The recent verdict that Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams’ hit “Blurred Lines” infringed the copyright to the late Motown legend Marvin Gaye’s composition “Got To Give It Up” has generated significant media attention.[1] And this coverage has certainly been compounded by the eye-popping $7.4 million in damages the California jury awarded Gaye’s heirs.

Controversy and debate have raged about whether the jury was correct, with the primary issue being whether Thicke and Williams actually copied “Got To Give It Up,” or were simply inspired by Gaye’s late-’70s soul/funk composition. Of course, copyright protection does not extend to a musical idea, genre, or overall “feel” of a song. Rather, copyright protects a musical expression fixed in a tangible medium — here, the written composition filed with the U.S. Copyright Office for “Got To Give It Up.” (Gaye’s estate does not own the copyright to the sound recording of “Got To Give It Up,” and thus could not assert that “Blurred Lines” infringed the recording.)

Thicke and Williams made this idea vs. expression dichotomy the primary issue in their complaint for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement: “Being reminiscent of a ‘sound’ is not copyright infringement. The intent in producing ‘Blurred Lines’ was to evoke an era. In reality, the Gaye defendants are claiming ownership of an entire genre, as opposed to a specific work . . . .”

The jury disagreed with this argument. Weighing evidence such as competing expert testimony, recordings of the compositions (interestingly, the judge only allowed the jury to hear a new recording of Gaye’s composition that was made for the litigation and which was based on the music filed with the Copyright Office), and testimony from Thicke and Williams regarding the creation of “Blurred Lines,” the jury found that Thicke and Williams incorporated too many elements of “Got To Give It Up” into “Blurred Lines,” such that it crossed the line from “inspired by” to “copying.”

Does this verdict represent a slippery slope in copyright law, in which songwriters now have grounds to plead infringement when another composition has a similar “feel” but does not actually copy a song? Further, could this decision extend to other media, such as film, literary works, or photography, in which new works are often inspired by those which precede them? (more…)

When Sirius XM broadcasts “Happy Together,” “It Ain’t Me Babe,” and other hit recordings from The Turtles through its satellite and Internet radio services, it infringes the copyrights to these recordings, according to a court in the Central District of California.

In an order issued September 22, 2014, in Flo & Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Inc., 2:13-cv-05693 (C.D. California: Public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings protected by California copyright law)[1], the record industry scored a significant victory in the first major court ruling on the issue of state copyright protection for public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings. The court granted Flo & Eddie summary judgment on its claim that Sirius’ unlicensed public performances of its sound recordings violated California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), the section in California’s copyright statute that applies to pre-1972 sound recordings. Flo & Eddie is the corporation owned and operated by Howard Kaylan and Mark Volman, founding members and the lead singer and guitarist, respectively, of the 1960s pop group The Turtles. Because the case involves only California state law, however, the court’s ruling is limited in scope to public performances of these recordings in the state of California.

This case is one of a series of lawsuits that seek royalties for public performances by new media music services such as Sirius XM and Pandora of sound recordings created before February 15, 1972, based on the argument that state law protects these recordings from such unlicensed uses. While music compositions have long enjoyed copyright protection under U.S. copyright law, only in 1972 did Congress extend copyright protection to sound recordings. Individual states, however, had enacted their own copyright statutes, which co-existed with the federal Copyright Act until the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, which preempted these state laws. The 1976 federal law, however, expressly carved out a preemption exemption to sound recordings created before February 15, 1972. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (“With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067.”)

In 1995, Congress expanded the rights attached to a sound recording when it passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, which added digital audio transmissions of sound recordings to the exclusive bundle of rights a copyright grants. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). SoundExchange has emerged as the performance rights organization that collects the compulsory license fees that non-interactive digital music services—including Sirius XM—pay to perform these recordings.

But Sirius did not pay, and SoundExchange did not attempt to collect, royalties for pre-1972 recordings, as these do not have federal copyright protection. The digital public performance rights that owners of these sound recordings possess have existed in a sort of legal limbo based on the interpretations of state copyright statutes. Flo & Eddie owns the rights to The Turtles’ recordings, and tested these legal waters by suing Sirius for violating California copyright law—and bringing claims for unfair competition, conversion, and misappropriation—for broadcasting its sound recordings.

The author of an original work of authorship consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972, has an exclusive ownership therein until February 15, 2047, as against all persons except one who independently makes or duplicates another sound recording that does not directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in such prior recording, but consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate the sounds contained in the prior sound recording.

Flo & Eddie argued that “exclusive ownership” of sound recordings encompasses the right to control public performances of these recordings. Sirius argued that because the statute did not expressly specify the public performance right, it was not included in the “exclusive ownership” of a recording. Based on the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, and two court decisions which implied that the California statute granted the owner of a sound recording the exclusive right to control public performances of its recordings, the court agreed with Flo & Eddie’s interpretation. As such, because no dispute existed that Sirius had broadcast The Turtles’ recordings without a license, the court granted Flo & Eddie’s summary judgment motion that these public performances infringed their sound recording copyrights. The court also granted Flo & Eddie summary judgment on its unfair competition, conversion, and misappropriation claims.

This case has the potential to create significant revenue streams for major record labels and other owners of pre-1972 sound recordings. Conversely, it presents new licensing and business challenges to Internet, satellite, and other new media non-interactive music service providers. Of course, a treasure trove of artistically and commercially successful music was recorded before 1972—think Elvis, The Beatles, Jimi Hendrix, Miles Davis, Duke Ellington … the list could go on and on. A huge void would exist if Sirius simply stopped broadcasting these recordings. As such, the full implications of the decision in the Flo & Eddie case may take years to emerge, especially considering that the decision applies only in California. For example, a court interpreting another state’s law could issue an opposite decision. But in practicality, Sirius could most likely not block its broadcasts from California. So if this decision is affirmed on appeal, new licensing requirements will likely emerge for digital public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings.

Describing its Internet-based television streaming services, tech start-up Aereo proclaims, “It’s not magic. It’s wizardry.”[1] In yesterday’s 6-3 decision the Supreme Court disagreed, or at the very least, adopted a staunchly anti-wizardry stance.[2]

Justice Breyer, writing for the majority in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., characterized the issue before the Court as whether “Aereo, Inc., infringes this exclusive right [of public performance under §106(4) of the Copyright Act] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over air.”[3] Despite Aereo’s self-description as a mere equipment supplier doing no “performing” of its own, the Court held in the affirmative.

The Court analyzed the issue in two parts: whether Aereo “performed” under the Copyright Act, and if so, whether the performance was “public.”

In concluding that Aereo did, in fact, perform under the Copyright Act, the majority of the Court turned to the 1976 amendments to the Act, which were adopted, in large part, to bring community antenna television, or CATV—the precursor to cable television—within the scope of the Act. CATV functioned by placing antennas on hills above cities, then using coaxial cables to carry the television signals received by the antennas into subscribers’ homes. CATV did not select which programs to carry, but rather served as a conduit for the transmission and amplification of television signals. Before the 1976 amendments, Supreme Court precedent considered CATV to be a passive equipment supplier that did not “perform” under the Act.[4] After the amendments, to “perform” an audiovisual work such as a television program meant “to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.”[5] CATV thus “performed” the shows it transmitted because it both showed the television programs’ images to its subscribers, and made the accompanying sounds audible. Over a strong dissent authored by Justice Scalia[6], the majority found that, because its services were so similar to those once offered by CATV, Aereo also “performed” under the post-1976 definition of the term.[7]

Having determined that Aereo’s services constitute a performance under the Copyright Act, the Court next turned to the issue of whether those performances are public. Aereo argued its services do not constitute public performance because whenever a subscriber selects a program to watch, Aereo places a unique copy of the show in that subscriber’s folder on Aereo’s hard drive, which no one other than that subscriber can view. If another subscriber wants to watch the same show, she will receive her own copy of the program in her own folder from Aereo. The Court dismissed this argument, finding the “technological difference” inconsequential in light of Congress’s clear intent to bring anything analogous to CATV within the scope of the Copyright Act’s requirements. Under the post-1976 Act, an entity performs a copyrighted work publicly any time it “transmits” a performance. A performance is “transmitted” when it is communicated by any device or process beyond the place from which it is sent, whether the recipients receive the transmission at the same time and place, or at different times and places.[8] Aereo therefore publicly performs a copyrighted television program each time its system sends a copy of that program to a subscriber’s personal Aereo folder.

The majority characterized its holding as a “limited” one, and was careful to emphasize that its decision does not apply to other new technologies, such as cloud-based storage and remote storage DVRs. But with a slew of amici curiae predicting the decision could have a catastrophic impact on the tech industry, there are surely some who will take no comfort from the Court’s assurances. Aereo, unfortunately, may not have a spell to resurrect itself.

[6] Justice Scalia argues that Aereo does not “perform” because it is the subscriber, rather than Aereo, who selects the program she wishes to watch, which in turn activates the individual antennae Aereo has assigned to her for the purpose of viewing that program. This means it is the subscriber who is doing the performing, since she is the one rousing Aereo’s antennae from dormancy and calling up a specific program to watch. Justice Scalia went on to note that although he disagrees with the majority’s interpretation of “perform,” he agrees that Aereo’s activities ought not to be allowed, either because Aereo is secondarily liable for its subscribers’ infringement of the Networks’ performance rights, or because it is directly liable for violating the Networks’ reproduction rights. If future courts fail to find Aereo liable under either of those theories, Justice Scalia advocates relying on Congress to close the loophole. Slip Op. at 12.

A renowned illusionist has achieved a very real victory in court. The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada held that Teller’s performance of his Shadows magic trick is protected under copyright law, even though the magic trick itself is not. Teller v. Dogge, 110 USPQ2d 1302 (D. Nev. 2014).[1]

Teller – a well-known magician, best known as half of Penn & Teller – has performed Shadows for over three decades. This illusion involves a spotlight pointed at a vase containing a rose, projecting a shadow onto a screen as shown below:

Teller, wielding a large knife, slowly cuts the leaves and petals of the rose’s shadow on the screen. Meanwhile, the corresponding leaves and petals of the real rose fall to the ground.

Teller brought a lawsuit against Gerard Dogge, a Dutch performer who uploaded to YouTube two videos of himself performing a similar illusion, entitled The Rose and Her Shadow.

Dogge’s caption for the videos stated: “I’ve seen the great Penn & Teller performing a similar trick and now I’m very happy to share my version in a different and more impossible way with you.” Dogge admitted that he posted the videos in an attempt to sell the illusion’s secret.

The court last month court granted Teller’s motion for summary judgment on his copyright infringement claim, holding that Teller’s performance of Shadows is subject to copyright protection. While magic tricks are not protected under copyright law, the court explained, the Copyright Act protects “dramatic works” and “pantomimes.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). “The mere fact that a dramatic work or pantomime includes a magic trick, or even that a particular illusion is its central feature does not render it devoid of copyright protection,” the court found.

The court rejected Dogge’s argument that Teller had waived his copyright because his partner, Penn Jillette, had issued a challenge of sorts, publicly stating that “no one will ever figure out” Shadows. This statement, the court observed, “merely provokes others to unearth the secret, not perform the work.” And for copyright purposes, the secret behind the trick is insignificant: “the performance it is used for is everything.”

Having determined that Teller’s illusion merited copyright protection, the court had no trouble finding infringement. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s two-part analysis – an “extrinsic test” and an “intrinsic test” – the court found that Teller’s Shadows and Dogge’s The Rose and Her Shadow were substantially similar.

The court noted that the two parties’ illusions were “nearly identical twins,” even though their secrets may have been different.

In discerning substantial similarity, the court compares only the observable elements of the works in question. Therefore, whether Dogge uses Teller’s method, a technique known only by various holy men of the Himalayas, or even real magic is irrelevant, as the performances appear identical to an ordinary observer.

Last week the court set trial for June 2, 2014, to determine whether Dogge committed willful infringement and to decide Teller’s unfair competition claim.

In its summary judgment order, the court noted that the magic community has traditionally blackballed performers who reveal other magicians’ secrets. This case confirms that wronged magicians also may have another avenue for relief, in federal court.

Inhale Inc.’s efforts to protect the shape of its hookah under copyright law went up in smoke, as the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 739 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2014).[1]

Inhale, a designer and manufacturer of smoking products, sold the hookah[2] shown below:

It obtained a U.S. copyright registration for this product.

Inhale sued Starbuzz for copyright infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that Starbuzz sold a similar hookah. Inhale’s claim was based entirely on the shape of Starbuzz’s hookah. For purposes of the lawsuit, Inhale disclaimed copyright protection to the skull-and-crossbones graphic.

The district court granted Starbuzz’s motion for summary judgment in 2012, holding that Inhale did not own a valid copyright in the shape of its hookah, notwithstanding its registration. Last month the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Copyright Act generally protects “original works of authorship,” including sculptural works. But it does not protect “useful articles.” Under the Copyright Act, a “useful article” is “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Individual design elements of a useful article may be subject to copyright protection, to the extent that they “can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U.S.C. 101. Such protectable elements may be either physically separable or conceptually separable.

Inhale argued that the shape of its hookah was conceptually separable from its utilitarian features, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed. It explained: “The shape of a container is not independent of the container’s utilitarian function—to hold the contents within its shape—because the shape accomplishes the function.” 739 F.3d at 449.

The court, citing Copyright Office practice, rejected Inhale’s contention that the distinctiveness of the hookah shape affected the separability analysis. The court observed:

Although Inhale’s water container, like a piece of modern sculpture, has a distinctive shape, “the shape of the alleged ‘artistic features’ and of the useful article are one and the same.”

The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Starbuzz under 17 U.S.C. § 505, and further awarded Starbuzz its attorneys’ fees on appeal.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision is a blow to producers of creative works that have utilitarian functions, including other sculptural works such as bottles and vases. In view of this decision, it may be harder for such entities to address copying by competitors – at least under copyright law.

[2]A hookah is a device for smoking tobacco, in which the smoke passes through a water basin, which filters and cools the smoke before it is inhaled by the user. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hookah.

The U.S. Supreme Court decided today that copyright law would not protect against most gray market works.[1] It is important to remember, however, that U.S. federal and state trademark and unfair competition laws still provide effective remedies against the importation, sale and distribution of gray market goods.

In most cases, a brand owner in the U.S. must establish that it owns a valid trademark here in the United States, or is an exclusive licensee, and that there are material differences between the authorized domestic product and the gray market product that bear the mark. Trademark law protects consumers from confusion when they encounter a product with the same trademark, but that has materially different components, functionality, or health and safety information or warnings. Federal courts have restricted the sale of gray market goods under trademark and unfair competition law involving a wide variety of goods from soft drinks and packaged foods, to pharmaceutical and cosmetic products, among others. In many cases, the gray market good is not appropriate for sale in the U.S. because it is tailored to the tastes, preferences, conditions and laws of another country, and not the U.S. The Tariff Act as well, and, to a lesser extent because of a labeling exception, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Lever Rule may provide additional protections against gray market goods. Finally, for famous brands, anti-dilution laws may provide a remedy.

The Court’s decision in Wiley does not impact these trademark and unfair competition remedies, as it is limited to copyright protection. Therefore, when faced with a gray market goods problem, a brand owner should explore remedies available under trademark and unfair competition laws, notwithstanding this copyright decision.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a gossip magazine’s publication of photographs of a secret celebrity wedding did not constitute fair use under the Copyright Act. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2012).

Noelia Lorenzo Monge, the Puerto Rican pop singer and model known to the world as Noelia, married her manager, Jorge Reynoso, in January 2007. The couple attempted to keep their marriage a secret to maintain Noelia’s image as a single sex symbol. Only the minister and two chapel employees witnessed the wedding ceremony. For two years Noelia and Reynoso succeeded in keeping their marriage a secret, even from their families.

In the summer of 2008, Oscar Viqueira, a paparazzo who worked as a driver and bodyguard for Noelia and Reynoso, discovered a memory chip containing photographs of the wedding night. Viqueira sold the photos to Maya Magazines for $1,500, without Noelia’s or Reynoso’s permission.

Maya published three photos of the wedding ceremony, and three additional photos from the wedding night, in Issue 633 of TVNotas Magazine. Until then, the photos had been unpublished. The TVNotas cover headline stated: “The Secret Marriage of Noelia and Jorge Reynoso in Las Vegas.” The photo spread inside referred to the “first and exclusive photos of the secret wedding.” Issue 633 was the first time the public learned of the wedding – including Reynoso’s mother, who berated her son for getting married without telling her.

Noelia and Reynoso promptly registered the copyrights in five of the photos and then brought suit against Maya for copyright infringement. The Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor Maya based on fair use. 2010 WL 3835053 (Sept. 30, 2010). The Ninth Circuit reversed.

Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement. The fair use doctrine, the Ninth Circuit explained, presumes that unauthorized copying has occurred but protects such copying under certain circumstances. Section 107 of the Copyright Act enumerates four factors for courts to consider in evaluating a fair use defense:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. (more…)

In 1997, Timothy McGee pitched an animated TV series, “The Music Factory of the 90’s,” to The Cartoon Network. McGee’s show, set in Atlanta, centered on Tony “The Play Maker” Rich, a wealthy corporate attorney who leaves his law firm to become a music producer. The show would feature animated versions of well-known guest musicians. Each episode would include a musical performance, and at the end of the episode the guests would appear in their live-action state. The show would deal with serious issues such as racism and violence, and it aimed to teach viewers lessons about the music industry and life. The Cartoon Network rejected “The Music Factory of the 90’s” because it did not meet the network’s programming needs at the time.

Nearly ten years later, The Cartoon Network debuted “Class of 3000,” an animated series co-created and co-produced by Andre “Andre 3000″ Benjamin, best known as one-half of the hip-hop duo Outkast. This show was also set in Atlanta. It focused on Sunny Bridges, a musical superstar who returned to Atlanta to teach, and his students at a performing arts school. Sunny displayed supernatural abilities and lived in a magical house in the woods. Benjamin provided the voice of Sunny, and each episode included his original music. According to the complaint, “Class of 3000″ taught viewers lessons, and the plan was for animated versions of real artists to appear on the show.

In May 2008, “Class of 3000″ concluded its second and final season. Shortly following, McGee brought suit against Benjamin, The Cartoon Network, and its parent company, Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., alleging copyright infringement and other claims.

The court granted the motion to dismiss of The Cartoon Network and TBS, the only defendants that McGee served, because McGee was unable to show probative similarity between “The Music Factory of the 90’s” and “Class of 3000.” McGee v. Benjamin 3000, 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1299 (D. Mass. March 20, 2012).

To demonstrate copyright infringement a plaintiff must establish (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. There was no dispute McGee satisfied the first element. He owned a copyright registration for a treatment of “The Music Factory of the 90’s” and related materials. However, McGee could not demonstrate actionable copying.

In the First Circuit, establishing copying involves two steps. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “actually copied the work as a factual matter,” either through direct evidence or through indirect evidence of access and probative similarity. In comparing the works to determine similarity, only protectible elements are relevant; the court must ignore “unprotected ideas or unoriginal expressions.” Second, if court finds probative similarity, then it considers substantial similarity. “Two works are substantially similar if a reasonable, ordinary observer, upon examination of the two works would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriate the plaintiff’s protectable expression.”

The court found McGee’s claims insufficient with respect to probative similarity. McGee’s vague references to similarities in “location, characters, content, format, and dramatis personnae” were not enough. The only specific similarities, the court explained, were that both shows take place in Atlanta; both shows involve the music industry; and both shows involve a character who left his job to try something new. But McGee does not have the exclusive right to any of these elements.

McGee’s argument regarding probative similarity runs up against several hurdles often encountered by those who seek to enforce a copyright in a treatment for a television show, movie, or theatrical performance. Most notably, there are very few elements of the Music Factory treatment that are original; most of the alleged similarities are noncopyrightable “basic concepts and ideas” or “stock scenes and characters.”

Because ideas are not protected by copyright, whether or not the defendants copied McGee’s ideas was irrelevant. Further, under the scenes a faire doctrine, copyright generally does not protect “plots, subplots or themes” insofar as they are “for all practical purposes indispensable, or at least customary, in the treatment of a given subject matter.” For example, “the plot device of a protagonist leaving one profession to embark on an unrelated profession with little experience but considerable passion is a familiar one.”

Likewise, copyright does not protect stock characters. The court found that several characters in the parties’ shows, such as young musicians and a tough executive, were largely stock characters. Meanwhile, the shows’ main characters – Sunny and The Play Maker – were “in certain fundamental senses … almost polar opposites.”

Therefore, McGee’s copyright claim failed based on the absence of probative similarity. The court added that McGee also could not establish substantial similarity. In that regard, it pointed to additional differences in “format and tone,” and added that the themes of the two shows were in conflict. While “The Music Factory of the 90’s” celebrated the pursuit of money and fame, “Class of 3000″ emphasized the love of music and creativity.

McGee reflects the difficulty in establishing copying infringement in this context. Copyright owners must beware that basic concepts and ideas are not protectable, nor are routine storylines or stock characters. Superficial similarities between creative works are often not actionable.

In “one [of] a series of domestic disputes between” Paul Bogoni and Vicdania Gomez, Gomez registered the domain names paulbogoni.org and paulbogoni.com without his authorization.[1] She offered to sell the domain names for $1 million each and posted content on one of them related to certain of her and her daughter’s artwork. Bogoni sued under the personal name protection provisions of the Anti-cybersquatting Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8131, seeking a preliminary injunction. He prevailed when Gomez’s defense of use in connection with a copyrighted work failed to show her good faith registration. Bogoni v. Gomez, No. 11 civ 08093 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2012).[2]

Gomez initially populated paulbogoni.org with statements that her three-year old daughter wrote and operated the website, which would donate proceeds to charity from the sale of art objects called “Angel” and “Airplane.” A message on the site stated, “Hi, I’m Vittoria and this my [sic] first website that my mommy helped me launch in order to begin my journey in making the world a better place.” The web site advised visitors that the two art objects were constructed at an arts institution named “Make Meaning in the Upper West Side of Manhattan.” The “Airplane” object was titled “Bogoni.” Finally, the web site displayed the following statement: “I will am [sic] also selling this domain name http://www.PAULBOGONI.ORG and http://www.PAULBOGONI.COM for $1Million (ONE MILLION DOLLARS) each.” A photograph of “Airplane” appeared on the web site a month after the filing of Bogoni’s complaint and Gomez never explained the relationship between the name Bogoni and the “Airplane.”

Under these facts, Bogoni satisfied his burden to show that Gomez: (1) registered a domain name that consists of his name; (2) did so without the Bogoni’s consent; and (3) had the specific intent to profit from Bogoni’s name by selling the domain name for financial gain.[3] The court’s analysis turned on the availability of a defense to cybersquatting liability for

“good faith registration of a [personal] domain name . . . if such name is used in, affiliated with, or related to a work of authorship protected under Title 17 . . . and if the person registering the domain name is the copyright owner or licensee of the work [and] the person intends to sell the domain name in conjunction with the lawful exploitation of the work.”

15 U.S.C. § 8131(1)(B).

The Court found that Gomez exhibited an absence of good faith based upon the facts in evidence, and her offer to sell the domain names was not “in conjunction” with the sale of the two art objects. Thus, she did not qualify for this copyrighted work defense. The Court’s injunction did not require Gomez to transfer the domain names, however, but only required her to stop using them, which she did by removing all content. Currently, paulbogoni.org simply states “underconstruction.”

This decision illustrates a key distinction between a claim over the use of a personal name as a domain name under the ACPA versus the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: the UDRP does not protect personal names that are not trademarks as well, even the names of famous people who do not use their names in connection with a designation for their business. Seehttp://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview2.0/ (response to question 1.6). Business executives who find themselves subject to attack or pseudo-extortion through domain names incorporating their personal names may be able to take advantage of this targeted ACPA claim, as well as claims under state laws protecting rights of privacy.

[3] The Court discussed at some length whether Bogoni satisfied the third prong of this test because of some prior decisions finding that personal name cybersquatting to recover a debt would avoid liability. See Carl v. BernardJCarl.com, 409 F. App’x 628, 630 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curium) (unpublished).

As the father of two little boys, I’ve changed thousands of diapers in the last three years, but never diaper jeans. Apparently, I’m missing out. The owner of a copyright in certain diaper jeans sued Kimberly-Clark, which sold jean diapers.[1] Kimberly-Clark moved to dismiss the claims because the alleged designs were not substantially similar, and prevailed. Pollick v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., Case No. 11-12420 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 23, 2011).[2] The Court stated, “Perhaps frivolous, Plaintiff’s complaint was plainly objectively unreasonable,” and granted Kimberly-Clark its attorneys’ fees as well. Images of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s diaper designs are below.

The Judge analyzed the lack of similarities as follows:

First, the color of the diapers: Plaintiff’s diaper comes in two colors, white or light blue; Defendant’s comes in one color, dark blue. Second, the pattern of the diapers: Plaintiff’s diaper comes in two patterns, flat white or flat light blue; Defendant’s comes in one pattern, distressed blue denim. Third, the color of the stitching: Plaintiff’s diaper has red stitching; Defendant’s has either black or gold stitching. Fourth, the front pockets: Plaintiff’s diaper has two pockets, indicated by a straight line and a curved line; Defendant’s has three pockets, the larger two pockets indicated by a single curved line and a rivet at the top, and the third, smaller pocket inset within one of the larger pockets and indicated by a gently curving line and a rivet at the top. Fifth, the front fly: Plaintiff’s diaper indicates the fly with a single straight line (with no button); Defendant’s indicates the fly with a straight line and curved line, a button, and thicker hashed lines representing reinforced stitching. Sixth, the front belt loops: Plaintiff’s diaper has none; Defendant’s has two, one above each larger pocket with thicker lines representing reinforced stitching. Seventh, the back belt loops: Plaintiff’s diaper has none; Defendant’s has three with thicker lines representing reinforced stitching. Eighth, the back label: Plaintiff’s diaper has an embroidered “Diaper Jeans” on the left side of right pocket; Defendant’s diaper has a patch with “Huggies® Little Movers EST. 1975″ above the right pocket between the belt loops. And ninth, the back waist: Plaintiff’s waist is indicated by a single straight line and single v-line; Defendant’s is indicated by a double straight line and v-line.

The above contains considerable factual analysis at the motion to dismiss stage. Under the Twombly/Iqbal standard articulated by the Supreme Court, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that are facially plausible. Here, a picture is worth a thousand words (actually, 272 in the quoted section). You be the judge.

For businesses facing a copyright infringement suit, this type of ruling helps pave the way for efficient resolutions of copyright disputes at the pleading stage. Many judges, however, would not rule at such an early stage of the proceeding, preferring to allow the litigation to play out to a greater extent, including discovery. This judge had no such qualms and clearly saw this case a certain way.