The recognition
of cultural relativism as a fact is a contribution made by anthropological work.
It is the result of the huge diversity of cultural practices, and the complexity
of the different manifestations of human beings' interests. Nevertheless, if
this complexity is so huge that we cannot compare between such practices, Anthropology
-as science- is not possible. That is, it does not make any sense to attempt
to develop a science of Anthropology. If we think of different cultures as different
symbolic systems, we are left with the problem that we cannot make a comparison
between them. According to cultural relativism, the social character of meaning
results in an incommensurability between different systems. So, if we accept
that there is a compartmentalisation between cultures, or between social
contexts, Anthropology is not possible, given that we cannot enter a context
different from our own.

To examine
the importance of the relativist thesis in Anthropology, as well as some of
its failures and contradictions, the guiding lines of this paper are the following:

To solve
the problems arising from the attempt to start anthropological work, we have
to justify the existence of common elements between different cultures, departing,
so to speak, from "ours". Our basis for examining whether this is
possible will be the study of language and the possibilities of communication
and translation between different linguistic systems. To attain that goal, I
will start my consideration with an analysis of the importance of the idea of
incommensurability. To do this, I will examine Th.S.Kuhn's and P.K.Feyerabend's
contributions. Understanding incommensurability as no-intertranslatability,
I will analyse W.v.O.Quine's thesis on the indeterminacy of translation,
stressing some of its problems. At the same time, while joining the indeterminacy
of translation with the ontological relativity thesis, I will try
to reflect on some of the inconsequences arising from both theses as well as
I will reflect on those elements that allow us to overcome the difficulties
arising from the acceptance of them.

Th.S.Kuhn,
as well as P.K.Feyerabend [2]
, understood incommensurability as the unintelligibility of
affirmations between different domains of discourse. According to this interpretation
of incommensurability, those statements of one domain lack sense if they
are introduced in a different one. Both authors used this concept to oppose
the positivistic idea of development in sciences, understood as a lineal process
of progressive acummulation of knowledge.

The term
incommensurability has been used very successfully in recent discussions
in philosophy of science, and the echoes of the debates about the value of such
a concept are still present [3] . For Kuhn, the idea of incommensurability is strongly
linked to that of paradigm, so that the statements in a paradigm are
unintelligible in a different one. They cannot be coherently interpreted in
a rival paradigm. In what actually matters to us, the domain of anthropological
reflection, we can basically identify the value we give to a paradigm [4] with that of the idea of a cultural context; that
context being the place where meaning is socially constructed.

For Kuhn,
the paradigms tell scientists which kind of entities inhabit the Universe,
and the way such entities behave; at the same time, the paradigms give information
about the questions that can be asked about Nature, and the techniques that
can be properly used in the search for answers to those questions. According
to Kuhn, the development of paradigms implies the existence of a Gestalt,
a perception of the world, unavoidably linked to that language describing it.
Thus, change from one paradigm to another cannot be achieved by derivation.
Rather, the process of change in such cases is best described, according to
Kuhn, as a process of scientific revolution. With the change of a paradigm
the world itself changes [5]
, and when scientific revolutions happen, the scientists see
new and different things when they use old tools and look at things which they
had looked at before.

Changes between
paradigms are not, then, guided by logic, and the result such changes lead us
to is a modification in the way people link the theoretical apparatus with nature;
a redefinition of that link, such that the perception of reality becomes different.
The change of a paradigm gives way to a change in the conceptual scheme, due
to the fact that a change in those rational criteria that guarantee the development
of scientific work, as well as a modification of those values and beliefs that
are at their basis, is implied. There is no objective guarantee to provide a
comparison between paradigms. The transition between them, in so far as there
is incommensurability between their terms and concepts, can be achieved only
by means of a sort of conversion
[6] .

The radicality
of this proposal can be seen clearly when we take into account one of its basic
assumptions: there is no such language as the neutral language of experience.
Observation is not organised in a language that, so to speak, immediately puts
us into contact with experience. Language depends on the theory it belongs to,
on the theory where it is given shape, so that two different theories cannot
be compared. Kuhn reassessed his conclusions appealing to the psychological
conditionings of perception: two different people could see different objects
though they were receiving the same stimulus
[7] . So, perceptive learning can condition our way of understanding
the world.

The final
conclusion is that those who posit incommensurable theories cannot communicate
between them, ..., but they cannot justify their disagreements either. According
to Kuhn [8] , two people in the
same place looking in the same direction must receive the same stimulus. But
what they see is not the stimulus but the sensation. In the interval
between them there is a sort of conditioning by means of education and learning,
so that those individuals growing in different communities would proceed as
if they saw different things [9] . This implies that there could be
different discourses on reality, although one whole conceptual scheme could
remain fixed and be transmitted from one generation to another. This conceptual
relativism is intimately connected to what matters to us in this work. It is
linked to cultural relativism, in so far as sharing learning is but sharing
interests, language and culture. For a relativist, the survival character of
perceptual mechanisms is extreemly important. We transmit to each other the
ways of seeing that bear those group testings that are more effective
in positively ordering groups' behaviour, and that give way to such order because
they provide a better adaptation to the environment.

If the process
of perceptive learning is something particular to a group, we have as a result
the closed and exclusive character of, in Kuhn's case, those sides engaged in
scientific debates when the revolution is about to come. In the case of interest
to us, we can speak of different cultures as the subject matter of Anthropology.
In such cases, there is a big problem when we want to justify communication
as well as in regard to the interpretation we are trying to make of a different
culture: the existence of incommensurability between languages representing
different approaches to reality prevents us from having any kind of, so to speak,
conversation. This interrupted, Kuhn's proposal is as follows
[10] : what those engaged in a broken conversation can do is to realise
that they are members of different communities with different languages, and
then become translators.

When anthropologists
work with cultures, they are confronted by this limitation. What was supposed
to be the tool to gain access to them -language- is just an insurmountable obstacle.
If we accept that the patterns to construct meaning have a fundamental social
character, it is unavoidable to conclude that the cultural systems are closed
"wholes". This circumstance conditions the value of any attempt to
understand any other culture different from ours. Such understanding would only
be possible in the case one could have some sort of translation between those
meanings that the cultures provide. Because languages depend upon different
conceptual schemes, arising from the different ways through which traditions
and institutions develop, the question of a possibly accurate translation is
something that remains open to discussion. Proper knowledge and understanding
of those attitudes and beliefs that we are going to encounter, is only possible
if we accept that there is such an option as an achievable accurate translation
into our language. However, given the fact that there are no objective facts
of meaning, there seems not to be any possibility of verifying that the intended
translation is right and, together with that, we would also find difficulty
in understanding how other cultures approach reality. These theses are the indeterminacy
of translation thesis and the ontological relativity thesis.

The indeterminacy
of translation thesis states [11] the impossibility of knowing whether
one has ever achieved a correct translation between two different languages.
As such, this thesis was posited by W.v.O.Quine in his work Word and Object.
The problem Quine wants to stress is that we cannot be sure about what our interlocutors
are referring to in their speeches, so that we are unable to determine what
conceptual scheme and what ontology they share. We could be sharing identical
schemes, but there would be no possible way to know it from observable behaviour,
which is the only thing we can speak about with certain rigor. So, if we are
led to conclude that it is impossible to enter another context different
from ours, Anthropology cannot be a science [12] .

Thus, we
can see one of the negative effects provided by Quine's thesis. All anthropological
work is affected if the Quinean proposal is right. Nevertheless, it is not true
that a failure in translation, the impossibility of guaranteeing objectivity
in communication, indicates that we are before different rationalities.
For Quine, it would imply only that we go blind when talking about facts of
meaning. We could be perfectly sharing conceptual schemes, but it is incredibly
difficult to show it through observable behaviour. However, in our opinion,
the result is that the acceptance of Quine's thesis leads us to relativism,
due to the fact that we cannot guarantee any kind of objectivity: if we cannot
be sure about our knowledge of the values and interests appearing in the linguistic
behaviour of members of other cultures, there is no reason to think that our
interlocutors share any cultural assumption. This would be the unavoidable conclusion
coming from Quine's behaviourism. When anthropologists have tried to understand
other cultures, they have used the native language as a fundamental tool: those
elements of expression and communication by means of which the members of the
group understand each other.

The other
Quinean thesis is that of referential opacity, or the inscrutability
of reference. This thesis comes from the idea that any word is related to
a language. Depends upon it to acquire meaning. The reference could be the same
for native and linguist, but neither of them would know it. This would remain
beyond the many hypotheses the linguist wanted to use. To say which are the
objects one is speaking about is, according to Quine, the same as to make a
proposal for translation, that is, how to propose a translation of his/her terms
and sentences to ours. [13]
This is what leads Quine to stress that the translator imposes as
much as he/she discovers; he/she imposes upon the native his/her ontology in
order to assimilate the native's behaviour (verbal and non-verbal). So, different
manuals of translation could be perfectly compatible with the behaviour under
study. There is no way to find any objective point and no way to know which
manual is, so to speak, the right answer.

The conclusion
we reach is obviously discouraging. The question is not whether translation
is or is not possible. In fact, anthropologist's attempts to make a translation
seem to work without any major problems. But we will never obtain a coherent
and definite justification of it beyond the fact of practical success; and this
would frustrate the results obtained. Any attempt to justify anthropological
objectivity would be open to question. So, cultural incommensurability, supported
by these considerations, would seem to guarantee relativism.

Some problems
about the indeterminacy of translation thesis.

The exposition
Quine does of the issue of translation is, as it was stressed before, an unavoidable
result of his linguistic behaviourism. Its main elements are the correlations
between stimulus and response. There are no mental entities to justify the process
of meaning, what we have to deal with is just dispositions to verbally response
to external stimuli. That would be the only way to guarantee an objective study
of linguistic meaning.

The problems
derived from the assumption of those implications coming from Quine’s arguments,
have effect on the comparison between theories; and so become an obstacle to
properly compare or study different cultures. The same difficulties apply to
the traditionally named scietific theories as well as to social sciences
like Anthropology. According to W.H.Newton-Smith [14] , if there is no
objective point to justify the continuity or divergence between different discourses,
languages or traditions, the point about what a, so to speak, former scientist
wanted to say is basically nonsense. What we have is simply different and equally
valid ways to give an interpretation of his/her affirmations.

According
to Quine, indeterminacy of translation leads to inscrutability of reference.
This thesis states that we can have alternative interpretations equally valid
about the reference of the terms of a theory, because there is no truth about
which one of the interpretations is right. If reference is inscrutable, there
is no possible way to discover what other individuals were referring to or talking
about. To compare theories, we need a translation and a specification of the
reference. But, if Quine is right, and there is no unique translation, there
will be no answer for the question: “Has your theory more or less truth than
mine?” [15]

The indeterminacy
of translation was Quine’s interpretation of the problem of incommensurability.
Nevertheless, Quine rejected the accusations of being relativist by stressing
his commitment as a realist
[16] . For him, the last criterion to speak about reality was Physics
[17] , and he has been adopting a realist attitude towards it
[18] .

Such proposal
as Quine’s is, despite of his coherence, has been accused of many failures,
and this could not be otherwise due to its particularly strong implications
for issues concerning not only linguistics but anthropological knowledge as
well. To start with, his theses lack some accuracy about how meaningful human
behaviour works. That is, his linguistic behaviourism impells him to accept
very radical views that collide with some broadly accepted considerations about
the intentionalist character of human conduct. P.M.S.Hacker expresses it as
follows:

“The field
linguist’s point of access, according to Quine, is the one-word observation
sentence, assent and dissent to which are allegedly identifiable inductively.
But assent and dissent are intensional (as well as intentional) notions; a person
assents not to a sentence –that is, to an assertion that things are thus-and-so-
and assents to what he understands inasmuch as he believes it to be
true. The identification of assent and dissent therefore presupposes viewing
the observed behaviour not as mere bodily movement, but intentionalistically-
and it is not obvious that Quine’s austere behaviourism entitles him to this
intentional stance” [19]

For Quine,
if we want to understand a different language or a different conceptual shceme,
we have to translate it. There is a difference between those activities. Understanding
has to do with abilities, and translating is something one becomes engaged in.
That means that they are different, and one depends on the other. Translating
(and interpreting) [20]
presupposes understanding [21] . This is shown in the way we behave.
The responses we give show how we have achieved to understand others’ intentional
behaviour. It is seen in what we do. This is also the way to show that we share
the same basic form of life of that culture, or language alien –in principle-
to us. To negate this, would mean to negate the possibility of considering others
as human and, then, to be in any kind of meaningful contact.

Another point
of controversy is that of the problem of reference/ontology. According to Quine,
the inscrutability of reference is the basis for the indeterminacy of translation.
Departing from observable behaviour, we have no possibility of knowing that
with respect to which the terms of a language are true. For Donald Davidson,
this idea is but supporting a relativist view on reference. Davidson accepted
some of Quine’s ideas, though not the derivations coming from them. In a very
clear account of his own point of view, Davidson wrote that he accepted Quine’s
inscrutability of reference and the indeterminacy of translation. But he realised
the existence of some problems concerning the derivations of these theses. For
Davidson, reference cannot be relativized the way Quine thinks it possible.
For him, the whole ontology is something fixed.

It seems
to be true that two different schemes would equally assign truth value to certain
statements, given that the point of departure would be in facts or, so to speak,
those objective situations provoking assent or dissent. The empirical
equivalence is valuable as such. Nevertheless, it does not allow us to justify
nor determine the existence of referents in an univocal way (for Quine, the
referential relation between objects and terms is relative to an arbitrary chosing
of a scheme of reference or manual of translation). Understanding semantical
traits as something public, and assuming that they are affected by indeterminacy,
there seems to be no such thing as a unique reference
[22] .

If Quine
is true, reference as well as ontology can be fixed relative to a scheme. But
to say that reference is fixed to a language implies considering that language
as a language-object. That is, we can only take into account such circumstance
if we make a metalinguistic use of terms. We can only speak of that relativity
if we go back to a different language, but if we do that we have to keep on
doing it. We have to repeat the same procedure again and again, and we could
not see any end for it. This is one of the obvious failures of relativism. To
talk about relativity we have to go out of it, and then reject it. This is something
valid for the problem of ontology as well. If, as Quine states, ontology is
relative to a scheme or system of coordinates, this can only be stated if we
can reinterpret the ontology in terms of a different theory. However, this process
has the same problems pointed before. Such ontological relativity could not
be deduced from those decisions with respect to schemes.

For Davidson,
the conclusion is as follows: what we can see is not that the reference is not
relative, but that there is no intelligible way to relativize it to justify
the concept of ontological relativity
[23] . The speakers of a language, sharing a scheme, can answer questions
about reference from their own scheme. That is, the scheme allows us to give
answers to the questions concerning what the speakers want to say by means of
their propositions, but the reference cannot be specified in an absolute
way. Nevertheless, the existence of reference can be justified and guaranteed.
There is, then, a reasonable way to relativize truth and reference, avoiding
the problems of the strong relativist proposal, as Quine’s seems to be. We need
a scheme to understand any object of the world, because objects, so to speak,
do not exist apart from conceptual schemes. This is a way to reject metaphysical
realism, but it does not imply the truth of relativism. We cannot be apart from
our own thoughts to compare them with reality; nevertheless, this is not relativism
but, in Putnam’s words, some sort of pragmatic realism.

What we have,
then, is not that there is a unique way to approach reality, but neither the
opposite radical view is true. A sort of compromise between the different points
of view seems to be a practical solution. The anthropologist has to face many
difficulties and limitations when dealing with his/her object of study but,
nevertheless, he/she has some tools to justify his/her work. The reality of
different cultures, languages, traditions, etc., is something he/she has to
face because that is the only way to work. This implies the acceptance of those
limitations the extremes of which are present in the incommensurability
and indeterminacy of translation theses. We may not guarantee absolute
accuracy in our study, but that does not mean that we cannot approach any sort
of justification for our investigations. The limits of cultural study are the
limits of the communication of meaning. Interpretation (as well as translation)
of other cultures, domains of discourse, etc., has to do with our ability to
recognize similitudes in others, that is, to realise the importance of those
patterns of behaviour common to all of us. To understand a sentence means to
understand a language, and this means the understanding of a form of life
[24] .

Some problems
for the incommensurability thesis.

Talking about
incommensurability means talking about the absence of that common element by
means of which we are able to compare two different discourses. This absence
allows us to justify the existence of, so to speak, communicative incapacity
between those individuals supporting different systems, so that there cannot
occur any interchange of meaning between them. Those systems are closed and
limited in themselves. Thus understood, incommensurability supports a relativist
conception of reality.

For H.Putnam [25] , the incommensurability thesis
is self-refuting. If that thesis shows the impossibility in the equivalence
of meaning or reference between terms of different systems (cultures, we could
say), we could neither translate other languages to ours, nor previous stages
of our own language to our present one. Analyzing Kuhn's and Feyerabend's points
of view [26] , Putnam
states that if they were true, we could only characterise the members of other
cultures as animals producing responses to stimuli (including amongst them those
noises that, curiously, seem to be Italian, Spanish or English words). We cannot
say that our conceptions differ, and in what they are different, if we cannot
translate them. This is the result of proposing theses like incommensurability.

A consistent
relativist should not treat others as the speakers they are (or as rational
beings). If the sounds they produce are incommensurable, then, they are nothing
but noise. According to Putnam, we cannot proclaim the validity of the incommensurability
thesis without going beyond it. But we cannot do that if we do not reject it.

D.Davidson
also criticizes Kuhn's view on the importance and implications of incommensurability.
For Davidson, speaking of different scientists working in different worlds is
but a metaphorical use of terms
[27] . Davidson develops an exhaustive criticism of the conceptual
relativism subjacent to proposals like that of the incommensurability thesis.
For relativists, there is a close connection between a conceptual scheme and
the language in which it is expressed. According to such a point of view, reality
is related to a scheme (understood as a system of categories organising experience).
Different schemes could not be true counterparts for those who subscribe to
each particular one. Davidson, when examining B. Lee Whorf’s proposals [28] , stressed that whenever Lee Whorf tries to show
that “Hopi” and “English” cannot be compared because of their different metaphysics,
he uses English to explain the content of Hopi statements [29] .

Whorf asserts
that language produces a certain organisation of experience, classifying the
stream of sensorial experience resulting in a certain order of the world [30] . In this sense, the existence
of a basic difference between English and Hopi seems to be obvious. For Whorf,
Hopi language is equipped with tools to deal with phenomena that our scientific
terminology cannot really express well. That is simply because Hopi language
establishes a contrast between kinds of experience different from those that
our scientific language is able to distinguish
[31] . Davidson thinks that the differences are not so huge that we
cannot express them without making use of a unique language. So, he reminds
us that Kuhn is using a postrevolutionary language when he wants to talk about
what happened before a scientific revolution. For Davidson, it does make sense
to talk about different points of view, but only if there is a common coordinated
system in which to represent them. If there is a common system, a huge incomparability
is something contradictory.

When we want
to give an interpretation of the attitudes and beliefs we think are present
in our interlocutor’s utterances, we have to assume the possibility of translating
what he/she says into our language. If we cannot achieve translation, we could
conclude his/her conceptual system is absolutely alien to ours. But, according
to Davidson, what is true is that we do not live in different worlds, we are
only separated by words. We understand something as a language if it is in relation
to experience, organising it. This organisation is due to the ontology subjacent
to language, allowing us to individuate objects. When we establish a predicative
correlation between two different languages we can presuppose there is a common
ontology. So, when we organise experience we can ask about how much similitude
exists in those possibilities of organisation. According to Davidson, there
is an inevitable organisational affinity.

At the same
time, to begin understanding another language, we have to presume the speaker
is basically right with respect to what he/she says. That is the so-called principle
of charity. We need to admit that our interlocutors are rational, and that
they are basically logical and coherent; that they have beliefs. If we are able
to reconcile charity with the formal conditions for a theory, we have
done everything we need to assure communication, says Davidson. Nothing else
is possible, but we do not need anything else [32] .

Our attempts
to understand what others say must be made in terms of an optimization of agreement,
because there is no intelligible foundation that justifies that the so-called
different schemes are really different. Otherwise, we would be accepting
what Davidson calls the third dogma of empiricism: the dualism scheme/content
(reality). If this dualism were true, we could not judge if other individuals
have ideas, attitudes or absolutely different beliefs. Nevertheless, this is
what we actually do. We do judge. To credit beliefs and rationality to those
who supposedly own a conceptual scheme different to ours, is something fundamental
if we want to admit they really take part in that scheme. But if we presuppose
that the scheme is absolutely alien to ours, we cannot justify our belief in
the rationality of others. We have no element to guarantee it. As M.Hollis says,
we cannot understand what is irrational
[33] .

To achieve
the goals of communication, we have to presume beforehand the internal coherence
of what others utter; though such coherence could be understood in more than
one way [34] . The only difficulty,
then, would be a difference between words.

Incommensurability,
in terms of our interest in this paper, shows the extent of the social nature
of knowledge. It is true that, by means of learning, all conventions and institutions
become, so to speak, assimilated by individuals. These make cultural variables
present in any particular situation, giving sense to behaviour and making it
be symbolically coherent. Nevertheless, to say that how the world is,
depends upon the social elements within our interpretations, is just going too
far. According to D.Bloor [35] , the way to comprehend the world
and adapt to it singularly reflects our physical limits and mental capacities,
giving way to a whole system of interrelations by means of which we have a firm
view of the world. But this process is prejudiced by our learning; a typically
social process. So, we have the union of language and conceptual scheme, and
consequently at the same time we have different groups with huge discrepancies,
because language is learnt at the same time as we learn those conventions that
support it. This is precisely the point of view we are criticising.

If the relativist
thesis of incommensurability is true, anthropologists, as scientists, cannot
propose any questions nor suggest any answers. As M.Hollis points out, if Anthropology
were to be possible, the natives have to share with us our concepts of
truth, coherence and rational interdependence of beliefs
[36] . Despite the possibility that we can have problems with our
communication, we can know many things about our interlocutors. It is true that
translation is a key point in determining whether the relativist thesis about
cultures is true [37]
but, accepting the limitations in achieving an accurate translation, communication
is possible, and common practice provides evidence for this.

We cannot
go beyond our thoughts to compare them with reality
[38] ; it is true that those entities we deal with are as much constructed
as discovered. It is true that objectivity is, in a sense, objectivity for
us, and the idea of a metaphysical spectator is of no real use. But
our conceptions of coherence and acceptability are closely linked to our psychology.
They depend on our biology, though they can be affected by our culture, and
particular interests and values. Nevertheless, as Putnam points out
[39] , we share even with the strangest culture we can imagine, a
huge number of suppositions and beliefs about what is reasonable. This is a
crucial point we have to bear in mind, because it reminds us of the importance
of a conception of human nature, whatever we want to say with that term.

[1] This paper is part of a work sponsored by the Fundación Caja de
Madrid

[2] R.Harré and M.Krausz (Varieties of Relativism. Blackwell,
Oxford 1996, p.194) point that Feyerabend's main arguments about this topic
where influenced by B.L.Whorf's Language, Thought and Reality.

[4] To avoid M.Masterman's criticisms to the concept of paradigm
("The Nature of a Paradigm"; in: I.Lakatos and A.Musgrave: Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1970,
pp.55-90) I will give a wide meaning to that concept, understood as a scientific
theory as well as a specific way to work in science. Some criticisms
on Kuhn's points of view can be seen in: D.Shapere, "The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions", Philosophical Review, vol.73 (1964),
pp.383-394; also from the same author: "Meaning and Scientific Change",
in: Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy,
The University of Pittsburgh Series in the Philosophy of Science III, Pittsburgh
1966, pp.41-85; G.Doppelt, "Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism",
Inquiry, vol.21 (1978) pp.33-86; P.Achinstein, Concepts of Science,
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1968; G.Buchdahl, "A Revolution in
Historiography of Science", History of Science, vol.4 (1965),
pp.55-69.

[11] The thesis is as follows: manuals for translating one language into
another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality
of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. W.v.O.Quine, Palabra
y Objeto. Ed Labor, Barcelona 1968.

[12] There would be no possible way to justify any kind of objectivity.
Appealing to intersubjectivity to construct objectivity would be of no help
in this case. We would need first of all to justify the possibility of achieving
the real possibility for such a sort of communication. (To see an attempt
to justify objectivity in terms of intersubjectivity, read J.Fabian's "Ethnographic
Objectivity Revisited: From Rigor to Vigor"; in: A.Megill (ed.) Rethinking
Objectivity, 1994, pp.81-104).