In January 2004, when I was building the Iraqi Security Forces, I had dinner with Iraqi Kurdish Regional President Massoud Barzani during a recruiting trip in the Kurdish provinces for senior Kurd officers. When I expressed my concerns about Kurdish soldiers’ integration into the Iraqi Army, he told me that the recent Kurd/Arab issue was a Saddam Hussein legacy. Although it was not immediately apparent, Barzani told me, the real problem was the Sunni/Shia divide.

He was, of course, proven correct.

In 2003 and 2004, forces were at play to set the stage for the civil war between Iraq’s Sunnis and the Shias. Amb. Paul Bremer, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s administrator, made three significant mistakes: the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, the dissolution of state industries and, most importantly, the de-Baathification of the Iraqi government. At once, the United States established a large cohort of well-trained, unemployed, angry men and a cohort of Sunni bureaucrats that were now disenfranchised.

A second force was the overly aggressive behavior of some U.S. units, notably the 4th Division operating in Anbar. Unlike the 101st Division in the north, led by then-Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, the 4th Division went out of its way to alienate potential Sunni allies and undermine nascent U.S. counterinsurgency efforts.

When the Shia/Sunni crisis really blew up after the Golden Mosque bombing in 2006, the United States was forced to address the political dilemma of disenfranchised Sunnis, some 20 percent of the Iraqi population. Then-Col. Sean McFarland reached out to the Sunni sheiks and gave them an opportunity to engage militarily and politically. Simultaneously, President Bush applied the so-called surge, deploying U.S. forces among the Iraqi population to provide much-needed security—an initiative developed by a member of General Petraeus’s staff, then-Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant. Those forces served to reintegrate the Sunnis and to provide security for the Iraqi population.

Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki has reversed the progress of 2006-2007. He has once again alienated the Sunnis and failed to provide for the first rule of governance: security for the governed. The situation in Iraq will continue to deteriorate until the Iraqi government brings the Sunni leadership back into the fold. The solution is political.

Gen. Paul Eaton (ret.), who served more than 30 years in the U.S. Army, was commanding general of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq from 2003 to 2004.

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The blame game is pointless

By Col. Kevin Benson

Iraq is not lost yet. Thus, the correct question is not “who lost Iraq?” The correct question is how do we, the United States, support the Iraqi people as they determine their own path and solve their own problems?

It is far too soon to assign blame. The blame game is a pointless exercise, as there is enough to go around. We should not expend energy, although we will, assigning blame, because the challenge is at hand. If our policy objective remains an independent Iraq building democratic institutions and traditions in accord with Iraqi culture, then we must determine how we will support the Iraqi people. The solutions to Iraqi problems must come from the Iraqis.

We must assemble a team of cold-blooded, realistic military and Foreign Service officers. Charge them to analyze the situation, determine what is needed for the short, near and far term, present the cold-blooded assessment to the president and then act. The past is the past. The future is not decided. We know our interests and we have this moment. If the assessment is to cut our losses and let the dust settle, so be it. In any event, we must take a decision and act.

The prize is not just Iraq. The prize is in retaining influence in the region. There is no time for assigning blame, for hand wringing and worry. We must settle on our interests, assess the situation, determine what to do and act. Iraq is not lost.

Col. Kevin Benson (ret.), who teaches at the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., was the lead planner at the U.S. land war command in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and a consultant on the plan that concluded the Iraq mission in 2011.

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Who isn’t to blame?

By Peter Van Buren

Who lost Iraq? All of the above. Supported by post-9/11 bloodlust among the American people, Congress and the media, the Bush administration invaded a relatively stable country amid the volatile Middle East. Procounsel Paul Bremer almost immediately disbanded the two elements that held Iraq together—the civil service, including the police, and the army. The U.S. military first stood aside as chaos and looting engulfed the country, then responded with ever-increasing violence, as represented by the medieval siege of Fallujah. Near comic-failures in reconstruction by contractors, the State Department and USAID, outlined in my book; unnecessary violence toward civilians by mercenaries like Blackwater; and CIA torture in Iraq and elsewhere all ensured that no hearts and minds would be won.

Failing to impose a unity government through nine years of occupation, the U.S. Embassy stood on the sidelines as the Iranians brokered the election of Prime Minister Maliki in 2010, and then stood helpless again as the newly empowered Shias led by Maliki almost immediately turned against the violent Sunni minority, almost begging al Qaeda to come in as their protectors. The Obama administration funded al Qaeda elements in Syria and clumsily unleashed stores of weapons from Libya into the mix. The failure to close Guantanamo kept the pool of jihadi fighters well motivated. The final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq at the end of 2011 served almost as a mercy killing for our failed policy. Given the foundational mistake of destroying a country in hopes of rebuilding it, perhaps we should better ask, prior to the next U.S. military action, “Could we have not lost Iraq?”