Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State is a critique of the state recognition of marriage and a proposal for an alternative form of regulation. Part One, ‘Against ...
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Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State is a critique of the state recognition of marriage and a proposal for an alternative form of regulation. Part One, ‘Against Marriage’, sets out the critique. State-recognized marriage is unjust as it violates two fundamental values: equality and freedom. Marriage has historically been an instrument for maintaining inequality between men and women both practically, through laws, and symbolically, through norms. Marriage also violates equality between same-sex and different-sex couples. Reform can remove some of these inequalities, but marriage inevitably involves inequality between married and unmarried people. Moreover, state-recognized marriage threatens liberty since it involves the state endorsing a particular way of life. Various arguments have been offered in favour of this state promotion, but none of them adequately support the state recognition of marriage as opposed to other, more inclusive measures. Part Two, ‘The Marriage-Free State’, sets out the alternative. Most feminist and egalitarian critics of state-recognized marriage advocate replacing it with either relationship contracts or alternative statuses such as civil or care-based unions. Neither option is ideal, particularly since both contracts and alternative statuses leave vulnerable people unprotected. Instead, the book proposes a piecemeal, practice-based model of regulation, applying to all people who are engaging in relationship practices that should justly be regulated. In this model, equality is secured by the regulations themselves and liberty is secured by opting out. Finally, the book considers how the state should act to ensure equality in private marriages, be they religious or secular.Less

Against Marriage : An Egalitarian Defense of the Marriage-Free State

Clare Chambers

Published in print: 2017-07-27

Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State is a critique of the state recognition of marriage and a proposal for an alternative form of regulation. Part One, ‘Against Marriage’, sets out the critique. State-recognized marriage is unjust as it violates two fundamental values: equality and freedom. Marriage has historically been an instrument for maintaining inequality between men and women both practically, through laws, and symbolically, through norms. Marriage also violates equality between same-sex and different-sex couples. Reform can remove some of these inequalities, but marriage inevitably involves inequality between married and unmarried people. Moreover, state-recognized marriage threatens liberty since it involves the state endorsing a particular way of life. Various arguments have been offered in favour of this state promotion, but none of them adequately support the state recognition of marriage as opposed to other, more inclusive measures. Part Two, ‘The Marriage-Free State’, sets out the alternative. Most feminist and egalitarian critics of state-recognized marriage advocate replacing it with either relationship contracts or alternative statuses such as civil or care-based unions. Neither option is ideal, particularly since both contracts and alternative statuses leave vulnerable people unprotected. Instead, the book proposes a piecemeal, practice-based model of regulation, applying to all people who are engaging in relationship practices that should justly be regulated. In this model, equality is secured by the regulations themselves and liberty is secured by opting out. Finally, the book considers how the state should act to ensure equality in private marriages, be they religious or secular.

This book presents a new, integrated theory of social oppression, which tackles the fundamental question that no theory of oppression has satisfactorily answered: if there is no natural hierarchy ...
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This book presents a new, integrated theory of social oppression, which tackles the fundamental question that no theory of oppression has satisfactorily answered: if there is no natural hierarchy among humans, why are some cases of oppression so persistent? The book argues that the explanation lies in the coercive co-opting of the oppressed to join in their own oppression. This answer sets the stage for analysis throughout the book, as it explores the questions of how and why the oppressed join in their oppression. The book argues that oppression is an institutionally structured harm perpetrated on social groups by other groups using direct and indirect material, economic, and psychological force. Among the most important and insidious of the indirect forces is an economic force that operates through oppressed persons' own rational choices. This force constitutes the central feature of analysis, and the book argues that this force is especially insidious because it conceals the fact of oppression from the oppressed and from others who would be sympathetic to their plight. The oppressed come to believe that they suffer personal failings and this belief appears to absolve society from responsibility. While in the book's view oppression is grounded in material exploitation and physical deprivation, it cannot be long sustained without corresponding psychological forces. The book examines the direct and indirect psychological forces that generate and sustain oppression. It discusses strategies that groups have used to resist oppression and argues that all persons have a moral responsibility to resist in some way. The concluding chapter proposes a concept of freedom that would be possible for humans in a world that is actively opposing oppression, arguing that freedom for each individual is only possible when we achieve freedom for all others.Less

Analyzing Oppression

Ann E. Cudd

Published in print: 2006-05-01

This book presents a new, integrated theory of social oppression, which tackles the fundamental question that no theory of oppression has satisfactorily answered: if there is no natural hierarchy among humans, why are some cases of oppression so persistent? The book argues that the explanation lies in the coercive co-opting of the oppressed to join in their own oppression. This answer sets the stage for analysis throughout the book, as it explores the questions of how and why the oppressed join in their oppression. The book argues that oppression is an institutionally structured harm perpetrated on social groups by other groups using direct and indirect material, economic, and psychological force. Among the most important and insidious of the indirect forces is an economic force that operates through oppressed persons' own rational choices. This force constitutes the central feature of analysis, and the book argues that this force is especially insidious because it conceals the fact of oppression from the oppressed and from others who would be sympathetic to their plight. The oppressed come to believe that they suffer personal failings and this belief appears to absolve society from responsibility. While in the book's view oppression is grounded in material exploitation and physical deprivation, it cannot be long sustained without corresponding psychological forces. The book examines the direct and indirect psychological forces that generate and sustain oppression. It discusses strategies that groups have used to resist oppression and argues that all persons have a moral responsibility to resist in some way. The concluding chapter proposes a concept of freedom that would be possible for humans in a world that is actively opposing oppression, arguing that freedom for each individual is only possible when we achieve freedom for all others.

In these two lectures, the author argues that since the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have entered a phase of global civil society that is governed by cosmopolitan norms of ...
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In these two lectures, the author argues that since the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have entered a phase of global civil society that is governed by cosmopolitan norms of universal justice—norms which are difficult for some to accept as legitimate since they are sometimes in conflict with democratic ideals. In her first lecture, the author argues that although this tension can never be fully resolved, it can be mitigated through the renegotiation of the dual commitments to human rights and sovereign self-determination. Her second lecture develops this idea in detail, with special reference to recent developments in Europe (for example, the banning of Muslim head scarves in France). The European Union has seen the replacement of the traditional unitary model of citizenship with a new model that disaggregates the components of traditional citizenship, making it possible to be a citizen of multiple entities at the same time. The volume also contains an introduction by the editor, and contributions by Bonnie Honig (Northwestern University), Will Kymlicka (Queens University), and Jeremy Waldron (Columbia School of Law).Less

Another Cosmopolitanism

Seyla Benhabib

Published in print: 2006-11-16

In these two lectures, the author argues that since the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have entered a phase of global civil society that is governed by cosmopolitan norms of universal justice—norms which are difficult for some to accept as legitimate since they are sometimes in conflict with democratic ideals. In her first lecture, the author argues that although this tension can never be fully resolved, it can be mitigated through the renegotiation of the dual commitments to human rights and sovereign self-determination. Her second lecture develops this idea in detail, with special reference to recent developments in Europe (for example, the banning of Muslim head scarves in France). The European Union has seen the replacement of the traditional unitary model of citizenship with a new model that disaggregates the components of traditional citizenship, making it possible to be a citizen of multiple entities at the same time. The volume also contains an introduction by the editor, and contributions by Bonnie Honig (Northwestern University), Will Kymlicka (Queens University), and Jeremy Waldron (Columbia School of Law).

While a number of books and many articles have been written on the work of Stanley Cavell, this is the first monograph on his contribution to politics and practical philosophy. Though skepticism is ...
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While a number of books and many articles have been written on the work of Stanley Cavell, this is the first monograph on his contribution to politics and practical philosophy. Though skepticism is Cavell’s central topic, he understands it not as an epistemological problem or position but as an existential one. The central question is not what we know or fail to know, but to what extent we have made our lives our own, or failed to do so. Accordingly, Cavell’s reception of Austin and Wittgenstein highlights, as other readings of these figures do not, the uncanny nature of the ordinary, the extent to which we ordinarily fail to mean what we say. Bringing this out highlights Cavell’s debts to Heidegger and Thompson Clarke, even as it allows for a deeper appreciation of the extent to which Cavell’s perfectionism is a rewriting of Rousseau’s and Kant’s theories of autonomy. This in turn opens up a way of understanding citizenship and political discourse that develops points made more elliptically in the work of Hannah Arendt, and that contrasts in important ways with the positions of liberal thinkers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas on the one hand, and radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on the other.Less

Becoming Who We Are : Politics and Practical Philosophy in the Work of Stanley Cavell

Andrew Norris

Published in print: 2017-09-07

While a number of books and many articles have been written on the work of Stanley Cavell, this is the first monograph on his contribution to politics and practical philosophy. Though skepticism is Cavell’s central topic, he understands it not as an epistemological problem or position but as an existential one. The central question is not what we know or fail to know, but to what extent we have made our lives our own, or failed to do so. Accordingly, Cavell’s reception of Austin and Wittgenstein highlights, as other readings of these figures do not, the uncanny nature of the ordinary, the extent to which we ordinarily fail to mean what we say. Bringing this out highlights Cavell’s debts to Heidegger and Thompson Clarke, even as it allows for a deeper appreciation of the extent to which Cavell’s perfectionism is a rewriting of Rousseau’s and Kant’s theories of autonomy. This in turn opens up a way of understanding citizenship and political discourse that develops points made more elliptically in the work of Hannah Arendt, and that contrasts in important ways with the positions of liberal thinkers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas on the one hand, and radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on the other.

This book examines the ethical controversy surrounding biomedical enhancement: the use of biotechnologies to improve normal human capacities and characteristics. It deflates the heated rhetoric of ...
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This book examines the ethical controversy surrounding biomedical enhancement: the use of biotechnologies to improve normal human capacities and characteristics. It deflates the heated rhetoric of the debate and, unlike other treatment of the topic, is informed by an understanding of evolutionary biology. The book debunks the idea that the natural is always good, and explains why and how we might need to change human nature.Less

Beyond Humanity? : The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement

Allen E. Buchanan

Published in print: 2011-02-01

This book examines the ethical controversy surrounding biomedical enhancement: the use of biotechnologies to improve normal human capacities and characteristics. It deflates the heated rhetoric of the debate and, unlike other treatment of the topic, is informed by an understanding of evolutionary biology. The book debunks the idea that the natural is always good, and explains why and how we might need to change human nature.

Modern states claim rights of jurisdiction and control over particular geographical areas and their associated natural resources. Boundaries of Authority explores the possible moral bases for such ...
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Modern states claim rights of jurisdiction and control over particular geographical areas and their associated natural resources. Boundaries of Authority explores the possible moral bases for such territorial claims by states. The book maintains throughout that the requirement of states’ justified authority over persons has normative priority over, and as a result severely restricts, the kinds of territorial rights that states can justifiably claim, and it argues that the mere effective administration of justice within a geographical area is insufficient to ground moral authority over residents of that area. The book argues that only a theory of territorial rights that takes seriously the morality of the actual history of states’ acquisitions of power over land and the land’s residents can adequately explain the nature and extent of states’ moral rights over particular territories. Part I of the book examines the interconnections between states’ claimed rights of authority over particular sets of subject persons and states’ claimed authority to control particular territories. Part II organizes, explains, and criticizes the full range of extant theories of states’ territorial rights, arguing that a little-appreciated Lockean approach to territorial rights is in fact far better able to meet the principal desiderata for such theories. Part III of the book looks closely at the more property-like territorial rights that states claim—in particular, their claimed rights to control over the natural resources in and around their territories and their claimed rights to control and restrict movement across (including immigration over) their territorial borders.Less

Boundaries of Authority

A. John Simmons

Published in print: 2016-08-01

Modern states claim rights of jurisdiction and control over particular geographical areas and their associated natural resources. Boundaries of Authority explores the possible moral bases for such territorial claims by states. The book maintains throughout that the requirement of states’ justified authority over persons has normative priority over, and as a result severely restricts, the kinds of territorial rights that states can justifiably claim, and it argues that the mere effective administration of justice within a geographical area is insufficient to ground moral authority over residents of that area. The book argues that only a theory of territorial rights that takes seriously the morality of the actual history of states’ acquisitions of power over land and the land’s residents can adequately explain the nature and extent of states’ moral rights over particular territories. Part I of the book examines the interconnections between states’ claimed rights of authority over particular sets of subject persons and states’ claimed authority to control particular territories. Part II organizes, explains, and criticizes the full range of extant theories of states’ territorial rights, arguing that a little-appreciated Lockean approach to territorial rights is in fact far better able to meet the principal desiderata for such theories. Part III of the book looks closely at the more property-like territorial rights that states claim—in particular, their claimed rights to control over the natural resources in and around their territories and their claimed rights to control and restrict movement across (including immigration over) their territorial borders.

When individuals stash away their wealth in offshore bank accounts and multinational corporations shift their profits or their actual production to low-tax jurisdictions, this undermines the fiscal ...
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When individuals stash away their wealth in offshore bank accounts and multinational corporations shift their profits or their actual production to low-tax jurisdictions, this undermines the fiscal autonomy of political communities and contributes to rising inequalities in income and wealth. These practices are fuelled by tax competition, with countries strategically designing fiscal policy to attract capital from abroad. Building on a careful analysis of the ethical challenges raised by a world of tax competition, the book puts forward a normative and institutional framework to regulate the practice. In short, individuals and corporations should pay tax in the jurisdictions of which they are members, where this membership can come in degrees. Moreover, the strategic tax setting of states should be limited in important ways. An international tax organization (ITO) should be created to enforce the principles of tax justice. The book defends this call for reform against two important objections. First, it refutes the suggestion that regulating tax competition will harm economic efficiency. Second, the book argues that regulation of this sort, rather than representing a constraint on national sovereignty, in fact turns out to be a requirement of sovereignty in a global economy. The book closes with a series of reflections on the obligations that the beneficiaries of tax competition have towards the losers both prior to any institutional reform and in its aftermath.Less

Catching Capital : The Ethics of Tax Competition

Peter Dietsch

Published in print: 2015-08-20

When individuals stash away their wealth in offshore bank accounts and multinational corporations shift their profits or their actual production to low-tax jurisdictions, this undermines the fiscal autonomy of political communities and contributes to rising inequalities in income and wealth. These practices are fuelled by tax competition, with countries strategically designing fiscal policy to attract capital from abroad. Building on a careful analysis of the ethical challenges raised by a world of tax competition, the book puts forward a normative and institutional framework to regulate the practice. In short, individuals and corporations should pay tax in the jurisdictions of which they are members, where this membership can come in degrees. Moreover, the strategic tax setting of states should be limited in important ways. An international tax organization (ITO) should be created to enforce the principles of tax justice. The book defends this call for reform against two important objections. First, it refutes the suggestion that regulating tax competition will harm economic efficiency. Second, the book argues that regulation of this sort, rather than representing a constraint on national sovereignty, in fact turns out to be a requirement of sovereignty in a global economy. The book closes with a series of reflections on the obligations that the beneficiaries of tax competition have towards the losers both prior to any institutional reform and in its aftermath.

To what extent should parents be allowed to use selection technologies (such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis) to determine the characteristics of their children? And is there something morally ...
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To what extent should parents be allowed to use selection technologies (such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis) to determine the characteristics of their children? And is there something morally wrong with parents who wish to do this? Choosing Tomorrow's Children provides answers to these questions. In particular, the book applies the techniques of philosophical bioethics to address issues raised by selective reproduction, the practice of choosing between different possible future persons by selecting or deselecting (for example) embryos, eggs, and sperm. It offers answers to questions including the following. Do children have a ‘right to an open future’ and, if they do, what moral constraints does this place upon selective reproduction? Under what circumstances (if any) should sex selection be allowed? Should we ‘screen out’ as much disease and disability as possible before birth, or would that be an objectionable form of eugenics? Is it acceptable to create or select a future person (a ‘saviour sibling’) in order to provide life-saving tissue for an existing relative? Is there a moral difference between selecting to avoid disease and selecting to produce an ‘enhanced’ child? And should we allow deaf parents to use reproductive technologies to ensure that they have a deaf child? The book does not provide one overarching conclusion but rather assesses each argument-type on its merits. Insofar as it is possible to generalise though, Choosing Tomorrow's Children concludes that most of the arguments usually provided against selective reproduction are flawed in one way or another.Less

Choosing Tomorrow's Children : The Ethics of Selective Reproduction

Stephen Wilkinson

Published in print: 2010-02-18

To what extent should parents be allowed to use selection technologies (such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis) to determine the characteristics of their children? And is there something morally wrong with parents who wish to do this? Choosing Tomorrow's Children provides answers to these questions. In particular, the book applies the techniques of philosophical bioethics to address issues raised by selective reproduction, the practice of choosing between different possible future persons by selecting or deselecting (for example) embryos, eggs, and sperm. It offers answers to questions including the following. Do children have a ‘right to an open future’ and, if they do, what moral constraints does this place upon selective reproduction? Under what circumstances (if any) should sex selection be allowed? Should we ‘screen out’ as much disease and disability as possible before birth, or would that be an objectionable form of eugenics? Is it acceptable to create or select a future person (a ‘saviour sibling’) in order to provide life-saving tissue for an existing relative? Is there a moral difference between selecting to avoid disease and selecting to produce an ‘enhanced’ child? And should we allow deaf parents to use reproductive technologies to ensure that they have a deaf child? The book does not provide one overarching conclusion but rather assesses each argument-type on its merits. Insofar as it is possible to generalise though, Choosing Tomorrow's Children concludes that most of the arguments usually provided against selective reproduction are flawed in one way or another.

These essays challenge both theorists and citizens to confront grave injustices committed by their country. That calls on Americans to take a fresh look at their nation’s beginnings, including the ...
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These essays challenge both theorists and citizens to confront grave injustices committed by their country. That calls on Americans to take a fresh look at their nation’s beginnings, including the colonists’ early adoption of race‐based slavery even though it was unlawful and why those who rebelled against English oppression were responsible for greater injustices against their Native American neighbors. Confronting injustice requires Americans to consider how delegates to the 1787 constitutional convention readily embraced increased protections for chattel slavery, why the federal government later abandoned Reconstruction, and why the nation allowed former slave-owners to establish a new system of racial oppression called Jim Crow. It requires Americans to ask why America’s official rejection of white supremacy is combined with an unwillingness to address continuing racial stratification. Confronting injustice calls upon political theorists to test their views in the crucible of social history. It challenges those who debate abstractly the idea of an obligation to obey the law to consider the implications of grievous injustices. It calls upon those who assume that their society is now “reasonably just” to ask when that transformation occurred, despite the fact that children who are black or poor lack are denied equal opportunity.Less

Confronting Injustice : Moral History and Political Theory

David Lyons

Published in print: 2013-06-13

These essays challenge both theorists and citizens to confront grave injustices committed by their country. That calls on Americans to take a fresh look at their nation’s beginnings, including the colonists’ early adoption of race‐based slavery even though it was unlawful and why those who rebelled against English oppression were responsible for greater injustices against their Native American neighbors. Confronting injustice requires Americans to consider how delegates to the 1787 constitutional convention readily embraced increased protections for chattel slavery, why the federal government later abandoned Reconstruction, and why the nation allowed former slave-owners to establish a new system of racial oppression called Jim Crow. It requires Americans to ask why America’s official rejection of white supremacy is combined with an unwillingness to address continuing racial stratification. Confronting injustice calls upon political theorists to test their views in the crucible of social history. It challenges those who debate abstractly the idea of an obligation to obey the law to consider the implications of grievous injustices. It calls upon those who assume that their society is now “reasonably just” to ask when that transformation occurred, despite the fact that children who are black or poor lack are denied equal opportunity.

This book presents twelve chapters on constructivism — some sympathetic, others critical — by a group of moral philosophers. ‘Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood ...
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This book presents twelve chapters on constructivism — some sympathetic, others critical — by a group of moral philosophers. ‘Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts.’ So wrote John Rawls in his highly influential 1980 Dewey lectures ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’. Since then there has been much discussion of constructivist understandings, Kantian or otherwise, both of morality and of reason more generally. Such understandings typically seek to characterize the truth conditions of propositions in their target domain in maximally metaphysically unassuming ways, frequently in terms of the outcome of certain procedures or the passing of certain tests, procedures or tests that speak to the distinctively practical concerns of deliberating human agents living together in societies. But controversy abounds over the interpretation and the scope as well as the credibility of such constructivist ideas. The chapters here reach to the heart of this contemporary philosophical debate, and offer a range of new approaches and perspectives.Less

Constructivism in Practical Philosophy

Published in print: 2012-08-02

This book presents twelve chapters on constructivism — some sympathetic, others critical — by a group of moral philosophers. ‘Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts.’ So wrote John Rawls in his highly influential 1980 Dewey lectures ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’. Since then there has been much discussion of constructivist understandings, Kantian or otherwise, both of morality and of reason more generally. Such understandings typically seek to characterize the truth conditions of propositions in their target domain in maximally metaphysically unassuming ways, frequently in terms of the outcome of certain procedures or the passing of certain tests, procedures or tests that speak to the distinctively practical concerns of deliberating human agents living together in societies. But controversy abounds over the interpretation and the scope as well as the credibility of such constructivist ideas. The chapters here reach to the heart of this contemporary philosophical debate, and offer a range of new approaches and perspectives.

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