Regional election will open new phase in Catalan conflict

The major pro-independence parties will not stand for election with a unified list, as they did at the 2015 regional election, with the Catalan Republican Left (ERC) set to become the largest party in the regional parliament.

Amid considerable uncertainty, opinion polls point to broadly stable support of just under 50% for pro-independence parties. Non-separatist parties may win a small majority of votes, although there is a risk of a shift of public opinion in favour of nationalist formations.

Even a narrow victory for unionists would be likely to yield a majority of seats for separatist parties, owing to the electoral system in the region, which over-represents the more strongly pro-independence rural areas.

This implies that the national government will come under pressure after the election to negotiate on constitutional reform with a separatist regional government, most likely headed by the ERC.

The most probable outcomes are a prolonged stalemate if talks become deadlocked or, possibly, a compromise on constitutional reform. The pro-independence parties' bargaining position will be stronger if they win a majority of votes.

The political climate in Catalonia remains tense ahead of elections to the regional parliament on December 21st amid the jailing on remand of seven former members of the ousted regional executive and the issuance of an international warrant for the arrest of five others, including the former regional president, Carles Puigdemont. Nonetheless, all of the main political parties are set both to participate in the regional election and to recognise the legitimacy of the results.

Opinion polls point to entrenched voter intentions

For the moment, opinion polls detect a modest decline in support for the pro-independence parties. Having won a combined 47.8% of the popular vote in 2015, support has eased back to 45.9% in recent weeks, according to a simple average of voting intentions in five recent opinion polls.

We remain of the view that polls should be treated with some scepticism in the current political climate. The temporary suspension of home rule in Catalonia—approved by the Spanish Senate (the upper house of parliament) on October 27th under Article 155 of the constitution—and the placement under precautionary custody of Catalan ministers on charges of rebellion for planning and proclaiming a new republic have the potential to trigger a surge of support for pro-independence parties. Even so, voter intentions are deeply entrenched: the vote share of the pro-independence parties has summed to 47‑49% of the popular vote in every regional election since 1999.

Even if non-secessionist parties retain a narrow majority of Catalan voters, they are unlikely to win a majority of seats in the next parliament. This reflects the design of the electoral system, which over-represents rural, conservative areas (where support for independence is strongest) and under-represents the more working-class and liberal urban areas in and around Barcelona. The separatist parties won 53% of the parliamentary seats (72 deputies in the 135‑member assembly) in the 2015 regional election—which was framed as a de facto referendum on independence, and saw high turnout of about 75%—with just 47.8% of the popular vote. Three of the five most recent opinion polls indicate that the pro-independence parties will retain a parliamentary majority in December.

Performance of unionist parties hinges on turnout

The fortunes of unionist parties will hinge on voter turnout. Although the pro-independence constituency has been highly mobilised for several years, political activism has been weaker among Catalonia's pro-Spanish voters, and their abstention rates in regional elections have been historically much higher. This could be changing, as witnessed by the large-scale pro-unity demonstrations in Barcelona in recent weeks. As Spanish media have awoken belatedly to the seriousness of the political crisis in Catalonia, it is likely to provide unprecedented coverage of the December election campaign. These two factors could result in strong turnout by pro-unity voters, although it remains unclear if this will be sufficient to disrupt the separatist majority in the regional legislature. The polling average cited above still places turnout on around 75%, broadly similar to the result in 2015.

The vote will open a new political cycle in Catalonia

At the same time, the risk of losing a working majority could lead the pro-independence parties to rally the electorate around a less divisive message. It seems likely that their campaign efforts will emphasise the loss of regional autonomy under Article 155 of the constitution and demands for the liberation of their imprisoned politicians, as well as a push for a legal referendum agreed with the national government.

The regional government's lack of preparation for its unilateral declaration of independence on October 27th, before disbanding as the national government announced its dismissal, appeared to shock many of its own supporters. Thousands of Catalonia's largest companies, including its two main banks, have moved their headquarters to other parts of Spain; the EU has offered no support to the ousted Catalan government and has refused to mediate in the crisis; and the independence movement's lack of preparation for day one of the newly proclaimed republic has been exposed. These factors suggest that many voters may desire new political proposals, and the opening of a new political cycle.

The ERC is set to become the dominant pro-independence party

The main pro-independence parties, the ERC and the Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT)—a centrist, liberal pro-independence party that has traditionally dominated Catalan politics—will contest the December election separately, thereby ending the coalition that has governed the region since 2015. This also suggests that the election campaign will not be a single-issue contest like the last regional election, and that the participating parties will present differentiated policy proposals for government.

The ERC, led by Oriol Junqueras—currently in custody on remand—is expected to win the election with just under 30% of the popular vote. PDeCAT is currently polling on 10‑11%, and is likely to suffer an electoral debacle, despite being led by the deposed Mr Puigdemont, whose self-imposed exile in Belgium will serve as a symbol for the separatist movement. The implosion of support for PDeCAT is a reflection of its move towards radicalism in recent years, as well as its association with a series of major corruption scandals. Support for the third pro-independence party, the anti-capitalist Popular Unity Candidates (CUP), is also expected to fall in December, to about 5‑6%, although the party has yet to decide officially whether it will participate.

Among the non-secessionist parties, polls show support rising for both Ciudadanos (Citizens) and the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), to about 19% and 14% respectively, and that of the conservative People's Party (PP) should be broadly unchanged at about 9%. Finally, Catalunya en Comú (associated with Podemos—We Can—in Catalonia), which opposes independence but supports the right to self-determination, is polling on about 10% of the popular vote. Profound ideological differences rule out the possibility of a four-party governing alliance, and if the pro-independence parties shift their stance to advocating an agreed referendum rather than a unilateral push for independence there is a possibility of convergence on some points between Catalunya en Comú and the ERC.

The Catalan conflict is set to rumble on

After the December 21st election, the national government is likely to be faced with another pro-independence regional government. The central administration would be obliged to negotiate on constitutional reform in such a scenario, and would come under particularly strong pressure to make concessions if the pro-independence parties won a majority of votes. It remains unclear whether Mariano Rajoy, the PP prime minister, would be willing or able to offer conditions acceptable to the pro-independence parties, and there is a strong risk of a political stalemate in the region. It is also possible that tensions with the national government could re-intensify, particularly if criminal charges result in the jailing of other former Catalan officials, or if Mr Puigdemont and other former officials are extradited from Belgium to Spain.