United States v. Mayfield

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,v.HORACE MAYFIELD, LEONARDO STEEPLES[1], and NATHAN ANTONIO HOWARD, Defendants. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,v.HORACE MAYFIELD Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

J.
Clay Fuller, United States Magistrate Judge.

This
matter is before the undersigned on the following motions
filed in Criminal Action No. 2:16-CR-9: Defendant Horace
Mayfield's Motion To Suppress Physical Evidence Seized In
Unlawful Search (Doc. 121); Defendant Leonardo Steeple's
Motion To Suppress Physical Evidence Seized in Unlawful
Search (Doc. 141); Defendant Nathan Antonio Howard's
Motion To Suppress Physical Evidence Seized In Unlawful
Search (Doc. 152); Defendant Howard's Request For Leave
To File Out Of Time, His “Amended Motion To Suppress
Physical Evidence Seized In Unlawful Search” (Doc.
349); and Defendant Steeple's Request For Leave To File
Out Of Time, His “Supplemental Motion To His First
Motion To Suppress” (Doc. 350). Defendant Mayfield also
filed the same Motion To Suppress Physical Evidence Seized In
Unlawful Search in Criminal Action No. 2:16-CR-10 (Doc.
100).[2]

Background

In
Criminal No. 2:16-CR-9, Defendants Horace Mayfield, Nathan
Antonio Howard, Leonardo Steeple and others are charged in a
16-count Indictment with drug-related offenses, including
conspiracy. (Doc. 1, 2:16-CR-9). The 12-count Indictment
filed in 2:16-CR-10 similarly charges Defendants Mayfield and
others with drug-related offenses, including conspiracy.
(Doc. 1, 2:16-CR-10). Defendant Mayfield filed a motion to
suppress evidence seized from his residence at 714 Baskins
Circle, Winder, Georgia pursuant to a search warrant issued
on February 15, 2016 (Doc. 121; see also Doc. 100,
2:16-CR-9); Defendant Steeple filed a motion to suppress
evidence seized from his residence at 196 Tabitha Paige Lane,
Toccoa, Georgia and at a business, Chosewood Auto Sales
(“Chosewood Auto”) at 7124 Dicks Hill Parkway,
Mt. Airy, Georgia pursuant to search warrants issued on
February 12, 2016 (Doc. 141); and Defendant Howard filed a
motion to suppress evidence seized from his purported
residence at 1995 Carithers Way, Marietta, Georgia and at
Chosewood Auto Sales pursuant to search warrants issued on
Febuary 12, 2016 (Doc. 152). The Government filed a
consolidated response to Defendants' motions. (Doc. 330;
see also Doc. 269, 2:16-CR-10). Mayfield submitted a
reply (Doc. 345; see also Doc. 283, 2:16-CR-10), but
Defendants Howard and Steeple did not. Instead, they moved to
supplement their motions to assert additional grounds for
suppression (Docs. 349, 350). The Government objected to
their motions as untimely (Doc. 352), and Howard and Steeple
filed replies in support of their request to amend (Docs.
355, 356). The Court directed the Government to file a
response to Defendants' arguments made in their proposed
amended motions to suppress and indicated it would consider
the issue of the timeliness of Defendants' motions to
amend when it considered the merits of their motions to
suppress. (See Doc. 353). The Government has done so
(Doc. 359); Defendants did not reply to that response.
Briefing is complete, and the undersigned now considers the
merits of Defendants' motions.

Defendant
Mayfield moves to suppress evidence seized from his residence
at 714 Baskins Circle, Winder, Georgia on February 17, 2016
pursuant to a search warrant issued by a Barrow County
Superior Court Judge on February 15, 2016 (see Doc.
330-1) based on an affidavit submitted by GBI Special Agent
Clay Bridges (see Doc. 330-1 at 1-75). (Doc. 121;
see also Doc. 100, 2:16-CR-10). “Where a
search is conducted under the authority of a warrant, the
defendant challenging the search carries the burden of
showing the warrant to be invalid.” United States
v. Kilgore, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154148, at *14
(N.D.Ga. Sept. 13, 2012) (internal quotation omitted),
adopted by 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153867 (N.D.Ga.
Oct. 26, 2012). “It is not easy for a Defendant to meet
this burden, and a judicial preference is accorded searches
under a warrant.” United States v. Teague, No.
2:10-CR-006-RWS-SSC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142717, at *86
(N.D.Ga. Nov. 22, 2010) (internal quotation omitted),
adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42260 (N.D.Ga. Nov.
22, 2010).

“The
Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable cause,
a standard well short of absolute certainty.” L.A.
County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007). The task of
a magistrate judge, when issuing a warrant, “ ‘is
simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . .,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.' “
United States v. Miller, 24 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983)). The Miller court explained the role of
a court reviewing a search warrant:

Courts reviewing the legitimacy of search warrants should not
interpret supporting affidavits in a hypertechnical manner;
rather, a realistic and commonsense approach should be
employed so as to encourage recourse to the warrant process
and to promote the high level of deference traditionally
given to magistrate[ judges] in their probable cause
determinations.

Miller, 24 F.3d at 1361 (citing Gates, 462
U.S. at 236-37).

The
undersigned has considered Agent Bridges' affidavit (Doc.
330-1 at 1-75) with these principles, and Defendant
Mayfield's arguments about its deficiencies (see
Docs. 121, 345), in mind. It is not necessary to determine
whether the affidavit established the existence of probable
cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be found at
Defendant's residence, however, because the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule set out in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) applies in this
case. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 149 F.Appx.
954, 963 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished decision) (“We
need not determine whether probable cause existed, because
the good faith exception applies here.”); United
States v. Dos Santos, No. 1:05-CR-613-TWT, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55943, at *15 (N.D.Ga. June 21, 2006) (“The
good faith exception is applicable to this case; therefore,
this court need not reach the underlying issue of probable
cause.”), adopted by 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55944 (N.D.Ga. July 25, 2006).

The
exclusionary rule, which provides that evidence seized as the
result of a search violative of the Fourth Amendment may not
be used by the Government in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, is “ ‘a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect.' ” Martin,
297 F.3d at 1312 (quoting United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). In Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), the Supreme Court addressed
the limited role of the exclusionary rule:

The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation
occurredâi.e., that a search or arrest was
unreasonableâdoes not necessarily mean that the exclusionary
rule applies. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223[]
(1983). Indeed, exclusion “has always been our last
resort, not our first impulse, ” Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591[] (2006), and our precedents
establish important principles that constrain application of
the exclusionary rule.

Id. at 140. The Court explained that “[t]o
trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth
the price paid by the justice system.” Id. at
144. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is “to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in
some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”
Id.

In
Leon, the Supreme Court modified the exclusionary
rule to allow prosecutors to use evidence “obtained by
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately
found to be unsupported by probable cause.” 468 U.S. at
900. In Martin, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals explained what has become known as the Leon
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule:

[Leon] stands for the principle that courts
generally should not render inadmissible evidence obtained by
police officers acting in reasonable reliance upon a search
warrant that is ultimately found to be unsupported by
probable cause. The Leon good faith exception
applies in all but four limited sets of circumstances.
Id. at 923. The four sets of circumstances are as
follows: (1) where “the magistrate or judge in issuing
a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the
affiant knew was false or would have known was false except
for his reckless disregard of the truth”; (2)
“where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his
judicial role in the manner condemned in” Lo-Ji
Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319[] (1979); (3)
where the affidavit supporting the warrant is “so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4)
where, depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case, a warrant is “so facially deficient B i.e., in
failing to particularize the place to be searched or the
things to be seized B that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Martin, 297 F.3d at 1313 (original formatting
altered).

The
first, second and fourth circumstances are not present
here-Mayfield has not shown that Agent Bridges misled the
issuing judge; there is no evidence that the issuing judge
abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant; and the
warrant sufficiently describes the person, premises, and
property to be searched, and the things to be seized
(see Doc. 330-1 at 76-80). Rather, Defendant's
arguments in support of suppression implicate the third
circumstance described in Leon-that the affidavit
was so lacking in indicia of probable cause to believe that
evidence of a crime would be found at Mayfield's
residence that official belief in its existence was
unreasonable.

Here,
Agent Bridges' affidavit states the following: In July
2015 two confidential informants (CI) told agents that they
had been purchasing methamphetamine from Mayfield for three
to four months at multiple locations. (Doc. 330-1 at 10-17).
On July 13, 2015, agents recorded conversations between one
of the CIs and Mayfield discussing drug trafficking and how
Mayfield “orchestrates” his trips to Atlanta to
resupply, i.e., he uses two vehicles, on in which he is
traveling and the other in which the methamphetamine is
placed so that if he is pulled over, “he's clean
and the first car[] keeps going.” (Id. at 10).
During the agents' surveillance of Mayfield, they
observed him using counter surveillance measures, such as
taking erratic turns when driving to multiple locations,
consistent with counter surveillance measures taken by drug
traffickers before and after drug transactions, and they also
observed him traveling with two cars, consistent with the
manner he described when transporting narcotics.
(Id. at 10, 13-15, 17-18, 25). On January 7, 2016
“CRS #1”[3] provided information that Mayfield had one
kilogram of cocaine at his Baskins Circle residence that
“he was preparing for distribution by breaking it down
into smaller quantities.” (Id. at 19). CRS #1
indicated that Mayfield lived at 714 Baskins Circle in Barrow
County and “used this location as a base of operations
for his multi county and multi state drug trafficking
business.” (Id. at 62). Agents, who had
conducted surveillance of Mayfield for 60 days,
“confirmed that he begins most days and ends most days
at this location, ” and his vehicles were parked at
that location when not in use. (Id.).

On
January 16, 2016 CRS #1 informed agents that Mayfield planned
to pick up money from a subject, later identified to be Mario
Stowers, in South Carolina, and agents observed Mayfield and
Audreona Scott at Stowers' residence in South Carolina.
(Id. at 29). An Oconee County, South Carolina
Sheriff's Investigator informed agents that Stowers was a
target of a methamphetamine and cocaine trafficking
investigation. (Id.). Following Mayfield's visit
to Stowers, CRS #1 informed agents that Mayfield had placed
an order for “cream, ” which “is street
lingo for methamphetamine.” (Id. at 30). CRS
#1 also provided information that Mayfield intended to travel
to a Target shopping center in Atlanta. (Id.). At
approximately 2:30 p.m., Agent Howard observed Mayfield and
Scott arrive at that location in a black BMW, and he saw
another gray BMW arrive, driven by a person later identified
as Gus Melendez. (Id.). Melendez exited his vehicle
with a backpack, got into the back of Mayfield's and
Scott's vehicle, and then exited the vehicle without the
backpack. (Id.).

Later
that day, at 7:23 p.m. CRS #1 provided information that
Mayfield was arranging to meet someone to deliver
“three, ” possibly meaning three ounces of
methamphetamine. (Id. at 31). At 7:38, Mayfield and
Scott left Baskins Circle and met a Mercedes in a parking lot
in South Carolina before traveling to the area of
Stowers' residence in South Carolina. (Id. at
31-32). CRS #1 provided information that Mayfield was on his
way to visit Stephens Ivester to deliver “something,
” and Agent Howard observed Mayfield arrive at an
address in Stephens County, Georgia, and CRS #1 provided
information that Mayfield was leaving “two and a
half” at Ivester's residence. (Id. at 32).
On January 20, 2016, Mayfield and Scott left Baskins Circle
and parked in a parking lot at a truck stop in South Carolina
next to the same Mercedes seen on January 16, 2016 at the
same location. (Id. at 36). Mayfield exited the
Mercedes carrying a black backpack. (Id.). The
affidavit describes additional surveillance observations as
well as information obtained from CRS #1 that indicates that
Mayfield continued to engage in drug trafficking activity
through the rest of January and into February 2016. (See
generally Id. at 34-60).

The
undersigned finds that the information set forth in Agent
Bridges' affidavit shows that it was not so
“lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable.” Martin, 297 F.3d at 1313. The
warrant sufficiently alleges facts that support a finding of
probable cause to believe that Mayfield was engaged in drug
trafficking from before July 2015 until February 2016 and
that evidence of that crime would be found in his residence
at the Baskins Circle address. See, e.g., United
States v. Cunningham, 633 Fed.Appx. 920, 922 (11th Cir.
2015) (finding that warrant was supported by probable cause
where affidavit described evidence that the defendant was
engaged in drug trafficking and “law enforcement
officials attested that, based on their significant
experience with drug investigations, drug traffickers often
store evidence of their crimes in their homes”).

Mayfield
contends, however, that the search warrant does not establish
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be
found at the Baskins Circle address. (Docs. 121, 345). First,
he challenges the veracity of CRS #1 as to the information
provided by CRS #1 that Mayfield possessed a kilogram of
cocaine at the Baskins Circle residence: “The informant
may have simply heard a rumor about his ‘kilogram of
cocaine' from a totally reliable source. The informant
may have assumed that Mayfield kept cocaine at home, or he
may have been trying to impress the agents with a factually
unsupported fabrication.” (Doc. 121 at 5-6). “In
general, ‘[i]f an informant is mentioned in an
affidavit [underlying a search warrant], the affidavit must
also demonstrate the informant's ‘veracity' and
‘basis of knowledge.' ” Martin, 297
F.3d at 1314. “However, when there is sufficient
independent corroboration of an informant's information,
there is no need to establish the veracity of the
informant.” Id. Here, the affidavit stated the
following about CRS #1:

CRS #1 has been proven to be reliable and truthful in ITS
dealings with Agent BRIDGES. In the last 14 days, CRS #1 has
provided information, to AGENTS, which lead to the arrest of
two people for trafficking cocaine and the seizure of more
than 900 grams of suspected cocaine. Over the course of the
last 5 weeks, CRS #1 has provided detailed information, to
law enforcement, including identifications of participants
in[, and locations, and times for] methamphetamine, marijuana
and cocaine transactions, and amount of methamphetamine,
marijuana and cocaine involved in the transactions. All of
this was corroborated by extensive law enforcement
surveillance outlined above. CRS #1 has provided no
information that was later found to be untrue. CRS #1 has
been recognized[] by Stephens County Chief of Superior Court
Judge RUSSELL W. SMITH, as a confidential, reliable source.

(Id. at 74). Thus, the affidavit sets forth facts
demonstrating CRS #1&#39;s reliability and veracity. Even if
the affidavit insufficiently demonstrates CRS #1&#39;s
&ldquo;basis of knowledge&rdquo; as to the presence of
cocaine in Mayfield&#39;s residence, sufficient indicia of
probable cause existed to believe that evidence of drug
trafficking would be found there in light of the extensive
surveillance and information provided by CRS #1 which shows
that while engaged in drug trafficking activity described in
the affidavit, Mayfield was living at that residence, and he
parked his vehicles used in drug trafficking at that address.
See, e.g., United States v. Meryl, 322
Fed.Appx. 871, 874 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished decision)
(noting the district court&#39;s &ldquo;common-sense finding
that &lsquo;drug dealers are likely to keep evidence of their
drug business at home&#39; &rdquo; in finding that probable
cause supported the issuance of the warrant); United
States v. Villa[n]ueva Pineda, No,
1:11-CR-00006-CAP-JFK, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98692, at ...

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