Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to address force structure, personnel, and Total Force
issues. We are here to discuss recommendations recently made by the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) and National Defense Panel (NDP). The Air Force plans,
programs, and fights as a Total Force. We are convinced the recommendations we
made during the QDR were responsible, prudent, and designed to preserve our
national defense at a lesser cost. We set lofty, but achievable goals during the QDR
and NDP process. We need your help to achieve those goals. The Air Force faces
a difficult task in meeting today's commitments while modernizing for the future.
Without your help, that difficult task will be impossible.

On behalf of the Air Force, we want to amplify two critical points. First, we are
preserving our current capabilities to fulfill our service's mission while meeting the
directives of the QDR and NDP. Second, we need legislative relief to achieve our
anticipated savings. To preserve current readiness while simultaneously modifying
our force structure for future needs, we must do the following: (1) competitively
source more of our infrastructure (2) conduct additional BRACs and (3) expand
our already considerable reliance on the Guard and reserve.

The QDR and NDP built upon the 1993 effort, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR).
The BUR framed the military force structure needed to support a new national
security strategy - fighting two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs)
at once. This effort was designed to achieve a right-sized force structure. In his
response to the NDP Report, Secretary Cohen stated the Two-Major Theater
War (MTW) construct is "central to credibly deterring opportunism and
aggression." In addition, he noted "fighting and winning major theater wars will
remain the ultimate test of our Total Force." We agree. Smaller Scale
Contingencies (SSCs) are important, but regional security remains most critical to
our national interest. The risks of failure against one or more regional aggressors far
outweigh the risks associated with near-term (and peripheral) peacekeeping
operations.

IMPACT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The QDR concluded that assumption of greater near-term risks is acceptable if we
take advantage of the strategic pause to modernize, further integrate our active and
reserve forces, and adjust our infrastructure to keep up with changing requirements.
The QDR provided the Air Force with a means to support the two-MTW strategy
and to continue implementation of the Revolution in Military Affairs. As our
technology continues to improve, it is no longer accurate to measure capabilities of
weapon systems almost exclusively in terms of dollars. The value of air and space
forces lies in their unique characteristics - range, speed, mobility, adaptability, and
capacity to project greater lethality with less vulnerability. Complementing these
characteristics with force multipliers such as stealth; precision standoff weapons;
integrated sensor-to-shooter C4ISR networks; and loiter-capable, all-weather,
day-or-night munitions, provides an unprecedented ability to transform and redefine
the nature of war.

The new strategy emphasizes the critical importance of quickly and decisively
halting armed aggression. This strategy, called by some the "halt phase", depends
heavily on the characteristics that are most typically found in air and space power -
speed, range, agility, and overwhelming firepower. The merit of air and space
power extends far beyond rapidly halting armed aggression anywhere in the world.
It can substitute a small, agile force for a large, standing one, while adding more
firepower in the process.

IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL

The National Defense Panel report called for desired military capabilities and
characteristics that are resident in today's Air Force. The report recognized the
paramount importance of continued American air dominance as a necessary
predicate to success in any conflict. The F-22 and the Airborne Laser are
representative of the RMA capabilities that will fill these requirements well into the
next century. The NDP also observed that projecting military power on short
notice requires light and mobile forces that can deploy rapidly and stealthily, seize
the initiative by striking precisely, and rely increasingly on unmanned and
space-based systems. These characteristics represent the current capabilities of the
Air Force.

These recommendations point to a military force structure that can meet current
and future challenges with fewer personnel and resources. The technologies,
operating concepts, and organizational framework of the post-Desert Storm Air
Force are force multipliers.

AIR FORCE APPROACH

In the face of historic and significant change, since 1985 the Air Force has
dramatically downsized its force structure. During the same period, our
deployments have nearly quadrupled. In 1988 we averaged 3,400 people
deployed daily for contingencies and exercises. By 1997, that number grew to
14,000. This strain has begun to show in the force. We see the initial indicators of
stress on our people. The indicators - lower aircraft mission capable rates in some
areas, shortages in engine spares, and lower pilot and navigator retention - have
caused us concern. We are aggressively moving to bring some relief to our
personnel. Despite the difficulties, 91 percent of all Air Force units remain at the
highest readiness levels possible. During the QDR, the Department of Defense
conducted exercises that examined the risks and dangers associated with forward
presence and attempted to quantify the limited asset shortfalls that might be
expected. These exercises ultimately proved our projected POM force is suitable,
although stressed, to execute current DoD, Joint, and service strategy.

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

We have consolidated and streamlined our organizational structure and eliminated
unnecessary command layers. The Air Force has pared its major commands from
13 to 9. We reconfigured Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) into operational and
warfighting organizations by eliminating their support functions. By eliminating Air
Divisions, we shortened operational command lines and reduced overhead staff
functions. The Air Force has also done systematic, in-depth studies to identify the
minimum number of support personnel needed to sustain its infrastructure. We
targeted positions in excess of wartime requirements for outside competition. By
working with the General Accounting Office (GAO Code 701078, OSD Case
1288), we were able to document our personnel processes and procedures. The
GAO then reported back to you in March 1997 that the Air Force had sufficient
personnel to meet wartime requirements and could safely pursue further force
reductions.

We continue to lead the way in integrating our reserve component with our active
duty operations. During 1997, an average of 6,000 guardsmen and reservists were
on active duty each month to support exercises, contingencies, and military
operations around the world. Additionally, guardsmen and reservists participated in
over 60 exercises worldwide. In addition to the contributions the Guard and
Reserve bring to the table in mission areas such as strategic lift, air refueling,
aeromedical evacuation and general purpose fighter forces, we have looked to
other mission areas for additional Total Force contributions. For example, the Air
Force Reserve Command now operates the 8th Space Operations Squadron and
the 310th Security Forces Squadron. Additionally, the Air National Guard
activated the 137th Space Warning Squadron and assumed control of 1st Air
Force's CONUS air defense mission. Consistent with the mandates of the QDR
and NDP to aggressively pursue the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the
Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA), we are seeking ways to further exploit cost
savings. In particular, we are exploring a concept - the Future Total Force Unit -
that will follow this path to seamless integration of the active and reserve
components.

VIEW OF THE FUTURE

We have growing problems as a result of our high operations tempo. As a result,
we have sought reduced DoD tasking of our highest demand systems. By using Air
Expeditionary Forces as a substitute for standing deployments, we hope to be able
to limit total deployment times to no more than 120 days. The Air Force is further
strengthening portions of its heavy demand forces, including RC-135 Rivet Joint
aircraft. We are activating reserve component associate units, including a recently
created AWACS squadron.

The Air Force seeks to capitalize on competitive sourcing and privatization
initiatives. We are currently evaluating our entire military and civilian workforce to
identify those functions, which are candidates for competition under the Office of
Management and Budget's A-76 program. We expect to compete over 67,000 full
time equivalent positions by FY03.

CONCLUSION

Given the budgetary realities of the present and the foreseeable future, we again
ask for your help in achieving our goals. To maintain our successful course, we
need collective and strong congressional support.

Congressional relief in such forms as repeal of military end-strength floors, the
50/50 depot-level maintenance and repair split, and laws restricting the outsourcing
of functions are just a few of the measures which might bring needed relief. We
need additional BRACs, similar legislation or some other means of placing bases in
less than fully active status. Greater reserve component involvement, to include
more full-time personnel, could achieve additional savings. We need authority to
extend and modify separation incentives beyond FY99. Absent a national effort to
implement QDR and NDP recommendations, we will find it difficult to posture our
current and future Air Force as effectively and efficiently as possible. We have
identified and outlined a number of challenges facing you, the Air Force, and the
nation. We look forward to working with you in the coming months and years to
meet those challenges.