In natural law theory, "determinatio" is the process by which natural law is made into determinate positicve law. A lot of discussion of "determinatio" in natural law jurisprudence is just the repetition of tired formulas from Aquinas. In this paper, I try to bring the subject to life by considering the case that can be made for more more detailed elaboration of laws prohibiting (a) assisted suicide and (b) torture. I assume that "determinatio" can be a multi-step process by which we move first from a natural law ideal to a particular formulation of positive law and then from that particular positive law formulation to more precise formulations and applications. I assume also that the demand for greater and greater precision is not always healthy or wholesome in law. (a) John Finnis thinks this about the demand for more precise guidelines relating to possible prosecutions for assusted suicide in the House of Lords' last case: R. (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2010] 1 A.C. 345. (b) I have argued elsewhere that the demand for more precise guidance concerning the application of the prohibition on torture is often vicious and unwholesome - as abusive interrogators demand a precise envelope whose boundaries they can push. In this paper, I explore why I do not agree with Finnis about (a) and why Finnis does not seem to be in wholehearted agreement with me about (b). I think that exploring these cross-cutting antagonisms casts useful light on all three topics: the law relating to assisted suicide, the law relating to torture, and the naturla law idea of "determinatio."

Reliance on an informant's testimony as the primary basis for charging and convicting the accused is fraught with problems. While the hypothetical explicitly addresses the ethical dilemmas defense counsel faces when her client is trading false testimony in exchange for a reduced charge and shorter sentence, the hypothetical also implicitly illustrates the inadequacies of our criminal justice system's current handling of testimony from cooperating witnesses.

The Innocence Movement has unwittingly participated in the construction of a binary between “actual” and “legal” innocence. Because the Innocence Movement has focused on defendants who did not commit the actions underlying their convictions, courts, lawyers, and the larger society have come to believe that a person is wrongly convicted of a crime only if the person is “actually” innocent. This perception overlooks the fact that a person can be wrongly convicted if their constitutional rights were violated in the process of obtaining the conviction. As such, the Innocence Movement devalues “legal” innocence and the constitutional values that underlie a broader conception of innocence. In order to affirm the importance of those constitutional values, this Article argues for the need to reclaim an understanding of innocence unmodified by qualifiers such as “actual” or “legal.” Part I explains how the concept of “actual” innocence has played a pivotal role in the development of the Innocence Movement. Part II examines innocence unmodified in the context of trials. It explains that one reason to protect innocence unmodified is because the Supreme Court has not yet held that “actual” innocence alone is enough to reverse a wrongful conviction; constitutional claims underlying an “actual” innocence claim, working together, are necessary to achieve justice. Part III explores innocence unmodified in the context of guilty pleas. It reveals the degree to which the Court has itself reduced innocence to a binary—prioritizing “actual” innocence over fundamental constitutional protections for all people, including people who might be wrongly convicted if the courts do not safeguard their constitutional rights. The Article concludes that a modified conception of innocence dilutes the constitutional core that protects us all—innocent or guilty alike.

A man sets himself on fire in front of the White House in a dispute with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He has been working as an informant for the FBI in a high-profile terrorism prosecution and is unhappy with the $100,000 he has been paid so far. He has also been recently convicted of bank fraud. As a result, the government declines to call him as a witness, given the damage his actions have on his credibility and trustworthiness. This incident underscores the difficulty inherent in relying on paid informants to drive a prosecution, where material considerations such as money and legal assistance are often the price the government pays for an informant’s services. In the years since September 11, 2001, informants have been at the heart of many major terrorism prosecutions. The entrapment defense, perhaps the only legal tool available to defendants in such prosecutions, has proven ineffective. This is evident when one considers the context of generally heightened suspicion of the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States. Further, a closer look at several of these prosecutions reveals repeated instances of suggestive and provocative activity by informants geared at obtaining a conviction, calling into question whether a genuine threat to U.S. national security actually existed in the first place. This Article argues that the government should cease its current practice of using informants to generate terrorism prosecutions.

Whether this Court’s clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always "in custody" for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

The petition and the Sixth Circuit's opinion are available at the site.

The notion of "error" and "error rates" is central both to the Daubert opinion and to the recent National Academy of Sciences Report on the strengths and weaknesses of forensic science in the United States. As might be expected, the NAS Report does a better job of explaining the kinds of error it is concerned with than did the opinion in Daubert. However, to a greater or lesser degree, both fall short of a full consideration of the applicable concept of error, and so doing, they invite confusion about how inaccurate results in forensic science and criminal adjudication may occur, and who if anyone is to blame. This paper examines the notion of error as it might apply in these settings, with due regard to both the philosophical and scientific literature. It concludes that competing notions of normative and objective error have led to unnecessary miscommunication between practitioners of forensic disciplines and their critics, which has resulted in many forensic practitioners feeling unfairly criticized. This in turn has led some in the forensic science community, perhaps understandably, to resist changes in forensic practice that are necessary for the reduction of error in all its forms.

The defining challenge facing German prosecution offices today is reconciling the tension that exists between prosecutors’ historical mandate to serve as “guardians of the law” and their institutional position as members of an institution with limited resources. During the past three decades, the tension between the prosecution service’s normative mission to objectively investigate and prosecute criminal activity and increasingly severe resource constraints has transformed the law and practice of German criminal procedure. Although German legal scholars have long championed the system’s commitment to restricting prosecutorial discretion, in recent years the scope of prosecutors’ discretionary decision-making authority has widened dramatically. This development is particularly stark with respect to low-level crimes where prosecutors perform a critical gate keeping role.