This chapter discusses Freud’s thoughts about memory and the inter-related concepts of remembering, repeating, and working through. Freud believes that the present mind contains the past, though ...
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This chapter discusses Freud’s thoughts about memory and the inter-related concepts of remembering, repeating, and working through. Freud believes that the present mind contains the past, though often in unrecognizable form. Remembering — unlike its avoidance, repetition — allows for working through: clarifying, and integrating into the fabric of the mind, something previously warded off. The concepts of repression, remembering, repetition, working through, transference, and mourning together draw a conceptual map that Freud continually refined.Less

Keeping Time: Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through

Marcia Cavell

Published in print: 2006-02-23

This chapter discusses Freud’s thoughts about memory and the inter-related concepts of remembering, repeating, and working through. Freud believes that the present mind contains the past, though often in unrecognizable form. Remembering — unlike its avoidance, repetition — allows for working through: clarifying, and integrating into the fabric of the mind, something previously warded off. The concepts of repression, remembering, repetition, working through, transference, and mourning together draw a conceptual map that Freud continually refined.

This book concludes by discussing the consequences of studying Santayana. The author's increased acquaintance with Santayana's philosophy started when he returned to Harvard. One of the main reasons ...
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This book concludes by discussing the consequences of studying Santayana. The author's increased acquaintance with Santayana's philosophy started when he returned to Harvard. One of the main reasons this author veered toward Santayana is because Santayana was the first great aesthetician in the history of American philosophy. The author was convinced that, despite their differences, Santayana's humanistic works were worthy of the closest attention. This Epilogue attempts to show here how much Santayana resembled the very pragmatists whose views he strenuously opposed. The pragmatists were not Neoplatonists like Santayana, but they also retained vestiges of traditional thinking that the author considers flawed and unprofitable. Pragmatism, the Epilogue argues, is also often liable to the same kind of difficulties detected in Santayana.Less

Epilogue

Irving Singer

Published in print: 2000-09-10

This book concludes by discussing the consequences of studying Santayana. The author's increased acquaintance with Santayana's philosophy started when he returned to Harvard. One of the main reasons this author veered toward Santayana is because Santayana was the first great aesthetician in the history of American philosophy. The author was convinced that, despite their differences, Santayana's humanistic works were worthy of the closest attention. This Epilogue attempts to show here how much Santayana resembled the very pragmatists whose views he strenuously opposed. The pragmatists were not Neoplatonists like Santayana, but they also retained vestiges of traditional thinking that the author considers flawed and unprofitable. Pragmatism, the Epilogue argues, is also often liable to the same kind of difficulties detected in Santayana.

Synthesizing decades of research, this book advances a theory of the psychological and neurophysiological correlates of conscious experience. The first part of the book argues that consciousness ...
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Synthesizing decades of research, this book advances a theory of the psychological and neurophysiological correlates of conscious experience. The first part of the book argues that consciousness always arises at a particular stage of perceptual processing, the intermediate level, and that consciousness depends on attention. Attention changes the flow of information and that gives rise to experience. The resulting account is called the AIR Theory, for attended intermediate-level representations. Objections to the theory are addressed. The second part of the book argues that all consciousness is perceptual: there is no cognitive phenomenology, no experience of motor commands, and no experience of a conscious self. The conclusions challenge popular theories in consciousness studies: the view that we can directly experience our thoughts, the view that consciousness essentially involves action, and the view that every experience includes awareness of the subject having that experience. The third part of the book explores the neural correlates of consciousness. It argues attention—hence consciousness—arises when populations of neurons fire in synchrony, and the book responds to those who deny that consciousness could be a process in the brain. Along the way, the book also advances novel theories of qualia, the function of consciousness, the unity of consciousness, and the mind-body relation, defending a view called neurofunctionism. Each chapter brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.Less

The Conscious Brain

Jesse Prinz

Published in print: 2012-09-14

Synthesizing decades of research, this book advances a theory of the psychological and neurophysiological correlates of conscious experience. The first part of the book argues that consciousness always arises at a particular stage of perceptual processing, the intermediate level, and that consciousness depends on attention. Attention changes the flow of information and that gives rise to experience. The resulting account is called the AIR Theory, for attended intermediate-level representations. Objections to the theory are addressed. The second part of the book argues that all consciousness is perceptual: there is no cognitive phenomenology, no experience of motor commands, and no experience of a conscious self. The conclusions challenge popular theories in consciousness studies: the view that we can directly experience our thoughts, the view that consciousness essentially involves action, and the view that every experience includes awareness of the subject having that experience. The third part of the book explores the neural correlates of consciousness. It argues attention—hence consciousness—arises when populations of neurons fire in synchrony, and the book responds to those who deny that consciousness could be a process in the brain. Along the way, the book also advances novel theories of qualia, the function of consciousness, the unity of consciousness, and the mind-body relation, defending a view called neurofunctionism. Each chapter brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.

The most famous objection to physicalism may be Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, a thought experiment involving a person who knows everything about the brain, but does not know what it's like to ...
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The most famous objection to physicalism may be Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, a thought experiment involving a person who knows everything about the brain, but does not know what it's like to see colors. This chapter reviews the standard replies to this argument: representationalism, which claim that knowledge of the brain suffices for consciousness; the ability account, which says that phenomenal knowledge is a skill rather than a set of propositions; and mode-of-presentation replies, which posit a special class of phenomenal concepts. Objections are raised each of these, and a new reply is proposed based on cognitive neuroscience. On this reply, phenomenal knowledge involves working memory structures that maintain sensory states but do not describe or represent them. Such structures cannot be acquired by merely learning about the brain, even though physicalism is true. This account integrates lessons from other replies, but avoids their weaknesses.Less

Could Consciousness Be Physical? The Brain Maintained

Jesse J. Prinz

Published in print: 2012-09-14

The most famous objection to physicalism may be Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, a thought experiment involving a person who knows everything about the brain, but does not know what it's like to see colors. This chapter reviews the standard replies to this argument: representationalism, which claim that knowledge of the brain suffices for consciousness; the ability account, which says that phenomenal knowledge is a skill rather than a set of propositions; and mode-of-presentation replies, which posit a special class of phenomenal concepts. Objections are raised each of these, and a new reply is proposed based on cognitive neuroscience. On this reply, phenomenal knowledge involves working memory structures that maintain sensory states but do not describe or represent them. Such structures cannot be acquired by merely learning about the brain, even though physicalism is true. This account integrates lessons from other replies, but avoids their weaknesses.

In the biological works the capacities of the soul are considered as embodied in various species of animals. From this holistic perspective we find their operation differing in different animals. The ...
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In the biological works the capacities of the soul are considered as embodied in various species of animals. From this holistic perspective we find their operation differing in different animals. The differences are related to the four general ways in which animals differ from each other: in their lives (bioi), actions (praxeis), habits (êthê) and their parts (moria). The body (available matter, determination by environment, and other functions) is also a determining factor in how the capacities function. However, the holistic explanations of the differences between the capacities in animals rely on, rather than undermine, the definitional discreteness (‘modularity’) of the capacities, as demonstrated by the DA.Less

The Capacities in the Parts and Lives of Animals

Thomas Kjeller Johansen

Published in print: 2012-10-18

In the biological works the capacities of the soul are considered as embodied in various species of animals. From this holistic perspective we find their operation differing in different animals. The differences are related to the four general ways in which animals differ from each other: in their lives (bioi), actions (praxeis), habits (êthê) and their parts (moria). The body (available matter, determination by environment, and other functions) is also a determining factor in how the capacities function. However, the holistic explanations of the differences between the capacities in animals rely on, rather than undermine, the definitional discreteness (‘modularity’) of the capacities, as demonstrated by the DA.

There is evidence that mere activity within perceptual systems is not sufficient for consciousness. This chapter begins by reviewing evidence for subliminal perception. This raises the question, when ...
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There is evidence that mere activity within perceptual systems is not sufficient for consciousness. This chapter begins by reviewing evidence for subliminal perception. This raises the question, when do perceptual states become conscious? The answer defended here is that we are conscious when and only when perception is modulated by attention. Evidence for the necessity and sufficiency of attention is presented, and empirical results that aim to dissociated attention and consciousness are critically reviewed. The chapter also offers an account of the nature of attention, according to which attentional modulation is a change in information processing that allows perceptual states to gain access to working memory. It is argued that accessibility to working memory is the psychological correlate of consciousness; actual encoding in working memory is not necessary.Less

When Are We Conscious? Attention and Availability

Jesse J. Prinz

Published in print: 2012-09-14

There is evidence that mere activity within perceptual systems is not sufficient for consciousness. This chapter begins by reviewing evidence for subliminal perception. This raises the question, when do perceptual states become conscious? The answer defended here is that we are conscious when and only when perception is modulated by attention. Evidence for the necessity and sufficiency of attention is presented, and empirical results that aim to dissociated attention and consciousness are critically reviewed. The chapter also offers an account of the nature of attention, according to which attentional modulation is a change in information processing that allows perceptual states to gain access to working memory. It is argued that accessibility to working memory is the psychological correlate of consciousness; actual encoding in working memory is not necessary.

It is widely believed in philosophy that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. This book ...
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It is widely believed in philosophy that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. This book challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate “explanatory space”. The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our own sensory imagery (including inner speech). In fact our access to our own thoughts is no different in principle from our access to the thoughts of other people, utilizing the conceptual and inferential resources of the same “mindreading” faculty, and relying on many of the same sources of evidence. The book proposes and defends the Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This is supported through comprehensive examination of many different types of evidence from across cognitive science, integrating a diverse set of findings into a single well-articulated theory. One outcome is that there are hardly any kinds of conscious thought. Another is that there is no such thing as conscious agency.Less

The Opacity of Mind : An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge

Peter Carruthers

Published in print: 2011-09-01

It is widely believed in philosophy that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. This book challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate “explanatory space”. The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our own sensory imagery (including inner speech). In fact our access to our own thoughts is no different in principle from our access to the thoughts of other people, utilizing the conceptual and inferential resources of the same “mindreading” faculty, and relying on many of the same sources of evidence. The book proposes and defends the Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This is supported through comprehensive examination of many different types of evidence from across cognitive science, integrating a diverse set of findings into a single well-articulated theory. One outcome is that there are hardly any kinds of conscious thought. Another is that there is no such thing as conscious agency.

This chapter examines one of the central predictions of the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. Since the theory claims that our only access to our thoughts and thought ...
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This chapter examines one of the central predictions of the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. Since the theory claims that our only access to our thoughts and thought processes is interpretive, relying on sensory, situational, and behavioral cues, there should be frequent instances where the presence of misleading data of these sorts leads us to attribute attitudes to ourselves mistakenly. And just as predicted, there turn out to be numerous circumstances where people will confabulate about their attitudes. A variety of forms of evidence are examined, focusing especially on the self-perception and dissonance traditions in social psychology. While transparent-access theories can attempt to accommodate the data by embracing a dual-method account, none are capable of explaining the patterning in the data.Less

Self-Interpretation and Confabulation

Peter Carruthers

Published in print: 2011-09-01

This chapter examines one of the central predictions of the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. Since the theory claims that our only access to our thoughts and thought processes is interpretive, relying on sensory, situational, and behavioral cues, there should be frequent instances where the presence of misleading data of these sorts leads us to attribute attitudes to ourselves mistakenly. And just as predicted, there turn out to be numerous circumstances where people will confabulate about their attitudes. A variety of forms of evidence are examined, focusing especially on the self-perception and dissonance traditions in social psychology. While transparent-access theories can attempt to accommodate the data by embracing a dual-method account, none are capable of explaining the patterning in the data.

This chapter further develops and supports the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) account of the nature and sources of self-knowledge. One goal is expository—it is to develop and explain the ISA ...
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This chapter further develops and supports the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) account of the nature and sources of self-knowledge. One goal is expository—it is to develop and explain the ISA theory in more detail than has been done up to this point in the book. But another goal is to show that the ISA account draws significant support from three well-established theories in cognitive science. These are global broadcasting theory, theories of sensory-based working memory, and theories that see the evolution of metarepresentational capacities as driven by the demands of living in complex social groups.Less

The ISA Theory: Foundations and Elaborations

Peter Carruthers

Published in print: 2011-09-01

This chapter further develops and supports the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) account of the nature and sources of self-knowledge. One goal is expository—it is to develop and explain the ISA theory in more detail than has been done up to this point in the book. But another goal is to show that the ISA account draws significant support from three well-established theories in cognitive science. These are global broadcasting theory, theories of sensory-based working memory, and theories that see the evolution of metarepresentational capacities as driven by the demands of living in complex social groups.

This chapter outlines and critiques a number of intermediate-strength theories of self-knowledge. These either violate the restrictions imposed by the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory without ...
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This chapter outlines and critiques a number of intermediate-strength theories of self-knowledge. These either violate the restrictions imposed by the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory without yet going so far as to suggest dedicated channels of access to attitudes, or they are inner sense views that are restricted to a specific class of mental events. One of these accounts claims that representations in sensory-based working memory are tagged to indicate their attitude of origin. Another postulates the existence of a non-sensory form of working memory in which attitudes themselves can be globally broadcast. The third account claims that we can have transparent knowledge of our own active intentions and mental actions through the efference copies that they create.Less

Intermediate-Strength Transparent-Access Theories

Peter Carruthers

Published in print: 2011-09-01

This chapter outlines and critiques a number of intermediate-strength theories of self-knowledge. These either violate the restrictions imposed by the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory without yet going so far as to suggest dedicated channels of access to attitudes, or they are inner sense views that are restricted to a specific class of mental events. One of these accounts claims that representations in sensory-based working memory are tagged to indicate their attitude of origin. Another postulates the existence of a non-sensory form of working memory in which attitudes themselves can be globally broadcast. The third account claims that we can have transparent knowledge of our own active intentions and mental actions through the efference copies that they create.