Considered
and decided by Wright,
Presiding Judge, Anderson,
Judge, and Stoneburner,
Judge.

S
Y L L A B U S

Generally, a police officer’s untrue
statement during the interrogation of a suspect used as a tactic to gain
cooperation is not conduct probative of the officer’s truthfulness or
untruthfulness that can be used to impeach the officer’s credibility at trial.

O P I N I O N

STONEBURNER, Judge

Appellant Lauro Balleza Martinez
challenges his conviction of first-degree controlled-substance crime in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subds. 1(1) and (3)(a) (2000). Martinez argues that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his pre-trial request to impeach a police
officer with an untrue statement that the officer made in the course of
interrogating Martinez, even though Martinez had successfully moved to suppress
his statements made during the interrogation as involuntary. Martinez also argues that he did not
properly waive his right to a jury trial.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying use
of the untrue statement to impeach the officer, and because Martinez waived his
right to a jury trial on the record, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Lauro Balleza Martinez was charged with a
first-degree controlled-substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021,
subds. 1(1) and (3)(a), for selling 13 grams of cocaine in a “controlled
buy.” While interrogating Martinez, a
police officer misrepresented the number of controlled buys that the police had
made from Martinez. The officer
intentionally used the misrepresentation as a tactic to gain Martinez’s
cooperation in a larger investigation.

The district court granted Martinez’s motion to
suppress statements he made during the interrogation. The district court found that, although no single police
statement was overly coercive, the interrogation improperly pressured Martinez
by threatening incarceration or suggesting favorable treatment in exchange for
cooperation.

Martinez then moved for permission to
impeach the officer with his false statement and for an order barring the state
from attempting to rehabilitate the officer by introducing any part of the
suppressed interrogation. The district
court denied the motion, concluding that the officer’s statement was probably
not indicative of a general character for truthfulness and that the prejudice
resulting from such use of the statement, out of context, outweighed its
probative value.

Martinez agreed to submit his case to the
district court on stipulated facts, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd.
3. The district court found Martinez
guilty, and he was sentenced. This
appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Is an untrue statement used by a
police officer as a tactic during an interrogation probative of the officer’s
truthfulness or untruthfulness such that it could be used to impeach the
officer’s credibility?

II. Did
the district court abuse its discretion by determining that use of a police
officer’s untrue statement to impeach his trial testimony would be overly
prejudicial when the prosecution was precluded from introducing evidence of the
context of the statement?

A witness’s credibility may be attacked
by specific instances of conduct if they are probative of the witness’s
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
Minn. R. Evid. 608(b). Martinez
characterizes the officer’s untrue statement as “a legitimate piece of
impeachment evidence.” But the district
court noted that the officer’s untrue statement is not necessarily legitimate
impeachment evidence. We agree.

Use of false statements by police
officers during interrogations of suspects has been widely discussed,
particularly in the context of how such deceit affects the voluntariness of a
suspect’s statement. See State v.
Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 808-9 (Minn. 1995) (quoting at length the
Commentary to § 14.04 of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
(1975)). The supreme court has consistently
held that use of trickery and deceit as a police tactic does not necessarily
make the suspect’s response involuntary.
Id. at 810 (declining to adopt a per se rule of exclusion, but
cautioning police that they proceed at their own risk when they use deception);
State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. 1993) (holding that
officer’s false statement to suspect during interrogation did not make
confession involuntary where interrogating officers used no threats or
intimidation, defendant had experience in criminal-justice system, and
defendant was of sufficient age and intelligence to understand situation in
which he found himself); State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn.
1995) (stating that trustworthiness of confession should not always be discounted
because investigative officers might have made discursive or imprecise
statements to defendant); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S. Ct.
1420, 1425 (1969) (holding that police misrepresentation to suspect during
interrogation did not render confession involuntary).

Despite the risk that use of deceptive
statements will result in exclusion of a statement, there is no authority
suggesting that use of deception as a tactic implicates an officer’s
credibility under oath. We conclude
that use of a deceptive statement as an interrogation technique is generally
not relevant to a determination of an officer’s character for
truthfulness. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in this case by denying Martinez’s request to impeach
the officer with the untrue statement on the basis that the statement was not
probative of the officer’s truthfulness.

II.

The district court also reasoned that, even if the
statement is probative of the officer’s truthfulness, admitting the officer’s
statement out of context would result in unfair prejudice to the state that
would outweigh any probative value. The
state was precluded from introducing context evidence because involuntary
statements cannot be used for any purpose at trial. Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
401-2, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1978); State v. Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d 238,
243 (Minn. 1986) (holding that state may not use coerced statement even for
impeachment). Therefore, the district
court denied Martinez the use of the untrue statement to impeach the officer’s
character because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

Martinez argues that holding his use of the
officer’s untrue statement “hostage” to the introduction of related suppressed
statements amounts to the indirect use of the coerced statement to limit
his defense, in violation of the principle that the coerced statement cannot be
used for any purpose. We disagree.

When a * * * recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a
party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it.

Minn. R. Evid. 106. The district court correctly concluded that
in this case, but for suppression of the interrogation, the state would be
entitled to introduce context evidence to explain the officer’s use of the
untrue statement. The district court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding use of the statement for impeachment
on the ground that admission of the officer’s statement out of context was more
prejudicial than probative. See
Minn. R. Evid. 403 (providing that even relevant evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice).

III.

In order to submit a case to the district
court for trial on stipulated facts, a defendant must waive the right to a jury
trial either in writing or orally on the record. State v. Sandmoen, 390 N.W.2d 419, 424 (Minn. App.
1986). The defendant must also waive
other rights associated with a contested trial in writing or orally on the
record. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd.
3. Martinez was asked about each right
enumerated in Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, and orally waived his right to
a jury trial on the record. Martinez’s
claim that he did not properly waive his rights is without merit.

D
E C I S I O N

The district court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that a police officer’s false statement used as an
interrogation tactic generally does not constitute conduct probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness for purposes of impeachment. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that prejudice resulting from Martinez’s use of an
officer’s statement, when the state is precluded from offering evidence of the
context of the statement, outweighed the probative value of the statement. Martinez voluntarily waived his right to a
jury trial on the record.