Veconlab
Software for about 60 web-based experiments run on any PCs
that are connected to the Internet. The administrator's setup menu
is
available at: http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.htm.
For a brief introduction and instructions on obtaining a password, click
here. The software is associated with an experimental economics textbook, Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior (Pearson).

This paper provides a laboratory test of a new model of bargaining in the shadow of conflict.
Conflict rates are significant and are essentially invariant to power asymmetries.
This invariance is due to the paradox of counterveiling concessions."An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining"
(with Katri Sieberg, David Clark, Timothy Nordstrom, and William Reed), Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, 4(3): 375-397.

Hierarchical Package Bidding (HPB) for Spectrum Auctions: Laboratory experiments indicate that both efficiency and revenue can be
enhanced by the use of a hierarchical structure of non-overlapping packages and a
pricing rule that signals to bidders how high they need to go to get into the action in the next round of bidding. "Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction"
(with Jacob Goeree), Games and Economic Behavior, 2010. HPB is being considered for use in the upcoming FCC auction 96.

This paper shows that the quantal response equilibrium does have empirical content if the modeller
is not free to specify decision-specific error distributions or error distributions that
tend to force the error for one decision to be generally larger than the error for another decision. These
perverse manipulations are ruled out when errors in a probabilistic choice model are i.i.d. For example,
the common assumption of double exponential errors produces a logit quantal response equilibrium with
clear empirical predictions. The paper also presents an alternative (axiomatic) "reduced form" QRE model and uses an example to derive the empirical predictions of such a model. "Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium" (with Jacob Goeree and Tom Palfrey), Experimental Economics, 2006, 347-367.

If you want to see a game where the data go to the opposite
side of the set of feasible decisions from the unique Nash equilibrium,
see "Anomalous
Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?"(with M. Capra, J. Goeree, and
R. Gomez), American Economic Review, June 1999, 89, 678-90..