Monday, 13 April 2009

PIRATES

Some thinking on Somali pirates:

Seal snipers took out three Somali pirates and freed an American hostage held in a lifeboat. What's interesting to me is the decision making process used to resolve this minor problem. Here are some of the aspects. Firstly, there was a timer on the hostage stand-off. Other pirate groups/ships (an open source insurgency with commercial drivers) were en route to surround the lifeboat or take control of the hostages. Secondly, this minor decision involved a highly centralized decision making loop that included the President, the Commander of CENTCOM, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the DoJ, and the White House/NSC -- just to pull the trigger on three kidnappers holding a hostage at gunpoint. Lastly, one of the biggest fears of the US government is that these pirates would be arrested. Why? Since Somalia is a mess, they would become wards of the US, likely suffer only minimal jail time, and eventually end up applying for US citizenship.

The symbiosis between private insurance and privateering dominates. If the company that owned the rescued ship wasn't a US defense contractor, its kidnapping insurance company (likely Lloyds) and its designated crisis representatives (likely Control Risks Group) would have negotiated to pay the pirate's fee to get the hostage back -- as are thousands of kidnappings from Mexico to Colombia to Nigeria to the Gulf of Aden are settled every year. Somali pirates have made tens of millions this way already. Further, in many parts of the world, kidnappers are almost never caught/killed (<5% in Mexico and the same is likely true for Somalia). So, given this backdrop, the Navy's rescue effort was just a sideshow and the industry that made it possible will continue to grow rapidly.

Dead end solutions dominate in great power capitals. The most commonly suggested solutions, patrols by conventional navies and nation-building, aren't the answer. Both are expensive and would be futile over the longer term. The Pyrrhic solution that will eventually be adopted is a combination of A) funded militias (Somali anti-pirates that raid pirate dens) and B) business as usual (private sector management ala the symbiosis detailed above). Might as well cut to the end game and quite the near term charade (I told this to the House Armed Services committee when I testified in early April).

NOTE: In the comments on this post, "Moon" came up with a term: The Somali Coast Guard, which may serve as a moniker for a militia effort. How much would this cost?

Let's do the numbers. The short term "solution" that arrested Iraq's descent into state failure was an open source counter-insurgency (aka managed militias) called the Anbar Awakening (not the "surge," which was a costly PR stunt). That program costs $30 million (plus administration) per month. 1/200 of the cost of maintaining US troops in theater (perversely, the US gov't has offloaded the administration and cost of this program to the Iraqi government, which because it sees the militias as disloyal, isn't paying them anymore -- ultimately, this will lead to a renewed descent into state failure). A similar program in the Gulf of Aden, using Somali militias, would likely cost $2-3 m a month (guesstimate). That's a small, small fraction of the cost of patrols by conventional navies and a infinitesimal fraction of what would be a failed nation-building effort in Somalia. Granted, this is an extremely flawed solution (the militias will end up being lots of trouble), but it is going to be the one eventually adopted.

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PIRATES

Some thinking on Somali pirates:

Seal snipers took out three Somali pirates and freed an American hostage held in a lifeboat. What's interesting to me is the decision making process used to resolve this minor problem. Here are some of the aspects. Firstly, there was a timer on the hostage stand-off. Other pirate groups/ships (an open source insurgency with commercial drivers) were en route to surround the lifeboat or take control of the hostages. Secondly, this minor decision involved a highly centralized decision making loop that included the President, the Commander of CENTCOM, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the DoJ, and the White House/NSC -- just to pull the trigger on three kidnappers holding a hostage at gunpoint. Lastly, one of the biggest fears of the US government is that these pirates would be arrested. Why? Since Somalia is a mess, they would become wards of the US, likely suffer only minimal jail time, and eventually end up applying for US citizenship.

The symbiosis between private insurance and privateering dominates. If the company that owned the rescued ship wasn't a US defense contractor, its kidnapping insurance company (likely Lloyds) and its designated crisis representatives (likely Control Risks Group) would have negotiated to pay the pirate's fee to get the hostage back -- as are thousands of kidnappings from Mexico to Colombia to Nigeria to the Gulf of Aden are settled every year. Somali pirates have made tens of millions this way already. Further, in many parts of the world, kidnappers are almost never caught/killed (<5% in Mexico and the same is likely true for Somalia). So, given this backdrop, the Navy's rescue effort was just a sideshow and the industry that made it possible will continue to grow rapidly.

Dead end solutions dominate in great power capitals. The most commonly suggested solutions, patrols by conventional navies and nation-building, aren't the answer. Both are expensive and would be futile over the longer term. The Pyrrhic solution that will eventually be adopted is a combination of A) funded militias (Somali anti-pirates that raid pirate dens) and B) business as usual (private sector management ala the symbiosis detailed above). Might as well cut to the end game and quite the near term charade (I told this to the House Armed Services committee when I testified in early April).

NOTE: In the comments on this post, "Moon" came up with a term: The Somali Coast Guard, which may serve as a moniker for a militia effort. How much would this cost?

Let's do the numbers. The short term "solution" that arrested Iraq's descent into state failure was an open source counter-insurgency (aka managed militias) called the Anbar Awakening (not the "surge," which was a costly PR stunt). That program costs $30 million (plus administration) per month. 1/200 of the cost of maintaining US troops in theater (perversely, the US gov't has offloaded the administration and cost of this program to the Iraqi government, which because it sees the militias as disloyal, isn't paying them anymore -- ultimately, this will lead to a renewed descent into state failure). A similar program in the Gulf of Aden, using Somali militias, would likely cost $2-3 m a month (guesstimate). That's a small, small fraction of the cost of patrols by conventional navies and a infinitesimal fraction of what would be a failed nation-building effort in Somalia. Granted, this is an extremely flawed solution (the militias will end up being lots of trouble), but it is going to be the one eventually adopted.

On Brave New War

G. Gordon Liddy Show (radio)...this is a seminal book in the truest sense of the term.. way ahead of the curve... go out and buy it right now -- G. Gordon Liddy

City JournalRobb has written an important book that every policymaker should read -- Glenn Reynolds (Instapundit)

Small Wars JournalWithout reservation Brave New War is for professional students of irregular warfare and for any citizen who wants to understand emerging trends and the dark potential of 4GW -- Frank Hoffman

Scripps Howard News ServiceA brilliant new book published by terrorism expert John Robb, titled "Brave New War," hit stores last month with virtually no fanfare. It deserves both significant attention and vigorous debate... - Thomas P.M. Barnett

Chet Richards DNIJohn has produced an important book that should help jar the United States and other legacy states out of their Cold War mindset. You can read it in a couple of hours – so you should read it twice...

Washington Times / UPIRobb correctly finds the antidote to 4GW not in Soviet-style state structures such as the Department of Homeland Security, but in decentralization -- William Lind (the father of 4th generation warfare).

Robert PatersonHaving painted a crystal clear picture of how a war of networks is playing out, he comes to an astonishing conclusion that I hope he fills out in his next book.

The Daily DishJohn Robb of Global Guerrillas has written the most important book of the year, Brave New War. - Daily Dish (The Atlantic)

Simulated LaughterWell-written. Brave New War reads more like an action novel than a ponderous policy book. - Adam Elkus

FutureJackedGo buy a copy of this book. Now. If you are low on cash, skip a few lunches and save up the cash. It is worth it. - Michael Flagg

ZenPunditThe second audience is composed of everyone else. Brave New War is simply going to blow them away. - Mark Safranski

Haft of the SpearThere aren’t a lot of books that make me recall a 12-year-old self aching for the next issue of The Invincible Iron Man to hit the shelves. Well done.
- Michael Tanji

Ed ConeHis book posits an Army of Davids -- with the traditional nation state in the role of Goliath. - Ed Cone (Ziff Davis)

Shloky.comThis is the first real text on next generation warfare designed for the general population and it sets the bar high for following acts. It is smart, it is a short read, and it will change your thinking. - Shlok Vaidya

Politics in the ZerosI suggest this is something Lefties need to start thinking about now, as that decentralized world is coming. - Bob Morris