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DYNCORPS POST STORY -- SECOND SHOE TO DROP

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05761691 Date: 06/30/2015RELEASE IN FULLFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, June 04, 2009 1:24 PM
To:
Subject: FW: Dyncorps Post Story -- Second Shoe To Drop
Attachments: Dyncorps Sec Note.doc; Kabul Memo Washington Post 5 June.docx
FYI
From: Johnson, David T
Sent:
Thursday, June 04, 2009 11:37 AM
To: Campbell, Piper A; Wood, Robert A (PACE); Crocker, Bathsheba N
Cc: Crowley, Philip J; Hammer, Michael A; Byrnes, Robert S; Pittman, Susan R (INL); Sullivan, John C (INL/PC); McGlynn,
William J; Macmanus, Joseph E; Kennedy, Patrick F; Matano, Albert K; Jones, Paul W; Russell, Daniel A; Polt, Michael C
Subject: Dyncorps Post Story -- Second Shoe To Drop
Folks,
You may recall an April 17 Post story on problems with Dyncorps in Afghanistan which focused on a suspected
drug overdose death, breakdown in internal controls within the company, and actions the USG and the firm
were taking. The other issue that surfaced at the time was a colossal error in judgment by one of the
contractors' employees in hiring an adolescent boy dancer for some sort of event that, at least to most folks,
looked very inappropriate. The Post is now looking at the dancing boy, which was not included in the April 17,
article, and we expect will soon publish a story on it.
The Post inquiry at this point focuses only on confirming whether or not there's an OIG investigation. We are,
of course, referring the Post to the OIG on such a question. However, the premise for the question raises the
issue again in some eye-popping rhetoric which could feature in the follow-up story, so I wanted to make sure
everyone had a heads-up.
We have already relieved the folks involved with both incidents and I am meeting with the firm's CEO today to
hear his report on his trip to Afghanistan and Iraq to address these, as well as other, issues on which we have
demanded corrective actions.
I'm attaching the original note to Deputy Secretary Lew at the time of the original inquiry which lays out both
issues, a copy of the memo the INL section at Embassy Kabul provided to Post Management on the most
recent Post inquiry, as well as the Post inquiry itself for context.
David.
Incoming from Post:
"According to my reporting, the week of April 13th, the DynCorp regional commander from Konduz, Flint Chambers,
allowed his men to hire a 15-year-old boy dancer to do tribal dances at a DynCorp party on the training site.
Some 15 or so DynCorp employees in attendance pulled out a single chair and had the boy do mock lap dances. This
was captured on video. The video shows DynCorp employees putting dollar bills in the boy's waistband, just as they would
a stripper's garter. The revelry lasted about 45 minutes.
74
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05761691 Date: 06/30/2015
No sex took place.
The video was leaked to Kabul INL program manager, Marissa Martin. INL Washington ordered INL Kabul to replace the
entire DynCorp chain of commaand.
The video was leaked by Mike Gonzalez to another DynCorp employee who emailed the video to Martin. Flint Chambers
retaliated against Mike by spitting in his face, pushing him to the ground in front of the DynCorp security building in Kabul.
Chambers was fired, along with Dean Deines, Stan Knee and David Kelly.
Can you confirm that the IG is looking into this? (in addition to the Kurt Schafer incident)
Thank you,
Ellen Nakashima
The Washington Post"
From: Nash, Ardenia R (INL/FO)
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2009 5:56 PM
To: Johnson, David T
Subject: FINAL version - Note to Lew - Dyncorp
«Dyncorps Sec Note.doc>>
«Kabul Memo Washington Post 5 June.docx>>
25