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Is Japan Tilting toward China?

Key officials in the Bush administration, especially Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, have long been on record as
urging Japan to play a more substantial role in East Asia’s
security affairs. Some of them even want Japanese leaders to
repeal, or at least modify, Article 9 of the country’s
constitution, which renounces war and prevents Japan from taking
military action except to repel a direct attack on its own
territory. The underlying assumption of those American policymakers
is that a Japan free of Article 9’s restrictions would be a much
more useful and reliable U.S. military ally.

With the rise of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, part of
Washington’s wish may come true. In his first statement to the
press and public, Koizumi emphasized the need to change Article 9
and to admit that Japan had a fully functioning military dedicated
to the defense of its security. Since that time, the prime minister
has given other indications that Japan intends to be much more
assertive in defending its interests in East Asia and beyond.

But Armitage and other officials who assume that a more active
Japan will be an obedient junior partner of the United States are
in for an unpleasant surprise. Tokyo shows signs of not only being
more active on the security front, but also of being more
independent of the United States. Nowhere is that trend more
evident than with respect to policy toward China.

Japanese leaders have long been uneasy about the possible
negative consequences for their country if a confrontation erupted
between the United States and China. The recent incident involving
the U.S. spy plane brought those concerns to the forefront. The
plane operated from a U.S. base in Japan’s prefecture of Okinawa,
and more than a few Japanese opinion leaders fretted that, if a
U.S.- Chinese conflict ever broke out, those bases would likely be
targets for Chinese military strikes.

There is also smoldering resentment in Japan over Washington’s
habit of ignoring or marginalizing Tokyo in dealings with China.
The latest episode was President Clinton’s conduct during his 1998
summit meeting in China. Not only did the president fail to stop in
Japan either going to or returning from the summit, but U.S. and
PRC officials issued a series of joint statements that callously
impinged on Japanese interests.

Prime Minister Koizumi’s government has signaled a clear desire
to distance itself from Washington’s policies and to improve
Tokyo’s own relations with Beijing. Koizumi himself stressed the
need for such improvement in a key speech to the Japanese Diet in
early May.

The appointment of Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka also sent such
a signal. She is the daughter of Kakuei Tanaka, the prime minister
who normalized relations with China in the 1970s. In the Japanese
culture, children are normally expected to carry on the views and
policies of their parents. In the course of her political career,
she has also acquired her own reputation of being somewhat
pro-Chinese.

The foreign minister’s initial actions tend to confirm that
impression. After unceremoniously canceling appointments with
several visiting foreign dignitaries, including Armitage, she found
time to meet with China’s foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan. Earlier,
she stated to the press that she had no intention of giving visas
in the future to former Taiwanese president Lee Teng- hui. Tanaka
and other officials also stopped short of endorsing Washington’s
position on ballistic missile defense, much to the disappointment
of the Bush administration.

Tang responded with a surprisingly conciliatory statement,
playing down the previous controversy over a new Japanese textbook
that critics contend whitewashes Imperial Japan’s atrocities during
the 1930s and 1940s. Instead, he emphasized that China would not
make “unreasonable demands” on Japan.

The conditions are in place for a rapprochement between Japan
and China. Tokyo probably will not adopt a position of complete
neutrality between the United States and China. Japanese leaders
regard the alliance with the United States as too important an
insurance policy for Japan if China should turn aggressive to ever
do that. But the Koizumi government is showing every sign of
pursuing an independent policy toward China-one that is designed to
advance Japanese, not American, interests.

Those in the Bush administration who wanted a more active and
assertive Japan are about to discover the price of that change. It
means a Japan less subject to U.S. influence on China policy, and
probably on an assortment of other issues. It is a price well worth
paying to alleviate America’s disproportionate security burdens in
East Asia, but it must be acknowledged.