For Iraqi Democracy, Voting Is The Easy Part

>Iraq's election, held on Sunday, were a significant success for Iraqi democracy. Despite scattered violence, turnout in Iraq's third-ever national election was 62 percent, compared to only 56.8 percent in the 2008 U.S. election. The UN says there was no widespread fraud. Encouragingly, Sunni Arabs made good on their goal to turn out the vote,
demonstrating faith and investment in the Iraqi democracy they once
boycotted in vast numbers. But, as in any democracy, getting elected
poses an entirely different set of challenges from actual governing.
The one is reliant on the other and a feedback loop of failure
threatens any democratic government. A failure to govern undermines
popular faith in the political system, which makes governance even
harder, in turn further eroding the government's popularity and
legitimacy. This disintegration is especially possible in Iraq.

As
a parliamentary system, Iraq's government requires significant
political cooperation to function. Representatives from the
multiple-party system must form a majority coalition to appoint a Prime
Minister and move forward with the country's business. Given that
Iraq's parties reflect ethnic and religious divisions that extend for
centuries, forming a coalition requires overcoming some of the Middle
East's most entrenched antagonisms. This is rife with all sorts of
pitfalls. If, for example, Shia and Kurd parties come together, this
risks alienating Sunni Arabs. Iraq's political culture is rife with
paranoia and conspiracy theories, so even a legitimate political
outcome could be seen as something far more pernicious. It's not
difficult to foresee some Iraqis turning away from the democratic
experiment in favor of the sectarian militias that tore apart the
country in 2006. After all, politically excluded ethnic minorities
throughout history have faced a choice between, as Malcolm X put it, "the ballot or the bullet."

Following
the decline of violence in 2007, Iraqis came together in an
unprecedented and forward-looking willingness to cooperate. But now
that the political parties and ethnic populations have tasted power,
the allure of self-interested power-seeking risks outshining the need
for selfless compromise. Iraq's primary goal after the elections of
2005 was to restore order and peace, a mission that any Iraqi can get
behind. But as the country stabilizes, the various factions have more
specific, and sometimes conflicting, goals. How to count the population of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen, is just one example of a political issue threatening to splinter coalitions. Sunni Arabs are extremely suspicious
of Iran's influence in Shia political parties. That suspicion could
turn to accusations of illegitimacy in what is likely to be a
Shia-dominated government. As American political observers can tell
you, even the wildest accusations can prove surprisingly resilient and problematic. Even within the factions, divisions are beginning to show. Among Shia, the violence of the past few years has left lasting resentments. The Kurds, once balanced between two parties, have splintered into three over accusation of corruption.

In
the coming months, the newly elected Iraqi parliament will engage in
huddled negotiations over determining the contours of the Iraqi
government. Cooperation, as any observer of the U.S. Senate can tell
you, is crucial to democratic governance, and a break-down can bring
everything to a dead halt. For an Iraq desperately in need of strong
leadership in enduring security crises, negotiating a looming Iranian
neighbor, and distributing oil wealth, success will require much more
than high voter turnout.

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