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Nearly half of coal produced in the United States is mined from federal government lands. The federal government therefore has an unusual degree of control over the domestic production and consumption of this fossil fuel. Given that the use of federal coal generates 13 percent of U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, federal coal policy also has important climate change implications. In recent years, both Democratic and Republican administrations have made efforts to mitigate U.S. CO2 emissions by reducing use of fossil fuels through a variety of programs. However, federal coal policy has yet to reflect these efforts.

In a new paper from The Hamilton Project and the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, Professors Kenneth T. Gillingham (of Yale) and James H. Stock (of Harvard) propose reforms to the federal minerals leasing program that address the negative climate effects associated with coal mining in an efficient manner that benefits the taxpayer. Specifically, they propose applying a royalty adder of 20 percent of the social cost of carbon to new and renewed federal coal leases in order to reduce but not eliminate federal coal production, thereby reducing total power sector CO2 emissions. The authors project that an additional $3 billion annually would be collected, which they would allocate to programs that support residents of coal communities in transition.

Aligning U.S. Federal Coal Leasing and Climate Policy

Despite growing public attention to the climate consequences of fossil fuel extraction, U.S. climate policy so far has not extended to the government’s role as a major source of fossil fuels. According to the authors, it will be important to implement upstream policies like federal coal royalties that work alongside downstream policies like the Clean Power Plan to achieve broader climate policy goals.

Some royalties, assessed as a percent of the selling price of the fuel, are already collected on federal coal production. In fiscal year 2012, nearly $800 million was raised. These revenues are split evenly between the federal government and the state where the lease is located.

However, current royalties are much less than would be required to account for the climate damages from use of coal. In formulating their proposal, Gillingham and Stock consider a number of factors including the social cost of carbon, the interaction of the royalty adder with other climate policies like the Clean Power Plan, and the potential for substitution of federal and nonfederal coal production. In part because federal coal constitutes such a large fraction of total U.S. coal consumption and transportation costs are high, the extent of substitution of nonfederal for federal coal is expected to be limited.

Proposed Reforms

The authors conclude that reforms of federal coal leasing policy could help achieve important climate goals while benefiting residents of coal communities and retaining use of the most valuable federal coal resources. Gillingham and Stock propose a two-step approach:

Using authority provided in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (as amended), the Secretary of the Interior would place a royalty adder on federal coal equal to 20 percent of estimated climate damages. This royalty adder will apply to all new leases and lease renewals.

Congress would enact legislation authorizing the use of the federal portion of additional revenues for transitional assistance to communities reliant on nonfederal coal mining.

Gillingham and Stock’s proposed carbon adder would bring the private and social costs of coal use into better alignment. This would mitigate climate change, benefiting current and future generations. While reduction of federal coal production would reduce coal-related employment on federally leased land, Stock and Gillingham project that employment would rise on private lands as demand for nonfederal coal increases.

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Nearly half of coal produced in the United States is mined from federal government lands. The federal government therefore has an unusual degree of control over the domestic production and consumption of this fossil fuel. Given that the use of federal coal generates 13 percent of U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, federal coal policy also has important climate change implications. In recent years, both Democratic and Republican administrations have made efforts to mitigate U.S. CO2 emissions by reducing use of fossil fuels through a variety of programs. However, federal coal policy has yet to reflect these efforts.
In a new paper from The Hamilton Project and the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, Professors Kenneth T. Gillingham (of Yale) and James H. Stock (of Harvard) propose reforms to the federal minerals leasing program that address the negative climate effects associated with coal mining in an efficient manner that benefits the taxpayer. Specifically, they propose applying a royalty adder of 20 percent of the social cost of carbon to new and renewed federal coal leases in order to reduce but not eliminate federal coal production, thereby reducing total power sector CO2 emissions. The authors project that an additional $3 billion annually would be collected, which they would allocate to programs that support residents of coal communities in transition.
Aligning U.S. Federal Coal Leasing and Climate Policy
Despite growing public attention to the climate consequences of fossil fuel extraction, U.S. climate policy so far has not extended to the government’s role as a major source of fossil fuels. According to the authors, it will be important to implement upstream policies like federal coal royalties that work alongside downstream policies like the Clean Power Plan to achieve broader climate policy goals.
Some royalties, assessed as a percent of the selling price of the fuel, are already collected on federal coal production. In fiscal year 2012, nearly $800 million was raised. These revenues are split evenly between the federal government and the state where the lease is located.
However, current royalties are much less than would be required to account for the climate damages from use of coal. In formulating their proposal, Gillingham and Stock consider a number of factors including the social cost of carbon, the interaction of the royalty adder with other climate policies like the Clean Power Plan, and the potential for substitution of federal and nonfederal coal production. In part because federal coal constitutes such a large fraction of total U.S. coal consumption and transportation costs are high, the extent of substitution of nonfederal for federal coal is expected to be limited.
Proposed Reforms
The authors conclude that reforms of federal coal leasing policy could help achieve important climate goals while benefiting residents of coal communities and retaining use of the most valuable federal coal resources. Gillingham and Stock propose a two-step approach:
- Using authority provided in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (as amended), the Secretary of the Interior would place a royalty adder on federal coal equal to 20 percent of estimated climate damages. This royalty adder will apply to all new leases and lease renewals. - Congress would enact legislation authorizing the use of the federal portion of additional revenues for transitional assistance to communities reliant on nonfederal coal mining.
Gillingham and Stock’s proposed carbon adder would bring the private and social costs of coal use into better alignment. This would mitigate climate change, benefiting current and future generations. While reduction of federal coal production would reduce coal-related employment on federally leased land, Stock and Gillingham project that employment would rise on private lands as demand for nonfederal coal increases. Nearly half of coal produced in the United States is mined from federal government lands. The federal government therefore has an unusual degree of control over the domestic production and consumption of this fossil fuel.https://www.brookings.edu/events/ensuring-the-success-of-the-post-paris-climate-agenda-u-s-japan-relations-on-the-global-stage/Ensuring the success of the post-Paris climate agenda: U.S.-Japan relations on the global stagehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/240686820/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~Ensuring-the-success-of-the-postParis-climate-agenda-USJapan-relations-on-the-global-stage/
Thu, 08 Dec 2016 19:00:28 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=event&p=345533

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Last December, COP21 negotiators convened in Paris to lay out ambitious goals to combat global climate change. While the Paris Agreement was a remarkable breakthrough, it is the post-Paris agenda that will determine the ultimate success of this international effort. Climate change is a priority item in the U.S.-Japan agenda to globalize their alliance, as underlined in the Obama-Abe joint vision statement of April 2015. As two of the largest emitters in the world, domestic measures to abide by their Paris emission targets will loom large in the abatement of greenhouse gases. The challenge is steep for Japan as it has moved away from nuclear energy in the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, while making slow progress in the development of renewables. And new questions have arisen regarding the future implementation of U.S. climate agenda commitments under the incoming Trump administration.

On December 20, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Cross-Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate will host a distinguished panel of climate policy experts from the United States and Japan to address critical issues for the future of the climate agenda and U.S.-Japan relations. What does the nature of the Paris commitments mean for the task of implementation? What kind of domestic transformation is required in each country, e.g., what are the choices to be made in energy policy? And how can Japan and the United States collaborate on innovation efforts to move away from carbon dependent-economies?

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Last December, COP21 negotiators convened in Paris to lay out ambitious goals to combat global climate change. While the Paris Agreement was a remarkable breakthrough, it is the post-Paris agenda that will determine the ultimate success of this international effort. Climate change is a priority item in the U.S.-Japan agenda to globalize their alliance, as underlined in the Obama-Abe joint vision statement of April 2015. As two of the largest emitters in the world, domestic measures to abide by their Paris emission targets will loom large in the abatement of greenhouse gases. The challenge is steep for Japan as it has moved away from nuclear energy in the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, while making slow progress in the development of renewables. And new questions have arisen regarding the future implementation of U.S. climate agenda commitments under the incoming Trump administration.
On December 20, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Cross-Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate will host a distinguished panel of climate policy experts from the United States and Japan to address critical issues for the future of the climate agenda and U.S.-Japan relations. What does the nature of the Paris commitments mean for the task of implementation? What kind of domestic transformation is required in each country, e.g., what are the choices to be made in energy policy? And how can Japan and the United States collaborate on innovation efforts to move away from carbon dependent-economies? Last December, COP21 negotiators convened in Paris to lay out ambitious goals to combat global climate change. While the Paris Agreement was a remarkable breakthrough, it is the post-Paris agenda that will determine the ultimate success of this ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/federal-minerals-leasing-reform-and-climate-policy/Federal Minerals Leasing Reform and Climate Policyhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/240662122/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~Federal-Minerals-Leasing-Reform-and-Climate-Policy/
Thu, 08 Dec 2016 17:58:13 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=research&p=346034

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Through its minerals leasing program, the U.S. government plays a large role in the extraction of oil, natural gas, and coal. This footprint is the largest for coal: 41 percent of U.S. coal is mined under federal leases, and burning this coal accounts for 13 percent of U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Currently, producers and consumers of this coal do not bear the full social costs associated with its use. At the same time, the threat of climate change has led the international community, including the United States, to pledge significant reductions in CO2 emissions. Over the past two decades Democratic and Republican administrations have taken steps to reduce U.S. CO2 emissions by reducing use of fossil fuels. Despite growing public attention to the climate consequences of fossil fuel extraction, U.S. climate policy so far has not extended to the government’s role as a major source of fossil fuels. In a new paper from The Hamilton Project and the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, Kenneth Gillingham and James Stock propose to incorporate climate considerations into federal coal leasing by placing a royalty adder on federal coal that is linked to the climate damages from its combustion. The magnitude of the royalty adder should be chosen to recognize both the substitution of nonfederal for federal coal, and the interaction of the royalty adder with other climate policies. A royalty adder set to 20 percent of the social cost of carbon would reduce total power sector emissions, raise the price of federal coal to align with coal mined on private land, increase coal mining employment in Appalachia and the Midwest, and provide additional government revenues to help coal communities. This proposal strikes a middle path between calling for a stop to all federal fossil fuel leasing on the one hand, and relying entirely on imperfect downstream regulation on the other.

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Through its minerals leasing program, the U.S. government plays a large role in the extraction of oil, natural gas, and coal. This footprint is the largest for coal: 41 percent of U.S. coal is mined under federal leases, and burning this coal accounts for 13 percent of U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Currently, producers and consumers of this coal do not bear the full social costs associated with its use. At the same time, the threat of climate change has led the international community, including the United States, to pledge significant reductions in CO2 emissions. Over the past two decades Democratic and Republican administrations have taken steps to reduce U.S. CO2 emissions by reducing use of fossil fuels. Despite growing public attention to the climate consequences of fossil fuel extraction, U.S. climate policy so far has not extended to the government’s role as a major source of fossil fuels. In a new paper from The Hamilton Project and the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, Kenneth Gillingham and James Stock propose to incorporate climate considerations into federal coal leasing by placing a royalty adder on federal coal that is linked to the climate damages from its combustion. The magnitude of the royalty adder should be chosen to recognize both the substitution of nonfederal for federal coal, and the interaction of the royalty adder with other climate policies. A royalty adder set to 20 percent of the social cost of carbon would reduce total power sector emissions, raise the price of federal coal to align with coal mined on private land, increase coal mining employment in Appalachia and the Midwest, and provide additional government revenues to help coal communities. This proposal strikes a middle path between calling for a stop to all federal fossil fuel leasing on the one hand, and relying entirely on imperfect downstream regulation on the other.
Through its minerals leasing program, the U.S. government plays a large role in the extraction of oil, natural gas, and coal. This footprint is the largest for coal: 41 percent of U.S. coal is mined under federal leases, and burning this coal ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/12/08/decoupling-economic-growth-from-emissions-growth/Growth, carbon, and Trump: States are “decoupling” economic growth from emissions growthhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/240647436/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~Growth-carbon-and-Trump-States-are-%e2%80%9cdecoupling%e2%80%9d-economic-growth-from-emissions-growth/
Thu, 08 Dec 2016 16:56:12 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=346016

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As the Earth heats up, “decoupling” economic growth from carbon emissions growth is essential—for the world, nations, and localities alike. “Decoupling” is critical because it represents the only way to decarbonize the global economy while maintaining growth.

And progress is being made. In recent years, at least 35 countries, including the United States, have increased real gross domestic product (GDP) while reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Long to short, a relatively encouraging juncture has been reached and seems to warrant cautious optimism about the campaign to limit global warming.

Authors

Now, though, some of the earlier optimism has slumped. With the stunning election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, every aspect of the low-carbon paradigm for national and world progress has been thrown into question. No longer does it appear likely that America’s next national government will subscribe to the emerging global consensus that assumes the importance of “decarbonizing” the global economy by decoupling economic growth from emissions growth.

Which raises the issue of the resilience of decarbonization at the state and local level. States and cities, after all, represent an important possible counterweight to the likely coming period of climate skepticism in Washington. Furthermore, states especially retain much of the policy and legal power needed to reduce emissions.

And so today, we are releasing a new brief that provides a clear look at the status of state-side decarbonization at a time of federal pull-back. To that end, the brief reviews state-level decoupling trends in the United States by matching data on real GDP growth between 2000 and 2014 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia with data on energy-related CO2 emissions (for the same years and locations). In doing so, the brief—along with this cool data visualization tool from our colleagueAlec Friedhoff—provides an initial survey of the pace and geography of state-side decoupling and decarbonization in the United States.

What do these data show? Overall, some 33 states delinked their growth and carbon emissions between 2000 and 2014, confirming that economic growth does not inevitably require emissions growth. To see what’s going on, take a look at the following state map and the set of small line charts below that.

A look at these graphics shows that, as a group, the 33 decoupling states expanded their economies by 22 percent while reducing their emissions by nearly 12 percent. Maine achieved the largest CO2 decline among the 50 states, at 25 percent, while growing its economy by 9 percent. Among the larger states (in terms of GDP), Massachusetts, New York, and Georgia saw some of the largest reductions in emissions since 2000. Massachusetts managed to cut its emissions by 22 percent even as its GDP grew by 21 percent. New York and Georgia decreased their emissions by 20 percent and 17 percent, respectively, while growing their GDPs by 24 percent and 15 percent. The pace of decoupling, meanwhile, has accelerated over time, with more and more states breaking the historically tight link between economic growth and emissions growth. For instance, in 2007, only 14 states had decoupled. In the years since then, however, the number has doubled, with new states like California, Georgia, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia joining the ranks of the delinked.

Overall, the state experience suggests that President-elect Trump’s assumption of an opposition between economic growth and environmental stewardship is false.

At the same time, though, the pace and degree of states’ decoupling vary widely, with distinct regional dynamics. This suggests that much more work remains to be done, with or without federal support. Sixteen states—including Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, and Oklahoma—have not decoupled and instead experienced rising emissions along with rising GDP. And a few states, including Nebraska and North Dakota, have shown dramatic increases in emissions.

Underlying this regional variation are differences in energy sourcing across regions. Northeastern and many Southern states have achieved some of the most impressive feats in emissions reduction and decoupling, largely due to favorable changes in these states’ fuel mixes, such as coal-to-gas power switching and increased reliance on nuclear energy. The shift toward cleaner-burning natural gas has enabled significant decoupling of growth from emissions in Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Virginia. Similarly, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee have supported their double-digit growth and emissions reductions in large part by sourcing a significant share of their electricity from nuclear power. Decoupling trends are relatively weaker in the Midwest and West due to these regions’ dependence on dirty coal for power generation and fewer nuclear plants providing zero-carbon power.

Many states, in short, have made impressive progress in reducing emissions and decarbonizing their economies. However, much more work needs to be done for the United States to come close to meeting the Paris goal of long-term decarbonization. For now, progress will depend heavily on market-driven trends like the glut of low-priced natural gas driving the massive coal-to-gas switch in the power sector. Beyond that, states and cities will need to lead progress in the next few years, even more so than in the recent past. Specifically, the goal must now be a bottom-up brand of American decarbonization strong enough to mitigate the worst costs of federal abdication, should the latter occur in the next four years.

We will have more to say about these topics in the coming weeks.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/zjd6nvwuf5k-koushik-c.jpg?w=270As the Earth heats up, “decoupling” economic growth from carbon emissions growth is essential—for the world, nations, and localities alike. Decoupling” is critical because it represents the only way to decarbonize the global economy while maintaining growth.
And progress is being made. In recent years, at least 35 countries, including the United States, have increased real gross domestic product (GDP) while reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Long to short, a relatively encouraging juncture has been reached and seems to warrant cautious optimism about the campaign to limit global warming.
Authors D
Devashree Saha
Senior Policy Associate and Associate Fellow - Metropolitan Policy Program
Mark Muro
Senior Fellow and Policy Director - Metropolitan Policy Program Twitter markmuro1
Now, though, some of the earlier optimism has slumped. With the stunning election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, every aspect of the low-carbon paradigm for national and world progress has been thrown into question. No longer does it appear likely that America’s next national government will subscribe to the emerging global consensus that assumes the importance of “decarbonizing” the global economy by decoupling economic growth from emissions growth.
Which raises the issue of the resilience of decarbonization at the state and local level. States and cities, after all, represent an important possible counterweight to the likely coming period of climate skepticism in Washington. Furthermore, states especially retain much of the policy and legal power needed to reduce emissions.
And so today, we are releasing a new brief that provides a clear look at the status of state-side decarbonization at a time of federal pull-back. To that end, the brief reviews state-level decoupling trends in the United States by matching data on real GDP growth between 2000 and 2014 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia with data on energy-related CO2 emissions (for the same years and locations). In doing so, the brief—along with this cool data visualization tool from our colleague Alec Friedhoff—provides an initial survey of the pace and geography of state-side decoupling and decarbonization in the United States.
What do these data show? Overall, some 33 states delinked their growth and carbon emissions between 2000 and 2014, confirming that economic growth does not inevitably require emissions growth. To see what’s going on, take a look at the following state map and the set of small line charts below that. ________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
A look at these graphics shows that, as a group, the 33 decoupling states expanded their economies by 22 percent while reducing their emissions by nearly 12 percent. Maine achieved the largest CO2 decline among the 50 states, at 25 percent, while growing its economy by 9 percent. Among the larger states (in terms of GDP), Massachusetts, New York, and Georgia saw some of the largest reductions in emissions since 2000. Massachusetts managed to cut its emissions by 22 percent even as its GDP grew by 21 percent. New York and Georgia decreased their emissions by 20 percent and 17 percent, respectively, while growing their GDPs by 24 percent and 15 percent. The pace of decoupling, meanwhile, has accelerated over time, with more and more states breaking the historically tight link between economic growth and emissions growth. For instance, in 2007, only 14 states had decoupled. In the years since then, however, the number has doubled, with new states like California, Georgia, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia joining the ranks of the delinked.
Overall, the state experience suggests that President-elect Trump’s assumption ... As the Earth heats up, “decoupling” economic growth from carbon emissions growth is essential—for the world, nations, and localities alike. Decoupling” is critical because it represents the only way to decarbonize ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/growth-carbon-and-trump-state-progress-and-drift-on-economic-growth-and-emissions-decoupling/Growth, carbon, and Trump: State progress and drift on economic growth and emissions ‘decoupling’http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/240518944/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~Growth-carbon-and-Trump-State-progress-and-drift-on-economic-growth-and-emissions-%e2%80%98decoupling%e2%80%99/
Thu, 08 Dec 2016 05:00:12 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=research&p=345547

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“Decoupling” economic growth from the growth of carbon emissions is critical for the world, nations, and states alike because it represents the “squaring of the circle” necessary to decarbonize the global economy while maintaining economic growth.

In recent years, at least 35 countries, including the United States, have increased their real gross domestic product (GDP) while reducing their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This success is an encouraging juncture in the campaign to limit global warming, and would seem to license cautious optimism.

Yet now all of that is in question. With the stunning election of Donald Trump to the presidency, every aspect of the low-carbon paradigm for national and world progress has been thrown into doubt, starting with the federal government’s support of the quest to “decarbonize” the economy by decoupling economic growth from emissions growth.

All of which raises the question of how resilient the decarbonization paradigm is at the state and local level. Given their substantial powers to encourage emissions decoupling, states and cities are crucial players in the carbon drama. Therefore, it is worth assessing whether states’ and localities’ momentum on decoupling is strong enough to maintain recent progress.

And so this brief takes a look at state-level decoupling trends by matching data on real GDP growth between 2000 and 2014 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia with data on energy-related carbon dioxide emissions for the same years and locations. In doing so, the brief provides an initial baseline look at the pace and geography of state-side decoupling and decarbonization—with an eye to assessing state-level momentum on the brink of federal pull-back.

What do these data show? Overall, they show that more than 30 states have delinked their growth and carbon emissions, confirming that economic growth does not inevitably require emissions growth. At the same time, the findings of this report provide a layered assessment that runs as follows:

Decoupling is occurring in most U.S. states, confirming that cleaning up the economy doesn’t necessarily put an end to growth

However, the pace and extent of decoupling varies greatly

Market forces and changes in states’ economic structures are one set of influences on carbon emissions and decoupling

Region and fuel mix matter a lot

Despite significant progress, all states need to do more to decouple emissions from growth and decarbonize their economies in keeping with the goal of holding global mean temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius

As to the future, states and cities are going to need to do much more to maintain and accelerate the pace of local, national, and global decarbonization. With responsibility for U.S. decarbonization now devolving to the states and cities, state and regional actors will need to fill the vacuum created by Washington’s abdication of leadership with new energy and resolve.

Introduction

In April 2016, when the presidential primaries were just warming up and Donald Trump’s candidacy was a longshot, separate analyses by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the UK-based Carbon Brief concluded that at least 35 countries, including the United States, had increased their real gross domestic product (GDP) over the last 15 years while actually reducing their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.1

Earlier, the International Energy Agency (IEA) had found that the world’s emissions remained flat in 2014 and 2015 even as GDP continued to grow by more than 3 percent in each year.2

In sum, an important juncture—anticipated for years—had finally been reached. For the first time, the globe’s growth and emissions had “decoupled.” For a moment, the data warranted a small measure of encouragement that the world’s nations might be able to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions enough to limit global mean surface temperature increases to less than 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, an objective agreed to at the Paris climate summit.3

Yet now all of that is in question.

With the stunning election of Donald Trump to the presidency, every aspect of the low-carbon paradigm for national and world progress has been thrown into doubt, starting with the government’s support of the push to “decarbonize” the economy by decoupling economic growth from emissions growth.4

Trump, after all, openly disavows the concept of human-caused climate change; has threatened to pull the United States out of the Paris climate agreement, through which 175 nations have pledged to cut back on emissions; and promises to scrap major regulations like the Clean Power Plan, which aims to reduce CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants. More broadly, the president-elect does not subscribe to the paradigm of decarbonization for the world or the nation. All in all, it seems fair to say that federal climate policy will all but disappear in the coming years.

All of which raises the question of how resilient the decarbonization paradigm is at the state and local level at a moment of federal retreat.

States and cities are crucial players in the carbon drama because global and national emissions reductions originate in specific locations.

States and cities matter, in this regard, because they control much of the legal and policy power that can control emissions.5 State public utility commissions regulate investor-owned electric utilities. State legislatures set and update renewable energy and energy-efficiency targets and portfolio standards. And states shape land-use rules, building codes, and transportation systems that are implemented and delivered by municipalities and metropolitan planning organizations. In fact, it’s safe to say that the largest share of America’s past progress on cleaning carbon out of the economy in recent decades has owed to state and local efforts.6

Which is why state and local progress on emissions matters more than ever as Donald Trump takes office. With the likely coming abdication of federal leadership on energy and climate issues, cities and states—which are already important laboratories for clean energy problem-solving—represent a possible counterbalance to a climate-skeptic federal government.

More than 30 states have delinked their growth and carbon emissions, confirming that economic growth does not inevitably require emissions growth

And so this brief looks at state-level decoupling trends by matching data on real GDP growth between 2000 and 2014 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia with data on energy-related carbon dioxide emissions for the same years and locations.7 In doing so, the brief provides an initial baseline look at the pace and geography of state-side decoupling and decarbonization—with an eye to assessing state-level momentum on the brink of federal pull-back.

What do these data show? Overall, more than 30 states have delinked their growth and carbon emissions, showing that economic growth does not inevitably require emissions growth. At the same time, the pace and degree of states’ decoupling vary widely, with distinct regional dynamics.

Pinpointing the precise factors that are influencing these outcomes is mostly beyond the scope of this analysis. However, it is clear that many states have made progress in delinking emissions from growth through the replacement of coal-burning power plants with natural gas-fired plants or, in some cases, renewables.8 Nuclear generation and changes in states’ industrial structure have played a role as well.9 And while formal statistical analyses of the role of clean energy policy in decarbonization are also beyond the scope of this study, it is fair to say that state- and city-level policy choices have also contributed to decoupling and decarbonization.10

In short, while decarbonization is not happening nearly fast enough in most states, as a final analysis here shows, state-level policy choices and economic trends have fostered solid momentum that in many places could proceed even without federal leadership.

Yet even still, the outlook is more challenging than ever. Continued progress on decoupling will require heroic, expanded efforts by more states—and hopefully some degree of support from Washington.

How and where growth and carbon have decoupled

Why does carbon decoupling matter? Decoupling is important because it represents the squaring of the circle—the accomplishment of a task some have said was impossible—necessary to decarbonize the global economy.

Deep reductions in carbon emissions will be necessary to transition the world to a low-carbon economy consistent with the internationally agreed goal of limiting human-associated global warming. Holding the world’s climate to 2 degrees Celsius of warming, as the world community has agreed is imperative, will require cutting the world’s greenhouse gas emissions 40 to 70 percent from their 2010 levels by 2050 and to zero by the century’s end.11 Such an accomplishment will entail a profound transformation of the economy.

At the same time, governments across the globe—especially in the developing world—are faced with the challenge of promoting faster economic development. Even in the United States an often torpid recovery from the Great Recession has prompted calls for faster growth.12

These twin demands combine to form the challenge of the present (one that Donald Trump rejects): Can the world decarbonize the economy and erase emissions by the end of the century while maintaining or accelerating growth?

For most of the 20th century, the possibility of preserving growth and erasing emissions remained theoretical and was most commonly presented as an unsatisfactory, divisive face-off between the “growth imperative” and the “climate imperative.” Consequently, conventional views on the relationship between economic growth on the one hand and energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions on the other generally claimed that economic growth would lead to an increase in production and therefore to an increase in energy use and emissions.13

Yet in recent decades, more and more data have confirmed that it is possible to address global climate challenges while preserving economic growth and prosperity. (See Figure 1.)

WRI’s analysis of 67 countries, for instance, shows that in the United Kingdom carbon emissions declined even as real GDP grew in five different years between 2000 and 2014.14 Over the full 14-year period, the United Kingdom reduced its carbon emissions while growing its economy by 27 percent. Similarly, Carbon Brief’s global analysis found that, while 45 nations reduced their emissions between 2000 and 2014, 35 did so while increasing their real GDP.15 Intensely urban Singapore, for example, scored the most dramatic decoupling, as it doubled its real GDP while slashing its CO2 emissions by 46 percent.

The United States first decoupled its economic growth and emissions in 2001, when it achieved a modest 2 percent reduction in carbon emissions while growing its economy by 1 percent.16 That was a recession year, but decoupling occurred again in 2006, a year of solid growth, before relapsing. More recently, the nation’s emissions and growth decoupled from 2010 to 2012, and then again in 2015. Emissions decoupling has clearly become more frequent amid the ongoing large-scale switch from coal to natural gas—driven by the hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) boom. At the same time, numerous other factors are clearly influencing outcomes, ranging from changes in the structure and growth of the national economy to investment decisions and technology change to land-use change and the availability of clean new energy resources, including renewables.17

Hence the present assessment: To examine decoupling trends at the state level, this analysis links state-level GDP data to state-level carbon emissions information to provide a simple look at states’ progress on decarbonization. Secondarily, some observations are made about some of the state-side influences on those trends, especially those involving states’ fuel mix and industry structure.18 Finally, in concluding, a few observations are offered about the prospects for maintaining progress in the current policy environment.

Findings

Decoupling is occurring in most states, confirming that cleaning up the economy doesn’t necessarily put an end to growth

The Trump-style climate view frequently depicts efforts to curb emissions as a drag on economic growth. However, between 2000 and 2015 (the latest year available for national data), the United States expanded its GDP by 30 percent while cutting its emissions by 10 percent—making it the largest country that has had multiple years in which economic growth has been decoupled from growth in carbon emissions (see Figure 2).19 Many states have managed similar feats, which in turn confirms the compatibility of economic growth and emissions reductions and counters the Trump-style skepticism.

Altogether 33 states and the District of Columbia managed to expand their economies between 2000 and 2014 while reducing their carbon emissions (see Figure 3 and Appendix Table A). As a group, these jurisdictions expanded their economies by 22 percent while reducing their emissions by nearly 12 percent.20Maine achieved the largest CO2 decline among the 50 states, at 25 percent, while growing its economy by 9 percent.21 Among the larger states (in terms of GDP), Massachusetts,New York, and Georgia have seen some of the largest reductions in emissions since 2000. Massachusetts managed to cut its emissions by 22 percent even as its GDP grew 21 percent. New York and Georgia decreased their emissions by 20 percent and 17 percent while growing their GDP by 24 percent and 15 percent, respectively.

The pace of decoupling, meanwhile, has accelerated over time, with more and more states breaking the historically tight link between GDP growth and increased carbon emissions. For instance, only 14 states and the District of Columbia managed to sever the link between growth and emissions between 2000 and 2007. Among these pioneers were five New England states—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont—as well as New York. As a group, these early decouplers reduced their aggregate carbon emissions by nearly 4 percent between 2000 and 2007 while expanding their economies by 18 percent. However, since 2008, coinciding with the onset of the Great Recession, the number of decoupled states has doubled, with new states such as California, Georgia, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia joining the ranks of decoupled states (while a few from the earlier group, such as Connecticut, Maine, and Nevada, fell off the list).22 Across this 36-state group of 2008-2014 decouplers, the average reduction in carbon emissions was 10 percent and GDP growth was 6 percent.

Overall, as discussed in more detail below, the largest reductions in energy-related carbon emissions, especially after 2007, can be attributed to the fuel use changes in the electric power sector.

More broadly, President-elect Trump’s notion of an opposition between economic growth and environmental stewardship appears to be a false one.

The pace and extent of decoupling vary greatly

Decoupling, meanwhile, has spread widely in the last decade, but not evenly. The trend is strongest among 11 states—mainly in the Northeast—and the District of Columbia that all reduced their carbon emissions by more than 15 percent during the years 2000–2014. Collectively these states have reduced their emissions by 19 percent while expanding their GDP by a robust 22 percent. These strong decouplers, except for Alaska, also tend to have the lowest per capita carbon emissions. New York, for instance, had the lowest per capita carbon emissions at 8.6 metric tons (mt) per capita in 2014, followed by Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maryland, which emitted around 10 mt per capita (see Appendix Table B).23 In general, the states with higher per capita emissions reduction also achieved the greatest overall reductions in carbon emissions during the study period.

At the same time, about eight states have experienced a weaker form of decoupling, with emissions reductions of less than 8 percent during the 2000 to 2014 period. These states have seen average emissions reductions of about 6 percent accompanied by GDP growth of about 25 percent. California falls in this category: despite its record of adopting stringent climate action policies, California reduced its emissions by a modest 6 percent during the study period while expanding its economy by 28 percent.24 California remains something of a unique case here: the initial low presence of coal-fired power generation in the state deprived it of the leading mechanism for reducing carbon emissions: fuel switch from coal plants. Thus, labeling California a “weak” decoupler during the study period does the state something of a disservice given its past progress, history of low-carbon policy, and low carbon emissions per capita, at 9.3 mt per capita. By contrast, states like Kansas, Kentucky, and Wisconsin, which generate an average of about 17.4 mt per capita—close to the national per capita emissions level of 17.0 mt per capita—are also exhibiting “weak” decoupling.

In between the strong and weak decouplers, meanwhile, lie about 14 states such as Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington that have each reduced their emissions by 8 percent to 15 percent while increasing the size of their economy by an average of 19 percent. As a group, these states have average per capita carbon emissions of 19.8 mt per capita.

Finally, the data reveal that 16 states, including Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, and Oklahoma, have not decoupled and instead experienced rising emissions (an average of 4 percent) along with rising GDP (32 percent) between 2000 and 2014. A few of these states have shown dramatic increases in emissions—for example, 26 percent in Nebraska and 16 percent in North Dakota. Not surprisingly, these 16 states also have some of the highest per capita carbon emissions in the nation. Wyoming’s carbon emissions, at 111.6 mt per capita, are the highest, followed by North Dakota’s, at 74.8 mt per capita. Decarbonization, while prevalent, is a work in progress as Donald Trump begins his presidency.

Multiple factors are influencing the pace of decoupling across states, and some of the most important factors are market trends and the shifting nature of state economies. Driven by technology change, global value chain decisions, and evolving consumer preferences, the nation’s economy has been shifting steadily from “dirtier,” more carbon-intensive goods production to less energy-intensive high-tech goods and services provision, and this transition may be contributing to decoupling in some states.

To be sure, a statistical analysis of the impact of changing industry structure on states’ carbon emissions did not find a highly visible relationship between state industry mix and emissions.25 Nevertheless, copious research highlights the link of sector change and emissions declines. These analyses document that traditional manufacturing is relatively energy- and carbon-intensive while higher-value, high-tech manufacturing is much less so. Services are even less energy- and carbon-intensive.26

Regardless of exactly how large the role of industry structure has been in reducing emissions to date, the present analysis does surface some interesting trends. States that have seen their economies shift significantly toward service delivery, for example, have tended to see reductions in their carbon emissions. In fact, almost all of the states that experienced the largest shift toward services industries also registered large declines in their carbon emissions during 2000–2014. For example, as Maine’s service sector’s share of real GDP (in millions of chained 2009 dollars) expanded from 75 percent in 2000 to 83 percent in 2014, its carbon emissions declined by 25 percent. Similarly, Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia all experienced some of the largest relative expansions of their service sectors among states and likewise achieved substantial carbon emissions declines of 20 percent, 17 percent, 15 percent, and 15 percent, respectively.27

Parallel trends have followed many states’ shifts away from energy-intensive manufacturing to cleaner forms of production, such as computer chip and electronic component manufacturing.28Nevada’s carbon emissions, for example, declined by 18 percent between 2000 and 2014 as the state’s output from energy-intensive manufacturing industries dropped from 44 percent of manufacturing output to 24 percent. Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Oregon witnessed similar trends as they shifted from commodity manufacturing to advanced manufacturing during the 15-year period. The role played by changes in state and local industrial structure in decoupling warrants further investigation.

In any event, significant decarbonization will continue to take place regardless of policy changes in Washington thanks to state and regional economic restructuring.

Region and fuel mix matter a lot

Determining even more of the varied state-by-state decoupling stories are significant differences in energy sourcing across regions, these often also driven by market-ordained price changes, such as the decline of natural gas prices made possible by the “fracking” revolution.

Northeastern and many Southern states, for example, have achieved some of the most impressive feats of decoupling, and their achievement owes to mostly favorable changes in the states’ fuel mixes, such as through the substitution of natural gas for coal in power plants. (See Figure 4 and Appendix Table C.)

Overall, Northeastern states have achieved the largest declines in carbon emissions—a collective 15 percent—even as they significantly expanded their economies by 19 percent between 2000 and 2014. Heavily influencing these trends have been changes in the region’s energy systems.

The Northeastern states, for instance, have been generating more electricity from natural gas and importing more hydroelectric power from Canada. Since 2000, the region has witnessed a dramatic shift away from petroleum and coal-fired generation to natural gas-fired output. This shift has raised concerns about overreliance on a single fuel, but it has clearly reinforced decoupling in the region.29 Natural gas accounted for 95 percent of Rhode Island’s net electricity generation in 2014, for example, and enabled significant delinking of growth and emissions. In Connecticut the share of net generation from natural gas jumped from 12 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2014. In Massachusetts it jumped from 28 percent to 60 percent.

New England states have also maintained or expanded the capacity of multiple zero-emissions nuclear plants, although the Vermont Yankee plant was taken out of service late in 2014.30 Nuclear’s share of net electricity generation went up from 23 percent in 2000 to 31 percent in 2014 in New York and from 14 percent to 19 percent in Massachusetts. Nuclear plants accounted for no less than 35 percent of Northeastern states’ electricity generation in 2014—the highest share among all regions. These choices have allowed these states to substantially reduce the use of coal and oil as generation fuels even while expanding their economies. In addition, the New England states along with New York and Delaware are members of the nation’s first regional cap-and-trade program, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which has capped carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of these states have led the national decoupling trend while driving their per capita CO2 emissions to some of the lowest levels among states.

In similar fashion, power-sourcing choices across the South have allowed multiple states there to sever the growth/emissions link. While not as impressive as the Northeastern states, the Southern states reduced their carbon emissions by 7 percent while growing their economies by 30 percent.

Most notably, significant coal-based power generation has been replaced by cleaner natural gas plants, as the share of net electricity generation from natural gas in the South increased from less than 20 percent in 2000 to 35 percent in 2014. Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, and Virginia have all shifted significant power generation to natural gas.

Southern states reduced their carbon emissions by 7 percent while growing their economies by 30 percent

In addition to natural gas, nuclear plants, which operate in 12 of the 17 Southern states, accounted for 19 percent of net electricity generation in the South in 2014. Maryland’s sole nuclear power plant supplies 38 percent of the state’s net electricity generation—increasing its share from 27 percent in 2000—and the state has curbed its emissions by 20 percent while expanding its economy by 33 percent. Tennessee has reduced its emissions by 19 percent while expanding its economy by 23 percent in part because its two nuclear facilities account for more than one-third of the state’s net electricity generation. In fact, nuclear power increased its share of Tennessee generation from 27 percent to 35 percent between 2000 and 2014. In short, the combination of nuclear plants and coal’s replacement by natural gas has enabled many Southern states to pull off some of the most dramatic decouplings in the country. Like Georgia, North Carolina has supported its double-digit growth and emissions reductions in large part by sourcing nearly 32 percent of its electricity from nuclear and 22 percent from natural gas. Coal-based generation has fallen to just 38 percent.31 That four new nuclear reactors are under construction in Georgia and South Carolina (with another due to begin commercial operation soon in Tennessee) suggest that multiple Southern states will continue their recent progress and have zero-carbon power at their disposal as they continue to grow.

Decoupling trends in the Midwest and West, by contrast, reflect a far less optimal set of fuel sourcing trends. Both Midwestern and Western states managed carbon reductions of just 5 percent each, while economic growth came in at 14 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Behind these trends lie distinctive energy-sourcing patterns. Most notably, Midwestern states have been able to switch far fewer coal-burning power plants over to natural gas than states in the Northeast and South. In 2014, for example, Midwestern states sourced just 7 percent of their electricity from natural gas generation, compared to 35 percent each for Northeastern and Southern states. That leaves the Midwest far more dependent on coal for generating power—61 percent in 2014 compared to 17 percent in the Northeast, 38 percent in the South, and 27 percent in the West. For example, in 2014 Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska depended on carbon-intensive coal for 60 percent, 82 percent, and 63 percent of their electricity production, respectively. For its part, while the West burns more natural gas (enough to account for 30 percent of electricity generation) than the Midwest, it runs far fewer nuclear plants. At present only Arizona, California, and Washington possess nuclear plants in the West, and the share of net electricity generated by nuclear declined from 10.5 percent in 2000 to 7.7 percent in 2014. (This drop may reflect the closure of the San Onofre plant in California in 2013).

A note about renewables is in order, meanwhile: wind and solar generation have yet to register as broad an impact on decoupling as might be expected—even in the green West. In this regard, while solar and wind’s share of electricity generation has been on the rise, its large-scale growth in some states dates only to the last decade, and so this analysis does not find a strong statistical relationship between states’ emissions reductions and solar and wind’s share of power generation.32 With that said, however, wind’s share of electricity generation grew from less than 2 percent in 2008 to 19 percent in 2014 in Idaho, and similar trends can be seen in Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. Texas leads the nation in wind-powered electricity generation, producing more than one-fifth of the U.S. total in 2014 and supplying 9.3 percent of its own power needs from that source.33 Similarly, solar generation has increased in a few states. California, for instance, became the first state in 2014 to get five percent of its electricity generation from solar. In 2014 solar contributed less than 3 percent to Arizona’s net electricity generation but had increased almost 50 percent from the previous year. However, in most of these states carbon emissions rose between 2001 and 2014, as well as in the period since 2008 when wind and solar development has taken place in the country. The positive impact of solar and wind energy deployment is probably being undercut by other factors. But it is likely that renewables will soon contribute to decoupling and decarbonization.

In sum, it is impossible to overestimate the importance of decisions, both market-ordained and otherwise, about electricity sourcing in states’ decarbonization. Overall, the Energy Information Administration concludes that changes in the national mix of electricity production—especially the shift toward cleaner-burning natural gas—accounted for more than two-thirds of the country’s and states’ emissions reductions between 2005 and 2015.34 And that link is extremely visible here. On the one hand, the rapid switch from coal to natural gas in scores of power plants has been a principal driver of state-level decoupling and emissions reductions.35 Altogether, coal’s share of state electricity generation declined in no less than 43 states and contributed heavily to emissions reductions in most states. (See Figure 5).36 On the other hand, nuclear power has helped a number of Northeastern and Southern states limit their carbon emissions since 2000.37 That Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, Maryland, Tennessee, and Michigan all increased the share of their electricity drawn from nuclear plants allowed these states to power growth with plentiful zero-carbon energy and so decouple strongly. At a time when more plants are being shut down than opened, however, it is important that Maryland, Tennessee, and New York are all increasing the nuclear share of their total generation. With that said, many more reactors will likely need to come on line in the next 30 years to enable the next round of deeper decarbonization.38

Going forward, policy uncertainty is going to be a variable in determining whether market dynamics and state self-determination can maintain adequate progress on decarbonization, particularly through stable renewables markets and nuclear expansion. With that said, significant progress has taken place during both supportive and challenging federal administrations. And to the extent that natural gas prices remain low, significant decarbonization will continue at least in the next few years by dint of the market-based substitution of coal by gas in power plants.

Despite significant progress, all states need to do more to decouple emissions from growth and decarbonize their economies.

Many states, in short, have made impressive progress in reducing carbon emissions and decarbonizing their economies. These gains have been achieved during both sympathetic and skeptical administrations, and much of that progress has been aided by the gas boom. In fact, in 2016 natural gas became the number one fuel source for electricity generation.39 However, much more needs to be done for the United States to come anywhere near to meeting the Paris goal of long-term decarbonization, which will remain an important benchmark whether or not Donald Trump withdraws from the global agreement.

To understand the challenge, it is helpful to consider the needed pace of decarbonization that will be required to prevent warming in excess of 2 degrees Celsius. Analysis from PricewaterhouseCoopers calculates that the global economy will need to cut its carbon intensity (meaning its emissions of CO2 per dollar of GDP) by a rapid 6.3 percent every year from now to 2100 to achieve that outcome.40 For its part, the United States will need to decarbonize its economy by 4.3 percent a year from now till 2030.41 What does that say about the current pace of decarbonization in the United States? It says that the nation and its states—notwithstanding recent progress made possible by the current windfall of the switch from coal to gas in many states’ power sectors—are falling far short of the goal.

At the national level, for example, the United States decarbonized its economy at a rate of 2.1 percent a year between 2000 and 2014—a pace just at half of the needed pace.

As to the states, some of them have reduced their carbon intensity faster than others and could be better positioned than others to achieve the needed 4.3 percent a year benchmark. (See Figure 6.) The decarbonization of state economies has been driven by two forces: changes in the energy intensity of the economy and changes in the carbon intensity of the energy supply.42 In keeping with those trends, at least 27 states and the District of Columbia have been decarbonizing their economies at rates above the national rate and sometimes exceeding the needed rate of 4.3 percent. At 5.1 percent and 4.4 percent, for example, North Dakota and the District of Columbia surpassed the needed 4.3 percent mark. Alaska,Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Oregon accomplished more than 3.0 percent average annual reductions in carbon intensity between 2000 and 2014.

The District of Columbia, for example, a city, has been able to lead the nation in decarbonization thanks to a combination of density, progressive energy policies, and fast growth across its relatively low-carbon service industries.43 North Dakota’s decarbonization is in some ways deceptive and cautionary, as it has been driven more by large oil and gas shipments from its fracking rigs than by a modest shift in its electricity mix from coal to wind energy. Maryland has achieved its rapid rate of decarbonization thanks to significant change in its energy intensity. The state’s economy is not energy intensive: service industries contribute two-thirds to state GDP while manufacturing, including the manufacture of chemicals and electronics, contributes less than 6 percent.44 In a similar fashion, Massachusetts and New York’s economies rely on less energy-intensive industries, such as financial services, information technology, health care, and professional, technical, and scientific services. Meanwhile, Missouri (0.4 percent a year decarbonization pace), Mississippi (0.7 percent), Nebraska (0.7 percent), and Illinois (0.7 percent) have barely decarbonized their economies at all. In short, all states will need to do significantly more to decarbonize their economies so that they can contribute to the national decarbonization target of 4.3 percent per year going forward.

It does not bode well that decarbonization has proceeded only half as fast as needed during a period encouraged by the pro-decarbonization Obama administration and empowered by a glut of cheap natural gas that allowed plentiful switches from coal.

Policy

Overall, the data on decoupling across U.S. states highlight some troubling dynamics but also an encouraging fact: that places can sever the historical link between economic growth and carbon emissions, and that local factors (not just federal ones) matter a lot to how this happens. Moreover, the trends depicted here suggest that while federal policy reversals could be traumatic, progress on decarbonizing the nation’s economy will likely continue regardless of Donald Trump, driven by technology advances, market dynamics, and state policy.

Those three trends—technological progress, market dynamics, and state policy—warrant confidence that the decarbonization of the U.S. economy will continue.

And yet, such confidence must be tempered given the coming sea change in federal energy and environmental policy.

Neither the world, the nation, nor the states are making enough progress at decarbonizing the world economy, even acknowledging the genuine progress of recent years. And now, the arrival of Trump in the White House promises vast uncertainty and likely setbacks.

States and cities, in short, are going to need to do much more. Which raises the question of policy. With responsibility for U.S. decarbonization now devolving to the states and cities, state and regional actors must fill the vacuum created by Washington’s abdication of leadership with new energy and resolve.

Policy choices at the state level are going to matter even more than in the past. Smart oversight of the utility sector, for example, to ensure the continued rapid switch from coal to gas in power plants should remain a top priority. Likewise, renewable portfolio standards—which have played an important role in increasing the production of energy from renewable sources in many states—must continue to be maintained.45 And then, states can double down on their recent experimentation in the area of green finance, in which some states have developed innovative uses of clean energy funds, green banks, and green bonds.46

Progress on decarbonizing the nation’s economy will likely continue regardless of Donald Trump, driven by technology advances, market dynamics, and state policy

Looking forward, the standards should be strengthened. States can regulate emissions from power plants within their own borders, push for deeper investments in energy efficiency, spur the development of new technology, and find other ways of cutting carbon emissions.47 Moreover, the important role of nuclear power in decarbonization underscores the importance of state-level regulatory support. More states need to expressly include nuclear energy in their renewable energy plans, and more states should consider, as New York has done recently, ways to subsidize and otherwise support struggling nuclear plants to keep them running.48 Enlightened renewables development will also be crucial.

At the same time, states will need to push back against the most disruptive policy assaults from Washington and demand a minimum viable platform of basic policy supports.

What might that platform look like? Investment in clean energy research and development may provide one element of it, since clean energy R&D has long enjoyed broad support in both parties. Likewise, Congress should leave in place key wind and solar tax breaks, which were extended in a bipartisan deal through 2020 and 2021 and enjoy pockets of GOP support. There also exists the opportunity to leverage Trump’s promise to invest over $500 billion in infrastructure to modernize and expand the electrical grid to eliminate impediments to the long-term growth of clean energy resources.

Beyond that, Trump-circle statements suggest the president-elect may support actions to expand the nation’s nuclear capacity, which will be critical to developing a clean, modern power system. To that end, state leaders should impress upon the new administration the urgent need to take steps—in partnership with state and local regulatory authorities—to use production payments, loans, efficient licensing, and other supports to ensure the continued operation of existing plants and the possibility of new plants coming on line.49 Research into safer, cheaper, more compact reactor designs would seem a viable priority for the new administration.

In any event, states are going to need to lead in the next years. Whether they can be successful or not, their goal must be a bottom-up brand of American decarbonization strong enough to mitigate the worst costs of federal abdication, if that is what occurs.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the reality of emissions decoupling across nations and states confirms that the transition to a modern energy system can occur without sacrificing growth, contrary to the false notion in command in Washington that these are opposing forces. In fact, the decoupling of economic growth from carbon emissions in so many states demonstrates that states and cities alike now have the opportunity—with or without federal partnership—to craft a new sort of growth that at once widens the circle of prosperity and achieves environmental sustainability.

The challenge now is to spread the decoupling of growth from emissions to all states, increase the pace of decarbonization, and maintain it for decades to come with or without the help of Washington.

That the main responsibility for this urgent project has fallen to America’s states and regions may seem discouraging, but it is nothing new—and it does not rule out success.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/metro_20161206_carbon_emissions-e1481061661275.jpg?w=270“Decoupling” economic growth from the growth of carbon emissions is critical for the world, nations, and states alike because it represents the “squaring of the circle” necessary to decarbonize the global economy while maintaining economic growth.
In recent years, at least 35 countries, including the United States, have increased their real gross domestic product (GDP) while reducing their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This success is an encouraging juncture in the campaign to limit global warming, and would seem to license cautious optimism.
Yet now all of that is in question. With the stunning election of Donald Trump to the presidency, every aspect of the low-carbon paradigm for national and world progress has been thrown into doubt, starting with the federal government’s support of the quest to “decarbonize” the economy by decoupling economic growth from emissions growth.
All of which raises the question of how resilient the decarbonization paradigm is at the state and local level. Given their substantial powers to encourage emissions decoupling, states and cities are crucial players in the carbon drama. Therefore, it is worth assessing whether states’ and localities’ momentum on decoupling is strong enough to maintain recent progress.
And so this brief takes a look at state-level decoupling trends by matching data on real GDP growth between 2000 and 2014 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia with data on energy-related carbon dioxide emissions for the same years and locations. In doing so, the brief provides an initial baseline look at the pace and geography of state-side decoupling and decarbonization—with an eye to assessing state-level momentum on the brink of federal pull-back.
What do these data show? Overall, they show that more than 30 states have delinked their growth and carbon emissions, confirming that economic growth does not inevitably require emissions growth. At the same time, the findings of this report provide a layered assessment that runs as follows:
- Decoupling is occurring in most U.S. states, confirming that cleaning up the economy doesn’t necessarily put an end to growth - However, the pace and extent of decoupling varies greatly - Market forces and changes in states’ economic structures are one set of influences on carbon emissions and decoupling - Region and fuel mix matter a lot - Despite significant progress, all states need to do more to decouple emissions from growth and decarbonize their economies in keeping with the goal of holding global mean temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius
As to the future, states and cities are going to need to do much more to maintain and accelerate the pace of local, national, and global decarbonization. With responsibility for U.S. decarbonization now devolving to the states and cities, state and regional actors will need to fill the vacuum created by Washington’s abdication of leadership with new energy and resolve.
Read the full brief here »
Introduction
In April 2016, when the presidential primaries were just warming up and Donald Trump’s candidacy was a longshot, separate analyses by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the UK-based Carbon Brief concluded that at least 35 countries, including the United States, had increased their real gross domestic product (GDP) over the last 15 years while actually reducing their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.1
Earlier, the International Energy Agency (IEA) had found that the world’s emissions remained flat in 2014 and 2015 even as GDP continued to grow by more than 3 percent in each year.2
In sum, an important juncture—anticipated for years—had finally been reached. For the first time, the globe’s growth and emissions had “decoupled.” For a moment, the data warranted a small measure of encouragement that the ... “Decoupling” economic growth from the growth of carbon emissions is critical for the world, nations, and states alike because it represents the “squaring of the circle” necessary to decarbonize the global economy while ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-framework-for-building-resilience-to-climate-change-through-girls-education-programming/A framework for building resilience to climate change through girls’ education programminghttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/237421414/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~A-framework-for-building-resilience-to-climate-change-through-girls%e2%80%99-education-programming/
Fri, 02 Dec 2016 19:42:03 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=research&p=345054

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Girls’ education and climate change are currently two of the most topical global issues in the development arena. Due to a myriad of limiting factors, more girls around the world are falling through the cracks in terms of their educational access, retention, and learning. At the same time, many countries and regions are facing more frequent and more intense climate-related extreme weather events such as heat waves, floods and droughts.

However, there appears to be minimal convergence between climate change and girls’ education conversations despite the negative effects that climatic shocks, such as droughts, have on girls’ education. As such droughts threaten to erode the gains made thus far to keep all girls and boys in school. Further, the climate factor has not been fully incorporated into education sector planning, girls’ education program design and donor funding models for this work, thus rendering it impossible for the education sector to respond to drought. Ultimately, the opportunity cost of using a “business as usual” approach to girls’ education is high for everyone involved—policymakers, donors, and development actors alike, but more so for the girls themselves.

This paper reflects some initial thinking on the significance of climate change, and more specifically drought, as a barrier to girls’ education. The paper highlights the opportunities presented by girls’ education work to build climate resilience at multiple levels—program, school, and community as well as at the level of the girl child—with a view to fostering a partnership between actors in the climate change and girls’ education sectors, which collectively ensures that every girl continues to learn, especially during crises.

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Girls’ education and climate change are currently two of the most topical global issues in the development arena. Due to a myriad of limiting factors, more girls around the world are falling through the cracks in terms of their educational access, retention, and learning. At the same time, many countries and regions are facing more frequent and more intense climate-related extreme weather events such as heat waves, floods and droughts.
However, there appears to be minimal convergence between climate change and girls’ education conversations despite the negative effects that climatic shocks, such as droughts, have on girls’ education. As such droughts threaten to erode the gains made thus far to keep all girls and boys in school. Further, the climate factor has not been fully incorporated into education sector planning, girls’ education program design and donor funding models for this work, thus rendering it impossible for the education sector to respond to drought. Ultimately, the opportunity cost of using a “business as usual” approach to girls’ education is high for everyone involved—policymakers, donors, and development actors alike, but more so for the girls themselves.
This paper reflects some initial thinking on the significance of climate change, and more specifically drought, as a barrier to girls’ education. The paper highlights the opportunities presented by girls’ education work to build climate resilience at multiple levels—program, school, and community as well as at the level of the girl child—with a view to fostering a partnership between actors in the climate change and girls’ education sectors, which collectively ensures that every girl continues to learn, especially during crises.
Download the full report » Girls’ education and climate change are currently two of the most topical global issues in the development arena. Due to a myriad of limiting factors, more girls around the world are falling through the cracks in terms of their educational ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-the-us-coal-leasing-program-royalty-rates-and-auction-practices-do-not-reflect-the-social-costs-of-coal/Reforming the US coal leasing program: Royalty rates and auction practices do not reflect the social costs of coalhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236856800/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~Reforming-the-US-coal-leasing-program-Royalty-rates-and-auction-practices-do-not-reflect-the-social-costs-of-coal/
Thu, 01 Dec 2016 07:01:34 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=research&p=343713

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About 40% of all coal mined in the United States is extracted from lands owned by the federal government, under leases managed by the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). As 13% of U.S. energy-related greenhouse gas emissions come from burning coal, and the U.S. boasts 10% of the world’s known coal reserves, federal coal alone has the potential to contribute substantially to CO2 atmospheric concentrations.

In response to calls for reform to the Department of Interior’s coal leasing program, resulting from the Paris agreement and U.S. efforts to reduce CO2 emissions, DOI has suspended all new leases while working to develop the program’s first major reform since 1982. In a new paper, Brookings Senior Fellow Adele Morris and co-authors review existing knowledge of key issues relevant to DOI reform before turning to actions that would contribute to more informed debate and policy development.

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About 40% of all coal mined in the United States is extracted from lands owned by the federal government, under leases managed by the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). As 13% of U.S. energy-related greenhouse gas emissions come from burning coal, and the U.S. boasts 10% of the world’s known coal reserves, federal coal alone has the potential to contribute substantially to CO2 atmospheric concentrations.
In response to calls for reform to the Department of Interior’s coal leasing program, resulting from the Paris agreement and U.S. efforts to reduce CO2 emissions, DOI has suspended all new leases while working to develop the program’s first major reform since 1982. In a new paper, Brookings Senior Fellow Adele Morris and co-authors review existing knowledge of key issues relevant to DOI reform before turning to actions that would contribute to more informed debate and policy development.
Get access to the full paper at Science Magazine »About 40% of all coal mined in the United States is extracted from lands owned by the federal government, under leases managed by the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). As 13% of U.S. energy-related greenhouse gas emissions come from ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/achieving-sustainability-in-a-5g-world/Achieving sustainability in a 5G worldhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236344838/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~Achieving-sustainability-in-a-G-world/
Wed, 30 Nov 2016 12:00:38 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=research&p=343102

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In September 2015, the United Nations established new global sustainable development goals and committed to “protect the planet from degradation, including through sustainable consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural resources and taking urgent action on climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations.”

In this paper, Darrell West examines the ways in which technology can help the international community achieve its ambitious sustainability goals. As the world faces major conservation and environmental challenges in terms of water and air quality, energy and transportation, and building design, the paper contends, technology advances are underway that will help people deal with those problems.

West details the scope of the environmental challenges facing our world, nothing that understanding their reach is vital to determining ways to mitigate their negative consequences and to identifying which emerging technologies are going to improve service delivery and further economic opportunity.

West goes on to examine the many companies and cities today that are deploying existing technology solutions that help with resource management and monitoring. And he discusses the intelligent devices of the future, including sensors and other connected devices, that will enable never-before-seen data analytics that will generate social and economic benefits including things like traffic alleviation, smart building design and energy management—all informed using advanced intelligent networking capability.

As governments prepare to adopt these new technologies, West cautions, officials should be cognizant of the rule of unintended consequences. Policymakers sometimes adopt measures that improve outcomes in some areas while hindering other ones. Recognizing the importance of maintaining technology neutrality, and supporting open, standards-based performance rules are a much better approach than issuing technology mandates.

Ultimately, West concludes, with the emerging 5G network and the internet of things, it is possible to deploy technology in ways that protect the environment and promote long-term sustainability. These new technology innovations have the potential to become an integral part of and accelerate global efforts to address the challenges of sustainability. With 5G, governments, industry, communities, and individuals will have the connectivity, capability and agility to meet many of the challenges the world faces as we work towards ensuring the lasting protection of the planet and its resources.

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In September 2015, the United Nations established new global sustainable development goals and committed to “protect the planet from degradation, including through sustainable consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural resources and taking urgent action on climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations.”
In this paper, Darrell West examines the ways in which technology can help the international community achieve its ambitious sustainability goals. As the world faces major conservation and environmental challenges in terms of water and air quality, energy and transportation, and building design, the paper contends, technology advances are underway that will help people deal with those problems.
West details the scope of the environmental challenges facing our world, nothing that understanding their reach is vital to determining ways to mitigate their negative consequences and to identifying which emerging technologies are going to improve service delivery and further economic opportunity.
West goes on to examine the many companies and cities today that are deploying existing technology solutions that help with resource management and monitoring. And he discusses the intelligent devices of the future, including sensors and other connected devices, that will enable never-before-seen data analytics that will generate social and economic benefits including things like traffic alleviation, smart building design and energy management—all informed using advanced intelligent networking capability.
As governments prepare to adopt these new technologies, West cautions, officials should be cognizant of the rule of unintended consequences. Policymakers sometimes adopt measures that improve outcomes in some areas while hindering other ones. Recognizing the importance of maintaining technology neutrality, and supporting open, standards-based performance rules are a much better approach than issuing technology mandates.
Ultimately, West concludes, with the emerging 5G network and the internet of things, it is possible to deploy technology in ways that protect the environment and promote long-term sustainability. These new technology innovations have the potential to become an integral part of and accelerate global efforts to address the challenges of sustainability. With 5G, governments, industry, communities, and individuals will have the connectivity, capability and agility to meet many of the challenges the world faces as we work towards ensuring the lasting protection of the planet and its resources.
Please read the full report here. In September 2015, the United Nations established new global sustainable development goals and committed to “protect the planet from degradation, including through sustainable consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/11/29/climate-accord-in-the-balance/Climate accord in the balancehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236344842/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~Climate-accord-in-the-balance/
Tue, 29 Nov 2016 15:25:43 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=344274

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The United Nations’ Conference of the Parties (COP22) in Marrakech on November 7-18, 2016, pressed ahead on the daunting climate agenda, trying to make more concrete their Paris (COP21) commitments. The meetings came on the heels of some rare successes: ratification of the historic Paris accord; a climate deal for aviation; and an agreement to phase out harmful hydrofluorocarbons. But Donald Trump’s election victory in the United States deflated much of the optimism because of his pledged to renege on the Paris accord and withdraw U.S. support for cutting carbon emissions.

Trump’s victory has indeed made the critical agenda of protecting our planet that much more difficult, at least for the present. But the crucial question is whether the emerging U.S. position on climate action will permanently set back momentum and action. We doubt this—mostly on pragmatic grounds.

A crucial question concerns the future of fossil fuels. Worldwide, more than two-thirds of electric power generation relies on fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, and petroleum), more than two-thirds of which is coal (see Figure 1). Even in the U.S., one-third of power generation is still based on coal. But coal power production in the U.S. is on its way out as power plants are being shut down for health reasons. Also, natural gas production in the U.S. is at an all-time high, and coal plants cannot compete with low-cost natural gas. The U.S. has come too far in cleaning up its air and water to revert to polluting technologies in unbridled coal and steel production that cause asthma, cancers, and loss of productivity. Similar concerns exist in Germany, France, as well as China and India where the desire for electricity is being tempered by deadly smog, pollution, and health effects.

While Trump and other Republicans have taken the view that climate change is a hoax, even as it flies in the face of scientific evidence and the views of the vast majority of scientists. The latest findings add fresh urgency for action: the rise of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over the past half a century; the last 16 of 17 years being the warmest on record; intense floods, storms, droughts, and heat waves linked to global warming; and much of the Arctic Ocean temperatures are currently peaking at an extreme 20 degrees Celsius warmer than normal for this time of the year. The weight of all this evidence will be hard for the new administration to ignore.

The U.S. holds many of the keys to technological breakthroughs: higher-efficiency, cleaner fuels; longer-range electric cars; safer, smaller, self-driving cars; drones; robots; energy storage; and renewable energy. These are good for business, for climate change, and for better living. U.S. citizens want clean air and water. Opportunities for environmentally-friendly business are growing. The case for business opportunity and healthier living will likely be more persuasive than the argument for greenhouse gas reduction.

To create millions of jobs while maintaining a healthy environment, the only path going forward is through high tech, creativity, innovation, conservation, and efficiency in energy and production. In successful and growing states like California and New York, most people did not vote for Trump. He was elected by the unhappy Rust Belt population who had lost their steel, coal, and automotive jobs. Their old jobs are not coming back, and new avenues must be opened—in the U.S. and worldwide.

The way to sustaining economic growth globally has to be environmentally friendly, therefore also low-carbon and efficient. Having realized the devastation from air and water pollution, China and India, the fastest-growing large economies, are keen to adopt cleaner energy. Germany has been a leader in decoupling greenhouse gas emissions from economic growth. More than a hundred nations have ratified the Paris accord. The Marrakech climate conference expressed the deep fears and strong commitments of the global leadership. For a new U.S. administration, the forces for a sustainable planet will be hard to resist.

The U.S. has been instrumental in achieving the recent climate accords and breakthroughs. The U.S. has also been a powerhouse in developing technologies for clean energy, clean transport, and clean water. That role is needed now more than ever as new evidence from the World Meteorological Organization warns that global warming in 2016 (over the pre-industrial average) is likely to break 1.2 degrees Celsius, dangerously close to the 1.5 degrees Celsius limit set in Paris.

COP 22 was rightly fearful that a Trump administration would derail the delicate progress on climate change. But faced with scientific, political, economic, and environmental forces, its stance on climate change will likely end up being reasonable. Pragmatism in the face of the momentum created by global leaders should ultimately prevail.

The author acknowledges the collaboration on the subject with Vinod Thomas of National University of Singapore.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/rtx2trg3-e1480429964898.jpg?w=320The United Nations’ Conference of the Parties (COP22) in Marrakech on November 7-18, 2016, pressed ahead on the daunting climate agenda, trying to make more concrete their Paris (COP21) commitments. The meetings came on the heels of some rare successes: ratification of the historic Paris accord; a climate deal for aviation; and an agreement to phase out harmful hydrofluorocarbons. But Donald Trump’s election victory in the United States deflated much of the optimism because of his pledged to renege on the Paris accord and withdraw U.S. support for cutting carbon emissions.
Trump’s victory has indeed made the critical agenda of protecting our planet that much more difficult, at least for the present. But the crucial question is whether the emerging U.S. position on climate action will permanently set back momentum and action. We doubt this—mostly on pragmatic grounds.
A crucial question concerns the future of fossil fuels. Worldwide, more than two-thirds of electric power generation relies on fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, and petroleum), more than two-thirds of which is coal (see Figure 1). Even in the U.S., one-third of power generation is still based on coal. But coal power production in the U.S. is on its way out as power plants are being shut down for health reasons. Also, natural gas production in the U.S. is at an all-time high, and coal plants cannot compete with low-cost natural gas. The U.S. has come too far in cleaning up its air and water to revert to polluting technologies in unbridled coal and steel production that cause asthma, cancers, and loss of productivity. Similar concerns exist in Germany, France, as well as China and India where the desire for electricity is being tempered by deadly smog, pollution, and health effects.
Figure 1: World electricity generation by fuel (2012, percent of total)
While Trump and other Republicans have taken the view that climate change is a hoax, even as it flies in the face of scientific evidence and the views of the vast majority of scientists. The latest findings add fresh urgency for action: the rise of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over the past half a century; the last 16 of 17 years being the warmest on record; intense floods, storms, droughts, and heat waves linked to global warming; and much of the Arctic Ocean temperatures are currently peaking at an extreme 20 degrees Celsius warmer than normal for this time of the year. The weight of all this evidence will be hard for the new administration to ignore.
The U.S. holds many of the keys to technological breakthroughs: higher-efficiency, cleaner fuels; longer-range electric cars; safer, smaller, self-driving cars; drones; robots; energy storage; and renewable energy. These are good for business, for climate change, and for better living. U.S. citizens want clean air and water. Opportunities for environmentally-friendly business are growing. The case for business opportunity and healthier living will likely be more persuasive than the argument for greenhouse gas reduction.
To create millions of jobs while maintaining a healthy environment, the only path going forward is through high tech, creativity, innovation, conservation, and efficiency in energy and production. In successful and growing states like California and New York, most people did not vote for Trump. He was elected by the unhappy Rust Belt population who had lost their steel, coal, and automotive jobs. Their old jobs are not coming back, and new avenues must be opened—in the U.S. and worldwide.
The way to sustaining economic growth globally has to be environmentally friendly, therefore also low-carbon and efficient. Having ... The United Nations’ Conference of the Parties (COP22) in Marrakech on November 7-18, 2016, pressed ahead on the daunting climate agenda, trying to make more concrete their Paris (COP21)https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-future-of-global-governance-and-climate-action-in-a-changing-political-landscape/The future of global governance and climate action in a changing political landscapehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236344846/0/brookingsrss/topics/climatechange~The-future-of-global-governance-and-climate-action-in-a-changing-political-landscape/
Sat, 26 Nov 2016 07:06:56 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=event&p=344023

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The world’s change of political landscape adds to the uncertainties and challenges facing by international cooperation, demanding a reevaluation of the future of global governance. What do Brexit and U.S. election mean for international affairs? Is progress still possible in global governance? Could the Paris Agreement withstand the risk of a possible global diplomatic backlash?

On November 30, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center, Caixin Video and Columbia Global Center | Beijing co-hosted a public event on The future of global governance and climate action in a changing political landscape to discuss the above issues.

Above: Prof. QI Ye

Above: Prof. JIA Qingguo

Above: Prof. SHI Yinhong

Above: Prof. ZOU Ji

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2p1a8545.jpg?w=252
The world’s change of political landscape adds to the uncertainties and challenges facing by international cooperation, demanding a reevaluation of the future of global governance. What do Brexit and U.S. election mean for international affairs? Is progress still possible in global governance? Could the Paris Agreement withstand the risk of a possible global diplomatic backlash?
On November 30, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center, Caixin Video and Columbia Global Center | Beijing co-hosted a public event on The future of global governance and climate action in a changing political landscape to discuss the above issues.
Above: Prof. QI Ye
Above: Prof. JIA Qingguo
Above: Prof. SHI Yinhong
Above: Prof. ZOU Ji
The world’s change of political landscape adds to the uncertainties and challenges facing by international cooperation, demanding a reevaluation of the future of global governance. What do Brexit and U.S. election mean for international ...