Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics

This chapter uses quantitative evidence to assess the effects of international conditionality and diplomatic engagement on electoral conduct and outcomes. It shows, in short, that enforcement works. ...
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This chapter uses quantitative evidence to assess the effects of international conditionality and diplomatic engagement on electoral conduct and outcomes. It shows, in short, that enforcement works. Specifically, post-election conditionality—the wielding of concrete sticks and carrots—is associated with improvements in electoral quality in the next election, while pre-election conditionality is associated with opposition electoral victories. Softer tools of diplomatic engagement—mediation, diplomatic missions and shaming—instead are associated with immediate post-election concessions, namely, a decision by the incumbent to step down or cancel electoral results. Crucially, the efforts of international actors interact with, and augment, the effect of opposition protests, indicating that international validation and support are indeed key ingredients for the success of mass mobilization after flawed elections. The chapter concludes by probing the robustness and nuances of these findings. It shows, first, that enforcement by regional organizations proves to have the strongest and most consistent positive effects, which points to these organizations’ unique combination of leverage and legitimacy. Second, no evidence is found to support the idea that enforcement is imposed disproportionately in “easy” cases that are otherwise more likely to democratize. On the contrary, conditionality tends to be imposed in more intransigent regimes where change is harder to achieve.Less

The Effects of Enforcement

DANIELA DONNO

Published in print: 2013-09-03

This chapter uses quantitative evidence to assess the effects of international conditionality and diplomatic engagement on electoral conduct and outcomes. It shows, in short, that enforcement works. Specifically, post-election conditionality—the wielding of concrete sticks and carrots—is associated with improvements in electoral quality in the next election, while pre-election conditionality is associated with opposition electoral victories. Softer tools of diplomatic engagement—mediation, diplomatic missions and shaming—instead are associated with immediate post-election concessions, namely, a decision by the incumbent to step down or cancel electoral results. Crucially, the efforts of international actors interact with, and augment, the effect of opposition protests, indicating that international validation and support are indeed key ingredients for the success of mass mobilization after flawed elections. The chapter concludes by probing the robustness and nuances of these findings. It shows, first, that enforcement by regional organizations proves to have the strongest and most consistent positive effects, which points to these organizations’ unique combination of leverage and legitimacy. Second, no evidence is found to support the idea that enforcement is imposed disproportionately in “easy” cases that are otherwise more likely to democratize. On the contrary, conditionality tends to be imposed in more intransigent regimes where change is harder to achieve.

Drawing on the previous chapters discussions of “enlightened” realism and “cowboy” liberalism, and the formative experiences of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, this chapter examines the ...
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Drawing on the previous chapters discussions of “enlightened” realism and “cowboy” liberalism, and the formative experiences of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, this chapter examines the contrasting worldviews of these two presidents. The chapter contrasts four distinct sets of beliefs that, when combined, form each presidents worldview. First, George H.W. Bush’s pragmatism and experience are contrasted with George W. Bush’s reliance on ideology and gut instinct. Second, George H.W. Bush’s flexibility and willingness to compromise is contrasted with George W. Bush’s certainty of belief and desire for competition. Third, the negotiation styles of the two men are contrasted. George H.W. Bush’s diplomatic skill is compared to George W. Bush’s messianic universalism – the idea that the United States had a universal, unlimited message with global applications. Lastly, George H.W. Bush’s multilateral internationalism is contrasted with George W. Bush’s unilateral nationalism.Less

Beliefs and Style

Michael F. Cairo

Published in print: 2012-10-01

Drawing on the previous chapters discussions of “enlightened” realism and “cowboy” liberalism, and the formative experiences of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, this chapter examines the contrasting worldviews of these two presidents. The chapter contrasts four distinct sets of beliefs that, when combined, form each presidents worldview. First, George H.W. Bush’s pragmatism and experience are contrasted with George W. Bush’s reliance on ideology and gut instinct. Second, George H.W. Bush’s flexibility and willingness to compromise is contrasted with George W. Bush’s certainty of belief and desire for competition. Third, the negotiation styles of the two men are contrasted. George H.W. Bush’s diplomatic skill is compared to George W. Bush’s messianic universalism – the idea that the United States had a universal, unlimited message with global applications. Lastly, George H.W. Bush’s multilateral internationalism is contrasted with George W. Bush’s unilateral nationalism.

The chapter summarizes the lessons of Millian nonintervention and intervention and notes the continuing tendencies toward intervention in a world politics characterized by deepening globalization. It ...
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The chapter summarizes the lessons of Millian nonintervention and intervention and notes the continuing tendencies toward intervention in a world politics characterized by deepening globalization. It concludes with a plea for increased reliance of multilateral authorization.Less

Conclusion

Michael W. Doyle

Published in print: 2015-01-13

The chapter summarizes the lessons of Millian nonintervention and intervention and notes the continuing tendencies toward intervention in a world politics characterized by deepening globalization. It concludes with a plea for increased reliance of multilateral authorization.