01951cam a22002657 4500001000600000003000500006005001700011008004100028100002300069245010100092260006600193490004100259500001800300520084000318530006101158538007201219538003601291690008701327690005401414700002601468710004201494830007601536856003701612856003601649w6223NBER20150303182602.0150303s1997 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aAnderson, James E.10aTrade and Security,Ih[electronic resource]:bAnarchy /cJames E. Anderson, Douglas Marcouiller. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc1997.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w6223 aOctober 1997.3 aMarket exchange is subject to an endogenously determined level of predation which impedes specialization and gains from trade. We construct a model in which utility-maximizing agents opt between careers in production and careers in predation. Three types of equilibria may emerge: autarky (with no predation and no defense), insecure exchange equilibria (with predation and defense), and secure exchange equilibria (in which defense completely deters predation). Trading equilibria, two-thirds of them secure, are supported only in a narrow range of security parameter values. Since changes in the technologies of defense and predation have terms of trade effects, some producers may be hurt by enhanced security. We show cases of immiserizing security' in which producers in large poor countries are harmed by increased security. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web. 7aD7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making2Journal of Economic Literature class. 7aF1 - Trade2Journal of Economic Literature class.1 aMarcouiller, Douglas.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w6223.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w622341uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6223