[21.1]I consider myself at liberty to commence
what is only a section of my history with a prefatory remark such as most
writers have placed at the very beginning of their works, namely, that
the war I am about to describe is the most memorable of any that have ever
been waged, I mean the war which the Carthaginians, under Hannibal's leadership,
waged with Rome. No states, no nations ever met in arms greater in strength
or richer in resources; these Powers themselves had never before been in
so high a state of efficiency or better prepared to stand the strain of
a long war; they were no strangers to each other's tactics after their
experience in the first Punic War; and so variable were the fortunes and
so doubtful the issue of the war that those who were ultimately victorious
were in the earlier stages brought nearest to ruin. And yet, great as was
their strength, the hatred they felt towards each other was almost greater.
The Romans were furious with indignation because the vanquished had dared
to take the offensive against their conquerors; the Carthaginians bitterly
resented what they regarded as the tyrannical and rapacious conduct of
Rome. The prime author of the war was Hamilcar. There was a story widely
current that when, after bringing the African War to a close, he was offering
sacrifices before transporting his army to Spain, the boy Hannibal, nine
years old, was coaxing his father to take him with him, and his father
led him up to the altar and made him swear with his hand laid on the victim
that as soon as he possibly could he would show himself the enemy of Rome.
The loss of Sicily and Sardinia vexed the proud spirit of the man, for
he felt that the cession of Sicily had been made hastily in a spirit of
despair, and that Sardinia had been filched by the Romans during the troubles
in Africa, who, not content with seizing it, had imposed an indemnity as
well.

[21.2]Smarting under these wrongs, he made
it quite clear from his conduct of the African War which followed immediately
upon the conclusion of peace with Rome, and from the way in which he strengthened
and extended the rule of Carthage during the nine years' war with Spain,
that he was meditating a far greater war than any he was actually engaged
in, and that had he lived longer it would have been under his command that
the Carthaginians effected the invasion of Italy, which they actually carried
out under Hannibal. The death of Hamilcar, occurring as it did most opportunely,
and the tender years of Hannibal delayed the war. Hasdrubal, coming between
father and son, held the supreme power for eight years. He is said to have
become a favourite of Hamilcar's owing to his personal beauty as a boy;
afterwards he displayed talents of a very different order, and became his
son-in-law. Through this connection he was placed in power by the influence
of the Barcine party, which was unduly preponderant with the soldiers and
the common people, but his elevation was utterly against the wishes of
the nobles. Trusting to policy rather than to arms, he did more to extend
the empire of Carthage by forming connections with the petty chieftains
and winning over new tribes by making friends of their leading men than
by force of arms or by war. But peace brought him no security. A barbarian
whose master he had put to death murdered him in broad daylight, and when
seized by the bystanders he looked as happy as though he had escaped. Even
when put to the torture, his delight at the success of his attempt mastered
his pain and his face wore a smiling expression. Owing to the marvellous
tact he had shown in winning over the tribes and incorporating them into
his dominions, the Romans had renewed the treaty with Hasdrubal. Under
its terms, the River Ebro was to form the boundary between the two empires,
and Saguntum, occupying an intermediate position between them, was to be
a free city.

[21.3]There was no hesitation shown in
filling his place. The soldiers led the way by bringing the young Hannibal
forthwith to the palace and proclaiming him their commander-in-chief amidst
universal applause. Their action was followed by the plebs. Whilst little
more than a boy, Hasdrubal had written to invite Hannibal to come to him
in Spain, and the matter had actually been discussed in the senate. The
Barcines wanted Hannibal to become familiar with military service; Hanno,
the leader of the opposite party, resisted this. "Hasdrubal's request,"
he said, "appears a reasonable one, and yet I do not think we ought
to grant it" This paradoxical utterance aroused the attention of the
whole senate. He continued: "The youthful beauty which Hasdrubal surrendered
to Hannibal's father he considers he has a fair claim to ask for in return
from the son. It ill becomes us, however, to habituate our youths to the
lust of our commanders, by way of military training. Are we afraid that
it will be too long before Hamilcar's son surveys the extravagant power
and the pageant of royalty which his father assumed, and that there will
be undue delay in our becoming the slaves of the despot to whose son-in-law
our armies have been bequeathed as though they were his patrimony? I, for
my part, consider that this youth ought to be kept at home and taught to
live in obedience to the laws and the magistrates on an equality with his
fellow-citizens; if not, this small fire will some day or other kindle
a vast conflagration."

[21.4]Hanno's proposal received but slight
support, though almost all the best men in the council were with him, but
as usual, numbers carried the day against reason. No sooner had Hannibal
landed in Spain than he became a favourite with the whole army. The veterans
thought they saw Hamilcar restored to them as he was in his youth; they
saw the same determined expression the same piercing eyes, the same cast
of features. He soon showed, however, that it was not his father's memory
that helped him most to win the affections of the army. Never was there
a character more capable of the two tasks so opposed to each other of commanding
and obeying; you could not easily make out whether the army or its general
were more attached to him. Whenever courage and resolution were needed
Hasdrubal never cared to entrust the command to any one else; and there
was no leader in whom the soldiers placed more confidence or under whom
they showed more daring. He was fearless in exposing himself to danger
and perfectly self-possessed in the presence of danger. No amount of exertion
could cause him either bodily or mental fatigue; he was equally indifferent
to heat and cold; his eating and drinking were measured by the needs of
nature, not by appetite; his hours of sleep were not determined by day
or night, whatever time was not taken up with active duties was given to
sleep and rest, but that rest was not wooed on a soft couch or in silence,
men often saw him lying on the ground amongst the sentinels and outposts,
wrapped in his military cloak. His dress was in no way superior to that
of his comrades; what did make him conspicuous were his arms and horses.
He was by far the foremost both of the cavalry and the infantry, the first
to enter the fight and the last to leave the field. But these great merits
were matched by great vices - inhuman cruelty, a perfidy worse than Punic,
an utter absence of truthfulness, reverence, fear of the gods, respect
for oaths, sense of religion. Such was his character, a compound of virtues
and vices. For three years he served under Hasdrubal, and during the whole
time he never lost an opportunity of gaining by practice or observation
the experience necessary for one who was to be a great leader of men.

[21.5]From the day when he was proclaimed
commander-in-chief, he seemed to regard Italy as his assigned field of
action, and war with Rome as a duty imposed upon him. Feeling that he ought
not to delay operations, lest some accident should overtake him as in the
case of his father and afterwards of Hasdrubal, he decided to attack the
Saguntines. As an attack on them would inevitably set the arms of Rome
in motion, he began by invading the Olcades, a tribe who were within the
boundaries but not under the dominion of Carthage. He wished to make it
appear that Saguntum was not his immediate object, but that he was drawn
into a war with her by the force of circumstances, by the conquest, that
is, of all her neighbours and the annexation of their territory. Cartala,
a wealthy city and the capital of the tribe, was taken by storm and sacked;
the smaller cities, fearing a similar fate, capitulated and agreed to pay
an indemnity. His victorious army enriched with plunder was marched into
winter quarters in New Carthage. Here, by a lavish distribution of the
spoils and the punctual discharge of all arrears of pay, he secured the
allegiance of his own people and of the allied contingents.

At the beginning of spring he extended his operations to the Vaccaei,
and two of their cities, Arbocala and Hermandica, were taken by assault.
Arbocala held out for a considerable time, owing to the courage and numbers
of its defenders; the fugitives from Hermandica joined hands with those
of the Olcades who had abandoned their country - this tribe had been subjugated
the previous year - and together they stirred up the Carpetani to war.
Not far from the Tagus an attack was made upon Hannibal as he was returning
from his expedition against the Vaccaei, and his army, laden as it was
with plunder, was thrown into some confusion. Hannibal declined battle
and fixed his camp by the side of the river; as soon as there was quiet
and silence amongst the enemy, he forded the stream. His entrenchments
had been carried just far enough to allow room for the enemy to cross over,
and he decided to attack them during their passage of the river. He instructed
his cavalry to wait until they had actually entered the water and then
to attack them; his forty elephants he stationed on the bank. The Carpetani
together with the contingents of the Olcades and Vaccaei numbered altogether
100,000 men, an irresistible force had they been fighting on level ground.
Their innate fearlessness, the confidence inspired by their numbers, their
belief that the enemy's retreat was due to fear, all made them look on
victory as certain, and the river as the only obstacle to it. Without any
word of command having been given, they raised a universal shout and plunged,
each man straight in front of him, into the river. A huge force of cavalry
descended from the opposite bank, and the two bodies met in mid-stream.
The struggle was anything but an equal one. The infantry, feeling their
footing insecure, even where the river was fordable, could have been ridden
down even by unarmed horsemen, whereas the cavalry, with their bodies and
weapons free and their horses steady even in the midst of the current,
could fight at close quarters or not, as they chose. A large proportion
were swept down the river, some were carried by cross currents to the other
side where the enemy were, and were trampled to death by the elephants.
Those in the rear thought it safest to return to their own side, and began
to collect together as well as their fears allowed them, but before they
had time to recover themselves Hannibal entered the river with his infantry
in battle order and drove them in flight from the bank. He followed up
his victory by laying waste their fields, and in a few days was able to
receive the submission of the Carpetani There was no part of the country
beyond the Ebro which did not now belong to the Carthaginians, with the
exception of Saguntum.

[21.6]War had not been formally declared
against this city, but there were already grounds for war. The seeds of
quarrel were being sown amongst her neighbours, especially amongst the
Turdetani. When the man who had sown the seed showed himself ready to aid
and abet the quarrel, and his object plainly was not to refer the question
to arbitration, but to appeal to force, the Saguntines sent a deputation
to Rome to beg for help in a war which was inevitably approaching. The
consuls for the time being were P. Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius
Longus. After introducing the envoys they invited the senate to declare
its opinion as to what policy should be adopted. It was decided that commissioners
should be sent to Spain to investigate the circumstances, and if they considered
it necessary they were to warn Hannibal not to interfere with the Saguntines,
who were allies of Rome; then they were to cross over to Africa and lay
before the Carthaginian council the complaints which they had made. But
before the commission was despatched news came that the siege of Saguntum
had, to every one's surprise, actually commenced. The whole position of
affairs required to be reconsidered by the senate; some were for assigning
Spain and Africa as separate fields of action for the two consuls, and
thought that the war ought to be prosecuted by land and sea; others were
for confining the war solely to Hannibal in Spain; others again were of
opinion that such an immense task ought not to be entered upon hastily,
and that they ought to await the return of the commission from Spain. This
latter view seemed the safest and was adopted, and the commissioners, P.
Valerius Flaccus and Q. Baebius Tamphilus, were despatched without further
delay to Hannibal. If he refused to abandon hostilities they were to proceed
to Carthage to demand the surrender of the general to answer for his breach
of treaty.

[21.7]During these proceedings in Rome
the siege of Saguntum was being pressed with the utmost vigour. That city
was by far the most wealthy of all beyond the Ebro; it was situated about
a mile from the sea. It is said to have been founded by settlers from the
island of Zacynthus, with an admixture of Rutulians from Ardea. In a short
time, however, it had attained to great prosperity, partly through its
land and sea-borne commerce, partly through the rapid increase of its population,
and also through the maintenance of a high standard of political integrity
which led it to act with a loyalty towards its allies that brought about
its ruin. After carrying his ravages everywhere throughout the territory,
Hannibal attacked the city from three separate points. There was an angle
of the fortifications which looked down on a more open and level descent
than the rest of the ground surrounding the city, and here he decided to
bring up his vineae to allow the battering rams to be placed against the
walls. But although the ground to a considerable distance from the walls
was sufficiently level to admit of the vineae being brought up, they found
when they had succeeded in doing this that they made no progress. A huge
tower overlooked the place, and the wall, being here more open to attack,
had been carried to a greater height than the rest of the fortifications.
As the position was one of especial danger, so the resistance offered by
a picked body of defenders was of the most resolute character. At first
they confined themselves to keeping the enemy back by the discharge of
missiles and making it impossible for them to continue their operations
in safety. As time went on, however, their weapons no longer flashed on
the walls or from the tower, they ventured on a sortie and attacked the
outposts and siege works of the enemy. In these irregular encounters the
Carthaginians lost nearly as many men as the Saguntines. Hannibal himself,
approaching the wall somewhat incautiously, fell with a severe wound in
his thigh from a javelin, and such was the confusion and dismay that ensued
that the vineae and siege works were all but abandoned.

[21.8]For a few days, until the general's
wound was healed, there was a blockade rather than an active siege, and
during this interval, though there was a respite from fighting, the construction
of siege works and approaches went on uninterruptedly. When the fighting
was resumed it was fiercer than ever. In spite of the difficulties of the
ground the vineae were advanced and the battering rams placed against the
walls. The Carthaginians had the superiority in numbers - there were said
to have been 150,000 fighting men - whilst the defenders, obliged to keep
watch and ward everywhere, were dissipating their strength and finding
their numbers unequal to the task. The walls were now being pounded by
the rams, and in many places had been shaken down. One part where a continuous
fall had taken place laid the city open; three towers in succession, and
the whole of the wall between them fell with a tremendous crash. The Carthaginians
looked upon the town as already captured after that fall, and both sides
rushed through the breach as though the wall had only served to protect
them from each other. There was nothing of the desultory fighting which
goes on when cities are stormed, as each side gets an opportunity of attacking
the other. The two bodies of combatants confronted one another in the space
between the ruined wall and the houses of the city in as regular formation
as though they had been in an open field. On the one side there was the
courage of hope, on the other the courage of despair. The Carthaginians
believed that with a little effort on their part the city would be theirs;
the Saguntines opposed their bodies as a shield for their fatherland now
stripped of its walls; not a man relaxed his foothold for fear of letting
an enemy in through the spot which he had left open. So the hotter and
closer the fighting became the greater grew the number of wounded, for
no missile fell ineffectively amongst the crowded ranks. The missile used
by the Saguntines was the phalarica, a javelin with a shaft smooth and
round up to the head, which, as in the pilum, was an iron point of square
section. The shaft was wrapped in tow and then smeared with pitch; the
iron head was three feet long and capable of penetrating armour and body
alike. Even if it only stuck in the shield and did not reach the body it
was a most formidable weapon, for when it was discharged with the tow set
on fire the flame was fanned to a fiercer heat by its passage through the
air, and it forced the soldier to throw away his shield and left him defenceless
against the sword thrusts which followed.

[21.9]The conflict had now gone on for
a considerable time without any advantage to either side; the courage of
the Saguntines was rising as they found themselves keeping up an unhoped-for
resistance, whilst the Carthaginians, unable to conquer, were beginning
to look upon themselves as defeated. Suddenly the defenders, raising their
battle-shout, forced the enemy back to the debris of the ruined wall; there,
stumbling and in disorder, they were forced still further back and finally
driven in rout and flight to their camp. Meantime it was announced that
envoys had arrived from Rome. Hannibal sent messengers down to the harbour
to meet them and inform them that it would be unsafe for them to advance
any further through so many wild tribes now in arms, and also that Hannibal
in the present critical position of affairs had no time to receive embassies.
It was quite certain that if they were not admitted they would go to Carthage.
He therefore forestalled them by sending messengers with a letter addressed
to the heads of the Barcine party, to warn his supporters and prevent the
other side from making any concessions to Rome.

[21.10]The result was that, beyond being
received and heard by the Carthaginian senate, the embassy found its mission
a failure. Hanno alone, against the whole senate, spoke in favour of observing
the treaty, and his speech was listened to in silence out of respect to
his personal authority, not because his hearers approved of his sentiments.
He appealed to them in the name of the gods, who are the witnesses and
arbiters of treaties, not to provoke a war with Rome in addition to the
one with Saguntum. "I urged you," he said, "and warned you
not to send Hamilcar's son to the army. That man's spirit, that man's offspring
cannot rest; as long as any single representative of the blood and name
of Barca survives our treaty with Rome will never remain unimperilled.
You have sent to the army, as though supplying fuel to the fire, a young
man who is consumed with a passion for sovereign power, and who recognises
that the only way to it lies in passing his life surrounded by armed legions
and perpetually stirring up fresh wars. It is you, therefore, who have
fed this fire which is now scorching you. Your armies are investing Saguntum,
which by the terms of the treaty they are forbidden to approach; before
long the legions of Rome will invest Carthage, led by the same generals
under the same divine guidance under which they avenged our breach of treaty
obligations in the late war. Are you strangers to the enemy, to yourselves,
to the fortunes of each nation? That worthy commander of yours refused
to allow ambassadors who came from allies, on behalf of allies, to enter
his camp, and set at naught the law of nations. Those men, repulsed from
a place to which even an enemy's envoys are not refused access, have come
to us; they ask for the satisfaction which the treaty prescribes; they
demand the surrender of the guilty party in order that the State may clear
itself from all taint of guilt. The slower they are to take action, the
longer they are in commencing war, so much the more persistence and determination,
I fear, will they show when war has begun. Remember the Aegates and Eryx,
and all you had to go through for four-and-twenty years. This boy was not
commanding then, but his father, Hamilcar - a second Mars as his friends
would have us believe. But we broke the treaty then as we are breaking
it now; we did not keep our hands off Tarentum or, which is the same thing,
off Italy then any more than we are keeping our hands off Saguntum now,
and so gods and men combined to defeat us, and the question in dispute,
namely, which nation had broken the treaty, was settled by the issue of
the war, which, like an impartial judge, left the victory on the side which
was in the right. It is against Carthage that Hannibal is now bringing
up his vineae and towers, it is Carthage whose walls he is shaking with
his battering rams. The ruins of Saguntum - would that I might prove a
false prophet - will fall on our heads, and the war which was begun with
Saguntum will have to be carried on with Rome.

"'Shall we then surrender Hannibal?' some one will say. I am quite
aware that as regards him my advice will have little weight, owing to my
differences with his father, but whilst I was glad to hear of Hamilcar's
death, for if he were alive we should already be involved in war with Rome,
I feel nothing but loathing and detestation for this youth, the mad firebrand
who is kindling this war. Not only do I hold that he ought to be surrendered
as an atonement for the broken treaty, but even if no demand for his surrender
were made I consider that he ought to be deported to the farthest corner
of the earth, exiled to some spot from which no tidings of him, no mention
of his name, could reach us, and where it would be impossible for him to
disturb the welfare and tranquillity of our State. This then is what I
propose: 'That a commission be at once despatched to Rome to inform the
senate of our compliance with their demands, and a second to Hannibal ordering
him to withdraw his army from Saguntum and then surrendering him to the
Romans in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and I also propose that
a third body of commissioners be sent to make reparation to the Saguntines.'"

[21.11]When Hanno sat down no one deemed
it necessary to make any reply, so completely was the senate, as a body,
on the side of Hannibal. They accused Hanno of speaking in a tone of more
uncompromising hostility than Flaccus Valerius, the Roman envoy, had assumed.
The reply which it was decided to make to the Roman demands was that the
war was started by the Saguntines not by Hannibal, and that the Roman people
would commit an act of injustice if they took the part of the Saguntines
against their ancient allies, the Carthaginians. Whilst the Romans were
wasting time in despatching commissioners, things were quiet round Saguntum.
Hannibal's men were worn out with the fighting and the labours of the siege,
and after placing detachments on guard over the vineae and other military
engines, he gave his army a few days' rest. He employed this interval in
stimulating the courage of his men by exasperating them against the enemy,
and firing them by the prospect of rewards. After he had given out in the
presence of his assembled troops that the plunder of the city would go
to them, they were all in such a state of excitement that had the signal
been given then and there it seemed impossible for anything to withstand
them. As for the Saguntines, though they had a respite from fighting for
some days, neither meeting attacks nor making any, they worked at their
defences so continuously by day and night that they completed a fresh wall
at the place where the fall of the former wall had laid the town open.

The assault was recommenced with greater vigour than ever. In every
direction confused shouts and clamour resounded, so that it was difficult
to ascertain where to render assistance most promptly or where it was most
needed. Hannibal was present in person to encourage his men, who were bringing
up a tower on rollers which overtopped all the fortifications of the city.
Catapults and ballistae had been put in position on each of the stories,
and after it had been brought up to the walls it swept them clear of the
defenders. Seizing his opportunity, Hannibal told off about 500 African
troops to undermine the wall with pick-axes, an easy task, as the stones
were not fixed with cement but with layers of mud between the courses in
the ancient fashion of construction. More of it consequently fell than
had been dug away, and through the gaping ruin the columns of armed warriors
marched into the city. They seized some high ground, and after massing
their catapults and ballistae there they enclosed it with a wall so as
to have a fortified position actually within the city which could dominate
it like a citadel. The Saguntines on their side carried an inside wall
round the portion of the city not yet captured. Both sides kept up their
fortifying and fighting with the utmost energy, but by having to defend
the interior portion of the city the Saguntines were continually reducing
its dimensions. In addition to this there was a growing scarcity of everything
as the siege was prolonged, and the anticipations of outside help were
becoming fainter; the Romans, their one hope, were so far away, whilst
all immediately round them was in the hands of the enemy. For a few days
their drooping spirits were revived by the sudden departure of Hannibal
on an expedition against the Oretani and the Carpetani. The rigorous way
in which troops were being levied in these two tribes had created great
excitement, and they had kept the officers who were superintending the
levy practically prisoners. A general revolt was feared, but the unexpected
swiftness of Hannibal's movements took them by surprise and they abandoned
their hostile attitude.

[21.12]The attack on Saguntum was not
slackened; Maharbal, the son of Himilco, whom Hannibal had left in command,
carried on operations with such energy that the general's absence was not
felt by either friends or foes. He fought several successful actions, and
with the aid of three battering rams brought down a considerable portion
of the wall, and on Hannibal's return showed him the place all strewn with
the newly-fallen wall. The army was at once led to an assault on the citadel;
a desperate fight began, with heavy losses on both sides, and a part of
the citadel was captured. Attempts were now made in the direction of peace,
though with but faint hopes of success. Two men undertook the task, Alco,
a Saguntine, and Alorcus, a Spaniard. Alco, thinking that his prayers might
have some effect, crossed over without the knowledge of the Saguntines
to Hannibal at night. When he found that he gained nothing by his tears,
and that the conditions offered were such as a victor exasperated by resistance
would insist upon, harsh and severe, he laid aside the character of a pleader
and remained with the enemy as a deserter, alleging that any one who advocated
peace on such terms would be put to death. The conditions were that restitution
should be made to the Turdetani, all the gold and silver should be delivered
up, and the inhabitants should depart with one garment each and take up
their abode wherever the Carthaginians should order them. As Alco insisted
that the Saguntines would not accept peace on these terms, Alorcus, convinced,
as he said, that when everything else has gone courage also goes, undertook
to mediate a peace on those conditions. At that time he was one of Hannibal's
soldiers, but he was recognised as a guest friend by the city of Saguntum.
He started on his mission, gave up his weapon openly to the guard, crossed
the lines, and was at his request conducted to the praetor of Saguntum.
A crowd, drawn from all classes of society, soon gathered, and after a
way had been cleared through the press, Alorcus was admitted to an audience
of the senate. He addressed them in the following terms:

[21.13]"If your fellow-townsman,
Alco, had shown the same courage in bringing back to you the terms on which
Hannibal will grant peace that he showed in going to Hannibal to beg for
peace, this journey of mine would have been unnecessary. I have not come
to you either as an advocate for Hannibal or as a deserter. But as he has
remained with the enemy either through your fault or his own - his own
if his fears were only feigned, yours if those who report what is true
have to answer for their lives - I have come to you out of regard to the
old ties of hospitality which have so long subsisted between us, that you
may not be left in ignorance of the fact that there do exist terms on which
you can secure peace and the safety of your lives. Now, that it is for
your sake alone and not on behalf of any one else that I say what I am
saying before you is proved by the fact that as long as you had the strength
to maintain a successful resistance, and as long as you had any hopes of
help from Rome, I never breathed a word about making peace. But now that
you have no longer anything to hope for from Rome, now that neither your
arms nor your walls suffice to protect you, I bring you a peace forced
upon you by necessity rather than recommended by the fairness of its conditions.
But the hopes, faint as they are, of peace rest upon your accepting as
conquered men the terms which Hannibal as conqueror imposes and not looking
upon what is taken from you as a positive loss, since everything is at
the victor's mercy, but regarding what is left to you as a free gift from
him. The city, most of which he has laid in ruins, the whole of which he
has all but captured, he takes from you; your fields and lands he leaves
you; and he will assign you a site where you can build a new town. He orders
all the gold and silver, both that belonging to the State and that owned
by private individuals, to be brought to him; your persons and those of
your wives and children he preserves inviolate on condition that you consent
to leave Saguntum with only two garments apiece and without arms. These
are the demands of your victorious enemy, and heavy and bitter as they
are, your miserable plight urges you to accept them. I am not without hope
that when everything has passed into his power he will relax some of these
conditions, but I consider that even as they are you ought to submit to
them rather than permit yourselves to be butchered and your wives and children
seized and carried off before your eyes."

[21.14]A large crowd had gradually collected
to listen to the speaker, and the popular Assembly had become mingled with
the senate, when without a moment's warning the leading citizens withdrew
before any reply was given. They collected all the gold and silver from
public and private sources and brought it into the forum, where a fire
had already been kindled, and flung it into the flames, and most of them
thereupon leaped into the fire themselves. The terror and confusion which
this occasioned throughout the city was heightened by the noise of a tumult
in the direction of the citadel. A tower after much battering had fallen,
and through the breach created by its fall a Carthaginian cohort advanced
to the attack and signalled to their commander that the customary outposts
and guards had disappeared and the city was unprotected. Hannibal thought
that he ought to seize the opportunity and act promptly. Attacking it with
his full strength, he took the place in a moment. Orders had been given
that all the adult males were to be put to death; a cruel order, but under
the circumstances inevitable, for whom would it have been possible to spare
when they either shut themselves up with their wives and children and burnt
their houses over their heads, or if they fought, would not cease fighting
till they were killed?

[21.15]An enormous amount of booty was
found in the captured city. Although most of it had been deliberately destroyed
by the owners, and the enraged soldiers had observed hardly any distinctions
of age in the universal slaughter, whilst all the prisoners that were taken
were assigned to them, still, it is certain that a considerable sum was
realised by the sale of the goods that were seized, and much valuable furniture
and apparel was sent to Carthage. Some writers assert that Saguntum was
taken in the eighth month of the siege, and that Hannibal led his force
from there to New Carthage for the winter, his arrival in Italy occurring
five months later. In this case it is impossible for P. Cornelius and Ti.
Sempronius to have been the consuls to whom the Saguntine envoys were sent
at the beginning of the siege and who afterwards, whilst still in office,
fought with Hannibal, one of them at the Ticinus, both shortly afterwards
at the Trebia. Either all the incidents occurred within a much shorter
period or else it was the capture of Saguntum, not the beginning of the
siege, which occurred when those two entered upon office. For the battle
of the Trebia cannot have fallen so late as the year when Cn. Servilius
and C. Flaminius were in office, because C. Flaminius entered upon his
consulship at Ariminum, his election taking place under the consul Tiberius
Sempronius, who came to Rome after the battle of the Trebia to hold the
consular elections, and, after they were over, returned to his army in
winter quarters.

[21.16]The commissioners who had been
sent to Carthage, on their return to Rome, reported that everything breathed
a hostile spirit. Almost on the very day they returned the news arrived
of the fall of Saguntum, and such was the distress of the senate at the
cruel fate of their allies, such was their feeling of shame at not having
sent help to them, such their exasperation against the Carthaginians and
their alarm for the safety of the State - for it seemed as though the enemy
were already at their gates - that they were in no mood for deliberating,
shaken as they were by so many conflicting emotions. There were sufficient
grounds for alarm. Never had they met a more active or a more warlike enemy,
and never had the Roman republic been so lacking in energy or so unprepared
for war. The operations against the Sardinians, Corsicans, and Histrians,
as well as those against the Illyrians, had been more of an annoyance than
a training for the soldiers of Rome; whilst with the Gauls there had been
desultory fighting rather than regular warfare. But the Carthaginians,
a veteran enemy which for three-and-twenty years had seen hard and rough
service amongst the Spanish tribes, and had always been victorious, trained
under a general of exceptional ability, were now crossing the Ebro fresh
from the sack of a most wealthy city, and were bringing with them all those
Spanish tribes, eager for the fray. They would rouse the various Gaulish
tribes, who were always ready to take up arms; there would be the whole
world to fight against; the battleground would be Italy; the struggle would
take place before the walls of Rome.

[21.17]The seat of the campaigns had already
been decided; the consuls were now ordered to draw lots. Spain fell to
Cornelius, Africa to Sempronius. It was resolved that six legions should
be raised for that year, the allies were to furnish such contingents as
the consuls should deem necessary, and as large a fleet as possible was
to be fitted out; 24,000 Roman infantry were called up and 1800 cavalry;
the allies contributed 40,000 infantry and 4400 cavalry, and a fleet of
220 ships of war and 20 light galleys was launched. The question was then
formally submitted to the Assembly, Was it their will and pleasure that
war should be declared against the people of Carthage? When this was decided,
a special service of intercession was conducted; the procession marched
through the streets of the city offering prayers at the various temples
that the gods would grant a happy and prosperous issue to the war which
the people of Rome had now ordered. The forces were divided between the
consuls in the following way: To Sempronius two legions were assigned,
each consisting of 4000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and 16,000 infantry and
1800 cavalry from the allied contingents. He was also provided with 160
warships and 12 light galleys. With this combined land and sea force he
was sent to Sicily, with instructions to cross over to Africa if the other
consul succeeded in preventing the Carthaginian from invading Italy. Cornelius,
on the other hand, was provided with a smaller force, as L. Manlius, the
praetor, was himself being despatched to Gaul with a fairly strong detachment.
Cornelius was weakest in his ships; he had only 60 warships, for it was
never supposed that the enemy would come by sea or use his navy for offensive
purposes. His land force was made up of two Roman legions, with their complement
of cavalry, and 14,000 infantry from the allies with 1600 cavalry. The
province of Gaul1 was held by two Roman legions and 10,000 allied infantry
with 600 Roman and 1000 allied cavalry. This force was ultimately employed
in the Punic War.

[21.18]When these preparations were completed,
the formalities necessary before entering upon war required that a commission
should be despatched to Carthage. Those selected were men of age and experience
- Q. Fabius, M. Livius, L. Aemilius, C. Licinius, and Q. Baebius. They
were instructed to inquire whether it was with the sanction of the government
that Hannibal had attacked Saguntum, and if, as seemed most probable, the
Carthaginians should admit that it was so and proceed to defend their action,
then the Roman envoys were to formally declare war upon Carthage. As soon
as they had arrived in Carthage they appeared before the senate. Q. Fabius
had, in accordance with his instructions, simply put the question as to
the responsibility of the government, when one of the members present said:
"The language of your previous deputation was peremptory enough when
you demanded the surrender of Hannibal on the assumption that he was attacking
Saguntum on his own authority, but your language now, so far at least,
is less provocative, though in effect more overbearing. For on that occasion
it was Hannibal whose action you denounced and whose surrender you demanded,
now you are seeking to extort from us a confession of guilt and insist
upon obtaining instant satisfaction, as from men who admit they are in
the wrong. I do not, however, consider that the question is whether the
attack on Saguntum was an act of public policy or only that of a private
citizen, but whether it was justified by circumstances or not. It is for
us to inquire and take proceedings against a citizen when he has done anything
on his own authority; the only point for you to discuss is whether his
action was compatible with the terms of the treaty. Now, as you wish us
to draw a distinction between what our generals do with the sanction of
the State and what they do on their own initiative, you must remember that
the treaty with us was made by your consul, C. Lutatius, and whilst it
contained provisions guarding the interests of the allies of both nations,
there was no such provision for the Saguntines, for they were not your
allies at the time. But, you will say, by the treaty concluded with Hasdrubal,
the Saguntines are exempted from attack. I shall meet that with your own
arguments. You told us that you refused to be bound by the treaty which
your consul, C. Lutatius, concluded with us, because it did not receive
the authorisation of either the senate or the Assembly. A fresh treaty
was accordingly made by your government. Now, if no treaties have any binding
force for you unless they have been made with the authority of your senate
or by order of your Assembly, we, on our side, cannot possibly be bound
by Hasdrubal's treaty, which he made without our knowledge. Drop all allusions
to Saguntum and the Ebro, and speak out plainly what has long been secretly
hatching in your minds." Then the Roman, gathering up his toga, said,
"Here we bring you war and peace, take which you please." He
was met by a defiant shout bidding him give whichever he preferred, and
when, letting the folds of his toga fall, he said that he gave them war,
they replied that they accepted war and would carry it on in the same spirit
in which they accepted it.

[21.19]This straightforward question and
threat of war seemed to be more consonant with the dignity of Rome than
a wordy argument about treaties; it seemed so previous to the destruction
of Saguntum, and still more so afterwards. For had it been a matter for
argument, what ground was there for comparing Hasdrubal's treaty with the
earlier one of Lutatius? In the latter it was expressly stated that it
would only be of force if the people approved it, whereas in Hasdrubal's
treaty there was no such saving clause. Besides, his treaty had been silently
observed for many years during his lifetime, and was so generally approved
that, even after its author's death, none of its articles were altered.
But even if they took their stand upon the earlier treaty - that of Lutatius
- the Saguntines were sufficiently safeguarded by the allies of both parties
being exempted from hostile treatment, for nothing was said about "the
allies for the time being" or anything to exclude "any who should
be hereafter taken into alliance." And since it was open to both parties
to form fresh alliances, who would think it a fair arrangement that none
should be received into alliance whatever their merits, or that when they
had been received they should not be loyally protected, on the understanding
that the allies of the Carthaginians should not be induced to revolt, or
if they deserted their allies on their own accord were not to be received
into alliance by the others?

The Roman envoys in accordance with their instructions went on to Spain
for the purpose of visiting the different tribes and drawing them into
alliance with Rome, or at least detaching them from the Carthaginians.
The first they came to were the Borgusii, who were tired of Punic domination
and gave them a favourable reception, and their success here excited a
desire for change amongst many of the tribes beyond the Ebro. They came
next to the Volciani, and the response they met with became widely known
throughout Spain and determined the rest of the tribes against an alliance
with Rome. This answer was given by the senior member of their national
council in the following terms: "Are you not ashamed, Romans, to ask
us to form friendship with you in preference to the Carthaginians, seeing
how those who have done so have suffered more through you, their allies,
cruelly deserting them than through any injury inflicted on them by the
Carthaginians? I advise you to look for allies where the fall of Saguntum
has never been heard of; the nations of Spain see in the ruins of Saguntum
a sad and emphatic warning against putting any trust in alliances with
Rome." They were then peremptorily ordered to quit the territory of
the Volciani, and from that time none of the councils throughout Spain
gave them a more favourable reply. After this fruitless mission in Spain
they crossed over into Gaul.

[21.20]Here a strange and appalling sight
met their eyes; the men attended the council fully armed, such was the
custom of the country. When the Romans, after extolling the renown and
courage of the Roman people and the greatness of their dominion, asked
the Gauls not to allow the Carthaginian invaders a passage through their
fields and cities, such interruption and laughter broke out that the younger
men were with difficulty kept quiet by the magistrates and senior members
of the council. They thought it a most stupid and impudent demand to make,
that the Gauls, in order to prevent the war from spreading into Italy,
should turn it against themselves and expose their own lands to be ravaged
instead of other people's. After quiet was restored the envoys were informed
that the Romans had rendered them no service, nor had the Carthaginians
done them any injury to make them take up arms either on behalf of the
Romans or against the Carthaginians. On the other hand, they heard that
men of their race were being expelled from Italy, and made to pay tribute
to Rome, and subjected to every other indignity. Their experience was the
same in all the other councils of Gaul, nowhere did they hear a kindly
or even a tolerably peaceable word till they reached Massilia. There all
the facts which their allies had carefully and honestly collected were
laid before them; they were informed that the interest of the Gauls had
already been secured by Hannibal, but even he would not find them very
tractable, with their wild and untamable nature, unless the chiefs were
also won over with gold, a thing which as a nation they were most eager
to procure. After thus traversing Spain and the tribes of Gaul the envoys
returned to Rome not long after the consuls had left for their respective
commands. They found the whole City in a state of excitement; definite
news had been received that the Carthaginians had crossed the Ebro, and
every one was looking forward to war.

[21.21]After the capture of Saguntum,
Hannibal withdrew into winter quarters at New Carthage. Information reached
him there of the proceedings at Rome and Carthage, and he learnt that he
was not only the general who was to conduct the war, but also the sole
person who was responsible for its outbreak. As further delay would be
most inexpedient, he sold and distributed the rest of the plunder, and
calling together those of his soldiers who were of Spanish blood, he addressed
them as follows: "I think, soldiers, that you yourselves recognise
that now that we have reduced all the tribes in Spain we shall either have
to bring our campaigns to an end and disband our armies or else we must
transfer our wars to other lands. If we seek to win plunder and glory from
other nations, then these tribes will enjoy not only the blessings of peace,
but also the fruits of victory. Since, therefore, there await us campaigns
far from home, and it is uncertain when you will again see your homes and
all that is dear to you, I grant a furlough to every one who wishes to
visit his friends. You must reassemble at the commencement of spring, so
that we may, with the kindly help of the gods, enter upon a war which will
bring us immense plunder and cover us with glory." They all welcomed
the opportunity, so spontaneously offered, of visiting their homes after
so long an absence, and in view of a still longer absence in the future.
The winter's rest, coming after their past exertions, and soon to be followed
by greater ones, restored their faculties of mind and body and strengthened
them for fresh trials of endurance.

In the early days of spring they reassembled according to orders. After
reviewing the whole of the native contingents, Hannibal left for Gades,
where he discharged his vows to Hercules, and bound himself by fresh obligations
to that deity in case his enterprise should succeed. As Africa would be
open to attack from the side of Sicily during his land march through Spain
and the two Gauls into Italy, he decided to secure that country with a
strong garrison. To supply their place he requisitioned troops from Africa,
a light-armed force consisting mainly of slingers. By thus transferring
Africans to Spain and Spaniards to Africa, the soldiers of each nationality
would be expected to render more efficient service, as being practically
under reciprocal obligations. The force he despatched to Africa consisted
of 13,850 Spanish infantry furnished with ox-hide bucklers, and 870 Balearic
slingers, with a composite body of 1200 cavalry drawn from numerous tribes.
This force was destined partly for the defence of Carthage, partly to hold
the African territory. At the same time recruiting officers were sent to
various communities; some 4000 men of good family were called up who were
under orders to be conveyed to Carthage to strengthen its defence, and
also to serve as hostages for the loyalty of their people.

[21.22]Spain also had to be provided for,
all the more so as Hannibal was fully aware that Roman commissioners had
been going all about the country to win over the leading men of the various
tribes. He placed it in charge of his energetic and able brother, Hasdrubal,
and assigned him an army mainly composed of African troops - 11,850 native
infantry, 300 Ligurians, and 500 Balearics. In addition to this body of
infantry there were 450 Libyphoenician cavalry - these are a mixed race
of Punic and aboriginal African descent - some 1800 Numidians and Moors,
dwellers on the shore of the Mediterranean, and a small mounted contingent
of 300 Ilergetes raised in Spain. Finally, that his land force might be
complete in all its parts, there were twenty-one elephants. The protection
of the coast required a fleet, and as it was natural to suppose that the
Romans would again make use of that arm in which they had been victorious
before, Hasdrubal had assigned to him a fleet of 57 warships, including
50 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes, and 5 triremes, but only 32 quinqueremes
and the 5 triremes were ready for sea. From Gades he returned to the winter
quarters of his army at New Carthage, and from New Carthage he commenced
his march on Italy. Passing by the city of Onusa, he marched along the
coast to the Ebro. The story runs that whilst halting there he saw in a
dream a youth of god-like appearance who said that he had been sent by
Jupiter to act as guide to Hannibal on his march to Italy. He was accordingly
to follow him and not to lose sight of him or let his eyes wander. At first,
filled with awe, he followed him without glancing round him or looking
back, but as instinctive curiosity impelled him to wonder what it was that
he was forbidden to gaze at behind him, he could no longer command his
eyes. He saw behind him a serpent of vast and marvellous bulk, and as it
moved along trees and bushes crashed down everywhere before it, whilst
in its wake there rolled a thunder-storm. He asked what the monstrous portent
meant, and was told that it was the devastation of Italy; he was to go
forward without further question and allow his destiny to remain hidden.

[21.23]Gladdened by this vision he proceeded
to cross the Ebro, with his army in three divisions, after sending men
on in advance to secure by bribes the good-will of the Gauls dwelling about
his crossing-place, and also to reconnoitre the passes of the Alps. He
brought 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry over the Ebro. His next step
was to reduce to submission the Ilergetes, the Bargusii, and the Ausetani,
and also the district of Lacetania, which lies at the foot of the Pyrenees.
He placed Hanno in charge of the whole coast-line to secure the passes
which connect Spain with Gaul, and furnished him with an army of 10,000
infantry to hold the district, and 1000 cavalry. When his army commenced
the passage of the Pyrenees and the barbarians found that there was truth
in the rumour that they were being led against Rome, 3000 of the Carpetani
deserted. It was understood that they were induced to desert not so much
by the prospect of the war as by the length of the march and the impossibility
of crossing the Alps. As it would have been hazardous to recall them, or
to attempt to detain them by force, in case the quick passions of the rest
of the army should be roused, Hannibal sent back to their homes more than
7000 men who, he had personally discovered, were getting tired of the campaign,
and at the same time he gave out that the Carpetani had also been sent
back by him.

[21.24]Then, to prevent his men from being
demoralised by further delay and inactivity, he crossed the Pyrenees with
the remainder of his force and fixed his camp at the town of Iliberri.
The Gauls were told that it was against Italy that war was being made,
but as they had heard that the Spaniards beyond the Pyrenees had been subjugated
by force of arms, and strong garrisons placed in their towns, several tribes,
fearing for their liberty, were roused to arms and mustered at Ruscino.
On receiving the announcement of this movement, Hannibal, fearing delay
more than hostilities, sent spokesmen to their chiefs to say that he was
anxious for a conference with them, and either they might come nearer to
Iliberri, or he would approach Ruscino to facilitate their meeting, for
he would gladly receive them in his camp or would himself go to them without
loss of time. He had come into Gaul as a friend not a foe, and unless the
Gauls compelled him he would not draw his sword till he reached Italy.
This was the proposal made through the envoys, but when the Gauls had,
without any hesitation, moved their camp up to Iliberri, they were effectually
secured by bribes and allowed the army a free and unmolested passage through
their territory under the very walls of Ruscino.

[21.25]No intelligence, meanwhile, had
reached Rome beyond the fact reported by the Massilian envoys, namely that
Hannibal had crossed the Ebro. No sooner was this known than the Boii,
who had been tampering with the Insubres, rose in revolt, just as though
he had already crossed the Alps, not so much in consequence of their old
standing enmity against Rome as of her recent aggressions. Bodies of colonists
were being settled on Gaulish territory in the valley of the Po, at Placentia
and Cremona, and intense irritation was produced. Seizing their arms they
made an attack on the land, which was being actually surveyed at the time,
and created such terror and confusion that not only the agricultural population,
but even the three Roman commissioners who were engaged in marking out
the holdings, fled to Mutina, not feeling themselves safe behind the walls
of Placentia. The commissioners were C. Lutatius, C. Servilius, and M.
Annius. There is no doubt as to the name Lutatius, but instead of Annius
and Servilius some annalists have Manlius Acilius and C. Herennius, whilst
others give P. Cornelius Asina and C. Papirius Maso. There is also doubt
as to whether it was the envoys who had been sent to the Boii to remonstrate
with them that were maltreated, or the commissioners upon whom an attack
was made whilst surveying the ground. The Gauls invested Mutina, but as
they were strangers to the art of conducting sieges, and far too indolent
to set about the construction of military works, they contented themselves
with blockading the town without inflicting any injury on the walls. At
last they pretended that they were ready to discuss terms of peace, and
the envoys were invited by the Gaulish chieftains to a conference. Here
they were arrested, in direct violation not only of international law but
of the safe-conduct which had been granted for the occasion. Having made
them prisoners the Gauls declared that they would not release them until
their hostages were restored to them.

When news came that the envoys were prisoners and Mutina and its garrison
in jeopardy, L. Manlius, the praetor, burning with anger, led his army
in separate divisions to Mutina. Most of the country was uncultivated at
that time and the road went through a forest. He advanced without throwing
out scouting parties and fell into an ambush, out of which, after sustaining
considerable loss, he made his way with difficulty on to more open ground.
Here he entrenched himself, and as the Gauls felt it would be hopeless
to attack him there, the courage of his men revived, though it was tolerably
certain that as many as 500 had fallen. They recommenced their march, and
as long as they were going through open country there was no enemy in view;
when they re-entered the forest their rear was attacked and great confusion
and panic created. They lost 700 men and six standards. When they at last
got out of the trackless and entangled forest there was an end to the terrifying
tactics of the Gauls and the wild alarm of the Romans. There was no difficulty
in repelling attacks when they reached the open country and made their
way to Tannetum, a place near the Po. Here they hastily entrenched themselves,
and, helped by the windings of the river and assisted by the Brixian Gauls,
they held their ground against an enemy whose numbers were daily increasing.

[21.26]When the intelligence of this sudden
outbreak reached Rome and the senate became aware that they had a Gaulish
war to face in addition to the war with Carthage, they ordered C. Atilius,
the praetor, to go to the relief of Manlius with a Roman legion and 5000
men who had been recently enlisted by the consul from among the allies.
As the enemy, afraid to meet these reinforcements, had retired, Atilius
reached Tannetum without any fighting. After raising a fresh legion in
place of the one which had been sent away with the praetor, P. Cornelius
Scipio set sail with sixty warships and coasted along by the shores of
Etruria and Liguria, and from there past the mountains of the Salyes until
he reached Marseilles. Here he disembarked his troops at the first mouth
of the Rhone to which he came - the river flows into the sea through several
mouths - and formed his entrenched camp, hardly able yet to believe that
Hannibal had surmounted the obstacle of the Pyrenees. When, however, he
understood that he was already contemplating crossing the Rhone, feeling
uncertain as to where he would meet him and anxious to give his men time
to recover from the effects of the voyage, he sent forward a picked force
of 300 cavalry accompanied by Massilian guides and friendly Gauls to explore
the country in all directions and if possible to discover the enemy.

Hannibal had overcome the opposition of the native tribes by either
fear or bribes and had now reached the territory of the Volcae. They were
a powerful tribe, inhabiting the country on both sides of the Rhone, but
distrusting their ability to stop Hannibal on the side of the river nearest
to him, they determined to make the river a barrier and transported nearly
all the population to the other side, on which they prepared to offer armed
resistance. The rest of the river population and those of the Volcae even,
who still remained in their homes, were induced by presents to collect
boats from all sides and to help in constructing others, and their efforts
were stimulated by the desire to get rid as soon as possible of the burdensome
presence of such a vast host of men. So an enormous number of boats and
vessels of every kind, such as they used in their journeys up and down
the river, was got together; new ones were made by the Gauls by hollowing
out the trunks of trees, then the soldiers themselves, seeing the abundance
of timber and how easily they were made, took to fashioning uncouth canoes,
quite content if only they would float and carry burdens and serve to transport
themselves and their belongings.

[21.27]Everything was now ready for the
crossing, but the whole of the opposite bank was held by mounted and unmounted
men prepared to dispute the passage. In order to dislodge them Hannibal
sent Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, with a division, consisting mainly of
Spaniards, a day's march up the river. He was to seize the first chance
of crossing without being observed, and then lead his men by a circuitous
route behind the enemy and at the right moment attack them in the rear.
The Gauls who were taken as guides informed Hanno that about 25 miles up-stream
a small island divided the river in two, and the channel was of less depth
in consequence. When they reached the spot they hastily cut down the timber
and constructed rafts on which men and horses and other burdens could be
ferried across. The Spaniards had no trouble; they threw their clothes
on to skins and placing their leather shields on the top they rested on
these and so swam across. The rest of the army was ferried over on rafts,
and after making a camp near the river they took a day's rest after their
labours of boat-making and the nocturnal passage, their general in the
meantime waiting anxiously for an opportunity of putting his plan into
execution. The next day they set out on their march, and lighting a fire
on some rising ground they signalled by the column of smoke that they had
crossed the river and were not very far away. As soon as Hannibal received
the signal he seized the occasion and at once gave the order to cross the
river. The infantry had prepared rafts and boats, the cavalry mostly barges
on account of the horses. A line of large boats was moored across the river
a short distance up-stream to break the force of the current, and consequently
the men in the smaller boats crossed over in smooth water. Most of the
horses were towed astern and swam over, others were carried in barges,
ready saddled and bridled so as to be available for the cavalry the moment
they landed.

[21.28]The Gauls flocked together on the
bank with their customary whoops and war songs, waving their shields over
their heads and brandishing their javelins. They were somewhat dismayed
when they saw what was going on in front of them; the enormous number of
large and small boats, the roar of the river, the confused shouts of the
soldiers and boatmen, some of whom were trying to force their way against
the current, whilst others on the bank were cheering their comrades who
were crossing. Whilst they were watching all this movement with sinking
hearts, still more alarming shouts were heard behind them; Hanno had captured
their camp. Soon he appeared on the scene, and they were now confronted
by danger from opposite quarters - the host of armed men landing from the
boats and the sudden attack which was being made on their rear. For a time
the Gauls endeavoured to maintain the conflict in both directions, but
finding themselves losing ground they forced their way through where there
seemed to be least resistance and dispersed to their various villages.
Hannibal brought over the rest of his force undisturbed, and, without troubling
himself any further about the Gauls, formed his camp.

In the transport of the elephants I believe different plans were adopted;
at all events, the accounts of what took place vary considerably. Some
say that after they had all been collected on the bank the worst-tempered
beast amongst them was teased by his driver, and when he ran away from
it into the water the elephant followed him and drew the whole herd after
it, and as they got out of their depth they were carried by the current
to the opposite bank. The more general account, however, is that they were
transported on rafts; as this method would have appeared the safest beforehand
so it is most probable that it was the one adopted. They pushed out into
the river a raft 200 feet long and 50 feet broad, and to prevent it from
being carried down-stream, one end was secured by several stout hawsers
to the bank. It was covered with earth like a bridge in order that the
animals, taking it for solid ground, would not be afraid to venture on
it. A second raft, of the same breadth but only 100 feet long and capable
of crossing the river, was made fast to the former. The elephants led by
the females were driven along the fixed raft, as if along a road, until
they came on to the smaller one. As soon as they were safely on this it
was cast off and towed by light boats to the other side of the river. When
the first lot were landed others were brought over in the same way. They
showed no fear whilst they were being driven along the fixed raft; their
fright began when they were being carried into mid-channel on the other
raft which had been cast loose. They crowded together, those on the outside
backing away from the water, and showed considerable alarm until their
very fears at the sight of the water made them quiet. Some in their excitement
fell overboard and threw their drivers, but their mere weight kept them
steady, and as they felt their way into shallow water they succeeded in
getting safely to land.

[21.29]While the elephants were being
ferried across, Hannibal sent 500 Numidian horse towards the Romans to
ascertain their numbers and their intentions. This troop of horse encountered
the 300 Roman cavalry who, as I have already stated, had been sent forward
from the mouth of the Rhone. It was a much more severe fight than might
have been expected from the number of combatants. Not only were there many
wounded but each side lost about the same number of killed, and the Romans,
who were at last completely exhausted, owed their victory to a panic among
the Numidians and their consequent flight. Of the victors as many as 160
fell, not all Romans, some were Gauls; whilst the vanquished lost more
than 200. This action with which the war commenced was an omen of its final
result, but though it portended the final victory of Rome it showed that
the victory would not be attained without much bloodshed and repeated defeats.
The forces drew off from the field and returned to their respective commanders.
Scipio found himself unable to form any definite plans beyond what were
suggested to him by the movements of the enemy. Hannibal was undecided
whether to resume his march to Italy or to engage the Romans, the first
army to oppose him. He was dissuaded from the latter course by the arrival
of envoys from the Boii and their chief, Magalus. They came to assure Hannibal
of their readiness to act as guides and take their share in the dangers
of the expedition, and they gave it as their opinion that he ought to reserve
all his strength for the invasion of Italy and not fritter any of it away
beforehand. The bulk of his army had not forgotten the previous war and
looked forward with dismay to meeting their old enemy, but what appalled
them much more was the prospect of an endless journey over the Alps, which
rumour said was, to those at all events who had never tried it, a thing
to be dreaded.

[21.30]When Hannibal had made up his mind
to go forward and lose no time in reaching Italy, his goal, he ordered
a muster of his troops and addressed them in tones of mingled rebuke and
encouragement. "I am astonished," he said, "to see how hearts
that have been always dauntless have now suddenly become a prey to fear.
Think of the many victorious campaigns you have gone through, and remember
that you did not leave Spain before you had added to the Carthaginian empire
all the tribes in the country washed by two widely remote seas. The Roman
people made a demand for all who had taken part in the siege of Saguntum
to be given up to them, and you, to avenge the insult, have crossed the
Ebro to wipe out the name of Rome and bring freedom to the world. When
you commenced your march, from the setting to the rising sun, none of you
thought it too much for you, but now when you see that by far the greater
part of the way has been accomplished; the passes of the Pyrenees, which
were held by most warlike tribes, surmounted; the Rhone, that mighty stream,
crossed in the face of so many thousand Gauls, and the rush of its waters
checked - now that you are within sight of the Alps, on the other side
of which lies Italy, you have become weary and are arresting your march
in the very gates of the enemy. What do you imagine the Alps to be other
than lofty mountains? Suppose them to be higher than the peaks of the Pyrenees,
surely no region in the world can touch the sky or be impassable to man.
Even the Alps are inhabited and cultivated, animals are bred and reared
there, their gorges and ravines can be traversed by armies. Why, even the
envoys whom you see here did not cross the Alps by flying through the air,
nor were their ancestors native to the soil. They came into Italy as emigrants
looking for a land to settle in, and they crossed the Alps often in immense
bodies with their wives and children and all their belongings. What can
be inaccessible or insuperable to the soldier who carries nothing with
him but his weapons of war? What toils and perils you went through for
eight months to effect the capture of Saguntum! And now that Rome, the
capital of the world, is your goal, can you deem anything so difficult
or so arduous that it should prevent you from reaching it? Many years ago
the Gauls captured the place which Carthaginians despair of approaching;
either you must confess yourselves inferior in courage and enterprise to
a people whom you have conquered again and again, or else you must look
forward to finishing your march on the ground between the Tiber and the
walls of Rome."

[21.31]After this rousing appeal he dismissed
them with orders to prepare themselves by food and rest for the march.
The next day they advanced up the left bank of the Rhone towards the central
districts of Gaul, not because this was the most direct route to the Alps,
but because he thought that there would be less likelihood of the Romans
meeting him, for he had no desire to engage them before he arrived in Italy.
Four days' marching brought him to the "Island." Here the Isere
and the Rhone, flowing down from different points in the Alps, enclose
a considerable extent of land and then unite their channels; the district
thus enclosed is called the "Island." The adjacent country was
inhabited by the Allobroges, a tribe who even in those days were second
to none in Gaul in power and reputation. At the time of Hannibal's visit
a quarrel had broken out between two brothers who were each aspiring to
the sovereignty. The elder brother, whose name was Brancus, had hitherto
been the chief, but was now expelled by a party of the younger men, headed
by his brother, who found an appeal to violence more successful than an
appeal to right. Hannibal's timely appearance on the scene led to the question
being referred to him; he was to decide who was the legitimate claimant
to the kingship. He pronounced in favour of the elder brother, who had
the support of the senate and the leading men. In return for this service
he received assistance in provisions and supplies of all kinds, especially
of clothing, a pressing necessity in view of the notorious cold of the
Alps. After settling the feud amongst the Allobroges, Hannibal resumed
his march. He did not take the direct course to the Alps, but turned to
the left towards the Tricastini; then, skirting the territory of the Vocontii,
he marched in the direction of the Tricorii. Nowhere did he meet with any
difficulty until he arrived at the Durance. This river, which also takes
its rise in the Alps, is of all the rivers of Gaul the most difficult to
cross. Though carrying down a great volume of water, it does not lend itself
to navigation, for it is not kept in by banks, but flows in many separate
channels. As it is constantly shifting its bottom and the direction of
its currents, the task of fording it is a most hazardous one, whilst the
shingle and boulders carried down make the foothold insecure and treacherous.
It happened to be swollen by rain at the time, and the men were thrown
into much disorder whilst crossing it, whilst their fears and confused
shouting added considerably to their difficulties.

[21.32]Three days after Hannibal had left
the banks of the Rhone, P. Cornelius Scipio arrived at the deserted camp
with his army in battle order, ready to engage at once. When, however,
he saw the abandoned lines and realised that it would be no easy matter
to overtake his opponent after he had got such a long start, he returned
to his ships. He considered that the easier and safer course would be to
meet Hannibal as he came down from the Alps. Spain was the province allotted
to him, and to prevent its being entirely denuded of Roman troops he sent
his brother Cneius Scipio with the greater part of his army to act against
Hasdrubal, not only to keep the old allies and win new ones, but to drive
Hasdrubal out of Spain. He himself sailed for Genoa with a very small force,
intending to defend Italy with the army lying in the valley of the Po.
From the Durance Hannibal's route lay mostly through open level country,
and he reached the Alps without meeting with any opposition from the Gauls
who inhabited the district. But the sight of the Alps revived the terrors
in the minds of his men. Although rumour, which generally magnifies untried
dangers, had filled them with gloomy forebodings, the nearer view proved
much more fearful. The height of the mountains now so close, the snow which
was almost lost in the sky, the wretched huts perched on the rocks, the
flocks and herds shrivelled and stunted with the cold, the men wild and
unkempt, everything animate and inanimate stiff with frost, together with
other sights dreadful beyond description - all helped to increase their
alarm.

As the head of the column began to climb the nearest slopes, the natives
appeared on the heights above; had they concealed themselves in the ravines
and then rushed down they would have caused frightful panic and bloodshed.
Hannibal called a halt and sent on some Gauls to examine the ground, and
when he learnt that advance was impossible in that direction he formed
his camp in the widest part of the valley that he could find; everywhere
around the ground was broken and precipitous. The Gauls who had been sent
to reconnoitre got into conversation with the natives, as there was little
difference between their speech or their manners, and they brought back
word to Hannibal that the pass was only occupied in the daytime, at nightfall
the natives all dispersed to their homes. Accordingly, at early dawn he
began the ascent as though determined to force the pass in broad daylight,
and spent the day in movements designed to conceal his real intentions
and in fortifying the camp on the spot where they had halted. As soon as
he observed that the natives had left the heights and were no longer watching
his movements, he gave orders, with the view of deceiving the enemy, for
a large number of fires to be lighted, larger in fact than would be required
by those remaining in camp. Then, leaving the baggage with the cavalry
and the greater part of the infantry in camp, he himself with a specially
selected body of troops in light marching order rapidly moved out of the
defile and occupied the heights which the enemy had held.

[21.33]The following day the rest of the
army broke camp in the grey dawn and commenced its march. The natives were
beginning to assemble at their customary post of observation when they
suddenly became aware that some of the enemy were in possession of their
stronghold right over their heads, whilst others were advancing on the
path beneath. The double impression made on their eyes and imagination
kept them for a few moments motionless, but when they saw the column falling
into disorder mainly through the horses becoming frightened, they thought
that if they increased the confusion and panic it would be sufficient to
destroy it. So they charged down from rock to rock, careless as to whether
there were paths or not, for they were familiar with the ground. The Carthaginians
had to meet this attack at the same time that they were struggling with
the difficulties of the way, and as each man was doing his best for himself
to get out of the reach of danger, they were fighting more amongst themselves
than against the natives. The horses did the most mischief; they were terrified
at the wild shouts, which the echoing woods and valleys made all the louder,
and when they happened to be struck or wounded they created terrible havoc
amongst the men and the different baggage animals. The road was flanked
by sheer precipices on each side, and in the crowding together many were
pushed over the edge and fell an immense depth. Amongst these were some
of the soldiers; the heavily-laden baggage animals rolled over like falling
houses. Horrible as the sight was, Hannibal remained quiet and kept his
men back for some time, for fear of increasing the alarm and confusion,
but when he saw that the column was broken and that the army was in danger
of losing all its baggage, in which case he would have brought them safely
through to no purpose, he ran down from his higher ground and at once scattered
the enemy. At the same time, however, he threw his own men into still greater
disorder for the moment, but it was very quickly allayed now that the passage
was cleared by the flight of the natives. In a short time the whole army
had traversed the pass, not only without any further disturbance, but almost
in silence. He then seized a fortified village, the head place of the district,
together with some adjacent hamlets, and from the food and cattle thus
secured he provided his army with rations for three days. As the natives,
after their first defeat, no longer impeded their march, whilst the road
presented little difficulty, they made considerable progress during those
three days.

[21.34]They now came to another canton
which, considering that it was a mountain district, had a considerable
population. Here he narrowly escaped destruction, not in fair and open
fighting, but by the practices which he himself employed - falsehood and
treachery. The head men from the fortified villages, men of advanced age,
came as a deputation to the Carthaginian and told him that they had been
taught by the salutary example of other people's misfortunes to seek the
friendship of the Carthaginians rather than to feel their strength. They
were accordingly prepared to carry out his orders; he would receive provisions
and guides, and hostages as a guarantee of good faith. Hannibal felt that
he ought not to trust them blindly nor to meet their offer with a flat
refusal, in case they should become hostile. So he replied in friendly
terms, accepted the hostages whom they placed in his hands, made use of
the provisions with which they supplied him on the march, but followed
their guides with his army prepared for action, not at all as though he
were going through a peaceable or friendly country. The elephants and cavalry
were in front, he himself followed with the main body of the infantry,
keeping a sharp and anxious look-out in all directions. Just as they reached
a part of the pass where it narrowed and was overhung on one side by a
wall of rock, the barbarians sprang up from ambush on all sides and assailed
the column in front and rear, at close quarters, and at a distance by rolling
huge stones down on it. The heaviest attack was made in the rear, and as
the infantry faced round to meet it, it became quite obvious that if the
rear of the column had not been made exceptionally strong, a terrible disaster
must have occurred in that pass. As it was, they were in the greatest danger,
and within an ace of total destruction. For whilst Hannibal was hesitating
whether to send his infantry on into the narrow part of the pass - for
whilst protecting the rear of the cavalry they had no reserves to protect
their own rear - the mountaineers, making a flank charge, burst through
the middle of the column and held the pass so that Hannibal had to spend
that one night without his cavalry or his baggage.

[21.35]The next day, as the savages attacked
with less vigour, the column closed up, and the pass was surmounted, not
without loss, more, however, of baggage animals than of men. From that
time the natives made their appearance in smaller numbers and behaved more
like banditti than regular soldiers; they attacked either front or rear
just as the ground gave them opportunity, or as the advance or halt of
the column presented a chance of surprise. The elephants caused considerable
delay, owing to the difficulty of getting them through narrow or precipitous
places; on the other hand, they rendered that part of the column safe from
attack where they were, for the natives were unaccustomed to the sight
of them and had a great dread of going too near them. Nine days from their
commencing the ascent they arrived at the highest point of the Alps, after
traversing a region mostly without roads and frequently losing their way
either through the treachery of their guides or through their own mistakes
in trying to find the way for themselves. For two days they remained in
camp on the summit, whilst the troops enjoyed a respite from fatigue and
fighting. Some of the baggage animals which had fallen amongst the rocks
and had afterwards followed the track of the column came into camp. To
add to the misfortunes of the worn-out troops, there was a heavy fall of
snow - the Pleiads were near their setting - and this new experience created
considerable alarm. In the early morning of the third day the army recommenced
its heavy march over ground everywhere deep in snow. Hannibal saw in all
faces an expression of listlessness and despondency. He rode on in front
to a height from which there was a wide and extensive view, and halting
his men, he pointed out to them the land of Italy and the rich valley of
the Po lying at the foot of the Alps. "You are now," he said,
"crossing the barriers not only of Italy, but of Rome itself. Henceforth
all will be smooth and easy for you; in one or, at the most, two battles,
you will be masters of the capital and stronghold of Italy." Then
the army resumed its advance with no annoyance from the enemy beyond occasional
attempts at plunder. The remainder of the march, however, was attended
with much greater difficulty than they had experienced in the ascent, for
the distance to the plains on the Italian side is shorter, and therefore
the descent is necessarily steeper. Almost the whole of the way was precipitous,
narrow, and slippery, so that they were unable to keep their footing, and
if they slipped they could not recover themselves; they kept falling over
each other, and the baggage animals rolled over on their drivers.

[21.36]At length they came to a much narrower
pass which descended over such sheer cliffs that a light-armed soldier
could hardly get down it even by hanging on to projecting roots and branches.
The place had always been precipitous, and a landslip had recently carried
away the road for 1000 feet. The cavalry came to a halt here as though
they had arrived at their journey's end, and whilst Hannibal was wondering
what could be causing the delay he was informed that there was no passage.
Then he went forward to examine the place and saw that there was nothing
for it but to lead the army by a long circuitous route over pathless and
untrodden snow. But this, too, soon proved to be impracticable. The old
snow had been covered to a moderate depth by a fresh fall, and the first
comers planted their feet firmly on the new snow, but when it had become
melted under the tread of so many men and beasts there was nothing to walk
on but ice covered with slush. Their progress now became one incessant
and miserable struggle. The smooth ice allowed no foothold, and as they
were going down a steep incline they were still less able to keep on their
legs, whilst, once down, they tried in vain to rise, as their hands and
knees were continually slipping. There were no stumps or roots about for
them to get hold of and support themselves by, so they rolled about helplessly
on the glassy ice and slushy snow. The baggage animals as they toiled along
cut through occasionally into the lowest layer of snow, and when they stumbled
they struck out their hoofs in their struggles to recover themselves and
broke through into the hard and congealed ice below, where most of them
stuck as though caught in a gin.

[21.37]At last, when men and beasts alike
were worn out by their fruitless exertions, a camp was formed on the summit,
after the place had been cleared with immense difficulty owing to the quantity
of snow that had to be removed. The next thing was to level the rock through
which alone a road was practicable. The soldiers were told off to cut through
it. They built up against it an enormous pile of tall trees which they
had felled and lopped, and when the wind was strong enough to blow up the
fire they set light to the pile. When the rock was red hot they poured
vinegar upon it to disintegrate it. After thus treating it by fire they
opened a way through it with their tools, and eased the steep slope by
winding tracks of moderate gradient, so that not only the baggage animals
but even the elephants could be led down. Four days were spent over the
rock, and the animals were almost starved to death, for the heights are
mostly bare of vegetation and what herbage there is is buried beneath the
snow. In the lower levels there were sunny valleys and streams flowing
through woods, and spots more deserving of human inhabitants. Here the
beasts were turned loose to graze, and the troops, worn out with their
engineering, were allowed to rest. In three days more they reached the
open plains and found a pleasanter country and pleasanter people living
in it

[21.38]Such, in the main, was the way
in which they reached Italy, five months, according to some authorities,
after leaving New Carthage, fifteen days of which were spent in overcoming
the difficulties of the Alps. The authorities are hopelessly at variance
as to the number of the troops with which Hannibal entered Italy. The highest
estimate assigns him 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry; the lowest puts
his strength at 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. L. Cincius Alimentus
tells us that he was taken prisoner by Hannibal, and I should be most inclined
to accept his authority if he had not confused the numbers by adding in
the Gauls and Ligurians; if these are included there were 80,000 infantry
and 10,000 cavalry. It is, however, more probable that these joined Hannibal
in Italy, and some authorities actually assert this. Cincius also states
that he had heard Hannibal say that subsequently to his passage of the
Rhone he lost 36,000 men, besides an immense number of horses and other
animals. The first people he came to were the Taurini, a semi-Garlic tribe.
As tradition is unanimous on this point I am the more surprised that a
question should be raised as to what route Hannibal took over the Alps,
and that it should be generally supposed that he crossed over the Poenine
range, which is said to have derived its name from that circumstance. Coelius
asserts that he crossed by the Cremonian range. These two passes, however,
would not have brought him to the Taurini but through the Salassi, a mountain
tribe, to the Libuan Gauls. It is highly improbable that those routes to
Gaul were available at that time, and in any case the Poenine route would
have been closed by the semi-German tribes who inhabited the district.
And it is perfectly certain, if we accept their authority, that the Seduni
and Veragri, who inhabit that range, say that the name of Poenine was not
given to it from any passage of the Carthaginians over it but from the
deity Poeninus, whose shrine stands on the highest point of the range.

[21.39]It was a very fortunate circumstance
for Hannibal at the outset of his campaign that the Taurini, the first
people he came to, were at war with the Insubres. But he was unable to
bring his army into the field to assist either side, for it was whilst
they were recovering from the ills and misfortunes which had gathered upon
them that they felt them most. Rest and idleness instead of toil, plenty
following upon starvation, cleanliness and comfort after squalor and emaciation,
affected their filthy and well-nigh bestialised bodies in various ways.
It was this state of things which induced P. Cornelius Scipio, the consul,
after he had arrived with his ships at Pisa and taken over from Manlius
and Atilius an army of raw levies disheartened by their recent humiliating
defeats, to push on with all speed to the Po that he might engage the enemy
before he had recovered his strength. But when he reached Placentia Hannibal
had already left his encampment and taken by storm one of the cities of
the Taurini, their capital, in fact, because they would not voluntarily
maintain friendly relations with him. He would have secured the adhesion
of the Gauls in the valley of the Po, not by fear but by their own choice,
if the sudden arrival of the consul had not taken them by surprise whilst
they were waiting for a favourable moment to revolt. Just at the time of
Scipio's arrival, Hannibal moved out of the country of the Taurini, for,
seeing how undecided the Gauls were as to whose side they should take,
he thought that if he were on the spot they would follow him. The two armies
were now almost within sight of one another, and the commanders who were
confronting each other, though not sufficiently acquainted with each other's
military skill, were even then imbued with mutual respect and admiration.
Even before the fall of Saguntum the name of Hannibal was on all men's
lips in Rome, and in Scipio Hannibal recognised a great leader, seeing
that he had been chosen beyond all others to oppose him. This mutual esteem
was enhanced by their recent achievements; Scipio, after Hannibal had left
him in Gaul, was in time to meet him on his descent from the Alps; Hannibal
had not only dared to attempt but had actually accomplished the passage
of the Alps. Scipio, however, made the first move by crossing the Po and
shifting his camp to the Ticinus. Before leading his men into battle he
addressed them in a speech full of encouragement, in the following terms:

[21.40]"If, soldiers, I were leading
into battle the army which I had with me in Gaul, there would have been
no need for me to address you. For what encouragement would those cavalry
need who had won such a brilliant victory over the enemy's cavalry at the
Rhone or those legions of infantry with whom I pursued this same enemy,
who by his running away and shirking an engagement acknowledged that I
was his conqueror? That army, raised for service in Spain, is campaigning
under my brother, Cn. Scipio, who is acting as my deputy in the country
which the senate and people of Rome have assigned to it. In order, therefore,
that you might have a consul to lead you against Hannibal and the Carthaginians,
I have volunteered to command in this battle, and as I am new to you and
you to me I must say a few words to you. "Now as to the character
of the enemy and the kind of warfare which awaits you. You have to fight,
soldiers, with the men whom you defeated in the former war by land and
sea, from whom you have exacted a war indemnity for the last twenty years,
and from whom you wrested Sicily and Sardinia as the prizes of war. You,
therefore, will go into this battle with the exultation of victors, they
with the despondency of the vanquished. They are not going to fight now
because they are impelled by courage but through sheer necessity; unless
indeed you suppose that, after shirking a contest when their army was at
its full strength, they have gained more confidence now that they have
lost two-thirds of their infantry and cavalry in their passage over the
Alps, now that those who survive are fewer than those who have perished.
"'Yes,' it may be said, 'they are few in number, but they are strong
in courage and physique, and possess a power of endurance and vigour in
attack which very few can withstand.' No, they are only semblances or rather
ghosts of men, worn out with starvation, cold, filth, and squalor, bruised
and enfeebled amongst the rocks and precipices, and, what is more, their
limbs are frostbitten, their thews and sinews cramped with cold, their
frames shrunk and shrivelled with frost, their weapons battered and shivered,
their horses lame and out of condition. This is the cavalry, this the infantry
with whom you are going to fight; you will not have an enemy but only the
last vestiges of an enemy to meet. My only fear is that when you have fought
it will appear to be the Alps that have conquered Hannibal. But perhaps
it was right that it should be so, and that the gods, without any human
aid, should begin and all but finish this war with a people and their general
who have broken treaties, and that to us, who next to the gods have been
sinned against, it should be left to complete what they began.

[21.41]"I am not afraid of any one
thinking that I am saying this in a spirit of bravado for the sake of putting
you in good heart, whilst my real feelings and convictions are far otherwise.
I was at perfect liberty to go with my army to Spain, for which country
I had actually started, and which was my assigned province. There I should
have had my brother to share my plans and dangers; I should have had Hasdrubal
rather than Hannibal as my foe, and undoubtedly a less serious war on my
hands. But as I was sailing along the coast of Gaul I heard tidings of
this enemy, and at once landed, and after sending on cavalry in advance
moved up to the Rhone. A cavalry action was fought - that was the only
arm I had the opportunity of employing - and I defeated the enemy. His
infantry were hurrying away like an army in flight, and as I could not
come up with them overland, I returned to my ships with all possible speed,
and after making a wide circuit by sea and land have met this dreaded foe
almost at the foot of the Alps. Does it seem to you that I have unexpectedly
fallen in with him whilst I was anxious to decline a contest and not rather
that I am meeting him actually on his track and challenging and dragging
him into action? I shall be glad to learn whether the earth has suddenly
within the last twenty years produced a different breed of Carthaginans,
or whether they are the same as those who fought at the Aegates, and whom
you allowed to depart from Eryx on payment of eighteen denarii a head,
and whether this Hannibal is, as he gives out, the rival of Hercules in
his journeys, or whether he has been left by his father to pay tax and
tribute and to be the slave of the Roman people. If his crime at Saguntum
were not driving him on, he would surely have some regard, if not for his
conquered country, at all events for his house and his father, and the
treaties signed by that Hamilcar who at the order of our consul withdrew
his garrison from Eryx, who with sighs and groans accepted the hard conditions
imposed on the conquered Carthaginians, and who agreed to evacuate Sicily
and pay a war indemnity to Rome. And so I would have you, soldiers, fight
not merely in the spirit which you are wont to show against other foes,
but with feelings of indignant anger as though you saw your own slaves
bearing arms against you. When they were shut up in Eryx we might have
inflicted the most terrible of human punishments and starved them to death;
we might have taken our victorious fleet across to Africa, and in a few
days destroyed Carthage without a battle. We granted pardon to their prayers,
we allowed them to escape from the blockade, we agreed to terms of peace
with those whom we had conquered, and afterwards when they were in dire
straits through the African war we took them under our protection, To requite
us for these acts of kindness they are following the lead of a young madman
and coming to attack our fatherland. I only wish this struggle were for
honour alone and not for safety. It is not about the possession of Sicily
and Sardinia, the old subjects of dispute, but for Italy that you have
to fight. There is no second army at our back to oppose the enemy if we
fall to win, there are no more Alps to delay his advance while a fresh
army can be raised for defence. Here it is, soldiers, that we have to resist,
just as though we were fighting before the walls of Rome. Every one of
you must remember that he is using his arms to protect not himself only
but also his wife and little children; nor must his anxiety be confined
to his home, he must realise, too, that the senate and people of Rome are
watching our exploits today. What our strength and courage are now here,
such will be the fortune of our City yonder and of the empire of Rome."

[21.42]Such was the language which the
consul used towards the Romans. Hannibal thought that the courage of his
men ought to be roused by deeds first rather than by words. After forming
his army into a circle to view the spectacle, he placed in the centre some
Alpine prisoners in chains, and when some Gaulish arms had been thrown
down at their feet he ordered an interpreter to ask if any one of them
was willing to fight if he were freed from his chains and received arms
and a horse as the reward of victory. All to a man demanded arms and battle,
and when the lot was cast to decide who should fight, each wished that
he might be the one whom Fortune should select for the combat. As each
man's lot fell, he hastily seized his arms full of eagerness and exultant
delight, amidst the congratulations of his comrades and danced after the
custom of his country. But when they began to fight, such was the state
of feeling not only amongst the men who had accepted this condition, but
amongst the spectators generally that the good fortune of those who died
bravely was lauded quite as much as that of those who were victorious.

[21.43]After his men had been impressed
by watching several pairs of combatants Hannibal dismissed them, and afterwards
summoned them round him, when he is reported to have made the following
speech: "Soldiers, you have seen in the fate of others an example
how to conquer or to die. If the feelings with which you watched them lead
you to form a similar estimate of your own fortunes we are victors. That
was no idle spectacle but a picture, as it were, of your own condition.
Fortune, I am inclined to think has bound you in heavier chains and imposed
upon you a sterner necessity than on your captives. You are shut in on
the right hand and on the left by two seas, and you have not a single ship
in which to make your escape; around you flows the Po, a greater river
than the Rhone and a more rapid one; the barrier of the Alps frowns upon
you behind, those Alps which you could hardly cross when your strength
and vigour were unimpaired. Here, soldiers, on this spot where you have
for the first time encountered the enemy you must either conquer or die.
The same Fortune which has imposed upon you the necessity of fighting also
holds out rewards of victory, rewards as great as any which men are wont
to solicit from the immortal gods. Even if we were only going to recover
Sicily and Sardinia, possessions which were wrested from our fathers, they
would be prizes ample enough to satisfy us. Everything that the Romans
now possess, which they have won through so many triumphs, all that they
have amassed, will become yours, together with those who own it. Come then,
seize your arms and with the help of heaven win this splendid reward. You
have spent time enough in hunting cattle on the barren mountains of Lusitania
and Celtiberia, and finding no recompense for all your toils and dangers;
now the hour has come for you to enter upon rich and lucrative campaigns
and to earn rewards which are worth the earning, after your long march
over all those mountains and rivers, and through all those nations in arms.
Here Fortune has vouchsafed an end to your toils, here she will vouchsafe
a reward worthy of all your past services.

"Do not think because the war, being against Rome, bears a great
name, that therefore victory will be correspondingly difficult. Many a
despised enemy has fought a long and costly fight; nations and kings of
high renown have been beaten with a very slight effort. For, setting aside
the glory which surrounds the name of Rome, what point is there in which
they can be compared to you? To say nothing of your twenty years' campaigning
earned on with all your courage, all your good fortune, from the pillars
of Hercules, from the shores of the ocean, from the furthest corners of
the earth, through the midst of all the most warlike peoples of Spain and
Gaul, you have arrived here as victors. The army with which you will fight
is made up of raw levies who were beaten, conquered, and hemmed in by the
Gauls this very summer, who are strangers to their general, and he a stranger
to them. I, reared as I was, almost born, in the headquarters tent of my
father, a most distinguished general, I, who have subjugated Spain and
Gaul, who have conquered not only the Alpine tribes, but, what is a much
greater task, the Alps themselves - am I to compare myself with this six
months' general who has deserted his own army, who, if any one were to
point out to him the Romans and the Carthaginians after their standards
were removed, would, I am quite certain, not know which army he was in
command of as consul? I do not count it a small matter, soldiers, that
there is not a man amongst you before whose eyes I have not done many a
soldierly deed, or to whom I, who have witnessed and attested his courage,
could not recount his own gallant exploits and the time and place where
they were performed. I was your pupil before I was your commander, and
I shall go into battle surrounded by men whom I have commended and rewarded
thousands of times against those who know nothing of each other, who are
mutual strangers.

[21.44]"Wherever I turn my eyes I
see nothing but courage and strength, a veteran infantry, a cavalry, regular
and irregular alike, drawn from the noblest tribes, you, our most faithful
and brave allies, you, Carthaginians, who are going to fight for your country,
inspired by a most righteous indignation. We are taking the aggressive,
we are descending in hostile array into Italy, prepared to fight more bravely
and more fearlessly than our foe because he who attacks is animated by
stronger hopes and greater courage than he who meets the attack. Besides,
we are smarting from a sense of injustice and humiliation. First they demanded
me, your general, as their victim, then they insisted that all of you who
had taken part in the siege of Saguntum should be surrendered; had you
been given up they would have inflicted upon you the most exquisite tortures.
That outrageously cruel and tyrannical nation claims everything for itself,
makes everything dependent on its will and pleasure; they think it right
to dictate with whom we are to make war or peace. They confine and enclose
us within mountains and rivers as boundaries, but they do not observe the
limits which they themselves have fixed. 'Do not cross the Ebro, see that
you have nothing to do with the Saguntines.' 'But Saguntum is not on the
Ebro.' 'You must not move a step anywhere.' 'Is it a small matter, your
taking from me my oldest provinces, Sicily and Sardinia? Will you cross
over into Spain as well, and if I withdraw from there, will you cross over
into Africa? Do I say, will cross over? You have crossed over.' They have
sent the two consuls for this year, one to Africa, the other to Spain.
There is nothing left to us anywhere except what we claim by force of arms.
Those may be allowed to be cowards and dastards who have something to fall
back upon, whom their own land, their own territory will receive as they
flee through its safe and peaceful roads; you must of necessity be brave
men, every alternative between victory and death has been broken off by
the resolve of despair, and you are compelled either to conquer, or if
Fortune wavers, to meet death in battle rather than in flight. If you have
all made up your minds to this, I say again you are victors, no keener
weapon has been put into men's hands by the immortal gods than a contempt
for death."

[21.45]After the fighting spirit of both
armies had been roused by these harangues, the Romans threw a bridge over
the Ticinus and constructed a blockhouse for its defence. Whilst they were
thus occupied, the Carthaginian sent Maharbal with a troop of 500 Numidian
horse to ravage the lands of the allies of Rome, but with orders to spare
those of the Gauls as far as possible, and to win over their chiefs to
his side. When the bridge was completed the Roman army crossed over in
the territory of the Insubres and took up a position five miles from Ictumuli,
where Hannibal had his camp. As soon as he saw that a battle was imminent,
he hastily recalled Maharbal and his troopers. Feeling that he could never
say enough by way of admonition and encouragement to his soldiers, he ordered
an assembly, and before the whole army offered definite rewards in the
hope of which they were to fight. He said that he would give them land
wherever they wished, in Italy, Africa, or Spain, which would be free from
all taxation for the recipient and for his children; if any preferred money
to land, he would satisfy his desires; if any of the allies wished to become
Carthaginian citizens he would give them the opportunity; if any preferred
to return to their homes he would take care that their circumstances should
be such that they would never wish to exchange them with any of their countrymen.
He even promised freedom to the slaves who followed their masters, and
to the masters, for every slave freed, two more as compensation. To convince
them of his determination to carry out these promises, he held a lamb with
his left hand and a flint knife in his right and prayed to Jupiter and
the other gods, that, if he broke his word and forswore himself they would
slay him as he had slain the lamb. He then crushed the animal's head with
the flint. They all felt then that the gods themselves would guarantee
the fulfilment of their hopes, and looked upon the delay in bringing on
an action as delay in gaining their desires; with one mind and one voice
they clamoured to be led into battle.

[21.46]The Romans were far from showing
this alacrity. Amongst other causes of alarm they had been unnerved by
some portents which had happened lately. A wolf had entered the camp and
after worrying all it met had got away unhurt. A swarm of bees, too, had
settled on a tree which overhung the headquarters tent. After the necessary
propitiation had been made Scipio moved out with a force of cavalry and
light-armed javelin men towards the enemy's camp to get a nearer view and
to ascertain the number and nature of his force. He fell in with Hannibal
who was also advancing with his cavalry to explore the neighbourhood. Neither
body at first saw the other; the first indication of a hostile approach
was given by the unusually dense cloud of dust which was raised by the
tramp of so many men and horses. Each party halted and made ready for battle.
Scipio placed the javelin men and the Gaulish cavalry in the front, the
Roman horse and the heavy cavalry of the allies as reserves. Hannibal formed
his centre with his regular cavalry, and posted the Numidians on the flanks.
Scarcely had the battle shout been raised before the javelin men retired
to the second line amongst the reserves. For some time the cavalry kept
up an equal fight, but as the foot-soldiers became mixed up with the mounted
men they made their horses unmanageable, many were thrown or else dismounted
where they saw their comrades in difficulty, until the battle was mainly
fought on foot. Then the Numidians on the flanks wheeled round and appeared
on the rear of the Romans, creating dismay and panic amongst them. To make
matters worse the consul was wounded and in danger; he was rescued by the
intervention of his son who was just approaching manhood. This was the
youth who afterwards won the glory of bringing this war to a close, and
gained the soubriquet of Africanus for his splendid victory over Hannibal
and the Carthaginians. The javelin men were the first to be attacked by
the Numidians and they fled in disorder, the rest of the force, the cavalry,
closed round the consul, shielding him as much by their persons as by their
arms, and returned to camp in orderly retirement. Caelius assigns the honour
of saving the consul to a Ligurian slave, but I would rather believe that
it was his son; the majority of authors assert this and the tradition is
generally accepted.

[21.47]This was the first battle with
Hannibal, and the result made it quite clear that the Carthaginian was
superior in his cavalry, and consequently that the open plains which stretch
from the Po to the Alps were not a suitable battlefield for the Romans.
The next night accordingly, the soldiers were ordered to collect their
baggage in silence, the army moved away from the Ticinus and marched rapidly
to the Po, which they crossed by the pontoon bridge which was still intact,
in perfect order and without any molestation by the enemy. They reached
Placentia before Hannibal knew for certain that they had left the Ticinus;
however, he succeeded in capturing some 600, who were loitering on his
side of the Po, and were slowly unfastening the end of the bridge. He was
unable to use the bridge for crossing, as the ends had been unfastened
and the whole was floating down-stream. According to Caelius, Mago with
the cavalry and Spanish infantry at once swam across, whilst Hannibal himself
took his army across higher up the river where it was fordable, the elephants
being stationed in a row from bank to bank to break the force of the current.
Those who know the river will hardly believe this for it is highly improbable
that the cavalry could have stood against so violent a river without damage
to their horses and arms, even supposing that the Spaniards had been carried
across by their inflated skins, and it would have required a march of many
days to find a ford in the Po where an army loaded with baggage could be
taken across. I attach greater weight to those authorities who state that
it took them at least two days to find a spot where they could throw a
bridge over the river, and that it was there that Mago's cavalry and the
Spanish light infantry crossed. Whilst Hannibal was waiting near the river
to give audience to deputations from the Gauls, he sent his heavy infantry
across, and during this interval Mago and his cavalry advanced a day's
march from the river in the direction of the enemy at Placentia. A few
days later Hannibal entrenched himself in a position six miles from Placentia,
and the next day he drew out his army in battle order in full view of the
enemy and gave him the opportunity of fighting.

[21.48]The following night a murderous
outbreak took place amongst the Gaulish auxiliaries in the Roman camp;
there was, however, more excitement and confusion than actual loss of life.
About 2000 infantry and 200 horsemen massacred the sentinels and deserted
to Hannibal. The Carthaginian gave them a kind reception and sent them
to their homes with the promise of great rewards if they would enlist the
sympathies of their countrymen on his behalf. Scipio saw in this outrage
a signal of revolt for all the Gauls, who, infected by the madness of this
crime, would at once fly to arms, and though still suffering severely from
his wound, he left his position in the fourth watch of the following night,
his army marching in perfect silence, and shifted his camp close to the
Trebia on to higher ground where the hills were impracticable for cavalry.
He was less successful in escaping the notice of the enemy than he had
been at the Ticinus, Hannibal sent first the Numidians, then afterwards
the whole of his cavalry in pursuit and would have inflicted disaster upon
the rear of the column at all events, had not the Numidians been tempted
by their desire for plunder to turn aside to the deserted Roman camp. Whilst
they were wasting their time in prying into every corner of the camp, without
finding anything worth waiting for, the enemy slipped out of their hands,
and when they caught sight of the Romans they had already crossed the Trebia
and were measuring out the site for their camp. A few stragglers whom they
caught on their side the river were killed. Unable any longer to endure
the irritation of his wound, which had been aggravated during the march,
and also thinking that he ought to wait for his colleague - he had already
heard that he had been recalled from Sicily - Scipio selected what seemed
the safest position near the river, and formed a standing camp which was
strongly entrenched. Hannibal had encamped not far from there, and in spite
of his elation at his successful cavalry action he felt considerable anxiety
at the shortness of supplies which, owing to his marching through hostile
territory where no stores were provided, became more serious day by day.
He sent a detachment to the town of Clastidium where the Romans had accumulated
large quantities of corn. Whilst they were preparing to attack the place
they were led to hope that it would be betrayed to them. Dasius, a Brundisian,
was commandant of the garrison, and he was induced by a moderate bribe
of 400 gold pieces to betray Clastidium to Hannibal. The place was the
granary of the Carthaginians while they were at the Trebia. No cruelty
was practiced on the garrison, as Hannibal was anxious to win a reputation
for clemency at the outset.

[21.49].The war on the Trebia had for
the time being come to a standstill, but military and naval actions were
taking place around Sicily and the islands fringing Italy, both under the
conduct of Sempronius and also before his arrival. Twenty quinqueremes
with a thousand soldiers on board had been despatched by the Carthaginians
to Italy, nine of them to Liparae, eight to the island of Vulcanus, and
three had been carried by the currents into the Straits of Messana. These
were sighted from Messana, and Hiero, the King of Syracuse, who happened
to be there at the time waiting for the consul, despatched twelve ships
against them, and they were taken without any opposition and brought into
the harbour of Messana. It was ascertained from the prisoners, that besides
the fleet of twenty ships to which they belonged which had sailed for Italy
thirty-five quinqueremes were also on the way to Sicily with the object
of stirring up the old allies of Carthage. Their main anxiety was to secure
Lilybaeum, and the prisoners were of opinion that the storm which had separated
them from the rest had also driven that fleet up to the Aegates. The king
communicated this information just as he had received it to M. Aemilius,
the praetor, whose province Sicily was, and advised him to throw a strong
garrison into Lilybaeum. The praetor at once sent envoys and military tribunes
to the neighbouring states to urge them to take measures for self-defence.
Lilybaeum especially was engrossed in preparations for war; orders were
issued for the seamen to carry ten days' rations on board that there might
be no delay in setting sail when the signal was given; and men were despatched
along the coast to look out for the approach of the hostile fleet. So it
came to pass that although the Carthaginians had purposely lessened the
speed of their vessels, so that they might approach Lilybaeum before daylight,
they were descried in the offing owing to there being a moon all night,
and also because they were coming with their sails set. Instantly the signal
was given by the look-out men; in the town there was the cry, "To
arms," and the ships were manned. Some of the soldiers were on the
walls and guarding the gates, others were on board the ships. As the Carthaginians
saw that they would have to deal with people who were anything but unprepared,
they stood out from the harbour till daylight, and spent the time in lowering
their masts and preparing for action. When it grew light they put out to
sea that they might have sufficient room for fighting, and that the enemy's
ships might be free to issue from the harbour. The Romans did not decline
battle, encouraged as they were by the recollection of their former conflicts
in this very place, and full of confidence in the numbers and courage of
their men.

[21.50]When they had sailed out to sea
the Romans were eager to come to close quarters and make a hand-to-hand
fight of it; the Carthaginians, on the other hand, sought to avoid this
and to succeed by maneuvering and not by direct attack; they preferred
to make it a battle of ships rather than of soldiers. For their fleet was
amply provided with seamen, but only scantily manned by soldiers, and whenever
a ship was laid alongside one of the enemy's they were very unequally matched
in fighting men. When this became generally known, the spirits of the Romans
rose as they realised how many of their military were on board, whilst
the Carthaginians lost heart when they remembered how few they had. Seven
of their ships were captured in a very short time, the rest took to flight.
In the seven ships there were 1700 soldiers and sailors, amongst them three
members of the Carthaginian nobility. The Roman fleet returned undamaged
into port, with the exception of one which had been rammed, but even that
was brought in. Immediately after this battle Tiberius Sempronius, the
consul, arrived at Messana before those in the town had heard of it. King
Hiero went to meet him at the entrance of the Straits with his fleet fully
equipped and manned, and went on board the consul's vessel to congratulate
him on having safely arrived with his fleet and his army, and to wish him
a prosperous and successful passage to Sicily. He then described the condition
of the island and the movements of the Carthaginians, and promised to assist
the Romans now in his old age with the same readiness which he had shown
as a young man in the former war; he should supply the seamen and soldiers
with corn and clothing gratis. He also told the consul that Lilybaeum and
the cities on the coast were in great danger, some were anxious to effect
a revolution. The consul saw that there must be no delay in his sailing
for Lilybaeum; he started at once and the king accompanied him with his
fleet.

[21.51]At Lilybaeum Hiero and his fleet
bade him farewell, and the consul, after leaving the praetor to see to
the defence of the coast of Sicily, crossed over to Malta which was held
by the Carthaginians. Hamilcar, the son of Gisgo, who was in command of
the garrison, surrendered the island and his men, a little under 2000 in
number. A few days later he returned to Lilybaeum, and the prisoners, with
the exception of the three nobles, were sold by auction. After satisfying
himself as to the security of that part of Sicily, the consul sailed to
the Insulae Vulcani, as he heard that the Carthaginian fleet was anchored
there. No enemy, however, was found in the neighbourhood, for they had
left for Italy to ravage the coastal districts, and after laying waste
the territory of Vibo they were threatening the city. Whilst he was returning
to Sicily the news of these depredations reached the consul, and at the
same time a despatch was handed to him from the senate informing him of
Hannibal's presence in Italy and ordering him to come to his colleague's
assistance as soon as possible. With all these causes for anxiety weighing
upon him, the consul at once embarked his army and despatched it up the
Adriatic to Ariminum. He furnished Sex. Pomponius, his legate, with twenty-five
ships of war, and entrusted to him the protection of the Italian coast
and the territory of Vibo, and made up the fleet of M. Aemilius, the praetor,
to fifty vessels. After making these arrangements for Sicily, he started
for Italy with ten ships, and cruising along the coast reached Ariminum.
From there he marched to the Trebia and effected a junction with his colleague.

[21.52]The fact that both consuls and
all the available strength that Rome possessed were now brought up to oppose
Hannibal, was a pretty clear proof that either that force was adequate
for the defence of Rome or that all hope of its defence must be abandoned.
Nevertheless, one consul, depressed after his cavalry defeat, and also
by his wound, would rather that battle should be deferred. The other, whose
courage had suffered no check and was therefore all the more eager to fight,
was impatient of any delay. The country between the Trebia and the Po was
inhabited by Gauls who in this struggle between two mighty peoples showed
impartial goodwill to either side, with the view, undoubtedly, of winning
the victor's gratitude. The Romans were quite satisfied with this neutrality
if only it was maintained and the Gauls kept quiet, but Hannibal was extremely
indignant, as he was constantly giving out that he had been invited by
the Gauls to win their freedom. Feelings of resentment and, at the same
time, a desire to enrich his soldiers with plunder prompted him to send
2000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, made up of Gauls and Numidians, mostly
the latter, with orders to ravage the whole country, district after district,
right up to the banks of the Po. Though the Gauls had hitherto maintained
an impartial attitude, they were compelled in their need of help to turn
from those who had inflicted these outrages to those who they hoped would
avenge them. They sent envoys to the consuls to beg the Romans to come
to the rescue of a land which was suffering because its people had been
too loyal to Rome. Cornelius Scipio did not consider that either the grounds
alleged or the circumstances justified his taking action. He regarded that
nation with suspicion on account of their many acts of treachery, and even
if their past faithlessness could have been forgotten through lapse of
time, he could not forget the recent treachery of the Boii. Sempronius,
on the other hand, was of opinion that the most effective means of preserving
the fidelity of their allies was to defend those who first asked for their
help. As his colleague still hesitated, he sent his own cavalry supported
by about a thousand javelin men to protect the territory of the Gauls on
the other side of the Trebia. They attacked the enemy suddenly whilst they
were scattered and in disorder, most of them loaded with plunder, and after
creating a great panic amongst them, and inflicting severe losses upon
them, they drove them in flight to their camp. The fugitives were driven
back by their comrades who poured in great numbers out of the camp, and
thus reinforced they renewed the fighting. The battle wavered as each side
retired or pursued, and up to the last the action was undecided. The enemy
lost more men; the Romans claimed the victory.

[21.53]To no one in the whole army did
the victory appear more important or more decisive than to the consul himself.
What gave him especial pleasure was that he had proved superior in that
arm in which his colleague had been worsted. He saw that the spirits of
his men were restored, and that there was no one but his colleague who
wished to delay battle; he believed that Scipio was more sick in mind than
in body, and that the thought of his wound made him shrink from the dangers
of the battlefield. "But we must not be infected by a sick man's lethargy.
What will be gained by further delay, or rather, by wasting time? Whom
are we expecting as our third consul; what fresh army are we looking for?
The camp of the Carthaginians is in Italy, almost in sight of the City.
They are not aiming at Sicily and Sardinia, which they lost after their
defeats, nor the Spain which lies on this side the Ebro; their sole object
is to drive the Romans away from their ancestral soil, from the land on
which they were born. What groans our fathers would utter, accustomed as
they were to warring round the walls of Carthage, if they could see us,
their descendants, with two consuls and two consular armies, cowering in
our camp in the very heart of Italy, whilst the Carthaginian is annexing
to his empire all between the Alps and the Apennines." This was the
way he spoke when sitting by his incapacitated colleague, this the language
he used before his soldiers as though he were haranguing the Assembly.
He was urged on, too, by the near approach of the time for the elections,
and the fear that the war, if delayed, might pass into the hands of the
new consuls, as well as by the chance he had of monopolising all the glory
of it while his colleague was on the sick list. In spite, therefore, of
the opposition of Cornelius he ordered the soldiers to get ready for the
coming battle.

Hannibal saw clearly what was the best course for the enemy to adopt,
and had very little hope that the consuls would do anything rash or ill-advised.
When, however, he found that what he had previously learnt by hearsay was
actually the case, namely, that one of the consuls was a man of impetuous
and headstrong character, and that he had become still more so since the
recent cavalry action, he had very little doubt in his own mind that he
would have a favourable opportunity of giving battle. He was anxious not
to lose a moment, in order that he might fight whilst the hostile army
was still raw and the better of the two generals was incapacitated by his
wound, and also whilst the Gauls were still in a warlike mood, for he knew
that most of them would follow him with less alacrity the further they
were dragged from their homes. These and similar considerations led him
to hope that a battle was imminent, and made him desirous of forcing an
engagement if there was any holding back on the other side. He sent out
some Gauls to reconnoitre - as Gauls were serving in both armies they could
be most safely trusted to find out what he wanted - and when they reported
that the Romans had prepared for battle, the Carthaginian began to look
out for ground which would admit of an ambuscade.

[21.54]Between the two armies there was
a stream with very high banks which were overgrown with marshy grass and
the brambles and brushwood which are generally found on waste ground. After
riding round the place and satisfying himself from personal observation
that it was capable of concealing even cavalry, Hannibal, turning to his
brother Mago, said, "This will be the place for you to occupy. Pick
out of our whole force of cavalry and infantry a hundred men from each
arm, and bring them to me at the first watch, now it is time for food and
rest." He then dismissed his staff. Presently Mago appeared with his
200 picked men. "I see here," said Hannibal, "the very flower
of my army, but you must be strong in numbers as well as in courage. Each
of you therefore go and choose nine others like himself, from the squadrons
and the maniples. Mago will show you the place where you are to lie in
ambuscade, you have an enemy who are blindly ignorant of these practices
in war." After sending Mago with his 1000 infantry and 1000 cavalry
to take up his position, Hannibal gave orders for the Numidian cavalry
to cross the Trebia in the early dawn and ride up to the gates of the Roman
camp; then they were to discharge their missiles on the outposts and so
goad the enemy on to battle. When the fighting had once started they were
gradually to give ground and draw their pursuers to their own side of the
river. These were the instructions to the Numidians; the other commanders,
both infantry and cavalry, were ordered to see that all their men had breakfast,
after which they were to wait for the signal, the men fully armed, the
horses saddled and ready. Eager for battle, and having already made up
his mind to fight, Sempronius led out the whole of his cavalry to meet
the Numidian attack, for it was in his cavalry that he placed most confidence;
these were followed by 6000 infantry and at last the whole of his force
marched on to the field. It happened to be the season of winter, a snowstorm
was raging, and the district, situated between the Alps and the Apennines,
was rendered especially cold by the vicinity of rivers and marshes. To
make matters worse, men and horses alike had been hurriedly sent forward,
without any food, without any protection against the cold, so they had
no heat in them and the chilling blasts from the river made the cold still
more severe as they approached it in their pursuit of the Numidians. But
when they entered the water which had been swollen by the night's rain
and was then breast high, their limbs became stiff with cold, and when
they emerged on the other side they had hardly strength to hold their weapons;
they began to grow faint from fatigue and as the day wore on, from hunger.

[21.55]Hannibal's men, meanwhile, had
made fires in front of their tents, oil had been distributed amongst the
maniples for them to make their joints and limbs supple and they had time
for an ample repast. When it was announced that the enemy had crossed the
river they took their arms, feeling alert and active in mind and body,
and marched to battle. The Balearic and light-armed infantry were posted
in front of the standards; they numbered about 8000; behind them the heavy-armed
infantry, the mainstay and backbone of the army; on the flanks Hannibal
distributed the cavalry, and outside them, again, the elephants. When the
consul saw his cavalry, who had lost their order in the pursuit, suddenly
meeting with an unsuspected resistance from the Numidians, he recalled
them by signal and received them within his infantry. There were 18,000
Romans, 20,000 Latin allies, and an auxiliary force of Cenomani, the only
Gallic tribe which had remained faithful. These were the forces engaged.
The Balearics and light infantry opened the battle, but on being met by
the heavier legions they were rapidly withdrawn to the wings, an evolution
which at once threw the Roman horse into difficulties, for the 4000 wearied
troopers had been unable to offer an effective resistance to 10,000 who
were fresh and vigorous, and now in addition they were overwhelmed by what
seemed a cloud of missiles from the light infantry. Moreover, the elephants,
towering aloft at the ends of the line, terrified the horses not only by
their appearance but by their unaccustomed smell, and created widespread
panic. The infantry battle, as far as the Romans were concerned, was maintained
more by courage than by physical strength, for the Carthaginians, who had
shortly before been getting themselves into trim, brought their powers
fresh and unimpaired into action, whilst the Romans were fatigued and hungry
and stiff with cold. Still, their courage would have kept them up had it
been only infantry that they were fighting against. But the light infantry,
after repulsing the cavalry, were hurling their missiles on the flanks
of the legions; the elephants had now come up against the centre of the
Roman line, and Mago and his Numidians, as soon as it had passed their
ambuscade, rose up in the rear and created a terrible disorder and panic.
Yet in spite of all the dangers which surrounded them, the ranks stood
firm and immovable for some time, even, contrary to all expectation, against
the elephants. Some skirmishers who had been placed where they could attack
these animals flung darts at them and drove them off, and rushed after
them, stabbing them under their tails, where the skin is soft and easily
penetrated.

[21.56]Maddened with pain and terror,
they were beginning to rush wildly on their own men, when Hannibal ordered
them to be driven away to the left wing against the auxiliary Gauls on
the Roman right. There they instantly produced unmistakable panic and flight,
and the Romans had fresh cause for .alarm when they saw their auxiliaries
routed. They now stood fighting in a square, and about 10,000 of them,
unable to escape in any other direction, forced their way through the centre
of the African troops and the auxiliary Gauls who supported them and inflicted
an immense loss on the enemy. They were prevented by the river from returning
to their camp, and the rain made it impossible for them to judge where
they could best go to the assistance of their comrades, so they marched
away straight to Placentia. Then desperate attempts to escape were made
on all sides; some who made for the river were swept away by the current
or caught by the enemy while hesitating to cross; others, scattered over
the fields in flight, followed the track of the main retreat and sought
Placentia; others, fearing the enemy more than the river, crossed it and
reached their camp. The driving sleet and the intolerable cold caused the
death of many men and baggage animals, and nearly all the elephants perished.
The Carthaginians stopped their pursuit at the banks of the Trebia and
returned to their camp so benumbed with cold that they hardly felt any
joy in their victory. In the night the men who had guarded the camp, and
the rest of the soldiers, mostly wounded, crossed the Trebia on rafts without
any interference from the Carthaginians, either because the roaring of
the storm prevented them from hearing or because they were unable to move
through weariness and wounds and pretended that they heard nothing. Whilst
the Carthaginians were keeping quiet, Scipio led his army to Placentia
and thence across the Po to Cremona, in order that one colony might not
be burdened with providing winter quarters for the two armies.

[21.57]This defeat so unnerved people
in Rome that they believed the enemy was already advancing to attack the
City, and that there was no help to be looked for, no hope of repelling
him from their walls and gates. After one consul had been beaten at the
Ticinus the other was recalled from Sicily, and now both consuls and both
consular armies had been worsted. What fresh generals, men asked, what
fresh legions could be brought to the rescue? Amidst this universal panic
Sempronius arrived. He had slipped through the enemy's cavalry at immense
risk while they were dispersed in quest of plunder, and owed his escape
rather to sheer audacity than to cleverness, for he had little hope of
eluding them or of successful resistance if he failed to do so. After conducting
the elections, which was the pressing need for the moment, he returned
to winter quarters. The consuls elected were Cneius Servilius and C. Flaminius.
Even in their winter quarters the Romans were not allowed much quiet; the
Numidian horse were roaming in all directions, or where the ground was
too rough for them, the Celtiberians and Lusitanians. They were, therefore,
cut off from supplies on every side, except what were brought in ships
on the Po. Near Placentia there was a place called Emporium, which had
been carefully fortified and occupied by a strong garrison. In the hope
of capturing the place, Hannibal approached with cavalry and light-armed
troops, and as he trusted mainly to secrecy for success, he marched thither
by night. But he did not escape the observation of the sentinels, and such
a shouting suddenly arose that it was actually heard at Placentia. By daybreak
the consul was on the spot with his cavalry, having given orders for the
legions of infantry to follow in battle formation. A cavalry action followed
in which Hannibal was wounded, and his retirement from the field discomfited
the enemy; the position was admirably defended.

After taking only a few days' rest, before his wound was thoroughly
healed Hannibal proceeded to attack Victumviae. During the Gaulish war
this place had served as an emporium for the Romans; subsequently, as it
was a fortified place, a mixed population from the surrounding country
had settled there in considerable numbers, and now the terror created by
the constant depredations had driven most of the people from the fields
into the town. This motley population, excited by the news of the energetic
defence of Placentia, flew to arms and went out to meet Hannibal. More
like a crowd than an army they met him on his march, and as on the one
side there was nothing but an undisciplined mob, and on the other a general
and soldiers who had perfect confidence in each other, a small body routed
as many as 35,000 men. The next day they surrendered and admitted a Carthaginian
garrison within their walls. They had just completed the surrender of their
arms in obedience to orders, when instructions were suddenly given to the
victors to treat the city as though it had been carried by storm, and no
deed of blood, which on such occasions historians are wont to mention,
was left undone, so awful was the example set of every form of licentiousness
and cruelty and brutal tyranny towards the wretched inhabitants. Such were
the winter operations of Hannibal.

[21.58]The soldiers rested whilst the
intolerable cold lasted; it did not, however, last long, and at the first
doubtful indications of spring Hannibal left his winter quarters for Etruria
with the intention of inducing that nation to join forces with him, either
voluntarily or under compulsion. During his passage of the Apennines he
was overtaken by a storm of such severity as almost to surpass the horrors
of the Alps. The rain was driven by the wind straight into the men's faces,
and either they had to drop their weapons or if they tried to struggle
against the hurricane it caught them and dashed them to the ground, so
they came to a halt. Then they found that it was stopping their respiration
so that they could not breathe, and they sat down for a short time with
their backs to the wind. The heavens began to reverberate with terrific
roar, and amidst the awful din lightning flashed and quivered. Sight and
sound alike paralysed them with terror. At last, as the force of the gale
increased owing to the rain having ceased, they saw that there was nothing
for it but to pitch their camp on the ground where they had been caught
by the storm. Now all their labour had to begin over again, for they could
neither unroll anything nor fix anything, whatever was fixed did not stand,
the wind tore everything into shreds and carried it off. Soon the moisture
in the upper air above the cold mountain peaks froze and discharged such
a shower of snow and hail that the men, giving up all further attempts,
lay down as best they could, buried beneath their coverings rather than
protected by them. This was followed by such intense cold that when any
one attempted to rise out of that pitiable crowd of prostrate men and beasts
it was a long time before he could get up, for his muscles being cramped
and stiff with cold, he could hardly bend his limbs. At length, by exercising
their arms and legs, they were able to move about, and began to recover
their spirits; here and there fires were lighted, and those who were most
helpless turned to their colleagues for help. They remained on that spot
for two days like a force blockaded; many men and animals perished; of
the elephants which survived the battle of the Trebia they lost seven.

[21.59]After descending from the Apennines
Hannibal advanced towards Placentia, and after a ten miles' march formed
camp. The following day he marched against the enemy with 12,000 infantry
and 5000 cavalry. Sempronius had by this time returned from Rome, and he
did not decline battle. That day the two camps were three miles distant
from each other; the following day they fought, and both sides exhibited
the most determined courage, but the action was indecisive. At the first
encounter the Romans were so far superior that they not only conquered
in the field, but followed the routed enemy to his camp and soon made an
attack upon it. Hannibal stationed a few men to defend the rampart and
the gates, the rest he massed in the middle of the camp, and ordered them
to be on the alert and wait for the signal to make a sortie. It was now
about three o'clock; the Romans were worn out with their fruitless efforts
as there was no hope of carrying the camp, and the consul gave the signal
to retire. As soon as Hannibal heard it and saw that the fighting had slackened
and that the enemy were retiring from the camp, he immediately launched
his cavalry against them right and left, and sallied in person with the
main strength of his infantry from the middle of the camp. Seldom has there
been a more equal fight, and few would have been rendered more memorable
by the mutual destruction of both armies had the daylight allowed it to
be sufficiently prolonged; as it was, night put an end to a conflict which
had been maintained with such determined courage. There was greater fury
than bloodshed, and as the fighting had been almost equal on both sides,
they separated with equal loss. Not more than 600 infantry and half that
number of cavalry fell on either side, but the Roman loss was out of proportion
to their numbers; several members of the equestrian order and five military
tribunes as well as three prefects of the allies were killed. Immediately
after the battle Hannibal withdrew into Liguria, and Sempronius to Luca.
Whilst Hannibal was entering Liguria, two Roman quaestors who had been
ambushed and captured, C. Fulvius and L. Lucretius, together with three
military tribunes and five members of the equestrian order, most of them
sons of senators, were given up to him by the Gauls in order that he might
feel more confidence in their maintenance of peaceful relations, and their
determination to give him active support.

[21.60]While these events were in progress
in Italy, Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who had been sent with a fleet and an army
to Spain, commenced operations in that country. Starting from the mouth
of the Rhone, he sailed round the eastward end of the Pyrenees and brought
up at Emporiae. Here he disembarked his army, and beginning with the Laeetani,
he brought the whole of the maritime populations as far as the Ebro within
the sphere of Roman influence by renewing old alliances and forming new
ones. He gained in this way a reputation for clemency which extended not
only to the maritime populations but to the more warlike tribes in the
interior and the mountain districts. He established peaceable relations
with these, and more than that, he secured their support in arms and several
strong cohorts were enrolled from amongst them. The country on this side
the Ebro was Hanno's province, Hannibal had left him to hold it for Carthage.
Considering that he ought to oppose Scipio's further progress before the
whole province was under Roman sway, he fixed his camp in full view of
the enemy and offered battle. The Roman general, too, thought that battle
ought not to be delayed; he knew he would have to fight both Hanno and
Hasdrubal, and preferred dealing with each singly rather than meeting them
both at once.. The battle was not a hard-fought one. The enemy lost 6000;
2000, including those who were guarding the camp, were made prisoners;
the camp itself was carried and the general with some of his chiefs was
taken; Cissis, a town near the camp, was successfully attacked. The plunder,
however, as it was a small place, was of little value, consisting mainly
of the barbarians' household goods and some worthless slaves. The camp,
however, enriched the soldiers with the property belonging not only to
the army they had defeated but also to the one serving with Hannibal in
Italy. They had left almost all their valuable possessions on the other
side of the Pyrenees, that they might not have heavy loads to carry.

[21.61]Before he had received definite
tidings of this defeat, Hasdrubal had crossed the Ebro with 8000 infantry
and 1000 cavalry, hoping to encounter the Romans as soon as they landed,
but after hearing of the disaster at Cissis and the capture of the camp,
he turned his route to the sea. Not far from Tarracona he found our marines
and seamen wandering at will through the fields, success as usual producing
carelessness. Sending his cavalry in all directions amongst them, he made
a great slaughter and drove them pell-mell to their ships. Afraid to remain
any longer in the neighbourhood lest he should be surprised by Scipio,
he retreated across the Ebro. On hearing of this fresh enemy Scipio came
down by forced marches, and after dealing summary punishment to some of
the naval captains, returned by sea to Emporiae, leaving a small garrison
in Tarracona. He had scarcely left when Hasdrubal appeared on the scene,
and instigated the Ilergetes, who had given hostages to Scipio, to revolt,
and in conjunction with the warriors of that tribe ravaged the territories
of those tribes who remained loyal to Rome. This roused Scipio from his
winter quarters, on which Hasdrubal again disappeared beyond the Ebro,
and Scipio invaded in force the territory of the Ilergetes, after the author
of the revolt had left them to their fate. He drove them all into Antanagrum,
their capital, which he proceeded to invest, and a few days later he received
them into the protection and jurisdiction of Rome, after demanding an increase
in the number of hostages and inflicting a heavy fine upon them. From there
he advanced against the Ausetani, who lived near the Ebro and were also
in alliance with the Carthaginians, and invested their city. The Laeetani
whilst bringing assistance to their neighbours by night were ambushed not
far from the city which they intended to enter. As many as 12,000 were
killed, almost all the survivors threw away their arms and fled to their
homes in scattered groups all over the country. The only thing which saved
the invested city from assault and storm was the severity of the weather.
For the thirty days during which the siege lasted the snow was seldom less
than four feet deep, and it covered up the mantlets and vineae so completely
that it even served as a sufficient protection against the firebrands which
the enemy discharged from time to time. At last, after their chief, Amusicus,
had escaped to Hasdrubal's quarters, they surrendered and agreed to pay
an indemnity of twenty talents. The army returned to its winter quarters
at Tarracona.

[21.62]During this winter many portents
occurred in Rome and the neighbourhood, or at all events, many were reported
and easily gained credence, for when once men's minds have been excited
by superstitious fears they easily believe these things. A six-months-old
child, of freeborn parents, is said to have shouted "Io Triumphe"
in the vegetable market, whilst in the Forum Boarium an ox is reported
to have climbed up of its own accord to the third story of a house, and
then, frightened by the noisy crowd which gathered, it threw itself down.
A phantom navy was seen shining in the sky; the temple of Hope in the vegetable
market was struck by lightning; at Lanuvium Juno's spear had moved of itself,
and a crow had flown down to her temple and settled upon her couch; in
the territory of Amiternum beings in human shape and clothed in white were
seen at a distance, but no one came close to them; in the neighbourhood
of Picenum there was a shower of stones; at Caere the oracular tablets
had shrunk in size; in Gaul a wolf had snatched a sentinel's sword from
its scabbard and run off with it. With regard to the other portents, the
decemvirs were ordered to consult the Sacred Books, but in the case of
the shower of stones at Picenum a nine days' sacred feast was proclaimed,
at the close of which almost the whole community busied itself with the
expiation of the others. First of all the City was purified, and full-grown
victims were sacrificed to the deities named in the Sacred Books; an offering
of forty pounds' weight of gold was conveyed to Juno at Lanuvium, and the
matrons dedicated a bronze statue of that goddess on the Aventine. At Caere,
where the tablets had shrunk, a lectisternium was enjoined, and a service
of intercession was to be rendered to Fortuna on Algidus. In Rome also
a lectisternium was ordered for Juventas and a special service of intercession
at the temple of Hercules, and afterwards one in which the whole population
were to take part at all the shrines. Five full-grown victims were sacrificed
to the Genius of Rome, and C. Atilius Serranus, the praetor, received instructions
to undertake certain vows which were to be discharged should the commonwealth
remain in the same condition for ten years. These ceremonial observances
and vows, ordered in obedience to the Sacred Books, did much to allay the
religious fears of the people.

[21.63]One of the consuls elect was C.
Flaminius, and to him was assigned by lot the command of the legions at
Placentia. He wrote to the consul giving orders for the army to be in camp
at Ariminum by the 15th of March. The reason was that he might enter upon
his office there, for he had not forgotten his old quarrels with the senate,
first as tribune of the people, then afterwards about his consulship, the
election to which had been declared illegal, and finally about his triumph.
He further embittered the senate against him by his support of C. Claudius;
he alone of all the members was in favour of the measure which that tribune
introduced. Under its provisions no senator, no one whose father had been
a senator, was allowed to possess a vessel of more than 300 amphorae burden.
This was considered quite large enough for the conveyance of produce from
their estates, all profit made by trading was regarded as dishonourable
for the patricians. The question excited the keenest opposition and brought
Flaminius into the worst possible odium with the nobility through his support
of it, but on the other hand made him a popular favourite and procured
for him his second consulship. Suspecting, therefore, that they would endeavour
to detain him in the City by various devices, such as falsifying the auspices
or the delay necessitated by the Latin Festival, or other hindrances to
which as consul he was liable, he gave out that he had to take a journey,
and then left the City secretly as a private individual and so reached
his province. When this got abroad there was a fresh outburst of indignation
on the part of the incensed senate; they declared that he was carrying
on war not only with the senate but even with the immortal gods. "On
the former occasion," they said, "when he was elected consul
against the auspices and we recalled him from the very field of battle,
he was disobedient to gods and men. Now he is conscious that he has despised
them and has fled from the Capitol and the customary recital of solemn
vows. He refuses to approach the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the
day of his entrance upon office, to see and consult the senate, to whom
he is so odious and whom he alone of all men detests, to proclaim the Latin
Festival and offer sacrifice to Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount, to
proceed to the Capitol and after duly taking the auspices recite the prescribed
vows, and from thence, vested in the paludamentum and escorted by lictors,
go in state to his province. He has stolen away furtively without his insignia
of office, without his lictors, just as though he were some menial employed
in the camp and had quitted his native soil to go into exile. He thinks
it, forsooth, more consonant with the greatness of his office to enter
upon it at Ariminum rather than in Rome, and to put on his official dress
in some wayside inn rather than at his own hearth and in the presence of
his own household gods." It was unanimously decided that he should
be recalled, brought back if need be by force, and compelled to discharge,
on the spot, all the duties he owed to God and man before he went to the
army and to his province. Q. Terentius and M. Antistius were delegated
for this task, but they had no more influence with him than the despatch
of the senate in his former consulship. A few days afterwards he entered
upon office, and whilst offering his sacrifice, the calf, after it was
struck, bounded away out of the hands of the sacrificing priests and bespattered
many of the bystanders with its blood. Amongst those at a distance from
the altar who did not know what the commotion was about there was great
excitement; most people regarded it as a most alarming omen. Flaminius
took over the two legions from Sempronius, the late consul, and the two
from C. Atilius, the praetor, and commenced his march to Etruria through
the passes of the Apennines.

End of Book 21

Copyright (c) 1996 by Bruce J. Butterfield.
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