In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs appeal by right the
orders granting summary disposition to defendants in this fair
housing action. We affirm.

Defendants John and Terry Hoffius, a married couple, rent residential
property in Jackson, Michigan. In June 1993, plaintiffs Kristal
McCready and Keith Kerr contacted defendants in response to defendants’
advertisement about housing for rent. Defendants refused to rent
to plaintiffs when they learned that McCready and Kerr were not
married but intended to live in the same rental unit. Similarly,
plaintiff Rose Baiz telephoned defendants in July 1993 about the
property. Defendants also declined to rent to Baiz when they
learned that she was not married to plaintiff Peter Perusse yet
planned to live with him. Defendant John Hoffius told plaintiffs
that unmarried cohabitation violated his religious beliefs.

Plaintiffs filed two separate complaints with the Jackson Fair
Housing Commission. Testers from the Commission posed as potential
renters and contacted defendants. Defendants did not ask the
marital status of all the testers. Defendants, however, refused
to permit unmarried testers to inspect the apartments, claiming
that the units only were available to married couples. Defendants
stated that they usually did not rent to unmarried couples.

Defendants moved for summary disposition on plaintiffs’ complaints,
arguing in part that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted because the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act, MCL 37.2502(1); MSA 3.548(502)(1), did not protect unmarried
cohabitation. Defendants also argued that, if the Civil Rights
Act protected unmarried cohabitation, it was unconstitutional
because it would force defendants to violate their sincerely held
religious beliefs against unmarried cohabitation.

The cases were heard separately, but decided similarly. Both
circuit court judges opined that the cases involved statutory
interpretation, and both declined to address the constitutional
issues. The judges noted that the Civil Rights Act protected
status, not conduct. They opined that unmarried cohabitation
was unprotected conduct, not protected marital status. Accordingly,
they determined that the Civil Rights Act did not protect unmarried
cohabitation. We agree.

Plaintiffs first assert that defendants violated the Civil Rights
Act by discriminating against them based on their marital status.
Whether unmarried cohabitation enjoys protection from housing
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act is an issue of first
impression in this state. Cases from other jurisdictions reflect
divergent opinions on this issue. For example, in Smith v
Fair Employment & Housing Comm, 12 Cal 4th
1143; 913 P2d 909 (1996) cert pending, the landlord presented
arguments similar to those of defendants in this case. The California
Supreme Court ruled that the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act protected unmarried cohabitants against housing discrimination
and rejected the landlord’s argument that the unmarried tenants’
sexual conduct, rather than their marital status, was at issue.Id. at 915-918. See also Swanner v Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm, 1994 Alaska LEXIS 40; 874 P2d 274, cert den ___
US ___; 115 S Ct 460; 130 L Ed 2d 368 (1994); Attorney General
v Desilets, 418 Mass 316; 636 NE2d 233 (1994), both of which
held in accordance with Smith.

In contrast, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided that a landlord’s
refusal to rent to unmarried tenants was based on their conduct
of living together and not on their marital status in County
of Dane v Norman, 174 Wis 2d 683; 497 NW2d 714, 717-718 (1993).
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered that state’s criminal
fornication statute when deciding this same issue in State
by Cooper v French, 1990 Minn LEXIS 287; 460 NW2d 2 (1990).
The Court concluded that the Minnesota Human Rights Act did not
extend to protect unmarried, cohabitating couples in housing cases.Id. at 7. The Court added:

Before abandoning fundamental values and institutions, we must
pause and take stock of our present social order: millions of
drug abusers; rampant child abuse; a rising underclass without
marketable job skills; children roaming the streets; children
with only one parent or no parents at all; and children growing
up with no one to guide them in developing any set of values.
How can we expect anything else when the state itself contributes,
by arguments of this kind, to further erosion of fundamental institutions
that have formed the foundation of our civilization for centuries?
[Id. at 11.]

A person engaging in a real estate transaction, or a real
estate broker or salesman, shall not on the basis of religion,
race, color, national origin, age, sex, familial status, or marital
status of a person or a person residing with that person:

(a) Refuse to engage in a real estate transaction with a person.

The Civil Rights Act does not define the term "marital status."
In defining a term, courts should attempt to give effect to the
legislative intent. Miller v CA Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355,
362; 362 NW2d 650 (1984). The Civil Rights Act’s purpose is to
prevent discrimination based on membership in certain classes
and to "eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes,
prejudices and biases." Id. at 363. "By including
marital status as a protected class, the Legislature manifested
its intent to prohibit discrimination based on whether
a person is married." Id. (emphasis in original).

The public policy of this state, as reflected in our laws, favors
the institution of marriage. Under Michigan’s Penal Code, cohabitation
remains a misdemeanor. MCL 750.335; MSA 28.567 provides:

Any man or woman, not being married to each other, who shall
lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together, and any
man or woman, married or unmarried, who shall be guilty of open
and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
more than 1 year, or by fine of not more than $500.00. No prosecution
shall be commenced under this section after 1 year from the time
of committing the offense.

When promulgating new laws, the Legislature is charged with the
knowledge of existing laws on the same subject and is presumed
to have considered the effect of new laws on existing laws. Walen
v Dep’t of Corrections, 443 Mich 240, 248; 505 NW2d 519 (1993);Schuster, supra at 351-352. The Legislature presumably
was aware that the above statute criminalized lewd and lascivious
cohabitation. Because the Legislature would not have intended
the Civil Rights Act to insulate criminal conduct, cohabitation
is not protected conduct under the act. See also Michigan
Gaming Institution, Inc v State Bd of Ed, 211 Mich App 514,
520-522; 536 NW2d 289 (1995) (Corrigan, J., dissenting). Our
Supreme Court adopted this dissent in its later opinion, 451 Mich
899 (1996). Although courts are to construe liberally remedial
statutes, Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 77;
503 NW2d 645 (1993), we decline to recognize the Civil Rights
Act as preventing housing discrimination against unmarried couples
and at the same time legitimizing criminal conduct.[1]

Further, if two statutes lend themselves to a construction that
avoids conflict, that construction should control. House Speaker
v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 568-569; 495 NW2d
539 (1993). The construction should give effect to each statute
without repugnancy, absurdity or unreasonableness. Michigan
Humane Society v Natural Resources Comm, 158 Mich App 393,
401; 404 NW2d 757 (1987). Our construction avoids conflict between
the Civil Rights Act and the criminal cohabitation statute. The
Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination against couples who
enjoy marital status, but the act is not violated when a landlord
refuses to rent to unmarried persons who will be engaging in criminal
unmarried cohabitation.

When two acts relate to the same subject, courts presume against
repeal of the former statute by implication. If possible, courts
give effect to both acts. Attorney General v Michigan Public
Service Comm, 161 Mich App 506, 513; 411 NW2d 469 (1987).
The intent to repeal must appear clearly, and the party claiming
an implied repeal has a heavy burden. Repeal may be inferred:
(1) when a subsequent legislative act clearly conflicts with
a prior act, or (2) when a subsequent act clearly is intended
to occupy the entire field covered by a prior enactment. House
Speaker, supra at 563.

Plaintiffs have not met their heavy burden of demonstrating that
the Legislature intended to repeal the criminal cohabitation statute.
Had the Legislature intended to repeal the criminal cohabitation
statute, it would have done so. Plaintiffs have not produced
a subsequent legislative act that clearly conflicts with the criminal
cohabitation statute, nor have plaintiffs demonstrated a subsequent
act that the Legislature clearly intended to occupy the field
covered by the criminal cohabitation statute. Making social policy
is a job for the Legislature, not for this Court. In re Kurzyniec
Estate, 207 Mich App 531, 542-543; 526 NW2d 191 (1994). Indeed,
the appropriate branch for resolution of the moral issue presented
is the legislative branch, which is well equipped to weigh these
issues.

Plaintiffs next contend that society’s need to provide equal
access in housing outweighs defendants’ religious beliefs that
they should not rent to an unmarried couple. Neither trial court
addressed this issue in its opinion; therefore, the issue is not
preserved for review. Bowers v Bowers, 216 Mich App 491,
495; 549 NW2d 592 (1996). Additionally, our Supreme Court has
refused to reach constitutional claims that are unnecessary to
the resolution of a case. Booth Newspapers, Inc v U of M Bd
of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993). We decline
to review this unpreserved issue, and we will not reach the constitutional
issue because it is unnecessary in deciding this matter. Northgate
Towers Ass’n v Royal Oak Charter Twp, 453 Mich 959-960; ___
NW2d ___ (1996).