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Feel free. I won't have time to respond until at least Friday. I'm on holiday at the moment.

Ta.

Here's some to be going on with:-

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Originally Posted by MissionIMPOSSIBRU

Sorry for being so late in responding to this post....

No prob. Well, I actually found it difficult to relate your latest post to the earlier one and Mordant's response. post #53 and #68

So I decided to look at them as they stand; and there seems to be a general argument, which is that, once one has been converted, then the truth of what one now believes in confirmed by finding in the scriptures

"What needs to be explained is how one can become aware of specific knowledge, later recognized to be theologically sound, when one has no mode (no Bible study of any kind, no social exposure to Christians) by which to be exposed to such specific knowledge." (thus) "1. What Christians ascribe to the inner witness of the Holy Spirit is a foundational-level experience on a par with innate knowledge such as the reality of the external world or the reality of one's senses. This means that it is in an entirely different epistemic category to mental tendencies such as promiscuous teleology, confirmation bias and wishful thinking."

We'd have to know what examples of this specific knowledge is. Because we here on the boards have rarely encountered any such knowledge, specific or innate that seems to be reliable, never mind the same as everyone elses'. In fact doctrinal wrangles and changing the mind about believing in Hell would suggest that doctrinal soundness is a doubtful claim.

We might call for examples, since we suspect that we are seeing a confirmation bias, cherry picking doctrine that is what one already thinks and ignoring what doesn't, one could, in the throes of faith, easily fall into wishful thinking finding of confirmation that what one now believed on faith was All true.

2. Immutability and immediacy are not pre-requisites for moral realism. In a theological sense, Judeochristian morality clearly demonstrates a shifting moral epistemology from "the Law of the Letter" to the "Ministry of the Spirit", and clearly specifies that the solution to the "human condition" lies beyond temporal concerns.

We atheists have never claimed that morality was anything more than a set of human rules, mutable and not always immediate. While Judeo -Christian theology puts the solution to human problems beyond temporal concerns, we rather think it would be better is we put temporal concerns beyond the interference of Judeo -christian theology.

3. Typologies and parallelisms are prior to hermeneutics. Studies of these phenomena are part of the very methodology by which one forms an interpretative basis of the text, so such study cannot represent hermeneutical cognitive dissonance or wishful thinking like you seem to believe.

I suppose artifacts and patterns in text do precede the interpretation is texts, (esp. scripture). However, many have found that such study throws up such areas of doubt about the reliability and veracity of the text that, when we find that the believer has not noticed them and brushes them aside when they are pointed out, then we are going think that what we are witnessing is cognitive dissonance and wishful thinking, specifically faith -based cognitive dissonance and wishful thinking

4. Parsimony is an a posteriori rule; meaning that it is secondary to logical and metaphysical axiology.

I am convinced that Occam's razor, like mathematics and indeed the rules of logic are (unlike moral codes for instance) founded in reality. It is more than just a rule without which reasoning would get nowhere, but is based on a pretty undeniable set of facts. I used the analogy of a bush vanishing behind a boulder. Is it just out of sight or has it vanished into the ground or been snatched away by piskies? Reason would tell us that it is the former explanation best accords with the known facts. This is the Friar's dictum in action and it is not only a dictum without which nothing could be decided (without scientific proof, and not even then) which would suit very well those who claim that beliefs based on fail are just as valid as beliefs based on fact, but is factually sound.

We'd have to know what examples of this specific knowledge is. Because we here on the boards have rarely encountered any such knowledge, specific or innate that seems to be reliable, never mind the same as everyone elses'. In fact doctrinal wrangles and changing the mind about believing in Hell would suggest that doctrinal soundness is a doubtful claim.

We might call for examples, since we suspect that we are seeing a confirmation bias, cherry picking doctrine that is what one already thinks and ignoring what doesn't, one could, in the throes of faith, easily fall into wishful thinking finding of confirmation that what one now believed on faith was All true.

Your argument, bolded above, is an informal logical fallacy, sometimes referred to as the Inflation of Conflict. As a general epistemic principle, it is inescapably anti-academic and anti-scientific.

Theology is a rigorous academic discipline with areas of specialty consensus and disagreement, much like other academic disciplines. From a specialty perspective (not from that of the broader population), certain principles require little hermeneutical inference from the primary text and are generally regarded to be true, others may be more controversial.

As for an example of specific knowledge, how about the following typology:

We atheists have never claimed that morality was anything more than a set of human rules, mutable and not always immediate. While Judeo -Christian theology puts the solution to human problems beyond temporal concerns, we rather think it would be better is we put temporal concerns beyond the interference of Judeo -christian theology.

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I suppose artifacts and patterns in text do precede the interpretation is texts, (esp. scripture). However, many have found that such study throws up such areas of doubt about the reliability and veracity of the text that, when we find that the believer has not noticed them and brushes them aside when they are pointed out, then we are going think that what we are witnessing is cognitive dissonance and wishful thinking, specifically faith -based cognitive dissonance and wishful thinking

This is interesting but has little to do with what we're discussing:

1. Actual arguments for and against the tenability of moral realism, and the nature of moral realism.
2. The nature of pre-hermeneutical patterns in the text.

All you've done above is merely affirm that you're a moral anti-realist (which is no surprise), and describe potential pitfalls within hermeneutics proper.

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I am convinced that Occam's razor, like mathematics and indeed the rules of logic are (unlike moral codes for instance) founded in reality. It is more than just a rule without which reasoning would get nowhere, but is based on a pretty undeniable set of facts. I used the analogy of a bush vanishing behind a boulder. Is it just out of sight or has it vanished into the ground or been snatched away by piskies? Reason would tell us that it is the former explanation best accords with the known facts. This is the Friar's dictum in action and it is not only a dictum without which nothing could be decided (without scientific proof, and not even then) which would suit very well those who claim that beliefs based on fail are just as valid as beliefs based on fact, but is factually sound.

All you've done above is merely affirm that you're a moral anti-realist (which is no surprise)

Well that was just nonense. There is nothing "anti" anything by simply recognising that there is no one evidencing the claim that morality is objective or "real" in any sense more than a subjective set of rules humans create - disagree on - and then adopt by methods such as democracy.

Well that was just nonense. There is nothing "anti" anything by simply recognising that there is no one evidencing the claim that morality is objective or "real" in any sense more than a subjective set of rules humans create - disagree on - and then adopt by methods such as democracy.

1. If you believe that objective moral truths exist, you are a moral realist.
2. If you believe that objective moral truths don't exist, then you are called a moral anti-realist.

Your argument, bolded above, is an informal logical fallacy, sometimes referred to as the Inflation of Conflict. As a general epistemic principle, it is inescapably anti-academic and anti-scientific.

No, yours is a common logical fallacy known as strawman, plus equivocation, I think. My argument is not that because they disagree, those who claim to be getting reliable input from one source are unable to use their expertise to come to common conclusions, which is what your linked example means by 'know nothing'. But it does indicate that the information they claim to be getting from one reliable source is plainly not from any such single source.

with areas of specialty consensus and disagreement, much like other academic disciplines. From a specialty perspective (not from that of the broader population), certain principles require little hermeneutical inference from the primary text and are generally regarded to be true, others may be more controversial.

Theology is not the issue here. It is claiming to have reliably true religious (at least) views through revelation from God. Theology is indeed a rigourous discipline (So is astrology, though with little more foundation) but I am not talking about theology, but the claim that God -given revelation is reliable, which spills over into interpretation of scripture (which nearly always turns out to be cherry picking barely relevant Bible -quotes to prop up a fixed personal opinion).

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As for an example of specific knowledge, how about the following typology:

Agreed. Actually this Christ as a type of Adam is basic to Paulinist thought, but that is another subject.

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1. Actual arguments for and against the tenability of moral realism, and the nature of moral realism.
2. The nature of pre-hermeneutical patterns in the text.

All you've done above is merely affirm that you're a moral anti-realist (which is no surprise),

It's a surprise to me. Not little in that it is ambiguously worded. Do you mean that you consider me against moral realism (which is not true) or a realist who is 'anti -moral' which is also not true and bit slanderous, in fact?

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and describe potential pitfalls within hermeneutics proper.

I am not even talking about hermeneutics. I am talking about claims of inspired revealed truth. Given that there is no valid reason to claim that any conclusions about religious of Bible -text claims are true on the basis of revealed inspiration, discussion about the text, patterns, artifacts, history, character personality can be carried out in a reasoned way. Not claiming that one interpretation is true because God told them personally it was. Which is the point of my argument.

1. If you believe that objective moral truths exist, you are a moral realist.
2. If you believe that objective moral truths don't exist, then you are called a moral anti-realist.

Ah. I see that you explained the point. Moral realism is something of an academic matter (unless we can find a non -arbitrary basis for moral decisions, given that we do not believe in God -given absolute morality) and we prefer to think in terms of relative morality and concensus morality, which, (no surprise) says that we have invented moral codes to suit ourselves, and they can be altered, if necessary.

But now, I wonder what it has to do with the subject? I suppose because I reject the claim that people get their morals from God and thus reject anyone claiming to be able to pronounce on moral issues because of inspiration from God. Yes indeed, especially if someone else claiming to have moral inspiration from the same God, says something different.

And I thought I'd have a stab at the last three points:

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5. A failing and explanatorily insufficient theory can still the best scientific explanation for a given phenomenon. An inference to the best explanation (abduction) can still be subject to independent epistemic scrutiny.

I have to have reservations about this. A failing and insufficient explanatory theory may be the best we have in the absence of definite proof (abiogenesis may be considered in this category) but it must be coherent within itself. The god claim and god -revelation claim is not coherent. Therefore, it is not even viable as a respectable theory to explain, for example, morals.

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6. Science and religion are not a competitive dichotomy. Science only challenges religion when it unwittingly strays into metaphysical territory, invoking abductive inferences that involve geological and cosmological timescales. Inferences of this kind implicitly presume the truth of unverifiable ontological assumptions such as Uniformitarianism.

I have already given examples of some uniformity claims being verified. The burden of proof then (if it already hadn't) reverts to those who claim that it might not have been Uniform in the past. Apart from unverifiable, I agree. It is only that some of the religious have found that science does not support their beliefs and -worse - even cuts across them. Thus it is some of the religious who take it upon themselves to try to discredit science - just in certain areas.

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7. Geopolitical emphasis upon Israel is disproportionate even when viewed through the lens of religious conflict. Moreover, Israeology is as central to Christianity as it is to Judaism. The New Testament is an incomplete book without the Torah.

Israelology covers a lot of ground. of course, Christianity cannot be understood without the Hebrew background. Those Christians who want to drag prophecy coming true in front of our eyes are of no interest to me.

I'll address the few points you've raised that are relevant and aren't self-contradictory.

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Originally Posted by AREQUIPA

No, yours is a common logical fallacy known as strawman, plus equivocation, I think. My argument is not that because they disagree, those who claim to be getting reliable input from one source are unable to use their expertise to come to common conclusions, which is what your linked example means by 'know nothing'. But it does indicate that the information they claim to be getting from one reliable source is plainly not from any such single source.

In both examples, you are making an inference from:

1. Disagreement or controversy among a body of specialty opinions on topic P, to:
2. General dismissal of the tenability of topic P.

Therefore, both are examples of the Inflation of Conflict. The form of the fallacy does not specify that the body of opinion must appeal to a singular source when discussing a topic. It merely specifies that there is disagreement regarding that topic.

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It's a surprise to me. Not little in that it is ambiguously worded. Do you mean that you consider me against moral realism (which is not true) or a realist who is 'anti -moral' which is also not true and bit slanderous, in fact?

The following is a textbook moral anti-realistic claim: "We atheists have never claimed that morality was anything more than a set of human rules, mutable and not always immediate."

It puts you directly in opposition to moral realism, whether you know it or not.

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Yes it is. Without it, reasoning (and science) can get nowhere, since any observed data can also be 'explained' by magic.

In other words, you believe:

1. Occam's Razor to be the justification for methodological naturalism.
2. Methodological naturalism to be essential for science and reason.

Interestingly enough, it's naturalist epistemology that has gone out of its way to prove both propositions to be false:

I have to have reservations about this. A failing and insufficient explanatory theory may be the best we have in the absence of definite proof (abiogenesis may be considered in this category) but it must be coherent within itself. The god claim and god -revelation claim is not coherent. Therefore, it is not even viable as a respectable theory to explain, for example, morals.

The bolded part of your comment simply agrees with what I've stated.

The rest of your comment misunderstands the concept of "coherency". I suspect what you are actually alluding to is "verifiability" in the context of the Verifiability Criterion, which, ironically, is an internally incoherent concept itself.

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I have already given examples of some uniformity claims being verified. The burden of proof then (if it already hadn't) reverts to those who claim that it might not have been Uniform in the past. Apart from unverifiable, I agree. It is only that some of the religious have found that science does not support their beliefs and -worse - even cuts across them. Thus it is some of the religious who take it upon themselves to try to discredit science - just in certain areas.

Uniformitarianism is an unverifiable assumption because the very process of verification presupposes it to be true.

This means that any claim you may have given regarding "proof" of this doctrine can only be circular by definition.

Last edited by MissionIMPOSSIBRU; 07-17-2014 at 07:20 AM..
Reason: Addressed new comments edited into previous posts

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