Katrina Report: The Final Version

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We've now got the full, final report, and are making our way through it. At first glance, it's much more thorough than the excerpts that leaked out, and does include a broader, more contextualized analysis than the previous week's headlines would have indicated (and, much more context than the excerpts included).

And, not so suprisingly, many of the prescriptions in the House report echo those in our March cover story, for instance, that disaster recovery contracts should be negotiated before a disaster.

However, many misconceptions we debunked in our March issue do show up in the report, notably the notion that the Convention Center was a recognized shelter, and authorities should have pre-staged supplies there.

"Conditions were also unbearable in the Convention Center. The Select Committee was unable to determine exactly when the Convention Center became a shelter and when officials became aware of the deteriorating conditions there. None of the officials who spoke with the Select Committee staff were willing to take responsibility for the operation of the Convention Center as a 'shelter,' and none claimed that they knew about the situation until Wednesday morning or afternoon, August ..."

According to numerous sources, including the National Guard units in charge of the initial rescue efforts, the Convention Center was never a shelter. In fact, it was locked up before the storm, only to be broken into by evacuees escaping the floodwaters. It's difficult to imagine pre-storm analysis to have taken this into account, let alone prepared for it. Especially because weather reports 24 hours before landfall showed a low likelihood of floodwall breaches.

There are, however, some salient points in the House report. For instance, the need for effective command and control of an emergency. Katrina—like 9/11—has highlighted the nation's lack of a unified communications system for emergency professionals. With telephones and cell towers knocked out, first responders had to rely on a myriad of radio frequencies, and over-burdened satellite systems, to communicate, which most likely created the "lack of coordination" the report criticizes, and PM noted.

If ever there was a time to focus our attention on creating a robust, mobile, easily deployable emergency communications system, it's now. And here are some suggestions.

But, most important, the report highlights the need for a comprehensive national review of all threats—both natural and manmade—and the creation of comprehensive playbooks by which everybody, from local levels to the federal government, can respond effectively. It's a strategy virtually every emergency management expert agrees on. We did this for the Cold War and there's no reason why we shouldn't do that now.

As the report makes painfully clear:

"Despite years of recognition of the threat that was to materialize in Hurricane Katrina, no one—not the federal government, not the state government, and not the local government—seems to have planned for an evacuation of the city from flooding through breached levees. Having failed to anticipate these needs, poor communications that hampered situational awareness, hours of service limits, security needs, and logistical problems further delayed the deployment of buses to evacuate the city."

And that should be the major takeaway from this report, instead of the proceedural nitpicking contained throughout. As on 9/11, most people did their jobs—indeed, went above and beyond their assigned duties. Now is the time to rethink what those duties are, and to prepare systematically for the next disaster.—The Editors