Here's What We Should've Learned From Benghazi

Expect a Capitol Hill circus on Wednesday as the House opens hearings, at which "whistle-blowers" will supposedly testify, into the attack on the American consulate in Benghazi, Libya, in 2012. Never mind the mudslinging—here's what the U.S. should have taken away from the tragedy.

It's hard to keep the stink of politics off any discussion about the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, in 2012. Questions about lack of preparedness and the Obama administration's public response to the attack will swirl around Washington, D.C. and play a part in presidential politics in 2016. And you can expect a burst of rhetoric and finger pointing during tomorrow's "whistle-blower" hearings on Capitol Hill.

There are a number of interesting questions to be answered: Did the Special Operation team in Tripoli receive an order to "stand down" and not head to Benghazi? Did administration officials lie when they blamed a little-known video for inciting a riot in Libya? Why did the State Department deny requests for more security?

But, while those politically loaded queries will be hashed out in public, there are real lessons about diplomatic tactics and military capabilities that America should have learned from this affair—lessons that should not be lost amid the political posturing to come. The military has already moved to learn from its mistakes, though it's unclear if politicians have done the same. As the nation contemplates intervention in Syria and budget cuts at home, here are some key takeaways from the Benghazi mess.

Position Your Forces Wisely

Americans expect the Pentagon to have a global and immediate reach. There's good reason for this perception—no other military in the world has the training, forward bases, and equipment the United States has at its disposal. But while the Pentagon can deliver a nuclear missile warhead to any point on the planet within half an hour, it can't make a well-armed security team materialize out of thin air in North Africa.

The attack on the Benghazi compound was a shocking lapse in military posturing. This is not a political slap but a simple fact, one supported by the Pentagon's actions in Africa since the attack. In October, Africa Command received a cadre of Green Berets to serve as the "Commander's in-Extremis Force," to stay on alert and rapidly respond to any crises. In April, Marine Corps commander Gen. James Amos told Congress that 550 Marines will be stationed in Spain to make up a larger rapid-reaction force. The Marines in Spain have six MV-22 Ospreys that can carry Marines into Africa as needed; there has been speculation that the base will be replaced with a facility on the African continent itself if a host nation emerges.

The Pentagon is making these changes to fix its previous lapse in judgment over the risk to personnel in Africa—who, after all, were in a war zone surrounded by terrorists with anti-American agendas. In April the U.S. Embassy in Madrid explained the troop movements by citing "the tragedy in the Libyan city of Benghazi."

The lesson here is simple: Plan for catastrophe. If the nation will support a regime change and place intelligence and diplomatic personnel in harm's way, as it did in Libya, then position military forces to deal with the worst-case scenario. The idea of maintaining a low profile during the Libyan operation and letting the European powers take the lead led to the U.S. keeping a poorly protected compound in Benghazi. (More on this below.)

There Are Limits to U.S. Air Power

The vast reach of our country's unmanned aircraft has led to the belief in all-powerful American power projection. But while it's true that UAVs can be redirected while in flight—from, say, Afghanistan to North Africa—the same cannot be said for manned airplanes. The U.S. actually had a drone overhead during the Benghazi crisis, but, like most UAVs, it had no weapons. Even if it had antitank missiles, it would have had no clear targets to engage.

More interesting is the question of F/A-18s F-16s. A show-of-force flyover by jet warplanes is awe-inspiring, as anyone who has witnessed one can attest. The recognizable roar of a warplane right overhead is a deterrent to attackers, who figure that the airplane can kill them if they stage an attack.

In this case, the inflated sense of U.S. military power could have worked in favor of those trapped on the ground. But the range of an F-16 is only about 2000 miles—if it's not carrying a load of weapons. That's the distance between the U.S. airbase in Aviano, Italy (where they'd take off), and Benghazi. That margin is tight—too tight to do without aerial refueling of tankers. The Air Force now has just 418 KC-135 tankers in its inventory, but those tankers are in high demand in Afghanistan and elsewhere—the U.S. lends them out to refuel French jets over Mali, for example. So getting a Stratotanker over the Adriatic to refuel an F-16 on short notice is pretty hard.

Plus, a well-planned air operation must also take disaster into account—what happens if there's a shootdown or a crash? Without ground forces at the ready to rescue a pilot (something those rapid-reaction Marines now in Spain could do) even a nonviolent show of force over Benghazi would have been very risky. A crash could have created a "Super Hornet down" scenario that the military was clearly unready to handle.

Again, placing diplomatic forces in an unstable, postrevolutionary state like Libya without an adequate military protection proved to be a massive mistake. But the larger lesson is about the limits of American air power, and the investments the nation needs—be they refueling tankers or more armed drones—to keep it ready.

Know Your Enemy. And Mistrust Your "Friends."

The overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya was just part of the Arab Spring, in which several Middle Eastern nations embraced democracy—though, in many cases, just long enough to vote in religious political parties with anti-American leanings. The goodwill that America generated with its airstrikes didn't last long, as the Libyan rebellion fractured along secular, ethnic, and religious lines, with some groups in Libya having been linked to al-Qaida. This was the boiling situation that the Benghazi diplomats were trying to influence. Their murders, while tragic, were also a setback for the United States.

Fast-forward to 2013. A chorus of voices is imploring the United States to arm the rebels of Syria in their fight against Bashar al-Assad. As in Libya, some of the powers in the area that have proved themselves effective against the Assad regime are Sunni Islamic fanatics allied with al-Qaida. (There are also Islamic fanatics who support Assad, such as Hezbollah, but they are Shiites.)

"The moderate opposition groups we support are not as good at fighting, they're not as good at delivering humanitarian aid," says Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations committee. "We're doing a lot more on the ground than really is known, but we do have to change the equation." That reference to "more on the ground" could mean that Special Forces—U.S. or foreign—are already operating in Syria.

Here's something the United States does a lot, and shouldn't: Create unwinnable situations by backing lost causes. It's cruel and credibility-killing to throw support to more palatable but less popular rebels who can't stand up to local enemies who are backed by regional powers. Even with Special Operations forces training them, most locals cannot become powerful enough to win these proxy fights.

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