Manuel v. City of Joliet

ON WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

During
a traffic stop, police officers in Joliet, Illinois, searched
petitioner Elijah Manuel and found a vitamin bottle
containing pills. Suspecting the pills to be illegal drugs,
the officers conducted a field test, which came back negative
for any controlled substance. Still, they arrested Manuel and
took him to the police station. There, an evidence technician
tested the pills and got the same negative result, but
claimed in his report that one of the pills tested
"positive for the probable presence of ecstasy."
App. 92. An arresting officer also reported that, based on
his "training and experience, " he "knew the
pills to be ecstasy." Id., at 91. On the basis
of those false statements, another officer filed a sworn
complaint charging Manuel with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance. Relying exclusively on that complaint,
a county court judge found probable cause to detain Manuel
pending trial.

While
Manuel was in jail, the Illinois police laboratory tested
the seized pills and reported that they contained no
controlled substances. But Manuel remained in custody,
spending a total of 48 days in pretrial detention. More
than two years after his arrest, but less than two years
after his criminal case was dismissed, Manuel filed a 42
U.S.C. §1983 lawsuit against Joliet and several of its
police officers (collectively, the City), alleging that his
arrest and detention violated the Fourth Amendment. The
District Court dismissed Manuel's suit, holding, first,
that the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred
his unlawful arrest claim, and, second, that under binding
Circuit precedent, pretrial detention following the start
of legal process (here, the judge's probable-cause
determination) could not give rise to a Fourth Amendment
claim. Manuel appealed the dismissal of his unlawful
detention claim; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on Fourth
Amendment grounds. This conclusion follows from the
Court's settled precedent. In Gerstein v. Pugh,420 U.S. 103, the Court decided that a pretrial detention
challenge was governed by the Fourth Amendment, noting that
the Fourth Amendment establishes the minimum constitutional
"standards and procedures" not just for arrest but
also for "detention, " id., at 111, and
"always has been thought to define" the appropriate
process "for seizures of person[s] ... in criminal
cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial,
" id., at 125, n. 27. And in Albright v.
Oliver,510 U.S. 266, a majority of the Court again
looked to the Fourth Amendment to assess pretrial restraints
on liberty. Relying on Gerstein, the plurality
reiterated that the Fourth Amendment is the
"relevan[t]" constitutional provision to assess the
"deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with
criminal prosecutions." Id., at 274; see
id., at 290 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)
("[R]ules of recovery for such harms have naturally
coalesced under the Fourth Amendment"). That the
pretrial restraints in Albright arose pursuant to
legal process made no difference, given that they were
allegedly unsupported by probable cause.

As reflected in those cases, pretrial detention can violate
the Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when
it follows, the start of legal process. The Fourth Amendment
prohibits government officials from detaining a person absent
probable cause. And where legal process has gone forward, but
has done nothing to satisfy the probable-cause requirement,
it cannot extinguish a detainee's Fourth Amendment claim.
That was the case here: Because the judge's determination
of probable cause was based solely on fabricated evidence, it
did not expunge Manuel's Fourth Amendment claim. For that
reason, Manuel stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he sought
relief not merely for his arrest, but also for his pretrial
detention. Pp. 6-10.

2. On remand, the Seventh Circuit should determine the
claim's accrual date, unless it finds that the City has
previously waived its timeliness argument. In doing so, the
court should look to the common law of torts for guidance,
Carey v. Piphus,435 U.S. 247, 257-258, while also
closely attending to the values and purposes of the
constitutional right at issue. The court may also consider
any other still-live issues relating to the elements of and
rules applicable to Manuel's Fourth Amendment claim. Pp.
11-15.

KAGAN,
J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.
J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ.,
joined.

KAGAN
JUSTICE

Petitioner
Elijah Manuel was held in jail for some seven weeks after a
judge relied on allegedly fabricated evidence to find
probable cause that he had committed a crime. The primary
question in this case is whether Manuel may bring a claim
based on the Fourth Amendment to contest the legality of his
pretrial confinement. Our answer follows from settled
precedent. The Fourth Amendment, this Court has recognized,
establishes "the standards and procedures"
governing pretrial detention. See, e.g., Ger-stein v.
Pugh,420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). And those constitutional
protections apply even after the start of "legal
process" in a criminal case-here, that is, after the
judge's determination of probable cause. See Albright
v. Oliver,510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (plurality opinion);
id., at 290 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
Accordingly, we hold today that Manuel may challenge his
pretrial detention on the ground that it violated the Fourth
Amendment (while we leave all other issues, including one
about that claim's timeliness, to the court below).

I

Shortly
after midnight on March 18, 2011, Manuel was riding through
Joliet, Illinois, in the passenger seat of a Dodge Charger,
with his brother at the wheel. A pair of Joliet police
officers pulled the car over when the driver failed to signal
a turn. See App. 90. According to the complaint in this case,
one of the officers dragged Manuel from the car, called him a
racial slur, and kicked and punched him as he lay on the
ground. See id., at 31-32, 63.[1]The policeman then
searched Manuel and found a vitamin bottle containing pills.
See id., at 64. Suspecting that the pills were
actually illegal drugs, the officers conducted a field test
of the bottle's contents. The test came back negative for
any controlled substance, leaving the officers with no
evidence that Manuel had committed a crime. See id.,
at 69. Still, the officers arrested Manuel and took him to
the Joliet police station. See id., at 70.

There,
an evidence technician tested the pills once again, and got
the same (negative) result. See ibid. But the
technician lied in his report, claiming that one of the pills
was "found to be ... positive for the probable presence
of ecstasy." Id., at 92. Similarly, one of the
arresting officers wrote in his report that "[f]rom
[his] training and experience, [he] knew the pills to be
ecstasy." Id., at 91. On the basis of those
statements, another officer swore out a criminal complaint
against Manuel, charging him with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance. See id., at 52-53.

Manuel
was brought before a county court judge later that day for a
determination of whether there was probable cause for the
charge, as necessary for further detention. See
Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 114 (requiring a judicial
finding of probable cause following a warrantless arrest to
impose any significant pretrial restraint on liberty);
Ill.Comp.Stat., ch. 725, §5/109-1 (West 2010)
(implementing that constitutional rule). The judge relied
exclusively on the criminal complaint-which in turn relied
exclusively on the police department's fabrications-to
support a finding of probable cause. Based on that
determination, he sent Manuel to the county jail to await
trial. In the somewhat obscure legal lingo of this case,
Manuel's subsequent detention was thus pursuant to
"legal process"- because it followed from, and was
authorized by, the judge's probable-cause
determination.[2]

While
Manuel sat in jail, the Illinois police laboratory reexamined
the seized pills, and on April 1, it issued a report
concluding (just as the prior two tests had) that they
contained no controlled substances. See App. 51. But for
unknown reasons, the prosecution-and, critically for this
case, Manuel's detention-continued for more than another
month. Only on May 4 did an Assistant State's Attorney
seek dismissal of the drug charge. See id., at 48,
101. The County Court immediately granted the request, and
Manuel was released the next day. In all, he had spent 48
days in pretrial detention.

On
April 22, 2013, Manuel brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 against the City of Joliet and several of its
police officers (collectively, the City). Section 1983
creates a "species of tort liability, " Imbler
v. Pachtman,424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976), for "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution, " §1983. Manuel's
complaint alleged that the City violated his Fourth Amendment
rights in two ways-first by arresting him at the roadside
without any reason, and next by "detaining him in police
custody" for almost seven weeks based entirely on
made-up evidence. See App. 79-80.[3]

The
District Court dismissed Manuel's suit. See 2014 WL
551626 (ND 111., Feb. 12, 2014). The court first held that
the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred
Manuel's claim for unlawful arrest, because more than two
years had elapsed between the date of his arrest (March 18,
2011) and the filing of his complaint (April 22, 2013). But
the court relied on another basis in rejecting Manuel's
challenge to his subsequent detention (which stretched from
March 18 to May 5, 2011). Binding Circuit precedent, the
District Court explained, made clear that pretrial detention
following the start of legal process could not give rise to a
Fourth Amendment claim. See id., at *1 (citing,
e.g., Newsome v. McCabe,256 F.3d 747, 750 (CA7
2001)). According to that line of decisions, a §1983
plaintiff challenging such detention must allege a breach of
the Due Process Clause-and must show, to recover on that
theory, that state law fails to provide an adequate remedy.
See 2014 WL 551626, at *l-*2. Because Manuel's complaint
rested solely on the Fourth Amendment-and because, in any
event, Illinois's remedies were robust enough to preclude
the due process avenue-the District Court found that Manuel
had no way to proceed. See ibid.

The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of Manuel's claim for unlawful detention (the
only part of the District Court's decision Manuel
appealed). See 590 Fed.Appx. 641 (2015). Invoking its prior
caselaw, the Court of Appeals reiterated that such claims
could not be brought under the Fourth Amendment. Once a
person is detained pursuant to legal process, the court
stated, "the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture
and the detainee's claim that the detention is improper
becomes [one of] due process." Id., at 643-644
(quoting Llovet v. Chicago,761 F.3d 759, 763 (CA7
2014)). And again: "When, after the arrest[, ] a person
is not let go when he should be, the Fourth Amendment gives
way to the due process clause as a basis for challenging his
detention." 590 Fed. Appx., at 643 (quoting
Llovet, 761 F.3d, at 764). So the Seventh Circuit
held that Manuel's complaint, in alleging only a Fourth
Amendment violation, rested on the wrong part of the
Constitution: A person detained following the onset of legal
process could at most (although, the court agreed,
not in Illinois) challenge his pretrial confinement
via the Due Process Clause. See 590 Fed. Appx., at 643-644.

The
Seventh Circuit recognized that its position makes it an
outlier among the Courts of Appeals, with ten others taking
the opposite view. See id., at 643;
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor,723 F.3d 91, 99 (CA1
2013) ("[T]here is now broad consensus among the
circuits that the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
seizure but upon probable cause extends through the pretrial
period").[4] Still, the court decided, Manuel had
failed to offer a sufficient reason for overturning settled
Circuit precedent; his argument, albeit "strong, "
was "better left for the Supreme Court." 590 Fed.
Appx., at 643.

On cue,
we granted certiorari. 577 U.S. ___ (2016).

II

The
Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . .
seizures." Manuel's complaint seeks just that
protection. Government officials, it recounts, detained-
which is to say, "seiz[ed]"-Manuel for 48 days
following his arrest. See App. 79-80; Brendlin v.
California,551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) ("A person is
seized" whenever officials "restrain[] his freedom
of movement" such that he is "not free to
leave"). And that detention was "unreasonable,
" the complaint continues, because it was based solely
on false evidence, rather than supported by probable cause.
See App. 79-80; Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S.
186, 192 (2013) ("[T]he general rule [is] that Fourth
Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on
probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a
crime"). By their respective terms, then, Manuel's
claim fits the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment
fits Manuel's claim, as hand in glove.

This
Court decided some four decades ago that a claim challenging
pretrial detention fell within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. In Gerstein, two persons arrested without
a warrant brought a §1983 suit complaining that they had
been held in custody for "a substantial period solely on
the decision of a prosecutor." 420 U.S., at 106. The
Court looked to the Fourth Amendment to analyze- and
uphold-their claim that such a pretrial restraint on liberty
is unlawful unless a judge (or grand jury) first makes a
reliable finding of probable cause. See id., at 114,
117, n. 19. The Fourth Amendment, we began, establishes the
minimum constitutional "standards and procedures"
not just for arrest but also for ensuing
"detention." Id., at 111. In choosing that
Amendment "as the rationale for decision, " the
Court responded to a concurring Justice's view that the
Due Process Clause offered the better framework: The Fourth
Amendment, the majority countered, was "tailored
explicitly for the criminal justice system, and it[] always
has been thought to define" the appropriate process
"for seizures of person[s] ... in criminal cases,
including the detention of suspects pending trial."
Id., at 125, n. 27. That Amendment, standing alone,
guaranteed "a fair and reliable determination of
probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial
restraint." Id., at 125. Accordingly, those
detained prior to trial without such a finding could appeal
to "the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unfounded invasions of liberty." Id., at 112;
see id., at 114.[5]

And so
too, a later decision indicates, those objecting to a
pretrial deprivation of liberty may invoke the Fourth
Amendment when (as here) that deprivation occurs after legal
process commences. The §1983 plaintiff in
Albright complained of various pretrial restraints
imposed after a court found probable cause to issue an arrest
warrant, and then bind him over for trial, based on a
policeman's unfounded charges. See 510 U.S., at 268-269
(plurality opinion). For uncertain reasons, Albright ignored
the Fourth Amendment in drafting his complaint; instead, he
alleged that the defendant officer had infringed his
substantive due process rights. This Court rejected that
claim, with five Justices in two opinions remitting Albright
to the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 271 (plurality
opinion) ("We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment . . .
under which [his] claim must be judged"); id.,
at 290 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]njuries
like those [he] alleges are cognizable in §1983 claims
founded upon . . . the Fourth Amendment"). "The
Framers, " the plurality wrote, "considered the
matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the
Fourth Amendment to address it." Id., at 274.
That the deprivations at issue were pursuant to legal process
made no difference, given that they were (allegedly)
unsupported by probable cause; indeed, neither of the two
opinions so much as mentioned that procedural circumstance.
Relying on Gerstein, the plurality stated that the
Fourth Amendment remained the "relevan[t]"
constitutional provision to assess the "deprivations of
liberty"- most notably, pretrial detention-"that go
hand in hand with criminal prosecutions." 510 U.S., at
274; see id., at 290 (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment) ("[R]ules of recovery for such harms have
naturally coalesced under the Fourth Amendment").

As
reflected in Albright's tracking of Gerstein
s analysis, pretrial detention can violate the Fourth
Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it
follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case. The
Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from
detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. See
supra, at 6. That can happen when the police hold
someone without any reason before the formal onset of a
criminal proceeding. But it also can occur when legal process
itself goes wrong-when, for example, a judge's
probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police
officer's false statements. Then, too, a person is
confined without constitutionally adequate justification.
Legal process has gone forward, but it has done nothing to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment's probable-cause
requirement. And for that reason, it cannot extinguish the
detainee's Fourth Amendment claim- or somehow, as the
Seventh Circuit has held, convert that claim into one founded
on the Due Process Clause. See 590 Fed. Appx., at 643-644. If
the complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in
pretrial detention unsupported by probable cause, then the
right allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth
Amendment.[6]

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For
that reason, and contrary to the Seventh Circuit&#39;s view,
Manuel stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he sought relief
not merely for his (pre-legal-process) arrest, but also for
his (post-legal-process) pretrial detention.[7]Consider again the
facts alleged in this case. Police officers initially
arrested Manuel without probable cause, based solely on his
possession of pills that had field tested negative for an
illegal substance. So (putting timeliness issues aside)
Manuel could bring a claim for wrongful arrest under the
Fourth Amendment. And the same is true (again, disregarding
timeliness) as to a claim for wrongful detention-because
Manuel&#39;s subsequent weeks in custody were also
unsupported by probable cause, and so also
constitutionally unreasonable. No evidence of Manuel's
criminality had come to light in between the roadside arrest
and the County Court proceeding initiating legal process; to
the contrary, yet another test of Manuel's pills had come
back negative in that period. All that the judge had before
him were police fabrications about the pills' content.
The judge's order holding Manuel for trial therefore
lacked any proper basis. And that means Manuel's ensuing
pretrial detention, no less ...

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