During an interview by BBC Radio 3, Bell proposed the idea of a "superdeterminism" that could explain the correlation of results in spacelike-separated two-particle experiments without the need for faster-than-light signaling. The two experiments need only have been pre-determined by causes reaching both experiments from an earlier time.

I was going to ask whether it is still possible to maintain, in the
light of experimental experience, the idea of a deterministic universe?

You know, one of the ways of understanding this business is to
say that the world is super-deterministic. That not only is inanimate
nature deterministic, but we, the experimenters who
imagine we can choose to do one experiment rather than another,
are also determined. If so, the difficulty which this experimental
result creates disappears.

Free will is an illusion - that gets us out of the crisis, does it?

That's correct. In the analysis it is assumed that free will is
genuine, and as a result of that one finds that the intervention of
the experimenter at one point has to have consequences at a
remote point, in a way that influences restricted by the finite
velocity of light would not permit. If the experimenter is not free
to make this intervention, if that also is determined in advance,
the difficulty disappears.

In his 1996 book, Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point, Huw Price proposes an Archimedean point "outside space and time" as a solution to the problem of nonlocality in the Bell experiments in the form of an "advanced action."

Rather than a "superdeterministic" common cause coming from "outside space and time" (as proposed by Bell, Gisin, Suarez, and others), Price argues that there might be a cause coming backwards in time from some interaction in the future.