1734

Protection of Government ProcessesState of Mind
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18 U.S.C. § 1513

Section 1513(a) makes it an offense to kill or attempt to kill
another
with intent to retaliate for one of the actions set out in (a)(1), (A) and
(B).

Section 1513(b) proscribes conduct causing bodily injury or
damaging the
tangible property of another that is "knowingly" undertaken. As explained
in
this Manual at 1731, this term designates
general
intent. In addition to general intent, the prosecutor must prove that the
defendant took his/her actions with intent to retaliate for one of the
actions
set out in the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(1), (2).
See
alsoUnited States v. Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1986) (need
to
show intent to retaliate; no need to show intent to execute threat). Thus,
section 1513, like § 1512, has a compound state-of-mind requirement.

However, unlike § 1512, section 1513 does not excuse the
prosecutor
from proving that the defendant knew he/she was obstructing an official
proceeding or investigation. The section-by-section analysis of H.R. 7191
explains: "By the nature of the offense, the wrongdoer knows that the
person
retaliated against has been a party to or witness in a Federal proceeding or
has
reported information to a Federal law enforcement officer." 128 Cong. Rec.
H8206
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982). This explanation is flawed, for it does not
allow
for the possibility that the wrongdoer will not be the party aggrieved by
the
Federal proceeding or investigation. The wrongdoer, for example, could be
hired.
Furthermore, it is foreseeable that the aggrieved party will know that a
person
has been "talking" without knowing whether the recipients of the information
are
Federal or State authorities.