Churchill left the Teheran conference in December 1943 less satisfied than
the Americans. Some of his ideas had differed from Roosevelts. Rooseveltattributed paramount importance to the creation of a world organization based
on "Big Three unity," and Stalin's willingness to go along with this program
filled American policy-
makers
with great hopes. In Cordell Hull's words, "Moscow and Teheran brought Russia
into a program of real cooperation for war and peace." Churchill on the other
hand, while not less devoted to the program of worldwide cooperation, was
increasingly worried about the practical details of this cooperation in Eastern
Europe. And while the Americans continued to believe in universalism as a cure
for all problems, Churchill was anxious to meet the special problems with
special arrangements.

The special problems in Eastern Europe accumulated with great speed as
the year 1944 brought the Red Army one success after another. Only one problem,
Czechoslovakia's future, seemed to be neatly settled in that disordered area.
Benes's treaty, signed with Moscow in December 1943, served as a model for
future bilateral cooperation between Soviet Russia and her western neighbors;
but to reproduce this model was not easy for the rest of the nations in Eastern
Europe.

In January 1944, the Russians crossed the pre-
war
Polish-
Soviet
frontier, and although in Teheran the Big Three had tentatively agreed on the
Curzon Line as the future frontier between Russia and Poland, agreement between
the Kremlin and the Polish government in exile on both territorial and
political problems made no progress at all. In Teheran it had been agreed also
that the British would give full support to Tito's Communist partisans, but
relations between Tito and the Yugoslav government in exile were not yet
clarified. The problems of the Axis satellites, HungaryRomania and Bulgaria,
were coming to the fore too, as the Russians approached Central Europe and the
Balkans. While the retreating Germans were alerted to forestall defection among
their satellites, the latter were increasingly anxious to avert defeat
alongside the Germans.

The situation was unique in satellite Hungary There Premier Kállay
successfully sabotaged cooperation with Germany, while his emissaries got in
touch with the British intelligence and agreed on some preliminary conditions
under which Hungarywould turn against Germany; the most important of these
conditions provided that the Hungarian army should be in a position to
establish contact with the Western forces. Kállay's hopes, like those of
others who were planning to desert their German allies, were based on the
assumption that the Western armies would be the liberators of Central Europe.
These hopes were dashed when the Allied advance in Italy bogged down in the
face of German resistance, and when the plans for invasion in the Balkans which
Churchill had proposed at Teheran failed to materialize. Thus it was not the
Western armies, as Kállay and others had hoped, but the Red Army, which
was moving toward Central Europe. From Hitler's point of view, of course, it
made no difference which enemy threatened the Nazi redoubt in the center of
Europe. In March 1944, therefore, in order to protect the hinterland of the
eastern front, which was rapidly being pushed west-
ward, Hitler ordered the occupation of Hungary Kállay was overthrown,
and, with eager cooperation from Hitler's Hungarian followers, the Germans got
the reliable satellite government in Hungarythat they needed.

Even had the Western Allies approached Central Europe from the south, the
Germans, supported by their numerous pro-
Nazi
Hungarian devotees, could at any time have carried out this coup anyway.
Therefore the claim Kállay made in his memoirs that the failure of "Anglo-
Hungarian
collaboration" was an essential cause of the tragedy of half of Europe was
extraordinary. According to Kállay, had this Anglo-
Hungarian
collaboration developed, Churchill could not have been voted down at the
Teheran conference over the question of attacking in the Balkans, and British
and American influence would today prevail in the Balkans and on the Danube.2
Kállay's commentary on the failure of his policy was just another
exhibit of that traditional delusion of grandeur which always, throughout
central and eastern Europe, led the small nations to seek exalted roles of
partnership with the Great Powers and which was the fundamental reason for the
failure of these small nations to work together.

But, though the failure of Kállay's policy was not instrumental in
the ruin of half of Europe's chance to be liberated by the West, still his
failure certainly crushed the Horthy regimes chance to perform the triple
miracle of saving itself and of saving Hungaryfrom both the German and the
Russian occupation. Up until Kállay's overthrow, Hungaryhad managed to
remain, in spite of several incidents and measures of the Nazi type, a relative
"island of freedom" in Hitler's Europe. Kállay's successor as premier
was a pro-
German
Hungarian general under whose government Nazi terror engulfed the country.
Hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews were now added to the millions murdered
by the German Nazis. Nevertheless Regent Horthy, who stayed in office after the
Nazi coup in March 1944, did not give up hope of saving Hungaryfrom total
defeat. The elements favoring a separate peace regrouped around him, and in the
confusion of great German defeats, he was able in August to appoint to the
premiership an anti-
Nazi
Hungarian general who was ready to negotiate with the Russians, rather than,
like Premier Kállay, exclusively with the Western Allies.

Meanwhile in Romania and Bulgaria also, the break with Germany was in
preparation behind the scenes. Even in the two satellite states that owed their
very existence to Hitler, Croatia and Slovakia plans for defection were laid.
The foreign minister of satellite Croatia paid with his life for an
unsuccessful attempt to bring his country over from Pavelic's Fascists to the
Allied side. And the initial success of the partisan rising in satellite
Slovakia in the summer of 1944, owed at least something to the connivance of
some people in the Tiso regime, in the army in particular.

The Hitler era was drawing to a close in Eastern Europe. But what would
the Soviet liberation be like? What would the liberators and the liberated do?
The active or potential anti-

German forces which looked forward to liberation were split into numerous
mutually suspicious or even openly hostile factions. In many of the underground
movements, loose "popular fronts" did unite different resistance groups,
sometimes even conservatives with Communists. But the fratricidal struggle in
Yugoslavia between the two partisan leaders, the Communist Tito and the anti-
Communist
Mihailovic was a warning of what could happen elsewhere, with the stage set
for similar conflicts. Suppressed nationalist rivalries in the Danube Valley
were threatening to erupt. Old ruling classes were trying to save themselves,
and great social revolutionary forces were preparing for the day of reckoning.

Who would "take the lead," who would be "playing the hand" in these
affairs? How could order be brought out of chaos? These were the questions
that weighed heavily upon Churchill's mind in the spring of 1944.[3]

As the difficulties of cooperation with the Russians increased, Churchill
renewed his plea for an Allied thrust from Italy toward Vienna, this time with
the explicit intention to "forestall the Russians in certain areas of Central
Europe."[4] In view of the stubborn German resistance, it is uncertain
whether much of Central Europe could have been liberated by the Western Allies
ahead of the Red Army. The crossing of the Alps would have been a tremendous
task, even had the Allied forces in Italy not been stripped of their offensive
power by the landing in southern France. In any case, the military power was
not available for Churchill's plans, so he resorted to power politics to meet
the unsettled problems of Central Europe and the Balkans. He himself considered
his controversial deals with Stalin as "wartime arrangements," stressing in his
memoirs that "all larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then
hoped would be a peace table when the war was won."[5] Nevertheless
they were unquestionably sphere-
of-
influence
arrangements.

On May 17, 1944, Eden suggested to the Soviet Ambassador in London that
the Soviets should temporarily regard Romanian affairs as mainly their concern
under war conditions, while leaving Greece to the British. The Russians agreed,
but wanted to know if the United States had been consulted. On May 31 Churchill
notified Rooseveltof the plan. The American reaction was cool. Cordell Hull
was of the view that "any creation of zones of influence would inevitably sow
the seeds of future conflict." On June 8 Churchill urged acceptance, and added
Bulgaria to the list of countries where the Russians would be taking the lead.
On June 11, Rooseveltrejected the plan, advising instead the setting up of
"consultative machinery" which would "restrain the tendency towards the
development of exclusive spheres." Churchill replied on the same day and again
strongly urged acceptance, suggesting that the arrangement should have a trial
of three months. On June 13 Roosevelt without consulting Cordell Hull, agreed
to this proposal, adding, "We must be careful to make it clear that we are not
establishing any post-
war
spheres of influence." The Soviet government was notified accordingly on June
19, but actually no final agreement was reached. Stalin, on July 15, noting
that "the American Government have some doubts regarding this question,"
proposed "to revert to the matter." However, no further discussions
followed.[6] In the middle of August, Churchill, driven by his desire to bring "order
out of chaos," met Tito in Naples, where he succeeded in paving the way for an
agreement of cooperation between Tito and Subasic the Premier of the Yugoslav
exiles. But the assurance which Tito gave Churchill that he had "no desire to
introduce the communist system into Yugoslavia,"7 was probably not the same
assurance that he gave Stalin a few weeks later when he left his British-
protected
stronghold on the Adriatic island of Vis for a secret trip to Moscow.

The Russian summer campaign was driving the Germans westward with
irresistible force, and the need for East-
West
agreement on post-
liberation policies was greater than ever. Most disturbing was the Soviet
behavior during the heroic Warsaw uprising against the Germans in August. Not
only was no help rendered by the Red Army, which was within easy reach of the
city, but even the use of Soviet airfields was denied to the West, anxious to
bring relief to the Warsaw Poles who paid allegiance to the London government
in exile. Soviet charges that some of the Poles in the London government were
reactionaries and enemies of Russia were not without foundation. On the other
hand, Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk was an agrarian democrat and a sincere
advocate of reconciliation and cooperation with Russia. The popular Western
assumption that cooperation with the Russians was a matter of a liberal and
progressive partnership was a delusion. It greatly impeded any realistic
interpretation of Soviet policies, even in such a case as Poland, where the
Russians made little effort to hide their imperialistic designs.

The Russians took the lead in dictating armistice terms to Romania, when
on August 23 the country followed King Michaelto a man and overthrew the pro-
German
regime. They were again in the lead in signing an armistice with Finland after
fighting stopped on September 4. Without even consulting the Western Allies,
the Russians declared war on September 5 against Bulgaria. (Bulgaria, alone
among Hitler's satellites, and although at war with the Western Powers, had
maintained diplomatic relations throughout the war with Soviet Russia.) The
Russo-
Bulgarian
"war" lasted four days and enabled Russia to treat Bulgaria as a defeated
German satellite.

Where Hitler's tyranny ended, Stalin's began, in the Danube Valley. Only
in Hungarywere the Nazis able to solidify their rule for a little longer.
Horthy's coup against the Germans on October 15 was a complete failure. The
Hungarians did not follow their regent to a man as the Romanians had followed
their king. While Horthy was engaged in the immensely difficult task of
bringing over German-
occupied
Hungaryto the Allied side, the Germans had the much easier job of passing the
government of Hungaryover to a group of Nazi extremists whom they had held in
reserve for the eventuality of Horthy's defection.

This was the inglorious end of Admiral Horthy's counterrevolutionary
regime. Or, in the more kindly words of C. A. Macartney (the most understanding
chronicler among the Western historians of the Horthy era), this was "the end
of a world."8 The conservative wing of the Horthy regimewas clever enough to
foresee Hitler's doom. But the indoctrination, anti-
Semitic,
chauvinistic, pro-
German,
of Hungarian public opinion under Horthy's regency was responsible for the hope
which so many Hungarians blindly shared, for Hitler's victory. Horthy's Nazi
successors posed as defenders of Christianity and national rights, while at the
same time distinguishing themselves as Hitler's ablest disciples in committing
crimes against humanity. As part of their propaganda they denounced the horrors
of impending Bolshevik rule and the sinister plans of the Allies to reimpose on
Hungarythe unjust terms of the Trianon Treaty. This propaganda unfortunately
proved true. However, the Hungarian Nazis' fanatical faith in Hitler's final
victory was proved wrong. Their brief period of power under the "leadership" of
Major Ferenc Szálasi marked the all-
time
low point in Hungarys history.

Threatened by the advancing Russians from the north, the Germans began
to withdraw from the Balkans. A critical situation arose in Greece, where the
greater part of the country was held by the Communist ELAS guerrilla bands.
Although, in the so-
called
Caserta agreement, ELAS had recognized the authority of the Greek government in
exile, and although according to the British-
Soviet
June agreements, Britain was supposed to take the lead in Greece, the
restoration of the legal government to power in Athens constituted a grave
problem in view of the mounting disorder. With growing concern Churchill
watched "the upsurge of Communist influence" in Eastern Europe (a fact which
according to him the United States "were very slow in realizing"), but his
concern, at least for the time being, was limited to certain countries. He felt
that Britain's past relations with Romania and Bulgaria did not call for any
special sacrifices; but, he said, "the fate of Poland and Greece struck us
keenly. For Poland we had entered the war; for Greece we had made painful
efforts. "[9] On October 9, Churchill and Eden arrived in Moscow for
another round of conferences, which were conducted in the same spirit in which
the "temporary arrangements" had been made in June. On the first day of the
Moscow conference it was agreed that Russia should have 90 percent
predominance" in Romania, 75 percent in Bulgaria; Britain should have 90
percent of Greece; while Russia and Britain should go fifty-
fifty
in Yugoslavia and Hungary[10] On the subject of Poland, protracted
negotiations, to which the Lublin Poles and Mikolajczyk were also invited,
produced meager results. The percentage system, this newly discovered basis of
East-
West
agreements, failed to bridge the gulf between the Lublin Poles and Mikolajczyk.
Boleslaw Bierut, head of the Lublin Committee, contended that "if Mikolajczyk
were Premier he [Bierut] must have 75 percent of the Cabinet." Churchill backed
up Mikolajczyk with a proposal of "fifty-
fifty
plus himself" (that is, Mikolajczyk as Premier). As to the other burning issue,
the Russo-
Polish
frontier, Mikolajczyk was "going to urge upon his London colleagues the Curzon
Line, including Lvov, for the Russians." Nevertheless Churchill was hopeful
that a final settlement would be reached soon.11
Churchill's optimism was sustained by events in Greece. When it came to
an armed showdown with the Greek Communists, the Russians kept their hands off
and let the British act. In other words, the Moscow percentage agreements
worked beautifully in Greece. The course of events in Poland, however,
contributed only to pessimism. Mikolajczyk resigned after his failure to make
his London colleagues accept the Curzon Line. The deadlock between Moscow and
the Polish government in exile became complete when, on January 1, 1945, Moscow
recognized the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland.

The United States never subscribed to Churchill's percentage diplomacy.
Rooseveltand his advisers opposed these special arrangements because they were
anxious to avoid the creation of zones of influence. The United States
government believed as strongly as the British government that the Soviet Union
was entitled to full security along her western borders, and that the countries
in Eastern Europe should have governments friendly to the Soviet Union. But
Rooseveltbelieved, in the words of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Hull's successor
at the head of the State Department, that "a strong world organization, created
before the end of the war . . . would help the world to deal with the
inevitable difficulties that would arise over the control of liberated
territories and would make spheres of influence of less importance than in the
past."[12]

On the eve of Yalta the difference between Churchill's attitude and
Roosevelts seemed to be this: Rooseveltwas hopeful that a strong United
Nations organization might prevent the partition of Europe into spheres of
influence; whereas Churchill, recognizing Europe's partition as an accomplished
fact, sought to ease its consequences by bargaining with the Russians.