tag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2/tag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-2015-02-17T06:16:45ZComments for Wondermark on PasswordsA blog covering security and security technology.Movable Typetag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:403155Comment from Arkh on 2009-12-16Arkh
@The problem
"Obviously you give information by saying 'wrong' as well, but the simple elimination of an invalid password is the least information we can get away with giving."

You could imagine a system where some false password put you in use of a locked down with random info version of your system. It opens new vulnerabilities, but the attacker would have to work a little to know what he got access is on a random VM.

]]>
2009-12-16T11:29:07Z2009-12-16T11:29:07Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:403038Comment from Adam on 2009-12-15Adam
@Travis: The problem with that is that you have security in obscurity concerns - if the attackers know the methods your system is using (which you should assume they will eventually find out) they will be able to tell when the system is 'just pretending' that you've guessed too many times and infer the additional information as mentioned above. ]]>
2009-12-15T14:43:10Z2009-12-15T14:43:10Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402906Comment from Travis on 2009-12-14Travis
@ The problem "If you allow more guesses if the guesses being given are 'close' rather than 'far' from right, then by sensing the number of guesses allowed we can infer how 'close' to right we are guessing."

You could pretend you are not allowing more guesses by giving the response that they have guessed too many times and must wait awhile. But you could be actually checking each guess, and if it is correct, look back and see if they had guessed something similar before hitting the limit on number of guesses. If so, allow them access. If not, continue saying they are at the guess limit.

]]>
2009-12-14T16:10:54Z2009-12-14T16:10:54Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402890Comment from The problem on 2009-12-14The problem
@ Andrew -
In a word no, if you vary your response to password guessing beyond just letting them in if it is right and not if it is wrong you give information about the password.

Obviously you give information by saying 'wrong' as well, but the simple elimination of an invalid password is the least information we can get away with giving. If you allow more guesses if the guesses being given are 'close' rather than 'far' from right, then by sensing the number of guesses allowed we can infer how 'close' to right we are guessing.

The best option I have seen is a simple method that penalizes guesses exponentially. That is, first wrong guess results in a 1s lockdown, second in 2s, and so on. After 15 wrong guesses the lockdown is 4.5 hours. Of course then DoS issues come into play.

]]>
2009-12-14T15:06:25Z2009-12-14T15:06:25Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402869Comment from BF Skinner on 2009-12-14BF Skinner
@Roger "send the userid to syslog but *NOT* the wrong password!)"

We used to, and likely some still do. That's why it was identified as a bad practice and put on the list of things to test for. The thinking then was "well only the SA can get to it and they already have root."

This is the thinking of a developer (occasionally O&M) not someone in security.

]]>
2009-12-14T13:07:38Z2009-12-14T13:07:38Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402737Comment from Peter E Retep on 2009-12-12Peter E Retep
Dear Bruce,
Among the trade-off's you'v analyzed,
I'm not sure if you've ever analyzed thse shift
from internal to external motivation.
I just had an experience of the latter at work:

When it is in your own economic advantage to use a computer,
and you discover this, you are in a 'learning mood'
and have a motivation to make easier to learn,
and to guard from hazards;
whereas when the economic motivation is imposed,
as by economy apparent to a suupervisor but not the user,
the computer user has no interest in the device,
in securing or understanding the natutre of passwords,
it seems an encumbrance resented and resisted.

" ...and take appropriate action without revealing information about the password to the potential attacker?"

You might be making an assumption that is not (or should not be) true, which is the system knows the plaintext password, or how the specific user constructs their passwords.

For a correctly working password system the only information the system should know is,

`if the current password guess matches or not`

nothing else.

It's the fundemental idea behind the original *nix password system, which many modern password systems appear to have forgoten in order to get "more security" (to prevent users re-using passwords etc).

Ignoring for a moment this and Rogers (@9:21PM) other major point about storage of the "attempts".

What you are looking for is a (Delphinic) oracal combined with a Turing test.

Both are problems that Hard AI has not solved and arguably cannot solve without the use of quantum computing (see info on Roger Penrose and his search for Quantum structures in the Human Mind).

This only leaves a statistical analysis of the "supposed user" input.

Thus the question falls back to what you are trying to do,

1, Help the user remember.
2, Help the user guess

In the first case you can model human behaviour on past experiance in the "general" or "specific" case. The "specific" case would reveal meta knowledge of the user and thus their password which would aid an attacker. The "general" is unlikley to be of help as it would only do what the attacker should be doing anyway which is to guess the password.

The second case of guessing can be reworded as,

How do you work towards an "unknown" from a zero knowledge postion.

Which is a more restricted case of the problem cryptographers face when faced with a new cryptogram.

To which the answer should be `only by brut force search or random guess'.

Thus anything else does reveal something about the password or the user of the password. Both of which in theory (and practice) will help an attacker get the actual password.

]]>
2009-12-12T06:56:47Z2009-12-12T06:56:47Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402676Comment from Roger on 2009-12-11Roger
@Andrew: " ... could we come up with a way to distinguish between ..."

Problem is, normal rate limiting just needs to count the attempts. Any more sophisticated method needs to store either the actual guesses, or less opaque information about the password (so goodness of fit can be recorded.)

For a computer (as against a human brain), this can create new security problems (it's the reason why on failed login attempts, we send the userid to syslog but *NOT* the wrong password!)

]]>
2009-12-12T03:21:01Z2009-12-12T03:21:01Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402652Comment from Peter E Retep on 2009-12-11Peter E Retep
Bruce,
Did you notice the Turctopus of
November 26th, 2009?]]>
2009-12-11T23:51:09Z2009-12-11T23:51:09Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402651Comment from Andrew on 2009-12-11Andrew
The person in the comic is quite obviously guessing (even before his admission in the last panel). Much of the humor in this comic is due to the incongruity of the human guard not responding to that as a real human would.
It does bring up an interesting question: could we come up with a way to distinguish between password typoes, password guesses by a human who has partially forgotten the password, guesses by a human trying to discover the password, or automated password guessing, and take appropriate action without revealing information about the password to the potential attacker?]]>
2009-12-11T23:50:48Z2009-12-11T23:50:48Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402641Comment from Brendan on 2009-12-11Brendanhttp://threebrothers.org/brendan/
Reminds me a little bit of this: http://www.bash.org/?244321]]>
2009-12-11T20:53:22Z2009-12-11T20:53:22Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402634Comment from Johns on 2009-12-11Johns
Funny. But he used my password in it! Now I can't share it with my friends. :(]]>
2009-12-11T20:03:17Z2009-12-11T20:03:17Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402629Comment from Ray on 2009-12-11Ray
Instant classic. Thanks for sharing!]]>
2009-12-11T19:22:24Z2009-12-11T19:22:24Ztag:www.schneier.com,2009:/blog//2.3157-comment:402628Comment from Brandioch Conner on 2009-12-11Brandioch Conner
Don't forget to read the mouse over comment.]]>
2009-12-11T19:21:27Z2009-12-11T19:21:27Z