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1 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General DHS' Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving OIG December 2008

2 Office of Inspector General U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC December 10, 2008 Preface The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law ) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. In response to a congressional request from U.S. Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, our report addresses whether DHS is providing adequate oversight and guidance for fusion centers, and what problems and challenges are being encountered as fusion centers develop. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant federal and state agencies and departments, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all who contributed to the preparation of this report. Richard L. Skinner Inspector General

3 Table of Contents/Abbreviations Executive Summary...1 Background...3 Results of Review...8 Fusion Center Coordination Is Improving and Evolving, But Some Challenges Remain...8 Recommendations...15 Management Comments and OIG Analysis...16 Office of Intelligence and Analysis Coordination Within the Department of Homeland Security Is Progressing, But Major Challenges Still Exist...17 Recommendations...25 Management Comments and OIG Analysis...25 Additional Work Is Necessary to Align Fusion Center Funding and Activities With the Department of Homeland Security s Mission...27 Recommendations...32 Management Comments and OIG Analysis...32 Fusion Centers Are Concerned With Sustainability and Funding...34 Office of Intelligence and Analysis Intelligence Officers Are Adding Value to Fusion Centers...37 Deploying Intelligence Officers to Fusion Centers Has Been a Challenge for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Recommendations...45 Management Comments and OIG Analysis...46 Appendices Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology...47 Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report...48 Appendix C: DHS-Managed Systems Available to Fusion Centers...54 Appendix D: Office of Inspections Fusion Center Sample, March Appendix E: Major Contributors to This Report...56 Appendix F: Report Distribution...57

5 OIG Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General Executive Summary Improving intelligence gathering and information sharing at all levels of government has been a major concern and priority since the terrorist attacks of September 11, To promote greater information sharing and collaboration among federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement entities, state and local authorities established fusion centers throughout the country. These centers are a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing its ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. In June 2006, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security signed an implementation plan to support state and local fusion centers and designated the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as the executive agent for managing the department s role in the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. The department s fusion center program is intended to provide information, people, technology, and other resources to fusion centers to create a web of interconnected information nodes across the country. At the request of Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, we assessed whether the Department of Homeland Security is providing adequate oversight and guidance for fusion centers, and what problems and challenges are being encountered as fusion centers develop. Specifically, we determined: (1) the extent to which the department s Office of Intelligence and Analysis has been working to coordinate and develop its relationship and role with fusion centers; (2) whether fusion center funding and activities are aligned to further the department s mission; (3) the merits of detailing Office of Intelligence and Analysis staff to fusion centers; and (4) whether the Office of Intelligence and Analysis is successful in backfilling positions used to staff fusion centers. Office of Intelligence and Analysis coordination efforts with fusion centers are improving and evolving, and its intelligence officers assigned to fusion centers have added value. However, challenges remain with internal Department of Homeland Security coordination, aligning fusion center activities and funding with the department s mission, and deploying personnel to state and local fusion centers in a timely manner. Page 1

6 We are making seven recommendations to assist the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis in improving the overall effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security s fusion center program. In response to our report, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has proposed plans and taken action that, once fully implemented, will reduce a number of the deficiencies we identified. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis concurred with all seven recommendations. Page 2

7 Background Improving intelligence gathering and information sharing at all levels of government has been a major concern and priority since the terrorist attacks of September 11, The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and charged it with coordinating activities and improving information sharing efforts among federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies and the private sector. Furthermore, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, the 9/11 Commission, concluded that a lack of information sharing contributed to the inability to prevent the attacks. Moreover, in its 2004 final report, the 9/11 Commission promoted the value of state and local agencies in the information sharing process and recommended that DHS have the responsibility of coordinating these efforts. 1 Establishing Fusion Centers Information sharing has become the primary means to detect, identify, and assess terrorist threats to and vulnerabilities of the homeland. To promote greater information sharing and collaboration among federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement entities, state and local authorities established fusion centers throughout the country. Fusion centers are a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. 2 They are joint multi-jurisdictional information centers that combine data from various sources and disciplines. The term fusion refers to the process of managing the flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and private industry, and through analysis, provides meaningful intelligence. Legislation and Initiatives To Facilitate Information Sharing To aid information sharing efforts further, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of This Act established the Information Sharing Environment within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 3 The Information Sharing Environment 1 The 9/11 Commission Report, July DHS and the Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines, August Public Law Page 3

8 is an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information. 4 The Implementation Plan for the Information Sharing Environment envisions that the federal government will promote the establishment of a nationwide and integrated network of state and major urban area fusion centers to facilitate effective terrorism information sharing. This network of fusion centers would house federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence resources to provide useful sources of law enforcement and threat information, facilitate information sharing across jurisdictions and functions, and establish a conduit among federal, state, and local agencies. Recognizing that state and local governments are vital partners in information sharing, federal agencies such as DHS, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have collaborated to assist in establishing and sustaining fusion centers. Creating Fusion Center Guidance and Information Sharing Requirements On December 16, 2005, the President issued a memorandum prescribing the guidelines and requirements supporting the creation and implementation of the Information Sharing Environment. 5 The President directed the heads of executive departments and agencies to work actively to create a culture of information sharing within their respective departments or agencies by assigning personnel and dedicating resources to terrorism-related information sharing. The President s guidelines recognized that state, local, and tribal authorities are critical to the nationwide efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks and are the first to respond when an attack occurs. In August 2006, DHS and the Department of Justice published the Fusion Center Guidelines to help direct and provide assistance to developing fusion centers. These guidelines delineate 18 recommended elements for establishing and operating fusion centers. The guidelines are intended to improve consistency among the many different state and local fusion centers, enhance coordination, strengthen regional and national partnerships, and improve fusion center capabilities. 4 Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, accessed March 28, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment, Office of the Press Secretary, December 16, Page 4

9 Developing a Strategy for Information Sharing With Fusion Centers In October 2007, the President issued the first National Strategy for Information Sharing 6 to prioritize and unify the Nation s efforts to advance terrorism-related information sharing. The strategy integrates Information Sharing Environment-related initiatives and sets forth a national plan to build on progress made in improving information sharing and establishing an integrated national information sharing capability. The National Strategy emphasizes that information on homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement related to terrorism can come from multiple sources and all levels of government. The National Strategy designates fusion centers as vital assets critical to information sharing and antiterrorism efforts, and as the primary state and local focal points for receiving and sharing of terrorism-related information. As a part of the National Strategy, the federal government recommends that fusion centers achieve a baseline capability level and become interconnected with the federal government and each other. This collaboration is intended to create a nationwide, integrated network of fusion centers to enable the effective sharing of terrorism-related information. As of April 2008, state and local authorities have created 58 fusion centers nationwide. The centers goals are to blend law enforcement and intelligence information, and coordinate security measures to reduce threats in local communities. Fusion centers vary in size, scope, jurisdiction, capability, and maturity. The missions of these centers also vary. For example, some fusion centers are focused specifically on terrorism-related threats, others deal with information sharing related to all crimes, while other centers focus on addressing all hazards. DHS Implementation of the Fusion Center Program DHS uses the national intelligence and law enforcement communities to support state and local government requirements through its fusion center program. In June 2006, the Secretary signed the DHS Support Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers and designated the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) as its executive agent for managing the department s role in the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. The implementation plan identified state and local governments among DHS primary partners. It also explained DHS role in supporting and developing state and local partnerships and highlighted domestic 6 National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing, October Page 5

10 information gathering and analysis as DHS unique contribution to the national-level mission to protect the Nation. Further, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 codified the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative and DHS role in it. 7 DHS fusion center program is intended to provide information, people, technology, and other resources to fusion centers to create a nationwide web of interconnected information nodes. DHS views fusion centers as entities that provide critical sources of unique law enforcement and threat information, and facilitate sharing information across federal, state, and local jurisdictions and functions. DHS envisions creating partnerships with all state and local fusion centers to improve information flow between DHS and the fusion centers, and to improve the effectiveness of the centers in general. The goal is to enable DHS and the fusion center network to produce accurate, timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence products and services in support of securing the homeland. Office of Intelligence and Analysis Role in DHS Fusion Center Program As the executive agent for managing DHS fusion center program, I&A is responsible for coordinating among its federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners to ensure the program s success. Each I&A division has a specific mission that in some way relates to the program. I&A is headed by an Under Secretary, who also serves as the department s Chief Intelligence Officer. The State and Local Program Office, which coordinates the fusion center program, is directed by a program manager. The State and Local Program Office contains three divisions: State and Local Fusion Center Program Management Office; Information Sharing Fellows Program; and Law Enforcement Liaison Team. The Program Management Office directs the day-to-day operations of DHS fusion center program, including the management and coordination of deployed officers and Homeland Secure Data Network 8 access. Through the Information Sharing Fellows Program, state or local representatives are detailed temporarily to I&A to familiarize state and local entities with DHS missions, capabilities, roles, and programs, and to promote information sharing among federal, state, and local entities. Law Enforcement Liaison Team representatives liaise with state and local law 7 Public Law The Homeland Secure Data Network is DHS classified communications network system to which federal, state, and local users can post and manage information. Page 6

11 enforcement entities to advise them about DHS role in the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative, promote state and local use of DHS systems and databases such as the Homeland Security Information Network, 9 and improve information sharing. Figure 1 depicts I&A s current organizational chart. Figure 1: Office of Intelligence and Analysis Organizational Chart, as of March 2008 Source: I&A DHS Support to Fusion Centers As part of its support to fusion centers, DHS has provided more than $254 million, from FY 2004 to FY 2007, to state and local governments. 10 DHS is also deploying personnel to fusion centers to facilitate state and local access to information, technology, and training. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 specifies that DHS 9 The Homeland Security Information Network is DHS primary, nationwide information-sharing application for sharing sensitive but unclassified information. The network is composed of more than 35 community-of-interest topic-portals, such as Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Emergency Management. 10 DHS State and Local Fusion Center Initiative Web site, accessed May 21, Page 7

12 intelligence officers may be assigned from I&A, the Office of Infrastructure Protection, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and other DHS components as determined by the Secretary. I&A has deployed intelligence officers to work side by side with state and local authorities at fusion centers and to facilitate the two-way flow of timely, accurate, and actionable information on all types of threats. As of April 2008, I&A has deployed 22 intelligence officers, and the Under Secretary anticipates having 35 officers in major fusion centers nationwide by the end of FY At the request of Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, we assessed whether DHS is providing adequate oversight and guidance for fusion centers, and what problems and challenges are being encountered as fusion centers develop. Specifically, we examined the following: The extent to which I&A has been working to coordinate and develop its relationship and role with fusion centers; Whether fusion center funding and activities are aligned to further the department s mission; The merits of detailing I&A staff to fusion centers; and Whether I&A is successful in backfilling positions used to staff fusion centers. Results of Review Fusion Center Coordination Is Improving and Evolving, But Some Challenges Remain Coordination efforts with fusion centers continue to improve through the combined efforts of I&A and other federal, state, and local information sharing partners. Many state and local fusion center officials praised I&A s efforts on the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. However, fusion center officials remain concerned that I&A has not developed an action plan to ensure that it understands and can meet the centers evolving and unique needs. Such needs include receiving adequate and timely information from DHS, assistance in navigating DHS complex organization, and obtaining initial and ongoing training for state and local analysts. I&A is working to address fusion center coordination needs by improving access to information, responding to Requests for Information, assisting fusion centers in coordinating communications with DHS Page 8

13 components, and developing and offering training opportunities to state and local officials. Adequate and Timely Information Dissemination Needs Improvement Fusion centers have experienced difficulty receiving adequate and timely information from DHS. Many fusion center officials we interviewed said that they received irrelevant or outdated information in the past. In addition, center officials could not determine whether the information was adequately processed through all relevant systems or coordinated with other intelligence or law enforcement entities. However, according to I&A officials, I&A is striving to meet the needs of fusion centers. In an April 2008 speech, the Under Secretary for I&A recognized that state and local authorities have been analyzing and acting on information for years and the federal government must aggressively support these endeavors. As a result, I&A plans to increase its support to state and local partners in three main areas: standing information needs, Requests for Information, and use of open source information. Although much work remains, fusion center officials note many improvements in obtaining timely and relevant information from DHS. For example, a sample of fusion centers are benefiting from a pilot program to improve Request for Information processing and from access to deployed intelligence representatives. The Request for Information Process Increases Information Support to State and Local Partners Fusion center officials identified information needs as a primary concern. I&A has taken steps to improve DHS Request for Information process and implemented a pilot program to refine the department s response to fusion center information requests. Such requests express a need for information that can be satisfied through the exploitation of existing databases or analyses not normally available to the requestor. The requestor may be a person, component, agency, or a group of organizations or stakeholders. The Request for Information pilot program examined information flows and processes regarding requests, standing information needs, and open source information. The pilot program identified several areas needing improvement, including establishing a single point of entry to submit Requests for Information, improving response time, and training fusion center personnel on how to access information through the Request for Information process. Page 9

14 DHS has established policies, procedures, and responsibilities for departmental processing of Requests for Information. Through the Request for Information pilot process and deployed officers, fusion centers gain assistance in obtaining information from DHS. However, DHS needs to improve the quality and timeliness of DHS information support to fusion centers and establish a single point of service. Creation of Fusion Cell Within the National Operations Center I&A accepts, processes, and responds to Requests for Information through the National Operations Center. I&A coordinates with the Office of Operations Coordination, which oversees the National Operations Center. The center collects and processes information from more than 35 federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector agencies; it is the primary national-level hub for domestic situational awareness, information processing and sharing, communications, and coordination pertaining to terrorist attack prevention and domestic incident management. Within the National Operations Center, the Fusion Cell serves as the initial entry point for inquiries and requests from deployed I&A officers or fusion center personnel for intelligence and operations information. The Fusion Cell, established in 2007, tasks requests that are deemed immediate action within the center. More in-depth requests are forwarded to I&A s Collection Requirements division for further analysis and delegated to the appropriate responder, such as an analyst in one of I&A analytical divisions, DHS components, or other intelligence community agencies. The Fusion Cell comprises personnel from the National Operations Center s Fusion Desk and I&A s Watch and Warning division. There are two branches within the Watch and Warning division. One branch is the Watch Section, which operates 24 hours per day, 7 days per week to maintain situational awareness. The second branch is the Warning Section, which deals primarily with intelligence threats and notifications to state and local entities, fusion centers, and other homeland security personnel as appropriate. The Warning Section coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on intelligence products. The products are approved by the Under Secretary for I&A, and disseminated by the Watch and Warning division. The Watch Section distributes daily intelligence updates and provides information to DHS representatives in the fusion centers. Both sections focus primarily on domestic threats to fit the state and local fusion center needs. Classified products are distributed through the secure Homeland Secure Data Network. Page 10

15 Request for Information Pilot Project Implemented Beginning in July 2007, I&A conducted a six-month pilot project to evaluate and improve its Request for Information process. The pilot examined information flows and processes regarding requests, routine information needs, and open source information. It was intended to upgrade the quality and timeliness of DHS information support to fusion centers, and establish a single point of service for fusion centers to submit requests. DHS State and Local Fusion Center Support Oversight Group, an integrated product team of the Information Sharing and Collaboration Council, was established to provide oversight. The group, composed of I&A division chief managers; senior I&A analysts assigned to the pilot project; and representatives from the National Operations Center, Fusion Desk, ICE, and CBP, monitored the pilot. The group assessed the pilot s operation and acted as necessary to resolve requests, meet fusion center standing information needs, and other issues of significance. The pilot was conducted at six fusion centers two in California and one each in Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York. National Operations Center officials said that all requests were treated with equal importance, whether the request originated from a pilot site or nonpilot site, but pilot-site Requests for Information were tracked separately for statistical purposes and analysis. A senior I&A official said that although the initial pilot officially concluded in December 2007, I&A decided to extend it to conduct a complete review of I&A s efforts with all fusion centers. Pilot Project Results The results described improvements made since the pilot s inception and included recommendations for increasing performance, efficiency, quality and timeliness of responses, and overall program effectiveness. For example, I&A should assist states in developing priority information needs to reflect each fusion center s top priorities and focus areas for the upcoming year. Some of the top priorities for the pilot fusion centers include threats to critical infrastructure and prison radicalization. These information needs give I&A an accurate picture of each fusion center s mission-critical intelligence support needs. 11 Identifying needs may encourage dialogue between DHS and fusion centers, as well as direct analyst-to-analyst exchanges. I&A also may use the priority needs to inform its production planning. 11 Enhancing DHS Information Support to State and Local Fusion Centers: Results of the Chief Intelligence Officer s Pilot Project and Next Steps, Centra Technology, February 20, Page 11

16 I&A is working to improve its response time and critical needs assessments for fusion centers through the pilot project. One I&A representative said that it reflects poorly on DHS when information requests from state and local officials do not receive timely or sufficient attention. Another DHS official reported that, prior to the pilot, the interaction between the Offices of Operations Coordination and I&A was not streamlined. As a result, there was some friction over who had what information and who was responsible for tasking the requests. The pilot project attempted to formalize the process to determine information flow and needs. Operating Outside the Established Request for Information Process Several fusion center officials and I&A representatives reported that the information flow to and from DHS is inconsistent and the Request for Information process still needs improvement. For example, many I&A officers assigned to fusion centers rely on prior informal relationships with the National Operations Center or I&A personnel to obtain information, rather than using the established Fusion Cell request process. In addition, some fusion center personnel rely on their I&A officers, or on previously developed DHS contacts, to obtain information rather than navigate DHS information system or the National Operations Center Fusion Cell. Additional Needs for Law Enforcement and Immigration Information Some of the information that interests fusion center personnel is incomplete, classified intelligence from the intelligence community, which could be provided by I&A. However, many state and local personnel desire access to law enforcement information that is more readily available from DHS law enforcement components, such as ICE and CBP, or immigration information managed by U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Services (USCIS). A State and Local Program Office official said that DHS has a great deal of information at its disposal that could be useful to state and local authorities, such as immigration and law enforcement information in databases managed by CBP, ICE, and USCIS. As I&A employees, the deployed officers may not be best suited to provide fusion center personnel with information from those databases, which are largely under the control of other DHS components. Navigating DHS Complex Organization Is More Efficient When I&A Representatives Are Deployed The majority of fusion center officials whom we spoke with reported frustrations when navigating DHS complex organization, and are confused by the department s structure. As a result, state and local Page 12

17 officials rely on their assigned I&A officer for fast, efficient, and adequate responses to their information needs. In response, I&A officials said that I&A continues to identify ways to improve the Request for Information process. For example, one I&A representative said that when there is an administrative request, such as a Request for Information about security clearances, the representative refers the request to I&A s State and Local Program Office, who could be immediately and appropriately tasked. In another example, should a request involve an analytical product, the representative refers the request to one of I&A s analytical branches for resolution. To discourage the practice of several fusion center officials contacting multiple DHS components directly for information, another I&A representative suggested creating a single address to receive requests from fusion center officials and provide one DHS answer. DHS is taking steps to facilitate efficient and coordinated communications between it and the fusion centers by enhancing I&A s Request for Information process and by requesting that each state that has multiple fusion centers designate one of its centers as the primary point of contact with DHS. Analytical Training, Working Groups, and Conferences That Target Fusion Centers Are Viewed As Beneficial Fusion center officials reported benefits from DHS communications, training, and outreach efforts, as these efforts enhance state and local officials understanding of the federal intelligence community and their role within the community. However, fusion center officials expressed a need to obtain more structured and formalized analytical training to improve their ability to generate products for the intelligence community, and to facilitate coordination and communication between DHS and the fusion centers. Fusion center officials also reported that budget constraints limit their ability to send personnel to out-of-state training. One fusion center director said funds are not routinely available to send personnel to off-site training or conferences, and it can be difficult convincing state governments to fund such travel. A number of fusion center officials suggested that DHS conduct training outside of the Washington, DC, metropolitan area and explore the feasibility of online training modules to provide low- or no-cost training to state and local field personnel. I&A Is Developing Training for State and Local Governments The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandates that I&A develop training opportunities for state and local Page 13

18 government officials. 12 According to the Deputy Under Secretary for Operations, I&A is developing specific training plans to support the needs of state and local analysts and deployed I&A officers. Specifically, I&A divisions have developed targeted training opportunities for state and local government officials. These I&A divisions participate in, coordinate, and host analytical exchanges, working groups, workshops, training sessions, and conferences to develop I&A s relationship with fusion centers. Although subject matter varies, focus areas include maritime and border security, extremism and radicalization, programmatic and planning elements, and state intelligence requirements. I&A issues information related to analytical training in its weekly training newsletter. The newsletter provides descriptions of intelligence-related courses, such as Best Practices in Community Collaboration, Intelligence Oversight and Information Handling, and Analytical Thinking and Presentation. I&A has conducted Reports Officers training and intelligence writing courses, and is working with DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Office of the Chief Privacy Officer to develop privacy and civil liberties training, as required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of Working Groups and Conferences Have Been Established To Enhance Coordination To ensure that DHS is working toward coordinating with fusion centers, I&A personnel are also involved in various working groups and committees. For example, the National Fusion Center Coordination Group, co-chaired by I&A s State and Local Program Office program manager and the FBI s Deputy Assistant Director for the Directorate of Intelligence, was established as part of the Information Sharing Environment to oversee progress and encourage collaboration on the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. The National Fusion Center Coordination Group operates with the full participation of state and local officials to help ensure that the federal government s efforts to work with fusion centers are coordinated and carried out efficiently. Additionally, I&A s State and Local Program Office helps coordinate the annual, jointly planned DHS and Department of Justice National Fusion Center Conferences, which were held in Destin, Florida, in March 2007, and in San Francisco, California, in March Public Law Page 14

19 Deployed I&A Officers Participate in Various Forums To Facilitate Communication and Coordination Deployed I&A officers said that they participate in or lead working groups, briefings, planning meetings, and governance committees designed to improve information sharing and coordinate state, local, regional, and national efforts. I&A officers serve as advisors on fusion center governing boards and planning committees, such as the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center s Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council, the Alabama Fusion Center Advisory Board, the Mississippi Fusion Center Steering Committee, and the National Capital Region Fusion Center Regional Programmatic Working Group. In addition, I&A officers may attend or lead sessions at regional forums, outreach groups, and homeland security task forces whose members include federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement representatives. I&A officers also participate in regional consortiums such as Southern Shield, which unites law enforcement and fusion center personnel in the Southeast region. I&A officials said they have hosted many fusion center officials in Washington, DC. One fusion center director reported that a classified intelligence briefing given in Washington in June 2007 was a valuable experience. The State and Local Program Office has also given briefings in the field to fusion center personnel and state and local government officials, such as governors and state Homeland Security Advisors. Recommendations We recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with relevant DHS components: Recommendation #1: Develop a plan to improve the adequacy, quality, and timeliness of responses to Requests for Information, and identify designated points-of-contact between I&A and fusion centers to receive, task, and respond to information needs. Recommendation #2: Develop a plan to expand analytical training courses, provide additional course locations, and explore the feasibility of online training modules to provide low- or no-cost training to state and local fusion center personnel. Page 15

20 Management Comments and OIG Analysis We evaluated I&A s written comments and have made changes to the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary of I&A s written response to the report s recommendations and our analysis of the response follows each recommendation. A copy of I&A s response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix B. I&A Response: I&A concurred with recommendation 1. In its response, I&A said that it has created a single point of service to increase the ease of use, efficiency, and quality of support for its state and local fusion center partners. This single point of service provides fusion centers with a one-stop shop for DHS information and intelligence support. It employs a streamlined Request for Information process to ensure that I&A s partners needs are addressed quickly and effectively. OIG Analysis: We consider I&A s proposed actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This recommendation will remain open pending receipt of documentation that describes the current single point of service and the streamlined Request for Information processes, as well as the way in which I&A will measure and document improvements in its ability to respond quickly and effectively to the information needs of fusion centers. I&A Response: I&A concurred with recommendation 2. In its response, I&A said that Section 503 of the 9/11 Commission Act mandates that DHS develop training curricula on the intelligence cycle for state and local officials, using existing training programs as appropriate and assessing needs of the target audience. The DHS Intelligence Enterprise Training Working Group was formed to ensure the fulfillment of the intelligence training-related requirements in the 9/11 Commission Act. As a result, this working group has developed and delivered the DHS Analytic and Critical Thinking Skills Workshop, which is mobile training that combines elements of critical thinking, analytic tools, techniques, and writing. I&A said that it has delivered 4 workshop classes to more than 80 state and local students; and has plans to offer training to another 140 state and local analysts over the next year. This training is delivered regionally at sites readily accessible to fusion center personnel. Additionally, I&A said that it is pursuing a more flexible delivery system for DHS Basic Intelligence and Threat Assessment Page 16

21 Course, which is currently only offered at facilities in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. I&A also plans to develop the Homeland Security Intelligence Specialist Certificate program and offer modules through mobile training teams at regional facilities nationwide. Further, I&A is working with federal partners to develop and provide critical training to state and local officials at fusion centers nationwide. OIG Analysis: We consider I&A s proposed actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and closed. No further reporting is necessary. Office of Intelligence &Analysis Coordination Within the Department of Homeland Security Is Progressing, But Major Challenges Still Exist To develop its role and relationship with fusion centers, I&A is working to coordinate internally among its divisions and externally among other DHS components. I&A has experienced some successes in this effort. Most notably, I&A is shifting its analytical focus and reporting to meet the needs of state and local officials more effectively. However, I&A s coordination and support among some DHS components appears inconsistent, and several communication and management difficulties challenge I&A s ability to fulfill its mandate as the executive agent for DHS fusion center program. Fusion Center Program Coordination and Support Within I&A Divisions Is Evolving State and Local Program Office officials said that they interact with all I&A divisions on DHS fusion center program. These divisions must work together to ensure that the program meets its objectives. The extent to which the State and Local Program Office interacts with each I&A division varies according to programmatic or operational needs. For example, the program office works with the Production Management division to coordinate and generate intelligence products for federal, state, and local use. The State and Local Program Office assists in the development of DHS Interaction with State and Local Fusion Center Concept of Operations plan, which is led by I&A s Information Sharing and Knowledge Management division. Also, the program office coordinates with the Collection Requirements division to aid in the identification of federal, state, and local intelligence needs, and with the Homeland Environment Threat Analysis division to provide analytic and Page 17

22 oversight support to the State and Local Fusion Center s pilot project concerning the processing of Requests for Information. Some Internal Coordination Challenges Exist Within I&A Despite the importance of all I&A divisions participating in the fusion center program, coordination and support among some I&A divisions remains inconsistent. Although fusion center officials, I&A deployed officers, and I&A divisions have reported successes, additional challenges exist. For example, one I&A official said, I&A divisions are playing in the same sandbox but building their own castles. Another I&A officer suggested that coordination and communication among I&A divisions is confusing and varies widely. Some divisions are more helpful than others in obtaining information requested by fusion centers. I&A personnel also noted that some divisions may not have a clear understanding of the State and Local Program Office s mission, responsibilities, and activities. This ambiguity leads to confusion over roles and responsibilities of the office, slows coordination, and hampers communications among the divisions. Some I&A officials said that internal coordination is further challenged by personality-driven tensions and confusion about meeting state and local needs. Efforts To Address Coordination Challenges As a result, I&A has begun taking measures to ensure that its divisions understand the overall mission and goal of DHS fusion center program. I&A is devising an internal plan to meet the needs of state and local partners. More important, I&A officials said that I&A is directing its attention to state and local entities and the divisions have been instructed to tailor analytical products to meet state and local customer needs. Greater internal coordination of the fusion center program s mission is essential for DHS to succeed in its involvement in the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. Executing a successful program and coordinating with external partners relies on I&A s ability to coordinate more effectively within its internal divisions. I&A Coordination With and Support From Other DHS Components Requires Additional Attention To fulfill its role as the department s executive agent for the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative, I&A coordinates with and needs support from other DHS components. However, coordination and support among a number of DHS components appears inconsistent, with some successes and several challenges reported by fusion center officials, I&A officials, Page 18

23 I&A deployed officers, and DHS component representatives. Communications among I&A, fusion centers, and DHS components are sometimes conducted informally or on an ad hoc basis, which may exclude relevant parties with equities in information sharing on a local or national level. Some DHS Fusion Center Support Roles Are Not Clearly Understood Many DHS components already coordinate with state and local government authorities. However, as stated in DHS State and Local Fusion Center Support Implementation Plan, there is a need to work with fusion centers as a Department, not as a group of separate entities. As an Operations Coordination official noted, greater transparency and an enhanced understanding of respective roles in DHS fusion center program is important. In addition, I&A representatives reported that more transparency and increased communication are essential to ensure that all relevant components are consulted on decisions that may affect their roles in the fusion center program. Fusion Centers Request DHS Component Representatives A majority of state and local officials we spoke with expressed a desire that representatives from DHS components be assigned to their fusion centers. Some fusion center officials said that although they requested that DHS components such as ICE, CBP, or USCG assign a representative to their fusion center, some requests have not been fulfilled. Budget constraints were the reason most often cited for DHS components inability to assign personnel to fusion centers. One fusion center official requested a USCG representative but was told that resource constraints made it difficult to assign an officer to the center. Another center official reported that he requested a CBP officer but has not yet received confirmation that one would be deployed. Although we encountered ICE, CBP, and TSA personnel as well as DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate Protective Security Advisors working at fusion centers, we did not seek to determine the extent to which representatives from DHS operational components are assigned to fusion centers. However, few DHS components have assigned personnel to fusion centers, partly because the newer fusion centers are developing needs and resource requirements and DHS components have limited resources to fulfill competing priorities. The few DHS component representatives assigned to fusion centers is apparent when comparing DHS participation at fusion centers with that of other federal agencies such as the FBI or National Guard Bureau. Most of the fusion centers that we visited were co-located with FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces or Page 19

24 received other support from FBI resources and personnel. One fusion center had five National Guard counter-drug analysts, while another center had three intelligence analysts from the FBI. According to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, it is a priority for DHS to assign representatives from CBP, ICE, and USCG to border-state fusion centers. 13 DHS State and Local Fusion Center Support Implementation Plan also recommends assigning personnel from DHS components other than I&A. One State and Local Program Office official suggested that a fusion center near a large seaport might prefer to have a representative from USCG, rather than a representative from one of I&A s analytical divisions. Conversely, officials from a fusion center in a land border state might prefer a Border Patrol agent instead of a USCG officer. However, few fusion center officials we spoke with seemed inclined to refuse any personnel from any DHS component. Efforts To Address More Effective Coordination and Communication Formal working groups, such as the Information Sharing Governance Board, have formed to address some of these concerns and barriers that affect communication and coordination. This board is a DHS-wide forum that provides strategic oversight to the department s information sharing activities. It is responsible for ensuring consistency in information sharing and collaboration on policies across the department, and assists in decision-making policies related to DHS support and interaction with fusion centers. The board provides a forum for senior DHS intelligence, operational, and management leaders to ensure consistent governance, both internally and externally, when interacting with the fusion centers. Under the auspices of the Information Sharing Governance Board, the Information Sharing and Collaboration Council is the coordination body that addresses information sharing issues, including those that support fusion center activities. The council drafted DHS Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations plan. Among the various members of the council, the Office of Operations Coordination has many connections with DHS fusion center program. I&A collaborates with Operations Coordination on initiatives such as the Fusion Center Concept of Operations plan, the Homeland Security Information Network, the Request for Information pilot project, and National Operations Center activities. According to Operations Coordination officials, the relationship with I&A is improving. However, 13 Public Law , 511. Page 20

25 Operation Coordination officials expressed a desire for better communication to ensure that their office receives proper visibility on and awareness of interagency working groups and activities related to its role in DHS fusion center program. Coordination Progressing Well With the Offices of the Chief Privacy Officer and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties The Offices of the Chief Privacy Officer and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties have critical roles in ensuring that DHS fusion center program is carried out in accordance with all applicable privacy and civil rights regulations, laws, and constitutional protections. Officials from both offices said that coordination with I&A is progressing well. According to I&A officials, these offices are essential partners in DHS fusion center program. Each office has participated in privacy guidelines committees and working groups related to fusion centers and information sharing. Also, the offices have been involved in drafting DHS State and Local Fusion Center Concept of Operations plan, pursuant to guidelines set forth in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of At the conclusion of our fieldwork, the concept of operations plan was in the final stages of review, as the Privacy Office worked to finalize its Privacy Impact Assessment. As information sharing efforts expand, it will be even more critical for DHS and fusion centers to work on developing privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties procedures to protect information and systems. Both the Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties offices provide relevant training and guidance to fusion centers to support these efforts. Both offices work with I&A to ensure that fusion centers are operating in accordance with current statutes and guidelines. In addition, these offices assess systems, information flows, and information use to ensure that processes and procedures are in compliance with applicable privacy laws. Fusion center personnel also receive training to assist in complying with Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23. This regulation governs criminal intelligence systems that are operated by, or on behalf of, state and local law enforcement agencies and use certain federal funds. The regulations are intended to ensure that criminal intelligence systems operate in compliance with an individual s privacy and constitutional rights. Fusion centers receive assistance from the Offices of Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in developing policies to comply with 14 Public Law , 511. Page 21

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