dobbins says: “The Taliban
negotiators in Qatar include almost all the members of the Political Commission
of the Taliban. And they clearly take orders from the Leadership Council, the
next higher level. The fact that the representatives in Doha are hanging back
suggests that they are awaiting orders from the Taliban leadership.”

Dobbins is
learnt to believe that the Haqqani Network is also backing the Qatar dialogue.
But Hizb-e-Islami chieftain, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has renounced the dialogue,
apparently relying on separate negotiations that might yield him greater
benefits.

Braving New
Delhi’s scepticism, Dobbins is appreciative of Islamabad’s role in the dialogue.
“We have good evidence that Pakistan is being helpful. Pakistan has certainly
contributed to the Taliban’s decision to come to the table. We do not know if
this cooperation will endure, but we hope so,” he says.

Asked why
the Taliban --- for which freeing Afghanistan of “foreign occupation” is a
fundamental tenet --- would talk in earnest with a “foreign occupier” that is
simultaneously negotiating a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Karzai
government for a residual American presence after 2014, Dobbins says: “The
Taliban has made contradictory public statements about a residual US force
after 2014. First a Taliban representative recently said that they could accept
a residual US presence; then another statement said that this would not be
acceptable.”

On whether the Taliban could be entering dialogue in order
to get NATO forces to reduce their tempo of operations, the US Special
Representative points out, “The Taliban is clearly not intending to bring down
the tempo of NATO operations because it is itself ramping up operations, as we
saw from this week’s attack on the US Embassy in Kabul. We believe that the
Taliban would like to see the US leave Afghanistan in defeat, not in victory,
so they will step up violence and try to disrupt the elections. We are
conducting our own military operations based on that assumption.”

Thursday, 27 June 2013

Heavily dependent on Pakistan for a smooth withdrawal, US will give it $7 billion worth of leftover kit for a token payment

By Ajai
Shukla

Business Standard, 27th Jun 13

Along with
the Taliban, Pakistan will be a massive gainer from America’s troop drawdown
from Afghanistan by end-2014. A top-level US official, speaking off-the-record,
has told Business Standard that Pakistan will get first call on all the American
military equipment that costs too much to be transported back to the US.

Washington
believes it is obligated to Islamabad for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating
table at Qatar, for discussions aimed at reducing violence in Afghanistan, which
would smoothen the American troop drawdown this year and the next. Furthermore,
Washington relies on Pakistan for overland transit from Afghanistan to Karachi,
where heavy equipment is loaded onto cargo vessels bound for the US.

Uzbekistan,
which also provides transit routes to the US, had earlier sought to buy the surplus
US equipment in Afghanistan. But routing through Uzbekistan, and then over a
road and rail network in Central Asia and Russia called the Northern
Distribution Network, is 4-5 times more expensive and time consuming than
transiting through Pakistan. Washington has now decided conclusively in favour
of Pakistan.

An earlier
report in The Washington Post had estimated that the US military would leave
behind some $7 billion worth of defence equipment, one-fifth of what is
deployed in Afghanistan. US military officials tell Business Standard that
aircraft, heavy weapons, vehicles and equipment are likely to be repatriated to
the US. Much of what Pakistan will benefit from will be ammunition, vehicles,
construction material, air-conditioners, etc.

Much more
could be left behind if the situation deteriorates; Taliban resistance would determine
what could feasibly be transported. Sceptics in New Delhi point out that
Pakistan controls the spigot of violence.

It has not
been revealed how much Pakistan would pay for the equipment left behind, but US
officials say it would be a fraction of the real value. Given that the US is
paying billions of dollars each year to build up the Afghan National Army (ANA)
and Afghan National Police (ANP), it remains unclear why Washington has not
given Kabul the first call on the surplus equipment being left behind.

The cost of
repatriation, says Bloomberg News, could be about $7 billion. Danish container
giant, Moeller-Maersk A/S, Singapore-based Neptune Orient Lines, and German
company, Hapag-Lloyd AG will ship out some 22,000 container-loads of equipment,
says US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Logistics, Alan Estevez.

Much of
that business would go to Pakistani truck operators in Peshawar and Quetta.
Equipment in northern Afghanistan would be transported over the Khyber Pass,
through Peshawar to Karachi; while equipment in the south of Afghanistan would
cross the Bolan Pass, and then be taken through Quetta to Karachi.

Islamabad
has effectively demonstrated to Washington its reliance on Pakistani goodwill.
After a US air strike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at a border post in Nov
2011, Islamabad shut down transit routes till July 2012, forcing the Pentagon
into costly dependence on the Northern Distribution Network.

Over the
years, Washington has provided Islamabad an approximate $2.5 billion annually
in military aid. About half of that is Coalition Support Funds, which
reimburses the Pakistan military for counter insurgency operations in the
tribal areas along the Afghanistan border. Over the last decade, US media
reports have extensively documented that the Pakistan military has been
submitting inflated expense reports to claim more money.

Wednesday, 26 June 2013

Admiral Locklear meets Air Chief Marshal Browne, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. His request to meet all three service chiefs together was not granted

By Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 26th Jun 13

Admiral Sam Locklear heads the US Pacific Command (PACOM),
making him the most powerful military commander on earth. With 60 per cent of
the US Navy under him, PACOM oversees 52 per cent of the planet. Locklear is
America’s military pointsman for 36 countries, including India and China.

But for India’s protocol-driven ministry of defence (MoD), the
admiral is just a military commander. During Locklear’s ongoing visit to India,
Defence Minister AK Antony has turned down a request for a meeting, directing Locklear
instead to Defence Secretary RK Mathur. Also turned down was Locklear’s request
for a meeting with India’s three service chiefs. Instead, he was only invited to
meet the Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, who heads the
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

MoD officials admit that these meetings were “substantive,
not just ceremonial.” PACOM provides the military muscle for the US “rebalance
to Asia.” And with the Indian Navy --- concerned about China’s growing presence
in the Indian Ocean --- rapidly developing Asia-Pacific partnerships with
countries like Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore, PACOM is a crucial
interlocutor.

Furthermore, Locklear is a crucial arbiter of what weaponry
and defence technologies the US supplies to India. Every proposed sale must
have the PACOM chief’s backing, based on his determination that providing that
capability to India would be in the strategic interests of the US.

PACOM, headquartered in Hawaii, is by far the biggest of
America’s six “geographic commands”, each headed by a four-star general or
admiral who reports to the US President through the Secretary of Defence. These
six operational commanders are far more powerful, and relevant to regional
partner countries like India, than the Washington-based chiefs of the US air
force, army, navy or marine corps. While the service chiefs merely man, equip
and recruit for their services, the geographic heads are battlefield commanders
who command the US military in combat.

The US campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were run from
Central Command (CENTCOM), headquartered in Tampa, Florida. And the PACOM chief
would be the top US commander in a hypothetical war against China.

For years, India’s ministry of defence (MoD) has been
unenthusiastic about the burgeoning US-India relationship, which insiders
frankly say is due to Defence Minister AK Antony’s left-of-centre political
inclinations. Though the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Prime
Minister’s Office (PMO) are more bullish on the relationship, Antony’s
seniority and clout allow him to have his way.

While the MoD is authorized a joint secretary from the MEA
for coordinating foreign policy, the MEA has failed to provide one. As a
result, an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer, Smita Nagaraj, fills
that post. MoD insiders say that her foreign policy inexperience lets Antony
have his way.

Consequently, Antony has resolutely blocked multilateral
naval exercises with the US since 2007, when the participation of 25 warships
from India, the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore in Exercise Malabar aroused
protests from the Left Front and the apparent ire of China.

Now the MoD is stonewalling India’s participation in next
year’s RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Maritime Exercise), the world’s largest
multilateral maritime exercise, which PACOM hosts in Hawaii. In the last
edition of RIMPAC, 22 navies and 40 warships participated, including the
Russian Navy. In the next edition in 2014, the Chinese navy is expected to
participate. But the MoD worries that India’s participation might offend
someone.

In contrast, bilateral exercises with the US have progressed
apace; 62 joint exercises have taken place so far. The US says it does more
joint training with India than with any other country. Indian Navy officers say
US-India exercises have reached a level of sophistication where they provide
excellent training.

“They especially help in developing operational doctrines
for new platforms like the P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Both countries
are just inducting it into service and there are lessons that we can share,”
says an Indian Navy planner.

Trying to bridge these gaps between the MoD and the Pentagon
is the Defence Technology Initiative (DTI), jointly headed by US Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, and National Security Advisor, Shivshankar
Menon. Even though its primary purpose is to find ways of moving beyond a
buyer-seller relationship into the realm of co-development and co-production,
the DTI also hopes to soothe some of the irritants between the two defence
bureaucracies.

Although the MoD has refused to comment, officials say that
the US army chief, General Ray Odierno, who will visit India shortly, will be
meeting Antony.

Tuesday, 25 June 2013

The Indian
Air Force (IAF) has imaginatively employed its new C-130J Super Hercules
aircraft --- six of which were purchased in 2010 from the United States for Rs 3,835
crore --- to revive flagging rescue and relief efforts at Dharasu, in flood-hit
Uttarakhand. With fuel running out for the IAF’s Mi-17 helicopters that were
flying relief missions from the small, 1300 metre Dharasu airstrip, the C-130Js’
game-changing ability to land on tiny airstrips was brought into play. Fully
fuelled C-130Js flew in from Hindan (near Ghaziabad) and landed in Dharasu, each
one unloading 8,000 litres of aviation fuel from its on-board tanks for use by the
Mi-17s. On their return journey, the C-130Js ferried medically distressed people,
making this a two-way air bridge.

This is
just one recent example of military equipment and personnel becoming the
instrument of last resort for overwhelmed administrators in disaster
situations. The Gujarat earthquake in 2001; the Kashmir earthquake in 2005; the
Ladakh flash floods in 2010, the Sikkim earthquake in 2011, and multiple flood
relief operations that the services undertake every year highlight that the
military is the only effective disaster response force in the country. And that
the vast sums spent on the military, and its equipment, is not just insurance for
some far-fetched threat of external aggression but real capability for
situations that all-too frequently move beyond the capacity of the other
instruments of state.

Every one
of India’s military units has an official plan for “Aid to Civil Authorities”
that is as carefully formulated as its plans for war. This spells out exactly what
that unit will do when the government asks for help during flood, earthquake or
breakdown of public order. When officially requisitioned by what the army still
cheerfully calls “the civil administration” all its equipment is deployed to
assist the people.

India’s
armed forces have proved equally useful during trans-national natural disasters,
such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. The Indian Navy put 30 vessels to sea
in just 48 hours, providing desperately needed relief in coastal India, and across
the region including Sri Lanka and Indonesia. So quick and effective was the
navy’s response that the US Pacific Command, which arrived later, openly
acknowledged for the first time that the Indian Navy was the only regional force
with the resources and will to exercise power across the Indian Ocean.

This
careful planning and ability contrasts starkly with the bumbling ineptitude of
local administrations, state disaster response forces and the National Disaster
Management Agency (NDMA), which wags say is a full-fledged disaster itself. If
the Uttarakhand government seems overwhelmed, the reason --- as is evident from
the April 23 audit report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of the
Uttarakhand Disaster Management Authority --- is that the state has utterly
failed to prepare for natural disasters. The Authority, created in 2007, has
never held a meeting; almost half the posts in the district emergency cells
remain unfilled to this day.

A
fatalistic Uttarakhand Chief Minister, Vijay Bahuguna, told CNN-IBN’s Karan
Thapar in an interview that there can be no actionable programme for the
plethora of disasters --- cloudbursts, glacier collapses and flooded rivers ---
that Uttarakhand might face. In his defence, he argued that no Indian state
meets the norms of disaster management. This is factually true, but logically
irrelevant.

Trying to show up Bahuguna, Gujarat’s chief minister arrived
in Uttarakhand, putting together a surreal cameo performance entitled, “No
Gujarati Left Behind” (I made up the title, but the rest is true). Ignoring the
responses of other agencies, Narendra Modi and his crack team brainstormed till
the wee hours, and then dispatched (according to one Times of India report, at
least) 80 Toyota Innovas, four Boeings and a fleet of luxury buses to pluck a
claimed 15,000 stranded Gujaratis from the sliding mud and swirling waters of Uttarakhand
and transport them to safety. But while Modi may rescue Gujaratis in an
election year (Why? I thought he was projecting himself as the leader of all
Indians?), the rest of the citizenry must rely on the armed forces.

True, India’s
geography makes it essential for the military to play this role. It is equally
true that even countries with functional governments call upon their militaries
when situations legitimately escalate: remember Hurricane Katrina and New
Orleans? But few countries do so as often as India, except perhaps Pakistan ---
and we know what that has led to. It must also be noted that the remoteness and
vulnerability of so much of this otherwise teeming country is unquestionably
the failure of the Indian state. When things go bad --- whether in terms of
security or natural disasters --- there is always the military!

To remember
what we often forget, the military must be nurtured as an important wing of
government, our last recourse in dire need. The cold-eyed mandarins in New
Delhi must commit the resources and attention that this instrument needs,
remembering that this is not “non-productive expenditure”, but a living
organisation that must be continually replenished.

Tailpiece: I remember, during the 2002 J&K
elections, which are widely regarded as a turning point in open insurgency in
that troubled state, a 20-minute sortie that I flew in an IAF Mi-17 helicopter,
which was conveying a polling team and an EVM from Doda to an isolated village
high in the Pir Panjal. This was done so that 11 voters in that village could
cast their ballots. On the evening of polling day, the Mi-17 went back to pick
up the polling team. More than any flowery statements on India’s democracy,
this astonishing military effort to obtain the ballots of 11 voters represents for
me the triumph of India’s electoral exercise.