Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Individual Liberty, Free Markets, and Peacehttp://www.cato.org/
enamast@cato.org (Andrew Mast)webmaster@cato.org (Cato Webmaster)Fri, 14 Dec 2012 19:37:05 -0500Fri, 14 Dec 2012 19:37:05 -0500From 911 to 9/11: Obligations of U.S. Allieshttp://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/911-911-obligations-us-allies
<p>As the shock of September 11 wanes, attention is increasingly focused on the anticipated U.S. military response. </p>
<p>The United States must find out who was responsible for the attacks, determine what is required to eliminate the threat, and conceive a strategy to meet that challenge. America’s allies-from Europe to East Asia to the Persian Gulf-are potentially an important part of that strategy.</p>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of the hijackings, friends and foes alike pledged support for any U.S. response to the terror. Within days, though, second thoughts surfaced.</p>
<p>To the extent that U.S. allies’ hesitation arises from concern that Washington may be tempted to indulge in hot-headed revenge, that hesitation is justifiable. The United States has a responsibility to craft an appropriate military response, balancing the security imperative to wipe out those responsible for the September 11 events with a healthy appreciation for the unintended consequences of U.S. military activities.</p>
<p>But U.S. allies bear a tremendous responsibility as well. </p>
<p>The NATO countries, Japan, and South Korea have enjoyed mutual defense pacts with the United States that have amounted to a multi-billion dollar U.S. taxpayer-financed defense subsidy for more than 50 years, along with the assurance that the U.S. military would stand by them through any threat. </p>
<p>Now it’s time for those allies to demonstrate support for the United States through more than words. The responsibility of those countries, some of which may owe their very existence to the United States, is no less than to support <i>any reasonable request</i> Washington might have as the United States faces an unprecedented threat to its homeland. </p>
<p>A reasonable request would be any request that a) is part of a well-conceived strategy that meets defined security objectives; b) seeks political, economic, or military support that an ally is in a position to offer; and c) will not create a domestic backlash that poses a threat to the country’s political and economic system. </p>
<p>Such a request may demand sacrifice, even hardship, on the part of U.S. allies-just as U.S. support for these countries has required the sacrifice of American blood and treasure for decades. Unfettered access to air space and military bases, logistical support, diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, economic contributions and, perhaps, the contribution of military personnel would be reasonable requests. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf region also have an obligation to support the United States right now. </p>
<p>As in the case of some other allies, many of the regimes that rule these states also owe their existence to the United States. That is true of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in particular, which relied on the United States as their national security 911 when Saddam Hussein took over Kuwait in 1990. Moreover, assuming that Saudi-born multimillionaire Osama bin Laden is indeed behind the September 11 incidents, it was Washington’s support of the Persian Gulf countries that is likely the chief reason the United States came under attack this month. </p>
<p>This translates into a hefty obligation on the part of Persian Gulf region allies. Full access to intelligence and complete law enforcement cooperation, which often have not been forthcoming in the past, are critical-after all, bin Laden hails from Saudi Arabia and there are many in that country who support him, financially and otherwise. </p>
<p>Washington may also justifiably request economic support. In light of the U.S. taxpayer investment in the defense of the southern gulf states since 1991, cash contributions would not be unreasonable. America’s Persian Gulf allies should also pledge to keep oil production at its current levels. </p>
<p>Washington may also seek political support, particularly insofar as it can help prevent a sense among Muslims that the American response to terror represents a clash of civilizations.</p>
<p>In deference to the domestic challenges that these Persian Gulf countries face, it’s probably best that Washington not ask for direct military support, which would likely be of little practical use in any event.</p>
<p>And what happens if America’s allies-whether in Europe, East Asia or the Persian Gulf-fail to come to the aid of the United States? </p>
<p>The United States should simply withdraw from NATO if the alliance withholds support, or remove U.S. troops from recalcitrant countries in East Asia or the Middle East. That should happen immediately because the United States faces its own national security threat and cannot afford to waste a single soldier, aircraft or ship on fair-weather allies.</p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/911-911-obligations-us-alliesTue, 18 Sep 2001 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara ConryNational Missile Defense: Examining the Optionshttp://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/national-missile-defense-examining-options
<div class="subhead"><p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></p></div>
<p>To date, the debate surrounding national missile defense (NMD) has been dominated by political rhetoric. Supporters (usually conservatives) often paint a “doom-and-gloom” picture, pointing out that the United States is vulnerable to an attack by ballistic missiles. Critics (usually liberals) defend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the cornerstone of deterrence and stability and argue that any defensive deployment would upset the balance between the offensive strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"> Opponents of NMD, who use the ABM treaty as an argument not to deploy a defense, need to acknowledge that the threat of attack by long-range ballistic missiles from rogue states may become real. They also need to recognize that the United States can build a limited NMD without disrupting the strategic nuclear balance. Supporters of NMD need to acknowledge that NMD is not a panacea for the full spectrum of threats from rogue states — that long-range ballistic missiles are only one of the options available to those states to strike America. NMD will not provide protection against shorter-range ballistic missiles launched from ships, cruise missiles launched from aircraft or ships, or terrorist attacks. Supporters also need to recognize the daunting technological challenge that NMD poses.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"> A limited NMD, which would afford the United States protection against long-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states, is feasible and probably can be deployed at a reasonable cost. The elements of the Clinton administration’s NMD program can provide such a capability. The debate should not be whether or not to deploy defenses. It should be about the nature and capabilities of a limited NMD system that would accomplish cost-effectively the mission of protecting the nation against threats from rogue states. </p>
<p style="text-align: left;"> No matter what the threat, however, the development of an NMD system should proceed at a measured pace because an excessively rapid development program could waste taxpayer dollars on an ineffective system.</p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/national-missile-defense-examining-optionsTue, 16 Mar 1999 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Charles V. Peña, Barbara ConryLet Europeans Defend Themselveshttp://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/let-europeans-defend-themselves
<p>During four decades of cold war, rivalry with the Soviet Union was the beacon that guided American foreign policy. The size and structure of the U.S. military, American alliances and security commitments and U.S. involvement in remote regional conflicts all were driven by the need to contain America’s enemies in the Kremlin and their surrogates around the world. No part of the foreign policy debate occurred outside the confines of the East-West conflict.</p>
<p>That Cold War paradigm, which for so long was in the center of every foreign policy initiative, withered away with the Soviet Union, yet Washington policy-makers have displayed a disturbing inclination to maintain Cold War policies.</p>
<p>Rather than welcome the opportunity to divert resources from national defense to more productive sectors of the economy, they cling stubbornly to a military that costs more than it did during the Nixon era and remains configured to confront a superpower enemy. Instead of viewing minor regional conflicts as unfortunate but ubiquitous features of the international state system from which the United States can afford to remain detached, much of the foreign policy elite advocates rushing in at the first signs of trouble, needlessly sacrificing American blood.</p>
<p>Instead of encouraging America’s West European allies to develop a new security system that is relevant to the post-Cold War era, Washington insists on maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - an alliance that was designed to defend the West against the Soviet Union and has no other credible mission or rationale. In many ways, the debate over post-Cold War European security epitomizes the foreign policy community’s irrational, almost sentimental attachment to Cold War institutional and policy relics, regardless of their relevance in the new international environment.</p>
<p>So strong is the determination to maintain NATO that the alliance no longer seems to be viewed as a tool to protect American vital interests; in the eyes of many of its proponents, NATO itself has risen to the level of a vital interest.</p>
<p>That approach is wrong and potentially dangerous. NATO functioned effectively during the Cold War, but it is out of place in the new environment. The conditions that led to its creation - the Soviet threat and the extraordinary coincidence of American and European interests in containing that threat - no longer exist.</p>
<p>The Soviet Union is gone, and the concurrence in American and European interests has diminished dramatically. Conflict, not cooperation, has been the hallmark of U.S.-European relations in the post-Cold War era. Former British diplomat Jonathan Clarke makes the provocative observation, “If NATO did not already exist, it is doubtful that Washington would now invent it.”</p>
<p>Yet Washington not only refuses to “disinvent” NATO, it seems determined to reinvent it. Much of the foreign policy community is obsessed with proposals for new NATO missions and expanded NATO membership. Many of the proposals conflict with one another, and others are inherently unworkable. But their authors remain engaged in an earnest discussion of how to ensure that NATO remains relevant in the post-Cold War world.</p>
<p>To most of NATO’s champions, no suggestion is too radical for serious consideration - except the suggestion that the alliance has outlived its usefulness and should be eliminated so that an alternative arrangement for European security, one that is appropriate to the post-Cold War era, can be made.</p>
<p>What should be done? The Western European Union, the security arm of the European Union, should replace NATO as the primary guarantor of European security. A robust WEU would have a number of advantages over NATO. WEU member states have many common security interests, in contrast to the increasingly divergent U.S. and European perspectives that already have produced serious disarray in NATO.</p>
<p>The West European nations have ample economic resources and are capable of providing for their own defense without a U.S. subsidy. Finally, Moscow is likely to view the WEU as less provocative than a U.S.-dominated NATO - especially an enlarged version that expands to Russia’s borders.</p>
<p>Maintaining NATO as the primary European security institution is expensive and risks drawing the United States into military entanglements even when no vital American interests are at stake. Replacing NATO with the WEU would emphasize that most disputes in Central and Eastern Europe are more relevant to the European nations than to America, and that dealing with such problems is properly a European responsibility. Moreover, once the West Europeans develop a full independent military capability, the WEU would be a strong partner for the United States in the event of a future threat to mutual U.S.-European security interests.</p>
<p><em>This article originally appeared in the </em>Budapest Sun.</p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/let-europeans-defend-themselvesTue, 08 Apr 1997 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara ConryU.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policemanhttp://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/us-global-leadership-euphemism-world-policeman
<div class="subhead"><p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></p></div>
<p>“Global leadership” has gained increasing prominence as a guiding principle for American foreign policy. Yet the concept itself remains largely unexamined. Although “leadership” sounds benign, today’s proponents of global leadership envision a role for the United States that resembles that of a global hegemon—with the risks and costs hegemony entails. </p>
<p>Global political and military leadership is inadequate, even dangerous, as a basis for policy. The vagueness of “leadership” allows policymakers to rationalize dramatically different initiatives and makes defining policy difficult. Taken to an extreme, global leadership implies U.S. interest in and responsibility for virtually anything, anywhere. </p>
<p>Global leadership also entails immense costs and risks. Much of the $265 billion defense budget is spent to support U.S. aspirations to lead the world, not to defend the United States. There are also human costs. Moreover, it is an extremely risky policy that forces U.S. involvement in numerous situations unrelated to American national security. </p>
<p>There are no concrete benefits that justify the costs and risks of U.S. global leadership. Advocates’ claims that leadership enables Washington to persuade U.S. allies to assume costs the United States would otherwise bear alone and that failure on the part of the United States to lead would cause global chaos do not hold up under scrutiny. </p>
<p>There are several alternatives to global leadership, including greater reliance on regional security organizations and the creation of spheres of influence or regional balance-of-power arrangements. The United States would then act as a balancer of last resort. Such a strategy would preserve U.S. security without the costs and risks of an unrealistic crusade to lead the world. </p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/us-global-leadership-euphemism-world-policemanWed, 05 Feb 1997 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara ConryTime Bomb: The Escalation of U.S. Security Commitments in the Persian Gulf Regionhttp://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/time-bomb-escalation-us-security-commitments-persian-gulf-region
<div class="subhead"><p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></p></div>
<p>U.S. involvement in the security of the Persian Gulf region has escalated dramatically since the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, at a cost to U.S. taxpayers of some $40 billion per year. Through a network of formal and informal bilateral relationships with Washington, the southern gulf states have effectively become a U.S. military protectorate. </p>
<p>Guaranteeing southern gulf security, however, is a risky undertaking and may ultimately prove an unsustainable policy. There are numerous disputes between U.S. allies in the region. Although the U.S. military presence in the gulf is ostensibly intended to protect friendly countries from Iran and Iraq, many of the southern gulf countries fear threats from one another more than they fear Tehran’s mullahs or Saddam Hussein.</p>
<p>The southern gulf monarchies also face serious internal problems. The fall in oil revenues has severely strained the region’s cradle-to-grave welfare states. That economic pressure has tremendous political implications in countries where corrupt and authoritarian rulers have long relied on state largesse to pacify restive populations. Consequently, gulf monarchs face increasingly serious internal security threats—which often have a strong element of anti-Americanism, as recent attacks, such as the bombing of the U.S. military installation in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, have indicated.</p>
<p>The potential for a regional conflagration—which the United States would have little chance of escaping—is great. The United States has no interests to justify the risks and costs of attempting to manage Persian Gulf security. Washington should withdraw U.S. troops and encourage countries in the region to take responsibility for gulf security.</p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/time-bomb-escalation-us-security-commitments-persian-gulf-regionSun, 29 Sep 1996 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara ConryWashington's Deepening Persian Gulf Morasshttp://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washingtons-deepening-persian-gulf-morass
<p>If the bankruptcy of U.S. Persian Gulf policy was not apparent before, the most recent Iraqi crisis should clarify beyond doubt the folly of meddling in gulf affairs. </p>
<p>Washington has been attempting to manage Persian Gulf security ever since President George Bush decided on a U.S. military response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Such high-profile involvement in the gulf is unwise and has caused one headache after another for the United States. </p>
<p>U.S. policymakers have long underestimated the complexity of the region, which is one of the reasons the United States is now in the bizarre position of having intervened in the Kurdish civil war on the same side as Iran against the wishes of virtually every U.S. ally. Even Saudi Arabia and Kuwait — whose security the United States is supposedly protecting — did not support the latest U.S. military operation against Iraq. </p>
<p>It is not clear why the United States decided to launch missile strikes in response to Saddam Hussein’s operation against the Kurdish city of Irbil. Some commentators argued that the United States had to act to preserve American credibility because Saddam’s troops violated a U.N.-designated “safe haven.” Other experts alluded to U.N. resolution 688, which demands that Saddam respect the political and human rights of Iraqi minorities.<br />
Still others hinted that the United States should use Saddam’s latest provocation as an excuse to finish off the Persian Gulf War once and for all. Many Americans have always regretted George Bush’s decision to end the war “prematurely” by agreeing to a cease-fire without getting rid of Saddam Hussein. It is true that Washington will have to deal with Baghdad’s belligerence as long as Saddam remains in power. But if Saddam loses power, the United States will have to contend with the aftermath. There is no government in exile waiting to take over Iraq and transform it into a Western-style liberal democracy. Instead, there is an array of competing ethnic and religious groups — not only the Kurds but also the Sunnis and the Shi’ites — that hate one another. </p>
<p>In any event, America’s Persian Gulf problem is far larger than Iraq. Washington has effectively transformed the region into a U.S. military protectorate, thus becoming entangled in the convoluted affairs of the entire area. The United States must deal with threats emanating not only from Iraq and its troublesome northern gulf counterpart, Iran, but also from the southern gulf. </p>
<p>Events in the southern gulf are increasingly worrisome. Popular sentiment against the corrupt and oppressive southern gulf monarchies is growing, as is anti-American sentiment. The U.S. military presence has already been targeted in Saudi Arabia, where 19 U.S. troops died in the Dhahran truck bombing in June </p>
<p>and five American soldiers were killed by a bomb last November in Riyadh. Secretary of Defense William Perry has already warned Americans to be prepared for similar attacks against U.S. soldiers, in the other southern gulf states as well as in Saudi Arabia. And anti-U.S. feeling intensifies every time the United States launches another military operation — such as the recent cruise missile strikes — in the region. </p>
<p>The United States also gets pulled deeper into regional intrigues with every operation, to the detriment of U.S. interests. Washington put itself in the middle of intra-Arab gulf affairs with the Persian Gulf War. Then, in the aftermath of the war, Washington meddled in internal Iraqi politics when it established the northern no-fly zone to protect Iraqi Kurds from Saddam’s air attacks and one in the south to protect Iraqi Shi’ites. Now Washington has intervened in internal Kurdish politics. </p>
<p>The pattern of ever-deepening involvement is undeniable and will continue as long as Washington persists in taking responsibility for Persian Gulf security. The United States has no interests at stake in the region to justify the escalating risks and costs of its current policy. Proponents of the high-profile American presence usually cite access to gulf oil at a reasonable price as a vital national interest. But the human, political, and economic costs of U.S. security commitments in the Persian Gulf — which cost American taxpayers $40 billion per year — undermine that argument. </p>
<p>The United States needs to fundamentally rethink its Persian Gulf policy. Washington should recognize that no vital U.S. national security interests are at stake in the gulf and withdraw U.S. troops, before the United States becomes further entangled in the perennially volatile affairs of the region.</p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washingtons-deepening-persian-gulf-morassWed, 04 Sep 1996 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara ConryThe Western European Union as NATO's Successorhttp://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/western-european-union-natos-successor
<div class="subhead"><p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></p></div>
<p>Washington unwisely clings to outdated Cold War policies instead of devising new policies that better address America’s security requirements in the post-Cold War era. Nowhere is that more evident than in the effort to maintain or even expand NATO, even though the enemy it was created to face, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, and the United States and Europe now have relatively few common security interests. </p>
<p>The Western European Union, the security arm of the European Union, should replace NATO as the primary guarantor of European security. A robust WEU would have a number of advantages over NATO. WEU member states have many common security interests, in contrast to the increasingly divergent U.S. and European perspectives that have already produced serious disarray in NATO. The West European nations have ample economic resources and are capable of providing for their own defense without a U.S. subsidy. Finally, Moscow is likely to view the WEU as less provocative than a U.S.-dominated NATO—especially an enlarged version that expands to Russia’s borders. </p>
<p>Maintaining NATO as the primary European security institution both is expensive and risks drawing the United States into military entanglements even when no vital American interests are at stake. Replacing NATO with the WEU would emphasize that most disputes in Central and Eastern Europe are more relevant to the European nations than to America and that dealing with such problems is properly a European responsibility. Moreover, once the West Europeans develop a full independent military capability, the WEU would be a strong partner for the United States in the event of a future threat to mutual U.S.-European security interests. </p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/western-european-union-natos-successorMon, 18 Sep 1995 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara ConryAmerica's Misguided Policy of Dual Containment in the Persian Gulfhttp://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/americas-misguided-policy-dual-containment-persian-gulf
<div class="subhead"><p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></p></div>
<p>The Clinton administration has adopted an ambitious policy in the Persian Gulf: “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. Though it seeks to avoid previous administrations’ ill-fated attempts to cultivate one regime as an alternative to the other, the Clinton approach invites even more problems.</p>
<p>Dual containment is a risky strategy that relies on a vast and precarious network of alliances, assumes Washington can restrict Iranian and Iraqi military buildups, and requires a prolonged U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region. Yet the United States has no vital interests in the area to justify a policy that is so costly and entails so great a risk of drawing America into regional conflicts.</p>
<p>If dual containment succeeds, even partially, in isolating Iran and Iraq, the consequences for the United States may be grave. An anti-U.S. alliance between Tehran and Baghdad is not inconceivable. And in the event of either regime’s breakdown, many forces in the gulf region will seek to exploit the ensuing chaos, making a regional war—which the United States will have little hope of avoiding—nearly inevitable. </p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/americas-misguided-policy-dual-containment-persian-gulfThu, 10 Nov 1994 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara ConryThe Futility of U.S. Intervention in Regional Conflictshttp://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/futility-us-intervention-regional-conflicts
<div class="subhead"><p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></p></div>
<p>Regional conflicts have greatly increased since the end of the Cold War, a trend that promises to continue. As Washington gropes for a policy toward regional wars, military intervention frequently emerges as an option. Except in the rare cases in which regional conflicts threaten American national security, however, military intervention in regional conflicts is ill-advised.</p>
<p>As tragic as many of the regional wars are, most cannot be resolved by American military intervention. In fact, military involvement often aggravates the situation. Furthermore, intervention can create a number of problems for the United States, including a rise in anti-American sentiment, diminished American credibility if the mission fails, domestic skepticism about future military operations even when legitimate U.S. interests might be involved, and threats to vital interests where none previously existed.</p>
<p>Proponents of intervention cite a number of interests, both security related and humanitarian, as justifications for U.S. military involvement in regional wars. The most common, and fallacious, argument for intervention is that global instability is a threat to U.S. security. That argument relies heavily on the discredited domino theory and the notion of deterrence by example. Global instability does not, per se, threaten vital American interests and is the normal state of affairs. A policy that views disorder or instability as a security threat would force the United States to expend vast resources in pursuit of an unattainable objective.</p>
<p>Rather than attempt to stifle regional conflicts through military intervention, the United States should encourage regional initiatives. Washington must, however, recognize that many regional conflicts are so deeply rooted that no outside party, from within or outside the region, will succeed in ending the fighting.</p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/futility-us-intervention-regional-conflictsThu, 19 May 1994 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara ConryLoose Cannon: The National Endowment for Democracyhttp://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/loose-cannon-national-endowment-democracy
<div class="subhead"><p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></p></div>
<p>The National Endowment for Democracy is a foreign policy loose cannon. Promoting democracy is a nebulous objective that can be manipulated to justify any whim of the special-interest groups—the Republican and Democratic parties, organized labor, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—that control most of NED’s funds. As those groups execute their own foreign policies, they often work against American interests and meddle needlessly in the affairs of other countries, undermining the democratic movements NED was designed to assist. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has nullified any usefulness that such an organization might ever have had. There is no longer a rival superpower mounting an effective ideological challenge, and democracy is progressing remarkably well on its own. </p>
<p>NED, which also has a history of corruption and financial mismanagement, is superfluous at best and often destructive. Through the endowment, the American taxpayer has paid for special-interest groups to harass the duly elected governments of friendly countries, interfere in foreign elections, and foster the corruption of democratic movements. </p>
http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/loose-cannon-national-endowment-democracyMon, 08 Nov 1993 (All day)Barbara Conry (Author at Cato Institute)Barbara Conry