On November 24, 2017, I posted a reminder of this federal evidence rule change that became effective today, December 1st, or as Josh calls it, “eDiscovery Day.” Josh Gilliland’s post and webpage covers the changes in more depth, and are worth a bookmark for future reference. Don’t overlook the tweets on the right-hand side of the page. -CCE

The links no longer work in my January 22, 2017 post on the amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendments are effective December 1, 2017. This link is reliable and worth a bookmark. This website includes the rules, highlights the amendments, and the Committee Notes. -CCE

In this wrongful termination case, the court was considering the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as well as the defendants’ motion to strike certain exhibits attached to plaintiff’s brief in opposition to summary judgment for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) & (e). One of the items that the defendants sought to exclude was a read receipt sent from defendant Grimes email address to plaintiff, triggered when an email plaintiff sent defendant Grimes was opened, arguing that the Read Receipt was ‘unauthenticated hearsay’.

Judge’s Opinion

Judge Flanagan made a swift ruling on this issue when she stated ‘Defendants’ argument fails. The Read Receipt is not hearsay.’ . . .

Yesterday [November 7, 2014], we saw the Colorado Supreme Court grappling with whether an act of shoplifting is admissible as evidence bearing on a witness’s credibility. In that same opinion, People v. Segovia, the C.S.C. noted that acts of violence have typically been excluded when offered to impeach credibility.

This frequently cited notion, that acts of violence are not particularly relevant to credibility, is worth interrogating further. To do so, I turn to another opinion from the past decade. This one is a frequently cited opinion by then Judge Sotomayor of the Second Circuit, U.S. v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606. The case was an appeal of the convictions of two men who were found to have conspired to sell cocaine and heroin. At trial, the government called cooperating witnesses. Defense counsel sought to impeach the two witnesses with evidence that between them they had burglary, larceny, felony drug and murder convictions. Acknowledging that F.R.E. 609(a)(1) suggest that felony convictions are presumptively relevant to credibility, the trial court held in camera hearings to probe into the nature of the larceny, felony drug and murder convictions. It found that they weren’t especially probative of truthfulness. The court therefore ruled that defense counsel could not name the particular felonies committed or ask about the nature of the convictions, but instead could simply elicit the fact of the convictions and the dates.

The Second Circuit disagreed with the blanket prohibition on naming the felonies. It held that unless a conviction fails 403 balancing and is excluded entirely, ‘it is the jury’s function to assess the probative value of a witness’ specific conviction or convictions as part of its overall evaluation of the witness’s credibility.’ Judge Sotomayor wrote that the trial court must examine ‘which of a witness’s crimes have elements relevant to veracity and honesty and which do not’ because while all felonies are not equally probative of credibility ‘many are significantly probative of a witness’ propensity for truthfulness.’

Judge Sotomayor then offered a taste of how the trial court should go about making these determinations. And this is where it gets really interesting. With heavy reliance on earlier authority, she distinguished acts of violence from crimes that “reflect adversely on a person’s integrity.’ Crimes of violence ‘generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity’ because they result from provocation, carelessness, impatience or combativeness. By contrast, she explained, theft and escape crimes, which don’t fall under 609(a)(2), are nonetheless highly probative of credibility because they involve ‘deliberate and injurious violation of basic standards rather than impulse or anger, and usually . . . some element of deceiving the victim.’ In addition, the gravity and/or depravity involved in the offense should be considered both for their ability to prejudice the jury and because ‘particularly heinous crimes may be high in probative value insofar as they reflect a rejection of social mores.’

Once again, then, rejection of social mores and ‘violation of basic standards” are held up as clear indicators of lack of credibility. Strangely, though, crimes of violence seem to fit those definitions quite well. The very criminalization of such acts suggest that society demands that one maintain self-control and refrain from violence in most circumstances. A violent lack of inhibition or a deliberate indifference to the injuries caused by ones’ actions arguably run contrary to basic standards that glue society together just as fundamentally as the decision to steal from another person.

Even if, instead, lying is linked to the ability to scheme or plan, then this is not much more helpful as a way to distinguish crimes of violence. Certainly, many theft crimes may happen without much thought (shoplifting, for example) and they may be more excusable as the result of thoughtlessness than violence that causes bodily harm to another person. Why is it likely that someone who steals $100 on a whim is more prone to lying than someone who lashes out at another with a beer bottle during a brawl? Why isn’t it equally likely that people who are prone to fly into a violent rage at a perceived slight or recklessly injure others would be careless of the courtroom oath or think nothing of fabricating facts in order to protect themselves? Judge Sotomayor doesn’t answer these questions.

Ironically, even as she offered this fairly detailed explanation of how to weigh felonies under Rule 609(a)(1), Judge Sotomayor illustrated the subjectivity of such line drawing. Coming to the opposite conclusion of the Colorado Supreme Court, she found that it was not error for the district court to conclude that the circumstances of one of the witness’ shoplifting conviction did not ‘involve falsity or deceit such as to fall within the ambit of Rule 609(a)(2).’ Her explanation: stealth and dishonesty are not the same thing.

Craig Ball’s Lawyers’ Guide to Forms of Production! Although Mr. Ball says there is much he wants to re-organize and rewrite, I can’t wait to dive in. You will find the hyperlink to the Guide when you go to the web site. Thank you, Craig Ball! -CCE

Semiannually, I compile a primer on some key aspect of electronic discovery. In the past, I’ve written on computer forensics, backup systems, metadata and databases. For 2014, I’ve completed the first draft of the Lawyers’ Guide to Forms of Production, intended to serve as a primer on making sensible and cost-effective specifications for production of electronically stored information. It’s the culmination and re-purposing of much that I’ve written on forms heretofore, along with new material extolling the advantages of native and near-native forms.

Reviewing the latest draft, there is much I want to add and re-organize; accordingly, it will be a work-in-progress for months to come. Consider it a “public comment” version. The linked document includes exemplar verbiage for requests and model protocols for your adaption and adoption. I plan to add more forms and examples. . . .

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay for

A statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.

As a Rule 803 exception, this present sense impression exception applies “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness….” Indeed, the exception can apply even if the declarant has not been identified. But, like with a witness’s testimony at trial, a statement offered under a hearsay exception is only admissible if the declarant had personal knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence 602. So, where does that leave us?

[I]n United States v. Thunder, 2014 WL 944752 (8th Cir. 2014), the defendant was charged with sexual abuse of a minor and sexual abuse of a person incapable of consenting. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce the prior sexual abuse conviction of an alleged alternate suspect, but the district court deemed the evidence inadmissible under Rule 412(c)(1). This prompts two questions: (1) Why did the Eighth Circuit mention Rule 412; and (2) Is there such a thing as reverse Rule 413/414 evidence? . . . .

This post discusses an Alabama District Court’s and 11th Circuit Court of Appeal’s interpretation of Rule 706(a) of the Federal Rule of Evidence in a prisoner’s lawsuit in which he claims that he has Hepatitis C, his illness is not being treated and, without treatment, he will become sicker and die. -CCE

Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a) provides that:

On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own choosing. But the court may only appoint someone who consents to act.

As you can see from the language of Rule 706(a), there is nothing in the Rule’s text limiting expert appointment to either criminal or civil cases. So where did that leave the plaintiff in Gillentine v. Correctional Medical Services, 2014 WL 701575 (11th Cir. 2014)?

[A] new Ninth Circuit decision about the scope of expert discovery in federal court caught our attention. The decision in Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, No. 12-15572 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2014) poses the question: where the expert has served both as a confidential advisor to counsel and as a testifying expert, may counsel withhold documents shared with the expert by asserting an opinion work product objection? The short answer is no—documents from testifying experts must be produced unless protected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4).

Dan is on trial for aggravated battery. He has a prior conviction for aggravated battery. After Dan testifies, the prosecution seeks to impeach him through evidence of his five year-old conviction for armed robbery. To be admissible, the evidence cannot simply satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 403; instead, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)(B), the prosecution must affirmatively prove that the probative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect.

A defendant calls an alibi witness at trial. After the alibi witness testifies on direct examination, the prosecution seeks to impeach him with evidence of a prior inconsistent statement that tends to incriminate the defendant. The prior statement is hearsay and only admissible to impeach that alibi witness, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. My question today is: Should courts apply the same modified Rule 403 analysis that they would apply in the case above?

Federal Rule of Evidence 803 provides exceptions to the rule against hearsay that apply regardless of the availability of the hearsay declarant. Federal Rule of Evidence 804 provides exceptions to the rule against hearsay that apply if the hearsay declarant is ‘unavailable.’ As exceptions to the rule against hearsay, these Rules merely place qualifying statements beyond the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 802. And what this means is that, like all evidence, statements falling under a hearsay exception must be relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and have a probative value that is not substantially outweighed by dangers such as the danger of unfair prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. And yet, parties almost never make Rule 403 objections to evidence offered under a hearsay exception, and courts almost never sustain such objections. Why?