(23) To strengthen the solidarity between Member States in the case of a Community Emergency and in particular to support Member States which are exposed to less favourable geographical, geopolitical or geological conditions, Member States should devise specific measures to exercise solidarity, including measures such as commercial agreements between natural gas undertakings, compensation mechanisms, the building of technical junctions, increased gas exports or increased releases from storages. Solidarity measures may be particularly appropriate between Member States for which the Commission recommends the establishment of joint preventive actions plans or emergency plans at regional level.

(30) Since gas supplies from third countries are central to the security of gas supply of the Community, the Commission should coordinate the actions with regard to third countries, working with producer and transit countries on arrangements to handle crisis situations and to ensure a stable gas flow to the Community. The Commission should be entitled to deploy a task force to monitor gas flows in crisis situations within and, in consultation with the third countries involved, outside the Community and, where a crisis arises due to difficulties in a third country, to assume a mediation and facilitation role. The Community should find the means to allow the purchase of gas according the changing needs (if diminished) of Member States.

Ga. whereas already expressed or eventual claim of certain states to sovereignty on Arctic Ocean spaces, including those of bottom, water or ice, may cause problems or even the conflicts between them, when the new period of quasi colonial redistribution of Polar parts of the globe is to be prevented by efforts of many powers, including the EU,

16. Believes, that the impression given by some observers of a so-called scrambleabout a competition of sovereignties for the Arctic, often symboliwhich was caused by the planting of a Russian flag on the sea floorbed at the North Pole, does not contribute to fostering a constructive understanding and cooperation in the region; stresses that the Arctic States have on should not involve themselveral ocs into disputes about applicastions declared their commitment to resolve possible conflicts of interests according to the principles of international law of international law principles, particularly while trying to resolve possible conflicts of interests by using accomplished facts and declaring that national interests will be defended by all means;

B. whereas as a result of the August 2008 war in Georgia, of the EU’s successful intervention to achieve a Ceasefire Agreement and of the great need for further engagement that followed from these developmentsat step, the EU became a significant security actor in the region, through the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission, the launch of a major post-war assistance programme and the start of a fact-finding mission on the causes and course of the war,

1. Considers that the EU needs to play a moren increasingly active political role and develop a strategy to assist the transformation of the South Caucasus into a region of sustainable peace, stability and prosperity and to use fully its potential to contribute to the peaceful solution of the conflicts in the region by combining its soft power with a firm approach;

3. Notes that conflict management and conflict resolution necessitate inter alia the recognition of the rights and legitimate interests of all relevant parties and communities, openness to review perceptions of past events, serious willingness to overcome hatred and fear, preparedness to give up maximalist ambitions, interest in innovative approaches, including to the exercise ofmaking sovereignty choices, and readiness to makdebate real concessions;

4. Points to the importance of conflict prevention, including through respect for the rights of all national minorities and internally displaced groups, religious tolerance and efforts to strengthen social and economic cohesion;

5. Stresses the responsibility of external actors to use their power and influence in ways that are fully consistent with international law, including human rights law; believes that reduction of the competition between external actors in the region should be pursued, but cannot come at the price of effectivelyvia accepting any actor’s claim to have ‘privileged interests’; is of the opinion that introducing conditions for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the South Caucasus states is unacceptable;

6. Fully supports the Minsk Group Co- chairs’ mediation, the Madrid Principles and the Moscow Declaration; condemns the idea of a military solution and calls on both sides to avoid militant rhetoric; furthermore calls on both sides to show more ambition in the bilateral peace talks and to abandon the tendency to prefer perpetuating the status quo created through military conquests in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions; calls on the international community likewise to show courage and political will to overcome the remaining sticking points which hinder an agreement;

8. Notes that interim status for Nagorno- Karabakh could imply interim legitimisation of the de facto authorities there; believes that inter alia in order to raise their credibility with a view to such a prospect, these authorities should rapidly abandon the positions that Nagorno- Karabakh includes all Armenian-occupied Azerbaijani lands and that displaced persons’ right of return cannot even be discussed at the present stage; calls on the Government of Armenia to exercise its influence in this respect and to begin the good-will return from additionally controlled territories, and on the Council and Commission to join this call;

10. Welcomes the protocols on the establishment of diplomatic relations, border opening and cooperation; calls on both sides to seize this opportunity to mend their relations through ratification and implementation; does not support the introduction of conditions for ratification not mentioned in the protocols, but notes that if implemented, they will have wide- ranging, potentially overall very positive consequences in the region and that they can therefore not be seen in isolation; calls on Armenia, as well as Azerbaijan, to intensify their efforts in the Minsk Co- chairs-led and other talks on the principles for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;

11. Welcomes the Tagliavini Report and supports its main conclusions including those on ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; supports the EU Monitoring Mission mandate and its implementation of the part which is not blocked by Russia and the de facto authorities of the breakaway regions; the mandate remains valid and for full scale implementation;

12. Is seriously concerned about the continued use of ethnic cleansing as a preluden element to the Russian recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian statehood; notes with satisfaction that the international community remains united in its rejection of the unilateral declaration of tricky independence of the regions under foreign control; calls on Russia to honour its commitment in the Ceasefire Agreement to withdraw its troops to the positions held before the outbreak of the August 2008 war and to cease its blocking of EUMM access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia;

17. Underscores the importance of free and fair elections to be held in accordance with international commitments and standards; notes that the last presidential elections held in Armenia in February 2008 were once again violent and that repercussions of the internal crisis in their aftermath are still being felt; takes note of the municipal elections held in a peaceful manner in Azerbaijan on 23 December 2009 and awaits the report of the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities observation delegation thereon; calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure that the local elections scheduled for 30 May 2010 take place in accordance with international standards and that the electoral law is amended accordingly, and reaffirms that securing direct election of mayors is crucial; confirms its and the EU’s position that elections and referenda in breakaway regions under foreign control are illegitimate; defends the political rights of displaced persons;

21. Holds the view that broader cooperation on a regional level and with the EU in sectors such as the economy, transport, energy and environment is essential for the optimal development of the sectors themselves and for ensuring stability in the region, but that cooperation should also embrace the building of human capital in the whole region as a long-term investment; welcomes the fact that all three countries benefit from the EU’s GSP and takes note that all of them qualify for the GSP+ for sustainable development and good governance; notes that regional cooperation in the judicial and police fields and the establishment of integrated border management are essential for further promoting mobility in the region and with the EU; welcomes Georgia for its leading position in fighting corruption and improving the state governance;

22. Underscores the importance of building a favourable business climate and the development of the private sector; commends Azerbaijan on its noteworthy economic growth and the reform process, which makes the economy more attractive to foreign investors, and hopes that Azerbaijan will continue and eventually complete its negotiations on accession to the WTO; is of the opinion that Azerbaijan should be involved more actively in the Nabucco project; welcomes the progress in implementing market-economy reforms aiming at liberalisation of the market in Armenia and Georgia; notes however that the economic development of Armenia and Georgia has been affected by the general economic crisis and welcomes the decision at the end of 2009 to provide macrofinancial assistance to the two countries;

31. Takes note of the current EU involvement in conflict resolution processes in the region and believes that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty justifies a more prominent role for the EU; welcomes the work of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and calls for increased EU action to persuade Russia and the relevant de facto authorities to stop blocking the EUMM from enteringacting in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; calls Russia to use its presence for stopping of South- Ossetian snipers' provocations at the demarcation line with rest of Georgia; considers that the EU now has the opportunity to play a greater role in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and could do so by participating in the negotiations also through the establishment of an EU mandate for the French Co-chair of the Minsk Group, by standing ready to launch reconstruction aid programmes and by supporting civil-society projects that aim to promote reconciliation and contacts between individuals in the region;

32. Calls on the High Representative for the Union’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to follow closely the developments in the region and to be actively involved in the conflict resolution processes; acknowledges the work of the Special Representative for the South Caucasus and expresses the firm hope that the High Representative will ensure its continuity and consistency; encourages the Council to consider the possible use of tools from the CSDP to step up its participation in the peace-building and conflict-management processes;

40. Reiterates the significance of people- to-people contacts and mobility programmes, especially aimed at youth; calls on the Council and Commission to make progress towards visa facilitation with the three countries and; welcomes the initialling of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Georgia, deploring the fact that it could not be finalized in 2010;

1. Is convinced that the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the accompanying action plans proposed by the Commission will be more successful only if constructive cooperation takes place with external partners in the region;

2. Notes that the Northern Dimension framework should provide the main fundamentan additional basis for the external aspects of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region; underlines, in this context, the importance of close cooperation with Norway, Belarus and in particular Russia, the only non-EU country with direct access to the Baltic Sea; specifically notes the status of the Kaliningrad Oblast enclave, which is surrounded by EU Member States;

- in her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission for fulfilling within the Commission the responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the services of the Commission.

4. The High Representative shall designate from among EEAS staff members the chairpersons of Council preparatory bodies that are chaired by a representative of the High Representative, including the chair of the Political and Security Committee, whose candidacy is consulted within the Commission.

2. Each Union delegation shall be led by a Head of Delegation. The Head of Delegation shall have authority over all staff in the delegation, whatever their status, and for all its activities. He/she should assure a broad representation of the national variety of the Union inside of the staff. He/she shall be accountable to the High Representative for the overall management of the work of the delegation and for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the Union. Staff in delegations shall comprise EEAS staff and, where this is appropriate for the implementation of the Union budget and Union policies other than those under the remit of the EEAS, Commission staff.

6. All appoinRecruitments in the EEAS shall be based on merit and on the broadest possible geographical basiswhilst ensuring adequate geographical and gender balance. The staff of the EEAS shall comprise a meaningfuln adequate presence of nationals from all the Member States. Concrete measures analogous to the Council regulation 401/2004 should be taken to ensure adequate geographical representativity in all grades within the EEAS, both in Headquarters and in Delegations. These measures should apply to nationals from under-represented Member States.

6. All appointments in the EEAS shall be based on merit and on the broadest possible geographical basis. The staff of the EEAS shall comprise a meaningfulbalanced presence of nationals from all the Member States. Concrete measures analogous to the Council regulation 401/2004 should be taken to ensure adequate geographical representation in all grades within the EEAS, both in Headquarters and in Delegations.

3. The Council, acting on a proposal from the High Representative, shall review this Decision in the light of experience as soon as possible but no later than the beginning of 2014, in accordance with Article 27 of the TEU.

A. whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter referred to as Iran), being one of the most alarming regimes among the world's non-democracies, is facing an array of governance challenges - from power struggles between competing factions within the country’s ruling elites to a crippling social and economic malaise, a problematic regional security environment and rising popular discontent at home - many of which are products of the Iranian regime’s own making,

G. whereas there has been a remarkable deepening of relations between Iran andtoday's non-democratic Iran and democratic Turkey, and whereas Iran is using its state and non-state allies Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, to destabilise the region,

1. Stresses that popular discontent and disenchantment with the Iranian government as a result of the grave socio- economic situation combined with an absence of liberty and basic respect for human dignity within Iran represent the main challenge to the regime’sprovision whereby such a regime cannot survivale;

2. Points out that although President Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 on a platform of social justice and economic populism, Iran’s domestic problems have continued to deteriorate despite burgeoning oil prices; deplores, therefore, Ahmadinejad’s aim of shoring up his political position at home by embracing a radical international agenda with the expectation that a stridently anti-Western, anti-Israel stance will enhance Iran’s leadership position in the Middle East Muslim world;

20. Rejects fiercely the desire expressed by the Iranian leadership to "wipe out" Israel; also fiercely rejects the anti-Semitic rhetoric of the Iranian president, especially his denial of the Holocaust and his underlying agenda of delegitimizing the Israeli state build along with decision of UN; consequently, urges Iran to stay within UN; calls on the EU institutions to safeguard the existence of the Jewish state;

22. Expresses its concerns on the remarkable deepening of relations between today's Iran and EU accession candidate Turkey; asks the Council and the Commission to discuss the Turkish attitude towards Iran with their counterparts in Ankara; calls on the Turkish authorities to follow the European approach towards the Iranian nuclear threat; calls on the EU institutions to do their utmost to sever the lines between Teheran and Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas;

22a. Issues the strongest warning on Iran's interference in Iraq's policies including attacks, when sometimes IRGC do participate, against Ashraf Camp of Iranian refugees, security to whom should be guaranteed;

23. Calls on the Council and the Commission to closely attune their policies towards Iran with Washington before this cooperation is ultimately challenged by Iran's eventual attack on Israel or vice versa; disunity in Iranian policies already now can become detrimental;

8. Regards inclusiveness and regional ownership as important principles of the EU approach towards the region and sees Turkey and Russia as crucialwished partners in Black Sea regional cooperation, which should be appropriately engaged; believes that the dual role of Bulgaria, Romania and Greece as both littoral States and EU Member States is essential to the success of EU policy in the Black Sea area;

12. Believes that the EU can and should play a bigger role in shaping the Black Sea security environment; calls for an enhanced EU involvement in the regional strategic dialogue, and cooperation with its strategic partners on security issues, as well as in conflict prevention and resolution; believes that the EU, if taking more coherent position, would be able to prevent militant aggressions in the region; calls for cross-border crime and trafficking to be tackled in the Black Sea Strategy, as well as for a further strengthening of cooperation on border and movement management;

14. Believes that a security strategy for the Black Sea region should also incorporate the objectives of improving governance, democratic rule and state capabilities; calls on the Commission to mainstream initiatives on institution-building and democratic governance which are indispensible for any state wishing to develop successfully;

17. Recalls the EU's aim of diversifying routes and sources of supply, therefore encourages more direct cooperation without mediator with Black Sea region states in energy sector; reiterates the importance of the Nabucco project and of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) transportation to Europe, in the form of the AGRI project and the development of LNG terminals in Black Sea ports; recalls the need for a common normative framework for promoting a transparent, competitive and rules-based gas market;

8. Regrets the lack of focus in the Commission Communication and Council Conclusions on the CBRN Action Plan on adequately protecting public transport networks and the health of their users, given the many terrorist attacks on transport in recent years and the generally increased risk of CBRN incidents occurring during transport of CBRN materials; calls on the Member States to guarantee pre-exposure protection of first responders to CBRN incidents and post-exposure treatment of victims, in particular against biological pathogens;

11. Calls on the Member States, when drafting requested to have evacuation plans infor a case of a CBRN incident, and while drafting them, to give special attention to the needs of the elderly, children, people under medical care and other such specific groups;

2010/2124(INI) Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2009, presented to the European Parliament in application of Part II, Section G, paragraph 43 of the Inter-institutional Agreement of 17 May 2006

29a. Calls on the VP/HR to intensify talks with Russia to assure the unconditional fulfilment of all the provisions of the agreement of 2008 between Russia, the European Union and Georgia; takes the view Russia that should, in particular, guarantee full unlimited access of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Abkhazia and South Ossetia; underlines the necessity to provide stability in aforementioned Georgian regions;

E. whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of minors and of persons belonging to minorities,

21. Welcomes the work of the UNHRC and stresses its crucial role within the overall UN architecture and its potential to develop a valuable framework for the European Union’s multilateral human rights efforts; notes that this new body has to keep workingwork ever better in order to gain more credibility;

28. Notes that, as the Annual Report points out, EU Member States are in a minority in the UNHRC; calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to take concerted action in developing appropriate alliances with those countries and non-state actors that are continuing to defend the universal and indivisible nature of human rights questioned by certain non-democracies;

36. Reiterates that the EU is opposed to the death penalty in all circumstances including extra-judicial executions; recalls that the EU is the lead donor to civil society organisations which fight against the death penalty; asks the Commission to continue to give priority to the fight against this cruel and inhuman punishment and to keep it as a thematic priority under the EIDHR;

49. Calls urgently for additional EU measures against child labour especially that similar to slavery and calls for the EU to apply more efficiently the instruments at its disposal by incorporating them in human rights dialogues and consultations; calls for the EU to implement effectively the EU Guidelines on the Rights of the Child and to study the possibility of adopting guidelines on combating child labour; recognises the supportive role of EU trade policy in the fight against child labour, notably through the use of GSP+ incentives;

51. Expresses deep concern about children involved in or otherwise affected by armed conflicts; urges the Commission and the Council to strengthen the implementation of the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflicts; welcomes the new UNSC resolution 1882 (2009), which further strengthens the protection of children involved in, and affected by, armed conflict;

55. Acknowledges conclusions in many human rights reports that human rights defenders have been suffering from increasingly strong attacks in various forms, such as attacks on freedom of expression or association, assault on, and murder of, relevant persons, arbitrary arrests, unfair trials and closure of the offices of civil society organisations;

59. Emphasises the importance of human rights clauses together with democracy clauses, in trade policies, partnerships and trade agreements between the EU and third countries; proposes a ‘human rights assessment’ of non-EU countries that engage in trade relations with the EU;

68. Remains deeply concerned that discrimination based on religion or belief still exists in all regions of the world, and that persons belonging to particular religious communities, including religious minorities, continue to be denied their human rights in many countries; condemns the Chinese authorities for the persecution of individuals who practise their religion outside officially sanctioned channels, including Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and Falun Gong practitioners; consistently and permanently urges the Chinese authorities to refrain from their oppressive policy in Tibet, which might eventually lead to the annihilation of the Tibetan religion and culture;

72. Supports the right of expression and peaceful assembly in Russia as formally but not in life guaranteed by Article 31 of the Russian Constitution; expresses solidarity with the organisers and participants of Strategy-31, the series of civic protests in support of this right which started on 31 July 2009 and take place on Triumfalnaya Square in Moscow on the 31st of every month with 31 days; regrets that so far all of Strategy-31 demonstrations have been refused permission by the authorities on the grounds that other activities had been scheduled to take place in Triumfalnaya Square at the same time; is deeply concerned that on 31 December 2009, among dozens of other peaceful protesters, Russian police detained the Chairperson of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Lyudmila Alexeyeva, who had been awarded Parliament’s Sakharov Prize only a few weeks before her detention;

73. Notes that measures to fight terrorism have resulted in violations of basic human rights in a number of countries around the world, in the form of the application of excessive surveillance measures, illegal detentions and the use of torture as a means of extracting information from suspected terrorists; condemns these violations of human rights and is convinced that civil liberties should not be compromised in the fight against terrorism, as the disruption of normal democratic life in Western societies is precisely what the terrorists are seeking, while in Russia even terminology as "terrorist" or "extremist" goes applied with heavy consequences to opponents of a regime too much arbitrarily;

80. Welcomes the establishment of human rights dialogues with each of the Central Asian states – Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan – in 2008; welcomes the first EU-Uzbek civil society seminar on human rights dialogue in October 2008; regrets that the EU-China human rights dialogues have consistently failed to deliver any improvements as regards specific human rights abuses in China; expresses its disappointment that EU-Russia human rights consultations after they replaced usual dialogue, have not yielded any substantial results, if any; welcomes the launch in 2009 of human rights dialogues with Indonesia, and the holding of the first dialogue meetings with Georgia and Armenia;

83. Recognises that economic, social and cultural rights should be given equal importance to civil and political rights together with a right to live in democracy, to enjoy the access to fair trial, bearing in mind the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and inter-relatedness of all human rights, as confirmed by the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna; urges countries around the world to sign up to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR), which was opened for signature on 24 September 2009;

3. Recalls that strategic autonomy in security affairs entails, for the EU, the capacity to agree common political objectives and strategic guidelines, to establish strategic partnerships with a wide range of international organisations and trustful states, to collect adequate information and generate joint analyses and assessments, to harness and where necessary pool financial, military, and civilian resources, to plan and run effective crisis management operations across the entire range of the Petersberg tasks, and to frame and implement a common defence policy, laying the first tangible foundations on which to build common defence;

3. Recalls that strategic autonomyinterest in security affairs entails, for the EU, the capacity to agree common political objectives and strategic guidelines, to establish strategic partnerships with a wide range of international organisations and trustful states, to collect adequate information and generate joint analyses and assessments, to harness and where necessary pool financial, military, and civilian resources, to plan and run effective crisis management operations across the entire range of the Petersberg tasks, and to frame and implement a common defence policy, laying the first tangible foundations on which to build common defence;

4. Emphasises that the new common security and defence policy (CSDP) introduced by the Lisbon Treaty provides a firm political statement of the Union's intention to build up and act as a force for stability in the world and provides a clear legal framework for reinforcing its capacities in pursuing its foreign and security policy through a comprehensive approach drawing upon all the instruments available to the EU and its Member States, to prevent and manage crises and conflicts, and to buildin a name of lasting peace;

(2) The Kaliningrad oblast has an exceptional geographic situation: as a relatively small area completely surrounded byonland by lands of two Member States, it constitutes the only enclave in the EU; its shape and the distribution of its population are such that applying the standard rules on the definition of the border area would artificially divide the enclave, whereby some inhabitants would enjoy facilitations for local border traffic while the majority, including the inhabitants of the city of Kaliningrad, would not. In light of the homogeneous nature of the Kaliningrad oblast, for trade, social and cultural interchange and regional cooperation to be enhanced, a specific exception to Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 should be introduced that would allow the entire Kaliningrad oblast, with the consent of the bordering States, to be considered as a border area.

(6) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely to provide for amendment to the existing Union rules on local border traffic, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the consenting Member States and can be better achievedinvolved without supervision at Union level, the Union may adopt suggested measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as also set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve this objective.

(12a) The present Kaliningrad Oblast was transferred to the Russian Federation by the Soviet Union, which acquired that Central European territory of Königsberg by virtue of the Potsdam Agreement in 1945, to administer it pending the provided Peace Treaty which as yet has not been signed by the Allied victors of the second World War including the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation and Germany.

(21) Due to the successive integration of various sectors into the single payment scheme and the ensuing period of adjustment granted to farmers, it has become increasingly difficult to justify the presence of significant individual differences in the level of support per hectare resulting from use of historical references. Therefore direct income support should be more equitably distributed between Member States, by reducing the link to historical references and having regard to the overall context of the Union budget. To ensure a more equal distribution of direct support, while taking account of the differences that still exist in wage levels and input costs, the levels of direct support per hectare should be progressively adjusted. Member States with direct payments below the level of 9a current level of direct payments per hectare below 80 % of the EU average should close one third of the gap between their current level and this level. This convergence should be financed proportionally by all Member States with direct payments above the UnionMember States with a level of direct payments above 80% but below the EU average should close this gap by 10 %. This convergence should be financed proportionally by all Member States with direct payments above the Union average. However, the maximum level of direct payments per hectare in the Member States should not exceed 120% of the EU average. In addition, all payment entitlements activated in 2019 in a Member State or in a region should have a uniform unit value following a convergence towards this value that should take place during the transition period in linear steps. However, in order to avoid disruptive financial consequences for farmers, Member States having used the single payment scheme, and in particular the historical model, should be allowed to partially take historical factors into account when calculating the value of payment entitlements in the first year of application of the new scheme. The debate on the next Multiannual Financial Framework for the period starting in 2021 should also focus on the objective of complete convergence through the equal distribution of direct support across the European Union during that period.

Farmers complying with the requirements laid down in Article 29(1) of Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 as regards organic farming shall be entitled ipso facto to the payment referred to in this Chaptershall be entitled ipso facto to payment referred to in this Chapter when they fall within the following categories: - farmers which have at least 20 % of forest areas; - farmers with more than 50 % of the eligible agricultural area covered by grassland; - farmers which are 100 % certified as using sustainable farming methods, including of integrated farming.

1 a. The first paragraph shall not apply to farms: - where the arable land is entirely used for grass production or other herbaceous forage, entirely left fallow, entirely cultivated with crops under water for a significant part of the year or a combination of these, or; - where the arable land of the farmer covers up to 50 hectares and more than 50% of the eligible agricultural area of the holding is covered by permanent crops.

Member States shall ensure the maintenance of the ratio of the land under permanent grassland in relation to the total agricultural area. That obligation shall apply at national or regional level. The reference ratio shall be established as relation between the land under permanent grassland and total agricultural area declared by the farmers in 2014.

2. Farmers shall be allowed to convert a maximum of 5 % of their reference areas under permanent grassland. That limit shall not appMember States shall ensure that the ratio under this Article shall not decrease to the detriment of land under permanent grassland by more than 10 % relatively into the case of force majeure or exceptional circumstancesratio for the relevant reference year.

3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 55 laying down rules concerning the increase of reference areas under permanent grassland as laid down in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, the renewal of permanent grassland, the reconversion of agricultural area into permanent grassland in case the authorised decrease referred to in paragraph 2 is exceeded, as well as the modification of the reference areas under permanent grassland in case of transfer of land. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 55 laying down rules on maintenance of permanent grassland, in particular to ensure that measures are taken to maintain the ratio, including individual obligations to be respected such as obligation to reconvert areas into permanent grassland where it is established that the ratio of land under permanent grassland is decreasing.

1. FWhere the arable land and area covers more than 20 hectares, farmers shall ensure that at least 7 % of their eligible hectares as defined in Article 25(2), excluding areas under permanent grassland and permanent crops, is ecological focus area such as land left fallow, terraces, landscape features, buffer strip like hedges or stone walls, buffer strips, land planted with nitrogen-fixing crops, land cultivated according to environmentally friendly methods and afforested areas as referred to in article 25(2)(b)(ii).

1 a. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the minimum percentage indicated in paragraph 1 is reduced to: - 5% in cases of joint undertakings of groups of farmers putting in place continuous, adjacent ecological focus areas; - 1,5% in the Member States with at least 45% of their total terrestrial area covered by forests or; - 1,5% in the Member States where utilised agricultural area constitute is less than 35% of the total terrestrial area.

Ea. whereas the efforts to restore, by violating overmentioned principles, the zone of dominating post-soviet influence over the common neighbourhood would be incompatible with aims of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement;

(g) reiterate that modernisation of Russia is a common interest for both parties and that the EU wishes to further promote the process initiated through the Partnership for Modernisation; underline that Russia's policies of exclusively economic modernisation should bemay appear fruitless if not accompanied by political reform;

(h) follow closely Russia's positive internal evolution, if any, especially in democracy, broaden dialogue with Russia's civil society and all major political protagonists, support institution building in Russia and the principles of representative democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

(nb) encourage Russia to not compete destructively EU's plans about getting energy supply from Caspian-Black Sea region (Bulgarian case), to help international community in its efforts to stop destruction and bloodshed of civilians in Syria - those must be the urgent issues of real EU-Russia political dialogue and cooperation;

(x) take into consideration that considerable investment efforts still have to be carried for Soviet-dated infrastructures of critical importance for the Russian economy and for EU investments; they should be given priority over the offensive militarization;

C. whereas media platforms are essential for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression; whereas the independent press, as a collective manifestation of free expression, is one of the key actors in the media landscape;

D. whereas freedom of the press, media, including the freedom of journalist- employee from the censorship imposed by media business companies, the digital sector and journalism in general are considered to be public goods;

1. Recognises that governments have the primary responsibility for ensuring or hampering freedom of the press and media, and; in the worst cases they are increasingly resorting to legal pressure, e.g. through the abuse of anti-terrorism or anti-extremism legislation and laws on national security, treason or subversion, in order to restrict press and media freedom;

5. DeploreStrongly condemns the fact that many journalists have no access to legal assistance while their profession increasingly finds itself in the front line of the struggle for human rights, whether online or offline;

5a. Considers that media freedom suffers damage by being totally misinterpreted when journalist (-ism) appears involved or bribed for a slander, defamation and similar means in order to crush political or business opponent;

B. whereas, with the process of consolidation of strong economic and foreign policy powers such as the BRICS, a multi-polar system has emerged, where global leadership is increasingly shared amongst several countries and regional blocks of countries; whereas such a multi- polar system entails a progressive shiftturned to a new bipolarity (Euro-Atlantic entity versus others led by Russia or China); in global economic power to the BRICS and other emerging economies and furthermay entails a shift of sovereignty and control, in foreign policy terms, from existing powers to emerging powers; whereas the current economic crisis has accelerated the process of transfer of powers from existing to emerging powers;

C. whereas without an inclusive new global governance system based on close consultation and cooperation with the BRICS, there will be little incentive for emerged and emerging powers to cooperate and concert action on major global issues with the potential risk of (i) political and economic fragmentation and the emergence of competing world orders and separate regional areas, (ii) the disentanglement of global economic structures and investment flows and (iii) the creation of regional blocks of influence with very limited international coordination and no concerted solution possible for transnational challenges;

D. whereas the eventual consolidation of the economic and political power of the BRICS and other emerging countries as the world's largest economies may not necessarily be associated with the transition from low-income economies to middle-income economies and, thereby, the emergence and consolidation of a large middle class; whereas the lack of a large middle class in such countries would mark the end of the substantial role in world affairs of countries characterised by affluent societies and a stable and moderate political orientation;

1. Stresses how the current economic crisis has demonstrated the interdependence between the emerged powers and the BRICS group and other emerging countries; points out that stable economic growth of the latter is clearly conditional on stable economic growth of the former; emphasises that political and economic ties between emerged and emerging economies are mutually beneficial and believes that further political understanding and coordination with the BRICS group and other emerging countries should thus be pursued by the EU as a matter of priority;

2. Believes that the interdependence between, on the one hand, the emerged powers and, on the other, the BRICS group and other emerging powers maintains a relevant economic dimension, but is essentially political, as both the emerged and the emerging powers share an interest in ensuring an effective system of global governance and in tackling together those global stability and security risks which may curb the global growth potential;

3. Strongly rejects the contention that, in view of the emergence of new economic and foreign policy powers and potential rivals, the West should agree to relinquish its leadership and focus on managing its decline. Contends, rather, that the West and, in particular, the EU should focus on achieving the necessary economies of scale and develop concerted efforts to enable it to interact with the emerging powers constructively and effectively; points out to the need to develop an inclusive system of global governance based on cooperation and coordination with the BRICS and other emerging countries, as appropriate; points further to the key role of the West and, particularly, the EU in promoting an inclusive system of global governance such as this;

4. Notes that the BRICS havegroup has embarked on quasi-permanent coordination of foreign policy by abstaining from the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya (South Africa was not yet part of the BRICS at that time), by deferring the vote on the EU's role in UNGA, and through their coinciding positions on Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan and the placement of weapons in outer space, as well as by coordinating their action through the BRICS Leaders' meetings; points out that the BRICS seem to be challenging the current system of international governance; believes that if the EU will duly take into account the new weight, in political and economic terms, of the BRICS and other emerging powers, this may contribute to an orderly reform of global governance without any destabilising effects;

5. Believes that, in light of the increasing relevance of the BRICS and other emerging economies and the looming quasi-multi-polar (if not bipolar) system of governance, the G-20 is the appropriate forum for consensus building and for a decision-making process which is inclusive and able to foster convergence, including regulatory convergence; takes the view that notwithstanding the increasing relevance of the G-20, the G-7 maintains a key role as a consultative, coordinating and consensus- building forum for the emerged powers with a view to dialogue with the BRICS and other emerging economies, and ahead of G-20 meetings; supports the G-20 parliamentary dimension and believes that it should be further consolidated and involved in the decision-making processes to ensure a reinforced democratic dialogue and scrutiny;

7. Stresses the importance that the overall coordination of EU foreign policy towards the BRICS group and other emerging economies should lie with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; believes that the EU should strive to achieve, under the coordination by the High Representative, a better linking of foreign and security policy with EU sectoral policies, such as development, energy security, trade, access to raw materials and rare earths, climate change and migration, with a view to valorising synergies and ensuring a coherent and systemic foreign policy approach;

9. Notes that the EU should have capacity to adjust and reform its internal governance structures in order to ensure a decision- making process able to reflect its plurality and create consensus; stresses the importance that a coherent foreign policy approach at EU level towards the BRICS and other emerging countries be reflected in the organisation of the EEAS; takes the view that with regard to the BRICS group, in addition to its organisacomposition along geographical and thematic lines, the EEAS should establish an ad hoc coordinating unit to ensure that all individual policies towards BRICS states are compatible from a systemic point of view and that the policy lines adopted are reflected in the EU dialogue with emerged powers such as the USA, Canada and Japan; believes that the EU delegations in BRICS countries and other relevant emerging countries should form a network aimed at providing continuous monitoring and analysis on relations amongst the BRICS group and relevant cross-sensitivities, thus enabling a more systemic approach; believes that the EU should direct its resources to leading the reform process of a global system of governance and of international organisations with a view to ensuring a more inclusive consensus-building and decision-making process at global level;

10. Stresses the key, positive role of Parliament's Liaison Office in Washington DC in promoting dialogue and cooperation between Parliament and the US Congress, and believes that, building on this kind of positive experience, the staff of EU Delegations in BRICS countries shcould include Parliament liaison officers in order to foster a greater understanding of the national parliamentary dimension in each of those countries and promote closer cooperation and dialogue between the European Parliament and national parliaments on a bilateral basis; believes that, in addition to its existing delegations for relations with Russia, India, China and South Africa, respectively, a delegation for relations with Brazil should also be considered;

A. whereas Georgia is an European state with long lasting tradition of Christian culture and successfully building democracy when the Eastern Partnership has created a meaningful political framework for deepening relations, accelerating political association and furthering economic integration between the EU and Georgia, by supporting political and socio-economic reforms and facilitating approximation towards the EU;

I. whereas the negotiations with Georgia on the Association Agreement are progressing swiftly; wherea, nevertheless negotiations on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) have not yet begun;

(a) to ensure that the Assocnegotiation Agreement is a comprehensive and forward looking framework for the further development of relations with Georgia in upcoming yearss with Georgia continue at a steady pace;

(b) to take the necessary action to ensure that the negotiations with Georgia continue at a steady paceensure as well that the Association Agreement is a comprehensive and forward looking framework for the further development of relations with Georgia in upcoming years;

(c) to recognise Georgia as a European state and to base the EU’s commitment and ongoing negotiations with Georgia as a European state on a European perspective, includingalong with Article 49 of the Treaty on the EU, considered as a valuable lever for implementation of reforms and a necessary catalyst for public support for these reforms which could further strengthen Georgia’s commitment to shared values and the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance;

(d) to strengthen the EU’s support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and to ensure the applicability of the agreements, once ithey hasve been concluded, to the whole territory of Georgia; to that end, to continue actively engaging in Russia-Georgia conflict resolution, inter alia by prolonging the mandate of the EUMM after 15 September 2011; to envisage the possibility of the inclusion of international police and peacekeeping components in order to establish genuine conditions for the start of a peace process;

(h) to call on Russia to reconsider its recognition of the independenceseparation of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to end the occupation of those Georgian territories and to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia as well as the inviolability of its internationally-recognised borders as recognised by international law, the UN charter, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(i) to welcome the policy of constructive unilateralism by Georgia, committing itself to not usinge the force toin restoregaining control over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as outlined in the speech by President Saakashvili to the EP on 23 November 2010 and call upon Russia to reciprocate the commitment to the non-use of force against Georgia;

12. Underlines the opportunity that negotiations ona way towards association agreements and the very agreement provides to boost reform; stresses that all the components should be linked in order for the EU to deepen its relationship in a holistic and coherent manner; believes that they should therefore include concrete conditions, timetables and performance benchmarks which should be regularly monitored;

13. States that differentiation should be applied to trade, invites ENP partner countries to move forward on creating the conditions that will allow the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) and calls oninstructs the EUC to assist them in their reform efforts and to open itsEU internal market accordingly; underlines that the EU should also assess the political, social and environmental circumstances of each country with reference to their participation in the future DCFTA;

14. Welcomes the reference to Article 49 of the TEU and believeaffirms that all partner countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) have a legitimate right to strive for EU membership; believes that the conclusion of association agreements does not exclude this perspective but can, on the contrary, be an important step towards further European integration;

-24a. Reminds that peaceful resolution of regional military conflicts, including so called frozen ones, is the essential precondition for democracy consolidation, respect of human rights, prosperity and economic growth, thus should be of the highest interest for the EU;

24. Recalls that the EU should get more involved and play a more active and constructive role in resolution of regional armed conflicts by developing more confidence-building measures, considering new pragmatic and innovative approaches, launching public communication strategies, supporting civic culture and community dialogue and strengthening good- neighbourly relations;

25. Insists on the need to keep a regional approach and welcomes the decision to appoint an EUSR for the South Caucasus as well as for the Southern Mediterranean Region and also the task force for the Southern Mediterranean; similar task force for the South Caucasus should be considered;

26. Welcomes the work that international organisations, particularly UN agencies, carry out on the ground in conflict and post-conflict situations and in promoting sustainable development throughout the neighbourhood, notably the long-standing commitment of UNRWA to Palestinian war refugees;

29. Welcomes the proposal for the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the increase of funding for the ENP, as requested in its previous resolutions; considers that the distribution of funds should be flexible and adequate for both regions, with an approach that is performance-driven and not geographically driven; emphasises that none of the ENP dimensions (Southern or Northern) should be advantaged in expense of the other; notes that more flexibility and simplification should respect the right of democratic scrutiny and be accompanied by increased supervision of the spending;

34. Insists that the Council should adopt without further delay the legislative proposal to amend Article 23 of the ENPI Regulation presented by the Commission in May 2008 and adopted by Parliament on 8 July 2008, which would make it possible to reinvest funds returned following past operations; recalls that this measure is already considered as a given and is reflected in the proposal for financing the review of the ENP in the 2011-2013 budget;

4. Notes that the existing disproportionate reliance on the United States in defence matters, as symbolised by the fact that the US share of all defence spending in the North Atlantic Alliance has risen to 75 %, can no longer be acceptable either for Europe or for the USas well;

5. Urges all EU Member States to assume fully their part of the responsibility for peace and security in Europe, its neighbourhood and the wider world; reminds them of their repeated commitments, including in the Treaty and European Council conclusions, to improve their militarydefence capabilities;

27. Points out that current research and technology (R&T) efforts will be determining in mastering future technological advances; deplores the fact that only about 1 % of EU countries' overall defence spending goes to R&T, while more than 50 % continues to be spent on personnel, and in particular that for most Member States this is well below 1 %; urges the Member States to exclude R&T from their spending cuts as a matter of priority, and to restore R&T where it became mistakenly closed;

6 a. Regrets the fact that some EU partner countries are initiating politicised and falsified trials against persons, thus violating human rights and fundamental norms of the rule of law; is deeply concerned that despite international calls, no measures are being taken in those third countries to ensure and respect the rights of those convicted in politically- motivated cases;

33 a. Regrets that despite all the calls of the European Parliament and other international institutions, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was sentenced in his second politicized and administratively- motivated trial in Russia, which did not comply with the principles of a fair and independent judicial system, thus strongly violating human rights;

52 a. Recalls the tragic case of Sergey Magnitsky who was fighting against high- ranking corruption and was tortured to death by officials; regrets that the case is still not solved and those responsible for Sergey Magnitsky's death have not been punished; urges Russian judicial authorities to resume the investigation by naming and punishing the guilty;

D. whereas the Armenian authorities have repeatedly stated their willingness to adhere to these values and emphasised Armenia’s European ambitions, but did not show a sufficient will to resolve the armed conflict with Azerbaijan in accord with international law and European standards;

(a a) ensure that the conclusion of the EU-Armenia Association Agreement, in line with the demands made in the Parliament’s Report on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus of 23 April 2010 and with OSCE Minsk Group Basic Principles, is linked to a substantial progress towards the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including confidence-building measures and active incident-prevention on the line of contact, the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the all occupied territories of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and their gradual return to Azerbaijani control, the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their home places and properties and international security guarantees that would include a genuine multinational peacekeeping operation;

(f a) get clarification of concerns about the status and authorization of The Republic of Armenia Police under Armenian Government, out of accountability to any elected body or ministry when supervising the investigative units of internal affairs bodies;

(g) ensure that the Association Agreement is consistent with the principles of international law - in particular the non-use of force, free self-determination and territorial integrity - and that the Agreement, once concluded, applies to the whole territory of Armenia;

(h) strengthen the European Union’s conflict-resolution capacity, inter alia by supporting the efforts of the Minsk Group and other forms of engagement thus clearing the way for the implementation of confidence-building measures, as the Presidents of both Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed;

(i) emphasise the need to use the achieved Association Agreement as a platform to promote regional synergies and cooperation by establishnot blocking a level playing field for all three countries in the South Caucasus;

H. whereas unresolved conflicts and problems with still occupied territories are undermining the stability and development of Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus region; whereas in its Joint Communication on ‘A new response to a changing neighbourhood’ the EU stated its ambition to engage more pro-actively in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus;

H a. whereas the EU in its relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan respects the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and in its approach to resolving regional conflicts supports the basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act, i.e. Non-Use of Force, Territorial Integrity, and the Equal Rights and Self- Determination of Peoples;

(a a) ensure that the conclusion of the EU-Azerbaijan Association Agreement, in line with the demands made in the Parliament's Report on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus of 23 April 2010 and with OSCE Minsk Group Basic Principles, is linked to a substantial progress towards the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including confidence-building measures and active incident-prevention on the line of contact, the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their home places and properties and international security guarantees that would include a genuine multinational peacekeeping operation;

(b) incorporate in the Association Agreement clauses and benchmarks on the protection and promotion of human rights which reflect the principles and rights enshrined in the Constitution of Azerbaijan and the highest international and European standards, drawing to the fullest possible extent on Council of Europe and OSCE frameworks; ensure that the negotiations take full account of the need to safeguard the rights and livelihoods of internally displaced persons, and that in fact Azerbaijan does not carry responsibilities about human rights on its territories that were forcibly occupied by neighbouring state;

(c) emphasise in the Association Agreement the importance of guaranteeing citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms, the development of civil society, the rule of law, the continued fight against corruption, political pluralism and the independence of the media and the judiciary, with except of territories over mentioned;

(f) strengthen the European Union's conflict-resolution capacity, inter alia by supporting the efforts of the Minsk Group and other forms of engagement thus clearing the way for the implementation of confidence-building measures, as the Presidents of both Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed;

(f b) stress that hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons who fled their homes during or in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh war remain displaced and denied their rights, including the right to return, property rights and the right to personal security; those rights should be unconditionally respected and provided without any delay; call to the Commission and Members Sates to continue and extend the EU assistance and financial support to Azerbaijan in dealing with the situation of displaced persons;

(g) emphasise the need to use the Association Agreement as a platform to promote regional synergies and cooperation by establishing a level playing field for all three countrdemocracies in the South Caucasus;

(m) take the necessary action to incorporate in the Association Agreement provisions enabling Azerbaijan to participate in Community programmes and agencies, as a tool to promote advancing European integration at all levels;

(n a) emphasise the vital importance of Azerbaijan in the diversification of the energy supplies and routes of their delivery to Europe, and in this connection commends the efforts of Azerbaijan in promoting such pioneering projects as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku- Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, which played a significant role in the opening-up the resource potential of the Caspian basin to the international markets as well as the fulfilment of the AGRI Project, the first ever Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) transport and delivery system at the Black Sea, together with Georgia and Romania;

(r) encourage the EU negotiating team of Azerbaijan to continue to cooperate with the European Parliament, providing continuous feedback, supported by documentation, on the progress made, in accordance with Article 218(10) TFEU, which states that Parliament must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure;

2. Considers that the Copenhagen criteria continue to represent a valuablefundamental basis and should remain at the heart of enlargement policy; underlines, however, the need to keep the economic subcriteria up to date in line with recent developments in the sphere of economic governance, while taking due account of their social implications for the candidate and potential candidate countries;

4. Takes the view that strict conditionality requires that the progress of a country is effectively assessed at every stage of the process, and that countries wishing to join the EU should proceed from one stage to the next only once all the conditions are confirmed have been met at each stage; notes, however, certain tendencies to exaggeration, and recommends avoiding requiring of candidate and potential candidate countries higher standards than those applying in the EU; stresses the importance of setting transparent and fair benchmarks throughout the process;

6. Believes that, in order to maintain the credibility of the enlargement process, the EU's integration capacity should be evaluatconsidered at an early stage and should be properly considerreflected in the Commission's ‘opinion’ for each potential candidate state, outlining the major concerns in this regard; is of the view that a comprehensive impact assessment should then follow;

18. Strongly believes that the EU can stillis able to attain great strategic benefits through enlargement policy; emphasises that EU membership represents a stable anchor in the swiftly changing international environment, and that ‘belonging to the club’ continues to offer hope for stability and prosperity, despite the ongoing economic crisis; is of the opinion that enlargement is a long-term strategic concept, which cannot necessarily be measured in terms of short-term balance sheets; considers it important to take due account of its value as representing soft but nevertheless essential power for the EU;

20. Recalls that the process is not concluded with the simple transposition of the acquis, and stresses the importance of effective implementation; considers that in order to maintain the credibility of the accession conditions, existing Member States should also be assessed for their continued compliance with the EU's fundamental values and the fulfilment of their commitments concerning the functioning of democratic institutions and the rule of law; calls on the Commission to work out a detailed proposal for a monitoring mechanism, building on the provisions of Article 7 TEU and Article 258 TFEU;

34. Calls for greater efforts towards achieving the objectives of the Eastern Partnership, as stated in the Prague Declaration and the Warsaw Summit Conclusions, particularly by pursuing the negotiations on, and conclusions of, Association Agreements with the Eastern Partners, by promoting stability via solution of problem of occupied territories and mobility through mobility partnerships and visa dialogues, by ensuring continued progress in adoption and implementation of reforms, in close association with the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly;

35. Underlines that, whilst the EU-Ukraine Agreement has been initialled and prepared, its signature and ratification can only happen if Ukraine fulfilsdepends on fulfilment of the necessary requirements; this means respect for the rule of law in the form of strengthening the stability, independence and effectiveness of the institutions of Ukraine which guarantee the rule of law, and ofestablishing a truly pluralistic democracy by showing respect for the rights of the opposition and putting an end to persecution of it, thus establishing a truly pluralistic democracymaltreatment of it;

37. Calls for continued and strong engagement on the part of the EU in resolving the region's ‘frozen conflicts’, in cooperation with other importantgood-willing regional partners, in particular breaking the deadlock on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and playing a full role in support of any ensuing peace agreement; believes that the Transnistrian question can be a good test-case for the good will of the regional partners;

38. Considers Russia as an important strategic partner, but continues to have concerns regarding Russia's commitment to the rule of law, pluralist democracy and human rights as conditional for the development of relations with its authorities;

39. Believes that Russia understands that it is the sovereign right of countries in the region to choose, free from external interference, the security organisation/arrangements/framework which, in their view, brings greatest security to their citizens;

40. Supports the EU's promotion of a regional approach in Central Asia, which is essential to tackling the regional dimension of issues including organised crime, trafficking in drugs, radioactive materials and human beings, terrorism, natural and manmade environmental disasters and management of water resources; calls for such engagement to be differentiated and conditional upon progress in democratisation, human rights, good governance, sustainable socio-economic development, the rule of law and the fight against corruption; therefore the regional approach would not contradict an individual encouragement for more advanced states; notes that the EU cooperation Strategy for Central Asia identifies seven priorities, but provides resources too limited to have an impact in all policy areas; calls therefore for the EU to define priorities better according to the resources available, whilst ensuring that development cooperation is not subordinated to economic, energy or security interests;

44. Takes the view that regular EU-US summits would provide an opportunity to identify common objectives and coordinate strategies on matters of global relevance, including economic governance and developing a common approach towards the emerging powers; considers that the Transatlantic Economic Council and the Transatlantic Legislators‘ Dialogue should include a reflection on strategic engagement by the EU and the US with the BRICS and other relevant emerging countries and on how to foster regulatory convergence with such countries; recalls the need to set up a Transatlantic Political Council as an ad hoc body for systematic, high-level consultation and coordination on foreign and security policy between the EU and the US in parallel with NATO;

45. Notes that, given the increasing global and regional relevance of China, India and other emerging countries in Asia, both the United States of America and the EU may progressively shift their primaryincrease their attention, political investment and resources to the Pacific; further notes that Asia should have a more important place on the foreign agenda of the European Union and EU Member States; calls therefore for greater coordination of the US and EU policies towards China, India and other emerging countries in Asia in order to avoid a decoupling of approaches to key policies;

16a. Regrets that despite many calls from international bodies to Russian authorities, no progress was made in investigation of Sergei Magnitsky death, therefore urges Council to impose and implement an EU-wide visa ban on officials responsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky and to freeze any financial assets they or their immediate family may hold inside the EU;

33. Remains extremely concerned at the lack of democracy, rule of law, fundamental freedoms and the respect for human rights in Belarus, the only European Neighbourhood country not to fully participate in the Eastern Partnership and the work of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, especially in the aftermath of the presidential elections in December 2010 and the subsequent violent crackdown on protesters and political opposition, including trials of activists 2011 which did not conform to international standards and saw disproportionately harsh sentences handed down; commends the EU's unity in response to the expulsion of EU diplomats from Belarus in February 2012; urges the Union and all of its Member States to remain coherent and consistent in their policies towards Belarus, and to keep up the pressure on the political regime, including through sanctions against enlisted officials, while reaching out to civil society through such tools as enhanced visa facilitation and increased education opportunities;

80. Supports the plans to make further advances in developing rights-based approaches to development cooperation as stated in the EU human rights strategy action plan; emphasises the urgency to do so in the case of children's rights in order to ensure longer-term sustainable progress; notes a need to overview children's rights in a comparison with the principles of human rights, in order to get transparency to what extent those first ones are covered or not by basic human rights;

13. Recalls that, if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or of a natural or man-made disaster (when the last formula covers also a foreign state- caused disaster), the Union and the Member States have an obligation to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity to assist it, at the request of its political authorities, and that the Union shall in such cases mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States; recalls also the Union's obligation to mobilise all the instruments at its disposal to prevent terrorist threats in the EU and to protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist or foreign state attack;

14. Calls for sufficient flexibilitconsistency as regards the types of attacks and disasters for which the clause may be triggered, to ensure that no significant threats, such as attacks in cyberspace, pandemics, or energy shortages, are overlooked;

15. Stresses the need to prevent any moral hazard, elaborate grounds and rules stating that some Member States may be tempted to excessively rely lidarity commitment, especially as for rapid response, is not undermined by long speculations the solidarity of others whileat maybe the victim was guilty by alleged under-investing in their own security and disaster response capabilities; emphasises the primary responsibility of Member States for civil protection and security in their territory;

16. Takes the view that the solidarity clause should be invoked in situations that overwhelm the capacities of the affected Member State or require a multi-sector response involving a number of actors; stresses that solidarity also means the obligation to invest in adequate national capabilitiesalong with its fair presentation;

17. Stresses that the implementation of the solidarity clause should form an integral part of a permanent EU crisis response, crisis management and crisis coordination system, building on the existing sectoral instruments and capabilities and providing for their effective mobilisation to deliver a coordinated multi-sector response when needed; stresses that, in principle, the implementation should notif necessary, may lead to the creation of ad hoc tools;

24. Recalls that under the provisions of Article 122(1) TEU the Council may decide on measures to address a difficult economic situation in a spirit of solidarity, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy, especially when a politically motivated measure of blockade was used; stresses the importance of seeing this provision as part of a comprehensive Union solidarity toolbox to address some new major security challenges, such as challenges in the area of energy security and the security of supply of other critical products;

Member of the council of the European Democrat Union (EDU) (2001). Member of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (until 2009) and member of the group's bureau (since 2004).

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Chair of the Supreme Council (Reconstituent Seimas (Parliament)) of the Republic of Lithuania (1990-1992). Member of the Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania, Leader of the Opposition (1992-1996). Chair of the Seimas (1996-2000). Member of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2000-2004).

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Head of State (1990-1992).

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Observer at the European Parliament (2003-2004). Member of the European Parliament (since 2004).

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Member of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (1989-1990). One of the leaders of the Council of the Baltic States (1990-1992). Member of the Baltic Assembly (1992-1996, 2000-2004). Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (1993-1996, 2000-2002). Founder of the Lithuanian-Polish Parliamentary Assembly (with the Chair of the Polish Parliament) (1997).

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Member of musical organisations (since 1963). Member of Lietuvos Sąjūdis (since June 1988). Chair of the M. K. Čiurlionis Society (since 1987).

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Honours: Norwegian People's Peace Prize (1991); Award of the French Fondation du Futur (1991); Riflemen's Star of the Union of Lithuanian Riflemen (1991); Hermann Ehlers Prize (Germany, 1992); Ninth International Ramon Llull Prize of the Catalonian Culture Congress Foundation (1994); Companion of the order of the German Order of Riflemen of St Sebastian Order (1995); Legion of Honour, second class (France, 1997); Vibo Valentia Testimony prize (Italy, 1998); Order of Grand Duke Vytautas, first class (Lithuania, 1998); Royal Norwegian Order of Merit (Grand Cross) (1998); Grand Cross of the Republic of Poland (1999); UNESCO medal (1999); Order of Merit (Grand Cross) of the Order of Malta (1999); Grand Cross Medal of Honour (Greece, 1999); Truman-Reagan Freedom Award of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (1999); Order of La Pléiade of La Francophonie (France, 2000); Order of the Three Stars, second class (Latvia, 2001); Order of the Cross of Terra Mariana, first class (Estonia, 2002); Order of Vytautas the Great and Constitutional Medal of the Parliament of the German Land of Saxony (2003); Robert Schuman Medal (2005); Charles IV Europe Medal (2007).

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Member of the council of the European Democrat Union (EDU) (2001). Member of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (until 2009) and member of the group's bureau (since 2004).

Chair of the Supreme Council (Reconstituent Seimas (Parliament)) of the Republic of Lithuania (1990-1992). Member of the Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania, Leader of the Opposition (1992-1996). Chair of the Seimas (1996-2000). Member of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2000-2004).

Head of State (1990-1992).

Observer at the European Parliament (2003-2004). Member of the European Parliament (since 2004).

Member of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (1989-1990). One of the leaders of the Council of the Baltic States (1990-1992). Member of the Baltic Assembly (1992-1996, 2000-2004). Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (1993-1996, 2000-2002). Founder of the Lithuanian-Polish Parliamentary Assembly (with the Chair of the Polish Parliament) (1997).

Member of musical organisations (since 1963). Member of Lietuvos Sąjūdis (since June 1988). Chair of the M. K. Čiurlionis Society (since 1987).

Honours: Norwegian People's Peace Prize (1991); Award of the French Fondation du Futur (1991); Riflemen's Star of the Union of Lithuanian Riflemen (1991); Hermann Ehlers Prize (Germany, 1992); Ninth International Ramon Llull Prize of the Catalonian Culture Congress Foundation (1994); Companion of the order of the German Order of Riflemen of St Sebastian Order (1995); Legion of Honour, second class (France, 1997); Vibo Valentia Testimony prize (Italy, 1998); Order of Grand Duke Vytautas, first class (Lithuania, 1998); Royal Norwegian Order of Merit (Grand Cross) (1998); Grand Cross of the Republic of Poland (1999); UNESCO medal (1999); Order of Merit (Grand Cross) of the Order of Malta (1999); Grand Cross Medal of Honour (Greece, 1999); Truman-Reagan Freedom Award of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (1999); Order of La Pléiade of La Francophonie (France, 2000); Order of the Three Stars, second class (Latvia, 2001); Order of the Cross of Terra Mariana, first class (Estonia, 2002); Order of Vytautas the Great and Constitutional Medal of the Parliament of the German Land of Saxony (2003); Robert Schuman Medal (2005); Charles IV Europe Medal (2007).

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2014-01-31

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start

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party

Tėvynės sąjunga - Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai

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