2/2): TOWARDS POLITICAL SOLUTION ..

Subject: 2/2): TOWARDS POLITICAL SOLUTION ... (A REPORT TO UNGA'96)
/* Written 28 Oct 6:00am 1996 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* --------------" Towards Political Solution .. (2/2)"---------------- */
TOWARDS POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE BURMA'S REFUGEE PROBLEM (PART 2)
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2. Situation of refugees and displaced people
---------------------------------------------
2.2 Internally Displaced People
-------------------------------
Massive forced relocations have occurred in Karenni and Shan States of
Burma's eastern states, which both areas are adjacent to Thailand.
In Karenni state, the Burmese army ordered ninety-six villages to relocate
two relocation site - Shadaw and Ywa Thit - on early June 1996 [44].
The relocation in Karenni State is intended to pressure the Karenni
National Progressive Party - which signed ceasefire pact with government in
March 1995 and brokedown in July 1995. There are also forced relocations
in Shan State since March 1996 in the towns of Nam San, Mong Nai and Kurn
Heang and affecting 450 villages with estimated 50,000 people. Despite
continuing ceasefire talks between the Karen National Union and SLORC,
there are continuing reports of forced relocation of villages within Karen
State, as Amnesty International reports [45]:
".... Forcible relocations of villages in central Papun
district are occurring on a wide scale. As a result, some 1,000
Karen civilians fled to camps in Mae Hong Son province in northwest
Thailand during December 1995 and January 1996; tens of thousands
of displaced persons are reported to remain behind, hiding in the
forest.
According to unconfirmed sources from Papun district, during 1995
in Dwelo township eight villages were burned and another 23 were
forcibly relocated by the army to Mae Wai village. Thirty-two
villages in Lu Thaw township were forcibly relocated to Papun town.
Fourteen villages in Butho township were also relocated to Kaw Pauk
near a SLORC army base."
The Burmese army has been carrying out large-scale forced relocation
campaign in Karen State since 1991-92, to pressure the Karen National Union
in ceasefire negotiation. In Karenni State, the villagers are ordered to
move by certain date from their place of residence at a short notice and
threaten to shoot and kill who left behind, as a testimony given by
Karenni refugee interviewed by Karen Human Rights Group [46]:
"[T]he letter they sent said "The 7th of June (1996) is the last
day. If you don't arrive by the 7th we'll come and if we see anyone
we'll shoot and kill them. You must bring all your belongings."
They sent us that letter on June 2nd. It was No 337 Battalion.
The relocation sites are ill-prepared to accommodate the displaced
villagers. The displaced villagers have to built their own huts or live in
existing buildings in an overcrowded situation. One Shan villager report to
KHRG about the living condition at relocated place: Villagers have to live
underneath the floor of the other people's house [47]:
"We had to stay on the ground underneath the house and on the
floor, there were no real rooms, we had no good place to stay. Each
house has 4 or 5 pots of rice cooking [i.e. 4 or 5 families staying
there], so you can imagine how crowded it was. In the daytime, we
had to lay on a mat on the floor in the passage. We were so tired,
but to take a nap in the daytime they just laid mats all over the
floor, all of us together. We all had to buy our own food."}
The military has denied villagers of their subsistence needs. Since the
relocations were carried out at short notice, the villagers could not bring
much food with them. The army do not provide food and medical care for the
villagers at the relocated site. One villager witnessed the instance of
displaced family had been refused of food by the army [48]:
"I saw a family whose children were very hungry, so their father
went to the Army and asked for food, but they refused. He went
home, but then he saw his children all so hungry and crying, so he
went back and asked the Army again. They beat him, then they pushed
him away and shouted "Go away!". That man said later, "I have to
get away from here, if I stay here a long time I will die by
starvation or by SLORC".
The majority of uprooted villagers cannot find work at the relocated place;
they therefore have to resort to begging food by the road side, as one Shan
traveler testify [49]:
"I just got back [to Thailand] 6 days ago. I went back on May 5th,
and I got back here on June 3rd. I went to Mong Ton, then crossed
the Salween River and went to lang Ker, Nam Sang, Laikha, Mong
Kung, and then back down to Kun Hing. While I was there I saw
people moving, carrying children, carrying their things. ...{\em
Abridged}...they were moving close to the towns. They're just
living in bamboo huts, I saw the places they're staying in. They're
staying all packed together. They don't have any money to build
proper houses,..{\em Abridged}....I saw lots of these places. In
some places the people beg along the sides of the road. they hold
monk's bowls and just stand there by the roadside, all day long.
They hope passerby will put some rice or money in their bowls. The
children hold out their caps. I saw groups of 30 people or more
standing together along the roadsides doing this.
Some villagers were told by the army that they would have to stay at
relocated places 3 to 4 years. The anxiety about an uncertain future,
combined with difficulty to make the ends meet at the relocated places
has prompted the uprooted villagers to flee to the refugee camps [50]:
Then the Burmese said, "...{\em Abridged}.... here we won't give
you food. If you don't bring your food from your village you can
starve and die, we don't care." That's why we left. At Shadaw a lot
of people were sick, but when we asked for medicine there was no
medicine for us. ....{\em Abridged}... I could see that if we
stayed there for long the situation would get much worse. .....{\em
Abridged}.... If they keep forcing people to move I think most
people will come here to be refugees. I don't know when they'll let
people go back to their villages, 3 months or 3 years, but it will
be a long time. I've never seen a situation this bad. Before we
just had to run to neighbouring villages to avoid them [Burmese
soldiers]. But now it's everywhere, and they said they'll burn our
villages and kill our animals. I've never faced problems this bad
in my life. ... Now we even have to receive food from other
people, it's not like our own food. I can't talk about it anymore.
2.3 Current state of voluntary repatriation for refugees
--------------------------------------------------------
The UNHCR efforts to negotiate humanitarian access for returnees/refugees
are largely unsuccessful. SLORC is reluctant to allow the UNHCR monitoring
to Mon and Karen refugees. The Mon and Karen refugee communities have several
time express their willingness to participate in UN voluntary repatriation
programmes [51,52].
In Arakan State, where Rohingya-muslim refugees are repatriating from
Bangladesh, the UNHCR was not allowed unhindered access to refugees and
local community [53]. SLORC has taken various restrictive measures against
the operation of UNHCR. The UNHCR is not allowed to implement its projects
directly with the local community, only through the Myanmar military
government agency - Immigration and Man Power Department. UNHCR personnel
have always been escorted by military therefore make the refugees difficult
to contact UNHCR. The UNHCR is not allowed to find an independent
interpreter.
In early 1996, there are reports of an estimated 10,000 Rohingyas arrived
in Bangladesh. The newly arrived Rohingya are classified as ``economic
migrants" which deprived them of assistance by the UNHCR. This new influx
clearly indicate that there are inadequacy in addressing the root causes of
the flight and also the narrow protection mandate and meagre resources given
to the UNHCR. Consideration also need to be made to attenuate the flow of
economic displacements.
The UNHCR should be given responsibility to monitor the internally
displaced people throughout Burma. This will reduce the threat of a further
outflows of refugees across international border. Although the UNHCR's
mandate is primarily to protect refugees/returnees, its mandate can be
extended by the Secretary-General and UN General Assembly in the case of
Burma [54].
When looking at overall picture of human displacement in Burma, the
refugees/returnees and internally displaced people constitute only a
fraction. The other form of displacement,``economic displacement", also need
to be tackled. This protection responsibility, however, will not be
entirely within the UNHCR mandate. Nevertheless, the UNHCR and UN
Commission on Human Rights should be given the mandate, as an initiative to
assist in democratic institution building, to attenuate the causes of
``economic displacements". The elected members of parliament should be
empowered to formulate and enforce the legislation that require to deter
the economic displacement.
2.4 Mass Displacements: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
----------------------------------------------------------------
The most widely recognized statement of human rights is the U.N. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by United Nations General Assembly on
10 December 1948. Three decades after the Declaration, the U.N. has
formulated an ``international bill of human rights": The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its
Optional Protocol.
Generally, the two Covenants (ICCPR \& ICESCR) provisions reflect the rights
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For example,
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is reflected in the
Article 11 of ICESCR [55]; Article 21 of Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is reflected in the Article 25 of ICCPR. States which ratify the two
Covenants and additional Protocol have an obligation to implement the
measures (Burma is not a signatory to both Covenant). The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, however, is not promoted in 1948 as a treaty
but an internationally endorsed statement of principles. Nevertheless, it
has now gained a customary acceptance of Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as a fundamental principle for promoting and protecting human
rights. Member states of the United Nations which are not signatory to the
ICCPR \& ICESCR still have obligation to promote human rights in accordance
with the U.N. Charter, as noted by Special Rapporteur in his February 1993
report [56]:
Para.141."[A]rticle 55 of the Charter states that the United Nations
shall promote universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion. Article 56 of the Charter states
that all Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes. Article 2, paragraph 2 states that all Members ...
shall fulfill in good faith the obligation assumed by them in
accordance with the Charter.
142. Thus, as a Member State, Myanmar is granted the rights of
membership under the Charter and has an obligation to cooperate
with the United Nations and other Member States in taking
progressive measures and joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization to promote the observance of the human rights
as elaborated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights within
the territory of the State of Myanmar.}}
Full and unreserved cooperation to the United Nations Organization must be
demanded of the SLORC, regardless of Burma's status in relations to Human
Rights Conventions, when government's actions were threatening
international peace and security. The improvement to the situation of human
rights must, therefore, be called for when there are displaced people flows
within and across international border.
One can notice from preceding paragraphs that no distinction or priority
may be made between ICCPR and ICESCR when promoting and protecting human
rights. With regards to the human displacements, the link between violation
of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and ``refugee movements'' may be
easier to understand in comparison to the link between violation of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the so-called ``economic
migrants". This may be attributed to interpreting the customary 1951 U.N.
Refugee Convention definition of a "well founded fear of {\em persecution}";
where the term ``persecution" is generally accepted as {\em political
persecution}. However, in analysing and removing the root causes of human
displacements, the attentions should be given to violation of ICCPR as well
as ICESCR.
Current Burma situation suggest that promoting the respect for ICESCR can
be much more effective in attenuating the flow of so-called ``economic
migrants'' as well as refugees and internally displaced people. The
observation is that because of the power decline of SLORC central
government, various forms of human rights violations have occurred at the
grassroots level. Lawless practices of armed forces in counter-insurgency
operations; the regional military administrator's arbitrary imposition of
burdensome tax on local population; government using forced labour in various
development and tourism projects, and the practice of forced procurement of
rice that are causing the pressure on population. As a result, the rural
population are increasingly faced with economic and social insecurity. This
consequently has led to the outflows of displaced people to the
neighbouring countries.
The consequence of these violations are, by its nature, inflicted upon
the masses. These violation occurred as a result of government's
ill-defined policies: forced labour, counter-insurgency measures, taxation,
infrastructure development and government purchasing practices. Followings
in this report summarize the forms of violation related to ICESCR, except
for forced labour. The situation related to forced labour in Burma has been
extensively studied by human rights groups over the year and therefore not
being repeated here [57].
2.5 Forcible Procurement of Rice
--------------------------------
The government practice of forcible procurement of rice and other primary
product has been causing hardship and insecurity to the rural population.
Since 1993, in an effort to increase rice production, SLORC has introduced
double-cropping and cultivation of summer paddy. SLORC targeted the rice
output for 1993/94 as 675-million baskets and to increase it in 1994/95
as 900-million baskets [58]. To expect such dramatic increase in
agricultural output is clearly unrealistic. Farmers also have technical
difficulties to produce in accordance with the government's new measures.
In Irrawaddy delta, for example, it is difficult for the farmers to grow
summer paddy and it is also expensive by added costs of fuel and hiring
irrigation pumps. The regional military administrations, on the otherhand,
have taken measures to reach its production quota without due consideration
given to circumstances. This has resulted hundreds of farmers arrested,
detained and land confiscated. One refugee interviewed by KHRG testify the
incident of local authorities in Irrawaddy Delta intimidate farmers in
order to get the rice quota [59]:
"[I]n May (1996) they started taking action against farmers who
failed to meet the quota requirements, which were due in April. The
farmer unable to meet the quota requirements number around 15-50 per
village [out of perhaps 100-400 house per village in total]. These
farmers were instructed to bring their own food supplies along with
them, and they were placed under detention in the police jail
cells, or in school buildings once the cells were all full. Then
the quota requirements were again demanded of them.}
It need to be noted from the testimony that the percentage of household
in a village which cannot meet quota does not appears to indicate a normal
circumstance of crop failure (In which case the percentage will be higher).
This confirm reports that the poorer sector of rice farmers suffer much
harder from the government procurement scheme [60]. The testimony given
also indicate that such practice of forced procurement is widespread
throughout the region of Irrawaddy delta [61]:
"[T]hose failing to give it continued to be held in detention. In May
at Wah Kema town, the school was filled with detained farmers, and
I saw 33 farmers, some handcuffed, the other tied with rope, all
guarded by police, walking on the road to be relocated. This was a
public demonstration that anybody who failed to give rice would be
treated this way. The same thing happened in Myaung Mya, Ein Meh
and Pantanaw. }
Some expert has pointed out that Burma's agricultural sector, within
existing technology and available land, may already be at its production
plateau [62]. Therefore, the failure to meet its rice export target this
year attribute to the government incompetence in policy formulations.
Recently, U Win Htein, an assistant to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was {\em
formally} arrested on the charge of video-taping of the failed-summer rice
crop in Henzada District of Irrawaddy Delta. He was sentenced to 7-year,
and later extended to 14-year, imprisonment [63]. This can be seen as the
reflection of government's embarrassment in relation to the failure of its
major policy - a punishment that can be interpreted as a retaliation for
publicizing Government's failure.
As noted by Human Rights Watch/Asia in its report [64], such method of
purchasing rice is the only means to collect revenue for government since
there is no systematic taxation scheme exisit in Burma. Burmese government
since 1962 have used this method for collecting revenue from farmers.
Threfore, the situation calls for reform on government taxation practices.
SLORC tendency to use public forced labour in its infrastructure project
can also be seen in the same context [65].
2.6 Emerging pattern of lawlessness
-----------------------------------
Weakness in the central SLORC administration, which combined with lack of
independent judiciary, has become a major contributor to the increase in
corruption and lawlessness amongst regional administrations. For example,
there are evidences that the SLORC central administration had ordered all
regional commanders to cease the practice of forced-unpaid labour [66].
However, continuing cases of forced labour throughout the country in this
year may be attributed to the waning power of the SLORC central
administration [67]. The Special Rapporteur also note this in his report as:
Para.141." ... In addition, the Special Rapporteur notes that
several months after their publication, these directives are still
not public and therefore not accessible to those to whom they would
apply and to those protecting the rights of persons accused of
breaking the laws.
142. Given the many complaints received by the Special Rapporteur
from several reliable sources, it seems that neither of the
directives is being implemented rigorously. .......}
There are also cases of the regional commanders used the forced labour
as a pretex to extort money from the local population. The authorities
confiscate private properties without compensation, or forcibly relocate
residents. The Special Rapporteur noted in his report as [68]:
Para. 138. "Other well-documented reports received by the Special
Rapporteur concern violations of the right to own property, as
articulated in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The reports refer to cases of confiscation or destruction
of movable and immovable property, for which only in a very few
cases were the victims said to have been given some form of
compensation. People continue to be forcibly relocated, with little
or no compensation, to new towns and villages. In some areas, such
as Hlaing, Thngangyun and Tamew, displaced home-owners do not get
any compensation, although some were reportedly given the option of
buying apartments in the buildings constructed on the site of their
old homes. Usually the cost of these new apartments is beyond the
means of the displaced owners. Most of these displaced have to buy
plots of land in the new townships with their own money, causing
them great financial hardship. The displaced population are usually
faced with great economic difficulties, as their means of
livelihood were connected to the area where they previously lived.}
Such cases of authorities arbitrarily confiscating private property,
also of agricultural lands in rural areas, are reported to be occurring
throughout the country [69]. These forcible relocations, as in the case of
the internally displaced people in \Section 2.2, deprive the rural
villagers of their livelihood as well as social security. In Burmese
society, especially in the rural communities, a person cannot simply exist
as an individual, but must lives as part of a family and part of the
community. A person is traditionally expected to given cares to the aged
within his/her family and also contribute towards the community [70].
For example, if there is case of a person or family in severe illness or
crop-failure, the community usually help them in facing difficulties [71].
The forcible relocations break these social bonds between the uprooted
persons and their community; therefore it deprive the uprooted people of
their social security.
2.7 Additional Protection Measures
----------------------------------
Perhaps enough information been presented, at least to comprehend the
complexity of the ICESCR related violations, on situation which can be
considered as the root cause of the so-called economic displacements. The
economically displaced persons, in essence, are those whose livelihoods
been deprived by generalized violence or the government's policy. In
Burma's case, the poverty is generated through the political system. These
violations are not targeted to the individual concerned. It however
inflicted upon the whole population. An appropriate measures to improve the
situation, therefore, can be different from normal form of monitoring human
rights.
The attention need to be given, firstly, to the restoration of independent
judiciary. This will enable the population to seek protection from the
abuse by local authorities through the courts. Secondly, instituting a
system of taxation will put a stop to the local authorities arbitrarily
collecting tax from the population. Thirdly, the realistic target for
government rice producing/purchasing quota need to be set with the help of
local population.
The elected representatives are the perfect candidate to be charged with
these protection responsibilities. Formulation of the appropriate
legislation with regards to voluntary labour, taxation and procurement
scheme with the participation of population will be a good foundation for
building democratic institutions.
Therefore, in accordance with the United Nation General Assembly
resolutions, the elected-representatives should be empowered to legislate
with regards to forced labour, taxation and procurement of rice.
3. Conclusions and Recommendations
-----------------------------------
1. Burma is in a state of triple transition from civil war to peace;
dictatorship to democracy and centralized to a freemarket economy. The
institution building should be done in political, human rights as well as
economic and financial fronts.
2. In last 12 months, the SLORC has not made any meaningful cooperation
with United Nations and international community in resolving country's
problems, in particular the refugee problem, and implementing UN General
Assembly resolutions. Such lack of cooperation by military authorities
warrant a decisive and forceful action in implementing previous U.N.
General Assembly Resolutions.
3. Because of continuing power decline by the central military authorities,
the preventive measures against human rights violations must be made
at the grassroots level. The U.N. should send international peace-keeping
mission and human rights monitors to Burma.
4. Current undemocratic practices of writing Constitution need to be
changed. With an arrangement agreeable to all parties to the conflict,
the National Convention does present an opportunity for Burma to end its
civil war and to restore democracy. A constitution that accommodate
democratic aspiration of people of Burma must be realized. A clear time
table should be set for the formulation and adoption of such Constitution.
5. The international community's peace-keeping effort should be linked with
democratic institution building. Efforts need to be made of instituting
independent judiciary, formulation and implementation of legislation with
regards to forced labour and forcible procurements in various part of the
country. The elected representatives must be charged with these
responsibilities as a measure to protect the violation of human rights.
6. There are reports of the current military authorities engaging in
drug-related corruption. This threaten the Burmese army to become
institutionally involved in drug trade. The neighbouring governments as
well as international drug agencies should monitor Burmese army personnel
of drug money-laundering. Serious efforts should be made to counter this
growing trend.
Recommendations to the United Nations
-------------------------------------
Peacemaking: At this United Nations General Assembly, the priority should
be given to the task of persuading the military government of Myanmar to
(1) implement the ceasefire and peacesettlement; (2) to make dialogue with
civilian opposition and (3) to give the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations unhindered access to
returnees and internally displaced persons.
1. The United Nations Security Council should enact a resolution similar to
688 and create Safety Zones in Burma (Myanmar). The U.N. Security Council
should demand the government of Myanmar to give unhindered access to
humanitarian organizations to those Safety Zones. The Safety Zone should
include the Tannessarim Division, Mon State, Karen State, Arakan State,
Karenni State, Shan State, Kachin and Chin State where the forced labour is
occurring, internally displaced people are residing and refugees/returnees
are repatriating.
2. The United Nations General Assembly at this 51st Session should authorize
to send a civilian peace-keeping mission to Myanmar in order to
(a) monitor human rights situation, (b) assist national political forces in
their efforts for reconciliation and (c) assist in installing independent
judiciary and building democratic institution.
3. The term of peace-keeping mission should be set for no less than two
years, until the time that a democratic federal constitution is approved by
the people's referendum and a national government inclusive of elected
representatives of May-1990 are bestowed with state power.
4. The United Nations Security Council to institute an international arms
embargo applicable to all parties to armed conflicts in Burma.
Peace-keeping and peace-building
--------------------------------
1. The U.N. Secretary-General and U.N. General Assembly urge the Myanmar
military authorities to engage in dialogue with civilian opposition NLD and
ethnic leaders; and encourage the remaining ethnic rebel groups to enter
ceasefire.
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross, under the U.N.
peace-keeping mission, should be given responsibility to monitor ceasefire
between Burmese army and ethnic rebels.
3. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, under the
U.N. peace-keeping mission, should be charged with the responsibility for
monitoring, the repatriation and resettlement of refugees, returnees and
internally displaced people. The international non-governmental
organizations should also contribute in this humanitarian efforts.
As part of UN High Commissioner for Refugees effort to rehabilitate
war affected population, the ethnic freedom fighters as well as government
soldiers should participate in demobilization, disarmament and
demilitarization.
4. As a measure to implement previous UN General Assembly resolutions and
also to attenuate the causes of forced displacement of Burmese people, the
representative-elects should be given the responsibility to enact and
implement the legislation regarding with forced labour, taxation and
procurement of primary products, especially rice. The UNHCR and U.N.
Commission on Human Rights should assist the elected representatives in
this effort to reduce the flows of economically displaced persons.
5. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, under the U.N. peace-keeping
mission, should be charged with the responsibility in assisting the
installing the independent judiciary.
The elected representatives, together with the ethnic nationality and
Burmese military authorities should begin dialogue and drawing-up of the
constitution. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, in collaboration with
international Non-governmental organizations, should take the role of
observer in writing constitution.
Developmental Issues
--------------------
6. The United Nations Development Programme and other international
financial organizations should assist in developing an appropriate taxation
scheme in Burma.
7. As a part of UNHCR's effort for repatriation and resettlement of
displaced population, the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)
should be directed at building longer-term infrastructure for Burma. The
UNHCR/NGOs should implement QIPs directly with local community. The national
political forces in consultation with UN Development Programme should put
forward proposals for such projects; the UNHCR should consider, on
case-by-case basis, to implement the projects with the help of Burma's
traditional donors (U.S.A., Japan and Germany).
Close attention should be given in relation to reducing the opium poppy
production in Shan State. The UNDCP should take a particular interest in
implementing its crop substitution program in the form of
Quick Impact Projects in Shan State.
\end{document}
Footnotes:
==========
[1] Human Rights Watch/Asic, "Burma: Entrenchment or Reform?", Vol.7,
No.10.July 1995.
[2] Mary P Callahan, "Burma in 1995: Looking Beyond the Release of Aung San
Suu Kyi", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI. No.2, February 1996.
[3] Amnesty International, "Myanmar: Renewed repression", AI Index: ASA
16/30/96, 10 July 1996.
[4] In December 1995, the Australian Deputy Opposition Leader visit Burma.
The SLORC do not accept the Australian Government's mediation efforts.
[5] Far Eastern Economic Review, `Round One To Rangoon', August 1, 1996.
[6] SLORC was invited to Malaysia on 12 August 1996. However, there has not
been any concession from SLORC. Reuter also report that Japanese mediators
has been trying to broker peace in early September. However, there are no
results so far.
[7] Human Rightws Sub-committee, "Human Rights and Progress Towards
Democracy in Burma", Octover 1995.
[8] Amnesty International, "Myanmar: Human Rights violation against ethnic
minorities", AI Index: ASA 16/38/96, 8 August 1996.
[9] 1. New Democratic Army (300-400 men), 2. Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (1000-1500 men), 3. United Wa State Army (10,000-15,000
men) and 4. Former CPB 815 War zone (1,500-2,000 men)
[10] Bertil Lintner, "The Politics of the Drug Trade in Burma", Occasional
Paper N.33, Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, The University of
Western Australia, May 1993.
[11] The DAB is essentially the umbrella group of NDF and Student rebel
groups, formed after 1988 uprising.
[12] Prof. Yozo. Yokota, "Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar",
para.159-160, E/CN.4/1996/65, 5 FEbruary 1996.
[13] BurmaNet News, September 18, 1996.
[14] Economic Intelligence Unit report, 14 June 1996.
[15] [A-1] U.S. Department of State, March 1996.
[16] Bertil Lintner, "The Politics of Drug Trade in Burma", Occasional
Paper No.33 IOCPS, May 1993.
[17] Lintner wrote, "[I]solated diplomatically and condemned by most
Western powers because of the masscres of pro-democracy activists in
1988, the SLORC has been trying desperately to be re-admitted into the
international community. Given its direct involvement with the heroin
traffickers along teh Sino-Burmese border, it may seem ironic that it
decided to do this by exploiting the drug issue.", See detail in
Chapter 4 of his IOCPS paper.
[18] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1994.
[19] U.S. Department of State, International Narcotic Control Strategy
Report, March 1996.
[20] The U.S. General Accounting Office report on 1 March 1996 notes,
"Without these tax revenues, UWSA would nave serious funding problems.
UWSA has no incentive to reduce its size or end its involvement in
opium trafficking until (1) alternative sources if income are found to
replace opium generated revenues or (2) the threat of Burmese
government aggression is diminished or removed. Neither of these
possibilities appears likely to happen."
[21] Burma Debate, March/April 1996.
[22] U.S. Department of State report, March 1996.
[23] Human Rights Sub-Committee of teh Joint Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade, the Parliament of Commonwealth of
Australia, "Human Rights and Progress towards Democracy in Burma",
October 1995.
[24] Professor Yozo Yokota, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar", E/CN.4/1993/37, 17 February 1993.
[25] ULf Sundhaussen, "Indonesia's new order: A model for Myanmar ?", Asian
Survey, Vol. XXXV, No.8, August 1995.
[26] SLORC convention declare self-administered zone for NAGA, DA-NU, PA-O,
PA-LAUNG, KOKANG and WA ethnic minority groups. The
elected-representatives have reservation about the creation of the
so-called Self Administered Zone, which may create ethnic enclaves and
fuel racial tensions, see Overseas Burma Liberation Front report, 15
June 1995.
[27] Overseas Burma Liberation Front, "SLORC's latest political crisis", 15
June 1995.
[28] Press statement by National League for Democracy, "THE OBSERVATION OF
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY ON THE NATIONAL CONVENTION", 22
November 1995.
[29] United Nations General Assembly Resolution, A/C.3/L.52, 11 December
1995.
[30] U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, March 1996.
[31] [A-2] Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1, 1996.
[32] Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Burma: Rohingya Muslim, Ending Cycle of
Exodus ?", Vol(8) No.9(C), September 1996.
[33] SLORC information committee press release, September 2, 1996.
[34] Amnesty International, "Myanmar: No Place to Hide", AI INDEX: ASA
16/13/95, June 1995.
[35] Human Rights Watch/Asia, "BURMA: ABUSES LINKED TO THE FALL OF
MANERPLAW", Vol.7. No.5., March 1995.
[36] Professor Yozo Yokota, Interim report to General Assembly by Special
Rapporteur, General Assembly A/50/568, 16 October 1995.
[37] ibid., para 31,32.
[38] Amnesty International, "Myanmar: NO Place to HIde, Killings,
abductions and other abuses against ethnic Karen villagers and
refugees", AI INDES: ASA 16/13/95, June 1995.
[39] Far Eastern Economic Review, `Burma: It's Rangoon, Not Rebels', May
18, 1995 pp21.
[40] The Nations, "Karen Rebels threaten to attack Thai refugee camps", 21
January 1996.
[41] AUSTCARE, "Tour Report: Thailand-Burma border", May 1996.
[42] Bangkok Post, "KNU troops kill 8 rival camp soldiers in attack", 21
January 1996.
[43] Amnesty International, "Myanmar: Kayin (Karen) State - The killing
continue", AI INdex: ASA 16/10/96, April 1996.
[44] Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Burma - HRW Demands End to Forced
Relocations", 11 July 1996.
[45] Amnesty International, "Myanmar: Kayin (Karen) State - The Killings
continue", AI Index: ASA 16/10/96, April 1996.
[46] Karen Human Rights Group, Interview with Koo Klaw Reh, 4/7/96.
[47] Karen Human Rights Group, Interview with Nang Zang Sang, 1/6/96.
Houses in Burma are usually built with the floor 3 or 4 feet above
ground leval. What appears to happen was the displaced villagers, who
could not built their own hut have to live underneath the floor of a
house as the last resort. It is degrading and a great-deal of
discomfort for the displaced villagers.
[48] Karen Human Rights Group, Interview with Koo Maw Reh, 3/7/96.
[49] Karen Human Rights Group, Interview with Sai Hon, 11/6/96.
[50] Karen Human Rights Group, Interview with Koo Nga Reh, 4/7/96.
[51] Mon National Relief Committee, January 1996.
[52] Karen REfugee Committee, "Statement of the Karen Refugee Committee on
the present situation with regard to the Karen Refugee Problem and
Question of Repatriation", 20 June 1995.
[53] Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Burma: the Rohingya Muslims, Ending the
Circle of Exodus?", Vol.8. No 9(C), September 1996.
[54] Para.16.[T]he Working Group considered that the same reasoning held
true for persons displaced within their own country for refugee-like
reasons. While the office does not have any general competence for
this group of persons, certain responsibilities may have to be assumed
on their behalf, depending on their protection and assistance needs.
In this context, UNHCR whould indicate its willingness to extend its
humanitarian expertise to internally displaced persons, on a
case-by-case basis, in response to request from the Secretary-General
or General Assembly. -- Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's
Programme, "NOte on International Protection", A/AC.96/799, 25 August
1992.
[55] Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 25.
"1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control."
[56] Professor Yozo Yokota, "Report on Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar", E/CN.4/1993/37, 17 February 1993.
[57] Reports in this regards are: Australian Parliament's Human Rights
Sub-Committee publications, Vol.5 &6.;Australian Council For Overseas
Aid Report, February 1996; Southeast Asian Information Network and
EarthRight International, "Total Denial", May 1996; Amnesty
Internationa, ASA 16/42/96; Prof. Yozo Yokota, E/CN.4/1996/65.
[58] Economic Intelligence Unit Report, 2nd quarter 1994.
[59] Karen Human Rights Group, Interview with Saw Kler En, 3/6/96.
[60] [A-3] Far Eastern Economic Review, August 29, 1996.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Khin Maung Kyi, "Myanmar: Will Forever Flow the Ayeyarwady?",
Southeast Asian Affairs 1994.pp.210-230.
[63] Associated Press, 4 Sep 1996.
[64] [A-4] Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Burma: The Rohingya Muslims, Ending a
Cycle of Exodus?", pp-30 Land Ownership and Arbitrary Taxation,
September 1996.
[65] This may be attributed to the SLORC own knowledge of running the
country, which generally reflect the thinking of socialist state
monopoly.
[66] E/CN.4/1996/65, Page 41.
[67] Widespread incidence of forced labour was reported, for example, by
Karen Human Rights Group, February 20, 1996: KHRG#96-08.
[68] Professor Yozo Yokota, E/CN.4/1996/65, 5 February 1996.
[69] Special Rapporteur noted one more case of confiscation of land in
eastern Shan State in para.139. There are also various independent
reports indicating such practice was prevalent thorughout the country.
Most of the reports may be found on Karen Human Rights Group report
datebase on the Internet.
[70] This kind of voluntary contribution towards community is obviously
different from the SLORC term of "voluntary contribution". The SLORC
try to mislead, or itself being confused, about the Burmese social
values when it try to defend the practice of forced labour etc.
[71] This behaviour generally reflect the Burmese people's generosity and
also the social cohesions within families and their community.
\ENDREPORT