Amid broiling sectarianism, crumbling borders, and humanitarian devastation in Syria, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern states, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taken an undoubtable backseat in the Obama administration’s list of regional priorities.

President Obama’s addresses to the UN General Assembly between 2009-2015 illustrate a stark contrast in the administration’s prioritization of the conflict. In Obama’s 2009 address, he mentioned “Israel” (or “Israeli”) and “Palestine” (or “Palestinian”) 31 times, whereas in 2015, the president excluded any mention of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (see Figure 1).

Further confirming this reality is the sharp decrease in mentions of these words between the Administration’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) report published in May 2010 and its latest NSS report published in February 2015 (see Figure 2).

Following the collapse of the 2013-2014 US-led peace talks, the Obama administration deprioritized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on an assessment that both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas cannot make the necessary compromises to reach a negotiated solution.

For a team that rode into the Oval Office on a wave of optimism and hope, the bleak reality of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has generated immense frustration—particularly for Secretary of State John Kerry.

A conversation between Kerry and Martin Indyk, the former US special envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in December 2015, highlighted the Secretary of State’s frustration. Indyk remarked, “There was a certain sense, I felt, in what you had to say of frustration, and that the underlying message… is basically it’s up to them [the Israelis and Palestinians] now… Is that the message you’re sending here?” Kerry replied, “Not entirely. Is there some frustration? Sure there is, because I believe it’s doable… I don’t think it’s just exclusively up to them, but it is mostly up to them.” Vice President Biden echoed a similar message in April, saying the US sometimes has an “overwhelming frustration with the Israeli government.”

Dynamism Over Passivity

Despite frustration with the stagnant peace process, the US can still play an active role in bringing the two sides closer to a comprehensive peace rather than passively managing the conflict.

In its final months, the Obama administration should issue a set of updated US parameters thatdelineate the US view of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and address both sides’ core needs.

Whether through a speech or published document, Obama would likely issue these parameters following the November elections to prevent any harm to the democratic nominee’s election prospects. Moreover, unlike the Clinton Parameters of 2000, the Obama administration should not withdraw the document as it leaves office, ensuring the parameters remain official US policy on which the next Administration can launch future negotiations.

The ultimate rationale for the Obama Parameters is the conditions, which have historically characterized Arab-Israeli breakthroughs, do not exist in the current Israeli-Palestinian dynamic. Key elements underlying the emergence of the three previous Arab-Israeli agreements (Egypt-Israel 1979, PLO-Israel 1993, Jordan-Israel 1994) were: 1) both sides felt a consequence for not acting,2) leaderships with wills for peace and legitimacy in the eyes of their publics existed on both sides, and 3) a level of trust was present between both sides’ leaders and among their publics.

The current absence of these characteristics among the leaders and publics of Israel and the Palestinians means the traditional model of US-brokered bilateral negotiations will not successfully revitalize a peace process between the sides. Since none of these conditions appear to be emerging in the near horizon, the US must adopt a more dynamic approach.

Indyk’s Approach

The merit of this new approach is embodied by the evolution of Martin Indyk’s thinking regarding the proper US mediation role with the Israelis. In a recently declassified email Indyk sent to another former special envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, George Mitchell, in 2010, the former outlined his theory of how Netanyahu can be persuaded to make concessions favorable to a peace agreement. Indyk writes, “Put your arm around Bibi [Netanyahu]… the purpose of embracing him is to nudge him forward.” However, Indyk reassessed his theory of embracing Netanyahu in an interview with me in 2015 stating, “Bibi has proved that he’s not moveable with [the embracing] technique…” To move someone like Netanyahu, Indyk now believes, “The only leverage that might work is the threat not to veto in the UN Security Council.”

While critics of proposing parameters argue that the Israeli and Palestinian governments will reject the parameters and that the incoming president will nullify them in 2017, the option of turning the parameters into a UN Security Council resolution would likely prevent such obstacles.

Although not a panacea, a realistic and balanced set of parameters adopted by the UNSC would commit both Israeli and Palestinian leadership to operating in ways more favorable to the two-state solution, and the international community to standing by a framework that addresses Israel’s security concerns and realities on the grounds.

While Israeli-Palestinian peace appears farther away than ever, the US must act with dynamism over passivity, beginning with the publication of the Obama Parameters.

Elijah Jatovsky is a senior at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service majoring in International Politics. Following graduation in May 2016, he will work as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nicaragua.

This article draws from Jatovsky’s research conducted through Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, which is set for publication in the Georgetown Security Studies Review in May 2016.

The decay of the Sykes-Picot borders in the Middle East, has paved the way to increased Kurdish autonomy and development of international relations with many states including Israel. The three dominant Kurdish entities, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, and Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria, have staked out different positions vis-a-vis Israel. The KRG, comprised of numerous sub-entities, has cultivated relatively positive relations with Israel. As for the PKK and PYD, the former has historically maintained hostility towards Israel, while the latter largely still has not addressed relations with Israel. As Kurdish autonomy becomes a salient factor in a chaotic Middle East, Israel will likely continue its long history of outreach to Kurdish groups.

Israel and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)

Despite US and Turkish preferences for a unified Iraq, Israel is one of the most vocal supporters of Kurdish independence in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Institute for International Security Studies (INSS) on June 30, 2015, “[The Kurds are] a warrior nation that is politically moderate…[and] worthy of statehood”. Israeli Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked echoed Netanyahu’s sentiment at the annual INSS conference on January 20, 2016, “We must openly call for the establishment of a Kurdish state that separates Iran from Turkey, one which will be friendly towards Israel”. Israel views relations with the KRG as a strategic necessity to counter Iran. A friendly KRG could potentially extend Israel’s intelligence capabilities into the broader Middle East and Iran, which shares a porous 400 kilometer border with the KRG.

While Israel has no official representation in Erbil, Israel has trade relations with the KRG. According to the Financial Times, Israel imported 19 million barrels of Kurdish oil between early May 2015 and mid-August 2015. The KRG sends its oil through the Kirkuk-Ceyphan pipeline to the Ceyphan Port in southern Turkey and thereafter, to Israel. However, PKK and affiliated Kurdish militant groups have increasingly targeted the pipeline, but shipments will almost certainly continue because Israel relies heavily on Kurdish oil. With the exception of oil, KRG-Israeli trade is limited due to political considerations. The KRG is wary of overstepping the authority of the central Baghdad government, which has hostile relations with Israel, but will remain open to further engagement as Iraq continues to transform.

Israel and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Israel has not and most probably will not develop relations with the PKK. The Kurdish group is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey and the US and offers little to secure Israel’s strategic interests. The Israeli army also has cooperated closely with the Turkish army for many years and aided it in its fight against the PKK. According to a 2010 CNN report, the then commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, Gen. Ilker Basbug admitted to the use of Israeli Heron drones in the mountainous border region between Iraq and Turkey to monitor PKK positions. PKK leaders also have accused Israel of assisting Turkey in the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999. More recently, Israel has made efforts to restore relations with Turkey, which suffered after Israeli Naval commandos raided a Turkish flotilla in 2011. Thus, Israel almost certainly will not make overtures to the PKK, which could derail its reconciliation process with Turkey.

Israel and the Democratic Union Party (PYD)

Turkish sensitivities also stand in the way of the PYD and Israel developing close ties. The PYD has an intimate relationship with the PKK, and Turkey, in many respects, views the PYD as an extension of the PKK influence. Turkey even shelled the PYD’s military wing in February 2016, illustrating the deeply rooted tensions between the two parties. Thus, Israel unlikely can develop ties with the PYD without undermining its relationship with Ankara.

Furthermore, Israel has prioritized maintaining security along the Golan Heights and combating Iranian influence in Syria over developing relations with the PYD. Nevertheless, future cooperation should not be counted out because the PYD has maintained a relatively neutral position on Israel. PYD co-leader Salih Muslim stated that Israel could play a role in the PYD’s vision of a Middle East democratic confederalism, “If[Israel] is democratic…and can live in peace along with the Arabs and the other nations”. Given the strategically important PYD autonomous region in northern Syria, Israel may undertake efforts to build ties with the PYD as the Syrian Civil War evolves.

The overarching theme in Israel’s policy towards the various Kurdish factions is the Turkey factor. The KRG’s working relationship with the United States and Turkey makes the Iraqi Kurds Israel’s most politically feasible Kurdish partner. Meanwhile, future Israeli engagement with the PYD and PKK will depend on Israeli-Turkish rapprochement and PKK-Turkish tensions.

Kurdish concerns over the regional backlash from Israeli relations must also be considered. The KRG and PYD will be wary of aggravating their Arab neighbors, who are hostile to Israeli influence. Additionally, the KRG must take into consideration its significant commercial and diplomatic ties with Iran before any upgraded relationship with Israel. Iran is the only state entity that maintains two diplomatic missions in the KRG, with consulates in Erbil and Sulaimaniya. Furthermore, Iran has the ability to impose significant leverage on the KRG with its influence over Baghdad, border security, imports, and exports.

Iranian concerns over Israel’s relationship with the KRG have already spurred condemnation from Iranian officials. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the Chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission commented in 2014 that Kurdish independence is “the Zionist regime’s special goal in the region.”

The development of three distinct Kurdish powers highlights the long term impact of the Sykes-Picot borders on the Kurdish ethnic group. As in the case for Arab states, Kurdish entities have formed unique and at times competing regional agendas. Meanwhile, amidst the present day climate of conflict in Syria and Iraq, Israel has been presented with greater opportunities to develop relations with the Kurds. However, just as the KRG cannot maintain official ties with Israel due to its status within the Iraqi state, the PYD may fall under a similar constitutional bind in the eventual post-civil war days of Syria. Lastly, Jerusalem’s relationship with Ankara will remain the constant factor amidst these developments. Israel’s cold war era strategy of reaching out to Kurds certainly has a relevant future in the evolving power structures Middle East minority politics.

Guido Weiss worked as a risk consultant for American and European companies operating in the Middle East and North Africa. He holds also holds a master’s degree in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a bachelor’s degree in International Studies from the American University in Washington, D.C.

The three Israel-Hamas wars in the last eight years have destroyed billions of dollars of infrastructure and housing in Gaza. Hamas launches rockets into Israel to burnish its credentials for violent resistance in the eyes of its public and Israel retaliates to manage an unacceptable security situation. Some Israelis refer to these wars as efforts to “mow the grass” and prevent Hamas’s terror infrastructure from developing. Yet, while regularly mowing down Hamas’s capabilities, Israel also has set back development and humanitarian efforts.

Despite the risks, many donors recognize that their efforts must continue for humanitarian reasons. Yet ongoing tensions between Hamas and Israel and the promise of future conflict likely make them hesitant to continue providing aid. At the very least, these groups probably would want guarantees—from Hamas and Israel—to avoid targeting projects or using them for cover in the future.

After the last 2014 Gaza War, donor countries promised more than $3.5 billion of humanitarian and development aid, but according to an August 2015 World Bank report, only 35% of promised funds have been delivered. Western donors, including the United States, European Union, and Japan, have given the most aid and almost met their full pledges. Qatar and Turkey, both Hamas supporters, have fulfilled 10% and 29% of their pledges, still high absolute totals, respectively. Finally, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait—aligned against Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood more broadly—have all given less than 13% of their pledges. Egypt did not pledge aid to Gaza and instead has undermined the Gaza economy by closing the Rafah crossing and destroying smuggling tunnels along the Egyptian-Gazan border.

For the Middle Eastern countries, the decision to send aid to Gaza results from political competition. Hamas’s backers eagerly help the group improve living conditions in Gaza to aid an ally and increase its legitimacy, while opposing countries, cautious about bolstering Hamas, limit funds and disburse them through proxies and international organizations such as the United Nations.

Humanitarian concerns rank foremost for Western donors, which helps explain their speedy and full delivery of aid, but several countries have questioned the wisdom of spending more money on projects that Israel later destroys. European diplomats in particular have expressed concern about the destruction of their Gazan—and West Bank—projects and have even debated asking Israel for compensation for destroyed humanitarian efforts. European officials perceive Israeli intransigence as the main obstacle to resolving the conflict and they fear Western aid may unintentionally prolong the Israeli occupation by defraying the costs of occupation. Given that the European Commission estimates that Israel destroyed 29.4 million Euros of European Union and EU member state-funded projects in the West Bank and Gaza from May 2001 to October 2011, it is unsurprising that a Western diplomat reported “considerable donor fatigue” from watching “infrastructure projects that we have contributed to” be destroyed.

Though aid continues to flow, donor wariness has impacted the ability of international organizations to continue raising funds for large development projects and expanded humanitarian work. As Robert Piper, the United Nation’s Deputy Special Coordinator (UNDSC) for the Middle East Peace Process, notes, “[The] possibility that work completed now, could be destroyed later in the event of renewed conflict…makes it more difficult to obtain funding – for the reconstruction of totally destroyed homes, as well as large-scale development projects.”

Piper contrasts ongoing humanitarian work—repairing homes, disbursing food, maintaining educational infrastructure—with bigger efforts such as building new homes, building a 161kv power line for a desalination plant, and converting Gaza’s power plant to natural gas. Donors are abandoning such large scale projects which seek to invest in the future of Gaza for fears of another conflict. Piper also noted that these same donors limit these projects due to concerns about empowering Hamas and granting the Islamist group construction materials, which could be used to build weapons. In Piper’s view, Palestinian reconciliation that would give the non-violent, Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority a greater role could reassure donors and increase aid.

However, the specter of future war may not discourage donors, but spur them to invest in measures that decrease the chances of conflict. According to Mike Herzog, a retired Israeli brigadier general and senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, donors are “actually motivated to do more to…delay the next round.” In other words, donations that improve Gaza’s quality of life may alter Hamas’s strategic calculus from seeking legitimacy through conflict, to seeking legitimacy through economic prosperity.

Further, Israel has demonstrated willingness to work with the international community in developing Gaza. According to Herzog, Israel does consider the presence of foreign investments when making its targeting decisions and Israel has never cut off water or electricity supplies to Gaza during conflict. Thus, investments in desalination plants or electricity grids have a high chance of lasting through conflict. Herzog holds that investors could work with Israel and Hamas to obtain commitments not to target or militarily use projects before starting constructions. Nevertheless, guaranteeing the safety of an air or seaport, would be harder given Israeli concerns on their use for smuggling in military materials.

Yet, guaranteeing any project against Israeli targeting is unlikely. Even if Hamas and Israel both agreed to respect a no-go zone around a desalination plant, Palestinian factions could launch rockets near the site and trigger and Israeli retaliation. The absence of a political deal or even ceasefire between Israel and Hamas also shakes donor confidence. Between this donor wariness and competing urgent priorities, including the civil war in Syria, Western donors and major international organizations remain unlikely to undertake major projects.

Donors continue to fund Gaza’s reconstruction for humanitarian political reasons. Still, the promise of renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas leads donors to shy away from funding the large-scale projects and new housing developments needed to improve and not simply manage living conditions in Gaza. Donor wariness alone does not explain this behavior—the lack of Palestinian reconciliation, competing priorities, and regional politics all matter as well—but without hope of tangible progress donors will remain hesitant to invest in a failing a project.

Mitchel Hochberg is a research associate at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a Masters student at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.

On January 14th, Knesset opposition leader Isaac Herzog of the Zionist Union presented a controversial bill to the public and the Ministerial Legislation Committee demanding that Israel grant work permits and health insurance to 41,000 Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers. Though shot down in committee on January 17th, the proposition marks a victory for African asylum seekers in Israel and their advocates. For nearly 10 years, the Israeli Supreme Court has contended that Israel’s treatment of asylum seekers including indefinite detention of African migrants without trial and pressuring “voluntary deportation” is unlawful. The Israeli opposition is thus presenting a compassionate and economically viable alternative to the Netanyahu government’s policy that should be seriously considered as an opportunity to lawfully integrate asylum seekers and begin rebuilding South Tel Aviv.

Israel has long been torn between acquiescing to humanitarian demands of non-Jews in need and fears about maintaining its Jewish and democratic character and security in the Middle East. Around 60,000 African asylum seekers have entered Israel since 2005, predominantly fleeing Eritrea’s civil war and the reinvigoration of violence in Sudan. The 1954 Prevention of Infiltration Law and its subsequent amendments represent the primary body of law regarding asylum seekers in Israel. Since 2012 Israel has implemented a policy of temporary non-deportation, officially referred to as “group protection.” Specifically, this policy denies asylum seekers in Israel basic rights and access to social services, and potentially subjects them to indefinite arbitrary detention in detention centers and prisons such as the Holot detention center in the Negev. Former interior minister Eli Yishai has unapologetically stated, the standing policy aims to “to make their lives miserable” until they willingly accept deportation.

Under the proposed law, cities agreeing to accept the African asylum seekers will receive financial incentives to reduce concentrations of asylum seeker populations in south Tel Aviv alongside efforts to rebuild decaying south Tel Aviv infrastructure. The law would be passed on temporary provision for five years, as reported by Haaretz.

The Zionist Union’s policy is in line with the Supreme Court of Israel, which has, in two different decisions, affirmed that the State’s treatment of African asylum seekers is unacceptable and violates fundamental laws concerning human dignity and liberty. The Supreme Court insisted on a comprehensive policy that addresses this issue. However, the coalition government remains noncompliant.

Executive director of the African Refugee Development Center in southern Tel Aviv, Mutasim Ali, perceives the Zionist Union bill as a positive move towards a better Israel. “Generally speaking,” he states, “this is the right direction the government should be taking and we’ve been calling on Israel to accept its obligation to give basic rights and a dignified life to asylum seekers for quite a long time.” He acknowledges, however, that “the chances of this passing are very limited with a right-wing public and Knesset.” Further, according to Ali, the bill fails to address the asylum claims filed by of those already under group protection.

While Prime Minister Netanyahu has not made any public statements on Herzog’s proposed bill, he has argued in the past that granting tens of thousands of work permits would hurt the Israeli workforce. However, Zionist Union Knesset chairwoman MK Merav Michaeli defends that the proposed bill allows “the state to stop importing new foreign workers and simply use those who are already here.”

Despite some deficiencies with the bill, Herzog is providing a clear alternative to the problematic policy of the Netanyahu government, which chooses to import thousands of labor workers into Israel while attempting to deport African asylum seekers. These asylum seekers are not only already in Israel seeking work, but also are unable to return to their home countries for legitimate fears of violence and persecution.

By addressing the issue of African asylum seekers in Israel, Herzog bolsters his position as leading Israel’s opposition in the Knesset and highlights an issue on which his policies are not only more humanitarian than Netanyahu’s but also can provide economic benefits to the state.

According to Adi Drori Avraham who heads the Advocacy Department of the Aid Organization for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Israel, “After 10 years under limbo, threat of detention, deteriorating conditions in Tel Aviv and frustrated Israelis alike, we now have a clearly voiced plan on asylum seekers in Israel. I am no fortune teller, but I choose to be optimistic. And I think there’s a very important development happening here.”

Ariella Plachta is a Senior at the University of California Santa Barbara studying Political Science and Writing. She has previously worked with Vietnamese asylum seekers in Thailand for the NGO Boat People SOS.

Turkey’s December 4th deployment of a large battalion to Camp Bashiqa near Mosul in northern Iraq may draw Ankara deeper into the US-led fight against ISIS in Iraq. The incursion, ostensibly a mission to train anti-ISIS militiamen, has brought Ankara head to head with Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq, which view Turkey’s heightened presence as a threat to their power broker status in Baghdad. As Iranian proxies work to undermine Turkey’s influence in northern Iraq, Ankara may take measures to curb their importance by heightening its support for US-led battles against ISIS in Ramadi and elsewhere. In the coming weeks, a successful push by US-backed Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to secure Ramadi would empower forces independent of Tehran, including Turkey, to more easily counter Iranian influence in northern Iraq.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi had originally requested Ankara’s presence in Camp Bashiqa in 2014.Yet the December 4th deployment drew sharp criticism from Abadi, who denounced it as an unsanctioned military incursion. Abadi’s criticism came just days after leading Shia parliamentarians threatened Abadi with a vote of no confidence if he accepts any new US or US-allied forces. The response to Turkey’s positioning near Mosul highlighted the growing influence of Iraq’s hardline, Iran-backed Shia militias, which have long pressured Abadi to reject all non-Iranian and non-Russian military aid.

Under international pressure, Turkey made a partial withdrawal from Bashiqa on December 14th, and again on December 18th. Since then, Ankara has heavily criticized Baghdad, which Erdoğan accused of pursuing sectarian policies at the behest of Tehran, and basing its decisions on “the latest developments in the region, that is, the steps taken by Russia and Iran.”

The deployment, though aggressive, aligns with Turkey’s long-term objectives, which seek to ensure the stability of the Turkish-Iraqi border region and reinforce the control of pro-Turkish Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Reinforcing the governing KDP, partly led by KRG President Masoud Barzani, enables Ankara to safeguard Turkey-KRG relations, which include lucrative trade and efforts to train KDP forces to contain Turkey’s domestic Kurdish nationalist movement, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey’s deep ties to Iraqi Kurdistan have allowed Ankara to maintain a consistent military presence in northern Iraq since 1997, as well as oil and trade relations. Ultimately, Turkey hopes to position itself as a key provider of stability in any post-ISIS scenario in northern Iraq. “The basic goal of the troops,” stated Turkish PM Ahmet Davutoğlu stated on December 27th, “is to better protect our trainees on duty against Daesh, and Mosul’s people.”

Turkey’s steps toward de-escalation have been purely gestural. Along with a refusal to fully withdraw from Bashiqa, Davutoğlu addedthat Turkey would continue with its “military arrangements” in the area as it sees necessary. On December 17th, ISIS mortar fire wounded four Turkish servicemen at an unnamed training camp outside of Mosul. The fact that Turkish troops were within mortar range of Mosul just days after allegedly downscaling its Bashiqa operations suggests that Turkey has little intention of abandoning its interests in the area.

If Turkey wants to guarantee its influence in northern Iraq it must empower the US-backed ISF, which will counter Iranian influence in Iraq as a whole. The ongoing battle for Ramadi presents the clearest opportunity to achieve this goal. The counteroffensive is the most high-profile anti-ISIS operation in Iraq, and is currently carried out by US-backed Iraqi forces. A string of recent ISF gains culminated in the December 27th seizure of Ramadi’s central government complex, and the collapse of a consolidated ISIS presence within the city. As Sunni tribal and ISF troops begin the process of uprooting ISIS elements from Ramadi’s suburbs, the US-led coalition will look to promote the ISF as the leading anti-ISIS force and Iraq’s most reliable guarantor of security.

The complete ISF recapture of Ramadi will not be a panacea for Tehran’s tightening grip on Baghdad. Iranian proxy militias are still reveling in the credibility they gained by expelling ISIS from Baiji in northern Iraq in October. Additionally, the US Coalition in Ramadi will need to prevent the late arrival of pro-Iran militias, who may attempt to take credit for the final expulsion of ISIS. Nonetheless, such a prominent success by US-backed forces could push Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi to more openly welcome US assistance, and to mend the damaged relations between Baghdad and Ankara. Abadi announced on December 25th that the primary objective after Ramadi will be retaking Mosul; if Turkey could prove of vital assistance in the securing of Ramadi, the Iraqi government will likely be more receptive to assistance from Turkish forces already posted outside Mosul.

While the deployment of Turkish ground forces into Anbar remains highly unlikely, airstrikes coordinated with US intelligence in ISIS-held Ramadi suburbs would be a practical escalation of Ankara’s role in the conflict. Ankara could additionally offer its resources to assist in the training of ISF and Iraqi Police officers involved in clear-and-hold operations around the city. Since the Bashiqa controversy, Turkey joined a Saudi-led Sunni anti-terror alliance, and entered into further talks with US Defense Secretary Ash Carter, who urged Turkey to take greater efforts against ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.

The continued deployment of a high-profile Turkish ground force in Iraq would invite rhetorical and possibly violent retaliation by Iranian proxy militias, which could ultimately garner them support as defenders of Iraq’s territorial integrity. But Turkey is also unlikely to give up on its sphere of influence near Mosul. In fact, the December 17th ISIS attack on Turkish troops has bolstered the popular opinion in Ankara that Turkey is justified in intervening in areas that Baghdad cannot control.

Washington is keenly aware of the current level of Iranian pressure on Abadi, and has pursued a short-term goal of de-escalating the Bashiqa conflict. But Washington and Ankara’s long-term objectives are now aligned in Iraq. By ramping up support for US-led battles against ISIS in Ramadi and elsewhere, Turkey may undermine the political status of the very Iranian proxies that now threaten Turkish interests in northern Iraq.

CF Brennan is an independent researcher based in Turkey specializing in Turkish and Middle East security issues.

Russia launched a military campaign in Syria on September 30, largely targeting Free Syrian Army (FSA) and ISIS positions threatening the Assad regime. However, after the Turkish Air Force downed a Russian SU 24 warplane on November 24, Russia expanded its campaign, attacking Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) adversaries in northern Syria. This new approach challenges Turkish interests in Syria and will likely continue to embolden the PYD and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

RUSSIAN AIRSTRIKES

Since launching its campaign in Syria, Russia has primarily conducted airstrikes in concert with the strategic interests of the Assad Regime. Specifically, Russia has targeted rebel groups bordering Assad controlled territories in Idlib, Aleppo, and Latakia and ISIS positions in Raqqa and Deir al-Zour.

However, after November 24, Moscow began targeting territories more strategic to the PYD. In particular, the focus of its airstrikes shifted to regions outside of the Syrian regime’s front lines, close to the Turkish border and YPG positions. Reports from late November suggest that Russian airpower bombarded Jabhat Al-Nusra and other rebel factions in the Azaz region, while YPG forces affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian, and Turkmen militias, simultaneously attacked on the ground. This cooperation allowed the YPG to take control of Azaz and other neighboring towns such as Miremin and Anab.

Russia’s new efforts conflict with Turkey’s policy of establishing a no-fly zone in the northern Syrian regions of Jarabulus and Azaz. Moreover, its activities also contravene Turkey’s policy to prevent a contiguous PYD controlled territory along the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey fears PYD administration in this region because of the latter’s historical connections to the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Talal Ali Solo, an SDF spokesman, underscored differences between the SDF and Turkey on December 3rd, speaking positively about the “liberation of the so called Turkish safe zone, between Kobane and Azaz”.

Additionally, Russia has targeted many Syrian Turkmen, who live in Jarabulus and Azaz and maintain positive ties with Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, blasted Russian bombardments on Turkmen positions in Azaz on December 9, claiming that such actions aid ISIS. Russia has also attacked Turkmen outside of the Jarabulus andAzaz, striking Bayirbucak and Turkemndagi, Turkmen areas adjacent to the Turkish border.

RUSSIAN MEDIA ATTACKS

Russia and the PYD have also increasingly employed similar anti-Turkey rhetoric.PYD leadership has consistently accused Turkey of providing assistance to Sunni jihadist groups in Syria. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has followed suit, stating on November 25, “Turkey’s actions are de facto protection of Islamic State”. Additionally, Medvedev accused Turkish officials of having a financial interest in oil delivered by ISIS. On December 5, the Russian Ministry of Defense took the accusations to another level claiming, “US officials say they don’t see how the terrorists’ oil is smuggled to Turkey… it smells badly of a desire to cover up these acts”. In June 2015, YPG spokesman, Redur Xelil, criticized Turkey in an online forum saying, “We do not confirm or deny that ISIS entered from Turkey to Kobani”, paralleling Russian accusations that Turkey turns a blind eye to ISIS activities.

A CAUTIONARY NOTE

Robust Russia-PYD relations may not survive in the long run because Russia still views supporting the Assad regime as its main objective in Syria. PYD Co-Chair Salih Muslim recognized this reality when he told Al-Monitor in October, “[Russia] will prevent Turkish intervention not to defend us but to defend Syria’s border.” Furthermore, Russia must consider the US and its relationship with its NATO ally, Turkey. Thus, a de-escalation of tensions between Ankara and Moscow remains possible. In the meantime, the PYD has benefitted from positive diplomatic relations with the United States, the Russian Federation, and to a lesser extent the Syrian regime. For the PYD, Russian intervention equates to increased attacks on rival factions, a mitigated threat of a Turkish no-fly zone, and a significant power publicly denouncing Turkish policies in Syria.

Guido Weiss worked as a risk consultant for American and European companies operating in the Middle East and North Africa. He also holds a master’s degree in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a bachelor’s degree in International Studies from the American University in Washington, D.C.

More than 600,000 Syrians have sought refuge in Jordan since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil war, including 15,000 registered Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS), although the number of unregistered PRS is likely much higher. The Jordanian government originally afforded PRS refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, but, in January 2013, Amman banned their further entry. Jordanian Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour said in an interview with Al-Hayat on July 8th 2014, “Jordan has made a clear and explicit sovereign decision to not allow the crossing to Jordan by our Palestinian brothers who hold Syrian documents,” adding, “They should stay in Syria until the end of the crisis.” This new policy also threatened PRS who already entered Jordan with arrest and deportation. Moreover, the irregular status of PRS in Jordan denies them the right to legal protections such as challenging a deportation in a Jordanian court.

By April 2012, 1,300 PRS had crossed into Jordan legally. However, intense fighting between Syrian government troops and opposition fighters near the Yarmouk Camp in southern Damascus home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, caused a dramatic increase in PRS seeking refuge in Jordan. Jordan responded by refusing entry to PRS a couple of months later, but officially denied such a policy until Prime Minister Ensour announced it in January 2013.

Jordan has not made clear what specifically motivated it to adopt this policy. But Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour said on January 9th, 2014 that “Jordan is not a place to solve Israel’s problems,” referring to the the Palestinian right of return issue. Fayez Taraweh, Chief Justice of Jordan’s Royal Court explained it in terms of national security, “if Jordan permitted entry [to PRS], then hundreds of thousands would seek permanent refuge in Jordan, thereby permanently increasing the number of population [with] Palestinian origin.” This imbalance, he argued, would negatively affect the security of the country.

The Jordanian Government has arrested hundreds of ‘illegal’ PRS. Moreover, Jordanian authorities established ‘Cyber City’, a refugee camp and detention center, in 2013, which currently holds over 180 PRS. Jordan typically deports PRS after detention at Cyber City, but often directly after arrest as well. PRS have no opportunity to challenge deportation with the exception of lobbying via UNRWA, which seldom succeeds.

Following deportation, PRS frequently enter dangerous and even life threatening situations. Human Rights Watch has documented numerous cases where PRS have been killed after being deported to Syria. The number of deportations increased in 2013 and 2014 and most reports indicate they continue today.

Since Jordan lacks any domestic asylum law, refugees and asylum seekers are treated as ‘non-nationals’ under Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs. Whereas, The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan gives refugees slight protection stating, “Political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or their defence of liberty.”Further, Jordan has ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment which prohibits refoulment, essentially protecting an asylum seeker from being thrown back into the violence they were fleeing.

However in practice Jordan has attempted to sidestep any responsibility for PRS by repeatedly denying them admittance at the Jordanian border. While international law does not confer a right to asylum to PRS rejected at the border, International law does require Jordan to ensure the safety of those escaping violence, either by offering temporary refuge or removal to a safe third country.

With ongoing conflicts in both Syria and Iraq, the refugee population in Jordan continues to balloon. Jordan’s response thus far has been generous, although discriminatory towards Palestinian refugees. Jordan has repeatedly denied PRS admittance at the border contradicting the principle of non-refoulement, which holds Jordan responsible for sending PRS back into danger. This policy towards PRS compounds a dire situation in Syria, it forces refugees to make the perilous trek across contested territory to seek refugee in Lebanon or Turkey, thereby needlessly putting lives at further risk.

Hector Sharp is currently a law student at the University of Melbourne, previously he worked as a Legal Intern for UNWRA’s Jordan Field Office

]]>http://thejerusalemreview.com/2015/12/08/in-jordan-not-all-syrian-refugees-are-equal/feed/06271107146_d4ac5b35ba_zthejerusalemreviewFrom Enemies to Allies: The Evolving Relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabiahttp://thejerusalemreview.com/2015/10/26/from-enemies-to-allies-the-evolving-relationship-between-egypt-and-saudi-arabia/
http://thejerusalemreview.com/2015/10/26/from-enemies-to-allies-the-evolving-relationship-between-egypt-and-saudi-arabia/#respondMon, 26 Oct 2015 20:31:08 +0000http://thejerusalemreview.com/?p=1140More…]]>Saudi-Egyptian relations have transformed since the 1962 North Yemen Civil War, but they still do not constitute a full-proof alliance.

“Each one of their shoes is more honorable than the crowns of King Saud and King Hussain”, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser said during a speech on December 23, 1962 in Port Said, Egypt. Nasser was referring to the 136 Egyptian soldiers killed so far in what became known as the North Yemen Civil War. Just three months before Nasser’s Port Said speech, a group of Yemeni officers called the Free Officers Movement successfully staged a coup to oust the Saudi-backed Imam of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen. Nasser, who came to power the decade prior in the 1952 Free Officers coup that dethroned Egypt’s British-backed monarchy, sought to mold Yemen as a member of his pan-Arab dominion in the region.

Military historians often label the eight-year proxy war as “Egypt’s Vietnam” due to the length of the conflict and its immense drain on the Egyptian economy. More than 10,000 Egyptian soldiers died and hundreds of millions of dollars of war debt were incurred. It is often cited as one of the reasons why Egypt lost so devastatingly in the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967. Current developments in Yemen reflect the polar opposite: While Egyptian forces are back in the war-plagued Gulf republic, they are fighting on the side of the very monarchical family that Nasser had vehemently sought to undermine – the House of Saud. In September 2015, about 800 Egyptian soldiers arrived in Yemen in support of Operation Restoring Hope, the Saudi-led initiative aimed at reversing the Houthi militia’s advances across the country and restoring deposed President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. The operation appears to be a success so far, with the Sunni coalition claiming to have taken back most major cities and destroying the Houthis’ conventional forces in the south.

Diverging Interests

Nonetheless, Egypt’s participation in the coalition does not constitute a fool-proof alliance with Saudi Arabia. In fact, there are inherent flaws in the relationship that may not precipitate a strong Egyptian-Saudi relationship and regional stability. On July 30, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Mohamed Bin Salman announced the signing of the “Cairo Declaration”, which seeks to enhance economic and security cooperation between the two countries, including investments in energy and transport sectors, as well as the establishment of a joint Arab military force. According to estimates, the Gulf monarchies have given Egypt $20 billion in aid in exchange for active Egyptian participation in its coalition, which Saudi Arabia hopes will counter Iranian aggression in the region.

However, committing military forces abroad under Saudi auspices to counter Iranian influence may potentially draw Egypt into regional conflicts that are not necessarily in its best interests. The divergence in interests is emblematic of broader cleavages in the Egyptian-Saudi relationship. Egypt’s chief national security concern is containing Islamist groups – from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated Wilayat al-Sinai – not Iran. To al-Sisi’s dismay, the Saudis have re-established links with the Islah Party – the Brotherhood’s Yemeni wing – in a possible effort to recruit the party as political allies for Hadi. Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal visited Riyadh in July, further proving Saudi Arabia’s softening stance on Brotherhood-affiliated parties in an attempt to garner greater Sunni support across the region and sideline Iranian influence. A reinvigorated Brotherhood worries al-Sisi, who sees the re-emergence of the movement as an existential threat to his regime.

While Saudi Arabia frames its hostility towards Iran in sectarian lens, Egypt’s approach resembles a bounded rationality. In April, Egyptian diplomats welcomed the nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – between Iran and the P5+1. On July 29, Egyptian Oil Minister Sherif Ismail stated he had no objections to importing crude oil from Iran. Despite reluctantly accepting American assurances over the nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia views a sanctions-free Iran as a legitimate threat to its regional influence. Similar to how it built its relationship with Saudi Arabia, Egypt also seeks to benefit from a stronger, more liberalized Iranian economy.

Just days after Saudi Arabia launched its first airstrike in Yemen; Egypt had proposed the formation of a joint Arab military force. While this joint force appeared to support Saudi efforts to counter Iran, the idea of such an entity under the auspices of the Arab League would have limited Saudi Arabia’s ability to dictate strategy and operations. Instead, Saudi Arabia – with no Arab League decree – pursued an informal, ad-hoc coalition of Sunni nations. This minimized Egyptian capacity to exert any operational influence without full Saudi approval, confining them to an ancillary role in a coalition largely dictated by the Saudis. In this way, Saudi Arabia does not have to depend on a single partner, especially one with clear differences in ideological and national security interests.

The less successful Saudi Arabia is in Yemen and elsewhere, the more it will have to depend on Egyptian assistance. However, this assistance may prove limited due to the divergence of interests from Iran to the Brotherhood. Then again, if Saudi Arabia feels confident enough to pursue its military strategy independently, Egypt will have more leeway and flexibility in undertaking its own foreign policy.

Patrick Hoover is a recent graduate of the University of Virginia, where he earned a bachelors of arts in Foreign Affairs and Arabic.

Photo Credit: Wikimedia

]]>http://thejerusalemreview.com/2015/10/26/from-enemies-to-allies-the-evolving-relationship-between-egypt-and-saudi-arabia/feed/0800px-San'a03_flickrthejerusalemreviewPalestinian Media Roundup-October 16-21http://thejerusalemreview.com/2015/10/21/palestinian-media-roundup-october-16-21/
http://thejerusalemreview.com/2015/10/21/palestinian-media-roundup-october-16-21/#respondWed, 21 Oct 2015 16:43:57 +0000http://thejerusalemreview.com/?p=1132More…]]>The Palestinian Media Roundup features translated excerpts from various articles from the Palestinian press. Content of the articles including its specific language does not reflect the views of The Jerusalem Review.

“Mohammed Dahlan, PLC Parliamentarian and a member of the Fatah Central Committee, saluted the amazing steadfastness of the sons of the Palestinian people and their outcry against the Zionist occupation and its fascist army that has filled Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.

Dahlan said, ‘My national son, for the third week consecutively, the people of Jerusalem are fighting and clashing valiantly in defense of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and it’s dignity, national identity, and Arab honor.’”

“Abd Hamid Essa, also know as Al-Lino (a Fatah leader in Lebanon), said Friday, “Martyrdom will remain the most noble phenomenon in Palestinian history and the martyrs will remain etched in the national memory.

He also said, ‘Now the time has arrived to do away with he who only [yells] empty slogans and sermons. Today we [stand] in front of the martyrs and we cannot [employ] ambiguity as no sound is louder than the sound of an intifada.”

October 17, 2015

“A young girl from Hebron became a martyr Saturday afternoon after a settler opened fire on her claiming that she tried to stab a female soldier. The young girl appeared to be a student carrying a book bag on her back. The female soldier had asked her to open the bag and let her search it, but the settler opened fire on the young girl before the end of the search.”

“Saeb Erakat, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, called on UN special rapporteur concerned with illegal executions, Kristof Heinz, to carry out an immediate investigation of the occupation’s killings at the expense of many [Palestinians] in the past few weeks.”

“Parliamentarians from the Fatah bloc endorsed the mass uprising the Palestinian people…They said the Palestinian people have the right to resist the occupation until the liberation and establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.”

“PM Rami Hamdallah said, “As President Abbas has said, we are partaking in peaceful popular resistance and a political and legal struggle for the protection of our people and its national accomplishments realized after decades of struggle, pain, and suffering.”

“Al-Hayat London published a statement by a Jordanian official who said Jordan will look positively at all international efforts to end the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.

He also said that diplomatic and legal choices are in front of his country’s government to deal with this extremist aggression.”

“The concluding statement of a meeting of Arab trade ministers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia revealed their support for the State of Palestine’s efforts to achieve observer status on international trade committees and councils.”

“General Jabril Rajoub, Deputy Secretary General of the Fatah Central Committee, praised the individual operations [carried out recently], describing them as heroic. He said he is proud of those who undertook them.”

“A state of confusion has befallen Fatah since the youth of Jerusalem and their counterparts in the West Bank and Gaza have risen up against the Zionist occupation. Some leaders of Fatah have announced their support for the official decision of Mahmoud Abbas to back popular peaceful resistance. Others have rejected this decision and called for arming the people to resist the occupier in light of its continued crimes.”

“Sources in the General Council for Civil Affairs told Dunia Al-Watan that the occupation informed them this morning of the closure of the Erez crossing. However, following discussions carried out by the General Council, it was agreed to keep the border open for the entry of sick persons.”

“Yousef Idais, Minister of Holy Sites and Religious Affairs, signed an agreement on behalf Abu A’sab, Chairman of the Crescent Society of Jerusalem to establish a sports city based on olympic standards in Jerusalem.”

“Well-informed sources revealed what was discussed in a secret meeting held recently between the leadership of the Qassam Brigades and Mahmoud Zahar, a Hamas leader.

According to the sources, who leaked a report of the meeting between Marwan Essa, a Qassam leader, and Mahmoud Zahar, the Qassam Brigades informed the Hamas political leadership of its wish avoid an escalation with the Israeli occupation in the coming period. Essa said, ‘The Qassam has no intention to respond to any Israeli escalation in Gaza, even if it reached the Hamas leadership itself in Gaza.’”

“Gal Berger, the West Bank correspondent of Hebrew Radio, claimed that a Palestinian official carried out an interview with him this morning said PASF arrested a Hamas cell in Hebron that was preparing to attack Israeli targets.”

October 20, 2015

“Samih Shukri, Foreign Minister of Egypt, said there is a complete Egyptian-Jordanian consensus regarding the necessity to contain the current situation in the occupied Palestinian territories and implement the two state solution, establishing a Palestinian state through any [possible] path, whether that is through joint Arab efforts or the UN.”

“Azzam Al-Ahmad, Chairman of the Palestinian delegation at the General Assembly of the International Parliamentary Union, called on…the 133rd session the International Parliament to play a major and practical role in investigating Israeli crimes at the expense of the Palestinian people.”

“Mushir Al-Masri, a Hamas leader, revealed that his movement intends to increase its foreign relations outside the Arab and Islamic world, especially with states that have suffered occupation, persecution, and racism such as South Africa.”

“Nabil Abu Rudeinah, official spokesperson of the Palestinian Presidency, said that the continuation of daily killing operations and Israeli incitement on all levels against President Abbas will lead to an explosion of the current situation completely.”

“King Abdullah II rejected a request by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu to visit Amman and meet with him. Jordanian sources explained Jordan’s refusal to receive the Israeli official as a result of the Israeli violence in Jerusalem.

Mohammed Moumani, Jordanian minister of media affairs and official spokesperson of the Jordanian government, said, “The Al-Aqsa Mosque can not be divided and we will employ our diplomatic and legal options to preserve Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem.”

Starting a commotion is not unusual for Jamal Zahalka, a notorious firebrand politician in the Israeli Knesset. He has been kicked out of the Knesset multiple times for controversial statements aimed mostly at his center-right and far-right counterparts in the Israeli parliament. However, in early September, Zahalka took aim at a far less likely opponent, MK Stav Shaffir, a member of the center-left Zionist Union party and typically known for her focus on social justice and equality. Zahalka harshly chastised Shafir, calling her a “racist” who “ignores the existence of [Arab-Israelis].” Zahalka went on to state that the Labor party “is the mother and father of racism” and that “The people who took our land, who expelled us, weren’t the ones who chant ‘death to Arabs.’ They’re the ones who said ‘we’re bringing peace to you.’” In Zahalka’s opinion, the real enemy is not right-wing parties but the center-left Zionist Union party.

The irony of Zahalka’s scathing rebuke is apparent. In March, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu exhorted his supporters to get out the vote on election day claiming that Arab-Israelis were pouring into the voting booths and thus threatening the future of his right wing government. Netanyahu quickly came under fire for his statements, with leaders from both the Joint List and the Zionist Union uniting in accusations of racism. Issac Herzog, leader of the Zionist Union, characterized Netanyahu’s remarks as “the most fraudulent and racist utterances that exist.” Shaffir also responded saying, “We will not stay silent about racist rants.”

Unlikely Cooperation

However, the pre-election cooperation that saw a united opposition facing down Netanyahu and his coalition has crumbled and wavered in a post-election reality. And the Joint list has recently cooperated with the very prime minister it castigated for racism.

Threatening a general strike of the Arab sector, members of the Joint List met with PM Netanyahu on September 3rd putatively to outline their demands, namely pertaining to budgetary appropriations. The meeting scheduled for 45 minutes lasted much longer than an hour and a half and the Joint List members emerged from the meeting telling reporters that it had been very successful. Ayman Oudeh, the head of the Joint List hailed the meeting saying, “It was a very positive meeting and most of the demands of the local Arab authorities were accepted.” Even Masoud Ghneim, the Joint List member affiliated with the Islamic Movement praised the meeting remarking, “Netanyahu responded positively to the issue of immediate budgetary assistance. 400 million Shekels will be transferred to the local Arab authorities.”

This successful outcome led members of the Zionist Union to suspect the Joint List had secretly struck a deal with Prime Minister Netanyahu in exchange for not attending the controversial gas deal vote. Specifically MKs Stav Shafir and Michal Biran suggested that such a deal had been struck and Shafir sent a letter to Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein demanding an investigation.

Ultimately the Joint List voted against the gas deal, which most opposition parties criticized as benefitting big businesses. However, the Joint List votes were unnecessary as the gas deal passed in a 59-51 vote.

Yet, the recent Shaffir-Zahalka spat is just the most visible of a growing list of differences between Israel’s two largest opposition parties. In June the Zionist Union left the Knesset in mass ahead of a vote to extend a law that limits Palestinian family reunifications. The Joint List strongly opposed the extension and perceived the Zionist Union to be abandoning the opposition. Ahmad Tibi, a leading member of the Joint List, argued that the Zionist Union’s no vote proves that it has no moral high ground to chastise Arab MKs.

In September the Zionist Union also threw its support with Likud behind an anti-terror law sponsored by MK and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked. MK Tzipi Livni, a key figure in the Zionist Union leader, argued that her party cannot compromise with the Joint List on certain core issues. She said,“[Being] in the opposition does not mean that we will make deals with you [Joint List] at the expense of our worldview and values. The fact that we are together in the opposition will not cause us to give up on things we believe in.”

Acting Independently

Prior to the elections last March, Isaac Herzog suggested that he would not count the Joint List out of any future coalition. However, more than six months later, with a host of fundamental differences surfacing, a viable Zionist Union-Joint List coalition seems nearly impossible. Israel’s second largest opposition party has made clear it does not see itself as part of the center-left opposition and will act independently, if necessary. While the Joint List eventually voted against the gas deal, it still harbors intense policy-related and ideologically-rooted differences with the Zionist Union.

Although the Zionist Union would greatly appreciate a unified opposition that could stand as a bulwark against Netanyahu and champion center-left policies, it should expect a continuation of patchwork politics, cooperating with the Joint List on certain issues and disagreeing on others. It should be no surprise if the Joint List cooperates with the Likud to secure its interests ignoring that of the Zionist Union and other opposition parties in the future.

Eli Kamisher is an independent journalist based in Tel Aviv, Israel and Adam Rasgon is editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Review.