"In this essay I offer a formal analysis of Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in the Proslogion and in his reply to Gaunilo. I do not attempt to show here that the
arguments are compelling, or that they are not. What I try to do is discover in each argument, so far as possible, a valid logical form, to exhibit the relations of the arguments to each other, and
to show how they depend on certain doctrines in logic or the philosophy of logic. Anselm's arguments are far from dead, and in this paper I hope to provide a logical map, so to speak, of some ground
that is still very much fought over.

The first two sections of the paper are concerned with the most famous of Anselm's arguments, the argument of Chapter 2 of the Proslogion. In Section I, I formulate a version of the
argument in modern logical symbolism, and state the assumptions about existence and predication on which the argument seems to me to depend. Gaunilo's criticism of Anselm was directed very largely
against the ontological presuppositions of the Proslogion 2 argument; and in Section II I try to show how Gaunilo's famous "lost island" counterexample proves that the assumptions stated in Section I
must be modified, if not rejected. In his reply to Gaunilo Anselm introduced two new arguments for the existence of God, which do not depend on assumptions about predication.

I discuss one of these arguments in Section III; it seems to me to be at least a better argument than the argument of Proslogion 2. Analysis of this argument from the reply to
Gaunilo leads to the conclusion that the crucial question about logically necessary divine existence is whether it is possible. Section IV is devoted to an analysis of Anselm's argument in the third
chapter of the Proslogion and its relation to the other arguments."

Armour, Leslie. 1999. "Anselm's Proof and Some Problems of Meaning and Reference." In God and Argument, edited by Sweet, William, 97-113. Ottawa: Ottawa University
Press.

"In Proslogion IV, Anselm addresses the peculiar referring power of the expression "God". In the light of the idea of determinates and determinables (used by W.E. Johnson
and others) one can read what Anselm says here, supplemented perhaps by De Grammatico, as making a case for the belief that "God" refers not to a thing in the world but to the highest member
of the system of determinates and determinables, and that this hierarchy is essential to meaning. The highest order determinable can plausibly be identified with God. Denying that God exists,
therefore, is denying the possibility of meaningfulness."

"The ontological argument of Saint Anselm has attracted a great deal of attention. There has been considerable discussion of whether the argument begs the question, by assuming the
existence of God in the premises of the argument. But, although the theological, Augustinian context of Anselm's argument has been dealt with, and although the argument has been extensively treated
in modern logical terms, little attention has been paid to how the argument fares in terms of traditional logic. In this article I shall analyze the argument of Proslogion 2 in traditional
terms. I shall then argue that to a great extent the debate between Anselm and Gaunilon can be viewed as depending on attitudes toward the Aristotelian syllogistic.1 In short, the standard for the
validity and soundness of arguments in medieval philosophy was the syllogistic. It was apparently assumed that all terms used in the syllogistic have existential import. So Anselm's argument is
suspect in that it employs a term, 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived,' which cannot be assumed to have existential import. I then shall offer a solution of this difficulty. I shall
argue that the success of the argument of Proslogion 2 depends on the modal character of 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' That modal character suggests that the argument
of Proslogion 2 is modal as well. I shall show that there are grounds in theology and in the Aristotelian modal syllogistic for rejecting the existential import assumption, and shall suggest
that Anselm does not make such an assumption, at least in the ontological argument. Rather, despite its assertoric appearance, the argument in Proslogion 2 is modal."

"Examination of Anselm's Proslogion shows that he carefully distinguishes 'greater' from 'better' or 'more perfect'. He says that God 'most truly exists', that he exists 'in the
highest degree'; the Neo-platonist metaphysical framework suggested by this is confirmed by examining Anselm's Augustinian background, and the Monologion. 'Greatness' is an ontological
concept. This both makes good sense of Anselm's argument, and justifies his refutation of the 'Lost Island' objection: it is nonsense to say of any island, or dollar, that it is ontologically
superior to another, or to anything else."

"The paper aims to show that parody-based critiques of Anselm's ontological argument fail to do damage because there is a crucial disanalogy between 'God' and for example, Gaunilean
'Islands'. the basis of the disanalogy is God's alleged uniqueness in terms of necessary existence. It is this rather than the structure of Anselm's argument which constitutes the real problem in
attempting to assert that there is a God."

Campbell, Richard James. 1976. From Belief to Understanding. A Study of Anselm's Proslogion Argument on the Existence of God. Canberra: Australian National University.

Contents: Acknowledgments VII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The Text 6; 3. The Structure of the Argument 10; 4. The First Stage 30; 5. The Second Stage 92; 6. The Third Stage 126; 7. A
Formalisation of the Argument 151; 8. The Force of the Argument 172; 9. The Relevance of the Argument 208; Index 228-229.

Chambers, Timothy. 2000. "On Behalf of the Devil: A Parody of Anselm Revisited." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 100:93-113.

"This paper treats a question which first arose in these Proceedings: Can Anselm's ontological argument be inverted so as to yield parallel proofs for the existence (or
nonexistence) of a least (or worst conceivable being? Such "devil parodies" strike some commentators as innocuous curiosities, or redundant challenges which are no more troubling
than other parodies found in the literature (e.g., Gaunilo's Island). I take issue with both of these allegations; devil parodies, I argue, have the potential to pose substantive, and novel,
challenges to Anselm's ontological argument."

"The principal arguments considered are in some ways similar to those offered in Anselm's Proslogium, Chapters II and III. In addition, two quick' versions of the
ontological argument are examined. Finally, I worry a bit about the ineffable One. The general line of attack is similar to a procedure employed by David Lewis in discussing Proslogium II.
My approach to Proslogium III is based upon the idea that the appropriate modal logic for these matters is much weaker than the standard S5. The hope is that this alternative perspective
reveals features worthy of notice."

"This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that "exists" is not a predicate (existence is not a property). None, it is concluded, is both true and a refutation of st
Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God."

"The author argues that Anselm's proof of God in the Proslogion is the first and so far the last example of an entirely new philosophical method which is neither categorial
not analytic but axiomatic and synthetic: the method of mathematics validly applied to the highest possible subject of human thought. With particular reference to Karl Barth's 1958 study, Fides
quaerens intellectum, he first reconstructs Anselm's theological program. He then discusses Anselm's notions of rationality and proof and presents his axiomatic concept of the name of God.
Finally, the author examines the argument between Anselm and Gaunilon step by step."

"The article aims at elucidating the argumentation in Anselm's Proslogion by relating some aspects of it to the early medieval theory of argument. The focus of the analysis
is on the "single argument" (unum argumentum), the discovery of which Anselm announces in the Preface to the Proslogion. Part 1 of the article offers a preliminary description of
the single argument by describing the reductio ad absurdum technique based on the notion "that than which a greater cannot be thought". Part 2 discusses the ideas about arguments and
argumentation that Boethius presents in Book One of his In Ciceronis Topica. Part 3 draws attention to some early medieval sources (Abelard, Lanfranc, Anselm) that are witness to the
importance of the Boethian ideas in Anselm's time. Finally, Part 4 argues that Anselm looked at his single argument in the Boethian framework and that the term "that than which a greater cannot be
thought" should be identified as his single argument."

Hopkins, Jasper. 1972. A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

"The article presents a formalization of Anselm's so-called 'ontological arguments' from Proslogion. The main idea of our research is to stay to the original text as close
as is possible. We show, against some common opinions, that (i) the logic necessary for the formalization must be neither a purely sentential modal calculus, nor just non-modal first-order logic, but
a modal first-order theory; (ii) such logic cannot contain logical axiom A right arrow implies that A is possible; (iii) none of Anselm's reasoning requires the assumptions that God is a
consistent object or that existence of God is possible; (iv) no such thing as the so-called Anselm's principle is involved in any of the proofs; (v) Anselm's claims (that God exists in reality and
that God necessarily exists in reality) can be obtained independently, hence, there is no need for presenting them in an opposite order than Anselm did."

Introduction: "With this International Bibliography of Anselm of Canterbury we intend to lay out a comprehensive list of works and sources of Anselm of Canterbury as well as the
relevant research literature. The systematic presentation takes into consideration the time period from the first manuscripts until 1996. The bibliography includes all together three thousand, seven
hundred, and eighty four individual citations.

Part I: For a manual of this kind, not only a presentation of secondary literature, but also a presentation of texts, manuscripts, omnia opera, editions, and translations, ordered
according to the most important languages, should be useful. This latter collection is presented in the first part of the bibliography, entitled 'Texts and Editions'. We have undertaken no new
studies of sources and manuscripts, but have taken the references of F. S. Schmitt's Omnia Opera and F. S. Schmitt's and R. Southern's Memorial, and have reprinted the most important bibliographical
information.

Part Il: The 'Alphabetical Table' presents alphabetically all the relevant secondary literature in detail. This second section is the heart of the bibliography. It serves as the
foundation for Part III. The systematic presentation of the literature extends to the year 1996. The final references were to the contributions in the collection of D. E. Luscombe and G. R. Evans,
Aosta, Bec, and Canterbury. Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-hundreth Anniversary of Anselm's Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093 (1996). After that, particular titles appear only
sporadically.

Part III: The 'Systematic Table' is conceived as an aid for research into the works of Anselm of Canterbury. In a systematic reference word table, developed especially for this
purpose, relevant research contributions are presented in short form. It should be possible quickly to find citations in the 'Alphabetical Table' through the presentation of references of Author
(Year) in the 'Systematic Table'."

"Anselm's Ontological Argument is an ad hominem argument against the Foole, part of which is a reductio ad absurdum, designed to prove the existence of God. The
actual argument offered by St. Anselm has seventeen premisses; the heart of the argument is a careful distinction among intentional objects-and the Ontological Argument cannot be formalized
by modal logic. It is not a modal argument at all, but rather relies on certain intuitive principles of intentional logic, which Anselm applies throughout the Proslogion. The Ontological
Argument is valid, if one accepts these principles; insofar as an ad hominem argument may be sound, it is sound as well. It is not a demonstration, for the key premiss granted by the Foole
is highly implausible. Those who agree with the Foole, however, may justifiably assert God's existence.

These claims only apply to Anselm's actual argument, not to other Ontological Arguments, no matter how distinguished the pedigree, no matter how careful the formalization.
Other Ontological Arguments only interest me insofar as they shed light on, or claim to accurately represent, Anselm's Ontological Argument. Other Ontological Arguments must be judged on their own
merits. Anselm's actual argument, unlike most versions, is an exercise in intentional logic, a fact that has eluded commentators from the time of Gaunilon. That Ontological Argument is the subject of
this article, and henceforth I shall call it the Ontological Argument."

"This paper provides replies to the objections Tony Roark presented (Roark, T. 2003. 'Conceptual closure in Anselm's proof', History and Philosophy of Logic 24) to my
reconstruction of Anselm's famous argument in the Proslogion (Klima, G. 2000. 'Saint Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding', in G.
Holmström-Hintikka, Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 69-87). The replies argue that Roark's objections actually strengthen the general conclusion
of my original paper concerning the different attitudes one can take toward Anselm's argument, depending on whether one refers to that than which nothing greater can be thought 'constitutively' or
'parasitically'. In agreement with Roark, however, at the end of the paper I also indicate some of the broader implications of this distinction worthy of further exploration."

Losoncy, Thomas. 1982. "Anselm's Response to Gaunilo's Dilemma. An Insight into the Notion of 'Being' Operative in the Proslogion." New Scholasticism no.
56:207-216.

———. 1994. "Chapter 1 of St. Anselm's Proslogion: Its Preliminaries to Proving God's Existence as Paradigmatic for Subsequent Proofs of God's Existence." In Greek and Medieval
Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J., edited by Carroll, William J. and Furlong, John J., 171-180. New York: Peter Lang.

———. 2008. "Language and Saint Anselm's Proslogion Argument." In Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bononiensis, edited by Schoeck, Richard J. Binghantom: State University
of New York Press.

Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies: Bologna, 26 August to 1 September 1979.

"In the over nine hundred years since Saint Anselm wrote the Proslogion steadfast disagreement over what he meant, and sometimes over what he said, functions as an unbroken
principle of interpretation among its readers and commentators alike. How to explain this phenomenon has proven equally controversial. However, two explanations of the long embattled history of the
Proslogion are feasible.

One is that access to the complete Proslogion was impossible for many of Anselm's successors, including such renowned reviewers of the work as Aquinas, Scotus, and the
noted modern critic of the ontological argument, Immanuel Kant. A second, applying more to recent times, appears to be a failure to exercise due regard for the language of the work. (1) This is
further evidenced by a tendency to concentrate only on part of the Proslogion, principally chapters two-four."

(1) Two recent discussions of the Proslogion deserve notice in this regard. Professor G. R. Evans, Anselm and Talking about God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978),
devotes more time to talking about the interpretation a large tradition has placed upon the Proslogion argument than to an analysis of the argument's language as such. See, especially, chapters two
and three, pp. 39-75. On the other hand, Professor Gregory Schufreider's study, "The Identity of Anselm's Argument," The Modern Schoolman, LIV (1977), pp. 345-61, breaks genuinely new ground in its
search for the argument in Anselm's Proslogion instead of a new search for confirmation of an old rendition. In arguing that Saint Anselm has a single argument in the Proslogion Schufreider provides
a careful analysis of Anselm's use of "vere esse" in chapter eleven's heading and chapter three's text (pp. 349-52); of "absolute" in chapters twenty-two and twenty-eight of the Monologion
(pp. 353-58) and the modal quality of the Proslogion's "vere esse" (p. 360). The conclusion Schufreider reaches reinforces the argument of this paper from a different perspective.

"I offer a defence of the ontological argument. I argue for the principle that if Fis a necessarily exemplified concept and G is not, then Fs are a
greater kind of thing than Gs. This principle is defended on the basis of two other principles concerning such attitudes as total reliance, which it is appropriate to take to Fs if
f is a necessarily exemplified concept."

Mann, William E. 1972. "The Ontological Presuppositions of the Ontological Argument." Review of Metaphysics:260-277.

"I present a semi-formal analysis of St. Anselm's version of the ontological argument from Proslogion II, with two purposes in mind. First, I show that some contemporary
analyses of the argument, in terms of the apparatus of modal logic, neglect the conceptual framework within which Anselm worked. I then display three ingredients of that framework: the distinction
between beings 'in intellectu' and beings 'in re', the distinction between one's conceiving of a thing and one's conceiving it to exist, and the doctrine that existence is a property of things.
Second, I argue that even if Anselm is granted all three of these presuppositions, he still cannot produce a convincing argument for the existence of God."

"The contrast between the reception of Anselm's Proslogion in the work of Bonaventure and in the work of Thomas Aquinas is often held up as a classic example of their competing
intellectual assumptions. Some have located the intellectual prerequisites for the acceptance or rejection of Anselm's argument in the prior acceptance of univocal or analogical accounts of being.
(1) P. A. Daniels argued that the prerequisites for Bonaventure's acceptance of the argument were not his "ontological" mode of thought, or a doctrine of the innate idea of God within the soul, but
in his acceptance of examplar causality.(2) Half a century later, Jean Chattillon, following Étienne Gilson, affirmed the more common view of the issue, that the acceptance or rejection of Anselm's
argument among the first scholastics of the thirteenth century depended upon their allegiance to Augustinian or Aristotelian traditions.(3) Anton Pegis did the same when he insisted that recovery of
the Anselmian argument in its original form involved stripping away the Aristotelian framework in terms of which the Proslogion has been read since Thomas. (4)"

(1) In general terms, the interpretation of Bonaventure as leader of an Augustinian tradition, and of Thomas as representative of Aristotelianism, can be found in the work of E.
Gilson, A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1978). On Bonaventure's refinement of Anselm in the context of the Augustinian tradition, see H. R. Klocker, S.J.
"Bonaventure's Refinement of the Ontological Argument," Mediaevilla 4 (1978): 209-23. On analogical and univocal accounts of being as factors determining attitudes to Anselm's argument, see
H. J. Johnson, "Contra Anselm But Contra Gentiles: Aquinas's Rejection of the Ontological Argument," Schede Medievali 13 (1986): 18-27.

"In his paper Has the Ontological Argument Been Refuted?' (Religious Studies, 29 (1993), 97-110) William F. Vallicella argues that my attempt to show that the Ontological
Argument begs the question is unsuccessful. I believe he is wrong about this, but before endeavouring to vindicate my position I must first make clear what precisely is the point at issue between us.
The Ontological Argument is not a single argument, but a family of arguments. Newly devised formulations of the argument are frequently put forward by philosophers in an effort to avoid difficulties
that have been pointed out in previous versions. As a consequence there is no possibility of a conclusive proof that every form of the argument embodies the same fallacy. Nevertheless, one can, I
believe, prove that all the standard versions of the argument embody a certain fallacy and that, given the nature of the argument, it is therefore unlikely that the argument can be formulated in such
a way as to avoid this difficulty. What I tried to show in my paper is that the six best-known versions of the argument (the non-model versions of Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz and the modal versions
of Malcolm, Hartshorne and Plantinga) all beg the question and that they do so at the same point in the argument, namely when it is asserted that it is possible,that an absolutely perfect being
exists. It is difficult to see how an ontological argument could be formulated without, including this claim as one of its premises, since the distinguishing badge of the argument is the inference
from the possibility of an absolutely perfect being to its actuality. It must be unlikely then, if my criticism of these six versions is correct, that there is any way of formulating the argument
that avoids this fallacy."

"Anselm's Ontological Argument fails, but not for any of the various reasons commonly adduced. In particular, its failure has nothing to do with violating deep Kantian principles by
treating 'exists' as a predicate or making reference to 'Meinongian' entities. Its one fatal flaw, so far from being metaphysically deep, is in fact logically shallow, deriving from a subtle scope
ambiguity in Anselm's key phrase. If we avoid this ambiguity, and the indeterminacy of reference to which it gives rise, then his argument is blocked even if his supposed Meinongian extravagances
are permitted. Moreover it is blocked in a way which is straightforward and compelling (by contrast with the Kantian objections), and which generalizes easily to other versions of the
Ontological Argument. A significant moral follows. Fear of Anselm's argument has been hugely influential in motivating ontological fastidiousness and widespread reluctance to countenance talk of
potentially non-existing entities. But if this paper is correct, then the Ontological Argument cannot properly provide any such motivation. Some of the most influential contributions to ontology,
from Kant to Russell and beyond, rest on a mistake."

"The kernel of Anselm's famous argument in chapter II of his Proslogion consists of a few lines. Thousands of pages have been written about them, but nevertheless they have resisted
final clarification, though the literature about them still grows.

Most of what has allegedly been written about Anselm's argument is concerned more with phantasies than with Anselm's original text. In fact most authors take Anselm's argument as an
excuse for doing quite different things and developing their own ideas.

Anselm's brilliant text does not deserve such a treatment. Accordingly I will focus on Anselm's own words and will display the ingenuity of his argument as well as where it
fails."

"I argue contrary to Stephen Makin's "The Ontological Argument" (Philosophy 63, No. 243) that one can't show that necessary being is a meaningful concept by the use of modal notions
involving the exemplification of concepts. For conceptual coherence provides, at best, a necessary condition for necessary exemplification, not a sufficient one. What then could there possibly be
about a concept beyond its coherence that would necessitate its exemplification. I suspect there is none."

"This study is a reexamination of the Proslogion, aiming, in the light of the interpretations of K. Barth, E. Gilson and especially H. Bouillard, to determine the nature of
its argument for God as a rational construction. St. Anselm believes that the believing reason is both believing in itself and rationally visible to an unbeliever. The argument in chapters 2-4 is not
from thought to existence, but from God as designated by and in things to God as posited in his transcendence. There is no reason for thinking that the so-called ontological argument originates in
the Proslogion."

"Although 'exists' has the superficial appearance of a predicate in the Proslogion, Anselm does not rely on the premise that 'exists' is a logical predicate (or that
existing is a property) in the ontological proof. Anselm argues that God exists not only as a mental object (in intellectu) but also exists in extramental reality (in re). Whether
'exists' is a predicate is irrelevant to this inference. It follows that many putative refutations of the argument fail."

"In Anselm's ontological argument, the phrase 'to exist (only) in the understanding' needs explanation; so also does the claim that something which exists only in the understanding,
and so does not exist, is less great than something that does exist. What this means is that, if it were to exist, it would be less great than the other. But it could not then be less great than
itself. So Anselm's argument collapses."

"Gyula Klima maintains that Anselm's ontological argument is best understood in terms of a theory of reference that was made fully explicit only by later medievals. I accept the
interpretative claim but offer here two objections to the argument so interpreted. The first points up a certain ambiguity in Klima's formulation of the argument, the correction of which requires a
substantive revision of the argument's conclusion. The second exploits the notion of semantic closure introduced by Tarski. Klima offers the atheist an 'out' by drawing a distinction between
constitutive and parasitic reference. I argue that using Klima's preferred description ('the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater') to refer constitutively to God
results in conceptual closure, a condition analogous to semantic closure that renders the instant conceptual scheme inconsistent and subject to paradox. Although the proof ultimately fails, Klima's
development of the notions of constitutive and parasitic reference has important and far-reaching implications."

"The article presents an analysis of Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God, based on Transparent Intensional Logic. Section I consists of general considerations on
denotation and existence. In section II, two fallacies flawing Descartes's proof are exposed. Anselm's argument is reconstructed and assessed in section III, it is found logically sound, but doubt is
cast on one of its premises."

"Suppose we say that a deductive argument is probative just in case it is (i) valid in point of logical form, (ii) possesses true premises, and (iii) is free of informal fallacy. We
can then say that an argument is normatively persuasive for a person if and only if it is both probative and has premises that can be accepted, without any breach of epistemic propriety, by the
person in question. If the premises of a probative argument would be accepted by any reasonable person, I will call such an argument demonstrative.

Now it seems that a reasonable position to take with respect to the Ontological Argument for the existence of God (hereafter, OA) is that none of its versions is demonstrative,
though some of the versions are normatively persuasive. If so, the OA in at least one version is a 'good' argument although not a successful piece of natural theology'. To show that the OA is 'bad'
in all versions one would have to show, for each version, either that it is not probative, by showing that it is either invalid, or possessed of one or more false premises, or guilty of informal
fallacy, or such that its premises are more rationally rejected than accepted by the person who considers the argument. To show a version 'bad', then, it does not suffice to show that it fails to
establish its conclusion in some incontrovertible manner. Precious few philosophical arguments get the length of that." (Notes omitted).

"Gaunilo's "Lost Island" argument is his most famous objection to Anselm's ontological proof, and Anselm is known to provide quite an unsatisfactory response to it. So someone
sympathetic to Anselm might ask: is there something that Anselm is not saying, some point he has perhaps made elsewhere and he might be implicitly appealing to which would give substance to his
disappointing statement? I believe there is, and this paper provides my answer."

"The received view is that Gaunilo's attempted refutation of Anselm's ontological argument fails. But those who believe this do not agree as to why it fails. The aim of this essay
is to show that "whether" the attempted refutation succeeds depends crucially on how one formulates the so-called greatmaking principle on which Anselm's argument rests. This principle has largely
been ignored by contemporary philosophers, who have chosen to focus on other aspects of the argument. I sketch two analyses of metaphysical greatness and suggest that on one of them, which Anselm may
have held, his argument avoids Gaunilo's criticism."

"Gaunilo, monk of Marmoutier, is known almost exclusively for his attempted refutation of Anselm's ontological argument around 1079. Indeed, both his counterexample about the
alleged island which is more excellent than all others and Anselm's rebuttal thereof have nowadays become standard items for courses in medieval philosophy. Over the past decade or so, which has
witnessed a revival of interest in the ontological argument, Gaunilo has been either lauded for his brilliancy or disparaged for his mediocrity. Thus, R. W. Southern judges that, "in words which are
as trenchant as, and in some details strikingly similar to, those of Kant", Gaunilo pointed out the main difficulty in accepting Anselm's argument. (1) By contrast, the most Charles Hartshorne can
say on Gaunilo's behalf is that he is "a clever, but essentially commonplace mind". (2) Those who praise Gaunilo tend to do so because he "wisely" discerned the illegitimacy of inferring a factual
statement from an a priori description. Those who speak derogatorily of his achievement tend to side with Anselm's two criticisms: (I) that he misunderstood the phrase aliquid quo nihil maius
cogitari potest - replacing it by maius omnibus - and (II) that his definition of "understanding" is inconsistent with his having maintained that what is unreal can be understood. (3)
Now, if Gaunilo did commit himself to two blatantly inconsistent statements within a few lines of each other, as the second criticism maintains, then to call him a clever mind would itself be an
overstatement.

In this paper I want to cleat up several misinterpretations both within and about the debate between Anselm and Gaunilo. At the same time, I want to articulate the reformulations of
the ontological argument as they occur in Reply to Gaunilo 1. I shall not take up the issue of whether or not any of these reformulations presents a sound argument for the existence of God,
though in my judgment none does. Nor shall I worry about the respective degrees of brilliancy attributable to our two opponents, though on the present interpretation Gaunilo will fare better than
Hartshorne supposes but not as well as Southern fancies." (pp.25-26)

(3) Hartshorne complains that Gaunilo, and others like him, neglected the principle of Proslogion 3 that to exist without conceivable alternative of not existing is better than
to exist with such alternative. Anselm's Discovery, 88 (verbatim).

"Gaunilo presents Anselm with a dilemma in section 7 of his Responsio: I know most certainly that I exist. But If I cannot think my non-existence at the same time, then
Anselm's claim in Proslogion 3 (that my inability to think God's non-existence, while knowing most certainly that He exists, is a unique property of God) would be false. If I can do so,
however, then I should also be able to know most certainly that God exists and, at the same time, think his non-existence. I will show that Anselm's response to Gaunilo's attack is not adequate
because it does not address the issue of certainty, which is at the heart of Gaunilo's objection."

"The existence of major disagreement between Saint Anselm and Gaunilo concerning reason's ability (unaided by faith) to attain any knowledge of God's hence is easily recognized by
reading their famous exchanges. What has received minimal notice is the extent of this disagreement and its significance for interpreting Anselm's argument in the Proslogion. This study will seek to
establish to what extent knowledge of God's existence is / is not attainable and what said knowledge includes according to these two thinkers. The method for conducting this endeavor will be to
examine the kinds, range, and origins of human knowledge of existence as variously held and disputed by Anselm and Gaunilo. Such a survey should help to place this aspect of the two protagonists'
thought in sharper relief. Moreover, expanding the parameters of our consideration of Anselm's argument in this fashion will free us from the, for many, enslaving fascination of Anselm's logic in
Proslogion II-IV and allow a clearer insight into the metaphysics at work in these three chapters and the work as a whole. Additionally, such freedom of inquiry will permit a due recognition
of chapter one's role in posing the problematic according to Anselm.

Finally, the metaphysical notions stated obliquely in Proslogion II-IV, and especially in III, will be better heard by examining their elaboration in later chapters of
Proslogion and the subsequent exchanges between Anselm and Gaunilo.

It is necessary, then, to turn to the originals to see if, indeed, such insights are forthcoming."

"In previous articles, Fr. Gedeon Gàl and I have shown that after rejecting Anselm's argument in its original form, Rufus, like John Duns Scotus, and like the modern American
analytical philosopher, Norman Malcolm, proposed another ontological argument in its place. To oversimplify: either as a gloss on Anselm or as a substitute for his argument, they claimed that God's
existence, or rather the existence of a per se being, could be inferred by modus tollens: a per se being is necessary if possible, a variety of arguments show that a per se being is
possible, therefore a per se being is necessary. (3) Here, I want to look at Rufus' criticism and very briefly at another proposed substitute argument for God's existence." p. 88

" For St Bonaventure the self-evident truth of God's existence can be shown forth by 'intellectual exercises' like that of st Anselm. Such exercises are not simple-minded transits
from the ideal to the real order. Rather they are based upon a sophisticated metaphysics. They involve the experience of common intelligibility. With Plato, they accept the 'really real' character of
that intelligibility. implicitly, they also accept a plurality and a one-way hierarchy of intelligibles leading up to a 'First'. Turning then precisely upon the unprincipiated nature of this 'First',
they spread before us its absolute necessity both in reality and for thought."

"The formula (if God is God, God exists) is the shortest summary of the ontological argument. The article tries to demonstrate that this argument, as interpreted by Bonaventure, in
no way is guilty of the logical mistakes with which one reproaches it. It proceeds not from a subjective idea or concept but from an intrinsically necessary and supremely intelligible divine nature
and therefore applies to no other being but to the divine being. Bonaventure's basic thesis is that the inner truth (necessity) of the divine nature imposes itself on the mind and contains
objectively the real existence of God. Only someone who does not understand this inner necessary truth can deny God's existence."

"The article discusses inadequacies in Aquinas' criticism of Anselm's ontological argument. Aquinas is commonly credited with criticizing Anselm by distinguishing two kinds of
self-evidence, a distinction which for the purpose of criticizing Anselm, is not very helpful, and instead of an effective rebuttal of Anselm, Aquinas provides mostly a mere denial that his argument
is cogent. The article attempts to show how Anselm's ontological argument can be defeated."

"St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent represent three medieval philosophical traditions in proving the existence of God, namely, the Platonic, the
Aristotelian and the Avicennian. Platonic hierarchy and participation, leading to a supreme term, govern the proof of God in St. Bonaventure and St. Anselm. St. Thomas, beginning with data in nature
(e.g. motion), reaches God as the cause of these data before reaching him as he is in his own absoluteness. St. Thomas' argumentation and method are Aristotelian. The proofs of God in St. Anselm
(specifically, in the Proslogion), in St. Bonaventure and in St. Thomas are all empirical and "a posteriori". but the proof of God in Henry of Ghent, Avicennian in origin, is "a priori" and
seeks to reach God in his unity as the necessary being. Henry's proof is the model and perhaps the origin of the ontological argument."

"Duns Scotus has substituted the notion of a "highest thinkable" for Anselm's "that than which a greater cannot be thought." For Scotus, the touchstone of "thinkability" is
non-contradiction. He resumes the non-contradictory and therefore the thinkable character of God. He then shows God's existence in two steps: (1) from thinkability to essential reality, and (2) from
essence to existence. The first step involves Scotus in some inconsistency and also comes close to making man's mind the very rule of reality. The second step entails a confusion of internal
possibility with total possibility, which ordinarily, beyond internal possibility, includes an external potency."

"In his "Ordinatio", Scotus disregards the constitutive function of thinking inherent to Anselm's "ratio". Scotus's representation of the argument in "Ordinatio" I d. 2 p. 1 q. 2,
which lays no claim to "coloratio", eliminates this constitutive function, proving instead by means of a syllogism containing the terms "being", "non-being" and "the highest" the existence of the
highest. In the "coloratio" ("Ord." I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1), then, Scotus replaces Anselm's expression "that than which nothing greater can be thought" with the concept "the highest thinkable", by which he
means an infinite being. The introduction of an infinite being taken as the highest thinkable, however, destroys the structure of Anselm's argument with its innate coherence. In fact, Scotus proves
the existence of the highest thinkable not by means of this argumentative structure, but instead on the basis of his own analysis of certain ontological structures. This proof has no real connection
in content to Anselm's argument and does not foster its comprehension; instead, Scotus merely couches his argument in Anselm's terms, so that it is more appropriate to talk about a "coloration
rationum Scoti". "

Kielkopf, Charles. 1978. "Duns Scotus's Rejection of 'Necessarily Exists' as a Predicate." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 16:13-21.

"The paper begins with a reconstruction of Scotus's argument in chapter three (3.23) of his Treatise about the first principle that there can be at most one necessary
being. This argument is shown to presuppose that 'necessarily exists' is not a predicate. Scotus' argument is modified to show that he also has to accept that 'exists' is not a predicate. The
remaining problem is, then, to explain how Scotus can still accept a "colored" ontological argument. This problem is met by suggesting that the nature of an existing being has more perfections than
any nature of a non-existing being but that, still, existence is not one of the features -l et alone anything which can be called a perfection -- making up the nature."

Translated in English as: A Platonic justification for the argument a priori in: J. Hick and A. C. McGill (eds.), The many-faced argument. Recent studies on the
ontological argument for the existence of God, London: Macmillan 1967, pp. 111-118.

Davidson, Herbert Alan. 1979. "Avicenna's Proof of the Existence of God as a Necessarily Existent Being." In Islamic Philosophical Theology, edited by Morewedge, Parviz,
165-187. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"The first philosopher known to use the concept of necessary existence in order to construct a proof of the existence of God was Avicenna. Avicenna's proof, it will appear, neither
is, nor inevitably reduces itself to, an ontological proof. It is rather a certain kind of cosmological proof.

The concept of necessary existence is used by Avicenna to prove the existence of God in two works, at length in the Najat, briefly and somewhat obscurely in the Isharat. The concept
is also discussed fully in two other works, the Shifa and Danesh Namesh, but there Avicenna employs it only to define the nature of God, not, as far as I can see, to establish His existence."

———. 1987. Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In this paper I offer an interpretation of the Stoic argumentum ex gradibus entium as it appears in Book II of Cicero's De Natura Deorum. In addition to displaying certain
similarities to later formulations of the so-called "ontological argument," particularly Anselm's, I argue that the argument ex gradibus entium was a versatile feature of Stoic philosophical
theology, capable of employment in relation to two distinct topics: the existence of god and the identification of god's essential nature with the world. I claim that the instance of the argument ex
gradibus entium at ND II 18-21 is a token of this latter type, and show that there are no textual reasons precluding this interpretation. In light of the fact that the argument can be
analyzed more effectively in this role, I suggest that this particular instance of the argument is best thought of as an attempt on the part of the Stoics to identify the world with god rather than
as a strict proof for god's bare existence. I end with some reflections on the general type of the Stoic argument qua precursor to two of Anselm's ontological proofs. Although I think it is a mistake
to call the Stoic argument "ontological" in a strict sense, it may, I suggest, have shared a similar conceptual underpinning with at least one of Anselm's famous formulations."

"Aristotle produced several arguments to vindicate the futura contingentia and to refute the conception of modalities which do not allow incidental facts. This conception
was coined mainly by

Diodorus Cronus and implied the view that whatever may happen, is to happen necessarily. Although Aristotle condemned this view and refuted the theology which it implies, Diodorean
modalities were employed by the Scholastics (at least since Abelard, as Leibniz pointed out) to support their theology. Abelard's Diodorean formula reads: God wishes no more and no less than what He
is able to do -- i.e., God's ability to do something implies necessity. In the Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas employed Diodorean modalities along with this result of Abelard's. Leibniz
himself confessed his debt to Diodorean modalities as well as to the work of Abelard in formulating his own ontological proof. For the Greek-speaking scholars of the Middle Ages, however,
Aristotelian influences were stronger than Diodorean as regards theory building on modalities. The absence of Leibniz-like modal ontological proofs in the Greek tradition seems more plausible under
these circumstances."

"Ibn Sina (d.429/1037) gave a distinctive argument for the existence of God in his works. Scholars disagree on the exact structure and character of his argument (admittedly, Ibn
Sina gives it in more than one form). This paper tries to determine the argument's precise shape and classify it in relation to other such proofs. It attempts this through a detailed analysis of one
of the best known presentations of the proof, in Ibn Sina's Isharat, which is cross-checked with other versions and the commentaries. The argument is found to build on the proposition that
existence occurs in the mind dichotomically, as either necessary or contingent. Ibn Sina claims that an extramental Necessary Existent follows from both modes. In the first case, it is contradictory
to posit 'necessary existence' in the mind and deny it outside the mind. In the second case 'contingent existence' is such that it could not be self-explanatory. Most space in Ibn Sina's argument is
taken up with showing that contingent existence, even if temporally infinite, ultimately implies necessary existence. On these grounds, it is concluded that Ibn Sina's proof must be classified as
both ontological and cosmological, without paradox. It is ontological insofar as 'necessary existence' in intellect is the first basis for arguing for a Necessary Existent in re. It is, however, also
cosmological insofar as most of it is taken up with arguing that contingent existents cannot stand alone and must end up in a Necessary Existent."

Morewedge, Parviz. 1979. "A Third Version of the Ontological Argument in the Ibn Sinian Metaphysics." In Islamic Philosophical Theology, edited by Morewedge, Parviz,
182-222. New York: State University of New York Press.

"An argument for the existence of gods given by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and reported by Sextus Empiricus appears to be an ancient version of the ontological argument. In this
paper I present a new reconstruction of Diogenes' argument that differs in certain important respects from the reconstruction presented by Jacques Brunschwig. I argue that my reconstruction makes
better sense of how Diogenes' argument emerged as a response to an attack on an earlier Stoic argument presented by Zeno of Citium. Diogenes' argument as reconstructed here is an example of a modal
ontological argument that makes use of the concept of being of such a nature as to exist. I argue that this concept is a modal concept that is based on the Philonian definition of possibility, and
thus that Diogenes' argument is a source of important evidence about the use of non-Stoic modalities in the post-Chrysippean Stoa. I conclude by arguing that the objections made against considering
Diogenes' argument as ontological are unfounded and that Diogenes' argument clearly resembles modern versions of modal ontological arguments."

GENERAL STUDIES ON THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD

Bonansea, Bernardino. 1973. "The Ontological Argument: Proponents and Opponents." Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy no. 6:135-192.

"This study is a follow-up to my previous article, Duns Scotus and St Anselm's ontological argument, and traces the history of the controversy about the Anselmian proof
from the time when it was first proposed up to the present day. The argument found its strongest opponents in Gaunilo, Aquinas, and Kant, who objected to it on more or less the same ground but from a
different perspective, while Bonaventure, Descartes, Leibniz, and Barth came to its support. Between these two opposite positions there is the view of Malcolm and Hartshorne, who see in the "ratio
Anselmi" two distinct pieces of reasoning and claim that only one is valid. Koyré and Gilson view the argument within the context of the whole Proslogion and other Anselmian works. Each
position is carefully analyzed and evaluated."

———. 1979. "The Ontological Argument." In God and Atheism. A Philosophical Approach to the Problem of God, 107-170. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

This chapter is a combination, with some minor changes, of two essays which appeared in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press), i.e., "Duns Scotus and St. Anselm's Ontological Argument," vol. IV (1969), pp. 128-41, and "The Ontological Argument: Proponents and Opponents," vol.
VI (1973), pp. 135-92.

"St. Anselm's ontological argument is one of the most provocative and fascinating topics in the field of philosophy. Although the subject of endless discussion, the argument
continues to draw the attention of philosophers of different persuasions. New interpretations have superseded those of the past and new insights into the controversy have been revealed which point
out, among other things, the difficulty and complexity of the issue.

It has been customary to dismiss the Anselmian argument for the existence of God on the ground that it involves a transition from the ideal to the real order, from a concept in our
mind to the existence of the being so conceived. This transition, it is asserted, is never permissible, not even in the case of the greatest conceivable being, as the argument seems to imply. The
fact that many great thinkers, such as Aquinas and Kant, have felt a need to refute the argument is a further proof, so it is claimed, that the ratio Anselmi has little more than a
historical value. St. Anselm would have fallen victim to an illusion, and no dialectical effort could ever rescue his argument from the attacks of its critics, even though no serious scholar would
subscribe today to Schopenhauer's view that the ratio Anselmi is merely a charming joke.

Yet, despite the many attacks and "refutations", the argument has a peculiar power of survival. There is a growing realization, even among those whose philosophical background is
very different from St. Anselm's way of thinking, that the argument is not as simple as it first appears to be and that much of the criticism directed against it is due to a superficial knowledge of
its context and the general framework of Anselm's thought. As a contemporary author points out, "If Anselm is to be refuted, it should be for what he said, taken in something like the context which
he provided, and not for something someone else said he said, or a fragment of what he said, torn wholly out of context.'' (1) The Anselmian argument, which has been called "one of the boldest
creations of man's reason and a credit not only to its inventor, but to human reason itself," (2) is not to be treated lightly, nor are some of its later formulations.

An objective study of the Anselmian argument in its actual context and historical development may reveal that, while undue credit has been given to certain modern and contemporary
thinkers for their role in the controversy about it, the actual contribution of philosophers who long preceded them in the academic arena has often been neglected or even completely ignored. Yet it
is perhaps in the writings of these forgotten masters, who both historically and intellectually are closer to the "father of scholasticism" than their later contenders, that one may find a clue to a
better appreciation of the celebrated argument.

To avoid misunderstanding, a distinction must be made at the very outset between two different issues: first, the nature and scope of the argument in the mind of its author, and
second, the validity of the argument as an attempt to prove the existence of God. The first issue must be solved in terms of the argument's original text as contained in the Proslogion and
set in relation to Anselm's other writings where his philosophical, and especially his epistemological, doctrines are more clearly stated. The solution of the second issue rests to a great extent on
the critic's conviction as regards the possibility, ways, and means of attaining to any knowledge of a Supreme Being by unaided reason. The failure to make such a distinction has contributed to much
of the confusion in appraisals of the Anselmian proof.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the essential features of the ontological argument as stated in the Proslogion and follow the history of the controversy it has
generated from Anselm's first debate with his fellow-monk Gaunilo down to the present day. The presentation will be followed by a critical evaluation of the argument itself and of the argument's
interpretations by succeeding philosophers and commentators." pp. 107-108

"We need only look back upon the history of medieval philosophy to become immediately aware that it was not only Gaunilon who saw reason to criticise Anselm's famous argument. I
would like to examine here, in a rather sketchy manner, two medieval critiques of Anselm's argument which, to my mind, are quite unique and which, in many ways, far surpass in cogency and relevancy
the common criticisms found in textbooks. The first I gather from certain remarks of William of Occam which, are not directed precisely at Anselm's argument, but which are naturally applicable to it.
The second is the critique of Gregory of Rimini.

Occam's critique, it will be seen, rests upon a very subtle logical point, which is somewhat unique in medieval philosophy and which anticipates views in modern symbolic logic.
Occam was recognized even in his own day as somewhat of an innovator, although we have since learned that there were others of his contemporaries of even more radical stature.

The second critique I gather from Gregory of Rimini, a younger contemporary of Occam, whose thought evinces certain affinities to that of the latter. Rimini's fame among logicians
of modern symbolic logic who attempt to see anticipations of later more sophisticated developments in medieval philosophy, rests upon his doctrine of the cornplexe significabile which seems to be a
subtle anticipation of our modern notion of a proposition, or at least of the Fregean notion of the "object" of thought.

It should be remarked also, by way of introduction, that a great deal of the ideas and interpretations as well as of the scholarly references utilized in this paper came to me
through discussions with my former teacher and friend of happy memory, the late, Julius R. Weinberg." pp. 55-56.