Moral Proofs Revisited

Religious Belief and Contemporary Ethical Theory

James Krueger

Department of Philosophy

University of Notre Dame

In her article titled "The Reasons We Share" Christine Korsgaard
appears to endorse the claim that in the well-known case of Jim and the
Indians, Jim may be justified in shooting one Indian to save the rest.{1}
This conclusion is a surprising one for a professed Kantian. I want to
suggest that at least part of the reason she ends up taking this position
is because of an objection she presents against a view she attributes to
Kant. Ultimately, I think her objection fails as an objection to Kant, as
does the view that she herself advocates in response to the objection. The
reasons why, however, reveal a lot about the conceptual foundations of
different ethical theories, and the role that belief in God must play in
them. Ultimately, the conclusion I hope to suggest is that without belief
in God, there is deep problem that exerts an unavoidable pressure to accept
some form of consequentialism. This pressure, then, can explain why
Korsgaard stops short of endorsing universal moral rules against lying,
suicide, and the direct killing of the innocent.

I. The Objection

The objection that Korsgaard presses against Kant stems from the
consideration of particular cases. She considers, for example, Bernard
Williams' familiar case of Jim and the Indians, where Jim is given the
choice of killing one Indian or watching soldiers kill twenty. A second,
also familiar, case involves a murderer approaching one's door and asking
if the person he intends to be his next victim is at home. The choice in
this case is meant to be between telling the murderer the truth, that the
person he seeks is at home next door (which will lead to the victim's
death) and lying to the murderer in order to save the intended victim's
life.

First, I want to consider a general problem that such cases present
for non-consequentialist ethical views. It is this general problem which
is the basis for the specific objection Korsgaard presents. Then I will
consider Korsgaard's objection to Kant in some detail.

What these cases have in common is that in each the course of action
normally considered to be morally forbidden (killing an innocent, lying) is
the only way to secure the outcome that a good person would most like to
realize given the possibilities available in each set of circumstances
(e.g., saving the most Indians possible, saving the potential murder
victim).{2} In short, these cases illustrate that it is possible for the
ends we would like to seek, the ends that we believe a moral person, a
virtuous person, would seek, to pull apart from the actions that are
normally thought to be moral or virtuous. This generates a problem in
securing the intelligibility of the project of morality, of moral action as
allowing us to achieve certain goods. If moral action cannot secure
certain ends, ends that appear to be the best outcome of a given situation,
then what is it that moral action aims at? What is moral action meant to
secure for us if it cannot guarantee our fulfillment in this important
respect? This thought, perhaps rightly, can lead to a rejection of the
moral project as incoherent.

To illustrate consider one of several claims Robert Adams thinks
it is important to believe if we are to act morally. He thinks it is
important to believe that a moral life is "better for the world." {3}
We must believe that acting as we should does not, on balance, make the
world a worse place. As Adams asks, "how else can we care about
morality as morality itself requires?"{4} If morality can, and
sometimes does, lead to disaster, how can we understand a universal
call to be moral? What is important, then, about the cases Korsgaard
considers is that in each, by acting morally, more evil seems to
result, more death and more harm. Each makes it seems as if the course
of action we are morally required to take is not consistent with our
belief that morality is good for the world. The problem is not one of
providing a grounding for or justifying a moral requirement. The
problem is maintaining the coherence of action in accordance
with this moral requirement as seeking some genuine good.

Of course, one obvious solution to this problem is the
consequentialist one. Consequentialism avoids the problem by defining it
out of existence. By making consequences definitive of right action there
can be no separation of the two, and hence no lack of fit to threaten the
intelligibility of moral action seeking good ends. What is moral is always
good for the world, by definition. Korsgaard, then, hopes to find a
position that can justify actions that violate certain general moral rules,
without falling into a simple consequentialism.

II. Korsgaard on Kant

The objection to Kant that I want to consider can be found in
Korsgaard's article titled: "The Right to Lie: Kant on dealing with
evil."{5} It is more specific than the general problem I just
mentioned, but ultimately stems from the same source. She objects to
Kant because he holds strong to certain moral rules, such as never kill
an innocent or never lie, even if horrible consequences result.
Korsgaard appears to believe that his justification for doing this has
to do with his claims about when agents can be held responsible for the
outcomes that follow from actions.{6} She suggests this claim about
responsibility follows from his acceptance of a particular kind of
ethical view, what she calls a single-level ethical view.{7} She
distinguishes single-level ethical theories from two-level theories
asserting that a single-level view does not take into account
both ideal and non-ideal cases, while a two-level theory does.

There are two kinds of single-level view. They either (1) focus only on
what a perfectly just society would be like (what is normally thought to be
morally required of us in terms of the discussion above, never kill an
innocent, never lie), or (2) focus only on the realities of injustice in
the world that we are in (the outcomes given the nature of our world).{8}
Korsgaard claims utilitarian views are single-level in the second sense
because they only focus on how to act in the particular circumstances we
confront. Such views do not independently consider what we should do apart
from outcomes; outcomes determine what is right.{9} Kant's view, then, is
single level in the first sense because, in her view, it focuses only on
the ideal (never lie, never kill) and does not address the often
less-than-ideal particulars of real cases (and because of this, there
can be the lack of fit between what we should do, and what results,
mentioned above). She asserts that "The standard of conduct [Kant]
sets for us is designed for an ideal state of affairs, we are to always
act as if we were living in a Kingdom of Ends, regardless of the
possible disastrous results."{10} It is Kant's perceived inability to
adequately respond to the reality of these disastrous results that
leads Korsgaard to argue in favor of a two level view.

By focusing only on an ideal state of affairs, she argues, Kant
"defin[es] a determinate ideal of conduct to live up to rather
than setting a goal of action to strive for."{11} As such, he
gives the individual a "definite sphere of responsibility" such that
"if you act as you ought, bad outcomes are not your responsibility."{12}
Korsgaard considers this suggestion in relation to Williams' famous
case of Jim and the Indians, and concludes that it is "grotesque" to
argue that Jim is justified in not killing a single Indian when this
results in the death of 20 by simply saying that "[Jim has] done [his]
part . . . and the bad results are not [his] responsibility" (as she
suggests Kant does).{13} It is this grotesqueness objection, then,
that is at the heart of her rejection of a Kant-style single level view
and hence helps to explain her acceptance of exceptions to general
prohibitions against lying, suicide, and killing of the innocent.

In response to this objection, I first want to consider whether the
two level theory that Korsgaard defends is up to meeting the general
challenge of making moral action intelligible as seeking some good without
falling into consequentialism. Then I will turn to consider whether she is
right to think that this claim about responsibility plays the role she
identifies in Kant's ethical view. I will argue that she is not right in
thinking this, and that there is a very different set of considerations
that are key to understanding Kant's response.

III. The Problem with Two Levels

One danger that the proponent of a two level view must face is that of
lapsing into the other kind of single level view, lapsing into
consequentialism. Korsgaard needs to provide an answer to the question of
when it is okay to deviate from the strictures of the moral ideal in a way
that either does not make reference to consequences or limits the role of
consequences to a specific range of cases. She recognizes this danger
observing that the "common sense" answer to the question of when we can
deviate is when the consequences of not doing so "would be 'very bad.'"{14}
She rightly observes that this answer is both too vague and leads down a
slippery slope to consequentialism (at any threshold, we can ask about
cases just over the line and wonder why they are ruled out and others are
not).{15} She claims that her own approach avoids both these problems.

Korsgaard suggests that she avoids consequentialism by providing a more
clear, identifiable threshold at which consequences can become
relevant.{16} Drawing on an example from Rawls, Korsgaard suggests that
the point at which it becomes morally acceptable to trade gains in
efficiency for reductions of liberty (for example) is the point at which
inefficiency itself becomes a threat to liberty.{17} The suggestion seems
to be that there is something special about this point, the point at which
the consequences of acting in accord with a rule embodied in the goal we
seek become so bad that they make the achievement of that goal impossible.

This seems like a promising suggestion, but it does not solve the problem
for it is hard to see how it generalizes to individual moral choices.
Consider the case of Jim and the Indians. Jim is supposedly, in his
specific circumstances, morally permitted to kill one Indian in order to
save twenty. When we deviate from the ideal, Korsgaard argues, the ideal
is not simply cast aside, but comes to define "the goal towards which we
are working."{18} This is, then, how she can avoid the problem associated
with maintaining the intelligibility of moral action with respect to ends.
But how could it be that killing one Indian to save twenty aims at this
ideal? How could we see this action as aiming at securing a world in which
this rule is universal? In fact, if we accept this threshold, we seem to
be incapable of ever violating the ideal, for how can an action contrary to
the moral rules contained in the ideal (goal) be a means for achieving a
world in which such moral rules are always followed? The goal, then,
cannot actually be securing the ideal if we are justified in deviating.
But, if the goal must be something other than achieving the ideal, then the
supposed threshold cannot be sustained. What makes this a unique threshold
is that it marks where following the ideal causes problems with respect to
the ideal. If we grant that causing problems with respect to some other
goal is relevant, then we have started back down the slippery slope to a
robust consequentialism. It becomes hard to see why any important goal is
not relevant, why any sufficiently bad outcome cannot justify a different
course of action.

Rawls' example, dealing with broader social/political concerns, seems to be
intuitively different from cases of individual moral choices. There is at
least some plausibility to the claim that temporary injustice or
restriction of liberty is necessary to set up the social conditions needed
to secure greater liberty or equality in the long term.{19} However, it is
not at all clear how killing an innocent man can be aimed at setting the
conditions needed to make killing always immoral. How does killing one
Indian serve to prevent another Jim at another time from finding himself in
the exact same circumstances? How can committing suicide be aimed at
making the world such that no one encounters the kind of profound suffering
Korsgaard thinks can make suicide morally acceptable (more on suicide in a
moment)?

A second problem with Korsgaard's approach is that it does not provide
a coherent reason for deviation from the ideal other than the
recognition that the consequences of not deviating are "very bad." If
there are no relevant factors other than consequences justifying
deviation, there is no clear threshold to be drawn. To see this,
consider how she constructs the two levels of her account. She relies
on the claim that in some cases the Formula of Humanity of the
Categorical Imperative is stricter than the Formula of Universal Law.
This allows these two to define the two levels of the view; the former
gives us the ideal, while the latter is responsive to the world.{20}
Importantly, however, the arguments under the Formula of Humanity are
perfectly general, they do not appear to admit the possibility of
exceptions, so how can there be a reason for setting aside these
arguments other than through the recognition that outcomes can trump
any such arguments.

Consider, for example, the case of suicide. Korsgaard argues that
Kant's argument against suicide under the Formula of Universal Law does
not work,{21} but that "Under the Formula of Humanity we can give a
clear and compelling argument against suicide."{22} That argument is,
simply, that "Nothing is of any value unless the human person is so,
and it is a great crime, as well as a kind of incoherence, to act in a
way that denies and eradicates this source of value."{23} She then
claims that "it might be possible to say that suicide is wrong from an
ideal point of view, though justifiable in circumstances of very great
natural or moral evil."{24} In The Sources of Normativity
Korsgaard further discusses the circumstances under which suicide
becomes morally licit. It is when "The ravages of severe illness,
disability, and pain can shatter your identity by destroying your
physical basis, obliterating memory or making self-command
impossible."{25} The question, then, is how these considerations can
provide a reason to deviate from the ideal that does not lead to
outright consequentialism.

Notice that none of these considerations undermine or are even responsive
to the argument given under the Formula of Humanity. It simply does not
follow from the fact that nature can rob us of our identity that we are
then justified in acting to destroy it. If it is indeed a "great crime"
and incoherent to commit suicide in ordinary circumstances, to deliberately
"eradicate the source of all value", then it still seems to be so in these
special circumstances. To put the point another way, the fact that nature
makes the achievement of a goal that we see as important impossible (in
this case the preservation of our identity) simply does not make it
coherent for us to act in a way that similarly makes the achievement of
that goal impossible (committing suicide). The argument against suicide
given under the Formula of Humanity does not admit to exceptions in such
circumstances because such circumstances are, ultimately, irrelevant to the
argument that is the basis for the rule.

Her suggestion, then, that sometimes circumstances can make suicide morally
licit cannot be grounded in anything other than the claim that sometimes
the badness of an outcome can override a moral rule. Since there is no
threshold contained within the arguments for the rules themselves, the
threshold must be found in the relationship of the outcomes to the rule.
As we saw in the first argument above, however, Korsgaard's attempt to
bootstrap a threshold from those considerations fails to make violating the
rule coherent. All Korsgaard is left with, then, is the claim that the
consequences are really bad and no principled dividing line. Korsgaard
thinks she can defend a threshold by holding to the Formula of Universal
Law, but if really bad consequences allow us to violate the moral ideal
(the Formula of Humanity), why can't the same consequences, or even worse
consequences, allow us to violate the requirements of the Formula of
Universal Law? Korsgaard insists that the Formula of Universal Law
provides the threshold at which "morality become uncompromising" but she
cannot give a principled defense of this claim.{26} All she is left with,
then, is a long, slippery slope to consequentialism.

IV. Kant's Solution

Let us consider, then, Kant's own account, and see if it cannot do
better. Korsgaard clearly thinks that the only solution which Kant offers
is the simple assertion that the bad consequences that follow from moral
actions cannot be seen as the responsibility of the person who has acted
morally. I believe, however, that there is much more to his answer.
Either the claim about responsibility is not meant to provide a candidate
end, in which case it cannot solve the problem, or it does propose a
candidate end that is clearly inadequate given Kant's own view. If we take
the avoidance of responsibility to be the end that is sought, then the
action is no longer consistent with the requirements of the moral law. If
Jim's action aims at avoiding the dirtying of his own hands, then he is
using the Indians as a means, a means to secure his own good conscience.
Aiming at this end in these circumstances is, in fact, incompatible with
the requirements of the moral law so it cannot serve as the end that is
sought when we act from the moral law. Kant can rightly say that acting in
this way is grotesque, not because of the consequences that result, but
because it is immoral to do so. If this is Jim's end, then his action
cannot be motivated out of respect for the moral law.

Korsgaard is right to think that the solution of the problem requires
identifying some goal, some good, that moral action seeks. Kant's claims
about responsibility, then, cannot solve the problem because they do not
provide an appropriate positive goal for moral action. Not just any end
will serve as a solution to this problem of ends. The concern is that in
cases such as those under consideration here, there appears to be no
connection between moral action and an appropriate end. In such
circumstances, remembering Adams' phrase, morality does not seem to be good
for the world. Limiting responsibility does not solve the problem because
aiming at this cannot be seen as aiming at a genuine good for the world.

What, then, is Kant's answer? The only way to solve the problem
is to provide an end, something that can rightly be viewed as a good
that is sought through moral action even if other, bad consequences
also result. In this way, acting morally can still intelligibly be
understood as seeking some good, even in such difficult circumstances.
The place where Kant talks about the end of moral action in most detail
is in the third Critique under the rubric of the highest good.
There he claims that there is an end that we seek when we act morally.
He calls this end the highest good and suggests it is
constituted by both the requirements of the moral law and happiness,
where the former is the condition for the achievement of the
latter.{27} Since he does not believe happiness and morality are
connected by definition, since the concept of morality does not imply
happiness, the only possible way these two could be connected is for
them to be causally connected.{28} For Kant, then, when we act morally
we seek the highest good; we seek a world in which moral action is
connected to the achievement of our ends as a causal condition for that
achievement.

Importantly, then, Kant suggest that the moral rule is
constitutive of the good that is sought in such a way that this good
cannot be sought by any means other than moral means. We fall victim
to irrationality if we seek a world where moral action is a condition
for the achievement our goals by acting immorally. In such a case we
would be willing, at the same time, that we achieve our goal and that
it be impossible for us to achieve our goal by the means we have
selected.{29} It is, of course, important that Kant thinks this is the
highest good. The end that is sought must be the greatest good,
the complete, unconditioned end so that this end is always capable of
securing the intelligibility of moral action in terms if ends. If some
end could be higher than this, then the problem could be reconstituted
in cases where an immoral act is the only way to secure this higher
good.

The problem, however, is that simply asserting that moral action must have
this relationship with the good that we seek does not completely solve the
problem. As the cases Korsgaard considers suggest, there are some
circumstances where moral action seems unable to achieve the goals we seek.

More generally, there is no guarantee that living a moral life will lead
to a good life.{30} People who always act morally suffer calamities just
like everyone else. Why should someone who has faced one calamity after
another when acting morally continue to act morally when he can achieve
other good ends by not doing so? Why should Jim act morally when he knows
that he could save the lives of so many Indians if, in this case, he sets
aside his moral commitments?

It is to this very real problem that Kant responds by introducing the
practical postulates. We must, according to Kant, believe in God (or at
least a god capable of securing the connection between moral action and the
ends we seek) and the immortality of the soul (so that there is time for
this connection to be realized).{31} In this way, we can see the
possibility of moral action connecting up with the ends that we seek, and
the intelligibility of the project of morality in terms of ends can be
secured. Rather than trying to make clear the reasoning here in purely
theoretical terms, let me instead consider a further example.

The case I have in mind is that of the Maltese conjoined twins treated in
England in the year 2000 and referred to in the press by the names Mary and
Jodie. There are several reasons for selecting this case, but the most
important are the fact that it is a real world case, not a philosopher's
thought-experiment, and that it is comes about naturally, that is it does
not rely on a person acting immorally in order to generate the problem
(unlike the other cases mentioned so far). The twins presented a moral
dilemma because they were joined in such a way that even though Mary had
all her own vital organs, her heart and lungs were not capable of
circulating and oxygenating her blood. An artery connecting Mary's
circulatory system to Jodie's heart was all that kept Mary alive.
Unfortunately, Jodie's heart, while strong enough to support her own life,
was not strong enough to support Mary's as well. Doctors believed that
Jodie's heart would only continue to function for a matter of months before
it gave out and both twins died.{32} The choice, then, was a difficult
one: separate the twins and kill Mary, or do nothing and watch both Mary
and Jodie die.{33} I do not want this discussion to get bogged down in
questions of double effect, which are interesting in their own right, but
have no bearing on the point I want to make here today. Let us stipulate,
then, for the sake of this discussion that compelling arguments can be
given that separating Mary and Jody would count as a case of direct
killing.

How do we see our way through such a case, to a description of choosing not
to separate the twins such that it can be understood as aiming at an
appropriate end? Notice first that this case does fit the general problem
we have been considering. Acting in the way normally thought to be moral
does seem to lead to more suffering, more death. It does, then, seem that
moral action, in this case, is not consistent with believing morality is
better for the world. In response, Kant suggests that this apparent
problem is just that, an appearance. If we understand what morality
requires of us properly, we see that moral action not only aims at some
good, but also is the only way to achieve this good.

We have also seen, however, that just any good will not do, there are
certain requirements that the end must meet. As pointed out above, for
example, the goal of avoiding responsibility will not serve because it is
not a genuine good for the world and is not compatible with the moral law.
Further, if we note that the prohibition against killing is founded on the
requirement that we recognize the value of other beings like ourselves, we
see that this end cannot serve since this end is not an end for the
twins.{34} It is not properly part of the project of their lives so taking
this end does not seem to be consistent with aiming at a good for them.
Since either course of action clearly causes harm to one or both, the fact
that this end is not an end for them makes it impossible to see the action
as consistent with the belief that their lives are valuable. Following the
rule for this reason, then, would be to act contrary to the very basis for
the rule.

The only way to avoid this problem is for the end to be an end for them as
well, something that can genuinely viewed as a good for them. We have,
then, four requirements that the end must meet: 1) right action must be
constitutive of it, 2) it must be a possible end for those affected by the
action, 3) it must rightly be seen as good for the world, and 4) it must be
plausibly seen as the highest, or most important, good. Kant takes what he
calls the highest good, a world in which moral action always results in
achieving the goods sought, to be one such end. Other possibilities
include union with God or human flourishing. In each case, it is plausible
(or necessary) to claim that the end can only be sought by right action,
the good that is sought is a good for all human beings, and its achievement
is good for the world. Each of these ends, then, is a candidate for what
we seek when we act morally.{35}

The fact that such action results in the deaths of both Mary and Jodie,
however, must be reckoned with. Since it results in their deaths, it
seems impossible to see the moral action (or failing to act) as seeking
these goals for them. Even when the end sought could be, in
general, an end for them, the fact that it is not just harm that
immediately results, but death, makes it hard to see how it can be an
actual end for them in this case. But notice that this is only true if
what we are concerned with is life in this world.{36} Kant argues that
we must believe the soul to be immortal so that there is an infinite
period of time in which persons can move toward the highest good.{37}
Even with an infinite amount of time, however, the world seems to be
such that we will be frustrated. The goal itself does not always seem
to be achievable, given the world that we experience, because of the
way moral action and the ends we seek can pull apart. Nature simply is
not such that we can avoid such frustration even with infinite time.
Believing in the possibility of achieving such a goal, then, similarly
depends on believing in the possibility of a God capable of arranging
the world such that the goal is possible.{38} For Kant the end in
question is something that we just do seek, in so far as we are moral
beings, so there is no separation between our seeing this end as
important for Mary and Jodie, and their own seeking of it. Both stem
from the same source. In so far as we are morally obligated to
encourage moral action on the part of others, then, we are morally
obligated to see this as a possible end for them, a part of their
project.{39} It is also important that for Kant following the moral
rule is itself necessary for actually making progress towards achieving
such a moral, transcendent end because the end is itself partly
constituted by the moral law itself. This precludes the possibility of
achieving the end in question by any means other than moral means.{40}

If we admit a transcendent dimension to human life, then, we begin to see
the possibility of acting in a way consistent with seeing the lives of Mary
and Jodie as valuable, their projects as in some sense our own, valuable to
us, even when our failure to perform the surgery results in the death of
both infants.{41} The special relationship between the rule and the ends
in question, as illustrated in the case of Kant, explains why this end can
only be sought by following the rule, and underscores the necessity of
following the rule even when we focus attention on the ends of action, and
not on the rule or the action itself. Since not performing the surgery
results in the death of both Mary and Jodie, the only way to sustain the
intelligibility of the project of morality is to see their projects, their
lives, as not limited to the material world as we experience it. In short
it is to believe in the possibility of God's existence and of the
immortality of the soul.

Though the end that Kant selects (the highest good) is particular to his
own ethical view, the central move can be generalized. I have already
mentioned two other candidate ends (flourishing, relationship with God).
In each, moral action must be constitutive of the ends that we seek, to
make it impossible to achieve what is thought to be good by any means other
than moral means. That good must, of course, be general, be good for those
affected by the action and good for the world in general, given the
arguments we have seen here. Nonetheless, the heart of the solution is the
assertion of this strong connection between what is right, and the good we
seek. The problem that leads to the need for belief in God, then, can also
be generalized.{42} We simply have no reason to believe that such a
connection is born out as we act in this world. Right actions pull apart
from the achievement of good ends and threaten the intelligibility of moral
action as seeking such ends. The only solution is to look beyond this
world, to look beyond to something capable of transforming the world and
securing the connection that is needed.

V. Conclusion

As we have seen, then, there is a general problem in making moral action
intelligible as action for ends. It is important that what we believe to
be right connects up with the ends that we seek. We have also seen that
there are several possible ways of thinking about this connection.

First, we could think that what achieves the ends that are important
to us defines what is right; this is the consequentialist solution and
avoids the problem by defining it out of existence.

Second, we could think that what is right is of necessity a condition
for our achieving the ends that we seek. For Kant, right action is what
makes us eligible for, deserving of, achieving our ends. For most modern
virtue theorists, human flourishing cannot be achieved through immoral
action. In the world we inhabit, however, we can come to have reason to
doubt this connection can be realized, that we can indeed achieve our ends
through moral action. No matter how often we do the right thing, it is
always possible that the ends we seek will not be fulfilled; suffering can
always result. Sometimes, as in the cases important here, suffering
appears to be the only possible result. Since this connection does not
seem to be hold in the world we experience, but belief in its possibility
is crucial to maintaining the intelligibility of morality in terms of ends,
taking this solution requires the belief that the world we experience is
not how the world has to be, it requires the belief that the connection is
at least possible. Since we cannot secure it on our own, since we cannot
change the very nature of the world, it requires the possibility of God to
secure it for us.

Third there is Korsgaard's approach, which attempts to maintain that
sometimes moral action is important to the fulfillment of the ends we seek,
but sometimes the fulfillment of our ends should allow us to deviate from
what is ordinarily considered right. The challenge for this view, as we
have seen, is to provide some form of principled dividing line.
Korsgaard's own attempt, as we have seen, fails. It is worth wondering if
any such account could succeed. On what principled basis could
consequences define what is right only sometimes? If we have a principle
defense of a moral rule, how can we make consequentialist exceptions to it
without admitting that consequences are playing the defining role? How can
we hold fast to any rule, if no rule connects up with ends in the way
required?

Such questions are not a conclusive argument, but they do, along with the
other arguments I have presented today, suggest a provocative conclusion.
It may be that we are faced with a fundamental choice if we want to be
moral: either accept some form of consequentialism, or hold onto hope that
there is a god who can secure the connection between good ends and moral
actions.

{1} Christine Korsgaard, "The Reasons We Share" in Creating the
Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), page
296.

{2} This assumes, as is necessary given Williams intention in presenting
the case, that there is no course of action that can save all the Indians.

{13} TRL, page 150. I do not deny that Kant makes claims about
responsibility that suggest this conclusion, what I object to is the
thought that these passages can be taken in isolation, apart from arguments
Kant gives elsewhere concerning the end of moral action. See below, page
11ff.

{19} The claim here is tentative because it is not at all clear to me that
Rawls' own examples don't fall victim to the same problem. The problem is,
however, at the very least much more obvious in the case of individual
morality Korsgaard discusses.

{21} She suggests that Kant's argument relies on a certain teleological
claim, that our instinct to improve our lives "cannot universally be used
to destroy our life without contradiction" (TRL, page 158n20). She does
not believe such teleological claims have any place in the test associated
with the Formula of Universal Law, and hence does not find his argument
convincing. Further, she does not see any way, given her understanding of
this test, to argue suicide is morally illicit (TRL, page 158n20). Though
I will not dispute her view here, I do not find her arguments convincing.

{26} TRL, page 154. Further, it is worth noting that the general problem
of securing the intelligibility of an action with respect to ends is not
entirely solved simply by moving to a two level view (even if it could be
defended). The moral ideal, remember, is the goal when we are justified in
deviating from the strictures of the goal, but what is the positive goal
that we seek when the bad consequences of an action in accord with the
ideal fall just short of allowing us to deviate? Might there not be some
cases where following the moral ideal leads to bad, but not quite bad
enough, consequences? How do we secure the intelligibility of action in
accord with the ideal in such circumstances? Say Jim must choose between
executing one Indian and watching twenty be tortured (but not killed)? Or
between killing one and watching the twenty be separated from their
families and children with no hope of ever returning? What is the positive
good we seek in such cases? Notice, importantly, that the goal cannot be
the ideal itself, for if the ideal is the goal when we act according to the
ideal (not just when deviating), then Korsgaard cannot generate her
grotesqueness objection in the first place. There would no longer be a
need simply to deny responsibility for the bad outcome, because there would
be an overriding a positive good that one is seeking. This thought is, I
hope to argue, the heart of Kant's own solution to the problem.

{27} Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5:110-111. Page references to Kant
will be to the standard German Academy edition pagination.

{29} The reason Korsgaard's view falls victim to the first objection I
mentioned above is because she appears to endorse this same view of the
relationship of the goal and moral rule in cases where deviation from the
ideal is acceptable. In such cases, the moral ideal becomes the goal. She
then tries to suggest that this goal can be sought be means inconsistent
with the moral rules that are part of the goal, but this, I argued above,
cannot be made intelligible.

{30} Obviously, "a good life" is taken to mean something more than doing
what is morally required; it also implies happiness or fulfillment.

{32} The British Court of Appeal nicely summarizes the details of the case
in the introduction, summary and conclusions of the decision in the case.
The case number was B1/2000/2969, and the decision was released on
September 22, 2000.

{33} I will assume without argument, though I think there are compelling
arguments that can be given, that the separating of the infants would be a
case of directly killing Mary to save Jodie.

{34} Whatever reason we have for valuing the lives of other human beings,
whether it is because the are rational, created in God's image or whatever,
the requirement to act in a way that recognizes that value still remains.

{35} The fact that each of these ends are ends for Mary and Jodie is
important, because only in this way can we see seeking this end as not
using them to achieve an end. Since in each of these cases, the end sought
is also the ultimate end for them, we are furthering their projects as much
as are own, we can see this end as consistent with seeking their
fulfillment. As will be argued in a moment, however, more needs to be said
before this claim can be fully made good.

{36} Notice that it is not the value of their lives that needs to be
secured, it is the need to recognize or, perhaps better, acknowledge the
value of their lives through our action. This does not mean that life in
this world is not important, not good, or cannot be seen as such without
admitting the possibility of an afterlife. All it means is that in this
case, we need to see the possibility of there being a further good in order
to make our action intelligible as seeking a good for them given what
results from the moral course of action.

{39} In fact, more than just a part of their own project, but the ultimate
end of their life.

{40} These arguments are here phrased in terms of Kant's own theory, but I
believe they apply equally well to other non-consequentialist ethical views
that can meet the challenge discussed here.

{41} The problem is not finding value in their lives, but acting in a way
consistent with recognizing that value.

{42} Of course, in the case of Aquinas, the end explicitly acknowledges the
need for God, so no further argument is required. In his case, this
argument only highlights why reference to God is a necessary part of that
end.