The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.

From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."

?php
>

Sunday, July 29, 2018

Towards an Arab NATO? - Irina Tsukerman

​by Irina Tsukerman

Despite the complications, new
developments show that over the long run there is a likelihood of a
strategic response to -- Iran-related
problems -- upgrading the scattered and divided Arab
Coalition into a formal and organized infrastructure similar to NATO.

Yemeni Civil War, image by Ali Zifan via Wikimedia CC

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 907, July 27, 2018

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The
Arab Coalition in Yemen is facing three internal challenges: differences
between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, Qatari meddling, and recent tensions
between Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Despite these complications, new
developments show that over the long run there is a likelihood of a
strategic response to the stalemate in Yemen and to other Iran-related
problems in the form of an upgrading of the scattered and divided Arab
Coalition into a formal and organized infrastructure similar to NATO.

The Arab Coalition, which consists of Yemeni
government forces, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait,
Sudan, Jordan, and Academi (formerly Blackwater) mercenaries, is on the
verge of a potentially decisive battle to liberate the port city of
Hodeida from Houthi control. The offensive, dubbed “Golden Victory,” had
been temporarily paused to allow the UN to negotiate a political
resolution to the stalemate, including a Houthi withdrawal from the
city. This resolution would avoid mass civilian casualties while
clearing a path for the Coalition, backed by American, British, and
French intelligence and logistical support, to secure the airport, which
had served as the main entry point for humanitarian aid into the
country as well as for Iranian missiles and other advanced weaponry.
Having refocused on gaining ground on the outskirts of Hodeida and other parts of the country, the forces are bracing for what could be a long and grueling task ahead.

The war in Yemen has dragged on for three years. The Saudi-led coalition has faced numerous obstacles: untrained ground forces, rough terrain that has challenged the effectiveness of their air campaign, flawed or fluid intelligence provided by Western allies, a merciless enemy that has recruited child soldiers, tortured prisoners, and used civilian targets and entire towns as hostages and human shields, an influx of sophisticated weaponry and training from Iran and Hezbollah (as even the UN now admits), as well as assorted terroristorganizations seeking
to destabilize the situation. Communicating this complicated set of
facts to Western states used to quick, decisive victories, while at the
same time countering Iran-backed propaganda machinery and resolving
internal disputes, has also been challenging.

Tensions have beset the Coalition, complicating
its ability to stay focused on the mission. First, the UAE forces, which
are better trained, have backed a separatist group opposed to the
Saudi-backed Hadi government. The UAE’s mission and interests lean more
towards combating Islamists than towards countering Iranian influence,
whereas Saudi Arabia views Tehran’s support for the Houthis – who have
repeatedly fired in Riyadh’s direction and whose missiles on occasion
have reached it – as an existential threat.

Second, Qatar, which used to be part of the
coalition, was asked to leave in 2017 following the imposition of the
blockade by the Anti-Terrorism Quartet (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and
Bahrain). Qatar’s departure split the Hadi government, some members of
whom sympathized with Doha while others backed Riyadh. While many public
reasons were given for the air, naval, and land blockade against Doha,
which has proved largely ineffectual after a year, there has not been
much discussion of the likely military reasons for kicking Qatar out of
the Coalition, despite the costs. In addition to accusations of Doha’s
support for Iran, there may be evidence that Qatar was clandestinely aiding the enemy. Recently, a Qatari national was captured sneaking out of Yemen; he allegedly was an intelligence officer assisting the Houthis.

Third, recent tensions between Morocco and Saudi Arabia threaten to destabilize the Coalition, as some voices in Morocco are urging Rabat
to withdraw all forces from Yemen. The reason for the spat, which has
the potential for dramatic and undesirable consequences, is multifold.
According to some experts, Morocco and Saudi Arabia are competing as
beacons of moderate Islam, which ultimately means competing foreign
policies and lack of cohesion in coordinating commitments. That
explanation, however, is inaccurate, as Morocco has sought to steer
clear of regional rivalries and conflicts by developing its identity as
an African,
rather than a Middle Eastern, state. If that is indeed the reasoning, a
friendly competition could push both countries to develop strong
educational and cultural institutions that would benefit both regions.

If taken too far, however, this would be both
futile and damaging as the countries share important goals and
interests. Each could be a leader in their respective regions, working
closely together on resolving common concerns and complementing each
other’s strengths. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that Morocco
has pursued an independent foreign policy, including refusing to
participate in the blockade of Qatar, and indeed maintaining a growing
trade relationship with that country.

This has irked Saudi officials, including the head
of the General Sports Authority, Turki al-Sheikh, who attempted to
strong-arm Morocco into following Riyadh’s lead through public comments
as well as through Saudi Arabia’s support for the North American joint
World Cup 2026 bid, in opposition to Morocco’s bid.

The proximate cause of the cooling in relations
came out of that chain of events. Al- Sheikh, unhappy about Rabat’s
continuing relationship with Doha and the supposed insufficiency of
Moroccan forces in Yemen, put a great deal of energy into underscoring
those grievances and supporting Donald Trump’s odd interest in the World
Cup by hosting parties for EU, Middle Eastern, and FIFA officials and
lobbying countries that would otherwise have sided with Morocco but
ended up voting for the US instead.

As a result of these developments, Rabat, which considered these moves to be acts of betrayal, found itself too busy to
participate in the Saudi-led emergency session on Yemen that took place
on June 23. These developments could be damaging to the fragile balance
of powers in Yemen. Iran is sure to delight in such public
disagreements and to perceive the growing distrust as a sign the
coalition is weakening, in Yemen and elsewhere. Likewise, these
disagreements detract from battlefield cohesion. The Coalition faces the
daunting tasks of demining the booby-trapped environs of Hodeida and
having to fight through the streets,
where Houthis have positioned themselves to maximize the damage they
can inflict on incoming forces and civilians. (The alternative,
attacking by water, is unlikely given that Iran sent a flotilla to the Gulf of Aden.)

Additional obstacles are mounting. The recent
elimination of eight Hezbollah fighters by the Coalition confirmed the
group’s direct involvement in Yemen. Elite and well-trained, Hezbollah
in Yemen is tasked with
transforming the Houthis into a medium-sized army capable of
sophisticated operations around the world, with the Houthis quickly
gaining in weapons and skills what they lack in experience. The
Coalition, meanwhile, is accused of not having a coherent strategy
towards retaking the city, much less securing the port to prevent future
infiltration.

Because of the sophisticated nature of the enemy,
the Coalition cannot afford the luxury of superficial spats over
tangential matters. In every challenge, though, there is an opportunity.

Hezbollah’s growing presence in Yemen may compel
US forces and the CIA to increase counterterrorism involvement and unite
the fractious Coalition members around the common threat. US
involvement has been limited so far to gathering intelligence, deploying
Green Berets (who
help identify missiles the Houthis are using against Coalition forces
and Yemeni and Saudi civilians), and countering al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Ironically, the relatively minor American support to the Coalition has
resulted in its sometimes acting at cross purposes
with Riyadh (and increasingly distancing itself from major operations,
such as “Golden Victory”). The kingdom has allegedly tried to coopt some
of the local groups, including al-Qaeda, as a bulwark against the Houthis.

There is no public support for increasing the
American troop commitment for what is widely viewed as a proxy war
against Iran (though it is no longer proxy, as both Iranians and Saudis
are on the ground). Indeed, existing US involvement has been
controversial in Congress, with several failed resolutions pushing for
withdrawal. Moreover, increasing the US military presence to fight the
Houthis directly might be considered an act of war, which could require
Congressional authorization beyond the current AUMF.

However, expanding the scope of counterterrorism
operations against non-state actors would not pose such challenges.
Fighting Hezbollah has become a Trump administration priority,
particularly as recent revelations have demonstrated its extensive
presence in Latin America, collaboration with drug cartels, and infiltration into the US. Hezbollah likewise is playing a damaging role in Syria, alongside Iranian forces, Iraqi and Syrian militias, and Assad’s army. Bahrain is not immune to infiltration, and Hezbollah has managed to utilize the Lebanese Air Force, which the Pentagon arms, to put sophisticated weapons in the service of its agenda.

Hezbollah, with the help of Iranian diplomats, in
what appears to be part of a pervasive pattern of financing its
operations through criminal and terrorist activities, is arming the North African separatist group Polisario,
which threatens Morocco’s territorial integrity and sells illicit arms
to other unstable countries. And most recently, a Vienna-based Iranian
diplomat, now stripped of
his diplomatic immunity, was caught in Germany for, along with cohorts
in Belgium and France, plotting a terrorist attack against an Iranian
opposition rally in Paris. That Hezbollah is likely involved in this
plot should come as no surprise, as it has been associated with other
terrorist attacks all over the world. Hezbollah and associated
Iran-backed proxies have become a truly global problem that threatens
the security and stability of all the allies, Western and Arab.

Until now, however, the response of the Arab
Coalition has been subdued and limited, with little action beyond
designating Hezbollah as an international terrorist group. In Lebanon,
Hezbollah – perhaps reinvigorated by the failed coup against Hariri – has been working hard to split the
Saudi and UAE-backed Sunni bloc. Furthermore, Hezbollah has become more
successful at recruiting disaffected Shiites in Lebanon by taking
advantage of the proliferation of drugs and lack of development, particularly in tribal areas.

There is an opportunity here for the Arab
Coalition to counter this influence by infusing development aid directly
into these areas and combating drug trafficking through specific,
targeted means. There is also room to exploit existing divisions. This
fertile area (Beka), filled with violent tribes, has been misled and
deceived by Hezbollah, which has recruited foot soldiers from there
while stacking the officer ranks from bigger, more central cities. And
despite Hassan Nasrallah’s words of solidarity towards
the Houthis, he is hiding in his bunker rather than leading the troops
to battle. That is a major weakness that the Coalition can counter to
demoralize the enemy through effective joint information warfare.

Tehran’s strategy of seeking to build naval bases
and gain control of strategic waterways all over the world – the Strait
of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb, the Horn of Africa – endangers the
interests of the international community far beyond the Arab Coalition.
Iran relies on strong, flexible, and resilient non-state proxy groups
like Hezbollah to clear the way and secure these victories. Until now,
the Arab Coalition and the West have been playing whack-a-mole with
terrorists, occasionally freezing accounts, arresting key figures, or
blowing up bases. However, with the clear strategic vision of
Hezbollah’s expanse across many continents and countries, the Arab
Coalition together with the US and its allies can join forces to combat
this encroaching threat. In so doing, they can deal a mortal blow to the
Islamic Republic itself, severing the source of financing to its
remaining proxies.

Rather than being distracted by differences and
short-term, parochial goals that alienate Coalition members at the cost
of its strategic interests and global security, the partners should work
to create the NATO of the Arab World. The Arab NATO would be a military
and security alliance dedicated to defense and insulated from economic,
diplomatic, or political disputes. Such a system would also survive
rival personalities and leadership changes. The US can play a vital role
in the training, strengthening, and support of the nascent Arab NATO,
which should also cultivate willing and capable partners against common
enemies. Hezbollah’s role in conflicts that threaten everyone concerned
would be a great place to start.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and
national security attorney based in New York. She has written
extensively on geopolitics and US foreign policy for a variety of
American, Israeli, and other international publications.Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/arab-nato/ Follow Middle East and Terrorism on Twitter