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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, June 3, 2004:
Commercial Aviation:
Despite Industry Turmoil, Low-Cost Airlines Are Growing and Profitable:
Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director
Physical Infrastructure:
GAO-04-837T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-837T, a report to Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2001, the U. S. airline industry has confronted financial losses
of previously unseen proportions. From 2001 through 2003, the industry
reported losses of about $23 billion, and two of the nation’s largest
airlines went into bankruptcy. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S.
government has provided struggling airlines with $7.0 billion in
direct assistance and many billions more in indirect assistance in the
form of loan guarantees, a tax holiday, and pension relief. Under the
2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11)
and Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176),
Congress mandated that GAO review measures taken by air carriers to
reduce costs, improve their revenues and profits, and strengthen their
balance sheets. Later this year, GAO will provide a report to Congress
in response to these mandates. This statement provides a preliminary
summary of that work and focuses on three main questions: (1) What
have been the major challenges to the airline industry since 1998? (2)
What cost-cutting measures have airlines reported taking to remain
financially viable? (3) What is the financial condition of the airline
industry?
What GAO Found:
U.S. airlines, particularly major network or “legacy” airlines, have
faced an unprecedented set of challenges since 1998 that have reshaped
the industry and reduced the demand for air travel. Within the
industry, the growth of the Internet as a means to sell and distribute
tickets and the emergence of well-capitalized low-cost airlines as a
powerful market force have created unprecedented pressures on how
airlines operate and price their products. Coincidently, a series of
largely unforeseen events—among them a steep decline in business
travel, the September 11th terrorist attacks, war in the Middle East,
and global recession---have combined to seriously disrupt the demand
for air travel.
To counter these challenges, airlines undertook very different
strategies. Legacy airlines sought to cut costs, while low-cost
airlines took advantage of legacy airlines’ retrenchment and expanded.
Legacy airlines collectively reported a reduction in operating costs
of $12.7 billion (14.5 percent) between the October 1, 2001
(immediately after September 11th) and the end of 2003. The reductions
occurred in nearly all areas of operations, but 43 percent of the
savings came from labor. Legacy airlines reduced their seat capacity by
12.6 percent as they reduced operations and shifted service to their
regional airline partners. Conversely, low-cost airlines increased
seating capacity by 26.1 percent as they expanded their operations,
and operating expenses actually increased by just over $1 billion (9.8
percent).
Since 2000, the financial condition of legacy airlines, as a group,
has deteriorated significantly. Despite their cost-cutting efforts,
legacy airlines’ unit costs have not declined, and low-cost airlines
enjoy even a greater cost competitive advantage. Meanwhile, neither
legacy nor low-cost airlines have been able to significantly improve
their revenues owing to weak fare growth and overcapacity in the
system. As a result, legacy airlines have recorded nearly $25 billion
in operating losses since 2001, while low-cost airlines have remained
profitable throughout. Two major legacy airlines have already declared
bankruptcy; others may follow.
Legacy Airlines Have Recorded Nearly $25 billion in Operating Losses
Since 2001:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Transportation Form 41 data
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making no recommendations in this statement.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-837T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker, 202-
512-2834, HeckerJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the financial condition of U.S. airlines. Since 2001, the U. S.
airline industry has confronted financial losses of unprecedented
proportions. From 2001 through 2003, the industry reported losses of
$23 billion, and two of the nation's largest airlines went into
bankruptcy. Following the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the U.S. government has provided struggling airlines with $7.0
billion in direct assistance and many billions more in indirect
assistance in the form of loan guarantees, a tax holiday, and pension
relief.[Footnote 1] The most recent assistance to airlines came in
April 2003, under the 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11). The federal government provided $2.4
billion to the airline industry, and Congress mandated that the GAO
review measures taken by airlines to reduce costs, improve their
revenues and profits, and strengthen their balance sheets. Subsequent
to P.L. 108-11, in December 2003, Congress provided a similar mandate
under the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act for GAO
to report on the financial condition of the U.S. airline industry.
Later this year GAO will provide a report to Congress in response to
these mandates. Although we are still gathering and analyzing
information in response to these mandates, my statement today provides
a preliminary look at some of our findings. My remarks today address
three main questions: (1) What have been the major challenges to the
airline industry since 1998? (2) What cost cutting measures have
airlines reported taking to remain financially viable? (3) What is the
financial condition of the airline industry?
My statement today focuses on the seven legacy and seven low-cost
airlines that accounted for 90 percent of all domestic airline industry
seat capacity in 2003.[Footnote 2] Legacy airlines are essentially
those airlines that were in operation before airline deregulation in
1978 and whose goal is to provide service from "anywhere to
everywhere." To meet this goal, these airlines support large, complex
hub-and-spoke operations with thousands of employees and hundreds of
aircraft (of various types) with service to domestic communities of all
sizes as well as international points at numerous fare levels. Legacy
airlines contract with, or separately operate, smaller regional
airlines to provide service to smaller communities. Low-cost airlines,
except Southwest,[Footnote 3] entered the market after deregulation and
generally operate point-to-point service using fewer types of aircraft.
These airlines typically offer a simplified fare structure and
generally do not offer international service outside of Canada, Central
America, and the Caribbean. Although there is variation among the
airlines in each of these groups, there are far more similarities than
differences. Most importantly, the seven low-cost airlines consistently
had lower unit costs than the seven legacy airlines between 1998 and
2003. To determine the major challenges that airlines have faced, we
examined prior GAO work and research by various industry experts. To
determine the cost-cutting measures airlines took and to assess the
industry's financial condition, we analyzed financial and operating
data reported by airlines to the Department of Transportation (DOT). To
assess the reliability of those data, we reviewed the quality control
procedures that DOT applies and subsequently determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We performed our work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary:
* U.S. airlines, particularly legacy airlines, have faced a sweeping
set of challenges since 1998. These challenges are both internal
factors reshaping the airline industry and external events that sharply
reduced the demand for air travel. Within the airline industry, even
before September 11th, the growth of the Internet as a means to sell
and distribute tickets and the emergence of well-capitalized low-cost
airlines as a powerful market force created tremendous competitive
pressures on airlines. At the same time, a series of largely unforeseen
events--among them the September 11th terrorist attacks and associated
security concerns, war in the Middle East, the SARs epidemic, global
economic downturn, and a decline in business travel---seriously
disrupted the demand for air travel.
* To overcome the many challenges of the last several years, the two
groups of airlines undertook very different strategies. Legacy airlines
sought to cut costs, while low-cost airlines took advantage of legacy
airlines' retrenchment and expanded. Legacy airlines collectively
reported a reduction in operating costs of $12.7 billion (14.5 percent)
between the October 1, 2001 (immediately after September 11th) and the
end of 2003. The reductions occurred in nearly all areas of operations,
with the single largest reduction coming from labor costs that were
reduced $5.5 billion. During this time period, legacy airlines reduced
their seat capacity by 12.6 percent by shifting traffic to regional
airline partners and grounding aircraft. Conversely, low-cost airlines'
operating expenses increased by just over $1 billion (9.8 percent); and
their seat capacity increased by 26.1 percent as they expanded their
operations.
* Since 2000, the financial performance and viability of legacy
airlines has deteriorated significantly compared with low-cost
airlines. Legacy airlines have collectively lost $24.3 billion over the
last 3 years, while low-cost airlines made $1.3 billion in profits.
Despite the cost-cutting efforts of legacy airlines over the last
couple of years, legacy airlines are even less cost competitive
relative to low-cost airlines than in 2000. Low-cost airlines still
maintain a significant unit cost advantage over legacy airlines despite
legacy airline cost cutting. Meanwhile, neither legacy nor low-cost
airlines have been able to significantly improve their revenues owing
to weak fare growth. As a result of their weak performance and mounting
losses, legacy airlines' financial condition has also deteriorated, and
they face considerable debt and pension obligations in the next few
years. At least one other legacy airline has announced that, like
USAirways and United Airlines in 2002, it may enter bankruptcy this
year.
U.S. Airline Industry Is Facing Significant Challenges:
A series of significant changes and unforeseen events during the last
several years has presented the airline industry with its most
significant challenges since it was deregulated 25 years ago. These
challenges have come from within the industry as well as from external
factors affecting the demand for air travel.
Internal Challenges Lead to Structural Changes:
Since the late 1990s, the U.S. airline industry, especially legacy
airlines, has faced several internal challenges that have altered the
way it operates. Foremost among these challenges is addressing
declining yields brought on by price transparency and competition. The
airlines' increased use of the Internet to reduce ticket distribution
costs.[Footnote 4] However, the price transparency the Internet
provides has empowered consumers searching for the lowest fares and
depressed fare levels. The emergence of well-capitalized low-cost
airlines has also been a significant challenge. Although earlier new
entrant airlines quickly disappeared, this recent group is better
capitalized and offers a good overall product. Between 1998 and 2003,
these low-cost airlines increased their presence in the 5,000 largest
city pair markets (e.g., New York - Boston) from 32 to 46 percent and
increased overall market share of passenger enplanements from 23 to 33
percent.
External Shocks Have Depressed Demand for Air Travel:
Demand for air travel began weakening in 2000, well before the
September 11th terrorist attacks. An economic downturn that began in
2000 depressed airline revenues, and the terrorist attacks of September
11th, the Iraq war, and the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) have compounded this trend. These events have
contributed to a change in the demand for air travel that is likely to
suppress revenues for the foreseeable future, including the inability
of airlines to charge premium business fares. Although it is impossible
to isolate the effect of various events, demand as measured by revenue
passenger miles (RPMs), was down 6.5 percent and 11.4 percent for 2001
and 2002, respectively, from the Federal Aviation Administration's
(FAA) June of 2001 forecasts.
In Response to Challenges, Legacy Airlines Reduced Costs and Cut
Capacity, While Low-Cost Airlines Grew:
Airlines responded very differently to the challenges of the last few
years. Legacy airlines faced with mounting losses and curtailed demand
for air travel sought to reduce capacity and along with it their
operating expenses. Low-cost airlines, already enjoying a cost
advantage over legacy airlines, used their competitive cost advantage
to grow.
Legacy airlines cut operating expenses by $12.7 billion between October
1, 2001, and December 31, 2003. This 14.5 percent reduction in
operating expenses exceeds the percentage reduction in seat capacity of
12.6 percent during the same period. According to airline financial
reports to DOT, legacy airline labor costs were reduced $5.5 billion
annually, or about 16 percent during this time period (see fig. 1).
Both USAirways and United signed new labor agreements while in
bankruptcy, and American Airlines also achieved new agreements while on
the verge of bankruptcy. Legacy airlines also achieved $2.1 billion
savings from a 59 percent reduction in the commissions paid to travel
agents, because those commissions were sharply reduced. Finally, legacy
airlines reduced fuel costs by 18.7 percent during the period, although
the recent upsurge in fuel prices has reversed these savings. The only
cost category to increase for legacy airlines was transport-related
expenses, which doubled during the period, an increase of $3.9 billion.
Increases in transport-related expenses for legacy airlines are largely
because of fees paid to regional airline partners for providing
regional air service. In the aftermath of September 11th, legacy
airlines shifted some of their routes over to regional airlines in an
attempt to reduce seat capacity on these routes.
Figure 1: Change in Legacy Airline Costs, Oct. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31,
2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Other includes fees, taxes, and other charges; filing costs,
membership dues, and losses.
[End of figure]
Meanwhile, low-cost airlines used legacy airlines retrenchment as an
opportunity to expand. The seven low-cost airlines increased seat
capacity by 26.1 percent during the same period that legacy airlines
cut capacity by 12.6 percent, but total operating costs for low-cost
airlines increased by a more modest 9.8 percent, or a little more than
$1 billion. Low-cost airlines' labor costs, these airlines' largest
single cost component increased over $750 million, or 21 percent (see
fig. 2). Despite their growth, low-cost airlines were able to achieve
small reductions in some of their other costs, including commissions,
passenger food, depreciation and amortization, and transportation
related expenses.
Figure 2: Change in Low-cost Airline Costs, Oct. 1, 2001, to Dec. 31,
2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Other includes fees, taxes, and other charges; filing costs,
membership dues, and losses.
[End of figure]
Legacy Airlines' Financial Performance Trails Low-cost Airlines:
The financial performance of U.S. airlines since 2000 has followed two
very different paths. Despite significant cost-saving initiatives and
industry-wide traffic volumes approaching pre-September 11th levels,
legacy airlines continue to lose money. Legacy airlines' unit costs
(cost to fly one seat 1 mile) have increased since 2000 while fares
have declined; as a result, these airlines have yet to regain
profitability. Meanwhile, low-cost airlines continue to expand market
share, enjoy a greater unit cost advantage over legacy airlines than
they did in 2000, and in all but one quarter have collectively earned a
profit. The weak performance of the legacy airlines over the last 3
years has significantly diminished their financial condition; as a
result, some of these airlines are vulnerable to bankruptcy, especially
if there are additional shocks to the industry.
Low-Cost Airlines Have Significantly Lower Unit Costs Than Legacy
Airlines:
Legacy airlines, as a group, have been unsuccessful in sufficiently
reducing their costs to make them more competitive with low-cost
airlines. Unit cost competitiveness is key to profitability for
airlines because airlines have found it extremely difficult to increase
their revenues in the current environment. While legacy carriers
reduced their overall operating expenses over the last three years,
these cuts largely paralleled legacy airlines' capacity reductions.
Conversely, low-cost airlines have been able to reduce their unit costs
through expansion. Low-cost airlines' ability to maintain lower labor
costs and lower asset-related costs accounts for the majority of the
unit cost differences between low-cost airlines and legacy airlines.
Wall Street analysts suggested that one of the best measure for
examining airline unit cost performance is to compare airline unit cost
curves. These curves relate airlines' unit costs to the stage length
(distance) flown. Figure 3 shows legacy and low-cost airline unit cost
curves for 2000 and 2003 and shows that the gap between legacy and low-
cost airline unit costs has widened across all distances. For example,
in 2000, at a 1,000-mile stage length legacy airlines' unit costs were
45 percent higher than low-cost airlines; by 2003, legacy airlines'
unit costs were 67 percent higher. Some of the legacy airline unit cost
increase is due to the capacity purchased from regional airlines--an
increase in operating expenses (the numerator) but without a
corresponding increase in available seat miles (the denominator) in the
unit cost calculation. However, this does not account for all or even
most of the gap between legacy and low-cost airlines' unit costs.
Figure 3: Stage Length Cost Curves, 2000 and 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To account for this unit cost difference between legacy and low-cost
airlines, we also examined legacy and low-cost airline unit costs over
time and the various cost items that comprise total operating expenses.
Overall, we found that the gap in aggregated (for all stage lengths)
unit costs for legacy and low-cost airlines has widened since 2000,
from 2.1 cents per available seat mile to 3.8 cents at the end of 2003.
Figure 4 shows this widening gap and the cost components that account
for the difference.
Figure 4: Unit Cost Differential, 1998 to 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The two primary cost components that comprise the unit cost difference
between legacy airlines and low-cost airlines are labor costs and
asset-related costs.
* Legacy airlines have high labor costs owing to a highly tenured,
unionized workforce, while low-cost airlines are able to keep labor
costs down because of a younger and lower paid work force but also by
achieving higher levels of labor productivity than legacy airlines.
* Legacy airlines have higher asset-related costs than low-cost
airlines because legacy airlines generally have older fleets and more
types of aircraft in their fleets than low-cost airlines. Legacy
airlines also put their planes in the air fewer hours per day than low-
cost airlines. Finally, some portion of this difference is due to
legacy airlines' purchase of regional airline capacity during the
period.
* Other costs that currently are part of the remaining unit cost
difference between legacy airlines and low-cost airlines include
expenses for fuel, passenger ticketing commissions, and passenger food.
Depressed Fares Have Impeded Revenue Growth For Legacy Airlines:
Both legacy and low-cost airlines have encountered weak revenues over
last several years. The internal and external factors cited earlier
have depressed fares and demand for air travel. Overall, industry-wide
demand has nearly returned to pre-September 11th levels, but fares have
not. Unit revenue, or yield, the amount of revenue airlines collect for
every mile a passenger travels, has fallen 19 percent from the first
quarter of 2000 through the fourth quarter of 2003, for the airlines
examined in this study. The trends are similar for both the legacy
airlines and low-cost airlines; legacy yields dropped about 19 percent,
and low-cost airline yields dropped about 18 percent (see Figure 5).
Although nearly as many passengers are flying as before September 11th,
they are paying less to do so. In addition, legacy airlines are losing
market share to the low-cost airlines. Demand, as measured in the
number of miles paying passengers were transported, is down over 10
percent for the legacy airlines since 2000; demand for low-cost
airlines has risen nearly 40 percent. Not only are legacy airlines
collecting less fare revenue from the passengers they fly, they are
also flying fewer passengers than they used to. Low-cost airlines are
flying more passengers at lower prices.
Figure 5: Percentage Change in Airline Fares and Demand Since 2000:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Yield is the amount of fare revenue collected for each passenger
mile flown. Revenue Passenger Mile (RPM) is a measure of the number of
miles each paying passenger is flown and a standard measure of airline
passenger demand.
[End of figure]
Low-Cost Airlines Are Profitable Owing to Lower Costs:
Low-cost airlines have been able to use their relative cost advantage
to remain profitable at a time when fares are down throughout the
industry. As figure 6 demonstrates, legacy airlines have lost money in
each of the last 3 years, for a total of $24.3 billion; low-cost
airlines have made money in every year.
Figure 6: Airline Profits and Losses, 1998-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Legacy Airlines' Financial Condition Has Deteriorated Since 2000:
Since 2000, the financial condition of legacy airlines has
deteriorated. Both legacy airlines and low-cost airlines increased
their cash balances following the events of September 11th; legacy
airlines did so primarily through borrowing, while low-cost airlines
increased theirs by generating profits as well as borrowing. Since
2001, legacy airlines have taken on more debt, relying on creditors for
more of their capital needs than they have in the past. Increased debt
increases interest expenses and can make raising additional capital
more expensive. Low-cost airlines have acquired some debt, but their
solvency (or ability to repay the debt) has not deteriorated to the
same extent as it has for legacy airlines. In the process of taking on
additional debt, several legacy airlines have used all, or nearly all,
of their assets as collateral, limiting their access to capital
markets.
Legacy airlines face large debt repayment and pension funding
obligations during the next 4 years. These fixed obligations greatly
exceed the current cash balances for many of the legacy airlines. For
example, legacy airlines had a collective cash balance of $6.8 billion
at the close of 2003 versus $19.2 billion of long-term debt and capital
leases (a fixed obligation similar to long-term debt) coming due
through 2007. In contrast, low-cost airlines had a collective cash
balance of $3.5 billion versus long-term debt and capital lease
obligations of $2.1 billion coming due through 2007. If legacy
airlines' debt cannot be refinanced, some legacy airlines might be
forced to enter bankruptcy. In addition, legacy airlines have
significant defined benefit pension funding obligations that low-cost
airlines do not. Recent pension reform legislation postpones a portion
of legacy airlines' requirements to make payments to their defined
benefit pension plans in 2004 and 2005,[Footnote 5] but are still
required to fully fund these plans in the years beyond.[Footnote 6]
Because legacy airlines' future access to capital markets appears to be
limited, these airlines will need to begin generating cash from
operations if they intend to fulfill their future financial obligations
and avoid bankruptcy.
Concluding Observations:
Although the airline industry was deregulated more than 25 years ago,
some of the most significant competitive changes are only now occurring
brought about by a myriad of challenges over the last 4 years. Before
2000, large legacy airlines, all of which predated deregulation,
dominated the domestic airline industry. These airlines competed on the
basis of their networks and in-flight amenities as well as fares; they
earned profits by maximizing revenues from high value business
travelers. Low-cost airlines competed in some markets, but as a whole
did not account for much more than 10 percent of the market, and they
rarely took on a legacy airline directly. However, in recent years,
this pattern has changed, perhaps permanently. Significant structural
change combined with severe demand shocks has presented unprecedented
challenges to the airline industry, especially for legacy airlines.
Legacy airlines, burdened by significant costs of labor contracts and
pension plans negotiated during profitable years and an extensive and
costly network infrastructure, have found it difficult to reduce costs
quickly enough to become cost competitive and restore profitability.
Meanwhile, low-cost airlines are using their cost advantage to expand
their market share and challenge legacy airlines like never before.
Although airline industry traffic has recovered to pre-September 11th
levels, profitability for legacy airlines has not, owing to higher
costs and weak fare growth. Three years of losses have left legacy
airlines in a weakened financial position with large debt and pension
obligations looming in the next few years. The potential for airlines
to earn the large profits of 1995-2000 does not appear possible.
Instead, the airline industry is being transformed into two industries,
profitable low-cost point-to-point airlines that continue to grow and
extend their reach into ever more markets and the major network legacy
airlines that account for the vast majority of the industry's losses.
Although legacy airlines still control two-thirds of all domestic
traffic, possess profitable overseas routes, and have a valuable
domestic route structure, until these airlines are able to bring their
unit costs closer to those of low-cost airlines and align their
services with fares that passengers are willing to pay for "anywhere to
everywhere" networks, they are unlikely to be able improve their
financial condition.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
For further information on this testimony, please contact JayEtta
Hecker at (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at heckerj@gao.gov. Individuals
making key contributions to this testimony include Paul Aussendorf, Tom
Gilbert, Grant Mallie, Steve Martin, Richard Swayze, and Pamela Vines.
FOOTNOTES
[1] For more information on prior GAO work related to these issues, see
Summary Analysis of Federal Commercial Aviation Taxes and Fees,
GAO-04-406R, March 12, 2004, Aviation Assistance: Information on
Payments Made under the Disaster Relief and Insurance Reimbursement
Programs, GAO-03-1156R, September 17, 2003, and Financial Management:
Assessment of the Airline Industry's estimated Losses Arising From the
Events of September 11, GAO-02-133R, October 21, 2001.
[2] The legacy airlines included in our analysis are Alaska, American,
Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways. The low-cost
airlines are AirTran, America West, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest,
and Spirit.
[3] Southwest operated within Texas before deregulation.
[4] Airline Ticketing: Impact of Changes in the Airline Ticket
Distribution Industry, GAO-03-749, Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2003.
[5] Pension Fund Equity Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-218, April 10,
2004). The law temporarily replaces the interest rate on 30-year U.S.
Treasury Bonds with an interest rate based on the average rate of
return on high-quality long-term corporate bonds and allows airlines to
postpone part of their necessary contributions for 2004 and 2005.
[6] Defined benefit plans promise a fixed payment amount in the future.
In contrast, the defined contribution plans employed by low-cost
airlines fix the current contribution amount, but the future payment
amount depends on returns on the pension assets.