This
statement in my opinion suggests Moscow may be willing to concede
territories east of the Euphrates River to Western powers and their
Sunni/Wahhabist allies.

What's more, the situation is southern Syria, where Israel continues to rather openly support Islamic terrorists, seems to indicate Moscow may similarly be willing to concede territories bordering Israel and Jordan. And the growing semi-autonomy of Kurds in northern Syria
strongly suggests portions of northern Syria will be given up as well.
It remains to be seen if Tehran and Damascus will agree to such
concessions. Nevertheless, power-brokers overseeing Syria's
dismemberment and remodeling will essentially be Russia, Iran, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia and Anglo-American-Jews. While the aforementioned powers
figure out what to do with Syria, the Trump administration will continue
its efforts to gather regional support for its main objective in the
region - the containment of Iran.

The Trump administration's main objective, essentially a plan to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran, has not yet gained traction in the United States for one simple reason: It envisions better relations with Russia.Simply put: The traditional Russophobic establishment in the Western world will have none of it. There has therefore been a severe backlash, something no one in the Trump camp seemed to have anticipated.

The
anti-Russian hysteria playing out in the United States
recently has been astounding, intense, relentless and merciless. The political witch hunt, eerily reminiscent of McCarthy era hysteria,
rampaging throughout the United States in recent months has all but
extinguished the Trump administration's hope of reaching a détente with
Russia. To ensure the continuation of their anti-Russian hysteria indefinitely, they may have even silenced one of the individuals in the United States most probably involved in the DNC email hacking -

Former Trump adviser Steven Bannon answered the question posed above in a recent interview: The Trump presidency that we fought for, and won, is over.President Donald Trump never had a chance in my opinion. The
American empire is too large, too wealthy, too powerful, too global,
too multicultural and finally too set in its ways to change. All in all,
what has been happening in the United States in recent times is
astonishing. Despite its external luster and boasts of excellence and
exceptionalism, the country is actually seriously ill, deeply divided
and at war with itself. In fact, the country is in a civilizational decline.
Its aliment is thus internal and could therefore prove terminal.
Instead of seeking ways to cure its ailments, it is seeking
confrontations around the world. Instead of seeking ways to stop its
historic decline, it is vandalizing itself. Russia, China or Iran are not America's enemies. America should fear itself -

There
hasn't been this much political tension and infighting inside
Washington DC since the Civil War 150 years ago. American society has
not been this divided along racial and religious lines since the 1960s.
Actually, a lot of what's going on in the US today, like the unrest that took place during inauguration day, is unprecedented in its history. Although there has been dire predictions like civil unrest and major financial collapse or even total societal collapse
for the US in recent years, no one could predict the internal political
strife we are seeing the Washington DC today. This leads me to believe
we may finally be seeing the preliminary stages of the much awaited
implosion and/or downsizing of the American empire by forces that remain
way beyond our comprehension. The process in question may take years or
even tens-of-years, but I do believe it has started.
Nevertheless, the facade of American inadvisability and exceptionalism
is forever broken. American propaganda and hype, which was the empire's
greatest weapon, is now all but gone.

Somebody, somewhere is trying to tear the country apart. The United States has been turned into an ideological battlefield.The next four-to-eight years will be decisive for the country's future. Some of what's been happening in the United States actually reminds me
of the Soviet Union's last years.Which brings up an inevitable question: Is
the Trump camp struggling against the agenda to sow unrest in the country, or
are they actually part of the said agenda? Is President Donald
Trump America's Mikhail Gorbachev
(i.e. tasked with downsizing or restructuring the American empire) or
is he a selfless patriot trying to save America from the fate that was
met
by the Soviet Union? Thus far, a case can be made for
both arguments in my opinion. After all, globalist forces were behind
the rise of the Anglo-American-Jewish world order, the fall of the
Russian Empire, the rise of Bolshevism, the fall of communism and the
rise of a multicultural Western world.

All in all, it has been an amazing period in the history of the United States.The coming years will be
historic, as well as dangerous. Expectedly, it has also gotten a lot of reactions from Russian. Russians, including President Vladimir Putin, have made some stinging comments about the political unrest in the United States -

There
is no doubt that the Trump presidency is under siege by the country's
mainstream news media, political establishment (both Democrat and
Republican) as well as Russophobic elements in the deep state. What we are seeing play-out in the United States, is also, to a great degree, Jewish infighting. At its core, this historic fiasco can be characterized as left wing Jews fighting right wing Jews - with America's goyim left in the middle to choose a side. Even they admit it: Jews are divided over President Trump. Consequently, the United States today had become a deeply divided nation at war with itself. This historic mess, one that has forever tainted the American mystique,can
also be characterized as ideological clash between Western globalists
(which of course includes the Jewish left) who see Russia as their
number one enemy on the global stage and Western conservatives (which of
course includes the Jewish right) who see Russia as an entity that
should be contained but can also be negotiated with, and perhaps even
learn some lessons from as well.

Simply put: While Western conservatives look at Russia with caution, they also look at Russia with envy, if not genuine admiration. Western globalists on the other hand simply hate Russia because Russia has in recent years become an
outspoken champion of classical European civilization, conservatism,
ethnocentrism, Christianity, traditional family values and the
traditional nation-state. In other words, Russia today is the embodiment of anti-globalism. Russia today is also the leader of a growing wave of anti-globalist sentiments around the world. Nevertheless, it's somewhat ironic that in the past Western globalists tended to favor Soviet Russia and Western conservatives were known as the hardcore Russophobes. It's the exact opposite today.
As noted above, all the anti-Russian hysteria that the Trump
administration, as well as the Western public, is being subjected to
recently is primarily designed to stop President Trump from establishing
friendly ties with the Kremlin. It is also designed to keep Europe's
relations with Russia adversarial. Because Russia poses a serious risks
to their globalist agenda, they are doing all they can to keep Russia
underdeveloped, under pressure and under isolation. For these
Russophobes, Russians must therefore remain the bad guys and official
Moscow must not be appeased under any circumstances. And they have been
utilizing all their powerful levers of control to make sure this
happens. Thus far, it seems to be working. Despite the highly suspicious deaths,
the Globalist political/financial establishment in the
Anglo-American-Jewish world seem to be winning the battle over the
hearts-and-minds of the American cattle -

The political atmosphere in the United States has become utterly
toxic. The Trump administration cannot effectively conduct its foreign
policy under such circumstances. In the big picture, this essentially
means that the Trump administration's desire to establish closerties with Moscow to make its agenda against Iran (and China) easier will not succeed; at least not for the foreseeable future. The Trump administration may therefore be forced to deal with its foreign policy challenges without first disarming Russia.
If so, this will no doubt make the Trump administration's agenda
against Iran much more difficult and thus very risky. Official Tehran
understands this and they are getting ready for an inevitable showdown -

Consequently, the Trump administration is trying to rally international support behind his anti-Iran policy. In my opinion, this was what President Trump'sfirst official visit overseas all about.

At the bidding of Zionist and Wahhabist warmongers, and fears in the West that Tehran will one day soon obtain nuclear weapons, Uncle Sam is diligently trying to put together a regional force to counter Iran's growing influence
in the Middle East. Iran is the number one problem in the world today
for the Anglo-American-Jewish alliance and Saudi Arabia-led Gulf Arab
states. Had Iran been an easy target, they would have attacked it a very
long time ago. Iran's strength - political, demographic, cultural,
military and paramilitary - and thus its ability to hit back forcefully,
is the reason why they are still trying to figure out what is the best
approach to deal with Iran. Regardless, they will not let off. They will
do all they can to either stop the expansion of the Iranian Arc
and to stop Tehran's nuclear weapons program. If Tehran does not
abandon its regional ambitions willingly, they will sooner-or-later wage
war against it. The sword dancing in Saudi Arabia and the prayer at the so-called "wailing wall" in Jerusalem was all about laying the ground work for the agenda against Iran, and it was also meant to send Tehran a stern message.
The sudden problem Western and Saudi Arabian leaders have with Qatari
leaders suggest that Qatar may have become a weak-link in the budding
anti-Iranian alliance. Nevertheless, neoconservative warmonger Charles Krauthammermore-or-less admitted on television what many of us already know, they intendto drag Iran into a regional war. The first shots may have been fired. The recent unprecedented attacks in Tehran has profound implications -

Syria,
Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen are the places where they will do all they can -
which includes military intervention - to stop Iran's expansion and
smash pro-Iranian entities such as the Houthis and Hezbollah. They will
no doubt use terrorist related incidents in the Western world (which in my opinion are orchestrated in one from or another by Western and/or Israeli intelligence agencies)
to keep the Western cattle frightened and therefore compliant. They
will also use such incidents as an excuse for their military
interventions. I have no doubt Anglo-American-Jews and their Sunni Arab
allies will invade Syria at one point. Once they reach their objectives
in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, and if the current system of
government in Tehran remains in power in the meantime, they will turn
their deadly attention onto Iran itself.The
success or failure of their grand agenda to smash the Iranian Arc
hinges upon three fundamental factors: 1) Whether or not the Trump
administration is successful in it's effort to bring together Israel and
Gulf Arab states. 2) Whether or not President Trump's opponents at home
will sabotage the said effort. 3) How will Moscow (and Beijing) react.

Israel
and Saudi Arabia may unite. In fact, the two have been cooperating
behind-the-scenes for decades. But the hate towards the Trump
administration is so raw, so deep rooted and so wide spread in the
United States - especially now that one of the major Globalist agendas
of the day, The Paris Climate Accord,
has been outright rejected by President Trump - that the anti-Trump and
anti-Putin hysteria and witch hunt in the country will not be abated
any time soon. This therefore will cause problems for all of the Trump
administration's agendas, including that against Iran. Getting to
Russia: Although Moscow may acquiesce to some of the Trump
administration's wishes against Iranian interests in Syria, it will not
under any circumstances support a direct attack on Iran itself nor will
it take any steps to stop Tehran's nuclear program. Therefore, the Trump
administration's agenda in the Middle East is far from being a sure
thing. This
only means that the agenda against Iran will be very risky. In any
case, the desire to enlist Sunni Arab states into the
Anglo-American-Jewish campaign against Iran is the reason why the United States will not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capitol anytime in the near future.Lurking behind all this volatility in the Middle East is also the potential of very serious problems occurring inside Turkey. Turkey's belligerent president has been reorienting his country's politics and in doing so alienating his country's traditional supporters in the Western world. Predictably, various Kurdish factions, some of whom are backed by Anglo-American-Jews and some by Russians, have gained from this situation. The growing Kurdish factor in the region has become a major cause of concern for Ankara.
The Erdogan government's overly-aggressive behavior in recent times is
actually a sign that Ankara is feeling vulnerable. Having failed to
overthrow Erdogan's government with a revolution last summer, Western
powers will be seeking other means to bring the Turkish state back into
the Western orbit. Therefore, the more Turkey's autocratic leader drags
Ankara eastward, the more will Anglo-American-Jews pull his country
westward. If this tug-of-war over the country's fate continues for any length of time, Turkey's NATO membership - as well as its territorial integrity - will be in serious jeopardy.
Turkey can descend into chaos. What happens after that is anybody's
guess. In any case, anti-Erdogan voices in the West are on the rise and Moscow continues to conspire against Turkey -

As the reader can see, the region where Armenia is located continues to be a
volatile tinderbox. The various hot spots in the region are essentially
at the doorstep of the small, impoverished and landlocked country
surrounded by Turkic/Islamic predators, and the danger of a major war
igniting in the south Caucasus remains very real. In the big
geostrategic picture I always write about, this is essentially the
reason why Armenia's strategic alliance with Russia will be the single
most important factor in Armenian politics for the foreseeable future.
As the various fires burning in the region get more-and-more intense,
the importance of Russian-Armenian relations will increase
exponentially, not only for Yerevan but also for Moscow. This is why Russia will remain Armenia's reliable strategic partner and Yerevan's only source of support. This is why Moscow has a significant military footprint inside Armenia.The already very tense situation in the greater region where Armenia is located is made worst due
to the unresolved conflict between Yerevan and Baku. The historic
Armenian province of Artsakh has been an open wound that has been
festering for over 25 years now. And now there is growing sense of
urgency about it. With changing political and economic tides around
the world, many observers think Baku has only a few years (perhaps not
even that) to figure out what to do with Artsakh before it runs into
serious domestic problems. After 25 years of preparing its population
for war against Armenians, Baku is suddenly facing a rapidly shrinking
window of opportunity. The Azeri leadership may be fearing that if
they do not try to make good on their promises to retake Artsakh, they
may lose power in an uprising, especially now that Azerbaijan's economy
is very bad shape primarily due to a major slump in global energy
prices. Many therefore think that the next couple of years will be
dangerous. Although
a terrible war of attrition continues to play out along the line of
contact between Armenia and Azerbaijan, some predict large-scale military operations. The
fighting that took place during early April of last year (many
questions about which remain unanswered) may have somehow been related
to this calculus. What happened was not a full scale war. It was
more like heavy skirmish confined only to border regions. The fighting
could have been a trial run to assess Armenia's military capabilities
and political resolve. But, like I said, many questions remain
unanswered about the fighting. In any case, I believe Moscow's decision
to provide highly sophisticated ballistic missile systems
to Armenia, its first deployment outside of Russia, is also related to
the overall calculus. Moscow's move may have been a message to Baku to
back off. Nevertheless, the possibility that a major conflict can erupt
in the region is now a serious concern for Moscow. And the last thing
Russia needs right now is yet another hot-spot on its already volatile
and vulnerable southern periphery.

Our
Western-funded political activists and nationalist crazies claim that
Moscow is ready to return Artsakh to Azerbaijan and that it wants a war
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is a Russophobic lie.

Moscow's
primary goal in the south Caucasus is not to instigate a major war but
to bring all three nations - Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan - into
Russia's orbit. Yes, Moscow may use strong-arm tactics to realize this
goal. However, after
over twenty-five years of sociopolitical unrest, economic depression
and disastrous wars in the Caucasus, both north and south, a resurgent
Moscow is primarily seeking to reestablish Pax Russica. That is the end
game. Russian officials also know that Armenia, being their most
reliable ally in the region, is key to achieving
Russian dominance in the region. Being that Tbilisi will have
fundamental problems with Moscow for the foreseeable future due to
Russia's role in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and being that Azerbaijan
is a Turkic/Islamic nation, senior policymakers in Russia know that
Armenia's is their safest and most long-term center of operation. This
fact alone suggests Moscow will never abandon or undermine the Armenian.This does not however mean there will be no disagreements and/or technical problems between Russia and Armenia.

Speaking
of technical problems: While the status quo over Artsakh fit Moscow's
(and Yerevan's) interests, it is increasingly looking as if this is
beginning to change now. This change is in my opinion a direct result of Moscow
successfully reestablishing itself as a hegemon in the region. Allow me
to once more remind the reader that Russian control over both the north
and south Caucasus is of paramount strategic importance for Moscow. For
Russia, the Caucasus region has historically been known as its
vulnerable underbelly. Controlling it and pacifying it, both north and
south, provides Russia with a major defensive buffer against Western, Turkic and Islamic forces.With the situation in and around Artsakh getting progressively worst as a result of tensions in adjacent regions, as well as Baku's increasing desperation, the status quo in Artsakh may no longer be working in Moscow's favor, and this worries many Armenians.Russian
officials know that in the big picture, the south Caucasus is like a
three-legged chair: It can't function with one or more legs missing. Russian officials may be seeing that the unresolved dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan is indirectly hurting their plans for
Georgia. The thinking may therefore be that once the conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan is put to rest, bringing Georgia into Russia's
fold, making the three-legged south Caucasus chair whole once again,
will become easier. Making the EEU work is also a factor in all this.
For the Russian-led economic union to begin showing life, territorial
disputes involving Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have to be resolved
and the region has to come back under Russia's orbit. In my opinion,
these are the reasons why Russians officials have been doing their best
to maintain levers of control over Baku and Tbilisi and of course
Yerevan. These are also the reasons why Russian officials have been
engaging in efforts, albeit intermittent, to finally resolve the
lingering dispute over Artsakh.

This
worries many Armenians today because there is no way of knowing exactly
what a final settlement, when we eventually get to it, will look like.
The worry Armenians have is being made worst by malicious predictions
that "Moscow will betray Armenia once again". Needless to say, such
disinformation is being disseminated by nefarious Western-funded sources
that are embedded throughout Armenian society.

Those
of us who do not want any change to the status quo in Artsakh may be
happy to know that Anglo-American-Jewish, as well as Turkish interests,
will do their best to sabotage any unilateral effort by Moscow to
resolve the dispute. This is why Baku is being encouraged to remain on the offensive against Armenia and this is why Armenia's fifth-column is being asked to sabotage any Russian-led peace effort.The following is a Western look at the inherent complexities of the south Caucasus -

In my opinion, understanding
the geopolitical landscape of the south Caucasus at a profound level
and appreciating Moscow's role in it is absolutely crucial for us
Armenians for doing so will help us better navigate the turbulent waters that the coming years will most probably bring. Better understanding the political world we live in will also help
us better recognize opportunities when they present themselves and
exploit them when possible. It may be naive of me to wish for this, but I
want there to be a political culture among Armenians that is patriotic
yet also sober minded, pragmatic and farsighted. I also want Armenians
to understand that although the status quo in Artsakh has worked well
for us during the past 25 years, we may not be able to afford another 25
years of it. Armenia's main problem today is not its "oligarchs", as
our Western-funded activists desperately need us to believe, it's the
prevailing dysfunctional situation throughout the south Caucasusbrought upon by Western machinations.
Even if our oligarchs turned into lovely angels overnight, Armenia
would continue having severe problems. I want Armenians to realize that
what Armenia needs is lasting peace and stability in the south Caucasus.
I want Armenians to understand that peace and stability in the south
Caucasus, at least from Armenia's perspective, can only be brought by
Russia. Finally, I want Armenians to also understand that Armenia will
one day need to settle the dispute over Artsakh, and this may include
land concessions as well as stationing Russian troops between Armenians
and Azeris. Although that day seems a very long time away today, I have
no doubt that day will arrive sooner or later.

It
is therefore best to be ready and understand that when that day
arrives, the degree of concessions we Armenians will be expected to make
will essentially be determined by the capabilities of our diplomatic corps and the depth of our nation's ties with Russia.

The aforementioned thoughts and comments about Armenia and Artsakh will be a reoccurring theme throughout this blog commentary.
Helping the reader contemplate about the aforementioned inevitabilities
regarding the dispute over Artsakh is the main motivation behind this
work. Another motivation is to provide the reader some context to the
Artsakh conflict never discussed elsewhere. I would also like to engage
in, if at all possible, discussions about what a final negotiated
settlement with Azerbaijan can potentially or theoretically look like.
There will come a day when Yerevan and Baku will be expected to make
land concessions. Needless to say, I understand how sensitive this topic
is for us Armenians: How can we negotiate with bloodthirsty animals,
let alone pull back from strategically important territories under our
control? How can one give back anything that has been painstakingly won
by the precious blood of our heroic compatriots?

I
fully share such sentiments. I also however understand how politics
work. I am also all too familiar with our history, and the many grave
mistakes we have made as a people.

I
therefore want Armenians to understand that this subject is not a black
and white matter. I want Armenians to understand that there is no room
for maximalistic attitudes in politics. I want Armenians to understand
that this subject needs to be approached without emotions and without
preconceived notions. Going forward, I will share ideas but I will also
refrain from making absolute statements. I will suggest solutions but I
will leave many questions open ended. With the following passages, I
will simply try to promote a particular mindset, an attitude - a type of
political philosophy if I may - that is in my opinion necessary for
Armenians to posses within themselves for when that day arrives to
settle the dispute over Artsakh.October 27, 1999

Some
20 years ago Western interests in the south Caucasus seemed to be on
the verge of a historic breakthrough. After several years of actively
lobbying Armenian officials, by 1999 Washington seemed to have begun
making some headway. At least on the surface, official Yerevan seemed to
have begun accepting, at least preliminary, the basic principals of a
comprehensive peace plan put forth by the US State Department. This US
sponsored plan, known as the Goble Plan (named after it's mastermind, Paul Goble,
a State Department official with ties to the CIA), proposed to
"internationalize" a 10 kilometer wide corridor along Armenia's entire
southern border with Iran so that Western-financed gas and oil pipelines
could be passed from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan and beyond. In return,
the plan envisioned giving self-determination for Artsakh and billions
of dollars to Armenia in financial aid.Yerevan
was essentially being asked by Uncle Sam to give up its strategic
border with Iran for Artsakh and promises of some cash. Yerevan was also
being asked by Uncle Sam to break its ties with Russia and Iran. This
controversial proposal was devised in the early 1990s, at a time when
Armenia was barely alive, Russia was on its knees and Western powers
reigned supreme throughout the post-Soviet world. US officials actively
lobbied Armenian officials to convince them about the plan's perceived
benefits to Armenia and to the greater region. Some US officials even
seemed to have been given the task of winning Diasporan support. I
vividly recall attending a public meeting at an ARF community center on
the imperial East Coast, where a State Department deputy essentially
presented the tenets of Goble Plan and appealed to our community for
support. His talk predictably sounded like an infomercial. But what was
particularly interesting for me was that during the course of his
presentation, the official clearly insinuated that Turkey could be
convinced by the United States to return Mount Ararat to Armenia if the
proposed plan was accepted by Armenians. It was an amazing thing for
me to see an American official dangling Mount Ararat in front of us
Armenians as a magical bait, to encourage us to accept their plan.Well,
the young Irish-American official visiting us from Washington DC was
essentially heckled out of the building by the end of his talk. I still
remember him, his face reddened by frustration, grabbing his briefcase
and rushing off to his black automobile parked in front of the building.
Other American officials were said to have experienced similar
treatment in their meetings with other ARF chapters in the US. Their
failure with the ARF however did not deter them. Uncle Sam was also in the process of lobbying Armenian officials, seemingly with better results. They also knew they had support in the Hovnanian-financed Armenian Assembly of America.

Prime
Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Speaker of the National Assembly Karen
Demirjyan (arguably two of the most powerful and influential men in
politics in Armenia at the time) had meetings in Washington and Berlin
respectively in October, 1999. According to many international news
reports at the time, there were strong indications that official Yerevan
was seriously considering the proposals put forth by the US State
Department.Ultimately,
we weren't able to see if official Yerevan was indeed preparing to
break its fledgling ties with Moscow and Tehran at the time and allow
Western powers broker a peace deal between Yerevan and Baku. On the
morning of October 27, 1999, barely three weeks after Vazgen Sargsyan was in Washington, Strobe
Talbot, a US State Department official was in Yerevan holding a private
meeting with him. By the afternoon of that day, Vazgen Sargsyan, Karen
Demirjyan and several other Armenian lawmakers were dead. Gunmen had
burst into the Armenian Parliament and assassinated eight officials. The
controversial Goble Plan was never again publicly discussed by Armenian
officials.The
following blog commentary reflects my thoughts on the historic event
that took place in Yerevan on October 27, 1999. When reading the
commentary please pay particular attention to the article written by the
former Russian ambassador to Armenia in which he warns Armenians
against adopting the Goble Plan. Also read the Wall Street Journal
article lamenting the deaths of Vazgen Sargsyan and Karen Demirjyan-

Some
20 years ago was the closest Washington DC would come to settling the
dispute over Armenian Artsakh under its terms. Needless to say, it's a
different world today than it was
back in 1999 when Russian leader Vladimir Putin's FSB-backed gradual
rise to power had only begun to register tangible gains. Today, the
Russian Federation is a resurgent superpower. Today, Russia is back
being the alpha-and-the-omega of the Caucasus, a role it has dearly
earned during the past two hundred years. It is Russia today that stands
poised to broker a
final peace settlement in Artsakh. Fearing the further lose of their already
declining influence throughout the Caucasus region, Western powers are understandably
concerned. Understandably, Uncle Sam still wants to remain in the game,
especially since Central Asian energy supplies via Azerbaijan is still
of great strategic significance to Europe and Israel. Uncle Sam would therefore want's a real
say in any settlement process in Artsakh. Western powers
will therefore do what they can to sabotage any settlement brokered by
Russia. The escalation of violence on Armenia's border with Azerbaijan
may be related. Interestingly, the mastermind of the failed Goble Plan
never stopped fearing-mongering about Russia -

When
Armenia entered the Moscow-led EEU I predicted that Moscow will
gradually begin addressing the festering dispute between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. All the signs from Moscow point in that direction. Resolving
the dispute may have taken on an air of urgency in the Kremlin because
of the very explosive situations in Syria and Ukraine and the
potentially explosive situations in Turkey and Iran. Moscow does not
want to have another war-front opening up on its strategic - and still
very vulnerable - Caucasian underbelly. Although the status quo in
Artsakh is something Moscow can certainly live with, solving the always
explosive problem under its terms is more desirable and may better serve
Russia's longer-term interests in the region. This is why Western
powers are interested in sabotaging Russia's effort. In my opinion, this
is also why we had the assault on the police station in Yerevan last
summer.

July 17, 2016

When
Yerevan
shocked Western officials several years ago by announcing Armenia's membership in the Russian-led
EEU, I said it's only a matter of time before Western powers begin
appealing to the emotions of Armenian nationalists both in the homeland and
in the Diaspora in an attempt to drive a
wedge between Yerevan and Moscow. And when Moscow began signalling it was ready to broker a final settlement to the Artsakh dispute,
I knew something was going to happen. I knew Western powers would try
to make life very difficult for Armenia and sabotage any attempts by
Moscow to settle the dispute. I wish could say I was
wrong. Besides the monstrous and still mysterious murder of an entire family in Gymri by a Russian soldier in the winter of 2015 and the short but intense and still somewhat mysterious war that took place in spring of 2016, there has since been at least two revolution attempts in Armenia recently. The first attempt came during the summer of 2015, when Western-led opposition groups tried to take advantage of mass protests taking place in Yerevan. The effort proved unsuccessful. The second attempt, in my opinion, came on the morning of July 17, 2016. Five days before, on July 12, 2016, I had written the following in this blog's comments section:

"Back
in the late 1990s, the US had come very close to brokering a peace deal
between Yerevan and Baku. The deal in question would have most probably
been a variation of the now infamous "Goble Plan". The parliamentary
assassinations that took place on October 27, 1999 put a quick and
bloody end to it. Thank God. This time around, if the Russian plan is
not fully supported by the West, Western powers will most probably try
to sabotage the Russian brokered peace deal by appealing to the emotions
and sentiment of our "nationalistic" idiots. We already see our
"nationalists" acting hysterical." 17 years ago Russian intelligence services put an abrupt
end to the US-led negotiations process. Today, US intelligence services
are trying to do the same to the Russian effort."

On the morning of July 17, 2016 a couple of dozen armed men, mostly members of the extremist organization called Founding Parliament, stormed a police compound in Yerevan,
killing a policeman and taking several hostages. The gunmen, who
more-or-less presenting themselves as disgruntled nationalists, demanded
a number of things. Primary among their demands were the following: The
resignation of President Serj Sargsyan; the release of their jailed
leader Jirayr Sefilian; and an immediate end to any negotiation over
Artsakh. The gunmen also used social media to repeatedly call on the
general public to rise-up and overthrow their government. It was clearly
a coup d'état attempt.

Soon, Armenia's Western-funded news organizations, opposition activists and politicians were out in force spewing
anti-government and anti-Russian slogans. They were soon joined by
several thousand of their most faithful followers - mainly disgruntled
civilians, many of whom are professional demonstrators. The
demonstrations also began
attracting an assortment of hooligans from slums near Yerevan. Within
days, the unsanctioned street show had morphed into a gathering of
several thousand Western-funded activists, hardcore
nationalists, disgruntled seniors, young liberals and petty hooligans.
People who
normally would not even be able to locate Artsakh on a map were all of a
sudden on the streets shouting,"Aghdam is our homeland". People who
hated Armenians from Artsakh more than they hated Turks were suddenly
demanding that Armenia withdraw from peace negotiation with Azerbaijan.Other
than the usual number of well-known Western-funded activists and their
usual number of faithful followers, at most numbering several thousand,
there was no widespread uprising in the country.The unsanctioned demonstrations gradually died down after their initial intensity, and flareups that occurred at times were quickly contained by law-enforcement. The
standoff between the extremists and
Armenian security officials came to an end when a number of the
assailants were
deliberately wounded by government marksmen and the rest were
persuaded to give up. A number of other individuals who were not
involved in the actual takeover of the police compound, some with ties
to the Western world, were also apprehended and jailed.

In the end, Armenians had not taken to the
streets en masse in support of the extremists and none
of the extremist's demands were met by official Yerevan. However, the
damage was done in another sense. Armenia's burgeoning tourism industry,
something the country is very dependent on, suffered and Armenia looked
like a troubled little third world country on the verge of implosion.
American and European officials wasted no time in calling on their
Armenian counterparts to abstain from using force against the militants
and their supporters - although under similar circumstances they
themselves would have resorted to much harsher forms of violence.
Official Yerevan looked vulnerable in the eyes of Moscow. Tragically, the
only thing the extremists, who were said to have taken up arms to save
Artsakh (from imaginary phantoms), managed to do was kill Armenians and
make Armenia look like a banana republic on the
international stage.

In my opinion, there was more to the unrest in Yerevan last summer than
meets the eye. What took place on July 17, 2016 was a version of what
took place on October 27, 1999 - but in reverse.

Ever since Armenia first signaled its willingness to join the EEU,
Armenian news media and Armenian cyberspace in general has been flooded
with slogans like, "Russia is taking over Armenia". More recently, the
slogans had morphed into, "now that Putin has fully
occupied Armenia, he will give Artsakh back to the Azeris". Moreover, the dangerous notion that Armenians can solve all of Armenia's problems simplyby uniting had also been gaining fast traction among Armenia's self-destructive peasantry.
It was a medley of these types of attitudes, and most probably tacit
support by foreign intelligence services, that led the group of
extremists in Armenia to
carryout their criminal act.

It should also be noted that the coup came on the heals of a larger US-backed military coup in neighboring Turkey.
Being
that Jirayr Sefilian and his circle are funded from abroad, most probably by US and/or European
intelligence
agencies, it's not a stretch of
the imagination to conclude that their
criminal act last summer was blessed if not outright ordered by Western
intelligence agencies. Being that nationalists, in any given society,
tend to be predisposed to irrationality and extremism, I
have repeatedly warned that Western powers will begin working with our
nationalists to drive a wedge between Yerevan and Moscow. I have
repeatedly warned that Western powers will begin using our nationalists
to derail any Russian-led settlement plan.

In my opinion, Yerevan's "complimentary politics", where Armenian officials try play both sides of the geopolitical
fence, got Armenia to this point. I recognize that
this approach to East-West relations worked well for Yerevan while
the Russian Federation was weak and incapable of imposing its political will within its near
abroad. However, what we all now need to recognize is that the
geopolitical climate of the south Caucasus, as well as of the world, has changed drastically since the time
when Yeltsin the Drunk was in power in Moscow. Today, Russian power and
influence has been reinstated throughout much of former Soviet
territory. Today, the continuation of complimentary politics, if carried out without Moscow's approval, will keep
Armenia stagnant at best and vulnerable to collapse at
worst. In my opinion, what happened in Armenia last summer was a direct assault against attempts by Moscow to settle the Artsakh dispute. It's results however are not as
discernible as the one that took place on October 27, 1999.

Why do Russians want control over the south Caucasus and what does it mean for Artsakh?

Political
predictions are difficult even in the best of times. During times of
major political changes around the world, politics can be extremely
unpredictable. It's becoming very difficult to write on political
matters these days because of the speed with which things are changing
and unexpected turns they are taking. At its core, the periodic
sociopolitical upheavals we have seen take place in Armenia in recent
years has little to do with the dislike Armenians have towards President
Sargsyan and even less with democracy or the rule of law in the
country. The unrest we have been seeing in Armenia recently has
everything to do with Russia's ties to Armenia and the West's desire to
drive a wedge between Yerevan and Moscow. For Western powers the
problem with Armenia is not that it is not a "democracy" as many of
their favorite allies around the world are not democracies. The
fundamental problem Western powers have with Armenia is Russia's
military presence in the country. If Armenia had been hosting an
American military base instead, Armenia's "oligarchs" would do no wrong
in the eyes of Uncle Sam. Because Armenia hosts a Russian military
presence, Armenia's oligarchs therefore cannot do anything right. It's
that simple.

The
primary concern in Western capitals is that Moscow is becoming too
powerful throughout Eurasia and beyond. This threatens their
long-standing strategy of containing a geopolitical behemoth like Russia
(as well as rising powers like China and Iran). This also threatens
their ability to freely exploit central Asian energy.
They are justified in their concerns. Moscow has become the sole
power-broker in the south Caucasus. It is therefore expected that it
would be devising plans to bring the entire region back under its fold.

Throughout
its one thousand year old history Russia has been surrounded by
powerful enemies that have coveted its vast and bountiful territory.
Consequently, Russians have been forced to fight-off various invading
empires throughout much of their history. Just within the last century
alone Russia suffered immense devastation, losing tens-of-millions of
its sons and daughters to foreign instigated wars and revolution. More
recently, its been forced to face economic collapse, NATO expansion and
an Islamic insurgency. Russians know all too well that Russia's enemies
still exist and they still covet its territory. Russians also are cognizant of the fact that their enemies still surround them. These
are the historic circumstances that have molded the modern Russian
mindset - and these circumstances have a direct bearing on political culture/mindset prevalent in the Kremlin today. This
is the reason why Kremlin officials look at places like eastern Europe,
central Asia and the south Caucasus as strategically important zones
that need to remain within the Russian orbit. This is why Russians
officials have reacted so forcefully to Western-instigated wars in the
Ukraine and Syria. This is why nations like Armenia, Belarus and
Tajikistan are members of Russian-led organizations like the CSTO and
EEU.

Simply
put: Russians have been bred by historic circumstances they have been
subjected to for hundreds of years to be resilient, warlike and
patriotic. Russians feel, and rightfully so, that their vast and
bountiful country is being besieged by powerful opponents. They are
therefore farsighted, proactive, aggressive and always on the defensive.
The aforementioned are aspects of the modern Russian psyche that is
least understood by non-Russians. Which is why Russian actions always
seem to catch Western powers by surprise.

Russia's land borders, which borders 16 nations and stretches for well over 12,000 miles, does not have natural barriers. Russia's southern regions, in particular, which straddles the Turkic/Islamic world, does not have much strategic depth. Dangers in the region have the potential therefore to directly threaten the Russian heartland. Throughout history Russian leaders have therefore sought to
establish buffer states around the Russian mainland. This
is why Russian leaders have looked at the Caucasus, both north and
south, as a strategic buffer protecting the Russian heartland. This
is why when Moscow sensed a serious threat in Georgia in the summer of
2008, it did not hesitate to take military action. We have also seen
Moscow take similar proactive military stances in Syria and Ukraine more
recently. Fundamentally, it all has to do with Moscow's fears over
Russia's lack of defensive depth. Maintaining sufficient strategic depth
- i.e. stopping threats far from Russia's borders - is a problem that
has kept Russian leaders busy for centuries. The matter in question has become a fundamental part of their defense doctrine.

Russians know that losing the southCaucasus
will directly threaten Russia's hold over the north Caucasus. Needless to say, Russians know that losing
the north Caucasus will directly threaten the Russian mainland. Therefore,
we should all have by now come to the realization that Russia's
southern border essentially begins in the south Caucasusand Russia will do everything it can to maintain a powerful presence in the region.

For
Russian leaders, the importance of controlling the Caucasus cannot
therefore be overstated because, as noted above, its loss can lead to the weakening of
the Russian state, and even perhaps lead to its fragmentation one day. The Caucasus therefore plays a very vital role for Kremlin policymakers.The problem here is that all of Russia's opponents today - Westerners, Jewry, Turks and
Islamists - also know this. After all, wrestling the strategic
Caucasus from Russian control was the reason behind the Chechen wars of the
1990s, when virtually all of Russia's opponents mentioned above played a
role in it. It is therefore no secret that when it comes to eastern Europe, central Asia and the Caucasus,
Moscow will spare no effort in securing the regions militarily and
bringing them back into its fold economically and politically.

Recently,
Moscow's plan to bring the south Caucasus back into its orbit has been
given renewed priority due to three factors: 1) With Russia resurging as
a power throughout the region, Russian officials may be thinking it's
high time to reinstate their control over the region that that they
consider part of Russia's orbit. 2) With the surge of major wars in adjacent regions, Russian
officials fear that conflict may also spill into the south Caucasus. 3)
Russian officials also fear that Baku's war of attrition against
Armenia, as well as its increasing economic problems, may ignite a major
war in the south Caucasus.

Russian officials know that in case of a major war, say in Turkey or Iran, the south Caucasus
can act as a forward fortress and provide Moscow the defensive depth that it
desperately needs along its vulnerable underbelly.It was therefore expected that Moscow would begin paying
more attention to the unresolved disputes that exists within territories that it see as part of its sphere of influence. Needless to say, the dispute over Artsakh is one of the region's main problems at this time.

While the status quo in Artsakh served Moscow's interests during the
past two decades, it is now increasingly looking as if this will not be the case much longer. Having returned to the
south Caucasus after many years of absence, Moscow will not want an
open wound getting in the way of its plans for the region. Moscow may therefore try to force a peace settlement on Yerevan and Baku. Despite opinions to the contrary, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan will no doubt end one day. It's only a matter of time. And that is when
things might get a little complicated for Armenia.

I
personally believe that Artsakh's unification with Armenia will
eventually happen, and it will happen with Moscow's blessing, be it
overt or covert. Russia will continue being Armenia's closest and most
trusted partner for well into the foreseeable future. However, while
Russian officials look upon Armenia as a reliable ally in a very
strategic but anti-Russian environment, they also desire to see Baku
come back into Russia's political and economic orbit. Azerbaijan's
location - situated on Central Asian energy distribution conduits and
acting as a buffer zone between Russia and Iran - makes Baku
strategically valuable for Moscow, as well as other regional interests.
Russian officials know that Western powers, Turkey, Israel and Iran have
been courting Baku for the past 25-plus years. Moscow cannot afford
losing Baku to them. This is why Moscow has been doing its best to
maintain leverage over Baku, and this is why Moscow has been very
cautiously walking a tightrope between Armenia and Azerbaijan in recent
years.

While we Armenians can expect Russians to
continue securing
Armenia's (including Artsakh's) existence on a grander, strategic
level, we cannot expect (nor should we want) Russians to turn
their backs on Azerbaijan. Moscow cannot risk turning Azerbaijan into a
center of Western or Turkic/Islamic operations. This means, while Moscow may ultimately be inclined to support Artsakh's reunification with Armenia, that does not mean Moscow will support Armenian claims over all of the territories taken outside of the internationally recognized boundaries of Artsakh. It also means, Moscow may eventually want to station troops between Armenians and Azeris.Having
established leverages over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moscow is currently trying to assess how far Armenians and Azeris would be willing to bend to make a final peace settlement possible. A lot of proposals are being thrown
around and formulas are being devised. A lot of closed-door meetings are taking place. A lot of trial balloons are being floated. Moscow
has not attempted to force the issue thus far because it realizes just
how sensitive the matter is in Yerevan and Baku. Imposing a settlement
from above runs the risk of toppling both the Armenian and Azeri
leadership. Moscow is therefore playing it patiently, but it will remain
persistent and may yet make a concerted push if it senses an
opportunity. That day may be some time away.

Nevertheless, in the meanwhile, weneed to learn to ignore
the fear-mongering being carried-out by Armenia's Western-led political
opposition activists and Western-supported propaganda outlets like
"Hetq", "Gala", "Lragir", "Azatutyun Radio" and others. In other words: Russia is not
getting ready to sell Armenia or Artsakh to anyone, let alone to Turks or Muslims. Moscow is simply
working behind-the-scenes to try to settle the dispute between Yerevan
and Baku. This is natural. This is expected. This is good. It remains
to be seen how successful Moscow will be. The Artsakh knot will not be
an easy one to undo because both sides of the dispute essentially claim full ownership to the land,
although the Armenian side is, at least ostensibly, open to
negotiations.

Putting
it mildly, the mood in Baku is not receptive to a peace settlement at
this time. And may not be so for a while, because for 25-plus years
Azeri officials seeded their country with extreme forms of
anti-Armenianism. Azerbaijan's younger generation, in particular, has
been raised solely on anti-Armenian propaganda as well as repeated
promises that Karabakh will be liberated by Azerbaijan's powerful
military. In fact, Azeri officials have used the fear and hate of
Armenians among the Azeri population to justify their massive military
spending. How can Baku now stop all this and simply tell its people that
the time has come to make a peace deal with Armenians without risking
serious internal political unrest? Baku is therefore stuck in a very bad
situation of its own making.

This
is why I think there will be another round of fighting, which the Azeri
side will surely lose. But, eventually, inevitably, one way or another,
and despite what the Armenian Diaspora wants, there will come a
juncture where both Armenians and Azeris will be faced with an
opportunity to settle their differences.
Until we get to that juncture, how well Armenia's military is able to
fend-off Azeri military incursions that will be periodically coming its
way will be crucially important to setting the right kind of attitude
ahead of any future negotiations. Once we get to that juncture, the political unity of Armenians and the exploitative capabilities of Armenia's diplomatic corps will thereafter be a determinant factor in the dispute's final settlement.

Speaking of manipulating and exploiting circumstances towards political gains, I'd like to add the following: It is no secret that I am often angered by the presence of extremist groups and Western-financed activists
in Armenia. I see such pro-Western and/or anti-Russian groups in
Armenia as long term risks. I often characterize them as cancerous cells
in the Armenian body. But, my intellectual objectivity, as well as my
healthy dose of cynicism, allows me to also look at this matter from another
angle.I mentioned in one of my previous blog commentaries that there was a "silver lining" to all the political unrest we have seen in Armenia.

In the spirit of, "never let a serious crisis go to waste", I believe last summer's coup attempt can be used by Armenian officials to strengthen Armenia's position during negotiations.

It goes without saying that Founding Parliament, a small but vociferous organization, is
a foreign-funded operation. It goes without saying that its
rank-and-file is for the most part anti-Russian. It also goes without
saying that what its members tried to pull-off last summer was a coup
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to sabotage any potential peace
talks with Baku that would involve land concessions. However, there is
also a good possibility that Armenia's National Security Services (NSS) had informants working in Founding Parliament or that the organization was actually penetrated by NSS agents.

With
that in mind, consider this: There
were some strange aspects to last summer's coup attempt. This leads me
to suspect that elements within Armenia's security apparatus may have
somehow been involved in orchestrating the incident. At the very least,
they may have simply allowed it to happen. I say this because the
leading militants involved in the coup were all well-known to security
officials because they were members of Founding Parliament and were
constantly making threats against the Armenian government. It was widely
known that the organization and its members were under surveillance by
Armenia's NSS. I therefore refuse to believe that the militants were
able to organize such an operation - involving more than two dozen armed
men - without the government's knowledge. Moreover, a number of
militants involved in the incident had at the time recently come to
Armenia from abroad (including from Russia) and a number of these were
quickly released after the two week standoff ended. There was a
mysterious death of a policeman. Varuzhan Avetisyan, the commander of
the militants seemed to enjoy an unusually warm relationship with
security officials. But the most suspicious aspect of the coup attempt
in my opinion was security officials allowing the militants to have what
seemed to be unrestricted access to social media, which the militants
gladly used to make their demands publicly know.

The
stranger aspects of last summer's ordeal may not have been due to
incompetence of Armenian officials after all. There is a very good
possibility that the extremist group was manipulated or goaded into
doing what it did by Armenian security officials. At the very least,
law-enforcement officials may have stood-down and allowed the militant
group to carryout their plan. In hindsight, it is beginning to look as
if the militants unwittingly became pawns in a much bigger chess game
than they could have possibly imagined. Founding Parliament crazies
therefore cannot be given any credit for anything other than being
unsuspecting dupes. The credit in my opinion goes to Armenian
authorities.

It is very possible that official Yerevan allowed the situation to get
to the point that it did to show the world that Armenia cannot
risk ceding lands to Azerbaijan.By
pointing to the extremists in the country (regardless of who they are
funded by) official Yerevan can show Russians, Westerners and
Azeris/Turks alike that Armenians are violently opposed to pulling back
from any territory in Artsakh that is currently under Armenian control.
By making Russian officials know that Western-funded groups in Armenia
are growing in strength, official Yerevan can force Moscow's hand and
make it play a more proactive role inside Armenia. I admit that this is a
very delicate and dangerous game and that it can seriously backfire.

This reminds of the words of the great German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche:
That which does not kill us makes us stronger.So, in a sense, Armenia is stronger today because its
extremists and Western-led activists have not succeeded in killing it. Regardless of who or what was behind it, the
crisis that afflicted
Armenia last summer has the potential now to make the country stronger.
Everyone now - including Russians, Americans and Azeris - have gotten a
little taste of what can happen if official Yerevan is even perceived as
being too giving in terms of land concessions. I firmly believe that
the crisis Armenia endured will at the very least give Armenian
officials an upper hand in any negotiations over Artsakh. I also believe
that it may force Armenian officials to begin reconsidering their
management - or rather mismanagement - of the country.

I
am of course speculating. I admit I may be reading too much into the
incident. I may therefore be wrong about this. However, I do nonetheless
believe that if properly manipulated and exploited by national security
officials, extremist groups in the country can be helpful for Armenia
in two fundamental ways: By forcing Moscow's to become more active
inside Armenia and by helping strengthen Armenia's hand during
negotiations over Artsakh. Needless
to say, more needs to be done to manipulate existing circumstances and
situations today to help bring about and mold circumstances and
situations that are more conducive to Armenian interests. More needs to
be done to manipulate the political landscape in Moscow to derive
benefits for Armenia and Artsakh.

This
needs to be done because Armenians cannot expect Russians to uphold
every single one of Armenia's interests - especially in the absence of
Armenian lobbying efforts in Moscow. Yes, Russia will ensure Armenia's
existence as a nation-state, but the particulars of that existence, like
exact boundaries, will be determined by how well Armenians are able to
manipulate the political process. Therefore, a deep understanding of
regional affairs, pragmatic nationalism, disciplined militarism,
political foresight and being proactive in Moscow are all essential for a
positive outcome.

We Armenians also need to be cognizant of the fact that there is
absolutely no room for maximalistic or extremist attitudes in politics.
Politics is not a zero-sum game. Such approaches can only lead to defeat
and destruction. There are many examples from around the world.

In fact, there are many examples right from our own experience. One
such example is the rigidity of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
(ARF) during the time of the First Republic. Hoping that the French and
the British will eventually come to their rescue from thousands of miles
away, the ARF-led government at the time stubbornly refused to
negotiate with the newly established Bolshevik government in Moscow. Although
Russia's Bolsheviks were essentially Armenia's neighbors and their
power was gradually expanding throughout the Caucasus, Armenia's
government was instead looking to distant France and Britain for
salvation. In other words, Armenians at the time had no real
understanding of the political world they lived in. They had therefore
hopelessly cornered themselves with their ideological extremism. In
fact, not only was Armenia, essentially a failed state at the time, in a
state of war with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia's leadership
was also agitating against Bolsheviks. Needless to say, there was no
Western cavalry coming to Armenia's rescue. Needless to say, Armenia
were in no condition to fight anyone. The battle of Sardarapat, by
international standards of the time, was a skirmish. Turks would have
come back with a larger, more lethal army. In the end, Armenia may have
lost more lands than necessary. Thankfully, Bolsheviks took over what
was left. Thankfully, due to the Bolshevik presence in the south
Caucasus, Turks stayed away. In the big picture, the losses of Kars,
Ardahan, Nakhijevan and Artsakh were due to catastrophic failures in
Armenia's foreign policy. In my opinion, had we had pragmatic leaders
with foresight and a good understanding of the political world they
lived in, at least some of those lands would have been saved. It is
troubling that even today many Armenians, due to their arrogance, pride
and political illiteracy, refuse to learn from their history.

We as a people need to be firm, yet also be willing to bend where needed. We need to be aggressive, yet also seek peace. Most
important of all, we need to realize that the south Caucasus needs
Russian stewardship if Armenia is to come out of its 25 year nightmare.
We Armenians must understand that we cannot afford to live through
another 25 years of what we have lived through. This time around,
Armenian officials are not my concern. I believe Armenia's foreign
ministry is capable of doing the right thing in this regard. I say this
because Russian-Armenian ties are now quite deep and for the most part
institutionalized. Moreover, I believe Russian forces are in Armenia for
the long-term. What concerns me therefore are Armenia's Western-backed
political activists and nationalist crazies, as well as our armchair
generals in the Diaspora, who from the comforts of theirs homes make
daily calls for war against Azerbaijan and Turkey.

We
as a people must in principal be ready for serious negotiations with
Azerbaijan. We must accept that such talks may entail land concessions.
Needless to say, we must enter such talks from a position of strength.
In my opinion, a position of strength for Armenia means a very capable
military and a very deep alliance with Moscow. While Armenia's military
needs to be its tactical advantage on the battlefield, Yerevan's ties
with Moscow must be made its strategic advantage on the global
chessboard. Nevertheless, we as a people must be willing to talk and
seriously consider land concessions if (I emphasize if) there is a
genuine opportunity for peace one day.
The particulars of land concessions is altogether another topic of
discussion, although I touch upon the subject a little later in my
commentary. What I am essentially trying to say here is that at least in
principle we as a people need to be ready to negotiate a comprehensive
peace settlement.

At
the end of the day, Armenia must have peace with its neighbors. Yes, I
wholeheartedly believe that. The reason why Armenia is as backward and
vulnerable as it is today is because the Turkic/Islamic region where
Armenia unfortunately finds itself has not had sustained periods of
peace for hundreds of years. Anyone that has read this blog knows that I
am under no illusions whatsoever about Armenia's neighbors. Moreover, I'm still of the mindset that if Armenia is to ever breakout of its desolate mountainous prison it needs access to the Black Sea and/or common borders with Russia.If the time is right, that is if Azerbaijan, Turkey and/or Georgia descend into serious internal problems,
I would wholeheartedly support a war that would bring Armenia to the
Black Sea or to the borders of Russia. Needless to say such, if the time
comes to embark on such an endeavor, it must be coordinated with Russia. Such an opportunity could have presented itself several years ago.I spoke about it at the time. Such an opportunity may still come. Therefore, it's all in the timing. Geopolitical circumstances of the times will determine whether there will be peace or war. We
can't however sit back and simply wait for such a war because it may or
may not come. But, what we know for sure is that without peace in the
south Caucasus, Armenia will continue to stagnate. If we don't have a
major regional war in the nations noted above to try to exploit, we
then need to have peace. What I'm simply saying here is that I want
Armenians to be as ready for peace as they are for war. I want
Armenians to always be politically aggressive yet always seek peace as
well. As I said above, my concern is not Armenia's leadership. My
concern is our extremists on both sides of the political spectrum: Our
nationalist warmongers are a problem just as much as our self-hating liberal peaceniks.

Yes,
it is a very difficult/nuanced approach to Armenia's regional
challenges, but we don't have any other options in my opinion. Simply
put: Too much militarism will hurt Armenia, too much anti-militarism
will also hurt Armenia. In the long run, however, peace, normal
neighborly relations, has to be somehow achieved in the south Caucasus
if only for Armenia's longevity and well being.
I know I'm not making friends saying any of this but making friends was
never a motivation behind this blog. I simply want the reader to
rationally think about what's begin said here even if he or she
disagrees.

Since Armenians have a bad habit of comparing Armenians to Jews and
therefore Armenia to Israel, allow me to also say this: Even "almighty"
Jews were made to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip
by their closest and most faithful ally, the United States. Even Jews
cannot outright annex the West Bank because of objections by their
American allies. Allow me to remind the reader that Jews also shed their
precious blood in the occupation of these lands. Moreover, even Jews,
who for the most part control American foreign policy, have not yet been
able to get the US to attack their existential threat, Iran. Jews
who number in the tens-of-millions around the world and control much of
the world's financial wealth, as well as politics in Washington DC, are
not maximalistic in their political aspirations in the Middle East and
they don't play a zero sum game. Yet, here we are - a tiny,
dispersed and disorganized people with a tiny, dependent, impoverished
and landlocked country - not only insisting we will not pull back from a
single plot of land, but we are also demanding more lands from
Azerbaijan (and Turkey), and we waste no opportunity to accuse Russia of
treason for not attacking Azerbaijan on Armenia's behalf. So, yes, we
Armenians do exhibit crazy mountain people traits.

Success in Artsakh is dependent upon the depth of Armenia's ties with Russia

I repeat: Even almighty Israel was forced to
cede territory to its enemies. Even God's so-called "chosen" has given up territory for peace with neighbors that still hate it. Even Zionists cannot outright annex the West Bank or move the Israeli
embassy to Jerusalem. Even organized Jewry has been unsuccessful in
getting its most faithful ally attack Iran. Israel also desperately need defensive depth. Yet, of all the territories that
the Israeli military
occupied in the 1967 war, the only territory Tel Aviv would not give up
under
any circumstances is the Golan Heights. Even
Russians, who as I pointed out previously are always very concerned
about their nation's defensive depth, are at times forced to pull back.
Even Russians are at times forced to put their national interests on
hold. That is why after liberating Crimea, Moscow did not make a direct
move on the rest of Novorossiya.
Did Moscow fear Ukraine? No. Did Moscow fear that NATO might get
involved? Not really. Simply put: Moscow assessed that the time for
bringing Crimea back under its fold was perfect, but it concluded that
the time for Donbass was not yet ripe.

We
see two of the world's most powerful nations conceding territory to
their enemies purely for sound geopolitical reasons. There are many such
examples around the world.So, what makes us Armenians think we are different?

We need to put to sleep the Qaj Nazar that dwells inside us. We
also need to put to sleep that cat inside us that likes to see a lion
every-time it looks into the mirror. Politics is a game of chess.
Politics is a game of give and take. Politics is a game that is played
by pragmatic people with intelligence, wisdom and foresight. There is no
room for maximalistic attitudes in politics. There is no room for
emotions in politics. I agree that Baku is currently in a war-footingand cannot therefore be expected to negotiate a genuine peace settlement. I agreethat real peace is still far away. As I have said, we may even see another round of major fighting before things finally settle down. However, what I want the reader to understand is that the time for peace will eventually come and when it does it will be brokered by Moscow.When that time arrives, and we'll know when it does, we Armenians will need to be ready for concessions.

When
we eventually get to it, the final settlement phase, that which will
involve concessions, may prove to be one of the most difficult parts of
the decades old dispute over Artsakh. Besides the current wide gap
between Yerevan's and Baku's take on the matter, I have no doubt that
problems will also be caused by all parties involved: Russians,
Westerners, Turks, Azeris, Islamists, Jewry, Iranians, Georgians,
Armenian nationalists, Armenia's political opposition, the Armenian
Diaspora... as well as Armenians that blame Artsakh (and its people) for
all of Armenia's problems (believe me, such garbage exists in bigger
numbers than one would think).

Despite it all, we must recognize that Moscow is the primary
power-broker in the south Caucasus. Being that Moscow is also Armenia's
strategic partner, we must recognize that Moscow holds the keys to
Armenia's successes in Artsakh. In other words: if Armenians are smart
enough to recognize Moscow's hegemony in the Caucasus region and work to
harness the potential of its strategic alliance with the Russian Bear,
Artsakh will fair well. If not, we may have to deal with some unpleasant
situations.

That
said, Baku's ties to Western powers, Israel and Turkey and its
hardstand regarding Artsakh will work in Yerevan's favor. Yerevan's
flirtations with Western powers and the seeding of anti-Russian hysteria
in Armenia may work in Baku's favor. If Yerevan remains firmly within
the Russian orbit, begins containing its Western-financed fifth column
and begins working on deepening Russo-Armenian relations, then Artsakh
proper, all of it, will remain part of Armenia. Regarding the "7
territories" outside of Artsakh proper: From a personal, Armenian
perspective, I would rather not want us pulling back from any of the
territories in question. The Azeri occupation of Nakhijevan, Shahumyan
and parts of Martakert is bad enough. I would actually like to see these
territories brought back to Armenia one day. The south Caucasus is very
cluttered. Armenia's has virtually no defensive depth. So, yes,
territorial expansion (especially towards the Black Sea and/or Russia)
should be in the hearts and minds of all Armenians around the world.
That said, there may come a time for us to pull back from some of the
said territories currently under our control.

If Baku is genuinely interested in ending hostilities with Yerevan, I don't see a problem with Armenian troops, for instance,
withdrawing from Aghdam. I
am merely suggesting. Aghdam for recognition. Perhaps Fizuli for
Shahumyan. From the perspective of realpolitik, such a deal, if
achieved, would be a major victory for Armenia. I also don't see any problems with stationing Russians troops between Armenians and the Azeris. As
I mentioned, Armenia does not have defensive depth. In real military
terms, Armenian control over a region like Aghdam does not in real
military terms solve this problem. Russian troops can thus act as
Armenia's defensive depth on Armenia's eastern front, as they do on
Armenia's western front. I therefore have no problems with having
Moscow place its peacekeepers between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I also
have no problems with Armenian forces pulling back from some territories
- if (I emphasize if) Baku is genuinely willing to reciprocate such a
move by Armenia by recognizing Artsakh's reunification with Armenia.

However, what cannot under any
circumstances be discussed (i.e. Armenia's red line) is return of Azeri
"refugees" and pulling back from Karvajar and Berdzor regions. There are
things that simply cannot be a subject for discussion. The international community needs to know that there things that we
as a nation are willing to go to
war over.In principal, the Armenian side must be willing to negotiate and discuss
concessions. Why? Essentially because Azeris are not ready or able to do the same.
Official Baku has fostered a culture of hate and extremism with regards
to Armenians. It will therefore be very difficult, if not outright impossible, for Baku
to negotiate anything with Armenians. Baku has therefore cornered itself into a
position where it has no choice but to be maximalistic. The political rigidity in Baku is a key advantage
for Yerevan. Let Baku look like the party not willing to negotiate. Let Russian
officials view Baku as the primary party undermining their ambitions in the
south Caucasus.By showing the international community, particularly Moscow,
that Yerevan is ready and willing to make a deal whereas Baku is not,
the pressure from Moscow will automatically be placed on Baku. If however official Yerevan
listens to our armchair generals in the Diaspora and extremist chobans in Armenia and therefore adopts their
irrational attitudes, Moscow will place pressure on Yerevan as well.

Ultimately, the important thing for us here of course is getting the
kind of deal we want. This in my opinion is contingent upon how
effectively we lobby Russians. The key to our success lies in the effort
we put into explaining to our Russian partners the importance of
keeping Artsakh fully under Armenian administration. An intelligent
approach to the matter would be to somehow convince Kremlin officials
that Armenian control over all of Artsakh serves Russia's regional
interests. In other words: Making Russians believe that it is in
their interests to have Armenians not only control Artsakh proper but
also its surrounding territories. How this can be done, I'll leave to
the talents of Armenia's leadership. However, this is the kind of
problem solving we need to engage in as a people. This is the kind of
mindset we need in Yerevan and in the Armenian Diaspora.

That said, we will fail miserably
if we do what our "nationalistic" idiots tend to do during times like
this - which is to turn against Russia and get the self-destructive urge
to try to establish a ծովից-ծով Հայաստան.Anti-Russian attitudes in Yerevan will not help us in anyway, not only because it
seeds Armenia's younger generations with a cancerous toxicity but also because it will
make Moscow distrustful of Yerevan. Why would Russians want to
strengthen a nation that exhibits any degree of Russophobic tendencies?

Instead of Russophobia and illusions of grandeur, this is a time when the Russian Bear has to be fully
embraced by Armenians - if we want it to do us any favors. In other
words, telling Russians that we will look Westward if it does not do
everything we want it to do will not work. In other words, we Armenians
need to develop some political sophistication, and do so real fast. In
this regard, I'm glad to say Baku is in the worst position because
unlike Armenian officials who have repeatedly shown their willingness to
negotiate, Azeri officials have raised an entire generation of Azeris
to harbor intense hate for Armenians and expect total victory in
Artsakh. Therefore, while a land for peace deal may create some
unpleasant situations in Armenia (like the one we saw last summer), it
may actually topple Sultan Aliyev. Aliyev's ouster, which is a real
possibility, has the potential to either bring to power a more
aggressive government (one that will upset Moscow) or pro-Russian
government (that will upset Western powers and Turkey). Both cases would
work in Armenia's favor.

We
as a people need to be smart and farsighted about this. This is where a healthy understanding of
geopolitics, international relations and an emotionless approach to
political matters is essential for a positive outcome. What lands we
give back in exchange for peace is ultimately dependent upon the capabilities of
our officials and the quality of our relationship with Russia.The most important thing here for us is to understand that
organized lobbying efforts in Moscow is an essential need.It therefore concerns me thatone of the major flaws in Armenia's foreign policy today is the lack of
Armenian lobbying
efforts in Moscow. So, if
Russians one day make decisions that are against the interests of
Armenia/Artsakh, it
will essentially be a failure of Armenian diplomacy.

The
desire to maintain a close relationship with Western powers -
essentially for financial handouts - has made official Yerevan neglect its ties with Moscow. Azerbaijan and Turkey on the other hand have been doing their utmost best to lobby Russian officials. The indifference Armenian officials show in regards to Armenia's
relations with Russia is very alarming. In the following two television
interviews we see Chairman of Union of Armenians in Russia Ara
Abrahamyan and former Armenian National Security Council Secretary
Arthur Baghdasaryan raising the alarm about the lack of Armenian
lobbying efforts inside Moscow and the inability of official Yerevan
today to efficiently exploit its strategic relationship with Moscow -

Amazingly,
Armenia, a nation today that is desperately dependent on Russia and to a lesser extent Iran for survival,
is not actively engaging in any form of organized lobbying efforts in Moscow or Tehran!It seems that Armenians are too busy searching for easy money and luxury goods in the Western world. And they say Armenians are smart?!?!?!Armenia's diplomatic void in Moscow has been so apparent that Russians themselves are now complaining about it. During a recent press conference in Yerevan, Vladimir Solovyov implied that the Armenian ambassador to Russia is failing to do his job -

Finally! I have been advocating organized Armenian lobbying efforts in Moscow for well over ten years now. I guess we needed to hear it from Russiansthemselves. But just think about this for a moment. It was Russians themselves that noticed a void in Armenian diplomacy in Moscow and felt compelled to tell us that we needed to do something about it. Doesn't that say a lot?! Doesn't that suggest Russians are actually concerned about Armenia well being? Doesn't that reveal just how politically incompetentwe Armenians tend to be? It's so damn embarrassing for me as an Armenian that we had to waituntil a Russian came to our country to tell us something we ourselvesshould have easily, quickly figured out some twenty-five years ago.In any case, better late than never.

As unlikely as it may seem right now,
there is a very strong chance that a final settlement will be possible in the coming
years. When such an opportunity comes, we as a people should be ready to embrace it. If we
want to see Armenia resume the
development it had begun during Soviet times, we need regional peace. If we want to see
Armenians begin repatriating to Armenia once again; we need regional peace. If we want to see
peace and stability return to the south Caucasus - then Armenia, Georgia
and Azerbaijan will have to enter the Russian orbit once more and we need to
end the Great Game, the international tug-of-war taking place
in the region for more than 25 years now. Ultimately, what the the south Caucasus
desperately needs is Pax Russica. I believe Georgia will come to terms with Russia, sooner or later, with or without Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russian officials know that their agenda to bring Georgia back under
Russia's fold will become much easier once the dispute between Armenia
and Azerbaijan is settled. Therefore, the key to establishing Pax
Russica in the region is resolving the dispute over Artsakh.

As
of now, however, all this talk about "land for peace" is a moot matter.
We are not dealing with rational people on the other side of the
negotiations table. I do not think Baku will willingly and in good faith
negotiate with Yerevan. Knowing how Azeris/Turks are, I'm afraid the
only way to settle the Artsakh dispute for once and for all will be
through another war. A real war, not like the one we had a year ago.
The only other way the dispute can be settled is if Azerbaijan descends
into chaos in the next few years, which is also a real possibility. In
either case, Moscow will most likely step in and clean-up the mess.
Therefore, sooner or later, one way or another, one of the warring
parties, perhaps both, will be dragged to the peace table and be forced
to sign a settlement agreement. Let's hope that the party that will be
dragged to the table is Baku. Actually, let's not hope, let's work
towards making that happen. When that day comes, Yerevan can outclass
Baku on the battlefield and at the negotiations tablethrough a powerful military, political foresightand deep ties with the Kremlin,

Moscow sells arms to Baku because major powers see the world on a grander scale

I
understand that all this is a moot point for a vast majority of
Armenians. The thing that Armenians generally speaking have a very hard
time understanding is realpolitik. It does not matter how wealthy or how
educated an Armenian is, when it comes to serious political matters,
the Armenian acts like emotional child. An Armenian can be brilliant in
science, medicine, literature, art, business, sports, etc. But somehow
when it comes to politics, the Armenian is a self-destructive peasant
regardless of his or her social status. I personally think this is a
serious matter that has its roots in culture (up bringing) and genetics
(i.e. breeding). Political ignorance is so pervasive in Armenian society
that there is actually an Armenian word for describing politically
ignorant Armenians engaging in serious political analysis: It's called, կոշկակարների քաղաքականութիւն.

Translated, կոշկակարների քաղաքականութիւն means the politics according to shoemakers. In other words:
Tradesmen trying to make sense out of stuff that is well above their
heads.

And when you add typical Armenian arrogance and emotions to this kind of illiteracy, politics all of a sudden becomes volatile .For such people, politics is like a domestic dispute or a street
brawl. And the sad thing about Armenian society today is that it's not only tradesmen
but doctors, professors, lawyers, clergymen and even politicians that engage in
կոշկակարների քաղաքականութիւն.It
is no secret therefore that Western intelligence services and their
lackeys embedded throughout Armenian society are on the constant lookout
to hijack complex geopolitical matters like the issue of Russian arms
sales to Azerbaijan and grossly misrepresent the matter to make it fit
neatly into their self-serving political narrative. That narrative, a
poisonous cocktail, is then fed to the Armenian sheeple through a number
activists and news media outlets. Consequently, discussions about
Russia and Artsakh among Armenians inevitably turns into discussions
about Russians betraying Armenia -

I
have lost count of how many times I have reflected on this matter, but I
guess one more time won't hurt. To begin with, I present the reader the
Russian Prime Minister's comments about this most contentious of
matters for us Armenians -

Russia's Prime Ministerbasically said: If Moscow broke its ties with Baku, then Western, Israeli, Turkish and Islamist interests will inevitably fill the void; the region will not be less militarized; and Armenia will not be able to maintain its military parity with a wealthy Azerbaijan.
In other words, PM Medvedev is saying Moscow would lose control of the
situation in the region if it stopped dealing with Baku.

From an emotional perspective, I don't like the thought of our allies
in Moscow selling weapons to our enemies in Baku. From a political
perspective, however, I fully agree with the comments made by the
Russian prime minister. I think the situation with Baku could be much worst had Russia not been in the picture in Azerbaijan.Moscow primary concern is to keep Baku within its orbit.
In trying to reclaim the south Caucasus as a Russian zone of influence,
Moscow is doing its best to keep Baku away from the Turkey, US, Europe,
Israel and Islamists - while keeping Armenia protected at the same
time.In
my opinion, Moscow is executing a very sophisticated political approach
to the very complex dispute in question. And Western-activists, like
the filthy smut-peddlers that they are, are exploiting Moscow's
political predicament and vulnerability to incite Russophobia inside
Armenia.

Let's recognize the fact that
Baku has the petrodollars to purchase whatever it wants. If Russia does
not sell it the weaponry it is seeking, there are a number of nations
that are more than willing to do so. Western powers, Turkey and Israel
have in fact been providing Baku with billions-of-dollars in arms and
training. The US and Britain even train Azeri sharpshooters, those responsible for killing
Armenian border guards. Russian arms sales to Baku is not directed
against Armenia. Military specialists and political analysts agree that
Russian arms sales to Baku and Yerevan are designed to maintain the balance of power
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It may also be a pressure tactic to
ensure Yerevan's allegiance to Moscow and allow
Russia a greater role inside Armenia and/or Artsakh.This is somewhat similar to how
Washington tries to keep its influence over Turks and Greeks and Israelis
and Arabs by selling the conflicted parties US made weaponry and mediating between them when problems occur. This was why Azerbaijani forces did not used any of their newly acquired weapons systems against Armenian defense forces in Artsakh during the four day war in April.

While
Russia sells weaponry to Azerbaijan at market prices, it gives weaponry
to Armenia at domestic (insider) prices, and sometimes for free.Azeris
have had the
luxury - the petrodollars - to purchase whatever they want from whomever
they want. Armenia on the other hand does not have the resources for
maintaining military parity with Azerbaijan. Russia is therefore giving
Armenia whatever arms it needs to counter Azeri aggression. The recent provision of the Iskander ballistic missile system to Armenia is proof of this.
We
also know that Armenia
has a tiny military (so tiny that yearly recruitment quotas aren't even
being met).
By militarily covering the entire length of Armenia's vulnerable border
with
Turkey, Russia is giving Armenia the ability to concentrate its meager
resources on its more manageable border with Azerbaijan. This is how
Russia's military presence in Armenia is the single most strategic
factor contributing to Armenia's existence as a nation-state in the
south Caucasus.

We
also need to recognize that Russia has normal relations with
Azerbaijan. Moscow is also trying hard to lure Azerbaijan into its orbit
and by selling it the weaponry that Baku wants, Moscow realizes it
gains leverage over Baku - which is good for Armenia. Russia will
therefore do its best to maintain good relations with Baku while making
sure Armenia is protected from Baku. I should also add this: Even though
Armenia is
allied to Russia and Armenians in general are very pro-Russian, Kremlin
officials know very well that Armenians in positions of power can be
easily bought by Western money and that Armenia and Armenian society in
general is rife with Western operatives. A quick look at Armenian
society these days is enough to show one that Russians cannot trust
Armenians, even if there was a thing called “trust” in politics.
Therefore, Russia will protect its only strategic ally in the south
Caucasus but it will also make sure to also have some leverage over Yerevan by arming Baku, just in case. Russia is thus managing
the situation on the ground between Yerevan and Baku by making sure
that the current status quo, that which benefits the Armenian side,
is maintained.

At the end of the day, for Moscow, there is alsosomething called realpolitik: The necessitytokeepbothYerevanandBakudependenton Russia.I am willing to admit that Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan (specifically, the delivery of weapons systems such as the Smerch)
is one of the flaws found in Russo-Armenian relations today. Such flaws however are in my opinion a consequence of Yerevan's
flirtations with the West and the absence of Armenian lobbying
activities in Moscow.In any case, Baku seems more rational in this regard -

Nevertheless, Russian arms sales to Baku is not a serious threat to Armenia because, as already noted, Moscow provides Armenia with countermeasures to such arms, and also because most of the weapons systems Moscow sells to Baku, such as warships and anti-aircraft missiles, are in fact not directed against Armenia. Russians have gone out of their way to explains these things to us -

Most of Baku's recent arms purchasesfrom
Russia are defensive weapons meant for their air and sea
defenses. One also finds quite a bit of
Western and Israeli made weaponry in Azerbaijan's arsenal. In fact, most of the damage inflicted on the Armenian side during the "four day" war came as a result of Israeli made weapons. More importantly,
as noted above, for every weapons system Russia sells to Baku it gives Armenia weapons that can counter it on the battlefield. As such, Moscow is maintaining the balance of power between Yerevan and Baku, as it makes sure to keep control over both Yerevan and Baku. Simply put, what Moscow is doing is a pragmatic execution of
realpolitik and conflict management. Basically, Moscow is macro-managing the situation on the ground by keeping
leverage over both nations and making sure neither nation slips away
from its influence.
At the end of the day, the big bad Russian Bear is Armenia’s one and
only ally, and thank God for that because without Russia, all of the
south Caucasus has the potential to be overrun by Turks and Muslims.
What Armenians need to be worried about instead is the military support
Anglo-American-Jews are giving to Turks and Azeris -

Similar to how discussions about Russia and Armenia among Armenians inevitably turn into discussions about Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan, discussions about Russian and Azerbaijani
or Turkish relations among Armenians inevitably turns into discussions
about the controversial Russian political philosopher, Alexander Dugin.Alexander Dugin is an extremely intelligent
man and he has a strategic vision that needs to be supported. Despite what
Western pundits say about him, Dugin is not one of President Putin's
closest advisors. He does nonetheless have ties to political and
security officials in the Russian Federation. Russian officials have
given him the freedom and the task of pursuing his vision. Simply put: Dugin's desire is the repulsion of Western advances in Eurasia by making
peace or, if possible, an alliance with Russia's neighboring
Turkic peoples. His ultimate desireis to lure Turks (and Azeris) into
Russia's orbit. Whether or not this can be done is altogether another
topic of discussion. But let's recall that the Bolsheviks failed because of Ataturk's, at the
time unknown, intimate ties with the Anglo-American-Jewish world.
Perhaps Russians are sensing a better opportunity this time with
Erdogan.

The main thing to understand here is that Russians are
trying to disarm/defang the region's Turkic peoples because it is the smart
thing to do. The alternative to peaceful coexistence with the
region's Turkic and Islamic peoples is to have them - one hundred
million-plus Turks, Chechens, Azeris, Uzbeks, Tatars, Turkmens, ect.
(many millions of whom also live in the Russian Federation itself) - as
enemies of Russia. Moscow is trying to avoid a clash of civilization
because, unlike Western nations, Russia actually borders the Turkic/Islamic world. What Russians are trying to do is therefore strategically wise. I wish them success, because I do not see what they are doing as a threat to Armenia. Russian officials, as well as
influential men like Alexander Dugin, know that a fundamental element in trying to establish leverage over Turkic peoples in the region is to have a
solid alliance between Russia and Armenia. Russians know all too well that Turkic peoples
and Muslims can't be trusted. They therefore look at Armenia as their
strategic stronghold and their insurance policy. In a nutshell, the
following is more-or-less Alexander Dugin's agenda -

Better
Russian-Turkish or better Russian-Azeri relations does not pose an
existential threat to Armenia. On the contrary, in the big picture, it
would be better for Armenia if Turks and/or Azeris did indeed have
better relations with Russia. While Alexander Dugin may not be
Armenia's friend, but he is not Armenia's enemy either. Alexander Dugin
is simply a Russian nationalist, and he is also someone that Armenians
need to embrace and engage. I find it troubling and somewhat
strange that we Armenians are always upset with the man, but
there has never been an effort on our part to connect with him. When
was the last time Armenian officials invited him to Armenia for meetings? When was the last time a Diasporan organization invited him for meetings? Have we had closed door meetings with the man? As
far as I'm aware, at least on a public level, Armenians have not been in
touch with him. Here we have an influential man in Russian politics and Armenians have not attempted to establish ties with him. Why? Because we Armenians have mastered the art of
sitting back and just whining and complaining about things we don't
like.

To recap: Russian arms sales to Baku does not mean Russia is abandoning
Armenia (Moscow would sooner occupy Armenia than abandon it). Russia is
not taking sides against Armenia (had Russia taken sides against
Armenia, we would not have an Armenia today). Remember that we are
talking about a tiny, impoverished and blockaded nation that would not
be able to defend itself against any of its predatory neighbors had it
not been for the military and economic support it receives from Russia.
The same actually applies to Artsakh. Had Russia actually been against
Artsakh being under Armenian control, the situation there would have
been a whole lot different today. This is the bottom line: Oil rich Baku
has the money to purchase whatever it wants from whoever it wants.
Armenia does not have that luxury. Russia therefore sells Baku what its
military wants to purchase, and Moscow gives to Yerevan what Armenia's
military needs to counter what Baku has purchased. In doing so, it
maintains levers over both parties. It's that simple.

Russia
has been the only reason why an impoverished, landlocked and blockaded
Armenia has been able to maintain military parity with an oil rich
Azerbaijan. Moreover, Russia is the only factor keeping western Turks on
their side of the border, thereby allowing us Armenians to concentrate
our limited resources on the Azeri threat.

Ironically, those who are warning Armenians about Russia are those who are directly or indirectly serving Western and Turkish interests. The point is, Armenia is too small and too weak to have influence even over its territory. The Armenian nation-state is within the Russian orbit, it's part of the Russian world.If Russian influence in Armenia is weakened, American influence will increase by default. Needless to say, falling under Western influence will prove catastrophic for Armenia. Thankfully, Russia
will never betray Armenia nor will it ever abandon the south Caucasus. Russian-Armenian relations has historically
been based on very firm geostrategic foundations. The two centuries old
friendship between the peoples of Russia and Armenia have passed the test of time.
Yes, there are flaws in the relationship as there are flaws in any
relationship. But instead of fear-mongering about Russia (which is
becoming a popular pass time in some circles of Armenian society), Armenians should
embark on a pan-national effort to fix the existing flaws between Moscow
and Yerevan.

Russia
is a massive nation bordering Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus,
Central Asia the Far East and the United States. Russia is a superpower.
As with all superpowers, Moscow carefully/meticulously formulates
geostrategy and implements them cautiously, systematically and
professionally. As we saw in the aftermath of the downing of the Russian
warplane over the border between Syria and Turkey by the Turkish air
force, there is absolutely no room for emotions or knee-jerk reactions
in superpower politics. Major powers like Russia see the world on a much grander scale than would a small ethnic group like us Armenians.Russians
therefore look at a issue like the dispute over Artsakh or Syria, or
even Novorossiya for that matter, not from an emotional, cultural or
historical perspective, as we Armenians love to do, but from a legal,
political and geostrategic angle as major powers do. It's time we as a
people start understanding all this if we want to safely navigate the
periodic storms that afflicts the south Caucasus - and exploit
opportunities when they present themselves.

Why Armenia needs to remain close to the Russian Bear

The flames ignited by Western powers are slowly getting closer to Armenia's borders. There are troubling signs that the flames will be getting more intense in the coming years. Ukraine, Syriaand Iraq will remain very volatile. Turkey, Lebanon, Georgia and Azerbaijan will remain unpredictable, The situation mayunexpectedly worsen in any one of these countries. Iran, thus far stable, may find itself in a major war sometime in the next few years. The Azerbaijani leadershipwill most likely continue its
war of attrition, hoping to foment a political uprising inside Armenia.
Western-funded activists operating throughout Armenia will continue
stirring trouble in the country. Simply put: The situation around
Armenia is highly volatile and it may get much worst before it subsides.
Armenia's neighborhood is living up to its terrible reputation.Dangerous neighborhoods, like the one in the south Caucasus, as well as dangerous periods in human history, like the times we are living in, should underscore the strategic importance of maintaining close ties with Russia. Times like this is ultimately why Armenia needs the Russian Bear. Times like this is also why Russia needs Armenia. For Armenians, however, nature of Armenia's ties with Russia is a matter of life and death.

It is therefore a matter that is existential in nature; so much so that Armenia's ties to Russia is in my opinion more important than its ties to the Armenian Diaspora. I am saying this as a Diasporan Armenian. And I am saying this for a very simple and logical reason: Only the Russian Bear can help Armenia defend itself from regional predators.

If Armenia's existence was ever threatened, which is a mathematical
inevitability for a place like the south Caucasus, the best that the
Armenian Diaspora would be able to do is send some money, a few hundredmilitaryvolunteers, and of courseorganize a lot of rallies in Western capitals. In other words, the Armenian Diaspora would be utterly useless for Armenia in times of a major war. Note: What happened in Artsakh in the 1990s was not a major war, Azerbaijan did not even have a standing army until very late in the war,and the Armenian Diaspora was not instrumental in wining the war for Armenia. Artsakh was liberated because of the fighting spirit of Armenians in the region and because of direct military support from Russia which began arrivingstarting in 1992, after a post-Soviet Moscow had regained its geopolitical composure. I therefore am a Russophile just as much as I'm an Armenian nationalist. I therefore take heart in knowing that Russia and Armenia today are as close as they have ever been -

Although Armenians are by nature very pro-Russian, as a recent Pew Research poll clearly revealed, had it been for the so-called
"democratic process", in which most political activists are financed by
Western interests, Armenia would have been torn from Russia a long time
ago, and the country would have been thoroughly ravaged by regional predators as a result. Armenia has stayed under Russia's protection thanks to a handful of people known to Western activists as the "Karabakh clan". Despite
the current Armenian leadership's flaws, both real and perceived, they need to
be at least commended for keeping Armeniawithin Russia's orbit. Armenia's Հանրապետական Կուսակցություն (Hanrapetakan) therefore continues being the lesser evil in the country's decrepit political landscape.

On the wake of Armenia's recent parliamentary elections, I'd like to point out that the popularity enjoyed by unsavory characters like Gagik Tsarukyan, Raffi Hovanissian, Levon Ter Petrosian and Nikol Pashinyan is ample proof that Armenia's electorate remains emotionally unstable and politically illiterate. Armenia's citizenry cannot be trusted with the thing called democracy. Gagik Tsarukyan's Բարգավաճ Հայաստան կուսակցություն
(Barkavaj Hayastan) is arguably the most popular political party in
Armenia today. Why? Simply because Gagik Tsarukyan gives out handouts.
In other words, he is popular because Armenia's electorate is full of
beggars with no dignity or self-respect. Don't believe the nonsense
about Armenians hating their oligarchs. In the depths of their hearts
Armenians actually admire their oligarchs. This is why Armenia's
oligarchs are warmly received
everywhere they go in the country. This is why not one of them have in
any way been harmed by any Armenian (including nationalist crazies)
during the past 25-plus years. Armenians are merely envious of their
oligarchs. In any case, democracy and capitalism for a politically
immature and materialistic people like Armenians is a painful road to
national suicide. Most Armenians do not yet understand this. A
growing number however are beginning to. One is Markar Melkonian (Monte
Melkonian's brother). Markar Melkonian has been warning Armenians about democracy, capitalism and Russophobia for some years now.

I would also like to say that Armenia's
Hanrapetakan party pulled off a very impressive win during the parliamentary elections. The voting process
was very well organized, relatively orderly and surprisingly
modern.
Approximately 60% of all registered voters participated, which is also
impressive for a
country like Armenia where political apathy rules. Hanrapetakans were
able to secure about 50% of the votes. The runner-up was Gagik
Tsarukyan's Barkavaj Hayastan party, and they
got 30% of the votes. More significantly, the losing parties did not
object to the final tally. This in itself is no small miracle. Are
Armeniams
growing up? Perhaps. I nonetheless give Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan
the credit for all this.
A lot changed in Armenia's political landscape since his return last
autumn.

I also have to add this: Armenia's Western activists finally got
their wish, but with a little, ironic twist.

Armenia's political system now
fully resembles the Western model: Armenia today has a top heavy
political system, where the country's citizenry is allowed to
participate in limited forms of democracy and where a handful of
mainstream political parties are tightly controlled from above by an
unseen elite. What Armenia's Western activists were not expecting however is
that Moscow is that unseen elite controlling the political process from
above. Thank God.This
election cycle showed that Moscow has also begun paying more
attention to Armenia. The Kremlin has been actively pulling the
political
strings in the country right now. Levon Petrosyan, Seyran Ohanyan and
Gagik Tsarukyan and several
others were playing the role of controlled opposition. Raffi Hovanissian
and Vartan Oskanian were allowed to exist for show, like political stage
props. Regarding Vartan Oskanian: They put him up on
charges in 2012 for not disclosing the millions of dollars he was
receiving from a John Huntsman in the United States. He never fully
recovered from that
ordeal since. Regarding Raffi Hovanissian: Remember when he was
boycotting President
Sargsyan's win in 2012? Remember when he stopped his nonsense? One
minute he was on a hunger strike, next minute he was suddenly
flying to Moscow to have closed-door meetings with undisclosed
individuals. Raffi more-or-less retired from Armenian politics after his
return from Moscow. A similar thing had happened to Gagik in 2007. In
any case,
as I said, by the latest election cycle in Armenia, men like Raffi and
Vartan had become political stage props. The only real political
opposition in the country today is, or rather was, Founding Parliament
and
Paruyr Hayrikian's handful of zombies.

In
other words, there is no real political
opposition in the country anymore. In other words, Armenia is now a
country with
two main political parties, Hanrapetakan and Bargavaj Hayastan and
they both serve one master. In other words, Armenian politics resembles
the American model. Armenia's Western-funded activists should be happy,
but they are not. Russia's
growing role in the political process in Armenia has become so obvious
that even the Washington DC based Stratfor has picked
up on it. The following is an excerpt from one of their recent articles -

Basically, they are admitting to
the obvious;the obvious begin that Moscow has more political control
over Yerevan today than at any time during the post-Soviet period.The closing of CIA agent John Hugh's ArmeniaNow office in Yerevan a year ago was a good omen. After his dismal showing in the latest election cycle, the American agent Vartan Oskanian
has officially abandoned his activities in Armenia and has gone back to
his homeland in the United States. Rumors are that Raffi Hovanissian
may follow his footsteps. One by one, Uncle Sam's agents are dropping out of the political scene in Armenia essentially because they have been, as President Trump would say, total losers.

Armenia
has survived the past twenty-five years in the south Caucasus (as well
as the past two hundred years to be exact) not because of capitalism,
democracy, the nation-building talents of Armenians or the "almighty"
Armenian Diaspora - but because of Armenia's intimate ties to the Russian nation.
Russians laid the foundations of today's Armenia. Russians continue
keeping Armenia alive. Armenians need to profoundly understand this.
Armenians also need to find comfort in knowing that the Russian Bear
needs Armenia and will continue needing Armenia for as long as the
Caucasus region and its surrounding areas remain Turkic and Islamic.
This is why Russian forces are in Armenia to protect the country's western border. This is why despite Armenia's flirtations with Western powers; despite the fact that Armenian politicians today cannot be trusted; despite the fact that a majority of Armenians today are ready to flee their homeland - Moscow gives Yerevan the economic help to keep Armenia afloat and the military resources to defend itself against regional predators.

As to the matter of Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan: Moscow does it essentially because it wants to stop Azerbaijan from drifting too far from its center of geopolitical gravity. Maintaining ties with Azerbaijan enables Moscow to have some leverage over Baku. This keeps other nations like Turkey and Israel from further deepening their ties with Azerbaijan. Do we Armenians really want Baku to fall fully under Turkish and/or Islamic influences or would we rather have Moscow hold at least some sway over it? As long as Russia is providing Armeniathe proper military countermeasures (often times free ofcharge) to defeat what Azerbaijan is purchasing with its petro-dollars from a number of countries around the world, is it really smart for Armenians to throw temper-tantrums every time Moscow sells anythingto Baku?By engaging both Yerevan
and Baku, Moscow manages to maintain control over both Armenia and
Azerbaijan. From a Russian perspective, it's essentially conflict management, and it's something
that is also in Armenia's interest.

Nevertheless, although there remains some
flaws in the relationship (in my opinion mostly due to the absence of
Armenian lobbying efforts in Moscow) Russia's goodwill towards Armenia
is genuine and long-termed. When it comes to a number of geostrategic matters, there
is a lot of convergence of interests between Russia and Armenia. Russia
and Armenia are therefore natural allies and will remain so for
the foreseeable future. Also, while Western powers are in decline,
Russia is on the rise politically, militarily and economically - and
will remain so for the foreseeable future. Russia is
therefore a historic opportunity for Armenia as well.However, many Armenianstoday seem incapable of fully comprehending any of this because in my opinion there are large numbers of professionals working hard to distort reality, dirty the atmosphere and sow toxicity and Russophobia throughout Armenian society. The following American agent with an Armenian last name is one such individual -

Because Armenian society today is saturated by Western operatives, Armenians, generally speaking, seem incapable of fully appreciating Russia
as a historic opportunity. Because of Armenian materialism, in addition
to its Western agents, Armenian attention is naturally being drawn
towards Western countries (US, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, etc.),
Western goods (cars, electronic gadgets, clothing, music, etc.) and
Western concepts (democracy, globalism, feminism, gay rights, etc.). For
such people, Western products and Western lifestyles are worth risking
life and limb, as well as Armenia's well-being. I found that one of the
main concerns about worsening Russian-West relations several years ago
among Armenians in Armenia was the fear that Western products, such as
American and German made cars, would be difficult to import into the country as a result. I
would tell such people, why don't you instead drive Russian cars that
cost a lot less but are much more reliable? I would get either blank
stares or laughs in reply. And they say Armenians are smart? Related to this discussion is language: It is very worrying for me that the younger generation in Armenia speak better English than Russian (at least from what I see in Yerevan). This serious problem, strategic in nature, is now being noticed by other observers as well -

It is said that political power travels on the coattails of cultural influence. Movies, television programming, music, cuisine,
clothing, literature and language are some of the more potent tools of
cultural influence found in the Western arsenal. It is through these
tools that Western powers are capable of penetrating through even the
hardest of national borders. These are the tools used to subjugate
peoples around the world. What makes these tools of cultural influences
so dangerous is that those who fall victim to them do not know it. Think
of it in this way: If we want to sing their songs, watch their films,
eat their foods, drive their cars, trade in their money, wear their
clothing and speak their language, how can we then ever think of them as the
enemy? If we have our eyes on the West, how can be keep our attention to deepening
our ties with our natural allies in the East? If we are thralled by
Western culture, how can we stop them from embedding their agents in our
societies?

Simply put: By willingly importing their culture into our land, they have already won half the battle against us. Who today understands this? Sadly, not many, which is why Armenians continue singing and dancing to impress imperial officials -

The US and British embassies regularly sponsor these types of "cultural" events in Armenia. It's essentially is part of their
"soft power" approach to dealing with backward tribes around the world.
Armenians in particular are very susceptible to soft power approaches
because Armenians in general love handouts, they love singing and dancing and they love to be told just how wonderful they
are. While many Armenians today tend to praise the new generation we have in the
country today, I tend to say: Let's wait and see how they turn out. The
signs, in my opinion, are not all that encouraging. In any case, these types of Western sponsored events
basically showcase the cultural/civilization hold the
Anglo-American-Jewish world order has over humanity.

Allow me to put it this way: When you get
barbarians to willingly sing and dance to your music, you have already
more-or-less defeated them.

Again, I want to remind the reader that I do not speak Russian.I
am an Anglophone because I have lived in the West for most of my
life. In fact, I have a better command of the English language thana vast
majority of its native speakers. However, my intellectual honesty and objectivity, as well as my ability to think out of my skin, helps me see the English language for what it really is. English
today is the catalyst upon which Globalization (where everybody speaks
English and, trades in Western currency and where there are no genders,
religions, borders or nationalities) travels on. English is also the
vehicle upon which Westernization (the spread of materialism and the
worship of Anglo-American-Jewish-African pop culture) is disseminated
around the world. It would be wise for us to recognize that language
imparts outlook and mentality on its speaker. Every language has a
value system of its own. Every language is a world of its own. English
today may be the language of international trade, but it is also the
language of idiots, perverts and Western-financed activists. For a poor,
remote and isolated nation like Armenia, learning English is also the
first steppingstone for either leaving the country permanently or
working for some Western-financed NGO that is trying to undermine
Armenia's statehood.

As such, the
most powerful weapon Western powers have in their military arsenal is by-far the cultural influence they have over humanity.
And it is we the sheeple, and the choices we make, that give them their power over us.By
far, the most important language in Armenia today (after Armenian of course)
has to be Russian. Again, I say this as an Anglophone. I look at this matter
logically: Russian is the language of Armenia's largest and most affluent diaspora,
largest investor, largest trade partner, largest energy provider, largest number of tourists visiting Armenia, largest arms supplier and ONLY military ally. Armenia today
lives because of its close ties to Russia. Yet, young people in
Armenia are striving to learn English instead?! And they say Armenians are smart?!

I reiterate: Russia is Armenia's most important partner and Russia is home to the world's largest and most affluent Armenian Diaspora. In fact, Armenians of Russia are disproportionately represented in the highest layers of Russian society. Yet, there is no discernible agenda topromote Armenian interests in Moscow today. Turks and Azeris on the other hand do their best to lobby Russian officials. Armenians in contrast are no where to be seen in the Kremlin. Yet, Armenians can be in Moscow what Jews are in Washington DC - but Armenians are too busy begging for handouts and genocide recognition in the West.And they say Armenians are smart?!?!

Although English is the language
of international trade, it is always much more effective to speak with
business partners in their native languages. In other words, an Armenian businessman
will gain a lot more attention and sympathy in places like China, Iran, India, Germany, France, etc., if he converses with his counterparts in their language. After
Russian, I believe German, French, Iranian, Chinese and Turkish should
also be taught in Armenian schools. English should be part of
this tertiary group of languages. When I share these thoughts with fellow Armenians, I mostlyget blank stares or laughs in reply. And they say Armenians are smart...

I have learned that Armenians can be very capable in many fields of
profession, but when it comes to truly understanding the political world they live in or planning for Armenia's future, Armenians can be very idiotic
and self-destructive, like spoiled children. Study of Armenian history suggests this may be a
result of genetic traits compounded by Armenian folk culture. This is essentially
why Russians feel they have to break with diplomatic protocol to talk
sense into Armenians -

To be frank, it's very embarrassing for me as an Armenian to see Russians publicly explaining
the above to our people. These types of talks usually takes place
behind closed doors. I find it troubling that we Armenians are so
emotional and out of touch with reality that Russians feel the need to
explain to us even the simplest of things. Think for a moment: Do we
really need Russians to explain to us that EU membership is very dangerous for Armenia? Do we really need Russians to explain to us that Russia needs Armenia as an ally and vice-versa? Do we really need Russians to explain to us that Russia having good relations with Turkey or Azerbaijan is not a bad thing for Armenia? Do we really need Russians to explain to us that they are actively protecting Armenia from regional predators? These are things Russians would rather not talk about in public because it can undermine Moscow's overall regional strategy. This kind of talk therefore has the potential to adversely effect Moscow's relations with Baku. The fact that Russiansfeel the strong need to do so is proof that Armenians are politically ignorant and out-of-tough with reality. It's also proof that the pursuit of democracy in a place like Armenia is a toxic affair.

I think Syria
should have shown the entire world, us Armenians in particular, the importance of having the Russian Bear on the
global arena today. Recent developments in the Middle East should have again reminded us Armenians of the cruel and unforgiving nature of the region
in which Armenia is unfortunately located in. A reminder to our westernized Russophobes and nationalist chobans: Armenia's
neighbors are not Italians, Greeks, Spaniards, Danes, Germans, Poles or Swedes. Armenia's neighborsTurks, Azeris, Kurds, Iranians, Islamists and backstabbing
Georgians. Any degree of "independence" from Russia will automatically, by-default, increase Armenia's dependence on its Turkic/Islamic neighbors.Armenia therefore does not need "independence" from Russia. Speaking of "independence from Russia", I ask: What has independence from Russia gotten Ukrainians and Georgians? After its Western-financed Maidan, Ukraine is economically much worst off, Kiev has no chance of joining NATO or the EU, Crimea has been reunited with Russia, south-eastern Ukraine is a war zone and thousands of Ukrainians have died as a result. After theWestern-backed dictator came to power in Tbilisi in 2003, Georgia lost 20% of its territory, poverty and emigration is still a major problem and Turks areeverywhere-

Kiev and Tbilisi are in terrible situations today. Despite enjoying very good relations with Turks and Azeris; despite enjoying very good relations with Western powers; despite enjoying full access to the Black Sea, Ukraine and Georgia today are hurting economically, politically and demographically - essentially because they ruined their relationship with the Russian Bear essentially to blindly appease Western powers. Now, I ask my Armenian readers to imagine
how much worst it would have been for Armenia had it also fallen victim to its pro-Westernactivists and politicians. I ask: How well would have "independence" from Russia work out for our tiny, impoverished, remote, landlocked
and blockaded nation surrounded by Turks and Muslims? Can't even think of it.

Simply
put: No Russia in Armenia means no Armenia in the south Caucasus.
Armenians need Russian boots on the ground in Armenia as much as
Armenians need statehood. At the end of the day, Russia is the only choice and only hope
Armenia has in the south Caucasus. I say only hope because, if God
forbid Armenia is ever threatened by a much larger power in the region,
the only nation that is ready and willing to come to its aid is the Russian nation. After Armenians, Russians are the only nation on earth that would willingly spill blood for Armenia. Itis not me saying these things, Russians themselves have been saying this for many years.

In an article appearing in Russia Today, Mikhail Aleksandrov, a political
analyst working for the Institute of CIS made the following comment
about Moscow's military presence inside Armenia -

The
men I quoted above couldn't be more candid or more accurate in their
assessments of the current geopolitical situation in the south Caucasus,
nor could they have been more pro-Armenian in their sentiments. These
men basically outlined the 0geostrategic importance of Russia's presence
in the south Caucasus, as well as Armenia's strategic importance in the
eyes of Kremlin officials. More importantly, the rhetoric expressed by
these men is similar to the kind of rhetoric we often hear expressed by
American officials about the Zionist state. Regardless of what weapons
Russians sell to whom, the quotes I outlined above is more-or-less the prevailing pro-Armenian political culture in Moscow today.Russia today is a very fertile ground in which Armenians can but are not promoting their country's interests. I suggest we stop admiring Jews for their political acumen and start acting like them.

We Armenians need to be farsighted enough and intelligent enough to begin exploiting the opportunity the Russian Federation is providing us. We need to be lobbying Armenian matters in the Kremlin as obsessively and as persistently as we pursue Armenian Genocide recognition in the United States.We need to be cultivating
deeper Russian-Armenian relations. We need to
be laying
the foundations of a permanent Armenian presence within the highest
offices of the Kremlin. While Armenia's military may be its
tactical advantage on the battlefield, Armenia's presence within the walls of the Kremlin must be made its strategic advantage on the global chessboard. We therefore should
not be giving any of Uncle Sam's whores in Armenia a political platform to spew
their dangerous agendas. We should not allow modern slave-masters such
as the IMF, World Bank or the USAID or troublemakers such a George Soros funded organizations any foothold inside Armenia.

I
reiterate: At a fundamental level, Russian officials see Armenia the same as Western powers
see Israel. Similar to Jews in the United States, the Armenian Diaspora in Russia is by-far the largest and most affluent in the world and Russian-Armenians are well represented in all layers of Russian society, including its highest layers. The following is a partial list -

Sergei Lavrov (Foreign Minister of Russia)

Artur Chilingarov (Duma spokesman, Scientist, Hero of Russia)

Sergey Avakyants (commander of Russia's Pacific Fleet)

Margarita Simonyan (director of Russia Today, married to film director Tigran Keosayan)

Gagik Gevorkyan (president of Estet Jewelry House and new head of the prestigious Russian Jewelers Guild)

Tigran Khudverdyan (CEO Yandex)

Artur Janibekyan (television producer and head of Russia's most successful Comedy Club)

Ara Abrahamyan (billionaire businessman, president of the Union of Armenians in Russia)

As I have been saying for over ten years now, Armenians
can be in Moscow what Jews are in Washington DC. What's more, I agree with Alexsei
Arbatov when he says: Armenia is more important to Russia than Israel is to the United States. Without an
Armenia, Russia's position in the already volatile Caucasus will be seriously compromised. The disappearance of Israel, on the other hand, will have no tangible effects on the United States. In fact, the United States can do much better globally without the Israeli or Jewish monkey on its back. If the United States is closer to Israel than Russia is to Armenia, it's onlybecause American Jews are farsighted enough and intelligent enough to have concentrated all their efforts in recent decades on manipulating American officials into adopting an "Israel first" policy.

In stark contrast to Jews, we Armenians, numbering in the millions in Russia and representedin the highest layers of Russian society, engage in virtually no lobbying efforts inside the Kremlin.Armenia's diplomatic void in Moscow has been so apparent that even Russians have been complaining about it.It therefore concerns me thatone of the major flaws in Armenia's foreign policy today is the lack of
Armenian lobbying
efforts in Moscow. This is why I said if
Russians one day make decisions that are against the interests of
Armenia, it
will essentially be a failure of Armenian diplomacy. That said, I
do not believe Moscow will take any steps that are detrimental to Armenia or Artsakh.

Nevertheless, being that Armenians will remain politically illiterate and out-of-touch with reality, I am under no illusions. Chances are that a majority of Armenians will simply continue concentrating on kissing the asses of Western officials either for easy money (bribesdisguised as financial aid) or for genocide recognition - with the help of sickly homosexuals nonetheless. Chances are, Armenians by-in-large will continue neglecting the promotion of Armenian interests in Russia, as well as in Iran and China. Chances are, Western officials will continue having an easy time of manipulating and exploiting Armenians by keeping
our self-destructive peasantry preoccupied with nonsense like gay
rights, feminism, civil society, free speech and free elections. Allow me to remind the reader once more:While they keep our idiots preoccupied with their bullshit, their ultimate plan is to keep Armenia politically isolated and economically backward. It
would therefore be wise to look past the lofty rhetoric of professional
mercenaries and street whores serving Western powers throughout
Armenian society and instead assess their words and actions within the
following geostrategic context -

The
ultimate goal of high-level Western officials continues to be either
the strangling of
Armenia (through their NATO blockade) and/or severing it from Russia.Thus,
it could
be said
that the West's ultimate intention is
to either destroy Armenia or place it under the mercy of their Turkic
and Islamic allies. After all, the primary reason why Western powers
are in the
south Caucasus to begin with is to push Russia and to a lesser extent
Iran out of the region so that their economic/energy interests can
exploit
Central Asian gas and oil without Moscow's meddling. Western powers
realize
that without Russia in the picture in the Caucasus, the strategic region
will be their playground. We Armenians however need to be sober enough to realize that without a Russian presence in Armeniathere won't
be an Armenian presence in the south Caucasus.

Any Armenian todaythat wants "independence" from Russia or wants to shutdown Russia's military bases in Armeniais a filthy traitor to Armenia regardless of his or her intention. Regarding Russia's military presence in Armenia, I can say it is the single most important factor contributing to Armenia's existence as a nation state in the south Caucasus; it is the onlydeterrence Armenia's has against regional predators like Turkey. Intelligentpeople who are truly concerned about Armenia's future understand this -

With a major war looming on the horizon this is the time to stick as close to the Bear as possible. I would like to repeat once more that Armenia's ties to Russia is immeasurably more important to the Armenian state's survival in the south Caucasus than Armenia'sties to the Armenian Diaspora. Moreover, lobbying Armenian interests in Moscow in my opinion is incalculably more important to Armenia's long-term welfare than pursuing Armenian Genocide recognition in the Western world.I realize these words may be very difficultfor most Armenians to digest. But this is our reality today. Disregard
the nonsense spewed by our Western-financed mercenaries, lunatics posing as nationalist and disgusting Russophobes and recognize a certain, albeit uncomfortable reality when it comes to Armenia. The Russian presence in the south Caucasus has been the fundamental historic reason behind why we
have
an Armenia today and will continue to have an Armenia tomorrow. In other words, had Ivan not come down to the south
Caucasus some two hundred years ago - and stayed - our nationalistic Russophobes today would still be herding
goats or making donkey saddles in the mountains of eastern Turkey or northern Iran.Allow
me to put all this in an another way to help the reader better understand:
Imagine the south Caucasus as a political/economic table where Russians, Armenians, Persians, Georgians, Turks,
Azeris, Islamists and Anglo-American-Jewish energy
interests sit and discuss various regional matters. Now imagine this table without
its Russian occupant. In another words, imagine the Caucasuswithout a
powerful Russia. Now imagine the challenges our tiny,
impoverished, remote, landlocked, inexperienced, embattled and blockaded
homeland would haveat that table. To be honest, I find it very difficult imagining an Armenian state in the South Caucasus without having a strong Russian presence in the south Caucasus. It is very troubling for me that there are many Armenian today, especially in the Diaspora, that do not understand this.So,
once more: No Russia in the south Caucasus means no Armenia in the south Caucasus.
Without Russian lordship in the south Caucasus, the region would no
doubt be overrun once more by Turkic and/or Islamic hordes.

The need to be pragmatic and negotiate from a position of strength

Now,
for the most important part of this discussion: When the day finally
arrives, what could or should a peace settlement between Armenia and
Azerbaijani look like? Foremost, any settlement that is to take place
has to be agreed to not only by Yerevan but also by Stepanakert.
Armenians of Artsakh MUST have the ultimate say in the end and the rest
of us have to be ready to support WHATEVER they decide. Moreover, Moscow
must be made to understand that there is in deed a - red line - that
Armenians will not hesitate to go to war over. As I already mentioned,
that red line is bringing Azeri refugees into Artsakh and returning the
regions of Karvajar and Berdzor to Azerbaijan. And Armenian officials
for their part need to understand that if they agree to Azeri refugees
and/or put Karvajar or Berdzor on the negotiations table, they will run
the risk of getting killed.

We still do not know exactly what
panned on April 2, 2016. The four day war may or may not have been
orchestrated, it may or may not have been a trial run. It nevertheless
was not a major war. There may be one more bout - a quick, decisive and
most probably a predetermined battle between Yerevan and Baku - that
will settle the matter for once and for all. And the side that is
closest to Moscow will inevitably derive the most benefits. The side
that has the deepest ties with Moscow will come on top. This is why
Yerevan's decision to enter the Russian-led EEU and CSTO were important
strategic steps to secure Armenia's vital interests within the Kremlin.
More needs to be done to looby Russian officials.

Nevertheless
imagine what would have happened if Armenia abstained from entering the
EEU and/or the CSTO and Baku instead took that first step. It would
most probably be a catastrophic political disaster for Armenia and
suicide for Artsakh. In fact, any lessening of Russian support for
Armenia will prove catastrophic for Armenia. With all due respects to
all the brave men and women serving in the Armenian armed forces today,
without direct Russian support, Armenians would simply be unable to
mount a long-term defense of Artsakh if Armenia's larger and wealthier
neighbors to its east and west decided to resort to sustained violence
once again. Needless to say, placing hope on the political West to come
to Armenia's aid is like placing hope on the tooth-fairy.

And
to our nationalistic idiots who say Armenians will fight alone and win
just like they did 25 years ago, I only say this: As my favorite Wall
Street saying goes - past performances do not guarantee future results.

Armenians were able to liberate Artsakh during the chaotic years
following the Soviet Union's collapse. Even then Armenians began winning
only after Russian support began coming into Armenia starting in early
1992 when the Soviet Union had collapsed and a new Russian state was
born. Armenian society today is demoralized, largely thanks to the
country's Western-led doom-and-gloom campaign carried out by the
country's opposition freaks, and Armenia today is impoverished, tiny,
remote, landlocked and blockaded by enemies in one of the most volatile
geographic regions of the world. And the traditional Armenian Diaspora
(the diaspora comprising of Ottoman-Armenian genocide survivors) is
simply too busy obsessing over genocide recognition in Washington, too
busy assimilating in their beloved countries, too busy fighting
"corruption" in Armenia and too busy complaining about dirty toilets in
Yerevan. With the following article we see where Diasporan priorities
lie today -

While
the oil rich dictatorship in Baku is busy spending billions of Dollars
acquiring a large arsenal of modern weaponry from around the world, many
of us Armenians are busy infighting, spreading Russophobia, turning our
backs to our homeland, attacking Armenia's leadership, pursuing
dangerous Western fairytales, pathetically crying at the feet of Western
officials every April 24 and, of course, bravely championing gay
rights! Official Yerevan cannot therefore afford to be under any
illusions today. In other words, in times of war, there will be no
Diasporan cavalry galloping to the rescue. My suggestion therefore is to
know our enemy well and to know ourselves well. This is a military
wisdom Armenians must learn well. We cannot make the grave mistake of
overestimating our capabilities and underestimating that of our enemies.

Azerbaijan's military has gotten stronger in recent years because of
its oil and gas revenues. If for some reason Moscow stopped providing
military support to Armenia and/or gave Baku a green light to attack,
Armenians will sooner-than-later lose the territory of Artsakh - if not
more. We as a people need to wake-up from our illusions of grandeur and
recognize this cold hard reality. Instead of fear-mongering about our
dependence on Russia, we need to see it as a historic opportunity to use
Armenia's alliance with the Russian Bear to strengthen Armenia's
position in the south Caucasus. The key to Armenia's success in Artsakh
is therefore found in the highest offices of the Kremlin.

I
reiterate: While our military is our tactical advantage on the
battlefield, our ties to Russia is our strategic advantage on the global
battlefield. Armenians must be a constant presence in the Kremlin.

The
reality is that Armenia and Artskah today play a very major
geostrategic role for Moscow. Artsakh's existence as a Russia-friendly
Armenian fortress overlooking Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Iran
serves the Kremlin's geostrategic interests in the region. Equally
important for Russians is the simple fact that the dispute over Artsakh
also ensures Yerevan's and Baku's political dependence on Moscow.
Moreover, Artsakh is essentially an arms depot with a battle-ready
population that will not bow down to anyone and the Artsakh-Armenian
military leadership enjoy a very close relations with their Russian
counterparts. Therefore - strategically, economically, culturally,
tactically and practically - Moscow will not do anything that will
drastically change the status quo in Artsakh. Armenian sovereignty over
Artsakh is therefore set in stone. With that said, now that Yerevan's
allegiance has been secured via Armenia's ascension to the Moscow-led
Customs Union, I expect Moscow to earnestly begin pursuing bringing Baku
under its fold as well. Of course a best case scenario, from an
Armenian perspective, would be if Baku continues to remain inflexible in
its dealings with Moscow and Yerevan and continues its flirtations with
Turkey, Israel and the Anglo-American world.

Nevertheless, as
already suggested, we might see a short, choreographed war to convince
both sides to come to the negotiation table and settle the Artsakh
dispute for once and for all. In a final negotiated settlement with
Baku, Yerevan may be expected to return some of the "seven regions"
taken outside of Artsakh proper. I do not have any concerns about the
fate of the territories west and south of Artsakh, namely the strategic
regions between Karvajar in the north-west and the Iranian border in the
south-east. In return for Armenian concessions, Baku would be expected
to recognize Artsakh's independence or its reunification with Armenia
and perhaps return some areas of Artsakh currently under its control.

Although
Russia is the alpha and the omega of the Caucasus region, Armenians can
still use their God-given talents to win hearts-and-minds in the
Kremlin. It is therefore crucially important to show Russian officials
that Armenians are ready to negotiate but Armenians are also united
behind their leadership and that the entire population of Artsakh is
fully mobilized and ready for war.

As it has been for hundreds of years, the inability of Armenians to effectively unite as a people
behind an Armenian leadership continues to be Armenia's main problem today. Let's
recall that major powers only respect power, not victim-hood and not
constant whining. Over a century ago one of our most beloved clergymen,
Mkrtich Khrimyan, popularly known as Khirmyan Hayrik, warned Armenians
about the paramount importance of Iron Ladles. Today,
the proverb is as important for Armenia as it has ever been. In today's
Armenia, however, the Iron Ladle should looked at from the context of
Armenia's alliance with Russia.

Sadly,
however, I do not see much of an effort being put into this vital
strategic matter by money hungry Armenians in Armenia and democracy
obsessed Armenians in the Diaspora. On one side, we have Western
mercenaries doing their best to spread Russophobia inside Armenian
society. On the other side, we have chobans-in-Armani-suits sitting back
and expecting Russian officials to decide everything for Armenia. Sadly, we seem stuck between self-hating morons and self-destructive chobans. There is a deficit of farsighted and pragmatic mindsets in Armenian society today.

There
is currently no pan-national effort being made by Armenians to tap into
the opportunities Russia's alliance provides. Everything that Moscow
does with regards to Armenia is essentially a by-product of Russian
calculations. Thus far we Armenians have been lucky because our national
interests and that of Russia's coincide for the most part. But this
unsettling reality is one of the reasons why I have been preaching
Russian-Armenian relations for well over a decade. Russian-Armenian
relations have to set deep roots and become institutionalized. We cannot
sit back and expect - let alone demand - that Russians to do the right
thing for Armenia. Armenians need to embark on a collective, cohesive
and pan-national effort to make a case for Artsakh's territorial
integrity. Armenians need to figure out a way to turn Armenian lordship
over Artsakh into a strategic asset for policymakers in Moscow. Official
Yerevan needs to work towards making sure it will have a major say in
whatever the final settlement over Artsakh will look like.

I
reiterate: The secret to Armenia's and Artsakh's success is the
following: A modern and highly efficient military to defend territory
and fight off Azeri incursions that will be coming periodically; a
politically unified population to show the world that Armenians speak
with one voice; a diplomatic corps that is farsighted, patriotic and
pragmatic; effectively lobbying Russian officials and establishing a
closer, deeper alliance with the Russian bear. Moreover, we as a people
also need patience.

Disregard all the Russophobic
fear-mongering coming from our Western-funded smut peddlers. Moscow is
not going to sell Armenia or Artsakh to anybody and time is on our side.
If Yerevan does what I suggested above, there is a good chance that in a
matter of few years Azerbaijan will descend into serious internal
unrest. If Yerevcan does what I suggested above, Armenia will clearly
come on top in any final peace settlement. That said, we as a people
must also understand that the south Caucasus desperately needs peace and
stability. We also need to understand that peace and stability will
come at a price. We also need to understand that peace and stability can
only be brought by Russia. In my opinion, the above are the fundamentals of our success in the Artsakh dispute.

Closely observing the Russian weather vane

For a nation to truly become a global power, it must champion some sort of an ideology.
For a nation to be looked up to by people around the world, it must
have a higher calling. The Russian Empire championed Orthodox
Christianity. The Soviet Union championed Marxism. Russian Federation
was totally devoid of an ideology (that is if we discount crony
capitalism as an ideology) during much of its post-Soviet period. The
last decade or so saw a historic transformation in Russia. It seems that
Moscow found itself a new calling and is on path to becoming a true
global power people around the world will look up to. Perhaps
unwittingly, perhaps by divine providence,
Russia today is looking a lot like the world's only champion of
traditionalism, conservatism, ethnocentrism, family values, apostolic
Christianity, the traditional nation-state and multipolarity in global
politics. Russia has become the last front against Globalism and
Westernization. I dare the reader to imagine the political state of
world today without the existence of the Russian Federation. I dare my
Armenian readers to imagine what Armenia's plight would have been like
today had there not been a strong Russian factor in the south Caucasus
today. President Putin has been, and I say this literally, a God sent
not only for Russia but also for Armenia and the rest of humanity. This
is being better understood today, even by Westerners -

Russians officials have a historic opportunity on their hands. I hope they are able to fully embrace their new calling. Thus
far they have been doing so masterfully. I hope it continues
indefinitely. All
signs nevertheless suggest Russia will be in the driver's seat in the
twenty-first century. My hope as an Armenian is to see Armenia in its
passenger seat. Related to all this is a recent Pew Research Center study that revealed some pleasantly surprising results. It seems that after 25-plus years of being subjected to social engineering by the Anglo-American-Jewish alliance,
the moral compass and survival instincts of Central and Eastern
Europeans, Armenian in particular, remains alive and well. Please
thoroughly review the following document-

I
would like to make some additional comments about this Pew study: Prior
to designing social engineering projects (such as the worldwide
promotion of so-called free press, democracy, interracialism,
multiculturalism, global warming, feminism, homosexuality and holocaust
awareness through political podiums, social activism, television,
literature, cinema, music and school curriculum) senior policymakers in
the Western world get Western institutions, like the Pew Research Center
for instance, to conduct in-depth studies of peoples around the world.
This is done to basically help imperial interests to better understand
nations of interest. This is how they evaluate, assess and gauge
societal and political conditions in countries; in this case nations
that were formerly within the orbit of the Soviet Union. They then use
such findings to basically custom design their social engineering
programs for societies they are interested in exploiting/manipulating.
In any case, Russians must be very happy with these findings, some of
which even surprised me. It seems that decades of Western propaganda has
not been able to brainwash a majority of people in central and eastern
Europe. But Moscow can't rest. Despite the good news, the fact remains
that so-called "millennials" are for the most part compromised. As we
all know, younger generations are the future of any given nation. We
also know that social engineering takes time to show tangible results.
Therefore, while the results look somewhat promising today, in a
generation or two it may not be the case.

After
an absence of a few years Russia is back in the south Caucasus, and
it's there to stay. Those who adjust to this reality will do well. Those
who observe the Russian weather vane will do well. Moscow has serious
plans for the greater Caucasus region. Naturally, this plan is not meant
to turn the Russian Federation into a benevolent entity. Moscow
is implementing projects, both military and economic, that are meant to
serve long-term interests in the region. Moscow's strategic allies will
be the first to benefit from these. The better we as a
people understand Moscow's long-term plans for the region the better
will Armenia be off. We as a people therefore have the urgent need to
closely observe the political climate in Moscow and adjust our foreign
relations policies accordingly.

The
first blow to Western inroads in the south Caucasus came in 2008.
Western powers have been in retreat from the region ever since. Today,
Russia is back in its traditional sphere of influence as its main
power-broker and its power and influence is expanding with each passing
year. But Moscow cannot fully realize its ambitions with the presence of
unresolved disputes in the region. There will therefore most probably
be a push by Moscow to settle the Artsakh dispute between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, as well as the dispute Moscow itself has with Georgia.
Eventually, there will come a time for peace. There has to come a time
for peace. And we Armenians need to be ready for that eventuality. And
we need to hope that Azerbaijan will have descended into sociopolitical
unrest by that time. With a weakened Azerbaijan, the peace process will
be significantly less painful for Armenia. With things being the way
they are in Azerbaijan, I hope to see Baku dragged to the peace table kicking and screaming.
However, knowing how uncompromising Armenian mindsets can be, and
knowing how politics work, the peace process in question will most
probably be painful for Armenians as well.

When
that day comes, and it will sooner or later, I personally would like to
see a comprehensive peace deal reached between Yerevan and Baku - even
it it entails some land concessions.

I
am not one of your typical Diasporan armchair generals calling for war
from Los Angeles, Beirut or Montreal, nor am I under any illusions about
Armenian military strength. I also believe that despite its current
warlike attitude, Baku will eventually, perhaps after another round of
fighting or after sociopolitical unrest in Azerbaijan, reluctantly come
to the peace table. Nevertheless, the dispute over Artsakh has to be
resolved if we want Armenia's 25 year old stagnation to end. We have to
have peace in the south Caucasus if the region is to prosper once again
after a quarter of a century of destruction. Armenia in particular needs
lasting peace to develop and reach its potential.

Back
in
the late 1990s, the US had come very close to brokering a peace deal
between Yerevan and Baku. The deal in question would have most probably
been a variation of the now infamous "Goble Plan" that envisioned
literally cutting Armenia off from Iran. The parliamentary
assassinations that took place on October 27, 1999 put a quick and
bloody end to the madness. Russia has since reemerged as a world power
and the Caucasus region's only hegemon. It is Moscow's turn to settle
the dispute under its terms. The intent is to bring the south Caucasus
back under its fold and reestablish Pax Russica. This time around, it will be the West's turn to try
to sabotage a Russian-brokered peace deal. As it was during the Cold War, Armenian nationalists will once again be called upon by foreign powers to raise arms against their state. That may have been what we saw take place in Yerevan last summer.
If Armenia's national security officials are not vigilant and execute
their duties well, more unrest may come. Armenia therefore faces
internal and external dangers in a very volatile area of the world and in very dangerous times.

Official Yerevan better begin closely observing the Russian weather vane, lest it gets caught in a bad storm without a reliable shelter.If
in a final peace settlement Armenia gets less than what its national
security needs require, it will ultimately be the fault of its
officials. And speaking of Armenian officials, they should also be aware
of Artsakh's red lines. They need to understand that if they dare
crossing it they will risk assassination. However, at the end of the day, I know only one thing: Another 25 years of
what we have already endured during the past 25 years may put Armenia
permanently in a third world category and on the very edge of being a
failed state. Sooner or later, one way or another, peace and stability has to come to the south Caucasus. And we must understand that peace and stability will have a price. And the price that we pay as a people will ultimately be determined not by our political illiteracy or Russophobia but by the capabilities of our military, the foresightedness of our diplomatic corps and the depth of our ties with Russia.

ArevordiSummer, 2017

***

National Interest: The Next Crisis You're Not Watching: Don't Ignore the South Caucasus

Paris and Syria share the headlines today, but worrying developments
in the South Caucasus raise alarm bells about weak governance and the
risk of war. The countries of the region—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia—have chosen diverging domestic and foreign policy paths, but all
face intense pressures from Russia to expand its influence. The West
should act now to diminish the likelihood of a new war and press for
greater political pluralism. The most serious concerns are internal developments in Azerbaijan and
prospects for a resumption of hostilities between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, an area populated and militarily
controlled by Armenians but located within Azerbaijan.

For the past eighteen months, Azerbaijan has consistently repressed
press and media freedom and basic human rights. Rigged parliamentary
elections on November 1 produced an overwhelming vote for the ruling
party and its satellites with the opposition shut out. There was no
credible monitoring, as the OSCE and European Parliament cancelled
missions when the government did not allow them to operate according to
international standards.Key opposition voices remain imprisoned or exiled with the only ray
of light being the recent transfer to house arrest from prison of the
prominent human rights activist, Arif Yunus, for health reasons.
International calls for the release of his wife Leyla Yunis, Ildar
Mammadov and other political prisoners have fallen on deaf ears.

Anti-Western
and pro-Russian rhetoric is increasing from official
sources, focusing on alleged efforts by the West, especially the United
States, to repeat the Maidan popular uprising of Ukraine in Baku. With
oil and gas prices falling, Azerbaijan is experiencing hits to
its budget, the banking system is in crisis due to questionable loans to
regime loyalists, and speculation about another currency devaluation is
rife. The recent removal of the powerful Minister of Security and
eighty of his colleagues, and the Minister of Communications with
overtones of massive corruption are signs of division within the circle
of the autocratic President Aliyev and his lack of control over key
security ministries.

Concurrently, the situation on [5]the ceasefire line[5]
with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh threatens to deteriorate, as the
number of sniping deaths and attacks with sophisticated weaponry is
mounting. Bilateral and international peace efforts remain frozen as the
respective leaders make no effort to prepare their publics for
compromise and Moscow enables both sides with arms deliveries. A key
risk is a major escalation resulting from a series of smaller clashes, a
scenario which could eventuate as Aliyev’s popularity falls and he
resorts to a military strike to unify the nation. Aliyev, of course,
must weigh Armenia’s defense pact with Russia and the probability of a
military defeat. Yet he is using paranoia, populism, and unpredictable,
bold strikes to build public support. He is also undermining the OSCE
Minsk Group process—the only hope for a peaceful resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The Armenian political situation is relatively quiet. After buckling
under Russian pressure and joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in
lieu of an Association Agreement with the EU, Armenia and the EU are now
to begin negotiations to salvage part of the old Association Agreement
and reconcile it with Armenian EEU membership. This effort by Yerevan to
maintain some balance in its foreign policy and gain more access in a
rich market may yet run into difficulties with Russia. Armenia continues
its hostile narrative vis-à-vis Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, even
as the continuing state of war with Azerbaijan saps its economy,
reinforces its semi-authoritarian political system and provides Russia
with leverage regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Georgia’s reputation as a leader in democratic growth and judicial
reform in the former Soviet Union is now coming into question. The
immediate issue is a battle over the ownership and control of Rustavi 2[6], an independent television broadcaster and leading media voice critical of the ruling Georgia Dream government.

The legal maneuvering has been anything but judicially sound and
transparent. A lower court ruling in the middle of the night
contradicted the Constitutional Court and turned the station back to a
previous owner, who supports the government. The latter argues that he
had been forced by the prior government of President Mikheil Saakashvili
to sell his asset at a giveaway price. The latest turn is that the
lower court judge has altered his original ruling to now leave control
of the station to the present owners until their appeal process is
completed.

Many in the West and in Georgia see this evident judicial abuse as a
direct attack on freedom of the press, at a time when the government’s
popularity is falling due to Georgia’s weak economic performance and
alleged indecisive leadership. To thicken the plot, intercepted tapes of
alleged phone conversations between Saakashvili, now governor of the
Odessa region in Ukraine, and several of his supporters in Georgia,
record his calling on them to use the Rustavi 2 issue to develop a
“revolutionary” scenario to challenge the current government.
Parliamentary elections will be held in October 2016, and right now,
undecided voters are in the majority.

The development and export to world markets of Caspian energy remains
a Western strategic interest. But with the emergence of alternative
global sources of energy, the drop in oil and gas prices, and the
reduced need for logistical support to NATO forces in Afghanistan the
South Caucasus may become less important in these dimensions.

The pivotal location between Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Middle
East, however, requires that the West pay more policy level attention to
the South Caucasus. Peacemaking with Armenia and Azerbaijan has long
been frustrating for the West and Russia, but it remains worthwhile to
reduce the risk that Nagorno-Karabakh will erupt into a hot war. It
could even ensnare Turkey, Russia and Iran in wider tensions. This
requires the parties to decide that face-to-face negotiations under
Minsk Group mediation are the way forward. Second, the West should
pursue tough love with Azerbaijan to counter its authoritarian spiral
and free the remaining political prisoners. Finally, the West ought to
conduct a more direct dialog with the Georgian government and opposition
about democratic principles and freedom of the press, and how they may
affect its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Recent
meetings between the heads of Georgia and Azerbaijan with the most
senior American officials should alert Washington to the importance of
strengthening peace and security in the troubled South Caucasus.

For over 20 years, the Minsk Group (created by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)
that was established in the wake of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, has accomplished virtually nothing while
the risk of a renewed war grows steadily along with the quality of
weapons that both sides possess. Recently Russian-made missiles locked on to an Azerbaijani helicopter carrying the Defense Minister and Azerbaijan hit these launchers with an Israeli-made missile.
But it was the missiles, not the initial locking onto the helicopter,
that aroused this group’s consternation. Indeed, the U.S. does not even
appoint a senior-level individual to the Minsk Group — not even at the
ambassadorial level — so it clearly does not rate highly in Washington.

Nevertheless,
preventing renewed hostilities is very much in America’s interest.
Since Moscow not only sells high-grade weapons to both sides, it
pressures Azerbaijan to renounce its independence and join Moscow’s
Eurasian Economic Union, while it obtains a 99-year lease for bases in
Armenia. It is clear that Russia seeks to manage, not resolve, this
conflict. Meanwhile
the threat of war grows with thousands of casualties and refugees
because both sides now possess high-tech weapons. Moreover, Azerbaijan is rebuilding
its forces in Nakhichevan, the province that is both the ancestral seat
of the ruling Aliyev family and the territory closest to Armenia, in
growing anticipation of a potential war.

A
war would almost certainly lead to the full Russian takeover of the
Armenian forces as Yerevan and Moscow have agreed to create joint forces
that Russia will control in case of war. Since Russia already has a
major base at Gyumri and has fortified it with troops and advanced
weapons, a war would amount to Russian occupation of Armenia as well as a
likely Russian military intervention against Azerbaijan, perhaps even
an invasion. And given the closeness and long-standing historical and
cultural affinities between Turkey and Azerbaijan this war would also
raise the specter of Turkish involvement.

These
are not idle speculations. The level of violence and number of
incidents in and around Nagorno-Karabakh have steadily risen over the
last few years while nothing has been done to arrest the drift to a new
war that benefits only Moscow. But preserving peace and security in an
increasingly important zone is not our only interest here. Moscow has
steadily encroached upon Georgia’s territories and relentlessly tried to
subvert both Azerbaijan and Georgia from within. Russian influence has
led to new political parties based on diaspora figures in Russia to
stand in those countries’ elections, while inciting ethnic minorities
against the governments in Tbilisi and Baku.

Apart
from Russia’s ingrained imperialism, the West has concrete strategic
interests here. In Georgia, Russia is sending a message not to join NATO
lest Georgia’s integrity and sovereignty be destroyed. Meanwhile
Russian troops are annexing parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
planning these territories’ incorporation into the Russian Federation. Furthermore,
as Azerbaijan’s joint pipeline with Turkey from Baku through Anatolia
to the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea approaches completion, Russia is
pulling every trick in the book to prevent an energy rival from
competing with it in the Balkans.

Thus,
Russia’s aggressive policies are as evident here as they are elsewhere.
And its tactics are the same everywhere. Russia creates “frozen
conflicts”, invades states that resist its pressure, prevents them from
exercising their sovereign right to look to Europe, occupies their
territory and declares “independent states” there that then are
incorporated into Russia. It also continues to use its energy as a
weapon, which is precisely why Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
met with Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev in Istanbul. Therefore,
it is clear what we need to do to advance our own interests and those of
states who wish to work with us.

Rather
than tolerate the Minsk Group’s inactivity, Washington should launch a
mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since our stated policy is
to cooperate with Russia wherever feasible, and Russia reiterates its
desire for peace there (even if its actions are contradictory) this is
an excellent opportunity to call Putin’s bluff. And if he shuns
mediation, we should do it ourselves and show our interest in regional
peace. Second, we should make clear our support for unhampered flow of
Azerbaijan’s energy to Europe and freer and more diversified routes of
energy supply for Europe. Third, if we wish to encourage democratization
in Azerbaijan as we have in Georgia we ought to take Baku’s security
concerns seriously for that is the only way to achieve progress on human
rights. Fourth, we ought to bolster Georgia’s security with action —
rather than verbal proposals.

Moscow’s
aggressive and imperial tactics in the Caucasus are just as visible as
they are in Ukraine and equally dangerous to international security.
Neglect, which can only be malign neglect here, does not advance
American interests or promote regional security. Therefore, we should
not continue contributing to that neglect because as the signs already
show, that means not only more wars. But the ones to come will have
greater repercussions and are likely to spread to Europe and our allies.

International Crisis Group Report: Armenian Military Planning To Push Deeper Into Azerbaijan

Armenia
has decided that if fighting again breaks out with Azerbaijan, it will
attempt to take the offensive and seize more Azerbaijani territory.
That's the scoop from a new report from the International Crisis Group.

The report,
Nagorno-Karabakh’s Gathering War Clouds, summarizes the political,
diplomatic, and military developments since last year's "April War"
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It convincingly makes the argument that
"Armenia and Azerbaijan are closer to war than at any point since the
1994 ceasefire." From
The Bug Pit's perspective, the most intriguing news from the report is
that: "[d]e facto Nagorno-Karabakh has even declared its readiness, if
attacked, to advance deeper into Azerbaijan’s densely populated
territory along the Line of Contact to gain a new security belt and
strengthen its hand in future negotiations."

Recall
that last April's fighting saw the first time territory has changed
hands between the two sides since 1994, when Azerbaijan seized the strategic heights of Lala Tapa on the southern edge of the line of contact. Now,
apparently, Armenia -- though it fully controls Nagorno Karabakh, as
well as a security zone two-and-a-half times as large around the
disputed region -- may want to push its advantage.

"Toward
the end of the winter, an internal consensus emerged within the de
facto Nagorno-Karabakh leadership that – in the event of an Azerbaijani
attack – the Armenian side should not only defend their positions, but
also attempt to advance deeper into Azerbaijan," the report said, citing
unnamed government and military officials from the de facto Nagorno
Karabakh government.

"Preliminary
planning by Nagorno-Karabakh-based military suggests advancing 15km
beyond the established Line of Contact, which, they believe, would force
the enemy to abandon hostilities, or at a minimum establish a new
buffer zone that could break the enemy’s will to conduct regular attacks
and become a new negotiating bargaining tool," the report adds.

In
another bit of news, the report also cited Russian officials -- again
unnamed -- acknowledging that they wanted to have a military presence in
Karabakh. While both Armenians and Azerbaijanis have long suspected
that motive behind Russian offers to set up international peacekeeping,
it's still noteworthy to hear it from a Russian official. (One of the
few areas on which the two sides agree is that neither wants a Russian
military presence in the region.)

The
report also provides a little glimpse at the effect that the war had on
daily life in Karabakh, where news on the ground is hard to come by.
"During the escalation, the de facto authorities called up the vast
majority of Nagorno-Karabakh’s male population, most of whom remained in
the trenches for at least the next two months," the report notes. Anyway,
you don't need The Bug Pit to tell you that the whole report is an
essential read for getting up to date on the biggest security threat in
the region. Read it here.

European Council on Foreign Relations: Nagorno-Karabakh: The edge of Russia’s orbit

The
flare-up in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016 again raised questions as to
the extent of Moscow’s influence and role in the South Caucasus. It is
quite clear that Karabakh is the only post-Soviet de facto state that is
not under Russia’s control. There is no common border, no Russian
troops in Karabakh, and no direct relations with Moscow. But even so,
the simmering conflict provides Russia with tremendous leverage in the
South Caucasus – a region Moscow considers to be its backyard. It was
again Moscow’s diplomatic intervention that ended the fighting in April.

After
the collapse of the Tsarist regime in Russia, Karabakh became a
disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1921, Stalin
decided to place the entity, predominantly inhabited by ethnic
Armenians, under Baku’s control as a way to divide and rule the South
Caucasus. This uneasy arrangement lasted until the Soviet Union started
to disintegrate in the late 1980s. Serious inter-ethnic clashes erupted
in 1988 after the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast voted to join
Armenia. Moscow rejected this decision and sent troops to Yerevan to
calm the situation but to no avail. As the Soviet Union collapsed,
Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in September 1991. Inter-ethnic
clashes intensified and, by early 1992, Armenia and Azerbaijan were at
war. While there were several attempts to end the fighting, it was
Russia that managed to mediate a ceasefire, in May 1994.

Today,
Russia remains the main mediator in the conflict. Russia, together with
the United States and France, are co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group
but, in this trio, it is clearly Russia that has the most dominant role.
Yet its actual interest in resolving the conflict is dubious. While
Russia does not want a major outbreak of hostilities, it is questionable
whether it actually wants a resolution to the conflict. The status quo –
in which Karabakh’s status remains unsolved – suits Russia well. It
provides Russia with the greatest leverage it could hope for in this
part of the South Caucasus. In order to maintain this status quo, Moscow
strives for parity between the Azeri and Armenian sides, in part by
selling arms to both – all this while being allied with Armenia.

The Russian security presence and the absence of diplomatic relations

Ever
since the ceasefire in 1994, analysts have discussed the possibility of
deploying international peacekeepers to the conflict zone. Although
there is an understanding among the three co-chairs that none of them
would provide peacekeepers in the event of a settlement, Russia has
eyed-up the possibility of deploying troops. This would provide Moscow
with increased leverage over Armenia and Azerbaijan and influence in the
region.

It
is for this reason that the sides are sceptical of the prospect of
Russian troops in the enclave. Although Russia has some 5,000 troops in
Armenia, the Karabakhis have never demonstrated any wish to host
peacekeepers, saying that only the Karabakh army can be the guarantor of
their own security. Until now the only forces on the frontline are
Armenian – a portion of them being transported over from Armenia itself
and doing their two years of compulsory military service.

The
four-day battle in April, when Azerbaijan took Karabakh positions on
the Line of Contact, raised the possibility once more of deploying
peacekeepers. But Karabakh’s negative perception of peacekeepers –
Russian or otherwise – has not changed. Moreover, neither of the active
parties nor the US or France would accept a contingent of Russian
peacekeepers alone in the conflict zone.

Even
without boots on the ground, Moscow retains considerable leverage over
both sides. Russia is Armenia’s strategic ally. It has two military
bases in Armenia and sells arms to Yerevan at reduced prices. In
addition, both Russia and Armenia are members of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a Russia-led organisation that includes
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Although it
does not cover Karabakh, the territory can still benefit indirectly,
receiving cheap weaponry through Armenia.

But
Russia sells weaponry to Azerbaijan as well, arming both sides in the
conflict. In 2013, Baku signed $4 billion worth of arms deals with
Russia – considerably more than it has signed with Armenia. In response
to Armenian criticism, the CSTO’s secretary general, Nikolai Bordyuzha,
said the sales were “simple business deriving from our economic
interests”. By selling weapons to both sides, Russia keeps them
dependent on Moscow, which can pull different strings to control the
security balance in the region. This criticism increased after the
recent fighting in April, when Azerbaijan used weaponry purchased from
Russia.

Nagorno-Karabakh
has no official political or diplomatic ties with Russia. But some
members of the Russian State Duma have visited Karabakh to observe
elections or attend other events. However, there is Karabakhi
representation in Moscow, even though it does not have diplomatic
status. This office maintains contact with Karabakhis in Russia, works
with local businessmen and experts, and organises educational and
cultural events. Russia has no diplomatic presence in Karabakh.

Economic ties with Russia via the Armenian bridge

Since
Karabakh is unrecognised, it has no official ties with any state except
Armenia. For that reason, Stepanakert trades through Armenia. This
means that Karabakh-made products are stamped as “Made in Armenia”. The
same process was taking place when Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic
Union (EEU) in 2015, meaning that the doors of the EEU were effectively
opened to Karabakhi products too. Nagorno-Karabakh exports mostly
agricultural products, as well as textiles and mining products.

This
means that there are import and export relations between Russian and
Karabakhi companies. Russia is Karabakh’s second-largest export market
after Armenia. In the past three years, it made up 3–4 percent of all
exports ($2 million). Imports from Russia are relatively low too at
around 1.2 percent in 2015 ($3 million). Though there was a rapid
increase in 2015 probably due to Armenia entering the EEU.

Russian
foreign direct investment in Karabakh has increased in recent years. In
2014, Russian investments had increased to 58.6 percent of all foreign
direct investment. It is largely Russian Armenians that are the source
of these investments, mostly in tourism, agriculture, mining, and
hydroelectric power. In recent years, Karabakh has recorded 8–10 percent
GDP growth, but also an increase in tourism, which has grown annually
at over 10 percent. In 2015, Karabakh had around 17,000 foreign
tourists, nearly half of whom were Russian, and mostly of Armenian
origin.

Russians in Karabakh, Karabakhis in Russia

In
1992, after the establishment of a land corridor with Armenia, the
Karabakh authorities allowed national minorities to choose whether to
stay or move elsewhere, and provided government assistance in accordance
with people’s desires. As a result, in 1992, a considerable number of
Russians and Greeks left Karabakh. But those Russians and Ukrainians who
stayed in Karabakh later officially established an organisation to
represent themselves. Currently, the community has around 200 members
who are either Russian or Ukrainian. Including the children of mixed
marriages, they number over 700.

The
Ministry of Culture gives this community €6,000 per year to organise
national events, and covers their costs if they make trips to Russia for
events. The community gets no support from the Russian government, the
only exception being a couple of years ago, when Yuri Luzhkov was mayor
of Moscow. He funded the Russian community to hold Russian traditional
ceremonies and keep their cultural identity. The Karabakh government
funds a Russian “Sunday school”. There is also a religious organisation
called the Russian Orthodox Church of Artsakh, established in 2009.
Stepanakert municipality provided the community land to build a church
and a cultural centre.

The
overwhelming majority of Russians living in Nagorno-Karabakh have
Armenian citizenship. This is because many of the people who live in
Karabakh have done so since the Soviet period, and had to claim a
national passport again in the 1990s. The largest Armenian diaspora in
the world is in Russia, at around two million people. This obviously
includes Armenians from Karabakh. The majority of them have some family
ties to Karabakh, though few would likely send remittances.

Russian language and culture in Karabakh

In
Stepanakert, there is one school that provides education in Russian for
the most part, but which follows the Armenian curriculum. The school
accepts only children whose parents are Russian citizens or are
foreigners that have lived and studied in Russia for some time. At all
other schools in Karabakh, the operational language is Armenian.
Children are also taught two foreign languages – Russian, and English,
French, or German. In
the early 1990s, there were more Russian TV channels broadcasting in
Karabakh than Armenian ones. But today the Armenian media is more
influential at the expense of the Russian media.

In
the Soviet period, the Russian language was strong in Karabakh because
the Armenian language was repressed by the Soviet Azeri authorities, and
the population did not want to study or use Azeri. As there were so few
good Armenian schools, parents preferred to send their children to
Russian schools. Nowadays, as in Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russian is
perceived as a foreign language with regional importance but little
more.

Given
the Soviet Russian legacy and the impact of Russian media and language,
Russian culture had a strong presence in Karabakhi life in the 1990s.
However, in parallel with the development of the country and the
strengthening of Armenian culture, language, and media, the influence of
Russian culture has decreased. Moreover, cultural events have
diversified, including more Armenian and Western influence. As a result,
more and more world-known artists visit Karabakh and hold concerts and
master classes there. On the other hand, it is also obvious that
Russia’s traditionally strong position in the near abroad gives Moscow
an opportunity to affect developments mostly through security tools, its
strategic alliance with Armenia, and its position as one of the three
co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group.

Every year, as the spring thaw
is awaited in the mountains of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the small coterie
of scholars and experts who keep an eye on the Nagorny Karabakh
conflict ask, “Will there be war?” This year, Karabakh watchers are
especially gloomy. Twenty-sixteen was a bad year, and 2017 could yet be
worse.

Over four days last April, up to 200 Armenians and Azerbaijanis died
in the worst fighting since 1994 across the so-called line of contact
that divides their two armies east of the disputed territory of Nagorny
Karabakh and cuts across Azerbaijani territory that the Armenians
captured as they secured a victory in the conflict of the 1990s.The
violence precipitated a flurry of diplomatic activity over the summer.
The Azerbaijanis tentatively agreed to measures to strengthen the 1994
ceasefire regime, and the Armenians assented to a more comprehensive
negotiating process. But in the last six months, the deals provisionally
concluded in the summer have slowly unraveled. The Karabakh situation
has defaulted to a familiar and depressing mix of mutual accusations of
bad faith, Azerbaijani frustration, Armenian inertia, and diplomatic
wrestling over tiny details.

Of course, as U.S. Founding Father
Benjamin Franklin said, a bad peace is better than a good war. A new
conflict in the Caucasus could lead to thousands of casualties and
economic devastation—without resolving the core issues of the dispute.
But there is a danger that the parties could miscalculate and end up
fighting anyway, despite their better judgment.

The arrangements made in 1994–1995
after the ceasefire was signed look less and less sustainable: no
peacekeepers, a tiny Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
monitoring mission with a limited mandate, and a process that has
managed the situation but not resolved it. In 1994, the 250-kilometer
(155-mile) line of contact was a string of hastily dug trenches
separating the two armies, across which conscript soldiers took
occasionally potshots—and sometimes met to chat and exchange cigarettes.
Now, it is the most militarized zone in Europe, bristling with
artillery, long-range missile launchers, attack helicopters, and
military drones. Azerbaijan has spent billions of dollars of oil
revenues on new weaponry. The Armenians have spent less but maintained a
credible defensive capability, thanks to buying Russian weapons at
discounted prices.

In the four-day war in April 2016, the
Azerbaijani side recaptured two small pockets of territory. The
psychological boost the Azerbaijanis received was far bigger. The
perception of a successful military offensive helped reverse
two-decades-old feelings of humiliation, and an upsurge of patriotism
helped distract the Azerbaijani population from a shrinking economy and
falling currency.Now that the latest diplomatic initiative,
spearheaded by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, has stalled,
there is a temptation for Baku to retry what might be called military
leverage—to launch another operation to recapture territory and put
pressure on the Armenian side.

The risk is that a small
operation would inevitably escalate into something even more serious
than last time. The Azerbaijani authorities would be under pressure to
capture substantial amounts of territory, rather than the small slivers
they took last time. The Armenians would be under pressure from their
public to fight more strongly than they did last April and reverse any
gains made by the other side.

Both sides almost certainly
overestimate their military prowess. Both also have newly acquired
deadly weaponry. The Armenians have obtained Iskander missiles from Russia
that they exhibited at an Independence Day parade in September 2016.
The weapons have a range of 280 kilometers (174 miles) and could be
targeted at urban centers or oil and gas infrastructure in Azerbaijan.
This would be a desperate option, but possible if a larger-scale
Azerbaijani were launched. Such a move would also be in line with
Armenia’s 2015 military strategy, which permits preemptive action in the
name of deterrence. The Azerbaijanis have made big weapons purchases from Israel, including an Iron Dome missile-defense system and military drones.

If the military context is dangerous, the political one is no better. Azerbaijan’s oil boom has ended and the economy has declined further
over the last year, shrinking by around 4 percent in 2016, with the
manat having lost 57 percent of its value since January 2015.In Armenia,
President Serzh Sargsyan faces a tricky parliamentary election on April
2. When the vote is completed, his country is due to make the
transition to a new constitution in which executive power switches from
the president to the parliament. This is widely perceived as a gambit by
Sargsyan, whose second and last presidential term ends in 2018, to find
a way of shoring up his own power. The switch is controversial and the
opposition will use the election to challenge him in all ways possible.

A final factor of instability is international turbulence—the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, ongoing crises in the EU—which is being felt in the South Caucasus and could encourage the parties to behave more irresponsibly and believe they can get away with more.

If
there is fighting, it will be hard to manage. In April 2016, Moscow
negotiated a verbal ceasefire between the parties. But it is a
misconception that Moscow is pulling the strings in the Karabakh
conflict. Moscow has never been in control since the dispute broke out
in 1988, having tried variously to back one side or the other or to
mediate. Currently, Russia is highly distrusted in both countries and
neither Baku nor Yerevan will allow it to impose its own agenda on their
number one national issue.

In short, the threat of preemptive
violence over Karabakh needs to be met with intense preemptive
diplomacy. A descent into new conflict in the South Caucasus is the last
thing anyone wants—least of all the ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis
who will be caught in the middle of it.

More than two months ago, an escalation in the Azerbaijan-Karabakh
conflict without precedent since 1994 occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh. From
the night of April 1 to April 2, combat operations continued until
April 5, having begun in two parts of the contact line between the
Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army and the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. On that
day, the parties agreed to an armistice, signed in Moscow. The four-day
war answered many questions regarding military balance, while posing new
ones. Since the threat of another escalation is not excluded, it makes
sense to analyze the condition of the armed forces of Armenia, the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan, taking into account the
results of the short but bloody April war. But first, we must talk about
the early history of the Azerbaijan-Karabakh conflict.

Roots of the Conflict: The Early Twentieth Century

Bloody collisions occurred between Armenians and Azerbaijanis twice
at the beginning of the twentieth century: from 1905 to 1907 and from
1918 to 1920. During those years, after the end of the First World War,
the Soviet Union was taking shape. During this process, in 1921 the
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, approximately 90 percent of its
population Armenians who practiced the Christian religion, was allocated
to the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Some years later the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) was created, and was deprived
of any direct land connection with the Armenian SSR.

During the years of the USSR’s decay in the late 1980s, a
reunification movement arose in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. It was
fueled by the policy of pushing Armenians out of the NKAR; by 1989, the
share of the Armenian population in the NKAR was down to 76.9 percent.
Additionally, in 1988 the local Muslim population in the Azerbaijani
city of Sumgait implemented the most brutal programs regarding the
Armenian population, at which the Soviet leadership completely lost
control over the processes underway. The NKAR declared its independency
from Azerbaijan, resulting in the outbreak of war in 1991. The war
continued until May 12, 1994, when three parties—Armenia, the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan—signed a provisional cease-fire
agreement. The Armenians gained victory in this war, having established
control over the NKAR and the territories around it by renewing the
land connection with Armenia.

Upon signing the armistice, the parties led negotiations within the
framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. However, this process did not yield
any actual results. In recent years, violations of the state of
cease-fire and constant losses from both sides have become regular
occurrences.

The Four-Day War Is a Bloody Stalemate without Hope of Success

As a result, in April 2016, Azerbaijan attempted to resolve the
conflict through military means. About one hundred men from the Armenian
side, and more than one hundred from the Azerbaijani side, died during
these four days (despite the fact that Azerbaijan officially recognized
thirty-one losses, only fifty dead bodies were found on Armenian
territory, and the opposition media counted more than one hundred killed
persons, some neutral media even spoke of some three to eight hundred
casualties). A significant quantity of armor was destroyed, and villages
near the border met with significant harm.

As for the results, Azerbaijan was able to move forward three to four
kilometers in two directions during the first day, because of the
suddenness of attack and the posting of a detachment of special forces
in the village of Talysh. However, from the moment the Nagorno-Karabakh
Defense Army began its full-scale military operation, the attackers’
successes withered. The detachment of special forces was almost
completely annihilated in Talshyn, together with its commander, and some
of the lost positions were forcibly retaken. By the time the armistice
was signed, Azerbaijan was able to occupy several hills, with an overall
area of about eight hundred hectares. Nevertheless, there are no signs
of serious success—any attempt at blitzkrieg had no real chance, and by
the second day, the war already had the character of a bloody stalemate,
with dozens of people dying to advance or retreat by one hundred
meters.

The Existing Balance of Forces Will Not Allow Azerbaijan to Attack

Before the conflict, the media often advanced the opinion that
Azerbaijan, having purchased billions of dollars in arms from Israel,
Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, could tilt the balance in its favor.
Azerbaijani officials said they would be able to retake Nagorno-Karabakh
by force in the space of one or two weeks. Nevertheless, as we have
already said above, any attempted blitzkrieg had no chance in April. Let
us see what existing balance of forces we are left with. Regarding manpower, there are approximately sixty to seventy thousand
men in the armed forces of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Approximately
seventy thousand men are in the Azerbaijani army; however, it has a
higher mobilization potential, taking into account Azerbaijan’s larger
overall population.

All parties are armed with a “classic” rifle for post-Soviet
countries: different series of Kalashnikov guns. The special detachments
also have some Western models of arms—for example, Azerbaijan has
purchased a number of Israeli assault rifles TAR-21. The variety of
sniper rifles is great; almost all basic Western and Russian models
appear. As for antitank means, both parties have a large number of
antitank missile systems of Soviet and Russian manufacture, and
Azerbaijan has also purchased modern Israeli Spike systems, which proved
their quality during the four-day war. As for Armenia, the country was
able to purchase some number of Franco-German Milan antitank missile
systems by an unknown supplier. Both parties to the conflict are armed
with hundreds of man-portable “Igla” air defense systems.

As for armor, here Azerbaijan possesses a qualitative advantage,
having purchased a large batch of armaments in Russia: Baku has obtained
approximately one hundred modern T-90C tanks and one hundred BMP-3
mechanized infantry combat vehicles. That said, altogether the parties
have approximately four hundred tanks each; in the case of Armenia these
are generally Soviet T-72Bs. The situation is similar with regard to
conventional artillery—but, to tell the truth, it is almost impossible
to count the exact number of armaments: a great number are located in
Nagorno-Karabakh, where much information is classified. However,
Azerbaijan has eighteen “Msta-C” self-propelled 152-millimeter
howitzers.

Today, Azerbaijan has obtained the most sensible advantage in the
field of heavy multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). The country has
thirty “Smerch” three-hundred-millimeter MLRS that are able to fire at a
distance of up to ninety kilometers, and eighteen TOC-1A “Solntsepyok”
reactive flamethrower systems . There is some information about
Azerbaijan’s contract with Turkey for the delivery of
three-hundred-millimeter Kasirga MLRS. As for Armenia, regarding heavy MLRS, today the country has,
according to different sources, four to eight Chinese WM-80 systems that
fire at a distance of up to 120 kilometers, as well as, according to
some sources, six Chinese copies of the “Smerch” AR1A. However, this
difference will be soon nullified: Armenia has ordered a number of
“Smerch” MLRS and TOC-1A “Solntsepyok” units from Russia.

It is interesting that Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh were able to
obtain a sensible advantage in the field of ballistic missiles. Armenian
soldiers are armed with a significant number of “Tochka-U” Tactical
Ballistic Missile Systems (SS-21 Scarab A according to NATO
classification) that can fire at a distance of up to 120 kilometers.
Besides, Armenians have at least eight R-17 launchers (SS-1c Scud B
according to NATO classification) with thirty-two missiles that are able
to fly to any target in Azerbaijan; its maximum launching range is
three hundred kilometers.

Let us now look at the potential enemies’ air forces. In spite of the
visible and serious advantages of Azerbaijan, the parties are nearly
equal here. And that is because both have powerful antiaircraft defense
systems, preventing the use of aviation in the conflict. This was
partially confirmed by the four-day war—almost at once, Azerbaijan lost
one Mi-24G attack helicopter (two, according to Armenian sources), after
which aircraft did not participate in the conflict at all. Armenia’s antiaircraft defense system is armed at least with six
battalions of S-300 air-defense missile systems (ADMS—NATO reporting
name SA-10 Grumble). This is a huge number for a country with relatively
little territory. Azerbaijan also has S-300s and other antiaircraft
defense systems that are almost impossible to be suppressed by the
Soviet Su-25 attack aircraft and MiG-29 fighters that the parties own.

Finally, we shall turn to unmanned aerial vehicles. Both parties used
them widely during the recent escalation. Azerbaijan uses a wide range
of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (reconnaissance as well as kamikaze
IAI Harop UAVs), while Armenia relies on models of its own manufacture. A
comparable number of unmanned aerial vehicles has probably not been
lost in any other conflict in such a short period of time. Azerbaijan
lost a minimum of ten unmanned aerial vehicles (some “landed” by means
of electronic warfare, some were brought down by “Osa-AKM” short-range
air-defense missile systems and twenty-three-millimeter “Shilka”
antiaircraft guns) while Armenia lost at least two.

In spite of some qualitative advantage, as we see, it is impossible
to say that Azerbaijan has any overwhelming dominance. Assuming that it
will attack, and that Armenia continuously fortifies its positions and
constructs new fortifications, a war will be very difficult and long
without any breakthroughs, which will make it senseless for Baku.
Besides, taking into account the existence of the serious long-range
MLRS and ballistic missiles of the enemy, there is a high risk of the
destruction of large settlements and infrastructure, including gas and
oil facilities. It is almost impossible to forecast the results of the
stalemate, somewhat similar to the First World War.

As
the equilibrium between Azerbaijan and Armenia breaks down, Baku is
left with an unpalatable choice: increasingly losing control of the
situation or being drawn further into Russia’s orbit. After the end of
the ‘four-day war’− a brief but violent outbreak of hostilities between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh − there are muted hopes for
a renewal of peace negotiations. This bodes poorly for Baku – despite
Azerbaijan’s military advantage over Armenia, it has increasingly
limited diplomatic choices.

Timing

Azerbaijan’s
offensive was clearly the result of planning and training but it was
not a blitzkrieg aimed at liberating territories under Armenian
occupation – once the mission was completed, Azerbaijan announced a
unilateral truce. Baku gambled on psychological factors such as a
demonstration of the technological advancement of its armed forces. The
timing of escalation led to speculation that the Azerbaijani authorities
used the conflict chiefly to distract the population from domestic
factors – such as the country’s economic decline and corruption scandals
revealed in the Panama Papers. But were this truly a factor, the
offensive would likely have taken place in January, amid the regional
protests against price hikes, or immediately following the revelations
of the Panama Papers.

The more likely scenario is that Armenia’s
declaration in February that it would pursue a deterrence strategy
including the possibility of a preemptive strike became strategically
problematic for Baku. Such a policy could limit Baku’s abilities along
the Line of Contact. Thus, a carefully controlled escalation served to
raise international awareness of the fragility of a status quo which
Azerbaijan regards as unfavourable, in order to galvanize the
international mediators and put pressure on Yerevan to be constructive
at the negotiating table.

In addition, the military escalation
also destroyed any expectations Armenia might have harboured for support
from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Its response was fragmented, with Belarus, for example, openly
supporting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

Non-military goals

But
Baku’s ultimate goal was diplomatic, to put pressure on the Armenian
side. A stalemate in negotiations is unpalatable, and the military
offensive helped to show Baku’s military muscle with offensive weapons
of a higher technological capability than Yerevan’s. While both
countries are reliant on Russian exports for conventional arming, Baku
has used its larger state budget to acquire military equipment from
other sources such as Israel and Turkey.

There has been a
stalemate over Nagorny Karabakh since the failure of the 2011 Kazan
meeting under Moscow’s auspices, which was intended to produce a
framework agreement on conflict resolution. At that point, Azerbaijan
offered to support the re-opening of the Turkish-Armenian border in
exchange for partial liberation of territories. Previously it had
opposed the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations without full
liberation as a prerequisite. At the Munich Security Conference in
February 2015, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that
‘de-occupation of some of these districts, assuming negotiations
continue, will immediately change the picture’.

The offensive has
two further non-military goals. First, Baku needs to secure
international investment − primarily for its gas projects, to compensate
for the effect on its economy of the decline in oil prices. Baku does
not have the luxury of engaging in military adventurism with the risk of
a full-blown war. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan hopes that the situation will
encourage potential investors to return.

The second is to
consolidate army and military reform. Baku’s military budget has
increased from $175 million in 2004 to $4.8 billion, which the
population has thus far tolerated because of symbolic military
successes. But without results in diplomatic negotiations, and with
continuing troop losses, the public will turn against the government.
More importantly, the effectiveness of Baku’s strategy depends not
merely on deterring Armenian troops on the frontline through a war of
attrition, but on the Azerbaijani army’s resolution to use its military
power as a deterrent during negotiations. The reaction of Armenia is
crucial; recent events could provoke a more pro-active Armenian position
on Azerbaijan. Further escalation could harm the already pitifully thin
modicum of trust between the two societies and their respective
leaders.

The Russian factor

The
short war has shone a light on Russia’s actions in the region. Moscow
was previously uninterested in stopping the skirmishes. While most
people in Armenia and Azerbaijan perceive Russia’s hand in the
escalation, Russia’s pretense of being a mediator of the conflict has
been exposed, with the unwelcome publicity that it has been selling arms
to both sides.

The short war has increased the need to revive
the negotiations and Russia is most likely to utilize the opportunity.
Russia would like to return to the failed Kazan accords, which would
entail returning five or six territories and then resolving key sticking
points including the political future of Nagorny Karabakh. Russia hopes
that with a resolution of the conflict, it can compel Azerbaijan into
joining the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union. This is Azerbaijan’s
dilemma: submitting itself into the Russian sphere is a high price to
pay, even for conflict resolution. However, in the absence of diplomatic
negotiations, Baku could see increasing levels of domestic unrest.
Thus, if tangible results do not come soon, more devastating military
action may lie ahead.

The Jamestown Foundation: Azerbaijan’s War of Attrition: A New Strategy to Resolve the Karabakh Conflict?

he
escalation of tensions between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces
along the line of contact (LOC) saw the outbreak of a five-day exchange
of fire, the bloodiest since the 1994 ceasefire agreement. The latest
clashes ended with a mutually agreed ceasefire on April 5. According to
official estimations from both sides, the Azerbaijani side lost 31
soldiers (Azadliq.org, April 6), while Yerevan’s last official statement—not updated—says they lost 20 men, with 26 soldiers missing (Panarmenian.net, 5 April). Both countries have also lost military equipment, including tanks and military helicopters.

The outbreak of clashes prompted speculation about the timing—both the
Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents were in Washington, DC, for the
Nuclear Summit. Russia’s approach also led to questions: Moscow
contented itself with a statement calling for an end to the violence,
rather than the expected intervention to demonstrate Russia’s key role
in the Karabakh conflict. This is precisely what happened back in August
2014, when hostilities were cut short by Moscow’s involvement. It was
suggested at the time that Moscow had manufactured the escalation of
tensions in order to show off its mediation capacity to the West,
emphasizing Russia’s regional influence on the eve of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) September 2014 summit in Wales (Caucasus
Analytical Digest, September 17, 2014).

But
Moscow did not attempt such an intervention during the recent clashes,
despite their devastating outcome. Moreover, the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Moscow-led military bloc in which
Yerevan has placed its hopes, limited itself to calls to end the
fighting. It did not support the Armenian position. On the contrary, one
member state, Kazakhstan, released a statement of neutrality, while
another, Belarus, declared that the conflict should be resolved based on
international legal principles of territorial integrity, creating deep
bewilderment in Yerevan (Euro Belarus Information Service,
April 4). These two developments undercut early speculation by some
analysts that Moscow had also manufactured this month’s skirmishes, in
order to punish Azerbaijan for attempting to revitalize relations with
the United States and the West, following a long period of relative
disengagement.

Azerbaijan’s military offensive and its policies during the period of
escalation may have been precipitated by a “gentlemen’s agreement”
between Baku and Moscow; or Russia could have given Azerbaijan a kind of
“green light” for military action, as long as the latter refrained from
pushing Armenia to question its strategic alliance with Moscow. Whether
or not such an understanding was reached, clearly Baku did not cross
Moscow’s red line—i.e. April’s military operation did not lead to a
full-fledged war. At the same time, Russia benefits financially from
this situation and so is taking a business-like approach. The
Azerbaijani army’s military offensive means that Baku will need to
negotiate the purchase of replacement military equipment from Moscow in
the future. At the same time, Yerevan is also requesting help to arm its
military. This situation strengthens Russia’s role in conflict
management.

However,
Azerbaijan’s military strategy suggests this was not just a case of
displaying military muscle. Rather, Baku apparently hoped to open up the
way for the diplomatic resolution of the conflict, bringing Armenia to
the negotiations table by militarily changing the status quo along the
LOC.

The overall situation shows that Azerbaijan’s military commanders had
planned in advance for their army units—with some degree of support from
the air force—to be prepared to react to an Armenian violation of the
LOC. Armenia’s strategy was to rely on a hazardous landmine zone on its
side of the LOC. This zone would be much harder to penetrate for
Azerbaijani forces, and would result in devastating personnel losses
(Crisis Group, Europe Briefing no. 71, September 26, 2013). If they
succeeded in getting through the second echelon of defense, Azerbaijani
army units would face mobilized Armenian units.

The
aim of the Azerbaijani forces was to isolate Armenian units that had
been cut off near the various fortifications along the contact line, and
operations were launched in five directions (Anadolu Agency,
April 2). With that, the initial goal was to take strategic
heights—providing an important advantage in terms of targeting military
infrastructure. By April 3, when Baku declared a unilateral truce,
Azerbaijani forces had taken Lele Tepe, a small peak in occupied Fuzuli
region; a hill around the Talish village in the Aghdere region; and the
Seysulan settlement (APA,
April 2). Azerbaijani forces calculated that Armenian troops would
mobilize to take back these lost territories, and Azerbaijan would
respond by deploying Orbiter 2M weaponized drones with the Spike-LR
missiles system. This response also enabled Azerbaijani troops to
capture other nearby strategic locations. In total, Armenia lost three
positions in the southern direction and three in the northern direction (Armenianow.com, April 4).

By not pursuing a limited war strategy, Baku demonstrated its strategic
approach—a short, sharp intervention. This can be described as a policy
of attrition: wearing down the enemy to the point of compromise through
continuous losses. The idea is that Armenian defense forces will now be
more vulnerable to targeting by Azerbaijani offensives from higher
ground, leading to greater losses in the future, and/or a forced
retreat.

However, the ultimate goal of Azerbaijan’s attrition strategy is
actually to bring Armenia back to the negotiations table, as maintaining
the military status quo along the LOC will now be more costly for
Yerevan and could spark domestic turbulence in Armenia. The latest
clashes destroyed the belief that Azerbaijan is not prepared to use
force. Whether or not Baku’s strategy will work depends on the
international environment, how the mediators and Yerevan react, and
whether the situation achieves anything in terms of the diplomatic
resolution of the conflict. This strategy also holds disadvantages for
Baku: First of all, it will require the purchase of more armaments,
which in the current economic conditions is problematic. Also, it may
incur further losses on the front line, especially if Armenia tries to
retake the military positions that Azerbaijan gained. Yerevan might also
launch a preventive attack at any time. During the recent clashes, the
majority of the population was very supportive of the government’s
military actions. But more troop fatalities in the absence of a
resolution could damage public backing.

In
sum, the strategy of attrition warfare seems to demonstrate a new
approach by Baku toward conflict resolution. It may achieve short-term
success, if international mediation efforts capitalize on the current
momentum to push for a resolution. Otherwise, in the long term, this
strategy could spark a full-blown war.

The
Caucasus Mountains that run between the Black and Caspian Seas could
soon turn into a nuclear flash point because of dangerous saber-rattling
by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan. Armenia has illegally claimed territory in western Azerbaijan, an assertion backed by military offensives against Azerbaijan, including a massacre of 600 citizens in 1992. Sadly now, Armenia may be taking the region to the brink of nuclear war.

Armenia received the Iskander missile system from Russia last autumn, a major provocation meant to send a message to Azerbaijan
and NATO ally Turkey. This is consistent with Moscow’s policy of using
missile deployments in Eurasia and the Middle East to threaten western
interests. The
Iskander short-range ballistic missile system is designed to destroy
small targets at up to 300 miles. This means that Iskander missiles
deployed in eastern Armenia could reach targets all over Azerbaijan, including the capital of Baku. Alarmingly, Iskander missiles are capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads.

As if the presence of the missiles were not a clear enough menace, Mr. Sargsyan
visited the improperly held territories and bragged that his government
possessed a “state-of-the-art, powerful striking force.” He went on to
identify potential targets in Azerbaijan — “the most important
infrastructure” — and followed up with a chilling pronouncement about
his intentions as head of the Armenian military. “If needed, the
commander in chief of the Armenian forces will without batting an eyelid
order volley fire by Iskander,” he said.

This
new round of warmongering is troubling in several respects and raises
tensions in Baku and throughout the region. In addition to unnerving Armenia’s neighbors, Mr. Sargsyan’s
statements raised concerns in Washington, D.C. The Jamestown Foundation
recently held a panel discussion on Capitol Hill to address the danger
posed by Armenia’s
deployment of the Iskander missiles, writing that the new weapons
“threaten European stability, put U.S. allies at risk and potentially
violate the 1988 [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty.”

Mr. Sargsyan’s
inflammatory rhetoric destroys the myth propagated by separatists that
the Armenian-seized Azerbaijani territory is an independent republic.
Rather, the region occupied Azerbaijan and is now a staging area for missiles pointed at the rest of Azerbaijan. It is also clear that Mr. Sargsyan is using the missiles as a political weapon. Armenia’s president is seeking to stir his nationalistic supporters against Azerbaijan to increase voter turnout in elections. He is rejecting bids from more sober leaders in Armenia, including former President Levon Ter-Petrossian, for a plan that would reduce tensions between the two nations.

And then there’s the Russia question. Armenia is the only nation that has received the Iskander system from Russia. Why Armenia? Possibly because “the most important infrastructure” in Azerbaijan
that could be targeted by the missiles includes companies owned and
operated by Western entities, including American ones, that ensure
Europe’s energy security. Natural gas from Azerbaijan
flows by pipeline from the Caspian Sea west through Georgia and into
Turkey and Europe. Should that flow be disrupted by military conflict,
Europe would be at the mercy of Russia for its energy needs.

Another
possibility: Russia might be attempting to rebuild its Soviet-era
footprint in the Lesser Caucuses as it has done in Crimea and is
attempting in Eastern Ukraine. It’s no secret that Russia and Armenia recently established a joint air defense pact. If Mr. Sargsyan’s troubling boasts about his willingness to deploy his new Iskander missile system were the only such noise coming from Armenia,
it would be worrisome enough. But in the past six months, top members
of his administration have made more than a dozen similar statements.

Azerbaijan has more than twice as many people as Armenia
yet its Gross Domestic Product is nearly seven times greater. While
Armenians have watched their leaders diminish their economy, Azerbaijan has prospered. Much like North Korea, military posturing is all Armenia has left. This is a dangerous time for Azerbaijan and the entire region because of Armenia’s
reckless pursuit of offensive weapons and incendiary rhetoric.
Azerbaijanis at home and in the United States have depended on America
as a good friend and strong ally. The world can only hope that that will
continue under the new Trump administration.
• Lloyd Green is a former staff secretary to the George H.W. Bush
campaign’s Middle East Policy Group in 1988 and served in the Department
of Justice between 1990 and 1992.

On April 17, the Washington Times published an article by Lloyd Green,
in which the author describes the Karabakh-Azerbaijani conflict, and
its consequences for the whole region and international community. Many
theses of my colleague are distorted and, therefore, readers may get the
wrong understanding of both the real causes of the conflict and the
current geopolitical situation in Transcaucasia. The first misconception
is that Armenia occupied the territories of neighboring Azerbaijan. The
reality is that Nagorno-Karabakh—a historical territory of the Armenian
people—was transferred to Soviet Azerbaijan, which was created by the
Bolshevik government for political purposes. The Soviet Union was
striving for territorial expansion against Iran; creating a republic
with the name Azerbaijan, Moscow expressed its claims to the Iranian
provinces of East and West Azerbaijan. Thus, transfer of the Armenian
territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan was based
on pragmatic geopolitical calculations by the Soviet leadership.

During
Soviet rule, Nagorno-Karabakh had autonomous status. According to the
constitution, it had the right to declare its independence, as did all
national republics. In 1988, Karabakh deputies asked the central
authorities to consider and positively resolve the issue of transferring
the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region to the Armenian Soviet Socialist
Republic. After that moment, widespread killing of the Armenian
population took place in the Azerbaijani cities of Baku and Sumgait.
Incidentally, it was the United States that reacted first to these acts
of aggression. Senators Claiborne Pell (chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee at that time) and Robert Dole (the Senate’s
Republican leader), as well as John Kerry and Joseph Biden, sent a
letter to Mikhail Gorbachev demanding a stop to the violence against
Armenians. In response to the lack of reaction from Moscow, Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh, who had survived the 1915–23 genocide in Ottoman
Turkey, announced their withdrawal from Azerbaijan.

In response,
the authorities of Baku led their troops to Armenian territory,
committing an act of aggression. The fact that it was an act of
aggression by Azerbaijan against Nagorno-Karabakh is evidenced by
Washington’s official and consistent position throughout the period of
conflict. Thus, meeting with Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze
in 1990, Senator Pell conveyed America’s concern over the Azerbaijan’s
aggression against Armenian Karabakh. Moreover, Pell sent a letter to
the minister in which many influential senators demanded that Moscow
transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. During the acute phase of the
armed conflict, Congress adopted Section 907, which prohibited any
possible assistance to Azerbaijan from the United States because of its
aggressive actions and illegal blockade of the borders of Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, Nagorno-Karabakh, on an equal footing with
Armenia, was included in the official list of countries to which until
today America has provided annual financial aid. Believing Green’s
statements means that America has supported “aggressors”: Armenia and
Karabakh. Is this even possible?

Today, the United States,
Russia and France are the permanent cochairs of the OSCE Minsk Group for
the settlement of the Karabakh-Azerbaijani conflict. Numerous
statements of this group note that there is no alternative to a peaceful
solution of the issue. The only country that does not share this
position of international community, as represented by the Minsk Group,
is Azerbaijan. The leadership of this state openly declares that
Armenians around the world are enemies of Azerbaijan, regardless of what
their political views are and what countries they are citizens of. The
entire civilized world condemned President Ilham Aliyev for granting
state honors to Ramil Safarov, a lieutenant who murdered the sleeping
Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan with an axe during NATO’s Partnership
for Peace program in Budapest.

During Azerbaijan’s massive
aggression last April, the most dangerous types of weapons were used
against peaceful villages and cities, including the TOS-1 heavy
flamethrower system. This aggression was once again condemned by the
White House, which stated that the conflict should be resolved by
respecting the right of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh to
self-determination. Ed Royce (the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee), Adam Schiff (the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence
Committee), Senator Robert Menendez and other legislators also spoke out
against Azerbaijan’s military aggression.

If we carefully
analyze Azerbaijan’s aggressive rhetoric, coupled with systematic
violation of the cease-fire and diversionary actions against the
civilian population, we can understand why Armenia purchased the
Iskander system from Russia. Green is deeply mistaken that the Armenian
side seeks to use these systems against Western energy infrastructure.
Besides that, statements of high-ranking politicians, which can easily
be verified, are taken out of context. Iskander systems are viewed by
official Yerevan not as an element of intimidation, but as a system for
restraining the aggressive plans of Baku. Realizing the existing
realities, I would like to ask my colleague Lloyd Green a question: Does
Christian Armenia have the right to ensure the safety of its people,
while its nearest neighbor every time claims the need to wipe out the
Armenian people from the face of the Earth?

Stratfor: Armenian-Russian air defense system to put brakes on Azerbaijan’s claims to Nagorno Karabakh

A joint missile Russian-Armenian air defense system will put the
brakes on Azerbaijan’s goal of retaking Nagorno-Karabakh and seven
adjacent territories, Stratfor said as it analyzed the motives behind
the Russian-Armenian air defense deal. Excerpts from the analysis are
provided below. On Nov. 11, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed his
government to sign an agreement with Armenia to create a joint missile
air defense system in the region. Not long after, the Armenian
government confirmed that Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev is
expected to visit Armenia in late November to officially sign the air
defense system deal.

The move, though reminiscent of Moscow’s actions in Central Asia and
Belarus in previous years, comes at a time when Russia is being forced
to respond to a wider array of challenges than ever before. Threats are
rising from the Near East, while the West is ramping up its military
activities in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh moves closer to changing its
political status. And as Russia increases its military presence in Armenia, its
competition with major regional powers for influence in the South
Caucasus will intensify, adding to the growing list of issues Russia
must contend with outside its borders. An expanding military presence will put Russia in direct competition
with Turkey’s ambitions in the South Caucasus and Georgia’s cooperation
with NATO and U.S. forces. It will also put the brakes on Azerbaijan’s
goal of retaking Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent territories.

For Armenia’s part, the joint air defense deal comes at an opportune
time. Its government has received mounting criticism from Armenian
politicians and media amid a growing belief that the country’s
membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
and its reliance on Russia as a security guarantor have yielded few
results, particularly as Azerbaijan pursues a more assertive military
posture around Nagorno-Karabakh.

Under the new agreement, Armenian air defenses will be strengthened,
and the country will likely see new air defense equipment, radios, radar
systems and combat helicopters deployed to its territory. Armenian
Minister of Territorial Administration and Emergency Situations Armen
Yeritsyan also recently announced that the Stepanavan Airport, located a
mere 20 kilometers (about 12 miles) from the Armenia-Georgia border,
will host Russian Mi-24 and KA-32 heavy helicopters starting in 2016.
While these aircraft do not amount to a projection of Russian force
because of their limited range, they do reflect the Kremlin’s broader
policy of boosting its air capabilities in Armenia — a process that
dates back to January 2014, when Russia announced that it would
strengthen Armenia’s Erebuni Airport with Mi-24P, Mi-8MT and Mi-8SMV
helicopters. Along a similar vein, Nagorno-Karabakh’s president has said
Russian forces may use his region’s Stepanakert Airport for air
operations, an offer that may be in response to the recent uptick in air
cooperation between Armenia and Russia.

Russia’s growing military presence in the South Caucasus will be
especially worrisome to Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia’s longtime rivals
in the region. The two countries have ramped up their joint military
exercises with Georgia over the past year, posing a heightened threat to
Armenia, whose strategic position is already weak. Since Turkey already
had less ability than Russia to project power into the South Caucasus,
the Kremlin’s recent moves will only increase the gap between Russian
and Turkish influence there, thus intensifying their competition for
sway in the wider region.

Meanwhile, Russia’s stronger aerial presence in Armenia could alter
the military balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijani politicians have already voiced concerns about the air
defense agreement, and on Nov. 11 — the same day Putin gave his orders
to sign the deal — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited his
country’s S-300 anti-aircraft missile brigade, the unit responsible for
Azerbaijan’s aerial defenses.

The timing of the deal is significant for a number of reasons. First,
it signals Russia’s response to recent developments in the ongoing
standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. As talks
progress on Armenia handing over to Azerbaijan several regions adjacent
to the breakaway territory, Russia will boost its military presence in
the South Caucasus to ensure the security of Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh and to make any further territorial concessions more
politically palatable to Yerevan. Second, as Russia becomes more
involved in the Syrian conflict, Moscow is keen to increase its ability
to monitor its southern borders — a goal that a military presence in
Armenia, with its proximity to the Middle East, is ideally suited to
achieve.

In a recent op-ed in Al Jazeera,
Caucasus political analyst Richard Giragosian argued that Russia,
desperate to retain its influence in the former Soviet space, seeks to
spark an armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). Specifically, he
asserted that the military build-up between Armenia and Azerbaijan has
“greatly enhanced Russian power and influence” and that “the looming
risk of ‘war by accident’ may be a tempting tool for Moscow to
consolidate its leverage in the region by provoking, promoting and then
exploiting renewed hostilities.”

The move, wrote Giragosian, could “garner greater dividends for
Russian hard power.” He added that this “stems from the Russian desire
to further project its power in the South Caucasus by seeking to spark
further military confrontation in order to deploy Russian peacekeepers
to Nagorno-Karabakh.”

The notion that Russia aims to purposefully instigate a war between
Armenia and Azerbaijan is illogical and conflicts with the basic
realities of the Caucasus region. The allegation by Giragosian is an
extreme version of the idea of Russia using the Nagorno-Karabakh issue
as a “divide and rule” mechanism to retain Armenia and Azerbaijan in its
sphere of influence. This concept is derived from a flawed historical
understanding of the origins of the dispute, which attributed the
assignment of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan to the cynical interests of
Stalin and Soviet Russia.

However, this myth has recently been put to rest. The historical research
of the scholar, Arsene Saparov, persuasively argued that
Nagorno-Karabakh was assigned to Soviet Azerbaijan based on the fact
that it was, despite its overwhelming Armenian majority, controlled by
Azerbaijan at the time of Sovietization. Simply put, it was easier for
the Bolsheviks to sanction the pre-existing situation on the ground
while giving the Armenians the concession of political autonomy, a
solution that satisfied neither side. Stalin, far from the height of his
power, played only a minor role.

This debunked divide-and-rule premise notwithstanding, the idea that
Russia would want a war in Nagorno-Karabakh also runs contrary to
Russia’s strategic interests in the region. Russia’s primary interest is
stability and security, not war and chaos. This is especially important
given Russia’s concerns with the rise of Islamic extremism in the North
Caucasus. Specifically, Moscow wants to shore up its position in the
region by having a secure buffer of friendly states south of the
Caucasus Mountains that will help it contain and isolate this threat.

Armenia, Russia’s main military ally in Transcaucasia, is a key part of this strategy. Georgia, which has its own problem with Islamic extremists,
is likewise an important component of it. However, Russo-Georgian
tension, especially during Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency, has
hindered these efforts. The current Georgian government, led by the
pragmatist prime minister Irakli Garibashvili, seeks to mend
Russo-Georgian ties—and with good reason.

Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, home to a Chechen subgroup known as the Kists, has become a prime target for ISIS recruiting efforts.
One of its natives is Omar al-Shishani (born Tarkhan Batirashvili), a
veteran of the 2008 war in Georgia and now a top ISIS commander. This
has raised much concern in Moscow, which faces a similar problem across the border in the North Caucasus. In a recent 60 Minutes interview with Charlie Rose,
Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that “more than 2,000 fighters
from Russia and Ex-Soviet Republics” are fighting on Syrian territory.

This only underscores the need for cooperation between Tbilisi and
Moscow. Both share a common interest in combating the spread of
terrorism and Islamic extremism in Pankisi and in the Caucasus
generally. Yerevan too shares this interest. In fact, for both Armenia
and Georgia, the presence of ISIS in the neighborhood has reawakened bad
historical memories. Having a large country like Russia nearby to ward
off such threats is a major advantage for the security of both states.

Russia’s concerns in the Caucasus are not just limited to Islamic
extremism. Moscow is also troubled by efforts, led by the United States,
to expand NATO, to promote Western-backed energy projects, and to
encourage pro-Western “color revolutions” in the region. Russia is
perplexed by these moves, which it regards as a continuation of Cold War
containment. These measures are also viewed by the Kremlin as creating
the conditions for instability in the region, as the 2008 war in Georgia
demonstrated.

Given this, a war in Nagorno-Karabakh, especially in light of recent
events in Ukraine and Syria, is the absolute last thing that Russia
wants or needs. This explains the reason for the Russian-backed Sochi summit on Nagorno-Karabakh in August 2014.
Hostilities on the ceasefire line between the sides reached alarming
levels and Russian President Putin sought to calm tensions between Baku
and Yerevan. If Russia really wanted a war, it would have permitted the
ceasefire violations to escalate until a major conflict erupted.
Instead, Russia sought to avert that prospect.

In Giragosian’s view, “Russia has largely benefitted from the
unresolved nature of the conflict” over Nagorno-Karabakh since the 1994
ceasefire. This is not the case. Although the tenuous ceasefire has
maintained some peace and stability in the region, in the long term,
Russia is not interested in seeing any renewed hostilities over
Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, long-term solutions to the issue
have been elusive; Putin and other Russian officials acknowledge this.

Nevertheless, Giragosian is correct on one point; Russia has indeed
supplied both sides with weapons. It is true that Moscow has cautiously
supplied weapons to Azerbaijan, in part to entice it to join the
Eurasian Union. However, the political reality is that Armenia remains
Russia’s major military ally and most reliable partner in Transcaucasia.
Russia’s major military infrastructure in the region, including the
102nd military base at Gyumri, is located in Armenia. Further, Moscow’s
military obligations and security guarantees to Yerevan remain firm.

The Russian-Armenian relationship, determined by hard political
factors and security interests, is mutually beneficial for both
countries. For Armenia, Russia remains the strongest guarantor for its
security against potential threats and concerns from its hostile
neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan. For Russia, Armenia remains an
important and friendly pillar in a strategically vital region.

The conclusion of Giragosian’s piece is that, “…the danger of a ‘war
by accident’ over Nagorno-Karabakh necessitates much more strategic
scrutiny and greater attention by the West. This remote and fairly
removed conflict can no longer be so easily ceded to Russian control.
Moscow has been afforded too much room as a primary actor for far too
long.” This conclusion is based on another troubling premise. The West, he wrote, “can no longer so easily cede” the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute to Russia. However, is the dispute the West’s
to “cede” at all? Conflicts, such as the one in Nagorno-Karabakh, are
not pieces in a “great game” between the “great powers” on a “grand
chessboard” (to quote Zbigniew Brzezinski). Instead, they are
international disputes that require international cooperation, not
competition.

In addition, the view that the West can “cede” the dispute to Moscow
also implies that Armenia, Georgia, and other post-Soviet countries are
objects that can be “ceded” from one power to another. According to this
perspective, Yerevan, Baku, Tbilisi, Kiev, Astana, and others are not
independent political players, whose relations with Moscow and the West
are determined by savvy, pragmatic interests. In this view, they cannot
decide for themselves what kind of future or political system they
should have. This problematic position also arises from an outlook based
on international competition, not cooperation. However, the Caucasus
needs much more of the latter and much less of the former if is to find
peace, security, and stability.

Pietro
A. Shakarian is a PhD Candidate in Russian History at The Ohio State
University in Columbus. He earned his MA in Russian, East European, and
Eurasian Studies at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. In addition
to The Armenite, he has written analyses on Russia and the former USSR
for The Nation, Russia Direct, and Hetq. He is also an Associate Editor
at the Gomidas Institute.

The
regional military and political events of the recent week raise a
number of questions, the most important of which is related to Russia’s
intentions. While some try to claim that the recent tensions could have
been possible without Russia’s permission and that Baku had attacked
Nagorno Karabagh upon its own initiative, the events of the last few
years bear witness of a different trend.

In particular, the
Russian-Azerbaijani military trade, the fact that till today Armenia has
not received the loan amount of 200 million USD (the loan agreement was
signed in the summer of 2015) intended for purchasing arms,
Azerbaijan’s protest against the loan and the apologizing response of
Russian Foreign Ministry’s official representative Maria Zakharova
prompt Aliev that he will not run the risk of being scolded by the
Russian big brother in case of provoking war. The diplomatic statements
of the recent days also testify that Kremlin did not mind such
developments. The following events show that Moscow has changed its
approach not only in regard with arms sales, but diplomacy as well. One
of the indicators was the act of moving the meeting of the EAEU prime
ministers from Yerevan to Moscow by using war as an excuse. In reality,
this was a message to Baku implying that the EAEU does not stand by
Armenia in this difficult situation. Another indicator was Medvedev’s
decision to cut short his visit to Yerevan in order to be able to visit
Baku as well. Moreover, the Russian prime minister also visited the
monument dedicated to the so-called martyrs in Baku and laid a wreath in
memory of Azerbaijani soldiers who died in the battles against the
Armenian forces.

Naturally, Russia’s main aim is the deployment
of Russian peacekeeping troops in Nagorno Karabagh. There is no doubt
that Nagorno Karabagh conflict is the main lever for Russia to keep its
influence in the South Caucasus. Hence, the resolution of the conflict
(in favor of any of the sides) is not in the interests of Russia.
Whereas the deployment of Russian peacekeepers would solve the issue of
submitting Armenia to Russia’s will whenever Armenia would dare not to
obey Kremlin. The circumstances mentioned below serve as testimony of
such intentions of Russia:

1. The agreement on ceasing the
fire was reached by Chiefs of General Staff of the Armed Forces of
Armenia and Azerbaijan in Moscow on April 5. This means that the
agreement is not a diplomatic but a military one because the issue was
discussed by Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, not Foreign Ministers.
Thus, a question arises… What did the sides discuss during that meeting
in Moscow and why was it a secret meeting?

2. On April 7,
Armenian President Serj Sargsyan gave an interview to the German
Deutsche Welle, in which he stated that Armenia had never objected to
the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabagh. Taking into
account the fact that Nagorno Karabagh has strongly opposed the
deployment of peacekeepers in in its territory ever since 1994, we get
the impression that Serj Sargsyan is paving the way for the news to
come.

3. The Russian-Armenian relations have sharply
deteriorated during the recent days. It was expressed in multiple ways:
starting from the change of rhetoric of official Yerevan when referring
to its “strategic ally” and ending with the fact that Dmitri Medvedev
was accompanied to the Armenian Genocide Memorial only by Yerevan Mayor
Taron Margaryan. This change may both be related to the fact of arms
sales to Azerbaijan and some diplomatic coercion.

4. There is
also an activation of discussion about the mystical Kazan Document which
was suggested by Russia during the meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani
presidents in 2011. Armenia had agreed to accept the document and
Azerbaijan had refused. At that time there was speculation that
according to that document Armenia had agreed to return part of the
regions outside the territory of former Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous
Oblast (some speculated about 5 of them, others – about all the 7), and
Nagorno Karabagh had to receive a special status. In the first place, it
is doubtful whether the document is beneficial for the Armenian side.
Nevertheless, an even more doubtful statement was recently made by
Sergey Lavrov in Baku. Namely, he had stated that the Russian side has
suggestions regarding the conflict settlement and the sides are close to
accepting those suggestions. In response to this statement, Spokesman
of the Armenian Foreign Ministry Tigran Balayan had mentioned that the
Kazan document submitted in 2011 is on the negotiating table.

It
is unclear what document the sides are close to adopting (the Kazan
document or another one). Nevertheless, it is more than clear that if
Kremlin forces a suggestion on Armenia according to which part of the
territories will be passed to Azerbaijan and the rest will receive a
special status under peacekeepers’ control, we will have clear
diplomatic evidence that Baku’s last attack was carried out with
Russia’s permission or even provocation.

5. There are already
political forces in Armenia which are in favor of deployment of
peacekeeping troops in Nagorno Karabagh. Particularly, such an opinion
has been expressed by head of ANC faction of the RA National Assembly
Levon Zurabyan. Head of the ruling party faction has also announced that
they would not mind the deployment of peacekeepers.

6. On April 11, we learnt
that the “National Guard”, which was created according to Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s decree, will receive authorization of
carrying out foreign peacekeeping mission. And though that structure is
based on the Russian police forces, it is going to operate beyond the
Russian borders and have a “peacekeeping mission”. This means that in
case Russian peacekeeping troops are deployed in Nagorno Karabagh, these
are going to be the same forces that disperse protests in Russia.

The
militants who seized the police station in Yerevan had demanded
concessions from the authorities. Five hostages are still in the hands
of the bandits. The deputy head of the Armenian police, Major-General
Vardan Yeghiazaryan and Deputy Chief of Yerevan Police, Colonel Valery
Osipyan, are among the hostages. A group of radicals unsuccessfully
tried to join militants at Monday.

Criminals

On Saturday-Sunday night, the police station in the capital of Armenia
was captured by militants associated with the group "The Constituent
Parliament”. They are demanding the release of their leader Jirair
Sefilian, who is under arrest on charges of illegal acquiring and
possessing weapons. One policeman was killed during the building’s
seizure.

Ringleaders

Jirair Seiflian is a native of Lebanon who arrived in Armenia to take
part in the Karabakh war in the early 1990’s. He has experience from
fighting in Lebanon. In Karabakh, he became one of the most famous
military leaders and enjoys the support of the Armenian diaspora and war
veterans of Karabakh. He is harshly critical of official Yerevan's
position on the Karabakh issue. Seiflian calls for the resumption of
hostilities against Azerbaijan after the April 2016 war. On June 20th,
2016, he was arrested on suspicion of smuggling and possessing weapons.

Sefilian created "The Constituent Parliament”, the radical opposition
organization. In 2015, he joined the board of the opposition campaign
"New Armenia" which attempted a color revolution using as a pretext that
the authorities had initiated a referendum on transitioning to a
parliamentary form of government. At the head of the opposition force is
Raffi Hovannisian who at the presidential elections of 2013 received
more than 36% of the vote. He was born and lived his first 31 years in
the US. After the collapse of the USSR Raffi Hovannisian became the
first Minister of foreign Affairs in Armenia. "New Armenia" actively
uses the Karabakh problem to accuse authorities of surrendering national
positions.

The forces connected to seizing the police station (New Armenia) earlier
organized protests against Russian military base in Armenia, supported
coup d’etat in Ukraine and took active participation in the protest in
the Armenian capital last summer. They are closely connected to the US
embassy and the Open Society (Soros Foundation) in Armenia.

The purpose of the operation

These events in Armenia are part of the strategy of hybrid war used by
the US against Continentalist forces, and primarily against Russia. The
goal is changing the government or policies of the Armenian authorities
to ones less pliable for Russia. Currently, the Russian government is
trying to find a formula of compromise between Armenia and Azerbaijan in
order to ensure long-term peace, which naturally requires concessions
from the Armenian side. The United States, in turn, is using its agents
of influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to derail the peace
process and kindle war, which would naturally draw in Russia and Turkey.

The activities of armed radicals are a natural element of this hybrid
war strategy. The recent attack has multiple objectives: exerting
pressure on the Armenian leadership with an eye on preventing compromise
on Karabakh; creating a pole of attraction for radical discontent
elements which will then be used in a color revolution; using military
operations by paramilitary formations to demonstrate the weakness of the
government and its inability to control the situation; and
strengthening overall opposition sentiment.

Moscow
is uniquely positioned to bring peace to Nagorno-Karabakh, due to its
deep historical knowledge of the South Caucasus region and the emergence
of fledgling institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union.

The negotiated solution to the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh
appears to be entering a new phase with the active involvement of
Russia. It was Russian President Vladimir Putin who stopped the four-day
war in Nagorno-Karabakh in early April, leading to speculation that a
peace agreement could be reached soon. It now appears that ongoing tensions between Russia and the
West over Syria and Ukraine might compel Moscow, Baku and Yerevan to
take the plunge for a major breakthrough in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process.

Russia aims to assume a leading role in the peace
settlement while increasing its economic engagement and political
rapprochement with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Considerable military
might, a rich legacy that dates back to Tsarist Russia, as well as
shrewd tactics and relatively flexible diplomacy that allows Russia to
keep the West out of the South Caucasus
(mainly through a multidimensional partnership with Turkey and a
strategic alliance with Iran) are among the key factors that can help
the Kremlin stabilize the situation.

In the absence of a greater Western assertiveness, both
President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Serzh Sargsyan of
Armenia consider Russia as the closest mediator, which realizes much
better than others what should be done, and which has enough political will to alter the status quo, and materialize peacekeeping initiatives.

Armenia and Azerbaijan face complex political, economic,
and social processes that inevitably affect the security of Russia
itself. For this reason, Russia’s mediating role in the region is firmly
rooted in common security interests. With the lack of Western resources
to actively interfere in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, Russia now
has carte blanche for breaking the deadlock. The Kremlin seeks to cope
with the mission singlehandedly, trying to bring Baku and Yerevan to the
negotiating table by convincing them to reach a compromise.

In principle, Russia’s activist role has become
particularly relevant against the backdrop of regular ceasefire
violations, border skirmishes and an increased number of casualties.
Moscow finds further escalation unacceptable, calling for the
restoration of the political dialogue. That is why the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was thoroughly
discussed during the one-day visit of Aliyev and Sargsyan to St.
Petersburg where they met with Putin for closed-door talks on June 20.
Consequently, Baku and Yerevan understand very well that it will be
difficult to find a way forward for a lasting agreement by ignoring
Russian national interests.

In turn, the West seems to agree with the Russian
leadership role, albeit the U.S. and the EU remain very worried about
Russian hegemony extending to South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region.
Even though the Western powers possess considerable peacekeeping
potential, they lack factual knowledge of the history of the South
Caucasus, and have little understanding of the national interests
pursued by nations of the former Soviet Union.

For
this reason, the U.S. and the EU proved to be
unprepared for procuring information in this conflict-torn region.
Together, all these factors testify to Russia’s much stronger position
in the region and explain why the West fears Moscow’s greater
involvement in regional security issues directly influencing the rapidly
changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Strikingly, Moscow started
promoting the idea of resolving the conflict within a single, integrated
organization like the Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU). Russia is indeed viewed as a powerful player to initiate this
process. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are members of the EEU, the
political and economic dimensions of which are still developing.

Baku and Yerevan expect the Kremlin to present a road map for peace
that will best suit the national interests of the two conflicting
parties in the region. For example, Armenia already joined the Eurasian
Economic Union to secure the Kremlin’s support on the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue, and to enhance its pivotal relationship with Moscow. Azerbaijan’s
importance for Russia is likewise quite obvious. But the tougher
challenge facing the Kremlin leader is how to solve the Gordian knot
that binds Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan together.

Many in Russia believe that integration into the EEU holds
great promise for Azerbaijan, arguing that an energy-rich country can
also act as a bridge for the Union’s wider cooperation with Iran and Turkey.
While hoping for a renewed impetus to the conflict settlement,
Azerbaijan may well consider the possibility of joining the EEU, but as
yet sees challenges for the membership in the Russia-led bloc. Instead,
Baku seems to focus on boosting bilateral-level cooperation within the
Eurasian organization.

However,
the Kremlin may try out some new tactics based on a
well thought-out peace proposal leading to a change in the situation.
Such a settlement would need to take into account the deep-seated
territorial disputes that surround Nagorno-Karabakh. By doing so, Moscow
could demonstrate how obstacles may easily turn into opportunities.
While pursuing a very subtle two-pronged policy of delicate signaling
to Azerbaijan and Armenia, Putin is most likely capable of unraveling
the Nagorno-Karabakh conundrum. But if the Kremlin really wants to reach
greater regional stability, the Armenia-Azerbaijan knot needs to be cut
once and for all, not merely untied.

Russia Direct: What needs to happen for a peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh

The
OSCE reenergized peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh is still underway,
but faces obstacles to a negotiated settlement. What must be done to
open the way for OSCE incident investigation mechanism and build trust
for a comprehensive resolution?

The Russian mediator in the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group triumvirate, Ambassador Igor
Popov, in a rare media appearance on June 7, speculated that the “framework agreement” on Nagorno-Karabakh is not a remote possibility at all.Adding even more complexity to the reenergized peace
process, Popov also hinted at “individual Russian efforts” to achieve
resolution, whereas OSCE experts are working on finalizing the
implementation mechanisms of agreements reached in Vienna on May 16. The
Russian Foreign Ministry came up with a short statement on the website
on June 9 announcing a “trilateral summit” on Nagorno Karabakh
resolution is being scheduled to be held in St. Petersburg “at the end of June”. So what does all this mean for attempts to find a negotiated settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh?

Difficulties in finding a solution

To refresh, a pre-negotiation round convened by U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry, French Secretary of State for European
Affairs Harlem Desir and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in
Vienna on May 16 ended with agreement (inked in a Joint Statement)
on four basic points: to respect the open-ended 1994 and 1995 ceasefire
agreements; finalize “in the shortest possible time” an OSCE
investigative mechanism; expand the existing Office of the Personal
Representative of the OSCE Chairperson in Office; and exchange data on
missing persons under the auspices of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC).

Two of these points (honoring the ceasefire and exchanging
data on prisoners of war and missing persons) are international
obligations of any state engaged in an international dispute, so both
Armenia and Azerbaijan did a favor only to themselves by agreeing to
adhere to international norms of the civilized world. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, talking to a pool of
journalists en route from Vienna, said Armenia was satisfied with the
agreements reached and was ready to embark on their implementation. After a few days of silence and a brief demarche by the Azerbaijani presidential aide, Baku committed to all the above-mentioned bullet points within a span of 24 hours.

Azerbaijan, which has never been very much willing to
adhere to the peace process (it views it as something Armenia and other
peacemakers were using to prolong the status quo), admitted that a new
meeting between presidents “was necessary”
in order to use the momentum reached in Vienna. Since then, only single
incidents of ceasefire violations have been reported. In Brussels and
Paris, respectively, on May 31 and June 2, Minsk Group
mediators equipped the Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers with “expert-level elaborated ideas,” or drafts,
on the OSCE investigative mechanism and expansion of the existing pool
of monitors within the mandate of OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Personal
Representative (CiO PR) Andrzej Kasprzyk to chart the path for a
high-level meeting during June.

he common narrative after the
so-called “Four Day War” suggests that, without these two preconditions
satisfied, the peace process would remain in deadlock. It would
only be a matter of time before the next round of armed hostilities. How
to prevent a new round of devastating war in a region
bordering Iran, Russia and Turkey (not to mention Iraq and Syria) – is
the primary challenge before the mediators and parties involved.
Speaking at the OSCE Permanent Council meeting in Vienna on
June 9, Russian Permanent Representative Alexander Lukashevich urged “to finalise at an earliest date” preparations for establishment of incident investigation mechanism and expansion of office of CiO PR Kasprzyk.

A few things are clear. Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises at the border with Armenia, conducted in Kars, are certainly not the recipe for a peaceful resolution. Neither is Ilham Aliyev’s claim that Armenia is “a historically Azerbaijani land,”
or blaming German Chancellor Angela Merkel for sins before Turkey’s
Recep Tayyip Erdogan just 48 hours before his own landing in Berlin. To brainstorm for the interlinked elements of the OSCE
investigation mechanism and expanded monitoring mission in
Nagorno-Karabakh (especially if Kasprzyk’s mandate is staying the same), one will need to look into the recent OSCE experience in Ukraine following the Minsk Agreements.

Frustrated with the limited utility of the SMM, Ukraine,
Russia and other stakeholders are now mulling over introducing a lightly
armed policing mission in Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin is against the
whole idea in principle, while Kiev argues that there should be “no
Russian boots on the ground.” As long as neither party has demonstrated
willingness to abide by agreements reached, the SMM will continue
playing a marginal role in the open-ended peace process.

The financial cost
of sustaining observation or monitoring missions, especially in the
case of Nagorno-Karabakh, is another problem. Back in 2012, Azerbaijan
disabled the consensus in OSCE budget discussions for the allocation of
funds for establishing incident investigation mechanisms. For those familiar with the history of peacekeeping
operations and international observation missions in the past few
decades, the SMM in Ukraine has a sample mandate for a Cold War-era,
state sovereignty-conscious mission that will only do reporting and
filing with no effect on the conflict resolution, allowing the sides to
exercise their political rhetoric.

The age-old case that comes to mind is the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in Spring 1978, which
played virtually no role in deterring (it didn’t have mandate to use
force and stop) Israeli interventions in either 1982 or 2006. UNIFIL,
too, as the SMM in Ukraine, developed a robust library of their activity
reports. Of course, proper and expert-level discussion of
peacekeeping or observation mission mandates and specifics would require
larger space and depth to elaborate, yet the recipe for
Nagorno-Karabakh, in a nutshell, requires a more tailored approach.

Recommendations

The OSCE investigation mechanism in Nagorno-Karabakh will
either fall within the mandate of the CiO PR Kasprzyk (likely) or a
special mandate established by the Permanent Council (unlikely).
However, if Kasprzyk’s office expands within the existing mandate, what
added value are they going to bring apart from producing a lot of
paperwork?

On the positive side, for the purposes of advancing the
peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh, the deterrence effect of the
investigation mechanism as such will overshadow the practical utility of
the mechanism, if parties agree to this in principle instead of pro
forma box ticking. And if the goodwill is out there to view this as a
beginning of a longer journey, the six-hour blackout for leaking the
incident to the media, as enshrined in the February 1995 document
drafted by former Russian special envoy Vladimir Kazimirov and
signed by all parties (Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan), will
show not only consistency in mediation efforts in the past 20 years, but
also allow for real work instead of abusing the whole arrangement by
spinning narratives in the media.

And, last but not least, those who fought back in the Four
Day War, shall have their say to this measure, as they are the real
players on the ground, able to upset or veto any arrangement that
negotiators will otherwise ink.

Without searching for nuances in the wording of the latest
OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ press statement of June 3 or Popov’s
interview of June 7, it is nonetheless clear that the thought-provoking
documents delivered to Yerevan and Baku shall be, among other things,
consented to by the “elected representatives” of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic, too. This is because the main effect of these papers is well
beyond the physical borders of Armenia and, in fact, of Azerbaijan –
neither side has bodies of governance functioning in the yet
unrecognized state, nor they ever had since the demise of Soviet Union.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is due to meet his Azerbaijani
counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, on June 13 in Baku. On the agenda: resolving
the quarter-century-old dispute over the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh, a
majority-Armenian territory which split from Azerbaijan in a brutal war
with Armenia during the early 1990s. A ceasefire concluded the active
phase of the conflict in 1994, but the feud remains unresolved, and
violent incidents persist along the line of contact.

There is
little reason to believe the meeting will yield any progress. An
official peace process, the OSCE Minsk Group, has been underway since
1992 with joint Russian-French-American leadership. The Minsk Group is
plagued by Western inattention and Kremlin intrigue. Russia deliberately
plays both sides in Nagorno Karabakh and Washington and its allies seem
not to care. Putin’s meeting comes only three days after American Minsk
Group representative James Warlick discussed the conflict with Armenian
President Serzh Sarkisian. That Russia provides presidential-level
attention to Nagorno Karabakh while the United States offers only its
liaison to a paralyzed negotiation forum is illustrative of U.S.
indifference towards the conflict.

American disinterest could
prove costly for both the United States and Europe. For the United
States, settling the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict would carry two key
benefits: improving energy security for European allies and reducing the
risk of a conflict involving NATO member Turkey.

Putin
previously met Aliyev and Sarkisian in August 2014 to discuss the
conflict. Before that, Russia organized several presidential-level
negotiations in 2011, 2008, and 2004. This stands in stark contrast with
Western efforts, marked by abortive talks held in the United States in
2001 and in France in 2006.

In 2010, Aliyev and Sarkisian verbally agreed to some elements of the Madrid Principles
[3], a basic outline for the peaceful resolution of the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. This plan includes a phased withdrawal of
Armenian forces from Nagorno Karabakh and a final referendum on the
territory’s political status. While Baku and Yerevan still dispute many
issues, the Madrid Principles provide a strong foundation for compromise
and a mediated settlement. On the surface, this makes the lack of
progress in recent years surprising. Closer examination of Russia’s role
in the South Caucasus indicates otherwise. Moscow, ostensibly pursuing a
negotiated peace, benefits from an indefinite dispute.

Armenia simply cannot afford the
same degree of military prowess as Azerbaijan. As Baku grows stronger,
Armenia becomes more dependent on Russia for security. Yerevan
occasionally registers a complaint with its powerful patron over arms
sales to Azerbaijan, but Armenia can do little more than that. At the
same time, Baku risks war with Russia if it attacks its western
neighbor, as Moscow is bound to Armenia by the Collective Security
Treaty Organization’s mutual defense agreement. The commander of the
Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia, reported in 2013 that his
troops would intervene on Yerevan’s behalf if Azerbaijan attempted to
retake Karabakh by force. However, these statements are of questionable
value to Armenia, as they have never been confirmed by Russia’s top
officials.

Despite the dangers associated with renewed conflict,
Baku and Yerevan are demonstrating a growing willingness to test one
another’s patience. Over the past month, Armenian [5] and Azerbaijani
[6] media have frequently reported ceasefire violations by the other
side. These incidents come after months of intermittent fighting on the
line of contact.

Eventually, Azerbaijan may determine that
retaking Nagorno Karabakh is worth the risk. If Russia entered the fray,
it would undoubtedly result in a catastrophic defeat for Baku. However,
Moscow could remain on the sidelines, on the basis that Nagorno
Karabakh is not part of Armenia’s internationally recognized territory
and is therefore not protected by the CSTO. In this case, the conflict’s
outcome might be less decisive. A protracted struggle could develop
with or without Russian intervention, endangering prospective energy
projects in the Caspian Sea basin and damage existing infrastructure.
This would benefit Russia, which perceives Western energy enterprises in
the area as threatening its dominant position in the European oil and
gas market.

Would Russia really abandon its Armenian ally in a
war with Azerbaijan? It is certainly possible. If Russia did fail to
intervene on Armenia’s behalf, Yerevan would have little room to rebuke
the Kremlin for its duplicity. Years of Russian protection have steadily
eroded Armenian sovereignty. The Russian border guards who patrol
Armenia’s frontiers and the 5,000 soldiers stationed in Gyumri are only
the tip of the iceberg: Moscow’s influence now extends far beyond
military affairs. As of 2008, Russia controlled 80 percent [7] of Armenian energy infrastructure. In June 2015, Yerevan announced plans to sell an Armenia-Iran natural gas pipeline
[8] to Gazprom, further entrenching Russia’s position in the small
South Caucasus republic. Armenia is a member of the Kremlin-led Eurasian
Economic Union and Russia is the country’s single largest import and
export partner. All of these factors grant Russia a wider range of
policy options in the South Caucasus at Armenia’s expense.

What
is clear is that Russia is unlikely to mediate in good faith as long as
it can control the initiative in the Nagorno Karabakh dispute and profit
from the conflict’s perpetuation. For Moscow, revenue from arms sales
to Armenia and Azerbaijan, political leverage in the South Caucasus, and
protection of Russian energy interests all come before a peaceful
settlement. This does not bode well for the United States or its
European allies.

Escalating hostilities might endanger emerging
energy projects such as the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
(TANAP). This system is the first to bring Caspian natural gas to
Europe, drawing supplies from Azerbaijan via Turkey and Georgia. The
project would help diversify Europe’s energy supplies, making Russian
influence vis-à-vis Gazprom less potent. This should be especially
important for the United States, as current energy politics [9] make it difficult for Washington and its European allies to respond in concert to the Ukraine crisis.

Although
TANAP’s planned terminus is in Azerbaijan, in the future, the route
could link up with sources in Iraqi Kurdistan, Central Asia, and even
Iran. Even without these additional outlets, the system promises to
reach a capacity of 31 billion cubic meters
[10] of gas by 2026. Renewed conflict in the South Caucasus could delay
all of these prospects. With TANAP construction underway as of March
2015, workers and equipment are also placed at risk.

In addition
to threatening European energy security, another South Caucasus war
could draw in other regional powers like Turkey. Ankara previously
played a significant role in the active phase of the Nagorno Karabakh
War (as did Russia). To demonstrate solidarity with Baku, Turkey sealed
the border with Armenia and instituted a blockade in 1993, measures that
remain in place today. Turkish officers also trained the Azerbaijani
military.

Turkey and Armenia lack diplomatic ties. If Ankara
became involved again, it might find pretext to invoke Article V of the
North Atlantic Treaty, the charter’s mutual defense clause (Turkey
already threatened
[11] such a move over Syrian Civil War spillover). In this eventuality,
the United States and other NATO members would be drawn into a conflict
directly on Russia’s doorstep, something that would undoubtedly poison
already strained relations between Moscow and the West. If the United
States can induce Turkish cooperation, Ankara’s position would be a
valuable asset in conflict mediation rather than a liability in regional
security.

Armenia is strategically insecure, but it also
maintains control over Nagorno Karabakh two decades after the active
phase of the conflict ended. Because of this, Armenia may perceive
little need to make concessions.

That being said, diplomatic
normalization with Turkey and an end to the land blockade on Armenia’s
western border are objectives Yerevan cannot achieve under the status
quo. Washington can help facilitate normalization between its Turkish
ally and Armenia in exchange for settlement of Karabakh. In this
scenario, Armenia can yield on certain issues relating to Azerbaijan
while still getting an economic and political return. Terminating the
blockade and normalizing relations would improve Armenia’s economy and
help alleviate its isolation.

Turkey would reap several benefits as well. The country wishes to enter into a free trade agreement
[12] with the Eurasian Union, in which Armenia is a member. Open
borders and stable diplomatic ties could make such a move less
complicated for Ankara. Turkey also has a 30 percent [13] share in the TANAP project, meaning it would benefit from a stable environment in the South Caucasus.

A
framework for peace already exists. While challenges will arise, the
United States can and should commit itself to a consistent negotiation
process on Nagorno Karabakh. Renewed warfare would carry negative
ramifications well beyond the South Caucasus. Armenia and Azerbaijan
need a mediating partner that benefits from peace in the region, not
perpetual conflict.

Old grievances are being aired with new force in the former Soviet Union’s longest-running conflict. Armenia
and Azerbaijan, technically at war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region
despite a cease-fire brokered by Russia 22 years ago, are beefing up
their arsenals just seven months after the worst fighting in two
decades. Armenia has acquired Russian-made Iskander ballistic missiles,
while Azerbaijan says it’s tested combat drones produced with Israel and
is in talks with Pakistan to buy high-tech weapons.

“We
have a much more serious arms race,” said Zaur Shiriyev, an academy
associate at Chatham House in London. “It will significantly increase
the chance of future outbreaks.”

The
rearmament is raising the stakes should tensions flare again between
Russian ally Armenia and Azerbaijan, close to NATO member Turkey, after
the two neighbors spent almost $27 billion on defense in 2005-2015. The
conflict, within striking distance of a BP Plc-led oil pipeline, is once
more showing signs of boiling over as talks mediated by Russia and the
U.S. run aground and uncertainty mounts after Donald Trump’s election as
American president.

Armenians
took over Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts from Azerbaijan
after the 1991 Soviet breakup. The conflict killed 30,000 people and
displaced more than a million. No peace accord was signed despite talks
involving Russia, the U.S. and France halting major hostilities in 1994.
Rhe enclave’s mainly Armenian population declared independence in 1991,
which hasn’t been recognized internationally, and insists on its right
to self-determination. Azerbaijan says it’s ready to grant more autonomy
than the region enjoyed during the Soviet period, but demands respect
for its territorial integrity.

Military Might

Azerbaijan,
the third-largest crude producer in the former Soviet Union, has
converted its oil wealth into battlefield might, becoming Europe’s
largest importer
of major weapons in the decade through 2015 by spending $22.7 billion
on the military in the period, according to the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute. Its annual defense spending eclipses Armenia’s
entire state budget. The largess has been a boon for companies like
Uralvagonzavod, the state-run maker of battle tanks in central Russia
since World War II, and Elbit Systems Ltd., Israel’s biggest publicly
traded defense contractor.

Violence surged in April, when more
than 200 troops were killed on both sides in four days of fighting that
involved hundreds of tanks and aircraft. Azerbaijan regained control of
several hills lost to Armenians 23 years ago, before another
Russian-engineered truce. New cease-fire violations were reported last
week, which the belligerents blamed on each other.

‘Kamikaze Drones’

April’s
clashes featured the first known use of “kamikaze drones” by
Azerbaijan, with the explosive-tipped aircraft slamming into a bus
carrying Armenian volunteers. Media including Radio Free Europe claimed
to have identified the weapons as Israeli-made Harop drones. The Azeri and Israeli defense ministries both declined to confirm or deny that Harops were used.

Azerbaijan said in September that it would build “hundreds” of kamikaze and other combat drones
using Israeli technology. Armenia has also bolstered its capabilities,
getting a $200 million loan from Russia to buy and modernize weapons and
other military equipment. It showcased its Iskander missiles at an
Independence Day parade in September in Yerevan, the capital. Stationing
the short-range missiles in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan’s BP-operated
Sangachal oil-and-gas-processing terminal south of Baku would fall
within firing range. Azerbaijan has attracted more than $60 billion of
investments in energy projects by BP and its partners in the past 20
years.

A spokesman for Russia’s state-run arms trader
Rosoboronexport, Vyacheslav Davidenko, declined to comment on any
weapons provided to Armenia. Russia has stressed that is also sells
military hardware to Azerbaijan. It supplied the missiles through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a post-Soviet military alliance, according to the Vedomosti business newspaper.

Shifting Balance?

“Armenia
sought to use this display to deter Azerbaijan from a further attack
and to demonstrate a solid position in the recently shifting military
balance of power,” said Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional
Studies Center in Yerevan. “This missile system is capable of reaching
significant infrastructure and vulnerable targets in around Baku and
throughout Azerbaijan. This is why the balance of power is now more
equal.”

Azerbaijan
rejects any shift in the military balance, and Armenia’s missile
display certainly hasn’t eased tensions. The Azeri Defense Ministry
responded by holding drills involving Russian-made S-300 air-defense
systems and threatened to retaliate with “thousands of rockets” should
Armenia try to use “a few” of its missiles. Deadly clashes around the
conflict zone resumed last month, while Azerbaijan began some of its
biggest-ever military drills on Nov. 12.

In Deadlock

The
military one-upmanship has complicated mediation. Talks over a
settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh are deadlocked, according to Russia,
which helped arrange a June meeting between the Azeri and Armenian
presidents, Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan. U.S., Russian and French
diplomats failed to persuade them to meet again soon. Meanwhile, the
possible cost of any renewed violence is rising. “Russia’s delivery of
Iskander missiles and other heavy weapons systems to Armenia” has the
potential to “raise the costs to both sides of a potential future armed
conflict,” said Matthew Bryza, an ex-U.S. deputy assistant secretary of
state who also served as an ambassador to Azerbaijan and brokered talks
over Karabakh.

For many decades, the dominant discourse of Armenian political and
intellectual leaders was summed up by an emblematic quote from Khachatur
Abovian, a 19th-century Armenian writer. "Blessed be the hour when the
blessed Russian foot stepped upon our holy Armenian land," Abovian wrote
in his most famous novel, set during the Russian-Persian war in the
South Caucasus. For the Christian Armenians remaining in what at that time was just
the central and eastern parts of an ancient Armenian kingdom, the
Russian victory in the 1826-1828 war ended centuries of oppressive
Muslim rule and their status as second-class subjects of the Persian
Empire. It also laid the groundwork for the eventual establishment of
the modern-day Republic of Armenia, a successor to one of the 15 Soviet
republics.

The Armenian nationalist groups which emerged in tsarist Russia in
the late 19th century generally professed loyalty to the Russian state.
The 1915 mass killing of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey, which many
historians and about two dozen countries have recognized as genocide,
only reinforced this geopolitical orientation. Both the communist rulers
of Soviet Armenia and anti-Soviet nationalist leaders in the worldwide
Armenian diaspora portrayed Russia as the sole guarantor of Armenia's
survival in a hostile Muslim neighborhood. Things started changing with the onset in 1988 of a popular movement
for Armenia's unification with Nagorno-Karabakh. The anticommunist
leaders of that movement, who eventually formed independent Armenia's
first government, took a more critical view of the Russian-Armenian
relationship, saying that it also had negative consequences for the
Armenian people.

Yet even they chose to keep Armenia anchored to Russia politically
and military after the breakup of the Soviet Union. This strategic
choice facilitated the result of the 1991-1994 war with Azerbaijan,
which left Armenians in control of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
areas. It was rarely questioned by major Armenian opposition groups,
pundits and independent media until the early 2000s.

Pro-Western Sentiment

The past decade has seen a rapid spread of pro-Western sentiment
among local journalists, civil society members, and youth activists who
rely heavily on social media. This process only accelerated after
Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian unexpectedly decided in 2013 to
forego a far-reaching Association Agreement with the European Union and
make Armenia part of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)
instead. For this expanding circle of politically active people, Russia is a
threat to Armenia's sovereignty, security, and democratization which
must be neutralized by a reorientation of Armenian foreign policy
towards the West. Some of them demand not only Armenia's exit from the
EEU, but also an end to the Russian military presence in the country.

Although Russian policies are indeed a cause for legitimate concerns,
such rhetoric glosses over the grave security challenges facing
Armenia. Like virtually all other Armenians, the vocal pro-Western
elements want Nagorno-Karabakh to remain under Armenian control --
something which hinges, in large measure, on the military alliance with
Russia. But they do not present the country's political elite with
alternatives security options, resorting instead to emotional
oversimplifications of foreign policy issues.

Even so, these changing attitudes have fueled suggestions by some
Armenia watchers in the West that Russia may be on the brink of losing
one of its staunchest ex-Soviet allies. Such speculation was stoked by
last February's furious street protests outside the Russian consulate in
Armenia's second largest city of Gyumri over the gruesome killing of a
local family, which a Russian soldier is accused of having carried out.
It intensified further during this summer's demonstrations in Yerevan
against an electricity price hike engineered by the country's
Russian-owned power distribution network. The so-called "Electric
Yerevan" campaign was so dramatic that it raised Russian fears of
another "color revolution" against a Moscow-friendly government in the
ex-USSR, leading the Kremlin to hastily make a number of major
concessions to the Armenian government.

All the same, a closer look at Russian-Armenian ties should be enough
to demonstrate why Armenia will continue to heavily rely on Russia for
defense and security in the foreseeable future. The conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh is the most important driving force of that alliance,
and it is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.

Military Aid

Thanks to its massive oil revenues, Azerbaijan has increased its
annual military spending by almost 30 times during President Ilham
Aliyev's more than decade-long rule. It is projected to total $3.6
billion this year, more than Armenia's entire state budget. Consequently, the Azerbaijani army has been beefed up with large
quantities of offensive weapons, including $4 billion worth of tanks,
combat helicopters, air-defense systems, and other military hardware
purchased from Russia since 2010. This military buildup has emboldened
Aliyev to repeatedly pledge not only to win back Nagorno-Karabakh and
surrounding Armenian-controlled territories, but to take what he has
called "historical Azerbaijani lands" in Armenia itself, including
Yerevan.

By comparison, Armenia's 2015 defense budget is equivalent to only
about $500 million. Despite this huge spending disparity, the country
has so far been able to largely maintain the military balance with its
oil-rich foe. Through bilateral defense agreements with Russia and
membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), it has long been receiving Russia weapons at knock-down prices
or free of charge. This mostly unpublicized military aid appears to have
intensified in recent years.

In particular, Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian-backed army is known to
have formed a new tank brigade (which typically consists of around 100
tanks) and received more heavy artillery in 2012. In late 2013, it
announced the provision of another 33 Russian-made tanks to its forces.
Russia also reportedly delivered 110 armored vehicles and 50 rocket
systems to the Armenian military during that period.

Armenia will soon buy more advanced weaponry at domestic Russian
prices with a $200 million low-interest loan that was disbursed by
Moscow during the "Electric Yerevan" protests. Around the same time, the
Russian government revealed that it is negotiating with the Armenian
side on supplying the latter with state-of-the-art Iskander-M missiles
that would significantly boost Armenia's ability to strike Azerbaijan's
vital oil and gas installations.

The Armenian missile arsenal currently includes Soviet-era Scud-B and
Tochka-U systems with firing ranges of 300 and 120 kilometers
respectively. The Azerbaijani military has implied that it can
neutralize them with S-300 surface-to-air missiles supplied by Russia in
2009-2010 as well as other missile-defense systems reportedly purchased
from Israel in 2012. But these systems would most probably be unable to
intercept Iskander-M missiles, one of the most potent weapons of their
kind in the world.

Iskander-Ms would thus give Armenia an additional major deterrent
against possible Azerbaijani attempts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict by force. Armenian leaders have repeatedly hinted at their
impending acquisition in recent years. Russia has also been a key provider of free education and training
for Armenian military personnel. As of last year, as many as 250
Armenians reportedly studied full-time or took shorter courses at
Russian military academies. This figure is comparable to the total
number of cadets graduating from Armenia's two military academies
annually.

The Russian military base in Armenia's second largest city of Gyumri
is another essential component of close military cooperation between the
two states. Debate in Armenia on the wisdom of hosting it usually
focuses on the question of whether or not the Russian troops would
openly fight on the Armenian side should Azerbaijan act on its threats
of military action. That misses the point.

The Turkey Factor

What Yerevan needs first and foremost is not Russian ground forces in
Nagorno-Karabakh but a safeguard against Turkey's direct military
intervention in the conflict, in light of its close ties with, and
treaty obligations to, Azerbaijan. (Under the 2011 Agreement on
Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support, the two sides undertake to
support each other using "all possible means" in the event of an attack
or aggression against one of them.) Bombing raids by Turkey's sizable Air Force alone could seriously
affect the outcome of another Nagorno-Karabakh war by overwhelming
Armenia's air defenses and destroying other Armenian military targets.
The Russian base precludes such intervention, enabling the Armenians to
concentrate the bulk of their military might on Azerbaijan.

For all its efforts to woo Baku, including with arms deals, Moscow is
simply not interested in Armenia's defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute because that would eliminate the key rationale for the Armenian
reliance on Russia. A military withdrawal from Armenia would in turn
minimize Russian presence in a region which Moscow continues to regard
as its backyard.

Pro-Western circles in Armenia rarely discuss these specific security
issues in their critique of Russian-Armenian dealings. Nor do they
question the underlying motive behind successive Armenian governments'
pursuit of close ties with Moscow: continued Armenian control over
Nagorno-Karabakh. So far the pro-Western camp has been unable or
unwilling to disprove the notion that, as long as the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict remains unresolved, Armenia's ability to resist Russian
pressure and seek deep integration with the West will be seriously
limited.

As much as Sarkisian's dramatic 2013 volte-face was a manifestation
of poor foreign policy making, it reflected this reality. A more
legitimate, democratic and, therefore, pro-Western regime in Yerevan
might have succeeded in wriggling out of the EEU. But even such a
government could have hardly afforded a far-reaching accord with the EU
in the existing geopolitical environment aggravated by Russia and the
West's standoff over Ukraine.

Little wonder, then, that only one of the six parties represented in
the Armenian parliament has openly opposed membership in the EEU. Most
ordinary Armenians, too, continue to support the alliance with Russia,
even if their pro-Russian sentiment is now far less intense than in the
past. With a Nagorno-Karabakh peace remaining elusive, they are still
more likely to agree with Khachatur Abovian than with the cohort of
pro-Western pundits and activists increasingly setting the tone of
political debate in their country.

Russia Direct: Weighing the pros and cons of NATO policy in the Caucasus

NATO
policy in the South Caucasus primarily serves U.S. interests to contain
Russia’s influence in the region. But will it be able to provide real
security once it is needed?

The upcoming NATO Summit
in Warsaw has the potential to become one of the most important
international events of the year. The July event will occur against the
backdrop of the most serious confrontation with Russia since the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. As a result,
NATO Summit participants will make important decisions that will
determine the European security agenda for years to come.

News reports on the upcoming Warsaw Summit often mention the South Caucasus
region. In their comments, politicians and experts focus on two major
issues: Georgia and the prospects of its NATO membership and Moscow’s
“stubborn” reluctance on the Alliance’s eastward expansion that involves
the incorporation of former Soviet countries. To what extent is Brussels interested in the South Caucasus?
What are the risks of converting the region into a point of contention
between Russia and the West, especially in the light of currently
unresolved ethno-political conflicts?

How NATO views the Caucasus

After the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the emergence of new
post-Soviet sovereign states, NATO did not exhibit particular interest
in the Caucasus for quite some time. Until the mid-1990s, it
concentrated on the Balkans. Then the list of problems with “Europe’s
powder keg” grew even longer due to the discussion of prospects for NATO
enlargement (the fourth addition of new members since the formation of
the Alliance occurred on March 12, 1999, and the fifth came on March 29,
2004).

Since Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in March 2004, the
Trans-Caucasian region has been perceived as the new Black Sea frontier
of the entire European security system. Moreover, Turkey,
an influential member of the Alliance with the second largest army of
all NATO countries, showed its interest in the region. Ankara partnered
with Azerbaijan, its strategic ally and
Armenia’s adversary, and Turkey’s relations with Russia that had their
ups and downs since the 1990s years have deteriorated dramatically over
the past two years.

Currently, NATO is interested
in the Caucasus as a strategically important energy market, a lucrative
traffic artery with access to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, and a
region bordering with Iran. Moreover, Brussels takes notice of
Russia’s high activity in the area, but tends to overlook Moscow’s
actions on deescalating ongoing regional conflicts and, instead, focuses
on the threat of Russia establishing its hegemony over the post-Soviet
space.

In this context, the famous American diplomat and expert
Ronald Asmus’ assessment of the 5-Day War of 2008 [The Russian-Georgian
war that lasted from August 7-12, 2008 – Editor’s note] is very telling.
He believes that the conflict “was not fought over territory, minority
rights or the future status of the separatist provinces Abkhazia and
South Ossetia… But the root cause of this war was geopolitical. Georgia
was determined to go to the West and Russia was determined to stop it
from doing so.” (Source: Ronald Asmus, “A Little War That Shook the
World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West”)

Indeed, it would be incorrect to use Asmus’ final statement
to interpret all NATO activity in the Caucasus exclusively as the
manifestation of the interests harbored by the U.S. and its military
allies. Every country of the region had its reasons for building a
relationship with the Alliance. It would be naïve to presume that the
choice came down to democracy and the system of values.

Reaction to NATO within the post-Soviet space

After their defeat in the ethno-political conflicts of the
early 1990s and the loss of control over contested territories, Georgia
and Azerbaijan saw NATO as a way to counter Russian influence. At the
same time, both Tbilisi and Baku sought Moscow’s support. For example,
in 1993-94, Georgian leadership decided to join the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and agreed to Russia’s military presence on its
territory (outside of Abkhazia and South Ossetia). In 1996, both Russia
and Georgia introduced sanctions against Sukhumi through the CIS
Council.

As for Armenia, when facing the land blockade from Turkey and Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
Yerevan started to view the Western direction of its policy as a
compensating factor. Armenia did have other reasons as well. Yerevan
wanted to block Baku from being the only Caucasian state considered for
the NATO membership, especially since Azerbaijan got actively involved
in efficient energy cooperation with the West in 1994. Armenia’s
partnership with the Alliance was meant to prevent Brussels from making
the ultimate choice between the two warring nations.

In 2007-08, NATO’s response to the request for the
“internationalization” of the region created extremely high (and
topically unfounded) expectations among Trans-Caucasian elites,
especially in Georgia. These expectations were based on misjudged
calculations and undervaluation of the relations between Russia and the
West, as well as problems with Iran, Afghanistan and the fight against
terrorism.

This lapse in judgment led to the overstated perception of
NATO’s potential ability to keep the peace. Consequently, these
expectations were let down by the Alliance’s actual conduct towards
Russia during the war of 2008, when Georgia suffered its major military
and political defeat since the collapse of the U.S.S.R. NATO showed the
Caucasus that it was not going to war with Russia over Georgia’s
territorial integrity. The message rang clear to Azerbaijan, which then
diversified its foreign policy and joined the Non-Aligned Movement in
May 2011, and Armenia, which opted for Eurasian integration.

At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO provided Georgia and Ukraine with
the opportunity to join the Alliance, but it did not result in the
acceleration of integration processes. NATO was all talk promising
Georgia the sun and the moon, announcing new phases and stages of its
integration, and even coming up with the creative label of an “aspirant
country” just for Georgia.

During his 2012 visit to Tbilisi, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
NATO General Secretary at the time, declared that the Trans-Caucasian
country was as close to the Alliance as ever. In April 2014, at the
session of the Georgia-NATO commission, the “aspirant” was referred to
as the “example for the entire region” and the “exporter of security.”
Still, so far Georgia has not even obtained the Membership Action Plan
(MAP) status, which is the penultimate step on the path to becoming a
NATO member.

According to experienced Georgian diplomat Tedo Japaridze,
former minister of foreign affairs and secretary of the Security Council
of Georgia, who is currently serving as the chairman of the
Parliamentary Committee on International Affairs, “We have a
long-standing relationship with NATO. Everyone knows that Georgia will
not become an MAP at the Warsaw Summit. This decision has already been
made. But it is necessary to point out that MAP is an instrument that
ties us to NATO.”

Under these circumstances, naturally there are politicians
who are skeptical about Georgia’s prospects for cooperation with the
West. For example, Gogi Topadze, the leader of the Industrial Party,
states that, “It is abundantly clear that we can kiss NATO goodbye. Did
NATO interfere in the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Or the
war in Ukraine?”

The importance of American influence

Inside the Alliance itself, in spite of America’s
dominance, there is no agreement on accepting new members. That is
especially true of the so-called “old Europe,” which includes Germany,
France, Italy and the Netherlands. However, Washington’s foreign policy
(as opposed to the integration project) could not care less for the
opinion of its resilient German or French allies.

Of course, the U.S.
establishment in the White House, Department of State and Congress must
consider the consequences of risking confrontation with Russia by
converting its neighboring former Soviet republics into instruments for
containing “re-Sovietization” or curbing the Kremlin’s “imperial
ambitions.” In any case, Washington is reluctant to cede the
post-Soviet space and acknowledge it as Moscow’s geopolitical domain, so
attempts at cooperating with the former Soviet republics come not just
from NATO, but also from the White House.

It is also important to remember that over the years of its
NATO membership, the U.S. has accumulated extensive experience in
bilateral cooperation with countries that for some reason (political,
geographic, etc.) could not join the Alliance, as was the case with
Franco's Spain, Israel, Japan, and some Latin American countries. Following suit, after the Ukrainian crisis,
Washington prepared a series of laws aimed at “including” several
post-Soviet states, such as Georgia, in the push for the defense of
territorial integrity and sovereignty. The most vivid example of such
legal action is the Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014, which
extended the offer of U.S. assistance not only to Kiev, but also
Tbilisi.

However, the efficiency of the above-mentioned steps meant
to ensure Georgia’s integrity and tackle such security issues as defense
against radical jihadist groups (which Tbilisi unfortunately already
encountered in the Pankisi Gorge) remains to be seen. It is one thing to
act as an aide to a global superpower in the desire to “contain” Russia
and a completely different matter to get actual support in fighting
against emerging risks.

In this fiercely pro-Western nation that
fought a brief war with Russia in 2008, few thought the Kremlin could
ever regain a toehold. But with the West backing away from Georgia’s
path to E.U. and NATO membership after a year of conflict in Ukraine,
pro-Russian sentiments are on the rise.

The
former Soviet nation’s leaders are warning that Russia may yet prevail
if Georgia is shut out from Western clubs. Wary of further provoking
Russia, Western politicians have quashed talk of NATO and the European
Union expanding eastward anytime soon. Russia has stepped into the
vacuum, increasing its presence by opening Georgian-language outlets of
its state-owned news network and deepening investments in the energy
industry and other key sectors. Similar
movements are happening in other former Eastern bloc nations trapped
between Russia and the West, in a tug of war that has deep Cold War
resonance.

“Stability
and security cannot be maintained with this paradigm, with Russia’s
paradigm of having special rights towards other countries,” said
Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili, in an interview in the
presidential palace on a bluff overlooking the old city of Tbilisi. The
blue-and-gold E.U. flag flies outside of the building, as it does at
most Georgian governmental buildings, as an emblem of the nation’s
aspirations.

“Russia is working pretty
actively, not only in Georgia, but all around the world” to expand its
influence, he said. Despite the growing Russian presence, Georgia
remains unshakably committed to eventual membership in NATO and the
E.U., he said. As a token of its devotion, Georgia has sent more soldiers to Afghanistan to fight alongside U.S. troops in recent years than many nations already in NATO. The
germ of the present conflict between Russia and the West lies in an
E.U. offer of closer ties to Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s infuriated reaction. E.U. membership for Ukraine was always a
long shot — but it has become even less likely after fighting that has
killed more than 6,400 people, according to U.N. estimates.

E.U. leaders squabbled at a summit in May
about whether to offer even the faintest prospects for membership to
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, which have said they want to join. The
E.U. leaders decided against it, and they also delayed plans to ease
visa rules for Georgian travelers, a bitter disappointment for Georgia’s
leaders. The E.U. caution stemmed from a desire not to inspire backlash
from Russia, diplomats involved in the discussions say.German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has taken the role of the lead European
interlocutor with Putin, has played down expansion prospects. So has
President Obama.

“Neither Ukraine or
Georgia are currently on a path to NATO membership. And there has not
been any immediate plans for expansion of NATO’s membership,” Obama said
last year.

Now support for pro-Russian
politicians in Moldova and Georgia is growing, while Ukraine is so
consumed by conflict that it has made little progress in instituting
overhauls necessary for westward integration. Armenia, a fourth
post-Soviet country that had been in talks with E.U. leaders about a
trade deal, last year abandoned the discussions altogether, allying
itself with the Russian camp. Many here say that Russia has skillfully outmaneuvered the West.

“The
Russians are working to dominate this part of the world. They
calculate, they plan and they know this region much better than the
Europeans and Americans,” said Tedo Japaridze, the chairman of the
Georgian Parliament’s foreign relations committee. The
United States has tried to offer consolation measures. U.S. troops did
training exercises with Georgian soldiers in May, and Georgia’s leaders
present an upbeat face about their westward efforts.

“We
don’t have time to be disappointed,” said David Bakradze, the state
minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. “Our aspirations are
irreversible.”

But some Georgians feel
they have little to show for their long westward push. Some of those
sacrifices have been made in blood in grueling deployments to
Afghanistan, where they have been one of the top contributors of
soldiers to the battle efforts per capita, even though they are not NATO
members.

“More
and more Georgians are feeling they haven’t gotten anything tangible
from the West,” said Shorena Shaverdashvili, a prominent Georgian
journalist. “There isn’t more love for Putin and Russia. It’s just a
realization that we’re left face-to-face with Russia, and we have to
deal with it.”

Spurned by the West,
Georgians are starting to look elsewhere. Support for signing the E.U.
trade agreement was at 68 percent in April polls from the National
Democratic Institute, down from 80 percent immediately before the
Ukraine crisis started. Support for Georgia’s joining the
Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union, meanwhile, is up to
31 percent.

Part of the shift inside
Georgia came with the ousting of President Mikheil Saakashvili, the
Western-trained lawyer who ruled the country for a decade starting in
2003. Passionately anti-Russian and close to U.S. leaders, Saakashvili
rarely missed a chance to jab at the Kremlin. The biggest eruption came
in August 2008, when Georgian soldiers attacked Russian soldiers who
were amassing in greater numbers on breakaway territories of Georgia.

The
ensuing five-day war decimated Georgia’s military and led to Russia’s
recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. By 2012,
many Georgians were ready to embrace the leadership of their nation’s
wealthiest man, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who promised to improve relations
with Russia while maintaining ties to the West. The payoff for Georgia
was swift. Russia lifted a ban on imports of Georgian wine in 2013, and
trade spiked.

“Those
people who are trying to help us, we just want to tell them, ‘Stop
meddling with Russia,’ ” said Jemal Veliashvili, who works in a seed and
fertilizer shop in Georgia’s Kakheti wine-growing region, in the green
shadow of the Caucasus Mountains that form the border with Russia. He
said his business had tripled since the ban was lifted. Even
though diplomatic relations with the Kremlin remain tense, Russia’s
presence inside Georgia is strengthening. Just last month, Russia’s
Sputnik news agency opened new offices here and started a Georgian- and
Russian-language Georgian news service.

“Georgia
should be neutral, and it should be militarily free,” said Archil
Chkoidze, the leader of Georgia’s Eurasian Choice, a coalition of
pro-Russian groups that says it has nearly 16,000 members.

For
now, even some of Georgia’s most committed pro-Western politicians say
that their best hope is to hold tight to their goals but to expect
little from their partners. “No one told
us it was going to be easy,” said Irakli Alasania, the leader of the
opposition Free Democrats. Alasania was defense minister until November,
when he was ousted for being too pro-West, he says. The possibility of
joining NATO “will only open up after Putin,” he said. Putin is widely expected to remain Russia’s leader until at least 2024.

Armenpress: Georgia has no plans to join anti-Russian sanctions: Garibashvili

Georgia
has no plans to join anti-Russian sanctions set by the EU. Armenpress
reports, referring to TASS news agency, that Prime Minister of Georgia
Irakli Garibashvili, told the journalists the aforementioned. The Prime
Minister said: “As head of the government I have always thought and keep
thinking that Georgia must not join the sanctions against Russia set by
the EU. We had such an approach last year and we stick to that. We are
not going to change that.” “More than a year ago we joined only one of
15 anti-Russian sanctions (July 23, 2014) set by the EU.” clarifies the
PM, referring to the imports of goods from Crimea and Sevastopol. Garibashvili
stressed that Georgia highly appreciates that in recent years they
could reestablish and develop trade and economic relations with Russia.
The Prime Minster added that they want to continue developing trade and
economic cooperation with the Russian Federation.

Azerbaijan
is increasingly dissatisfied with Russia’s role as a mediator in the
conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. And Baku’s frustration is
starting to seep out in public.

The
trigger, according to government officials and analysts in Baku, was
Russia’s response to the flare-up in fighting between Armenia and
Azerbaijan in April 2016. Azerbaijani leaders expected that the fighting
– the worst bout of violence in and around Karabakh in over two decades
– would prompt Russia to use its influence over Armenia, a treaty ally
of Moscow’s that is dependent on Russian arms supplies, to become more
pliable in Karabakh peace negotiations.

But Russia has instead
taken a more passive approach, officials in Baku complain. The growing
rift between Moscow and Baku could complicate efforts to reach a
resolution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, for which Russia remains
an indispensable mediator. In one of the more noteworthy incidents, an
Azerbaijani journalist asked Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a
January press conference in Moscow what Russia would do if Azerbaijan
initiated a “counter-terrorist operation in the occupied territories” of
Nagorno-Karabakh. “Will Moscow close its eyes to it, or interfere in
the internal affairs of Azerbaijan?” asked Anar Hasanov, the Moscow
correspondent for Azerbaijan’s Lider TV.

“This is not exclusively
about the internal affairs of Azerbaijan,” Lavrov responded. This
seemed to be a challenge to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty: Karabakh is
recognized by all countries other than Armenia – including Russia – to
be de jure part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar
Mammadyarov responded quickly,
albeit obliquely: “I am fully confident that if Russia deals with this
issue seriously, the status quo will be changed, regional stability will
prevail and Armenian armed forces will withdraw from the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan.”

And in February, Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev seemed to address the issue, without directly
mentioning Lavrov’s comments. “Armenia tried every possible way to
globalize this issue after the April battles,” Aliyev said, referring to
the deadly outbreak of fighting between the two sides in April 2016.
“We’re in our own land... Hence the April battles and whatever happens
on the contact line of troops is an internal affair of ours.”

In a measure of how delicate the issue is for Azerbaijan, however, Hasanov – the journalist who asked the offending question – was fired from his job
just days afterward. In March, Lavrov again offended Baku when he
indicated support for the stalled Armenia-Turkey rapprochement
negotiations. “When Yerevan and Ankara sit at the negotiating table,
Russia will be ready to provide them with most vigorous assistance,”
Lavrov said.

Azerbaijan
hopes to use the prospect of re-opening the border between Armenia and
Turkey as a carrot in its negotiations with Yerevan, perhaps in exchange
for Armenia handing over two or more of the Azerbaijani territories
around Karabakh that it occupies, and which Yerevan has, in principle,
agreed to give up. Lavrov’s statement was viewed by many in Baku as a
diplomatic shift by Russia, in which Moscow was now looking to separate
the issue of Armenia-Turkey normalization from the resolution of the
Karabakh conflict.

Azerbaijan
also has been frustrated by Russia’s backing of efforts by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to increase monitoring
along the Karabakh line of contact. “Before resuming practical talks on
the settlement of outstanding issues, we need to defuse tensions, which
have increased on the ground, at the contact line, and in the public
space. I am convinced that confidence-building measures could be
useful,” Lavrov said March 6 at a joint news conference with Mammadyarov.

Baku,
though, wants such monitoring measures adopted only as part of a larger
deal. “They offer to conduct a monitoring on investigation of incidents
on the contact line of troops, and we agree to this. However, it should
be an integral part of a big plan. It should be done after the
withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied lands,” Mammadyarov said the following day, speaking in Moscow.

Analysts
in Baku believe factional infighting in Moscow is hampering
Azerbaijani-Russian relations: one camp in Moscow, they say, is content
with Azerbaijan’s current geopolitical stance – with Baku not firmly in
Moscow’s orbit, yet also keeping its distance from Euro-Atlantic
structures, specifically the European Union and NATO. The other camp in
Moscow, led by Lavrov, is suspicious of Azerbaijan, and wants to see
guarantees from Baku that Azerbaijan is committed to the Russian sphere.

Some
Azerbaijani officials believe that Lavrov is inclined to aid Yerevan
because his father was Armenian. “The Azerbaijani public perceives the
mediation activities of Lavrov as biased, one-sided, ethnically
motivated and pro-Armenian,” said former foreign minister Tofig
Zulfugarov in a March interview
with local media. Azerbaijani diplomats also accuse Lavrov of unfair
dealings with them. One senior Azerbaijani diplomat told EurasiaNet that
during negotiations with Armenia in Sochi in 2011, Azerbaijan had
reached a deal it was happy with, but then Lavrov asked for time to
consult with the Armenian side.

“At that point, the Armenian side
did not fully agree to the terms of the agreement. Lavrov promised that
the same document would be discussed at Kazan” at a summit a few months
later “and in the worst case, the text would bear some cosmetic
changes,” the diplomat said. But the document presented in Kazan had
been subject to more than just ‘cosmetic’ changes,” the diplomat said,
while declining to provide details on the specifics of the disagreement.

There
also is the perception that Russian President Vladimir Putin is less
sympathetic to Azerbaijan than was his predecessor, Dmitry Medvedev. It
was under Medvedev that the two countries signed a $4-billion arms deal,
although the deliveries themselves have mostly come under Putin, who
returned to the presidency in 2013. Putin has not agreed to any more
arms sales, though, and the deliveries have been taking place more
slowly than Russia had initially promised. Those deals have nevertheless
raised alarm in Armenia, and rising public anger over those deals has
forced Armenian politicians into their own increasing outspoken
criticisms of Moscow.

Azerbaijan continues to pursue arms deals
with Moscow, not only to build up its military, but because it also
believes that such deals help build relations with the Russian security
elite. “Good relations with Russia’s military industry elite helped
Azerbaijan, and led Moscow to have a neutral position during the April
war,” one pro-government Azerbaijani analyst said, on condition of
anonymity. In January, Aliyev said that Azerbaijan was in talks with
Russia on weapons purchases. “Yes, we’re negotiating on new purchases,”
he said. “We’re interested especially in the most advanced defense
equipment, new products: helicopter technology, defense systems, the
whole complex. This is an ongoing process.”

The Jamestown Foundation: Moscow Pressing the Azeri Diaspora is a Shot Across Azerbaijan’s Bow

The
Russian Supreme Court ruled, on May 15, to revoke the registration of
the All-Russia Azerbaijanis Congress (ARAC), the largest and most
influential Azerbaijani Diaspora organization in Russia. The initial
decision came on March 9, at the request of the Russian Ministry of
Justice, which alleged the ARAC was not in compliance with legal
requirements (APA; TASS, May 15; Abc.az,
May 16). Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Patriarch of Moscow
and All Russia Alexy II sent welcoming messages to the Congress when it
was founded back in 2001. President Putin also attended the II
Convention of the ARAC in 2004 (Kremlin.ru [1], [2], [3] January 19, 2004; October 19, 2004; Vakrf.ru, accessed May 22, 2017).

The
liquidation of the ARAC’s registration foreshadows the possibility of
further acts to follow concerning Azerbaijanis living in Russia,
particularly the hundreds of thousands of labor migrants who send
remittances back to Azerbaijan. This scenario must be viewed in light of
Moscow’s push to expand the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)—Russia’s
political project to institutionalize its grip on post-Soviet countries
under an economic guise (see EDM, October 4, 2013; May 9, 2014; March 2, 2015; March 2, 2016; Kennan-russiafile.org, April 13, 2017).

Moscow
has a long track record of using labor migrants as leverage against its
post-Soviet neighbors, including Azerbaijan. Remittance flows provide
Moscow with political influence over these countries, which the Kremlin
routinely uses as a bargaining chip on various issues (see EDM, November 10, 2011; July 6, 2015; September 15, 2015; EurasiaNet,
March 27, 2017). National governments are forced to take this factor
into account for fear of a mass return of labor migrants from Russia,
which could heighten the unemployment rate and social tensions at home.
And now, Azerbaijani labor migrants may become useful to Moscow as it
seeks to draw Baku into the EEU.

Indeed,
back in 2013–2014 Russia specifically used the threat of expelling
guest workers as an instrument of leverage against Azerbaijan (APA, November 22, 2013; Interfax, October 22, 2013; Unikal.org,
January 16, 2014). Then, Azerbaijan was preparing to hold presidential
elections and simultaneously negotiating an association agreement with
the European Union. Ultimately, Baku refused to sign the association
agreement with the EU in 2015. Now again, the Kremlin is apparently
boosting its efforts to expand the EEU ahead of the 2018 presidential
elections in Azerbaijan and just as Baku has started negotiations to
upgrade its relations with the EU. However, Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev has made it clear that Baku is not interested in joining any
union, at least for now (see EDM, March 24).

The
sudden mass return of labor migrants from abroad would be a serious
burden and social inconvenience for Azerbaijan, particularly at this
time of economic constraints and low oil prices. No exact statistics
exist as to the actual number of Azerbaijanis living and working in
Russia (Caucasus Analytical Digest, December 3, 2013; BBC—Azerbaijani service,
November 1, 2013). Various sources put the figure at between 600,000
and one million, while a few estimates even point to two million
Azerbaijanis working in Russia. Many of those are not Russian citizens
and work there temporarily as guest workers. Remittances from Russia to
Azerbaijan totaled $739 million in 2016, which actually represents a
drop from previous years (Azadinform,
April 7, 2017). Sources of Russian pressure on the Azerbaijani
expatriate community comes in a variety of forms. On February 13, for
example, hundreds of Azerbaijani migrants were detained by the police in
the Russian city of Derbend (Mia.az,
February 13). This incident was followed by dozens of trucks carrying
agricultural produce from Azerbaijan being held up at the Russian border
in March (Xezer TV, Medianews.az, March 24).

Moscow’s
toolbox for coercing Baku includes not only instruments for controlling
labor migrants and blockades of food imports (see above) but also the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh. Of those, the Karabakh
conflict is the most serious since another large-scale breakout of armed
violence could have significant consequences for Russia itself,
particularly in the North Caucasus. Hence, at this stage, the other
options are still more convenient and safer to employ for Moscow as it
seeks to push Baku into the Russia-centric Eurasian Economic Union.

Russian
political analyst Evgeny Mikhailov attributed this month’s decision to
de-register the ARAC to efforts of the Armenian lobby in Russia (Trend
May 15, 2017). However, according to many Azerbaijani experts, the
decision was also driven by the Russian government’s discontent over
Azerbaijan’s independent policies—including its large, multinational
infrastructure and transportation projects such as the Trans-Anatolian
Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the
Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railroad, all of which bypass Russia (Strateq.az, May 15; Azpolitika.info, Musavat, May 16; A24.az, April 4; Amerikanin Sesi, April 13).

The
tensions along the Moscow-Baku axis are developing while Azerbaijan’s
relations with Europe are far from perfect. And it is difficult to
predict whether the Donald Trump White House will pursue a more active
policy toward the South Caucasus than his predecessor. All these factors
make Baku more vulnerable in the face of Moscow’s assertive pressure.
Despite its constraints and internal weaknesses, however, Azerbaijan
continues to sound quite defiant; it will, therefore, likely not be an
easy task for Russia to pull Azerbaijan into a much closer orbit despite
the mounting pressure on the Azerbaijani diaspora.

The
spokesperson for the Azerbaijani foreign ministry, Hikmet Hajiyev,
declared that the de-registration of the ARAC will negatively impact
Azerbaijani-Russian relations (Azertag,
May 16). But that said, Moscow also will have to consider that, over
the past few years, the Azerbaijani government has become more mature in
dealing with external pressure and threats that have a domestic
dimension. The recent detection and arrest of a group of Azerbaijani
servicemen and civilians collaborating with and passing classified
information to Armenian intelligence is a case in point (Azernews, May 7).

The
All-Russia Azerbaijanis Congress is now appealing the decision of its
de-registration, and the appellate court may overrule the Supreme
Court’s decision. But even in that case, the incident nevertheless
represents a Russian shot across Azerbaijan’s bow.

With
all eyes focused on Ukraine's border with Russia, it is hardly
surprising that the "other" dispute has fallen off the front pages.
However, as Stratfor notes,
there has been a burst of diplomatic activity in recent months over the
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia and Azerbaijan have
disputed for decades. Russia, the strongest power in the Caucasus, has
become more engaged in the issue as Azerbaijan's leverage in the region
grows. Russia's involvement could herald a change in this longstanding
conflict.

In 1994, after mediation by numerous external players
including Russia, Turkey, and Iran, a cease-fire was reached to end the
conflict. But by that time Armenian forces had decisively defeated
Azerbaijan, leading to the de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh and
Armenian control of several provinces bordering the region.

Atlantic Council: There He Goes Again. Putin Meddles in the South Caucasus

Russia
President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump likely agreed to
restrict intervention in the affairs of third countries at the G-20
summit. This agreement, however, contradicts Russian foreign policy. In
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, Russia seeks to curtail the ability of
these governments to pursue independent foreign policies. A series of
recent probes in the region demonstrate that Trump’s agreement with
Putin is worthless and that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
these states is meaningless from Moscow’s standpoint. Russia feels free
to intervene in their affairs at any time, threaten their compatriots
in Russia, and regularly brandish military and other forms of power to
intimidate them. Unless Washington, Brussels, and NATO step up their
game, this region will either explode or be compelled to shelter under
Russian power. The West cannot simply look away because European
security is linked to the security of the South Caucasus.

In
Georgia, Russia continues to press Tbilisi to accept the abridgement of
its territorial integrity, stonewalls Georgian efforts to negotiate, and
insists that the country renounce its NATO and EU aspirations. In early
July, Russian forces unilaterally moved
700 meters deeper into Georgia in a process called “borderization.”
Russian troops are now less than a kilometer from the Baku-Tbilisi-Poti
highway, one of the main regional highways. In Armenia, Russia curtailed
Yerevan’s ability to conduct an independent foreign and economic policy
years ago. It has forced Armenia into Moscow’s Eurasian Economic Union,
reserves the right to veto any Armenian agreement with the EU, and
obtained army and air bases in virtual perpetuity at Gyumri and Erebuni.
Ostensibly these bases defend Armenia against Turkey or Azerbaijan, but
they also ensure Moscow’s de facto protectorate over Armenia and are
vital to the projection of Russian power into the Black Sea and Middle
East.

Russia has recently stepped up its pressure on Azerbaijan.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian border troops have abandoned any pretense
of neutrality and have reportedly held drills
with Armenian troops in July 2017. At the same time, Russia and Iran
jointly launched drills in the Caspian Sea, which threaten Azeri energy
installations there. These drills take place in the context of other
signs of Moscow’s efforts to pressure Azerbaijan into joining the
Eurasian Economic Union, refrain from becoming a major pro-Western
outpost, and block it from becoming an energy competitor to Russia in
the Balkans. As is typical in such campaigns, Russia’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has fabricated charges of discrimination by Azerbaijan against Russians. Russia’s courts also closed the main lobby organization of Azeris in Russia, the All-Russian Azerbaijan Congress, while Russian officials appear to be paying heed to Armenian diaspora organizations in Russia, and Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova publicly humiliated journalists from Azerbaijan.

The
recent tragic killing of an Azerbaijani woman and her infant
granddaughter by Armenian troops firing upon supposed Azeri targets in
Nagorno-Karabakh underscores the fact that this conflict is a simmering
one that may catch fire at any time. The broader point is this: what
happens in Nagorno-Karabakh will not stay in Nagorno-Karabakh. As we saw
from the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and as scholars such as Robert Legvold
and I have written, the security of the Caucasus is inextricably linked
to European security. Another conflagration in the region will have
serious repercussions across Europe, the Middle East, and on the
international order.

The good news is that things are changing in
Washington. The Obama administration essentially ignored the Caucasus
and trouble spots like Nagorno-Karabakh, while US Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson recently met
with Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev in Istanbul. The new
administration has an opportunity to display a stronger presence in
helping Baku and Yerevan negotiate a peace settlement that meets both
countries needs and reduces the likelihood of future military
intervention. It’s critically important for Tillerson, Vice President
Mike Pence, Trump, and their European counterparts to make clear to
Russia through regular visits to Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan that the
West will defend these states’ sovereignty and integrity and actively
play a role in the peace process.

Of course none of these
countries has suffered the depredations loosed upon them by Moscow to
the extent that Ukraine has, but the same principles are at work. For
the Russian president, these are not real states and he alone decides to
what degree they may “pretend” to act as such. But here’s the rub: the
continuation of Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus may entail
war, since these states will not indefinitely renounce their statehood.
Moreover Moscow, by fanning the flames of conflict in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia against Georgia and in Nagorno-Karabakh by selling
high-performance weapons to both sides, encourages the very outcome it
professes to abhor. Russia’s policies all but ensure that ancient
grudges will lead to new wars—an outcome that neither Washington nor
Europe can passively accept. As Tillerson’s visit suggests, the time for
neglect is over and the time for engagement is now.

Armenpress: Military expert Vladimir Evseev proposes to form Iran-Russia-Armenia triangle

Military
expert Vladimir Evseev, deputy director of the CIS Countries Institute,
positively assesses the May 19 presidential election results in the
Islamic Republic of Iran. According to him, Hassan Rouhani’s re-election
as President of Iran is beneficial both for Armenia and Russia.

“It
was under Hassan Rouhani’s presidency that the Russian-Iranian
strategic dialogue launched which is very important, in other words,
currently we speak about strategic dialogue which leads to strategic
partnership. I think that dialogue will strengthen more easily under
Rouhani’s presidency. In late March Rouhani visited Russia, and a number
of joint decisions were made which will be easier to implement again
during his tenure”, Evseev told Armenpress.

The expert said in
line with strengthening of the Russian-Iranian relations, he expects
also deterioration of Iran-US ties. “Why, because Trump will probably
support Israel and Saudi Arabia which has money. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s
range of interests, that weakened a little under Obama’s presidency,
will return to its place, and Saudi Arabia is Iran’s regional rival. And
if Iran’s relations deteriorate, it will be more open for partnership
with neighbors, and in this sense Armenia is that friendly state with
which Iran can cooperate”, Vladimir Evseev said.

He also proposed to take respective steps to form Armenia-Iran-Russia triangle.Moreover,
this must be directed not only towards political cooperation, but also a
military one, the grounds of which we already have. In this sense I
would like to highlight the visit of Armenia’s Defense Minister to Iran
during which a number of issues, including defense issues were
discussed”, the military expert stated. Rouhani won Iran’s Presidential
election with 57% of votes. Four candidates were running for the post.
Over 70% of eligible voters participated in the election.

Russia
is making efforts to maintain parity in arms trade with Armenia and
Azerbaijan, Izvestia cited Director of the Federal Service for
Military-Technical Cooperation Aleksandr Fomin as saying. “Everything
must be solved via political and diplomatic channels,” Fomin said as he
commented on Russia’s weapons sale to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. “I
wouldn’t focus on whether our military-technical cooperation with them
influenced the relationship among various countries. The main task of
such a cooperation is not about helping one of the sides or creating
superiority of forces. The main task, as paradoxical as it may sound, is
the preservation of peace and stability in a particular country, a
region and the world in general.” “Even if parity exists theoretically
or one of the sides has an advantage, it is not determinative," Fomin
said in a blurred message. "Conflicts start irrespective of whether one
of the sides is armed better or worse. Nevertheless, we need to strive
for parity. And Russia is making efforts to maintain parity both in
absolute terms as well as in the quantity and quality of basic weapons
systems.”

Azerbaijan
is arming Armenia through its own purchase of weapons from Russia, head
of Russia’s state-run news agency Rossiya Segodnya Dmitry Kiselyov
said. “Azerbaijan can buy armaments from Israel, the U.S. and Russia.
The world's second largest exporter of weapons, Russia supplies arms to
the international markets and shows, where Azerbaijan, like many other
countries, buys weapons,” he said. Kiselyov urged against searching for
political implication behind the sale of arms to Azerbaijan. According
to him, Moscow thus maintains relations with Baku. Kiselyov expressed
the belief that Armenia benefits from relations between Russia and
Azerbaijan, since Russia, according to him, uses the money received from
Azerbaijan to develop its military-industrial complex, thus gaining an
opportunity to arm Armenia. “Azerbaijan thus buys weapons for Armenia
through Russia,” he said.

Armenian
authorities and people were not happy with Russia’s sale of ammunition
to Azerbaijan during the four-day war in early April, 2016. Russian
officials, however, defended the deals, claiming that Moscow “thus
maintains the balance in the South Caucasus.” Azerbaijan on April 2
unleashed a large-scale military offensive against Artsakh (Nagorno
Karabakh), which claimed the lives of hundreds on both sides. Chief
Armenian and Azerbaijani defense officials reached an agreement on the
cessation of hostilities on April 5 in Moscow.

Also,
Kiselyov said fluency in Russian language is vital for Armenia. “Once I
happened upon a young Armenian taxi driver who didn't know how to say
something in Russian, which really surprised me. My words drew a stormy
response, with people reacting not to the fact that the driver could not
count in Russian, but to my saying that ‘Russian language is a security
factor for Armenia,’” Kiselyov explained, according to Radio Sputnik
Armenia. He stressed that he never recanted and still believes that
fluency in Russian is vitally important for Armenia. According to
Kiselyov, "without this (knowledge of Russian - editor’s note), it is
impossible to imagine the future of Armenia."

Azerbaijan is arming Armenia through its own purchase of weapons from Russia, head of Russia’s state-run news agency Rossiya Segodnya Dmitry Kiselyov said.
“Azerbaijan can buy armaments from Israel, the U.S. and Russia. The
world's second largest exporter of weapons, Russia supplies arms to the
international markets and shows, where Azerbaijan, like many other
countries, buys weapons,” he said. Kiselyov urged against
searching for political implication behind the sale of arms to
Azerbaijan. According to him, Moscow thus maintains relations with Baku.
Kiselyov expressed the belief that Armenia benefits from relations
between Russia and Azerbaijan, since Russia, according to him, uses the
money received from Azerbaijan to develop its military-industrial
complex, thus gaining an opportunity to arm Armenia. “Azerbaijan thus buys weapons for Armenia through Russia,” he said.Armenian
authorities and people were not happy with Russia’s sale of ammunition
to Azerbaijan during the four-day war in early April, 2016. Russian
officials, however, defended the deals, claiming that Moscow “thus
maintains the balance in the South Caucasus.”Azerbaijan
on April 2 unleashed a large-scale military offensive against Artsakh
(Nagorno Karabakh), which claimed the lives of hundreds on both sides.
Chief Armenian and Azerbaijani defense officials reached an agreement on
the cessation of hostilities on April 5 in Moscow. Also, Kiselyov said fluency in Russian language is vital for Armenia.
“Once I happened upon a young Armenian taxi driver who didn't know how
to say something in Russian, which really surprised me. My words drew a
stormy response, with people reacting not to the fact that the driver
could not count in Russian, but to my saying that ‘Russian language is a
security factor for Armenia,’” Kiselyov explained, according to Radio
Sputnik Armenia. He stressed that he never recanted and still
believes that fluency in Russian is vitally important for Armenia.
According to Kiselyov, "without this (knowledge of Russian - editor’s
note), it is impossible to imagine the future of Armenia."

Russian expert: Armenia should be interested in Russian-Azeri arms deals

Russia's
only goal is to avoid a new war in Nagorno-Karabakh, Head of the
Caucasus Department of the CIS Institute Sergey Mikheyev said during a
Yerevan-Moscow TV link-up on Monday. He said that both Armenia and
Azerbaijan urge Russia to sever contacts with the opposite side and to
develop ties with them only. "We cannot do this as this may cause
instability in the region. The point here is that in order to guarantee
peace in the region, Russia has to keep balance between the parties,"
Mikheyev said. Director of the Public Political Studies Center Vladimir
Yevseyev said that if Russia stops selling arms to Azerbaijan, Israel,
the US or somebody else will start doing it. "So, Armenia should be
interested in Azerbaijan's buying arms from Russia as the Russians know
their arms and will be able to help the Armenians with 'antidotes' if
need be. There is no evil design in these supplies. Russia is not going
to abandon Armenia. All it wants is just peace in the region," Yevseyev
said. It was reported on 26 May that Russia planned to supply another
ordered lot of 6 TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems. According to
Uralvagonzavod plant, under a contract with Azerbaijan, that country
will receive 18 items of TOS-1A "Solntsegorsk." Last year, Russian
supplied the first lot of 6 systems. In addition, on 23 May, Konstantin
Byrulin, Deputy Head of the Federal Services for Military-Technical
Cooperation of Russia, said Azerbaijan has already received 100 tanks
T-90C and another 100 tanks may be delivered to Baku later, along with
helicopters Mi-171 and Mi-35, armored vehicles, light weapons, and
mortar howitzers.

President Aliyev: No allergy in Azerbaijan for Russia's selling arms to Armenia

The
fact that Russia is selling weapons to Armenia doesn't create any
allergy in Azerbaijan, said the country's president, Ilham Aliyev
answering a question at the joint press conference with German
Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin, Trend's correspondent reported from
the event. "We consider Russia as our strategic partner," he said. "We
understand that Russia is a big producer of arms, and can sell weapons
to any country. The allergy is in Armenia, for the fact that Russia
sells weapons to Azerbaijan." The president went on to add that unlike
Armenia, Azerbaijan paid the full price for the weapons, and Russia is
not the only country where Azerbaijan purchases weapons. "It is not a
secret that we purchase weapons from Turkey, Israel, Belarus, Iran and
many other countries, because we are modernizing our armed forces," the
president said. Ilham Aliyev further said that Russia is also one of
the members of the OSCE Minsk Group, which deals with the Nagorno
Karabakh settlement, adding that Azerbaijan considers Russia's role to
be very positive. "We hope that Russia, along with the US and France
will use all their potential to convince Armenia that it is time to
leave the occupied territories."

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Dear reader,

Arevordi will be taking a sabbatical to tend to personal matters. New blog commentaries will henceforth be posted on an irregular basis. The comments board however will continue to be moderated on a regular basis.

The last 20 years or so has also helped me see Russia as the last front against scourges of Westernization, Globalism, American expansionism, Zionism, Islamic extremism and pan-Turkism. I have also come to see Russia as the last hope humanity has for the preservation of classical western civilization, Apostolic Christianity and the traditional nation-state. This realization compelled me to create this blog in 2010. Immediately, this blog became one of the very few voices in the vastness of cyberia that dared to preach about the dangers of Globalism and the Anglo-American-Jewish alliance, and the only voice preaching the strategic importance of Armenia remaining within Russia's orbit. From about 2010 to 2015 I did monthly, at times weekly, commentaries about Russian-Armenian relations and Eurasian geopolitics in general. It was very difficult as I had no assistance in this endeavor. The time I put into this blog therefore came at the expense of work and family. But a powerful feeling inside me urged me to keep going; and I did.

When Armenia finally joined the EEU and integrated its armed forces into Russia's military structures a couple of years ago, I finally felt a deep sense of satisfaction and relaxation, as if a very heavy burden was lifted off my shoulders. I finally felt that my personal mission was accomplished. I therefore felt I could take a step back, as I really needed the rest. Simply put: I have lived to see the institutionalization of Russian-Armenian alliance. Also, I feel more confident now that Armenians are collectively recognizing the strategic importance of Armenia's ties with Russia. Moreover, I feel satisfied knowing that, at least on a subatomic level, I had a hand in the outcome. As a result, I feel a strong sense of mission accomplished. I therefore no longer have the urge to continue as in the past. In other words, the motivational force that had propelled me in previous years has been gradually dissipating because I feel that this blog has lived to see the realization of its stated goal. Going forward, I do not want to write merely for the sake of writing. Also, I do not want to say something if I have nothing important to say. I feel like I have said everything I needed to say. Henceforth, I will post seasonal commentaries about topics I find important. I will however continue moderating the blog's comments section on a regular basis; ultimately because I'm interested in what my readers have to say and also because it's through readers here that I am at times made aware of interesting developments.

To limit clutter in the comments section, I kindly ask all participants of this blog to please keep comments coherent and strictly relevant to the featured topic of discussion. Moreover, please realize that when there are several anonymous visitors posting comments simultaneously, it becomes very confusing (not to mention extremely annoying) trying to figure out who is who and who said what.Therefore, if you are here to engage in conversation, make an observation, express an idea or simply attack me, I ask you to at least use a moniker to identify yourself. Moreover, please appreciate the fact that I have put an enormous amount of information into this blog. In my opinion, most of my blog commentaries and articles, some going back ten-plus years, are in varying degrees relevant to this day and will remain so for a long time to come. Articles in this blog can therefore be revisited by longtime readers and new comers alike. I therefore ask the reader to treat this blog as a depository of important information relating to Eurasian geopolitics, Russian-Armenian relations and humanity's historic fight against the evils of Globalism and Westernization.