Russian Fleet PART 1: Towards a ‘frigate-centric’ navy

After a brief interlude due to professional reasons, please find below the first part of an article on the Russian Navy, on the latest generation of frigates and the technological advances that has enabled Russian sea power to be noticed globally.

This is article is partly in response to the original article, “New, Blue-Water Frigates to Become Main Surface Vessels of the Russian Navy”, back in the summer, written by an Ukrainian naval officer for the Jamestown Foundation and widely circulated on social media. To save the readers too much trouble, the Russian naval capabilities are mostly presented in a negative light, and yet at the same time over exaggerates the Russian Navy’s overall ambitions. [NB Typical Western commentator framing of Russian military].

The author devotes a chunk of the article on the woes of operating the “Admiral Kuznetsov” aircraft carrier. The author also slants his article towards a perception of Russia’s naval ambitions being blunted by financial woes. (Russia Insider 15 May 2017). What the Jamestown author does show is the fact that the Russian Navy is concentrating its efforts on frigates type ships rather than carriers or Mistral type Amphibious Helicopter ships. Given the need of reconciling divergent interests, 1. Geopolitical necessities, 2. financial restrictions and 3. actual/projected naval operational capabilities, all of which requires careful consideration when designing a surface warship.

What does it mean in real terms, what is a frigate anyway? And how does modern technology blur this definition beyond the traditional concepts of the last 50 years. Going back to basics:

Definition & role of frigate is:

“a warship with a mixed armament, generally lighter than a destroyer (in the US navy, heavier) and of a kind originally introduced for convoy escort work.” And post-war: “also adopted an antiaircraft role.”

In other words, a multi-tasking warship, between approximately 3000-7000 tonnes, with various types of missiles, guns, air defence systems/radars & ASW sensors, designed to either operate autonomously, or as part of a task group, with also the ability to escort merchant ships. A complex naval platform, with multilayered and overlapping systems onboard.

Thus, by their very nature, frigates tend to be the mainstay combat ship of most navies. China has 24 Type 054A frigates in service for example,(with 46 overall), compared to 35 destroyers, whereas India has 11 frigates & 11 destroyers. The number & use of frigates does vary from navy to navy, depending on its naval doctrine. The designation of ‘frigate’ to ships can be misleading, take for instance, at the moment, the US Navy also has only 1 frigate in commission, the “USS Constitution”.

The US Navy retired its Oliver Hazard Perry frigate class and its intended replacement is the Littoral Combat Ship, (LCS), (8 currently in service) which for a long time riddled with technical glitches & ‘issues’.(Wikipedia 2017). Not quite a frigate but a glorified expensive oversized patrol boat, judging by the comments made in various US reports. (Bloomberg May 2013) (DefenceWorld Net April 2013)

A little bit about shipping and technology in general for context. At a time when shipyards are building bigger and bigger, with container ships of 21,000+ TEU, this shows well how important parts of merchant shipping is increasing vastly in size and rapidly too. Now compare this to the military, where downsizing and automating systems is becoming increasingly the norm and extremely vital for improving combat effectiveness.

The space once filled by battleships, followed by large missile cruisers taking the limelight, is now filled primarily by frigates. Big gun ships became obsolete with improved air power & long-range coastal defences. Not quite the same story with large missile cruisers, as this is largely based on impressive changes in missile technology as well as electronics, computing, engineering miniaturisation & nanotechnology.

Another aspect to consider is flexibility, in other words multi-tasking roles. The US Navy initially took the route of using modular units, (using ISO containers), for its LCS class ships, the idea of being able to change the mission roles of a ship in matter of weeks. This trailblazing concept has hit a few snags along the way, and as a result it has been reconsidered. (US Navy April 2017). Yet they certainly don’t have the same firepower as a much smaller Russian navy Buyan-M class corvette! [More on that in Part 2].

This nevertheless shows the huge innovative & ambitious design concept that continued expansion of high-tech technology has offered in the naval field in a few decades. Add in, the increased use of unmanned vehicles in a combat role is also a significant step forward. Interestingly, the US Navy is now reconfiguring the LCS into a frigate class. [NB The keywords to retain are flexibility and multi-tasking.]

A comprehensive technical rundown of the top 10 modern frigates from around the world is covered in this article. (Defencyclopedia 2 Jan 2016). Surprisingly the number one spot is a Russian frigate that has not yet entered service.

Background- Russian navy

Back in April 2017, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, said that in the near future the main combat ships of the Navy frigates will be like “Admiral Gorshkov”. He stated that: “Such multi-purpose frigates, equipped with long-range precision weapons, should become the Navy’s main combat ships in the near future,” (TASS 21 April 2017).He continued by adding “Their commissioning for service will help ensure the smooth renewal of the fleets’ surface forces and raise their combat potential by 30%”.

Several days later, President Putin stated in a defence meeting that “by 2020, the share of modern weapons and equipment both in the Army and Navy should rise to 70%.” (Kremlin.ru 25 April 2017). At the end of 2016, it stood at 47%.

Taking a strictly conservative outlook, yes, the Russian navy has downsized considerably, it is a shadow of what was the Soviet Navy and hadn’t had the opportunity to modernise itself effectively until fairly recently. President Putin termed it this week as : …”navy reboot program…” (TASS 16 May 2017)

The underpinning defence doctrine is largely based on the perception of making Russia secure, as part of “Eurasia” as an entity. Broadly similar to what China is doing. In other words, ensuring a robust defensive posture of what is regarded as being on “home turf”. When there is news that construction of a an aircraft carrier is being touted in Russia, it is because some defence contractors are trying to position themselves for future potential bids. Yet, the shipyards are busy with mostly submarine or small combatant ship building.

The Russian & Chinese military doctrines are poles apart with that of the US, with its aggressively militarized global ‘exceptionalism’ doctrine, with its 10+ “carriers which are the centerpiece of America’s naval fleet.” (The National Interest 15 May 2017) They are substantially different in approach, methodology and expectations.

The main focus of attention of the Russian Navy is on green-water operations, defending its coastline, close to home first and foremost. Even the US Navy saw the large destroyers would not be effective in shallow waters, hence the introduction of the LCS. However, Russia took out one element out of the US navy convoluted thought process, and went straight for a versatile frigate class warship, ideal for a green water environment, but also having the capability to carry out long-range blue-water missions as necessary. Quite a challenging portfolio for naval designers.

The Jamestown author, however does not mention the obvious fact that there has been a gaping ‘hole’ in the combat capabilities of the Russian navy for several decades. That hole needed to be filled by a dedicated frigate class warship, comparable to the range of sophisticated NATO frigates. The last time there was a frigate class was with the Soviet-era Burevestnik Class frigates (Project 1135).

What does Russia have on the table that makes a shift towards a ‘frigate-centric’ navy purposeful?

Basically, Russia had almost a clean slate when designing its new frigates, taking into consideration, the capabilities of its ‘competitors’ but also its domestic defence needs & power projection. But having a clean slate also means encountering problems along the way. The US Navy too has experienced that quite clearly & persistently with its LCS program. However, undertaking such a design also meant halting & reversing significant long-term decline in Russian naval research and development. Despite having limited access to Western naval shipbuilders know-how, (mostly through the Mistral class contract), Russian naval constructors still lag behind their Western & Asian counterparts.

Which Russian Navy fleets will get the modern frigates first designed back in 1997 and 2003 respectively ? One, the Admiral Essen”, has its permanent home port as part of the Black Sea Fleet, joining the “Admiral Grigorovich”, (TASS 5 May 2017).”By the end of the year the Black Sea fleet will receive two new frigates”.

The successor to the Burevestnik class, based on a proven design originating in the proven Indian Talwar class, the “Admiral Grigorovich” class is an alternative to the “Admiral Gorshkov” class. This particular class were constructed as a stop-gap measure, largely due to the ongoing problems with construction of the “Admiral Gorshkov”. Not as powerful, but still with a good overall capability as a frigate.

The “Admiral Grigorovich” itself has already gained some ‘notoriety’, judging by the hype of the MSM articles written about it so far. This now famous frigate initially earned its reputation for taking part in Syrian operations back in 2015, with a series of Kalibr launches against terrorists targets. US naval expert, J. Harley remarked that the Russian Navy was a key factor in the Syrian campaign, something that was inconceivable 15 years previously. [Harley, Jeffrey A. “Meeting operational needs. President’s forum.” Naval War College Review, Winter 2017, p. 7+. Academic OneFile]

Not taking MSM articles at face value, but the latest missile technology suite presented onboard a frigate such as the “Admiral Essen”, has twice the main weapon capacity of a Sovremmeny class destroyer with 8 Moskits. Another example of the technological leap would be the Soviet Kynda class cruiser with the SSN3 missile unit onboard. It was so bulky that reloads were limited to 16 missiles in total capacity. Now compare its size and capacity with that of the “Admiral Grigorovich” class.

Interestingly, the Black Sea Fleet is earmarked to have all 4 of this class. So the Northern Sea and Pacific Sea Fleets aren’t expected to have this warship class at all. The last 2 of this class are earmarked to be sold to India, as announced by the USC shipyard in August 2017.

A Project 22350 frigate has a displacement of 4,550 tons, with a length of 135m. The capacity of its diesel-gas-turbine power plant is 65,000 hp.

As exemplified in this video:

Project 22350 ‘Admiral Gorshkov’ frigate was earmarked to be a jewel in the Russian Navy’s combat inventory. Beset by a long-running series of technical problems since the start, it is intended as the successor to the ‘Krivak’ class.

Although it was originally planned to have 6 built by 2020, (Lenta 5 May 16), only two more Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates are expected to be commissioned into the Russian Navy by 2020. (TASS 5 March 2017) and with another 2 anticipated by 2025. (RIA 16 May 2017)

This is largely due to the non-availability of appropriate marine turbines. However, the start of a domestically-produced serial production of such turbines planned for next year, should help to clear up the hold-up in construction programs at a later date (RIA Novosti Dec 2016). This is so significant that President Putin opened a production line for marine gas turbines at the Saturn, (NPO),company earlier in the year.

“Admiral Makarov”,(on sea missile trials) is also in its final stages of operational acceptance, as of late April, as shown on Russian TV (April 2017). The Northern Sea Fleet is the intended recipient for all of these frigates.

Significantly, the head of Naval Shipbuilding, Vladimir Trapeznikov, said that “after the Navy receives four project 22350 frigates, the project will be upgraded.” (RIA 16 May 2017). Notice ‘upgrade’, not new blue-sky new off-the-wall design, well meant design concept similar to what the US Navy envisaged with the LCS program but instead ended up in a mess. [Which is probably why the Russian Navy ‘Lider-Class’ has not gone ahead as originally scheduled].

Limitations in physical numbers of frigates have been offset by a versatile missile technology, which allows a small ship to have a formidable missile capability. Probably what Defence Minister Shoigu’s quote of raising combat potential by 30% was referring to.

Missiles are the post WW2 naval game changers, take for example: the destruction of the ‘Eilat’ and the sinking of HMS ‘Sheffield’. Both changed the naval dimension of conflict and subsequently redefined the types & roles of warships, in response to the missile threat.

At the heart of the Russian navy modernisation program is the Kalibr cruise missile, first in service in 2012. It is a tremendous potent force multiplier for the Russian military overall and makes the Russian Navy significantly more powerful & with greater range, proportionally to its overall tonnage.

A self-contained, compact, multi-purpose frigate is extremely useful for general high-end naval missions. This is what we are seeing (as a microcosm) in Syria of late, more so that there the “Admiral Essen” & “Admiral Grigorovich” have been together as part of the Mediterranean Squadron. (TASS 5 May 2017)

The predominantly use of frigates and corvettes, (which I will cover in Part II) are sufficient to give Russia an effective security/defence buffer zone, with the added benefit of a long-range strike capacity. As testified in this US navy document “The new technologically advanced Russian Navy, increasingly armed with the Kalibr family of weapons, will be able to more capably defend the maritime approaches to the Russian Federation and exert significant influence in adjacent seas”.

[NB: Yeah – those ‘adjacent areas’ so coveted by NATO as sole property, is being slowly contested by Russian sea power.]

Quickly outlining the types of Kalibrs in naval use on warships:

SURFACE SHIP

SUBMARINE

Anti-ship variant

Land-attack Variant

Anti-ship variant

Land-attack Variant

3M54T

3M14T

3M54K

3M14K

VLS

VLS

_

_

Thrust Vectoring boosters

Thrust Vectoring boosters

_

_

440-660km range

1.500-2.500km range

440-660km range

1.500-2.500km range

The Kalibr is designated the SS-N-27 Sizzler by NATO and LACM has NATO designation of SS-N-30A. The Russian cruise missile counterpart to the well-known U.S Navy Tomahawk, made its world combat debut on 7 October 2015, launched from Mediterranean and Caspian Sea based Buyan-class corvettes.

The ship-based Kalibr cruise missile is deployed from a VLS (Vertical Launch System: a ‘cell’, part of the UKSK module), based on 2x 4-missile tubular configuration. The advantage of this, is that missiles can clear the hull of the ship before igniting. Thus a ship can launch a series of high-precision strikes on shore targets from a distance of thousands of kilometers. Another variant is the 3C-14 box missile launcher unit, (more rectangular at deck level).

Russia continues to use Kalibrs against terrorist infrastructures in Syria, in which both the ‘Admiral Essen” and “Admiral Grigorovich” have played a significant role so far and likely to continue to do so for the time being. The use of ship-borne missile strikes during the Syrian campaign is a classic example of what is cited as being “liquid warfare”, liquid warfare being “a way of war that shuns the direct control of territory, focusing instead on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure.”[Mutschler, Max M. “Liquid warfare as a challenge to international order.”]

In other words, something that had been the exclusive domain of the US and NATO, has also been harnessed by Russia.

The small numbers of current & planned Russian Navy frigates have been largely offset by the combat proven versatile Kalibr missile and other advanced electronic technology. It was probably hoped that the Russian Navy in the next decade would have shifted towards a ‘frigate- centric’ navy, but this in fact hasn’t happened, due to the small numbers and limitations on power plants, shipbuilding and design parameters. Yet at the same time, focus has also been geared towards a ‘corvette-centric’ navy, which will be covered more in Part 2.

The Essential Saker III: Chronicling The Tragedy, Farce And Collapse of the Empire in the Era of Mr MAGA

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The First World War was the age of the battleship. The Second World War was the age of the aircraft carrier, with battleships acting either as a backup for aircraft carriers, or for ground operations. The twenty first century will be the age of the corvette, frigate and destroyer, ie. smaller ships armed with high tech. The US has a large number of aircraft carriers. However, they are both expensive to build and to maintain. Worse, they are excellent targets for high tech cruise missiles, like the Russian Sunburn and Mosqit; a single cruise missile of that type can sink an aircraft carrier, because it uses kinetic energy. Pretty soon the US will only be able to use its aircraft carriers against third world countries, because missile technology is being improved, especially its range. Even now it’s questionable if the US could use its aircraft carriers against Russia or China. When Russia began it’s military operations in Syria, it’s corvettes fired Kalibr missiles against ISIS in Syria. The US withdrew one of it’s aircraft carriers from the Mediterranean, the excuse being given that it might be hit by a technically “deficient” Kalibr missile, as ostensibly “four” Kalibrs crashed in Iran. In fact not a single Kalibr crashed in Iran, all of them hitting ISIS targets and in the process giving NATO a nasty shock, as it didn’t know the Kalibr had such a long range, nor that it had such excellent accuracy.

Doubt it. Even less so when the Zircon is deployed with its high Mach speed. No one is sure of the top speed but in excess of Mach 6 at least. That is five or six times the speed of a rifle bullet. Even if the target is detected, a firing solution calculated and then hit the kinetic energy of the parts could still do massive damage. What about multiple missiles from multiple directions. The other threat to carriers is subs.

Yes, the US carrier battle group might be able to defend themselves against a few incoming missiles. What about multiple sea-skimming missiles coming from different angles? Things are becoming much trickier, no? Logically, there must be a cutting point where defenses simply get swamped. I feel pretty confidence that advanced countries, like Russia and China, have done their math.

Thus, even if an attacker spends twenty missiles to sink an aircraft carrier, he still has the advantage; for a cost of less than $50 million, he has just sunk a boat costing $5 billion, plus $3 billion in aircrafts.

The question, then, is not whether Russia or China can sink an aircraft carrier, because they certainly can. The question is, what happens afterwards? Because, there is a high probability that things will escalate quickly into a nuclear war.

US Politicians once asked how long the carriers would last in a all out war with for instance Russia or China. 2 weeks the admirals said, maybe 3 to 4 if they keep them in port. A lot will be destroyed in a very short time, on both sides. Jets will be shot out of the sky like in WW2.
Let’s hope it never gets to that point.

For most people, the ‘navy’ issue isn’t the mass of ‘trainspotting’ detail above- interesting as that may be to a small number of military enthusiasts. No, it is something else altogether different.

Go back to the Falklands War, then back to Britain’s defeat of Napoleon. Once the British Empire was synonymous with the power of the British navy. Then Britain almost lost a war with a sad South American opponent because Britain chose to run down its navy to such a degree. What gives?

Well super-power thinking from the 1960s onward said that navies were over, because anti-ship Empire class weapons (many of which have nuclear warheads) take out entire fleets within the first hour of a major war. Yet new Empire class warships had an exponential increase in build cost. Billions spent on scrap at the bottom of the ocean.

So everyone but America started winding down their navies, Russia included. America, as Britain 2, inherited the duties of the British Empire, especially in the Far East. So America still needed ships, and certainly had the cash to pay for them, unlike the other Empire powers.

But today, clearly, things have changed. Russia uses its fleet to support operations in Syria, for instance- a scenario Russian military planners could never have predicted 20 years ago- because events in Syria, Iraq etc are literally ‘insane’. The West has been ruining assets considered by Russia planners to be fully in the West’s sphere of influence. Syria was a rock solid partner of Blair’s post-911 alliance, as was Libya. Saddam begged to be allowed to sell his oil to the USA at bargain rates after the First Gulf War.

The Deep State that Tony Blair brought to the stage has changed all the rules. 19th Century Empire thinking makes sense again, so everyone that can is enlarging their naval capacity. The nerdy details of each ship I frankly find tedious and irrelevant. In a real war, all these ships are sunk overnight – the West’s and Russia’s. They only work against very weak powers- so it doesn’t really matter what tech they have, the intended opponent has far less.

What matters is the types of game that are now part of Empire machinations. The maneuvers Team Blair engage in to steer the world to the next World War. And in this regard we are closer to the days leading up to WW1 and WW2 than the rules that applied from 1945 thru to perhaps the mid 1990s.

Anyway as Russia builds ships, it will need and desire new ports across the globe. And this means Russia finding ways to incentivize the nations that can provide their ports. And this changes things.

But the Deep State is working to put Russia back in its box, so NATO is being extremely unreasonable on Russia’s own borders, and the Middle East is about to blow up to a level where Putin either “goes large or goes home”. Putin isn’t going to “go large” in the Middle East when he has regional problems around the Homeland.

Russia’s new naval ambitions are about to become largely pointless. Putin isn’t the man to take on the Deep State on the world stage. Putin will do a perfect job protecting Russia itself, but the Zionist tentacles wrapped around everything Russian ensure Putin cannot and will not properly challenge the Deep State’s biggest plans.

Putin does not need to challenge the Deep States imperial ambitions in a head on collision, Syria being the exception. How long can the Deep State impersonate Imperial Rome and not go totally bankrupt in the process ? What is the total US foreign and domestic debt ? How many dollars are printed each year backed by nothing ? How long can this last ? Why did Trump go on his Asian tour ? Perhaps to beg the Chinese not to introduce the petro-yuan, and later on a gold backed yuan ? Perhaps to ask the Chinese not to join the emerging Eurasian Economic Union ? What do you think the Chinese are going to say and do ? Fall for Americas divide and conquer tactics and turn their back on Russia ? I think not. Putin knows what he is doing, brilliantly moving his chess pieces. The Eurasian Economic Union is reality, and it’s only a matter of time before Europe joins it. America knows it. The danger point will ensue when Trump returns from his Asian tour, almost nothing accomplished. Then we shall see what the Washington political establishment, Wall Street and Pentagon are going to decide to do.

How much did Mr. Putin’s coming to Syria’s rescue cost The Evil Empire in terms of extra costs? How much extra aid and arms to the moderate terrorists? How many extra hours of flight time, at tens of thousands of dollars per hour, in extra air missions? Trump alone spend some $60 million just by launching his ineffective barrage of cruise missiles that one night. And that’s not counting the costs of having those ships sail to the eastern med, nor the costs of the air time for any flights associated with that one attack.

Early in the Afghan War, I heard an anti-war activist say that a policy of using million dollar missiles to blow up stone huts which were then just rebuilt by the peasants could not in the long term do anything but bankrupt a country.

Correct. Trump’s little missile attack against Syria did not go according to plan. The US Navy fired a first volley of 30 Tomahawk missiles. On misfired and 29 never reached their destination. The Russian used their Khibir electronic jamming system, disabling all the missiles. The US Navy fired a second volley of 30 missiles. Only some reached that Syrian airfield. The impression is that the Russians let them fly on purpose, to see the efficiency of those Tomahawks. Well, they saw it all right. I presume NATO and the Pentagon were in a state of shock by what happened. No more missiles launched after that.

Latest news on HMS Sheffield is that Ops Room was empty when the Exocet struck with one Officer at the lavatory and another getting a cup of coffee. Courts Martial appears not to have occurred but a cover-up

I like to play detailed simulations, like the Harpoon series of games. From that experience, I tend to regard anything on top of the water as highly vulnerable. If there is another major war, the one place I would not want to be is on a surface ship.

Something like a USN CV group might have enough defenses to be able to stay afloat, maybe. Otherwise, most surface ships can be killed by a missile launch from 50 or 100 miles away or further. And generally, if you are worried about the ship’s defenses, just send a few more missiles and at least one will get through. And one is all you need. Which is why only a massed group like one of those CV task forces even stands a chance. And with enough missiles, you can sink one of those. And the introduction of unmanned drones that can also carry missiles makes it even easier to mass an attack that can overwhelm the missile defenses of a group.

Generally, a ship on top of the water is one of the last places I’d want to be in the next big war. An awful lot of those ships are going to disappear in the first few days or hours of that war. To the extent you do need surface ships to control an area, to board merchantmen as part of a blockade, etc, it seems smart to build smaller ships (like Frigates) that can also carry their own load of missiles. Spending trillions of dollars on huge expensive ships, like the ship named after our clumsy president, just seems like a big waste of money.

For coastal defense, I wouldn’t use ‘ships’ at all. Missile batteries in protected bunkers and caves can kill anything that gets close to the coast. Combine that with air power launching more missiles if you have air superiority. Ships are only for when you need to project power far beyond your mainland.

For example, if Kalibre’s have a range of 600 km, a few batteries of those in Crimea and the east shore of the Black Sea could deny the Black Sea to any NATO surface ships. You’d still need to spot the enemy to hit them, but that can be anything from hardened landbased vacilities to drones to satelites (if any survive the beginning of the war)

But the days when you needed your own ships to defend your coast from enemy ships are long gone.

Just a little comment – I would not prefer static silos/bunkers for the job, as they become very vulnerable once spotted. Mobile system like the K-300P Bastion Coastal Defense System is my first go-to choice for non-ship coastal defense.

What I really would like to see, though, are Kalibrs disguised in standard sized shipping containers. This can turn any transport vessel into potential missile carrier (or a shipping port into a full blown defensive point).

the promo videos of kalibrs show the container variation (rendered) so they thought about that from the beggining.
never heard of them being used, but if you had a couple hundredth container equiped with kalibrsa, saling the 7 seas on common merchant ships, would you brag about that, or leave it as a nasty surprise to be discovered by whomever crosses some lines?

Thnx for this informative article.
The Bunyan has a draft of 2.5m, as far as I can tell this allows it to traverse many internal waterways ,but which ones, can they travel from the Baltic to the White Sea using rivers or Baltic to Black Sea using the don.
If so Corvettes would give a massive advantage being able to travel to different oceans through friendly territory avoiding anglozio chokepoints(gilbraltar).
Having so many rivers does Russia have a brown water navy? Seems there are many areas not easily accessed by road, could the Bunyan’s fulfil this role.
Mabe a modified one with grad rockets
Cheers

Hopefully the Russian Navy will not have women alongside men on warships. The destruction of morale was seen when Iran seized Royal Navy personnel in 2007. Now the removal of female officers from HMS Portland (Cmdr Sarah West) and the collapse of discipline on HMS Vigilant (???) a Trident class SSBN where the first two officers were cavorting with female subordinates and 9 members of crew failed drugs tests and had been cavorting with prostitutes in King’s Bay, GA.

These are good reasons to scrap dangerous naval vessels if you cannot find the right quality crew to operate them. Dangerous weapons and stupid people do not mix

I think you’ll it’s got nothing to do with anatomical parts, but a philosophy rooted in absolutely hopeless political correctness and inability to weed out poor on lack of competencies. Thankfully we don’t too much of that in the merchant navy.

A nice cocktail of destroyers, frigates and corvettes….complimented with a good amount of submarines, cruise-missiles (anti-ship), torpedoes and medium to long range multi-role fighters and bombers is the way to go for countries who want to protect their waters from the Anglo-Zionist Empire.

Obviously it would be nice to have deliverable nuclear tipped MRBMs and ICBMs….with nuclear tipped SLBMs being the cherry on top of the cake :-).

This is all assuming that you are not already allied (vassal) with the Anglo-Zionist Empire and that the non Anglo-Zionist big nuclear boys cannot guarantee your protection.

So basically go North Korean style until the Anglo-Zionists cannot project power over you ;-).

LeDahu, perhaps this is off the topic you really intend to stress, however I find it curious enough to mention:

The photo of Frigate 799 shows that it is underway (bow waves) and its anchors are both lowered several feet. Seas are calm, but in years at sea never ONCE did we lower the anchors even a few feet unless stopped or very nearly stopped (such as pointed into a very strong wind….) unless a split seconf earlier they were snugged up tight against the the anchor chain holes in the upper bow and were continuously in gravitational fall downwards toward the bottom where they were to take hold.

What on earth would be the purpose of steaming around with anchors a few feet below where they should be?

Where should they be? They should either be snugged up where they belong, falling into the sea, or grabbing the bottom. Otherwise, even in very calm seas those anchors could smash into the bow just crossing the wake of another ship, or even making a tight turn.

Good point, off tangent but not obscure.
Particularly since a Indian Frigate managed to prang a Russian hospital ship in Vladivostok recently, doing an unfamiliar Med moor. The Russian Navy does that a lot. So to answer your question

There is a great benefit to reliance upon frigates and destroyers, instead of battleships and carriers, when building a fleet of surface combat ships. Economy of Force being the most important. As long as these fleets operate within the range of land-based aircraft and shore-based missile batteries, they would actually have an advantage in surface combat over a fleet that depended only on aircraft carriers for its air support.

But geography and distance makes the aircraft carrier essential to any navy that intends to project force onto the land from the sea. That is why the super-sized carriers of the US Navy will remain the centerpiece of its force structure.

The same holds true for other naval powers. The United States and its territories are so remote from potential adversaries, like Russia and China, that these navies would have to create their own versions of super carriers in order to pose a serious threat to the United States from the sea.

There does not appear to be any logical need for Russia to put a squadron of aircraft carriers into its navy. Its primary responsibility is to defend its Arctic coastline from the US Navy, and to contest with the US Navy for control over the Arctic Ocean. Weather conditions in the Arctic are too harsh for aircraft carriers to operate during much of the year.

The choke points of Jutland and Bosphorus are close to the Russian mainland. They could be contested by frigates, supported by land-based aircraft. But, beyond these choke points, Russian ships would still be surrounded by the coastal forces of potentially hostile nations. So, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets cannot be expected to fight their way to the Mediterranean and North Seas, and much less to the Atlantic Ocean.

Only in the Pacific could n argument be made for Russia to incorporate aircraft carriers. But logistics and distances make them impractical and extremely vulnerable.The Japanese Archipelago forms a barrier that can be overcome should the Russian Navy want to force a passage into the Pacific Ocean against a hostile Japan, using land-based air forces and shore-based missile batteries in support of its surface fleet. But, once past the Japanese Islands, the Russian fleet would be outside the range of land-based air support.

China is in a different situation. In the event of a conflict with the United States, the US navy will seal off the Straits of Malacca and will cut off access to and from the Chinese mainland through the sea lanes north and south of Taiwan. It can do this effectively with submarine and surface ships, supported by carriers farther out in the Pacific, beyond the reach of China’s land-based forces. Until the Silk Road and Belt becomes fully operational, such a blockade would cripple China (once its extensive stockpiles of essential resources have been exhausted). So, China will have to build several aircraft carriers in order to protect the vital sea lanes from US interdiction.

There is no escaping the conclusion that, without aircraft carriers, there is a strict limit to a navy’s ability to project power from the sea.

Thank you for your reply.
I have read the article recently posted by the Saker.
Perhaps you have read my comment there as well.

In the midst of that comment, I pointed out that USN aircraft carriers will -initially- have to operate at distances greater than 600 miles. (600 miles is the operational radius of USN F-18s.) This standoff will mitigate threats from enemy aircraft and surface ships; but it will not reduce the threat from submarines.

At the end of that comment, I imagine that the decisive naval battles of the future will be fought with missiles and submarines rather than with aircraft and carriers.

Regardless of which side you may wish to be victorious in such a war, the anti-ship capabilities of your adversary must be suppressed at least -preferably destroyed- before the carriers can move into striking distance of their objectives.

From the “In perspective: the loss of HMS Sheffield” article you linked earlier, a few things:

“The best option would have been the Phalanx CIWS that had been in development since 1973 and was proven in service with the US Navy by 1980. Phalanx is entirely automated and would almost certainly have saved the Sheffield. It was hurriedly purchased by the RN and subsequently fitted to many surface ships, it is still in service today.”

Reality is the much mythologized (by pindos) phalanx has never shot anything out of the sky in combat. Not even a retail available quadrocopter. The weapon system is one of those notorious american frauds, like the more recent f-35. The one time a ship armed with phalanx was attacked, it was supposedly turned off at the time, so didn’t fire. If one can believe the usn (1980s, uss Stark). Tellingly, other navies use much more powerful, and longer ranged, weapons in their point defense systems, 30mm as opposed to 20mm. Had his Sheffield been phalanx armed, it is an unknown whether the exocet would have hit, but I personally doubt a phalanx would have made any difference.

“The Type 42 destroyer was designed as an air defence ship and built to a tight budget resulting in a slightly compromised platform.” & “No single individual can be held accountable for these decisions which are typical of a long period in a peacetime mentality where painful lessons learned in past conflicts fade from consciousness and funding pressures result in corners being cut.”

The problems are more fundamental, complicated and long-standing.

The first is an overly conservative ship design system in place that reinforces mediocrity and a strict adherence to hierarchy, along with a command structure too inflexible to accommodate necessary change. This goes back centuries and has been a serious problem holding back rn ship design. The interface between user and design bureau, between sailors afloat and admiralty staff ashore rigid and poor, which results in top down decision making that is too far removed from the current necessities of those tasked to follow those decisions.

The second manifested itself in the mid 19th century with the change over from sail to mechanical power and wood being replaced by iron as the primary construction material and is a corruption problem. At this time, the rn increasingly began relying upon private contractors for their vessels, which now is at a level where they are wholly reliant upon these corrupt entities. So instead of the naval designer deciding, the contractor decides. And in such a way where the amount of profit takes precedence over the actual applied practicality.

The result of this combination of conservative, enforced mediocrity and wholesale corruption is inferior ship’s. The rn has been saddled with incredibly poor ship’s since WW2, the Sheffield being a very typical example, the new carriers being the latest. The Sheffield’s lack of effective armament and detection equipment, poor construction using unsuitable materials, poor equipment suit that failed to function correctly , poorly laid out design detailing, these are all manifestations of the basic fundamental problems described above.

That “In perspective: the loss of HMS Sheffield” is the sort of standard obfuscation material I’ve read dozens of over the years seeking to explain the failures of rn ship’s through describing some glaring problems without addressing the fundamental causes that created the problems. It was better than the guardian article it addressed, which true to the pathetic level of self debasement the zionazis have sunk the guardian was nothing but propaganda rubbish. The article was itself a subtler form of propaganda designed not to rock the boat and raise questions that could genuinely correct a deeply flawed and corrupt system.

“the rn increasingly began relying upon private contractors for their vessels, which now is at a level where they are wholly reliant upon these corrupt entities. So instead of the naval designer deciding, the contractor decides.”

I was once within that process, saw it, but it is the contractor’s naval design team!

“built to a tight budget resulting in a slightly compromised platform.”

And still is the case for practically all of the NATO procurements.

No one wants to get to the heart of matter. Same for civilian designs.

I got enough glimpse during some of my work on this aspect. Naval architecture isn’t my strong point, although I had to study it, but common sense got chucked out of the window re using materials such using aluminium ladders (that melted on the Sir Galahad for example). As always in shipping, (naval or otherwise) lessons are learned the fatal way.

But now it seems that none of the experience is enough for paid work for me here in euroland.

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