OMNI U.S.A., INC., PETITIONER V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 87-1743
In the Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Brief for the Respondent in Opposition
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented
Opinions below
Jurisdiction
Statement
Argument
Conclusion
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-18a) is reported
at 840 F.2d 912. The opinion and judgment of the Court of
International Trade (Pet. App. 19a-34a) are reported at 663 F. Supp.
1130.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was issued on March 2, 1988.
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on April 21, 1988.
This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals and the Court of International Trade
correctly held that petitioner's claim for reliquidation of certain
customs entries was time-barred under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) by virtue
of its failure to file a claim within the one-year period provided
under that statute.
STATEMENT
1. On May 6, 1977, the United States Department of the Treasury
(Treasury) published a countervailing duty (CVD) order, T.D. 77-128,
11 Cust. B. 242, 42 Fed. Reg. 23146, imposing countervailing duties on
certain fasteners imported from Japan into the United States. /1/ The
order covered fasteners that were classifiable under certain item
numbers contained in the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS)
and that were entered into the United States or withdrawn from a
warehouse for consumption on or after May 6, 1977. On June 4, 1979,
as a result of a petition filed on March 23, 1979 (44 Fed. Reg.
17851), Treasury published T.D. 79-158, 13 Cust. B. 366, 44 Fed. Reg.
31972, a final CVD determination and order imposing countervailing
duties on industrial fasterners from Japan that were classified under
the same TSUS item numbers as those fasteners covered by T.D. 77-128
(as well as certain additional items) and that were entered or
withdrawn from a warehouse for consumption on or after June 4, 1979.
Except for a brief period in June 1979, entries of Japanese fasteners
covered by T.D. 79-158 were liquidated and assessed with
countervailing duties pursuant to that order. /2/
On January 2, 1980, the administration of the CVD program was
transferred to the Department of Commerce (Commerce) by Exec. Order
No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1981). On May 13, 1980, Commerce published
a notice advising the public of its intention to review annually all
CVD orders then in existence. 45 Fed. Reg. 31455. The notice
included a list of existing orders to be reviewed. The list included
the original Japanese-fastener order, T.D. 77-128, but did not include
the subsequent order, T.D. 79-158, which covered the fasteners at
issue here.
The May 1980 notice by Commerce did not call for any suspension of
liquidation of entries. On August 22, 1980, however, pursuant to
instructions from Commerce, the Customs Service advised all field
personnel by telex to suspend liquidations of entries of merchandise
subject to various cited pending CVD orders. The telex listed the
first Japanese-fastener order, T.D. 77-128, but not the second, T.D.
79-158. Consequently, entries subject to T.D. 79-158 continued to be
liquidated. That process was ultimately halted on November 26, 1980,
by a telex from Customs to its field personnel.
2. Between February 14, 1980, and September 18, 1980, petitioner
made 16 entries of industrial fasteners from Japan that were covered
by T.D. 79-158, and it deposited the estimated countervailing duties
for each entry. Those entries were liquidated between April 7, 1980,
and October 23, 1980, and were assessed with countervailing duties at
the estimated CVD deposit rate established by T.D. 79-158. Petitioner
did not file a protest challenging the assessment of countervailing
duties within 90 days after receiving notice of liquidation, as
authorized by 19 U.S.C. 1514; nor did it request reliquidation on the
ground of clerical error within one year after the notice of
liquidation, as authorized by 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1). /3/
On October 29, 1981, Commerce published a notice of "Final results
of administrative review" for 1979. 46 Fed. Reg. 53485. That
administrative review, which covered fasteners entered in 1979 and
subject to T.D. 77-128 and T.D. 79-158, set substantially lower CVD
rates for unliquidated merchandise classifiable under the TSUS item
numbers that applied to petitioner's 1980 entries. The notice also
declared that the net subsidy found for fasteners classifiable under
other TSUS item numbers covered by T.D. 77-128 and T.D. 79-158 was de
minimis and that, therefore, shipments of merchandise classifiable
under those numbers and entered between June 4, 1979, and December 31,
1979, were to be liquidated without any contervailing duties. A
subsequent review reached essentially the same result for 1980
entries. 48 Fed. Reg. 4864 (1983).
3. On October 13, 1982, almost two years after liquidation of its
last entry on October 23, 1980, petitioner submitted a petition to the
Customs Service, requesting, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1520(c),
reliquidation of its 16 entries of industrial fasteners in 1980.
Petitioner argued that there had been a clerical error in the
assessment of countervailing duties on those entries. Of course,
because petitioner's entries were all liquidated before October 23,
1980, the petition was not filed within one year after liquidation, as
required by 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1).
On August 3, 1983, the Customs Service issued a ruling that stated,
inter alia, that liquidations of entries of merchandise covered by
T.D. 77-128 and T.D. 79-158 were valid and became final as to both the
government and importers 90 days after the date of notice of
liquidation, unless protests were timely filed pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
1514 or a request for reliquidation had been timely filed pursuant to
19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1). On May 21, 1984, petitoner's request for
reliquidation was denied as untimely on the basis of the Customs
Service ruling. On June 4, 1984, petitioner protested, pursuant to 19
U.S.C. 1514, the denial of its Section 1520(c) petition. The protest
was denied, again on the basis of the Customs Service ruling.
4. Petitioner instituted this action in the Court of International
Trade (CIT) within 180 days after the denial of its protest, claiming
that it was entitled to relief under Section 1520(c)(1) or to
equitable relief under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i). Relying on United States v.
C.O. Mason, Inc., 51 C.C.P.A. 107 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 999
(1965), and United States v. Cajo Trading, Inc., 55 C.C.P.A. 61, 403
F.2d 268 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968), petitioner
asserted that the liquidations of its 16 entries were void and that,
therefore, those liquidations did not begin the one-year period for
requests for reliquidation under Section 1520(c)(1). It also argued
that United States. v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 66 C.C.P.A. 50, 593 F.2d
1015 (1979), which held that Cajo and Mason were no longer
controlling, had been incorrectly decided. /4/
Relying on Deringer, the trial court rejected petitioner's argument
that the liquidations were void and therefore could not have started
the running of the one-year period specified in Section 1520(c). /5/
Accordingly, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because
petitioner's request for relief under Section 1520(c)(1) was untimely.
The court also rejected petitioner's claim that the liquidations at
issue were ultra vires acts that could be reviewed by the court
pursuant to the grant of residual jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. 1581(i).
Observing that Section 1581(i) jurisdiction was available only when
the more specific means of obtaining review were unavailable or
"manifestly inadequate" (Pet. App. 28a (citation omitted)), the court
held that it would not have been futile for petitioner to have
asserted its objection by way of a timely protest (id. at 29a-30a).
In particular, the court rejected petitioner's claim (which was not
raised in the pleadings or briefs, but mentioned for the first time at
oral argument) that it had not been alerted to look for liquidations
at a time when they should not have occurred. The court responded
that, as in Deringer, it is the importer's burden "to check for posted
notices of liquidation and to protest timely" (Pet. App. 30a). Since
petitioner "did not make out a case of no valid notice," there was "no
legally sufficient element of surprise which rendered the normal
administrative avenues unavailable here" (ibid.).
5. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed (Pet. App. 1a-18a). The court first held that "Section
1520(c)(1) appears to fit the present case like a glove" because the
liquidation of petitioner's 1980 entries by mistake was due to an "'*
* * inadvertence not amounting to an error in the construction of a
law, adverse to the importer'" (Pet. App. 7a, quoting 19 U.S.C.
1520(c)(1)). Petitioner's claim was plainly out of time under that
squarely applicable provision. The court then rejected (Pet. App.
10a-18a) petitioner's reliance on the "void liquidation" theory
espoused in Mason and Cajo and cited by petitioner as a basis for
salvaging its untimely protests.
The court of appeals explained that the Mason/Cajo theory had been
eliminated by statute in 1970 and discredited by its predecessor court
in Deringer in 1979, so that Cajo and Mason were not binding (Pet.
App. 13a-14a). In any event, the court continued, there is no good
reason to distrub the overruling of Mason and Cajo. Even if the
Deringer court had misapprehended the purpose of the 1970 statutory
change, that factor could "not restore Cajo and Mason to any position
requiring obeisance," because the void liquidation doctrine served
only to thwart Congress's aim to identify legal and factual issues for
prompt disposition and to place to rest all issues not so identified
(Pet. App. 15a). Not only does Section 1520(c)(1) apply "by its own
plain language," the court concluded, but the time limit on correction
of errors is as necessary in this case as in others to which it
applies (Pet. App. 16a). /6/ The court accordingly agreed with the
trial court that the Section 1520(c)(1) protest mechanism was adequate
and that this case thus presented no occasion to apply equitable
doctrines "under the supposed authority of 28 U.S.C. Section 1581(i)"
(Pet. App. 17a). /7/
ARGUMENT
The concurrent decisions of the Court of International Trade and of
the Federal Circuit -- the specialized tribunals Congress has
established to resolve customs disputes of the kind presented here --
are correct and do not conflict with any holding of this Court. Nor
do they conflict with decisions of any other court of appeals, and no
such conflict will arise given the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT
and the Federal Circuit in this area. Further review is therefore not
warranted.
In challenging the 1980 liquidations, petitioner plainly failed to
comply with the conditions set by the statutes specifically designed
for such cases. Under 19 U.S.C. 1514(a) and (c)(2), a liquidation
like those at issue here is "final and conclusive" unless a protest is
filed within 90 days or reliquidation is sought under Section 1520(c).
/8/ Petitioner did not file a protest to challenge the 1980
liquidations within 90 days. And its request for reliquidation under
Section 1520(c) was out of time, because it was not filed within the
one-year period allowed by that provision. Accordingly, the
government, acting under 19 U.S.C. 1515, properly denied the protest
challenging the refusal to reliquidate under Section 1520(c), and the
courts below properly rejected petitioner's attempt to contest that
denial in a suit brought under the jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C.
1581(a). /9/
The courts also properly rejected petitioner's attempt to invoke
the catchall residual grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. 1581(i).
"Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction
under another subsection of Section 1581 is or could have been
available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection
would be manifestly inadequate." Miller & Co. v. United States, 824
F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, No. 87-676 (Jan. 25,
1988); see also National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547
(Fed. Cir. 1988); United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467
(C.C.P.A. 1982); American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States,
718 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984).
Otherwise, the residual jurisdiction could be used to circumvent the
specific conditions Congress established for review under other
subsections of Section 1581 -- e.g., the time limits set for suits
covered by Section 1581(a). In this case, Section 1581(a)
jurisdiction was available: petitioner could have requested
reliquidation within the one-year period prescribed by Section
1520(c)(1); if its request had been denied, it could have filed a
protest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1514, and upon denial of the protest
under 19 U.S.C. 1515, petitioner could have filed suit in the Court of
International Trade under 28 U.S.C. 1581(a). Moreover, because
petitioner has not established a lack of effective notice of the
liquidations, the protest remedy under Section 1581(a) was not
"manifestly inadequate." Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i) was
therefore unavailable.
Petitioner renews its attempt to escape that conclusion by invoking
the "void liquidation" theory. Under that theory, the one-year period
specified in Section 1520(c) never commenced because the liquidations
of petitioner's 16 entries in 1980 were ultra vires and hence void.
The courts below correctly rejected this argument as well.
First, the 1979 Deringer decision, which was a binding precedent,
rejected the theory that an invalid liquidation could be treated as a
nullity and thereby not start the running of prescribed time limits
for relief. Since that decision, Congress has several times amended
the provisions that govern the filing and judicial review of
challenges to liquidations (e.g., 19 U.S.C. 1514, 1520; 28 U.S.C.
1581), but it has made no modification to cast doubt on the Derringer
ruling. See, e.g., Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573,
Section 210(b), 212(b)(7)(B), 612(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2977, 2984, 3034;
Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, Section 201, 601(5),
605, 94 Stat. 1728, 1744-1745. In any event, the void liquidation
theory is wholly unfounded in statutory language, and it plainly
undermines the time limits and other procedural requirements of
Sections 1514 and 1520(c). The theory thus is contrary to the
important congressional policy of channeling specified challenges into
carefully designed review processes and of ensuring finality after
specified times in the numerous liquidation decisions made each year.
/10/ Moreover, the theory offers no coherent basis on which to
distinguish the errors that must be corrected through the prescribed
statutory mechanisms, including failures to follow any of numerous
statutes, regulations, and orders, from those which are sufficiently
grave to render a liquidation ultra are sufficiently grave to render a
liquidation ultra vires or "void." /11/ Accordingly, the court of
appeals correctly concluded that, at least where, as here, there is no
valid claim of lack of notice of a liquidation, there is no
justification for judicial recognition of an ill-defined
extra-statutory means of avoiding the procedures and time limits
established by Congress for challenging liquidations. /12/
Petitioner's suggestion (Pet. App. 12-13) that the decision of the
court of appeals is contrary to decisions of this Court and of other
courts of appeals is patently meritless. None of the relied-on
decisions involves the current customs statutes. None involves a
claim that an allegedly "void" action of which the plaintiff had
knowledge did not begin the running of a statutory time limit for
challenging the action. To the extent those decisions speaks of "void
actions by public officials -- a characterization that in some
settings means nothing more than that the actions are invalid -- they
do so in contexts far removed from this case. /13/
Finally, the decisions relied on the petitioner (Pet. 12 n.2) that
were rendered by courts that are now within the Federal Circuit cannot
create a conflict warranting this Court's review. That is especially
so with respect to a claim, such as petitioner's, that is based on an
extra-statutory doctrine created by such courts. In any event, the
relied-on decisions all predate both Deringer and the subsequent
congressional revisions of the pertinent statutes. And even Cajo and
Mason, on which petitioner chiefly relies, did not establish and broad
principle: as Deringer explained, "Cajo and Mason were the result of
extraordinary factual and legal situations requiring unique remedies."
593 F.2d at 1020. /14/
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
JOHN R. BOLTON
Assistant Attorney General
ANTHONY J. STEINMEYER
JOHN S. KOPPEL
SHEILA N. ZIFF
Attorneys
JUNE 1988
/1/ Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1303, a special duty, termed a
"countervailing duty," is imposed on imports that have benefited from
a bounty or grant prior to import. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
/2/ "Liquidation" is the final computation or ascertainment of the
duties owed on a particular entry of merchandise. 19 C.F.R. 159.1.
##FN3
/3/ Section 1520(c) provides that the Customs Service may
reliquidate an entry to correct a "clerical error, mistake of fact, or
other inadvertence not amounting to an error in the construction of a
law, adverse to the importer * * *, when the error, mistake, or
inadvertence is brought to the attention of the appropriate customs
officer within one year after the date of liquidation or exaction * *
*."
/4/ In Cajo and Mason, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) applied the "void liquidation" theory to permit the survival of
claims that otherwise would have been barred by failure to follow
statutory protest and review procedures. Under the "void liquidation"
theory, ultra vires liquidations are void and therefore do not trigger
statutory procedures and time limits. In Deringer, the CCPA held that
that theory was no longer tenable, noting the intervening 1970
amendments to 19 U.S.C. 1500(d).
/5/ The court observed that 19 U.S.C. 1520(c) allows correction of
factual or clerical errors "if Customs is advised of the error within
one year of liquidation or exaction," noting that petitioner did "not
argue that no exaction occurred" but, rather, limited its argument to
the "nonexistence" of any liquidation. Pet. App. 25a n.2 (emphasis
added).
/6/ The court also suggested (Pet. App. 16a-17a) that, if Section
1520(c)(1) did not apply at all because the initial liquidations were
simply void, then even the Customs Service could not invoke the
provision (within one year) to correct an error in the
liquidation(s)."
/7/ The court of appeals also noted (Pet. App. 12a) that, although
petitioner asserted that notices of the liquidation were inadequate,
the complaint contains no count based on that claim and the trial
court did not mention it. "We think the adequacy of notice is not a
separate issue for us to decide, but an added circumstance for the
assertion of unjust enrichment" (ibid.), over which the court found it
lacked jurisdiction.
/8/ Section 1514(a) states, in pertinent part: "Except as provided
in * * * section 1520 * * *, decisions of the appropriate customs
officer, including the legality of all orders and findings entering
into the same, as to * * * (5) the liquidation of reliquidation of an
entry * * * and (7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under section
1520(c) of this title, shall be final and conclusive upon all persons
* * * unless a protest is filed in accordance with this section, or
unless a civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or
in part, is commenced * * *."
Section 1514(c)(2) states, in pertinent part: "A protest of a
decision, order, or finding described in subsection (a) of this
section shall be filed with such customs officer within ninety days
after but not before -- (A) notice of liquidation or reliquidation, or
(B) in circumstances where subparagraph (A) is inapplicable, the date
of the decision as to which protest is made."
/9/ 19 U.S.C. 1515 describes the administrative process for review
of a protest filed under 19 U.S.C. 1514, including a protest (see 19
1514(a)(7)) from a refusal to reliquidate under Section 1520(c). In
turn, 28 U.S.C. 1581(a) states: "The Court of International Trade
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to
contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under (19 U.S.C.
1515)."
/10/ While petitioner argues at great length (Pet. 16-25) that
Deringer misread the 1970 Congress's intent in deleting certain words
from the statute, neither Deringer nor the decision in this case rests
on that deletion. Deringer cited the deletion merely as confirmation
of its finding of a "pervasive requirement throughout the statute to
channel all non-excepted protests through Section 1514 even when those
protests go to the legality of a custom official's action" (593 F.2d
at 1021). And the court below expressly declined to rely solely on
Deringer as precedent or on the 1970 legislative change, concluding
that the void liquidation theory was contrary to the statutory scheme
because it "appears to be an abstraction having no function except to
thwart the efforts of Congress to identify issues of fact and law for
prompt administrative or judicial disposition, and to put permanently
to rest issues not thus promptly identified for disposition" (Pet.
App. 15a).
/11/ Customs officials are required to liquidate entries in
conformity with numerous applicable statutes, regulations, and orders,
including those issued by agencies such as the Food and Drug
Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, Internal Revenue
Service, and Department of Agriculture. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. Pts. 11,
12. Moreover, in some cases, Customs may be required to suspend the
liquidation of certain entries pending further investigation or other
action. See., e.g., 19 C.F.R. 159.55. It is not clear why a
violation of even a statutory duty to suspend is any different in kind
from a violation of any of numerous other constraints on customs
officials' actions. Ambassador Div. of Florsheim Shoe v. United
States, 748 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and American Permac, Inc. v.
United States, 642 F. Supp. 1187 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), on which
petitioner relies (Pet. 14-15) to establish the duty in this case,
merely upheld the government's reliance on a statute-based suspension
of liquidation. Neither involved an effort to enforce any such
suspension against the government; neither suggested that the
critical time limits on importers' challenges set by Sections 1514 and
1520(c) could be ignored; and neither intimate that a liquidation
effected prior to the annual review under 19 U.S.C. 1675 of
outstanding CVD orders should be characterized as an ultra vires act
as opposed to an error that is remediable by a protest under Section
1514 or a request for reliquidation under Section 1520(c).
/12/ Petitioner asserts that the decisions of the lower courts in
this case have "placed upon importers the duty of checking bulletin
notices of liquidation, at the numerous Customs houses where their
merchandise is imported, even during the period when there should be
no liquidations under law, in the eventuality that the Government has
unlawfully liquidated them" (Pet. 28-29). But neither the trial court
nor the court of appeals in this case found that notice to petitioner
of the liquidations was inadequate (see Pet. App. 12a). Indeed, the
practice of posting bulletin notices of liquidation has been in effect
for more than 80 years. See United States v. Charles H. Wyman & Co.,
156 F. 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1907) (the importer is "bound to take notice
of the liquidation bulletin sheet posted for inspection by
importers"); Frederick Wholesale Corp. v. United States, 754 F.2d 349
(Fed. Cir. 1985). It would be both novel and unwarranted to allow an
end-run around statutory procedures on the ground that petitioner
simply failed to recognize a legal error in an adverse action of which
it was aware.
/13/ Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944)
(regulation is invalid under Fair Labor Standards Act); FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) (FTC has no jurisdiction over a
product in which there is no competition); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S.
606 (1917) (Secretary of Treasury has no jurisdiction to exclude tea
imports based on an unlawful purity test); Norton v. Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425, 441, 449 (1996) (bonds are void that were issued by a
county board that had no lawful existence; legality of body was "from
the outset * * * resisted by legal proceedings"); Director, OWCP v.
National Mines Corp., 554 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977) (administrative
hearings under black-lung-benefits program, if conducted by
unauthorized officers, would be invalid, but officers appointed by
Secretary of Labor were in fact authorized); United States v.
Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1979) (search was illegal because
agent who conducted the search was not authorized by law to do so).
Marriott v. Brune, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 619, 636 (1850), also cited by
petitioner (Pet. 12-13), actually supports the insistence on finality
in this case. The Court there held that a protest made after initial
payment of duties was timely if, but only if, the "final adjustment"
had not taken place and the payment had not been transferred by the
collector to the Treasury.
/14/ Cajo involved a liquidation under a presidential proclamation
later declared unlawful, and Mason involved a liquidation under a
Puerto Rico statute later declared unconstitutional. Balfour, Guthrie
& Co. v. United States, 67 Cust. Ct. 173 (1971), on which petitioner
also apparently relies, followed Cajo and Mason where a liquidation
was effected under a presidential proclamation later declared invalid.
Four of the remaining decisions cited by petitioner simply involved
holdings that certain presidential proclamations, statutes, or
findings were invalid, and hence "void" in a sense having nothing to
do with any questions regarding the timeliness of challenges. United
States v. Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 919 (1960) (presidential proclamation); United States v. Prym,
17 C.C.P.A. 180 (1929) (underlying finding); Falcon Sales Co. v.
United States, 47 Cust. Ct. 129 (1961), appeal dismissed, 49 C.C.P.A.
139 (1962) (presidential proclamation); Pan American Standard Brands
Co. v. United States, 43 Cust. Ct. 122 (1959) (Puerto Rico Law). The
other decisions cited by petitioner are also all readily
distinguishable. Stubbs v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 399 (1917)
(a liquidation while the appraisement is on appeal is void, and hence
the importer, which participated in the appellate proceeding, could
not assert the finality of such a premature liquidation as a ground
for invalidating a post-appeal, correct liquidation); United States
v. Astra Bentwood Furniture Co., 28 C.C.P.A. 205 (1940) (the
liquidation notice was so defective that the importer had no actual
notice); Nozaki Bros. v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 245 (1958)
(although the court based its ruling on the voidness of a liquidation
effected contrary to a binding judgment, in fact the importer timely
sought relief under Section 1520(c)).