1. A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress will be upheld if its factual findings are
supported by substantial competent evidence and the appellate court is satisfied that
its ultimate application of the law to those facts is correct.

2. A noncoercive law enforcement "knock and talk" outside a citizen's home does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

3. A consent to search must be unequivocal and specific. It must be given voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly and proved by a preponderance of the evidence. It must
be clear that the search was permitted or invited by the individual whose rights are in
question without duress or coercion.

4. The district court is charged with resolving factual conflicts because it is in a position
to assess the demeanor and credibility of witnesses. An appellate court cannot and
will not assess witness demeanor and credibility in the same manner as the district
court.

BEIER, J.: Defendant-appellant Scott D. Dwyer appeals the district court's denial of
his motion to suppress evidence from a warrantless search of his apartment. We affirm the
district court's ruling and Dwyer's convictions for possession of methamphetamine and
marijuana.

Our standard of review requires us to uphold the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress if its factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and we are
satisfied that its ultimate application of the law to those facts is correct. See State v.
Wakefield,267 Kan. 116, 131, 977 P.2d 941 (1999); State v.
Vandiver,257 Kan. 53, 58, 891 P.2d
350 (1995); State v. Crowder,20 Kan. App. 2d 117, 119, 887 P.2d 698
(1994).

The evidence regarding what happened on the day Dwyer was arrested conflicted in
certain critical details. The police testified that they talked to Dwyer outside his apartment
door, which he was holding shut behind him. They smelled burning marijuana and asked
Dwyer if he wanted to show them where the marijuana was. Dwyer said, "Yeah, okay," and
went into his apartment, leaving the door open behind him. The police officers interpreted
this exchange to mean that they had permission to follow, and they did so. Having entered
the apartment, the police recovered the marijuana, sought and received Dwyer's permission
to search the apartment further, and recovered additional drug evidence.

Dwyer's only significant departure from the police version of events at his apartment
is that the police did not ask him if he wanted to show them where the marijuana was but
requested he get it for them. He said he did not expect the police officers to follow him into
his apartment and denied that he consented to the later search.

Dwyer also testified the officers were not yelling or talking in a loud tone; they did
not touch him; and they did not physically intimidate him. Although he suggested that they
go upstairs to talk, he did not attempt to leave the area immediately outside of his door, and
the officers did not prevent him from doing so.

Dwyer also said he did not protest when the officers walked into his apartment
because he did not think there was any point in it. The police testified that Dwyer was
cooperative at all times and appeared to be relaxed during their conversation with him. After
he had received his Miranda warnings, Dwyer discussed his drug use with the
officers.

Dwyer argues initially that the conversation with the officers outside his door
amounted to a seizure of his person subject to Fourth Amendment analysis. We disagree.
Dwyer's own testimony belies the conclusion that his freedom was restricted in any
meaningful way at this point. He could have told the officers he did not want to talk to them
and retreated to his apartment or shut the door and walked up the stairs and away from them.
The politely and calmly executed "knock and talk" conversation outside the apartment did
not constitute an investigory detention. See United States v. Park-Swallow, 2000
WL 82183
(D. Kan., April 18, 2000) (noncoercive "knock and talk" a consensual encounter); see also
State v. Reason, 263 Kan. 405, 412, 951 P.2d 538 (1997) (officers' initial approach to
sleeping
defendant in parked automobile a voluntary encounter).

Dwyer next argues he merely submitted to authority and did not consent to police
entry into his apartment; further, any consent was not "unequivocal and specific" as required
under State v. Henry,14 Kan. App. 2d 416, 420, 792 P.2d 358,
rev. denied 247 Kan. 706 (1990).
Consent must be given voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly, and proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. "'[I]t must be clear that the search was permitted or invited
by the individual whose rights are in question without duress or coercion.'" State v.
Kriegh,23 Kan. App. 2d 935, 938, 937 P.2d 453 (1997) (quoting State v. Crowder, 20
Kan. App. 2d 117,
120, 887 P.2d 698 [1994]).

The district court is charged with resolving factual conflicts because it is in a position
to assess the demeanor and credibility of witnesses. It did so here by accepting the police
testimony and rejecting Dwyer's testimony of what occurred just before the officers' entry
into the apartment. We cannot and will not assess witness demeanor and credibility in the
same manner as the district court, see 23 Kan. App. 2d at 938 (quoting State v.
Ruden, 245
Kan. 95, 106, 774 P.2d 972 [1989]), and we are satisfied that substantial competent evidence
supports its factual findings in this case. We thus assume the truth of the police version of
events in evaluating whether Dwyer's statements and behavior met the legal standard for
consent.

According to the police, when they asked Dwyer if he wanted to show them where
the marijuana was, he responded affirmatively and opened the door he had been holding
closed. He then walked into the apartment and left the door open behind him. Obviously,
he knew where the marijuana was when he said he would show the police its location, and he
knew they would have to enter his apartment to be able to see it. He did not tell the officers
to wait outside. He did not shut the door behind him as he walked inside. Rather, he led the
police into his bedroom, where he pulled the marijuana out from its hiding place. Under
these facts, we have no trouble agreeing with the district court's legal conclusion that Dwyer
voluntarily, unequivocally, and specifically consented to the officers' entry into his
apartment.

Dwyer next argues that he did not consent to the later search of his apartment. On
this point too, the district court resolved a factual dispute by accepting the police version of
events. According to that version, after the marijuana was found, the police asked Dwyer if
they would find any other drugs. He responded that what they had already seen was "all of
it." One of the officers then asked Dwyer if he would mind if the officers looked around to
make sure there was not anything else. Dwyer said, "Sure, go ahead."

Again, it is not our function to reweigh witness credibility when testimony is
conflicting. 23 Kan. App. 2d at 938. The police version accepted by the district court
constituted substantial and competent evidence sufficient to support its factual findings and
its conclusion of law on the adequacy of the consent to search. Moreover, Dwyer's own
testimony about the demeanor of the police and the police testimony about Dwyer's outward
appearance of relaxation and his cooperation support the conclusion that Dwyer's will was
not overborne.