Monday, August 16, 2010

I make a lot of criticisms of things I find in the writings of the so-called "new atheists".

However, one set of criticisms I find that I can give absolutely no merit to are those who condemn the "shrillness" of the "new atheist" claims.

Shrillness?

In fact, it tells me something about the moral character of these individuals who make these kinds of claims. It tells me that these people do not care much about the victims of religious attrocities around the world - about real people killed, maimed and otherwise harmed, and forced to endure a lower quality of life for the one and only life they will ever have.

It suggests an attitude of, Don't concern yourself with the execution of an 18 year old because a Judge has decided, "He looks gay to me." Not at all. The real crime is this unspeakable evil of a "new atheist" being shrill in his protest of such actions.

Such a person may agree that executing an allegedly gay teenager or stoning a 13 year old girl should probably count as bad. However, it is the crime of shrilly condemning that execution that causes him to put finger to keypad. That's intolerable! We must speak up against such thing!

I have often wondered what these people thought of the act of shrilly protesting the shrillness of new atheist protests. By their shrillness they certainly show that shrill protests can sometimes be justified. What is interesting is the notion of what it is they think merits shrill protest, and what does not.

As I said, and as readers of this blog will confirm, I have some objections to some of the things that some "new atheists" have claimed. However, those objections have nothing at all to do with shrillness of their protests. In fact, I praise their shrillness. Shrillness is how we communicate the fact that we truly care about some state of affairs. And the harms that real people suffer as a result of certain religious beliefs are things we should care enough about to protest.

Imagine that are in the park. You witness an adult brutally attacking a child. At the same time, another adult shrilly protests the first adult's attack. Then a third person comes along and shrilly condemns the second person's condemnation of the attack.

First, I want to note that what this third person is saying by condemning the second person is that attacks on children are not serious enough to warrant protest.

Second, I want to point out the oddity of the third person's belief that it is worthwhile to condemn the second person's criticisms, but not the first person's attack on a child.

I would argue that the morally virtuous person would join in the condemnation of the attacker instead, rather than offer condemnation of one who condemns the attacker.

This is not a claim that one should remain silent when the "new atheist" makes a genuine mistake. Genuine mistakes deserve genuine criticism - but a genuine mistake is not criticized by attacking "shrillness".

For example, one "new atheist" claim I object to is the practice of making an entirely unjustified leap from premises about the moral crimes of "a religion" to the moral guilt of all who believe in a God. A sign, once popular among "new atheists" showing the World Trade Center buildings and the text "Imagine No Religion" provides just such an inference. However, I have only seen this image used once since I made my original complaints against it.

Some new atheists have taken to calling the act of teaching religion to a child "child abuse". I suspect that they like this term because of its emotional power. However, they neglect the fact that "abuse" requires a desire to harm children or a lack of concern as to their welfare. The woman who took thalidomide under a doctor's advice when she was pregnant and gave birth to a deformed child may have performed harmful acts, but cannot justifiably be condemned as an "abusive" parent.

A third problem concerns the tendency of some new atheists to ignore the fact that every atrocity built into scripture can be build into some moral theory or another that says nothing about the existence of a God. Sam Harris' argument in defense of torture in The End of Faith shows that a person does not have to appeal to a God to justify morally atrocious actions. Communism, Ayn Rand Objectivism, and moral relativism (or some of their more popular versions) are other examples where moral atrocities are defended without appeal to a God.

It is as much a sign of bigotry for the "new atheist" to focus only on the potential victims of sectarian irrationality (because it is sectarian) while ignoring the potential victims of secular irrationality (because it is secular), as it is for the religious bigot to ignore the victims of sectarian irrationality (because it is sectarian) and concern himself only with the victims of secular irrationality (because it is secular).

It might make some sense to say to the “new atheists” who make these mistakes that it is politically inexpedient of them to do so. However, I prefer to make the criticism that they are wrong to do so. The “political inexpedience” argument suggests that these are permissible errors when they are politically useful.

So, as I have shown. there are certainly things that appear in the writings and speeches of the new atheists that people can and should object to.

However, shrillness in defense of those being killed, maimed, and otherwise harmed by agents who give their actions religious justifications is not one of their faults. It is one of their virtues.

It is the lack of shrillness that deserves our moral condemnation in this case - and the condemnation of shrillness that deserves even harsher condemnation. Both of these options suggest a callous indifference to the victims of these moral atrocities.

The person who condemns shrillness on these matters is showing even more callous indifference than the person who remains silent.

7 comments:

Some new atheists have taken to calling the act of teaching religion to a child "child abuse". I suspect that they like this term because of its emotional power. However, they neglect the fact that "abuse" requires a desire to harm children or a lack of concern as to their welfare.

Although I (mostly) agree with your main point, I think you're in error in saying that abuse "requires a desire to harm children or a lack of concern as to their welfare."

Christian Science parents who pray for their children while they die of illnesses that could be easily cured with a trip to the doctor are clearly being abusive but do not desire to harm nor lack concern for their welfare. Actions resulting from egregious, willfully blind stupidity can be abusive.

You need some way to distinguish the person who does morally culpable harm from morally non-culpable harm.

You wrote, "Actions resulting from egregious, willfully blind stupidity can be abusive."

I would respond that the "willful" part of this represents a lack of concern with the truth or the consequences of the truth - they do not care.

Most religious parents do not fit this category because it is not morally culpable to adopt a view that is extremely widespread in one's society. It may be a logical fallacy, if 85% of the people are making an assertion, to adopt it for that reason. But it is a logical fallacy we all have to make use of at some point.

The difference with "willfully blind stupidity" that you have mentioned is that these people adopt absurd beliefs without having any type of excuse for doing so. That only happens to people who are reckless in informing beliefs, and recklessness is a lack of concern over the consequences.

I would respond that the "willful" part of this represents a lack of concern with the truth or the consequences of the truth - they do not care.

One cannot look on the emotional struggle Christian Science parents go through when they find themselves in a position where their faith is in conflict with their child's well-being and conclude that they simply don't care. Situations involving human minds, emotions and decisions are just not that simple.

I would put the distinction this way: we have a moral responsibility to act according the the best available information regarding what will promote our children's well-being. Embracing a belief on no rational grounds does not absolve one of this responsibility nor free one of moral culpability for harm resulting from one's embrace of those beliefs.

Beliefs ARE a matter of moral concern. It's for this reason that, though I don't agree with Dawkins position on religious instruction as abuse, I don't think he's entirely off base either.

You need some way to distinguish the person who does morally culpable harm from morally non-culpable harm.

Indeed. And I don't claim to have worked out the best criteria for deciding what is or isn't legitimately to be called abuse. What I do think is obvious is that the criteria you proposed exclude cases almost any reasonable person would consider abusive.

What I propse above as a refinement of your proposed criteria is, I think, a step in the right direction. But it should be examined against difficult test scenarios to work out if it actually holds up.

However, they neglect the fact that "abuse" requires a desire to harm children or a lack of concern as to their welfare.

I think the best refinement I can think of is to say that abuse can be the result of a desire to harm children, a lack of concern for their welfare or simply from irresponsibility (into which category would fall Christian Science parents, parents who drive drunk with their children in the car, etc.).

I think the best refinement I can think of is to say that abuse can be the result of a desire to harm children, a lack of concern for their welfare or simply from irresponsibility

Irresponsibility is a muddy concept that, I would argue, just begs the question. It does not answer the question but shifts the question. Instead of trying to find a way to distinguish between abuse and non-culpable harming, we now have to find a way to distinguish between responsiblity and irresponsibility.

Again, I would argue that the distinction rests on whether the actions demonstrate a lack of concern with being right in issues affecting the welfare of others.

It is not a culpable error when a person picks up a belief that 85% of the people share. That is "good enough reason" morally speaking for adopting a belief. But it is a culpable error to adopt an extreme position that 95% of the people diagree with.

Irresponsibility is a muddy concept that, I would argue, just begs the question.

Any definition of what qualifies as abuse is going to inevitably involve some "muddy" concepts. Abuse is not the sort of concept that has distinct edges. There's a grey area where one passes from bad parenting to abuse and no two reasonable people are likely to have precisely the same opinions as to what is one and what is the other. I think that's something we're substantially in agreement on.

On the other hand, this....

It is not a culpable error when a person picks up a belief that 85% of the people share.

I have to strongly disagree with. What is or isn't abuse is not determined by popular vote. If 85% of people (whether in a given community or the entire world) believe that female genital mutilation is good that does not make the practice any the less abusive.

Most religious parents do not fit this category because it is not morally culpable to adopt a view that is extremely widespread in one's society. It may be a logical fallacy, if 85% of the people are making an assertion, to adopt it for that reason. But it is a logical fallacy we all have to make use of at some point.

I strongly disagree with this statement. If a view leads to evil, and that a "reasonable person," upon reflection, ought to be able to recognize that evil, then it's still evil to hold that view even if it is common. Otherwise, we can't hold pre-American Civil War slaveholders morally culpable for their views on slavery, Nazis for their Nazism, Soviet Communists for their Communism, or any other such widespread belief.

In other words, sometimes it really is morally wrong not to question a widespread belief.

About Me

When I was in high school, I decided that I wanted to leave the world better off than it would have been if I had not existed. This started a quest, through 12 years of college and on to today, to try to discover what a "better" world consists of. I have written a book describing that journey that you can find on my website. In this blog, I will keep track of the issues I have confronted since then.