Philosophy electronic theses and dissertations (MU)https://hdl.handle.net/10355/5309
The electronic theses and dissertations of the Department of Philosophy.Sun, 07 Jun 2020 07:22:58 GMT2020-06-07T07:22:58ZAbsences as causes : a defense of negative causationhttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/8327
Absences as causes : a defense of negative causation
Hartsock, Michael D., 1979-
In this dissertation, I confront the issue of negative causation, (i.e., causation by or of absences). I investigate the causal status of absences with regard to particular philosophical concerns and argue that absences are very often causes and effects. On my analysis, it turns out that absences - at least those absences thought to be causally efficacious - are not metaphysical absences. They are perfectly ordinary entities, thus candidates for causal relata. Generally, I argue that the notion of an "absence" has been ill-understood and that this has been aggravated by focusing on sentences of the canonical form, "the absence of x caused y." Such a focus engenders the view that absences are capable of being causally efficacious only if there exists some entity, absence of x. If such a view were correct, then the case for absences as causes is a non-starter; there are no such entities. Instead, I recast the argument for negative causation as a vindication of our intuitive judgments that statements of the canonical and related forms are very often true and express genuine causal relations.
Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on May 25, 2010).; The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.; Dissertation advisor: André Ariew.; Vita.; Ph. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2010.
Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMThttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/83272010-01-01T00:00:00ZAmoralists, inverted commas, and the puzzle of moral internalism : an essay in experimental metaethicshttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/57266
Amoralists, inverted commas, and the puzzle of moral internalism : an essay in experimental metaethics
Shields, Kenneth Wesley, 1982-
The central question addressed in this dissertation is whether one must have some degree of motivation to comply with their moral evaluation in order to count as genuinely making a sincere moral judgment. Those that view motivation as intrinsic to moral judgment (internalists) grant this condition on moral evaluation, while those that take motivation to be extrinsic to such judgments (externalists) deny this condition. The traditional dispute between internalists and externalists has centered around thought experiments devised to test the coherence of scenarios involving an agent that genuinely makes moral judgments while being entirely unmotivated by them-an individual called the amoralist. Recently, experimental methods have been employed to determine whether non-philosophers find amoralist scenarios coherent. This dissertation is concerned primarily with addressing two open questions regarding this recent experimental research: (1) what is this research really tracking in terms of folk psychology, and (2) what impact does this research have on the traditional philosophical dispute over moral internalism. I address (1) by presenting new research showing that amoralist scenarios seem more coherent in factive contexts (e.g., understands that X is wrong) but less coherent in non-factive contexts (e.g., believes that X is wrong). I call this the Factivity Effect, and I argue (via experiments) that it is likely a feature of our cognitive architecture concerning morality. I address (2) by arguing that empirical investigation of our shared concepts impacts metaethical questions-particularly the traditional dispute over moral internalism-in a way that is arguably unique to this branch of analytic philosophy. In short, moral psychology is vital for metaethics.
Abstract from short.pdf file.; Dissertation supervisor: Dr. Philip Robbins.; Includes vita.
Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMThttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/572662016-01-01T00:00:00ZAn analysis of the Statehttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/5562
An analysis of the State
Tomhave, Alan
What the state is remains far from clear in political philosophy. However, the state is also a key concept at work in many discussions in political philosophy. For example, there is a debate about anarchism, the question of whether or not the state is legitimate in some way. However, if we are unclear about what the state is, then we cannot be clear about what the position of anarchism amounts to. To this end, I have attempted to find some necessary features of statehood. I have done this by considering two debates in political philosophy that concern the state. The first is the already mentioned issue of anarchism. The second is the issue of state sovereignty in international relations. The worry in this second debate is about the interference by some states with the affairs of other states. The guiding question for the dissertation has been: What features are required for the debates in question to make sense? If a debate requires a feature, then that feature is necessary for statehood. The central feature for statehood which has emerged concerns control. Basically, a state is an organization that controls the lives of its citizens in some way. Usually, this minimally means that a state says when citizens can and cannot use force and that this control is ensured through the use of forcible coercion. Any other features that we may be able to point to as necessary will be necessary only to ensure that states do control the lives if their citizens in some way.
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file.; Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on July 31, 2009); Thesis (Ph. D.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2008.
Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMThttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/55622008-01-01T00:00:00ZAristotle on happiness : a comparison with Confuciushttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/4335
Aristotle on happiness : a comparison with Confucius
Chang, Lily, 1975-
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines the highest good for humankind in terms of happiness. The nature of happiness includes intellectual activity, virtuous activity, and friendship; and certain external goods are needed for happiness. A good life involves consistently participating in activities that make a person good: intellectual activity, virtuous activity, and pursuing friendships. Though Confucius does not take the same exact approach as Aristotle, he is concerned with the good for humankind. Seeking the good of humankind involves consistently and habitually performing acts that develop good character. Such acts include: performing virtuous acts, acting with ritual propriety of the Zhou dynasty, living according to the dao or way, and doing what is appropriate. In this dissertation, I explicate Aristotle's conception of happiness, and I include a comparison of his conception of happiness with Confucius.
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file.; Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on April 24, 2009); Vita.; Thesis (Ph.D.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2006.
Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMThttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/43352006-01-01T00:00:00Z