Tuesday, 8 September 2015

The Refugee Crisis: What should the EU do next?

Steve Peers

Last week’s pictures of the tragic
death of a refugee toddler brought into focus the ongoing crisis facing Syria
and other conflict zones, which have given rise to increased numbers fleeing
persecution worldwide, and in the European Union. The events of recent weeks
(increasing numbers landing in Greece, the journey of many via the Western
Balkans, Hungary and Austria to Germany) demonstrate that the Schengen and
Dublin systems are coming under strain as a result.

How should the EU address this issue
next? Should it abolish or reform the Schengen and/or Dublin rules? Are
Member States complying with EU and international law in their response?

To answer these questions, I will
examine in turn (a) the international law framework; (b) the EU law framework;
(c) whether Schengen is at ‘fault’; (d) whether Dublin is at ‘fault’; and (e)
what the EU should do next. My main purposes are to explain the
legal background, to point out some legal errors, and to suggest the best way
forward in light of the international refugee law framework.

International
law framework

While it is often strongly asserted
that 'international law requires refugees to apply for asylum in the first safe
country they enter', in fact the position is rather vaguer than that. The
United Nations (Geneva) Convention on the status of refugees does not
contain any express rule to that effect in the rules on the definition of
refugee, or on the cessation (loss) or exclusion from being a refugee, as set
out in Articles 1.A to 1.F of that Convention.

However, there are some indirect suggestions in the Convention
that the number of countries which a refugee has crossed through might be
relevant. Article 31 of the Convention bans States from imposing penalties upon
refugees for entering a country illegally - a rule which contradicts some of
the rhetoric about refugees being 'illegal immigrants'. The drafters of the
Convention clearly recognised that it might be necessary and legitimate in practice
for a refugee to breach another country's immigration laws to escape threats to
his or her life or freedom. So it is not necessary to be on the territory
legally in order to qualify as a refugee.

This rule is, however, subject to
several conditions - including the requirement that the refugees were 'coming
directly' from the country which they had to flee. If that rule is interpreted
narrowly, then refugees can only benefit from the exemption from penalties for
breaching immigration law in neighbouring
states, not states further afield. But refugees’ failure to satisfy this condition
only permits States to prosecute them for breach of immigration law; it does not allow those States to exclude the refugees from protection. As
I pointed out already, the rules on definition and exclusion of refugees in the
Convention are quite separate from the rule on non-prosecution for breach of
immigration law. And it is also possible to interpret this condition more
generously - in the sense that the 'coming directly' requirement does not
exclude all refugees who have merely transited
through other countries, but only those who have stopped and obtained protection in another State
already.

Another relevant provision is the
'non-refoulement' rule in Article 33 of the Convention, which prevents States
removing refugees to an unsafe State. But it does not prevent refugees from
being removed to a safe State. Furthermore,
the restrictions in the Convention on expelling refugees to any State, and many
of the substantive benefits which the Convention gives to refugees (such as
welfare and access to employment) are reserved for those who are lawfully
resident or present in the territory; and the Convention does not require
States to give refugees a lawful status under national immigration law.

So overall, the Geneva Convention gives
States a degree of flexibility to insist upon a 'safe third country' requirement,
but there is no absolute rule that refugees must always apply in a safe third
country. If the Convention had intended to impose a firm rule in that regard,
it would surely have said so expressly and provided for obligations for the
first safe country to readmit the refugee. Moreover, the preamble to the
Convention refers to the heavy burden which the grant of asylum may place upon
some countries, and the need for international cooperation to avoid refugees
becoming a source of tension between States. Taken as a whole, then, the
drafters of the Convention recognized that a strict safe third country rule
could impose undue burdens on countries neighbouring a conflict in some cases,
but left it to States to work out the details of how to address such burdens
when they occur.

EU law
framework

The EU law framework consists first and
foremost of the Schengen rules - which set out conditions for crossing external
borders, in conjunction with no controls on internal borders. While some appear
to assume that the Schengen rules require EU States to refuse entry to refugees at the external borders, that is clearly
not the case. The Schengen Borders Code contains general exceptions
relating to refugees and human rights, as well as specific asylum exceptions
from the normal rules on the grounds for admission, and from the requirement to
penalizing those who cross the external border without authorization. The
latter exception obviously reflects Article 31 of the Geneva Convention,
discussed above.

While Member States are generally obliged
to ensure control of the external borders (just like non-Schengen States aim to
control their borders), there is no specific requirement to build fences, as
several Member States have done. Building fences is not ruled out by the Schengen rules, but it is Member States which decide to build the fences as a means of
controlling the border, not the EU. And anyone who makes it to those fences and
applies for asylum is entitled to be admitted to have their asylum application
considered.

This is confirmed by the EU’s asylum legislation,
which says that it applies to all those who apply at the border or on the territory.
There are some optional special rules for asylum applications made at
the border, but there is no rule saying that an application must be refused
because it was made at the border, or because the applicant entered the
territory without authorization. Reflecting the interpretation of the Geneva
Convention discussed above, the EU’s asylum procedures Directive states that an
application might be inadmissible if the asylum-seeker gained protection in a ‘first
country of asylum’, or has links with a ‘safe third country’. The application of these rules doesn’t mean
that the asylum-seeker is not a refugee; rather it means that another State is
deemed responsible for resuming protection, or for assessing the asylum
application.

The problem for refugees is reaching
the territory in the first place. EU law imposes carrier sanctions on transport
companies if they transport persons without visas, which explains why refugees
do not buy relatively cheap tickets to travel instead of paying smugglers for
unsafe journeys. Arguably the EU’s visa rules require Member States to issue
special visas for those in need of humanitarian protection (see discussion here),
but they rarely do so. Taken as a whole, then, the Schengen borders rules have
a rather uneasy co-existence with asylum law: but they clearly allow for the
admission of asylum-seekers who do reach the external borders of the EU.

There’s another uneasy relationship between
the Schengen rules and the Dublin rules, ie the rules which require an
asylum-seeker to apply usually in the first EU country which he or she reaches.
That’s because it’s obviously harder in practice to enforce those rules without
border controls between countries.

Is Schengen
at fault?

As noted already, the Schengen system
does not ban people from seeking asylum at EU borders, although it makes it
harder for them to reach the territory and more likely to risk their lives
trying. But there is nothing in EU law to prevent Member States from resettling
large numbers of refugees directly from conflict zones if they wish to. The
decision of most Member States to resettle few Syrians or others in need of
protection is up to them alone.

While the Schengen rules logically make
the Dublin system harder to enforce, this difficulty is relative: after all, if
an asylum-seeker moves on from Greece, he or she will have to cross further
borders anyway before reaching the rest of the Schengen area (Romania,
Bulgaria, and Croatia are not in Schengen yet; and most asylum-seekers prefer
instead to travel via the non-EU countries in the Western Balkans anyway).

And it is naïve in the extreme to
assume that reimposing border controls would stop all movement of
asylum-seekers between Member States. As discussed in Agnes Hurwitz’ book,
the Dublin rules have their origin in Council of Europe discussions in the
1980s, and were not initially connected to the Schengen project. There was
already a ‘refugees in orbit’ problem of refusal to take responsibility at that
point – when border controls were still
fully in place. Otherwise States would not have opened discussions on the
issue. So clearly borders are permeable even when border controls exist,
particularly the long land borders on the continent. Indeed, Germany last
received huge numbers of asylum-seekers during the Bosnian war of 1992, again
when the border controls were fully in place, which was years before countries
like Hungary joined the EU (Austria was not yet a member either).

Does Schengen encourage asylum flows,
as some claim? Looking at the statistics, it clearly does not. The flows
of asylum-seekers last reached 2014 levels back in 1992 and then dropped off.
There have been increases and decreases over the years, which can clearly be
linked back to events in countries of origin (Bosnia, Kosovo, Syria, et al). If
Schengen caused asylum flows, one would expect the numbers to increase after
the borders were abolished in 1995, and again when the system was extended to
Central Europe in 2008. But they did not. Nor did the numbers of irregular migrants.

Think about it. The asylum-seekers who
reach the EU have often crossed many Asian or African borders already, and those
arriving in Greece plan to cross some European borders anyway after they
arrive, unless (improbably) Greece is their intended destination. They have
fled poverty or persecution, paid smugglers a small fortune, often been
ill-treated on the way to the EU, and endured an appalling and dangerous sea
crossing. The EU’s assumption that withdrawing rescue vessels in the
Mediterranean would deter them from coming proved to be tragically wrong. Compared
to all that, why would the reimposition of Schengen border controls deter
anyone who would otherwise come?

Conversely, is Schengen at fault for
the treatment of asylum-seekers by Hungary? In principle, if third-country
nationals do not (yet) apply for asylum, they are irregular migrants, and so
Hungary had an obligation to remove them under the EU’s Returns Directive.
But that Directive does allow Member States to apply higher standards, and it
would have been foolish not to do so (as Hungary eventually did) in
circumstances where Germany had already signalled its willingness to consider
their planned asylum applications.

Is Dublin at
fault?

The Dublin system has undoubtedly
shifted a significantly higher burden to certain Member States (Greece, Italy
and Hungary at present), which is increasingly difficult to manage as migration
flows have increased and the Greek economy in particular has suffered from
austerity. It should be noted, however, that in principle the courts have ruled
since 2011 that Greece is not responsible for all the asylum-seekers who come
there. The normal assumption that each EU country is safe has had to be
suspended, since the ECHR and the EU courts have ruled (in the cases of MSS
and NS) that Greece is not
safe, due to the collapse of the asylum system there.

So it’s clearly legally incorrect to
claim that ‘Greece is safe’. Moreover, since the Dublin rules are effectively
disapplied to Greece, asylum-seekers can’t be criticised for evading the Dublin
system if they move on from that country. However, Greece still has the initial
burden of dealing with the large number of asylum-seekers which reach its
territory first; and it may be difficult in practice for those asylum-seekers
to move on quickly to other Member States. It’s not clear if the first other
Member State they reach after Greece then becomes responsible under the rules
or not.

The large number of asylum-seekers
moving in recent days has probably been partly affected by the German decision
that it would not apply the Dublin rules to Syrians. Germany is legally
entitled to do this: the Dublin Regulation has a sovereignty clause
(allowing States to consider asylum claims that are not their responsibility)
and the CJEU has ruled that there are no limits on how Member States may
use that clause. This will undoubtedly exacerbate the burden on Germany in
turn.

While it makes more sense from a
burden-sharing perspective to allocate asylum-seekers between Member States more
evenly, there are a number of political problems with that idea. Since Member
States are not keen to have more asylum-seekers, the would-be net recipients
always resist the suggestion. Various proposals for burden-sharing have
repeatedly failed since the 1990s. The EU is on the brink of sharing burdens
for the first time, by adopting a Decision on relocating some
asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy to other Member States. But the number
involved is modest (less than 40,000) and the offers to take asylum-seekers are
voluntary. The Commission’s proposal was for 40,000 people distributed by a
mandatory scheme, but Member States would not accept this.

This brings me to my next point: did
‘the EU stop the refugees coming’? Yes, to the extent that it did not give
sufficient relief (in the form of relocation of refugees) to Greece and Italy;
but the EU’s response on this was only insufficient because Member States, voting in the Council
(made up of national ministers), blocked the EU from adopting even a modestly
more ambitious relocation decision. As for refugees coming from outside the EU,
as noted above the EU does make it hard for them to get here (because Member
States want it to do so), but Member States are free to resettle
people as much as they like. If the EU did not exist, would Member States
really suddenly be willing to admit many more refugees?

The central issue then is the role of
national politicians. While the European Parliament has a joint decision-making
role on most asylum legislation (not a purely advisory role as some have
claimed), it does not have that usual role when it comes to the relocation
decision, since it is an emergency measure. And in turn, national politicians
are not on an anti-refugee frolic of their own, but responding to the
significant proportion of public opinion that still does not want to see
significant numbers coming to stay in the EU (see this recent UK opinion poll, for instance). Those who want a more liberal approach to refugees and
migration need to focus on convincing their fellow citizens, not blaming the
EU.

What should
the EU do next?

With all this in mind, what should the
EU do next? As I upload this blog post, Commission President Juncker is about
to make his ‘State of the European Union’ speech with new proposals. It seems
likely that they will include some of the ideas already previewed in May, as
part of the EU Migration Agenda (discussed here): a common list of ‘safe
countries of origin’; the greater use of Frontex in returns procedure; and new
rules on emergency exceptions from the Dublin rules. The latter will be much
more ambitious than the first decision to this end (aiming for 120,000 more
asylum-seekers relocated, according to reports), although whether Member States
will accept this remains to be seen.

I will blog about the details of the
new proposals when they emerge, but for now here’s an overview of what I think
the priorities should be. (For other suggestions, which partly cross-over with
mine, see the position of the UNHCR and Human Rights Watch. I
agree with their suggestions to step up rescues and to ensure safe passage for
more refugees, but I will elaborate here on some other ideas).

First of all, looking at the situation
within the EU, it’s obvious that there needs to be some form of relief (far more than provided for in
the relocation Decision about to be adopted) for the Member States bearing a very large share of the burden. As I
pointed out at the outset, the concept of burden-sharing is intrinsic to
international refugee law (see also the comments on this by my colleague Geoff Gilbert, and by Michael Ignatieff). It’s also recognized in EU law by Article 80 of the TFEU,
which refers to the principle of solidarity between Member States.

On that point, it’s reported that a
group of newer Member States is resisting not only the idea of relocating
asylum-seekers, but even the compromise suggestion of making an extra financial
contribution in lieu of this. This is a flagrant breach of the burden-sharing
principles of international and EU asylum law. Moreover, since these countries
have benefited enormously from their citizens’ refuge-seeking in and economic
migration to other countries (both into and outside the EU) as well as a
substantial inflow of EU funding, their position is morally untenable.

Secondly, it’s apparent that there
needs to be more coordination of
national policies within an overall EU framework. The overall impression
given is shambolic, although this has not stopped some commentators from
ascribing responsibility for every decision of the Hungarian government or even
a non-EU state’s police (in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) to the
EU. Some new forum – perhaps a framework for ministers, civil servants and the
heads of EU agencies to meet to discuss rapid reactions – needs to be
established. Clearly the overall amount of humanitarian
assistance for those reaching Member States’ shores also needs to be
increased.

Thirdly, on a similar theme, the consistent interpretation of EU rules
needs to be enhanced. There are too many examples of divergent approaches to EU
law which should in principle be ‘uniform’ (although Member States have scope
to apply higher standards). These sort of issues can partly be addressed
through the coordination framework discussed above, but further measures are
clearly necessary.

Let’s look at several examples. The
Hungarian government has just passed a law to impose custodial criminal
penalties upon those who cross its external borders fence. As we have seen
already, refugees must be exempt from penalties for irregular border crossing,
at least in some cases. Moreover, the CJEU has ruled that irregular migrants
should not be subject to custodial penalties for unauthorised entry, since that
delays their removal (for a summary of the case law to date, see the opinion in
the pending case of Celaj).

Several Member States also have stated
that they do not wish to take Islamic refugees. This is again a clear breach of
international and EU law: the Geneva Convention specifically states that it
applies without discrimination on ground of religion, while the EU Charter of
Rights bans discrimination on grounds of religion when applying EU law (and the
asylum process in all its aspects amounts to applying EU law). As for the
bizarre argument that ‘our country doesn’t have a mosque’, it is in fact possible
for Muslims to pray elsewhere. Refusing refuge to Muslims is not necessary to
keep Europe Christian; rather It’s a Christian duty to offer refuge, as Pope Francis and the Archbishop of Canterbury have pointed out.

Also, there have been examples of
individual mistreatment of groups of refugees and irregular migrants, in the
form of police action or border guard pushbacks, or inadequate living
conditions. While Member States’ border guards and military forces have surely
rescued many more people than they have mistreated, there needs to be a
commitment to ensure redress for the latter cases. Although the Schengen
Borders Code generally requires border guards to behave courteously and fairly,
it would be useful to agree common standards on prohibited behaviour.

On the living standards point, note
that it is not accurate to say (on one journalist’s blog) that someone
who applies for asylum in one Member State even though another Member State is
responsible for their claim under the Dublin is a ‘migrant’. The CJEU expressly
ruled in its judgment in CIMADE
and Gisti that such a person is an asylum-seeker
and is entitled to the relevant benefits until they are transferred to the
responsible Member State under the Dublin rules, The same rule is now expressly
set out in the preamble to the Dublin III Regulation.

More generally, the EU should reflect
on whether more far-reaching moves to achieve more harmonisation in practice
should be attempted: for instance, transforming the European Asylum Support
Office into a body able to make decisions on asylum applications in ‘overflow’
cases (if need be, by seconding national officials for the duration), and/or
creating a common European asylum appeal court. There are still wide
differences in recognition rates of refugees between Member States, despite a
common legal acquis: the low recognition rate of Eritreans in France as
compared to other Member States may have contributed to the ‘Calais crisis’,
for instance. In the meantime, the Commission needs to step up infringement
actions for breaches of EU immigration and asylum law.

Fourthly, more generally, should Schengen survive? It follows
from the analysis above that ending the Schengen system and reimposing internal
border controls would likely have little impact on the overall flows of
migrants and refugees coming to the EU. It might have a modest impact on
restricting their movement between Member States, but the desirability of that
outcome is tied up with the merits of the Dublin rules, to which I turn below.

But if Member States are serious about
ensuring that irregular migrants and asylum-seekers do not cross borders to
flout the Dublin rules, they would have to bring back internal border controls
with a vengeance, building fences and installing border guards across many
thousands of kilometres of common borders. Except for Malta, the Schengen states do not
have the built-in border control that the UK, Ireland and Cyprus (also not in
Schengen) have, for obvious geographic reasons. The likely outcome would be
dozens of ‘Calais’ situations at the various internal borders of the Union.

Furthermore, the basic obligation to
drop internal border controls is set out in the Treaties, and so a permanent
suspension of Schengen would require a Treaty amendment. A reasonable
compromise might be to amend the Schengen rules to allow for more temporary
internal border checks whenever intelligence shared between Member States
suggests that a large number of irregular migrants or asylum-seekers is likely
to cross an internal border.

Fifthly, should Dublin survive? I will forego answering this question until
we see whether Member States are willing to back a much more ambitious
relocation system. If they are, then a significant chunk of the excess burden
being borne by some Member States would be redistributed. Asylum-seekers would
also benefit from better conditions and a fairer chance of getting protection
as a result – although it would be best to take account of their preference in
any relocation system as far as possible, so as to reduce ‘secondary movements’.

Sixth, the individual enthusiasm of refugee advocates should be harnessed as
far as possible. Why not try to find money from the EU budget to pay those who
are willing and able to give humanitarian or other support to refugees and
asylum-seekers in an over-burdened Member State, or even a third State? (This
would supplement the EU’s existing programmes for volunteers). Why not address
a recommendation to Member States, encouraging private sponsorship of refugees
to reduce the burden on taxpayers? As well as family and friends, corporations
and NGOs should also be allowed to sponsor, and (for instance) universities
could ask if students, staff and alumni wanted to sponsor refugees who would
meet the criteria to enrol in courses.

Critics of refugee advocates often
argue that those advocates should put refugees up in their homes – but many
thousands of those advocates have in fact offered to do so. (For my
part, let me reassure those panicking about the admission of refugees that I was
not beheaded by my Middle Eastern refugee roommate at university). But let’s turn this argument around: why
don’t critics of refugees spend a year in Syria, or in the refugee camps which many
Syrians have fled to, before they criticise the refugees for leaving or others
for wanting to welcome them?

This brings me neatly to the
international framework. To repeat, burden-sharing in refugee matters is not
just an EU principle, it’s a requirement of international law too. As regards
Syrians, the neighbouring States (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon) have
borne a far heavier burden than the EU or any other countries have done. So it
is entirely right for the EU to assist them more with this burden than it is
doing already (the EU and Member States already give significant financial
assistance).

While refugees in those countries may
be safe from immediate persecution, they face difficult living conditions: see
the further analyses here of the position in Turkey and the nearby Arab States. Moreover, food support from UN agencies has just been halved.
The EU’s further support for these States does not have to be solely in the
form of admission of refugees: it could make a further financial contribution
to increase the refugees’ living standards. Nor does the EU alone have to offer
this assistance: the international law rules apply across the globe, and the
nearby Gulf states and other wealthy or middle-income countries could do more
by way of taking refugees and offering financial assistance.

In the medium term, some more
imaginative solutions are possible. One problem facing Syrian refugees in Turkey
is that they are technically not refugees there, since Turkey applies the
optional geographical limitation to the Geneva Convention, applying it to
European refugees only. This means that many Syrians are not allowed to work.
The EU could offer to waive visa requirements for Turkey in return for it
lifting the geographical limitation (along with other conditions).

Another idea is the creation of a UN
agency with the remit of the Syrian refugee crisis. This would mean that a
special regime in the Geneva Convention and EU law would apply: if the agency
could not take adequate care of Syrian refugees for any reason, they would be
fully entitled to refugee status. Otherwise, their applications could be
refused (see further the CJEU judgment in El-Kott,
on the application of these rules to Palestinians). At the very least, the EU
needs to take the initiative to hold a major international conference on the
Syrian refugee situation, in order to encourage and coordinate many other countries’
efforts to take efforts to take a greater share of the burden of relieving this
unfolding human tragedy.

24 comments:

Steve many thanks for a thoughtful and detailed analysis. I agree with your position on a legal framework but it seems you underestimate the political aspects of the issue. Just a couple of examples:

1) The position of Germany: They basically promised to grant asylum to any Syrians that arrive, but at the same time insist other states had to participate in sharing. I find this inconsistent- if I invite somebody to my house (which BTW further fuels the influx), it is fair to lodge her with a neighbour?

2) What the refugees want: It is very much clear that some states are preferred by refugees to others. Nobody wants to stay in the Czech Rep. or Hungary, so how can you force the people to stay? We (Czechs) could easily promise to take 300 thousand refugees, because if we do not lock them up, they would be in Germany in a week- of course everything according to the EU law rules.

3) The attitude of immigrants: There are numerous reports from the Western Balkans route (even by the serious media outlets) informing that the refugees are not willing to follow any rules, they just feel they have a right to get to Germany. They refuse to have their fingerprints taken, refuse to be taken to custody for identification, refuse food due to its "bad quality" etc. I am the last to support Orban's govt but when I see people that are safely from war to forcingly disrupt life of the whole country (walking highways, no trains between Prague and Budapest nowadays etc.), I am wondering where this will end...

I know, not exactly lege artis argumentation, but at this point we must accept that we are already well beyond following any Dublin daydreaming (from all sides).

1) I doubt that the German waiver of Dublin will last forever, The proposal is not to relocate people from Germany, but from 3 frontline states. If that goes ahead I think it is unlikely that Germany will keep its Dublin waiver.

2) This is why the relocation process should try to take account of refugee preferences as far as possible, and why the proposal will allow a financial contribution as an alternative to relocation.

3) There is also plenty of footage of refugees taking food from members of the public. They must have eaten and drunk something. In some cases refugees have been attacked or misled, and in general I can see why they distrust governments. I agree that refugees should comply with the law, but if certain governments behaved better, they would have more moral authority making this point.

Refugees have an obligation to comply with the law. Article 2 of the 1951 Convention is clear:

Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, whichrequire in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order.

As I said, refugees should comply with the law. If they break it though, they can only be excluded from refugee status in accordance with Article 1.F of the Geneva Convention for war crimes, terrorism et al in the country of origin. They can be refouled for very serious grounds under Article 33.2 of the Convention, but Article 3 ECHR will rule that out. Other penalties could be imposed for breaking the law in the host country though (other than the immigration law, as discussed above).

Thank you so much for this, even if short, very comprehensive article.As an early academic and a follower of yours, I do admire your capacity to be always so original and thoughtful.

In this regard i find very innovative a particular position of yours in this article. When you address the question of whether the Dublin Regulation should survive. I am personally very much surprised when other academics tend to agree that the Regulation must be completely reformed and I instead agree with you that it all depends from what will be done next.

In time since it was a still a Convention, the Regulation has been always amended and upgraded to the new realities. Sometimes slowlier and sometimes in a more reactive way. The same could be said for the 1951 Convention. It was not created as a perfect instrument and it did reflect the interests of a certain part of States. Yet in time it became better and better, even if it still not perfect.

As I am a Ph.D candidate writing on the Dublin Regulation Recast, I was wondering whether you have any ideas or comments on the role the EASO agency could play in the reformed Dublin Regulation. In particular when it comes to Art. 33 and how this could be linked to Art. 78(3) and 80 of the TFEU.

I personally think that the Support Agency has a big role to play and that the new 'EASO toolbox' must be very much still to be uncovered.

Thanks for your comments. I am looking at the changes to the Dublin system on relocation for a thinktank, so I will be writing about that soon. As for the existence of Dublin my concern about scrapping it entirely is that there would be an undue burden placed on rather different Member States - which has quickly proved to be the case re Germany's waiver. It is better to try to come up with a relocation system like the Commission's proposals to deal with the current large burdens more evenly.

I do agree with you. Scrapping the Regulation would make little sense, especially in consideration of the amount of time it took to get here. In this regard in my research I am trying to look at the Regulation in the context of the International Refugee Law rules and principles on refugee distribution (Art 31, ExCom 15 1979, ExCom 58 1989). From my assessment so far it looks like the Regulation is largely in line with such rules and principles, and in some parts it is even more progressive. I personally think it just needs a better implementation and the new instruments under Art 33 and EASO Regulation could be of great relevance in this sense.

I agree again with you on the relocation systems. They can give a great contribution to a better distribution, but they could never be considered a preventive and predictable mechanism in my opinion. They are emergency mechanisms that rely on the assumption that a given number of protection seekers, already present in the EU, must be more fairly allocated. If we think in this perspective, then we could also consider a quota system as well. But as the history of the EU negotiation in this sense teach us, they are unlikely to be accepted and way too complicated to be negotiated.

The EU system needs from time to time a relocation scheme, but only because it does not have yet a very coherent on-going mechanism which allocates people more fairly in relation to both the EU internal and external dimension. I think the way forward is to look at the EU internal mechanism in the context of the larger picture. In this sense, the Dublin can already be considered a relocation scheme. Plus, the use of the STC in relation to Dublin works as a quota system between the internal and external dimension. The rules of STC in relation to Dublin must be just adjusted in order not to put too much pressure on the third countries. So I do really think we need to insist working on a better implementation of the current framework, both internal and external, rather than look for a brand new formula that solves all the problems at the flick of a finger.

Thanks, Paolo. I think more needs to be done to see why asylum-seekers try to go to particular countries, in order to address the reasons why Dublin is so hard to apply in practice. How much of that is down to differences in recognition rates and reception conditions? Those could be addressed by changes in the content and enforcement of EU law - but other reasons (desire to be with extended family and others of the same ethnic group) could not.

I came across a number of articles about asylum destinations. The main criteria considered are indeed those that you mention as well. Recognition rates, reception conditions, family links and structural pull factors. Among the latters we can talk about geographic proximity, legislative pull factors (especially in relation to other countries).

Recognition rates are important as much as the reception conditions. Yet, much more importance seems to be given by refugees to family links or presence of an already established diaspora. The latter criteria are balanced with the reception conditions, or in other words, if effective protection from a legal and practical perspective.

Recognition rates can be improved with the harmonization of law and the use of best practices. This to a great extent is already happening. The same is valid for the reception conditions. But I personally think that recognition rates and reception conditions cannot be detached from family links and other criteria as presence of diaspora, language, and other ‘reasonable preferences’. The presence of family links is strongly related to the concept of effective protection. A refugee is more likely to be self-empowered in the short or long-term, if he can be supported by relatives or has other connection with the country. The same is valid for other reasonable preferences. Therefore, reception conditions can do better without further allocation of nation al resources, for instance, if the legislation is stronger when it comes to a more extensive use of substantial connection and reasonable preferences. Dublin is quite weak on this point.

Family links (substantial connection) and reasonable preferences can be easily enforced in law, as there are already international provisions in this sense. This is not only in the best interest of refugees but also, and in particular, of States. There is no need of substantial changes in the International Refugee Law or EU law to achieve this aim. The already existing rules and principles must be just implemented more coherently, both in the international and EU framework.

In view of your experience and analysis on EU legislation, it seems almost pointless to remind that the Dublin is so hard to apply in practice because his rules are not implemented consistently and coherently. With this I do not mean to say that it is perfect. The main problem about its rules is that they do not take to a greater extent the relation between effective protection and substantial connection and reasonable preferences, as argued above. But also because it cannot address some of EU member States structural pull factors, and thus the criteria are not enough flexible to address ad-hoc emergencies and the singularities of some EU MS, as those external to the EU.

In fact, while the the EU harmonisation and strong integration process levels the level of protection to minimum or common standards, which as such can promote a better responsibility-sharing, it is not accompanied by other measures, and this as an effect curtail the EU’s countries capacity to react to their asymmetries with the right instruments required by their specific cases. Differences in States needs that are not addressed properly by the Dublin implementation but mostly by the CEAS, curtails the possibility for specialization. Harmonisation and homogeneous and effective standards of protection along the EU is not enough alone. A stronger allocation criteria that takes into account the structural pull factors, as a stronger meaningful connection and reasonable preference, would make the effective protection reached partially with harmonisation even stronger. At the same time there is need of a toolbox of other measures which can be used to address in a preventive and reactive way the asymmetries of some countries.

So, while the Dublin contains already the connection criteria (family unity), it must be reinforced and at the same time better implemented in practice with other complementary measures. Therefore, since the choice of the country of asylum does not depend only on the effectiveness of protection offered, it is also important to take into account the presence of links. So, the focus on harmonisation must be accompanied by criteria of allocation able to take into account of some of the structural pull factors as meaningful connection and reasonable preference, but it must be also accompanied by other measures able to address the other geographic and structural pull factors.

Last but not least, Dublin is based on an internal use of the STC concept. Yet, the EU’s use of the STC demonstrated to be weak already in its external dimension, and now this problem is being reflected to the internal dimension. The predictability of any criteria of allocation or system, whether Dublin or any other, is directly proportional to the effectiveness of the measures put in place to offer protection. In fact, without effective protection not only rational distribution is not possible, but as the European Courts evidenced, it neither lawful and in point of fact in the end does not allow for a rational approach to distribution but instead allows even for the free choice of country of asylum. So this answers the question ‘why’ ‘the policies of the Union shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility’ according to Art. 80 TFEU. And the answer is simply that this is in States interest. A system that does not promote solidarity among EU member States is against State interests, but also against the possibility to have a sustainable way of offering protection without compromising the safety of refugee.

If, for instance, the STC formal identification of the host country was in parallel with the internal substitutive examination under the Dublin rules, the responsibility would be allocated to the country, whether internal or external to the EU, with whom the refugee has the strongest connection. In this case, it could be both an internal or external country. All would depend from the strongest connection, or eventually an internal to the EU in absence of connection externally, but only in case there is a reasonable preference if compared to external preferences. Such reinforcement of the connection criteria and parallel examination would be in accordance with the international rules and end up both the presumption that once a refugee reaches the EU can remain there even without meaningful connection or reasonable preference, but also the assumption that that the country of first asylum or safe third country should be ordinarily looked to as the sources of enduring protection. It would be a fairer and more efficient system of allocation of responsibilities within the EU but also with other countries.

What this means in practice? The internal and external dimensions are inter-related and inter-dependent. An EU CEAS cannot exist without an CEAS’s external dimension.

The issue is that the use of STC concept is quite tricky, as you also mention in your piece ‘Safe countries of origin’: Assessing the new proposal”.

I do not think that "newer member states benefitted from imigration". On the contrary, the huge imigration from Poland is exacerbating our already very difficult demographic situation, with thousands of young and educated people leaving the country (after their education being financed by Polish state). Personally I would be happy if UK would decide suddenly to deport all the Polish migrants.

As you know, we already accepted 150 christian Syrian families, and "many" of them (exact number is not given by the press) already escaped for Germany despite being provided finances larger than many Polish families. Forcing refugees to be relocated to Poland against their wishes does not seem moral; if refugees don't want to stay in Turkey and this is the reason why they are still refugees with right to enter the EU, why now you want to ignore their wish to avoid Poland?Moreover, is it moral to provide the refugees the financial help on such a scale, when in Poland with have literally hundreds of thousands of people living below the poverty line? Finally, for the same money more people could be helped in Turkey, Jordania or Lebanon; is it moral to waste those money instead of making the most efficient use of them?

Moreover, our state is not multiethnic or multi-cultural and, quite frankly, we are quite happy about this. The fact that Germany is driving the decision to force the decision on us to have the same model of the state as Germany or France, with all its vices and advantages, violates the very principles of democracy and is morally untenable (especially as the crisis was definetely made worse by German decisions, and now they want to force the outcomes on us) - this awakens all the worse demons from the past and confirms all the worse fears of eurosceptics.

Well, successive Polish governments are and have been strongly in support of free movement of persons within the EU. You are free to have a different view of course, but I am talking about the government's position.

In the last few paragraphs I suggest in detail how there should be much more financial assistance from the EU (and others) to refugees in States neighbouring Syria. I entirely agree that this is money well spent - it helps a greater number of people and should reduce 'push' factors that lead to them risking their lives in travel and handing over money to smugglers.

Many of the countries that Poles fled to or migrated to did not traditionally have a Polish community either. But I would agree with the flexibility in the Commission proposal to allow countries to make a financial contribution instead of relocating people there; actually I think the conditions should be more flexible on this.

This migration will be the end of the European Union, civil war in several countries and an economic crisis without precedentes in the history of the Western world how many activists of the Islamic state can come to Europe disguised as refugees? Europe can welcome all our guests who are hungry or who want to live better in the world? if the answer is yes I also want a better life and all other 205 050 500 million which has in Brazil would be excellent you in acolhedores for all of us too we can have a decent life, unfortunately this would impossíve, l then take care their European citizens countries before it is too late and esteje war in your country in your town in your neighborhood in your home, most European countries have always been my dream to live in peace and boua financial condition, I am descended Europeans have to live in a rubbish country Brazil that just is not corrupt because it is not possible laws that benefit corrupt police thugs who when not kill an innocent citizen can not fight crime, adolescents (persons between 01 e18 years) that kill or commit any other crime and can not be arrested because the state considers them as innocent, is chaos a living hell.I work six months of the year just to pay taxes and see a German tourist a rider had a fall from a horse died when he was a typical common service in a Brazilian hospital she would be alive if he were in Germany, it is very common here not rebel, we have become used to this, happens every day several times a day, every year here in Brazil with the Brazilian citizen.The German citizen wins in three days I earn in a month, and I have to give thanks to God I have a job, fight for their European citizens countries fight for their freedom by their boua financial condition by their customs for its tradition by his race by his family and Europe before it's too late to do anything.Or you can sit idly by and see how it goes, good luck.Forgive my English if there are any errors of grammar I do not speak English and used the google translator, 'm fruit of education and unfortunate financial situation in my country.

Well, none of those things have happened in the developing countries that currently host the vast majority of the world's refugees (or at least, such problems, where they do exist, are rarely if ever triggered simply by hosting refugees). As for a mass influx of people from Brazil, Brazilians can enter the EU visa-free but very few seek refugee status and the statistics don't show many Brazilians staying without authorization.

Well, you are not considering the facts about the Palaestinian refugees from Israil: They migrated or fled to Jordan and when they had reached about 15% of the population in Jordan, they started civil war to gain control over "their" areas. Then, they were thrown out and were again welcomed into a christian society; the arabs Paris by then; Lebanon. As they reached about 10-15% of the total population, they started civil war again. Living in the one northern European country that has welcomed the highest number of Palaestinian migrants/refugees, I am just wondering about how it will affect the cohesion of the Danish nation; will I still be living in a secular, free nation, where only the legislation passed by politicians elected by the people, will rule my nation? Will we have peace and tranquility 30 years from now in the old kingdom of Denmark or will it be a warzone between tyrannic, power-, money- and influence-loving clerics and people hanging on to individual freedom and Danish nationality?

Very interesting and educating, but of course articles such as these don't deal with the long-term implications of the population explosion and political and civilizational failures, in which civil war just like famine and epidemics is just an inevitable corrective force to the assault against the scarcity of nature's resources. The whole asylum system and especially the non-refoulement principle needs to be narrowly interpreted, and since the Strasbourg Court is not inclined to do so, the ECHR needs to be rewritten so as to accomodate something like the Australian approach. This was already written in a book by German social democrat Martin Neuffert in 1982, titled "Die Erde wächst nicht mit" (The earth doesn't grow along) and has been observed by many others since, leading also to the German asylum law reform of 1993 which led to the Dublin system. But it was a compromise that just hoped to dodge the question by extending it to the European frontline state. There basically seem to be two political directions for moving further: that of extending Dublin even further out of Europe, possibly with refugee camps sponsored by Europe outside Europe, as Australia is trying to do. Or that of rolling back the Dublin system and moving to a pan-European asylum system along the model that Germany had in 1993 and found to dangerous in view of the world situation, already back then. I'd very interested to read about possible paths of reform especially for the former approach.