Chapter
III.—The Question of Novelty Further Considered in Connection
with the Words of the Lord and His Apostles.

But (as for the question) whether monogamy be
“burdensome,” let the still shameless “infirmity of
the flesh” look to that: let us meantime come to an
agreement as to whether it be “novel.” This (even)
broader assertion we make: that even if the Paraclete had in this
our day definitely prescribed a virginity or continence total and
absolute, so as not to permit the heat of the flesh to foam itself down
even in single marriage, even thus He would seem to be introducing
nothing of “novelty;” seeing that the Lord Himself opens
“the kingdoms of the heavens” to
“eunuchs,”
585585 See
Matt. xix. 12. Comp.
de. Pa., c. xiii.;
de. Cult. Fem., l. ii. c. ix. as being Himself,
withal, a virgin; to whom looking, the apostle also—himself too
for this reason abstinent—gives the preference to
continence.
586586 See
1 Cor. vii. 1, 7, 37, 40; and comp.
de Ex. Cast., c.
iv.
(“Yes”), you say, “but saving the law of
marriage.” Saving it, plainly, and we will see under what
limitations; nevertheless already destroying it, in so far as he gives
the preference to continence. “Good,” he says,
“(it is) for a man not to have contact with a woman.”
It follows that it is evil to have contact with her; for nothing is
contrary to good except evil. And accordingly (he says),
“It remains, that both they who have wives so be as if they have
not,”
5875871 Cor. vii. 29. that it may be the
more binding on them who have not to abstain from having them. He
renders reasons, likewise, for so advising: that the unmarried
think about God, but the married about how, in (their) marriage, each
may please his (partner).
5885881 Cor. vii. 32–34. And I may
contend, that what is
permitted is not absolutely good.
589589 Comp.
ad Ux., l.
i. c. iii.;
de Cult. Fem., l. ii. c. x.
sub fin.; and
de Ex. Cast., c. iii., which agrees nearly verbatim with what
follows. For what is absolutely good is not
permitted, but needs no asking to make it lawful.
Permission has its cause sometimes even in
necessity.
Finally, in this case, there is no volition on the part of him who
permits marriage. For his
volition points another
way. “I
will,” he says, “that you all so
be as I too (am).”
5905901 Cor. vii. 7, only the Greek is
θέλω, not
βούλομαι. And when he
shows that (so to abide) is “better,” what, pray, does he
demonstrate himself to “will,” but what he has premised is
“better?” And thus, if he
permits something
other
than what he has “willed”—permitted not
voluntarily, but of necessity—he shows that what he has
unwillingly granted as an indulgence is not absolutely good.
Finally, when he says, “Better it is to marry than to
burn,” what sort of good must that be understood to be which is
better than a penalty? which cannot seem “better” except
when compared to a thing very bad? “Good” is that
which keeps this name
per
se; without comparison—I say not with an evil,
but even—with some other good: so that, even if it be
compared to and overshadowed by another good, it nevertheless remains
in (possession of) the name of good. If, on the other hand,
comparison with evil is the mean which obliges it to be called good; it
is not so much “good” as a species of inferior evil, which,
when obscured by a higher evil, is driven to the name of good.
Take away, in short, the condition, so as not to say, “Better it
is to marry than to burn;” and I question whether you will have
the hardihood to say, “Better (it is) to marry,” not adding
than what it is better. This done, then, it becomes
not “better;” and while not “better,”
not “good” either, the condition being taken away which,
while making it “better” than another thing, in that sense
obliges it to be considered “good.” Better it is to
lose one eye than two. If, however, you withdraw from the
comparison of either evil, it will not be better to have one eye,
because it is not even good.

What, now, if he accommodatingly grants all indulgence
to marry on the ground of his own (that is, of human) sense, out of the
necessity which we have mentioned, inasmuch as “better it is to
marry than to burn?” In fact, when he
61turns to the second case, by saying,
“But to the married I officially announce—not I, but the
Lord”—he shows that those things which he had said above
had not been (the dictates) of the Lord’s authority, but of human
judgment. When, however, he turns their minds back to continence,
(“But I will you all so to be,”) “I think,
moreover,” he says, “I too have the Spirit of God;”
in order that, if he had granted any indulgence out of necessity, that,
by the Holy Spirit’s authority, he might recall. But John,
too, when advising us that “we ought so to walk as the Lord
withal did,”
5915911 John ii. 6. of course admonished
us to walk as well in accordance with sanctity of the flesh (as in
accordance with His example in other respects). Accordingly he
says more manifestly: “And every (man) who hath this hope
in Him maketh himself chaste, just as Himself withal is
chaste.”
5925921 John iii. 3. For elsewhere,
again, (we read): “Be ye holy, just as He withal was
holy”
593593 There is no such passage
in any Epistle of St. John. There is one similar in
1 Pet. i. 15.—in the flesh,
namely. For of the Spirit he would not have said (that), inasmuch
as the Spirit is without any external influence recognised as
“holy,” nor does He wait to be admonished to sanctity,
which is His proper nature. But the flesh
is taught
sanctity; and that withal, in Christ, was holy.

Therefore, if all these (considerations)
obliterate the licence of marrying, whether we look into the condition
on which the licence is granted, or the preference of continence which
is imposed, why, after the apostles, could not the same Spirit,
supervening for the purpose of conducting disciplehood
594594 Disciplinam. into “all truth” through the
gradations of the times (according to what the preacher says, “A
time to everything”
595595Eccles. iii. 1.), impose by this time
a final bridle upon the flesh, no longer obliquely calling us away from
marriage, but openly; since now more (than ever) “the time is
become wound up,”
5965961 Cor. vii. 29.—about 160 years
having elapsed since then? Would you not spontaneously ponder
(thus) in your own mind: “This discipline is old, shown
beforehand, even at that early date, in the Lord’s flesh and
will, (and) successively thereafter in both the counsels and the
examples of His apostles? Of old we were destined to this
sanctity. Nothing of novelty is the Paraclete introducing.
What He premonished, He is (now) definitively appointing; what He
deferred, He is (now) exacting.” And presently, by
revolving these thoughts, you will easily persuade yourself that it was
much more competent to the Paraclete to preach unity of marriage, who
could withal have preached its annulling; and that it is more credible
that He should have tempered what it would have become Him even to have
abolished, if you understand what Christ’s “will”
is. Herein also you ought to recognise the Paraclete in His
character of Comforter, in that He excuses your infirmity
597597 Comp.
Rom. viii. 26. from (the stringency of) an absolute
continence.