Tor

Tor is an encrypted anonymising network that makes it harder to intercept internet communications, or see where communications are coming from or going to.

In order to use the WikiLeaks public submission system as detailed above you can download the Tor Browser Bundle, which is a Firefox-like browser available for Windows, Mac OS X and GNU/Linux and pre-configured to connect using the anonymising system Tor.

Tails

If you are at high risk and you have the capacity to do so, you can also access the submission system through a secure operating system called Tails. Tails is an operating system launched from a USB stick or a DVD that aim to leaves no traces when the computer is shut down after use and automatically routes your internet traffic through Tor. Tails will require you to have either a USB stick or a DVD at least 4GB big and a laptop or desktop computer.

Tips

Our submission system works hard to preserve your anonymity, but we recommend you also take some of your own precautions. Please review these basic guidelines.

1. Contact us if you have specific problems

If you have a very large submission, or a submission with a complex format, or are a high-risk source, please contact us. In our experience it is always possible to find a custom solution for even the most seemingly difficult situations.

2. What computer to use

If the computer you are uploading from could subsequently be audited in an investigation, consider using a computer that is not easily tied to you. Technical users can also use Tails to help ensure you do not leave any records of your submission on the computer.

3. Do not talk about your submission to others

If you have any issues talk to WikiLeaks. We are the global experts in source protection – it is a complex field. Even those who mean well often do not have the experience or expertise to advise properly. This includes other media organisations.

After

1. Do not talk about your submission to others

If you have any issues talk to WikiLeaks. We are the global experts in source protection – it is a complex field. Even those who mean well often do not have the experience or expertise to advise properly. This includes other media organisations.

2. Act normal

If you are a high-risk source, avoid saying anything or doing anything after submitting which might promote suspicion. In particular, you should try to stick to your normal routine and behaviour.

3. Remove traces of your submission

If you are a high-risk source and the computer you prepared your submission on, or uploaded it from, could subsequently be audited in an investigation, we recommend that you format and dispose of the computer hard drive and any other storage media you used.

In particular, hard drives retain data after formatting which may be visible to a digital forensics team and flash media (USB sticks, memory cards and SSD drives) retain data even after a secure erasure. If you used flash media to store sensitive data, it is important to destroy the media.

If you do this and are a high-risk source you should make sure there are no traces of the clean-up, since such traces themselves may draw suspicion.

4. If you face legal action

If a legal action is brought against you as a result of your submission, there are organisations that may help you. The Courage Foundation is an international organisation dedicated to the protection of journalistic sources. You can find more details at https://www.couragefound.org.

Submit documents to WikiLeaks

WikiLeaks publishes documents of political or historical importance that are censored or otherwise suppressed. We specialise in strategic global publishing and large archives.

The following is the address of our secure site where you can anonymously upload your documents to WikiLeaks editors. You can only access this submissions system through Tor. (See our Tor tab for more information.) We also advise you to read our tips for sources before submitting.

wlupld3ptjvsgwqw.onion

Copy this address into your Tor browser. Advanced users, if they wish, can also add a further layer of encryption to their submission using our public PGP key.

If you cannot use Tor, or your submission is very large, or you have specific requirements, WikiLeaks provides several alternative methods. Contact us to discuss how to proceed.

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) Summary: In the wake of Qadhafi's "mediation," Ahmed
Ould Daddah and President Abdallahi's FNDD have again been
pushed towards cooperation in denouncing Qadhafi and
renouncing the military strategy for June 6 elections. Ould
Daddah remains fixed in opposition to President Abdallahi's
return but in incrementally more open to a return long enough
to set the stage for a viable transition. Ould Daddah feels
Aziz is stupidly leading Mauritania towards a relation with
Iran that Aziz will be unable to manage. He also fears drug
interests will play upon Aziz' desperation for financial
support. End Summary
2. (C) Charge met March 15 with opposition leader and RFD
party president Ahmed Ould Daddah. Ould Daddah provided
Charge with a copy of the joint RFD / FNDD declaration of
March 14 that had denounced Qadhafi's support for the
military's unilateral election strategy and called for the
international community to again take charge of the political
dossier without Qadhafi as its spokesman. Ould Daddah noted
he had been impressed with Qadhafi's knowledge of the
Mauritanian personalities and state-of-play when he went to
Tripoli but found Qadhafi had little interest in
re-establishing democracy. Qadhafi stroked Ould Daddah's ego
somewhat by telling him, "We know you really won the
elections, but Aziz would have launched the coup
then-and-there had you been declared the winner." Ould
Daddah lamented that Qadhafi had missed a chance to act the
statesman by bargaining away his political support for the
short-term benefit of seeing Israel expelled.
3. (C) Ould Daddah told Charge he will be working in closer
collaboration with the FNDD in opposing the military's
agenda. He is in the process of writing parallel letters to
President Abdallahi's to the international community
leadership seeking a restatement of international
condemnation of the coup over Qadhafi's statements. Ould
Daddah said he would have been open to joint RFD/FNDD letters
but did not think those could clear his own internal party
clearance procedures in time. Ould Daddah stressed the
importance of the international community -- notably the AU,
EU, France and the U.S. to restate their opposition to the
coup and to renounce the regime's June 6 election plan.
4. (C) Charge noted his understanding that the FNDD had
offered to resolve Ould Daddah's strong opposition to
President Abdallahi's return by offering a largely symbolic
return wherein Abdallahi would yield his executive power to a
strong new Prime Minister who would head a government of
national unity including RFD members. Ould Daddah initially
retorted with a "I will never accept Abdallahi's return"
insisting that "Abdallahi is largely responsible for the
coup" in the first place for having accepted military support
in the campaign and allowing the military to manipulate his
presidency. Charge noted that, by making Abdallahi's return
the main issue, Ould Daddah allows the question of the
military's political departure to take second place --
effectively dividing the opposition. Ould Daddah then
relented somewhat (has he did previously in REFTEL) by
allowing he would accept Abdallahi back symbolically if that
was an effective measure to pressure the military -- but
insisting that the return lead immediately into a resignation
in favor of the President Senate. Charge pushed some more
asking if Ould Daddah really wanted the President of the
Senate (a man who has been politically gutted by regime
intimidation) to be responsible for a transition leading to
elections?. If so, with what government -- the current
regime government or the last Abdallahi government? When
pushed on the practicalities of his position, Ould Daddah
clarified that he could see Abdallahi coming back long enough
to establish a strong government of national unity with
reinforced executive authority and then resigning. As such,
the weak President of the Senate could take interim power
but, consistent with the constitution, would be unable to
NOUAKCHOTT 00000204 002 OF 002
alter the last appointed government.
5. (C) While welcoming Israel's departure because of his
views concerning the Palestinian process, Ould Daddah worried
that Aziz had kicked the Israeli Ambassador for less
principled reasons -- to gain Qadhafi's support in the
mediation and to win Iranian financial backing. Terming Aziz
as one of the least intelligent military leaders, Ould Daddah
said Aziz was playing a dangerous game thinking he can manage
those two relationships -- "Qadhafi and the Iranians are a
lot smarter than Aziz and will eventually pull us into a
jamahiriya with Libya and a Shi'ah outpost for Iran." Ould
Daddah said Aziz "will sell anything to stay in power" and
worried that "the same drug traffickers who knocked off the
government in Guinea Bissau will find a willing partner here."
6. (C) Comment: Ould Daddah and the RFD are again working
together, but Ould Daddah's personal animosity against
Abdallahi make the coalition tenuous at best. Ould Daddah is
aware that a transition government authored by President
Abdallahi (versus the military's plan) offers a far greater
chance of free and fair elections Ould Daddah can win but he
still hopes for a "ni - ni" option that allows him to
dispense with both Abdallahi and Aziz. Key FNDD leaders like
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir could probably agree with Ould Daddah
with an arrangement including Abdallahi's resignation once a
credible transition government is in place but the FNDD is
unlikely to put it in writing until Ould Daddah accepts
Abdallahi's return, albeit temporarily.
HANKINS

Raw content

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000204
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, USAU, LY, MR
SUBJECT: OULD DADDAH AND THE FNDD: UNITED AGAINST QADHAFI,
COMMON CAUSE (FOR NOW) AGAINST MILITARY, DIVIDED (AS
ALWAYS) ON ABDALLAHI
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 155
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)
1. (C) Summary: In the wake of Qadhafi's "mediation," Ahmed
Ould Daddah and President Abdallahi's FNDD have again been
pushed towards cooperation in denouncing Qadhafi and
renouncing the military strategy for June 6 elections. Ould
Daddah remains fixed in opposition to President Abdallahi's
return but in incrementally more open to a return long enough
to set the stage for a viable transition. Ould Daddah feels
Aziz is stupidly leading Mauritania towards a relation with
Iran that Aziz will be unable to manage. He also fears drug
interests will play upon Aziz' desperation for financial
support. End Summary
2. (C) Charge met March 15 with opposition leader and RFD
party president Ahmed Ould Daddah. Ould Daddah provided
Charge with a copy of the joint RFD / FNDD declaration of
March 14 that had denounced Qadhafi's support for the
military's unilateral election strategy and called for the
international community to again take charge of the political
dossier without Qadhafi as its spokesman. Ould Daddah noted
he had been impressed with Qadhafi's knowledge of the
Mauritanian personalities and state-of-play when he went to
Tripoli but found Qadhafi had little interest in
re-establishing democracy. Qadhafi stroked Ould Daddah's ego
somewhat by telling him, "We know you really won the
elections, but Aziz would have launched the coup
then-and-there had you been declared the winner." Ould
Daddah lamented that Qadhafi had missed a chance to act the
statesman by bargaining away his political support for the
short-term benefit of seeing Israel expelled.
3. (C) Ould Daddah told Charge he will be working in closer
collaboration with the FNDD in opposing the military's
agenda. He is in the process of writing parallel letters to
President Abdallahi's to the international community
leadership seeking a restatement of international
condemnation of the coup over Qadhafi's statements. Ould
Daddah said he would have been open to joint RFD/FNDD letters
but did not think those could clear his own internal party
clearance procedures in time. Ould Daddah stressed the
importance of the international community -- notably the AU,
EU, France and the U.S. to restate their opposition to the
coup and to renounce the regime's June 6 election plan.
4. (C) Charge noted his understanding that the FNDD had
offered to resolve Ould Daddah's strong opposition to
President Abdallahi's return by offering a largely symbolic
return wherein Abdallahi would yield his executive power to a
strong new Prime Minister who would head a government of
national unity including RFD members. Ould Daddah initially
retorted with a "I will never accept Abdallahi's return"
insisting that "Abdallahi is largely responsible for the
coup" in the first place for having accepted military support
in the campaign and allowing the military to manipulate his
presidency. Charge noted that, by making Abdallahi's return
the main issue, Ould Daddah allows the question of the
military's political departure to take second place --
effectively dividing the opposition. Ould Daddah then
relented somewhat (has he did previously in REFTEL) by
allowing he would accept Abdallahi back symbolically if that
was an effective measure to pressure the military -- but
insisting that the return lead immediately into a resignation
in favor of the President Senate. Charge pushed some more
asking if Ould Daddah really wanted the President of the
Senate (a man who has been politically gutted by regime
intimidation) to be responsible for a transition leading to
elections?. If so, with what government -- the current
regime government or the last Abdallahi government? When
pushed on the practicalities of his position, Ould Daddah
clarified that he could see Abdallahi coming back long enough
to establish a strong government of national unity with
reinforced executive authority and then resigning. As such,
the weak President of the Senate could take interim power
but, consistent with the constitution, would be unable to
NOUAKCHOTT 00000204 002 OF 002
alter the last appointed government.
5. (C) While welcoming Israel's departure because of his
views concerning the Palestinian process, Ould Daddah worried
that Aziz had kicked the Israeli Ambassador for less
principled reasons -- to gain Qadhafi's support in the
mediation and to win Iranian financial backing. Terming Aziz
as one of the least intelligent military leaders, Ould Daddah
said Aziz was playing a dangerous game thinking he can manage
those two relationships -- "Qadhafi and the Iranians are a
lot smarter than Aziz and will eventually pull us into a
jamahiriya with Libya and a Shi'ah outpost for Iran." Ould
Daddah said Aziz "will sell anything to stay in power" and
worried that "the same drug traffickers who knocked off the
government in Guinea Bissau will find a willing partner here."
6. (C) Comment: Ould Daddah and the RFD are again working
together, but Ould Daddah's personal animosity against
Abdallahi make the coalition tenuous at best. Ould Daddah is
aware that a transition government authored by President
Abdallahi (versus the military's plan) offers a far greater
chance of free and fair elections Ould Daddah can win but he
still hopes for a "ni - ni" option that allows him to
dispense with both Abdallahi and Aziz. Key FNDD leaders like
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir could probably agree with Ould Daddah
with an arrangement including Abdallahi's resignation once a
credible transition government is in place but the FNDD is
unlikely to put it in writing until Ould Daddah accepts
Abdallahi's return, albeit temporarily.
HANKINS