The Official
List of the Henchmen of
the MPLA RegimeLooting
the country's riches by liquefying the natural assets of the nation through
the creation of companies under the
name of family and members of the
ruling elite of the MPLA Regime

"Angola Grow With Us"70% of the Population lives under $2 US dollars a dayCORRUPTION - NEPOTISM - COMMUNIST IN ITS PUREST FORM

Information Last
Updated: 18 February 2014

The personal fortune of Mr. José Eduardo dos Santos
is estimated to be$20 Billion US Dollars or €14 Billion Euros
(Estimated in 2013)

From Rags to Riches

José Eduardo dos Santos was known to
only have one suit and two white shirts
in the city of Brazzaville in (1963-1970), José
Eduardo dos Santos is son of a stone mason and was born
in the Island of Sao
Tome, and doesn't speak any African Native Language, only fluent in
Portuguese and Russian.

SUBMISSION OF CASES OF
CORRUPTION

If you have any questions or wish to add
information to any of these cases, you are welcome to send
us any updated information in regards to the theft of public
funds and illicit enrichment in Angola and occupied Cabinda,
we are also keen on any information related to foreign
multinationals, banks, financial institutions, government
officials and governments relations with the MPLA Regime
Nomenclature in cases of Public Corruption, Traffic of
Influences, Criminal Activities between the MPLA Regime and
Foreign Partners.

They say that because they are black
they will not be noticed and they where told to learn portuguese. The
first platoon arrived in Angola between the 5 and 8 of October 2007, on
the 24 of October 2007 arrived the second platoon. And in the old Cuban
Communist fashion they where put to work at once, on the same day. They
are administered by a Coronel.

The last time Cuban troops provided the private security of the Angolan
President was under Agostinho Neto in the first years of Angola
Independence.

On the 27 of May 1977, used the Cuban
military men to suppress and kill the internal MPLA faction lead by Nito
Alves.

The Cuban Forces took over the Rádio
Nacional de Angola, the barracks of the elite forces that formed the 9ª
Brigade, and the Prison of S. Paulo, where the so called "nitistas"
where in the morning of that day.

In the book livro Purga em Angola, it
gives an account of that day the 27 of May, Dalila Cabrita and Álvaro
Mateus say that around 10:00 AM Agostinho Neto contacts Fidel Castro,
reporting to him the events with alarm of the happenings in the City of
Luanda, which in his words was taken by vandals and with the danger of
an invasion from Zairian and South African Forces, which became known as
«Operação Cobra». (snake operation)”

The presence of Cuban Military men in Angola is contrary to the
quadripartite treaties of13 December 1988, the “Acordos de New York”,
singed between Angola, Cuba, South Africa under the UN supervision, that
made provisions for the withdrawal of Cuban and South Africa troops from
the war theatre and the implementation of Resolution 435 that allowed
the independence of Namibia.

Comrade
Dictator - José Eduardo dos Santos

Dictator and self proclaimed
Chief of State. Was a member of the group of Cuban troops who took
Cabinda in the so-called north front. The MPLA awarded this
bastard the distinction of General. And he is the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces. He is the one who ultimately has
absolute power over the regime.

Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos
speaks no native language of Angola, which in it self its odd as
if he was bourn and grew up in Luanda he would at least could
speak Kimbundu, and it is well known that
Jose Eduardo dos Santos was born in the Island country of São Tomé and Príncipe, from both parents from
São Tomé and Príncipe, after the birth of their son they
decided to immigrate and moved to Angola.

Biography of Jose
Eduardo dos Santos

"I meet Jose Eduardo dos
Santos in Exile and at that time he could not have had more than two pairs
of Trousers and two pairs of shirts, so where does his massive fortune comes
from?" - Declarations of the Political Activist Dr. Makuta Nkondo in a
recorded interview on the 2 of April 2011 in Largo da Independecia, Luanda.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos was born in the Island and Country of Sao Tome in the village of Almeirim
where he studied until the fourth class (that is primary School
education).

His mother (Jacinta José Paulino) is of descent from people from Guinea
and Cape Verde mixed with Sao Tomense after having immigrating to the
island country of Sao Tome from Cape Verde due to the draught and hunger
affecting that island.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos Father (Avelino Eduardo dos Santos) had
originally as his family name Vandunen. The Vandunen are originally
descendent from slaves, and they are from a Dutch polygamous father that
had several offspring's from different African women.

This name Vandunen comes from the
Slaves and says nothing from the culture of Angola.

The Vandunen gathered a reputation for acting as mercenaries, assassins
and thieves, this being the main reasons for the Father of Jose Eduardo
dos Santos being ashamed of the name Vandunen and removed this name from
his full name.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos is not and engineer of petroleum as we claims.
He is lying to the people because he only studied until the 6th class in
the High School of Salvador Correia in Luanda, after his parents
immigrated to Angola.

He worked in a restaurant in Luanda and after an incident of removal and
food theft, the Police agency PIDE was requested to apprehend him, thus
is when he skipped as a fugitive to the neighbouring Congo.

Once in the Congo the MPLA Comrade Daniel Chipenda placed the thief Jose
Eduardo dos Santos in a instruction course of telecommunications
listening financed by the KGB, and it was due to this reason that
Comrade Agostinho Neto placed him as the chief of the
Communications DISA. This was his first work after 1975, and because of
this Agostinho Neto placed him to commence fractionising the population
and political manipulation of the society in order to establish a
Communist State with the aid of the Russians and the Cubans.

He was swiftly placed as
President of the MPLA after the mysterious death of Agostinho Neto
in a suspicious medical treatment operation in Moscow. Comrade Agostinho Neto was having second thoughts in moving his allegiance
to the United States and Europe and abandoning the Communist
Block.

In the mean time the Soviets had
this individual Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos who spoke fluent
Russian and was married to a Russian women, was the perfect
candidate to assure the Russians, Angola would not jump ship. The
autopsy of Comrade Agostinho Neto was never preformed. Agostinho
Neto died on the 10 of September of 1979 in Moscow.

As guerrilla war ends,
corruption now bleeds Angola to death

By Tim Butcher, 30 Jul 2002

The scale of the MPLA Regime
corruption problem only really registered when the senior army
officer leant forward and whispered the magic word "diamonds".

"It is illegal to buy diamonds in
Angola but if you know the right people they can fly you over the
border to Kinshasa [capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo] and
you can buy as many Angolan diamonds as you want," he said.

In Angola they use a Portuguese
euphemism for "bribe". They say you pay a little extra so a person
can have a gasosa or drink, but the sort of bribes being paid could
buy more than just a little refreshment.

Whether it is army officers
smuggling gems, government officials demanding multi-million-pound
bribes for oil contracts or teachers wanting money for exam
certificates, millions of pounds are being misappropriated every
week.

And with more than one million of
its 11 million population in need of food aid after the end of
decades of civil war, corruption in Angola means yet more human
suffering.

"Every person could be fed, every
baby could be vaccinated, every bridge could be rebuilt and every
mine could be lifted if the government of Angola properly used the
millions it steals each year," a foreign aid worker said.

One provincial governor from the
ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, was
recently exposed for selling schools to a friend who then charged
pupils an attendance fee.

The wives of senior MPLA members go
abroad for cosmetic surgery using a government fund meant to allow
sick Angolans to travel for treatment.

So bad is corruption in Angola that
it represents a grave challenge to the credibility of the new
African Union which is supposedly committed to supporting good
governance.

"The end of the war in Angola means
that right now the main institution in the country is corruption,"
said Rafael Marques, a dissident journalist from Luanda who has been
jailed by the Angolan government for his exposes.

"The system is rotten to the core
and until you change the entire system nothing will change."

The systemic scale of corruption
across the region compounds the task facing aid workers as they
fight the consequences of the worst drought in the region in a
decade.

At the top of the corruption charts
is the Angolan oil industry, contributing more than 90 per cent of
Angola's £2 billion annual foreign earnings from enormous off-shore
oil reserves.

Far from funnelling these earnings
into much-needed social programmes, the government of President Jose
Eduardo dos Santos has been accused of stealing up to a third of the
annual income - hundreds of millions of pounds.

Global Witness, an international
environmental watchdog, has also accused the MPLA of mortgaging the
next few years of oil revenues in exchange for cheap loans.

The IMF has indicated that it will
be reluctant to fund large-scale redevelopment in Angola unless some
move is made towards accounting for the country's oil money.

But Mr dos Santos has come out
fighting, accusing the IMF of trying to interfere in the sovereignty
of his country.

He has hired seven public relations
consultancies in Washington to try to improve Angola's standing
among US congressmen, as well as making clear that oil companies
will not be welcome in Angola if they reveal sharp business
practices.

A footnote in BP's 1999 annual
figures stated that it had spent £75 million on a "signature fee" to
win an offshore production contract. The payment never appeared in
any government accounts.

BP has subsequently declined to
publish details of signature fees paid for its three other big
contracts in Angola.

All the Presidents Men a
Global Witness Report on the MPLA Regime dated 1st March 2002

All the Presidents Men is the product of two
years of investigations, and provides an update on the campaign for full
transparency in the oil and banking sector. It continues an exposé, which
started with December 1999's A Crude Awakening, into the mechanisms of
wholesale state robbery in Angola.

Oil Revenues in Angola:
Much More Information But Not Enough Transparency 3rd December 2010

Significant gaps in the data published by the
Angolan government about its earnings from the oil industry undermine its
attempts to shed a reputation for corruption, says this new study by Global
Witness and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa – Angola (OSISA-Angola).

Angola is sub-Saharan Africa’s second
largest oil producer after Nigeria, with recent discoveries suggesting it
could soon become the largest; this at a time when the 1999 UN Human
Development Index (HDI) places Angola at 160 out of 174 countries, according
to social indicators. Whilst Angola should be a country with a thriving
economy, instead it is a country still at war, where a massive proportion of
national wealth is unaccounted for, and where the well-being of the population
appears no-longer to be a matter of priority for Government.

This report documents cases of human rights
violations by the police of the MPLA Regime in Angola between 2005 and 2007,
which reveal a pattern of police abuse of power and the consistent failure to
bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. It seeks to
highlight the deficiencies in Angolan police accountability that contribute
to, and exacerbate, these violations. The report concludes with
recommendations for the improvement of police policies and practice, which, if
fully implemented, would significantly contribute to a reduction in human
rights violations by the police.

Isabel José dos
Santos is considered by Forbes worth at least 50 million US Dollars and
as the most powerful and richest woman in her country and among the
richest in Africa.

6 December 2010 “Santoro Finance” last
week bought almost 700,000 shares in the portuguese Bank BPI for around 986,000
euros, thus adding to the shares it already owned, the company said in a
regulatory filing.

According to a statement filed with
Portuguese stock market regulator CMVM, Santoro Finance said it had acquired a
further 698,919 shares in the Bank BPI in purchases on the 26 November 2010
and 2 December 2010, and paid a total of 986,354 euros. With
these acquisition, the company owned by the daughter of the MPLA Dictator,
Isabel dos Santos, now has a 9.88% percent stake in the Bank BPI.

On 25 November 2010, Santoro Finance told the
regulator it had acquired a further 997,00 BPI shares and at the time had a
9.8% percent stake in the BPI Portuguese Bank. Santoro
Finance also owns 25% percent of BIC Portugal, an Angolan banking subsidiary. In Angola, BPI sold 49% percent of Banco de
Fomento de Angola to Unitel, a telecommunications operators and one of the
largest companies in Angola, which has Geni, a company also linked to Isabel
dos Santos, as a shareholder with 25% percent.

SAGRIPEKCapital divided between a group of partners Angolans in which
includes Isabel dos Santos, which owns 51% and a Brazilian
consortium.Activity: agriculture, livestock, agro-industrial production.

Link between Angolan president's
son-in-law and state oil company
raises questions about transparency

15th March 2010

Sonangol, the state-owned oil
company of Angola, nominated the son-in-law of Angola's President dos Santos
to the board of a holding company that owns a third of the listed Portuguese
oil firm Galp Energia, Global Witness has learned.

Angola is an impoverished country that depends on its oil industry to pay
for reconstruction after a long civil war. Angola has a reputation for
severe corruption which Global Witness has been reporting on for the last
decade.1 Angola's people have one of the lowest life expectancies in the
world: 46.5 years, according to the United Nations.2

Galp has major oil investments in Angola, a former colony of Portugal, and
works closely with Sonangol, whose chairman Manuel Vicente sits on its
board.3

A third of the shares in Galp are owned by a holding company called Amorim
Energia BV. Forty-five per cent of the shares in Amorim Energia are owned by
a company called Esperaza Holding BV, which is a subsidiary of Sonangol. The
rest of Amorim Energia is ultimately controlled by Portugal's Amorim
family.4

The board members of Amorim Energia include Sindika Dokolo5, a businessman
married to Isabel dos Santos, a daughter of the Angolan president. As this
briefing will show, Global Witness has learned that Dokolo was nominated to
this post in April 2006 by Esperaza Holding. The latter was wholly owned by
Sonangol at the time, according to Dutch corporate records.6

"The son-in-law of the Angolan president, a private businessman, should not
be working so closely with the state company which is responsible for
managing Angola's oil on behalf of its citizens," said Diarmid O'Sullivan of
Global Witness. "This arrangement raises concerns about conflicts of
interest to which Sonangol has not responded."

Sonangol's minority partner in Esperaza Holding is Exem Holding AG. a
secretive company based in the Swiss canton of Zug which does not publicly
disclose the identities of its owners.7 A director of Exem Holding, a
Paris-based financier called Konema Mwenenge, told Global Witness that he
has a "professional" relationship with Dokolo. But Mwenenge declined to say
whether Dokolo has a financial interest in Exem Holding.8 Dokolo himself,
via his lawyer, declined to respond to questions from Global Witness.9
Sonangol's chairman, Manuel Vicente, did not respond to written questions.10

The fact that the Angolan president's son-in-law appears to have been
representing Sonangol in its indirect investment in Galp does not amount to
evidence of wrongdoing. But these findings raise further questions about the
transparency of Sonangol, the state oil company which dominates the economy
of Angola.

Sonangol collects billions of dollars a year in revenues on behalf of the
Angolan government and controls other companies' access to Angola's oil and
gas reserves, but does not publish its accounts and discloses little
detailed information about its activities.

When President dos Santos called for "zero tolerance" of corruption in
November 2009, a prominent member of the ruling MPLA party said Angolans
should feel free to criticise the president over his family's business
dealings, Reuters news agency reported.11

Portuguese billionnaire Americo Ferreira de Amorim is the chairman of Amorim
Energia. He told Global Witness, in a three-page response to questions about
the issues raised in this briefing, that Dokolo had been appointed to the
board of Amorim Energia "at the designation of Esperaza Holding".12

"The fact that Mr Dokolo is the husband of the daughter of President Jose
Eduardo dos Santos does not seem in itself as relevant neither [sic] to
qualify nor to disqualify him as a board member of Amorim Energia, and
therefore was not a factor to have him appointed as a managing director of
Amorim Energia," Amorim wrote in his letter to Global Witness. He added: "I
can give you my personal views on the fact that the appointment of Mr Dokolo
did not raise discussions concerning ethical issues."

Amorim said in his letter that the relationship between Amorim Energia and
Galp was governed by a shareholder agreement that was in place before Dokolo
came onto the former's board. Global Witness does not assert, or seek to
imply, that companies controlled by the Amorim family have engaged in any
illegal or illegitimate activity.

At the end of 2006, Sonangol's 100 per cent shareholding in Esperaza Holding
had fallen to 60 per cent. The other 40 per cent was owned by a subsidiary
of Exem Holding.13 Exem Holding, via its subsidiaries, has been granted
access by Sonangol to potentially lucrative investments in Angolan oil and
gas but appears to be otherwise unknown in the oil industry.

Sonangol has authorised subsidiaries of Exem Holding to:

* Acquire a 40 per cent stake in Esperaza Holding by the end of 2006, making
it a partner in Sonangol's indirect investment in Galp.
* Acquire a 10 per cent stake in an Angolan gas exploration venture
announced in December 2007. This venture is controlled by Sonangol. Its
other shareholders include Galp, Italy's ENI and Spain's Gas Natural.14 The
venture has reportedly been awarded a ten-year gas exploration licence and
exempted from taxes.15
* Pre-qualify, as of late 2007, to bid for oil licences in Angola.16

Global Witness asked the Exem Holding director, Konema Mwenenge, to describe
the process by which Exem Holding had acquired these investments and
investment opportunities. Mwenenge replied in an email that: "I can confirm
as a Director of Exem Holding that its subsidiaries did respond to tenders
in Angola. Information concerning the tenders is available on the web site
of the national oil company of Angola."17

Sonangol's website does report that a subsidiary of Exem Holding has been
pre-qualified by Sonangol to bid for oil licences in Angola as a
"non-operator" - that is, as a minority shareholder in a joint venture with
other oil companies.18 However, there appears to be no information on this
website about tenders in relation to Exem Holding's other interests. Global
Witness wrote back and asked Mwenenge where this information could be found,
but he did not respond.

Although Sonangol has a reputation for being professionally run, its opacity
and its close links to the ruling elite of Angola have long been a cause of
public concern. The state oil company has long been used by the government
to borrow huge sums in a highly opaque manner and with little public
accountability for the use of the money.19

For more than a year, Global Witness has been investigating the
relationships between Sonangol and certain private companies that invest in
Angola's oil sector, which are often complicated and hard to unravel because
of a dearth of public information.

In August 2009, Global Witness reported on another little-known private
company which was pre-qualified to bid for oil rights in Angola by Sonangol
in late 2007. The shareholders of this company, Sociedade de Hidrocarbonetos
de Angola, included a person called Manuel Domingos Vicente. The chairman of
Sonangol, who has the same name, did not respond to a request for comment
from Global Witness, nor did two other senior officials who also have the
same names as shareholders in SHA.20

The International Monetary Fund agreed in late 2009 to lend $1.4 billion to
Angola in return for policy pledges which include more transparency for
Sonangol, but it remains to be seen whether these pledges will actually be
implemented.21

"At a time when Angola's government is promising more transparency to the
IMF in return for a bailout, our findings show that Sonangol is still
anything but transparent," said O'Sullivan.

Global Witness believes that Angola's government cannot begin to reverse the
country's international reputation for severe corruption until:

* Sonangol explains its relationship with Dokolo and identifies the ultimate
beneficial owners of Exem Holding, who are currently unknown to the public.
* Sonangol publishes its audited accounts and full details of oil revenue
flows between foreign oil companies, Sonangol itself and the Angolan
government.
* Sonangol relinquishes its control over the allocation of oil and mining
rights in Angola to an independent agency that operates under full public
oversight and awards these rights in a transparent manner.
* International oil companies in Angola commit themselves not to go into
partnership with any smaller companies whose ultimate beneficial ownership
is unknown to the public.
* The government ensures that civil society groups within Angola are able to
freely discuss matters of public interest, including the oil sector, without
fear of harrassment or censorship in any form.

Notes
1. Global Witness. A Crude Awakening. 1999; All the Presidents' Men. March
2002. Time for Transparency. March 2004. Available at www.globalwitness.org
2. United Nations. Human Development Report 2009. Angola. The figures for
life expectancy at birth are from 2007.
3. Galp Energia. Annual Report and Accounts 2008. Pages 6, 29 and 182
4. Amorim Energia BV. Annual accounts for 2008. Pages 3, 4 and 23.
5. Amorim Energia Annual report 2008. Page 3.
6. Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce. Handelsregisterhistorie. Esperaza Holding
BV.
7. Handelsregister des Kantons Zug. Exem Holding AG.
8. Global Witness phone and email conversations with Mwenenge.
9. Correspondence between Global Witness and a lawyer acting for Dokolo.
10. Letter sent to Vicente by Global Witness on 15 September 2009.
11. Reuters. Angolan President calls on party to end corruption. 21 November
2009. Angolan President's family taint corruption fight. 3 December 2009.
12. Letter from Americo Ferreira de Amorim to Global Witness. 18 January
2010.
13. Esperaza Holding B.V. annual accounts 2006. Page 3.
14. Eni. Eni acquires a participation stake in the Angola LNG Project. 10
December 2007. This press release refers to Exem Exploration & Production
B.V. This company has since been renamed Exem Oil & Gas B.V., according to
annual accounts filed by the latter for 2007, and is wholly owned by Exem
Energy B.V, which is wholly owned by Exem Holding AG.
15. Reuters. Angola set to exempt gas explorers from tax. March 25 2009.
16. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for
Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
17. Email to Global Witness from Mwenenge. 19 October 2009.
18. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for
Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
19. See Global Witness. Undue Diligence. How banks do business with corrupt
regimes. March 2009. Chapter Eight.
20. Global Witness. Angola. Private oil firm has shareholders with same
names as top government officials. Media briefing. 4 August 2009.
21. International Monetary Fund. IMF lends Angola $1.4 billion to support
reserves, reforms. Press release. 26 November 2009. See also Global Witness.
IMF risks condoning corruption with new loan to Angola. Press release. 5
November 2009.

http://www.zap.co.ao

ZAP TV & INTERNET PROVIDERS

24 February 2012

ZAP, its an Angolan company that delivers TV and Internet
content, with a participation 30% of its capital owned by ZON
Multimédia, commemorated this week end (February 2012) its second
anniversary with the inauguration of its brand new installations in Luanda.

ZAP is owned in its majority 70% by the Angolan businesswomen Isabel
dos Santos (daughter of El President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the source of
her wealth or her funds is unknown), the creation of the company ZAP
constituted the first step in the process of internationalization of the
company ZON Multimédia in the Portuguese speaking countries.

The project of ZAP was born after Isabel dos Santos (daughter of El
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos) became shareholder of the company ZON,
with the purchase of 10% of the capital of that Portuguese company. ZAP was
the first company to offer HD TV service in Angola.

http://www.zon.pt

In the opening ceremony of the
inauguration of the coporate offices in Luanda situated in Talatona, the
event was presided by the Minister of Social Communication Carolina Cerqueira,
and by the Minister of Telecommunications & Technology of Information, José da Rocha,
was also present at the event the President of the Executive Comission of ZON Multimédia, Rodrigo
Costa.

The Powerful Isabel dos Santos

16 May 2012

Who is and how she lives the woman who is buying so much in
Portugal? In the last 15 days (16 May 2012), she spent 82 Million Euros.
The personal fortune of the first born daughter of Jose Eduardo dos Santos,
known as the "Princess", has now surpassed the amount of investment in
Portugal in the tune of 1.4 Billion Euros.

With jeans trousers and thorn T-Shirt, accompanied by a
well-dressed lady and three children, a young woman arrives at Lisbon
airport. A friend waits for some time, her flight from Luanda. Although she
is famous and her name sparkles in all the headlines of newspapers of our
country economic (Portugal), not to mention Forbes Magazine, where she
figures as one of the largest fortunes in Africa, nobody,
apart from him, recognizes her. Camouflaged in simple dress mode -
although brand - lets the sparkle for her accompanier, in truth the "Au
pair" of the children (4, 7 and 8 years). The girl of thorn jeans, yet, she
is the one who is the boss... and the mother.

Maybe Isabel José dos Santos, 39
years old presumably completed last April, is only coming in a shopping trip.
Simple things: a participation in the company GALP, a reinforcement in the
position of ZON or another even bigger bite of the Bank BPI... The "Princes",
as she is known is Angola, first born of the President José Eduardo
dos Santos and of a Russian mother by the name of Tatiana, took a course in
mechanical engineering electronics in King's College, London, and displays a
bewildering discretion, averse to parties and art openings, interviews or
photographs of fuss and colourful African.

Completely westernised, anglophile, but speaking a perfect
Portuguese, speaks French (that she uses with her Congolese husband
Sindika Dokolo) and, presumably an impeccable Russian, she is a woman of the
world.

One of these days, Portugal needed investment like her place
of birth the dessert azeri (born in Baku, Azerbaijão) needs drops of rain. Isabel dos
Santos has been the angolan rain in service: through the company holding Santoro,
she has 25% of the BANK BIC, now owner of the Bank BPN, and 19,4% of the
Bank BPI. Through the company
Esperanza Holding (like Holy Hope, a poem of Agostinho Neto), in
partnership with Sonangol,
33,34% of the company Galp (45% of the company Amorim Energy).

And through the company holding Kento, 15% of the company ZON.
Its around 1,4 Billion Euros in the value of shareholder in companies in the
Portuguese stock market. Bank, Energy, Telecommunications - are her areas of
interest, also of cement, and food produce distribution and art.

She is also the darling girl that owns the sophisticated restaurant in
Luanda Oon.dah, where a meal costs in average around 100 Euros?...

In accordance with information obtained by the Portuguese
newspaper Diario de Noticias, the
offshore company, with headquarters in the USA, has finally been the subject
of an investigation, because it was part of a list of clients of PIC (International Consultants),
a fiduciary company that has already been search in connection to the
"Operation Thunder". Such company was used to register an apartment bought
in Lisbon by the husband of Isabel dos Santos.

In 2005, the First Born of José Eduardo dos Santos became
shareholder of Banco Internacional de Crédito (International Bank of Credit),
with a participation identical to the Portuguese businessman Américo Amorim.
And in partnership with this businessman gained entrance to the capital of
the Portuguese company GALP by means of the consortium of Amorim/Sonangol,
the National Oil Company of Angola, after that date and event there where no
longer limits in her funding and investment with moneys of unknown origin.

UNITEL a company which is Isabel dos Santos daughter of Jose
Eduardo dos Santos owned by 25% ACQUIRED 70% OF THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS PHONE COMPANY
"T Mais" October 2012.

Isabel dos Santos, Africa's Richest Woman

Daddy's Girl: How An African 'Princess' Banked $3
Billion In A Country Living On $2 A Day

This story appears in the 2 September 2013 issue of Forbes
By Kerry A. Dolan and Rafael Marques de Morais

LAST DECEMBER (2012) Isabel dos Santos commemorated her
tenth wedding anniversary to Congolese businessman Sindika Dokolo with a
party. Subtlety wasn’t on the menu. She jetted in dozens of friends and
relatives from as far as Germany and Brazil, who joined with hundreds of
local guests in Angola for three days of lavishness, including a bash at the
Fortress of Sao Miguel in the capital city of Luanda and a beachside Sunday
brunch on the posh Mussulo peninsula.

The invitation, according to one attendee, came in a sleek
white box, promising a celebration of “a decade of passion/ a decade of
friendship/ a decade worth a hundred years. …” A decade worth $3 billion is
more like it.

At 40 Dos Santos is Africa’s only female billionaire, and also the
continent’s youngest. She has quickly and systematically garnered
significant stakes in Angola’s strategic industries–banking, cement,
diamonds and telecom–making her the most influential businessperson in her
homeland. More than half of her assets are held in publicly traded
Portuguese companies, adding international credibility. When FORBES outed
her as a billionaire in January the government disseminated the news as a
matter of national pride, living proof that this country of 19 million has
arrived.

The real story, however, is how Dos Santos–the oldest daughter of Angolan
President José Eduardo dos Santos–acquired her wealth. For the past year
FORBES has been tracing Isabel dos Santos’ path to riches, reviewing a score
of documents and speaking with dozens of people on the ground.

As best as we can trace, every major Angolan investment held
by Dos Santos stems either from taking a chunk of a company that wants to do
business in the country or from a stroke of the president’s pen that cut her
into the action. Her story is a rare window into the same, tragic
kleptocratic narrative that grips resource-rich countries around the world.

For President Dos Santos it’s a foolproof way to extract money from his
country, while keeping a putative arm’s-length distance away. If the
71-year-old president gets overthrown, he can reclaim the assets from his
daughter. If he dies in power, she keeps the loot in the family. Isabel may
decide, if she is generous, to share some of it with her seven known
half-siblings. Or not. The siblings are known around Angola for despising
one another.

“It is not possible to justify this wealth, which is
shamelessly displayed,” former Angolan prime minister Marcolino Moco tells
FORBES. “There is no doubt that it was the father who generated such a
fortune.” Isabel dos Santos declined to speak with FORBES for this article.
Her representatives failed to respond to detailed questions sent months ago
but last week issued this statement: “Mrs. Isabel dos Santos is an
independent business woman, and a private investor representing solely her
own interests.

Her investments in Angolan and/or in Portuguese companies
are transparent and have been conducted through arms-length transactions
involving external entities such as reputed banks and law firms.”

In turn, the spokesman accuses this article’s coauthor, an
Angolan investigative journalist, of being an activist with a political
agenda. The Angolan government jailed Marques de Morais in 1999 over a
series of articles critical of the regime and has brought new criminal
defamation charges against him over his 2011 book, Blood Diamonds:
Corruption and Torture in Angola .

Finally, a representative of Mrs. Dos Santos said that any
allegations of illegal wealth transfers between her and the government are
“groundless and completely absurd.” That could well be. When your father
runs the show, and can dictate which national assets are sold and at what
price, what’s theft of public resources in one country can be rendered legal
with a swipe of the pen.

President José Eduardo dos Santos could not be reached for
comment. That is unfortunate, because the Dos Santoses, as Moco notes, have
“some explaining to do.” FOR THREE CENTURIES the Portuguese extracted wealth
from this mineral-rich country on Africa’s southwestern coast.

Almost immediately after Angola won independence in 1975,
various internal factions began battling one another for the right to do the
exact same thing. From this chaos, which lasted 27 years, Dos Santos, who
had studied oil engineering in Soviet Azerbaijan and served as foreign
minister upon independence, eventually emerged as president in 1979. He’s
held on to power ever since, making him the planet’s third-longest-serving
nonroyal head of state.

The president met his first wife (he’s been married at least
twice), Tatiana Kukanova, while a student in Azerbaijan, and his first
child–Isabel–was born there. By age 6 Isabel dos Santos was in Angola’s
presidential palace, and while the family’s lifestyle wasn’t over-the-top by
profligate African dictator standards (save the president’s dalliances–at
least five of his children are from various mistresses), the family had
Christmas trees flown in from New York and $500,000 worth of bubbly imported
from a Lisbon restaurateur.

There was decadence enough for Isabel to earn the nickname
“the Princess.” During Isabel’s upbringing the Angola economy sputtered,
crippled by two factors: ongoing civil war and Dos Santos’ socialist
policies. “In the 1980s you’d go to the supermarket and there would only be
noodles on the shelves.

There wasn’t much there,” says University of Southern
California associate professor emeritus Gerald Bender, who’s been studying
Angola since 1968. For cloistered Isabel that reality was likely invisible;
she eventually attended King’s College in London, where her mother, now a
British citizen, lives, and earned an undergraduate degree in engineering.

However, as civil war resumed by the end of 1992, Isabel
left for Angola’s capital city, Luanda, in a rush, allegedly after receiving
death threats in London. By the late 1990s, when the civil war was winding
down –a ceasefire was formally declared in 2002–President Dos Santos, like
the Soviets he had studied under in the 1960s, was embracing a
grab-what-you-can form of capitalism.

Over the past decade Angola has been one of the world’s
fastest-growing economies. GDP grew at an 11.6% annual clip from 2002 to
2011, driven by a more than doubling of oil production to 1.8 million
barrels a day. The government budget sits at $69 billion, up from $6.3
billion a decade ago. But predictably, precious little of the windfall has
made it to the people. Some 70% of Angolans live on less than $2 a day. And
by the government’s own count, 10% of the country’s population is scrambling
for food due to drought and bureaucratic neglect. So where’s the money
going? Start with a paranoid president-for-life.

The state security apparatus sucks more funds from the
budget than health care, education and agriculture combined. A lot is
clearly stolen: Between 2007 and 2010 at least $32 billion of oil revenue
went missing from the federal ledger, according to the International
Monetary Fund, which later tracked most of the money to “quasi-fiscal
operations.” Angola comes in at 157 out of 176 nations ranked by
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

It trails shining stalwarts of participatory democracy such
as Yemen and Kyrgyzstan. And it’s within this environment that Isabel dos
Santos has surfaced with an estimated net worth of $3 billion.

ISABEL DOS SANTOS’ formative business experience came at
Miami Beach. Not the Florida city, but rather a rustic chic beachside bar
and restaurant in Luanda that tries to emulate its namesake, down to the
mediocre food and indifferent service. In 1997 the owner, Rui Barata, was
having issues with health inspectors and taxmen. His solution: bringing in
Isabel dos Santos, then 24, as his partner, with the idea, contemporaries
say, that her name would keep pesky government regulators at bay.

Her initial investment was negligible, according to a source
with knowledge of the deal, and the restaurant thrived: Sixteen years later
it’s still a weekend hot spot. The lesson–the equity stake available to
those with a gilded name–couldn’t have been lost on Isabel dos Santos, who
was entering adulthood at the exact same time Angola’s riches were being
unlocked.

Here’s what followed: First, Grab the Diamonds. Angola is
the world’s fourth-largest diamond producer, selling an estimated $1 billion
in gems every year from mines situated in the country’s northeast. The
mines’ exclusive concession-holder is the state-owned company, Endiama. In
1999 President Dos Santos pushed Endiama to form a diamond-selling
partnership. Three Israeli diamond merchants, including Lev Leviev, who
FORBES now estimates is worth $1.5 billion, promised contacts and expertise.

The power behind the venture, according to British court
records, was Russian arms dealer Arkady Gaydamak–a former confidant of
President Dos Santos during the civil war of 1992-2002. The new company
would be called Ascorp. Leviev and his partners, including Gaydamak, would
wind up with 24.5% of Ascorp.

The government would retain 51%. The most surprising major
shareholder? Isabel dos Santos, who emerged with a 24.5% stake through a
Gibraltar investment company, Trans Africa Investment Services, that she had
set up with her mother, according to TAIS’ annual report. (Leviev did not
respond to a request for comment, and Gaydamak could not be reached at press
time.) Angola’s 2010 constitution bars the president from stealing public
money and acts of corruption, which would seem to prohibit the use of his
position for the private enrichment of his family.

No matter: Angola’s Council of Ministers, controlled by her
father, approved the Ascorp deal anyway. “In a country with separation of
powers and real democracy, these presidential actions to enrich his family
would have caused legal procedures for his impeachment,” says lawyer
Salvador Freire, president of the human rights group Maos Livres. “In Angola
he is the law.”

Ascorp was a cash cow, yielding millions of dollars in
dividends per month, according to British court documents, but as the “blood
diamond” business attracted international scrutiny in the middle of the
2000s, Dos Santos transferred to her mother total control of TAIS, now
renamed Iaxonh Limited, according to Gibraltar’s Registry of Companies
records accessed by FORBES.

It’s quite a parking spot, safely under the control of a
British citizen, with Isabel dos Santos conveniently sitting in Angola as
her mother’s sole heir. The mother could not be reached for comment.
Telecom: Father Knows Best. In 1997 President Dos Santos issued a decree
concerning the increasingly valuable telecommunications spectrum it
controlled: The government must undertake a public bidding process for new
telecom licenses. Two years later he defied his own decree–by issuing a new
one.

The government could grant such a license without a public
tender, as long as the grantee was a joint venture with the state. Eleven
months after that the president, backed by his rubber stamp Council of
Ministers, granted Unitel the right to be the first private mobile telephony
operator in the country–with the condition that he had sole power to approve
the project and to decide on the shareholding structure of the company,
since it involved state funds. The state-owned oil company got a 25% stake,
and Isabel emerged with her own 25% stake. A spokesman for Isabel dos Santos
said she contributed capital for her Unitel stake but declined to specify
how much. A year later Portugal Telecom paid $12.6 million for another 25%
stake.

It was one hell of an investment. Mobile phones have
revolutionized Africa, and as one of just two mobile phone networks in
Angola, Unitel had amassed 9 million subscribers. Revenue last year was $2
billion, making it Angola’s largest private company. Her share is worth at
least $1 billion, based on discussions with several analysts who follow
Portugal Telecom. Banking: A Friend in Europe. As Isabel dos Santos
diversified her Angolan business interests, in 2005 she diversified her
network of powerful patrons. Enter Americo Amorim, a Portuguese billionaire
worth $4.3 billion who has spent his life expanding his family’s business
empire from cork to real estate, tourism and, especially, oil.

The billionaire, who did not comment for this story, was
early to seek deals in Angola after hostilities ended. When the Dos Santos
clan made a move into banking in 2005, they did so in partnership with
Amorim and Fernando Teles, a Portuguese national who had been CEO of another
Angolan bank. They formally opened Banco Internacional de Credito, known as
BIC, according to the company’s annual reports. The hand of Isabel’s father
again played a role: President Dos Santos, as head of the Council of
Ministers, formally authorized the foreign investment in the capital of the
bank. Specifically how it was financed is murky, as there is no public
record showing who put money into the bank. BIC’s latest annual report shows
that Amorim owns 25% of the bank.

Various documents reveal that another 25% is held through an
investment vehicle controlled by Isabel dos Santos. Her spokesman says she
was a founding member of the bank and had independent means to pay her share
from her early business ventures. Regardless, BIC was a hit, in large part
because of a deal to lend money to … the Angolan government. BIC made loans
to the state worth $450 million, in addition to more than $350 million made
to private ventures. BIC had assets of $6.9 billion in 2012. Isabel dos
Santos’ stake is worth at least $160 million, FORBES estimates, based on the
bank’s book value listed in its latest annual report. BIC officials could
not be reached for comment. Oil: A Strange Partnership. Oil is Angola’s
greatest natural asset.

The country produces 650 million barrels per year, most of
it exported. The state-owned oil firm, Sonangol, is so profitable that it
was only a matter of time before the Dos Santos family would start looking
for ways to hitch a ride on its success. Isabel’s banking partner,
billionaire Americo Amorim, would play the key role. In 2005 Amorim set up a
subsidiary, Amorim Energia. He would control it with a 55% stake. The
remaining 45%, at least originally, went to Sonangol via a Netherlands
holding company called Esperaza Holding B.V. At the end of that year Amorim
Energia went shopping, acquiring 33.3% of Galp Energia, Portugal’s former
state-owned oil company, for roughly $1 billion, according to press reports.

At the end of 2006, according to investigative
not-for-profit Global Witness, 40% of Sonangol’s stake in Esperaza ended up
with a Swiss company called Exem Holding. No documents could be found that
definitively tie Exem Holding to Isabel dos Santos, but her fingerprints are
everywhere. Her husband, Sindika Dokolo, was put on the Amorim Energia board
at the request of Esperaza, according to Global Witness. And the chairman of
Isabel dos Santos’ holding company is also on the boards of Fidequity, a
subsidiary of Exem Holding, and entities called Exem Energy and Exem Oil &
Gas, according to public filings. Last year Amorim Energia paid $726 million
for an additional 5% of GALP. Isabel’s estimated 6.9% stake in Galp is worth
a recent $924 million.

Cement: Safeguarding the “Public Interest.” For most of
President Dos Santos’ reign there’s only been one cement factory in Angola,
owned by a firm called Nova Cimangola. By mid-2004 the government owned
39.8% of it, state-owned oil company Sonangol’s captive bank, BAI, owned
9.5%, and the remaining 49% was owned by Swiss firm Scanang, which was in
the process of being taken over by Portuguese cement company Cimpor. The
government began demanding a bigger stake, arguing that the factory was a
strategic asset for national reconstruction in the aftermath of the war.

On Oct. 29, 2006 the president’s Council of Ministers’
Resolution 78/06 approved a $74 million payment to buy out Cimpor, declaring
that the expenditure was necessary to safeguard “public interest, to restore
the legality and to maintain the shareholding control of Nova Cimangola by
national entities, incorporated in Angola.” The $74 million payment,
according to an Angolan newspaper, came from BIC, the bank half-owned by
Amorim and Isabel dos Santos.

The government would now own 89%, while BAI and Angolan
individuals would control the remaining 11%. What followed, however, showed
that the larger goal wasn’t to give Angola a larger stake but rather certain
Angolans. Prior to the council’s approval a company called Ciminvest was
incorporated in Angola. Ciminvest was initially fronted by the president’s
former legal counsel, according to the articles of incorporation he signed.
At one point Portuguese billionaire Americo Amorim owned an estimated 30% of
Ciminvest, but his representative confirms that he transferred his stake in
2009. He would not comment on who took over the stake or what was paid for
it.

The real owners are now widely understood to be Isabel dos
Santos and her husband, though documents detailing ownership are not
publicly available. However, Isabel admits on her resume that she chairs the
board of Nova Cimangola, which she controls through Ciminvest. Without much
ado, at no apparent cost, the company that was presidentially mandated to be
controlled by “national entities” had become controlled by Isabel dos
Santos. ISABEL DOS SANTOS’ holdings are more than just squirreled away
assets to be unearthed in case of a rainy day.

They throw off hefty dividends that allow her to buy yet
more assets in businesses seemingly unrelated to the exploitation of Angolan
properties, such as her $500 million stake in Portuguese media firm ZON.
Meanwhile, her father has taken steps to legally protect himself from all
the plundering. Under Angolan law President Dos Santos’ decision to grant a
license to Unitel for the personal benefit of his daughter could be
considered an abuse of power.

To cover his legal bases, in 1992 the president fiddled with
the law to reduce it to two grounds: taking bribes or betraying the country.
Technically, he can argue, neither was violated in the case of Unitel. The
larger strategy, though, is to portray Isabel as a hero.

In January, after FORBES declared her a billionaire, the
Angolan regime’s mouthpiece (and the country’s only daily newspaper), Jornal
de Angola , claimed that “while we give our best for Angola without poverty,
we are elated with the fact that businesswoman Isabel dos Santos has become
a reference in the world of finances. This is good for Angola and it fills
Angolans with pride.” Angolans should be mortified, not proud.

The Son of Comrade
Dictator
Jose Eduardo dos Santos

José Filomeno
dos Santos, aka "Zenu"

As chairman of the new Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA),
José Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos is mandated to get the US$ 5 Billion
sovereign fund off the ground. Dos Santos represents a new round of leaders
managing sub-Saharan Africa’s sovereign wealth. Dos Santos was a former
board member of Banco Kwanza Invest, an Angolan investment bank.

Millionaire overnight, where the
money come from?

José Filomeno dos Santos
is CEO of the China Petrotechnical
Corporation register in Hong Kong partner of SINOPEC Corp (China Petroleum
& Chemical Corporation) The Father is the Dictator of the MPLA,
Government, Armed Forces, etc… the uncle is Manuel Vicente, President
of the Counsel and Administration (PCA) of the Angola Petrol Company
Sonangol, family business is the best (wow is Angola a family run business?
yeap it seems so). Jose Filomeno dos Santos, aka Zenu spent time
in tour of China petroleum infrastructures in 2005.

José Filomeno
dos Santos son of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos is being investigated by the German Authorities for Money
Laundry

24 March 2011

José Filomeno dos Santos, son
of Jose Eduardo dos Santos the MPLA Regime Dictator, seen by some observers
as a potential successor to become Head of State, is in the eyes of the
German and Swiss media because of alleged illicit business activities.

Zenu, is the nick name for
José Filomeno dos Santos, is a man that has already worked in several
companies of the MPLA Regime: he was part of the Directors of Sonangol and
was director adjunct of its subsidiary company AAA, before venturing in the
world of International Businesses: he passed by Sweden, he studied in
England and participated in several projects, such as “Afrikanische
Innovations Stiftung”, Foundation for the Innovation of Africa, with head
quarters in Switzerland.

The Swiss journalist specialized in economic matters, Lukas Haessig,
recently published and article about the suspicious activities of Zenu dos Santos
in Switzerland, in which he explains the function of the Son of the Dictator
of Angola Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos,
allegedly to finance building works for Charity in Africa. “Zenu dos
Santos with this front pretends to create for himself a positive image”, sais
Haessig.

The Director of the Foundation is a Swiss lawyer by the name of Thomas Ladner,
who at the same time, also directs the company of financial services with
the name of
Quantum in Switzerland. Zenu dos Santos is also one of the promoters of the
Bank Quantum Angola: “This for me is a web of companies - an Angolan network -
always with the same individuals who work in together”, states the
journalist.

The unclear role of a German Banker

Behind the businesses of Zenu dos Santos is Jean-Claude de Morais Bastos,
a Swiss citizen original from Cabinda. It was through him that Zenu created
his Bank “Quantum Bank” and recruited to this Bank Ernst Welteke,
ex-president of the Central Bank of Germany, Mr. Ernst Welteke today
occupies the functions of President of the Council of Administration of the
Bank of the Son of Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

Haessig considers being “very peculiar” a ex-president of the Bundesbank
(German Central Bank) exercising such functions in a Bank of the Son of the
Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, e, and at the same time, in a Bank in
Switzerland with the same name, but that alegedly nothing has to do one with
the other. "But looking for the Administration we can see that its
Administrative personnel are exactly the same. Mr. Ernst Weltecke belongs to
both Administration Councils and also the Angolan-Swiss citizen Basto de Morais
is in both banks".

Accusations of Money Laundry

Angolan observers residents in
Germany have already made serious public accusations against this network,
which they qualify as a Laundry machine of money laundry from public funds
in Angola. The laundry would be made with the participation and help of some
German personalities, such as Ernst Welteke, writes an Angolan journalist
resident in Germany, in an article published in the German magazine "afrika
Süd". Title of the article: “Dirty money seeks washing-up”.

The Swiss Journalist, Lukas Haessig, says that despite of no proof, for the
time being. Deutsche Welle tried in vain to contact Mr. Ernst
Welteke, member of the Social-Democrat German party, which in 2004 was
forced to quit from the German Central Bank for suspicion of corruption.

Mr.
Jean-Claude
Bastos
de
Morais,
the
closest
business
associate
of
President
Dos
Santos’
son,
José Filomeno
“Zenú”.
He
was
convicted
by a
criminal
court
in
the
Swiss
canton
of
Zug
for
“repeated
qualified
criminal
mismanagement.”
The
judgment
dates
back
to
July
13,
2011.

Bastos
de
Morais
first
appealed
the
judgment.
On
December
11,
he
was
scheduled
to
meet
the
deadline
for
another
appeal
at
the
High
Court
of
Zug.
The
businessman
withdrew
from
appealing,
and
the
conviction
has
now
entered
into
force.
According
to a
press
release
issued
by Bastos
de
Morais’
communications
agency,
Spicy
Communications,
the
reason
for
the
withdrawal
is
that
he
was
“acquitted
in
all
major
charges.”
And
that
what
remained
was
“only
a
conditional
fine
and
another
one
for
two
formally
incorrect
wage
payments.”

He
also
denied
to
the
“Handelszeitung”
that
his
business
activities
in
Angola
are
due
to
his
good
relationship
with
the
Angolan
princeling.
“That’s
not
the
case,”
he
said.

According
to
Bastos
de
Morais,
the
idea
of
setting
up a
state
fund
for
venture
capital
is
his
brainchild.
He
mentioned
to
have
close
relationships
with
several
ministers,
including
the
minister
of
Economy,
Abrahão
Gourgel,
who
“was
willing
to
listen.”
Through
the
attentive
hears
of
the
minister,
and
through
a
web
of
connections,
Banco
Kwanza
secured
hundreds
of
millions
of
dollars
from
the
Angolan
Central
Bank
to
invest
abroad.
At
the
time,
minister
Abrahão
Gourgel,
was
the
head
of
the
central
bank.
“The
Minister
was
able
to
place
the
idea,
I
was
the
producer.”

“I
am a
machine
of
ideas,”
boasted
Bastos
de
Morais.

Longtime
business
partner
of
Bastos,
Marcel
Krüse,
who
is
currently
the
CEO
of
Banco
Kwanza,
was
also
convicted
in
the
Zug
court
on
the
same
case.

Bastos
received
a
suspended
fine
of
160,000
Swiss
Francs,
and
has
to
pay
4,500
Swiss
francs.
The
court
handed
Marcel
Krüse
a
suspended
fine
of
170,000
Swiss
francs,
and
has
to
pay
5,000.
A
suspended
fine
means
they
don’t
have
to
pay
the
fine
unless
they
commit
another
crime
within
the
next
two
years.
Nevertheless,
both
get
a
criminal
record.

Bank Kwanza Investwww.bancokwanzainvest.comJosé Filomeno dos Santos, on of the sons of the President Jose
Eduardo dos Santos in one of the proprietors of the Bank Kwanza Invest.

Rádio KwanzaRádio Kwanza is the now Radio Station of José Filomeno, dos Santos son of
the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, it will start to broadcast in 2012.

The Eldest
Daughter of Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, gave a Diamond Mine to his
oldest daughter.

The exploration of her Diamond mine in the mining zone of Camatué,
in Lunda Norte.

Ngutuika Josefa Matias
(dos Santos)

Daughter of Elisabeth Kaenje
Konambanfe and of Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, but of course this
daughter, born outside of his "official " marriage does not qualify for a
Diamond Mine. UPDATE: January 2012 apparently rumours in Luanda, say that
the Communist Leader Jose Eduardo dos Santos, finally has recognized this
person has his daughter while in Zaire.

In August, I sent a letter to the president
of the Angolan republic, in which I drew attention to the fact that the
attorney general of the republic was breaking the law by serving as the
managing director of various private firms, something that is incompatible
with the office that he holds. [1]

Several people have asked me about the lack
of a response from the head of state and government regarding these
complaints. My response has been that one cannot and should not expect any
positive reaction from the president of the republic concerning corruption
and respect for the law. I argued that José Eduardo dos Santos embodied the
same promiscuity that he himself had condemned as the worst evil of his
government. [2] I also stated that disrespect for the law was common practice
for His Excellency.

In response to these questions, I present a
brief investigation into the practices of the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation
(FESA) as a case study of the president's behaviour in relation to the
institutions of state, current law and corruption. While serving as
president of the republic, José Eduardo dos Santos also serves as chairman
of his foundation, a private entity whose structures include members of the
government, members of parliament, multinational corporations and private
businesses. Research reveals several articles of legislation which have been
ignored by FESA since it was founded in 1996, and which outlaw the use of
public powers to personal ends, conflict of interests, influence-peddling
and other corrupt practices.

Why has society seemed powerless in the
face of the innumerable abuses of power by the president of the republic?
This article tries to locate Dos Santos's actions in the context of the
collective mentality that is paralysing society: generalised corruption. The
article questions the president's political and moral legitimacy in
continuing to rule the country after 30 years in power, while disrespecting
the laws approved by his own government and allowing corruption to become
institutionalised.

THE REIGN OF DOS SANTOS

According to Article 65 of the Angolan
constitution, 'the President of the Republic is not responsible for acts
carried out in the exercise of his duties, except for cases of bribery or
treason to the Fatherland'. (Some lawyers argue that Angolan legislation
does not define the crime of bribery and that the provision on treason does
not apply to the president. Nevertheless, as a signatory to the SADC
(Southern African Development Community) Protocol against Corruption,[3]
Angola makes up for this omission since the state has incorporated the
protocol into its domestic law. [4] ) Thus, with a constitutionally enshrined
freedom from responsibility, the president can do as wishes. His slightest
whim is law. Lawyers from the ruling MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaçao
de Angola - Partido do Trabalho) party go to extremes to interpret the
president's violations of the law as acts of sovereignty and as
demonstrations of the political wisdom of their leader.

The 30-year reign of José Eduardo dos
Santos has been successful in two respects. First, in the accumulation of
wealth beyond measure, in shadowy ways and with impunity, by the
presidential family, the closed inner circle of government, generals of the
Angolan armed forces, high officers of the Angolan National Police, the MPLA
elite and foreigners partners. Second, in the absolute control of political,
economic and social power through a web of corruption that is complemented
by strategies of repression.

In a recent talk on Radio Ecclesia I drew
attention to a number of concrete cases of corruption in the highest
echelons of the state. I referred to the ongoing violation of the law by
members of the government and by those who control public resources. I
quoted in particular the flouting of the Law on Crimes Committed by Public
Office Bearers [5] and the Disciplinary Regulations for Public Management[6],
which both clearly prohibit officials from using their positions or engaging
in state business for personal benefit, beyond the proper remuneration for
their work.

Several citizens have spoken to me about
this subject. Yet it seems that society in general is still not yet prepared
to deal with the truth. People feel offended, and can even become hostile,
when someone exposes the truth to public view. This is one of the effects of
generalised corruption, not of fear of repression. Even though the looting
of public wealth has been laid bare, a large part of society prefers to
survive by hiding behind the illusion that everyday corruption is an act of
benevolence by those in power.

'They [the power holders] plunder, but also
allow others to plunder their share.' This seems to be the justification
among the more enlightened sections of society.

The fear that is so often evoked as an
explanation for the impotence of society is simply the fear of losing the
property or benefits that are to be gained through dealings based on
institutional, party-political or family connections. This is the condition
of citizens who are aware of reality and capable of effecting change. This
is a middle class riding on the back of opportunism.

THE PRESIDENT'S LAW

The president of the republic, José Eduardo
dos Santos, is the chairman of FESA, a private organisation which the
Council of Ministers, chaired by President dos Santos, ratified as a public
utility institution. [7] From an ethical and legal point of view, this act in
itself reveals a conflict of interest and influence-peddling, in that the
president, acting through a collegiate institution of government, approved
his private foundation as a public utility.

According to the Regulations for
Associations and Other Public Utility Institutions, [8] public utility status
is bestowed upon 'philanthropic or humanitarian associations, or aid and
educational institutions founded by private individuals, of which the
beneficiaries are the inhabitants of a particular place, and which are not
administered by the State'. [9]

According to FESA itself, the foundation
was created in 1996, 'with His Excellency President José Eduardo dos Santos
as its founder'.[10] Bestowing upon FESA the status of public utility thus
violates the regulation referred to above, which was approved by the
president of the republic as head of the Council of Ministers, and which is
supposed to apply only to institutions created by private individuals. The
president of the republic is not a private entity.

As the chairman of FESA, the organisation's
highest authority, the president of the republic plays an active role, with
the power to chair meetings of the trustees' committee, to appoint the
members of the same committee, to convene meetings, to appoint and dismiss
the president and vice-presidents of the foundation and to 'determine the
disposal of the foundation's assets', among other tasks. [11]

From an ethical and legal point of view,
the incumbent president of the republic may not exercise any private
function. Although constitutional law is not specific on the matter, this
conclusion can be reached through extensive interpretation, according to the
constitutional expert Mihaela Webba. If parliamentarians and judges may not
fulfil private functions other than teaching, then the president of the
republic as the bearer of the highest state office certainly may not.

Moreover, in Angola the president is an
executive entity, since he is head of government and as such should, at the
very least, respect the judicial regime applied to members of the
government, namely the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers.
Even if this law does not apply to the president of the republic, by
association and by interpretation José Eduardo dos Santos ought to comply
with this law as a member of the government. [12] This law prohibits the use
of public office for personal gain, and combining private and public roles.
Good sense should have persuaded José Eduardo dos Santos not to establish
the foundation while in office as president of the republic.

The very nature of the foundation conflicts
with the statesmanlike behaviour that is expected of the president, and
damages the supposed separation of public power from private interests. FESA,
in point 1.2 of article 3 of its constitution, provides for delivering
special consultancy services 'with a view to technical assistance to public
and private institutions (...)'. In point 1.3 of the same article, FESA
intrudes into the realm of national politics by declaring itself ready to
'contribute to the formulation of national policy conducive to the
sustainable development of the country'. [13]

Article 4 of FESA's statutes states that
the foundation must 'promote the creation of private business enterprises in
which the foundation becomes a shareholder.' [14] This is something which has
happened with great success. FESA's participation in commercial business,
with no line drawn between the state and the private sphere, makes the
president of the republic the representative of the commercial interests of
a private association in which local meets international capital.

As proof of his absolute power, José
Eduardo dos Santos has brought part of the government and other bodies of
state, such as the National Assembly, into the management of FESA, in
disregard of the law. The sustenance of such a decision corrupts the
workings of the public administration. This is demonstrated by looking at
the management structures of FESA and of its sporting offshoot, the Santos
Football Club.

FESA [15]

Santos Football Club
[16]

Manuel
Vicente, the chairman of the board of the Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, is breaking the Disciplinary Code for Public Management by serving
as vice-chairman of FESA, a private function, even though he was mandated to
do so by the president of the republic. On the other hand, Sonangol, a state
company, is a member of the FESA general assembly, one of the main donors to
the foundation and a partner in FESA's investment arm, Suninvest, in the
Empreendimentos Miramar project in Luanda. [17]

This is a modern high-rise
complex currently under construction next to the Alto das Cruzes cemetery,
and which includes a five-star Hotel Intercontinental [18], the biggest
casino in the country and three apartment towers, with the most expensive
flats currently on the market. Sonangol holds 43% of the shares and Suninvest 40%, while the foreign business that is building the
project, the Nankwing Rainbow Company, holds the remaining 17%. [19]
This raises the question of who is paying the millions of dollars needed for
the construction of the project? Where is Suninvest getting its funds from?
Or is Sonangol covering all the costs and offering shares to Suninvest? This
information is not in the public domain.

Although the National Assembly has removed
the explicit definition of acts of corruption from the Law on Economic
Crimes, and its succeeding laws, Angola remains a signatory to the SADC
Protocol Against Corruption, [20] the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, [21] and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption. [22] The legal mechanisms and definitions set out in these
documents apply to Angola.

More seriously, there is a simple
explanation for the total support that the president's actions enjoy among
members of the government, MPLA parliamentarians, and the leaders of the
armed forces and the police: they do as the president wishes so that they
too may act with impunity.

Let us take the example of the head of
Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, whose personal businesses, such as Sadissa, engage
in multi-million dollar deals with the state, but who has never been
punished for such illegal acts. [23]

The same can be said of Manuel Rabelais.
The minister of information is the managing director of various companies,
some of which provide services to the state media outlets. Apart from giving
away Channel 2 of TPA (Angolan Public Television) to the president's
children, Manuel Rabelais insists on breaking the law by keeping Tchizé dos
Santos, the president's daughter, as one of the interim directors of TPA. [24]
Tchizé dos Santos is the managing director of Semba Comunicaçao, which is
responsible for producing the content of TPA's Channel 2. The law known as
the Statute of the Public Manager prohibits the simultaneous holding of
public and private office in the way that Tchizé dos Santos does. She has
the double role of public servant and the main private supplier to TPA. What
possibility does this leave for an oversight role by the state?

As members of FESA structures, ministers
Manuel Rabelais, Francisca Espa­rito Santo and Mankenda Ambroise,
vice-ministers Pinda Simao and Victoria de Barros Neto, as well as the
ambassador to UNESCO, Sita José, and the Africa and Middle East Director in
the Foreign Ministry Nelson Cosme, are committing the crime of abuse of
power, according to the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers
(Lei dos Crimes Cometidos por Titulares de Cargos de Responsabilidade).

The Members of Parliament Domingos Peterson
and Teresa Cohen are violating Line H of Article 16 of the Deputies' Statute
(Estatuto dos Deputados), by serving on FESA's Curators' Committee. [25] Two
of the longest-standing members of the MPLA's political bureau - the
parliamentarians Afonso Domingos Pedro Van-Danem 'Mbinda' and Magalhaes
Paiva 'Nvunda' - are also involved in the Santos Football Club.

The president in turn abuses the human
resources that are put at his disposal for the fulfilment of his state
duties and for his personal security by deploying them in the management of
the Santos Football Club. This is the case with Manuel Paulo da Cunha and
Generals Leopoldino Nascimento and José Joao Mawa.

Moreover, according to the Santos Football
Club website, the club's main objectives include commercial success through
'finding the best and easiest route to acquire resources through the
international known model of the "business-club"'. [26] Since José Eduardo
dos Santos continues his role in FESA, and the Santos Football Clube is a
FESA project, it is fair to say that the president is directly involved in
private business.

INFLUENCE-PEDDLING

Furthermore, FESA represents the most
blatant example of influence-peddling ever seen in the country. The FESA
general assembly includes representatives of the oil multinationals British
Petroleum (BP), ExxonMobil, Total and of the Block 2 associates (Braspetro,
Sonangol Chevron, and the Angolan private companies Somoil, Poliedro and
Kotoil), as well as the diamond giant De Beers. The construction firms that
have benefited the most from state contracts - the Brazilian Odebrecht and
the Portuguese Soares da Costa, Teixeira Duarte and Mota Engil - enjoy
presidential favour as members of the FESA general assembly and its main
donors.

The firm that is almost exclusively responsible for the overseeing
of the main state construction projects, Dar, offered FESA office space
while the foundation was being set up. Dar is a member of the FESA general
assembly, while its proprietor, the Lebanese Ramzi Klimk, is also the
chairman of the foundation's fiscal committee.

Klimk is also a shareholder
in FESA's investment arm, Suninvest, and of the German multinational
Siemens, in Siemens Angola. [27] The main state-owned companies, Sonangol,
TAAG (Angola Airlines), the diamond company Endiama and Angola Telecom also
have seats in the FESA general assembly.

According to Article 21, point 1, line B of
the FESA statutes, one of the requirements for a seat in the general
assembly is the donation of at least a minimum sum 'determined by the
Council of Curators'. However, there is no public information as to what
this minimum sum is. [28]

In terms of current legislation, [29] the
monetary and material contributions by these companies to FESA can be
defined as acts of corruption since they involve direct or indirect gifts to
the highest state official, the president, who as head of the Council of
Ministers has the power to decide on the awarding of all relevant state
contracts. Until recently, FESA's President Ismael Diogo, who works with
members of the general assembly on a daily basis, was also a public office
holder with the position of Angolan consul general in Rio de Janeiro.

CONCLUSIONS

Over 30 years in power, José Eduardo dos
Santos has never earned a democratic mandate as president. Appointed
president of the republic by the MPLA in 1979, he did not win an outright
majority in Angola's first and only presidential election in 1992, and the
required second round of that election never took place. His current
behaviour deprives him of any political or moral legitimacy to continue in
office. As Manuel Jorge points out, 'there is no legitimate power without
respect for the law'. [30]

Since bribery is defined as an act of
corruption, citizens ought to organise themselves to explore all the legal,
civic and political means to insist on an independent audit of FESA's
activities, since there are plenty of indications that criminal action could
be taken against the president of the republic, José Eduardo dos Santos.

Society urgently needs a debate on how to
restore the legitimacy, honour and authority of the office of the president
of the republic. The ongoing disrespect for the law is, in itself, a form of
tyranny and the corruption of political power and of state institutions.

To take a stand against the political
irresponsibility, impunity and corruption that are robbing Angolans of the
prospect of a better collective future is an act that is in keeping with the
constitution and with aspirations for a more moral society. Angola needs a
leader who can restore morality to society and to government for the benefit
of future generations.

NOTES

[1] See the author's letter about the
attorney general's business activities, addressed to the president of the
republic on 13 August 2009. A copy is available at
http://makaangola.com/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-the-President-of-Angola.pdf
[2] Dos Santos, José Eduardo (2008) 'Devemos corrigir todas as praticas
negativas que afectam a imagem do Governo', address at the opening of the
11th Extraordinary Meeting of the MPLA Central Committee. [3] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluçao.° 38/05 de 8 de Agosto, Protocolo contra
a Corrupçao da SADC. [4] According to the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, 'Corruption ...
includes bribery or any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted
with responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their
duties as public officials, private employees, independent agents or other
relationships of that kind and aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any
kind for themselves or others.' [5] Assembleia do Povo (1990) Lei n.° 21/90 de 22 de Dezembro.
[6] Comissao Permanente da Assembleia do Povo (1989) Lei n.° 10/89 de 30 de
Dezembro. www.makaangola.com [7] Conselho de Ministros, Resoluçao n°14/96 de 20 de Dezembro.
[8] Conselho de Ministros (2001) Decreto n.° 5/01 de 23 de Fevereiro.
[9] Ibid., Artigo 2°, n.° 3. [10] See
http://www.fesa.og.ao/fundacao/estatuto.htm[11] See section II of the FESA Statures on the foundation's organs,
particularly article 8, which defines the role of chairman, and article 9
which sets out the competencies of the chairman in six lines. [12] The Supreme Court controversially ruled on 21 December 1999 that 'the
President of the Republic is in a certain manner a member of the government
since he presides over the formation of the government, having the power of
decision in the Council of the Republic.' The Angolan lawyer Antonio Paulo
disagrees with this interpretation by the Supreme Court, and argues that
from a constitutional point of view, the leadership of the government falls
on the prime minister. Nevertheless, the president shelters behind this
ruling as a way of legitimising his absolute control over the government's
decisions. He must therefore be held to account as a member of the
government. [13] See Fundaçao Eduardo dos Santos (2009) Alteraçao do Pacto Social da
FESA, Diairio da Republica, III Série, n.° 77, de 27 de Abril, p 3607. [14] Ibid.
[15] Table based on information available on the FESA website.
http://www.fesa.og.ao/fundacao/orgaos.htm[16] Ibid. http://www.fesa.og.ao/projectos/sfc.htm[17] See Miramar Empreendimentos, Limitada (2007) Constituiçao da sociedade
Miramar Empreendimentos, Limitada, Diairio da Republica, III Série, n.° 70,
de 11 de Junho, pp.2169-71. [18] See InterContinental Luanda at
http://www.ichotelsgroup.com/intercontinental/en/gb/new-hotels/luanda[19] Ibid. p.2170 [20] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluçao.n° 38/05 de 8 de Agosto, Protocolo
contra a Corrupçao da SADC. [21] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluçao n.° 20/06 de 23 de Junho, Convençao das
Naçaes Unidas contra a Corrupçao. [22] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluçao n.° 27/06 de 14 de Agosto, Convençao da
Uniao Africana sobre a Prevençao e o Combate à Corrupçao. [23] Marques de Morais, Rafael (2009) Legal Doubts over Thales' Angola Deal,
text available at
http://makaangola.com/?p=44〈=en-us [24] Gabinete do Ministro da Comunicaçao Social (2009) Despacho n.° 38/09,
28 May. [25] According to this point of law, one may not 'use the position of member
of parliament to benefit private interests, whether one's own or of a third
party, in any way'. [26] See FESA (2009) Programas e Projectos, Santos Futebol Clube de Angola:
Objectivos do Clube. http://www.fesa.og.ao/projectos/sfc.htm[27] Vide Siemens, S.A, Dia¡rio da Republica, III Série, n.° 94, de 4 de
Agosto de 2006, pp. 2629-33. [28] A public disclosure by a former member of FESA's general assembly, the
then Norwegian oil company Norsk Hydro (currently StatoilHydro) revealed
that it contributed with an annual sum of US$100,000 to the president's
foundation. See
http://www.hydro.com/upload/33521/Final%20Libya%20Investigation%20Report%202008-10-06.pdf[29] As an illustration, the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption defines corruption, in Article 4, point 1, line B as
'the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or
any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as
a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another
person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of
his or her public functions'. [30] Jorge, Manuel (2001) Poder e Autoridade: A Legitimidade em Questao,
text sent to the Farum sobre as Mutiplas Consequências da Guerra, 14-15
March, Luanda.

On the 5 of November 2010, José
Eduardo dos Santos, authorized the Ministry of Geology, Mines and Industry
to issue a concession in the region of Lunda-Norte of the Muanga Project to
his daughter Welwitschia José dos Santos “Tchizé”.

On the 2 of December 2010 this concession came into law with the
Presidential Decree No. 296/10

The Muanga Project was originally given issued on the 14 of July 2005 by
José Eduardo dos Santos as an association between Endiama (51%), and the
Society of Mining Development (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento Mineiro – SDM)
(20%), Odebrecht (19%) and Di Oro (10%).

SDM is a consortium between Endiama and the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht.

Semba Comunicação (Semba Comunications)This communications company as has partners two sons of the President of
Angola which are Welwitshea known as "Tchizé", and José Paulino dos Santos.
The company is spending 17 million USD between 2011 and 2012 on adverts
promoting the Republic of Angola and what a great place it is do do business
the international news channel CNN, the money off course is paid from public
funds, and the company gets its commission, all nice and clear. The name of
the advert campaign is "Angola Grow With Us". The web page of the company was www.semba-c.com and
www.semba.ao

Semba Comunicação, a private Angolan company, has been receiving millions
of dollars directly from the presidency of the Republic of Angola’s budget
to produce commercials to improve the image of Angola abroad. However, this
company, incorporated on 11 October 2006, is owned by President José
Eduardo dos Santos’ children, namely Welwitchea José dos Santos ‘Tchizé’ and
José Paulino dos Santos ´Coréon Du.’ They are promoting the image of their
father’s regime through campaigns broadcasted on CNN International.
President Dos Santos has been in power for 32 years without ever being
elected by the people.

The 2012 presidential budget alone allocates almost US $17 million for
Semba Comunicação to engage in a contractual agreement with CNN
International for a new advertisement campaign.

At the time of the signing of the Muanga Mining Project, the company Di Oro
–Sociedade de Negócios e Alta Costura Lda (Society of Businesses and High
Fashion Limited), had a different area and scope of business, has stated in
article No. 2 of the company incorporation papers, which was “high class
fashion designs, administration of industrial ventures, decoration,
commercialization of cosmetics, clothing for weddings, cocktails,
anniversaries and receptions”.

On the 30 of September 2005, two months after the diamond mining concession
was granted to both sons and the son in law of José Eduardo dos Santos they
changed the name of the company to “Di Oro – Sociedade de Negócios Limitada”
(Society of Businesses Limited), and the Article No. 2 of incorporation was
changed to “geological studies, diamond prospection and mining, association
in the participation of mining businesses, hospitality industry and
confections, general commerce, import and export”.

The Brazilian Multinational Odebrecht his
heavily involved in accounts of corruption directly involving the President
of Angola, by giving 10% of the Social Capital of the Muanda Mining Project
to the sons of the President Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, whom
personally signed the contracts with the Director of the Brazilian
Multinational Odebrecht Mr. António Mamieri.

The Contract of the Muanga Mining Project in
Article No.25 states that Odebrecht and SDM both assume the compromise to
make all investments. The only justification for the Di-Oro to receive 10%
of the business is the privilege that has in gaining the signature of the
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

The Dictator José Eduardo dos Santos is in the habit of giving mining
concessions to his own sons and family, on the 30 November 2005 he gave a
concession for Prospect, Research and Recognition of the deposits of primary
diamonds in the Cabuia Mining Project, in the region north-east of Saurimo
in Lunda Sul by Decree No. 106/05 of 9 December 2005 of the Council of
Ministers.

The consortium formed by the company of
Tchizé dos Santos, N’Jula Investments, Miningest and Sambukila, was given 5%
of the social capital in the mining project, without necessity of any
financial contributions to it, either material or technical.

In the mining Project Cabuia, the company Equatorial Diamonds owned by the
businessman Hélder Bataglia, assumed the entirety of the finance of the
project in his own account and risk, and stayed with 44% of the total of
shares.

The company Endiama, in its quality of representing the state, received 51%
of the shares. The contract was celebrated for a period of 5 years by
Executive Decree No. 7/06 of 30 of January 2006, of the Ministry of Geology
and Mines, such contract received some changed to its original
configuration, in relation to the Mining Project of Cabuia.

The consortium of Tchizé dos Santos gained a new amount of 30% for the
diamonds exploration period. The company Endiama (35.5%) and the company
Equatorial Diamonds (34.5%).

Media Nova www.medianova.co.aoMedia Nova (New Media) is the biggest editorial media in Angola they
are controlled and owned by two sons of Mr. El President Jose Eduardo dos
Santos, yep the same old giza, you should get the hang of the way things are
run in "Angola" by now.Media Nova owns Radio More (Rádio
Mais) and the TV Channel Zimbo (TV Zimbo).

www.radiomais.co.aoRádio Ecclesia was the
radio channel more widely listened in Angola but as from 2012 it can only
broadcast in certain areas, on the contrary Radio More
(Rádio
Mais) can broadcast everywhere at leisure, Radio More
(Rádio
Mais) you guess it, it is owned by the Company Media Nova which is owned by
two sons of Mr. El President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, owned by Welwitshea José
dos Santos “Tchizé” and of José Paulino dos Santos “Coréon Du".

Eduane Danilo Lemos Dos
Santos son of Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Ana Paula dos Santosnew purchased Penthouse Apartment on the 17 top Floor of the Solar de
Alvalade Building in Lundavalued at US$ 4,000,000 (Four Million US Dollars)

Reinhart Marville Torre’s lawyers(Lawyers to Corrupt and Criminal Regimes)"To retain our competitive edge, and mindful of our clients, lawyers and
support staff, we constantly monitor and seek to control our cost base".

Jean Reinhart, lawyer to the MPLA Corrupt Regime

MPLA Regime
No.2

General
Antonio dos Santos França, aka “Ndalu”

No decision is taken without his
presence. In al decisions even on those more sensitive such as
High Command decisions in the Regime, the last word is his. He is
revered as the strategist. He is a Regime figure such as Comrade
Carlos Feijó, all call him “The Chief”. Comrade General
França “Ndalu” is the father of the hawks. After the Dictator
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, General Ndalu is the only person
in the Regime that can order to “shut the mouth” of Comrade
Vice President “Nandó” and the mouth of Comrade General “Kopelipa”.

In the inner circle of the MPLA Regime it is mentioned that the
Armed Forces of Angola belong to Comrade President Jose Eduardo
dos Santos, but the Generals belong to Comrade General “Ndalu”.
He is the mentor of Comrade General “Kopelipa”, of Comrade
General João de Matos and others. He is the leader of the hawks
in the MPLA Regime. All Generals have to obey him. In 2005 De
Beers Angola Prospecting appointed General Antonio Dos
Santos Franca ‘Ndalu’ to the board of the company as
non-executive chairman.

General Antonio dos Santos França aka “Ndalu” also has Investments in Air Gemini, the Lumanhe Company (diamonds) with
Escom, linked to the Group Espirito Santo.

MPLA Regime
No.3

General
Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias, “Kopelipa”

The security of the Dictator
Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is in his hands. He is
the closest Henchmen of the Dictator and the one who has access to
his home. (also only Comrade Vaz da Conceição and Comrade
General Leopoldino have access).

He is Minister of State and Chief
of the Military House. In Government he follows all military
issues, defence, police and intelligence. All promotions in this
areas have to pass through his hands first for appraisal. The
Dictator Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos appreciates his
discrete side not getting involved with any group. He was the
individual who the Dictator sent to convince the dissident Comrade
Carlos Feijó to return to the presidential circle. Comrade Kopelipa is in the list of the 5 largest fortunes created by
corruption of the MPLA Regime. He
avoids political fights with the others in the Regime. He was the
responsible of ending the carrier of the Regime Dissident General
Fernando Miala.

NO PROOF OF ORIGIN: This insignificant piece of shit speaks no
native language of Angola it is known he was born in Cape Verde and Island
lost in the middle of the Atlantic somewhere between the African continent
and South America.

BUSINESS IS GOOD IF YOU
ARE A MPLA REGIME HENCHMEN

List of a few of the many companies
owned by Comrade General Kopelipa

MACONRevolutionize public transport
in Luanda (buses and taxis). Hélder Vieira Dias, head of the
Military House of the presidency and director of the Office of
National Reconstruction is a member-founder.

AutoStarOwns 40% of this company that distributes
Car Parts and sales new cars like the Mercedes brand. Comrade Manuel José
Van-Dúnem another MPLA Regime Henchmen has 10% on this same company.

Activity: transport, trade.

World Wide Capital (WWC):
As of April 2011 Comrade Kopelipa now owns 8,37% of the Bank BIG.

Hypermarket KeroJanuary 2012

Based on the Information of the
Director General of the Hypermarket Kero the Brazilian Citizen João Santos,
the investment interests in the Kero Hypermarket is made up from a joint of
capitals from a group of Angolan Investors and the Private Bank Atlântico:
“The US$35 millions are a joint of own capital and the resources made
available by the partnership with the Private Bank Atlântico”.

On the 10th of December
2011 the Minister of Commerce Idalina Valente, inaugurated the third
Hypermarket of Kero in Luanda in the new location of Kilamba. This housing
project is the biggest of Angola and was under the responsibility of the
Cabinet of National Reconstruction which is under the Command of General
Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”.

Presently (January 2012) the
project is managed by the State Oil Company Sonangol and it is directed by
Comrade Manuel Domingos
Vicente.

The company proprietor of the
project is Zahara, which is one of the Angolan companies that belong to the
Group Aquattro International S.A. Who controls 99,96% of its capital.

This group of companies has in the
last three years became the most dynamic and the leader of private
development and investment in the angolan economy, it is exclusive property
of three individuals: the President of the Board of Administration of
Sonangol the State Oil Company Comrade Manuel Vicente;

the Minister of State and Chief of
the Military House of the President of the Republic General Manuel Hélder
Vieira Dias “Kopelipa”; and its principal advisor General Leopoldino Fragoso
do Nascimento.

These three partners hold an equal
share in the Grupo Aquattro International S.A., each one has 33,3% of the
social capital in the Group.

Coronel João Manuel Inglês,
Logistics Officer in the Military House, and his Brother Domingos Manuel
Inglês, private assistant of the businesses of General Manuel Hélder Vieira
Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”, have a symbolic representation 0,5% of shares in the
Group.

This company was created by three
partners, Ismênio Coelho Macedo, portuguese citizen, and an administrator of
the Private Bank Atlântico, the one who financed in part the Hypermarket
Kero.

Sonangol State Oil Company has a
quantitative participation in the Private Bank Atlântico, of 7,5%, and it is
represented in the Bank by a non executive administrator appointed by
Sonangol Comrade Baptista Sumbe, who is a close associate and employed by
Senior Comrade Manuel Vicente.

The Hypermarket Kero, in the
housing estate of Cajú, Talatona, shows Comrade Manuel Domingos
Vicente a member of another
multimillionaire project which was financed by the State Oil Company
Sonangol, the housing project was created for the accommodation of its
workers, for the extended family of the President, and for the nomenclature
elite of the MPLA Regime.

General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias
Júnior “Kopelipa” and Comrade Manuel Domingos
Vicente in the development of a housing project in the location of Kilamba,
they both are the responsible for the taking of decisions in the project.

The Trio made up by Comrade Manuel
Domingos
Vicente, Generals Manuel Hélder
Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa” and Dino is also propriety of the Private
Company Delta Imobiliária, by which the Angolan State has contracted to
manage and oversee the sale of the houses at millionaire prices.

For the moment Comrade Manuel
Domingos
Vicente henchman of the MPLA
Regime and the Generals of the Regime are granted total impunity in front of
the law has they are the “de-facto” right hand men of José Eduardo dos
Santos.

Pumangol with participation of “Kopelipa”

Pumangol, it is a new company (2011) in the Angolan market of
comercialization and distribution of oil products, “downstream”, Angola, it is a company constituted between the multinational company Puma Energy
International, and the Trafigura Group and a group of Angolan investors.
Among these the main partners are the Chief of the Military House Gen M H
Vieira Dias “Kopelipa” and Leopoldino do Nascimento “Dino” , both very near
to several titles and both having several businesses in common.

Before of the constitution of Pumangol (the bureaucratic set up
process was done in an unusual speedy and timely manner unusual in Angola,
supposedly by direct influence of Angolan personalities interested),
Sonangol, through its holding, announced the intention of purchasing 20% of
the participation in the Trafigura Group in the Company Puma Energy
International, which mean that by the path it also has indirect interests in
the new company.

Since its set up Pumangol has already opened up 15 distribution posts of
gasoline in Luanda (end of 2011 early months of 2012), some of these gas
stations are of big proportions.

Pumangol thus does not need to deal with the usual paper word and red tape
and becomes more competitive in the “midstream”.

Pumangol does not depend of the Sonangol Refinery; it imports directly, in
accordance with the plans that traces and which execution controls.

Angola officials held hidden oil stakes

Financial TimesBy Tom Burgis and Cynthia O'Murchu, FT.com

16 April 2012

(Financial Times) Three of the most powerful officials
in Angola have held concealed interests in an oil venture with Cobalt
International Energy, the Goldman Sachs-backed explorer whose operations in
one of the world's most promising energy frontiers are under investigation
by US authorities, the Financial Times has learned.

The recently departed head of
the national oil company and an influential general confirmed to the FT last
week that they and another general have held shares in Nazaki Oil and Gáz,
the local partner in a Cobalt-led deepwater venture launched in early 2010.

Warning its shareholders that
it might face liabilities under US anti-corruption laws, Houston-based
Cobalt said in February that the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Department of Justice were investigating its Angolan operations.

The three men's previously
opaque shareholdings in Cobalt's local partner could raise questions about
compliance with US anti-corruption law, which makes it a crime to pay or
offer anything of value to foreign officials to win business.

Manuel Vicente, who was the
head of state-owned Sonangol until his appointment in January as minister of
state for economic co-ordination, and General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias
Júnior, known as Kopelipa, the head of the presidency's military bureau,
confirmed their holdings in Nazaki in near-identical letters.

As head of Sonangol, Mr
Vicente oversaw Africa's second-biggest oil industry. Asked whether they had
exerted any influence over the award of Cobalt's oil rights, Mr Vicente and
Gen Kopelipa denied wrongdoing. They said they had held their Nazaki
interests "always respecting all Angolan legislation applicable to such
activities, not having committed any crime of abuse of power and/or
trafficking of influence to obtain illicit shareholder advantages".

They said their interests and
those of General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento were held through Grupo
Aquattro Internacional. Aquattro is named as a Nazaki shareholder in two
company documents from 2007 and 2010 obtained by the FT. They said Aquattro
had been "recently dissolved" but did not say whether they had disposed of
their interests in Nazaki.

Gen Fragoso do Nascimento, a
former head of communications in the presidency, did not respond to requests
for comment.

Mr Vicente and Gen Kopelipa
added: "Should the continued operation of Cobalt in the Angolan petroleum
sector be unviable as a result of any failure to comply with any American
law, there will certainly be [Angolan] and/or foreign entities interested in
substituting for it in the assets it owns in Angola." Gen Kopelipa added
that "that hopefully will not happen".

Responding to FT inquiries
about the three officials, Cobalt stressed that its extensive and ongoing
due diligence "has not found any credible support for [the] central
allegation that Angolan government officials, and specifically the officials
identified . . . have any ownership in Nazaki". It would be happy to review
any proof.

"Cobalt has at all times
complied fully with both US and Angolan laws," it said. Nazaki, which did
not respond to a request for comment, denied the allegation, Cobalt said.

Goldman, one of Cobalt's
founding investors and its biggest shareholder, declined to comment, as did
the SEC and DoJ. Sonangol did not respond to requests for comment.

Kopelipa Pitta Gros Vieira Dias

The son of General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”

4 November 2012 -
The of son General Kopelipa bought the Portuguese Company Viauto
from the Company Santogal, a Company from the Portuguese Group
Espirito Santo.

Viauto represents in
Portugal and Spain the Car Brands of Ferrari and Maserati in both nations
markets, but the deal made with the Son of General Kopelipa only corresponds
to the Company Interests and Operations in Portugal.

Kopelipa Pitta Gros Vieira
Dias, has and owns several businesses in Portugal, both in the bar, club and
restaurants sector and in the Real Estate sectors, with this purchase he
enters the selling of luxury cars in the Portuguese market.

It is not know the origin
and source of his funds nor in which way and manner the funds will arrive in
this European Community Country, Portugal. The Bank of Angola in an attempt
to combat the exit of capitals from Angola, forbid that any Angolan citizen
transfer to the exterior no more than $ 60,000 USD per year.

MPLA Regime
No.4

Manuel Domingos Vicente

Comrade Manuel Domingos
Vicente (son-in-law of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos) receives $6
Million USD per year from the Oil Company Exxon for Rent of a Apartment
in Barrio Corimba in Luanda, Angola, the Oil Company Exxon deposits the
annual rent directly into
the personal account of Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente in a Swiss Bank.

Comrade Manuel Vicente is
the 39º most important man of the Portuguese Economy!!!So how much money does he has in Portugal? Just ask the Immensely
Incompetent and Corrupt Portuguese Authorities.

In the start of 2010 he was in
the path to become Minister of State for Economic Coordination, he
also seen the name of one of his protégées Comrade Baptista
Sumbo being denied to substitute him has President of the
Administration Council of Sonangol the MPLA run and control State
Oil Company.

The importance that the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos has given him denotes that he has
now passed into the list of natural candidates to the presidential
succession. He has received much power whereby he has now be given
the control of Transport, Economy and Public Works. In the last
years it is to him that Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos
started to ask for the names of who should and should not be
promoted. Some in the unelected Regime say that he is in training
for the passage of the political testament. He is placing
individuals of the MPLA Run State Oil Company Sonangol into
Governmental Posts.

BCP (Banco Comercial Português) this Bank is the largest investment of
the MPLA Regime in the portuguese economy. Sonangol, the State Oil Company
of Angola controls 11,57% of shares in this bank, which confers to the MPLA
Regime the largest share holder in the bank. Recently (early 2012) dictated
the rules and structure of the institution. And selected the model of
administration and appointed the names to the Council of Administration. We
must understand that the MPLA Regime is advised in such matters by the Cuban
advisors in the same way the Cuban Regime advises and controls the Regimes
in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia.

Manuel Domingos Vicente
has accumulated one of the largest fortunes in Angola. He is also
referred in the Regime structures as the financial facilitator of
the New Rich inside of the MPLA Regime.

Link between the MPLA Regime
Dictator son-in-law and state oil company raises questions about transparency

15th
March 2010

Sonangol, the state-owned oil company of
Angola, nominated the son-in-law of Angola's President dos Santos to the
board of a holding company that owns a third of the listed Portuguese oil
firm Galp Energia, Global Witness has learned.

Angola is an impoverished country that
depends on its oil industry to pay for reconstruction after a long civil
war. Angola has a reputation for severe corruption which Global Witness has
been reporting on for the last decade.1 Angola's people have one
of the lowest life expectancies in the world: 46.5 years, according to the
United Nations.2

Galp has major oil investments in Angola, a
former colony of Portugal, and works closely with Sonangol, whose chairman
Manuel Vicente sits on its board.3

A third of the shares in Galp are owned by
a holding company called Amorim Energia BV. Forty-five per cent of the
shares in Amorim Energia are owned by a company called Esperaza Holding BV,
which is a subsidiary of Sonangol. The rest of Amorim Energia is ultimately
controlled by Portugal's Amorim family.4

The board members of Amorim Energia include
Sindika Dokolo5, a businessman married to Isabel dos Santos, a
daughter of the Angolan president. As this briefing will show, Global
Witness has learned that Dokolo was nominated to this post in April 2006 by
Esperaza Holding. The latter was wholly owned by Sonangol at the time,
according to Dutch corporate records.6

"The
son-in-law of the Angolan president, a private businessman, should not be
working so closely with the state company which is responsible for managing
Angola's oil on behalf of its citizens," said Diarmid O'Sullivan of
Global Witness. "This arrangement raises concerns about conflicts of
interest to which Sonangol has not responded."

Sonangol's minority partner in Esperaza
Holding is Exem Holding AG. a secretive company based in the Swiss canton of
Zug which does not publicly disclose the identities of its owners.7
A director of Exem Holding, a Paris-based financier called Konema Mwenenge,
told Global Witness that he has a "professional" relationship with
Dokolo. But Mwenenge declined to say whether Dokolo has a financial interest
in Exem Holding.8 Dokolo himself, via his lawyer, declined to
respond to questions from Global Witness.9 Sonangol's chairman,
Manuel Vicente, did not respond to written questions.10

The fact that the Angolan president's
son-in-law appears to have been representing Sonangol in its indirect
investment in Galp does not amount to evidence of wrongdoing. But these
findings raise further questions about the transparency of Sonangol, the
state oil company which dominates the economy of Angola.

Sonangol collects billions of dollars a
year in revenues on behalf of the Angolan government and controls other
companies' access to Angola's oil and gas reserves, but does not publish its
accounts and discloses little detailed information about its activities.

When President dos Santos called for
"zero tolerance" of corruption in November 2009, a prominent
member of the ruling MPLA party said Angolans should feel free to criticise
the president over his family's business dealings, Reuters news agency
reported.11

Portuguese billionnaire Americo Ferreira de
Amorim is the chairman of Amorim Energia. He told Global Witness, in a
three-page response to questions about the issues raised in this briefing,
that Dokolo had been appointed to the board of Amorim Energia "at the
designation of Esperaza Holding".12

"The fact that Mr Dokolo is the
husband of the daughter of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos does not seem
in itself as relevant neither [sic] to qualify nor to disqualify him as a
board member of Amorim Energia, and therefore was not a factor to have him
appointed as a managing director of Amorim Energia," Amorim wrote in
his letter to Global Witness. He added: "I can give you my personal
views on the fact that the appointment of Mr Dokolo did not raise
discussions concerning ethical issues."

Amorim said in his letter that the
relationship between Amorim Energia and Galp was governed by a shareholder
agreement that was in place before Dokolo came onto the former's board.
Global Witness does not assert, or seek to imply, that companies controlled
by the Amorim family have engaged in any illegal or illegitimate activity.

At the end of 2006, Sonangol's 100 per cent
shareholding in Esperaza Holding had fallen to 60 per cent. The other 40 per
cent was owned by a subsidiary of Exem Holding.13 Exem Holding,
via its subsidiaries, has been granted access by Sonangol to potentially
lucrative investments in Angolan oil and gas but appears to be otherwise
unknown in the oil industry.

Sonangol has authorised subsidiaries of
Exem Holding to:

Acquire a 40 per cent stake in Esperaza
Holding by the end of 2006, making it a partner in Sonangol's indirect
investment in Galp.

Acquire a 10 per cent stake in an
Angolan gas exploration venture announced in December 2007. This venture
is controlled by Sonangol. Its other shareholders include Galp, Italy's
ENI and Spain's Gas Natural.14 The venture has reportedly
been awarded a ten-year gas exploration licence and exempted from taxes.15

Pre-qualify, as of late 2007, to bid for
oil licences in Angola.16

Global Witness asked the Exem Holding
director, Konema Mwenenge, to describe the process by which Exem Holding had
acquired these investments and investment opportunities. Mwenenge replied in
an email that: "I can confirm as a Director of Exem Holding that its
subsidiaries did respond to tenders in Angola. Information concerning the
tenders is available on the web site of the national oil company of
Angola."17

Sonangol's website does report that a
subsidiary of Exem Holding has been pre-qualified by Sonangol to bid for oil
licences in Angola as a "non-operator" - that is, as a minority
shareholder in a joint venture with other oil companies.18
However, there appears to be no information on this website about tenders in
relation to Exem Holding's other interests. Global Witness wrote back and
asked Mwenenge where this information could be found, but he did not
respond.

Although Sonangol has a reputation for
being professionally run, its opacity and its close links to the ruling
elite of Angola have long been a cause of public concern. The state oil
company has long been used by the government to borrow huge sums in a highly
opaque manner and with little public accountability for the use of the
money.19

For more than a year, Global Witness has
been investigating the relationships between Sonangol and certain private
companies that invest in Angola's oil sector, which are often complicated
and hard to unravel because of a dearth of public information.

In August 2009, Global Witness reported on
another little-known private company which was pre-qualified to bid for oil
rights in Angola by Sonangol in late 2007. The shareholders of this company,
Sociedade de Hidrocarbonetos de Angola, included a person called Manuel
Domingos Vicente. The chairman of Sonangol, who has the same name, did not
respond to a request for comment from Global Witness, nor did two other
senior officials who also have the same names as shareholders in SHA.20

The International Monetary Fund agreed in
late 2009 to lend $1.4 billion to Angola in return for policy pledges which
include more transparency for Sonangol, but it remains to be seen whether
these pledges will actually be implemented.21

"At a time when Angola's government is
promising more transparency to the IMF in return for a bailout, our findings
show that Sonangol is still anything but transparent," said O'Sullivan.

Global Witness believes that Angola's
government cannot begin to reverse the country's international reputation
for severe corruption until:

Sonangol explains its relationship with
Dokolo and identifies the ultimate beneficial owners of Exem Holding,
who are currently unknown to the public.

Sonangol publishes its audited accounts
and full details of oil revenue flows between foreign oil companies,
Sonangol itself and the Angolan government.

Sonangol relinquishes its control over
the allocation of oil and mining rights in Angola to an independent
agency that operates under full public oversight and awards these rights
in a transparent manner.

International oil companies in Angola
commit themselves not to go into partnership with any smaller companies
whose ultimate beneficial ownership is unknown to the public.

The government ensures that civil
society groups within Angola are able to freely discuss matters of
public interest, including the oil sector, without fear of harrassment
or censorship in any form.

1. Global Witness. A Crude Awakening. 1999;
All the Presidents' Men. March 2002. Time for Transparency. March 2004.
Available at
www.globalwitness.org2. United Nations. Human Development Report 2009. Angola. The figures
for life expectancy at birth are from 2007.3. Galp Energia. Annual Report and Accounts 2008. Pages 6, 29 and 1824. Amorim Energia BV. Annual accounts for 2008. Pages 3, 4 and 23.5. Amorim Energia Annual report 2008. Page 3.6. Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce. Handelsregisterhistorie. Esperaza Holding
BV.7. Handelsregister des Kantons Zug. Exem Holding AG.8. Global Witness phone and email conversations with Mwenenge.9. Correspondence between Global Witness and a lawyer acting for Dokolo.10. Letter sent to Vicente by Global Witness on 15 September 2009.11. Reuters. Angolan President calls on party to end corruption. 21 November
2009. Angolan President's family taint corruption fight. 3 December 2009.12. Letter from Americo Ferreira de Amorim to Global Witness. 18 January
2010.13. Esperaza Holding B.V. annual accounts 2006. Page 3.14. Eni. Eni acquires a participation stake in the Angola LNG Project. 10
December 2007. This press release refers to Exem Exploration &
Production B.V. This company has since been renamed Exem Oil & Gas B.V.,
according to annual accounts filed by the latter for 2007, and is wholly
owned by Exem Energy B.V, which is wholly owned by Exem Holding AG.15. Reuters. Angola set to exempt gas explorers from tax. March 25 2009.16. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for
Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website.
http://www.sonangol.co.ao/17. Email to Global Witness from Mwenenge. 19 October 2009.18. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for
Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website.
http://www.sonangol.co.ao/19. See Global Witness. Undue Diligence. How banks do business with
corrupt regimes. March 2009. Chapter Eight.20. Global Witness. Angola. Private oil firm has shareholders with same
names as top government officials. Media briefing. 4 August 2009.21. International Monetary Fund. IMF lends Angola $1.4 billion to support
reserves, reforms. Press release. 26 November 2009. See also Global Witness.
IMF risks condoning corruption with new loan to Angola. Press release. 5
November 2009.

MPLA Regime
No.5

Comrade
Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos aka Nando

Prime Minister of Angola between 2002 to 2008,
then President of the National Assembly, then February 2010 was
appointed vice-president of Angola, by private choice of Dictator
José Eduardo dos Santos

In the familiar circle of Comrade
Jose Eduardo dos Santos he is seen as the better person who would
protect them in adverse times. He is one of the rarest figures of
the Regime that in the absence of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo
dos Santos, would guarantee inner stability, in 1992 during the
war with UNITA he was the guarantee of stability in person. He is
respected because he had the merit to overthrow the Dissident
General Fernando Miala who he was his mortal enemy.

In the inner
hard side of the nucleus of the Regime the are scared of him, and
rumours about that with him, “he it will be worse than the
Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos”. People in his inner
circle do not think that Jose Eduardo dos Santos is grooming him
to replace him.

He hopes that one day he will be the “Constitutional
Substitute” to the Presidency. He has become lately a switched
of political figure, fact that disturbs him to bits. He no longer
seems to be received by the Dictator. He has made know via third
parties to the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos that he doesn’t
enjoys his new political situation. His office is where it
functioned the old Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma. The Regime wanted
to transfer him to a new office near to the Presidency, in an
office next to the Ceremonial Office but he refused.

He is one of the principal shareholders of the African Bank
of Investments "Banco Africano de Investimentos" (BAI).

Mr Nando has also other businesses he owns a Ranch and he
owns a Water Company which is managed by his sons, he also moves in the
areas of real estate and construction.

MPLA Regime
No.6

Comrade
Carlos Feijó

He is part of the doves faction
in the Regime. He is in practice the figure who has in fact taken
in the role of running the executive administration. He is not a
member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA Party but participates
in the meetings in the quality of “invited” of the Comrade
Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos has the Dictator makes a point in
introducing him in such capacity.

The Provincial Governor and the
Ministers of the Social Departments and of Economy report directly
to him, this makes of Comrade Carlos Feijó a figure in a superior
position than that of the Vice-President of the MPLA Communist
Regime. He has become the main individual in the investment
policies in Guinea-Bissau a major hub in Africa for the Narco
Trafficking.

GEMA

Company created by Simon Junior, its current president is Jose
Leitao, former head of the Civil House of the Presidency.
Account among its shareholders with the lawyer Carlos Feijó.
Activity: supermarkets, cinemas, private clinic, shareholder of
Coca-Cola Angola, partnerships with South African companies and
Chinese.

MPLA Regime
No.7

Comrade Paulo
Kassoma is the one on the left with the glasses.

Comrade Paulo Kassoma

He is constitutionally the third
person in the State. He is referred as the person that more
consensus gathers inside of the inner thought centre of the Regime
He has no inner enemies at present. Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo
dos Santos nurtures strong admiration for him and recognizes in
him a sense of humility.

In the eve of the Fraudulent Elections of
2008 where the Regime gained 80% of the votes after 37 Years in
Power, and the economy, the country totally destroy by corruption
and terrible management and total neglect by the unelected
Communist Regime. Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos visited
the region of Huambo having become “amazed” by what he had
seen. At night on his return to Luanda he called him on the phone
to inform him of his desire of making him his next Prime Minister
of Angola. One of his best friends is the Vice-President “Nandó”.
They studied together in the school of São Domingo when they
where kids.

In European circles of
intelligence Comrade Paulo Kassoma his seen as one of the possible
substitutes for the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos to the Post
of President of the Republic, but he has yet to give signs of his
desire for such a post in the Regime

MPLA Regime
No.8

General António José Maria

He is the Chief of the Military
Intelligence Service (SIM). He has the power of influence next to
Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos in relation to military
matters. The Generals have no sympathy for him. He is the Senior
Officer of the Armed Forces that has mostly shown obedience to the
wimps of the Regime, and is therefore the source of his power (a
perfect ass licker “general”).

In 1992 e became an enemy of
Fernando “Nandó” in regards to the assassination by the MPLA
Regime of Adolosi Paulo Mango Alicerces the Secretary General of
UNITA, Adolosi was his colleague when studying in the Huambo
Higher Seminary, and during the war took refuge in his house. He
was the mentor for the promotion of the Regime Dissident General
Fernando Miala. In 2006 he had serious differences with Comrade
Kundy Paihama.

He has already threatened Sebastião Martins the
Chief of the MPLA Regime Secret Service SINFO.

He has influenced the dismissal
of the ex Chief of the Armed Forces Comrade General Francisco
Furtado and also responsible for the dismissal of the ex Commander
of the Second Military region Comrade General Jack Raul and his
both assistants of the Military Intelligence Service SIM Comrade
General Zé Grande and Comrade General João Massano.

He has also made animosity with
Comrade General “Kopelipa”. In short he is a member of the
Regime that imposes order in the Generals.

MPLA Regime
No.9

Kundy
Paihama

He retains much influence in the
south part of Angola where the population assume that he is their
man that represents them in side of power. He is the individual in
which Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos seeks no fights
with. When the MPLA Regime was forces by the international
community to end the one party only policy he was one of the
Regime personalities who people fought he would leave the MPLA
party to start his own party.

Since then Comrade Dictator Jose
Eduardo dos Santos started to pay more attention to him and to his
Native Ovimbundos.

Kundy Paihama
visiting reclusive Regime of North Korea

Comrade Kundy Paihama is an equal partner in the Investment Group Angola
Casinos (Casinos de Angola) the Complex is calculated in US $3,5 millions
Dollars. One of the equal partner of the Investment Groups is a foreigner
which is hiding from prosecution and police in Europe, his where about are
unknown. Comrade Kundy Paihama promised (January 2012) that he will sort
things out in order to became the majority share older partner.

Comrade Kundy Paihama has a taste for expensive and luxurious watches he
bought a $50,000 USD watch and made it public. Now he says in his own words
"that the trick is to keep the mouth shut, he can not say and he cannot buy
what he likes".

Commentary: A member of the MPLA old guard, Roberto De Almeida has built up
a formidable business and political network. With good contacts in Europe,
especially in Moscow, he has also developed ties with some French-speaking
former activists of Holden Roberto's Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
(FNLA).

He his the Vice-President of the
Communist MPLA Regime party.

MPLA Regime
No.11

Comrade –
Julião Mateus Paulo aka Dino Matross

Secretary General of the MPLA
Party. He has importance for having been Minister of Security, for
which reason even by not being active he can be called to give
advise on sensitive matters. His political power of influences
remains next to the Administration of State.

MPLA Regime
No.12

Comrade João
de Almeida Martins aka “Jú”

His power is in the MPLA party.
He is presently the ideological architect of the MPLA policy, and
he operates like a specie of Vice-president in the shadows. From
this apreciation is why they call him the little “Lucio Lara”.
In party matters his vision is always taken into consideration by
Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos. No decision is taken
without his knowledge first.

The inner circle of the MPLA Regime
acknowledge him with political wisdom. Party leaders state in
informal circles that in the lack of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo
dos Santos, Comrade Jú can maintain the Regime together. His
adversaries for the post of President are “Manuel Vicente” and
“Nandó”. While both of this individuals fight the succession
struggle Jú Martins is laying down the foundations for the
succession.

MPLA Regime
No.13

Comrade General - Higino Carneiro

After the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos
Comrade General Higino Carneiro is the Richest Henchman of the Regime of the
MPLA.In 2009 he had a small fight with
“Kopelipa” concerning labour matters. He was one of the
ministers that was more involved with state matters. He
accompanies Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos to all his
foreign trips.

In October 2010 Comrade Dictator
Jose Eduardo dos Santos invited him to the post of Governor of
Luanda, but he refused saying that he only accepts that post if he
can have his own powers for the job and without any interference
from central power. He has acquired illegitimately like the rest
of the Members of the MPLA Regime an amazing personal fortune, and
he is the political figure that more supports the MPLA Party. He is responsible for moving $200USD
million dollars from INEA to the MPLA campaign in 2008.

CABUTA ORGANISATIONS"Holding set up by General
Higino Carneiro, Minister of Public Works and governor of Kwanza
Sul and family. Activity: agriculture, agro-industry, hotels,
tourism, banking, insurance.

From the endless list of Businesses he has
12 hotels dispersed in the territory of Angola, has big haciendas (Cabuta
Hacienda is one of them), he owns Banks (Bank Keve and Bank Sol), he owns an
aviation company with a fleet of 14 light aircrafts called Air Services,
which recently was in talks to start flights between Sao Paulo, Brazil and
Luanda, etc.

Puma Air He was a Partner with the Brazilian citizen Gambogi de Souza, the company
was based in Brazil a Puma Air.

MPLA Regime
No.14

Comrade Aldemiro Justino de Aguiar Vaz da Conceição

He is the political figure of the
MPLA that exercises political coercion over the Media in Angola.
His puppet is Luis de Matos the National Director of Information.
He has the job of assessing Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos
Santos in making him read all political happenings in Angola.

One
of his known assess is his capacity to manipulate public opinion.
He is presently in the Military House managing the Office of
Psychological Action and Information. He
his in charge of overseeing all of the Regime Propaganda.

MPLA Regime
No.15

Cândido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dúnem, Minister
of Defence

MPLA Regime
No.16

Miguel Maria Nzau Puna

a.k.a. o "Porco" e "Traidor"

Miguel Nzao Puna is also known by is nick name "Porco" (The
Pig) and "Traidor" (The Traitor), it was this Pig who was at one time the
Secretary General of UNITA, and Miguel Maria Nzau Puna was instrumental in
the betrayal of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi location and personal security,
which lead to the massacre and assassination of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi.
A native born of Cabinda, thus the Noble and Glorious Cabinda Patriots wipe
their arses with this communist, treacherous pig.

The Pig alias the Traitor Miguel Maria N`Zau Puna among other things served
as the ambassador of the MPLA Regime to Canada from September 28, 2000 to
2008.

António Domingos Pitra Costa NetoMinister of Public Administration, Employment and Social security

António Domingos Pitra Costa Neto is partner in GEMA a company created by Simon Junior, its current
president is Jose Leitao, former Head of the Civil House of the Presidency.
Account among its shareholders with the Lawyer Carlos Feijó and António
Domingos Pitra Costa Neto, vice-president of MPLA and Minister for Employment and Social and Security.

António Domingos Pitra Costa Neto is also partner
with Brazilian businessman Valdomiro Minoru Dondo in the company 2000 Empreendimentos.

MPLA Regime
No.19

General Bento Kangamba

The name of General Bento Kangamba apears
next and connected to the individuals from whom where ceased Millions of
Euros by the French Authorities. General Bento Kangamba is member of the
Presidential Family, he is married to Avelina Escórcio dos Santos, who is
the daughter of Avelino dos Santos, the eldest brother of José Eduardo dos
Santos.

He is the President of the Kabuscorp Football Club in Luanda, among other
things he is the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of Luanda of the MPLA
Party for the organization and mobilization in the rural and periphery areas
of the capital city of Luanda.

MPLA Regime
No.20

General Leopoldino Fragoso
do Nascimento

"The US $ 750 Million
Dollar Man"

How a Swiss commodities
giant used shell companies to make an
Angolan General three-quarters of a Billion Dollars richer

By Michael Weiss @
foreignpolicy.com
13 February 2014

Revolutionary communist
regimes have a strange habit of transforming themselves into corrupt crony
capitalist ones and Angola -- with its massive oil reserves and budding crop
of billionaires -- has proved no exception. In 2010, Trafigura, the world's
third-largest private oil and metals trader based in Switzerland, sold an
18.75-percent stake in one of its major energy subsidiaries to a
high-ranking and influential Angolan general, Foreign Policy has discovered.

The sale, which amounted to
$213 million, appears on the 2012 audit of the annual financial statements
of a Singapore-registered company, which is wholly owned by General
Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento. Details of the sale and purchaser are also
buried within a prospectus document of the sold company which was uploaded
to the Luxembourg Stock Exchange within the last week. "General Dino," as
he's more commonly called in Angola, purchased the 18.75 percent stake not
in any minor bauble, but in a $5 billion multinational oil company called
Puma Energy International. By 2011, his shares were diluted to 15 percent;
but that's still quite a hefty prize: his stake in the company is today
valued at around $750 million.

The sale illuminates not only
a growing and little-scrutinized relationship between Trafigura, which
earned nearly $1 billion in profits in 2012, and the autocratic regime of
71-year-old Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in power
since 1979 -- but also the role that Western enterprise continues to play in
the Third World.

Despite a boom in its oil
revenue over the last few decades, and dos Santos's own declared
zero-tolerance campaign against corruption, Angola has yet to implement any
meaningful development programs for a citizenry of 14 million, many of whom
still live in poverty. "Angola is incredibly compelling from a human rights
point of view partly because of the corruption and the fact that this is a
government that has the resources to respond to the needs of its people and
to fulfill the huge economic and social and cultural rights and yet is not
doing so," said Leslie Lefkow, the deputy director for Human Rights Watch's
Africa Division. Meanwhile, Trafigura has spent the last several years
cultivating lucrative commercial interests in Angola and buying up shares in
at least seven different companies, ranging from real estate to cargo
shipping.

Unsurprisingly, it has
assiduously pursued investment in Angola's oil sector, according to Marc
Gueniat, the senior researcher at the Berne Declaration, a Swiss NGO that
monitors corporate transparency. (The group is named for the 1968 accord
signed by scholars and intellectuals calling for more equitable business
practices in an increasingly globalized economy.) "I am not aware of any
other country where one company has such a dominance on the oil imports as
Trafigura has in Angola," Gueniat said. "It effectively has a monopoly to
supply petroleum products in the country. What sense does this make from an
Angolan perspective?" Gueniat has extensively documented the curious
arrangement between Trafigura and the dos Santos regime, including deals
that directly involve General Dino, whose actual legal ownership of former
Trafigura assets was previously unsubstantiated although suspected.

In a February 2013 Berne
Declaration report titled "Trafigura's Business in Angola," Gueniat found
that the commodities trader, which is the third-largest company in
Switzerland in terms of money brought in "seems to have committed itself to
agreements in which the risk is high that the distinction between public and
private interests becomes confused." Most of Trafigura's investments in
Angola have been managed through a Singapore-registered company called DTS
Holdings, also known as the DT Group.

The two directors of this
entity are General Dino and Claude Dauphin, a French billionaire who helped
found Trafigura and is today its chief executive officer. As the Berne
Declaration noted: "While DTS Holdings is involved infrastructure, logistics
and real estate, it is oil where the majority of its revenues are generated.
The group is party to a swap contract, which may be one of the largest in
the world.

They export unknown quantities
of Angolan crude and in return, since 2009, have been supplying Angola with
all of the oil-derivative products required to meet domestic demand." DTS
Holdings's monopoly on oil-derivative products has proved remarkably
lucrative. In 2011, DTS Refining -- the subsidiary responsible for
controlling the company's contract with the Angolan state -- was valued at
$3.3 billion. Trafigura's investments tend to involve or enlist the
so-called "triumvirate" of regime officials who oversee large swaths of the
Angolan economy.

Angolan Vice President Manuel
Vicente, said to be dos Santos's anointed successor, as well as the former
CEO of Sonangol, Angola's state oil company, is one member of this
triumvirate. Another is Gen. Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Junior, also known as
"General Kopelipa," who is now the chief of the Security Intelligence Bureau
of the Presidency, a national security agency. Kopelipa is widely considered
to be the most powerful man in the country, and the only real rival to
President dos Santos's influence. That makes his deputy, the third man in
the trio, extremely well placed: General Dino, formerly the head of
communications for the Angolan presidency and then General Kopelipa's
special advisor. He was appointed to this role in September 2010 by in a
presidential decree which was heralded in Diario da Republica, the state
newspaper of Angola. Whether he's still formally in this role is somewhat
unclear.

Trafigura, in a statement,
noted that "Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento is a leading Angolan business
man and a long standing partner of Trafigura and holds no current position
in the Angolan Government." But the Angolan journalist and watchdog Rafael
Marques de Morais counters, "When ranking officials are dismissed or resign,
the president must publish his decision in the daily gazette. Also, as a
general he should have been retired from the army to be able to take a
private job." Regardless of his position now, the Berne Declaration makes
clear that he was indeed General Dino at the time Trafigura "befriended"
him, which may account for how he managed to buy a nice chunk of one of its
most valuable assets.

Here's how it happened. In
2010, a Singapore-registered company known as Cochan Pte Ltd. invested
approximately $213 million in cash and in kind to purchase an 18.75 percent
stake in Puma Energy International, a company acquired by Trafigura in 2000.
Headquartered in Singapore and claiming to "bring secure, safe and
affordable fuels, lubricants and other oil products to millions of business
and retail customers every day," Puma Energy International is in the
business of supplying, storing, refining, and selling petroleum-based
products. It employs 6,000 people in over 30 countries, operates 1,500 gas
stations, and has regional offices from Puerto Rico to Australia.

The investment in that 18.75
percent stake was made via Cochan Pte's Marshall Island-registered holding
company, Cochan Holdings LLC. Cochan Pte's sole shareholder is an entity
known as Cochan Ltd .-- this one registered in the Bahamas, an offshore tax
haven much sought for its corporate secrecy laws. In 2011, owing to an
enlargement of shares in Puma Energy International, Cochan Pte's 18.75
percent stake was diluted to 15 percent. It was not at the time disclosed,
however, who the ultimate legal beneficiary was of the Bahaman parent
company.

That mystery has now been
solved thanks to Cochan Pte's financial statements for 2012, which were
audited by global accounting firm Ernst & Young, copies of which have been
obtained by Foreign Policy, and by a newly published prospectus document
which corroborates the audit. The owner of the Bahaman Cochan is none other
than General Dino, making him the owner of Cochan Pte (in Singapore) and now
the sole owner of 15 percent interest in Puma Energy International. "Where
did a general get $213 million dollars to invest?" asks Arvind Ganesan, the
director of the Business and Human Rights Program at Human Rights Watch.
Another question asked by anti-graft monitors contacted by Foreign Policy is
how General Dino managed to enrich himself so extravagantly in such a short
period of time, and through a transaction with one of the world's largest
commodities trader.

Yet General Dino wasn't the
only one to gobble up shares in in the oil company. In 2011, Trafigura also
decided to sell another 20 percent stake of Puma Energy International to
Sonangol Holdings LDA, a holding company of Sonangol, the Angolan state oil
company. This transaction apparently satisfied both buyer and seller
because, as the Financial Times reported last November, Trafigura sold an
additional 10 percent interest in Puma Energy International to the Angolan
state oil company for $500 million. That means, that as of this writing, 45
percent of a $5 billion multinational is owned by either the dos Santos
regime or General Dino. But that's not all.

The Ernst & Young audit of
Cochan Pte further discloses that General Dino owns 50 percent of DTS
Holdings. If this company's subsidiary, DTS Refining, was valued at $3.3
billion in 2011, then General Dino's half interest in DTS Holdings is likely
worth a small fortune today. Combined with his stake in Puma Energy
International, he is almost certainly an on-paper billionaire, again raising
the question of how he obtained the initial capital to make such
remunerative investments. Foreign Policy contacted Trafigura for comment. A
spokesperson for the company, Victoria Dix, emailed back confirmation of the
sale as well as General Dino's ownership of Cochan.

Dix quotes from a prospectus
document for the bond issued by Puma Energy International in January 2014,
which does indeed name General Dino as the ultimate owner of the Bahaman
entity. However, that prospectus is only available on the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange website and was only uploaded on Feb. 3, 2014. There was no mention
of General Dino's direct ownership of Cochan in any public press statement
linking him to this much-scrutinized transaction four years ago.

The prospectus also confirms
that General Dino was appointed a special advisor to Kopelipa in September
2010 but adds that he "no longer serves in such capacity." It does not say
when he stepped down from his position or whether or not he currently holds
any other active role in the dos Santos government. (As recently as April
2012, the Financial Times referred to General Dino as one of three of the
"most powerful officials in Angola.") Nevertheless, the prospectus confirms
that General Dino was an active public official in Angola when he bought his
stake in Puma Energy International.

Dix declined to respond to
Foreign Policy's question about whether or not Trafigura was concerned that
selling a sizable stake in a multinational oil company to an Angolan
official, while simultaneously investing in Angola's publicly owned energy
economy, constituted a conflict of interest. Puma Energy's bond prospectus,
though, does seem to address these concerns by stating: "Certain of our
direct shareholders, Sonangol, Cochan and Trafigura, and certain of their
beneficial shareholders, as well as local partners have in the past or are
currently, and may in the future, be the subject of criticism or allegations
by the press relating to fraud, corruption, bribery and non-compliance with
sanctions, and have in the past or are currently, and may in the future, be
subject to investigation by certain regulatory authorities and other
governmental and non-governmental entities relating to such matters.

These allegations and
criticism can be found in the public domain. Such allegations and criticisms
do not relate to their shareholding in or relationship with us." While
Trafigura has not done anything illegal in selling its assets to either the
government or an Angolan individual, General Dino may have violated his own
country's Law on Public Probity. Passed in June 2010, or about two months
after he was named an advisor to General Kopelipa, this law criminalizes the
act of a state official "acquiring for [himself] or for another, in the
exercise of [his] duties, responsibilities, employment or public function,
goods of any nature whose value is disproportionate to the capital gains or
income of the public servant." The law also requires those officials to
disclose their assets and revenue, and the sources of both, once every two
years, although, according to Freedom House, the "dominant interpretation of
the law is that the president, vice president, and president of the National
Assembly are exempt from this requirement."

General Dino is no stranger to
corruption allegations within and without Angola. He currently features in a
still-pending U.S. federal investigation into the activities of an American
oil company.

Along with General Kopelipa
and Vice President Vincente, General Dino is a shareholder in Nazaki Oil &
Gas, an Angolan enterprise that partnered with the Texas-based Cobalt
International Energy, a U.S. concern whose main shareholders are Goldman
Sachs and a joint energy fund controlled by the Carlyle Group and Riverstone
Holdings, an American private equity firm. In 2009, Cobalt received licenses
to operate two deepwater blocks in the Angola seabed thought to contain
large reservoirs of recoverable oil.

Cobalt's original investment
was $500 million in 2005, but, as the Angolan journalist Rafael Marques de
Morais points out in a comprehensive study titled, "The Angolan Presidency:
The Epicentre of Corruption," this was roughly the same amount that Sonangol
itself had previously invested in the Carlyle Group and Riverstone Holding's
joint energy fund. In other words, he claims, the money that private U.S.
enterprise was investing in Angola actually already belonged to the Angolan
people.

Interestingly, in 2011, Cobalt
further admitted that it'd been made aware of a "connection between senior
Angolan government officials and Nazaki." But the Texan oil company chose to
go ahead with the deal anyway. In November 2012, the U.S. Securities
Exchange Commission and the Justice Department launched an investigation
into Cobalt International under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
outlaws U.S. citizens or companies paying bribes to foreign officials. The
U.S. government's suspicions were triggered by Nazaki's links to the
triumvirate of General Dino, General Kopelipa, and Vice President Vincente.
The investigation remains ongoing. Cobalt, meanwhile, maintains that it did
nothing wrong.

It told the Financial Times in
April 2012 that it had "not found any credible support" to corroborate ties
between Nazaki and these three Angolan officials. Vincente and Kopelipa also
denied that their interests in the company consisted an "abuse of power."
Still, the Financial Times disclosures about Cobalt's ties to General Dino
and these other Angolan political figures cost the company close to $1
billion in market capitalization. * * * For its part, Trafigura's history
outside of Angola has similarly merited unflattering attention -- quite a
lot, in fact, for such a short corporate lifespan.

The commodities trading giant
was founded in 1993 following the departure of a number of senior
commodities traders -- including Eric de Turckheim and current CEO Claude
Dauphin -- from Marc Rich & Co., run by the eponymous American billionaire
who fled to Switzerland in 1983 to evade U.S. federal prosecutors. Rich at
that time had been charged with 64 crimes including racketeering and
"trading with the enemy," namely Iran. He died last June but not before
being infamously pardoned by President Clinton in 2001.

Other Marc Rich & Co. traders
left to found Glencore, today Switzerland's largest commodities trader,
which last year merged with XStrata, a Swiss mining giant. According to a
2005 BusinessWeek article, Rich's own money may have helped to found
Trafigura "to expand his empire," although he is thought to have divested at
some point. A 2012 bond prospectus put out by Trafigura's finance subsidiary
states that the company, which now has 81 offices operating in 54 countries,
and a total of 9,000 employees, is "exclusively owned by over 750 senior
employees," although their identities are not stated.

The French-born, 63-year-old
CEO Claude Dauphin is widely regarded as Trafigura's single largest
shareholder. A separate 2010 bond prospectus discloses that he owns "less
than 20%" of the company. Trafigura was accused of violating sanctions
against Iraq in 2001 when it took part in removing 500,000 barrels of oil
from the country, according to the 2005 Volcker Report on the abuses and
misuses of the United Nations' "oil-for-food" program. The report found that
Trafigura had bought Saddam Hussein's crude from a Bermuda company known as
Ibex Energy -- itself owned by a former Marc Rich & Co. trader named
Jean-Paul Cayré.

Trafigura denied having any
links to Ibex Energy but, in the end, its Swiss arm, Trafigura AG, was fined
$20 million by the U.S. government after pleading guilty to falsifying
information about the origins of the oil, which subsequently was sold on to
American refineries. In October 2009, the details of confidential scientific
report Trafigura had commissioned three years earlier were published by the
Guardian showing that the company bore responsibility for dumping tons of
toxic waste in Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast and created a public
health crisis for tens of thousands of people. Effects ranged from severe
burns to the skin and to the lungs; permanent ulceration; corneal damage;
vomiting, diarrhea, loss of consciousness and death.

Trafigura, the Minton Report
found, had used an amateur chemical reduction process to lower the sulfur
quotient in a consignment of cheaply-bought contaminated gasoline; the
result led to the creation of a corrosive and poisonous black sludge that
was then discarded recklessly by a ship called the Probo Koala. Following
this, Amnesty International and Greenpeace launched a three-year
investigation into Probo Koala incident, concluding in a lengthy report
published in 2012 that Trafigura hadn't adequately safeguarded against a
repeat of toxic waste dumping and calling for the company to be brought up
on criminal charges in Britain.

The company's operations "are
essentially run from London," as the Guardian's David Leigh wrote. Trafigura
countered by alleging "significant inaccuracies and misrepresentations" in
the Amnesty/Greenpeace study, although it declined to specify what these
were. Trafigura had initially tried to keep its pollution of the Ivory Coast
hidden from public view, despite a raft of damning internal company emails
that were leaked to the press.

Leigh accused the company of
engaging in a "massive cover-up" and documented the legal avenues it had
pursued which included "launch[ing] a libel case against BBC Newsnight,
forc[ing] an alleged correction from the Times, demand[ing] the Guardian
delete articles, and ... [trying] to gag journalists in the Netherlands and
Norway with legal threats." To even publish an article on the Minton Report,
the Guardian had to fight a "five-week legal battle." Then, in December
2012, Trafigura again found itself mired in African controversy when Wynter
Kabimba, the Zambian justice minister, was hauled before his own country's
Anti-Corruption Commission to account for allegations that the Swiss trader
paid Midland Energy Zambia, a company he owned, to facilitate an oil and
diesel deal. Trafigura denied that it had ever made any payments to Midland
Energy Zambia.

As far as African countries
go, Angola is at once a bad place for conducting clean and transparent
business transactions and a good place for garnering sweetheart deals with
state officials inclined to ignore their own laws and look the other way.
Much of Angola's $114 billion GDP has either gone missing or straight into
the pockets of the ruling elite. Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index ranked Angola 153 out of 177 countries in 2013, and the
U.S. State Department noted in 2012 that the Angolan "business environment
remains one of the most difficult in the world.

Investors must factor in
pervasive corruption, an underdeveloped financial system, poor
infrastructure and extremely high on-the-ground costs." Last year, Isabel
dos Santos, the president's 40-year-old daughter, was declared Africa's only
female billionaire, and the continent's youngest, with a net worth of $3
billion, according to an article in Forbes.

Perhaps most famously, between
2007 and 2010, the International Monetary Fund found that $31.4 billion had
disappeared somewhere along the way from Sonangol to the government's bank
accounts. Even though the dos Santos regime later claimed to have accounted
for 85 percent of the money in "losses," Sonangol is still seen as the
"personal ATM of the government," according to Human Rights Watch's Arvind
Ganesan, who has spent 15 years studying corruption in Angola. "The
fundamental problem in Angola with oil money is that, as the second largest
oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, there should be enough revenue to make
Angola a model of development around the continent and really around the
world," says Ganesan. "But that doesn't happen.

The reason is that the dos
Santos government is opaque in how it uses the funds." Instead, the richer
the dos Santos regime becomes on oil revenue, the more it cracks down on
dissent and oppositional activity. Rafael Marques de Morais, the muckraking
journalist who has anatomized the triumvirate's dodgy commercial
involvements, now faces possible jail time -- for what, exactly, he's never
been informed. "I've been indicted now to go to court, but after 8 months of
investigations and questioning, I was never allowed to see a word on the
charges against me," he told Foreign Policy. Even minor challenges to the
authoritarian status quo are met punishingly.

In October 2013, for instance,
17-year-old Manual Chivonde Bapista Nito Alves, who'd been arrested a month
earlier for ordering T-shirts that read, "Out Disgusting Dictator," was
tossed into solitary confinement and kept for weeks without access to
lawyers, family, or doctors. (Under Angolan law, juveniles may not be kept
in pretrial detention, much less solitary confinement.) Nito Alves is now
the first citizen to be charged under a 2010 state security law which
prohibits "insulting" the Republic of Angola.

The lesser insult, apparently,
is making dos Santos' cronies exorbitantly rich at the expense of the people
whose lives they are meant to better. In a speech delivered before the PMLA
in 2009, President Dos Santos condemned "[i]rresponsible people, people of
bad faith, [who] have taken advantage ... to squander resources and to carry
out illicit and even damaging and fraudulent acts of management." General
Dino, it seems, has yet to be included in this category.

- José Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos
aka Zenuson of the
Dictator José Eduardo dos Santos, was nominated a member of the Council of
Administration of the Petroleum Fund (Fundo Petrolífero) of the State Oil
Company SONANGOL by presidential order Nº 19 /2012. He is also the executive
vice president of the Administration of the Bank Kwanza Investment (Banco
Kwanza Investimento). He is being groomed by his father the Dictator to be a
presidential candidate in the election period after 2017. As chairman of the
new Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA), José Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos is
mandated to get the US$ 5 billion sovereign fund off the ground. Dos Santos
represents a new round of leaders managing sub-Saharan Africa’s sovereign
wealth. Dos Santos was a former board member of Banco Kwanza Invest, an
Angolan investment bank. Son of the Dictator of Angola he was born in 1977
from Jose Eduardo dos Santos second wife Luísa Perdigão Abrantes.

- Eduardo Santos nephew of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos was
nominated a member of the Council of Administration of the Petroleum Fund
(Fundo Petrolífero) of the State Oil Company SONANGOL by presidential order
Nº 19 /2012.

- Afonso Van-Dúnem M'Binda , Minister
of External Relations 1985-1988 is the Husband of Luzia Inglês Van-Dúnem who
was the leader the MPLA Ruling Party Woman's Organization until 2011 and
which is now the President of the National Electoral Commission of Angola

- Cândido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dúnem
, Minister of Defence is a cousin of the Dictator José
Eduardo dos Santos, and Kopelipa Minister of State and Chief of the Military House, and José Vieira Dias Van-Dunem
Minister of health.

- José Vieira Dias Van-Dúnem , cousin of General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias ‘Kopelipa'
Minister of State and Chief of the Military Bureau of the President

José dos
Santos da Silva Ferreira

- José dos Santos da Silva Ferreira,
is the head of the super ministry which oversees Chinese contracts
and projects

Luzia Inglês Van-Dúnem

- Luzia Inglês Van-Dúnem ex-Secretary General of OMA, the women's mass movement
of the ruling party MPLA, and now President of the Angola National
Commission, she is the wife of Afonso Van-Dúnem M'Binda who was the Minister
of External Relations 1985-1988

Lionidio Ceita

- Lionidio Ceita President of
the Administration Council of the State Water Company EPAL, Mr. Lionido Ceita is the Brother of Ana Paula dos Santos Wife of
the Dictator José Eduardo dos Santos

The name of General Bento Kangamba apears next and connected to the
individuals from whom where ceased Millions of Euros by the French
Authorities. General Bento Kangamba is member of the Presidential Family, he
is married to Avelina Escórcio dos Santos, who is the daughter of Avelino
dos Santos, the eldest brother of José Eduardo dos Santos.

He is the President of the Kabuscorp Football Club in Luanda, among other
things he is the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of Luanda of the MPLA
Party for the organization and mobilization in the rural and
periphery areas of the capital city of
Luanda.

List of the Richest
Men of
the MPLA "Nomenklatura"

The New rich MPLA Regime
bets in Business

I miss Angola and from Angonotícias and
other sites to learn of the generals that enabled me to move quite at ease
throughout the territory during the war, arrived only in areas where the
mercenaries, soldiers ... and, worse, where people were attacked by the military and
where assassinated without having no one to turn to. It continues to find unforgivable that
the international community, because of the wealth that prey on the MPLA
Angola, did not press the organisation of free elections in the country.

'Invest in Angola is now the currency of our
rich' says the 'Weekly Angolense. The newspaper, which caused scandal in 2004
with the publication of the richest men listed the "nomenklatura"
Angolan, again loading two weeks ago with a "portrait" of private
groups that proliferate in MPLA Angola, to lift the 'boom' economic and
confesses intention of the government to stimulate domestic private groups and
to enter into strategic sectors such as banking, oil or diamonds.

The Director of the 'Weekly Angolense ",
Graca Campos, admits that the list is not exhaustive and does not support a
thorough investigation. They are the 'business' giving that talk and that
illustrate the importance of political lobbying activities and' desire 'for
foreign investors to form partnerships with political figures of the regime or
their relatives. With the proper salute to the 'Weekly Angolense ", that
is, in short, from A to Z, the portrait of private groups more' exciting 'of
today in Luanda.

ARMINDO CÉSAR & SONSIn the beginning was the Maboque, company
specializes in catering, hotel and "Catering. It is said that counts
among its shareholders with family members of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos and
a pleiades of generals. But in the last five years the group grew and
multiplied itself. Activity: the earlier, more fishing (catch and marketing),
hotel and tourism, real estate, trade (hypermarket Interpark), training and
services.

INTERNATIONAL BANK CREDIT (BIC)Isabel dos Santos, first born daughter of
Comrade Dictator Jose
Eduardo dos Santos, and Portuguese businessman Americo Amorim (25%) are the
main shareholders. Created in June, has already opened 13 branches (8 in
Luanda) and raised more than 165 million dollars in deposits.

COMMERCIAL BANK OF ANGOLA (BCA) BANCO COMERCIAL DE ANGOLA (BCA)It includes among its shareholders three
former MPLA Regime prime ministers: Lopo do Nascimento, France Van-Dúnem and Marcolino
Moco. Solomon Xirimbimbi (Minister of Fisheries), Augusto Thomas (former
Governor of Benguela, former Minister of Finance) and businessman Jaime
Freitas (COSAL, Interauto, Tecnomat) are the other members. In 2005 sold 50%
of the shares to Absa Bank of South Africa, which in turn was bought by
Barclays Bank, the United Kingdom.

CABUTA ORGANISATIONS"Holding set up by General Higino
Carneiro, Minister of Public Works and governor of Kwanza South and family.
Activity: agriculture, agro-industry, hotels, tourism, banking, insurance.

FINANGESTAmong the shareholders are listed José Pedro
de Morais, Ex-Minister of Finance (December 2002 to October 2008), General Pedro Neto, chief of General Staff of
the Air Force, and Kundi Paihama, Minister of Defence. Activities: games and
lotteries, publishing record, transport, services, construction,
"import-export 'insurance, security.

GEMACreated by Simon Junior, its current
president is Jose Leitao, former head of the Civil House of the Presidency.
Account among its shareholders with the lawyer Carlos Feijó and António
Domingos Pitra Costa Neto, vice-president of MPLA and Minister for Employment and Social and Security. Activity: supermarkets, cinemas, private
clinic, shareholder of Coca-Cola Angola, partnerships with South African
companies and Chinese.

GENICompanies in the sectors of banking, oil,
diamonds and construction thrive as' boom in MPLA Angola. The starting point was the creation of UNITEL
(mobile telephone) in partnership with aPortugal Telecom. Founders: Isabel dos
Santos, Brig Leopoldino Fragosodo Birth (Head of Communications of the
Presidency), Anthony Van-Dúnem (former secretary of the Council of Ministers)
and Manuel Augusto da Fonseca, the bureau's legal Sonangol. Joined them to the
Franco-Brazilian businessman Pierre Falcone. Activity: telecommunications and services.

GENIUSCreated by General Joao de Matos (ex-chief of
General Staff General of the FAA) and Mário Pizarro (former Governor of the
BNA). The crown jewel of the group is GEVAL-Angola Joint-venture with the
Brazilian Vale do Rio Doce, No. 1 worldwide for mining.Activity: mining (diamonds, manganese,
others). Projects: electricity, telecommunications. Participations: Torres of Caramel (Luanda),
Fine Shopping Centre

IMPORÁFRICA-IMPORCARFaustino Muteka former Minister of
Administration of Territory and current secretary of the MPLA Party for the
mobilisation is the figure-of-bow of the group, which are associated with
capital from Portugal to India. Activity: construction, agriculture, trade,
sale of cars, real estate.

In the photo the Angolan actres Lesliana Pereira, the Brazilian Xuxa, and
the Valdomiro Minoru Dondo

MACONRevolutionized the public transport in Luanda
(buses and taxis). Hélder Vieira Dias, head of the Military House of the
presidency and director of the Office of National Reconstruction, Brig
Leopoldino Fragoso and Julio Bessa, former Minister of Finance, in partnership
with the Brazilian native with Angolan citizenship Valdomiro Minoru Dondo are members-founders.
Activity: transport, trade (the Shopping
Centre Kinaxixi is "stuck" for two years).

Note on the dark activities of Mr. Valdomiro Minoru DondoIn 2010 the Brazilian Federal Police discovered his name in a dark operation
with an Official of the International Airport of Rio de Janeiro which has
now been dismissed.

XAVIER MELLOThere is much that Mr George Mello Xavier by
MPLA in 1992 ceased to be 'the entrepreneur of the regime "but remains
active, influential and irreverent. Activity: construction, tourism, hospitality,
beverage, agro-industry,

PECUSCreated by Portuguese group Tecnocarro, Jose
Récio, was sold to brothers Anthony and Luis Faceira. Activity: production and marketing of meat,
which leads sector.

SOMOILFirst private company to enter the Angolan
oil exploration. Founded by Desidério Costa, Minister of Petroleum, and
Alberto de Sousa. Activity: oil and derivatives (lubricants)

SUNINVESTDirected by Ismael Diogo, Consul of Angola in
Rio de Janeiro and President of the FESA (Eduardo dos Santos Foundation). Activity: pharmaceutical industry
(partnership with the Laboratory Teuto of Brazil), urban transport, waste
removal (Luanda), trade.

VALENTIM AMÕESHe came to Luanda from the Central Plateau,
which has a large property and controls much of the trade. He joined the
Central Committee of MPLA in 2004 and among its members include the General
Fernando Miala, the information services outside of the presidency. Activity: road and air transport, hotel and
tourism, 'rent-a-car' trade.

SECURITYThe security companies deserve to be treated
separately, as it was by way that many MPLA generals first entered in business
and acquired the capital that allowed them highest flights. They are now the
hundreds, more or less sophisticated, and provide all kinds of services, from
the safety of the premises personal escorts, transport of funds and
installation of monitoring systems. The 'Weekly Angolense "highlighted
the following:

ANGO SEGUCompany pioneer in industrial safety. Its
founding the generals Fernando Miala and José Maria and Santana André Pitra
(Petroff) former Minister of Interior and Commander-General of Police.

ALFA 5Created by General Joao de Matos and other
generals and officers. It controls 50% of the safety of large areas of exploitation
of diamonds.

TELESERVICEMonopoly security of oil fields. Its founders
were the generals Joao de Matos, France Ndalu, Armando da Cruz Neto, and
Antonio Luis Faceira and Hendrick. Investments in Air Gemini, the Lumanhe
Company (diamonds) with Escom, linked to the Group Espirito Santo.

Valdomiro Minoru Dondo, is a Brazilian Business man who became rich with
the Socialism of the Angolan market, he did not made the miracle alone. He
is the owner of a conglomerate of more than 20 companies, which the solitary
client is the MPLA Regime itself, he is the partner of at least 5 local
authorities, including regime leaders without portfolio, who made
millionaire contracts with him.

But the relation with power goes further. In Brazil Minoru has negotiated at
least 3 buildings for Angolan leaders and their families members.

His wife, Agla Dondo, is personal friend of Ana Paula dos Santos, wife of
José Eduardo dos Santos, the dictator who has has hold the grip on power for
the last four decades which Minoru has businesses.

Considered a myth in Angola Minoru gets annually an officially $4.5 Million
USD in profits from public contracts, in Brazil he is known for the
extravagant birthday parties of his wife, in one of these parties he send to
make a giant cake in the shape of a Louis Vuitton hand bag.

In the businesses of Minoru, there are no limits between public and private.

Has a physical person he is partner of Pedro Sebastião Teta, vice Minister
of Science and Technology of Angola, in the company Júpiter; he is partner
of brigadier Leopoldino Fragoso, Dino, in the company Supermar; he is
partner of the sister of the first lady of Angola, Artemísia Cristina
Cristóvão de Lemos, in the company Bob's; he is partner again of Leopoldino
Fragoso, in the company Tilápia Psicultura; he is partner of Pitra Neto,
Minister of Work and Social Security of Angola, in the company 2000
Empreendimentos; he is partner of the Chief of the Military House of the
Presidency of Angola and Director of National Reconstruction of Angola,
General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias, o Kopelipa, in the company Medicamentos e
Cosméticos (Medicine & Cosmetics) he is partner of Prenda; and also, has
juridical person (by Midras), of the ex-Minister of Finances José Pedro de
Morais (December 2002 to October 2008), in the Company Gesa Health.

Minoru is also the 3rd largest shareholder of the BNI Bank, this Bank has in
its social composition again the ex Minister of Finances José Pedro de Morais
(December 2002 to October 2008), and the
Ex-Chief of Armed Forces and General of the Army João de Matos and the
President of the National Assembly, Paulo Kassoma, represented by his
daughter, Kanda.

International businessman Valdomiro Dondo applies his entrepreneurial
acumen in both his professional and charitable endeavors. Under the auspices
of his executive work with Brazilian firm Midras Group, L.L.C., Dondo has
spent two decades fostering a powerful connection between Latin America’s
largest country and the East African province of Angola. In addition to
bolstering general economic and cultural transfusion between the two
regions, Dondo’s firm has been instrumental in encouraging a significant
Brazilian audience presence at the Miss Angola contest. His work with Midras
Group also supports a strong Angolan market for Brazilian daytime
television.

Valdomiro Dondo began investing in Angola when its economy opened in 1992,
while the country struggled under a decades-long civil war. Rather than
focusing solely on the region’s explicit business interests in the form of
diamonds and oil, Dondo set out to establish critical inroads for Angolan
infrastructure, including the region’s first urban transportation program.
In addition to major installations in the healthcare, technology, and retail
sectors of the country, Dondo helped found Angola’s stock exchange. He also
instituted language programs to help Angolan businessmen communicate with
their largest investors, the Chinese.

Education on several vital issues has proved an essential ingredient in
Valdomiro Dondo’s ongoing mission to improve Angola’s healthcare and human
services. Entrenched superstitions surrounding such issues as hygiene,
medicine, and gender roles have made it difficult for human aid services to
establish the type of systems needed to help equalize rights and provide
care for Angolan natives. Consequently, the charitable organizations working
in the region emphasize instruction and information, in addition to the
provision of relevant resources. Dondo’s beneficiaries in this sector
include projects supporting dental health, advanced prenatal care, and
vaccinations against malaria and other infectious diseases endemic to the
area.

ANTWERP—Somewhere between Africa’s diamond mines and the dazzling
diamond bazaars of Dubai and Antwerp, a Belgian company called Omega
Diamonds has constructed a financial triangular trade, where at least
$3.5 billion worth of diamond profits simply vanished between 2001 and
2008. And, if Belgian investigators are to be believed, there was little
anyone could do about it. Not only did Dubai authorities deliberately
turn a blind eye to questionable corporate practices of tax evasion and
systematic under-invoicing—“tax optimization" being the preferred
term—but the Dubai Multi-Commodities Center (DMCC) leadership appears to
have actively blocked investigation by other governments. Instead of
being busted and black-balled from the industry, Omega Diamonds, owned
by two of the largest industry players, was handed a
get-out-of-jail-free card.

While Brussels would claim a major victory on march 14, 2013, after
levying a fine of $195 million on Omega Diamonds—the biggest-ever
imposed on a Belgian enterprise—the company and at least two of its
principals would escape any other sanction. Ironically, a few days
earlier, Omega’s former attorney Koen Geens was appointed as Belgium’s
minister of finance, putting him in charge of tax investigators—the very
office that was prosecuting his former clients.

But a year earlier, Omega’s main shareholder, Ehud “the Argentine”
Laniado, sold all his property in Belgium, and according to the industry
intelligence newsletter Rough & Polished, took up residence in
the tax haven of monaco, beyond the reach of the Brussels tax
inspectors. His partner, Sylvain Goldberg, appeared to have moved his
operations to Switzerland and Israel—the former a major tax haven, the
other, not exactly known for cooperating with foreign tax authorities.
Both men remain members in good standing of Antwerp’s venerable Diamond
Bourse, whose officials declined to comment on the Omega settlement.

Undoubtedly, Omega was able to beat the system because of its
particularly complex web of illicit activities. In short, Omega’s
illegal diamond trade linked countries in central Africa to Omega
subsidiaries in Dubai and, ultimately, Antwerp. Employing corrupt
African autocrats and money-hungry businessmen, Omega would purchase
diamonds of questionable origin for little to no money in Angola, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe. They would then ship the
diamonds to Dubai, where they would be given certificates of mixed
origin—legal under the Kimberley Process definition—and subsequently
over-value the worth of those diamonds. From Dubai, the diamonds would
be sent to Antwerp, where they would be sold on the biggest diamond
market for more than their actual worth. The money gained from those
sales would finance the personal bank accounts of Omega and many of the
corrupt characters they employed in their tri-continental scheme.

A three-month investigation into the efficiency of the international
agreement designed initially to combat blood diamonds, known as the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), reveals that one of
the most effective tactics enabling the continued looting of Africa’s
mineral resources is the practice of under-invoicing the value of
diamonds through subsidiary companies, based in jurisdictions providing
legal and financial secrecy, like Dubai. This maneuver alone has managed
to subvert and cleanse several billion dollars worth of African diamonds
of questionable origin. And although Omega agreed to pay the fine that
Belgian tax investigators had imposed as part of an out-of-court
settlement, it has denied all guilt.

These jurisdictions are often Kimberley Process-certified, enabling
tax havens to act as transit countries for diamonds, serving the purpose
of removing the origin of diamonds through certificates of mixed origin.
But the root cause of the problem does not lie in the ineffectiveness of
the Kimberley Process as a monitoring mechanism for actual conflict
diamonds. It lies in the Kimberley Process's commendable goal of
removing the stain or reputation of “conflict” from diamonds, through a
process of certification. Subverting this process requires narrowly
defining the concept that now frames rebels as the sole source of
conflict in Africa, which still produces at least 65 percent of the
world’s production of raw, uncut diamonds. So the cleansed Kimberley
Process diamonds, produced in African countries that have not been
subjected to violence but which may be ruled by venal autocrats, have
augmented the personal wealth of these nations’ rulers. Certified as 99
percent conflict-free, they may then be used to produce vast profits for
a handful of individuals and families. This mechanism is only just
coming into focus thanks to a series of court proceedings in Europe.

By 2007, when the first investigations leading to these proceedings
were just debuting, Dubai had become a $35 billion-a-year juggernaut
that, by virtue of its lax tax laws, secrecy, and its position
straddling the old world of diamonds, represented by Antwerp and the new
world of Mumbai and Shanghai. Players like Goldberg and Laniado had
already spotted opportunities that a tax haven and diamond hub like
Dubai offered. To understand how the Kimberley Process helped Dubai grow
into what Britain’s Scotland Yard believes is the world’s largest
entrepot for diamond and gold smuggling, it’s only necessary to
understand what the reigning Dubai Diamond Council had hoped to
achieve—and the myriad of unintended consequences that resulted.

Antwerp was the world’s leading diamond trading center and home to
the World Diamond Council. As early as 2000, the World Diamond Council
was working to protect its position in an industry where much of the
world’s diamonds passed via Amsterdam’s Pelikaanstraat at the heart of
their Diamantkwartier. Getting everyone to play by the same rules was
critical to protecting Antwerp as home to the 500-year-old diamond
cutting and trading business, while fending off threats posed by
upstarts such as Tel Aviv’s Ran Gamat and, to a lesser extent, Dubai and
Mumbai.

Dubai’s rise to preeminence may be traced in a barely straight line
to 1992, when the beleaguered government in Luanda, the center of
barely-legal diamond mining, was facing a loss of control over most of
the Angolan hinterlands to UNITA. The government, led by UNITA’s rival
MPLA, hired a group of former South African soldiers who styled
themselves as Executive Outcomes (EO) to, at first advise, and later
assume operational command of their military campaign against UNITA.
Heavy arms, gunships, and specialized tracking technology—all
expensive—would be needed to bring an end to the murderous campaign of
Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA. To fill that increasingly pressing
need, the Luanda regime turned to a coterie of Russian-Israeli arms and
diamond dealers, namely Sylvain Goldberg, Pierre Falcone, Arkadi
Gaydamak, and Lev Leviev. And eventually, to Dubai. But not before the
Kimberley Process sought to throw a monkey wrench into their business.

THE RIP-OFF

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was designed in
2003 to “keep diamonds tainted with violence out of the international
trade,” and was supposed to be limited to the activities of rebel groups
in diamond-producing nations of Africa—largely Angola and Zimbabwe. But
the $800 billion Marange diamond field in Zimbabwe, looted through a web
of politicians, the army, and opaque companies, was beyond the reaches
of the entire Kimberley Process. Instead of bringing to its knees the
trade in Zimbabwe’s “blood diamonds,” named for the brutality and
looting by President Robert Mugabe’s political and military thugs, their
operations continued to be financed by these very diamonds.

Various forms of violence, from physical to economic and social, fall
outside of the Kimberley definition, including acts perpetrated by those
who control the state and their corporate partners. As one cable,
originating at the American Embassy in Belgium and disclosed by
Wikileaks, states, “Belgium very recently has begun to take steps to
monitor the flow of Zimbabwe-sourced diamonds through Antwerp’s Diamond
Office … but those involved in the Zimbabwean illicit trade were savvy
enough to mingle diamonds with those from other countries such as the
DR-Congo, and then send them to other diamond trading centers in …Dubai
where they could receive legitimately-issued Kimberley certificates that
indicated the source was ‘mixed,’ and then be sent on to Antwerp.”

“What can we do in the face of this?” asked Chindori Chininga, chair
of the Zimbabwean Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines. “What is
the value of the KP certificate if it comes from places that are also
tax havens?” referring to Dubai’s ability to issue mixed origin
certificates, eliminating the sources entirely. Chininga, considered a
moderate Zimbabwe politician and member of the ruling ZANU party,
cautioned that fingering those responsible for establishing or profiting
from this corrupt system won’t work if the corruptors are never held
accountable. “We must ask who the system is really working for,” said
Chininga, who served as Zimbabwe’s minister of mines from 2000 to 2004.
Several days after an interview with the authors, Chininga, who headed
an investigation into the economic activities of diamond companies, was
killed in a car accident ahead of forthcoming elections. At his funeral,
some family members claimed he was murdered.

Intelligence dossiers authored by Zimbabwe’s notorious Central
Intelligence Organization (CIO) would later reveal that six ZANU
moderates including Chininga were “to be stopped,” and that elections
were being rigged with the help of two African presidents, one of them
Joseph Kabila from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, according
to these documents, money and diamonds were passing from African
presidents and businessmen from Zimbabwe through to Dubai, Angola, and
China. According to a South African Supreme Court document, including a
judgment delivered in September 2011, the system works very well for
companies like Omega. This document outlines how the company had
effectively operated a massive transfer-pricing scheme through Dubai:

“Omega imported diamonds from Angola and Congo through
an associated company in Dubai into Belgium. Omega ordered the
shipment of diamonds purchased in Angola and Congo in accordance
with the legally required Kimberley certificates, for delivery … in
Dubai. The diamonds were packed in small parcels. Upon arrival in
Dubai the small parcels were retained but repacked into larger
parcels, containing diamonds from both Angola and Congo, without
physically mixing the stones. Thereafter the new shipment of
diamonds was provided with a new Kimberley Certificate indicating
that the shipment emanated from the United Arab Emirates and marked
‘diamonds of mixed origin.’ The new shipment was issued with a new
invoice … addressed to Omega wherein the value of the diamonds was
increased.”

According to the seized invoices, the increase in value, from Dubai
to Antwerp, was estimated at 20 percent to 31 percent. For each
shipment, a new price list and a mixed origin Kimberley Process
certificate were attached. Omega had systematically under-valued
diamonds from Africa via their Dubai-based trading company, Tulip FZE,
run by Vivian Hawkins-Green, sister-in-law to Laniado. The company then
increased the value when exporting from Dubai to their Antwerp-based
entities. This was done by taking advantage of the Kimberley practice of
allowing non-producing diamond trading countries like the United Arab
Emirates to mix diamond parcels as needed and then issue their own
certificates of mixed origins, enabling Dubai to omit the real origins
of diamonds—in this case, Zimbabwe, whose diamonds were initially banned
from international traffic by the Kimberley Process. By becoming a
member of the Kimberley Process, tax havens like Switzerland and Dubai
legitimately obtain the right to obfuscate the origins of African
diamonds. The entire system rests largely on the integrity of African
diamond producing and exporting governments, diamond dealers, and
conduit countries like the United Arab Emirates. The goal is to prevent
blood diamonds, synonymous with Angola’s former rebel movement, UNITA,
or Zimbabwe, from entering the international diamond trading chain.

UNDER-INVOICING

The dubious strategy of under-invoicing was used by Omega, which had
exported an average of at least $1.2 billion of diamonds every year
between 2001 and 2008—$10 million per month from the Democratic Republic
of Congo and $100 million per month from Angola. David Renous, a former
Congo-based diamond buyer for Omega, claimed that a substantial number
of these diamonds were under-valued and declared neither
in Angola nor the DRC.

Renous told Belgian and American investigators that this systematic
under-declaration was done with the cooperation of key Angolan elites,
including longtime President José Eduardo dos Santos, and was
part of an elaborate scheme to compensate at least one arms trader,
Arkadi Gaydamak, for rearming José Eduardo dos Santos’s party, between
1992 and 1998, and in defiance of UN sanctions on Angola’s protagonists.
The arms, all of Russian design and East European origin, were supplied
in violation of UN arms sanctions. But the arms dealers and other
facilitators needed to be paid. In a conflict-ridden, cash-poor country
like Angola, hard currency, especially in large quantities, is quite
difficult to obtain. Along came diamonds and their merchants.

Gaydamak’s payoff was to become a silent partner in Omega’s monopoly
with the Angolan government. Israeli diamond magnate Lev Leviev, active
in Angolan diamonds since 1998, would be the principal financier. The
Tulip FZE, Renous claimed, “generated profits. The profits could either
be reinjected into the system to grow the capital, or used as desired. [Gaydamak]
laundered funds legally. Nobody knew about it.” The system, Renous told
investigators, not only allowed Gaydamak to launder his arms wealth
outside of Angola through diamonds—an easy-to-access hyper-mobile
resource, but also allowed mass profiteering from the value of diamonds.
These were sold at rock bottom prices to Gaydamak’s own subsidiaries
abroad.

But the alleged money-laundering, under-invoicing, and tax avoidance
in Africa, all illicitly taking place under the umbrella of Kimberley
Process-certification, were not the problems investigated by the Belgian
court. The fraud lay in the fact that Omega and tulip then sought to
avoid taxes in Belgium. In fact, Omega never officially kept more than
two percent of the profits, in a valiant effort to sidestep taxes
payable on such profits. Three of Omega’s connected entities including
evaluation company MDC, as well as trading companies DexDiam and MBD,
would trade the diamonds—on paper— and send cash onward to various bank
accounts largely based in tax havens, such as Luxembourg, Dubai, and
Switzerland. Other players in the operation are alleged to have included
several Dubai-based diamond merchants, since all the profits would
ultimately stay in Dubai. And all the companies, Renous claimed, were
under the control of Laniado. Dubai is one of the top three diamond
trading hubs, rivaling such historic centers as Antwerp.

There is little doubt why the Belgian investigators closed the file
on a four-year-long investigation that stretched from Antwerp to Africa
and the Middle East. Tax havens like the Kimberley Process-certified
Dubai ensured the paper trail would lead to multiple dead ends.
Prosecutors could not prove Omega benefitted from over-invoiced sales
from Dubai to Antwerp. As the U.S. Embassy cable from Brussels, released
through Wikileaks, quoted an investigator stating, “It’s like our fax
line was directly connected to their shredder [in Dubai]." The eerie
silence from the UAE in response to official requests for information
was answer enough.

DESTINATION DUBAI

Dubai is one of the top three diamond trading hubs, rivaling such
historic centers as Antwerp, and the world’s leading cutting and
polishing hub, Mumbai. Dubai’s Almas towers, the tallest commercial
building in the Middle East, is said to house more than 1,000 diamonds
dealers, as well as 300 international and regional companies. In 2003,
KPCS was inaugurated in the UAE by the ministry of economy, naming the
Dubai Multi Commodities Center Authority (DMCC) the sole point of entry
and exit for diamonds in the country. The Financial Secrecy Index (FSI),
assessing the UAE’s opacity, ranks it at 80 percent, or “the top end of
the secrecy scale." All of which has made Dubai a prime global transit
point for diamonds of all provenance, described by Nick Shaxson, author
of Treasure Islands, as “one of the filthiest spots on the planet.” And
that has nothing to do with hygiene.

“Because of the Kimberley Process certificates, the diamond dealers
did not want to ship the diamonds directly from their African buying
offices to the market,” says one leading Belgian government diamond
investigator, who requested we withhold his name for fear of political
reprisals. “The shipments were diverted to the UAE (Dubai). The
certificate and invoice was then changed to a desired price and then
shipped to a trading center. This way the evaluation office in the
trading center received a shipment of rough diamonds with a UAE
Kimberley Process certificate ‘origin: mixed or unknown,’ and with a
value close to the market price. The full purchase amount, as mentioned
on the invoice, is transferred and diverted to different accounts all
over the world, private accounts or accounts of individuals. In the
bookkeeping, all transfers are attributed to the UAE supplier. It may be
clear that the UAE as a transit point was only created to produce ‘new’
documents in order to mask the origin of the diamonds and to create a
possibility to divert the payments.”

In another American embassy cable released by Wikileaks, former CEO
of the Dubai Diamond Exchange (DDE), Noora Jamsheer, claimed that the
Kimberley Process system in Dubai was corrupted, and that she was
offered commissions to turn a blind eye. In 2007, she resigned because
she was “unwilling to make compromises and overlook suspicious shipments
of diamonds.” According to the cable, concerning one suspicious
shipment, “In September 2006,… Ahmed bin Sulayem, DDE Chief Operating
Officer, authorized the release of this shipment.” The Kimberley Process
certificate from Ghana was not properly authenticated at the time of its
release. As the court cable continued, “Jamsheer believes that Dubai and
the UAE are being very short-sighted by not stringently abiding by the
KP protocols. She thinks that the desire to make Dubai a hub of the
diamond trade is the motivation for a willingness to gloss over some
suspicious transactions.”

SETTING UP OURSELVES

In an attempt to gauge how quickly and easily layers of secrecy could
be accessed for companies intent on under-invoicing commodities, we
contacted Vandort Consulting and Intuit, two leading firms facilitating
DMCC company formation. We explained that our primary purpose was
to engage in “tax optimization” strategies for our diamonds, meaning to
under-invoice by using different price lists, and to Kimberley
Process-certify our diamonds in countries other than the countries of
origin. We also requested as much non-disclosure and opacity as
possible— nominees, anonymity, banking secrecy, and other layers of
secrecy.

In seeking to enlist their help as clients, we told them, “We deal in
Zimbabwean, Angolan diamonds. We often obtain KPC in Tanzania, South
Africa, and Namibia for lower reputational risks, before exporting
directly to our trading center. However, our partners have informed us
that tax optimization banking would be better suited for a Dubai-based
entity [as recipient of our rough diamonds]. Also, that DMCC can offer
us use of mixed origin certification.”

Vandort provided a price list: establishment of a new company or
subsidiary ($8,200), a flexi-desk ($4,200) or serviced office ($9,600),
professional fees ($4,000), visas ($2,100), bank account ($1,500). There
were no rules as to who would occupy the office. the entire process
would take four to six weeks to establish. The companies could not
operate in the UAE real economy, save through locals. Renewal of the
trade license requires financials of the DMCC entity, not the parent
company.

We explained how worried we were that artificially reducing our
profits, avoiding taxes, or using different lists would result in
external penetration of our company’s activities. The most accommodating
consultant at Vandort suggested, "If you are worried about privacy of
your economic activities for tax optimization purposes, you
could…incorporate an off-shore company in, for instance, the British
Virgin islands (BVI) which can hold the shares in the DMCC company. The
costs to incorporate a BVI company are $2,500 including our costs.” The
company informed us that DMCC would require all corporate papers,
including beneficial owners, but that there had not yet been any
government inquiries. Intuit suggested a more proximate tactic for the
additional secrecy layer, using the Ras Al Khaimah (RAK) free zone in
Dubai, which allows anonymity of ownership and the ability to protect
assets legally from claims by others. It would take just a week to
incorporate.

ROOTED IN ARMS TRADE

To understand the full implications for the Kimberley Process’s
credibility and the industry’s claim to be its own best policeman, only
one key fact is essential. The persons who’ve benefitted most from
contributing to UNITA’s destructive 10-year campaign to seize power by
way of a diamond-funded war were the very ones who allegedly benefit
most from the Omega deal.

UNITA and its late leader Jonas Savimbi, along with former Liberian
President Charles Taylor, were among the main reasons KPCS was
implemented in the first place—to cut off their movements from financial
oxygen.

To place this in its full historical perspective: twenty years ago,
UNITA founder Jonas Savimbi angrily rejected his narrow loss to
incumbent Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos in UN-supervised
elections, re-igniting one of Africa’s most brutal civil wars. In a
country blessed or cursed, depending on your perspective—with some of
the richest alluvial diamond deposits in the world, buyers from Antwerp
were enlisted as financiers of the war.

In 1994, in an effort to deprive Savimbi of his source of cash for
weapons, the UN slapped sanctions on all diamond dealings with the rebel
leader. Faced with a major crisis of legitimacy and a threatened
worldwide boycott of the diamond trade, the world’s largest diamond
producer, De Beers, and the South African government initiated the
Kimberley Process. Its chief aim was to sever all rebel movements from
the formal diamond trade. Between 2001 and 2003, more than 50 countries
and over 90 diamond traders formally signed up for the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme—including the government of Dubai, then just a tiny
player with little more than $5 million in annual turn-over.

By 1997, the luanda regime found itself trapped. though their
military campaign had pushed UNITA out of every major Angolan town, the
government’s ability to pay for their mercenaries and expensive military
hardware was increasingly constricted. Documents brought to light by the
“Falcongate” investigation in Paris implicated the late french President
François Mitterrand’s son Jean-Christophe and a clique of top African
officials in gun-running and money-laundering. Through this probe, it
emerged that Gaydamak—vying with goldberg and leviev for control of
Angola’s prolific diamond production—hit on a method that not only
circumvented un arms sanctions, but also contributed greatly to
undermining the very foundations of the Kimberley Process.

The meteoric rise of Isabel dos Santos, daughter of Angola’s
president, to the position of Africa’s first woman billionaire can be
traced to this system. First floated by Gaydamak in the mid-1990s, her
goal was to create a diamond-buying monopoly, much like De Beers’ scheme
in Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa. Her company, TAIS, was set up in
1997 and incorporated in Switzerland for the sole purpose of diamond
trading. Two years later, as mercenaries helped the Angolan armed forces
establish control of Angola’s prolific Lunda Norte diamond fields,
President José Eduardo dos Santos decreed that henceforth only ASCorp
Ltd—an Omega subsidiary based in Angola—would be permitted to buy and
export Angolan diamonds. Total control, with zero accountability,
coupled with an official monopoly produces its own set of
opportunities—as events in Angola would so clearly illustrate.

By early 2004, these partners took full advantage of the higher legal
hurdle set by the newly-created Kimberley Process by dropping the price
they would pay officially for Angolan rough diamonds to below $200 a
carat, thereby fattening the margin they in turn would make when selling
to Antwerp and Tel Aviv. In 2007, the World Bank criticized the practice
“based on concerns about special and privileged treatments.” In effect,
the Luanda regime actively promoted a scheme that would rob their own
country of several billion dollars of revenue lost to Omega—the
intermediary that made it all happen.

Omega’s diamond-laundering scheme, a daisy-chain of briefcase
companies registered in tax havens, all controlled by either Goldberg or
Laniado’s clan, would launder money through blind investment trusts in
jurisdictions ranging from Luxembourg to Cyprus. But Omega is just one
company in this sordid tale. There are thousands of such companies
working the murky world of Africa’s diamond fields. Actual losses
to African countries from widespread under-invoicing and other form of
illicit activities, according to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA),
could be as high as $200 billion each year.

For their part, since 2011, Omega and the Angolan regime, notably
President José Eduardo dos Santos, his military, and corporate allies,
circumvented potential obstacles by operating out of another tax haven.
In Geneva, they were able to continue business-as-usual through
acquisition of shares in companies like De Grisogono, founded by the
king of black diamonds, Fawaz Gruosi—publicly uninvolved in prior ASCorp
dealings.

REBOOTING KIMBERLEY

Not all governments are equal. The difference between
diamond-producing countries and non-producing tax havens is vast. The
latter provide the legal and financial-secrecy infrastructure enabling
illicit activities, while the former struggle to generate revenue for
citizens’ needs. But efforts to interdict the trade in rebel-produced
diamonds fail to take into account the role of diamond-producing
governments. Whether authoritarian, undemocratic, or corrupted, they may
be far more pernicious than rebel movements. For unlike rebel groups,
these regimes are legitimately accepted as global players—exploiting
national resources in the name of citizens, but abusing or diverting
national wealth for the profit of their rulers or criminal elements with
ties to the leadership.

Alas, most of these activities still take place in a technically
legal way within the bounds of the Kimberley Process, using the process
to provide a veneer of legality to deeply criminal undertakings.
Designed to shut out the violent activities of one specific group—rebel
organizations, as a means of protecting revenues of the world’s largest
diamond players—it has become a process that merely lubricates this
spiral of illicit operations.

Instead, the geography needs to be broadened to include other forms
of violence and violations—including economic violence from
under-invoicing and tax avoidance; and political and civil rights
violence, when harsh authoritarian or one-party state regimes are
financed through revenues, facilitating directly and indirectly,
cultural, social, and collective violence.

The Kimberley Process definition has enabled a 99 percent clean
diamond industry to exist largely because the real violence of the
industry is whitewashed, ignored, or excluded entirely from the
framework—the criminal portion of which continues to exist entirely on
the periphery. In the end, if the Kimberley definition remains limited
to rebels, rather than the far broader array of often unsavory players
who have forced their way into the industry, violating the letter and
spirit of the system, there may be no fundamental way to save the
diamond industry. The Kimberley Process as it is currently defined is a
system that produces the wrong kind of results.

It would be difficult, if not politically impossible, to reform the
Kimberley Process in its current form, particularly as it took the
better part of two years to originally negotiate with all the diamond
industry players. Still, a few tweaks could help curb the illicit off
shore-based trade. The definition of conflict diamonds must be broadened
to include economic and political conflicts—rather than simply violent
conflicts—underwritten by illicit profits. No country that does not
actually produce diamonds should be allowed to issue Kimberley Process
certificates, and producing countries governed by authoritarian regimes,
or dominated by big corporate players, who refuse to disclose pricing
policies to investigating authorities should be suspended from the
process. Better policing of the diamond police themselves—the key demand
of clean diamond campaigners like Global Witness and Fatal Transactions,
which unmet, led to their withdrawal from the negotiations process—
appears to be the single most important aspect that could be quickly
addressed. Finally, tax havens—including Dubai, Luxembourg, and
Switzerland—should be barred from playing any role whatsoever in the
diamond pipeline, save as end consumer destinations of diamonds
themselves.

To accomplish these changes, of course, would take another injection
of good faith from all the original signatories of the Kimberley
Process—which, given the abuses and the loopholes that have clearly
emerged, should be attainable. And while the stakes are high, if these
revisions are not quickly implemented, the Process itself will soon
become little more than another failed and empty gesture.

Comments

Tulip FZE’s Vivien Hawkins, sister-in-law to Laniado, responded to
repeated interview requests stating, “We choose not to be interviewed
and accordingly do not want to comment on subjudice matters and reserve
our rights to invoke appropriate legal remedies against any public
comments on subjudice matters.” Since then, court actions have
terminated and a settlement has been reached. Still, Omega Diamonds,
including Serge Majer (M.D.C) and Aslan Piha (Margaux) and its listed
auditors, WF & Co, failed to respond to repeated interview requests.

Deutsche Bank Luxembourg responded, “Please be informed that banks in
Luxembourg are bound by a duty of professional secrecy pursuant to the
law dated 5 April 1993 on the financial sector. Based on this duty of
professional secrecy, please [accept our] apologies that we are not
entitled to answer your request and provide you with any information.”

Representatives of the Kimberley Process, based in the DRC, also failed
to respond at the time of print. Lev Leviev responded with threats of a
lawsuit seeking “substantial damages” for unspecified issues. Attempts
to contact Arkadi Gaydamak were unsuccessful. Jamsheer declined to be
interviewed.

In Dubai, the Kimberley Process office and its listed head Mariam al-Hashemi
were contacted. But the request was forwarded to the DMCC’s public
relations office. Jade Mamarbachi, director of the public relations
consultants Brunswick group, responded only by inquiring about the
nature of the story, including “who else [we] were interviewing.”

Following several email exchanges, interview requests with the DMCC
were denied. We replied “Dubai is both a major diamond trading hub and a
tax haven,” central to the illicit activity. Mamarbarchi stated in a
subsequent e-mail, “I understand, and they know that. I have gone
through it with them. This is their stance.”

Corruption MPLA Soviet
style Regime is a pervasive phenomenon

Corruption in the MPLA
soviet style Regime in Angola is a pervasive phenomenon, hindering economic
growth and government-sponsored liberalization programs.

1970s and 1980s

The Soviet press, despite the close
relationship between Angola and the USSR, accused the ruling MPLA party of
clientelism, corruption, and nepotism, accusing the government of illicitly
accumulation US$1 billion. Ogonek said that "corruption has flourished on
a scale which is unprecedented even in Africa... the ruling party in Angola...
being pro-communist by nature, was ready to sacrifice everything and
everybody." [1] 1990s

In April 1999 Gustavo Costa, a journalist for
Expresso, wrote an article entitled Corruption Makes Victims, accusing José
Leita-o, the chief presidential advisor, of embezzling government revenue.
Police arrested Costa and charged him with defamation and injury. The
Angolan Supreme Court found him guilty, sentencing him to eight-months
imprisonment, suspended for two years, and fined him $2,000.[2] Rafael
Marques, a journalist and human rights activist, wrote "The Lipstick of
Dictatorship," an article criticizing corruption in the Angolan
government and President José Eduardo dos Santos, on July 3.

The National
Criminal Investigation Division (DNIC) questioned him on October 13 for
several hours before releasing him. Later that day Morais gave an interview
with Radio Ecclésia and repeated his criticism of the dos Santos government.
Twenty armed members of the Rapid Intervention Police arrested him along with
Aguiar dos Santos, the publisher of Agora, and Antonio José Freitas, Agora
staff reporter, on charges of defamation on October 16, 1999. Marques said dos
Santos bore responsibility for the "destruction of the country... for the
promotion of incompetence, embezzlement and corruption as political and social
values."[3][4]

In May 1999 the World Bank threatened to cut
off aid to Angola if the government did not take serious steps to counter
corruption, beginning with an audit of the petroleum and diamonds industries,
Angola's primary sources of income.[5] 2000s

In 2002 the International Monetary Fund found
the Angolan MPLA Regime could not account for more than US$900 million in 2006
due to "extensive corruption". Bestos de Almeida, spokesman for the
Angolan Finance Ministry, denied any financial inconsistency existed. [6]
Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2003
found the governments of Angola and Zimbabwe the most corrupt in Southern
Africa. On a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 the most corrupt and 10 the most
transparent, TI rated Angola 1.8 and Zimbabwe 2.3, some of the highest
corruption ratings in the world.[7]

In 2004, Human Rights Watch found the
government could not account for US$4 billion spent between 1997 and 2002.[8]
Transparency International ranked Angola 142 out of 163 countries in the
Corruption Perception Index just after Venezuela and before the Republic of
the Congo with a 2.2 rating.[9] The The Heritage Foundation gave a 47.1%
"free" rating in its Index of Economic Freedom in 2008. [10]

Negocios are corrupt business deals in
Angola. [11] References

1990's to Present

Since 1961 Angola has been at war. First
against the Portuguese colonial administration, then since 1975 against the
unelected communist dictatorship. When the 50,000 Cuban mercenaries left
Angola by 1991, Angola enjoyed over a year of rare peace. Until the UN
supervised elections of September 1992. The widespread MPLA fraud surrounding
that shameful excuse of an election was followed by the worst outbreak of
massacres committed by the MPLA troops ever seen in Angola. In just 3 days MPLA
mobs murdered over 10,000 Bakongo and Ovimbundu Natives. The war exploded
again with a ferocity never before seen in the region. More people died in the
2 years following "the election" than in the previous 30 years of
war which it was meant to end!

Instead of punishing the Marxist MPLA soviet
style regime for the electoral fraud and cold-blooded massacres of their
opponents, Western governments inexplicably imposed total economic sanctions
on the victims - those who supported UNITA. This blockade has prevented even
food aid and medicines from being delivered to the millions of people living
in Free Angola. So while Western governments continued to sell weapons of mass
destruction (including napalm fuel-air bombs) to the MPLA Marxists aparatus in
Luanda, they enforced severe sanctions against humanitarian aid reaching the
victims of these attacks.

Elections?

Observers already point to several
deficiencies in the election campaigns, such as intimidation of the
opposition, tight control over the media, MPLA's use of oil and diamond
resources to buy off political supporters, etc.

The state remains heavily centralised in the
office of the presidency, who in several instances has overruled government
ministries. Dos Santos governs through an extensive patronage network of
friends, MPLA allies and relatives, popularly known as the Futungo. Members of
this patronage network , have been provided with attractive positions in the
political administration of Angola. This ruling elite enjoys virtually
unchecked access to state funds and is widely accused of depriving Angolans of
benefits from the lucrative oil deals.

The resource-rich patronage system has resulted in extreme inequalities in
Angola, with the United Nations estimating that 70% of the population live on
less than US$ 1 a day. This has raised concerns over Angola's long-term
stability. Economic reforms have been limited and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has raised concerns that economic growth derives solely from high
oil prices and not from sectors outside the oil industry.

Public spending is
generally high, but low in social sectors (far below its regional neighbours),
making public spending highly unsustainable. Each year, large amounts of oil
revenues disappear from the state budget through clandestine channels to the
ruling elite, and international observers have estimated that more than US$ 1
billion in oil revenues is lost annually.

Public services

Public services in Angola are highly
inefficient and sometimes non-existent at sub-provincial levels, which are
completely dependent on transfers from the central government. Public servants
generally compensate for their low salaries by demanding bribes in return for
public services, thus spreading corruption to virtually all sectors and levels
of society. This pattern is aggravated by the fact that the 18 provincial
governments are ruled by powerful provincial MPLA governors loyal to the
president.

These individuals administer their provinces as small kingdoms with little
interest in broad social and economic development. The ineffective and
corruption-plagued public services, especially at the local level, coupled
with the non-responsiveness of the Angolan government, has resulted in a loss
of political legitimacy for the government, leading several observers to
question the sustainability of the fragile democratic process in Angola.

In 2010 a further eight kimberlites were added to
the De Beers Angolan portfolio bringing the total number to 158 discoveries in
the past five years. The Lunda NE concession has yielded the most prospective
portfolio at both an early and advanced stage of exploration, with 114
kimberlite discoveries. In 2010 the work programme focused on the deposit
assessment phase which was successfully completed on the Mulepe-1 deposit of
three adjacent pipes with a combined size of around 20 hectares. 100 carats of
diamonds were recovered from these pipes for revenue determination purposes, and
Mulepe-1 has now moved to the desktop phase which should be completed in Q2,
2011.

The way and manner in which the MPLA Regime exploits the
Lunda StateThe following is a list of Diamond Mining sites in
the Lunda Region

CATOCA DIAMOND MINING SITEThe Catoca Mine is the world’s 4th largest kimberlite and is currently being
operated by SMC (Sociedade Miniera de Catoca), which is in turn owned by Endiama
(32.8%), Russia's Alrosa (32.8%), Brazil’s Odebrecht Mining (16.4%) and the
Diamond Finance CY BV Group (18%). The mine produced just over 2.6 Mct in 2001.
The kimberlite yields quality diamonds, of which 35% is gem quality, fetching
prices of around $75 - $100/carat. Reserves are estimated at 60 million carats.
SMC intends increasing production to as much as 5 Mct per year.

This mine site is used by the MPLA Regime to pay its debt to Russia and China,
there is strong presence of Israeli firms and personnel at this site also
specially in the provision of technology equipment and staff.

LUÓ DIAMOND MINING SITEDiamondWorks, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Branch Energy, has
numerous interests in Angola, including alluvial and kimberlite operations.
DiamondWorks operated the Luo and Yetwene kimberlite mines. The Camatchia and
Camagico diamondiferous kimberlite pipes are also located within DiamondWorks’
license areas. The Luo mine began production in 1997 and has produced almost 200
000ct, with diamonds fetching between $120 and 350/carat. The largest diamond
recovered to date has been a 232.6 carat stone. The Yetwene mine began
production in June 1998. Exploration activities on this property have been
suspended due to the security situation.

DiamondWorks have alluvial concessions
in and around the kimberlite operations, including the Luarica property (North
of Luo) and the Alto Kwanza property in the Bie province of central Angola. The
Alto Kwanza concession is Diamondworks’ largest, with an area of 18 000km2.

In this mine is from where the MPLA Regime operates his financial centre, and
provides military and security logistic to beat, intimidate and assassinate the
Lunda Tchokwe Native Population.

CAMAFUCA DIAMOND MINING SITESouthern Era is currently investigating the Camafuca - Camazambo kimberlite
pipe in the Calonda area of the Lunde Norte province. Camafuca is estimated to
be the world’s largest undeveloped diamondiferous pipe with a surface area of
160 hectares. The pipe is approximately 3.3 kilometres in length and 500 metres
in width, and lies 40 kilometres north of the Luo concession on the Chicapa
River. Camufuca was the first kimberlite pipe to be discovered in Angola. Recent
sampling of the Camafuca pipe yielded just over 1000 carats from a bulk sample
of 3 500 m3treated. This represents a significant increase from previous
historical estimates. Grades ranged from $126 - $140/carat, with 32% of the
diamonds being greater than 1 carat in size and 21% greater than 2 carats.

A feasibility study to evaluate the technical and economic viability of the
project is essentially complete and was presented to the Camafuca partners in
April, 2000. Plans are to develop the higher grade portions of the pipe first -
an exercise that is estimated to cost $14 million. The partners have accepted
the feasability study and now plan to move ahead with the development of Phase 1
that intends developing the southeastern part of the kimberlite that contains
6.1 million cubic metres of material at an average grade of 0.18 carats per
cubic metre. Mining of Camafuca has been complicated by a major river that
dissects the kimberlite - initial mining will utilise dredging methods.

Ownership of the project is outlined as follows: SouthernEra Angola LDA 32%,
followed by Endiama 20%, SML 15% and the Welox Limited 33%. Welox Ltd is part of
the Leviev Group of companies . In mid 2002, the Angolan Government formally
approved the operating agreement and formation of the operating company, to be
called Sociedade Mineira do Angola, Lda (SMC).

This mine is the biggest diamond site in the Lunda State it is situated in the
locality of Calonda, which provides direct income and revenue to the fortune of
the Jose Eduardo dos Santos family. The MPLA Regime never speaks of it in
“government” , it is never mentioned, and there exists a total obscurity on the
matter.

CAMITONGO SASWAHA DIAMOND MINING SITEThis mine is managed directly by the manager of the Catoca Project, the income
of this mine goes to the Regime MPLA elite and cronies, among them people from
Sao Tome, Cabo Verde, Guine and Portugal.

PROJECTO LUANGUE DIAMOND MINING SITEThis mine is under the direct control of the MPLA leaders, and its revenue is
shared by the top brass of the MPLA Regime, specially the ones committed to the
Regime 100%, the Regimes hard liners.

CUANGO ALUVIAL DIAMOND MINING SITEThis mining site is the crown of the Generals of the Armed Forces of the MPLA
Regime. In this mining site it is practised slavery acts found in the XVI
century world, it is also where anyone and anything is and can be killed no
questions asked nor any enquiries will ever exist, people are constantly going
missing and disappear in this mining site.

ALTO CHICAPA DIAMOND MINING SITEThis mining site was given to the criolos (individuals) that helped the MPLA
Regime gain power in its struggle and war against the Portuguese, it is also
know as the centre of enrichment of the dominant families in Angola.

BAIXA DO MINUNGO DIAMOND MINING SITEThe Dictator José Eduardo dos Santos, gave the exploration of this mining site
to his wife, Ana Paula dos Santos.

LUNGUENA DIAMOND MINING SITEThis mining site is located in the River Lueji a tribute river of the larger
River Luangue, this is the site which was given to the MPLA Regime elite in
particular the top brass of the SINFO, SIE and the secret services under the
Control of the MPLA Regime. This site was set up as the revenue and reward for
the loyalty and special services given to the MPLA Regime.

CAZOMBO COPER AND ALUMINIUM MINESThe Regime top brass who have been given the rights to exploit this sites are
General João de Matos and General Led senior officers in the MPLA Armed Forces.

MPLA Generals Colonizing the
Lunda, steal their wealthfurther evidence of corruption at
the epicentre of the MPLA regime Dictator

August 6, 2010

The corrupt general Kopelipa is also
formally represented in the diamond industry, as a shareholder of Lumanhe.
On February 13, 2004, a group of six generals had to give, equally, shares
in mining company Lumanhe in favour of the current minister of state and head
of the Military House of the President. This transfer occurred at a moment
of frank rising power of General Kopelipa and its increasing control over
the Armed Forces (FAA) and the generals now have seven each from 14:28% of
the capital.

The corrupt Generals Armando da Cruz Neto, General Hendrick Vaal Carlos da Silva and
General Adrian Mackenzie Makevela remain active at official functions, respectively,
as governor of Benguela, the Inspector General Staff of FAA, and head of the
Directorate of Primary Education and Preparation of the State Troops General
Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The other three generals dedicate
themselves exclusively to the business and are the former chief of General
Staff of FAA, Chief of Staff and Chief of Army Commands, including Joao de
Matos, and the brothers Luis and Antonio Coquette.

Five days after the entry of General Kopelipa corrupt in society, February
18, 2004, Hendrick Vaal General Carlos da Silva, signed as a representative
of Lumanhe an agreement with Endiama and ITM Mining for the establishment of
the Mining Society Chitotolo. The state, through Endiama, transferred, in
this way, 15% of the share capital of the generals Chitotolo. The Lumanhe
also owns 21% of the Cuango Mining Society (SMC), in partnership with
Endiama (41%) and ITM Mining (38%).

The SMC is responsible for systematic violations of human rights in the
village of Cafunfo in Cuango basin, where it has a large mining concession.
Killings, torture, destruction of mines, and arbitrary police actions are
part of the routine of the Mining Society Cuango against the villagers and
miners. SMC enjoys the impunity of the generals who profit from the deal. A
new report on human rights in the region is expected shortly.

A European government is also involved with the shady dealings of corrupt
generals. This is the Portuguese government. In June 30, 2009, the
consortium ITM Mining / Lumanhe terminated their contract operations in
Calonda Mining Society, where he maintained a 50% stake, while the Mining
Society of Lucapa, which holds the concession for diamond mining, guaranteed
the other half actions. The Parpública SGPS, a holding company owned 100% by
the Portuguese State, controls 81.13% stake in Sociedade Portuguesa de
Empreendimentos (SPE), which in turn holds 49% stake in Sociedade Mineira do
Lucapa. To the Angolan state has in the Endiama company the majority of the
shares.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos a man that had only 2
shirts and a pair of suits. Has it is well remembered in the memory of those who
meet and lived with him. Now he has his photo in all bank notes and
Identification Cards of each Angolan.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos a man that had only 2
shirts and a pair of suits. Has it is well remembered in the memory of those who
meet and lived with him. Now he has his photo in all bank notes and
Identification Cards of each Angolan.

37 Million US Dollars in Mr. Jose Eduardo dos
Santos bank account

The Bank "Banque Internationale du Luxemburg", in a document signed by its
directors A. Roelants, J. Rieter and J. Bodoni declare that the beneficiary and
owner of the Panamanian registered Company “Camparal Inc.” with the bank account
numbers: 275748 and 275903 belongs to Mr José Eduardo dos Santos of Luanda,
Angola. Furthermore, the French police confirms that COMPARAL of José Eduardo
dos Santos represented in Paris by Mr Elísio de Figueiredo. And in the bank
account of COMPARAL (of Mr Eduardo dos Santos) the balance is USD$
37,112,567.46

The company TUTORAL (registered in the name of
Elísio de Figueiredo) has USD$ 7,331,199.53

Mr. Pierre Joseph Falcone owner of the Bank Accounts 01-88-126279-03 and
Acc.45885 of the Bank Leumi Le-Israel Geveva, Acc CO-325794 of the Bank UBS
Geneva and of the Bank account 1.038.915 of the Bank Ferrier Lullin & Cie in Geneva
has deposited USD $59,954,664.00

This moneys came out from the State Company SONANGOL
of its Account CO-101457 Escrow Agreement 3.06.97 of the Bank UBS Geneva, where
it was deposited USD$ 774,193,545.00 and distributed in several accounts.

Rigged: The Scramble for Africa's Oil, Gas and
Minerals
8 February 2012

The intensifying competition for commercial access
to the world’s remaining deposits of oil, gas and minerals brings
with it a serious risk of exacerbating corruption and violent
conflict. Our new report shows that in Angola and Nigeria there is a
risk that complex deals struck between governments and corporations
for access to natural resources could be used corruptly to benefit
vested interests in these countries, rather than the citizens. The
report also points to major concerns over opaque sales of mining
assets in the Democratic Republic of Congo to offshore companies.

Our research reveals two major problems in the government allocation
of oil contracts:

Governments are not making clear the grounds for why a particular
company is given a contract. In certain cases, they appear to allow
certain companies special or preferential access to oil licences,
leading to doubts about the integrity of the process.
Governments are awarding the licences to companies whose beneficial
owners remain undisclosed. In certain cases, there are grounds for
suspicion that some of the companies may be owned or controlled by
government or their private sector proxies.

If citizens do not know why particular companies have been awarded
natural resource licenses, it can lead to suspicions of wrongdoing,
especially in countries like Nigeria, Angola and the DRC with track
records of natural resource related corruption. Transparency is
crucial for citizen’s ability to trust that there has been no
conflict of interest and to ensure that Angola, Nigeria and the DRC
use their natural resource revenues for development and poverty
reduction.

Bribery, Money Laundry and CorruptionCriminal state of
affairs, and wide spread Endemic Corruption MPLA Regime
Daylight theft and pillage of the state assets

This Report was elaborated in 2010

This report focuses among other in the commercial
activities of of the Minister of State and Chief of the
Military House of the Presidency of the Republic of
Angola, General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”.

It is to this individual is the
responsibility of the regime sectors of defence and
security of state of Angola. With this individual the
Chief of Communications of the Presidency of the
Republic, General Leopoldino Fragoso
do Nascimento “Dino”, and the president of the
Administration Board and Director-General of the State
Oil Company Sonangol, Manuel
Vicente, form the so called triumvirate, which today
completely dominates the political economy of Angola,
without any distinction between public and private funds

Manuel Vicente joins also
the accumulated powers of the Generals and those of the
State Oil Sonangol, the fact that he is one of the most
influential members of the Political Bureau of the MPLA
party, has the protégé of the President of the Republic
and the responsible for the fiscal inspection of the
private businesses of the MPLA Party.

The State Oil Company Sonangol is the
biggest company of Angola, and the largest contributing
to the coffers of the State, several analysts have
considered Sonangol as the principal instrument of
maintaining the Corrupt Regime of José Eduardo
dos Santos in the domains of the financial, political
and diplomatic circles internationally, like wise is the
single source of illicit enrichment of the leaders of
the MPLA Regime.

In certain cases, they show solidarity
with other junior members in the administration who are
accomplices in allowing the theft of public money, by
showing gratitude and sharing in the heist, these are
normally members of the executive, and public senior
officials who where involved and assisted in the theft,
pillage of the public funds.

Strategic sectors such as the Oil sector,
telecommunications, baking, social communication,
diamonds, all make part of the empire build by this
regime figures.

The companies which relate to what we
have just mentioned above
are: Movicel, Biocom, Banco Espírito Santo
Angola, Nazaki Oil & Gás, Media Nova, World Wide
Capital and Lumanhe.

MovicelAt present (2010) there are only two
mobile phone service operators in angola one is Unitel
and the other is Movicel.

Unitel
Operates since 2001,
it is a result from the association by equal shares of
(25%), between Sonangol, through its subsidiary
MSTelcom (ex-Mercury), and Portugal Telecom, GENI and Vidatel.

Movicel was created by the government in 2003,
as a subsidiary of the state company
Angola-Telecom.

Through the Resolution N.° 67/09 of 26 August 2009, the
Council of Ministers decreed the meditate privatization
and without public tender the privatization of the
company Movicel, they allocated the company to a
consortium of angolan companies by the value of 200
millions de dollars.

For such effect, the MPLA Regime, invoked the difficulty
on the mobilization of other investors for the
privatization of the companies.

The MPLA Regime also argued of the
urgency in generation funds to the coffers of government
in "face of world financial crisis";

That decision, according to the
government resolution, had into account the
identification on the "structure of the national investment
partners, that secures the financial resources vitals to
the immediate application of the investment plans
of Movicel and the financial
backup awaited by the national treasury".

Mean wile
59% of the capital of the company Movicel was
transferred
to two companies linked to high ranking officers under
the State Minister and Chief of the Military House, General
Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”, the company Portmill
and the company Modus Comunicare, as we will describe.

On the
10 of June 2009, General Kopelipa, and General
Dino and Manuel Vicente, formally separated from the
company Portmill Investments and Telecommunications from
which they where both proprietors, with control of
99,96% of the company shares equally divided between
themselves.

They gave their shares by the intermediary of a
portuguese citizen called Ismênio Coelho
Macedo, to a group of high ranking officials of the Unit
of the Presidential Guard (UGP), as per the grid shown
under.

In the case of the company Portmill, the Lieutenant-Coronel
Leonardo Lidinikeni, official of the Presidential Escort
has 99,96% of the shares of the company.

In the company Modus Comunicare, the Lieutenant-Coronel Tadeu Agostinho dos Santos
Hikatala, responsible for the presidential escort, is
the share holder of 99,92% of the shares of the company.
The United of Presidential Guard (UGP) is subordinated
to the Military House (Casa Militar).

The private administrator of the Businesses' of General Kopelipa,
Mr. Ismênio Coelho Macedo, made the operation of
purchase, selling and restructuration of a small company
of communications, publicity and marketing called Modus Comunicare – Comunicação e Imagem Lda.,
which had already had expression in the market, and
placed in its ownership list high ranking officials of
the Presidential Palace.

The company was transformed into an
anonymous society, dedicated to telecommunications on
the 14 August 2009.

That date indicates that the process of
recognition of such transaction, its transformation into
an anonymous society and alteration of its business
scope, only was concluded two weeks after the government
of President José Eduardo dos Santos,
atributed 19% of the shares of the company Movicel to
this new company.

On the
29 July 2009, the Council of Ministers approved
the privatization of 80% of the capital of the company Movicel
in favour of the angolan companies Portmill Investimentos
and Telecomunicações
(40%), Modus Comunicare (19%), Ipang – Indústria de
Papel e Derivados (10%), Lambda (6%) and Novatel (5%).

By its turn the state companies
Angola Telecom and the Empresa
Nacional de Correios e Telégrafos de Angola have the
following shares 18% and 2% of the social capital of the
company Movicel.

We now present the list of beneficiary share holders on
the companies:

Portmill, Investments
and Telecommunications
(40%)

Partner

Function

Lieutenant-Coronel
Leonardo Lidinikeni

Official of
Presidential Escort

Francisco
Ndeufeta

Unit of Presidential
Guard

Manuel
dos Santos Rodrigues Cardoso

Nelson
Paulo António

Lieutenant-Coronel
Francisco Mbava

Psychological Action,
Military House

Modus Comunicare - Telecomunicações (19%)

Partner

Function

Lieutenant-Coronel
Tadeu Agostinho dos Santos Hikatala

Official of
Presidential Escort

João
Ricardo Belarmino

Unit of Presidential
Guard

Lieutenant-Coronel
João José António Soares

Advisor to the Chief of the
Presidential Unit Guard,
General Alfredo Tyaunda

José
Kakonda

José
Luís Alves

Ipang - Indústria de Papel e Derivados,
Limitada (10%)

Share holders

N'datembu - Comércio Geral, Importação e Exportação
Lda.

Ipang is the only beneficiary company that presents in
its formal share holders structure businessmen.

N’datembu has among its share holders Mr. Miguel
Domingos Martins and sons, the lawyer Ildeberto Manuel
Teixeira and the Portuguese José Mamade Etbal. Another
name associated to the Ipang company is the Spanish
businessman Óscar
Ouersagasti Soraluce.

The capitalization of Movicel is the only company
activity publicly known Ipang.

Lambda (6%)

Partner

Function

José
Carvalho da Rocha

Minister Telecommunications and Technologies of Information

Aristides
Safeca

Vice-Minister
das Telecommunications and Technologies of Information

Zulmira
Mitange da Rocha

Wife of the
Minister José Carvalho da Rocha

Arminda
Vireya Safeca de Sá

Family relative of
the Vice-Minister Aristides Safeca

Antónia
Dias dos Santos Caxinda

As national director of
Telecommunications
Mr
Aristides Cardoso Frederico Safeca, integrated the
Commission for the Negotiations of Movicel, in accordance
with the government edict No.
67/07 issued by the ex-Ministry of Finances Mr José Pedro de Morais
(December 2002 to October 2008),
dated of 19 January 2007.

That commission was headed by the then economic assessor
of the President
José Eduardo dos Santos, Archer Mangueira.

Since 2 October 2006, Aristides Safeca
has the functions of President of
the Administration Council and Director of the Belgian
Company Parisa, S.A.

The same Aristides
Safeca, in association with his Brothers Alcides Safeca,
Secretary of State for Budget (Secretario de Estado do Orçamento
- Ministry of Finances) and Amílcar Safeca, Director of UNITEL,
are majority partners in the
company Trans Omnia,

in which the associate themselves with General Fernando Vasquez Araújo,
Chief of the Main Department of
Armament and Technical of the Army General Staff of the
FAA. The company Trans Omnia
has been privileged in multimillion contracts to the
supply of food to the Angolan Armed Forces FAA.

Aristides Safeca accumulates the public functions with
private sector functions, which is a norm in the MPLA
Regime

The Vice-Minister for Telecommunications
is also the President of the Administration Board of the
foreign Company Parisa (Based in Belgium), making
multiple business with the Angolan State for self
enrichment and of those family members and associates.

Novatel (5%)

Partner

Function

Hélder
Bruno da Gama Bento

Paula
Sammer Pinto Jorge

Aurélio
Vimbuando Muelecumbi

Onezandro
Catinhe Mauro Santos Piedade

Marília
da Conceição dos Santos Kissuá

The attribution of a quota to
Novatel, in the privatization of Movicel constitutes
another proof of public funds being diverted in
determent of the State.

Novatel was created on the 29 April 2009, after the
presentation of the recommendations of the Commission
for the Negotiation of Movicel and
3 months before the formal announcement of the
beneficiary companies by the Council of Ministers.

Protests demanding reform and led by the youth and reported on national
media challenged the despotic dictator José Eduardo dos
Santos, who completed 32 years in absolute power.

Source: Committee for the protection of Journalists (Comitê de proteção de Jornalistas)

The Parliament, dominated by the MPLA party of Jose Eduardo dos Santos,
analyzed legislation to "combat crimes" in the domain of technologies of
information and social communication. The Law Project, since last year
(2011), intends to harden the sentences for defamation and to criminalize
the electronic diffusion of "recordings, images and videos"
from anybody without the express consent of those in such recordings, images
or videos.

Two journalists, Armando José Chicoca and William Tonet, where condemned
to prison, due to their critical coverage of the MPLA Regime; both appealed
to their sentences and where released on the end of 2011.

José Manuel Gimbi enfrentou intimidação por parte das forças
de segurança enquanto realizava reportagens do enclave militarizado e rico
em petróleo de Cabinda. Ataques ao serviço de navegação (DoS), targeting sites
hosted in the exterior such as the popular Angolan Independent news sites
Club-K and Angola24horas, where taken from the internet in October 2011,
closed down by the MPLA Regime.

Principal Happenings

Law of "crimes" on the internet, restricts news and of social network
sites.

Incarceration or treat of incarceration, and aggression to journalists
to make them to refrain or be afraid in reporting in cases of corruption,
involving members of the MPLA Regime.

Important data

Attacks and Persecution of Journalists in Angola 2012 by the MPLA
Regime Security Apparatus

7 of March 2012 On the 7 of March 2012 the Journalist Francisco Mukkuta also known as "Coque"
from the "Radio Station Despertar" was followed by elements of the MPLA
Security Apparatus on a 4X4 Land Cruiser, of grey colour and without any
number plaque which is issued by Frescangol, after conducting and interview
on the Radio at 18:30 with two young Human Rights activist Mário Domingos
and Kimbanba who have been earlier kidnapped and beating by the MPLA
Security Forces apparatus in the vicinity of the Water Tank of the shanty
town Cazenga, Luanda then taken to the area of the Sanitary Installations
bordering the Cazenga, Cacuanco and Viana areas.

The Land Cruiser followed the Journalist from the door of the Radio Station
to the car park next to his house.

Hand written message on a pamphlet with death treat to the Journalist
Francisco Mukkuta also known as "Coque"
from the "Radio Station Despertar". The message in hand writing reads:
"Koke is better if you move neighbourhood, take care thief.
Koke you are not afraid, better look out"

The note was delivered on the 21 March 2012 to the Journalist Francisco Mukkuta

25 Attacks on journalists in 2011 by the MPLA Regime Security
Apparatus

In 2011 it saw an increase of attacks to journalists in Angola
perpetrated by the MPLA Regime. Several cases of physical aggression,
censorship, arrests and treats have severely increased in 2011 in comparison
to 2010. Many of the Journalists involved, who where targeted where those
journalists who covered the many youth protests against the MPLA Regime
following the inspiration of the Arab Spring protests in north Africa in
2011.

List of attacks to Journalist in Angola by the MPLA Regime per year
and the amount of fatal or attacked journalists.

2007 - 4
2008 - 4
2009 - 7
2010 - 7
2011 - 25

2 Two the number of independent Angolan Newspapers

With the exception of only two independent private newspapers the rest
of the newspapers in Angola are in the hands of MPLA Party Officials, Civil
Servants or are under the control of shareholder ownership by companies
aligned with the MPLA Regime, including family members of the MPLA Regime
ruling elite.

2 List of the two independent Angolan Newspapers

Agora
Folha 8

Note:
Folha 8 a weekly newsletter had its offices raided by the MPLA Regime
Security Forces on the 12 March 2012, all the Computers where removed and
taken form Folha 8 offices.

It is to be known that the Editor of Folha 8 publicly revealed a few
months ago that he had written documents on the state of Foreign Bank
accounts in the Name of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos. Is this a way
for the MPLA Regime find out what those documents are and who made them
available?

Luanda, Angola, 10 March 2012

All photos where taken on the 10 March 2012, the anniversary of the first
Demonstration of 7 march 2011 in Luanda.
Those in the picture are among others the secretary of the Democratic Bloc
Political Party and Civil Activists, on of them is a well known rapper.

7 Seven is the number of the Angolan Newspapers controlled by the MPLA
Regime:

In the law of Internet in Angola, it is proposed a severe punishment "to
those without consent, supply, transmit, facilitate, distribute recordings,
films and photos of other peoples by means of a system of information".

Apart from controlling the public radio stations, the MPLA Party
officials also control all Radio Stations in Angola apart from only 2
Independent and private Radio Stations.

2 Two independent Radio Stations:

Radio Ecclésia
Radio Despertar

8 Eight Radio stations controlled by the MPLA Regime:

Radio Nacional de Angola
Television Pública de Angola
FM Radio LAC
FM Radio Comercial de Cabinda
FM Radio 2000
FM Radio Morena
Radio Mais
TV Zimbo

10 Journalists Killed since 1992

10 Journalists where killed by the MPLA Regime because of their work in
the last two decades in Angola. Many more deaths of journalist occurred
during the civil war committed by the MPLA Regime apparatus, which no one
has ever been brought to justice for it.

Details of killing of Journalists in Angola by the MPLA Regime since 1992:

7 journalists assassinated
2 journalists killed by supposedly crossed fire
1 journalist killed during a reporting mission
0 Zero the number of detentions by the Police or by the Regime in
reference to the assassinations of the Journalists in Angola

THE MPLA IS BUYING THE NEWSPAPERS IN PORTUGAL

Tobis -The
MPLA Regime bought this Film Archive company which holds the Film from the
decolonization era. The buying company was Filmdrehtsich Unipessoal, they
paid 4 million euros for the Lumiar Studios. The archive - which includes
the Colonial war time - was taken out from Tobis before it had become
classified as national patrimony.

Cofina - The company Newshold controls 15,08% of Cofina, this
company is controlled by the MPLA Regime is the source of the financing,
it has almost 22% of the editorial and controls the following press
titles in portugal: Correio da Manhã, Record, Sábado and Jornal de
Negócios. This information clarifies why in the recent years, and more
noticeable in the recent 6 months jornalists and editorial staff have
been removed and fired for publishing articles which are not favourable
of the MPLA Regime actions.

Newshold - This company has now
achieved 1,7% in the portuguese media group SIC, Expresso, Visão and
Caras, among other titles. The MPLA Regime is trying to purchase 23% of
shares that the Company Ongoing has in the company, which if they are
allowed to purchase it, they will have the control of 25% of the
Newshold media group.

The Russian / Chinese Mafia

The Russian and Chinese Mafia is lead and composed by Sam Pa [(Xu Jinghua)
president the China International Fund (CIF) (?) and of China-Sonangol, Wang Xiangfei
[Non Executive Director of China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC Group)], Jin Liqun (
President of the Counsel of Supervision of China
Investment), Wu Yang (one of the Directors of Group 88 Queensway), all
conected to the Ministry of Security of the Communist Chinese State, and Lev Avnerovich Leviev (Russian
Businessman Billionaire (Bukharian)-Israel), Arcadi Aleksandrovich Gaydamak
(Russian Businessman Billionaire).

Lev Avnerovich Leviev sold his participation of 18% in the Diamond Mines
of Catoca to China Sonangol International Holding Ltd for US$400 Million
USD, having acquired that participation in the decade of the 1990 for
only US$20 Million Dollars.

Xu Jinghua comes to Luanda monthly to get bags of Diamonds valued at of
more than US$66,2 Million Dollars – All this information given to us by
Superior Officers of the Angolan Counter Intelligence Unit.

Xu Jinghua [(Sam Pa), old soviet time student colleague of José Eduardo
dos Santos in one of the Military Collages of the KGB. Xu Jinghua during
the civil war he always appeared next to the Russians as a consultant,
and the funny thing is that this same individual was also the agent of
the counterintelligence of china in Angola. As is was told to us by one
of the most close collaborators of General Helder Viera Dias
“Kopelipa,” who asked for anonymity.

Xu Jinghua, Manuel Domingos Vicente and José Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos
have always been involved in the management of China Sonangol International
Holding Ltd, in both ways visible and invisibly...

Before the creation of China-Sonangol, Xu Jinghua served as intermediary
of crude oil between the Angolan regime and the communist Chinese
regime!...

The General Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Júnior (Kopelipa) occupied and was
in charge of the protocol aspects, maximum security and Manuel Domingos Vicente
was in charge of the administrative and logistic matters … while that, José Filomeno de
Sousa dos Santos learned with his “adoptive uncle” Xu Jinghua, in Hong Kong,
the secrets of the transnational administration …

José Filomeno de
Sousa dos Santos was thus prepared to administer Billions and Billions
of US Dollars and to abandon the administration bosy of China-Sonangol,
some time in la second part of 2012,
leaving behind Manuel Domingos Vicente, who staid as the Executive
Director of China-Sonangol...

Due to his health conditions of Domingos, it is Francisco Lemos José Maria,
supposedly direct cousin of Ana Paula Cristóvão Lemos dos Santos, who
has travelled to Hong Kong regularly in the name of the President of the
Republic of Angola.

Question: Who is the real owner of China Sonangol
International Holding Ltd Group and of Endiama China International Holding
Limited owned by the Group 88 Queensway, localized in Hong Kong?

China International Fund (CIF) is a Chinese-owned
officially private company based in Hong Kong that describes its major
businesses as including "large-scale national reconstruction projects
and infrastructure construction in developing countries". The China
International Fund CIF and its associated companies in Hong Kong and
Singapore invested upwards of $US 20 billion mainly in unstable African
dictatorships.

They have made agreements with the Angolan and Guinean governments to
explore for various resources in those countries. These agreements will
result in billions of dollars of money being invested in the two
countries.

The Company is under the suspicion of being a state-owned company,
because “key personnel have ties to Chinese state-owned enterprises and
government agencies.”

In a conversation between American Ambassador Dan
Mozena and Chinese Ambassador Bolum Zhang, Zhang said, "the China
International Fund CIF made many promises to Angola, and that while the
company has a large presence in Angola, its weak management and lack of
leadership have stalled many of the projects. Zhang said that as the
China International Fund CIF is a "private company," the Chinese embassy
does not actively participate or monitor its relationship with Angola.
He added that China International Fund CIF continues to benefit from the
Hong Kong-based owner's "close relationship" with President Dos Santos."

With José
Eduardo
dos
Santos, Jinghua
frequented
an
ex-military
academy
of the
KGB in
Baku
(capital
of
Azerbaijan),
in the
end of
the
decade
of 1960.

During
the
civil
war in
Angola,
Jinghua
was
directly
connected
to the
department
of
Chinese
intelligence
and
facilitated
the
delivery
of
secret
services
of arms
and
weapons
to the
MPLA, in
the name
of the
Chinese
Communist
Government.

He was
always
seen at
the side
of the
Russians
has a
consultant
in the
neighbourhood
of Futungo
of Belas,
Miramar
and the
airport
military
of
Luanda,
as per
the
confirmation
of one
of the
more
direct
collaborators
of
General Helder
Viera
Dias “Kopelipa,”
who
asked
for his
name not
to be
divulged.

His
involvement
in the
Civil
War in
Angola
was so
lucrative
to the
point
that
Jinghua
publicly
claim
that is
slice of
cake in
the
construction
of
Angola
was
worth
more
than US$ 30
Billion
Dollars.

After
the
assassination
and
death of
Dr Jonas Savimbi,
Dos
Santos
gave to Jinghua
“obscure
contracts”
of
construction
in
Angola,
allowing
him to
in a
short
period
of time
to open
several
real-estate
and
civil
construction
companies
in
China,
where he
created
the
following
companies:
China
Steel 20
(Zhongtie
20),
Guangxi
Guangxi
(construction
and
engineering,
water
and
electricity),
Sichuan
Nanchong,
Sichuan
Uingshan,
Fuikan
Ningde e
Jinghend
International.

Jinghua
has a
Diplomatic
Passport
of
Angola,
and has
acted as
an
intermediary
of sale
of the
Cabinda
and
Angolan
petrol
to the
Chinese
Government:
he buys
the
crude
oil at
US$50
per
barrel
and
sells it
at the
daily
market
price.
For
example
if a
crude
oil
barrel
costs US$90,
less
US$50,
immediately
there is
a profit
of
US$40.
With
whom
does
Jinghua
shares
the
profits
with?

Cheap
work
force
from
china is
also a
lucrative
business
for
Jinghua,
that
through China
Sonangol
and
other
companies
by him
created,
he
brought
to
Angola
more
than
270,000
Chinese
ex-prisoners.
Generals
and High
Ranking
Officials
in the
Angolan
Regime
also
benefit
from
this
“business.”

Xu
Jinghua
was also
able to
create
the
following
companies
China
Sonangol
International
Holding
Ltd,
Endiama
China
International
Holding
Limited,
Sonangol
Sinopec
International
Limited,
Dayuan
International
Development
Limited,
Sonangol
Asia
Limited
e New
Bright
International
Development
Limited.

The sad
thing
about
all
this, is
that no
one
knows
the
presumed
share
that the
Angolan
partners
(through
the
Angolan
Regime)
have in
the
partnerships
with
this
companies.
State
secret?

Recently,
the
Company China Sonangol
was
accused
of
trafficking
diamonds
in
Zimbabwe,
but Wee
Jee Kin,
Chief of
Juridical
Services,
recognised
that the
company
only has
business
in the
mines of
Catoca,
as per
100Reporters.com.

In
reference
with a
report
by
100Reporters.org,
at lease
once a
month, a
private
jet
Aibus
319CJ,
registered
as VP-BEX,
takes of
from
Lanseria
International
Airport,
Code:
HLA (Johannesburg,
South
Africa),
with the
flight
path of
Harare,
Luanda,
Singapore
and
Hong
Kong.

The
airplane
that
transports Xu
Jinghua
(Sam
Pa), who
goes to
those
places
to get
those
diamond
parcels
raw
uncut...
"the
aircraft
is
supposedly
granted
access
to the
South
African
space
without
having
any
inspection
of
cargo",
informs
us the
report.
As per a
Security
Specialist
of
private
security
in South
Africa,
the
airplane
landed
in
Luanda
without
registering
in the
local
system.

He is
involved
in
several
criminal
processes
in Hong
Kong, Xu
Jinghua
is
involved
in
illicit
business
activities
in
Angola,
Zimbabwe,
Madagascar,
Venezuela,
South
Africa,
Zambia,
Tanzania,
Guinea Equatorial, etc.

The National Electoral Commission of Angola selected Indra to carry out
the integral process of the legislative elections of 2008, including the
counting, totalisation and reporting of results, as well as the supply
and distribution of the Electoral Kit with all the material and
equipment required for the elections.

INDRA PREPARING LUBANGO
AIRPORT IN ANGOLA FOR THE 2010 AFRICAN CUP OF NATIONS

The contract
amounts to euros 7M and is part of the effort the country is making so
that facilities are ready in January
Indra acquires an important reference in information systems for
passenger management in this continent

Elections 2012

Chairmen of CNE, André Silva Neto (left) and Indra, Jesus Ortega

CNE and Indra sign service delivery
agreement
The National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Spanish company Indra,
concluded Wednesday, in Luanda, an agreement to provide service in the
field of supply of voting materials and technology solution.

The agreement was signed by the CNE chairperson, André Silva Neto, and
Jesus Ortega, for Indra, in a ceremony attended by members of both
institutions.

At the end of the ceremony, the CNE spokesperson, Julia Ferreira, said
Indra won the tender promoted by the CNE out of the nine candidates
registered, for having presented a technical and financial proposal that
meets the requirements enshrined in the law.

She added that the company will provide two services considered
essential for the elections: the provision of essential logistics of the
elections and the technological solution concerning the equipment to be
used in the 31 August polls.

According to Julia Ferreira, the kits are defined in the ballot papers,
ballot boxes and clothing to be used by members of polling station and
logistic supervisors (a figure that is created by the CNE to monitor the
electoral process).

In addition, the spokeswoman said that there were already defined modes
of minutes, forms and statements that will be used in the electoral
process, adding that the material should arrive in the country in late
July.

The official welcomed the fact that the CNE has performed this act,
taking into account the closeness of the election date (August 31,
wishing a good performance by Indra, to continue to assist the
institution in implementing these tasks.

Javier Monzón

Economist. He started his professional career in Caja Madrid, being
Director of Corporate Banking. Later, he was Chief Financial Officer and
General Director of Corporate Development in Telefónica, where occupied
also the position of Chairman of Telefónica International. He is
Chairman of Indra since its creation in 1993. He has been and is
Director in other listed companies spanish and international and in
different business associations and foundations.

Daniel García - Pita

Born in 1947. Graduated in Law. He has developed his entire professional
career in J&A Garrigues Law Firm to which he joint in 1969 and where he
was Managing Partner. He is specialized in Corporate Law and Financial
Market Regulations; he has been professor in Corporate Law at the
Central University of Madrid and deputy of the Governing Assembly of the
Madrid’s Bar.
Legal adviser in many companies and Secretary of the Board of Directors
of relevant listed companies like Indra where he was Secretary non
member until June 2009.

Manuel
Lagares

Degree in Economics (E-2) by the “Universidad Pontificia de Comillas (ICADE)”
and Master in Public Finance and Tax. He has served as Tax, Customs and
Excise Duty Inspector, and State Auditor. As Tax Inspector he has
developed several public responsibilities. Additionally he has been
Professor of Public Finance at Alcalá Henares University and of Tax
issues at Colegio Universitario CEU Luis Vives.

He is General Manager of Banco Financiero y de Ahorros since September
2011. Before joining Banco Financiero y de Ahorros he was Managing
Director at Grupo Neinver, where he joined as General Manager in 2004.
Besides that he has been Chairman of IRUS European Retail Property Fund.

Regino
Moranchel

Graduated in Economics and Technical Telecommunication Engineering. He
has developed his whole professional career in Indra, having held office
in the different areas of activity of the Company. Before his
appointment as Chief Executive Officer in 2001 he was the General Chief
Operations Officer. On December 2010 is appointed President

Javier de Andrés

He is Economist, MBA by the IESE and EOI. He started his professional
career in the actual Fujitsu, S.A. España, having held different office
of responsibility in the financial area, and becoming Economic and
Financial Director. He held also this office in Tupperware Iberica, S.A.
and in Cyanamid Ibérica, S.A./ Wyeth Orfi. He joined Indra in 1999 where
he held office as Management Control Director from 2002 to 2007. In 2007
he is appointed Corporate Control, Purchase and Logistic Systems Senior
Vicepresident. In 2009 he is appointed CEO of the BPO Division. In
December 2010 is proposed CEO , being formalized his appointment in June
2011.

Unmasking Angola’s Diamond Giants

Much has been written about the subject of diamonds
in Africa, from the plethora of the luxury jewel on the African
continent to the human rights abuses that often surround the harvesting
of diamonds.

What fewer people know is that diamond-rich
countries like Angola survive by arranging complex business deals with
resource-needy countries like China and billionaires such as Lev Leviev—a
Uzbekistan-born Israeli-based real estate magnate and diamond merchant.Rather than contribute to Angola’s Gross Domestic Product and
advance the country’s standing in the global economy, these business
deals serve to help those that head Angola’s already lucrative oil
companies collect even larger personal profits rather than directing
funds to the government and Angola’s citizens.

Lev Leviev’s close ties with Angola’s central
government allowed him to gain primary control of the country’s
rough-diamond supply circa 2000, according to a profile of Mr. Leviev
published in New York magazine. China is where
Lev Leviev and Angola collide, via a business called China Sonangol—a
joint venture between Angola’s state oil company Sonangol and Hong
Kong-based private Chinese investors in the China International Fund.China-Sonangol is part of the 88 Queensway Group—a group of
companies named after the address of the building in Hong Kong where
they are registered, and which the U.S. government suspects is “nothing
more than a cover for activity conducted by the People’s Republic of
China’s foreign intelligence.”

Headed by chairman and CEO Manuel Vicente, Sonangol
is described in news sources as one of Africa’s “least transparent oil
companies.”Case in point, research into the
corporate structure of China Sonangol reportedly revealed links to the
Chinese state and its agencies.China Sonangol is
said to have a “ruthless business style in Africa” that is “reminiscent
of some of South Africa’s mining conglomerates,” and to work in alliance
with Lev Leviev, who’s regarded with “great suspicion by established
industry leader De Beers.”It is through Lev Leviev
that China Sonangol bought an 18 percent share in Angola’s largest
diamond consortium,
Catoca.

A May 31, 2011 news story published on industry
website Mining.com reported that Lev Leviev sold his 18 percent stake in
Angola’s Catoca diamond mine to China’s Sonangol International for $400
million, having acquired the stake in Catoca in the 1990s for only $20
million.The deal is slated to be wrapped up in June
2011 when Sonangol will become the first Chinese company to own part of
a diamond mine.Last year, Catoca had $527 million
revenue from rough diamonds and reported a net profit of $111
million.

The end result of transactions like Lev Leviev’s
profitable sale of shares in Catoca equates to Chinese intelligence
gaining an increasing foothold in Angola, not to mention the United
States, where the 88 Queensway Group has acquired a significant amount
of property.And if history repeats itself, it looks
like the future holds more in store for China and Angola.In April 2011, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping met with
Sonangol’s Manuel Vicente, calling on the two sides to work together to
“further enrich the Sino-Angolan strategic
partnership.” Unfortunately, rather than enriching underdeveloped
countries like Angola, these business deals solely benefit the world’s
most powerful CEOs.

When money stops talking, The sound of
dissent in oil-rich Angola

In "The Economist" 31st March 2012

Mr Dos Santos’s Regime does not like
surprises. The constitution it enacted in 2010 means that Angola’s next
president will be chosen not by popular vote, but by the ruling party,
which since independence in 1975 has been the MPLA (or Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola). One of Angola’s last two independent
newspapers, Folha 8, was recently raided for
lampooning the president (12 March 2012). Other media outlets have long
since been bought off.

Nobody expects an effective challenge from the host of brave but
impotent opposition parties. Yet despite being banned on government
radio, the lyrics of popular musicians like MCK and other rappers sound
a constant subversive drumbeat:

"The
boss is the coloniserin the Banana Republic…We either put an end to corruptionor corruption puts an end to us."

Music
by MCK on the wide spread corruption, of the MPLA Regime in Angola

If you have any questions or wish to add
information to any of these cases, you are welcome to send
us any updated information in regards to the theft of public
funds and illicit enrichment in Angola and occupied Cabinda,
we are also keen on any information related to foreign
multinationals, banks, financial institutions, government
officials and governments relations with the MPLA Regime
Nomenclature in cases of Public Corruption, Traffic of
Influences, Criminal Activities between the MPLA Regime and
Foreign Partners.