PER CURIAM: Liberty Life Insurance Co. (Liberty Life) denied life
insurance proceeds to Stephen Ney's beneficiary after toxicology reports
reflected the presence of methamphetamines in Ney's blood when he was killed in
a single vehicle accident. Shannon Hutchinson, Ney's daughter and beneficiary,
sued Liberty Life for the insurance benefits arguing the policy exclusion for
injury resulting from an insured being "under the influence of any
narcotic" did not apply to Ney's claim because methamphetamine is not a
narcotic. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Hutchinson on the
ground that methamphetamine is not a narcotic within the definition of the
insurance policy exclusion.

On appeal, Liberty Life
argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Hutchinson when
(1) the circuit court adopted a specialized medical definition of the term
"narcotic" in the context of an insurance policy written for
laypersons, as opposed to the plain and ordinary meaning of
"narcotic" as understood by laypersons, and (2) the operative
language of the Liberty Life policy exclusion providing that benefits will not
be payable when the insured is "under the influence of any narcotic"
was taken verbatim from the South Carolina Insurance Code. We reverse the
grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS / PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ney purchased an accidental
death insurance policy from Liberty Life in connection with a mortgage on
property he owned in Inman, South Carolina. The policy, effective October 1,
2006, provided it would pay off the balance on Ney's mortgage in the event of
Ney's accidental death. Two days after the policy came into effect, on October
3, 2006, Ney was killed as a result of driving his tractor-trailer off an
interstate highway directly into a bridge abutment.[1]
The death certificate listed the cause of death as blunt force trauma to the
chest in connection with a motor vehicle crash, but it also listed
methamphetamine use under "other significant conditions contributing to
death." A coroner's inquest determined the manner of death to be an
accident.

In her capacity as personal
representative of her father's estate, Hutchinson filed a claim for insurance
proceeds (the unpaid balance on the mortgage) after Ney's death. Liberty Life
refused to pay any benefits due pursuant to the accidental death policy, and Hutchinson
lost Ney's home due to foreclosure. Hutchinson brought suit against Liberty
Life for a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to all proceeds payable
under the policy, for bad faith, and for violation of the South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act.[2]
Liberty Life answered, noting the insurance company denied benefits after an
investigation revealed "Insured's illegal drug use contributed to his
death" and the policy contained an exclusion for "illegal drug
use." Hutchinson moved for summary judgment on all three claims, and the
circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion.

During the hearing,
Hutchinson presented an affidavit from Dr. Donald O. Allen. Dr. Allen noted
narcotic drugs are those drugs that induce pain relief, drowsiness, sleep, and
similar states of stupor. In contrast, Dr. Allen stated methamphetamines are
stimulants that induce wakefulness, alertness, focus, and a heightened sense of
awareness. Therefore, Dr. Allen opined that methamphetamine is not a narcotic
drug.

Liberty Life noted Ney's
blood concentration of methamphetamine was ten times greater than the threshold
for impairment. Liberty Life submitted affidavits from two medical experts who
described Ney's methamphetamine blood concentration as being in the toxic to
lethal range. Liberty Life's medical experts reported the symptoms that usually
accompany this level of methamphetamine use included euphoria, excitation,
rapid speech, insomnia, hallucinations, delusions, psychosis, poor impulse
control, perceptual distortion, and aggressive behavior. Withdrawal symptoms
included dysphoria, extreme fatigue, uncontrollable sleepiness, restlessness,
agitation, irritability, nervousness, and paranoia. In addition, Liberty
Life's experts noted a link between methamphetamine use and driving impairment,
including reports of decreased ability to concentrate, inability to divide
attention, and errors in judgment. Both experts opined Ney was under the
influence of methamphetamines when he drove his truck off the highway and
struck a bridge support, thereby resulting in his death.

Liberty Life further noted
the phrase "under the influence of any narcotic" appears in insurance
codes in at least thirty-three states including South Carolina. Liberty Life
relied on a case from the Eastern District of Missouri (Doe v. General
American Life Insurance Co., 815 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (E.D. Mo. 1993)), which
held that cocaine is commonly understood by lay persons to be a narcotic drug despite
the fact that it is technically a stimulant. Therefore, Liberty Life reasoned methamphetamine
should also be classified as a narcotic. Liberty Life suggested the court
should adopt a definition of narcotic to include any illegal mood or behavior
altering drug or controlled substance.

The circuit court issued an
order granting summary judgment to Hutchinson on the basis that methamphetamine
is not a narcotic within the definition of the policy exclusion. The circuit
court found Liberty Life had no right to deny coverage to Ney as the exclusion for
injury while under the influence of any narcotic did not apply. The circuit
court ordered Liberty Life to pay Hutchinson the balance due on the home at the
time of Ney's death, in addition to 20% of the loan balance due in accordance
with the additional death benefit provided in the policy, plus pre-judgment
interest. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

(1) Did the circuit court err in adopting
a specialized medical definition of the term "narcotic" in the
context of an insurance policy which did not define the term, as opposed to adopting
the plain and ordinary meaning of "narcotic" as understood by
laypersons?

(2) Did the circuit court err in
granting summary judgment to Hutchinson when the operative language of the
Liberty Life policy exclusion providing that benefits will not be payable when
the insured is "under the influence of any narcotic" was taken
verbatim from section 38-71-370(9) of the South Carolina Code (2002)?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews the grant
of a summary judgment motion under the same standard applied by the circuit
court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Jackson v. Bermuda Sands, Inc., 383
S.C. 11, 14 n.2, 677 S.E.2d 612, 614 n.2 (Ct. App. 2009). Rule 56(c),
SCRCP, provides summary judgment shall be granted where "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."

In ascertaining whether any
triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences which can be
reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Belton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 360 S.C.
575, 578, 602 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2004). "[I]n cases applying the
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only
required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion
for summary judgment." Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C.
326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009).

LAW / ANALYSIS

I. Definition of the Term
"Narcotic"

Liberty Life argues the
circuit court erred in adopting a specialized medical definition of the term
"narcotic" in the context of an insurance policy written for
laypersons, as opposed to the plain and ordinary meaning of "narcotic"
as understood by laypersons. We agree.

"Where the words of an
insurance policy are capable of two reasonable interpretations, the
interpretation most favorable to the insured will be adopted." State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Barrett, 340 S.C. 1, 8, 530 S.E.2d 132,
135 (Ct. App. 2000). "We should not, however, torture the meaning of
policy language in order to extend or defeat coverage that was never intended
by the parties." Id.

"When a policy does not
specifically define a term, the term should be defined according to the usual
understanding of the term's significance to the ordinary person." Id. at 8, 530 S.E.2d at 136; USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 312
S.C. 536, 539, 435 S.E.2d 879, 881-82 (Ct. App. 1993) ("In the
absence of a prescribed definition in the policy, the term should
be defined according to the ordinary and usual understanding of the term's
significance to the ordinary person.").

Although no South Carolina case
law directly addresses the question of whether methamphetamine is commonly
understood by ordinary laypersons to be a narcotic drug, one case from Missouri
is analogous to the present case and warrants discussion. In Doe v. General
American Life Insurance, Co., 815 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Mo. 1993), the
Eastern District Court of Missouri interpreted the terms of a health plan
exclusion for injury or sickness arising out of the use of "a) narcotics;
b) hallucinogens; c) barbiturates; d) marijuana; e) amphetamines; or similar
drugs or substances." Id. at 1283. The district court found that
the five categories of drugs listed in the health plan were ambiguous, as
cocaine was not listed as being covered or excluded. Id. at 1285. To
clarify this ambiguity, the district court looked to the ordinary, not
specialized, meaning of these terms as a layperson would understand them. Id.

The district court noted
"narcotics" were the broadest category because "the term
'narcotic' has come to have a generic meaning for drugs considered to be
illegal." Id. The district court concluded that a layperson would
commonly understand cocaine to be classified as a narcotic because it is a drug
that is illegal to buy, sell, and possess in this country. Id.
Therefore, the district court reasoned "this Court need not be concerned
with cocaine's 'pharmacological' similarities or dissimilarities with
narcotics, hallucinogens, barbiturates, marijuana, or amphetamines." Id.

Other jurisdictions have used
the terms "narcotic" and "methamphetamine"
interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d
577, 580 (8th Cir. 2002) ("A large quantity of narcotics is indicative of
an intent to distribute, and we have previously held that possession of
approximately 50 grams of methamphetamine is consistent with an intent to
distribute."); United States v. Robinson, No.
4:08CR386(HEA), 2008 WL 4790324, *7 (E.D. Mo. October 29, 2008) (finding
a search warrant was not deficient for referring to "certain narcotic
drugs" at a residence because "the fact that methamphetamine may
technically not be a narcotic is a distinction without a difference," and
further finding that the term "narcotics" was used generically as a
synonym for "controlled substances"); United States v. Real
Property Known as 77 East 3rd Street, 869 F. Supp.
1042, 1058-59, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (using the terms narcotic and
methamphetamine interchangeably); State v. Carmichael, 53 P.3d 214, 232
(Haw. 2002) (noting although methamphetamine is not a narcotic from a
scientific point of view, the term narcotic has evolved to include any
addictive drug).

In the case at hand, the
circuit court's order adopted the definition of "narcotic" supplied
by Dr. Allen. Dr. Allen opined that methamphetamine is not a narcotic drug
because narcotic drugs are those drugs that induce pain relief, drowsiness,
sleep, and similar states of stupor. Methamphetamines, according to Dr. Allen,
are stimulants that induce wakefulness, alertness, focus, and a heightened
sense of awareness. The scientific description of the term
"narcotic" according to a medical doctor is not representative of the
ordinary and usual understanding of the term to an ordinary person. SeeRowland, 312 S.C. at 539, 435 S.E.2d at 881-82 ("In the absence of
a prescribed definition in the policy, the term should be defined according to
the ordinary and usual understanding of the term's significance to the ordinary
person."). Therefore, we hold the circuit court erred in adopting the specialized
medical definition of "narcotic" supplied by Dr. Allen.

The Liberty Life policy did
not define the term "narcotic" to exclude or include
methamphetamines. Like the district court in General American Life
Insurance, this court need not be concerned with methamphetamine's
pharmacological similarities to other narcotic drugs. 815 F. Supp. at 1285. Instead,
we look to the usual understanding of the term's significance to an ordinary
person. Barrett, 340 S.C. at 8, 530 S.E.2d at 136. Based on its
widespread illegal use, we believe a layperson would commonly understand
methamphetamine to be a narcotic drug.

Accordingly, we hold the
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Hutchinson. Because we
reverse on the issue of how the circuit court defined the term
"narcotic," we need not reach the additional issue raised on appeal. SeeWhiteside v. Cherokee Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 311 S.C. 335,
340-41, 428 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1993) (holding an appellate court need not address
the remaining issue on appeal when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and
LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] Dr. Barry Logan reviewed the accident reconstruction
report and submitted an affidavit noting there was no evidence of braking on
the roadway or on the 200+ feet of median Ney traveled before the point of impact
with the bridge support.