30 April 2010

Over at FT Energy Source Kate Mackenzie has a really interesting post about a report by Nick Robins of HSBC on the possible effects of recent public issues involving climate science (specifically, CRU and IPCC) on the HSBC Climate Change Index (CCI, details on the invest-able version here in PDF).

There are several really interesting things here. First, since 2007 the CCI consistently outperformed the MSCI World Index. When the release of the CRU emails occurred, there was no noticeable negative effect on the market index as compared to the global benchmark. However, following the issues associated with the IPCC, the CCI has underperformed with respect to the global benchmark. This is suggestive only, as I would have expected that the dismal outcome from Copenhagen to be much more important all along. So while we can conclude that the CRU leak has been irrelevant to the markets, it is not possible to conclude the same with respect to the IPCC.

And this brings us to another very interesting point and that is the perceived (and perhaps real) connection between what the IPCC says and the movement of markets. Reuters says of the HSBC report:

"We believe that any market impacts over climate science may be nearing its floor, with the results of the three independent reviews confirming the integrity of the climate science," the report said.

For the rest of this year, HSBC identified four factors that should catalyze a revival in public concern and market confidence.

A review on the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will be finalized at the end of August and governments will meet in October to take any remedial measures.

"We believe that practical steps to strengthen the IPCC's procedures would represent a positive outcome from this saga. The IPCC also has the opportunity to regain momentum with its special report on renewables later in the year," Robins said.

Because the IPCC is perceived to move markets, as least the sliver of the market associated with climate change, and thus management of actual or perceived conflicts of interest are more than a matter of speculation, but very tangible.

They say three independent reviews into climate science - the key one being the Inter Academy Council review of the IPCC reports, due by August, will assuage doubts about climate science — adding that the IPCC’s general meeting in October and its reports, due out some time in H2, on renewable energy and managing the risks of extreme events will also provide opportunities for a confidence boost.

No kidding? Smart money says you'd better line up your investments in the HSBC CCI while the getting is good!

Legislation and regulation aimed at controlling greenhouse gas emissions are predicated on the belief that science definitively shows that man’s greenhouse gas emissions are causing the Earth’s temperature to rise, with serious deleterious effects. What if the cause-and-effect relationships between GHGs and temperature are greatly overstated? What if the data used to measure temperature change and its effects are of poor quality? What if we don’t adequately understand important climatic systems (such as clouds or oceans) to simulate them accurately in the computer models used to predict climatic change? What if the stated positions of key scientific societies are under assault by the member rank and file? What if the state of empirical knowledge points to only a small human effect on climate?

The answers to these questions directly impact the legislative and regulatory debates underway in the Congress and the Obama Administration.

I reject the premise of the briefing. Legislation and regulation aimed at controlling greenhouse gas emissions are not in fact need not be predicated on the belief that science definitively shows that man’s greenhouse gas emissions are causing the Earth’s temperature to rise, with serious deleterious effects. I recognize that there are some people who make this argument, and they are wrong also.

My rejection of the premise has nothing to do with the state of climate science or what the Marshall Institute or their opponents belief about it. A compelling case can be made that decarbonizing the global economy makes good sense independent of uncertainties in climate science. Reactions to an earlier post along these lines from self-described climate skeptics suggest that some people will strongly resist efforts to move beyond engaging the political debate through science. This is understandable of course, because once the political debate is engaged in terms of science, it confers a distinct advantage to those opposing action. Of course, at the same time I expect that many of those calling for action will face similar difficulties in giving up on science as a political battleground. The irony of course is that both sides agree on where the battle should be waged, but only one side seems to appreciate who is the spider and who is the fly.

28 April 2010

Yesterday's column in the NYT by Thomas Friedman illustrates why efforts to put a price on carbon are not going to do much at all to stimulate energy technology innovation. Friedman writes:

After months of heroic negotiations, Senators John Kerry, Lindsey Graham and Joseph Lieberman had forged a bipartisan climate/energy/jobs bill that, while far from perfect, would have, for the first time, put a long-term fixed price on carbon — precisely the kind of price signal U.S. industry and consumers need to start really shifting the economy to clean-power innovations. . .

Without that price signal, you will never get sustained consumer demand for, or sustained private investment in, clean-power technologies. All you will get are hobbies. . .

I’d love to see the president come out, guns blazing with this message: “Yes, if we pass this energy legislation, a small price on carbon will likely show up on your gasoline or electricity bill. I’m not going to lie. But it is an investment that will pay off in so many ways. It will spur innovation in energy efficiency that will actually lower the total amount you pay for driving, heating or cooling. It will reduce carbon pollution in the air we breathe and make us healthier as a country. It will reduce the money we are sending to nations that crush democracy and promote intolerance. It will strengthen the dollar. It will make us more energy secure, environmentally secure and strategically secure. . . "

It is not clear what that "price on carbon" is in the legislation or how widely it would be applied, but for the purposes of discussion, let's just say that it starts at $15 per metric ton of carbon dioxide and is applied economy-wide.

That level of tax equates to about a $0.12 increase to the cost of gasoline (from Table 2 here). It is hard to see how a $15 carbon tax -- or even a $150 carbon tax -- is going to do much at all to change oil economics or stimulate transformational innovation. It will just make the costs of transportation more expensive.

What about electricity? A price on carbon would have its biggest effects on coal, to be sure, because of its high carbon intensity. The most common form of coal would see its price increase by about 30%. The most immediate effect would likely be to hasten a shift already underway from coal to natural gas. A $15 per ton carbon dioxide price would increase the price of natural gas by about 7%. Over the past year natural gas prices have fluctuated by more than 100%. Wind is already close to cost competitive with fossil electricity in many places. However, a 2009 report from European Wind Energy Association indicates that a 25 Euro carbon tax does not increase the costs of coal or gas above wind (Figure 0.7, here in PDF). And FYI, 25 Euro is about $33, which is a higher price than the "ceiling" in House Legislation. In any case, wind energy is already being expanded dramatically based on mandates, subsidies and through conventional energy economics.

Bottom line -- it is hard to see a carbon price leading to transformational innovation in the electricity sector. It will lead to some marginal changes and make energy a bit more expensive.

For the most part, the message from these economists is a sort of climate version of St. Augustine’s famous prayer, “Give me chastity and continence, but not just now.” Thus Nordhaus’s DICE model says that the price of carbon emissions should eventually rise to more than $200 a ton, effectively more than quadrupling the cost of coal, but that most of that increase should come late this century, with a much more modest initial fee of around $30 a ton. Nordhaus calls this recommendation for a policy that builds gradually over a long period the “climate-policy ramp.”

On the other side are some more recent entrants to the field, who work with similar models but come to different conclusions. Most famously, Nicholas Stern, an economist at the London School of Economics, argued in 2006 for quick, aggressive action to limit emissions, which would most likely imply much higher carbon prices. This alternative position doesn’t appear to have a standard name, so let me call it the “climate-policy big bang.”. . .

Personally, I lean toward the big-bang view.

To put this in perspective, the "central case" of the Stern Review indicates a carbon price of $310 per ton (p. 6 in Dasgupta PDF)-- this is the "big bang" view. It is at a level more than 3 times the ceiling that has been discussed in recent legislation ($310/tonne C = $85/tonne CO2 ~ 3 times $27/tonne CO2, thanks JJ). It is not in the cards. Krugman doesn't explicitly discuss the carbon price implied by Stern.

The carbon price paradox is that any politically conceivable price on carbon can do little more than have a marginal effect on the modern energy economy. A price that would be high enough to induce transformational change is just not in the cards. Thus, carbon pricing alone cannot lead to a transformation of the energy economy.

So where does this leave the debate?

An increasing number of scholars have been coming to the view that a carbon tax coupled with direct investments in energy innovation offers a way past the carbon price paradox. For instance, a Brussel's based think tank intelligently laid out the essential argument late last year (PDF):

How can governments tackle climate change while maintaining reasonable growth, even in the short term? How can they turn on the green innovation machine? We find that 1. both public intervention and private initiative are indispensable: governments must initially redirect market forces towards cleaner energy before market forces can take over; 2. climate change policy should combine a carbon price with high initial clean-innovation R&D subsidies: the carbon price would need to be much higher if used alone; 3. policymakers must act now: delaying clean innovation policies results inmuch higher costs; 4. developed countries must act as technological leaders in implementing new environmental policies and should smooth access to new clean technologies for less-developed countries.

Thomas Friedman seems to get this when he finishes up his hypothetical "guns blazing" speech by the president:

". . . It will make us more energy secure, environmentally secure and strategically secure. Sure, our opponents will scream ‘carbon tax!’ Well, what do you think you’re paying now to OPEC? The only difference between me and my opponents is that I want to keep any revenue we generate here to build American schools, American highways, American high-speed rail, American research labs and American economic strength. It’s just a little tick I have: I like to see our spending build our country. They don’t care. They are perfectly happy to see all the money you spend to fill your tank or heat your home go overseas, so we end up funding both sides in the war on terrorism — our military and their extremists."

The ironic thing about Friedman's impassioned speech is how little money in US climate legislation has been targeted towards energy innovation. While the Senate bill hasn't been released, I would be surprised if it had more than a small amount of investment in innovation in parallel with putting a price on carbon. (How much investment is needed to transform the energy economy? Think about US investments in innovation in health or the mititary, perhaps $30-$100 billion annually for decades.)

Many environmentalists are so desperate for action, any action, that they'll support anything that is proposed. However, the proposals that we've seen so far would do more to sustain the general form of the modern energy economy than transform it. Seeing leading environmental groups and otehrs calling for action on climate change put their energies behind such counter-productive policies may be the real carbon prcing paradox.

. . . starting this weekend, the German government will attempt to rekindle international efforts to save the Earth's climate as it hosts a conference at the Petersberg Hotel near Bonn. But, at the same time, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has now decided to change the course of her climate policy.

As recently as last December she said: "If we don't succeed in limiting global warming to 2 degrees, then the costs of the resulting damages will be many times higher than what we now, with a change in our lifestyle, can achieve."

Now it's a different story: Merkel will no longer endeavor to contractually implement the 2-degree target -- in other words, to reach a legally binding agreement with specific reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. She doesn't want to be snubbed again because she has realized that important countries won't lend their support the next time around either. This was confirmed two weeks ago at the nuclear summit in Washington by Chinese President Hu Jintao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The Limits of Germany's Influence

Germany now has to acknowledge the limits of its influence. The country's climate policy was an attempt to play a leadership role on the grand stage. But the others didn't follow suit. On paper they praise the objective, but they are not prepared to do more than make vague promises. The only way forward, it seems, is by taking side roads. But even there the Chinese and the Indians won't simply trot along behind the Germans.

On the domestic front, this threatens to bring down the great symbol of Germany's efforts to remodel society in line with a climate-friendly lifestyle and mode of production. If Merkel is no longer fighting on the international stage to achieve the 2-degree target, how does she intend to convince her fellow Germans that they have to change anything? A domestic temperature target would be absurd.

What is to emerge is not made clear in the article, but there are some interesting suggestions about what might:

After having dreamt of achieving the great objective, now it's time for realpolitik. Merkel and Röttgen had to admit that countries like China and India will not submit to a mandatory target that others have contrived. They are continuing to pursue their climate policies, but are focusing strictly on domestic issues -- and neither is willing to relinquish any of their sovereignty. Germany is adapting to this and now plans to launch concrete climate protection projects with individual partner countries. Röttgen speaks of a new approach: "In Bonn we want to create a new level that will allow us not only to point towards CO2 targets from above, but also to launch projects from below that produce measurable successes." This includes forest protection and more concrete cooperation in the transfer of environmentally friendly technologies. . .

Röttgen is already trying to move forward by emphasizing additional arguments beyond the 2-degree target -- primarily based on economic reasoning. "We can live well and cheaply now at our children's expense over the next 20 years or invest in long-term opportunities," he says. German environmental technologies are an export hit, "one of the leading sources of prosperity that we have," and crude oil and other natural resources are becoming increasingly scarce, he adds. But he still hasn't made any significant headway in convincing the ministers in his coalition government -- which is comprised of Merkel's conservative Christian Democrats and the business-friendly Free Democratic Party -- that climate protection is not a hopeless issue plagued by sacrifice, but rather a "win-win-win opportunity" for industry, the environment and future generations. Here, too, he is fighting an uphill battle.

A technology-centered approach focused on "win-win-win" rather than sacrifice makes good sense, but it will probably take a while to take hold in Germany, and the EU more generally. But it will, eventually.

27 April 2010

. . . arguments about climate change are invested with powerful ideological instincts and interests. Solutions to climate change vary from market-based mechanisms and technology-driven innovation to justice-focused initiatives and low-consumption localism as a form of lifestyle, each carrying ideological commitments. It is despairingly naive to reduce such intense (and legitimate) arguments to the polarities of ‘belief’ or ‘scepticism’ about science.

Belief in what, exactly? Is it the belief that humans are contributing significantly to climate change? Yes, science can speak authoritatively on this question. Or a belief that the possible consequences of future change warrant an emergency policy programme? Scientific evidence here offers only one strand of the necessary reasoning. Or a belief that such an emergency policy programme must be secured through an international, legally binding targets-and-timetables approach, such as Kyoto? On this, science has very little to say.

On the other hand, what exactly is it that the so-called sceptics are charged with? Scepticism that environmental scientists, businesses and central government are in collusion to fabricate evidence? This is barely plausible. Or scepticism that claims about the future that are based on scientific knowledge are sometimes overstretched and underplay uncertainties? The latter is a warning that all would do well to heed.

The problem here is the tendency to reduce all these complexities into a simple litmus test of whether or not someone believes orthodox scientific claims about the causes and consequences of climate change. This is dividing the world into goodies and baddies, believers and deniers. Climate change demands of us something much more sophisticated than this.

Now that I have apparently been unambiguously tossed out the “warmist blogger” tribe by Joe Romm who is the arbiter of political correctness with regards to global warming alarmism, what is a poor tribeless person like me to do?

But she also realizes that tribalism is here to stay, but she does not like its consequences:

So I guess all my discussion about tribalism and the harm it can do didn’t sink in. My whole point is that we need to have a respectful and reasoned dialogue with a broad range of people. And I have to say that it is easier for me, a “moderate warmist,” to have a respectful and reasoned dialogue at climateaudit than it is at climateprogress. A sad state of affairs, and one that damages the credibility of the warmists.

The definition of tribalism that i have been using is this:

Tribalism is defined here as a strong identity that separates one’s group from members of another group, characterized by strong in-group loyalty and regarding other groups differing from the tribe’s defining characteristics as inferior.

Tribalism is antithetical to science, it is far worse than groupthink.

Like Hulme, Curry rejects such naive and simplistic ways to view the climate debate. Yet if the most ardent of antagonists in the climate debate, on either side, believe that we all have to be members of tribes, please note my request to be in the non-tribe tribe with Hulme and Curry ;-)

26 April 2010

In what is the final act of a prolonged death spiral, the Rudd government has put off its proposed emissions trading scheme until at least 2013. From ABC News:

It was once a centrepiece of the Federal Government's election strategy, but now the emissions trading scheme (ETS) has been relegated to the shelf until at least 2013.

Delaying the scheme means the Government could save $2.5 billion from its budget over the next three years, because it would not be paying compensation to households and industries.

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently said climate change remained a fundamental economic, environmental and moral challenge, whether it was popular or not.

But Government sources say it was decided last week to remove the scheme from next month's budget, bowing to the political reality that the Senate is unlikely to pass the ETS any time soon.

The Upper House has already blocked the ETS legislation twice.

The bills are before the Parliament again but the Senate has delayed the debate while it examines the deal that Mr Rudd struck with former Opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull.

The bottom line is that neither the Opposition, now led by Tony Abbott, nor the Greens like the amended legislation, so it remains in limbo.

The targets set forth in the legislation could not have been met in any case, as I show in this paper (it has since been updated and is just about to be submitted), so perhaps the reprieve will enable a rethink. The Rudd government recently admitted that the bulk of the emissions reductions would have had to come from offsets. In any case a lot will happen between now and 2013, in Australian politics, but also with respect to other national climate policies and international negotiations.

Emissions reductions targets are offered up with little understanding of the implications for energy supply or the economy. Complex legislation is proposed that obscures the simple math of decarbonisation.

When push comes to shove no politician wants to impose economic discomfort on his or her constituents, so they look desperately for magical solutions. Emissions trading has provided that illusion up to now.

Australia, the United States and Japan, in particular are at a crossroads in climate policy. The decisions that they make at this juncture will shape climate policy around the world, leading up to the summit in Mexico at the end of the year and beyond.

Will they continue in pursuit of magical solutions? Or will they start fresh, with an approach grounded in the realities of the simple math of decarbonisation?

The success or failure of emissions reductions efforts depends on their answers.

Does Australia's step-back from the ETS represent a fresh start? Time will tell.

One of the issues being debated in the UK election is the potential expansion of Heathrow airport, and air travel in general in the UK as a part of "green" policies. On this issue Labor seems to have it right, as they argue that economic growth requires expanding air travel capacity. Looking at the graph above, it is easy to see why the debate over Heathrow (and air travel in the UK generally) is entirely of symbolic importance. Of course, the other parties have their own problems, the Lib Dems are adamantly opposed to nuclear power, the Conservatives are populated by "climate skeptics," while none of the three seems to understand the simple math of emissions reductions targets and timetables (while the Green party explains that good climate policy means being unpopular, enough said).

The UK election won't be decided on environmental issues. However, whatever government emerges from this most interesting of elections will face some real challenges related to climate policy. I suppose that the good news for the new government is that nobody else around the world has it figured out either.

The 2010 Gordon Conference on Science and Technology Policy will focus on a wide range of research at the intersection of science, technology, policy and society. The 2010 Conference will focus in particular on further developing partnerships between North American and European researchers. Invited speakers represent a variety of scientific disciplines in the policy sciences, social and natural sciences as well as the humanities. The Conference will bring together a collection of investigators who are at the forefront of their field, and will provide opportunities for junior scientists and graduate students to present their work in poster format and exchange ideas with leaders in the field. The collegial atmosphere of this Conference, with programmed discussion sessions as well as opportunities for informal gatherings in the afternoons and evenings, provides an avenue for scholars from different disciplines to brainstorm and promotes cross-disciplinary collaborations in the various research areas represented.Location:Waterville Valley Resort, Waterville Valley, NH, United States

Applications for this meeting must be submitted by July 18, 2010. Please apply early, as some meetings become oversubscribed (full) before this deadline. If the meeting is oversubscribed, it will be stated here. Applications will still be accepted for oversubscribed meetings. However, they will only be considered by the Conference Chair if more seats become available due to cancellations.

23 April 2010

The UK Election Second Leaders Debate. An interesting moment on Climate Change. Cameron wisely avoided the science and opted for a skeptical joke about not breathing. Clegg is clearly made of ecologically sound wooden stuff and Gordy...is, well, just himself.

Journalist Keith Kloor has posted up an interview with Judy Curry, a climate scientist at Georgia Tech. As usual Judy is a straight shooter and has some smart things to say about CRU, IPCC and climate science in general. Have a read here. Here is a bit to whet your interest, from her discussion of the Oxburgh report:

I recall reading this statement from one of the blogs, which seems especially apt: the fire department receives report of a fire in the kitchen; upon investigating the living room, they declare that there is no fire in the house.

Academic research has shown that for the UK to meet the emissions reductions targets implied by the 2008 Climate Change Act would require an effort the equivalent of 30 new nuclear power plants by 2015, just to get part way to the target. Clearly this is not going to happen.

Ed Miliband, the Labor secretary of state for energy and climate change (in the center of the above photo), responded first by saying that he disputes my figures. My figures can easily be checked because they have been published in the peer-reviewed literature:

Just because they are published doesn't make them right, but it does not mean that they should be cavalierly dismissed either. I am certain that they are correct. Anyone with a line to Miliband is asked to request from him the details of his objection to these figures, and should a reply ever be forthcoming, I'll post it up here.

In fact, thanks to the Guardian, you can easily confirm that they are correct as well. The Guardian has put online a nifty carbon calculator for the UK, which allows one to play around with assumptions to try to reach the short term target. A reduction of 15% from today is equivalent to the 2020 target of a 34% reduction from 1990.

Using the calculator, you can get to the 2020 target by eliminating all 20 coal-fired power plants and an additional 30 natural gas power plants. To balance energy supply and demand these would have to be replaced by carbon-free generation. So, when I say that the level of effort is equivalent to 30 1GW nuclear power plants to get only part way to the short-term target, you can easily see that number is correct using the online calculator (how very cool). Spreading that level of effort around many sectors of the economy does not make the magnitude of the task any smaller, and arguably makes it more complex.

On this issue, Ed Miliband is simply wrong. His opponents in the debate, however, did not seem any better on the substance. Whoever inherits or retains the job of energy minister is eventually going to have to deal with the failure of the Climate Change Act. Denying the figures will only work for so long.

21 April 2010

Jonathan Gilligan, Associate Director for Research, Vanderbilt Climate Change Research Network and Associate Professor, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, at Vanderbilt University, has written in with some interesting questions on the thought experiment I posted earlier today. With his permission I reproduce his email below, along with my replies.

If you have time to think about them and reply, I would like to ask three related questions:

(1) Do you similarly think that decisions whether to spend lots of money researching and developing air-capture technology don't depend on climate science?

REPLY: The decision to deploy air capture technology certainly depends upon a judgment that we should "tune" atmospheric carbon dioxide levels to some precise value. My view is that air capture is not a technology that would be deployed any time soon, but we may wish to develop it to keep our options open decades hence. This judgment is based on the possibility that we may want to have a back-up plan in canse conventional mitigation does not work out and we wish to adopt a "brute force" approach.

So, any decision to deploy air capture will certainly require a judgment that doing so is beneficial, and this would come from information produced by climate science. Just as we will want to invest in air capture research in coming decades, so too will we want to invest in continued climate science research. The state of climate science today is already sufficient to justify investing in air capture research.

My post today was about accelerating decarbonization, and to start on that path, we need not depend upon climate science, and those steps make sense for reasons well beyond science. Just because we can justify accelerated decarbonization without depending on climate science does not mean that we may not wish to rely on climate science for future decisions.

(2) Do you think decisions how much foreign aid to give LDCs to help them adapt to climate change depend on climate science? I can see arguments either way: much of the adaptation aid would help reduce vulnerabilities to current natural hazards, as you have pointed out many times; but on the other hand, the magnitude and timing of the aid could be very different if we were looking at sea-level rise displacing 18 million Bangladeshis in the next 50 years vs. no real change from current circumstances in the coming century.

Just so I'm clear: when I talk of the relevance of climate science, I'm talking mostly about what we know today---that AGW is real and that within the envelope of possible/plausible futures, there are truly catastrophic outcomes, although the science can't assign meaningful probabilities to those outcomes and (as you and Sarewitz have argued) is unlikely over the next decade to improve its predictive power significantly. Despite what you write, I can't help concluding that this limited scientific understanding is indeed very relevant to energy and adaptation policy because the quasi-irreversible nature of climate change (unless we quickly perfect air capture) would strongly affect the speed with which we choose to act.

REPLY: No. I do not think that adaptation funding should in any way be tied to climate science. The reason for this is that is virtually every location that experiences climate impacts, climate (and projected future changes in climate) is far less important than the societal factors that drive losses. Simply focusing resources on the places that are most vulnerable to impacts will have large benefits irrespective of how the future evolves over the next half century or so.

Consider your Bangladesh example. Bangladesh is projected to gain land area by 2050. But whether it does or does not I think is less relevant than the certainty that Bangladesh is a poor country with considerable exposure to climate events. Developing adaptive capacity in Bangladesh makes sense on its own merits. As I have argued, with Dan Sarewitz and others, adaptation policies can stand on their own, and recently with Mike Hulme and Suraje Dessai, such polices do not depend upon accurate climate predictions.

(3) Could research on public opinion test your hypothesis and perhaps settle some disagreements surrounding it? It seems to me that many questions about or disagreements over your hypothesis on the relevance of climate science come down in large part to empirical questions of what matters to voters and decision-makers. Do you know whether anyone's doing good public opinion research to test whether voters' (or their elected representatives') support for decarbonizing energy (or the related hypotheses about support for air capture or adaptation) depend on questions pertaining to climate science? And would such research be relevant to the questions you raise?

REPLY: A good part of Chapter 2 of my new book makes the case that there is ample political will for action on climate change, and has been for more than a decade. Public support in the US has been remarkably consistent over that time, even with its periodic ups and downs. At the same time, the public has grown increasingly skeptical about the claims made about climate science, believing that it has been exaggerated by climate scientists. Yet, support for action remains strong. There is plenty of polling data to back up these claims, which I cite in the book. And there is also literature which suggest that appeals to alarm or fear just "won't do it."

There is also a much broader literature on the public understanding of science which argues that knowledge of particular scientific facts does not compel particular actions. See this review article, for instance. So I think that the work in this area provides a compelling body of theoretical and empirical reasons to suggest that support for climate policy depends far less on climate science than many in the debate actually might think.

In his review of my book Science as a Contact Sport — a personal retrospective account of the development of climate science and policy covering 40 years — Roger Pielke Jr misrepresents my position on advocacy (Nature 464, 352–353; 2010).

Pielke fairly represents my decades-old argument that scientists should avoid policy prescriptions. But he omits my frequently stated context: policy advocacy by scientists is inappropriate in formal assessments, such as those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or of the US National Academy of Sciences.

As citizens, scientists may have personal-value positions on policy. But when involved in public advocacy, they must clearly lay out their world views and separate the more objective scientific issue of risk assessment from the value-laden risk-management part. Contrary to Pielke's implication, I am aware of this 'paradox'.

Understanding science does not in itself lead to effective policy. In fact, my book demonstrates that special interest or ideological chicanery is more responsible than scientific ignorance for blocking policy. However, as Pielke notes, I did say that if people better understood what is at stake, they'd be likely to make better risk-management decisions.

That last paragraph seems contradictory to me, as the first and last sentence say pretty much the opposite things.

I don't recall Schneider discussing advocacy by the IPCC or NAS. I wonder what he makes of the advocacy letters of the US NAS on climate change and the various advocacy efforts of Rajendra Pachauri. I'd guess that he'd say that there is a bright line between science and advocacy and individuals can choose what side of that line to be on in different contexts. Obviously, I don't see science and politics being nearly so distinguishable, for individuals and institutions.

These are the relevant paragraphs in the review that Schneider is responding to (it also refers to Jim Hansen's latest book):

Hansen and Schneider each provide a troubling inside view of the political battle over climate change in their respective books, Storms of My Grandchildren and Science as a Contact Sport. Hansen invokes religious terms, characterizing himself and Schneider as witness and preacher, respectively. Both are evangelists who hold science as an ascendant authority.

The tension between the role of scientists as political advocates and as expert advisers is an undercurrent in both books. Schneider explains that “as scientists, we never recommend which policies should be chosen”; Hansen similarly sees himself as an “objective scientist”. Yet both books largely comprise strong ideological and political commentary based on an unstated assumption that science compels action on climate change. Neither author accepts the label of advocate, claiming to be speaking for science; nor do they see the paradox in their position.

Both scientists express a desire to influence political outcomes. Hansen describes how he hoped to sway the US presidential election in 2004 through his public endorsement of Senator John Kerry over George W. Bush in a speech made in the swing state of Iowa. Schneider relates how, at an IPCC meeting, he may have aided the viability of the Kyoto Protocol after explaining climate science to an African national delegate who later changed his position.

Can you imagine any discoveries or conclusions in climate science would indicate that accelerated decarbonization of the global economy does not make sense?

Answer: No

Accelerating decarbonization of the global economy makes good sense independent of the conclusions reached in climate science. That said, the fact that humans influence the climate system in ways that are understood and not understood gives us another reason to consider whether accelerated decarbonization of the global economy might be a good idea. And for some people the science may indeed be a sufficient justification. But there is no reason why it has to be for everyone.

But just for fun, lets imagine that we learn that all of climate science is a hoax or a fraud (it is not), would that mean that we would no longer need to discuss a need to diversify energy supply, reduce energy costs and expand energy access? No.

The insensitivity of the importance of climate science to decarbonization is the main reason why waging a political war over climate science is wrongheaded. Whether you win or lose that debate it really doesn't ever touch the main policy issues. Sure it generates lots of heat, and may serve other aims, but in the end, it doesn't matter much for the implementation of policies focused on accelerating decarbonization of the economy.

IPCC procedures are robust and rigorous, but they can always be improved. Upholding exacting standards is a responsibility and a sacred trust that IPCC authors — and I — accept with the utmost respect and sincerity. It is our duty to correct or clarify the inevitable oversights and errors that may slip into reports of this magnitude and complexity.

With this in mind, I would like to provide a response to some issues that have given rise to recent controversy.

What issues does he discuss? The 2035 glacier error, the Amazon rainfall issue, and the African agriculture issue.

What issue does he neglect completely? The misrepresentation of disasters and climate change.

19 April 2010

The fact is that we can't account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can't.

Last week Science magazine gave Trenberth a chance to explain what he meant by this comment, which has been much discussed in the aftermath of the released emails (the image above is from that article). In that article, Trenberth, and Kevin Fasullo, write:

Over the past 50 years, the oceans have absorbed ~90% of the energy added to the climate system; the rest has gone into melting sea and land ice and heating the land surface and atmosphere ( 4). CO2 concentrations have further increased since 2003, and even more heat should have accumulated at a faster rate since then. Where has this energy gone (see the figure)?

. . . Since 2004, ~3000 Argo floats have provided regular temperature soundings of the upper 2000 m of the ocean, giving new confidence in the ocean heat content assessment—yet, ocean temperature measurements from 2004 to 2008 suggest a substantial slowing of the increase in global ocean heat content (see the figure, panel A) ( 10). If the extra energy has not gone into the ocean, where has it gone?

Where indeed?

The open admission that scientists don't understand the location of the missing heat is a vindication for my father, who has been discussing this issue since 2006, and taking a lot of grief for it. For instance, in 2006 my father noted that model predictions and observations of the accumulation of heat in the oceans were diverging:

The mismatch between the data and the model predictions, however, raises serious questions on the ability of the multi-decadal global climate models to accurately predict even the global average variability and long term trend of the radiative imbalance of the climate system.

But if the aquatic robots are actually telling the right story, that raises a new question: Where is the extra heat all going?

Kevin Trenberth at the National Center for Atmospheric Research says it's probably going back out into space. The Earth has a number of natural thermostats, including clouds, which can either trap heat and turn up the temperature, or reflect sunlight and help cool the planet.

That can't be directly measured at the moment, however.

"Unfortunately, we don't have adequate tracking of clouds to determine exactly what role they've been playing during this period," Trenberth says.

It's also possible that some of the heat has gone even deeper into the ocean, he says. Or it's possible that scientists need to correct for some other feature of the planet they don't know about. It's an exciting time, though, with all this new data about global sea temperature, sea level and other features of climate.

The observed absence of heat accumulation (of Joules) in the upper ocean (and in the troposphere) for the last four years means that there has been NO global warming in these climate metrics during this time period. It is unknown whether this is a short term aberration but, regardless, it is clear that the IPCC models have failed to skillfully predict this absence of warming.

You can read an interesting exchange from earlier this week among Roger Pielke, Sr., Kevin Trenberth and Josh Willis on my father's blog here.

What to take from this?

First, there was ample indication of issues associated with the divergence of model projections and accumulated heat years ago, but for whatever reasons, it was not openly discussed, with the exception of the 2008 NPR story (perhaps I've missed others).

Second, it took the released CRU emails to open up a public scientific dialogue on this subject, which suggests that there are some issues with either model projections or observations. Judging from the Pielke-Trenberth-Willis exchange, I'd put my money on problems with the models.

Third, none of this should alter how we think about the policy issues, as uncertainties have always been with us and always will. But getting uncertainties out in the open is a new thing for the public face of climate science and undoubtedly some will likely try to reassert the old ways of suppressing uncertainties.

The story of the missing heat does not indicate that climate science is a fraud or that we need not worry about a human influence on the climate system. What it does tell us is that there have been some unhealthy goings on in the climate community and we should all bask in the new found sunshine.

So where is the missing heat? Apparently no one knows, but I hope they find it soon.

Last week I noted a New York Times article which discussed how improvements in maternal health were not welcomed by some who worried about the effects of the news on the perceived urgency of the problem. Some advocates went so far as to try to influence the process of peer review to keep the good news out of sight (sound familiar?).

Today's New York Times has two letters (of four total on the original article) that continue to display these very different perspectives. The first is from Mary Robinson, a former president of Ireland and United Nations high commissioner for human rights:

New data on maternal mortality looks like encouraging news but is hardly cause for celebration.

Only 23 nations are on track to reach the United Nations Millennium Development Goal on reducing by three-quarters maternal deaths by 2015. Real progress will require tackling discrimination against women, increasing resources to strengthen health systems to ensure universal access to care, including through skilled birth attendants and emergency obstetric care, and expanding access to family planning.

Lack of reproductive choices for women, child marriage, sexual violence, exposure to unsafe abortions and the inability to own property are all linked to slow progress on achieving this and other Millennium Development Goals, commitments governments pledged to meet at the start of this century.

The new evidence is encouraging, but must not be allowed to undermine the urgency of addressing maternal mortality and health as a basic human right.

The second is from Dorothy Balaba Byansi, a doctor from Kampala, Uganda:

Your article about the Lancet report on declining maternal mortality brought me so much joy. I work for a Ugandan N.G.O., PACE, where we manage a network of 100 partly franchised clinics, and I’m accustomed to grim stories of “little progress,” even after loads of hard work to ensure that women in Uganda have better access to lifesaving services and products. It is therefore encouraging that the efforts health workers put in across the world are bearing fruit.

In Uganda, though there remains a long mile to walk, we are making progress, too. In 2009, PACE’s partnership with the Ministry of Health enabled 13,686 women to receive long-term family planning methods, up from 255 the previous year. We also distributed 12,420 clean delivery kits and 17,926 Misoprostol doses for the prevention of post-partum hemorrhage, which accounts for one-third of maternal deaths in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

Whether you come down on the side of Robinson or Byansi, or better yet, if you realize that multiple valid perspectives on the significance of the Lancet study can co-exist at the same time, we should all be able to agree that trying to shape a political message by intercepting research before it is published is just a bad idea.

[UPDATE: Will Toor, Boulder County Commissioner, helpfully responded to my invitation to respond to this post. He writes by email, reproduced with permission:

This program was designed with cost effectiveness as a primary consideration, so the prescriptive path focuses on cheap, easy upgrades (such as duct sealing, air sealing, insulation upgrades in accessible cavities) . The city went out and conducted 6 case studies of actual rental units in Boulder and hired contractors to do the work, and measured pre and post energy costs. In every case the improvements were better than cost neutral from day 1 - meaning that if you financed the improvements with a 15 year loan at 6%, the decrease in monthly utility bills was larger than the loan payment. In the case studies, most of the buildings would achieve about a 20% reduction in GHG emissions. And, since most of the improvements have a lifetime that of 30 years, eventually the savings will be even larger. So the real cost per ton is negative. Not positive.

Even if you ignored that, and pretended that energy is free so only capital costs matter, you would need to divide that capital cost by the cumulative emissions reductions over the 30 year lifetime of the improvements. So you would arrive at something more like $25/ton.

I looked at the case studies that he refers to (available here) and the amortized costs per tonne of CO2 over 30 years in the cases is $20 to $60. I have some serious methodological questions about the assumptions used in such a calculus, but Will explains that looking at amortized costs doesn't even matter:

. . . in the real world almost every landlord will finance this, and will be making annual payments. So you can ignore the future, and just take their annual payment and subtract the annual energy savings, and divide by the annual emissions reductions, to get a cost per ton. The data from the case study suggests the cost will be negative. If the landlord association claims were correct (they are claiming, with no study to back up the claim, that it will cost twice as much as the city claims) it will be a small positive number.

If it is indeed the case that the program saves money from day 1, which I have no reason to doubt, I do question the emphasis on greenhouse gas reductions, which seems to be a side benefit to a program than can be justified on economics alone, rather than a primary goal which depends upon a range of questionable assumptions to arrive at a reasonable number.

Will has convinced me that he cost per ton may not be $800, but I'm not buying $25 per ton. But if the program is a net economic winner than this debate is irrelevant, however the characterization of the program as focused on carbon dioxide rather than costs might be rethought.

Thanks to Will for adding this valuable context.]

Last week I highlighted a program in NSW, Australia which was paying $1,000 per tonne to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Today its Boulder's turn to be in the spotlight for unjustifiably expensive carbon policies. An article in the Boulder Daily Camera today discusses a new program focused on regulating energy efficiency improvements for the purpose of reducing carbon dioxide:

On Thursday, the Boulder Planning Board will take up "SmartRegs," a proposed point-based system designed to get rental properties -- which make up about halfof the city's housing stock -- to reduce their carbon footprint.

Under the program, landlords would be required to make improvements that could include installing energy-efficient appliances, sealing ducts or better insulating.

The city's overall goal is to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions coming from homes by 94,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide by 2012. The SmartRegs program, it's estimated, could make up about 45,000 tons of that goal. . .

The costs for making energy upgrades would vary widely based on the age and overall condition of rental properties. The city of Boulder recently completed testing on seven homes and found that reaching the 100-point threshold cost between $675 and $3,243 each.

The total estimated investment to upgrade all rental properties in the city is $17.7 million. But opponents of the measure, including the Boulder Area Rental Housing Association, say the total cost to property owners could top $35 million.

How much does the program cost per ton of carbon dioxide?

Assuming that the program actually leads to a reduction of 45,000 tons (a dubious assumption, as the goal is most likely "reductions" against a counterfactual baseline), and that the costs will be between the $17.7 and $35 million suggested by proponents and opponents, respectively, of the program then the costs per ton work out to be between about $400 and $800 per ton.

This is crazy. The city recognizes that imposing an economic burden on landlords and tenants might not be the best idea, so they are already floating ideas to step back from the program, which invariably would drive down the emissions reductions a good deal, perhaps making the cost-per-ton even higher:

To minimize the financial shock to landlords, the city is proposing that the requirements be phased in over time.

Options being considered include requiring all rental properties to meet the 100 points when they renew their rental licenses -- which would bring all of the estimated 19,600 rental properties into compliance by 2014 -- or having smaller steps toward meeting the efficiencies over many years, which could stretch full compliance into 2018.

Affordable housing units that don't qualify for government assistance could be given up to 12 years to phase in the upgrades.

City staffers are recommending a "hardship provision" that would extend the deadlines for owners who can demonstrate an inability to pay for the upgrades. Those landlords might be allowed to purchase carbon offsets to buy them more time to meet the requirements.

Ah yes, carbon offsets. Faced with a choice of taking symbolic action at up to $800 a ton or taking symbolic action at around $20 per ton, what do you think will happen?

Boulder is showing leadership in climate policy. Too bad that leadership is showing the inanity of climate policies focused on regulating energy use for purposes of reducing carbon footprints. There are better ways.

The primary frustration with these investigations is that they are dancing around the principal issue that people care about: the IPCC and its implications for policy. Focusing only on CRU activities (which was the charge of the Oxbourgh panel) is of interest mainly to UEA and possibly the politics of UK research funding (it will be interesting to see if the U.S. DOE sends any more $$ to CRU). Given their selection of CRU research publications to investigate (see Bishop Hill), the Oxbourgh investigation has little credibility in my opinion. However, I still think it unlikely that actual scientific malfeasance is present in any of these papers: there is no malfeasance associated with sloppy record keeping, making shaky assumptions, and using inappropriate statistical methods in a published scientific journal article.

The corruptions of the IPCC process, and the question of corruption (or at least inappropriate torquing) of the actual science by the IPCC process, is the key issue. The assessment process should filter out erroneous papers and provide a broader assessment of uncertainty; instead, we have seen evidence of IPCC lead authors pushing their own research results and writing papers to support an established narrative. I don't see much hope for improving the IPCC process under its current leadership.

The historical temperature record and the paleoclimate record over the last millennium are important in many many aspects of climate research and in the communication of climate change to the public; both of these data sets are at the heart of the CRU email controversy. In my opinion, there needs to be a new independent effort to produce a global historical surface temperature dataset that is transparent and that includes expertise in statistics and computational science. Once "best" methods have been developed and assessed for assembling such a dataset including uncertainty estimates, a paleoclimate reconstruction should be attempted (regional, hemispheric, and possibly global) with the appropriate uncertainty estimates. The public has lost confidence in the data sets produced by CRU, NASA, Penn State, etc. While such an independent effort may confirm the previous analysies, it is very likely that improvements will be made and more credible uncertainty estimates can be determined. And the possibility remains that there are significant problems with these datasets; this simply needs to be sorted out. Unfortunately, the who and how of actually sorting all this out is not obvious. Some efforts are underway in the blogosphere to examine the historical land surface data (e.g. such as GHCN), but even the GHCN data base has numerous inadequacies. Addressing the issues associated with the historical and paleo temperature records should be paramount.

16 April 2010

Editor's note: This is a guest post by Sharon Friedman, who describes herself as "a scientist and a by day, a mild-mannered federal employee, with an avocation of science and technology policy studies." This post presents, of course, her personal views. Along with others interested in forest planning she blogs at A New Century of Forest Planning.

Sometimes scientists behaving as policy advocates is a gentle, almost difficult to detect, kind of thing. This week we have a chance to observe it at its most extreme. And for those of you who think climate scientists are unique.. well.. not so.

In this case, we have 500 (count ‘em ) scientists writing a letter (here in PDF) to the President supporting a specific regulation.

So let’s parse out where the “science” is in their knowledge claims.

First, they claim if roadless areas are important, then the 2001 Rule is the only correct policy choice. (Does this sound familiar- like climate change and cap and trade? Any hardwiring between science and a specific policy has to be highly suspect.)

I call this the “sleight of science” approach where their scientific arguments are that protecting roadless areas are good for environment values. But I don’t think you can simply say that therefore, because of science, you must have environmental values or you’re not using the science. Which is highly confusing, but on top of that, even if you do share environmental values for roadless, there are many ways of developing a protective policy. The question is whether the 2001 Roadless Rule is the best policy that could be invented by a Democratic administration today. Guess what- scientists don’t get to frame policy questions as being simply science questions. They can try, but people usually catch on, to the detriment of public trust (do biologists want to join climate scientists on the low-trust bandwagon?).

Second, a policy question usually is thought to require the balancing of social, economic and environmental concerns. Yet our 500 “scientists” seem to be heavily biased toward biology and ecology. Except for a philosopher, which last I checked wasn’t actually a science. Oh, well.

Third, the facts are not correct and I know that most of the people who signed this do not know what is in the Idaho Rule nor the Colorado Petition. They do not know what the 2001 Rule really does, the exceptions and the case law. That is the role of roadless geeks and I don’t see their names on this list.

Let’s just take one example in the Colorado statement and ask “where’s the science?”

In Colorado, which contains over 4 million acres of inventoried roadless areas, proposed exemptions in their draft rule would impact at least 246,000 acres of inventoried roadless areas by removing them from the national inventory or degrading them by eliminating many restrictions on logging and road building.

This refers to the July 29, 2009 tally which has been subsequently revised by the Governor of Colorado. The current numbers are that 467,000 acres were removed based on on-the-ground reviews by the Forest Service and Colorado Department of Wildlife because they had roads or timber sales. But what is not mentioned is that 409,000 additional acres that were determined to be really roadless were added. Thus, there is a net loss from the inventory of 57,600 acres.

But these removed acres were not really roadless – so how can it be science that determines whether protecting roaded roadless areas is better than unroaded roadless areas? We are definitely in the realm of values here... and why did they use the old petition numbers when the new one came out on April 4, 2010 (here in PDF,their letter was dated April 14, 2010 )?

I could go on with their other statements to document a pattern.

Now I am not naïve. I know what happened is that someone wrote a letter and everyone signed on without independently verifying the facts, let alone independently thinking about whether this is a science issue or not. But if scientists don’t due diligence on things they sign, then they are no better than politicians in terms of being trusted to have the facts right.

The letter's conclusion made me cringe:

In closing, we thank you for your pledge to restore scientific integrity to policy development and specifically to decisions impacting the environment – including the conservation of our public lands. As scientists, we believe that the 2001 Roadless Rule remains the most scientifically credible approach for managing and protecting our last undeveloped national forests, and we urge your continued support for it.

I don’t know what “scientific integrity” means in term of policy development. I do know what plain old human integrity is. Signing on to something without checking the facts, and claiming that something is a science issue that we all know it ain’t, is not really walking the integrity talk, in my opinion.

I recommend that science and technology scholars begin to write letters of correction when they see egregious evidence of science abuse. Maybe we can get 1000 science and technology policy scholars to sign a letter.

THE NSW government spent $104,000 from its Climate Change Fund to save a single tonne of carbon dioxide - worth about $35 under international carbon prices - the fund's annual report shows.

The money, to renovate a building at Sylvania Public School so it used less electricity, was spent on one in a series of projects that appear not to match the Climate Change Fund's main objective: cutting carbon emissions.

More than half the 26 public projects funded in the 2008-09 financial year valued carbon at more than $1000 a tonne, almost 30 times its estimated market value, although many of the projects did fulfil requirements to save large amounts of water.

The Department of Environment and Climate Change and Water says the spending is worthwhile, even though it is not always the most efficient way to slash emissions, because it helps educate about saving energy.

Other projects paid for by the fund, which is sustained by a levy on energy and water bills, included a $20,000 grant to Dungog Shire Council to put a solar heater on its swimming pool, saving one tonne of carbon dioxide. Manly Council was also granted $154,000 to install energy-saving floodlights at Manly Oval, saving 17 tonnes of carbon dioxide and allowing the council to ''educate a segment of the market that does not normally respond to energy-saving messages''.

The fund supported 299 projects and a residential rebate program, saving $100 million on water and energy bills, 731,000 tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions and 17 million litres of water, the department said.

A spokeswoman said the fund was saving money in schools and clubs and demonstrating what can be achieved through improved efficiency and new technology.

But the NSW opposition said the annual report showed taxpayer funds were being used inefficiently. "The [fund] exists to tackle climate change, and you don't do that by spending 5000 times more than you have to save a single tonne of carbon dioxide,'' one MP, Michael Richardson, said.

The department said its Renewable Energy Development Program was the best performer, spending $6.63 for each tonne of carbon. The $700 million fund was set up in July 2007.

The project that worked best is focused on stimulating innovation in renewable energy technology using public funds. The ones that performed the worst were focused on efficiency gains and energy consumption reduction (which some people call conservation). The programs focused on conservation probably could not be justified except for their co-benefits, such as related to water savings.

The annual report referred to in the article above can be downloaded here in PDF.

There are important lessons here about the effectiveness of public investments in innovation and the limits of efforts to promote efficiencies.

15 April 2010

Three weeks after empaneling a distinguished committee to look into issues related to the release of the CRU emails at the request of the University of East Anglia, Lord Oxburgh has issued a final statement reporting their conclusions. According to the LA Times, on the BBC he summarized what they found as follows:

Last summer I noted that the Obama Administration gave the go-ahead for the building of a new pipeline to bring petroleum from Canadian oil sands to the United States. I am sure that I wasn't alone in wondering why they would do this at the same time that they were pushing to create a cap-and-trade program to put a price on carbon. I got the answer in today's FT in an article on investors who are seeking to increase disclosure from BP on tar sand development.

It turns out that development of Canadian oil sands in insensitive to the price ceiling that was being discussed under the Waxman-Markey bill. From the FT (emphasis added):

At the heart of BP's resistance to its dissident shareholders' resolution on oil sands is a point of principle: managers should be free to manage.

Yet it is also engaged in a vigorous debate over the details.

The resolution, backed by investors including Co-operative Asset Management of the UK, and Calpers and Calstrs, the California state pension funds, is on the face of it quite uncontroversial.

A Greenpeace-backed attempt last year to use a shareholder vote to force Statoil, Norway's state-controlled oil company, to pull out of Canada's oil sands was unsuccessful.

The resolutions proposed this year for BP and Royal Dutch Shell, backed by FairPensions, a British campaign group, are less ambitious.

They simply demand that the companies commission reports setting out the assumptions they make when deciding on oil sands investments, including factors such as oil prices, the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, and "legal and reputational risks arising from local environmental damage and impairment of traditional livelihoods".

The reports would be presented to the companies' annual general meetings next year. That might not sound like a lot to ask, especially as BP has already released much of the information.

It has made clear it uses an oil price range of $60-$90 per barrel, and an assumed carbon price of $40 per tonne of CO 2 when appraising projects.

The proposed project assumes a carbon price much higher than the ceiling that Waxman-Markey would have established. The then leads to a question: If cap and trade, as proposed, would not halt oil sands development due to simple economics then how exactly would it compel innovation in the renewable energy sector?

14 April 2010

An enlightening article in today's FT on the growth of coal powered energy in India, China and elsewhere allows us to play a bit of climate policy mad libs. First, an excerpt from the text:

Yet China is not the only force driving increased demand. India's huge and rising coal needs are just as critical. In effect, "Chindia" is redescribing the industry. "Coal is the fuel of the future for Asia," says Eoghan Cunningham, chief executive of GlobalCoal, a trading platform owned by miners, traders and utilities.

Emmanuel Fages, a coal analyst at Société Générale, forecasts that India will overtake South Korea as the world's second-largest buyer before the end of the decade. The increase in demand comes as New Delhi continues to expand its coal-fired power generation capacity. According to the World Bank, 40 per cent of homes in India are still without electricity. The country's authorities see coal as a "poverty alleviation" tool to spread electricity across the country.

The growth of South Korea and Taiwan is also likely to support the market as those centres switch from crude oil. At the same time Vietnam, a medium-sized expor-ter, has signalled that it might become an importer in three to five years as rapid urbanisation and industrialisation increase coal needs. Tran Xuan Hoa, general director of Vinacomin, the Vietnamese state-owned coal company, says the country might need to import 100m tonnes annually by 2020.

What of the west? The current weakness in Europe, Japan and the US is thought likely to prove a temporary consequence of recession; utilities, cement companies and steelmakers are set to buy large amounts this year, although in the longer term developed countries are moving away from coal in a bid to curb global carbon emissions. The rise in coal consumption in developing countries, particularly China and India, poses questions about this endeavour, in particular because the new coal-fired power stations will be consuming the commodity for the next 30 to 40 years.

Now the mad libs:

If India characterizes coal energy as "poverty alleviation," then those opposed to coal are also opposed to ________________.

The best way to deal with "poverty alleviation" without relying on coal energy would be to ________________.

The New York Times has a front page story today on the declining rate of maternal deaths as shown in a new study, attributed in part to efforts to address the problem. The story is one of policy success, and is welcome good news. Apparently, however, not everyone viewed the news positively:

But some advocates for women’s health tried to pressure The Lancet into delaying publication of the new findings, fearing that good news would detract from the urgency of their cause, Dr. Horton said in a telephone interview.

“I think this is one of those instances when science and advocacy can conflict,” he said.

Dr. Horton said the advocates, whom he declined to name, wanted the new information held and released only after certain meetings about maternal and child health had already taken place.

He said the meetings included one at the United Nations this week, and another to be held in Washington in June, where advocates hope to win support for more foreign aid for maternal health from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Other meetings of concern to the advocates are the Pacific Health Summit in June, and the United Nations General Assembly meeting in December.

“People who have spent many years committed to the issue of maternal health were understandably worried that these figures could divert attention from an issue that they care passionately about,” Dr. Horton said. “But my feeling is that they are misguided in their view that this would be damaging. My view is that actually these numbers help their cause, not hinder it.”