Weitere Angaben:

"Assessing the effects of monetary policy and wage bargaining on employment and inflation in
the European Monetary Union (EMU), in the first step a Post-Keynesian competitive claims
model of inflation with endogenous money is developed. In this model the NAIRU is
considered to be a short-run limit to employment enforced by independent and conservative
central banks. In the long run, however, the NAIRU will follow actual unemployment and is
therefore also dependent on the forces determining aggregate demand, including monetary
policies. But the NAIRU may also be reduced by effectively co-ordinated wage bargaining as
has been shown by institutional political economists. Applying these considerations to the
economic performance of the EMU, different scenarios determined by wage bargaining coordination
and the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policies are developed. It is
shown that the first phase of EMU was dominated by uncoordinated wage bargaining across
EMU and an "anti-growth-bias" of the ECB. Therefore, the Euro area was plagued with
nominal wage restraint, high unemployment and rising inflation. Economic performance will
improve if the ECB abandons its asymmetric monetary strategy. This may be facilitated by a
higher degree of effective wage bargaining co-ordination across EMU." (author's abstract)