► My research project is a break from the current trend in the literature that focuses on the conflict associated with roll call voting—party polarization and…
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▼ My research project is a break from the current trend in the literature that focuses on the conflict associated with roll call voting—party polarization and institutional friction. I am interested in determining how policy characteristics of roll call decisions can affect legislators' vote choices. Bills not only differ according to issue content—agricultural policy versus social welfare policy—but also according to how ambiguous they are—a collection of disparate issues versus one specific issue. Using a dataset of House roll calls from 1985-2004 and the Policy Agendas Project content coding scheme, I show that variation in both policy area and policy ambiguity of a given bill is associated with variation in the accuracy of ideology in predicting roll call vote choice.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), Theriault, Sean M. (committee member).

► To understand the dynamics of legislative gridlock, as well as account for the mixed and often conflicting findings in the divided government literature, this paper…
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▼ To understand the dynamics of legislative gridlock, as well as account for the mixed and often conflicting findings in the divided government literature, this paper posits that the previous unidimensional approach of using divided government as an explanatory variable of interest fails to accurately reflect the changing realities of American politics since WWII. Two new and interlocking conceptual approaches are introduced that expand the dimensionality of legislative gridlock: ideological polarization explained through the temporal shift of political parties from a party system of moderation and universalistic policy outputs, to one where particularistic goals became much more common. As studies of divided government center on temporally-bound concepts, they ignore most of the inter- and intra-party variation evident throughout the latter 20th century.
Advisors/Committee Members: Tulis, Jeffrey (advisor), Theriault, Sean M. (committee member).

► This analysis considers the security-accountability paradox: in a democracy, how can the People consent to what they cannot see? Congress is the branch of government…
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▼ This analysis considers the security-accountability paradox: in a democracy, how can the People consent to what they cannot see? Congress is the branch of government most concerned with democratic representation and is directed by Article I to give a public accounting of expenditures from time to time. However, when it comes to national security and the intelligence community (IC), Congress has abdicated this responsibility and fails to use tools such as hearings to exercise meaningful oversight. This analysis lays out qualitative standards for adjudicating between responsible legislative delegation and irresponsible legislative abdication. It finds that in routinizing unvouchered funds through the CIA Act of 1949, Congress systematized abdication of budgetary control over the IC. Using data from the Comparative Agendas Project, this study finds that, since the CIA Act, Congress has failed to adequately compensate for its initial abdication through meaningful use of congressional IC hearings. Rather, Congress continues routinized abdication at the expense of accountability to the public.
Advisors/Committee Members: Tulis, Jeffrey (advisor), Theriault, Sean (committee member).

► Voters are exposed to vastly different campaign environments based on their geographic location. This results in heterogeneity in the intensity and communicative content that voters…
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▼ Voters are exposed to vastly different campaign environments based on their geographic location. This results in heterogeneity in the intensity and communicative content that voters are exposed to across a nationally representative sample. The present analysis seeks to leverage this variance in communication environments facing voters to better capture the effects of campaign priming. I find that when taking account of the communications that voters face, the effects of priming are clearer, but also more complex.
Advisors/Committee Members: Shaw, Daron R., 1966- (advisor), Theriault, Sean (committee member).

► This project focuses on how news coverage of climate change structures policy debates to examine its role in slowing down the momentum for large-scale policy…
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▼ This project focuses on how news coverage of climate change structures policy debates to examine its role in slowing down the momentum for large-scale policy change, such as cap-and-trade legislation. I present a theory of media signaling in what I call the “muddled space” of policy debates on complex problems, and apply it to the issue climate change. I argue that there is a dual role for media influence in the muddled space: it prioritizes attention to policy problems, but also limits the comprehensiveness of solutions used to fix them. On problem expansion, findings suggest that two aspects of news coverage – attribute diversity and volume – amplify problem uncertainty in policy debates and heighten disputes over its severity and are thus important factors in prioritizing the climate problem. Causal uncertainty in news coverage – doubt about the linkages among human actions, global warming, and climate impacts – makes it less likely that the climate problem will be on the policy agenda. But once it is on the agenda, causal uncertainty seems to mobilize policy brokers around strategies to define the climate problem and delineate its solutions. On solution containment, findings suggest that high levels of causal uncertainty is a limiting factor for the generation of large-scale climate solutions, such as cap-and-trade. I also find that attribute diversity and causal uncertainty in news coverage play an important role in increasing the likelihood that policy debates on climate solutions will converge around incremental approaches to fixing it, such as energy efficiency measures. This study is important because it demonstrates that the influence of news coverage on public affairs is quite large in its ability to moderate attention to policy problems and their attendant solutions. The “muddled space” helps explain why complex problems get “stuck” in cycles of policy debates over problem definitions, which leads to less effective solutions employed to solve them. Finally, this study also helps explain why the US is such a laggard in terms of climate policy.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), Workman, Samuel (committee member), Theriault, Sean (committee member), Moser, Scott (committee member).

► Given that Congressional hearings are established legislative and political information generating tools for committee members engaging in oversight, fact finding, and agenda setting, I examine…
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▼ Given that Congressional hearings are established legislative and political information generating tools for committee members engaging in oversight, fact finding, and agenda setting, I examine whether or not hearings provide information to actors outside of government. More specifically, does testimony by corporate representatives provide new information to the stock market about the future profitability of certain firms? In this paper, I utilize a new dataset collected by Workman and Shafran (2009) that includes 3,300 witnesses (and their affiliations) who testified in business regulation hearings between 2000 and 2005. I identify 99 publicly traded firms with representatives testifying in 117 hearings, and utilize event study methodology to estimate the effects of testimony events on the daily stock returns of corresponding firms. I find that, even with the ‘expectedness’ of Congressional hearings, such events negatively impact stock returns both generally as well as with greater magnitude under certain conditions. This event effect is largest for politically sensitive firms and for hearings held in the Senate. When selecting a portfolio of firms that combines all significant conditions, I determine that the ‘upper bound’ of the effect is one-half a standard deviation in daily returns (or a change of -1.6% in prices). Congressional hearings with corporate testimony do, in fact, generate information for external actors.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), Theriault, Sean M. (committee member), Roberts, Brian E. (committee member).

Thomas, H. F. (2011). A source of new information? the market effects of corporate testimony in congressional hearings (2000-2005). (Thesis). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3238

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Thomas HF. A source of new information? the market effects of corporate testimony in congressional hearings (2000-2005). [Thesis]. University of Texas – Austin; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3238

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Texas – Austin

7.
-5832-7693.
Prioritizer-in-chief : the role of the president in the policy process from Reagan to Obama.

► This dissertation sets out a fresh approach to understanding presidential decision-making by connecting the presidency to information processing theories. This approach to behavioral choice highlights…
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▼ This dissertation sets out a fresh approach to understanding presidential decision-making by connecting the presidency to information processing theories. This approach to behavioral choice highlights how the structure of the presidency creates a decision-making process that relies on the cognitive and emotional capacities of the individuals in the office, while the political and policy environment put pressures on their choices. Once presidents have decided to get involved in policy making, they have to process information about the responsibilities of the office, the policy and political environment, as well as their own political strength, to make decisions about what policy areas to prioritize and what strategies they should use to pursue those policy goals. To examine those decisions and understand the forces that shape them, I analyze ten datasets of presidential actions, seven of which are original to this project: presidential press conferences, budget messages, State of the Union addresses, major televised addresses, addresses to a joint session of Congress, proclamations, memoranda, signing statements, executive orders, and veto threats. By examining these datasets of presidential policy action, from Ronald Reagan (1981) to Barack Obama (2014), we gain a clearer insight into the decisions that presidents make about the policy process, their strategies, and the factors that affect their abilities to make trade-offs between their policy priorities and strategies. This dissertation makes a contribution to the presidency and policy process literatures by moving towards a empirically-grounded study of the presidency, one which relies on the combination of theory and data to better understand the decisions that presidents make and the factors that shape those decisions.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), McDaniel, Eric (committee member), Roberts, Brian (committee member), Theriault, Sean (committee member), Thomas, Herschel F (committee member).

-5832-7693. (2018). Prioritizer-in-chief : the role of the president in the policy process from Reagan to Obama. (Thesis). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/68121

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Author name may be incomplete
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

-5832-7693. “Prioritizer-in-chief : the role of the president in the policy process from Reagan to Obama.” 2018. Thesis, University of Texas – Austin. Accessed March 21, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/2152/68121.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Author name may be incomplete
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

-5832-7693. “Prioritizer-in-chief : the role of the president in the policy process from Reagan to Obama.” 2018. Web. 21 Mar 2019.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Author name may be incomplete

Vancouver:

-5832-7693. Prioritizer-in-chief : the role of the president in the policy process from Reagan to Obama. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Texas – Austin; 2018. [cited 2019 Mar 21].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/68121.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Author name may be incomplete
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

-5832-7693. Prioritizer-in-chief : the role of the president in the policy process from Reagan to Obama. [Thesis]. University of Texas – Austin; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/68121

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Author name may be incomplete
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

▼ Political agenda-setting research primarily studies how political institutions direct policy attention and gives little consideration to individual decision-making (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 1995; Baumgartner et al. 2011). This dissertation examines policymakers’ strategic communications to illuminate the important but less understood agenda-setting patterns of individuals. The normalization of social media platforms, like Twitter, gives U.S. senators a new platform to aggregate their policy priorities into a complex agenda that reveals individual decision-making and prioritization. Senators face pressures from constituents, the party, and the institution that lead them to structure unique agenda setting patterns that have implications for both policy and representation. Using a new dataset of all tweets by U.S. senators, I offer new insight into how individual senators divide their limited attention. First, senators must strike a balance between policy and representation because attention to policy results in less time for constituent issues. Second, for political priorities, there is an asymmetric pattern of partisan attention such that Republicans prioritize politics and use partisan rhetoric more often in their political communication. By using a hybrid media measure like Twitter, I glean useful insight into a politician’s agenda to not only understand how politicians rank issues but more broadly the role of policy, politics and representation within a senator’s agenda.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), Theriault, Sean (committee member), Wlezien, Chris (committee member), Baumgartner, Frank (committee member), Sparrow, Bartholomew (committee member).

► The central question of this dissertation is “What makes law last?” I argue that when legislators seek out diverse sources of information, engage in deliberation,…
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▼ The central question of this dissertation is “What makes law last?” I argue that when legislators seek out diverse sources of information, engage in deliberation, and reach a substantive compromise, they pass the most durable law. To investigate legislative durability, I hand-collected a dataset, drawn from the volumes of the United States Code, that documents the longevity of all 268,935 provisions of federal law passed between 1789 and 2012. Through a combination of logistic and duration analysis I find that the most durable provisions are the subject of lengthy deliberation and are voted on before the last moments of a Congressional session. They are normally referred to multiple House and Senate committees and are enacted after Congress has gained institutional experience in a particular policy area. Durable laws also tend to be considered under open rules and exclude non-germane provisions. Finally, provision level durability is conditional on changes in control of Congress and the public’s preferences for a more or less active federal government.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), Elkins, Zachary (committee member), Theriault, Sean (committee member), Wlezian, Chris (committee member), Roberts, Brian (committee member).

► This dissertation is a study of contagion effects in policymaking. The policy process behaves in many ways like a complex system, which is characterized by…
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▼ This dissertation is a study of contagion effects in policymaking. The policy process behaves in many ways like a complex system, which is characterized by communication among actors, dynamic interaction, and evolution in behavior over time. As a result, the attention of policy elites rapidly jumps from issue to issue as they struggle to address an array of pressing issues and problems simultaneously. I argue that a process of issue contagion explains these rapid changes as policy elites are highly interdependent actors who are subject to cognitive limits, have incentives to closely monitor the political environment, and frequently mimic the behavior of their peers. Drawing on the methods of computational social science, I build a simulation model of agenda-setting behavior and examine issue contagion through an experimental research design. I test the empirical implications of the model by applying it to real-world datasets—from the disclosed lobbying activity of organized interests to the bill introductions of members of Congress. The core contribution of the project is that patterns in attention to policy issues are a function of a contagion process generated by cue-taking behavior among elites.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), Baumgartner, Frank R (committee member), Wlezien, Chris (committee member), Roberts, Brian E (committee member), Theriault, Sean M (committee member).

▼ This project focuses on information processing in policy subsystems, specifically how congressional committees in the domestic commerce, energy, and health care policy areas prioritize available information, with an extended analysis of information supply and prioritization in energy policy. I examine the conditions under which federal bureaucrats are most likely to supply information to Congress in these three policy areas. I seek to determine whether and to what extent the bureaucratic supply of information changes by issue area, presiding congressional committee, and in response to problem uncertainty. My findings suggest that the number of bureaucrats testifying varies by both policy area and committee type. Furthermore, as the problem uncertainty for a committee increases, so too does the number of federal bureaucrats invited to testify. These findings are especially true for careerist bureaucrats. Within energy policy, my findings show that the subsystem actors most likely to supply information at a hearing varies across committees, over time, and by specific issue area. By examining who supplies information, this project will provide a better understanding of how subsystem actors are prioritized by congressional committees as information suppliers. This study is important because the information supplied by these non-elected policy elites can then influence the problem definition process, structure policy debates, and impact policy formulation.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), Workman, Samuel (committee member), Theriault, Sean (committee member), Moser, Scott (committee member), McDaniel, Eric (committee member).

► Policymakers need a wide array of information for multiple purposes. Acquiring information often is costly, so it is assumed that incentives must be provided to…
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▼ Policymakers need a wide array of information for multiple purposes. Acquiring information often is costly, so it is assumed that incentives must be provided to overcome these costs and stimulate information gathering. It is further assumed that increasing the number of actors engaged in acquiring information creates free-rider problems. In 2007 the U.S. House of Representatives created a select committee to address energy and environment issues, but did not give that committee legislative authority. The new committee could not compete with others for the ability to write or amend legislation, so its presence should not have changed the standing committee’s information gathering patterns. In fact, committees did alter their hearing patterns in response to the select committee’s work. Information has jurisdictional and reputational value to policymakers in addition to the incentives it can help them obtain, and policymakers will act to acquire information even without explicit incentives to do so.
Advisors/Committee Members: Theriault, Sean M., 1972- (advisor), Jones, Bryan D (committee member).

▼ Drawing from previous scholarship, contemporary policy debates, historical records, and 53 interviews with policymaking elites, this dissertation project takes a qualitative, field-based approach to expose the internal dynamics of autonomous policy subsystems. I contend that these subsystems are characterized by insular, expert-based channels of information, specialized media attention, parochial interest groups, a politically inactive – yet advantaged – target population, and an inherent lack of policy conflict. The military personnel policy subsystem operationalizes this renewed theory of autonomous policy subsystems. From the American Revolution and the Civil War through the first and second World Wars and beyond, this dissertation traces the American political development of military pension policy though the lens of the policy subsystem, documenting the subsystem’s formation, evolution, and ultimate transformation into the autonomous military personnel policy subsystem. Through field-based interviews of contemporary policy elites, I offer five key findings that contribute to the policy subsystems literature. First, high rates of congressional and bureaucratic turnover on the military personnel subcommittees and within the Pentagon are detrimental to the subsystem’s institutional memory. Second, the Pentagon marginalizes itself by stove piping expert information through bureaucratic hierarchies leaving it unresponsive to the subsystem’s demands for timely information. Third, subsystem actors see a clear distinction between power and influence within the subsystem as the congressional subcommittees on military personnel wield power and prominent Veterans’ Service Organizations wield influence. Fourth, subsystem actors search for and prioritize interinstitutional signals from policy elites. Finally, issues surrounding military social policy attract a whole new set of competing actors and institutions into the subsystem’s policymaking process. Though powerful, autonomous policy subsystems of this sort are still susceptible to breakdown and policy change. Beyond exogenous shocks and policy entrepreneurs, I contend autonomous policy subsystems are particularly vulnerable to jurisdictional threats from blue ribbon commissions chartered to gather new information, reframe policy images, alter issue definitions, and make policy recommendations. As institutional venues for policy change, blue ribbon defense commissions are well-positioned to breakdown autonomous policy subsystems and bring about meaningful policy change. The dissertation concludes with a broad set of recommendations along with ideas for future research agendas.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jones, Bryan D. (advisor), Buchanan, Bruce (committee member), Dorn, Edwin (committee member), Sparrow, Bartholomew H (committee member), Suri, Jeremi (committee member), Theriault, Sean M (committee member).

▼ The dissertation analyzes why legislators fail to use their oversight powers over bureaucracy in democratic Mexico. While dominant institutional theories assume a unidirectional flow of authority from politicians to bureaucrats, in Mexico there is a bidirectional negotiation process; as such, principals have formal rights to control the agents, but agents have informal leverage over principals, as well. Due to the absence of a Weberian state and extensive state intervention, bureaucrats are able to control resources that legislators require in order to advance their careers. By distributing resources that politicians can use for patronage purposes, bureaucrats obtain legislators’ consent to design and implement programs as they wish. Consequently, members of Congress renounce their control powers in exchange for securing resources for their constituents or cronies. Furthermore, informal mechanisms of influence neutralize the formal control powers that legislators have over bureaucrats. Public officials’ power and the lack of legislative control over bureaucracy are documented by analyzing the budgetary process and health policy in Mexico between 1997 and 2006. The main implication of the dissertation is that although democratization produced changes that gave more formal powers to Congress, it has not eliminated the informal mechanisms used by bureaucrats to influence legislators. As a result, public officials continue to enjoy ample leeway in implementing public policies and programs.
Advisors/Committee Members: Weyland, Kurt Gerhard (advisor), Greene, Kenneth F. (committee member), Madrid, Raul L. (committee member), Theriault, Sean M. (committee member), Ward, Peter M. (committee member).

► The U.S. Congress has significantly curtailed its lawmaking activities in recent years, and many commentators, scholars, and legislators themselves point to a decline in the…
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▼ The U.S. Congress has significantly curtailed its lawmaking activities in recent years, and many commentators, scholars, and legislators themselves point to a decline in the institution’s output. Two trends blur this focus. First, the number of substantive (non-commemorative) laws enacted by Congress did not significantly decline until very recently. Second, that the roots of this decline have been growing for several decades, in the committee system. Data from 1981 to 2012 show that congressional committees have significantly shifted their activity towards oversight and other non-legislative policymaking at the expense of advancing legislation. Congressional committees act as Congress’s agenda setting capacity by determining what issues the institution can and will address and how it does so. Any explanation for a decline in congressional lawmaking, therefore, must begin with committees. I develop a theory of committee policymaking in this dissertation based on the limited agenda space decisionmakers face. Making policy through legislative or non-legislative means involves opportunity costs, and committees face uncertainty about whether their legislative work will bear fruit. With this theory as a guide, I test three explanations for the longitudinal shift in committee activity away from legislation. While current and former members of Congress, commentators, and other observers blame political gridlock and an expanding executive branch, I find that changes made to the legislative process itself have altered the incentives for committees to compete for agenda space and make policy through legislation. Members of both parties have centralized agenda setting responsibilities under party leaders over the last three decades, which has altered the contours and availability of legislative authority. My findings have important implications for Congress’s role in the policy process and how scholars and citizens evaluate the institution, including the importance of committee incentives and capacity for congressional agenda setting.
Advisors/Committee Members: Theriault, Sean M., 1972- (advisor), Jones, Bryan D (committee member), Wlezien, Christopher (committee member), Jessee, Stephen (committee member), Workman, Samuel (committee member).

Lewallen, J. D. (2017). You better find something to do : lawmaking and agenda setting in a centralized Congress. (Thesis). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/47283

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

► This dissertation investigates how presidents build successful legislative coalitions and enact their agenda into law in the United States Congress. It argues that constituencies and…
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▼ This dissertation investigates how presidents build successful legislative coalitions and enact their agenda into law in the United States Congress. It argues that constituencies and electoral incentives cause members of Congress to respond to the president’s agenda in a systematic manner. The president’s strength in members’ constituencies interacts with members’ electoral incentives to determine whether members will vote for or against the president. The theoretical claims presented in this dissertation are supported by a combination of case studies and quantitative analysis. The empirical analysis utilizes a dataset with observations for every member of Congress from 1957 to the present. I find that constituency-level presidential strength causes systematic variance in members’ response to the president’s agenda. Vulnerable members of Congress are particularly sensitive to the president’s strength in their constituencies, while safe members of Congress are a bit less attentive to their constituencies. These findings contribute to our understanding of American politics by showing that the president’s ability to enact agenda items into law is affected by much more than mere party politics. This conclusion is especially relevant in the modern, polarized era in American politics.
Advisors/Committee Members: Theriault, Sean M., 1972- (advisor), Buchanan, Bruce (committee member), Jessee, Stephen (committee member), Shaw, Daron (committee member), Young, McGee (committee member).