A county’s
committee on school district organization is not responsible for polarized
voting in the districts that make up the county, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal ruled yesterday.

The justices
affirmed the dismissal of the Madera County Board of Education from a lawsuit
charging it and the Madera Unified School District from a suit under the
California Voting Rights Act. It also rejected the Hispanic plaintiffs’ claim
that Madera Superior Court Judge James Oakley abused his discretion by awarding
their attorneys from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher $162,500 in attorney fees, a
fraction of the $1.7 million they had sought.

The plaintiffs
sued in August 2008, arguing that the Madera district was in violation of the
CVRA because it elected school board members at-large, and by doing so prevented
Hispanics from electing their candidates of choice. The plaintiffs alleged that
they had attempted to persuade the defendants to change the method of election
without litigating, but that the district had denied that voting in its
elections was racially polarized.

Federal Counterpart

Both the CVRA
and its federal counterpart provide remedies for such racially polarized
voting. But the CVRA is friendlier to plaintiffs, who do not have to prove that
the disfavored minority lives in a geographically compact area or that the
defendant or its officials have a discriminatory animus.

The plaintiffs
moved for a preliminary injunction. The district responded that it was already
working toward a system of electing board members from “trustee areas” and
agreed to delay its November 2008 election.

The judge
ultimately granted the plaintiffs an injunction against the district, but
granted summary judgment to the county agency on the ground that it has no
responsibility for CVRA compliance by the local districts. He agreed that the
plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees against the district only, but cut
the amount substantially.

In doing so,
Oakley reasoned that Gibson Dunn could not justify putting in more than 500
hours on the case, even though it claimed a “patently unreasonable” 3,028
hours. He also rejected the firm’s hourly rate request, with some attorneys
claiming more than $700 per hour, and its request for a “modest” premium of 8
percent.

Lower Prices

The judge
concluded that there was no need for the plaintiffs to import out-of-town
counsel, and that a “blended” rate of $325 per hour was reasonable, based on
the rates generally charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in
Madera County.

Justice Herbert
Levy, writing for the Court of Appeal, said the plaintiffs demonstrated no
error on Oakley’s part.

In Madera
County, the justice explained, the elected Board of Education functions as the
committee on school district organization, setting the boundaries of the local
school districts, of which there are currently nine.

Contrary to the
plaintiffs’ argument, Levy said, the board is not responsible for monitoring
the local districts in order to ensure compliance with the CVRA.

The language of
the act, the jurist explained, “indicates that liability is based on active
involvement with the election.” Since the county agency is responsible for the
initial election establishing a school district, but not for subsequent
elections, the plain meaning of the legislation makes clear that it has no
liability with regard to polarized voting at those elections.

Turning to the
fee award, the justice noted that trial judges are vested with broad discretion
because they are in the best position to evaluate the nature and necessity of
the work performed in their courts.

Here, Levy
explained, it was not unreasonable for the judge to conclude that it was
unnecessary for more than 10 attorneys to work a total of more than 3,000 hours
on a case whose merits were resolved within three months of the complaint being
filed.

Local Lawyers

With respect to
the need for out-of-town counsel, Levy cited declarations by two local lawyers,
whom the trial judge found to have been qualified, and who said they would have
been willing to represent the plaintiffs. In any event, he said, the
plaintiffs’ claim that local counsel were unwilling to bring suit against local
agencies was speculative, given that there was no evidence the plaintiffs tried
to engage local lawyers to represent them.

Nor was a fee
multiplier required under the circumstances, the justice said. Oakley, he
explained, carefully examined all of the relevant criteria, and made
appropriate findings, including his determination that additional fees would
impose an undue burden on taxpayers, because the district would likely cut
instruction rather than seek additional sources of funding to pay the higher
fees.