50 Years after the Cuban Missile Crisis

The nuclear threat still with us

Irma Arguello, NPSGlobal

October 28, 2012

A Sunday like today, October 28, but 50 years ago, during the Cold War, the concrete possibility of a nuclear holocaust was left behind, after many days of extreme tension. Only the good judgment of John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev avoided the disaster that they had helped create. Many in both governmental circles promoted the use of nuclear force as the best alternative to define the conflict. A third actor, the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, also pushed the Soviets to carry out a nuclear attack against the United States.

Nevertheless, good judgment prevailed over pressures. Both statesmen were wise but also, they were very lucky…

It is disappointing to say that after 50 years, the nuclear threat is still with us. The expectations of a post Cold War distension in nuclear terms gave way, perhaps too soon, to a hardening of positions, and to more nuclear armed states, from 4 to 9. Moreover, nuclear terrorism, immune to any deterrence and ready to impose its own rules is, appeared in the forefront as perhaps the more dangerous and likely XXI Century threat.

There is no doubt that the world is today more complex and uncertain than during the Cold War. There are still 20,000 nuclear weapons, many on high alert, deployed in 14 countries. Beyond good intentions, at the present time, many of nuclear disarmament commitments are still pending of accomplishment, while virtuous and successful cooperation systems, such as Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement between USA and Russia, popularly known as Nunn-Lugar Agreement, which made possible the dismantlement of more than 7,000 nuclear warheads form the former USSR, run the risk of being deactivated.

There are still nuclear materials suitable to make a bomb -weapons grade HEU and plutonium- spread all over the world, and not enough protected from the hands of traffickers and terrorists. There are still fanatic and irresponsible governments that believe that the solution to national problems is to reach nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capabilities, and consequently spend large amount of resources, while their populations struggle in the middle of the most basic social deficits.

This dossier includes facts, describes positions, and analyzes the crisis management and decision making processes occurred during such period in October 1962 known as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis set a remarkable precedent of successful conflict resolution (and cooperation among actors with conflicting interests) , privileging negotiation over use of force.The main purpose is, then, to see in what extent messages emerging form such traumatic days could be useful in today's decision making in order to build a more secure world.

Image gallery

Reconnaissance aircraft that discovered the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. National Security Archive, George Washington University (NSA, GWU).

Map of the U.S. territory potentially reached by the missiles in Cuba, as it was informed by CIA to JFK. JFK Library.

Meeting of the Advisory Committee that advised President Kennedy during the crisis. NSA, GWU.

List by Robert F Kennedy with the positions in the first ExComm meeting regarding how to respond to the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba, 16 October 1962. Michael Dobbs, Foreign Policy.

President Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense at an ExComm meeting.History Today.

Picture of the first IRBM site (intermediate range ballistic missiles) under construction in Guanajay, Cuba, October 17 1962. NSA, GWU.

President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko and the Soviet Ambassador in the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin, 18 October 1962. Kennedy did not disclose his knowledge of the deployment of missiles in Cuba. NSA, GWU.

J.F. Kennedy in the Oval Office of the White House pondering his decisions. The New York Times

President Kennedy announced to the U.S. people and to the world by national TV a naval blockade (quarantine) to Cuba, 22 October 1962. US History II.

In the same speech, the President made responsible the USSR of any possible incident, 22 October 1962. AP photo.

U.S. Navy Photo of the MRBM Site 1 in San Cristobal taken by the famous mission of the Commander William Ecker, 23 October 1962. NSA, GWU.

It was deployed in Cuba as an anti-aircraft defense. NSA, GWU.

The Cuban leader pressured the Soviet Premier to carry on a nuclear weapons attack to the U.S.

U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson (right) shows photographic evidence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, in clear contradiction with the statements of Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin, who chairs the meeting, 25 October 1962. NSA, GWU

Newspaper article describing the confrontation in the UN Security Council between the U.S. Ambassador Stevenson and the Soviet Ambassador Zorin, 26 October 1962, JFK Library.

The U.S. Ambassador was one of the more relevant protagonists during the crisis. Associated Press / AP1962.

Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations, confronted by Stevenson. UN.

The Soviet freighter Grozny crosses the quarantine line but stops after the warning shooting of the U.S. fleet in the so-called Black Saturday, 27 October 1962. NSA, GWU.

John F. Kennedy and his brother and confidant, General Attorney and member of the ExComm, Robert F. Kennedy, who played an important role in the conflict resolution. JFK Library.

Aleksandr Feklisov, trusted man of Khrushchev and Soviet KGB spy in the United States under the pseudonym of Alexander Fomin, served as an informal intermediary between both leaders' environments during the crisis. The Truth News.

Kennedy meeting with the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), 29 October 1962. JFK Library.

It shows the removal of Soviet missile erectors in Cuba, 29 October 1962. NSA, GWU.

The withdrawal of these missiles settled in Turkey was part of the negotiation to remove of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis must be understood as a win-win process, made possible by the common sense of both leaders, even against the pressures of their environments. JFK Library

1. The Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis, without any doubt, is regarded as the most serious confrontation during the Cold War and a turning point in international relations. Historically it refers us to the brink of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union because of the deployment of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba, in October 1962.

Even with longer duration, the conflict’s timeline can be condensed into the increasingly tense thirteen days, ranging from October 16, 1962 - when photographic evidence of Soviet nuclear missiles within 50 miles of Havana was communicated to the President John F. Kennedy- to October 28 when the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, announced the decision to remove such missiles from Cuba. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the conflict began earlier and lasted well beyond October 28, within a context of declining tensions.

During this iconic period of thirteen days, stressful moments and hard negotiations took place, both external and internal, formal and informal between governments involved, to reach the so-called Black-Saturday -October 27 - where the situation was about to get out of control.

1.1. Chronology/Stages

Background

The Missiles Crisis has its closest antecedent in the success in Cuba of Socialism, later Marxism-Leninism, after Fidel Castro's take over, in January 1959. At that time, Castro was seen by Moscow and its allies as the leader who would guide the expansion of pro-Soviet revolutionary movements throughout Latin America.

In the United States, both successive administrations as well as public opinion, showed unalterably opposition to accepting Cuban situation and the Caribbean state’s close relations with the Soviet Union, which included cultural penetration, as well as economic and military aid.

During those years, there had been many failed attempts to stop the Castro regime. From a military standpoint, the most important and provocative one was the failed invasion to Cuba, called as the Bay of Pigs (Bahía de los Cochinos) in April 1961, which counted on plentiful help of the United States, although no direct participation in the field of American troops.

Such failure, that took place only three months after the beginning of Kennedy’s mandate, was perceived as a big false step, which put on big trouble the image and credibility of the brand-new administration. Prior to that, the United States-Cuba relationship had experienced a significant record of economic sanctions mixed with plots to kill Fidel Castro, with the participation of U.S. intelligence agencies.

In 1962 a new plan, the operation Mongoose, to invade the island and overthrow the Castro regime was being developed by the Pentagon in the greatest secrecy.

Other points of tension between both superpowers were, at that time, the situation in Berlin, and the deployment since 1961 of U.S. Jupiter MRBMs (medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,500 miles) with nuclear warheads in Italy and Turkey, with capability of reaching Moscow. This fact had greatly annoyed the Soviet leadership.

The issue of a potential second invasion of Cuba deeply concerned both Cubans as Soviets; consequently, as part of a strategy of deterrence, in May 1062 Khrushchev conceived and proposed a plan to deploy nuclear missiles in the island. At that time, the movement was noticed by the U.S. intelligence, but related signs were dismissed as erroneous or misleading.

On October 14 an U2 reconnaissance aircraft from the United States (CIA) got the first unquestionable photographic evidence of the existence of active work to construct missile sites for SS-4s, MRBMs ( range of 1,300 miles) with nuclear warheads, also known as Sandal. After analysis, the evidence was communicated to President Kennedy on October 16.

The Thirteen Days

The most significant events of this period, day by day, were:

October 16:

McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor informed President Kennedy the photographic detection by an U2 reconnaissance aircraft of the MRBM SS-4 Sandal missile sites, at 50 miles from Havana.

First meeting of the ExComm, secret “think tank”1 made up of senior members of the National Security Council and other key advisers.

It is assessed a shift in the Soviet doctrine from defensive to offensive.

The ExComm discusses the first answer options, all military:

A surgical air strike reaching missile sites.

An extensive attack against missiles and other defenses.

An invasion.

It was proposed the Acheson Plan, which implied the use of force. Retaliation anywhere in Europe and escalation of conflict were considered as potential scenarios should the plan was implemented. No one could answer a key question: how to protect the country from a possible total nuclear war.

October 17:

Debate continued within the ExComm. The Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed the “blockade” around Cuba, and the various alternatives were re-analyzed.

October 18:

Meeting of President Kennedy with Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Secretary who confirms that the aid to Cuba was purely defensive, as had been previously reported.

President's meetings with heads of the U.S. Armed Forces. The military wanted an air strike, along with a ground invasion, but no one had convincing answers on how to proceed to control a potential escalation.

There was no agreement within the ExComm and clearly differentiated groups emerged: hawks2, definitely in favor of the use of force to resolve the conflict, generally underestimating the consequences, doves3, definitely with the idea of applying only peaceful means, even at the cost of not entirely favorable concessions, and owls4, who were in favor of choosing the most appropriate alternative, on a case-by-case basis.

October 19:

The ExComm finally reached consensus to support the blockade. Adlai Stevenson proposed the removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and the hand-over of the U.S. Guantanamo base in Cuba as items to be negotiated. This proposal was overwhelmingly rejected by the group.

New evidence of the presence of intermediate range missiles, IRBMs, (with ranges between 1,800 and 3,100 miles), and therefore able to reach almost any city in the United States, was showed.

October 20:

Following McNamara's suggestion, JFK made the first decision in favor of a "smooth blockade" or "quarantine."

The President accepted the idea of bombing and invading Cuba, if the crisis was not resolved before the end of the month.

October 21:

The President announced to the National Security Council that a quarantine would be put in place.

Letters were sent to leaders of ally states and to Khrushchev

October 22:

The media began to report movements of troops.

JFK met Congress leaders, who expressed their position in favor of initiating the attacks.

Armed forces in DEFCON 3 (Medium Defense Readiness condition).

President Kennedy took direct command of military operations. To prevent overflow, routes of informal control of troops on alert were opened.

The President spoke to the nation on TV, he argued that the Soviet Union had to remove the missiles from Cuba or to face a total nuclear retaliation.

JFK also announced a "defensive quarantine" to be imposed over ships en route to Cuba.

October 23:

Khrushchev protested against the United States´ interference, while the deployed missiles were reaching operational state.

Statement by the OAS, Organization of American States, to support the quarantine.

A nuclear test was performed by the United States in the Pacific without presidential knowledge. It led to further tensions.

October 24:

Quarantine in force, it implied the use of a strategy of "red line".

Most Soviet vessels going to Cuba stopped or returned but some of them, which were not carrying weapons, continued. The presence of a Soviet submarine was detected.

DEFCON 2 (War Readiness condition) was set by the U.S. Air Force without presidential authorization. It further increased external and internal tensions.

October 25:

Meeting of the United Nations Security Council with tough exchange of arguments between the U.S. and Soviet Union ambassadors, Adlai Stevenson and Valerian Zorin. Photographic evidence of the missiles' deployment was presented to the world. The case took a positive turn to the United States in world opinion.

Media operation to check a potential face-saving deal involving the dismantlement of Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

Some of the missiles were reported as operational.

October 26:

Risk of loss of control of the U.S. forces on alert.

JFK exposed to the ExComm the need of a peaceful solution, aided by international support.

Secret meeting between the ABC journalist John Scali with the KGB chief in America, Aleksandr Fomin (pseudonym of the spy Aleksandr Feklisov), Khrushchev's informal messenger and person of his confidence. Steps towards a possible deal were outlined.

Khrushchev's first letter proposing an initial settlement proposal: to remove the missiles in exchange for a U.S. commitment of not invading Cuba.

October 27 (Black Saturday):

The most dangerous day. Cuban air defenses shoot down an U2 aircraft. Soviet tactical nuclear weapons on high level of alert, already prepared to contain a potential invasion.

Inner pressures within the U.S. government to begin punitive attacks. Kennedy ordered attacks for Monday October 29 morning.

A second letter from Khrushchev, more inflexible, intended to negotiate the removal of the missiles in Cuba for the removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

During the ExComm meetings, and after tense discussions, President Kennedy decided to adopt a dual strategy: to make official the acceptance of terms included in by the first letter dated October 26 plus a private guarantee of a deferred removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

Bob Kennedy's secret meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the U.S.(there had been others). An unwritten secret agreement, involving the removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey, in six months, was put on the negotiation table. Crisis reaches its climax.

October 28th:

As planned, Khrushchev's second letter was ignored and Kennedy officially accepted the first proposal.

A third Khrushchev's letter announced that the missiles would be dismantled and removed.

Beginning of a progressive distension.

The Aftermath

The following day the dismantling began and it was completed in November 9, 1962. There was an exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Castro where the Soviet leader informed the decision to remove the missiles. Castro protested and acted as if had been cheated. He also complained about not being included during negotiation.

Even so, all steps were accomplished as agreed.

1.2 The Core Issue

The main point in the conflict was the secret installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba and the hemispheric and concrete threat to the United States that it entailed.

In this sense the threat had a concrete shape: the possibility of an effective use of nuclear missiles that could reach any target in the United States. Broadly speaking, the political implications involved the introduction of a highly destabilizing factor in the delicate Soviet-American bilateral relations. Within such context, the core issue to negotiate was, then, the action of a full removal of those missiles. Incentives were offered to the opponent in order to get such action fulfilled. Cuba had a secondary role during the conflict as the field where the strategic dialogue between both superpowers took place.

1.3 Actors and their Interests

A stakeholder analysis from the point of view of interests at different levels: States (and multilateral organizations), Bureaucracies and Decision Groupsshows the following findings:

States (and multilateral organizations)

Soviet Union: It tried to uphold and defend the Castro regime to pursue its own interests. In this sense, it acted to deter the U.S. from a second invasion of Cuba. It tried to improve its positioning within the balance of power in the world as well as to establish a psychological balance to compensate existing imbalances in military equipment. The USSR also aimed to give clear signs of power to China, and to expand communism in Latin America and other regions. Finally the Soviet state sought to protect its interests in Berlin and in Eastern Europe and to force the removal of U.S. missiles deployed in Turkey and Italy.

United States: It tried to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Cold-War World. In addition, to keep hemispheric security by avoiding the presence of Soviet weapons, especially nuclear, in the Western Hemisphere, and in particular in the vicinity of the U.S. In order to pursue its strategy worldwide it needed to keep an image of strength, determination, commitment and superiority vis à vis the international community, as well as to protect West Berlin and to prevent the spread of Communism.

Cuba:It tried to set up a more solid defense against brand-new potential offensive actions by the United States. It also sought to expand its revolution to Latin America and to receive all kinds of economic and military aids from the Soviet Union..

U.S. allies: They looked for the U.S. financial support, direct investment, and protection against Communism.

USSR Allies: They looked for economic support, direct investment, and USSR´s protection in order to expand the Soviet-kind Communism.

Other States: Some of them, such as China, with strong interests opposed to both, the USSR and the U.S.

UN/OAS (multilateral organizations): Tried to maintain world peace and regional balance of power. In this regard, the mediating role of the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, was key and rather unknown.

Bureaucracies (some)

Kennedy Administration: They looked for consolidating its internal power and acceptance, both in the Congress and in the U.S. public opinion. They sought to give an image of firmness and determination as well as to regain prestige after the early and spectacular failure in Bay of Pigs. They also wanted to adequately position for the following legislative elections, and to fight communism by consolidating the values of democracy. A longstanding goal was to neutralize the Castro regime.

U.S. Military: They were mostly hawks and had a general adverse position toward the JFK Administration. They wanted to impose the U.S. supremacy, if necessary through the use of force. As elite they had got a tough mindset, for which negotiation was considered as a synonym of weakness. Their view of problems was eminently tactical.

U.S. Congress: Mostly unfavorable to Kennedy, it supported the invasion and other punitive measures against Cuba.

U.S. National Security Council: A mix of hawks, doves, and owls.

U.S. Diplomacy: It generally followed the guidelines of President Kennedy in communication and negotiation.

CIA: Hawks, they showed some significant flaws in data interpretation and prevention. They were passing through recent changes in their management.

Soviet Presidium: They have doubts about the installation of missiles in Cuba but they supported due to the strong Khrushchev´s leadership.

Soviet Diplomacy: They also acted following the strong Khrushchev´s leadership.

USSR Military: Some of them were enthusiastic about the deployment of the missiles, other more realistic, but because of the vertical structure they offered no further opposition to the project.

KGB: Acted under the strong and direct Khrushchev´s leadership.

Decision Groups

ExComm: It was an information, analysis, and direct consultation group, chosen by Kennedy on the basis of criteria of ability or prestige. There were diversity positions and the President played a style of leadership open to receive ideas and proposals, but reserving for him the final decision, within the environment of his formal authority.

JFK's inner circle: Their interests were those of the Kennedy administration, in fact they were the core of it. Besides of the potential humanitarian consequences of a nuclear war, they perceived the crisis as a litmus test for their management style. This small group was based on big trust and openness derived from long-standing close relationships.

Khrushchev's inner circle: They acted under the influence of their leader, constantly supporting his thinking. They had low confidence in Fidel Castro and his regime.

Castro's inner circle (Raúl Castro and Che Guevara): They were subordinated only by need to Soviet decisions. They pursue the goal of perpetuation in power. In this sense, they held at that time an absolute power in Cuba, supported by their revolutionary militias. Their agenda was, by circumstance, coincident with Soviet interests.

2. Why the Cuban Missile Problem is Considered a Crisis?

The Cuban missile problem is framed in the category of crisis. The definitions of crisis are varied through literature but all share a number of common attributes.

Indeed, from a descriptive point of view, crises are characterized by two key elements:The emergence of a severe threat to significant values, and a limited time to neutralize that threat. Sometimes the surprise factor is added as a third element. A fourth element, generally present, has to do with an environment of uncertainty and limited information.

Consequently, crises have a rapid development, they are contingent, and they involve high risks of escalation and high probability of losses. Crises are accompanied by extreme stress and they are very likely to evolve into disastrous lose-lose situations.

In this case, all the above described elements were identified: the missiles represented a serious threat to the United States national security and, according to the Cold War logic, to the international security; the time to find a solution was limited; before missiles become operational, and the secrecy of the deployment and the lack of previous detection added the surprise factor. Uncertainty was present all the time within an environment of limited information about the opponent. The limited information, more acute in such time than now reached significant issues such as if Khrushchev was still in charge, and if communications were true or false, etc.

The risk of escalation to the extreme situation of a total nuclear war and the consequent Mutual Assured Destruction, where all players end losing, was always there. In fact, this was the first time in the nuclear history when world leaders became fully aware of the magnitude of such risk.

3. Crisis Management

Once started a crisis, the parties are obliged to do whatever is necessary to protect their own interests or to achieve their most important goals, yet it is clear that the options used should avoid an unwanted and uncontrollable escalation.This is the basic political dilemma of crisis management.

Crisis management with threat of war has specific political and operational requirements, in order to achieve a positive outcome, such as avoiding war.

The political ones are related to the limitation of goals and of means employed; this point has an underlying concept of proportionality, valid while opponents keep themselves far from the brink.

Operational requirements are diverse and they have to do with the need to integrate military and diplomatic measures taken during the crisis, even though the military and diplomatic logic are markedly different.

There are multiple strategies designed to address these types of crises. The offensive ones attempt to change the status quo at the expense of the adversary. The defensive ones seek to defend the status quo against an opponent who tries to change it in their favor.

In the case of the Crisis of October 1962 the previous status quo refers to the "balance of power and geographical spread of the two superpowers, and the fact that the Western Hemisphere was free of Soviet nuclear weapons."

3.1. Soviet strategy of "faits accomplis"

We have already examined the scheme of Soviet interests underlying the conflict, but in recognizing the strategy used in the initiation and handling of the crisis, we see that they chose a clearly offensive one, of the type called of faits accomplis.

This strategy seeks to produce a change in status quo through unilateral and surprising actions, and it is based on the belief that the opponents are either not committed to defending the previous status quo, or they are too weak to do so or perhaps they will not do it because the transformation is fast enough to puzzle them, or, in the case of nuclear threats, they are reasonable enough to not to do so because of the consequences.

The missiles were installed in Cuba in absolute secrecy -the fait accompli- and they were put into operation throughout the entire crisis, in parallel with different events and moments of negotiation. In this respect, Khrushchev initially overestimated the likeliness of keeping the project in secrecy, ignored warnings from his advisers about the degree of tension that the move would generate. He let him be carried away by the belief in Kennedy´s rationality to avoid escalation towards a nuclear war. One of the worst mistakes of the leaders is to assume the rationality of their opponents.

3.2. United States' choice of "coercive diplomacy"

In order to avoid war, Kennedy employed a defensive strategy, the coercive diplomacy. This strategy seeks to persuade the perpetrator to undo what has done, for example, to stop provocation.

Instead of the initial direct use of force it is sought to threaten with the use of force in an exemplary manner in case of failure, (it is based on the degree of credibility of the defender, and, in all cases the level of support got from third parties).

A driver to success is to offer the perpetrator positive incentives for compliance. It implies that an ongoing negotiation process should be developed in parallel.

Kennedy proposed an initial stage in which he avoided presenting Khrushchev a deadline to remove the missiles, but a blockade or quarantine of Cuba was actually implemented, in deliberate steps. In that way, he drew with international support, a dividing line, a physical one, but mostly of events, that intended to bring light to the opponent´s actions.

He resisted internal pressures of the toughest wings of his administration and of public opinion, the hawks, but at the same time he started tuning up the military factor as he foresaw a possible beginning of hostilities.

With such strategy he prevented the escalation, as he proposed limited goals, nothing further than the removal of Cuban missiles and limited coercion means were used, the blockade (or defensive quarantine) that did not involve the immediate use of force.

At a second stage, when the crisis began to overheat, on October 27 (the Black Saturday) specifically, he turned to a tougher position, by issuing a sort of ultimatum, with an imminent start of hostilities two days later. This calmed the spirits and pressures on the home front, while painted a picture of determination from outside. However, at the same time, he offered, through various channels of negotiation and symbolic communication, incentives to the USSR in order to close an honorable deal.

Based on the expressed, the basic operating principles of the crisis management were followed here, and an absolute leadership of operations was kept, showing the opponent concrete signs of strength, but also a preference for a peaceful resolution.

All this was done, through the direct and symbolic languages. In addition, the process was slowed down in the most critical moments, to give more time to decision making. On the Soviet side, these basic principles were also taken into account.

3.3. The Negotiation

Within the crisis management strategies employed by both sides, permanent communication and negotiation at different levels turned out a key. In fact, communication between the parties was profuse through multiple pathways. On the contrary, communication to the public was relatively restricted.

The negotiation with the opponent was developed primarily at a private informal level, although there were also confirmatory actions of public and official type. There was also direct diplomatic negotiation of the parties, within the United Nations, the OAS and with third countries, to seek support.

Soviet negotiations with the Castro regime were intense before, during, and after the crisis. There was also a tireless negotiation and implementation of methods of influence, focused on the inner front. With military chiefs or within the ExComm, to achieve consensus with congressional representatives, with the media, with pilots in order to minimize attacks on reconnaissance flights, etc.

It is assumed that a similar process but with less intensity took place on the Soviet side because of the characteristics of the regime.

Stages/ moments /actors / strategies

From the external negotiation point of view, opponents tried energetically to avoid a lose-lose outcome. It led them to reach a win-win outcome, as all parties won when they avoided the possibility of a nuclear holocaust.

With a bigger detail, this negotiation represented a positive turning point in the development of the Cold War. JFK's negotiation strategy paced his way to manage the crisis. In the bargain, it showed willingness to arrive at a peaceful solution but also firmness, taking only the opponent's more favorable aspects to reach a solution.

At a first stage the diplomatic channel was primarily used, it latter gave way to secret informal negotiations, that eventually led to close the final deal. The heads of State communicated through letters in order to formalize the steps.

The key moments in this process were:

The meeting between Kennedy and Gromyko, dated October 18, where the willingness to conceal Soviet intentions related missiles in Cuba was put in evidence.

The JFK televised message to the people of the U.S. and to the world dated October 22.

The turning point is the confrontation at the United Nations Security Council when the photographic evidence of missile sites is showed to the world. At that time the formal diplomatic via reached exhaustion.

The meetings between the journalist Scali and Aleksandr Fomin, although plagued by uncertainties about its legitimacy, they were a key to reach a direct and informal communication with Khrushchev, to make know intentions, and finally to open the door to an informal higher-level negotiation.

The meetings between Bob Kennedy and Dobrynin, that gave shape to such informal high level negotiating track, which ultimately turned out the most important path towards a solution.

The internal negotiation was also very hard, due to the positions between hawks and doves in the various groups and bureaucracies involved.

3.4. Decision-Making Process

The steps of a typical decision-making process in a crisis like that of October 1962 can be summarized as:

a. Gathering of useful information from intelligence, diplomatic corps, media, armed forces, and all other available sources.

b. Analysis of such information followed by identification of alternatives together with their pros and cons, a search of consensus, and a recommendation.

c. Decision making by the leader.

d. Implementation of the decision by different actors with different roles. Among them were the diplomacy, armed forces, negotiators, and other formal and informal actors.

e. Monitoring of decision and feedback, including data collection and decision maker's own perceptions.

f. New decision, either corrective or affirmative, as appropriate.

In this sense, the decision chain related to coercive diplomacy applied by the United States was heavily dependent on the context, and on the information that gathered in previous steps. It was, therefore, more complex than the Soviet's of faits accomplis , which simply went ahead until it stopped.

In this case, there was a fairly long period of data collection and analysis, till October 20, which was coincident with the ExComm´s consolidation as a think-tank and direct advisory group to the President.

However, beyond that, parallel decisions chains existed, converging or diverging on JFK. Among the first, the secret negotiations with the Soviet ambassador were very relevant. Among the latter, the decisions of military commanders under their rules of engagement to rise the readiness to DEFCON 2, without presidential authorization, or the untimely American nuclear test in the Pacific, whose decision depended on a decentralized atomic energy entity.

On the Soviet side it is assumed that the decision-making process was actually much more concentrated on the hands of Nikita Khrushchev, as was the decision to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba under the most absolute secret. His circle of confidence acted with the syndrome of "group think" by which the group is unable to offer the leader a different vision of a problem, so that the entire decision making process is greatly downgraded.

4. Preliminary Conclusions

Some preliminary conclusions immediately emerged from the analysis:

The complexity of a crisis is the most demanding situation for a leader and their group of decision.

A healthy decision-making process leads to a better quality decision.

The leader’s profile is a key to achieve a healthy process of decision. In this sense, the leader should choose a dynamic and diverse advisory group, able to dissent and to bring different views and perspectives of the issue under analysis. The leader should be able to receive and positively process such views, as well as to take full responsibility for the final decision.

It is necessary to constantly review decisions made and to correct the path, if required, keeping clear the ultimate goals.

Taking for granted the strict rationality of the opponent, and a mistaken appreciation of the different actors’ potential behavior, can both lead to wrongly ponder decisions and their consequences.

Concerning international crises with risk of war, flaws on the decision process may lead to a succession of events which could push governments to take the option of war, without a clear assessment of consequences.

In such crises, it is highly opportune to keep the conflict restricted by setting limited goals and limited means to achieve them. Such practice is useful to avoid escalation from conventional to nuclear level, a zone where the concept of proportionality is no longer valid.

An important point is the control by all means of troops on a high state of alert, as they entail a high risk of s triggering incidents which may lead to spark the armed conflict.

The best scenario is the no-crisis. It means prevention, by adequately pondering governmental decisions, in order to resolve disputes during their early stages.

The most sustainable conflict resolutions derive from win-win deals. Appropriate incentives play a key role in the achievement of such deals.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, solution timely came because of leaders’ pragmatism when they got a clear perception of the likeliness of a lose-lose scenario and adequate incentives were employed.

On the contrary, little or nothing was done by both parts on prevention of the crisis, moreover, both leaders behave provocative on the previous stages, such as Bay of Pigs incident, Mongoose Operation or the missiles secret deployment, without clearly measuring potential consequences.

5. A Few Messages for the Present and the Future

With the passage of time, the Cuban Missile Crisis has been analyzed from many different angles. An interesting approach is to understand the relevant impact of those days on the United States’ further foreign policy decisions and their global implications. Some argue that if messages from this crisis would have been properly understood, decisions on Vietnam and Iraq had been pondered in a different way.

Now it is time to find key elements in this experience which could serve leaders as inspiration for future decision making in the sense of a more secure world. We touch here three topics of maximum interest:

Preservation and continuous improvement of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Russia as a key for an increasing global security.

Trust and cooperative relation between both powers, not only including their progressive nuclear disarmament, but also on other key security issues, is a must for international balance.

In other words, the quality of the U.S.-Russia relationship matters the entire global community.

It is therefore worrisome, that the mentioned Nunn-Lugar framework agreement, for example, could be cancelled after its expiration in June 2013. The Russian government has expressed its reluctance to renew it. If concreted, it would be a serious step backward on the path for a more secure world.

To renew the agreement, as a way to further enhance cooperation between Russia and the United States on strategies for nuclear threats reduction, should not be any obstacle for Russians to recover all their potentiality as a state. It is necessary to recall that both countries together own the 95% of nuclear weapons in the world, so that, it is clear that they have still much joint work ahead on nuclear weapons dismantlement and on securing dangerous fissile materials.

Should Cuban Missile Crisis’ messages were listened and understood, prevention of a further deterioration in the bilateral relationship would be a clear priority for both governments. Common interests should be identified, in order to go on with the cooperative work.

Need to achieve a deeper consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the P5, on key ways to prevent further proliferation and to accomplish their nuclear disarmament responsibilities.

In the past, behind every case of proliferation there has been a P5 acting as “protector”, a P5 thinking more of strategic balances among peers than of final effects of proliferation. The game of opposing interests and lack of a common view among them together with a failure in fulfilling their own commitments ended weakening the whole disarmament and nonproliferation regime. It should stop.

Lessons from the Cuban Missile crisis can be applied here to mutually encourage negotiation processes where global priorities and common points of consensus in favor of an increasing global security could be identified. It should be understood and put into practice something that it is constantly declared: the policy of seeking geopolitical balances through nuclear weapons has led humankind to extremely big strategic mistakes.

Messages from the October crisis could inspire political will in the line of traversal cooperative work to neutralize the regional endemic crisis in the Middle East.

In a recent speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referring to the Iran's potential nuclear weapons program said that: "President Kennedy set a red line during the Cuban missile Crisis. That red line also prevented war and helped preserve peace for decades." He added that: "The red line should be drawn at the Iranian enrichment program because these enrichment facilities are the only nuclear installations that we definitely see and credibly target. I believe that faced with a red line Iran will back down."

The leader of Israel assumes that before the "red line", Iran will turn back on the continuity of its program. But have the consequences been rightly assessed if this back down does not happen?

However, the meaning of the "red line" in the case of Iran's conflict has not been fully explained. If we stick to an accurate reading of the messages derived from the October crisis, the "red line" implied a warning of potential use of force, but not the use of force itself.

Kennedy searched parallel negotiation tracks when possible, but there is a clear difference in profiles between those key actors and the ones related to Middle East conflict. The difference has mostly to do with fanaticism.

To set an analogy, to negotiate with the government of Iran today and try to reach win-win terms could become as difficult as having performed the negotiation with Fidel Castro, rather than with Khrushchev during the crisis.

Both leaders, Castro and Khrushchev, in some ways represented concurrent national interests; the clear difference was the ability to anticipate the final consequences of their actions or maybe, if anticipated, how much potential negative outcomes could matter to them in order to turn back.

Sanctions by the UNSC and other relevant international actors have traced previous "red lines" in front of Iran, with unsuccessful results. This poses a concern about how to draw a new red line in this conflict avoiding the use of force.

On the other hand, the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, called to carry out a Conference on the Middle East during 2012 with the participation of all states in the region, so as to move forward with the 1995 proposal to shape a WMD Free Zone. The government of Finland is acting as facilitator for the Conference, although Israel said from the beginning that it will not participate.

The fact that Israel has never declared itself a nuclear weapons state and never participated in any of control regimes related to Weapons of Mass Destruction, brings to the Middle East conflict another disruptive element, as well as provides easy arguments to other regional proliferators, like Iran, to go ahead with their plans.

A new political will and new strategies of negotiation and cooperative work, including shifts to more flexible positions and confidence building should be considered by the most reliable states in the region, in order to strengthen security and to prevent regional escalation of the conflict and proliferation. It necessarily implies to break the old logic and beliefs through an increase of transparency, and transversal negotiations including Israel.

6. Final Thoughts

Often associated with toughness, entrenched positions, and unilateral victory, the real lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis have more to do with a paradigm of flexibility and search of a positive outcome, in which all parties win. But the questions are: does such paradigm work with fanatic opponents? Does such paradigm work with opponents unable to be deterred?

It is necessary further analysis to assess in what extent these messages are applicable to negotiations with actors different from states, whose logic and behavioral models are completely different. How much of these messages are useful to deal with governing elites in states which sponsor terrorism or with terrorism fundamentalist itself?

Even so, it is clear that the logic underlying the Cuban Missile Crisis related to a win-win successful outcome can be applied to bring states to work in cooperation to reduce their security vulnerabilities, to more successfully face threats immune to deterrence.

In this sense, a realistic assessment of win-win and win-lose scenarios, a clear acceptance of other parties’ interests, as well as an appropriate incentives management can bring states, even with diverse interests, to work together for a common goal.

In fact, it is necessary to understand that prevention of crisis is even most important than the best crisis management. Preventing crises is based on an ongoing negotiation made of small steps, and a cooperative resolution of differences.

50 years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world is even more uncertain and complex. Should these lessons be understood and help open new paths to cooperatively reduce global nuclear dangers.

7. Notes

(1) Some key members of the ExComm were: Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice-President, Bob Kennedy, Attorney General, Theodore Sorensen, Special Advisor to the President, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, John McCone, CIA Director; Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Ken O'Donnell, special Assistant to the President, Adlai Stevenson, U.S. ambassador to the UN and others.

(2) Some of the hawks were: McGeorge Bundy, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, John McCone, Gen. Curtis LeMay of the Air Force and Acehson Dean, former Secretary of State and foreign policy adviser.