"Notifications: The Department became aware of this event on Tuesday, February 3, 2015. The event is immediately reportable as per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1).

"Event Description: A package containing Fluorine-18 was found to have removable radioactive surface contamination upon receipt at the Philadelphia facility. An average of five wipe tests performed on the container resulted in 39,000 dpm of removable contamination; however the wipe area dimensions have not been provided. This will be clarified during the reactive inspection. The distributing radiopharmacy (PETNET Solutions) has been contacted but it is unknown at this time if the courier was contacted.

"Cause of the Event: Unknown at this time.

"The [Pennsylvania DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection] plans a reactive inspection. More information will be given when known."

"On October 14, 2013 a calculation for the containment internal structural analysis was revised and accepted by the station. This calculation limited the Safety injection tank level to 74%. On October 16, 2013 Safety injection tank level was raised to 100% for approximately 13 hours in preparations for plant start-up. While the plant was safely in a cold shutdown condition, this represents a reportable unanalyzed condition. This issue is of a historical nature and does not question the current operability of any plant systems or structures. This was self identified during a Fort Calhoun calculation review."

"The station took prompt actions to vent the identified voids. The void at 1 RH-12 was vented to within acceptable limits allowing LCO 3.0.3 to be exited at 0538 on February 10. Venting at 1RH-11 is in progress.

"Voiding was identified at location 1-RH-11 with a calculated volume of 62.21 cubic inches with an OPERABILITY limit of 11.62 cubic inches.

"Voiding was identified at location 1-RH-12 with a calculated volume of 350 cubic inches with an OPERABILITY limit of 22.84 cubic inches.

"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as Safety Injection was available and the time both trains of RHR were INOPERABLE was limited.

"This event is being reported as a unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."

"On February 10, 2015, at 1055 CST, the Shift Manager was notified that both [High Pressure Coolant Injection] HPCI Secondary Containment interlock doors were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative.

"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee reported that personnel were posted in the area as a compensatory measure.

"On February 10, 2015, at 1240 EST, Northern States Power-Minnesota (NSPM) determined that the Station Blackout (SBO) implementation at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was not consistent with the NRC Safety Evaluation (SE). Specifically, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was not being utilized in a manner consistent with the NRC SE for SBO. Current battery calculations do not reflect a full complement of HPCI system equipment running for the duration (coping requirements) of the SBO event. The calculation assumed a manual action to remove the HPCI auxiliary oil pump from operating during an SBO event in order to preserve the station battery.

"NSPM is reporting this as an Unanalyzed Condition pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The health and safety of the public was not affected since no SBO event occurred. All station batteries and the HPCI system remain operable in accordance with the plant Technical Specifications.

"This is a non-emergency 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"At 1750 [EST] hours on 2/10/15, Unit 4 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to missing tubing supports identified for two separate high point vent lines. This condition is unanalyzed and potentially rendered the cold leg High Head Safety Injection flow path inoperable. Upon discovery, the vent line root isolation valves were closed and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 1805. Investigation has been initiated to determine cause."