Tuesday, November 19, 2013

More than 100 days after he stole his latest reelection, it is safe to
say that Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe has gotten away with the
crime. Other leaders in the region may be studying his methods, which
makes it all the more important for democracy advocates to do the same.

In 2008, Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party essentially lost at the ballot
box, and remained in power only by pursuing a campaign of political
violence that caused his main presidential challenger to withdraw from
the runoff vote. Moreover, amid international pressure and economic
collapse, he was forced to accept a power-sharing agreement. But this
year Mugabe was able to engineer a win that did not trigger the same
international criticism. Both the African Union (AU) and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) deemed the July 31 elections to be
“generally” credible, finding that any irregularities would not have
changed the outcome: a supermajority in Parliament for ZANU-PF and an
overwhelming presidential victory for Mugabe.

In devising an election strategy for 2013, Mugabe had to account for
greater outside scrutiny, as the violence of 2008 had put Zimbabwe
permanently on SADC's agenda. The updated election playbook also had to
take into consideration the increased use of technology in Zimbabwe.
Over the past five years, access to mobile phones has grown
dramatically. According to the International Telecommunication Union,
Zimbabwe now has an estimated mobile subscription rate of 97 percent.
These new factors meant that Mugabe had to work harder and with more
cunning. He could no longer use blatant election-day fraud or brute
force to win.

Step one: Begin the rigging process well in advance.

In order to avoid any violence or overt manipulation on election
day, Mugabe began his rigging activities well before an official poll
date was even confirmed. The first voter registration drive kicked off
in May 2013, focusing mainly on ZANU-PF strongholds in the north. This
allowed the party to get a head start in the process. Less than two
weeks after the Constitutional Court's ruling on an application to set
an election date, Mugabe unilaterally announced that the vote would be
held on July 31. Critics of the move argued not only that it violated
the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA), which required the president
to consult all parties when determining an election date, but also that
the date itself contradicted provisions in the new constitution and
reduced the number of days available for voter registration.

While the stated goals of the GPA were broad, its primary purpose—in
the aftermath of the 2008 political violence—was to clearly outline the
legal and institutional reforms necessary for the country to hold free,
fair, and credible elections. Among the GPA's 25 articles were
provisions calling for a new constitution, depoliticization of state
institutions and the security sector, liberalization of the media
sector, and prosecution of the perpetrators of politically motivated
violence. The pact gave rise to a multiparty Government of National
Unity (GNU), but after five years of power sharing, it had failed to
implement almost all of the required reforms. The only task accomplished
was the passage of a more progressive constitution and bill of rights.
Mugabe interpreted the conclusion of the constitutional ratification
process as marking the expiration of the GNU, meaning elections had to
be held immediately, even though the basic electoral reforms prescribed
under the new constitution had not yet been enacted. The absence of such
reforms aided Mugabe in his efforts to manipulate the election process.

Step three: Take control of the state media.

Lack of media reforms prior to the elections had a significant
impact on news coverage of the process. On election day itself, the
media were highly polarized along party lines and generally biased in
their reporting. According to the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe,
news outlets carried stories on all parties, but 90 percent of the
coverage of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was negative. It is
noteworthy, if not surprising, that the biggest perpetrator of hate
speech during the election period was Mugabe himself.

Manipulation of the judicial system started early in the election
process. In May 2013, following a court application in which an activist
affiliated with ZANU-PF sought to “compel” Mugabe to set an election
date, the Constitutional Court ruled that elections must be held by July
31. Despite domestic and regional pressure, the court ruled against
postponing the vote by two weeks, declaring that election preparations
were already under way. The Constitutional Court's decision clearly
violated the constitution, reinforcing the perception that it is a
Mugabe puppet.

Step five: Seize control of the election machinery and make sure that your rigged triumph is plausible.

Determined to avoid another period of power sharing, Mugabe made a
concerted effort to rig a margin of victory that would be plausible
(something short of 99 percent), but also large enough to negate the
need for a runoff vote. The incumbent president ultimately won 61
percent of the ballots, according to official results. He argued that he
was able to obtain more votes than in 2008 because of a renewed effort
to attract support through his indigenous and black empowerment
programs. However, Mugabe also benefited from his heavy influence over
the voter registration process. The chairperson of the Zimbabwe
Electoral Commission, Judge Rita Makarau, was a former ZANU-PF lawmaker,
while the registrar general, Tobaiwa Mudede, had been leading the
registrar's office for more than three decades.

Step six: Avoid the use of violence at all costs.

Demonstrating that he had learned the greatest lesson from 2008,
Mugabe this time restrained party members and supporters, including
youth militias, and prevented a repeat of the 2008 electoral violence.
Only a handful of reports of politically motivated violence emerged on
election day, and none garnered any significant international attention.
Both SADC and AU observer missions were quick to declare the July 31
election peaceful, and therefore credible. Nevertheless, members of
civil society and the opposition were subject to intimidation, arrest,
and other forms of persecution throughout the election process. In the
run-up to the constitutional referendum earlier in the year, nearly a
dozen civil society organizations had their offices raided by state
security personnel, and many prominent civil society leaders and human
rights defenders were arrested on spurious charges.

Step seven: Declare that the people have spoken, and do not look back.

On August 22, Mugabe was sworn in for his sixth term as president
with the same pomp and circumstance as in his first inauguration 33
years ago. The ceremony, held at the National Sport Stadium, was
attended by foreign dignitaries and a crowd of 60,000. The event was
initially delayed by a court petition filed by his main rival, Morgan
Tsvangirai of the MDC, over allegations of widespread electoral fraud.
But the Constitutional Court dismissed the case, declaring that the
election was free, fair, and credible. Once the ruling was announced,
Mugabe never looked back. Immediately after his inauguration, he
appointed a new cabinet and began phasing out officials who were brought
in by the MDC under the power-sharing government. Mugabe was also quick
to place blame for Zimbabwe's economic crisis on continued sanctions by
the United States and Europe.

Having successfully overcome the electoral hurdle, Mugabe will face
few checks on his power. The GNU's failure to repeal restrictive
laws—including the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Criminal
Reform and Codification Act, and the Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)—means that the government will remain
empowered to severely limit citizens' fundamental freedoms of
expression, association, and assembly. It also means that further
declines in political rights and civil liberties will most likely occur,
resulting in the reemergence of a pre-2008 environment.

At the regional level, emulation of the Zimbabwean model is a
growing concern. Over the next year a total of six countries in SADC
will hold elections. Several of the votes are expected to be very
contentious, and the incumbents up for reelection may use Mugabe's
playbook in order to secure a win, risking similarly disastrous results
for democracy and human rights.

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