This
case is one of several originally filed in state court
against Defendants, entities engaged in oil and gas
exploration, production, and/or transportation operations in
the development of the East Hackberry and West Hackberry Oil
& Gas Field in Cameron Parish. The original Plaintiff
Parish of Cameron (“the Parish”) and Intervenor
the State of Louisiana ex rel. Jeff Landry, Attorney
General and through the Louisiana Department of Natural
Resources, Office of Costal Management, and Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources, Thomas F. Harris
(collectively “the State”) brought suit against
Defendants under the State and Local Coastal Resources
Management Act of 1978, as amended, La. Rev. Stat. 49:214.21,
et seq. The Parish and the State contend that
Defendants are liable for damages to the Cameron Parish
Coastal Zone, based on alleged violations of permits obtained
through the Local Coastal Zone Management Program, pursuant
to LA. REV. STAT. 49:214.28. The Parish and the State seek
all damages and remedies available under state law,
including, restoration and remediation costs, actual
restoration, declaratory relief, money damages, and costs and
expenses, including attorney's fees. The Parish and the
State expressly disclaim that they pursue any federal claims
or remedies.

Having
conducted a de novo review of the record in this
matter, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and DECLINES TO ADOPT IN
PART the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.
The Court DECLINES TO ADOPT Magistrate Judge Kay's
analysis under the third and fourth factors of the
Gunn-Grable test, but otherwise ADOPTS the Report
and Recommendation.[1] The Court issues this Ruling solely to
address objections to Magistrate Judge Kay's findings
raised by the Parish and the State.

Although
they did not object to Magistrate Judge Kay's conclusion
and other analyses, the Parish and the State raised
objections to her consideration of Apache's Supplemental
Notice of Removal and her application of the Supreme
Court's federal question test. First, as to Magistrate
Judge Kay's consideration of Apache's Supplemental
Notice of Removal, the Court agrees with and ADOPTS the
analysis and conclusion. Contrary to the Parish and the
State's arguments, in passing the Federal Courts
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, which added
subsection (b)(2)(C) to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, [2] there is no
evidence that Congress contemplated the situation at hand.
See Helford v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., No.
3:14-CV-4539-L, 2015 WL 5771915, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30,
2015) (“This provision simply allows an earlier-served
defendant to consent to a removal filed by a later-served
defendant even if that earlier-served defendant did not
initiate or consent to removal at an earlier time when the
case may have been removed. In other words, this statutory
provision gives the earlier-served defendant a second chance
or ‘bite at the apple' to consent to the removal if
that defendant did not previously initiate or consent to
removal.”). This statute appears to have been amended,
so as to protect the right of later-served defendants to
timely remove to federal court. Curtis v. Woy, No.
3:15-CV-01900-P, 2016 WL 6561582, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5,
2016) (“This amendment appears designed to protect
later-served defendants from not being allowed to remove the
case should the first-served defendant fail timely to remove
it (and so waive the opportunity for all subsequently-served
defendants).”).

In this
case, nine (9) defendants timely removed to federal court
before any single defendant was served. Further, Plaintiffs
have raised no arguments that the original Notice of Removal
was defective. Rather, the later-served defendant, Apache
Corporation, agreed with and consented in that removal, but
timely filed a Supplemental Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 33]
to raise an additional basis for the removal to federal
court: “In addition to the grounds identified in that
Notice, this case is independently removable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) because it is ‘founded on a claim or
right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States.'” The Parish and the State have
cited no authority, other than the statute itself, to support
their argument. As recognized by Magistrate Judge Kay and the
Parish and the State, once a case has been removed, any
later-served defendants automatically become federal
defendants.

Such
defendant has the option to file a motion to remand,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1448, within thirty (30) days.
In this case, Apache timely sought, not to remand, but to
clarify an additional basis for removal. The interpretation
of the statute urged by the Parish and the State undermines
the very purpose of the amendments:

Congress adopted this later-served defendant rule to provide
“for equal treatment of all defendants in their ability
to obtain Federal jurisdiction over the case against
them.” H.R. Rep. No. 12-10, at 14 (2011). “The
rule acknowledges that ‘[f]airness to later-served
defendants, whether they are brought in by the initial
complaint or an amended complaint, necessitates that they be
given their own opportunity to remove, even if the
earlier-served defendants chose not to remove initially.'
” Act II Jewelry[LLC v. Wooten], 2015 WL
7889039, *3 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112- 10, at 14 (2011)).
Congress “plainly intended for each defendant to have
its own right to initiate removal.” Central West
Virginia Regional Airport Authority [v. Triad Engineering,
Inc.], 2016 WL 685086, *20 [(S.D. W.Va. Feb. 18, 2016)]
.

Finally,
the Court notes that, if it were to accept the Parish and the
State's arguments, a later-served defendant could
conceivably sit on his rights and then file a second notice
of removal on a new basis as soon as the case was remanded to
state court. Such an interpretation would not serve the
interests of judicial economy.

Having
determined that Magistrate Judge Kay properly considered
Apache's separate basis for jurisdiction, the Court also
considers the Parish and the State's objection that
Magistrate Judge Kay improperly applied the Supreme Court
test for jurisdiction based on a substantial federal
interest. “Despite the applicability of the
well-pleaded complaint rule, a claim which has origins in
state law may still be found to arise under federal law if it
falls within a ‘special and small category' of
cases.” Borne v. Chevron U.S.A. Holdings,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 15-631, 2015 WL 3417520, at *3 (E.D.
La. May 27, 2015) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.
251, 258 (2013)). The Supreme Court set forth the standard of
review in in Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mnf., 545 U.S. 308
(2005), and this standard was framed as a four-part test in
Gunn:

That is, federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie
if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually
disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in
federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance
approved by Congress. Where all four of these requirements
are met, we held, jurisdiction is proper because there is a
“serious federal interest in claiming the advantages
thought to be inherent in a federal forum, ” which can
be vindicated without ...

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