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Written at a time when furious arguments were raging about the best way to govern America, The Federalist Papershad the immediate practical aim of persuading New Yorkers to accept the newly drafted constitution in 1787. In this they were supremely successful, but their influence also transcended contemporary debate to win them a lasting place in discussions of American political theory. Acclaimed by Thomas Jefferson as 'the best commentary on the principles of government which ever was written', The Federalist Papers make a powerful case for power-sharing between State and Federal authorities and for a constitution that has endured largely unchanged for more than two hundred years. In his brilliantly detailed introduction, Isaac Kramnick sets the Papers in their historical and political context. This edition also contains the American constitution as an appendix.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

11

(71)

Note on the Text

82

(3)

THE FEDERALIST PAPERS

85

(404)

PREFACE TO THE 1788 EDITION

85

(2)

I INTRODUCTION

87

(3)

II CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND INFLUENCE

90

(4)

III THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

94

(3)

IV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

97

(4)

V THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

101

(3)

VI CONCERNING DANGERS FROM WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

104

(5)

VII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND PARTICULAR CAUSES ENUMERATED

109

(4)

VIII THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL WAR IN PRODUCING STANDING ARMIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS UNFRIENDLY TO LIBERTY

113

(5)

IX THE UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION

118

(4)

X THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

122

(6)

XI THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO COMMERCE AND A NAVY

128

(6)

XII THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO REVENUE

134

(4)

XIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW TO ECONOMY

138

(2)

XIV AN OBJECTION DRAWN FROM THE EXTENT OF COUNTRY ANSWERED

140

(5)

XV CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES

145

(6)

XVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE SAME PRINCIPLE

151

(5)

XVII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMPLES TO SHOW THE TENDENCY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS RATHER TO ANARCHY AMONG THE MEMBERS THAN TYRANNY IN THE HEAD

156

(3)

XVIII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER EXAMPLES

159

(5)

XIX THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER EXAMPLES

164

(5)

XX THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER EXAMPLES

169

(3)

XXI FURTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

172

(5)

XXII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED

177

(7)

XXIII THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED

184

(4)

XXIV THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH AN ANSWER TO AN OBJECTION CONCERNING STANDING ARMIES

188

(4)

XXV THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW

192

(4)

XXVI THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW

196

(5)

XXVII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW

201

(3)

XXVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONCLUDED

204

(4)

XXIX CONCERNING THE MILITIA

208

(4)

XXX CONCERNING TAXATION

212

(4)

XXXI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

216

(4)

XXXII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

220

(3)

XXXIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

223

(3)

XXXIV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

226

(5)

XXXV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

231

(4)

XXXVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

235

(6)

XXXVII CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE CONVENTION MUST HAVE EXPERIENCED IN THE FORMATION OF A PROPER PLAN

241

(6)

XXXVIII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND THE INCOHERENCE OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN EXPOSED

247

(7)

XXXIX THE CONFORMITY OF THE PLAN TO REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES: AN OBJECTION IN RESPECT TO THE POWERS OF THE CONVENTION EXAMINED

254

(5)

XL THE SAME OBJECTION FURTHER EXAMINED

259

(7)

XLI GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS PROPOSED TO BE VESTED IN THE UNION

266

(7)

XLII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED

273

(6)

XLIII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED

279

(7)

XLIV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED

286

(6)

XLV A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE SUPPOSED DANGER FROM THE POWERS OF THE UNION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS

292

(5)

XLVI THE SUBJECT OF THE LAST PAPER RESUMED WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMPARATIVE MEANS OF INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

297

(5)

XLVII THE MEANING OF THE MAXIM, WHICH REQUIRES A SEPARATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF POWER, EXAMINED AND ASCERTAINED

302

(6)

XLVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW TO THE MEANS OF GIVING EFFICACY IN PRACTICE TO THAT MAXIM

308

(4)

XLIX THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW

312

(4)

L THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW

316

(2)

LI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW AND CONCLUDED

318

(4)

LII CONCERNING THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WITH A VIEW TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE ELECTORS AND ELECTED, AND THE TIME OF SERVICE OF THE MEMBERS

322

(4)

LIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW OF THE TERM OF THE SERVICE OF THE MEMBERS

326

(5)

LIV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW TO THE RATIO OF REPRESENTATION

331

(4)

LV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE BODY

335

(4)

LVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE SAME POINT

339

(4)

LVII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE SUPPOSED TENDENCY OF THE PLAN OF THE CONVENTION TO ELEVATE THE FEW ABOVE THE MANY

343

(4)

LVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE FUTURE AUGMENTATION OF THE MEMBERS

347

(5)

LIX CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF ELECTIONS

352

(4)

LX THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

356

(4)

LXI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED

360

(4)

LXII CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE WITH REGARD TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMBERS, THE MANNER OF APPOINTING THEM, THE EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION, THE NUMBER OF THE SENATORS AND THE DURATION OF THEIR APPOINTMENTS

364

(5)

LXIII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE IN REGARD TO THE DURATION OF APPOINTMENT OF ITS MEMBERS

369

(6)

LXIV A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE IN REGARD TO THE POWER OF MAKING TREATIES

375

(5)

LXV A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE IN RELATION TO ITS CAPACITY AS A COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS

380

(4)

LXVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

384

(5)

LXVII CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A GROSS ATTEMPT TO MISREPRESENT THIS PART OF THE PLAN DETECTED

389

(3)

LXVIII THE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE MODE OF APPOINTMENT

392

(4)

LXIX THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, WITH A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK ON THE OTHER

396

(6)

LXX THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE UNITY OF THE EXECUTIVE, WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROJECT OF AN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

402

(7)

LXXI THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN REGARD TO THE DURATION OF THE OFFICE

409

(3)

LXXII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN REGARD TO THE RE-ELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT

412

(5)

LXXIII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE PROVISION CONCERNING SUPPORT AND THE POWER OF THE NEGATIVE

417

(5)

LXXIV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL FORCES AND THE POWER OF PARDONING

422

(2)

LXXV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE POWER OF MAKING TREATIES

424

(4)

LXXVI THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

428

(4)

LXXVII THE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED, WITH A FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT, AND A CONCISE EXAMINATION OF HIS REMAINING POWERS

432

(4)

LXXVIII A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE TENURE OF GOOD BEHAVIOR

436

(6)

LXXIX A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS FOR THE SUPPORT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGES

442

(3)

LXXX A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE EXTENT OF ITS POWERS

445

(5)

LXXXI A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITS AUTHORITY

450

(8)

LXXXII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN REFERENCE TO SOME MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS

458

(3)

LXXXIII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE TRIAL BY JURY