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Libya's continuing struggle for democracy

An anti-militia protester gunned down on November 15, 2013.

By
Chris Slee

January
9, 2014 – Links International Journal of
Socialist Renewal -- In recent months there has been a wave of protests
against militias in Libya’s cities. The militias are armed groups originally
formed during the 2011 civil war. Most are based in particular towns or regions,
but they sometimes try to exercise power over a wider area. There is widespread
resentment at their arbitrary exercise of power. One protester told the Libya
Herald that the militias “terrorise, steal and kidnap people”.[1]

On
November 15, 2013, protesters marched on a militia base in Gharghour, a suburb
of Tripoli, Libya’s capital. The base was occupied by a militia from the city
of Misrata. The protesters were demanding that the militia leave Tripoli. But
the militia opened fire, killing 47 people and injuring 500.[2]

This
led to more protests. The Tripoli local council called a general strike,
initially intended to last three days.[3]

The
militias agreed to withdraw from Tripoli, and Libya’s Prime Minister Ali Zeidan
called for an end to the strike. However there were reports that some of the
militias had merely moved to locations on the outskirts of the city, waiting to
return when protests died down.

University
students and staff met and voted to continue the strike. The Tripoli local
council also called for the strike to continue.[4]

The
strike lasted for two weeks. It ended on November 30 after the government had
promised to ensure that all militias were withdrawn from the capital.[5]

There
have also been anti-militia protests in many other towns. In Benghazi and Derna
the main target of the protests has been an Islamist militia called Ansar
al-Sharia.

History

Most
of the militias were formed in 2011 during the war to overthrow the regime of
Muammar Gaddafi.

Gaddafi
had come to power in a military coup in 1969. In the early years of his rule he
was a radical Arab nationalist, evicting a United States air base from Libya
and nationalising the oil industry.

Gaddafi
used Libya’s oil revenue to create a welfare state. Health and education were
greatly improved and life expectancy rose from 51 to 74 years.[6]

For
a long time the Western powers were very hostile to Gaddafi. The US attempted
to kill him by bombing his Tripoli compound in 1986. The Western powers
also imposed economic sanctions on Libya and supported attempts by Gaddafi’s
opponents to overthrow him.

The sanctions caused considerable difficulties for Libya,
and Gaddafi made big concessions in an effort to end them. The pretext for the
sanctions was Libya’s alleged involvement in the terrorist bombing of an
aircraft over Lockerbie in Scotland. Although Libya always denied involvement,
Gaddafi eventually agreed to hand over two suspects for trial. One was
eventually found guilty and one acquitted in a trial of dubious validity.

In
2003-2004 normal diplomatic and economic relations with the Western powers were
re-established. Gaddafi began implementing neoliberal policies. Michael Porter,
a Harvard Business School professor and neoliberal ideologue, was appointed as
an adviser to the Libyan government. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (one of Muammar
Gaddafi’s sons) announced plans to cut the state sector by 20 per cent.

However
the neoliberal policies were not implemented as fast as Porter wanted. In March
2007 Business Week magazine said:

Porter complains that
reform ground to a halt last year… One reason: a backlash against proposed
layoffs of public sector workers. A planned privatisation of a public sector
bank called Sahara also failed when investors rejected the government’s
valuation.[7]

Nevertheless,
it appeared as if Gaddafi and the Western powers were now reconciled. The
latter even sent back a few exiled opponents of Gaddafi to Libya to face
punishment.

However
there were still tensions between Libya and the Western powers. For example,
Gaddafi opposed US plans to establish the Africa Command, Africom – a military
force with bases in Africa and able to intervene in African countries. Hence
when the opportunity arose to remove Gaddafi, NATO took it.

Despite
the improvements in health, education and welfare made under the Gaddafi
government, there was widespread discontent for a number of reasons – lack of
democracy[8], high unemployment, the privileges of the elite (including
Gaddafi’s family) and inadequate public services.

There
was also a rise in hostility to African migrant workers. The exploitation of
these workers had contributed to Libya’s wealth, but many Libyans blamed them
for the country’s social problems, leading to race riots in the year 2000.

In February 2011, there was a wave of anti-Gaddafi protests in many
Libyan cities, inspired by the protests which had succeeded in overthrowing
repressive governments in Tunisia and Egypt. In Tripoli the protests were
suppressed by the regime, but in a number of other cities and towns the rebels
took control. Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, and Misrata, the third
largest, were among them.

The
rebel movement was portrayed in the Western media as a movement for democracy. But
in reality it was more complicated than that. No doubt the February protests
included many who were sincere in their desire for democracy. But many of the
leaders of the movement were prepared to act in an undemocratic manner to
promote their own interests, and those of the anti-Gaddafi wing of the
capitalist class. The most blatant example of this was the promotion of violent
racism by the rebel leadership.

The
rebel leaders were generally neoliberal in their economic outlook, but varied
politically. Some were regarded as Islamists, others not. Some were recent
defectors from the Gaddafi regime, including former high officials; some were
people who had campaigned peacefully for human rights (e.g. lawyers who had
defended political prisoners); and some were longstanding opponents of Gaddafi
who had attempted to overthrow him by violent means in the past.

Some
of Gaddafi’s opponents were veterans of war in Afghanistan. Many anti-Gaddafi
Libyans went to Afghanistan in the 1980s as part of the US-backed war against
the government of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which was backed
by the Soviet Union. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in
1989 and the overthrow of the PDPA government in 1992, some of the Libyans
returned to Libya to fight against Gaddafi.

One
Afghan veteran who played a significant role was Abdul Hakim Belhadj. He fought
in Afghanistan from 1988 to 1992. He then returned to Libya and set up the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which fought a guerrilla war and made several
unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Gaddafi. When the LIFG was crushed in 1998
Belhadj went into exile. Belhadj was seized by the CIA in 2004 and sent back to
Libya, where he was imprisoned. He was released in 2010.

When
the protests began in February 2011, Gaddafi’s various opponents all saw an
opportunity to get rid of him. Some put themselves forward as spokespeople for
the rebel movement. Some, including Belhadj, became leaders of rebel armed
groups.

The
National Transitional Council was formed in an attempt to unite the disparate
anti-Gaddafi forces. However, past grievances, ideological differences and
personal rivalries created conflict within the rebel movement. General Abdul
Fattah Younis, a defector from the regime, was murdered by Islamists.

Racism
among the rebels

One
particularly harmful feature of the rebel movement was racism. Sections of the
rebel leadership actively promoted virulent hostility to black people. This was
initially directed mainly against migrant workers from sub-Saharan Africa, who
were falsely accused of being “mercenaries” for Gaddafi,and were subject to
pogroms in which they were murdered, detained or forced to flee the country. But
black people who were Libyan citizens were also affected.[9]

If
the rebel movement had been genuinely democratic, it would have made every
effort to win the support of black Libyans. But the racism of the rebel
movement naturally alienated black people. This made it much less likely that
black soldiers in Gaddafi’s army would join the rebellion. Thus the rebels were
weakened militarily by their own racism. This was one factor contributing to
their inability to defeat Gaddafi without NATO support.

Why
did the rebel leadership promote racism? In my view they did not want a
thoroughgoing democratic revolution in Libya. They wanted parliamentary
democracy, but only if it was dominated by politicians representing the
interests of the capitalist class.

Dividing
the population on racial lines was a tactic for avoiding a real democratic
revolution, which might have led eventually to the election of a left-wing
government.

The
war

Although
some military units and a number of senior officers defected to the rebels in
the early days of the uprising, Gaddafi’s army did not collapse. Instead it was
able to go on the offensive. In March 2011 it recaptured several cities and was
advancing on Benghazi. The rebels appealed for foreign intervention. The UN
Security Council passed a resolution authorising “all necessary measures” to
protect civilians. NATO took this as carte blanche to intervene on the side of
the rebels, bombing government troops and sending military advisers to
accompany selected rebel units. The rebels also got aid and military advisers
from Qatar.

Eventually
the rebels gained the upper hand. NATO bombing played an important role in the
rebel victory. NATO planes carried out more than 9600 bombing raids on Libya.[10]

NATO
special forces personnel accompanying some rebel units were able to guide NATO
aircraft in accurately targeting pro-Gaddafi troops who were blocking their
advance. According to George Friedman of STRATFOR:

Accurately
identifying targets and taking them out with sufficient precision involves
highly skilled special operations teams guiding munitions to those targets. The
fact that there have been relatively few friendly-fire accidents indicates that
standard operational procedures have been in place.

These teams were
probably joined by other special operators who trained – and in most cases
informally led – indigenous forces in battle. There were ample reports in the
early days of the war that special operations teams were on the ground
conducting weapons training and organising the fighters who opposed Gaddafi.[11]

During
August rebel forces advanced on Tripoli from the west. There was also an
insurrection within Tripoli by residents of the city. Participants in this
insurrection claimed to have liberated most of Tripoli before the rebels from
outside the city arrived.

Tripoli
residents showed considerable suspicion towards the outsiders. According to
Nicholas Pelham, writing in the online version of Middle East Report on September
7, 2011:

Neighborhoods that
claim to have freed themselves continue to man their own checkpoints and
barricades long after the fighting has moved on. Their purpose, they say, is to
guard against pockets of [Gaddafi] loyalists, but few doubt that they also
intend to keep out incoming anti-Gaddafi fighters. Inside these enclaves, the
neighborhood councils hold sway, reestablishing civilian life in the name of
the NTC, but with little if any actual contact with it.[12]

Meanwhile
resistance by pro-Gaddafi forces continued in some cities such as Sirte and
Bani Walid for a few months. Gaddafi was captured and murdered near Sirte on
October 20.

The
new regime

The NTC acted as an interim legislative body
until July 2012, when elections were held for a new 200-member legislative
assembly called the General National Congress. Elections were also held for
local government bodies.

Limitations
on democracy included the continuing detention without trial of political
prisoners; a ban on alleged Gaddafi supporters running for office; and a ban on
“glorifying” Gaddafi or criticising the “revolution”.

Although
the “anti-glorification” law was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, most people would probably still hesitate to say anything positive about
Gaddafi or critical of the “revolution”, for fear of being violently attacked
by reactionary militias, or discriminated against in employment.

Militias
and army

The
militias created during the war continued to exist after the war. They tend to
behave like warlord armies, each ruling over a particular area. Sometimes they
have fought battles for control of territory. Some militias have their
own prisons.

The
government tries to exercise some control over them, by paying militia members
and declaring them to be part of the army or police force. However they cannot
always be relied on, especially if there is a conflict between the central
government and the local elite of the area in which the militia is based.

The
government has begun to build a new army and police force. Militia members can
apply to join, but have to do so as individuals, not as a group. Progress in
building the new army is slow.

Because
the new army remains weak, the government still sometimes has to use militias
to suppress dissent.

Misrata

The
most powerful militia is that which is based in Misrata, Libya’s third-largest
city.

According
to Juan Cole, it has more arms than the central government:

Misrata is a vast
arms depot, with tanks, rocket propelled grenades and other arms stockpiled in
such numbers as to dwarf the armaments of the central government. Much of the
equipment was conquered from Gaddafi’s forces, but some was sent during the
fighting of 2011 by Qatar.[13]

The
Misrata militia has often been called on by the central government to repress
rebellions in other cities.

Misrata
is the place in Libya where private enterprise is most highly developed. It is
making a big effort to attract foreign capital, with considerable success. The
Economist magazine has described Misrata as “the can-do city”.[14]

The
Misrata militia is extremely racist. In August 2011 it expelled the whole
population of Tawergha, a town near Misrata whose people were descended from
black African slaves.

The
expulsion was planned in advance by the militia leadership. A June 21, 2013,
article by Sam Dagher in the Wall Street Journal quoted a militia leader
stating his intention to drive out the residents of Tawergha from their homes:

Ibrahim al-Halbous, a rebel commander leading the
fight near Tawergha, says all remaining residents should leave once his
fighters capture the town: “They should pack up”, Mr Halbous said. “Tawergha no
longer exists, only Misrata”.[15]

Why
is Misrata such a centre of racism? In part, it is a legacy of Misrata’s past
involvement in the slave trade. Sean Kane, writing in Foreign Policy magazine, says:

Originally
inhabited by black African cast-offs from the 19th century slave trade,
Tawerghis were kept as owned slaves in Misrata until Libyan King Idris
al-Sannoussi reportedly put a stop to the practice in the 1960s.[16]

But
racism today is not just a product of history. It has been consciously promoted
by influential figures in Misrata. For example, Yusuf Bin Yusuf, who was at
that time the newly elected leader of Misrata’s city council, said of the black
people of Tawergha:

There is a lot of
doubt about their right to be in this particular place. As far as we know they
are escaped slaves or freed slaves who just came and took over this area.[17]

Why
have the political and military leaders of Misrata promoted racism? I believe
it is a conscious effort by the Misrata capitalists to divide the working
class.

The
Misrata bourgeoisie supported the anti-Gaddafi rebellion because it wanted the
more rapid and thorough implementation of neoliberal policies. But the
rebellion had the potential to develop in a more progressive direction. Racism
was a key tactic to avoid this possibility.

Many
of the inhabitants of Tawergha formerly worked in Misrata. So, among
other things, the expulsion of the Tawerghans was a racial purge within the
Misrata working class. It is reminiscent of the religious purge in Northern
Ireland in 1920, when Catholic workers were driven out of the shipyards and
other workplaces.

I
am not aware of any overt resistance to the militia within Misrata. However there
is some anti-militia sentiment among youth. John Thorne, writing in the Christian
Science Monitor, mentions a café where such young people gather, and quotes
a graphic designer called Abdul Hamid as saying: “They [the militia] make the
rest of us look bad.”[18]

The
struggle for democracy

The
struggle against the arbitrary power of the militias is one aspect of the
struggle for democratic rights in Libya. Many people hope that an army and
police force accountable to the elected government will be better than militias
under the control of warlord/gangster leaders.

In
reality, there is no guarantee that a regular army and police force under the
control of a bourgeois government will be any better than the militias. The
struggle against the abuse of power by “bodies of armed men” (whether these be
militias, or the regular army and police) will need to continue.

It
should also be noted that most people who belong to militias do so because of
the lack of other work. According to Bill Lawrence, director of the North
Africa project for the International Crisis Group:

Surveys have revealed
that only 10-15 percent of the 200,000 or so Libyans under arms want to be in
the police or army. Most of them want to start businesses or to be doctors or
lawyers or to go overseas.[19]

However, most are unable to achieve their
goals, and remain in the militia for lack of anything better:

Being a militia
member is also a relatively dependable way to earn a living in Libya right now.
Job opportunities are limited.[20]

Hence
job creation must be part of the solution. But the economy is in poor shape and
prospects for job creation do not appear good, given the neoliberal policies of
the current government.

Other
democratic struggles include those for ethnic minority rights, workers’ rights,
women’s rights and civil liberties.

The
Amazigh, Tebu and Tuareg minorities have taken action around issues including
recognition of their languages and increased representation in parliament. At
times they have shut down oil and gas facilities to put pressure on the central
government.[21, 22]

The
people of Tawergha, who currently live in refugee camps in Tripoli and other
cities, have demanded the right to return to their home town.[23] However the
Misrata local authorities and militia will not permit this, and the central
government is unwilling or unable to confront the rulers of Misrata over this
issue, so the Tawerghans continue to live in terrible conditions.[24]

There
have been strikes by oil, electricity and other workers, around health and
safety, pay and other issues. At times, the workers have demanded the sacking
of managers.[25] (However the frequent closures of oil, gas and electricity
facilities are not always due to workers’ strikes. Ethnic minority campaigns
have already been mentioned. But in addition, closures are often carried out by
local elites as a tactic in conflicts with the central government.)

The
campaign for women’s rights has suffered setbacks. According to Libyan writer
Aicha Almagrabi:

Things have changed
but not for the better, and we’ve lost the few rights we had. As an example,
polygamy is still common currency in Libya, but at least a man needed his
wife’s approval to marry a second wife under Gaddafi. That is no longer
required…

Girls at school are
now forced to wear the hijab (a headscarf that covers women’s hair and necks
but not their faces) and the mufti [chief Islamic religious leader] is also
campaigning for all women to always cover their hair.[26]

Almagrabi
reports that some militias try to enforce restrictions on women’s freedom:

I live outside the
city, and on February 13, I was stopped by a group of armed men on my way to
work. They held me at gunpoint for and hour and a half because I had no muharram [male companion] traveling with me. I took
the issue to media and it got the attention of the general public. On March 14
we organized a protest called “the march for the dignity of women”. As usual we
were insulted, beaten and harassed.[27]

Almagrabi
says that:

a key question is to
break the militia rule… If that doesn’t happen, we’ll be heading towards an “Afghan
model” in women’s rights.[28]

Currently the struggle against the militias is the key front
in the fight for democracy. But a real democratic revolution will require a
mass campaign for women’s rights. It will require widespread solidarity with
the struggle of the people of Tawergha to return to their homes. It will
require a struggle for free speech, and a struggle to free all political
prisoners.

It
will also require a struggle against neoliberal economic policies, and for jobs
and social justice.