Amid rumors
that the otherwise moribund "Transitional Federal Government" (TFG) of
Somalia might just bestir itself enough to attempt to break out of the
tiny enclave in Mogadishu which Islamists insurgents have kept it and
its supporters from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) boxed,
there is reason to be concerned that in this geopolitically critical
corner of the world the United States and other governments have
substituted wishful thinking for realistic assessment and muddled
platitudes for policy objectives, thereby magnifying the potential
damage when, as I
warned earlier this year, this improvised approach falls apart.

Four points
to consider:

First, the
virtual entirety of the international community's Somali strategy—if the
hodgepodge of policies can even be dignified with that name—has been
predicated on an assumption about Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's accession
to the TFG presidency last year that has now been exposed as a false
premise. As Bronwyn Bruton succinctly summarized in her recentCouncil
on Foreign Relations Special ReportSomalia:
A New Approach(for
which I had the privilege of being a member of the advisory committee):

In the
months immediately following Sheikh Sharif's election, there was
widespread optimism that the TFG would draw radical factions into the
peace process—but those hopes rapidly proved illusory. Although Sheikh
Sharif has attempted to create an Islamist identity for the TFG by
promising to adopt sharia, he has been rejected as a Western proxy by
the principal Islamist factions in Somalia. The TFG has also failed to
generate a visible constituency of clan or business supporters in
Mogadishu. Its survival now depends wholly on the presence of AMISOM
forces, which further reinforces the perception that the TFG is a
foreign implant.

Readers of
this column will not be surprised by this. A fortnight after Sharif
Ahmed's "election" by anersatzassembly
that could not even convene inside Somali territory and which, as the
TFG legislature, has not met again for nearly a year for want of a
quorum, Iwarned
herethat
while an unexpectedly turnaround could not be ruled outa
priori, it was highly unlikely that anyone—much less someone with as
checkered a past as Sharif Ahmed—could prevent the whole transitional
framework from unraveling. The fact that, one year after its "makeover,"
the TFG still has yet to even establish a mere presence in—much less
control over—a majority of Mogadishu's sixteen districts is a sobering
reminder of its limitations. As the director of one Somali
nongovernmental organization told me last year,"Muhammad
the prophet could be in charge and the result would be the same."

Second, the
very notion of a unitary national government could succeed given the
overall dynamics of the ongoing devolution of Somalia demonstrates
nothing so much as the wholesale ignorance of its proponents, both with
respect to Somali culture and history and Somali political developments
over the last two decades. Events over the course of the last year
confirm the trend. As Inoted
last year, the inhabitants of the northwestern region of Somaliland
remains committed to their quest for recognition of the independent
state they had before joining with the former Italian colony of Somalia
in a 1960 union that they regretted for the ensuing three decades.
Elections, expected later this year, will only consolidate this
effective schism as all three political parties contesting the polls
agree on the independence of Somaliland from the former Somali
Democratic Republic. The northeastern region of Puntland was, when Ilast
examined the subject, still committed to being a part of a future
federal Somalia, although its people reserved their right to negotiate
the precise terms of any union. Since then, despite the fact that a
fellow Darood/Harti clansman, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, is the
designated "prime minister" of the TFG, in recent months Puntlanders
have edged closer to formally abandoning the scuttled (and apparently
sinking) Somali ship of state. In late December, the regional parliament
voted unanimously to adopt a distinctive flag (hitherto the flag of
Somalia had been used), coat of arms, and anthem.

All of this
means that Somali policies which are wedded to reestablishing a
centralized government around the TFG are irrelevant. Consider just the
raw demographic data. Of the estimated 9 million Somalis in the world,
more than one million of them are refugees or permanently living in the
diaspora, about 3 million live in Somaliland, and another 2.4 million in
Puntland. Thus TFG and its struggles with the Islamists—whether of theHarakat
al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen("Movement
of Warrior Youth," al-Shabaab) or theHisbul
Islam("Islamic
party") factions—really only affect at most less than one-third of the
total Somali population, all of whom live in the southern and central
Somalia. This area accounts for about only one-third of the territory of
the Somali state before its collapse in 1991. If the United States and
the international community are interested in stability in the Horn of
Africa—and they should be given the links between Islamists there and
those in Yemen, especially al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—then
what is needed is something more comprehensive than the affirmation made
by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson in aspecial
briefing on Somali policy two weeks agothat"U.S.
policy in Somalia is guided by our support for the Djibouti peace
process,"a
process that ignores two-thirds of the relevant geopolitical space and
most of its effective authorities.

In point of
fact, about the only Somalis who have been interested in signing up for
a centralized Somali government are those who have some ulterior motive,
usually pecuniary, to gain by the allegiance—which only lasts as long as
the relationship continues to be lucrative. Take the case of the deal
struck last week by the TFG with some leaders of theAhlu
Sunna wal-Jama'a(roughly,
"[Followers of] the Traditions and Consensus [of the Prophet Muhammad]")
militias which have opposed al-Shabaab and its allies in the central
regions of Somalia. The ASWJ leadership will "join" the TFG insofar as
they get to appoint five ministers, one minister of state, five deputy
ministers, ten directors general, three ambassadors, twelve other
diplomats, and the deputy commanders of the army, national police, and
security agency. While the deal signing was duly witnessed by the
Ethiopian foreign minister, the chairperson of the African Union
Commission, and the special representative of the United Nations
secretary-general, the accord is not quite what it was spun as. For one
thing, while ASWJ has several thousand members, they are—notwithstanding
Ethiopian efforts to train them professionally and equip them
properly—largely just clansmen mustered on anad
hocbasis,
rather than a standing force that could be incorporated into the TFG's
armed forces. For another, the TFG's ministries are virtual entities, so
the political nominations are nothing more than licenses to steal the
money that outside donors throw at the regime—recall that two of the
"ministers" killed by the December 2009 suicide bombing of the Shamo
Hotel in Mogadishu, "Minister of Higher Education" Ibrahim Hassan Adow
and "Minister of Education" Ahmed Abdullahi Wayel, held overlapping
portfolios which were all the more redundant considering that neither of
them actually ran any schools, while two of the "ministers" wounded,
"Minister of Tourism" Mohamed Hussein Said and "Minister of Sports"
Saleban Olad Roble, hold titles which are almost black humor given the
grim reality of Somali life. In fact, the deal has already been
repudiated by a number of ASWJ leaders—including its number two, Sheikh
Hassan Sheikh Abdi—who apparently weren't given their due in the
division of spoils.

Nor will
the addition of additional African peacekeepers—according to areport
in the U.S. Armed Forces newspaperStar
and Stripes, some additional 1,700 Ugandan troops were flown
into Mogadishu last week by American contractor DynCorp—alter this
dynamic. In fact, even with the reinforcements, it is beyond delusional
to think that such a modest contingent of Africans can succeed where the
infinitely more robust UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces, with their 37,000
and 28,000 troops respectively, including at one point more than 25,000
U.S. personnel, failed in the 1990s against a less capable foe than the
Islamist insurgents opposing the TFG.

Third, even
if it was an effective government—and it isn't (more on this
below)—there is little evidence that Sharif Ahmed's regime is a
desirable partner in the least. While professing moderation during his
many peregrinations abroad, the TFG head promotes, asThe
Economistpointed
out last year,"a
version ofsharialaw
whereby every citizen of Somalia is born a Muslim and anyone who
converts to another religion is guilty of apostasy, which is punishable
by death."Contrast
this with the situation in Somaliland, a largely democratic, if
struggling, polity where Islamic jurisprudence is just one source of
legal norms, alongside civil legislation and customary Somali law (xeer),
or in Puntland where, notwithstanding its other difficulties, religious
extremism is resisted.

Sharif
Ahmed does not even have the good manners to keep his noxious ideology
at home, but with an almost reckless disregard to the fact that his very
continued existence is owed to the good will of the international
community, he has chosen to rub America's nose in it. In November, the
TFG appointed Omar Jamal, a Minneapolis Somali advocate, to the post of
first secretary at the Permanent Mission of the Somalia at the United
Nations in New York. The new job comes just in time for its new
incumbent—who has been dubbed"the
Al Sharpton of the Twin Cities' Somali community"—since it includes
diplomatic immunity that will likely stay his deportation (a federal
jury convicted him in 2005 of lying to immigration officials and he has
exhausted his appeals). Then in February, Sheikh Sharif appointed as his
"special envoy to the United States of America" one Abukar Abdou Arman,
a former president of the Columbus, Ohio, chapter of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). While Arman regularly posts on theHuffington Post—before his elevation he hadfloated
a proposal thereto"offer
confidence-building amnesty to key individual players who are on the US
terrorist list, as these lists further radicalize people"as
well asscreedsaccusing
Israel of being"devoid
of any conscience"and
comparing Israeli leaders to"Pharaoh
and Hitler"—he doesn't seem to be as concerned about the free speech
of those who disagree with him, earning at one point apublic
rebuke from theColumbus
Dispatchfor
his"effort
to suppress the discussion ... by labeling it as bigotry and
hatemongering."Lovely. Perhaps those who would hold the TFGcapoup
as a partner might want to consider what these two nominations say about
what he really is.

Fourth, one
might even hold one's nose and engage with an unsavory partner if the
latter were at least effective. Alas, "effective" is not a term which
can be used alongside the TFG, support to which is more likely to have
the reverse consequence from what is intended. In his briefing,
Ambassador Carson acknowledged that the United States has"provided
limited military support to the Transitional Federal Government."Other
countries, including a number of our European Union allies, have
provided training and equipment to the TFG's forces. Unfortunately, theUnited
Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia recently delivered a scathing report
to the Security Councilon
all the good that this assistance has been. The UN analysts' findings
are tantamount to an indictment not just of the TFG, but of any policy
that relies on that outfit:

The
military stalemate is less a reflection of opposition strength than of
the weakness of the Transitional Federal Government. Despite infusions
of foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain
ineffective, disorganized and corrupt — a composite of independent
militias loyal to senior government officials and military officers who
profit from the business of war and resist their integration under a
single command. During the course of the mandate, government forces
mounted only one notable offensive and immediately fell back from all
the positions they managed to seize. The government owes its survival to
the small African Union peace support operation, AMISOM, rather than to
its own troops ...

The
security sector as a whole lacks structure, organization and a
functional chain of command—a problem that an international assessment
of the security sector attributes to "lack of political commitment by
leaders within the Transitional Federal Government or because of poor
common command and control procedures" ... To date, the Transitional
Federal Government has never managed to deploy regimental or
brigade-sized units on the battlefield.

The
consequences of these deficiencies include an inability of the security
forces of the Transitional Federal Government to take and hold ground,
and very poor public perceptions of their performance by the Somali
public. As a result, they have made few durable military gains during
the course of the mandate, and the front line has remained, in at least
one location, only 500 meters from the presidency.

As the UN
Monitoring Group exhaustively documented, about the only thing the
members of the TFG do well—aside from losing battles—is to engage in
criminal activity. The UN investigators confirmed what Ifirst
reported here last fall, that a large proportion, if not the
majority, of U.S. military assistance to the TFG, including some 94 tons
of infantry weapons and ammunition to date, simply ends up being sold on
the open market. Moreover, it seems that TFG officials have extended
their corruption from simple misappropriation of resources to the far
more dangerous realm of visa fraud:

Visa
fraud involving Transitional Federal Government officials and members of
parliament is among the most brazen. Politicians claim that they need to
travel on official business, such as an invitation to address a diaspora
group or attend a conference, accompanied by a bogus delegation of
government officials (and occasionally family members). Such requests
are typically accompanied by a note verbale or other introductory
document from the Somali Embassy, often with a supporting letter from a
minister, the Speaker of Parliament or one of his deputies. If the
request meets with approval, the other members of the delegation pay as
much as $15,000 each for the opportunity to travel. Many do not return
...

Monitoring Group investigations have linked a number of senior officials
of the Transitional Federal Government to the practice of visa fraud,
including the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Fisheries,
Abdirahman Ibrahim Adan Ibbi, the Minister for Women's Affairs and
Gender, Fowsiya Mohamed Sheikh, and the Minister of Constitutional
Affairs, Madoobe Nunow Mohamed. The Constitutional Minister is a repeat
offender: in April and June 2009 he organized delegations to attend a
constitutional training workshop in Germany convened by a prestigious
institution, as part of the UNDP-coordinated constitution-building
activities in Somalia. The delegations included members of the
Independent Federal Constitutional Commission, private individuals
masquerading as ministry officials, and relatives of the Minister. At
least eight of these individuals, including Nunow's son, subsequently
"disappeared". With the exception of his relatives, the Monitoring Group
has learned that those who did not return paid the Minister $14,000 per
visa. Subsequently, five of the individuals claimed political asylum in
the Netherlands. Nunow has since submitted similar requests to other
European embassies in Nairobi.

One of
the most prominent "brokers" is a Somali member of parliament and former
member of the African Union Parliament named Abdiaziz Abdullahi Mohamed
"Abdi-hukun". A Kenyan resident since 1997 and Somali member of
parliament since 2004, Abdiaziz possesses an African Union passport,
despite having lost his seat in the African Union Parliament more than
five years ago, as well as a Swedish travel document. Together with
another Swedish Somali resident, formerly based in Kismaayo with
Al-Shabaab, Abdiaziz facilitates the movement through Kenya of Somali
diaspora youth seeking to join Somali armed opposition groups.

In April
2009, Abdiaziz requested visas from the Italian Embassy for two members
of his family. The visas were issued and the men travelled to Milan, but
subsequently left Italy with fraudulent papers for a third country.
Monitoring Group investigations offer grounds to believe that both men
were in fact members of an armed opposition group—allegedly Al-Shabaab.

These
allegations are especially worrisome when one couples them with the
evidence produced by the Monitoring Group that Al-Shabaab—which,
incidentally, achieved recognition earlier this month asa
"proscribed organization" under the Terrorism Act by the British
governmentand
asa
"listed terrorist group" by the Canadian government, in addition to
terrorist designations previously made by the United States and
Australia—and Hisbul Islam as well as Somali pirates have exploited
these connections to facilitate the travel of members to Western
countries. Given both the increasing internationalization of al-Shabaab
as well as the group's recent public acknowledgement of an alliance with
al-Qaeda, one cannot afford to ignore the threat posed by the TFG's
criminal disregard for the security of the members of the international
community.

Given this
reality, it should come as no surprise that the approach taken by the
United States and other countries with respect to Somalia is more than a
tad bit schizophrenic. While the media is wont to describe the
TFG—which, it should be recalled, is just the fifteenth in a succession
of failed interim regimes since the overthrow of the dictatorship of
Muhammad Siyad Barre—as the "internationally recognized government" of
Somalia, the fact is its legal recognition as a sovereign subject of
international law is more the exception than the rule. While the United
States, for example, never formally severed relations with Somalia after
shutting down the American Embassy there in 1991, neither has it
officially recognized any of the fifteen transitional governments,
including the current TFG. The State Department website merelystates:"The
United States maintains regular dialogue with the TFG and other key
stakeholders in Somalia through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya."In
fact, the lack of affirmativede
jurerecognition
for the TFG is presumed by the introduction in October 2009 of aproposed
Congressional Resolutionby
Congressman Donald Payne, chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the
U.S. House of Representatives, urging"the
Obama Administration to recognize the TFG and allow the opening of an
official Somali Embassy in Washington."The
clear implication is that the United States Government accords the TFG
something less than normal diplomatic recognition as a sovereign. In
fact, this point was formally conceded in early 2010 by the Obama
administration when, in abrief
filed with the U.S. Supreme Courtin
a case involving Siyad Barre's defense minister, Mohamed Ali Samantar,
the Solicitor-General of the United States and the Legal Advisor of the
State Department acknowledged that"since
the fall of that government, the United States has not recognized any
entity as the government of Somalia"(full
disclosure: Professors Lee Cassanelli of the University of Pennsylvania,
Ioan M. Lewis of the London School of Economics, Gérard Prunier of the
University of Paris, and Hussein Bulhan of the University of Hargeisa
filed ajoint
brief asamici curiaein
support of Samantar's victims).

The
approach taken by the United States is in line with that taken by other
nations. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's websitestates:
"Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 there have been no
formal diplomatic links between the UK and Somalia." And the TFG's
former "foreign minister," Ismail Mohamud Hurre, a.k.a. "Buba," and its
"defense minister," Yusuf Mohamed Siad, a.k.a. "Inda'adde," have been
arrested in recent months in Kenya and Uganda, respectively,
demonstrating just how little regard its neighbors hold for the TFG as
the government.

Nonetheless, the lack of diplomatic recognition has not stopped some in
Washington and other Western capitals from looking for ways to deepen
their hitherto fruitless involvement with the TFG. Although Ambassador
Carson emphasized that"the
United States does not plan, does not direct, and does not coordinate
the military operations of the TFG, and we have not and will not be
providing direct support for any potential military offensives,"there
is no shortage of individuals inside the Beltway who, making up with
stubborn bellicosity for what they evidently lack in strategic vision,
are pushing to throw America's precious military resources directly
behind Sharif Ahmed and his gang. And, after he took his peripatetic
sideshow to London two weeks ago—one can hardly blame the chap since
apparently no one wants to be in Mogadishu these days, even if one
claims to be the Somali president—there seem to be a few Whitehall
mandarins who have taken up the siren call.

Thus, the
muddled message seems to be we will arm you in the hope that you make
something of yourself because we don't have any other ideas at the
moment, but we won't recognize you just in case you utterly embarrass
us—not much of a strategy as far as it goes. What is needed is a
fundamental change in approach. If, after more than five years since its
inception, hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid, and the lives
of hundreds of valiant Ethiopian, Ugandan, and Burundian officers and
enlisted men who have given their lives defending it when its own
ministers won't commit their own sons to the effort, the TFG is still
unable to rally to its banner the very people it purports to represent,
there is nothing that any outside power can or should do to impose it
upon clearly unwilling Somalis. Rather, it is high time that the United
States and Somalia's other international partners look after their own
legitimate interests and refocus their energies on minimizing and
containing the harm caused by the interim regime's ineffectiveness and
corruption, while strengthening those functional parts of the former
Somali state and integrating them into the framework for regional
security and stability. To put it in terms that would resonate with the
traditional pastoral Somali, the stakes are simply too high for us to
risk a bet on a camel that, if not quite dead, is certainly crippled.

Dr. Pham
has authored, edited, or translated over a dozen books and is the author
of over three hundred essays and reviews on a wide variety of subjects
in scholarly and opinion journals on both sides of the Atlantic. In
addition to the study of terrorism and political violence, his research
interests lie at the intersection of international relations,
international law, political theory, and ethics, with particular
concentrations on the implications for United States foreign policy and
African states as well as religion and global politics.

Dr. Pham
has testified before the U.S. Congress on numerous occasions and
conducted briefings or consulted for the U.S. and foreign governments as
well as private firms. He has appeared in various media outlets,
including CBS, PBS, CBC, SABC, VOA, CNN, the Fox News Channel, MSNBC,
National Public Radio, the BBC, Radio France Internationale, the
Associated Press, Reuters,The
Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The
Washington Times, USA Today, National Journal, Newsweek, The Weekly
Standard, New Statesman,andMaclean's,among
others.