One of the most notable failures to prevent a terrorist attack in recent years involves Tamerlan Tsarnaev. After the Russians alerted us he was engaging with radical elements, he flew to Chechnya in January 2012. In spite of an alert set to identify him, Customers and Border Protection did not stop him either going out or coming back from Russia.

As the Inspector General report on the attack explains, though CBP had probably been properly alerted he was a concern, Tsarnaev was not interviewed on the way out of the country because there were higher priority passengers.

On Tsarnaev’s way back into the country, CBP would have gotten an alert from Aeroflot, but that alert did not come up on CBP’s display status.

A recent story from the Intercept reveals that one of the things that may have been a higher priority than interviewing Tsarnaev was interviewing “good” guys.

In years leading up to the attack on the Boston Marathon CBP started working with the FBI to identify potential informants through CBP interviews. Reports describe how this involved a shift in perspective, from an enforcement perspective focused on “looking for the ‘bad guys’,” to an intelligence perspective focused on “looking for the ‘good guys'” who might be willing to trade information about their community for immigration benefits.

It worked this way: CBP would provide a 3-day passenger list to the FBI, the FBI would find anyone of interest, and then CBP would screen them to determine whether they had access to sources and willingness to serve as an informant.

The documents the Intercept released pertain only to Boston’s Logan Airport, Buffalo, and Rochester; curiously, at least Buffalo seems to coordinate primarily with Boston. So they don’t describe how this program got rolled out at JFK, through which Tsarnaev flew. But in Boston, at least, there was a big spike in the number of CBP inspections conducted in January 2012, the very month Tsarnaev flew out.

Was CBP so busy looking for informants it missed someone the Russians had IDed (correctly) as a terrorist?

Reminds me of a program a few years back where Traffic Cops pulled over drivers and award them a Good Drivers Certificate. Personally I’d think most drivers would not appreciate being stopped for such a farce. Elevate by 1000% the feeling of being stopped and interviewed and intimidated by Customs/FBI. Who the fuck thinks up this shit, and why are they still employed? Of the thousands interviewed and the tens of thousands relatives, friends and acquaintances made aware of this shit has had enough the USofA bullshit and would work against the government and its interests.

You understate the case. Tsarnaev had already been intimidated by the FBI. The TLAs were leaving US citizens and green card holders stranded in places like Tunisia by putting them on the no-fly list, and then getting places like Canada to enforce it as well.

A legal challenge against the British government’s secret surveillance activities has won in court, with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal judging the collection of bulk personal data—conducted by GCHQ and MI5 between 1998 and 2015—to have been illegal.

Responding to a claim brought by Privacy International, the 70-page judgment handed down this morning [PDF*] found that the spooks’ surveillance activities had been taking place without adequate safeguards or supervision for over a decade; and as such were in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(was it really a screwup or was it intentional?
And was it intentional to remove a backdoor?
And was the backdoor there in the first place
due to an NSL? Did they do the revoke because the NSL expired?)