Preserving the Army

The problem of the Revolution was not one of military strategy,
but of keeping an army in existence, and it was in this that the
commander-in-chief's great ability showed itself. The British could and
did repeatedly beat the Continental army, but they could not beat the
General, and so long as he was in the field there was a rallying ground
for whatever fighting spirit there was.

The difficulty of this task can hardly be over-magnified. When Washington
assumed command of the forces before Boston, he "found a mixed multitude
of people ... under very little discipline, order, or government," and
"confusion and disorder reigned in every department, which, in a little
time, must have ended either in the separation of the army or fatal
contests with one another." Before he was well in the saddle his general
officers were quarrelling over rank, and resigning; there was such a
scarcity of powder that it was out of the question for some months to do
anything; and the British sent people infected with small-pox to the
Continental army, with a consequent outbreak of that pest.

Hardly had he brought order out of chaos when the army he had taken such
pains to discipline began to melt away, having been by political folly
recruited for short terms, and the work was to be all done over. Again and
again during the war regiments which had been enlisted for short periods
left him at the most critical moment. Very typical occurrences he himself
tells of, when Connecticut troops could "not be prevailed upon to stay
longer than their term (saving those who have enlisted for the next
campaign, and mostly on furlough), and such a dirty, mercenary spirit
pervades the whole, that I should not be at all surprised at any disaster
that may happen," and when he described how in his retreat through New
Jersey, "The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a
brave and manly opposition in order to repair our losses, are dismayed,
intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off;
in some instances, almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by
companies at a time." Another instance of this evil occurred when "the
Continental regiments from the eastern governments ... agreed to stay six
weeks beyond their term of enlistment.... For this extraordinary mark of
their attachment to their country, I have agreed to give them a bounty of
ten dollars per man, besides their pay running on." The men took the
bounty, and nearly one-half went off a few days after.

Nor was this the only evil of the policy of short enlistments. Another was
that the new troops not merely were green soldiers, but were without
discipline. At New York Tilghman wrote that after the battle of Brooklyn
the "Eastern" soldiers were "plundering everything that comes in their
way," and Washington in describing the condition said, "every Hour brings
the most distressing complaints of the Ravages of our own Troops who are
become infinitely more formidable to the poor Farmers and Inhabitants than
the common Enemy. Horses are taken out of the Continental Teams; the
Baggage of Officers and the Hospital Stores, even the Quarters of General
Officers are not exempt from Rapine." At the most critical moment of the
war the New Jersey militia not merely deserted, but captured and took with
them nearly the whole stores of the army. As the General truly wrote, "the
Dependence which the Congress have placed upon the militia, has already
greatly injured, and I fear will totally ruin our cause. Being subject to
no controul themselves, they introduce disorder among the troops, whom you
have attempted to discipline, while the change in their living brings
on sickness; this makes them Impatient to get home, which spreads
universally, and introduces abominable desertions." "The collecting
militia," he said elsewhere, "depends entirely upon the prospects of the
day. If favorable they throng in to you; if not, they will not move."