Arne Jungjohannhttp://arnejungjohann.de
Fri, 26 Jan 2018 09:22:45 +0000en-GBhourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.4http://arnejungjohann.de/wp-content/uploads/cropped-AJ-06-32x32.jpgArne Jungjohannhttp://arnejungjohann.de
3232German Greens Elect New Leadershiphttp://arnejungjohann.de/german-greens-elect-new-leadership/
http://arnejungjohann.de/german-greens-elect-new-leadership/#respondFri, 26 Jan 2018 09:22:45 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1603A new federal board. A new party council. Today and tomorrow the German Green Party elects a new party leadership at the convention in my hometown Hanover.

While Berlin prepares for another Grand Coalition of Angela Merkel’s Conservatives and the Social Democrats, the Greens are setting course for a personal and programmatic renewal. The congress – technically called Federal Delegate Conference (BDK) – begins today with the political speech of the outgoing party leader Simone Peter, who, like her counterpart Cem Özdemir, is not running again. Expect a warm goodbye tonight and standing ovations after the speech from the delegates. For those who want to watch: The entire party congress will be broadcast live on www.gruene.de.

Later on tonight, the convention will decide on an important statute question: an update to the long-term hailed principle of the separation between office and mandate. So far, only one third of the Federal Executive Board may be a member of the Bundestag, state parliaments or the European Parliament. State or Federal Ministers as well as EU Commissioners are currently excluded from chairing the party. The debate does not put the separation of office and mandate in question, but whether there should be a transitional period in which newly elected officials on the federal board have to resign from their government mandate. This decision is highly acute given the candidacy of Robert Habeck for the party chair. Robert is currently Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in Schleswig-Holstein and could – under the current status – not run for chair. Delegates tonight will vote not only about the if, but also about the length of such a transitional period. The current state of the application and negotiation situation offers the options of three, eight or twelve months. An

Tomorrow, the convention will elect a new federal executive, including its two Federal Chairs. Three candidates are applying so far: Annalena Baerbock, Anja Piel, and Robert Habeck. Annalena and Robert are considered to represent the realowing of the party, Anja the left wing. Further candidatures are still possible.

I am on my way to the convention. It’s a homecoming match for me, I grew up in Hanover. Over at @GermanGreens I will be tweeting from and about the convention. Check it out.

]]>http://arnejungjohann.de/german-greens-elect-new-leadership/feed/0Lecture: Energy Transistionhttp://arnejungjohann.de/lecture-energy-transistion/
http://arnejungjohann.de/lecture-energy-transistion/#respondMon, 11 Dec 2017 10:57:52 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1571The German energy production revolution is beeing driven by citizens rather than mulitnational utilities, I outlined at Ireland’s largest energy forum in Dublin.

This article was first published on Energy Ireland. The text is based on a lecture on 14 June 2017 in Dublin.

“The result has been a rapid transition away from coal and nuclear to renewable energy sources,” explains Jungjohann. “This has also led to tremendously exciting economic opportunities for Germany. Today, 355,000 people are employed within the German renewables’ industry. This figure is greater than the combined total of people working within the coal and nuclear power industries.”

1. Take away: The Energiewende is an economic showcase.

Jungjohann says that ‘people power’ has driven successive governments in Germany to allow citizen ownership of the country’s energy sector.

“The history of the transition can be traced back to activities of the anti-nuclear power movement, some 40 years ago. Today, we have reached the stage where the transition process, known as Energiewende, is now fully embedded within national policy at all levels of society.”

He references three core developments as being fundamental in the democratisation of energy policy in Germany.

2. Take away: There is no silver bullet.

“The first of these was the 1990 push by a small number of politicians to secure legislation, allowing for the introduction of an Energy Feed-In Law.

“The backbenchers involved represented groups within the Green, Social Democratic and LINKE Parties. They actually drafted up the legislation required, which was unique at the time. Up to that point only the German government brought forward draft legislation to parliament.

“The debate which followed took place during the Summer of Reunification for Germany and it took place under the radar of the large utilities in the west of the country, as they were totally focussed on gauging the costs involved in bringing the energy sector of Eastern Germany up to speed.”

According to Jungjohann, the success of getting the Feed-In legislation enacted greatly increased the general public’s awareness, where renewables are concerned.

“In 2000, another cross-party grouping of backbench politicians succeeded in abolishing the links that existed between central government and the power utilities. This represented a seismic shift in allowing community ownership of the power sector in Germany.

“Numerous energy co-ops were established around the country, a process that led to a dramatic increase in the production of electricity form renewable sources.”

He adds: “The final piece of the jigsaw was put in place courtesy of the decision by Chancellor Angela Merkel to legislate for the phasing out of nuclear power stations in Germany. Adding to the pressure which she came under from ordinary citizens throughout Germany to make this decision were the dramatic incidents, which unfolded at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in Japan.

“Today there is total acceptance within Germany of the need to embrace renewable technologies. Over the past 15 years, the proportion of Germany’s energy market accounted by renewables has risen from five per cent to almost 33 per cent. This figure will continue to grow.”

Jungjohann cited the now environment-friendly approach by the Government and institutions, such as the banks, as being the key drivers in facilitating the growth of renewables in Germany.

“Take solar as a case in point,” he says. “The cost of installing panels in Germany is half that which is incurred across in the United States. Panels are now an internationally traded commodity. As a result, they are pretty-much uniformly priced.

“What makes the difference is the more encouraging planning and investment-related environment that exists in Germany. It is these reduced soft costs that create such an encouraging backdrop for the development of renewable technologies, across the board.

“Solar power is working in Germany. There is no reason why this should not be the case in Ireland. The figures confirm that the number of sunlight hours recorded on an annual basis in Ireland is actually greater than is the case in Germany.”

Jungjohann stresses the absolute importance for national governments to put strict rules in place, in order to allow the sustainable growth of renewable technologies.

“This sets the backdrop for citizens to act individually, or as groups, in order to harness the real power of renewables.”

The former political advisor outlines a number of key drivers for Energiewende taking grip across Germany in such a powerful way.

“We are talking about a bottom-up movement driven by citizens. A major motivation for Germany to transition to a renewable energy-based economy is its goal to fight climate change. A 2015 Pew Research Centre survey found that 84 percent of Germans believe climate change is already harming or will harm people around the world.

“In fact, there is no debate among German citizens or lawmakers as to whether climate change is real. There is a broad consensus that climate change is happening, is caused by human activity, and must be addressed by reducing carbon emissions and cutting energy waste.

“The German public feels a responsibility to act. They understand that Germany is among the countries that have most contributed to carbon emissions over the past century.”

According to Junjohann, another motivation for the energy transition is the idea that increasing use of renewables can strengthen Germany’s energy security.

He adds: “Since the country does not have a lot of natural resources, aside from lignite and relatively expensive hard coal, Germany imports two-thirds of its energy, including uranium. This dependency on energy imports makes the country vulnerable to fluctuating prices for fossil fuels and political influence from abroad. This vulnerability is particularly clear in the case of Russia.”

Germany is, by far, the largest importer of natural gas from the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Germany only produces roughly 15 percent of its own natural gas, importing about 40 percent from Russia.

“A third motivation for the energy transition is Germany’s planned phasing out of nuclear power. In fact, the Energiewende movement began as a popular protest against the construction of nuclear reactors in the 1970s, long before climate change became a common concern. Among German politicians there is a broad consensus that nuclear power has no role in a sustainable energy future.”

]]>http://arnejungjohann.de/lecture-energy-transistion/feed/0Energize the people to effect policy changehttp://arnejungjohann.de/energize-the-people-to-effect-policy-change/
http://arnejungjohann.de/energize-the-people-to-effect-policy-change/#respondFri, 01 Dec 2017 11:14:36 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1558Community power projects in Denmark and Germany have inspired politicians worldwide but have failed to translate to other countries. Sometimes the first step is to let people say no.

In June 2008, George Smitherman was sworn in as the energy minister of Ontario in Canada. The province was already low-carbon, generating one-quarter of its energy from hydropower and more than half from nuclear. But the reactors were ageing, and Smitherman was keen to push renewable energy further.

One of his first actions was to go on a fact-finding mission to Denmark and Germany. Danish renewable-energy campaigns that began in the 1970s had inspired a movement in Germany known as Energiewende (‘energy transition’). Smitherman encountered innovations such as ways to turn municipal and agricultural waste into electricity and heat. And in Freiburg, Germany, mayor Dieter Salomon introduced him to the country’s Renewable Energy Sources Act. Passed in 2000, the act gives everyone from utility firms to individuals the right to produce renewable electricity and sell it to the grid — even if conventional power plants have to ramp down to accommodate it.

Smitherman told his advisers to “imagine a world where we could emulate their success”. So in 2009 the Ontario Green Energy Act was passed in an attempt to foster community-run renewable-energy schemes.

As a result of the act, by the end of 2016, Ontario was home to nearly 40% of Canada’s wind-power capacity and 98% of its solar capacity. This success, however, did not stem from a German-style grass-roots movement for renewables.

Instead, the subsidies provided by the act attracted big foreign firms. “Companies like Samsung C&T and Pattern Energy of California were the big winners in Ontario for renewables,” says an industry insider who prefers not to be named. “The process favoured those who filed first,” he says. “No community project could act as quickly as a commercial project, with paid staff to watch the process.”

The Green Energy Act placed communities in the reactive position of having to accept projects nearby — they had no veto, only a right to consultation. In the end, the only grass-roots movement the act engendered was one of fierce opposition to wind power. “The government has had a devil of a time trying to get people in the rural parts of the province to put up wind turbines,” explains Ontarian TV news anchor Steven Paikin, who has followed developments closely. Several of the strongest opponents of large renewable-energy projects in Ontario are former proponents of community schemes that were shut out by industrial giants from outside the province.

Ontario is not alone in failing to replicate the German model. More than 100 jurisdictions worldwide have adopted policies similar to Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act, resulting in great growth in renewables. But nowhere — not in the Czech Republic, France, Spain, Italy or Ontario — did this growth come mainly through community projects as intended.

The legislation in Germany was instigated by an existing grass-roots movement, but copy­cat policies attempt to do just the opposite — using legislation to inspire communities. The goal of policymakers the world over is to get people more productively involved, yet how to achieve that goal is unclear.

Communities back renewables

It is tempting to assume that the driving force behind all renewable-energy projects is a desire to combat climate change, but in fact they are often driven by more immediate concerns. In the 2016 US presidential election, citizens in St Tammany Parish, Louisiana, voted overwhelmingly for the Republican climate-change doubter Donald Trump. One year on, however, Abita Springs, a town in St Tammany, has adopted a vision for 100% renewables. The town bottles spring water for sale and is also home to an eponymous brewery. When fracking for oil and gas was proposed locally in 2014, the Abita Springs Republican mayor began looking for alternatives that would not risk polluting the water. He adopted the renewables plan in 2017.

This pattern occurs across the country: for example, wind power is thriving in Republican-dominated states such as Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma. “The left sees climate change and renewables as inextricably intertwined,” says Simon Mahan of the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, a non-profit, non-partisan organization that promotes renewables in the southeast United States. “But Republicans see business opportunities with renewables, regardless of how they feel on climate change.”

Germany’s Energiewende didn’t start with concern about global warming, either. In 1974, a conservative farming community near the French border successfully blocked plans to industrialize the region. This resistance inspired other small towns to stand up against big development and come up with community-based renewables and energy efficiency as an alternative to top-down fossil fuels and nuclear energy. By the time carbon emissions entered the public consciousness in the late 1980s, the movement was already well established and calling for democratic accountability in the energy sector. And because Christian Democrat voters — the centre-right party in Germany — helped to launch the Energiewende, renewables enjoyed support across party lines.

Today, there are around 1,000 renewable-energy cooperatives in Germany, which have collectively invested more than €1.8 billion (US$2.1 billion) in wind farms, solar panels and biogas plants. Its early start meant the Energiewende had space to grow before the big push for decarbonization. Germany’s big utility companies showed little interest in renewables until recently; as of 2012, they owned only 3% of solar capacity and 10% of wind capacity in the country. Most other countries, however, started with large-scale wind farms and solar arrays, skipping community-level projects altogether.

No utility company today will fail to take renewables seriously. But they will fight renewable investments in their own territory by competitors — including consumers. It’s no wonder that Ontario attracted developers from abroad; utility companies frequently use renewables to enter a competitor’s territory. One of the biggest investors is Florida Power & Light, which has built almost no renewables in Florida (the ‘Sunshine State’) but is a leader in other parts of North America. Likewise, France’s EDF has built more wind capacity abroad than at home, as have Germany’s Eon and RWE.

Education and democracy

However, there are a few community-led power projects in the United States. Anya Schoolman, executive director of the non-profit Solar United Neighbors based in Washington DC, has organized 35 buying groups of residential solar homeowners, covering more than 865 solar installations in the wider Washington DC area. Whether they are Democratic, Republican or independent, “people feel that monopolies are sucking our communities dry”, she says. Her projects face pushback from utility companies. “Some are trying to shut down rooftop and community solar movements before too many folks benefit from the technology. But once the word is out, there will be no way to shut it down,” Schoolman says. “The main driver, I think, is education.”

Education has many benefits. Through decades of community projects, the German people have amassed a wealth of knowledge about power generation. Today, German energy experts do not seek to sway decisions by claiming that the public lacks expertise. Instead, there are clear signs that informed public opinion sways the German government. In 2012, Germany’s environment minister, Peter Altmaier, stopped supporting research into carbon capture and storage (CCS), saying: “You cannot store carbon underground against the will of the population. I don’t see any support for coal plants with CCS in any German state.” Lack of public support for energy projects is less of a concern in other countries. Philip Johnstone, an energy-policy researcher at the University of Sussex in Brighton, UK, points out that “local opposition to fracking in the United Kingdom gets overridden at the national level”.

Germany’s phasing out of nuclear power is another case in point. Begun in 2002, the process was sped up under Chancellor Angela Merkel in the wake of the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, in March 2011. To guide her accelerated phase-out, Merkel put together a 17-member ethics committee that included three bishops, a sociologist, a philosopher and an education expert, among others. The composition reflects Germany’s current focus on a broader, more inclusive process. The ethics committee provided indirect social input that helped Merkel consider the wider societal concerns surrounding the energy sector alongside the technological issues.

The German strategy contrasts with the British response to the Fukushima disaster: the Weightman review. The review was led by the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and its advisory panel consisted only of technical experts; civil society did not have a seat at the table. As a result, Johnstone notes, only technical issues were dealt with: “We weren’t able to ask what society wants.”

Johnstone says that citizen input in the German energy sector is fostered by the structure of its political system. “In addition to cities and the federal government in Berlin, German citizens have strong representation in their 16 state governments,” he points out. “The Scots and Welsh have similar regional representation in their parliaments,” says Johnstone, who is from Scotland, “but the English only have Westminster and city councils. There is a democracy deficit in England.”

Scotland has used its regional voice to set out its own energy agenda, which has included community projects for several years; the Community and Renewable Energy Scheme has a goal of generating 500 megawatts annually from community renewables by 2020. Regional decision-making has strengthened community renewables elsewhere in Europe as well. Paris-based energy consultant David Bourguignon says the systems of governance in Brittany, which has a unique identity in France thanks to its Celtic culture, resemble those of Germany. “Local and regional governments work hand-in-hand with citizen-led efforts in order to achieve in-depth transition,” he says. France otherwise has mainly state-driven endeavours, with less grass-roots action. Likewise, the Catalonia region of Spain adopted a plan for 100% renewables this year, but the region cannot implement the plan without approval from the central government in Madrid. Renewables have thus become part of Catalonia’s call for independence.

Regional and municipal decision-making leans towards renewables and efficiency. But when a national government sets the course, “national interests, such as keeping nuclear skills for national security, play a large role”, Johnstone explains. He argues that regions push for local development, which often means promoting renewable-energy start-ups. “In terms of technology, Germany is thus more open to new pathways sometimes blocked in the United Kingdom — partly because the various tiers of German democracy make the country’s markets more open.”

Bottom-up innovation

Communities can be crucial innovators, but business interests can stymie innovation. Policymakers therefore have to help cash-strapped communities act, even when the private sector cannot expect a return on investments. District heat is one such example.

The heating sector consumes around 50% of total energy supply in cold countries such as Denmark and Germany, compared with about 30% for mobility and only 20% for electricity. Traditionally, each building — and sometimes each dwelling — has its own furnace to generate heat. By contrast, a district heat network can efficiently share heat energy across local buildings through connecting pipes. Such a network is effectively a shared natural monopoly, and access to it can be granted equitably to heat suppliers — no matter the size. “In the beginning, power generators used the pipes to sell their excess heat, which makes fossil-fuel consumption more efficient and power production cheaper,” says Brian Vad Mathiesen, an energy systems researcher at Denmark’s Aalborg University. “Gradually, renewable heat providers come on board: we make heat from excess wind power, and add more solar thermal and geothermal.” Because smaller firms can compete with the big players, there are opportunities for new businesses and innovation; no big utility company can simply refuse to buy the energy.

Firms that sell fossil-fuel power might not promote district heat because they then sell less energy, which has stymied development in some countries. The Netherlands, for instance, is only now rolling out district heat networks, because it is running out of domestic natural gas. Denmark is also an oil exporter, but the Danes solved the conflict by developing consumer-owned, non-profit heat networks. People like the arrangement because they know profits are going back to the community. “Consumers may resent a corporation making profits out of a local natural monopoly like district heat lines,” says Mathiesen.

Equal access to the heat network was thus crucial for renewable heat in Denmark. In the power sector, the grid served a similar role, allowing wind and solar power sellers of all sizes to be profitable. The Danish power grid is state-owned, but if regulations are stringent enough, state ownership of the grid is not necessary — Germany has four investor-owned grid networks.

Of course, community projects still install solar panels made by corporations: citizens can’t do everything alone. But the reverse is also true: not much can be done without citizens. The crucial step is to find a way to get citizens involved constructively.

Lessons for the future

Bill Irwin, a policy researcher at Huron University College in London, Canada, argues that cultural attitudes affect innovation. Ontario suffers from short-term thinking and complacency, he says, whereas Germany plans for the longer term. “The German tenure with going green is in fact 35–40 years in the making,” he says (see ‘Germany’s transition to renewables’). Energiewende is a generational project that requires time to gestate. Irwin is hopeful that the current popular backlash against wind power in Ontario is a “necessary step already taken by Germany” in an evolution towards community renewable energy.

Granted, no one wants their project blocked by nay-saying locals, but at least protesters are engaged. For their protest to be productive, people who say no to a project should be required to say what they want instead. The Germans said no to nuclear, and experts demanded to know the public’s preference. The answer was renewables and efficiency.

Nine years after its Green Energy Act, Ontario has its first success stories, and they sound similar to those in Germany andDenmark. Oxford County, an hour west of Toronto, has a plan to go 100% renewable. The county started with ten wind turbines in 2016. At first, locals were concerned about the impact of the turbines, but “now that they are up and everyone can hear how quiet they are, the debate has died down considerably”, explains Miranda Fuller of Future Oxford, a local campaign group that seeks a sustainable community.

Fuller outlines the other community benefits of Oxford County’s scheme. “Homeowners along the edge of the wind farm were won over by the argument that farmland would be protected,” she says. Farmers were worried about the sprawling town of Woodstock encroaching on their land; now, the wind farm will protect their land for at least 20 years (the service life of the turbines). The county has also built a biogas unit, fired with locally sourced bioenergy and waste, to provide new revenue streams and warm local homes through district heat lines. The impetus for this transition to renewables was that it promised improvements to the community: local jobs and citizen input in infrastructure planning. The side effect was climate protection. As Anya Schoolman would say, once word gets out, people engage.

]]>http://arnejungjohann.de/energize-the-people-to-effect-policy-change/feed/0An agenda for Germany’s ecological modernisationhttp://arnejungjohann.de/an-agenda-for-germanys-ecological-modernisation/
http://arnejungjohann.de/an-agenda-for-germanys-ecological-modernisation/#respondWed, 22 Nov 2017 16:20:11 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1550No matter which parties will eventually form a coalition, Germany’s next government will continue with an agenda of ecological modernisation. How such an agenda could look like?

After exploratory talks to form a new coalition broke down on Sunday (19 November), Germany enters a period of uncertainty. It seems unlikely that Chancellor Angela Merkel will attempt to form a minority government which would be the only alternative to snap elections in spring of 2018. Until then, the minister of the former Grand Coalition from CDU/CSU and SPD will stay in office and keep the government running.

Together with migration, climate change was the top contagious issue of the negotiations between Merkel’s Christian Democrats, its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green party. For some time it looked like the four parties were aiming at holding their own centres, not downplaying their strengths.

It was a strategy of focusing on differences. For the Greens, ecology was and is the centre that they must hold. Of course, a Greens-based government couldn’t declare less climate protection than a government without them.

Even though the exploratory talks broke down, they provided some worthwhile insights. Most of all they dispelled the myth that all German parties are truly committed to fighting climate change. Paying lip services to climate targets is not enough. Especially the FDP was not ready to agree on robust policies for reaching them. Climate is still party politics in Germany.

Second, most Germans support the Energiewende [energy transition]and want the government to shut down coal plants, even if it would cost more. The talks showed them there was only one party standing up for this position. Especially in the talk’s early stage conservatives and Liberals were fighting tooth and nail to protect the interests of the coal industry, and only slowly gave in. Overall the talks boosted the Green Party’s credibility as the political force for bringing the Energiewende on track.

Third, the parties eventually came close to an agreement on climate change which includes sticking to the government’s national and international climate targets, accelerating the expansion of renewables, and starting a coal phaseout by shutting down generation capacity of at least five Gigawatts by 2020.

And lastly, the talks brought Greens and Conservatives closer together. Just some weeks ago the FDP was seen as the conservatives’ natural ally. Not anymore. Both Greens and conservatives put the blame on the failing talks more or less on the FDP. Both had left their comfort zone to find compromises.

They experienced that they could work together in difficult times. This lays a foundation for future cooperation between the Greens and conservatives and thus improves the outlook for Germany’s transition to renewable energy.

No matter which parties will eventually form a coalition, Germany’s next government will continue with an agenda of ecological modernisation. Exploratory talks indicate it could look like this:

First, simplify the complicated mess of various ecological taxes, levies and surcharges. Getting rid of the electricity tax and reducing excessively high grid fees would provide space for a carbon floor price. This would allow the German Chancellor to join forces with French President Emanuel Macron who pushed for the idea

Second, a robust coal phaseout would need to become the centrepiece of the energy transition. Countries such as Italy, the UK, and the Netherlands already lead the way. Germany can follow the path, and given its record net electricity exports it can easily shut down a dozen coal plants without risking blackouts.

Third, renewable energy needs to grow faster. Now that most wind and solar projects are auctioned, the – admittedly misinformed – talk of “subsidies” is finally over. And renewables are cheaper than ever.

Fourth, building renovations need to be stepped up in the heat sector so that renewables can make up a larger share of supply. Industry can begin to make more of its own energy again, and waste heat from these distributed generators should be recovered and used in district heat networks.

Finally, the coalition should seize the opportunity for a true mobility transition. Across the globe, cities and governments are banning diesel cars and are rolling out the red carpet for electric mobility. Germany falls behind. If German carmakers aim to continue selling cars to California, India, and China, they will have to play by the rules made there.

It will take some months for Germany to sort things out and form a new government. The current managing government will shy away from taking major political decisions.

However, ministers and civil servants will keep matters running and prepare the energy and climate policy for the incoming government as outlined above.

In addition, the Bundestag, Germany’s lower house, could pass resolutions with a simple majority and request the government to take next steps. The Greens have already announced to prepare a resolution for starting a coal phaseout.

]]>http://arnejungjohann.de/an-agenda-for-germanys-ecological-modernisation/feed/0Future of Germany’s coal sector hangs on electionshttp://arnejungjohann.de/future-of-germanys-coal-sector-hangs-on-elections/
http://arnejungjohann.de/future-of-germanys-coal-sector-hangs-on-elections/#commentsThu, 21 Sep 2017 15:22:28 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1487Three in four Germans want to phase out coal. If Merkel wins the elections, which seems likely, then she’ll have to deliver.

If Angela Merkel is to win another term in Germany’s upcoming election on September 24, then winning the western state of North-Rhine/Westphalia (NRW) will be essential. NRW is the country’s most populous state, making up a fifth of the country’s electorate. It’s also the epicentre of another political tussle: What to do about Germany’s coal sector?

The state is the historic heart of Germany’s industry; an industry that is largely powered by coal. NRW sits atop Europe’s biggest lignite coal region, and despite Germany’s rapid adoption of renewables, NRW still generates 75% of its electricity from coal, making it responsible for almost 1% of global annual greenhouse gas emissions.

So it’s no surprise that the Rhineland coalfields near Cologne have become a hot spot for climate activists in the past few years. As recently as August, thousands of people blocked train tracks and roads between the coal mines and power plants. The activists recognise that blocking trains won’t stop the industry but see the symbolic nature of the protests as important. “Our powerful protests have put climate justice on the political agenda,“ said Janna Aljets, spokesperson of the “Ende Gelände” campaign, which translates literally as “the end of the terrain”. “Coal has no public acceptance any longer,” she added.

Coal country

Internationally, Germany is well-known for its Energiewende, a transition away from nuclear and fossil fuels to renewables. But despite the aggressive push toward renewables, coal remains central to Germany’s power supply. In recent years, electricity production from coal has hardly fallen, unlike in other developed countries such as the UK and US. In fact, lignite coal provided 23% of gross power production in 2016, and hard coal 17%.

Some critics argue that coal still dominates Germany’s power generation because the country has chosen to phase-out nuclear power, with the remaining plants to shutter by 2022. In the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster in Japan, around a dozen new coal plants opened in Germany.

What’s missing from reports about the alleged “German coal renaissance” though is that Germany’s coal surge was part of a Europe-wide trend, and not just a reaction to the nuclear phase-out. Construction of many of the plants started long before the meltdown in Fukushima, and investors cancelled two dozen projects altogether.

German utilities began abandoning coal projects around 2011 for the simple reason that there was no demand for them. By then, it was clear that renewables growth had been underestimated. The surge in wind and solar power combined with on-going coal power production led to an oversupply of electricity. As a result, power exports hit a record high by 2016. Almost 8% of electricity generated in Germany last year was used in neighbouring countries.

These developments have led to the so-called “Energiewende paradox”: Germany’s rapid development of renewable power has barely dented CO2 emissions even though electricity generated from renewables has more than replaced nuclear power.

The result is that Germany’s greenhouse gas emissions actually increased in 2016, and are expected to grow even more in 2017.

This begs the question: how will Germany kick its coal habit?

Coal on the agenda

For Germany to meet its climate goal of becoming close to carbon-neutral by 2050, it needs to stop burning coal and leave it in the ground. Germany is also on course to spectacularly miss its 2020 climate target, according to a study by the think-tank Agora Energiewende, which says the government’s estimates are too rosy. The country also risks jeopardising its international reputation as a leader in the global fight against climate change.

There is an urgent need for action but a fierce political debate is raging over how the coal phase-out process should unfold.

To get back on track with climate targets, Agora is calling for Germany to adopt an emergency “Climate Protection 2020” programme as soon as possible after the federal elections this month.

And some utilities are already shutting down old coal plants for economic reasons. The power company STEAG, for instance, will decommission five coal-fired units because of low wholesale electricity prices. Other companies are hoping that a political agreement on phasing-out coal power will be sweetened by financial benefits for those shutting down plants.

Source: Agora Energiewende

An EU agreement on stricter pollution standards for existing power plants starting in 2021 will also factor into plans for a phase-out. Notably, the German government voted against these stricter standards.

Gerard Wynn from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) estimates that Germany has many gigawatts of coal and lignite generating capacity above the new limits. Owners are facing multiple headwinds: competition with renewables, sluggish power demand growth, and carbon emissions targets. Owners will have to decide whether to retrofit or close their plants. “Utilities may use this opportunity to close or sell certain coal plants before the new standard is implemented in 2021,” he said.

Germany’s current government coalition has avoided specific discussion of a coal phase-out. But there are signs that preparations for one are underway. Under a new programme by the Ministry of Economics, lignite mining areas can apply for federal funds to develop model ideas for economic transition in mining regions. The four-million-euro programme starts in 2017.

For the Paris Agreement, deputy economy minister Rainer Baake says Germany will have to shut half its existing coal power capacity by 2030.

Most importantly, the government’s Climate Action Plan includes a commission to address the challenges of a coal phase-out. In 2018, this commission for “growth, structural change and regional development” will develop suggestions to support coal regions in the transition.

This could provide the next government coalition with a foundation for implementing the coal phase-out. But what might that coalition look like?

Parties and coalitions

The folks from Clean Energy Wire provide a great summary of where the parties stand on energy and climate issues here. Depending on the result of the election, three scenarios appear likely:

Low ambition

Another “grand coalition” of CDU/CSU and SPD would likely continue the Energiewende with little ambition. The parties support decarbonisation in general but are weak on the details.

Both parties highlight the need to provide economic support for coal mining regions, such as workforce retraining. But the state governments of these regions are opposed to a coal phase-out in order to drive up the price for an agreement. The state premier of Saxony-Anhalt, Rainer Haseloff (CDU), says lignite will remain indispensable in Germany until 2050. The Social Democrats are traditionally close to the coal unions and utilities and avoid talking about a coal phase-out, highlighting the need to keep industrial traditions in coal regions by creating new jobs.

Putting the brakes on

The traditional centre-right coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP would likely slow down renewables growth and delay plans for a coal phase-out. Following the recent win in state elections in North Rhine-Westphalia by the CDU and FDP, the parties are already looking to limit investments in new wind power. The coalition in the state also announced it will overturn NRW’s climate protection law and oppose a coal phase-out at the national level.

Higher ambition

A coalition of CDU/CSU, FDP and the Green Party would be the most fascinating because the parties have contradictory positions on the Energiewende. FDP leader Christian Lindner sees “high hurdles in energy policy” for a coalition with the Green party. The Greens underscore their demand for a coal exit by 2030, and for shutting down the 20 dirtiest coal-fired power plants immediately. Of course, the Greens wouldn’t be able to force all of their demands, but in comparison to the other likely coalition options, this one seems to be the most likely to push forward with a coal phase-out.

After the elections

Three out of four Germans expect the next government to issue a coal phase-out plan. In a survey commissioned by Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND), 59% of respondents said that German coal-fired power plants should be decommissioned “soon”.

Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is a strong favourite for a fourth term, said her government is still committed to reaching the country’s 2020 climate target, despite the recent increase in emissions. Asked if she thinks the government will succeed, Merkel said: “I’m working on making it happen, yes.”

Internationally, Merkel gets a lot of credit for her constructive role in securing the Paris Agreement. She also strongly defended the Paris agreement against the US government as president of the G20 in 2017. But so far, she has done little at home to deserve her climate reputation. “There’s a growing gap between successful climate diplomacy on the international stage and a virtual standstill on domestic climate policy,” says Christoph Bals of the non-governmental organisation Germanwatch.

So it remains to be seen when Germany will go coal-free, although most predictions range from 2030 to 2050. Clearly, the election will have an impact on the way forward, with the Green Party being the most ambitious in a potential coalition. But the government will continue to respond to pressure from stakeholders.

That’s why Ende Gelände is calling for more mass actions of civil disobedience. When the United Nations climate negotiations take place in Bonn in early November, the activists plan to block train tracks, roads and excavators in the Rhineland coalfield only 50 kilometres away.

]]>http://arnejungjohann.de/future-of-germanys-coal-sector-hangs-on-elections/feed/2Ignore ‘red line’ campaign talk on energy and climatehttp://arnejungjohann.de/ignore-red-line-campaign-talk-on-energy-and-climate/
http://arnejungjohann.de/ignore-red-line-campaign-talk-on-energy-and-climate/#respondMon, 18 Sep 2017 10:38:00 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1466The scope of the next government’s ambition for the Energiewende depends on the constellation of its coalition although the shift to a renewables-based economy is not at stake. In an interview with Clean Energy Wire, I talk about controversial issues, voter mobilization and red lines.

Clean Energy Wire: What will the result of the general election mean for Germany’s energy and climate policy? Is the Energiewende as a whole at stake?

Arne Jungjohann: The Energiewende will continue under the next government. Germany’s political system, its cooperative federalism and the strong role of civil servants ensures a long line of continuity beyond legislative terms. What is in question is the Energiewende’s ambition under the new coalition. It really depends on which of the small parties join a coalition: the pro-business FDP stands for a roll-back by putting the brakes on renewables, keeping coal mines open and lowering the country’s climate ambitions. The Greens on the other side could serve as an accelerating force, throwing their political capital in full throttle behind a fast transition to renewables. They would have no other choice, as their base and voters measure the Greens’ success in the party’s core field of competence, environment and climate.

CLEW: There was a lot of sabre-rattling by German parties and several red lines were defined and government coalition possibilities questioned. What does this mean for the negotiations after the election? What can international readers expect directly after 24 September?

AJ: Both the FDP [the economic liberal Free Democrats] and CSU [Bavarian sister party of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU] have started balking at joining a government with the Greens. This serves the tactical purpose of mobilizing supporters for a center-right coalition. It means narrowing down voters’ choice to two options: another grand coalition of the CDU and Social Democrats (SPD) – which big parts of the electorate are tired of – and a ‘black-yellow’ coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP. It is basically a call to arms for centre-right voters who are tired of the grand coalition and a way to demobilize supporters of the Greens, because their party would be excluded from a coalition no matter what. The Greens’ response just days before the election? Putting more distance between themselves and the FDP to highlight the election will come down to a choice of which party will govern with Angela Merkel. It’s a way to mobilize voters form the centre left who reject the idea of black-yellow coalition. But I don’t see these tactical manoeuvres as a serious red line. If CDU-FDP or CDU-Greens fail to win a majority, both a grand coalition and a CDU-FDP-Greens coalition are on the table. In this case international observers should pay attention to which of the small parties gets the better result. The difference might be tiny, the ranking is what matters to start from a strong position.

CLEW: Are there real red lines?

AJ: The unfolding of a Jamaica Coalition of CDU/CSU, FDP and Greens would be most fascinating to watch. Its political dynamics would be highly complex, given the parties’ controversial positions on a variety of issues, including the Energiewende. Each of the parties have no-gos. But if the leadership really aims to build a new coalition, red lines won’t be crossed. It’s clear that the Greens can’t enter a government without some kind of agreement on a coal phase-out. It’s clear that the FDP can only sign a coalition treaty that claims to reduce burden for industry and keep costs under control. Each partner would have to deliver to their bases. My guess: In comparison to other coalition options, Jamaica seems to be the most ambitious coalition option in play to move the Energiewende forward.

]]>http://arnejungjohann.de/ignore-red-line-campaign-talk-on-energy-and-climate/feed/0The Green Party in Germany’s state governmentshttp://arnejungjohann.de/the-green-party-in-germanys-state-governments/
http://arnejungjohann.de/the-green-party-in-germanys-state-governments/#commentsThu, 10 Aug 2017 15:00:08 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1007In April 2017, the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation published the study German Greens in Coalition Governments, in which I analyze the experiences of the German Green party in state governments. Over the course of 2017 I will work on an updated second edition which will take into account recent changes in state coalitions as well as the likely formation of the so-called Jamaica coalition in Berlin and its implications for the Green Party’s internal coordination structures between the state and federal level. In addition, I am working on a new study which focuses on the impact of the Green party in environmental policy-making.

Much has changed since the launch of the German edition of German Greens in Coalition Governments in December 2016. State elections in Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein resulted in changing coalitions. Therefore we have decided to update the study in several blog posts throughout 2017 (in German only), by focusing on the Green Votes in the Bundesrat(second chamber), the Greens’ options of different coalitions and a new generation of politicians beginning to take the lead (Landesrüne im Wandel). By the end of 2017 the blog posts will be incorporated into a second edition of the study.

Where the first study asked about ‘how’ do Greens govern?, the new study is interested in answering ‘what’ do they accomplish when in government? Protecting the environment and fighting climate change is the core DNA of Green politics. It is also the policy field in which the Greens have not only the strongest profile and expertise, but also most government responsibilities. Therefore, the upcoming study investigates how the Greens use their core competencies to implement policies for an ecologic modernization. It will do so by evaluating exisiting studies on state policy-making and by highlighting qualitative case studies on energy and transportation policies. The study will be published in 2018 and is supported by the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation. Stay tuned!

]]>http://arnejungjohann.de/the-green-party-in-germanys-state-governments/feed/1German Elections: The Future of the Energiewendehttp://arnejungjohann.de/german-elections-the-future-of-the-energiewende/
http://arnejungjohann.de/german-elections-the-future-of-the-energiewende/#commentsWed, 12 Jul 2017 10:05:38 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1413When Germans cast their vote in the national elections on September 24 they will also be deciding on the direction of the country’s energy policy. With elections looming, Merkel’s flagship energy policy faces its greatest threat yet. I explore the possible outcomes here

The economy, security and refugees have dominated the campaign trail so far but, a recent, unexpected vote on whether to legalize same-sex marriage showed, the campaign agenda can pivot at speed.

A key decision for voters in the coming election will be who guides the country’s Energiewende. Germany’s much feted transition to a low carbon economy is going to face challenging circumstances in the next legislative period (2017 – 2021).

First, 2020 will be a year of reckoning for the incoming coalition. Germany is likely to meet its renewable targets but fall short on goals to cut energy consumption and increase energy productivity under its EU obligation. Most damaging for the Energiewende’s international credibility, the government will miss its national 2020 climate target by a wide margin. Instead of cutting emissions by 40%, the latest estimates see the country hitting only 32%.

Will Germany meet its 2020 energy targets?

The second issue is that many coal and nuclear power plants will shut down over the next few years. Under the government’s law, eight nuclear reactors which currently provide around 13% of gross power generation, with a total capacity of 10.8 gigawatts will be taken offline by 2022.

In addition, the government has moved eight lignite coal-power plants into what’s called a “cold capacity reserve”. These plants, totalling 2.7 gigawatts of capacity, will only be re-activated if Germany’s power supply unexpectedly cannot meet demand. However, experts think it is unlikely the plants will ever be used again; with many referring to the reserve as “Jurassic Park”.

The third consideration is the European Union’s (EU) climate and energy agenda, which will demand significant input from Germany’s next government.

To set the course for achieving its 2030 energy and climate targets, the EU plans to revise several of its directives. The wide-ranging Clean Energy for All Europeans package covers renewable energy, reform of the EU’s emissions trading system, the design of electricity markets, security of electricity supply and governance rules.

To improve efficiency across the EU, the EU Commission is also proposing more ambitious standards for technical appliances under its eco-design directive, such as tablets and televisions, as well as a strategy for building renovation and automated mobility

Policy agenda

Although the Energiewende faces setbacks, the country’s integrated approach to climate and energy policy has provided a solid foundation for it to move away from nuclear and fossil fuels to renewable energy sources by mid-century.

Merkel’s Grand Coalition has already shifted away from feed-in tariffs to auctions; it passed an electricity market law to improve price signals when demand is low to activate peaking power plants and pushed through changes to the grid by promoting underground power lines, limiting additional wind turbines and requiring grid operators to integrate, so-called, peak shaving as a key instrument of their planning.

With near-term targets likely to be missed, the challenge ahead is to meet the country’s mid-term targets. These include cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 55% from 1990 levels and increasing the share of renewables in the power supply to at least 50% by 2030.

Targets

The next era of the Energiewende will also see major structural changes to Germany’s energy supply.

Wind and solar power will become the main pillars of the country’s electricity supply. To cope with fluctuations, Germany must increase its grid flexibility and back-up capacity. Fundamentally different generation patterns will emerge. And sooner or later, inflexible, baseload power plants such as nuclear will disappear altogether, leaving the remaining gas and coal power plants to operate on a part-time basis.

Another priority will be sector coupling, in which renewable electricity is used to supply buildings, industry and transportation. So what policies can address these challenges?

Government to-do list

At the top of the next government’s list will be a roadmap for the phase-out of German coal mining and coal-fired power generation.

In its recent Climate Action Plan 2050, the government already announced the establishment of a commission for structural change and regional development to address a coal phase-out. Its mandate is still to be defined.

While the mining union opposes a planned phase-out, coal regions have slowly accepted that the end of coal mining is in sight; and their leaders are already bargaining for federal funds to finance the economic transformation of their states. In the end, the question is not if, but when, Germany finally says goodbye to coal.

Another task is a fundamental reform of energy levies and surcharges. Germany’s main instrument to support renewables expansion – the renewable energy surcharge – is under intense scrutiny. Demands for a fairer distribution of costs, as well as the prospect of rising power demand as heating and transport switch from fossil fuels to electricity, have led to calls for a new system to support investment in the sector.

Experts argue that pricing carbon higher would be a far more efficient way to finance the Energiewende. Thus, calls for a national carbon floor price are growing, similar to what the UK has introduced and to what France is planning. The idea will gain traction if the EU doesn’t improve its carbon price under the emissions trading system (EU-ETS), which for years has been plagued by low prices due to an oversupply of permits.

Though the current government claims it has established an “efficiency first” principle, ambitious policies to cut energy consumption remain to be seen. The roll-out for “smart metres” is coming late and with low ambition. Other upgrades, such as, time-of-use energy pricing, smart grids and load shifting offer economic benefits and energy savings but better policies are needed.

Finally, Germany needs to adjust its power grids to accommodate growing flexibility and decentralised generation. Despite a high share of renewables, Germany has one of the most reliable power supplies in the world. But to keep the grid stable with large influxes of renewable power, the Federal Network Agency has proposed expanding it.

These plans are highly controversial and already face delays. The next government will have to decide how to deal with these.

Where the political parties stand

Implementation of these policies falls to the next coalition government. In Germany’s pluralistic system, no party alone expects to win a majority. The need to form coalitions forces parties to cooperate. A change in government, therefore, does not necessarily result in a complete policy reversal.

So does it matter who wins the September elections? You bet.

All five established parties support the Energiewende, in general, and see the need for climate protection. But they differ on priorities, ambitions and pathways.

Current polls give Chancellor Merkel’s conservative party (CDU/CSU) a double-digit lead over the Social Democrats (SPD). The left-wing Die Linke, the Green Party and the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) are likely to make the 5% threshold needed to re-enter parliament. So is Alternative for Germany (AfD), a nationalistic far-right party that embraces climate denialism.

Germany polling trends

With her strong lead, Angela Merkel is hoping to win a fourth term. Although she has the nickname of “Climate Chancellor”, in Brussels and Berlin her record is not as green as her reputation would suggest. Critics say she puts the interests of German carmakers and coal utilities ahead of climate and the health of Europeans.

With the conservatives strongest, and both the AfD and Die Linke unlikely to form a government, a number of coalition constellations are in play. This includes another Grand Coalition or a centre-right coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP, which could lower the pace and ambition of the energy transition. In the state of North-Rhine/Westphalia, the two parties recently formed a coalition and announced a roll-back of the state’s climate protection law and drastically slow the expansion of wind power.

There is one party though whose participation in the next government would likely raise ambition on the Energiewende. The Greens are putting climate protection and ecological modernisation at the heart of their campaign. They want to shut down the 20 dirtiest coal plants immediately, initiate a coal phase-out by 2030, promote citizen energy, and ban the sale of cars with internal combustion engines by 2030.

The transformation of Germany’s energy sector is in full swing. The focus on the triple challenges of decarbonisation, decentralisation and digitisation will have to be addressed by the new coalition will have to address. Germany will continue to demonstrate that even a highly-industrialised country can decarbonise while growing its economy.

This article by Arne Jungiohann was originally published by China Dialoge on July 11, 2017.

]]>http://arnejungjohann.de/german-elections-the-future-of-the-energiewende/feed/1Germany Shows It’s Worth Fighting For Energy Democracyhttp://arnejungjohann.de/germany-shows-its-worth-fighting-for-energy-democracy/
http://arnejungjohann.de/germany-shows-its-worth-fighting-for-energy-democracy/#respondThu, 29 Jun 2017 12:00:50 +0000http://arnejungjohann.de/?p=1372Citizen energy is the big winner. This is the surprising result of Germany’s first auction for onshore wind power. 9 out of 10 successful bids came from citizens and energy cooperatives, not from utilities. The outcome highlights what makes Germany’s energy transition, the Energiewende, unique in an international comparison.

By Arne Jungiohann and Craig Morris. Originally published by Resilience.org

This transition is not only one from dirty to clean technologies. It is also a social-economic transition: from a centralized, corporate dominated energy system to a smaller, more distributed and decentralized one. What makes the Energiewende really unique is that citizens, not corporations, are driving the transition. But why is that so?

The answer is to be found long before the nuclear accident at Fukushima in 2011. The Energiewende dates back to the mid-1970s – a decade before climate change and Chernobyl became buzzwords. Regular people protested all around the country: teachers, wine makers, farmers in rural areas who fought back plans for nuclear power stations. They demanded a say in these decisions, but they faced an authoritarian state and aggressive police forces with barbed wire, police dogs and water cannons.

People soon realized it was not enough to just say no. They needed to offer a better alternative and say yes to something. So the Germans demanded what has since become known as energy democracy: the right to make your own energy. As in any other country, German utilities were hostile to the idea of distributed renewable energy, such as solar panels on rooftops and citizen wind farms. They wanted to run their coal and nuclear baseload power plants around the clock at full capacity.

How did the Germans convince their politicians to pass laws allowing citizens to make their own energy? And why were utilities unable to prevent these laws? Looking back, three critical junctions appear:

Feed-in Tariff Act in 1991

The first junction was the Feed-in Act of 1991. A few parliamentarians wanted to promote citizen energy. But they realized the government was not on their side. This unlikely coalition of backbenchers across party lines drafted the law on their own. The bill slipped under the radar of the West German utilities, because 1990 was the year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Utilities were busy taking over the East German energy sector.

The red-green revolution

Jump forward ten years for the second junction when renewables just barely provided five percent of electricity supply in Germany. In 2000, the Red-Green coalition between the Social Democrats and the Green Party disrupted the traditionally strong ties between utilities and the government by passing the Renewable Energy Act. Like a decade before, the parliamentarians had to write the legislation themselves, because the ministerial experts didn’t support the idea yet. And like a decade before, the utilities again had bigger fish to fry, such as the nuclear phase-out and ecological tax reform, which were being negotiated in parallel.

Fukushima

For the third junction, fast-forward another decade. In 2010, the center-right coalition extended the operating time of nuclear plants. But the public and municipal utilities that did not own any reactors opposed the extension. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s law mobilized large demonstrations. When just a few months later a nuclear power plant in Fukushima exploded live on TV, Merkel knew her nuclear extension policy could not stand. With the public overwhelmingly supporting a phase-out more than ever before, and with elections coming up, she reversed her party’s long-held position. That summer, a historic vote sealed the end of the nuclear industry in Germany.

These three junctures are crucial to understand how the Energiewende got rolling, allowing renewables to grow from 6 to over 33 percent of electricity consumption since 2000. These moments were each unique in that sudden change was enacted in an otherwise highly stable system. None of the changes appeared to be a revolution at the time, however. But influential interest groups and their allies in parliament and government were unable to prevent this progressive legislation, partly because they underestimated the threat.

Energiewende take-aways

The first take-away from this story is that there is no silver bullet. No single policy has proven to be the single cause of success for the Energiewende. True, the Renewable Energy Act and the nuclear phase-out are signature policies. But only a broad policy mix with long-term targets created the solid foundation for the rapid growth of renewables. In the end, parliamentary leadership, skillful maneuvering, patience and the right timing were all needed.

The second take-away is that the German energy transition is an economic showcase. Renewables create jobs. In 2016, roughly 355,000 people worked in the German renewables sector (down from a high of 380,000 in 2011) – more than in coal and nuclear combined.

By expanding renewables, Germany cuts back on energy imports, which swallowed more than 8 billion euros in 2015. Instead of importing dirty fossil fuels, Germany will increasingly be an industrial frontrunner in exporting clean energy tech. Already today, the German solar and wind industry only sell 1/3 of their technology at home and 2/3 on international markets.

Germany embarked on the transition when renewables were still expensive. A robust policy provided high investment certainty. By cutting red tape and providing easy access to financing, the government triggered a growing market with declining costs. Installing a one-kilowatt solar array on the roof of a family house in Germany cost roughly $2,000 in 2013. In America, it costs about twice as much. In a nutshell, the German government made it easy and affordable for its citizens to go solar.

Finally, the energy transition represents a one-time window of opportunity to democratize the energy sector. In Germany, citizens and cooperatives made up 47% of all investments in renewables as of 2012.

Luckily, global investments in renewables are soaring. The transition is underway. Renewables are winning the cost race. One thing is also clear: Without rules that allow citizens to take part in this rally, corporations will handle the transition without citizens. In representing the interests of their shareholders, companies view people as consumers, not as citizens. They have conventional assets to protect as long as they are profitable. A corporate-driven transition is not only less democratic, but also slower when excluding citizens. Those who are worried about climate change and our ability as a human race to cut emissions fast enough should embrace energy democracy. It’s the fast track to decarbonization.

The German case shows it is worth fighting for energy democracy. An active role for citizens in the energy transition helps revitalize our communities, accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy and strengthen our democracy against the poison of rising populism – both in Germany and around the world.

This article by Arne Jungiohann and Craig Morris was originally published by Resilience.org on June 22, 2017.

The tour started in Halifax (Nova Scotia) and took me to Montréal, Ottawa, Waterloo and Toronto with meetings and briefings at the Goethe Institute, the National Observer and science centers like CIGI.

The message I brought was that, from the German experience, energy democracy is the fast track to decarbonization. Those worried about our ability as the human race to cut emissions fast enough – and there are good reasons to be very worried – should embrace citizen power. Leaving the transition up to utilities who want to protect their current assets will be much slower. For them each kWh from renewables undermines their profits from conventional power plants. But energy democracy will accelerate the transition.

Click here for an article or a video about the event in Ottawa. Photo credit: private.

Two observations

These kind of tours provide a learning experience for both audiences and speakers. Over the course of events and Q&A sessions, I realized more and more how political conditions and energy markets in Canadian provinces differ from those in Germany. In fact, touring Canada and presenting the German story revealed to me which factors had provided favorable conditions for the Energiewende. Two observations struck me most.

First, many Canadian provinces have regulated electricity markets. Public and municipal utilities provide electricity for cities or whole regions, usually without competition. If you live in a city, you buy the power from your local utility. Not in Germany. The Germans liberalized their power markets in the late 1990s. Households can choose among hundreds of firms to buy electricity from. This open market, in combination with feed-in tariffs, allows for new investors to come in and build new power plants, including citizen groups to invest in wind farms and community solar.

Second, Canadian provinces have little coal in their power mix compared to Germany. Take Ontario, which is the first jurisdiction in North America to get out of coal, thanks to an amazing campaign which is summarized here. With lots of hydro and nuclear, their power mix is already low-carbon. In Germany, more renewables would drive coal out of the market. When most electricity already comes from low-carbon sources, however, there is little climate benefit from a switch to renewables. That takes away a strong argument for energy community advocates in Canada to make their case. Coal’s continuing strong role in Germany’s power mix and the liberalized power market both helped Energiewende campaigners to push for more renewables. In the process, the market opened for the new investors who built those wind farms, solar parks and biogas plants that the incumbents had no interest in.

A final thanks to all the helping hands of people at the organizations hosting me on the tour: the Goethe Institute, the Ontario Solar Energy Association and others: vielen Dank! In particular, the clean tech company Senvion chipped in some funding for the tour expenses. Finally, the tour would not have been possible without the German Embassy in Ottawa, to which I am grateful for the generous support, in particular Mr. Christoph Hebermehl for organizing such a rich program. It is activities like these that brings people together to share ideas about how to promote the public interest and democratic values.

Some personal highlights from the tour

Talking energy democracy & green party politics with Elizabeth May, MP and Leader of the Green Party Canada: