Theft and Thaumaturgy II

The previous post in this series discussed the idea that Rachel stole Lavan’s תרפים in order to prevent them from informing Lavan of her family’s flight; this post discusses the other main traditional explanation of her theft, that the תרפים were idols worshipped by Lavan, and Rachel stole them to wean him from idolatry.

בראשית רבה

רש”י

The simple version of this approach is that Rachel’s goal was practical: by removing the objects of Lavan’s worship from his possession, his ability to worship them would be thus thwarted. Abarbanel seems to have so understood Hazal, and he rejects their interpretation of Rachel’s motive (in favor of basically that of the previous post), essentially accusing them of naïveté: he considers it preposterous that a daughter might alter her elderly father’s religious convictions, and insists that Rachel would have been quite foolish to have had such a hope:

It is perhaps to counter this objection (as Dr. Alexander Klein suggests) that R. Hananel explains that Rachel’s action was not a pragmatic attempt to prevent her father from worshipping his idols, but rather a theological demonstration of their worthlessness: she meant to lead her father to the realization that “there can be no substance to a god who is stolen”:

Vandalizing Televisions

In any event, Rachel’s act may serve as precedent to justify the theft or destruction of property in order to prevent the commission of sin, and it is indeed invoked as such by R. MosheShternbuch, in the course of his consideration of the case of a baal teshuvah who continually (!) vandalizes the television at his parents’ home in order to prevent the family from watching it. R. Shternbuch begins by conceding that the prohibition of watching television is “very severe”, but is nevertheless unwilling to grant unequivocal permission to vandalize the television, noting that such vigilantism is often counterproductive. He points out that Rachel did not include Jacob in her scheme, and he ultimately objected to what she had done, with his imprecation against the perpetrator ultimately causing Rachel’s death!

Spilling Out חלב עכו”ם

R. Avraham Weinfeld was asked about a yeshivah that persisted upon serving its students חלב עכו”ם, despite the pleas of local G-d fearing individuals, until one zealot spilled out one morning’s milk delivery, to protest the sinners and raise public awareness of the infraction. The yeshivah administration responded by suing for the loss. As R. Weinfeld summarizes, “the basic question is whether one who damages another’s property in order to prevent him from sinning is liable for compensation or not”:

R. Weinfeld has a lengthy analysis of the question, inclining toward the zealous defendant, and concludes by noting that “with the aid of Heaven, the protest was effective, and they henceforth distributed חלב ישראל”:

ובעז”ה הועילה המחאה ומאז הנהיגו לחלק חלב ישראל ושלום על ישראל.

My parashah lecture and weekly halachah column for פרשת ויצא covered the topics and (most of the) sources of this and the previous post. Here is the column:

In parashas Vayeitzei, the Torah relates that Rachel stole her father Lavan’s “terafim” as she fled from him. What were these mysterious terafim, and what was Rachel’s motive and justification for stealing them? The midrashim and classic commentators offer two general approaches:

The terafim were magical devices capable of speech, and Rachel stole them to prevent them from revealing to Lavan the flight of Yaakov and his household (Tanchuma #12, Chizkuni).

The terafim were idols of Lavan, and Rachel stole them to cure him of idol worship (Bereishis Rabah 74:5, Rashi).

The latter approach seems to imply the legitimacy of theft as a means to prevent someone from sinning. R. Moshe Shternbuch does indeed adduce Rachel’s action in support of the permissibility of destroying property that is being used in the commission of sin, although he subsequently points out that Yaakov apparently disagreed with her decision, and that Rachel was eventually punished by death for her action (Shut. Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:368).

In the course of his analysis, R. Shternbuch cites a dispute between the Ketzos Hachoshen and the Nesivos Hamishpat over whether the Talmudic rule approving the use of force to prevent someone from sinning (Bava Kama 28a) is limited to the courts, or endorses even vigilante action by private citizens. R. Shternbuch sides with the Ketzos that the authority to use force is the sole prerogative of the court, but he seems to overlook the fact that the Ketzos subsequently clarifies his position and concedes that even a private citizen may use force to prevent someone from actively violating a prohibition (such as eating non-kosher food), and it is only the use of force to compel someone to act in fulfillment of a positive commandment (such as taking the four species) that is limited to the court (see Ketzos, Nesivos and Meshoveiv Nesivos at the beginning of siman 3).