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IF THE ECONOMY IS DYING, WHY DOESN'T IT LIE DOWN? November data released last week for both employment and manufacturing reveal an economy that continues to grow, despite the drag of the credit and housing markets.

At the same time, however, the credit crunch has gone on too long to expect the non-housing parts of gross domestic product to continue to match the stellar performance of the past two years.

The probable outlook through 2008, then, is for slowed growth in gross domestic product, running only 1% to 2%. At that anemic rate of growth, the unemployment rate will rise. Make it 5.2% by year-end 2008, up from 4.7% currently. GDP growth accompanied by a rise in joblessness is what economists call a "growth recession."

Strictly speaking, a growth recession has already taken hold, although so far it has been quite mild. The employment report for November, released Friday, revealed that the rate of joblessness held at 4.7% for the third month in a row. Since the quarterly low on the unemployment rate was 4.5%, first reached in the fourth quarter of last year, the September-November average of 4.7% amounts to an increase of two-tenths of a percentage point.

There has also been a slowdown in the growth of nonfarm payroll employment. The headline figure for November showed a respectable gain of 94,000, with the three-month average running 103,000. But a much better indication of the underlying trend in this volatile and much-revised series is a rise of 1.1% in the number of payroll jobs from November of a year ago.

That 12-month gain of 1.1% reflects a slowdown from the increases of 1.4% to 1.6% in the early part of this year. But it is definitely in growth territory, and a couple of football fields away from outright recession. Back in November 2001, for example -- the last time the economy hit bottom -- the 12-month change in payroll employment was a negative 1.1%.

The 12-month gain in private-sector payroll jobs also ran 1.1%, down from the increases of 1.4% to 1.7% early this year. But this, too, is solidly in growth territory. Back in recession-month November '01, the 12-month change in private- sector payrolls ran a negative 1.8%.

Despite job declines in manufacturing, the Purchasing Manager's Index for November, released Friday, still signaled modest growth in manufacturing output. Job declines are more than offset by gains in labor productivity. The Composite PMI for November ran 50.8 -- and while 50 is officially designated as "neutral" on the PMI (neither expansion nor contraction), neutral is really closer to around 48.

Coincidentally, the 4.7% unemployment rate is about where Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke predicted it would be in testimony before Congress in July, just before the credit crunch hit. On the other hand, the interest rate target on federal funds was then at 5.25%. The Fed chairman clearly expected no interest-rate cut, but events have since forced him to lower fed funds to 4.50%.

At the Federal Open Market Committee meeting this coming Tuesday, another cut will be on the table. Given the relatively encouraging performance of employment and manufacturing -- and in light of Chairman Bernanke's clear reluctance to cut rates -- a quarter-point cut seems likely, rather than the half point the markets are hoping for.

Further cuts are likely down the road. But even so, the growth recession should continue to bite. If, as predicted here, the unemployment rate rises to 5.2% by the end of next year, that will mean a half-percentage-point increase. But 5.2% is still quite low by historical standards.

For all the usual reasons, the unemployment rate has recently been challenged as misleading. None of those reasons hold up. Yes, the official rate of joblessness reflects only those who are active job-seekers -- those who have looked for work over the past month. "What about those who have given up looking?" goes the refrain.

In fact, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has tracked these people for years. Using these BLS figures, the naysayers charge that the unemployment rate, including discouraged workers, is really 4.9%; or that the unemployment rate, including all other marginally attached workers, is really 5.5%.

But these higher rates of unemployment, which the BLS also tracks, should not be compared with the official rate, but with their own past trend. With logic that is just as flawed, we could challenge the record-low unemployment rates of the late '90s -- when jobs were clearly going begging -- by pointing out that these "shadow" unemployment rates were also higher at the time.

In fact, the two above-mentioned rates of joblessness in November were both two-tenths of a percentage point higher than a year ago, showing exactly the same trend as the official rate. Far from indicting the accuracy of the official rate, then, they only tend to confirm it.