James Carey and Stuart Hall

In A Cultural Approach To Communication, Jame Carey (1989)
distinguishes between the transmission and ritual perspectives of
communication. He characterizes the transmission view as, "‘imparting,’
‘sending,’ ‘transmitting,’ or ‘getting information to others"
(1989:15). The ritual view is characterized as "’sharing’,
‘participation’, ‘association’, ‘fellowship’, and ‘the possession
of a common faith’" (1989:18). He argues that a ritual view is directed "not
toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society
in time; not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared
beliefs" (1989:18). But isn't an expression for the purposes of representing
solidarity information? Is this distinction over-drawn? In this short essay I
will attempt to reconcile Carey’s communication perspectives within Stuart
Hall's framework.

In Encoding/Decoding, Stuart Hall argues that communication entails
the translation of a historical event into a story as part of the communicative
event. Hall's model of communication is most easily understood via its two
cardinal points: an encoding of a message by a sender which is then decoded by
the recipient. (Carey is seemingly more concerned with communication’s role
in a larger social realm.) "In a determinate moment the structure employs a
'code' and yields a 'message'; at another determinate moment the 'message', via
its decodings, issues into the structure of social practices." (Hall 2001:168)
Of course, the contextual meaning structures of the sender's and receiver's
social and economic relations are not identical. "What are called 'distortions'
or 'misunderstandings' arise precisely from the lack of equivalence between two
sides of the communication exchange." (Hall 2001:169) Yet, much of the intended
meaning might be perceived if there is a sharing of codes between the sender
and recipient, some of which are so common, achieving a near-universality, that
they become naturalized (Hall 2001:170).

So then, how might the line that Carey is attempting to draw be understood
within Hall's framework? A helpful bridge is Luhmann's understanding of
information: once information is expressed it is no longer information per se;
it has exhausted itself. Though, this "automatic mechanism does not exclude the
possibility of repetition" (2000:20). Repetition itself is a form of
meta-information that can be interpreted as indicating the value of the
repeated (now) non-information. Consequently, Carey seems to be arguing that
the ritual view focuses on the communication of this meta-information of
commonality, instead of novelty.

However, Luhmann alone is not sufficient for reconciling Hall and Carey.
First, Carey's text contains some caveats on the difference, and an ambiguity
regarding control I cannot completely resolve. Second, Carey and Hall each
collapse concepts that could be rendered as distinct: ontology, decodings, and
meaning.

On the question of the distinction between the transmission and ritual
perspectives of communication Carey himself includes some caveats. First, this
difference is not one of opposing forms, but of a perspective or "view." In
fact, Carey (1989:20) notes that the ritual view is more closely associated
with European scholarship. This cleavage might even be generalized to the
differences between the Continental school of "semiology" (Saussure and
Barthes) and the Anglo-American school of "semiotics" (Morris and Rommetveit).
Furthermore, Carey (1989:21) writes:

Neither of these counterposed views of communication necessarily denies what
the other affirms. A ritual view does not exclude the processes of
information transmission or attitude change. It merely contends that one
cannot understand these processes aright except insofar as they are cast
within an essentially ritualistic view of communication and social order.
Similarly, even writers indissolubly wedded to the transmission view of
communication must include some notion ... of ritual action in the social
life.

However, I can not yet reconcile a distinguishing characteristic of these
two views: control. Carey's very definition of the transmission view depends
upon it, "Communication is the process whereby messages are transmitted and
distributed in space for the control of distance and people" (1989:15). On the
other hand, "The ritual view of communication is directed not toward the
extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in the
time" (1989:18). How could the transmission of a friendly telegraph be
considered a form of control, but not the maintenance of social order?! It's
difficult to determine. But, if one put asides the confusing use of the term
and instead refocus on the process of communication one can find much
similarity between Carey and Hall.

Carey defines communication as, "A symbolic process whereby reality is
produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed" (1989:23). What Carey means by
reality here is "a more substantial domain of existence" layered upon a "real
world of objects, the events, and processes that we observe" (1989:25) . While
Hall does not explicitly address the ontological issue of objective and
constructed reality, his theory clearly presumes "historical events" and that a
sign "possesses some of the properties of the thing represented" (2001:169).
(Rommetveit (1968:Figure 8) is more explicit on this point and includes within
his model a domain of objects and events, people's cognitive representations of
that domain, word meanings, and encodings.)

As mentioned, Hall notes that certain codes can be so pervasive that they,
"appear not to be constructed ... but to be ‘naturally’ given" (2001:170).
He cautions that this does not mean that no codes have intervened, but they
have been profoundly naturalized. These naturalized codes constitute a
dominant culturalorder. Carey (1989:24 ) agrees:

There is a truth
in Marshall McLuhan's assertion that the one thing of which the fish is unaware
is water, the very medium that forms its ambiance and supports its existence.
Similarly, communication, through language and other symbolic forms,
compromises the ambiance of human existence ... the activities we collectively
called communication ... are so ordinary and mundane that it is difficult for
them to rest our attention"

And while Carey does not explicitly consider alternative decodings/readings
of messages, he does write of different (co-existent) maps that
simplify/abstract objective reality creating different symbolic realities
(1989:28).

This then, is how I interpret Carey's ritualistic communication in Hall's
framework:

The encodings produce information (Carey) or message events (Hall) from a
real world of objects (Carey) or historical events (Hall) in the sender’s
meanings structure (Hall) or map (Carey).

These are received and decoded (Hall) in the receiver’s meanings
structure (Hall) or map (Carey).

This process of symbolic circulation may have permitted the sender's
intended message to correspond (Hall) to the understanding of the receiver:
that it has been communicated with speed and effect (Carey).

Within this fairly complete translation between the two authors, a final
subtle difference becomes more clear: Carey's optimism regarding the dominant
cultural order. As already noted, maintenance of the social order seems to be a
good thing. Carey links ritualistic communication with sharing, fellowship, and
communion. But Hall’s model acknowledges the hegemonic potential of the
dominant encodings, and permits negotiated and even oppositional
decoding/reading.

Carey locates control in simple transmission; Hall in the
ritual/naturalized. Carey actually considers the ritual function of maintaining
the social order through "dramatic action" (1989:21) but chooses not to engage
with a radical critique. Instead, he concludes, "but social life is more than
power and trade ... it also includes the sharing of this that experience, the
religious ideas, personal values and the sentiments, and intellectual notions
-- a ritual border" (1989:34).

My conclusion is that ritualized communication should not go unexamined, but
that naturalized meanings need not always be suspect.