Both by nature and by grace, Augustin was formed to be the champion of truth in this controversy. Of a naturally philosophical
temperament, he saw into the springs of life with a vividness of mental perception to which most men are strangers; and his
own experiences in his long life of resistance to, and then of yielding to, the drawings of God’s grace, gave him a clear
apprehension of the great evangelic principle that God seeks men, not men God, such as no sophistry
could cloud. However much his philosophy or theology might undergo change in other particuxxiilars, there was one conviction too deeply imprinted upon his heart ever to fade or alter,—the conviction of the ineffableness
of God’s grace. Grace,—man’s absolute dependence on God as the source of all good,—this was the common, nay, the formative element, in all stages of his doctrinal development, which was marked only by the ever growing consistency with which he
built his
theology around this central principle. Already in 397,—the year after he became bishop,—we find him enunciating with admirable
clearness all the essential elements of his teaching, as he afterwards opposed them to Pelagius.4040 Compare his work written this year, On Several Questions to Simplicianus. For the development of Augustin’s theology, see the admirable statement in Neander’s Church History, E.T., ii. 625 sq. It was inevitable, therefore, that although he was rejoiced when he heard, some years later, of the zealous labours of this
pious monk in Rome towards stemming the tide of luxury and sin, and esteemed him for his devout life, and loved him for his
Christian activity, he yet was deeply troubled when subsequent rumours reached him that he was “disputing against the grace
of God.” He tells us over and over again, that this was a thing no pious heart could endure; and we
perceive that, from this moment, Augustin was only biding his time, and awaiting a fitting opportunity to join issue with
the denier of the Holy of holies of his whole, I will not say theology merely, but life. “Although I was grieved by this,”
he says, “and it was told me by men whom I believed, I yet desired to have something of such sort from his own lips or in
some book of his, so that, if I began to refute it, he would not be able to deny it.”4141On the Proceedings of Pelagius, 46. Thus he actually excuses himself for not entering into the controversy earlier. When Pelagius came to Africa, then, it was
almost as if he had deliberately sought his fate. But circumstances secured a lull before the storm. He visited Hippo; but
Augustin was absent, although he did not fail to inform himself on his return that Pelagius while there had not been heard
to say “anything at all of this kind.” The controversy against the Donatists was now occupying all the
energies of the African Church, and Augustin himself was a ruling spirit in the great conference now holding at Carthage with
them. While there, he was so immersed in this business, that, although he once or twice saw the face of Pelagius, he had no
conversation with him; and although his ears were wounded by a casual remark which he heard, to the effect “that infants were
not baptized for remission of sins, but for consecration to Christ,” he allowed himself to pass over the matter, “because
there was no opportunity to contradict it, and those who said it were not such men as could cause him solicitude for their
influence.”4242On the Merits and Remission of Sins, iii. 12.

It appears from these facts, given us by himself, that Augustin was not only ready for, but was looking for, the coming controversy.
It can scarcely have been a surprise to him when Paulinus accused Cœlestius (412); and, although he was not a member of the
council which condemned him, it was inevitable that he should at once take the leading part in the consequent controversy.
Cœlestius and his friends did not silently submit to the judgment that had been passed
upon their teaching: they could not openly propagate their heresy, but they were diligent in spreading their plaints privately
and by subterraneous whispers among the people.4343Epistle 157, 22. This was met by the Catholics in public sermons and familiar colloquies held everywhere. But this wise rule was observed,—to
contend against the erroneous teachings, but to keep silence as to the teachers, that so (as Augustin explains4444On the Proceedings of Pelagius, 46.) “the men might rather be brought to see and acknowledge their error through fear of ecclesiastical judgment than be punished
by the actual judgment.” Augustin was abundant in these oral labours; and many of his sermons directed against Pelagian error
have come down to us, although it is often impossible to be sure as to their date. For one of them (170) he took his text
from Phil. iii. 6–16, “as touching the righteousness which is by the law
blameless; howbeit what things were gain to me, those have I counted loss for Christ.” He begins by asking how the apostle
could count his blameless conversation according to the righteousness which is from the law as dung and loss, and then proceeds
to explain the purpose for which the law was given, our state by nature and under law, and the kind of blamelessness that
the law xxiiicould produce, ending by showing that man can have no righteousness except from God, and no perfect
righteousness except in heaven. Three others (174, 175, 176) had as their text 1 Tim. i. 15, 16, and developed its teaching, that the universal sin of the world and its helplessness in sin constituted the necessity of
the incarnation; and especially that the necessity of Christ’s grace for salvation was just as great for infants as for adults.
Much is very forcibly said in these sermons which was afterwards incorporated in his treatises. “There was no reason,” he
insists, “for the coming of Christ the Lord except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no
reason for medicine. If the great Physician came from heaven, a great sick man was lying ill through the whole world. That
sick man is the human race” (175, 1). “He who says, ‘I am not a sinner,’ or ‘I was not,’ is ungrateful to the Saviour. No
one of men in that mass of mortals which flows down from Adam, no one at all of men is not sick: no one is healed without
the grace
of Christ. Why do you ask whether infants are sick from Adam? For they, too, are brought to the church; and, if they cannot
run thither on their own feet, they run on the feet of others that they may be healed. Mother Church accommodates others’
feet to them so that they may come, others’ heart so that they may believe, others’ tongue so that they may confess; and,
since they are sick by another’s sin, so when they are healed they are saved by another’s confession in their behalf. Let,
then, no
one buzz strange doctrines to you. This the Church has always had, has always held; this she has received from the faith of the elders; this she will perseveringly
guard until the end. Since the whole have no need of a physician, but only the sick, what need, then, has the infant of Christ,
if he is not sick? If he is well, why does he seek the physician through those who love him? If, when infants are brought,
they are said to have no sin of inheritance (peccatum propaginis) at
all, and yet come to Christ, why is it not said in the church to those that bring them, ‘take these innocents hence; the physician
is not needed by the well, but by the sick; Christ came not to call the just, but sinners’? It never has been said, and it
never will be said. Let each one therefore, brethren, speak for him who cannot speak for himself. It is much the custom to
intrust the inheritance of orphans to the bishops; how much more the grace of infants! The bishop protects the orphan lest
he should be oppressed by strangers, his parents being dead. Let him cry out more for the infant who, he fears, will be slain
by his parents. Who comes to Christ has something in him to be healed; and he who has not, has no reason for seeking the physician.
Let parents choose one of two things: let them either confess that there is sin to be healed in their infants, or let them
cease bringing them to the physician. This is nothing else than to wish to bring a well person to the physician. Why
do you bring him? To be baptized. Whom? The infant. To whom do you bring him? To Christ. To Him, of course, who came into
the world? Certainly, he says. Why did He come into the world? To save sinners. Then he whom you bring has in him that which
needs saving?”4545Sermon 176, 2. So again: “He who says that the age of infancy does not need Jesus’ salvation, says nothing else than that the Lord Christ
is not Jesus to faithful infants; i.e., to infants baptized in Christ. For what is Jesus? Jesus means saviour. He is not Jesus to those whom He does not save, who do not need to be saved. Now, if your hearts can bear
that Christ is not Jesus to any of the baptized, I do not know how you can be acknowledged to have sound
faith. They are infants, but they are made members of Him. They are infants, but they receive His sacraments. They are infants,
but they become partakers of His table, so that they may have life.”4646Sermon 174. The preveniency of grace is explicitly asserted in these sermons. In one he says, “Zaccheus was seen, and saw; but unless
he had been seen, he would not have seen. For ‘whom He predestinated, them also He called.’ In order that we may see, we are
seen; that we may love, we are loved. ‘My God, may His pity prevent me!’”4747 Do. And in another, at more length: “His calling has preceded you, so that you may have a good will. Cry out, ‘My God, let Thy
mercy prevent me’ (Ps. lviii. 11). That you may be, that you may feel, that you may hear, that you may consent, xxivHis mercy prevents you. It prevents you in all things; and do you too prevent His judgment in something. In what, do you say?
In what? In confessing that you have all these things from God, whatever you
have of good; and from yourself whatever you have of evil” (176, 5). “We owe therefore to Him that we are, that we are alive,
that we understand: that we are men, that we live well, that we understand aright, we owe to Him. Nothing is ours except the
sin that we have. For what have we that we did not receive?” (1 Cor. ix. 7) (176, 6).

It was not long, however, before the controversy was driven out of the region of sermons into that of regular treatises. The
occasion for Augustin’s first appearance in a written document bearing on the controversy, was given by certain questions
which were sent to him for answer by “the tribune and notary” Marcellinus, with whom he had cemented his intimacy at Carthage,
the previous year, when this notable official was presiding, by the emperor’s orders, over the
great conference of the catholics and Donatists. The mere fact that Marcellinus, still at Carthage, where Cœlestius had been
brought to trial, wrote to Augustin at Hippo for written answers to important questions connected with the Pelagian heresy,
speaks volumes for the prominent position he had already assumed in the controversy. The questions that were sent, concerned
the connection of death with sin, the transmission of sin, the possibility of a sinless life, and especially infants’ need
of
baptism.4848On the Merits and Remission of Sins, iii. 1. Augustin was immersed in abundant labours when they reached him:4949On the Merits and Remission of Sins, i. 1. Compare Epistle 139. but he could not resist this appeal, and that the less as the Pelagian controversy had already grown to a place of the first
importance in his eyes. The result was his treatise, On the Merits and Remission of Sins and on the Baptism of Infants, consisting of two books, and written in 412. The first book of this work is an argument for original sin, drawn from the
universal reign of death in the world (2–8), from the teaching of Rom. v.
12–21 (9–20), and chiefly from the baptism of infants (21–70).5050 On the prominence of infant baptism in the controversy, and why it was so, see Sermon 165, 7 sq. “What do you say? ‘Just this,’ he says, ‘that God creates every man immortal.’ Why, then do infant children die?
For if I say, ‘Why do adult men die?’ you would say to me, ‘They have sinned.’ Therefore I do not argue about the adults:
I cite infancy as a witness against you,” and so on, eloquently developing the argument. It opens by exploding the Pelagian contention that death is of nature, and Adam would have died even had he not sinned, by
showing that the penalty threatened to Adam included physical death (Gen. iii. 19), and that it is due to him that we all die (Rom. viii. 10, 11; 1 Cor. xv. 21) (2–8). Then the Pelagian assertion that we are injured in Adam’s sin only by its bad example, which we imitate, not by any
propagation from it, is tested by an exposition of Rom. v. 12 sq. (9–20). And then the main subject of the book is reached, and the writer sharply presses the Pelagians with the universal
and primeval fact of the baptism of infants, as a proof of original sin (21–70). He tracks out all
their subterfuges,—showing the absurdity of the assertions that infants are baptized for the remission of sins that they have
themselves committed since birth (22), or in order to obtain a higher stage of salvation (23–28), or because of sin committed
in some previous state of existence (31–33). Then turning to the positive side, he shows at length that the Scriptures teach
that Christ came to save sinners, that baptism is for the remission of sins, and that all that partake of it are
confessedly sinners (34 sq.); then he points out that John ii. 7, 8, on which the Pelagians relied, cannot be held to distinguish between ordinary salvation and a higher form, under the name
of “the kingdom of God” (58 sq.); and he closes by showing that the very manner in which baptism was administered, with its
exorcism and exsufflation, implied the infant to be a sinner (63), and by suggesting that the peculiar helplessness of infancy,
so different not only from the
earliest age of Adam, but also from that of many young animals, may possibly be itself penal (64–69). The second book treats,
with similar fulness, the question of the perfection of human righteousness in this life. After an exordium which speaks of
the will and its limitations, and of the need of God’s assisting grace (1–6), the writer raises four questions. First, whether
it may be said to be possible, by God’s grace, for a man to attain a condition of entire sinlessness in this life (7).
This he answers in the affirmative. Secondly, he asks, whether any one has ever done this, or xxvmay ever be expected to do it, and answers in the negative on the testimony of Scripture (8–25). Thirdly, he asks why not,
and replies briefly because men are unwilling, explaining at length what he means by this (26–33). Finally, he inquires whether
any man has ever existed, exists now, or will ever exist, entirely without sin,—this question differing from the second inasmuch
as that
asked after the attainment in this life of a state in which sinning should cease, while this seeks a man who has never been
guilty of sin, implying the absence of original as well as of actual sin. After answering this in the negative (34), Augustin
discusses anew the question of original sin. Here after expounding from the positive side (35–38) the condition of man in
paradise, the nature of his probation, and of the fall and its effects both on him and his posterity, and the kind of
redemption that has been provided in the incarnation, he proceeds to answer certain cavils (39 sq.), such as, “Why should
children of baptized people need baptism?”—“How can a sin be remitted to the father and held against the child?”—“If physical
death comes from Adam, ought we not to be released from it on believing in Christ?”—and concludes with an exhortation to hold
fast to the exact truth, turning neither to the right nor left,—neither saying that we have no sin, nor surrendering
ourselves to our sin (57 sq.).

After these books were completed, Augustin came into possession of Pelagius’ Commentary on Paul’s Epistles, which was written while he was living in Rome (before 410), and found it to contain some arguments that he had not treated,—such
arguments, he tells us, as he had not imagined could be held by any one.5151On the Merits and Remission of Sins, iii. 1. Unwilling to re-open his finished argument, he now began a long supplementary letter to Marcellinus, which he intended to
serve as a third and concluding book to his work. He was some time in completing this letter. He had asked to have the former
two books returned to him; and it is a curious indication of his overworked state of mind, that he forgot what he wanted with
them:5252Letter 139, 3. he visited Carthage while the letter was in hand, and saw Marcellinus personally; and even after his return to Hippo, it
dragged along, amid many distractions, slowly towards completion.5353Letter 140. Meanwhile, a long letter was written to Honoratus, in which a section on the grace of the New Testament was incorporated.
At length the promised supplement was completed. It was professedly a criticism of Pelagius’ Commentary, and therefore naturally
mentioned his name; but Augustin even goes out of his way to speak as highly of his opponent as he can,5454 See chaps. 1 and 5.—although it is apparent that his esteem is not very high for his strength of mind, and is even less high for the moral quality
that led to his odd, oblique way of expressing his opinions. There is even a half sarcasm in the way he speaks of Pelagius’
care and circumspection, which was certainly justified by the event. The letter opens by stating and criticising in a very
acute and telling dialectic, the new arguments of Pelagius, which were such as the following: “If Adam’s
sin injured even those who do not sin, Christ’s righteousness ought likewise to profit even those who do not believe” (2–4);
“No man can transmit what he has not; and hence, if baptism cleanses from sin, the children of baptized parents ought to be
free from sin;” “God remits one’s own sins, and can scarcely, therefore, impute another’s to us; and if the soul is created,
it would certainly be unjust to impute Adam’s alien sin to it” (5). The stress of the letter, however, is laid upon two
contentions,—1. That whatever else may be ambiguous in the Scriptures, they are perfectly clear that no man can have eternal
life except in Christ, who came to call sinners to repentance (7); and 2. That original sin in infants has always been, in
the Church, one of the fixed facts, to be used as a basis of argument, in order to reach the truth in other matters, and has
never itself been called in question before (10–14). At this point, the writer returns to the second and third of the new
arguments of Pelagius mentioned above, and discusses them more fully (15–20), closing with a recapitulation of the three great
points that had been raised; viz., that both death and sin are derived from Adam’s sin by all his posterity; that infants
need salvation, xxviand hence baptism; and that no man ever attains in this life such a state of holiness that he cannot truly pray, “Forgive
us our trespasses.”

Augustin was now to learn that one service often entails another. Marcellinus wrote to say that he was puzzled by what had
been said in the second book of this work, as to the possibility of man’s attaining to sinlessness in this life, while yet
it was asserted that no man ever had attained, or ever would attain, it. How, he asked, can that be said to be possible which
is, and which will remain, unexampled? In reply, Augustin wrote, during this same year (412), and sent
to his noble friend, another work, which he calls On the Spirit and the Letter, from the prominence which he gives in it to the words of 2 Cor. iii. 6.5555Sermon 163 treats the text similarly. He did not content himself with a simple, direct answer to Marcellinus’ question, but goes at length into a profound disquisition
into the roots of the doctrine, and thus gives us, not a mere explanation of a former contention, but a new treatise on a
new subject,—the absolute necessity of the grace of God for any good living. He begins by explaining to Marcellinus that he
has affirmed the possibility while denying the actuality of a sinless life, on the ground that all
things are possible to God,—even the passage of a camel through the eye of a needle, which nevertheless has never occurred
(1, 2). For, in speaking of man’s perfection, we are speaking really of a work of God,—and one which is none the less His
work because it is wrought through the instrumentality of man, and in the use of his free will. The Scriptures, indeed, teach
that no man lives without sin, but this is only the proclamation of a matter of fact; and although it is thus contrary to
fact
and Scripture to assert that men may be found that live sinlessly, yet such an assertion would not be fatal heresy. What is
unbearable, is that men should assert it to be possible for man, unaided by God, to attain this perfection. This is to speak
against the grace of God: it is to put in man’s power what is only possible to the almighty grace of God (3, 4). No doubt,
even these men do not, in so many words, exclude the aid of grace in perfecting human life,—they affirm God’s help; but they
make it consist in His gift to man of a perfectly free will, and in His addition to this of commandments and teachings which
make known to him what he is to seek and what to avoid, and so enable him to direct his free will to what is good. What, however,
does such a “grace” amount to? (5). Man needs something more than to know the right way: he needs to love it, or he will not
walk in it; and all mere teaching, which can do nothing more than bring us knowledge of what we ought to do, is but the
letter that killeth. What we need is some inward, Spirit-given aid to the keeping of what by the law we know ought to be kept.
Mere knowledge slays: while to lead a holy life is the gift of God,—not only because He has given us will, nor only because
He has taught us the right way, but because by the Holy Spirit He sheds love abroad in the hearts of all those whom He has
predestinated, and will call and justify and glorify (Rom. viii. 29, 30). To prove this, he
states to be the object of the present treatise; and after investigating the meaning of 2 Cor. iii. 6, and showing that “the letter” there means the law as a system of precepts, which reveals sin rather than takes it away,
points out the way rather than gives strength to walk in it, and therefore slays the soul by shutting it up under sin,—while
“the Spirit” is God’s Holy Ghost who is shed abroad in our hearts to give us strength to walk aright,—he undertakes to prove
this
position from the teachings of the Epistle to the Romans at large. This contention, it will be seen, cut at the very roots
of Pelagianism: if all mere teaching slays the soul, as Paul asserts, then all that what they called “grace” could, when alone,
do, was to destroy; and the upshot of “helping” man by simply giving him free will, and pointing out the way to him, would
be the loss of the whole race. Not that the law is sin: Augustin teaches that it is holy and good, and God’s instrument in
salvation. Not that free will is done away: it is by free will that men are led into holiness. But the purpose of the law
(he teaches) is to make men so feel their lost estate as to seek the help by which alone they may be saved; and will is only
then liberated to do good when grace has xxviimade it free. “What the law of works enjoins by menace, that the law of faith secures by faith. What the law of works does
is to say, ‘Do what I command thee;’ but by the law of faith we say
to God, ‘Give me what thou commandest.’”(22).5656 See this prayer beautifully illustrated from Scripture in On the Merits and Remission of Sins, ii. 5. In the midst of this argument, Augustin is led to discuss the differentiating characteristics of the Old and New Testaments;
and he expounds at length (33–42) the passage in Jer. xxxi. 31–34, showing that, in the prophet’s view, the difference between the two covenants is that in the Old, the law is an external
thing written on stones; while in the New, it is written internally on the heart, so that men now wish to do what the law
prescribes. This
writing on the heart is nothing else, he explains, than the shedding abroad by the Holy Spirit of love in our hearts, so that
we love God’s will, and therefore freely do it. Towards the end of the treatise (50–61), he treats in an absorbingly interesting
way of the mutual relations of free will, faith, and grace, contending that all co-exist without the voiding of any. It is
by free will that we believe; but it is only as grace moves us, that we are able to use our free will for believing; and
it is only after we are thus led by grace to believe, that we obtain all other goods. In prosecuting this analysis, Augustin
is led to distinguish very sharply between the faculty and use of free will (58), as well as between ability and volition
(53). Faith is an act of the man himself; but only as he is given the power from on high to will to believe, will he believe
(57, 60).

By this work, Augustin completed, in his treatment of Pelagianism, the circle of that triad of doctrines which he himself
looked upon as most endangered by this heresy,5757 See above, p. xv.—original sin, the imperfection of human righteousness, the necessity of grace. In his mind, the last was the kernel of the
whole controversy; and this was a subject which he could never approach without some heightened fervour. This accounts for
the great attractiveness of the present work,—through the whole fabric of which runs the golden thread of the praise of God’s
ineffable grace. In Canon Bright’s opinion, it “perhaps, next to the ‘Confessions,’ tells us most of the
thoughts of that ‘rich, profound, and affectionate mind’ on the soul’s relations to its God.”5858 As quoted above, p. xx.

After the publication of these treatises, the controversy certainly did not lull; but it relapsed for nearly three years again,
into less public courses. Meanwhile, Augustin was busy, among other most distracting cares (Ep. 145, 1), still defending the grace of God, by letters and sermons. A fair illustration of his state of mind at this time, may be
obtained from his letter to Anastasius (145), which assuredly must have been written soon after the treatise On the
Spirit and the Letter. Throughout this letter, there are adumbrations of the same train of thought that filled this treatise; and there is one
passage which may almost be taken as a summary of it. Augustin is so weary of the vexatious cares that filled his life, that
he is ready to long for the everlasting rest, and yet bewails the weakness which allowed the sweetness of external things
still to insinuate itself into his heart. Victory over, and emancipation from, this, he asserts, “cannot,
without God’s grace, be achieved by the human will, which is by no means to be called free so long as it is subject to enslaving
lusts.” Then he proceeds: “The law, therefore, by teaching and commanding what cannot be fulfilled without grace, demonstrates
to man his weakness, in order that the weakness, thus proved, may resort to the Saviour, by whose healing the will may be
able to do what it found impossible in its weakness. So, then, the law brings us to faith, faith obtains the Spirit in
fuller measure, the Spirit sheds love abroad in us, and love fulfils the law. For this reason the law is called a schoolmaster,
under whose threatening and severity ‘whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be delivered.’ But ‘how shall they
call on Him in whom they have not believed?’ Wherefore, that the letter without the Spirit may not kill, the life-giving Spirit
is given to those that believe and call upon Him; but the love of God is poured out into our hearts by the Holy Spirit
who is given to us, so that the words of the same apostle, ‘Love is the fulfilling of the law,’ may be realized. Thus the
law is good to him that uses it lawfully; and he uses it lawfully, who, understanding wherefore it was given, betakes himself,
under the pressure of its threatening, xxviiito liberating grace. Whoever ungratefully despises this grace by which the ungodly is justified, and trusts in his own strength
for fulfilling the law, being ignorant of God’s
righteousness, and going about to establish his own righteousness, is not submitting himself to the righteousness of God;
and therefore the law is made to him not a help to pardon, but the bond of guilt; not because the law is evil, but because
‘sin,’ as it is written, ‘works death to such persons by that which is good.’ For by the commandment, he sins more grievously,
who, by the commandment, knows how evil are the sins which he commits.” Although Augustin states clearly that this letter
is
written against those “who arrogate too much to the human will, imagining that, the law being given, the will is, of its own
strength, sufficient to fulfil the law, though not assisted by any grace imparted by the Holy Ghost, in addition to instruction
in the law,”—he refrains still from mentioning the names of the authors of this teaching, evidently out of a lingering tenderness
in his treatment of them. This will help us to explain the courtesy of a note which he sent to Pelagius himself at
about this time, in reply to a letter he had received some time before from him; of which Pelagius afterwards (at the Synod
of Diospolis) made, to say the least of it, an ungenerous use. This note,5959Epistle 146. See On the Proceedings of Pelagius, 50, 51, 52. Augustin tells us, was written with “tempered praises” (wherefrom we see his lessening respect for the man), and so as to
admonish Pelagius to think rightly concerning grace,—so far as could be done without raising the dregs of the controversy
in a formal note. This he accomplished by praying from the Lord for him, those good things by which he might be good forever,
and might live eternally with Him who is eternal; and by asking his prayers in return, that he, too, might be
made by the Lord such as he seemed to suppose he already was. How Augustin could really intend these prayers to be understood
as an admonition to Pelagius to look to God for what he was seeking to work out for himself, is fully illustrated by the closing
words of this almost contemporary letter to Anastasius: “Pray, therefore, for us,” he writes, “that we may be righteous,—an
attainment wholly beyond a man’s reach, unless he know righteousness, and be willing to practise it, but one which is
immediately realized when he is perfectly willing; but this cannot be in him unless he is healed by the grace of the Spirit,
and aided to be able.” The point had already been made in the controversy, that, by the Pelagian doctrine, so much power was
attributed to the human will, that no one ought to pray, “Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.”

If he was anxious to avoid personal controversy with Pelagius himself in the hope that he might even yet be reclaimed, Augustin
was equally anxious to teach the truth on all possible occasions. Pelagius had been intimate, when at Rome, with the pious
Paulinus, bishop of Nola; and it was understood that there was some tendency at Nola to follow the new teachings. It was,
perhaps, as late as 414, when Augustin made reply in a long letter,6060Epistle 149. See especially 18 sq. to a request of Paulinus’ for an exposition of certain difficult Scriptures, which had been sent him about 410.6161Epistle 121. Among them was Rom. xi. 28; and, in explaining it, Augustin did not withhold a tolerably complete account of his doctrine of predestination, involving
the essence of his whole teaching as to grace: “For when he had said, ‘according to the election they are beloved for their
father’s sake,’ he added, ‘for the gifts and calling of God are without repentance.’ You see that those are certainly meant
who belong to the number of the predestinated.…‘Many
indeed are called, but few chosen;’ but those who are elect, these are called ‘according to His purpose;’ and it is beyond
doubt that in them God’s foreknowledge cannot be deceived. These He foreknew and predestinated to be conformed to the image
of His Son, in order that He might be the first born among many brethren. But ‘whom He predestinated, them He also called.’
This calling is ‘according to His purpose,’ this calling is ‘without repentance,’”etc., quoting Rom. v.
28–31. Then continuing, he says, “Those are not in this vocation, who do not persevere unto the end in the faith that worketh by
love, although they walk in it a little while.…But the reason why some belong to it, and some do not, can easily be hidden,
but cannot be unjust. For is there injustice xxixwith God? God forbid! For this belongs to those high judgments which, so to say, terrified the wondering apostle to look upon.”

Among the most remarkable of the controversial sermons that were preached about this time, especial mention is due to two
that were delivered at Carthage, midsummer of 413. The former of these6262Sermon 293. was preached on the festival of John the Baptist’s birth (June 24), and naturally took the forerunner for its subject. The
nativity of John suggesting the nativity of Christ, the preacher spoke of the marvel of the incarnation. He who was in the
beginning, and was the Word of God, and was Himself God, and who made all things, and in whom was life, even this one “came
to us. To whom? To the worthy? Nay, but to the unworthy! For Christ died for the ungodly, and for the
unworthy, though He was worthy. We indeed were unworthy whom He pitied; but He was worthy who pitied us, to whom we say, ‘For
Thy pity’s sake, Lord, free us!’ Not for the sake of our preceding merits, but ‘for Thy pity’s sake, Lord, free us;’ and ‘for
Thy name’s sake be propitious to our sins,’ not for our merit’s sake.…For the merit of sins is, of course, not reward, but
punishment.” He then dwelt upon the necessity of the incarnation, and the necessity of a mediator between God and “the whole
mass of the human race alienated from Him by Adam.” Then quoting 1 Cor. iv. 7, he asserts that it is not our varying merits, but God’s grace alone, that makes us differ, and that we are all alike, great
and small, old and young, saved by one and the same Saviour. “What then, some one says,” he continues, “even the infant needs
a liberator? Certainly he needs one. And the witness to it is the mother that faithfully runs to church with the child to
be baptized.
The witness is Mother Church herself, who receives the child for washing, and either for dismissing him [from this life] freed,
or nurturing him in piety.…Last of all, the tears of his own misery are witness in the child himself.…Recognize the misery,
extend the help. Let all put on bowels of mercy. By as much as they cannot speak for themselves, by so much more pityingly
let us speak for the little ones,”—and then follows a passage calling on the Church to take the grace of infants in their
charge as orphans committed to their care, which is in substance repeated from a former sermon.6363Sermon 176, 2. The speaker proceeded to quote Matt. i. 21, and apply it. If Jesus came to save from sins, and infants are brought to Him, it is to confess that they, too, are sinners.
Then, shall they be withheld from baptism? “Certainly, if the child could speak for himself, he would repel the voice of opposition,
and cry out, ‘Give me Christ’s life! In Adam I died: give me Christ’s life; in whose sight I am not clean, even if I am an
infant whose life has been
but one day in the earth.’” “No way can be found,” adds the preacher, “of coming into the life of this world except by Adam;
no way can be found of escaping punishment in the next world except by Christ. Why do you shut up the one door?” Even John
the Baptist himself was born in sin; and absolutely no one can be found who was born apart from sin, until you find one who
was born apart from Adam. “‘By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin, death; and so it passed through upon all men.’
If these were my words, could this sentiment be expressed more expressly, more clearly, more fully?”

Three days afterwards,6464 The inscription says, “V Calendus Julii,” i.e., June 27; but it also says, “In natalis martyris Guddentis,” whose day appears to have been July 18. Some of the martyrologies assign 28th of June to Gaudentius (which some copies
read here), but possibly none to Guddene. on the invitation of the Bishop of Carthage, Augustin preached a sermon professedly directed against the Pelagians,6565Sermon 294. which takes up the threads hinted at in the former discourse, and develops a full polemic with reference to the baptism of
infants. He began, formally enough, with the determination of the question in dispute. The Pelagians concede that infants
should be baptized. The only question is, for what are they baptized? We say that they would not otherwise have salvation
and eternal life; but they say it is not for salvation, not for eternal life, but for the kingdom of God.…“The
child, they say, although not baptized, by the desert of his innocence, in that he has no sin at all, either actual or original,
either from himxxxself or contracted from Adam, necessarily has salvation and eternal life even if not baptized; but is to be baptized for this
reason,—that he may enter into the kingdom of God, i.e., into the kingdom of heaven.” He then shows that there is no eternal
life outside the kingdom of heaven, no middle place between the right and left
hand of the judge at the last day, and that, therefore, to exclude one from the kingdom of God is to consign him to the pains
of eternal fire; while, on the other side, no one ascends into heaven unless he has been made a member of Christ, and this
can only be by faith,—which, in an infant’s case, is professed by another in his stead. He then treats, at length, some of
the puzzling questions with which the Pelagians were wont to try the catholics; and then breaking off suddenly, he took a
volume in his hands. “I ask you,” he said, “to bear with me a little: I will read somewhat. It is St. Cyprian whom I hold
in my hand, the ancient bishop of this see. What he thought of the baptism of infants,—nay, what he has shown that the Church
always thought,—learn in brief. For it is not enough for them to dispute and argue, I know not what impious novelties: they
even try to charge us with asserting something novel. It is on this account that I read here St. Cyprian, in order that you
may
perceive that the orthodox understanding and catholic sense reside in the words which I have been just now speaking to you.
He was asked whether an infant ought to be baptized before he was eight days old, seeing that by the ancient law no infant
was allowed to be circumcised unless he was eight days old. A question arose from this as to the day of baptism,—for concerning
the origin of sin there was no question; and therefore from this thing of which there was no question, that question that
had arisen was settled.” And then he read to them the passage out of Cyprian’s letter to Fidus, which declared that he, and
all the council with him, unanimously thought that infants should be baptized at the earliest possible age, lest they should
die in their inherited sin, and so pass into eternal punishment.6666 The passage is quoted at length in On the Merits and Remission of Sins, iii. 10. Compare Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, iv. 23. The sermon closed with a tender warning to the teachers of these strange doctrines: he might call them heretics with truth,
but he will not; let the Church seek still their salvation, and not mourn them as dead; let them be exhorted as friends, not
striven with as enemies. “They disparage us,” he says, “we will bear it; let them not disparage the rule [of faith], let them
not disparage the truth; let them not contradict the Church, which labours every day for the remission
of infants’ original sin. This thing is settled. The errant disputer may be borne with in other questions that have not been
thoroughly canvassed, that are not yet settled by the full authority of the Church,—their error should be borne with: it ought
not to extend so far, that they endeavour to shake even the very foundation of the Church!” He hints that although the patience
hitherto exhibited towards them is “perhaps not blameworthy,” yet patience may cease to be a virtue, and become
culpable negligence: in the mean time, however, he begs that the catholics should continue amicable, fraternal, placid, loving,
long suffering.

Augustin himself gives us a view of the progress of the controversy at this time in a letter written in 414.6767Epistle 157, 22. The Pelagians had everywhere scattered the seeds of their new error; and although some, by his ministry and that of his brother
workers, had, “by God’s mercy,” been cured of their pest, yet they still existed in Africa, especially about Carthage, and
were everywhere propagating their opinions in subterraneous whispers, for fear of the judgment of the Church. Wherever they
were not refuted, they were seducing others to their following; and they were so spread abroad that he
did not know where they would break out next. Nevertheless, he was still unwilling to brand them as heretics, and was more
desirous of healing them as sick members of the Church than of cutting them off finally as too diseased for cure. Jerome also
tells us that the poison was spreading in both the East and the West, and mentions particularly as seats where it showed itself
the islands of Rhodes and Sicily. Of Rhodes we know nothing further; but from Sicily an appeal came to Augustin in 414
from one Hilary,6868Epistle 156, among Augustin’s Letters. setting forth that there were xxxicertain Christians about Syracuse who taught strange doctrines, and beseeching Augustin to help him in dealing with them.
The doctrines were enumerated as follows: “They say (1) that man can be without sin, (2) and can easily keep the commandments
of God if he will; (3) that an unbaptized infant, if he is cut off by death, cannot justly perish, since he is born without
sin; (4) that a rich man that remains in his
riches cannot enter the kingdom of God, except he sell all that he has;…(5) that we ought not to swear at all;” (6) and, apparently,
that the Church is to be in this world without spot or blemish. Augustin suspected that these Sicilian disturbances were in
some way the work of Cœlestius, and therefore in his answer6969Epistle, 157, 22. informs his correspondent of what had been done at the Synod of Carthage (412) against him. The long letter that he sent
back follows the inquiries in the order they were put by Hilary. To the first he replies, in substance, as he had treated
the same matter in the second book of the treatise, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, that it was opposed to Scripture, but was less a heresy than the wholly unbearable opinion that this state of sinlessness
could be
attained without God’s help. “But when they say that free will suffices to man for fulfilling the precepts of the Lord, even
though unaided to good works by God’s grace and the gift of the Holy Spirit, it is to be altogether anathematized and detested
with all execrations. For those who assert this are inwardly alien from God’s grace, because being ignorant of God’s righteousness,
like the Jews of whom the apostle speaks, and wishing to establish their own, they are not subject to God’s
righteousness, since there is no fulfilment of the law except love; and of course the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts,
not by ourselves, nor by the force of our own will, but by the Holy Ghost who is given to us.” Dealing next with the second
point, he drifts into the matter he had more fully developed in his work On the Spirit and the Letter. “Free will avails for God’s works,” he says, “if it be divinely aided, and this comes by humble seeking and doing; but when
deserted by
divine aid, no matter how excellent may be its knowledge of the law, it will by no means possess solidity of righteousness,
but only the inflation of ungodly pride and deadly arrogance. This is taught us by that same Lord’s Prayer; for it would be
an empty thing for us to ask God ‘Lead us not into temptation,’ if the matter was so placed in our power that we would avail
for fulfilling it without any aid from Him. For this free will is free in proportion as it is sound, but it is sound in
proportion as it is subject to divine pity and grace. For it faithfully prays, saying, ‘Direct my ways according to Thy word,
and let no iniquity reign over me.’ For how is that free over which iniquity reigns? But see who it is that is invoked by
it, in order that it may not reign over it. For it says not, ‘Direct my ways according to free will because no iniquity shall
rule over me,’ but ‘Direct my ways according to Thy word, and let no iniquity rule over me.’ It is a prayer, not a
promise; it is a confession, not a profession; it is a wish for full freedom, not a boast of personal power. For it is not
every one ‘who confides in his own power,’ but ‘every one who calls on the name of God, that shall be saved.’ ‘But how shall
they call upon Him,’ he says, ‘in whom they have not believed?’ Accordingly, then, they who rightly believe, believe in order
to call on Him in whom they have believed, and to avail for doing what they receive in the precepts of the law; since what
the law commands, faith prays for.” “God, therefore, commands continence, and gives continence; He commands by the law, He
gives by grace; He commands by the letter, He gives by the spirit: for the law without grace makes the transgression to abound,
and the letter without the spirit kills. He commands for this reason,—that we who have endeavoured to do what He commands,
and are worn out in our weakness under the law, may know how to ask for the aid of grace; and if we have been able to do any
good work, that we may not be ungrateful to Him who aids us.” The answer to the third point traverses the ground that was
fully covered in the first book of the treatise On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, beginning by opposing the Pelagians to Paul in Rom. v. 12–19: “But when they say that an infant, cut off by death, unbaptized, cannot perish since he is born without sin,—it is not this
that the apostle says; and xxxiiI think that it is better
to believe the apostle than them.” The fourth and fifth questions were new in this controversy; and it is not certain that
they belong properly to it, though the legalistic asceticism of the Pelagian leaders may well have given rise to a demand
on all Christians to sell what they had, and give to the poor. This one of the points, Augustin treats at length, pointing
out that many of the saints of old were rich, and that the Lord and His apostles always so speak that their counsels avail
to the
right use, not the destruction, of wealth. Christians ought so to hold their wealth that they are not held by it, and by no
means prefer it to Christ. Equal good sense and mildness are shown in his treatment of the question concerning oaths, which
he points out were used by the Lord and His apostles, but advises to be used as little as possible lest by the custom of frequent
oaths we learn to swear lightly. The question as to the Church, he passes over as having been sufficiently treated in the
course of his previous remarks.

To the number of those who had been rescued from Pelagianism by his efforts, Augustin was now to have the pleasure of adding
two others, in whom he seems to have taken much delight. Timasius and James were two young men of honorable birth and liberal
education, who had, by the exhortation of Pelagius, been moved to give up the hope that they had in this world, and enter
upon the service of God in an ascetic life.7070Epistles 177, 6; and 179, 2. Naturally, they had turned to him for instruction, and had received a book to which they had given their study. They met
somewhere with some of Augustin’s writings, however, and were deeply affected by what he said as to grace, and now began to
see that the teaching of Pelagius opposed the grace of God by which man becomes a Christian. They gave their book, therefore,
to Augustin, saying that it was Pelagius’, and asking him for Pelagius’ sake, and for the sake of the truth,
to answer it. This was done, and the resulting book, On Nature and Grace, sent to the young men, who returned a letter of thanks7171Epistle 168. On the Proceedings of Pelagius, 48. in which they professed their conversion from their error. In this book, too, which was written in 415, Augustin refrained
from mentioning Pelagius by name,7272On the Proceedings of Pelagius, 47; and Epistle 186, 1. feeling it better to spare the man while not sparing his writings. But he tells us, that, on reading the book of Pelagius
to which it was an answer, it became clear to him beyond any doubt that his teaching was distinctly anti-Christian;7373 Compare On Nature and Grace, 7; and Epistle 186, 1. and when speaking of his own book privately to a friend, he allows himself to call it “a considerable book against the heresy of Pelagius, which he had been constrained to write by some brethren whom he had persuaded to adopt his fatal error, denying
the grace of Christ.”7474Epistle 169, 13. Thus his attitude towards the persons of the new teachers was becoming ever more and more strained, in despite of his full
recognition of the excellent motives that might lie behind their “zeal not according to knowledge.” This treatise opens with
a recognition of the zeal of Pelagius, which, as it burns most ardently against those who, when reproved for sin, take refuge
in censuring their nature, Augustin compares with the heathen view as expressed in Sallust’s saying, “the
human race falsely complains of its own nature,”7575On Nature and Grace, 1. Sallust’s Jugurtha, prologue. and which he charges with not being according to knowledge, and proposes to oppose by an equal zeal against all attempts
to render the cross of Christ of none effect. He then gives a brief but excellent summary of the more important features of
the catholic doctrine concerning nature and grace (2–7). Opening the work of Pelagius, which had been placed in his hands,
he examines his doctrine of sin, its nature and effects. Pelagius, he points out, draws a distinction, sound
enough in itself, between what is “possible” and what is “actual,” but applies it unsoundly to sin, when he says that every
man has the possibility of being without sin (8–9), and therefore without condemnation. Not so, says Augustin; an infant who dies unbaptized has
no possibility of salvation open to him; and the man who has lived and died in a land where it was impossible for him to hear
the name of Christ, has had no possibility open to him of becoming righteous by nature and free
will. If this be not so, Christ is dead in vain, since all men then might have accomplished their salvation, even if Christ
had never died (10). Pelagius, moreover, he shows, exhibits a tendency to deny the sinful character of all sins xxxiiithat are impossible to avoid, and so treats of sins of ignorance as to show that he excuses them (13–19). When he argues that
no sin, because it is not a substance, can change nature, which is a substance, Augustin replies that this
destroys the Saviour’s work,—for how can He save from sins if sins do not corrupt? And, again, if an act cannot injure a substance,
how can abstention from food, which is a mere act, kill the body? In the same way sin is not a substance; but God is a substance,—yea,
the height of substance, and only true sustenance of the reasonable creature; and the consequence of departure from Him is
to the soul what refusal of food is to the body (22). To Pelagius’ assertion that sin cannot be punished by
more sin, Augustin replies that the apostle thinks differently (Rom. i. 21–31). Then putting his finger on the main point in controversy, he quotes the Scriptures as declaring the present condition of
man to be that of spiritual death. “The truth then designates as dead those whom this man declares to be unable to be damaged or corrupted by sin,—because, forsooth, he has discovered sin to
be no substance!” (25). It was by free will that man passed into this state of
death; but a dead man needs something else to revive him,—he needs nothing less than a Vivifier. But of vivifying grace, Pelagius
knew nothing; and by knowing nothing of a Vivifier, he knows nothing of a Saviour; but rather by making nature of itself able
to be sinless, he glorifies the Creator at the expense of the Saviour (39). Next is examined Pelagius’ contention that many
saints are enumerated in the Scriptures as having lived sinlessly in this world. While declining to discuss the
question of fact as to the Virgin Mary (42), Augustin opposes to the rest the declaration of John in 1 John i. 8, as final, but still pauses to explain why the Scriptures do not mention the sins of all, and to contend that all who ever
were saved under the Old Testament or the New, were saved by the sacrificial death of Christ, and by faith in Him (40–50).
Thus we are brought, as Augustin says, to the core of the question, which concerns, not the fact of sinlessness in any
man, but man’s ability to be sinless. This ability Pelagius affirms of all men, and Augustin denies of all “unless they are
justified by the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ and Him crucified” (51). Thus, the whole discussion is about grace,
which Pelagius does not admit in any true sense, but places only in the nature that God has made (52). We are next invited
to attend to another distinction of Pelagius’, in which he discriminates sharply between the nature that God has made, the
crown of which is free will, and the use that man makes of this free will. The endowment of free will is a “capacity;” it
is, because given by God in our making, a necessity of nature, and not in man’s power to have or not have. It is the right
use of it only, which man has in his power. This analysis, Pelagius illustrates at length, by appealing to the difference
between the possession and use of the various bodily senses. The ability to see, for instance, he says, is a necessity of
our
nature; we do not make it, we cannot help having it; it is ours only to use it. Augustin criticises this presentation of the
matter with great sharpness (although he is not averse to the analysis itself),—showing the inapplicability of the illustrations
used,—for, he asks, is it not possible for us to blind ourselves, and so no longer have the ability to see? and would not
many a man like to control the “use” of his “capacity” to hear when a screechy saw is in the neighbourhood? (55); and as
well the falsity of the contention illustrated, since Pelagius has ignored the fall, and, even were that not so, has so ignored
the need of God’s aid for all good, in any state of being, as to deny it (56). Moreover, it is altogether a fallacy, Augustin
argues, to contend that men have the “ability” to make every use we can conceive of our faculties. We cannot wish for unhappiness; God cannot deny Himself (57); and just so, in a corrupt nature, the mere possession of a faculty
of choice does not imply the ability to use that faculty for not sinning. “Of a man, indeed, who has his legs strong and sound, it
may be said admissibly enough, ‘whether he will or not, he has the capacity of walking;’ but if his legs be broken, however
much he may wish, he has not the ‘capacity.’ The nature of which our author speaks is corrupted” (57). What, then, can he
mean by saying that, whether we will or not, we have the capacity of not sinning,—a statement so opposite to Paul’s in
Rom. vii. 15? Some space is next given to an attempted rebuttal by Pelagius of the testimony of Gal. v. 17, on the ground that the “flesh” xxxivthere does not refer to the baptized (60–70); and then the passages are examined which Pelagius had quoted against Augustin
out of earlier writers,—Lactantius (71), Hilary (72), Ambrose (75), John of Constantinople (76), Xystus,—a blunder of Pelagius,
who quoted from a Pythagorean philosopher,
mistaking him for the Roman bishop Sixtus (57), Jerome (78), and Augustin himself (80). All these writers, Augustin shows,
admitted the universal sinfulness of man,—and especially he himself had confessed the necessity of grace in the immediate
context of the passage quoted by Pelagius. The treatise closes (82 sq.) with a noble panegyric on that love which God sheds
abroad in the heart, by the Holy Ghost, and by which alone we can be made keepers of the law.

The treatise On Nature and Grace was as yet unfinished, when the over-busy7676 For Augustin’s press of work just now, see Epistle 169, 1 and 13. scriptorium at Hippo was invaded by another young man seeking instruction. This time it was a zealous young presbyter from
the remotest part of Spain, “from the shore of the ocean,”—Paulus Orosius by name, whose pious soul had been afflicted with
grievous wounds by the Priscillianist and Origenist heresies that had broken out in his country, and who had come with eager
haste to Augustin, on hearing that he could get from him the instruction which he needed for confuting
them. Augustin seems to have given him his heart at once; and, feeling too little informed as to the special heresies which
he wished to be prepared to controvert, persuaded him to go on to Palestine to be taught by Jerome, and gave him introductions
which described him as one “who is in the bond of catholic peace a brother, in point of age a son, and in honour a fellow-presbyter,—a
man of quick understanding, ready speech, and burning zeal.” His departure to Palestine gave Augustin an
opportunity to consult with Jerome on the one point that had been raised in the Pelagian controversy on which he had not been
able to see light. The Pelagians had early argued,7777 The argument occurs in Pelagius’ Commentary on Paul, written before 410, and is already before Augustin in On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, etc., iii. 5. that, if souls are created anew for men at their birth, it would be unjust in God to impute Adam’s sin to them. And Augustin
found himself unable either to prove that souls are transmitted (traduced, as the phrase is), or to show that it would not involve God in injustice to make a soul only to make it subject to a sin
committed by another. Jerome had already put himself on record as a believer in both original sin and the creation of souls
at the time of birth.
Augustin feared the logical consequences of this assertion, and yet was unable to refute it. He therefore seized this occasion
to send a long treatise on the origin of the soul to his friend, with the request that he would consider the subject anew,
and answer his doubts.7878Epistle 166. In this treatise he stated that he was fully persuaded that the soul had fallen into sin, but by no fault of God or of nature,
but of its own free will; and asked when could the soul of an infant have contracted the guilt, which, unless the grace of
Christ should come to its rescue by baptism, would involve it in condemnation, if God (as Jerome held, and as he was willing
to hold with him, if this difficulty could be cleared up) makes each soul for each individual at the
time of birth? He professed himself embarrassed on sucha supposition by the penal sufferings of infants, the pains they endured
in this life, and much more the danger they are in of eternal damnation, into which they actually go unless saved by baptism.
God is good, just, omnipotent: how, then, can we account for the fact that “in Adam all die,” if souls are created afresh
for each birth? “If new souls are made for men,” he affirms, “individually at their birth, I do not see, on the one hand,
that they could have any sin while yet in infancy; nor do I believe, on the other hand, that God condemns any soul which He
sees to have no sin;” “and yet, whoever says that those children who depart out of this life without partaking of the sacrament
of baptism, shall be made alive in Christ, certainly contradicts the apostolic declaration,” and “he that is not made alive
in Christ must necessarily remain under the condemnation of which the apostle says that by the offence of one, judgment
came upon all men to condemnation.” “Wherefore,” he adds to his correspondent, “if that xxxvopinion of yours does not contradict this firmly grounded article of faith, let it be mine also; but if it does, let it no
longer be yours.”7979 An almost contemporary letter to Oceanus (Epistle 180, written in 416) adverts to the same subject and in the same spirit, showing how much it was in Augustin’s thoughts.
Compare Epistle 180, 2 and 5. So far as obtaining light was concerned, Augustin might have spared himself the pain of this composition: Jerome simply answered8080Epistle 172. that he had no leisure to reply to the questions submitted to him. But Orosius’ mission to Palestine was big with consequences.
Once there, he became the accuser of Pelagius before John of Jerusalem, and the occasion, at least, of the trials of Pelagius
in Palestine during the summer and winter of 415 which issued so disastrously, and ushered in a new phase of the conflict.

Meanwhile, however, Augustin was ignorant of what was going on in the East, and had his mind directed again to Sicily. About
a year had passed since he had sent thither his long letter to Hilary. Now his conjecture that Cœlestius was in some way at
the bottom of the Sicilian outbreak, received confirmation from a paper which certain catholic brethren brought out of Sicily,
and which was handed to Augustin by two exiled Spanish bishops, Eutropius and Paul. This
paper bore the title, Definitions Ascribed to Cœlestius, and presented internal evidence, in style and thought, of being correctly so ascribed.8181 See On the Perfection of Man’s Righteousness, 1. It consisted of three parts, in the first of which were collected a series of brief and compressed “definitions,” or “ratiocinations”
as Augustin calls them, in which the author tries to place the catholics in a logical dilemma, and to force them to admit
that man can live in this world without sin. In the second part, he adduced certain passages of Scripture in defence of his
doctrine. In the third part, he undertook to deal with the texts that had been quoted against his
contention, not, however, by examining into their meaning, or seeking to explain them in the sense of his theory, but simply
by matching them with others which he thought made for him. Augustin at once (about the end of 415) wrote a treatise in answer
to this, which bears the title of On the Perfection of Man’s Righteousness. The distribution of the matter in this work follows that of the treatise to which it is an answer. First of all (1–16),
the “ratiocinations” are taken up one by one
and briefly answered. As they all concern sin, and have for their object to prove that man cannot be accounted a sinner unless
he is able, in his own power, wholly to avoid sin,—that is, to prove that a plenary natural ability is the necessary basis
of responsibility,—Augustin argues per contra that man can entail a sinfulness on himself for which and for the deeds of which he remains responsible, though he is no
longer able to avoid sin; thus admitting that for the race, plenary ability
must stand at the root of sinfulness. Next (17–22) he discusses the passages which Cœlestius had advanced in defence of his
teachings, viz., (1) passages in which God commands men to be without sin, which Augustin meets by saying that the point is,
whether these commands are to be fulfilled without God’s aid, in the body of this death, while absent from the Lord (17–20); and (2) passages in which God declares that His commandments
are not grievous, which Augustin meets by explaining that
all God’s commandments are fulfilled only by Love, which finds nothing grievous; and that this love is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, without whom we have only
fear, to which the commandments are not only grievous, but impossible. Lastly, Augustin patiently follows Cœlestius through
his odd “oppositions of texts,” explaining carefully all that he had adduced, in an orthodox sense (23–42). In closing, he
takes up Cœlestius’ statement, that “it is quite possible for man not
to sin even in word, if God so will,” pointing out how he avoids saying “if God give him His help,” and then proceeds to distinguish
carefully between the differing assertions of sinlessness that may be made. To say that any man ever lived, or will live,
without needing forgiveness, is to contradict Rom. v. 12, and must imply that he does not need a Saviour, against Matt. ix. 12, 13. To say that after his sins have been forgiven, any one has ever
remained without sin, contradicts 1 John i. 8 and Matt. vi. 12. Yet, if God’s help be allowed, this contention is not so wicked as the other; and the great heresy is to deny the necessity
of God’s constant grace, for which we pray when we say, “Lead us not into temptation.”

Tidings were now (416) beginning to reach Africa of what was doing in the East. There was diligently circulated everywhere,
and came into Augustin’s hands, an epistle of Pelagius’ own “filled with vanity,” in which he boasted that fourteen bishops
had approved his assertion that “man can live without sin, and easily keep the commandments if he wishes,” and had thus “shut
the mouth of opposition in confusion,” and “broken up the whole band of wicked conspirators
against him.” Soon afterwards a copy of an “apologetical paper,” in which Pelagius used the authority of the Palestinian bishops
against his adversaries, not altogether without disingenuousness, was sent by him to Augustin through the hands of a common
acquaintance, Charus by name. It was not accompanied, however, by any letter from Pelagius; and Augustin wisely refrained
from making public use of it. Towards midsummer Orosius came with more authentic information, and bearing letters from
Jerome and Heros and Lazarus. It was apparently before his coming that a controversial sermon was preached, only a fragment
of which has come down to us.8282 Migne’s Edition of Augustin’s Works, vol. v. pp. 1719-1723. So far as we can learn from the extant part, its subject seems to have been the relation of prayer to Pelagianism; and what
we have, opens with a striking anecdote: “When these two petitions—‘Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors,’
and ‘Lead us not into temptation’—are objected to the Pelagians, what do you think they reply? I was horrified, my brethren,
when I heard it. I did not, indeed, hear it with my own ears; but my holy brother and fellow-bishop Urbanus,
who used to be presbyter here, and now is bishop of Sicca,” when he was in Rome, and was arguing with one who held these opinions,
pressed him with the weight of the Lord’s Prayer, and “what do you think he replied to him? ‘We ask God,’ he said, ‘not to
lead us into temptation, lest we should suffer something that is not in our power,—lest I should be thrown from my horse;
lest I should break my leg; lest a robber should slay me, and the like. For these things,’ he said, ‘are not in my power;
but for overcoming the temptations of my sins, I both have ability if I wish to use it, and am not able to receive God’s help.’8383 Compare the words of Cicero quoted above, p. xiv. You see, brethren,” the good bishop adds, “how malignant this heresy is: you see how it horrifies all of you. Have a care
that you be not taken by it.” He then presses the general doctrine of prayer as proving that all good things come from God,
whose aid is always necessary to us, and is always attainable by prayer; and closes as follows: “Consider, then, these things,
my brethren, when any one comes to you and says to you, ‘What, then, are we to do if we have nothing in
our power, unless God gives all things? God will not then crown us, but He will crown Himself.’ You already see that this
comes from that vein: it is a vein, but it has poison in it; it is stricken by the serpent; it is not sound. For what Satan
is doing to-day is seeking to cast out from the Church by the poison of heretics, just as he once cast out from Paradise by
the poison of the serpent. Let no one tell you that this one was acquitted by the bishops: there was an acquittal, but it
was his
confession, so to speak, his amendment, that was acquitted. For what he said before the bishops seemed catholic; but what
he wrote in his books, the bishops who pronounced the acquittal were ignorant of. And perchance he was really convinced and
amended. For we ought not to despair of the man who perchance preferred to be united to the catholic faith, and fled to its
grace and aid. Perchance this was what happened. But, in any event, it was not the heresy that was acquitted, but the man
who
denied the heresy.”8484 Compare the similar words in Epistle 177, 3, which was written, not only after what had occurred in Palestine was known, but also after the condemnatory decisions
of the African synods.

The coming of Orosius must have dispelled any lingering hope that the meaning of the council’s finding was that Pelagius had
really recanted. Councils were immediately assembled at Carthage and Mileve, and the documents which Orosius had brought were
read before them. We know nothing of their proceedings except what we can gather from the letters which they sent8585Epistles 175 and 176 in Augustin’s Letters. to Innocent at Rome, seeking his aid in their condemnation of the heresy now so nearly approved in Palestine. To these two
official letters, Augustin, in company with four other bishops, added a xxxviithird private letter,8686Epistle 177. The other bishops were Aurelius, Alypius, Evodius, and Possidius. in which they took care that Innocent should be informed on all the points necessary to his decision. This important letter
begins almost abruptly with a characterization of Pelagianism as inimical to the grace of God, and has grace for its subject
throughout. It accounts for the action of the Palestinian synod, as growing out of a misunderstanding of Pelagius’ words,
in which he seemed to acknowledge grace, which these catholic bishops understood naturally to mean that
grace of which they read in the Scriptures, and which they were accustomed to preach to their people,—the grace by which we
are justified from iniquity, and saved from weakness; while he meant nothing more than that by which we are given free will
at our creation. “For if these bishops had understood that he meant only that grace which we have in common with the ungodly
and with all, along with whom we are men, while he denied that by which we are Christians and the sons of God, they not only
could not have patiently listened to him,—they could not even have borne him before their eyes.” The letter then proceeds
to point out the difference between grace and natural gifts, and between grace and the law, and to trace out Pelagius’ meaning
when he speaks of grace, and when he contends that man can be sinless without any really inward aid. It suggests that Pelagius
be sent for, and thoroughly examined by Innocent, or that he should be examined by letter or in his writings; and that he
be not cleared until he unequivocally confessed the grace of God in the catholic sense, and anathematized the false teachings
in the books attributed to him. The book of Pelagius which was answered in the treatise On Nature and Grace was enclosed, with this letter, with the most important passages marked: and it was suggested that more was involved in the
matter than the fate of one single man, Pelagius, who, perhaps, was already brought to a better mind; the fate of multitudes
already
led astray, or yet to be deceived by these false views, was in danger.

At about this same time (417), the tireless bishop sent a short letter8787Epistle 178. to a Hilary, who seems to be Hilary of Norbonne, which is interesting from its undertaking to convey a characterization of
Pelagianism to one who was as yet ignorant of it. It thus brings out what Augustin conceived to be its essential features.
“An effort has been made,” we read, “to raise a certain new heresy, inimical to the grace of Christ, against the Church of
Christ. It is not yet openly separated from the Church. It is the heresy of men who dare to attribute so much
power to human weakness that they contend that this only belongs to God’s grace,—that we are created with free will and the
possibility of not sinning, and that we receive God’s commandments which are to be fulfilled by us; but, for keeping and fulfilling
these commandments, we do not need any divine aid. No doubt, the remission of sins is necessary for us; for we have no power
to right what we have done wrong in the past. But for avoiding and overcoming sins in the future, for conquering all
temptations with virtue, the human will is sufficient by its natural capacity without any aid of God’s grace. And neither
do infants need the grace of the Saviour, so as to be liberated by it through His baptism from perdition, seeing that they
have contracted no contagion of damnation from Adam.”8888Epistle 179. He engages Hilary in the destruction of this heresy, which ought to be “concordantly condemned and anathematized by all who
have hope in Christ,” as a “pestiferous impiety,” and excuses himself for not undertaking its full refutation in a brief letter.
A much more important letter was sent off, at about the same time, to John of Jerusalem, who had conducted the first Palestinian
examination of Pelagius, and had borne a prominent part in the synod at Diospolis. He sent with
it a copy of Pelagius’ book which he had examined in his treatise On Nature and Grace, as well as a copy of that reply itself, and asked John to send him an authentic copy of the proceedings at Diospolis. He
took this occasion seriously to warn his brother bishop against the wiles of Pelagius, and begged him, if he loved Pelagius,
to let men see that he did not so love him as to be deceived by him. He pointed out that in the book sent with the letter,
Pelagius called nothing the grace
of God except nature; and that he affirmed, and even vehemently contended, that by free will alone, human nature was able
to suffice for itself for working righteousness and keeping xxxviiiall God’s commandments; whence any one could see that he opposed the grace of God of which the apostles spoke in Rom. vii. 24, 25, and contradicted, as well, all the prayers and benedictions of the Church by which blessings were sought for men from God’s
grace. “If you
love Pelagius, then,” he continued, “let him, too, love you as himself,—nay, more than himself; and let him not deceive you.
For when you hear him confess the grace of God and the aid of God, you think he means what you mean by it. But let him be
openly asked whether he desires that we should pray God that we sin not; whether he proclaims the assisting grace of God,
without which we would do much evil; whether he believes that even children who have not yet been able to do good or evil
are
nevertheless, on account of one man by whom sin entered into the world, sinners in him, and in need of being delivered by
the grace of Christ.” If he openly denies such things, Augustin would be pleased to hear of it.

Thus we see the great bishop sitting in his library at Hippo, placing his hands on the two ends of the world. That nothing
may be lacking to the picture of his universal activity, we have another letter from him, coming from about this same time,
that exhibits his care for the individuals who had placed themselves in some sort under his tutelage. Among the refugees from
Rome in the terrible times when Alaric was a second time threatening the city, was a family of
noble women,—Proba, Juliana, and Demetrias,8989 See vol. i. of this series, p. 459, and the references there given. Compare Canon Robertson’s vivid account of them in his
History of the Christian Church, ii. 18, 145.—grandmother, mother, and daughter,—who, finding an asylum in Africa, gave themselves to God’s service, and sought the friendship
and counsel of Augustin. In 413 the granddaughter “took the veil” under circumstances that thrilled the Christian world, and
brought out letters of congratulation and advice from Augustin and Jerome, and also from Pelagius. This letter of Pelagius
seems not to have fallen into Augustin’s way until now (416): he was so disturbed by it that he wrote
to Juliana a long letter warning her against its evil counsels.9090Epistle 188. It was so shrewdly phrased, that, at first sight, Augustin was himself almost persuaded that it did somehow acknowledge the
grace of God; but when he compared it with others of Pelagius’ writings, he saw that here, too, he was using ambiguous phrases
in a non-natural sense. The object of his letter (in which Alypius is conjoined, as joint author) to Juliana is to warn her
and her holy daughter against all opinions that opposed the grace of God, and especially against the
covert teaching of the letter of Pelagius to Demetrias.9191 Compare On the Grace of Christ, 40. In the succeeding sections, some of its statements are examined. “In this book,” he says, “were it lawful for such an one to read it, a virgin of Christ would read that her holiness and
all her spiritual riches are to spring from no other source than herself; and thus before she attains to the perfection of
blessedness, she would learn—which may God forbid!—to be ungrateful to God.” Then, after quoting the words of Pelagius, in
which he declares that “earthly riches came from others, but your spiritual riches no one can have conferred on
you but yourself; for these, then, you are justly praised, for these you are deservedly to be preferred to others,—for they
can exist only from yourself and in yourself,” he continues: “Far be it from any virgin to listen to statements like these.
Every virgin of Christ understands the innate poverty of the human heart, and therefore declines to be adorned otherwise than
by the gifts of her spouse.…Let her not listen to him who says, ‘No one can confer them on you but yourself, and they cannot
exist except from you and in you:’ but to him who says, ‘We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency of
the power may be of God, and not of us.’ And be not surprised that we speak of these things as yours, and not from you; for
we speak of daily bread as ‘ours,’ but yet add ‘give it to us,’ lest it should be thought it was from ourselves.” Again, he
warns her that grace is not mere knowledge any more than mere nature; and that Pelagius, even when using the word “grace,”
means
no inward or efficient aid, but mere nature or knowledge or forgiveness of past sins; and beseeches her not to forget the
God of all grace from whom (Wisdom i. 20, 21) Demetrias had that very virgin continence which was so justly her boast.

With the opening of 417, came the answers from Innocent to the African letters.9292Epistles 181, 182, 183, among Augustin’s Letters. And although they were marred by much boastful language concerning the dignity of his see, which could not but be distasteful
to the Africans, they admirably served their purpose in the satisfactory manner in which they, on the one hand, asserted the
necessity of the “daily grace, and help of God,” for our good living, and, on the other, determined that the Pelagians had
denied this grace, and declared their leaders Pelagius and Cœlestius deprived of the communion of the
Church until they should “recover their senses from the wiles of the Devil by whom they are held captive according to his
will.” Augustin may be pardoned for supposing that a condemnation pronounced by two provincial synods in Africa, and heartily
concurred in by the Roman bishop, who had already at Jerusalem been recognized as in some sort the fit arbiter of this Western
dispute, should settle the matter. If Pelagius had been before jubilant, Augustin found this a suitable time for his
rejoicing.

About the same time with Innocent’s letters, the official proceedings of the synod of Diospolis at last reached Africa, and
Augustin lost no time (early in 417) in publishing a full account and examination of them, thus providing us with that inestimable
boon, a full contemporary history of the chief events connected with the controversy up to this time. This treatise, which
is addressed to Aurelius, bishop of Carthage, opens with a brief explanation of Augustin’s delay
heretofore, in discussing Pelagius’ defence of himself in Palestine, as due to his not having received the official copy of
the Proceedings of the Council at Diospolis (1–2a). Then Augustin proceeds at once to discuss at length the doings of the synod, point by point, following the official record
step by step (2b-45). He treats at large here eleven items in the indictment, with Pelagius’ answers and the synod’s decision, showing that
in all of them Pelagius either explained away
his heresy, taking advantage of the ignorance of the judges of his books, or else openly repudiated or anathematized it. When
the twelfth item of the indictment was reached (41b-43), Augustin shows that the synod was so indignant at its character (it charged Pelagius with teaching that men cannot be
sons of God unless they are sinless, and with condoning sins of ignorance, and with asserting that choice is not free if it
depends on God’s help, and that pardon is given according to
merit), that, without waiting for Pelagius’ answer, it condemned the statement, and Pelagius at once repudiated and anathematized
it (43). How could the synod act in such circumstances, he asks, except by acquitting the man who condemned the heresy? After
quoting the final judgment of the synod (44), Augustin briefly characterizes it and its effect (45) as being indeed all that
could be asked of the judges, but of no moral weight to those better acquainted than they were with Pelagius’
character and writings. In a word, they approved his answers to them, as indeed they ought to have done; but they by no means
approved, but both they and he condemned, his heresies as expressed in his writings. To this statement, Augustin appends an
account of the origin of Pelagianism, and of his relations to it from the beginning, which has the very highest value as history
(46–49); and then speaks of the character and doubtful practices of Pelagius (50–58), returning at the end (59–65) to a
thorough canvass of the value of the acquittal which he obtained by such doubtful practices at the synod. He closes with an
indignant account of the outrages which the Pelagians had perpetrated on Jerome (66).

This valuable treatise is not, however, the only account of the historical origin of Pelagianism that we have, from Augustin’s
hands. Soon after the death of Innocent (March 12, 417), he found occasion to write a very long letter9393Epistle 186, written conjointly with Alypius. to the venerable Paulinus of Nola, in which he summarized both the history of and the arguments against this “worldly philosophy.”
He begins by saying that he knows Paulinus has loved Pelagius as a servant of God, but is ignorant in what way he now loves
him. For he himself not only has loved him, but loves him still, but in different ways. Once he loved him as apparently a
brother in the true faith: now he loves him in the longing that God will by His mercy free him from
his noxious opinions against God’s grace. xlHe is not merely following report in so speaking of him: no doubt report did for a long time represent this of him, but he
gave the less heed to it because report is accustomed to lie. But a book of his9494 The book given him by Timasius and James, to which On Nature and Grace is a reply. at last came into his hands, which left no room for doubt, since in it he asserted repeatedly that God’s grace consisted
of the gift to man of the capacity to will and act, and thus reduced it to what is common to pagans and Christians, to the
ungodly and godly, to the faithful and infidels. He then gives a brief account of the measures that had been taken against
Pelagius, and passes on to a treatment of the main matters involved in the controversy,—all of which gather
around the one magic word of “the grace of God.” He argues first that we are all lost,—in one mass and concretion of perdition,—and
that God’s grace alone makes us to differ. It is therefore folly to talk of deserving the beginnings of grace. Nor can a faithful
man say that he merits justification by his faith, although it is given to faith; for at once he hears the words, “what hast
thou that thou didst not receive?” and learns that even the deserving faith is the gift of God. But if, peering
into God’s inscrutable judgments, we go farther, and ask why, from the mass of Adam, all of which undoubtedly has fallen from
one into condemnation, this vessel is made for honor, that for dishonor,—we can only say that we do not know more than the
fact; and God’s reasons are hidden, but His acts are just. Certain it is that Paul teaches that all die in Adam; and that
God freely chooses, by a sovereign election, some out of that sinful mass, to eternal life; and that He knew from the beginning
to whom He would give this grace, and so the number of the saints has always been fixed, to whom he gives in due time the
Holy Ghost. Others, no doubt, are called; but no others are elect, or “called according to his purpose.” On no other body
of doctrines, can it be possibly explained that some infants die unbaptized, and are lost. Is God unjust to punish innocent
children with eternal pains? And are they not innocent if they are not partakers of Adam’s sin? And can they be saved from
that,
save by the undeserved, and that is the gratuitous, grace of God? The account of the Proceedings at the Palestinian synod
is then taken up, and Pelagius’ position in his latest writings is quoted and examined. “But why say more?” he adds.…“Ought
they not, since they call themselves Christians, to be more careful than the Jews that they do not stumble at the stone of
offence, while they subtly defend nature and free will just like philosophers of this world who vehemently strive to be thought,
or to think themselves, to attain for themselves a happy life by the force of their own will? Let them take care, then, that
they do not make the cross of Christ of none effect by the wisdom of word (1 Cor. i. 17), and thus stumble at the rock of offence. For human nature, even if it had remained in that integrity in which it was created,
could by no means have served its own Creator without His aid. Since then, without God’s grace it could not keep the safety
it had received, how can it without God’s grace repair what it has lost?” With this profound view of the Divine immanence,
and of the necessity of His moving grace in all the acts of all his creatures, as over against the heathen-deistic view of
Pelagius, Augustin touched in reality the deepest point in the whole controversy, and illustrated the essential harmony of
all truth.9595 Compare also Innocent’s letter (Epistle 181) to the Carthaginian Council, chap. 4, which also Neander, History of the Christian Church, E.T., ii. 646, quotes in this connection, as showing that Innocent “perceived that this dispute was connected with a different
way of regarding the relation of God’s providence to creation.” As if Augustin did not see this too!

The sharpest period of the whole conflict was now drawing on.9696 The book addressed to Dardanus, in which the Pelagians are confuted, but not named, belongs about at this time. Compare Retractations, ii. 49. Innocent’s death brought Zosimus to the chair of the Roman See, and the efforts which he made to re-instate Pelagius and
Cœlestius now began (September, 417). How little the Africans were likely to yield to his remarkable demands, may be seen
from a sermon9797Sermon 131, preached at Carthage. which Augustin preached on the 23d of September, while Zosimus’ letter (written on the 21st of September) was on its way
to Africa. The preacher took his text from John vi. 54–66. “We hear here,” he said, “the true Master, the xliDivine Redeemer, the human Saviour, commending to us our ransom, His blood. He calls His body food, and His blood drink; and,
in commending such food and drink, He says, ‘Unless you eat My flesh, and drink My
blood, ye shall have no life in you.’ What, then, is this eating and drinking, but to live? Eat life, drink life; you shall
have life, and life is whole. This will come,—that is, the body and blood of Christ will be life to every one,—if what is
taken visibly in the sacrament is in real truth spiritually eaten and spiritually drunk. But that He might teach us that even
to believe in Him is of gift, not of merit, He said, ‘No one comes to Me, except the Father who sent Me draw him.’ Draw
him, not lead him. This violence is done to the heart, not the flesh. Why do you marvel? Believe, and you come; love, and you are drawn. Think not that this is harsh and injurious
violence; it is soft, it is sweet; it is sweetness itself that draws you. Is not the sheep drawn when the succulent herbage
is shown to him? And I think that there is no compulsion of the body, but an assembling of the desire. So, too, do you come
to Christ; wish not to plan a long journey,—when you
believe, then you come. For to Him who is everywhere, one comes by loving, not by taking a voyage. No doubt, if you come not,
it is your work; but if you come, it is God’s work. And even after you have come, and are walking in the right way, become
not proud, lest you perish from it: ‘happy are those that confide in Him,’ not in themselves, but in Him. We are saved by grace, not of ourselves: it is the gift of God. Why do I continually say this to you? It is because there
are men
who are ungrateful to grace, and attribute much to unaided and wounded nature. It is true that man received great powers of
free will at his creation; but he lost them by sinning. He has fallen into death; he has been made weak; he has been left
half dead in the way, by robbers; the good Samaritan has lifted him up upon his ass, and borne him to the inn. Why should
we boast? But I am told that it is enough that sins are remitted in baptism. But does the removal of sin take away weakness
too?
What! will you not see that after pouring the oil and the wine into the wounds of the man left half dead by the robbers, he
must still go to the inn where his weakness may be healed? Nay, so long as we are in this life we bear a fragile body; it
is only after we are redeemed from corruption that we shall find no sin, and receive the crown of righteousness. Grace, that
was hidden in the Old Testament, is now manifest to the whole world. Even though the Jew may be ignorant of it, why should
Christians be enemies of grace? why presumptuous of themselves? why ungrateful to grace? For, why did Christ come? Was not
nature already here,—that very nature by the praise of which you are beguiled? Was not the law here? But the apostle says,
‘If righteousness is of the law, then is Christ dead in vain.’ What the apostle says of the law, that we say to these men
about nature: if righteousness is by nature, then Christ is dead in vain. What then was said of the Jews, this we see repeated
in
these men. They have a zeal for God: I bear them witness that they have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. For,
being ignorant of God’s righteousness, and wishing to establish their own, they are not subject to the righteousness of God.
My brethren, share my compassion. Where you find such men, wish no concealment; let there be no perverse pity in you: where
you find them, wish no concealment at all. Contradict and refute, resist, or persuade them to us. For already two councils
have, in this cause, sent letters to the Apostolic See, whence also rescripts have come back. The cause is ended: would that
the error might some day end! Therefore we admonish so that they may take notice, we teach so that they may be instructed,
we pray so that their way be changed.” Here is certainly tenderness to the persons of the teachers of error; readiness to
forgive, and readiness to go all proper lengths in recovering them to the truth. But here is also absolute firmness as to
the
truth itself, and a manifesto as to policy. Certainly, on the lines of the policy here indicated, the Africans fought out
the coming campaign. They met in council at the end of this year, or early in the next (418); and formally replied to Zosimus,
that the cause had been tried, and was finished, and that the sentence that had been already pronounced against Pelagius and
Cœlestius should remain in force until they should unequivocally acknowledge that “we are aided by the grace of God through
Christ, not only to know, but to do, what is right, and that xliiin each single act; so that without grace we are unable to have, think, speak, or do anything belonging to piety.” As we may
see Augustin’s hand in this, so, doubtless, we may recognize it in that remarkable piece of engineering which crushed Zosimus’
plans within the next few months. There is, indeed, no direct proof that it was due to Augustin, or to the Africans under
his leading, or to the Africans at all, that the
State interfered in the matter; it is even in doubt whether the action of the Empire was put forth as a rescript, or as a
self-moved decree: but surely it is difficult to believe that such a coup de théâtrecould have been prepared for Zosimus by chance; and as it is well known, both that Augustin believed in the righteousness
of civil penalty for heresy, and invoked it on other occasions, and defended and used it on this, and that he had influential
friends at
court with whom he was in correspondence, it seems, on internal grounds, altogether probable that he was the Deus ex machinâ who let loose the thunders of ecclesiastical and civil enactment simultaneously on the poor Pope’s devoted head.

The “great African Council” met at Carthage, on the 1st of May, 418; and, after its decrees were issued, Augustin remained
at Carthage, and watched the effect of the combination of which he was probably one of the moving causes. He had now an opportunity
to betake himself once more to his pen. While still at Carthage, at short notice, and in the midst of much distraction, he
wrote a large work, in two books which have come down to us under the separate titles of
On the Grace of Christ, and On Original Sin, at the instance of another of those ascetic families which formed so marked a feature in those troubled times. Pinianus
and Melania, the daughter of Albina, were husband and wife, who, leaving Rome amid the wars with Alaric, had lived in continence
in Africa for some time, but now in Palestine had separated, he to become head of a monastery, and she an inmate of a convent.
While in Africa, they had lived at Sagaste under the tutelage of
Alypius, and in the enjoyment of the friendship and instruction of Augustin. After retiring to Bethlehem, like the other holy
ascetics whom he had known in Africa, they kept up their relations with him. Like the others, also, they became acquainted
with Pelagius in Palestine, and were well-nigh deceived by him. They wrote to Augustin that they had begged Pelagius to condemn
in writing all that had been alleged against him, and that he had replied in the presence of them all, that “he
anathematized the man who either thinks or says that the grace of God whereby Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners
is not necessary, not only for every hour and for every moment, but also for every act of our lives,” and asserted that “those
who endeavor to disannul it are worthy of everlasting punishment.”9898On the Grace of Christ, 2. Moreover, they wrote that Pelagius had read to them, out of his book that he had sent to Rome,9999 The so-called Confession of Faith sent to Innocent after the Synod of Diospolis, but which arrived after Innocent’s death. his assertion “that infants ought to be baptized with the same formula of sacramental words as adults.”100100On Original Sin, 1. They wrote that they were delighted to hear these words from Pelagius, as they seemed exactly what they had been desirous
of hearing; and yet they preferred consulting Augustin about them, before they were fully committed regarding them.101101 Do., 5. It was in answer to this appeal, that the present work was written; the two books of which take up the two points in Pelagius’
asseveration,—the theme of the first being “the assistance of the Divine grace towards our justification, by which God co-operates
in all things for good to those who love Him, and whom He first loved, giving to them that He may receive from them,”—while
the subject of the second is “the sin which by one man has entered the world along with death,
and so has passed upon all men.”102102On the Grace of Christ, 55.

The first book, On the Grace of Christ, begins by quoting and examining Pelagius’ anathema of all those who deny that grace is necessary for every action (2 sq.).
Augustin confesses that this would deceive all who were not fortified by knowledge of Pelagius’ writings; but asserts that
in the light of them it is clear that he means that grace is always necessary, because we need continually to remember the
forgiveness of our sins, the example of Christ, the
teaching of the law, and the like. Then he enters (4 sq.) upon an examination of Pelagius’ scheme of human xliiifaculties, and quotes at length his account of them given in his book, In Defence of Free Will, wherein he distinguishes between the possibilitas (posse), voluntas (velle), and actio (esse), and declares that the first only is from God and receives aid from God, while the others are entirely ours, and in our own
power. Augustin opposes to this the
passage in Phil. ii. 12, 13 (6), and then criticises (7 sq.) Pelagius’ ambiguous acknowledgment that God is to be praised for man’s good works, “because
the capacity for any action on man’s part is from God,” by which he reduces all grace to the primeval endowment of nature
with “capacity” (possibilitas, posse), and the help afforded it by the law and teaching. Augustin points out the difference between law and grace, and the purpose
of the former as a pedagogue to
the latter (9 sq.), and then refutes Pelagius’ further definition of grace as consisting in the promise of future glory and
the revelation of wisdom, by an appeal to Paul’s thorn in the flesh, and his experience under its discipline (11 sq.). Pelagius’
illustrations from our senses, of his theory of natural faculty, are then sharply tested (16); and the criticism on the whole
doctrine is then made and pressed (17 sq.), that it makes God equally sharer in our blame for evil acts as in our praise
for good ones, since if God does help, and His help is only His gift to us of ability to act in either part, then He has equally
helped to the evil deeds as to the good. The assertion that this “capacity of either part” is the fecund root of both good
and evil is then criticised (19 sq.), and opposed to Matt. vii. 18, with the result of establishing that we must seek two roots in our dispositions for so diverse results,—covetousness for
evil, and love for good,—not a single
root for both in nature. Man’s “capacity,” it is argued, is the root of nothing; but it is capable of both good and evil according
to the moving cause, which, in the case of evil, is man-originated, while, in the case of good, it is from God (21). Next,
Pelagius’ assertion that grace is given according to our merits (23 sq.) is taken up and examined. It is shown, that, despite
his anathema, Pelagius holds to this doctrine, and in so extreme a form as explicitly to declare that man comes and
cleaves to God by his freedom of will alone, and without God’s aid. He shows that the Scriptures teach just the opposite (24–26);
and then points out how Pelagius has confounded the functions of knowledge and love (27 sq.), and how he forgets that we cannot
have merits until we love God, while John certainly asserts that God loved us first (1 John iv. 10). The representation that what grace does is to render obedience easier (28–30), and the twin view that
prayer is only relatively necessary, are next criticised (32). That Pelagius never acknowledges real grace, is then demonstrated
by a detailed examination of all that he had written on the subject (31–45). The book closes (46–80) with a full refutation
of Pelagius’ appeal to Ambrose, as if he supported him; and exhibition of Ambrose’s contrary testimony as to grace and its
necessity.

The object of the second book—On Original Sin—is to show, that, in spite of Pelagius’ admissions as to the baptism of infants, he yet denies that they inherit original
sin and contends that they are born free from corruption. The book opens by pointing out that there is no question as to Cœlestius’
teaching in this matter (2–8), as he at Carthage refused to condemn those who say that Adam’s sin injured no one but himself,
and that infants are born in the same
state that Adam was in before the fall, and openly asserted at Rome that there is no sin ex traduce. As for Pelagius, he is simply more cautious and mendacious than Cœlestius: he deceived the Council at Diospolis, but failed
to deceive the Romans (5–13), and, as a matter of fact (14–18), teaches exactly what Cœlestius does. In support of this assertion,
Pelagius’ Defence of Free Will is quoted, wherein he asserts that we are born neither good nor bad, “but with a capacity for
either,” and “as without virtue, so without vice; and previous to the action of our own proper will, that that alone is in
man which God has formed” (14). Augustin also quotes Pelagius’ explanation of his anathema against those who say Adam’s sin
injured only himself, as meaning that he has injured man by setting a bad “example,” and his even more sinuous explanation
of his anathema against those who assert that infants are born in the same condition that Adam was in before he fell, as meaning
that they are infants and he was a man! (16–18). With this introduction to them, Augustin next treats of Pelagius’ subterfuges (19–25), and then animadverts on xlivthe importance of the issue (26–37), pointing out that Pelagianism is not a mere error, but a deadly heresy, and strikes at
the very centre of Christianity. A counter argument of the Pelagians is then answered (38–45), “Does not the doctrine of original
sin make marriage an evil thing?” No, says Augustin,
marriage is ordained by God, and is good; but it is a diseased good, and hence what is born of it is a good nature made by
God, but this good nature in a diseased condition,—the result of the Devil’s work. Hence, if it be asked why God’s gift produces
any thing for the Devil to take possession of, it is to be answered that God gives his gifts liberally (Matt. v. 45), and makes men; but the Devil makes these men sinners (46). Finally, as Ambrose had been appealed to in the
former book, so at the end of this it is shown that he openly proclaimed the doctrine of original sin, and here too, before
Pelagius, condemned Pelagius (47 sq.).

What Augustin means by writing to Pinianus and his family that he was more oppressed by work at Carthage than anywhere else,
may perhaps be illustrated from his diligence in preaching while in that capital. He seems to have been almost constantly
in the pulpit, during this period “of the sharpest conflict with them,”103103On the Gift of Perseverance, 55. preaching against the Pelagians. There is one series of his sermons, of the exact dates of which we can be pretty sure, which
may be adverted to here,—Sermons 151 and 152, preached early in October, 418; Sermon 155 on Oct. 14, 156 on Oct.17, and 26
on Oct. 18; thus following one another almost with the regularity of the days. The first of these was based on Rom. vii. 15–25, which he declares to contain dangerous words if not properly understood;
for men are prone to sin, and when they hear the apostle so speaking they do evil, and think they are like him. They are meant
to teach us, however, that the life of the just in this body is a war, not yet a triumph: the triumph will come only when
death is swallowed up in victory. It would, no doubt, be better not to have an enemy than even to conquer. It would be better
not to have evil desires: but we have them; therefore, let us not go after them. If they rebel against us, let us rebel
against them; if they fight, let us fight; if they besiege, let us besiege: let us look only to this, that they do not conquer.
With some evil desires we are born: others we make, by bad habit. It is on account of those with which we are born, that infants
are baptized; that they may be freed from the guilt of inheritance, not from any evil of custom, which, of course, they have
not. And it is on account of these, too, that our war must be endless: the concupiscence with which we are born
cannot be done away as long as we live; it may be diminished, but not done away. Neither can the law free us, for it only
reveals the sin to our greater apprehension. Where, then, is hope, save in the superabundance of grace? The next sermon (152)
takes up the words in Rom. viii. 1–4, and points out that the inward aid of the Spirit brings all the help we need. “We, like farmers in the field, work from
without: but, if there were no one who worked from within, the seed
would not take root in the ground, nor would the sprout arise in the field, nor would the shoot grow strong and become a tree,
nor would branches and fruit and leaves be produced. Therefore the apostle distinguishes between the work of the workmen and
of the Creator (1 Cor. iii. 6, 7). If God give not the increase, empty is this sound within your ears; but if he gives, it avails somewhat that we plant and
water, and our labor is not in vain.” He then applies this to the
individual, striving against his lusts; warns against Manichean error; and distinguishes between the three laws,—the law of
sin, the law of faith, and the law of deeds,—defending the latter, the law of Moses, against the Manicheans; and then he comes
to the words of the text, and explains its chief phrases, closing thus: “What other do we read here than that Christ is a
sacrifice for sin?…Behold by what ‘sin’ he condemned sin: by the sacrifice which he made for sins, he condemned sin. This
is
the law of the Spirit of life which has freed you from the law of sin and death. For that other law, the law of the letter,
the law that commands, is indeed good; ‘the commandment is holy and just and good:’ but ‘it was weak by the flesh,’ and what
it commanded it could not xlvbring about in us. Therefore there is one law, as I began by saying, that reveals sin to you, and another that takes it away:
the law of the letter reveals sin, the law of grace takes it away.” Sermon 155 covers
the same ground, and more, taking the broader text, Rom. viii. 1–11, and fully developing its teaching, especially as discriminating between the law of sin and the law of Moses and the law
of faith; the law of Moses being the holy law of God written with His finger on the tables of stone, while the law of the
Spirit of life is nothing other than the same law written in the heart, as the prophet (Jer. xxx. 1, 33) clearly declares. So written, it
does not terrify from without, but soothes from within. Great care is also taken, lest by such phrases as, “walk in the Spirit,
not in the flesh,” “who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” a hatred of the body should be begotten. “Thus you
shall be freed from the body of this death, not by having no body, but by having another one and dying no more. If, indeed,
he had not added, ‘of this death,’ perchance an error might have been suggested to the human mind, and it might have been
said, ‘You see that God does not wish us to have a body.’ But He says, ‘the body of this death.’ Take away death, and the
body is good. Let our last enemy, death, be taken away, and my dear flesh will be mine for eternity. For no one can ever ‘hate
his own flesh.’ Although the ‘spirit lusts against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit,’ although there is now a battle
in this house, yet the husband is seeking by his strife not the ruin of, but concord with, his wife. Far be it, far be it,
my brethren, that the spirit should hate the flesh in lusting against it! It hates the vices of the flesh; it hates the wisdom
of the flesh; it hates the contention of death. This corruption shall put on incorruption,—this mortal shall put on immortality;
it is sown a natural body; it shall rise a spiritual body; and you shall see full and perfect concord,—you shall see the creature
praise the Creator.” One of the special interests of such passages is to show, that, even at this early date,
Augustin was careful to guard his hearers from Manichean error while proclaiming original sin. One of the sermons which, probably,
was preached about this time (153), is even entitled, “Against the Manicheans openly, but tacitly against the Pelagians,”
and bears witness to the early development of the method that he was somewhat later to use effectively against Julian’s charges
of Manicheanism against the catholics.104104 Compare, below, pp. lv-lviii. Neander, in the second volume (E.T.) of his History of the Christian Church, discusses the matter in a very fair spirit. Three days afterwards, Augustin preached on the next few verses, Rom. viii. 12–17, but can scarcely be said to have risen to the height of its great argument. The greater part of the sermon is occupied with
a discussion of the law, why it was given, how it is legitimately used, and its usefulness as a pedagogue to bring us to Christ;
then of the need of a mediator; and then, of what it is to live according to the flesh, which includes living
according to merely human nature; and the need of mortifying the flesh in this world. All this, of course, gave full opportunity
for opposing the leading Pelagian errors; and the sermon is brought to a close by a direct polemic against their assertion
that the function of grace is only to make it more easy to do what is right. “With the sail more easily, with the oar with
more difficulty: nevertheless even with the oar we can go. On a beast more easily, on foot with more difficulty:
nevertheless progress can be made on foot. It is not true! For the true Master who flatters no one, who deceives no one,—the
truthful Teacher and very Saviour to whom the most grievous pedagogue has led us,—when he was speaking about good works, i.e.,
about the fruits of the twigs and branches, did not say, ‘Without me, indeed, you can do something, but you will do it more
easily with me;’ He did not say, ‘You can make your fruit without me, but more richly with me.’ He did not say this! Read
what He said: it is the holy gospel,—bow the proud necks! Augustin does not say this: the Lord says it. What says the Lord?
‘Without me you can do nothing!’” On the very next day, he was again in the pulpit, and taking for his text chiefly the ninety-fourth Psalm.105105 English version, xcv., see verse 6. The preacher began106106Sermon 26. by quoting the sixth verse, and laying stress on the words “our Maker.” ‘No Christian,’ he said, ‘doubted that God had made him, and that in such a
sense that God created not only the xlvifirst man, from whom all have descended, but that God to-day creates every man,—as He said to one of His saints, “Before that
I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee.” At first He created man apart from man; now He creates man from man: nevertheless,
whether man apart from man, or man from man, “it
is He that made us, and not we ourselves.” Nor has He made us and then deserted us; He has not cared to make us, and not cared
to keep us. Will He who made us without being asked, desert us when He is besought? But is it not just as foolish to say,
as some say or are ready to say, that God made them men, but they make themselves righteous? Why, then, do we pray to God
to make us righteous? The first man was created in a nature that was without fault or flaw. He was made righteous: he did
not
make himself righteous; what he did for himself was to fall and break his righteousness. This God did not do: He permitted
it, as if He had said, “Let him desert Me; let him find himself; and let his misery prove that he has no ability without Me.”
In this way God wished to show man what free will was worth without God. O evil free will without God! Behold, man was made
good; and by free will man was made evil! When will the evil man make himself good by free will? When good, he was not able
to
keep himself good; and now that he is evil, is he to make himself good? Nay, behold, He that made us has also made us “His
people” (Ps. xciv. 7). This is a distinguishing gift. Nature is common to all, but grace is not. It is not to be confounded with nature; but if
it were, it would still be gratuitous. For certainly no man, before he existed, deserved to come into existence. And yet God
has made him, and that not like the beasts or a stock or a stone, but in His own
image. Who has given this benefit? He gave it who was in existence: he received it who was not. And only He could do this,
who calls the things that are not as though they were: of whom the apostle says that “He chose us before the foundation of
the world.” We have been made in this world, and yet the world was not when we were chosen. Ineffable! wonderful! They are
chosen who are not: neither does He err in choosing, nor choose in vain. He chooses, and has elect whom He is to create to
be
chosen: He has them in Himself; not indeed in His nature, but in His prescience. Let us not, then, glory in ourselves, or
dispute against grace. If we are men, He made us. If we are believers, He made us this too. He who sent the Lamb to be slain
has, out of wolves, made us sheep. This is grace. And it is an even greater grace than that grace of nature by which we were
all made men.’ “I am continually endeavouring to discuss such things as these,” said the preacher, “against a new heresy which
is attempting to rise; because I wish you to be fixed in the good, untouched by the evil.…For, disputing against grace in
favor of free will, they became an offence to pious and catholic ears. They began to create horror; they began to be avoided
as a fixed pest; it began to be said of them, that they argued against grace. And they found such a device as this: ‘Because
I defend man’s free will, and say that free will is sufficient in order that I may be righteous,’ says one, ‘I do not say
that
it is without the grace of God.’ The ears of the pious are pricked up, and he who hears this, already begins to rejoice: ‘Thanks
be to God! He does not defend free will without the grace of God! There is free will, but it avails nothing without the grace
of God.’ If, then, they do not defend free will without the grace of God, what evil do they say? Expound to us, O teacher,
what grace you mean? ‘When I say,’ he says, ‘the free will of man, you observe that I say “of man”?’ What then?
‘Who created man?’ God. ‘Who gave him free will?’ God. ‘If, then, God created man, and God gave man free will, whatever man
is able to do by free will, to whose grace does he owe it, except to His who made him with free will?’ And this is what they
think they say so acutely! You see, nevertheless, my brethren, how they preach that general grace by which we were created
and by which we are men; and, of course, we are men in common with the ungodly, and are Christians apart from them. It is
this
grace by which we are Christians, that we wish them to preach, this that we wish them to acknowledge, this that we wish,—of
which the apostle says, ‘I do not make void the grace of God, for if righteousness is by the law, Christ is dead in vain.’”
Then the true function of the law is explained, as a revealer of our sinfulness, and a pedagogue to lead us to Christ: the
Manixlviichean view of the Old Testament law is attacked, but its insufficiency for salvation is pointed out; and so
we are brought back to the necessity of grace, which is illustrated from the story of the raising of the dead child in 2 Kings iv. 18–37,—the dead child being Adam; the ineffective staff (by which we ought to walk), the law; but the living prophet, Christ with
his grace, which we must preach. “The prophetic staff was not enough for the dead boy: would dead nature itself have been
enough? Even this, by which we are made, although we nowhere read of it under this name, we
nevertheless, because it is given gratuitously, confess to be grace. But we show to you a greater grace than this, by which
we are Christians.…This is the grace by Jesus Christ our Lord: it was He that made us,—both before we were at all, it was
He that made us, and now, after we are made, it is He that has made us all righteous,—and not we ourselves.” There was but
one mass of perdition from Adam, to which nothing was due but punishment; and from that mass vessels have been made unto honor.
“Rejoice because you have escaped; you have escaped the death that was due,—you have received the life that was not due. ‘But,’
you ask, ‘why did He make me unto honor, and another unto dishonor?’ Will you who will not hear the apostle saying, ‘O man,
who art thou that repliest against God?’ hear Augustin?…Do you wish to dispute with me? Nay, wonder with me, and cry out with
me, ‘Oh the depth of the riches!’ Let us both be afraid,—let us both cry out, ‘Oh the depth of the riches!’ Let us both
agree in fear, lest we perish in error.”

Augustin was not less busy with his pen, during these months, than with his voice. Quite a series of letters belong to the
last half of 418, in which he argues to his distant correspondents on the same themes which he was so iterantly trying to
make clear to his Carthaginian auditors. One of the most interesting of these was written to a fellow-bishop, Optatus, on
the origin of the soul.107107Epistle 190. Optatus, like Jerome, had expressed himself as favoring the theory of a special creation of each at birth; and Augustin,
in this letter as in the paper sent to Jerome, lays great stress on so holding our theories on so obscure a matter as to conform
to the indubitable fact of the transmission of sin. This fact, such passages as 1 Cor. xv. 21 sq., Rom. v. 12 sq., make certain; and in stating this, Augustin takes
the opportunity to outline the chief contents of the catholic faith over against the Pelagian denial of original sin and grace:
that all are born under the contagion of death and in the bond of guilt; that there is no deliverance except in the one Mediator,
Christ Jesus; that before His coming men received him as promised, now as already come, but with the same faith; that the
law was not intended to save, but to shut up under sin and so force us back upon the one Saviour; and that the
distribution of grace is sovereign. Augustin pries into God’s sovereign counsels somewhat more freely here than is usual with
him. “But why those also are created who, the Creator foreknew, would belong to damnation, not to grace, the blessed apostle
mentions with as much succinct brevity as great authority. For he says that God, ‘wishing to show His wrath and demonstrate
His power,’ etc. (Rom. ix. 22). Justly, however, would he seem unjust in forming vessels of wrath for
perdition, if the whole mass from Adam were not condemned. That, therefore, they are made on birth vessels of anger, belongs
to the punishment due to them; but that they are made by re-birth vessels of mercy, belongs to the grace that is not due to
them. God, therefore, shows his wrath,—not, of course, perturbation of mind, such as is called wrath among men, but a just
and fixed vengeance.…He shows also his power, by which he makes a good use of evil men, and endows them with many natural
and
temporal goods, and bends their evil to admonition and instruction of the good by comparison with it, so that these may learn
from them to give thanks to God that they have been made to differ from them, not by their own deserts which were of like
kind in the same mass, but by His pity.…But by creating so many to be born who, He foreknew, would not belong to his grace,
so that they are more by an incomparable multitude than those whom he deigned to predestinate as children of the promise into
the glory of His Kingdom,—He wished to show by this very xlviiimultitude of the rejected how entirely of no moment it is to the just God what is the multitude of those most justly condemned.
And that hence also those who are redeemed from this condemnation may understand, that what they see rendered to so great
a part of the mass was the due of the whole of it,—not only of those who add many others to original sin, by the choice of
an evil will, but as well of so many children who are
snatched from this life without the grace of the Mediator, bound by no bond except that of original sin alone.” With respect
to the question more immediately concerning which the letter was written, Augustin explains that he is willing to accept the
opinion that souls are created for men as they are born, if only it can be made plain that it is consistent with the original
sin that the Scriptures so clearly teach. In the paper sent to Jerome, the difficulties of creationism are sufficiently
urged; this letter is interesting on account of its statement of some of the difficulties of traducianism also,—thus evidencing
Augustin’s clear view of the peculiar complexity of the problem, and justifying his attitude of balance and uncertainty between
the two theories. ‘The human understanding,’ he says, ‘can scarcely comprehend how a soul arises from a parent’s soul in the
offspring; or is transmitted to the offspring as a candle is lighted from a candle and thence another fire comes into
existence without loss to the former one. Is there an incorporeal seed for the soul, which passes, by some hidden and invisible
channel of its own, from the father to the mother, when it is conceived in the woman? Or, even more incredible, does it lie
enfolded and hidden within the corporeal seed?’ He is lost in wonder over the question whether, when conception does not take
place, the immortal seed of an immortal soul perishes; or, does the immortality attach itself to it only when it lives?
He even expresses the doubt whether traducianism will explain what it is called in to explain, much better than creationism;
in any case, who denies that God is the maker of every soul? Isaiah (lvii. 16) says, “I have made every breath;” and the only question that can arise is as to method,—whether He “makes every breath from
the one first breath, just as He makes every body of man from the one first body; or whether he makes new bodies indeed, from
the one body, but new souls out of nothing.” Certainly nothing but Scripture can determine such a question; but where do the
Scriptures speak unambiguously upon it? The passages to which the creationists point
only affirm the admitted fact that God makes the soul; and the traducianists forget that the word “soul” in the Scriptures
is ambiguous, and can mean “man,” and even a “dead man.” What more can be done, then, than to assert what is certain, viz.,
that sin is propagated, and leave what is uncertain in the doubt in which God has chosen to place it?

This letter was written not long after the issue of Zosimus’ Tractoria, demanding the signature of all to African orthodoxy; and Augustin sends Optatus “copies of the recent letters which have
been sent forth from the Roman see, whether specially to the African bishops or generally to all bishops,” on the Pelagian
controversy, “lest perchance they had not yet reached” his correspondent, who, it is very evident, he was anxious should thoroughly
realize “that the
authors, or certainly the most energetic and noted teachers,” of these new heresies, “had been condemned in the whole Christian
world by the vigilance of episcopal councils aided by the Saviour who keeps His Church, as well as by two venerable overseers
of the Apostolical see, Pope Innocent and Pope Zosimus, unless they should show repentance by being convinced and reformed.”
To this zeal we owe it that the letter contains an extract from Zosimus’ Tractoria, one of the two brief
fragments of that document that have reached our day.

There was another ecclesiastic in Rome, besides Zosimus, who was strongly suspected of favoring the Pelagians,—the presbyter
Sixtus, who afterwards became Pope Sixtus III. But when Zosimus sent forth his condemnation of Pelagianism, Sixtus sent also
a short letter to Africa addressed to Aurelius of Carthage, which, though brief, indicated a considerable vigor against the
heresy which he was commonly believed to have before defended,108108 See Epistle 194, 1. and which claimed him as its own.109109 See Epistle 191, 1. Some months afterwards, he sent another similar, but longer, letter to Augustin and Alypius, more fully xlixexpounding his rejection of “the fatal dogma” of Pelagius, and his acceptance of “that grace of God freely given by Him to
small and great, to which Pelagius’ dogma was diametrically opposed.” Augustin was overjoyed with these developments. He quickly
replied in a short letter110110Epistle 191. in which he expresses the delight he has in learning from Sixtus’ own hand that he is not a defender of Pelagius, but a preacher
of grace. And close upon the heels of this he sent another much longer letter,111111Epistle 194. in which he discusses the subtler arguments of the Pelagians with an anxious care that seems to bear witness to his desire
to confirm and support his correspondent in his new opinions. Both letters testify to Augustin’s approval of the persecuting
measures which had been instituted by the Roman see in obedience to the emperor; and urge on Sixtus his duty not only to bring
the open heretics to deserved punishment, but to track out those who spread their poison secretly, and
even to remember those whom he had formerly heard announcing the error before it had been condemned, and who were now silent
through fear, and to bring them either to open recantation of their former beliefs, or to punishment. It is pleasanter to
recall our thoughts to the dialectic of these letters. The greater part of the second is given to a discussion of the gratuitousness
of grace, which, just because grace, is given to no preceding merits. Many subtle objections to this doctrine were
brought forward by the Pelagians. They said that “free will was taken away if we asserted that man did not have even a good
will without the aid of God;” that we made “God an accepter of persons, if we believed that without any preceding merits He
had mercy on whom He would, and whom He would He called, and whom He would He made religious;” that “it was unjust, in one
and the same case, to deliver one and punish another;” that, if such a doctrine is preached, “men who do not wish to live
rightly and faithfully, will excuse themselves by saying that they have done nothing evil by living ill, since they have not
received the grace by which they might live well;” that it is a puzzle “how sin can pass over to the children of the faithful,
when it has been remitted to the parents in baptism;” that “children respond truly by the mouth of their sponsors that they
believe in remission of sins, but not because sins are remitted to them, but because they believe that sins are
remitted in the church or in baptism to those in whom they are found, not to those in whom they do not exist,” and consequently
they said that “they were unwilling that infants should be so baptized unto remission of sins as if this remission took place
in them,” for (they contend) “they have no sin; but they are to be baptized, although without sin, with the same rite of baptism
through which remission of sins takes place in any that are sinners.” This last objection is especially interesting
112112 It appears to have been first reported to Augustin, by Marius Mercator, in a letter received at Carthage. See Epistle 193, 3. because it furnishes us with the reply which the Pelagians made to the argument that Augustin so strongly pressed against
them from the very act and ritual of baptism, as implying remission of sins.113113 As, for example, in On the Merits and Remission of Sins, etc., i. His rejoinder to it here is to point to the other parts of the same ritual, and to ask why, then, infants are exorcised and
exsufflated in baptism. “For, it cannot be doubted that this is done fictitiously, if the Devil does not rule over them; but
if he rules over them, and they are therefore not falsely exorcised and exsufflated, why does that prince of sinners rule
over them except because of sin?” On the fundamental matter of the gratuitousness of grace, this letter is
very explicit. “If we seek for the deserving of hardening, we shall find it.…But if we seek for the deserving of pity, we
shall not find it; for there is none, lest grace be made a vanity if it is not given gratis, but rendered to merits. But,
should we say that faith preceded and in it there is desert of grace, what desert did man have before faith that he should
receive faith? For, what did he have that he did not receive? and if he received it, why does he glory as if he received it
not? For
as man would not have wisdom, understanding, prudence, fortitude, knowledge, piety, fear of God, unless he had received (according
to the prophet) the spirit of wisdom and understanding, of prudence and fortitude, of knowledge and piety and the fear of
God; as he would not have justice, love, continence, except the spirit was received of whom the apostle says, ‘For you did
not receive the spirit of fear, but of lvirtue, and love, and continence:’ so he would not have faith
unless he received the spirit of faith of whom the same apostle says, ‘Having then the same spirit of faith, according to
what is written, “I believed and therefore spoke,” we too believe and therefore speak.’ But that He is not received by desert,
but by His mercy who has mercy on whom He will, is manifestly shown where he says of himself, ‘I have obtained mercy to be
faithful.’” “If we should say that the merit of prayer precedes, that the gift of grace may follow,…even prayer itself is
found
among the gifts of grace” (Rom. viii. 26). “It remains, then, that faith itself, whence all righteousness takes beginning;…it remains, I say, that even faith itself
is not to be attributed to the human will which they extol, nor to any preceding merits, since from it begin whatever good
things are merits: but it is to be confessed to be the gratuitous gift of God, since we consider it true grace, that is, without
merits, inasmuch as we read in the same epistle, ‘God divides
out the measure of faith to each’ (Rom. xii. 3). Now, good works are done by man, but faith is wrought in man, and without it these are not done by any man. For all that
is not of faith is sin” (Rom. xiv. 23).

By the same messenger who carried this important letter to Sixtus, Augustin sent also a letter to Mercator,114114Epistle 193. an African layman who was then apparently at Rome, but who was afterwards (in 429) to render service by instructing the Emperor
Theodosius as to the nature and history of Pelagianism, and so preventing the appeal of the Pelagians to him from being granted.
Now he appears as an inquirer: Augustin, while at Carthage, had received a letter from him in which he had consulted him on
certain questions that the Pelagians had raised, but in such a manner as to indicate his
opposition to them. Press of business had compelled the postponement of the reply until this later date. One of the questions
that Mercator had put concerned the Pelagian account of infants sharing in the one baptism unto remission of sins, which we
have seen Augustin answering when writing to Sixtus. In this letter he replies: “Let them, then, hear the Lord (John iii. 36). Infants, therefore, who made believers by others, by whom they are brought to baptism,
are, of course, unbelievers by others, if they are in the hands of such as do not believe that they should be brought, inasmuch
as they believe they are nothing profited; and accordingly, if they believe by believers, and have eternal life, they are
unbelievers by unbelievers, and shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on them. For it is not said, ‘it comes on them,’ but ‘it abideth on them,’ because it was on them from the beginning, and will not be taken from them
except by the grace of God through Jesus Christ, our Lord.…Therefore, when children are baptized, the confession is made that
they are believers, and it is not to be doubted that those who are not believers are condemned: let them, then, dare to say
now, if they can, that they contract no evil from their origin to be condemned by the just God, and have no contagion of sin.”
The other matter on which Mercator sought light concerned the statement that universal death proved universal sin:
115115 Compare On Dulcitius’ Eight Questions, 3. he reported that the Pelagians replied that not even death was universal,—that Enoch, for instance, and Elijah, had not died.
Augustin adds those who are to be found living at the second advent, who are not to die, but be “changed;” and replies that
Rom. v. 12 is perfectly explicit that there is no death in the world except that which comes from sin, and that God a Saviour, and we
cannot at all “deny that He is able to do that, now, in any
that he wishes, without death, which we undoubtingly believe is to be done in so many after death.” He adds that the difficult
question is not why Enoch and Elijah did not die, if death is the punishment of sin; but why, such being the case, the justified
ever die; and he refers his correspondent to his book On the Baptism of Infants116116 That is, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, etc., ii. 30 sq. for a resolution of this greater difficulty.

It was probably at the very end of 418 that Augustin wrote a letter of some length117117Epistle 196. to Asellicus, in reply to one which he had written on “avoiding the deception of Judaism,” to the primate of the Bizacene
province, and which that ecclesiastic had sent to Augustin for answering. He discusses in this the law of the Old Testament.
He opens by pointing out that the apostle forbids Christians to Judaize (Gal. ii. 14–16), and explains that it is not merely the ceremonial lilaw that we may not depend upon, “but also what is
said in the law, ‘Thou shalt not covet’ (which no one, of course, doubts is to be said to Christians too), does not justify
man, except by faith in Jesus Christ and the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” He then expounds the use of the
law: “This, then, is the usefulness of the law: that it shows man to himself, so that he may know his weakness, and see how,
by the prohibition, carnal concupiscence is rather increased than healed.…The use of the law is, thus, to convince man of
his
weakness, and force him to implore the medicine of grace that is in Christ.” “Since these things are so,” he adds, “those
who rejoice that they are Israelites after the flesh, and glory in the law apart from the grace of Christ, these are those
concerning whom the apostle said that ‘being ignorant of God’s righteousness, and wishing to establish their own, they are
not subject to God’s righteousness;’ since he calls ‘God’s righteousness’ that which is from God to man; and ‘their own,’
what they
think that the commandments suffice for them to do without the help and gift of Him who gave the law. But they are like those
who, while they profess to be Christians, so oppose the grace of Christ, that they suppose that they fulfil the divine commands
by human powers, and, ‘wishing to establish their own,’ are ‘not subject to the righteousness of God,’ and so, not indeed
in name, but yet in error, Judaize. This sort of men found heads for themselves in Pelagius and Cœlestius, the most acute
asserters of this impiety, who by God’s recent judgment, through his diligent and faithful servants, have been deprived even
of catholic communion, and, on account of an impenitent heart, persist still in their condemnation.”

At the beginning of 419, a considerable work was published by Augustin on one of the more remote corollaries which the Pelagians
drew from his teachings. It had come to his ears, that they asserted that his doctrine condemned marriage: “if only sinful
offspring come from marriage,” they asked, “is not marriage itself made a sinful thing?” The book which Augustin composed
in answer to this query, he dedicated to, and sent along with an explanatory letter to, the
Comes Valerius, a trusted servant of the Emperor Honorius, and one of the most steady opponents at court of the Pelagian heresy.
Augustin explains118118On Marriage and Concupiscence, i. 2. why he has desired to address the book to him: first, because Valerius was a striking example of those continent husbands
of which that age furnishes us with many instances, and, therefore, the discussion would have especial interest for him; secondly,
because of his eminence as an opponent of Pelagianism; and, thirdly, because Augustin had learned that he had read a Pelagian
document in which Augustin was charged with condemning marriage by defending original sin.
119119 Compare the Benedictine Preface to The Unfinished Work. The book in question is the first book of the treatise On Marriage and Concupiscence. It is, naturally, tinged, or rather stained, with the prevalent ascetic notions of the day. Its doctrine is that marriage
is good, and God is the maker of the offspring that comes from it, although now there can be no begetting and hence no birth
without sin. Sin made concupiscence, and now concupiscence perpetuates sinners. The specific object of the work, as it states
it itself, is
“to distinguish between the evil of carnal concupiscence, from which man, who is born therefrom, contracts original sin, and
the good of marriage” (I. 1). After a brief introduction, in which he explains why he writes, and why he addresses his book
to Valerius (1–2), Augustin points out that conjugal chastity, like its higher sister-grace of continence, is God’s gift.
Thus copulation, but only for the propagation of children, has divine allowance (3–5). Lust, or “shameful concupiscence,”
however, he teaches, is not of the essence, but only an accident, of marriage. It did not exist in Eden, although true marriage
existed there; but arose from, and therefore only after, sin (6–7). Its addition to marriage does not destroy the good of
marriage: it only conditions the character of the offspring (8). Hence it is that the apostle allows marriage, but forbids
the “disease of desire” (1 Thess. iv. 3–5); and hence the Old-Testament saints were even permitted
more than one wife, because, by multiplying wives, it was not lust, but offspring, that was increased (9–10). Nevertheless,
fecundity is not to be thought the only good of marriage: true liimarriage can exist without offspring, and even without cohabitation (11–13), and cohabitation is now, under the New Testament,
no longer a duty as it was under the Old Testament (14–15), but the apostle praises continence above it. We must, then, distinguish
between the goods of marriage, and seek
the best (16–19). But thus it follows that it is not due to any inherent and necessary evil in marriage, but only to the presence,
now, of concupiscence in all cohabitation, that children are born under sin, even the children of the regenerate, just as
from the seed of olives only oleasters grow (20–24). And yet again, concupiscence is not itself sin in the regenerate; it
is remitted as guilt in baptism: but it is the daughter of sin, and it is the mother of sin, and in the unregenerate it is
itself sin, as to yield to it is even to the regenerate (25–39). Finally, as so often, the testimony of Ambrose is appealed
to, and it is shown that he too teaches that all born from cohabitation are born guilty (40). In this book, Augustin certainly
seems to teach that the bond of connection by which Adam’s sin is conveyed to his offspring is not mere descent, or heredity,
or mere inclusion in him, in a realistic sense, as partakers of the same numerical nature, but concupiscence. Without
concupiscence in the act of generation, the offspring would not be a partaker of Adam’s sin. This he had taught also previously,
as, e.g., in the treatise On Original Sin, from which a few words may be profitably quoted as succinctly summing up the teaching of this book on the subject: “It is,
then, manifest, that that must not be laid to the account of marriage, in the absence of which even marriage would still have
existed.…Such, however, is the present condition of mortal men, that
the connubial intercourse and lust are at the same time in action.…Hence it follows that infants, although incapable of sinning,
are yet not born without the contagion of sin,…not, indeed, because of what is lawful, but on account of that which is unseemly:
for, from what is lawful, nature is born; from what is unseemly, sin” (42).

Towards the end of the same year (419), Augustin was led to take up again the vexed question of the origin of the soul,—both
in a new letter to Optatus,120120Epistle 202, bis. Compare Epistle 190. by the zeal of the same monk, Renatus, who had formerly brought Optatus’ inquiries to his notice,—in an elaborate treatise
entitled On the Soul and its Origin, by way of reply to a rash adventure of a young man named Vincentius Victor, who blamed him for his uncertainty on such a
subject, and attempted to determine all the puzzles of the question, though, as Augustin insists, on assumptions that were
partly Pelagian and partly worse. Optatus had written in the hope
that Augustin had heard by this time from Jerome, in reply to the treatise he had sent him on this subject. Augustin, in answering
his letter, expresses his sorrow that he has not yet been worthy of an answer from Jerome, although five years had passed
away since he wrote, but his continued hope that such an answer will in due time come. For himself, he confesses that he has
not yet been able to see how the soul can contract sin from Adam and yet not itself be contracted from Adam; and he
regrets that Optatus, although holding that God creates each soul for its birth, has not sent him the proofs on which he depends
for that opinion, nor met its obvious difficulties. He rebukes Optatus for confounding the question of whether God makes the
soul, with the entirely different one of how he makes it, whether ex propagine or sive propagine. No one doubts that God makes the soul, as no one doubts that He makes the body. But when we consider how he makes it, sobriety
and
vigilance become necessary lest we should unguardedly fall into the Pelagian heresy. Augustin defends his attitude of uncertainty,
and enumerates the points as to which he has no doubt: viz., that the soul is spirit, not body; that it is rational or intellectual;
that it is not of the nature of God, but is so far a mortal creature that it is capable of deterioration and of alienation
from the life of God, and so far immortal that after this life it lives on in bliss or punishment forever; that
it was not incarnated because of, or according to, preceding deserts acquired in a previous existence, yet that it is under
the curse of sin which it derives from Adam, and therefore in all cases alike needs redemption in Christ.

liiiThe whole subject of the nature and origin of the soul, however, is most fully discussed in the four books which are gathered
together under the common title of On the Soul and its Origin. Vincentius Victor was a young layman who had recently been converted from the Rogatian heresy; on being shown by his friend
Peter, a presbyter, a small work of Augustin’s on the origin of the soul, he expressed surprise that so great a man could
profess ignorance
on a matter so intimate to his very being, and, receiving encouragement, wrote a book for Peter in which he attacked and tried
to solve all the difficulties of the subject. Peter received the work with transports of delighted admiration; but Renatus,
happening that way, looked upon it with distrust, and, finding that Augustin was spoken of in it with scant courtesy, felt
it his duty to send him a copy of it, which he did in the summer of 419. It was probably not until late in the following
autumn that Augustin found time to take up the matter; but then he wrote to Renatus, to Peter, and two books to Victor himself,
and it is these four books together which constitute the treatise that has come down to us. The first book is a letter to
Renatus, and is introduced by an expression of thanks to him for sending Victor’s book, and of kindly feeling towards and
appreciation for the high qualities of Victor himself (1–3). Then Victor’s errors are pointed out,—as to the nature of the
soul
(4–9), including certain far-reaching corollaries that flow from these (10–15), as well as, as to the origin of the soul (16–30);
and the letter closes with some remarks on the danger of arguing from the silence of Scripture (31), on the self-contradictions
of Victor (34), and on the errors that must be avoided in any theory of the origin of the soul that hopes to be acceptable,—to
wit, that souls become sinful by an alien original sin, that unbaptized infants need no salvation, that souls
sinned in a previous state, and that they are condemned for sins which they have not committed but would have committed had
they lived longer. The second book is a letter to Peter, warning him of the responsibility that rests on him as Victor’s trusted
friend and a clergyman, to correct Victor’s errors, and reproving him for the uninstructed delight he had taken in Victor’s
crudities. It opens by asking Peter what was the occasion of the great joy which Victor’s book brought him? could it be
that he learned from it, for the first time, the old and primary truths it contained? (2–3); or was it due to the new errors
that it proclaimed,—seven of which he enumerates? (4–16). Then, after animadverting on the dilemma in which Victor stood,
of either being forced to withdraw his violent assertion of creationism, or else of making God unjust in His dealings with
new souls (17), he speaks of Victor’s unjustifiable dogmatism in the matter (18–21), and closes with severely solemn words
to
Peter on his responsibility in the premises (22–23). In the third and fourth books, which are addressed to Victor, the polemic,
of course, reaches its height. The third book is entirely taken up with pointing out to Victor, as a father to a son, the
errors into which he has fallen, and which, in accordance with his professions of readiness for amendment, he ought to correct.
Eleven are enumerated: 1. That the soul was made by God out of Himself (3–7); 2. That God will continuously create souls
forever (8); 3. That the soul has desert of good before birth (9); 4. (contradictingly), That the soul has desert of evil
before birth (10); 5. That the soul deserved to be sinful before any sin (11); 6. That unbaptized infants are saved (12);
7. That what God predestinates may not occur (13); 8. That Wisd. iv. 1 is spoken of infants (14); 9. That some of the mansions with the Father are outside of God’s kingdom (15–17); 10. That the
sacrifice of Christ’s blood may be
offered for the unbaptized (18); 11. That the unbaptized may attain at the resurrection even to the kingdom of heaven (19).
The book closes by reminding Victor of his professions of readiness to correct his errors, and warning him against the obstinacy
that makes the heretic (20–23). The fourth book deals with the more personal elements of the controversy, and discusses the
points in which Victor had expressed dissent from Augustin. It opens with a statement of the two grounds of complaint that
Victor had urged against Augustin; viz., that he refused to express a confident opinion as to the origin of the soul, and
that he affirmed that the soul was not corporeal, but spirit (1–2). These two complaints are then taken up at length (2–16
and 17–37). To the first, Augustin replies that man’s knowledge is at best limited, livand often most limited about the things nearest to him; we do not know the constitution of our bodies; and, above most others,
this subject of the origin of
the soul is one on which no one but God is a competent witness. Who remembers his birth? Who remembers what was before birth?
But this is just one of the subjects on which God has not spoken unambiguously in the Scriptures. Would it not be better,
then, for Victor to imitate Augustin’s cautious ignorance, than that Augustin should imitate Victor’s rash assertion of errors?
That the soul is not corporeal, Augustin argues (18–35) from the Scriptures and from the phenomena of dreams; and then
shows, in opposition to Victor’s trichotomy, that the Scriptures teach the identity of “soul” and “spirit” (36–37). The book
closes with a renewed enumeration of Victor’s eleven errors (38), and a final admonition to his rashness (39). It is pleasant
to know that Augustin found in this case, also, that righteousness is the fruit of the faithful wounds of a friend. Victor
accepted the rebuke, and professed his better instruction at the hands of his modest but resistless antagonist.

The controversy now entered upon a new stage. Among the evicted bishops of Italy who refused to sign Zosimus’ Epistola Tractoria, Julian of Eclanum was easily the first, and at this point he appears as the champion of Pelagianism. It was a sad fate that
arrayed this beloved son of his old friend against Augustin, just when there seemed to be reason to hope that the controversy
was at an end, and the victory won, and the plaudits of the world were greeting
him as the saviour of the Church.121121 Compare Epistle 195. But the now fast-aging bishop was to find, that, in this “very confident young man,” he had yet to meet the most persistent
and most dangerous advocate of the new doctrines that had arisen. Julian had sent, at an earlier period, two letters to Zosimus,
one of which has come down to us as a “Confession of Faith,” and the other of which attempted to approach Augustinian forms
of speech as much as possible; the object of both being to gain standing ground in the Church for the
Italian Pelagians. Now he appears as a Pelagian controversialist; and in opposition to the book On Marriage and Concupiscence, which Augustin had sent Valerius, he published an extended work in four thick books addressed to Turbantius. Extracts from
the first of these books were sent by some one to Valerius, and were placed by him in the hands of Alypius, who was then in
Italy, for transmission to Augustin. Meanwhile, a letter had been sent to Rome by Julian,122122 Julian afterwards repudiated this letter, perhaps because of some falsifications it had suffered; it seems to have been certainly
his. designed to strengthen the cause of Pelagianism there; and a similar one, in the names of the eighteen Pelagianizing Italian
bishops, was addressed to Rufus, bishop of Thessalonica, and representative of the Roman see in that portion of the Eastern
Empire which was regarded as ecclesiastically a part of the West, the design of which was to obtain the powerful support of
this important magnate, perhaps, also, a refuge from persecution within his jurisdiction. These two
letters came into the hands of the new Pope, Boniface, who gave them also to Alypius for transmission to Augustin. Thus provided,
Alypius returned to Africa. The tactics of all these writings of Julian were essentially the same; he attempted not so much
to defend Pelagianism, as to attack Augustinianism, and thus literally to carry the war into Africa. He insisted that the
corruption of nature which Augustin taught was nothing else than Manicheism; that the sovereignty of grace, as taught by
him, was only the attribution of “acceptance of persons,” and partiality, to God; and that his doctrine of predestination
was mere fatalism. He accused the anti-Pelagians of denying the goodness of the nature that God had created, of the marriage
that He had ordained, of the law that He had given, of the free will that He had implanted in man, as well as the perfection
of His saints.123123 Compare Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, iii. 24: and see above, p. xv. He insisted that this teaching also did dishonour to baptism itself which it professed so to honour, inasmuch as it asserted
the continuance of concupiscence after baptism,—and thus taught that baptism does not take away sins, but only shaves them
off as one shaves his beard, and leaves the roots whence the sins may grow anew, and need cutting down again. He complained
bitterly of the way in which Pelagianism had been condemned,—that bishops had been compelled to sign a
definition of dogma, not in council lvassembled, but sitting at home; and he demanded a rehearing of the whole case before a lawful council, lest the doctrine of
the Manichees should be forced upon the acceptance of the world.

Augustin felt a strong desire to see the whole work of Julian against his book On Marriage and Concupiscence before he undertook a reply to the excerpts sent him by Valerius; but he did not feel justified in delaying obedience to
that officer’s request, and so wrote at once two treatises, one an answer to these excerpts, for the benefit of Valerius,
constituting the second book of his On Marriage and Concupiscence; and the other, a far more elaborate
examination of the letters sent by Boniface, which bears the title, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians. The purpose of the second book of On Marriage and Concupiscence, Augustin himself states, in its introductory sentences, to be “to reply to the taunts of his adversaries with all the truthfulness
and scriptural authority he could command.” He begins (2) by identifying the source of the extracts forwarded to him by Valerius,
with Julian’s work against his first book, and then
remarks upon the garbled form in which he is quoted in them (3–6), and passes on to state and refute Julian’s charge that
the catholics had turned Manicheans (7–9). At this point, the refutation of Julian begins in good earnest, and the method
that he proposes to use is stated; viz., to adduce the adverse statements, and refute them one by one (10). Beginning at the
beginning, he quotes first the title of the paper sent him, which declares that it is directed against “those who condemn
matrimony, and ascribe its fruit to the Devil” (11), which certainly, says Augustin, does not describe him or the catholics.
The next twenty chapters (10–30), accordingly, following Julian’s order, labour to prove that marriage is good, and ordained
by God, but that its good includes fecundity indeed, but not concupiscence, which arose from sin, and contracts sin. It is next argued, that the doctrine of original sin does not imply an evil origin
for man (31–51); and in the course
of this argument, the following propositions are especially defended: that God makes offspring for good and bad alike, just
as He sends the rain and sunshine on just and unjust (31–34); that God makes everything to be found in marriage except its
flaw, concupiscence (35–40); that marriage is not the cause of original sin, but only the channel through which it is transmitted
(41–47); and that to assert that evil cannot arise from what is good leaves us in the clutches of that very
Manicheism which is so unjustly charged against the catholics—for, if evil be not eternal, what else was there from which
it could arise but something good? (48–51). In concluding, Augustin recapitulates, and argues especially, that shameful concupiscence
is of sin, and the author of sin, and was not in paradise (52–54); that children are made by God, and only marred by the Devil
(55); that Julian, in admitting that Christ died for infants, admits that they need salvation (56); that what the
Devil makes in children is not a substance, but an injury to a substance (57–58); and that to suppose that concupiscence existed
in any form in paradise introduces incongruities in our conception of life in that abode of primeval bliss (59–60).

The long and important treatise, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, consists of four books, the first of which replies to the letter sent to Rome, and the other three to that sent to Thessalonica.
After a short introduction, in which he thanks Boniface for his kindness, and gives reasons why heretical writings should
be answered (1–3), Augustin begins at once to rebut the calumnies which the letter before him brings against the catholics
(4–28). These are
seven in number: 1. That the catholics destroy free will; to which Augustin replies that none are “forced into sin by the
necessity of their flesh,” but all sin by free will, though no man can have a righteous will save by God’s grace, and that
it is really the Pelagians that destroy free will by exaggerating it (4–8); 2. That Augustin declares that such marriage as
now exists is not of God (9); 3. That sexual desire and intercourse are made a device of the Devil, which is sheer Manicheism
(10–11); 4. That the Old-Testament saints are said to have died in sin (12); 5. That Paul and the other apostles are asserted
to have been polluted by lust all their days; Augustin’s answer to which includes a running commentary on Rom. vii. 7 sq., in which (correcting his older exegesis) he shows that Paul is giving here a transcript of his own experience as a typical
Christian (13–24); 6. That Christ is said not to have been free from sin (25); 7. That baptism
lvidoes not give complete remission of sins, but leaves roots from which they may again grow; to which Augustin replies that
baptism does remit all sins, but leaves concupiscence, which, although not sin, is the source of sin (26–28). Next, the positive
part of Julian’s letter is taken up, and his profession of faith against the catholics examined (29–41). The seven affirmations
that Julian makes here are designed as the obverse of the seven charges against the catholics. He believed:
1. That free will is in all by nature, and could not perish by Adam’s sin (29); 2. That marriage, as now existent, was ordained
by God (30); 3. That sexual impulse and virility are from God (31–35); 4. That men are God’s work, and no one is forced to
do good or evil unwillingly, but are assisted by grace to good, and incited by the Devil to evil (36–38); 5. That the saints
of the Old Testament were perfected in righteousness here, and so passed into eternal life (39); 6. That the grace of
Christ (ambiguously meant) is necessary for all, and all children—even those of baptized parents—are to be baptized (40);
7. And that baptism gives full cleansing from all sins; to which Augustin pointedly asks, “What does it do for infants, then?”
(41). The book concludes with an answer to Julian’s conclusion, in which he demands a general council, and charges the catholics
with Manicheism.

The second, third, and fourth books deal with the letter to Rufus in a somewhat similar way, the second and third books being
occupied with the calumnies brought against the catholics, and the fourth with the claims made by the Pelagians. The second
begins by repelling the charge of Manicheism brought against the catholics (1–4), to which the pointed remark is added, that
the Pelagians cannot hope to escape condemnation because they are willing to condemn another
heresy; and then defends (with less success) the Roman clergy against the charge of prevarication in their dealing with the
Pelagians (5–8), in the course of which all that can be said in defence of Zosimus’ wavering policy is said well and strongly.
Next the charges against catholic teaching are taken up and answered (9–16), especially the two important accusations that
they maintain fate under the name of grace (9–12), and that they make God an “accepter of persons” (13–16). Augustin’s
replies to these charges are in every way admirable. The charge of “fate” rests solely on the catholic denial that grace is
given according to preceding merits; but the Pelagians do not escape the same charge when they acknowledge that the “fates”
of baptized and unbaptized infants do differ. It is, in truth, not a question of “fate,” but of gratuitous bounty; and “it is not the catholics that assert fate under the name of grace, but the Pelagians that choose to call divine grace
by the
name of ‘fate’” (12). As to “acceptance of persons,” we must define what we mean by that. God certainly does not accept one’s
“person” above another’s; He does not give to one rather than to another because He sees something to please Him in one rather
than another: quite the opposite. He gives of His bounty to one while giving all their due to all, as in the parable (Matt. xx. 9 sq.). To ask why He does this, is to ask in vain: the apostle answers by not answering
(Rom. ix.); and before the dumb infants, who are yet made to differ, all objection to God is dumb. From this point, the book becomes
an examination of the Pelagian doctrine of prevenient merit (17–23), concluding that God gives all by grace from the beginning
to the end of every process of doing good. 1. He commands the good; 2. He gives the desire to do it; and, 3. He gives the
power to do it: and all, of His gratuitous mercy. The third book continues the discussion of the
calumnies of the Pelagians against the catholics, and enumerates and answers six of them: viz., that the catholics teach,
1. That the Old-Testament law was given, not to justify the obedient, but to serve as cause of greater sin (2–3); 2. That
baptism does not give entire remission of sins, but the baptized are partly God’s and partly the Devil’s (4–5); 3. That the
Holy Ghost did not assist virtue in the Old Testament (6–13); 4. That the Bible saints were not holy, but only less wicked
than
others (14–15); 5. That Christ was a sinner by necessity of His flesh (doubtless, Julian’s inference from the doctrine of
race-sin) (16); 6. That men will begin to fulfil God’s commandments only after the resurrection (17–23). Augustin shows that
at the basis of all these calumnies lies either misapprehension or misrepresentation; and, in concluding the book, enumerates
the three chief points in the lviiPelagian heresy, with the five claims growing out of them, of which they
most boasted, and then elucidates the mutual relations of the three parties, catholics, Pelagians, and Manicheans, with reference
to these points, showing that the catholics stand asunder from both the others, and condemn both (24–27). This conclusion
is really a preparation for the fourth book, which takes up these five Pelagian claims, and, after showing the catholic position
on them all in brief (1–3), discusses them in turn (4–19): viz., the praise of the creature (4–8), the praise of
marriage (9), the praise of the law (10–11), the praise of free will (12–16), and the praise of the saints (17–18). At the
end, Augustin calls on the Pelagians to cease to oppose the Manicheans, only to fall into as bad heresy as theirs (19); and
then, in reply to their accusation that the catholics were proclaiming novel doctrine, he adduces the testimony of Cyprian
and Ambrose, both of whom had received Pelagius’ praise, on each of the three main points of Pelagianism (20–32),
124124 To wit: Cyprian’s testimony on original sin (20-24), on gratuitous grace (25-26), on the imperfection of human righteousness
(27-28), and Ambrose’s testimony on original sin (29), on gratuitous grace (30), and on the imperfection of human righteousness
(31). and then closes with the declaration that the “impious and foolish doctrine,” as they called it, of the catholics, is immemorial
truth (33), and with a denial of the right of the Pelagians to ask for a general council to condemn them (34). All heresies
do not need an ecumenical synod for their condemnation; usually it is best to stamp them out locally, and not allow what may
be confined to a corner to disturb the whole world.

These books were written late in 420, or early in 421, and Alypius appears to have conveyed them to Italy during the latter
year. Before its close, Augustin, having obtained and read the whole of Julian’s attack on the first book of his work On Marriage and Concupiscence, wrote out a complete answer to it,125125 Compare Epistle 207, written probably in the latter half of 421.—a task that he was all the more anxious to complete, on perceiving that the extracts sent by Valerius were not only all from
the first book of Julian’s treatise, but were somewhat altered in the extracting. The resulting work, Against Julian, one of the longest that he wrote in the whole course of the Pelagian controversy, shows its author at his best: according
to Cardinal Noris’s judgment, he appears in it “almost divine,” and Augustin himself clearly set great
store by it. In the first book of this noble treatise, after professing his continued love for Julian, “whom he was unable
not to love, whatever he [Julian] should say against him” (35), he undertakes to show that in affixing the opprobrious name
of Manicheans on those who assert original sin, Julian is incriminating many of the most famous fathers, both of the Latin
and Greek Churches. In proof of this, he makes appropriate quotations from Irenæus, Cyprian, Reticius, Olympius, Hilary, Ambrose,
Gregory Nazianzenus, Basil, John of Constantinople.126126 That is, Chyrsostom. Then he argues, that, so far from the catholics falling into Manichean heresy, Julian plays, himself, into the hands of the
Manicheans in their strife against the catholics, by many unguarded statements, such as, e.g., when he says that an evil thing
cannot arise from what is good, that the work of the Devil cannot be suffered to be diffused by means of a work of God, that
a root of evil cannot be placed within a gift of God, and the like. The second book advances to greater
detail, and adduces the five great arguments which the Pelagians urged against the catholics, in order to test them by the
voice of antiquity. These arguments are stated as follows (2): “For you say, ‘That we, by asserting original sin, affirm that
the Devil is the maker of infants, condemn marriage, deny that all sins are remitted in baptism, accuse God of the guilt of
sin, and produce despair of perfection.’ You contend that all these are consequences, if we believe that infants are born
bound by the sin of the first man, and are therefore under the Devil unless they are born again in Christ. For, ‘It is the
Devil that creates,’ you say, ‘if they are created from that wound which the Devil inflicted on the human nature that was
made at first.’ ‘And marriage is condemned,’ you say, ‘if it is to be believed to have something about it whence it produces
those worthy of condemnation.’ ‘And all sins are not remitted in baptism,’ you say, ‘if there remains any evil in baptized
couples whence evil offspring are produced.’ ‘And how is God,’ you ask, ‘not unjust, if He, while remitting their own sins
to baptized persons, yet condemns their offspring, lviiiinasmuch as, although it is created by Him, it yet ignorantly and involuntarily contracts the sins of others from those very
parents to whom they are remitted?’ ‘Nor can men believe,’ you add, ‘that virtue—to which corruption is to be understood to
be contrary—can be perfected, if they cannot
believe that it can destroy the inbred vices, although, no doubt, these can scarcely be considered vices, since he does not
sin, who is unable to be other than he was created.’” These arguments are then tested, one by one, by the authority of the
earlier teachers who were appealed to in the first book, and shown to be condemned by them. The remaining four books follow
Julian’s four books, argument by argument, refuting him in detail. In the third book it is urged that although God is good,
and
made man good, and instituted marriage which is, therefore, good, nevertheless concupiscence is evil, and in it the flesh
lusts against the spirit. Although chaste spouses use this evil well, continent believers do better in not using it at all.
It is pointed out, how far all this is from the madness of the Manicheans, who dream of matter as essentially evil and co-eternal
with God; and shown that evil concupiscence sprang from Adam’s disobedience and, being transmitted to us, can be removed
only by Christ. It is shown, also, that Julian himself confesses lust to be evil, inasmuch as he speaks of remedies against
it, wishes it to be bridled, and speaks of the continent waging a glorious warfare. The fourth book follows the second book
of Julian’s work, and makes two chief contentions: that unbelievers have no true virtues, and that even the heathen recognize
concupiscence as evil. It also argues that grace is not given according to merit, and yet is not to be confounded with fate;
and explains the text that asserts that ‘God wishes all men to be saved,’ in the sense that ‘all men’ means ‘all that are
to be saved’ since none are saved except by His will.127127 Compare On Rebuke and Grace, 44, and the footnote there. The fifth book, in like manner, follows Julian’s third book, and treats of such subjects as these: that it is due to sin
that any infants are lost; that shame arose in our first parents through sin; that sin can well be the punishment of preceding
sin; that concupiscence is always evil, even in those who do not assent to it; that true marriage may exist without intercourse;
that the “flesh” of Christ differs from the “sinful flesh” of other men; and the like. In the sixth
book, Julian’s fourth book is followed, and original sin is proved from the baptism of infants, the teaching of the apostles,
and the rites of exorcism and exsufflation incorporated in the form of baptism. Then, by the help of the illustration drawn
from the olive and the oleaster, it is explained how Christian parents can produce unregenerate offspring; and the originally
voluntary character of sin is asserted, even though it now comes by inheritance.

After the completion of this important work, there succeeded a lull in the controversy, of some years duration; and the calm
refutation of Pelagianism and exposition of Christian grace, which Augustin gave in his Enchiridion,128128 See vol. iii. of this series, pp. 227 sq. might well have seemed to him his closing word on this all-absorbing subject. But he had not yet given the world all he had
in treasure for it, and we can rejoice in the chance that five or six years afterwards drew from him a renewed discussion
of some of the more important aspects of the doctrine of grace. The circumstances which brought this about are sufficiently
interesting in themselves, and open up to us an unwonted view into the monastic life of the times. There was
an important monastery at Adrumetum, the metropolitan city of the province of Byzacium,129129 Now a portion of Tunis. from which a monk named Florus went out on a journey of charity to his native country of Uzalis about 426. On the journey
he met with Augustin’s letter to Sixtus,130130Epistle 194. in which the doctrines of gratuitous and prevenient grace were expounded. He was much delighted with it, and, procuring a
copy, sent it back to his monastery for the edification of his brethren, while he himself went on to Carthage. At the monastery,
the letter created great disturbance: without the knowledge of the abbot, Valentinus, it was read aloud to the monks, many
of whom were unskilled in theological questions; and some five or more were greatly offended, and
declared that free will was destroyed by it. A secret strife arose among the brethren, some taking extreme grounds on both
sides. Of all this, Valentinus remained ignorant lixuntil the return of Florus, who was attacked as the author of all the trouble, and who felt it his duty to inform the abbot
of the state of affairs. Valentinus applied first to the bishop, Evodius, for such instruction as would make Augustin’s letter
clear to the most simple. Evodius replied,
praising their zeal and deprecating their contentiousness, and explaining that Adam had full free will, but that it is now
wounded and weak, and Christ’s mission was as a physician to cure and recuperate it. “Let them read,” is his prescription,
“the words of God’s elders.…And when they do not understand, let them not quickly reprehend, but pray to understand.” This
did not, however, cure the malecontents, and the holy presbyter Sabrinus was appealed to, and sent a book with clear
interpretations. But neither was this satisfactory; and Valentinus, at last, reluctantly consented that Augustin himself should
be consulted,—fearing, he says, lest by making inquiries he should seem to waver about the truth. Two members of the community
were consequently permitted to journey to Hippo, but they took with them no introduction and no commendation from their abbot.
Augustin, nevertheless, received them without hesitation, as they bore themselves with too great simplicity to allow
him to suspect them of deception. Now we get a glimpse of life in the great bishop’s monastic home. The monks told their story,
and were listened to with courtesy and instructed with patience; and, as they were anxious to get home before Easter, they
received a letter for Valentinus131131Epistle 214. in which Augustin briefly explains the nature of the misapprehension that had arisen, and points out that both grace and
free will must be defended, and neither so exaggerated as to deny the other. The letter of Sixtus, he explains, was written
against the Pelagians, who assert that grace is given according to merit, and briefly expounds the true doctrine of grace
as necessarily gratuitous and therefore prevenient. When the monks were on the point of starting home, they were
joined by a third companion from Adrumetum, and were led to prolong their visit. This gave him the opportunity he craved for
their fuller instruction: he read with them and explained to them not only his letter to Sixtus, from which the strife had
risen, but much of the chief literature of the Pelagian controversy,132132Epistle 215, 2 sq. copies of which also were made for them to take home with them; and when they were ready to go, he sent by them another and
longer letter to Valentinus, and placed in their hands a treatise composed for their especial use, which, moreover, he explained
to them. This longer letter is essentially an exhortation “to turn aside neither to the right hand nor to the left,”—neither
to the left hand of the Pelagian error of upholding free will in such a manner as to deny grace, nor
to the right hand of the equal error of so upholding grace as if we might yield ourselves to evil with impunity. Both grace
and free will are to be proclaimed; and it is true both that grace is not given to merits, and that we are to be judged at
the last day according to our works. The treatise which Augustin composed for a fuller exposition of these doctrines is the
important work On Grace and Free Will. After a brief introduction, explaining the occasion of his writing, and exhorting
the monks to humility and teachableness before God’s revelations (1), Augustin begins by asserting and proving the two propositions
that the Scriptures clearly teach that man has free will (2–5), and, as clearly, the necessity of grace for doing any good
(6–9). He then examines the passages which the Pelagians claim as teaching that we must first turn to God, before He visits
us with His grace (10–11), and then undertakes to show that grace is not given to merit (12 sq.), appealing especially
to Paul’s teaching and example, and replying to the assertion that forgiveness is the only grace that is not given according
to our merits (15–18), and to the query, “How can eternal life be both of grace and of reward?” (19–21). The nature of grace,
what it is, is next explained (22 sq.). It is not the law, which gives only knowledge of sin (22–24), nor nature, which would
render Christ’s death needless (25), nor mere forgiveness of sins, as the Lord’s Prayer (which should be read with
Cyprian’s comments on it) is enough to show (26). Nor will it do to say that it is given to the merit of a good will, thus
distinguishing the good work which is of grace from the good will which precedes grace (27–30); for the Scriplxtures oppose this, and our prayers for others prove that we expect God to be the first mover, as indeed both Scripture and experience prove that He is. It is next shown that both free will and grace are concerned in
the heart’s conversion
(31–32), and that love is the spring of all good in man (33–40), which, however, we have only because God first loved us (38),
and which is certainly greater than knowledge, although the Pelagians admit only the latter to be from God (40). God’s sovereign
government of men’s wills is then proved from Scripture (41–43), and the wholly gratuitous character of grace is illustrated
(44), while the only possible theodicy is found in the certainty that the Lord of all the earth will do right. For,
though no one knows why He takes one and leaves another, we all know that He hardens judicially and saves graciously,—that
He hardens none who do not deserve hardening, but none that He saves deserve to be saved (45). The treatise closes with an
exhortation to its prayerful and repeated study (46).

The one request that Augustin made, on sending this work to Valentinus, was that Florus, through whom the controversy had
arisen, should be sent to him, that he might converse with him and learn whether he had been misunderstood, or himself had
misunderstood Augustin. In due time Florus arrived at Hippo, bringing a letter133133Epistle 216. from Valentinus which addresses Augustin as “Lord Pope” (domine papa), thanks him for his “sweet” and “healing” instruction, and introduces Florus as one whose true faith could be confided in.
It is very clear, both from Valentinus’ letter and from the hints that Augustin gives, that his loving dealing with the monks
had borne admirable fruit: “none were cast down for the worse, some were built up for the better.”134134On Rebuke and Grace, 1. But it was reported to him that some one at the monastery had objected to the doctrine he had taught them, that “no man ought,
then, to be rebuked for not keeping God’s commandments; but only God should be besought that he might keep them.”135135Retractions, ii. 67. Compare On Rebuke and Grace, 5 sq. In other words, it was said that if all good was, in the last resort, from God’s grace, man ought not to be blamed for not
doing what he could not do, but God ought to be besought to do for man what He alone could do: we ought, in a word, to apply
to the source of power. This occasioned the composition of yet another treatise On Rebuke and Grace,136136 On the importance of this treatise for Augustin’s doctrine of predestination, see Wiggers’ Augustinianism and Pelagianism, E.T. p. 236, where a sketch of the history of this doctrine in Augustin’s writings may be found. the object of which was to explain the relations of grace to human conduct, and especially to make it plain that the sovereignty
of God’s grace does not supersede our duty to ourselves or our fellow-men. It begins by thanking Valentinus for his letter
and for sending Florus (whom Augustin finds well instructed in the truth), thanking God for the good effect of the previous
book, and recommending its continued study, and then by briefly expounding the Catholic faith
concerning grace, free-will, and the law (1–2). The general proposition that is defended is that the gratuitous sovereignty
of God’s grace does not supersede human means for obtaining and continuing it (3 sq.). This is shown by the apostle’s example,
who used all human means for the prosecution of his work, and yet confessed that it was “God that gave the increase” (3).
Objections are then answered (4 sq.),—especially the great one that “it is not my fault if I do not do what I have not
received grace for doing” (6); to which Augustin replies (7–10), that we deserve rebuke for our very unwillingness to be rebuked,
that on the same reasoning the prescription of the law and the preaching of the gospel would be useless, that the apostle’s
example opposes such a position, and that our consciousness witnesses that we deserve rebuke for not persevering in the right
way. From this point an important discussion arises, in this interest, of the gift of perseverance (11–19), and of
God’s election (20–24); the teaching being that no one is saved who does not persevere, and all that are predestinated or
“called according to the purpose” (Augustin’s phrase for what we should call “effectual calling”) will persevere, and yet
that we co-operate by our will in all good deeds, and deserve rebuke if we do not. Whether Adam received the gift of perseverance,
and, in general, the difference between the grace given to him (which was that grace by which he could stand) and
lxithat now given to God’s children (which is that grace by which we are actually made to stand), are next discussed (26–38),
with the result of showing the superior greatness of the gifts of grace now to those given before the fall. The necessity
of God’s mercy at all times, and our constant dependence on it, are next vigorously asserted (39–42); even in the day of judgment,
if we are not judged “with mercy” we cannot be saved (41). The treatise is brought to an end by a concluding
application of the whole discussion to the special matter in hand, rebuke (43–49). Seeing that rebuke is one of God’s means of working out his gracious purposes, it cannot be inconsistent with the
sovereignty of that grace; for, of course, God predestinates the means with the end (43). Nor can we know, in our ignorance,
whether our rebuke is, in any particular case, to be the means of amendment or the ground of greater condemnation. How dare
we, then, withhold it? Let it be, however,
graduated to the fault, and let us always remember its purpose (46–48). Above all, let us not dare hold it back, lest we hold
back from our brother the means of his recovery, and, as well, disobey the command of God (49).

It was not long afterwards (about 427) when Augustin was called upon to attempt to reclaim a Carthaginian brother, Vitalis
by name, who had been brought to trial on the charge of teaching that the beginning of faith was not the gift of God, but
the act of man’s own free will (ex propria voluntatis). This was essentially the semi-Pelagian position which was subsequently to make so large a figure in history; and Augustin
treats it now as necessarily implying
the basal idea of Pelagianism. In the important letter which he sent to Vitalis,137137Epistle 217. he first argues that his position is inconsistent with the prayers of the church. He, Augustin, prays that Vitalis may come
to the true faith; but does not this prayer ascribe the origination of right faith to God? The Church so prays for all men:
the priest at the altar exhorts the people to pray God for unbelievers, that He may convert them to the faith; for catechumens,
that He may breathe into them a desire for regeneration; for the faithful, that by His aid they may
persevere in what they have begun: will Vitalis refuse to obey these exhortations, because, forsooth, faith is of free will
and not of God’s gift? Nay, will a Carthaginian scholar array himself against Cyprian’s exposition of the Lord’s Prayer? for
he certainly teaches that we are to ask of God what Vitalis says is to be had of ourselves. We may go farther: it is not Cyprian,
but Paul, who says, “Let us pray to God that we do no evil” (2 Cor. xiii. 7); it is the
Psalmist who says, “The steps of man are directed by God” (Ps. xxxvi. 23). “If we wish to defend free will, let us not strive against that by which it is made free. For he who strives against grace,
by which the will is made free for refusing evil and doing good, wishes his will to remain captive. Tell us, I beg you, how
the apostle can say, ‘We give thanks to the Father who made us fit to have our lot with the saints in light, who delivered
us from the power of darkness,
and translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love’ (Col. i. 12, 13), if not He, but itself, frees our choice? It is, then, a false rendering of thanks to God, as if He does what He does not
do; and he has erred who has said that ‘He makes us fit, etc.’ ‘The grace of God,’ therefore, does not consist in the nature
of free-will, and in law and teaching, as the Pelagian perversity dreams; but it is given for each single act by His will,
concerning whom it is
written,”—quoting Ps. lxvii. 10. About the middle of the letter, Augustin lays down twelve propositions against the Pelagians, which are important as communicating
to us what he thought, at the end of the controversy, were the chief points in dispute. “Since, therefore,” he writes, “we
are catholic Christians: 1. We know that new-born children have not yet done anything in their own lives, good or evil, neither
have they come into the miseries of this life according to the
deserts of some previous life, which none of them can have had in their own persons; and yet, because they are born carnally
after Adam, they contract the contagion of ancient death, by the first birth, and are not freed from the punishment of eternal
death (which is contracted by a just condemnation, passing over from one to all), except they are by grace born again in Christ.
2. We know that the grace of God is lxiigiven neither to children nor to adults according to our deserts. 3.
We know that it is given to adults for each several act. 4. We know that it is not given to all men; and to those to whom
it is given, it is not only not given according to the merits of works, but it is not even given to them according to the
merits of their will; and this is especially apparent in children. 5. We know that to those to whom it is given, it is given
by the gratuitous mercy of God. 6. We know that to those to whom it is not given, it is not given by the just judgment of
God. 7.
We know that we shall all stand before the tribunal of Christ, and each shall receive according to what he has done through
the body,—not according to what he would have done, had he lived longer,—whether good or evil. 8. We know that even children
are to receive according to what they have done through the body, whether good or evil. But according to what “they have done”
not by their own act, but by the act of those by whose responses for them they are said both to renounce the Devil and to
believe in God, wherefore they are counted among the number of the faithful, and have part in the statement of the Lord when
He says, “Whosoever shall believe and be baptized, shall be saved.” Therefore also, to those who do not receive this sacrament,
belongs what follows, “But whosoever shall not have believed, shall be damned” (Mark xvi. 16). Whence these too, as I have said, if they die in that early age, are judged, of course, according to what they have done
through
the body, i.e., in the time in which they were in the body, when they believe or do not believe by the heart and mouth of
their sponsors, when they are baptized or not baptized, when they eat or do not eat the flesh of Christ, when they drink or
do not drink His blood,—according to those things, then, which they have done through the body, not according to those which,
had they lived longer, they would have done. 9. We know that blessed are the dead that die in the Lord; and that what they
would have done had they lived longer, is not imputed to them. 10. We know that those that believe, with their own heart,
in the Lord, do so by their own free will and choice. 11. We know that we who already believe act with right faith towards
those who do not wish to believe, when we pray to God that they may wish it. 12. We know that for those who have believed
out of this number, we both ought and are rightly and truly accustomed to return thanks to God, as for his benefits.” Certainly
such
a body of propositions commends their author to us as Christian both in head and heart: they are admirable in every respect;
and even in the matter of the salvation of infants, where he had not yet seen the light of truth, he expresses himself in
a way as engaging in its hearty faith in God’s goodness as it is honorable in its loyalty to what he believed to be truth
and justice. Here his doctrine of the Church ran athwart and clouded his view of the reach of grace; but we seem to see between
the lines the promise of the brighter dawn of truth that was yet to come. The rest of the epistle is occupied with an exposition
and commendation of these propositions, which ranks with the richest passages of the anti-Pelagian writings, and which breathes
everywhere a yearning for his correspondent which we cannot help hoping proved salutary to his faith.

It is not without significance, that the error of Vitalis took a semi-Pelagian form. Pure Pelagianism was by this time no
longer a living issue. Augustin was himself, no doubt, not yet done with it. The second book of his treatise On Marriage and Concupiscence, which seems to have been taken to Italy by Alypius, in 421, received at once the attention of Julian, and was elaborately
answered by him, during that same year, in eight books addressed to Florus.
But Julian was now in Cilicia, and his book was slow in working its way westward. It was found at Rome by Alypius, apparently
in 427 or 428, and he at once set about transcribing it for his friend’s use. An opportunity arising to send it to Africa
before it was finished, he forwarded to Augustin the five books that were ready, with an urgent request that they should receive
his immediate attention, and a promise to send the other three as soon as possible. Augustin gives an account of his
progress in his reply to them in a letter written to Quodvultdeus, apparently in 428.138138Epistle 224. This deacon was urging Augustin to give the Church a succinct account of all heresies; lxiiiand Augustin excuses himself from immediately undertaking that task by the press of work on his hands. He was writing his
Retractations, and had already finished two books of them, in which he had dealt with two hundred and thirty-two works. His letters and
homilies remained and he had given the necessary reading to many of the letters. Also, he tells his
correspondent, he was engaged on a reply to the eight books of Julian’s new work. Working night and day, he had already completed
his response to the first three of Julian’s books, and had begun on the fourth while still expecting the arrival of the last
three which Alypius had promised to send. If he had completed the answer to the five books of Julian which he already had
in hand, before the other three reached him, he might begin the work which Quodvultdeus so earnestly desired him to
undertake. In due time, whatever may have been the trials and labours that needed first to be met, the desired treatise On Heresies was written (about 428), and the eighty-eighth chapter of it gives us a welcome compressed account of the Pelagian heresy,
which may be accepted as the obverse of the account of catholic truth given in the letter to Vitalis.139139 The account given of Pelagianism is as follows: “They are in such degree enemies of the grace of God, by which we have been
predestined into the adoption of sons by Jesus Christ unto Himself (Eph. i. 5), and by which we are delivered from the power of darkness so as to believe in Him, and be translated into His kingdom (Col. i. 13)—wherefore He says, ‘No man comes to Me, except it be given him of My Father’
(John vi. 66)—and by which love is shed abroad in our hearts (Rom. v. 5), so that faith may work by love: that they believe that man is able, without it, to keep all the Divine commandments,—whereas,
if this were true, it would clearly be an empty thing that the Lord said, ‘Without Me ye can do nothing’ (John xv. 5). When Pelagius was at length accused by the brethren, because he attributed nothing to the assistance of God’s grace
towards the keeping of His commandments, he yielded to their rebuke, so far as not to place this grace above free will, but
with faithless cunning to subordinate it, saying that it was given to men for this purpose; viz., that they might be able
more easily to fulfil by grace, what they were commanded to do by free will. By saying, ‘that they might be able more easily,’
he, of course, wished it to be believed that, although with more difficulty, nevertheless men were able without divine grace
to perform the divine commands. But that grace of God, without which we can do nothing good, they say does not exist except
in free will, which without any preceding merits our nature received from Him; and that He adds His aid only in that by His
law and teaching we may learn what we ought to do, but not in that by the gift of His Spirit we may do what we have learned
ought to be done. Accordingly, they confess that knowledge by which ignorance is banished is divinely given to us, but deny
that love by which we may live a pious life is given; so that, forsooth, while knowledge, which, without love, puffeth up,
is the gift of God, love itself, which edifieth so that knowledge may not puff up, is not the gift of God (1 Cor. viii. 11). They also destroy the prayers which the Church offers, whether for those that are unbelieving and resisting God’s teaching,
that they may be converted to God; or for the faithful, that faith may be increased in them, and they may
persevere in it. For they contend that men do not receive these things from Him, but have them from ourselves, saying, that
the grace of God, by which we are freed from impiety, is given according to our merits. Pelagius was compelled, no doubt,
to condemn this by his fear of being condemned by the episcopal judgment in Palestine; but he is found to teach it still in
his later writings. They also advanced so far as to say that the life of the righteous in this world is without sin, and the
Church of Christ is perfected by them in this mortality, to the point of being entirely without spot or wrinkle (Eph. v. 27); as if it were not the Church of Christ, that, in the whole world, cries to God, ‘Forgive us our debts.’ They also deny
that children, who are carnally born after Adam, contract the contagion of ancient death from their first birth. For they
assert that they are born so without any bond of original sin, that there is absolutely nothing that ought to
be remitted to them in the second birth, yet they are to be baptized; but for this reason, that, adopted in regeneration,
they may be admitted to the kingdom of God, and thus be translated from good into better,—not that they may be washed by that
renovation from any evil of the old bond. For although they be not baptized, they promise to them, outside the kingdom of
God indeed, but nevertheless, a certain eternal and blessed life of their own. They also say that Adam himself, even had he
not
sinned, would have died in the body, and that this death would not have come as a desert to a fault, but as a condition of
nature. Certain other things also are objected to them, but these are the chief, and also either all, or nearly all, the others
may be understood to depend on these.” But the composition of this work was not the only interruption which postponed the completion of the second elaborate work
against Julian. It was in the providence of God that the life of this great leader in the battle for grace should be prolonged
until he could deal with semi-Pelagianism also. Information as to the rise of this new form of the heresy at Marseilles and
elsewhere in Southern Gaul was conveyed to Augustin along with entreaties, that, as “faith’s great
patron,” he would give his aid towards meeting it, by two laymen with whom he had already had correspondence,—Prosper and
Hilary.140140 Compare Epistles 225, 1, and 156. It is, of course, not certain that this is the same Hilary that wrote to Augustin from Sicily, but it seems
probable. They pointed out141141 In Letters 225 and 226. the difference between the new party and thorough-going Pelagianism; but, at the same time, the essentially Pelagianizing
character of its formative elements. Its representatives were ready, as a rule, to admit that all men were lost in Adam, and
no one could recover himself by his own free will, but all needed God’s grace for salvation. But they objected to the doctrines
of prevenient and of irresistible grace; and asserted that man could initiate the process of salvation
by turning first to God, that all men could resist God’s grace, and no grace could be given which they could not reject, and
especially they denied that the gifts lxivof grace came irrespective of merits, actual or foreseen. They said that what Augustin taught as to the calling of God’s elect
according to His own purpose was tantamount to fatalism, was contrary to the teaching of the fathers and the true Church doctrine,
and, even if true, should not be preached, because of its
tendency to drive men into indifference or despair. Hence, Prosper especially desired Augustin to point out the dangerous
nature of these views, and to show that prevenient and co-operating grace is not inconsistent with free will, that God’s predestination
is not founded on foresight of receptivity in its objects, and that the doctrines of grace may be preached without danger
to souls.

Augustin’s answer to these appeals was a work in two books, On the Predestination of the Saints, the second book of which is usually known under the separate title of The Gift of Perseverance. The former book begins with a careful discrimination of the position of his new opponents: they have made a right beginning
in that they believe in original sin, and acknowledge that none are saved from it save by Christ, and that God’s grace leads
men’s wills, and
without grace no one can suffice for good deeds. These things will furnish a good starting-point for their progress to an
acceptance of predestination also (1–2). The first question that needs discussion in such circumstances is, whether God gives
the very beginnings of faith (3 sq.); since they admit that what Augustin had previously urged sufficed to prove that faith
was the gift of God so far as that the increase of faith was given by Him, but not so far but that the beginning of faith
may
be understood to be man’s, to which, then, God adds all other gifts (compare 43). Augustin insists that this is no other than
the Pelagian assertion of grace according to merit (3), is opposed to Scripture (4–5), and begets arrogant boasting in ourselves
(6). He replies to the objection that he had himself once held this view, by confessing it, and explaining that he was converted
from it by 1 Cor. iv. 7, as applied by Cyprian (7–8), and expounds that verse as containing in
its narrow compass a sufficient answer to the present theories (9–11). He answers, further, the objection that the apostle
distinguishes faith from works, and works alone are meant in such passages, by pointing to John vi. 28, and similar statements in Paul (12–16). Then he answers the objection that he himself had previously taught that God acted
on foresight of faith, by showing that he was misunderstood (17–18). He next shows that no objection lies against predestination
that does not lie with equal force against grace (19–22),—since predestination is nothing but God’s foreknowledge of and preparation
for grace, and all questions of sovereignty and the like belong to grace. Did God not know to whom he was going to give faith
(19)? or did he promise the results of faith, works, without promising the faith without which, as going before, the works
were impossible? Would not this place God’s fulfilment of his promise out of His power, and make it depend on man
(20)? Why are men more willing to trust in their weakness than in God’s strength? do they count God’s promises more uncertain
than their own performance (22)? He next proves the sovereignty of grace, and of predestination, which is but the preparation
for grace, by the striking examples of infants, and, above all, of the human nature of Christ (23–31), and then speaks of
the twofold calling, one external and one “according to purpose,”—the latter of which is efficacious and sovereign (32–37).
In closing, the semi-Pelagian position is carefully defined and refuted as opposed, alike with the grosser Pelagianism, to
the Scriptures of both Testaments (38–42).

The purpose of the second book, which has come down to us under the separate title of On the Gift of Perseverance, is to show that that perseverance which endures to the end is as much of God as the beginning of faith, and that no man
who has been “called according to God’s purpose,” and has received this gift, can fall from grace and be lost. The first half
of the treatise is devoted to this theme (1–33). It begins by distinguishing between temporary
perseverance, which endures for a time, and that which continues to the end (1), and affirms that the latter is certainly
a gift of God’s grace, and is, therefore, asked from God which would otherwise be but a mocking petition (2–3). This, the
Lord’s Prayer itself might teach us, as under Cyprian’s exposition it does teach us,—each petition being capable of being
read as a lxvprayer for perseverance (4–9). Of course, moreover, it cannot be lost, otherwise it would not be “to the end.”
If man forsakes God, of course it is he that does it, and he is doubtless under continual temptation to do so; but if he abides
with God, it is God who secures that, and God is equally able to keep one when drawn to Him, as He is to draw him to Him (10–15). He argues anew at this point, that grace is not according to merit, but always in mercy; and explains
and illustrates the unsearchable ways of God in His sovereign but merciful dealing with men (16–25), and closes this part
of
the treatise by a defence of himself against adverse quotations from his early work on Free Will, which he has already corrected in his Retractations. The second half of the book discusses the objections that were being urged against the preaching of predestination (34–62),
as if it opposed and enervated the preaching of the Gospel. He replies that Paul and the apostles, and Cyprian and the fathers,
preached both together; that the same objections will lie against the preaching of
God’s foreknowledge and grace itself, and, indeed, against preaching any of the virtues, as, e.g., obedience, while declaring
them God’s gifts. He meets the objections in detail, and shows that such preaching is food to the soul, and must not be withheld
from men; but explains that it must be given gently, wisely, and prayerfully. The whole treatise ends with an appeal to the
prayers of the Church as testifying that all good is from God (63–65), and to the great example of unmerited grace and
sovereign predestination in the choice of one human nature without preceding merit, to be united in one person with the Eternal
Word,—an illustration of his theme of the gratuitous grace of God which he is never tired of adducing (66–67).

These books were written in 428–429, and after their completion the unfinished work against Julian was resumed. Alypius had
sent the remaining three books, and Augustin slowly toiled on to the end of his reply to the sixth book. But he was to be
interrupted once more, and this time by the most serious of all interruptions. On the 28th of August, 430, with the Vandals
thundering at the gates of Hippo, full of good works and of faith, he turned his face away from the
strifes—whether theological or secular—of earth, and entered into rest with the Lord whom he loved. The last work against
Julian was already one of the most considerable in size of all his books; but it was never finished, and retains until to-day
the significant title of The Unfinished Work. Augustin had hesitated to undertake this work, because he found Julian’s arguments too silly either to deserve refutation,
or to afford occasion for really edifying discourse. And certainly the
result falls below Augustin’s usual level, though this is not due, as is so often said, to failing powers and great age; for
nothing that he wrote surpasses in mellow beauty and chastened strength the two books, On the Predestination of the Saints, which were written after four books of this work were completed. The plan of the work is to state Julian’s arguments in
his own words, and follow it with his remarks; thus giving it something of the form of a dialogue. It follows Julian’s
work, book by book. The first book states and answers certain calumnies which Julian had brought against Augustin and the
catholic faith on the ground of their confession of original sin. Julian had argued, that, since God is just, He cannot impute
another’s sins to innocent infants; since sin is nothing but evil will, there can be no sin in infants who are not yet in
the use of their will; and, since the freedom of will that is given to man consists in the capacity of both sinning and not
sinning, free will is denied to those who attribute sin to nature. Augustin replies to these arguments, and answers certain
objections that are made to his work On Marriage and Concupiscence, and then corrects Julian’s false explanations of certain Scriptures from John viii., Rom. vi., vii., and 2 Timothy. The second book is a discussion of Rom. v. 12, which Julian had tried, like the other Pelagians, to
explain by the “imitation” of Adam’s bad example. The third book examines the abuse by Julian of certain Old-Testament passages—in
Deut. xxiv., 2 Kings xiv., Ezek. xviii.—in his effort to show that God does not impute the father’s sins to the children; as well as his similar abuse of Heb. xi. The charge of Manicheism, which was so repetitiously brought by Julian against the catholics, is then examined and
refuted. The fourth book treats of Julian’s strictures on Augustin’s On Marriage and Concupiscence ii. 4–11, and lxviproves from 1 John ii. 16 that concupiscence is evil, and not the work of God, but of the Devil. He argues that the shame that accompanies it is due
to its sinfulness, and that there was none of it in Christ; also, that infants are born obnoxious to the first sin, and proves
the corruption of their origin from Wisd. x. 10,
11. The fifth book defends On Marriage and Concupiscence ii. 12 sq., and argues that a sound nature could not have shame on account of its members, and the need of regeneration for
what is generated by means of shameful concupiscence. Then Julian’s abuse of 1 Cor. xv., Rom. v., Matt. vii. 17 and 33, with reference to On Marriage and Concupiscence ii. 14, 20, 26, is discussed; and then the origin of evil,
and God’s treatment of evil in the world. The sixth book traverses Julian’s strictures on On Marriage and Concupiscence ii. 34 sq., and argues that human nature was changed for the worse by the sin of Adam, and thus was made not only sinful,
but the source of sinners; and that the forces of free will by which man could at first do rightly if he wished, and refrain
from sin if he chose, were lost by Adam’s sin. He attacks Julian’s definition of free will as “the capacity for sinning and
not sinning” (possibilitas peccandi et non peccandi); and proves that the evils of this life are the punishment of sin,—including, first of all, physical death. At the end,
he treats of 1 Cor. xv. 22.

Although the great preacher of grace was taken away by death before the completion of this book, yet his work was not left
incomplete. In the course of the next year (431) the Ecumenical Council of Ephesus condemned Pelagianism for the whole world;
and an elaborate treatise against the pure Pelagianism of Julian was already in 430 an anachronism. Semi-Pelagianism was yet
to run its course, and to work its way so into the heart of a corrupt church as not to be easily
displaced; but Pelagianism was to die with the first generation of its advocates. As we look back now through the almost millennium
and a half of years that has intervened since Augustin lived and wrote, it is to his Predestination of the Saints,—a completed, and well-completed, treatise,—and not to The Unfinished Work, that we look as the crown and completion of his labours for grace.

40 Compare his work written this year, On Several Questions to Simplicianus. For the development of Augustin’s theology, see the admirable statement in Neander’s Church History, E.T., ii. 625 sq.

50 On the prominence of infant baptism in the controversy, and why it was so, see Sermon 165, 7 sq. “What do you say? ‘Just this,’ he says, ‘that God creates every man immortal.’ Why, then do infant children die?
For if I say, ‘Why do adult men die?’ you would say to me, ‘They have sinned.’ Therefore I do not argue about the adults:
I cite infancy as a witness against you,” and so on, eloquently developing the argument.

64 The inscription says, “V Calendus Julii,” i.e., June 27; but it also says, “In natalis martyris Guddentis,” whose day appears to have been July 18. Some of the martyrologies assign 28th of June to Gaudentius (which some copies
read here), but possibly none to Guddene.

79 An almost contemporary letter to Oceanus (Epistle 180, written in 416) adverts to the same subject and in the same spirit, showing how much it was in Augustin’s thoughts.
Compare Epistle 180, 2 and 5.

94 The book given him by Timasius and James, to which On Nature and Grace is a reply.

95 Compare also Innocent’s letter (Epistle 181) to the Carthaginian Council, chap. 4, which also Neander, History of the Christian Church, E.T., ii. 646, quotes in this connection, as showing that Innocent “perceived that this dispute was connected with a different
way of regarding the relation of God’s providence to creation.” As if Augustin did not see this too!

96 The book addressed to Dardanus, in which the Pelagians are confuted, but not named, belongs about at this time. Compare Retractations, ii. 49.

122 Julian afterwards repudiated this letter, perhaps because of some falsifications it had suffered; it seems to have been certainly
his.

123 Compare Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, iii. 24: and see above, p. xv.

124 To wit: Cyprian’s testimony on original sin (20-24), on gratuitous grace (25-26), on the imperfection of human righteousness
(27-28), and Ambrose’s testimony on original sin (29), on gratuitous grace (30), and on the imperfection of human righteousness
(31).

136 On the importance of this treatise for Augustin’s doctrine of predestination, see Wiggers’ Augustinianism and Pelagianism, E.T. p. 236, where a sketch of the history of this doctrine in Augustin’s writings may be found.

139 The account given of Pelagianism is as follows: “They are in such degree enemies of the grace of God, by which we have been
predestined into the adoption of sons by Jesus Christ unto Himself (Eph. i. 5), and by which we are delivered from the power of darkness so as to believe in Him, and be translated into His kingdom (Col. i. 13)—wherefore He says, ‘No man comes to Me, except it be given him of My Father’
(John vi. 66)—and by which love is shed abroad in our hearts (Rom. v. 5), so that faith may work by love: that they believe that man is able, without it, to keep all the Divine commandments,—whereas,
if this were true, it would clearly be an empty thing that the Lord said, ‘Without Me ye can do nothing’ (John xv. 5). When Pelagius was at length accused by the brethren, because he attributed nothing to the assistance of God’s grace
towards the keeping of His commandments, he yielded to their rebuke, so far as not to place this grace above free will, but
with faithless cunning to subordinate it, saying that it was given to men for this purpose; viz., that they might be able
more easily to fulfil by grace, what they were commanded to do by free will. By saying, ‘that they might be able more easily,’
he, of course, wished it to be believed that, although with more difficulty, nevertheless men were able without divine grace
to perform the divine commands. But that grace of God, without which we can do nothing good, they say does not exist except
in free will, which without any preceding merits our nature received from Him; and that He adds His aid only in that by His
law and teaching we may learn what we ought to do, but not in that by the gift of His Spirit we may do what we have learned
ought to be done. Accordingly, they confess that knowledge by which ignorance is banished is divinely given to us, but deny
that love by which we may live a pious life is given; so that, forsooth, while knowledge, which, without love, puffeth up,
is the gift of God, love itself, which edifieth so that knowledge may not puff up, is not the gift of God (1 Cor. viii. 11). They also destroy the prayers which the Church offers, whether for those that are unbelieving and resisting God’s teaching,
that they may be converted to God; or for the faithful, that faith may be increased in them, and they may
persevere in it. For they contend that men do not receive these things from Him, but have them from ourselves, saying, that
the grace of God, by which we are freed from impiety, is given according to our merits. Pelagius was compelled, no doubt,
to condemn this by his fear of being condemned by the episcopal judgment in Palestine; but he is found to teach it still in
his later writings. They also advanced so far as to say that the life of the righteous in this world is without sin, and the
Church of Christ is perfected by them in this mortality, to the point of being entirely without spot or wrinkle (Eph. v. 27); as if it were not the Church of Christ, that, in the whole world, cries to God, ‘Forgive us our debts.’ They also deny
that children, who are carnally born after Adam, contract the contagion of ancient death from their first birth. For they
assert that they are born so without any bond of original sin, that there is absolutely nothing that ought to
be remitted to them in the second birth, yet they are to be baptized; but for this reason, that, adopted in regeneration,
they may be admitted to the kingdom of God, and thus be translated from good into better,—not that they may be washed by that
renovation from any evil of the old bond. For although they be not baptized, they promise to them, outside the kingdom of
God indeed, but nevertheless, a certain eternal and blessed life of their own. They also say that Adam himself, even had he
not
sinned, would have died in the body, and that this death would not have come as a desert to a fault, but as a condition of
nature. Certain other things also are objected to them, but these are the chief, and also either all, or nearly all, the others
may be understood to depend on these.”

140 Compare Epistles 225, 1, and 156. It is, of course, not certain that this is the same Hilary that wrote to Augustin from Sicily, but it seems
probable.