Australia must strive for strategic independence

By hosting Pine Gap, Australia is contributing to the undermining of China's longstanding minimalist nuclear deterrent, destabilising the precarious strategic fundamentals in East Asia.

Schutz: Wikimedia Commons

Australia is better off strategically independent and able to agree and disagree with both Washington and Beijing, as it suits our interests. We should not be afraid to express our views and stick to our beliefs, writes Malcolm Fraser.

Some argue that a war between China and the United States will never arise because their economies are so closely connected by capital markets, by commerce, by trade, by self-interest.

But war often starts from small and insignificant events, as the shooting of Archduke Franz Ferdinand demonstrated 100 years ago. Neither China nor the United States want to see a war develop between them. But small events that touch on pride and esteem, and that promote misjudgement and miscalculation, can all eventually lead to conflict.

Professor Hugh White from the Australian National University has suggested that if America cannot be persuaded to share power with China, then a conflict could ensue. It appears the most likely trigger for such a calamity would be an assertive and increasingly militaristic Japan.

Unfortunately sharing power with Beijing is not in Washington's strategic thinking. Its objective is the maintenance of American supremacy, driven by American exceptionalism and neo-conservative philosophy.

If a war began between China and the United States, it would be very hard, if not impossible, for Australia not to be involved as a result of its current policy of strategic dependence. And if America were to lose, as Professor White concluded it could, then Australia would be in a very dangerous situation.

America would be able to withdraw to the western hemisphere. But Australia would remain here, geographically part of the Asia–Pacific, but also a defeated ally of a defeated superpower.

We cannot pick and choose the elements of our alliance that we want and discard those we do not. We are too closely intertwined with US strategies and plans.

This is not a position that any Australian government would want to be in. This is the worst case consequence of a continuation of the policies and approaches adopted by Australia, especially since 1996.

Australia's security decisions must be made in a highly complex world that is rapidly changing. As I see it, there are three options to choose from.

Australia's first option would be to continue with its historic policy of strategic dependence on a great and powerful friend. This would be the easiest option to take, politically at least. But being seen as Washington's deputy sheriff in this part of the world is not good for Australia's relationships in East and South-East Asia. It also means following US decisions in foreign and security policy issues, irrespective of whether these decisions relate to a part of the world important to us or to our national interests.

Most importantly, it leaves us exposed in the event of conflict between the US and China.

The second option would involve trying to have it both ways: asserting Australia's independence while allowing the relationship to continue. Theoretically, we could tell the United States that we would not automatically follow it into its wars. If Canada has been able to achieve a degree of strategic independence, geographically close to both the United States and a potential adversary in Russia, why should Australia, in a more geographically advantageous position, not be able to do likewise?

But unfortunately, this option isn't really an option at all. We cannot pick and choose the elements of our alliance that we want and discard those we do not. We are too closely intertwined with US strategies and plans. Australian facilities are too heavily involved.

What happens if the United States uses its Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Darwin against countries with whom we wish to maintain friendship? We cannot host that task force and pretend that what it does and who it might attack has nothing to do with us when we provide the infrastructure to support its existence in the region. By hosting that task force, we are making American military actions much easier and more effective throughout South-East Asia and the Western Pacific. We cannot avoid complicity in what America does by just saying that we are not involved and we are not going to add forces of our own.

The capabilities of Pine Gap, and America's strategic thinking relating to its use, also stand in the way of Australia's strategic independence within the alliance. When Pine Gap was first established in 1966, Australia never envisaged that it would develop far beyond its original purpose of collecting information on the testing of Soviet missiles. However, in the period since it was built, Pine Gap and systems related to it have undergone extraordinary technical development, greatly increasing the sensitivity and breadth of its signals intelligence capacities - most notably in the interception of mobile phones and satellite communications.

This has provided the technical basis for Pine Gap to provide data enabling the targeting of illegal US drone attacks, in countries with which neither the United States nor Australia are at war, including Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The fact that the information gathered in outback Australia can now be used, almost in real time, by weapons such as drones has increased the importance of Pine Gap in American strategic thinking.

The Chinese leadership also fears, with some justification, that US and Japanese missile defence that depends on Pine Gap might be able to destroy most, if not all, of China's nuclear missiles in flight, thereby vitiating China's nuclear deterrent force and leaving the country vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. By hosting Pine Gap, Australia is contributing to the undermining of China's longstanding minimalist nuclear deterrent, destabilising the precarious strategic fundamentals in East Asia.

We must turn therefore to the third option, an option of strategic independence to avoid complicity in America's future military operations and secure a future that best serves Australia's interests. Strategic dependence might have fulfilled this role in decades past, but its usefulness as a platform for Australia's foreign and security priorities has ended.

These are some features of the alliance, as presently constituted, that have us caught in a vice. To avoid complicity in America's future military operations, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force would have to be asked to leave. The deployment of our frigate, as part of that carrier strike group, would cease, and the appointment of Major General Burr, an active Australian major general, as second in command of the US Army in the Western Pacific, would have to be revoked.

These three actions could be undertaken relatively easily and quickly, without too much disruption. Pine Gap is another matter. The facility is a huge one, of great importance to the United States, and replacing it will take time - perhaps four to five years. To shut the facility down forthwith would leave a gap in America's strategic capabilities, which would be much more than an annoyance to the United States, but nevertheless a requirement to close it within five years would be reasonable.

There is no doubt that the United States would take the strongest possible exception to such moves. Every pressure would be exercised on an Australian government so that the United States would maintain strategic control. We would need to resist such pressures and make it clear that, in our view, the risks of a strategic alliance with the United States, of being forced into a war that was not in our interest, were so great that we had to cut the ties.

We need to look carefully at the risks, the costs and the benefits of a policy of strategic independence. There is no worldwide global threat as there was during the Cold War.

An independent Australia could act much more effectively in concert with other Western Pacific countries, on the one hand to avoid flashpoints and points of danger, and on the other to promote initiatives that would do much to maintain continuing peace throughout the region.

There are Australians who are afraid of China, but for China to be a danger, it would have to act out of character, contrary to all the traditions of its past. If China were to be a danger, this would also signal a total failure of Australian diplomacy. China does not represent a threat to the integrity of an independent Australia. We would earn greater respect as a consequence of such a policy.

The Economist summed it up best in 1963 when it said: "No Indonesian regime short of a blatantly communist one would earn active American hostility, no matter what harm it did to national Australian interests."

The United States would support Indonesia over Australia because it is the largest, most populist Islamic state in the world. On the question of Indonesia, we have relied on our own resources in the past, and we can do so in the future.

The current interpretation of ANZUS by Australian leaders is paradoxical - it might be the biggest threat to our own security despite it being presented as the guarantor of our security. Strategic independence would provide us with the motivation to look to the future – to ask ourselves what we must do to secure a future that best serves our needs and priorities, along with those of our region.

An independent Australia could act much more effectively in concert with other Western Pacific countries, on the one hand to avoid flashpoints and points of danger, and on the other to promote initiatives that would do much to maintain continuing peace throughout the region. An Australian position that is not interpreted by China and other nations in Asia as automatically representing the view of Washington can only enhance our diplomatic standing and ability to influence regional policy.

Strategic independence does not mean ending our relationship with America and cutting our ties. It does mean having a different relationship, a more equal one in which we can feel free to say no or offer a differing opinion. Similarly, strategic independence should not mean acquiescing to all the demands of a growing China, ignoring such issues as human rights. It does mean needing to appreciate and accept that China will increasingly seek out a new role for itself, as its power continues to grow.

Strategic independence would allow Australia to agree and disagree with both Washington and Beijing, as it suits our interests. We should not be afraid to express our views and stick to our beliefs.

Whichever way the dice fall, whether a conflict or war occurs between China and the United States or whether peace is maintained, Australia is better off being strategically independent.

This is an edited extract from Dangerous Allies by Malcolm Fraser with Cain Roberts, published by (MUP).

Malcolm Fraser will be appearing on The Drum tonight at 6pm (AEST) on ABC News 24.

Malcolm Fraser served as Australia's 22nd prime minister from 1975-1983. View his full profile here.