Sunday, August 26, 2012

In the first game after the All-Star game, Justin Masterson
combined with Vinnie Pestano and Chris Perez to shut out the Blue Jays in the
first game of the series in Toronto,
bringing the Tribe’s record on the year to 45-41, three games back in the AL
Central. It represented a positive first
step as the Indians embarked on the second half of their season, particularly
with Masterson’s start providing some hope that the front-end-of-the-rotation,
which had been inconsistent all season, would settle into some sort of groove
and propel the Indians to a consistent pattern of winning with the AL Central
looking more winnable with each passing day in early July.

The next game, Ubaldo lasted only 2 1/3 innings giving up 8
earned runs paced by 7 hits allowed, 4 walks allowed and 2 HR allowed as the
Tribe would fall to former Tribe LH Aaron Laffey and the Blue Jays. Though many did not know it at the time, the
Indians’ season would never get back on track as they have now gone 10-30since Masterson’s victory the previous day,
winning 25% of their games over the course of the next 6 weeks as the
Indians’ season and any “hope” for the Indians’ future (short-and-long-term)
became dimmer with each passing loss.
There were a few moments when “hope” returned – notably the 7th
inning against Verlander – but for the most part, the Indians’ season has
reached levels of desperation and despair that I can’t remember feeling as an
Indians’ fan…and it all happened over the course of about a month and a half.

For a fanbase that never really bought into the start of the
season, the last six weeks has resulted in a level of disenchantment, apathy,
and outright anger about an organization that now finds themselves facing some
very difficult questions, where it would seem that nobody involved in this
absolute freefall will be excluded from assessment…and nor should they be. Yes, I know that almost everyone from the
Indians attended Manny Acta’s charity event and things were said Paul Dolan
about how nobody’s jobs were in jeopardy, which was groused over and
overanalyzed in all corners, but what did anyone expect Paul Dolan to say about
the Front Office or the manager – whose CHARITY EVENT he was attending – in
terms about their future?

What would have been accomplished had he said, “we’re a
mess…this obviously isn’t working and people IN THIS ROOM are going to get
fired for this disaster of a season”?

That’s not to say that I know that this guy or that guy
won’t be around come November though frankly, I’m not sure how
Acta/Antonetti/Shapiro survive(s) this season with the recent performance and
this growing feeling of a disconnect between manager and Front Office – Antonetti’s
comment a while back that “THESE players need to play better” show you
everything you need to know about what he thinks about the assembled talent –
leads me to believe that the blow-up that’s coming may not be limited to the
25-man roster regardless of any statements made at The Corner Alley at the end
of August, and both “blow-ups” are looking more and more necessary and
inevitable. While you certainly wouldn’t
have guessed that back around the Fourth of July, when the Tribe was only a few
games out of the AL Central race, what’s happened since – with multiple extended
losing streaks and with a homestand that could get U-G-L-Y in the coming week –
usually causes changes to be made, regardless of any “progress” that can be
pointed to or any larger “plan” that is used to justify the end result.

Because that “end result” as we’ve seen over the last month
is about as bad as I can remember for a team that was in contention mid-season,
just simply falling off a cliff without an obvious injury or regression to
point to as the impetus for the sudden descent.
And that’s why I think everyone is so shell-shocked here because the
team that we’ve seen over the last month is the same team – in terms of lineup,
rotation, and bullpen – that overachieved their way into contention for nearly
3 months. Now that “overachievement” is undeniable,
but the Indians actually made upgrades
to the team that was vying for 1st place for a couple of months, in
terms of adding McAllister and Allen to the mix, and still the team has simply
fallen off of the table at an unprecedented rate.

Again, I’m not going to get into the minutia of why that
might have happened as I think that the topic has been…um, delved into a couple
of times over the last week, but it is interesting to note an exercise that Joe Posnanski did in analyzing WAR for all MLB teams to this point in the season
and how the contributions of individual players have played out in terms of
teams’ records. You may not like WAR or
understand WAR or may not want to understand WAR and Posnanski’s piece is a
great introduction to anyone who has any of those feelings, but his findings –
particularly on the Tribe – are telling.
Personally, I’m probably what Posnanski identifies as a “WAR agnostic”,
who thinks “that it’s a stat in progress, that there are good and bad things
about it, that it’s hardly one-stop stat shopping but that it adds to the
picture”, particularly when it comes to using the stat to measure the
performance of a player over half-of-a-season or even over a full season, but
what Posnanski found about the Indians’ offense and pitching is worth noting,
particularly in the context of the rest of MLB and in light of Acta’s recent declaration
that the Indians need 3 more bats to compete, because Posnanski’s exercise
concluded that:

“That pitching staff” now has a 4.80 ERA, which ranks as the
10th worst in club’s 112-year history and while my feelings on the
short-and-long-term expectations for the pitching staff are well-documented,
what I keep coming back to as we watch this trainwreck of a month of baseball
is that – short of major FA additions and assuming they stand pat on the trade
front – what we’re currently seeing is what is lined up for 2013, particularly
in the rotation. Yes, you have Carrasco
coming back (as well as Lonnie on the offensive side) and you have a full
season of McAllister instead of Tomlin as well as a presumed full year of
Fauxberto instead of Lowe with the likes of Kluber, Gomez, and the other litany
of young arms that may or may not pan out or even make it to MLB without a trip
to Dr. Lewis Yocum or Dr. James Andrews.

But if you’re looking at essentially the same team coming back, particularly in
the rotation – and I threw out the idea that they needed to add an arm via FA a
couple of weeks back, before things went from bad to worse – why are we to
expect much different results than a pitching staff that, as Posnanski writes,
“is performing poorly enough to lose 110” games?

Indians right-hander Ubaldo Jimenez: “It seems like most of the time he wants to be anywhere in the
world but on the mound. He doesn’t give 100 percent very often. He’s become an
embarrassment to himself with his lack of focus and effort.”

And that’s the killer on the Ubaldo deal as I think that the
Tribe Front Office saw the gaping hole on this 2012-2013 team at the top of
their rotation, in need of that “stopper” that was so obviously lacking to
prevent long losing streaks…ahem, and for the rest of the rotation to feed off
of. They took the “bird in the hand” in
Ubaldo over the “two in the bush” in White and Pomz and Ubaldo – the purported
“known” quantity – now has the second-highest ERA in the AL among qualified
starters. So, while his acquisition was
meant to settle the team’s biggest need in the short-term, what he’s done since
arriving (particularly this year) when coupled with what it took to get him has
put in the Indians in the hole in the short-and-long-term in terms of their
rotation as he continues to confound and enrage as he flails away and doesn’t
seem to care about what’s happening or show much interest in improving. If you think that’s projection, realize that Ubaldo had this to say about his increased HR rate this year, “It’s crazy…I don’t know
what it is. I guess it’s just that every time I fall behind in the count, I try
to throw a fastball in there and they’re hacking hard and getting it out of the
park.”

Just to make sure I have his quote right here, a pitcher
that has thrown a little more than 1,050 innings in MLB is surprised that
“every time (he) falls behind in the count” and tries to “throw a fastball in
there”, the hitter is waiting for said fastball and resorts to “hacking hard
and getting it out of the park”. The
scouts’ words that Ubaldo has “become an embarrassment” is spot-on as I don’t
think that there’s much doubt that Ubaldo’s failure to (or reluctance to) make
adjustments to his approach has led to his disastrous time here as well as
Radinsky’s dismissal.

Indians right-hander Roberto Hernandez: “I wasn’t a fan of before he got
busted for using a false name (Fausto Carmona) and being three years older than
he claimed, and I’m not holding out hope that he’s going to anything more than
he is now—a guy who will tease with some good games but generally be a
below-average starting pitcher on a bad team.

Now, I will give you that this is just the opinion of one
scout talking to Perrotto, but does anyone who has watched Fauxberto since 2008
think any differently?

That’s 40% of the assumed rotation for 2013, and the veteran
part at that, and think back to how those 2005 to 2007 teams won – with strong
starting pitching – and look at how the A’s and the Rays (and this is good stuff on pitcher development in Tampa) and the other “small-market darlings” are winning these days,
with young, top-of-the-rotation talent under club control acquired incompletely different ways that will be around for a while and you start to see
where the pessimism sinks in as the Indians don’t have that young stable of
ready-to-compete-in-MLB arms and are left with two pitchers whose best days are
obviously behind them.

And that’s where the frustration comes in when you think
about the construction of the future of the rotation in the past 5 years, because
the Indians made three big bets on their starting rotation since the beginning
of the 2007 season – they extended Westbrook, extended Fausto, then after it
was seemingly “re-built”, they made the move to get Ubaldo.

With Fausto and Ubaldo likely to be in this rotation next
year because of their “affordable” options (and they actually are if you look
at what veteran FA pitchers get on the open market), to see Jake Westbrook
inking an extension in St. Louis is to realize that the one that doesn’t factor
into the 2013 plans for the Tribe is likely to be the best pitcher next year…albeit
in St. Louis. And, as a quick aside
here, does anyone else think that after the Indians paid Jake $31M for 162 1/3
IP over three years, now seeing him top that TOTAL inning total in each of the
last two years for the Cardinals, that we may have an organizational rationale
to perhaps (gulp) keep Grady and Hafner around next year because they’re afraid
of seeing something similar happen with Grady and Hafner if they cut them
loose…which they so obviously should?

Regardless and back to the matter at hand, the Indians face
major hurdles this off-season to improve upon what we’re seeing now and some
bold moves may be in the offing to perhaps jump over those hurdles or at least
not lead to the bloody hands and knees that we’re seeing now. Though I think it’s pretty well-established
that Chris Perez is not long for the Indians and the argument to keep Choo for
next year – or even half of next year – loses steam with each mounting loss
with even the Indians reportedly feeling that way, the move that is suddenly
looking more likely to me is what’s been suggested in many places to add in an
effort to add more talent (namely pitching) to the current group, and that’s to
trade Asdrubal this off-season.

Over at LGT, Ryan Richards has a great piece on Asdrubal as the #84 Indian of All-Time, complete with the lead-up to Asdrubal’s arrival on
the North Coast, and though it feels like not that long ago that we were
looking at potential FA to ADD to this group or players scheduled to be FA
after this year as potential trade targets, we’re forced to go in the opposite
direction because of what has transpired over the course of the last month as
the Indians need to not only review their organizational set-up, but they need
to analyze and make very hard decisions on players on the 25-man roster,
particularly players that aren’t under club control as long as the likes of
Santana and Kipnis are and decide how to handle those players this off-season.

This is brought up because it was reported that the Arizona
Diamondbacks, having just traded Stephen Drew, are in the market for a SS this off-season and it may not be one that they’re going to find on the FA market:

“We’ve been thinking
about (next year's shortstop) all year already,” General Manager Kevin Towers
said. “There’s not a lot on the free-agent market, so more than likely it’s
going to take a trade. We’ll probably have to trade a good player -- or a
couple of good players -- to find one.”

Now, this is brought up because if the Indians are open to
trading Choo for the right package, you’d have to think that they’d at least
listen to offers for Cabrera, who is only under club control for one year
longer than Choo, with an extension already in his pocket meaning he’s unlikely
to sign another one to remain an Indian.
Even more than that, this Diamondbacks’ report is relevant because Arizona
is FLUSH with young arms like Trevor Bauer, Archie Bradley, Tyler Skaggs, and
Patrick Corbin, among others, with Bauer (21 years old), Skaggs (20 years old
and LH), and Corbin (22 years old and also LH) making their MLB debuts this
year. Now, it is true that Bauer was #11on B-Pro’s preseason top prospect list, “graduating” from that list by making
it to MLB, and that Bradley was #18 and Skaggs was #19 on Kevin Goldstein’s mid-season top 50 list a couple of weeks ago, so wishing for any of that trio
for two years of Asdrubal may represent pie-in-the-sky wishing.

But given that the Snakes have Wade Miley (their #10 prospect going into the season and currently sitting on a 2.80 ERA in his first
full year) and Trevor Cahill topping their rotation with Ian Kennedy still on
board for a while, Arizona might be willing to part with some of their pitching
depth to acquire an elite offensive SS if they’re serious about making a push
in the next couple of years. If they
are, the Indians might be wise to explore such a deal in an effort to add an
arm/multiple arms at the upper levels that might be able to contribute/begin
maturing immediately for the parent club with an eye towards some place past
2013 or maybe even 2014.

To do it, they’d be sacrificing the offensive contributions
of Asdrubal for the next couple of years, as he is signed through 2014 and
while most thought that the control that the Indians gained in his extension aligned
nicely with an ETA for Francisco Lindor (prospect slobbering over Lindor here from B-Pro’s Jason Parks) to eventually replace him, if the Indians need to
revamp this roster – and particularly add upper-level arms that project as more
than 5th-man fodder – considering a deal for Cabrera should be
considered as most teams would be interested in him playing on what would be a
2-year, $16.5M deal that would control his age-27 and age-28 seasons and paying
a premium in terms of players/prospects to add him.

In terms of what the Indians would do at SS prior to the
arrival of Lindor or Ronny Rodriguez, they would have Lillibridge and Donald as
obvious replacements which are…well, more than a little uninspiring. Or they have a player like Juan Diaz, who has
suddenly become a pretty interesting guy as he’s a switch-hitter who is just 23
years old, holding his own in both AA and AAA this year. Maybe the Indians have something in him (he
has 13 HR and 24 2B in 104 games on the year as a 23-year-old SS in the upper
levels) or maybe they don’t (he is averaging a K per game in MiLB), but if 2013
doesn’t look like a year where contention is likely, much less plausible, he
might be a somewhat-suitable replacement, particularly if the Indians can turn
2 years of Asdrubal into players that would be able to step in and contribute
with their years of control aligning more closely with Kipnis, Santana,
Brantley, and Pestano than those of Choo, Perez, and Masterson.

Would that be a “bold” move?

Of course, but after the events of the last month, isn’t
there a sense that a “bold” move is what’s necessary?

Maybe that “bold” move involves sweeping out the Front
Office – parts of it or maybe all of it…though I think “parts” is more likely –
and changing organizational philosophy because a simple managerial change
doesn’t represent a “bold” move by most standards. Those “bold” moves though should extend to
the 25-man roster as the current 25-man roster is exactly what we’re looking at
for the 2013 season and to expect better performance from the same players –
particularly on the pitching side – with few additions is to ignore reality and
rely on “hope” as a plan.

Because as we’ve found out over the last month, “hope” is
not really a plan…

Wednesday, August 22, 2012

It was about a week ago that the “Five Stages of Grief” was
mentioned in this space and – at the risk of invoking another topic based in
deeper topics of human nature – the events of the last week certainly all have
us feeling like we’re on the psychologists’ couch again, either attempting to
cope with this unprecedented (well…probably unprecedented) collapse of the
Indians, trying to figure out what went wrong or attempting to be rational and
even try to hazard a guess as to where it goes from here. So even though I’ve already leaned on the
psycho-babble for column fodder in the recent past, the events of the last
month and quotes from the last month have me wondering about how this team fell
off the cliff so profoundly and whose fault it is.

Because coming into the season, there was some thought that
the young players that showed promise in 2011 would build on their successful
(to varying degrees) years last year and would keep the Indians around in the
AL Central pennant race, with the Indians needing a little luck and a lot of
good health to perhaps make a push towards contention throughout the
season. At this point, with September on
our doorstep, to say that none of that has happened (developing players,
pleasant surprises, health) is too sweeping of a statement, but it isn’t that
far off-base. While so much of the focus
has been placed on the failures of the past off-season, with Santana’s power
outage, Masterson’s regression, Cabrera’s ordinariness, and Kipnis’ recent
struggles, the players that looked like they could form a backbone to a team
that resembled a contender disappointed and put the onus of production on a
supporting cast that was poorly-designed and ill-equipped to assume it.

So what happened here?

While I’m not about to launch into a series akin to the 2008 “Things Fall Apart” series, where the reasons for the Tribe’s non-contention
and the beginning of the tear-down were examined in minute detail, the question
that I keep coming back to on this is that THESE young players – that are faltering so badly
down the stretch and whose development seems to have stalled to the point that
a “window of contention” built around them seems more laughable with each loss –
were supposed to carry this team in 2012 and they simply haven’t. So who bears the responsibility for that?

Is it the Front Office for assuming that these players
were/are more than what they seem to be?

Is it the Manager and the Coaching Staff for not putting
these players in the best situation to succeed and – to borrow a trite football
phrase – “coach them up” to the point that they are maximizing potential?

Is it the players, who seem as lifeless and helpless as I
can remember ANY Tribe team as the string is slowly – and painfully – played
out?

To expand on the title of the piece, is it these players’
individual shortcomings (their DNA) or is it the failure of the organization to
develop them and put them in the best environment to succeed?

There’s enough blame to go around here, but as this team
becomes increasingly difficult to watch and is certainly less compelling and
less likable than ever (and the fact that I returned from some time away last
weekend to find an e-mail from a TMZ…um, operative regarding this ugliness with
Chris Perez in Oakland provides a pretty concise indication of how horribly
this team has fallen) as a group of players, it seems that the internal discord
has started in terms of pointing fingers.
The first finger was pointed by the Tribe’s manager when Acta dropped this bomb, regarding how the struggles of Kipnis and Asdrubal (apparently, he hasn’t
noticed Choo falling off of a cliff in the last month) aren’t the “problem” for
this team:

“Realistically, I can’t
expect those guys to be on top of their game for 162 games,” said Acta. “That’s
why we do need more than four guys in our lineup to be productive.”

How will the Indians
correct that for 2013?

“It’s no secret, we’re
going to need to improve our offense,” said Acta. “We’re going to have to find
a solution in left field, we’re going to have to find a solution at first base
and we’re going to have to find a solution at DH. That’s pretty obvious.

“And the third base
situation is not determined either. Lonnie [Chisenhall] has a broken arm.
The guys that are here right now are fine and doing what they can, but we
expect more.”

--SNIP--

When Acta was told
that’s quite a shopping list, he said, “We gotta have it.”

Though I remain firmly on the record that the rotation is
this teams’ biggest issue – both now (starters’ ERA is now FIVE POINT
SEVENTEEN) and going forward – if Manny wants to talk about offensive
deficiencies, I’ll play along…

So as the current manager, coaching staff, and Front Office
runs for cover, Acta’s comments – while not untrue – struck me as oddly
reminiscent of the ol’ Cholly Manuel line that the Front Office was giving him
3-tool players (he was referring to Milt Bradley) and telling him to win with
all of the 5-tool players that they’d assembled in that it looks on the surface
like a stinging indictment of the supporting cast around those “four guys” (and
it is), but it also sounds to me like Acta is saying that those “four guys” are
not impactful enough to carry an offense.

Going into this season, it was easy to look at 1B, LF, and
3B as probable problems and though we were forced to read all Spring Training about
how Shelley Duncan deserved a shot to be a full-time LF and Hannahan switching
to a heavier bat meant that he had suddenly turned into an effective hitter
with the LASIK surgery for Casey Kotchman leaned on as the “reason” for his
improved offensive numbers, anyone who was pretending that those players
represented even suitable options was being pretty optimistic. But more than those spots being black holes
(and they were…and are), it’s hard not to see how the likes of Choo, Cabrera,
Santana, and Kipnis were being counted on to do much of the heavy lifting for
this offense by design with their track records, both long (Choo) and short
(Santana, Kipnis) providing some inkling of optimism that the quartet – with
some hope that other pieces like Brantley and/or Chiz would emerge or that
Grady (oof) or Hafner (double oof) would be healthy – could lead the Indians
offensively, with similar hope for young(ish) pitchers - most notably Masterson
- to do the same for the pitching staff.

But that simply hasn’t happened and, though there have been
some offensive bright spots, those players that were thought to perhaps form a
core going forward have been too inconsistent to legitimately carry an offense (much
less a pitching staff) on their own or even as a group. What’s happened is that they’ve looked like
complementary pieces – granted, nice complimentary pieces – and that’s pretty
much your worst-case scenario here, particularly for players like Santana,
Masterson, and Kipnis. Yes, those three
(and the two offensive players in particular) are young players that are still
developing and maturing, but with 2012 representing a step back for them, who
gets the blame for that?

Did the Front Office assume too much from a player like
Santana to anchor the lineup or did the Coaching Staff fail in helping Santana
(since I’m using him as the example) make the necessary adjustments to continue
to succeed or does some of the blame fall at Santana’s cleats?

Obviously, these are all hypothetical “blame” questions that
have been around as long as baseball, but with this group of assembled players
– acquired because they’re similarly-aged and similarly-controlled – supposed
to be taking that next step in 2012 and actually falling backwards down the
steps (in what has to be the longest flight of stairs in recent memory), that’s
what we’re left doing, asking questions that have very ambiguous answers.

And while some will firmly purport to have those “answers”, assigning
“blame” in black-and-white terms is akin to predicting success or failure in
absolute terms from Lake County to Cleveland.

Why did Santana’s power desert him?

Was Masterson’s 2011 a mirage?

How did someone not see that LaPorta couldn’t hit an MLB
curveball?

Maybe you think all (or at least most) of the blame falls at
the feet of the Front Office for assembling THIS particular group of players
and hoping for the best, or for their failure to augment this group of players
externally in the off-season, and those aren’t unfair criticisms. But for as much as I hear “WILLINGHAM”
screamed amid a cacophony of “harrumphs”, everyone knows that Ryan Ludwick has
a higher OPS than Josh Willingham right now, right?

That’s not meant to add “LUDWICK” as a new calling cry
amidst the “harrumphs”, but Ludwick was signed in early February for $2.5M with
a 2013 option by the Reds, after the Indians had added other OF “options” (and
this is a great recap of all of those off-season “options” added from Andrew Clayman) to hopefully help the assembled talent. So was Ludwick all set to “break out” this year and the
Indians simply whiffed on him, or is he a product of his environment in
Cincinnati last year and he would be – had he signed with the Tribe – mentioned
in the same breath as Duncan and Kotchman and every other “unsuitable” addition
to this team?

Because isn’t that what gnaws at us as fans?

To see Beltran and Willingham and (now) Ludwick succeed
while the Indians’ LF continue to flail away, with the manager joining the
chorus heard across the North Coast begging for an answer?

But that’s where this thing gets cloudy in terms of “Nature
vs. Nurture” in talent acquisition as the White Sox are competing this year
with a motley cast of characters, with players that were thought to be injured,
flawed, or AWFUL additions (Rios, Dunn, Peavy) carrying that team, augmented by
a group of lesser-known players that are thriving with little fanfare. So Kenny Williams is lauded for pulling this
group of players together – on the fly and with a barren farm system…and if
someone can explain to me how he poached Youkilis and Liriano, giving up nearly
nothing in return, I’m all ears – even if nobody can figure out how he’s doing
it.

But is Williams simply prescient when it comes to acquiring these guys or are
they developing and contributing at the MLB level because they’re being put in
the right positions to succeed while being coached to maximized their
potential?

Remember when Brennan Boesch (the 15th ranked prospect IN THE TIGERS’ SYSTEM, not in all of MLB, prior to the 2010 season) came out of nowhere
a couple of years ago to post at least league-average production for the Tigers
or how Quintin Berry (a 27-year-old rookie) held down the fort this year when
Austin Jackson was missing in Detroit?

How are those teams hitting on those under-the-radar
additions to plug holes while the Indians languish away and continually struggle
to build depth of any kind?

Though I know I’m not comparing apples-to-apples here as the
White Sox are winning with a rag-tag group of players assembled (some off of
waivers, with some big price tags on players that were pretty unattractive when
they arrived on the South Side) by Kenny Williams while the Tigers are winning
on the largesse of Mike Ilitch’s dying wish (and yes…I know he’s not dying) to
win a World Series as the Tigers’ owner, it is worth noting that the White Sox
and Tigers get production from unlikely sources (particularly on offense) with
the question coming back as to why that is, when that does not seem to happen
for the Indians on a regular basis…

Obviously, you could say that the White Sox are paced by
Konerko, just as the Tigers are led by Miggy, Prince, and Jackson, but doesn’t
that get back to that point that Acta made?

He seems to be saying that the Indians need 7 to 8
productive bats in the lineup – since he names Choo, Cabrera, Kipnis, and
Santana as his “quartet” and says he needs bats for 3 more positions (LF, 1B,
and DH) while leaving Brantley and Chiz out of the conversation – when that
kind of up-and-down-the-lineup production isn’t all that prevalent…well,
anywhere. Most teams are built on the
backs of the middle-of-the-order hitters with the ancillary pieces fitting
around them and that reason is one of the things that keeps leading me back to
this idea that Acta doesn’t think that the hand he’s been dealt is all that
compelling – with issues surrounding those purported “middle-of-the-order
hitters” perhaps being the unspoken message.

What’s so troubling about this idea – that Choo, Santana,
Kipnis, and Cabrera (plus Brantley and Chiz) CANNOT pace an offense – is that
those are the pieces that were put in place when this rebuild/reload/whatever
started (with LaPorta) and continued in earnest. And if those guys are not good enough to form
a productive offense as 2/3 of a lineup, that doesn’t leave a lot of room for
hope for them maturing into those pieces as a group, much less individually. Sure, you can say that LF and 1B, most
notably, have been complete black holes, but their production from C has been middle-of-the-road, and their OPS from 2B and CF are merely a little
above-average as we enter the final month of the season.

And with expectations high for players like Santana and
Kipnis coming into the season, if this is what is to be expected from the
players that are thought to be the burgeoning top-to-middle-of-the-lineup,
suddenly a full-scale blow-up doesn’t seem as implausible as it may have just a
couple of weeks ago. Maybe that’s
extreme and asking too much of too many young players, but AC sums it up pretty well here:

You start to wonder if
the Indians would, indeed, be best to move the most attractive pieces from a
team that wasn’t all that good to begin with in order to bring in some younger,
projectable bodies you can place around the likes of Jason Kipnis, Chisenhall,
Santana and Brantley.

Yes, that could mean
trading Shin-Soo Choo, who wants to be with a winner as much as he wants to
sign a fat free-agent contract. Yes, that could mean trading (Chris) Perez,
though his reputation will undoubtedly precede him in trade talks. Yes, that
could mean even mean parting with Asdrubal Cabrera, who has once again seen his
production wane in the second half.

The freefall somehow cannot find a bottom and with the
Manager sniping at the Front Office as the young players that were thought to
lead this team in 2012 and beyond continue to struggle with their consistency,
the question that sticks is whether those players are struggling because
they’ve been misevaluated on the high side or if they’re not reaching their potential
because of a lack of adjustments.

It’s a question that becomes more pointed with each loss,
with an “answer” (however that is gleaned) likely costing someone in the
Indians’ organization their job this off-season, with the hope that the correct “answer” is eventually found.

Sunday, August 19, 2012

The Indians can’t draft well. They’re in this mess right now
because they miss on too many of their draft picks. I know it’s true, everyone
says so. Fire Antonetti and Shapiro! They haven’t drafted a good player since
Ray Fosse! Right? The Indians clearly went through a dry spell in their amateur
talent acquisition from 1999 through 2008. The club drafted lefthanded pitcher
Carsten Charles Sabathia in 1998, then basically sat back and said “C.C., you’ve
got this.” From 1999-2007, the best player the Indians drafted was Jeremy
Guthrie, their first round pick in the 2002 draft. And he went on to have most
(all) of his success in cities other than Cleveland. OK, in the interest of
full disclosure, the best player they drafted
was Tim Lincecum, with their 42nd round pick in 2005. But Lincecum
wanted too much to sign and went to college instead, and grew up to be The
Freak that Giants fans know and love today. Sure, there were some other decent
picks; Vinnie Pestano in the 25th round of the 2006 draft for one.
But the Rule 4 Amateur Draft was not kind to Director of Scouting John
Mirabelli, who assumed the role in 1999 and relinquished it in November of
2008.

Enter Brad Grant. Grant was promoted to the Director of
Amateur Scouting role in 2008 when Mirabelli was inexplicably promoted to his
current title of Vice President, Scouting Operations. I can’t be the only onewho finds it funny that the press release touting Mirabelli’s promotion plugs
his international signings of Masa Kobayashi (retired), Jason Smit (retired) and
Sung-Wei Tseng (guess what? retired). Grant became responsible for
the club’s amateur draft and international signings while Mirabelli was
mercifully promoted to a more administrative role. The good news for Grant is
that he had (has) an extremely low bar to vault over when it comes to talent
acquisition. If he can draft more than Jeremy Guthrie, he’s a better drafter
than Mirabelli. If he can sign international free agents who’s cumulative
contributions equal more than Faus…Roberto Hernandez’s one glorious summer,
he’s acquired more talent in the international realm than Mirabelli. But simply
being better than Mirabelli isn’t going to be enough to propel the Indians to
contention. With a budget that’s not going to allow for significant free agent
signings to cover for continued misses in the draft, Grant has to be in the top
echelon of his peers when it comes to signing that precious talent that is
under club control at a reasonable cost for a significant period of time. Some fans
see the lack of top-100 prospects in the Indians organization (only Lindor made
the list this offseason) and assume that Grant is as bad as, if not worse than,
Mirabelli. After taking a little more in-depth look at Grant’s record, I
couldn’t disagree more.

In 2008, the Indians had the
29th overall pick, the highest they’d drafted since the “Era of
Champions” Indians back in the late-90’s. Grant’s first ever draft pick was a
shortstop out of Pitt Community college named Lonnie Chisenhall. The Chiz pick
was roundly criticized at the time, as most saw a position switch to 3B and a
bat that wouldn’t play at a corner. Some thought that Wichita State 3B Conner
Gillespie would have been a much better selection. Chisenhall flew through the
Indians system, appearing as a top-50 overall prospect in both 2010 and 2011
before passing the Rookie of the Year thresholds, and at age 23 he’s
accumulated 284 MLB AB and is seen as the Indians 3B of the future. I think we
can safely give that pick a passing grade.

With their 2nd pick
(#79 overall), Grant and the Indians took Nacogdoches, TX RHP Trey Haley. Haley
is currently 22 years old and in AA, his development slowed by some arm and
groin injuries the past two years. But on the mound, Haley has a legit
triple-digit fastball and a knee-bending curveball. He’s seen as a likely
reliever down the road, but he has the arm to close. Other highlights from the
2008 draft include infielder Cord Phelps (3rd round), relief pitcher
Zach Putnam (5th round), outfielder Tim Fedroff (7th
round), pitcher Eric Berger (8th round), starter T.J. House (16th
round) and catcher Roberto Perez (33rd round). Phelps and Putnam
have already appeared in the major leagues. The other four should get there at
some point. None appear in the top-100 prospects, and none project to be future
all-stars, but that hardly makes them useless.

Contrast the Indians’ 2008
draft with that of everyone’s small-market darlings, the Tampa Bay Rays. Tampa
had the #1 overall pick and selected SS Tim Beckham. Beckham is 22, in AAA, and
has fallen completely off the top-100 lists as well. His 2011 OPS of .736 is
his career high. I wouldn’t trade Lonnie Chisenhall for Tim Beckham. No players
from the Rays 2008 draft have appeared in the major leagues. No players from
the Rays 2008 draft appear in the most recent top-100 prospect lists. I do not
point this out to pick on the Rays, but to give context to what a “good” draft
is. The Red Sox didn’t do much better; their 1st round pick, pitcher
Casey Kelly, was rated as the #27 overall prospect in 2012, but none of their
other choices appear in the top 100. Their 7th round pick, 3B Ryan
Lavarnway, is 24 and has a .594 OPS in 63 MLB at bats. None of the players they
selected have done anything in the major leagues. The Tigers hit on 5th
round pick Alex Avila, but little else. All this is a long way of saying that
no matter how you stack up the Indians 2008 draft, Brad Grant did a pretty good
job in his first year at the helm.

If we flip the calendar to
2009, we see a similar story. Picking #15 overall, the Indians took RHP Alex
White. Some saw White as a future bullpen arm with only two pitches, but the
Indians kept him in the starting rotation and saw him rank in the top-75 in
prospect rankings in both 2010 and 2011 before making his MLB debut in the 2011
season. White pitched well, got hurt, and was included in the trade package for
Ubaldo Jiminez (not Grant’s doing). The real home run in the draft though was
in the 2nd round, when Grant took Arizona State outfielder Jason
Kipnis with the 63rd overall pick. When the Indians made it known
that their intentions were to transition Kipnis to 2B, the derisive cries of
“Trevor Crowe redux” were heard long and loud across the North Shore. Kipnis
was a preseason top-100 prospect in 2011 before his successful MLB debut in the
2nd half of the season, and the 25-year old narrowly missed being
named to the all-star team in his first full season in the show here in 2012.
Other than wunderkid Mike Trout of the Angels, Jason Kipnis is far and away the
best major league player from the 2009 MLB draft. Grant didn’t do as well in
the later rounds of the draft as he did in 2008, especially with 4th
round pick Austin Adams going down with a shoulder injury this offseason, but
pitchers Preston Guilmet (9th round), Tyler Sturdevant (27th
round) and Matt Packer (32nd round) all have MLB potential. If we
again look at the Yankees, Rays and Red Sox, we see no MLB talent and no
top-100 prospects from their 2009 drafts. The Tigers did snag pitcher Jacob
Turner, but would you trade Kipnis for Turner right now? I wouldn’t. So despite
a lack of overall depth in 2009, I think that Grant is now 2-2 when it comes to
Rule 4 Drafts.

Just one player that the
Indians drafted and signed in 2010 has played in the majors; 5th
overall pick Drew Pomeranz. Pomeranz of course was the co-headliner of the deal
that brought Ubaldo Jimenez to Cleveland after ranking in the top 75 prospects
in baseball prior to the 2011 season. He was a consensus top-50 guy prior to
2012, and is now over the ROY thresholds with mixed results in Colorado. Five
players from the first round of the 2010 draft have appeared in the majors, and
only 1st overall pick Bryce Harper and Chris Sale have produced more
in the show thus far. Second round pick LeVon Washington has shown glimpses of
talent, but has been injured too much to really have an accurate judgment of
type of player he’s going to be. Third round pick Tony Wolters, skipped over
low-A completely, started 2012 slowly but has come on to have a solid season
for high-A Carolina. He’s splitting time between 2B and SS, but his glove
profiles better at 2B with shortstops Ronny Rodriguez and Francisco Lindor also
in the system. Catcher Alex Lavisky (8th round) has a power bat and
the defensive chops to stick behind the plate, and 10th round OF
Tyler Holt looks a lot like Trevor Crowe (which is ok since he was drafted in
the 10th round instead of the 1st). There aren’t many
other guys who look like potential major leaguers in the rest of the draft, but
that makes the third time in three years that Grant has hit on at least the
Indians first round pick, something that hasn’t happened for a long time in
Cleveland in any sport.

Leading up to the 2011 draft,
many of the “experts” had the Indians selecting another college arm for the 3rd
year in a row. In one of the most talented drafts in years, there were eight
elite level talents, and the Indians had the 8th overall pick. The
college arms that were projected to be on the board at #8 were not among those
elite talents, and I was on pins and needles hoping that Grant would take the
best player available rather than the top available college arm. Fortunately,
he came through and took high school shortstop Francisco Lindor (as I’d
fervently hoped all along). Lindor is now the undisputed top prospect in the
Indians organization, and a consensus top-10 prospect in all of baseball. He’s
ranked higher than all but two of the 2011 draft picks, and projects as an
above average everyday SS on the low end, and a perennial all-star and gold
glover on the high end. In addition to Lindor, 23rd round pick Cody
Allen was the 2nd player in the entire 2011 draft class to make it
to the majors when he was promoted last month, and looks like a potential
back-end arm in the bullpen. It’s still awfully early to judge the rest of the
draft, but 2nd round pitcher Dillon Howard was seen as a first round
talent prior to the draft, 7th round catcher Eric Haase looks really
interesting, and there are a number of arms later in the draft that could end
up in a major league bullpen down the road. So if you’re scoring at home, that
makes it 4-4 for Grant in the first round of the MLB draft.

It’s far too early to judge
the 2012 draft that took place just about two months ago, but if we’ve learned anything
in this article so far it’s that Grant has earned our trust by drafting better
than…well, probably better than any Cleveland executive in my lifetime at least
(born in 1981). So let’s move on to the other method Grant has used to infuse
talent into the organization; international free agency. Grant has hit on a
number of players since coming onto the job, players who are starting to take
over the Indians top prospect lists. Ten of the Indians projected top-50
prospects in this coming offseason’s countdown are IFA’s that have signed under
Grant’s watch. In 2008, reliever C.C. Lee, catcher Alex Monsalve and 3B Gio
Urshela came into the fold. Lee was on the cusp of reaching the Indians bullpen
when he went down with Tommy John surgery this spring. The 20-year old Urshela
is a slick-fielding 3B who wasn’t doing much with the bat coming into this
year, but is putting up career highs in OPS, HR and AVG in the pitcher-friendly
Carolina League. Monsalve was a Midwest League All-Star last season, and is up
with the Mudcats now and has already matched his career high in HR.

Grant followed that up with a
pair of toolsy infielders in 2009, SS/3B Jorge Martinez and 2B Jose Ramirez.
Martinez is 19 years old, and has one of the better bats in the Arizona Summer
League right now, hitting .340/.376/.543 with 6 HR and 31 RBI in 28 games. He’s
a work in progress in the field, but should be able to develop into at least an
average 3B. Ramirez is a second baseman, and led the Indians organization last
year with a .325 batting average in the Arizona Summer League, and is hitting
an impressive .343/.399/.428 for Lake County in his first experience in
full-season ball. Ramirez is also just 19, and while he doesn’t have much power
(2 HR in 406 pro AB), he makes a ton of contact, has good speed and legit top
of the order on base skills.

Never one to rest on his
laurels, Grant signed two more potential impact players in the international
market the very next year. In 2010, the Indians inked 2B turned CF Luigi
Rodrigez and SS Ronny Rodriguez (no relation). Luigi is one of the fastest,
most athletic players in the system. He’s hitting .264/.330/.394 with 9 HR and
20 SB in 105 games with the Captains this year, and is fast becoming a legit
CF. He’s got the speed and the arm to play CF, he just needs more experience
reading flyballs and patrolling the OF to improve his instincts. He’s got
plenty of time to improve though, as he’s still just 19 years old. Ronny
Rodriguez made his stateside debut last year with the Captains, hitting
.246/.274/.449 and 11 HR in 98 games. He moved up to high-A Carolina this
season, and has improved on that batting line, going .267/.304/.451 with 16 HR and
61 RBI. It’s not a line that sets the world on fire, but when you consider that
he’s a 20-year old in his first full season stateside, playing above-average
defense at SS and that those 16 HR are tied for 5th in the Carolina
League…well, that starts to look a lot better now, doesn’t it? Rodriguez has
the potential to be a top-100 guy this coming offseason, and is looking more
and more like the #2 guy in the Indians organization every day.

So the trend for Grant seems
to be that he adds two solid international free agents per season, and 2011 was
no different. Grant signed OF Anthony Santander and SS Dorssys Paulino out of
the Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, respectively. Santander is a 6’1”,
190lb OF who’s hitting .302/.361/.488 with 4 HR, 30 RBI and 6 SB in 35 games in
the Arizona Summer League. He projects to LF defensively, and is just 17 years
old. As impressive as that line is, what SS Dorssys Paulino is even more
eye-opening. Paulino is also just 17-years old and making his stateside debut,
and is hitting .358/.406/.606 with 5 HR, 14 doubles, 6 triples, 29 RBI and 8
stolen bases in 39 AZL games. To put those numbers in the proper context, let me refer you to a Baseball America article that compares Paulino’s debut tothat of some elite infielders around baseball:

Dominican teenagers who come to the U.S. for their
pro debut aren't supposed to make it look this easy. Robinson Cano hit
.230/.330/.365 in 57 games in the Rookie-level Gulf Coast League when he was
18. When Placido
Polanco was 18, he hit .213/.259/.268 in 32 games in the AZL, while
a 19-year-old Rafael Furcal (.258/.335/.342 in 50 GCL games) didn't fare much
better.

Hanley Ramirez exploded on to the scene for the Red Sox 10 years ago as an
18-year-old in the GCL, where he hit .341/.402/.555 in 45 games, while Starlin
Castro hit .311/.364/.464 in 51 AZL games at 18. Yet in addition to
being a year older than Paulino at the time, both Ramirez and Castro had spent
a season in the Dominican Summer League before making the jump to a U.S.
complex league. The Indians have thrown Paulino into the fire, and he's
responded by making the Arizona League look like Little League.

The Indians are not going to
make the playoffs in 2012. Consider this my bold prediction on that front. The
Indians do not have impact talent in AAA or AA that will step up next year to
augment the big league club to fuel a run to the playoffs next year. When you
look back at how this roster was built, you see a few good trades (Santana,
Asdrubal, Masterson) working desperately to overcome a decade of terrible
drafting. That’s not a good business model, on a number of levels. That’s also
not Brad Grant’s fault. Since taking over in 2008, Grant has gone 4-4 with his
first round picks in the Rule 4 Draft which is four more than the previous
administration can claim. Between the draft picks and international signings,
the lower levels of the Indians minor league system are well-stocked and loaded
with potential impact talent. That talent of course is a long ways from the
corner of Carnegie and Ontario, and a lot can happen between Lake County and
Cleveland. But when you’re calling for heads to roll in the Indians front
office, make sure that Brad Grant is spared your wrath. He’s making a lot more
good decisions then bad, and whenever the next “window of contention” cracks
open, it’s going to be either because players that Grant acquired are playing
at a high level in the show, or because they were used to trade for older guys
to help pry open that window before the core of Kipnis, Droobs, Santana, Chiz,
Brantley and Masterson hit free agency.

Wednesday, August 15, 2012

As I stared at the back of Corey Kluber’s jersey this past Sunday
afternoon, before I decided to continue on with my Sunday (oh…about 1:30 PM)
without the Tribe, I was struck that Kluber’s last name reminded me of a name
that I saw those many years ago at some Psych 101 class at the University of
Dayton. Bored as I watched the Red Sox
batter Kluber, I did a quick search on the Interwebs, which drew me to the name
Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross. Now, if you
have taken any kind of Psychology class, that name might look familiar to you as
Kubler-Ross famously wrote “On Death and Dying”, in which she identified her
“Five Stages of Grief” regarding terminally ill patients coming to grips with
their mortality.

Though I will NEVER attempt to equate something as
meaningless (in the grand scheme of things) as baseball or a Cleveland Indians’
season and a terminal patient and/or death, reading through Kubler-Ross’ Five
Stages, I was struck by how every Indians’ fan (and maybe every Cleveland
sports fan) currently finds themselves in one of these categories…particularly
since the season (and perhaps organization) defining losing streak a couple of
weeks ago.

Though I don’t think too many people are in “Denial”
(although anyone who thinks that Matt MaTola still represents a viable option
for this team going forward or if he “deserves that chance” is certainly in
denial) about what’s happened here and probably “Anger” is where most of the
North Coast sits right now, with “Bargaining” probably coming in the off-season
as trades involving Dave Huff, Zeke Carrera, Jeanmar Gomez and Mark Trumbo are
bandied about among Tribe fans. Certainly,
“Depression” and “Acceptance” are feelings that can be found among the fanbase,
although “Apathy” is probably more applicable than “Acceptance” to the
particular situation, even if the Tribe is no longer at the bottom of the MLB Attendance list.

But this season certainly has a terminal feel to it and,
regardless of where you sit on Kluber…I mean, Kubler-Ross’ Stages of Grief
chart, know that there are others right there with you, even if we are still
just talking about baseball. But
“talking about baseball” is what we do in this space, so with that said (and
with you remembering how you got that Psych requirement in pursuit of your
degree) let’s get some Tomahawks in the Air…

__________

With the Indians now having won 4 of their last 7 since the
end of the 11-game losing streak (hey, that’s better than average) against the
Red Sox and the Angels, anyone else noticing a trend in terms of the games the
team is winning and those they’re losing?

Somehow, when the Indians get good starts (McAllister on
Saturday, Masterson on Monday), they win.
Conversely, when they get lousy starts (Kluber on Sunday, Ubaldo on
Tuesday), they lose. Who had that one
figured out?

Wait…it’s tied into PITCHING, and STARTING pitching at that?

I thought that the oft-repeated choruses involving some
combination of “RH Bat”, “Damon/Duncan”, and “Kotchman” buried this team. You’re telling me it was the pitching and,
more specifically, the starting pitching?

Incredible…

While I know that you think that this dead horse has been
beaten, then beaten some more (particularly by me), I will point back to
something that I wrote in this space just a week ago, particularly as this
“Roberto Hernandez” fellow is ready to take a turn on the bump for the
Tribe. Lest you forget, last July the
Indians had a rotation going of Masterson, Carrasco, Carmona, and Tomlin all
looking pretty solid (even if the wheels were starting to come off for Carrasco
and Tomlin and Fausto had been…well, “Bad Fausto”) with the Indians making the
decision to add Ubaldo to that mix.
Again, even if this was just written here last week, this cannot be
overstated in terms of the starting pitching and the events over the last 13
months:

What has transpired
since that trade has been beyond catastrophic for the organization, as Carrasco
went under the knife, Fausto was exposed as being the Dominican Don Draper, and
Ubaldo didn’t come close to resembling the front-end-of-the-rotation “stopper”
that they thought they were getting.

So now here we sit, with Ubaldo and Masterson looking
alternatively good and bad, Tomlin likely out for an extended period of time
(and does anyone else wonder if Tomlin has been dealing with this injury for a
while and didn’t fully reveal it, being in MLB and all), and with Zach McAllister
looking like the best starting pitcher for a team that has purported itself to
rely on starting pitching from the day that the current regime took office. Now, Fauberto’s return to the mound this week
really brings to a point how “catastrophic” the turn has been for the rotation
and how it really took the Front Office by surprise, both in terms of injury
(Carrasco and now Tomlin), regression (Masterson/Ubaldo), and fraud
(Carmona/Hernandez) to the point that I don’t think they even considered the
“Plan F” that was going to be necessary when things started imploding.

The Indians must decide
if they exercise Hernandez’s watered-down $6 million option for 2013. The
option was originally worth $9 million, but the team was so upset at Hernandez’s
fraud, and the fact that he could not leave the Dominican Republic for more than
half the season, that they restructured his deal.

It’s important to remember that Lowe was acquired in
November, leading Grantland’s Jonah Keri to proclaim the Indians’ pitching
staff as “Worms’ No. 1 Enemy”, with the rotation of Masterson, Ubaldo, Carmona, Lowe, and
Tomlin/Gomez/McAllister figuring to pitch the majority of the innings for the
Tribe in 2012. Two months later,
Fauxberto was exposed and the young, high-level, high-impact depth that was
compromised by the Ubaldo deal and the Carrasco injury left the Tribe looking
at Tomlin and Gomez with guaranteed spots in the rotation and with Lowe as
their de facto #3 starter…after the Braves basically paid the Tribe to take
him.

Certainly, Lowe and Gomez (most notably) started out strong,
but there’s a big difference between Gomez and Tomlin battling it out for the 5th
spot and BOTH of those pitchers being in the rotation from Opening Day through
mid-June (in the case of Gomez) and into late-July (in the case of Tomlin) for
a team that had any thoughts of contending as Fauxberto’s exclusion from the
team – and he’ll have about 10 starts this year, which is 2 less than Mitch
Talbot (remember him) had for last year’s club – threw the organization back on
its heels at a time (in January) when most FA arms have already been signed for
a month or longer.

Though I’ll get into this a little later, since the
beginning of the 2008 season, the player that has worn #55 for the Tribe has
been affecting the plans that the organization has and hasn’t made because of
expectations for him and because of his assumed “presence” in the
rotation. This season, “presence” has
had nothing to do with it as his surprising “absence” – and the timing of that
news – was just as, if not more, impactful than any point than any season…

__________

So with no guarantee that Fauxberto – who always seems to
throw a wrench in the Indians’ best-laid (or seemingly best-laid plans) – will
even be back in a Tribe uniform (though that $6M salary is almost too enticing
when Aaron Harang got a 2-year, $12M deal last off-season...and check the whole list) and with Carrasco
still on the mend with Tomlin about to hit the shelf, it’s been well-documented
(here) about how the Indians’ starting pitching remains their weakness going
forward.

With little of interest expected to emerge from the Farm
next year in terms of starting pitching and with McAllister, Gomez, and Kluber
all largely unproven (and, for whatever reason, I see Gomez as the long man and
Kluber as a bullpen arm in the future), what do the Indians do?

Certainly, there are questions all over for the
organization, but I do think that it is worth noting that the Indians have
actually been active on the FA market in the past when it came to adding a
veteran SP to fill a hole…and I don’t mean Derek Lowe, as he was acquired via
trade. Rather, it’s worth pointing out
that when the Indians were full of a talented lineup and a young and uneven (if
talented) pitching staff in the mid-2000s, they did go out and augment the
rotation because nothing was ready to contribute from the Minor Leagues to
complement the pieces already in place.
Of course, I speak of that “magical” Kevin Millwood signing (for $7M) in
2005, then Paul Byrd getting a 3-year, $21M deal back in 2006 to “replace”
Millwood as examples when the Indians did go out and spend some money on the FA
market to add to the starting rotation with a veteran arm.

Now, you may say that neither Millwood nor Byrd was a
top-tier FA arm, or a “stopper”, which is
what this team needs, it might be interesting to see what the Indians do this
off-season in terms of dedicating some payroll – in terms of years and dollars
– to an arm. Though they might have
thought they were doing that in the Ubaldo deal and FA starting pitchers are
NEVER cheap – in terms of years and dollars – the Indians may survey the scene,
look at their projected payroll (and this “guess” at the 2013 payroll is pretty solid and suggests that there may be some room for flexibility), and decide to
make a move to add to their obviously-depleted and in-need-of-help rotation.

While I’m ACUTELY aware of the presumed Modus Operandi of
this ballclub, I can’t help but shake this idea that the ownership and Front
Office aren’t also ACUTELY aware of that presumed Modus Operandi and go out to
make an addition that falls closer to the Byrd signing (again, 3-years at $7M
per) than the Carl Pavano ($1.5M guaranteed with a lot of incentives) as they
have to realize that they’re at a crossroads in terms of their ownership and
the Front Office regime with the Tribe.
Certainly, I’m not suggesting that Zach Grienke is about to don the
Chief, but players (as mentioned in the aforementioned payroll article) like
Joe Blanton, Brandon McCarthy (assuming health), Shawn Marcum (assuming health),
or Dan Haren (say it with me…assuming health) might all be intriguing options
for the Indians to look at, particularly if the Trade Market doesn’t develop
for them in terms of adding a starting pitcher.

Because, short of internal help and not being able to count
on an arm coming via trade (without having to give up Choo…with no suitable
replacement anywhere close), the other way to add pieces to a team is via
FA. And while the Indians have certainly
dabbled in FA, their shopping habits – which is closer to rummaging around the
bargain-bin with about 22 to 25 other clubs in MLB – may have to change if they
want to seriously consider making a run in 2013. Maybe ownership won’t even let THAT happen,
but with the Padres (THE PADRES) being sold for $800M (and yes, $200M of that
is upfront money as part of the Fox Sports San Diego media rights deal
scheduled to take place), you would have to think that the Dolans could make
one last push as owners before seriously considering whether this whole “I want
to own the Indians” dream is more of a nightmare.

That one last “push” – if it were to come – would be nice to see about 60 feet
and 6 inches from home plate in 2013, particularly given the state of the starting
rotation and of the franchise…

__________

Finally and speaking of the “state of the franchise”, with
the return of Fauxberto on our doorstep and with the Indians’ DL (again and
still) populated by Hafner and Sizemore, it is worth noting that the 3 players
that the Indians essentially “bet” on to carry them through contention for a
couple of years back in 2007 and 2008 are still on this 2012 roster
together…likely for the last month or so here.

Though I know that nobody needs a history lesson – as it’s
all too painful to recall – dating back in April of 2008, the Tribe signed a thought-to-be-24-year-old pitcher coming off of a dominant year in 2007 to a
contract that guaranteed him “only” $15M, AND gave the team flexibility to
potentially control him through the 2014 season at what looked to be pretty
affordable numbers. What has happened
since has been well-documented and tragic on many levels, but 6 months after
#55 stared down the Yankees between the midges, he was inked to a deal that
he’s still working off of (if at a reduced rate), even if the end of his
Indians’ career may be in sight.

If Fauxberto may not be long for the Tribe, the player for
whom the end has almost certainly been reached as an Indian is Travis
Hafner. Remember, less than a year
before the Carmona extension, the team extended Hafner in July of 2007 with the
largest guaranteed contract ever handed out by the team that kept him under
club control through 2012. The deal came
on the heels of a 3-year stretch in which Hafner was among the game’s elite
hitters (third in wOBA, in fact, in all of MLB over those 3 years), with the
other names on that list still plugging away as the elite among MLB hitters
these 5 years later. As we all know, Hafner’s
career was derailed by too many injuries to recount, with the latest just
feeling like the final straw for a player whose greatness (yes…“greatness”) at
the plate for that 3-year stretch will unfortunately be overshadowed by what
happened after that 3-year stretch of time.

Speaking of 3-year stretches, the 2008 season started with
Grady Sizemore just having finished a 3-year stretch (from 2005 through 2007)
in which he was the 5th most valuable player in MLB, just having
turned 25 in August of 2007. His career comparables after that 2008 season were flush with recognizable names, some of
whom would end up in the Hall of Fame.
Now, as he struggles to even get on the field having just turned
TWENTY-NINE, with the glimpse provided in 2011 of what he once was and what we
thought he could become still leaving those pangs of regret, Grady has also
likely played his last inning with the Indians, a career unrivaled – really in
all of MLB – in terms of promise and potential at a young age being completely snuffed out far too early as
we all still wonder what might have been.

And “what might have been” is the overwhelming feeling with
those three as the end of the 2007 really wasn’t all that long ago, in terms of
flips of the calendar. But for those
three, these five years could not have been more unkind and since the beginning
of that 2008 season through today, the career paths of that trio have mirrored
that of the organization that they were once thought to lead into a new “Era of
Champions” or at least of contention once again. Instead, each faded away in their own way,
just as the promise of that 2007 season faded away into just a “what might have
been” memory…

Sunday, August 12, 2012

With the Indians’ season bottoming out in the course of
about two weeks, the team has attempted to turn the page past 2012 (despite
more than 50 games remaining) with an eye towards…yes, next year. The moves that put an end to the 2012
incarnation of the Indians have already started with Lowe, Damon, and Lopez
giving way to Kluber, Zeke, and Donald…in a roundabout way at least. Going further, Hafner is on the DL…again, and
maybe this time for good, with a new pitching coach in the dugout as Radinsky’s head was put up on a stake to proclaim “there will be casualties here”. And while I’m not going to pretend to know if
Radinsky was part of the problem or part of an unreachable solution, it is
interesting to note that Ubaldo said of Radinsky, upon his firing that “he did everything
possible…It’s my fault”, showing that Jimenez is pretty acutely aware of his
role in the shocking descent of the team over the last year, the last month,
and the last few weeks.

Of course, Ubaldo assuming blame for the firing doesn’t get
Radinsky his job back or anything and we’re left here looking down the barrel
of a little more than 50 games (think about the fact that the season is only
2/3 of the way over) wondering what happens now. That is, there is no real chance of
contention this year and the Indians have already largely cleared the decks of
veterans that don’t factor in next year, with Kotchman being the lone remaining
“not-under-contract” player for 2013 (and I imagine they’ll move him in an
August trade at some point as his glove is still compelling and he has a
not-all-that-embarrassing .723 OPS since July 1) with all of the other players
on the roster still under club control…even Duncan (under club control through
2015 and still affordable and useful as a RH bench bat), who is often lumped
into the Lowe/Damon column.

But, really…what now?

Unfortunately, it becomes a time where evaluation takes
place and players try to build some momentum for next year, the way that
Santana seems to be doing, or gaining confidence in their ability to compete at
the MLB level, the way that McAllister and a couple of the young relievers are doing. While that isn’t really all that interesting,
as it feels like what we’ve been doing from August on since 2009, the Indians
are full of players that they need to either figure out as useful parts or
parts whose “use” is most valuable elsewhere, either via trade or as an open 40-man
roster spot.

Certainly, they should be taking a look at Marson every day
(or close to it) as a catcher, particularly given that the DH spot is open (probably
for the rest of the year) and 1B could be open soon, meaning that Santana could
focus on his hitting for the rest of the year while staying healthy. Perhaps they could find that their “problem”
at 1B could be solved by Marson catching with Santana at 1B in 2013 and beyond
if Marson is able to show some semblance of consistency at the plate. In addition, they should be seeing if Donald
is able to handle the Utility role (as in, can he be a viable back-up SS) so
they don’t have to subject themselves to any kind of external Brent
Lillibridge-ian player as an “addition” to the team in the off-season. Likewise, they should be giving Zeke as much
exposure as they can in both LF and CF (giving Brantley some days at DH or off)
to see if he can actually look like the “best defensive OF” that he’s been
purported to be, in essence to see if Carrera is a legitimate possibility as
the 4th OF next year.
Additionally, they should continue to try to build Cody Allen, Esmil
Rogers, and Tony Sipp (back) into viable back-end-of-the-bullpen options for
next year while continuing to see if McAllister and Kluber are about to take
any kind of Westbrook-ian leap into a permanent starting rotation spot for the
foreseeable future.

But frankly, all of that isn’t all that interesting (even to
someone like me) and that’s really just talking about the periphery of the
roster in terms of a back-up catcher, a utility IF, the middle of the bullpen,
and the back-end-of-the-rotation. Not to
say that it isn’t useful to find answers to some questions on these guys – or
even seeing if they could build up some trade value for a guy like Lou Marson
or Jason Donald as a throw-in for an off-season trade – but the performance of
those guys down the stretch isn’t likely to have a big impact on the 2013 team,
even if some of the performances down the stretch here could affect some of the
decisions (and there are lot of them) facing this team this off-season, in
terms of FA, trades, and internal pieces.

Even more important than seeing if any of those peripheral
pieces can legitimately be counted on for 2013 (affecting how/if the Indians
augment this group), the players that could have a big impact on 2013 are the
ones that we’ve been watching all year long, with few “new” answers likely to
come in the final months. How the
organization handles those players (Choo and Perez, most notably) this
off-season is going to determine whether they think of the future of this group
of currently assembled players in the short-and-long term.

Because as much momentum as there seems to be for the “blow
it all up”…um, strategy, let’s remember that the Indians acquired these particular players back from 2008
to now (via trade and draft) because they were similarly-aged,
similarly-controlled, and (hopefully) talented enough that they would mature
into a contender. Though the Ubaldo deal
threw a bit of a wrench into those works, there are still pieces and parts –
particularly on offense – that align very nicely on the field and in terms of controlled years, particularly when you remember that Santana and Kipnis are
under club control through the 2017 season.
That’s why I have such difficulty seeing the “trade anything/everything
of value” and try to envision a day 3 to 4 years from now – when Brantley,
Santana, and Kipnis (just to name a few) are playing out the end of their days
with the Tribe – when the High-A and Low-A talent that would come from a
complete blow-up/rebuild now are hopefully
maturing and congealing into a contender…because didn’t we just see that attempted?

Indians: “They are in
a really tough spot. They don’t have much talent on their big-league club, and
they don’t have anything in the farm system. If I’m running that club, I’m
trading Justin Masterson, Chris Perez, and Shin-Soo Choo over
the winter and trying to collect as much young talent as I can. They need to
rebuild, and it's going to be a long process if they do.”

Oof…

So about 3 to 4 years after trading everything that wasn’t
nailed down in an attempt to collect as much young talent as they could, this
“Front Office type” is telling Perrotto that they’d trade the biggest assets
(and those closest to FA) in an attempt to “collect as much young talent as
(they) can”.

And that’s why this Front Office (assuming they’re still the
Indians’ Front Office in 3 months) faces such a difficult off-season as they
aligned Santana, Kipnis, Brantley, Masterson, Perez, and others to be “ready”
to contribute in the final years that Choo and Ubaldo are under contract, with
Cabrera under control for another two years.
Though they’re unquestionably handcuffed by a lack of payroll that would
allow them to compete for the Hamiltons and Grienkes of the world and the
prospects to make a splash in the Trade Market, they’re left with the unenviable
decision to try to make the right moves to augment the current club in place or
go for a full-bore rebuild, which would be a pretty hard sell to ownership so
quickly after the last “rebuild/reload/whatever” less than 5 years ago.

Since the more likely of the two “alternatives” is to augment
and reshape the current roster – as I don’t think the full-scale bomb is
dropping soon – and they take it about 1/3 of the way or ½ way from what that
“Front Office type” suggested, meaning that don’t move Masterson, but gauge
market interest and return for Perez and Choo, what are we looking at here, and
is any kind of assumed return for either (or both) enough to make 2013 much
more palatable or are we quite suddenly writing off 2013, once thought to be
the “target date” when Ubaldo was added?

In other words, is it possible to move Perez and/or Choo this
off-season and expect this team to still think about contention in 2013?

In terms of what could reasonably be expected for a trade
that would involve Perez and/or Choo, the assumption that the Indians can add a
ready-for-MLB starting pitcher or 1B seems to be floating out there, but is
that realistic?

If they were to move Perez – and it has been suggested that
he should be traded for some time, for reasons listed pretty accurately here –
they would be dealing from a position of strength and it would seem that they
have a ready-made replacement in Vinnie Pestano for the 9th inning. If the assumption is that
Smith/Rogers/Sipp/Allen/name a MiLB reliever can settle themselves into roles
for the 6th through 8th innings, it makes sense to attempt
to “sell” Perez (who my son has taken to call “Babyface” with his beard
gone) when his value is at its peak and before he gets (too) expensive via
arbitration.

But what could they expect to get for him?

Certainly, the ideal is what the A’s received for Andrew Bailey and Ryan Sweeney, namely OF Josh Reddick, who currently has 21 2B, 25
HR, and a .849 OPS to date in Oakland. And you can simply say…let’s turn Chris Perez
into a ready-to-be-an-All-Star corner OF like the A’s did last year with Bailey
(and Sweeney) for Reddick.

But let’s remember that, when that deal was consummated, Josh
Reddick had played in 143 games for Boston,
with 10 HR and a .706 OPS in a little more than 400 PA and he was likely slated
to start the season in AAA. Even if he
was a name that was bandied about here (and other places…and check this out from last December from Adam Van Arsdale, suggesting Reddick for C. Perez) that
came largely based on this from B-Pro, written about Reddick (again, 21 2B, 25
HR, .849 OPS to date) and Ryan Kalish (only 85 PA with the Red Sox this year,
with a .922 OPS in AAA Pawtucket) and how each had “potential” coming into the
season:

Kalish and Reddick
have come up together through the Red Sox system and have similar potential as
corner outfielders. Kalish is the more athletic of the pair, but Reddick has
more power and the stronger arm. As of right now, Reddick is the starting right
fielder in Boston, but as one scout put it, “They’re both good enough to play
every day in the big leagues… just not for the Red Sox.” Both could be involved
in potential deals that return older, more expensive upgrades.

So how do the Indians find another Josh Reddick and would
some team be willing to trade a young, under-club-control OF (as an example)
for an about-to-get-more-expensive closer in C. Perez?

That’s the question at hand as, yes…in an ideal world, the
Indians simply deal Perez, get a ready-to-step-in bat (or starter) and call it
a day, but finding that situation – when they probably did gauge interest and
return for Perez at the Trading Deadline – is what it will come down to. Certainly, they could get some package of
prospects for Perez, but what would a trade like that mean for 2013 or even
2014?

Even more confusing is the Choo situation as he (unlike
Perez) is entering his walk year and the Indians have NO compelling options
anywhere in the organization to replace him.
Don’t get me wrong here, at some point, they’re going to have to
eventually replace him as Choo is going to leave either by hook (via trade) or
crook (Messr. Boras)
at some point in the next 14 months or so.
But again, if the Indians do look to move Choo, what expectation should
there be that they could add a ready-to-contribute starting pitcher (or OF or
1B) when recent trades involving other still-under-control OF have resulted
largely in prospect packages.

Perhaps the best example of this is to look at the packages
that netted Hunter Pence in the past two years, with the Astros sending 2 ½ years
of club control of Pence to the Phillies and the Phillies recently trading 1 ½ years
of club control to the Giants. Now,
realizing that this isn’t a “this is the going rate for an OF on the Trade
Market” proclamation, it is interesting to look to see what the Astros, then
the Phillies were able to get for Hunter Pence…and Hunter Pence for longer than
what the Indians would be giving up in Choo.

When the Astros sent him to Philly, they added Jarred
Cossart as the main piece closest to MLB, who at the time was a 21-year-old
pitcher in AA who was listed as the 70th best prospect in baseball
prior to the 2011 season. Since then,
he’s ascended to AAA (just recently) and was BA’s 50th best prospect
coming into the 2012 season and could perhaps contribute to the Astros next
year…or about 2 years after Houston added him.
Past Cossart, they acquired OF Jonathan Singleton, who was in High-A
ball at the time and ranked as the 39th best prospect prior to last
season by BA, “improving” to the #34 slot prior to this year, where he is
currently a 20-year-old in AA. In
addition to those two main players, they added an older arm in Josh Zeid (now
25, with a 6.08 ERA in AA) and a very young OF in Domingo Santana (now 19 years
old and playing in High-A) as the PTBNL.
After having traded Pence about a year ago, the Astros have yet to see
any kind of MLB contributions from the players they added, even if Cossart may
not be too far away, depending upon his performance in AAA.

Now, just a year later, the Phillies sent Pence off to the
Bay Area for the Giants to retain club control over him for 1 ½ years. The Phillies’ return for those 1 ½ years of
Pence from San Francisco was an interesting 20-year-old catcher that was
recently promoted to AA in Tommy Joseph and a hard-throwing relief prospect in
Seth Rosin that figures to start 2013 in AA, though he could move quickly as a
late-inning reliever. So…two guys that –
while interesting with high ceilings – are likely to spend the 2013 season in
AA, maybe making it to AAA in 2014, with an eye towards a call-up to MLB
(assuming things go well) towards the end of 2014, or about the time that
Francisco Lindor should (knocking firmly on wood) be getting close to MLB.

And the reason that I put all of the ETA’s in there for
those players is not coincidental as both packages revolved around players
either in AA or High-A ball, meaning players that weren’t going to arrive to
MLB in any kind of short order. Perhaps
the Astros, then Phillies, desired lower-level players and demanded that those
particular players be included in the deals, but one would assume (particularly
with the Phillies) that most clubs would prefer to get closer-to-MLB players,
assuming that their pedigree was in line with those below them in the Minors.

Maybe they can target closer-to-MLB players or insist upon
already-established MLB players under club control for the foreseeable future,
but there are you returns for 2 ½ years of Hunter Pence and 1 ½ years for
Pence. Certainly, I realize that Choo is
a better player than Pence, but he’s also a Boras client who is unquestionably going to
test the FA waters at the end of 2013 and the likelihood that he signs with any
team that would acquire him in the off-season is as laughable as the idea that
he’s suddenly going to ink a deal with the Tribe.

All of that context brings us back to the idea that the
Indians can simply make a deal to bolster their MLB rotation immediately by
moving Choo or would be able to find his replacement in RF by essentially
trading for him. If the Pence deals
provide any insight, the Indians might be looking at a package that would
include players further away from MLB and, lacking an obvious replacement for
Choo, how they handle the Choo situation is going to be the move/non-move that
tips their hand about expectations for 2013, most notably.

The assumption that the Indians can simply trade Choo (or
Perez) for guys that step in right away is a tough one to envision on a
tit-for-tat scale, particularly given the limited control that any acquiring
team would be getting with Choo (or Perez) in a move. Yes, there have been moves that have involved
MLB players being dealt for MLB players, but those deals (Garza-for-Young,
Hamilton-for-Volquez) often involve young players under control for a longer
period of time than the one year remaining on Choo’s deal. And yes, there have been deals like the one
involving Josh Reddick last year heading West to Oakland, but the Indians would have to hit on
one of those deals – and hit a HR doing so – to make 2013 not feel like a step
back or just another plea to “wait until these guys are ready”.

Because that “wait until these guys are ready” day has
already arrived for the current group of Indians and how the organization
envisions them in 2013 – as a contender in need of a few tweaks/additions or as
a non-contender – is going to become clear in what is shaping up as a
franchise-altering and ownership-defining off-season for the team.