tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/morality-676/articlesMorality – The Conversation2019-03-05T03:05:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1125042019-03-05T03:05:41Z2019-03-05T03:05:41ZChanging morals: we're more compassionate than 100 years ago, but more judgmental too<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261846/original/file-20190304-110107-1319pwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">As cultures evolve and societies develop, people’s change the way they think about good and evil.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">from shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Values such as care, compassion and safety are more important to us now than they were in the 1980s. The importance of respecting authority has fallen since the beginning of the 20th century, while judging right and wrong based on loyalty to country and family has steadily risen.</p>
<p>Our analysis, using the <a href="https://books.google.com/ngrams">Google Books database</a> and published in <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0212267">Plos One</a>, showed distinctive trends in our moral priorities between 1900 to 2007.</p>
<p>How we should understand these changes in moral sensibility is a fascinating problem. Morality is not rigid or monolithic. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_foundations_theory">Moral Foundations Theory</a>, for instance, puts forward five moral grammars, each with its own set of associated virtues and vices. </p>
<p>These are:</p>
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<li><p>purity-based morality, which is rooted in ideas of sanctity and piety. When standards of purity are violated, the reaction is disgust, and violators are seen as unclean and tarnished </p></li>
<li><p>authority-based morality, which prizes duty, deference, and social order. It abhors those who show disrespect and disobedience</p></li>
<li><p>fairness-based morality, which stands in opposition to authority-based morality. It judges right and wrong using values of equality, impartiality and tolerance, and disdains bias and prejudice</p></li>
<li><p>ingroup-based morality, which esteems loyalty to family, community or nation, and judges those who threaten or undermine them as immoral </p></li>
<li><p>harm-based morality, which values care, compassion and safety, and views wrongness in terms of suffering, mistreatment and cruelty. </p></li>
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<p>People of different ages, genders, personalities, and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19379034">political beliefs</a> employ these moralities to different degrees. People on the political right, for instance, are more likely to endorse the moralities of purity, authority and ingroup loyalty. Those on the left rely more on the morality of harm and fairness. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3116962/">Women tend to endorse harm-based morality</a> more than men.</p>
<p>We used these five moral foundations in our analysis. Put simply, our culture, at least as revealed through moral language in the books we read and write, is increasing the emphasis it places on some moral foundations and decreasing its emphasis on others.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/the-greatest-moral-challenge-of-our-time-its-how-we-think-about-morality-itself-92101">The greatest moral challenge of our time? It's how we think about morality itself</a>
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<h2>Historical change in moral concepts</h2>
<p>Moral psychologists know a lot about how people today vary in their moral thinking, but they have largely ignored how moral thinking has changed historically. As cultures evolve and societies develop, people’s ways of thinking about good and evil also transform. The nature of that transformation is a matter of speculation.</p>
<p>One narrative suggests our recent history is one of <em>de-moralisation</em>. On this view, our societies have become progressively less prudish and judgmental. We have become more accepting of others, rational, irreligious, and scientific in how we approach matters of right and wrong.</p>
<p>A contrary narrative implies <em>re-moralisation</em>. By this account, our culture is increasingly censorious. More things offend and outrage us, and the growing polarisation of political debate reveals excesses of righteousness and self-righteousness.</p>
<p>We wanted to find which of these stories best captured how morals have changed over time, and we used an emerging field of inquiry to do so – <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3279742/">culturomics</a>. Culturomics uses very large text databases to track changes in cultural beliefs and values. Changing patterns of language use over time may reveal alterations in how people have made sense of their world and themselves.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261848/original/file-20190304-110123-g8ihai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261848/original/file-20190304-110123-g8ihai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261848/original/file-20190304-110123-g8ihai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=901&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261848/original/file-20190304-110123-g8ihai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=901&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261848/original/file-20190304-110123-g8ihai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=901&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261848/original/file-20190304-110123-g8ihai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1133&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261848/original/file-20190304-110123-g8ihai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1133&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261848/original/file-20190304-110123-g8ihai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1133&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Patterns of language is one of way to see how people make sense of themselves and the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/t61ffOYIn-Q">Annie Spratt/unsplash</a></span>
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<p>The most common platform for examining such cultural shifts is the Google Books database. Containing more than 500 billion words from 5 million scanned and digitised books, the database is a rich source of information on the rising and falling popularity of words.</p>
<p>Studies using English-language books, for example, have shown increases in individualist values, revealed through <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7516/64025f5fbd2d2bf2b64676ef16d1facb8827.pdf">decreases in “us”</a> and increases in “me”. Studies in <a href="http://greenfieldlab.psych.ucla.edu/Cultural_and_Cross_Cultural_Studies_files/A267%20Zeng%20%26%20Greenfield%20ijop_12125_Rev4_EV%5B3%5D_2.pdf">Chinese-language books</a> have shown similar declines in words associated with collectivist values in recent decades.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/googles-vast-library-reveals-the-rising-tide-of-climate-related-words-in-literature-45056">Google's vast library reveals the rising tide of climate-related words in literature</a>
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<p>To date, there has only been one <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17439760.2012.715182">culturomic study of moral language</a>. The researchers examined changes in the frequency of a set of virtue words such as “conscience”, “honesty” and “kindness” over the 20th century. As the de-moralisation narrative would predict, most of these words showed a significant decline in popularity, suggesting ideas of moral virtue became less culturally salient.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0212267">our study</a>, we explored changes in 20th century morality in greater depth. Each of the five foundations was represented by large, well-validated sets of virtue and vice words. We also examined changes in a set of basic moral terms such as “good”, “moral”, “righteous”; and “bad”, “evil”, and “wrong”. </p>
<p>We extracted the relative frequency of each word in a set for every year, standardised it so that the year in which this frequency peaked scored 100, and then averaged the words in the set. The trajectory of these averaged values over time reflects broad changes in the prominence of each form of morality.</p>
<h2>Differently moral</h2>
<p>We found basic moral terms (see the black line below) became dramatically scarcer in English-language books as the 20th century unfolded – which fits the de-moralisation narrative. But an equally dramatic rebound began in about 1980, implying a striking re-moralisation. </p>
<p>The five moral foundations, on the other hand, show a vastly changing trajectory. The purity foundation (green line) shows the same plunge and rebound as the basic moral terms. Ideas of sacredness, piety and purity, and of sin, desecration and indecency, fell until about 1980, and rose afterwards.</p>
<p>The other moralities show very different pathways. Perhaps surprisingly, the egalitarian morality of fairness (blue) showed no consistent rise or fall. </p>
<iframe title="Chart: Prominence given to five moral foundations from 1900 to 2007" aria-describedby="The importance of overall morality over the century is shown in the black line" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/RlyRb/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="600"></iframe>
<p>In contrast, the hierarchy-based morality of authority (grey) underwent a gentle decline for the first half of the century. It then sharply rose as the gathering crisis of authority shook the Western world in the late 1960s. This morality of obedience and conformity, insubordination and rebellion, then receded equally sharply through the 1970s.</p>
<p>Ingroup morality (orange), reflected in the communal language of loyalty and unity, insiders and outsiders, displays the clearest upward trend through the 20th century. Discernible bumps around the two world wars point to passing elevations in the “us and them” morality of threatened communities. </p>
<p>Finally, harm-based morality (red) presents a complex but intriguing trend. Its prominence falls from 1900 to the 1970s, interrupted by similar wartime bumps when themes of suffering and destruction became understandably urgent. But harm rises steeply from about 1980 in the absence of a single dominating global conflict.</p>
<h2>What can we say about this?</h2>
<p>The decades since 1980 can be seen as a period when moral concerns experienced a revival. What has driven this revival is open to speculation. Some might see the election of conservative governments in the US, UK and Australia at the start of this period as a pivotal change. </p>
<p>That might explain the rise of the typically conservative purity-based morality but not the even steeper increase in the typically liberal harm foundation. </p>
<p>Others might point to the rise of social justice concerns – or “political correctness” to critics – as the basis for the upswing in harm-based morality. The surge of harm language during early- and mid-century wartime may point to the late century rise being linked to the so called “culture wars”. Certainly, the simultaneous rise in conservative (purity) and left-liberal (harm) moralities since that time is a recipe for moral conflict and polarisation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/how-we-decide-who-and-what-we-care-about-and-whether-robots-stand-a-chance-91987">How we decide who and what we care about – and whether robots stand a chance</a>
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<p>Our research has its limitations. Books are windows into only some aspects of culture. The population of English-language books is dominated by American and to a lesser extent British volumes, and we cannot isolate patterns specific to different English-speaking nations. The Google Books database does not allow us to examine changes in morality over the past decade.</p>
<p>Even so, this research points to some important cultural transformations. How we tend to think about matters of right and wrong is different now from how we once did and, if the trends are to be believed, how we will in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112504/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Haslam receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa Wheeler has engaged in paid and pro-bono consulting and research relating to issues of social justice, applied ethics, and gender equality (e.g., Our Watch, Queen Victoria Women’s Centre, National Association of Women in Operations). She has previously worked for research centres that receive funding from several partner organisations in the private and public sector, including from the Victorian Government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melanie J. McGrath does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An analysis of billions of words in the Google Books database shows the way society has valued moral principles such as compassion, respect for authority, community values and fairness over time.Nick Haslam, Professor of Psychology, University of MelbourneMelanie J. McGrath, PhD Candidate in Social Psychology, University of MelbourneMelissa A. Wheeler, Research Fellow, University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1107452019-02-28T11:41:07Z2019-02-28T11:41:07ZHow being beautiful influences your attitudes toward sex<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260786/original/file-20190225-26174-mfvubs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Beauty can mean more opportunities – but can it also influence values?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/painting-male-portrait-oil-on-canvas-708034999?src=4_54FaVD-kL8jWYGZvrdng-2-69">Nataliass/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>People tend to feel strongly about matters of sexual morality, such as premarital sex or gay marriage. </p>
<p>Some sources of these differences are obvious. <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2011.557005">Religion</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jadohealth.2018.11.016">media portrayals</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1994.tb00451.x">parents and peers</a> are big social forces that shape attitudes about sex.</p>
<p>But could something as innocuous as the way we look spark these different outlooks, too? In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12544">recently published article</a>, I studied this question.</p>
<h2>Beauty and opportunity</h2>
<p>Compared with the rest of us, most beautiful people lead charmed lives.</p>
<p>Studies show that pretty people <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X16000340">tend to get favorable treatment</a>. They secure better jobs and earn higher salaries. Others are friendlier toward them. With this extra money and social support, they’re better equipped to fend off any consequences of their actions. For instance, the better-looking can get <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1994.tb01552.x">more benefit of the doubt from juries</a>. </p>
<p>Their lives are most charmed, though, in matters of sex and romance. While many benefits of beauty are small – a slightly higher salary offer here, a better performance evaluation there – the romantic benefits are larger and more consistent. Good-looking people on average have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.014">more sexual opportunities and partners</a>. </p>
<p>Could this create a sense, among attractive people, that anything goes when it comes to sex? Could it make them less inclined <a href="https://mic.com/articles/54313/the-value-placed-on-virginity-is-one-of-history-s-biggest-travesties#.J3MWGtyOM">to value sexual purity</a>? And might sexually experienced people belittle the moral costs of sex in order to feel better about their own past conduct?</p>
<p>If so, we would expect good-looking people to be the most tolerant ones where sex is concerned. They would have less restrictive views on issues like premarital sex, abortion or gay marriage.</p>
<h2>A link to conservatism?</h2>
<p>But you could also argue the opposite. </p>
<p>Higher salaries and greater success in the job market might pull good-looking people toward more conservative views when it comes to taxes or economic justice. </p>
<p>Since conservatives, on average, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2001.tb02489.x">dislike sexual freedom more than liberals do</a>, identifying with conservatives for economic reasons – or simply moving in conservative social circles – might make the beautiful less, not more, tolerant where sex is concerned. Along these lines, studies have found that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.12.008">good looks are associated with conservatism</a> among politicians. </p>
<p>Attractiveness could then plausibly associate with higher or lower standards for what sexual activities are morally acceptable. Or the two arguments could cancel each other out, as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-006-9075-x">one study of college students</a> suggested.</p>
<h2>Digging into the surveys</h2>
<p>To further explore this issue, I turned to two large, prominent surveys of Americans’ views: the <a href="https://www.gss.norc.org/">General Social Survey</a> from 2016 and the <a href="https://electionstudies.org/">American National Election Studies</a> from 1972. </p>
<p>Both surveys were administered face-to-face. And, unusually, both studies asked the person administering the survey to evaluate the respondent’s looks on a one-to-five scale. (The respondent doesn’t see the score. The study’s designers weren’t that heedless of social awkwardness.)</p>
<p>This measure of beauty isn’t rigorous. But it does resemble quick personal judgments made in everyday life. Moreover, the decades-long gap between the studies gives some sense of whether effects persist across a generation’s worth of cultural change.</p>
<p>The surveys also asked about legal and moral standards relevant to sex, such as how restrictive abortion laws should be, whether gay marriage should be legal and about the acceptability of premarital, extramarital and gay sex.</p>
<p>In both studies, the better-looking seem more relaxed about sexual morality. For instance, in the data from 2016, 51 percent of those whose looks were rated above average said a woman who wants an abortion for any reason should legally be allowed to have one. Only 42 percent of those with below-average looks said the same. This nine-point difference increases to 15 points when accounting for factors like age, education, political ideology and religiosity.</p>
<p>This pattern repeated for almost all questions. The one exception was a question that asked when adultery was morally acceptable. Almost all respondents said “never” to that, washing out differences between the more and less attractive.</p>
<h2>Are morals opportunistic?</h2>
<p>If past experience is what makes beautiful people more tolerant toward issues like abortion and gay marriage, we would not expect them to be notably more tolerant about matters in which looks don’t apply. This proves to be true. Good-looking respondents in these surveys aren’t detectably more open, for example, to a legal right to die or to accepting civil disobedience.</p>
<p>These results are consistent with other findings showing that getting away with violating norms can make you more casual about those norms in the future. Whether in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34111-8_5">white-collar crime</a> or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12102">police violence</a> or <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2642034">international human-rights violations</a>, those who pull off one questionable action often become more willing to justify doing the same, or perhaps even a little more, in the future.</p>
<p>The same could be said for sex. If you’ve have a lot of sexual experiences in the past, it may color your attitudes toward the vast range of sexual possibilities – even those that don’t directly apply to your own sexuality or personal experience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Urbatsch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beautiful people tend to lead more charmed lives. Could their attractiveness also color their views on issues like abortion, premarital sex and gay marriage?Robert Urbatsch, Associate Professor of Political Science, Iowa State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1110792019-02-13T19:18:29Z2019-02-13T19:18:29ZIn an Australian first, the ACT may legally recognise animals' feelings<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258653/original/file-20190213-90479-63gvhy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Happiness is a warm puppy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joe Caione/Unsplash</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Have you ever wondered what’s going through your dog’s mind when you say the word “walk”? And does your pup seem to show guilt when you ask them sternly “what have you done?” Their tail might drop between their legs, their ears droop down, and their eyes turn away.</p>
<p>We often attribute human emotions to animals, in a practice called <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/anthropomorphism">anthropomorphism</a>. It’s frowned upon in scientific circles, because it can lead us to incorrectly assume what animals are expressing. In the example of your naughty pet, you’d be right to think your dog displays some change in emotional state when you scold them. However, the emotion <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-23/dog-shaming-falls-on-deaf-ears-for-canines/6715932">isn’t guilt</a>: they’re expressing confusion and occasionally anxiety.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/about-time-science-and-a-declaration-of-animal-consciousness-9513">About time: science and a declaration of animal consciousness</a>
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<p>The ACT is currently considering <a href="https://www.yoursay.act.gov.au/animal-welfare-bill-amendments">legislation</a> that would enshrine animal “sentience” in the law, which means for the first time an Australian jurisdiction will consider animals’ feelings as well as their physical well-being in animal protection laws.</p>
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<h2>The emotional lives of animals</h2>
<p>Modern science has clearly demonstrated that animals experience <a href="https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article-pdf/50/10/861/26889738/50-10-861.pdf">feelings, sensations and emotional states</a> (or as scientists like to call them, “<a href="https://horback.faculty.ucdavis.edu/assessing-affective-states/">affective states</a>”). What owners and livestock attendants have known or suspected for a long time, we can now definitively prove.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the idea that animals can experience emotions has only re-emerged fairly recently. We can blame thinkers during the <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/">Renaissance</a> for the spread of the idea that animals weren’t capable of experiencing emotions or feelings. They maintained that animals were like machines, unable to feel or perceive. Any animal which cried out when injured or beaten was thought to be showing an automatic response, <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/2/4/628/htm">similar to a reflex</a>, rather than a conscious response. </p>
<p>It wasn’t until the 18th century that philosophers and scientists began recognising that animals were not only conscious, but they were actually <a href="https://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremybentham.html">sentient and capable of suffering</a>.</p>
<h2>What is sentience?</h2>
<p>Sentience can be defined simply as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-what-the-science-says-about-animal-sentience-88047">ability to feel or perceive</a>. Humans are obviously sentient, but many other animal species are also considered sentient. These are animals that respond to a sensory input such as heat, interpret that sensation as an emotion or feeling such as discomfort, then consider an <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/sentience">appropriate response to that feeling</a>. </p>
<p>This goes beyond a simple reflex, as sentient animals may choose different responses based on their environment or internal state. For example, a sheep experiencing uncomfortable heat might not move and seek shade if a predator is nearby.</p>
<h2>Most animals are sentient</h2>
<p>All animals with spines, which includes all mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish, as well as some animals without spines such as octopus, squid, crabs and lobsters are generally <a href="http://agriculture.vic.gov.au/pets/care-and-welfare/animals-and-people/what-is-sentience">considered sentient</a>. This means that essentially all the animals we use for food, entertainment, work and companionship have feelings, emotions and the ability to suffer. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/octopuses-are-super-smart-but-are-they-conscious-57846">Octopuses are super-smart ... but are they conscious?</a>
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<p>Other animals like insects and some lower crustaceans haven’t demonstrated sentience. However, as knowledge increases, and <a href="https://was-research.org/paper/invertebrate-sentience-urgent-understudied">experimental methods improve</a>, it is possible that in the future we may reclassify these animals as sentient too.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258663/original/file-20190213-90491-pzh8qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258663/original/file-20190213-90491-pzh8qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258663/original/file-20190213-90491-pzh8qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=450&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258663/original/file-20190213-90491-pzh8qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=450&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258663/original/file-20190213-90491-pzh8qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=450&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258663/original/file-20190213-90491-pzh8qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=566&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258663/original/file-20190213-90491-pzh8qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=566&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258663/original/file-20190213-90491-pzh8qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=566&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">We commonly misinterpret dog behaviour, especially by thinking they look guilty when they’re actually anxious or confused.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">NatalieMaynor/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Moral responsibility</h2>
<p>With the knowledge that almost all animals are able to experience both positive and negative emotions such as fear, happiness, anxiety and excitement, how we deal with this information is underpinned by our morals and ethics. </p>
<p>Some people consider the moral responsibility of knowing our actions may cause pain and suffering towards animals too great and follow a type of virtue ethics called “<a href="http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195371963-e-5">animals rights</a>”. People who believe in animals rights think that no amount of harm towards animals for human gain is worth the suffering it causes, and hence they seek to do no harm by not eating animals or using them for entertainment.</p>
<p>A more dominant ethical position is that of utilitarianism, a type of <a href="https://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/">consequentialist ethical theory</a> often associated with the saying “the end justifies the means”. <a href="http://www.animal-ethics.org/utilitarianism/">Utilitarians</a> try to minimise the amount of harm done to the largest number of moral subjects.</p>
<p>As animals can suffer, they are considered moral subjects alongside humans. Therefore, it would be wrong to cause animals to suffer for no reason. However, if only a small number of animals suffered in order to feed or bring joy to a large number of people, that might be morally acceptable. </p>
<p>There are many other types of ethical theories which consider the idea of animal sentience, and in reality, most people are a mixture of a few different moral positions (it is really hard being a strict utilitarian: see the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-trolley-dilemma-would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-five-57111">The Trolley Dilemma</a>).</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/the-trolley-dilemma-would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-five-57111">The trolley dilemma: would you kill one person to save five?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What the ACT is proposing</h2>
<p>The ACT is proposing to become the first Australian state or territory to formally recognise the sentience of animals in animal welfare legislation. With public consultation closed, the ACT government will now consider public feedback on their proposed changes. This feedback will inform the final piece of legislation, to be debated by the Legislative Assembly later in the year.</p>
<p>If sentience is included in the amended law, the ACT won’t be the first jurisdiction to have done so. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/animals-are-now-legally-recognised-as-sentient-beings-in-new-zealand-10256006.html">New Zealand</a>, <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/animal-emotions/201306/universal-declaration-animal-sentience-no-pretending">Europe</a> and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/quebec-bill-calls-animals-sentient-beings-and-includes-jail-time-for-cruelty/article24832028/">Canada</a> have already included it in their animal welfare laws.</p>
<p>However, it is significant for Australia, as it commits the government to consider how the feelings of animals may impact their welfare. Far from giving animal’s rights, it acknowledges that an animal can be physically healthy but mentally suffering, and this mental suffering can lead to poor welfare. With animal welfare an issue of growing importance to many Australians, recognising the inner lives of animals is an important step forward.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/what-does-it-mean-to-think-and-could-a-machine-ever-do-it-51316">What does it mean to think and could a machine ever do it?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111079/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bronwyn Orr works as a veterinarian for RSPCA ACT. She is a member of the Australian Veterinary Association.</span></em></p>Recognising animals as sentient means welfare laws must consider animals' feelings as well as their physical conditions.Bronwyn Orr, Veterinarian and PhD candidate, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1105472019-01-28T11:45:14Z2019-01-28T11:45:14ZThe shutdown took so long to end because it became a moral issue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255733/original/file-20190128-108358-16xt6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Donald Trump speaks in the Rose Garden.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Trump-Government-Shutdown/7d472be7fd5843df97ea79556f3b2376/12/0">AP Photo/ Evan Vucci</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Even as the partial shutdown of the federal government came to an end, many Americans were left baffled. </p>
<p>Why didn’t Congress and the president strike a deal sooner?</p>
<p>Hundreds of thousands of federal employees were asked to work without pay because of a fight over a border wall. The <a href="https://www.crfb.org/blogs/economic-cost-shutdown">full economic cost</a> of the shutdown is likely to be far larger than the amount politicians are fighting over. </p>
<p>From <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=_7iS-50AAAAJ&amp;hl=en&amp;oi=ao">our perspective</a> as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vrFT_JIAAAAJ&amp;hl=en">social scientists</a>, this shutdown is an example of the powerful forces that make political bargaining very different than bargaining over, say, the price of a new car. </p>
<p>We have found that one of the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=C4YMEYkAAAAJ&amp;hl=en&amp;oi=sra">greatest barriers</a> to political agreement is moral outrage. The shutdown over funding for a border wall with Mexico is but the latest example of an issue that is relatively small in monetary terms acquiring outsized influence because it became a moral sticking point.</p>
<h2>A moral standoff at the border</h2>
<p>It might seem obvious to blame the shutdown on partisan politics. But, partisan politics apply equally to almost any political negotiation. Why did the wall in particular become a flashpoint?</p>
<p>The way people usually move past a bargaining impasse is to look for more ways to sweeten the deal until everyone is happy.</p>
<p>For example, say you want to buy a car with a working air conditioner. I have a car with a broken air conditioner. I can’t fix that, but I can knock US$300 off the price. This kind of give-and-take is key to greasing the wheels in politics, but it breaks down when morality is in play. </p>
<p>What payoff you would accept to do something you think is immoral? For example, what if someone offered you $10 to wear a Nazi symbol, hunt an endangered species, or burn your country’s flag? </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661303001359">Most people</a> would storm off in disgust, <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.385.1825&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf">not ask for a better price</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255734/original/file-20190128-108355-1rnma3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255734/original/file-20190128-108355-1rnma3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255734/original/file-20190128-108355-1rnma3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255734/original/file-20190128-108355-1rnma3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255734/original/file-20190128-108355-1rnma3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255734/original/file-20190128-108355-1rnma3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255734/original/file-20190128-108355-1rnma3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255734/original/file-20190128-108355-1rnma3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">House Speaker Nancy Pelosi of Calif., accompanied by House Democratic members stand after signs a deal to reopen the government on Capitol Hill in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Government-Shutdown/c53bdec34b3649bc827d8666db3bf2fa/5/0">AP Photo/Andrew Harnik</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now, consider the moral accusations that accompanied the shutdown. At the outset, Democratic Speaker of the House <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/pelosi-calls-trumps-wall-plan-an-immorality-2019-01-02">Nancy Pelosi said</a>, “A wall, in my view, is an immorality.” </p>
<p>In his Oval Office address, President Donald Trump responded, “The only thing that is immoral is the politicians to [sic] do nothing and continue to allow more innocent people to be so horribly victimized.”</p>
<p>This exchange is an example of what we call “moral thinking.” In our research, we study how moral thinking interferes with political bargaining and closes the door on compromise. </p>
<h2>Costly stalemates</h2>
<p>In one <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12248">study</a> from 2016, we asked participants whether they would support hypothetical politicians who cut deals on a political issue. Generally, they were willing to support politicians who bargained with each other. They recognized that, in politics, you can’t get everything you want. </p>
<p>But when participants had moral convictions about the political issue, they withdrew support – even for politicians from their own party. We saw <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1017/S0022381613001357">similar patterns</a> on issues with an obvious moral dimension such as same-sex marriage, and also ones where the moral implications are not as clear, such as Social Security reform.</p>
<p>More recently, we conducted <a href="http://timryan.web.unc.edu/files/2019/01/Moral-Obstinancy-in-Political-Negotiations-FINAL_identified.pdf">experiments</a> that more directly test whether people are prone to costly stalemates over political issues they think about in moral terms. </p>
<p>In an economic game, participants played the role of a legislator. Their job was to bargain over a series of political issues with a person who disagreed with them about those issues. For instance, one participant might want to raise the minimum wage and would therefore be paired with someone who wants to lower it. </p>
<p>If they reached a deal, both participants could earn real money – and more money, the more concessions the opponent agreed to. </p>
<p>If they could not reach a deal, then both earned nothing – analogous to a shutdown where everyone loses.</p>
<p>We found that when participants bargained over an issue that had little moral significance such as the cost of road tolls, 72 percent of pairs reached a bargain. </p>
<p>When they bargained over a morally fraught issue such as funding for stem cell research, only 60 percent of pairs struck a bargain.</p>
<p>This was the result of bargaining over fictional political policies. When real policies are at stake, and when both sides are working hard to portray their side as morally righteous, we suspect moral outrage poses an even greater barrier to compromise. That’s both because politicians have their own moral convictions, and because they fear repercussions from the citizens who judge them.</p>
<p>Many people believe moral considerations have begun to show up in debates over <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rights-Talk-Impoverishment-Political-Discourse/dp/0029118239/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1548449490&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=rights+talk">more political issues</a> than they used to, but the evidence is unclear. </p>
<p>Either way, compromise is indispensable to many pressing issues – immigration, criminal justice reform, housing and Brexit, to name just a few. When voters and leaders alike cultivate ways to keep moral outrage in check, they will be more likely to find pragmatic solutions to these stubborn divides.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Research on the psychology of politics reveals that when issues are framed in terms of moral right and wrong, the possibility of compromise becomes very small.Timothy Ryan, Associate Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillAndrew W. Delton, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Management, Stony Brook University (The State University of New York)Peter DeScioli, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stony Brook University (The State University of New York)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/997302019-01-10T11:51:34Z2019-01-10T11:51:34ZWho's more compassionate, Republicans or Democrats?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252755/original/file-20190107-32151-1t0ym5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An anti-abortion advocate in Jackson, Mississippi, March 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Abortion-Mississippi/aff1d13d43ef46cebffd23e2bd38f128/20/0">AP/Rogelio V. Solis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s a common refrain of American voters: How can your party be so heartless?</p>
<p>Democrats want to know how Republicans can support President Trump’s policy of separating babies from refugee families. Republicans want to know how Democrats can sanction abortion. But does either party really care more about compassion? </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.polisci.pitt.edu/people/meri-t-long">my research</a> into the public’s support for a variety of government policies, I ask questions about how compassionate someone is, such as how concerned they are about others in need. </p>
<p>These questions are integral to understanding how people feel about who in America deserves government support. </p>
<p>Some people are more compassionate than others. But that doesn’t break simply along party lines.</p>
<p>I find that Democratic and Republican Party voters are similar, on average, busting up the cliché of bleeding heart liberals and uncaring conservatives.</p>
<p>And then there are Trump voters.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252912/original/file-20190108-32154-1n90w4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252912/original/file-20190108-32154-1n90w4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252912/original/file-20190108-32154-1n90w4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=360&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252912/original/file-20190108-32154-1n90w4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=360&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252912/original/file-20190108-32154-1n90w4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=360&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252912/original/file-20190108-32154-1n90w4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=453&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252912/original/file-20190108-32154-1n90w4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=453&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252912/original/file-20190108-32154-1n90w4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=453&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters hold up signs before a rally with President Donald Trump in Tupelo, Mississippi, Monday, Nov. 26, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump/0e4d21241fe244d0ad6f94b044149938/23/0">AP//Thomas Graning</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Beyond partisan stereotypes</h2>
<p>Compassion is defined by many psychology researchers as <a href="https://books.wwnorton.com/books/detail.aspx?id=8666">concern for others in need</a> and a desire <a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341065.001.0001/acprof-9780195341065">to see others’ welfare improved</a>. </p>
<p>The similarity in compassion among voters of both parties contrasts with other measures of personality and worldview that increasingly divide Republicans and Democrats, such as <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Prius-Pickup-Answers-Questions-Americas-ebook/dp/B078FH3BC6">values about race and morality</a>.</p>
<p>Republicans are not less compassionate than Democrats, but my research also shows that there is a stark divide between parties in how relevant an individual’s compassion is to his or her politics.</p>
<p><a href="https://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-07132016-155021/unrestricted/Long.pdf">Public opinion surveys</a> show that you can predict what kind of policies a more compassionate person would like, such as more government assistance for the poor or opposition to the death penalty.</p>
<p>But for most political issues, the conclusion for Republicans is that their compassion does not predict what policies they favor. Support for more government assistance to the poor or sick, or opinions about the death penalty, for example, are unrelated to how compassionate a Republican voter is. </p>
<p>In my work, I find that the primary policy area where compassion is consistently correlated to specific policies for conservatives is abortion, where more compassionate conservatives are more likely to <a href="https://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-07132016-155021/unrestricted/Long.pdf">say they are pro-life</a>. </p>
<h2>Democrats predictable</h2>
<p>When Democratic voters say they are compassionate, you can predict their views on policies. </p>
<p>They’re more supportive of immigration, in favor of social services to the poor and opposed to capital punishment.</p>
<p>Yet, while Democrats may be more likely to vote with their heart, there isn’t evidence that they’re more compassionate than Republicans in their daily life. </p>
<p>When it comes to volunteering or donating money, for example, compassion works the same way for Republicans and Democrats: More compassionate voters of either party donate and volunteer more. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252749/original/file-20190107-32151-1gj63xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252749/original/file-20190107-32151-1gj63xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252749/original/file-20190107-32151-1gj63xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=827&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252749/original/file-20190107-32151-1gj63xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=827&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252749/original/file-20190107-32151-1gj63xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=827&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252749/original/file-20190107-32151-1gj63xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1039&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252749/original/file-20190107-32151-1gj63xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1039&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252749/original/file-20190107-32151-1gj63xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1039&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000 made ‘compassionate conservatism’ a major campaign theme.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-Domestic-News-Iowa-United-Stat-/720ce34c03e5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/133/0">AP/Eric Draper</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The real difference</h2>
<p>My research suggests that voter attitudes about the role of compassion in politics are shaped not only by personal philosophy, but by party leaders. </p>
<p>Political speeches by Republican and Democratic leaders vary in the amount of compassionate language they use. </p>
<p>For instance, political leaders can draw attention to the needs of others in their campaign speeches and speeches on the House or Senate floor. They may talk about the need to care for certain people in need or implore people to “have a heart” for the plight of others. Often, leaders allude to the deserving nature of the recipients of government help, outlining how circumstances are beyond their control. </p>
<p>Democratic politicians use compassionate rhetoric much more often than their Republican counterparts and for many more groups in American society than Republican leaders do. </p>
<p>Do citizens respond to such rhetoric differently depending on what party they affiliate with? </p>
<p>When their leaders use compassionate political language, such as drawing attention to other people’s suffering and unmet needs as well as the worthiness of the groups in need, Republicans in experiments are actually moved to be more welcoming to immigrants and to support state help for the disabled. </p>
<p>This explains how Republican voters responded positively to Republican Sen. Robert Dole’s campaign for <a href="http://dolearchivecollections.ku.edu/collections/ada/">the rights of the disabled</a> in 1989. It also explains the success of presidential candidate <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-republican-national-convention-0">George W. Bush’s “compassionate conservatism”</a> in 2000, which <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/worst-ideas/compassionate-conservatism.html">one Washington Post columnist wrote</a> “won George W. Bush the White House in 2000.”</p>
<p>It also suggests that it’s not necessarily the public, but the party leaders, who differ so significantly in how relevant they believe compassion should be to politics.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252760/original/file-20190107-32154-v8qs6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252760/original/file-20190107-32154-v8qs6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252760/original/file-20190107-32154-v8qs6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252760/original/file-20190107-32154-v8qs6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252760/original/file-20190107-32154-v8qs6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252760/original/file-20190107-32154-v8qs6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252760/original/file-20190107-32154-v8qs6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252760/original/file-20190107-32154-v8qs6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Families with young children protest the separation of immigrant families with a sit-in on July 26, 2018, on Capitol Hill in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Immigration-Separating-Families/01237ac5a9dd4efebbba28168ac74cad/32/0">AP/Jacquelyn Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Trump supporters the exception</h2>
<p>Despite political rhetoric that places them at opposite ends of the spectrum, Republican and Democratic voters appear to be similarly compassionate. </p>
<p>Democrats view compassion as a political value while Republicans will integrate compassion into their politics when their leaders make it part of an explicit message.</p>
<p>There is a caveat to this: I asked these survey questions about personal feelings of compassion in a 2016 online survey that also asked about choice of president. </p>
<p>The survey was conducted a few days after Republican presidential primary candidates Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas and Gov. John Kasich of Ohio had dropped out of the race, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2016/05/04/476074761/kasich-dropping-out-of-presidential-race">making Donald Trump the only viable Republican candidate for the nomination</a>. </p>
<p>In their responses to the survey, a large percentage of Republican voters said they would rather vote for someone other than Trump, even though he was the unofficial nominee at that point. </p>
<p>The Republican voters who didn’t support Trump were similar to Democrats on the survey with respect to their answers about compassion. Their average scores on the compassion items were the same. This is in line with the other survey data showing that liberals and conservatives, and Republicans and Democrats, are largely similar in these personality measures of compassion.</p>
<p>But Trump supporters’ answers were not in line with these findings. </p>
<p>Instead, their average responses to the broad compassion questions were significantly lower. These answers showed that Trump supporters were lower in personal compassion. </p>
<p>While a lot of the Republican voters in the sample may well have gone on to support Trump in the general election, the survey respondents who were early adopters of candidate Trump might continue to be his most steadfast supporters today.</p>
<p>We know that public officials’ rhetoric can <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nature-and-origins-of-mass-opinion/70B1485D3A9CFF55ADCCDD42FC7E926A">influence public opinion on political issues</a>. This leads to another important question: Can political messages influence how much people value compassion more generally? Or even how compassionate people consider themselves to be?</p>
<p>The research indicates that appeals to compassion – if made by trusted leaders – should work for voters of both parties. </p>
<p>But it also indicates that if such messages are absent, compassion is less likely to be seen as important in politics and the positions people and parties take.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meri T. Long does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Are Democrats or Republicans more caring about others? One study of the role compassion plays in politics provides some surprising answers. And then there were the outliers: Trump voters.Meri T. Long, Lecturer, American Politics, University of PittsburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1057142018-11-15T11:45:18Z2018-11-15T11:45:18ZSci-fi movies are the secret weapon that could help Silicon Valley grow up<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244833/original/file-20181109-116820-1dd6y55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">If you don&#39;t want to be facing down an angry dinosaur, pay attention to what happens on screen.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107290/mediaviewer/rm2687618048">Universal Pictures</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If there’s one line that stands the test of time in Steven Spielberg’s 1993 classic “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107290/">Jurassic Park</a>,” it’s probably Jeff Goldblum’s exclamation, “Your scientists were so preoccupied with whether or not they could, they didn’t stop to think if they should.” </p>
<p>Goldblum’s character, Dr. Ian Malcolm, was warning against the hubris of naively tinkering with dinosaur DNA in an effort to bring these extinct creatures back to life. Twenty-five years on, his words are taking on new relevance as a growing number of scientists and companies are grappling with how to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/12/tech-humanities-misinformation-philosophy-psychology-graduates-mozilla-head-mitchell-baker">tread the line between “could” and “should”</a> in areas ranging from <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/362/6414/527">gene editing</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-scientists-bringing-extinct-species-back-from-the-dead-1539093600">real-world “de-extinction”</a> to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-19/biohackers-are-implanting-everything-from-magnets-to-sex-toys">human augmentation</a>, <a href="https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/16/17978596/stephen-hawking-ai-climate-change-robots-future-universe-earth">artificial intelligence</a> and many others. </p>
<p>Despite growing concerns that powerful emerging technologies could lead to unexpected and wide-ranging consequences, innovators are struggling with how to develop beneficial new products while being socially responsible. Part of the answer could lie in <a href="https://mango.bz/books/films-from-the-future-by-andrew-maynard-458-b">watching more science fiction movies</a> like “Jurassic Park.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244822/original/file-20181109-36763-1x9u650.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244822/original/file-20181109-36763-1x9u650.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244822/original/file-20181109-36763-1x9u650.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=337&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244822/original/file-20181109-36763-1x9u650.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=337&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244822/original/file-20181109-36763-1x9u650.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=337&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244822/original/file-20181109-36763-1x9u650.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=424&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244822/original/file-20181109-36763-1x9u650.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=424&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244822/original/file-20181109-36763-1x9u650.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=424&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Just because you can….</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.throwbacks.com/jeff-goldblum-talks-jurassic-park/">Universal Pictures</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hollywood lessons in societal risks</h2>
<p>I’ve long been interested in how innovators and others can better understand the increasingly complex landscape around the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=b8NhWc4AAAAJ&amp;hl=en&amp;oi=ao">social risks and benefits associated with emerging technologies</a>. Growing concerns over the impacts of tech on jobs, privacy, security and even the ability of people to live their lives without undue interference highlight the need for new thinking around how to innovate responsibly. </p>
<p>New ideas require creativity and imagination, and a willingness to see the world differently. And this is where science fiction movies can help.</p>
<p>Sci-fi flicks are, of course, notoriously unreliable when it comes to accurately depicting science and technology. But because their plots are often driven by the intertwined relationships between people and technology, they can be remarkably insightful in revealing social factors that affect successful and responsible innovation. </p>
<p>This is clearly seen in “Jurassic Park.” The movie provides a surprisingly good starting point for thinking about the pros and cons of modern-day genetic engineering and the growing interest in <a href="https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130310-extinct-species-cloning-deextinction-genetics-science/">bringing extinct species back from the dead</a>. But it also opens up conversations around the nature of complex systems that involve both people and technology, and the potential dangers of “permissionless” innovation that’s driven by power, wealth and a lack of accountability.</p>
<p>Similar insights emerge from a number of other movies, including Spielberg’s 2002 film “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0181689/">Minority Report</a>” – which presaged a growing capacity for <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/artificial-intelligence-is-now-used-predict-crime-is-it-biased-180968337/">AI-enabled crime prediction</a> and the ethical conundrums it’s raising – as well as the 2014 film “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0470752/">Ex Machina</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244824/original/file-20181109-37973-1eh9qw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244824/original/file-20181109-37973-1eh9qw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244824/original/file-20181109-37973-1eh9qw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=399&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244824/original/file-20181109-37973-1eh9qw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=399&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244824/original/file-20181109-37973-1eh9qw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=399&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244824/original/file-20181109-37973-1eh9qw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=502&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244824/original/file-20181109-37973-1eh9qw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=502&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244824/original/file-20181109-37973-1eh9qw0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=502&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Movie geniuses always have blind spots that viewers can hopefully learn from.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0470752/mediaviewer/rm1897135872">Universal Pictures International</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As with “Jurassic Park,” “Ex Machina” centers around a wealthy and unaccountable entrepreneur who is supremely confident in his own abilities. In this case, the technology in question is artificial intelligence. </p>
<p>The movie tells a tale of an egotistical genius who creates a remarkable intelligent machine – but he lacks the awareness to recognize his limitations and the risks of what he’s doing. It also provides a chilling insight into potential dangers of creating machines that know us better than we know ourselves, while not being bound by human norms or values.</p>
<p>The result is a sobering reminder of how, without humility and a good dose of humanity, our innovations can come back to bite us.</p>
<p>The technologies in “Jurassic Park,” “Minority Report” and “Ex Machina” lie beyond what is currently possible. Yet these films are often close enough to emerging trends that they help reveal the dangers of irresponsible, or simply naive, innovation. This is where these and other science fiction movies can help innovators better understand the social challenges they face and how to navigate them. </p>
<h2>Real-world problems worked out on-screen</h2>
<p>In a recent op-ed in The New York Times, journalist Kara Swisher asked, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/opinion/who-will-teach-silicon-valley-to-be-ethical.html">Who will teach Silicon Valley to be ethical</a>?” Prompted by a growing litany of socially questionable decisions amongst tech companies, Swisher suggests that many of them need to grow up and get serious about ethics. But ethics alone are rarely enough. It’s easy for good intentions to get swamped by fiscal pressures and mired in social realities.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244961/original/file-20181111-39548-r1p8kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244961/original/file-20181111-39548-r1p8kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244961/original/file-20181111-39548-r1p8kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=693&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244961/original/file-20181111-39548-r1p8kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=693&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244961/original/file-20181111-39548-r1p8kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=693&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244961/original/file-20181111-39548-r1p8kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=871&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244961/original/file-20181111-39548-r1p8kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=871&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244961/original/file-20181111-39548-r1p8kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=871&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Elon Musk has shown that brilliant tech innovators can take ethical missteps along the way.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/SpaceX-Moon/f67fc5d84eb149ba8c1a3c3f059165ea/1/0">AP Photo/Chris Carlson</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Technology companies increasingly need to find some way to break from business as usual if they are to become more responsible. High-profile cases involving companies like <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-is-killing-democracy-with-its-personality-profiling-data-93611">Facebook</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/uber-cant-be-ethical-its-business-model-wont-allow-it-85015">Uber</a> as well as Tesla’s <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/27/17911428/sec-lawsuit-elon-musk-tesla-funding-tweet">Elon Musk</a> have highlighted the social as well as the business dangers of operating without fully understanding the consequences of people-oriented actions. </p>
<p>Many more companies are struggling to create socially beneficial technologies and discovering that, without the necessary insights and tools, they risk blundering about in the dark.</p>
<p>For instance, earlier this year, researchers from Google and DeepMind <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.05162.pdf">published details of an artificial intelligence-enabled system</a> that can lip-read far better than people. According to the paper’s authors, the technology has enormous potential to improve the lives of people who have trouble speaking aloud. Yet it doesn’t take much to imagine how this same technology could threaten the privacy and security of millions – especially when coupled with long-range surveillance cameras.</p>
<p>Developing technologies like this in socially responsible ways requires more than good intentions or simply establishing an ethics board. People need a sophisticated understanding of the often complex dynamic between technology and society. And while, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/12/tech-humanities-misinformation-philosophy-psychology-graduates-mozilla-head-mitchell-baker">as Mozilla’s Mitchell Baker suggests</a>, scientists and technologists engaging with the humanities can be helpful, it’s not enough.</p>
<h2>Movies are an easy way into a serious discipline</h2>
<p>The “new formulation” of complementary skills Baker says innovators desperately need already exists in a thriving interdisciplinary community focused on <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/responsible-innovation-31243">socially responsible innovation</a>. My home institution, the <a href="http://sfis.asu.edu">School for the Future of Innovation in Society</a> at Arizona State University, is just one part of this. </p>
<p>Experts within this global community are actively exploring ways to translate good ideas into responsible practices. And this includes the need for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nnano.2015.196">creative insights into the social landscape around technology innovation</a>, and the imagination to develop novel ways to navigate it.</p>
<p>Here is where science fiction movies become a powerful tool for guiding innovators, technology leaders and the companies where they work. Their fictional scenarios can reveal potential pitfalls and opportunities that can help steer real-world decisions toward socially beneficial and responsible outcomes, while avoiding unnecessary risks.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244826/original/file-20181109-34102-1kuntvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244826/original/file-20181109-34102-1kuntvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244826/original/file-20181109-34102-1kuntvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=459&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244826/original/file-20181109-34102-1kuntvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=459&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244826/original/file-20181109-34102-1kuntvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=459&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244826/original/file-20181109-34102-1kuntvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=576&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244826/original/file-20181109-34102-1kuntvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=576&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244826/original/file-20181109-34102-1kuntvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=576&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People love to come together as a movie audience.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nationalarchives/3002426059">The National Archives UK</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And science fiction movies bring people together. By their very nature, these films are social and educational levelers. Look at who’s watching and discussing the latest sci-fi blockbuster, and you’ll often find a diverse cross-section of society. The genre can help build bridges between people who know how science and technology work, and those who know what’s needed to ensure they work for the good of society.</p>
<p>This is the underlying theme in my new book “<a href="https://mango.bz/books/films-from-the-future-by-andrew-maynard-458-b">Films from the Future: The Technology and Morality of Sci-Fi Movies</a>.” It’s written for anyone who’s curious about emerging trends in technology innovation and how they might potentially affect society. But it’s also written for innovators who want to do the right thing and just don’t know where to start.</p>
<p>Of course science fiction films alone aren’t enough to ensure socially responsible innovation. But they can help reveal some profound societal challenges facing technology innovators and possible ways to navigate them. And what better way to learn how to innovate responsibly than to invite some friends round, open the popcorn and put on a movie?</p>
<p>It certainly beats being blindsided by risks that, with hindsight, could have been avoided.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Maynard is author of the book &quot;Films from the Future: The Technology and Morality of Sci-Fi Movies&quot; (published by Mango), on which this article is based. </span></em></p>As fictional inventors make terrible choices on the big screen, real-world tech innovators can learn from their example how not to make the same kinds of ethical mistakes.Andrew Maynard, Director, Risk Innovation Lab, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1039822018-10-03T10:32:26Z2018-10-03T10:32:26ZHow should we judge people for their past moral failings?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239018/original/file-20181002-101576-bfdjtm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The #MeToo movement and more recent allegations against Brett Kavanaugh have posed questions about past conduct.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Supreme-Court-Kavanaugh-MeToo/d404cf1712bc48da99b0251790de864f/5/0">AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/kavanaugh-sexual-assault-allegation-dle/index.html">recent allegations</a> of sexual assault against Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh have further divided the nation. Among the questions the case raises are some important ethical ones. </p>
<p>Not least among them is the question of moral responsibility for actions long since passed. Particularly in light of the #MeToo movement, which has frequently involved the unearthing of decades old wrongdoing, this question has become a pressing one.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=lp2AS3oAAAAJ&amp;hl=en&amp;authuser=1">As a philosopher</a>, I believe this ethical conundrum <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-012-9976-6">involves two issues</a>: one, the question of moral responsibility for an action at the time it occurred. And two, moral responsibility in the present time, for actions of the past. <a href="http://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book2_4.pdf">Most</a> <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Doing_Deserving.html?id=EEl4KgAACAAJ">philosophers</a> <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/An_Essay_on_Moral_Responsibility.html?id=-zvXAAAAMAAJ">seem</a> <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009933?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">to</a> <a href="http://mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014090.001.0001/upso-9780262014090-chapter-7">think</a> that the two cannot be separated. In other words, moral responsibility for an action, once committed, is set in stone.</p>
<p>I argue that there are reasons to think that moral responsibility can actually change over time – but only under certain conditions.</p>
<h2>Locke on personal identity</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239022/original/file-20181002-101588-1s7ydcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239022/original/file-20181002-101588-1s7ydcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=833&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239022/original/file-20181002-101588-1s7ydcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=833&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239022/original/file-20181002-101588-1s7ydcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=833&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239022/original/file-20181002-101588-1s7ydcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1047&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239022/original/file-20181002-101588-1s7ydcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1047&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239022/original/file-20181002-101588-1s7ydcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1047&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Portrait of John Locke.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/63794459@N07/6282628216">Skara kommun/Flickr.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is an implicit agreement among philosophers that moral responsibility can’t change over time because they think it is a matter of one’s “personal identity.” The 17th-century British philosopher <a href="https://www.iep.utm.edu/locke/">John Locke</a> was the first to explicitly raise this question. He asked: What makes an individual at one time the very same person as an individual at another time? Is this because both share the same soul, or the same body, or is it something else? </p>
<p>Not only is this, as philosopher <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/KORPI">Carsten Korfmacher</a> notes, <a href="https://www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/">“literally a question of life and death</a>,” but Locke also thought that personal identity was the key to moral responsibility over time. <a href="http://earlymoderntexts.com/authors/locke">As he wrote,</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Personal identity is the basis for all the right and justice of reward and punishment.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Locke believed that individuals deserve blame for a crime committed in the past simply because they are the same person that committed the past crime. From this perspective, Kavanaugh the 53-year-old would be responsible for any of the alleged actions that he committed as a young adult. </p>
<h2>Problems with Locke’s view</h2>
<p>Locke argued that being the same person over time was not a matter of having the same soul or having the same body. It was instead a matter of having the same consciousness over time, which he analyzed in terms of memory. </p>
<p>Thus, in Locke’s view, individuals are responsible for a past wrong act <a href="https://iainews.iai.tv/articles/should-people-be-punished-for-crimes-they-cant-remember-committing-what-john-locke-would-say-about-vernon-madison-auid-1050?access=ALL">so long as they can remember committing it</a>. </p>
<p>While there is clearly something appealing about the idea that memory ties us to the past, it is hard to believe that a person could get off the hook just by forgetting a criminal act. Indeed, <a href="http://jaapl.org/content/7/3/219">some research suggests that violent crime actually induces memory loss</a>.</p>
<p>But the problems with Locke’s view run deeper than this. The chief one is that it doesn’t take into consideration other changes in one’s psychological makeup. For example, many of us are inclined to think that the remorseful don’t deserve as much blame for their past wrongs as those who express no regret. But if Locke’s view were true, then remorse wouldn’t be relevant. </p>
<p>The remorseful would still deserve just as much blame for their past crimes because they remain identical with their former selves. </p>
<h2>Responsibility and change</h2>
<p>Of late, <a href="https://www.pdcnet.org/harvardreview/content/harvardreview_2012_0018_0001_0109_0132">some philosophers</a> are beginning to question the assumption that responsibility for actions in the past is just a question of personal identity. <a href="https://liberalarts.tulane.edu/departments/philosophy/people/david-shoemaker">David Shoemaker</a>, for example, argues that responsibility doesn’t require identity. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/KHOIBF-2">a forthcoming paper</a> in the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association">Journal of the American Philosophical Association</a>, my coauthor <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=oHU097gAAAAJ&amp;hl=en">Benjamin Matheson</a> and I argue that the fact that one has committed a wrong action in the past isn’t enough to guarantee responsibility in the present. Instead, this depends on whether or not the person has changed in morally important ways. </p>
<p>Philosophers generally agree that people deserve blame for an action <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/blame/#WheBlaApp">only if the action was performed with a certain state of mind</a>: say, an intention to knowingly commit a crime.</p>
<p>My coauthor and I argue that deserving blame in the present for an action in the past depends on whether those same states of mind persist in that person. For example, does the person still have the beliefs, intentions and personality traits that led to the past act in the first place? </p>
<p>If so, then the person hasn’t changed in relevant ways and will continue to deserve blame for the past action. But a person who has changed may not be deserving of blame over time. The reformed murderer Red, played by Morgan Freeman, in the 1994 film, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0111161/">“The Shawshank Redemption,”</a> is one of my favorite examples. After decades in the Shawshank Penitentiary, Red the old man hardly resembles the teenager that committed the murder. </p>
<p>If this is right, then figuring out whether a person deserves blame for a past action is more complex than simply determining if that individual did, in fact, commit the past action. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239020/original/file-20181002-101576-1vd0qiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239020/original/file-20181002-101576-1vd0qiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239020/original/file-20181002-101576-1vd0qiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239020/original/file-20181002-101576-1vd0qiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239020/original/file-20181002-101576-1vd0qiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239020/original/file-20181002-101576-1vd0qiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239020/original/file-20181002-101576-1vd0qiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brett Kavanaugh giving his opening statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Supreme-Court-Kavanaugh/6145486a413648efa4c278453d907898/3/1">Saul Loeb/Pool Image via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the case of Brett Kavanaugh, some commentators have, in effect, argued that his recent Senate testimony displayed the persisting character of an <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/09/brett-kavanaugh-sexual-assault-hearing-teenager.html">“aggressive, entitled teen,”</a> although there are those <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/09/30/graham_explains_anger_at_kavanaugh_hearing_this_was_about_delaying_the_nomination.html">who disagree</a>. </p>
<p>What I argue is that when confronted with the issue of moral responsibility for actions long since passed, we need to not only consider the nature of the past transgression but also how far and how deeply the individual has changed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Khoury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whether the sins of our past stay with us forever has become a pertinent question of our time. A philosopher argues we don't need to carry our past burdens – although there are some moral conditions.Andrew Khoury, Instructor of Philosophy, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/768132018-08-13T12:28:02Z2018-08-13T12:28:02ZHow we use good deeds to justify immoral behaviour<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231299/original/file-20180809-30476-e7w48e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">&#39;I helped my neighbour move yesterday - you can&#39;t rescue everyone.&#39;</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photographee.eu/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>We all like to think of ourselves as morally sound individuals. However in doing so we often assume that morality is static – that we are consistently moral to some extent over time. In reality, research suggests that most of us will behave in contradictory ways and act both morally and immorally from time to time. Interestingly, when we think about our past moral actions, we are likely to engage in compensatory behaviour and act immorally going forward.</p>
<p>For instance, if you recently donated to charity, you may donate less money at a future charity event or be less willing to volunteer. This has been termed <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167212442394">moral licensing</a>, and describes how previous engagement in moral behaviour provides people with moral “credits” that then affords them with a ticket to subsequently engage in morally questionable behaviour. </p>
<p>The consequences of this can be quite serious, and happens even when people are merely anticipating future engagement. One study showed that people who expected to engage in some future moral action, such as in a fundraiser or donating blood, were <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103114001450">more likely to pick a white candidate</a> over a black candidate as being suitable for a job. </p>
<p>Moral licensing has also attracted attention in the area of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-corporate-social-responsibility-and-does-it-work-89710">corporate social responsibility</a>. This term can broadly be thought of as an organisation’s focus beyond the bottom line – how it acts towards its stakeholders, the environment, and society. For example, Kenneth Lay, the former CEO of Enron – a company <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/28/how-to-get-away-with-financial-fraud">notoriously known for its accounting fraud</a> which ultimately led to its collapse in 2001 – was <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1523153/Kenneth-Lay.html">noted to be a keen philanthropist</a>. It may well be that he felt that his philanthropic efforts provided him with moral credits, allowing him to subsequently endorse the negative goings on within the company.</p>
<p>This view is in fact reinforced by research. One study that looked at moral licensing within the organisational context showed that prior corporate social responsibility of CEOs was <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/peps.12029/full">linked to more corporate social irresponsibility</a> later. Interest in moral licensing has even extended to areas such as energy conservation. One study showed that residents <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513000281">reduced their water consumption</a> when exposed to a water conservation programme. However, at the same time their electrical consumption was shown to have increased in comparison to a control group.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167215/original/file-20170428-12984-j1ouhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167215/original/file-20170428-12984-j1ouhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167215/original/file-20170428-12984-j1ouhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167215/original/file-20170428-12984-j1ouhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167215/original/file-20170428-12984-j1ouhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167215/original/file-20170428-12984-j1ouhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167215/original/file-20170428-12984-j1ouhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Previous organisational CSR has been linked to subsequent social irresponsibility.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David D'Amico/Flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Currently we are not sure <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00263.x/full">what the psychological processes</a> underpinning moral licensing are. Does prior moral behaviour really provide credits that can be withdrawn to allow engagement in a questionable act – because we feel we have “earned” the right to do so? Or could it be that prior moral behaviour changes the meaning of the subsequent questionable behaviour? For instance, if we have established through previous actions that we are not racially biased, we may more easily convince ourselves that picking a white candidate over a black candidate was due to some factor other than race. </p>
<p>But are others willing to accept our moral license? One study looked at the reactions of individuals to a white speaker who made a potentially offensive comment directed at African Americans. When this comment was preceded by “I’m not racist or anything, but …”, the white people rated the speaker as <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00263.x/full">slightly less racist</a>, while the black people judged the speaker as more racist. And so, where the targeted group was concerned, they were less likely to license the speaker – causing the speaker’s initial claim of not being racist to backfire. </p>
<h2>Moral cleansing</h2>
<p>The opposite to moral licensing is also true. We know that when people recall their recent immoral behaviour, they express greater willingness to engage in compensatory moral actions. This is referred to as <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167211400208">moral cleansing</a> – demonstrating the dynamic nature of moral behaviour.</p>
<p>For instance, Donald Trump’s quick decision in April 2017 to launch a missile strike in Syria in response to a chemical attack by the Syrian regime, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39529605">drew praise from his critics</a> as being “the right thing to do”. However, as Hillary Clinton <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/07/politics/clinton-trump-syria-refugees/index.html">pointed out</a>, “we cannot in one breath speak of protecting Syrian babies and in the next close American doors to them” – referring to a ban on receiving refugees. </p>
<p>It could well be argued that Trump’s morally questionable previous behaviour motivated him to engage in “moral cleansing” by launching the applauded missile strike. But the example clearly shows that while this may have assured him about his own morality, it takes more consistency to be accepted as moral by others.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167216/original/file-20170428-12970-ecags.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167216/original/file-20170428-12970-ecags.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167216/original/file-20170428-12970-ecags.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167216/original/file-20170428-12970-ecags.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167216/original/file-20170428-12970-ecags.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167216/original/file-20170428-12970-ecags.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/167216/original/file-20170428-12970-ecags.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump received praise for his response to a chemical attack in Syria – but didn’t want to receive refugees to the US.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gage Skidmore/ Flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Finally, there is some evidence to suggest that moral licensing seems to be apparent only for <a href="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/sbp/sbp/2014/00000042/00000003/art00004">private transgressions</a>, such as donating to charity privately as opposed to doing so publicly. It seems as individuals, we seek to protect, and in some cases even bolster our reputation through public displays of moral actions. And engaging in morally questionable behaviour that we ourselves feel we have earned isn’t something we want to broadcast. Indeed, research has evidenced that those people who are publicly charitable <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513809000695">do benefit from reputational enhancement</a>. </p>
<p>Being good isn’t always easy. When it comes to behaving morally, it appears there is a balance we all strive to achieve, so that personally we can remain assured of our own moral goodness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76813/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nishat Babu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Think you are a moral person? Research shows that we are often prone to act immorally when we think we're moral.Nishat Babu, Lecturer in Work & Organisational Psychology, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/997272018-08-06T10:38:17Z2018-08-06T10:38:17ZWhat makes a good friend?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230609/original/file-20180803-41327-j2e5ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">How should you choose your friends?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/girls-having-fun-home-laughing-549118006?src=UFCxqfQ8eXxGXWPkzm6t6A-1-3">Liderina/ Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Good friendships seem worth celebrating. But for many of us, tensions can appear from time to time between being a good friend and doing “the right thing.” When faced with, for example, a situation where it’s tempting to lie to cover for a friend, it can seem as though friendship and morality are on a collision course. </p>
<p>I am an <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Friendship-Robots-and-Social-Media-False-Friends-and-Second-Selves/Elder/p/book/9781138065666">ethicist who works on issues involving friendship</a>, so this tension is of great interest to me. </p>
<p>It can be tempting to say that bad people are likely to treat their friends badly: For example, they could lie, cheat or steal from their friends. But it seems logically possible for a person to be bad to some people but good to others.</p>
<p>So are there other, more fundamental reasons to think being a good person is necessary for a good friendship?</p>
<h2>Problems for friendship and morality</h2>
<p>Let’s begin by looking at cases where morality and the demands of friendship are in conflict.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230612/original/file-20180803-41354-y28ed7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230612/original/file-20180803-41354-y28ed7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=417&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230612/original/file-20180803-41354-y28ed7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=417&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230612/original/file-20180803-41354-y28ed7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=417&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230612/original/file-20180803-41354-y28ed7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=524&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230612/original/file-20180803-41354-y28ed7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=524&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230612/original/file-20180803-41354-y28ed7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=524&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">What are the demands on a friendship?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/kaneda99/205712346/in/photolist-jbk7A-8PHbui-4EtLP2-iAC9K-9dDkAQ-75s4SB-531hYP-7dty6B-83ksN6-dHkuqV-Fo7u2n-dHwYJM-2ZV4AR-co8do-TteFAE-aukyTo-4bEqnL-4hodHw-WUj8oN-nMXBKr-2xabiL-75vw57-6GYnHR-qfYZRM-4wrdGx-mcAq6M-DE7wZ-5moPcb-48ADJq-FRhs-cDVHPQ-fxeJKQ-4ZPBzf-fbCpf-26kQKX6-5UztBt-8ZQdG6-26L3bSV-bD5Lh2-bKBDHp-bqev2y-bBMAW2-s7ySUK-pbhbz8-bD9qHk-bD9qK6-9opbHC-XriM4u-5d3xQX-8V2bHi">Alessandro Pautasso</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Friendship seems to require that we be open to our friends’ ways of seeing things, even when they differ from our own. It also seems to require that we be concerned for our friends’ well-being. It’s not just that we desire good things for them. We also want to be involved ourselves in providing at least some of those goods. </p>
<p>This is one thing that distinguishes the care of friends from that of mere well-wishers.</p>
<p>But we also need to remain open to our friends’ beliefs about what is good for them: Blithely acting on what we think is best for our friends, when the friend disagrees, seems paternalistic. In some circumstances, like hiding a friend’s keys when he’s been drinking, a little paternalism might be permitted. But it seems a poor general feature of friendship.</p>
<p>Some theorists argue that it is this openness to friends’ perspectives that introduces moral danger. For example, friendship with a person who has different values <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00287.x">can gradually change your own</a>, including for the worse. This is especially true when the relationship makes you inclined to take their point of view seriously. </p>
<p>Other scholars argue that it is the combination of the desire to help friends with this openness to their point of view that <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2678396">poses the biggest problem</a>. In making this argument, scholars <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=p5UGlmUAAAAJ&amp;hl=en">Dean Cocking</a> and <a href="https://researchers.mq.edu.au/en/persons/jeanette-kennett">Jeanette Kennett</a> <a href="http://www.pemberley.com/etext/PandP/chapter10.htm">quote a line</a> from Jane Austen’s “Pride and Prejudice.” In this line, the protagonist Elizabeth Bennett tells the cold and inflexible Mr. Darcy that “A regard for the requester would often make one yield readily to a request, without waiting for arguments to reason one into it.”</p>
<p>In other words, if your friend asks you to tell the boss she’s sick, not hung over, you should do it, just because she asked. </p>
<h2>Aristotle on virtue in friendship</h2>
<p>In order to respond to these concerns, it is helpful to review what Aristotle says about friendship and being a good person. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230611/original/file-20180803-41331-10usx3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230611/original/file-20180803-41331-10usx3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=800&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230611/original/file-20180803-41331-10usx3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=800&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230611/original/file-20180803-41331-10usx3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=800&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230611/original/file-20180803-41331-10usx3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1005&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230611/original/file-20180803-41331-10usx3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1005&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230611/original/file-20180803-41331-10usx3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1005&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Statue of Aristotle in front of a university building in Freiburg, Germany.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/maha-online/64458832/in/photolist-8SXSrg-6Gnnb">Martin aka Maha</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For Aristotle, there are <a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.8.viii.html#173">three main kinds of friendships</a>. One, friendships of utility: as, for example, between friendly co-workers. Two, friendships of pleasure: for example, between members of a trivia team. And, three, friendships among those who find each other good and valuable for their own sakes. This last one he calls friendships of virtue, the <a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.8.viii.html#232">best and fullest form</a> of friendship. </p>
<p>It seems reasonably clear then why valuing someone for their virtues is characteristic of good friendship. Unlike the other forms of friendship, it involves valuing friends for themselves, not just for what they can do for you. Furthermore, it involves thinking their character and values have worth. </p>
<p>Some might worry that this sets the standard too high: Requiring that good friends be perfectly good would make good friendship impossibly rare. But Aristotelian scholar <a href="https://scholar.princeton.edu/johncoop/home">John Cooper</a> argues that we can just take this to mean that the quality of a friendship <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20126987?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">varies with the quality of the friends’ characters</a>.</p>
<p>Mediocre people will tend to have mediocre friendships, while better people will have better friendships, all else being equal. </p>
<h2>What is virtue?</h2>
<p>This might all seem hopelessly subjective, if we leave “good person” undefined, or think it is relative to a person’s individual values. But Aristotle also offers an <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#HumaGoodFuncArgu">objective account of what it takes to be a good person</a>. </p>
<p>A good person, he says, is someone who possesses the virtues. Virtues, like courage, justice and moderation, are individual qualities of character that help us live good human lives, alone and together.</p>
<p>Aristotle argues that just as sharpness is a quality that helps a good knife perform its function well, we function better as human beings when we can protect what we value, work well with others and enjoy pleasures in moderation. </p>
<p>He defines bad qualities, or vices, as those qualities that make it harder to live a good life. For example, cowards have trouble protecting what matters, gluttons don’t know when to stop consuming and unjust people exhibit what he calls “graspingness,” grabbing for more than their share. So, they have trouble working well with others, which can be a major impediment for a social species. </p>
<p>Lastly, and crucially, he says that we build up these qualities, both good and bad, through repeated practice: We become good by repeatedly doing good, and bad by the reverse. </p>
<h2>Connecting virtue and friendship</h2>
<p>How then can this help us understand the relationship between being a good person and being a good friend?</p>
<p>I have already said that friendship involves both openness to friends’ perspectives and helping them out. Assuming Aristotle is right about the relationship between good character and ability to live well, it is not good to enable a friend who acts badly, because doing so will make it harder for that friend to live a good life. </p>
<p>But friendship is also not served by riding roughshod over the friend’s own beliefs about what he or she needs, even if those beliefs are mistaken. So the only people we can consistently do well by as friends are those who have reasonably good character. </p>
<p>We can, of course, change our own values and reactions to better match our friends. Much of this can happen unconsciously, and some such change might even be healthy. But when this change is for the worse (for example, becoming cowardly or unjust), we seem to be harmed by the association. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230613/original/file-20180803-41338-k26np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230613/original/file-20180803-41338-k26np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230613/original/file-20180803-41338-k26np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230613/original/file-20180803-41338-k26np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230613/original/file-20180803-41338-k26np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230613/original/file-20180803-41338-k26np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230613/original/file-20180803-41338-k26np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Does time spent with friends makes you a better person?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/marcomonetti/9294089822/in/photolist-fahD6Y-qQ6fQs-n1TaXZ-iWuxxB-f26HCy-4z5Bhr-iWvdZU-iWtQG8-buBUFY-d7MQVU-iWsB2M-iWsnYn-4z9Nv5-iWuQms-c5WafW-piiYfU-9NKkq5-6i2trg-6BKhTe-3LgGz5-71QAAT-fBLg-4QFZK9-cZhNXq-7tthv2-4eNNaq-ewXBj1-8W5qWA-6MF6w7-iWwwX7-nGqW7x-KoBgPY-FmFDkc-dZHKZD-dugcMs-bBpZ5m-UnTLdu-6z65Vx-8ktJCG-XssuM-cYBJxw-nGqVTr-66eN63-cWorjq-bHRogi-oCxSb2-6fNEmt-f4EAfb-4CdAtc-e9SyHc">marco monetti</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If time spent with my lazy friend tends to make me less motivated when it comes to my own life, I arguably am worse off. This can make such friends bad to us, even if unintentionally. </p>
<p>Really good friendship, it turns out, isn’t even possible unless both friends are reasonably good.</p>
<p>The apparent tension between friendship and morality turns out to be just an illusion that results from failing to think carefully and clearly about the relationship between openness to our friends’ perspectives and our interest in helping our friends. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.9.ix.html#670">Aristotle put it</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99727/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexis Elder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Friendship requires that we be open to our friends’ ways of seeing things, even when they differ from our own. Is being a good person necessary for a good friendship? Who is a good person?Alexis Elder, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Minnesota DuluthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/950242018-07-27T12:29:59Z2018-07-27T12:29:59ZCompanies that promise to lighten baby skin colour reinforce prejudice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229438/original/file-20180726-106517-1eakvvb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/144900295?src=kqd3EGCL_KqFfyoglTNA1A-1-5&amp;size=medium_jpg">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Skin lightening is a longstanding practice that occurs in many parts of the world. It’s been done through the use of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/23/skin-lightening-creams-are-dangerous-yet-business-is-booming-can-the-trade-be-stopped">creams, lotions, soaps</a>, folk remedies, and staying out of the sun. The desire for light skin has been extended to children too. Advice to “marry light” is not uncommon in <a href="https://ejop.psychopen.eu/index.php/ejop/article/view/144">Asian</a> and <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0192513X10390858">black</a> families, for example, in order to produce a light-skinned child. </p>
<p>Some have also tried to lighten the skin of their unborn child with the help of new technologies, whether or not these technologies are effective or safe. In Ghana, some women have reportedly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-43214786">taken a pill to lighten</a> the skin of their foetus despite the questionable science. Others in the US using IVF technology have selected egg or sperm donors with <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/life/dear_prudence/2015/06/dear_prudence_my_white_wife_won_t_let_us_use_a_black_sperm_donor.html">light or white skin</a> irrespective of the inaccurate results. There is even the possibility – however remote at the moment – of <a href="https://theconversation.com/genome-editing-poses-ethical-problems-that-we-cannot-ignore-39466">genetic selection of embryos</a> for traits such as fair skin. If there was a diagnostic test for skin tone that could be carried out on embryos, for instance, reproducers could select “this” embryo likely to have fairer skin over “that” one likely to have darker skin. </p>
<p>Philosophers have offered some conflicting moral principles to provide direction on whether people looking to have a child via assisted conception technologies should select certain embryos. While some have suggested that <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/04/the-case-against-perfection/302927/">we should not select at all</a>, others have argued we should select embryos in various morally significant ways. These include picking: the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8519.00251">“best” child</a>; the child you <a href="http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?search_name=Robertson%2C+John+A.&amp;collection=journals&amp;base=js">most want</a>; the child that will do the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28786178">least harm to others</a>; or the child that will provide the <a href="https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/4109108">most benefit to others</a>. </p>
<h2>Complicity of companies and states</h2>
<p>Whatever the current plausibility of these various interventions, I believe there is a wider socio-political question to ask in these debates. This goes beyond individual decisions, and looks at the role played by companies which provide embryo, or sperm or egg, selection services, or skin-lightening products, and those legislators who govern such practices. </p>
<p>Companies that produce skin-lightening pills for foetuses, laboratories that develop technology for non-disease embryonic selection, and clinics that offer sperm and eggs likely to have lighter skin at a higher cost, all have a vested, monetary, interest in offering these services or products. </p>
<p>Liberal democracies too might want to allow such services or products because decisions about children are private matters and such states profess to respect citizens’ autonomy. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-future-of-genetic-enhancement-is-not-in-the-west-63246">Non-liberal democracies</a> might want populations that are stronger, smarter, more competitive or more beautiful. </p>
<p>The hypothetical argument is that, so long as there are protections in place – it is medically safe, no one is coerced, and there is recourse to resolve disputes – then it should be permitted. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229321/original/file-20180725-194140-nzmqs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229321/original/file-20180725-194140-nzmqs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229321/original/file-20180725-194140-nzmqs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229321/original/file-20180725-194140-nzmqs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229321/original/file-20180725-194140-nzmqs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229321/original/file-20180725-194140-nzmqs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229321/original/file-20180725-194140-nzmqs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Embryo selection: is it ethical?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-ivf-invitro-fertilization-embryo-laboratory-1121729447?src=gXuG57mdLXMXdw0LOJh2lA-1-49">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Some moral arguments about selection</h2>
<p>However, there are moral arguments – most often raised in the case of disability, but no less relevant in other cases – against these practices. Foremost among them is a concern over <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09687599826452">being eugenic</a> if we select against disability. Applying this to the skin colour case, if babies are bred to have fairer skin, could whole populations of darker skinned people begin to disappear? </p>
<p>Defenders of non-disabled embryo selection reject this eugenic concern. They argue this is because neither <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8519.00251">the state</a>, at least in liberal democracies, nor companies, are mandating the selection of particular traits. Rather it is individuals who are choosing what they want. This could apply equally to the skin colour case too. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/can-you-turbo-charge-your-genes-to-produce-designer-babies-53261">Can you turbo-charge your genes to produce 'designer babies'?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There are other concerns too when selecting against disability, including what is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/article-abstract/19/2/334/944634">expressed</a> about current disabled people through selection. When applying this to the skin colour case, if darker skin is chosen less often by parents than fairer skin – a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/hypa.12056">global trend</a> when buying sperm and eggs for IVF for surrogacy – then existing darker skinned people might feel they are less valuable. </p>
<p>Those philosophers that defend embryo selection against disability discount this worry by proposing ways to make current disabled people <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/choosing-children-9780199238491?cc=gb&amp;lang=en&amp;">feel valuable</a>. By extension, others may argue that although people could select against darker skin, we can promote broader messages that emphasise that <a href="http://womenofworth.in/dark-is-beautiful/">dark skin is beautiful</a> and that existing darker-skinned people are valuable. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229320/original/file-20180725-194137-1mhnp0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229320/original/file-20180725-194137-1mhnp0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229320/original/file-20180725-194137-1mhnp0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229320/original/file-20180725-194137-1mhnp0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229320/original/file-20180725-194137-1mhnp0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229320/original/file-20180725-194137-1mhnp0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229320/original/file-20180725-194137-1mhnp0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Colourism is a practice where one type of skin colour is portrayed as better than another.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/home">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Colourism</h2>
<p>Another worry that I am exploring in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjcjYvXoOTaAhXrCcAKHXpgCvgQFggpMAA&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%2Fs10728-017-0341-y&amp;usg=AOvVaw13NDhwdFZyYWsII0iO2Wgs">my research</a>, is that companies or states that offer or allow embryo selection for fairer skin are complicit in practices that are substantively about one type of skin colour being better than another – a form of what’s called <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6V1AjDqXnk">“colourism”</a>. Put into a context where skin colour, as a proxy for race and ethnicity, has been used to enslave, colonise, rape and marginalise, this is deeply troubling and ethically suspect. If we are committed to values of equality, where skin colour – among other traits – should not matter to us privately or publicly, it’s wrong to allow companies and institutions to develop or permit selection for this very unequal thing.</p>
<p>Banning practices can drive them underground: the pill to lighten foetuses is illegal, as is <a href="http://www.who.int/ipcs/assessment/public_health/mercury_flyer.pdf">mercury in products</a>, which also lightens skin. Yet both are still available, and are used by some of the poorest women in the world to boot. Stopping production of such products or services won’t eradicate the desire or societal norm in some places for lighter skin. But companies and states should consider whether current products – like lightening creams – or future interventions, such as embryo selection for fair skin, encourage or perpetuate inequality, and they should not partake in them if they do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95024/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Herjeet Marway does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A philosopher's take on the ethics of products that allow parents to lighten the skin colour of their unborn baby.Herjeet Marway, Lecturer in Global Ethics, Department of Philosophy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/978952018-07-24T22:56:28Z2018-07-24T22:56:28ZReligion does not determine your morality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227236/original/file-20180711-27036-kqv6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Does your morality come from your religion? Not really. Trafalgar Square (Stop B), London, United Kingdom</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Malcolm Lightbody/Unsplash</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most religious people think their morality comes from their religion. And deeply religious people often wonder how atheists can have any morality at all. </p>
<p>I’m going to use Christianity as my example, not because it’s representative of religion in general, but because there’s a lot of research on Christians, and because many readers will likely be familiar with it. </p>
<p>Christians will often tell you that their morality comes from their religion (or from their parents’ version of it). And if you ask them about what their religion tells them about what’s right and wrong, it will likely line up with their own ideas of right and wrong. </p>
<p>But the causal link is not as clear as it first appears. </p>
<p>The Bible is complex, with many beliefs, pieces of advice and moral implications. Nobody can believe in all of it. Different branches of Christianity, and indeed every different person, take some things from it and leave others. </p>
<p>Many things in the Bible are unacceptable to modern Christians. Why? Because they do not sit right with contemporary moral sensibilities. </p>
<p>Let’s take magic as an example. Many Christians don’t believe in magic, but even the ones who do, don’t think they should kill those who use it, even though <a href="http://biblehub.com/exodus/22-18.htm">one could interpret passages in the Bible to be suggesting exactly that</a>. </p>
<p>What’s going on? </p>
<p>In the case of the magic above, there is a moral behaviour advocated by the Bible that gets rejected by most people. Why? Because they think it’s morally wrong. </p>
<p>They ignore that part of the moral teachings of the Bible. Instead, they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/books/review/the-better-angels-of-our-nature-by-steven-pinker-book-review.html">tend to accept those moral teachings of the Bible that feel right to them.</a> This happens all the time, and a good thing too.</p>
<p>There’s more to a religion than what its scripture says. </p>
<p>When researching for my book <a href="http://www.jimdavies.org/riveted/"><em>Riveted: The Science of Why Jokes Make Us Laugh, Movie Make Us Cry, and Religion Makes Us Feel One with the Universe</em></a>, I found that the source of morality doesn’t come as clearly from religion as most people think.</p>
<h2>Free to interpret</h2>
<p>Clergy interprets scripture, and cultural practices and beliefs are passed down, many of which have little or nothing to do with the Bible, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2012/04/05/150061991/lust-lies-and-empire-the-fishy-tale-behind-eating-fish-on-friday">like the Catholic idea of having fish instead of meat on Friday</a> a cultural tradition never mentioned in the Bible at all.</p>
<p>Basically, people take or leave religious morality according to some internal moral compass they already have. They might even choose which church to go to, according to how well the teachings of that church match up with what they feel is right or wrong.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229086/original/file-20180724-194134-1tm5yk6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229086/original/file-20180724-194134-1tm5yk6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229086/original/file-20180724-194134-1tm5yk6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229086/original/file-20180724-194134-1tm5yk6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229086/original/file-20180724-194134-1tm5yk6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229086/original/file-20180724-194134-1tm5yk6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229086/original/file-20180724-194134-1tm5yk6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Some Christians convert to Buddhism or other religions based on what they think works for their beliefs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Hershey/Unsplash</span></span>
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<p>In the modern Western world, some people feel free to choose the religion that feels right to them. Why might someone convert to Christianity from Buddhism, or become a Muslim? Often it’s because the new religion speaks to them in a way that the old one didn’t.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/millennials-abandon-hope-for-religion-but-revere-human-rights-90537">Millennials abandon hope for religion but revere human rights</a>
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</em>
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<p>We see that people can choose religious beliefs, churches and even whole religions based on the morality that they already have. And this is the morality that atheists have too. </p>
<h2>Right and wrong</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19955414">Experimental evidence</a> suggests that people’s opinion of what God thinks is right and wrong tracks what they believe is right and wrong, not the other way around. </p>
<p>Social psychologist <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19955414">Nicholas Epley and his colleagues surveyed religious believers</a> about their moral beliefs and the moral beliefs of God. Not surprisingly, what people thought was right and wrong matched up pretty well with what they felt God’s morality was like. </p>
<p>Then Epley and his fellow researchers attempted to manipulate their participants’ moral beliefs with persuasive essays. If convinced, their moral opinion should then be different from God’s, right? </p>
<p>Wrong. When respondents were asked again what God thought, people reported that God agreed with their new opinion! </p>
<p>Therefore, people didn’t come to believe that God is wrong, they just updated their opinion on what God thinks.</p>
<p>When you change someone’s moral beliefs, you also change their opinion on what God thinks. Yet most surveyed still clung to the illusion that they got their moral compass from what they think God believes is right and wrong. </p>
<h2>Who defines our morals?</h2>
<p>If people are getting their morals from their conception of God, you’d think that contemplating God’s opinion might be more like thinking about someone else’s beliefs than thinking about your own. </p>
<p>But this isn’t the case. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19955414">The same study</a> also found that when you think about God’s beliefs, the part of your brain active when thinking about your own beliefs is more active than the part of your brain that is active when thinking about other people’s beliefs. </p>
<p>In other words, when thinking about God’s beliefs, you’re (subconsciously) accessing your own beliefs.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/being-a-progressive-christian-shouldnt-be-an-oxymoron-96617">Being a progressive Christian shouldn't be an oxymoron</a>
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</em>
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<p>So where do our morals come from, then, if not from religion? That’s a complicated question: <a href="http://righteousmind.com/">There seem to be genetic as well as cultural components</a>. These cultural components are influenced by religion, to be sure. </p>
<p>This equation happens even for atheists, who often take up the mores of their culture, which happens to have been influenced heavily by religions they don’t even ascribe to. So it’s not that religion does not effect morality, it’s just that morality also impacts religion. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20149715">Atheists don’t score differently than religious people when given moral dilemmas</a>. Clearly, we all have morality. </p>
<p>Whether you’re religious or not, morality comes from the same place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jim Davies does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many believe their morality comes from their religion. But evidence suggests that people’s opinion of what God thinks is actually what they believe is right and wrong, not the other way around.Jim Davies, Professor, Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1001512018-07-23T20:05:21Z2018-07-23T20:05:21ZDebate: Could anti-speciesism and veganism form the basis for a rational society?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228094/original/file-20180717-44076-11vv5wi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;rect=0%2C2%2C1500%2C997&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Salon de l&#39;agriculture, Paris (2007).</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/alainbachellier/408926084">Alain Bachellier/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Anti-speciesism and veganism are presented today as projects for society as a whole. Several political parties have even recently structured themselves under this banner, such as <a href="https://dieranimal.be/fr/">DierAnimal</a> in Belgium and <a href="https://rev-parti.fr/">Rassemblement des écologistes pour le vivant</a> in France. For an ethical system to become more than just a simple mind game and instead a social project, it must at the very least not be built on a manifest denial of reality. It must be concretely applicable.</p>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Singer">Peter Singer</a>, the founding father of anti-speciesism, claims a rational approach to the animal condition derived from the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism">utilitarian moral theory</a> founded in the 18th century by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Bentham">Jeremy Bentham</a>. Utilitarianism defends a consequentialist view of morality. Each action must be judged according to its consequences on the collective well-being.</p>
<h2>Ability to suffer</h2>
<p>Singer’s main contribution is to have redefined the identity of the moral community. He assumes that no human should be excluded from it. This therefore requires identifying a characteristic that is present in all humans without exception. For Singer, the capacity to suffer, or sensitivity, being equally shared between all humans, constitutes the only possible selective criterion. Since animals also have this ability, Singer proposes that they must necessarily be included in our moral sphere. In his 1975 book <em>Animal Liberation</em>, he wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“There can be no reason – apart from the selfish desire to preserve the privileges of the exploiting group – to refuse to extend the fundamental principle of equal consideration of interests to members of other species.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Anti-speciesism is thus opposed to the traditional hierarchical vision of species, derived from the Abrahamic religions, which made the animal a creation for the use of man. Although often lumped together with Singer’s anti-speciesism, veganism is distinguished by its radicalism. <a href="https://www.vegansociety.com/">It is defined as</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A philosophy and way of life that seeks to exclude – as far as possible and practicable – all forms of exploitation and cruelty to animals.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unlike utilitarian anti-speciesism, veganism does not calculate the consequences of an act on collective happiness. It considers any act of animal exploitation, whether or not it inflicts suffering, as immoral in absolute terms. Some philosophers, including <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/effective-non-violence/position-politique-antisp%C3%A9ciste-une-contribution-deze-paez/779602062219845/?hc_ref=ARRWeWAffx21uUFz3Z9gV6n3CD7EomU_wi4hFtw_CEdDrt-U-lYah1S51I8qfVGG8Ng">Eze Paez</a>, go even further in this radicality by making the human also responsible for animals in nature:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A movement that does not take into account the interests of these animals simply because they live in the wild would be guilty of the same type of discrimination that it denounces on the part of those who accept animal exploitation. Our goal must also be to improve their lives.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Humanising nature</h2>
<p>Note first of all that, in their efforts to push humans off of their divine pedestal to bring them back to nature, the theorists of anti-speciesism or veganism necessarily humanise nature at the same time. It is indeed difficult to find a trace in nature of the principle enunciated by Singer of equal consideration of interests. A fox does not ask the question of the interests of the rabbit before devouring it. Each animal is generally prey and predator, exploited and exploiting. On what rational basis can the exploitation of animals by humans be taboo if the same exploitation is part of nature?</p>
<p>The theorists of anti-speciesism or veganism seem to have little regard for the complexity of the animal kingdom, that is to say of all <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heterotroph">heterotrophic</a> multicellular <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eukaryote">eukaryotic</a> organisms. While mammals (approximately 5,000 species) are familiar to us, we often neglect that there are about 1,250,000 animal species in all. The Animalia <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxon">taxon</a> includes arthropods, which cover insects and crustaceans that alone account for more than 1.2 million species. How are we to avoid harming these over one million species by our simple existence?</p>
<p>More than one-third of the land surface is actively used by humans for its habitat or agriculture and is only able to accommodate a very small amount of animal diversity. At a minimum, a boundary within species would seem to be essential to make a vegan policy workable. When asked where to place this boundary, Singer replies:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“As with everything in life and evolution, there needs to be more question of graduation and progression along a continuum than of real categories and clear distinctions.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Other theorists, like Elisabeth de Fontenay, do not hesitate to decide. In 2013 she wrote in <em>Les animaux aussi ont des droits</em>, co-signed with Boris Cyrulnik and Peter Singer:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“There is an animal hierarchy […] This recognition, based on science, should justify differentialism in the allocation of rights. […] Sensitivity to pain differs in intensity depending on the degree of evolution of the species. […] I do not think that we can recognise interests and confer rights on those who do not belong to the genus of vertebrates and mammals.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Many theorists of anti-speciesism and veganism reintroduce, under the guise of common sense or science, a hierarchy within animal species. Those whose organisation and suffering are close to ours are thought to be included in our moral sphere, while the (very many) others are excluded. Yet, an increasing number of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S009286741400292X">studies</a> unequivocally demonstrate sensitivity in the simplest of organisms. For example, insects have the ability to experience complex emotional states such as anxiety and depression. Sensitivity is essential for adaptation to environmental fluctuations and is therefore a fundamental characteristic of the living being as a whole. A boundary within sensitivity (or consciousness) does not seem to rest on any scientific basis and is therefore purely subjective and anthropomorphic. But without this border, how could we include all animal species in our moral sphere? Moreover, even if we draw an arbitrary boundary that includes only mammals, is it realistic to ban exploitation and suffering among approximately 5,000 species while we are powerless to banish them within the human race alone?</p>
<h2>Global veganism?</h2>
<p>In practice, because of globalisation of the economy, a state could hardly unilaterally choose a vegan economic policy, excluding or penalising animal exploitation within its territory. As for a global vegan revolution, it is difficult to imagine the African or Asian continents supporting a vegan policy while the consumption of meat is increasing and meat itself is still a coveted commodity. In addition, the liberal economy is opposed in principle to the regulation of trade by states and would hardly accommodate the constraints of a vegan absolutist regulation. Another important question is what could be offered to people who live off of animal exploitation. Indeed, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations estimated in 2005 that fishing for aquaculture provided 300 million jobs worldwide. And finally, what about the hundreds of billions of domestic animals around the world that are unable to live in nature without human assistance?</p>
<p>Anti-speciesism and veganism are based on a strongly idealised, or even simplistic, vision of the animal kingdom and symbiotic relationships within it. Although it can be beneficial at the individual level (for adults, outside of maternity, and with regular medical follow-up), the vegan ideal of no animal exploitation can be extremely controversial from a social standpoint. It seems difficult to apply at the level of our modern societies, especially in the context of a globalised liberal economy. It may be more beneficial for animal welfare to focus our energies on convincing the international community to impose respect for the integrity of natural ecosystems and a drastic reduction of meat consumption, because of their respective importance for our survival and health, rather than attempting to impose the absolutist principles of vegans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Muraille has received funding from the Fond National de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS-FRS), Belgium</span></em></p>A vegan and anti-speciesist society is based on a somewhat simplistic view of the animal world. And its principles cannot be implemented in a globalised world.Eric Muraille, Immunologist, FNRS Senior Research Associate, Faculty of Medicine, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Université Libre de BruxellesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/989482018-07-03T20:11:46Z2018-07-03T20:11:46ZWhy do kids lie, and is it normal?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225647/original/file-20180702-116132-gkls8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">&quot;No, I didn&#39;t eat any cake.&quot;</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">from www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Children typically begin lying in the preschool years, between <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2612240/">two and four years</a> of age. These intentional attempts at deception may worry parents, who fear their child will become a pint-sized social deviant.</p>
<p>But from a developmental perspective, lying in young children is rarely cause for concern. In fact, lying is often one of the first signs a young child has developed a “<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26431737">theory of mind</a>”, which is the awareness others may have different desires, feelings, and beliefs to oneself. When a child misleadingly claims “Daddy said I could have an ice cream”, they’re using this awareness of others’ minds to plant false knowledge.</p>
<p>While lying itself may not be socially desirable, the ability to know what others are thinking and feeling is an important social skill. It’s <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27337508">related to</a> empathy, cooperation, and care for others when they’re feeling upset.</p>
<h2>How lying changes with age</h2>
<p>Young children’s first lies are often <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3483871/">more humorous than effective</a>. Imagine the child who claims not to have eaten any cake while her mouth is still full, or who blames the family dog for drawing on the wall. Young children may know they can deceive others, but they don’t yet have the sophistication to do so well.</p>
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<p>Before age eight, children frequently give themselves away when lying. In one <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01650250143000373">study</a>, children aged three to seven were asked not to peek at a mystery toy (Barney) that had been placed behind them. Nearly all did, and nearly all lied about it later (increasing with age). </p>
<p>But across the group, children also had trouble maintaining the lie. Liars aged three to five were surprisingly good at keeping a straight face but typically gave themselves away by describing the Barney toy by name. Liars aged six and seven had mixed success, with half feigning ignorance and half accidentally saying Barney’s name.</p>
<p>As children get older and their perspective-taking ability develops, they’re increasingly able to understand the kinds of lies that will be believable to others. They also become better at <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3483871/">maintaining the lie</a> over time. </p>
<p>Moral development also kicks in. Younger children are more likely to lie for personal gain, while older children increasingly anticipate <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8624.00098">feeling bad about themselves</a> if they lie. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/the-evolution-of-lying-14254">The evolution of lying</a>
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<p>Older children and teens are also more likely to draw distinctions between different kinds of lies. White lies, to them, are considered <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2581483/">more appropriate</a> than <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2864928/">harmful or antisocial</a> lies.</p>
<p>While studies that estimate the frequency of lying among children and teens are rare, teenagers are especially likely to lie to parents and teachers about things they consider their own personal business. </p>
<p>One <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:JOYO.0000013422.48100.5a">study</a> found 82% of US teenagers reported lying to their parents about money, alcohol, drugs, friends, dating, parties, or sex in the past year. They were most likely to lie about their friends (67%) and alcohol/drug use (65%). Perhaps surprisingly, they were least likely to lie about sex (32%). </p>
<p>When reading short scenarios in which the protagonist lied to his or her parents, the teens were also likely to consider the lying acceptable if it was to help somebody or keep a personal secret, but not if it was to harm or hurt someone.</p>
<h2>Is lying a cause for concern?</h2>
<p>Despite its prevalence, lying among children is rarely cause for concern. It’s important to remember many adults also lie – sometimes for good, as in the case of white lies that protect someone’s feelings, and sometimes for ill. While estimates vary, a <a href="https://msu.edu/%7Elevinet/Serota_etal2010.pdf">study</a> found approximately 40% of US adults reported telling a lie in the past 24 hours.</p>
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<p>In some instances, chronic lying can become a concern if they occur alongside a cluster of other behaviours that are maladaptive. For example, deceitfulness through lying is often present in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3826598/">conduct and oppositional defiant disorders</a> (ODD). </p>
<p>Young people with conduct disorders or ODD cause considerable disruptions in the home or at school through persistent aggression and harm to others or property. But to meet diagnoses, lying would have to occur with a cluster of other symptoms such as refusal to comply with authority figures, persistent violations of rules, and failure to take responsibility for their actions.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/truth-is-everyone-lies-all-the-time-6749">Truth is, everyone lies all the time</a>
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<p>Another cause for parental concern is if lying serves to mask other mental health problems due to fear or shame. For example, a child or adolescent suffering from severe anxiety may lie chronically to avoid confronting situations that make them afraid (for example, school, parties, germs). </p>
<p>They may also lie to avoid the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2904965/">stigma of mental health disorders</a>. In these instances, consulting your doctor or a mental health professional (such as a psychologist or psychiatrist) will help clarify whether lying is indicative of a mental health concern.</p>
<h2>Parents and teachers make a difference</h2>
<p>While lying is developmentally normal, parents and teachers can support children’s truth-telling in three ways.</p>
<p>First, avoid excessive or over-the-top punishments. In a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22023095">study</a> comparing a West African school that used punitive punishments (such as hitting with a stick, slapping, and pinching) and a school that used non-punitive reprimands (such as time outs or scolding), students at the school with punitive punishments were more likely to be effective liars. </p>
<p>Children from families that place a strong emphasis on following the rules and not open dialogue also <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:JOYO.0000013422.48100.5a">report lying</a> more frequently. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225835/original/file-20180703-116147-qvqv1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225835/original/file-20180703-116147-qvqv1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225835/original/file-20180703-116147-qvqv1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225835/original/file-20180703-116147-qvqv1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225835/original/file-20180703-116147-qvqv1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225835/original/file-20180703-116147-qvqv1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225835/original/file-20180703-116147-qvqv1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">By figuring out whether your child is trying to deceive you on purpose, you can target your response more effectively.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">from www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Second, discuss emotional and moral scenarios with children. This “emotion coaching” supports children’s understanding of when lies are most harmful, how they affect others, and how they themselves might feel when they lie. Children increasingly <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1992.tb03601.x">anticipate pride</a> for telling the truth, and parents can emphasise these positive aspects of truth-telling.</p>
<p>Third, ensure the lie really is a lie. Very young children are prone to blend real life and imagination, while older children and adults frequently remember arguments differently to one another. If a child reports physical or sexual abuse, these allegations must <em>always</em> be investigated. By distinguishing whether or not there is a deliberate attempt at deception, parents and teachers can target their response effectively.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/hows-your-poker-face-why-its-so-hard-to-sniff-out-a-liar-25487">How's your poker face? Why it's so hard to sniff out a liar</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Lying in children is developmentally normal</h2>
<p>Lying is developmentally normal and an important sign other cognitive skills are also developing. </p>
<p>If lying is persistent and is impairing the child’s ability to function effectively in everyday life, it’s worth consulting a mental health expert or your doctor. </p>
<p>But in other situations, remember that lying is just one way children learn to navigate the social world. Open and warm discussions about telling the truth should eventually help to reduce children’s lies as they develop.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carol Newall is affiliated with the Black Dog Institute.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Penny Van Bergen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Children lying is rarely cause for concern and actually means your child is developmentally normal.Penny Van Bergen, Senior Lecturer in Educational Psychology, Macquarie UniversityCarol Newall, Senior Lecturer in Early Childhood, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/985872018-06-21T10:04:31Z2018-06-21T10:04:31ZChildren have been separated from their families for generations – why Trump's policy was different<p>After weeks of mounting pressure, Donald Trump signed an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/us/politics/trump-immigration-children-executive-order.html">executive order</a> on June 20 to stop his administration’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-and-sessions-can-end-immigrant-family-separations-without-congress-help-98599">policy of separating migrant children</a> from their parents at the southern border of the US. Putting the policy into a wider historical context of state-sanctioned policies of child separation helps to understand why some aspects of it were remarkably distinctive – and caused such international outrage. </p>
<p>From the closing decades of the 19th century, <a href="https://www.academia.edu/36691325/Saving_the_child_for_the_sake_of_the_nation_moral_framing_and_the_civic_moral_and_religious_redemption_of_children">an array of policies emerged</a> across the Anglophone world which challenged assumptions about parents’ inalienable rights to their children. A transnational child protection movement led to the formation of child protection societies, beginning with the <a href="https://www.nyspcc.org/about-the-new-york-society-for-the-prevention-of-cruelty-to-children/history/">New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children</a> in 1875. New legislation followed in the UK, Canada and Australia allowing the removal of children from parents on grounds of cruelty or neglect. </p>
<p>Alongside this, various forms of welfare intervention developed which removed children from their families, with varying degrees of parental consent. This was done on the basis that children would be placed in new environments better suited to their moral, religious and civic development. </p>
<p>These included policies that sought to place children from indigenous communities in institutions in which they could be “Christianised and civilised”. This led to “Indian” residential schools <a href="http://nctr.ca/map.php">in Canada</a> and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/video/unspoken-americas-native-american-boarding-schools-oobt1r/">the United States</a>. It also sparked programmes which moved unaccompanied children around within their own country, such as the <a href="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/O/bo3630532.html">American “orphan trains”</a>, or to other countries, such as the <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/remembering-child-migration-9781472591128/">UK child migration schemes</a> where children were sent to Canada or Australia. Other forms of residential incarceration were also introduced, such as <a href="http://www.childabusecommission.ie/rpt/ExecSummary.php">the industrial school system in Ireland</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224176/original/file-20180621-137741-atk60h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224176/original/file-20180621-137741-atk60h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=459&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224176/original/file-20180621-137741-atk60h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=459&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224176/original/file-20180621-137741-atk60h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=459&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224176/original/file-20180621-137741-atk60h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=576&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224176/original/file-20180621-137741-atk60h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=576&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224176/original/file-20180621-137741-atk60h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=576&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An ‘Indian’ residential school in Saskatchewan, Canada in 1908.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Indian_residential_school_system#/media/File:Indian_school.jpg">Library and Archives Canada via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<h2>Sacred bonds broken</h2>
<p>These initiatives continued just as ideas of the sacred emotional ties between parent and child were becoming <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/5452.html">more pervasive in society</a>. However, state-sanctioned policies of family separation, usually delivered by leading charities and religious organisations, operated on the basis that such sacred bonds need not be respected for certain types of parents. These extended far beyond cases of child cruelty to judgements made about the suitability of a parent based on their ethnicity, class, lifestyle or marital status.</p>
<p>While the history of these welfare initiatives is complex and diverse, two common characteristics stand out. First, moral justifications were made for them with claims that the child’s social background – including the relationship with their parents – was a harmful influence and that removal of the child was necessary for saving them as a future citizen. <a href="http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9780719078941/">Moral symbolism</a> of the polluting home and the rescue of the child from darkness to light proliferated in publicity materials and public statements of support for their work. </p>
<p>Second, in almost all cases – apart from in the US – such welfare initiatives have become a focus of national shame and regret, expressed through <a href="https://www.iicsa.org.uk/news/inquiry-publishes-child-migration-programmes-report">inquiries</a> and <a href="http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/index.php?p=905">truth commissions</a>, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8531664.stm">public apologies</a> and, in some cases, <a href="http://www.rirb.ie/">financial compensation</a>.</p>
<p>In some respects the current policy by the Trump administration reflects aspects of this history. Similar dehumanising moral language about parents used to justify child separation in the past has been reflected in statements made by US officials that describe migrants as criminals. As Trump put it in one tweet, they <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1009071403918864385">threaten to “infest” American society</a>. </p>
<h2>Scale and harm</h2>
<p>In other respects, there are striking differences. The sheer scale of reported separations – <a href="https://apnews.com/dc0c9a5134d14862ba7c7ad9a811160e">2,300 migrant children</a> are said to have been removed from parents in six weeks – is extraordinary compared to previous state-sanctioned policies of separation. If rates of removal had continued at this level, the policy would have led to numbers of separations of children from parents in five years that other historical policies took several decades to realise. </p>
<p>Compared to historical welfare interventions, this US policy also lacked any moral claim that the separations were for the good of the child. It functioned simply as a punitive measure against immigration, ignoring evidence of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/what-separation-from-parents-does-to-children-the-effect-is-catastrophic/2018/06/18/c00c30ec-732c-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html?utm_term=.7ea30788ab50">traumatic effects of separation</a> from parents for children. This may help to explain why it has received much greater public censure than previous policies which received varying degrees of public toleration or support on the basis of claims that they benefited the children involved.</p>
<p>Another contrast concerns the speed and extent to which public opposition to the policy grew. Historically, state-sanctioned policies of child separation have often faced public criticisms and periodic scandals. But despite evidence of their harmful effects the policies usually persisted for decades, in part because public opinion has too readily deferred to the positive moral intent that governments and voluntary organisations claimed had driven the separations. </p>
<p>An example of this was the finding of the <a href="https://canadianhistory.ca/natives/timeline/1900s/1907-the-bryce-report-on-health-conditions-in-residential-schools">Bryce Report of 1907</a> which revealed that in the Indian residential schools in Canada, the mortality rate of indigenous children from tuberculosis was 24% – double that of the wider indigenous population. Support for the missionary aims of this work meant, however, that <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10767-013-9132-0">far from being closed down</a> the residential school system subsequently expanded and did not undergo any significant reforms until the 1960s.</p>
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<p>By comparison, public opposition to the Trump administration’s family separation policy has grown rapidly through print and broadcast media no longer characterised by such deference. <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1008953199963746304">Social media</a> has also played an integral part in this process. Visual records of previous state-sanctioned policies of child separation were usually made by those supporting them, such as publicity photographs of British child migrants smiling and waving <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/celebrity/stolen-childhoods-20110610-1fwru.html">into the camera</a> before setting off overseas. </p>
<p>By contrast, the widespread circulation of images and <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/children-separated-from-parents-border-patrol-cbp-trump-immigration-policy">audio files</a> capturing the distress of migrant children has played an <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10767-013-9132-0">important role in mobilising public opinion</a> against the moral symbolism that dehumanises migrants and legitimises such separations. </p>
<p>Judged in this historical context, if Trump’s policy proves shortlived, it is because its exceptional scale and brutality lacked sufficient moral legitimacy in American public opinion to outweigh the powerful images of children’s suffering circulated in the media. For those children who have already been separated from parents – uncertain how they will be reunified – this will come as little consolation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98587/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gordon Lynch receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>The scale and brutality of Trump's family separation policy was like nothing that has gone before.Gordon Lynch, Michael Ramsey Professor of Modern Theology, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/962872018-06-21T09:28:45Z2018-06-21T09:28:45Z'Please Alexa': are we beginning to recognise the rights of intelligent machines?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224188/original/file-20180621-137728-dh7mh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robot rights!</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/white-male-cyborg-opening-his-two-1115832683?src=qPfnEl_G3CsJ_aZv1Hb4GQ-1-27">shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amazon has recently developed an option whereby Alexa <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43897516">will only activate</a> if people address it with a “please”. This suggests that we are starting to recognise some intelligent machines in a way that was previously reserved only for humans. In fact, this could very well be the first step towards recognising the rights of machines.</p>
<p>Machines are becoming a part of the fabric of everyday life. Whether it be the complex technology that we are <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-the-biohackers-letting-technology-get-under-their-skin-60756">embedding inside of us</a>, or the machines on the outside, the line between what it means to be human and machine is softening. As machines get more and more intelligent, it is imperative that we begin discussing whether it will soon be time to recognise the rights of robots, as much for our sake as for theirs.</p>
<p>When someone says that they have a “right” to something, they are usually saying that they have a claim or an expectation that something should be a certain way. But what is just as important as rights are the foundations on which they are based. Rights rely on various intricate frameworks, such as law and morality. Sometimes, the frameworks may not be clear cut. For instance, in <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf">human rights law</a>, strong moral values such as dignity and equality inform legal rights.</p>
<p>So rights are often founded upon human principles. This helps partially explain why we have recognised the <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/#Pers">rights of animals</a>. We recognise that it is ethically wrong to torture or starve animals, so we create laws against it. As intelligent machines weave further into our lives, there is a good chance that our human principles will also force us to recognise that they too deserve rights.</p>
<p>But you might argue that animals differ from machines in that they have some sort of conscious experience. And it is true that consciousness and subjective experience are important, particularly to human rights. <a href="http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/">Article 1</a> of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, for example, says all human beings “are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. </p>
<p>However, consciousness and human rights are not the only basis of rights. In New Zealand and Ecuador, <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rivers-get-human-rights-they-can-sue-to-protect-themselves/">rivers have been granted rights</a> because humans deemed their very existence to be important. So rights don’t emerge only from consciousness, they can extend from other criteria also. There is no one correct <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023/B:LAPH.0000015417.05737.0e.pdf">type or form of rights</a>. Human rights are not the only rights. </p>
<p>As machines become even more complex and intelligent, just discarding or destroying them without asking any questions at all about their moral and physical integrity seems ethically wrong. Just like rivers, they too should <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-007-9137-3">receive rights</a> because of their meaning to us.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223878/original/file-20180619-126550-11tir8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223878/original/file-20180619-126550-11tir8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223878/original/file-20180619-126550-11tir8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223878/original/file-20180619-126550-11tir8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223878/original/file-20180619-126550-11tir8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223878/original/file-20180619-126550-11tir8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223878/original/file-20180619-126550-11tir8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Whanganui river in New Zealand has been granted the same rights as humans.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cool_Bend_on_Whanganui_River_-_panoramio.jpg">Duane Wilkins</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What if there was a complex and independent machine providing health care to a human over a long period of time. The machine resembled a person and applied intelligence through natural speech. Over time, the machine and the patient <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10400435.2017.1396565">built up a close relationship.</a> Then, after a long period of service, the company that creates the machine decides that it is time to turn off and discard this perfectly working machine. It seems ethically wrong to simply discard this intelligent machine, which has kept alive and built a relationship with that patient, without even entertaining its right to integrity and other rights. </p>
<p>This might seem absurd, but imagine for a second that it is you who has built a deep and meaningful relationship with this intelligent machine. Wouldn’t you be desperately finding a way to stop it being turned off and your relationship being lost? It is as much for our own human sake, than for the sake of intelligent machines, that we ought to recognise the rights of intelligent machines.</p>
<p>Sexbots are a good example. The UK’s sexual offences law exists to protect the sexual autonomy of the human victim. But it also exists to ensure that people respect sexual autonomy, the right of a person to control their own body and their own sexual activity, as a value. </p>
<p>But the definition of consent in section 74 of the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/74">Sexual Offences Act 2003</a> in the UK specifically refers to “persons” and not machines. So right now a person can do whatever they wish <a href="https://theconversation.com/samanthas-suffering-why-sex-machines-should-have-rights-too-93964">to a sexbot</a>, including torture. There is something troubling about this. And it is not because we believe sexbots to have consciousness. Instead, it is probably because by allowing people to torture robots, the law stops ensuring that people respect the <a href="http://srh.bmj.com/content/early/2018/04/24/bmjsrh-2017-200012">values of personal and sexual autonomy</a>, that we consider important.</p>
<p>These examples very much show that there is a discussion to be had over the rights of intelligent machines. And as we rapidly enter an age where these examples will no longer be hypothetical, the law must keep up.</p>
<h2>Matter of respect</h2>
<p>We are already recognising complex machines in a manner that was previously reserved only for humans and animals. We feel that our children must be polite to Alexa as, if they are not, it will damage our own notions of respect and dignity. Unconsciously we are already recognising that how we communicate with and respect intelligent machines will affect how we communicate with and respect humans. If we don’t extend recognition to intelligent machines, then it will affect how we treat and <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/5/2/17301702/westworld-isabella-season-2-virtu-e-fortuna-artificial-intelligence">consider humans</a>.</p>
<p>Machines are integrating their way in to our world. Google’s recent experiment <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/08/google-duplex-assistant-phone-calls-robot-human">with natural language</a> assistants, where AI sounded eerily like a human, gave us an insight into this future. One day, it may become impossible to tell whether we are interacting with machines or with humans. When that day comes, rights may have to change to include them as well. As we change, rights may naturally have to adapt too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paresh Kathrani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is just as much for our own sake, as for the sake of robots, that we should begin recognising the rights of intelligent machines.Paresh Kathrani, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/974652018-06-11T20:37:32Z2018-06-11T20:37:32ZMoral development: children become more caring and inclusive as they age<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221690/original/file-20180605-175445-l6qwwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Knowing when children develop morality means we can aid their moral development.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Schools track and nurture the <a href="https://www.aare.edu.au/publications-database.php/6662/The-Silent-Voice-in-the-NAPLAN-Debate:-Expoloring-Childrens-Lived-Experiences-of-the-tests-">academic development of children</a>, measuring literacy and numeracy against a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-outcomes-parents-should-expect-from-early-childhood-education-and-care-94731">bell curve</a>. But what about children’s moral development? A <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0197819">new study</a> has found this also develops over time, and there’s a lot parents can do to help it along.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/how-we-decide-who-and-what-we-care-about-and-whether-robots-stand-a-chance-91987">How we decide who and what we care about – and whether robots stand a chance</a>
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<p>Although adults’ sense of morality has <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0963721417730888?journalCode=cdpa">previously been mapped</a>, until now we have known little about what children care about, or how this might change as they age. </p>
<p>Our team of researchers from the University of Queensland recently examined the growth of <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0197819">moral concern</a> (caring about the well-being of another) in children, and found children become more inclusive in who and what they care about as they age. </p>
<h2>Moral growth in childhood</h2>
<p>We asked 151 children - aged four to ten years - to map out how much they cared about a range of 24 things. These things included various humans, animals and inanimate objects. Our participants placed each one across three “moral circles”, indicating whom or what they cared about a lot, a little, or not at all. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221298/original/file-20180601-69514-1reogqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221298/original/file-20180601-69514-1reogqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=450&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221298/original/file-20180601-69514-1reogqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=450&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221298/original/file-20180601-69514-1reogqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=450&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221298/original/file-20180601-69514-1reogqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=566&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221298/original/file-20180601-69514-1reogqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=566&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221298/original/file-20180601-69514-1reogqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=566&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children placed items in moral circles on a mat.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We discovered children included more targets in their moral circles as they aged. Their ability to extend concern to others improves with development, much like numeracy and literacy skills do. This suggests the penny drops at multiple points through a child’s moral development as their understanding of the moral needs of others becomes more nuanced. </p>
<p>We are born social: from an early age children are driven to share with, help and be liked by others. Helping behaviours can occur <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16513986">as early as 18 months of age</a>, and become commonplace by age three. But these behaviours generally only occur in situations where helping doesn’t come at a direct cost (for example, giving up something you value such as a cherished toy). </p>
<p>In contrast, although a four-year-old recognises sharing is a good thing to do, and they punish others who do not share, they find it extremely <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0059510">difficult to do themselves</a>. We found four-year-olds were the least likely to donate stickers they earned in our task to an unknown peer. </p>
<p>It’s only at the later stages at seven to eight years old that children begin to engage in altruistic sharing behaviours. At this age, children are becoming much more receptive to societal norms of fairness and justice. They will show aversion not only to unfair scenarios where they receive less than another child, but also when they <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21616483">receive more than another child</a>. </p>
<p>This ability to incorporate the experience of others into our own decision making is the crux of moral reasoning. It’s this ability that might also explain why older children reported caring significantly more about vulnerable members of society – such as the sick and people with disabilities. </p>
<p>While four-year-olds cared just as little about a sick person as a shoe, from seven years of age children were reporting caring a lot about a sick person, placing them in their inner circle. Older children (so, age seven and above) also appear more capable of caring for more abstract concepts, such as the environment.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221299/original/file-20180601-69497-1h4pdcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221299/original/file-20180601-69497-1h4pdcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221299/original/file-20180601-69497-1h4pdcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=286&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221299/original/file-20180601-69497-1h4pdcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=286&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221299/original/file-20180601-69497-1h4pdcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=286&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221299/original/file-20180601-69497-1h4pdcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=359&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221299/original/file-20180601-69497-1h4pdcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=359&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221299/original/file-20180601-69497-1h4pdcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=359&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">While the items at either end remain similar, there is large movement across some targets in the middle as children grow older.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To become a moral being is quite an undertaking, and it takes time. So, if your four-year-old seems more concerned about what’s in front of them than about people who need care most, give them time – they’ll get there. </p>
<h2>Some things change, some things stay the same</h2>
<p>Our research also demonstrates there are some moral preferences that appear stable across the lifespan. At any age, children prefer family members and best friends, keeping them in the inner circles of their concern. </p>
<p>Similarly, villains or wrongdoers are reliably cast outside our circles of concern: children at all ages report not caring about bullies and robbers. There is a strong preference for members of our ingroup (those we identify with, such as classmates) than an unfamiliar outgroup (such as children living overseas). These patterns are also <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26751743">reflected in adult samples</a>, suggesting they are built into the human condition. </p>
<p>But this doesn’t mean these preferences can’t be influenced by experience. Simply having <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16737372">more contact with an outgroup member</a> can help foster liking and feelings of similarity in both adults and children. </p>
<p>Similarly, reading stories to children containing main characters with a disability <a href="https://spssi.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2006.00469.x">decreases prejudice in children towards disabled people</a> from five years of age. By giving children the opportunity to engage with a wide range of people from diverse backgrounds, parents can help build tolerance and compassion in children.</p>
<h2>Developing a moral future</h2>
<p>The big picture here is these decisions tap into the origins of prejudice and tolerance. Understanding when these traits emerge means we can better develop ways to overcome bias and foster acceptance. </p>
<p>We all have a role to play here: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>encourage sharing between your child and others </p></li>
<li><p>emphasise similarities between groups, not differences </p></li>
<li><p>read children stories with a diverse range of human and non-human main characters</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1967-04413-001">explain <em>why</em> something is wrong</a>, rather than just stating it’s wrong. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>By doing this, we can all help to foster the moral development of our future generations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97465/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Children develop a sense of morality as they grow, similar to how literacy and numeracy skills develop over time and with practice.Karri Neldner, PhD Candidate, The University of QueenslandCharlie Crimston, Postdoctoral Researcher in Morality and Social Psychology, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/943232018-04-04T16:26:05Z2018-04-04T16:26:05ZWhy Zuma's trial matters for South Africa's constitutional democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213161/original/file-20180404-189824-15g9qrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African president Jacob Zuma stands accused of racketeering, fraud, money laundering and corruption. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former South African president Jacob Zuma’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics-zuma/south-africas-zuma-to-appear-in-court-on-april-6-on-graft-charges-idUSKBN1H2252">court appearance</a> carries huge significance for the country. That’s because his criminal trial is not merely about public outrage at <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">state capture</a> and corruption in high political offices. Nor is it just about Zuma facing the consequences of his abuse of office. Or the criminal justice implications of a former president being charged with a series of crimes. </p>
<p>Its broader significance is that Zuma’s court appearance affects many of the most important philosophical foundations of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. The charges against him are immensely important for the foundations of the state. They also matter for democracy and for the constitutional social contract.</p>
<p>This is because the legitimacy of any elected public representative is based on the mandate they receive at a general election. That mandate is the product of a contract between voters and public representatives. Voters cede part of their most fundamental democratic rights of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-end-of-representative-politics-41997">public participation</a> to the representatives. In exchange, and as a cornerstone of representative democracy, elected representatives must account for their actions to Parliament and to the voters.</p>
<p>If a public representative deviates from that mandate – or abuses it for other purposes or his own interest, or worse even for criminal purposes – then the foundation of representative democracy is violated. If abuses become widespread, or if a person in a key public position violates this contractual relationship, the foundation of representative democracy is under threat.</p>
<p>Public opinion in South Africa accuses Zuma of such a violation. The public also expects him to take political responsibility for it. In this context, his prosecution will amount to a public process to rectify and remedy his undemocratic and <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/concourt-says-parliament-failed-hold-zuma-accountable-nkandla/">unconstitutional behaviour</a>.</p>
<p>Zuma’s mere appearance in court, and the accompanying public humiliation, should act as a reprimand for his abuse of the public’s trust in him as elected president. In essence, it could be seen as a process to restore the constitutional relationship between the public and elected representatives.</p>
<h2>State capture and state institutions</h2>
<p>Although his charges don’t address it directly, <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">state capture </a> is a subtext in his court appearance. State capture – the alleged undue influence of Zuma’s friends, the Gupta family, in the running of the state for private gain – has caused serious institutional degradation in the public sector. The works of scholars Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson emphasise the importance of <a href="http://www.loot.co.za/product/james-a-robinson-why-nations-fail/dkdr-2320-g450?PPC=Y&amp;gclid=EAIaIQobChMI9Iygw6qe2gIVTrHtCh06uQnGEAAYASAAEgLqkPD_BwE&amp;gclsrc=aw.ds">strong and capable state institutions</a>. </p>
<p>Once institutions are threatened or undermined, states start to malfunction and constitutional crises develop. Institutions are associated with a number of constitutional principles. These include the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/who-we-are">separation of powers</a>, <a href="https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/xmlui/handle/10413/9769">judicial independence</a>, a state’s responsibility to provide security and services as well as to collect taxes. Once state institutions are weakened, it becomes impossible to implement and protect constitutional rights.</p>
<p>Zuma’s infiltration of state institutions, such as the criminal justice system, the revenue service, the intelligence institutions and enterprises such as the power utility Eskom, almost broke the institutional spine of the state. This would have happened had it not been for institutions such as the Public Protector and the National Treasury, the Reserve Bank and the judiciary. </p>
<p>Part of Zuma’s legacy also includes the state’s fiscal capacity being seriously compromised as well as state institutions such as the Hawks or National Prosecuting Authority. </p>
<p>It’s necessary for him to account for all, in public.</p>
<h2>The law and moral values</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-south-africa-zuma-charges-20180316-story.html">criminal offences</a> that Zuma faces – including corruption, fraud, money laundering or racketeering – are not only crimes. They’re also violations of a society’s moral value system.</p>
<p>A legal system is intended to protect a society’s value system. It’s therefore an essential aspect of any <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/alraesa/conferences/2005uganda/ent_s3_waliggo.pdf">constitutional democracry</a>.</p>
<p>In this light, Zuma’s trial is not only about whether he did, or didn’t, commit certain crimes. It will also serve to reaffirm the moral values that direct the lives of public representatives. Corruption, for example, harms the relationship between the voter and public representative and the electoral mandate that regulates that relationship. It challenges the very essence of representative democracy.</p>
<p>A former president on trial will be a strong reminder that political power is not supreme, that it cannot guarantee uncensored immunity and privilege. A trial will send the message that unbridled power comes with high risks and huge costs. </p>
<p>Luckily, the South African legal system does not allow for presidential immunity. It can thus avoid the spectre of autocratic executives who <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/25163/05chapter5.pdf?sequence=6">escape punishment for corruption</a>.</p>
<h2>A message for the private sector</h2>
<p>Zuma’s trial also sends a message to the private sector – that it’s conduct is judged by the same moral values as those used for public representatives. State capture collusion by private sector entities equally undermines the constitutional dispensation. </p>
<p>Hopefully, Zuma’s case will motivate business executives to reconsider how they relate to government, what form of lobbying is acceptable, how they participate in procurement processes, and how they deal with conflicts of interest.</p>
<p>It’s very important that the Zuma case is approached with utmost professionalism by the prosecuting authority. All the principles of the rule of law should be on display. No special treatment should be considered and no overt political agendas should be tolerated from any side – either to please or to humiliate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94323/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africans expect former president Zuma him to take responsibility and remedy his undemocratic and unconstitutional behaviour.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/927062018-03-29T10:27:12Z2018-03-29T10:27:12ZHow to stay honest this tax season<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212479/original/file-20180328-109179-1bblcmd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Each year many people cheat on their taxes.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures-of-money/16687016624">Pictures of Money</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Americans begrudgingly work through their taxes this year, many could be facing a moral struggle about whether to be honest or not. They might be thinking about exaggerating that donation to Goodwill, or not reporting that side job, among other things.</p>
<p>It is true that each year many people do cheat on their taxes. According to <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/04/29/tax-evasion-cost/">findings</a> released by the IRS in 2016, tax evasion costs the federal government over US$450 billion each year.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=io5Ihu4AAAAJ&amp;hl=en">philosopher</a> whose <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-character-gap-9780190264222?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;">research</a> focuses on character and ethics, I can say that there isn’t much controversy that cheating, in most situations, is morally wrong – and that includes cheating on one’s taxes. </p>
<p>So, how can we stay honest this tax season? </p>
<h2>We want to consider ourselves honest people</h2>
<p>First let’s dive into the recent psychological research on cheating.</p>
<p>Researcher <a href="https://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty/profiles/s/shu-l-1#.WrucVdXwZ-U">Lisa Shu</a> and her colleagues published a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21307176">study</a> in 2011 in which participants were given a test with 20 problems for which they would be paid $0.50 per correct answer. Their answers were checked by a person in charge, and they were paid accordingly. </p>
<p>This part of the experiment was pretty straightforward.</p>
<p>But then they changed the setup a bit. The participants were told that they would be the ones grading their answers with no one checking on them. The incentive and the test remained the same. They were also told that their paperwork would be shredded and they could report their own “scores.” </p>
<p>Here’s the difference it made in what people ended up doing: In the first setup where there was no opportunity to cheat, participants averaged about eight correct answers. In the second setup where there was ample opportunity to cheat, the number of “correct” answers jumped all the way to 13.22.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212480/original/file-20180328-109169-uicoi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212480/original/file-20180328-109169-uicoi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=397&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212480/original/file-20180328-109169-uicoi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=397&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212480/original/file-20180328-109169-uicoi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=397&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212480/original/file-20180328-109169-uicoi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=499&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212480/original/file-20180328-109169-uicoi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=499&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212480/original/file-20180328-109169-uicoi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=499&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Researchers have found that moral reminders can stop people from cheating.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/cheat-sheet-written-hand-schoolboy-student-417465649?src=qiy3z0sIcXMYVYZ0kLrFSQ-1-13">Roman Pelesh/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This finding and other published results like them, provide an important lesson about the <a href="http://danariely.com/books/the-honest-truth-about-dishonesty/">psychology of cheating</a>: When people think they can get away with cheating, and they also think it would be worthwhile to cheat, they are often motivated to do so. </p>
<p>But that is not all the research has to offer. Using the same basic framework as Shu’s study, other research has added some interesting variations. For instance, participants in another study were first <a href="http://journals.ama.org/doi/abs/10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633?code=amma-site">asked to recall</a> as many of the Ten Commandments as they could before they took the test. In another variation, the participants were college students who first had to <a href="http://journals.ama.org/doi/abs/10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633?code=amma-site">sign their school’s honor code</a> before they began.</p>
<p>Researchers found the average number of problems solved was essentially the same as when participants had no opportunity to cheat and their answers were graded by someone else.</p>
<p>Psychologists have <a href="http://journals.ama.org/doi/abs/10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633?code=amma-site">provided an explanation</a> for what is happening here. While people often want to cheat in certain cases if it would benefit them, they also want to think of themselves as honest. What the honor code and the Ten Commandments did in the experiments was to serve as moral reminders of the importance of being honest. </p>
<p>Other studies of cheating have found that even more subtle reminders can be effective. In one such study, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23127418">cheating continued</a> even when the instructions said, “Please don’t cheat. … Even a small amount of cheating would undermine the study.” However, when researchers changed the wording for a second group, people did not cheat. This group was told: “Please don’t be a cheater. … Even a small number of cheaters would undermine the study.” </p>
<p>The switch to “cheater” called to mind how the participants wanted to think of themselves as honest. Most fascinating of all, psychologists stopped study participants from cheating simply by having them <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/009265667690088X">sit in front of a mirror</a>.</p>
<p>When given a moral reminder, it is hard for most people to cheat.</p>
<h2>What can you do to stay honest</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212482/original/file-20180328-109175-13k0b1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212482/original/file-20180328-109175-13k0b1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212482/original/file-20180328-109175-13k0b1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212482/original/file-20180328-109175-13k0b1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212482/original/file-20180328-109175-13k0b1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212482/original/file-20180328-109175-13k0b1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212482/original/file-20180328-109175-13k0b1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">How can you stay honest?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-businessman-partner-using-calculator-laptop-641524333?src=fwN5UMw5iT4Ax94pLJBtCg-1-12">Natee Meepian/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Coming back to the tax season, the question is how we can stay honest. Based on the research mentioned here, I want to suggest three practical steps:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Use tangible moral reminders. They can be as simple as a Post-it note on your computer to be honest. One could also read a passage from a religious text or a different source of moral inspiration.</p></li>
<li><p>If possible, do your taxes with someone else that you trust. With that accountability, it is a lot harder to give into temptation to cheat. We want to think of ourselves as honest, and we also want other people to think of us as honest too.</p></li>
<li><p>Call upon role models. Try to imagine what your moral heroes in life would tell you to do if you are considering bending the truth to lessen your tax burden. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>We shouldn’t cheat on our taxes, not because we necessarily care about the IRS, but because we care about being people of honesty and integrity. </p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This piece is part of our series on ethical questions arising from everyday life. We would welcome your suggestions. Please email us at <a href="mailto:ethical.questions@theconversation.com">ethical.questions@theconversation.com</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian B. Miller receives funding from the Templeton Religion Trust. </span></em></p>While people often want to cheat in certain cases if it would benefit them, they also want to think of themselves as honest. Here are three steps to stay honest while filing taxes.Christian B. Miller, A.C. Reid Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/937092018-03-28T10:42:20Z2018-03-28T10:42:20ZActive shooter drills may reshape how a generation of students views school<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212289/original/file-20180327-109172-18el4ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A police officer portrays an active shooter with an assault rifle loaded with dummy rounds.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Charles Krupa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent school shootings and the March for Our Lives rallies held in cities around the world on March 24 have rekindled debates over how to keep students safe. </p>
<p>“The notion of ‘it can’t happen here’ is no longer a notion,” said <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/20/us/great-mills-high-school-shooting/index.html">Sheriff Tim Cameron</a> of St. Mary’s County, Maryland after a student opened fire on March 20 at Great Mills High School, killing one student and injuring another.</p>
<p>Increasingly, schools are turning to active shooter drills and videos to prepare students and staff to face a gunman. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=_222Y44AAAAJ&amp;hl=en&amp;oi=ao">sociologist</a> who studies the social impacts of security strategies, I am concerned about the unintended ethical and political consequences of these exercises.</p>
<p>All students deserve safe learning environments. Yet training kids to take responsibility for their own survival while treating gun violence as inevitable may make schools – even those that are never the site of a shooting – feel unsafe. Effects like this need to be weighed against the potential benefits of active shooter training to ensure that measures to protect students do not cause unintended harm.</p>
<h2>Ethical dilemmas of ‘run, hide, fight’</h2>
<p>By 2013, over <a href="https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_233.65.asp">two-thirds of public schools</a> in the U.S. used <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q27GFEuOuho">lockdown drills</a> to prepare for an active shooter. In these exercises, students huddle in classrooms to practice waiting for help from police and SWAT teams. </p>
<p>School shootings continued unabated, however, so the Department of Education began to encourage students and teachers to plan a more active response. Rather than huddle and wait, students and teachers <a href="https://www.ready.gov/active-shooter">are now told to</a> “run, hide, fight.”</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/aRHcbJ9DHEg?wmode=transparent&amp;start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Lockdown and “run, hide, fight” active shooter drills are designed to habituate students and staff to an active shooter situation. However, some schools have faced criticism for using overly realistic simulations. For example, when officers armed with rifles burst into a Florida school for an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aRHcbJ9DHEg&amp;t=14s">unannounced drill</a>, parents were outraged. </p>
<p>Training materials designed for teachers, like a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOkHepDdTlM">computer simulation</a> produced by the Department of Homeland Security, may partially shield children from seeing scary scenarios. However, even when schools focus their trainings on teachers, drills remind students of the possibility that they will face a shooter. A <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VCd6SAeWbHM&amp;t=306s">video</a> created by the Santa Ana Unified School District tells teachers to develop a “run, hide, fight” plan and urges them, “Communicate these plans to students. Rehearse, practice, and drill each plan on a regular basis.” </p>
<p>By having students practice responding to a pretend emergency, school administrators hope they will respond the same way to a real one. However, training exercises that instill fear may have negative effects on students. <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022146514567576">Research shows</a> that exposure to neighborhood violence alters kids’ cognitive performance, affecting how quickly and accurately they respond to cues on a computer screen. If simulated or anticipated violence has similar impacts on kids’ cognition, it could impact their classroom performance.</p>
<p>In addition, moral lessons are hidden within the “run, hide, fight” model. Training videos built on this model are full of underlying messages about the right thing to do during a shooting.</p>
<p>Run: “Encourage others to leave with you, but don’t let them slow you down,” says a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2D0">training video</a> promoted by the Department of Homeland Security for schools and workplaces.</p>
<p>Hide: In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQIR1pqd3k8">video</a> published by the Oregon Trail School District, a teacher explains, “We’re gonna push some stuff against the door. That’s called a barricade. We’re gonna barricade the door so nobody can get in.” </p>
<p>Fight: A <a href="https://police.stanford.edu/active-threat.html">training video</a> produced by Stanford University advises, “Fire extinguishers are great as weapons and as a chemical spray. Coffee cups, laptops, books – anything you can do to increase your odds of survival is a good tactic.” </p>
<p>Students and teachers are led to reimagine their learning environment as they rehearse the “run, hide, fight” strategy. To plan escape routes, they must picture classrooms and hallways as potential crime scenes. To prioritize their own survival, they must close the door to the shooter and the injured, putting to rest <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-trolley-dilemma-would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-five-57111">moral questions</a> about leaving others to die. They must do away with the ideal that schools are weapon-free zones and spot classroom objects to wield in battle.</p>
<h2>Social stakes of shooter drills</h2>
<p>Social scientists know that the strategies people use to protect themselves shape their social lives, regardless of whether they work. <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Citizen_protectors.html?id=Qal0jwEACAAJ&amp;hl=en">Carrying a gun</a> for protection, for example, bears on a person’s identity, political views and social ties even if they never use it. Women who take <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077801203256202?journalCode=vawa">self-defense classes</a> likewise report feeling newly empowered afterwards, even if they have never been threatened.</p>
<p>While the “run, hide, fight” response is modeled on strategies law enforcement teams have used effectively, there is <a href="http://safehavensinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Fight_Flight_or_Lockdown-Dorn-Satterly.pdf">little evidence</a> as to whether or not it will work to minimize harm in school shootings. In the recent <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/02/16/active-shooter-training-florida/343641002/">Parkland, Florida</a> shooting, it seems the shooter designed his attack with the school’s emergency drills in mind. </p>
<p>Whether or not active shooter training works, however, it is likely to shape the way students and teachers think and act at school and beyond. Schools play a large role in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1170032?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">formation of political views</a>. When kids learn to plan for school shootings the same way they plan for fires, earthquakes and tornadoes – inevitable events beyond their control – how will it affect how they vote, organize or lead in the future? </p>
<p>Will it impact their trust in public schools, police, the government or each other?</p>
<p>Nobody wants to feel powerless in the face of an attacker, and one casualty from a school shooting is too many. Parents, educators and students naturally seek to do everything possible to limit the harm these tragedies cause. Yet, active shooter training strategies have consequences that communities need to consider. Knowledge is power, but maybe books shouldn’t be weapons. I argue that the hidden lessons of active shooter training need to be openly debated before they are unintentionally ingrained in an entire generation of students.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93709/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Devon Magliozzi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While emergency drills may help schools feel safer, they contain underlying and often unintended moral messages about the nature of school and life itself.Devon Magliozzi, Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology, Stanford UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/930122018-03-25T19:28:15Z2018-03-25T19:28:15ZDebate: On the place of mankind in evolution, ethics and nutrition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209729/original/file-20180309-30986-1odq7ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;rect=3%2C28%2C1194%2C743&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A shepherd with his flock in the Netherlands. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.bndestem.nl/zeeland/over-schaapherders-en-schaapuitlaters~acbece0b/">Peter Nicolai</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Having reached an advanced level of communication through thinking, humans have been trying for a long time to differentiate themselves from the rest of the biological world. Until the end of the 19th century it was more or less thought that humanity was on top of the evolutionary tree.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209723/original/file-20180309-30979-1d7vbzf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209723/original/file-20180309-30979-1d7vbzf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209723/original/file-20180309-30979-1d7vbzf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=1037&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209723/original/file-20180309-30979-1d7vbzf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=1037&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209723/original/file-20180309-30979-1d7vbzf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=1037&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209723/original/file-20180309-30979-1d7vbzf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1303&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209723/original/file-20180309-30979-1d7vbzf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1303&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209723/original/file-20180309-30979-1d7vbzf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=1303&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Archaic phylogenetic tree.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://acces.ens-lyon.fr/acces/thematiques/biodiversite/dossiers-thematiques/les-trois-domaines-du-vivant/historique-de-la-classification-du-vivant-1">ENS Lyon</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This anthropocentric vision describing humans as the ultimate step of evolution goes together with moral and religious developments described in several religions that propose that humanity was chosen by God or indicating that God has created us in his own image or else that God can occasionally present Himself under a human appearance. The last of these is not unique to monotheist religions as in polytheist Greek or Latin religions, where gods can easily acquire a human appearance, in particular to seduce attractive young women. Beyond the anecdote, these dated phylogenetic trees and those much more ancestral beliefs reflect the propensity of humankind to consider itself as superior to other biological organisms. Or is it to reassure ourselves?</p>
<h2>Superior, or insecure?</h2>
<p>Why on earth do we feel that need to prove that we are superior to other species? – doesn’t it hide a profound insecurity? Are we really so superior to other biological species, and if not, why did we invent such a fable?</p>
<p>An interesting level of answer to this question concerns animal nutrition, including that of humans. The whole animal chain depends on molecules containing carbon, nitrogen and sulphur, which are present in macromolecules built by other biological organisms capable of feeding on inorganic forms as carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), nitrate (NO3-) and sulphate (SO42-). The most important macromolecules from a catalytic point of view in the cell are the proteins made by combining a repertoire of 20 amino acids. However, animals can synthesize only 11 of them. This is only one example among others, and we could also mention the needs for vitamins that are strikingly different between animal and plant species. It is clear that the whole animal chain is totally dependent on photosynthetic organisms for its survival and that without plants, we would die out very quickly.</p>
<p>A significant proportion of animal species (carnivores, omnivores) can or must feed on other animals. However, ruminants that are preyed upon by carnivores survive only by consuming plants. It is likely that during millennia the mixed nature of the human diet posed no ethical problems whatsoever. However, moral limits have rapidly emerged – for example, cannibalism is a strong taboo in modern societies. Likewise, the use of animal food for humans has certainly posed a number of ethical/moral problems, in particular because it’s much easier for a human to identify with other animal species, in particular mammals – broadly speaking, we have all four limbs, two eyes, one nose, etc. That’s not the case with plant species, which on the surface look extremely different and appear more like strangers to us.</p>
<p>One solution to this dilemma is to postulate that human beings are superior to the rest of the creation. Actually, one will note that the primitive phylogenetic tree shown above places safely humankind on top of the hierarchy. To further solve this moral riddle, it has been proposed that not only is man on top of the creation and at the image of God but also he is the only being with the capacity of communicating and reasoning. As a consequence, morally we have the right to prey upon “inferior” species.</p>
<h2>Genetics upsets the apple cart</h2>
<p>Of course, this convenient piece of reasoning has been shattered in the 20th century through progress made in genetics, genomics and behavioural sciences. Genetics and genomics have allowed us to refine the phylogenetic trees, their modern aspect being conform to the scheme below. In this modern version, <em>Homo sapiens</em> belongs to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opisthokont">Opisthokontes</a> and it is very clear that this branch is in no way more special than the other ones. On top of that, if we zoom on that branch, we’re not on the top of it but rather share a position at the end of a twig with all the other species. (Incidentally the human genome is more than 95% identical to the one of the chimpanzee, our closest relative.)</p>
<p>Thus if one want to defend the consumption of meat on moral grounds, one has to argue that our behaviour is justified because we’re the only species capable of higher reasoning. This certitude has also evaporated following the work of behavioural scientists who have shown that many other animal species possess elaborate communications skills and intelligence. An excellent recent article in The Conversation details a thorough analysis of this topic and the reader is strongly referred to it. <strong>PROVIDE A LINK</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209724/original/file-20180309-30975-1gd4443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209724/original/file-20180309-30975-1gd4443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=491&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209724/original/file-20180309-30975-1gd4443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=491&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209724/original/file-20180309-30975-1gd4443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=491&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209724/original/file-20180309-30975-1gd4443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=617&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209724/original/file-20180309-30975-1gd4443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=617&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209724/original/file-20180309-30975-1gd4443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=617&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://acces.ens-lyon.fr/acces/thematiques/biodiversite/dossiers-thematiques/les-trois-domaines-du-vivant/historique-de-la-classification-du-vivant-1">ENS Lyon</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is more and more obvious that all these arguments weigh heavily on how human societies deal with nutrition issues, and there is a notable trend in Western societies moving toward a more <a href="http://theconversation.com/vegetarian-diets-and-health-the-voice-of-science-needs-to-be-heard-87222">plant-based diet</a>. </p>
<p>Still, the moral acceptability of the consumption of plant products is once again based on the concept that plants would be inferior organisms compared to animals, but is that really biologically true? In reality the answer is extremely cruel for the animal world overall and mankind in particular. On a genomic standpoint, a key figure is the number of genes programmed by a given genome. We know now that the human genome codes for roughly 23,000 genes, yet the first plant sequenced, <em>Arabidopsis thaliana</em>, a weed of no agronomical interest and with a very stunt stature, has 27,000 genes. Amazingly, a tree like poplar contains nearly 40,000 genes, nearly twice the content of the human genome. This is a first humiliation, but it does not stop there.</p>
<p>The genes of eukaryotic terrestrial plants are incredibly close in their sequence and organisation to those of their animal homologues, and the proteins derived from these genes are also extremely similar. Plants are also autotrophs for carbon nitrogen and sulphur and they exhibit a growth plasticity that cannot be matched by animal systems, explaining in part the increase in gene number. These are only two examples illustrating the superiority of plants to animals when it comes to metabolic and functional aspects.</p>
<h2>Speaking of plants</h2>
<p>Some might say that, even if this is all true, plants have no sensitivity and do not communicate. This also is wrong: Plants do in fact communicate with one another as well as with their environment. For example, when a plant is attacked by a pathogen (fungi, viruses, herbivores) it releases volatile compounds (gases such as terpenes or ethylene) that signal to the plant next door that an attack is underway and allows them to turn on their defence mechanisms. Another example is that plants emit compounds that enable them to recruit pollinators (bees, etc.) needed for their reproduction. We are certainly only in the infancy of deciphering the communication of plants with other biological species.</p>
<p>These biological considerations lead to the following concept: although plants appear extremely different from us, in reality they are much closer than what we think and they are in no way inferior beings. It follows that when you feed exclusively on plants, you kill life as much as you do by using animal food. This is actually recognized in variants of Hindi philosophy that recommend their followers to eat only parts of the plants that allow it to not die in the process, such as fruits and grains. Fortunately, plants have an excellent the capacity to regenerate themselves… </p>
<p>From a biological point of view, it is neither more ethical nor more moral to feed on plants than on animals – in both cases we have to destroy lives to construct our own. Sadly, in terms of nutrition the law that often prevails is that the strongest wins, but that is also the way we survive and for that we have to pay a moral price. One superiority of mankind is that we are possibly the only ones able to grasp that, but it’s also our major weakness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93012/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Pierre Jacquot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Humans have long been trying differentiate themselves from the rest of the biological world. Is it because we're superior, or just insecure?Jean-Pierre Jacquot, Professeur, Biologie et Biochimie végétales, IUF, Université de LorraineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916572018-03-21T23:42:29Z2018-03-21T23:42:29ZEmbracing multicultural voices can lead to a more democratic future<p><em>This is the seventh and final article in a series in which philosophers discuss the greatest moral challenge of our time, and how we should address it. Read part one <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-greatest-moral-challenge-of-our-time-its-how-we-think-about-morality-itself-92101">here</a>, part two <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-for-truth-in-the-facebook-age-seek-out-views-you-arent-going-to-like-91659">here</a>, part three <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-become-global-citizens-to-rebuild-trust-in-our-globalised-world-91660">here</a>, part four <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-shoot-the-messenger-when-confronted-with-inconvenient-ideas-91661">here</a>, part five <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-must-develop-techno-wisdom-to-prevent-technology-from-consuming-us-91656">here</a>, and part six <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-rethink-our-moral-obligations-to-create-a-better-world-93286">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>One of the great moral challenges of our time is the rising tide of inequality in liberal democracies around the world. This includes Australia, where both <a href="http://www.imf.org/en/publications/fm/issues/2017/10/05/fiscal-monitor-october-2017">income and wealth inequality are increasing</a>, especially the latter.</p>
<p>There are arguments about the rise of China and other authoritarian regimes threatening the viability of liberal democracy. But a deeper problem is the persistent inability of liberal democracies to live up to their own moral promise. That promise is one anchored deeply in the fundamental equality and freedom of their citizens.</p>
<p>It’s not that liberal democracy is going to collapse anytime soon. But there are deep fissures emerging that constitute a fundamental moral challenge to its flourishing.</p>
<p>In many ways, this has been a contested feature of liberal democracy from its inception. Indeed, it embodies, at its heart, a philosophical quandary that was articulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract back in 1762: how is it possible to reconcile freedom and equality with power?</p>
<h2>Are we asking too much of liberal democracy?</h2>
<p>Many contemporary political scientists argue that we shouldn’t confuse liberal democracy with social justice. At best, it offers a peaceful means for the transfer of political authority, converting real stones into the “paper stones” of ballots.</p>
<p>This kind of minimalist democracy might be the most we can hope for. However, I believe liberal democracy, in any meaningful sense of the term, will not survive in the long run if it doesn’t embody a commitment to its citizens’ basic equality. And this is increasingly under threat today, from at least two directions.</p>
<p>First, income and wealth inequality remain stubbornly entrenched. Second, deep social and cultural change is transforming liberal democratic politics.</p>
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<p>Previously dominant groups, such as white, working class men, are being challenged. And their values are being overtaken by the rise of alternative values, often linked to claims for racial and gender equality, multiculturalism and human rights. </p>
<p>It is a complicated story, as <a href="https://www.vox.com/conversations/2017/3/27/15037232/trump-populist-appeal-culture-economy">Pippa Norris</a> has demonstrated. But one consequence of these changes is that the conditions required for achieving equality are now also changing. Nowhere is this truer than at the complex intersection of history, race, gender and economic inequality.</p>
<h2>Identity and democracy</h2>
<p>The particular moral challenge facing liberal democracy that should worry us most, then, is the intersection between inequality, history and the drivers of these shifting values.</p>
<p>We need to be careful not to misdiagnose the challenge. Many commentators are laying the blame for the disenchantment with liberal democracy at the feet of “identity politics”. I think this is a mistake, but it is a mistake worth unpacking.</p>
<p>The thesis that liberal democracy is being undone by identify politics is perhaps best exemplified by Mark Lilla’s bracing <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/9780062697431/the-once-and-future-liberal">The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics</a>. It can also be found, to differing extents, in Edward Luce’s <a href="https://www.hachette.com.au/edward-luce/the-retreat-of-western-liberalism">The Retreat of Western Liberalism</a> and Amy Chua’s <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/535371/political-tribes-by-amy-chua/9780399562853">Political Tribes</a>.</p>
<p>The basic argument of these books is that the rise of multiculturalism and the clamour for “recognition” by minority groups is undermining the social solidarity required for the realisation of social justice, and consequently the very idea of liberal democracy itself.</p>
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<p>I think these claims are deeply misguided. On one level, they are correct: there are deep divisions within our communities that need to be addressed. And social solidarity is indeed a vital component for the sustainability of the kind of social democratic welfare state many liberals support.</p>
<p>But multiculturalism and the rise of movements such as <a href="https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/">Black Lives Matter</a> in the United States, and initiatives such as the <a href="https://www.referendumcouncil.org.au/final-report#toc-anchor-ulurustatement-from-the-heart">Uluru Statement from the Heart</a> in Australia, are an expression of a vibrant, democratic equality, not a repudiation of it.</p>
<p>These movements have emerged precisely at the intersection of both identity claims and persistent structural inequalities that liberalism has failed to address. More importantly, they prefigure a possible future for liberal democracy.</p>
<h2>Imagining the future of liberal democracy</h2>
<p>Consider the recent Uluru Statement, which includes two crucial components. First, it is a clear call to acknowledge a history of dispossession and injustice in a truthful way, from the heart. But at the same time it also contains an offer for what could be an innovative way to address the legacies of those injustices.</p>
<p>Breaking free from many of the stagnant moves in Australia’s national debate centred around reconciliation and token gestures of recognition, the Uluru Statement calls for a “First Nations voice” to be enshrined in the Constitution, as well as “Makarrata”, an agreement making process to re-establish political relations on more just terms.</p>
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<p>This is a generous and deeply democratic proposal. A call framed in action, in movement towards change, rather than a reiteration of tired platitudes. It seeks to address, simultaneously, both the deep structural inequalities that Indigenous people face, but also calls for a democratic voice and political engagement, not withdrawal.</p>
<p>Can it create a genuine common ground for new forms of social solidarity across Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities? Much will depend on the ability of our liberal democratic institutions to respond to these new possibilities.</p>
<p>Social and economic inequality is a serious threat to the sustainability of liberal democracy. It cannot be addressed by declaring that identity claims are democratically suspect. Nor will inequality be overcome without grasping the complex overlay between history, culture and economic disadvantage that exists in so many communities today.</p>
<p>It turns out that there are genuine possibilities for change prefigured in some of the most vital political movements of our time. The real challenge is whether we have the vision and capacity to grasp the opportunities already before us.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Duncan Ivison receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>Social and economic inequality is a serious threat to the sustainability of liberal democracy. It cannot be addressed by declaring that identity claims are democratically suspect.Duncan Ivison, Professor of Political Philosophy, Deputy Vice Chancellor (Research), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/932862018-03-20T00:48:00Z2018-03-20T00:48:00ZWe need to rethink our moral obligations to create a better world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210966/original/file-20180319-104694-1pu0a7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Large-scale adoption of a plant-based diet could have a great impact on climate change mitigation and anti-microbial efficacy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/organic-fruit-vegetables-sale-local-market-1048582124">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is the sixth article in a series in which philosophers discuss the greatest moral challenge of our time, and how we should address it. Read part one <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-greatest-moral-challenge-of-our-time-its-how-we-think-about-morality-itself-92101">here</a>, part two <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-for-truth-in-the-facebook-age-seek-out-views-you-arent-going-to-like-91659">here</a>, part three <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-become-global-citizens-to-rebuild-trust-in-our-globalised-world-91660">here</a>, part four <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-shoot-the-messenger-when-confronted-with-inconvenient-ideas-91661">here</a>, and part five <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-must-develop-techno-wisdom-to-prevent-technology-from-consuming-us-91656">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Our collective overuse and misuse of antibiotics is accelerating resistance to these universal drugs, leaving people increasingly vulnerable to infections that can no longer be treated. This applies not only to the use of antibiotics in human medicine, but also in animal industries. </p>
<p>Antibiotic resistance is an example of a collective action problem. These are problems where what is individually rational leads to a collectively undesirable outcome. Small things that many of us do, often on a daily basis, can have disastrous consequences in aggregate. The most challenging problems humanity is facing are in one way or another collective action problems. </p>
<p>The list of global collective action problems is long: plastic pollution of our oceans and waterways; the heightened concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere leading to global warming; and the consumption of meat, the production of which is tied to environmental degradation.</p>
<h2>The importance of individual action</h2>
<p>What problems such as these have in common is that they cannot be resolved by any political actor on their own. We need global, coordinated policy responses to address these issues with any measure of success. Political actors – states, international organisations, or alliances of states – need to cooperate.</p>
<p>But should we leave it to policy makers and our political representatives to address these questions? I believe that in doing so we would violate important moral obligations as individuals.</p>
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<p>Apart from coordinated policy responses, aggregate individual actions can actually have a significant positive impact on alleviating problems of collective action (even if they will not resolve them).</p>
<p>Let’s take the example of antibiotic resistance. The World Health Organization has identified a <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/antibiotic-resistance/en/">number of actions</a> each of us can take to help reduce the spread of resistance. These include limiting the medical use of antibiotics (where that is a safe option), reducing the consumption of food produced using antibiotics, and preventing infections through improved hygiene.</p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7541">climate researchers</a> have identified individual actions that will have the greatest impact on climate change mitigation, provided enough people join in. These include having one fewer child, living car-free, avoiding air travel and shifting to a plant-based diet. If enough of us take such actions we can collectively limit global warming to a maximum of 2℃, thereby achieving something that global political actors have failed to achieve.</p>
<h2>The paradox of collective action</h2>
<p>The paradox of collective action is that while none of us can individually make a difference to the overall outcome, together we can. And while no individual’s failure to act will undermine the success of the collective effort, if too many people continue with business as usual we will not make a change for the better.</p>
<p>So why change your behaviour if it doesn’t make much difference for better or worse? Understanding how we might have obligations for collective problems will mean we need to rethink some of our common assumptions and intuitively held views about morality.</p>
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<p>This, in fact, is something moral philosophers have been grappling with for several decades. The late Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit thought that so-called “common-sense morality” would often lead us to make mistakes in our “<a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085-chapter-3">moral mathematics</a>”. We tend to neglect the moral import of small (often imperceptible) contributions to large-scale problems (or benefits, for that matter). This is an empirical claim, but it also applies to moral theorising.</p>
<p>One of the conceptual obstacles to rethinking our moral mathematics is the view that if an action of mine does not make a perceptible difference to an outcome then I cannot be morally required to perform it (or to refrain from performing it). Holding on to such a principle means to let everyone off the hook for the kind of global collective action problems mentioned above.</p>
<h2>Rethinking our moral obligations</h2>
<p>Here is a way in which we could rethink our moral obligations regarding problems of collective action. We could think of our individual obligations as deriving from the collectively optimal response to these problems and understand our responsibility to address them as shared, rather than individual.</p>
<p>Moral obligations or responsibilities, on this view, have different sources. Sometimes, we have obligations to perform certain actions or to produce certain outcomes because we can make a difference for the better. At other times, the source of our obligation may not reside in the effect of our actions or omissions, but in how these relate to a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13164-011-0058-z">collective pattern of action</a> that we perceive as morally right.</p>
<p>We might think that closing the emissions gap or slowing down antibiotic resistance by reducing our carbon or anti-microbial footprint is the best collective pattern of action available to us (beyond government action). Consequently, our obligations to change our behaviour can be seen as deriving their moral force from the fact that they form part of that pattern.</p>
<p>So reducing our carbon footprint or reducing our anti-microbial footprint are actions that are constitutive of our collectively doing the right thing. Another way of putting this is to say that individual moral responsibility (remedial, in this case) need not be tied to individual causal impact, but may derive from our collective responsibility and our joint difference-making ability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93286/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Schwenkenbecher has received funding from the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.</span></em></p>Individually rational actions can lead to collectively undesirable outcomes. Rethinking our individual moral obligations as forming part of a collective pattern of action can lead to positive change.Anne Schwenkenbecher, Lecturer in Philosophy, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916562018-03-18T23:25:35Z2018-03-18T23:25:35ZWe must develop 'techno-wisdom' to prevent technology from consuming us<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210213/original/file-20180314-131598-m1omvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Modern surveillance cameras can use artificial intelligence to identify targets.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/modern-motorized-surveillance-camera-double-wide-1024579366">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is the fifth article in a series in which philosophers discuss the greatest moral challenge of our time, and how we should address it. Read part one <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-greatest-moral-challenge-of-our-time-its-how-we-think-about-morality-itself-92101">here</a>, part two <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-for-truth-in-the-facebook-age-seek-out-views-you-arent-going-to-like-91659">here</a>, part three <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-become-global-citizens-to-rebuild-trust-in-our-globalised-world-91660">here</a>, and part four <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-shoot-the-messenger-when-confronted-with-inconvenient-ideas-91661">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>My first real awareness of our psychological attitudes to technology came from an unusual source: the British comedian Eddie Izzard. Izzard describes two diametrically opposed attitudes to technology: techo-fear and techno-joy. </p>
<p>Those with techno-fear are hesitant, blundering and worry that technology will cause the end of the world. Those with techno-joy are blindly optimistic about what technology can do. Izzard <a href="https://youtu.be/C9I_xhaDyxs">explains</a> his own techno-joy:</p>
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<p>When I get a new machine I think, “Yes! This machine will save my life, I’ll never work again!” … And the first thing you do if you’ve got techno-joy is you get the instructions and throw them out the window!</p>
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<p>One of the great moral challenges of our time will be to find something between the categories of techo-joy and techno-fear. We need to find something resembling “techno-wisdom” (though I doubt it would make for good comedy). </p>
<p>It’s going to take a lot of people working together to map out exactly what this techno-wisdom looks like. Happily, lots of different academics and organisations have been working on versions of this for a while.</p>
<h2>Argumentative themes</h2>
<p>Most arguments about technology centre around three distinct themes:</p>
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<li><p>technology overcomes: technology will either save the world by overcoming our greatest challenges or it will overcome us. An example is the debate around <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-16030">lethal autonomous weapons systems</a></p></li>
<li><p>technology influences: technology will either free us up to focus on what matters or it will distract us from what matters. Negative examples appear in just about every episode of the television series <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2085059/">Black Mirror</a>. More optimistic versions can be found in the debate over “<a href="http://www.ethics.org.au/on-ethics/blog/october-2016/whose-decision-the-ethics-of-being-nudged">ethical nudging</a>”.</p></li>
<li><p>technology amplifies: with technology we’ll either be able to do great things quickly, efficiently and at scale or we’ll be able to do horrible things in the same fashion.</p></li>
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<p>The parameters of the debate are set and nobody seems to be budging in their opinions. But this impasse itself generates ethical challenges. The opportunities are too great to ignore technology, but the risks are too high to allow it to proceed unrestrained. </p>
<h2>Understanding technology is vital</h2>
<p>In Izzard’s comedy, ignorance and ineptitude drive those who fear technology. Interestingly though, he paints those with techno-joy in much the same way. Neither understands technology. This is where our techno-wisdom should begin: understanding what technology is and how it works. </p>
<p>Philosophers of technology such as <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/">Martin Heidegger</a>, <a href="https://ellul.org/life/biography/">Jacques Ellul</a> and <a href="http://hs.umt.edu/philosophy/People/faculty.php?s=Borgmann">Albert Borgmann</a> have argued that technology reflects a distinctive way of seeing the world around us. It tends to reduce the world to a series of technical problems to solve and an assortment of things to use, measure, store and control.</p>
<p>On this understanding, technology isn’t value-neutral. It encourages us to seek control, values efficiency and effectiveness over other considerations, and reduces everything to a unit of measurement.</p>
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<a href="http://theconversation.com/we-need-to-become-global-citizens-to-rebuild-trust-in-our-globalised-world-91660">We need to become global citizens to rebuild trust in our globalised world</a>
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<p>There are countless examples to prove this point. Online technology is challenging traditional journalistic values in favour of speed and reach. Dating apps commodify our potential romantic partners and try to free dating from the perils of rejection or unwanted advances. Computer-generated porn allows you to make your favourite celebrity crush do whatever you want. She doesn’t have to consent. She doesn’t even have to know. </p>
<p>If this is the values system behind technology, are we comfortable with it, even if it does make life incredibly convenient? If not, what should we do about it?</p>
<h2>Focus on means</h2>
<p>Despite being polar opposites, techno-fear and techno-joy have a common ethical thread: a focus on outcomes. Each side agrees that ethical technology must lead to positive change in the world (or at least, not create more problems). They disagree about whether technology will end up being a force for good or ill.</p>
<p>However, focusing on outcomes blinds us to another dimension of technological ethics: the means by which those outcomes are achieved. </p>
<p>Many people are thinking about technological processes and their ethical implications, but often they’re focusing on them because they’ve brought about bad outcomes. The discussion becomes another battlefield on which to have a debate about outcomes.</p>
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<a href="http://theconversation.com/dont-shoot-the-messenger-when-confronted-with-inconvenient-ideas-91661">Don't shoot the messenger when confronted with inconvenient ideas</a>
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<p>For instance, debate about COMPAS – the data sentencing algorithm that was the subject of a widely-read <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing">Pro Publica investigation</a> – focused on the fact that it tended to produce racially-loaded outcomes. That’s important. But it’s also important to understand how COMPAS worked, even if the outcomes weren’t so evidently problematic. </p>
<p>Let’s imagine we knew an algorithm like COMPAS was 100% effective at predicting an offender’s likelihood of re-offending. Let’s also imagine that the reason it was so accurate was because its data set was so comprehensive. It included every piece of private communication an offender had produced in the past ten years. Every text message, Facebook post, email, phone call, webpage view – all of it. This data enabled a crystal-clear psychological profile of the offender and incredibly precise predictions of re-offending.</p>
<p>There would still be reason to object to this technology, not because it achieved awful results, but because it achieved good results in a way that undermined our commonly-held principles around privacy and civil liberty. That’s where an exclusively outcome-driven philosophy becomes a real problem. </p>
<h2>Humans first</h2>
<p>Technology is likely to be part of the solution to most of our great moral challenges. But not alone. One of technology’s functions is to amplify human activity. This means humans need to get their own house in order before tech can be helpful. </p>
<p>We also need to get the technological process right. We need to change our standard of what counts as “excellent” technology away from the logic of speed, effectiveness and control. If we don’t, technology is likely to become our next great moral challenge. More worrying, by then we may have ceded too much power to the machines to be able to do anything about it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Beard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Technology isn't value-neutral. Unless we understand the ethical assumptions behind our technology, we can't trust the solutions it offers.Matthew Beard, Associate Lecturer, University of Notre Dame AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916612018-03-14T23:02:21Z2018-03-14T23:02:21ZDon't shoot the messenger when confronted with inconvenient ideas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209427/original/file-20180308-146700-2dz38i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Al Gore&#39;s climate change advocacy was rejected out of hand by his political opponents.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/pittsburgh-pennsylvania-usa-october-17-2017-750320158?src=LdrxS7fknwincPWGx_bgiA-1-8">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is the fourth article in a series in which philosophers discuss the greatest moral challenge of our time, and how we should address it. Read part one <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-greatest-moral-challenge-of-our-time-its-how-we-think-about-morality-itself-92101">here</a>, part two <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-for-truth-in-the-facebook-age-seek-out-views-you-arent-going-to-like-91659">here</a> and part three <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-become-global-citizens-to-rebuild-trust-in-our-globalised-world-91660">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>In August 2017, James Damore, a Google software engineer, was fired for writing <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/355823379/Google-s-Ideological-Echo-Chamber">an internal memo</a> that offered views about sex-related differences in interests and emotions. </p>
<p>Damore had suggested that part of the over-representation of men in software engineering at Google might be due to psychological differences between women and men: not intellectual differences, but differences in what activities the sexes find attractive and enjoyable. He argued that Google should focus on equality of opportunity for individuals, without necessarily expecting equality of outcomes across its workforce.</p>
<p>Damore’s firing from Google was an example of an increasing intolerance of inconvenient or controversial ideas within democratic societies. Here, then, is one great moral challenge of our time. Once an issue becomes politically toxic, we may reject inconvenient viewpoints out of hand. We may reject opponents – viewing them as ill-disposed people – without listening to them, and we may even try to punish them for their views.</p>
<h2>The memo</h2>
<p>Damore’s memo cited a body of mainstream, though often controversial, scientific research. The research suggests that women tend, compared to men, to be more willing to please others, more anxious and susceptible to stress, more oriented to feelings and people (rather than to solving and using impersonal, rule-bound systems), and more attracted to life balance (rather than status).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/looking-for-truth-in-the-facebook-age-seek-out-views-you-arent-going-to-like-91659">Looking for truth in the Facebook age? Seek out views you aren't going to 'like'</a>
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<p>Damore explained that these are statistical differences, discernible at the level of populations, and that there is a large overlap in the distribution curves for the respective sexes. For example, many individual men might be more oriented to feelings and people than most women. Thus, he emphasised, these findings should not be used to stereotype or prejudge individuals.</p>
<p>Social psychologists Sean Stevens and Jonathan Haidt have since attempted an <a href="https://heterodoxacademy.org/the-google-memo-what-does-the-research-say-about-gender-differences/">assessment of Damore’s specific claims</a>.</p>
<p>Though Damore expressed his ideas thoughtfully and mildly, his memo is often referred to online as a rant or a tirade. Its tone is unemotional, but it evidently stirred passions in others. After the memo was publicly leaked, Damore was shamed on social media platforms, then promptly fired. Throughout these events, his opponents blatantly demonised and misrepresented him.</p>
<h2>A compassionate, feminist response</h2>
<p>In the aftermath, the high profile psychologist and feminist author Cordelia Fine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/16/james-damore-google-memo-interview-autism-regrets">made some remarks worth taking to heart</a>. Fine has long been a critic of research into sex differences in cognition and emotions. She regards many claims based on this research as <a href="http://books.wwnorton.com/books/978-0-393-35548-2/">scientifically doubtful and socially troublesome</a>, insofar as they can be used to undermine activism for gender equality.</p>
<p>Though she criticised Damore’s knowledge and reasoning, Fine also stated that his summary of the extant research was “more accurate and nuanced than what you sometimes find in the popular literature” and, indeed, that some of his ideas were not especially controversial.</p>
<p>Fine added: </p>
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<p>So there was something quite extraordinary about someone losing their job for putting forward a view that is part of the scientific debate. And then to be so publicly shamed as well. I felt pretty sorry for him.</p>
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<p>This shows a level of human decency that is often missing from public debate. Fine expressed compassion for an intellectual opponent who was poorly treated.</p>
<h2>Moral challenge</h2>
<p>We can all be tempted to reject inconvenient ideas, whether or not they turn out to be truths. So we face an urgent moral challenge to overcome this tendency and address ideas on their merits rather than how well they accord with our pre-existing beliefs.</p>
<p>The stakes are high. There is plenty of evidence that our tendency to dismiss ideas with potentially unsettling implications for our worldview is hampering our ability to deal with pressing issues, like climate change.</p>
<p>In their 2016 book, <a href="https://www.oup.com.au/books/others/9780190626600-asymmetric-politics">Asymmetric Politics</a>, Matt Grossman and David A. Hopkins argue that the Republican Party has shown a distrust of the scientific consensus on biological evolution and anthropogenic global warming, but that this is not the consequence of an underlying hostility to science itself. Rather, Republicans tend to reject science where its findings are inconvenient.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/we-need-to-become-global-citizens-to-rebuild-trust-in-our-globalised-world-91660">We need to become global citizens to rebuild trust in our globalised world</a>
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<p>Because they dislike government intervention in economic markets, Republicans baulk at proposed solutions to climate change. They begin here and “work backward” to reject climate science itself.</p>
<p>Often, indeed, the situation is even worse. Once an issue has become intensely politicised, we may interpret others’ views as evidence of their overall ideology, which then sways whether or not we regard them as fundamentally ill-disposed people who are not worth listening to.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1477-x">recent article</a>, Neil Levy presents evidence that this is now the case with global warming. For many American conservatives, acceptance of the scientific consensus has become a marker of untrustworthiness. It’s a cue to stop listening.</p>
<p>Such reactions are not new, nor are they found on only one side of politics. Hostile and dogmatic reactions to ideas can be found across the political spectrum. When combined with <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-shame-of-public-shaming-57584">social media shaming</a>, they can produce cruel outcomes for well-meaning individuals.</p>
<h2>New ideas</h2>
<p>All too often, we automatically dismiss ideas with potentially unsettling implications for our worldviews. We may go further in rejecting, and even attempting to harm, the messenger. </p>
<p>It doesn’t have to be this way, but it has become so common that it frustrates good-faith efforts to discuss and solve the large problems confronting humanity in the 21st century. Such rejection of messages and lashing out at messengers blocks useful discussion across moral and political divides.</p>
<p>To make progress, we will need to reboot our thinking. We need to focus on evidence and arguments, and on ordinary fairness and compassion to others, even when we disagree.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Russell Blackford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Too often, we automatically dismiss ideas with unsettling implications. We need to focus on evidence, and on ordinary fairness and compassion towards others.Russell Blackford, Conjoint Lecturer in Philosophy, University of NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916592018-03-12T23:27:53Z2018-03-12T23:27:53ZLooking for truth in the Facebook age? Seek out views you aren't going to 'like'<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209271/original/file-20180307-146666-1ytixob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Facebook&#39;s algorithm is based on pleasing rather than challenging users.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bangkok-thailand-october-14-2015-man-328031672?src=W5WRNYoz1elIwriNydDxSQ-1-16">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is the second article in a series in which philosophers discuss the greatest moral challenge of our time, and how we should address it. Read the first article <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-greatest-moral-challenge-of-our-time-its-how-we-think-about-morality-itself-92101">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>“Post-truth” was the Oxford English Dictionary “<a href="https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016">word of the year</a>” for 2016. As we move into 2018, let’s hope the hype surrounding this term gives way to more measured assessments. The term has all the uses and disadvantages of the hyperbole it represents.</p>
<p>On one hand, it draws attention to the profound challenges facing today’s news media and liberal democracies. On the other, it makes it seem like we have entered into a new dystopian world where politicians no longer want or need to tell the truth, and the media is so awash with “fake news” that citizens cannot trust it.</p>
<p>Yet this won’t do. It is easy to imagine that Australia’s former Deputy Prime Minister, Barnaby Joyce, wishes that the media no longer had the will or wherewithal to report the truth. When Steve Bannon called the mainstream media the new “<a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/donald-trump-steve-bannon-media-opposition-party-234280">opposition party</a>”, it is clear that he <em>wanted</em> it to be true.</p>
<p>Yet CNN, the Washington Post and the New York Times are still trading. It is Bannon who has fallen from power. In Australia, too, media outlets continue to express biases and all the shortcomings that beset the mortal frame. Yet trying and failing to tell the whole truth, and nothing but, is a very different thing from disregarding truth altogether.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="http://theconversation.com/the-greatest-moral-challenge-of-our-time-its-how-we-think-about-morality-itself-92101">The greatest moral challenge of our time? It's how we think about morality itself</a>
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<p>Traditional news services now face <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet-socialmedia/two-thirds-of-american-adults-get-news-from-social-media-survey-idUSKCN1BJ2A8">unprecedented competition</a> in the age of the internet and social media. The need to attract large numbers of clicks favours sensationalism over serious research and partisanship over patient reportage.</p>
<p>Yet none of this makes truth-telling impossible. That is a claim which favours people who want to truck in half-truths and misrepresentations, and excuse themselves by saying that everyone else does it. Trump is a big fan of throwing around the term “fake news”. So is Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Nor do such challenges remove the vital role of truth-telling in sustaining open societies. On the contrary, citizens need to be able to “<a href="https://www.theage.com.au/news/national/democrat-who-worked-to-keep-the-bastards-honest/2006/08/29/1156816899990.html">keep the bastards honest</a>” more than ever, especially when they take to donning saviour’s clothing. Speaking truth to power is the great moral challenge of our time.</p>
<h2>What’s Francis Bacon to Facebook?</h2>
<p>At the beginning of modern scientific culture, philosopher <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/">Francis Bacon</a> made a series of observations about how our minds work. They remain as relevant as ever in this apparent age of post-truth. For example:</p>
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<p>The human mind resembles those uneven mirrors which impart their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted that distort and disfigure the truth.</p>
<p>When any proposition has been once laid down (our mind) forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation.“ </p>
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<p>By contrast, we have a tough time accepting anything we don’t, well, "like”:</p>
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<p>and although the most cogent and abundant evidences may exist to the contrary, yet we either do not observe or despise them, … sometimes with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of our own first conclusions. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209272/original/file-20180307-146675-pgpwkh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209272/original/file-20180307-146675-pgpwkh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=748&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209272/original/file-20180307-146675-pgpwkh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=748&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209272/original/file-20180307-146675-pgpwkh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=748&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209272/original/file-20180307-146675-pgpwkh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=940&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209272/original/file-20180307-146675-pgpwkh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=940&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209272/original/file-20180307-146675-pgpwkh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=940&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Francis Bacon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Francis_Bacon,_Viscount_St_Alban_from_NPG_(2).jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>In short: “people always believe more readily that which they prefer to be true”, rather than what happens to be true.</p>
<p>When it comes to prescribing his “new instrument” for inquiry, Bacon coaches his readers in how and where to actively seek out things that elude, challenge, upset or reframe their established beliefs.</p>
<p>So you can see what Francis Bacon is to Facebook. </p>
<p>Facebook generates your feed based on your past likes. Its business model figures you’ll be more likely to stay on the platform by being fed items that please rather than oppose or challenge you.</p>
<p>In other words, social media weaponises the “<a href="http://www.sirbacon.org/links/4idols.htm">idols of the human mind</a>”, which Bacon said prevent people from finding the truth. A Baconian Facebook would select your news items based on what you are likely to disagree with rather than playing to your prejudices. </p>
<p>Liberals and leftists would be made to “friend” devoted readers of Breitbart. They in turn would be fed the New York Times and the Washington Post. And perhaps the accelerating <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/17/our-politics-is-polarized-on-more-issues-than-ever-before/">uncivil polarisation</a> of public life would actually slow. </p>
<h2>What’s Spinoza to sharing?</h2>
<p>Shortly after Bacon, another modern giant, <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/spinoza">Benedict de Spinoza</a>, also distinguished the ways we follow the prejudices and “likes” of our tribes from how he believed people should seek the truth.</p>
<p>We are social creatures, Spinoza observed. His <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/#Ethi">Ethics</a> deftly analyses the way our emotions and opinions “love company”. We very often do or believe things simply because others around us do. Moreover, “everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates”. </p>
<p>Share that.</p>
<p>Indeed, fuelled by this echoing and mirroring of our passionate beliefs, we readily jump to generalisations about whole groups, based only on whether we like or dislike some individuals:</p>
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<p>If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause … the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.</p>
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<p>Today’s social media feeds upon these characteristics, fuelling tribalism and incivility. But Spinoza agrees with Bacon that the only way to halt the hatred is to cultivate people’s awareness of their own tendencies to select, simplify and screen information.</p>
<p>We are not post-truth. But it is up to citizens to be alert to lies and distortions. And it’s up to our educational institutions to keep alive the many resources in our tradition which can prevent hyperbole from becoming fact.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91659/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sharpe works at Deakin University, and in 2017, received ARC (Centre for Excellence in the History of Emotions) money for research on Francis Bacon and the Emotions.</span></em></p>We are not yet "post-truth", but truth-telling remains vital in sustaining open and democratic societies.Matthew Sharpe, Associate Professor in Philosophy, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.