Abstract: Carbon policies introduce potentially uneven cost burdens. Anticipating these outcomes is important for policymakers seeking to achieve an equitable outcome and can be politically important as well. This paper describes the details of a microsimulation model that utilizes the price and quantity changes predicted by economic models of carbon policies to make an estimation of economic incidence by income quintile or state, and potentially across other dimensions. After taking as inputs the aggregate output from partial or general equilibrium economic modeling, the microsimulation model uses data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE), the State Energy Data System (SEDS), the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), estimations from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Haiku electricty model. These data sources are used to estimate the share of consumer and producer surplus changes that accrue to households in each income quintile and state. The model is unique among existing incidence models in its ability to drill down to the level of state incidence and to plug into a wide range of economic models.

Abstract: China started seven carbon cap-and-trade pilot programs in order to inform the development of a future national cap-and-trade market. This paper assesses the design of three of the longer-running cap-and-trade pilot programs in Guangdong, Shanghai and Shenzhen. Based on extensive stakeholder interviews and a detailed literature review we formulate a series of recommendations to improve the design of these three pilots, including: strengthening the legal foundations for the cap-and-trade pilots, incorporating achievement of goals established by the cap-and-trade pilots into the performance reviews of participating government officials and executives of state-owned entities, further clarifying the cap-setting process, increasing the transparency of the cap, reducing or eliminating within-compliance period adjustments to enterprise-level allowance allocation, gradually moving away from free allocation toward auctioning, reforming enforcement policy, and adopting a symmetric safety valve to manage prices. By making these recommendations, we hope to shed light on ways that Chinese regulators might adapt cap and trade, a fundamentally market-based tool, to China's economy that has many non-market features.

Abstract: Carbon taxes introduce potentially uneven cost burdens across the population. The distribution of these costs is especially important in affecting political outcomes. This paper links dynamic overlapping-generations and microsimulation models of the United States to estimate the initial incidence of a carbon tax across states. Geographic differences in incidence are driven primarily by differences in sources of income. Differing patterns of energy use also matter but are relatively less important. The use of the carbon tax revenue plays an important role, particularly in determining how different income sources are affected, as: (1) using carbon tax revenue to cut capital taxes disproportionately benefits states with large shares of capital income; (2) returning the revenue via lump-sum transfers favors relatively low-income states; and (3) returning the revenue via cuts in labor taxes provides a relatively even distribution of cost across states. In general, geographic differences in incidence are substantially smaller than the differences across income groups.

Abstract: Carbon taxes efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions but are criticized as regressive. This paper links dynamic overlapping-generation and microsimulation models of the United States to estimate the initial incidence. We find that while carbon taxes are regressive, the incidence depends much more on how carbon tax revenue is used. Recycling revenues to cut capital taxes is efficient but exacerbates regressivity. Lump-sum rebates are less efficient but much more progressive, benefiting the three lower income quintiles even when ignoring environmental benefits. A labor tax swap represents an intermediate option, more progressive than a capital tax swap and more efficient than a rebate.

Abstract: Substantially reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from electricity production will require a transformation of the resources used to produce power. This paper analyzes the economic consequences of a suite of different flexible and comprehensive policies to reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector, including a carbon tax, a tradable emissions rate performance standard, and two versions of a clean energy standard (CES). A technology-based CES can bring about substantial reductions in CO2 emissions but would neglect to harvest some economic reductions because it fails to affect decisions at three margins: emissions rate heterogeneity in the natural gas and coal generation fleets and electricity demand reductions. Natural gas emissions rate heterogeneity can be addressed by crediting clean generation based on emissions rates instead of technology. Coal emissions rate heterogeneity can be addressed by altering the policy to credit all generators instead of just a subset. Demand reductions can be harvested by removing the subsidy component of the policy and allowing retail electricity prices to rise. Harvesting emissions abatement on all three margins saves about 40 percent of the discounted cumulative economic welfare costs of a technology-based CES through 2035, although the distributional implications are different. All of the policies result in substantial increases in social welfare.

Abstract: US climate policy is unfolding under the Clean Air Act. Mobile source and construction permitting regulations are in place. Most important, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states will determine the form and stringency of the regulations for existing power plants. It is widely believed that flexible approaches could be suggested in EPA guidelines or proposed by states. Various approaches would create an implicit price on emitting greenhouse gases and create valuable assets that would be distributed differently among electricity producers, consumers, and the government. We compare a tradable performance standard with three variations on cap-and-trade policies that would distribute the asset value in different ways. Keeping the value within the electricity sector by distributing it to fossil-fueled producers or consumers or spending on energy efficiency has smaller effects on average electricity prices than a revenue-raising policy. These approaches impose greater social cost, but comparable net benefits in the sector.

Abstract: Myriad policy measures aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector, promote generation from renewable sources, and encourage energy conservation. To what extent do innovation and energy efficiency (EE) market failures justify additional interventions when a carbon price is in place? We extend the model of Fischer and Newell (2008) with advanced and conventional renewable energy technologies and short and long-run EE investments. We incorporate both knowledge spillovers and imperfections in the demand for energy efficiency. We conclude that some technology policies, particularly correcting R&D market failures, can be useful complements to emissions pricing, but ambitious renewable targets or subsidies seem unlikely to enhance welfare when placed alongside sufficient emissions pricing. The desirability of stringent EE policies is highly sensitive to the degree of undervaluation of EE by consumers, which also has implications for policies that tend to lower electricity prices Even with multiple market failures, emissions pricing remains the single most cost-effective option for reducing emissions.

Abstract: Concerns about budget deficits, tax reform, and climate change are fueling discussions about taxing carbon emissions to generate revenue and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Imposing a carbon tax on electricity production based on the social cost of carbon (SCC) could generate between $21 and $82 billion in revenues in 2020 and would have important effects on electricity markets. The sources of emissions reductions in the sector depend on the level of the tax. A carbon tax based on lower SCC estimates reduces emissions by reducing demand and through the substitution of gas for coal, whereas taxes based on higher SCC estimates induce switching to wind and nuclear generation. The slow rate of growth of the SCC estimates means that any SCC-based carbon tax trajectory provides weaker long-run incentives for expanded renewable and nuclear generation than a cap-and-trade program that achieves an equivalent level of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions reductions. Taxing carbon at the SCC is welfare enhancing, but the SCC may not be the optimal tax rate.

Abstract: The introduction of a price on carbon dioxide is expected to be more efficient than prescriptive regulation. It also instantiates substantial economic value. Initially programs allocated this value to incumbent firms (grandfathering), but the growing movement toward auctioning or emissions fees makes carbon revenues into a payment for environmental services. This paper asks, to whom should this payment accrue? If the atmosphere resource, as a common property resource, is viewed as the property of government, then the decision of how to use the revenue can be viewed as a fiscal problem, and efficiency considerations dominate. If the atmosphere is viewed as held in common, then the revenue might be considered compensation to owners and delivered as payment to individuals. This decision has efficiency and distributional consequences that affect the political economy and the likelihood and durability of climate policy. We summarize trends among six existing carbon-pricing programs.

Abstract: Carbon taxes are a potential revenue source that could play a key role in major tax reform. This paper employs a numerical general equilibrium model of the United States to evaluate alternative tax reductions that could be financed by the revenues from a carbon tax. We consider a carbon tax that begins at $10 per ton in 2013 and increases at 5 percent per year to the year 2040. The net revenue from the tax is substantial, and the GDP and welfare impacts of the tax depend significantly on how this revenue is recycled to the private sector. Under our central case simulations (which do not account for beneficial environmental impacts) over the period 2013–2040, the tax reduces GDP by .56 percent when revenues are returned through lump-sum rebates to households, as compared with .33 and .24 percent when the revenues are recycled through reductions in personal and corporate tax rates, respectively. Introducing tradable exemptions to the carbon tax reduces or eliminates the negative impacts on the profits of the most vulnerable carbon-supplying or carbon-using industries. The GDP and welfare impacts are somewhat larger when such exemptions are introduced.

Abstract: This paper considers how tax reductions financed by a carbon tax could be designed to mitigate the need for specific relief for firms in select energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) sectors. In particular, I consider impacts on manufacturing sectors at the six-digit North American Industry Classification System level, with a special focus on firms that would be presumptively eligible for competitiveness relief using the criteria in the Waxman–Markey bill (H.R. 2454). The paper has a number of findings. First, determination of eligibility for relief analogous to the free allowance allocation in H.R. 2454 is sensitive to energy intensity. Second, providing compensation to EITE sectors through the corporate income tax—analogous to the output-based allowance allocation in Waxman–Markey—is certainly feasible, but tax appetite within the EITE sectors is insufficient to fully use any credits that attempted to offset more than about one-quarter of their carbon tax liability. Third, certain reforms do better than others at providing disproportionate relief to EITE sectors. Finally, economic theory predicts a substantial cost to diverting carbon tax revenue toward compensation of specific sectors. Theory also suggests that firms should treat policy risk no differently from the way they treat the other risks they face as they do business. But politics may dictate otherwise; if so, the analysis here suggests that certain approaches may work better than others to ensure that relief is appropriately targeted at minimal cost.

Abstract: Over the last half decade, a variety of federal legislative proposals for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been put forward, most of which would set a price on carbon. As of early 2013, the one politically plausible policy appears to be a carbon tax, passed as part of a larger fiscal reform package. Meanwhile, the US Environmental Protection Agency has begun regulating GHG emissions from a variety of sources using its authority under the Clean Air Act. It may be necessary to choose between these two policies, however. The Waxman–Markey cap-and-trade bill that failed in 2009 would have preempted much of this authority, and it appears likely that a carbon tax law would do the same. But how can one make this choice? What are the key questions and issues to consider? The purpose of this paper is to compare these policies. Our aim here is therefore not to determine whether an exchange is wise or unwise. Instead, our intention is to give policymakers and other interested readers an impartial assessment of both policies and, in particular, the features that are important to a comparative evaluation. We don’t give answers, but hope at least to give the right questions to ask.

Abstract: A carbon tax will interact with other policies that are intended to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and encourage clean sources of energy and energy efficiency. This paper examines these policy interactions. A well-designed carbon tax can be an efficient instrument for reducing emissions, yet whether it will be implemented in an efficient manner is uncertain. A legislatively determined tax may not fully reflect up-to-date scientific and economic information. Behavioral and institutional factors suggest that a tax may not have its fully intended effect. These considerations suggest that climate policy should and will continue to be a complex mix of regulaions at various levels of government, even with a carbon price. Nonetheless, the possibility of unintended interactions among policies remains. The role for policies to encourage renewables and energy efficiency depends on the stringency of the carbon tax and presence of externalities related to technological learning and the energy efficiency gap.