At approximately 9:50 a.m., on Sunday, August 6, 1995, a fatal
electrical accident occurred at the No. 1 Longwall Section in the
No. 4 Mine of Jim Walter Resources, Incorporated.

Hilburn Hulsey, Maintenance Foreman, was electrocuted when he was
attempting repairs and came in contact with energized parts inside
a Miller Dialarc welding machine. The accident and subsequent
fatality occurred as a direct result of the failure to deenergize
the power circuit and lock out and tag disconnecting device(s) when
performing electrical work on the equipment.

GENERAL INFORMATION

The No. 4 Mine, Jim Walter Resources, Incorporated, is located in
Brookwood, Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. This is a shaft mine
approximately 2,000 feet in depth which liberates an average of
approximately 20,000,000 cubic feet of methane gas in a 24-hour
period. This mine employs 554 miners and has an average daily
production of 9,307 clean tons of coal. The mine operates three
shifts per day, five to six days per week. The continuous mining
machine sections are used for development of main air courses and
longwall gate entries. The continuous miner sections develop a
maximum of six entries and use various size pillars to control
strata subsidence and floor heave. The last MSHA regular health
and safety inspection was completed on June 29, 1995 and an MSHA
health and safety inspection which began on July 5, 1995 was in
progress at the time of the accident. Company officials are listed
below.

William Carr................................President
K. J. Matlock..............................Vice President
James M. Sims............................Vice President
W. H. Weldon.............................Treasurer
John F. Turbiville..........................Secretary

The crew arrived on the section at approximately 7:40 a.m. Hulsey
and Lange divided the work crews into pairs. Lange accompanied
Sloan and Douglas down the longwall face to repair hydraulic return
valves on shield No. 53.

Hulsey accompanied Naramore and Blankenship to weld metal straps
across the return idler sprocket at the headgate on the longwall
face. The owl shift crew had informed Hulsey that the welding
leads had been pulled apart while transporting them to the
headgate.

The welding machine was located 317 feet outby the face line of the
longwall in the No. 3 intake entry in the crosscut to the right of
survey spad No. 13337. The No. 2 cable welding leads were 457 feet
each in length.

Hulsey instructed Naramore to examine the welding leads and to make
the necessary repairs. Naramore found two locations where the
leads were separated. He then twisted the leads together and taped
them. Blankenship was sent to find metal straps to weld across the
return idler sprocket at the headgate. Naramore and Blankenship
met back at the headgate to begin the welding operation.

When Naramore began welding, he only got a "cold arc." A "cold
arc" is one in which the power provided was insufficient to create
enough heat with which to weld with the rod being used. Naramore
informed Blankenship who then informed Hulsey, who was located
outby at the welding machine to turn the machine up. Naramore
attempted to weld again and got a "cold arc" the second time.

Blankenship, classified as an inside laborer, also retains an
electrical qualification. According to statements obtained during
interviews, Blankenship asked Hulsey to insure that the welder
control was set on the high or maximum amperage setting. Hulsey
informed him that it was. Naramore went to the welding machine to
examine the reset button. However, this particular welding machine
was not equipped with one. Naramore also found that the amperage
control indicator knob was missing and a loose lug nut had been
previously installed on the adjustment shaft of the rheostat
control.

Naramore removed the lug nut and turned it twice with his pliers to
make sure it was on the maximum amperage setting. When Naramore
returned to the headgate, he was still getting a "cold arc."
Naramore suggested to Hulsey that the rheostat was inoperative.
Blankenship and Hulsey went to the welding machine while Naramore
re-examined the welding leads for damage.

Hulsey instructed Blankenship to remove the top cover of the
welding machine to permit access to the rheostat. Blankenship
switched the welding machine off and, with the unit still energized
by the power source, removed the bolts from the top cover and slid
it back. Naramore alternately turned the rheostat selector shaft
up and down still checking it's operation. Hulsey was on his knees
on the damp mine floor with his left hand on the metal post of the
welding sled, observing the rheostat. Hulsey then stated that he
thought the rheostat was working and asked for a can of lubricant.
According to his statement, Blankenship pointed at the welding
machine and informed Hulsey that the unit was still energized.

Naramore, an eyewitness to the accident, stated that he immediately
came to the victim's aid and separated Hulsey from the electrical
current using his foot.

Naramore remained with Hulsey and began CPR while Blankenship
called to the surface dispatcher for an ambulance and for Lange's
crew from the longwall face to assist them. Hulsey was placed onto
a stretcher and CPR continued as they transported him to the
surface where Lifesaver Helicopter awaited his arrival. The mine
notified Ron Vass, Federal Coal Mine Inspector, via telephone at
approximately 10:20 a.m. Vass notified Ken Ely, Acting Subdistrict
Manager of the accident at approximately 10:30 a.m. and the
investigation was begun at 12:30 p.m.

PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT

At the time of the investigation, the established lock-out
system for the disconnecting devices at the No. 1 Longwall
Section power center was not being maintained in working
order. The metal lock box was damaged and could not be
locked as originally designed. There were holes drilled in
the cable plugs' fork-keyed cock, but the shaft on the locks
provided, were larger than the holes in the plugs.

Statements obtained during interviews indicated that the
welder was energized and not locked out and tagged while work
was being performed. Further statements revealed that other
work had been performed previously on energized equipment
without the equipment being locked-out and tagged, indicating
an unsafe work practice.

Both Hulsey and Blankenship were qualified electricians.

The welding leads on the welding machine, S/N HK317619, did
not meet the manufacturer's recommendations in relation to
length and size. The manufacturer recommends that when a No.
2 cable is used, the length should not exceed 50 feet each for
a total of 100 feet of cable. The welding machine being used
was supplied with 457 feet of cable for each lead for a total
length of 914 feet. This is a recommendation made by the
manufacturer and is not a violation of the Federal
Regulations.

Overcurrent protection was not provided for the 575 Volt AC
Miller Dialarc welding machine, S/N HK317619. A violation was
issued during a separate inspection for this condition as non-
contributory to the accident.

The amperage adjustment dial indicator was missing on the 575
Volt AC Miller Dialarc Welding Machine, S/N HK317619. A
violation was issued during a separate inspection for this
condition as non-contributory to the accident.

Investigators observed improper connectors being used to
splice the welding leads in two locations. A violation was
issued during a separate inspection for this condition as non-
contributory to the accident.

Testing conducted at the mine by MSHA's Technical Support on
August 8, 1995, found the maximum current the welding machine
could produce was 110 amperes when the ends of the welding
leads were connected together to create a bolted fault. This
relatively low value of current supports the statement that
only a "cold arc" was possible. The welding leads were
shortened from 457 feet to the manufacturer's recommendations
of 50 feet each for No. 2 welding cable. The fault test was
repeated and a current of 220 amperes was found to be
available from the welding machine. This value is 10 percent
above the 200 ampere rating for this type of machine. By
maintaining the welding lead length at the manufacturer's
recommendation, the voltage drop across the leads remains low
while the current is maximized. This reduces the possibility
of a "cold arc" occurring.

Additional testing conducted on this date found the open
circuit voltage at the dc terminals of the welding machine to
be 120 volts (RMS). According to information obtained from
the manufacturer, the maximum open circuit voltage at the dc
terminals should be 76 volts. Discussions were held with
representatives from the Miller Electric Manufacturing Company
regarding the high open circuit voltage. It was decided to
perform additional testing to determine why the high open
circuit voltage existed at the dc terminals. On October 23,
1995, MSHA's Technical Support and a representative from the
manufacturer were at the mine site to conduct further testing.
A resistor utilized as part of a surge suppressor circuit was
found to be open. When this resistor was replaced, the open
circuit voltage was measured to be 84 volts (RMS). This
voltage was higher than the manufacturer's suggested maximum
of 76 volts. It is possible that an increase in the supply
voltage into the welder caused this higher voltage to appear
on the dc output. This condition was non-contributory to the
accident and was not a violation of the Code of Federal
Regulations.

CONCLUSION

The accident occurred because repair work was performed on the
energized welding machine, a piece of electrical equipment.
It is the consensus of the investigation team that work being
performed on energized electrical equipment without locking and
tagging such equipment directly contributed to the fatality.
The length of cables used was a contributing factor in that they
decreased the power available at the welding site causing doubt as
to the output of the welding unit.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

A 103-K Order No. 3198332 was issued to insure the safety of
all persons in the mine until the investigation was completed.

A 104-D-2 Order No. 3198340, a violation of 30 CFR Section
75.511, was issued as a contributing factor to the fatality.
During the investigation, it was observed on that the
established lock out system for the disconnect device for the
575 Volt AC Miller Dialarc Welding Machine was not used nor
maintained in working order. The metal lock box was damaged
and could not be locked as designed. Further statements
obtained during interviews revealed that work had previously
been performed on energized equipment without locking out and
tagging such equipment, indicating an unsafe work practice at
this mine.

A 104-D-2 Order No. 3021235, violation of 30 CFR Section
75.509, was issued as a contributing factor to the fatality.
Work was being performed on the 575 Volt AC Miller Dialarc
Welding Machine while the equipment was energized.