AUSTRALIAâ€™s â€œsubmarine greybeardsâ€™â€™ have torpedoed a plan to build the nationâ€™s stealth submarine fleet in Japan, warning Defence Minister David Johnston that â€œa submarine is not a carâ€™â€™.

It warns the â€œtime delays, high cost and riskâ€™â€™ associated with outsourcing the sensitive project to Japan, a move that could also anger China.

Australia has made no formal announcement that the next generation of submarines will be built in Japan but the Defence Minister has hailed the Japanese submarines as on â€œthe cutting edgeâ€™â€™ of technology worldwide.

Speculation has surrounded Australia buying up to 12 Japanese Soryu submarines, the worldâ€™s biggest non-nuclear submarines.

At around $500 million each, they would be cheaper than Aussie built subs. But the deal would risk thousands of jobs in South Australia.

The retired senior naval commanders warn that â€œhowever desirable closer Defence ties with Japan may be, little consideration seems to have been given to the suitability of Japanese designed submarines to meet the Australian requirements.â€™â€™

â€œSubmarines are not cars â€” you cannot simply switch to another like

disposing of a Holden to buy a Mitsubishi,â€™â€™ the letter states.

â€œThey are designed for a specific purpose and unfortunately big compromises would have to be accepted if Australia is to buy Japanese without serious design modifications, incurring

further time delays, high cost and risk.

â€œThe prospects for difficulties arising from cultural differences with Japan are all too apparent and very real. To expect to access all relevant technologies during the course of an

overseas build of such a complex vessel as a submarine for the initial

collaboration with a country, which has no experience in such matters, is

extraordinarily ambitious and inherently risky.

â€œThe practicalities of establishing a transparent dialogue with Japan, a country

that has no established protocols with Australia for the exchange of classified,

sensitive technical data and which must develop regimes to regulate this

dialogue seem to have been ignored. It is certain that this will be a very

protracted process.â€™â€™

In response a spokesman for Senator Johnston said he would not be drawn into a discussion of the merits of Japanâ€™s submarines.

â€œWe donâ€™t discuss the military capability of Australia or other nations,â€™â€™ he said.

A senior government source confirmed the subs were regarded as among the best currently available but that no final decision had been made on strategic partners with Sweden, France and German partners sill in the mix.

â€œWe donâ€™t make decisions that are not in the national interest,â€™â€™ he said.

A major concern, however, is the long ranges Australian submarines need to travel and the unique requirements involved.

â€œIt is apparent therefore that SORYU will need to be modified to meet the

Australian requirements â€” long ocean transits and patrols. This would carry

considerable cost and risk,â€™â€™ the letter states.

â€œThe Japanese submarines are reportedly retired at a much earlier age (about

16 or so years) than normally expected in the Western world, which will

require Australia to invest heavily in special maintenance and upgrade

Within the space of a few weeks the Abbott government has presided over a shake-up of the options for a fleet of submarines to replace the ageing -Collins class.

While an evolved Collins class was a short-price favourite at the end of the Labor era, an almighty spat between the Swedish government and German industrial giant Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems means a German design could now fall over the line.

The nuclear option remains off the table despite the US indicating it would be amenable to an Australian approach on the Virginia class submarines.

Prime Minister Tony Abbottâ€™s enthusiasm for the Japanese Soryu class submarine â€“ one of the most advanced diesel electric submarines on the planet â€“ has also thrown a fresh option in to the mix. Australia is looking for a vessel of about 4000 tonnes, armed with land attack cruise missiles and capable of performing long-range intelligence and surveillance.

Officially, Defence Minister David Johnston says all four approaches to the purchase of new submarines are still on the table and to be considered as part of the release of a new defence white paper by April next year.

The former Labor government pared back the options to either an updated Collins or a new design but the Coalition re-embraced two others â€“ an existing off-the-shelf design only slightly modified to Australia con-ditions or an existing design more -drastically modified.

Senator Johnston also threw grave doubt on both the need for 12 sub-marines and the price tag of up to $36 billion at a submarine conference in Canberra in April, when he said the number 12 had never been justified.

â€œThere has been a lot of speculation on whether we need 12 boats,â€™â€™ Senator Johnston said. â€œLet me make it clear that my primary focus is not on -numbers but on the capability and availability of boats required to meet the tasks set by the government.â€

JAPANESE OPTION ON THE TABLE
Senator Johnston has also described the Japanese submarine as the most capable conventional submarine in service and closest of all contenders, including European boats, to meeting Australiaâ€™s needs.

It has been reported that Japan might be willing to sell -Australia the 3500-tonne Soryu. Certainly Australia and Japan are expected to sign a defence technology and sharing deal as part of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abeâ€™s determination to normalise Tokyoâ€™s defence posture.

But defence sources play down the prospect of Japan selling Australia an entire submarine and suggest it is more likely some of the systems aboard the Soryu could be incorporated into whatever design the Abbott government opts for.

Were Japan to sell Australia a fleet of Soryu submarines, it would be the biggest arms sale since Tokyo relaxed restrictions two years ago and would also presumably sacrifice jobs at Adelaide-based ASC.

But such a sale would require the alteration of Japanâ€™s constitutional restrictions on self-defence imposed after World War II and it would ratchet up tensions in the region, incurring the wrath of China.

The dispute between the Swedish and German governments, which threatens the â€œevolved Collinsâ€ approach spilled onto the floor of a submarine conference in Canberra in early April after retired Swedish Navy Rear-Admiral GÃ¶ran Larsbrink of the Swedish government purchasing agency said it had been a mistake to sell Swedish submarine builder Kockums to Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems and the Swedes should reacquire it.

Sweden has become increasingly angry, accusing Thyssen Krupp of sidelining Kockums, which the Germans acquired some years ago, in favour of its own subsidiary and German sub-marine builder HDW.

The Swedish government owns the Kockums intellectual property for the Collins class submarines and a defence source suggests that unless the row is resolved it effectively rules out the evolved Collins option.

SWEDES TURNS TO SAAB
Sweden has now turned to defence giant Saab to build the next generation of submarines for its Navy. Saab has poached some of the workforce from Kockums and is making an aggressive pitch for the Australian project.

But defence sources suggest Saabâ€™s disadvantage is that it has not built a submarine. Kockums was excluded from an initial global design search by the former Labor government.

None of the existing submarines offered by European submarine builders were considered large enough or as having the endurance for the long-range patrols required by Australia, which is why the European off-the-shelf option was ruled out by former defence minister Stephen Smith.

Both political parties are committed to assembling submarines at ASC in Adelaide despite ongoing delays and budget overruns on the $8.5 billion air warfare destroyer project.

TKMS-owned HDW is the worldâ€™s most successful exporter of diesel electric submarines and it has proposed a 4000-tonne Type 216 submarine â€“ a stretched version of its successful Type 214 for the Australian project.

TKMS chief executive Hans Christoph Atzpodien told the same conference the Germans could build 12 submarines for Australia for $20 billion rather than the often-mooted price tag of $36 billion, even while using the Adelaide based workforce.

However, one should be wary of accepting price promises from defence contractors, given the propensity for delays and cost blowouts on technically complex projects.

The Australian Navy has IIRC six Collins class submarines which have a Range of 11,500 nautical miles at 10 knots when surfaced, 9,000 nautical miles at 10 knots in snorkel mode and 480 nautical miles at 4 knots when submerged. Its endurance is pegged at 70 days.

The Collins was designed by the Swedish submarine builder Kockums as the Type 471 specifically to meet Australian requirements, many of which were derived from Australia's need for great range without utilizing a nuclear propulsion system.

The Swedish government owns the Kockums intellectual property for the Collins class submarines and since the German and the are in a deadlock over rights, one wonders if Collins could be an option to be upgraded.

While a submarine is not a car, one wonders if Australia has indigenous capability to upgrade the Collins class, which is a Kockums submarine and given the current spat between the Germans and the Swedes, the â€œtime delays, high cost and riskâ€™â€™ is in this option of upgrading the Collins, rather than an off the shelf purchase.

Japan is an ally of the Western Powers, therefore where is the issue 'outsourcing the sensitive project to Japan'.

Could it be that these old 'greybeards" are being a bit 'race' conscious and indicating affinity towards the European origin, even if the origin is steeped in shame?

But yes, this buying from Japan would be a move that could also anger China.

The Japanese SÅryÅ«-class submarines are fitted with air-independent propulsion (licensed from Kockums) that allow a longer endurance submerged. Therefore, it fits ideally the requirement of the RAN for being armed with land attack cruise missiles and capable of performing long-range intelligence and surveillance.

I'm sure it's the same with all countries, but ex servicemen in Australia have all sorts of opinions about the current government military policy. Perhaps because they aren't allowed to express any opinions while serving, but when they retire they seem to be critical of everything. Or perhaps, it's just them getting old and bitter.

They've been quiet for a while now, but ex RAAF guys expressed a wide range of criticisms of the acquisition of F-35 and some army guys talked alot about operations in Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan.

There's going to stories like this, in the Australian media, for the next 15 years.

Can't see why we'd prefer German subs. We've never used any German equipment. Well, actually we had some German tanks. But, we bought those a million (30???) years ago.

Think German's (or maybe it was Swede's) had some involvment in the Collins class, so if the Japanese deal falls through and we make an Improved Collins to replace our existing fleet, you might be correct.

Not sure what the problem with the Virginia class was, but you rarely (/ever) see them mentioned as an option.

I'm sure it's the same with all countries, but ex servicemen in Australia have all sorts of opinions about the current government military policy. Perhaps because they aren't allowed to express any opinions while serving, but when they retire they seem to be critical of everything. Or perhaps, it's just them getting old and bitter.

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The Navy preferred Japanese subs. I guess.

In current situation, looking at Asia-Pacific region, the Japanese subs are the best option.

They've been quiet for a while now, but ex RAAF guys expressed a wide range of criticisms of the acquisition of F-35 and some army guys talked alot about operations in Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan.

There's going to stories like this, in the Australian media, for the next 15 years.

Can't see why we'd prefer German subs. We've never used any German equipment. Well, actually we had some German tanks. But, we bought those a million (30???) years ago.

Think German's (or maybe it was Swede's) had some involvment in the Collins class, so if the Japanese deal falls through and we make an Improved Collins to replace our existing fleet, you might be correct.

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The new German subs by TKMS, type 216 is a project, they didn't build any of type 216 yet, but it supposed to be a long range conventional submarine.

There were two options, one improved Collins class or second all new sub.

Could it be that these old 'greybeards" are being a bit 'race' conscious and indicating affinity towards the European origin, even if the origin is steeped in shame?

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His view is valid. The Soryu is a hotchpotch of various systems from different countries.

The engines and AIP is from Sweden. Radar and sonars are from US and Germany companies. A lot of parts are just imported and then assembled in Japan.

So, when you want to build a version that you want you will have to negotiate with all these countries. And submarine configurations are extremely complex and will take a long time to negotiate. Training of new crews is affected if compromises are made. And a glitch in training can be disastrous as we recently witnessed in India.

Even I prefer a European solution which is wholly sourced from the same country. The European jugaad in building something to suit a particular requirement is very high. They almost always deliver. The same cannot be said of the Japanese.

What's also important to consider is that the Japanese are developing a newer class of submarines. The JMSDF plan to use the Soryu only for 20 years. So the Australians will end up being the sole operators of the submarine for the remaining 20 years. And this is considering the Japanese have designed the Soryu for a full 40 year life cycle. If that is not so, then it puts serious doubts on the capability of a submarine designed for only a 20 year life.

There are far too many risks in such a case. The Australians are better off with the new German Type 216 since they want range and endurance.

Originally ZQQ sonar series was developed by Hughes electronics, Japan first used ZQQ-1 in 1967.

For Stirling engine, they are using 4V-275 Mk3 which is made by Kawasaki (under license).

Not sure about EWS though. They are using ZLR-3-6. Any idea about it?

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Yeah, they are all manufactured in Japan. But the actual owners of the technologies are European and American, especially the critical technologies. You can say IPR is actually shared between different countries. And this doesn't include hundreds of other parts and equipment which Japan imports or manufactures on license.

Take the example of FGFA, we will own 50% IPR, but most of the technologies will still belong to Russia.

Choosing the Soryu is a much more complex decision than if the Australians go for the German Type 216. I'm just glad we don't have such range and endurance requirements.

he Type 216 is a submarine design concept announced by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft based on the Type 212/214. It is a larger design targeted to meet the needs of the Australian Collins-class submarine replacement project, also known as Sea 1000, and the needs of other countries possibly including India and Canada. The design is double hulled with two decks, includes a fuel cell, Permasyn motor, and lithium-ion batteries.

At Euronaval 2012, German Shipbuilder TKMS released information about a proposed conventional propulsion long-range submarine project, called Type-216. Based on the Type 214, the Type 216 is designed specifically to meet the "larger conventional submarine" needs of countries like Australia, India and Canada.

Third, the deal offers the potential â€” as yet unrealized â€” of Japan spreading its wings and becoming a bigger player in the global defense market, said Satoshi Tsuzukibashi, director of the Office of Defense Production Committee at Nippon Keidanren, Japanâ€™s most powerful business lobby.

â€œ[This agreement] is a trigger to change the mind and view of Japanese companies to do business in the global defense market.â€

Questions Raised
However, somewhat ironically, the deal actually poses a series of tough questions for Japanâ€™s defense industry, sources said.

If, and itâ€™s a big if, Japan actually sells Soryu-based or derived submarines, it would be a big win for both sides, Ota said, with production driving down costs for Japan.

â€œJapanâ€™s defense industry will have a good opportunity to reduce submarine costs because the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces orders submarines almost only once every five years,â€ he said. â€œMitsubishi and Kawasaki Heavy Industries will be able to maintain superb submarine technicians if Japan exports her submarines.â€

Exporting subs potentially offers Australia better value for money, particularly as Collins-class subs are costing Australia upwards of $800 million each year just for maintenance, Wallace said.

â€œMaintaining core industry capabilities while getting more value for money from Japanâ€™s defense budget were the main motivations for the recent changes to the arms export restrictions. Japan produces its Soryu at around [US] $540 million per year, so even if Japan and Australia designed and built a modified version together, then the full complement of 12 boats will only cost a fraction of the original budget. With the drive train in the pocket, this will ensure the Australian government against significant budgetary risk and against the risk of platform failure,â€ he said.

Bob Nugent, with AMI International, was less upbeat. Any deal could help Japanese makers compete in an emerging $250 billion global naval market for up to 300 new hulls to be built over the next 20 years, challenging traditional leaders in submarine export such as ThyssenKrupp in Germany, Russian builders and DCNS in France.

But the size of Soryu-class boats â€” 3,000 tons fully loaded â€” probably makes them too large for the emerging and highly competitive export market for small- medium-sized conventional diesel electric and AIP vessels of 1,500-2,500-tons, he said.

â€œA larger hull is attractive to future customers like Australia whose requirements for endurance and embarked weapons (missiles, underwater vehicles) push for hulls of 3,000 tons or larger to accommodate, but are not looking at nuclear-powered hulls,â€ Nugent said. â€œThere are some other prospective submarine buyers over the next 10 years whose requirements for a larger submarine are similar â€” Canada comes to mind. This could favor a Japanese design.â€

In particular, Japan faces stiff competition from European hull designs such as German-maker Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werftâ€™s Type 416, which are conceived around Australian requirements, rather than purchases of entire Soryu submarines.

Further, a senior source familiar with Japanâ€™s defense industry said local makers already felt Abe was moving too fast, as Japan is still working out its export control regimes and is inexperienced in technology transfer agreements outside of familiar negotiations as part of the US-Japan alliance.

Following a tentative UK-Japan defense technology agreement last year, Japan is figuring out a ShinMaywa US-2i short-takeoff-and-landing amphibious aircraft export contract with India, which will likely see 13 units assembled locally, as well as figuring out a welter of potential deals with the Philippines, Turkey, Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries.

â€œAbe and others have been going around the world making promises and shaking hands, but government officers are wondering how to deal with them because we havenâ€™t worked out standards for technology transfers,â€ the source said. â€œIndustry needs and is waiting for concrete standards. We are asking, â€˜how do we do this? How do we get good deals without giving our technologies away?â€™â€

Added Nugent: â€œInternal fears of losing technical and tactical advantages via submarine exports are reasonable. Some of the established submarine builders who once â€˜ownedâ€™ the global export market have seen customers like Korea and Turkey become competitors â€” enabled in part by technology transfer from past submarine export and cooperative construction programs.â€

Johnston was careful to point out that Australia still has options as to what, specifically, will replace the Collins boats.

â€œWhat weâ€™re looking at initially is a defense, science and technology exchange. We are working towards an agreement to that. Submarine technology is very sensitive for both countries,â€ he said from Japan on June 12. â€œWe are taking very small steps. Japan is one of several countries we are talking to actively about our new submarine program.â€

Johnston also pointed out that Australia is also talking with the US, UK, France and Germany on technology-related matters.

However, while any technology transfer agreement with Japan could put another horse in the proverbial submarine race, it is purely speculative at this point, said Andrew Davies, a senior analyst with Australiaâ€™s Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra.

â€œItâ€™s not clear what Australiaâ€™s expectations are and what Japanâ€™s readiness is, in terms of technology transfer,â€ he said

The tactical balance between the surface warship and the submarine has strategic impact. The submarine is not made for a show of force. Its principal weapon is designed not to damage a ship, but to sink itâ€”rapidly and probably with much loss of life. Itâ€™s a sure way to shift the trajectory of any conflict in a more violent direction.

The best deterrent against submarine attack is robust defenseâ€”but as little as surface sailors like to discuss it, that defense has seldom been less assured.

Modern diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) are very hard to detect. Itâ€™s not that SSKs with air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems are much quieter, but they mitigate the SSKâ€™s drawback: lack of speed and endurance on quiet electric power. When the Swedish AIP boat Gotland operated with the U.S. Navy out of San Diego in 2005-07, the Navyâ€™s surface combatants turned up all too often in a photo album acquired by the submarineâ€™s mast.

AIP submarines are a high priority in the budgets of nations such as Singapore, South Korea and Japan. Russia has struggled with its Lada-class boats, but persisted, and is selling them to China. Sweden, whose Kockums yard developed the AIP technology for Japanâ€™s big 4,100-ton Soryu-class subs, had trouble getting its A26 replacement submarine program started. In an indication of its importance, Saab will buy the Kockums yard back for Sweden from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems.

Whether based on the Swedish Stirling-cycle engine or the fuel cells favored by TKMS and Russia, AIP seems to be here to stay. Lithium-ion batteries will further increase underwater performance. Kockums advertises another step in invisibility called Ghost (genuine holistic stealth), including hull-shaping and coatings.

Other improvements are making the submarine more elusive and lethal. Masts with high-definition cameras are as clear as direct-vision optics, so the mast needs only to break the surface and make a single sweep to provide a full horizon view. Finmeccanicaâ€™s WASS division and Atlas Electronik offer modern all-electric torpedoes with multiple guidance modes, from fiber-optic to wake-homing, and back-breaking influence fuzes that work too well for comfort (see photo).

Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) has not stagnated, but it shows signs of disarray. After the end of the Cold War stopped the Soviet Unionâ€™s push for quieter submarines, the U.S. scrapped improvements to the Lockheed P-3 aircraft and its replacement. The carrier-based Lockheed S-3 Viking went the same way, and the U.K., more recently, retired the Nimrod and canceled its deeply flawed BAE-built MRA4 replacement. ASW assets and crews have been diverted to reconnaissance missions in overland and littoral wars. The U.S. Navyâ€™s strategy for the new Boeing P-8A Poseidon is to get the airframes first, because P-3s are wearing out.

The Navyâ€™s ASW future hinges on two new technologies: multistatic, active, coherent (MAC) acoustics; and automated radar detection of periscopes. Planned for the Increment 2 P-8A, MAC is a big change from todayâ€™s sonobuoy systems (which are mostly passive, their active modes relying on noise sources that can be as simple as an explosive squib). MAC is likely to be quite costly to operate: The P-8A carries many more buoys than a P-3, and they are more complex. Testing so far has not been a disaster, but it has been limited. One series of tests last year was truncated so the test aircraft and crew could chase drug-runners. Picking real targets from false ones and clutter is still down to operators.

Better ways to detect periscopesâ€” with the radar cross-section of a floating Coke canâ€”have been under study since the early 1990s, but the Navy has vacillated on deployment plans. First, Automatic Radar Periscope Detection and Discrimination (ARPDD) technology was to be used on upgraded P-3 radars. But in 2005â€”after the Gotland tests started, which may not have been a coincidenceâ€”the plans changed to stress close-in defense of the aircraft carrier, with ARPDD used first on Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk helicopters and on a radar mounted on the carrier itself. ARPDD disappeared from the P-8 radar requirement, then returned. More recently, the carrier-mounted radar has been discontinued and surface combatants will have ARPDD.

But the key to telling the periscope and the Coke can apart is that one of them is moving purposefully, and an electronic mast that surfaces intermittently makes an even less-obvious track than a direct-view periscope that has to stay up to function. That change was not in sight when ARPDD was conceived.

Surface warfare may be heading for a strategic dilemma. The surface combatant is vital for many missions, but its utility could be drastically limited if a submarine threat imposes a no-go area. And as more new AIP subs enter service, denying the problem is less and less of an option.

The Soryu Class diesel-electric submarines are being built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Soryu Class is an improved version of the Oyashio Class submarine.

The keel for the first submarine in the class, Soryu (SS-501), was laid down in March 2005. It was launched in December 2007 and commissioned in March 2009. Unryu (SS-502) was laid down in March 2006, launched in October 2008 and commissioned in March 2010.

Hakuryu was laid down in February 2007 and launched in October 2009 for commissioning in March 2011. The fourth and fifth submarines under construction are scheduled to be commissioned in 2012 and 2013 respectively.

The class is also referred to as the SS 2,900t and the 16SS project. Soryu and Unryu have been named after the World War II aircraft carriers. Soryu was one of the carriers that participated in the Pearl Harbour attack. Both submarines are home-ported at Kure and operated by Subron 5, S-flotilla-1 of the JMSDF.

Soryu Class design and features

The Soryu Class carries a hydrodynamic design based on the Oyashio class submarine. It has a larger displacement than any other submarine class in JMSDF's service. The hull form is made of high tensile steel and is covered with anechoic coating to reduce the reflection of acoustic waves. Interiors of the submarine boast acoustic isolation of loud components. The submarine features computer-aided X control planes. The design incorporates highly automated systems.

The submarine is equipped with Stirling engines for increased propulsion performance and underwater endurance. The engine supports superior submerged operations. The high-performance sonar onboard improves surveillance capabilities. The submarine also features stealth capabilities and enhanced safety measures such as snorkel equipment.

The submarine has an overall length of 84m, beam of 9.1m and depth of 10.3m. The normal draft of the sub is 8.4m. It has a surfaced displacement of 2,950t and submerged displacement of 4,200t. The Soryu Class can complement a crew of 65 including nine officers and 56 enlisted members. The submarine can sail at a surfaced speed of 13kt and submerged speed of 20kt. It has a maximum range of 6,100nm at 6.5kt speed.

Weapon systems

The Soryu Class is fitted with six HU-606 533mm torpedo tubes for Type 89 torpedoes and UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The Harpoon has a range of over 124km and speed of 864km/h.

Type 89 is a wire-guided torpedo with active and passive homing modes. It has a maximum speed of 130km/h and can engage targets within the range of 50km. The torpedo can carry a warhead of 267kg.

Sensors / radars

The submarine is equipped with a ZPS-6F navigation or surface search radar. The sonar suite integrates four low frequency flank arrays, a bow-array and a towed array sonar.

Soryu is powered by a diesel-electric propulsion system. Two Kawasaki 12V 25/25 SB-type diesel engines and four Kawasaki Kockums V4-275R Stirling engines provide a total power output of 2,900kW surfaced and 6,000kW submerged.

Soryu is the first submarine of the JMSDF to be equipped with Stirling engines manufactured by Sweden-based Kockums.

Stirling is a silent and vibration-free external combustion engine. The Kockums Stirling air independent propulsion system onboard reduces the need for frequent battery charging surfaced and thus increases the submerged endurance of the submarine.

The electric propulsion motor drives a propeller through a single shaft. The submarine is also fitted with an X rudder to provide high manoeuvrability to the submarine when operating very close to the seabed. This X rudder configuration was initially developed by Kockums for the Swedish Gotland class. The propulsion system provides a maximum speed of 20kt.

Making a decision to design oneâ€™s own submarine takes something more that a decision to build to the design of a third party in-country. A submarine design decision requires an industry wide investment.

Germany, by way of example, has an submarine industry consisting of Atlas Elektronik for the combat system and torpedoes, Diehl BGT Defence for subsurface to air missiles, Carl Zeiss for the periscopes, Aeromaritime Systembau or Rohde & Schwarz for above water communications, L-3 Communications Elac Nautik for underwater communications Raytheon Anschutz for the navigation systems, Gabler for the mast hoists, EADS Astrium for submarine rapid surfacing equipment, Ballonfabrik See & Luftausrustung for submarine escape systems, Draeger for submarine air quality control, MTU for diesel engines, Piller Power Systems for generator control systems, Hawker or GAIA or Exide Technologies for submarine batteries, L-3 Communications AUROATLAS for static power supplies, Siemens for the permanent main motors and Fuel Cell system, Renik for submarine shaft equipment and HDW, with a in-house team of about 600 engineers, building the platforms and integrating the other suppliersâ€™ sub-systems.

France has similar depth in its industrial base, while Spain combines its significant in-country industrial capability with the US and UK partners.

Designing and building submarines is an expensive game. Countries with smaller GDPs than Japan that do have a submarine design capability sustain it through the export of submarines to other customers. It does not appear as though Australia is seeking to do this â€“ though it was one of the many thoughts behind building Collins here, rather than in a European shipyard.

There is real danger that we might start down that path, without a sustainable Government commitment for the required money necessary to do the job properly and see it through to completion.

KAMIKAZI APPROACH
Despite it being a possibility, it makes little sense to select a Japanese drive train to insert into an option three or four Australian submarine and claim that it reduces the risk significantly. A â€œtechnologically refreshedâ€ Collins class submarines, as option three was referred to by RADM Moffitt in last monthâ€™s Estimates, is essentially a new design of submarine. Once a permanent magnet motor, new diesels, lithium ion batteries, AIP, bridge type hoistable masts, special forces facilities, AUV cradles or locks, new weapon discharge technologies, Multiple All Up Round Canisters, flexible payload technologies and the like are included, the only resemblance our future submarine would have to Collins would be only the steel hull. Even then, there has been commentary suggesting that we should change the shape and pressure hull diameter. In effect, an evolved Collins would be a new design of submarine.

A submarine is not a collection of proprietary items or systems, rather a carefully integrated design that accommodates weight, space, signature and performance contributions of every component part. Integration is absolute and central to a submarineâ€™s operational capability, sustainability and reliability. ASC, or even â€œTeam Australiaâ€, doesnâ€™t have the requisite design experience to do it. RAND and RADM Rowan Moffitt both know this.

Perhaps the visits to Japan are being conducted to ensure that an option three or four alternative to Kockums is seen to exist?

Soryu is powered by a diesel-electric propulsion system. Two Kawasaki 12V 25/25 SB-type diesel engines and four Kawasaki Kockums V4-275R Stirling engines provide a total power output of 2,900kW surfaced and 6,000kW submerged.

I wonder even if there are assemblies and sub-assemblies that are under licence production, there must be some clause that allows sales by Japan to others.

Or else, this deal would be a non starter.

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The Japanese are venturing out to the world of exports for the first time. Their laws will have to be modified and new laws will have to be enacted. This is obviously going to take time. But there is a lot of room for making these changes.

The Japanese are venturing out to the world of exports for the first time. Their laws will have to be modified and new laws will have to be enacted. This is obviously going to take time. But there is a lot of room for making these changes.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abeâ€™s administration approved Tuesday a document to reinterpret Article 9 of Japanâ€™s so-called pacifist constitution, which bans the use of military force abroad.

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So, now they are going to build an offensive military capability. Something that they have lacked for decades.

As for exports, the Japanese do not export military equipment by law. That was the reason why they couldn't join the F-35 program as a partner. Naturally, they require new laws for export of military equipment. The Russians did the same when we needed ToT for our tanks and aircraft. And unlike the Russians, the Japanese have to start from scratch.

Whether Abe will be successful in doing both is yet to be seen. Recently his administration has allowed the export of non-lethal equipment, like the U-2 contract with India. It is yet to be seen what they will really do with regard to the export of offensive military weapons like the Soryu.