It is too soon to call Egypt’s revolution over—and there is no question that the country could fall much further. That’s why it’s so urgent to right the ship before fears of growing sectarian strife, widening violence, or even civil war become more real. The trouble is the window for even the most basic successful democratic transition appears to be closing.

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Egypt’s paltry political inheritance after 30 years under Hosni Mubarak guaranteed that this would never be easy. When the dust settled from the collapse of his regime, the only institutions that remained standing were the Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood—the backbone of Mubarak’s authoritarian system and the banned political party that had been persecuted by that system for decades. An accommodation between these two players was always going to give Egypt its first, best chance at democracy. That seems like a far more remote possibility today.

Even Tahrir Square is complicating matters now. Tahrir is less a creative epicenter of protest than a revolving door for hollering grievances against whoever is in charge. To be sure, Mubarak, the military, and Morsi each deserved that criticism in turn, but at this point everyone has been a target of Tahrir, leaving no one with the standing to lead with a clear mandate. (The only other potential leaders, secularists such as Mohamed ElBaradei, are too politically irrelevant.) In recent days, Egyptian police officers have been lauded and celebrated by protesters in the square. That would have been unimaginable in February 2011 when the country’s corrupt and abusive police officers were among the most reviled. Wait long enough and Tahrir will eventually love you and hate you.

The prospects for Egypt’s revolution may have been dim from the beginning, and not just because of the toxic politics. The truth is that many of the earliest decisions—which were made or pushed by the generals who were then in charge—planted the seeds of the revolution’s destruction. Egypt’s military moved quickly to preserve the strong presidential system that had been in place since the Free Officers coup in 1952. (If they are familiar with the end of Eastern European dictatorships in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they know that those who chose a strong parliamentary system are the only ones who have avoided an authoritarian relapse.) Indeed, President Morsi took only a handful of months to demonstrate how easily Egypt’s young democratic system could be abused and turn dictatorial. The generals ensured that the revision of the country’s constitution would include protections for the military that frankly run counter to any truly democratic regime. And as Harvard political scientist Tarek Masoud points out, Egypt’s military-led government was hardly inclusive, dissolving the former regime’s National Democratic Party in April 2011, thereby guaranteeing that many of the remnants of the old regime would have a greater interest in playing the spoiler than helping to get the country back on its feet.

So, in the last week, as Egypt’s revolution has appeared to go off the rails, we may simply be witnessing the inevitable outcome of what Egypt already set in motion. Then again, the military seems intent on finishing the job.