enDid the 2017 Tax Reform Discriminate against Blue State Voters?https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/research/publications/wp/2019/07-did-the-2017-tax-reform-discriminate-against-blue-state-voters-2019-04-10.pdf
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Papers by David E. Altig, Alan J. Auerbach, Patrick C. Higgins, Darryl Koehler, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Michael Leiseca, Ellie Terry and Victor YeDid the 2017 Tax Reform Discriminate against Blue State Voters?2019-04-01T00:00:07ZThe Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) made significant changes to corporate and personal federal income taxation, including limiting the SALT (state and local property, income and sales taxes) deductibility to $10,000. States with high SALT tend to vote Democratic. This paper estimates the differential effect of the TCJA on red- and blue-state taxpayers and investigates the importance of the SALT limitation to this differential. We calculate the effect of permanent implementation of the TCJA on households using The Fiscal Analyzer: a life-cycle, consumption-smoothing program incorporating all major federal and state fiscal policies. We find that the average percentage increase in remaining lifetime spending under the TCJA is 1.6 percent in red states versus 1.3 percent in blue states. Among the richest 10 percent of households, this differential is larger. Rich households in red states enjoyed a 2.0 percent increase compared to a 1.2 percent increase among the rich in blue-state households. This gap is driven almost entirely by the limitation on the SALT deduction. Excluding the SALT limitation from the TCJA results in a spending gain of 2.6 percent for rich red-state households compared to 2.7 percent for rich blue-state households.Did the 2017 Tax Reform Discriminate against Blue State Voters?Full texthttps://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/research/publications/wp/2019/07-did-the-2017-tax-reform-discriminate-against-blue-state-voters-2019-04-10.pdfDavid E. AltigAlan J. AuerbachDarryl KoehlerLaurence J. KotlikoffMichael LeisecaEllie TerryVictor YePatrick C. HigginsDavid E. Altig, Alan J. Auerbach, Patrick C. Higgins, Darryl Koehler, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Michael Leiseca, Ellie Terry and Victor Ye2019-04-01Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working PapersD15D31D72E62H20H22H71The Global Macroeconomics of a Trade War. The EAGLE model on the US-China trade conflicthttps://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/wp623_tcm47-381884.pdf
Netherlands Bank DNB Working Papers by Wilko Bolt, Kostas Mavromatis and Sweder van WijnbergenThe Global Macroeconomics of a Trade War. The EAGLE model on the US-China trade conflict2019-01-01T00:06:23ZWe study the global macroeconomic effects of tariffs using a multiregional, general equilibrium model, EAGLE, that we extend by introducing US tariffs against Chinese imports into the US, and subsequently Chinese tariffs against US imports into China, consistent with recent trade policies by the US and the Chinese governments. We abstract from tariffs on goods exported from the euro area, focusing on a US-China trade war. A unilateral tariff from the US against China dampens US exports in line with the Lerner Symmetry theorem but global output contracts. Global output contracts even further after China retaliates. The euro area benefits from this trade war. These European trade diversion benefits are caused by cheaper imports from China and Europe&#39;s improved competitiveness in the US. As price stickiness in the export sector in each region increases, the negative effects of tariffs in the US and China are mitigated, but the positive effects in the euro area are then also dampened.The Global Macroeconomics of a Trade War. The EAGLE model on the US-China trade conflictFull texthttps://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/wp623_tcm47-381884.pdfSweder van WijnbergenWilko BoltKostas MavromatisWilko Bolt, Kostas Mavromatis and Sweder van Wijnbergen2019-01Netherlands Bank DNB Working PapersE32F30H22The Macroeconomic Effects of Trade Policyhttps://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1242.pdf
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Financial Discussion Papers by Christopher J. Erceg, Andrea Prestipino and Andrea RaffoThe Macroeconomic Effects of Trade Policy2018-12-01T00:12:42ZWe study the short-run macroeconomic effects of trade policies that are equivalent in a friction-less economy, namely a uniform increase in import tariffs and export subsidies (IX), an increase in value-added taxes accompanied by a payroll tax reduction (VP), and a border adjustment of corporate pro.t taxes (BAT). Using a dynamic New Keynesian open-economy framework, we summarize conditions for exact neutrality and equivalence of these policies. Neutrality requires the real exchange rate to appreciate enough to fully offset the effects of the policies on net exports. We argue that a combination of higher import tariffs and export subsidies is likely to trigger only a partial exchange rate offset and thus boosts net exports and output (with the output stimulus largely due to the subsidies). Under full pass-through of taxes, IX and BAT are equivalent but VP is not. We show that a temporary VP can increase intertemporal prices enough to depress aggregate demand and output, even when wages are sticky. These contractionary effects are especially pronounced under fixed exchange rates.The Macroeconomic Effects of Trade PolicyFull texthttps://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1242.pdfChristopher J. ErcegAndrea RaffoAndrea PrestipinoChristopher J. Erceg, Andrea Prestipino and Andrea Raffo2018-12Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Financial Discussion PapersE32F30H22Hidden Baggage : Behavioral Responses to Changes in Airline Ticket Tax Disclosurehttps://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018057pap.pdf
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by Sebastien Bradley and Naomi E. FeldmanHidden Baggage : Behavioral Responses to Changes in Airline Ticket Tax Disclosure2018-08-14T00:00:00ZWe examine the impact on air travelers of an enforcement action issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation in January 2012 that required U.S. air carriers and online travel agents to incorporate all mandatory taxes and fees into their advertised fares. Exploiting cross-itinerary ticket tax variation within international city market pairs, we provide evidence that the more prominent display of tax-inclusive prices is associated with a significant reduction in tax incidence on consumers and a decline in passenger volume along more heavily-taxed itineraries. Ticket revenues are commensurately reduced. These results suggest a pronounced degree of inattention to ticket taxes prior to the introduction of full-fare advertising and reinforces the theoretical predictions and experimental findings of the literature on tax salience in a quasi-experimental context where taxes average more than $100 per ticket and where firms may engage in price-setting behavior.Hidden Baggage : Behavioral Responses to Changes in Airline Ticket Tax DisclosureFull texthttps://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018057pap.pdfSebastien BradleyNaomi E. FeldmanSebastien Bradley and Naomi E. Feldman2018-08-14Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesD18D90H22H31L5Price strategies of independent and branded dealers in retail gas market. The case of a contract reform in Spainhttps://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosTrabajo/18/Files/dt1818e.pdf
Bank of Spain Working Papers by Pilar Cuadrado, Aitor Lacuesta, María de los Llanos Matea and F. Javier Palencia-GonzálezPrice strategies of independent and branded dealers in retail gas market. The case of a contract reform in Spain2018-06-01T00:00:18ZThis paper analyses how the contract structure between gas stations and the wholesale operator affects price strategies. Using daily data on prices of different gas stations the paper finds that independent dealers charge lower margins than other dealers with different contracts. One potential hypothesis is that this is the case because independent stations react more to the number of competitors. We use the introduction of a discretional regional excise duty (IVMDH) on gas stations to check the reaction of markups to changes in marginal costs of the actual number of competitors. Results are consistent with the idea that regardless the type of contract all dealers react notably to the increases in relative marginal costs by decreasing average markups. We use those results to interpret the inexistent reduction in markups that followed a change in the Spanish regulation that took place in 2013 fostering competition in the retail sector. One potential interpretation is that the big increase in independent stations following the reform was not considered an increase in actual competition for most of the incumbent stations.Price strategies of independent and branded dealers in retail gas market. The case of a contract reform in SpainFull texthttps://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosTrabajo/18/Files/dt1818e.pdfPilar CuadradoAitor LacuestaMaría de los Llanos MateaF. Javier Palencia-GonzálezPilar Cuadrado, Aitor Lacuesta, María de los Llanos Matea and F. Javier Palencia-González2018-06Bank of Spain Working PapersD40H22H23L13Q41Do Mortgage Subsidies Help or Hurt Borrowers?http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016081pap.pdf
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by David E. RappoportDo Mortgage Subsidies Help or Hurt Borrowers?2016-10-14T06:23:00ZMortgage subsidies affect homeownership costs by reducing effective mortgage rates and increasing house prices. I show analytically the role of mortgage subsidies in determining house price changes, economic incidence, and efficiency costs using a theoretical framework for applied welfare analysis. I derive simple expressions for these effects, as functions of reduced-form sufficient statistics, which I use to measure the effects from eliminating mortgage deductions. My main results characterize the distributional impact of mortgage subsidies among buyers and owners and how house price responses attenuate efficiency losses. My results provide broader methodological insights into the welfare analysis of credit policies.Do Mortgage Subsidies Help or Hurt Borrowers?Full texthttp://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016081pap.pdfDavid E. RappoportDavid E. Rappoport2016-10Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesH22R21Income Instability and Fiscal Progressionhttp://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{4F45D0A3-18BF-E6D0-3F1B-712789941F6C}.pdf
Bank of Mexico Working Papers by Garcia-Medina Cecilia; Jean-Francois WenIncome Instability and Fiscal Progression2016-06-14T17:36:59ZWe construct the ratio of the post-fisc to the pre-fisc transitory component of the variance of family incomes in Canada from 1993 and 2008. The ratio measures how much the tax and transfer system attenuates market income instability. It is shown that the ratio of variances is equivalent theoretically to the concept of residual income progression. The fiscal system became less stabilizing beginning in the late 1990s, especially for families headed by main earners with less than high school education. The trend is attributable to personal income tax reforms and reductions in transfers for lower income families.Income Instability and Fiscal ProgressionFull texthttp://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{4F45D0A3-18BF-E6D0-3F1B-712789941F6C}.pdfCecilia Garcia-MedinaWen Jean-FrancoisGarcia-Medina Cecilia; Jean-Francois Wen2016-06Bank of Mexico Working PapersH22H53J38Changes in the Distribution of After-Tax Wealth: Has Income Tax Policy Increased Wealth Inequality?http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015058pap.pdf
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by Adam Looney and Kevin B. MooreChanges in the Distribution of After-Tax Wealth: Has Income Tax Policy Increased Wealth Inequality?2015-08-04T06:19:00ZA substantial share of the wealth of Americans is held in tax-deferred form such as in retirement accounts or as unrealized capital gains. Most data and statistics on assets and wealth is reported on a pre-tax basis, but pre-tax values include an implicit tax liability and may not provide as accurate a measure of the financial position or material well-being of families. In this paper, we describe the distribution of tax-deferred assets in the SCF from 1989 to 2013, provide new estimates of the income tax liabilities implicit in those assets, and present new statistics on the level and distribution of after-tax net worth. The results of our analysis suggest that, relative to published statistics on pre-tax net worth, the distribution of after-tax wealth is slightly less concentrated at each point in time and the effectiveness of the income tax system in reducing wealth inequality has decreased during the last decade. We find the reduction in the long-term capital gains rate is the primary reason for the muted effectiveness of the income tax system in reducing wealth inequality.Changes in the Distribution of After-Tax Wealth: Has Income Tax Policy Increased Wealth Inequality?Abstracthttp://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/index.htm#2015058Full texthttp://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015058pap.pdfAdam LooneyKevin B. MooreAdam Looney and Kevin B. Moore2015-08-03Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesH22H24Inter-temporal Differences in the Income Elasticity of Demand for Lottery Ticketshttp://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2007/2007-042.pdf
St Louis Fed Working Papers by Thomas A. Garrett, and Cletus C. CoughlinInter-temporal Differences in the Income Elasticity of Demand for Lottery Tickets2007-10-11T07:14:59ZInter-temporal Differences in the Income Elasticity of Demand for Lottery TicketsFull texthttp://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2007/2007-042.pdfThomas A. GarrettCletus C. CoughlinThomas A. Garrett, and Cletus C. Coughlin2007-10Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Working PapersH22H71