For everybody who is interested in the problems of psychology
of science. Psychology of science is a relatively young and less cultivated
discipline - this is a good chance to get an impression about it. The lecture
provides basic knowledge in psychology of science. Thus, students don’t need any
kind of pre-knowledge in psychology. Some basic knowledge in epistemology and
philosophy of science is recommended. The lecture is open for all students who
take an interest in knowledge construction and its critical reflection.

The lecture provides basic knowledge in psychology of science. Thus, students
don’t need any kind of pre-knowledge in psychology. Some basic knowledge in
epistemology and philosophy of science is recommended. The lecture is open for
all students who take an interest in knowledge construction and its critical
reflection.

Main Topics:

Scientific Thinking and its Mental
Infrastructure

In the Western (academic)
world scientific thinking is generally viewed as the most powerful means to
tackle different problems and to find the most effective solutions for them. The
ability to create good theories in order to describe and explain the phenomena
is acknowledged as central to scientific thinking. Accordingly, a kind of
objectivity and pure rationalism are attributed to it. But scientific thinking
is neither a pure cognitive process nor does it take place in an empty space. In
this chapter it is argued that scientific thinking just like any other normal
every day type of thinking is to be understood as a cognitive-affective process
embedded in a mental infrastructure. This thesis will be elaborated in detail.
Every scientist engaged in constructing a theory (or a model or a hypothesis)
starts from some kind of pre knowledge in order to formulate his or her first
considerations concerning a scientific problem. These considerations have to be
transformed into a consistent pattern so that they are amenable to further
elaboration. Scientists have their own special theoretical orientation (e.g., a
psychodynamic or behavioral one in psychology) which constitutes the explicit
frame for their reasoning, and provides the major components which function as a
guide for research. But there is something more behind the explicit theoretical
orientation affecting theory building. Researchers have adopted various ways of
thinking (e.g., formalistic, mechanistic, organismic and contextualist thinking),
have developed basic belief systems (mindscapes, root metaphors) about how
things are (e.g., man as machine or man as a living organism), have made
decisions in regard to a special epistemology (e.g., objectivist or
constructivist), have demonstrated preferences for a special philosophy of
science (e.g., positivism, critical rationalism or hermeneutics) and its
corresponding scientific methodology (quantitative and/or qualitative) and
methods (e.g., observation, experiment, simulation, biography). These mental
characteristics of researchers may be conceived and conceptualized as the mental
infrastructure of theory building. The mental infrastructure is characteristic
for the individual and reflects his or her cognitive, motivational, affective
and personality characteristics. The basic argument is that every kind of theory
building needs an infrastructure of this kind which, on the one hand, enables
theory building, and on the other hand, constrains theory building. Thus, the
mental infrastructure of theory building represents the basic ingredients of all
researchers' theorizing. In this chapter an attempt is made to reconstruct these
ingredients in detail and to render them explicit. This is necessary since most
scientists most of the time are not aware of their mental infrastructure.
Becoming aware of it may enable the investigator to recognize its impact on
one's theorizing. This may be helpful for overcoming scientific dead ends and
for finding new solutions to problems.

Altered States of Consciousness,
Scientific Creativity, and Possible Benefits of State-Specific Knowledge

It is argued that there
exists a trans-cultural natural trance capacity in every human that renders
possible the experience of different states of consciousness and awareness,
regardless of whether they are produced spontaneously or voluntarily. These
induced altered states of consciousness often show not only dramatic alterations
in subjective experiences, but also include from time to time some kind of
knowledge, different from our normal day by day knowledge. Since this special
kind of knowledge often appears only in altered states of consciousness, we will
refer to it as "state-specific knowledge". In this lecture criticism will be
levelled against the still often practised stance of interpreting knowledge
produced by altered states of consciousness as trivial and unimportant.
Alternatively, an approach regarding knowledge produced by altered states of
consciousness with special reference to Charles Tart’s concept of state-specific
sciences as a potentially meaningful resource for human development and personal
growth will be presented. First, an integrative account of altered states of
consciousness, states of awareness and emerging patterns of experience will be
provided. After considering the manner in which people induce altered states,
the various kinds of emerging experiences will be classified into a typology of
knowledge patterns. Finally, the potentialities of these knowledge types to
contribute to human development and personal growth will be outlined and
discussed. Various experiential phenomena and types of knowledge produced by
altered states of consciousness may function as important resources for human
development and personal growth. Thus, the devaluation of this knowledge is
rejected. It depends on the individual's ability to critically reflect on the
emerging contents of consciousness and to integrate them into every life or
scientific practice.

Reality Testing and Knowledge
Production: A Psychological View of the Realism-Antirealism Controversy

There are two basic
positions in regard to knowledge about the world and reality which can be traced
as far back as the times of the philosophers of ancient Greece. On the one hand,
there is the position of those who believe that there exists a way of knowing
allowing an objective access to the structures of the world and reality beyond
observation. On the other hand, there is the position of those who argue that no
such way of ontological knowing exists. The former is known as (scientific)
realism, the latter as antirealism. Both positions provide a lot of good reasons
for their stance and against the contrary one. From a philosophical point of
view the disputation seems to be held on a pure rational level. However,
empirical evidence shows that in (scientific) reasoning emotional factors are
always involved and that pure rationalism is nothing but a big myth. Starting
with a psychological analysis of human reality testing ability as an important
adaptation principle in every day life, an attempt is made to identify the
implicit emotional factors underlying scientific reasoning and co-determining
the preferences for epistemological positions.

World Views and the Meaning of Truth:
Dogmatic versus Hypothetical Interpretations

Every human being needs
a kind of orientation to cope with the challenges of life. This general frame,
the subjective world view helps to bring order into the complexity and variety
of events and things. With regard to the individual’s world view two basic
differences may be distinguished. On the one hand, more and more people become
able to recognise that their personal world views have to be understood as
mental constructions offering different accesses to reality, and that there
doesn’t exist a last absolute kind of truth which can be grasped rationally. On
the other hand, more and more people tend to become convinced that their
personal world views (e.g., political or religious belief systems) represent the
absolute truth. This kind of polarisation can be observed all over the world, in
all cultures and societies and leads to conflicts or even wars. It is argued
that the preference of dogmatic or hypothetical world views with respect to the
meaning of truth cannot be understood in a poor rational way. In this lecture an
attempt is made to reconstruct the underlying generating mechanisms being
responsible to produce and maintain dogmatic or hypothetical meanings of truth.

Every scientist needs
some kind of philosophical orientation to guide his or her research intentions
and projects. This orientation is based on some fundamental assumptions about
the world and its phenomena. Assumptions of this kind, often called root
metaphors, are considered to be largely implicit. Thus, most scientists are
unaware of their basic belief systems in regard to science. Various authors have
stressed the function of these belief systems as structuring and simultaneously
limiting research and theory construction. With respect to scientific creativity
researchers are advised to take an interest in transcending their mental scope,
gaining new insights into problems and finding new solutions for them. Since
root metaphors are below the level of conscious awareness it is necessary to
make some special effort or apply a specific method to render them explicit.
Such a method, systematic self-reflection, will be presented in this paper.
Systematic self reflection is regarded as a special way to tackle important
areas of science systematically, characterized by intentionality and regularity.
Following a survey of the theoretical background, the rationale of systematic
self-reflection will be discussed, thereby focussing on its goals ("What should
be reached via self-reflection?"), contents ("What should one reflect about?")
and formal aspects ("How should one reflect?"). Finally, possibilities and
limits of systematic self-reflection are considered.

In recent years we have
been witnessing various movements attacking the position of science. These
attacks originated in different domains, such as political and religious
fundamentalism, esotericism, or relativism. They all share a more or less
radical rejection of science emphasizing their own brand of world view as
absolute truth. Some of these attacks on science (e.g., the New Age Movement)
may be considered as a reaction against the extreme version of science –
scientism. Viewing science as the only way of gaining genuine (true) knowledge,
scientism has provoked and promoted anti-scientific movements. Unsatisfied with
the position of scientism, even many students and young graduates in the Western
culture have become susceptible to modern versions of superstition and
pseudo-science. The obvious side-effects are the loss of the ability of critical
thinking and the increase of superstitious thinking. This lecture offers an
attempt to analyse and to understand these movements from a psychological
perspective.