The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is Australia's national transport safety investigator. The ATSB's function is to improve safety and public confidence in the aviation, marine and rail modes of transport. The ATSB is Australia's prime agency for the independent investigation of civil aviation, rail and maritime accidents, incidents and safety deficiencies.

Summary

Summary

On 7 March 1997, the Polish flag general cargo vessel Lodz
2 was lying at no. 24 berth, Victoria Dock, Melbourne. Using
one of the its own cranes, the ship was discharging a general cargo
of steel products, including bundles of steel pipes, from no. 2
hold and tweendeck.

At about 0740, the sixth load of steel pipes, for that morning,
was being discharged onto the wharf by no.1 crane, a 12.5 tonne
capacity crane situated on the aft end of the forecastle on the
ship's centreline. The crane was being driven by one of the
waterside workers.

The load, weighing approximately 8.6 tonnes, consisted of 18
lengths with diameters varying up to 273 mm. As the load reached
the side of the ship, there was a violent jolt and a bang as the
slew bearing failed, then the crane fell from its pedestal into the
port tweendeck of no. 2 hold. The jib struck the port bulwark,
setting it down and out from the ship's side, while the body of the
crane hit the inboard edge of the port hatch coaming, before
rotating through 180 and finishing up, upside-down, in the
tweendeck.

The driver was able to climb out through one of the broken cab
windows and up the ladders, out of the tweendeck to the main deck,
before the effects of shock caught up with him. He had fallen, in
the cab of the crane, approximately 17 metres into the tweendeck
from the crane's position on its pedestal.

An ambulance was called and the crane driver and a waterside
worker acting as the hatchman, also suffering from shock, were
taken to a medical clinic but were not detained. The crane was
severely damaged and the badly twisted jib had to be cut up to
remove it from the ship.

The incident was investigated by the Marine Incident
Investigation Unit under the provisions of the Navigation (Marine
Casualty) Regulations.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors which
contributed to the circumstances and causes of the incident and
should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any
particular organisation or individual.

No. 1 deck crane collapsed due to a catastrophic failure of the
slew ring bearing. The crane was not overloaded at the time of the
failure.

The slew ring bearing failed following a prolonged period of
progressive wear which went undetected at any statutory survey or
examination.

The extreme wear which led to the bearing failure was induced
largely by an almost total absence of lubrication for the
bearing.

The vessel had no established planned maintenance or
lubrication schedules for the deck cranes.

There was no record relating specifically to a measurement of
the bearing clearances at any time since the vessel was built, and
there was no record on board of the initial bearing clearances, by
which the wear rate could have been established. 6. Damage to the
jib of the crane, as witnessed by repairs, may also indicate that
damage to the slew ring bearing was initiated by some earlier
incident. 7. The standard of record keeping and the absence of
detail in certification, together with the condition of the slew
bearing of no. 1 crane at the time of the incident, would suggest
that the standard of survey over the last five years had not been
of an acceptable quality.