Before
the Court is Defendant Daikin Industries, Ltd.'s
("DIL") Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction as well as Defendants Daikin Applied Americas
Inc. (XXDAA") and Daikin North Americas,
LLC's ("DNA") Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint. (Docs. 32, 33.) Plaintiff filed responses in
opposition to both motions (docs. 35, 36), and Defendants
filed replies in support of their respective motions (docs.
44, 45)[1] Accordingly, Defendants' respective
motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for the
Court's review. For the reasons stated herein,
Defendants' motions are GRANTED.

Plaintiff[3] alleges in its amended
complaint that Defendants DIL, [4] DAA, [5] and DNA[6] "design,
manufacture and sell heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning units ("HVAC Units') containing a
component known as an evaporator coil manufactured with
copper tubing ("Daikin Coils')."[7] (Amended
Complaint, Doc. 5, ¶ 3.) These Daikin Coils consist of
copper tubing affixed with aluminum fins secured thereon by
aluminum bands that wrap around the tubing. The Daikin Coils
contain "a refrigerant that absorbs heat from
surrounding air, cooling the air in the process."
(Id. ¶ 4.) The trapped heat is then expelled
from the exterior of the building to the outside.
(Id. ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff
alleges, however, that the Daikin Coils fail to perform
"their intended purpose of cooling air . . . because
they corrode and leak refrigerant well before the expiration
of their useful life." (Id. ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff further alleges that:

The failure of Daikin Coils to perform as intended is an
unavoidable consequence of their design. As a result of their
manufacturing process, the copper tubes in the Daikin Coils
are prone to "formicary corrosion." This process
causes microscopic holes within the tubing that cause the
Daikin Coils to leak refrigerant and ultimately fail. The
corrosion and failure of Daikin Coils are due to
Defendants' actions, including but not limited to,
selecting the wrong alloy, defective manufacturing of the
Daikin Coils, and failing to properly ensure that the Daikin
Coils will perform for their useful life and are fit for
their intended purpose. Defendants designed, created product
materials for, designed instructions for, caused the
manufacture of, and sold HVAC units containing Daikin Coils
that were installed in homes throughout Georgia, including
Plaintiff's and the Class's homes.[8]

(Id. ¶ 6.) In a properly-functioning HVAC unit,
refrigerant rarely needs to be replaced, because
"refrigerant does not deplete from use" and
"evaporator coils are designed to be sealed systems such
that the refrigerant cannot escape." (Id.
¶ 11.) In contrast, Daikin Coils begin to corrode
"as soon as the Daikin Coils are put to use under normal
environmental conditions, " which in turn causes the
Daikin Coils to "leak refrigerant at an ever increasing
rate within months of installation, dramatically diminishing
the useful life of the product." (Id. ¶
12.) Indeed, "at the time Defendants manufactured, sold
and distributed the Daikin Coils, " it was widely known
that copper evaporator coils were "particularly
susceptible to formicary corrosion" and that
"[a]lternative designs for the [Daikin Coils] were
available and feasible at the time of [their]
manufacture."[9] (Id. ¶¶ 13, 119.)
Plaintiff alleges that the Daikin Coils "expose
consumers to health and safety risks" because
"[l]eaked refrigerant can cause severe injury if inhaled
or if it comes in contact with skin or eyes."
(Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also alleges that
"leaked refrigerant can cause damage to surrounding
property." (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff further
alleges that the Daikin Coils "also damage[] the
environment" by "emitting a greenhouse gas [i.e.,
the leaked refrigerant] that is thousands of times more
potent than CO2." (Id. ¶ 17.)

In
March 2010, Plaintiff purchased and installed an HVAC system
in its medical offices building located in Evans, Georgia.
(Id. ¶ 19.) This HVAC system was comprised of
nineteen HVAC units which were allegedly "manufactured,
sold and distributed by Defendants" and
''installed by a Daikin-certified
installer."[10] (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that it
has suffered -and will continue to suffer - harm "as a
result of the defective Daikin Coils" (and their alleged
corrosion and resulting leaking of refrigerant) which have
caused Plaintiff's HVAC units to "no longer
adequately cool air, " which in turn have caused
Plaintiff to incur "out-of-pocket repair and service
costs, " have devalued the HVAC units for which
Plaintiff bargained, and have “diminish[ed]
Plaintiff's property value unless
replaced."[11](Id. ¶¶ 20-23.)

On
December 11, 2015, Plaintiff "mailed a letter" to
Mr. Takayuki Inoue, the senior vice president of the SVP, VRV
and Light Commercial division of DNA, in which Plaintiff
allegedly: (a) identified himself; (b) described the nature
of the defect in its Daikin HVAC units; (c) described the
damages incurred as a result of the Daikin Coils; and (d)
"requested adequate relief from
Defendants."[12] (Id. ¶ 76.) When it did
not receive a response to its December 11, 2015 letter,
Plaintiff's co-owner, Dr. Sanders R. Callaway, sent a
follow-up email to Mr. Inoue on January 4, 2016.
(Id.) On January 6, 2016, Mr. Inoue sent a reply
email to Dr. Callaway confirming that he had received
Plaintiff's December 11, 2015 letter. (Id.)

Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a plaintiff's
complaint contain both "a short and plain statement of
the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" and
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)
-(2). A responding party thus may move to dismiss the
complaint based on, inter alia, a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), lack of
personal jurisdiction, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), or a failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P.
12 (b) (6) .

A.
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF STANDING

"Because
a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is one attacking the
district court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is
brought pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1)." Region 8 Forest
Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800,
807 n.8 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also
Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th
Cir. 2005) ("Standing is a threshold jurisdictional
question which must be addressed prior to and independent of
the merits of a party's claims.")- In assessing
standing on a motion to dismiss, a district court must
"presume the plaintiff's general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the
claim." Kawa Orthodontics, LLP v. Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, 773 F.3d 243, 245 (11th Cir.
2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Further, the court "must accept
as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining
party." Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ("For purposes of ruling on a
motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and
reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations
of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of
the complaining party.")).

B.
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

"In
the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction in which no evidentiary hearing is held, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case
of jurisdiction over the movant, nonresident defendant."
Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir.
1988). The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by
presenting "enough evidence to withstand a motion for
directed verdict." Madera v. Hall, 916 F.2d
1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). A party presents enough evidence
to withstand a motion or directed verdict by putting forth
"substantial evidence ... of such quality and weight
that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment might reach different conclusions."
Walkerv. Nations Bank of Florida, 53 F.3d
1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995).

C.
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
include enough” factual allegations to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, " and those facts
must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 545, 570 (2007). Although a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion need not be buttressed by detailed factual
allegations, the plaintiff's pleading “requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do."
Id. at 555. The Rule 8 pleading standard
"demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) .

A
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, however, "unless it appears beyond a doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of circumstances that would
entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Robinson v. United
States, 484 F.App'x 421, 423 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Lopez v. First Union Nat'1 Bank of
Fla., 129 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997)). At this
stage, courts must accept as true all facts alleged in the
complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Belanger v. Salvation
Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250-, 1262
(11th Cir. 2004)).

III.
DISCUSSION

A.
DIL'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION

DIL
contends that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it
because Plaintiff cannot satisfy either the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Georgia's long-arm
statute - both of which are required for the Court to
exercise jurisdiction over DIL. As well, while conceding that
its subsidiary, non-party Daikin Applied Georgia
("DAG"), may transact business in Georgia, DIL
maintains that its ownership of DAG alone is insufficient to
confer jurisdiction over DIL, and that the separate and
independent nature of the companies precludes imputing
DAG's contacts with Georgia to DIL. In support of its
motion to dismiss, DIL has submitted the Declaration of
Takatoshi Kondo, DIL's Legal Officer, who states,
inter alia:

• DIL's design and manufacturing activities for its
HVAC products take place exclusively in Japan or outside the
United States.

• DIL does not design, manufacture, advertise, or sell
products in Georgia or the United States.

• DIL does not control sales or distribution of its
products within the United States, including how many
products are sold in Georgia.

• DIL does not design products specifically for the
Georgia market or sell its products to a distributor specific
to the Georgia market.

• DIL does not perform services in Georgia or derive
revenue from any services performed in Georgia.

• DIL is not the warrantor for any warranty offered to
consumers in Georgia or the United States.

(Kondo Decl., Doc. 32-2, ¶¶ 3-6, 12, 14.) Mr. Kondo
further attests that DIL does not maintain - nor does it have
employees who maintain - an office in Georgia, is not
registered to do business in Georgia, does not have a
registered agent in Georgia, does not pay taxes in Georgia,
and does not own real property in Georgia. (Id.
¶¶ 7-11, 13.)

In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction over
DIL is proper because: (1) Georgia's long-arm statute is
satisfied as DIL has either transacted business within
Georgia (either directly or through DAG) or has derived
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in Georgia;
and (2) due process is satisfied as DIL has purposefully
availed itself of the benefits of transacting business in
Georgia by distributing and deriving substantial profits from
its products purchased and used in Georgia (either directly
or through DAG), Plaintiff's claims arise out of
DIL's forum-related activities, and the exercise of
jurisdiction would otherwise comport with fair play and
substantial justice. In support of its allegations, Plaintiff
has attached the Declaration of Graham B. Lippsmith,
Plaintiff's counsel, who attaches thereto copies of
screenshots or printouts of DAG's website as well as news
articles related to DNA's manufacturing activities and
DIL's 2 006 acquisition of DAA (f/k/a McQuay
International). (Lippsmith Decl., Doc. 36-1.) Plaintiff
explicitly concedes, however, that this Court would not have
general jurisdiction over DIL. (Doc. 36, at 5.)

To
determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to
personal jurisdiction, the Court must perform a two-part
analysis. United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d
1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2 009) . First, the Court must
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
proper under the forum state's long-arm statute as that
statute would be interpreted by the state's Supreme
Court.[14]Id. Next, the Court must
determine whether there are sufficient "minimum
contacts" with the forum state to satisfy the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.;
lnt'1 Shoe Co. v. Washington Office ofUnemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).

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