A lot has been written on the tragedy of 1941. In the last few years a large amount of new publications appeared on the subject, but still they all explain the events of the beginning of the war differently. All of them keep asking the same question - why Red Army had suffered such a heavy defeat having had such a huge quantitative superiority in military equipment. Each publication provides an answer of its own. Some wrote that the USSR had planned to attack Germany and the Red Army army concentration had an offensive nature and had not been able to react properly at being attacked unexpectedly, some wrote that the Army hadn't had enough new equipment, some stated that the data on Red Army equipment are incorrect, etc. In other words: everyone has his own opinion.
The editors of Frontline Illustration have received a large amount of letters form our readers with requests to tell them more on the events of 1941. Answering these requests, we decided to create an issue dedicated to the description of the conditions of the land forces of the USSR and Germany
in June 1941. But in the course of work on the issue, our authors discovered that the basic information on many of the issues is highly controversial and misleading, and this fact required additional research. Besides, an evaluation of an event very often can not be done without taking into account political, economic and military realities of that time. Overall, the subject turned out to be so wide and multidimensional that to cover it we will require more than one issue of Frontline Illustration.
That is why, in this issue, the editors decided to touch upon only the most popular aspects. The main accent is given to the description of the condition of the Red Army, especially its Auto-Armoured Forces and fortified districts. In chapter dedicated to Wehrmacht, we have only touched upon the most interesting (in our opinion) moments. Authors also tried and evaded giving their own evaluations of events, leaving conclusion making to the readers. This issue contains a large amount of tables, many of which a published for the first time. Overall, this publication does not pretend
to be a conclusive material and is only a reference material. We would like the readers to draw their own conclusions on the basis of the published materials.
Please, let us know, how interesting for you are the issues dedicated to separate topics, as for instance: The Condition of the Red Army Armored Forces by Summer 1941; Artillery of RKKA by Summer 1941; Fortified Districts on the New and Old Borders of the USSR by 1941 ("Stalin Line" and "Molotov
Line"); and also data on weaponry, equipment and structure of Wehrmacht by the start of the war with the USSR.

List of ContentsWehrmacht
Preparations of German Armed Forces
Equipment and WeaponryThe Condition of the Red Army in the Wake of the War
Red Army Control Mechanisms
Operative and Strategic Planning
Mobilization Deployment
Rifle Troops (Infantry)
Artillery
Auto and Armored Forces
Cavalry
Paratroops
Signals Troops
Engineers
Fortified Districts
Red Army Support Troops
80 pages, 75 photographs

Illustrations
1. There were 1122 PzKpfw1 Ausf.B in the Armored Forces of Germany by the beginning of the war, but hey could only be used in reconnaissance role
2. There were 2331 amphibious tanks T-37A by June 1941, but less than half of them were operational
3. Tractor Voroshilovets could tow any type of tank (including heavy tanks)in the Red Army (RKKA) that were on the armament by Summer 1941
4. There were 132 amphibious tanks T-40 in the Red Army by June1941
5. KV-2 heavy tank could not be used on the swamp terrain due to its weight