Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness

MARK E. VINSON

"If we do not do something, we run the risk of a return to the
hollow Army and a risk of not being able to execute our national strategy."[1]
-- General Dennis J. Reimer, 1998

Ironically, in the years since the US Army triumphantly
watched the Berlin Wall crumble, archived its war plans for the defense
of the Fulda Gap, and stepped past the Cold War threat of global war, its
warfighting readiness challenges have grown with each passing year. Building
for almost a decade, the military's dilemma came to a head on 29 September
1998 when, at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged declining readiness levels and sought
additional resources to mitigate risk. The Chiefs described the degree
of risk in stark strategic terms, stating that although the military was
still ready to carry out the national strategy, "The United States
now faces moderate risk of increased casualties and prolonged conflict
if it gets involved in one war, and high risk if it becomes involved
in a second war."[2] More recently, after two of the Army's ten active
divisions reported a readiness rating of C-4, the lowest rating possible,
Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki assessed the Army's ability to fight
and win two major theater wars as "high risk."[3]

At its core, the Army's readiness challenges stem from a mismatch between
mission requirements and forces. In the wake of the bipolar stability of
the Cold War, major theater war (MTW) has supplanted global war as the
nation's biggest security concern. As such, it is the most significant
military requirement in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and it has
driven the Army's current force structure to resemble a cut-down version
of the Cold War Army. Defining a two-MTW requirement, the NSS states that
"for the foreseeable future, the United States, in concert with regional
allies, must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border
aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."[4]
However, since 1989 the Army has been called upon to do much more than
prepare for MTWs. In order to exert American leadership in an increasingly
dynamic and uncertain post-Cold War world, the two-MTW requirement has
been folded into the broader imperative of engagement.[5]

Until recently, senior Army leaders resisted reorganizing the Army's
force structure to more effectively and efficiently focus unit capabilities
and training on the full spectrum of missions required by the National
Security Strategy. They pointed out that the military's primary purpose
is to fight the nation's wars and argued that the force structure should
not be shaped to perform lesser missions. Nevertheless, as the national
strategy has evolved to increase emphasis on global engagement, the Army's
leaders have recognized the need to adapt the size and shape of Army force
structure to provide capabilities required by the NSS for the full spectrum
of missions.

To increase the military's emphasis on the more relevant post-Cold War
engagement requirements, while maintaining focus on warfighting as the
military's most critical mission, then-JCS Chairman John Shalikashvili
adapted the National Military Strategy in 1997 to require an integrated
approach. This approach obligates the military to manage the competing
requirements to shape the international environment to deter or
prevent threats, to respond to the full spectrum of potential crises,
and to prepare now for an uncertain future.[6] Implementation of
this strategy has evolved slowly as the United States explored the requirements
of its role as the remaining superpower and increased its commitment to
shaping and smaller-scale responding opportunities. For the Army, maintaining
acceptable readiness levels to meet the competing demands and diffused
focus of this strategy, with a significantly smaller force and budget,
has been an ongoing struggle.

To the Army, "readiness" specifically refers to a qualitative
assessment of its ability to provide sufficient trained and ready ground
combat forces to successfully execute all of the requirements of the National
Military Strategy. Anything less than full-spectrum readiness engenders
increased risk of either unacceptable expenditure of resources to achieve
success, such as too many casualties, or mission failure.

The Army's first purposeful step toward full-spectrum readiness was
taken upon the arrival of General Eric Shinseki as its new Chief of Staff
in 1999. In his vision of the future Army, he stated that while "our
core competency will remain fighting and winning wars . . . we will also
demonstrate our flexibility, our versatility, and our agility when responding
to a wider range of missions--including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,
and operations designed to counter emerging threats."[7] To achieve
his vision, General Shinseki recognized the important role of each of the
Army's components, declaring an end to the term "Total Army"
and insisting, "We are the Army, and we will march into the 21st century
as the Army."[8] He further defined his intent for structuring the
Army for full-spectrum readiness when he said, "We acknowledge our
components and their unique strengths. But we are the Army, and we will
work to structure ourselves accordingly."[9] In expressing his vision,
the Chief of Staff has pointed the way ahead toward a 21st-century Army
that is ready for the full spectrum of missions.

The balance of this article examines the roots of the Army's readiness
dilemma and discusses potential approaches to restoring readiness. It then
focuses on framing an approach for the reorganization of the Army's force
structure and mission allocation to more fully exploit the vast manpower
assets of the reserve components. The article suggests that by reshaping
the Army's force structure and reallocating its missions, it will more
effectively and efficiently provide ready and responsive forces to both
major theater war and smaller-scale contingency requirements.

The Army's Readiness Dilemma

The increased readiness risk for the Army is the cumulative result of
many factors, including a strategy that overreaches the military's current
capabilities, increased deployments with fewer forces and a smaller budget,
and the competing budget requirements for modernization.

General Colin Powell published the first post-Cold War National Military
Strategy in 1992, establishing a minimum "Base Force" capable
of responding rapidly to defeat a regional aggressor, while maintaining
enough forces so that the United States and its allies would not be vulnerable
to potential aggression elsewhere.[10] To accomplish its post-Cold War
military objectives, the Base Force strategy envisioned an Army with 12
active divisions, six reserve divisions, and two cadre divisions.[11]

The following year, the Bottom-Up Review refined the Base Force strategy,
formally establishing the two nearly simultaneous MTW strategy that we
have today. The Bottom-Up Review acknowledged that the Base Force was sized
to allow us to fight two MTWs plus conduct other concurrent operations.
Nevertheless, it recommended that the military's force structure be reduced
to ten active divisions and five-plus reserve divisions in order to achieve
the expected post-Cold War "peace dividend." Additionally, it
called for 15 Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades to be enhanced to improve
their readiness and offset the risk of the reduced number of active divisions
in a two-MTW scenario.[12] The Bottom-Up Review acknowledged that while
this strategy allowed "us to carry forward with confidence our strategy
of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously
. . . it leaves little other active force structure to provide for overseas
presence or to conduct peacekeeping or other lower-intensity operations
if we had to fight two MRCs [major regional contingencies] at once."[13]
Thus, the Bottom-Up Review knowingly created an ends-means mismatch in
the strategy by requiring the Army to conduct engagement missions with
forces required for the two-MTW mission. It also sought to offset the risk
associated with reduced active forces by enhancing the National Guard's
readiness to fight.

In 1997 the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reaffirmed the two-MTW
strategy and further emphasized that we must be able to transition to fighting
MTWs from a posture of global engagement.[14] The QDR acknowledged that
withdrawing forces from smaller-scale contingency operations, reconstituting,
retraining, and then deploying to an MTW in accordance with required timelines
"may pose significant operational, diplomatic, and political challenges."
However, with no apparent alternatives identified in the strategy, the
QDR simply dismissed those challenges by insisting that "the ability
to transition between peacetime operations and warfighting remains a fundamental
requirement for virtually every unit in the US military."[15] Calling
the transition of forces from smaller contingency operations--where little
or no relevant combat training is likely--to an MTW a "challenge"
is an understatement of the highest magnitude. At best, this strategy is
wishful thinking; at worst, it is creating the conditions for a future
high-casualty disaster.

The QDR reaffirmed the Bottom-Up Review's allocation to the Army of
ten active divisions and 15 reserve enhanced separate brigades (eSBs).
The eSBs were specifically tasked to "provide an important hedge against
adverse circumstances--such as the use of weapons of mass destruction--in
major theater wars by augmenting or reinforcing active combat units."[16]
The QDR pointed out that the ARNG's eight divisions are not included in
existing major theater war plans, and called into question their continued
relevance.[17] So, while the current strategy appears to place too many
mission requirements on too few forces, the ARNG's divisions represent
additional uncommitted force structure available to the Army.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army's senior leaders have sized,
shaped, and justified the Army to fight two MTWs. They structured the active
force to provide the Army's primary combat forces. At the same time, they
organized the Army's reserve forces, the Army Reserve and National Guard,
to provide critical individuals and units to augment and reinforce active
forces in time of war or national emergency. To conduct the secondary shape
and respond missions, senior leaders have generally drawn units from the
MTW forces under the assumption that they could be quickly extracted from
a smaller-scale contingency if necessary.

A force structured exclusively to fight two MTWs seemed more reasonable
immediately after the Cold War when the military was searching for reasons
to retain force structure, and when smaller-scale contingencies were historically
the exception and not the rule. However, since the end of the Cold War
the frequency of deployments for smaller contingencies has grown greatly.
The United States responded to a total of 16 contingencies during the entire
Cold War period, from 1947 to 1989. But from 1989 to 1997, the United States
responded to a burdensome 45 contingencies.[18] In 1997, on average, more
than 31,000 soldiers were deployed every day to 70 different countries
around the world.[19] Since the substantial Army forces that are globally
engaged will generally not be immediately ready to respond to an MTW, the
Army has implicitly accepted the risk of this loss of responsive combat
power.

Perhaps the truest measure of diminishing warfighting readiness, short
of wartime performance, is the performance of combat units at the combat
training centers. In early 1999, the Army's Inspector General confirmed
for senior leaders that "entry-level performance at the combat training
centers `continues to decline,' in part because units have fewer opportunities
to train at home station."[20] The IG's report goes on to cite several
factors that inhibit unit training, including lack of resources, absent
or distracted leaders, unsynchronized modernization, the high pace of operations,
personnel turbulence, poor understanding of training doctrine, and diffused
mission focus.[21]

The significant increase in deployments to smaller-scale contingencies
is a primary reason that unit training suffers from a lack of mission focus
throughout the Army. US Army training doctrine recognizes that units do
not have the resources to be prepared for all missions; therefore, it calls
for unit training to be focused on essential tasks derived from missions.
Although the Army focuses its peacetime training on its primary warfighting
mission, frequent deployments to non-combat operations divert the attention
of an increasingly large share of the force. Most active divisions have
experienced one or more major deployments to conduct smaller-scale contingency
missions in the past decade. At any given time, many units are either in
the preparation, deployment, or post-deployment training cycle for a contingency
mission, or supporting a unit that is. When not involved with a contingency,
however, most units focus their peacetime training on MTW tasks. Currently,
the Army plans on six months of retraining as a rule of thumb following
a six- to 12-month smaller-scale contingency deployment.[22] Thus, by drawing
its contingency forces from the MTW force pool, the Army has instituted
an inefficient cycle of unit training, shifting from a focus on warfighting
tasks to smaller-scale contingency tasks for a deployment, and back to
warfighting tasks after redeployment.

The decrease in the Army's readiness has also resulted from other post-Cold
War realities. Without the imminent threat of global war and without a
clear understanding of what the post-Cold War requirements would demand
of its military, the US government significantly cut military end-strength
and force structure and slashed defense spending. From 1989 to 1997, the
Army reduced its ranks by more than 630,000 soldiers and civilian employees
and cut its combat divisions from 18 active and ten reserve divisions to
ten active and eight reserve divisions.[23]

The Army's significant decrease in buying power, especially with the
increase in deployments since the Cold War, is also certainly a major contributing
factor to its readiness difficulties. Since the Cold War ended, the Army's
budget has decreased almost 39 percent, with the annual budget falling
from $102 billion in FY89 to $64 billion in FY99.[24] While the Army provided
the preponderance of forces--more than 60 percent--in 28 of the 32 significant
operations from 1989 to 1998, the Army's share of the DOD budget dropped
from 27 percent in FY89 to 24.9 percent in FY99.[25]

Although maintaining current warfighting readiness remains the Army's
top budget priority, underfunded modernization requirements are in growing
competition for limited budget dollars. Without significant and continuing
investment in new equipment, the Army's long-term readiness is threatened
by old equipment that is expensive to maintain and no longer dominates
its competition. With information technology offering a possible revolution
in military affairs, and unexpected contingencies and current readiness
requiring immediate funds, the Army has squeezed money from efficiencies
and made tough budget decisions in order to try to invest in its future.

Though presidential and congressional support for a modest increase
in resources over the next five years looks promising, returning to a level
of acceptable risk will require the Army to do more than garner its share
of a slightly increased defense budget.[26] Whatever additional resources
Congress may decide to give the Army will fix only part of the problem.
Certainly more resources will improve the funding of current readiness
training, base operations requirements, quality-of-life programs, and modernization
accounts. But what about the negative readiness effects on the Army of
frequent deployments to smaller-scale contingencies? Even with more money,
as long as the Army continues to deploy its first-to-fight MTW forces to
smaller contingencies, it still faces a significant, long-term readiness
challenge.

The Army is not likely to regain much of its lost end-strength, and
an increase in the budget alone will not address the destructive mismatch
between mission requirements and forces available. It is time for the Army
to apply internal solutions to address its readiness shortfall.

There is perhaps no clearer signal that the Army has readiness problems
that additional money will not solve than the fact that it was recently
compelled to deploy one of its first-to-fight divisions, the 1st Cavalry
Division, to Bosnia to conduct peacekeeping operations. On top of that,
the 3d Infantry Division and 101st Air Assault Division are now scheduled
for rotations to Bosnia. In 1997, the QDR stated that "employing any
of the Force Package I divisions for peacetime engagement or smaller-scale
contingencies would further increase the delay in meeting major theater
war timelines, and could put the halt phase at risk."[27] While the
1st Cavalry Division was focused on peacekeeping tasks for more than a
year (including train-up, deployment, peacekeeping, and redeployment time),
how ready was the division to deploy to a possible MTW?

If the Army does not have the forces necessary to execute the mission
requirements of the national strategy, then what about changing the strategy?
Does the Army really need to be ready to fight two overlapping MTWs? The
National Security Strategy describes the reasoning behind this policy decision,
saying that it "deters opportunism elsewhere while we are heavily
committed to deterring or defeating aggression in one theater. . . . It
also provides a hedge against the possibility that we might encounter threats
larger or more difficult than we expected."[28] The two-MTW strategy
remains prudent and has withstood close and continuous scrutiny by many
who seek to reduce or redistribute the defense budget.

If the two-MTW requirement of the strategy is valid, then what about
decreasing the frequency of engagement missions around the world? Again,
the National Security Strategy correctly rejects the alternative of isolationism
and asserts that "we must . . . continue to exert global leadership
and remain the preferred security partner for the community of states that
share our interests."[29]

So, how can the Army improve its readiness to fight and win two MTWs
at the same time that it improves its capabilities and readiness to respond
to the spectrum of potential smaller-scale contingencies? In response to
recent questions concerning the Army's readiness dilemma, General Hugh
Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked, "We never
said we had enough to do two major theater wars and also do peacekeeping
activities around the world."[30] A larger budget can provide only
temporary and incomplete relief to the Army's readiness challenges. It
cannot cure the debilitating mismatch between mission requirements and
forces available. The remedy for this mismatch will require major renovation
of the Army's force structure.

Organizing for the 21st Century

The mismatch between mission requirements and forces available is not
a result of the inadequate size of the current force, but a result of the
inappropriate shape of the force structure inherited from the Cold War
strategy. Within the Army, enough manpower exists to meet all of the mission
requirements. It remains for the Army's leaders to articulate a more concrete
vision for the integration of the Army's components, organizing its force
structure for successful execution of the national strategy. This vision
should describe a future force structure with unit-specific MTW or smaller-scale
contingency mission focus and organization. Essentially, the Army needs
to reshape its forces to more effectively and efficiently meet the full
spectrum of requirements, thereby reducing the degrading effects of smaller-scale
contingency missions on the Army's readiness to conduct MTWs.

The Army's Manpower Reserve

An approach to improving the Army's readiness that has promise is to
more fully exploit the vast manpower resources of the reserve components.
Out of necessity, the Army has already significantly increased its use
of reserve component forces to conduct current missions and relieve active-force
deployment tempo. For example, in 1997 an average of 25 percent of the
Army's forces in Bosnia were from the reserve components.[31] Due to the
Army's integrated force structure, a result of the Defense Department's
"Total Force Policy," the reserve components provide unique and
essential capabilities to any force deployment package. Additionally, as
noted above, a smaller active force has led the Army to rely on reserve
forces to pick up some of the increased mission load in order to relieve
active-force deployment tempo. Furthermore, deployment of citizen-soldiers
is appropriate to invoke the nation's will for all major contingencies,
not just major wars.

Although the reserve components are busier than ever reinforcing and
augmenting active forces all over the world, the combat brigades and divisions
of the ARNG remain largely on the shelf. Although General Reimer's white
paper on active-reserve integration offered that there are more than sufficient
missions to justify the size of the whole Army, only the 15 enhanced separate
brigades have been assigned combat missions in current war plans.[32] The
eight ARNG divisions were generally assigned "to missions which include
easing Army personnel tempo in peacetime operations, providing rotation
forces for extended contingencies, responding to domestic emergencies,
and hedging against the emergence of a more threatening international environment."[33]
Though the eSBs and divisions have been used very little, their potential
contribution is clear. Elements of the divisions and the eSBs are now being
tapped to support ongoing, long-term contingency operations. Rotations
of ARNG divisional elements, such as the successful deployment of subordinate
units of the 29th Infantry Division to Bosnia in 1997, and the projected
deployment of several ARNG division headquarters and some eSBs to Bosnia
(which began with the 49th Armored Division headquarters in March 2000),
demonstrate the potential of the reserve divisions and brigades to contribute
to the Army's capabilities to conduct smaller-scale contingencies over
extended periods.

Recognizing the manpower potential represented by these units, the Army
decided in 1998 to convert 12 ARNG combat brigades "to provide needed
combat support and service support requirements identified as essential
to the National Military Strategy."[34] However, such limited use
and restructuring of reserve forces only begins to tap the reserve components'
potential to provide "rotation forces for extended contingencies,"
as described in the QDR.[35] With the right mission focus, force structure,
and readiness enablers, much more of the reserve components' combat force
structure could contribute greatly to restoring the Army's readiness for
the full range of missions.

Increased use of the reserve components is certainly not without cost.
Without a careful, reasoned approach, the Army could break this force.
As a result of frequent and recurring deployments of reserve soldiers,
cracks in the reserve components have already begun to show. Lengthy deployments
are straining employer support for the reserve program, especially in small
towns and small businesses.[36] The increased deployment demands also tax
the reserve components' training model. Thirty-nine days of training per
year may not be enough to meet the increasing readiness demands on a force
that is frequently turned to for quick-response smaller contingency missions.
If the Army is to maintain healthy reserve components, trained and ready
in time of war or national emergency, then it must develop a long-term
strategy that capitalizes on the inherent strengths of the reserves in
a way that meets the intent of the Total Force Policy without bankrupting
the reserve system for the future.

It is time for the Army to adopt a strategy that does more than integrate
the active and reserve components on the fringe. The Army should restructure
its forces and reallocate its missions to more effectively and efficiently
use its entire force to execute the two-MTW strategy.

A Two-MTW Force

The Army's most serious readiness shortfall is that it is not organized
to provide sufficient forces ready to conduct two MTWs from a posture of
global engagement. According to the Bottom-Up Review, an active force of
at least 12 divisions and eight reserve-enhanced equivalent divisions are
needed to win two nearly simultaneous MTWs plus conduct some smaller-scale
contingencies.[37] Desert Storm required a US Army force of seven divisions,
five of which were armored or mechanized. Today, the Army has only ten
active divisions, including six heavy divisions. With at least three divisions
currently committed or unavailable for rapid response to an MTW, simple
math shows that the two-MTW strategy is bankrupt and in need of a more
realistic balancing of the ends, ways, and means necessary for success.
The Army is accepting unreasonable risk expecting units to quickly withdraw
from smaller-scale contingencies, reconstitute, retrain, and deploy to
an MTW.

The Army should adopt an integrated approach guided by the principle
that the active component be sized and structured to do those missions
that cannot be done by the reserve components. Generally, the active component
brings to the table forces maintained at the highest levels of readiness;
therefore, they are responsive to missions that require rapidly deployable
forces. Likewise, the reserve components should generally be sized and
shaped to provide the forces that are needed later in a contingency, such
as augmenting and reinforcing forces or follow-on rotation forces for extended
contingencies.

Accordingly, for the Army's two-MTW requirement, the primary combat
forces needed for the first MTW and the halt phase of the second MTW should
be active component forces. However, the combat forces required for the
decisive counterattack phase of the second MTW should be primarily drawn
from the Army National Guard.

The objective of the halt phase is "to halt the enemy invasion
in forward areas and protect key assets and terrain features."[38]
The Army's mission during this phase is "to establish blocking positions
on key axes of advance while conducting a mobile defense in depth."[39]
Key to preventing an MTW from becoming a prolonged and difficult war is
the success of the halt-phase fighting.[40] There is no doubt that the
halt-phase force for the first MTW must be ready to deploy immediately;
therefore, it must be drawn from active forces maintained at the highest
levels of readiness. The second MTW's halt phase will also require active
forces, for even as the first MTW forces deploy, a second halt-phase force
must be ready to deter an opportunistic rogue state from being tempted
to initiate a second MTW.

Phases II and III of an MTW call for the buildup of large combat forces
and the subsequent "decisive counterattack aimed at destroying enemy
forces, restoring borders, and achieving key political goals."[41]
Until recently, the Army planned to use improved prepositioned materiel,
airlift, sealift, and deployment infrastructure to reach a goal of deploying
a seven-division MTW force in 75 days.[42] In October 1999 General Shinseki
announced his vision to develop a more deployable, medium-weight Army capable
of responding anywhere in the world with five divisions in 30 days.[43]
In either case, for the first MTW these timelines require using active
component forces in order to deploy combat-ready soldiers. The 15 eSBs
currently require at least 90 days to mobilize, train, and deploy to an
MTW, although the General Accounting Office still judges their capability
to be "highly uncertain."[44] If activated soon enough, later-deploying
eSBs could be ready to augment the first MTW force, or they could deploy
as the buildup or decisive force element for a second MTW following the
deployment of the active component halt-phase force.

To make this a realistic strategy, the Army needs to identify, structure,
and train reserve brigades, or divisions, for specific missions. Additionally,
the national strategy must require these forces to be called up to begin
post-mobilization training by the time active forces begin to deploy to
the first MTW. That's imperative. These forces need to be called up for
the dual purpose of preparing for their potential commitment as a hedge
force in case of a more difficult first MTW, or deploying as the decisive
force for a possible second MTW. Building into the system the acquiescence
of civilian leaders to such a triggered early call-up of reserve component
forces will be essential to achieving an acceptable level of risk for the
Army's readiness to fight and win two overlapping MTWs.

Realists will also recognize that the Army must improve the current
readiness of the reserve combat units in order to make this concept feasible.
Even if the eSBs can achieve their aim of being ready for deployment within
90 days, current doctrine requires the Army to build counterattack forces
around divisions. Without a fundamental change in the way reserve combat
divisions are organized and trained, there is little hope of preparing
them for combat within required timelines. Although the Army may be moving
toward a medium-weight force organized around brigades, the near-term solution
to improving reserve combat division and brigade readiness will require
significant teamwork from the active and reserve components.[45]

The answer to this problem may be found by integrating active-duty officers
and NCOs directly into key positions in reserve brigades and divisions
and significantly increasing the number of full-time reserve support personnel
within the reserve units. This concept has been used effectively by the
Marine Forces Reserve to provide units of battalion strength or less to
augment and reinforce their active divisions.[46] The Marine Corps integrates
a combination of active reservists and active Marines into its Selected
Marine Corps Reserve units at a level of about 20 percent to achieve deployment
readiness by C+30.[47] During the Persian Gulf War, Marine combat battalions
achieved credible results, although most observers recommended increasing
post-mobilization training time.[48]

The Army is progressing in the direction of the Marine Corps with its
ongoing initiative to stand-up two active/reserve integrated divisions.
Two active Army headquarters have been given responsibility for the combat
readiness of three eSBs each.[49] Although these divisions are not currently
structured as deployable entities, they could be further expanded with
personnel and units from each component to build full, multicomponent divisions.

The increased use of active and reserve observer-controller-trainers
organized into Training Support Brigades to help train high-priority reserve
units is also an organizational step in the direction of increasing the
use of active forces to improve reserve force readiness. A further evolution
of this concept would assign these leaders to key or shadow positions in
the reserve component units in the same way the Marine Corps integrates
its active instructor-inspectors into its reserve units. In addition to
the direct benefit of improved readiness, the large-scale infusion of active
officers and NCOs into the reserve forces would also improve understanding
and trust between the active and reserve components. Although the active
force structure costs associated with this plan would be high, the benefit
of this structure would be a more relevant and ready Army.[50]

To be sure, achieving universal support for such a concept will be difficult
politically and a tough sell. The Army's situation is more complicated
than the structure of the federally controlled Marine Corps Reserve. The
political feasibility of generating support for such an integration of
National Guard forces is greatly complicated by the Army's need to gain
support from the individual state and territorial governments, in addition
to the federal government. As leverage, the Army would be offering a more
relevant combat role to ARNG divisions and eSBs. Realistically, however,
the end-state force structure would certainly require compromises in order
to achieve necessary readiness levels while maintaining political acceptability.

To establish its MTW force, the active Army should identify its halt-phase
forces for both MTWs--at least one heavy division each--and provide the
resources and training needed to achieve the readiness levels required
for that specific mission. The Army also needs to identify the buildup
and decisive counterattack forces required for both MTWs, and, likewise,
provide the resources and training needed to meet the readiness levels
for this specific mission. This force will likely require four to six additional
divisions for each MTW, assuming that five to seven divisions are required
to win an MTW.[51] For the second MTW, the Army would need to organize
and train four to six enhanced-readiness reserve component divisions--perhaps
hybrid active/reserve integrated divisions--to reinforce the active component
halt-phase force and to conduct the decisive counterattack. The units and
individuals needed for these reserve component divisions would be drawn
from that part of the active force structure not required for MTW or smaller-scale
contingency missions, and from the existing ARNG eSBs and combat divisions.

Thus, a total of approximately six to eight active divisions and four
to six reserve divisions would be needed for the two-MTW requirements of
the strategy. These forces should generally not train for nor be deployed
to non-combat, smaller-scale contingencies that erode readiness for their
primary MTW mission.

A Smaller-Scale Contingency Corps

Key to preserving the readiness of the MTW forces would be a largely
separate force, a Smaller-Scale Contingency Corps, organized and trained
to conduct the non-combat smaller-scale contingency missions. Here again,
the active component elements should be sized and structured to do those
missions that require rapidly deployable, trained and ready forces. Likewise,
the reserve components should be sized and shaped to provide the forces
that are needed later in a contingency, such as augmenting and reinforcing
forces, or follow-on rotation forces for extended contingencies. In both
cases, these units should be modular in design to facilitate rapid tailoring
into force packages for a wide variety of smaller-scale contingencies.
Divisions may not be a flexible enough organization for this mission. Instead,
perhaps command and control headquarters organized and trained for the
combined and joint operations that characterize smaller-scale contingencies
should be employed. Sub-units and individual augmentees could then be attached
to provide required capabilities for specific missions.

Some smaller-scale contingencies, such as the peace support operations
in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, are likely to require extended commitments
of units. Therefore, the use of reserve forces for follow-on rotations
is important to the success of this concept. In most cases, active forces
should provide the initial one or two rotations of forces. Reserve component
forces could then provide most of the follow-on rotations. Active forces
could then train for the next possible contingency. The Army would thus
preserve a continuous capability to rapidly deploy a smaller-scale contingency
response force. With at least 12 months of lead time, reserve rotational
units will have sufficient notice to mobilize and prepare for the mission.
Building an integrated force and having the commitment of the National
Command Authority and Congress to use reserve component units for extended
deployments will also ensure that commitments are made with the full support
of the American people.

Both the active and reserve forces that are a part of this "Smaller-Scale
Contingency Corps" would need to be structured to provide the types
of forces needed for smaller contingencies and given adequate recovery
time between missions. Their force structure should be shaped to more adequately
conduct the most likely smaller contingency missions (e.g., military police,
civil affairs, light or medium infantry). The active forces should have
sufficient redundancy of forces to allow at least 12 months at home station
between deployments. Additionally, the units' soldiers and leaders should
be rotated to the MTW units regularly to avoid retention problems due to
deployment burnout. Likewise, the reserve forces should be structured with
sufficient redundancy to allow enough time between missions, at least three
to five years, to mitigate such adverse effects as strained employer support
and recruiting and retention problems.

Conclusion

With a more integrated approach, the Army can reduce the risk of fighting
and winning two nearly simultaneous MTWs from a posture of global engagement.
With mission-focused structure, resourcing, and training, the readiness
of the Army will improve.

This concept requires a two-MTW force that relies heavily on enhanced
readiness and active/reserve-integrated divisions. It also requires a dedicated
Smaller-Scale Contingency Corps that can deploy reserve component units
for follow-on rotations in extended contingencies. The result will be a
more relevant and ready Army force structure for the world of today, permitting
the Army to place increased emphasis on preparing for the uncertain world
of tomorrow.

44. US General Accounting Office, Army National Guard: Combat Brigades'
Ability to be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain (Washington: GAO,
June 1995), p. 3. The eSB concept had until FY99 to be fully implemented,
so readiness has probably improved. Also, eSBs completing an NTC rotation
will be more ready than other eSBs, and may be ready in less than 90 days.
If so, these brigades may be available to deploy in time for a first MTW
as an augmentation force.

50. Based on the Marine Corps Reserve model of 20 percent full-time
support in units, approximately 13,000 to 20,000 active and reserve component
full-timers would be required to fill out this concept. To assign active
component officers and NCOs to reserve component units in sufficient quantity
would require the active component to increase its numbers of officers
and NCOs and decrease its numbers of soldiers. This shift would increase
the demand on retention and decrease the requirement for recruits.

51. This assumption is based on a minimum number equal to the five active
divisions currently allocated to each MTW--half the ten active divisions--and
a maximum of seven divisions as employed during Operation Desert Storm.

Colonel Mark E. Vinson is Deputy Chief of Operations, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army, Europe. Colonel Vinson earned
his B.S. at the US Military Academy and his M.S. in operations research
at the Georgia Institute of Technology, and he is a graduate of the US
Army War College. An armor officer, Colonel Vinson has served in a variety
of command and staff positions, including command of the 2d Battalion,
70th Armor. He participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
with the 1st Armored Division. As part of the Army Initiatives Group on
the Army Staff, Colonel Vinson was a member of the Active Component/Reserve
Component Integration Council of Colonels. He also has conducted a variety
of force structure studies as an operations research analyst with the TRADOC
Analysis Command and J-8, Joint Staff. Most recently, Colonel Vinson has
been selected as the TRADOC Systems Manager for the Combined Arms Tactical
Trainer.