Tuesday, June 10, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Putin Won’t Make Any Further Concessions on Ukraine, Two Moscow Experts Say

Paul
Goble

Staunton, June10 – Over the last
several days, many in the West have professed to see Moscow pulling back from
its subversive aggression against Ukraine and expressed confidence that the
crisis Vladimir Putin’s actions there have caused is approaching an end that
both Russia and the West will be able to live with, however angry Ukrainians
may be.

But two Moscow analysts, Vitaly
Leybin and Valery Fadeyev, argue in “Ekspert” that Russia’s “political
leadership has taken the maximum possible number of steps to meet its Western
partners concerning the situation in Ukraine.” Instead, they say, “the struggle
for Ukraine is moving toward a decisive stage” (expert.ru/expert/2014/24/myi-ih-ne-brosim/).

They
suggest that Putin’s next actions in support of the “Russian world” in the
south east of Ukraine may take different but no less consequential forms as far
as the future of Donetsk, Luhansk, the Donbass more generally, and Ukraine are
concerned, even if and indeed because they may attract less attention and
opposition from the West.

That conclusion
rests in part on the evolving conditions on the ground, the two analysts
say.The pro-Russian forces and those
who backed them had expected Moscow to support them in the way it did their
counterparts in Crimea, but that has not happened and Kyiv forces have
inflicted real losses on them.

At the moment, those identified as
pro-Russian still are, but “the situation could change” and do so quickly
because many of them see the concessions Moscow has made in response to Western
demands as”the betrayal of ‘the Russian world.’”And others elsewhere who are watching this
are drawing similar conclusions.

But in thinking about the future,
one needs to understand what the real limiting factors are on all the actors
involved.Ukraine, they say, “even if it
is preserved as a single country (without Crimea) will ll the same never be
what it was. A return to the times before the Maidanis impossible.”

Moreover, the two Moscow analysts
continue, “the Donbass already will never be part of Ukraine if the latter
tries to stand on the foundations of unitarism and an ethno-national ideology.The Donetsk and Luhansk peoples republics in
a definite sense are already a part of Russia” and important players in the
struggle for “the Russian world” that Moscow cannot avoid pursuing.

In reality, Levybin and Fadeyev say,
“the rapid unification of the Donetska and Luhansk republics with Russia as
happened with Crimea is impossible for a variety of reasons,” including the
ethnic composition of the population, its attitudes toward Moscow and Kyiv, and
the absence of a major Russian military base as in Sevastopol.

Blocking NATO from expanding into
Crimea as part of Ukraine was and remains far more strategically important,
they say. “One must not lose Sevastopol, [and] this in fact has been recognized
by the West.”There is no equivalent in
Donetsk or Luhansk.

Moreover, the annexation of Donetsk
and Luhansk “could lead to an uncontrolled escalation of tensions between
Russia and the West,” a development that would entail “risks – political,
economic and military” for both the international system as a whole and for
Russia in particular.

A civil war of the kind now raging
could have been avoided, the two analysts argue, if Kyiv had met the relatively
limited demands of the people of the south east for elected governors, greater
autonomy, fiscal federalism, and the provision of official status for the
Russian language.But that is something
Kyiv would not and will not do.

After the events in Odessa, they
continue, the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk were radicalized and voted for
independence. In response, the two Russian analysts say, “Kyiv began its punitive
operation against the citizens of its own country.”

Kyiv’s leaders do not understand
even yet that “a unitary Ukrainian state in its former border is impossible.” There
are only four possible outcomes: the military victory of the regional groups
and the creation of an independent state of Novorossiya, the victory of these
groups and the inclusion of the two republics in Russia, the forcible suppression
by Kyiv of the regions, or the restoration of relations between Donetsk and
Luhansk with Kyiv.

“It is important to note,” they say,
that in none of these caseswll Ukraine be able to return to the status quo ante.”

Could the two oblasts remain in
Ukraine? they ask.That would require
that Kyiv agree toend military operations, negotiate with the activists from
the two places, and seek a compromise resolution, something Kyiv is unwilling
to do because that would change the nature of the Ukrainian state.

In principle, such an outcome would
not be impossible nor would it be inconsistent with what the Russian Federaton
has done in the past.Moscow, they point
out, “has its own experience of complex federtiv relations of the center with
the regions,” as with Chechnya, which has, as is quite obvious, “relations
which are not the same as those with Tambov oblast.”

If the Ukrainian military defeats what
it sees as the secessionists, something it can do only with outside assistance,
the consequences would be dire in the case of the two oblasts but also for
Ukraine as a whole and mean it could exist as “a mono-cultural and
mono-national state” only by repression might quickly break down.

The possibility of a complete
victory by the irregular forces supporting the self-proclaimed regimes in
Donetsk and Luhansk is also improbable unless they receive massive outside
assistance. “the most probable outcome of military actions” is thus not the
victory of one side or the other but “a continuation of local clashes.”

According to Leybin and Fadyever, a
Novorossiya would have a much greater chance “to cquire real independence” than
have Abkhazia or Transdniestria. It would have a vastly larger population, 6.6
million as opposed to the 240,000 of Abkhazia or the 513,000 people in Transdniestria,
it has a larger industrial base, and it has more direct access to Russia.

Moscow can and Putin should and
probably will help, they say.“The
official introduction of regular [Russian] foces is now impossible.” It would
cause a self-inflicted wound on Russia and would “nnot help the residents of
the Donbass because it would lead to the escalation of the conflict.”

More limited military intervention,
however, remains possible, especially regarding the provision of airpower and
heavy artillery.If Moscow provides
these, then there will be no chance for Kyiv to have any “illusions that a
military victory” by Ukrainian forces will ever be possible.

But equally important Moscow can
provide humanitarian and economic assistance, something that “in contemporary
wars” is especially importance because no side can win “without the support of the
population, and the support of the population [for pro-Russian forces] must be
guaranteed.”

Not
surprisingly, the leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk are focused on military
issues, but they need to do a great deal more to shore up their position with the
civilian population, and Moscow can help them.The possibilities in this regard are large, and not all of them are
financially onerous or likely to spark antagonism in the West.

Among these are giving medical help
to those who have been hurt by Ukrainian attacks, eliminating quotas on
university enrollment in Russia for Donetsk and Luhansk students, providing
assistance for those who wish to resettle in Russia, and sending specialists
and investment to help build up the economies of these hard-pressed regions.

Moreover, Russia needs to be ready to help Donetsk
and Luhansk deal with a step Kyiv has not yet taken but could. The banks in
these two oblasts are branches of Ukrainian banks and Kyiv could tie up the
economy of both by restricting the flow of cash.Moscow needs to open Russian banks there and
consider the introduction of Moscow-backed national currencies.

Such actions would go a long way to
ensure that “the Russian world” would be defended and that Putin would have a
kind of victory, and they would do so in ways that neither Kyiv nor the West is
likely to be able to mobilize in response.As a result, the two analysts say, these are Putin’s likely next steps
and why he won’t make any more concessions on Ukraine.