11/17/2016

First impressions may be important, but when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and US President-elect Donald Trump meet in New York on Thursday, details about the US-Japan relationship will likely be in short supply.

That’s assuming the two leaders manage to actually meet.

One day before the meeting, “Japanese officials said they had not finalized when or where in New York it would take place, who would be invited, or in some cases whom to call for answers,” according to Reuters.

The meeting will almost surely take place, of course, but the disorganization Japanese officials have encountered is just a reflection of the intense infighting and overall chaotic mood that has overtaken Trump’s transition process, supposedly designed to facilitate a smooth takeover of the reins of the US government on January 20.

Efforts to find out who within the Trump camp is in charge of the meeting have been fruitless, with repeated phone calls left unreturned.

Within the Trump transition team, there is no official Asia advisory team. The main figure formally in charge of national security issues, former Congressman Mike Rogers, was ousted earlier this week in a brutal internal power struggle involving Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, whom Trump summarily dumped as chairman of the transition late last week. Rogers was close to Christie.

Trump has yet to nominate a secretary of state, and he has not named a national security advisor. (Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, whose name has been bandied about for the Foggy Bottom job, has apparently dropped down on the favored list, having angered Trump by openly campaigning for the job.)

And State Department officials confirmed yesterday that no one in the Trump camp has been in contact with the department’s Asia experts about the Abe meeting. Indeed, State officials report that no one from the Trump camp has been in official contact with any of the specialists designated by the White House and Secretary of State John Kerry to facilitate a smooth transition from Barack Obama to a Trump administration.

The betting among veteran Asia Hands in Washington is that retired Lt. General Michael Flynn will sit in on Trump’s meeting with Abe. The controversial Flynn, who was ousted as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 2014, is unusually outspoken among intelligence specialists usually known for quiet discretion. He has been Trump’s closest foreign policy and national security advisor for the past year, and is widely thought to have the inside lane to be named Trump’s White House national security advisor.

Flynn has a fairly large network of acquaintances in Japan. During a visit to Tokyo in October, he met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and Democratic Party defense specialist Akihisa Nagashima, among others, and let it be known that Trump would likely urge increased defense spending by Japan.

But Flynn himself has been the target of unflattering attention in Washington in recent days, with reports that the biggest client for his private consulting company is the government of Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan. On Election Day, Flynn published an opinion editorial in the Washington daily The Hill, urging the US to meet one of Erdogan’s biggest demands and extradite to Turkey a controversial cleric living in the US who Turkish officials claim was a facilitator of a failed coup attempt last July.

Trump has no known Japan or Korea specialists in his orbit, Flynn included. His views of Japan have been shaped by nationalist trade hawks who used to criticize Japan for “freeloading” on the US defense budget, while repeatedly outsmarting US officials in trade negotiations. Now, those same trade nationalists aim more of their rage at China, both on trade issues and out of concern about China’s aggressive military buildup.

On the campaign stump, Trump often included Japan in his denunciations of nations that have managed to rig trade ties with the US in ways that have devastated the country’s manufacturing industries and harmed American workers. Trump has also faulted Japan, and South Korea, for failing to boost defense spending commensurate with their economic capabilities.

Two people often cited as Trump advisors on China are University of California economist Peter Navarro and Capitol Hill staffer Alexander Gray. But Navarro is more of an “idea entrepreneur” than a China specialist, and has not even met Trump, and Gray is not a candidate for a top position.

Also cited as a Trump China advisor is Washington veteran Michael Pillsbury, an enigmatic hawk on China who has maneuvered throughout the US foreign policy and intelligence community for decades, managing to remain somewhat influential.

There is no evidence that Trump has any working plans on how to turn his campaign rhetoric into actual policy toward Japan.

The hope among Japan specialists in Washington is that Trump will quickly grasp that the US cannot realistically adopt harder stances toward China and North Korea, if Trump determines that to be warranted, without the close cooperation of Tokyo and Seoul.

The harsh reality is that none of the “advance work” normally done between staff specialists prior to a leadership summit has been conducted between Trump and Abe.

No one knows for sure how Trump, well-known for his limited attention span, will manage to effectively converse with Abe in any depth, when the pressures to make personnel and other big decisions are hitting him from so many directions.

Abe apparently hopes to impress Trump as a bold decision-maker, and a steadfast US ally, with whom the incoming US president can work. Before departing Japan, Abe a told private audience in Tokyo that he plans to defend the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, and present the Japan he governs as a strong supporter of free trade and the rule of law. Abe’s bet is that Trump, while likely to stick to his anti-TPP stance, will see Abe as a strategic partner.

02/01/2016

The hotly contested race for mayor of Ginowan on January 24 did little to ease the intense stalemate over restructuring the heavy presence of US Marines in Okinawa, Japan’s southern-most prefecture.

With strong backing from the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, incumbent mayor Atsushi Sakima garnered 56 percent of the vote, handily beating challenger Keiichiro Shimura in what analysts expected to be a tighter race.

The election amounted to a proxy war between Tokyo (and Washington) on the one side, and the Okinawa prefectural government on the other. The US and Japan almost 20 years ago acquiesced to the inevitable closure of the US Marine Air Station Futenma, which is dangerously located in the center of Ginowan, and settled on moving the Futenma operations to a new air station to be built in the less-populated Henoko Bay area, a district of Nago, which is north of Ginowan.

The Henoko plan has met with fierce opposition among a large majority of Okinawans, striking a discordant note in what is supposed to be a deepening US-Japan security alliance in the face of growing assertiveness by China throughout East Asia.

Prime Minister Abe and Governor Onaga

Abe greeted the Sakima victory with a reaffirmation of his intention to push ahead with construction of the Henoko facility. But Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga, who was swept into office in late 2014 with his insistence that any Futenma replacement facility be located outside of Okinawa, has not changed his position, leaving obstacles in place to hinder smooth implementation of the Henoko plan.

HIGH STAKES STANDOFF: The stakes were high for both Abe and Onaga in the Ginowan race. Abe, who has promised an irritated Washington that he will get the Henoko project built, was anxious to end the recent string of electoral victories for anti-Henoko candidates in Okinawa, including Susumu Inamine as mayor of Nago, Onaga as governor, and all four members of the Lower House from Okinawa, all in 2014. A victory in Ginowan for the anti-Henoko Shimura would have boosted Onaga’s “All Okinawa” claim that public opinion at the local level in Okinawa is united against the Henoko plan, and further complicated implementation.

For Onaga, on the other hand, it is critical to maintain the pressure on Abe that a united Okinawa generates, as part of what Onaga and his aides describe as a strategy to “shame” Washington and Tokyo into changing course. For Tokyo to proceed with Henoko in the face of intense local opposition, Onaga says, would be fundamentally anti-democratic.

Abe pulled out all the stops to get Sakima reelected, including putting his closest confidante, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, in charge of the effort. Suga dispatched influential Diet members to Okinawa to quietly lobby business associations and other interest groups to back Sakima, being careful to keep a low profile so that Tokyo did not appear to be wielding a heavy hand. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party dispatched three staff members from party headquarters to assist the Sakima campaign. Suga backed up Sakima’s idea of bringing a Disney Land resort to the property to be vacated by the Marines at Futenma, personally lobbying executives from the Oriental Land Co. that operates Tokyo Disney Land.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga and Governor Onaga

During the campaign, Sakima tactfully avoided taking a stand on the Henoko facility, insisting instead that Futenma be closed and that Ginowan focus on economic development. Tokyo warned that construction delays in the Henoko project would only result in the hazardous Futenma base remaining open for an indeterminate period of time.

Onaga, for his part, made the quick trip from his office in capital city Naha to central Ginowan to deliver impassioned speeches in support of Shimura and in opposition to the Henoko project.

WHO WON THE PROXY WAR?: Prime Minister Abe and the LDP machinery were quick to claim victory, arguing in essence that the result in Ginowan exposed a myth that public opinion in Okinawa is uniformly opposed to the Henoko project. Abe, and Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, both asserted that construction of the Henoko facility would proceed. Aiko Shimajiri, an LDP Upper House member from Okinawa and Abe’s state minister for Okinawa issues, argued that a “silent majority” had spoken in Ginowan.

But exit polls conducted by Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun tell a very different story. Asahi found that 57 percent of voters said they oppose the Henoko project. Mainichi found that 57 percent were opposed, while only 33 percent favored the new facility. Mainichi also found that 55 percent of voters were critical of the central government’s approach to the Futenma-Henoko issue. Two weeks before the election, Abe told the Diet that “matters related to national security will be decided by the nation as a whole,” effectively dismissing public opinion in Okinawa.

The citizens of Ginowan understandably have mixed feelings about the Futenma-Henoko issue. On the one hand, they favor quick closure of the Futenma base, which occupies a quarter of the city’s entire land mass, and poses a constant danger to surrounding populated neighborhoods. The US and Tokyo have insisted that Futenma will remain open as long as the Henoko replacement facility remains largely stuck on the drawing boards. With the economy of Ginowan weak, citizens also hope to gain from economic development projects that might blossom with the return of land now used by the US Marines at Futenma.

But the evidence is strong that voters in Ginowan, and throughout Okinawa, while desirous of a quick closure of Futenma, also opposed replacing the Futenma base with a new facility in Henoko Bay.

THE NEXT STEPS: The next battles over the US Marine presence in Okinawa will be in the courts, the June elections for the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and the Upper House elections to follow.

The Okinawa Prefectural Government has sued Tokyo, arguing that the central government illegally overturned Onaga’s decision to revoke permission granted by his predecessor for the central government to conduct land reclamation in Henoko Bay necessary for the new facility.

Onaga has little confidence that the courts will rule in Okinawa’s favor, but the process of legal maneuvering will buy him some valuable time to continue to organize political opposition.

June elections for the Prefectural Assembly, which has 48 members, should provide an accurate reading of the mood in Okinawa. The governing coalition, which came to power in 2012, strongly backs Onaga’s fierce opposition to the Henoko facility.

The Upper House elections will have national significance far beyond Okinawa, as they will amount to a referendum on the Abe government, especially new defense and security policies, trade policies, and the prime minister’s personal drive to change the postwar ‘pacifist’ Constitution, for which he needs, among other things, a two-thirds majority in the Upper House.

Aiko Shimajiri

In that context, the seats from Okinawa are important, especially that held by Aiko Shimajiri, who took over the Okinawa portfolio for Abe’s cabinet last October. Shimajiri was first elected to the Upper House from Okinawa in 2007, and is the most prominent politician from Okinawa who sides with the central government in favor of the Henoko facility. Staff close to Onaga say the governor has set his sights on defeating Shimajiri in her upcoming reelection bid.

01/24/2016

It will be back to the future for the citizens of Okinawa’s Ginowan City today, when they cast ballots in the hot race for mayor. The outcome could have a major impact on the controversy over the large US military presence on Okinawa, Japan’s southern-most and poorest prefecture.

Twenty years ago, Ginowan was briefly thrust on the world’s center stage, as the rape of a young woman by three US servicemen led to large demonstrations, reflecting long-simmering anger that Okinawa bears a disproportionate share of the burden for hosting US military facilities in Japan. Washington and Tokyo briefly quelled the high-strung mood on Okinawa by agreeing to close the US Marine Air Station Futenma, dangerously located in the center of Ginowan.

US Marine Air Station Futenma

There was a catch: closure of Futenma was tied to the creation of a replacement facility from which the Futenma operations would carry on.

A large majority of Okinawans favor locating a replacement facility outside of the prefecture. Okinawa comprises just 0.6 percent of Japan’s total land mass, but the US military facilities in the prefecture utilize a full 75 percent of the land used by the US military in all of Japan.

Tokyo and Washington think otherwise, and several years ago settled on construction on a new facility in the Henoko district of Nago. AV-shaped double runway would start from US Marine Camp Schwab, and extend with the help of landfill into Henoko Bay.

Planned Henoko facility

The Henoko plan has sparked a political backlash on Okinawa, sending shivers down the spine of the US-Japan security alliance. An unusual coalition of conservative forces long-associated with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has joined with more left-leaning organizations in opposition. Governor Takeshi Onaga, an LDP stalwart of yesteryear, was swept into office in November 2014 on the basis of his promise to do everything in his power to halt implementation of the Henoko plan. Lower House elections for the national Diet held the following month saw all LDP candidates lose in the races for Okinawa’s four seats.

Governor Onaga has since reversed the decision of his predecessor to approve permits for the landfill projects necessary for construction of the new runways. The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to proceed anyway, prompting Onaga to sue the central government.

BACK TO GINOWAN: Eyes have shifted back to Ginowan because the mayoralty contest has become a proxy for the battle between Tokyo and Washington on the one side, and political forces backing Onaga on the other.

American and Japanese officials argue that closing the Futenma air station will reduce the base-hosting burden on Okinawa, and that the new facility is critical to maintaining the US deterrent in East Asia against an increasingly assertive China. The Abe government is supporting incumbent mayor Atsushi Sakima, who has not shied away from promoting his ties with the central government. Sakima has refused to align with Governor Onaga in opposition to the Henoko facility, and has received incentives from Tokyo in the form of backing for a Disney resort and additional economic aid. Sakima is a talented speaker.

By contrast, challenger Keiichiro Shimura is a low-key former official of the prefectural government, and lacks Sakima’s charisma. But his father was once chairman of the LDP’s Okinawa chapter, and he has made opposition to the Henoko plan the center of his campaign.

At election time, there were roughly 73,600 registered voters in Ginowan. Mayoralty races in the city are usually decided by 2,000 votes or less, and the outcome was too close to call when balloting began.

A win by Shimura would be a huge setback for Abe, and greatly disappoint the US, as Washington and Tokyo would have a harder time arguing that coordinated closure of the Futenma facility and construction of the Henoko facility would reduce the burden on Okinawa.

Onaga would gain political momentum by being able to work with Shimura for four years. The mayor of Nago, Susumu Inamine, was elected in 2014 on a platform of opposition to the Henoko plan. Henoko falls under Nago’s municipal jurisdiction. In the last two years, every major election in Okinawa has been won by opponents of the Henoko project.

Abe hopes a Sakima reelection will knock the wind out of the opposition’s political sails. The prime minister’s office has been careful to not dispatch to Okinawa high-profile Cabinet ministers, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, or Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, out of concern that their support for Sakima would not be well-received. A few well-known LDP Diet members, such as Toshihiro Nikai (chairman of the LDP’s General Council) and Toshimitsu Motegi (who ran the LDP’s election campaign in late 2014) have visited, but dared not campaign in public for Sakima. They opted instead for small private meetings with business leaders, whom they hope will influence their employees to vote for Sakima.

08/09/2015

On July 19, Mitsubishi Materials Corp. took the landmark step of issuing a formal apology to American ex-Prisoners of War (POWs) forced to work under “inhumane” conditions in copper mines run by the company’s predecessor – Mitsubishi Mining – during World War II. The apology was a first by a major Japanese firm. An estimated 12,000 US POWs were forced to work by Japanese government and private companies during the war. The apology was delivered by Hikaru Kimura, a senior executive of Mitsubishi Materials, at a ceremony held at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. Kimura expressed a “most remorseful apology” to the estimated 900 POWs who were forced to work in conditions of “harsh, severe hardships.”

Also present was Yukio Okamoto, a Mitsubishi outside director, and former POW James Murphy of California, who accepted the apology.

Okamoto said he “entered the room with a heavy heart, seeking forgiveness,” adding that “we also have to apologize for not apologizing earlier.” (See interview, below.) Okamoto, a former diplomat and advisor to then-prime ministers Ryutaro Hashimoto, Junichiro Koizumi, and Yasuo Fukuda, is also a member of the 16-member Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and World Order in the 21st Century,” which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe established to counsel him on a statement to be issued around August 15 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II.

It’s unclear if Mitsubishi’s actions, or the advisory panel, will have any influence on the content of Abe’s statement, but the prime minister may be bending to considerable pressure to emulate his predecessors Tomiichi Murayama and Junichiro Koizumi and acknowledge Japan’s “aggression” and “colonial rule” in the first half of the 20th century.

The Japanese government has officially apologized to ex-American POWs on several occasions, but long stood firm against providing any compensation on the grounds that the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 had settled all claims stemming from World War II. In recent times, the ex-POWs have dropped their demand for compensation, but have continued their anguished search for an apology from Japanese firms that exploited them as forced labor in what Okamoto termed “inhumane conditions.”

In the past, some prominent Japanese firms have quietly considered issuing apologies, and perhaps even compensation, to ex-POWs, only to encounter deep resistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which cited the San Francisco Treaty. But Okamoto says the MOFA has inaudibly shifted its stance. “The MOFA is no longer saying that the issue was settled by the Peace Treaty, and that we have to be mindful of legal stability. They are no longer holding on to that position.” Mitsubishi Materials’s actions could now spur other Japanese firms to follow suit.

The most poignant aspect of Mitsubishi’s action was not the apology itself, but the genuineness conveyed by words used to reinforce the apology. In a talk before the Foreign Correspondent’s Club (FCCJ) in Tokyo on July 22, just days after the Los Angeles event, Okamoto said that Mitsubishi is prepared to extend the same apology to former British, Dutch, and Australian POWs. “Ours is one of the companies who tortured POWs most, so we have to apologize,” he said.

COMPENSATION FOR FORCED CHINESE LABORERS: Meanwhile, in what could have widespread repercussions in Northeast Asia, Mitsubishi Materials officials have privately revealed that they are close to announcing an agreement with close to 4,000 Chinese citizens (or bereaved family of) who were used as forced labor during World War II. The company will acknowledge “a historical fact that the company violated human rights during World War II,” and will express its “heartfelt regret” and “deep apology,” for its actions.

From 1944-1945, upwards of 37,000 Chinese were brought to Japan due to severe labor shortages in the war-ravaged country. An estimated 6,830 died while working under harsh conditions. Mitsubishi Mining exploited close to 4,000, of whom about 1,500 have been found and identified.

Each of the roughly 4,000 victims (or their respective families) will receive about $16,140 in compensation.

Mitsubishi acted even though Japan’s Supreme Court had previously dismissed in 1997 a lawsuit filed on behalf of the Chinese laborers. The Court ruled that all claims had been settled by the 1972 communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. The Supreme Court ruling was in line with the stance of the Japanese government.

Much as former forced laborers from Korea had done in Seoul, the Chinese victims had begun to file suit in Chinese courts. In Korea, the high court ruled in 2013 that former Korean forced laborers were entitled to compensation, even though the Korean government at the time agreed with Tokyo that the 1965 Treaty between Japan and Korea had settled all claims stemming from World War II.

China has never officially demanded compensation from Japanese companies, arguing that Japan’s political leadership was responsible for war crimes, not the Japanese people, thereby absolving private Japanese firms of responsibility.

Negotiations between Mitsubishi and representatives of Chinese forced laborers began in early 2014. Mitsubishi officials were anxious to have the issue resolved by this year, prior to the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Mitsubishi, which is looking to expand business in China, also did not want the forced labor issue tarnishing its image.

KOREA NOT INCLUDED: Thousands of Koreans were also forced to work in Japan during the war, but thus far Mitsubishi has not reached out to the 6,489 who toiled for its various group companies, including 4,150 for Mitsubishi Mining.

Okamoto says the legal circumstances differ between Chinese and Korea laborers exploited in Japan. Korea came under Japanese colonial rule in 1910, so Koreans were technically Japanese citizens ordered to work, as were all Japanese, under the 1938 mobilization law. Korean laborers were paid the same amount as Japanese nationals, though the currency in which they were paid became useless at the end of the war. The 2013 Korean court ruling says that the Korean workers were, for all practical purposes, never paid for their labor.

But Okamoto is quick to add that, legality aside, “the fundamental sin was the annexation of Korea, obliterating their national identities. We did not allow Koreans to use their own name, use their language. We even forced Shintoism on them to create second-class Japanese citizens.”

THE ABE STATEMENT: Coincidentally or not, the actions by Mitsubishi came just as the panel appointed by Abe to advise him on his 70th anniversary statement was about to make public its report.

For weeks, authoritative “leaks” circulated that indicated the panel was trying to corner a reluctant Abe into using the words “aggression” and “colonial rule,” while softening the explicit apology issued by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995, and Prime Minister Juniichi Koizumi in 2005.

Prime Minister Abe is known to harbor a strict ideological aversion to use of those words.

Sure enough, on August 6, the advisory committee issued a report that criticized Japan’s “aggression” and “colonial rule” in the first half of the 20th century in what amounted to a “reckless war.” The report also thoroughly repudiated the notion popular among “revisionists” that Japan’s intention in the 1930s-1945 was to “liberate” the rest of Asia from Western colonial rule.

At this point, the proverbial diplomatic ball is in Shinzo Abe’s court. What will he say in his upcoming statement marking the 70th anniversary of the close of World War II? Abe deeply clings to the romantic illusion that annexation of Korea in 1910 was “legal,” and that the militarist rampage through China and Southeast Asia during the 1931-1945 period was somehow guided by noble intentions. It’s not surprising that Abe’s hero is his grandfather, the late Nobusuke Kishi, who was a key architect of Japan’s wartime policies.

Until recently, Abe seemed very unlikely to use the words “aggression” or “colonial rule,” terms he has never come close to uttering with respect to Japan’s calamitous wartime actions. Moreover, he seemed unlikely to communicate the genuineness of Yukio Okamoto’s apologies to ex-POWs, to exploited Chinese laborers, and for the annexation of Korea, or to capture to earnestness of his own advisory committee’s rejection of the revisionist notion that Japan was out to “liberate” the rest of Asia.

A lot is riding on Abe’s upcoming statement. Failure to heed the advice of his own advisory committee would likely lead to another round of icy diplomatic relations in Northeast Asia. And the United States, after having rolled out a red carpet for Abe during his late-April visit to Washington, would be in a weak position to disentangle itself from the regional political damage Abe could very well cause.

Okamoto: ‘Annexation of Korea Japan’s fundamental sin’

Yukio Okamoto is president of Okamoto Associates, Inc., providing strategic political and economic advice to major corporations. From 1968 to 1991 he was a career diplomat in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including postings in Paris and Washington, and responsibility for helping manage the day-to-day operations of the US-Japan security relationship.

Mr. Okamoto serves as a board member for several Japanese multinational firms, including Mitsubishi Materials. Well-versed in economic and government policy debates, he is a familiar figure both in Japan and within the United States government. He is currently the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Mr. Okamoto has also served as a special advisor to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, Special Advisor on Iraq to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and chairman of Koizumi’s task force on foreign relations. In addition, he was a member of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s Study Group on Diplomacy.

Mr. Okamoto also served on the 16-person committee appointed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to advise him on the statement he will issue in August commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How did Mitsubishi Materials come to the decision to apologize to US POWs, and to compensate Chinese forced laborers? What were the discussions inside the company like?

OKAMOTO: Mitsubishi Materials was sued by American POWs some years back [1999]. We had to take up the issue quite seriously. Within the company, we conducted an extensive examination. We were sympathetic to the cause of the POWs, and we decided that we had to be very sincere, and not hide behind the official government position that all claims against the Japanese government or private companies had been settled by San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.

We tried to communicate with the POWs, working through American intermediaries, in the hope of reaching an amicable settlement, including an apology.

But there were many elements to be considered. Many outsiders said many things, so our goal did not materialize. I can’t say much more about this, except that we consulted outsiders. The time was simply not mature enough for us to go ahead. These were not, of course, formal consultations, but they advised us.

Then, early last year, there was another approach, by a volunteer -- who was apparently working with the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. She is Kinue Tokudome, director of the US-Japan Dialogue on POWs. We knew from our previous consideration and examination of the issue that we had to face it with sincerity. So this time, we decided to comply with the request to express an apology.

It took a while to arrange the meeting that occurred recently in Los Angeles.

DISPATCH JAPAN: When did Mitsubishi make the decision to extend this approach to Chinese laborers who were forced to work for Japanese companies?

OKAMOTO: There has been an ongoing lawsuit with Chinese forced laborers. The issue is not the same as that with the American POWs. But there was a prevailing feeling that Mitsubishi as a private company used these laborers, and therefore had to apologize in the same manner. The difference is that the American POWs were no longer demanding financial compensation; they just wanted an apology. By contrast, the Chinese argue that our response is in essence an extension of the law suit, so we have been talking about the amount of reparation as well.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What was the response from the big business federation Keidanren, or individual Japanese companies? Have you received criticism? Or is there sentiment in favor of the actions you are taking?

OKAMOTO: We have not contacted Keidanren, or other companies. We have been doing this on our own. There is no official contact. All I know is through my friends, who work for a wide variety of companies, and they have been supportive.

DISPATCH JAPAN: But this could have major implications for other companies, right?

OKAMOTO: I don’t know. I have not spoken with executives from other companies that actually used POWs as forced laborers. The people to whom I have spoken represent a kind of Japanese common sense. But I do not know what the other firms who used POWs as laborers are going to decide. We should remember that Mitsubishi Materials succeeded Mitsubishi Mining, and is a different corporate entity. Nonetheless, we assumed what we thought was our responsibility. We remain a big company. On the other hand, a good number of the coal mining companies that used forced laborers are now quite small, as a result of the virtual death of coal mining in Japan. I don’t know what those firms will decide.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there any thought about creating a compensation fund for forced laborers involving the business community as a whole?

OKAMOTO: Not that I know of. I have not spoken with Keidanren. And we are not in a position to preach to other companies about steps they might take.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded? As you indicated, providing compensation to forced laborers is contrary to the longstanding government position that all claims against Japanese public and private entities were settled by the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

OKAMOTO: I think officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are sympathetic to us as a private firm having made the decision to apologize to American POWs. The MOFA is no longer saying that the issue was settled by the Peace Treaty, and that we have to be mindful of legal stability. They are no longer holding on to that position. They used to say that if a private company apologizes and pays compensation, it might rock the legal settlement reached at the official level. This was the position as of the Foreign Ministry until several years ago.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is this your perception through informal communication with Foreign Ministry officials, or do you regard this as a change in the official position?

OKAMOTO: I’ll have to check about the actual official MOFA stance. But I have many friends there, and I have informally been telling them about our plans. They perfectly understood, and they said that the government, of course, would not stand in our way.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about the Chinese government? Have you been communicating with officials in Beijing? Does this have broader diplomatic implications for Japan-China relations?

OKAMOTO: The company has been communicating with the Japanese foreign ministry. I would be surprised if they are not doing anything. I think they are at least consulting with their Chinese counterparts. But I do not know the content of the discussions at the government level.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about Korea? Are there discussions with Korean forced laborers, or is that more complicated because of their legal status as Japanese ‘citizens’ during the colonial period?

OKAMOTO: There are not any talks with Koreans. The Korean case is quite different. Koreans were mobilized as laborers, just as Japanese were mobilized. This was, of course, a very wrong policy on the part of the Japanese government of that time. It is Japan’s historical sin to have annexed Korea in 1910. But in a formal sense, they were technically ‘Japanese,’ so when the national mobilization law took effect in 1938, they were mobilized along with Japanese nationals, and put to work. They were given a choice: be conscripted into the armed forces to fight as a soldier, or, to work at a factory. There were many Koreans taken to factories. They were placed under the same labor conditions as Japanese. I do not assume the working conditions were not as harsh and cruel as those to which Chinese and POWS were subjected. But Korean workers were paid. Of course, whether they were paid in cash, or in the form of military money, it all amounted to trash after the war.

It amounted, in effect, to zero compensation. But all of the Japanese mobilized in a similar fashion had to accept that fate. But Korean nationals, of course, were not satisfied. This is essentially an issue of unpaid labor and abuse. Japan has to deal with this issue sincerely of course, but the legal nature is different.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you foresee any scenario for getting around that problem?

OKAMOTO: In the case of Korea, in addition to the substantial difference in the labor issue, the legal status is also completely different. Japan concluded with Korea the renunciation of the right-to-compensation treaty in 1965. The Koreans clearly and unambiguously settled the issue. So there is resentment within the Japanese government. The treaty binds the entire nation of Korea – not only the administrative branch, but the judicial branch as well – yet the Korean Supreme Court has ruled against the treaty. The Korean case is quite difficult, and at this point I certainly do not see how this will evolve.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You don’t have any ideas about how deadlock might be broken?

OKAMOTO: I don’t even know personally if we [Mitsubishi Materials] used Korean laborers. If they were used, it means they were placed under the same conditions as Japanese nationals. I feel sympathetic to POWs and Chinese laborers, since we have ample evidence that these people were subjected to inhuman conditions. But in the Korean case, I do not know to what extent, if any, we shoulder some blame.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The Mitsubishi Materials announcement comes shortly before Prime Minister Abe’s expected statement commemorating the August 15 end of the Pacific War 70 years ago. I don’t know if this is just coincidental. Does Mitsubishi’s decision concerning POWs and Chinese laborers have any implications for the prime minister’s statement?

OKAMOTO: I don’t know. You would have to ask Prime Minister Abe himself. The committee appointed by the prime minister to advise him on the statement has released its report. But the prime minister’s statement will be issued separate from our report. It is the 70th anniversary, and I do not deny that the sequence of events leading to a new reconciliation has been influencing Japanese society. Mr. Abe spoke to the US Congress, and referred to Bataan and Corregidor in the Philippines [where Japanese forces terribly mistreated American POWs], expressing deep repentance.

In other words, Prime Minister Abe officially apologized to American nationals. Of course, that made our decision as a private company much easier. American POWs used by Mitsubishi were virtually all seized at Bataan and Corregidor. So, I think our apology and the prime minister’s statement are related.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Perhaps I am asking for your personal opinion. You referred to the annexation of Korea in 1910 as Japan’s “historical sin.” I am not sure Prime Minister Abe agrees with that.

OKAMOTO: I don’t think the prime minister defends the annexation of Korea. There is a national consensus that the annexation was wrong.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Really? A national consensus? I hear some politicians, writers, and even some historians regularly defend the annexation as “legal.”

OKAMOTO: You are not listening to honest people.

DISPATCH JAPAN: If there is a national consensus that annexation of Korea was wrong, why has Abe always avoided the word “colonization” with respect to Japan’s actions in Korea?

OKAMOTO: The prime minister has no specific resentment to using the four “key words” that journalists are calling for: colonialism, aggression, apology, and repentance. But he thinks we have done enough, in the past, using those words, having issued apologies more than 10 times via written statements by prime ministers. Rather than continue to be shackled by those terminologies, we will, by substance, aim for a new vision that will serve the interests of the nation. The tone will be forward-looking.

Whether or not those ‘key words’ are used is not the result of historical interpretation as to the rightness or wrongness of Japan’s past actions.

I teach at a university, and students often ask me for just how long Japan will have to keep apologizing. Certainly, for my generation, Japan’s mistaken policies were decisions made by our fathers and grandfathers, so we still are besieged by the sense of guilt. But my students are two generations younger, and the wartime policies were carried out by their great, or great-great grandfathers. These students bear no responsibility for our dark past. We have a moral obligation to keep apologizing to the victims of our past. But we also have a responsibility not to make these students immersed in pessimism.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will you be comfortable with a 70th anniversary statement from Prime Minister Abe that does not include the words “aggression” and “colonialism”?

OKAMOTO: I will simply say that those are not crucial points. I will make my judgment based on the overall tone of the prime minister’s statement.

07/15/2015

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continues to struggle with widespread public opposition to his push to overhaul Japan’s pacifist, “self-defense only” security policy. But that is not Abe’s only headache on defense issues.

Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga is escalating his fierce resistance to a US-Japan plan to build a new US Marine facility in Japan’s southern-most, and poorest, prefecture. (See interview, below.)

A stalemate causing long construction delays would be a severe embarrassment for Abe, who has pledged to swiftly implement the plan. Abe was warmly welcomed in Washington in late April in part because of the widespread belief that he can deliver on that promise.

But Washington is sufficiently concerned that, following an early-June visit to the US capital by Onaga, US officials inquired as to whether there would be significant constructions delays on the new facility, planned for the coastal district of Henoko, part of Nago city. Japanese officials reassured their American counterparts that the project would proceed as scheduled. But the reassurances had a hollow ring.

Onaga was swept into office last November on a wave of anger over the 2013 decision by his predecessor, Hirokazu Nakaima, to approve a massive landfill project necessary for construction of the new base. The Henoko facility is supposed to replace the existing Marine Air Station Futenma, which the US and Japan agreed to close almost twenty years ago – contingent upon construction of an alternative base. Futenma is dangerously located in the center of the city of Ginowan, and has long been seen as a disaster waiting to happen.

Onaga insists that a prospective ‘Futenma Replacement Facility’ (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa, as the prefecture already makes available over 70 percent of the land in Japan utilized by US military facilities. Okinawa prefecture makes up less than one percent of all of Japan’s territory. Tokyo and Washington over the years have outwardly acknowledged the huge imbalance in the burden of hosting of US bases in Japan, but little has changed on the ground. US and Japanese officials insist there is “no viable alternative” to placing the FRF in Henoko, but Onaga says this is just a continuation of long-standing exploitation of Okinawa.

Onaga is a conservative at heart, and a strong supporter of the US-Japan security alliance. He used to head up the Okinawa chapter of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and was the campaign manager for Nakaima’s successful 2010 reelection campaign, during which Nakaima pledged to keep the FRF out of Okinawa. Onaga was furious when Nakaima broke his pledge, and has been campaigning against the Henoko project ever since.

Shortly after taking office in December of last year, Onaga pledged to look for legal flaws in Nakaima’s approval of the landfill project, as a means to cancel the permit, as part of his commitment to use every means available to stop the project. He subsequently established a 6-person panel to investigate Nakaima’s decision-making process. The panel initially said it would issue its report at the end of June, but the release will likely not take place until the end of this month.

Numerous media reports indicate the 6-person panel has already decided to state in its review that Nakaima failed to sufficiently consider, and put into to place to counter, likely environmental problems associated with the Henoko project. The framework of the decision is reportedly already in place, and the panel is now working on the final language. At the time of his decision, Nakaima said that concerns about the environment were fully taken into account, but officials from the Okinawa environment and life department say that Onaga’s predecessor ignored their remaining concerns.

Based on the panel’s likely finding, Onaga could withdraw the landfill permit, putting a major obstacle in front of Abe’s commitment to Washington. Indeed, numerous Japanese media organs report that Onaga has already decided to withdraw the permit, but his office will not confirm that.

Legal specialists say that Onaga has authority over at least 10 areas related to the Henoko project, including: rescinding of the landfill decision; cancel permits to crush coral reefs that now lie below areas where an envisioned V-shaped runway will jut out into Henoko Bay; rescind permits to alter roads leading to the construction site.

ONAGA TO WASHINGTON: Onaga, along with a large delegation of Okinawa Prefectural Assembly members, brought their case to Washington, hoping to meet influential Americans who might press the Obama administration and Congress for a change in policy. The Obama administration only made available two mid-level officials from the State and Defense departments. The State Department issued a statement reiterating US policy that there was “no viable alternative” to the Henoko project. Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee was the most senior member of Congress to agree to meet Onaga. His office issued a statement echoing that of the State Department. In the past, McCain had seemed to be a skeptic of the Henoko project, but that was largely motivated by his concerns about the costs of related US plans to relocate upwards of 8,000 Marines to Guam.

Former Senator Jim Webb, a decorated former Marine and former secretary of the Navy, told Dispatch Japan that he reluctantly turned down a request from Onaga for a meeting. Webb has declared his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination. While in the Senate, Webb worked hard to stop the Henoko project, and devise a new deployment strategy for the Marines in East Asia.

Subsequent to the visit, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly adopted an ordinance that would virtually block the importation of soil from outside of Okinawa for use in the landfill project that must precede construction of the facility itself.

Overall, Onaga demonstrated an unusually pugnacious, if polite, willingness to speak directly to US officials. He denied at a June 3 press conference that the trip had been a failure, saying he never expected the US government to easily change its view. Onaga has established an official prefectural office in Washington to continue lobbying Congress and the administration.

ONAGA-SUGA TALKS: Meanwhile, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, whom Abe has charged with resolving the Henoko stalemate, met with Onaga for two hours over dinner at the Okura Hotel on July 4th. Onaga deeply dislikes Suga, whom he humorously derides in talks with reporters.

Onaga told reporters upon leaving the meeting that Suga had agreed to engage in “serious” talks on the Hekono issue. Suga is scheduled to visit Okinawa at the end of this month. The dinner did include talk of the national budget for FY2016, which starts next April, with an eye on the amount of aid to be provided to Okinawa.

At least part of the dinner was taken up with Suga apologizing for the June 25th proceedings of an LDP Diet member study group consisting mostly of young, haughty nationalists who rode Abe’s coattails into office. The study group hosted ultra-nationalist novelist Naoki Hyakuta, a friend of Abe, who urged that Okinawa’s two leading newspapers – both oppose the Henoko project – be punished for their respective stances, and ultimately shut down. Hyakuta is one of Japan’s most vitriolic deniers of the Nanjing Massacre. Several Diet members echoed views on Okinawa, with one saying that public opinion in Okinawa is “contorted.”

In questioning before the Diet, Abe initially declined to apologize to Okinawans, but recanted and issued an apology, saying the remarks were “thoughtless.”

Suga has reminded Abe that it works against the Abe administration to unnecessarily antagonize Okinawans, and let the Henoko issue fester, with no sign of any effort to accommodate Okinawan concerns. Abe and Suga both felt that danger on June 23, at an annual solemn commemoration marking the end of the 3-month Battle of Okinawa in 1945. It’s customary for the prime minister to attend. Abe was met with heckles and jeers, in a public display of disdain that is highly unusual in Japan.

Abe desperately wants to avoid a showdown that would require the use of force to dislodge protesters to enable construction to proceed. Onaga knows this, and is using it to his advantage.

At the same time, Onaga knows that in the long-run, he cannot win a legal or violent showdown with a Tokyo determined to proceed. Onaga’s plan is to demonstrate so much opposition among Okinawans to the Henoko project that Washington and Tokyo will be shamed into devising a new plan.

INTERVIEW

Okinawa Governor Takeshi Onaga

'Henoko project would damage US-Japan relations'

DISPATCH JAPAN: The conflict between Okinawa and the central government has become so intense that it raises the question: do you think of yourself primarily as Okinawan or Japanese?

ONAGA: Fundamentally, I believe I am Japanese. However, sometimes, when I consider our historical development and the status quo, I have some doubts about this. But, fundamentally, I am Japanese.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you harbor any desire for Okinawa to break away from Japan?

ONAGA: I have no intention of trying to achieve independence of Okinawa from Japan. However, looking at the status quo, it is clear that Okinawa bears an excessive burden of the US military base presence in Japan. Okinawa accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japan’s national territory, but US facilities in Okinawa are located on land that amounts to 73.8 percent of all land in Japan utilized by US facilities in all of Japan. Seventy years ago, at the time of the grand battle in Okinawa, more than 200,000 people died, including at least 100,000 Okinawan people. At the San Francisco peace treaty conference, Okinawa was separated from Japan. That means that when I was growing up, I was neither a Japanese citizen nor an American citizen. This fact remains in the back of my mind. But I feel responsible to play my role as a Japanese person.

Meanwhile, the issue of US military bases in Okinawa remains. The central government continues to impose the heavy burden on Okinawa to host such a big portion of US military facilities. It is unfair. The dignity and human rights of Okinawans have not been defended.

In last year’s elections, all four candidates for the national Diet endorsed by the Liberal Democrats (LDP) were defeated. And the LDP candidates for mayor of Nago City, for the Nago assembly, and for the governor of Okinawa prefecture were all rejected by voters. Candidates who opposed the Henoko base construction plan were elected. But the central government ignored these results. It is not Okinawa that tries to distinguish itself from the rest of Japan. It is the central government that treats Okinawa as if it were not part of Japan.

DISPATCH JAPAN: From the Okinawa point of view, which is more complicated: relations with Tokyo, or relations with the US Marines?

ONAGA: Both are difficult. But if I have to identify the bigger problem, I would say it is the central government in Tokyo. It is the responsibility of the central government to protect the Japanese people. I understand that the US military suffered many casualties on Okinawa toward the end of the Pacific War, and established bases on Okinawa in preparation of possible future conflicts. And I understand that both Japan and the US are democratic nations working together to deal with common concerns, such as the rise of China. But I think the US military has to pay more attention to the burden imposed on Okinawa by the heavy US base presence. To not do so could pose a risk to the whole bilateral security arrangement.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Despite the conflict over the Henoko project, do you remain a supporter of the US-Japan alliance?

ONAGA: I have served as a politician for over 30 years, and I have consistently supported the US-Japan security arrangement. However, the burden of hosting so much of the US military presence is simply excessive. With regard to the Futenma air station, our land was expropriated by the US forces, and our people were forced into concentration camp conditions. With regard to other US bases, the US used bulldozers to destroy our houses, expropriate our land, and build new bases. The people of Okinawa have never voluntarily offered our land for base construction. And now, the US acknowledges that the Futenma air station is the most dangerous airport in the world. But the US says that if Okinawans oppose construction of the new Henoko facility, it is Okinawa that must come up with an alternative plan.

The Japanese government often makes similar comments, and asks us: “Are you Okinawans really thinking about the security of Japan?” This is remarkable. Okinawa was separated from Japan by the San Francisco Treaty, and hosted most of the US bases, which in turn allowed Japan proper to focus on high-level economic development. Okinawa has suffered a lot, which is a situation that cannot endure.

I fully accept the US-Japan security arrangement, assuming it is fair. The US-Japan security arrangement has to be dignified, and protect freedom, democracy, and human rights. This is very helpful to Asia, and the rest of the world. But, at this point, the security arrangement does not extend these values to the Okinawan people. Under these circumstances, the alliance is groundless.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Privately, some US officials say that the Yokosuka naval facility, and the Kadena air base are the top strategic priorities, and that everything else should be negotiable. Do you agree with the idea that Yokosuka and Kadena are crucial?

ONAGA: In the past, many reformists in Okinawa were opposed to all US bases in the prefecture. But I have spoken extensively with the reformists, and the consensus now is that if the Henoko plan is abandoned, the rest of the bases would be tolerable. I understand your question, but I can’t really comment on whether other individual bases are critical or not.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The fuel tankers that used to be based at Futenma have already moved to Iwakuni. So the issue is: where to base the 24 Osprey the Marines want to place in Okinawa. Couldn’t the Osprey be placed inside Camp Schwab, or inside the Kadena air base? In other words, why do the Marines need a new runway at Henoko? Top officials from the Ministry of Defense have told me that they have asked the same question, and have not heard a good answer from the US about the need for a new runway.

ONAGA: It is not clear to me why the Marines want a new runway at Henoko. But my suspicion is that in 30-40 years, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces will utilize the new facility. The former defense minister, Satoshi Morimoto, has written that the Henoko facility is designed to eventually host more than 100 Osprey. Morimoto wrote in his last book that 12 Osprey would be deployed to Okinawa in 2012, and another 12 in 2013. At the time, the MOD denied any knowledge of such a plan. But it turned out to be true. So the real question is: how many Osprey do the Marines plan to deploy in Okinawa? We don’t know.

ONAGA: Looking back over his personal history, Suga has tried to cozy up with people in power so as to promote himself. That is at the root of Suga’s relationship with Abe.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you expect from Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming statement commemorating the end of World War II 70 years ago?

ONAGA: I would like to hear Abe repeat the words of former prime ministers Murayama and Koizumi.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Prime Minister Abe on occasion has questioned the validity of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

ONAGA: Two years ago, Prime Minister Abe sponsored a ceremony celebrating the signing of the treaty, as it marked the return of sovereignty to Japan. But Okinawans were shocked, because Okinawa was separated from the rest of Japan, and kept under US occupation. Abe was not thinking about Okinawa. This indicated to me that Japan’s sense of responsibility to other countries is weak. In this sense, I think Abe has inherited the ideas of his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke. Abe has often said that he wants Japan to emerge from under the postwar regime, and restore pride in Japan. But I wonder whether Abe includes Okinawa in his thinking, because with regards to Okinawa, Abe is desperately defending the postwar regime.

DISPATCH JAPAN: With regards to Henoko, have you already made your decision to reverse the landfill approval of former governor Nakaima that allows construction at Henoko to proceed?

ONAGA: Several years ago I served as campaign manager for then-governor Nakaima. I spent many hours with him, and we agreed on the campaign pledge to move a Futenma replacement facility outside of Okinawa. But later, without any consultation with me, he approved the landfill application, which was very damaging to the pride of Okinawans. People on the mainland said that Nakaima made his decision in exchange for economic aid from Tokyo. This was very hurtful. I decided to run for governor to help restore the damaged pride of Okinawans. I have a very strong determination to oppose the Henoko project, perhaps by reversing Nakaima’s decision.

But I am also aware of the US-Japan security situation, so my administration is trying to engage in talks with the US and Tokyo to find a solution.

If Japan and the US try to push ahead with the Henoko project, which they justify in part as a response to the rise of China, then the image of the US will be very damaged. That is why I think the new facility will actually not be built.

05/22/2015

The May 17 demonstration in Okinawa in opposition to the Henoko project brought out 35,000 people, which was the largest gathering of opponents since Governor Takeshi Onaga defeated incumbent Hirokazu Nakaima last November.

There have been larger demonstrations in recent years, with 90,000 having gathered in 2010 to protest the prospect of building a new facility in Henoko Bay, off the coast of Marine Camp Schwab, to replace the Marine Air Station Futenma, dangerously located in the center of Ginowan City. In 2012, somewhere between 50,000 – 100,000 gathered in a park in Ginowan to protest the then-planned deployment of the hybrid Osprey aircraft to the Futenma base.

While relatively small, the demonstration last Sunday marked an important turning point, with average Okinawans seeming to gain faith that Governor Onaga will fulfill his campaign promise to give his all to stop construction of the new Henoko facility.

Even though voters swept Onaga into office last November, and voted down all four parliamentary candidates in Okinawa backed by the Abe administration and the LDP, they remained skeptical that Onaga would be willing and able to follow through on his unambiguous campaign promise.

Many Okinawans felt betrayed by Nakaima, who had seemed to promise to block construction of the Henoko facility, only to give his approval for necessary landfills in December 2013. Nakaima, with what came across as a verbal sleight of hand, claimed he had never promised to block the Henoko facility, but only to close the Funtema facility as soon as possible. The reaction against Nakaima was swift; his vain attempt at reelection ended in humiliating defeat.

But, while Onaga was welcomed as a sincere alternative to the chameleon-like Nakaima, the mood in Okinawa turned decidedly dour, with many voters and civic activists doubtful that Onaga would ultimately stand up to Tokyo. For many, it seemed inevitable that the Henoko project would be built, and the third-class status that many Okinawans feel is their plight would continue unabated.

Demonstrators have consistently shown up at the planned construction site for the new facility, but the numbers have been small, with a wait-and-see attitude toward Onaga prevailing among the somewhat fatalistic Okinawan population.

But now it’s Onaga’s determination that appears unabated, and average Okinawans have taken notice.

Onaga has put Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and his top aide, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, on the defense, suggesting meetings to discuss the impasse, only to put Abe and Suga in the embarrassing position of refusing to meet. Suga, whom Abe put in charge of the Okinawa problem, eventually gave in, and has met with Onaga several times. On April 5, Suga flew down to Okinawa, and repeated the oft-heard contention that there is “no alternative” to a new facility at Henoko as a replacement for the obsolete Futenma facility. Onaga, who has become known for his comedic-sarcastic mimicking of Suga’s predictable comments, responded with a brief history of postwar Okinawa. After the brutal Battle of Okinawa in April-June 1945, the US constructed what turned out to be permanent bases on what is Japan’s southern-most prefecture.

While the post-war US occupation of Japan ended in 1952, returning full sovereignty to Japan, the US maintained control of Okinawa for another 20 years. For Okinawans, this amounted to abandonment, and solidified a feeling of alienation from mainland Japan that continues to this day. Onaga told Suga that, with regard to US bases, “all of the land for those bases, including Futenma, was expropriated.” Onaga went on to say that Tokyo does not treat Okinawa, and Okinawans, as a full-fledged part of Japan.

Onaga cannot easily be dismissed as an ideological opponent to the US-Japan security alliance. He formerly headed up the Okinawa chapter of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, and broke with the central government with great reluctance. He is now the leader of a new political reality in Okinawa: a broad coalition of leftists, liberals, and conservatives alike who believe the time has come for Okinawa to no longer bear the overwhelming burden of US forces deployed in Japan.

Following Suga’s ill-fated visit to Okinawa, Prime Minister Abe gave it his best shot by finally agreeing to meet Onaga in Tokyo on April 17, prior to the prime minister’s late April visit to Washington. The result was the same. Abe acknowledged that the Futenma facility is dangerous, and must be closed – a common US-Japan understanding for the past 20 years – but insisted that the planned Henoko facility is the only viable replacement. Onaga later told reporters about his response to Abe: “I said that I will never allow a new base in Henoko.”

Onaga has crossed the Rubicon; there is no going back for him, and the recognition of that fact is gradually easing the sense of demoralization among many Okinawans that followed former governor Nakaima’s decision to allow the Henoko project to move forward.

ONAGA: RELUCTANT ACTIVIST: Can Onaga really stop the Henoko project? The governor knows that if the issue comes down to brute force, there is little he can do to stop a determined central government. But will Tokyo, backed by the US, really want to engage in the brutal police tactics that would likely be required to push past determined demonstrators backed by the governor of Okinawa?

Several sources close to Onaga report that the governor has commented in private that Tokyo too easily forgets the pleas from Okinawa, so “it might be better to throw rocks because no one forgets pain.” Indeed, Onaga wants his ‘private’ comments public, as his office has provided the information to numerous journalists.

Onaga is not a professional, anti-American rabble-rouser. This comes from a governor who is conservative at heart, moderate in temperament, and reluctant to be an activist, but who is fed up with what he truly believes is mistreatment of Okinawa by both the United States and Japan’s central government.

ONAGA’S STRATEGY: Governor Onaga also knows that if the impasse over the Henoko project boils down to a battle in the courts, Okinawa will almost surely lose. He has been pursuing a four-part strategy that ultimately rests on mobilizing large demonstrations of public opposition that might force Washington and Tokyo to reconsider: 1) Slow down the construction process as much as possible, until he can put together an air-tight legal argument to overturn former governor Nakaima’s approval of the landfill procedures needed for construction of the envisioned new facility. Construction was supposed to begin this summer, but all involved unofficially acknowledge that the project won’t get underway until Autumn, at the earliest. Onaga intends to delay construction in part by rejecting what would normally be routine requests for modifications to the existing building plans. Each rejection will likely require court intervention, pushing construction further behind schedule; 2) Produce a report, now scheduled for late June or early July, by a panel of experts appointed by Onaga that will poke huge holes in the decision-making process and conclusions that led to Nakaima’s controversial decision, and use the report as the legal basis for reversing and withdrawing Nakamia’s approval; 3) Use the expected panel report to demand a stop to all work on the Henoko project, throwing the issue into the uncharted territory of Japan’s court system. Never before has Japan’s court system had to take up such a big case involving a local governor objecting to central government construction plans;. 4) Use the court delays to build public opposition to the Henoko project, such that the central government and the US government cannot avoid revisiting the entire issue.

That’s the plan. Onaga recently set up a special unit within his office charged specifically to investigate and pursue every possible means to shutter the Henoko project.

The next big events to watch are Onaga’s planned trip to Washington starting May 30, the June 23 celebration of Memorial Day on Okinawa, a holiday in the prefecture that commemorates the end of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, and the mayoral election in Ginowan City in January 2016.

The Obama administration will be under pressure to find a balance between according Onaga the respect deserved by a sitting governor of such an important prefecture, while not giving Onaga any reason to believe the US will alter its plans for the Henoko facility. The aggressive Okinawa media will be ready to pounce on any perceived snub of Onaga. The upcoming visit will follow the recent opening of a prefectural office in Washington designed to press Okinawa’s case directly to US policy makers.

Meanwhile, Memorial Day on Okinawa will put Prime Minister Abe in a bind. The sitting prime minister traditionally attends the day’s festivities. For Abe to not attend would further inflame anger among Okinawans. But should he attend, Abe will be under pressure to address and defend the Henoko project, which will also raise the ire of island residents.

Further out, political insiders in Okinawa will be watching the January 2016 race for mayor of Ginowan City, where the controversial Marine Air Station Futenma dominates the landscape. Incumbent mayor Atsushi Sakima, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party and close to Prime Minister Abe, insists that all Marine operations at Futenma cease within the next 4-5 years.

But Sakima has not taken a stand on the Henoko replacement facility, arguing that his responsibility to his supporters is to close Futenma, not to figure out a new location for the bases’s ongoing operations. The US says it will keep Futenma open until a replacement facility is up and running. Abe, in line with his predecessors, says the Henoko facility must be built so that Futenma can be closed. A large majority of Okinawans, who backed Onaga in his race against Nakaima last year, want the Futenma base closed, and oppose construction of a new facility at Henoko. It is not clear who will run against Sakima next January. But should a candidate who openly opposes both the Futenma base and the Henoko plan knock him out of office, pressure will intensify for the US and Japan to revisit the issue.

05/16/2015

On Tuesday, May 5, 187 Japan scholars mostly from English-speaking countries came together in an Open Letter to warn against what they see as a worrisome trend of intolerance in Japan toward journalists and scholars who express disagreement with the Abe government’s view of history issues, particularly “comfort women.”

The co-coordinators of the Letter were Professor Alexis Dudden of the University of Connecticut, and Professor Jordan Sand of Georgetown University. Both argue that the purpose of the Letter was to encourage a renewed effort to resolve the comfort women issue, and for Japan to redouble efforts for reconciliation with China and South Korea. Both deny that their intent, and that of the other signatories, was to criticize Prime Minister Abe, but they acknowledge that those who interpret the Letter as a rebuke are “not incorrect.”

We sat down with Professors Sand and Dudden for a joint interview, during which they described in detail the process that led to the writing and publication of the Open Letter with such a large list of signatories.

Jordan Sand is Professor of Japanese History at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. He teaches modern Japanese history and other topics in East Asian history, as well as urban history and the world history of food. He has a doctorate in history from Columbia University and an MA in architecture history from the University of Tokyo. His research and writing has focused on architecture, urbanism, material culture and the history of everyday life. From 2009 through 2011, he served as Chair of Georgetown's Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures. During academic year 2012-13, he was a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo Graduate School for Interdisciplinary Information Studies, where he taught a seminar on approaches to the modern city.

Alexis Dudden is professor of history at the University of Connecticut, specializing in modern Japan, modern Korea, and international history. She has a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and a BA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University. She is perhaps best known for her book Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States.

DISPATCH JAPAN: I am hoping to explore with you both the substance of the Open Letter, and how the Letter came about, and then look a little bit at some criticisms that have emerged in the few days since the publication. I’ll direct a question to one of you, and the other can then respond. Professor Sand, let me put this question to you. The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times both characterized the Open Letter as a “rebuke” of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Is that an accurate description of the spirit of the Letter, and does it capture your intention?

SAND: The Letter addresses our colleagues in Japan, the public, the media, and the government. We expressed hopes for action from the government on the issue of “comfort women.” I believe, and I think most of the signatories believe, that there is a lot the prime minister could do. But I did not participate in order to rebuke the prime minister. I don’t think that’s our role. It is not mistaken to read it as a rebuke, but that does not capture the intent of the Letter.

DUDDEN: I agree. The headlines on those stories, using the work “rebuke,” were not incorrect. But that is not why 187 historians and scholars became involved. The Letter is a collective reflection on a new environment in Japan that is often inhospitable to objective historical inquiry on certain topics. This is quite different from even the recent past. The signers of the letter have all made Japan the center of their professional lives. Something new has emerged in Japan in the last year or two to the extent that putting together a common reflection on this trend by such a divergent group of people turned out to be remarkably easy.

SAND: You could even say the Letter was intended more as an encouragement than a rebuke. The Letter is a collective expression of opinion, not a set of demands to the government. Japan is a democratic society, and the prime minister is an elected official. He can answer his own constituents. We didn’t presume to tell the prime minister what he “must” or “must not” do. But the government bears some responsibility for the climate in Japan around the “comfort women” issue. The Letter is a comment on this worrisome climate. The government has the power to change that.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Professor Sand, would you elaborate a bit on the “climate” you refer to?

SAND: Let me be specific. The timing of the release of the Letter gave the appearance that it was somehow responding to the prime minister’s recent visit to the US. But I started talking with colleagues about putting together some kind of statement last year. At the time, I had no idea Abe would be making a visit to the US. Many scholars here were disturbed by reports of intimidation of journalists, and we found colleagues of ours in Japan saying that because of receipt of government funding, they would not be able to work on certain issues. In the political sphere, it was becoming common to hear callous statements about the surviving victims of the comfort women system passing as everyday political speech. It struck me, and many others, as a strange turn in discourse. It felt like it was time to comment, as friends and colleagues. I should also say that I’ve found many friends in Japan who are not academics who are tired from so-called “apology fatigue.” These are good friends of mine. They just want the whole issue to go away. And I thought it was important to step back, and say that the issue has not gone away because it remains unresolved.

Those were my sentiments. So a few of us decided we would get a group together to discuss this at the March meeting in Chicago of the Association of Asian Studies annual conference. A few weeks before the conference, I visited Japan, still thinking about how to address these concerns at the AAS meeting. In Japan, I was astonished once again at the degree to which important and intelligent mainstream people were saying off-base things, such as: “This generation of American scholars are anti-Japan,” and ridiculing serious scholars and newspapers. And I thought: “Wow, Japan has become a hot-house for this kind of thinking.” Now, Japan is a very cosmopolitan place. So this deepened my conviction that we should try to blow some fresh air in from the outside, even if this ran the risk of appearing to be patronizing.

DUDDEN: We got 187 scholars with wildly divergent specializations to come together based on each of us noticing a troubling atmosphere. A lot of the recent presentation of the comfort women issue has been quite constricted. It is not full-on censorship from the highest level. Rather, there seems to be a narrowing of what is considered permissible speech. So a lot of people are losing sight of the fact that it is not all the fault of the “other side” – Team China, or Team Korea. The notion that Japan has “done enough” becomes pervasive, such that even the mildest of critiques of current Japanese policy defines one as “pro-China” or “pro-Korea.” And within the world of Japanese politics, those who want to really reach out to China and Korea, while still on the scene, are far from the councils setting the country’s policy agenda. That is a recent development, and it undercuts the notion of Japan being a regional leader. Much of the region looks to Japan as the open society. When the confines of “permissible” discussion in Japan become more narrow, Japan’s aspirations for regional leadership become more difficult to realize. Still, we tried to operate as quietly as possible.

DISPATCH JAPAN: When you arrived in Chicago for the March AAS meeting, were there already discussions underway to initiate the writing of a Letter?

SAND: There were multiple conversations already underway. The issue of Foreign Ministry pressure on McGraw-Hill had sparked some conversations. There were conversations about the bashing of the Asahi Shimbun over articles that had long ago been retracted. The whole environment in Japan seemed to have taken a turn toward intolerance. By last December I concluded that some kind of statement would be appropriate, or at least possible. By February, Alexis and I were in email contact with old friends, and we discussed reserving a room in Chicago where those who shared our concerns and were attending the AAS meeting could get together for a discussion.

DUDDEN: We are not an organization of any kind, so we did not have a room of our own automatically available at the AAS meeting. We had to reserve one ourselves. The annual AAS meeting is really the only time that a good number of Japan specialists gather in one spot, so we were cognizant of the fact that if we were going to have momentum for the issuance of a Letter, we would have to have our act together going into the Chicago meeting.

SAND: I reserved a room for 11:30 pm, because that was the only time everyone was free. I was thinking that we would discuss whether as a group we could come up with a statement, what we have the right to say, and whether a statement would be constructive. The conversation was very constructive, but at that point still pretty inconclusive. Lots of good ideas were shared, but we did not resolve what exactly we wanted to say, and what would be the best way to say it. And to whom?

After the AAS meeting, Alexis and I played the role of on-line switchboard. About 30 people were present at the late-night meeting in Chicago, and they wanted to stay in the loop. They talked with other people, some of whom came on board. Drafts of a Letter started to circulate. It was all quite messy; organic. At a certain point, the content coalesced, and enough people had seen a draft that they thought was at least close to right.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Was there one person who wrote the initial draft?

DUDDEN: Nice try! 187 people wrote it!

SAND: I would call myself the secretary. I sketched out the main points of the first meeting and circulated them. Over a month-and-a-half, I kept putting in new commas, and taking out old semicolons, until everyone saw a final document that a large number of us could live with. At that point, the draft had circulated to so many people that we worried a bit that it might be released unfinished and we felt pressure to finalize the whole process. We gave everyone 24 hours to look at both the English and Japanese final versions, to recuse themselves if they decided the final version did not reflect their own opinion, and to otherwise make sure their respective names were spelled correctly.

We had to battle to keep the Letter from being too long. Every time someone suggested an addition, the Letter got longer and longer.

DUDDEN: Some people wanted footnotes. From the other side, there was a group from the Midwest that wanted to keep the Letter to 500 words, or they would not sign. It says a lot about the strong sentiments on the issues we raised that 187 academics were willing and able to come together behind the Letter.

DISPATCH JAPAN: There were roughly 30 people in this core group that collectively put the Letter together?

DUDDEN: There is an exact list of 29 people who made up the core. And there were 5-6 people who were deeply involved in the drafting of the Letter, throwing back at Jordan every adjective, comma, and semicolon they did or didn’t like.

SAND: The whole process took over a month even though I think the Letter consists of rather common sense prose.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How did you go from the core of 30, to 187 signatories?

SAND: The final version was circulated by the original 30.

DUDDEN: To people they knew.

SAND: That’s right. This was meant as a statement from scholars of Japan based outside of Japan, so we circulated to colleagues in North America, Europe, and Australia. Some colleagues in Japan saw it, but we wanted this to be a message that came from outside of Japan.

DUDDEN: We are cognizant that the Letter might come across as a bunch of westerners telling Asians what to do. But we were influenced by the statement issued late last year by the Historical Science Society of Japan (Rekishigaku kenkyukai) that was sharply critical of the Abe administration’s stance toward the comfort women issue.

SAND: Many people read the Rekishigaku kenkyukai statement, and it really resonated. But we are not an organization of any kind. The Letter was issued by a group of people who were persuaded that “this much we can all agree on, this much we believe is common sense.” There are people involved in this who have never had their names printed on the same page, anywhere. Some of them may not be willing to appear in the same room with each other. But we all shared the statement.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Did you deliberately issue the Letter after Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the US?

SAND: Yes. We had a draft that many people saw before the prime minister arrived. A number of people commented that we couldn’t very well issue the Letter until we’ve heard what he has to say. I felt that the Letter was not all about addressing Prime Minister Abe, but the point came through to me. We owed Abe the respect to let him come, address American audiences, and see what he says on the issues we raise. And the final version made reference to the more inspiring comments the prime minister made in his address to Congress. We did not want to rush the Letter out to have it somehow tied to the visit. It just so happened that the draft had already circulated far and wide so it was time to finalize.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about the paragraph on nationalism? I initially took it to mean that some people in the drafting process thought it would be important to reference nationalism in Korea and China so that the Letter not appear to be ganging up on Japan.

SAND: Everyone accepted that passage, though there were a few people who raised concerns that in some ways it is ahistorical. The roots of nationalism are profoundly different in different places, and of course in this case we are talking about the country of the perpetrator and the countries of the victims. To paint the nationalism we’ve seen in China, Korea, and Japan regarding comfort women with a single brush might appear to be very facile. But everyone agreed that at the present moment, on this issue, you can’t ignore that nationalism is a problem far from unique to Japan. The comfort women issue is made even more complicated than it already is by the nationalism surrounding the issue in all three countries.

DUDDEN: Many of us who have published writings specifically on the comfort women issues have stated up front that nationalism in all three countries is an obstacle to resolution. The Letter, however, tries to return to what we do in the classroom, which is to focus on the substance of what happened: the brutality of this particular history. People who throw history around as a weapon tend to forget what actually happened on the ground, which transcends national boundaries.

SAND: The whole statement is about the ethics of doing history, and the responsibility of governments to protect and respect the work of historians.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Prime Minister Abe has already said that he does not plan to use the key language from the Murayama Statement when he issues his own statement on World War II in August. Are you concerned that the upcoming statement will not bring Japan and its neighbors any closer to reconciliation, and might even worsen relations?

SAND: Alexis and I come at this from different specialties, so the question is best put to her. The politics of war memory and apology is a central research issue for her and a topic about which she writes. For my part, I of course believe the Japanese government has the power to make changes toward reconciliation. But I am less engaged in the diplomatic issues. I wanted to play the role of “switchboard” in the compilation of the Letter partly because I am not heavily involved in the issue, and felt I could channel the common sense of colleagues and bring opinion together.

DUDDEN: In my view, the current government in Japan seems determined to play with words, to divert attention from what really happened, and what needs to be said to move forward. It is disheartening that in this very important anniversary year, a nation that has acted in peace and with respect for human rights over the past 70 years sees its top leaders objecting to rather common sense assessments of what occurred in Asia in World War II.

SAND: We were in touch with some very prominent political scientists who have influence in Japan. For the most part, they said they are working through other channels, and chose not to sign. But several said: “I hope you will convey to the Japanese government how bad it is for Japan that this type of nationalism is still kicking around.” It seems so obvious.

DISPATCH JAPAN: At least one critic in Japan has gotten considerable attention by claiming there is a split between you two, with Professor Dudden interpreting the Letter with a decidedly anti-Japan twist, and Professor Sand remaining more objective.

DUDDEN: There is no division between us. Whoever says there is a split has a gross misunderstanding.

SAND: Alexis and I were the two people who sent out the final version, which raised the question: what should we call ourselves? I suggested that we were two co-coordinators. We got the room at the AAS, we carried the whole thing forward on-line with the group of 30 or so. We decided on the deadline, and gave everyone involved their final say. And then we sent it out. But all of that is different from being the representatives, or spokespeople for the 187 signatories. Alexis has been on the public record on this topic many times. Her email inbox was filled with messages, many of them quite nasty. In many respects the Japanese language version of the Letter has turned out to be the more important one, because I expect more people are reading it. It was co-translated by me and Asano Toyomi of Waseda University. He is very devoted to the document, and he turned it into beautiful Japanese.

The Letter went all over the media. Sometimes it has been misrepresented in the media, and sometimes fairly represented. Lots of media have printed the whole document.

DUDDEN: We sent the Letter to the Cabinet Office, in both languages, out of respect. We offered the Letter to Yomiuri Shimbun on an exclusive basis, but we never heard back from the paper. Then we gave the Letter to about 10 people for whom I had meishi on my desk. Most of them were Japanese reporters. I sent it to the New York Times and the Washington Post, and then to Bloomberg and the Korean news agency Yonhap. I had worked with a Yonhap reporter the week before at a conference. Subsequently, this turned into me being “pro-Korea,” and me “manipulating” Jordan. Frankly, it is absurd. Some critics in Japan cited a Yonhap dispatch that I asserted I was the leader of the push for the Letter. I never said that; the Yonhap reporter wrote that. As we explained, I was one of the leaders, but one among many. Somehow the notion emerged that I led the push for the Letter in an effort to damage Japan. But this plays into something that has been going on inside Japan for over a year. I’ve been labeled as “anti-Japan,” which of course I am not. But that label is very difficult to defend yourself against.

The Letter is not about me, or Jordan, or any other individual. This is 187 scholars, some of them very big names, who share a concern about a worrisome trend in Japan on history issues, in this case comfort women. That is a big deal.

Japan is an open society. We’d like to add to the debate in a productive manner. Unless there is discussion inside Japan, nothing else will matter.

SAND: We haven’t gotten caught up in any of the commentary. We know we live in the age of the 24-hour, second-by-second media world. And we issued the Letter during Golden Week, so a lot of people we sent it to were probably not paying attention. I expect this week could be ‘smear week.’ Kobayashi Yoshinori has already started in.

We wrote a statement that we all feel strongly about. We are historians. We know that we can stand back, and it will either speak to people on its own terms, or it won’t. Any negative comments said around it are just part of that day’s news cycle.

05/05/2015

Joseph S. Nye Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. His latest book, Is the American Century Over?, is now available in paperback. On Monday, April 27, Professor Nye helped host Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan during a forum held at Harvard.

With Prime Minister Abe having recently been in Washington, with the US and Japan announcing new “guidelines” for the bilateral defense relationship, we turned to Nye to discuss Japan policy, the US “rebalance” toward Asia, and a range of other foreign policy issues. Starting in 1994, while serving as a senior Pentagon official, Nye led an initiative to upgrade the US-Japan defense relationship, culminating in the 1997 bilateral guidelines forged in large part to ensure a smooth US-Japan reaction to any potential crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The new guidelines announced last week are the first since those of 1997.

Professor Nye was an advisor to Hillary Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign, and remains an influential foreign policy voice within the Democratic Party.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You argue in your new book that the US will remain the world’s main power for quite some time, but that the diffusion of power will make the US relatively less-able to control others.

NYE: Yes. Entropy may prove a greater challenge to the American role than China. This means there will be times when the US will actually have to work with China to get things done. For example, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is not the kind of thing we should oppose. We should be encouraged that China will pick up some of the role of providing global public goods. And having other countries participate in the AIIB means that instead of it becoming a Chinese political slush fund, it will have to have transparency and organization.

The AIIB case is an example of the type of decision the US will have to make. The US will remain the dominant power, but we will have to learn to work more with others, and not just China. It is not possible to solve global climate change with just two countries. You can’t have international monetary stability with just two countries. We have to think of Europe, Japan, and others.

This requires an attitude about foreign policy that gets away from the kind of zero-sum way we have often approached it.

DISPATCH JAPAN: As you wrote the book, were you thinking to encourage Americans to think in a new way about foreign policy, or were you trying to reassure our allies and potential adversaries that America is not a declining nation?

NYE: Both. I try to write in an academically-respectable way, with footnotes and suggested additional readings. I addressed this book to people who are concerned about America’s role in the world, whether they are in the United States or abroad.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the general trend in American foreign policy? The Bush administration was quite interventionist, and the Obama administration seems to have retrenched.

NYE: There are periods in American foreign policy in which we are “maximalist,” and others during which we retrench. But retrenchment is not the same things as “isolationism.” Retrenchment is an adjustment of strategic goals and means. Dwight Eisenhower followed a retrenchment policy, and Obama is in the tradition of Eisenhower. By contrast, George W. Bush was a maximalist. I argue that maximalists often get us into worse trouble than retrenchment. But too much retrenchment can be a problem, and I do worry about that.

For example, look at the role of Congress in not ratifying the Law of the Sea Treaty. Congress has refused to go forward with agreements reached to raise the quota for emerging countries in the International Monetary Fund. These are foolish decisions, and they hurt our position in the world.

In addition to this overview, it is important to look at specific regions. It would be foolish for the US to retrench in Asia or Europe, or even Latin America and Africa. But in the Middle East, we are going to see a period of revolutions of different types. Some will challenge state borders, as we are seeing now in the so-called Ottoman Provinces. We will also see increasing religious divisions. There will be popular discontent about delayed modernization, which occurred in the Arab Spring. These types of revolutions are not going to end quickly. It’s a bit like the French Revolution, which began in 1789, and it was not until 1815 – 25 years later – that the Congress of Vienna restored some semblance of stability to Europe. In circumstances like that, trying to control events through external intervention often makes the situation worse, not better. Prussia, Austria, and Britain found that out when they tried to control events in France.

In the Middle East, we are going to have to learn how to use shifting partners, try to nudge things when we can, but accept that controlling these revolutions will be beyond our capacity, or the capacity of any external actor.

In the Middle East, we will have to think of policy in terms of containment of the effects of these revolutions.

In East Asia, in contrast, there needs to be a major American presence, which is what the “rebalance” policy is all about. We are welcome in East Asia: Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, India, Australia. These countries want us there to help manage the rise of Chinese power.

This is not containment. It is to ensure that as China’s power increases there is a natural balance of power.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Some critics argue that President Obama looks weak.

NYE: In East Asia, the rebalance policy is correct. The administration has been challenged by so many problems that keep arising in the Middle East. So if you simply look at the travelogue of administration officials, you don’t seem to see much rebalancing. This is a case of the urgent driving out the important. In Europe, I think President Obama has been right to ensure that Vladimir Putin cannot divide the US from Europe, which has been a major Russian objective. Obama has been very smart to keep a close relationship of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Meanwhile, the opening to Cuba in Latin America was a good move. With Iran, we still do not know what is going to happen with the nuclear negotiations until next June. These are all steps in the right direction.

Overall, I would say President Obama is headed in the right direction.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Let’s look a bit more at the rebalance in East Asia.

NYE: One of the important questions is whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership will get through. One can complain about the details of trade agreements, and I am not a trade expert. But if TPP fails, it will be seen as a major American setback for rebalance policy. There are indications that US and Japanese negotiators are getting close to an agreement, but it is not done until it is done.

We are also going to have to find ways to work with China on the key issues. Obama has tried. The statement on climate change reached while he was in China late last year was useful; not earth-shaking, but useful. We are going to have to think about a more subtle approach to the AIIB.

And the US-Japan defense relationship is the better than I have seen in years. When I was in the Pentagon 20 years ago, people were talking about the security treaty with Japan being a relic of the Cold War. People don’t think that anymore.

American relations with India have moved in a healthy direction. So the overall direction of the rebalance is good, but it is occurring at a slower pace than I would like to see.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do you evaluate Prime Minister Abe, especially on history issues?

NYE: It really is time to put the history issues behind us. The 70th anniversary of the end of World War II should be a time to now turn to the 21st Century, and not get stuck in the details of the 20th Century. At times, Prime Minister Abe has been pragmatic on the issues. I hope that pragmatic side will continue to come through. Abe is Kishi’s grandson, and that does have effect on how he thinks back over history. The visit to Yasukuni Shrine in late-2013 not only irritated Japan’s neighbors but also disappointed Washington. I hope he will see that those kinds of steps are more costly than they are worth. He wants to create a legacy, including TPP, the upgraded defense guidelines, and repairing relations with South Korea so as to be prepared if something were to erupt with North Korea. These are the things to think about, not history.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Okinawa continues to be a source of unease. What do you think the US should do about the Futenma Replacement Facility project?

NYE: If there is enough political support on Okinawa to build the replacement facility at Henoko, I think we should carry it out. But I am not sure that is going to be possible. We’ll have to see. The more important issue is to think over a ten year period. How do we want to see American troops deployed? I have suggested that we ought to consider having US troops co-located on Japanese bases throughout the islands, which reduces their vulnerability, but also makes clear that these are Japanese bases, with Japanese flags, with the American presence rotating around these bases. Misawa Air base would be a case in point. If we think ahead 10 years and ask how we are going to ensure a continuing alliance, a continuing strong American presence, with US and Japanese forces capable of operating together, then we really have to get away from the idea of large, fixed bases on Okinawa as a long-term solution. We should be planning for that decade-long process, rather than letting everything sink or swim on the issue of relocating the Futenma operations to a new facility at Henoko.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is this you forward-thinking, or are you aware of this approach being on anyone’s radar screen in Washington?

NYE: This is my personal view, but I have raised it with friends in Washington. I participate in the US-Japan commission coordinated by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and there is also an annual conference held jointly by CSIS and Nihon Keizai Shimbun. I have floated these ideas in these forums. But I am not a stalking horse for any Pentagon consideration of new approaches to Okinawa. To the contrary; a lot of people would say I am out on a limb.

04/20/2015

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan will speak to a joint meeting of the US Congress on April 29, marking the first time Japan’s top political leader will address the full US national legislature. The speech will carry enormous symbolism; Abe will speak from the rostrum of the House of Representatives, from which Franklin Roosevelt declared war on Japan in 1941 in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of that year. The US and Japan have long been reconciled, of course, with a post-war bilateral security alliance that continues to form the bedrock of stability in East Asia. But Abe has a testy relationship with his leadership counterparts in China and South Korea, and both countries will be listening carefully to hear if and how he addresses lingering animosities about Japan’s historical role in the region.

Many analysts in Washington expect (and some have recommended) that Abe will model his upcoming address to Congress on the talk he delivered to the Australian parliament in capital-city Canberra in July of last year. Abe effectively referenced two incidents of severe mistreatment of Australian prisoners-of-war during World War II that had long been thorns-in-the-side of Japan-Australia relations. The Bataan ‘Death March’ of 1942, in which hundreds of American POWs died in Japan-occupied Philippines, conjures up similar emotions in the United States. In 2009, Japan officially apologized for that mistreatment of captured American soldiers. Japan’s prime minister at that time, Taro Aso, was under some pressure in part because his family’s lucrative coal mining business used US POWs as forced-laborers during World War II. (Aso is now Japan’s finance minister.)

Whether Abe really apologized to Australians on behalf of Japan, or merely commiserated about a shared bitter experience, remains a matter of contention. And his Canberra comments made no reference to China, Korea, or any other country in East Asia, leaving unanswered whether he really agrees with his predecessors Tomiichi Murayama and Junichiro Koizumi, who stated unambiguously in 1995 and 2005 respectively that Japan adopted a “mistaken national policy” that resulted in “aggression” and “colonial rule” in the first half of last century.

While stating that he agrees with his predecessors “on the whole,” Abe himself has never used the most important operative words from those past apologies that Chinese and Korean officials consider a litmus test of his views and intentions.

Unresolved history issues between Japan and Korea – key US allies – continue to complicate American diplomacy in East Asia, making Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming address to Congress, and his planned statement in August marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, particularly important.

To discuss Abe’s ‘Canberra Strategy,’ we turned to Tessa Morris-Suzuki, one of Australia’s top specialists on Japan. Morris-Suzuki is professor of Japanese history at Australian National University, and author of East Asia Beyond the History Wars. She is past president of the Asian Studies Association of Australia.

Morris-Suzuki: ‘Prime Minister Abe

is deliberately ambiguous about apologies’

DISPATCH JAPAN: Was Prime Minister Abe’s “Canberra” speech last year well-received in Australia?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: The prime minister’s speech made headline news and attracted some media debate at the time, but its long- term impact on Australian views of Japan appears to have been quite small. It is difficult to say whether this impact was positive or negative. A number of media, business, and political commentators praised Abe’s words of condolence for the Australian servicemen killed in World War II, but much of the discussion in letters-to-the-editor of major newspapers was critical. The event also attracted public criticism from Australia’s main veterans’ organization, the Returned and Services League. An interesting note is that much of the criticism focused on Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who replied by praising the skill and sense of honor shown by Japanese troops during the war. This was widely criticized by veterans and others, who argued that Japan’s wartime treatment of prisoners of war was not honorable.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe referred specifically to the Sandakan wartime events on Borneo, and the Kokoda events in Papua New Guinea. Remind readers why Sandakan and Kokoda resonate with Australians.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Abe began his speech by referring to Sandakan and Kokoda. Sandakan in Borneo is the site of a death march during which some 1,000 Australian soldiers were killed or died of starvation, disease, and exhaustion. The Kokoda track over the mountains of Papua New Guinea was the site of crucial and fierce battles between Australian and Japanese forces, in which some 600 Australian soldiers were killed.

It is worth noting that although Abe mentioned the place name Sandakan, he did not use the term “death march”. These two sites, and particularly Kokoda, have become key symbols of the sufferings of Australian soldiers during the Pacific War. Monuments to the Kokoda track exist in many parts of Australia, and some Australians still visit the track to reenact the march over its rugged terrain.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Did Australians receive Abe’s comments as an apology? He seemed to speak somewhat in the passive tense – “regretting” that terrible things happened, but not acknowledging responsibility on the part of Japan.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Most commentators noted that Abe expressed condolences but not apology. In fact, Abe’s speech presented the war, not as an event for which Japan should apologize, but rather as a part of history which Australia and Japan share. He spoke of “our fathers and grandfathers” -- both Japanese and Australian -- experiencing the events of Sandakan and Kokoda, and went on to speak of the Japanese naval officers killed in an attempted midget submarine attack on Sydney harbor. He recalled how Australia had invited the mother of one of the dead to visit Sydney for a memorial ceremony, and then quoted the words of former Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies: “Hostility to Japan must go. It is better to hope than always to remember.” The clear message was, “We all suffered similarly during the war. We should let bygones be bygones.”

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe seemed perhaps more ready to reconcile with Australia than with China or Korea?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I look at this in strategic terms. Abe wishes as far as possible to avoid making any direct apologies or acknowledgments of wrongs committed by the Japanese military during the war. But at the same time his strategy is to deepen the military alliance with the United States and forge new and deep military and intelligence alliances with countries like Australia. In order to combine these two aims, he and his advisers choose words very carefully to try to smooth over concerns about memories of the war without directly addressing or apologizing for the events of the past.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe says he upholds the Murayama and Kono statements “as a whole.” To you, what does that mean?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: This is a phrase devised to confuse and blur the meaning of Abe’s stance on the issues of war responsibility and apology. It is a deliberately ambiguous phrase which enables him to avoid saying whether he accepts words such as “aggression” and “apology” contained in the Murayama statement, and to avoid reconfirming the Kono statement’s acknowledgment that “comfort women” were recruited by coercion.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you anticipate the prime minister will say in his August 15 statement, marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I think it likely that he will use two verbal strategies in an effort to appease international (particularly US) opinion, while at the same time avoiding making a direct statement of apology about the war. First, he will express a personal sense of pain at the memory of the war. In many recent statements, including his Canberra speech, Abe has spoken of his sadness and heartache at this memory. These words present the prime minister to the world as being a compassionate and caring person, but at the same time avoid any notion of historical responsibility. The second strategy is to use the word “反省” [hansei - best translated as “reconsideration” or “self-questioning”] in his statement in Japanese, but to translate this into English as “remorse”. The word “remorse” in English has a much stronger meaning than “反省” in Japanese (and would most commonly be rendered in Japanese as 後悔 [kōkai]or 自責の念 [jiseki no nen]). In the Murayama and Koizumi statements, the word “反省” was also translated into English as “remorse”, but was followed by the words お詫びの気持ち[owabi no kimochi - a feeling of apology]. If Abe uses the word 反省 (translated as remorse) but not the word お詫び (apology), he will convey to English speaking audiences the impression that he is apologizing, but will make it clear to those who read his statement in Japanese, Korean or Chinese is that he is merely expressing 反省 and not お詫び.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How will Korea react if PM Abe omits the wording of the Murayama Statement – “aggression,” “colonial rule,” and “mistaken national policy”?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I am deeply concerned about the likely impact of Abe’s 70th anniversary statement. If he uses the verbal strategies I have mentioned, these will not only fail to ease the painful memories of many people in Korea, China and elsewhere, but also deepen misunderstandings between East Asian countries and the English-speaking world. Many Americans and others, hearing the word “remorse”, will think that Abe has issued an apology, and fail to understand why Chinese and Koreans are still dissatisfied. In short, I am concerned that Abe and his advisors may be planning to use verbal games to send one message to the English speaking world and another to East Asian countries, including Japan itself. The terrible events of the Pacific War should be recalled with sincerity, honesty and directness, not with word games.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you think Abe a transformational figure, leading and reflecting fundamental changes in Japan?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: The Abe administration has already changed Japan in important ways through alterations to military strategy, state control of information, educational guidelines, trade and energy policy and other matters. In this sense Abe is a transformational figure; but it still too early to say whether he will succeed in carrying out the further and even more fundamental transformations, including changes to the constitution, which remain on his policy agenda.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why does the Abe Cabinet receive high marks in public opinion polls, but low marks for its major policies?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Public opinion is still reacting to the sense of crisis and absence of leadership which followed the triple disaster of March, 2011. Many people in Japan feel a profound sense of insecurity because of the ongoing aftermath of the disaster, the continuing weakness of the Japanese economy and the rise of China. In this situation, Abe’s large and simple statements about Japan’s revival and national pride are reassuring. Many people also still pin hopes on the future effects of Abenomics, even though, after two-and-a-half years, no significant positive impact on economic fundamentals or on the lives of ordinary Japanese people has yet been seen.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a thought-out, realistic national strategy underlying “revisionism,” or is it more of a romantic whim about Japan.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I believe that this is driven by emotion and ideology, not by political realism. A more realistic political strategy would positively and creatively address the concerns of China, Korea, and other Asian neighbors, since Japan’s long-term economic and security future rely on good relations with its neighbors. Revisionism is also creating deepening divisions within Japanese society itself. At a grassroots popular level, Japan has a fine history of efforts to seek reconciliation with neighboring countries and address problems of war responsibility. A more realistic national policy would build on these grassroots achievements, rather than ostracizing and marginalizing ordinary Japanese people who have worked so hard for reconciliation.

04/13/2015

Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe will arrive in Washington two weeks from now, with the highlight of his visit to be an address to a joint meeting of the US Congress. The key issues on the agenda include an upgrade of the US-Japan security relationship, and the ongoing efforts to conclude an Asia-wide trade deal known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). But Abe, Japan’s most politically-stable prime minister in years, is a polarizing figure in Northeast Asia, and could wind up receiving as much or more attention himself than the important issues at play.

Patrick Cronin directs the Asia program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), one of Washington’s more influential think tanks on defense and national security issues. He has been involved with US-Japan policy for over 20 years, going back to the “Nye Initiative” of the early 1990s, which resulted in the upgrade of bilateral defense “guidelines” in 1997. When the Liberal Democrats (LDP) temporarily lost power in 2009, Cronin was one of the few specialists in Washington who had good contact with the LDP, the defense bureaucracy, and the then-newcomers of the Democratic Party (DPJ). Cronin has held senior positions at the National Defense University, London’s IISS, and CSIS in Washington, and served several years as the third-ranking official at the US Agency for International Development (AID).

DISPATCH JAPAN: Before we get into Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington, let’s set some context. The US Congress is now considering the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). You’ve suggested to members of Congress that they view TPP as critical to US national security, that it would rebrand the US as more than a military power in the region.

CRONIN: That’s right. The Asia-Pacific region is driven mostly by trade and economics, and economic strategy. The United States has lost a lot of credibility; we used to be the dominant economic power, and the dominant trade power.

For the past few years, the US has pushed TPP as the leading framework for region.

My point to US policy makers is the intrinsic importance of reminding the region that the US is a great market power, interested first and foremost in open access to trade, and the global commons more broadly.

For better or worse, the US has made TPP the end-all and be-all of our whole approach to the region. So, without TPP, and without the trade promotion authority (TPA) that is a necessary precursor for TPP, the United States would be pushed onto our back feet for a number of years – well into the next administration. That is how long it would take to put together any new initiative that would have any hope of winning broad appeal, not just in the region, but with our Congress.

It is quite ironic that the US Trade Representative initially opposed bringing Japan into the TPP, on the theory that Japan would drag out an endless dialogue and negotiation. But now, in the 11th hour of trying to bring the TPP negotiations to a successful conclusion, it doesn’t seem to be Prime Minister Abe who is dragging his heels. It is the US that can’t get its act together.

For Japan, TPP is clearly a vital strategic interest. Abe seems anxious to prevent Japan from slipping down the ladder of great power nations. He is trying to preserve Japan’s strong stature, especially as China rises so quickly. Abe’s third arrow of structural reform has been waiting for something like TPP, and if it is not forthcoming, then it will be a serious wound to Japan’s hopes of preserving its stature.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You think Japan – the Abe government – sees TPP in such strategic terms?

CRONIN: Japan has been pushing to tighten our alliance, even while it has been seeking economic revival, including with the TPP. But Japan is not reassured. Look at the lack of reassurance that Japan apparently feels over the Senkaku Islands. Because of the growing contest with China in the South China Sea, Japan is very wary over whether the United States will be fully committed to Japan. Every ally worries about this kind of thing to some degree. But there are plenty of signs of deep concerns in Japan about this, which led President Obama last year to state very publicly that Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty we have with Japan would apply to the Senkakus. It showed that Japan is in need of greater reassurance today than ever before.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You have similar concerns about Australia.

CRONIN: Yes. The Australians want to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) proposed by China. I think the AIIB is a natural thing for the region to do. The US should have a clear message in support of any principled approach to multinational development programs. The British, the Germans, the Italians apparently want to join. The AIIB will likely be congruent with World Bank-type rules. Having Australia, Korea, and other allies inside the institution would be a welcome development.

Think back just two governments ago in Australia, to the Howard government, at the time of the financial crisis in the US in 2008. Australia was worried that by 2030 the US would no longer be the dominant power. China looked ascendant. Other Australian leaders are on record saying that Australia needs a more balanced approach between China and the US.

Australia, like other powers, keep trying to balance their security interests with the United States on the one hand, and their trade interests with China.

That is both the real danger, and real opportunity for the US. If we rebrand ourselves as a balanced power, one that brings trade, and not simply security guarantees, we will be more palatable to all of our partners and other powers in the region, including new partners in Southeast Asia. If we just have a security agenda in the region, we’ll be thwarted because of a lack of political will when tensions rise with China. Even a strong China will be much more compelled by a strong, balanced US to modify the rules it would like to perpetuate, such as labor, property rights, and state enterprises. China might like to push its own rules in these and other areas, but will have to adjust if they are forced to comply with a high-standards trade agreement of the sort we are talking about with TPP. China will have to compromise. That is the aim: to negotiate the rules for the Asia-Pacific region, to which China would have to comply.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Just to clarify: US trade negotiators initially did not want Japan included in TPP?

CRONIN: Lawyers inside USTR made it very clear that they did not want Japan an initial stakeholder, on the grounds that it would protract the negotiations, and potentially thwart a successful conclusion. The alternative idea was to have a smaller group in the initial round, and then invite Japan to join in the second round.

Things have changed with Prime Minister Abe, though Prime Minister Kan was also open to joining the TPP negotiating process as a lever to promote necessary domestic reforms in Japan.

But there certainly was a time when US officials harbored major doubts that Tokyo would be serious about the economic reforms needed for Japan to comply with TPP.

The irony now is that it does not appear to be Japan that is foot-dragging.

Systemically, it is the US Congress’s inability to come to grips with Trade Promotion Authority that makes the United States appear as the dysfunctional party.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you think the Obama Administration is really committed to TPA, and TPP?

CRONIN: The US faces a presidential race in 2016, and whichever party wins, the new president will start with either a huge gain, or a huge deficit, depending on whether TPP has been adopted.

TPP is not the end-all or be-all of civilization. But the US Government has made it our singular trade liberalization initiative. We won’t be able to get to our European initiative if we don’t succeed with TPP.

As a result, a lot rides on the success of TPP passing; for the US Government broadly, not just the Obama Administration’s legacy.

Without TPP, the US strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region will look very hollow.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why?

CRONIN: Thus far, the US military presence in the region has adjusted only on the margins of what we had before. If TPP were to fail, our diplomacy in the region will largely be forgotten, or dismissed. The US will look like a declining, one-dimensional power; big guns, but little sway or influence in the very important local disputes in the region.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the Obama administration doing enough?

CRONIN: The Obama administration is definitely mobilizing. But when I was up on Capitol Hill recently, it was obvious that the White House needs to do more. Congressional staffers are still asking: When will the White House really reach out to us?

In fairness: The mood in Congress is not exactly open and friendly to the White House. But the White House needs to do a lot more.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Such as?

CRONIN: It really needs to be bipartisan. I think the White House should reach out to someone like Jon Huntsman, who may be the only Republican of note not running for president, and suggest that they work together to sell TPA and TPP to Congress. Huntsman knows the issues, and the politics. There needs to be some compromise, starting with the president.

There is a moral hazard for the president. He has become a very polarizing figure, and that will only increase as the 2016 presidential race heats up. If President Obama is the sole major advocate for TPP, that could make it even more difficult to pass. So the president has to be surrounded by strong bipartisan voices. Paul Ryan is another important Republican who could play that role very well, and there are other sitting members of Congress who could do it effectively.

The president should be looking to share the success of TPA and TPP because passage would only be the beginning of a new round of fierce competition and additional negotiations.

The US will have to follow through with new initiatives. But we can’t even think about that until we get to the finish line of TPA and TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: In the context of the Obama administration’s initiative to rebalance our global policies toward East Asia, how is it that Washington so poorly managed the diplomacy surrounding China’s proposal for a regional infrastructure bank?

CRONIN: For better or worse, the United States has been heavily focused on major security initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq. We created an economy that went into a downward spiral and deep recession. We are now trying to be restrained in our international security policy which, in general, was a prudent move, but did provide others with opportunities to try to fill the gaps. We have been cutting defense spending, especially with sequestration in place, and we have been cutting back on foreign assistance.

So, in a declining budgetary and economic environment, we were failing to initiate more comprehensive moves that could appeal to the Asia-Pacific region.

We put ourselves in the unwise position of telling Asian allies and friends to turn down money very much needed for infrastructure, unless the money came from us. And we said this even though we had no money to give them.

The US has to be on the side of progress, of problem-solving, and of rules that everyone can live by. But other than TPP, which is a very important initiative, we have been failing to promote additional trade, investment, and development programs. We could have been working in a bipartisan fashion to rework the Bretton Woods institutions, such as reworking the distribution of voting rights in the Asian Development Bank. The existing institutions need to be more innovative and creative in tackling development issues in the region. And even if we had been doing those things, there would still have been a shortage of capital in Asia because the area is so dynamic economically.

So China’s capital is going to be important. We should have been trying to steer China’s initiative in a direction that is consistent with global rules that have worked so well in the region over the past 70 years. We certainly should not have been trying to block our friends and allies from joining the AIIB. In fact, the US ought to join. We should want a voice in the rules that will govern infrastructure investments. We would be in a position to help shape rules and regulations on labor, the environment, and other issues that are critical for the region.

Instead, the perception regarding China’s bank proposal is that the US is being defensive, and is trying to stop China. In fact, China’s track record on infrastructure investments is not very good. We should be on the inside, having influence.

That brings us back to the broader point that we have put all of our policy eggs in the TPP basket, which is why it is so important that Congress pass it.

DISPATCH JAPAN: But who in the Administration dropped the ball on China’s AIIB idea?

CRONIN: Ultimately the White House is responsible. There are some excellent people who are trying to convey reasonable messages that then have to be implemented by various departments. But the messaging from this administration has at times been abysmal. That is not me being critical of the administration. This is what I hear from the region. Even if the administration wants to hedge on the AIIB more than I would, we should at least have had a clear message to deliver. For example, we could have been saying: “There are lots of questions about the AIIB. We don’t oppose it, and we won’t stand in the way of any of our friends and allies in the region from joining, but we hope they will raise the serious questions that need to be raised.” That would have been a reasonable position. But it is the kind of message that has to be made consistently, over time. Our principles only matter if it doesn’t appear that we are changing them from moment to moment. Right now, our friends find us unpredictable. We’ve put ourselves in a very unhealthy position.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Relations with Korea seem to be particularly up and down these days, with differences over the THAAD missile defense system, and the AIIB. How much are the Koreans hedging because of the troubles with Washington that you describe?

CRONIN: Every government has its domestic challenges. President Park certainly is facing a slew of them. She has seen a lot of opportunities in improving relations with China. There are economic incentives. Better ties with Beijing also give Seoul some leverage over North Korea. And finally, President Park is hedging against the US-Japan relationship. She wants to gain some leverage with Washington, to get the US to put pressure on Japan, both to atone for history, and to not move in a direction on defense issues that makes Seoul uncomfortable.

Our alliance with South Korea is strong, but our relationship with Seoul has certainly been better than it is right now. We do not have the kind of high-level, deep trust with Seoul that we should. This is partly attributable to President Park’s governing style of reliance on a very small inner circle, though Washington certainly shares part of the blame.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What explains Seoul’s reluctance about THAAD?

CRONIN: Missile defense is something that is very much in the national security interests of Korea, and in the interest of protecting US forces in Korea. It is an important factor in deterring North Korea, as Pyongyang grows its missile, and potentially nuclear weapons stockpile. We need missile defense systems. And as North Korea’s missile capabilities expand in both range and quantity, we need multi-layered missile defense. Ultimately that means something like the THAAD system, to provide defense at a higher altitude over a larger area than a system like the Patriot 3 batteries. This does not threaten China in any way, though Chinese perceptions may be a different matter. We need to consistently, vociferously, and relentlessly make the case that THAAD has nothing to do with China. The issue is deterring North Korea’s ability to threaten the South, to threaten US forces in the region, and to perhaps even threaten US territory.

As a matter of political reality, President Park, having moved closer to China for the reasons I mentioned, probably will not accept US deployment of THAAD until the next crisis. We have once again run into a messaging problem. We probably have been talking with the South Koreans about THAAD, but we then seek plausible deniability by saying that it has not formally been on the bilateral agenda so it has really not been talked about. The point of that is to have a guise to hide behind so we don’t have to acknowledge talking about a system that is so politically sensitive in South Korea. It is sensitive for President Park, because she doesn’t want to have to explain the situation every time she talks with Chinese officials.

The reality is that we ought to be preparing THAAD as a response to a serious North Korean provocation in the future, such as a fourth nuclear test, or more missile launches, including mobile missiles that would be very hard for us to strike. [North Korea fired some short-range missiles last week, shortly before US defense secretary Ashton Carter arrived in Seoul for scheduled consultations.]

All of this would justify the need for further beefing up of the missile defense network that we already have, beyond the Korean missile defense system that Seoul is committed to.

We could concentrate on interoperability, rather than an integrated regional system. That would be a bit of finesse, as it would help enable the Koreans to tell the Chinese that the system is not part of a larger, regional system aimed at China.

But it would mean that American, Korean, and Japanese forces, in a crisis, could start to network in response to an impending North Korean missile launch.

The whole issue has not been handled well. The Koreans don’t want to talk about it, and even want to deny that they are thinking about THAAD. The issue is very cumbersome to talk about.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Meanwhile, it doesn’t seem very surprising that Seoul showed interest in the AIIB from the beginning.

CRONIN: The Koreans have criticized the US on this in much the same way the Australians and British did. They all perceived mixed or confused messages from Washington, and thus were put in the difficult position of having to consider whether their involvement in this important initiative would risk tension with the US. The message from us should have been an emphatic “sure, go ahead.” Of course, we still hope they will press for the kinds of institutional rules that have helped them grow into prosperous G20 economies.

DISPATCH JAPAN: In the context of rocky ties right now with Seoul, what are the “pros” and “cons” of the invitation extended to Prime Minister Abe to address the Congress?

CRONIN: I think it is correct to invite the prime minister to address Congress, at the right time. Japan is our most important ally in the region. We could not have the kind of force presence that we do have in the region without Japan. Japan is a democracy, and the world’s third-largest economy. Prime Minister Abe is committed to making a contribution to peace, the way Japan has done over the past seven decades, not like the decades before that.

So an invitation to the prime minister is the right thing to do. The question is: Is this the right time? I think a case can be made that we should have waited until we have the Trans-Pacific Partnership in place. And it may not be the best idea to excessively highlight the announcement of the new US-Japan defense guidelines during the prime minister’s visit, since defense is not necessarily the message we want underscore at the time of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II.

Next year might have been the ideal time for Prime Minister Abe to address Congress.

During this year’s visit, we could have showered the prime minister with all sorts of attention, while putting pressure on Congress to pass TPA, followed by TPP. And we could have unveiled the new defense guidelines as the new framework for thinking through new roles and missions for this critical bilateral alliance.

In this way, we could have gotten past the May and August anniversaries of the end of the War. Remember, Prime Minister Abe will be back in Washington, probably repeatedly during his time in office. We could have ensured an arrangement for him to address Congress next year, hopefully with TPP having been adopted, and with the new defense guidelines operational.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do you expect the prime minister to deal with history issues?

CRONIN: Nobody knows for sure, except Prime Minister Abe himself. I think he is his own counsel on this matter. But clearly people like Professor Shinichi Kitaoka, who is acting chairman of the commission that is supposed to advise the prime minister on this, is fully aware of the sensitivity of the issue. I was in Japan recently, and Professor Kitaoka agreed with the three points I raised. First, the prime minister has to make sure that he atones with deep respect and remorse for the past. This wouldn’t have to be an endless part of a speech or statement, but the prime minister will have to be sincere and believable. Secondly, he could then go on and talk with quiet pride – but plenty of pride – about the contributions Japan has made to order and stability in the international system over the past 70 years. And third, I think he needs to put forth something that would be a positive, rules-based vision for all, for the future. Sincere atonement for the past, quiet pride for Japan’s seven decades of contribution to international order, and a positive, inclusive vision for the future.

Those are the three ingredients I think are key, and I think Kitaoka Sensei understands this, and would recommend it.

I also think the prime minister understands this, but until he actually says these things, no one knows what political calculations may come into play, and change the perception of what he says.

DISPATCH JAPAN: To be effective, do you think Prime Minister Abe would do best to use the precise language from the Murayama and Koizumi statements?

CRONIN: I don’t necessarily think there is only one way to convey sincerity and believability. But including the language from those earlier statements is the clearest way to signal continuity, and not to raise concerns. Conversely, deviating from the earlier statements does not gain Japan anything, but could cause lots of trouble. That would be the surest path to invite criticism at a time when Japan should be applauded for the contributions the country has made over the past 70 years.