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Sondermann on election results

Eric Sondermann, a longtime political operative and consultant sent this memo to members of Denver’s Policy Discussion Group

Looking Back – Ten Quick Takes

Voters were in a generous mood.The narrow defeat of Referendum D notwithstanding, voters were in arather generous mood yesterday. Beyond the passage of ReferendumC, it appears that local funding issues generally fared verywell. When even semi-conservative Lakewood approves a sales taxincrease after all of the bad press around the extravagances of theCity Manager, you know there is a pattern and that it was a good dayfor public sector interests.

Referendum C was won in the suburbs among centrist-to-conservative Republican voters.The fact that Referendum C carried Denver and Boulder counties in themid 60% range was no surprise. But by themselves, thoseleft-leaning, tax-friendly locales would not have done the trick hadthe rest of the state turned a cold shoulder. The suburbancounties extending up and down the Front Range are the gold mine ofColorado politics. And in those counties, Referendum C wascompetitive if not better than that. In my review, its passagewas sealed when it carried Republican-dominated Arapahoe County with52% of the vote. Beyond that, it carried Jefferson County by afraction of a point and won in Broomfield County at 51.5%. Evengoing south to Douglas and El Paso counties, the heart of conservatismin Colorado, the thumbs-down on Refer-endum was mild and modest with itgarnering 48.5% in Douglas County and a solid 47% in El PasoCounty. (If there was an exception to this pattern, it was in thenorthern suburb of Adams County and in Weld County which is becomingincreasingly an exurban place. Referendum C won only 42.5% of thevote in Adams County and just shy of 44% in Weld County. AndReferendum D barely cleared the 40% threshold in both of thosecounties. The juxtaposition of Adams and Weld with other majorFront Range counties suggests that the divide had more to do withsocio-economic factors than necessarily with political or ideologicalones.)

Beyond the Front Range, Referendum C did quite well in many parts of tax-sensitive, rural Colorado.With the exception of Mesa County (Grand Junction) and nearby Montroseand Delta counties where both Referendums C and D got completelycrushed, much of out-state and rural Colorado showed surprisingreceptiveness to the proposals. Referendum C won handy margins ina number of normally conservative, tax-sensitive areas ranging fromLogan, Phillips and Sedgwick counties on the northeastern plains to RioBlanco County in northwestern Colorado to Montezuma County in thesouthwestern corner of the state. And in a number of other ruralcounties on both the Eastern Plains and Western Slope, Referendum Clost – but only by a few points, thereby depriving the opponents of anykind of real margin.

This was won NOT on the air, but on the ground with an unprecedented coalition.In my estimation, the opponents held their own, if not better thanthat, in the campaign’s televised air wars. But that is not wherethis election was decided. The key to the passage of Referendum Cwas in the ground game and the unprecedented coalition of constituencygroups assembled by the proponents. This coalition extended farbeyond the usual suspects. As one lonely voter, I receivedrepeated mailings from groups that I had no idea I was a part of andwhich do not normally engage in such outright politicalgive-and-take. That coalition, fueled with passion andmotivation, then was able to generate a get-out-the-vote effort whichthe opposition could not begin to match.

Bill Owens laid it on the line and delivered a stand-up performance.There were many key players in this campaign, but the Governor was theindispensable one. This would not and could not have been wonwithout his active support and engagement. That role was mademore impressive by the simple fact that he was one of the few peoplewho actually paid a political price. And his price was a steepone. Further, he could have signed onto the compromise butlimited his campaign involve-ment to some token appearances. Instead, he decided to go “all-in”. That was an essentialcomponent of Referendum C’s passage. As I noted in a columnseveral weeks back (“ABCs of C&D Campaign”, Denver Post, 9.25.05),many voters of centrist or even conservative orientation may end upinclined to give Owens the benefit of the doubt, intuitively rejectingthe notion that he somehow became a big-spending liberal overnight.

This had to be done in an odd-numbered year.Yesterday’s turnout model worked substantially to the proponents’advantage. With the enormous turnout of last year’s intenselyfought Presidential race (to say nothing of the Governor’s publicopposition at that time), any such proposition would have been handilyand terminally defeated in 2004. And the dynamics of higherturnout and higher partisanship attendant to next year’s gubernatorialand legislative elections would have served to make 2006 equallyproblematic.

Referendum D lagged a few points behind Referendum C for a number of reasons.I would submit that there was no single reason but rather a handful offactors to explain why Referendum D ran a little over three percentagepoints (and critical points they were) behind Referendum C. First, Colorado voters have a rich tradition of splitting theirtickets, and in some ways, this was indicative of that pattern. Voters like to pick and choose, and to show their discernment. Second, the whole rationale and message of the “Yes” campaign relatedto Referendum C and not to D. Voters may not have understood itor felt that they had heard a convincing case. In this respect,Referendum D was something of an after-thought. Third, those30,000 swing voters who said “Yes” to C but “No” to D may have regardedbonded debt as somehow inconsistent with the idea of escaping a fiscalcrisis. Fourth and lastly, the ballot appearance and wording ofReferendum D was far longer and more convoluted and off-putting thanthat of Referendum C.

The media drumbeat was a thing to behold.When the media gets behind an issue with such relative unanimity (savefor talk radio) and at such full throttle, it is a notable event and isnot without its political impact. I thought that the newscoverage of this campaign was reasonably straight-forward andbalanced. Most indicative of that was the front page story in theSunday Denver Post (a paper that was as big a booster of these measuresas there was) a week out from the election as to the self-interestednature of some of the big dollars flowing into the proponent’scampaign. Of course, both papers as well as other mediums gaveperhaps excessive coverage to the tit-for-tat sound bites coming fromboth camps. But such is the nature of politics these days. On the editorial and commentary side, however, the drumbeat wasoverwhelming. When the Colorado Springs Gazette lines up withevery other media outlet in favor of a tax measure and then when theDenver Post runs a front page editorial for the first time in memory,you know that unprecedented unanimity and intensity have beenachieved. The effect of all this was to contribute to a sensethat a “Yes” vote was the safe, civically responsible course.

Ultimately, enough voters understood the rather limited scope of the issue.Related to the above point, and despite the predictable hyperbole onall sides, a critical mass of voters ultimately comprehended that thiswasn’t a tax increase or a proverbial blank check for a whole host ofnew government programs or a wholesale abandonment of TABOR. Despite polling that must have deeply concerned the proponents, showingthat far less than half of Coloradans really perceived a “fiscalcrisis”, that critical mass of voters who began the campaign without afirm attachment to either side finally got that this was essential acorrection to a TABOR flaw that prevented the state from reboundingfrom the recession early this decade (unlike family or business budgetswhich were not so constrained in rebounding as revenuesimproved). Had this been perceived as a repeal or wholesalegutting of TABOR, it never would have flown. But, instead, it wasseen – accurately, in my estimation – as fixing a glitch and gettingthe state out of a post-recession jam while preserving the essence ofTABOR.

The proponents had two or three times as much money, but that was not the variable.We will see what the final numbers show. But pre-election reportsshowed that the “Yes” forces had appreciably greater financialresources than the various allied groups on the “No” side. But toascribe that as a determining factor in explaining the outcome strikesme as focusing on a few trees while missing the forest. Incountless ballot issue battles, even modest advertising campaigns onbehalf of the opponents have been more than sufficient to defeataffirmative campaigns with far greater resources and advertisingbuys. In this case, the advertising campaign of the “No” sidestruck me as fully competitive with that waged by the proponents. In sum, there are a dozen-and-one factors that led to yesterday’soutcome. The matter of money and the differential in resourceswill be much discussed – but does not belong on that list.

Looking Forward – What Now

Shifting gears to the prospective, what does this mean going forwardinto the coming legislative session and election year? (Beyondthe fact that today was a really miserable one for bond dealers andhighway contractors who invested deeply in the “Yes on C&D”campaign only to be deprived of the payday that Referendum D would haveprovided.) A few observations:

_ Be careful about putting red or blue connotations on yesterday’s vote.Some will try to interpret the passage of Referendum C in partisanterms and as a continuation of the blue trend that Colorado witnessed(below the Presidential level) in the 2004 election. I havealready seen some such commentary today. I would urge severecaution and restraint in any such analysis. As set forth above,the political divide this week had at least as much to do withsocio-economic variables than with partisan or ideological ones. Unless huge chunks of Arapahoe, Douglas and El Paso counties havesuddenly morphed into Democratic strongholds – to say nothing of ruraltowns such as Sterling, Julesburg, Meeker and Cortez – one might wantto avoid colorizing this election in such bright and simplistic hues.

_ The 2006 legislative session will be different – but not pain-free.Had Referendum C failed, the coming session clearly would have been oneof rare difficulty and recrimination. Some would have pushedshort-term fixes such as securitization of tobacco settlement fundsand/or invoking the fiscal emergency clause of the state’s new tobaccotax. Others would have advocated that it was time for Coloradansto feel the rather dire consequences that Referendum proponents hadsaid would ensue. With the passage of this measure, legislatorsand policy-makers are not faced with those choices. But neitherare they home free. The fiscal hemorrhage has been stopped, butthe state budget is still not in fat-city. Most of the fundsrecouped will prevent further cuts. But only a fraction of thesefunds actually will be available for programmatic improvements. The line of those who think they were promised such new monies in thecourse of the “Yes” campaign is a long one. If over a thousandgroups were aligned in support of the campaign, then rest assured thatthere were a thousand meetings or conference calls this morning – eachone trying to figure out how to best angle for a chunk of newfunds. Seniors who think their homestead exemption is about to berestored will be heard from…as will community college faculty andstudents who finally sense some relief…as will parents of severelydisabled kids who were front and center at campaign photo-ops. With the defeat of Referendum D, highway interests will be looking toannual appropriations to aggressively fund the state’s road and bridgeneeds. And on and on. New-found money is like a beacon towhich many will flock, particularly those who bring a sense ofentitlement from the proponents’ campaign.

_ With the “fiscal crisis” addressed, advocates for some new programs are free to take initiative.Had Referendum C failed, the state’s political mood and fiscalimperative would have been one of retrench-ment. Any newprogrammatic initiatives would have been regarded as superfluous andeffectively dead-on-arrival. But with the crisis now past, manyinterests and advocates who have been primarily playing defense canagain turn to their aspirations and think offense. Issues rangingfrom early childhood education to school capital construction inimpoverished districts to open space preservation will becomeincreasingly viable and elevate on the political radar screen.

_ Will the Republicans sing Kumbaya or is there more blood to be shed?Clearly, this campaign was notable for the palpable dissension inRepublican ranks. It was as bitter an intra-party fight as I canrecall in some time and exposed fault lines that may not be instantlyrepaired. My sense is that some degree of reunification will beeasier to achieve in the aftermath of Referendum C’s passage than wouldhave been the case had it failed. Still, it is hard to imagineBill Owens or Bruce Benson or Norma Anderson exchanging Christmasbaskets with Marc Holtzman or Joe Stengel or John Andrews. Interms of what has become a prematurely bitter gubernatorial primary, itis tempting to call yesterday’s results a terminal defeat for MarcHoltzman’s candidacy. That would be a mistake, in my book. While his message did not carry the day, it is not one to be minimizedamong Republican Party activists and primary election voters. Further, he gained significant exposure and name identification withoutspending hard-earned, Amendment 27-limited campaign dollars. Though, at the end of the day, it is difficult to imagine that hisnaked appeal to Republican base voters would make him a terriblyattractive general election candidate. On the Bob Beauprez sideof the equation, his disappearing act may well have been the wisepolitical strategy. But he will need to back-and-fill with bothRepublican supporters and opponents of yesterday’s ballotquestions. (Though Bill Owens will ensure that he has plenty ofcover with the former.) Ultimately, Beauprez benefits from thepassage of Referendum C in that, as the frontrunner and prospectivegovernor, he no longer needs to worry about inheriting a state in adeep mess.

_ Do the Democrats have an Act Two?Turning to the other side of the partisan aisle, the approval ofReferendum C presents its own set of problems and challenges toColorado Democrats. As I noted in a July op-ed ( “Success inTABOR-fixing C&D might backfire on state Dems”, Rocky MountainNews, 7.9.05), Colorado’s “fiscal crisis” has been the centralorganizing principle of the state’s Democratic leadership for much ofthe last decade. Their raison d’etre, if you will. Withthat mission accomplished, what comes next? Andrew Romanoff, JoanFitzGerald and their colleagues will need to roll out a legislativeagenda that no longer has TABOR reform as its focal point. Timewill tell whether that agenda is achievable and resonates withmainstream, centrist voters. Moreover, the sense of budgetarycrisis and Republican inattentiveness certainly contributed to theDemocrats’ 2004 legislative breakthrough. But now with that“crisis” redressed in the minds of most voters, the core Republicanmessage of fiscal conservatism (at least at the state level) may regaintraction. These factors will determine whether the 2004legislative elections were truly a turning point or simply anhistorical aberration.

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Those are some quick takes and observations. Many are open tointerpretation; some forecasts undoubtedly will be proven wrong. But in the meantime, I hope they are of interest and use in evaluatingTuesday’s results and in understanding what this “mother of all ballotissue campaigns” meant and didn’t mean.