Doug has been a member of HARS since 1993. His aviation career started at Bankstown, learning to fly while still at High School. He joined the RAAF in 1976, flying BAC 1-11 VIP, Hercules C-130H, and instructed on CT-4A and HS 748 until 1984.

Joined Qantas in 1984, he is a currently a Check and Training Captain on the Airbus A380, and has flown and instructed on the B747 (Classic to 400) previously.

He has been involved in the Warbird movement for many years, and was part owner of a CAC Wirraway in the 1990s. He is now part owner of a CAC P-51D Mustang, based at Caboolture.

At HARS he has been the Project Manager for the Caribous since acquisition in 2011. Co-captained our Convair from South Africa to Albion Park in 2017. He flies the Caribou, Dakota, Convair 440, Constellation and Tiger Moth and whatever else he can get his hands on.

Captain Haywood is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society (FRAeS).

That is without a doubt an impressive resumè Daniel. Regarding your “under qualified” nuance, unless I missed it, there has not been such a statement - the point is rather that the license does not seem to have been validated by the SACAA.

Be that as it may, what is clear as lessons learned from this accident is that no matter how well qualified and experienced one may be in aviation, human frailty in yielding to possible operational pressure, making inappropriate decisions, not preparing adequately for emergencies and so forth can and will lead to a disastrous outcome.

If the above can be taken aboard by young aviators, and taken aboard again as a wake-up call to the old-and-bolds, then something good will result from this tragedy.

Another sensible post P, glad you are contributing more often to help provide some well needed objectivity and balance.

Thanks for giving us the info and background of the pilots in question - what a C.V. they could post !! It really is SO SAD that they, the crew should suffer so much - and as much compassion as I have for them - there IS REALLY NO OTHER party who could share the "blame" with them ?? All the authority and final decisions nestled in their hands ??

Well, there is a lesson in as much as, if it could happen to them it COULD EASILY happen to me also - hence this AVCOM FORUM which helps us to wake-up and see things with new perspective and safety consciousness.

Doug has been a member of HARS since 1993. His aviation career started at Bankstown, learning to fly while still at High School. He joined the RAAF in 1976, flying BAC 1-11 VIP, Hercules C-130H, and instructed on CT-4A and HS 748 until 1984.

Joined Qantas in 1984, he is a currently a Check and Training Captain on the Airbus A380, and has flown and instructed on the B747 (Classic to 400) previously.

He has been involved in the Warbird movement for many years, and was part owner of a CAC Wirraway in the 1990s. He is now part owner of a CAC P-51D Mustang, based at Caboolture.

At HARS he has been the Project Manager for the Caribous since acquisition in 2011. Co-captained our Convair from South Africa to Albion Park in 2017. He flies the Caribou, Dakota, Convair 440, Constellation and Tiger Moth and whatever else he can get his hands on.

Captain Haywood is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society (FRAeS).

That is without a doubt an impressive resumè Daniel. Regarding your “under qualified” nuance, unless I missed it, there has not been such a statement - the point is rather that the license does not seem to have been validated by the SACAA.

Be that as it may, what is clear as lessons learned from this accident is that no matter how well qualified and experienced one may be in aviation, human frailty in yielding to possible operational pressure, making inappropriate decisions, not preparing adequately for emergencies and so forth can and will lead to a disastrous outcome.

If the above can be taken aboard by young aviators, and taken aboard again as a wake-up call to the old-and-bolds, then something good will result from this tragedy.

Hi Peregrine,

The citizen ran an article yesterday with headline, Wonderboom crash pilots ‘weren’t qualified’ As much as I don’t take aviation news in newspapers seriously, it is a viewpoint that is now a part of public opinion. The CAA report lists him as not rated but HARS lists him as flying the 440. Would that not mean he IS rated in Australia but not in SA? The report does not say it couldn’t verify his license, it says he is not rated. Is there a difference between rated and not legal or current in a particular country? Doesn’t listing him as not rated bear more heavily on him in the context of the report than it should?
With that in mind, what is the legal CAA procedure for international pilots to ferry planes out of SA?
Accidents do happen as a sequence of events and I do think that this accident was preventable, my thoughts are that time was a constraint, decisions could have been made in haste and expectations were high. I think those decisions were made on the ground where flying experience makes no difference to the outcome.

Please delete if you think think this post does not belong here, or let me know I will:
The reason I post this is it does not matter which accident arena you about to enter, if your senses warns your brain/body that the next 3-50 seconds might be your end, your body goes to a forced emergency mode designed by nature which inhibits your abstract systematic reasoning etc, you now applying short thoughts(Dictaded by senses observations) and actions quickly or if you got no experience or time, you freeze. Daredevills prolong the start of this due to a lot of stunt practise, but it can happen to them also. I feel this humanary(Animals also) situation is not properly discussed, excamined, or taken into account in court cases as it deserves to be, thats the reason I have sympathy with those involved in crashes, this is naturally just out of your control should the condition kicks in. I found reference of it years ago in an old medical book, but without connection to accidents. Some stuff you may not remember at all.

For me it looks this P51 pilot was partially in this reflex mode, complicated by the restarting episodes of the engine(false relief).

When you as a human being is in an EMY-Reflex mode yourself(PLane, Car, Motorcycle, Pedestrian), how much can you react from outside advice at that point when your reflexces build from experience take over in seconds...?

Here follows an in depth discussion with a pilot after his crash.
0-Intermittant engine failure/power loss can be more dangerous that just a complete cutout, it messes with your emergency mode as a human being, restart unnecessary EMY-thought processes
1-No time for checklist, fly till it stops, gear up.
2-Pilot loose hearing in emergency mode(himself)....Interesting may ignore advice
3-Interesting discussion about what goes through a pilots mind in this type of situation.

Then the self analyzes afterwards of must have should have could have......

Yip except for these unfortunate pilots we are all perfect, right?

What engineer would willingly get into an aircraft with 19 others if he was not 100% confident of the mechanical integrity of the aircraft. In this case the man paid with his life. The shock of realising that the aircraft was failing must have been enormous and he had no option but to contend with the situation only once they were airborne. Similarly, what pilot will fly an aircraft knowing that it was not 100%. I consider all three gentlemen as integral members of the flight crew. Somebody mentioned earlier that the engineer may have been an encumbrance in the cockpit. I put it to you that this engineer was doing his best, as were the pilots, to contend with the situation. Having an engineer on board that is familiar with aircraft as was the case here, is a real asset for the flight crew. Why would the pilots not have been confident that the aircraft was good to go if the engineer who had worked on it, was ?

Somewhere in the mists of time I seem to remember that a qualified type rated AME can sit right hand seat in these old propliners, but maybe that's just oldtimers disease.

An aviation expert says there are glaring holes in Sacaa’s preliminary report that will probably be fixed in the final one.
It is not possible that the current and former Qantas airline pilots, with more than 37,000 hours’ flying time between them, were not licensed to fly the Convair aircraft that slammed into the ground killing two people near Wonderboom Airport last month.

According to aviation expert and former airline pilot Karl Jensen, the co-pilot’s licence at least was valid and correctly endorsed.

He cited several other problems with the preliminary report on the crash issued by the South African Civil Aviation Authority (Sacaa) over the weekend.

Jensen noted that both the pilot and first officer had qualified on the plane a short while before they flew its sister to Australia in 2016.

“It was a massive journey and there wasn’t a single problem. It was absolutely fine,” he added.

He said the aircraft that crashed had been standing around in the open and “who knows what was interfered with”, given that one engine disintegrated shortly after take-off, but that it should have been able to fly on one engine.

The climb rate would have been slower on one engine, but the plane should have been able to stay in the air, he added.

“A very serious omission [in the report] is the lack of analysis of the fuel and of the internal guts of the engine,” Jensen said. “In that situation, in all emergency procedures on all aeroplanes, the first thing you do is fly the aeroplane. Aviate, navigate, communicate. That is the mantra pilots learn and have to apply.

“It does appear those guys were battling to keep the plane in the air and, playing devil’s advocate, maybe they didn’t apply the line-by-line emergency procedures because they didn’t have the time.”

He explained that once an engine shut down it was not always possible to get it back on.

“Under those circumstances they would have been under extreme stress.

“I flew that exact aeroplane in 2006, and its sister ship, so my knowledge of the plane is extensive. The licensed aircraft maintenance engineer, Christo Barnard, was extremely competent.

“I can’t comment on how much he operated the engines but, as they said in the report, it was common practice in the days of Rovos (the previous owners of the downed Convair) that we had someone there to help us,” Jensen said.

“The aeroplane was a handful. I’ve flown all the Boeing planes and the biggest one, the 747-400, was a breeze compared to the engine handling of the Convair.”

He said modern jet engines, which have far fewer working parts, were much more reliable than radial engines.

“Until the final report comes out, which the aviation authority has to put out in less than 30 days, the preliminary report isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on.

“Without analysis of the fuel and the damage to both engines, no conclusions should be drawn. Those engines always bring people home.”

I like Karl Jensens approach, and am generally dismayed at how many posters appear to want to lynch the crew notably from the safety of their keyboards, where still facts such as fuel, or other technical issues may have played a part not fully yet revealed in the investigation.

Whilst we all want to learn from this and discuss and speculate some of the speculation has been rather for the man/men and not the ball, some posters smack of arrogance is insufferable.

Very likely in aviation at some point a pilot will get his/her turn at a crisis and no matter to what level and how high you may hold your ability (usually we think we are a far better than we are) it's amazing when the chips are down, and there is not much time, how we can make mistakes or have no choice but to aviate navigate and then communicate and sometimes all the time that is left is aviate A - Z straight bypassing all in between before the ground is there, or the situation is unraveling quickly.

As Karl pointed out the aircraft is complex and not an easy one to manage, having myself suffered a couple of engine failures after takeoff things can happen very quickly when low and options are running out, and those were not in near as complex aircraft and situation this crew had to contend with.

.......An aviation expert says there are glaring holes in Sacaa’s preliminary report that will probably be fixed in the final one.
It is not possible that the current and former Qantas airline pilots, with more than 37,000 hours’ flying time between them, were not licensed to fly the Convair aircraft that slammed into the ground killing two people near Wonderboom Airport last month.

According to aviation expert and former airline pilot Karl Jensen, the co-pilot’s licence at least was valid and correctly endorsed.

Just a side note: before we fall into the same trap again.
It has become fashion to criticize SACAA - (and often justly so) but in this case they may just be following the set protocol in SA.

In Australia - CASA - will endorse a pilot under a "block" endorsement.
Example - if you get endorsed on a Cessna 414 - you automatically get the C401 / 402 and C421 with it (as a group).

If the FO of the Convair was endorsed in Australia on the 440 - (HARS have one), it is very likely that he got the 340 in the same "block" endorsement. Yet if that option is not available under SACAA validations - then - according to the South African standards the FO was not endorsed on "type" (being the 340). That does not mean he was not "trained on type" - but as it was a ZS registered aircraft - SACAA rules apply. Thereby the text in the report could be in line with SACAA rules.

I asked the question about 4 pages back - whether the aircraft would be ferried under the PH register (as I presume final transfer of ownership would have taken place after the test flight / and the ownership transferred to the Dutch owners).

If so - it is quite possible that the ferry permit (under PH) by the Dutch RLD would have recognized the FO's endorsement and license.

With smoke and flames billowing from a binding brake, and with the emergency braking system not working because of a lack of time to repair the system, the driver of a huge truck was hailed as a hero by his colleagues and boss for bravely fighting to keep the truck on the road.

The truck was previously seen to have ignored a compulsory truck-stop at the start of a steep incline, placed there by authorities to ensure that trucks are able to select the appropriate low gear before entering the decline. The truck careened down the incline, weaving from side to side and narrowly missing several oncoming vehicles before smashing into a builder's yard at the bottom of the hill. Sadly, the driver of the truck succumbed to his injuries.

Mr I Amtheman, the driver of the truck, had many years of driving experience, and had once won a Driver of the Year Award. "He was a great driver" said his boss Mr Smith." He always got the job done, no matter what". Pollo Leven, a co-worker, agreed. "He is a hero - despite the odds he managed to avoid a major accident".

The local community is however up in arms. "The truck was smoking as it left the premises. We warned the driver, but he said it was OK, as the brakes had been overhauled the previous day". A fellow worker, who preferred to remain anonymous, said that the emergency braking system was not working. This was known by Mr I Amtheman, but he said he was not worried about it, because he had never had to use emergency brakes before. Someone also claimed that Mr Amtheman's licence had expired. "That's not a problem" said Mr Smith "it only lapsed a few months ago, and in any event, he was a very good and experienced driver".

Mr Smith went on to say that the community should not judge Mr Amtheman harshly, despite the facts pointing to major mistakes and poor decisions he made before the truck became uncontrollable. "He did his very best as the truck sped downhill", he said. "None of us are in a position to know what was happening in the cabin as he fought heroically to keep his truck on the road".

To expect the reults of an engine teardown and fuel analysis in a prelim report is also a bit of a dream.

I think the SACAA did quite well with this prelim, judging by the coments from foreign pilots on the “other” forum. They have no beef with the SACAA, and are in general far more experienced than the average poster on Avcom.

To expect the reults of an engine teardown and fuel analysis in a prelim report is also a bit of a dream.

I think the SACAA did quite well with this prelim, judging by the coments from foreign pilots on the “other” forum. They have no beef with the SACAA, and are in general far more experienced than the average poster on Avcom.

I agree Sandpiper. Other than the detracting small mistakes, the report is OK. And the point AFAIK about a preliminary report is simply to establish base facts that might immediately improve safety, without trying to establish causes - or apportion blame.

Our body is made to move, and our mind is made to connect with other people.
– Sjur Nesheim, Norwegian mountaineer

The essentials to happiness:
• someone to love,
• something to do,
• something to hope for

.......An aviation expert says there are glaring holes in Sacaa’s preliminary report that will probably be fixed in the final one.
It is not possible that the current and former Qantas airline pilots, with more than 37,000 hours’ flying time between them, were not licensed to fly the Convair aircraft that slammed into the ground killing two people near Wonderboom Airport last month.

According to aviation expert and former airline pilot Karl Jensen, the co-pilot’s licence at least was valid and correctly endorsed.

Just a side note: before we fall into the same trap again.
It has become fashion to criticize SACAA - (and often justly so) but in this case they may just be following the set protocol in SA.

In Australia - CASA - will endorse a pilot under a "block" endorsement.
Example - if you get endorsed on a Cessna 414 - you automatically get the C401 / 402 and C421 with it (as a group).

If the FO of the Convair was endorsed in Australia on the 440 - (HARS have one), it is very likely that he got the 340 in the same "block" endorsement. Yet if that option is not available under SACAA validations - then - according to the South African standards the FO was not endorsed on "type" (being the 340). That does not mean he was not "trained on type" - but as it was a ZS registered aircraft - SACAA rules apply. Thereby the text in the report could be in line with SACAA rules.

I asked the question about 4 pages back - whether the aircraft would be ferried under the PH register (as I presume final transfer of ownership would have taken place after the test flight / and the ownership transferred to the Dutch owners).

If so - it is quite possible that the ferry permit (under PH) by the Dutch RLD would have recognized the FO's endorsement and license.

JK

Thr differences between a 340 and a 440 are very slight, from what I can find. Addition of weather radar, more passengers from removing some of the baggage area and replacing with additional seating and a slightly increased max take off weight. And many 340s have been converted to 440 standard without officially being called 440s. This one might very well also have picked up these mods, as mentioned earlier.

Now where I get lost a bit...if the SACAA does not have an endorsement for a specific type rating, how would you be legally rated locally to operate the type within the regs?

I and I feel that others not wanting to play the crew here but the ball, absolutely acknowledge there were red flags raised, and yes the flight should not have happened until those issues were investigated. But the flight did go ahead and that brings us to the next segment - in the air, and engine problems on no.1

I think a comparison between the truck driver and the flight crew is a a tad deflective, but I appreciate the correlation.

The Capt did query the auto feather light not illuminating and the lame assured him it was a bulb not functioning.

I'm guessing by saying if the lame was not present to say that , very possibly the capt may have decided to abort the flight there and then - but that is pure speculation. And yes he as PIC had the final decision.

I'm thinking the engineers experience which would have been well known to the crew and may have significantly allayed doubt, and not to blame the lame at all, but he obviously felt the engines were A ok. His confidence and experience on these engines appeared to satisfy the crews concerns - in hindsight that auto feather bulb should have been replaced and tested first.
At the 50 kt call the lower than normal manifold pressure presented the next red flag and the takeoff should have been aborted, what transpired between crew and lame there to continue?

Was the no. 2 engine producing full power, could it with the weight and DA conditions actually maintain?
Will be good to see the performance graphs.

The crews report will be crucial to clear up why the decision was made to takeoff.

Edited auto feather light ...

Last edited by apollo11 on Thu Aug 16, 2018 4:13 pm, edited 1 time in total.