Nile Gardiner is a Washington-based foreign affairs analyst and political commentator. A former aide to Margaret Thatcher, Gardiner has served as a foreign policy adviser to two US presidential campaigns. He appears frequently on American and British television, including Fox News Channel, BBC, and Fox Business Network.

Will Barack Obama try to grab the glory for the downfall of Gaddafi?

Without a doubt, the US president has already begun to do so with his rather self-congratulatory statement on Thursday at the White House. And his Secretary of State and Vice President have been loudly joining in, with Hillary Clinton jubilantly proclaiming that “we came, we saw, he died.” Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry was positively gushing in his praise of the Obama administration’s role, declaring: “the United States demonstrated clear-eyed leadership, patience, and foresight by pushing the international community into action after Qaddafi promised a massacre.”

Colonel Gaddafi’s demise is of course cause for celebration – not only in Libya, but also in America, a nation that lost nearly 200 citizens in the Lockerbie bombing in 1988, carried out by an agent of the Libyan regime. But does Barack Obama and his presidency really deserve to take the credit for the removal of one of the most vicious dictators of modern times? As I’ve noted in previous pieces, President Obama’s leadership on the Libya issue was hardly the stuff of General MacArthur. In the early stages of the Libyan uprising his administration was clearly hedging its bets, adopting a largely non-confrontational stance, and Obama himself was one of the last world leaders to call on Gaddafi to step aside.

It was only when David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy pushed hard for a UN Security Council resolution backing intervention in Libya that the US president shifted into gear. And you can be certain that if the UN hadn’t given its blessing for a Nato-led operation that Barack Obama would not have got involved in Libya at all. For this is a presidency that craves what the Left calls “international legitimacy,” and worships at the shrine of multilateralism, with the war against al-Qaeda a rare exception. The White House fittingly described this strategy as “leading from behind,” and throughout the Libya operation itself President Obama generally adopted an indifferent, almost lackadaisical approach, failing to consult Congress or bothering to even make the case to an increasingly sceptical American public. In terms of political leadership of the Nato operation, London and Paris, rather than Washington, appeared to be largely in the driving seat for most of its eight-month duration, a point that Senator Marco Rubio of Florida made in an interview on US television:

Ultimately it's about the freedom and liberty of the Libyan people. But let's give credit where credit's due, it's the French and the British that led on this fight and probably even led on the strike that led to his capture or to his death.

In the coming months I expect we will see the White House starting to rewrite history when it comes to Barack Obama’s role in the Libyan operation. There will no doubt be numerous references in his upcoming speeches to his supposedly decisive “leadership” in bringing down Gaddafi, and his imaginary rallying of the international community. In reality, President Obama dithered for weeks, and initially projected a great deal of confusion and mixed-messaging on Libya, in marked contrast to key US allies. During the war itself the president preferred to be largely an observer rather than a robust commander in chief with a clearly defined mission.

If anyone deserves credit for the removal of a murderous tyrant who brutalised an entire nation, it is the brave men and women of the US, British and French militaries who merit great applause for their tremendous skill and bravery during the Libyan operation. In the case of Mr Obama, as we have seen with his decidedly weak-kneed performances on both Iran and Syria, this is a president who continues to lead from behind rather than the front on most foreign policy matters.