Month: May 2015
Page 1 of 2

Hold onto hope for the future,
Even if the present’s bleak,
and champion the cause of peace,
to bring solace to the weak.
For too long the corrupt and evil
have defined the laws of life.
So champion the cause of peace,
bring light unto this world of strife.

Let not the hate and suffering,
Of which this world has much,
bring champions of the cause of peace
to silence with a hush.
And let not the fear of failure,
let not the fear of death,
take from champions of the cause of peace,
the confidence in their breath.

Let not the naysayers,
who themselves pose no solutions,
dissuade the champions of the cause of peace
from their noble resolution.
And let not the myriad of foes
who oppose this cause of peace,
find in their nefarious designs
any moments of relief.

Look, champions, how few we are!
This fight will not be quick.
Yet the cause itself is heroic,
bringing health unto the sick.
And our utopian ideals are heard,
Our hopes can all be seen.
Our world is borne of visions,
Which in turn are borne of dreams.

So dream on, you champions!
Hold fast to your beliefs –
That the world is full of goodness,
and will one day know just peace

Exploring the Use of the Chinese Space Program as a Tool to Establish China as a “Major Power”

Introduction

As the People’s Republic of China continues to develop its economic, military, and technological capabilities, and as China begins to assert itself more aggressively on the world stage, the Chinese leadership has sought to portray the country as being among the world’s major powers. It appears evident that achieving “great power” status is a fundamental goal for China’s fourth generation leadership, as doing so represents to the Chinese people the overcoming of China’s historical period of “national humiliation,” bolsters the Chinese Communist Party’s political legitimacy, and benefits China in its push for regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. China’s quest for global status, a major characteristic of the foreign policy and domestic rhetoric of the current Xi Jinping administration, can be seen reflected by the use of the rapidly developing Chinese space program as a tool to promote and enhance China’s standing at home and influence abroad. With a growing budget, growing ambitions, increasingly advanced capabilities, and through the formation of significant organizational linkages with the Chinese government, it is clear that China’s space program enjoys support from the main political organs of the Chinese state – the PLA, the CCP, and the Civil Service – and is becoming a prominent feature of China’s rise. Underlying this support is the belief that maintaining an active space program is a symbol of great power status and brings with it the economic, technological, cultural, and geopolitical benefits which great powers enjoy. This paper analyzes the domestic and international significance of China’s space program along with the implications of its current capabilities and future plans. By exploring the connections between the effects of China’s space program and the Chinese leadership’s broader strategic and rhetorical goals, the use of the program as an effective tool for establishing China as a global power is explained. Understanding these connections, as well as the overall significance of China’s space program, is vital for a nuanced understanding of China’s rise as a major international actor and reveals the vision which Chinese leaders have for the country’s status as a global power in the coming decades.

A History of the Chinese Space Program

Although the pace of China’s space program’s development has quickened considerably over the past two decades, the program itself is among the oldest in the world. With an origin the mid-1950s, roughly concurrent with the beginnings of the American and Soviet programs, the Chinese space program has had a history reflective of the PRC’s evolution. Due to its military origins and the nature of Communist China during the Mao era, much of the early history of China’s space program remains shrouded in mystery, making it difficult to discern the relationship between the program’s designers, the PLA, and the political establishment; indeed, some analysts have called the Chinese program one of the “last secret space programs.” Nonetheless, the overall course of development can be tracked using what information is available.[i] Initially, Mao Zedong sponsored the program, seizing upon the political and military message sent by achieving space flight during the “space race” of the 1950s and 1960s. Driven by the influence and expertise of Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen, an American-educated rocket scientist, and technical assistance from the Soviet Union, the program had ambitious early goals, including plans for manned spaceflight.[ii] An emphasis was placed on the development of ballistic missiles, which were linked to the development of China’s nuclear arsenal and overall military aims. Due to its initially military character, the space program was placed under the supervision of the PLA.[iii] However, the cutting off of Soviet aid as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, the enormous disruptions caused by the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, and general technological underdevelopment delayed China’s entry into space. It was not until 1970 that China launched its first satellite, named “The East is Red 1,”[iv] using a modified intercontinental ballistic missile. Doing so, it became, after the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Japan, the fifth country to place a satellite in orbit. Plans continued to be proposed for manned spaceflight through the 1960s, but the Chinese leadership, suffering from the consequences of political and economic upheaval, chose instead to limit development to new launch vehicles and space technologies. Although the government continued to float the idea of a manned program during the 1970s it lacked the economic wherewithal necessary to sustain such efforts, which never materialized. However, although the emphasis on the space program’s military application continued, the program began to explore the development and utilization of communications satellites and recoverable film satellites.[v] A number of military satellites, about which little is known, were also flown during the last years of the Mao era.[vi]

A “second phase” in the Chinese space program began with the death of Mao and the ascension of Deng Xiaoping to leadership in China. With Deng’s focus on economic growth and revitalization, the space program became linked to the national goals of economic and technological development. As such, there was a separation of the military and civilian spheres of space activity, with the efforts of the latter focused more explicitly on economic development.[vii] With the production of the upgraded “Long March 2” launch vehicle, the Chinese leadership decided to pursue the launching of communications satellites and expanding into the lucrative commercial launch market. 12 launch vehicle variants of the Long March 2 began development and multiple launch sites were built across China.[viii] In 1984, the first Chinese communication satellite, the “East is Red 2,” was placed into orbit.[ix] In 1985, China began conducting commercial launches. China conducted 18 commercial launches between 1985 and 2000, usually at prices undercutting American and European competition. However, the 1996 crash of a rocket carrying a US-built communications satellite, coupled with American concerns over improper technology transfers, led to a general embargo of Chinese commercial launches.[x]

Some scholars point to Ronald Reagan’s 1983 speech announcing the Strategic Defense initiative as providing the impetus for the resurrection of China’s manned space program. The Chinese leadership, searching for a way to respond to the United States’ renewed space efforts, decided again to explore the possibility for manned missions.[xi] Throughout the 1980s, through the outline of “Plan 863,” which sought to identify fields where China could narrow the development gap with more advanced nations, China moved toward the development of technologies necessary to sustain such a program.[xii] In 1992, the CCP Standing Committee gave the go-ahead for “Project 921,” which would eventually become China’s manned program. Technology transfer between China and Russia, in addition to agreements involving the training of astronauts and experts, led to the development of the Shenzhou “Divine Craft” spacecraft, which closely resembled the Russian “Soyuz” spacecraft. Meanwhile, new launch facilities and heavy-launch variants of the Long March rocket were developed to support the spacecraft.[xiii] Starting in 1999, the Shenzhou spacecraft began a series of unmanned launches testing and certifying various systems.[xiv] Finally, in October 15, 2003, Shenzhou 5, carrying Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei, was launched, making China the third country to launch a human into space.

Shenzhou 6, the second manned Chinese mission, was launched in 2005, and Shenzhou 7, launched in 2008, carried the first three-person crew and conducted the first Chinese extravehicular activity. Meanwhile, plans were developed for lunar operations throughout the early 2000s. By 2004, the State Council and CCP Central Committee had directed the formation of leading small group for lunar exploration, placing it outside the purview of the PLA, and in 2007 Chang’e 1, a lunar orbiter, was placed into orbit around the moon, where it remained for approximately 1 year. In 2010, Chang’e 2, a second lunar orbiter with advanced imaging and mapping capabilities, was launched.[xv] An anti-satellite missile test conducted in 2007, which intercepted and destroyed a defunct Chinese weather satellite in low Earth orbit, demonstrated the PLA’s evolving military application of space technologies.[xvi] As part of China’s multiphase plan to construct a major space station by 2020, begun in the late 2000s, the experimental space station Tiangong 1, known as “Heavenly Palace,” was launched in 2011.[xvii] Shenzhou 9, launched in 2012 carrying China’s first female astronaut, conducted the first docking with Tiangong 1, and Shenzhou 10, China’s most recent manned mission launched in 2013, spent a number of days carrying out experiments while docked with Tiangong 1. Yunghuo 1, a Chinese Mars exploration probe, sought to demonstrate China’s capacity for interplanetary space activity, and would’ve made China the first Asia-Pacific power to visit Mars. Launched in 2011 attached to a Russian probe, the mission failed when the probe failed in Earth orbit.[xviii] However, Chang’e 3, a lunar lander launched in late 2013, made China’s first successful lunar landing. It deployed and operated a rover, named Yutu, on the lunar surface for a month.[xix] In addition to the Chinese space program’s manned and lunar efforts, it has developed and deployed a range of satellite during the 2000s and 2010s. Indeed, the bulk of China’s current, high-tech surveillance, imaging, meteorological, oceanographic, and navigation satellites have been launched within the last two decades.[xx]

As can be seen by its history, the Chinese space program has reflected the evolution and growth of the modern Chinese state, and has long served as a tool to advance its leadership’s rhetorical and strategic goals. As early as the 1950s, Mao sought to use the program to assert Chinese technological and strategic superiority and present a challenge to the growth of American hegemony in space. Although the turmoil of the Mao era prevented the realization of many of the programs lofty initial goals, the application of developed launch vehicles as ballistic and intercontinental weapons platforms nonetheless advanced China’s strategic capabilities and goals. During the Deng era, the expansion of the space program toward economic pursuits reflected the Chinese leadership’s emphasis on economic growth and development. Furthermore, in a number of speeches, including a key speech in 1978, Deng emphasized the space program’s role in achieving wider social and economic goals in China. The development theme and motivation attached to China’s space program has since connected to the Communist party’s various domestic development platforms, such as the “Four Modernizations” campaign and Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”. [xxi] With China’s meteoric economic growth through the 1990s and into the modern day, the space program has undergone equally significant development. Space policy “White Papers” released by the Chinese government through the 2000s emphasized the role of the space program in “upholding the principle of independence, self-reliance, and self-renovation” and laid out its use in “revitalizing the country with science and education and that of sustainable development,” further reinforcing the program’s connection to the leadership’s development rhetoric.[xxii] The contemporary connections between the Chinese space program and the Chinese leadership’s goals and rhetoric will be explored later in this paper. However, to better understand these connections, the current capabilities of the future plans must be described in order to recognize the Chinese leadership’s goals and vision for the program.

Current Capabilities and Future Plans

With a long history of development and a period of rapid expansion over the past two decades, China’s capabilities in outer space are currently sophisticated, extend into the military and civilian spheres, and encompass both manned and unmanned spaceflight. The centerpiece of China’s space program is the Shenzhou spacecraft, which enables China the ability for manned flight. Over the course of 5 manned missions, China has demonstrated its ability to sustain complex, long-duration human spaceflight and conduct scientific experiments with the Shenzhou craft. “Heavenly Palace 1,” China’s first space station, has, through a series of manned and unmanned visits by the Shenzhou spacecraft, proven that China can conduct in-orbit docking and space station experiments, paving the way for future larger, manned stations. China’s space transportation infrastructure includes a reliable family of launch systems which deploy payloads into space for military, civilian, and commercial users. Four main variants of the Long March rocket can put payloads into varying altitudes and orbital inclinations, and numerous sub-variants can accommodate different types of payloads. The LM-2F, China’s most powerful launch vehicle to date, can launch more than 8,000 kilograms into Earth orbit. China also currently has a number of space operations centers, including satellite launch centers at Jiuquan, Taiyuan, and Xichang, and a space launch center on Hainan Island which serves as a base for payloads associated with the manned space program. A number of space academies and science centers located across China assist with technological research, development, and training.[xxiii]

Through the launch of Chang’e 1, 2, and 3, China has shown its capacity for lunar orbit, landing, and operations. Meanwhile, China’s current satellite fleet serves a number of uses and applications. Electro-optical imaging satellites enable high-resolution imaging and surveillance of the Earth, and over 13 remote sensing satellites with civilian and military imaging capabilities launched since 2006. Synthetic aperture radar satellites and electronic reconnaissance satellites enable the tracking and imaging of ground and maritime targets, and can serve dual civilian and military purposes as a disaster-tracking platform and as a surveillance platform. A growing fleet of oceanographic satellites support disaster warning, recovery, and response efforts, and help enable the exploitation of maritime resources and fishing. Meteorological satellites provide valuable weather information for civilian and scientific consumption and lend aid to military operations and planning. Meanwhile, a limited but growing network of data relay satellites have expanded the scope of China’s communications satellite program Finally, the development of a fleet of experimental microsatellites have enabled China to augment its existing space assets with cheaper, smaller satellites. Microsatellites have been viewed as a platform for a wide range of technologies, including observation, communications, and military counterspace operations. [xxiv]

As security analysts in the West routinely point out, China’s space program also supports PLA aims. The dual-use of much of China’s space infrastructure for civilian and military application blends the division between distinctly civilian space assets and military space assets.[xxv] China’s current space assets boost the PLA’s capacity in numerous ways. Analysis of the Shenzhou program has led to conclusions that that they incorporated military elements, with the spacecraft carrying various imaging and tracking equipment for military surveillance.[xxvi] Launch platforms such as the Long March rockets, but also including an array of intercontinental ballistic missiles, provide the PLA with global striking capabilities. Navigation, observation, and communications satellites augment the PLA’s campaign planning and operations, and help refine the targeting capability of its missile-based weapons. Tracking satellites allow for the monitoring of foreign space assets and provide an early warning against space debris, which could pose potential problems for the Chinese space fleet in the event of space-based warfare. A network of ballistic missile warning satellites provide further early warning against the launch of foreign ballistic missiles, and enable precise targeting for anti-missile weapons platforms. Finally, space-borne and ground-launched anti-satellite missiles, such as the one tested in 2007, provide the PLA an offensive capability against foreign country’s space assets.[xxvii]

Among the future plans for China’s civilian space program are an expanded lunar program, the construction of a large-scale space station, the development of more launch vehicles, and the development of more advanced satellite technology. By 2020, China hopes to conduct a series of lunar landings under the Chang’e program, including sample-return missions bringing back lunar soil.[xxviii] Some analysts see the expansion of this program as the precursor for large-scale, manned lunar missions in the 2020s or 2030s.[xxix] With the projected 2015 launch of Tiangong 2 and late 2010s launch of the larger Taigong-3, China will have the capacity for expanding testing of new technologies for large space stations and long-term living conditions for astronauts. The three Tiangong modules serve as a precursor to a fully functioning, continuously-manned, large-scale space station planned for construction by the end of the decade. Significantly, the construction of this space station is planned to occur concurrently with the decommissioning of the American-led International Space Station. Some see the this large-scale space station as a base of support for the Chinese lunar program, while others argue that it supports the leadership’s goals of boosting national pride and national standing.[xxx] China has also committed to the development of a series of new, upgraded launch vehicles, including the planned Long March 5, 6, and 7 rockets. The Long March 5 is planned to be a heavy-lift launcher capable of carrying heavy payloads into high Earth orbit. Additionally, a number of Chinese tracking, telemetry, and control centers are scheduled to be upgraded, allowing for the better tracking of an increased number of space assets. Finally, as laid out by recent “White Papers” published by the Chinese government, plans are in place to significantly increase China’s fleet of Earth observation satellites while upgrading their capabilities. The constellation of China’s navigation and communications satellites are expected to be upgraded as well, enabling global rather than regional reach.[xxxi]

Again, the future expansion of China’s space program will serve a dual purpose for PLA goals. While information about the PLA’s future plans for space technology is limited, the expansion of its capabilities can be extrapolated from the program’s overall trajectory. Through the expansion and upgrading of China’s space-based surveillance network to include new, high-resolution electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar systems, the PLA will be able to image and track enemy targets at an increased scale and global level. Furthermore, more sophisticated tracking satellites will enhance the targeting ability of the PLA’s missile fleet. This fleet will further be augmented by the development of more, larger-scale launch vehicles, which will be able to deliver weapon payloads with a greater distance. Chinese space technology journals have suggested the development of stealth and camouflage measures for China’s military satellites, which would provide them with effective deterrents and counter-measures against enemy counter-space activity.[xxxii] The development of a microsatellite fleet, meanwhile, will mitigate adversaries’ abilities to effectively destroy China’s space capabilities. Ultimately, these elements fall within China’s military strategy for outer space, which has been garnered from recurring themes in Chinese writings on military space operations. A consensus has developed on achieving “space dominance,” which involves securing information, offensive, and defense superiority in outer space. Maintaining a fleet of observation, warning, and communications satellites allows for uninterrupted operation of information collection, while developing offensive space weapons such as anti-satellite missiles and defensive space measures such as stealth capabilities ensures the survival of China’s space assets and the denial of enemy assets. As can be seen through the plans in place for China’s expanding space program, the PLA is taking active steps towards the realization of this outer space dominance.[xxxiii]

The Chinese space program’s current capabilities in both the civil and military spheres provide China with a diverse array of benefits, and China’s future plans for outer space look to only increase the scope and scale of the space program’s impact. Because of the dual-use application of China’s space technology for military and civil purposes, the expansion of China’s space program will likely continue the growth of China’s domestic and military capabilities. The foreign and domestic implications of China’s space capabilities will be explored later in this paper, but first the organizational structure of the Chinese space program, along with its linkages with the Chinese political establishment and leadership, must be analyzed. By doing so, the Chinese leadership’s support for the space program’s current capabilities and expansion as well as the effects of the program’s organization and decision-making structure on the current and future use of space assets may be revealed.

The Chinese Space Program’s Organization and Political Linkages

Without a structured, centralized agency akin to the United States’ NASA or Russia’s Roscosmos, the Chinese space program’s organization and structure is quite dissimilar to the programs of the West. Rather, with its linkages with the PLA and numerous state-owned corporations, the Chinese space program has taken on a distinctly Chinese structure. During the Mao and Deng eras, the space program fell largely under the leadership of the PLA, although some parts were nominally placed under civilian control; the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense was the main civilian agency involved with China’s space program. Although numerous scientists working on and advocating for China’s commercial launch program and communications satellites came from the civilian sphere, the PLA maintained active control of the program.[xxxiv] In 1991, the State Council formed the Space Leading Group and, in 1993, the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA), also under the State Council and responsible to the Premier of China, was formed and given the responsibility of administering China’s civilian space program. In 2000, the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), a state-owned enterprise responsible for the development of China’s space hardware, software, and R&D, was restructured into two entities, the China Aerospace Machinery and Electronics Corporation (CAMEC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASTC). However, the majority of space-related industrial activity is conducted within the CASTC’s organization. Three key organizations under the CASTC handle the majority of space projects – the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) oversees institutes and facilities related to the development and production of satellites, the China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT) conducts the development of launch vehicles and missiles. The Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST), which also falls under the CASTC, is also responsible for the development of launch vehicles and satellites. Over 130 other organizations with direct impact on spaceflight fall within the structure of the CASC, as well. Primary among them is the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), which contracts and handles China’s commercial launch and space industry.[xxxv]

The CCP Central Committee, Central Military Commission, and State Council also rely upon the PLA’s General Armaments Department (GAD) for the execution of civil and military space acquisition policies. The GAD is responsible for establishing space defense policies, managing China’s space program, developing technical solutions for operational requirements, and overseeing space research and development. A number of departments within the GAD take on various space-related responsibilities. The S&T Committee consists of working groups that advises the Central Military Commission and civilian leaders on technology acquisition planning and space operations policy. Further working groups work with national leaders on resource allocation and determine which technological hurdles and bottlenecks demand the most attention. At least 10 second level departments within the GAD also support space operations, space asset modernization, and space planning. The Aerospace Equipment Bureau is responsible for charting the PLA’s space communications and surveillance infrastructure. The Electronic and Information Infrastructure Department establishes general research and development strategies and priorities. The Comprehensive Planning Department is responsible for overall space-modernization planning. Furthermore, the GAD Headquarters Department functions as an operational command overseeing space launch, tracking, and control, and oversees China’s various space tracking centers and facilities. Finally, the GAD works closely with China’s space academies and corporations in order to coordinate research and development strategies.[xxxvi]

The diffuse organization of the Chinese space program, along with limited information regarding its decision-making hierarchy, makes it difficult to discern who is really “in control” of the program. The PLA, the civil government, and state corporations all play roles in the development of the program’s military and civil aspects, while the dual-use application of much of China’s civil space assets for military purposes blends the distinction between civilian and military planning and execution. As such, the sources of China’s overall space strategy are not easily identified. Information on the ratios of funding the program receives from the military and from the civilian government is limited, thereby preventing a breakdown and analysis of the program’s emphasized focus. Furthermore, a lack of transparency into the space program’s management system limits analysts’ ability to predict the program’s likely response to a variety of future circumstances. China’s State Council has issued “White Papers” outlining the Chinese space program’s overall policy approach while pledging to make space decisions in a coordinated manner through overall planning. The Communist Party’s Central Committee has also called upon the State Council to enhance its role in policy guidance of space development.[xxxvii] This, combined with the rapid growth of China’s lunar program, overseen by the State Council, has suggested to some an increasing level of civilian control over space program decisions.[xxxviii] However, some scholars argue that the PLA continues to play a large role in the civilian space program, and maintains overall control of the space program’s general direction. They point to the dual-use of China’s civil space technologies for military purposes as indicative of the PLA’s influence. It is suggested that the PLA maintains de facto control over civilian programs in order to ensure their military applicability, despite the de jure authority exercised by the space program’s civilian organs. Additionally, the security benefits of the space program’s military sphere are enough to keep them a priority regardless of economic downturn or space disaster, reinforcing the PLA’s control over funding and decision making. It is argued that, should conflict break out with other space powers such as the United States, the space program’s civilian programs will be placed on the backburner while the PLA ramps up its militarization campaign.[xxxix] Other scholars downplay the PLA’s influence over the space program, stating that the importance of the civil program to the Chinese leadership’s broad domestic, international, and rhetorical strategies is equal to the importance of the military program. Accordingly, they argue that the civilian leadership will continue to decide and support the direction of China’s space program’s non-security related development.[xl]

The difficulties in determining who maintains overall control of the Chinese space program poses problems for Western security and policy analysts, yet a crucial fact is clear – regardless of PLA or civilian control over the program, its development has been deemed important by the Chinese leadership. The cost of China’s manned program has exceeded $2.4 billion, which the CNSA argues is the single most expensive project undertaken by the PRC[xli]. As the expenditure of such sums of money suggests that China’s leaders are confident in the program, it should be expected that the expansion of China’s military space capabilities, its manned exploration efforts, and its fleet of satellites should continue. As the Chinese space program has significant linkages with the main organs of the Chinese state, its rapid growth and expanding capabilities are reflective of an overall support for the program. Indeed, over the past decades, the Chinese leadership’s main figures have actively participated in and demonstrated their enthusiastic support for the program. Chinese President Jiang Zemin is credited with choosing the name for the Shenzhou spacecraft, and his own calligraphy was written on the vehicle during its first orbit around the Earth in 1999. President Hu Jintao watched the launch of Shenzhou 6 in 2005 from its control center in Beijing, while Premier Wen Jaibao called the flight a “glorious and sacred mission.” In 2007, Wen Jaibao argued that the Chang’e lunar mission was of “deep historical significance for raising our international standing and strengthening the force of our ethnic solidarity.” Following Shenzhou 9’s docking with Tiangong 1 in 2012, Hu sent a congratulatory message to China’s space scientists and astronaut crew and later, accompanied by senior party leaders such as Xi Jinping, held a televised phone conversation with the crew. Upon Shenzhou 9’s return to Earth, Wen Jaibao and other senior leaders such as He Guoqiang and Zhou Yongkang watched the landing live. Furthermore, China’s astronauts frequently become ambassadors for the program and the government following their return. The crew of Shenzhou 9 paid a state-sponsored visit to Hong Kong and Macao, two territories recently reincorporated into the PRC, following their successful return and were awarded medals by the CCP’s Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission in an October 2012 ceremony. Finally, the Chinese state media frequently mentions the space program’s achievements, highlighting notable “firsts” accomplished by Chinese missions and reinforcing the connections between China’s space program and the government’s messages of technological, economic, and cultural growth.[xlii]

It is thus evident that China’s space program enjoys enthusiastic support from China’s highest leadership and is promoted through the government’s rhetoric and state media. Underlying this support is the perceived benefit that the space program brings domestically and internationally. With a wide range of applications in the civilian and military spheres, the Chinese space program has a significant impact on China domestically and abroad. The Chinese government has sought to develop policies for the program which support its overall strategy and have used the program as a propaganda tool to enhance its message and rhetoric. However, to understand how the Chinese leadership sees and uses the space program as an effective tool for advancing its goals, the domestic and international impact of the program should first be analyzed.

Domestic Significance

The domestic significance of China’s space program is multifold, as it brings both tangible benefits to the Chinese state and people and also reinforces and reflects the Chinese leadership’s political and rhetorical message. China’s space program begets economic growth and development, supports China’s focus on education, science, and technology, and is a source of considerable national pride and unity. The economic and development benefits brought about by China’s space program fit squarely into the government’s campaigns for economic development and prosperity.[xliii] The space program itself employs hundreds of thousands of employees, and the highly-technical and complex nature of the program means that many of the jobs are necessarily high-skill and high-paying. As a result of the linkages between the space program’s main state corporations and the broader Chinese economy, the economic growth brought about through production of spacecraft and associated technology reverberates through China’s industrial sector. The expansion of China’s fleet of communications and navigation satellites have provided for the Chinese people greater access to cell phone, internet, radio, and television communications, which in turn help stimulate the broader Chinese economy. Imaging satellites help provide disaster warning and support disaster relief, saving China considerable amounts of money of relief efforts. Furthermore, these imaging satellites help enable the exploitation of maritime fishing grounds, maritime resources, fertile farming land, and ground-based natural resources, further benefitting the expansion of the Chinese economy.[xliv] These satellites additionally enable easier mapping needed to plan China’s continued urbanization and infrastructure growth. Scientific experiments in space involving technology applicable back on Earth, such as the breeding of crops in space and space medicine, similarly affect the daily lives of Chinese citizens in a positive fashion, as do the spin-off technologies developed from the lessons learned through the use of outer space. The development of China’s commercial launch industry provides domestic companies the ability to cheaply and easily loft their products into Earth orbit, and state income is produced through China’s selling of commercial launches to various domestic and foreign companies. Future plans for the mining of Helium-3 on the moon or valuable resources on near-Earth asteroids could potentially bring in enormous amounts of revenue and keep China’s resource-hungry economy sustained indefinitely.[xlv]

The Chinese space program also reflects and supports the government’s emphasis on education and science. Through the training of qualified space scientists and engineers, the fostering of space science interests in the youth, and the development of space-based education programs, the Chinese space program has gone to great lengths to increase the level of technical and scientific education among the Chinese population. These efforts seem to be successful, as demonstrated by widespread interest in space, science, and technology among the student population. As a result of this interest, higher levels of China’s college students are entering into college science and engineering departments. The broadcasting of television through satellites has supported China’s program of satellite education TV, which the government claims has enabled more than 30 million people to receive college or technical secondary school education since the 1980s.[xlvi] The growth of a generation of highly educated individuals interested in science, technology, and entering high-skill technical fields will enable China’s continued growth as a sophisticated, 21st-century economy in the coming decades. Furthermore, the ability for Chinese academies and universities to launch scientific payloads aboard China’s launch vehicles greatly expands their educational and research capabilities. Of course, as previously mentioned, the technological and educational progress made through the researching and development of space technology has helped China develop a more sophisticated, advanced, and knowledgeable academia.[xlvii]

Key among the domestic impacts of China’s space program, however, is its application as a source of national pride and unity. As discussed earlier, the Chinese government has routinely used the space program to highlight China’s achievements, accomplishments, and progress. An active space program, in the eyes of the Chinese population, is a sign of national and international prestige; accordingly, its continued success resonates with the Chinese people as an indicator of China overcoming its historical period of “national humiliation.” The development of China’s military capabilities in outer space reflects the government’s emphasis on “comprehensive national strength,” and indicates to the Chinese people China’s emerging military might. Furthermore, the development themes recurring in the Chinese leadership’s narratives about the space program suggest that China is on a path of growth, progress, and technological innovation, all of which appeal to the national pride of China’s citizenry. Indeed, the ability for China’s space program to excite and unite China’s population is demonstrated in its continued use by the Chinese media and government for propaganda purposes. Space missions are routinely addressed by the Chinese media and government as advancing and enhancing China’s power and prestige, rousing national ethos, and inspiring people of all of China’s ethnic groups for “the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics.”[xlviii] These messages clearly resonate with the Chinese people, who, as earlier stated, demonstrate high interest in China’s space missions and who regularly turn out in massive numbers for the parades and celebrations held for China’s recently returned astronauts.[xlix]

These beneficial domestic impacts are crucial for China’s leadership, for they help support and legitimize continued CCP rule.[l] The Chinese Communist Party has premised its continued rule on its ability to produce economic results, to advance China’s development as a technological and economic power, to overcome China’s past humiliations, and to enhance China’s standing in the international community. As the Chinese space program supports all of these goals in various ways, the Chinese government has come to see the space program as a reinforcing agent in China’s domestic politics. It is no wonder, then, that the Chinese leadership is so quick to enthusiastically support the continued development of the program and reinforce the linkages between the program’s benefits and its political platform.

Foreign Significance

The international impact of China’s space program is perhaps most clearly evident in its military application. The development of China’s fleet of dual-use satellites has benefitted China in its quest to establish security, assert regional hegemony, and reach military parity with the United States. As earlier mentioned, China’s observation, communications, and navigation satellites all provide support to the PLA’s ground, air, and naval operations, thereby enhancing their capacity to assert regional hegemony through hard power projection. Furthermore, the dual-use of the programs launch vehicles as ballistic and intercontinental missiles allows the Chinese military global striking range with its tactical and nuclear weapons. The development of offensive and defensive space technologies provides China the capability to track, counter, and destroy enemy nations’ space assets, a crucial element of modern, high-tech warfare. Indeed, through these counterspace technologies, China has developed an effective deterrent against American power projection in the Asia-Pacific, which relies heavily upon American space assets for coordination and execution.

The expansion of China’s civilian space program serves to enhance China’s standing on the international stage. Through the accomplishment of a number of space “firsts,” the Chinese leadership has been able to portray China as a scientific and technological leader in the Asia-Pacific. The landing of Chang’e 3 on the moon marked the first time an Asian power conducted a lunar lander, and the manned flights of Shenzhou have been the only human missions conducted by an Asian space program. The Yunghuo 1 mission of 2011 was to be the first Asian mission to Mars, although its failure and the subsequent success of India’s 2014 Mars Orbiter Mission meant that China could not achieve such a “first.” The importance placed on these symbolic achievements by national governments is demonstrated by the ramping up of space activities by a number of Asian space programs. As previously mentioned, India has conducted a mission to Mars, and has plans for subsequent missions to Mars and the Moon. It too is in the process of developing a manned space program.[li] In the wake of Chang’e 3’s landing on the moon, the Japanese space agency announced its own plans for a campaign of lunar landings and exploration.[lii] However, at this stage, these powers are playing “catch up” to China’s accomplishments. Nonetheless, the competition between regional powers in the arena of space demonstrates the “soft power” impact of an active space program, and Chinese success in this area has thereby enabled the Chinese leadership to assert its supremacy over its neighbors. Indeed, as evidenced by the “space race” of the 1950s and 1960s, maintain an active and expanding manned space program is perceived by the international community as the hallmark of a great power. The Chinese leadership, recognizing this, has therefore committed heavily to the development of its manned programs.

China’s history of cooperation with international partners in outer space is also of great significance. China has had longstanding ties with the Russian, Brazilian, and European space agencies which involve agreements for cooperation on the development of space missions, transfers of technology and information, joint training, and participation in major space programs.[liii] Through these cooperative agreements and longstanding ties, China is capable of building partnerships and relationships which have the potential to extend beyond the realm of space. History has demonstrated that cooperation in space activities develop norms of cooperation and mutual understandings between partners which serve to benefit a cooperative, diplomatic resolution to broader political concerns and disagreements. Furthermore, through the binding of its space program with other programs and the resulting establishment of joint responsibilities, China has effectively limited the ability for its foreign partners to disavow or terminate cooperation with China; such is a similar affect to the mutual Russian-American responsibility for the ISS continuing cooperatively despite geopolitical tensions between the two states. Additionally, establishing space partnerships enables China to develop a geopolitical counter to American hegemony. Many see the Chinese-Russian space partnership as an element in a broader partnership designed to counter American influence, while the growing partnership between the European Space Agency and the Chinese space program has been seen by some as China’s strategy of limiting the clout and influence the United States has in convincing its allies to support the containment of China’s and the growth of its capabilities.[liv] The Chinese commercial launch market, by catering to the needs of countries without indigenous launching capabilities, helps strengthen China’s international economic ties. As analysts of the Asia-Pacific are quick to point out, China’s economic ties with numerous states prevent the formation of a bloc designed to contain China’s continued rise. As many countries don’t wish to jeopardize their significant economic relationships with China, they will be less likely to abandon those ties in order to balance against China, allowing China’s rise to continue without concentrated opposition. The establishment of economic ties in the realm of space therefore furthers China’s goal for an unopposed rise to hegemony. Finally, China’s emphasis on cooperation in space reflects the Chinese leadership’s rhetorical position of international cooperation and peaceful coexistence, and thereby further emphasizes the international standing which China’s leaders hope for China to be seen.[lv]

Finally, and of much significance for the impact of China’s space program internationally, the Chinese program is rapidly developing at a time when the United States and Russian programs, long seen as the major, established space programs, are facing stagnation. The Chinese space station is expected to be placed into orbit around the same time the ISS, Russia’s and America’s space station, is to be decommissioned. Although NASA has ambitious plans for the manned exploration of Mars, such plans are still decades away from being realized, and as of 2015 the United States has no national spacecraft capable of manned missions in use. The Russian space program, meanwhile, has been mired with technical problems and malfunctions and is significantly strapped for cash.[lvi] As such, some see China’s redoubled efforts in outer space as an attempt to supplant the United States and Russia as the world’s eminent space power while the American and Russian programs remain stagnant. Doing so would be a major “soft power” and propaganda feat for China, for it would demonstrate in the eyes of its citizens and the international community that China has surpassed the world’s superpower in an important metric of great power status.

Conclusion – An Effective Tool

The political, military, economic, and cultural benefits brought about through China’s space program show considerable parallels to the Apollo-era American rationale for pursuing space flight; the Chinese leadership is not pursuing space development not just as an end in itself, but as part of its larger strategy of asserting Chinese power and influence on the world stage.[lvii] There exists a view among the Chinese space community and leadership that “to be a major power, a country must have a space station.”[lviii] Indeed, in the opinion of numerous scholars, China has sought to emulate existing great powers by achieving the “metrics” that identify great power status in the contemporary international system. Along with the hosting of the Beijing Olympics and the construction of major weapons systems like the Liaoning class aircraft carrier, the development of China’s space program places China in an “elite club” of powers which stand out in the international community. Indeed, Chinese commentary and reflections on the space program regularly emphasize how Chinese space accomplishments place China among a small club of other technologically advanced, globally eminent powers.[lix]

Through its rhetorical messages, China’s leadership has sought to portray China to its citizens and to the international community as a rising major power. The development of China’s economy, a focus on education, science, and technology, the advancement of China’s military capabilities and reach, and the level of China’s international prestige are all “soft power” factors which the Chinese government has used to demonstrate China’s rising status. Meanwhile, through the deployment of “hard power” offensive and defensive capabilities, the Chinese leadership has sought to demonstrate their ability to counter America’s containment efforts. Asserting power in order to deter or counter the American presence in the Asia-Pacific is a key step in China’s quest for regional hegemony, and is ultimately necessary for China to rise as a superpower with global reach and influence. The Chinese space program, through its dual civil and military use, supports the achievement of all of these aims.

Recognizing this, the Chinese leadership has lent enthusiastic support to the Chinese space program, seeing to it that its ambitious and growing capabilities continue to develop. More importantly, they have used the space program as a propaganda tool to reflect their message of China’s growth and development, a message intimately connected to China’s view of itself as a major power in the global arena. Through its practical military and security applications, the economic, technological, and cultural benefits it brings domestically, and its effective application in Chinese rhetoric and propaganda for building a sense of national pride and unity, China’s space program is today an effective tool used by the Chinese leadership for establishing China, in the eyes of both its citizens and the international community, as one of the world’s major power.

What is love? What are its essential characteristics? What roles do romantic relationships play in the formation and transformation of our own identities? Such are critical questions for understanding the human experience, for love is quite possibly the most essential and fundamental experience we may have. It is no wonder, then, that philosophers and thinkers have grappled with these questions for ages, coming up with a wide range of answers which seek to explain and legitimize the love experience. Yet, to answer these questions, it is equally important to ask how our context defines our relationships, and how our relationships are structured in such a way to give meaning to the emotions we feel and describe as “love.” Through an exploration of the writings of Piazzesi, Solomon, and Kollontai, I seek in this paper to describe love and its essential characteristics while exploring the role romantic relationships play in the formation of our identities. By exploring relationships of different forms and definitions of love coming from different contexts, an approach suggested by Piazzesi, I attempt to find the characteristics of love, if there are any, which are transcendental of context. Ultimately, I arrive at the conclusion that love, outside of context of relationship and explanation given to legitimize it in a given context, involves the “fulfillment” of the individual through identity-construction and role-identification and the “transformation” of the individual through personal betterment. Love itself, we may conclude, is hard to define as an all-encompassing concept, for it exists in many forms and different contexts; nonetheless, love is the emotional experience which includes these crucial characteristics which we use to legitimize and justify the form of relationship in which those emotions are manifest.

Prior to further inquiry into the concept of love, however, an important caveat must be recognized – the form of a romantic relationship, in which love is manifest, is very much the product of our cultural and social context. As perhaps the most “important psychological and social factor” in the human experience, love has “always instinctively [been] organized in [society’s] interest,” whether for reasons of economy, spirituality, or social cohesion (Kollontai 285). According to the different needs of different societies, then, what constitutes a “loving” experience may alter as the result of disparate discourses on the matter. As Kollontai and Piazzesi would point out, these discourses are the products of historical, cultural, and economic variation, and are therefore subject to change over time and space. Indeed, as demonstrated through Kollontai’s historical perspectives on love, the epitomical form of a loving relationship, as culturally perceived and desired, has evolved considerably over the course of Western civilization – beginning with a love for one’s blood relatives in kinship communities, evolving into a love for friendship in the ancient world, a chivalrous love in the feudal era, and, finally, into the private, intimate relationships of contemporary times. Piazzesi rightfully argues that the discourses, social norms, and understandings which shape and sustain these relationships provide “individuals, couples, and groups with frameworks for the definition (‘for making sense’) of their experience;” that is, they give meaning and legitimacy to the contextual “how and with whom” by which people love (Piazzesi 5). Accordingly, by “defining” love, attributing to it certain characteristics and elements, we are legitimizing an experience shaped around our context. This variable nature of the experience of love, influenced by culture and history, poses difficulties for the development of a singular “concept of love.” Like Piazzesi argues, a general definition of love, which is removed from an immersion in contextual experience, misses the “historical diversity, the social character, and the semantic richness of ordinary experience,” and therefore fails to acknowledge that cultural nuances influence the manner by which love is manifest in and connected to a relationship (Piazzesi 3). Nor does providing a “minimal definition” to love, which seeks to find a universal” essence” to love by reducing it to its simplest and most basic elements, do justice in meaningfully describing what love is, for it detaches the concept of love from the variety of experiences and social expectations which we associate with and define it by. Rather, to establish a more personal, more pertinent, and therefore more “meaningful” concept of love, we should take Piazzesi’s suggested approach, which is to explore how we arrange our relationships so as to feel like we are experiencing love; to, as Piazzesi’s analogy puts it, see how we “get the feeling of being in a romantic living room” (Piazzesi 7). Such is the approach I will take, exploring how Solomon’s and Kollenti’s writings on relationships, defined by their contextual circumstances, show the connection between love and a relationship, along with its implications on identity. Comparing the similar motivations of love laid out by these authors will hopefully provide closer a closer understanding of the transcendental romantic love experience, unaffected by the form of a relationship.

As previously mentioned, the romantic relationship of two people in a union is considered the quintessential loving relationship in our current context, and shapes our discourses surrounding love. Kollontai argues that this form of relationship is the product of a bourgeois society, which places emphasis on the “married couple, working together to improve their welfare and to increase the wealth of their particular family” (Kollontai 284). Furthermore, the “moral ideal of a love the embraced both the flesh and the soul,” has been propagated by the bourgeoisie as crucial elements in loving relationships (Kollontai 283). The discourses surrounding love in this context, then, naturally point to the union of two people with a physical and emotional connection as the key to experiencing love. But what are the characteristics of love which we experience in this form of relationship, or, better put, how does this structure of romantic relationship shape our definition of a loving experience? To answer this, we can turn to Solomon, who writes that love is the “attempt to create for ourselves a sense of wholeness or completion through a union… with another person” (Solomon 194). A crucial element of this “wholeness” is in the process of forging a mutual identity with another in a relationship. The “identity theory” of love, which Solomon bases his arguments on love around, states that the self is, individually, indeterminate, and is rather “defined with and through others” (Solomon 197). Though we individually attempt to define our “true” selves, giving priority through our actions to some of our features over others, there is no “true” self or set of roles which dominates over others. Rather, who we are and the value of our person, or the worth of our accomplishments, depends a great deal upon the opinions of others, who help establish the “way we ‘fit’ in the world” (Solomon 201). As Solomon puts it, “we are the persons we think ourselves to be and become through the eyes and opinions of the people around us” (Solomon 202); that is, our identity may be self-constructed, but is mutually defined and established. Such is equally the case in our self-esteem and self-worth, for the self is “never assured” (Solomon 200). Rather, it “consists of proving oneself to be what one is,” depending on the value held by others of our person in order to be reinforced. This is why we choose the friends and – more importantly – the lovers that we do, for they are the ones who make us feel “virtuous and worthwhile (Solomon 201). In addition to the role that love and relationships play in the definition of our identity, they, according to Solomon, also play a role in the transformation of the self. Romantic love is “a redefinition of oneself in terms of goodness,” for it embodies a desire for self-improvement. The lover wishes to not only be loved for what they are, but for what they can become, their “ideal self” (Solomon 206). The desire to improve oneself comes from the creation of roles inherent in the establishment of a relationship; we dress and act the roles we would like to play in order to attract a partner, and, once that relationship has been established, we develop and perfect those parts “to the point where they seem as if they were completely natural” (Solomon 207).

Thus, as can be seen through Solomon’s writings, the essential characteristics of love include an establishment of identity through mutual definition and a self-transformation of identity toward “goodness.” We may not “become ourselves” in our romantic relationships, for the self is never assured nor ever “perfectly” defined, but we do narrow and define the set of roles we wish to take on and the characteristics of ourselves which foster and support our relationships. Being in love in a romantic relationship, in effect, helps us find our “place in the world.” While all the networks of people and opinions in our lives help form a sense of ourselves, Solomon rightfully acknowledges that “it is love that often proves to be definitive” (Solomon 207.) Yet he ascribes these essential characteristics of love to only relationships which encompass a union of two people. As our identity and self is, in part, intimate and private, it takes “one and only one other person” to really know and be in contact with it, according to Solomon (207). Accordingly, many of our essential attributes are determined by that single other person, who is “closest” to us. Looking back to Piazzesi, though, a question must be asked – are the characteristics of love put forth by Solomon absolute, or are they simply manifestations of the monogamous form of relationship which he understands in his context? That is, are these characteristics simply legitimizing the love we experience in a relationship, giving us a sense of “being in that romantic living room?” Or, are these characteristics transcendental of context, equally capable of being manifested in a different form of relationship? To answer this question, we may turn to Kollontai, who presents arguments about the characteristics and nature of love which extend beyond the sphere of a monogamous union between two lovers.

To begin, Kollontai takes an opposition to Solomon’s last point, stating that “love is not in the least a ‘private’ matter concerning only the two loving persons; love posses a uniting element which is valuable to the collective” (Kollontai 279). As had been previously mentioned, Kollontai then lays out the historical development of loving relationships, demonstrating how they have evolved and changed their fundamental character in order to satisfy the needs of society. The modern concept of monogamy, sustained by bourgeois discourses, has developed to support the need to accumulate and concentrate capital within the family unit. The characteristics Solomon ascribes to a monogamous union, then, indeed are simply legitimizing an experience developed for extraneous needs. Yet, as Kollontai argues, love can “not be contained within the limits set down by bourgeois ideologists,” and, with a change in context, can be “set free” to take shape in different forms. For Kollontai, the key among these different forms is polyamory, which allows for a “fulfillment” not possible in a monogamous union. She writes that a “man may feel sympathy and protective tenderness [for one woman], and for another he might find support and understanding for the strivings of his intellect” (Kollontai 288). Why must he choose one of the two, thereby tearing “himself apart and crippling his inner self, if only the possession of both types of inner bond affords the fullness of living” (Kollontai 288)? By having multiple intimate, romantic relationships, then, the individual can find themselves more “satisfied,” more “complete,” in ways which are impossible in Solomon’s context. The multi-sidedness of this emotional experience and fulfillment, Kollontai argues, would assist in the growth of the bonds between people which would benefit the growth of the communist collective, a reflection of the context in which Kollontai exists. Kollontai further lays out the qualities of love, which would help benefit the “collective” for which she writes. Among them, mirroring the statements of Solomon, is the nature of “transformation” in love, in which the individual betters themselves intellectually, creatively, and emotionally as a response to their lover. Yet, whereas Solomon argued that such betterment is only possible through an intimacy with one other person, whose opinions reign supreme, Kollontai argues that it can exist in both the “private” and “public” sphere (Kollontai 290). In a collectivized society, built “upon the principles of comradeship and solidarity linking all members of the collective,” then, the characteristics of love are such that they help build ties with all of individuals of the society, not just a single other person, and thus manifest themselves in polygamous relationships. Again, as seen through the lens of Piazzesi and in the case of Solomon, contextual circumstances influence the nature of love as seen by Kollontai, and the form of our relationships, in this particular case polygamous ones, legitimize the experience of that love.

Yet we see two distinct characteristics of love which transcend context emerging from these two authors. The first is a broad sense of “fulfillment,” of finding completion and meaning for ourselves. Solomon describes this fulfillment in terms of identity-construction, detailing how our identity is mutually defined through our lovers; the unsure nature of identity, which needs to be defined by another, should be expected in the individualistic society in which he wrote. Developing identity, then, helps “fulfill” and “complete” the individual in that form of society, for it helps establish their place, role, and value in the world. For Kollontai, this “fulfillment” comes in building ties to the broader collective, again a natural reflection of the society in which she wrote. Through the establishment of multiple romantic relationships, which may help develop and grow the individual in different ways, the individual is bound closer to the collective and the collective accordingly grows closer. In a society of solidarity, then, love helps “fulfill” the individual in that it allows them solidify their role and place within the collective as another member working toward the broader, collective good. The second characteristic of love we see emergent is its “transformative” nature, which moves the individual toward bettering themselves. Again, the reason for this “transformation” is different according to context; for Solomon, it is in response to having a lover, for the beloved wishes to be loved for, and therefore wishes to develop, their ideal self. For Kollontai, this transformation need not be “private” but rather should be “public,” as would benefit a collectivized society, and comes about as a desire to help strengthen and develop the collective. Nonetheless, the transformation of identity through personal betterment is a crucial element of love for both these writers, regardless of their context.

Through this exploration of love and romantic relationships as they exist in different contexts, two crucial characteristics emerge: “fulfillment” of the individual and “transformation” of the individual. Love, we can conclude, is thus the experiencing of these two characteristics, plus others dependent upon context, and the legitimization of our relationships by the presence of these characteristics. Ultimately, regardless of the form of romantic relationship in which we experience love, we become ourselves in our relationships, and find and satisfy our place in society in our relationships. Though love took on other characteristics throughout history, these two characteristics, as laid out by the authors explored herein, are transcendental of context. Piazzesi warns against making a “minimal definition” to love, but, using these characteristics as fundamentals, perhaps with them we are closer to a true and encompassing concept of love.