Nuclear Energy: Saudi Arabia’s Impending Battle with Washington

US President Donald Trump speaks with then Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman during their meeting at the White House on March 14, 2017. Photo: Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead.

Current tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia, and the kingdom’s inability to present a credible and sustainable version of events surrounding the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi on the premises of its Istanbul consulate, are complicating Saudi Arabia’s negotiations with the US for the acquisition of designs for nuclear power plants in a deal valued at up to $80 billion — depending on how many plants Saudi Arabia ultimately decides to build.

Prospects of this massive deal go to the heart of President Donald Trump’s America First policy, which is focused on helping the American economy and finding business deals. But growing criticism and distrust of Saudi Arabia in the US Congress and intelligence community as a result of the Khashoggi crisis, as well as of the kingdom’s handling of the Yemen war, which has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises since World War II, are likely to strengthen efforts to thwart an agreement that honors Saudi insistence on producing its own nuclear fuel, even though it can buy it more cheaply abroad.

The kingdom’s insistence on this has exacerbated concerns that it may divert nuclear fuel for military purposes. Similar fears coupled with Iran’s ballistic missile program drove world powers to first sanction Iran and then conclude a 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. Trump withdrew from that agreement earlier this year, charging that it did not provide sufficient guarantees that Iran would not be able to develop a nuclear weapon.

Congressional Democrats, and some Republicans, have described refusing to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear technology as proper punishment for the killing of Khashoggi, which the kingdom insists was done without the knowledge of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman.

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While the Trump administration has as yet not abandoned longstanding strict US nuclear export safeguards to secure a deal with Saudi Arabia, it has also ambiguously said it would uphold them.

As he did in his rejection of hard-hitting sanctions in the wake of the Khashoggi killing, Trump is likely to argue that if the US does not conclude a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, countries like China, Russia, and South Korea — which have less strict controls — will step in. The argument essentially is that the US must commit a wrong because, if it doesn’t, someone else will.

Saudi officials have repeatedly insisted that the kingdom is developing nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, such as medicine production, electricity generation, and desalination of sea water. They say Saudi Arabia is committed to putting its future facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

However, with a $56 billion military budget for 2018, Saudi Arabia is also stepping up the development of a domestic military industry. The kingdom aims to source 50 percent of its military procurement domestically by 2030, up from its current 2 percent.

Speaking to CBS earlier this year, Prince Muhammad appeared to put conditions on Saudi nuclear assurances by warning that “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”

In putting forward demands for parity with Iran, Saudi Arabia was also seen as potentially backing away from a 2009 memorandum of understanding with the US, in which it pledged to acquire nuclear fuel from international markets.

Nuclear energy cooperation was one of a host of agreements concluded last year by Saudi Arabia and China during a visit to Beijing by Saudi King Salman. The agreement included a feasibility study for the construction of high-temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) nuclear power plants in the kingdom, as well as cooperation on intellectual property and the development of a domestic industrial supply chain for HTGRs built in Saudi Arabia. This HTGR agreement built on an accord signed in 2012 that involved maintenance and development of nuclear power plants and research reactors, as well as the provision of Chinese nuclear fuel.

A report by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released shortly after the king’s visit warned that the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement had “not eliminated the kingdom’s desire for nuclear weapons capabilities and even nuclear weapons.” And potential Chinese sales to Saudi Arabia of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles remain one of the murkier areas of Sino-Saudi military cooperation.

Military experts say that satellite imagery of missile bases in Saudi Arabia in recent years and other open-source circumstantial evidence, including Saudi press coverage of graduation ceremonies at the kingdom’s Strategic Missile Force school in Wadi ad-Dawasir, attest to ongoing transfers.

In 2014, Saudi Arabia showcased Chinese-made Dongfeng-3 missiles that have a range of up to 5,000 kilometers. Media reports said the missiles had been purchased in 2007, possibly with US acquiescence.

“Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in conventional ballistic and cruise missiles to provide the kingdom a shot of strategic deterrence,” said non-proliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis. His conclusion was confirmed by Anwar Eshqi, a retired Saudi major general and adviser to the Saudi military.

“The Saudi military did indeed receive DF-21 missiles from China and the integration of the missiles, including a full maintenance check and upgraded facilities, is complete,“ Eshqi said.

Dr. James M. Dorsey, a non-resident Senior Associate at the BESA Center,is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological Universityand co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture. BESA Center Perspectives Papers, such as this one, are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

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