A limited constitutional government calls for a rules-based, freemarket monetary system, not the topsy-turvy fiat dollar that now exists under central banking. This issue of the Cato Journal examines the case for alternatives to central banking and the reforms needed to move toward free-market money.

The more widespread use of body cameras will make it easier for the American public to better understand how police officers do their jobs and under what circumstances they feel that it is necessary to resort to deadly force.

Americans are finally enjoying an improving economy after years of recession and slow growth. The unemployment rate is dropping, the economy is expanding, and public confidence is rising. Surely our economic crisis is behind us. Or is it? In Going for Broke: Deficits, Debt, and the Entitlement Crisis, Cato scholar Michael D. Tanner examines the growing national debt and its dire implications for our future and explains why a looming financial meltdown may be far worse than anyone expects.

The Cato Institute has released its 2014 Annual Report, which documents a dynamic year of growth and productivity. “Libertarianism is not just a framework for utopia,” Cato’s David Boaz writes in his book, The Libertarian Mind. “It is the indispensable framework for the future.” And as the new report demonstrates, the Cato Institute, thanks largely to the generosity of our Sponsors, is leading the charge to apply this framework across the policy spectrum.

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Do We Need a National ID Card? No.

Reports this week that government testers got into the country with false IDs are sure to turn up the volume on calls for a “more secure” national identification system. But identity-based security cannot - and should not - be fixed.

Why are we asked for identification cards in the first place? The theory is that there is greater security when someone can examine your background or track your movements.

It’s true that surveillance makes law-abiding people easier for authorities to control. People required to show ID could, for instance, be run against databases of outstanding fines and tax delinquencies at local shopping malls. But identification gives the government no similar control over terrorists and sophisticated criminals - the people we’re trying to stop with these ID checks.

To do identity-based security, you need to know who people are in the first place. That’s not easy to do with lawbreakers.

To start, the U.S. has a substantial trade in false documents good enough to fool Department of Motor Vehicle employees. And criminals regularly corrupt DMV workers to procure false drivers’ licenses. Can this problem be curtailed? Yes. Solved? No. Even if we had the strongest possible national ID card - a cradle-to-grave, government-mandated, biometric tracking system - the greatest weakness would still remain: Knowing who a person is does not reveal what they plan to do.

Examples are legion in terrorism, and routine in crime, of people with no history of wrongdoing being the ones who act. For the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda selected operatives without records of involvement in terrorism.

In the end, talk about creating a foolproof ID card distracts us from making honest improvements in security that address tools and methods of attack directly. Strong cockpit doors and self-reliant passengers prevent commandeering of airplanes no matter who is onboard. That is real security.

What’s more, the negative consequences of a national ID card would be profound. Lawful trade and travel would be disrupted for ID checks, at a substantial cost to both liberty and commerce. What little benefits we’d reap would not be worth such a high price.

It’s possible to “fix” the identification problem, but it doesn’t solve the security problem. A national ID system would provide a tiny margin of security - and almost none against threats like terrorism.