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SPACE DEBRIS INCIDENTS INVOLVING SOVIET/RUSSIAN LAUNCHES
Phillip S Clark
Molniya Space Consultancy, Heston, Middx.
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ABSTRACT Interest in the issues raised by the space debris
population has increased greatly in the last decade. This paper
briefly describes the Russian space surveillance system and then
reviews the disintegrations and possibly related "anomalous events"
which have been noted in connection with payloads and rocket bodies
launched by the former Soviet Union (FSU).
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1. INTRODUCTION
To the middle of 1994 there have been 68 breakups or debris
"anomalous events" involving satellites launched by the former Soviet
Union - more recently Russia. In addition 18 similar events have
been discovered involving rocket bodies and other propulsion-related
operational debris.
Table 1 provides a summary of the satellites and other objects
which have been involved in the creation of space debris, the objects
being classified by mission class for satellites and launch vehicle
stage for rocket breakups.
Ignoring the creation of operational space debris (ie, discarded
rocket stages, rocket and payload shrouds, etc which remain intact
while in orbit), two types of debris production are generally
recognised. Satellite (or rocket) breakups which are normally
explosive events resulting in the creation of a large cloud of debris
while anomalous events which appear to be non-destructive and only
produce one or two additional objects in orbit long after the parent
has been launched.
In any discussion of space debris it has to be realised that
there is far more debris orbiting the Earth undetected than that which
has been tracked. The ability to track an object is a function of
its size, orbital parameters and composition.
There is also a limitation involving the placement of the
USSPACECOM tracking network. A specific example involves the
disintegration of the Cosmos Oko series of early warning satellites in
Molniya-type orbits. When passing over US sensors the debris is too
high to be tracked - apart from the larger object(s) - while the
location of the low perigee where small pieces of debris could be
tracked is deep in the southern hemisphere where USSPACECOM has no
facilities for the tracking of objects.
Much of the public-domain study of space debris has been
undertaken by Teledyne Brown Engineering, with a series of reports
having been prepared over the years. Those responsible for the
Teledyne Brown reports have been Nicholas L Johnson and David J Nauer,
but after Mr Johnson began working for Kaman Sciences (still dealing
with space debris) the reports became the responsibility of Mr Nauer.
The latest edition of the Teledyne Brown reports [1] is the major
reference used in the preparation of this paper.
2 FSU FACILITIES FOR TRACKING SPACE DEBRIS
Western contacts with Russian space debris specialists have led
to the conclusion that the Russians do not have the same ability to
track small objects in orbit as has the United States. Many of the
pieces of debris which result at the end of photoreconnaissance
satellite missions - for example - were simply not tracked and
catalogued by the Russians, although the debris is has been routinely
tracked in the West for some years.
A recent paper has described the Russian space surveillance
system in terms of its ability to track space debris [2].
The Russian space surveillance system was first suggested in
1961, with the first surveillance undertaken in 1962 using optical
facilities operated by the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of
Defence. In 1969 the Space Surveillance Centre was set up and the
following year it was monitoring 200-250 objects in orbit (about 10-
15% of the number of object actually in orbit, according to the 1993
paper). The facilities used for this tracking were both radar - the
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Defence (ABMD) - and optical (Table 2). By 1975 the number
of tracked objects had exceeded 1,000. In more recent years the
Russian system has been improved.
Unlike the surveillance system operated by the United States, the
Russian system has been based solely on the former Soviet Union's
territory: as a result of this, there are many interruptions in the
observations of objects, and there are some zones of "invisibility".
Information from all of the sensors used in the Russian space
surveillance system is collated at the Space Surveillance Centre: the
measurements are equated with the known objects in orbit and the
results of new launches, and then used for up-dating the orbital
parameters in Russian satellite catalogues, re-discovering "lost"
objects, etc (Table 3).
The description of the Russian space surveillance system comments
that the system was not designed to track small objects, and this is
considered to be a problem. However, work is underway to overcome
the problem, the following investigations being carried out:-
lowering the radar's operational sensitivity threshold
creating special ground-based facilities for the
detection of small objects
development of special methods of acquisition of a weak
but useful signal, using a-priori information concerning
satellite motions with the help of narrow-angle and
narrow beam sensors
Concerning the first of these three investigations, five
experiments with a VHF radar have been conducted, the duration of each
being an hour. The measurement flux increased by a factor of 2.7 and
the number of 10 cm objects to be detected increased "several times".
The second approach is being undertaken by research groups, the
example of Dr Tolkatchev from SRI of Radiophysics in Moscow being
cited.
3 SATELLITES SUSCEPTIBLE TO BREAK-UPS
While many satellites have the potential for destructive breakups
in orbit, even a cursory glance at Table 1 will show that certain
classes of satellite are more prone to breakup than others. Of the
68 breakups sixteen have involved ELINT Ocean Reconnaissance
Satellites (EORSATS), sixteen photoreconnaissance satellites and
fifteen Molniya-orbit early warning satellites: these three classes
account for more than two-thirds of the satellite breakups.
Even though some classes of satellites are more prone to breakup
than others, this cannot be taken as an indication that the
disintegrations are always planned as a way of destroying the
satellites.
In the cases of photoreconnaissance satellites, the destruction
of the satellites is planned as a contingency in case there is a
payload failure or retrofire fails to take place and therefore there
is a chance that the satellite might survive re-entry and allow its
payload to fall into non-Soviet/Russian hands. Similarly, the
destruction of the anti-satellite weapons is clearly part of the
planned programme.
On the other hand, the same cannot be said for Molniya-orbit
early warning satellites and EORSATs. Neither of these satellite
classes carry a re-entry capsule and thus one would expect that the
mission planners would have no doubts that when natural decay from
orbit does take place the satellite will be completely destroyed.
Having said this, it was normal practice for the EORSATs to be
boosted into higher storage orbits following their end of operations,
and it is possible that a partial destruction was planned to ensure
that any future foreign inspector satellites would see nothing useful.
Despite this rational, the EORSAT breakups have not taken place at any
specific time intervals after the boosts to the storage orbits which
is strange if the breakups were to be intentional.
There have been random disintegrations of rocket stages in orbit,
but the largest single group of propulsion systems to have suffered
disintegrations have been the ullage rockets discarded just before the
final burns by Block DM fourth stages on Proton launches.
4 BREAKUPS INVOLVING ANTI-SATELLITE MISSIONS
The breakups to be considered here immediately fall into two
classes: the breakups which are a direct result of the anti-satellite
(ASAT) test and the later breakups of the target vehicles without any
(apparent) outside influence.
When the testing of the Chelomei ASATs began in 1968 it was
normal practice for the weapon to approach the previously-launched
target, pull away and then disintegrate, with a cloud of shrapnel
debris being tracked from the weapon. In the cases of the original
tests the debris cloud was in a long-lived orbit, with much debris
still being in orbit. In a few later tests of the ASAT the weapon
was placed into a low or decay orbit after the fly-by of the target,
with the resulting debris re-entering the atmosphere shortly after the
test.
Reference to Table 4 shows that there have been a few cases of
the ASAT target - which does not carry the explosive charge of the
weapon - disintegrating some time after the ASAT tests have been
conducted. The causes of these breakups are unknown: some other
breakups of satellites (see section 8 below) have been attributed to
the failures of on-board NiH2 batteries, and it is possible that the
ASAT target breakups might have had a similar cause.
5 BREAK-UPS INVOLVING EARLY WARNING SATELLITES
Cosmos satellites launched into Molniya-class orbits with
arguments of perigee close to 315-320 degrees are known to have been
the first generation of Oko missile early warning satellites, the
appearance of which has now been revealed. Some Oko satellites were
launched into geosynchronous orbit to test the technology at that
altitude and to supplement the main satellite system [3].
However, it is the Molniya-type orbit satellites which have been
subjected to partial disintegrations (geosynchronous Oko satellites
are far too high for any fragmentation events which might have
happened to be recorded, but these were launched after the debris
problem with the eccentric orbit satellites had been solved). Oko
satellites launched during 1976 and 1983 were normally observed to
disintegrate in orbit. The tracking of debris from the breakups was
extremely difficult since the orbits were so eccentric with apogees of
40,000 km in the northern hemisphere where western tracking sensors
are operating. As a result, only a few pieces of debris were
trackable from each disintegration, although it is reasonable to
assume that far more debris of a smaller size actually resulted from
each debris event.
The reason behind the breakups was ascertained during
conversations held between Nicholas L Johnson and Russian specialists
[4,5]. Each satellite carried an on-board explosive charge near the
focal plane of the primary optical sensor which was planned to destroy
the satellite in the case of a malfunction. Unfortunately, control
of the explosive charge was itself unreliable and this led to the
charge rendering the satellite inoperative while it was still under
control.
A change in the Oko design has eliminated the explosive charge
and Cosmos 1481 was the last satellite to be launched to suffer an
explosion.
6 BREAK-UPS INVOLVING ELINT OCEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES
The ELINT Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites - EORSATs - have not
been depicted in any Russian illustration to mid-1994, but they are
possibly generally cylindrical in shape with one or two pairs of solar
panels for the generation of electricity.
The EORSAT programme can be divided into three phases. The
testing period 1974-1979, first operational phase 1980-1986 and second
operational phase 1986-date. The first two phases are characterised
by the standard orbital altitude being approximately 430-445 km, while
the current phase uses lower 405-420 km orbits [6].
During the first and second phases the satellites would usually
perform an end-of-operations manoeuvre which would increase the
orbital period above 93.3 minutes of the operational orbit. During
the subsequent period of orbital decay the satellites would be
observed to fragment in the majority of cases. During the third
phase the end-of-operations manoeuvre would significantly reduce the
perigee of the orbit and the satellite would decay from orbit without
fragmenting. It is possible that the resulting relatively short
lifetime during the period of orbital decay simply does not allow the
conditions to develop on board the satellites which had previously led
to the fragmentations.
Not all of the first and second phase EORSATs disintegrated in
orbit: Table 6 lists those which did, and those which did not were
Cosmos 868, 937, 1096, 1337 (which failed shortly after reaching its
operational orbit), 1507, 1567, 1625 (failed immediately after
launch). The third phase programme started with the launch of Cosmos
1735 to the lower orbit, although after more than a year of operations
this satellite was manoeuvred to the higher orbital regime. Cosmos
1769 was the last of the phase two satellites.
There is no apparent reason for the fragmentations of the
EORSATs, although the events are generally judged to have been
deliberate. Most of the satellites which disintegrated suffered only
a single event, although some had multiple events: Cosmos 1355
suffered three fragmentation events. If the fragmentations have not
been deliberate then it is possible that they might result from the
mixing of residual propellants or the failure of on-board electrical
batteries.
7 BREAK-UPS INVOLVING PHOTORECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES
The disintegrations of the various classes of photoreconnaissance
satellites in orbit have usually been taken as an indication of an on-
board failure of some sort, the satellite's destruction being the
ultimate way of ensuring that the intelligence which it has gathered
does not fall into the wrong hands. Such a hypothesis is reasonable
for the first five generations of satellites, but a series of flights
which began in 1989 has always ended in an explosion and thus a
different explanation must be found for them.
Western observers have classified the photoreconnaissance
satellites into five "generations", with the series which began in
1989 possibly being a sixth generation. The first three generations
were based upon the original Vostok spacecraft design and the Russians
code-named them Zenit (not to be confused with the launch vehicle of
the same name). The appearances of the fourth generation close look
satellites (two months lifetimes) and topographic/mapping satellites
(six weeks lifetimes), code-named Yantar and Cometa respectively, have
not been revealed: similarly neither the code-names nor appearances of
the fifth and sixth (?) generation satellites are unknown.
Table 7 provides a list of the photoreconnaissance satellites
which have been destroyed by deliberate explosions, the missions being
initially classified by satellite type.
The first photoreconnaissance satellite to explode was Cosmos 50,
disintegrating after eight days in orbit when the recovery of the
satellite was expected. The satellite was destroyed either on ground
command or possibly due to the retrorocket exploding when the time
came for the satellite's de-orbit. A possible piece of debris from
the satellite landed in Malawi [7]. Similarly the third generation
variants Cosmos 554, Cosmos 1813 and Cosmos 1906 were destroyed in
orbit when it became clear to their ground controllers that a
successful recovery could not be guaranteed.
The fourth generation Yantar satellites have had more than their
fair share of disintegrations. Cosmos 758, the first of the series to
fly at 67.1 degrees, was destroyed only a day after launch, indicating
an early malfunction of the new satellite type. Similarly, Cosmos
844 suffered the same fate after only three days in orbit. There
followed a break of nine years before a group of similar incidents.
By this time the typical lifetimes of these satellites had increased
to about 60 days. Cosmos 1654 was destroyed at about the time that
recovery fell due. However, the same cannot be said about the other
three satellites of this class which exploded: Cosmos 1866, Cosmos
1916 and Cosmos 2030. These three satellites were only a few days
into their missions when they were destroyed, indicating an early in-
orbit failure of the payload.
A single fifth generation satellite is known to have been
destroyed in orbit, Cosmos 2243: although not identified as this class
of satellite at the time of launch, the subsequent flights of Cosmos
2267 (launched November 1993) and Cosmos 2280 (April 28 1994, almost
exactly a year after Cosmos 2243 was launched) have strongly suggested
that Cosmos 2243 was the first fifth generation launch to 70.4
degrees.
Approximately ten minutes after the launch of Cosmos 2243 and at
the time that orbital injection and the satellite's separation from
the Soyuz launch vehicle's Block I third stage could be expected, an
explosion took place, with 172 pieces being tracked [8,9]. Even more
than a year after the event it is unclear whether the rocket stage
exploded, damaging the payload so that it could not function or the
satellite itself exploded. The lifetime of the rocket stage was
normal for the orbit attained, suggesting that it was intact. On the
other hand, the satellite showed no apparent signs of life and simply
decayed from orbit nine days after launch. It is therefore deemed
more likely that the satellite exploded rather than its rocket stage,
and unlike the other photoreconnaissance satellites which have
exploded, the Cosmos 2243 event was accidental.
The latest series of photoreconnaissance satellites began in 1989
with the launch of Cosmos 2031 into the rarely-used Tyuratam
inclination of 50.5 degrees [10]. After performing manoeuvred which
were dissimilar from those normally seen in the fourth and fifth
generation photoreconnaissance series, the satellite disintegrated
after 44 days, matching the typical Cometa lifetime.
The satellite series continued at 65 degrees with Cosmos 2101,
Cosmos 2163 and Cosmos 2225 closely matching the standard Yantar
lifetime of 58-60 days. The latest in the series (to mid-1994),
Cosmos 2262, operated for 102 days before disintegrating in orbit
[11].
It is interesting to note that the explosions have come close to
the time when the satellites would be expected to be de-orbited for
recovery. After five flights ending with five explosions, one might
wonder whether this is to be the normal mode of terminating the
missions of this class of satellite.
8 REMAINING SATELLITE BREAK-UPS
Table 8 summarises the FSU satellites which have disintegrated
and which belong to other programmes.
The explosion aboard the Ekran 2 satellite nine months after
launch had not been suspected in the West, and it was only revealed by
the FSU in early 1992 [12,13]. The cause of the incident was the
failure of an NiH2 battery.
The revelation of this previously-unknown event raises the
question of how many other objects (dead satellites or discarded
rocket bodies) might have partially or totally disintegrated in
geosynchronous orbit, thus causing an untrackable debris hazard. It
is difficult enough to track the relatively large satellites and
rockets in geosynchronous orbit and any debris from fragmentation
events are impossible to track with our current facilities.
The same kind of NiH2 problem which caused the disintegration of
Ekran 2 has also been blamed by the Russians for the fragmentations of
Cosmos 1691 and Cosmos 1823 [12].
The loss of Cosmos 57, the Voskhod 2 precursor, was due to human
error. Ground instructions were mis-interpreted by the satellite's
on-board command system and the satellite's self-destruct system was
thus activated about two hours after launch [14,15].
The two unannounced launches of 1966 have recently been discussed
elsewhere [16], and since that discussion no additional information
has appeared. These FOBS-related missions exploded soon after
orbital injection and the causes of the explosions are unknown.
The loss of Cosmos 1275 has always been looked upon as the best
contender for a satellite being destroyed due to the impact of an
untracked piece of space debris [17]: this hypothesis has been given
support by a reported Russian statement [18]. However, the case has
yet to be proven.
Cosmos 1275 was a military navigation satellite in the Parus
series which was launched into the regular 83 degrees, near-circular
1,000 km orbit on June 4 1981. The satellite carried no propellant
for orbital changes or attitude control, the latter being provided
using a gravity gradient boom. Therefore, there appeared to be
nothing internal to the satellite which could have caused the
destructive explosion which took place on July 24 1981 at 23.51 GMT
[19]. More than 300 pieces of debris were catalogued from the
breakup, the majority still being in orbit, with many more pieces of
debris being too small to track.
Because of the lack of apparent internal causes for the
destruction of Cosmos 1275, it has been accepted that the loss of the
satellite is the best contender for a collision with a piece of
untracked space debris. While this is still the most likely cause,
the revelation that some satellites have been damaged or lost due to
electrical batteries exploding (see above) means that it is possible
that the loss of Cosmos 1275 had a similar cause.
The most recent breakup to be included in this section is that of
Cosmos 1484, ten years after launch [20]. This Resurs-O1 satellite
disintegrated on October 18 1993 at 12.04 GMT with no apparent cause.
It is possible that this is another victim of an electrical battery
explosion.
9 BREAK-UPS OF ROCKET BODIES AND OTHER DISCARDED PROPULSION SYSTEMS
Table 9 provides a summary of the various FSU upper stage rockets
and separated propulsion systems (not satellite propulsion systems)
which have suffered from disintegrations in orbit.
In many cases the cause of the disintegration can be put down to
the mixing of hypergolic propellants after separating membranes or
bulkheads have failed. The two failures of the Intermediate Cosmos
launch vehicle (SL-8) second stages probably fall into this category,
as possibly does the loss of a Tsyklon third stage.
The first of the Molniya disintegrations came after the failure
to place a planned 1962 Mars into its heliocentric orbit. It is
possible that the Molniya launch vehicle's Block I (orbital) and Block
L (escape) stages failed to separate. The fully laden Block L
apparently exploded five days after launch.
Two of the Molniya Block L stage disintegrations came when the
stage ignited to take the payloads out of low Earth orbit into planned
eccentric Molniya-class orbits (400-600 km perigee, 39,800 km apogee).
In the case of Cosmos 1305 the explosion came part way through the
Block L manoeuvre, while for Cosmos 1423 it came as the burn was
beginning.
The disintegration of the Salyut 2 orbital stage is unrelated to
the later loss of the Almaz station itself, and came less than 14
hours after launch. According to information discovered by Nicholas
Johnson in the spring of 1993, residual propellants aboard the Proton
launch vehicle's third stage caused an over-pressurisation of the
rocket body, causing the disintegration. It is reported that after
this fragmentation event the third stage has always been vented to
prevent a repetition of the event [21].
Similar preventative action has been taken concerning the
disintegration of some ullage rockets left in orbit during launches
involving four-stage Proton launches. Normally these rockets decay
from orbit relatively quickly, but some of those which have been in
orbit longer than usual have suffered disintegrations due to the
mixing of residual propellants. In 1993 it was stated that the
venting of unused propellant from Proton ullage rockets would become a
standard practice [22].
The breakups of two Zenit orbital stages in 1992 and 1993 were
unexpected, since the launch vehicle had been in use since 1985 with
no previous breakups taking place. The launch of Cosmos 2227 was the
second successful Zenit mission following a series of three launch
failures during 1990-1992: the second and third of these failures had
involved the second stage of the Zenit vehicle.
Four separate disintegration events soon after launch for the
Cosmos 2227 rocket body were reported by NAVSPASUR [23]. The first
event came at 07.38 GMT on December 26 1992, followed by others at
22.49 GMT and 23.10 GMT the same day and 09.03 GMT on December 30.
The next Zenit launch, that of Cosmos 2237 on March 26 1993, also
resulted in the orbital stage fragmenting: on this occasion there was
only one event, two days after launch at 07.16 GMT [24].
The causes of the disintegrations are unknown, but they might be
propulsion-related. One might speculate (perhaps rashly) that
modifications to the second stage propulsion system following the 1991
and 1992 launch failure introduced a problem which caused the
disintegrations, and the problem has now been overcome.
10 ANOMALOUS BREAK-UP EVENTS
In addition to the destructive fragmentations of satellites and
rocket bodies, there have been a series of debris-producing events
which have been classified within the space debris community as
"anomalous events".
An anomalous event is one which does not appear to be destructive
since it usually involves only a few pieces of debris being tracked:
the cases of the FSU events only one piece of debris has appeared in
each case.
Cosmos 1043 was a Worldwide ELINT satellite, and is the only
satellite of its class known to have suffered from an anomalous event.
The debris was first catalogued on February 28 1993 and decayed from
orbit eleven days later. It is possible that other satellites of
this class have suffered anomalous events with the debris being
uncatalogued, knowing the NAVSPASUR cataloguing practices.
Four FSU rocket stages have been observed to have undergone an
anomalous event, all being the orbital stages (Block E) of the Vostok
launch vehicle. No hypotheses for the anomalous events have been
offered.
11 CLOSING COMMENTS
As the Russians have begun to discuss space debris events and
matters arising from them with western specialists, some new insights
into the causes have been revealed. Most prominent have been the
explanation for the Oko early warning satellites fragmenting and the
revelation that some satellites have suffered a partial or total
disintegration due to electrical battery failures. On the other
hand, no cause has been revealed for the EORSAT disintegrations which
have been observed.
When possible the Russians have been willing to modify launch
procedures to prevent further space debris events. Examples are the
residual propellant venting of Proton launch vehicle third stages
following the disintegration of the Salyut 2 rocket body and the
Proton ullage rockets after that problem had been realised.
In addition, the Russians are making launch vehicles more
effective by minimising the amount of residual propellant remaining on
board discarded rocket stages after satellite deployments. Where
possible, the Russians seem to be moving towards a routine burn-to-
depletion for propellant during satellite deployment which not only
increases the launch vehicle's payload capability but also removed the
threat of later debris events.
While these moves are admirable, the Russians are not being
totally benevolent in space debris matters. Attention must be drawn
to the latest generation of photoreconnaissance satellites which has
had five flights starting in mid-1989 (though to mid-1994), all of
which have ended with the satellite's destruction in low Earth orbit.
As commented earlier in this paper, this record suggests that the
operational termination of this type of satellite's mission involves
the satellite's deliberate destruction. To date the debris clouds
from these explosions have quickly decayed from orbit, but there is
the potential for debris to intersect the orbit of another spacecraft
in a low orbit, resulting in that spacecraft's own destruction or
damage.
Additionally, the revelation of the Ekran 2 partial
disintegration in geosynchronous orbit shows that we are totally
ignorant of any partial or total disintegrations of satellites and
rocket bodies (the latter due to residual propellants) at the orbital
altitude. As the traffic in geosynchronous orbit becomes busier the
chances of an expensive satellite being lost due to a collision with
an untracked piece of debris will increase.
At present the insurance market has little interest in the slight
chance that a satellite will be lost due to a space debris event. As
time goes on, satellite owners might start to seek such insurance as
the population of objects orbiting the Earth increases.
REFERENCES
[1] David J Nauer, History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations (7th
edition), Teledyne Brown Engineering, July 1993.
[2] G Batyr et al, "The Current State of Russian Space Surveillance
System and Its Capability in Surveying Space Debris", paper published
in Proceedings of the First European Conference on Space Debris (ESA
SD-1, July 1993: conference held in Darmstadt, 5-7 April 1993), pp 43-
47.
[3] Phillip S Clark, "Soviet Geosynchronous Orbit Satellite Activity
October 1991-May 1992", JBIS, October 1993: Table 2 presents a
location history for the three Oko satellites (although they were not
known as such when the paper was presented) in geosynchronous orbit,
Cosmos 1546, Cosmos 1629 and Cosmos 1894.
[4] Nicholas L Johnson, private communications.
[5] David J Nauer, first update to History of On-Orbit Satellite
Fragmentations, undated (1993), pp 2-3.
[6] Phillip S Clark, "Soviet ELINT Satellites for Monitoring Naval
Transmissions", Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, August 1990, pp
378-381.
[7] P H H Bishop & K F Rogers, The Examination of a Sample of Space
Debris, RAE Technical Report 65165, August 1965.
[8] Phillip S Clark, Worldwide Satellite Launches, 10 June 1993,
updates page 20.
[9] Phillip S Clark, Worldwide Satellite Launches 1993, Molniya
Space Consultancy (1994), p 32.
[10] Phillip S Clark, "The Soviet Photoreconnaissance Satellite
Programme, 1982-1990", Journal of the British Interplanetary Society,
November 1991, pp 544-545.
[11] Phillip S Clark, Worldwide Satellite Launches 1993, p 58.
[12] Dr K M Suitnshev, discussions during an early 1992 space debris
conference.
[13] Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 March 1992, pp 18-19.
[14] "To Save Man: a Conversation with the General Designer of Life-
Support and Rescue Systems, Hero of Socialist Labour G I Severin",
Pravda, 26 June 1989, p 4.
[15] "Pages from a Diary: He Soared Freely Above the Earth",
Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 March 1990, p 6.
[16] Phillip S Clark, "Obscure Unmanned Soviet Satellite Missions",
Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, October 1993, p 375.
[17] D S McKnight, "Determining the Cause of a Satellite Breakup: a
Case Study of the Kosmos 1275 Breakup", paper presented at the 1987
IAF Congress, IAA-87-573.
[18] Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 March 1992, p 19.
[19] Details are from David J Nauer, History of On-Orbit Satellite
Fragmentations, p 154.
[20] Phillip S Clark, Worldwide Satellite Launches 1993, p 108.
[21] Details are from David J Nauer, History of On-Orbit Satellite
Fragmentations, p 78.
[22] B V Cherniatiev et al, "Identification and Resolution of a
Orbital Debris Problem with the Proton Launch Vehicle" paper published
in Proceedings of the First European Conference on Space Debris (ESA
SD-1, July 1993: conference held in Darmstadt, 5-7 April 1993), pp
575-580.
[23] Details are from David J Nauer, History of On-Orbit Satellite
Fragmentations, pp 250-251.
[24] Details are from David J Nauer, History of On-Orbit Satellite
Fragmentations, p 252.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This paper was presented at the British Interplanetary Society's
Soviet Astronautics meeting, 4th June 1994.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 1 SUMMARY TABLE OF SATELLITES AND ROCKET BODIES INVOLVED IN SPACE DEBRIS EVENTS
Class Satellite(s) Involved *
Anti-satellite target Cosmos 248, 839, 880, 1375
Anti-satellite weapon Cosmos 249, 252, 374, 375, 397, 462, 886, 970, 1174
Communications satellite Ekran 2, Cosmos 1691
Early warning satellite Cosmos 862, 903, 917, 931, 1030, 1109, 1124, 1191, 1247, 1261,
1278, 1285, 1317, 1456, 1481
ELINT satellite Cosmos 1043 (A)
EORSAT Cosmos 699, 777, 838, 1094, 1167, 1220, 1260, 1286, 1306, 1355,
1405, 1461, 1588, 1646, 1682, 1769
FOBS series 1966-088A, 1966-101A
Geodetic satellite Cosmos 1823
Man-related spacecraft Cosmos 57
Navigation satellite Cosmos 1275
Photoreconnaissance satellite Cosmos 50, 554, 758, 844, 1654, 1813, 1866, 1906, 1916, 2030,
2031, 2101, 2163, 2225, 2243 **, 2262
Remote sensing satellite Cosmos 1484
Rocket stage disintegrations
Intermediate Cosmos 2nd stage Cosmos 61-63
Molniya Block L Mars probe (1992-Beta-Iota 1), Cosmos 1305, Cosmos 1423
Proton 3rd stage Salyut 2
Proton ullage rocket Astron, Cosmos 1519-1521, Cosmos 1603, Cosmos 1656,
Cosmos 1710-1712, Gorizont 17, Gorizont 18, Cosmos 2054,
Cosmos 2125-2132,
Tsyklon 3rd stage Cosmos 1045
Vostok Block E Cosmos 44 (A), Cosmos 206 (A), Meteor-1 1, Meteor-1 7 (A),
Meteor-1 12 (A)
Zenit 2nd stage Cosmos 2227, Cosmos 2237
NOTES Within each group of satellites Cosmos payloads are generally identified by their serial numbers: for
rocket bodies the full names of the satellites are given. * In the cases of rocket stage disintegrations the
payloads placed in orbit are normally identified. ** It is presently unclear whether the satellite or the
rocket body disintegrated in this case. "Anomalous events" are indicated by "(A)".
TABLE 2 DETAILS OF RUSSIAN SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM SENSORS USED FOR TRACKING DEBRIS
Location Latitude Longitude Azimuth Coverage Observing Band
(1) Radar Sensors
Mingechaur, Azerbijan 41 deg N 48 deg E 105 - 215 deg VHF (BMEWS)
Balkhash, Kazakhstan 45 deg N 74 deg E 30 - 330 deg VHF (BMEWS)
Riga, Latvia 57 deg N 22 deg E 220 - 310 deg VHF (BMEWS)
Irkutsk, Russia 53 deg N 103 deg E 30 - 300 deg VHF (BMEWS)
Moscow, Russia 55 deg N 37 deg E 255 - 305 deg UHF (ABMD)
65 - 120 deg
Murmansk, Russia 68 deg N 40 deg E 295 - 335 deg VHF (BMEWS)
Petchora, Russia 65 deg N 57 deg E 300 - 0 - 55 deg VHF (BMEWS)
Sevastopol, Ukraine 44 deg N 33 deg E 140 - 260 deg VHF (BMEWS)
Uzhgorod, Ukraine 48 deg N 23 deg E 165 - 285 deg VHF (BMEWS)
(2) Optical Sensors
Burokan, Armenia 40 deg N 44 deg E 0 - 360 deg Electro-optical
Abastumani, Georgia 42 deg N * 43 deg E * 0 - 360 deg Electro-optical
Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan 43 deg N 77 deg E 0 - 360 deg Optical
Irkutsk, Russia 52 deg N 100 deg E 0 - 360 deg Electro-optical
Kourovka, Russia 57 deg N 60 deg E 0 - 360 deg Optical
Uzhno-Sakhalinsky, Russia 47 deg N 143 deg E 0 - 360 deg Optical
Zvenigorod, Russia 56 deg N 37 deg E 0 - 360 deg Optical
Dushanbe, Tadjikistan 39 deg N 69 deg E 0 - 360 deg Optical
Ashgabad, Turkmenia 38 deg N 58 deg E 0 - 360 deg Electro-optical
Kiev, Ukraine 50 deg N 30 deg E 0 - 360 deg Optical
Simeiz, Ukraine 44 deg N 34 deg E 0 - 360 deg Electro-optical
Uzhgorod, Ukraine 49 deg N 22 deg E 0 - 360 deg Optical
NOTES This Table is compiled using material from Tables 1 and 2 from reference 2. * The latitude and
longitude of Abastumani are incorrectly given in Table 2 of reference 2.
TABLE 3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM IN MARCH 1993
Total number of objects tracked 7,500
Number of breakup fragments 2,450
Number of payloads 2,000
Daily number of measurements 40,000
Percentage of identified measurements 99%
Number of orbit updates per day 10,000
Daily number of new orbits 7-10
Position determination mean square error
at the time of the latest measurement:
along the track 4.5 km
radial component 1.5 km
binormal component 0.8 km
Decay time determination error when time
to decay is less than: 1 day < 4.5%
2 days < 8%
30 days < 10%
NOTE These data are taken directly from Table 3 in reference 2.
TABLE 4 BREAKUPS OF ANTI-SATELLITE PROGRAMME PAYLOADS
Satellite Launch Date Breakup Date Incl Perigee Apogee Debris Debris
deg km km Tracked Remaining
ASAT Targets
Cosmos 248 19 Oct 68 1 Nov 68 62.2 475 545 13 8
Cosmos 839 8 Jul 76 29 Sep 77 65.9 980 2,100 70 67
Cosmos 880 9 Dec 76 27 Nov 78 65.8 550 620 49 2
Cosmos 1375 6 Jun 82 21 Oct 85 65.8 990 1,000 58 57
ASAT Weapons
Cosmos 249 20 Oct 68 20 Oct 68 62.3 490 2,165 109 55
Cosmos 252 1 Nov 68 1 Nov 68 62.3 535 2,140 140 53
Cosmos 374 23 Oct 70 23 Oct 70 62.9 530 2,130 102 36
Cosmos 375 30 Oct 70 30 Oct 70 62.8 525 2,100 47 27
Cosmos 397 25 Feb 71 25 Feb 71 65.8 575 2,200 116 59
Cosmos 462 3 Dec 71 3 Dec 71 65.7 230 1,800 25 0
Cosmos 886 27 Dec 76 27 Dec 76 65.8 595 2,295 76 63
Cosmos 970 21 Dec 77 21 Dec 77 65.8 945 1,140 70 67
Cosmos 1174 18 Apr 80 18 Apr 80 66.1 380 1,660 46 11
NOTES In this and the similar tables which follow the orbital data refer to the time of the satellite
disintegration.
TABLE 5 BREAKUPS OF EARLY WARNING SATELLITES
Satellite Launch Date Breakup Date Incl Perigee Apogee Debris Debris
deg km km Tracked Remaining
Cosmos 862 22 Oct 76 15 May 77 63.2 765 39,645 11 11
Cosmos 903 11 Apr 77 8 Jun 78 63.2 1,325 39,035 2 2
Cosmos 917 16 Jun 77 30 Mar 79 62.9 1,645 38,725 1 1
Cosmos 931 20 Jul 77 24 Oct 77 62.9 680 39,665 6 5
Cosmos 1030 6 Sep 78 10 Oct 78 62.8 685 39,760 4 4
Cosmos 1109 27 Jun 79 Mid-Feb 80 63.3 960 39,425 6 6
Cosmos 1124 28 Aug 79 9 Sep 79 63.0 570 39,795 5 5
Cosmos 1191 2 Jul 80 14 May 81 62.8 1,110 39,255 2 2
Cosmos 1247 19 Feb 81 20 Oct 81 63.0 970 39,390 4 4
Cosmos 1261 31 Mar 81 Apr/May 81 63.0 610 39,765 4 4
Cosmos 1278 19 Jun 81 Early-Dec 86 67.1 2,665 37,690 2 2
Cosmos 1285 4 Aug 81 21 Nov 81 63.1 720 40,100 3 3
Cosmos 1317 31 oct 81 Late-Jan 84 62.8 1,315 39,055 4 4
Cosmos 1456 25 Apr 83 13 Aug 83 63.3 730 39,630 4 4
Cosmos 1481 8 Jul 83 9 Jul 83 62.9 625 39,225 3 3
TABLE 6 BREAKUPS OF ELINT OCEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES
Satellite Launch Date EOL Date Breakup Date(s) Incl Perigee Apogee Debris Debris
deg km km Tracked Remaining
Cosmos 699 24 Dec 74 15 Mar 75 17 Apr 75 65.0 425 445 31 0
2 Aug 75 65.0 415 440 19
Cosmos 777 29 Oct 75 25 Jan 76 65.0 430 440 62 0
Cosmos 838 2 Jul 76 13 Nov 76 17 May 77 65.1 415 445 40 0
Cosmos 1094 18 Apr 79 19 May 79 17 Sep 79 65.0 380 405 1 0
Cosmos 1167 12 Mar 80 11 Apr 81 15 Jul 81 65.0 355 450 12 0
Cosmos 1220 4 Nov 80 2 Apr 81 20 Jun 82 65.0 570 885 47 1
25 Aug 82 65.0 565 885 31
Cosmos 1260 20 Mar 81 13 Sep 81 8 May 82 65.0 450 750 40 1
10 Aug 82 65.0 445 750 28
Cosmos 1286 4 Aug 81 16 Mar 82 29 Sep 82 65.0 300 325 2 0
Cosmos 1306 14 Sep 81 1 Feb 82 12 Jul 82 64.9 380 405 5 0
18 Sep 82 64.9 370 370 ? 3
Cosmos 1355 29 Apr 82 5 Feb 83 8 Aug 83 65.1 360 395 21 0
1 Feb 84 65.0 305 320 7 0
20 Feb 84 65.0 270 290 1 0
Cosmos 1405 4 Sep 82 25 Nov 82 20 Dec 83 65.0 310 340 32 0
Cosmos 1461 7 May 83 30 Jan 84 11 Mar 85 65.0 570 890 6 3
13 May 85 65.0 570 885 152
Cosmos 1588 7 Aug 84 14 Jul 85 23 Feb 86 65.0 410 440 45 0
Cosmos 1646 18 Apr 85 11 Apr 86 20 Nov 87 65.0 385 410 24 0
Cosmos 1682 19 Sep 85 6 Oct 86 18 Dec 86 65.0 385 475 23 0
Cosmos 1769 4 Aug 86 17 Sep 87 21 Sep 82 65.0 310 445 4 0
NOTE "EOL Date" is the date of the end-of-life manoeuvre for the satellite. A few EORSATs did not perform
such a manoeuvre.
TABLE 7 BREAKUPS OF PHOTORECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES
Satellite Launch Date Breakup Date Incl Perigee Apogee Debris Debris
deg km km Tracked Remaining
First Generation Series
Cosmos 50 28 Oct 64 5 Nov 64 51.2 175 220 96 0
Third Generation, Two-Tone Close Look Series
Cosmos 554 19 Apr 73 6 May 73 72.9 170 350 195 0
Third Generation, Two-Tone Medium Resolution Series
Cosmos 1813 15 Jan 87 29 Jan 87 72.8 360 415 194 0
Third Generation, Resurs-F2 Remote Sensing Series
Cosmos 1906 26 Dec 87 31 Jan 88 82.6 245 265 37 0
Fourth Generation, Close Look Series
Cosmos 758 5 Sep 75 6 Sep 75 67.1 175 325 76 0
Cosmos 844 22 Jul 76 25 Jul 76 67.1 170 355 248 0
Cosmos 1654 23 May 85 21 Jun 85 64.9 185 300 18 0
Cosmos 1866 9 Jul 87 26 Jul 87 67.1 155 255 9 0
Cosmos 1916 3 Feb 88 27 Feb 88 64.8 150 230 1 0
Cosmos 2030 12 Jul 89 28 Jul 89 67.1 150 215 1 0
Fifth Generation Series
Cosmos 2243 27 Apr 93 27 Apr 93 70.4 181 225 172 0
Presumed Sixth Generation Series
Cosmos 2031 18 Jul 89 31 Aug 89 50.5 240 365 9 0
Cosmos 2101 1 Oct 90 30 Nov 90 64.8 195 280 4 0
Cosmos 2163 9 Oct 91 6 Dec 91 64.8 185 260 1 0
Cosmos 2225 22 Dec 92 18 Feb 93 64.9 227 279 6 0
Cosmos 2262 7 Sep 93 18 Dec 93 64.9 185 265 1 0
TABLE 8 REMAINING SATELLITE BREAKUPS
Satellite Launch Date Breakup Date Incl Perigee Apogee Debris Debris
deg km km Tracked Remaining
Communications Satellites
Ekran 2 20 Sep 77 25 Jun 78 0.1 35,785 35,800 1 1
Cosmos 1691 9 Oct 85 22 Nov 85 82.6 1,410 1,415 14 11
FOBS Series
1966-088A * 17 Sep 66 17 Sep 66 49.6 140 855 53 0
1966-101A * 2 Nov 66 2 Nov 66 49.6 145 885 41 0
Geodetic Satellite
Cosmos 1823 20 Feb 87 17 Dec 87 73.6 1,480 1,525 110 46
Man-Related Spacecraft
Cosmos 57 22 Feb 65 22 Feb 65 64.8 165 425 167 0
Navigation Satellite
Cosmos 1275 4 Jun 81 24 Jul 81 83.0 960 1,015 306 275
Remote Sensing Satellite
Cosmos 1484 24 Jul 83 18 Oct 93 97.5 545 590 36 29
NOTES * These two launches were not announced by the Soviet Union and therefore no national names were
assigned. They are identified here by the international designations of the largest piece from each launch.
TABLE 9 BREAKUPS OF ROCKET BODIES AND OTHER DISCARDED PROPULSION SYSTEMS
Satellite(s) Launch Date Breakup Date Incl Perigee Apogee Debris Debris
Launched deg km km Tracked Remaining
Intermediate Cosmos Second Stage
Cosmos 61-63 15 Mar 65 15 Mar 65 56.1 260 1,825 147 22
Cosmos 2125-2132 12 Feb 91 5 Mar 91 74.0 1,460 1,725 73 23
Molniya Block L
1962-Beta-Iota 1 * 24 Oct 62 29 Oct 62 65.1 200 260 24 0
Cosmos 1305 11 Sep 81 11 Sep 81 62.8 605 13,795 3 3
Cosmos 1423 8 Dec 82 8 Dec 82 62.9 235 427 29 0
Proton Third Stage
Salyut 2 3 Apr 73 3 Apr 73 51.5 195 245 25 0
Proton Ullage Rockets
Astron/B 23 Mar 83 3 Sep 84 51.5 220 1,230 1 0
Cosmos 1519-1521/H 29 Dec 83 4 Feb 91 51.9 340 18,805 5 4
Cosmos 1603/F 28 Sep 84 5 Sep 92 66.6 836 845 22 1
Cosmos 1656/E 30 May 85 5 Jan 88 66.6 810 860 6 6
Cosmos 1710-1712/L 24 Dec 85 29 Dec 91 65.3 665 18,865 2 2
Gorizont 17 26 Jan 89 18 Dec 92 46.7 197 17,577 1 1
Gorizont 18 5 Jul 89 12 Jan 93 46.8 258 30,747 1 1
Cosmos 2054 27 Dec 89 Jul 92 47.1 344 27,651 2 2
Tsyklon Third Stage
Cosmos 1045 26 Oct 78 9 May 88 82.6 1,685 1,705 45 42
Vostok Block E
Meteor-1 1 26 Mar 69 29 Mar 69 81.2 460 850 37 0
Zenit Second Stage
Cosmos 2227 25 Dec 92 26 Dec 92 (3) 71.0 847 855 212 1
30 Dec 92 71.0 847 855 3 0
Cosmos 2237 26 Mar 93 28 Mar 93 71.0 841 850 27 27
NOTES * This launch attempt of a Mars probe was not announced by the Soviet Union and therefore no national
name was assigned. It is identified here by the international designator of the largest piece tracked in
orbit. The particular Proton ullage rocket which disintegrated is indicated by the upper case letter
following the payload name (two ullage rockets are carried on each flight of the four-stage Proton vehicle).
It is believed that there were three separate breakup events of the Cosmos 2227 rocket body on the day
following launch.
TABLE 10 ANOMALOUS BREAKUP EVENTS
Satellite Launch Date Breakup Date Incl Perigee Apogee Debris Debris
deg km km Tracked Decayed
ELINT Satellite
Cosmos 1043 10 Oct 78 Feb 93 81.2 435 437 1 0
Vostok Block E Rocket Stage
Cosmos 44 28 Aug 64 Late 90 65.1 655 775 1 1
Cosmos 206 14 Mar 68 Late 90 81.2 450 515 1 1
Meteor-1 7 20 Jan 71 Jun 87 81.2 535 665 1 1
Meteor-1 12 30 Jun 72 Sep 89 81.2 860 935 1 1