To the Marquis de Lafayette

[dateline] Passy Feb. 21. 1779

[salute] My dear Marquiss

The Conversation with which you honoured me last Evening,1 has induced me, to give you the Trouble of this Letter upon the same subject.

It is certain that a Loan of Money, is very much wanted, to redeem the Redundancy
of our Paper Bills, and without it, it is impossible to foresee what will be the Consequence
to their Credit, and therefore every service that may be rendered, in order to obtain
it from this Kingdom, from Spain or Holland, will be a most essential and acceptable
service.

But without some other Exertions, even a Loan, perhaps would be but a temporary Relief:
with them a smaller Loan might suffice.

You know perfectly well, that the Ennemy in America, is at present very weak and in
great Distress in every Part. They are weak in Canada—weak in Hallifax—weak in Rhode
Island—weak at New York <and> weak in the Floridas, and weak in every one of the West India Islands.

An Strong2 Armament of Ships of the Line, with Five thousand Troops, directed against Hallifax,
Rhode Island or New York, must infallibly succeed. So it must against The Floridas.
So it must against Canada, or any one of the West India Islands.

You are very sensible that, in this state of Weakness, the British Possessions in
America depend upon each other for reciprocal support. The Troops and ships derive
such supplies of Provisions, from Canada and Nova Scotia, that if these Places or
either of them was lost it { 422 } would be difficult, if not impossible for the others to subsist. The West India Islands
derive such supplies from the Floridas, that if they were lost, the others could scarcely
subsist. Their Fleets and Armies, in Canada Hallifax, Rhode Island, New York, and
the Floridas receive supplies of Rum Sugar, Molasses &c. from the West India Islands
without which they could scarcely subsist. Every Part of their Possessions in America,
both on the Continent and in the Islands receive constant supplies from, Europe, from
England Scotland and Ireland, without which they must fall. You perceive therefore
that their Dominions in America at present form such a Chain that the Links mutually
support each other, in such a Manner that if one or two were taken away the whole,
or at least the greatest Part must fall.

In this state of Things then the obvious Policy is, to send a strong Squadron of Ships
of the Line, to co-operate with the Count D'Estaing and the American Army in some
Expedition directed against New York Rhode Island or Hallifax or perhaps all of them
in Course—five or six Thousand Troops, would be quite enough. Above all it is indispensably
necessary to keep a clear superiority of naval Power both on the Coast of the Continent
and in the West India Islands. This, together with French and American Privateers,
would make such Havock among the Ennemies Transports passing from one of their Possessions
to another as must ruin their Affairs.

The French have a great Advantage in carrying on this Kind of War, in America at present.
The British ships are badly manned and in bad Repair. They cannot send them into the
American seas without the Utmost Terror for their own Coasts—and when they are in
America, they have not such Advantages for supplies of Provisions, naval stores and
so forth as the French.

The Devastation that was made among their ships of the Line Frigates Transports and
Traders in the American seas the last summer, shews how much more might be done, if
a stronger Force was sent there.3

As long as the Ennemy keep Possession of New York and Rhode Island so long it will
be necessary for Us to keep up large Armies to watch their Motions and defend the
Country against them, which will oblige Us to emit more Paper and still farther encrease
the Depreciation.

Now as long as they maintain the Dominion of those Seas, their Troops will be protected
by the Cannon of their ships, and We could not dislodge them, with any Army however
large—<and> at least We could not keep those Places.

But if their Force was captivated in those Places, as it might easily { 423 } be by a sea Force cooperating with the land Forces, We might reduce our Army, and
innumerable other Articles of Expence. We need not emit any more Paper, and that already
out, would depreciate no further.

I should be happy to have further Conversation with you, sir upon those subjects or
to explain any Thing by Letter, which may be in my Power.

With the highest sentiments of Esteem and Respect, I have the Honour to be, sir your
most obedient and most humble servant

LbC (Adams Papers); notation: “sent—and recd. as the Marquis told me 27 feb.” A copy (NHi), the first twelve lines of which are in JA's hand and the rest in John Thaxter's hand, was later made from the Letterbook copy
and enclosed in JA's letter to Elbridge Gerry of 11 Sept. (below). Another copy, entirely in Thaxter's hand, was sent as an enclosure (PCC, No. 84, I, f. 107–110) in JA's letter of 21 Oct. to the president of the congress (below).

1. JA described the conversation with Lafayette in his letter to Elbridge Gerry of 11 Sept. (below). Certainly JA's proposal fit in well with Lafayette's plan for a Franco-American attack on Canada,
which he pressed on the French government. Despite Lafayette's efforts, the plan was
rejected for financial reasons as well as the doubtful benefit to France of additional
American conquests (Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution, Chicago, 1942, p. 7–9).