@MikeAngelastroNot if 'logical' is being applied to an environment (politics) in which it is not possible. The resulting pseudological behaviour is in fact dogmatic. I don't know whether that's an oxymoron or not, but its certainly a contradiction. The contradiction lies in the irrelevance of logic to politics.@Harv2009You are wasting your time. Its pretty clear that SM is so far lost in logic that he isn't going to engage with the debate that the entire discussion is irrelevant.In reality, faced with SM's 'a prior' situation, power always wins. In reality Liberalism is the political philosophy that has developed to break the monopoly of power and enable democratic solutions to evolve.

Harv2009 suggests that the preceding argument is:"1. Equal weighting is the unique solution (in a logical sense) to the problem of aggregating preferences without giving priority to a particular subset."The argument is slightly more complicated than that. It is:"1. Equal weighting is the unique solution (in a logical sense) to the problem of aggregating preferences without giving priority to a particular subset" (using Harv2009's words);2. for any system that requires giving priority to a particular subset, there is no principle by which to identify the subset to be given priority (a necessary pre-condition to giving it a workable form); and3. as a result, there is no principle by which a workable form can be determined for such a system.Whether or not a particular device "ought" to be adopted is an individual decision that depends on the beliefs and motives of each person making it. For example, it is conceivable that someone will want to adopt a device even when it can be shown that the device is unworkable. Harking back to the example from the previous post, it is conceivable that someone will conclude that Method A "ought" to be adopted because:a) that person believes that an Angel from Heaven will come down and change the laws of mathematics at the critical moment to make it work (beliefs); orb) that person wants a system that will fail and cause mayhem (motives).Likewise, it is possible that a person has beliefs and motives inconsistent with an aggregation device for which a workable form may be determined. For example, the person's motive may be to become dictator of the world - regardless of any other considerations.However, in this case the argument applies recursively - yet again!! The question immediately arises: "By what principle may those beliefs and motives be privileged over those of other people?"Once again, this objection does not arise with a system that does not privilege - because the system itself may be used to select another system, and will do so without privileging. For example, an initial equally-weighted aggregation without pre-vetting might be used to choose a different system (involving privilege) to be used thereafter; there would be no issue of whose beliefs and motives were privileged a priori - because none were.

Just my luck, too late and no time to read all the rambling posts. Here a rambling post of my own:

A discussion on liberalism involving Europeans and Americans is futile, as both imply totally different things when talking about the term. The term was burned in the US some 30 or 40 years ago and now, as a self fulfilling prophecy, the only people labeling themselves Liberals are left of what the term initially meant. It is funny to see people want to substitute it with "progressive" (another euphemism for social democrats) or see the concept failed because of the people who label themselves “Liberals” (which are the same people calling themselves “progressives”).

Not that I have an issue with social democracy; I think the political system here in the US is all the poorer for being so skewed towards one end of the spectrum. Political debates sometimes feel a bit like an echo chamber. But then again, in the US you get not so much political debates as shouting matches, as debates do seem to be seen as continuations of warfare with other means and not so much social situations where one can expose his own views appropriate criticism to better understand the world.

Another big issue why debates about liberalism (or libertarianism, its ugly euphemist step brother) tend to be fruitless is that there are two totally different views described by that name. One, more common in Europe, is consequentialist and mostly a result of training in economics. It is mostly based on utilitarian considerations of a free society being better than the alternatives, and has a rather pragmatic approach to solving the issues Stephen Morris has addressed and is not in principle averse to an active state, where interventions by the state can be reasonably justified.

The alternative is a rights-based approach more prevalent in the US, where liberty and freedom (or at least what each individual proponent holds them to be) are universal rights that must be enforced, regardless of cost. That view indeed has the issue that in theory, if a person falls out of a window on the 14th floor of a building and by luck manages to hold on to your balcony on the 13th floor, that individual violates your rights as the owner of the balcony and you are entitled to ask that person to let go and plunge to death.

Right, but you still argue1. Equal weighting is the unique solution (in a logical sense) to the problem of aggregating preferences without giving priority to a particular subset2. Equal weightings ought to be adopted as the only solution to the problem of aggregation.You arrive at (2) by my (1A) below, don't you? (Or do you stop short of advocating (2), and merely note the uniqueness of the solution in (1)?)

Commentator Harv2009 suggests that the earlier arguments get "an 'ought' from an 'is'" by way of the implicit assumption that:"One ought not to give priority to a subset of individuals' preferences when there is no self evident way of aggregating preferences."A careful reading of the earlier posts reveals that the argument does not "get an ought from an is" by this route. Nor does it "get an ought" by some other route. In fact, the argument does not "get an ought" at all. It is not concerned with "ought".Moreover, no preference has been expressed or implied concerning a priori privileging of preferences. Rather, the argument is concerned with the logical possibility (or otherwise) of determining "which" preferences would be privileged if an aggregation required it.This may be illustrated with an analogy. Imagine that two aggregation devices are being considered. Method A involves assigning every person a sequence number according to the date and time of their birth, from oldest to youngest. The sequence numbers are divided by pi, and the person with the lowest sequence number perfectly divisible by pi is appointed dictator.Method B is identical to Method A, except that the sequence numbers are divided by 4.125 instead of pi.Now, different people may have different opinions concerning Method A and Method B. But there is something we can say about the two methods with mathematical certainty:i) Method B can yield a result. It will appoint as dictator the 33rd oldest person; andii) Method A can yield no result because no sequence number will ever be perfectly divisible by pi. It makes no difference whether or not one believes that Method A "ought" to be adopted. The fact remains that Method A can never yield a result whereas Method B can.Now let us suppose that someone (Harv2009, perhaps) proposes that some preferences "ought" to be privileged a priori. No judgement is made concerning whether that proposal is "right" or "wrong". But it does invite the rather obvious question: "Which ones?"Any answer to that question will be of the form, either:a) there is no way to answer the question; orb) the ones determined by "Method X".Method X could be all sorts of things. It might be nomination by Harv2009. It might be a lottery as suggested by alexlondon. Significantly, the choice of Method X will be critical to all subsequent outcomes. (Suppose, for example, that Method X was "Privilege Stephen Morris over everyone else." Then Stephen Morris would be in a position to control all subsequent aggregations and might establish himself as dictator of the world.)Given the critical importance of Method X, it may be expected that different individuals will have different preferences concerning what Method X ought to be.But any answer of form (b) is a statement of preference - and, as we have just seen, a critically important one. It may be expected that it will be disputed by other people. And so, it in turn invites the obvious response: "By what principle is that preference to be privileged over others?"And so on ad infinitum.The only way to get off that vicious circle of recursion is to find an aggregation device that does not require such privileging.Thus, the initial equally-weighted aggregation in no way reflects an implied assumption that preferences "ought not" to be privileged a priori. It simply arises from the logical impossibility of satisfying a precondition necessary for any initial aggregation that requires it - namely, determining which preferences would be privileged thus.

I was interested to see that commentator "alexlondon" had returned to heap some more abuse on me. (I was especially intrigued by the idea of being "lost in logic".)It is, however, ironic that alexlondon has accused me of not engaging with the debate, when the only debate that alexlondon will engage in is a futile one based on the rhetoric of Liberalism.Debating Liberalism is rather like debating religion.One denomination of Faithful proclaims that: "Liberalism says we ought to do X" (where, by some uncanny coincidence, "X" so often coincides with their own self-interest).Another denomination of Faithful proclaims that: "Liberalism says we ought to do Y" (where, again by uncanny coincidence, "Y" so often coincides with their own self-interest).Both the denominations base their "debate" on various fallacies, such as The Fallacy of Asymmetric Rights.Each denomination carries on as if their Creed somehow privileges their own preferences.And then what?When all the rhetoric has been exhausted, when all the Creeds have been recited, when all the fallacies have been trotted out, finally a joint decision comes to be made. How is it to be done?There must be an aggregation device of some kind. That device - whatever it might be - must take as input the conflicting preferences of individuals from each denomination and yield as output a joint decision.And so the essential problem remains: "How can a group of individuals choose an aggregation device to do this?"The various denominations of Liberalism give no answer.There is, however, a solution to this problem. It is a solution that does not rely on the impossible precondition of determining which preferences to privilege a priori. It is a solution that does not privilege any preferences (not even the preferences of those who have whispered the magic incantation "Liberal" over them).Moreover, we know from the historical record that when people are given an opportunity to participate in such a decision-making system, they choose - and choose to retain thereafter - elements of directly democratic government. We know from the historical record that people who enjoy such democracy do not use their democratic rights to abolish it, even though it is a straightforward matter to call a referendum to do so.And yet . . . . there are some people who are absolutely, resolutely, grimly, steadfastly determined never to discuss this solution under any circumstances whatsoever.Now, why might that be . . . I wonder?

Stephen Morris gets an "ought" from an "is" by the following1. There is no self evident way to aggregate preferences upon which everyone agrees.2. The only way to aggregate preferences without giving priority to one subset's preferences or anothers is for all preferences to be given equal weighting. But he gets to (2) by making the implicit assumption that 1A: One ought not to give priority to a subset of individuals' preferences when there is no self evident way of aggregating preferences.Much of the debate disputes (1A); e.g. "one ought to favour the preferences of the least well off when aggregating preferences."

In America "liberal" is associated with progressive political principles. It is approximately equivalent to the European term "social democrat." From the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt to that of Lyndon Johnson, it was used to label a benign philosophy of governmental outreach to the needy, the unfortunate, and the victims of social injustice. To some progressive Democrats it still does. In the mouths and minds of conservatives, however, it acquired a pejorative connotation: it became a synonym for socialism. Until the conservative movement fell victim to its own contradictions and fallacies, Democrats were made to feel defensive about their kind of liberalism, and indeed, they scarcely dared use the word.But The Economist uses the term "liberal" to mean a political system based on free markets, individual liberties, democratic government, and the rule of law. In England it also suggests -- at least to intellectuals and the historically minded -- the ideas of the Liberal Democrats and of their remote forebear, the party of William Gladstone.So you are confusing two very different animals. This article is about a non-issue.

Commentator "alexlondon" has posted a number of further comments regarding Liberalism and Democracy, some of which reflect a misunderstanding of the earlier posts.To begin with, the term "a priori" as used here (and as explained in an earlier post) refers to a choice made "without reference to some pre-existing aggregation device". It does not refer to past experiences.Secondly, it has been proposed that a random selection might be used to privilege certain people. At first glance this might appear to offer a solution. However, careful analysis quickly reveals that it simply gives rise to the original problem recursively.In order to privilege certain people using a random system it is necessary to make a decision to do so. But imagine, for example, that some individuals prefer that no-one be privileged - even by lot - or that some people be privileged but by a different system. Clearly, privileging some people randomly without reference to an earlier aggregation would privilege a priori the preferences of those individuals who support a system of lot against the individuals identified in the preceding sentence.It may be noted that the same does not apply to the equally-weighted aggregation without pre-vetting. Because it does not privilege any individual, it may be used to choose a subsequent system without violating the condition on a priori privileging. Such an initial aggregation might indeed choose a system of government in which certain people are privileged by lot. It might also choose a monarchy. Or a system of purely "representative" government. But it still requires an initial aggregation to make that decision. (It may be noted in passing that the historical record shows that when individuals are given the opportunity to choose without pre-vetting of options, they choose to retain elements of directly democratic government - not some bizarre allocation of privilege by lottery!)[Parenthetically, this comment also raises an interesting question of motive: why go to all the trouble of trying to identify a pseudo-random system - which, as we have just seen, does not actually provide a solution - when there is a perfectly satisfactory solution readily available? The entire argument seems to be driven by a grim determination to avoid the obvious solution. Could it be that the available solution conflicts with some prejudice? Is this a desperate ploy to privilege a particular preference concerning the system of government?]The reference to use of power is an "is-ought" fallacy. It tells us nothing about which preferences "ought" to be privileged and gives no solution to the logical problem of preference aggregation in the absence of a priori privileging.The very fact that the debate on Liberalism is occurring demonstrates the limitations of such rhetorical schemes. The conceit of being based on fundamental principles (such as "freedom" or "liberty") is quickly exposed by identifying the logical inconsistencies that underlie them. In the case of Liberalism it is the Fallacy of Asymmetric Rights.Like religion, rhetorical schemes may give a warm feeling to those who hold the Faith. The faithful may even believe that their creed somehow privileges their own preferences. But when all the rhetoric has been exhausted, and a joint decision comes to be made, there must be an aggregation device with which to make it. That device - whatever it might be - will take as input the preferences of individuals (possibly including those who do not share the Faith) and yield a joint decision.No rhetorical scheme - not even Liberalism - can yield a joint decision. Only an aggregation device can do that.And so the logical problem is this: "How does a group of individuals choose an aggregation device when they have no aggregation device with which to choose it?" Liberalism gives no answer to this problem. There is, however, a solution, one which does not rely on a priori privileging. Its derivation is set out in steps (a) to (e) of the earlier post.

@StephenMorrisYour missives are so long I have only just had time to digest the last one.Of course, there is no such thing as an “a priori” group decision making situation (“preference aggregation”). We all have past experience (our early childhood experiences is usually to have our preferences devalued). The construct is utterly academic.However, if such a situation existed we could resolve it through many solutions even as mundane as drawing lots (a completely arbitrary “allocation of privilege”). History shows that in the absence of liberal values, decisions are monopolised by those with power. Power dynamics always exist – and can always be tested through violence – so this solution is always available. It is liberal discourse that has moved us from the dominion of violence, challenging undemocratic processes and giving rise to democratic institutions.“To reiterate, the discourse of Democracy presented earlier - unlike that of Liberalism - is not about opinions. It is about the logic of aggregation devices, and the possible solutions to the problem of preference aggregation in the absence of a priori privileging.”I accept that is your premise, but Liberalism was never defined (by anyone other than you, as far as I can gather) to be the solution to one arcane question.“If - as asserted by alexlondon - politics is a discourse of opinions, then that is precisely what makes it illogical.“That all politics is “illogical” (by which you mean specifically nondogmatic) merely demonstrates the irrelevance of hard logic to the debate.“Upon realising that the rhetorical game is futile, some may choose to stand back and devote their energy to analysing the logical conclusions that can be drawn concerning preference aggregation. That line of inquiry eschews rhetoric and leads instead to the equally-weighted aggregation in which the available options are not pre-vetted by a subset of privileged individuals. “You seem to be presenting this as an objective truth, when it is, of course, an opinion.

@ulrich123Maybe. But Conservatism is pretty big on freedom (small governments, established hierarchies, absolute ownership of property, national sovereignty, deregulation etc.) even at the expense of equality."aspects such as tradition and religion and its relation to freedom".I think you are right - the interesting debate in conversatism is about the interplay of different values. (But Liberalism is not by definition against the value of religion.)In the end, you picks your values and take it from there. It is a matter of subjectivity (who has the best values). In this context I withdraw my original accusation of dogma (though since the practical experience of recent American 'conservatism' was so highly dogmatic, I don't regret using the term).But my original challenge was more specifically to counter claims that:a) liberal thinking is illogical because it isn't dogmaticb) any 'essay' can ever by the product of logic not opinionc) democracy could exist without presupposing much of liberal thinking.

alexlondon:Conservatism in general (the label is probably as meaningless as liberal though) does not only talk about equality it does include aspects such as tradition and religion and its relation to freedom. Those who only focus only on freedom and nothing else are for me simply anarchists not conservatives.

Commentator "alexlondon" has posted a number of further claims regarding the discussion of Liberalism and Democracy.To begin with:"It is preposterous to suggest that Democracy is 'derived' (like Mathematics maybe)?"Both in the original and in the subsequent essay, it was made clear that this is precisely what is being suggested.The equally-weighted aggregation in which the available options are not pre-vetted by a subset of privileged individuals is the unique solution to a particular logical problem: the problem of preference aggregation in the absence of a priori privileging. The derivation of this conclusion is set out in steps (a) to (e) of the previous posting.It makes no differences whether one personally prefers such an aggregation device or not. It makes no difference whether one describes oneself as a "Liberal" or not. It makes no difference that one finds such a claim bizarre. The equally-weighted aggregation in which the available options are not pre-vetted by a subset of privileged individuals is still the unique solution to this logical problem.Moreover, this is relevant because - as noted several times - there is no means by which to identify the individuals whose preferences would be privileged a priori in any other aggregation device. It makes no difference that they assign the label "Liberal" - or any other label - to their preferences. There is still no self-evident principle by which those preferences may be privileged a priori.alexlondon declares that: "Politics is a discourse of opinions." But opinions by their very nature are not logical. If an opinion could be proved logically it would no longer be an opinion. If - as asserted by alexlondon - politics is a discourse of opinions, then that is precisely what makes it illogical.The original essay on Liberalism and Democracy began with the claim: "Liberalism's biggest problem is its illogicality." If the discussion of Liberalism is a conducted as a political discourse - a discourse of opinions - how could it be anything other than illogical?To reiterate, the discourse of Democracy presented earlier - unlike that of Liberalism - is not about opinions. It is about the logic of aggregation devices, and the possible solutions to the problem of preference aggregation in the absence of a priori privileging.Regarding the system of state government in US states, a careful reading of the essays reveals that there is no claim to the effect that they are "examples of direct democracy". The precise claim made on both occasions was that "the individuals have chosen to perpetuate some form of directly democratic system."Under the non-democratic system that operates at the federal level in the United States, the peoples are not permitted to call a referendum to express their aggregate preference on the system of government at that level. Because no initial equally-weighted aggregation has ever been carried out, we do not know how the peoples would choose.What we do know from the historical record is how they have chosen at the state level when given the opportunity to do so. And we find that they have chosen to perpetuate some form of directly democratic system to the greatest extent permitted to them (i.e. at the state level). Moreover, we find that they do not use their democratic rights to abolish their directly democratic state system, even though it is a straightforward matter to call a referendum to do so.The proposition that: "The US Constitution was the product of liberal absolutism, not 'direct democracy'" is irrelevant to determining these preferences.The debate about the "misinterpretation" of Liberalism arises because Liberalism is illogical. It is a means by which individuals pretend to privilege their own preferences regarding the allocation of right-obligation pairs by assigning emotive labels ("Liberal" or "freedom" or "liberty") to them.But because rights and obligations come in ruthlessly symmetrical pairs (harking back to Coase's famous paper cited at the outset), such a strategy is open to obvious counter-attack. Because every "freedom" relies on the curtailment of an opposite "freedom", advocates of the opposite pairings can use exactly the same tactics. Thus Liberalism is open to any interpretation. How it could be otherwise?Upon realising that the rhetorical game is futile, some may choose to stand back and devote their energy to analysing the logical conclusions that can be drawn concerning preference aggregation. That line of inquiry eschews rhetoric and leads instead to the equally-weighted aggregation in which the available options are not pre-vetted by a subset of privileged individuals.

@ulrich123What I was getting at is that constructive debate demands the conflict of two (or more) values held equally dear. That it is no criticism of liberalism at all to point out it is caught on these horns. Indeed if it were not - if it were 'resolved' - it would truly be a dogma (i.e. prescribed).You could, of course, pick different values and, in the process of trying to resolve them, demonstrate a lack of dogma. But, it isn't obvious (at least to me) what values are claimed by other political systems that are absent in Liberalism. Conservatism promotes freedom over equality. Socialism espouses equality at the expense of freedom. These are both surely more dogmatic?

It is how the term has been used for at least the last 60 years,ie in my memory, it was used as a scathing term for those that were pecieved to have no back bone, ie Ban the Bomb unilateral dis-armement, and such like. As with a lot of terms, the real/ original meaning has been lost.

@StephenMorris"I will put to one side the abuse that makes up much of alexlondon's comment"I'm sorry if you feel attacked as a consequence of engaging in debate. My aim was to point out the weakness of your argument, that's all. I'm afraid I really do believe it is incoherent, a little absurd and based on a lack of understanding. These are the most 'abusive' terms I used."there is no reference to - nor dependence on - any such belief. On the contrary, Democracy is presented as being derived"The statement I made about Democracy was my belief, not a claim about yours. It is preposterous to suggest that Democracy is 'derived' (like Mathematics maybe)? Democracy, in all its imperfections, is a product of historical discourse (specifically, the rise in the belief in equality), just like everything else."The earlier essay was a logical argument, not an expression of preferences."Politics is a discourse of opinions. I'm not trying to claim objectivity in mine. I'm afraid I find your claim of objectivity (that your post was not itself the product of opinion from start to finish) a little bizarre."fallacies of irrelevance"You cited US states (irrelevantly?!) in your comment as examples of direct democracy. I merely referenced the Constitution to observe that they take place in a fundamentally liberal context (liberalism predating the practice of democracy in the United States). That is my only claim for its relevance."the problem is this: a) when a group of individuals come to decide upon a system for making joint decisions, they have no decision system"No, the problem, as set by the original author, is that the meaning of Liberalism is distorted so that the name is rejected by many people who actually uphold its values. I guess relevance is the base line of our disagreement - the article was about the misinterpretation of Liberalism, and your comments are both a misinterpretation and a digression.

It was not only the switch from equality of opportunity to equality of outcome as the goal, but the essentially authoritarian attitudes and tactics adopted that contributed to the malodorous aura that so-called liberals acquired in the '70s. Real affirmative action requires time, effort and money; it was much easier to impose quotas. School bussing often looked suspiciously like an imposition upon poor urban kids by suburban limousine liberals whose own kids were staying in their own superior schools. There were many people in those days who supported liberal ends, but who worried that the means imposed would cause a nasty backlash or, worse, be counterproductive.