Let us first of all see precisely what were the facts.
Miss Anthony was charged with having knowingly voted,
without lawful right to vote, at the Congressional
election in the eighth ward of the City of Rochester,
in the State of New York, in November, 1872. The
Act of Congress under which the prosecution was brought
provides that, “If, at any election for representative
or delegate in the Congress of the United States, any
person shall knowingly personate and vote, or attempt
to vote, in the name of any other person, whether
living, dead or fictitious, or vote more than once
at the same election for any candidate for the same
office, or vote at a place where he may not be lawfully
entitled to vote, or vote without having a lawful
right to vote, every such person shall be deemed guilty
of a crime,” &c.

The trial took place at Canandaigua, in the State
of New York, in the Circuit Court of the United States,
before Judge Hunt, of the Supreme Court of the United
States.

The defendant pleaded not guilty—­thus putting
the Government upon the proof of their entire case,
admitting, however, that she was a woman, but admitting
nothing more.

The only evidence that she voted at all, and that,
if at all, she voted for a representative in Congress,
offered on the part of the government, was, that she
handed four bits of paper, folded in the form of ballots,
to the inspectors, to be placed in the voting boxes.
There was nothing on the outside of these papers to
indicate what they were, and the contents were not
known to the witnesses nor to the inspectors.
There were six ballot boxes, and each elector had
the right to cast six ballots.

This evidence would undoubtedly warrant the conclusion
that Miss Anthony voted for a Congressional representative,
the fact probably appearing, although the papers before
the writer do not show it, that one of the supposed
ballots was placed by her direction in the box for
votes for Members of Congress. The facts are
thus minutely stated, not at all for the purpose of
questioning their sufficiency, but to show how entirely
it was a question of fact, and therefore a question
for the jury.

Upon this evidence Judge Hunt directed the clerk to
enter up a verdict of guilty. The counsel for
the defendant interposed, but without effect, the
judge closing the discussion by saying, “Take
the verdict, Mr. Clerk.” The clerk then
said, “Gentlemen of the jury, hearken to your
verdict, as the Court has recorded it. You say
you find the defendant guilty of the offence whereof
she stands indicted, and so say you all.”
To this the jury made no response, and were immediately
after dismissed.