This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that make
property rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing the
collateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast to
contractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affected
only with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement but
is costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in the
same asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consents
to overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:
recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and even
a regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionally
similar services, but their relative performance varies with the number
of transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatory
consistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowing
competition in the preparation and support of private contracts
while requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registration
activities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.