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Tuesday, June 14, 2016

Disengagement
Observer Force for the period from 1 March to 20 May 2016

I.
Introduction

1.
The present report gives an account of the activities of the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past three
months, pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council
resolution 350 (1974) and extended in subsequent resolutions, most
recently resolution 2257 (2015).

II.
Situation in the area and activities of the Force

2.
During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and the
Syrian Arab Republic was maintained, albeit in a continuously
volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the
Syrian Arab Republic and notwithstanding a significant number of
violations of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and
Syrian Forces (Disengagement of Forces Agreement) of 1974, which are
set out below. The Syrian Arab Armed Forces and non-State armed
opposition groups engaged in exchanges of heavy weapon fire in the
area of separation and the area of limitation. Different armed
groups, including the listed terrorist group Nusrah Front and the
Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, which pledged allegiance to Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant, continued to exchange fire in the UNDOF area of
operation. Inside the area of separation, the presence of the Syrian
armed forces and military equipment, as well as any other armed
personnel and military equipment other than that of UNDOF, is in
violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. As underscored by
the Security Council in its resolution 2257 (2015), there should be
no military activity of any kind in the area of separation.

3.
In employing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and see that
it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed in the Disengagement of
Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line.
All incidents of firing into the area of separation and across the
ceasefire line, as well as the crossing by individuals of the
ceasefire line, are violations of the Disengagement of Forces
Agreement. In his regular interaction with both sides, the Force
Commander continued to call upon both parties to exercise restraint
and prevent any miscalculations that might lead to an escalation of
the situation across the ceasefire line.

4.
A number of incidents of note occurred across the ceasefire line in
violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. On two occasions,
Israel Defense Forces soldiers fired small arms shots at persons
carrying out activities close to the ceasefire line on the Bravo
side. On 28 February, United Nations personnel at position 80
observed three persons on the Bravo side, close to the ceasefire
line, with two of them removing metal poles from the ground.
Subsequently, an Israel Defense Forces soldier on foot, approximately
700 metres from United Nations position 80, fired a single shot that
impacted close to the third person, who immediately boarded a vehicle
and drove off from the location with the other two individuals. On 23
March, United Nations personnel at position 80 also observed an
Israel Defense Forces patrol fire two rounds of gunfire in the
general direction of three persons working in a field in the area of
separation close to the ceasefire line. The three persons immediately
left the area in the direction of Rafid village.

5.
Crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians, primarily shepherds,
from the Bravo side to the Alpha side was observed on an almost daily
basis. On a number of occasions on 9, 10 and 28 March and 11 April,
United Nations personnel at observation post 54 observed interaction
at the Israeli technical fence between the Israel Defense Forces
personnel and individuals from the Bravo side, some of whom were
armed. The interactions involved vehicles from the Bravo side driving
to an Israeli technical fence gate. United Nations personnel at
observation post 51 observed, on 20 April, five Israel Defense Forces
soldiers escort an unarmed individual to a gate in the Israeli
technical fence, which they subsequently opened for the unarmed
person to cross from the Alpha side into the area of separation. The
individual was then picked up on the Bravo side by a person in a
vehicle that drove off towards the village of Ruwayhinah.

Recalling
resolution 2259 (2015) which welcomed the signing of the 17 December
2015 Libyan Political Agreement of Skhirat, Morocco and endorsed the
Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015 to support the Government of
National Accord (“GNA”) as the sole legitimate government of
Libya, that should be based in Tripoli, reiterating
its support for the full implementation of the Libyan Political
Agreement, and further expressing
its determination in this regard to support the GNA,

Reaffirming
its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity and national unity of Libya,

Reiterating
its grave concern
at the growing threat of terrorist groups in Libya proclaiming
allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (also known
as Da’esh), the growing trend of groups associating themselves with
it, as well as the continued presence of other Al-Qaida-linked
terrorist groups and individuals operating there, and recalling,
in this regard, the obligations under resolution 2253 (2015),

Recalling
its resolution 2178 (2014), in particular paragraph 5 of that
resolution, and expressing
concern that the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Libya can
increase the intensity, duration and complexity of the conflict and
pose a serious threat to their States of origin, transit, and travel,

Expressing
deep concern at the threat posed by unsecured arms and ammunition in
Libya and their proliferation, which undermines stability in Libya
and the region, including through their transfer to armed groups in
violation of the arms embargo, and underlining
the importance of coordinated international support to Libya and the
region to address these issues,

Expressing
concern that the situation in Libya is exacerbated by the smuggling
of illegal arms and related materiel in violation of the arms
embargo, underlining
its concern at the allegations of violations of the arms embargo by
sea, land, or air, and expressing
further concern
that such arms and related materiel are being used by terrorist
groups operating in Libya, including by ISIL,

Welcoming
the Vienna Communiqué of 16 May 2016 which recognizes the necessity
of enhanced coordination efforts between the legitimate Libyan
military and security forces, urges them to work quickly to implement
a unified command in accordance with the Libyan Political Agreement
to coordinate in the fight against Da’esh and UN-designated
terrorist groups in Libyan territory, and underlines that the GNA has
voiced its intention to submit appropriate arms embargo exemption
requests to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970
(2011) (“the Committee”) to procure necessary lethal arms and
materiel to counter UN-designated terrorist groups and to combat
Da’esh throughout Libya,

Recalling
that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal
framework applicable to activities in the ocean,

Reiterating
its request in resolution 2278 (2016)
to the GNA to appoint a focal point to brief the Committee at its
request and provide information relevant to the Committee’s work on
the structure of the security forces under its control, consolidated
procurement procedures, the infrastructure in place to ensure the
safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military
equipment by the Government security forces, and training needs, and
emphasizes
the
importance of the GNA exercising control over and safely storing
arms, with the support of the international community,

Affirming
that the GNA may submit exemption requests under paragraph 8 of
resolution 2174 (2014) for the supply, sale or transfer of arms and
related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, for
use by the national security forces under its control to, inter alia,
combat ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also known as
Da’esh), groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Ansar Al
Sharia, and other groups associated with Al-Qaida operating in Libya,
and calls
upon
the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970
(2011) to consider expeditiously such requests in accordance with its
rules and procedures,

Affirming
that, pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 2095 (2013), the
supplies of non-lethal military equipment and the provision of any
technical assistance, training or financial assistance, when intended
solely for security or disarmament assistance to the GNA and the
national security forces under its control, shall be exempt from
prior notification to and approval by the Committee,

Taking
note
of the final report of the Panel of Experts S/2016/209
established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by
resolution 2040 (2012) submitted pursuant to paragraph 24 (d) of
resolution 2213 (2015), and the findings and recommendations
contained therein, in particular the Panel’s report of regular
violations of the arms embargo despite reinforcement of the measures,

Taking
note
of the decision of the Council of the European Union on 23 May 2016
to extend the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia by one year
and to add further supporting tasks to its mandate, including the
implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast
of Libya,

Mindful
of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming
its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations,
constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns
the
flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Libya in
violation of the arms embargo, including to ISIL and other terrorist
groups in Libya;

2. Urges
Member
States to combat by all means, in accordance with their obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations under
international law, including international human rights law,
international refugee law and international humanitarian law, threats
to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts;

3. Decides,
with a view to addressing the threat posed by unsecured arms and
ammunitions in Libya and their proliferation, to authorize,
in these exceptional and specific circumstances for a period of 12
months from the date of this resolution Member States, acting
nationally or through regional organizations, with appropriate
consultations with the GNA, in order to ensure strict implementation
of the arms embargo on Libya, to inspect, without undue delay, on the
high seas off the coast of Libya, vessels bound to or from Libya
which they have reasonable grounds to believe are carrying arms or
related materiel to or from Libya, directly or indirectly, in
violation of paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), as
modified by paragraph 13 of 2009 (2011), paragraphs 9 and 10 of 2095
(2013) and paragraph 8 of 2174 (2014), provided that those Member
States make good-faith efforts to first seek the consent of the
vessel’s flag State prior to any inspections pursuant to this
paragraph, and calls upon all flag States of above-mentioned vessels
to cooperate with such inspections;

4. Authorizes
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations,
conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 3, to use all measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such
inspections, in full compliance with international humanitarian law
and international human rights law, as applicable, and urges Member
States conducting such inspections to do so without causing undue
delay to or undue interference with the exercise of freedom of
navigation;

5. Authorizes
all
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations,
to, and decides that all such Member States shall, upon discovery of
items prohibited by paragraph 9 or 10 of resolution 1970, as modified
by paragraph 13 of 2009 (2011), paragraphs 9 and 10 of 2095 (2013),
and paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014), seize and dispose (such as
through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to
a State other than the originating or destination States for
disposal) of such items, further
reaffirms
its decision that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts,
authorizes
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations,
to collect evidence directly related to the carriage of such items in
the course of such inspections, and urges
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations,
to avoid causing harm to the marine environment or to the safety of
navigation;

6. Affirms
that the authorizations provided by paragraph 3, 4 and 5 of this
resolution apply only with respect to inspections carried out by
warships and ships owned or operated and duly authorized by a State
and used only on government non-commercial service, and which are
clearly marked and identifiable as such;

7. Underscores
that these authorizations do not apply with respect to vessels
entitled to sovereign immunity under international law;

8. Affirms
that
the authorisation provided for in paragraph 4 includes the authority
to divert vessels and their crews to a suitable port to facilitate
such disposal, with the consent of the port State, affirms
further
that the authorization in paragraph 4 includes the authority to use,
all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances, in full
compliance with international humanitarian law and international
human rights law, as applicable, to seize items set out in paragraph
3 in the course of inspections;

9. Affirms
that the authorizations provided in this resolution apply only with
respect to the smuggling of illegal arms and related materiel on the
high seas off the coast of Libya and shall not affect the rights or
obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international
law, including any rights or obligations under UNCLOS, including the
general principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a Flag State over its
vessels on the high seas, with respect to any other situation,
underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be
considered as establishing customary international law;

10. Decides
that when any Member State, acting nationally or through regional
organizations, undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of
this resolution, it or the regional organization through which it is
acting shall submit promptly an initial written report to the
Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for
the inspection, the efforts made to seek the consent of the vessel’s
Flag state, the results of such inspection, and whether or not
cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are
found, further requires such Member State or regional organization
submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written
report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and
disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a
description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if
this information is not in the initial report; and requests the
Committee to notify the flag State of the inspected vessel that an
inspection has been undertaken, notes the prerogative of any Member
State to write to the Committee concerning the implementation of any
aspect of this resolution, and further encourages the Panel of
Experts to share relevant information with Member States operating
under the authorization set out in this resolution;

11. Encourages
Member States and the GNA to share relevant information with the
Committee, and with those Member States and regional organizations
acting under the authorisations set out in this resolution;

12. Requests
the Secretary-General to provide, with input from CTED, in close
collaboration with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team, as well as the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
resolution 1973, a report, in 30 days, on the threat posed to
Libya and neighbouring countries, including off the coast of Libya,
by Foreign Terrorist Fighters recruited by or joining the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh),
Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and
entities;