Under federal law, a person who is convicted of a felony is prohibited
from possessing firearms. The Secretary of the Treasury, acting through
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), may grant relief from
that prohibition if it is established to his satisfaction that certain preconditions
are established. See 18 U.S.C. 925(c). Since 1992, however, every appropriations
law for ATF has specified that ATF may not expend any appropriated funds
to act upon appliations for such relief. The question presented is whether,
despite that appropriations provision barring ATF from acting on such applications,
a federal district court has authority to grant relief from firearms disabilities
to persons convicted of a felony.

Whether petitioner's state common-law tort action, based on respondent's failure to install a propeller guard on a
motorboat, is preempted by the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq., or by the decision of the Secretary of Transportation in 1990 to take no regulatory action to require the installation of propeller guards on recreational
boats.

Whether the Michigan Supreme Court erred in holding that, under 49 U.S.C. 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) (1994) and 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(B) (iv)(III) (Supp. V 1999), only a State's generic fee is relevant to determining the fee that was collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.

The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act or Act),
26 U.S.C. 9701-9722 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), established the United Mine
Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund (Combined Fund) to ensure the continued
provision of health-care benefits to retired coal miners and their dependents
who worked under collective bargaining agreements that promised such benefits.
Those benefits are financed principally through premiums that must be paid
to the Combined Fund by "signatory operators" that employed miners
under those collective bargaining agreements and are assigned responsibility
for their retired miners' benefits. The Act provides that the Commissioner
of Social Security "shall, before October 1, 1993," assign responsibility
for each eligible retired coal miner to the signatory operator that employed
the miner (or to a "related person" of the signatory operator).
26 U.S.C. 9706(a). The Commissioner was unable, however, to complete all
such assignments before October 1, 1993.

The question presented is whether the Commissioner's assignments of responsibility
for retired miners that were made on or after October 1, 1993, are void.

In 1960, Congress declared that a former military post in Arizona would "be held by the United States in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land and improvements for administrative or school purposes for as long as they are needed for that purpose." Act of Mar. 18, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8. The question presented is whether that Act authorizes the award of money damages against the United States for alleged breach of trust in connection with such property.

Whether the Seventh Circuit correctly held, in acknowledged
conflict with the Ninth Circuit, that injunctive relief is
available in a private civil action for treble damages brought
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

Whether the Hobbs Act, which makes it a crime to obstruct,
delay, or affect interstate commerce by robbery or extortion
and which defines extortion as the obtaining of property
from another, with [the owners] consent, where such
consent is induced by the wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear (18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis
added)) criminalizes the activities of political protesters who
engage in sit-ins and demonstrations that obstruct the publics
access to a businesss premises and interfere with the freedom
of putative customers to obtain services offered there.

Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in holding, in square conflict with decisions of this
Court and of other circuits, that every Rule 60(b) Motion constitutes a prohibited "second or
successive" habeas petition as a matter of law.

Whether a court of appeals abuses its discretion in refusing to permit consideration of
a vital intervening legal development when the failure to do so precludes a habeas petitioner
from ever receiving any adjudication of his claims on the merits.

Is 23 U.S.C. § 409, a federal statute which protects certain documents "compiled or collected" in connection with certain federal highway safety programs from being discovered or admitted in federal or state trials, a valid exercise of Congress's power under the supremacy, spending, commerce, or necessary and proper clauses of the Constitution?

Do private plaintiffs have standing to assert "states' rights" under the 10th Amendment when their state's legislative and executive branches expressly approve and accept benefits and terms of the federal statute in question?

Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a State from listing convicted sex offenders in a publicly disseminated registry without first affording such offenders individualized hearings on their current dangerousness.

Whether, in computing their combined taxable
income from the export sales of aircraft during the
period from 1979-1984 under the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code pertaining to "domestic
international sales corporations" (26 §§ U.S.C. 991-997
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)), petitioners must take into
account expenses incurred for aircraft research and
development in the manner required by the thenapplicable
Treasury regulations.

Whether, in computing their combined taxable
income from the export sales of aircraft during the
period from 1985-1987 under the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code pertaining to "foreign sales
corporations" (26 §§ U.S.C. 921-927 (1988)), petitioners
must take into account expenses incurred for aircraft
research and development in the manner required by
the then-applicable Treasury regulations.

Whether the court of appeals properly held that the
United States is liable to the Navajo Nation for up to $600
million in damages for breach of fiduciary duty in connection
with the Secretary's actions concerning an Indian mineral
lease, without finding that the Secretary had violated any
specific statutory or regulatory duty established pursuant to
the IMLA.

Whether deep ripping, an activity that disgorges and redeposits soil in wetlands and waters of the United States to convert those areas to dry land, may result in a discharge of a pollutant for purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.

Whether petitioners' deep ripping of a wetland qualified for the conditional exemption from regulation under Section 404(f) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f).

Whether each violation of the Clean Water Act should be counted in determining the maximum civil penalty under Section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).

Whether the regulatory scheme for funding state
legal services by systematically seizing this property violates
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution so that the property owners are entitled to relief.

Whether injunctive relief is available to enjoin a
State from committing such a violation of the Takings
Clause, where the legislative scheme in issue clearly
contemplates that no compensation would be paid to the
owners of the interest taken, and where the small amount due
in any individual case often renders recovery through
litigation impractical.

Whether 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), the family medical care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, is a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, thereby constituting a valid exercise of congressional power to abrogate the states' 11th Amendment immunity from suit by individuals.

Whether respondent's mandatory detention under [8 U.S.C.] Section 1226(c) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, where respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony after his admission into the United States.

Whether a corporation is an "agency or instrumentality" if a
foreign state owns a majority of the shares of a
corporate enterpise that in turn owns a majority of the
shares of the corporation.

Whether a corporation is
an "agency or instrumentality" if a foreign state owned
a majority of the shares of the corporation at the time
of the events giving rise to litigation, but the foreign
state does not own a majority of those shares at the
time that a plaintiff commences a suit against the
corporation.

Whether petitioner's judgment of conviction became "final" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 6(1) one year after the court of
appeals issued its mandate on direct appeal or one year
after his time for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari expired.