Wednesday, September 30, 2015

At the end of August 2015 the Peshmerga made a rare
offensive move into southern Kirkuk. Several villages in the Daquq district were
taken in an off and on series of attacks. Soon after stories emerged about the
Kurds looting and destroying homes in the area, and several thousand people were
displaced in the process. This was the latest example of demographic changes
the Kurds are attempting to impose on the disputed territories of northern
Iraq.

On August
26, 2015 the Peshmerga attacked the Daquq district of Kirkuk. 14 villages
were reported cleared on the first day. There was a pause, and then the
offensive began again with another 10 towns seized on September
11, and then ten more on September
13. Then another break occurred before one more town was taken on September
22. As soon as the campaign started there were stories of looting by the
Kurdish forces. Two Peshmerga officers told Iraq
Oil Report that Kurdish volunteers were responsible. There was also a more
systematic destruction of houses in the district. A Peshmerga commander said
that homes in four villages were bulldozed. Another troubling trend was the
Kurds not letting families that fled the fighting return. A Kurdish General was
quoted in The
National saying that residents were free to return to the cleared towns,
but the paper’s reporter saw only empty villages on a trip through the district.
The International Organization for Migration counted
1,805 families displaced from the area, which was over 10,000 individuals. Arab
locals claimed that the Kurds were preventing them from returning. As usual the
government forces are justifying their actions by stating that the areas are
not safe because of explosives and they are afraid of IS infiltration and
supporters. The Kurds have carried out similar actions in Diyala
and Ninewa
of property destruction and forced displacement.

The Kurds have carried out few offensive operations this
year. They are mostly happy to stay in their dug in positions and hold the land
they have taken since last year rather than fight the Islamic State. When they
do act it is to take more of the disputed territories, which they claim as
historically Kurdish. Unless the Peshmerga have local allies, the trend is to
destroy homes and displace the locals as they are considered IS supporters. It
is also part of the Kurds’ larger plan to reverse Saddam Hussein’s Arabization
program that removed thousands of Kurds from northern Iraq and settled Arabs in
their place. By changing the populations of these areas they can create more
facts on the ground that they are Kurdish and should be annexed to the
Kurdistan Regional Government. The post-IS Iraq is much more important for
Kurdish leaders than the current war, which is shown in actions like these in
Kirkuk governorate.

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

In July 2015 the Islamic State initiated its latest car bomb
campaign in Iraq. Salahaddin has been a major focus of this new offensive with
a huge amount of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) being
launched there in August. Like in Anbar, almost all of these bombs are being used
against the government’s forces, especially in the Baiji area, which the
Islamic State has effectively used as a diversionary target for the last
several months. Salahaddin however is not only a target of these VBIEDs but a
base for further attacks in Anbar and Baghdad provinces.

Salahaddin has seen the most car bombs in Iraq from June to
August 2015. There were 50 VBIEDs in the governorate in June with 43 of them
destroyed before reaching their target. That went down to 34 car bombs in July
as IS began its new campaign and started hitting new areas of the country. Then
in August they shot up to 188 VBIEDs with 173 destroyed. That was a total of
272 car bombs, more than Baghdad that saw 58 and Anbar that had 230 during that
same period. Since June 608 of these types of bombs have been used with 44% of
them taking place in Salahaddin.

Almost all of the car bombs in Salahaddin have been used in
the Baiji area, which is in the northern section of the province above Tikrit.
From June to August 6 VBIEDs were launched against the Samarra area in the
south, 10 in the Tikrit district in the center, 13 in other locations, and 236
in Baiji. The refinery in that last district was heavily contested after the
fall of Mosul and Tikrit in June 2014. IS originally wanted to capture the
facility to use in its oil industry, but that proved impossible as Baghdad
constantly sent reinforcements there. By early 2015 IS decided to use the
district as a diversion from its real focus, which was Anbar. From April to May
the militants seized the largest amount of the facility to date, and then the
day it seized Ramadi it began blowing up the refinery and retreated. After the
Anbar offensive began in July IS again launched heavy attacks into Baiji
seizing several sections of the town and surrounding villages, which again
succeeded in bringing in government reinforcements. IS has perfected small and
medium sized infantry attacks beginning usually with a mortar barrage, then a
truck or bulldozer bomb that is used to break through government defenses such
as berms, usually followed by suicide car bombs that attempt to infiltrate into
the security forces and Hashd’s positions, and then finished off with an
infantry assault. The intensity of this fighting was shown in two stretches
from August 15-17 and August 22-25 when 115 car bombs were used in Baiji with
another 28 on August 20.

The Islamic State appears to have four main areas it
produces VBIEDs in Salahaddin. One is obviously in Baiji. IS holds many of the
small towns in the rural areas outside of the refinery, which are likely used
to put together the bombs. The Hamrin Mountains in the east is another source
of these bombs, which are likely sent out to hit the Tikrit and Samarra areas.
A third is probably around Samarra where IS continues to carry out hit and run
attacks and bombings. Finally, the fourth area is in the south around Taji and
Tarmiya. These camps are used to send car bombs into neighboring Anbar and
Baghdad.

Monday, September 28, 2015

In the west, the Islamic State (IS) is usually described as
a new type of insurgent group that is exploiting technological advances to
spread its message to create a new global brand of jihad that has attracted
followers from around the world. Haroro Ingram, a Research Fellow at the Coral
Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University,
Canberra argues that IS is actually following in the footsteps of previous
insurgent groups. What follows is an interview with Ingram, about IS’s information
campaign and how western governments have tried to counter it.

1. Many western
reporters and commentators have suggested that the Islamic State’s (IS) media
campaign, especially its use of social media and new technology, sets it apart
from previous jihadist and insurgent groups. You’ve argued that at its core IS
uses very similar communications strategies to those advocated by other
insurgency thinkers and revolutionary groups throughout history. Could you
explain how IS is following in the path of those older thinkers?

The core strategic mechanics of IS’s ‘information
operations’ (IO) campaign are not particularly unique. In fact, IS’s IO
strategy appears to share some really fundamental principles that can be found
in the writings of modern insurgency thinkers such as Mao, Guevara, Minh,
Muqrin and others. So let’s take a look at some of these core principles.

Firstly, like many other insurgency thinkers and
revolutionary groups, IS seems to understand that modern insurgencies are
characterized by two distinct but interconnected ‘competitions’. The first is
pretty obvious and broadly recognized in the field: the clash of what Bernard
Fall describes as ‘competitive systems of control’ i.e. the battle between
rival politico-military apparatuses. The other competition is characterized by
the clash of ‘competitive systems of meaning’ i.e. the battle for the perceived
credibility and legitimacy of each side’s ‘cause’.

Secondly, IS mirrors the thinking of other modern insurgency
movements by affording ‘information operations’ (some may prefer the terms
‘media’, ‘communications’ or ‘propaganda’) a central strategic role in its
politico-military campaign. The result is that IO is rarely used in a secondary
and largely reactive strategic role as an ‘information tool’ to let contested
populations know when and why a particular action was taken (probably the
dominant trait of counterinsurgency IO efforts). Rather, IS uses IO as a means
to ‘shape’ the human environment (contested populations, supporters and enemies
alike) for its politico-military activities and continues to use IO as a means
to sustain and compound those effects in the field. This is not the only way
modern insurgencies like IS tend to use IO but it underscores the broader
point.

Thirdly, like so many of their historical ‘predecessors’
(Islamist or otherwise), IS leverage both pragmatic (e.g. appeals to security,
stability and livelihood) and perceptual (e.g. appeals to the cause) factors in
its IO messaging as a means to shape the perceptions and polarize the support
of contested populations. What IS does so well in its IO campaign, perhaps
better than many of its Islamist predecessors (e.g. AQ), is weave pragmatic and
perceptual appeals together in its messaging as a means to align rational- and
identity-choice decision-making in its audiences. In doing so, its messaging
seeks to harness powerful psychosocial dynamics in its audiences.

Again, these three traits are not particularly unique to
IS’s IO campaign. Moreover, a lot of what IS does with its IO campaign isn’t
even particularly unique to the militant Islamist milieu. During a recent visit
to Kabul University I was exploring the Afghanistan Centre’s extraordinary
collection of primary source materials and found a collection of Al Jihad magazine issues which Abdullah
Azzam played a central role in producing and disseminating around three decades
ago. These issues of Al Jihad were
filled with a diverse array of articles – some focused on jurisprudential
themes while others promoted the mujahideen’s politico-military efforts or
eulogized martyrs – accompanied by eye-catching photos and graphics. The broad
similarities with AQAP’s Inspire or
IS’s Dabiq are clear.

Now, there is plenty that is unique about IS’s media
campaign but its core strategic mechanics aren’t.

2. Western
governments have tried to counter the Islamic State’s appeal by arguing that
moderate voices within the Muslim community should speak out against the group.
There were also the comments by President Obama that IS did not represent
‘real’ Islam. Is it an effective strategy to try to get into a religious debate
with IS?

Western governments need to fight the urge to launch a
counter-proselytizing campaign against IS (and other militant Islamist groups).
At best, such efforts are likely to fail. After all, why should the adherents
of a particular faith give any credibility to the ideological opinions of those
outside of their faith? At worst, such efforts may act as a catalyst of
radicalization by giving veracity to the claims of more radical fringes that
suggest Western governments are actively trying to change Islam.

Some western governments have tried to overcome these
problems by co-opting ‘moderates’ as the community advocates of such campaigns.
I suspect that may actually compound the problem because it tends to be
perceived by those most vulnerable to radicalization as the championing of a
government-sanctioned Islam by those moderate voices that are most important in
countering radical narratives. This is a lever militant Islamist narratives
regularly manipulate. For example, AQAP’s Inspire
and IS’s Dabiq magazines are
filled with articles that compel western audiences to be aware of how
governments are seeking to change Islam using ‘moderates’ as agents.

In the media battle against IS and similar groups, it is far
better to err on the side of strategies that are more likely to work than less
likely. A counter-proselytizing campaign epitomizes the type of strategy
that falls into the latter category. It’s very difficult to predict what types
of communication strategies will resonate in an audience but surely we can
start with working towards our strengths and avoiding our adversary’s
strengths.

3. The Islamic State
not only uses jihadist-Salafist thought in its information campaigns, but also
portrays itself as the champion and protector of Sunnis. What does the group
say about its latter role, which doesn’t get as much coverage in the west?

Coverage of IS’s media efforts has tended to
disproportionately focus on its extreme violence and proselytizing. While these
are important features of its IO efforts, I think it is important that the
field develops a greater appreciation for the breadth and diversity of IS’s
messaging, especially if better counter-narratives are to be developed.

The bulk of IS’s messaging appears to be devoted to showing
how IS are practically addressing the
needs of Sunnis via appeals to pragmatic factors like security, stability and
livelihood. This type of messaging is characterized by two aims. The first is
to promote IS’s system of control and synchronize its narrative and action
(what a colleague of mine describes as narrowing their say-do gap). The second
is to denigrate its enemy’s system of control and rupture the link between its
enemy’s narrative and action (exacerbate their enemy’s say-do gap). IS’s series
of mujatweet videos are excellent
examples of this dynamic (e.g. mujatweet 7and mujatweet 3).

The messaging produced and disseminated by IS’s wilayat-based ‘information offices’
tends to be dominated by these very pragmatic appeals. Strategically this makes
perfect sense. In order to maximize the appeal of IS’s system of control and
diminish the appeal of its enemy’s system of control, IS prioritizes
communications that are designed to leverage a population’s need for security,
stability and livelihoods in addition to coercing
them through violence. Having spent the last couple of years speaking with
Syrian opposition elements and Syrian and Iraqi refugees fleeing IS-controlled
areas, a common sentiment expressed by these interviewees is the ruthless
pragmatism of not just IS politico-military efforts but its communications too.

4. You’ve said that
what is unique about IS’s propaganda is its mix of identity- and
rational-choice appeals in its messaging. Can you explain what you meant by
that?

There is no single factor that explains the apparent
effectiveness of IS’s IO campaign nor singularly captures its uniqueness.
Rather, it is the cumulative impact of a range of subtle differences that is
most significant when trying to understand the appeal of IS’s messaging. And
yes, this is a dimension that distinguishes IS from many of its peers.

Appeals to pragmatic and perceptual factors in IS’s
messaging are designed to drive different types of decision-making processes in
its audiences, especially amongst supporters. Messages that appeal to pragmatic
factors, like those I just discussed, are designed to compel its audience to
engage in rational-choice decision-making (i.e. decisions based on cost-benefit
consideration of options).

In contrast, IS messaging that draws on perceptual factors
(IS’s ‘cause’) are designed to present IS as the champion and protector of the
in-group identity (Sunnis), IS’s enemies as Others responsible for
Sunni-crises, and thus IS as the bearer of solutions to that crises. This type
of messaging compels its audiences to engage in identity-choice decision-making
(i.e. decisions made in accordance with one’s identity).

While I wont bore you with any of the conceptual and
methodological details (instead see here),
I have compared the contents of thirteen issues of AQAP’s Inspire, five issues of the Taliban in Khurasan’s Azan and ten issues of Islamic State’s Dabiq and the differences are
potentially very significant. While Inspire’s
contents are dominated by narratives designed to empower the in-group
(Sunni Muslims) and provide operational advice and Azan focuses heavily on in- and out-group identity choice appeals, Dabiq is characterized by a pretty even fusion
of identity- and rational-choice appeals.

IS have demonstrated an adeptness for weaving together rational-
and identity-choice appeals in their messaging in a manner that is perhaps more
nuanced than many other groups. The implications are noteworthy: by weaving
together pragmatic and perceptual appeals, IS messaging is designed to align
rational- and identity-choice decision-making processes in its supporters. This
approach is not only designed to ensure IS messaging appeals to the broadest
spectrum of potential supporter motivations but may help to explain the
seemingly rapid radicalization of IS supporters from the sidelines to action
(whether as foreign fighters or ‘lone wolves’).

5. Finally, what ways
can both Arab and Western governments counter IS’s appeal particularly in the
‘media theatre’?

Western counter-narrative efforts against IS have generally
been pretty poor. Like many, I thought the State Department’s sarcastic ‘Welcome to the “Islamic
State” land’ video is a baffling example of counter-narrative messaging.
Indeed, a lot of the messaging that has been released as part of the State
Department’s ‘Think Again Turn Away’ strategy appears to be pretty ad hoc and not
driven by a coherent overarching strategy. Other western governments have
struggled too. For example, the Australian
Defense Department’s counter-IS twitter campaign has stumbled through its
first few weeks with basic errors that have left their efforts looking very amateurish.

I suspect there are two issues at the heart of many flawed
counter-narrative efforts. The first is an intellectual one. Counter-narrative
strategies need to be based on a nuanced understanding of an adversary’s IO strategy.
This analysis should then inform the overarching counter-narrative strategy.
Only then can an effective and coherent messaging campaign be developed and
implemented. I suspect this regularly hasn’t happened or, if it has, then the
process has not been adequately comprehensive.

I have spoken to Syrian opposition groups who are involved
in a daily battle against IS propaganda and, despite many of them engaging in
in-depth analysis of IS messaging with the expertise one would expect from
locals, they remain very cautious with the messaging they disseminate for fear
of counter-productive consequences. Many western efforts have not demonstrated
such a nuanced awareness of the ramifications of ill-conceived messaging and
continue to forge crudely ahead.

The second is an issue of personnel. More often than not the
architects of anti-IS messaging campaigns are the same COIN IO specialists who
are broadly recognized to have lost the IO war against the Taliban in
Afghanistan and AQI in Iraq or the CT strategic communications experts who have
been overwhelmed by AQ propaganda for over a decade. New ideas are desperately
needed in the ‘media theatre’ and this may often mean bringing in new people.

More specifically, the approach of Western (more broadly
non-Muslim) and Arab (more broadly Muslim) governments should have some
fundamental differences. For example, governments of Muslim majority countries
should make some attempt, if a light-footed and careful one, to actively engage
in debates about pertinent religious issues.

Broadly speaking though, the core principles of an anti-IS
counter-narrative campaign should be based on similar strategic principles to
those applied by our adversaries. This would involve developing and
disseminating messaging that attaches IS to perceptions of crisis, links
solutions to ourselves (i.e. government efforts), highlights the synchronicity
of our narrative and action while disrupting the connect between IS’s narrative
and action. From a western perspective, this would ideally be pursued while
avoiding the minefield of engaging in a counter-proselytizing campaign. Having
a broad strategic framework as a driver would help to ensure a coherence to the
messaging that is produced in the short, medium and long terms whilst
facilitating the flexibility necessary to leverage situational factors.

While this may seem a very rational-choice heavy
counter-narrative approach, it is designed to take advantage of what has thus
far been a strength of IS’s IO campaign: the interweaving of its rational- and
identity-choice appeals. By demonstrating how IS in fact isn’t providing solutions, is
causing perceptions of crisis and regularly disseminates hypocritical
messaging, its identity-choice appeals that declare that it is the provider and
protector for Sunnis weakens considerably. However, a communications strategy
that isn’t synchronized with effective politico-military efforts in the field
will be susceptible to IS’s highly effective counter-narrative efforts. These
points may seem simple or even obvious to many but they have rarely been
applied effectively against IS (or AQ for that matter).

In short, without considerable and frankly very unlikely
changes to the way that COIN IO and CT strategic communications campaigns are
developed, I suspect IS and others will continue to enjoy a strategic advantage
in the ‘media theatre’.

Thursday, September 24, 2015

Iraq’s Baath Party
began as one of many Arab nationalist groups vying for power in Iraq. After its
first attempt at power failed in 1963 it was finally able to assume control
over the state in 1968. It went from a small minority to including a rather
large share of the population. This expansion was fueled by the Iran-Iraq War
in the 1980s when the Baath transformed itself from a political group into one
that ran social organizations, assisted the public to access services, while
running the government as well. This moved into all sectors of society was
facilitated by a massive recruiting program especially into areas of the
country where the Baath were not represented such as amongst secondary students
and women. Kanan Makiya in his famous book Republic
of Fear wrote about all
of the punishments and coercive techniques Saddam Hussein used to rule. New
analysis based upon captured Baath documents such as that of Professor Joseph
Sassoon and Professor Dina Rizk Khoury showed all of the rewards and incentives
that the party also used to stay in control. That didn’t mean that repression
was not used, but that there was much more to running Iraq for 35 years then
just fear.

The Baath Party went
from obscurity to a corporatist, semi-fascist organization that attempted to
dominate every aspect of life in Iraq. In 1963 there were only around 3,000 party members out of an estimated population of 7.8
million people. That compared to 2002 when the Baath had 69 branches across the
country, 612 sections, 3,787 divisions, 32,852 cells, 76 secretary generals,
1,027 branch members, 6,128 section members, 45,537 division members, 223,662
active members, 254,081 apprenticed members, 27,242 candidates, 1,113,211
supporters, and 2,328,080 sympathizers for a grand total of 3,999,044
Baathists. Out of a population of 25 million, the party encompassed 15.6% of
the people, a much higher percentage than communist parties in the Soviet Union
and Eastern bloc during their heyday. The elite of the party who made decisions
were around 2.4% of the total Iraqi populace, while active members were 4%.
Many of these members joined during the 1980s when membership grew 140% from
1986-2002. This was due to a huge recruiting drive by the Baath to be
represented in each sector of society so that they might be monitored and
controlled.

The impetus for this
expansion was the Iran-Iraq War. On September 22, 1980 Iraq invaded Iraq in
what Saddam believed would be a short war. On September 28, Tehran refused a cease-fire offer from Baghdad destroying the initial plan to
seize territory and then end the war. The long and bloody conflict that
developed afterward shifted the entire focus of the Baath Party. Before it was
based upon an Arab nationalist and modernizing ideology. The war made it
concentrate upon managing the security of the country through both military and
civilian means. That included maintaining support for the war, monitoring
dissent and public opinion in general, watching over the military, hunting down
deserters and draft dodgers, as well as delivering goods and services. The
population came to rely upon the Baath to gain access to the state making it
far more then just a political party.

From 1985-1989 Baath
offices multiplied across Iraq as a result of its new responsibilities. The
party tried to recruit new members and build new officers in areas where it was
weak before. The Baath bureau in Baghdad for example grew to 19,274 members by
1988 or 5% of the population. It also moved into schools to gain young
supporters. From 1987-88 of 95,477 male secondary students in Iraq 60.8% were
brought in as supporters, 20.5% as advocates, and 4% as advanced advocates.
This was the basis for the party’s high representation amongst the public that
it achieved by 2002.

During the Iran-Iraq
War the Baath launched policies to interact with the public called
“cohabitating” and “perpetuating ties” which were aimed at both monitoring the
public for potential dissent as well as addressing their needs to maintain
their support. One of the main ways the Baath was able to achieve this was via
the various social committees it created such as the Committee to Oversee the
Affairs of the Martyrs and the Missing and the General Federation of Iraqi
Women. The former highlighted the new roles the Baath was expected to perform
during the war as one of its main jobs became helping the families of dead and
captured soldiers work their way through the government bureaucracy so that they
could receive benefits. The committee also responded to public complaints about
red tape to get several laws passed to help out with issues such as inheritance,
which was a major problem for families of deceased soldiers. The General
Federation of Iraqi Women played a similar role as well as helping to improve
the lot of females during the war, which was promoted by the Baath as part of
its modernization program. The Federation pushed for more opportunities for
women in jobs, government positions, and within the military. By 1987 850,000
women were in the federation with branches in 62% of the country’s
neighborhoods. These groups and others made visits to families across the
country several times a month. They also conducted surveys to hear people’s
concerns, meet their needs, and maintain surveillance of them. This all
facilitated the Baath’s expansion into Iraqi society that it felt was a
necessity to win the war and maintain control over the country.

During the 1980s the
Baath Party was both a tool of repression and part of the social welfare state.
For example, it ran counterinsurgency campaigns in southern Iraq to hunt down
the huge number of deserters that grew as the war dragged on. At the same time,
it became the way for the people to receive services and benefits, which were
all crucial to keeping up the social order and morale during the war. Saddam
wanted to control all aspects of the country and that’s what he used the Baath
Party for. It became a quasi-fascist and corporatist instrument for ruling
Iraq. As Professor Khoury wrote in the 1980s everyone and no one was a Baathist
as it became the main means to interact with the state whether people believed
in the party or not.

Wednesday, September 23, 2015

For the last five weeks the number of attacks have remained
relatively stable in Iraq. This is another sign that the war in Iraq has
largely stabilized and become deadlocked. The government is on the offensive in
several parts of Anbar province along with Salahaddin, but showing mixed
results, while bombings continue unabated in Baghdad. The rest of the country
remained relatively quite.

Musings On Iraq counted 122 security incidents from
September 15-21, 2015. That was lower than the previous weeks, which witnessed
144 attacks September 8-14, 139 from September 1-7, 136 from August 22-28, and
135 from August 15-21. Baghdad led the country with 50 attacks, followed by 21
in Salahaddin, 18 in Anbar, 16 in Ninewa, 8 in Kirkuk, 5 in Diyala, 3 in Babil,
and one each in Kurdistan and Wasit.

There were 323 deaths and 488 wounded reported in the press
during the week. That broke down to 2 Sahwa, 20 members of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF), 55 fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and 246
civilians killed, and 2 Hashd al-Shaabi, 5 Sahwa, 44 ISF, and 437 civilians
injured. Baghdad had the most fatalities with 88. After that there were 82 in
Salahaddin, 55 in Kurdistan, 45 in Ninewa, 30 in Anbar, 9 in Diyala, 6 in
Babil, and 4 each in Kirkuk and Wasit. Overall casualties have crept up
slightly from 699 August 15-21, to 638 August 22-28, to 637 September 1-7, to 762
September 8-14, and 811 September 15-21. Since losses are so underreported due
to government silence it’s impossible to tell whether this was a real increase
or just better coverage.

Violence
In Iraq By Week 2015

Date

Incidents

Dead

Wounded

Jan 1-7

189

466

464

Jan 8-14

172

733

518

Jan 15-21

189

403

528

Jan 22-28

195

492

899

Jan 29-31

91

306

568

JAN

836

2,400

2,977

Feb 1-7

155

408

688

Feb 8-14

177

443

566

Feb 15-21

169

592

383

Feb 22-28

171

391

705

FEB

672

1,834

2,342

Mar 1-7

176

373

595

Mar 8-14

137

398

656

Mar 15-21

146

1,304

505

Mar 22-28

174

273

406

Mar 29-31

72

205

219

MAR

705

2,553 + 4

2,381 + 150

Apr 1-7

127

218

422

Apr 8-14

137

676

542

Apr 15-21

172

729

717

Apr 22-28

163

497

483

Apr 29-30

50

162
+ 7

182
+ 299

APR

649

2,282

2,346

May 1-7

154

627

450

May 8-14

154

420

549

May 15-21

124

963

387

May 22-28

108

341
+ 1,499

348

May 29-31

38

66

164
+ 646

MAY

578

2,417 + 1,499

1,898 + 646

Jun 1-7

132

431

476

Jun 8-14

126

522
+ 405

394

Jun 15-21

141

365

373

Jun 22-28

162

306

474

Jun 29-30

61

122

189

JUN

622

1,804

2,012

Jul 1-7

161

435

719

Jul 8-14

140

384

570

Jul 15-21

109

359

597
+ 4,024

Jul 22-28

145

527

590

Jul 29-31

53

453
+ 8

603

JUL

608

2,166

3,079 + 4,024

Aug 1-7

154

650
+ 760

298

Aug 8-14

132

726

645

Aug 15-21

135

345

354

Aug 22-28

136

342

296

Aug 29-31

59

112
+ 5

169

AUG

616

2,180 + 760

1,762

Sep 1-7

139

285

352

Sep 8-14

144

368

394

Sep 15-21

122

323

488

Violence
In Iraq Sep 2015 by Province

Provinces

Sep
1-7

Sep
8-14

Anbar

25 Incidents

52 Killed: 5 Civilians, 10 Hashd,
13 ISF, 24 Sahwa

45 Wounded: 8 Civilians, 10 Sahwa,
12 ISF, 15 Hashd

10 Shootings

4 Suicide Bombers

3 Suicide Car Bombs

2 Mortars

19 Suicide Bombers Killed

20 Car Bombs Destroyed

24 Incidents

29 Killed: 4 Civilians, 8 Hashd,
17 ISF

57 Wounded: 13 Hashd, 19 ISF, 25
Civilians

10 Shootings

2 IEDs

2 Suicide Bombers

2 Suicide Car Bombs

2 Mortars

4 Suicide Bombers killed

5 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

1 Motorcycle Bomb Destroyed

13 Car Bombs Destroyed

Babil

2 Incidents

2 Killed: 2 Civilians

5 wounded: 5 Civilians

1 IED

5 Incidents

4 Killed: 4 Civilians

14 Wounded: 4 ISF, 10 Civilians

1 Shooting

3 IEDs

Baghdad

58 Incidents

73 Killed: 2 ISF, 71 Civilians

199 Wounded: 8 ISF, 191 Civilians

11 Shootings

28 IEDs

8 Sticky Bombs

2 Car Bombs

1 Grenade

2 Car Bombs Destroyed

57 Incidents

65 Killed: 1 Sahwa, 2 Hashd, 4
ISF, 58 Civilians

154 Wounded: 14 ISF, 140 Civilians

14 Shootings

22 IEDs

10 Sticky Bombs

1 Car Bomb

2 Grenades

Basra

-

3 Incidents

1 Wounded: 1 ISF

2 IEDs

1 Sound Bomb

Diyala

8 Incidents

14 Killed: 5 ISF, 9 Civilians

24 Wounded: 1 ISF, 23 Civilians

4 Shootings

2 IEDs

1 Car Bomb

1 Mortar

12 Incidents

16 Killed: 3 Hashd, 4 ISF, 9
Civilians

20 Wounded: 1 ISF, 1 Asayesh, 3
Hashd, 15 Civilians

5 Shootings

5 IEDs

1 Car Bomb

Karbala

1 Incident

2 Sound Bombs

1 Incident

1 Car Bomb Destroyed

Kirkuk

4 Incidents

1 Killed: 1 Civilian

1 Wounded: 1 Hashd

2 Shootings

2 Car Bombs Destroyed

6 Incidents

29 Killed: 9 Civilians, 20
Peshmerga

121 Wounded: 6 Civilians, 115
Peshmerga

2 Shootings

3 IEDs

KRG

-

2 Incidents

95 Killed: 95 PKK

2 Turkish Air Strikes

Ninewa

21 Incidents

116 Killed: 8 Peshmerga, 108
Civilians

22 Wounded: 2 Peshmerga, 20
Civilians

10 Shootings

3 IEDs

1 Rocket

1 Mortar

13 Incidents

104 Killed: 8 Peshmerga, 32 ISF,
64 Civilians

4 Shootings

1 IED

1 Mortar

Qadisiyah

1 Incident

-

Salahaddin

19 Incidents

27 Killed: 6 ISF, 21 Civilians

56 Wounded: 21 ISF, 35 Civilians

7 Shootings

4 IEDs

1 Mortar

12 Suicide Bombers Killed

1 Suicide Car Bomb Destroyed

21 Incidents

26 Killed: 6 Hashd, 9 Civilians,
11 ISF

27 Wounded: 7 Hashd, 9 ISF, 11
Civilians

11 Shootings

4 IEDs

1 Car Bomb

2 Suicide Bombers Killed

9 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

1 Motorcycle Bomb Destroyed

1 Car Bomb Destroyed

Provinces

Sep
1-7

Anbar

18 Incidents

30 Killed: 4 ISF, 26 Civilians

56 Wounded: 6 ISF, 50 Civilians

9 Shootings

1 IED

1 Rockets

2 Mortars

3 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

Babil

3 Incidents

6 Killed: 6 Civilians

19 Wounded: 19 Civilians

3 IEDs

Baghdad

50 Incidents

88 Killed: 2 Sahwa, 6 ISF, 80
Civilians

303 Wounded: 5 Sahwa, 9 ISF, 289
Civilians

13 Shootings

19 IEDs

4 Sticky Bombs

1 Suicide Bomber

3 Car Bombs

2 Rockets

2 Suicide Bombers Killed

Diyala

5 Incidents

9 Killed: 1 ISF, 8 Civilians

11 Wounded: 2 ISF, 9 Civilians

3 Shootings

1 IED

1 Sticky Bomb

2 Motorcycle Bombs Dismantled

1 Car Bomb Dismantled

KRG

1 Incident

55 Killed: 55 PKK

1 Turkish Air Raid

Kirkuk

8 Incidents

4 Killed: 4 Civilians

3 Wounded: 1 Civilian, 2 Hashd

2 Shootings

1 Rocket

Ninewa

16 Incidents

45 Killed: 5 ISF, 40 Civilians

9 Shootings

21 IEDs

1 Rocket

Salahaddin

21 Incidents

82 Killed: 4 ISF, 78 Civilians

96 Wounded: 27 ISF, 69 Civilians

15 Shootings

4 IEDs

2 Suicide Car Bombs

3 Mortars

1 Car Bomb Destroyed

Wasit

1 incident

4 Killed: 4 Civilians

1 Shooting

The Anbar offensive that started on July 13 continued to
show mixed results. The government forces are stuck in the rut of clearing
towns and then having to go back into them again and again, something that the
current campaign as supposed to solve, but hasn’t. The third week of September
was a perfect example. On September
13 Husaiba that is to the east of Ramadi was declared cleared for the fifth
time, and then a new operation started on September
15. The joint forces have been stuck on East Husaiba as well, which was
said to be freed on August
30 for the third time, and then the sixth operation there started on September
16. September
17 the joint forces went back to Shihabi in the Fallujah area after it was
cleared on July 14. September
17 the sixth operation since the start of August began in Khalidiya Island,
which is in between Ramadi and Fallujah. The government forces also had to go
back into southern Ramadi’s Tamim neighborhood on September
18, which was freed back on July
30, 5 Kilo that is right outside of the city on September
19 after it was freed a month before, and Humaira also south of Ramadi on
September 19 when it was said to be cleared on August 8. The joint forces have also
been drawn into sweeps through the Haditha district during the week, which is
in western Anbar, and Amiriya Fallujah in the east, while continuing with its
attempt to re-take the Garma area.

So far the Anbar offensive has suffered from three major shortcomings.
First, there is a massive manpower shortage. After Ramadi fell in May the Hashd
complained that they were being kept out of the province, and that if they were
allowed in they would rectify the situation. Unfortunately the Hashd have not
committed many fighters. There are approximately 10,000 total men focused upon
Ramadi and Fallujah compared to 30,000 that took Tikrit. Part of the reason for
the shortage is the fact that the government continues to give into
diversionary attacks by the Islamic State in other parts of Anbar and Baiji in
Salahaddin, which spreads out its forces. The third issue is the lack of unity
of command. Many Hashd forces act independently of Baghdad. For instance, the
government wanted to take Ramadi after it fell, but then IS posted a video of
an execution of a soldier from Sadr City in Fallujah, and the Hashd
unilaterally decided to take that area instead. Now the joint forces are spread
out across the entire corridor between the two cities. That is going to drag
out the operation for several more weeks and even months when a quick strike on
Ramadi back in May might have been able to re-take it.

Security Operations In Anbar Sep 15-21, 2015

Husaiba

East
Husaiba

Shihabi

Khalidiya
Island

Ramadi,
Tamim

7/13/15 center cleared

7/19/15 operation

7/14/15 cleared

8/4/15 operation

7/26/15 operation

7/18/15 center reached

7/21/15 cleared

9/17/15 operation

8/12/15 operation

7/30/15 cleared

7/19/15cleared

7/26/15 operation

8/16/15 operation

9/18/15 operation

7/27/15 cleared

8/2/15 operation

8/29/15 operation

7/29/15 operation

8/6/15 cleared

9/5/15 operation

8/16/15 operation

8/10/15 operation

9/17/15 operation

8/17/15 cleared

8/25/15 operation

8/31/15 operation

8/30/15 cleared

9/10/15 operation

9/16/15 operation

9/13/15 center cleared

9/15/15 operation

5 Kilo

Humaira

Albu Hayat

Haditha

Amiriya
Fallujah

7/20/15 operation

7/14/15 cleared

7/21/15 operation

7/21/15 operation

8/20/15 operation

7/22/15 cleared

8/2/15 operation

9/19/15 operation

7/30/15 operation

9/16/15 operation

8/19/15 operation

8/8/15 cleared

8/22/15 operation

9/19/15 cleared

9/19/15 cleared

9/21/15 operation

Shootings and bombings continued throughout Baghdad. There
were 15 incidents in the east, 14 in the south, 10 in the north, 5 in the
center, and 4 in the west. That included three car bombs, one in the south and
two in the east, and three suicide bombers, one in the center, and two in the
west. IEDs and sticky bombs were the main form of violence.

Diyala had very few incidents during the third week of
September, with just five, but included another attempted car bomb. As part of
IS’s new car bomb campaign it has tried to set off a vehicle borne improvised
explosive device (VBIED) at least once a week in the province. Otherwise, IS is
using Diyala to carry out attacks upon eastern Baghdad.

Turkey conducted another wave of air strikes against
Kurdistan. On September
15 Ankara claimed to have killed 55 PKK fighters as a result.

There were more executions in Ninewa. The Islamic State killed
45 people in Mosul, Qayara, and Hamam al-Alil during the week. That included an
imam, a former candidate, two journalists, four mayors, and five police. IS
also blew up 21 homes
belonging to Christians on the Ninewa Plains, and made one attack upon the Kurds in
the Sinjar district.

The fighting in Salahaddin’s Baiji district remains
inconclusive. Propaganda is so heavy that progress is very difficult to discern
there. Politicians, the security forces, and the different elements of the
Hashd all make their own separate announcements about Baiji, which are often
contradictory. That’s how 80% of Baiji can be declared freed in the middle of
August and then a few days later it goes down to 50% and then up to 60% and
then 70% in two days by the middle of September. Similar numbers have been
given for the Baiji Refinery going from 70% controlled in the middle of August,
down to 50% and then up to 60% on September 18. The government forces have also
refocused upon the IS stronghold of Siniya, which is just outside of Baiji. On
September 1, 5 and 19 the town was said to be surrounded, and then miraculously
cleared in between all that even though fighting is still going on there. Again,
the lack of unity of command causes all of this confusion about what is actually
going on in the province not to mention that the district has no strategic
value anymore. Instead, IS is using it to hold down government forces and
distract from Anbar.

Security Operations Baiji District May-Sep 2015

Baiji

Baiji
Refinery

Siniya

5/7/15 Operation

5/22/15 cleared

5/2/15 cleared

5/21/15 66% cleared

5/30/15 outskirts cleared

5/31/15 cleared

5/30/15 central Baiji
entered

6/30/15 50% cleared

6/11/15 operation

6/10/15 60% cleared

7/6/15 40% cleared

8/11/15 operation

6/22/15 80% of Baiji
district cleared

7/23/15 80% cleared

8/22/15 reached

6/29/15 operation

7/25/15 40% cleared

8/28/15 cleared

6/30/15 center cleared

8/3/15 40% cleared

9/1/15 surrounded

7/2/15 90% cleared

8/5/15 60% cleared

9/5/15 surrounded

7/6/15 operation

8/15/15 70% cleared

9/9/15 cleared

7/21/15 center reached

8/25/15 50% cleared

9/11/15 70% cleared

7/22/15 85% of Baiji
district cleared

9/9/15 center cleared

9/19/15 surrounded

8/7/15 Baiji surrounded

9/18/15 60% cleared

8/16/15 80% cleared

8/24/15 50% cleared

8/25/15 90% of Baiji
district cleared

8/31/15 operation

9/14/15 center cleared

9/17/15 60% cleared

9/19/15 70% cleared

Finally, one of the only good bits of news coming out of
Iraq was a dramatic decline in car bombs from September 15-21. There were just
10 total VBIEDs launched during the week, with half of them being destroyed.
That compared to 34 the week before, and 31 the first week of the month. The
decline might just be a temporary dip since IS’s bombing campaigns usually last
several months, and this is only the third.

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com