'Fountainhead of Jihad' - book explores al Qaeda-Haqqani links

March 18, 2013|Reuters

* Haqqani played vital role in al Qaeda's history

* Taliban talks could leave al Qaeda havens untouched

* Pakistan risks backlash if pushes Haqqanis too hard

By Myra MacDonald

LONDON, March 18 (Reuters) - "Know that we will not lay downour arms once Afghanistan is free." The fight must be pursued toliberate "the defenceless Muslims of the world" from Kashmir toPalestine to Samarkand, the speaker said.

It was 1988, a conference in Gujrat in Pakistan's Punjabprovince; a time when the enthusiasm of the anti-Soviet jihadfused with internationalist causes popular among Arab fightersand the Pakistani backers of the mujahedeen to forge theideology of al Qaeda.

The speaker was Jalaluddin Haqqani, patriarch of one of themost formidable fighting forces in Afghanistan.

The story is told in an account of Haqqani's links with alQaeda in a book published this month: "Fountainhead of Jihad:The Haqqani Nexus 1973-2012," by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler.

Based partly on new primary sources, the book highlights oneof the big failures of the Afghan war. Meant to defeat al Qaeda,the war has failed to break the resilience of the group withwhich it has the closest ties - the so-called Haqqani network.

As a result, western hopes that talks with the AfghanTaliban might persuade them to break with al Qaeda in return fora share of power face a serious flaw.

Al Qaeda is, and always has been, based in Haqqaniterritory, and the Haqqani network is excluded from those talksafter Washington designated it a terrorist organisation lastyear.

Western officials have long said the ties between theHaqqanis and al Qaeda make it hard to include them in apolitical settlement - contradicting Pakistani assertions theycould play a useful role in Afghanistan after most foreigncombat troops withdraw at the end of 2014.

But "Fountainhead of Jihad" is unusual in detailing quitehow close those ties are.

"I was surprised at how often Jalaluddin Haqqani appeared asplaying a vital role in al Qaeda's history," Brown told Reuters."The Haqqanis were everywhere."

Western officials have been holding intermittent talks withthe Taliban that could lead to them opening a political officein Qatar, paving the way for more substantive negotiations.

But in a war where power is seeping out from Kabul toautonomous local actors, no one has worked out how to deal withthe Haqqanis - beyond U.S. drone strikes - to ensure they do notprovide a growing safe haven for al Qaeda on either side of thePakistan-Afghanistan border.

Based partly in North Waziristan but with business linksrunning deep into Pakistan and the Gulf, the Haqqanis havemanaged to keep on the right side of the Pakistan army byfocusing on Afghanistan, while retaining ties with the PakistaniTaliban (TTP), waging war on the Pakistani state.

Such is their position at the centre of the Islamist networkthat Pakistan could face rising TTP attacks were it to push theHaqqanis too hard. "They can't go after them in a direct waywithout a serious backlash," said Brown.

Washington has also accused the Pakistan army of using theHaqqanis to promote Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan, acharge it denies.

PLATFORM FOR VIOLENCE, SANCTIONED BY ISLAM

The book characterises the Haqqanis both as providers ofsafe haven and "a platform for the delivery of violence". Thisenabled them to amass wealth and power by providing services toa variety of players, from their alleged state sponsors in thePakistan military, to al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, orTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

But as far back as the 1970s - when their secure base insoutheastern Afghanistan made them useful allies for Pakistan tocounter a hostile government in Kabul - the Haqqanis were alwaysmore than guns for hire.

"The Haqqanis' brand indicates a fountainhead of 'jihad', ofviolence specifically sanctioned by Islam," the book argues.

Crucially, the Haqqanis historically developed an outlook onglobal jihad which influenced al Qaeda as much as the Araborganisation influenced the Afghan mujahideen.

During the anti-Soviet jihad, Jalaluddin Haqqani was the first Afghan Islamist known to have actively recruited Arabfighters into his ranks.

He was also the first to declare the Afghan jihad a duty forMuslims worldwide - preceding by at least four years thePalestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam whose 1984 writings are credited with being the foundation of modern global jihad.

In the mid-1980s, it was in Haqqani-dominated territory thatOsama bin Laden established his first base in Afghanistan; itwas through the Haqqanis that Arab fighters found their way tothe battlefield; it was into this fervent atmosphere of jihadthat al Qaeda would be born "in a form that was and remains tothis day inextricably bound up with the Haqqani network."

When the Taliban, who ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001,came under pressure from the United States to curb al Qaeda inthe 1990s, bin Laden was able to use his relationship with theHaqqanis to resist their attempts to restrict his activities.

It was from Haqqani-controlled territory that bin Ladendeclared a jihad against "the Jews and Crusaders" in 1998.

The book's authors make no definitive claims about whetherthe links between the Haqqanis and al Qaeda can be broken, butconclude "such change would mark a significant break with thegroup's trajectory over the last two and a half decades."