========================================Congressman: U.S. Set Up Anti-Taliban to
be Slaughtered* Excerpts from a most revealing
hearing
* Comments by Jared Israel[posted 16 October 2001]========================================

"At a time when the Taliban were vulnerable,
the top person of this administration, Mr.
Inderfurth, and Bill Richardson, personally went to
Afghanistan and convinced the anti-Taliban forces not
to go on the offensive and, furthermore, convinced
all of the anti-Taliban forces, their supporters, to
disarm them and to cease their flow of support for
the anti-Taliban forces. At that same moment,
Pakistan initiated a major resupply effort, which
eventually saw the defeat, and caused the defeat, of
almost all of the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

"Now, with a history like that, it's very
hard, Mr. Ambassador, for me to sit here and listen
to someone say, "Our main goal is to drain the
swamp" -- and the swamp is Afghanistan --
because the United States created that swamp in
Afghanistan. And the United States' policies have
undercut those efforts to create a freer and more
open society in Afghanistan, which is consistent with
the beliefs of the Afghan people." Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher, lambasting the U.S. State Department at
Congressional hearings 12 July 2000. Excerpts from
those hearings are posted after these comments.

On July 12, 2000 a U.S. Congressional Committee held
hearings that turned into a knockdown drag out fight over
Washington's role in Afghanistan.

Rep. Dana Rohrabacher accused the U.S. State
Department of treachery and hypocrisy. He presented
evidence that:

The U.S. deliberately sent 'humanitarian aid'
only to Taliban-controlled areas;

The U.S. State Department refused to act on
information concerning the location of Osama bin
Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan.

U.S. officials tricked the Anti-Taliban
opposition into disarming, though the officials
knew Pakistan was airlifting weapons to the
Taliban. This allowed the Taliban to wipe out
most of the opposition forces.

Below I have posted excerpts from that hearing. As you
will see, the two U.S. State Department officials, Mr.
Eastham and Mr. Sheehan, and their congressional
supporters, never answered Rep. Rohrabacher's charges.
Rohrabacher listed specific acts of treachery. Eastham,
Sheehan and their supporters dodged and responded with
noble generalities.

This is important stuff. By definition, when a
government engages in covert support of terrorist forces
it does so to hide its real policy, and so of course the
real policy is hard to expose. As Rep. Rohrabacher
commented at the end of the hearing.

"You know, I am the only one here [making
these accusations]. I am not the chairman of the
committee. I would never get the opportunity to have
a back and forth with you [people from the State
Department], except in times like this." [From
hearing, posted below]

Because he charged the U.S. State Department with
pretending to oppose bin Laden and the Taliban while
actually secretly supporting them, and because the State
Department officials were manifestly unable to answer his
charges, and because the whole thing was recorded and
transcribed, Rohrabacher gave us a strong piece of
documented evidence that during the 1990s, the actual U.S.
policy was to support Islamist terrorism.

A note on Representative Rohrabacher: By posting this
material we are not endorsing the Congressman or his
current actions. In our opinion, Rep. Rohrabacher did the
world the service of exposing State Department duplicity
not because he opposed US interference in Afghanistan,
during the 1980s and 1990s, but because he wanted the U.S.
to meddle in a different way. While the U.S. was openly
financing the worst Islamist terrorists, and, later,
secretly supporting the Taliban, Rep. Rohrabacher was
close to the former Afghan King. Now that his King has
gained more influence, Rep. Rohrabacher has altered his
criticisms of U.S. policy. He used to say the U.S.
actively hurt Afghanistan. Now he says:

"We thought just forcing the Russians out and
supporting the Afghans in their fight against Soviet
domination was the end of story. But it wasn't,
obviously. We did not do, as far as I'm concerned,
our responsibility to the Afghan people. We left them
asleep in their own rubble and left them to suffer.
And what emerged? The Taliban emerged. What emerged
after that? Bin Laden." (CNN SUNDAY MORNING, 07:00,
September 30, 2001)

This is a complete change from the much more honest
criticism you will find below: namely, that the U.S.
actively fostered the rise of the Taliban and refused to
go after bin Laden, even when the information regarding
bin Laden and the Taliban came from Mr. Rohrabacher and
his Afghan friends. Thus he charged Washington with
having a policy of arrogant interference, treachery and
hypocrisy. During the hearing, quoted below, Mr.
Rohrabacher said: "The United States created that
swamp in Afghanistan." A far cry from "We left
them asleep in their own rubble and left them to suffer."

It appears that Dana Rohrabacher has made his peace
with the State Department.

July 12, 2000
Hearing Of the House International Relations Committee on
"Global Terrorism And South Asia."

Chaired By: Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)

Witnesses: Michael Sheehan, State Department
Coordinator For Counterterrorism; Alan Eastham, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State For South Asian
Affairs

[Emperor's Clothes note: Shortly after the hearing
started, Rep. Rohrabacher heated things up by attacking U.S.
policy in Afghanistan, head on:]

REP. DANA ROHRABACHER (R-CA): Mr. Chairman, thank you
very much, and thank you very much for holding this
hearing.

As we discuss terrorism in South Asia, I think it is
important to renew the members of this committee's and
the public's acquaintance with the request that I have
made for the last three years concerning American policy
toward the Taliban, because as we examine -- as we
examine terrorism in South Asia, one can't help but
recognize that if it weren't for the fact that the
Taliban are in power, there would be a different equation
going on.

It would be whole different situation in South Asia.

After a year of requesting to see State Department
documents on Afghan policy -- and I would remind the
committee that I have -- I have stated that I believe
that there is a covert policy by this administration, a
shameful covert policy of supporting the Taliban -- the
State Department, after many, many months -- actually,
years -- of prodding, finally began giving me documents,
Mr. Chairman. And I have, in the assessment of those
documents, I have found nothing to persuade me that I was
wrong in my criticism. And I might add, however, that
there has been no documents provided to me, even after
all of these years of requesting it, there have been no
documents concerning the time period of the formation of
the Taliban. And I would, again, I would hope that the
State Department gets the message that I expect to see
all those documents. And the documents that I have read,
Mr. Chairman, indicate that the State Department, time
and again, has had as its position that they have no
quarrel, or that it would give them no heartburn, to have
the Taliban in power. This, during the time period when
the Taliban was struggling to take over Afghanistan.

And although the administration has denied supporting the
Taliban, it is clear that they discouraged all of the
anti-Taliban supporters from supporting the efforts in
Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban. Even so much as when
the Taliban was ripe for being defeated on the ground in
Afghanistan, Bill Richardson and Rick Inderfurth, high-ranking
members of this administration, personally visited the
region in order to discourage the Taliban's opposition
from attacking the Taliban when they were vulnerable, and
then going to neighboring countries to cut off any type
of military assistance to the [opponents of the] Taliban.
This, at a time when Pakistan was heavily resupplying and
rearming the Taliban.

What did this lead to? It led to the defeat of all of the
Taliban's major enemies except for one, Commander
Massoud, in the north, and left the Taliban the supreme
power in Afghanistan.

So what we hear today about terrorism and crocodile tears
from this administration, let us remember this
administration is responsible for the Taliban. This
administration has acted in a way that has kept the
Taliban in power.

One last note. Many people here understand that I have
been in Afghanistan on numerous occasions and have close
ties to people there. And let me just say that some of my
sources of information informed me of where bin Laden
was, they told me they knew and could tell people where
bin Laden could be located. And it took me three times
before this administration responded to someone who
obviously has personal contacts in Afghanistan, to even
investigate that there might be someone who could give
them the information. And when my contact was actually
contacted, they said that the people who contacted them
were half-hearted, did not follow through, did not appear
to be all that interested, appeared to be forced to be
talking to him.

REP. DAVID E. BONIOR (D-MI): On earlier occasions, the
administration has expressed the importance of working
with Pakistan in addressing terrorism in South Asia. I
also believe that cooperation with Pakistan continues to
be very much in our national interest. Combating and
preventing global terrorism is one of the most serious
challenges facing America's foreign policy in this new
era.

It is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that Pakistan, as a
long-standing ally of the United States, is committed to
cooperating with the United States on terrorism. Its
record shows that. Sanctioning Pakistan will serve no
purpose other than to isolate them and aggravate the
social and economic and political challenges in the
region.

I also strongly believe that the Taliban support for
terrorism, and its harboring of Osama bin Laden, must be
condemned in the strongest possible terms. We must also
respond to the threat, and I believe that is where
Pakistan plays a very critical role. We must remember
that it is not in Pakistan's interest to have the Taliban
on its border. It is also not in Pakistan's interest to
have terrorist groups operating within its borders. And
it is clearly not in India's interest to have Pakistan
isolated, thereby producing a greater threat to peace and
stability in South Asia .

I know from my talks with General Musharraf, when I
visited Pakistan and India in April, that he is committed
to dealing with the Taliban. He has met with one leader
of the Taliban and is prepared to meet with others in
Afghanistan. Throughout my trip, I gained a new
appreciation of the new challenges facing the region. I
also came away, more convinced than ever, that the United
States must play a proactive role in helping to meet
those challenges.

There are serious challenges and threats, which exist
in Pakistan. But I also know that General Musharraf and
General Aziz (sp), in Pakistan, are well aware of what
needs to be done.

[Emperor's Clothes note: Shortly after this, Michael
Sheehan, the State Department Coordinator For
Counterterrorism and Alan Eastham, Jr., the Deputy
Assistant Secretary Of State For South Asian Affairs
spoke. However, they also talked in generalities.
Following there remarks REP. GEJDENSON spoke, ending with
the following heated exchange:]

REP. GEJDENSON: One last thing. Are there any
countries supplying weapons to the Taliban at this point?

MR. SHEEHAN [from State Dep't]: I think I'll have to
go in closed session on that as well, Mr. Congressman.
I'm not -- what I know about that is from classified
sources. I'll be glad to talk to you about it after this.

REP. GEJDENSON: Thank you. You might check with Mr.
Rohrabacher for any other information you need on
Afghanistan -- (laughter). He seems to be very
knowledgeable about the military situation there.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. Mr.
Rohrabacher?

REP. ROHRABACHER: (Laughing.) This is a joke! I mean,
you have to go to closed session to tell us where the
weapons are coming from? Well, how about let's make a
choice. There's Pakistan or Pakistan or Pakistan. (Laughs.)
Where do you think the Taliban -- right as we speak -- I
haven't read any classified documents. Everybody in the
region knows that Pakistan is involved with a massive
supply of military weapons and has been since the very
beginning of the Taliban.

Let me just state for the record, here, before I get
into my questions, that I think there's -- and it's not
just you, Mr. Ambassador, but it is this administration
and, perhaps, other administrations as well. I do not
believe that terrorism flows from a lack of state control.
A breakdown of state control, all of sudden you have
terrorism. That's not what causes terrorism. What causes
terrorism is a lack of freedom and democracy, a lack of a
means to solve one's problems through a democratic
process.

Afghanistan, from the very beginning, we have been --
when the Reagan administration was involved with helping
the Afghans fight the Russians, which was engaged in
trying to put a totalitarian government there -- because
of Pakistan's insistence, a lion's share of our support
went to a guy named Hekmatyar Gulbuddin, who had no
democratic tendencies whatsoever. And since the Russians
lost, we have not been supporting, the United States has
not been supporting any type of somewhat free, somewhat
democratic alternatives in Afghanistan, and there are
such alternatives, and we all -- those of us who have
been involved know that.

So there's no democracy or freedom in Afghanistan,
where people who are good and decent and courageous
people, have a chance to cleanse their society of the
drug dealers and the fanatics that torture and repress,
especially the women of Afghanistan. But the men of
Afghanistan are not fanatics like the Taliban, either.
They would like to have a different regime. Only the
United States has given -- and I again make this charge
-- the United States has been part and parcel to
supporting the Taliban all along, and still is let me add.
But you don't have any type of democracy in Afghanistan.

Let me note that, three years ago, I tried to
arrange support, aid, humanitarian aid, to a non-Taliban-controlled
section of Afghanistan, the Bamian area. Mr. Chairman,
the State Department did everything they could to thwart
these humanitarian medical supplies from going into
Bamian. And we heard today that we are very proud that we
are still giving aid to Afghanistan. Let me note; that
aid has always gone to Taliban areas. So what message
does that send to people of Afghanistan? We have been
supporting the Taliban, because all our aid goes to the
Taliban areas. And when people from the outside try to
put aid into areas not controlled by the Taliban, they
are thwarted by our own State Department.

And let me just note that that same area, Bamian,
where I tried to help those people who are opposed to the
Taliban; Bamian now is the headquarters of Mr. Bin Laden.
Surprise, surprise! Everyone in this committee has heard
me, time and again over the years, say, unless we did
something, Afghanistan was going to become a base for
terrorism and drug dealing. And, Mr. Chairman, how many
times did you hear me say that this administration either
ignored that or -- a part of the problem, rather than
part of the solution?

Again, let me just -- I am sorry Mr. Inderfurth is not
here to defend himself -- but let me state for the record:
At a time when the Taliban were vulnerable, the top
person of this administration, Mr. Inderfurth, and Bill
Richardson, personally went to Afghanistan and convinced
the anti-Taliban forces not to go on the offensive and,
furthermore, convinced all of the anti-Taliban forces,
their supporters, to disarm them and to cease their flow
of support for the anti-Taliban forces. At that same
moment, Pakistan initiated a major resupply effort, which
eventually saw the defeat, and caused the defeat, of
almost all of the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

Now, with a history like that, it's very hard, Mr.
Ambassador, for me to sit here and listen to someone say,
"Our main goal is to drain the swamp" -- and
the swamp is Afghanistan -- because the United States
created that swamp in Afghanistan. And the United States'
policies have undercut those efforts to create a freer
and more open society in Afghanistan, which is consistent
with the beliefs of the Afghan people.

REP. GILMAN: Did the panelists want to respond at all?

MR. SHEEHAN: I would, Mr. Congressman.

REP. GILMAN: Ambassador Sheehan.

MR. SHEEHAN: First of all, Mr. Congressman, I'm sorry
that you think it's a joke that I won't respond on the
issue of support for the arms for the Taliban, but the
information that I have, which is -- I cannot respond by
public source -- is based on intelligence methods, and I
don't have the authority to speak about that in this
session. But I'll be glad to talk to you or anybody else
afterwards.

Secondly, regarding the responsibility the United
States government has for Afghanistan and the situation
there, I don't accept that conclusion at all. The United
States did help participate in helping the mujaheddin
reject the Soviet occupation in the mid-'80s, and that
was a policy that I think was a correct one at that time.
The situation in Afghanistan, the deterioration of that
state since 1979, has primarily to do with the situation
in Afghanistan. Certainly there were those responsible,
whether it was the Soviet occupiers or those who were
involved in a civil war that has waged there for 20 years.
But the idea that the United States government is
responsible for everything in Afghanistan I think is not
true.

And the idea that we support the Taliban I also reject
as well completely. I have spent 18 months in this job
leading the effort within the United States government
and around the world to bring pressure on the Taliban.
After the bombing of the embassies in East Africa, when I
got hired for this job, I have made it my sole effort, my
primary effort in this job to bring pressure on that
regime. And the United States government leads that
effort in providing pressure on that regime. My office
leads that effort within the United States government. We
started with an executive order in August of 1999 that
brought sanctions to bear on the Taliban. We've led the
effort in the U.N. to bring international sanctions
against them. We're also leading the effort
internationally right now to look at further measures
against the Taliban. It's the United States government
that is leading that effort -- we're ahead of everybody
else -- to bring pressure on the Taliban. And the Taliban
knows it, and those other member states within the U.N.
and other -- the other community knows our efforts to
bring pressure to bear on that organization because of
its support for state -- for terrorism.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you.

Mr. Eastham, did you want to comment?

MR. EASTHAM: Yes, sir, I would. I would be happy to
defend Mr. Inderfurth, if you'd like, Mr. Rohrabacher,
even if he's not here in person.

I would just note that I have spent nearly 15 years of
my life working on this part of the world. I was with the
mujaheddin in Peshar [Pakistan!] from 1984 to 1987. I was
in the consulate in Peshar at that time. I've been back
on this account now for -- I began my sixth year on the
South Asia account this time, around this week. I was in
Pakistan when you were trying your effort to put -- the
airdrop assistance into Bamian. So I'm quite familiar
with the history of the whole episode. And I can say that
at no point -- at no point -- in the last six years has
the United States of America offered its support to the
Taliban.

This is why I think that despite the fact we've
provided you nearly a thousand documents in response to
the request of the chairman, that you haven't been able
to find the support for the Taliban, because it isn't
there.

REP. ROHRABACHER: That is incorrect, by the way. And I
will say that for the record. That is incorrect. I have
found several references. And documents have been kept
from me indicating what our policy formation about the
Taliban has been. So that is not accurate.

MR. EASTHAM: Well, we have a fundamental difference of
opinion, then, about the record of what this
administration has done with respect to the Taliban.

But I will say that we have -- that our goals with
respect to the Taliban have shifted over the past two
years, almost, since the East Africa bombings. When the
Taliban first came into power in Afghanistan, we had an
agenda which addressed terrorism, narcotics, human
rights, including the rights of women, and bringing peace
to Afghanistan. We tried to address all of those at the
same time.

After the East Africa bombing, the terrorism problem
became much more acute and a much higher priority in
terms of our -- in terms of what we were doing. But we've
been addressing all these issues since the first day the
Taliban came into being, and particularly since they came
to power in Kabul.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[TENC note: Rohrabacher replied:]

REP. ROHRABACHER: All right.

Let me just say that, in your denials to the charges
that I made, you were very good at general denials. But
there was no denial of some specific charges, so I'd like
to ask you about them now.

I charged that the aid that the United States has been
giving has been going to the Taliban-controlled
territories, especially during that time period when one-third
of Afghanistan was being controlled by non- and anti-Taliban
forces. Specifically, I used the example of the Bamian
effort in which we tried to help the folks down there,
who my sources said were in great deprivation and
starving, and the State Department undermined that effort.

And we mentioned earlier there is an aid program going
on to Afghanistan. Ten percent of Afghanistan is still
controlled by anti- Taliban forces. Is any of the aid
that we are giving going to this anti-Taliban area?

MR. EASTHAM: The answer to the question is, yes, there
is aid flowing to all areas in Afghanistan. That is a
function, however, of accessibility, of how you get it to
them. There is assistance, which flows through the United
Nations who are the implementers of the program, into the
North, via Tajikistan, and also through the Chitral area
of Pakistan --

REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay. Okay. So --

MR. EASTHAM: -- as well as to the 80 percent of the
country.

REP. ROHRABACHER: -- okay. So your answer is yes, that
currently that one area in the Panjshir Valley, now
controlled by Commander Massoud, that does -- they do
receive humanitarian supplies?

MR. EASTHAM: I can't take you specifically to the
Panjshir Valley because access to the Panjshir Valley is
blocked from the south by the Taliban.

REP. ROHRABACHER: But of course, it's not blocked from
Tajikistan, right?

MR. EASTHAM: Yeah. But there is assistance, which
flows into all areas of Afghanistan, through these U.N.
programs.

REP. ROHRABACHER: All right. Okay. So you're on the
record. Thank you very much.

MR. EASTHAM: Okay. But --

REP. ROHRABACHER: That's not what my sources say.

MR. EASTHAM: -- with respect to Bamian, I want to take
you back to the period two, three years ago that you are
referring to. In fact, I have -- at around that same
time, I made a trip myself from Pakistan to Kandahar, to
talk to the Taliban about the blockade, which they had
imposed at the time, upon assistance to Bamian, because
at the time Bamian was controlled by non-Taliban forces,
from the Hazara people, there.

One of the main effects of the trip by Mr. Richardson
and Mr. Inderfurth that you have so criticized was to
attempt to persuade the Taliban in fact to lift that very
blockade of Bamian, which was -- and we followed it up
with discussions in Islamabad, in which the Taliban did,
in fact, agree to a partial lifting to enable foodstuffs
to go into Bamian.

REP. ROHRABACHER: So we traded off with the Taliban
that they were going to lift their blockade and we were
going to disarm all of their opponents.

MR. EASTHAM: No, sir, that's not the case.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay. Well, let's go back -- go to
disarming the Taliban's opponents. And by the way, this
has been reconfirmed in everything that I've read, both
official and unofficial. Are you trying to tell us now
that the State Department's policy was not, at that
crucial moment when the Taliban was vulnerable, to disarm
the Taliban's opponents? Did not Mr. Inderfurth and the
State Department contact all of the support groups that
were helping the anti-Taliban forces and ask them to
cease their flow of military supplies to the anti-Taliban
forces?

MR. EASTHAM: At that time we were trying to -- we were
trying to construct a coalition which would cut off
support for all forces in Afghanistan from the outside.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Oh, and I take it --- so I take it
that's a yes to my question. But the --

MR. EASTHAM: No, sir; you've left out the cutting off
the Taliban part.

REP. ROHRABACHER: -- but the Taliban were -- but the
Taliban were included; except what happened right after
all of those other support systems that had been
dismantled because of Mr. Inderfurth's and Mr.
Richardson's appeal, and the State Department's appeal?
What happened immediately -- not only immediately after,
even while you were making that appeal, what happened in
Pakistan? Was there an airlift of supplies, military
supplies, between Pakistan and Kabul and the forward
elements of the Taliban forces?

(Pause.) REP. ROHRABACHER: The answer is yes. I know.

MR. EASTHAM: The answer is --

REP. ROHRABACHER: You can't tell me because --

MR. EASTHMAM: The answer is --

REP. ROHRABACHER: -- it's secret information.

MR. EASTHAM: The answer is closed session, if you
would like to dredge up that record.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Right. Okay.

MR. EASTHAM: That would be fine.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Well, I don't have to go into closed
session because I didn't get that information from any
classified document. That information is available to
anybody watching the scene up there. They know exactly
what happened. Mr. Inderfurth, Mr. Bill Richardson, a
good friend of mine, doing the bidding of this
administration, basically convinced the anti-Talibans'
mentors to quit providing them the weapons they needed,
with some scheme that the Taliban were then going to lay
down their arms. And immediately thereafter, Pakistan
started a massive shift of military supplies which
resulted in the total defeat of the anti-Taliban forces.

This is -- now, this is either collusion or
incompetence on the part of the State Department, as far
as this congressman is concerned

Why haven't I been provided any documents about State
Department analysis of -- during the formation period of
the Taliban, about whether or not the Taliban was a good
force or a bad force? Why have none of those documents
reached my desk after two years?

MR. EASTHAM: Congressman, we were responding to a
specific request dealing with a specific time period,
which I believe the commencing period of the request for
documents was after the time period you're talking about.
We were asked to provide documents, by the chairman of
this committee, from 1996 to 1999.

REP. ROHRABACHER: I see. You found a loophole in the
chairman's wording --

MR. EASTHAM: No, sir. We were responding to the
chairman's request.

REP. ROHRABACHER: You found a loophole in the
chairman's wording of his request as to not to provide me
those documents.

You know, I am the only one here. I am not the
chairman of the committee. I would never get the
opportunity to have a back and forth with you, except in
times like this.

The State Department has taken full advantage of its
use of words in order not to get this information out. I
am looking forward to more documents. I will say this, I
have spent hours overlooking those documents, and there's
been nothing in those documents to persuade me that my
charges that this administration has been covertly
supporting the Taliban is not accurate.

Feel free to respond to that.

MR. EASTHAM: It's not true.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay.

MR. EASTHAM: I have to negate the whole thesis that
you're operating under, sir.

REP. ROHRABACHER: All right. Then -- okay, the other
option is the State Department is so incompetent that we
have done things that helped the Taliban and have put
them in a position of having hundreds of millions of
dollars of drug money, and had power in Afghanistan, and
undercutting the anti-Taliban forces. This is just --
this isn't intent, this is just incompetence?

MR. EASTHAM: That's a judgment you can make.

REP. ROHRABACHER: All right.

MR. EASTHAM: And if you want to make that judgment,
that's up to you, Congressman.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay.

MR. EASTHAM: I would just observe that it's
considerably more complex than that to deal with people
over whom we have so little influence as with Taliban. I
have spent -- I have been myself, by my count, six times
into Afghanistan on both the northern side and the
southern side. I have met innumerable times with Taliban
officials to attempt to achieve U.S. objectives, and I
have to tell you that it's a tough job.

REP. ROHRABACHER: I believe it is a tough job --

MR. EASTHAM: I'd like to introduce you to some of them
sometime.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Oh, I've met many Taliban, thank you.
And as you are aware, I have met many Taliban and talked
to them. Especially when you disarm their opponents, and
you participate in an effort to disarm their opponents at
a time when they're being supplied -- resupplied
militarily, I guess it is very hard for them to take us
seriously when we say we're going to get tough with them.

MR. EASTHAM: You keep saying that, but it's not true.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Well -- oh --

MR. EASTHAM: The effort --

REP. ROHRABACHER: You're just saying -- no, you're
just --

MR. EASTHAM: The effort was to stop the support for
all the factions.

REP. ROHRABACHER: That's correct. You didn't deny that
we disarmed their opponents, you just said we were doing
it with the Taliban as well. But as I pointed out, which
you did not deny, the Taliban were immediately resupplied.
Which means that we are part and parcel to disarming a
victim against this hostile, totalitarian, anti- Western,
drug-dealing force in their society, and we were part and
parcel of disarming the victim, thinking that the
aggressor was going to be disarmed as well, but it just
didn't work out -- at the moment when Pakistan was arming
them, I might add.

3) In the course of one
week Osama bin laden switched from saying he opposed the
9-11 destruction to saying he rejoiced in it. Emperor's
Clothes found this change a bit too convenient. See
"'Osama bin laden, Terrorist Monster,' TAKE TWO!"
by Jared Israel, at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/taketwo.htm

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