10 October 2013 1:38 PM

Think! Read! Don't just Regurgitate!

I have to go and defend the Almighty (or rather attack His detractors, since He is quite able to defend Himself), at the Cambridge Union this evening, and so have to struggle into my ancient dinner jacket.

So rather than begin my planned revisiting of the wonderful Flashman books of George Macdonald Fraser, I’ll restrict myself to a bit of knockabout.

Thanks , by the way, to ‘Harry S’ for those details of the Labour Party’s appalling record on defence and rearmament in the 1930s, and for that biographical detail of A.V.Alexander. I’d love to know more, and to know where to look for more.

The fashionable view of the Tories as weak ‘appeasers’, and the generally patriotic role of the top echelon of the Labour Party during the war itself, have long obscured this very important truth – and also the fact that it persisted long after the character of the Hitler government became clear. The idea that the Left longed for and wished to prepare for a war with Hitler because he was uniquely wicked simply is not true. The history of the period was rewritten afterwards to leave out all this stuff, and ‘Guilty Men’, a denunciation of the Tories, became the standard text. The fact that the Left were just as guilty, and indeed more so because of their supposedly extra hatred of the Hitler regime, implelled by their leftist virtue, needs constantly to be reiterated.

An Italian medical man states the standard cliché of foreign policy ‘British foreign policy, and English before it, has always focussed on being what is known in the trade as an "offshore balancer" and its main goal being to stop one power from dominating the Continent. Nazi expansion may well have ended in Poland and other Eastern European destinations, but then again, it may not have. It could easily have moved westwards into France (as of course it later did), and the British would then be facing a single power consolidating itself over the Channel. This is not in British interests, so London moved to act against the Germans.’

But any intelligent reading of the state of affairs on the Continent in 1936 onwards would have shown that the balance of power in Europe lay between Germany and the USSR. If our concern had been to ensure no single-power dominance, then that objective had more or less been achieved by German military and economic resurgence. Adjustments between Germany and the USSR, over Poland, the remnants of Austria-Hungary, Romania, the Balkans in general did not threaten that balance. Indeed, the encouragement of Poland to break its pact with Germany, which we engaged in, tended to upset that balance quite seriously. By the mid-1930s, neither Britain nor France was a major continental power to compare with either Germany or Russia (this remains the case in 2013, though the harsh truth of it was long obscured by American intervention via NATO, and is still obscured by the camouflage of German power in the shrouds of the EU) . Britain was never a major continental power. France ceased to be one in 1918, at the very latest. The claim had been questionable since 1870.

Our Italian friend also makes the classic error of characterising German expansion as ‘Nazi’ expansion, when in fact Hitler pursued classic German foreign policy, which has since Bismarck been interested in eastward developments, regarding France only as a nuisance to be eliminated if it made trouble, or formed alliances with Moscow. If people wish to politicise foreign policy they would be much better to do so in the case of the USSR, whose foreign policy was for many years not purely national, but ideological. Oddly enough the 'New Cold War' merchants cannot seem to grasp that modern Russian policy is transformed, thanks to the end of the Soviet Communist Party.

Also, ‘London’ did not ‘move to act’ against the Germans. Britain took no action against Germany until she was attacked. She lacked the means to do so. All her moves were on paper, and involved the threatened deployment of forces which Britain (and Germany) knew to be imaginary. There is a rude word for this sort of thing. I do wish my critics would address the simple point: How can you assert your will on the Continent, without an army large enough to do so?

But they never do, scurrying instead for the shrubbery of sentiment and propaganda, in which they hide their nakedness.

The trouble is, a lot of people died because politicians of the time resorted to the same folly. And more will die in silly idealistic wars until this myth is punctured.

‘Paul P’ contributes this explanation of our behaviour: ‘The realisation that expansion westward would soon follow, and in fact that happened once German and Soviet forces had mopped up Poland. Our declaration of war over Poland rather forced Hitler's hand in the west, militarily and perhaps too early. It certainly galvanized our war preparation politics and industry into action, none too early. Had we made it clear that we would declare war over Czechoslovakia and had convincingly rattled our own sabres, such as they were, perhaps there would have been no Second World War. The thought must then be entertained that Nazism might have enjoyed such peacetime success in Germany that its spread by black-shirted osmosis throughout the rest of Europe might have enjoyed similar success. The mind shudders.’

Why won’t these people *think* instead of reiterating things they have read somewhere long ago? Talk about being the unconscious slaves of some defunct thinker. Strip away the barrier of sentiment, and interrogate each decision in the series of decisions that led (amongst other things) to war in 1939, the bloody erasure of Poland from the map, the humiliation of France and the destruction of Britain as a world empire. Were these decisions necessary? Were they right?

What is his evidence that Germany in 1939 or 1940 had any serious material, military, diplomatic or economic interest in westward expansion? If Britain and France had not declared war on Germany in September 1939, why would Hitler have attacked in the West in May 1940?

Much more to the point, take the story back to the actual point of choice. This was the moment when Britain chose the path which led inevitably to war for Poland, on Poland’s terms, at a time chosen by Poland, (even though in fact we couldn’t help Poland at all). Had Britain and France not guaranteed Poland in April 1939, and had Poland instead renewed its non-aggression pact with Germany(first made in 1934)and conceded Danzig and the Corridor, what harm would that have done to Britain and France? I can’t identify any harm at all from Britain as a result of Danzig (after all, a city full of Germans) becoming German again. But even if there was some harm of some kind, how does it compare with the lasting, profound harm we did to ourselves by joining that war, when we did?

Then let’s take this passage piece by piece. It’s as if the writer has never read any of the arguments I have posted on this subject, so many times:

‘Had we made it clear that we would declare war over Czechoslovakia and had convincingly rattled our own sabres, such as they were, perhaps there would have been no Second World War. The thought must then be entertained that Nazism might have enjoyed such peacetime success in Germany that its spread by black-shirted osmosis throughout the rest of Europe might have enjoyed similar success. The mind shudders.’

Think!

We could not ‘convincingly rattle our sabres’ over Czechoslovakia because we had no sabres to rattle. The British Army in 1938 was an even poorer and smaller thing than it was in 1939. The RAF was mainly composed of biplanes. the Royal Navy, as usual, lacked wheels by which its ships could reach central Europe. France, as I have said, had no aggressive capacity, let alone the desire to use it.

Do these people own atlases? Do they know where Czechoslovakia was? Do they know that Prague is *west* of Vienna. And do they grasp that the German Reich surrounded Bohemia and Moravia on three sides by September 1939? German troops based in what had been Austria could have been in Brno in a few days, with no significant natural obstacles to cross. The whole of Bohemia and Moravia was within range of German airfields. The Czech defences in the Erzgebirge were certainly excellent protection against an attack from Saxony, but the Anschluss had rendered them obsolete. And while Germany invaded Moravia and bombed every Czech city with impunity, what would France and Britain have been able to do about it? Nothing. There wouldn’t have been a ‘Second World War’, perhaps, just a smaller, quicker rout of Britain and France than eventually happened in 1940. The Second World War was a separate conflict in which the major powers were the USSR, the USA and Germany, with Britain, Japan and Italy playing secondary roles. Whether and how it would have happened as it did after 1941 is impossible to say.

This is the point A.J.P.Taylor makes when he muses that it was much better to have been a betrayed Czech than a saved Pole. A war over Czechoslovakia would merely have subjected Prague to the horrors that were unleashed on Warsaw, and prevented the escape of many Jews who managed to leave the Reich in the year between Munich and the outbreak of War.

Further:

I simply have no idea what 'black-shirted osmosis’ is. German National Socialism was by definition nationalist and German. It found few active sympathisers in any other countries, or in the countries it conquered. It found collaborators, as the powerful always do, sometimes among people who would have been among the noisiest patriots beforehand, or often among those who just hoped to be left alone as much as possible. Wait and see what you do when you’re invaded before being too hoity-toity about that. Hitler, unlike Stalin, was not an ideological invader. He was following the interests of Germany.

There is no doubt that, by picking a fight with Hitler and losing it, Britain and France placed Western Europe under German domination for five horrible years. Had they not done so, but instead maintained a strongly-armed neutrality, there is no reason to believe that Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands or Belgium would have fallen under German sway. Those Jews and others who had fled Hitler to these countries , and to France, would quite probably have survived unmolested. As it is, they were murdered in their hundreds of thousands, thanks to our posturing and bluster.

Italy, too, might have been detached from German influence.

Clive Govier writes: ‘“Had Britain lost to Hitler, his totalitarian style would have brought about in this country the same medical experiments on the weak and defenceless as he inflicted in German concentration camps etc. Sooner or later, it would have been Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, writ larger.” This belief provides the clue as to why we declared war on Germany, and enables us to determine whether the decision was good or bad. The fact is, it was a decision born of fear (stoked by Churchill's repeated warnings) that the day was soon coming when Hitler would force Britain to become either an ally in the Nazi cause (with all that that implied, as to supposed Aryan superiority), or become his enemy, thus to fight an evil regime.’

Where do I begin? We did lose to Hitler, at Dunkirk. He just did not invade this country (which he surely would have done, had he been as interested in us as the myth-makers like to claim) . We risked the imposition of Nazi demands on this country *precisely by joining the war*. Non-belligerents do not risk defeat by declaring war, and do not risk being forced to make terms with their conquerors, who can be expected to give a hard time to those who declare war on them and are then beaten by them. Since we were not on the German route of march into France, had substantial air and naval defences (thanks to our wise decision not to build a continental army) and could not be reached without a very hazardous seaborne invasion, we were unlikely to share the fates of the Netherlands and Belgium, nor those of Denmark and Norway, even if Hitler had decided on a westward war in 1940, without our declaring war on him. Our decision to go to war had nothing to do with Churchill’s ‘repeated warnings’, but was driven by Lord Halifax’s personal vanity and by general delusions of great power status, which, as we see, still persist.

I agree with most if your analysis about The Second World War, but where you say, "We risked the imposition of Nazi demands on this country *precisely by joining the war*. Non-belligerents do not risk defeat by declaring war, and do not risk being forced to make terms with their conquerors, who can be expected to give a hard time to those who declare war on them and are then beaten by them.", wasn't it in the case that Nazi Germany imposed their terms on non-belligerent countries which they invaded?

Almost everyone, except those committed to the left, think of your comments as trolling, as they clearly are. I'm not sure what place you have in any sort of discussion of the spirit of posting here.

I think Brian of Coventry is somewhat too much given to finding fault with what Mr. Hitchens writes for the sake of it. But he seems mostly harmless, at least compared with Bert and some other more shrill members of the attack Mr. Hitchens at all costs club.

Brian,

You seem to have got rather defensive. I was simply asking you what was the end point behind the nuggests of information you posted. They seemed kind of lonely on their own, without any sort of conclusion to accompany them.

Sometimes, though, I do take it upon myself to try and keep the trolls in line.

Mr. Bunker: OK, I get the 'bunker' idea now :-)
I think no dangers have been faced by 'heretics' anywhere near where you or I live for a long time now. I am quite new to these debates, and I also prefer to sleep peacefully.

I'm not claiming that a belief in God woud have made those atrocities "impossible", just much less likely. As far as I'm aware, all the major players opted out of organised religion, and those who stayed in (and were serious about it) generally couldn't take part.

Gadjo Dilo - by all means call me "Mr" bunker. It's not my real name anyway. Comes from the former D.Bunker actually! And whilst we're on the subject, I resent any comment from our host or others deriding the use of pseudonyms on the web. On principle it's advisable not to disclose too much personal information. And in my particular case, with my outspoken criticism of religion(s), I think it's even more advisable. We know the dangers that may face heretics, as well as unbelievers, heathens (i.e. atheists) from those of deep religious faith. And being a person of shy and timid disposition, I prefer to write anonymously and sleep peacefully.

Oh, I almost forget what I wanted to say to you. Ah, yes, you say:

"The lack of belief in God may not have been the driving force behind Stalinism and Nazism but it made their atrocities posible."

Are you therefore claiming that a belief in God woud have made their atrocities "impossible"? - If so, I cannnot agree with you!

Yes, I now qualify for a free TV licence... and, of course, a much-used bus pass. I am of the opinion that many conspiracy theories are spread by bus travellers who listen to the folk in the seat behind.

"An example is Paul P refuting my argument (supposedly) that World Trade Centre Building 7 is the smoking gun, which shows 9/11 was an inside job."

You are at liberty to go to the Wikipedia site and change the data to conform with your conspiracy theories. My guess is it would be up for about five seconds before being taken down in a flurry of rebuttals having all the appearance of hysterical laughter. The conspiracy theories, Mr Govier, are best confined to the popular mass-market shelves on which you might also find entertainments of the kind authored by Von Daniken and the Friends of the Grassy Knoll. It's a long time since I looked but the assassination of JFK might also now have been 'proved' to have involved a group of renegade Klingons.

@ Alan Thomas | 13 October 2013 at 02:26 PM
“Perhaps I should have made it clear that the elderly contributor in question was me. Much more of this and I certainly will be confused!”

Ah! - a moment of enlightenment! Thanks, now I understand. I shouldn't have been so confident I had interpreted your post properly. All's well that ends well. Are you a septuagenarian, like me? Another question – do you know who introduced the 9/11 issue on the thread? Shall we ask him if he could give us a work-in-progress report? (it wasn't you who introduced it, I suppose?)

Alan Thomas
" . . . my words [were] addressed - I'm fairly certain, to John, once of Dorset, but now of Australia. I'm reliably advised that age can lead to confusion, but your apparent confusion . . "

It's very pleasing to know I was not the intended person to whom your remark was addressed. I was beginning to wonder whether we had fallen out!! So, that's reassuring. I hate falling out, it's so debilitating, and too easily destroys the pleasure of genuinely contributing to a discussion.

I was asking my wife over lunch what is the difference between a discussion and an argument. She hates the latter. Her answer is an argument is where you impose your view unreasonably on others, without really trying to understand their point of view. A discussion stands back somewhat and ensures he/she understands the other person's assertions properly before saying anything.

I notice PH often says we commentators do not really make a proper effort to ensure we have understood his viewpoint properly, before responding. I think so much strife and ill will is caused by poor communication. One of Napoleon's officers is said to have asked him what was the key to effective military leadership? He said there were three rules: (1) Be clear (2) be clear and (3) be clear! Nice thought.
Posted by: Clive Govier |

Thank you for repeating my words addressed - I'm fairly certain, to John, once of Dorset, but now of Australia. I'm reliably advised that age can lead to confusion, but your apparent confusion is certainly increasing the likelihood of my admittance to that condition.

Still, it's good to know you are at least reading the various minor debates that often jump from thread to thread, sometimes leading, I suspect, to considerable despair for those with better things to do in their spare time...

“John is . . resorting to attacks on an elderly, polite (well, mostly) contributor in a most irreligious manner... Personally, if I were in charge of matters, I'd ship him off to the colonies for a spell of rock breaking!”

John is attacking our treating quotations from Wikipedia, as if it has oracular authority. An example is Paul P refuting my argument (supposedly) that World Trade Centre Building 7 is the smoking gun, which shows 9/11 was an inside job. Paul thinks a refutation from Wikipedia is good enough to carry the day.

Wikipedia presents the NIS report as authoritative, and it says WTC7 fell accidentally and precisely into its own footprint, on the same evening, without any help from Mossad's explosive contribution. Good grief! Some people will believe anything, if it has official sanction behind it. The lesson? – think, don't regurgitate!, to quote a well-known person.

Alan Thomas appears to dismiss my supposed illusions about 9/11, by pointing out I am an “elderly gentleman,” who has lost his marbles, and needs transportation to a colony for half-wits. No worries, Alan, we Australians can take your opprobrium - it's a tough continent. Truth is more subtle than that, but thanks anyway for retaining your interest in the 9/11 topic, and for the appellation - gentleman. I'll try to remember to be that.

@bunker (this sounds kinda disrespectful - can one call you 'Mr Bunker'?)
Hmm, I think of myself as an agreeable person but I don't think we do agree on this point. The lack of belief in God may not have been the driving force behind Stalinism and Nazism but it made their atrocities posible. Their ideologies may have been 'bonkers' in that they didn't necessarily take the pragmatic approach to gaining victories (which was the original point I was making to P. Hitchens) but they could be sold as being VERY rational (negate the fundamental worth of the human being and then kill those one doesn't like and/or who are in one's way) to the people who were following them.

@Paul P.
There wasn't much of an alternative to God in "the abominable regimes that dominated Europe for centuries before the Enlightenment". When one was finally tried (the French Revolution), it was horrendous. Then in the history of the last 100 years we have more thoroughgoing examples of atheism in action, which were even more horrendous - would you not agree? Thank you for your kind suggestion that I "avoid debating point-scoring for which counterpoints can be scored so easily". Well, I've just given you the counterpoints (I guess 'counter-arguments' is a better term) to your counterpoints, though I fear we won't have time to debate this here ad infinitum. I'm not in the slightest bit interested in point-scoring and I did not 'debate' it at any point in this discussion.

In reply to the response to my post made by Peter Hitchens concerning the British decision to go to war in 1939, I would like to clarify my point and will address the points he makes individually.

Peter writes: “But any intelligent reading of the state of affairs on the Continent in 1936 onwards would have shown that the balance of power in Europe lay between Germany and the USSR”

Another view of the era is that the balance of power was split three ways, between the liberal democracies, the communists, and the fascists.

He goes on to say: “If our concern had been to ensure no single-power dominance, then that objective had more or less been achieved by German military and economic resurgence. Adjustments between Germany and the USSR, over Poland, the remnants of Austria-Hungary, Romania, the Balkans in general did not threaten that balance”

I would agree with this (because single power dominance is always our concern), but it assumes that particular state of affairs would remain the status quo and does not allow for continued German expansion, whereupon Germany then becomes the single power dominating Europe. German rhetoric at the time was not exactly conducive to easing the fear that the balance of power would not be affected by German expansion into the east.

He then writes: “By the mid-1930s, neither Britain nor France was a major continental power to compare with either Germany or Russia (this remains the case in 2013, though the harsh truth of it was long obscured by American intervention via NATO, and is still obscured by the camouflage of German power in the shrouds of the EU). Britain was never a major continental power.”

Again, I agree with much of this, especially the part concerning Germany’s position in modern Europe. Britain’s power was gained from its empire – it was a maritime power, not a continental one. Its only interest in the continent was ensuring no single power dominate it. Yes, Germany dominates Europe now and will probably get much more powerful because of its superior economic strength and greater respect for its traditional culture than is found in UK. This is checked by the EU, or obscured by it, depending on your view.

In terms of his view that I make a “classic error” of conflating Nazi and classic German foreign policy, I would reply that Nazi foreign policy differed from classic German foreign policy because it incorporated the promotion of Nazi ideology, although they did share the desire for eastward expansion and the unity of German-speaking peoples. That is why I make the distinction.

He also states that “Germany has never been seriously interested in a global empire”

One of the big debates about this era has been whether Nazi foreign policy aimed at worldwide domination or European domination, neither of which was in the British interest. The respected German conservative military historian Andreas Hillgruber argued well that Hitler’s intention was global domination, for example.

It’s also important to make the point that the orthodox view of British foreign policy of this era is not idealistic, as he seems to imply, and the war was not one fought over idealism either. The British decision to go to war was pure realpolitik. If anything is idealistic it is the view that Hitler would stick to a non-aggression pact with Britain. As Hobbes once wrote in Leviathan, "covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."

In responding to Paul P, he asks “What is his evidence that Germany in 1939 or 1940 had any serious material, military, diplomatic or economic interest in westward expansion?”

Hitler did not often refer to France in his early speeches, and on at least one occasion specifically spoke out about how war with France was inconceivable (Berlin Reichstag, January 30, 1937). The anti-France rhetoric starts to appear in later speeches like the one he made in Danzig in September 19, 1939, but note this was over a fortnight after the British had declared was on Germany. An earlier speech by Hitler made in Wilhelmshaven in April 1939 also contains anti-France rhetoric. The rhetoric alone does not prove what Peter asks about intention or interest, but it demonstrates that Hitler had started to understand the need to change the way the German people thought about France, and before the British declaration in September (which was one of the last times Britain actually declared war, the last being in early 1942 against the Thais – today even that courtesy is gone, drowned out by spin and UN “reports”).

“How can you assert your will on the Continent, without an army large enough to do so?”

The British will, as far as the continent is concerned, is limited to its desire not to have an overwhelming single power dominating it. The British, and earlier, the English, have achieved this by supporting coalitions opposed to expanding powers on the continent. Examples of this are the Treaty of Windsor in 1522, the Treaty of Westminster in 1527, the Treaty of Paris in 1657, the Treaty of Hanover in 1725, etc. These are examples of the English and later the British aligning with various powers to oppose greater threats. That is how we asserted our will on the continent.

The difference between offshore balancers and isolationists is slight, but it exists. Hitler’s intentions were clear enough, and his actions made them all the clearer, so the question is, what was the alternative to engagement? Appeasement?

As I have written before, Peter Hitchens is one of the few commentators who will actually engage with his readers, and I appreciate that effort. In this case, I cannot see how conflict with Germany was permanently avoidable. At some point Britain and Germany would have gone to war with each other. Who would trust Hitler? It is a simple case of two powers with conflicting interests rubbing shoulders in the same region, not to mention Germany’s relations with Imperial Japan and the threat that power posed to various British colonies. So the debate is not really about whether Britain was right to go to war, but more was it right to go to war when it did? I accept the point about the Channel providing natural protection, but how would that defend us against German rocket technology at the time if we had chosen to remain neutral and hoped with our fingers crossed that Hitler didn’t change his mind and decide to attack Britain? From Hitler’s point of view, Britain was strategically important because of the risk it posed to the continent. Would he allow that to continue after he had consolidated his power on the continent? I remain of the classic, orthodox, realist view that Britain did the right thing, and if anything should have acted earlier, as I believe Niall Ferguson has argued.

I appreciate this is too long to post, but would be grateful if it was at least passed to Peter so he could read it, as he took the time to read my post and quote from it. Like many moderate conservative Englishmen, I happen to believe we did the right thing in declaring war on Hitler, but it’s refreshing to read an opposing view made with the usual well-articulated vigour that Peter often summons up to make his point!

".....I'm with Mr Hitchens in thinking that the absence of God in the totalitarian regimes of that era was very significant."

As was the presence of God in the abominable regimes that dominated Europe for centuries before the Enlightenment. Can I suggest you avoid debating point-scoring for which counterpoints can be scored so easily.

On Wikipedia: while not an infallible source of knowledge, I find it useful in keeping polemical journalists honest. My opinion is that its quasi-peer review format makes it one of the true gems of the Internet age. But think of it as compendia of knowledge, rather like TV docu-histories. You can fit the script of a TV history of the Roman Empire on three A4 pages. You wouldn't take any notice of a book on the Roman Empire only three pages long. So it is with Wikipedia - good stuff, but incomplete good stuff.

Gadjo Dilo - actually we are not so far apart. I too regard the lack of belief in God by Stalinists and Nazis as "very significant". But I don't think it was in any way the driving force behind their beiing "merciless". And most certainly not in their being "bonkers", since a rational rejection of the idea of a supernatural being can hardly lead to "bonkers-ness".

No, the true motivation behind the Stalinist and Nazi atrocities was the fanatical belief in, and the desire to spread, these irrational ideologies at all costs as you intimated in your original comment. - So I don't think our views diverge that much. I hope you agree.

Thanks for the remark, bunker - it's always nice to be noticed! But I fear that this is where your opinion and mine diverge, as I'm with Mr Hitchens in thinking that the absence of God in the totalitarian regimes of that era was very significant.

I was also very impressed by the 10 points of A. Jones and wonder whether he himself has a blog somewhere (though I've no wish to abandon this one over such disagreements).

Regarding Wikipedia, a P. Hitchens article on its efficacy might be interesting - was this the source of the 'regurgitation' to which he's been referring? It must be remembered that most people have regular jobs, family responsibilities, etc, and so not infinite time to read every history book going in order to get a balanced viewpoint.

"If you disagree with Wikipedia Mr Vernau then you are at liberty to go to the site and change the data."

Well, precisely, Mr P. Like Grouch Marx with his club, I'm unimpressed.
I'm actually a frequent and habitual user of Wiki myself, especially to look up half-remembered quotes and to keep up with the latest developments in Cargo Cult science.
By the way, I much appreciated your 'brown-shirted' aside and am still chuckling now and then.

From several of his recent posts, it seems to me that John is attempting to advance his own set of rules for this blog. And, when unsuccessful, resorting to attacks on an elderly, polite (well, mostly) contributor in a most irreligious manner... Personally, if I were in charge of matters, I'd ship him off to the colonies for a spell of rock breaking!

"I've always believed it was a last-ditch effort to prove that Britain and France were "really, really serious," after having been duped, deceived and played the fool by Hitler; to buy peace with posturing, which Hitler could not have found credible post-Munich."

You are correct. This is my analysis too. Push came to shove, and while we should have shoved over Czechoslovakia, we could not do otherwise than shove over Poland, little though we had to shove with other than purpose and resolve. One message was abundantly clear and that was Hitler would not be granted the several years of further military build-up he needed in order to be assured of overwhelming the western powers.

Our declaration of war over Poland alerted Hitler to the fact that 'gearing for war' would begin immediately in Britain and France. He in his turn could not afford to allow several years of allied build-up to thwart his western ambitions, and so attacked in the west prematurely. He was very lucky to get away with it in France, but Britain was a military objective too far at that time. Hitler had played his bluff hand and been called. It cost him the war.

It's strange that PH would emphasise the balance of power between Germany and the USSR, as if that would have demarcated the limits of German expansionism and guaranteed some measure of geopolitical stability once the fate of Eastern Europe had been settled. The operative word of the era was not "balance" but "conquest". As we know, the USSR in 1941-2 was in no shape to wage war against the Wehrmacht on equal terms. Without British pressure in the west, German attrition from 1939-41, and the arrival of the first Arctic convoys, Operation Barbarossa might well have triumphed by the arrival of the first winter.

What would have been in store for the peace-loving BrE then?

I'm taken aback by this notion that Hitler was a "classic" statesman in the Bismarckean mould. I'd have thought the research undertaken over all these decades of the psychology of the leadership of the Third Reich had put paid to the idea that Hitler was really a rational actor (see 8th Dec 1941). His and his inner circle were sociopathic thugs, liars and chancers. Up to his death, he would drone on to his confidantes about how the strong crush the weak and how the weak - which came to include his own Reich - were beneath contempt.

Accordingly, it's easy to picture how he would have acted towards the BrE had it stayed out of the war. And with such colonies and worldwide interests as it had, a BrE prepared to take the isolationist, self-sufficient course cannot get away with fielding a token Army - for a start, its sources of oil were not that far from where the Wehrmacht's Army Group A found itself in 1942. Any self-respecting megalomaniac wouldn't have hesitated to offer "protection" for the vast reserves of Persian and Middle Eastern oil, to which the world is still chained today. ("Today Europe, tomorrow the world!") Fortifying the Isles against a D-Day-in-reverse would not have been enough. And what about the "jewel in the crown"?

I agree with PH's premise that WW2 was a no-win scenario for Britain that led inexorably to loss of Empire and national decline. I'm open to contemplating realistic alternatives, but I'm just not convinced by the Pat Buchanan thesis.

Thanks PH for the mention in dispatches. The info re Parliamentary debates comes from Quintin Hogg's book "THE LEFT WAS NEVER RIGHT", published in June 1945. One interesting detail in the book is that 136 Conservative MPs (including Hogg) served in the forces during the war and just 14 Socialist MPs. This probably explains why the book is rather a late riposte to the 1940 book "The Guilty Men". I believe the quotes re debates are true because the relevant Hansards are listed. I disagree with Hogg on the minor detail in that he quoted more battleships than I (there were just the five KG5s) and I checked and rechecked the numbers in my old book about warships of WW2.
Hogg does go on a bit about Churchill always being right. We now know that Churchill, when it suited him, grossly inflated Luftwaffe bomber numbers and their ability to flatten London and Paris in just a few weeks. This had the effect of frightening Londoners and Parisians alike. Some of Churchill’s information came from members of the French Comintern. Duff info or not I don’t know. Furthermore we are now aware that Churchill was informed by middle ranking RAF officers of the deficiencies of bomber command to do like to like with Berlin. All this stuff was revealed in parliament and in our press by Churchill. I have not read of anyone making the point that this probably gave Hitler two aces in future negotiations.
The book also reveals Chamberlain’s attempts to seek a rapport with the USSR and how on every occasion the delegates met, the Soviets put more obstacles in the way. The French found the same. Hogg was not to know that Benes (sometime Soviet agent) saw through Stalin’s bluff at the time of Munich. On that issue I’ve always gone with the Soviet defector Krivitsky and Trotsky who said that Stalin would never make a pact with GB and France but would definitely make one with Hitler. Hogg also didn’t know what we do now is that Churchill confessed (on the quiet of course) that he would done exactly the same as Chamberlain in his meetings with Hitler.

There is no question Churchill and the Left rewrote, at the time, very recent history. I do believe it was deliberate attempt to give the impression that an integrated fighter command and all the other war machinery suddenly popped up when Churchill became PM and Lab/Libs got senior Government posts. One example of what I mean, from “TLWNR”, is Archibald Sinclair’s speech in Harrow 26th March 1943 when he said that in September 1939 our air force was outnumbered by the Germans 4 to 1. Hogg said that our aircraft complement was just below 9000 in 1939. If correct, then Sinclair was saying the Germans had just below 36000 aircraft. Ridiculous or what?

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