"He who sows seed in the minds of men must have the eye
of a hawk to see where it falls, and the vision of a god to discern whether its
fruit be good or evil."

The Nation, April 28, 1923 H.J.L.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY PURNELL AND SONS PAULTON,
SOMERSET, ENGLAND

NOTE

The Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos has been so long a rare book, that
it is hoped this reprint of the translation of 1689 will be useful to teachers
of political philosophy. One of the great difficulties of the subject is the
fact that the writings of all save the most important thinkers are not
available outside the great libraries. This volume fills at least a small gap
in the need. If it is successful, it is hoped to make it the first of a series
of similar reprints. The introduction is intended to supply a quite general
background to the theory of the text. Readers who require a fuller treatment
should go to G. Weill's excellent Théories sur le Pouvoir Royal en
France pendant les guerres de Religion (Paris, 1892).

The dedication is a word of thanks on my part for three pleasant years
of service in a great fellowship.

i. Whether Subjects are bound and ought to obey Princes, if they command
that which is against the Law of God ...... 65

ii. Whether it be lawful to resist a Prince which doth infringe the Law
of God, or ruin the Church. By whom, how, and how far it is lawful .... 87

iii. Whether it be lawful to resist a Prince which doth oppress or ruin
a public State, and how far such resistance may be extended. By whom, how, and
by what right or law it is permitted .... 117

iv. Whether neighbour Princes or States may be, or are, bound by Law to
give succour to the subjects of other Princes, afflicted for the cause of true
religion, or oppressed by manifest Tyranny .... 215

THEEmperorsTHEODOSIAS and VALENTINIANTO VOLUSIANUS, Great Provostof the Empire

It is a Thing well becoming the Majesty of an Emperor, to acknowledge
Himself bound to obey the Laws. Our Authority depending on the Authority of the
Laws, and in very Deed to submit the Principality to Law, is a greater thing
than to bear Rule. We therefore make it known unto all Men, by the Declaration
of this our Edict, that We do not allow Ourselves, or repute it Lawful, to do
anything contrary to this.

AN EPISTLE

Justin in the Second Book, speaks thus of Lycurgus, Law-giver to the
Lacedemonians, He gave Laws to the Spartans which had not any; and was as much
renowned for his diligent Observing of them Himself, as for his discreet
Inventing of them. For he made no Laws for Others, to the Obedience whereof he
did not first submit Himself: Fashioning the People to obey willingly, and the
Prince to Govern uprightly.

A DEFENCE OF LIBERTY AGAINST
TYRANTS

THE FIRST QUESTION

Whether subjects are bound and ought to obey princes, if they command
that which is against the law of God.

This question happily may seem at the first view to be altogether
superfluous and unprofitable, for that it seems to make a doubt of an axiom
always held infallible amongst Christians, confirmed by many testimonies in
Holy Scripture, divers examples of the histories of all ages, and by the death
of all the holy martyrs. For it may be well demanded wherefore Christians have
endured so many afflictions, but that they were always persuaded that God must
be obeyed simply and absolutely, and kings with this exception, that they
command not that which is repugnant to the law of God. Otherways wherefore
should the apostles have answered, that God must rather be obeyed than men, and
also seeing that the only will of God is always just, and that of men may be,
and is, oftentimes unjust, who can doubt but that we must always obey God's
commandments without any exception, and men's ever with limitation?

But for so much as there are many princes in these days, calling
themselves Christians, which arrogantly assume an unlimited power, over which
God himself hath no command, and that they have no want of flatterers, which
adore them as gods upon earth, many others also, which for fear, or by
constraint, either seem, or else do believe, that princes ought to be obeyed in
all things, and by all men. And withal, seeing the unhappiness of these times
is such, that there is nothing so firm, certain, or pure, which is not shaken,
disgraced, or polluted; I fear me that whosoever shall nearly and thoroughly
consider these things, will confess this question to be not only most
profitable, but also, the times considered, most necessary. For my own part,
when I consider the cause of the many calamities wherewith Christendom hath
been afflicted for these late years, I cannot but remember that of the prophet
Hosea, "the princes of Judah were like them that remove the bounds: wherefore I
will pour out myself like water. Ephraim is oppressed, and broken in judgment,
because he willingly walked after the commandiments." Here you see the sin of
the princes and people dispersed in these two words. The princes exceed their
bounds, not contenting themselves with that authority which the almighty and
all good God hath given them, but seek to usurp that sovereignty, which he hath
reserved to himself over all men, being not content to command the bodies and
goods of their subjects at their pleasure, but assume licence to themselves to
enforce the consciences, which appertains chiefly to Jesus Christ. Holding the
earth not great enough for their ambition, they will climb and conquer heaven
itself. The people on the other side walk after the commandment, when they
yield to the desire of princes, who command them that which is against the law
of God, and as it were to burn incense, and adore these earthly gods; and
instead of resisting them, if they have means and occasion, suffer them to
usurp the place of God, making no conscience to give that to Cæsar, which
belongs properly and only to God.

Now is there any man that sees not this, if a man disobey a prince
commanding that which is wicked and unlawful, he shall presently be esteemed a
rebel, a traitor, and guilty of high treason. Our Saviour Christ, the apostles
and all the Christians of the primitive church were charged with these
calumnies. If any, after the example of Ezra and Nehemiah, dispose himself to
the building of the temple of the Lord, it will be said he aspires to the
crown, hatches innovations, and seeks the ruin of the state. Then you shall
presently see a million of these minions and flatterers of princes tickling
their ears with an opinion, that if they once suffer this temple to be
re-builded, they may bid their kingdom farewell, and never look to raise impost
or taxes on these men.

But what a madness is this! There are no estates which ought to be
esteemed firm and stable, but those in whom the temple of God is built, and
which are indeed the temple itself, and these we may truly call kings, which
reign with God, seeing that it is by him only that Kings reign: On the
Contrary, what beastly foolishness it is to think that the state and kingdom
cannot subsist if God Almighty be not excluded, and his temple demolished. From
hence proceeds so many tyrannous enterprises, unhappy and tragic death of
kings, and ruins of people. If these sycophants knew what difference there is
between God and Cæsar, between the King of Kings, and a simple king,
between the lord, and the vassal, and what tributes this lord requires of his
subjects, and what authority he gives to kings over those his subjects,
certainly so many princes would not strive to trouble the kingdom of God, and
we should not see some of them precipitated from their thrones by the just
instigation of the Almighty, revenging himself of them, in the midst of their
greatest strength, and the people should not be sacked and pillaged and trodden
down.

It then belongs to princes to know how far they may extend their
authority, and to subjects in what they may obey them, lest the one encroaching
on that jurisdiction, which no way belongs to them, and the others obeying him
which commandeth further than he ought, they be both chastised, when they shall
give an account thereof before another judge. Now the end and scope of the
question propounded, whereof the Holy Scripture shall principally give the
resolution, is that which followeth. The question is, if subjects be bound to
obey kings, in case they command that which is against the law of God: that is
to say, to which of the two (God or king) must we rather obey, when the
question shall be resolved concerning the king, to whom is attributed absolute
power, that concerning other magistrates shall be also determined.

First, the Holy Scripture doth teach, that God reigns by his own proper
authority, and kings by derivation, God from himself, kings from God, that God
hath a jurisdiction proper, kings are his delegates. It follows then, that the
jurisdiction of God hath no limits, that of kings bounded, that the power of
God is infinite, that of kings confined, that the kingdom of God extends itself
to all places, that of kings is restrained within the confines of certain
countries. In like manner God hath created of nothing both heaven and earth;
wherefore by good right He is lord, and true proprietor, both of the one and
the other. All the inhabitants of the earth hold of Him that which they have,
and are but His tenants and farmers; all the princes and governors of the world
are His stipendiaries and vassals, and are bound to take and acknowledge their
investitures from Him. Briefly, God alone is the owner and lord, and all men of
what degree or quality soever they be, are His servants, farmers, officers and
vassals, and owe account and acknowledgment to Him, according to that which He
hath committed to their dispensation; the higher their place is the greater
their account must be, and according to the ranks whereunto God hath raised
them, must they make their reckoning before His divine majesty, which the Holy
Scriptures teacheth in infinite places, and all the faithful, yea, and the
wisest among the heathen have ever acknowledged. The earth is the Lord's, and
the fulness thereof (so saith King David). And to the end that men should not
sacrifice to their own industry; the earth yields no increase without the dew
of heaven. Wherefore God commanded that His people should offer unto Him the
first of their fruits, and the heathens themselves hath consecrated the same
unto their gods; to the end, that God might be acknowledged lord, and they his
grangers and vine dressers, the heaven is the throne of the Lord, and the earth
His footstool.

And, therefore, seeing all the kings of the world are under his feet, it
is no marvel, if God be called the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords; all kings
be termed His ministers established to judge rightly, and govern justly the
world in the quality of lieutenants. By me (so saith the divine wisdom) kings
reign, and the princes judge the earth. If they do it not he looseth the bonds
of kings, and girdeth their loins with a girdle. As if he should say, it is in
my power to establish kings in their thrones, or to thrust them out, and from
that occasion the throne of kings is called the throne of God. Blessed be the
Lord thy God (saith the Queen of Sheba to King Solomon) which delighted in thee
to set thee on his throne to be king for the Lord thy God, to do judgment and
justice. In like manner we read in another place, that Solomon sat on the
throne of the Lord, or on the throne of the Lord's kingdom.

By the same reason the people are always called the Lord's people, and
the Lord's inheritance, and the king's governor of this inheritance, and
conductor or leader of his people of God, which is the title given to David, to
Solomon, to Ezechias and to other good princes; when also the covenant is
passed between God and the king, it is upon condition that the people be, and
remain always, the people of God, to shew that God will not in any case despoil
himself of his property and possession, when he gives to kings the government
of the people, but establish them to take charge of, and well use them; no more
nor less than he which makes choice of a shepherd to look to his flocks,
remains, notwithstanding himself, still master and owner of them.

This was always known to those good kings, David, Solomon, Jehosaphat,
and others who acknowledged God to be the Lord of their kingdoms and nations,
and yet lost no privilege that justly belongs to real power; yea, they reigned
much more happily in that they employed themselves cheerfully in the service of
God, and in obedience to his commandments. Nebuchadnezar, although he was a
heathen, and a mighty emperor, did yet at the end acknowledge this, for though
Daniel called him the king of kings, to whom the King of Heaven had granted
power and royal majesty above all others, yet, on the contrary (said he), "Thy
God, O Daniel, is truly the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords, giving kingdoms to
whom He pleaseth," yea, to the most wretched of the world. For which cause
Xenophon said at the coronation of Cyrus," let us sacrifice to God." And
profane writers in many places do magnify God the most mighty and sovereign
king. At this day at the inaugurating of kings and Christian princes, they are
called the servants of God, destined to govern his people. Seeing then that
kings are only the lieutenants of God, established in the Throne of God by the
Lord God himself, and the people are the people of God, and that the honour
which is done to these lieutenants proceeds from the reverence which is born to
those that sent them to this service, it follows of necessity that kings must
be obeyed for God's cause, and not against God, and then, when they serve and
obey God, and not other ways.

It may be that the flatterers of the court will reply, that God has
resigned his power unto kings, reserving heaven for himself, and allowing the
earth to them to reign, and govern there according to their own fancies;
briefly that the great ones of the world hold a divided empire with God
himself. Behold a discourse proper enough for that impudent villain Cleon the
sycophant of Alexander, or for the poet Martial, which was not ashamed to call
the edicts of Domitian, the ordinances of the Lord God. This discourse, I say,
is worthy of that execrable Domitian who (as Suetonius recites) would be called
God and Lord. But altogether unworthy of the ears of a Christian prince, and of
the mouth of good subjects, that sentence of God Almighty must always remain
irrevocably true, "I will not give My glory to any other," that is, no man
shall have such absolute authority, but I will always remain Sovereign.

God does not at any time divest himself of his power; he holds a
sceptre in one hand to repress and quell the audacious boldness of those
princes who mutiny against him, and in the other a balance to control those who
administer not justice with equity as they ought; than these there cannot be
expressed more certain marks of sovereign command. And if the emperor, in
creating a king, reserves always to himself the imperial sovereignty, or a
king, as he of France, in granting the government or possession of a province
to a stranger, or if it be to his brother or son, reserves always to himself
appeals, and the knowledge of such things as are the marks of royalty and
sovereignty, the which also are always understood of themselves to be excepted,
although they were altogether omitted in the grant of investiture and fealty
promised; with much more reason should God have sovereign power and command
over all kings being his servants and officers, seeing we read, in so many
places of Scripture, that he will call them to an account, and punish them, if
they do not faithfully discharge their duties. Then therefore all kings are the
vassals of the King of Kings, invested into their office by the sword, which is
the cognisance of their royal authority, to the end that with the sword they
maintain the law of God, defend the good, and punish the evil. Even as we
commonly see, that he who is a sovereign lord puts his vassals into possession
of their fee by girding them with a sword, delivering them a buckler and a
standard, with condition that they shall fight for them with those arms if
occasion shall serve.

Now if we consider what is the duty of vassals, we shall find that what
may be said of them, agrees properly to kings. The vassal receives his fee of
his lord with right of justice, and charge to serve him in his wars. The king
is established by the Lord God, the King of Kings, to the end he should
administer justice to his people and defend them against all their enemies. The
vassal receives laws and conditions from his sovereign. God commands the king
to observe his laws and to have them always before his eyes, promising that he
and his successors shall possess long the kingdom, if they be obedient, and on
the contrary, that their reign shall be of small continuance, if they prove
rebellious to their sovereign king. The vassal obligeth himself by oath unto
his lord, and swears that he will be faithful and obedient. In like manner the
king promises solemnly to command, according to the express law of God.
Briefly, the vassal loses his fee, if he commit a felony, and by law forfeits
all his privileges. In the like case the king loses his right, and many times
his realm also, if he despise God, if he complot with his enemies, and if he
commit felony against that royal majesty. This will appear more clearly by the
consideration of the covenant which is contracted between God and the king, for
God does that honour to His servants to call them His confederates. Now we read
of two sorts of covenants at the inaugurating of kings, the first between God,
the king, and the people, that the people might be the people of God. The
second, between the king and the people, that the people shall obey faithfully,
and the king command justly. We will treat hereafter of the second, and now
speak of the first.

When King Joas was crowned, we read that a covenant was contracted
between God, the king, and the people: or, as it is said in another place,
between Jehoiada the high priest, all the people, and the king, "that God
should be their Lord." In like manner we read that Josias and all the people
entered into covenants with the Lord: we may gather from these testimonies,
that in passing these covenants the high priest did covenant in the name of God
in express terms, that the king and the people should take order that God might
be served purely, and according to His will, throughout the whole kingdom of
Judah, that the king should so reign that the people were suffered to serve
God, and held in obedience to his law. Thus the people should so obey the king,
as their obedience should have principal relation to God. It appears by this
that the king and the people are jointly bound by promise, and did oblige
themselves by solemn oath to serve God before all things. And indeed presently
after they had sworn the covenant, Josias and Joas did ruin the idolatry of
Baal and re-established the pure service of God. The principal points of the
covenants were chiefly these.

That the king himself, and all the people should be careful to honour
and serve God according to His will revealed in His word, which, if they
performed, God would assist and preserve their estates: as in doing the
contrary, he would abandon, and exterminate them, which does plainly appear by
the conferring of divers passages of holy writ. Moses, somewhat before his
death, propounds these conditions of covenant to all the people, and at the
same time commands that the law, which are those precepts given by the Lord,
should be in deposito kept in the ark of the covenant. After the decease
of Moses, Joshua was established captain and conductor of the people of God,
and according as the Lord himself admonished, if he would have happy success in
his affairs, he should not in any sort estrange himself from the law; Joshua
also, for his part, desiring to make the Israelites understand upon what
condition God had given them the country of Canaan, as soon as they were
entered into it, after due sacrifices performed, he read the law in the
presence of all the people, promising unto them in the Lord's name all good
things if they persisted in obedience; and threatening of all evil if they
wilfully connived in disobedience. Summarily, he assures them all prosperity,
if they observed the law; as otherwise, he expressly declared, that in doing
the contrary they should be utterly ruined. Also at all such times as they left
the service of God, they were delivered into the hands of the Canaanites, and
reduced into slavery, under their tyranny. Now this covenant between God and
the people in the times of the judges, had vigour also in the times of the
kings, and was treated with them. After that Saul had been anointed, chosen,
and wholly established king, Samuel speaks unto the people in these terms:
"Behold the king whom you have demanded and chosen; God hath established him
king over you; obey you therefore and serve the Lord, as well as your king
which is established over you, otherwise you and your king shall perish." As if
he should say, you would have a king, and God has given you this here,
notwithstanding, think not that God will suffer any encroachment upon his
right, but know that the king is as well bound to observe the law as you, and
if he fail therein, his delinquency shall be punished as severely as yours.
Briefly, according to your desires Saul is given you for your king, to lead you
in the wars, but with this condition annexed, that he himself follow the law of
God. After that Saul was rejected, because he kept not his promise; David was
established king on the same condition, so also was his son Solomon, for the
Lord said, "If thou keep my law, I will confirm with thee the covenant which I
contracted with David." Now concerning this covenant, it is inserted into the
second book of the Chronicles, as follows. "There shall not fail thee a man in
my sight, to sit upon the throne of Israel: yet so that thy children take heed
to their way to walk in my law, as thou hast walked before me. But if they
serve idols, I will drive them from the land whereof I have given them
possession." And therefore it was that the book of the law was called the book
of the covenant of the Lord (who commanded the priests to give it the king),
according to which Samuel put it into the hands of Saul, and according to the
tenure thereof Josias yields himself feudatory and vassal of the Lord. Also the
law which is kept in the ark is called the covenant of the Lord with the
children of Israel. Finally, the people delivered from the captivity of Babylon
do renew the covenant with God, and do acknowledge throughout the chapter, that
they worthily deserved all those punishments for their falsifying their promise
to God. It appears, then, that the kings swear as vassals to observe the law of
God, whom they confess to be Sovereign Lord over all.

Now, according to that which we have already touched, if they violate
their oath, and transgress the law, we say that they have lost their kingdom,
as vassals lose their fee by committing felony. We have said that there was the
same covenant between God and the kings of Judah, as before, between God and
the people in the times of Joshua and the judges. But we see in many places,
that when the people has despised the law, or made covenants with Baal, God has
delivered them into the hands of Eglon, Jabin, and other kings of the
Canaanites. And as it is one and the same covenant, so those who do break it,
receive like punishment. Saul is so audacious to sacrifice, infringing thereby
the law of God, and presently after saves the life of Agag, king of the
Amalekites, against the express commandment of God. For this occasion he is
called rebel by Samuel, and finally is chastised for his rebellion. "Thou hast
sacrificed," saith he, "but thou hadst done better to obey God, for obedience
is more worthy than sacrifice." Thou hast neglected the Lord thy God, He also
has rejected thee, that thou reign no more over Israel. This has been so
certainly observed by the Lord, that the very children of Saul were deprived of
their paternal inheritance, for that he, having committed high treason, did
thereby incur the punishment of tyrants, which affect a kingdom that no way
appertains unto them. And not only the kings, but also their children and
successors, have been deprived of the kingdom by reason of such felony. Solomon
revolted from God to worship idols. Incontinently the prophet Ahijah foretells
that the kingdom shall be divided under his son Rehoboam. Finally, the word of
the Lord is accomplished, and ten tribes, who made the greatest portion of the
kingdom, do quit Rehoboam, and adhere to Jereboam his servant.

Wherefore is this? For so much (saith the Lord) that they have left me
to go after Ashteroth, the god of the Sidonians and Chamos, the god of the
Moabites, etc. I will also break in pieces their kingdom: as if he should say,
they have violated the covenant, and have not kept promise; I am no more then
tied unto them. They will lessen my Majesty, and I will lessen their kingdom.
Although they be my servants, yet notwithstanding they will expel me my
kingdom. But I will drive them out themselves by Jeroboam, who is their
servant. Furthermore, for so much as this servant, fearing that the ten tribes,
for the cause of religion should return to Jerusalem, set up calves in Bethel,
and made Israel to sin, withdrawing by this means the people far from God; what
was the punishment of so ungrateful a vassal and wicked traitor towards his
Lord? First, his son died, and, in the end, all his race, even unto the last of
the males was taken from the face of the earth by the sword of Baasa, according
to the judgment which was pronounced against him by the prophet, because he
revolted from the obedience of the Lord God: this, then, is cause sufficient,
and oftentimes also propounded, for the which God doth take from the king his
fee, when he opposes the law of God, and withdraws himself from Him to follow
His enemies, to wit, idols, and as like crimes deserve like punishments, we
read in the holy histories that kings of Israel and of Judah who have so far
forgotten themselves, have in the end miserably perished.

Now, although the form, both of the church and the Jewish kingdom be
changed, for that which was before enclosed within the narrow bounds of Judea
is now dilated throughout the whole world; notwithstanding the same things may
be said of Christian kings, the gospel having succeeded the law, and Christian
princes being in the place of those of Jewry. There is the same covenant, the
same conditions, the same punishments, and if they fail in the accomplishing,
the same God Almighty, revenger of all perfidious disloyalty; and as the former
were bound to keep the law, so the other are obliged to adhere to the doctrine
of the Gospel, for the advancement whereof these kings at their anointing and
receiving, do promise to employ the utmost of their means.

Herod, fearing Christ, whose reign he should rather have desired, sought
to put Him to death, as if He had affected a kingdom in this world, did himself
miserably perish, and lost his kingdom. Julian the apostate, did cast off
Christ Jesus to cleave unto the impiety and idolatry of the pagans: but within
a small time after he fell to his confusion through the force of the arm of
Christ, whom in mockery he called the Galilean. Ancient histories are replete
with such examples, neither is there any want in those of these times. Of late
years divers kings, drunk with the liquor which the whore of Babylon has
presented unto them, have taken arms, and for the love of the wolf, and of
Antichrist, have made war against the Lamb of God, who is Christ Jesus; and yet
at this day some amongst them do continue in the same course. We have seen some
of them ruined in the deed, and in the midst of their wickedness; others also
carried from their triumphs to their graves. Those who survive and follow them
in their courses have little reason to expect a better issue of their wicked
practices: this sentence remains always most certain, "That though all the
kings of the earth do conjure and conspire against Christ and endeavour to cut
in pieces our Lamb, yet in the end they shall yield the place, and maugre their
hearts, confess that this Lamb is the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords."

But what shall we say of the heathen kings? Certainly although they be
not anointed and sacred of God, yet be they His vassals and have received their
power from Him, whether they be chosen by lot or any other means whatsoever. If
they have been chosen by the voices of an assembly, we say that God governs the
heart of man, and addresses the minds and intentions of all persons whither he
pleases. If it be by lot, the lot is cast in the lap, saith the wise man, "but
the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." It is God only that in all ages
establishes, and takes away, confirms, and overthrows kings according to His
good pleasure. In which regard Isaiah calls Cyrus the anointed of the Lord, and
Daniel says that Nebuchadnezar and others have had their kingdoms committed
unto them by God: as also Saint Paul maintains that all magistrates have
received their authority from Him. For, although that God has not commanded
pagans in express terms to obey Him as He has done those who have knowledge of
Him; yet, notwithstanding the pagans must needs confess that it is by the
sovereign God that they reign, wherefore if they will not yield the tribute
that they owe to God in regard of themselves, at the least let them not attempt
nor hinder the sovereign to gather that which is due from those people who are
in subjection to them; nor that they do not anticipate, nor appropriate to
themselves divine jurisdiction over them, which is the crime of high treason
and true tyranny, for which occasion the Lord has grievously punished even the
pagan kings themselves. It then becomes those princes who will free themselves
from so enormous a mischief, carefully to distinguish their jurisdiction from
that of Gods, yea, so much the more circumspectly for that God and the prince
have their right of authority over one and the same land, over one and the same
man, over one and the same thing. Man is composed of body and soul, God has
formed the body and infused the soul into him; to Him only then may be
attributed and appropriated the commands both over the body and soul of
man.

If out of His mere grace and favour He has permitted kings to employ
both the bodies and goods of their subjects, yet still with this proviso and
charge, that they preserve and defend their subjects, certainly kings ought to
think that the use of this authority is in such manner permitted, that
notwithstanding the abuse of it is absolutely forbidden. First, those who
confess that they hold their souls and lives of God, as they ought to
acknowledge, they have then no right to impose any tribute upon souls. The king
takes tribute and custom of the body, and of such things as are acquired or
gained by the industry and travail of the body. God doth principally exact His
right from the soul, which also in part executes her functions by the body. In
the tribute of the king are comprehended the fruits of the earth, the
contributions of money and other charges, both real and personal; the tribute
of God is in prayers, sacraments, predications of the pure Word of God;
briefly, all that which is called divine service, as well private as public.
These two tributes are in such manner divers and distinguished, that the one
nothing hurts the other. The exchequer of God takes nothing from that of
Cæsar, but each of them have their right manifestly apart. But to speak
in a word, whosoever confounds these things, does heaven and earth together,
and endeavours to reduce them into their first chaos, or latter confusion.
David hath excellently well distinguished these affairs, ordaining officers to
look to the right of God, and others for that of the king. Josephat has
followed the same course, establishing certain persons to judge the causes that
belonged to the Almighty, and others to look to the justice of the king; the
one to maintain the pure service of God, the other to preserve the rights of
the ' king. But if a prince usurp the right of God, and put himself forward,
after the manner of the giants to scale the heavens, he is no less guilty of
high treason to his sovereign, and commits felony in the same manner, as if one
of his vassals should seize on the rights of his crown, and put himself into
evident danger to be despoiled of his estates; and that so much the more
justly, there being no proportion between God and an earthly king, between the
Almighty and a mortal man; whereas yet between the lord and the vassal there is
some relation of proportion.

So often, therefore, as any prince shall so much forget himself, as
insolently to say in his heart, I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my
throne above the stars of God; I will sit also upon the mount of the
congregation in the sides of the north; I will ascend above the heights of the
clouds, I will be like the Most High: then on the contrary, will the Almighty
say, I will rise up more high, I will set myself against thee; I will erase out
thy name and all thy posterity, thy counsels shall vanish into smoke, but that
which I have once determined shall remain firm, and never be annihilated. The
Lord said unto Pharaoh, "let My people go, that they may serve Me, and offer
sacrifice unto Me," and for that this proud man answered, that he knew not the
God of the Hebrews: presently after he was miserably destroyed. Nebuchadnezar
commanded that his statue should be adored, and would be honoured as God, but
within a short time the true God did deservedly chastise his unruly boldness,
and desiring to be accounted God, he became a brute beast, wandering through
desert places like a wild ass, until (says the Prophet) that he acknowledged
the God of Israel to be the sovereign Lord over all: his son Belshaser abused
the holy vessels of the temple in Jerusalem, and put them to serve his excess
and drunkenness; for that therefore he gave not glory to Him, that held in His
hands both his soul and his counsels; he lost his kingdom, and was slain in
that very night of feasting.

Alexander the Great took pleasure in the lies of his flatterers, who
termed him the son of Jupiter, and not only approved, but procured his
adoration, but a sudden death gave a sad period to those triumphs, being
blinded through his excess of conquests he began with too much affection to
delight in Antiochus, under colour of pacifying and uniting his subjects,
commanded all men to forsake the laws of God, and to apply themselves in
obedience to his; he profaned the temple of the Jews, and polluted their
altars, but after divers ruins, defeats, and loss of battles, despoiled and
disgraced, he dies with grief, confessing that he deservedly suffered those
miseries, because he would have constrained the Jews to leave their religion.
If we take into our consideration the death of Nero, that inhuman butcherer of
Christians, whom he unjustly slandered with the firing of Rome, being the
abhorred act of his detested self; the end of Caligula, which made himself to
be adored of Domitian who would be called lord and god; of Commodus, and divers
others who would appropriate to themselves the honours due to God alone, we
shall find that they have all and always according to their deceits miserably
perished; when, on the contrary, Trajan, Adrian, Antonius the courteous, and
others, have finished their days in peace; for although they knew not the true
God, yet have they permitted the Christians the exercise of their religion.

Briefly, even as those rebellious vassals who endeavour to possess
themselves of the kingdom, do commit felony by the testimony of all laws, and
deserve to be extirpated; in like manner those are as really guilty which will
not observe the divine law, whereunto all men without exception owe their
obedience, or who persecute those who desire to conform themselves thereunto,
without hearing them in their just defences: now for that we see that God
invests kings into their kingdoms, almost in the same manner that vassals are
invested into their fees by their sovereign, we must needs conclude that kings
are the vassals of God, and deserve to be deprived of the benefit they receive
from their lord if they commit felony, in the same fashion as rebellious
vassals are of their estates. These premises being allowed, this question may
be easily resolved; for if God hold the place of sovereign Lord, and the king
as vassal, who dare deny but that we must rather obey the sovereign than the
vassal? If God commands one thing, and the king commands the contrary, what is
that proud man that would term him a rebel who refuses to obey the king, when
else he must disobey God? But, on the contrary, he should rather be condemned,
and held for truly rebellious, who omits to obey God, or who will obey the
king, when he forbids him to yield obedience to God.

Briefly, if God calls us on the one side to enrol us in His service, and
the king on the other, is any man so void of reason that he will not say we
must leave the king, and apply ourselves to God's service: so far be it from us
to believe, that we are bound to obey a king, commanding anything contrary to
the law of God, that, contrarily, in obeying him we become rebels to God; no
more nor less than we would esteem a countryman a rebel who, for the love he
bears to some rich and ancient inferior lord, would bear arms against the
sovereign prince, or who had rather obey the writs of an inferior judge than of
a superior, the commandments of a lieutenant of a province, than of a prince;
to be brief, the directions of an officer rather than the express ordinances of
the king himself. In doing this we justly incur the malediction of the prophet
Micah, who does detest and curse, in the name of God, all those who obey the
wicked and perverse ordinances of kings. By the law of God we understand the
two tables given to Moses, in the which, as in unremovable bounds, the
authority of all princes ought to be fixed. The first comprehends that which we
owe to God, the second that which we must do to our neighbours; briefly, they
contain piety and justice conjoined with charity, from which the preaching of
the gospel does not derogate, but rather authorize and confirm. The first table
is esteemed the principal, as well in order as in dignity. If the prince
commands to cut the throat of an innocent, to pillage and commit extortion,
there is no man (provided he has some feeling of conscience) who would execute
such a commandment. If the prince has committed some crime, as adultery,
parricide, or some other wickedness, behold amongst the heathen, the learned
lawyer Papinian who will reprove Caracalla to his face, and had rather die than
obey, when his cruel prince commands him to lie and palliate his offence; nay,
although he threaten him with a terrible death, yet would he not bear false
witness. What shall we do then, if the prince command us to be idolaters, if he
would have us again crucify Christ Jesus, if he enjoins us to blaspheme and
despise God, and to drive Him (if it were possible) out of heaven, is there not
yet more reason to disobey him, than to yield obedience to such extravagant
commands? Yet a little farther, seeing it is not sufficient to abstain from
evil, but that we must do good, instead of worshipping of idols, we must adore
and serve the true God, according as he has commanded us, and instead of
bending our knees before Baal, we must render to the Lord the honour and
service which He requires of us. For we are bound to serve God for His own sake
only; but we honour our prince, and love our neighbour, because and for the
love of God.

Now if it be ill done to offend our neighbour, and if it be a capital
crime to rise against our prince, how shall we entitle those who rise in
rebellion against the majesty of the sovereign Lord of all mankind. Briefly, as
it is a thing much more grievous to offend the creator, than the creature, man,
than the image he represents; and as in the terms of law, he that has wounded
the proper person of a king, is much more culpable than another who has only
broken the statue erected in his memory, so there is no question but a much
more terrible punishment is prepared for them who infringe the first table of
the law, than for those who only sin against the second, although the one
depend on the other; whereupon it follows (to speak by comparison) that we must
take more careful regard of the observation on the first than of the
second.

Furthermore, our progenitors' examples may teach us the rule we must
follow in this case. King Ahab, at the instigation of his wife Jezebel, killed
all the prophets and servants of God that could be taken, notwithstanding,
Abdias, steward of Ahab's house, did both hide and feed in a cave a hundred
prophets; the excuse for this is soon ready; in obligations, oblige they never
so nearly, the Divine Majesty must always be excepted. The same Ahab enjoined
all men to sacrifice to Baal. Elias, instead of cooling or relenting, did
reprove more freely the king and all the people, convinced the priests of Baal
of their impiety, and caused them to be executed. Then, in despite of that
wicked and furious Jezebel, and maugre that uxorious king, he does redress and
reform with a divine and powerful endeavour the service of the true God. When
Ahab reproached him (as the princes of our times do) that he troubled Israel,
that he was rebellious, seditious, titles wherewith they are ordinarily
charged, who are no way culpable thereof; nay, but it is thou thyself, answered
Elias, who, by thy apostasy has troubled Israel, who has left the Lord, the
true God, to acquaint thyself with strange gods His enemies. In the same manner
and by the leading and direction of the same spirit did Sidrac, Misack, and
Abednego refuse to obey Nebuchadnezar, Daniel, Darius, Eleazar, Antiochas, and
infinite others. After the coming of Jesus Christ, it being forbidden the
apostles to preach the gospel, Judge ye (said they), whether it be reasonable
as in the sight of God to obey men, rather than God; according to this, the
apostles, not regarding either the intendments or designs of the greatness of
the world, addressed themselves readily to do that which their master, Jesus
Christ, had commanded them.

The Jews themselves would not permit that there should be set up in the
temple at Jerusalem the eagle of silver, nor the statue of Caligula: what did
Ambrose when the Emperor Valentinian commanded him to give the temple at Milan
to the Arrians? "Thy counsellors and captains are come unto me," said he, "to
make me speedily deliver the temple, saying it was done by the authority and
command of the emperor, and that all things are in his power." I answered to
it, "That if he demanded that which is mine, to wit, mine inheritance, my
money, I would not in any sort refuse it him, although all my goods belong
properly to the poor, but the things divine are not in subjection to the power
of the emperor." What do we think that this holy man would have answered, if he
had been demanded whether the living temple of the Lord should be enthralled to
the slavery of idols? These examples, and the constancy of a million of
martyrs, who were glorious in their deaths, for not yielding obedience in this
kind, according as the Ecclesiastical Histories, which are full of them, do
demonstrate, may sufficiently serve for an express law in this case.

But for all this we have no want of a law formerly written. For as often
and ever as the apostles admonish Christians to obey kings and magistrates,
they do first exhort, and as it were by way of advice, admonish every one to
subject himself in like manner to God, and to obey Him before and against any
whatsoever, and there is nowhere to be found, in any of their writings, the
least passage for this unlimited obedience, which the flatterers of princes do
exact from men of small understandings. "Let every soul," saith Saint Paul, "be
subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God ": he makes
mention of every soul, to the end it may not be thought, that he would exempt
any from this subjection; we may easily gather by divers such speeches, that we
must obey God rather than the king. For if we obey the king, because, and for
the love of God, certainly this obedience may not be a conspiracy against God.
But the apostle will stop the gap to all ambiguity in adding that the prince is
the servant of God for our good, to wit, to do justice; from this necessarily
follows that which we come from touching, that we must rather obey God than him
who is His servant. This does not yet content Saint Paul, for he adds in the
end, "Give tribute, honour, and fear to whom they appertain," as if he should
say, that which was alleged by Christ, "Give to Cæsar that which is
Cæsar's, and to God that which is God's." To Cæsar tribute, and
honour; to God fear. Saint Peter says the same, "fear God, honour the king;
servants obey your masters, not only the good and kind, but also the rigorous."
We must practise these precepts, according to the order they are set down in:
to wit, that as servants are not bound to obey their masters if they command
anything which is against the laws and ordinances of kings, subjects in like
manner owe no obedience to kings which will make them to violate the law of
God.

Certain lewd companions object, that even in the things themselves that
concern the conscience we must obey kings, and are so shameless as to produce
for witness of so wicked an opinion the Apostles Saint Peter and Saint Paul,
concluding from hence, that we must yield obedience to all that the king shall
ordain, though it be to embrace, without reply, any superstition he shall
please to establish. But there is no man so grossly void of sense, that sees
not the impiety of these men. We reply that Saint Paul says in express terms,
we must be subject to princes, not only for wrath, but also for conscience
sake. In opposing conscience to wrath, it is as much as if the apostle had
said, that the obedience of which he speaks ought not to proceed for fear of
punishment, but from the love of God, and from the reverence which we are bound
to bear unto the Word. In the same sense Saint Paul enjoins servants in such
manner to obey their masters, that it be not with eye service for fear of
stripes, but in singleness of heart, fearing God, not simply to acquire the
favour of men, whom they may delude, but to bear the burden laid on their
shoulders by Him whom no man can deceive.

In brief there is manifest difference between these two manners of
speech: to obey, for conscience sake, and to obey in those things which concern
the conscience: otherwise those who had much rather lose their lives with
infinite torments than obey princes who command them things contrary to the
will of God, would have taught us that which these seek to persuade us to.
Neither do they express themselves less impudent in that which they are
accustomed to object, to those who are not so well able to answer them. That
obedience is better than sacrifice, for there is no text in Holy Writ that does
more evidently confound them than this, which is contained in Samuel's
reprehension of King Saul, for his disobedience to the commandment of God, in
sacrificing unfittingly. If then Saul, although he were a king, ought to obey
God, it follows in all good consequence that subjects are not bound to obey
their king by offending of God. Briefly those who (after the barbarous manner
of the men of Calcut) seek to enthral the service of God with a necessary
dependence on the will of a mutable man, and religion of the good pleasure of
the king, as if he were some God on earth, they doubtless little value the
testimony of Holy Writ. But let them (at the least) yet learn of a heathen
orator. "That in every public state, there are certain degrees of duty, for
those who converse and live in it, by which may appear wherein the one are
obliged to the other. Insomuch that the first part of this duty belongs to the
immortal God, the second concerns the country, which is their common mother,
the third, those who are of our blood, the other parts leading us step by step
to our other neighbours. Now, although the crime of high treason be very
heinous, yet, according to the civilians, it always follows after sacrilege, an
offence which properly pertains to the Lord God and His service; insomuch that
they do confidently affirm that the robbing of a church is, by their rules,
esteemed a greater crime than to conspire against the life of a prince." Thus
much for this first question, wherein we persuade ourselves, that any man may
receive satisfaction, if he be not utterly void of the fear of God.

THE SECOND QUESTION

Whether it be lawful to resist a prince who doth infringe the law of
God, or ruin His Church: by whom, how, and how far it is lawful.

This question seems at the first view to be of a high and difficult
nature, for so much as there being small occasion to speak to princes that fear
God. On the contrary, there will be much danger to trouble the ears of those
who acknowledge no other sovereign but themselves, for which reason few or none
have meddled with it, and if any have at all touched it, it has been but as it
were in passing by. The question is, If it be lawful to resist a prince
violating the law of God, or ruinating the church, or hindering the restoring
of it? If we hold ourselves to the tenure of the Holy Scripture it will resolve
us. For, if in this case it had been lawful to the Jewish people (the which may
be easily gathered from the books of the Old Testament), yea, if it had been
enjoined them, I believe it will not be denied, that the same must be allowed
to the whole people of any Christian kingdom or country whatsoever. In the
first place it must be considered, that God having chosen Israel from amongst
all the nations of the earth, to be a peculiar people to Him, covenanted with
them, that they should be the people of God. This is written in divers places
of Deuteronomy: the substance and tenor of this alliance was, "That all should
be careful in their several lines, tribes, and families in the land of Canaan,
to serve God purely, who would have a church established amongst them for
ever," which may be drawn from the testimony of divers places, namely, that
which is contained in the twenty-seventh chapter of Deuteronomy; there Moses
and the Levites covenanting as in the name of God, assembled all the people,
and said unto them: "This day, O Israel, art thou become the people of God,
obey you therefore His voice," etc. And Moses said, "When thou hast passed the
River of Jordan, thou shalt set six tribes on the mountain of Gerizzim on the
one side, and the six others on the mountain of Eball, and then the Levites
shall read the law of God, promising the observers all felicity, and
threatening woe and destruction to the breakers thereof, and all the people
shall answer, Amen." The which was afterwards performed by Joshua, at his
entering into the land of Canaan, and some few days before his death. We see by
this that all the people is bound to maintain the law of God to perfect His
church, and on the contrary to exterminate the idols of the land of Canaan: a
covenant which can no ways appertain to particulars, but only to the whole body
of the people. To which it also seems the encamping of all the tribes round
about the ark of the Lord to have reference; to the end that all should look to
the preservation of that which was committed to the custody of all.

Now for the use and practice of this covenant we may produce examples;
the inhabitants of Gabaa of the Tribe of Benjamin ravished the wife of a
Levite, who died through their violence. The Levite divided his wife into
twelve pieces, and sent them to the twelve tribes, to the end that all the
people together might wipe away this so horrible a crime committed in Israel.
All the people met together at Mizpah and required the Benjamites to deliver to
be punished those who were culpable of this enormous crime, which they refused
to perform. Wherefore with the allowance of God Himself, the states of the
people with an universal consent renounce and make war against the Benjamites,
and by this means the authority of the second Table of the Law was maintained
by the detriment and ruin of one entire tribe who had broken it in one of the
precepts.

For the first we have an example sufficiently manifest in Joshua. After
that the Reubenites, Gadites, and Manassites were returned into their dwellings
beyond Jordan, they incontinently built a goodly altar near unto the river;
this seems contrary to the commandment of the Lord, who expressly forbids to
sacrifice anywhere but in the land of Canaan only, where it was to be feared
lest these men intended to serve idols. This business being communicated to the
people, inhabiting on this side Jordan, the place assigned for the meetings of
the states was at Silo where the Ark of the Lord was. They all accordingly met,
and Phineas the High Priest, the son of Eleazar, was sent to the other to treat
with them concerning this offence committed against the law. And to the end
they might know all the people had a hand in this business, they sent also the
principal men of every tribe to complain that the service of God is corrupted
by this device, that God would be provoked by this rebellion, and become an
enemy, not only to the guilty, but also to all Israel, as heretofore in
Beelphegor. Briefly, that they should denounce open war against them, if they
desisted not from this their manner of doing. There must of necessity have
followed much mischief, if those tribes beyond Jordan had not protested that
they erected that altar only for a memorial that the Israelites both on the one
and the other side of Jordan, both did and do profess one and the same
religion, and at all times whensoever they have shewed themselves negligent in
the maintenance of the service of God, we have seen that they have ever been
punished: this is the true cause wherefore they lost two battles against the
Benjamites according as it appears in the end of the Book of Judges; for in so
carefully undertaking to punish the rape and outrage done to a particular
person, they clearly convinced themselves of much negligent profaneness in the
maintenance of God's right, by their continual negligence, omission to punish
both corporal and spiritual whoredoms; there was then in these first times such
a covenant between God and the people.

Now after that kings were given unto the people, there was so little
purpose of disannulling or disbanding the former contract, that it was renewed
and confirmed for ever. We have formerly said at the inaugurating of kings,
there was a double covenant treated of, to wit "between God and the king"; and
"between God and the people." The agreement was first passed between "God, the
king, and the people." Or between the "high priest, the people" (which is named
in the first place in the twenty-third chapter of the second book of the
Chronicles) "and the king." The intention of this was, that the "people should
be the people of God" (which is as much as to say) "that the people should be
the church of God." We have shewed before to what end God contracted covenants
with the king.

Let us now consider wherefore also He allies Himself with the people. It
is a most certain thing, that God has not done this in vain, and if the people
had not "authority to promise, and to keep promise," it were vainly lost time
to contract or covenant with them. It may seem then that God has done like
those creditors, which having to deal with not very sufficient borrowers, take
divers jointly bound for one and the same sum, insomuch as two or more being
bound one for another and each of them apart, for the entire payment of the
total sum, he may demand his whole debt of which of them he pleases. There was
much danger to commit the custody of the church to one man alone, and therefore
God did recommend, and put it in trust "to all the ' people." The king being
raised to so slippery a place might easily be corrupted: for fear lest the
church should stumble with him, God would have the people also to be
respondents for it. In the covenant of which we speak, God, or (in His place)
the High Priest are stipulators, the king and all the people, to wit, Israel,
do jointly and voluntarily assume, promise, and oblige themselves for one and
the same thing. The High Priest demands if they promise, that the people shall
be the people of God, that God shall always have His temple, His church amongst
them, where He shall be purely served. The king is respondent, so also are the
people (the whole body of the people representing, as it were, the office and
place of one man) not severally, but jointly, as the words themselves make
clear, being incontinent, and not by intermission or distance of time, the one
after the other.

We see here then two undertakers, the king and Israel, who by
consequence are bound one for another and each for the whole. For as when Caius
and Titus have promised jointly to pay to their creditor Seius a certain sum,
each of them is bound for himself and his companion, and the creditor may
demand the sum of which of them he pleases. In the like manner the king for
himself, and Israel for itself are bound with all circumspection to see that
the church be not damnified: if either of them be negligent of their covenant,
God may justly demand the whole of which of the two He pleases, and the more
probably of the people than of the king, and for that many cannot so easily
slip away as one, and have better means to discharge the debts than one alone.
In like manner, as when two men that are indebted, especially to the public
exchequer, the one is in such manner bound for the other, that he can take no
benefit of the division granted by the new constitutions of Justinian. So
likewise the king and Israel, promising to pay tribute to God, who is the King
of Kings, for accomplishment whereof, the one is obliged for the other. And as
two covenanters by promise, especially in contracts, the obligation whereof
exposes the obligees to forfeitures and hazards, such as this is here, the
failings of the one endamages the other: so that if Israel forsake their God,
and the king makes no account of it, he is justly guilty of Israel's
delinquency. In like manner, if the king follow after strange gods, and not
content to be seduced himself, seek also to attract his subjects, endeavouring
by all means to ruin the church, if Israel seek not to withdraw him from his
rebellion, and contain him within the limits of obedience, they make the fault
of their king their own transgression.

Briefly, as when there is danger that one of the debtors by consuming
his goods may be disabled to give satisfaction, the other must satisfy the
creditors who ought not to be endamaged; though one of his debtors have ill
husbanded his estate, this ought not to be doubted in regard of Israel toward
their king, and of the king towards Israel in case one of them apply himself to
the service of idols, or break their covenant in any other sort, the one of
them must pay the forfeiture and be punished for the other. Now that the
covenant of which we at this time treat is of this nature, it appears also by
other testimonies of Holy Scripture. Saul being established king of Israel,
Samuel, priest and prophet of the Lord, speaks in this manner to the people.
"Both you and your king which is over you serve the Lord your God, but if you
persevere in malice" (he taxes them of malice for that they preferred the
government of a man before that of God) "you and your king shall perish." He
adds after the reason, "for it has pleased God to choose you for His people."
You see here both the parties evidently conjoined in the condition and the
punishment. In like manner Asa, king of Judah, by the council of the prophet
Assary, assembles all the people at Jerusalem, to wit, Judah and Benjamin, to
enter into covenant with God. Thither came also divers of the tribes of
Ephraim, Manasses, and Simeon, who were come thither to serve the Lord
according to His own ordinance. After the sacrifices were performed according
to the law, the covenant was contracted in these terms, "Whosoever shall not
call upon the Lord God of Israel, be he the least or the greatest, let him die
the death." In making mention of the greatest, you see that the king himself is
not excepted from the designed punishment.

But who may punish the king (for here is question of corporal and
temporal punishment) if it be not the whole body of the people to whom the king
swears and obliges himself, no more nor less, than the people do to the king?
We read also that king Josias, being of the age of twenty-and-five years,
together with the whole people, makes a covenant with the Lord, the king and
the people promising to keep the laws and ordinances of God; and even then for
the better accomplishing of the tenure of this agreement, the idolatry of Baal
was presently destroyed. If any will more exactly turn over the Holy Bible, he
may well find other testimonies to this purpose.

But to what purpose should the consent of the people be required;
wherefore should Israel or Judah be expressly bound to observe the law of God?
For what reason should they promise so solemnly to be for ever the people of
God? If it be denied, by the same reason that they had any authority from God,
or power to free themselves from perjury, or to hinder the ruin of the church.
For to what end should it serve to cause the people to promise to be the people
of God, if they must and are bound to endure and suffer the king to draw them
after strange gods. If the people be absolutely in bondage, wherefore is it
commanded then, to take order that God be purely served? If it be so that they
cannot properly oblige themselves to God, and if it be not lawful for them by
all to endeavour the accomplishment of their promise, shall we say that God has
made an agreement with them, which had no right neither to promise, nor to keep
promise? But on the contrary, in this business of making a covenant with the
people, God would openly and plainly show that the people have right to make,
hold, and accomplish their promises and contracts. For, if he be not worthy to
be heard in public court that will bargain or contract with a slave, or one
that is under tutelage, shall it not be much more shameful to lay this
imputation upon the Almighty, that He should contract with those who had no
power to perform the conditions covenanted?

But for this occasion it was, that when the kings had broken their
covenants, the prophets always addressed themselves to the House of Judah and
Jacob, and to Samaria, to advertise them of their duties. Furthermore, they
required the people that they not only withdraw themselves from sacrificing to
Baal, but also that they call down his idol, and destroy his priests and
service; yea, even maugre the king himself. For example, Ahab having killed the
prophets of God, the prophet Elias assembles the people, and as it were
convented the estates, and does there tax, reprehend, and reprove every one of
them; the people at his exhortation take and put to death the priests of Baal.
And for so much as the king neglected his duty, it behoved Israel more
carefully to discharge theirs without tumult, not rashly, but by public
authority; the estates being assembled, and the equity of the cause orderly
debated, and sufficiently cleared before they came to the execution of justice.
On the contrary, so often, and always when Israel has failed to oppose their
king, which would overthrow the service of God, that which has been formerly
said of the two debtors, the inability and ill husbandry of the one does ever
prejudice the other, the same happened to them; for as the king has been
punished for his idolatry and disloyalty, the people have also been chastised
for their negligence, connivency, and stupidity, and it has commonly happened
that the kings have been much more often swayed, and drawn others with them
than the people, for so much as ordinarily the great ones mould themselves into
the fashion of the king, and the people conform themselves in humours to those
who govern them: to be brief, all more usually offend after the example of one,
than that one will reform himself as he sees all the rest.

This which we say will, perhaps, appear more plainly by examples. What
do we suppose to have been the cause of the defeat and overthrow of the army of
Israel with their king Saul? Does God correct the people for the sins of the
prince? Is the child beaten instead of the father? It is a discourse not easily
to be digested, say the civilians, to maintain that the children should bear
the punishments due for the offences of their fathers; the laws do not permit
that anyone shall suffer for the wickedness of another. Now God forbid that the
judge of all the world (said Abraham) should destroy the innocent with the
guilty. On the contrary (saith the Lord) as the life of the father, so the life
of the son is in my hands; the fathers shall not be put to death for the
children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man
shall be put to death for his own sin. That overthrow, then, did it not proceed
for that the people opposed not Saul when he violated the law of God, but
applauded that miserable prince when he wickedly persecuted the best men, as
David and the priests of the Lord?

Amongst many other examples let us only produce some few. The same Saul
to enlarge the possessions of the tribe of Judah broke the public faith granted
to the Gibeonites, at the first entry of the people into the land of Canaan,
and put to death as many of the Gibeonites as he could come by. By this
execution Saul broke the third commandment, for God had been called to witness
this agreement, and the sixth also, in so much as he murdered the innocent; he
ought to have maintained the authority of the two Tables of the Law; and
thereupon it is said, that Saul and his house have committed this wickedness.
In the meantime, after the death of Saul, and David being established king, the
Lord being demanded, made answer that it was already the third year that the
whole country of Israel was afflicted with famine because of this cruelty, and
the hand of the Lord ceased not to strike, until that seven men of the house of
Saul were given to the Gibeonites, who put them to death; seeing that every one
ought to bear his own burden, and that no man is esteemed the inheritor of
another's crime; wherefore they say, that all the whole people of Israel
deserved to be punished for Saul, who was already dead, and had (as it might
seem) that controversy buried in the same grave with him, but only in regard
that the people neglected to oppose a mischief so public and apparent, although
they ought and might have done it. Think you it reason, that any should be
punished unless they deserve it? And in what have the people here failed, but
in suffering the offence of their king.

In like manner when David commanded Joab and the governors of Israel to
number the people, he is taxed to have committed a great fault; for even as
Israel provoked the anger of God in demanding a king, one in whose wisdom they
seemed to repose their safety, even so David did much forget himself, in hoping
for victory through the multitude of his subjects; for so much as that is
properly (according to the saying of the prophet) to sacrifice unto their net,
and burn incense unto their drag, a kind of abominable idolatry; for the
governors, they seeing that it would draw evil on the people, drew back a
little at the first; afterwards, as it were, to be rid of the importunity they
made the enrolment: in the mean season all the people are punished, and not
David alone, but also the ancients of Israel, who represented the whole body of
the people, put on sack-cloth and ashes, the which, notwithstanding, was not
done nor practised when David committed those horrible sins of murder and
adultery. Who sees not in this last act, that all had sinned, and that all
should repent; and finally that all were chastised, to wit, David, who had
provoked God by so wicked a commandment, the governors (as peers and assessors
of the kingdom, ought in the name of all Israel to have opposed the king) by
their connivency and over-weak resistance, and all the people also who made
their appearance to be enrolled? God, in this respect, did like a chief
commander or general of an army; he chastised the offence of the whole camp by
a sudden alarm given to all, and by the exemplary punishments of some
particulars to keep all the rest in better awe and order.

But tell me wherefore after that the King Manasses had polluted the
Temple at Jerusalem, do we read that God not only taxed Manasses, but all the
people also? Was it not to advertise Israel, one of the sureties, that if they
keep not the king within the limits of his duty, they should all smart for it;
for what meant the prophet Jeremy to say, the house of Judah is in subjection
to the Assyrians, because of the impiety and cruelty of Manasses? but that they
were guilty of all his offences, because they made no resistance; wherefore
Saint Austin and Saint Ambrose said Herod and Pilate condemned Jesus Christ,
the priests delivered Him to be crucified, the people seem to have some
compassion, notwithstanding all are punished. And wherefore so? For so much as
they are all guilty of His death, in that they did not deliver Him out of the
hands of those wicked judges and governors. There must also be added to this
many other proofs drawn from divers authors for the further explication of this
point, were it not that the testimonies of holy scripture ought to suffice
Christians.

Furthermore, in so much as it is the duty of a good magistrate rather to
endeavour to hinder and prevent a mischief than to chastise the delinquents
after the offence is committed, as good physicians who prescribe a diet to
allay and prevent diseases, as well as medicines to cure them, in like manner a
people truly affected to true religion, will not simply consent themselves to
reprove and repress a prince who would abolish the law of God, but also will
have special regard, that through malice and wickedness he innovate nothing
that may hurt the same, or that in tract of time may corrupt the pure service
of God; and instead of supporting public offences committed against the Divine
Majesty, they will take away all occasions wherewith the offenders might cover
their faults; we read that to have been practised by all Israel by a decree of
Parliament in the assembly of the whole people, to remonstrate to those beyond
Jordan, touching the altar they had built, and by the king Ezechias, who caused
the brazen serpent to be broken.

It is then lawful for Israel to resist the king, who would overthrow the
law of God and abolish His church; and not only so, but also they ought to know
that in neglecting to perform this duty, they make themselves culpable of the
same crime, and shall bear the like punishment with their king.

If their assaults be verbal, their defence must be likewise verbal; if
the sword be drawn against them, they may also take arms, and fight either with
tongue or hand, as occasion is: yea, if they be assailed by surprisals, they
may make use both of ambuscades and countermines, there being no rule in lawful
war that directs them for the manner, whether it be by open assailing their
enemy, or by close surprising; provided always that they carefully distinguish
between advantageous stratagems, and perfidious treason, which is always
unlawful.

But I see well, here will be an objection made. What will you say? That
a whole people, that beast of many heads, must they run in a mutinous disorder,
to order the business of the commonwealth? What address or direction is there
in an unruly and unbridled multitude? What counsel or wisdom, to manage the
affairs of state?

When we speak of all the people, we understand by that, only those who
hold their authority from the people, to wit, the magistrates, who are inferior
to the king, and whom the people have substituted, or established, as it were,
consorts in the empire, and with a kind of tribunitial authority, to restrain
the encroachments of sovereignty, and to represent the whole body of the
people. We understand also, the assembly of the estates, which is nothing else
but an epitome, or brief collection of the kingdom, to whom all public affairs
have special and absolute reference; such were the seventy ancients in the
kingdom of Israel, amongst whom the high priest was as it were president, and
they judged all matters of greatest importance, those seventy being first
chosen by six out of each tribe, which came out of the land of Egypt, then the
heads or governors of provinces. In like manner the judges and provosts of
towns, the captains of thousands, the centurions and others who commanded over
families, the most valiant, noble, and otherwise notable personages, of whom
was composed the body of the states, assembled divers times as it plainly
appears by the word of the holy scripture. At the election of the first king,
who was Saul, all the ancients of Israel assembled together at Kama. In like
manner all Israel was assembled, or all Judah and Benjamin, etc. Now, it is no
way probable, that all the people, one by one, met together there. Of this rank
there are in every well governed kingdom, the princes, the officers of the
crown, the peers, the greatest and most notable lords, the deputies of
provinces, of whom the ordinary body of the estate is composed, or the
parliament or the diet, or other assembly, according to the different names
used in divers countries of the world; in which assemblies, the principal care
is had both for the preventing and reforming either of disorder or detriment in
church or commonwealth.

For as the councils of Basil and Constance have decreed (and well
decreed) that the universal council is in authority above the bishop of Rome,
so in like manner, the whole chapter may over-rule the bishop, the university
the rector, the court the president. Briefly, he, whosoever he is, who has
received authority from a company, is inferior to that whole company, although
he be superior to any of the particular members of it. Also is it without any
scruple or doubt, that Israel, who demanded and established a king as governor
of the public, must needs be above Saul, established at their request and for
Israel's sake, as it shall be more fully proved hereafter. And for so much as
an orderly proceeding is necessarily required in all affairs discreetly
addressed, and that it is not so probably hopeful that order shall be observed
amongst so great a number of people; yea, and that there oftentimes occur
occasions which may not be communicated to a multitude, without manifest danger
of the commonwealth: we say, that all that which has been spoken of privileges
granted, and right committed to the people, ought to be referred to the
officers and deputies of the kingdom: and all that which has been said of
Israel, is to be understood of the princes and elders of Israel, to whom these
things were granted and committed as the practice also has verified.

The queen Athalia, after the death of her son Ahazia king of Judah, put
to death all those of the royal blood, except little Joas, who, being yet in
the cradle, was preserved by the piety and wisdom of his aunt Jehoshabeah.
Athalia possesses herself of the government, and reigned six years over Judah.
It may well be the people murmured between their teeth, and dare not by reason
of danger express what they thought in their minds.

Finally, Jehoiada, the high priest, the husband of Jehoshabeah, having
secretly made a league and combination with the chief men of the kingdom, did
anoint and crown king his nephew Joas, being but seven years old. And he did
not content himself to drive the Queen Mother from the royal throne, but he
also put her to death, and presently overthrew the idolatry of Baal. This deed
of Jehoiada is approved, and by good reason, for he took on him the defence of
a good cause, for he assailed the tyranny, and not the kingdom. The tyranny (I
say) which had no title, as our modern civilians speak. For by no law were
women admitted to the government of the kingdom of Judah. Furthermore, that
tyranny was in vigour and practice. For Athalia had with unbounded mischief and
cruelty invaded the realm of her nephews, and in the administration of that
government committed infinite wickedness, and what was the worst of all, had
cast off the service of the living God to adore and compel others with her, to
worship the idol of Baal. Therefore then was she justly punished, and by him
who had a lawful calling and authority to do it. For Jehoiada was not a private
and particular person, but the high priest, to whom the knowledge of civil
causes did then belong. And besides, he had for his associates, the principal
men of the kingdom, the Levites, and being himself the king's kinsman and ally.
Now for so much as he assembled not the estates at Mizpah, according to the
accustomed manner, he is not reproved for it, neither for that he consulted and
contrived the matter secretly, for that if he had held any other manner of
proceeding, the business must probably have failed in the execution and
success.

A combination or conjuration is good or ill, according as the end
whereunto it is addressed is good or ill; and perhaps also according as they
are affected who are the managers of it. We say then, that the princes of Judah
have done well, and that in following any other course they had failed of the
right way. For even as the guardian ought to take charge and care that the
goods of his pupil fall not into loss and detriment, and if he omit his duty
therein, he may be compelled to give an account thereof, in like manner, those
to whose custody and tuition the people have committed themselves, and whom
they have constituted their tutors and defenders ought to maintain them safe
and entire in all their rights and privileges. To be short, as it is lawful for
a whole people to resist and oppose tyranny, so likewise the principal persons
of the kingdom may as heads, and for the good of the whole body, confederate
and associate themselves together; and as in a public state, that which is done
by the greatest part is esteemed and taken as the act of all, so in like manner
must it be said to be done, which the better part of the most principal have
acted, briefly, that all the people had their hand in it.

But here presents itself another question, the which deserves to be
considered, and amply debated in regard of the circumstance of time. Let us put
the case that a king seeking to abolish the law of God, or ruin the church,
that all the people or the greatest part yield their consent, that all the
princes or the greatest number of them make no reckoning; and, notwithstanding,
a small handful of people, to wit, some of the princes and magistrates desire
to preserve the law of God entirely and inviolably, and to serve the Lord
purely: what may it be lawful for them to do if the king seek to compel those
men to be idolaters, or will take from them the exercise of true religion? We
speak not here of private and particular persons considered one by one, and who
in that manner are not held as parts of the entire body, as the planks, the
nails, the pegs, are no part of the ship, neither the stones, the rafters, nor
the rubbish, are any part of the house. But we speak of some town or province,
which makes a portion of a kingdom, as the prow, the poop, the keel, and other
parts make a ship: the foundation, the roof, and the walls make a house. We
speak also of the magistrate who governs such a city or province.

If we must make our defence with producing of examples, although we have
not many ready by reason of the backwardness and carelessness of men when there
is question to maintain the service of God: notwithstanding, we have some few
to be examined and received according as they deserve. Libna, a town of the
priests, withdrew itself from the obedience of Joram, king of Judah, and left
that prince, because he had abandoned the God of his fathers, whom those of the
town would serve, and it may be they feared also lest in the end they should be
compelled to sacrifice to Baal. In like manner when that the king Antiochus
commanded that all the Jews should embrace his religion, and should forsake
that which the God Almighty had taught them, Mattathias answered, we will not
obey, nor will we do anything contrary to our religion: neither did he only
speak, but also, being transported with the zeal of Phineas, he killed with his
own hands a Jew, who constrained his fellow citizens to sacrifice to idols.
Then he took arms and retired into the mountain, gathered troops, and made war
against Antiochus, for religion, and for his country, with such success, that
he regained Jerusalem, broke and brought to nothing the power of the pagans
whom they had gathered to ruin the church, and then re-established the pure
service of God. If we will know who this Mattathias was, he was the father of
the Machabees of the tribe of Levi; insomuch as it was not lawful for him,
according to the received custom and right of his race to restore the kingdom
by arms from the tyranny of Antiochus. His followers were such as fled to the
mountains together with the inhabitants of Modin, to whom had adjoined
themselves divers neighbouring Jews, and other fugitives from sundry quarters
of Judaea; all who solicitously desired the re-establishment of the church.
Almost all the rest, yea, the principals, obeyed Antiochus, and that after the
rout of his army, and his own miserable death. Although there was then a fair
occasion to shake off his yoke, yet the Jews sought to the son of Antiochus,
and entreated him to take on him the kingdom, promising him fidelity and
obedience.

I might here produce the example of Deborah. The Lord God had subjected
Israel to Jabin king of Canaan, and they had remained in this servitude the
space of twenty years, who might seem in some sort to have gained a right by
prescription over the kingdom; and together also, that almost all Israel
followed after strange gods. The principal and most powerful tribes, to wit,
Reuben, Ephraim, Benjamin, Dan, Asher, and some others, adhered wholly to
Jabin. Yet, notwithstanding, the prophetess Deborah who judged Israel, caused
the tribes of Zebulon, Nephthalie, and Issachar, or at the least some of all
those tribes, to take arms under the conduct of Barak, and they overthrew
Sisera the lieutenant of Jabin, and delivered Israel, who had no thought of
liberty, and was content to remain in bondage; and having shaken off the yoke
of the Canaanites they reestablished the pure service of the living God. But
for so much as Deborah seems to have an extraordinary vocation, and that the
scripture does not approve in express terms the doings of them of Libna,
although that in not disallowing of their proceedings, it may seem in some sort
to allow them, and for that the history of the Machabees has had no great
authority in the ancient church, and for that it is commonly held that an
assertion must be proved by laws and testimonies, not by examples, let us
examine by the effect, what we ought to judge, according to the right of the
matter now in question.

We have formerly said that the king did swear to keep the law of God,
and promised to the uttermost of his power to maintain the church; that the
people of Israel considered in one body, covenanting by the high priest, made
the same promise to God. Now, at this present, we say that all the towns and
all the magistrates of these towns, which are parts and portions of the
kingdom, promise each of them on his own behalf, and in express terms, the
which all towns and Christian communalties have also done, although it has been
but with a tacit consent. Joshua, being very old and near to his death,
assembled all Israel at Sichem in the presence of God, to wit, before the ark
of the covenant, which was there. It is said that the ancients of the people,
the heads of the tribe, the judges and governors, and all who had any public
command in the town of Israel, met together there, where they swore to observe
and keep the law of the Lord, and did willingly put on the yoke of the Almighty
God: whereby, it appears, that these magistrates did oblige themselves in the
names of their towns and communalties, who did send them to take order, that
God should be served throughout the whole country, according as He had revealed
in His law. And Joshua, for his part, having passed this contract of agreement
between God and the people, and enregistered the whole, according as it was
done, for a perpetual memorial of the matter he incontinently set up a
stone.

If there were occasion to remove the ark of the Lord, the principals of
the country and towns, the captains, the centurions, the provosts, and others,
were summoned by the decree and commandment of David; and of the synagogue of
Israel, if there be a purpose of building the Lord's temple, the same course is
observed. And to the end it be not supposed, that some alteration has been
inserted after the creation of kings. In the times of Joas and Josias, when
there was question of renewing the covenant between God and the people, all the
estates met together, and all were bound and obliged particularly. Also not
only the king, but the kingdom, and not only all the kingdom, but also all the
pastors of the kingdom, promise each of them for themselves, fidelity and
obedience to God. I say again, that not only the king and the people, but also
all the towns of Israel, and their magistrates, oblige themselves to God, and,
as homagers to their liege Lord, tie themselves to be His for ever, with and
against all men. For further proof of the aforesaid, I would entreat the reader
diligently to turn over the Holy Bible, especially in the books of the Kings
and the Chronicles. But for a yet more ample explication of this matter, let us
produce for example what is in practice at this day.

In the empire of Germany, when the emperor is to be crowned, the
electors and princes of the empire, as well secular as ecclesiastical, meet
together personally, or else send their ambassadors. The prelates, earls and
barons, and all the deputies of the imperial towns, come thither also, or else
send special proxies; then do they their homage to the emperor, either for
themselves, or for them whom they represent, with, and under, certain
conditions. Now, let us presuppose that one of these who has done homage
voluntarily, afterwards endeavours to depose the emperor, and advance himself
into his place, and that the princes and barons deny their sovereign the
succour and tribute which they owe him, and that they have intelligence with
that other who conspired and sought to possess himself of the imperial throne.
Think you that they of Straesbourgh or of Nurembergh, who have bound themselves
by faith unto the lawful emperor, have not lawful right to repress and exclude
this traitorous intruder? Yea, on the contrary, if they do it not, if they give
not succour to the emperor in this his necessity, think you that they have
satisfied or performed their fealty and promise, seeing that he who has not
preserved his governor when he had means to do it, ought to be held as culpable
and guilty as he who offered the violence and injury unto him? If it be so (as
every one may sufficiently see it is) is it not then lawful for the men of
Libna and of Modin? and does not their duty enjoin them to do as much as if the
other estates of the kingdom have left God, to whose service and pleasure they
know and acknowledge themselves to be bound to render obedience? Let us imagine
then some Joram or Antiochus who abolishes true religion, and lifts up himself
above God, that Israel connives and is content, what should that town do which
desires to serve God purely? First, they should say with Joshua, for their
parts, look whom you desire rather to obey, the living God, or the gods of the
Amorites; for our parts, we and our families will serve the Lord. Choose you
then, I say, if you will obey in this point him, who, without any right,"
usurps that power and authority which no way appertains unto him; for my part,
happen what may, I will keep my faith to him to whom I promised it. I make no
question but that Joshua would have done the uttermost of his endeavour to
maintain the pure service of the living God in Thamnathe Serathe, a town of
Ephraim, where his house and estate lay; if the Israelites besides had so much
forgotten themselves as to have worshipped the god of the Amorites in the land
of Canaan.

But if the king should pass yet further, and send his lieutenants to
compel us to become idolaters, and if he commands us to drive God and His
service from amongst us; shall we not rather shut our gates against the king
and his officers, than drive out of our town the Lord who is the King of Kings?
Let the burgesses and citizens of towns, let the magistrates and governors of
the people of God dwelling in towns, consider with themselves that they have
contracted two covenants, and taken two oaths. The first and most ancient with
God, to whom the people have sworn to be His people; the second and next
following, with the king, to whom the people have promised obedience, as unto
him who is the governor and conductor of the people of God. So then, as if a
viceroy conspiring against his sovereign, although he had received from him an
unlimited authority, if he should summon us to deliver the king whom he held
besieged within the enclosure of our walls, we ought not to obey him, but
resist with the uttermost of our power and means, according to the tenor of our
oath of allegiance. In like manner think we, that it is not a wickedness of all
most detestable, if at the pleasure of a prince who is the vassal and servant
of God, we should drive God from dwelling amongst us, or deliver Him (as far as
in us lieth) into the hands of His enemies.

You will say, it may be that the towns appertain to the prince. And I
answer, that the towns consist not of a heap of stones, but of that which we
call people, that the people is the people of God, to whom they are first bound
by oath; and secondly, to the king. For the towns, although that the kings have
power over them, notwithstanding the right of inheritance of the soil belongs
to the citizens and owners, for all that which is in a kingdom is indeed under
the dominion of the king, but not of his proper patrimony. God in truth is the
only Lord proprietor of all things, and it is of Him that the king holds his
royalties, and the people their patrimony. This is as much as to say, you will
reply, that for the cause of religion it shall be lawful for the subjects to
revolt from the obedience of their king. If this be once granted, it will
presently open a gap to rebellion? But, hearken, I pray you patiently, and
consider this matter more thoroughly. I might answer in a word, that of two
things, if the one must needs be done, it were much better to forsake the king,
than God; or with Saint Augustine in his fourth book, Of the city of
God, chapter iv, and in the nineteenth book, and chapter xxi, that where
there is no justice, there is is no commonwealth; that there is no justice when
he that is a mortal man would pull another man out of the hands of the immortal
God, to make him a slave of the devil, seeing that justice is a virtue that
gives to every one that which is his own, and that those who draw their necks
out of the yoke of such rulers, deliver themselves from the tyranny of wicked
spirits, and abandon a multitude of robbers, and not the commonwealth.

But to re-assume this discourse a little higher, those who shall carry
themselves as has been formerly said, seem no ways accusable of the crime of
revolt. Those are said properly to quit the king or the commonwealth, which,
with the heart and purpose of an enemy, withdraw themselves from the obedience
of the king or the commonwealth, by means whereof they are justly accounted
adversaries, and are oftentimes much more to be feared, than any other enemies.
But those of whom we now speak do nothing resemble them. First, they do in no
sort refuse to obey, provided that they be commanded that which they may
lawfully do, and that it be not against the honour of God.

They pay willingly the taxes, customs, imposts, and ordinary payments,
provided that with these they seek not to abolish the tribute which they owe
unto God. They obey Cæsar while he commands in the quality of
Cæsar; but when Cæsar passes his bounds, when he usurps that
dominion which is none of his own, when he endeavours to assail the Throne of
God, when he wars against the Sovereign Lord, both of himself and the people,
they then esteem it reasonable not to obey Cæsar; and yet, after this, to
speak properly, they do no acts of hostility. He is properly an enemy who stirs
up, who provokes another, who out of military insolency prepares and sets forth
parties to war. They have been urged and assailed by open war, and close and
treacherous surprisals; when death and destruction environ them round about,
then they take arms, and wait their enemies' assaults. You cannot have peace
with your enemies when you will; for if you lay down your weapons, if you give
over making war, they will not for all that disarm themselves, and lose their
advantage. But for these men, desire but peace and you have it; give over but
assailing them, and they will lay down their arms; cease to fight against God,
and they will presently leave the lists. Will you take their swords out of
their hands? Abstain you only then from striking, seeing they are not the
assailants, but the defendants; sheathe your sword, and they will presently
cast their buckler on the ground, which has been the reason that they have been
often surprised by perfidious ambuscades, whereof these our times have afforded
over-frequent examples.

Now, as we cannot call that servant stubborn or a fugitive, who puts by
the blow which his lord strikes at him with his sword, or who withdraws or
hides himself from his master's fury, or shuts his chamber door upon him until
his choler and heat be passed over, much less ought we to esteem those
seditious, who (holding the name and place of servants and subjects) shut the
gates of a city against their prince, transported with anger, being ready to do
all his just commandments, after he has recovered his judgment, and related his
former indignation. We must place in this rank, David, commander of the army of
Israel, under Saul, a furious king. David, oppressed with calumnies and false
taxations, watched, and waylaid from all parts, he retired unto, and defended
himself in unaccessible mountains, and provided for his defence to oppose the
walls of Ceila against the fury of the king; yea, he drew unto his party all
those that he could, not to take away Saul's life from him, as it plainly
appeared afterwards, but to defend his own cause: see wherefore Jonathan, the
son of Saul, made no difficulty, to make alliance with David, and to renew it
from time to time, the which is called the alliance of the Almighty. And
Abigail says in express words, that David was wrongfully assailed, and that he
made the war of God.

We must also place in this rank the Machabees, who, having good means to
maintain wars, were content to receive peace from king Demetrius and others,
which Antiochus had offered them before, because by it, they should be secured
in the free possession and exercise of their religion. We may remember that
those who in our times have fought for true religion against Antichrist, both
in Germany and France, have laid down arms as soon as it was permitted them to
serve God truly according to His ordinance, and oftentimes having fair means
and occasion to advance and continue the war to their much advantage: as when
the Philistines compelled Saul to cease attack, and Antioch to desist from an
assault upon its neighbours; and other occasions when everything favoured
further warfare. See then the marks which distinguish and separate sufficiently
those of whom we speak from rebels or seditious.

But let us yet see other evident testimonies of the equity of their
cause; for their defection is of that nature, that take away but the occasion,
if some extreme necessity compel not the contrary, they presently return to
their former condition, and then you cannot properly say, they separated
themselves from the king, or the commonalty; but that they left Joram, and
Antiochus, or if you will, the tyranny and unlawful power of one alone, or if
divers particulars, who had no authority nor right to exact obedience in the
same manner, as they commanded. The doctors of the Sorbonne have taught us the
like sundry times: whereof we will allege some examples.

About the year 1300 Pope Boniface VIII, seeking to appropriate to his
See the royalties that belonged to the crown of France, Philip the Fair, the
then king, did taunt him somewhat sharply: the tenor of whose tart letters are
these:

"Philip by the Grace of God, King of the French, to Boniface, calling
himself Sovereign Bishop, little or no health at all.

"Be it known to the great foolishness and unbounded rashness, that in
temporal matters we have only God for our superior, and that the vacancy of
certain churches belongs to us by royal prerogative, and that appertains to us
only to gather the fruits, and we will defend the possession thereof against
all opposers with the edge of our swords, accounting them fools, and without
brains who hold a contrary opinion."

In those times all men acknowledged the pope for God's vicar on earth,
and head of the universal church. Insomuch, that (as it is said) common error
went instead of a law, notwithstanding the Sorbonists being assembled, and
demanded, made answer, that the king and the kingdom might safely, without
blame or danger of schism, exempt themselves from his obedience, and flatly
refuse that which the pope demanded; for so much as it is not the separation
but the cause which makes the schism, and if there were schism, it should be
only in separating from Boniface, and not from the church, nor from the pope,
and that there was no danger nor offence in so remaining until some honest man
were chosen pope. Every one knows into what perplexities the consciences of a
whole kingdom would fall, which held themselves separated from the church, if
this distinction be not true. I would demand now, if it be not yet more lawful
to make use of this distinction, when a king invades and encroaches on the
jurisdiction of God, and oppresses with hard servitude, the souls dearly bought
with the precious blood of Jesus Christ. Let us add another example.

In the year of our Lord 1408, when pope Benedict XIII did oppose the
French church by tributes and exactions; the clergy, assembled by the command
of King Charles VI decreed, That the king and inhabitants of the kingdom ought
not to obey Benedict, who was an heretic, a schismatic, and altogether unworthy
of that dignity: the which the estates of the kingdom approved, and the
parliament of Paris confirmed by a decree. The same clergy also ordained that
those who had been excommunicated by that pope, as forsakers and enemies of the
church, should be presently absolved, nullifying all such excommunications, and
this has been practised not in France only, but in other places also, as
histories do credibly report. The which gives us just occasion most
perspicuously to see and know, that if he who holds the place of a prince do
govern ill, there may be a separation from him without incurring justly the
blame of revolt; for that they are things in themselves directly contrary, to
leave a bad pope, and forsake the church, a wicked king, and the kingdom. To
return to those of Lobna, they seem to have followed this before remembered
expedient; for after the re-establishment of the service of God they presently
became again the subjects of king Ezekias. And if this distinction be allowed
place, when a pope encroaches on the rights of any prince, which,
notwithstanding in some cases acknowledges him for his sovereign, is it not
much more allowable, if a prince who is a vassal in that respect, endeavours to
assure and appropriate to himself the rights of God? Let us conclude, then, to
end this discourse, that all the people by the authority of those, into whose
hands they have committed their power, or divers of them, may, and ought to
reprove and repress a prince who commands things against God. In like manner,
that all, or at the least, the principals of provinces or towns, under the
authority of the chief magistrates, established first by God, and secondly by
the prince, may according to law and reason, hinder the entrance of idolatry
within the enclosure of their walls, and maintain their true religion: yea,
further, they may extend the confines of the church, which is but one, and in
failing hereof, if they have means to do it, they justly incur the penalty of
high treason against "the Divine Majesty.

Whether private men may resist by arms

It remains now that we speak of particulars who are private persons.
First, particulars or private persons are not bound to take up arms against the
prince who would compel them to become idolaters. The covenant between God and
all the people who promise to be the people of God, does not in any sort bind
them to that; for as that which belongs to the whole universal body is in no
sort proper to particulars, so, in like manner, that which the body owes and is
bound to perform cannot by any sensible reason be required of particular
persons: neither does their duty anything oblige them to it; for every one is
bound to serve God in that proper vocation to which he is called. Now private
persons, they have no power; they have no public command, nor any calling to
unsheathe the sword of authority; and therefore as God has not put the sword
into the hands of private men, so does He not require in any sort that they
should strike with it. It is said to them, "put up thy sword into thy
scabbard." On the contrary the apostles say of magistrates, they carry not the
sword in vain. If particular men draw it forth they make themselves
delinquents. If magistrates be slow and negligent to use it when just occasion
is offered, they are likewise justly blameable of negligence in performing
their duties, and equally guilty with the former.

But you will say unto me, has not God made a covenant, as well with
particular persons as with the generality, with the least as well as the
highest? To what purpose was circumcision and baptism ordained? What means that
frequent repetition of the covenant in so many passages of holy writ? All this
is true, but the consideration hereof is diverse in their several kinds. For as
all the subjects of a good and faithful prince, of what degree soever they be,
are bound to obey him; but some of them, notwithstanding, have their particular
duty, as magistrates must hold others in obedience; in like manner all men are
bound to serve God; but some are placed in a higher rank, have received greater
authority, in so much as they are accountable for the offences of others, if
they attend not the charges of the commonalty carefully.

The kings, the commonalties of the people, the magistrates into whose
hands the whole body of the commonwealth has committed the sword of authority,
must and ought to take care that the church be maintained and preserved;
particulars ought only to look that they render themselves members of this
church. Kings and popular estates are bound to hinder the pollution or ruin of
the temple of God, and ought to free and defend it from all corruption within,
and all injury from without. Private men must take order, that their bodies,
the temples of God, be pure, that they may be fit receptacles for the Holy
Ghost to dwell in them. If any man defile the temple of God, saith the apostle,
him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are; to
the former He gives the sword which they bear with authority; to the other He
recommends the sword of the Spirit only, to wit, the word of God, wherewith
Saint Paul arms all Christians against the assaults of the devil. What shall
then private men do, if the king will constrain them to serve idols? If the
magistrates into whose hands the people have consigned their authority, or if
the magistrates of the place, where these particulars dwell, do oppose these
proceedings of the king, let them in God's name obey their leaders, and employ
all their means (as in the service of God) to aid the holy and commendable
enterprises of those who oppose themselves lawfully against his wicked
intention. Amongst others they have the examples of the centurions, and men at
arms, who readily and cheerfully obeyed the princes of Judah, who, stirred up
by Jehoidas, purged the church from all profanation, and delivered the kingdom
from the tyranny of Athaliah. But if the princes and magistrates approve the
course of an outrageous and irreligious prince, or if they do not resist him,
we must lend our ears to the counsel of Jesus Christ, to wit, retire ourselves
into some other place. We have the example of the faithful mixed among the ten
tribes of Israel, who, seeing the true service of God abolished by Jeroboam,
and that none made any account of it, they retired themselves into the
territories of Judah, where religion remained in her purity. Let us rather
forsake our livelihoods and lives, than God, let us rather be crucified
ourselves, than crucify the Lord of Life: fear not them (saith the Lord) who
can only kill the body. He Himself, His apostles, and an infinite number of
Christian martyrs, have taught us this by their examples; shall it not then be
permitted to any private person to resist by arms? What shall we say of Moses,
who led Israel away in despite of King Pharaoh? And of Ehud, who, after ten
years' servitude, when Israel might seem to belong by right of prescription to
him who held the possession thereof, killed Eglon, the king of Moab, and
delivered Israel from the yoke of the Moabites: and of Jehu, who put to death
his lord the king Joram, extirpated the race of Ahab, and destroyed the priests
of Baal. Were not these particulars? I answer, that if they be considered in
themselves, they may well be accounted particular persons, insomuch as they had
not any ordinary vocation. But, seeing that we know that they were called
extraordinarily, and that God Himself has (if we may so speak) put His sword
into their hands, be it far from us to account them particular or private
persons: but rather let us esteem them by many degrees, excelling any ordinary
magistrates whatsoever.

The calling of Moses is approved by the express word of God, and by most
evident miracles: it is said of Ehud, that God stirred him up to kill the
tyrant, and deliver Israel; for Jehu, he was anointed by the commandment of the
prophet Elizeus, for to root out the race of Ahab, besides, that the principal
men saluted him king, before he executed anything. There may as much be said of
all the rest, whose examples are propounded in holy writ. But where God
Almighty does not speak with His own mouth, nor extraordinarily by His
prophets, it is there that we ought to be exceedingly cautious, and to stand
upon our guard; for if any, supposing he is inspired by the Holy Ghost, do
attribute to himself the before-mentioned authority, I would entreat him to
look that he be not puffed up with vain glory, and lest he make not a God to
himself of his own fancy, and sacrifice to his own inventions. Let him not then
be conceived with vanity, lest instead of fruit he bring forth deluding lies.
Let the people also be advised on their parts, lest in desiring to fight under
the banner of Jesus Christ, they run not to their own confusion to follow the
army of some Galilean Thendas, or of Barcozba: as it happened to the peasants
and Anabaptists of Munster, in Germany, in the year 1323. I will not say,
notwithstanding, that the same God who to punish our offences, has sent us in
these our days, both Pharaohs and Ahabs, may not sometimes raise up
extraordinary deliverances to His people: certainly His justice and His mercy
continue to all ages, firm and immutable.

Now, if these visible miracles appear not as in former times, we may yet
at the least fall by the effects that God works miraculously in our hearts,
which is when we have our minds free from all ambition, a true and earnest
zeal, a right knowledge, and conscience; lest being guided by the spirit of
error or ambition, we rather make idols of our own imaginations, than serve and
worship the true and living God.

Whether it be lawful to take arms for religion

Furthermore, to take away all scruple, we must necessarily answer those
who esteem, or else would that others should think they hold that opinion, that
the church ought not to be defended by arms. They say withal that it was not
without a great mystery that God did forbid in the law, that the altar should
be made or adorned with the help of any tool of iron; in like manner, that at
the building of the temple of Solomon, there was not heard any noise of axe or
hammer, or other tools of iron; from whence they collect the church which is
the lively temple of the Lord, ought not to be reformed by arms; yea, as if the
stones of the altar, and of the temple were hewed and taken out of the quarries
without any instrument of iron, which the text of the holy scripture doth
sufficiently clear.

But if we oppose to this goodly allegory, that which is written in the
fourth chapter of the Book of Nehemiah, that one part of the people carried
mortar, and another part stood ready with their weapons, that some held in one
hand their swords, and with the other carried the materials to the workmen, for
the re-building of the temple; to the end, by this means, to prevent their
enemies from ruining their work; we say also, that the church is neither
advanced nor edified by these material weapons; but by these arms it is
warranted and preserved from the violence of the enemies, which will not by any
means endure the increase of it. Briefly, there has been an infinite number of
good kings and princes (as histories do testify) which by arms have maintained
and defended the service of God against pagans. They reply readily to this,
that wars in this manner were allowable under the law; but since the time that
grace has been offered by Jesus Christ, who would not enter into Jerusalem
mounted on a brave horse, but meekly sitting on an ass, this manner of
proceeding has had an end. I answer first, that all agree with me in this, that
our Saviour Christ, during all the time that He conversed in this world, took
not on Him the office of a judge or king; but rather of a private person, and a
delinquent by imputation of our transgressions; so that it is an allegation
besides the purpose, to say that He hath not managed arms.

But I would willingly demand of such exceptionalists, whether that they
think by the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh, that magistrates have lost
their right in the sword of authority? If they say so, Saint Paul contradicts
them, who says that the magistrates carry not the sword in vain, and did not
refuse their assistance and power against the violence of those who had
conspired his death. And if they consent to the saying of the apostle, to what
purpose should the magistrates bear the sword, if it be not to serve God, who
has committed it to them, to defend the good and punish the bad? Can they do
better service than to preserve the church from the violence of the wicked, and
to deliver the flock of Christ from the swords of murderers? I would demand of
them, yet, whether they think that all use of arms is forbidden to Christians?
If this be their opinion, then would I know of them, wherefore Christ did grant
to the centurion his request? Wherefore did He give so excellent a testimony of
him? Wherefore does Saint John Baptist command the men at arms to content
themselves with their pay, and not to use any extortion, and does not rather
persuade them to leave their calling? Wherefore did Saint Peter baptize
Cornelius the Centurion, who was the first-fruits of the Gentiles? From whence
comes it that he did not in any sort whatsoever counsel him to leave his
charge?

Now, if to bear arms and to make war be a thing lawful, can there
possibly be found any war more just than that which is taken in hand by the
command of the superior, for the defence of the church, and the preservation of
the faithful? Is there any greater tyranny than that which is exercised over
the soul? Can there be imagined a war more commendable than that which
suppresses such a tyranny? For the last point, I would willingly know of these
men, whether it be absolutely prohibited Christians to make war upon any
occasion whatsoever? If they say that it is forbidden them, from whence comes
it then that the men at arms, captains and centurions, who had no other
employment, but the managing of arms, were always received into the church?
Wherefore do the ancient Fathers, and Christian historians make so horrible
mention of certain legions composed wholly of Christian soldiers, and amongst
others of that of Malta, so renowned for the victory which they obtained, and
of that of Thebes, of the which Saint Mauritius was general, who suffered
martyrdom, together with all his troops, for the confessing of the name of
Jesus Christ? And if it be permitted to make war (as it may be they will
confess) to keep the limits and towns of a country, and to repulse an invading
enemy, is it not yet a thing much more reasonable to take arms to preserve and
defend honest men, to suppress the wicked, and to keep and defend the limits
and bounds of the church, which is the kingdom of Jesus Christ? If it were
otherwise, to what purpose should Saint John have foretold that the whore of
Babylon shall be finally ruined by the ten kings, whom she has bewitched?
Furthermore, if we hold a contrary opinion, what shall we say of the wars of
Constantine, against Maxentius, and Licimius, celebrated by so many public
orations, and approved by the testimony of an infinite number of learned men?
What opinion should we hold of the many voyages made by Christian princes
against the Turks and Saracens to conquer the Holy Land, who had not, or at the
least, ought not to have had, any other end in their designs, but to hinder the
enemy from ruining the temple of the land, and to restore the integrity of His
service into those countries?

Although then the church be not increased by arms, notwithstanding it
may be justly preserved by the means of arms. I say further, that those that
die in so holy a war are no less the martyrs of Jesus Christ than their
brethren who were put to death for religion; nay, they who die in that war seem
to have this disadvantage, that with a free will and knowing sufficiently
hazard, into which they cast themselves, notwithstanding, do courageously
expose their lives to death and danger, whereas the other do only not refuse
death, when it behoveth them to suffer. The Turks strive to advance their
opinion by the means of arms, and if they do subdue a country, they presently
bring in by force the impieties of Mohamet, who in his Alcoran, hath so
recommended arms, as they are not ashamed to say it is the ready way to heaven,
yet do the Turks constrain no man in matter of conscience. But he who is a much
greater adversary to Christ and true religion, with all those kings whom he has
enchanted, opposes fire and faggots, to the light of the gospel, tortures the
Word of God, compelling by wracking and torments, as much as in him lies, all
men to become idolaters, and finally is not ashamed to advance and maintain
their faith and law by perfidious disloyalty, and their traditions by continual
treasons.

Now on the contrary, those good princes and magistrates are said
properly to defend themselves, who environ and fortify by all their means and
industry the vine of Christ, already planted, to be planted in places where it
has not yet been, lest the wild boar of the forest should spoil or devour it.
They do this (I say) in covering with their buckler, and defending with their
sword, those who by the preaching of the gospel have been converted to true
religion, and in fortifying with their best ability, by ravelins, ditches, and
rampers the temple of God built with lively stones, until it have attained the
full height, in despite of all the furious assaults of the enemies thereof. We
have lengthened out this discourse thus far, to the end we might take away all
scruple concerning this question. Set, then, the estates, and all the officers
of a kingdom, or the greatest part of them, every one established in authority
by the people: know, that if they contain not within his bounds (or at the
least, employ not the utmost of their endeavours thereto) a king who seeks to
corrupt the law of God, or hinders the re-establishment thereof, that they
offend grievously against the Lord, with whom they have contracted covenants
upon those conditions. Those of a town, or of a province, making a portion of a
kingdom, let them know also, that they draw upon themselves the judgment of God
if they drive not impiety out of their walls and confines if the king seek to
bring it in, or if they be wanting to preserve by all means, the pure doctrine
of the Gospel, although for the defence thereof, they suffer for a time
banishment, or any other misery. Finally, more private men must be all
advertised, that nothing can excuse them, if they obey any in that which
offends God, and that yet they have no right nor warrant, neither may in any
sort by their private authority take arms, if it appear not most evidently,
that they have extraordinary vocation thereunto, all which our discourse will
suppose we have confirmed by pregnant testimonies drawn from holy writ.

THE THIRD QUESTION

Whether it be lawful to resist a prince who doth oppress or ruin a
public state, and how far such resistance may be extended: by whom, how, and by
what right or law it is permitted.

For so much as we must here dispute of the lawful authority of a lawful
prince, I am confident that this question will be the less acceptable to
tyrants and wicked princes; for it is no marvel if those who receive no law,
but what their own will and fancy dictate unto them, be deaf unto the voice of
that law which is grounded upon reason. But I persuade myself that good princes
will willingly entertain this discourse, insomuch as they sufficiently know
that all magistrates, be they of never so high a rank, are but an inanimated
and speaking law. Neither though anything be pressed home against the bad, can
it fall within any inference against the good kings or princes, as also good
and bad princes are in a direct diameter opposite and contrary: therefore, that
which shall be urged against tyrants, is so far from detracting anything from
kings, as on the contrary, the more tyrants are laid open in their proper
colours, the more glorious does the true worth and dignity of kings appear;
neither can the vicious imperfections of the one be laid open, but it gives
addition of perfections and respect to the honour of the other.

But for tyrants let them say and think what they please, that shall be
the least of my care; for it is not to them, but against them that I write; for
kings I believe that they will readily consent to that which is propounded, for
by true proportion of reason they ought as much to hate tyrants and wicked
governors, as shepherds hate wolves, physicians, poisoners, true prophets,
false doctors; for it must necessarily occur that reason infuses into good
kings as much hatred against tyrants, as nature imprints in dogs against
wolves, for as the one lives by rapine and spoil, so the other is born or bred
to redress and prevent all such outrages. It may be the flatterers of tyrants
will cast a supercilious aspect on these lines; but if they were not past all
grace they would rather blush for shame. I very well know that the friends and
faithful servants of kings will not only approve and lovingly entertain this
discourse, but also, with their best abilities, defend the contents thereof.
Accordingly as the reader shall find himself moved either with content or
dislike in the reading hereof, let him know that by that he shall plainly
discover either the affection or hatred that he bears to tyrants. Let us now
enter into the matter.

Kings are made by the people

We have shewed before that it is God that does appoint kings, who
chooses them, who gives the kingdom to them: now we say that the people
establish kings, puts the sceptre into their hands, and who with their
suffrages, approves the election. God would have it done in this manner, to the
end that the kings should acknowledge, that after God they hold their power and
sovereignty from the people, and that it might the rather induce them, to apply
and address the utmost of their care and thoughts for the profit of the people,
without being puffed with any vain imagination, that they were formed of any
matter more excellent than other men, for which they were raised so high above
others; as if they were to command our flocks of sheep, or herds of cattle. But
let them remember and know, that they are of the same mould and condition as
others, raised from the earth by the voice and acclamations, now as it were
upon the shoulders of the people unto their thrones, that they might afterwards
bear on their own shoulders the greatest burdens of the commonwealth. Divers
ages before that, the people of Israel demanded a king. God gave and appointed
the law of royal government contained in the seventeenth chapter, verse
fourteen of Deuteronomy, when, says Moses, "thou art come unto the land which
the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein,
and shalt say, I will set a king over me like as all the nations that are about
me, thou shalt in any wise set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose from
amongst thy brethren, etc." You see here, that the election of the king is
attributed to God, the establishment to the people: now when the practice of
this law came in use, see in what manner they proceeded.

The elders of Israel, who presented the whole body of the people (under
this name of elders are comprehended the captains, the centurions, commanders
over fifties and tens, judges, provosts, but principally the chiefest of
tribes) came to meet Samuel in Ramah, and not being willing longer to endure
the government of the sons of Samuel, whose ill carriage had justly drawn on
them the people's dislike, and withal persuading themselves that they had found
the means to make their wars hereafter with more advantage, they demanded a
king of Samuel, who asking counsel of the Lord, he made known that He had
chosen Saul for the governor of His people. Then Samuel anointed Saul, and
performed all those rights which belong to the election of a king required by
the people. Now this might, perhaps, have seemed sufficient, if Samuel had
presented to the people the king who was chosen by God, and had admonished them
all to become good and obedient subjects. Notwithstanding, to the end that the
king might know that he was established by the people, Samuel appointed the
estates to meet at Mizpah, where being assembled as if the business were but
then to begin, and nothing had already been done, to be brief, as if the
election of Saul were then only to be treated of, the lot is cast and falls on
the tribe of Benjamin, after on the family of Matri, and lastly on Saul, born
of that family, who was the same whom God had chosen. Then by the consent of
all the people Saul was declared king. Finally, that Saul nor any other might
attribute the aforesaid business to chance or lot, after that Saul had made
some proof of his valour in raising the siege of the Ammonites in Jabish
Gilead, some of the people pressing the business, he was again confirmed king
in a full assembly at Gilgal. Ye see that he whom God had chosen, and the lot
had separated from all the rest, is established king by the suffrages of the
people.

And for David, by the commandment of God, and in a manner more evident
than the former, after the rejection of Saul, Samuel anointed for king over
Israel, David, chosen by the Lord, which being done, the Spirit of the Lord
presently left Saul, and wrought in a special manner in David. But David,
notwithstanding, reigns not, but was compelled to save himself in deserts and
rocks, oftentimes falling upon the very brim of destruction, and never reigned
as king until after the death of Saul: for then by the suffrages of all the
people of Judah he was first chosen king of Judah, and seven years after by the
consent of all Israel, he was inaugurated king of Israel in Hebron. So, then,
he is anointed first by the prophet at the commandment of God, as a token he
was chosen. Secondly, by the commandment of the people when he was established
king. And that to the end that kings may always remember that it is from God,
but by the people, and for the people's sake that they do reign, and that in
their glory they say not (as is their custom) they hold their kingdom only of
God and their sword, but withal add that it was the people who first girt them
with that sword. The same order offered in Solomon. Although he was the king's
son, God had chosen Solomon to sit upon the throne of his kingdom, and by
express words had promised David to be with him and assist him as a father his
son. David had with his own mouth designed Solomon to be successor to his crown
in the presence of some of the principal of his court.

But this was not enough, and therefore David assembled at Jerusalem the
princes of Israel, the heads of the tribes, the captains of the soldiers, and
ordinance officers of the kings, the centurions and other magistrates of towns,
together with his sons, the noblemen and worthiest personages of the kingdom,
to consult and resolve upon the election. In this assembly, after they had
called upon the name of God, Solomon, by the consent of the whole congregation,
was proclaimed and anointed for king, and sat (so says the text) upon the
throne of Israel; then, and not before, the princes, the noblemen, his brothers
themselves do him homage, and take the oath of allegiance. And to the end, that
it may not be said that that was only done to avoid occasion of difference,
which might arise amongst the brothers and sons of David about the succession,
we read that the other following kings have, in the same manner, been
established in their places. It is said, that after the death of Solomon, the
people assembled to create his son Rehoboam king. After that Amaziah was
killed, Ozias, his only son, was chosen king by all the people, Ochosias after
Joram, Joachim, the son of Josias, after the decease of his father, whose piety
might well seem to require that without any other solemnity, notwithstanding,
both he and the other were chosen and invested into the royal throne, by the
suffrages of the people.

To which also belongs, that which Hushai said to Absolom: "Nay, but whom
the Lord and His people, and all the men of Israel chose, his will I be, and
with him will I abide"; which is as much as to say, I will follow the king
lawfully established, and according to the accustomed order; wherefore,
although that God had promised to His people a perpetual lamp, to wit, a king,
and a continual successor of the line of David, and that the successor of the
kings of this people were approved by the Word of God Himself: notwithstanding,
since that, we see that the kings have not reigned before the people had
ordained and installed them with requisite ceremonies. It may be collected from
this, that the kingdom of Israel was not hereditary, if we consider David and
the promise made to him, and that it was wholly elective, if we regard the
particular persons. But to what purpose is this, but to make it apparent that
the election is only mentioned, that the kings might have always in their
remembrance that they were raised to their dignities by the people, and
therefore they should never forget during life in what a strict bound of
observance they are tied to those from whom they have received all their
greatness. We read that the kings of the heathen have been established also by
the people; for as when they had either troubles at home, or wars abroad,
someone, in whose ready valour and discreet integrity the people did
principally rely and repose their greatest confidence, him they presently, with
an universal consent, constituted king.

Cicero says, that amongst the Medes, Diocles, from a judge of private
controversies, was, for his uprightness, by the whole people elected king, and
in the same manner were the first kings chosen amongst the Romans. Insomuch,
that after the death of Romulus, the interreign and government of the hundred
senators being little acceptable to the Quirites, it was agreed that from
thence forward the king should be chosen by the suffrages of the people, and
the approbation of the senate. Tarquinius Superbus was therefore esteemed a
tyrant, because being chosen neither by the people nor the senate, he intruded
himself into the kingdom only by force and usurpation. Wherefore Julius
Cæsar, long after, though he gained the empire by the sword, yet to the
end he might add some shadow or pretence of right to his former intrusion, he
caused himself to be declared, both by the people and senate, perpetual
dictator. Augustus, his adopted son, would never take on him as inheritor of
the empire, although he was declared so by the testaments of Cæsar, but
always held it as of the people and senate. The same also did Tiberius,
Caligula and Claudius, and the first that assumed the empire to himself,
without any colour of right, was Nero, who also by the senate was
condemned.

Briefly, for so much as none were ever born with crowns on their heads,
and sceptres in their hands, and that no man can be a king by himself, nor
reign without people, whereas on the contrary, the people may subsist of
themselves, and were, long before they had any kings, it must of necessity
follow, that kings were at the first constituted by the people; and although
the sons and dependants of such kings, inheriting their fathers' virtues, may
in a sort seem to have rendered their kingdoms hereditary to their offsprings,
and that in some kingdoms and countries, the right of free election seems in a
sort buried; yet, notwithstanding, in all well-ordered kingdoms, this custom is
yet remaining. The sons do not succeed the fathers, before the people have
first, as it were, anew established them by their new approbation: neither were
they acknowledged in quality, as inheriting it from the dead; but approved and
accounted kings then only, when they were invested with the kingdom, by
receiving the sceptre and diadem from the hands of those who represent the
majesty of the people. One may see most evident marks of this in Christian
kingdoms, which are at this day esteemed hereditary; for the French king, he of
Spain and England, and others, are commonly sacred, and, as it were, put into
possession of their authority by the peers, lords of the kingdom, and officers
of the crown, who represent the body of the people; no more nor less than the
emperors of Germany are chosen by the electors, and the kings of Polonia, by
the yawodes and palatines of the kingdom, where the right of election is yet in
force.

In like manner also, the cities give no royal reception, nor entries
unto the king, but after their inauguration, and anciently they used not to
count the times of their reign, but from the day of their coronation, the which
was strictly observed in France. But lest the continued course of some
successions should deceive us, we must take notice, that the estates of the
kingdoms have often preferred the cousin before the son, the younger brother
before the elder, as in France, Louis was preferred before his brother Robert,
Earl of Eureux [Annales Gillii]; in like manner Henry before Robert, nephew to
Capet. Nay, which is more by authority of the people in the same kingdom, the
crown has been transported (the lawful inheritors living) from one lineage to
another, as from that of Merove to that of the Charlemains, and from that of
the Charlemains, to that of Capets, the which has also been done in other
kingdoms, as the best historians testify.

But not to wander from France, the long continuance and power of which
kingdom may in some sort plead for a ruling authority, and where succession
seems to have obtained most reputation. We read that Pharamond was chosen in
the year 419, Pepin in the year 751, Charles the Great, and Charlemain, the son
of Pepin, in the year 768, without having any respect to their fathers' former
estate. Charlemain dying in the year 772, his portion fell not presently into
the possession of his brother Charles the Great, as it ordinarily happens in
the succession of inheritances, but by the ordinance of the people and the
estates of the kingdom he is invested with it; the same author witnesses, that
in the year 812, Lewis the Courteous, although he was the son of Charles the
Great, was also elected; and in the testament of Charlemain, inserted into the
history written by Nauclere, Charlemain does entreat the people to choose, by a
general assembly of the estates of the kingdom, which of his grandchildren or
nephews the people pleased, and commanding the uncles to observe and obey the
ordinance of the people, by means whereof, Charles the Bold, nephew to Louis
the Courteous and Judith, declares himself to be chosen king, as Aimonius the
French historian recites.

To conclude in a word, all kings at the first were altogether elected,
and those who at this day seem to have their crowns and royal authority by
inheritance, have or should have, first and principally their confirmation from
the people. Briefly, although the people of some countries have been accustomed
to choose their kings of such a lineage, which for some notable merits have
worthily deserved it, yet we must believe that they choose the stock itself,
and not every branch that proceeds from it; neither are they so tied to that
election, as if the successor degenerate, they may not choose another more
worthy, neither those who come and are the next of that stock, are born kings,
but created such, nor called kings, but princes of the blood royal.

The whole body of the people is above the king

Now, seeing that the people choose and establish their kings, it follows
that the whole body of the people is above the king; for it is a thing most
evident, that he who is established by another, is accounted under him who has
established him, and he who receives his authority from another, is less than
he from whom he derives his power. Potiphar the Egyptian sets Joseph over all
his house; Nebuchadnezar, Daniel over the province of Babylon; Darius the six
score governors over the kingdom. It is commonly said that masters establish
their servants, kings their officers. In like manner, also, the people
establish the king as administrator of the commonwealth. Good kings have not
disdained this title; yea, the bad ones themselves have affected it; insomuch,
as for the space of divers ages, no Roman emperor (if it were not some absolute
tyrant, as Nero, Domitian, Caligula) would suffer himself to be called lord.
Furthermore, it must necessarily be, that kings were instituted for the
people's sake, neither can it be, that for the pleasure of some hundreds of
men, and without doubt more foolish and worse than many of the other, all the
rest were made, but much rather that these hundred were made for the use and
service of all the other, and reason requires that he be preferred above the
other, who was made only to and for his occasion: so it is, that for the ship's
sail, the owner appoints a pilot over her, who sits at the helm, and looks that
she keep her course, nor run not upon any dangerous shelf; the pilot doing his
duty, is obeyed by the mariners; yea, and of himself who is owner of the
vessel, notwithstanding, the pilot is a servant as well as the least in the
ship, from whom he only differs in this, that he serves in a better place than
they do.

In a commonwealth, commonly compared to a ship, the king holds the place
of pilot, the people in general are owners of the vessel, obeying the pilot,
whilst he is careful of the public good; as though this pilot neither is nor
ought to be esteemed other than servant to the public; as a judge or general in
war differs little from other officers, but that he is bound to bear greater
burdens, and expose himself to more dangers. By the same reason also which the
king gains by acquist of arms, be it that he possesses himself of frontier
places in warring on the enemy, or that which he gets by escheats or
confiscations, he gets it to the kingdom, and not to himself, to wit, to the
people, of whom the kingdom is composed, no more nor less than the servant does
for his master; neither may one contract or oblige themselves to him, but by
and with reference to the authority derived from the people. Furthermore, there
is an infinite sort of people who live without a king, but we cannot imagine a
king without people. And those who have been raised to the royal dignity were
not advanced because they excelled other men in beauty and comeliness, nor in
some excellency of nature to govern them as shepherds do their flocks, but
rather being made out of the same mass with the rest of the people, they should
acknowledge that for them, they, as it were, borrow their power and
authority.

The ancient custom of the French represents that exceeding well, for
they used to lift up on a buckler, and salute him king whom they had chosen.
And wherefore is it said, "I pray you, that kings have an infinite number of
eyes, a million of ears, with extreme long hands, and feet exceeding swift?" Is
it because they are like to Argos, Gerien, Midas, and divers others so
celebrated by the poets? No, truly, but it is said in regard of all the people,
whom the business principally concerns, who lend to the king for the good of
the commonwealth, their eyes, their ears, their means, their faculties. Let the
people forsake the king, he presently falls to the ground, although before, his
hearing and sight seemed most excellent, and that he was strong and in the best
disposition that might be; yea, that he seemed to triumph in all magnificence,
yet in an instant he will become most vile and contemptible: to be brief,
instead of those divine honours wherewith all men adore him, he shall be
compelled to become a pedant, and whip children in the school at Corinth. Take
away but the basis to this giant, and like the Rhodian Colossus, he presently
tumbles on the ground and falls into pieces. Seeing then that the king is
established in this degree by the people, and for their sake, and that he
cannot subsist without them, who can think it strange, then, for us to conclude
that the people are above the king?

Now that which we speak of all the people universally, ought also to be
understood, as has been delivered in the second question, of those who in every
kingdom or town do lawfully represent the body of the people, and who
ordinarily (or at least should be) called the officers of the kingdom, or of
the crown, and not of the king; for the officers of the king, it is he who
places and displaces them at his pleasure, yea, after his death they have no
more power, and are accounted as dead. On the contrary, the officers of the
kingdom receive their authority from the people in the general assembly of the
states (or, at the least were accustomed so anciently to have done) and cannot
be disauthorized but by them, so then the one depends of the king, the other of
the kingdom, those of the sovereign officer of the kingdom, who is the king
himself, those of the sovereignty itself, that is of the people, of which
sovereignty, both the king and all his officers of the kingdom ought to depend,
the charge of the one has proper relation to the care of the king's person;
that of the other, to look that the commonwealth receive no damage; the first
ought to serve and assist the king, as all domestic servants are bound to do to
their masters; the other to preserve the rights and privileges of the people,
and to carefully hinder the prince, that he neither omit the things that may
advantage the state, nor commit anything that may endamage the public.

Briefly, the one are servants and domestics of the king, and received
into their places to obey his person; the other, on the contrary, are as
associates to the king, in the administration of justice, participating of the
royal power and authority, being bound to the utmost of their power to be
assisting in the managing of the affairs of state, as well as the king, who is,
as it were, president amongst them, and principal only in order and degree.

Therefore, as all the whole people is above the king, and likewise taken
in one entire body, are in authority before him, yet being considered one by
one, they are all of them under the king. It is easy to know how far the power
of the first kings extended, in that Ephron, king of the Hittites, could not
grant Abraham the sepulchre, but in the presence, and with the consent of the
people: neither could Hemor the Hevite, king of Sichem, contract an alliance
with Jacob without the people's assent and confirmation thereof; because it was
then the custom to refer the most important affairs to be dispensed and
resolved in the general assemblies of the people. This might easily be
practised in those kingdoms which were then almost confined within the circuit
of one town.

But since the kings began to extend their limits, and that it was
impossible for the people to assemble together all into one place because of
their great numbers, which would have occasioned confusion, the officers of the
kingdom were established, who should ordinarily preserve the rights of the
people, in such sort notwithstanding, as when extraordinary occasion required,
the people might be assembled, or at the least such an abridgment as might by
the most principal members be a representation of the whole body. We see this
order established in the kingdom of Israel, which (in the judgment of the
wisest politicians) was excellently ordered. The king had his cupbearers, his
carvers, his chamberlains and stewards. The kingdom had her officers, to wit,
the seventy-one elders, and the heads and chief chosen out of all the tribes,
who had the care of the public faith in peace and war.

Furthermore, the kingdom had in every town magistrates, who had the
particular government of them, as the former were for the whole kingdom. At
such times as affairs of consequence were to be treated of, they assembled
together, but nothing that concerned the public state could receive any solid
determination. David assembled the officers of his kingdom when he desired to
invest his son Solomon with the royal dignity; when he would have examined and
approved that manner of policy, and managing of affairs, that he had revived
and restored, and when there was no question of removing the ark of the
covenant.

And because they represented the whole people, it is said in the
history, that all the people assembled. These were the same officers who
delivered Jonathan from death, condemned by the sentence of the king, by which
it appears, that there might be an appeal from the king to the people.

After that the kingdom was divided through the pride of Rehoboam. The
council at Jerusalem composed of seventy-one ancients, seems to have such
authority, that they might judge the king as well as the king might judge every
one of them in particular.

In this council was president the duke of the house of Judah, to wit,
some principal man chosen out of that tribe; as also, in the city of Jerusalem,
there was a governor chosen out of the tribe of Benjamin residing there. This
will appear more manifest by examples: Jeremy was sent by God to denounce to
the Jews the destruction of Jerusalem, was therefore condemned first by the
priests and prophets, in whose hands was the ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
afterwards by all the people of the city; that is, by the ordinary judges of
Jerusalem, to wit, the milleniers, and the centurions. Finally, the matter
being brought before the princes of Judah, who were the seventy-one elders
assembled, and set near to the new gate of the temple, he was by them
acquitted.

In this very assembly, they did discreetly condemn, in express terms,
the wicked and cruel act of the king Jehoiakin, who a little before had caused
the prophet Uriah to be slain, who also foretold the destruction of
Jerusalem.

We read in another place, that Zedechias held in such reverence the
authority of this council, that he was so far from delivering of Jeremy from
the dungeon, whereunto the seventy-one had cast him, that he dare scarce remove
him into a less rigorous prison. They persuading him to give his consent to the
putting to death the prophet Jeremy, he answered, that he was in their hands,
and that he might not oppose them in anything. The same king, fearing lest they
might make information against him, to bring him to an account for certain
speeches he had used to the Prophet Jeremy, was glad to feign an untrue excuse.
It appears by this, that in the kingdom of Judah this council was above the
king, in this kingdom, I say, not fashioned or established by Plato or
Aristotle, but by the Lord God Himself, being author of all their order, and
supreme moderator in that monarchy. Such were the seven magi or sages in the
Persian empire, who had almost a paralleled dignity with the king, and were
termed the ears and eyes of the king, who also never dissented from the
judgment of those sages.

In the kingdom of Sparta there were the ephori, to whom an appeal lay
from the judgment of the king, and who, as Aristotle says, had authority also
to judge the kings themselves.

In Egypt the people were accustomed to choose and give officers to the
king, to the end they might hinder and prevent any encroachment, or usurped
authority, contrary to the laws. Now as Aristotle does ordinarily term those
lawful kings, who have for their assistants such officers or counsellors, so
also makes he no difficulty to say, that where they be wanting, there can be no
true monarchy, but rather a tyranny absolutely barbarous, or at the least such
a dominion, as does most nearly approach tyranny.

In the Roman commonwealth, such were the senators, and the magistrates
created by the people, the tribune of those who were called Celeres, the
prætor or provost of the city, and others, insomuch as there lay an
appeal from the king to the people, as Seneca declares by divers testimonies
drawn from Cicero's books of the commonwealth, and the history of Oratius
sufficiently shews, who, being condemned by the judges for killing his sister,
was acquitted by the people.

In the times of the emperors, there was the senate, the consults, the
praetors, the great provosts of the empire, the governors of provinces,
attributed to the senate and the people, all which were called the magistrates
and officers of the people of Rome. And therefore, when that by the decree of
the senate, the emperor Maximus was declared enemy of the commonwealth, and
that Maximus and Albinus were created emperors by the senate, the men of war
were sworn to be faithful and obedient to the people of Rome, the senate, and
the emperors. Now for the empires and public states of these times (except
those of Turkey, Muscovy and such like, which are rather a rhapsody of robbers,
and barbarous intruders, than any lawful empires), there is not one, which is
not, or hath not heretofore been governed in the manner we have described. And
if through the conveniency and sloth of the principal officers, the successors
have found the business in a worse condition, those who have for the present
the public authority in their hands, are notwithstanding bound as much as in
them lies to reduce things into their primary estate and condition.

In the empire of Germany, which is conferred by election, there are the
electors and the princes, both secular and ecclesiastical, the counts, barons,
and deputies of the imperial cities, and as all these in their proper places
are solicitors for the public good, likewise in the diets do they represent the
majesty of the empire, being obliged to advise, and carefully foresee, that
neither by the emperor's partiality, hate nor affection, the public state do
suffer or be interested. And for this reason, the empire has its chancellor, as
well as the emperor his, both the one and the other have their peculiar
officers and treasurers apart. And it is a thing so notorious, that the empire
is preferred before the emperor, that it is a common saying, "That emperor does
homage to the empire."

In like manner, in the kingdom of Polonia, there are for officers of the
crown, the bishops, the palatines, the castellains, the nobility, the deputies
of towns and provinces assembled extraordinarily, before whom and with whose
consent, and nowhere else, they make new laws, and determinations concerning
wars. For the ordinary government there are the counsellors of the kingdom, the
chancellor of the state, etc., although notwithstanding, the king has his
stewards, chamberlains, servants, and domestics. Now if any man should demand
in Polonia who were the greater, the king, or all the people of the kingdom,
represented by the lords and magistrates, he should do as much, as if he asked
at Venice, if the duke were above the seigniory. But what shall we say of
kingdoms, which are said to go by hereditary succession? We may indeed conclude
the very same. The kingdom of France heretofore preferred before all other,
both in regard of the excellency of their laws and majesty of their estate, may
pass with most as a ruling case. Now, although that those who have the public
commands in their hands do not discharge their duties as were to be desired, it
follows not though that they are not bound to do it. The king has his high
steward of his household, his chamberlains, his masters of his games,
cup-bearers, and others, whose offices were wont so to depend on the person of
the king: after that the death of their master, their offices were void. And
indeed at the funeral of the king, the lord high steward in the presence of all
the officers and servants of the household, breaks his staff of office, and
says, "Our master is dead, let every one provide for himself." On the other
side, the kingdom has her officers, to wit, the mayor of the palace, who since
has been called the constable, the marshals, the admiral, the chancellor, or
great referendary, the secretaries, the treasurers and others, who heretofore
were created in the assembly of the three estates, the clergy, the nobility,
and the people.

Since that the parliament of Paris was made sedentary, they are not
thought to be established in their places before they have been first received
and approved by that course of parliament, and may not be dismissed nor
disposed, but by the authority and consent of the same. Now all these officers
take their oath to the kingdom, which is as much as to say, to the people in
the first place, then to the king who is protector of the kingdom, the which
appears by the tenure of the oath. Above all, the constable, who, receiving the
sword from the king, has it girded unto him with this charge, that he maintain
and defend the commonwealth, as appears by the words that the king then
pronounces.

Besides, the kingdom of France has the peers (so called either for that
they are the king's companions, or because they are the fathers of the
commonwealth) taking their denominations from the several provinces of the
kingdom, in whose hands the king at his inauguration takes his oath as if all
the people of the kingdom were in them present, which shews that these twelve
peers are above the king. They on the other side swear, "That they will
preserve not the king, but the crown, that they will assist the commonwealth
with their counsel, and therefore will be present with their best abilities to
counsel the prince both in peace and war," as appears plainly in the patentee
of their peership.

And they therefore have the same right as the peers of the court, who,
according to the law of the Lombards, were not only associates to the lord of
the fee in the judgment of causes, but also did take an account, and judge the
differences that happened between the lord and his vassals.

We may also know, that those peers of France did often discuss suits and
differences between the king and his subjects. Insomuch, that when Charles the
Sixth would have given sentence against the Duke of Brittany they opposed it,
alleging that the discussing of that business belonged properly to the peers
and not to the king, who might not in any sort derogate from their
authority.

Therefore it is that yet at this day the parliament of Paris is called
the court of peers, being in some sort constituted judge between the king and
the people; yea, between the king and every private person, and is bound and
ought to maintain the meanest in the kingdom against the king's attorney, if he
undertake anything contrary to law.

Furthermore, if the king ordain anything in his council, if he treat any
agreement with the princes his neighbours, if he begin a war, or make peace, as
lately with Charles the Fifth the emperor, the parliament ought to interpose
their authority, and all that which concerns the public state must be therein
registered; neither is there anything firm and stable which the parliament does
not first approve. And to the end that the counsellors of that parliament
should not fear the king, formerly they attained not to that place, but by the
nomination of the whole body of the court; neither could they be dismissed for
any lawful cause, but by the authority of the said body.

Furthermore, if the letters of the king be not subsigned by a secretary
of the kingdom, at this day called a secretary of state, and if the letters
patent be not sealed by the chancellor, who has power also to cancel them, they
are of no force or value. There are also dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts,
barons, seneschals, and, in the cities and good towns, mayors, bailiffs,
lieutenants, capitols, consuls, syndics, sheriffs and others, who have special
authority, through the circuit of some countries or towns to preserve the
people of their jurisdiction. Time it is that at this day some of these
dignities are become hereditary. Thus much concerning the ordinary
magistrates.

The assembly of the three estates

Besides all this, anciently every year, and since less often, to wit,
when some urgent necessity required it, the general or three estates were
assembled, where all the provinces and towns of any worth, to wit, the
burgesses, nobles and ecclesiastical persons, did all of them send their
deputies, and there they did publicly deliberate and conclude of that which
concerned the public state. Always the authority of this assembly was such that
what was there determined, whether it were to treat peace, or make war, or
create a regent in the kingdom, or impose some new tribute, it was ever held
firm and inviolable; nay, which is more by the authority of this assembly, the
kings convinced of loose intemperance, or of insufficiency, for so great a
charge or tyranny, were disthronized; yea, their whole races were for ever
excluded from their succession to the kingdom, no more nor less, as their
progenitors were by the same authority formerly called to that administration
of the same kingdom. Those whom the consent and approbation of the estates had
formerly raised, were by the dissent and disallowing of the same afterwards
cast down. Those who tracing in the virtuous steps of their ancestors, were
called to that dignity, as if it had been their inheritance, were driven out
and disinherited for their degenerate ingratitude, and for that being tainted
with insupportable vices, they made themselves incapable and unworthy of such
honour.

This shews that succession was tolerated to avoid practices, close and
underhand canvassing, discontents of persons refused, contentions, interreigns,
and other discommodities of elections. But on the other part, when successions
brought other mischiefs more pernicious, when tyranny trampled on the kingdom,
and when a tyrant possessed himself of the royal throne, the medicine proving
much worse than the disease, then the estates of the kingdom lawfully assembled
in the name of all the people, have ever maintained their authority, whether it
were to drive out a tyrant, or other unworthy king, or to establish a good one
in his place. The ancient French had learned that of the Gauls, as Cæsar
shews in his commentaries. For Ambiorix, king of the Eburons, or Leigeons
confesses, "That such were the condition of the Gaulish empire, that people
lawfully assembled had no less power over the king, than the king had over the
people." The which appears also in Vercingetorix, who gives an account of his
actions before the assembly of the people.

In the kingdoms of Spain, especially Aragon, Valentia, and Catalonia,
there is the very same. For that which is called the Justitia Major in Aragon
has the sovereign authority in itself. And there, the lords who represent the
people proceed so far, that both at the inauguration of the king, as also at
the assembly of the estates, which is observed every third year, they say to
the king in express words that which follows, "We who are as much worth as you,
and have more power than you, choose you king upon these and these conditions,
and there is one between you and us who commands over you, to wit, the Justitia
Major of Aragon, who oftentimes refuses that which the king demands, and
forbids that which the king enjoins."

In the kingdoms of England and Scotland the sovereignty seems to be in
the parliament, which heretofore was held almost every year. They call
parliaments the assembly of the estates of the kingdom, in the which the
bishops, earls, barons, deputies of towns and provinces deliver their opinions,
and resolve with a joint consent of the affairs of state. The authority of this
assembly has been so sacred and inviolable, that the king dare not abrogate or
alter that which had been there once decreed.

It was that which heretofore called and installed in their charges all
the chief officers of the kingdom; yea, and sometimes the ordinary councillors
of that which they call the king's privy council. In some, the other Christian
kingdoms, as Hungary, Bohemia, Denmark, Sweden, and the rest, they have their
officers apart from the kings; and histories, together with the examples that
we have in these our times, sufficiently demonstrate that these officers and
estates have known how to make use of their authority, even to the deposing and
driving out of the tyrannous and unworthy kings.

We must not therefore esteem that this cuts too short the wings of royal
authority, and that it is as much as to take the king's head from his
shoulders.

We believe that God is almighty, neither think we it anything diminishes
His power, because He cannot sin; neither say we, "that His empire is less to
be esteemed, because it cannot be neither shaken, nor cast down": neither also
must we judge a king to be too much abused, if he be withheld by others from
falling into an error, to which he is over much inclined, or for that by the
wisdom and discretion of some of his counsellors, his kingdom is preserved and
kept entire and safe, which otherwise, haply by his weakness or wickedness,
might have been ruined. Will you say that a man is less healthy because he is
environed with discreet physicians, who counsel him to avoid all intemperance,
and forbid him to eat such meats as are obnoxious to the stomach, and who purge
him many times against his will; and when he resists, who will prove his better
friends, these physicians who are studiously careful of his health, or those
sycophants who are ready at every turn to give him that which must of necessity
hasten his end? We must then always observe this distinction. The first are the
friends of the king. The other are the friends of Francis who is king. The
friends of Francis are those who serve him. The friends of the king are the
officers and servants of the kingdom. For, seeing the king has this name,
because of the kingdom, and that it is the people who give being and
consistence to the kingdom, the which being lost or ruined, he must needs cease
to be a king, or at the least not so truly a king, or else we must take a
shadow for a substance.

Without question, those are most truly the king's friends, who are most
industriously careful of the welfare of his kingdom, and those his worst
enemies who neglect the good of the commonwealth, and seek to draw the king
into the same lapse of error.

And, as it is impossible to separate the kingdom from the people, nor
the king from the kingdom, in like manner, neither can the friends of the king
be disjoined from the friends of the people, and the kingdom.

I say, further, that those who, with a true affection love Francis had
rather see him a king than a subject. Now, seeing they cannot see him a king,
it necessarily follows, that in loving Francis, they must also love the
kingdom.

But those who would be esteemed more the friends of Francis, than of the
kingdom and the people, are truly flatterers, and the most pernicious enemies
of the king and public state.

Now, if they were true friends indeed, they would desire and endeavour
that the king might become more powerful, and more assured in his estate
according to that notable saying of Theopompus, king of Sparta, after the
ephores or controllers of the kings were instituted. "The more" (said he) "are
appointed by the people to watch over, and look to the affairs of the kingdom,
the more those who govern shall have credit, and the more safe and happy shall
be the state."

Whether prescription of time can take away the right of the
people

But peradventure, some one will reply, you speak to us here of peers, of
lords and officers of the crown. But I, for my part, see not any, but only some
shows and shadows of antiquity as if they were to be represented on a stage. I
see not for the present scarce any tract of that ancient liberty, and
authority; nay, which is worse, a great part, if not all, of those officers
take care of nothing but their particular affairs, and almost, if not
altogether, serve as flatterers about those kings who jointly toss the poor
people like tennis balls: hardly is there one to be found who has compassion
on, or will lend a helping hand to the miserable subjects, fleeced and scorched
to the very bones, by their insolent and insupportable oppression. If any be
but thought to have such a desire, they are presently condemned as rebels and
seditious, and are constrained either to fly with much discommodity, or else
must run hazard both of life and liberty. What can be answered to this? The
business goes thus. The outrageousness of kings, the ignorance of the party,
together with the wicked connivance of the great ones of the kingdom, has been
for the most part such throughout the world, that the licentious and unbridled
power wherewith most kings are transported and which has made them
insupportable, has in a manner, by the length of continuance, gained right of
prescription, and the people, for want of using it, have intacitly quit, if not
altogether lost, their just and ancient authority. So that it ordinarily
happens that what all men's care ought to attend on, is for the most part
neglected by every man; for what is committed to the generality, no man thinks
is commended to his custody. Notwithstanding, no such prescription nor
prevarication can justly prejudice the right of the people. It is commonly said
that the exchequers do admit no rule of prescription against it, much less
against the whole body of the people, whose power transcends the king's, and in
whose right the king assumes to himself that privilege; for otherwise,
wherefore is the prince only administrator, and the people true proprietor of
the public exchequer, as we will prove here presently after.

Furthermore, it is not a thing resolved on by all, that no tyrannous
intrusion or usurpation, and continuance in the same course, can by any length
of time prescribe against lawful liberty. If it be objected that kings were
enthronized, and received their authority from the people who lived five
hundred years ago, and not by those now living, I answer that the commonwealth
never dies, although kings be taken out of this life one after another: for as
the continual running of the water gives the river a perpetual being, so the
alternative revolution of birth and death renders the people (quoad hunc
mundum) immortal.

And further, as we have at this day the same Seine and Tiber as was
1,000 years ago, in like manner also is there the same people of Germany,
France, and Italy (excepting intermixing of colonies, or such like); neither
can the lapse of time, nor changing of individuals, alter in any sort the right
of those people. Furthermore, they say the king receives his kingdom from his
father, and not from the people, and he from his grandfather, and so one from
another upward.

I ask, could the grandfather or ancestor, transfer a greater right to
his successor than he had himself? If he could not (as without doubt it must
need be so) is it not plainly perspicuous, that what the successor further
arrogates to himself, he may usurp with as safe a conscience as what a thief
gets by the highway side? The people, on the contrary, have their right of
eviction entire and whole. Although that the officers of the crown have for a
time lost or left their ranks, this cannot in any true right prejudice the
people, but rather clear otherwise; as one would not grant audience, or shew
favour to a slave who had long since held his master prisoner, and did not only
vaunt himself to be free, but also presumptuously assumed power over the life
and death of his master: neither would any man allow the excuses of a thief,
because he had continued in that trade thirty years, or for that he had been
bred in that course of life by his father, if he presumed by his long
continuance in that function to prescribe for the lawfulness; but rather the
longer he had continued in his wickedness, the more grievous should be his
punishment. In like manner, the prince is altogether unsupportable, who,
because he succeeds a tyrant, or has kept the people (by whose suffrages he
holds the crown) in a long slavery, or has suppressed the officers of the
kingdom (who should be protectors of the public liberty), that therefore
presumes, that what he affects is lawful for him to effect, and that his will
is not to be restrained or corrected by any positive law whatsoever. For
prescription in tyranny detracts nothing from the right of the people; nay, it
rather much aggravates the prince's outrages. But what if the peers and
principal officers of the kingdom make themselves parts with the king? What if
betraying the public cause the yoke of tyranny upon the people's neck? Shall it
follow that by this prevarication and treason the authority is devolved into
the king? Does this detract anything from the right of the people's liberty, or
does it add any licentious power to the king? Let the people thank themselves,
say you, who relied on the disloyal loyalty of such men.

But I answer, that these officers are indeed those protectors whose
principal care and study should be, that the people be maintained in the free
and absolute fruition of their goods and liberty. And therefore, in the same
manner as if a treacherous advocate for a sum of money should agree to betray
the cause of his client into the hands of his adversary, which he ought to have
defended, has not power for all that to alter the course of justice, nor of a
bad cause to make a good one, although perhaps for a time he give some colour
of it.

In like manner this conspiracy of the great ones combined to ruin the
inferiors cannot disannul the right of the people. In the mean season, those
great ones incur the punishment that the same allots against prevaricators, and
for the people, the same law allows them to choose another advocate and afresh
to pursue their cause, as if it were then only to begin.

For if the people of Rome condemned their captains and generals of their
armies, because they capitulated with their enemies to their disadvantage
(although they were drawn to it by necessity, being on the point to be all
overthrown) and would not be bound to perform the soldiers' capitulation, much
less shall a free people be tied up to bear the yoke of thraldom, which is cast
on them by those who should and might have prevented it; but being neither
forced nor compelled, did, for their own particular gain, willingly betray
those who had committed their liberty to their custody.

Wherefore kings were created

Now, seeing that kings have been ever established by the people, and
that they have had associates joined with them, to contain them within the
limits of their duties, the which associates considered in particular one by
one, are under the king, and altogether in one entire body are above him: We
must consequently see wherefore first kings were established, and what is
principally their duty. We usually esteem a thing just and good when it attains
to the proper end for which it is ordained.

In the first place every one consents, that men by nature loving
liberty, and hating servitude, born rather to command, than obey, have not
willingly admitted to be governed by another, and renounced as it were the
privilege of nature, by submitting themselves to the commands of others, but
for some special and great profit that they expected from it. For as Aesop
says, "That the horse being before accustomed to wander at his pleasure, would
never have received the bit into his mouth, nor the rider on his back, but that
he hoped by that means to overmatch the bull. Neither let us imagine, that
kings were chosen to apply to their own proper use the goods that are gotten by
the sweat of their subjects; for every man loves and cherishes his own. They
have not received the power and authority of the people to make it serve as a
pander to their pleasures: for ordinarily, the inferiors hate, or at least
envy, their superiors.

Let us then conclude, that they are established in this place to
maintain by justice, and to defend by force of arms, both the public state, and
particular persons from all damages and outrages, wherefore Saint Augustine
said, "Those are properly called lords and masters who provide for the good and
profit of others, as the husband for the wife, fathers for their children."
They must therefore obey them who provide for them; although, indeed, to speak
truly, those who govern in this manner may in a sort be said to serve those
whom they command over.

For, as says the same doctor, they command not for the desire of
dominion, but for the duty they owe to provide for the good of those who are
subjected to them: not affecting any lord like domineering, but with charity
and singular affection, desiring the welfare of those who are committed to
them.

Seneca in the eighty-first epistle says, "That in the golden age, wise
men only governed kingdoms: they kept themselves within the bounds of
moderation, and preserved the meanest from the oppression of the greatest. They
persuaded and dissuaded, according as it advantaged or disadvantaged, the
public profit; by their wisdom, they furnished the public with plenty of all
necessaries, and by their discretion prevented scarcity, by their valour and
courage they expelled dangers, by their many benefits they increased and
enriched their subjects; they pleaded not their duty in making pompous shows,
but in well governing their people. No man made trial what he was able to do
against them, because every one received what he was capable of from them,"
etc.

Therefore then, to govern is nothing else but to provide for. These
proper ends of commanding, being for the people's commodity, the only duty of
kings and emperors is to provide for the people's good. The kingly dignity to
speak properly, is not a title of honour, but a weighty and burdensome office.
It is not a discharge or vacation from affairs to run a licentious course of
liberty, but a charge and vocation to all industrious employments, for the
service of the commonwealth; the which has some glimpse of honour with it,
because in those first and golden ages, no man would have tasted of such
continual troubles, if they had not been sweetened with some relish of honour;
insomuch as there was nothing more true than that which was commonly said in
those times, "If every man knew with what turmoils and troubles the royal
wreath was wrapt withal, no man would vouchsafe to take it up, although it lay
at his feet."

When, therefore, that these words of mine and thine entered into the
world, and that differences fell amongst fellow citizens, touching the
propriety of goods, and wars amongst neighbouring people about the right of
their confines, the people bethought themselves to have recourse to some one
who both could and should take order that the poor were not oppressed by the
rich, nor the patriots wronged by strangers.

Nor as wars and suits increased, they chose someone, in whose wisdom and
valour they reposed most confidence. See, then, wherefore kings were created in
the first ages; to wit, to administer justice at home, and to be leaders in the
wars abroad, and not only to repulse the incursions of the enemy, but also to
repress and hinder the devastation and spoiling of the subjects and their goods
at home; but above all, to expel and drive away all devices and debauchments
far from their dominions.

This may be proved by all histories, both divine and profane. For the
people of God, they had at first no other king but God Himself, who dwelt in
the midst of them, and gave answer from between the cherubims, appointed
extraordinary judges and captains for the wars; by means whereof the people
thought they had no need of lieutenants, being honoured by the continual
presence of their Sovereign King.

Now, when the people of God began to be a-weary of the injustice of the
sons of Samuel, on whose old age they dare no longer rely, they demanded a king
after the manner of other people, saying to Samuel, "Give us a king as other
people have, that he may judge us." There is touched the first and principal
point of the duty of a king, a little after they are both mentioned. "We will
have" (said they) "a king over us like other nations. Our king shall judge us,
and go in and out before us, and lead our armies." To do justice is always set
in the first place, for so much as it is an ordinary and perpetual thing; but
wars are extraordinary, and happen as it were casually.

Wherefore, Aristotle says, that in the time of Herold, all kings were
judges and captains. For the Lacedemonian kings, they in his time also had
sovereign authority only in the army, and that confined also to the
commandments of the ephores.

In like manner the Medes, who were ever in perpetual quarrels amongst
themselves, at the length chose Deolces for the judge, who had carried himself
well in the deciding of some particular differences; presently after they made
him king, and gave him officers and guards, that he might more easily suppress
the powerful and insolent.

Cicero says, that anciently all kings were established to administer
justice, and that their institution, and that of the laws, had one and the same
end, which was, that equity and right might be duly rendered to all men; the
which may be verified by the propriety of the words almost in all languages.
Kings are called by the Latins, Reges a regendo, for that they must rule
and govern the limits and bounds, both of the public and particulars. The names
of emperors, princes, and dukes have relation to their conduct in the wars, and
principal places in combats, and other places of command. Likewise the Greeks
call them in their language, Basiles, Archa, Hegomodes, which is to say
props of the people, princes, conductors. The Germans and other nations use all
significant names, and which express that the duty of a king consists not in
making glorious paradoes; but that it is an office of a weighty charge and
continual care. But, in brief, the poet Homer calls kings the judges of cities,
and in describing of Agamemnon, he calls him wise, strong, and valiant. As
also, Ovid, speaking of Erechtheus, says, that it was hard to know, whether
justice or valour were more transparent in him; in which these two poets seem
exactly to have described the duties of kings and princes. You see what was the
custom of the kings of the heathen nations; after whose examples, the Jews
demanded and established their kings.

The Queen of Sheba said also to Solomon, that God had made him king over
them to do judgment and justice.

And Solomon himself, speaking to God, said, "Thou hast chosen me to be a
king over Thy people, and a judge of Thy sons and daughters."

For this cause also the good kings, as David, Josephat, and others,
being not able in their own persons to determine all the suits and differences
of their subjects (although in the causes of greatest importance they reserved
an appeal always to themselves, as appears in Samuel), had ever above all
things a special care, to establish in all places just and discreet judges, and
principally still to have an eye to the right administration of justice;
knowing themselves to carry the sword, as well to chastise wicked and unjust
subjects, as to repulse foreign enemies.

Briefly, as the apostle says, "The prince is ordained by God, for the
good and profit of the people, being armed with the sword to defend the good
from the violence of the wicked, and when he discharges his duty therein, all
men owe him honour and obedience."

Seeing then that kings are ordained by God, and established by the
people, to procure and provide for the good of those who are committed unto
them, and that this good or profit be principally expressed in two things, to
wit, in the administration of justice to their subjects, and in the managing of
armies for the repulsing their enemies: certainly, we must infer and conclude
from this, that the prince who applied himself to nothing but his peculiar
profits and pleasures, or to those ends which most readily conduce thereunto,
who contemns and perverts all laws, who uses his subjects more cruelly than the
barbarous enemy would do, he may truly and really be called a tyrant, and that
those who in this manner govern their kingdoms, be they of never so large an
extent, are more properly unjust pillagers and free-booters, than lawful
governors.

Whether kings be above the law

We must here yet proceed a little further: for it is demanded whether
the king who presides in the administration of justice has power to resolve and
determine business according to his own will and pleasure? Must the kings be
subject to the law, or does the law depend upon the king? The law (says an
ancient) is respected by those who otherways contemn virtue, for it enforces
obedience, and ministers' conduct in warfaring, and gives vigour and lustre to
justice and equity. Pausanias the Spartan will answer in a word, that it
becomes laws to direct, and men to yield obedience to their authority.
Agesilaus, king of Sparta, says that all commanders must obey the commandments
of the laws. But it shall not be amiss to carry this matter a little higher.
When people began to seek for justice to determine their differences, if they
met with any private man that did justly appoint them, they were satisfied with
it. Now for so much as such men were rarely and with much difficulty met
withal, and for that the judgments of kings received as laws were oftentimes
found contrary and difficult, then the magistrates and others of great wisdom
invented laws, which might speak to all men in one and the same voice.

This being done, it was expressly enjoined to kings, that they should be
the guardians and administrators, and sometimes also, for so much as the laws
could not foresee the particularities of actions to resolve exactly, it was
permitted the king to supply this defect, by the same natural equity by which
the laws were drawn; and for fear lest they should go against law, the people
appointed them from time to time associates, counsellors, of whom we have
formerly made mention, wherefore there is nothing which exempts the king from
obedience which he owes to the law, which he ought to acknowledge as his lady
and mistress, esteeming nothing can become him worse than that feminine of
which Juvenal speaks: Sic volo, sic jubeo, sic pro ratione voluntas. I
will, I command, my will shall serve instead of reason. Neither should they
think their authority the less because they are confined to laws, for seeing
the law is a divine gift coming from above, which human societies are happily
governed and addressed to their best and blessedest end; those kings are as
ridiculous and worthy of contempt, who repute it a dishonour to conform
themselves to law, as those surveyors who think themselves disgraced, by using
of a rule, a compass, a chain or other instruments, which men understanding the
art of surveying are accustomed to do, or a pilot who had rather fail,
according to his fantasie and imagination, than steer his course by his needle
and sea-card. Who can doubt, but that it is a thing more profitable and
convenient to obey the law, than the king who is but one man? The law is the
soul of a good king, it gives him motion, sense and life. The king is the organ
and as it were the body by which the law displays her forces, exercises her
function, and expresses her conceptions. Now it is a thing much more reasonable
to obey the soul, than the body; the law is the wisdom of diverse sages,
recollected in few words, but many see more clear and further than one alone.
It is much better to follow the law than any one man's opinion, be he never so
acute. The law is reason and wisdom itself, free from all perturbation, not
subject to be moved with choler, ambition, hate, or acceptances of persons.
Intreaties nor threats cannot make to bow nor bend; on the contrary, a man,
though endued with reason, suffers himself to be lead and transported with
anger, desire of revenge, and other passions which perplex him in such sort,
that he loses his understanding, because being composed of reason and
disordered affections, he cannot so contain himself, but sometimes his passions
become his master. Accordingly we see that Valentinian, a good emperor, permits
those of the empire to have two wives at once, because he was misled by that
impure affection. Because Cambises, the son of Cyrus, became enamoured of his
own sister, he would therefore have marriages between brother and sister be
approved and held lawful; Cubades, king of the Persians, prohibits the
punishment of adulterers; we must look for such laws every day, if we will have
the law subject to the king. To come to our purpose, the law is an
understanding mind, or rather an obstacle of many understandings: the mind
being the seal of all the intelligent faculties, is (if I may so term it) a
parcel of divinity; in so much as he who obeys the law, seems to obey God, and
receive Him for arbitrator of the matters in controversy.

But, on the contrary, insomuch as man is composed of this divine
understanding, and of a number of unruly passions; so losing himself in that
brutishness, as he becomes void of reason; and, being in that condition, he is
no longer a man, but a beast; he then who desires rather to obey the king than
the law, seems to prefer the commandment of a beast before that of God.

And furthermore, though Aristotle were the tutor of Alexander, yet he
confesses that the Divinity cannot so properly be compared to anything of this
life, as to the ancient laws of well-governed states. He who prefers the
commonwealth, applies himself to God's ordinances: but he who leans to the
king's fancies, instead of law, prefers brutish sensuality before well-ordered
discretion. To which also the prophets seem to have respect, who, in some
places describe these great empires, under the representation of ravening
beasts. But to go on, is not he a very beast, who had rather have for his guide
a blind and mad man, than he who sees both with the eyes of the body and mind,
a beast rather than God. Whence it comes, that though kings, as says Aristotle,
for a while, at the first, commanded without restraint of laws; yet presently
after, civilized people reduced them to a lawful condition, by binding them to
keep and observe the laws: and for this unruly absolute authority, it remained
only amongst those who commanded over barbarous nations.

He says afterwards, that this absolute power was the next degree to
plain tyranny, and he had absolutely called it tyranny, had not these beasts,
like barbarians, willingly subjected themselves unto it. But it will be
replied, that it is unworthy the majesty of kings to have their wills bridled
by laws. But I will say, that nothing is more royal than to have our unruly
desires ruled by good laws.

It is much pity to be restrained from that which we would do; it is much
more worse to will that which we should not do, but it is the worst of all to
do that which the laws forbid.

I hear, methinks, a certain furious tribune of the people who opposed
the passing of a law that was made against the excess which then reigned in
Rome, saying, "My masters, you are bridled, you are idle and fettered with the
rude bonds of servitude; your liberty is lost, a law is laid on you, that
commands you to be moderate: to what purpose is it to say you are free, since
you may not live in what excess of pleasure you like?" This is the very
complaint of many kings at this day, and of their minions and flatterers.

The royal majesty is abolished, if they may not turn the kingdom
topsy-turvy at their pleasure. Kings may go and shake their ears, if laws must
be observed.

Peradventure, it is a miserable thing to live, if a madman may not be
suffered to kill himself when he will.

For what else do those things which violate and abolish laws, without
which, neither empires, no, nor the very societies of free-booters can at all
subsist?

Let us then reject these detestable, faithless, and impious vanities of
the court-marmosites, which make kings gods, and receive their sayings as
oracles; and which is worse, are so shameless to persuade kings that nothing is
just or equitable of itself, but takes its true form of justice or injustice,
according as it pleases the king to ordain: as if he were some god, which could
never err nor sin at all. Certainly, all that which God wills is just, and
therefore, suppose it is God's will; but that must be just with the king's
will, before it is his will. For it is not just because the king has appointed
it; but that king is just, which appoints that to be held for just, which is so
of itself.

We will not then say as Anaxarchus did to Alexander, much perplexed for
the death of his friend Clitus, whom he had killed with his own hands; to wit,
that Themis, the goddess of Justice, sits by kings' side, as she does by
Jupiter's, to approve and confirm whatsoever to them shall seem good; but
rather, she sits as president over kingdoms, to severely chastise those kings
who wrong or violate the majesty of the laws. We can no ways approve that
saying of Thrasimacus the Chaldonian that the profit and pleasure of princes is
the rule by which all laws are defined: but rather, that right must limit the
profit of princes, and the laws restrain their pleasures. And instead of
approving that which that villainous woman said to Caracalla, that whatsoever
he desired was allowed him, we will maintain that nothing is lawful but what
the law permits.

And absolutely rejecting that detestable opinion of the same Caracalla,
that princes give laws to others, but received none from any; we will say, that
in all kingdoms well established, the king receives the laws from the people;
the which he ought carefully to consider and maintain; and whatsoever, either
by force or fraud he does, in prejudice of them, must always be reputed
unjust.

Kings receive laws from the people

These may be sufficiently verified by examples. Before there was a king
in Israel, God by Moses prescribed to him both sacred and civil ordinances,
which he should have perpetually before his eyes; but after that Saul was
elected and established by the people, Samuel delivered it to him written, to
the end, he might carefully observe it; neither were the succeeding kings
received before they had sworn to keep those ordinances.

The ceremony was this, that together with the setting of the crown on
the king's head, they delivered into his hands the Book of the Testimony, which
some understand to be the right of the people of the land, others, the law of
God according to which he ought to govern the people. Cyrus, acknowledging
himself conservator of his country's laws, obliges himself to oppose any man
who would offer to infringe them; and at his inauguration, ties himself to
observe them, although some flatterers tickled the ears of his son Cambises,
that all things were lawful for him.

The kings of Sparta, whom Aristotle calls lawful princes, did every
month renew their oaths, promising in the hands of the ephori, procures for the
kingdom, to rule according to those laws which they had from Lycurgus.

Hereupon, it being asked Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, who were the
governors of Sparta, he answered, "The laws, and the lawful magistrates."

And lest the laws might grow into contempt, these people bragged that
they received them from heaven; and that they were inspired from above, to the
end that men might believe that their determinations were from God, and not
from man. The kings of Egypt did in nothing vary from the tenor of the laws,
and confessed that their principal felicity consisted in the obedience they
yielded to them. Romulus, at the institution of the Roman kingdom, made this
agreement with senators: the people should make laws, and he would take both
for himself and others, to see them observed and kept. Antiochus, the third of
that name, king of Asia, wrote unto all the cities of his kingdom, that if in
the letters sent unto them in his name, there were anything found repugnant to
the laws, they should believe they were no act of the king's, and therefore
yield no obedience unto them. Now, although some citizens say, that by decree
of senate, the emperor Augustus was declared to be exempt from obedience to
laws; yet, notwithstanding, Theodosius, and all the other good and reasonable
emperors, have professed that they were bound to the laws, lest what had been
extorted by violence, might be acknowledged and received instead of law. And
for Augustus Cæsar, insomuch as the Roman commonwealth was enthralled by
his power and violence; she could say nothing freely, but that she had lost her
freedom. And because they dare not call Augustus a tyrant, the senate said he
was exempt from all obedience to the laws, which was in effect as much as if
they plainly should have said the emperor was an outlaw. The same right has
ever been of force in all well-governed states and kingdoms of Christendom.

For neither the emperor, the king of France, nor the kings of Spain,
England, Polander, Hungary, and all other lawful princes; as the archdukes of
Austria, dukes of Brabante, earls of Flanders, and Holland, nor other princes,
are not admitted to the government of their estates, before they have promised
to the electors, peers, palatines, lords, barons, and governors, that they will
render to every one right according to the laws of the country, yea, so
strictly that they cannot alter or innovate anything contrary to the privileges
of the countries, without the consent of the towns and provinces; if they do
it, they are no less guilty of rebellion against the laws than the people are
in their kind, if they refuse obedience, when they command according to law.
Briefly, lawful princes receive the laws from the people as well as the crown,
in lieu of honour, and the sceptre, in lieu of power, which they are bound to
keep and maintain and therein reposes their chiefest glory.

If the prince may make new laws

What then? Shall it not be lawful for a prince to make new laws and
abrogate the old? seeing it belongs to the king, not only to advise that
nothing be done neither against, nor to defraud the laws, but also that nothing
be wanting to them, nor anything too much in them: briefly, that neither age
nor lapse of time do abolish or entomb them; if there be anything to abridge,
to be added or taken away from them, it is his duty to assemble the estates,
and to demand their advice and resolution, without presuming to publish
anything before the whole have been, first, duly examined and approved by them,
after the law is once enacted and published, there is no more dispute to be
made about it, all men owe obedience to it, and the prince in the first place,
to teach other men their duty, and for that all men are easier led by example
than by precepts, the prince must necessarily express his willingness to
observe the laws, or else by what equity can he require obedience in his
subjects, to that which he himself contemns.

For the difference which is between kings and subjects ought not to
consist in impunity, but in equity and justice. And therefore, although
Augustus was esteemed to be exempt by the decree of the senate,
notwithstanding, reproving of a young man who had broken the Julian law
concerning adultery, he boldly replied to Augustus, that he himself had
transgressed the same law which condemns adulterers. The emperor acknowledged
his fault, and for grief forbore too late. So convenient a thing it is in
nature, to practise by example that which we would teach by precept.

The lawgiver Solon was wont to compare laws to money, for they maintain
human societies, as money preserves traffic; neither improperly, then, if the
king may not lawfully, or at the least heretofore could not, mannace or embase
good money without the consent of the commonwealth, much more less can he have
power to make and unmake laws, without the which, nor kings, nor subjects, can
cohabit in security, but must be forced to live brutishly in caves and deserts
like wild beasts, wherefore also the emperor of Germany, esteeming it needful
to make some law for the good of the empire, first he demands the advice of the
estates. If it be there approved, the princes, barons, and deputies of the
towns sign it, and then the law is satisfied, for he solemnly swears to keep
the laws already made, and to introduce no new ones without a general
consent.

There is a law in Polonia, which has been renewed in the year 1454, and
also in the year 1538, and by this it is decreed, that no new laws shall be
made, but by a common consent, nor nowhere else, but in the general assembly of
the estates.

For the kingdom of France, where the kings are thought to have greater
authority than in other places; anciently all laws were only made in the
assembly of the estates, or in the ambulatory parliament. But since this
parliament has been sedentary, the king's edicts are not received as
authentical, before the parliament has approved them.

Whereas on the contrary, the decrees of this parliament, where the law
is defective, have commonly the power and effect of law. In the kingdoms of
England, Spain, Hungary, and others, they yet enjoy in some sort their ancient
privileges.

For, if the welfare of the kingdom depends on the observation of the
laws, and the laws are enthralled to the pleasure of one man, is it not most
certain, that there can be no permanent stability in that government? Must it
not then necessarily come to pass, that if the king (as some have been) be
infected with lunacy, either continually, or by intervals, that the whole state
fall inevitably to ruin? But if the laws be superior to the king, as we have
already proved, and that the king be tied in the same respect of obedience to
the laws as the servant is to his master, who will be so senseless, who will
not rather obey the law than the king or will not readily yield his best
assistance against those who seek to violate or infringe them? Now seeing that
the king is not lord over the laws, let us examine how far his power may be
justly extended in other things.

Whether the prince have power of life and death over his
subjects

The minions of the court hold it for an undeniable maxim, that princes
have the same power of life and death over their subjects as ancient masters
had over their slaves, and with these false imaginations have so bewitched
princes, that many, although they put not in use with much rigour this
imaginary right, yet they imagine that they may lawfully do it, and in how much
they desist from the practice thereof, insomuch that they quit and relinquish
their right and due.

But we affirm on the contrary, that the prince is but as the minister
and executor of the law, and may only unsheathe the sword against those whom
the law has condemned; and if he do otherwise, he is no more a king, but a
tyrant; no longer a judge, but a malefactor, and instead of that honourable
title of conservator, he shall be justly branded with that foul term of
violator of the law and equity.

We must here first of all take into our consideration the foundation on
which this our disputation is built, which we have resolved into this head,
that kings are ordained for the benefit and profit of the public state; this
being granted, the question is soon discussed. For who will believe that men
sought and desired a king, who, upon any sudden motion, might at his pleasure
cut their throats; or which in choler or revenge, might, when he would, take
their heads from their shoulders?

Briefly, who (as the wise man says) carried death at his tongue's end,
we must not think so idly.

There is no man so vain, who would willingly that his welfare should
depend on another's pleasure. Nay, with much difficulty will any man trust his
life in the hands of a friend or a brother, much less of a stranger, be he
never so worthy. Seeing that envy, hate, rage, did so far transport Athanas and
Ajax, beyond the bounds of reason, that the one killed his children, the other
failing to effect his desire in the same kind against his friends and
companions, turned his fury and murderous intent, and acted the same revenge
upon himself. Now it being natural to every man to love himself, and to seek
the preservation of his own life, in what assurance, I pray you, would any man
rest, to have a sword continually hanging over his head by a small thread, with
the point towards him? Would any mirth or jollity relish in such a continual
affright? Can you possibly make choice of a more slender thread, than to expose
your life and welfare into the hands and power of a man so mutable, who changes
with every puff of wind. Briefly, who almost a thousand times a day, shakes off
the restraint of reason and discretion, and yields himself slave to his own
unruly and disordered passions.

Can there be hoped or imagined any profit or advantage so great or so
worthy, which might equalize or counterpoise this fear, or this danger? Let us
conclude then, that it is against delinquents only, whom the mouth of the law
has condemned, that kings may draw forth the sword of their authority.

If the king may pardon those whom the law condemns

But, because life is a thing precious, and to be favoured, peradventure,
it will be demanded, whether the king may not pardon and absolve those whom the
law has condemned?

I answer, no. Otherwise this cruel pity would maintain thieves, robbers,
murderers, ravishers, poisoners, sorcerers, and other plagues of mankind, as we
may read tyrants have done heretofore in many places, and to our woeful
experience, we may yet see at this present time; and therefore, the stopping of
law in this kind will, by impunity, much increase the number of offenders.

So that he who received the sword of authority from the law, to pardon
offences, will arm offenders therewith against the laws, and put himself the
wolf into the fold, which he ought to have warranted from their ravenous
outrage.

But for so much that it may chance in some occasions, that the law being
mute, may have need of a speaking law, and that the king being in some cases
the aptest expositor, taking for the rule of his actions, equity and reason,
which as the soul of the soul may so clear the intention thereof, as where the
offence is rather committed against the words than the intendment of the law,
he may free the innocent offender from the guilt thereof because a just and
equitable exposition of the law may in all good reason be taken for law itself,
as nearest concurring with the intention of the law-makers.

Notwithstanding, lest passion should prepossess the place of reason,
kings should in this fashion themselves to the ordinary practice of the emperor
Severus, not to determine absolutely anything before it were maturely discussed
by upright and discreet men in that faculty.

And so the king may rigorously punish the murderer; and yet,
notwithstanding, pardon him, which casually, and without any such purpose,
killeth one. He may put to death the thief, and yet pardon that man, who, in
his own defence killeth him that would have robbed him. Briefly, in all other
occurrences, he may distinguish, as being established arbitrator and neuter,
chance-medly from malice, fore-thought a good purpose from the rigour of the
law, without favouring at any time malice or treason. Neither can the right
omission of this duty gain to him any true esteem of merciful men: for
certainly that shepherd is much more pitiful who kills the wolf, than he who
lets him escape: the clemency of that king is more commendable who commits the
malefactor to the hangman, than he who delivers him; by putting to death the
murderer, many innocents are delivered from danger: whereas by suffering him to
escape, both he and others through hope of the like impunity, are made more
audacious to perpetrate further mischief, so that the immediate act of saving
one delinquent, arms many hands to murder divers innocents. There is,
therefore, both truly mildness in putting to death some, and as certainly
cruelty in pardoning of others. Therefore, as it is permitted the king, being
as it were custos of the law, in some cases to interpret the words
thereof, so in all well ordered kingdoms, it is enjoined the council of state,
and their duty obliges them to examine the king's interpretation, and to
moderate both his severity and facility. If, through the corruption and
weakness of men, this have not been so really and thoroughly observed as it
ought: yet, notwithstanding, the right always remains entire, and there wants
only integrity and courage in the parties to make it effectual.

But not to heap up too many examples in a matter so manifestly clear, it
has been in this manner practised in the realm of France. For we have there
oftentimes seen those put to death, to whom the king had granted his charter of
pardon: and those pardoned, whom he commanded should be put to death: and
sometimes offences committed in the king's presence remitted, because there was
no other witness but himself. The which happened in the time of Henry II to a
certain stranger, who was accused by the king himself of a grievous offence. If
an offender by the intercession of friends have his pardon granted by the king,
the chancellor upon sufficient cause may cancel it. If the chancellor connive,
yet must the criminal present it before the judges, who ought not only
carefully to consider whether the pardon were gotten by surreptitious or
indirect means, but also if it be legal, and in due form. Neither can the
delinquent who has obtained his charter of pardon make use of it, until first
he appeal in public court bare-headed, and on his knees plead it, submitting
himself prisoner until the judges have maturely weighed and considered the
reasons that induced the king to grant him his pardon. If they be found
insufficient, the offender must suffer the punishment of the law, as if the
king had not granted him any pardon. But, if his pardon be allowed, he ought
not so much to thank the king, as the equity of the law which saved his life.
The manner of these proceedings was excellently ordained, both to contain the
king within the limits of equity, lest being armed with public authority, he
should seek to revenge his own particular spleen, or out of fancy or partiality
remit the wrongs and outrages committed against the public safety: as partly
also to restrain an opinion in the subject, that anything could be obtained of
the king which might prejudice the laws. If these things have been ill observed
in our times, notwithstanding that which we have formerly said remains always
certain, that it is the laws which have power over the lives and deaths of the
inhabitants of a kingdom, and not the king, who is but administrator and
conservator of the laws.

Subjects are the king's brethren, and not his slaves

For truly neither are the subjects, as it is commonly said, the king's
slaves, or bondmen: being neither prisoners taken in the wars, nor bought for
money. But as considered in one entire body they are lords, as we have formerly
proved; so each of them in particular ought to be held as the king's brothers
and kinsmen. And to the end that we think not this strange, let us hear what
God Himself says when He prescribes a law to kings: That they lift not their
heart above their brethren from amongst whom they were chosen. Whereupon
Bartolus, a famous lawyer, who lived in an age that bred many tyrants, did yet
draw this conclusion from that law, that subjects were to be held and used in
the quality and condition of the king's brethren, and not of his slaves. Also
king David was not ashamed to call his subjects his brethren. The ancient kings
were called Abimelech, an Hebrew word which signifies, my father the king. The
almighty and all good God, of whose great gentleness and mercy we are daily
partakers, and very seldom feel His severity, although we justly deserve it,
yet is it always mercifully mixed with compassion; whereby He teacheth princes,
His lieutenants, that subjects ought rather to be held in obedience by love,
than by fear.

But, lest they should except against me, as if I sought to entrench too
much upon the royal authority, I verily believe it is so much the greater, by
how much it is likely to be of longer continuance. For, says one, servile fear
is a bad guardian, for that authority we desire should continue; for those in
subjection hate them they fear, and whom we hate, we naturally wish their
destruction. On the contrary, there is nothing more proper to maintain their
authority than the affection of their subjects, on whose love they may safely
and with most security lay the foundation of their greatness. And therefore
that prince who governs his subjects as brethren, may confidently assure
himself to live securely in the midst of dangers: whereas he who uses them like
slaves, must needs live in much anxiety and fear, and may well be resembled to
the condition of that master who remains alone in some desert in the midst of a
great troop of slaves; for look how many slaves any has, he must make account
of so many enemies, which almost all tyrants who have been killed by their
subjects have experienced. Whereas, on the contrary, the subjects of good kings
are ever as solicitously careful of their safety, as of their own welfare.

To this may have reference that which is read in divers places of
Aristotle, and was said by Agasicles, king of Sparta, That kings command as
fathers over their children, and tyrants as masters over their slaves, which we
must take in the same sense, that the civilian Martianus does, to wit, that
paternal authority consists in piety, and not in rigour, for that which was
practised amongst the men of the acorn age, that fathers might sell, and put to
death their children at their pleasure, has no authority amongst Christians;
yea, the very pagans who had any humanity would not permit it to be practised
on their slaves. Therefore, then, the father has no power over the son's life,
before first the law have determined it, otherwise he offends the law:
Cornelius against privy murderers, and by the law Pompeius against parricides,
the father is no less guilty who kills the son, than the son who murders the
father. For the same occasion the emperor Adrian banished into an island, which
was the usual punishment for notorious offenders, a father who had slain his
son, of whom he had entertained a jealous opinion for his mother-in-law.
Concerning servants or slaves, we are admonished in holy writ to use them like
brethren, and by human constitutions as hirelings, or mercenaries.

By the civil law of the Egyptians and Romans, and by the constitutions
of the Antonines, the master is as well liable to punishment who has killed his
own slave, as he who killed another man's. In like manner the law delivers from
the power of the master, the slave, whom, in his sickness, he has altogether
neglected, or has not afforded convenient food, and the enfranchised slave
whose condition was somewhat better, might, for any apparent injury, bring his
action against his patron. Now, seeing there is so great difference between
slaves and lawful children, between lords and fathers, and, notwithstanding
heretofore, it was not permitted amongst the heathen, to use their slaves
cruelly, what shall we say, pray you, of that father of the people, who cries
out tragically with Atreus, I will devour my children? In what esteem shall we
hold that prince who takes such pleasure in the massacre of his subjects
(condemned without being ever heard), that he despatched many thousand of them
in one day, and yet is not glutted with blood? Briefly, who, after the example
of Caligula (surnamed the Phaeton of the world) wishes that all his people had
but one head that he might cut it off at one blow? Shall it not be lawful to
implore the assistance of the law against such furious madness, and to pull
from such a tyrant the sword which he received to maintain the law, and defend
the good, when it is drawn by him only for rapine, and ruin?

Whether the goods of the people belong to the king

But to proceed, let us now see whether the king, whom we have already
proved has not power over the lives of his subjects, is not at the least lord
over their goods. In these days there is no language more common in the courts
of princes, than of those who say all is the king's. Whereby it follows, that
in exacting any thing from his subjects, he takes but his own, and in that
which he leaves them, he expresses the care he has that they should not be
altogether destitute of means to maintain themselves, and this opinion has
gained so much power in the minds of some princes, that they are not ashamed to
say that the pains, sweat and industry of their subjects is the proper revenue,
as if their miserable subjects only kept beasts to till the earth for their
insolent master's profit and luxury. And indeed, the practice at this day is
just in this manner, although in all right and equity it ought to be contrary.
Now we must always remember that kings were created for the good and profit of
the people, and that these (as Aristotle says) who endeavour and seek the
commodity of the people, are truly kings: whereas those who make their own
private ends and pleasures the only butt and aim of their desires, are truly
tyrants.

It being then so that every one loves that which is his own, yea, that
many covet that which belongs to other men, is it anything probable that men
should seek a master to give him frankly all that they had long laboured for,
and gained with the sweat of their brows? May we not rather imagine, that they
chose such a man on whose integrity they relied for the administering of
justice equally both to the poor and rich, and who would not assume all to
himself, but rather maintain every one in the fruition of his own goods? or
who, like an unprofitable drone, should suck the fruit of other men's labours,
but rather preserve the house, for those whose industry justly deserved it?
Briefly, who, instead of extorting from the true owners their goods, would see
them defended from all ravening oppressors? What, I pray you matters it, says
the poor country man, whether the king or the enemy make havoc of my goods,
since through the spoil thereof I and my poor family die for hunger? What
imports it whether a stranger or home-bred caterpillar ruin my estate, and
bring my poor fortune to extreme beggary? Whether a foreign soldier, or a
sycophant courtier, by force or fraud, make me alike miserable? Why shall he be
accounted a barbarous enemy, if thou be a friendly patriot? Why he a tyrant if
thou be king? Yea, certainly by how much parricide is greater than
manslaughter, by so much the wickedness of a king exceeds in mischief the
violence of an enemy.

If then, therefore, in the creation of kings, men gave not their own
proper goods unto them, but only recommended them to their protection; by what
other right then, but that of freebooters, can they challenge the property of
other men's goods to themselves? Wherefore the kings of Egypt were not
(according to law) at the first the lords of particular men's estates, but only
then when they were sold unto them for corn, and yet may there well be question
made of the validity of that contract. Ahab, king of Israel, could not compel
Naboth to sell him his vineyard; but rather if he had been willing, the law of
God would not permit it. The Roman emperors who had an unreasonable power,
could neither by right have done it. At this day there is with much difficulty
any kingdom to be found, where the meanest subject may not suit the king, and
where many times the king is not cast in the suit, which succeeding, he must as
well as others satisfy the judgment. And to this is not contrary, although at
the first view it seem so, that which some of their most familiars have written
of the emperors. That by the civil law all things were the king's, and that
Cæsar was absolute lord of all things, they themselves expound this their
opinion in this manner, that the dominion of all things belongs to the king,
and the propriety to particular persons, in so much as the one possesses all by
the right of commanding, the other by the law of inheritance. We know that it
is a common saying amongst the civilians, that if any make claim to a house or
a ship, it follows not therefore that he can extend his right to all the
furniture or lading. And therefore, a king may challenge and gain right to the
kingdom of Germany, France and England: and yet, notwithstanding, he may not
lawfully take any honest man's estate from him, but by a manifest injustice,
seeing that they are things diverse, and by law distinguished, to be possessors
of the whole, and of all the particular parts.

Whether the king be the proper owner of the kingdom

But the king, is he not lord proprietor of the public revenue? We must
handle this point somewhat more exactly than we did the former. In the first
place, we must consider that the revenue of the public exchequer is one thing,
and the proper patrimony of the prince another; of different nature are the
goods of the emperor, king, or prince, to those of Antonius, Henry, or Phillip;
those are properly the king's, which he enjoys as king, those are Antonius' his
which he possesses, as in the right of Antonius, the former he received from
the people, the latter from those of his blood, as inheritor to them.

This distinction is frequent in the books of the civil law, where there
is a difference ever made between the patrimony of the empire, and that of the
emperor: the treasury of Cæsar is one thing, and the exchequer of the
commonwealth another, and both the one and the other have their several
procurers, there being diverse dispensers of the sacred and public
distributions, and of the particular and private expenses, insomuch as he who
as emperor is preferred before a private man in a grant by deed or charter, may
also sometime as Antonius give place to an inferior person.

In like manner in the empire of Germany, the revenue of Ferdinand of
Austria is one thing, and the revenue of the Emperor Ferdinand is another: the
empire, and the emperor have their several treasures: as also there is
difference in the inheritances which the princes derive from the houses of
their ancestors, and those which are annexed to the electoral dignities. Yea,
amongst the Turks themselves, Selimus, his gardens and patrimonial lands, are
distinguished from those of the public, the one serving for the provision of
the Sultan's table, the other employed only about the Turkish affairs of state.
There be, notwithstanding, kingdoms as the French and English, and others in
which the king has no particular patrimony, but only the public which he
received from the people, there this former distinction has no place. For the
goods which belong to the prince as a private person there is no question; he
is absolute owner of them as other particular persons are, and may by the civil
law sell, engage, or dispose of them at his pleasure. But for the goods of the
kingdom, which in some places are commonly called the demesnes, the kings may
not be esteemed nor called in any sort whatsoever, absolute lords proprietors
of them.

For what if a man for the flocks' sake have made thee shepherd, does it
follow that thou hast liberty to slay, pill, sell, and transport the sheep at
thy pleasure? Although the people have established thee judge or governor of a
city, or of some province, hast thou therefore power to alienate, sell, or play
away that city or province? And seeing that in alienating or passing away a
province, the people also are sold, have they raised thee to that authority to
the end thou shouldest separate them from the rest, or that thou shouldest
prostitute and make them slaves to whom thou pleasest? Furthermore, I demand if
the royal dignity be a patrimony, or an office? If it be an office, what
community has it with any propriety? If it be a patrimony, is it not such a one
that at least the paramount propriety remains still in the people who were the
donors? Briefly, if the revenue of the exchequer, or the demesnes of the
kingdom, be called the dowry of the commonwealth, and by good right, and such a
dowry whose dismembering or wasting brings with it the ruin of the public
state, the kingdom and the king, by what law shall it be lawful to alienate
this dowry? Let the emperor Wencislaus be infatuated, the French King Charles
the Sixth, lunatic, and give or sell the kingdom, or part of it, to the
English, let

Malcolm, King of the Scots, lavishly dissipate the demesnes and consume
the public treasure, what follows for all this? Those who choose the king to
withstand the invasions of foreign enemies, shall they through his madness and
negligence be made the slaves of strangers: and those means and wealth, which
would have secured them in the fruition of their own estates and fortunes,
shall they, by the election of such a king, be exposed to the prey and rapine
of all comers, and that which particular persons have saved from their own
necessities, and from those under their tutorship and government (as it
happened in Scotland) to endue the commonwealth with it, shall it be devoured
by some pander or broker, for unclean pleasures?

But if, as we have often said, that kings were constituted for the
people's use, what shall that use be, if it be perverted into abuse? What good
can so much mischief and inconvenience bring, what profit can come of such
eminent and irreparable damages and dangers? If (I say) in seeking to purchase
my own liberty and welfare, I engage myself into an absolute thraldom, and
willingly subject myself to another's yoke, and become a fettered slave to
another man's unruly desires, therefore, as it is imprinted in all of us by
nature, so also has it by a long custom been approved by all nations, that it
is not lawful for the king by the counsel of his own fancy and pleasure, to
diminish or waste the public revenue; and those who have run a contrary course,
have even lost that happy name of a king, and stood branded with the infamous
title of a tyrant.

I confess that when kings were instituted, there was of necessity means
to be assigned for them, as well to maintain their royal dignity, as to furnish
the expense of their train and officers. Civility, and the welfare of the
public state, seem to require it, for it was the duty of a king to establish
judges, in all places, who should receive no presents, nor sell justice: and
also to have power ready to assist the execution of their ordinances, and to
secure the ways from dangers, that commerce might be open, and free, etc. If
there were likelihood of wars, to fortify and put garrisons into the frontier
places, and to hold an army in the field, and to keep his magazines well stored
with ammunition. It is commonly said, that peace cannot be well maintained
without provision for wars, nor wars managed without men, nor men kept in
discipline without pay, nor money got without subsidies and tributes.

To discharge therefore the burden of the state in time of peace was the
demesne appointed, and in time of wars the tributes and imports, yet so as if
any extraordinary necessity required it, money might be raised by subsidies or
other fitting means. The final intendment of all was ever the public utility,
in so much as he who converts any of these public revenues to his own private
purposes, much more he who misspends them in any unworthy or loose occasions,
no way merits the name of a king, for the prince (says the apostle) is the
minister of God for the good of the people; and for that cause is tribute paid
unto them.

This is the true original cause of the customs and imposts of the
Romans, that those rich merchandises which were brought from the Indies,
Arabia, Ethiopia, might be secured in their passage by land from thieves and
robbers, and in their transportation by sea from pirates, insomuch as for their
security, the commonwealth maintained a navy at sea. In this rank we must put
the custom which was paid in the Red Sea, and other imposts of gates, bridges,
and passages, for the securing of the great roadways (therefore called the
Pretorian Consular, and the king's highways) from the spoil of thieves and
free-booters. The care also of the reparation of bridges was referred to
commissaries deputed by the king, as appears by the ordinance of Lewis the
Courteous, concerning the twelve bridges over the river Seine, commanding also
boats to be in readiness, to ferry over passengers, etc.

For the tax laid upon salt there was none in use in those times, the
most of the salt-pits being enjoyed by private persons, because it seemed that
that which nature out of her own bounty presented unto men, ought no more to be
enhanced by sale than either the light, the air, or the water. As a certain
king called Lycurgus in the lesser Asia, began to lay some impositions upon the
salt-pits there, nature, as it were, impatiently bearing such a restraint of
her liberality, the springs are said to have dried up suddenly. Yet certain
marmosets of the court would persuade us at this day (as Juvenal complained in
his time) that the sea affords nothing of worth, or good, which falls not
within the compass of the king's prerogative.

He who first brought this taxation into Rome, was the Censor Livius, who
therefore gained the surname of Salter; neither was it done but in the
commonwealth's extreme necessity. And in France King Philip the Long, for the
same reason obtained of the estates the imposition upon salt for five years
only. What turmoils and troubles the continuance thereof has bred every man
knows. To be brief, all tributes were imposed and continued for the provision
of means and stipends for the men of war: so as to make a province stipendiary
or tributary, was esteemed the same with military.

Behold, wherefore Solomon exacted tributes, to wit, to fortify the
towns, and to erect and furnish a public magazine, which, being accomplished,
the people required of Rehoboam to be freed from that burden. The Turks call
the tribute of the provinces, the sacred blood of the people, and account it a
most wicked crime to employ it in anything but the defence of the people.
Wherefore, by the same reason, all that which the king conquers in war belongs
to the people, and not to the king, because the people bore the charges of the
war, as that which is gained by a factor accrues to the account of his master.
Yea, and what advantage he gains by marriage, if it belongs simply and
absolutely to his wife, that is acquired also to the kingdom, for so much as it
is to be presumed that he gained not that preferment in marriage in quality of
Philip or Charles, but as he was king. On the contrary, in like manner, the
queens have interest of endowment in the estates which their husbands gained
and enjoyed before they attained the crown, and have no title to that which is
gotten after they are created kings, because that is judged as the acquist of
the common purse, and has no proper reference to the king's private estate,
which was so determined in France, betwixt Philip of Valoys, and his wife Jean
of Burgundy. But to the end that there be no money drawn from the people to be
employed in private designs, and for particular ends and purposes, the emperor
swears not to impose any taxes or tributes whatsoever, but by the authority of
the estates of the empire. As much do the kings of Polonia, Hungary, and
Denmark promise: the English in like manner enjoy the same unto this day, by
the laws of Henry the Third, and Edward the First.

The French kings in former times imposed no taxes but in the assemblies,
and with the consent of the three estates; from thence sprung the law of Philip
of Valoys, that the people should not have any tribute laid on them but in
urgent necessity, and with the consent of the estates. Yea, and anciently,
after these moneys were collected, they were locked in coffers through every
diocese and recommended to the special care of selected men (who are the same
who at this day are called esleus), to the end that they should pay the
soldiers enrolled within the towns of their dioceses: the which was in use in
other countries, as namely in Flanders and other neighbouring provinces. At
this day, though many corruptions have crept in, yet without the consent and
confirmation of the parliament, no exactions may be collected; notwithstanding,
there be some provinces which are not bound to anything without the approbation
of the estates of the country, as Languedoke, Brittany, Province, Daulphiny,
and some others. Finally, all the provinces of the low countries have the same
privileges, lest the exchequer devour all, like the spleen which exhales the
spirits from the other members of the body. In all places they have confined
the exchequer within its proper bounds and limits.

Seeing then it is most certain that what has been ordinarily and
extraordinarily assigned to kings, to wit, tributes, taxes, and all the
demesnes which comprehend all customs, both importations and exportations,
forfeitures, amercements, royal escheats, confiscations, and other dues of the
same nature, were consigned into their hands for the maintenance and defence of
the people and the state of the kingdom, insomuch as if the sinews be cut, the
people must needs fall to decay, and in demolishing these foundations the
kingdom will come to utter ruin: it necessarily follows, that he who lays
impositions on the people only to oppress them, and by the public detriment
seeks private profit, and with their own sword kills his subjects, he truly is
unworthy the name of a king. Whereas contrarily, a true king, as he is a
careful manager of the public affairs, so is he a ready protector of the common
welfare, and not a lord in propriety of the commonwealth, having as little
authority to alienate or dissipate the demesnes or public revenue, as the
kingdom itself. And if he misgovern the state, seeing it imports the
commonwealth that every one make use of his own talent, it is much more
requisite for the public good, that he who has the managing of it, carry
himself as he ought.

And therefore, if a prodigal lord by the authority of justice, be
committed to the tuition of his kinsmen and friends, and compelled to suffer
his revenues and means to be ordered and disposed of by others; by much more
reason may those who have interest in the affairs of state, and whose duty
obliges them thereto, take all the administration and government of the state
out of the hands of him who either negligently executes his place, or ruins the
commonwealth, if after admonition he endeavours not to perform his duty. And
for so much as it is easily to be proved, without searching into those elder
times, that in all lawful dominions the king cannot be held lord in propriety
of the demesnes; whereof we have an apt representation in the person of Ephron
king of the Hittites, who dare not sell the field to Abraham without the
consent of the people. This right is at this day practised in public states:
the emperor of Germany, before his coronation, solemnly swears that he will
neither alienate, dismember, nor engage any of the rights or members of the
empire. And, if he recover, or conquer anything with the arms and means of the
public, it shall be gained to the empire, and not to himself. Wherefore when
Charles the Fourth promised each of the electors an hundred thousand crowns to
choose his son Wencislaus emperor, and, having not ready money to deliver them,
he mortgaged customs, taxes, tributes, and certain towns unto them, which were
the proper appurtenances of the empire: whereon followed much and vehement
contestation, most men holding this engagement void. And questionless it had
been so declared, but for the profit that those reaped thereby, who ought
principally to have maintained and held entire the rights and dignities of the
empire. And it followed also, that Wencislaus was justly held incapable of the
government of the empire, chiefly because he suffered the rights of the empire
over the duchy of Milan to be wrested from him.

There is a law very ancient in the kingdom of Polonia, which prohibits
the alienating of any of the kingdom's lands; the which also was renewed by
King Lewis in the year 1375. In Hungary in a.d. 1221 there was a complaint made
to Pope Honorius, that King Andrew had engaged the crown lands contrary to his
oath. In England was the same by the law of King Edward in the year 1298.
Likewise in Spain by the ordinance made under Alphonsus, and renewed in the
year 1560, in the assembly of the estates at Toledo. These laws were then
ratified, although long time before custom had obtained the vigour and effect
of law.

Now, for the kingdom of France whereto I longer confine myself, because
she may in a sort pass as a pattern to the rest, this right has ever remained
there inviolable. It is one of the most ancient laws of the kingdom, and a
right born with the kingdom itself, that the demesne may not be alienated: the
which law in a.d. 1566 (although but ill deserved) was renewed. There are only
two cases excepted, the portions or appanages of the children and brothers of
the king, yet with this reservation, that the right of vassalage remains always
to the crown in like manner if the condition of war require necessarily an
alienation, yet it must be ever with power of redemption. Anciently neither the
one nor the other were of validity, but by the commandment of the states: at
this day since the parliament has been made sedentary, the parliament of Paris
which is the court of the peers, and the chamber of accounts, and of the
treasury, must first approve it: as the edicts of Charles the Sixth and Ninth
do testify. This is a thing so certain, that if the ancient kings themselves
would endow a church (although that was a work much favoured in those days),
they were, notwithstanding, bound to have an allowance of the estates: witness
King Childebert, who might not endow the Abbey of Saint Vincent at Paris before
he had the French and Neustrians' consent. Clovis the Second, and other kings
have observed the same. They might neither remit the regalities by granting
enfranchisements, nor the nomination of prelates to any church. And if any of
them have done it, as Lewis the Second, Philip the Fourth, and Philip surnamed
Augustus, did in favour of the churches of Senis Auxera, and Nevers, the
parliament has declared it void. When the king is anointed at Rheims, he swears
to observe this law: and if he infringe it, that act has as much validity with
it as if he contracted to sell the empires of the Great Turk, or Sophia of
Persia. From this spring the constitutions or ordinances of Philip the Sixth,
of John the Second, of Charles Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth, by which they revoke
all alienations made by their predecessors.

In the assembly of the estates at Tours, where King Charles the Eighth
was in person, divers alienations made by Lewis the Second were repealed, and
annihilated, and there was taken away from the heirs of Tancred of Chastel his
great minion, divers places which he had given him by his proper authority.
This was finally ratified in the last assembly of the estates held at Orleans.
Thus much concerning the kingdom's demesne. But to the end that we may yet more
clearly perceive that the kingdom is preferred before the king, and that he
cannot by his own proper authority diminish the majesty he has received from
the people, nor enfranchise or release from his dominion any one of his
subjects; nor quit or relinquish the sovereignty of the least part of his
kingdom. Charlemain in former times endeavoured to subject the kingdom of
France to the German empire: the which the French did courageously oppose by
the mouth of a prince of Glasconnie; and if Charlemain had proceeded in that
business, it had come to the trial of the sword. In like manner when any
portion of the kingdom was granted to the English, the sovereignty was almost
always reserved. And if sometimes they obtained it by force, as at the treaty
of Bretigny, by the which King John quitted the sovereignty of Glasconnie and
Poytou, that agreement was not kept, neither was he more bound to do it, than a
tutor or guardian is being prisoner (as he was then), which for his own
deliverance should engage the estate of his pupils.

By the power of the same law the parliament of Paris made void the
treaty of Conlius, by the which Duke Charles of Burgundy had drawn from the
king Amiens and other towns of Picardy. In our days the same parliament
declared void the agreement made at Madrid, between Francis the First, then
prisoner, and Charles the Fifth, concerning the Duchy of Burgundy. But the
domain made by Charles the Sixth unto Henry King of England, of the kingdom of
France, after his decease, is a sufficient testimony for this matter, and of
his madness, if there had been no other proof. But to leave off producing any
further testimonies, examples, or reasons, by what right can the king give or
sell away the kingdom, or any part of it: seeing it consists of people, and not
of earth or walls? and of freemen there can be made no sale, nor traffic: yea,
and the patrons themselves cannot compel the enfranchised servants to make
their habitations in other places than themselves like. The which is the rather
to be allowed, in that subjects are neither slaves nor enfranchised servants,
but brothers: and not only the king's brethren taken one by one, but also
considered in one body, they ought to be esteemed absolute lords and owners of
the kingdom.

Whether the king be the usufructor of the kingdom?

But if the king be not lord in propriety, yet at the least we may esteem
him usufructor of the kingdom, and of the demesne; nay, truly we can allow him
to have the usufruct for being usufructor, though the propriety remain in the
people: yet may he absolutely dispose of the profits, and engage them at his
pleasure. Now we have already proved that kings of their own authority cannot
engage the revenues of the exchequer, or the demesne of the kingdom. The
usufructor may dispose of the profits to whom, how, and when he pleases.
Contrarily, the excessive gifts of princes are ever judged void, his
unnecessary expenses are not allowed, his superfluous to be cut off, and that
which is expended by him in any other occasion, but for the public utility, is
justly esteemed to be unjustly extorted, and is no less liable to the law
Cincea, than the meanest Roman citizen formerly was. In France, the king's
gifts are never of force, until the chamber of accounts have confirmed them.
From hence proceed the postils of the ordinary chamber, in giving up of the
accounts in the reigns of prodigal kings, Trop donne: soyt repele, which
is, excessive gifts must be recalled. The judges of this chamber solemnly swear
to pass nothing which may prejudice the kingdom, or the public state,
notwithstanding any letters the king shall write unto them; but they are not
always so mindful of this oath as were to be desired.

Furthermore, the law takes no care how a usufructor possesses and
governs his revenues, but contrarywise, it prescribes unto the king, how and to
what use he shall employ his. For the ancient kings of France were bound to
divide their royal revenues into four parts. The first was implied in the
maintaining of the ministers of the church, and providing for the poor: the
second for the king's table: the third for the wages of his officers and
household servants; the last in repairing of bridges, castles, and the royal
palaces. And what was remaining, was laid up in the treasury, to be bestowed on
the necessities of the commonwealth. And histories do at large relate the
troubles and tumults which happened about the year 1412 in the assembly of the
estates at Paris, because Charles the Sixth had wasted all the money that was
raised of the revenues and demesne, in his own and his minion's loose
pleasures, and that the expenses of the king's household, which before exceeded
not the sum of ninety-four thousand francs, did amount, in that miserable
estate of the commonwealth, to five hundred and forty thousand francs. Now as
the demesne was employed in the before-mentioned affairs, so the aids were only
for the war, and the taxes assigned for the payment of the men at arms and for
no other occasion. In other kingdoms the king has no greater authority, and in
divers less, especially in the empire of Germany, and in Poland. But we have
made choice of the kingdom of France, to the end it be not thought this has any
special prerogative above others, because there perhaps, the commonwealth
receives the most detriment. Briefly, as I have before said, the name of a king
signifies not an inheritance, nor a propriety, nor a usufruct, but a charge,
office, and procuration.

As a bishop is chosen to look to the welfare of the soul, so is the king
established to take care of the body, so far forth as it concerns the public
good; the one is dispenser of the heavenly treasure, the other of the secular,
and what right the one has in the episcopal revenues, the same has the other,
and no greater in the kingdom's demesne. If the bishop alien the goods of the
bishopric without the consent of the chapter, this alienation is of no value;
if the king alien the demesne without the approbation of the estates, that is
also void; one portion of the ecclesiastical goods ought to be employed in the
reparation of the churches; the second in relieving of the poor; the third, for
the maintenance of the church men, and the fourth for the bishop himself. We
have seen before, that the king ought to divide into four parts the revenues of
the kingdom's demesne. The abuse of these times cannot infringe or annihilate
the right, for, although some part of the bishops steal from the poor that
which they profusely cast away on their panders, and ruin and destroy their
lands and woods, the calling of the bishops is not for all that altered.
Although that some emperors have assumed to themselves an absolute power, that
cannot invest them with any further right, because no man can be judge in his
own cause. What if some Caracalla vaunt he will not want money whilst the sword
remains in his custody? The Emperor Adrian will promise on the contrary, so to
discharge his office of principality, that he will always remember that the
commonwealth is not his, but the people's; which one thing almost distinguishes
a king from a tyrant. Neither can that act of Attalus King of Pergamus
designing the Roman people for heirs to his kingdom, nor that of Alexander for
Egypt, nor Ptolemy for the Cyrenians, bequeathing their kingdoms to the same
people, nor Prasutagus King of the Icenians, who left his to Cæsar, draw
any good consequence of right to those who usurp that which by no just title
belongs to them, nay, by how much the intrusion is more violent, by so much the
equity and justice of the cause is more perspicuous: for what the Romans
assumed under the colour of right, they would have made no difficulty if that
pretext had been wanting to have taken by force. We have seen almost in our
days how the Venetians possessed themselves of the kingdom of Cyprus, under
pretence of an imaginary adoption, which would have proved ridiculous, if it
had not been seconded by power and arms. To which also may be not unfitly
resembled the pretended donation of Constantine to Pope Silvester, for that
straw of the decretist Gratian was long since consumed and turned to ashes;
neither is of more validity the grant which Lewis the Courteous made to Pope
Paschal of the city of Rome, and part of Italy. Because he gave that which he
possessed not, no man opposed it. But when his father Charlemain would have
united and subjected the kingdom of France to the German empire, the French did
lawfully oppose it: and if he had persisted in his purpose, they were resolved
to have hindered him, and defended themselves by arms.

There can be, too, as little advantage alleged that act of Solomon's,
whom we read to have delivered twenty towns to Hiram King of Tyre: for he did
not give them to him but for the securing of the talents of gold which Hiram
had lent him, and they were redeemed at the end of the term, as it appears by
the text. Further, the soil was barren, and husbanded by the remaining
Canaanites. But Solomon, having redeemed it out of the hands of Hiram,
delivered it to the Israelites to be inhabited and tilled. Neither serves it to
much more purpose, to allege that in some kingdoms there is no express
agreement between the king and the people; for suppose there be no mention
made, yet the law of nature teacheth us, that kings were not ordained to ruin,
but to govern the commonwealths, and that they may not by their proper
authority alter or change the rights of the public state, and although they be
lords, yet can they challenge it in no other quality, than as guardians do in
the tuition of their pupils; neither can we account him a lawful lord, who
deprives the commonwealth of her liberty, and sells her as a slave. Briefly,
neither can we also allege, that some kingdoms are the proper acquists of the
king himself, insomuch as they were not conquered by their proper means and
swords, but by the hands, and with the wealth of the public; and there is
nothing more agreeable to reason, than that which was gained with the joint
difficulties and common danger of the public, should not be alienated or
disposed of, without the consent of the states which represent the
commonwealth: and the necessity of this law is such, that it is of force
amongst robbers and free-booters themselves. He who follows a contrary course,
must needs ruin human society. And although the French conquered by force of
arms the countries of Germany and Gaule, yet this before-mentioned right
remains still entire.

To conclude, we must needs resolve, that kings are neither proprietors
nor usufructuaries of the royal patrimony, but only administrators. And being
so, they can by no just right attribute to themselves the propriety, use, or
profit of private men's estates, nor with as little reason the public revenues,
which are in truth only the commonwealth's.

But before we pass any further, we must here resolve a doubt. The people
of Israel having demanded a king, the Lord said to Samuel: hearken unto the
voice of the people, notwithstanding, give them to understand what shall be the
manner of the king who shall reign over them: "he will take your fields, your
vineyards, your olive trees, to furnish his own occasions, and to enrich his
servants," briefly, "he will make the people slaves." One would hardly believe
in what estimation the courtiers of our times hold this text, when of all the
rest of the Holy Scripture they make but a jest. In this place the almighty and
all good God would manifest to the Israelites their levity, when that they had
God Himself even present with them, who upon all occasions appointed them holy
judges and worthy commanders for the wars, would, notwithstanding, rather
subject themselves to the disordered commandments of a vain mutable man, than
to the secure protection of the omnipotent and immutable God. He declares,
then, unto them in what a slippery estate the king was placed, and how easily
unruly authority fell into disordered violence, and kingly power was turned
into tyrannous wilfulness. Seeing the king that he gave them would by
preposterous violence draw the sword of authority against them, and subject the
equity of the laws to his own unjust desires: and this mischief which they
wilfully drew on themselves, they would happily repent of, when it would not be
so easily remedied. Briefly, this text does not describe the rights of kings,
but what right they are accustomed to attribute to themselves: not what by the
privilege of their places they may justly do; but what power for the satisfying
of their own lusts, they unjustly usurp. This will manifestly appear from the
seventeenth chapter of Deuteronomy, where God appoints a law for kings. Here
says Samuel "the king will use his subjects like slaves." There God forbids the
king "to lift his heart above his brethren," to wit, "over his subjects, whom
he ought not to insult over, but to cherish as his kinsmen." "He will make
chariots, levy horse-men, and take the goods of private men," says Samuel: on
the contrary in Deuteronomy, he is exhorted "not to multiply horse-men, nor to
heap up gold and silver, nor cause the people to return into Egypt," to wit,
into bondage. In Samuel we see pictured to the life wicked Ahab, who by
pernicious means gets Naboth's vineyard: there, David, who held it not lawful
to drink that water which was purchased with the danger of his subjects' lives.
Samuel foretells that the king demanded by the Israelites, instead of keeping
the laws, would govern all according to his own fancy. On the contrary, God
commands that His law should by the priests be delivered into the hands of the
king, to copy it out, and to have it continually before his eyes. Therefore
Samuel, being high priest, gave to Saul the royal law contained in the
seventeenth of Deuteronomy, written into a book, which certainly had been a
frivolous act if the king were permitted to break it at his pleasure. Briefly,
it is as much as if Samuel had said: You have asked a king after the manner of
other nations, the most of whom have tyrants for their governors: you desire a
king to distribute justice equally amongst you: but many of them think all
things lawful which their own appetites suggest unto them; in the mean season
you willingly shake off the Lord, whose only will is equity and justice in the
abstract.

In Herodotus there is a history which plainly expresses how apt the
royal government is to degenerate into tyranny, whereof Samuel so exactly
forewarns the people. Deioces, much renowned for his justice, was first chosen
judge amongst the Medes: presently after, to the end he might the better
repress those who would oppose justice, he was chosen king, and invested with
convenient authority; then he desired a guard, after, a citadel to be built in
Ecbatana, the principal city of the kingdom, with colour to secure him from
conspiracies and machinations of rebels; which being effected, he presently
applied himself to revenge the least displeasures which were offered him with
the greatest punishments.

Finally, no man might presume to look this king in the face, and to
laugh or cough in his presence was punished with grievous torments. So
dangerous a thing it is, to put into the hands of a weak mind (as all men's are
by nature) unlimited power. Samuel therefore teaches not in that place that the
authority of a king is absolute; on the contrary, he discreetly admonishes the
people not to enthral their liberty under the unnecessary yoke of a weak and
unruly master; he does not absolutely exclude the royal authority, but would
have it restrained within its own limits; he does not amplify the king's right
with an unbridled and licentious liberty; but rather tacitly persuades to put a
bit into his mouth. It seems that this advice of Samuel's was very beneficial
to the Israelites, for that they circumspectly moderated the power of their
kings, the which, most nations grown wise, either by the experience of their
own, or their neighbour's harms, have carefully looked unto, as will plainly
appear by that which follows.

We have shewed already, that in the establishing of the king, there were
two alliances or covenants contracted: the first between God, the king, and the
people, of which we have formerly treated; the second, between the king and the
people, of which we must now say somewhat. After that Saul was established
king, the royal law was given him, according to which he ought to govern. David
made a covenant in Hebron before the Lord, that is to say, taking God for
witness, with all the ancients of Israel, who represented the whole body of the
people, and even then he was made king. Joas also by the mouth of Johoiada the
high priest, entered into covenant with the whole people of the land in the
house of the Lord. And when the crown was set on his head, together with it was
the law of the testimony put into his hand, which most expounds to be the law
of God; likewise Josias promises to observe and keep the commandments,
testimonies, and statutes comprised in the book of the covenant: under which
words are contained all which belongs to the duties both of the first and
second table of the law of God. In all the before-remembered places of the holy
story, it is ever said, "that a covenant was made with all the people, with all
the multitude, with all the elders, with all the men of Judah": to the end that
we might know, as it is also fully expressed, that not only the principals of
the tribes, but also all the milleniers, centurions, and subaltern magistrates
should meet together, each of them in the name, and for their towns and
communalties, to covenant and contract with the king. In this assembly was the
creating of the king determined of, for it was the people who made the king,
and not the king the people.

It is certain, then, that the people by way of stipulation, require a
performance of covenants. The king promises it. Now the condition of a
stipulator is in terms of law more worthy than of a promiser. The people ask
the king, whether he will govern justly and according to the laws? He promises
he will. Then the people answer, and not before, that whilst he governs
uprightly, they will obey faithfully. The king therefore promises simply and
absolutely, the people upon condition: the which failing to be accomplished,
the people rest according to equity and reason, quit from their promise.

In the first covenant or contract there is only an obligation to piety:
in the second, to justice. In that the king promises to serve God religiously:
in this, to rule the people justly.

By the one he is obliged with the utmost of his endeavours to procure
the glory of God: by the other, the profit of the people. In the first, there
is a condition expressed, "if thou keep my commandments": in the second, "if
thou distribute justice equally to every man." God is the proper revenger of
deficiency in the former, and the whole people the lawful punisher of
delinquency in the latter, or the estates, the representative body thereof, who
have assumed to themselves the protection of the people. This has been always
practised in all well-governed estates. Amongst the Persians, after the due
performance of holy rites, they contracted with Cyrus in manner following:

"Thou, O Cyrus! in the first place shalt promise, that if any make war
against the Persians, or seek to infringe the liberty of the laws, thou wilt
with the utmost of thy power defend and protect this country." Which, having
promised, they presently add, "And we Persians promise to be aiding to keep all
men in obedience, whilst thou defendest the country." Xenophon calls this
agreement, "A Confederation," as also Isocrates calls that which he wrote of
the duties of subjects towards their princes, "A Discourse of Confederation."
The alliance or confederation was renewed every month between the kings and
Ephores of Sparta, although those kings were descended from the line of
Hercules. And as these kings did solemnly swear to govern according to the
laws, so did the Ephores also to maintain them in their authority, whilst they
performed their promise. Likewise in the Roman kingdom, there was an agreement
between Romulus, the senate, and the people, in this manner: "That the people
should make laws, and the king look they were kept: the people should decree
war, and the king should manage it." Now, although many emperors, rather by
force and ambition, than by any lawful right, were seized of the Roman empire,
and by that which they call a royal law, attributed to themselves an absolute
authority, notwithstanding, by the fragments which remain both in books and in
Roman inscriptions of that law, it plainly appears, that power and authority
were granted them to preserve and govern the commonwealth, not to ruin and
oppress it by tyranny. Nay, all good emperors have ever professed, that they
held themselves tied to the laws, and received the empire from the senate, to
whose determination they always referred the most important affairs, and
esteemed it a great error, without their advice, to resolve on the occasions of
the public state.

If we take into our consideration the condition of the empires,
kingdoms, and states of times, there is not any of them worthy of those names,
where there is not some such covenant or confederacy between the people and the
prince. It is not long since, that in the empire of Germany, the king of the
Romans being ready to be crowned emperor, was bound to do homage, and make oath
of fealty to the empire, no more nor less than as the vassal is bound to do to
his lord when he is invested with his fee. Although the form of the words which
he is to swear have been somewhat altered by the popes, yet, notwithstanding,
the substance still remains the same. According to which we know that Charles
the Fifth, of the house of Austria, was under certain conditions chosen
emperor, as in the same manner his successors were, the sum of which was, that
he should keep the laws already made, and make no new ones without the consent
of the electors, that he should govern the public affairs by the advice of the
general estates, nor engage anything that belongs to the empire, and other
matters which are particularly recited by the historians. When the emperor is
crowned at Aquisgrave, the Archbishop of Cologne requires of him in the first
place: If he will maintain the church, if he will distribute justice, if he
will defend the empire, and protect widows, orphans, and all others worthy of
compassion. The which, after he has solemnly sworn before the altar, the
princes also who represent the empire, are asked if they will not promise the
same; neither is the emperor anointed, nor receives the other ornaments of the
empire, before he has first taken that solemn oath. Whereupon it follows, that
the emperor is tied absolutely, and the princes of the empire, under condition.
That the same is observed in the kingdom of Polonia, no man will make question,
who had but seen or heard of the ceremonies and rites wherewith Henry of Anjou
was lately chosen and crowned king of that country, and especially then when
the condition of maintaining of the two religions, the reformed and the Roman,
was demanded, the which the lords of the kingdom in express terms required of
him three several times, and he as often made promise to perform. The same is
observed in the kingdoms of Bohemia, Hungary, and others; the which we omit to
relate particularly, to avoid prolixity.

Now this manner of stipulation is not only received in those kingdoms
where the right of election is yet entirely observed; but even in those also
which are esteemed to be simply hereditary. When the king of France is crowned,
the bishops of Laon and Beauvois, ecclesiastical peers, ask all the people
there present, whether they desire and command, that he who is there before
them, shall be their king? Whereupon he is said even then in the style of the
inauguration, to be chosen by the people: and when they have given the sign of
consenting, then the king swears that he will maintain all the rights,
privileges, and laws of France universally, that he will not alien the demesne,
and the other articles, which have been yet so changed and accommodated to bad
intentions, as they differ greatly from that copy which remains in the library
of the chapter of Beauvois, according to which it is recorded, that King
Philip, the first of that name, took his oath at his coronation; yet,
notwithstanding, they are not unfitly expressed. Neither is he girded with the
sword, nor anointed, nor crowned by the peers (who at that time wore coronets
on their heads), nor receives the sceptre and rod of justice, nor is proclaimed
king, before first the people have commanded it: neither do the peers take
their oaths of allegiance before he has first solemnly sworn to keep the laws
carefully.

And those be, that he shall not waste the public revenue, that he shall
not, of his own proper authority, impose any taxes, customs, or tributes, that
he shall not make peace or war, nor determine of state affairs, without the
advice of the council of state. Briefly, that he should leave to the
parliament, to the states, and to the officers of the kingdom, their authority
entire, and all things else which have been usually observed in the kingdom of
France. And when he first enters any city or province, he is bound to confirm
their privileges, and swears to maintain their laws and customs. This is
straightly observed in the cities of Tholouse and Rochel, and in the countries
of Daulpiny, Province and Brittany. The which towns and provinces have their
particular and express covenants and agreements with the kings, which must
needs be void, if the condition expressed in the contract be not of force, nor
the kings tied to the performance.

There is the form of the oath of the ancient kings of Burgundy, yet
extant in these words: "I will protect all men in their rights, according to
law and justice."

In England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark, there is almost the same
custom as in France; but in no place there is used a more discreet care in
their manner of proceeding, than in Spain. For in the kingdom of Arragon, after
the finishing of many ceremonies, which are used between him» which
represents the Justitia Major of Arragon, which comprehends the majesty of the
commonwealth, seated in a higher seat, and the king, which is to be crowned,
who swears fealty, and does his homage; and having read the laws and
conditions, to the accomplishment whereof he is sworn.

Finally, the lords of the kingdom use to the king these words in the
vulgar language, as is before expressed, "We who are as much worth as you, and
have more power than you, choose you king upon these and these conditions, and
there is one between you and us, who commands over you." But, lest the king
should think he swore only for fashion's sake, and to observe an old custom,
every third year in full assembly of the estates, the very same words, and in
the same manner are repeated unto him.

And, if under pretext of his royal dignity he become insolent, violating
the laws, and neglect his public faith and promise given, then, by the
privilege of the kingdom, he is judged, excommunicated, as execrable as Julian
the apostate was by the primitive church: which excommunication is esteemed of
that validity, that instead of praying for the king in their public orations,
they pray against him, and the subjects are by the same right acquit from their
oath of allegiance: as the vassal is exempted from obedience and obligation by
oath to his lord who stands excommunicated; the which hath been determined and
confirmed both by act of council and decree of state in the kingdom of
Arragon.

In like manner, in the kingdom of Castile in full assembly of the
estates, the king, being ready to be crowned, is first in the presence of all
advertised of his duty: and even then are read the articles discreetly composed
for the good of the commonwealth; the king swears he will observe and keep them
carefully and faithfully, which, being done, then the constable takes his oath
of allegiance, after the princes and deputies for the towns swear each of them
in their order; and the same is observed in the kingdoms of Portugal, Leon, and
the rest of Spain. The lesser principalities have their institution grounded on
the same right. The contracts which the Brabancers and the rest of the
Netherlanders, together with those of Austria, Carinthia, and others, had with
their princes, were always conditional. But especially the Brabancers, to take
away all occasion of dispute, have this express condition: which is that in the
receiving of their duke, there is read in his presence the ancient articles,
wherein is comprised that which is requisite for the public good, and thereunto
is also added, that if he do not exactly and precisely observe them, they may
choose what other lord it shall seem good unto them; the which they do in
express words protest unto him. He having allowed and accepted of these
articles, does in that public assembly promise and solemnly swear to keep them.
The which was observed in the reception of Philip the Second, king of Spain.
Briefly, there is not any man can deny, but that there is a contract mutually
obligatory between the king and the subjects, which requires the people to obey
faithfully, and the king to govern lawfully, for the performance whereof the
king swears first, and after the people.

I would ask here, wherefore a man does swear, if it be not to declare
that what he delivers he sincerely intends from his heart? Can anything be
judged more near to the law of nature, than to observe that which we approve?
Furthermore, what is the reason the king swears first, and at the instance, and
required by the people, but to accept a condition either tacit or expressed?
Wherefore is there a condition opposed to the contract, if it be not that in
failing to perform the condition, the contract, according to law, remains void?
And if for want of satisfying the condition by right, the contract is of no
force, who shall dare to call that people perjured, which refuses to obey a
king who makes no account of his promise, which he might and ought to have
kept, and wilfully breaks those laws which he did swear to observe? On the
contrary, may we not rather esteem such a king perfidious, perjured, and
unworthy of his place? For if the law free the vassal from his lord, who dealt
feloniously with him, although that to speak properly, the lord swears not
fealty to his vassal, but he to him: if the law of the twelve tables doth
detest and hold in execration the protector who defrauds him that is under his
tuition: if the civil law permit an enfranchised servant to bring his action
against his patron, for any grievous usage: if in such cases the same law
delivers the slave from the power of his master, although the obligation be
natural only, and not civil: is it not much more reasonable that the people be
loosed from that oath of allegiance which they have taken, if the king (who may
be not unfitly resembled by an attorney, sworn to look to his client's cause)
first break his oath solemnly taken? And what if all these ceremonies, solemn
oaths, nay, sacramental promises, had never been taken? Does not nature herself
sufficiently teach that kings were on this condition ordained by the people,
that they should govern well; judges, that they should distribute justice
uprightly; captains in the war, that they should lead their armies against
their enemies? If, on the contrary, they themselves forage and spoil their
subjects, and instead of governors become enemies, as they leave indeed the
true and essential qualities of a king, so neither ought the people to
acknowledge them for lawful princes. But what if a people (you will reply)
subdued by force, be compelled by the king to take an oath of servitude? And
what if a robber, pirate, or tyrant (I will answer) with whom no bond of human
society can be effectual, holding his dagger to your throat, constrain you
presently to become bound in a great sum of money? Is it not an unquestionable
maxim in law, that a promise exacted by violence cannot bind, especially if
anything be promised against common reason, or the law of nature? Is there
anything more repugnant to nature and reason, than that a people should manacle
and fetter themselves; and to be obliged by promise to the prince, with their
own hands and weapons to be their own executioners? There is, therefore, a
mutual obligation between the king and the people, which, whether it be civil
or natural only, whether tacit or expressed in words, it cannot by any means be
annihilated, or by any law be abrogated, much less by force made void. And this
obligation is of such power that the prince who wilfully violates it, is a
tyrant. And the people who purposely break it, may be justly termed
seditious.

Hitherto we have treated of a king. It now rests we do somewhat more
fully describe a tyrant. We have shewed that he is a king who lawfully governs
a kingdom, either derived to him by succession, or committed to him by
election. It follows, therefore, that he is reputed a tyrant, which, as
opposite to a king, either gains a kingdom by violence or indirect means, or
being invested therewith by lawful election or succession, governs it not
according to law and equity, or neglects those contracts and agreements, to the
observation whereof he was strictly obliged at his reception. All which may
very well occur in one and the same person. The first is commonly called a
tyrant without title: the second a tyrant by practice. Now, it may well so come
to pass, that he who possesses himself of a kingdom by force, to govern justly,
and he on whom it descends by a lawful title, to rule unjustly. But for so much
as a kingdom is rather a right than an inheritance, and an office than a
possession, he seems rather worthy the name of a tyrant, who unworthily acquits
himself of his charge, than he who entered into his place by a wrong door. In
the same sense is the pope called an intruder who entered by indirect means
into the papacy: and he an abuser who governs ill in it.

Pythagoras says "that a worthy stranger is to be preferred before an
unworthy citizen, yea, though he be a kinsman." Let it be lawful also for us to
say, that a prince who gained his principality by indirect courses, provided he
govern according to law, and administer justice equally, is much to be
preferred before him, who carries himself tyrannously, although he were legally
invested into his government with all the ceremonies and rites thereunto
appertaining.

For seeing that kings were instituted to feed, to judge, to cure the
diseases of the people: Certainly I had rather that a thief should feed me,
than a shepherd devour me: I had rather receive justice from a robber, than
outrage from a judge: I had better be healed by an empiric, than poisoned by a
doctor in physic. It were much more profitable for me to have my estate
carefully managed by an intruding guardian, than to have it wasted and
dissipated by one legally appointed.

And although it may be that ambition was his first solicitor to enter
violently into the government, yet may it perhaps appear he affected it rather
to give testimony of his equity and moderation in governing; witness Cyrus,
Alexander, and the Romans, who ordinarily accorded to those people they
subdued, permission to govern themselves according to their own laws, customs,
and privileges, yea, sometimes incorporated them into the body of their own
state: on the contrary, the tyrant by practice seems to extend the privilege of
his legal succession, the better to execute violence and extortion, as may be
seen in these days, not only by the examples of the Turks and Muscovites, but
also in divers Christian princes. Therefore the act of one who at the first was
ill, is in some reasonable time rectified by justice: whereas the other like an
inveterate disease, the older it grows, the worse it affects the patient.

Now, if according to the saying of Saint Augustine, "those kingdoms
where justice hath no place, are but a rhapsody of free-booters," they are in
that, both the tyrant without title, and he by practice alike, for that they
are both thieves, both robbers, and both unjust possessors, as he certainly is
no less an unjust detainer who takes another man's goods against the owner's
will, than he who employs it ill when it was taken before.

But the fault is without comparison, much more greater of him who
possesses an estate for to ruin it, than of the other who made himself master
of it to preserve it.

Briefly, the tyrant by practice vainly colouring his unjust extortions
with the justice of his title, is much more blameable than the tyrant without
title, who recompenses the violence of his first intrusion in a continued
course of a legal and upright government.

But to proceed, there may be observed some difference amongst tyrants
without title: for there are some who ambitiously invade their neighbour's
countries to enlarge their own, as Nimrod, Minus, and the Canaanites have done.
Although such are termed kings by their own people, yet to those on whose
confines they have encroached without any just right or occasion, they will be
accounted tyrants.

There be others, who having attained to the government of an elective
kingdom, that endeavour by deceitful means, by corruption, by presents, and
other bad practices, to make it become hereditary. For witness whereof, we need
not make search into older times; these are worse than the former, for so much
as secret fraud, as Cicero says, "is ever more odious than open force."

There be also others who are so horribly wicked, that they seek to
enthral their own native country like the viperous brood which gnaws through
the entrails of their mother: as be those generals of armies created by the
people, who afterwards, by the means of those forces, make themselves masters
of the stage, as Cæsar at Rome under pretence of the dictatorship, and
divers princes of Italy.

There be women also who intrude themselves into the government of those
kingdoms which the laws only permit to the males, and make themselves queens
and regents, as Athalia did in Judah, Semiramis in Assyria, Agrippina in the
Roman empire in the reign of her son Nero, Mammea in the time of Alexander
Severus, Semiamira in Heliogabalus's; and certain Bruniehildes in the kingdom
of France, who so educated their sons (as the queens of the house of Medicis in
these latter times) during their minority, that attaining to more maturity,
their only care was to glut themselves in pleasures and delights, so that the
whole management of affairs remained in the hands of their mothers, or of their
minions, servants and officers. Those also are tyrants without title, who,
taking advantage of the sloth, weakness, and dissolute courses of those princes
who are otherwise lawfully instituted, and seeking to enwrap them in a sleepy
dream of voluptuous idleness (as under the French kings, especially those of
the Merovingian line, some of the mayors of the palace have been advanced to
that dignity for such egregious services), transferring into their own command
all the royal authority, and leaving the king only the bare name. All which
tyrants are certainly of this condition, that if for the manner of their
government they are not blameable. Yet for so much as they entered into that
jurisdiction by tyrannous intrusion, they may justly be termed tyrants without
title.

Concerning tyrants by practice, it is not so easy to describe them as
true kings. For reason rules the one, and selfwill the other: the first
prescribes bounds to his affections, the second confines his desires within no
limits. What is the proper rights of kings may be easily declared, but the
outrageous insolences of tyrants cannot without much difficulty be expressed.
And as a right angle is uniform, and like to itself one and the same, so an
oblique diversifies itself into various and sundry species. In like manner is
justice and equity simple, and may be deciphered in few words: but injustice
and injury are divers, and for their sundry accidents not to be so easily
defined; but that more will be omitted than expressed. Now, although there be
certain rules by which these tyrants may be represented (though not absolutely
to the life), yet, notwithstanding, there is not any more certain rule than by
conferring and comparing a tyrant's fraudulent slights with a king's virtuous
actions.

A tyrant lops off those ears which grow higher than the rest of the
corn, especially where virtue makes them most conspicuously eminent; oppresses
by calumnies and fraudulent practices the principal officers of the state;
gives out reports of intended conspiracies against himself, that he might have
some colourable pretext to cut them off; witness Tiberius, Maximinius, and
others, who spared not their own kinsmen, cousins, and brothers.

The king, on the contrary, does not only acknowledge his brothers to be
as it were consorts unto him in the empire, but also holds in the place of
brothers all the principal officers of the kingdom, and is not ashamed to
confess that of them (in quality as deputed from the general estates) he holds
the crown.

The tyrant advances above and in opposition to the ancient and worthy
nobility, mean and unworthy persons; to the end that these base fellows, being
absolutely his creatures, might applaud and apply themselves to the fulfilling
of all his loose and unruly desires. The king maintains every man in his rank,
honours and respects the grandees as the kingdom's friends, desiring their good
as well as his own.

The tyrant hates and suspects discreet and wise men, and fears no
opposition more than virtue, as being conscious of his own vicious courses, and
esteeming his own security to consist principally in a general corruption of
all estates, introduces multiplicity of taverns, gaming houses, masks, stage
plays, brothel houses, and all other licentious superfluities that might
effeminate and bastardise noble spirits, as Cyrus did, to weaken and subdue the
Sardiens. The king, on the contrary, allures from all places honest and able
men, and encourages them by pensions and honours; and for seminaries of virtue,
erects schools and universities in all convenient places.

A tyrant as much as in him lies, prohibits or avoids all public
assemblies, fears parliaments, diets and meetings of the general estates, flies
the light, affecting (like the bat) to converse only in darkness; yea, he is
jealous of the very gesture, countenance, and discourse of his subjects. The
king, because he converses always as in the presence of men and angels, glories
in the multitude and sufficiency of his counsellors, esteeming nothing well
done which is ordered without their advice, and is so far from doubting or
distasting the public meeting of the general estates, as he honours and
respects those assemblies with much favour and affection.

A tyrant nourishes and feeds factions and dissentions amongst his
subjects, ruins one by the help of another, that he may the easier vanquish the
remainder, advantaging himself by this division, like those dishonest surgeons
who lengthen out their cures. Briefly, after the manner of that abominable
Vitellius, he is not ashamed to say that the carcass of a dead enemy,
especially a subject's, yields a good savour. On the contrary, a good king
endeavours always to keep peace amongst his subjects, as a father amongst his
children, choke the seeds of troubles, and quickly heals the scar; the
execution, even of justice upon rebels, drawing tears from his compassionate
eyes; yea, those whom a good king maintains and defends against a foreign
enemy, a tyrant (the enemy of nature) compels them to turn the points of their
swords into their own proper entrails. A tyrant fills his garrisons with
strange soldiers, builds citadels against his subjects, disarms the people,
throws down their forts, makes himself formidable with guards of strangers, or
men only fit for pillage and spoil, gives pensions out of the public treasury
to spies and calumniating informers, dispersed through all cities and
provinces. Contrariwise, a king reposes more his safety in the love of his
subjects than in the strength of his fortresses against his enemies, taking no
care to enroll soldiers, but accounts every subject as a man-at-arms to guard
him, and builds forts to restrain the irruptions of foreign enemies, and not to
constrain his subjects to obedience, in whose fidelity he puts his greatest
confidence. Therefore, it is that tyrants, although they have such numberless
guards about them to drive off throngs of people from approaching them, yet
cannot all those numbers secure them from doubts, jealousies and distrusts,
which continually afflict and terrify their timorous consciences: yea, in the
midst of their greatest strength, the tyrannizer of tyrants, fear, makes prize
of their souls, and there triumphs in their affliction.

A good king, in the greatest concourse of people, is freest from doubts
or fears, nor troubled with solicitous distrusts in his solitary retirements:
all places are equally secure unto him, his own conscience being his best
guard. If a tyrant wants civil broils to exercise his cruel disposition in, he
makes wars abroad; erects idle and needless trophies to continually employ his
tributaries, that they might not have leisure to think on other things, as
Pharaoh did the Jews, and Policrates the Samians; therefore he always prepares
for, or threatens war, or, at least, seems so to do, and so still rather draws
mischief on, than puts it further off. A king never makes war, but compelled
unto it, and for the preservation of the public, he never desires to purchase
advantage by treason; he never enters into any war that exposes the
commonwealth to more danger than it affords probable hope of commodity.

A tyrant leaves no design unattempted by which he may fleece his
subjects of their substance, and turn it to his proper benefit, that being
continually troubled in gaining means to live, they may have no leisure, no
hope, how to regain their liberty. On the contrary, the king knows that every
good subject's purse will be ready to supply the commonwealth occasion, and
therefore believes he is possessed of no small treasure, whilst through his
good government his subjects flow in all abundance.

A tyrant extorts unjustly from many to cast prodigally upon two or three
minions, and those unworthy; he imposes on all, and exacts from all, to furnish
their superfluous and riotous expenses: he builds his own, and followers'
fortunes on the ruins of the public: he draws out the people's blood by the
veins of their means, and gives it presently to carouse to his court-leeches.
But a king cuts off from his ordinary expenses to ease the people's
necessities, neglects his private state, and furnishes with all magnificence
the public occasions; briefly is prodigal of his own blood, to defend and
maintain the people committed to his care.

If a tyrant, as heretofore Tiberius, Nero, Commodus and others, did
suffer his subjects to have some breathing time from unreasonable exactions,
and like sponges to gather some moisture, it is but to squeeze them out
afterwards to his own use: on the contrary, if a king do sometimes open a vein,
and draw some blood, it is for the people's good, and not to be expended at his
own pleasure in any dissolute courses.

And therefore, as the Holy Scripture compares the one to a shepherd, so
does it also resemble the other to a roaring lion, to whom, notwithstanding,
the fox is oftentimes coupled. For a tyrant, as says Cicero, "is culpable in
effect of the greatest injustice that may be imagined, and yet he carries it so
cunningly, that when he most deceives, it is then that he makes greatest
appearance to deal sincerely." And therefore does he artificially counterfeit
religion and devotion, wherein saith Aristotle, "he expresses one of the most
absolute subtleties that tyrants can possibly practise: he does so compose his
countenance to piety, by that means to terrify the people from conspiring
against him; who they may well imagine to be especially favoured of God,
expressing in all appearance so reverently to serve Him." He feigns also to be
exceedingly affected to the public good; not so much for the love of it, as for
fear of his own safety.

Furthermore, he desires much to be esteemed just and loyal in some
affairs, purposely to deceive and betray more easily in matters of greater
consequence: much like those thieves who maintain themselves by thefts and
robberies, yet cannot long subsist in their trade without exercising some
parcel of justice in their proceedings. He also counterfeits the merciful, but
it is in pardoning of such malefactors, in punishing whereof he might more
truly gain the reputation of a pitiful prince.

To speak in a word, that which the true king is, the tyrant would seem
to be, and knowing that men are wonderfully attracted with, and enamoured of
virtue, he endeavours with much subtlety to make his vices appear yet masked
with some shadow of virtue: but let him counterfeit never so cunningly, still
the fox will be known by his tail: and although he fawn and flatter like a
spaniel, yet his snarling and grinning will ever betray his currish kind.

Furthermore, as a well-ordered monarchy partakes of the principal
commodities of all other governments, so, on the contrary, where tyranny
prevails, there all the discommodities of confusion are frequent.

A monarchy has in this conformity with an aristocracy, that the most
able and discreet are called to consultations. Tyranny and oligarchy accord in
this, that their councils are composed of the worst and most corrupted. And as
in the council royal, there may in a sort seem many kings to have interests in
the government, so, in the other, on the contrary, a multitude of tyrants
always domineers.

The monarchy borrows of the popular government the assemblies of the
estates, whither are sent for deputies the most sufficient of cities and
provinces, to deliberate on, and determine matters of state: the tyranny takes
this of the ochlocracy, that if she be not able to hinder the convocation of
the estates, yet will she endeavour by factious subtleties and pernicious
practices, that the greatest enemies of order and reformation of the state be
sent to those assemblies, the which we have known practised in our times. In
this manner assumes the tyrant the countenance of a king, and tyranny the
semblance of a kingdom, and the continuance succeeds commonly according to the
dexterity wherewith it is managed; yet, as Aristotle says, "we shall hardly
read of any tyranny that has outlasted a hundred years": briefly, the king
principally regards the public utility, and a tyrant's chiefest care is for his
private commodity.

But, seeing the condition of men is such, that a king is with much
difficulty to be found, that in all his actions he only agrees at the public
good, and yet cannot long subsist without expression of some special care
thereof, we will conclude that where the commonwealth's advantage is most
preferred, there is both a lawful king and kingdom; and where particular
designs and private ends prevail against the public profit, there questionless
is a tyrant and tyranny.

Thus much concerning tyrants by practice, in the examining whereof we
have not altogether fixed our discourse on the loose disorders of their wicked
and licentious lives, which some say is the character of a bad man, but not
always of a bad prince. If therefore, the reader be not satisfied with this
description, besides the more exact representations of tyrants which he shall
find in histories, he may in these our days behold an absolute model of many
living and breathing tyrants: whereof Aristotle in his time did much complain.
Now, at the last we are come as it were by degrees to the chief and principal
point of the question. We have seen how that kings have been chosen by God,
either with relation to their families or their persons only, and after
installed by the people. In like manner what is the duty of the king, and of
the officers of the kingdom, how far the authority, power, and duty both of the
one and the other extends, and what and how sacred are the covenants and
contracts which are made at the inauguration of kings, and what conditions are
intermixed, both tacit and expressed; finally, who is a tyrant without title,
and who by practice, seeing it is a thing unquestionable that we are bound to
obey a lawful king, which both to God and people carries himself according to
those covenants whereunto he stands obliged, as it were to God Himself, seeing
in a sort he represents his divine Majesty? It now follows that we treat, how,
and by whom a tyrant may be lawfully resisted, and who are the persons who
ought to be chiefly actors therein, and what course is to be held, that the
action may be managed according to right and reason. We must first speak of him
who is commonly called a tyrant without title. Let us suppose then that some
Ninus, having neither received outrage nor offence, invades a people over whom
he has no colour of pretension: that Cæsar seeks to oppress his country,
and the Roman commonwealth: that Popiclus endeavours by murders and treasons to
make the elective kingdom of Polonia to become hereditary to him and his
posterity: or some Bruniehilde draws to herself and her Protadius the absolute
government of France, or Ebronius, taking advantage of Theoderick's weakness
and idleness, gains the entire administration of the state, and oppresses the
people, what shall be our lawful refuge herein?

First, the law of nature teaches and commands us to maintain and defend
our lives and liberties, without which life is scant worth the enjoying,
against all injury and violence. Nature has imprinted this by instinct in dogs
against wolves, in bulls against lions, betwixt pigeons and sparrow-hawks,
betwixt pullen and kites, and yet much more in man ' against man himself, if
man become a beast: and therefore he who questions the lawfulness of defending
oneself, does, as much as in him lies, question the law of nature. To this must
be added the law of nations, which distinguishes possessions and dominions,
fixes limits, and makes out confines, which every man is bound to defend
against all invaders. And, therefore, it is no less lawful to resist Alexander
the Great, if without any right or being justly provoked, he invades a country
with a mighty navy, as well as Diomedes the pirate who scours the seas in a
small vessel. For in this case Alexander's right is no more than Diomedes' but
only he has more power to do wrong, and not so easily to be compelled to reason
as the other. Briefly, one may as well oppose Alexander in pillaging a country,
as a thief in purloining a cloak; as well him when he seeks to batter down the
walls of a city, as a robber who offers to break into a private house.

There is, besides this, the civil law, or municipal laws of several
countries which governs the societies of men, by certain rules, some in one
manner, some in another; some submit themselves to the government of one man,
some to more; others are ruled by a whole commonalty, some absolutely exclude
women from the royal throne, others admit them; these here choose their king
descended of such a family, those there make election of whom they please,
besides other customs practised amongst several nations. If, therefore, any
offer either by fraud or force to violate this law, we are all bound to resist
him, because he wrongs that society to which we owe all that we have, and would
ruin our country, to the preservation whereof all men by nature, by law and by
solemn oath, are strictly obliged: insomuch that fear or negligence, or bad
purposes, make us omit this duty, we may justly be accounted breakers of the
laws, betrayers of our country, and contemners of religion. Now as the laws of
nature, of nations, and the Civil commands us to take arms against such
tyrants; so, is there not any manner of reason that should persuade us to the
contrary; neither is there any oath, covenant, or obligation, public or
private, of power justly to restrain us; therefore the meanest private man may
resist and lawfully oppose such an intruding tyrant. The law Julia, which
condemns to death those who raise rebellion against their country or prince,
has here no place; for he is no prince, who, without any lawful title invades
the commonwealth or confines of another; nor he a rebel, who by arms defends
his country; but rather to this had relation the oath which all the youth of
Athens were accustomed to take in the temple of Aglaura, "I will fight for
religion, for the laws, for the altars, and for our possessions, either alone,
or with others; and will do the utmost of my endeavour to leave to posterity
our country, at the least, in as good estate as I found it." To as little
purpose can the laws made against seditious persons be alleged here; for he is
seditious who undertakes to defend the people, in opposition of order and
public discipline; but he is no raiser, but a suppressor of sedition, who
restrains within the limits of reason the subverter of his country's welfare,
and public discipline.

On the contrary, to this has proper relation the law of tyrannicide,
which honours the living with great and memorable recompenses, and the dead
with worthy epitaphs, and glorious statues, that have been their country's
liberators from tyrants; as Harmodius and Aristogiton at Athens, Brutus and
Cassius in Rome, and Aratus of Sycione. To these by a public decree were
erected statues, because they delivered their countries from the tyrannies of
Pisistratus, of Cæsar, and of Nicocles. The which was of such respect
amongst the ancients, that Xerxes having made himself master of the city of
Athens, caused to be transported into Persia the statues of Harmodius and
Aristogiton; afterwards Seleucus caused them to be returned into their former
place: and as in their passage they came by Rhodes, those famous citizens
entertained them with public and stupendous solemnities, and during their abode
there, they placed them in the choicest sacresties of their gods. But the law
made against forsakers and traitors, takes absolutely hold on those who are
negligent and careless to deliver their country oppressed with tyranny, and
condemns them to the same punishment as those cowardly soldiers, who, when they
should fight, either counterfeit sickness, or cast off their arms and run away.
Every one, therefore, both in general and particular, ought to yield their best
assistance unto this: as in a public fire, to bring both hooks, and buckets,
and water; we must not ceremoniously expect that the captain of the watch be
first called, nor till the governor of the town be come into the streets; but
let every man draw water and climb to the house-top; it is necessary for all
men that the fire be quenched. For if whilst the Gaules with much silence and
vigilancy seek to scale and surprise the capital, the soldiers be drowsy with
their former pains, the watch buried in sleep, the dogs fail to bark, then must
the geese play the sentinels, and with their cackling noise, give an alarm. And
the soldiers and watch shall be degraded, yea, and put to death. The geese for
perpetual remembrance of this deliverance, shall be always fed in the capital,
and much esteemed.

This, of which we have spoken, is to be understood of a tyranny not yet
firmly rooted, to wit, whilst a tyrant conspires, machinates, and lays his
plots and practices. But if he be once so possessed of the state, and that the
people, being subdued, promise and swear obedience; the commonwealth being
oppressed, resign their authority into their hands; and that the kingdom in
some formal manner consent to the changing of their laws; for so much certainty
as then, he has gained a title which before he wanted and seems to be as well a
legal as actual possessor thereof, although this yoke were laid on the people's
neck by compulsion, yet must they quietly and peaceably rest in the will of the
Almighty, who, at His pleasure transfers kingdoms from one nation to another;
otherways there should be no kingdom, whose jurisdiction might not be disputed.
And it may well chance, that he who before was a tyrant without title, having
obtained the title of a king, may free himself from any tyrannous imputation,
by governing those under him with equity and moderation. Therefore then, as the
people of Jurie, under the authority of King Ezechias, did lawfully resist the
invasion of Senacherib the Assyrian; so, on the contrary was Zedechias and all
his subjects worthily punished, because that without any just occasion, after
they had done homage and sworn fealty to Nebuchadnezar, they rose in rebellion
against him. For, after promise of performance, it is too late to repent. And,
as in battles every one ought to give testimony of his valour, but, being taken
prisoner, must faithfully observe covenants, so it is requisite, that the
people maintain their rights by all possible means; but, if it chance that they
be brought into the subjection of another's will, they must then patiently
support the dominion of the victor. So did Pompey, Cato, and Cicero and others,
perform the parts of good patriots then when they took arms against
Cæsar, seeking to alter the government of the state; neither can those be
justly excused, whose base fear hindered the happy success of Pompey and his
partakers' noble designs. Augustus himself is said to have reproved one who
railed on Cato, affirming that he carried himself worthily and exceedingly
affected to the greatness of his country, in courageously opposing the
alteration which his contraries sought to introduce in the government of the
state, seeing all innovations of that nature are ever authors of much trouble
and confusion.

Furthermore, no man can justly reprehend Brutus, Cassius, and the rest
who killed Cæsar before his tyrannical authority had taken any firm
rooting. And so there were statues of brass erected in honour of them by public
decree at Athens, and placed by those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, then when,
after the despatching of Cæsar, they retired from Rome, to avoid Marc
Antonie and Augustus their revenge. But Cinna was certainly guilty of sedition,
who, after a legal transferring of the people's power into the hands of
Augustus, is said to have conspired against him. Likewise, when the
Pépins sought to take the crown of France from the Merovingians; as also
when those of the line of Capet endeavoured to supplant the Pépins, any
might lawfully resist them without incurring the crime of sedition. But when,
by public counsel and the authority of the estates, the kingdom was transferred
from one family to another, it was then unlawful to oppose it. The same may be
said, if a woman possess herself of the kingdom, which the Salic law absolutely
prohibits, or if one seek to make a kingdom merely elective, hereditary to his
offspring, while those laws stand in force, and are unrepealed by the authority
of the general estates, who represent the body of the people. Neither is it
necessary in this respect, to have regard whether faction is the greater, more
powerful or more illustrious. Always those are the greater number who are led
by passion, than those who are ruled by reason, and therefore tyranny has more
servants than the commonwealth. But Rome is there, according to the saying of
Pompey, where the senate is, and the senate is where there is obedience to the
laws, love of liberty, and studious carefulness for the country's preservation.
And therefore, though Brennus may seem to be master of Rome, yet,
notwithstanding, is Rome at Veii with Camillus, who prepares to deliver Rome
from bondage. It behoves, therefore, all true Romans to repair to Camillus, and
assist his enterprise with the utmost of their power and endeavours. Although
Themistocles, and all his able and worthiest companions leave Athens, and put
to sea with a navy of two hundred galleys, notwithstanding, it cannot be said
that any of these men are banished Athens, but rather, as Themistocles
answered, "These two hundred galleys are more useful for us, than the greatest
city of all Greece; for that they are armed, and prepared for the defence of
those who endeavour to maintain and uphold the public state."

But to come to other examples: it follows not that the church of God
must needs be always in that place where the ark of the covenant is; for the
Philistines may carry the ark into the temples of their idols. It is no good
argument, that because we see the Roman eagles waving in ensigns, and hear
their legions named, that therefore presently we conclude that the army of the
Roman commonwealth is there present; for there is only and properly the power
of the state where they are assembled to maintain the liberty of the country
against the ravenous oppression of tyrants, to enfranchise the people from
servitude, and to suppress the impudency of insulting flatterers, who abuse the
prince's weakness by oppressing his subjects for the advantage of their own
fortunes, and contain ambitious minds from enlarging their desires beyond the
limits of equity and moderation. Thus much concerning tyrants without title.
But for tyrants by practice, whether they at first gained their authority by
the sword, or were legally invested therewith by a general consent, it behoves
us to examine this point with much wary circumspection. In the first place we
must remember that all princes are born men, and therefore reason and passion
are as hardly to be separated in them, as the soul is from the body whilst the
man lives. We must not then expect princes absolute in perfection, but rather
repute ourselves happy if those who govern us be indifferently good. And
therefore, although the prince observe not exact mediocrity in state affairs;
if sometimes passion overrule his reason, if some careless omission make him
neglect the public utility; or if he do not always carefully execute justice
with equality, or repulse not with ready valour an invading enemy; he must not
therefore be presently declared a tyrant. And certainly, seeing he rules not as
a god over men, nor as men over beasts, but is a man composed of the same
matter, and of the same nature with the rest: as we would questionless judge
that prince unreasonably insolent, who should insult over and abuse his
subjects, as if they were brute beasts; so those people are doubtless as much
void of reason, who imagine a prince should be complete in perfection, or
expect divine abilities in a nature so frail and subject to imperfections. But
if a prince purposely ruin the commonwealth, if he presumptuously pervert and
resist legal proceedings or lawful rights, if he make no reckoning of faith,
covenants, justice nor piety, if he prosecute his subjects as enemies; briefly,
if he express all or the chiefest of those wicked practices we have formerly
spoken of; then we may certainly declare him a tyrant, who is as much an enemy
both to God and men. We do not therefore speak of a prince less good, but of
one absolutely bad; not of one less wise, but of one malicious and treacherous;
not of one less able judiciously to discuss legal differences, but of one
perversely bent to pervert justice and equity; not of an unwarlike, but of one
furiously disposed to ruin the people, and ransack the state. For the wisdom of
a senate, the integrity of a judge, the valour of a captain, may peradventure
enable a weak prince to govern well. But a tyrant could be content that all the
nobility, the counsellors of state, the commanders for the wars, had but one
head that he might take it off at one blow: those being the proper objects of
his distrust and fear, and by consequence the principal subjects on whom he
desires to execute his malice and cruelty. A foolish prince, although (to speak
according to right and equity) he ought to be deposed, yet may he perhaps in
some sort be borne withal. But a tyrant the more he is tolerated, the more he
becomes intolerable. Furthermore, as the princes' pleasure is not always law,
so many times it is not expedient that the people do all that which may
lawfully be done; for it may oftentimes chance that the medicine proves more
dangerous than the disease. Therefore it becomes wise men to try all ways
before they come to blows, to use all other remedies before they suffer the
sword to decide the controversy. If then, those who represent the body of the
people, foresee any innovation or machination against the state, or that it be
already embarked into a course of perdition; their duty is, first to admonish
the prince, and not to attend, that the disease by accession of time and
accidents becomes unrecoverable. For tyranny may be properly resembled unto a
fever hectic, the which at the first is easy to be cured, but with much
difficulty to be known; but after it is sufficiently known, it becomes
incurable. Therefore small beginnings are to be carefully observed, and by
those whom it concerns diligently prevented.

If the prince therefore persist in his violent courses, and contemn
frequent admonitions, addressing his designs only to that end, that he may
oppress at his pleasure, and effect his own desires without fear or restraint;
he then doubtless makes himself liable to that detested crime of tyranny: and
whatsoever either the law, or lawful authority permits against a tyrant, may be
lawfully practised against him. Tyranny is not only a will, but the chief, and
as it were the complement and abstract of vices. A tyrant subverts the state,
pillages the people, lays stratagems to entrap their lives, breaks promise with
all, scoffs at the sacred obligations of a solemn oath, and therefore is he so
much more vile than the vilest of usual malefactors. By how much offences
committed against a generality, are worthy of greater punishment than those
which concern only particular and private persons. If thieves and those who
commit sacrilege be declared infamous; nay, if they justly suffer corporal
punishment by death, can we invent any that may be worthily equivalent for so
outrageous a crime?

Furthermore, we have already proved, that all kings receive their royal
authority from the people, that the whole people considered in one body is
above and greater than the king; and that the king and emperor are only the
prime and supreme governors and ministers of the kingdom and empire; but the
people the absolute lord and owner thereof. It therefore necessarily follows,
that a tyrant is in the same manner guilty of rebellion against the majesty of
the people, as the lord of a fee, who feloniously transgresses the conditions
of his investitures, and is liable to the same punishment, yea, and certainly
deserves much more greater than the equity of those laws inflicts on the
delinquents. Therefore as Bartolus says, "He may either be deposed by those who
are lords in sovereignty over him, or else justly punished according to the law
Julia, which condemns those who offer violence to the public." The body of the
people must needs be the sovereign of those who represent it, which in some
places are the electors, palatines, peers; in other, the assembly of the
general estates. And, if the tyranny have gotten such sure footing, as there is
no other means but force to remove him, then it is lawful for them to call the
people to arms, to enroll and raise forces, and to employ the utmost of their
power, and use against him all advantages and stratagems of war, as against the
enemy of the commonwealth, and the disturber of the public peace. Briefly, the
same sentence may be justly pronounced against him, as was against Manlius
Capitolinus at Rome. "Thou wast to me, Manlius, when thou didst tumble down the
Gaules that scaled the capital: but since thou art now become an enemy, like
one of them, thou shalt be precipitated down from the same place from whence
thou formerly tumbled those enemies." The officers of the kingdom cannot for
this be rightly taxed of sedition; for in a sedition there must necessarily
concur but two parts, or sides, the which peremptorily contest together, so
that it is necessary that the one be in the right, and the other in the wrong.
That part undoubtedly has the right on their side, which defends the laws, and
strives to advance the public profit of the kingdom. And those, on the
contrary, are questionless in the wrong, who break the laws, and protect those
who violate justice, and oppress the commonwealth. Those are certainly in the
right way, as said Bartolus, "who endeavour to suppress tyrannical government,
and those in the wrong, who oppose lawful authority." And that must ever be
accounted just, which is intended only for the public benefit, and that unjust,
which aims chiefly at private commodity. Wherefore Thomas Aquinas says, "That a
tyrannical rule, having no proper address for the public welfare, but only to
satisfy a private will, with increase of particular profit to the ruler, cannot
in any reasonable construction be accounted lawful, and therefore the
disturbance of such a government cannot be esteemed seditious, much less
traitorous"; for that offence has proper relation only to a lawful prince, who,
indeed, is an inanimated or speaking law; therefore, seeing that he who employs
the utmost of his means and power to annihilate the laws, and quell their
virtue and vigour, can no ways be justly intituled therewith. So neither,
likewise, can those who oppose and take arms against him, be branded with so
notorious a crime. Also this offence is committed against the commonwealth; but
for so much as the commonwealth is there only where the laws are in force, and
not where a tyrant devours the state at his own pleasure and liking, he
certainly is quit of that crime which ruins the majesty of the public state,
and those questionless are worthily protectors and preservers of the
commonwealth, who, confident in the lawfulness of their authority, and summoned
thereunto by their duty, do courageously resist the unjust proceedings of the
tyrant.

And in this their action, we must not esteem them as private men and
subjects, but as the representative body of the people, yea, and as the
sovereignty itself, which demands of his minister an account of his
administration. Neither can we in any good reason account the officers of the
kingdom disloyal, who in this manner acquit themselves of their charge.

There is ever, and in all places, a mutual and reciprocal obligation
between the people and the prince; the one promises to be a good and wise
prince, the other to obey faithfully, provided he govern justly. The people
therefore are obliged to the prince under condition, the prince to the people
simply and purely. Therefore, if the prince fail in his promise, the people are
exempt from obedience, the contract is made void, the right of obligation of no
force. Then the king if he govern unjustly is perjured, and the people likewise
forsworn if they obey not his lawful commands. But that people are truly acquit
from all perfidiousness, who publicly renounce the unjust dominion of a tyrant,
or he, striving unjustly by strong hand to continue the possession, do
constantly endeavour to expulse him by force of arms.

It is therefore permitted the officers of a kingdom, either all, or some
good number of them, to suppress a tyrant; and it is not only lawful for them
to do it, but their duty expressly requires it; and, if they do it not, they
can by no excuse colour their baseness. For the electors, palatines, peers, and
other officers of state, must not think they were established only to make
pompous paradoes and shows, when they are at the coronation of the king,
habited in their robes of state, as if there were some masque or interlude to
be represented; or as if they were that day to act the parts of Roland, Oliver,
or Renaldo, and such other personages on a stage, or to counterfeit and revive
the memory of the knights of the round table; and after the dismissing of that
day's assembly, to suppose they have sufficiently acquitted themselves of their
duty, until a recess of the like solemnity. Those solemn rites and ceremonies
were not instituted for vain ostentation, nor to pass, as in a dumb show, to
please the spectators, nor in children's sports, as it is with Horace, to
create a king in jest; but those grandees must know, that as well for office
and duty, as for honour, they are called to the performance of those rites, and
that in them, the commonwealth is committed and recommended to the king, as to
her supreme and principal tutor and protector, and to them as co-adjutors and
assistants to him: and therefore, as the tutors or guardians (yea, even those
who are appointed by way of honour) are chosen to have care of and observe the
actions and importments of him who holds the principal rank in the tutorship,
and to look how he carries himself in the administration of the goods of his
pupil. So likewise are the former ordained to have an eye to the courses of the
king, for, with an equivalent authority, as the others for the pupil, so are
they to hinder and prevent the damage and detriment of the people, the king
being properly reputed as the prime guardian, and they his co-adjutors.

In like manner, as the faults of the principal tutor who manages the
affairs are justly imputed to the co-adjoints in the tutorship, if when they
ought and might, they did not discover his errors, and cause him to be
despoiled, especially failing in the main points of his charge, to wit, in not
communicating unto them the affairs of his administration, in dealing
unfaithfully in his place, in doing anything to the dishonour or detriment of
his pupil, in embezzling of his goods or estate, or if he be an enemy to his
pupil: briefly, if either in regard of the worthlessness of his person, or
weakness of his judgment, he be unable well to discharge so weighty a charge,
so also, are the peers and principal officers of the kingdom accountable for
the government thereof, and must both prevent, and if occasion require,
suppress the tyranny of the prince, as also supply with their care and
diligence, his inability and weakness.

Finally, if a tutor omitting or neglecting to do all that for his pupil,
which a discreet father of a family would and might conveniently perform,
cannot well be excused, and the better acquitting himself of his charge, has
others as concealers and associates, joined with him to oversee his actions;
with much more reason may and ought the officers of the crown to restrain the
violent irruptions of that prince, who, instead of a father, becomes an enemy
to his people; seeing, to speak properly, they are as well accountable for his
actions wherein the public has interests, as for their own. Those officers must
also remember, that the king holds truly the first place in the administration
of the state, but they the second, and so following according to their ranks;
not that they should follow his courses, if he transgress the laws of equity
and justice; not that if he oppress the commonwealth, they should connive to
his wickedness. For the commonwealth was as well committed to their care as to
his, so that it is not sufficient for them to discharge their own duty in
particular, but it behoves them also to contain the prince within the limits of
reason; briefly, they have both jointly and severally promised with solemn
oaths, to advance and procure the profit of a commonwealth, although then that
he forswore himself; yet may not they imagine that they are quit of their
promise, no more than the bishops and patriarchs, if they suffer an heretical
pope to ruin the church; yea, they should esteem themselves so much the more
obliged to the observing their oath, by how much they find him wilfully
disposed to rush on in his perfidious courses. But, if there be collusion
betwixt him and them, they are prevaricators; if they dissemble, they may
justly be called forsakers and traitors; if they deliver not the commonwealth
from tyranny, they may be truly ranked in the number of tyrants; as on the
contrary they are protectors, tutors, and in a sort kings, if they keep and
maintain the state safe and entire, which is also recommended to their care and
custody. Although these things are sufficiently certain of themselves, yet may
they be in some sort confirmed by examples. The kings of Canaan who pressed the
people of Israel with a hard, both corporal and spiritual, servitude
(prohibiting them all meetings and use of arms) were certainly tyrants by
practice, although they had some pretext of title. For Eglon and Jabin had
peaceably reigned almost the space of twenty years. God stirred up
extraordinarily Ehud, who, by a politic stratagem killed Eglon, and Deborah who
overthrew the army of Jabin, and by his service delivered the people from the
servitude of tyrants, not that it was unlawful for the ordinary magistrates,
the princes of the tribes, and such other officers to have performed it, for
Deborah does reprove the sluggish idleness of some, and flatly detests the
disloyalty of others, for that they failed to perform their duty herein.

But it pleased God, taking commiseration of the distress of his people,
in this manner to supply the defects of the ordinary magistrates.

Rehoboam, the son of Solomon, refused to disburden the people of some
unnecessary imposts and burdens; and being petitioned by the people in the
general assembly of the states, he grew insolent, and relying on the counsel of
his minions, arrogantly threatens to lay heavier burdens on them hereafter. No
man can doubt, but that according to the tenure of the contract, first passed
between the king and the people, the prime and principal officers of the
kingdom had authority to repress such insolence. They were only blameable in
this, that they did that by faction and division, which should more properly
have been done in the general assembly of the states; in like manner, in that
they transferred the sceptre from Judah (which was by God only confined to that
tribe) into another lineage; and also (as it chances in other affairs) for that
they did ill and disorderly manage a just and lawful cause. Profane histories
are full of such examples in other kingdoms.

Brutus, general of the soldiers, and Lucretius, governor of the city of
Rome, assembled the people against Tarquinius Superbus, and by their authority
thrust him from the royal throne: nay, which is more, his goods were
confiscated; whereby it appears that if Tarquinius had been apprehended,
undoubtedly he should have been according to the public laws, corporally
punished.

The true causes why Tarquinius was deposed, were because he altered the
custom, whereby the king was obliged to advise with the senate on all weighty
affairs; that he made war and peace according to his own fancy; that he treated
confederacies without demanding counsel and consent from the people or senate;
that he violated the laws whereof he was made guardian; briefly that he made no
reckoning to observe the contracts agreed between the former kings, and the
nobility and people of Rome. For the Roman emperors, I am sure you remember the
sentence pronounced by the senate against Nero, wherein he was judged an enemy
to the commonwealth, and his body condemned to be ignominiously cast on the
dung hill. And that other pronounced against Vitellius, which adjudged him to
be shamefully dismembered, and in that miserable estate trailed through the

city, and at last put to death. Another against Maximinius, who was
despoiled of the empire; and Maximus and Albinus established in his place by
the senate. There might also be added many others drawn from unquestionable
historians.

The Emperor Trajan held not himself exempt from laws, neither desired he
to be spared if he became a tyrant; for in delivering the sword unto the great
provost of the empire, he says unto him: "If I command as I should, use this
sword for me: but if I do otherways, unsheathe it against me." In like manner
the French by the authority of the states, and solicited thereunto by the
officers of the kingdom, deposed Childerick the First, Sigisbert, Theodorick,
and Childerick the Third for their tyrannies, and chose others of another
family to sit on the royal throne. Yea, they deposed some because of their
idleness and want of judgment, who exposed the state in prey to panders,
courtesans, flatterers, and such other unworthy mushrooms of the court, who
governed all things at their pleasure; taking from such rash phaetons the
bridle of government, lest the whole body of the state and people should be
consumed through their unadvised folly.

Amongst others, Theodoret was degraded because of Ebroinus, Dagobert for
Plectude and Thibaud his pander, with some others: the estates esteeming the
command of an effeminate prince, as insupportable as that of a woman, and as
unwillingly supporting the yoke of tyrannous ministers managing affairs in the
name of a loose and unworthy prince, as the burden of a tyrant alone. To be
brief, no more suffering themselves to be governed by one possessed by a devil,
than they would by the devil himself. It is not very long since the estates
compelled Lewis the Eleventh (a prince as subtle and it may be as wilful as
any) to receive thirty-six overseers, by whose advice he was bound to govern
the affairs of state. The descendants from Charlemaine substituted in the place
of the Merovingians for the government of the kingdom, or those of Capet,
supplanting the Charlemains by order of the estates, and reigning at this day,
have no other nor better right to the crown, than what we have formerly
described; and it has ever been according to law permitted the whole body of
the people, represented by the council of the kingdom, which are commonly
called the assembly of the states, to depose and establish princes, according
to the necessities of the commonwealth. According to the same rule we read that
Adolph was removed from the Empire of Germany a.d. 1296, because for
covetousness without any just occasion, he invaded the kingdom of France, in
favour of the English, and Wenceslaus was also deposed in the year of our Lord
1400. Yet were not these princes exceeding bad ones, but of the number of those
who are accounted less ill. Isabella, the wife of Edward the Second, King of
England, assembled the Parliament against her husband, who was there deposed,
both because he tyrannized in general over his subjects; as also for that he
cut off the heads of many noble men, without any just or legal proceeding. It
is not long since Christian lost the crown of Denmark, Henry that of Sweden,
Mary Stuart that of Scotland, for the same or near resembling occasions. And
the most worthy histories relate divers alterations and changes which have
happened in like manner, in the kingdoms of Polonia, Hungary, Spain, Portugal,
Bohemia, and others.

But what shall we say of the pope himself? It is generally held that the
cardinals, because they do elect him, or if they fail in their duty, the
patriarchs who are next in rank to them, may upon certain occasions maugre the
pope, call a council, yea, and in it judge him; as when by some notorious
offence he scandalizes the universal church. If he be incorrigible, if
reformation be as necessary in the head as the members, if contrary to his oath
he refuse to call a general council. And we read for certain, that divers popes
have been deposed by general councils. But if they obstinately abuse their
authority, there must (saith Baldus) first be used verbal admonitions;
secondly, herbal medicaments or remedies; thirdly, stones or compulsion; for
where virtue and fair means have not power to persuade, there force and terror
must be put in use to compel. Now, if according to the opinions of most of the
learned, by decrees of councils, and by custom in like occasions, it plainly
appears, that the council may depose the pope, who, notwithstanding, vaunts
himself to be the king of kings, and as much in dignity above the emperor, as
the sun is above the moon, assuming to himself power to depose kings and
emperors when he pleases: who will make any doubt or question, that the general
assembly of the estates of any kingdom, who are the representative body
thereof, may not only degrade and disthronize a tyrant; but also, even
disauthorize and depose a king, whose weakness or folly is hurtful or
pernicious to the state.

But let us suppose, that in this our ship of state, the pilot is drunk,
the most of his associates are asleep, or after large and unreasonable tippling
together, they regard their eminent danger in approaching a rock with idle and
negligent jollity; the ship in the mean season instead of following her right
course, that might serve for the best advantage of the owners' profit, is ready
rather to split herself. What should then a master's mate, or some other under
officer do, who is vigilant and careful to perform his duty? Shall it be
thought sufficient for him to pinch or punch them who are asleep, without
daring in the meantime to put his helping hand to preserve the vessel which
runs on a course to destruction, lest he should be thought to intermeddle with
that which he has no authority nor warrant to do? What mad discretion, nay,
rather notorious impiety were this? Seeing then that tyranny, as Plato says,
"is a drunken frenzy or frantic drunkenness," if the prince endeavour to ruin
the commonwealth, and the principal officers concur with him in his bad
purposes, or at the least are lulled in a dull and drowsy dream of security,
and the people (being indeed the true and absolute owner and lord of the state)
be, through the pernicious negligence and fraudulent connivency of those
officers, brought to the very brim of danger and destruction, and that there
be, notwithstanding, amongst those unworthy ministers of state, some one who
does studiously observe the deceitful and dangerous encroachments of tyranny,
and from his soul detests it, what opposition do we suppose best befits such a
one to make against it? Shall he consent himself to admonish his associates of
their duty, who to their utmost ability endeavour the contrary? Besides, that
such an advertisement is commonly accompanied with too much danger, and the
condition of the times considered, the very soliciting of reformation will be
held as a capital crime: so that in so doing he may be not unfitly resembled to
one, who, being in the midst of a desert, environed with thieves, should
neglect all means of defence, and after he had cast away his arms, in an
eloquent and learned discourse commend justice, and extol the worth and dignity
of the laws. This would be truly according to the proverb, "To run mad with
reason." What then? Shall he be dull and deaf to the groans and cries of the
people? Shall he stand still and be silent when he sees the thieves enter?
Shall he only hold his hands in his bosom, and with a demure countenance, idly
bewail the miserable condition of the times? If the laws worthily condemn a
soldier, who, for fear of the enemies, counterfeits sickness, because in so
doing he expresses both disloyalty and treachery, what punishment can we invent
sufficient for him, who either maliciously or basely betrays those whose
protection and defence he has absolutely undertaken and sworn? Nay, rather than
let such a one cheerfully call one and command the mariners to the performance
of their duty: let him carefully and constantly take order that the
commonwealth be not endamaged, and if need so require, even in despite of the
king, preserve the kingdom, without which the kingly title were idle and
frivolous, and if by no other means it can be affected, let him take the king
and bind him hand and foot, that so he may be more conveniently cured of his
frenzy and madness.

For as we have already said, all the administration of the kingdom is
not by the people absolutely resigned into the hands of the king; as neither
the bishopric nor care of the universal church, is totally committed to the
pope: but also to the care and custody of all the principal officers of the
kingdom. Now, for the preserving of peace and concord amongst those who govern,
and for the preventing of jealousies, factions, and distrusts amongst men of
equal rank and dignity, the king was created prime and principal superintendent
in the government of the commonwealth. The king swears that his most special
care shall be for the welfare of the kingdom; and the officers of the crown
take all the same oath. If then the king, or divers of them falsifying their
faith, ruin the commonwealth, or abandon her in her greatest necessity, must
the rest also fashion themselves to their base courses, and quit all care of
the state's safety; as if the bad example of their companions absolved them
from their oath of fidelity? Nay, rather on the contrary, in seeing them
neglect their promise, they shall best advantage the commonwealth in carefully
observing theirs: chiefly because for this reason they were instituted, as in
the steads of ephori, or public controllers, and for that every thing gains the
better estimation of just and right in that it is mainly and principally
addressed to that end for which it was first ordained.

Furthermore, if divers have jointly vowed one and the same thing, is the
obligation of the one annihilated by the perjury of the other? If many become
bound for one and the same sum, can the bankrupting of one of the obligees quit
the rest of their engagement? If divers tutors administer ill the goods of
their pupil, and that there be one amongst them who makes conscience of his
actions, can the bad dealing of his companions acquit him? Nay, rather on the
contrary, he cannot free himself from the infamy of perjury, if to the utmost
of his power he do not truly discharge his trust, and perform his promise:
neither can the others' deficiency be excused, in the bad managing of the
tutorship, if they likewise accuse not the rest who were joined with them in
the administration, for it is not only the principal tutor who may call to an
account those who are suspected to have unjustly or indiscreetly ordered the
affairs of their pupil, but even those who were formerly removed may also upon
just occasion discharge and remove the delinquents therein. Therefore those who
are obliged to serve a whole empire and kingdom, as the constables, marshals,
peers and others, or those who have particular obligations to some provinces or
cities, which make a part or portion of the kingdom, as dukes, marquises,
earls, sheriffs, mayors, and the rest, are bound by the duty of their place, to
succour the commonwealth, and to free it from the burden of tyrants, according
to the rank and place which they hold of the people next after the king. The
first ought to deliver the whole kingdom from tyrannous oppression; the other,
as tutors, that part of the kingdom whose protection they have undertaken; the
duty of the former is to suppress the tyrant, that of the latter, to drive him
from their confines. Wherefore Mattathias, being a principal man in the state,
when some basely connived, others perniciously consorted with Antiochus, the
tyrannous oppressor of the Jewish kingdom, he courageously opposing the
manifest oppression both of church and state, encourages the people to the
taking of arms, with these words, "Let us restore the decayed estate of our
people, and let us fight for our people, and for the sanctuary." Whereby it
plainly appears, that not for religion only, but even for our country and our
possessions, we may fight and take arms against a tyrant, as this Antiochus
was. For the Machabites are not by any questioned, or reprehended for
conquering the kingdom, and expelling the tyrant, but in that they attributed
to themselves the royal dignity, which only belongs by God's special
appointment, to the tribe of Judah.

Humane histories are frequently stored with examples of this kind.
Arbactus, governor of the Medes, killed effeminate Sardanapalus, spinning
amongst women, and sportingly distributing all the treasures of the kingdom
amongst those his loose companions. Vindex and Galba quit the party of Nero,
yea, though the senate connived, and in a sort supported his tyranny, and drew
with them Gallia and Spain, being the provinces whereof they were
governors.

But amongst all, the decree of the senate of Sparta is most notable, and
ought to pass as an undeniable maxim amongst all nations. The Spartans being
lords of the city Byzantium, sent Olearchus thither for governor and commander
for the wars; who took corn from the citizens, and distributed it to his
soldiers. In the meantime the families of the citizens died for hunger,
Anaxilaus, a principal man of the city, disdaining that tyrannous usage,
entered into treaty with Alcibiades to deliver up the town, who shortly after
was received into it. Anaxilaus, being accused at Sparta for the delivery of
Byzantium, pleaded his cause himself, and was there acquit by the judges; for
(said they) "Wars are to be made with families, and not with nature, nothing
being more repugnant to nature, than that those who are bound to defend a city,
should be more cruel to the inhabitants, than their enemies who besiege
them."

This was the opinion of the Lacedemonians, certainly just rulers.
Neither can he be accounted a just king, who approves not this sentence of
absolution; for those who desire to govern according to the due proportion of
equity and reason, take into consideration, as well what the law inflicts on
tyrants, as also, what are the proper rights and bounds, both of the patrician
and plebeian orders. But we must yet proceed a little further. There is not so
mean a mariner, but must be ready to prevent the shipwreck of the vessel, when
either the negligence or wilfulness of the pilot casts it into danger. Every
magistrate is bound to relieve, and as much as in him lies, to redress the
miseries of the commonwealth, if he shall see the prince, or the principal
officers of state, his associates, by their weakness or wickedness, to hazard
the ruin thereof; briefly, he must either free the whole kingdom, or at least
that portion especially recommended to his care, from their imminent and
encroaching tyranny. But has this duty proper relation to every one? Shall it
be permitted to Hendonius Sabinus, to Ennus Suranus, or to the fencer
Spartanus; or to be brief, to a mere private person to present the bonnet to
slaves, put arms into the hands of subjects, or to join battle with the prince,
although he oppress the people with tyranny? No, certainly, the commonwealth
was not given in charge to particular persons, considered one by one; but, on
the contrary, particulars even as papists are recommended to the care of the
principal officers and magistrates; and therefore they are not bound to defend
the commonwealth, which cannot defend themselves. God nor the people have not
put the sword into the hands of particular persons; therefore, if without
commandment they draw the sword, they are seditious, although the cause seem
never so just.

Furthermore, the prince is not established by private and particular
persons, but by all in general considered in one entire body; whereupon it
follows, that they are bound to attend the commandment of all, to wit, of those
who are the representative body of a kingdom, or of a province, or of a city,
or at the least of some one of them, before they undertake anything against the
prince.

For, as a pupil cannot bring an action, but, being avowed in the name of
his tutor, although the pupil be indeed the true proprietor of the estate, and
the tutor only owner with reference to the charge committed unto him; so
likewise the people may not enterprise actions of such nature, but by the
command of those into whose hands they have resigned their power and authority,
whether they be ordinary magistrates, or extraordinary, created in the assembly
of the estates; whom, if I may so say, for that purpose, they have girded with
their sword, and invested with authority, both to govern and defend them,
established in the same kind as the pretor at Rome, who determined all
differences between masters and their servants, to the end that if any
controversy happened between the king and the subjects, they should be judges
and preservers of the right, lest the subjects should assume power to
themselves to be judges in their own causes. And therefore if they were
oppressed with tributes and unreasonable imposts; if anything were attempted
contrary to covenant and oath, and no magistrate opposed those unjust
proceedings; they must rest quiet, and suppose that many times the best
physicians, both to prevent and cure some grievous disease, do appoint both
letting blood, evacuation of humours, and lancing of the flesh; and that the
affairs of this world are of that nature, that with much difficulty, one evil
cannot be remedied without the adventuring, if not the suffering of another;
nor any good be achieved without great pains.

They have the example of the people of Israel, who, during the reign of
Solomon, refused not to pay those excessive taxes imposed on them, both for the
building of the temple, and fortifying of the kingdom, because by a general
consent they were granted for the promulgation of the glory of God, and for an
ornament and defence of the public state.

They have also the example of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who,
though he were King of Kings, notwithstanding, because he conversed in this
world in another quality, to wit, of a private and particular man, paid
willingly tribute. If the magistrates themselves manifestly favour the tyranny,
or at the least do not formally oppose it; let private men remember the saying
of Job, "That for the sins of the people God permits hypocrites to reign," whom
it is impossible either to convert or subvert, if men repent not of their ways,
to walk in obedience to God's commandments; so that there are no other weapons
to be used, but bended knees and humble hearts. Briefly, let them bear with bad
princes, and pray for better, persuading themselves that an outragious tyranny
is to be supported as patiently, as some exceeding damage done by the violence
of tempests, or some excessive overflowing waters, or some such natural
accidents unto the fruits of the earth, if they like not better to change their
habitations, by retiring themselves into some other countries. So David fled
into the mountains, and attempted nothing against the tyrant Saul, because the
people had not declared him any public magistrate of the kingdom.

Jesus Christ, whose kingdom was not of this world, fled into Egypt, and
so freed himself from the paws of the tyrant. Saint Paul, teaching of the duty
of particular Christian men, and not of magistrates, teaches that Nero must be
obeyed. But if all the principal officers of state, or divers of them, or but
one, endeavour to suppress a manifest tyranny, or if a magistrate seek to free
that province, or portion of the kingdom from oppression, which is committed to
his care and custody, provided under colour of freedom he bring not in a new
tyranny, then must all men with joint courage and alacrity run to arms, and
take part with him or them, and assist with body and goods, as if God Himself
from heaven had proclaimed wars, and meant to join battle against tyrants, and
by all ways and means endeavour to deliver their country and commonwealth from
their tyrannous oppression. For as God does oftentimes chastise a people by the
cruelty of tyrants, so also does He many times punish tyrants by the hands of
the people. It being a most true saying, verified in all ages: "For the
iniquities, violences, and wickedness of princes, kingdoms are translated from
one nation to another; but tyranny was never of any durable continuance." The
centurions and men at arms did freely and courageously execute the commandments
of the high priest Jehoiada, in suppressing the tyranny of Athalia. In like
manner all the faithful and generous Israelites took part and joined with the
Machabites, as well to re-establish the true service of God, as also to free
and deliver the state from the wicked and unjust oppression of Antiochus, and
God blessed with happy success their just and commendable enterprise. What
then, cannot God when He pleases stir up particular and private persons, to
ruin a mighty and powerful tyranny? He that gives power and ability to some
even out of the dust, without any title or colourable pretext of lawful
authority, to rise to the height of rule and dominion, and in it tyrannize and
afflict the people for their transgressions; cannot He also even from the
meanest multitude raise a liberator? He who enthralled and subjected the people
of Israel to Jabin, and to Eglon, did he not deliver and enfranchise them by
the hand of Ehud, Barack and Deborah, whilst the magistrates and officers were
dead in a dull and negligent ecstasy of security? What then shall hinder? You
may say the same God, who in these days sends us tyrants to correct us, that he
may not also extraordinarily send correctors of tyrants to deliver us? What if
Ahab cut off good men, if Jezebel suborn false witnesses against Naboth, may
not a Jehu be raised to exterminate the whole line of Ahab, to revenge the
death of Naboth, and to cast the body of Jezebel to be torn and devoured of
dogs? Certainly, as I have formerly answered, the Almighty is ever mindful of
His justice, and maintains it as inviolably as His mercy.

But for as much as in these latter times, those miraculous testimonies
by which God was wont to confirm the extraordinary vocation of those famous
worthies, are now wanting for the most part: let the people be advised, that in
seeking to cross the sea dry foot, they take not some impostor for their guide,
who may lead them headlong to destruction (as we may read happened to the
Jews); and that in seeking freedom from tyranny, he who was the principal
instrument to disenthral them, become not himself a more insupportable tyrant
than the former. Briefly, lest endeavouring to advantage the commonwealth, they
introduce not a common misery upon all the undertakers participating therein
with divers States of Italy, who, seeking to suppress the present evil, added
an accession of greater and more intolerable servitude.

Finally, that we may come to some period of this third question; princes
are chosen by God, and established by the people. As all particulars considered
one by one, are inferior to the prince; so the whole body of the people and
officers of state, who represent that body, are the princes' superiors. In the
receiving and inauguration of a prince, there are covenants and contracts
passed between him and the people, which are tacit and expressed, natural or
civil; to wit, to obey him faithfully whilst he commands justly, that he
serving the commonwealth, all men shall serve him, that whilst he governs
according to law, all shall be submitted to his government, etc. The officers
of the kingdom are the guardians and protectors of these covenants and
contracts. He who maliciously or wilfully violates these conditions, is
questionless a tyrant by practice. And therefore the officers of state may
judge him according to the laws. And if he support his tyranny by strong hands,
their duty binds them, when by no other means it can be effected by force of
arms to suppress him.

Of these officers there be two kinds, those who have generally
undertaken the protection of the kingdom; as the constable, marshals, peers,
palatines, and the rest, every one of whom, although all the rest do either
connive or consort with the tyranny, are bound to oppose and repress the
tyrant; and those who have undertaken the government of any province, city, or
part of the kingdom, as dukes, marquesses, earls, consuls, mayors, sheriffs,
etc., they may according to right, expel and drive tyranny and tyrants from
their cities, confines, and governments.

But particular and private persons may not unsheathe the sword against
tyrants by practice, because they were not established by particulars, but by
the whole body of the people. But for tyrants, who, without title intrude
themselves for so much as there is no contract or agreement between them and
the people, it is indifferently permitted all to oppose and depose them; and in
this rank of tyrants may those be ranged, who, abusing the weakness and sloth
of a lawful prince, tyrannously insult over his subjects. Thus much for this,
to which for a more full resolution may be added that which has been formerly
discoursed in the second question.

THE FOURTH QUESTION

Whether neighbour princes may, or are bound by law to aid the
subjects of other princes, persecuted for true religion, or oppressed by
manifest tyranny.

We have yet one other question to treat of, in the discussing whereof,
there is more use of an equitable judgment than of a nimble apprehension; and
if charity were but in any reasonable proportion prevalent amongst the men of
this age, the disputation thereof was altogether frivolous; but, seeing nothing
in these days is more rare, nor less esteemed than charity, we will speak
somewhat of this our question. We have already sufficiently proved, that all
tyrants, whether those who seek to captivate the minds and souls of the people
with an erroneous and superstitious opinion in matter of religion, or, those
who would enthral their bodies and estates with miserable servitude and
excessive impositions, may justly by the people, be both suppressed and
expulsed? But, for so much as tyrants are for the most part so cunning, and
subjects seldom so cautelous, that the disease is hardly known, or, at the
least, not carefully observed before the remedy prove almost desperate, nor
think of their own defence before they are brought to those straits, that they
are unable to defend themselves, but compelled to implore the assistance of
others: Our demand therefore is, if Christian princes lawfully may, and ought
to succour those subjects who are afflicted for true religion, or oppressed by
unjust servitude, and whose sufferings are either for the kingdom of Christ, or
for the liberty of their own state? There are many, who, hoping to advance
their own ends, and encroach on others' rights, will readily embrace the part
of the afflicted, and proclaim the lawfulness of it; but the hope of gain is
the certain and only aim of their purposes. And in this manner the Romans,
Alexander the Great, and divers others, pretending to suppress tyrants, have
oftentimes enlarged their own limits.

It is not long since we saw King Henry the Second make wars on the
Emperor Charles the Fifth, under colour of defending and delivering the
Protestant princes. As also Henry the Eighth, King of England, was in like
manner ready to assist the Germans, if the Emperor Charles should molest them.
But if there be some appearance of danger, and little expectance of profit,
then it is that most princes do vehemently dispute the lawfulness of the
action. And as the former cover their ambition and avarice with the veil of
charity and piety, so, on the contrary do the others call their fear and
cowardly baseness integrity and justice; although that piety (which is ever
careful of another's good) have no part in the counsels of the first, nor
justice (which affectionately desires the easing of a neighbour's grief) in
cooling the charitable intendments of the latter. Therefore, without leaning
either to the one side or the other, let us follow those rules which piety and
justice trace us out in matter of religion.

First, all accord in this, that there is only one Church, whereof Jesus
Christ is the head, the members whereof are so united and conjoined together,
that if the least of them be offended or wronged, they all participate both in
the harm and sorrow, as throughout Holy Scripture plainly appears: wherefore
the church is compared to a body. Now, it oftentimes happens, that the body is
not only overthrown by a wound in the arm or thigh, but even also much
endangered, yea, sometimes killed by a small hurt in the little finger. Vainly,
therefore, does any man vaunt that this body is recommended to his care and
custody, if he suffer that to be dismembered and pulled in pieces which he
might have preserved whole and entire. The church is compared to an edifice: on
which side soever the building is undermined, it many times chances that the
whole tumbles down, and on what rafter or piece of timber soever the flame
takes hold, it endangers the whole house of burning; he must needs be therefore
worthy of scorn, who should defer to quench the fire which had caught his house
top, because he dwells most in the cellar. Would not all hold him for a madman
who should neglect by countermining to frustrate a mine, because it was
intended to overthrow that wall there, and not this here.

Again, the church is resembled to a ship, which, as it sails together,
so does it sink together; in so much that in a tempest, those who be in the
forecastle, or in the keel, are no more secure than those who remain at the
stern or on the deck: so that the proverb commonly says, "When men run the like
hazard in matter of danger, that they venture both in one bottom." This being
granted questionless, whosoever has not a fellow-feeling in commiserating the
trouble, danger, and distress of the church, is no member of that body, nor
domestic in the family of Jesus Christ, nor hath any place in the ark of the
covenant of grace. He who has any sense of religion in his heart, ought no more
to doubt whether he be obliged to aid the afflicted members of the church, than
he would be assisting to himself in the like distress; for the union of the
church unites us all into one body, and therefore every one in his calling must
be ready to assist the needy, and so much the more willingly, by how much the
Almighty has bestowed a greater portion of his blessings on us, which were not
conferred that we should be made possessors of them, but that we should be
dispensers thereof according to the necessity of his saints.

As this church is one, so is she recommended and given in charge to all
Christian princes in general, and to every one of them in particular; for so
much as it was dangerous to leave the care to one alone, and the unity of it
would not by any means permit that she should be divided into pieces, and every
portion assigned unto one particular; God has committed it all entire to
particulars, and all the parts of it to all in general, not only to preserve
and defend it, but also to amplify and increase it as much as might be.
Insomuch that if a prince who has undertaken the care of a portion of the
church, as that of Germany and England, and, notwithstanding, neglect and
forsake another part that is oppressed, and which he might succour, he
doubtless abandons the church, Christ having but one only spouse, which the
prince is so bound to preserve and defend, that she be not violated or
corrupted in any part, if it be possible. And in the same manner, as every
private person is bound by his humble and ardent prayers to God, to desire the
restoring of the church, so likewise are the magistrates tied diligently to
procure the same, with the utmost of their power and means which God has put
into their hands. For the church of Ephesus is no other than that of Colossus,
but these two are portions of the universal church, which is the kingdom of
Christ, the increase and prosperity whereof ought to be the continual subject
of all private men's prayers and desires; but it is the duty of all kings,
princes, and magistrates, not only to amplify and extend the limits and bounds
of the church in all places, but only to preserve and defend it against all men
whatsoever. Wherefore there was but one temple in Judea built by Solomon, which
represented the unity of the church; and therefore ridiculous and worthy of
punishment was that churchwarden, who had care only of some small part of the
church, and suffered all the rest to be spoiled with rain and weather. In like
manner, all Christian kings, when they receive the sword on the day of their
coronation, solemnly swear to maintain the catholic or universal church, and
the ceremony then used doth fully express it, for holding the sword in their
hands, they turn to the east, west, north, and south, and brandish it, to the
end that it may be known that no part of the world is excepted. As by this
ceremony they assume the protection of the church, it must be questionless
understood of the true church, and not of the false; therefore ought they to
employ the utmost of their ability to reform, and wholly to restore that which
they hold to be the pure and truly Christian church, to wit, ordered and
governed according to the direction of the Word of God. That this was the
practice of godly princes, we have their examples to instruct us. In the time
of Ezechias, King of Judah, the kingdom of Israel had been a long time before
in subjection to the Assyrians, to wit, ever since the King Hosea, his time;
and therefore if the church of Judah only, and not the whole universal church
had been committed to the custody of Ezechias; and if in the preservation of
the church, the same course were to be held, as in the dividing of lands, and
imposing of tributes, then questionably Ezechias would have contained himself
within his own limits, especially then when the exorbitant power of the
Assyrians lorded it everywhere. Now, we read that he sent express messengers
throughout Israel, to wit, to the subjects of the King of Assyria, to invite
them to come to Jerusalem to celebrate

the Paschal Feast; yea, and he aided the faithful Israelites of the
tribes of Ephraim and Manasses, and others the subjects of the Assyrians, to
ruin the high places which were in their quarters.

We read also, that the good king Josias expelled idolatry, not only out
of his own kingdom, but also even out of the kingdom of Israel, which was then
wholly in subjection to the King of Assyria, and no marvel, for where the glory
of God and the kingdom of Christ are in question, there no bounds or limits can
confine the zeal and fervent affection of pious and godly princes. Though the
opposition be great, and the power of the opposers greater, yet the more they
fear God, the less they will fear men. These generous examples of divers godly
princes, have since been imitated by sundry Christian kings, by whose means the
church (which was heretofore restrained within the narrow limits of Palestine)
has since been dilated throughout the universal world. Constantine and Licinius
governed the empire together, the one in the Orient, the other in the Occident.
They were associates of equal power and authority. And amongst equals, as the
proverb is, "There is no command."

Notwithstanding, because Licinius does everywhere banish, torment, and
put to death the Christians, and amongst them divers of the nobility, and that
for and under pretence of religion, Constantine makes war against him, and by
force compels him to give free liberty of religion to the Christians; and
because he broke his faith, and relapsed into his former cruelties, he caused
him to be apprehended and put to death in the city of Thessalonica. This
emperor's piety was with so great an applause celebrated by the divines of
those times, that they suppose that saying in the prophet Isaiah to be meant by
him: "That kings shall be pastors and nursing fathers of the church." After his
death, the Roman empire was divided equally between his sons, without
advantaging the one more than the other. Constans favoured the orthodox
Christians, Constantus, being the elder, leaned to the Arrians, and for that
cause banished the learned Athanasius from Alexandria; the greatest professed
adversary of the Arrians. Certainly, if any consideration in matter of confines
be absolutely requisite, it must needs be amongst brethren; and
notwithstanding, Constans threatened to war on his brother if he restore not
Athanasius, and had without doubt performed it, if the other had long deferred
the accomplishment of his desire. And if he proceeded so far for the
restitution of one bishop, had it not been much more likely and reasonable for
him to have assisted a good part of the people, if they implored his aid
against the tyranny of those who refused them the exercise of their religion,
under the authority of their magistrates and governors? So at the persuasion of
Atticus the bishop, Theodosius made war on Chosroes, King of Persia, to deliver
the Christians of his kingdom from persecution, although they were but
particular and private persons; which certainly those most just princes, who
instituted so many worthy laws, and had so great and special care of justice,
would not have done, if by that fact they had supposed anything were usurped on
another man's right, or the law of nations violated. But to what end were so
many expeditions undertaken by Christian princes into the Holy Land against the
Saracens? Wherefore were demanded and raised so many of those Saladine tenths?
To what purpose were so many confederacies made, and crusades proclaimed
against the Turks, if it were not lawful for Christian princes, yea, those
furthest remote, to deliver the church of God from the oppression of tyrants,
and to free captive Christians from under the yoke of bondage? What were the
motives that led them to those wars? What were the reasons that urged them to
undergo those dangers? But only in regard of the churches' union, Christ
summoned every man from all parts with a unanimous consent, to undertake the
defence thereof? For all men are bound to repulse common dangers with a joint
and common opposition, all which have a natural consent and relation with this
we now treat of. If this were lawful for them against Mahomet, and not only
lawful, but that the backward and negligent were ever made liable to all
infamous contempt, and the forward and ready undertakers always recompensed
with all honourable respect and reward, according to the merit of their
virtues; wherefore not now against the enemy of Christ and his saints? If it be
a lawful war to fight against the Greeks (that I may use that phrase) when they
assail our Troy; wherefore is it unlawful to pursue and prevent that incendiary
Sinon? Finally, if it have been esteemed an heroical act to deliver Christians
from corporal servitude (for the Turks enforce none in point of religion), is
it not a thing yet much more noble to enfranchise and set at liberty souls
imprisoned in the mists of error?

These examples of so many religious princes, might well have the
directive power of law. But let us hear what God Himself pronounces in many
places of His Word by the mouth of His prophets, against those who advance not
the building up of His church, or who make no reckoning of her afflictions. The
Gadites, the Reubenites, and half the tribe of Manasses desire of Moses that he
would allot them their portion on the other side of Jordon. Moses grants their
request, but with this proviso and condition, that they should not only assist
their other brethren the Israelites to conquer the land of Canaan; but also
that they should march the first, and serve as vanguard to the rest, because
they had their portions first set them forth, and if they fail to perform this
duty, he with an anathema, destines them to destruction, and compares them to
those who were adjudged rebels at Cadisbarnea. And what, says he, "your
brethren shall fight, and you in the mean season rest quiet at home?" Nay, on
the contrary, you also shall pass Jordan, and not return into their houses,
before first the Lord have driven his enemies out from before his face, and
granted place to your brethren as well as you, then shall you be innocent
before the Lord and His people Israel. He shews by this, that those who God
first blessed with so great a benefit, if they help not their brethren, if they
make not themselves sharers in their labours, companions in their travels, and
leaders in their dangers, they must questionless expect a heavy punishment to
fall upon them.

Likewise when under the conduct of Deborah, the Nephtalites and
Zabulonites took arms against the tyrant Jabin; and that in the mean season the
Reubenites, who should have been first in the field, took their ease and played
on their pipes, whilst their flocks and herds fed at liberty; the Gadites held
themselves secured with the rampire of the river; the Danites gloried in their
command at sea; and Ashur, to be brief, was confident in the difficult access
of their mountains. The Spirit of the Lord speaking by the prophetess, does in
express terms condemn them all: "Curse ye Meros" (said the Angel of the Lord),
"curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof, because they came not to the help
of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty.

But blessed above women shall Jael the wife of Heber the Kenite be";
who, though she might have alleged the alliance which her husband had with the
Canaanites, did, notwithstanding, kill Sisera, the general of the enemies'
army. And therefore Uriah spoke religiously, and like a true patriarch, when he
said: "The ark of the Lord, and Israel, and Judah abide in tents, and my Lord
Joab, and the servants of my Lord are encamped in the open fields; shall I then
go into mine house, to eat and to drink and to lie with my wife? As thou
livest, and as thy soul liveth, I will not do this thing." But, on the
contrary, impious and wicked were the Princes of Israel, who, supposing
themselves secured by the craggy mountains of Samaria, and strong fortification
of Sion, took liberty to loose themselves in luxurious feasts, loose delights,
drinking delicious wines, and sleeping in perfumed beds of ivory, despising in
the mean season poor Joseph; to wit, the Lord's flock tormented and miserably
vexed on all sides, nor have any compassion on their affliction. "The Lord God
hath sworn by Himself, saith the Lord God of Hosts, I abhor the excellency of
Jacob, and hate his palaces, therefore will I deliver up the city, with all
that is therein, and those that wallow thus in pleasures, shall be the first
that shall go into captivity." Wickedly, therefore, did those Ephraimnes, who,
instead of congratulating and applauding the famous and notable victories of
Gideon and Jephta, did envy and traduce them, whom, notwithstanding, they had
forsaken in dangers.

As much may be said of the Israelites, who, seeing David overcome the
difficulty of his affairs, and remain a peaceable king, say aloud, "We are thy
flesh and thy bones." And some years after, seeing him embroiled again in
troubles, cried out, "We have no part in David, neither have we inheritance in
the son of Jesse." Let us rank also with these, all those Christians in name
only, who will communicate at the holy table, and yet refuse to take the cup of
affliction with their brethren, who look for salvation in the church, and care
not for the safety and preservation of the church and the members thereof.
Briefly, who adore one and the same God the Father, acknowledge and avow
themselves of the same household of faith, and profess to be one and the same
body in Jesus Christ, and, notwithstanding, yield no succour nor assistance to
their Saviour, afflicted in his members; what vengeance do you think will God
inflict on such impiety? Moses compares those who abandon their brethren to the
rebels of Cadisbarnea. Now, none of those by the decree of the Almighty,
entered into the land of Canaan. Let not those then pretend any interest in the
heavenly Canaan, who will not succour Christ when He is crucified, and
suffering a thousand times a day in his members; and, as it were, begging their
alms from door to door. The Son of God with his own mouth condemns them to
everlasting fire, that when he was hungry gave Him no meat; when He was thirsty
gave Him no drink; when He was a stranger, lodged Him not; naked, and clothed
Him not; sick, and in prison, and visited Him not. And, therefore, let those
expect punishments without end, who lend a deaf ear to the complaints and
groans of our Saviour Jesus Christ, suffering all these things daily in his
members; although otherwise they may appear both to others and themselves, to
be jolly Christians, yet shall their condition be much more miserable than that
of many infidels. For why? were they the Jews only, and Scribes and Pharisees,
to speak properly, that crucified Christ? or were they Ethnicks, Turks, or some
certain pernicious sects of Christians, which crucify, torment, and persecute
him in his members? No, certainly, the Jews hold Him as impostor, the Ethnicks
a malefactor, the Turks an infidel, the others an heretic, insomuch as if we
consider the intention of these men, as the censoring of all offences ought to
have principal relation thereunto, we cannot conclude that it is properly
Christ that they persecute with such hatred, but some criminal person, who, in
their opinion deserves this usage. But they do truly and properly persecute and
crucify Christ Jesus, who profess to acknowledge Him for the Messiah, God and
Redeemer of the world; and which, notwithstanding, fail to free Him from
persecution and vexation in His members, when it is in their power to do it.
Briefly, he who omits to deliver his neighbour from the hands of the murderer,
when he sees him in evident danger of his life, is questionless guilty of the
murder, as well as the murderer. For seeing he neglected when he had means to
preserve his life, it must needs necessarily follow that he desired his death.
And in all crimes the will and intendment ought principally to be regarded. But
questionless, these Christian princes, who do not relieve and assist the true
professors, who suffer for true religion, are much more guilty of murder than
any other, because they might deliver from danger an infinite number of people,
who for want of timely succour, suffer death and torments under the cruel hands
of their persecutors. And to this may be added, That to suffer one's brother to
be murdered, is a greater offence than if he were a stranger. Nay, I say
further, These forsakers of their brethren in their time of danger and
distress, are more vile, and more to be abhorred than the tyrants themselves
who persecute them. For it is much more wicked, and worthy of greater
punishment, to kill an honest man who is innocent and fearing God (as those who
consent with them in the faith, must of necessity know the true professors to
be), than a thief, an impostor, a magician, or an heretic, as those who
persecute the true Christians do commonly believe them to be. It is a greater
offence by many degrees to strive with God, than man. Briefly, in one and the
same action it is a much more grievous crime, perfidiously to betray, than
ignorantly to offend. But may the same also be said of them who refuse to
assist those who are oppressed by tyranny, or defend the liberty of the
commonwealth against the oppression of tyrants? For in this case the
conjunction or confederacy seems not to be of so strict a condition between the
one and the other; here we speak of the commonwealth diversely governed
according to the customs of the countries, and particularly recommended to
these here, or those there; and not of the church of God, which is composed of
all, and recommended to all in general, and to every one in particular.

The Jew says, our Saviour Christ is not only neighbour to the Jew, but
also to the Samaritan, and to every other man. But we ought to love our
neighbour as ourselves; and therefore an Israelite is not only bound to deliver
an Israelite from the hands of thieves, if it be in his power, but every
stranger also; yea, though unknown, if he will rightly discharge his duty.
Neither let him dispute whether it be lawful to defend another, who believes he
may justly defend himself. For it is much more just, if we truly consider the
concomitants, to deliver from danger and outrage another than one's self;
seeing that what is done for pure charity, is more right and allowable, than
that which is executed for colour, or desire of revenge, or by any other
transport of passion: in revenging our own wrongs we never keep a mean; whereas
in other men's, though much greater, the most intemperate will easily observe
moderation. Furthermore, the heathens themselves may teach us what humane
society, and what the law of nature requires of us in this business; wherefore
Cicero says, "That nature being the common mother of mankind, prescribes and
ordains, that every man endeavour and procure the good of another, whatsoever
he be, only because he is a man; otherwise all bonds of society, yea, and
mankind itself, must needs go to ruin."

And therefore, justice is built on these two bases or pillars; first,
that none be wronged; secondly, that good be done to all, if it be possible. So
also are there two sorts of injustice; the first, in those who offer injury to
their neighbours; the second, in them who, when they have means to deliver the
oppressed, do, notwithstanding, suffer them to sink under the burden of their
wrongs. For whosoever does wrong to another, either moved thereunto by anger,
or any other passion, he may in a sort be truly said to lay violent hands on
his companion; but he that hath means, and defends not the afflicted, or to his
power, wards not the blows that are struck at him, is as much faulty, as if he
forsook his parents, or his friends, or his country in their distress. That
which was done by the first may well be attributed to choler which is a short
madness; the fault committed by the other discovers a bad mind and a wicked
purpose, which are the perpetual tormentors and tyrants of the conscience. The
fury of the first may be in some sort excused, but the malice of the second
admits no colour of defence. Peradventure you will say, I fear in aiding the
one I shall do wrong to the other. And I answer, you seek a cloak of justice
wherewith to cover your base remissness. And, if you lay your hand on your
heart, you will presently confess, that it is somewhat else, and not justice,
that withholds you from performing your duty. For, as the same Cicero says in
another place, "Either thou wilt not make the wrongdoer thine enemy, or not
take pains, or not be at so much charge, or else negligence, sloth or the
hindering of thine own occasions, or the crossing of other purposes, takes thee
off from the defence of those who otherwise thou art bound to relieve. Now in
saying thou only attend thine own affairs, fearing to wrong another, thou
fallest into another kind of injustice: for thou abandoneth human society, in
that thou wilt not afford any endeavour either of mind, body, or goods, for the
necessary preservation thereof." Read the directions of the heathen
philosophers and politicians who have written more divinely herein, than many
Christians in these days. From hence also proceeds, that the Roman law designs
punishment to that neighbour who will not deliver the slave from the outrageous
fury of his master.

Amongst the Egyptians, if any man had seen another assailed and
distressed by thieves and robbers, and did not according to his power presently
aid him, he was adjudged worthy of death, if at the least he discovered or
delivered not the delinquents into the hand of the magistrate. If he were
negligent in performing this duty for the first mulct, he was to receive a
certain number of blows on his body, and to fast for three days together. If
the neighbour be so firmly obliged in this mutual duty of succour to his
neighbour, yea, to an unknown person in case he be assailed by thieves: shall
it not be lawful for a good prince to assist, not slaves to an imperious
master, or children against a furious father, but a kingdom against a tyrant,
the commonwealth against the private spleen of one, the people (who are indeed
the true owners of the state) against a ministering servant to the public. And,
if he carelessly or wilfully omit this duty, deserves he not himself to be
esteemed a tyrant, and punished accordingly, as well as the other a robber, who
neglected to assist his neighbour in that danger? Thucydides upon this matter
says, "That those are not only tyrants which make other men slaves, but much
more those who, having means to suppress and prevent such oppression, take no
care to perform it "; and amongst others, those who assumed the title of
protectors of Greece, and defenders of the country, and yet stir not to deliver
their country from oppression of strangers. And truly indeed; for a tyrant is
in some sort compelled to hold a straight and tyrannous hand over those who, by
violence and tyranny, he hath constrained to obey him, because, as Tiberius
said, "he holds the wolf by the ears, whom he can neither hold without pain and
force, nor let go without danger and death."

To the end then that he may blot out one sin with another sin, he fills
up one wickedness to another, and is forced to do injuries to others, lest he
should prove by remissness injurious to himself. But the prince who, with a
negligent and idle regard, looks on the outrageousness of a tyrant, and the
massacring of innocents that he might have preserved, like the barbarous
spectacles of the Roman sword-plays is so much more guilty than the tyrant
himself, by how much the cruel and homicidious directors and appointers of
these bloody sports were more justly punishable by all good laws than the poor
and constrained actors in those murdering tragedies. And as he questionless
deserves greater punishment who, out of insolent jollity, murders one, than he
who unwillingly for fear of a further harm kills a man; if any object that is
it against reason and good order to meddle in the affairs of another, I answer
with the old man in Terence "I am a man, and I believe that all duties of
humanity are fit and convenient for me. If others seeking to cover their base
negligence, and careless unwillingness, allege that bounds and jurisdictions
are distinguished one from another, and that it is not lawful to thrust one's
sickle into another's harvest," neither am I also of that opinion, that upon
any, such colour or pretence, it is lawful for a prince to encroach upon
another's jurisdiction or right, or upon that occasion to usurp another's
country, and so carry another man's corn into his barn, as divers have taken
such shadows to mask their bad intentions. I will not say that after the manner
of those arbitrators whom Cicero speaks of, thou adjudge the things in
controversy to thyself. But I require that you repress the prince who invades
the kingdom of Christ, that you contain the tyrant within his own limits, that
you stretch forth your hand of compassion to the people afflicted, that you
raise up the commonwealth lying grovelling on the ground, and that you so carry
yourself in the ordering and managing of this, that all men may see your
principal aim and end was the public benefit of human society, and not any
private profit or advantage of your own. For seeing that justice respects only
the public, and that which is without, and injustice fixes a man wholly on
himself, it doubtless becomes a man truly honest to dispose his actions, that
every private interest give place, and yield to public commodity. Briefly, to
epitomize what has been formerly said, if a prince outrageously overpass the
bounds of piety and justice, a neighbour prince may justly and religiously
leave his own country, not to invade and usurp another's, but to contain the
other within the limits of justice and equity. And if he neglect or omit his
duty herein, he shews himself a wicked and unworthy magistrate. If a prince
tyrannize over the people, a neighbour prince ought to yield succour as freely
and willingly to the people, as he would do to the prince his brother if the
people mutinied against him: yea, he should so much the more readily succour
the people, by how much there is more just cause of pity to see many afflicted,
than one alone. If Porsenna brought Tarquinius Superbus back to Rome, much more
justly might Constantine, requested by the senate, and Roman people, expel
Maxentius the tyrant from Rome. Briefly, if man become a wolf to man, who
hinders that man (according to the proverb), may not be instead of God to the
needy? And therefore the ancients have ranked Hercules amongst the gods,
because he punished and tamed Procrustes, Busiris, and other tyrants, the
plagues of mankind, and monsters of the earth. So whilst the Roman empire
retained her freedom, she was truly accounted the safeguard of all the world
against the violence of tyrants, because the senate was the port and refuge of
kings, people, and nations. In like manner Constantine, called by the Romans
against Maxentius, had God Almighty for the leader of his army. And the whole
church does with exceeding commendations celebrate his enterprise, although
that Maxentius had the same authority in the West, as Constantine had in the
East. Also Charlemaine undertook war against the Lombards, being requested to
assist the nobility of Italy: although the kingdom of the Lombards had been of
a long continuance, and he had no just pretence of right over them. In like
manner when Charles the Bold, King of France, had tyrannously put to death the
governor of the country between the rivers of Seine and Loire, with the Duke
Lambert, and another nobleman called Jametius, and that other great men of the
kingdom were retired unto Lewis King of Germany, brother (but by another
mother) unto Charles, to request aid against him, and his mother called Judith,
one of the most pernicious women in the world, Lewis gave them audience in a
full assembly of the German princes, by whose joint advice it was decreed, that
wars should be made against Charles for the re-establishing in their goods,
honours, and estates, those whom he had unjustly dispossessed.

Finally, as there have ever been tyrants distressed here and there, so
also all histories testify that there have been neighbouring princes to oppose
tyranny, and maintain the people in their right. The princes of these times by
imitating so worthy examples, should suppress the tyrants both of bodies and
souls, and restrain the oppressors both of the commonwealth, and of the church
of Christ: otherwise, they themselves may most deservedly be branded with that
infamous title of tyrant.

And to conclude this discourse in a word, piety commands that the law
and church of God be maintained. Justice requires that tyrants and destroyers
of the commonwealth be compelled to reason. Charity challenges the right of
relieving and restoring the oppressed. Those who make no account of these
things, do as much as in them lies to drive piety, justice, and charity out of
this world, that they may never more be heard of.