Iran Has Less Power in Iraq Than We Think

By Michael Wahid Hanna

Iraq's seven-month political deadlock looks to be entering a new phase,
thanks in part to anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki received the support
of the Sadrist political wing earlier this month, likely ensuring
another term for Maliki but also giving Sadr, who has been living in
exile in Iran since 2007, an important voice in the country's political
future.

For many in the U.S., what should be cause for relief
and hope that the current impasse may be coming to an end has instead
produced fear and suspicion over Iran's influence in Iraq. Americans on
the political right and left are warning that Iran has engineered this
political about-face and that Sadr's rise will cement Iran's role as the
chief architect of Iraqi politics. Not only does this misunderstand the
fundamental nature of Iran-Iraq relations, it repeats a mistake we have
made repeatedly since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. U.S.
exaggeration of Iran's influence in Iraqi politics isn't just hyperbolic
and misguided, it actually makes an independent and Iran-resistant Iraq
less likely.

Clearly, for the U.S., the rise of Sadr's followers
is less than ideal. Their unbending hostility to the U.S. has included
armed conflict with the U.S. military: the Mahdi Army fought major
battles against American forces, opened up a two-front insurgency, and
fuelled the country's descent into sectarian civil war.

So it's
understandable why so many in the U.S. are worried about Sadr's
political inclusion. U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad James F. Jeffrey even
responded with a public warning
that Sadr's involvement might jeopardize U.S.-Iraq ties. However, the
Sadrists, who primarily represent the Shiite poor, are an enduring
feature of Iraq's political landscape and secured their current position
legitimately through the democratic process.

For many here in the U.S., concern
over the Sadrist role is, at root, based on a simplistic understanding
of Iran's role in Iraq. But Sadrist political participation cannot be
ascribed merely to the machinations of Iran. While linked to Iraq by
ties of history, commerce, and religion, observers in the U.S. have
often ascribed the Islamic Republic with near-magical powers to
orchestrate events within its war-torn neighbor's borders. However,
Iran's role in post-invasion Iraq has often been destructive. At various
junctures Iran has emphasized inflicting damage to the U.S. by giving
money, advice, and training to various Shiite militia groups in Iraq,
including the Sadrist Mahdi Army. These actions have eroded their
influence in Baghdad political circles and increased suspicions of
Iranian motivations.

Recent Iraqi history should make clear that
Iran cannot force its desired policy outcomes on Iraq, where lack of
cohesiveness among the dominant Shiite factions threatened Iran's goal
of a friendly, Shiite-led government in Baghdad. The pre-election
decision by Maliki to run independently thwarted Iran's hopes of seeing a
unified Shiite list contesting the elections and ensuring Shiite
preeminence. It should also speak volumes that Iran's closest ally among
the Shiite political parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, is
now the most recalcitrant party to Maliki's retention of power. The
Iranian desire for Shiite cohesion was also set back by Maliki's March
2008 Basra offensive against the Mahdi Army and other irregular Shiite
militias supported by Iran. This intra-Shiite military confrontation
clearly demonstrated Iran's lack of actual control over its purported
allies in Iraq. The offensive was a turning point for Maliki, bolstering
his reputation as an independent nationalist who is focused on law and
order. Iran can help shape events but cannot force Iraqi political
figures to act contrary to their own perceived interests.

Our
perception of Iran as the puppet master of Baghdad is rooted in decades
of enmity between the U.S. and Iran, which continue today. Also, Iran's
broad support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and its monetary support for
Hamas in Gaza makes it easy to imagine Iran replicating this strategy in
Iraq. But the biggest factor in our willingness to see exaggerated
Iranian influence in Iraq is something much simpler: partisan U.S.
politics. For years, both parties have exaggerated Iran's role to score
political points. Iran hawks on the right have done so to bolster their
case for greater U.S. hostility to the perceived Iranian menace. During
the 2008 presidential primaries and general election, Republicans also
used the threat of Iranian encroachment to argue against any drawdown in
Iraq. Today, they maintain this line in attacking President Barack
Obama's Iraq policies as strengthening Iran. Meanwhile, voices on the
left have, since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, latched onto to the notion
of an unstoppable Iran expanding its influence throughout the region.
This extension of the recriminations against the Iraq war, much like the
conservative criticism of Obama, is an effort to further discredit
President George W. Bush's invasion by accusing him of ceding Iraq to
Iran. This distortion on both sides is unfortunate because it paints
Iraq as a mere prop for the purpose of polemics and because it is
unmoored from the more prosaic reality of contemporary Iraq.

It
is true that the toppling of Saddam Hussein was a strategic windfall for
the Islamic Republic, but it has not allowed Iran to dictate Iraq's
agenda. Iraqi nationalism and suspicion of Iranian intentions, nearly
universal in Iraq, simply do not allow for the kind of Iranian power one
hears about in the U.S. While Maliki and Sadr's ascent in Baghdad are
in line with the Iranian desire for Shiite Islamist supremacy, their
rise is a reflection of Iraq's demography and politics. Of course a
Shiite-majority, Islamist-leaning country will elect a Shiite-majority,
Islamist-leaning government. Unfortunately, this is how democracy works
in a war-scarred country where ethno-sectarian identity remains
stubbornly vital to political affiliation. Sadr's political
participation, though it may make Iraq less likely to follow every
American interest, is simply a reflection of the realities of Iraq's
nascent, flawed democracy.

Vilifying and exaggerating Iran's
role in Iraq will cloud U.S. perception of both countries and runs the
danger of contributing to the formulation of bad policy. Simplistic
notions of Iranian hegemony will poison U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relations,
with each development judged in blunt zero-sum terms of whether it
benefits the U.S. or Iran. In assuming such inherent conflict, the U.S.
will be tempted to try to use Iraq as an American proxy in a broader
struggle against Iran. This would serve no useful purpose; why wage a
proxy war where none exists? Worse, it would weaken Iraq and enable the
very Iranian influence we are so afraid of. In fact, American and
Iranian long-term interests converge in Baghdad to a great extent. At
root, both countries need a stable Iraq.

While still dependent to
a large degree on outside assistance, thus prone to interference and
meddling, Iraqis are not interested in being a puppet of either the U.S.
or Iran. Pushing a proxy conflict and asking Iraq to be a front-line
pillar in the wider regional struggle against Tehran would subordinate
Iraqi interests to those of United States, alienate Iraqis, and
potentially undermine Iraq's relative stability.

The U.S.
understands well the importance of not excluding segments of Iraq from
political participation, and is concerned rightly over the potential
deleterious effects of locking out major Sunni parties from the incoming
government. As such, the U.S. would also be ill-served by seeking to
isolate the Sadrists. While the legacy of the Mahdi Army is distasteful
for the U.S., the experience of the Sunni Awakening is instructive as it
involved close U.S. cooperation with and support for former insurgents
with American blood on their hands. Following the success of the Sunni
Awakening, it should not seem far-fetched for the U.S. to contemplate
engaging with an Iraqi government with Sadrist representation.

The
Iraqis want and need good relations with both the U.S. and Iran.
Geography is immutable, and a relatively weak Iraq cannot afford a
hostile relationship with its larger neighbor. Iran's role in Iraq going
forward will evolve as the U.S. military presence recedes. The
imperative of stability should, in fact, dictate that the U.S. encourage
good but proper relations between Iraq and Iran. In this vein, the U.S.
should shield Iraq, to the extent possible, from the U.S.'s struggles
with the Iranian regime. The U.S. should once again open direct channels
of communication with Tehran to discuss issues of mutual concern
regarding Iraq and, at the very least, should seek avenues for indirect
cooperation where preferences are aligned. If the U.S. exacerbates
conflict with Iran in Iraq, it risks making that tension all the more
difficult to manage and ultimately handing Iran greater influence in
Baghdad than any number of Muqtada al-Sadrs could ever provide.

Image: Muqtada al-Sadr at a Damascus press conference after meeting with former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who won a large minority in the recent Iraqi elections. By Louai Beshara/AFP/Getty Images.