1. The district court must instruct the jury as to lesser included crimes where there is some
evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime.

2. The plain meaning of "any building" in K.S.A. 21-3716 requires no inquiry into the
extent to which adjoining or connecting portions of a structure are part of the dwelling
house.

3. Under the facts of this case, entry onto the porch was entry into any building. The porch
was an integral part of the house itself, sharing a common foundation, roof, gutter system,
and siding. Arguments that the porch was not used for dwelling purposes because the
owner did not keep anything of value on the porch and that it was uninhabitable, unused,
and not very secure, are simply irrelevant.

4. Removal of a screen from the kitchen window and opening the screen door from the
porch into the kitchen door are held to constitute an entry for purposes of burglary.

5. For a misdemeanor conviction of criminal damage to property, value need not be proven.
K.S.A. 21-3720(b)(3) merely provides that "the property damaged is of the value of less
than $500 or is of the value of $500 or more and is damaged to the extent of less than$500. Value of the property damaged may be important in determining the severity level
of felonies under K.S.A. 21-3720(b)(1) or (2), but value is irrelevant in a misdemeanor
prosecution under K.S.A. 21-3720(b)(3).

GREENE, J.: Reginald L. Carter appeals his convictions for aggravated burglary and
criminal damage to property, arguing that the district court erred in failing to give an instruction
on a lesser included offense and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction of criminal damage to property. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Maxine Alexander's neighbor was awakened by loud noises and observed two individuals
on his neighbor's porch moving between the kitchen window and the back door of the residence.
The neighbor's fiance called 911, and the observation continued until police arrived. The two
men were seen leaving the porch together, but officers pursued and apprehended one of the men,
who was identified as Carter.

The porch was screened in on all sides, Alexander kept it locked, and she did not give
Carter permission to enter the porch or damage her screen or window. The police inspection of
the porch revealed the screen next to the locked porch door had been pushed in, there was a
screen window taken off the kitchen window and placed on the ground, the storm door leading
into the residence was ajar, there were scuff marks on the back door, and there were fresh scrapes
on the window frame. The State's exhibits show damage to the porch's screen window, the screen
of the kitchen window, and the back door of the residence, and Alexander confirmed that these
items were not in the same condition after the incident as they were prior to the incident.

The trial judge denied Carter's requested jury instruction for attempted aggravated
burglary, finding as a matter of law that the porch was part of the residence for purposes of the
aggravated burglary statute, contrary to Carter's argument. A jury found Carter guilty of
aggravated burglary, misdemeanor criminal damage to property under $500, and obstructing
official duty. Carter now appeals.

Did the District Court Err in Refusing to Give a Requested Instruction on Attempted
Aggravated
Burglary?

Carter first contends the trial court erroneously refused to give his requested jury
instruction on attempted aggravated burglary as a lesser included crime of aggravated burglary.
He argues that he attempted but did not actually enter into the victim's residence because he only
entered onto her porch, which was not a part of the residence in this case. The State argues, and
the trial court expressly found, that an instruction on attempted aggravated burglary was not
necessary because "the enclosed back porch is part of the residence as a matter of law."

When considering the refusal of the trial court to give a specific instruction, the evidence
must be viewed by the appellate court in the light most favorable to the party requesting the
instruction. State v. Williams, 277 Kan. 338, 356, 85 P.3d 697 (2004). To the extent
that
appellate review requires the interpretation of a statute, it frames a question of law requiring de
novo review. State v. Legero, 278 Kan. 109, 111, 91 P.3d 1216 (2004).

The district court must instruct the jury as to lesser included crimes "where there is some
evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime as provided
in subsection (2) of K.S.A. 21-3107 and amendments thereto." K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 22-3414(3).
Lesser included crime instructions need not be given if the evidence would not permit a rational
factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the lesser included offenses.
State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 134, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005).

Carter argues that a favorable view of the evidence might conclude that he did not enter
"the residence" or "the dwelling house," but merely made an attempt to do so, presumably
because he got only as far as the porch. His argument, particularly his use of the phrases
"residence" and "dwelling house," seems to be based upon either a prior version of the applicable
statute or an erroneous reading of the current version. K.S.A. 21-3716 provides, in pertinent part:

"Aggravated burglary is knowingly and without authority entering into or
remaining
within any building, manufactured home, mobile home, tent or other structure, or
any motor
vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, railroad car or other means of conveyance of persons or property in
which there is a human being, with intent to commit a felony, theft or sexual battery therein."
(Emphasis added.)

In contrast to the statute's use of the phrase "any building," Carter continues to argue on
appeal
that the porch was not part of the "residence." This is simply a misreading of the applicable
statute.

Prior to the 1969 enactment of K.S.A. 21-3716, see L. 1969, ch.180, sec. 21-3716, the
prior aggravated burglary statute required entry into "the dwelling house of another." The text of
K.S.A. 21-513 (Corrick) read:

"Every person who shall be convicted of breaking into and entering, in the
nighttime, the
dwelling house of another, in which there shall be at the time some human being, with
intent to
commit some felony, or any larceny therein, either–First, by forcibly bursting
or breaking the
wall, or any outer door, window or shutter of a window of such house, or the lock or
bolt of such
door, or the fastening of such window or shutter . . . or, third, by unlocking an outer
door, by
means of false keys, or by picking the lock thereof, shall be adjudged guilty of burglary in the
first
degree."

Although the term "dwelling" was retained in the statute defining simple burglary, K.S.A.
21-3715, the statute for aggravated burglary no longer employed the term, replacing it with "any
building." K.S.A. 21-3716. We conclude that the plain meaning of "any building" requires no
inquiry into the issue that plagued some historic burglary prosecutions, the extent to which
adjoining or connecting portions of a structure were part of "the dwelling house." See, e.g.,
State
v. Gatewood, 169 Kan. 679, Syl. ¶ 1, 221 P.2d 392 (1950); State v. Scott,
162 Kan. 571, 573-75,
178 P.2d 182 (1947).

Here, there is no doubt that the Alexander porch was part of "any building." Photos in the
record reveal that the porch was an integral part of the house itself, sharing a common
foundation, roof, gutter system, and siding. Accordingly, Carter's arguments that the porch was
"not used for dwelling purposes" because Alexander "did not keep anything of value on the
porch" and that it was "uninhabitable," unused, and "not very secure," are simply irrelevant given
the statutory language. Whether or not the porch was being used as part of Alexander's
domicile,
it is indisputably part of the building in which she was present. Carter was not
entitled to an
instruction on attempted aggravated burglary because the evidence viewed in most favorable to
him necessarily includes his entry onto the porch, and the porch was indisputably part of the
building.

Moreover, the evidence shows Carter was not only present on the porch, he also removed
the screen of the kitchen window and opened the screen door from the porch into the kitchen
door. Either of these acts has been held to constitute an entry for purposes of burglary. See
State
v. Crease, 230 Kan. 541, 542, 638 P.2d 939 (1982).

Under either analysis, the crime of aggravated burglary was completed, and an instruction
for attempted aggravated burglary was not supported by the evidence. The district court did not
err in refusing to instruct on attempted aggravated burglary.

Is Carter's Conviction of Criminal Damage to Property Supported by Sufficient
Evidence?

Carter next argues the State failed to prove an essential element of criminal damage to
property because it presented no evidence of the value of the damaged porch screen or door.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence, an appellate court's standard of review
is whether, after review of all of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
appellate court is convinced that a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Mays, 277 Kan. 359, 377, 85 P.3d 1208 (2004).

Carter argues that his conviction for misdemeanor criminal damage to property was not
supported by the evidence because although the State presented evidence of general damage to
the screen window and back door, it did not present evidence of the value of the
damage and
therefore failed to prove an essential element of the crime. The State replies that the value of the
damage need not be proven for misdemeanor criminal damage, as the damaged property can be
assumed to be worth something:

K.S.A. 21-3720 provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Criminal damage to property is by means other than by fire or explosive:

(1) Intentionally injuring, damaging, mutilating, defacing, destroying, or
substantially
impairing the use of any property in which another has an interest without the consent of such
other person.

. . . .

"(b)(1) Criminal damage to property is a severity level 7, nonperson felony if the
property is damaged to the extent of $25,000 or more.

(2) Criminal damage to property is a severity level 9, nonperson felony if the
property is
damaged to the extent of a least $500 but less than $25,000.

(3) Criminal damage to property is a class B nonperson misdemeanor if the
property
damaged is of the value of less than $500 or is of the value of $500 or more and is damaged to
the
extent of less than $500."

Our appellate courts have consistently held that in order to support a conviction for the
felony offense of criminal damage to property, there must be evidence of value. See,
e.g., State v.
Jones, 247 Kan. 537, 802 P.2d 533 (1990); State v. Smith, 215 Kan. 865, 528
P.2d 1195 (1974).
Moreover, in a felony criminal damage to property prosecution, the failure to address
the value
of property damaged or the extent of damage in the instructions to the jury and its verdict, the
defendant can be resentenced for the misdemeanor conviction. See Smith, 215 Kan.
at 868. The
logical implication of these cases–as well as the statutory language itself–is that
for a
misdemeanor conviction, value need not be proven.

K.S.A. 21-3720(b)(3) merely provides that "the property damaged is of the value of
less
than $500 or is of the value of $500 or more and is damaged to the extent of less
than $500."
(Emphasis added.) Although these monetary criteria distinguish the misdemeanor from the
felonies, they have little significance to a misdemeanor prosecution. We take judicial notice of
the arithmetic fact that a "value of less than $500" and damage "to the extent of less than $500"
includes the value of $0. Obviously, some injury, damage, mutilation, defacement, destruction, or
impaired usage to property must have occurred, but value is irrelevant in a misdemeanor
prosecution under K.S.A. 21-3720(b)(3).

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Carter's conviction of
misdemeanor criminal damage to property beyond a reasonable doubt.