Sun, 18 Nov 2018 20:17:46 -0800WeeblyMon, 29 Feb 2016 00:25:29 GMThttp://www.cwjroberts.com/blog-africa-in-the-world/revisiting-africa-in-canadian-security-planning-assessment Since the October 2015 election in Canada of a Liberal majority government, there has been much anticipation of significant rethinking about Canadian foreign, defence, and development policy. There are processes underway in Ottawa that can be called foreign and defence policy reviews, and mandate letters to relevant ministers have been published which seem to suggest some differentiation from the previous government's policy directions. In June 2016, we'll be hosting at the University of Calgary an invitation-only workshop to revisit how Canada addresses Africa in its security and development planning and assessment, which then shapes how resources are allocated to the continent, the capabilities available, and the policies pursued. Of course, "security" issues in the African context cannot be separated from development, or, if they are, they are done at the peril of the security-oriented policy objectives. That said, please visit the workshop webpage here and note that until this event takes place, there will not be any new blog posts here.]]>Fri, 16 Oct 2015 00:58:39 GMThttp://www.cwjroberts.com/blog-africa-in-the-world/what-does-the-tunisian-nobel-peace-prize-tell-us-about-democratic-transitions Simply stated, the Nobel Prize committee made a great, if surprising, choice last week to award the Peace Prize to four Tunisian civil society organizations (working together as the National Dialogue Quartet), a decision that should be widely hailed. This decision helps to focus attention on at least some of the foundations that contribute to a successful democratic transition from an authoritarian to a more democratic political system: the presence of a range of civil society institutions that aggregate and represent varied interests of society. (The relative health and vitality of civil society in Burkina Faso played a role in the downfall of Blaise Compaore last year and the subsequent failure of an attempted coup against the provisional government last month.) Unfortunately, that key recognition of the Nobel Prize award will be lost in the forgotten praise for Tunisia in contrast to the continuing crises offered by Syria, next door Libya, Yemen, and other parts of the Middle East, including Egypt, where the Arab Awakening did not translate into a mostly peaceful and democratic transition. But despite autocratic governments since independence from France in 1956, Tunisia's unique political economic history at least facilitated the development of civil society institutions somewhat independent from the Bourguiba and Ben Ali governments. In effect, these two autocrats established the foundations for democratic transition and, I suspect, eventual consolidation. Not all authoritarian systems are the same, and even slight differences in overall economic orientation and relative efficacy of the rule of law can allow for a relatively strong and diverse civil society to emerge (Tunisia), to be partial if constrained (Egypt), or effectively not to emerge at all (Libya). So why Tunisia and not Libya or Egypt (just to examine those two nearby cases)? Barrington Moore's (1966) insights help here: "no bourgeoisie, no democracy." Even if the Ben Ali family had their fingers in various economic sectors, for the most part the Tunisian state (and, particularly, the Army) never played a permanent, direct, commanding role in the economy. Tunisia is the land of the bourgeoisie--of small business owners, farmers, tourism operators, and internationally-linked industry--but also of organized labour, a relatively professional civil service, and a vibrant legal and human rights community. After independence under Bourguiba (who studied law and political science in Paris), Tunisia looked set to follow the populist socialist lead of Nasser's Egypt, but in the 1970s Bourguiba and his economic advisers changed course. In combination with his secularizing initiatives around women's rights and free compulsory education, institutional/legal foundations for private enterprise and civil society organizations were in place to some degree by the end of the 1970s, even if political mobilization and protest remained off the table. Despite autocratic politics and some discretionary interference by Bourguiba and particularly Ben Ali into economic affairs, Tunisians fashioned one of the most dynamic and variegated private sectors and civil societies throughout the Middle East and Africa. The rule of law, and the rule of rules, existed to a large extent in Tunisia. Tunisia mostly worked, despite the Ben Ali regime and not because of it (which flies in the face of some World Bank analysis just prior to Ben Ali's downfall in January 2011). This contrasts sharply with Libya under Gadhafi, and could be observed simply in the day-to-day minutiae of life (I visited both countries in 2005): in Tunis, traffic lights, lanes, stop signs, organized public transit, and rules generally followed; in Tripoli, no traffic lights and no rules (I was told that there were no traffic lights in Tripoli because they would be ignored anyway. Accra and Lagos compare similarly, although even in Lagos there is an occasionally working traffic light, and rules then come into play for the most part.) Eventually, with the increase in internet access (and Tunisia had the highest ICT penetration rates in Africa by 2010), a controlled media could be bypassed. Where formal political mobilization and protest didn't exist, a widely shared sense of injustice, unfairness, and resentment about the lavish Ben Ali extended family lifestyle built up. Authoritarian ostentation and discretion creates resentment and trickles down into the actions of state agents: frustrated in his efforts to expand his fruit-selling business by local officials (his produce confiscated given a missing license, with few avenues of appeal), university educated Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated in December 2010. The internationally-praised economy wasn't working for far too many Tunisians, even if the Ben Ali family flourished. But once protests spread to Tunis and other cities, the Army and security services ultimately held back, and Ben Ali fled. Without a relatively independent and professional Army, without a broad and diverse civil society, without a wide range of private sector actors (employers, entrepreneurs, farmers, organized labour, lawyers), Tunisia would be Egypt today, or worse. It isn't political party mobilization and electoral competition which determine the potential of democratic transition, it is the wider milieu represented by a vibrant civil society. In the absence of a vibrant civil society (representing the politics of interest and compromise, of a politics mediated by the state, not solely in terms of capturing the state), the politics of affection and passion take their place, and too often that leads back towards exclusivist political and economic institutions. Tunisia is hardly out of the woods yet, as terrorist attacks and some government impulses towards old-school security practices. But given a well designed constitution, deep-rooted civil society institutions, a freer media, and lots of horrendous examples of what can happen when compromise and inclusiveness are set aside, Tunisia's prospects for democratic consolidation are, analytically speaking, pretty damn good.

]]>Sat, 19 Sep 2015 21:13:52 GMThttp://www.cwjroberts.com/blog-africa-in-the-world/top-ten-african-comparative-politics-booksAs we transition from the Letterman to Colbert era on "The Late Show", it seems timely to produce a Top Ten list of the most important and influential monographs in the field of African comparative politics. Yes, that's a completely contrived segue, but as a kick-off to restarting my blog, it seemed good enough.

After three years of dissertation research, writing, thinking, editing, re-editing, rethinking, writing, retooling, and revamping, the end is in sight. Still lots of work to do, but the pieces are finally starting to fall into place. A good time to relaunch the blog, albeit on a very occasional basis.

That said, I thought it might be useful or inciteful (that spelling is intended) to list what I consider to be the 10 most important monographs on African comparative politics published between 2000-2015. The list is subjective, but a good starting point for debate. Such a list reflects my own relationship with and thinking about the study of African politics, and other lists would surely look partly or substantially different. There are some obvious books in this list, and some not so obvious books which deserve wider consideration.

Parameters: - Monographs (not edited collections, but can have more than one author)- Publishing date 2000 or later- In English- Broadly comparative: not a (mostly) single country study (leaves out Posner's 2005 award winning book) or one that is broader than just Africa (Sangmpam 2007)- Not mostly a textbook (which leaves out Hyden 2006/2013 and Englebert & Dunn 2013, both excellent works)

Order is purely chronological:

(1) Herbst, Jeffrey Ira. (2000) States and Power in Africa : Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Cheeseman, Nicholas. (2015) Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform. New Approaches to African History. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Haven't had a chance to read this yet!]]]>