But seriously, think about this - here was a man who was a bloodthirsty persecuter of Christians and as far as we know did not have a prior literary career. He was struck from his horse, converted to Christianity, and went on to become the greatest evangelizer and man of letters in Christian history. An argument could be made that he could have not have responded to God's call to conversion and in by doing so exhibited free will. That seems so unlikely to me. Does God "suspend" free will for certain people in certain times in history so that His will will be done?

I was being serious. It's not an either/or. It's both. The Church's only consistent statements in regards to this are: 1) We have freewill 2) God's grace is necessary. So how do the two interact? Write that question down and ask when you get to heaven, cuz' there ain't no answer here.

Err . . . in the interest of consistency, I have to say that the point of this forum is pure philosophy, more or less. A question on the nature and interplay of free will in the light of divine foreknowledge would be manageable. But this is more in the line of exegesis and really belongs somewhere else. Right now, I don't know that we have that "somewhere else" clearly defined, but I need to lock this from here.

Free will does not exist in heaven because our will is fixed and confirmed immutabley on the Supreme Good, the Beatific Vision. In this life, our will is free, not because God supposedly "respects" our free will, as the personalists say, but because it is metaphysically impossible because of the dominating indifference throughout volitional act. "If we set before the will an object, which from any point of view is not good, the will is not drawn to it by necessity." Since we do not see the divine essence as it is, in itself, but only know things of the supernatural by analogy, or negatively, our will is not necessitated.

The twenty first Thomistic thesis states thus: "The will follows, it does not precede the intellect. And the will necessarily wills only that object which is presented to it as good from every angle, leaving nothing to be desired. But the will chooses freely between good things presented by mutable judgment. Hence choice follows indeed the last practical judgment, but it is the will which makes that judgment to be the last."

In this life, our will is free, not because God supposedly "respects" our free will, as the personalists say, but because it is metaphysically impossible because of the dominating indifference throughout volitional act.

Free will does not exist in heaven because our will is fixed and confirmed immutabley on the Supreme Good, the Beatific Vision. In this life, our will is free, not because God supposedly "respects" our free will, as the personalists say, but because it is metaphysically impossible because of the dominating indifference throughout volitional act. "If we set before the will an object, which from any point of view is not good, the will is not drawn to it by necessity." Since we do not see the divine essence as it is, in itself, but only know things of the supernatural by analogy, or negatively, our will is not necessitated.

The twenty first Thomistic thesis states thus: "The will follows, it does not precede the intellect. And the will necessarily wills only that object which is presented to it as good from every angle, leaving nothing to be desired. But the will chooses freely between good things presented by mutable judgment. Hence choice follows indeed the last practical judgment, but it is the will which makes that judgment to be the last."

I disagree with your contention that the will cannot be free in heaven. A will does not need to know evil to be free.

I disagree with your contention that the will cannot be free in heaven. A will does not need to know evil to be free.

I didn't say the will needs to know evil. I said that the will cannot be fixed immutabely in this life because everything the intellect presents to the will is considered good under one aspect and not good under another. That cannot happen when the soul sees the divine essence in itself. There is no room for indifference, it is impossible to remain aloof; therefore, the will is eternally fixed, by necessity. Heaven transcends the freedom of the will as its final end. It finally rests in the Supreme Good.

I disagree with your contention that the will cannot be free in heaven. A will does not need to know evil to be free.

I didn't say the will needs to know evil. I said that the will cannot be fixed immutabely in this life because everything the intellect presents to the will is considered good under one aspect and not good under another. That cannot happen when the soul sees the divine essence in itself. There is no room for indifference, it is impossible to remain aloof; therefore, the will is eternally fixed, by necessity. Heaven transcends the freedom of the will as its final end. It finally rests in the Supreme Good.

I guess I don't know why you think the fixing of the will towards the Good somehow affects its freedom. The freedom of the will does not mean that one needs the ability to choose evil. If the will is fixed on the Good, it can still be free.