There has been some evidence to the
effect that the defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant, namely <insert
type of intoxicant>, at the time of the alleged act[s]. The statute
pertaining to intoxication reads in pertinent part as follows:

intoxication shall not be a defense
to a criminal charge, but in any prosecution for an offense evidence of
intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is
relevant to negate an element of the crime charged.

"Intoxication" is defined by statute
as a substantial disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the
introduction of substances into the body.

If you find that the defendant was
under the influence of an intoxicant at the time of the alleged act[s], you must
then determine what effect, if any, this voluntary intoxication had on (his/her)
ability to form the specific intent required to commit the alleged crime[s].

Note that intoxication is not a
defense to or an excuse for the commission of a crime. It is only relevant to
negate an element of the crime charged, such as intent. If you find that the
defendant was intoxicated at the time of the crime, you may take this fact into
consideration in determining whether (he/she) was in such a state of
intoxication as to be incapable of forming the required specific intent, which
is a necessary element for the commission of the crime[s] of <insert crime(s)
charged>.

If you believe that the defendant,
although intoxicated, was still capable of forming a specific criminal intent,
then the defendant's responsibility is the same as if (he/she) were not
intoxicated. You must first decide whether the defendant was intoxicated at the
time of the alleged crime; and second, whether the defendant was incapable of
forming an intent to commit the acts constituting the crime[s] of <insert
crime(s) charged>. Remember, the defendant does not have to prove that
(he/she) was intoxicated. The state always has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was capable of forming the required intent.
Any degree of intoxication, not merely total intoxication, may be considered in
determining whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent.

The state always has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not only capable of
forming the required intent, but that he or she actually possessed such intent.
State v. Faria, 254 Conn. 613, 635-36 (2000); State v. Austin, 244
Conn. 226, 237-41 (1998); State v. Dwyer, 59 Conn. App. 207, 218-21,
cert. denied, 254 Conn. 937 (2000); State v. Toczko, 23 Conn. App. 502,
507 n.2 (1990).

In summarizing the evidence of the
defendant's intoxication for the jury, the court may limit its discussion to the
evidence directly relevant to the ability to form the requisite intent, but
should allow the jury to consider all the evidence in determining whether the
defendant had possessed the requisite intent. See State v. Roman, 67
Conn. App. 194, 205-206 (2001), rev'd in part on other grounds, 262 Conn. 718
(2003) (while there was evidence that defendant had ingested both alcohol and
cocaine, the court only referred to alcohol in its instruction because the
testimony of cocaine's affects was not relevant to his ability to form the
requisite intent).

Intoxication and
RecklessnessThe common-law rule regarding
intoxication explicitly made the distinction between specific and general intent
crimes. State v. Shine, 193 Conn. 632, 638-40 (1984). General Statutes
§ 53a-7 does not, "but rather expressly prohibits the evidence when the mental
state is recklessness or negligence." Id., 640. "It is entirely reasonable for
the legislature to make a rule that whatever cognitive elements there are in
recklessness, they cannot be negated by evidence of voluntary intoxication. The
majority of cases in America support the creation of a special rule relating to
intoxication, so that, if the only reason why the defendant does not realize the
riskiness of his conduct is that he is too intoxicated to realize it, he is
guilty of the recklessness which the crime requires." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 640-41.

"While the defendant cannot
introduce evidence of intoxication to dispute recklessness the state can
introduce that evidence to prove recklessness." State v. Shine, supra,
193 Conn. 642. The jury may be instructed that the jury should disregard
evidence of intoxication if it does not negate the element of intent. State
v. Jenkins, 88 Conn. App. 762, 772-75, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 901 (2005).