The much-hyped communal dimension (Sunni-Shia)
is probably a red herring, though. Arab arguments about Lebanon today
fall along regime-popular conflicts rather than Sunni-Shia. Despite the
sharp Sunni-Shia clashes in Iraq, and the anti-Iranian rhetoric coming
out of Arab capitals, the appeal to the wider Arab public of the Shia
Hezbollah movement seems to have only increased. Egypt’s very Sunni
Muslim Brotherhood has strongly backed Hezbollah, while al-Jazeera
(often described by disaffected Iraqi Shia as a “Sunni network”) has
given largely sympathetic coverage.

But a lot has transpired since then. Even if it was governments which fanned the flames, that doesn't mean that they can control the fire they unleashed. The scenes out of Iraq - from the daily violence to that accursed Saddam video - do seem to be sparking some real popular anti-Shia sentiment, regionalizing what started as an Iraqi civil war. A number of Arab commentators - including many who dislike American foreign policy and have in the past been sympathetic with Iran - now blame Iran and Ahmednejad for overplaying their hand in Iraq. The other day I mentioned Fahmy Howeydi as one example of this; today, the thoughtful Jordanian liberal Mohamed Abu Roman argues that Iran has revealed its true agenda against Arabs and Sunnis. Finally, as the Washington Post reports, the new Arab media appears to be contributing to the Sunni-Shia strife.

Combine all this, and we've got the makings of something very ugly. It isn't just the pro-American governments or Saudi media anymore: in an important recent essay published on the al-Jazeera website, the influential pan-Arabist journalist like Yasir al-Za'atra (no friend of American foreign policy) highlighted the historical and religious roots of the Shia threat to the Sunni Arab world. Quite a few other pieces on al-Jazeera and in al-Quds al-Arabi explore similar themes recently - often linking the anti-Shia trend to American foreign policy even as they support some if its main complaints. An al-Jazeera online survey (all usual caveats apply) found 73% blaming Iran for the deterioriating security problems in Iraq. In other words, now
we're seeing
something which goes well beyond the government-led campaign
against Iran and Hezbollah which we saw last summer.

The American response to this trend seems to be best described tacit encouragement (it is being driven almost exclusively by pro-American 'moderate Sunni' regimes - Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia). The popular idea out there, true or not, is that the US and its Arab allies hope to prepare the ground for a confrontation with Iran by turning Arab public opinion against the Shia (Edward Luttwak, for one, sees this as a positive trend). The official American position seems to be that that its concerns are all about Iran, not about the Shia, but that's not how it's playing out on the ground.

There's a very clear and obvious precedent for this anti-Shia/anti-Iranian mobilization, by the way: in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein rallied the Arab world against the Persian and Shia threat as part of his eight year war with Iran. 'Moderate Sunni' pro-American regimes - especially in the Gulf - rallied to the cause, and a lot of Arab journalists (whether on Saddam's payroll or not) happily raged against the Persian / Shia menace. Today, the United States and its Arab allies are seemingly replicating Saddam's Arab strategy against Iran, right down to the media campaigns. The mobilization also draws strength from the mainstreaming of the virulent anti-Shi'ism of the jihadists, which might rather bizarrely mean that American strategy is trying to reap what al-Qaeda has sown. Are Saddam and Zarqawi now America's role models and allies for dealing with the Iran question? That just can't be good.

Back to that Doha conference on Sunni-Shia relations. Ali Gumaa, the mufti of Egypt, for his part called on Sunni and Shia leaders to issue a joint apology and to work together to stem to the rising sectarian strife. I'd say that this is a good idea, albeit unlikely to make much difference at this point.

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Marc says, "The idea that a lot of Sunnis are converting to Shi'ism is bizarrely widespread given that I haven't been able to track down even a single documented case of it."

One of my Palestinian friends told me that in the wake of Israel pulling out of Lebanon in 2000, some members of the PFLP began paying a lot more attention to Hizbollah, listening to Nasrallah's speeches on CD, reading his and other Shia's writings, and not a few actually converted. A still quite small number, to be sure, but my friend assures me that it has happened.

Which is not to deny the larger point, that it most certainly is not widespread.

Hugh is right, although Palestinians have been listening to Hezbollah for awhile. Nasrallah and Hezbollah have been able to cross sectarian lines for two major reason: one, a common enemy and the proof that an unconventional army and an undeniably focused will can prevail over what often seems a Goliath-like conventional Israeli force, and second, Hezbollah's jump from strictly militantcy to political participation has set a great example that violence is not the only route to take and that groups can pursue a political option while attempting to phase out the militant one (no thanks to Israel for the July 06 debacle). What worries me about this Sunni-Shi'a rift that's quickly widening to a larger chasm throughout the Middle East proper, is that it can suck in old grievances and politicize even further governmental opposition in places like Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia where Shi'as are identified by their governments as illegal opposition. What easier way to rid yourself of "annoying" opposition than to label them "terrorists" or "Iranian-backed Shi'a" in order to target them and justify their imprisonment, torture or death. Not good, not good at all.

In light of the Sunni/Shia question, what do you make of this from Zawahiri's videotape today Marc?

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What a huge difference between the stance of those who accepted Resolution 1701 and the stance of the most sincere one, Abu Bakr which whom God was pleased, who when the Arabs apostatized, said "By God, if they refuse to give me a hobble, which they used to give the messenger of God, I will fight them over their refusal."

And what a huge difference between the stance of those who accepted Resolution 1701 and the stance of the Imam Husayn bin Ali (God was pleased with them both) who refused to give himself up saying, "no by God, I will not give them my hand like the meek and lowly, nor consent like a slave".

I'd be interested to know how Luttwak came to the conclusion that Siniora's "stand against the Shiite Hezbollah resonates with his fellow Sunnis of Syria" since I myself know at least a handful of Sunnis (admittedly not Syrian or Lebanese) who are greatly heartened by Hizbollah's continued display of non-violent civil disobedience and consider its claims for greater participation in government to be entirely legitimate. Would that Fatah could have followed Hizbollah's example and entered into some form of honourable opposition against the Hamas government instead of turning last year's Palestinian parliamentary elections to a joke.

I've heard cracks about "Hariri Inc" for quite a while, but today's strike does underscore the extent to which the divide is one of class as much as sect (not that those are totally divorced in today's Lebanon). The labor unions look like they're standing with Nasrallah, and the business community with Siniora. Pretty familiar, then: more like Venezuela than Iraq.