Proposed Agenda

Notes

Power to Remove Individual Board Director

- If an SO/AC plans to remove a Director, we suggest they make a public statement and provide a rationale. The Director person should be given the opportunity to respond. This would provide additional accountability: the community cannot secretly dismiss a person.

Feedback

- Board members would be able to appeal this decision. There needs to be a valid reason but it does not have to be justifiable i.e. a different mindset is not something you can prove in court.

- A Board member could use the IRP to challenge decision – e.g process was violated.

- We need something constructive and objective.

- We have compared it to notion of employment law. It will be arbitrary.

- The details depend on how you do it. Each SO/AC can respond on simple majority. Does GNSO split its right in two? Contracting/non contracting. There needs to be clear explanation.

à The process is giving the Director a right to respond. It was intentioned that the cause for or motive were exposed. We need to get into level of details of how various SO/ACs make decisions. To get to that level of detail, we would first need to confirm that this is something all are comfortable working with.

- How does it affect the community forum? SO/AC initiates the process to remove a Board member appointed by SO/AC. Community forum is conveyed and Board member is in room to defend himself. What if community determines that SO/AC initiated the process is not in interest of community? Does this mean that SO/AC will continue irrespective of forum. What is for purpose of forum? à It would be a matter of transparency to prevent secret discussions.

- Issues need to be clear. Document looks extremely complicated. Can we look at proposal and see how we can simplify?

à We will strive to simplicity

- According to the Charter, consensus should be among consensus of group.

- Board member must be given opportunity to be heard by members but you can’t delegate decision-making to a third party such as IRP. It will affect process.

- Support SO/AC removing own director but concerns about identifying causes (potential for ultimate liable suits). We need to have laundry list for why we are dismissing them just as we should have them for why we are appointing them.

- Due process is needed but don't see difference between this and public limited company.

- The Board has collegial responsibility to perform and to ensure safety of global interest in exercise of duties.

- A Board member has responsibility to act in public interest, not in the interest of one stakeholder. OK for the SO/AC to petition but what you are proposing is capture. It should be a community decision. You are creating two classes of citizens. Would the treatment be the same for NomCom members? This process should apply to all Board members – no distinction should be made.

- We need to be careful about what we want to do when dismissing board member.

On Community Forum

- Mutual accountability is important.

- More detail is needed on notion of public accountability forum i.e. concrete suggestions about areas that need formalized. How much formalization of that input should happen? Should the discussion be submitted in writing by a neutral rapporteur and be circulated to SO/AC. Open observation and participation in the community forum. Specificities about level of details is requirement. Note: Government representatives have requested a 90-day discussion but that would be slowing down processes.

Feedback:

- Is it intended to make a clear mandate of what issues can come to community forum or is it for SO/AC to bring any issues?

à It would be a know body of people that would not meet unless a procedure was happening that required it to. Details to be fleshed out.

- Is this a standing process? Would this be a mandated process?

à No one has suggested so far that these powers should only be exercised in a timeframe that lets the discussion happen at an ICANN meeting.

- More detail is needed on funding and composition. Context around that needs to be fleshed out.

- Forum is a floor of discussion – it is not a decision-making body.

- Agree to a standing panel called when necessary. Each SO/AC could choose members by their own means of choosing. Would there be people selection from at large, similar to NomCom? What would the terms be? Would there be term limits? Would this group function like a grand jury in that it returns indictments?

- The community forum falls within the discussion phase. If we were to move with CMSM – how could discussions in community forum include member group? How would those interplay and would there be obligations?

-.3 does not say it is a standing body and says that it would be open to participation of all community. There are open points that are being presumed. Idea of having preselected panel may not be the girth approach – they should be picked at the time.

- Goals of forum are to allow for conversation. We need a process. Put facts on table i.e. subsequent possibilities of interaction among all SO/ACs and open to participants/observers. It would be good for process to be facilitated by neutral body.

- Consider comments stressing that complexity is increasing. Let’s not forget we are here for the transition.

- We have three ICANN meetings a year and suggest using that structure in. How do you meet between ICANN public meetings?

- The forum will be a process. What are the consequences if GAC makes recommendations on public interest group that is a variation?

Conclusion:

- Let’s not discuss which model is preferable. The concept needs to be in place.

- Let’s avoid decisions being made in silos. Support for idea of there being discussion is important. There is an ongoing desire for detail and simplicity.

On Incorporation of Affirmation of Commitments into ICANN Bylaws & Jurisdiction

- AoC is a commitment ICANN made that should be brought into Bylaws.

- On ATRT: Whether ATRT should be able to handle Work stream 2 – to extent it is a requirement – it may not work – there will no obligation to implement information that flowed out of an ATRT.

Feedback:

- There is different between AoC language on jurisdiction and what article is. The key distinction is “remain” – article says it “is”. If we are not taking it in – we will need answer. That is a change.

à It cannot change without amendments to articles of incorporation. If word remain has special meaning, shall is all over bylaws. They have meaning. We had better put remain in every word.

- Support suggestion that 5-year cycle starts when results are presented.

- If ICANN were to move to another jurisdiction, it would take a lot more than changing one article in its article of incorporation and a line in its Bylaws. It would require a change in domicile/structure as well as redrafting. It is not easy. We only have a current statement of fact, not a commitment not to change. Friction to change would be extremely high.

- Incorporation has possibility to wind itself up. Don't see how can build in Bylaw. Guarantee is needed.

- Shall means it is mandatory.

Conclusion:

- We can feel positive about this. Community agreement.

On Appeals Mechanisms

Feedback:

- Board wanted to demonstrate that there were separate standards in the sense of costs and we want to draw a line to shoe there was a specific process for community-based use of arbitration rather than the singular use of arbitration.

- Would IRP be available if single member was attempting to impose an outcome inconsistent with bylaws obligations?

- ICANN suggestions mention a wish for a standard review that was in place pre-April 2013. Why? Clarification also needed on “consistently”.

- Does it matter for a decision to be binding? Does it matter whether we are a membership organization and that the membership standing entity brough the IRp or can all that be handled by holdings and agreement to abide by arbitration?

à Shared responsibility for making decisions is relevant. Membership model allows shared responsibility for making decisions relevant to certain aspects that fall within the Board’s fiduciary obligations. It gives affirmative authority to the community with respect to making decisions. With respect to statutory membership powers, membership model has fewer questions about enforceability.

NTIA Remarks

Hard work is being put in this initiative. Nobody should get discouraged or be frustrated. This is the group that has come together to solve issues. You should polish off a couple of issues and practice techniques. As everybody matures, we will continue to help and support in anyway we can. We do not have a view that a particular approach is ok or not. We need to see thoroughness – it is not there yet. We need to think through a process that makes everybody rise to occasion.

à We are going to review our list of consensus/disagreement and obtain confirmation on requirements. This approach will help us bridge gaps. If we remove concerns – we will be making progress

On Appeals Mechanisms

Feedback:

- We have to come to a single agreement. Compromise will be needed – standards will need to be lowered. Board suggested that it should go to panel. There needs to be outcome associated with IRP.

à Details on how decisions would be reached and parameters around that need further work.

- Suggest you may want a different skillset for governance arbitration in respect to community powers. This could be under same heading as IRP but you might need to have a separate standing panel or alternatively a standing panel that has a split in different experiences that you might need for different types of arbitration.

- We could have the same process with different standing panels. We need different skill sets for arbitrator for governance staff or fiduciary duties rather than other issues brought in front of the IRP. Seeking the group’s agreement that we use the same process but establish two separate standing panels that would be called upon when a set of specific questions is asked.

- Uncertain MEM and IRP necessarily need different panel. Issues considered by the MEM and IRP sit along a spectrum. The distinction between MEM and IRP may be rather technical.

- Is it meant that the MEM issue group outcome will be submitted to that standing panel which is different from IRP? I agree there should be two. Clarification needed on standard of review.

à The 2013 standard was a substantive standard of whether ICANN was abiding by its Bylaws or not, as opposed to the more procedural did ICANN have good faith? There are a lot of bells and whistles that would to be answered to revert to 2013 standard. Understanding that Board agreed the standard of review would be de novo. Prior to 2013, that was not the position ICANN legal had taken in independent reviews. It was the position IRP panels had felt was appropriate reading of language but that was under dispute. We would need to understand first. What does it mean to return to the 2013 standard? What does it mean with respect to the text of mission, commitments and core values? The standard we have proposed is not fundamentally different than the 2013 standard. The comment is also referring to an interim standard that adopts pieces including substance review piece.

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:That would be the point of the discussion. But many of us feel that the final right sits with the appointing SO/AC. But there can be a commmunity diolgue over it yes of course.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:Our proposal says the GNSO is split and each house can remove their own director

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:yup

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Many of the questions Chris is asking are set out in the report already

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:Yes this is clear already

Chris Disspain:I know Jordan but some members of the ccwg don't appear to undertand

Seun Ojedeji:@James you are getting to my question but not there yet. If after the community dialogue and the community have a view that the reason for the removal of the individual board director is not in the interest of the community then does the SO/AC that initiated the process stop?

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:That would be up to the initiating SO/AC to decide Seun.

Greg Shatan:Paragraph 407 of the Second Draft deals with much of this. Suggest reading this, so we are not replowing old ground.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:CCWG proposal is that those who appoint, do the removing of individual board members.

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:Hence as I said, it being a dialogue.

Chris Disspain:James...and how would the SO or AC decode?

Chris Disspain:decide

Jeff Neuman:Chris can we leave that to WS2?

Ray Plzak:@Robin, so the NomCom removes its appointees?

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):because it has to reach the internal threshold specified, Chris - if it doesn't, the director stays in place

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:Chris: Decide as per the proposal or after the addition of the community forum step?

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Ray: no - the report sets out how nomcom directors would be dealt with

Chris Disspain:Jeff....how can you agree 'in principle' to such an inportant change without knowing the detail..?

Greg Shatan:The community does not make a determination, in our current proposal.

Chris Disspain:Agree Greg

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Ray - see para 408-409 for how NomCom appointees would be removed.

Greg Shatan:That is the right of the SO/AC.

Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair:@chris: it would be so helpful if you could, for instance, describe what kind of decision making you would find acceptable for the ccNSO for instance. or the gNSO ?

Ray Plzak:Jordan I did not say that, I said there needs to be one common mechanism

Chris Disspain:but is that 75% across the gNSO?

Seun Ojedeji:I think the Thomas has simply indicated that the community forum is just a waste of time. Since its just a observer status for everyone

Chris Disspain:and is it 75% of th council or 75% of the 'members' of the SO/AC?

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:agree Fiona we need to message the intentions of the model far more effectivly and certainly *simplify* !!

Jeff Neuman:The GNSO has one director selected by the contracted parties (with approval of the Council) and one director selected by the non-contracted parties (with approval from the Council).

Kavouss Arasteh:Why we want to proceed with the Removal of the individual Director without cause?

Chris Disspain:and will the same rules apply to council members of each SO/AC?

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Seun: not many would agree with you that having to articulate arguments in public, rather than in the privacy of the SO or AC's own forums, is a waste of time.

Chris Disspain:that would be a step forward in 'community' accountablity

Jeff Neuman:I would argue that if a supermajority of the council is good enough for a "Consensus Policy" using the existing voting mechanisms, then it should be good enough for removal of a director

Ray Plzak:removal without cause is removal by polictical whim

Carlton Samuels:@Ray: That IS the problem! All Board members are equal but some are more equal than others. They are not equally protected. Goes back to the question, in whose interest are they seated? The sending SO/AC or the corporation. I believe they would have a right of petition under US/California law.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:The California legislature has provided a built-in means of accountability by allowing appointing parties to remove their directors. I don't understand the rationale to remove this key accountability tool from the California legislature.

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):"For the purposes of such a removal process, SO means the SO or for the case of the GNSO, the GNSO House that has the Bylaw right to appoint a director."

Seun Ojedeji:@Jordan whats the purpose of articulating aruguement when the decision is still in the hands of the appointing SO/AC

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:Mutualism in Community Accountabiity along with tht of ICANN / its Board is an essential plan IMO Chris...

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):holding decisionmakers to account in public is an absolutely standard and important part of transparency and accountability

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:So dialogue is esentially unneeded unless the ALAC or another community group has the decision making power over another Seun???

Seun Ojedeji:@Jordan well a lot of what we have in the ccwg seem to be a joke as well, so maybe I am

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:Wow

Ray Plzak:Jordan no argument with that statement. I fully support it. I fully support removal of individual members

Chris Disspain:It is Interesting to remove a Council member appointed by the nominating committee - requires cause:GNSO Council member selected by the Nominating Committee may be removed for cause: i) stated by a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all members of the applicable House to which the Nominating Committee appointee is assigned; or ii) stated by a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all members of each House in the case of the non-voting Nominating Committee appointee (see Section 3(8) of this Article). Such removal shall be subject to reversal by the ICANN Board on appeal by the affected GNSO Council member.

Seun Ojedeji:@Jordan it seem you are getting me wrong (or intentionally not appreciating my point) I am not against the public process. I am however saying that some level of +1 from the other community should confirm removal and it should not be the decision of the appointing SO/AC alone.

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):I am disagreeing with you about the value of a public process. Whatever the decision process, I think a public discussion has value. You have said it's a waste of time. Both perspectives are legitimate ones to debate.

Seun Ojedeji:@Jordan IMO if the decision is still in the hands of the initiator then i don't see the main value other than FYI to community forum.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:this is turning into a repeat of this morning with a small minority trying to roll back the reforms we had consensus on months ago (and still do).

Seun Ojedeji:By the way, I don't even think I like this idea of putting board member in front of the community when the particular board member knows that his/her accusser still makes the decision. So whats the point, I expect most of them would resign before it gets to that stage

Carlton Samuels:@Alan: As I read the law that obtains here, the Board member has justiciable rights that cannot be negated purely on the basis than an SO/AC selected them. Once they on the Board there is another set of fealties that comes into play.

Chris Disspain:I agree in part Robin.....if we concetrated on the discussing the detail we might actually get sonewhere

Greg Shatan:Robin, I agree. And we need to get to the comments.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:same pleas over and over....

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:Capture?

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:someone tell the California legislature they enable "capture" by providing for board recall in the law...

Mark Carvell GAC - UK Govt:Repeat my support for Kavouss - and also the facility for the member to defend his/her record and performance as Board member.

Carlton Samuels:@Cherine: +1. Once they are named to the Board they belong to the same class. They are - or should be! - equally protected, IMHO.

Greg Shatan:I had my hand up, but i lost connectivity.

Greg Shatan:So I guess I will be silenced by the vagaries of technology.

Thomas Rickert, CCWG Co-Chair:Greg, that was after I closed the queue. Sorry, my closing of queues was ignored many many times this morning. Need to be firm on this now.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:Greg, type it in here - at least it is on the record.

Carlton Samuels:@Greg S: :-). I always make that point that a remote does not give me the same rights and privileges.

Greg Shatan:By the logic just offered, having one SO/AC appoint a director is also a form of capture.

Keith Drazek:One of the concerns raised about the power to remove an individual Board member is the potential risk of turning the Board into a parliament, etc. While I prefer the proposed method of allowing an SO or AC or NomCom to remove its appointed member, I could live with a requirement that a second organization in some way "second" the removal petition. I think that would alleviate the concern about creating parliamentary pressures.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:Keith, how are those concerns alleviated? I'm not sure I understand how.

Greg Shatan:There should be a more discreet process of discussion between a board member and their appointee before getting to the more public process. Again, we are failing to consider escalation/resolution opportunities before we get to the endpoint Powers.

Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair:@Greg: is there no such discussion taking place on a regular basis ? If not, that might be a first useful step

Greg Shatan:The community forum offers the SO/AC to hear and consider the concerns of the community, and allows the community to come to understand how the situation arose with the director This is hardly useless. It may change the way the SO/AC would vote, or how their vote is viewed in the community.

Greg Shatan:We do have regular discussions with our appointed Board members. I was talking about an "irregular" discussion that would be triggered by mounting concern in the SO/AC.

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:If the community is deciding to potentially exercise a power, a huge step for the community, I think funding would be the least of the problem. Something to be clarified yes but certianly not a factor for deciding its structure or composition.

Edward Morris:I'm with Robin. I'm quite confused as to why we just don't follow California Corporations Code §7222(b)(2) which allows, nee requires, that a Board member elected by a particular class is / can only be removed by that class. But I guess we can just keep reinventing the wheel.

ebw:additionally, modulo the filtering that takes place within each NomCom, composed in part by AC and SO appointees, and also appointees by the IAB, the point of the NomCom is not representation but diversity. So non-representivity of an appointee is a given.

Wolfgang2:Is the new proposed forum needed to move forward with the transition?

Avri Doria:aren't all of these implementation issues?

Greg Shatan:I agree with Robin and Ed. Those who think it should be different from the default of the California Code should justify that deviation.

Seun Ojedeji:On one hand the community forum sounds like a group of select people and on the other hand it sounds like something similar to the public forum

Greg Shatan:Wolfgang, only if you want to give the multistakeholder community a chance to discuss and consider the issues before the SO/ACs.

Chris Disspain:Completely agree Steve

Keith Drazek:@Avri, I think they are implementation issues. But NTIA has said they need more detail to be able to properly assess the CCWG proposal, or whatever comes next following the public comments. I think the requirement for implementation detail has become more important for the next version.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:I also thought a main purpose of the community forum was to have a community-wide conversation on a topic where the various silos are able to talk to each other - answer each other's points.

Kavouss Arasteh:We wish to have confirmatioin from the Board that they do not expilictly oppose to that as CCWG believes that the Forum is is useful enviroment to analyse the issue which will be submitted for decision making

Kavouss Arasteh: For the sake of time perhaps the Board may reconsider its position to agree with the concept of Forum

Steve Crocker:Within the Board, we take conflicts of interests VERY seirously. If a Board member is conflicted, has the appearance of conflict, or has the potential for conflict, the Board member stands back (recuses himself or herself) from voting and stands back from discussion unless specifically invited because rest of the Board wants that director's knowledge on the partiycular issue. What conflict of interest rules will be in place within each of the SOs and ACs when these votes are taken?

Bruce Tonkin:@Kavouss - I see no problem with the Board supporting the concept of a forum to share information prior to the formation of an MEM issue group for example.

Holly J. Gregory (Sidley):@Greg - 6.3 not 7.3

Chris Disspain:No need to apologise that the group included you Greg :-)

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:I dont know Chris I think that may have been the beggining of the end for us all.

Greg Shatan:If we aare going to discuss these issues without explicit reference to the text of the Second Draft and without reference to our 94 comments, the risks of reopening old questions, mis-remembering our decisions and failing to consider the views of the community are rather large.

Bruce Tonkin:The key requirement for any "public" forum - is the ability to ensure sufficient participation and transparency of what is discussed. The ICANn public cofumrs at the ICANN meetings fulfil this role. We also need better ways of running focvussed forums using online tools. e.g a time-boxed 7 day period in tiwtter style exchanges - ie allow people to shares ideas in short messages on a topic

Kavouss Arasteh:In thde fORUM, not only the SOs and ACs participating but also any interested party can participate .Forum will contribute to the concept of inclussiveness and openess of ICANN

Bruce Tonkin:Agreed @Kavouss

Seun Ojedeji:Maybe a different term should be used for the selected members of the community forum and the community forum activity itself. It seem the forum will have only selected people in the discussion yet it seem not

Kavouss Arasteh:The Forum will not necessirily be a physical gathering as it could be a virtual meeting as well

Kavouss Arasteh:I strongly suggest to end this discussion as from the order of priority and importance it is a secondary issue.Let us conscentrate on some critical issue such as the type of MEMBER

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):the idea of the Community Forum is necessary in any of the possible implementation models under discussion

Bruce Tonkin:I think the key is we need to work out how to set up and operate an event within 7 days noticve and ensure broad participation. I think we need to continue to refine our onlien tools and test running some of these tools on specific topics between ICANN public meetings. Get people to be cofrotable and experienced with a particilar tool. Much like we are not experienced using this Adobe chat tool.

Bruce Tonkin:Any of tehse communiyt pwoers where we want to over-rule a budget, remove aq direcvtor etc - all require effective coordination tools that work globally.

Chris Disspain:So, Jordan what you've just said may be fine but it DOES change the balance of power because of the status of GAC advice...

Bruce Tonkin:Aand can operate with minimal set-up time - ie the tools must exist prior to needing to use them in ernest.

Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC):I would rather strive for clarity than simplicity.

Bruce Tonkin:@Greg - those two concepts are often linked though

Christopher Wilkinson:Greg: Currently we have neither simplicty nor clarity. CW

Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC):I would rather achieve simplicity through clarity. I think we have a fair amount of both, but we need to improve.

Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC):Reference to actual comments and I see the Second Draft on screen. Be still my heart.

Becky Burr:agree - the reviews are stated as reviews in the AOC. all of the commitments are in fact included

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Chris, sorry didn't see chat - what changes balance of power due to GAC advice? In respect of the Forum idea?

KMc:Link to Board suggested language for Whois?

Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC):Thank you for noting that the IPC (and/or other constituencies from the Commercial Stakeholder Group) is likely to be marginalized (and has in fact been marginalized) in that process.

Chris Disspain:the treatment of their public policy advice jordan...if it's given to the Board there is a by law under which it must be dealt - no such by law exists or is contempaltaed re the Forum or the subsequnt vote in the Sos and Acs

Alan Greenberg:For the record, I did participate in the discussion on review cycles, but disagreed with the inflexible 5 year cycle.

KMc:Anyone have a link to Board suggested language for Whois review?

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:"ICANN commits to enforcing its policy relating to the current WHOIS and any future gTLD Directory Service, subject to applicable laws, and working with the community to explore structural changes to improve accuracy and access to gTLD registration data, as well as consider safeguards for protecting data.This Review includes a commitment that becomes part of ICANN Bylaws, regarding enforcement of the current WHOIS and any future gTLD Directory Service policy requirements.The Board shall cause a periodic Review to assess the extent to which WHOIS/Directory Services policy is effective and its implementation meets the legitimate needs of law enforcement, promotes consumer trust, and safeguards data.The Review Team shall assess the extent to which prior Review recommendations have been completed, and the extent to which implementation has had the intended effect.This periodic Review shall be convened no less frequently than every five years, measured from the date the Board took action on previous review recomme

KMc:tks

KMc:"every five years, measured from the date the Board took action on previous review recommendations." - odd wording?

Jeff Neuman:I completely agree with the Board on opposing the additions that were made to the Consumer Trust Review dealing with new gTLDs

Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC):Good point, Chris. One is a promise, the other is a statement of fact.

Jeff Neuman:But I agree with the Board that that extra language has the effect of preventing competition and could have a chilling effect on new gTLDs IF the community cannot come to a consensus on all of the recommendations

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):ah Chris yes. Got you.

Jeff Neuman:Again, I wrongly assumed the AoC language was incorporated word for word (just as was stated to Steve Crocker when he opposed the language on WHOIS)

Anne Aikman-Scalese:Making the Article 18 question "Fundamental" will be very helpful at the point of Congressional hearings. The entire proposed enforceability mechansim depends on the CA law and jurisdiction structure.

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Bbut it's actually meaningless

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):I agree with Alan on this - if you decided to move ICANN, you'd set up a new entity elsewhere

Chris Disspain:Greg...it's not about making it fundamental is it? It's about the change of wording

Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC):Chris, exactly.

Greg Shatan:Remain isn't all over the place now. We shall see whether we get stuck or not....

Chris Disspain:Steve....the key is that it is IN the AoC....I'm not pushing this but I do think we need to be aware that we are not importing all of the committments from the AoC

Anne Aikman-Scalese:I am commenting from the perspective that we have arrived at a certain point through a Community multistakeholder process - don't see how that suddently gets changed given what Steve has said about the public comment period. "fundamental" defines the thresshold for changing and so provides additional strength to the notion that location and jurisdiction will not change. This is indeed a potential weakness vis a vis Congressional hearings but it is the result of the multistakeholder process. Cannot just change this to an absolute commitment now without additional public comment requested on this specific issue. That may be a wise course of action.

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Isn't the point that the commitment in the AOC is just that, a commitment? Putting it in the bylaws doesn't make it more of a commitment because of the entity change that would be invovled in abrogating that commitment...

Chris Disspain:Jordan...factually you are correct...my point was raised as a political one to stress that it MAY get picked up

Chris Disspain:and no amount of fact are going o beat down a policitcal point taen for sel-serving poilitical reasons

Anne Aikman-Scalese:@Chris - your point regarding the fact that there is a difference between AOC and CCWG- ACCT recommendation is absolutely correct. It WILL get picked up and you can bet that notes are being taken down. In fact, it seems likely NTIA will have to point out this difference and justify it as part of the certification process.

Christopher Wilkinson:@ James Gannon+KMc: That text does not take into account that the existing policy does not respect apliccable laws. CW

Louise:Did people talk about creating a budget for - oh, here it is: funding for the panel.

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:CW: I didint write it =)

Louise:The Sole Member should be funded out of ICANN's budget.

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:Yes a little

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Chris - yea, I've been trying to think about how one could make a stronger commitment

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Chris - did you have thoughts about that mutual accountability stuff? SO/AC chairs and councils same powers as for the Board? IRP to enforce SOs and ACs following their own rules?

Bruce Tonkin:@Chris - I am coming to the view it would be simpler to merge the MEM into the IRP process.

Chris Disspain:Fiine with me Bruce provided the lawyers have no issues

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:I for one would be interested in seeing if some blending can get us to a 'best of breed' "model @Bruce/@chris

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):those concrete suggestions are easier to get head around than the general notion I think -- thing is, is it WS1? Does it deliver the framework that needs to be in place or committed to prior to transition?

Chris Disspain:good question

James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]:Heading for midnight here in Dublin, will catch up with all you fine folks tomorrow.

Becky Burr:for example, the funding question seems to be very concrete.

Chris Disspain:which funding question Becky?

David McAuley (RySG):Useful appeals discussion, thank you Becky et al

Becky Burr:because no good deed goes unpunished.

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:Well said Larry we are making history we forget that at times, but we also need to make progress!

Becky Burr:When considering whether or not we are making progress it is important to keep in mind that we are still digesting the very substantive set of comments that we received. we cannot reach consensus until we understand the community input fully.

Becky Burr:we need to understand gaps in order to bridge them

Bruce Tonkin:I think you might want to get smaller groups of people that have differing views in the public comment process to see if compromises can be found. Today is more about sharing reasoning for the CCWG proposal and some of the comments -. DOesn't seem to be a great deal of discussion of the brad set of public comments received on some topics.

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:@Alan -- the outcome would be IRP overturning the panel decision. So they would have to do-over

Becky Burr:agree Alan

Becky Burr:not if the panel is fundamentally onstitutional

Alan Greenberg:@Steve, perhaps that is what we want to do, but that was not at all even implied in what we wrote (based on my memory). And since conflicting results are generally VERY clear, I am not sure we need an IRP to simply decide that there is a conflict. Either the IRP decides on the "correct outcome", or we keep IRP out of it and follow the Board's advice to use a new panel.

Keith Drazek:Agreed we need to focus on the public comments and evaluate them on their merits and fully understand the gaps. At some point after that, we'll need to understand all the "red lines" to manage and avoid the deal-killers through compromise.

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:Core Value 6 could be the standard of review for an IRP to challenge inconsistent expert decisions: 6. Make decisions by applying documented policies consistently, neutrally, objectively, and fairly,without singling out any particular party for discriminatory treatment;

Becky Burr:you can have different standing panels but i am not at all convinced that it makes sense. the critical issue - both for constitutional/goverance issues and for fiduciary issues is "is ICANN acting within its Mission"

Becky Burr:MEM and IRP do NOT need different panels IMHO -

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):I don't agree that the model is the central question. Models are easy. The question is whether the community or the board have the last say and on what. If we truly had consensus on that, the model would write itself.

Seun Ojedeji:@Jonathan and in your opinion who should have the last say? putting the question in ICANN context

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):In MY opinion, there should be a few instances in which the community should have the last word. But at the moment, I am not trying to argue my point of view. I'm trying to say that this discussion of models is a COMPLETE distraction. the real issue is community powers

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:Power flows from the bottom-up, so the community should ultimately drive.

Avri Doria:Jonathan & Robin, that is what the discussion between the 2 models is all about. Can we mitigate the circumstances where the Board has the last say well enough? can the Board mitigate the circumstances where the rest of the community has the last say. We are afrid they will change the bylaws after all is said and done. and today at lunch i heard that the Board is afraind the community will change the bylaws after all is said and done. ooops.

Keith Drazek:@Sean: Shared authority, checks and balances, and distribution of power have been strongly supported themes throughout the work of the CCWG. We need to find an appropriate balance and do so in a way that is not overly complex (per Larry's comments).

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:+++ to that Kieth

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):Yes, @Avri but using the "models" as a proxy for this discussion is a distraction. This is really a stress test discussion on which we need to acheive consensus on desired outcome. References to complexity, too much change, etc. are all a function of a desire NOT to have the conversation we need to have.

Avri Doria:to my mind that question is the key to much of the difference. unfortuanltey noone has come up with the model where we have to do that together - from a statuatory peerspective.

Seun Ojedeji:Okay i agree ith you on the methodology we are using but again one could argue that determining which model to follow will largely answer the question of who has the last say. Either way i agree we are not attacking the main issue yet.

Avri Doria:oh, i am all for discussing the nitty gritty instead of the fluff.

Bruce Tonkin:Yes @Becky - we were just trying to find some quick changes that could be implemented un bylaws language now - while we further refine the IRP process. We do still need to set a clear time period - e.g 90 days to procuded the final IRP processes. ie have it ready by Marrakech.

Greg Shatan:Why am I hearing the Monty Python theme song in my head?

Becky Burr:agree Bruce simple bylaws drafting

Avri Doria:Greg, me too

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):it's worse than "fluff" Becy. It's tanamount to obfuscation. There are like 3 real questions here but no one wants to have those discussions.

Seun Ojedeji:....and i thought their being in the room would have been an opportunity to get some clear direction on areas of disagrement. Talk about using 1 stone to kill 2 birds but it seem the stone has been missing all birds so far

ebw:the committment made to the sponsoring organization, reflected in its sponsored-form of application to icann, can be more specific (or onerous) than the general contract for a non-sponsored application where no third-party sponsoring organization is responsible for policy.

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):Agree with concerns expressed by Greg to a large extent - the proposed wording on "content/service regulation" is problematic

Becky Burr:WAIT - for purposes of this discussion, we need to stipulate that anything within the picket fence is consistent with icann's mission

Greg Shatan:Actually, I am concerned that the Bylaw proposal could be interpreted (wrongly) to limit enforcement of these contracts. The "consequences" of Stress Tests 29 and 30 state that strong enforcement is regulation and thus invalid. This is a dangerous and incorrect conclusion.

Greg Shatan:Can we assume that everyone knows what the "picket fence" is?

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):I would not presume that - are PICs within the picket fence?

Rafael Perez Galindo:Good question

Anne Aikman-Scalese:PICs are part of the contractual obligation, are they not? ICANN's role in the PIC DRP goes way beyond "limited technical mission".

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):@Becky: could you clarify whether the PICs are part of the "picket fence"? and if not, what effect the new proposed wording would have on such PICs?

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:@Greg -- the scenario and Consequences were stated by the public commenters. The ST team did all the analysis of existing and proposed mechanisms.

Alan Greenberg:PICs are contractual obligations but not within the picket fence.

Brett Schaefer:What is the definition of the public interest again?

Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair:Red card Brett ! ;-)

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):@Alan @Becky: if they are contractual, but not "picket fence", what impact would the new proposed wording have on PICs?

Greg Shatan:@Steve, it seems odd that the consequences were taken at face value. I have no problem with the scenarios being adopted as proposed. But the "consequences" imply a level of analysis that should have been done by the CCWG.

Becky Burr:PICS may or may not be within the picket fence - but they are voluntary offered by new gTLD applicants and, as such, i do not think that they are regulations - they are affirmative features

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:Brett, everyone's project and goals are in the public interest, naturally

Louise:Sorry, I can't get through.

Leon Sanchez (Co-chair ALAC):Can you type your feedback Louise?

Leon Sanchez (Co-chair ALAC):we can read it out loud

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:@Becky -- even if a PIC were within mission, what about an IRP challenge saying the PIC was not the result of consensus policy?

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):+1 Alan

Louise:Thanx = hang on.

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):good question Steve

Louise:ICANN's mission statement includes, "Introduce and promote competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial." If ICANN can intervene to limit or expand a Registrar's business in the interest of , promoting competition, why would it hold back from enforcing some principles in the RAA? ICANN's mission and its distancing itself from enforcement is fundamentally flawed.

Louise:ICANN has way too much power, which it uses selectively to benefit its insiders. That is why, the need for accountability. I didn't invent it.

Louise:If ICANN has nothing to hide, it should welcome the Sole Membership Model (SMM).

Louise:Sorry! Someone else please read my comment.

Louise:The, "mute," was on!

Louise:How do I lower my hand?

James Bladel:I agree with Alan.

James Bladel:The scenarios we are discussing are typically predicated by some sort of emergency/unusual event. ANd we need a clear message from the community. Not ambiguous consensus tests.

Wolfgang2:With a voting scheme you trigger fights for vote, lobbying and something else. You open a new field for conflicts and controversies.

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:Louse there is a pull down menu near the icon of a raised hand that should give you the lower i or clear status ption

Keith Drazek:Consensus may not be workable in every instance, but not having an agreed-to definition of consensus shouldn't be the reason to discard it. Define it and everyone then understands the threshold.

Suzanne Woolf:And if the ACs don't want to vote?

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:failing that we can ask staff to lower it for you

Suzanne Woolf:Is that a "no" or simply subtracted from the base?

Rinalia Abdul Rahim:+1 Kieran

Suzanne Woolf:agreed it's not something we'll decide here today

Jan Scholte:@hosts/staff. Maybe it is my link, but getting very little audio on my remote

Louise:James, Is, Sole Member Model off the table?

Athina Fragkouli (ASO):Dear all, maybe this is a good time to confirm -In response to a relevant request of our last meeting- that the ASO would like to have voting rights

Louise:Thanx, @ Cheryl Langdon-Orr!

Rinalia Abdul Rahim:Good to know, Athina.

Keith Drazek:Thanks Athina!

Louise:@ James Bladel, Is, Sole Member Model off the table?

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):we should be as flexible as possible with the way each SO/AC wishes to express its decision - maybe some might prefer voting (with split voting) and maybe some others could prefer to decide by consensus en only act through a resolution/advice

Keith Drazek:Agree Jorge

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:@Jorge -- if any AC/SO wants to have split votes, then all AC/SO would have that capability. But any AC/SO could vote all of its votes one way or the other.

James Bladel:@Louise - Not to my knowledge, no.

James Bladel:The GNSO would be a challenge.

Young eum Lee 2:granular is needed

Bruce Tonkin:Just to put my comments into the chat. For initiation of an arbitration process - you could simple have a minimum of one SO and AC to initaite a proceedeing. SOs and ACs can combine to form an MEM Issue group if they wish.

Gordon Chillcott:More granular

Young eum Lee 2:can we also have a feel of the online participants?

Edward Morris:For the GNSO it definitely needs to be more granular.

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):@Thomas: leave it to the SO/AC to decide

Bruce Tonkin:For bylaws changes - just one vote per SO and AC and work out the number that are needed for a bylaw change verus a fundamental bylaw change.

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):we do not need a one size fits all solution...

KMc:I think the vast majority of those saying yes, more granular, were in the GNSO

James Bladel:Agree with Robin.

Louise:@ James Bladel. Thank you for answering. I think you hold powerful sway in ICANN's dealings, and I notice you participate in committees.

Edward Morris:As do I, James.

Wolfgang2:Remember WCIT: It is always dangerous to measure the temparature of the room

James Bladel:@Louise - "Participate" is a strong word, but I follow as many groups as am able.

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):@Robin: double-dipping applies to all SO/AC which would participate in these powers

Edward Morris:Jorge, how?

Seun Ojedeji:@Robin Is there any organisation within ICANN setup to excercise powers?

James Bladel:@Jorge - How so? No other SO/AC has the same level of deference as the GAC.

Louise:It was sideways commendation.

Michele Neylon:+1 James

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Someone mentioned the notion or worry of the small group of deciders - I think it was Kieran - just to be clear, the community mech doesn't create that - it has decisions being made in each SO or AC according to their processes, and aggregated for the Mechanism to act. there's no meeting, no body of people, etc.

Suzanne Woolf:@Seun it seems to me that groups that are responsible for policy and PDPs of various sorts have a fundamentally different role to ACs, whose advice can actually be discarded.

Young eum Lee 2:I agree with Robin with regard to the change in balance b/w ACs and SOs.

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):Well, any of the participating SO/AC would add to their present functions the new participation in the new powers

James Bladel:I don't understand. The GNSO votes, the Board votes...

Louise:Hi, Michele Neylon.

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Seems to me the consensus test is the hardest one - it makes so much sense for policymaking and ensuring that everyone is together on what the substantive outputs of the organisation are. It's harder to see that's the right approach in dealing with problem situations - particularly ones caused by a lack of consensus. If we apply a consensus requirement to tools that are about solving those problems, we are probably tying ourselves up in knots?

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):[just thinking aloud]

James Bladel:@Jordan - This has been my experience with consensus tests. It can be vague or even allow Chair(s) to make the call.

Michele Neylon:Agree with James - a lot of the time the Chair has to make the call

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Seun - do you think the same should apply to the election of directors too?

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):i.e. should it be the same for appointent as for removal?

Seun Ojedeji:@Suzanne well the point is that this is overall ICANN accountability not on policy neither is it on advices. Each SO/AC represents specific stakeholder group. Certainly if the board refuses to implement names policy then GNSO should have strong powers to repell but we are not talking about policy here.

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):thanks for that, Avri...

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:+1 Avri

Seun Ojedeji:+1 to Avri as well

Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]:+1 Avri

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:Hear hear Alan ;-)

James Bladel:Not entirely accurate, Alan. The GNSO -creates- policy. The Board approves because the contracts change.

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:exactly, James - the GNSO was set up EXPLICITYLY to make policy recommendations. That is the GNSO's raison d'etre - not an extra bite at the apple like the ACs get in this proposal.

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:Hey James been a long day so I'm allowing some slight slack on the accuracy of statements were all making atm :-)

Seun Ojedeji:@James well policies are normally not active until board approves is that correct? If yes then saying GNSO recommends/proposes policies is in order

Suzanne Woolf:@seun no we're not explicitly talking about policy but we;re talking about input the organization is required to act on vs. input that's advisory. I'm agreeing with Robin about this. SSAC and RSSAC expressed some reluctance to exercise votes in the belief that structuring themselves to be good for that would make them less good for generating specialized advice that ICANN is free to decline.

Bruce Tonkin:@Suzanne - let each SO and AC determine its own way of reaching consensus

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:Excellent point to remind the room of Suzanne

Suzanne Woolf:@Bruce: not the point. Generating consensus on what advice to give is different to generating consensus on a formal policy recommendation that must be taken on.

Seun Ojedeji:@Suzanne that seem to imply that the ability to vote removes the ability to advice and i don't think so.

Brett Schaefer:Jorge, no one else has a priviledge advisory power that the GAC has

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:Right, Brett, this extra power to GAC jeopardizes whether NTIA will accept this proposal. We aren't supposed to be empowering govts over others like the proposal does. This is a big problem we cannot ignore.

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):Edward, the GAC advises, the GNSO proposes policy which has to be abided by, unless the Board decides with 2/3 majority - it's clear to me where the leadership lies

Seun Ojedeji:Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): Seun - do you think the same should apply to the election of directors too? Me: I don't think the process to electing directors should change, generally we when board members are elected the respective SO/AC is generally contributing to the interest of the organisation as a whole and its the violation of the interest of the organisation that should remove them

ebw:thx suzanne

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):well, clearly with the SO that proposes the policy - not the advisory body whose advice can be turned down by simple majority

Alan Greenberg:If we balance votes according to number of board members, who gets all of the votes associated with the NomCom seats on the Board?

KMc:Like the RSSAC response - reminds me of what ICANN was set up to do

Greg Shatan:Seun, you are making an assumption regarding how SO/ACs choose Board members that is not entirely true, and for which you have no basis.

Brett Schaefer:Jordan, I didn't say that it was turning ICANN into a governmnet controlled body. I said it granted the GAC enhanced authority that might run afoul of the NTIA principle.

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:Well said Anne

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):Bretty, but it is the NTIA principle that says government-led or intergovernmental organisation

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):+1 Anne - this is not a zero-sum game - and we should not try to present it as such

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):NTIA's principle didn't say that there could be no increase in governmental influence

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):and is it an increase, anyway, when everyone else's influence is increasing on those powers at the same time and in the same way?

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):this is an issue that Fadi and i disagreed on in BA in the public session, just expressing my view here :-)

Seun Ojedeji:@Greg well this still comes down on whats the responsibility of a board member, to serve his/her appointing SO/AC or to serve the entire organisation. Maybe we should ask those who have history on ICANN why they moved from filling board via end users to via SO/AC

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:@Chris -- when you speak next, could you please explain what you mean by "restructuring ICANN" ? THanks

Brett Schaefer:Jordan, there is no reason to state that principle unless there was a concern over government capture. I believe you are reading the text, not the intent.

Kavouss Arasteh:Leon-Thomas, Pls put me in the queue

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:Jordan, sorry, but giving GAC and GNSO (all users) the same power is a massive empowerment of govts.

Edward Morris:THe practical reality is that if you increase government power in the new ICANN this is DOA on the Hill.

Greg Shatan:@Seun, I think the short answer is that it's a combination. But I think that giving a stakeholder sector a voice on the Board is definitely a part of it.

Seun Ojedeji:@Keith i think the non-voting status given to AC could be by their choice (at least for GAC ).

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:@Ed and Brett -- Governments don't gain power on net, since this porposal includes Stress Test 18 and the ability for an IRP to overturn ICANN acting on GAC advice.

Brett Schaefer:Steve, I thought stress test 18 was in dispute?

Seun Ojedeji:@Greg i think it goes beyond voice but rather to get diverse experience to run the entire organisation

jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland):the scenario put forward by Chris shows that there needs to be a minimum threshold of participation to being able to activate the power

Anne Aikman-Scalese:So consider the possibility of establishing a rule for QUORUM within the voting structure

Seun Ojedeji:The challenge with consensus within ICANN is who observe the consensus from the entire community?

Edward Morris:@Steve, so we give GAC power equal to that of all SO's in the community mechanism, they keep their special advisory role and the saver is we can take them to an IRP to reverse Board action taken on GAC advice. Strange definition of no net power gain.

Chris Disspain:Jonathan....isn't the answer to your question 'both, the Board should help/lead/facilitate the community to consensus'/

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):given everyone else gains teh same power that GAC does, was more my point

Chris Disspain:and the backstop is the IRP

KMc:I think the solution is fairly obvious. All SOs/ACs have the right to vote. They can vote Yes, No, No determination or No vote. No determination counts as a vote

KMc:Then of those that vote you have to have more than two-thirds voting in favor

Keith Drazek:Thanks Thomas. Worth consideration.

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):That's NOT true. the board is NOT charged with weighing interests but checking process. The community IS, in fact, charged with reaching consensus

Edward Morris:KMc: How does no determination (absention) count as a vote? The way the 2nd draft proposes as "no" or the way the SEC proposes in proxy electioins as "participating but no opinion"?

KMc:At Edward: it counts because we are talking strong powers and it should have positive support. No determination means a group has decided it wishes to be included in the issue but has not reached agreement tes or no

Seun Ojedeji:@ebw if the issue don't concern ssac/rssac then we would not have seen some comments from them in this process. Nevertheless i think there was option for them to opt out

Keith Drazek:We should all thank Thomas for suggesting a concrete, thoughtful and constructive solution based on existing community procedures. We need more of that level of thinking.

Alan Greenberg:You really don't want to make these earth-shattering decisions must be made on actual issues, not based on whether policy was followed.

Anne Aikman-Scalese:TRUE - SCI is the only body I know of that requires full consensus. There are at least 5 or 6 levels of consensus defined in the PDP Manual and the WG reports to GNSO on the level of consensus.

ebw:seun, you appear to have arrived at a different reading than i have.

KMc:Eric - I don't think it does. The SSAC can decide if it wishes to involve itself i.e. if a vote being taken impacts security or stability. Otherwise, it introduces no vote

Edward Morris:KMc: Totally agree with you. It's a key issue if we go with a voting model. Counting abstentions/no opinioon as no is so strongly Board friendly it will make it very difficult for the community to exercise it's powers based upon the history of proxy battles.

Avri Doria:for example if the bylaw change was to eliminate the SSAC. would SSAC care

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):but then do you have to introduce a number of thresholds

Seun Ojedeji:Good example @Avri ;-)

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):"To remove the Board at least five must participate"?

KMc:I think the Board is worried that a small group of people will get themselves wound up about something and figure out how to play the system to make a huge decision

Avri Doria:or would they say, nope all we care about is SS.

Greg Shatan:This would also make the CMSM more like the SCWG (the separation WG that the CWG proposed as the body dealing with separation of the numbering functions from ICANN).

Seun Ojedeji:@KMc i don't think its only the board that is worried about that. Infact I think we should be worried if the board is the only one concerned

Joy Liddicoat:can I ask the chairs: a number of us are online waiting for th human rights discussion. why has this been moved?

Edward Morris:@Jordan. The difference between the two models: That proposed+ yes/no + no vote + absention . The majority vote model recommended by the SEcurities and Exchange Commission = yes/no + no vote. In our situation you may want to have a single threshold, not too complicated (for example, 2 groups voting "yes").. The problem with the current model is you could have a number (based upon 5 equal voting groups) of 5 yes, 2 anbstains and the proposals will fail with no one opposed with a 2/3 majority requirement. If that happens too often, the whole model is in trouble.

Keith Drazek:QUESTION: Did the CCWG begin an assessment of the SO/AC accountability mechanisms, bylaws, charters, etc.? I seem to recall we initiated an inventory of the existing community accountability structures.

Edward Morris:@Jordan. 3 yes 2 abstains in the hypothetical

Anne Aikman-Scalese:Term Limits for officers? Code of Conduct for Officers and address conflicts of interest?

Jan Scholte:@Thomas. Just to recall that paras 467 and 500 of the second draft proposal give some specific ideas on So/AC accountability and the closely related issue of diversity - and then keep as a headline concern for Work Stream 2.

James Bladel:+1 Robin. Trust is for people Insitutions need structures & controls.

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:+1 Robin

Keith Drazek:+1 Robin

Brett Schaefer:+1 Robin

Joy Liddicoat:I want to record an objection from some of the remote participants who have been waiting for the human rights discussion. we have people in Europe and Oceania time zones and it will be very difficult for them to participate at the revised time tomorrow.

Jan Scholte:@Thomas. Just wonder whether all the critics in the public comment read as far as paras 467 and 500, which seem to make a good start if thoroughly pursued.

Thomas Rickert, CCWG Co-Chair:You might be right, Jan!

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):I've been saying that about trust all along @Robin but the question here is a little different. what processes do we need in place so that those who currently fear commnunity empowerment are less afraid. It is, in fact, a way to eliminate trust from issue.

James Bladel:Jonathan - Maybe a better word is "Confidence" rather than "Trust"?

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):that's just symantics. it IS about institutional "trust" (or confidence) in both cases., not individual trust.

Greg Shatan:Trustworthiness?

Keith Drazek:@Joy: Regular participants in the CCWG are all-too accustomed to participating at odd and awful hours, no matter where you happen to live and no matter the subject matter. Welcome to our pain. That siad, it would be good to nail down a specific agenda for tomorrow so remote particpants can know when to dial in for their key interest.

Jan Scholte:@Thomas. More seriously, Working Group 3 has taken some good first steps to address SO/AC accountability, so there is some concrete response, plus the several additional steps mentioned by Mathieu. The question may be to highlight these intentions and specific measures early in the next draft report - and then make sure during the implementation phas e and Work Stream 2 actually to put these steps into practice.

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):The nature of power right now is that folks don't really need to trust the community because there is a process to check their work. Instead we are forced to trust the board. If we empower the community, we will now need to trust THAT mechanisms because we have put sufficient processes in place to alleviate people's concerns

Rinalia Abdul Rahim:+1 Chris.

Louise:Load of bullocks.

Asha Hemrajani:+1 Chris

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):I reiterate my disagreement with Chris on the point he has just made on the same basis as this morning. But it does raise a different interesting thought - are the ways the organisation makes policy internally captured?

Kavouss Arasteh:Some people are invited by the chair to speak more frequently than others

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):i.e. is the whole method of affected stakeholders making policies that affect them legitimate?

Louise:Who is speraking? CHRIS DISSPAIN. It's nice in theory. When has ICANN properly followed the bottom up model? ICANN Is absolutely without account to anyone, and wants to keep it that way!

Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair:I'd like to run Chris statements through the lawyers. It seems to me in member organisations with shared powers, the set of constraints is not as high for members than Board members.

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):(seems to be the multistakeholder model's feature, rather than a bug...?)

Chris Disspain:Thanks Louise....who are yo please?

David McAuley (RySG):Kieran’s point about outreach was a good one - the ccNSO outreach presentation at ICANN53 regarding FOI is a good example.

Jan Scholte:Thanks for these points, Steve. Sounds like it would be an idea to integrate these stress test points/proposals into para 500 to make a fuller list.

Rinalia Abdul Rahim:Agree wth Jan.

Kavouss Arasteh:I raised my hand two times but was lowered and foloor was given to thers

Kavouss Arasteh:OTHERS

Holly J. Gregory (Sidley):@Steve B. Does the language in para 997 contemplate that the actions of ACs and SOs could be challenged through an IRP?

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:True, Jan. I recited 7 mechanisms that were cited in the Stress Tests, as ways to keep the AC/SOs accountable to the global internet commuity

Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]:@Holly -- good question about 997. Guess the IRP would be against ICANN action/inaction arising from advice or policy coming from an AC/SO that had failed to meet the bylaws

Chris Disspain:Thank you Loiuse...

Chris Disspain:Louise

Keith Drazek:I think Steve's input and Jan's comments demonstrate there's an opportunity to refine the existing proposal so it is more tightly packaged and easier to follow. We will need to make further adjustment and refinements, of course, but there's a lot of good in the work product.

Jan Scholte:Keith +1

Louise:Okay, excuse me for the coarse expression. I guess you made some fine points, but ICANN is in trouble with its reputation.

Chris Disspain:No problem...just wanted to know who you were

Rinalia Abdul Rahim:Balance is key - Yes, Jonathan Zuck.

Louise:There is NO QUESION on the community's input. It has been sorely lacking for years.

Brett Schaefer:+1 Jonathan

Chris Disspain:Agree Jonathan

Asha Hemrajani:+1 Jonathan

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):So how do we resolve that one then, Jonathan? One minute.

James Bladel:Wow..>Thomas has such a low opinion of us. :)

Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair:I would refine Jonathan question:: what would be needed to enhance community accountability to go to a member model ; what would be needed to enhance Board accountability to go to a trust model ?

Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO) ALAC AP-Regional Member:Or he knows some of us rather well ;-)

James Bladel:Did we agree on that? I thought there was signfiicant push back against "mutual accountability"

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):I believe the community mostly agrees there is a greater danger in concentration of power in a few than in many but that said, if we spent the day on THAT we would be further along this evening.

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):that last aimed @Jordan

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):we really don't have a misunderstanding. We have a difference of opinion

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):the balance of control is the membership model

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):yes

Asha Hemrajani:Speaking on my own behalf, based on my observations, @Thomas I think SO/AC accountability is a concern of not only the board

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):agree it's not just the board Asha but it's still the question

James Bladel:Steve missed his calling.

Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur):but how much of the SO/AC problem do we need to solve as part of the transition?

Jonathan Zuck (IPC):did he? I think he's right where we need him

James Bladel:@Jonathan - Proposing a power-sharing arrangement where none currently exists is a "disruption to the balance of power." But its a good thing.

Greg Shatan:It will be a rationale. Whether it is rational or not, is up to us.

Holly J. Gregory (Sidley):@ Steve Thanks!!

nigel hickson:hank you

David McAuley (RySG):Thanks all, sorry to miss the bar

Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]:so it is a debrief or a continuation of today's work later tonight?