Respondents Kenneth R. Grossfeld and Murray L. Stein move to stay the
civil money penalties imposed in our opinion and order of December 10,
1996 pending their appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. The Division of Enforcement ("Division") opposes
respondents' request for a stay. For the reasons set forth below,
respondents' motion is denied.

Respondents' joint motion asserts that the civil money penalties are
automatically stayed by the operation of Section 6(e) of the Commodity
Exchange Act ("Act"), 7 U.S.C. 9a (1994). We previously
rejected that interpretation of Section 6(e) in In re Gordon,
[1994-1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,356 (CFTC Apr. 3,
1995). In Gordon, we stated that "although civil money
penalties are undoubtedly the subject matter of section 6(e), that
statutory provision does not stay those penalties pending appeal. It
provides that certain other sanctions [such as a trading ban and
registration suspension] imposed for nonpayment of a civil money penalty,
which in the absence of an appeal automatically would be imposed, may not
take effect while an appeal is pending. Those other sanctions are what
are stayed by section 6(e). The pendency of an appeal does not affect the
Commission's authority to demand payment of the money penalty and, in
its discretion, to initiate customary collection efforts to enforce that
demand." Gordon 26,356 at 42,663 (footnote omitted.)

Despite our ruling in Gordon, respondents argue that the following
language of Section 6(e) supports their contention:

If the person against whom the money penalty is assessed fails to pay
such penalty after the lapse of the period allowed for appeal or
after the affirmance of such penalty, the Commission may refer the
matter to the Attorney General who shall recover such penalty by action
in the appropriate United States district court. (Emphasis added.)

We have never read the language cited by respondents as providing for an
automatic stay pending appeal. The portion of Section 6(e) cited by
respondents was originally contained in Section 6(d) of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.

Prior to the enactment of Section 6(e), our precedent construed and
applied former Section 6(d) to require prompt payment of any civil money
penalty imposed by a final order of the Commission. SeeIn re
GNP Commodities, Inc., [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 25,399 (CFTC Sept. 25, 1992). Nothing in the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended to change the law or require an
automatic stay. Instead, we view the changes to Section 6(e) as intending
to strengthen the law by providing for the automatic suspension of a
person's registration and a prohibition against trading on all
exchanges by such person for failure to pay a civil money penalty. Thus
we have never interpreted the language cited by respondents as requiring
an automatic stay of civil money penalties pending appeal.

As an alternative to their statutory argument, respondents also assert
that they meet the traditional stay standard: that they are likely to
succeed on the merits, that they will suffer irreparable harm if a stay
is denied, and that neither the public interest nor the interests of any
other party will be adversely affected if a stay is granted.

The issues raised by respondents are simply not sufficient to establish a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Initially, respondents
argue that the penalties assessed against them are based on incompetent
evidence of customer losses. We disagree with respondents'
characterization of this evidence. As our December 10 opinion and order
indicates, $2,100,474.51 is a conservative estimate of the customer
losses due to respondents' wrongdoing in light of the limited number
of accounts audited, the limited period of time covered by the audit, and
the ongoing and pervasive nature of the fraud proven. Moreover,
respondents' argument ignores the other factors we considered in the
assessment of their civil money penalties. In particular, we considered
evidence of the seriousness of the violations, the scope of the
wrongdoing, respondents' role in the fraud, respondents' state of
mind, the prior Commission cease and desist order imposed upon Grossfeld,
and with respect to Stein, evidence of his financial benefit.

Respondents also argue that they were denied due process by an exclusive
focus on customer losses and respondent gains. As we explained above, the
civil money penalties we assessed were based on other factors in addition
to evidence of customer losses and respondent gains. Moreover,
respondents cannot be heard to complain that they had no notice of the
factors we would consider in assessing civil money penalties as our
precedent clearly identifies these various factors as relevant to such an
inquiry. SeeIn re Premex, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,165 (CFTC Feb. 17, 1988).

In addition, respondents argue that the amount of the sanctions bears no
relation to their net worths. As respondents voluntarily made an informed
waiver of their right to a net worth hearing, this argument, too, has no
merit.

We also find respondents' argument that they will be irreparably
harmed without a stay to be equally unavailing. We have previously stated
that "a party moving for a stay must demonstrate that the injury
claimed is 'both certain and great.' Cuomo v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 772 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The civil
monetary penalty cannot be deemed an irreparable harm because it can
always be refunded." GNP Commodities, 25,399 at 39,363.

Respondents assert, however, that the penalties assessed against them
"could" force them into bankruptcy. Respondents' assertion
amounts to nothing more than mere speculation. Respondents have provided
no affidavits or other documentary evidence to support their claim that
payment of the civil money penalties would result in bankruptcy.

Finally, in our view, the public interest would not be served by a stay
pending judicial review. Respondents' violations established on the
record are egregious and undermine public confidence in the integrity of
the futures markets. The civil money penalties we imposed are consistent
with the gravity of respondents' violations and the remedial purposes
of the Commission's sanctioning authority. Further delay in the
imposition of these sanctions would only erode public confidence in the
markets. SeeGNP Commodities, 25,399 at 39,364.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to stay is denied. The sanctions
imposed in our December 10, 1996 opinion and order shall become effective
within 15 days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

By the Commission (Chairperson BORN and Commissioners DIAL, TULL, HOLUM,
and SPEARS).