Efforts by Iraq to
impede U.N. weapons inspections since late 1997 and to challenge the allied-imposed
no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq have resulted in further
confrontations with the United States and its allies. In early 1998, U.S.-led
retaliatory strikes against Iraq were averted by an agreement negotiated
by the U.N. Secretary General on February 23, under which Iraq promised
"immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted" access by U.N. inspectors
throughout Iraq. On March 3, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
1154, which warned Iraq of the "severest consequences" for violating the
agreement.

A decision by Iraq
to ban almost all U.N. inspections on October 31, 1998, precipitated a
new phase of the confrontation. The Clinton Administration decided to
abort air and missile strikes planned for November 14-15 after Iraq agreed
at the last minute to resume cooperation with U.N. inspections. But, following
a report on December 15 by the chief weapons inspector that Iraq was withholding
cooperation, the United States and Britain conducted a four day operation
against Iraq (Operation Desert Fox) including approximately 410 missiles
and 600 bombs.

Since the December
1998 operation, the United States and Britain have carried out air strikes
against Iraqi air defense units and installations on a frequent basis,
in response to Iraqi attempts to target allied aircraft enforcing no-fly
zones over northern and southern Iraq. On January 18, 2001, then President-elect
Bush warned that his Administration would use force against Iraq if it
were found to be developing weapons of mass destruction, and on January
28 Vice President Cheney warned Iraqi President Saddam Hussein against
miscalculating as he had done in 1990 with the invasion of Kuwait. On
February 16, 2001, allied aircraft conducted strikes against five Iraqi
air defense installations north of the 33rd parallel (the northern
limit of the southern no-fly zone) in response to increasing challenges
by Iraqi air defense units.

According to the
U.S. Defense Department as of late November 1998, expanded military operations
and crisis build-ups in the Gulf since the 1991 war had cost a total of
$6.9 billion. Incremental costs of these operations amounted to approximately
$1.6 billion in FY1998, 1.3 billion in FY1999, $1.1 billion in FY2000,
and $1.1 billion estimated in FY2001. In November 1998, Members of Congress
from both parties voiced support for military action to compel Iraqi compliance
with U.N. resolutions, and on December 17, the House of Representatives
passed H.Res. 612, expressing unequivocal support for U.S. military personnel
conducting operations in the Gulf.

Erosion of the former
allied coalition and U.S. force constraints limit some military options.
Although some Arab states, notably Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, host U.S.
aircraft enforcing no-fly zones, no Arab states with the exception of
Kuwait have publicly supported allied air strikes against Iraq.

Some officials and
analysts have called for expansion of no-fly zones over Iraq. Others support
covert operations to inflict damage on key Iraqi facilities and build
a viable opposition to the regime.

MOST
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On January 18, 2001,
just prior to his inauguration, then President-elect Bush denounced Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein as a "big threat" and said his Administration
would use force against Saddam if Iraq were found to be developing weapons
of mass destruction. On January 28, Vice President Cheney called Saddam
"very much a force for instability in the region" and warned the Iraqi
leader not to miscalculate as he did with the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

On February 16, between
the hours of 11:20 a.m. and 1:40 p.m. Washington, D.C. time, 24 U.S. and
British combat aircraft struck five Iraqi air defense command-and-control
installations, using precision guided munitions. According to a U.S. Defense
Department spokesman, the installations struck by the allied aircraft
were located north of the 33rd parallel (the northern limit
of the southern no-fly zone), but the aircraft themselves did not go north
of the 33rd parallel. The spokesman said the strikes were prompted
by an increase in the frequency and sophistication of Iraqi air defense
operations over a two-month period, resulting in heightened risk to allied
air force units enforcing the southern no-fly zone. According to press
reports, one goal of the allied strikes was to destroy a fiber optic cable
network that Chinese are reportedly installing to upgrade the effectiveness
of Iraqi air defense radars. Defense spokesmen have declined to identify
the munitions used in the strikes and have said bomb damage assessments
are not complete; however, they have stated that the strikes had "good
effectiveness" in disrupting and degrading the capability of Iraq's integrated
air defense system.

BACKGROUND
AND ANALYSIS

This issue brief
covers the most recent U.S.-Iraqi confrontation, which began in the fall
of 1998. It summarizes events that led to the crisis, the allied military
build-up, military strikes against Iraq, international reactions, costs,
and options for U.S. policy makers. For further information on previous
U.S.-Iraqi confrontations and developments leading to the present crisis,
see CRS Report 98-386, Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998.

Since the cease-fire
of March 3, 1991 that ended the Persian Gulf war (Operation Desert Storm),
the United States has resorted on several occasions to the use or threat
of force against Iraq. Some of these incidents resulted from Iraqi challenges
to U.N. cease-fire terms that followed the war. Others resulted from bilateral
issues between Iraq and the United States and its allies.

A principal factor
in the most recent confrontation was Iraq's failure to cooperate fully
with U.N. weapons inspectors. The inspection regime, established by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687 adopted on April 3, 1991, is designed
to identify and dismantle Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare systems as well as
missiles capable of delivering them. Two agencies are charged with conducting
these inspections: the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which
deals with chemical, biological, and missile systems; and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which deals with Iraqi nuclear weapons programs.
Since the inception of the inspection regime, Iraq has obstructed its
work in various ways:

False, misleading,
or incomplete responses to questions posed by inspectors

Interference
by Iraqi escorts with the conduct of inspections

Denial of access
to "sensitive" sites on grounds of national security

Removal of or
tampering with material evidence of weapons programs

Attempts to exclude
U.S. personnel from inspection teams

On seven occasions
between 1991 and 1993, the U.N. Security Council found Iraq in "material
breach of cease-fire terms"; however, the Council has not issued a finding
of "material breach" since June 17, 1993, despite subsequent Iraqi provocations.
According to news reports, some Council members are reluctant to agree
to another such finding, which they think might provide the basis for
an attack on Iraq.

Another factor contributing
to the recent confrontation was Iraqi violation of the no-fly zones imposed
by the United States and its allies over portions of northern and southern
Iraq. U.S. and British aircraft (and formerly French aircraft) have conducted
overflights of northern and southern Iraq since 1991 and 1992, respectively,
to enforce the bans on Iraqi aircraft in these zones. The allied overflights
are known as Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch and
are designed to exclude Iraqi aircraft from flying north of the 36th
parallel and south of the 33rd parallel, respectively. The
southern zone, covering 227,277 square kilometers (87,729 square miles)
is larger than the northern zone, which covers 43,707 square kilometers
(16,871 square miles), but Iraqi air defenses reportedly are thicker in
the northern zone. Together, these zones cover 270,985 square kilometers
(104,600 square miles), or 62% of Iraqi territory.

U.S. officials base
the no-fly zones primarily on U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 of
April 5, 1991, which demands that Iraq end repression of its population
(notably Kurds in the north and Shi'ite Muslims in the south), and on
the military cease-fire agreements after the Gulf war (the Safwan Accords),
which forbid Iraq to interfere with allied air operations over Iraq. Some
countries question this interpretation, arguing that Resolution 688 was
not passed under Chapter VII provisions (peace and security) and does
not by itself permit military action to enforce its terms. Iraq maintains
that the no-fly zones constitute an illegal infringement on its sovereignty
and has occasionally fired on allied planes conducting overflights to
enforce these zones.

Events
of the Crisis

Forerunner
Episodes

Between mid-1993
and 1996, UNSCOM personnel were able to carry out their inspections of
Iraqi weapons programs with relatively little interference by the government
of Iraq. Increasing attempts by Iraq in 1997 to impede U.N. weapons inspections
and to exclude U.S. personnel from UNSCOM teams prompted demands by the
U.N. Security Council that Iraq cease its interference or face further
sanctions. A Russian undertaking in November 1997 to seek "balanced representation"
in UNSCOM membership temporarily averted a crisis; however, tensions mounted
again in January 1998, as Iraq once more barred U.S.-led teams from conducting
inspections and declared several "sensitive sites" off limits to U.N.
inspectors. After a month of intensive diplomacy and a continuing build-up
of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister
and the U.N. Secretary General signed an agreement with the following
provisions:

Reconfirmation
by Iraq that it accepts relevant U.N. resolutions

Commitment of
U.N. member states to "respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Iraq"

"Immediate, unconditional,
and unrestricted access" by UNSCOM and IAEA within Iraq, with respect
for Iraqi concerns relating to "national security, sovereignty, and
dignity"

Special procedures
to apply to inspections at eight "presidential sites" defined in an
annex to the agreement

Efforts to accelerate
the inspection process, and an undertaking by the Secretary General
to bring to U.N. Security Council members the concerns of Iraq over
economic sanctions.

On March 3, the U.N.
Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1154, co-sponsored by Britain
and Japan, which commended the initiative of the Secretary General in
security these commitments from Iraq, stressed that Iraq must comply with
its obligations, and warned that any violation of these terms or other
Security Council resolutions "would have the severest consequences for
Iraq." Although inspections during the spring of 1998 proceeded relatively
smoothly, many questions concerning Iraq's weapons programs remained unresolved.
Also, Iraqi spokesmen continued periodically to warn of a new crisis if
economic sanctions were not quickly removed.

December
1998 Air Strikes

After a lull of several
months, tensions mounted in August 1998, as Iraq began to challenge U.N.
operations once more. On August 5, Iraq announced that it would no longer
allow UNSCOM to inspect new facilities, and followed with a ban on all
remaining UNSCOM activities on October 31. U.S. officials described Iraq's
actions as unacceptable, as did some other members of the Security Council.
Resolution 1205 of November 5, which demanded that Iraq rescind its bans
on U.N. weapons inspection activities and resume full cooperation with
UNSCOM, did not specifically mentioned use of force; however, U.S. officials
emphasized again that all options are open including military force to
compel Iraqi compliance. On November 11, the United Nations evacuated
more than 230 staff personnel from Baghdad, including all weapons inspectors,
as the United States warned of possible retaliatory strikes against Iraq.

As U.S. forces were
on the verge of conducting air and missile strikes against Iraq on November
14, the Clinton Administration delayed them for 24 hours upon learning
that Iraq had agreed to resume cooperation with UNSCOM. After further
negotiations, Iraq agreed in a letter to the Security Council on November
15 to provide unconditional cooperation to UNSCOM and rescind its ban
on UNSCOM activities. The Administration then canceled the planned strikes;
however, the President warned that Iraq must fulfill its obligations.
Specifically, in a news conference on November 15, he listed five conditions
Iraq must fulfill to meet the criteria of unconditional cooperation:

Resolution of
all outstanding issues raised by UNSCOM and the IAEA.

Unfettered access
for inspectors with no restrictions, consistent with the February
23 memorandum signed by Iraq.

Turnover by Iraq
of all relevant documents.

Acceptance by
Iraq of all U.N. resolutions related to mass destructions weapons.

No interference
with the independence or professional expertise of weapons inspectors.

Despite its pledges
on November 14-15, Iraq began to impede the work of U.N. weapons inspectors
once more, according to statements by UNSCOM Chief Butler on December
8. On December 15, Butler submitted a report in which he concluded that
"Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November
1998" and "initiated new forms of restrictions upon the Commission's work."
On December 15, Butler withdrew remaining UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq,
saying that they could no longer perform their mission. On the following
day, then President Clinton directed U.S. forces to strike military and
security targets in Iraq. He described the mission as "to attack Iraq's
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and its military capacity
to threaten its neighbors."

Attacks began on
December 16, 1998, at 5:06 p.m. EST (December 17 at 1:06 a.m. Baghdad
time) in an operation known as Desert Fox, as U.S. forces launched over
200 cruise missiles (officials declined to give an exact number) at over
50 targets in Iraq, from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise, other
Navy ships in the region, and some 70 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.
According to some media reports, B-52 bombers based in the Indian Ocean
island of Diego Garcia took part as well. British forces also joined in
the attacks. A second wave of attacks took place on the evening of December
17-18, involving approximately 100 cruise missiles (but with larger warheads
than those used in the first wave of attacks) and B-52 bombers, again
with British participation. B-1 bombers joined the attack during the third
wave (evening of December 18-19), marking the first combat operations
for this aircraft. After the fourth wave of attacks (evening of December
19-20), President Clinton halted the 72-hour operation (code named Operation
Desert Fox) on December 20. Senior U.S. officials warned that the United
States would repeat its attacks as often as necessary to prevent Iraq
from continuing programs to develop mass destruction weapons.

During Operation
Desert Fox, U.S. and British forces launched approximately 415 cruise
missiles (325 Tomahawks fired by Navy ships and 90 air launched cruise
missiles mainly by B-52s) and dropped more than 600 bombs. According to
reports by the U.S. Department of Defense, the 97 targets of allied attacks
included lethal weapons production or storage facilities (11), security
facilities for weapons (18), Iraqi Republican Guards and other military
facilities (9), government command, control, and communications facilities
(20), air defense systems (32), airfields (6), and one oil refinery. According
to preliminary Defense Department assessments on December 20, 10 targets
were destroyed, 18 severely damaged, 18 moderately damaged, 18 lightly
damaged, and 23 not yet assessed. A second assessment on December 21 cited
a total of 98 targets, of which 43 were severely damaged or destroyed,
30 moderately damaged, 12 lightly damaged, and 13 not damaged. The U.S.
theater commander described the estimates as conservative, pointing out
that even lightly damaged facilities can be rendered unusable. There were
no U.S. or British casualties. According to the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister,
the allied action killed 62 Iraqi military personnel (including 38 Republican
Guards) and wounded 180; there have been no estimates of Iraqi civilian
casualties. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Harry Shelton
told the Senate on January 5, 1999, however, that allied strikes killed
or wounded an estimated 1,400 members of Iraq's elite military and security
forces (600 from the Special Republican Guard and 800 from the Republican
Guard).

Further
Actions

A series of follow-on
military actions have occurred since December 28, 1998, as Iraqi air defenses
have tried to target U.S. and British aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones
and Iraqi aircraft have made brief intrusions into the zones. A U.S. Defense
Department official told a congressional committee on March 23, 2000,
that Iraq violated the no-fly zones more than 600 times during 1999, either
by sending aircraft into the prohibited air space or by firing at coalition
aircraft with anti-aircraft guns or surface-to-air missiles. In a mid-June
2000 interview, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),
which covers most of the Persian Gulf region, cited nearly a thousand
Iraqi violations since December 1998. A U.S. Defense Department spokesman
on September 14, 2000, cited more than 150 violations of no-fly zones
since December 1998, apparently referring only to penetrations by Iraqi
aircraft.

U.S. Air Force and
Navy aircraft, as well as British aircraft, have responded to Iraqi challenges
with anti-radiation missile strikes directed against Iraq air defense
and command and control installations and have fired at intruding Iraqi
aircraft. According to a U.S. Defense Department spokesman on August 1,
2000, U.S. aircraft have flown more than 200,000 sorties in the south
since Operation Southern Watch began in August 1992 and more than 16,000
sorties under Operation Northern Watch, which began in January 1997. (The
spokesman did not indicate the number of sorties flown under Operation
Provide Comfort, which preceded Northern Watch and covered the period
from April 1991 to December 1996.)

Official Iraqi media
reported on January 3, 1999 that President Saddam Hussein condemned the
no-fly zones as illegal and said his people would resist them with "bravery
and courage." The Iraqi President followed up by offering a $14,000 bounty
to any unit that succeeded in shooting down an allied plane and an additional
$2,800 reward for capturing an allied pilot. In a May 8, 2000 interview,
the U.S. commander of Operation Northern Watch said Iraqi air defense
weapons, which can reach altitudes of 40,000 feet, have the capability
to hit U.S. aircraft. According to a July 24 press report, however, the
newly designated CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee
that Iraqi air defense missiles are largely ineffective because they do
not use their radar systems (which allied pilots can target) and because
they must move frequently (approximately every 12 hours). On June 15,
the commander of Iraqi air defense forces asserted that Iraq had succeeded
in shooting down or intercepting 100 U.S. high-speed anti-radar missiles
(HARM) used by allies to target Iraqi radar; however, allied sources dismissed
the Iraqi claim. Similarly, allied officials state that no U.S. or British
planes have been lost, despite Iraqi claims to the contrary. (On September
13, 2000, an Iraqi air defense spokesman asserted that Iraqi air defense
units had shot down 10 allied aircraft since December 17, 1998.)

Iraq has claimed
that allied air strikes have killed a number of Iraqi civilians. According
to a June 16, 2000 press article, the Iraqi Air Defense Commander said
approximately 300 Iraqis had been killed (including more than 200 civilians)
and more than 800 wounded by U.S. retaliatory attacks since President
Saddam ordered Iraqi air defense units to resist allied overflights (i.e.,
since early January 1999). The speaker of the Iraqi parliament cited 311
wounded and 927 wounded in a letter circulated on August 28. On January
25, 2001, the Iraqi government was quoted in a press article as claiming
323 civilians had been killed and 960 wounded by allied air strikes since
the end of 1998. U.S. and British officials have denied some Iraqi reports
of civilian casualties and have attributed others to the Iraqi practice
of placing air defense weapons in close proximity to populated areas,
thus using nearby residents as human shields. For example, on August 18,
1999, U.S. Defense Department officials said reconnaissance photographs
showed two Iraqi missile launchers located 115 feet from homes in the
northern Iraqi city of Mosul. On at least one occasion, in May 1999, U.S.
authorities reportedly acknowledged the likelihood that allied units had
erroneously identified a civilian target as an air defense installation.

In the past, U.S.
responses to Iraqi violations of the no-fly zones were usually confined
to the immediate source of the violation, i.e., an air defense battery
or an intruding Iraqi aircraft. On January 27, 1999, authorities expanded
rules of engagement to allow U.S. aircraft to target a wider range of
Iraqi air defense systems and related installations in response to Iraqi
violations of the no-fly zones. This policy has continued. In congressional
testimony on March 23, 2000, a Defense Department official said operational
commanders have been given additional flexibility in responding to Iraqi
provocations; under the current rules of engagement, pilots may respond
not only by defending themselves but also by acting to reduce the overall
Iraqi air defense threat to coalition aircraft. But, according to an October
25, 2000 news article, U.S. commanders have directed pilots in the Northern
Watch area to adopt a somewhat less confrontational approach, for example,
by dropping bombs only when fired upon by Iraqi air defense, launching
fewer missile strikes and taking further measures to avoid civilian casualties.

U.S. officials describe
these on-going military operations as part of a long-standing U.S. policy
to contain Iraq. They believe the allied overflights and responses have
been effective in restraining Saddam Hussein from attacking neighboring
states or his own citizens (Kurds in the north and Shi'ites in the south);
in demonstrating to Iraq that the United States is serious about enforcing
the no-fly zones; and in degrading the Iraqi air defense system and associated
communications. On March 23, 2000, a Defense Department official said
that "Coalition responses have caused a significant degradation of Iraqi
air defense capabilities in the [no-fly] zones," thereby reducing threats
to U.S. forces if they should have to conduct more sustained military
action in Iraq. (In mid-June, then CENTCOM Commander, General Anthony
Zinni, estimated that allied military action had destroyed more than 30%
of Iraq's air defense system.) The Defense Department official added,
however, that Iraq has begun to rebuild some facilities damaged in the
December 1998 Operation Desert Fox, including facilities that might support
Iraq's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction In this connection,
according to U.S. officials quoted in a press report of February 1, 2000,
satellite photographs and intelligence reports confirm that Iraq has rebuilt
some installations destroyed during Desert Fox, including 12 missile factories
and related industrial sites.

Recent
Iraqi Challenges. Iraqi officials continued to voice determination
to resist allied enforcement of the no-fly zone. On September 4, Iraqi
combat aircraft overflew the southern no-fly zone and, reportedly, penetrated
Saudi air space. In a further move, on November 5, Iraq resumed domestic
air service, which had been suspended in 1992, sending civilian flights
to the cities of Mosul and Basra that lie within the northern and southern
no-fly zones, respectively. According to news reports, U.S. and British
authorities did not object, taking the position that the no-fly zones
are meant to inhibit only military activity. A U.S. Defense Department
spokesman told reporters on November 7 that allied units enforcing the
no-fly zones are capable of distinguishing between Iraqi civilian transports
and combat aircraft.

The Commander of
Iraqi Air Defense Forces, speaking on December 18, dismissed "threats"
by then U.S. Secretary of State designate Colin Powell and said Iraqi
air defense units were ready to retaliate if the incoming Bush Administration
should threaten Iraq. On January 1, 2001, Iraqi newspapers criticized
a call by pro-Western Gulf states for Iraq to cooperate with U.N. weapons
inspections, and added that Gulf states should demand an end to U.S. and
British air strikes launched from Saudi and Kuwaiti territories. According
to Kurdish sources, an Iraqi military unit briefly moved about five kilometers
into the northern Kurdish enclave on December 9 but withdrew within a
few days. A U.S. Defense Department spokesman noted that the Iraqi incursion
was brief and that the Iraqi unit did not conduct any attacks.

On January 18, 2001,
just prior to his inauguration, then President-elect Bush denounced Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein as a "big threat" and said his Administration
would use force against Saddam if Iraq were found to be developing weapons
of mass destruction. On January 28, Vice President Cheney called Saddam
"very much a force for instability in the region" and warned the Iraqi
leader not to miscalculate as he did with the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Two days later, an Iraqi artillery commander told journalists that Iraq
had upgraded its mortars and missile launchers and could hit targets deep
inside Israel if permitted by neighboring countries to deploy to locations
near the Israeli border.

The
February 2001 Strikes. On February 16, between the hours of 11:20
a.m. and 1:40 p.m. Washington, D.C. time, 24 U.S. and British combat aircraft
struck five Iraqi air defense command-and-control installations, using
precision guided munitions. According to a U.S. Defense Department spokesman,
the installations struck by the allied aircraft were located north of
the 33rd parallel (the northern limit of the southern no-fly
zone), but the aircraft themselves did not go north of the 33rd
parallel. The spokesman said the strikes were prompted by an increase
in the frequency and sophistication of Iraqi air defense operations over
a two-month period, resulting in heightened risk to allied air force units
enforcing the southern no-fly zone. He noted that there have been 65 provocations
during the first six weeks of the year 2001 by Iraqi air defense units
(51 involving anti-aircraft artillery and 14 involving surface-to-air
missiles), as compared with 221 provocations throughout the entire year
2000. He noted that this was the first time since Operation Desert Fox
that allied aircraft had hit targets outside the southern no-fly zone,
although targets outside the northern zone had been struck during the
fall of 1999.

Although press sources
speculated that the Bush Administration had launched the strikes to demonstrate
its determination to confront Iraq, Defense spokesmen characterized the
strikes as solely a military operation based on recommendations from the
field. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that "The objective
of today's mission by coalition forces was to degrade Iraqi air defense
capabilities and thus reduce the threat posed to coalition aircraft and
crews." According to press reports, one goal of the allied strikes was
to destroy a fiber optic cable network that Chinese are reportedly installing
to upgrade the effectiveness of Iraqi air defense radars.

Subsequent press
reports indicated that many of the munitions fired by allied units had
missed their targets; according to these reports, a majority of the AGM-154A
Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOWs) dropped by U.S. aircraft went astray,
although two other types of "smart weapons" (AGM-130 guided missiles and
Stand-Off Land Attack missiles) achieved somewhat more success. These
alleged problems have been attributed by press sources to several possible
factors: human error in programming, heavy wind, software defects, mechanical
failure, or jamming of signals by Iraqis; officials reportedly believe
the first two explanations are the most likely. Defense spokesmen have
declined to identify the munitions used in the strikes and have said bomb
damage assessments are not complete; however, they have stated that the
strikes had "good effectiveness" in disrupting and degrading the capability
of Iraqi's integrated air defense system.

Force
Deployments and Costs

The
1998 Build-Up

U.S. force levels
have fluctuated somewhat since the latest series of confrontations that
began in the fall of 1997. During the mid-1990s, U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf region on an average comprised 15,000 to 20,000 personnel (many of
them Navy and Marine Corps personnel embarked on ships), together with
up to 200 aircraft and 20 ships, usually but not always including an aircraft
carrier. The first phase of the crisis saw U.S. force levels increase
to more than 40,000 personnel in late February and March, reinforced with
British and other allied contingents. As the crisis receded later in the
spring, forces were briefly drawn back down to their pre-1997 levels.

As the crisis worsened
again in the fall of 1998, U.S. force levels in the Gulf began to climb
once more. Additional deployments begun on November 11 were briefly halted
after November 16, following cancellation of planned allied strikes in
response to a last-minute understanding reached with Iraq. As Iraq failed
to honor its November commitments, Secretary Cohen announced "a sharp
increase in our forces in the Gulf" (approximately 24,100 personnel as
of December 15). Cohen and General Shelton announced the deployment of
a "crisis response force" consisting of nearly 60 additional Air Force
and Marine jet fighters (including 10 F-117A radar-evading stealth fighters),
additional Patriot missiles, elements of an Army brigade (some 2,700 troops),
and a second aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Carl Vinson with up to 60 Navy
jet fighters, to the Gulf region. According to subsequent reports, up
to 15,000 additional military personnel were deployed or ordered to the
region. During Operation Desert Fox, Defense Department officials said
U.S. force strength in the Gulf reached 29,900 on December 19, together
with 37 ships and 348 aircraft.

After
Desert Fox

These forces were
once more reduced after Operation Desert Fox was over, even though smaller
scale military action continued. U.S. commanders pointed out that the
lack of an effective Iraqi response to Desert Fox made the reinforcements
unnecessary at this time, and said the United States would return to a
normal continuous presence in the Gulf. Most U.S. personnel in the region,
including those conducting Operation Southern Watch, are assigned to the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), whose area of responsibility covers large
parts of the Middle East and portions of nearby northeastern Africa. U.S.
forces conducting Operation Northern Watch are based in Turkey and assigned
to U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The task forces responsible for enforcing
the two no-fly zones are linked by a hot line and coordinate many of their
operations. On September 12, 2000, a Defense Department official said
that at any given time the United States has between 20,000 and 25,000
personnel in the region, most of them afloat. (See Table 1 for varying
estimates of U.S. troop strength in the Gulf region.)

Table
1. Comparative U.S. Force Levels in Persian Gulf: 1997-1999

Date

Personnel

Aircraft

Ships

Source
of Data

mid-1997

20,000

200

20

News reports
and transcripts

03/1998

44,700

355a

34

DOD NB* 05/19/98,
08/12/98

06/1998

29,800

195

21

DOD NB 06/18/98

08/1998

19,650

165

20b

DOD NB 08/12/98

11/1998

23,500

173

23

DOD NB 11/10/98

12/1998

29,900

348

37

AFPS** 12/28/98

03/1999

24,400

189

30

AFPS 03/05/99

05/1999

18,500

208

c

USA Today
05/18/99

07/1999

c

200

24

Washington
Post 07/15/99

08/1999

22,000

200

19

London Times
08/23/99

03/2000

17,000-25,000

175

30

DOD Official-Congressional
Testimony

06/2000

24,500

c

c

DOD Staff

09/2000

20,000-25,000

c

c

DOD NB 09/12/2000

12/2000d

24,000

270

c

Army Times
12/18/2000

a. Interpolated

b. Estimated

c. No figure provided
by source

Consisting of
11,000 ground-based and 13,000 ship-based personnel. Source indicates
these figures apply only to personnel in the CENTCOM area, thus excluding
approximately 1,500 personnel stationed in Turkey to enforce Operation
Northern Watch.

* Department of Defense
News Briefing

** Armed Forces Press
Service

As of August 1999,
Britain had 1,400 military personnel, a supply ship, and 26 military aircraft
in the Gulf region, including 12 Tornado GR-1 bombers operating out of
Kuwait and 6 Tornado air defense aircraft in Saudi Arabia. A more recent
news report, on October 25, 2000, places British personnel strength in
the Northern Watch area of operations at 162. This figure does not include
British personnel in the Southern Watch area.

Costs

A Defense Department
spokesman told reporters on November 17, 1998 that expanded military operations
and crisis build-ups in the Gulf since the war in 1991 had cost a total
of $6.9 billion. Much of this figure represents the costs of enforcing
the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. Following are costs
estimates for several other crisis build-ups and retaliatory operations
undertaken by the United States between 1991 and 1997.

Troop movements
and retaliatory strikes against Iraq, December 1992-January 1993:
$400 million

Incremental costs
of U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf since FY1997 appear in Table 2,
below.

Table
2. Costs of Persian Gulf Operations(in U.S. $ millions)

Operation

FY1998

FY1999

FY2000

FY2001*

Southern Watch

1,497.2

954.8

755.4

678.0

Northern Watch

136.0

156.4

143.6

138.7

Desert Spring
(Kuwait training)**

5.6

13.8

239.8

241.8

Desert Thunder
(Nov. 1998 build-up)

n/a

43.5

n/a

n/a

Desert Fox (Dec.
1998 air strikes)

n/a

92.9

n/a

n/a

Totals

1,638.8

1,261.4

1,138.8

1,058.5

*Estimate

**Known as Intrinsic
Action until FY2000

Source: Department
of Defense, Comptroller

Britain, according
to an August 23, 1999 London Times report, is spending approximately 4.5
million pounds ($7.19 million at exchange rate of U.K. 1 pound=U.S. $1.5974)
per month on its deployments in the Gulf.

U.S.
and International Reactions

Administration
Position on Use of Force

U.S. administrations
have taken the position that they already have sufficient authority to
use military force to compel Iraqi compliance. On February 3, 1998, during
an earlier phase of the present confrontation, Clinton Administration
officials reportedly cited the joint resolution passed by Congress on
the eve of the 1991 Gulf war P.L. 102-1 as the basis for this authority.
P.L. 102-1 has no expiration date, and some specialists in international
law agree that this law provides sufficient authority to U.S. administrations
to use force against Iraq.

In the international
context, the United States believes that two previous U.N. Security Council
resolutions provide sufficient authority to use force against Iraq: Resolution
678 (November 29, 1990), which authorized military action after Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait, and Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), which made a cease-fire
conditional on Iraqi compliance with various specified terms, including
the inspection and dismantling of Iraq's lethal weapons programs. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1154 of March 2, 1998 (see above) does not
specifically mention the use of force, but warns Iraq of "severest consequences"
for violation. In a news conference on March 11, President Clinton said
"We believe that the resolution gives us the authority to take whatever
actions are necessary. But, of course, we would consult [with other Security
Council members]." Subsequently, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1205
of November 5, 1998 condemned Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM
as a "flagrant violation" of Resolution 687 and other relevant agreements,
and expressed full support for efforts by the Secretary General to seek
full implementation of the February 23 agreement. Other members of the
Security Council, however, with the notable exception of Britain, do not
believe that the wording of recent U.N. Security Council resolutions provides
an automatic trigger authorizing military force.

Congressional
Reactions

Congress has been
largely supportive of Administration efforts to compel Iraqi compliance
with U.N. resolutions. Some Members have argued for even stronger measures
against Iraq, although others believe the Administration should seek further
congressional authorization before engaging in any significant escalation
of hostilities. Congress has also appropriated funds to defray the cost
of increased U.S. force deployments to the Gulf since 1997 (see CRS Report
98-386, Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998, updated
March 31, 1999, for further information on costs and appropriations).

Some Republican Members
of Congress questioned the timing of the Clinton Administration's decision
to launch the strikes in December 1998, noting that the decision coincided
with the floor debates in the House on impeachment of then President Clinton.
The President denied that issue of impeachment was related to his decision
to launch air strikes, and said the timing was dictated by the need for
surprise, along with his desire to avoid starting hostilities during the
month of Ramadan. On December 17, 1998, the House of Representatives passed
H.Res. 612, expressing unequivocal support for the men and women of our
Armed Forces carrying out missions in the Persian Gulf region, and supporting
efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from power, by 417 to 5, with one voting
"present" (Roll No. 539).

International
Reactions

International reactions
to U.S. reprisals against Iraq have been mixed and have varied according
to the nature of the crisis that precipitated a U.S. military response.
On the whole, altered international conditions have caused some erosion
since 1991 in international support for the use of force against Iraq.
Contributing factors include U.S.-Russian tensions, Arab disillusionment
with broader U.S. Middle East policies, diminished Arab concerns over
a potential threat from Iraq, and increasing sympathy for the sufferings
of the Iraqi people.

Most European allies
supported Desert Fox, as did Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Canada.
Britain, on its part, has continued to participate in U.S. military actions
against Iraq and, along with the United States, takes the position that
existing U.N. resolutions provide the necessary legal basis for such action.
France, on the other hand, regretted the air strikes and China and Russia
condemned them. France also suspended its participation in the allied
overflights of southern Iraq. The latter three countries have continued
to criticize the U.S.-British retaliatory responses to Iraqi challenges
in the no-fly zones since December 1998. Criticism increased after the
February 16, 2001 allied strikes on Iraq's air defense installations.
According to the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the
strikes as "counter-productive for the process of a political settlement"
and the French Foreign Minister said there was "no legal basis for this
type of bombardment." Turkey's Prime Minister said "[t]he U.S. Administration
should have informed us beforehand" of the strikes. In east Asia, Japan
declined either to endorse or to criticize the strikes, but South Korea's
national news agency warned that the "policy of strangling Iraq" has failed
to achieve its goals. Meanwhile, according to a U.S. official, the U.S.
State Department has been in touch with China about reports of Chinese
assistance in upgrading Iraqi air defense units.

Most Arab leaders
were restrained in their comments on the December 1998 strikes, but hostile
demonstrations took place in several countries including Egypt, Jordan,
Yemen, Palestinian areas, and Syria (where they briefly turned violent).
The 55-member Islamic Conference Organization appealed for a halt to the
attacks on Iraq. Kuwait and Oman, alone among the six pro-western Gulf
states, allowed U.S. and British combat aircraft to launch strikes from
bases on their territory. The other four, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), allowed support operations and including
air space clearance and take-off by refueling planes. Saudi Arabia expressed
hopes that the strikes would end quickly, and the UAE Defense Minister
went so far as to say "the option of force should not even have been considered,
as the only ones who suffer are the Iraqi people." On December 30, 1998,
Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan reaffirmed that Saudi Arabia would
not agree to air strikes from its territory, but called on Iraq to implement
U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Arab countries have
reacted ambivalently to follow-on allied military operations against Iraq
during 1999 and 2000. Gulf states have not publicly endorsed U.S. responses
to Iraqi challenges in the no-fly zones and Qatar's foreign minister expressed
concern during a joint news conference with then Secretary of Defense
Cohen on March 9, 1999, commenting that "We do not wish to see Iraq bombed
daily or these attacks which are being made in the no-fly zones." An Arab
League foreign ministers' meeting on March 18 called for an end to all
operations against Iraq not backed by the U.N. Security Council, but urged
all countries to abide by Security Council resolutions in "spirit and
letter." A year later, on April 9, 2000, Saudi Minister of Defense Prince
Sultan made the following statement in a news conference:

... the [U.S.]
troops which have been in Saudi Arabia since the end of Desert Storm
are within the frame of United Nations assignments and directions to
continue the surveillance of southern Iraq, and also the border of Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, as well as the other GCC countries. And these troops
are doing their duties to protect peace only, and not for aggression.

Arab governments,
including those friendly to the United States, denounced the allied strikes
conducted against Iraqi air defense installations on February 16, 2001.
The Secretary General of the Arab League stated that the raid "has no
justification, violates international law, and has provoked anger and
resentment in the Arab world." Egypt's Foreign Minister called the raid
"a serious negative step that we cannot accept," while his Jordanian counterpart
said Jordan "never condones the use of military force against Iraq." Saudi
Arabia withheld official comment and a senior Saudi official said his
country was not previously informed of the strikes. In nearby Oman, the
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs commented that "[t]hose attacks
will not benefit regional security or negotiations and discussions."

Challenges
to the Civil Air Embargo. In August 2000, European and Arab states
began to challenge a long-standing ban on civilian flights to Iraq. This
ban has been based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 670, which requires
member states to prohibit cargo flights to Iraq from their territory,
unless the plane is carrying humanitarian food authorized by the U.N.
Sanctions Committee or medical supplies. The United States interprets
Resolution 670 as banning passenger flights to Iraq as well, but France,
Russia, and most Arab states disagree. Since August, approximately 15
countries have sent flights to Iraq carrying food, medical supplies, and
delegations including politicians, artists, and businessmen. Some Arab
states have obtained permission from the U.N. Sanctions Committee; others
have merely informed the committee. France and Russia have taken the position
that they are under no obligation to receive U.N. clearance for such flights.
Russia has mentioned plans to resume civil air service to Iraq, and Jordan
has said it would seek U.N. permission to do so.

Plans
and Alternatives

Military options
present various challenges. Shipborne missile strikes against selected
Iraqi targets incur relatively few risks and have the added advantage
of not requiring overflight permission or logistical support from Gulf
allies; however, missile strikes have had only limited effects in the
past. Supplementing missile strikes with a more massive bombing campaign
could succeed in destroying some key military organizations, weapons production
facilities, and command and logistical installations, as in the recent
Desert Fox operation. A bombing campaign, however, entails risks to U.S.
pilots and aircrews, inflicts more civilian casualties, and elicits significant
opposition within the Arab world. A further limiting factor is the unwillingness
of Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states to permit air strikes from
their territory. Operation Desert Fox, which combined missile strikes
and a bombing campaign, was more extensive than any of the previous post-1991
confrontations, but some analysts still feel that it represented a limited
operation producing limited results. A former key U.S. official, quoted
in a December 8, 1999 press article, opined that it would have been better
to conduct an open-ended, massive operation tied to Iraq's acceptance
of unconditional international inspections.

Since Operation Desert
Fox, the Clinton Administration seemed to adopt a policy of limited escalation,
including responses to Iraqi challenges in the no-fly zones through low-level
aerial bombardment and missile strikes. On March 1, 1999, commenting on
the expanded rules of engagement governing allied military action against
Iraq, then Secretary of Defense Cohen told reporters that U.S. pilots
"have been given greater flexibility to attack those systems which place
them in jeopardy" and added that pilots can go after command, control,
and communications centers as well as simply respond to provocation from
an antiaircraft or air defense missile site. In describing the allied
air strikes against Iraqi air defense installations on February 16, 2001,
a Defense spokesman said such strikes on targets outside the no-fly zones
are not routine, but they do occur occasionally "as part and parcel to
protecting our aircraft." The air strikes against Iraq have also provided
an opportunity to test the new Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOWs), which
were designed to protect pilots by enabling them to fire precision missiles
from greater distances than traditional weapons. As noted earlier, press
reports questioned the accuracy of the JSOW in the aftermath of the February
2001 allied strikes on Iraqi air defense installations, although the U.S.
Defense Department has not confirmed the use of JSOW in that operation.

Some commentators
have suggested that, in addition to targeting Iraq's air defense capability,
the allied strikes serve as a psychological weapon against key Iraqi commanders
and military units. According to this theory, the strikes are designed
to send a message that the regime is vulnerable and that Iraqi attempts
to shoot down an allied pilot will backfire. Iraq, on its part, seems
to be trying to achieve that goal by luring U.S. or British aircraft within
range of Iraqi air defense batteries. U.S. officials, quoted in a February
1, 2000 press report, emphasized that a U.S. attack (presumably on the
scale of Desert Fox) did not appear imminent, but warned that Iraq should
not cross three "red lines": a threat against a neighboring country (Kuwait
or Saudi Arabia); an attack on the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq;
or reconstitution of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs.
U.S. Ambassador-at-Large David Scheffer, in a briefing on August 2, 2000,
warned that the United States "would take an appropriate response" if
Iraq should "come uninvited into the north." As noted above, however,
Defense Department officials dismissed the Iraqi incursion into the Kurdish
enclave on December 9, 2000, as a short-lived troop movement that did
not involve any attacks on Kurdish targets.

Ground action, which
would probably be necessary if the U.S. government should seek to overturn
the Iraqi regime, would not be feasible without more widespread allied
support than currently exists; neither Saudi Arabia nor any other neighboring
country is likely to permit the United States to stage a ground invasion
of Iraq from its territory. A ground invasion would be costly, particularly
if the object were to unseat the incumbent regime.

Members of Congress
from both parties have expressed support for military action against Iraq.
Some have suggested that diplomatic efforts have been exhausted and that
failure to retaliate will embolden Saddam to mount more serious challenges.
At least one Member has suggested the use of ground troops, as well as
piloted aircraft, to supplement missile strikes. At the same time, others
have expressed concern over the burdens placed on U.S. Air Force assets
by continuing air operations over Iraq, as well as the risks to pilots
in the event of a mechanical failure or a successful hit by an Iraqi air
defense unit. There have been suggestions to scale back the U.S. presence
in the Gulf and rely more on long-range power projection capabilities.
In a press interview on August 23, 1999, then CENTCOM commander General
Anthony Zinni said that repeated Iraqi challenges to allied aircraft enforcing
the air exclusion zone made this an inopportune time to pull back forces,
and in mid-June 2000, said he would like to see even more allied military
presence in the region. General Zinni's successor, General Tommy Franks,
added that risks resulting from Iraqi air defense capabilities have been
reduced significantly since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.

U.S. officials and
analysts have suggested various other options that could be used in conjunction
with or as a substitute for a conventional military attack. These options
include further curtailments on Iraqi military activity, more emphasis
on unconventional warfare, or more active support for anti-government
militia or other opposition groups in their efforts to topple the regime
of Saddam Hussein. For example, the United States could consider extending
the two no-fly zones imposed by the allies over northern and southern
Iraq to cover the entire country, coupled with a ban on helicopter flights
and imposition of "no-drive" zones forbidding movement of Iraqi armored
forces in designated areas. To enforce such measures, however, the United
States and its allies would have to allocate more assets, incur greater
risks, and deal with further challenges by Iraq. Another approach would
involve covert action against the Iraqi regime, combined with an expanded
program to buttress the efforts of opposition groups. (For more information,
see CRS Report 98-179 (pdf), Iraq's Opposition Movements, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Many analysts believe the opposition is too fragmented and lacking in
support within the Iraqi heartland to be effective, and cite the failure
of previous efforts to build a viable opposition in Iraq. Others maintain
that the United States has provided insufficient support to opposition
groups and missed key opportunities to further their efforts.