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Two of the United States' closest traditional allies in the Middle East, Israel and Turkey, have a tumultuous relationship. Once-strong relations soured in the last decade, with the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010 marking its nadir. Repeated attempts by the United States to mediate have helped move the parties closer together, but the gap is still wide, hindering regional security and impacting U.S. interests. Questions remain about whether the ties between the two former allies be mended and what role the United States can play in managing the relationship.

On March 23, in conjunction with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP) at Brookings hosted a discussion examining the relationship between Israel and Turkey. The discussion built on an ongoing dialogue between the Israeli think tank Mitvim, and the Turkish Global Political Trends Center, sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, as well as ongoing work by Brookings experts.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

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Mon, 23 Mar 2015 14:00:00 -0400http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/20150323IsraelTurkeySAUL_64k_Itunes.mp3
Event Information
March 23, 2015
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT
Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
Two of the United States' closest traditional allies in the Middle East, Israel and Turkey, have a tumultuous relationship. Once-strong relations soured in the last decade, with the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010 marking its nadir. Repeated attempts by the United States to mediate have helped move the parties closer together, but the gap is still wide, hindering regional security and impacting U.S. interests. Questions remain about whether the ties between the two former allies be mended and what role the United States can play in managing the relationship.
On March 23, in conjunction with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP) at Brookings hosted a discussion examining the relationship between Israel and Turkey. The discussion built on an ongoing dialogue between the Israeli think tank Mitvim, and the Turkish Global Political Trends Center, sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, as well as ongoing work by Brookings experts.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #IsraelTurkey
Audio
- Strained alliances: Israel, Turkey, and the United States
Transcript
- Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
Event Materials
- 20150323_turkey_israel_transcript
Event Information
March 23, 2015
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT
Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
Two of the United States' closest traditional allies in the Middle ...

Event Information

Two of the United States' closest traditional allies in the Middle East, Israel and Turkey, have a tumultuous relationship. Once-strong relations soured in the last decade, with the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010 marking its nadir. Repeated attempts by the United States to mediate have helped move the parties closer together, but the gap is still wide, hindering regional security and impacting U.S. interests. Questions remain about whether the ties between the two former allies be mended and what role the United States can play in managing the relationship.

On March 23, in conjunction with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP) at Brookings hosted a discussion examining the relationship between Israel and Turkey. The discussion built on an ongoing dialogue between the Israeli think tank Mitvim, and the Turkish Global Political Trends Center, sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, as well as ongoing work by Brookings experts.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/03/16-turkey-europe-raiser?rssid=turkey{D7B18C4D-55EA-4EA7-B3AE-D21F2F3AB058}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/87090959/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~The-TurkeyEU-customs-union-at-Time-for-a-faceliftThe Turkey-EU customs union at 20: Time for a facelift

In a previous post I argued that European economic integration remains a key driver for Turkey’s future economic prospects. Specifically, the customs union agreement between the European Union and Turkey—a union that turns 20 at the end of this year—could give Turkey’s competitiveness a new boost if it was extended to cover services, agriculture, and procurement. But to do so, the customs union itself would require a facelift. An agreement originally designed as a stepping stone towards full EU membership needs to be modernized to take into account changing trends in world trade and in EU-Turkey relations.

Widening the customs union to include services and agriculture would produce welfare gains of up to $2 billion, even without taking into account the significant dynamic gains from greater investment and faster productivity growth. By liberalizing trade in services in particular, Turkey could boost its overall competitiveness, because the cost and quality of services matter as an input into manufacturing as well. Including procurement in the customs union or accession to the WTO’s General Procurement Agreement would open new markets to Turkey’s highly competitive contractors and experienced civil engineers.

But a widening of the customs union would require that asymmetries in its design are addressed. One concern is that Turkey needs to adopt EU law without participating in its design. Indeed, sometimes Turkey may be informed only with significant delay about a change in common market rules. Improved information sharing and consultation mechanisms are critical to ensure the customs union functions smoothly. While Turkey cannot be granted voting rights, it could be invited as an observer to more of the EU’s committees, including to key policy bodies such as the Trade Policy Committee or the General System of Preferences Committee. Informal information sharing mechanisms, such as “Friends of Turkey” groups could also be considered.

A second concern, which has received much attention in Turkey, is that Turkey needs to open its markets to countries with which the EU has signed free trade agreements without a clause guaranteeing reciprocal market access. Turkey is especially worried about the prospect of exclusion from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Because some tariff peaks still exist between the EU and the United States in sectors like textiles and clothing, for instance, Turkey could face additional competition from U.S. suppliers who under TTIP would enter the EU market duty free (trade economists call this “preference erosion”). For the case of a “shallow” TTIP considering only the elimination of all bilateral tariffs between the EU and the United States, we estimate welfare losses from “preference erosion” to be around $130 million. However, there is a flipside to this: to the extent that TTIP includes liberal rules of origin and that the EU and the United States agree on a system of mutual recognition of quality standards, Turkey through its customs union with the EU could obtain significantly improved access to the U.S. market, which would more than compensate for the losses from preference erosion. Conversely, Turkey’s losses would be far greater if TTIP was to include regulatory harmonization, without recognizing Turkish quality certificates.

A widening of the customs union to include services would allow Turkey to capitalize on its competitive strengths, e.g. in retail and transportation services, while creating welcome competitive pressure on modern service industries. The result could be an upgrading of service quality and competitiveness similar to what happened in manufacturing as a result of the customs union some 20 years ago. At the same time, this would prepare Turkey for the opening of its services sector in the context of potential accession to TTIP.

Authors

Martin Raiser

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Mon, 16 Mar 2015 09:30:00 -0400Martin Raiser
In a previous post I argued that European economic integration remains a key driver for Turkey's future economic prospects. Specifically, the customs union agreement between the European Union and Turkey—a union that turns 20 at the end of this year—could give Turkey's competitiveness a new boost if it was extended to cover services, agriculture, and procurement. But to do so, the customs union itself would require a facelift. An agreement originally designed as a stepping stone towards full EU membership needs to be modernized to take into account changing trends in world trade and in EU-Turkey relations.
Widening the customs union to include services and agriculture would produce welfare gains of up to $2 billion, even without taking into account the significant dynamic gains from greater investment and faster productivity growth. By liberalizing trade in services in particular, Turkey could boost its overall competitiveness, because the cost and quality of services matter as an input into manufacturing as well. Including procurement in the customs union or accession to the WTO's General Procurement Agreement would open new markets to Turkey's highly competitive contractors and experienced civil engineers.
But a widening of the customs union would require that asymmetries in its design are addressed. One concern is that Turkey needs to adopt EU law without participating in its design. Indeed, sometimes Turkey may be informed only with significant delay about a change in common market rules. Improved information sharing and consultation mechanisms are critical to ensure the customs union functions smoothly. While Turkey cannot be granted voting rights, it could be invited as an observer to more of the EU's committees, including to key policy bodies such as the Trade Policy Committee or the General System of Preferences Committee. Informal information sharing mechanisms, such as “Friends of Turkey” groups could also be considered.
A second concern, which has received much attention in Turkey, is that Turkey needs to open its markets to countries with which the EU has signed free trade agreements without a clause guaranteeing reciprocal market access. Turkey is especially worried about the prospect of exclusion from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Because some tariff peaks still exist between the EU and the United States in sectors like textiles and clothing, for instance, Turkey could face additional competition from U.S. suppliers who under TTIP would enter the EU market duty free (trade economists call this “preference erosion”). For the case of a “shallow” TTIP considering only the elimination of all bilateral tariffs between the EU and the United States, we estimate welfare losses from “preference erosion” to be around $130 million. However, there is a flipside to this: to the extent that TTIP includes liberal rules of origin and that the EU and the United States agree on a system of mutual recognition of quality standards, Turkey through its customs union with the EU could obtain significantly improved access to the U.S. market, which would more than compensate for the losses from preference erosion. Conversely, Turkey's losses would be far greater if TTIP was to include regulatory harmonization, without recognizing Turkish quality certificates.
However, the real risk of exclusion from TTIP lies in services. This is the area where the gains from greater cross-Atlantic trade would be highest. Because Turkey's own services trade has not been opened, however, the country would not be in a position to benefit from this trade creation effect. Turkey is a big trader in traditional services such as transport and tourism, but in modern services, including finance, legal services, accounting, design, and IT services, it punches well below its weight.
A widening of the customs union to include services would allow Turkey to ...
In a previous post I argued that European economic integration remains a key driver for Turkey's future economic prospects. Specifically, the customs union agreement between the European Union and Turkey—a union that turns 20 at the end of ...

In a previous post I argued that European economic integration remains a key driver for Turkey’s future economic prospects. Specifically, the customs union agreement between the European Union and Turkey—a union that turns 20 at the end of this year—could give Turkey’s competitiveness a new boost if it was extended to cover services, agriculture, and procurement. But to do so, the customs union itself would require a facelift. An agreement originally designed as a stepping stone towards full EU membership needs to be modernized to take into account changing trends in world trade and in EU-Turkey relations.

Widening the customs union to include services and agriculture would produce welfare gains of up to $2 billion, even without taking into account the significant dynamic gains from greater investment and faster productivity growth. By liberalizing trade in services in particular, Turkey could boost its overall competitiveness, because the cost and quality of services matter as an input into manufacturing as well. Including procurement in the customs union or accession to the WTO’s General Procurement Agreement would open new markets to Turkey’s highly competitive contractors and experienced civil engineers.

But a widening of the customs union would require that asymmetries in its design are addressed. One concern is that Turkey needs to adopt EU law without participating in its design. Indeed, sometimes Turkey may be informed only with significant delay about a change in common market rules. Improved information sharing and consultation mechanisms are critical to ensure the customs union functions smoothly. While Turkey cannot be granted voting rights, it could be invited as an observer to more of the EU’s committees, including to key policy bodies such as the Trade Policy Committee or the General System of Preferences Committee. Informal information sharing mechanisms, such as “Friends of Turkey” groups could also be considered.

A second concern, which has received much attention in Turkey, is that Turkey needs to open its markets to countries with which the EU has signed free trade agreements without a clause guaranteeing reciprocal market access. Turkey is especially worried about the prospect of exclusion from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Because some tariff peaks still exist between the EU and the United States in sectors like textiles and clothing, for instance, Turkey could face additional competition from U.S. suppliers who under TTIP would enter the EU market duty free (trade economists call this “preference erosion”). For the case of a “shallow” TTIP considering only the elimination of all bilateral tariffs between the EU and the United States, we estimate welfare losses from “preference erosion” to be around $130 million. However, there is a flipside to this: to the extent that TTIP includes liberal rules of origin and that the EU and the United States agree on a system of mutual recognition of quality standards, Turkey through its customs union with the EU could obtain significantly improved access to the U.S. market, which would more than compensate for the losses from preference erosion. Conversely, Turkey’s losses would be far greater if TTIP was to include regulatory harmonization, without recognizing Turkish quality certificates.

A widening of the customs union to include services would allow Turkey to capitalize on its competitive strengths, e.g. in retail and transportation services, while creating welcome competitive pressure on modern service industries. The result could be an upgrading of service quality and competitiveness similar to what happened in manufacturing as a result of the customs union some 20 years ago. At the same time, this would prepare Turkey for the opening of its services sector in the context of potential accession to TTIP.

Authors

Martin Raiser

]]>

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/03/11-europe-turkey-raiser?rssid=turkey{D9090060-DC1D-436E-8EFD-E427D2827B95}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86814502/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~European-economic-integration-is-the-key-to-Turkey%e2%80%99s-past-and-futureEuropean economic integration is the key to Turkey’s past and future

Turkey is a winner of globalization and economic integration. Opening up to trade and capital flows provided both the engine and the lubricant for Turkey’s economic modernization. In particular, the customs union with the EU, followed by the opening of EU accession negotiations, ensured that Turkey became part of the “European convergence machine.” Just as it has been the driver of progress in the past, economic integration is also central to Turkey’s future prospects. This was the topic of a session at Brookings on Turkey’s trans-Atlantic integration and its prospects to escape the “middle-income trap.” In a previous blog I wrote about that middle-income trap, now let me address the former topic.

Since the early 1980s, Turkey’s share of global exports and imports has increased fourfold and the share of trade to GDP has risen from barely 10 percent to over 50 percent today (see Figure 1). Turkey’s increasing global economic heft is comparable to developments in other large emerging market economies such as Brazil, India, and Russia, although it does not quite match the performance of China or Eastern Europe.

First, in January 1980, Turkey introduced comprehensive economic liberalization, around one decade before the start of transition in the former Communist bloc. After an initial surge in trade activity, the 1990s were characterized by inconsistent macroeconomic management, culminating in the 2001 financial crisis. Since then, however, liberal economic policies and sound macroeconomic management have allowed Turkey to resume the process of economic convergence and benefit from abundant global liquidity.

Second, Turkey’s customs union agreement with the EU, in effect since January 1996, has been a catalyst for the technological modernization of Turkey’s manufacturing by forcing the adoption of European quality standards and encouraging the integration into European production networks. Intra-industry trade—one summary measure of the extent of trade within integrated value chains—rose from 30 percent to 50 percent of Turkey-EU trade between 1990 and 2012. Moreover, the World Bank estimates that because it avoided the need for costly rules of origin, the customs union agreement boosted Turkey’s exports to the EU by up to 7 percent relative to a free trade agreement.

Third, Turkey’s investments in infrastructure have kept up with the needs of a growing economy. Thanks to substantial public and private investments in roads, airports, seaports, and customs facilities, for instance, Turkey’s logistics performance is on par with many high-income countries; Turkey is ranked 31st in the world, ahead of competitors such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Romania, or Brazil. Good logistics are essential for an effective participation in global value chains, which is where much of the recent growth in trade has taken place.

Yet in the last three years, Turkey’s economic engine has started to sputter. Some believe that the reason is over-reliance on a weak EU economy, and that group thus favors a diversification by Turkey to other markets. Indeed, as EU markets have slumped, Turkey’s trade with the Middle East has increased and Turkey is successfully expanding to markets in Africa and Latin America. However, it would be wrong to deduce from this that further integration with the EU is unnecessary. Our analysis shows that it is precisely the firms that have successfully established themselves in the EU market that are best at diversifying to third markets. The same firms also have higher productivity growth and pay higher wages than firms without exports to the EU. The European market may not be the most dynamic in the world, but it is still a standard setter for quality that cannot be ignored.

Figure 2: The chances of an exporter surviving increase with higher quality and greater import dependence

Source: World Bank calculations based on Turkstat industrial census. Note: The chart shows the probability of a firm surviving after 5 years in an export market. The blue bars show, respectively, firms with product quality and import content below the sample average. The orange bars show firms with above average product quality and import content.

Others argue that Turkey needs to reduce its reliance on imports to close a chronic trade deficit. Once again, this may be reversing cause and effect. Exporting firms with higher import content in production and firms producing higher quality goods are more likely to survive in export markets (see Figure 2). Turkey needs more integration, not less, to upgrade quality and move up the value chain.

Authors

Martin Raiser

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Wed, 11 Mar 2015 10:16:00 -0400Martin Raiser
Turkey is a winner of globalization and economic integration. Opening up to trade and capital flows provided both the engine and the lubricant for Turkey's economic modernization. In particular, the customs union with the EU, followed by the opening of EU accession negotiations, ensured that Turkey became part of the “European convergence machine.” Just as it has been the driver of progress in the past, economic integration is also central to Turkey's future prospects. This was the topic of a session at Brookings on Turkey's trans-Atlantic integration and its prospects to escape the “middle-income trap.” In a previous blog I wrote about that middle-income trap, now let me address the former topic.
Since the early 1980s, Turkey's share of global exports and imports has increased fourfold and the share of trade to GDP has risen from barely 10 percent to over 50 percent today (see Figure 1). Turkey's increasing global economic heft is comparable to developments in other large emerging market economies such as Brazil, India, and Russia, although it does not quite match the performance of China or Eastern Europe.
Figure 1: Turkey's share of global trade has increased fourfold since 1980
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on World Development Indicators.
Several key policies have contributed to Turkey's successful integration.
- First, in January 1980, Turkey introduced comprehensive economic liberalization, around one decade before the start of transition in the former Communist bloc. After an initial surge in trade activity, the 1990s were characterized by inconsistent macroeconomic management, culminating in the 2001 financial crisis. Since then, however, liberal economic policies and sound macroeconomic management have allowed Turkey to resume the process of economic convergence and benefit from abundant global liquidity. - Second, Turkey's customs union agreement with the EU, in effect since January 1996, has been a catalyst for the technological modernization of Turkey's manufacturing by forcing the adoption of European quality standards and encouraging the integration into European production networks. Intra-industry trade—one summary measure of the extent of trade within integrated value chains—rose from 30 percent to 50 percent of Turkey-EU trade between 1990 and 2012. Moreover, the World Bank estimates that because it avoided the need for costly rules of origin, the customs union agreement boosted Turkey's exports to the EU by up to 7 percent relative to a free trade agreement. - Third, Turkey's investments in infrastructure have kept up with the needs of a growing economy. Thanks to substantial public and private investments in roads, airports, seaports, and customs facilities, for instance, Turkey's logistics performance is on par with many high-income countries; Turkey is ranked 31st in the world, ahead of competitors such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Romania, or Brazil. Good logistics are essential for an effective participation in global value chains, which is where much of the recent growth in trade has taken place.
Yet in the last three years, Turkey's economic engine has started to sputter. Some believe that the reason is over-reliance on a weak EU economy, and that group thus favors a diversification by Turkey to other markets. Indeed, as EU markets have slumped, Turkey's trade with the Middle East has increased and Turkey is successfully expanding to markets in Africa and Latin America. However, it would be wrong to deduce from this that further integration with the EU is unnecessary. Our analysis shows that it is precisely the firms that have successfully established themselves in the EU market that are best at diversifying to third markets. The same firms also have higher productivity growth and pay higher wages than firms without exports to the EU. The European market may not be the most dynamic in the world, but it is still a standard ... Turkey is a winner of globalization and economic integration. Opening up to trade and capital flows provided both the engine and the lubricant for Turkey's economic modernization. In particular, the customs union with the EU, followed by the opening ...

Turkey is a winner of globalization and economic integration. Opening up to trade and capital flows provided both the engine and the lubricant for Turkey’s economic modernization. In particular, the customs union with the EU, followed by the opening of EU accession negotiations, ensured that Turkey became part of the “European convergence machine.” Just as it has been the driver of progress in the past, economic integration is also central to Turkey’s future prospects. This was the topic of a session at Brookings on Turkey’s trans-Atlantic integration and its prospects to escape the “middle-income trap.” In a previous blog I wrote about that middle-income trap, now let me address the former topic.

Since the early 1980s, Turkey’s share of global exports and imports has increased fourfold and the share of trade to GDP has risen from barely 10 percent to over 50 percent today (see Figure 1). Turkey’s increasing global economic heft is comparable to developments in other large emerging market economies such as Brazil, India, and Russia, although it does not quite match the performance of China or Eastern Europe.

First, in January 1980, Turkey introduced comprehensive economic liberalization, around one decade before the start of transition in the former Communist bloc. After an initial surge in trade activity, the 1990s were characterized by inconsistent macroeconomic management, culminating in the 2001 financial crisis. Since then, however, liberal economic policies and sound macroeconomic management have allowed Turkey to resume the process of economic convergence and benefit from abundant global liquidity.

Second, Turkey’s customs union agreement with the EU, in effect since January 1996, has been a catalyst for the technological modernization of Turkey’s manufacturing by forcing the adoption of European quality standards and encouraging the integration into European production networks. Intra-industry trade—one summary measure of the extent of trade within integrated value chains—rose from 30 percent to 50 percent of Turkey-EU trade between 1990 and 2012. Moreover, the World Bank estimates that because it avoided the need for costly rules of origin, the customs union agreement boosted Turkey’s exports to the EU by up to 7 percent relative to a free trade agreement.

Third, Turkey’s investments in infrastructure have kept up with the needs of a growing economy. Thanks to substantial public and private investments in roads, airports, seaports, and customs facilities, for instance, Turkey’s logistics performance is on par with many high-income countries; Turkey is ranked 31st in the world, ahead of competitors such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Romania, or Brazil. Good logistics are essential for an effective participation in global value chains, which is where much of the recent growth in trade has taken place.

Yet in the last three years, Turkey’s economic engine has started to sputter. Some believe that the reason is over-reliance on a weak EU economy, and that group thus favors a diversification by Turkey to other markets. Indeed, as EU markets have slumped, Turkey’s trade with the Middle East has increased and Turkey is successfully expanding to markets in Africa and Latin America. However, it would be wrong to deduce from this that further integration with the EU is unnecessary. Our analysis shows that it is precisely the firms that have successfully established themselves in the EU market that are best at diversifying to third markets. The same firms also have higher productivity growth and pay higher wages than firms without exports to the EU. The European market may not be the most dynamic in the world, but it is still a standard setter for quality that cannot be ignored.

Figure 2: The chances of an exporter surviving increase with higher quality and greater import dependence

Source: World Bank calculations based on Turkstat industrial census. Note: The chart shows the probability of a firm surviving after 5 years in an export market. The blue bars show, respectively, firms with product quality and import content below the sample average. The orange bars show firms with above average product quality and import content.

Others argue that Turkey needs to reduce its reliance on imports to close a chronic trade deficit. Once again, this may be reversing cause and effect. Exporting firms with higher import content in production and firms producing higher quality goods are more likely to survive in export markets (see Figure 2). Turkey needs more integration, not less, to upgrade quality and move up the value chain.

Authors

Martin Raiser

]]>

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/03/09-glimmer-of-hope-future-turkish-democracy-cengiz-kirisci?rssid=turkey{A9C761F1-C577-411C-A633-224AF0E1109E}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86698291/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~A-glimmer-of-hope-for-the-future-of-Turkish-democracyA glimmer of hope for the future of Turkish democracy?

Turkey's Constitutional Court elected Zühtü Arslan as its new chairman in February, replacing the outgoing Haşim Kılıç. With a master's degree in human rights and civil freedoms and a doctorate in constitutional law, Arslan has taught courses on constitutional law, human rights, and state theories, and has worked for the European Court of Human Rights. Arslan is widely praised, including by some prominent conservative columnists for his record of defending liberal democratic values. Arslan’s loud criticisms of the Turkish military’s attempts to shut down the governing Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish acronym AKP) in 2007, for example, are widely cited by many as a testament to his commitment to liberal democracy.

Arslan’s election comes during a time of growing concerns about the independence of Turkey’s judiciary and the future of the country’s democracy. Nearly a year ago, the government adopted controversial legislation that strengthened the Ministry of Justice’s hand over the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which deals with the appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors. The High Council also functions as the Turkish legal system’s disciplinary body, and its members, when necessary, are judged by the Constitutional Court. The Court is Turkey’s highest judicial body, and has the authority, when called upon, to review the conformity of laws to the constitution. The Court also has the power to preside over impeachment cases against the president of the Republic and members of the Council of Ministers. The president of the Republic appoints, for 12-year terms, the 11 regular and four substitute members of the Court, who then elect a chairman and a deputy chairman from among themselves every four years by secret ballot and an absolute majority.

The Court’s current membership composition is largely a result of appointments made by Abdullah Gül, the former president and foreign minister of Turkey, and a co-founder of AKP. Although the Turkish Constitutional Court was established more than five decades ago to prevent the abuse of executive power and defend democracy, it has not always been loyal to this purpose. Following the military coup of 1980, the Court was frequently associated with rulings that shut down political parties and restricted freedoms in general. In the past decade, however, the Court became increasingly supportive of liberal democratic principles. Ironically, this advancement owes itself to the series of political reforms that were introduced during Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s first term in office, when Turkey still espoused strong European Union membership aspirations.

Many interpreted last year's controversial legislation as an effort on the part of Erdoğan, Turkey’s current president (and then the prime minister), to enhance government control over the judiciary by weakening the High Council’s independence. The move is also widely recognized to have been a response to the December 2013 graft scandal, an investigation that implicated a number of AKP cabinet members on charges of corruption. Erdoğan and his government argue that these indictments were fabricated within the Turkish police and judiciary by sympathizers of the Hizmet Movement, led by the prominent Turkish preacher Fetullah Gülen. The government accuses Gülenists of having created a “parallel state” with the intention of overthrowing the elected and legitimate government of Turkey. This line of thinking led the government to dismiss or reassign almost 200 judges in January alone, and purge a long list of police officers over the course of 2014 for their alleged links to the Gülen movement.

These developments have coincided with other democratic setbacks in Turkey. In recent years there have been increasing restrictions on freedom of expression, including the weakening independence of traditional media and temporary shutdowns of social media. Erdoğan also aims to transform Turkey from a parliamentary into a presidential system with strong executive powers. A shift away from the parliamentary system would severely compromise Turkey’s current separation of powers and could take Turkey down an increasingly authoritarian path. The retiring Constitutional Court chairman Kılıç has on several occasions openly criticized AKP for its increasing interference in the judiciary. Recently, on February 10, Kılıç warned politicians about the dangers of turning the judiciary into an “instrument of revenge” and said that Erdoğan’s government is undermining the judiciary’s independence. Such remarks have earned Kılıç accusations of being a coup-plotter and holding anti-Islamist views. Kılıç has not always been out of favor with AKP. In yet another irony, Kılıç was the Court’s chairman—and even cast the tiebreaker vote—in the 2008 ruling that rejected the indictment seeking to dissolve AKP for its “anti-secular activities.” Had the Court ruled in favor of the indictment, then Prime Minister Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül and 70 other leading AKP members would have been banned from holding political office.

Like Kılıç, Arslan had also openly disapproved of the 2007 indictment to dissolve AKP. He was also among those who helped AKP in its attempts to draft a new civilian constitution in 2008, before Erdoğan revealed his majoritarian aspirations. At the time, Arslan had argued for changes to the preamble of the draft constitution to make it “much more liberal, and to emphasize the importance of individual rights and liberties and the rule of law."

Arslan will be taking office as Turkey prepares to hold parliamentary elections in June. The elections’ outcome will shape the fate of Erdoğan’s constitutional vision for a presidential system. If AKP can secure more than 330 parliamentary seats (out of 550), Erdoğan will be able to make constitutional amendments that reflect his views of a strong executive, or even completely rewrite the Constitution and bring it to a referendum. If Erdoğan achieves his goal, the Court could be weakened in its raison d’être of holding the government accountable and protecting Turkey’s separation of powers.

Government accountability, checks and balances, and separation of powers are the principles Arslan believes in wholly and has worked to promote. It will thus be interesting to see how Arslan steps up to the bench. Will Arslan’s liberal convictions help defend the independence of the judiciary, and preserve the Court’s place in the Turkish political system as a check against the executive abuse of power? Arslan has repeatedly expressed his commitment to holding the law above politics. For this reason, his appointment may offer a safeguard against autocracy and could become a much-needed glimmer of hope for Turkish democracy.

Authors

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Mon, 09 Mar 2015 00:00:00 -0400Kemal Kirişci and Melis Cengiz
Turkey's Constitutional Court elected Zühtü Arslan as its new chairman in February, replacing the outgoing Haşim Kılıç. With a master's degree in human rights and civil freedoms and a doctorate in constitutional law, Arslan has taught courses on constitutional law, human rights, and state theories, and has worked for the European Court of Human Rights. Arslan is widely praised, including by some prominent conservative columnists for his record of defending liberal democratic values. Arslan's loud criticisms of the Turkish military's attempts to shut down the governing Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish acronym AKP) in 2007, for example, are widely cited by many as a testament to his commitment to liberal democracy.
Arslan's election comes during a time of growing concerns about the independence of Turkey's judiciary and the future of the country's democracy. Nearly a year ago, the government adopted controversial legislation that strengthened the Ministry of Justice's hand over the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which deals with the appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors. The High Council also functions as the Turkish legal system's disciplinary body, and its members, when necessary, are judged by the Constitutional Court. The Court is Turkey's highest judicial body, and has the authority, when called upon, to review the conformity of laws to the constitution. The Court also has the power to preside over impeachment cases against the president of the Republic and members of the Council of Ministers. The president of the Republic appoints, for 12-year terms, the 11 regular and four substitute members of the Court, who then elect a chairman and a deputy chairman from among themselves every four years by secret ballot and an absolute majority.
The Court's current membership composition is largely a result of appointments made by Abdullah Gül, the former president and foreign minister of Turkey, and a co-founder of AKP. Although the Turkish Constitutional Court was established more than five decades ago to prevent the abuse of executive power and defend democracy, it has not always been loyal to this purpose. Following the military coup of 1980, the Court was frequently associated with rulings that shut down political parties and restricted freedoms in general. In the past decade, however, the Court became increasingly supportive of liberal democratic principles. Ironically, this advancement owes itself to the series of political reforms that were introduced during Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's first term in office, when Turkey still espoused strong European Union membership aspirations.
Many interpreted last year's controversial legislation as an effort on the part of Erdoğan, Turkey's current president (and then the prime minister), to enhance government control over the judiciary by weakening the High Council's independence. The move is also widely recognized to have been a response to the December 2013 graft scandal, an investigation that implicated a number of AKP cabinet members on charges of corruption. Erdoğan and his government argue that these indictments were fabricated within the Turkish police and judiciary by sympathizers of the Hizmet Movement, led by the prominent Turkish preacher Fetullah Gülen. The government accuses Gülenists of having created a “parallel state” with the intention of overthrowing the elected and legitimate government of Turkey. This line of thinking led the government to dismiss or reassign almost 200 judges in January alone, and purge a long list of police officers over the course of 2014 for their alleged links to the Gülen movement.
These developments have coincided with other democratic setbacks in Turkey. In recent years there have been increasing restrictions on freedom of expression, including the weakening independence of traditional media and temporary ...
Turkey's Constitutional Court elected Zühtü Arslan as its new chairman in February, replacing the outgoing Haşim Kılıç. With a master's degree in human rights and civil freedoms and a doctorate in constitutional ...

Turkey's Constitutional Court elected Zühtü Arslan as its new chairman in February, replacing the outgoing Haşim Kılıç. With a master's degree in human rights and civil freedoms and a doctorate in constitutional law, Arslan has taught courses on constitutional law, human rights, and state theories, and has worked for the European Court of Human Rights. Arslan is widely praised, including by some prominent conservative columnists for his record of defending liberal democratic values. Arslan’s loud criticisms of the Turkish military’s attempts to shut down the governing Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish acronym AKP) in 2007, for example, are widely cited by many as a testament to his commitment to liberal democracy.

Arslan’s election comes during a time of growing concerns about the independence of Turkey’s judiciary and the future of the country’s democracy. Nearly a year ago, the government adopted controversial legislation that strengthened the Ministry of Justice’s hand over the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which deals with the appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors. The High Council also functions as the Turkish legal system’s disciplinary body, and its members, when necessary, are judged by the Constitutional Court. The Court is Turkey’s highest judicial body, and has the authority, when called upon, to review the conformity of laws to the constitution. The Court also has the power to preside over impeachment cases against the president of the Republic and members of the Council of Ministers. The president of the Republic appoints, for 12-year terms, the 11 regular and four substitute members of the Court, who then elect a chairman and a deputy chairman from among themselves every four years by secret ballot and an absolute majority.

The Court’s current membership composition is largely a result of appointments made by Abdullah Gül, the former president and foreign minister of Turkey, and a co-founder of AKP. Although the Turkish Constitutional Court was established more than five decades ago to prevent the abuse of executive power and defend democracy, it has not always been loyal to this purpose. Following the military coup of 1980, the Court was frequently associated with rulings that shut down political parties and restricted freedoms in general. In the past decade, however, the Court became increasingly supportive of liberal democratic principles. Ironically, this advancement owes itself to the series of political reforms that were introduced during Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s first term in office, when Turkey still espoused strong European Union membership aspirations.

Many interpreted last year's controversial legislation as an effort on the part of Erdoğan, Turkey’s current president (and then the prime minister), to enhance government control over the judiciary by weakening the High Council’s independence. The move is also widely recognized to have been a response to the December 2013 graft scandal, an investigation that implicated a number of AKP cabinet members on charges of corruption. Erdoğan and his government argue that these indictments were fabricated within the Turkish police and judiciary by sympathizers of the Hizmet Movement, led by the prominent Turkish preacher Fetullah Gülen. The government accuses Gülenists of having created a “parallel state” with the intention of overthrowing the elected and legitimate government of Turkey. This line of thinking led the government to dismiss or reassign almost 200 judges in January alone, and purge a long list of police officers over the course of 2014 for their alleged links to the Gülen movement.

These developments have coincided with other democratic setbacks in Turkey. In recent years there have been increasing restrictions on freedom of expression, including the weakening independence of traditional media and temporary shutdowns of social media. Erdoğan also aims to transform Turkey from a parliamentary into a presidential system with strong executive powers. A shift away from the parliamentary system would severely compromise Turkey’s current separation of powers and could take Turkey down an increasingly authoritarian path. The retiring Constitutional Court chairman Kılıç has on several occasions openly criticized AKP for its increasing interference in the judiciary. Recently, on February 10, Kılıç warned politicians about the dangers of turning the judiciary into an “instrument of revenge” and said that Erdoğan’s government is undermining the judiciary’s independence. Such remarks have earned Kılıç accusations of being a coup-plotter and holding anti-Islamist views. Kılıç has not always been out of favor with AKP. In yet another irony, Kılıç was the Court’s chairman—and even cast the tiebreaker vote—in the 2008 ruling that rejected the indictment seeking to dissolve AKP for its “anti-secular activities.” Had the Court ruled in favor of the indictment, then Prime Minister Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül and 70 other leading AKP members would have been banned from holding political office.

Like Kılıç, Arslan had also openly disapproved of the 2007 indictment to dissolve AKP. He was also among those who helped AKP in its attempts to draft a new civilian constitution in 2008, before Erdoğan revealed his majoritarian aspirations. At the time, Arslan had argued for changes to the preamble of the draft constitution to make it “much more liberal, and to emphasize the importance of individual rights and liberties and the rule of law."

Arslan will be taking office as Turkey prepares to hold parliamentary elections in June. The elections’ outcome will shape the fate of Erdoğan’s constitutional vision for a presidential system. If AKP can secure more than 330 parliamentary seats (out of 550), Erdoğan will be able to make constitutional amendments that reflect his views of a strong executive, or even completely rewrite the Constitution and bring it to a referendum. If Erdoğan achieves his goal, the Court could be weakened in its raison d’être of holding the government accountable and protecting Turkey’s separation of powers.

Government accountability, checks and balances, and separation of powers are the principles Arslan believes in wholly and has worked to promote. It will thus be interesting to see how Arslan steps up to the bench. Will Arslan’s liberal convictions help defend the independence of the judiciary, and preserve the Court’s place in the Turkish political system as a check against the executive abuse of power? Arslan has repeatedly expressed his commitment to holding the law above politics. For this reason, his appointment may offer a safeguard against autocracy and could become a much-needed glimmer of hope for Turkish democracy.

Trust between Turkey and the United States has been constantly sinking, but with Washington giving more prominence to economic issues, Ankara remains important to the U.S. as it is still considered a stable country with a growing economy in a chaotic region, according to a Washington-based Turkish scholar.

With many Western countries facing their own problems of democratic governance, Turkey’s problems with democracy are becoming less of a priority, said Kemal Kirişci of the Brookings Institute.

Hurriyet Daily News: How does Turkey look from Washington from the perspective of Americans?

Kemal Kirişci: I cannot say that Turkey has the image it had until summer 2013. I was actually present in D.C. when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came on a state visit in May 2013. I participated in the lunch event organized for him at the State Department. I just could not believe the praise that he got showered with from [Secretary of State] John Kerry to [Vice President] Joe Biden; it was not just praise bestowed on Erdoğan but his family as well.

However, when the Gezi events took place and Erdoğan seemed to blame not only just Lufthansa, the West but also implied [U.S. President Barack] Obama, too, Obama apparently said to his close circles, “I can’t believe that someone whom I hosted for a private dinner at my residence would be saying this about me.”

That was the beginning of the break in confidence, the mutual trust. If we take that reference point; trust has been constantly sinking and the kind of language the president has chosen to resort to when referring to developments in the Middle East has widened this mistrust.

I also hear that Americans are tired of hearing that these populist statements are made for domestic political consumption.

HDN: Don’t you think another problem is the fact that Ankara and Washington are not on the same page on critical issues like the Middle East?

KK: In Turkey there are two perceptions on that issue: there is recognition in parts of the Turkish bureaucracy, business world and public opinion that the Middle East has become a liability for Turkey in terms of economic relations and security and that Turkey has to reorient its strategic vision as a function of its national interest.

But there is another position that is much more rhetorical; it is wrapped in political/ideological calculations. I think the Americans are aware of this. Against all odds, at the bureaucratic level, the relations are there. There is an effort to create a common ground and cooperate but then these efforts are sometimes pushed back to square one by statements coming from the government at the highest level. Still, that relationship is there.

That applies to economics as well. Secretary of Commerce [Penny Pritzker] came to Turkey, and Turkey is still designated as an economic partner for the U.S. and the West. One American official ahead of … Pritzker’s visit said to me: “I am afraid at the Hill these days we would not touch Turkey with a barge poll.” That’s because of the image Turkey has created of itself.

HDN: Although you say there is a relationship, it looks like the two capitals have been finding it more and more difficult to work together.

KK: What I am saying is that in Washington there are people who recognize that Turkey is more than Erdoğan; it is more than his rhetoric. What is leading them to say that is a recognition of a number of factors: one is that Turkey has an important economy; at a time when there is chaos surrounding this neighborhood, there is one economy that has managed to grow 3 percent. My impression is that the U.S. is giving growing emphasis to economic trade issues and will be channeling its energy into this area beside Iran, ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and Ukraine. With its emphasis on the economy, Turkey remains important for the U.S.

This is the message that I hear from officials but also from people who have a say in broader American policy circles.

And then there is the second realization: Turkey’s neighborhood is really in a mess and there is one country there somehow still managing to maintain some stability. Americans at the end of the day put a lot of emphasis on stability. And so because of the chaos reigning in the area and also because of their own problems with democracy and Europe’s own difficulties with democracy, issues like freedom of speech and democratic performance recede into the background in this broader context. It is less of a priority.

HDN: Political issues used to be the locomotive of relations while economic issues had secondary importance. Is it going to be the other way around?

KK: It would depend on how Turkey is managing economic issues. In the 2000s until 2009; Turkey and the U.S. had shared values, vis-à-vis the market economy, regulatory institutions’ independence, women’s rights, human rights and freedom of expression. There were also shared interests. Now shared values are not totally gone but substantially gone. In the U.S. there are concerns about the independence of regulatory bodies that manage the Turkish economy and about women’s rights.

Shared interests remain in place but because of the climate of mistrust and a lack of confidence, those shared interests are not acted upon it. My personal view is that there is a change that has been unfolding literally in the last three-four weeks. I would also argue that why this is possible is that behind the scenes, there is this constant interaction at the more bureaucratic level

HDN: So what you mean to say is that despite discord at the leadership levels, diplomats keep relations going; there is an accumulated working dynamic that serves as damage control.

KK: What you refer to as a phenomenon does not exist in U.S.-Iranian relations. Turkey and the U.S. have been part of an alliance, and a lot of this relationship has been going on for decades.

HDN: Does that mean that you would then challenge those who say that with the already-good relations with Iraqi Kurds and the possible reconciliation with Iran, Turkey will lose its importance and no longer remain a close ally?

KK: No, I would not challenge that. We must not look at what’s going on in Washington as a homogenous event. In Washington, there are clearly those who argue Turkey is a lost cause, that Turkey is acting against the interests of U.S., that it is an unreliable partner and alluding that rough measures should be taken against Turkey. Then there are those who don’t always openly say so, but argue that there are still shared interests and a decades-old working relationship.

Let me tie this to Iran. Brookings precipitated a debate on who should the U.S. work with in the Middle East to get it out of the trap it has fallen into.

There are some arguing Iran is the partner to work with; there is already an implicit cooperation taking place between Iran and the U.S. In that debate, Turkey is absent; no one is talking about Turkey, and I think the reason why they don’t talk about it is, first of all, this trust issue. The second is huge disillusionment with Turkey, and the third is a recognition that they don’t have any more shared values.

Remember when Obama came to Turkey in 2009; he talked about a model partnership. Then there was talk about how Turkey would be a model for the Arab Spring countries’ transition toward a liberal market economy and democracy. Now there is no talk about that. Turkey is right now a country out in the region that is reasonably stable; there are big question marks about the quality of its democracy, but in relation to the chaos in the neighboring Middle East and the difficulties that the EU is still continuing to experience in getting its economy back on its feet, it seems to be doing OK. But it has no relevance to the U.S. in addressing the challenges of the Middle East.

HDN: You say that despite the loss of trust, there is still a working relationship; Turkey’s position as an ally in the Middle East is questioned as well as whether there are still shared values. Yet the U.S. still appreciates Turkey as an island of stability and thus does not want to criticize democratic backpedalling in Turkey. All this might sound contradictory.

KK: Indeed, the world that surrounds Turkey extending all the way to Britain is having problems with democratic governance at different levels. Russia invades a neighboring country; in most of Europe the right is on the rise. So deep down, there is a recognition that one must shy away from statements and policies and acts that could undermine or exacerbate not only the relationship but also Turkey’s own domestic situation. The U.S. is also appreciating what is going on in Turkish- Kurdish relations. But when it comes to addressing grand strategic issues like how to tackle the Middle East, Turkey is not there.

HDN: How can Turkey not be there?

KK: There is an [emerging] consensus, but it is ambiguous whether that consensus has put ISIL [to the top of the threat list]. Whether we like it or not, [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad is receding in the list of threats. Somehow I have a feeling that the execution of Jordanian pilot [Muath al-Kasasbeh] by immolation had an impact here in Turkey that may well be changing government's position on what is ISIL is about.

HDN: What are your future projections?

KK: I think we will have to wait until parliamentary elections are over in Turkey, and we will have to see what kind of political landscape emerges. I have a feeling if that landscape enjoys a decent level of stability in Turkey, I think we will see an incremental improvement in Turkish-U.S. relations, there will be more and more convergences of policies over Syria and Iraq.

Authors

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Mon, 09 Mar 2015 00:00:00 -0400Kemal Kirişci
Trust between Turkey and the United States has been constantly sinking, but with Washington giving more prominence to economic issues, Ankara remains important to the U.S. as it is still considered a stable country with a growing economy in a chaotic region, according to a Washington-based Turkish scholar.
With many Western countries facing their own problems of democratic governance, Turkey's problems with democracy are becoming less of a priority, said Kemal Kirişci of the Brookings Institute.
Hurriyet Daily News: How does Turkey look from Washington from the perspective of Americans?
Kemal Kirişci: I cannot say that Turkey has the image it had until summer 2013. I was actually present in D.C. when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came on a state visit in May 2013. I participated in the lunch event organized for him at the State Department. I just could not believe the praise that he got showered with from [Secretary of State] John Kerry to [Vice President] Joe Biden; it was not just praise bestowed on Erdoğan but his family as well.
However, when the Gezi events took place and Erdoğan seemed to blame not only just Lufthansa, the West but also implied [U.S. President Barack] Obama, too, Obama apparently said to his close circles, “I can't believe that someone whom I hosted for a private dinner at my residence would be saying this about me.”
That was the beginning of the break in confidence, the mutual trust. If we take that reference point; trust has been constantly sinking and the kind of language the president has chosen to resort to when referring to developments in the Middle East has widened this mistrust.
I also hear that Americans are tired of hearing that these populist statements are made for domestic political consumption.
HDN: Don't you think another problem is the fact that Ankara and Washington are not on the same page on critical issues like the Middle East?
KK: In Turkey there are two perceptions on that issue: there is recognition in parts of the Turkish bureaucracy, business world and public opinion that the Middle East has become a liability for Turkey in terms of economic relations and security and that Turkey has to reorient its strategic vision as a function of its national interest.
But there is another position that is much more rhetorical; it is wrapped in political/ideological calculations. I think the Americans are aware of this. Against all odds, at the bureaucratic level, the relations are there. There is an effort to create a common ground and cooperate but then these efforts are sometimes pushed back to square one by statements coming from the government at the highest level. Still, that relationship is there.
That applies to economics as well. Secretary of Commerce [Penny Pritzker] came to Turkey, and Turkey is still designated as an economic partner for the U.S. and the West. One American official ahead of … Pritzker's visit said to me: “I am afraid at the Hill these days we would not touch Turkey with a barge poll.” That's because of the image Turkey has created of itself.
HDN: Although you say there is a relationship, it looks like the two capitals have been finding it more and more difficult to work together.
KK: What I am saying is that in Washington there are people who recognize that Turkey is more than Erdoğan; it is more than his rhetoric. What is leading them to say that is a recognition of a number of factors: one is that Turkey has an important economy; at a time when there is chaos surrounding this neighborhood, there is one economy that has managed to grow 3 percent. My impression is that the U.S. is giving growing emphasis to economic trade issues and will be channeling its energy into this area beside Iran, ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and Ukraine. With its emphasis on the economy, Turkey remains important for the U.S.
This is the message that I hear from ...
Trust between Turkey and the United States has been constantly sinking, but with Washington giving more prominence to economic issues, Ankara remains important to the U.S. as it is still considered a stable country with a growing economy in a ...

Trust between Turkey and the United States has been constantly sinking, but with Washington giving more prominence to economic issues, Ankara remains important to the U.S. as it is still considered a stable country with a growing economy in a chaotic region, according to a Washington-based Turkish scholar.

With many Western countries facing their own problems of democratic governance, Turkey’s problems with democracy are becoming less of a priority, said Kemal Kirişci of the Brookings Institute.

Hurriyet Daily News: How does Turkey look from Washington from the perspective of Americans?

Kemal Kirişci: I cannot say that Turkey has the image it had until summer 2013. I was actually present in D.C. when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came on a state visit in May 2013. I participated in the lunch event organized for him at the State Department. I just could not believe the praise that he got showered with from [Secretary of State] John Kerry to [Vice President] Joe Biden; it was not just praise bestowed on Erdoğan but his family as well.

However, when the Gezi events took place and Erdoğan seemed to blame not only just Lufthansa, the West but also implied [U.S. President Barack] Obama, too, Obama apparently said to his close circles, “I can’t believe that someone whom I hosted for a private dinner at my residence would be saying this about me.”

That was the beginning of the break in confidence, the mutual trust. If we take that reference point; trust has been constantly sinking and the kind of language the president has chosen to resort to when referring to developments in the Middle East has widened this mistrust.

I also hear that Americans are tired of hearing that these populist statements are made for domestic political consumption.

HDN: Don’t you think another problem is the fact that Ankara and Washington are not on the same page on critical issues like the Middle East?

KK: In Turkey there are two perceptions on that issue: there is recognition in parts of the Turkish bureaucracy, business world and public opinion that the Middle East has become a liability for Turkey in terms of economic relations and security and that Turkey has to reorient its strategic vision as a function of its national interest.

But there is another position that is much more rhetorical; it is wrapped in political/ideological calculations. I think the Americans are aware of this. Against all odds, at the bureaucratic level, the relations are there. There is an effort to create a common ground and cooperate but then these efforts are sometimes pushed back to square one by statements coming from the government at the highest level. Still, that relationship is there.

That applies to economics as well. Secretary of Commerce [Penny Pritzker] came to Turkey, and Turkey is still designated as an economic partner for the U.S. and the West. One American official ahead of … Pritzker’s visit said to me: “I am afraid at the Hill these days we would not touch Turkey with a barge poll.” That’s because of the image Turkey has created of itself.

HDN: Although you say there is a relationship, it looks like the two capitals have been finding it more and more difficult to work together.

KK: What I am saying is that in Washington there are people who recognize that Turkey is more than Erdoğan; it is more than his rhetoric. What is leading them to say that is a recognition of a number of factors: one is that Turkey has an important economy; at a time when there is chaos surrounding this neighborhood, there is one economy that has managed to grow 3 percent. My impression is that the U.S. is giving growing emphasis to economic trade issues and will be channeling its energy into this area beside Iran, ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and Ukraine. With its emphasis on the economy, Turkey remains important for the U.S.

This is the message that I hear from officials but also from people who have a say in broader American policy circles.

And then there is the second realization: Turkey’s neighborhood is really in a mess and there is one country there somehow still managing to maintain some stability. Americans at the end of the day put a lot of emphasis on stability. And so because of the chaos reigning in the area and also because of their own problems with democracy and Europe’s own difficulties with democracy, issues like freedom of speech and democratic performance recede into the background in this broader context. It is less of a priority.

HDN: Political issues used to be the locomotive of relations while economic issues had secondary importance. Is it going to be the other way around?

KK: It would depend on how Turkey is managing economic issues. In the 2000s until 2009; Turkey and the U.S. had shared values, vis-à-vis the market economy, regulatory institutions’ independence, women’s rights, human rights and freedom of expression. There were also shared interests. Now shared values are not totally gone but substantially gone. In the U.S. there are concerns about the independence of regulatory bodies that manage the Turkish economy and about women’s rights.

Shared interests remain in place but because of the climate of mistrust and a lack of confidence, those shared interests are not acted upon it. My personal view is that there is a change that has been unfolding literally in the last three-four weeks. I would also argue that why this is possible is that behind the scenes, there is this constant interaction at the more bureaucratic level

HDN: So what you mean to say is that despite discord at the leadership levels, diplomats keep relations going; there is an accumulated working dynamic that serves as damage control.

KK: What you refer to as a phenomenon does not exist in U.S.-Iranian relations. Turkey and the U.S. have been part of an alliance, and a lot of this relationship has been going on for decades.

HDN: Does that mean that you would then challenge those who say that with the already-good relations with Iraqi Kurds and the possible reconciliation with Iran, Turkey will lose its importance and no longer remain a close ally?

KK: No, I would not challenge that. We must not look at what’s going on in Washington as a homogenous event. In Washington, there are clearly those who argue Turkey is a lost cause, that Turkey is acting against the interests of U.S., that it is an unreliable partner and alluding that rough measures should be taken against Turkey. Then there are those who don’t always openly say so, but argue that there are still shared interests and a decades-old working relationship.

Let me tie this to Iran. Brookings precipitated a debate on who should the U.S. work with in the Middle East to get it out of the trap it has fallen into.

There are some arguing Iran is the partner to work with; there is already an implicit cooperation taking place between Iran and the U.S. In that debate, Turkey is absent; no one is talking about Turkey, and I think the reason why they don’t talk about it is, first of all, this trust issue. The second is huge disillusionment with Turkey, and the third is a recognition that they don’t have any more shared values.

Remember when Obama came to Turkey in 2009; he talked about a model partnership. Then there was talk about how Turkey would be a model for the Arab Spring countries’ transition toward a liberal market economy and democracy. Now there is no talk about that. Turkey is right now a country out in the region that is reasonably stable; there are big question marks about the quality of its democracy, but in relation to the chaos in the neighboring Middle East and the difficulties that the EU is still continuing to experience in getting its economy back on its feet, it seems to be doing OK. But it has no relevance to the U.S. in addressing the challenges of the Middle East.

HDN: You say that despite the loss of trust, there is still a working relationship; Turkey’s position as an ally in the Middle East is questioned as well as whether there are still shared values. Yet the U.S. still appreciates Turkey as an island of stability and thus does not want to criticize democratic backpedalling in Turkey. All this might sound contradictory.

KK: Indeed, the world that surrounds Turkey extending all the way to Britain is having problems with democratic governance at different levels. Russia invades a neighboring country; in most of Europe the right is on the rise. So deep down, there is a recognition that one must shy away from statements and policies and acts that could undermine or exacerbate not only the relationship but also Turkey’s own domestic situation. The U.S. is also appreciating what is going on in Turkish- Kurdish relations. But when it comes to addressing grand strategic issues like how to tackle the Middle East, Turkey is not there.

HDN: How can Turkey not be there?

KK: There is an [emerging] consensus, but it is ambiguous whether that consensus has put ISIL [to the top of the threat list]. Whether we like it or not, [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad is receding in the list of threats. Somehow I have a feeling that the execution of Jordanian pilot [Muath al-Kasasbeh] by immolation had an impact here in Turkey that may well be changing government's position on what is ISIL is about.

HDN: What are your future projections?

KK: I think we will have to wait until parliamentary elections are over in Turkey, and we will have to see what kind of political landscape emerges. I have a feeling if that landscape enjoys a decent level of stability in Turkey, I think we will see an incremental improvement in Turkish-U.S. relations, there will be more and more convergences of policies over Syria and Iraq.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/02/armenia-turkey-normalization-reconciliation?rssid=turkey{E8FBEBAB-22D0-40DB-BF1D-AF79B52DB957}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85901751/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~Armenia-and-Turkey-From-normalization-to-reconciliationArmenia and Turkey: From normalization to reconciliation

For Turkey and Armenia, normalization and reconciliation can be seen as two sides of the same coin. A critical and achievable breakthrough would be the opening of the international border and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, meaningful progress at the inter-state level does not seem probable in the immediate future given the heighted political sensitivities around the historic commemorations of this year. Nonetheless, the authors argue that informal normalization is occurring. Across Turkish and Armenian societies, the “thaw” is expanding and appears to be sanctioned by both governments. For the deeper process of reconciliation, both countries should support smaller, symbolic efforts that allow for dialogue and understanding.

Exactly one century ago in March 1915, the British and French navies, together with the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), attempted to force their way through the Turkish Straits to attack Istanbul and open a new front in World War I. At the same time, the Ottoman government was in the process of moving its Armenian population away from the eastern parts of the empire bordering its archenemy, Russia. Amid the chaos of war, the Ottomans feared Russia would stir the Christian Armenian millet to revolt, fragmenting the Ottoman Empire while its armies clashed with Russia’s allies, the British and the French. The forced displacement of the Armenians was accompanied by unimaginable violence and depredation. Today, Armenians, as well as most historians around the world, claim that 1.5 million of their ancestors were deliberately and systematically killed in the modern world’s first genocide. There are no exact, indisputable figures for the number of lives lost, but the magnitude of the catastrophe is incontestable.

24 April 2015 will be commemorated in Yerevan and globally as the centennial of these atrocities. Traditionally, Turkey has challenged the Armenian depiction of the circumstances surrounding the deportation, the number of deaths, as well as the designation of the events as genocide. The Turkish government contends that the deaths must be understood within the turbulent context of World War I; they were not systematically orchestrated; and they occurred amid other massacres committed against many Ottoman Muslims.

The official Turkish position, however, has softened over the course of the last decade. In the words of Thomas de Waal, author of Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide, a “Turkish thaw” is unfolding; Turkish society is increasingly revisiting “some of the dark pages of its past, including the oppression of the non-Turkish populations of the late Ottoman Empire.” (1) In April 2014, the former Prime Minister and current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, made a statement recognizing the significance of April 24th for Armenians around the world. He described the historic events as “inhumane” and offered condolences to the grandchildren of those who lost their lives. Erdoğan’s declaration fell short of issuing an apology or acknowledging genocide as such, but nonetheless marked a fundamental change in the nation’s approach to comprehending and addressing the events of 1915.

Erdoğan’s statement should be regarded as an important step toward reconciliation between Turks and Armenians, not just toward normalizing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia. However, given the multidimensional nature of the dispute between Turkey and Armenia and their peoples, reconciliation faces immense challenges. It is a process that must occur at the individual, societal, and state levels. Reconciliation requires time and a reconsideration of identity as well as of history.

In contrast, the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is more limited in scope. In theory, it could proceed more quickly. However, progress has been erratic in recent years. Both Turkey and Armenia have made positive steps forward toward normalizing their relations, only to have the apparent progress met by new setbacks and competing priorities. As former Armenian Ambassador David Shahnazaryan noted in this journal, “The evolution of the relationship between Turkey and Armenia has gone through various, and often contradicting phases.” (2)

At the state level, as important a step as Erdoğan’s April 2014 statement was, it was in many respects motivated by political expediency. While the statement marked a long-awaited official departure from previous categorical Turkish disavowals and adherence to an uncompromising historical narrative, it was clearly intended to help defuse international condemnation ahead of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide. Political calculations also factored into Turkey’s commemoration of the World War I Battle of Gallipoli (Çanakkale), which is typically observed on March 18th, to mark the end of the Allies’ 1915 naval campaign to break through the Dardanelles. This year, however, the Turkish government resolved to push the observance back to April 24-25, coinciding with the Armenian commemorations and the centennial of the ANZAC landings on 25 April 1915. Both President Erdoğan and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan have issued competing invitations for their respective events, although Erdoğan’s letter to his Armenian counterpart came months later, and has been denounced by many as a crude distraction. (3) Regardless of Erdoğan’s manipulation of the Armenian issue for political purposes, there are other manifestations of a new openness within Turkey. Some Armenian churches that survived outright destruction and decades of neglect are being restored and a few have reopened for services. (4) There are plans to construct a new Christian church in Istanbul, which would be the first built since 1923. (5) Of the hundreds of Armenian properties confiscated by the Turkish state, some are now being returned to their rightful owners, or alternative compensation is being provided.

More than a decade ago the government liberalized visa requirements for Armenian nationals wishing to travel to Turkey. This opened the way for Armenian citizens to enter the informal labor market in Turkey, especially in domestic work. The Turkish government has generally tolerated this arrangement and recently adopted legislation allowing the possibility for undocumented workers to regularize their status. Informal developments at the societal level are in some ways more conspicuous, but more difficult to document. Turks across all segments of society are facing the history of World War I in a new light. They are questioning official narratives, and struggling to come to terms with this troubled period in Turkey’s Ottoman past. As de Waal notes, after a long period of collective amnesia during which Armenians were essentially absent from Turkish historical accounts, a flood of books have appeared focusing on the legacy of Armenians in Turkey. Within the social history of Turkey, there is growing recognition of the thousands of Islamized Armenians – those Armenians, many of them young women, who were captured during the deportations by Kurds and Turks and taken into their families, and who adopted Islam to avoid persecution.

There are also growing interactions among academics, businesspeople, journalists, and representatives of civil societies from both countries. Prosecutions under the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which made “denigrating Turkishness” a crime, have diminished significantly in recent years, facilitating the breaking down of taboos. A noteworthy example is the 2008 “I apologize” campaign, an online initiative led by a group of Turkish intellectuals to reject the official denial of the massacres and offer an apology. (6) The petition initially provoked strong outcries from Erdoğan and Turkish nationalists, but has now been signed by over 32,000 Turks. (7) Growing numbers of Turks also annually recognize the significance of April 24th through both informal and public commemorations.

Efforts to Normalize Relations Between Armenia and Turkey

Based on interviews held in October and November 2014, with officials and civil society representatives in Ankara, Yerevan, and Tbilisi, the authors of this article believe that current efforts to normalize diplomatic relations could also help push along the process of Turkish-Armenian societal reconciliation. The idea of promoting
reconciliation through official normalization would be in line with the ideas and legacy of Hrant Dink, a Turkish- Armenian journalist from Istanbul, who was assassinated in January 2007 by a young Turkish nationalist. Dink long objected to the idea of using outside pressure – through international governmental, parliamentary, and other institutional resolutions – to force the Turkish state and society to recognize the Armenian genocide. He believed history could not be legislated. Support for reconciliation and recognition would have to come from within Turkey. In his articles, Dink advocated for an open democratic dialogue about the events of 1915 to provide the Turkish public with a more informed understanding of the events. He encouraged closer societal contacts between Armenia and Turkey, which he considered crucial to a deeper comprehension of the complexities of the past by both sides. (8)

In the years since his death, Hrant Dink’s work has become a key factor in bringing Armenia and Turkey together. Regional events have also played a role in shaping attitudes towards the stalemate in bilateral diplomatic relations. The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, for example, ruptured Armenia’s sole trading route through Georgia to Russia. It starkly underscored the strategic risks posed by Armenia’s position, framed by closed borders with both Turkey and Azerbaijan since the 1990s. Given the ongoing stalemate with Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories, Armenia’s chances of opening the border with Azerbaijan were slim. These considerations subsequently led Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to invite his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gül, to a soccer game between the two national teams in Yerevan later in 2008. The “soccer diplomacy” and subsequent interactions eventually culminated in the negotiation and signing of two sets of bilateral protocols in Zurich in October of 2009. (9) The Protocols offered a basis for further negotiations aimed at re-establishing formal diplomatic relations, opening the international border, and setting up a joint history commission to address the issue of the Armenian genocide.

Ultimately the Protocols could not be ratified on the Turkish side, in large part due to assurances Ankara had previously given to Baku during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan put considerable pressure on the Turkish government, including running a well-financed direct lobbying, PR, and media effort in 2009-10 against the Protocols that highlighted Turkey’s cultural ties with Azerbaijan and its political and security commitments. On the Armenian side, nationalists and hard-liners, especially within the global diaspora, denounced the Protocols and declared that any future deal with Turkey that lacked genocide recognition would be a capitulation. The Armenia-Turkey diplomatic track has been bogged down in issues related to Nagorno-Karabakh ever since, and the Protocols have remained frozen.

The idea of establishing diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey and opening the border as a step toward reconciliation is not new. In fact, this proposal originally emerged in Armenia itself, immediately after its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 under the government of Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Diplomatic relations with Turkey and the establishment of a new international border, on what had previously been the USSR’s frontier, were seen in Yerevan as a means of mitigating the dire economic consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the ongoing humanitarian crisis resulting from the devastating earthquake of 1988. Opening Armenia’s border with Turkey, a NATO member, was also seen as a signal of independence from Russia, and of an eventual Western vocation. After the Armenian earthquake, Turkey periodically opened the land border for shipments of EU grain to Armenia; and, in 1991, Turkey was the first nation after the United States to recognize the newly-independent Republic of Armenia. Turkey reopened the historical czarist-era railway between Kars and Gyumri. This was followed by informal contacts between both governments to explore the establishment of diplomatic relations and formal border agreements. At the time, Ter-Petrosyan is reported to have told Turkey’s Ambassador to Moscow Volkan Vural: “I cannot forget the past, but I don’t want to live with this past. I want to build a future for our children and grandchildren.” (10) This pragmatic approach brought both sides very close to adopting an agreement, until the Armenian occupation of the Kelbajar region of Azerbaijan in 1993.

Against the backdrop of war and Turkey’s decision to break off relations, Ter-Petrosyan’s pragmatism – including his support for a negotiated settlement with Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh and his willingness to put the issue of genocide recognition to the side – was denounced by Armenian hardliners. He was forced out of power in 1998, and succeeded by Robert Kocharian, the former leader of Nagorno-Karabakh. Kocharian put the embryonic rapprochement with Turkey on the back burner of Armenian policy and focused on broadening and deepening Armenia’s relations with Russia, which became the guarantor not only of the ceasefire with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, but also the formal guarantor of Armenia’s security. Domestic developments in Armenia in 2008, even before Russia’s war with Georgia, shifted the political calculus again. The election of Kocharian’s hand-picked successor, Serzh Sargsyan, was marred by allegations of electoral fraud and high-level corruption, and met with street demonstrations. Heavy-handed attempts to quash the protests resulted in clashes with the police, scores of arrests, and 10 deaths. In the aftermath, Sargsyan’s administration was eager to burnish its international credentials and gradually pursued closer relations with the European Union. These developments also contributed to expanding civil society (11) and trade ties with Turkey that paved the way for Sargsyan’s invitation to President Gül to attend the soccer game between the two national teams. (12)

Armenia’s Balancing Act

After the historic 2008 soccer match, Serzh Sargsyan attempted a delicate political balancing act between the West (including Turkey) and Russia: a strategy termed
“complementarity.” The risks of this tight-rope policy were underscored after the Protocols failed in spring 2010. In July 2010, Yerevan began the first round of its negotiations with Brussels to conclude an EU Association Agreement, an initial and crucial step toward closer political association and eventual economic integration with Europe. A month later, however, Yerevan also signed an agreement extending Russia’s military presence and basing rights in Armenia. In 2013, the policy of complementarity hit a dead end, when Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that Armenia should sign on to the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) along with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Moscow exerted similar pressure on Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which were also negotiating EU Association Agreements. The machinations around the competing EU and Eurasian associations were a key factor in generating the political crisis in Ukraine that ultimately led to the ouster of President Victor Yanukovych in February 2014, and, from there, Moscow’s decision to annex Crimea, and the subsequent civil war in Ukraine.

Following a meeting between Sargsyan and Putin in summer 2013, and against the background of an upsurge of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia made an abrupt policy U-turn. (13) Yerevan rejected the Association Agreement and then formally signed the Eurasian Economic Union Agreement in October 2014. In discussions with Armenian officials and experts in Yerevan in this same timeframe, the authors’ interlocutors stressed that Armenia’s existential security concerns about the escalating conflict with Azerbaijan had tipped the balance toward Russia. Armenia’s close economic ties with Russia, including trade and financial flows, and its large diaspora in Russia, also constrained Yerevan’s options for associating formally with the EU. Armenian government officials openly admitted that the Sargsyan regime’s decision to join the EEU was forced by economic and security concerns. It was a decision driven by the three decades long blockade imposed on Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey, the resulting economic dependency on Russia, and the escalating violence along the “contact line” between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. In short, it was a pragmatic, expedient move, not a “civilizational choice” to turn away from Europe and the West.

Windows to Turkey

Armenia’s lurch toward Russia and the Eurasian Union seemed to deal a further blow to the prospects of normalization with Turkey. Many had hoped in Yerevan, Brussels, and Ankara, that with Armenia and Turkey both engaged in negotiations for closer EU relations (or, in the case of Turkey, for accession), new doors might open for bilateral diplomatic contacts. However, even with these doors closed, regional policymakers and analysts suggested that some windows might still be opened, given the desire on both sides to forge a new relationship. In interviews in Yerevan in October 2014, Armenian experts stressed the intrinsic importance of opening the border with Turkey and maintaining a semblance of independence from Russia. As one academic put it: “without opening the border with Turkey, we can’t go West.” Another analyst argued that normalization with Turkey was a way for Armenia to show that “it is not a vassal of Russia.” In meetings in Ankara in November 2014, Turkish officials and foreign policy analysts discreetly noted that the decision in 1993 to break off the border negotiations with Armenia had not only left Yerevan completely dependent on Moscow, it had also limited Ankara’s own outreach to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Ratification of the 2009 Protocols, in their view, might have helped create new geopolitical configurations in the Caucasus. Furthermore, Turkish analysts recognized that Turkey’s policy of blockading Armenia since the 1990s had not persuaded Yerevan to change its policy toward Nagorno-Karabakh in the ways that Turkish decision makers had hoped. (14)

Behind the scenes and beyond the political gamesmanship, the Armenian and Turkish governments continue to be supportive of civil society contacts. They have not disrupted trade and the movement of people between the two countries. Nationals of both countries enjoy relatively free travel through electronic visas or visas obtained at international border crossings. This practice was introduced by Turkey in 2003 as part of what was then the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission and eventually reciprocated by Armenia. (15) Between 2000 and 2004 the number of Armenian nationals entering Turkey increased from less than 5,500 to about 32,000. The number had more than doubled to 73,000 by 2013. (16) Two private charter flights now operate between Istanbul and Yerevan each week – and those flights will likely bring some members of the Armenian diaspora to Yerevan for the genocide commemoration. There are also seasonal flights between Yerevan and the Turkish resorts of Antalya and Bodrum. Efforts to launch a Van-Yerevan air-route have been underway for some time, along with an ongoing project to open a new land border crossing between Turkey and Georgia that is much closer to the Armenian-Georgian border. (17) This crossing would cut travel time for road transportation between Armenia and Turkey and significantly increase the capacity for handling Turkish goods transiting through Georgia into Armenia. These and other initiatives illustrate the importance both sides ascribe to eventual normalization.

Looking Ahead

Moving beyond the anniversary of 2015, however, will be a significant challenge. Armenian distrust in Turkey’s intentions was exacerbated by the April 24th Gallipoli commemoration rescheduling and invitation. This will inhibit progress in the near future. Once April 24th has passed, the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will continue to plague Turkish-Armenian relations. As analysts in both Ankara and Yerevan admitted in the authors’ meetings, underestimating Azerbaijan’s fierce objections to the 2009 Protocols was a “strategic mistake” for both sides. Azerbaijan’s reactions will now have to be factored into any future steps toward diplomatic normalization. Similarly, Russia’s relations with both Turkey and Armenia will remain a complicating factor, with analysts stressing that Ankara and Yerevan will have to make a strong case to Moscow that opening the border would benefit Russia economically and politically. Many diplomats and regional experts suggested, as a result, that both countries should focus on small, “under the radar” projects and informal contacts to pave the way for returning to the basic tenets of the 2009 Protocols. Turkey and Armenia should avoid large, conspicuous initiatives that might provoke adverse reactions from either Azerbaijan or Russia.

One such smaller meeting that could help pave the way forward took place in Ankara in November 2014, under the auspices of the Hrant Dink Foundation. The Foundation and the School of Political Studies of Ankara University hosted the “Sealed Gate: Prospects of the Turkey-Armenia Border” conference, where Turkish bureaucrats, officials and academics, along with Armenian analysts and international diplomats and experts, engaged in a series of discussions on topics related to opening the border and societal reconciliation. The conference setting was deeply symbolic. The School of Political Studies has long been recognized as a “bastion” of the Turkish bureaucracy and known for educating state officials committed to the denial of the Armenian genocide. Outside the auditorium where the conference was held, portraits are permanently displayed of the Turkish diplomats who were assassinated in the 1970s and 1980s by ASALA, an Armenian terrorist group. Posters were also on exhibit that depict the tumultuous events in late-Ottoman Turkey that preceded World War I and the genocide.

At the opening of the conference, statements were read from Turkish parliamentarians representing both the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). Books, published by the Hrant Dink Foundation, relating the oral histories of families who went through the events of 1915 in Anatolia, including the revelations of many Turks about rediscovering their Armenian ancestry, were available at the conference. Photographs and other images from both sides of the Turkish-Armenian border were hung in the hallways. The significance of the juxtaposing images and narratives was inescapable. The substance of the conference itself was restrained, but Armenian and international participants appreciated the importance of the event as another step in a gradual process of reconciliation.

On the margins of the Hrant Dink conference in Ankara, other plans were discussed to organize follow-up events, including Turkish civil society efforts to observe, in some way, the upcoming commemorations in Yerevan. These types of discussions and initiatives were precisely what Hrant Dink had in mind when he considered the necessary steps toward Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. Dink was in favor of a methodical series of goodwill gestures, and increased interaction. This is the direction that both governments also generally favored before they embarked on the 2009 Protocols. Small, symbolic steps like the conference at the School of Political Studies and an intensification of bilateral engagement at the societal level, along with the efforts to enhance trade and communications, could help put Turkey and Armenia back on track toward diplomatic normalization – and, over time, toward reconciliation.

A unilateral act of statesmanship could also advance normalization as well as reconciliation. One proposal is for the Turkish government to quietly open its side of the land border with Armenia. Former Turkish Ambassador to London, Ünal Çeviköz recently suggested a game-changing step along these lines in an article published in late 2014. (18) A move like this would be akin to the Turkish Cypriot decision in April 2003 to lift their long-standing restrictions on crossing to the Greek Cypriot side of the island. The conflict over the reunification of Cyprus has not been resolved in the decade since, but the tension on the island has dramatically diminished. Greater contacts across the divide in Cyprus keep the prospects of a peaceful resolution alive. A similar quiet move by Turkey would do the same for realities with Armenia, once both countries have dealt with their competing commemorations of 1915.

(1) Thomas de Waal, “The G-Word: The Armenian Massacre and the Politics of Genocide” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2015), p. 136, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142489/thomas-de-waal/the-g-word(2) David Shahnazaryan, “Five Years After the Armenia-Turkey Protocols,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2014), http://turkishpolicy.com/article/Nervous-Neighbors-Five-Years-after-the-Armenia-Turkey-Protocols-Fall-2014-1010(3) Ayhan Aktar, “Yüzleşme yerine acıları yarıştırma hamlesi: Ankara ‘biz de mağduruz’ diyecek” Taraf, 25 January 2015, http://www.taraf.com.tr/guncel/yuzlesme-yerine-acilari-yaristirma-hamlesi-ankara-biz-de-magduruz-diyecek#; Robert Fisk, “The Gallipoli centenary is a shameful attempt to hide the Armenian Holocaust,” 19 January 2015, The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-gallipoli-centenary-is-a-shameful-attempt-to-hide-the-armenian-holocaust-9988227.html(4) These include the Church of the Holy Cross on the Akdamar Island and Saint Bartholomew Monastery near Van. Parkinson, Joe. “Armenian Church in Turkey Reopens to Worship”, Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2010 and “Historic Armenian church to reopen in Turkey’s east”, Anadolu Agency, 4 February 2014.(5) “Turkey Approves Construction Of First New Church In Nearly A Century,” The Huffington Post, 1 May 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/05/turkey-syriac-church_n_6418676.html(6) Cengiz Aktar, “Turkish Civil Society: Driving the Politics of Memory,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.13, No. 1 (Spring 2014), http://turkishpolicy.com/article/Turkish-Society-Driving-the-Politics-of-Memory-Spring-2014-977(7) See: www.ozurdiliyoruz.com The full text reads: “My conscience cannot accept the ignorance and denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and – on my own behalf – I share the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters – and I apologize to them.”(8) “To Unlock and Transcend History,” Agos, 27 May 2005. Translation provided by Hrant Dink Foundation.(9) “Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” and “Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.” For the full text see: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/88032/full-text-of-the-protocols-signed-by-turkey-and-armenia.html(10) “Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders,” Crisis Group Europe Report No 199, 14 April 2009.(11) For an assessment of projects supportive of civil society contacts between the two countries see: Susae Elanchenny and Narod Maraşlıyan, Breaking the Ice: The Role of Civil Society and Media in Turkey-Armenia Relations (Istanbul: Istanbul Kültür University, GPOT, 2012)(12) Tracing the volume of trade between the two countries is very difficult as it occurs mostly through Georgia. However, according to one study of Armenian-Turkish economic relations “the trade volume between the two countries is 150-200 million USD.” See: Armenian-Turkish Business Relations through the Eyes of Business Opinion Leaders - Study Report (Yerevan, 2011), p. 15. According to a more recent study, Armenia’s imports from Turkey were 213 million dollars and Turkey was listed as Armenia’s fifth largest import partner, ahead of Germany, Italy, and the USA. See: “Strengthening Connectivity and Business Synergies in the Southern Caucasus Towards a new Confidence Building Agenda: Final Report,” TEPAV (March 2014), p. 28. Businessmen dealing with Turkey told the authors of this article that they estimated the trade volume between the two countries to be between 250-300 million dollars but that it was probably much higher.(13) For more on Armenia’s decision to abandon the EU Association Agreement in favor of joining the Russian-led Customs Union see: Richard Giragosian, “Armenia’s Strategic U-Turn,” European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR99_ARMENIA_MEMO_AW.pdf.(14) Ünal Çeviköz, “Turkish-Armenian relations need a new game-changer,” Hurriyet Daily News, 13 November 2014.(15) David L. Phillips, Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols (New York: Columbia University, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, 2012).(16) Statistics obtained from www.tuik.gov.tr(17) “Turkey-based Van Airlines plans to operate flights to Armenia,” PanARMENIAN.Net, 10 July 2014, http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/180630/(18) Çeviköz (2014).

Authors

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Tue, 24 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0500Fiona Hill, Kemal Kirişci and Andrew Moffatt
Editor's Note: This article was originally published in the Winter 2015 edition of Turkish Policy Quarterly.________________________________________________________
For Turkey and Armenia, normalization and reconciliation can be seen as two sides of the same coin. A critical and achievable breakthrough would be the opening of the international border and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, meaningful progress at the inter-state level does not seem probable in the immediate future given the heighted political sensitivities around the historic commemorations of this year. Nonetheless, the authors argue that informal normalization is occurring. Across Turkish and Armenian societies, the “thaw” is expanding and appears to be sanctioned by both governments. For the deeper process of reconciliation, both countries should support smaller, symbolic efforts that allow for dialogue and understanding.________________________________________________________
Exactly one century ago in March 1915, the British and French navies, together with the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), attempted to force their way through the Turkish Straits to attack Istanbul and open a new front in World War I. At the same time, the Ottoman government was in the process of moving its Armenian population away from the eastern parts of the empire bordering its archenemy, Russia. Amid the chaos of war, the Ottomans feared Russia would stir the Christian Armenian millet to revolt, fragmenting the Ottoman Empire while its armies clashed with Russia's allies, the British and the French. The forced displacement of the Armenians was accompanied by unimaginable violence and depredation. Today, Armenians, as well as most historians around the world, claim that 1.5 million of their ancestors were deliberately and systematically killed in the modern world's first genocide. There are no exact, indisputable figures for the number of lives lost, but the magnitude of the catastrophe is incontestable.
24 April 2015 will be commemorated in Yerevan and globally as the centennial of these atrocities. Traditionally, Turkey has challenged the Armenian depiction of the circumstances surrounding the deportation, the number of deaths, as well as the designation of the events as genocide. The Turkish government contends that the deaths must be understood within the turbulent context of World War I; they were not systematically orchestrated; and they occurred amid other massacres committed against many Ottoman Muslims.
The official Turkish position, however, has softened over the course of the last decade. In the words of Thomas de Waal, author of Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide, a “Turkish thaw” is unfolding; Turkish society is increasingly revisiting “some of the dark pages of its past, including the oppression of the non-Turkish populations of the late Ottoman Empire.” (1) In April 2014, the former Prime Minister and current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, made a statement recognizing the significance of April 24th for Armenians around the world. He described the historic events as “inhumane” and offered condolences to the grandchildren of those who lost their lives. Erdoğan's declaration fell short of issuing an apology or acknowledging genocide as such, but nonetheless marked a fundamental change in the nation's approach to comprehending and addressing the events of 1915.
Erdoğan's statement should be regarded as an important step toward reconciliation between Turks and Armenians, not just toward normalizing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia. However, given the multidimensional nature of the dispute between Turkey and Armenia and their peoples, reconciliation faces immense challenges. It is a process that must occur at the individual, societal, and state levels. Reconciliation requires ...
Editor's Note: This article was originally published in the Winter 2015 edition of Turkish Policy Quarterly.________________________________________________________
For Turkey and Armenia, normalization and reconciliation can be seen as two ...

For Turkey and Armenia, normalization and reconciliation can be seen as two sides of the same coin. A critical and achievable breakthrough would be the opening of the international border and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, meaningful progress at the inter-state level does not seem probable in the immediate future given the heighted political sensitivities around the historic commemorations of this year. Nonetheless, the authors argue that informal normalization is occurring. Across Turkish and Armenian societies, the “thaw” is expanding and appears to be sanctioned by both governments. For the deeper process of reconciliation, both countries should support smaller, symbolic efforts that allow for dialogue and understanding.

Exactly one century ago in March 1915, the British and French navies, together with the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), attempted to force their way through the Turkish Straits to attack Istanbul and open a new front in World War I. At the same time, the Ottoman government was in the process of moving its Armenian population away from the eastern parts of the empire bordering its archenemy, Russia. Amid the chaos of war, the Ottomans feared Russia would stir the Christian Armenian millet to revolt, fragmenting the Ottoman Empire while its armies clashed with Russia’s allies, the British and the French. The forced displacement of the Armenians was accompanied by unimaginable violence and depredation. Today, Armenians, as well as most historians around the world, claim that 1.5 million of their ancestors were deliberately and systematically killed in the modern world’s first genocide. There are no exact, indisputable figures for the number of lives lost, but the magnitude of the catastrophe is incontestable.

24 April 2015 will be commemorated in Yerevan and globally as the centennial of these atrocities. Traditionally, Turkey has challenged the Armenian depiction of the circumstances surrounding the deportation, the number of deaths, as well as the designation of the events as genocide. The Turkish government contends that the deaths must be understood within the turbulent context of World War I; they were not systematically orchestrated; and they occurred amid other massacres committed against many Ottoman Muslims.

The official Turkish position, however, has softened over the course of the last decade. In the words of Thomas de Waal, author of Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide, a “Turkish thaw” is unfolding; Turkish society is increasingly revisiting “some of the dark pages of its past, including the oppression of the non-Turkish populations of the late Ottoman Empire.” (1) In April 2014, the former Prime Minister and current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, made a statement recognizing the significance of April 24th for Armenians around the world. He described the historic events as “inhumane” and offered condolences to the grandchildren of those who lost their lives. Erdoğan’s declaration fell short of issuing an apology or acknowledging genocide as such, but nonetheless marked a fundamental change in the nation’s approach to comprehending and addressing the events of 1915.

Erdoğan’s statement should be regarded as an important step toward reconciliation between Turks and Armenians, not just toward normalizing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia. However, given the multidimensional nature of the dispute between Turkey and Armenia and their peoples, reconciliation faces immense challenges. It is a process that must occur at the individual, societal, and state levels. Reconciliation requires time and a reconsideration of identity as well as of history.

In contrast, the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is more limited in scope. In theory, it could proceed more quickly. However, progress has been erratic in recent years. Both Turkey and Armenia have made positive steps forward toward normalizing their relations, only to have the apparent progress met by new setbacks and competing priorities. As former Armenian Ambassador David Shahnazaryan noted in this journal, “The evolution of the relationship between Turkey and Armenia has gone through various, and often contradicting phases.” (2)

At the state level, as important a step as Erdoğan’s April 2014 statement was, it was in many respects motivated by political expediency. While the statement marked a long-awaited official departure from previous categorical Turkish disavowals and adherence to an uncompromising historical narrative, it was clearly intended to help defuse international condemnation ahead of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide. Political calculations also factored into Turkey’s commemoration of the World War I Battle of Gallipoli (Çanakkale), which is typically observed on March 18th, to mark the end of the Allies’ 1915 naval campaign to break through the Dardanelles. This year, however, the Turkish government resolved to push the observance back to April 24-25, coinciding with the Armenian commemorations and the centennial of the ANZAC landings on 25 April 1915. Both President Erdoğan and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan have issued competing invitations for their respective events, although Erdoğan’s letter to his Armenian counterpart came months later, and has been denounced by many as a crude distraction. (3) Regardless of Erdoğan’s manipulation of the Armenian issue for political purposes, there are other manifestations of a new openness within Turkey. Some Armenian churches that survived outright destruction and decades of neglect are being restored and a few have reopened for services. (4) There are plans to construct a new Christian church in Istanbul, which would be the first built since 1923. (5) Of the hundreds of Armenian properties confiscated by the Turkish state, some are now being returned to their rightful owners, or alternative compensation is being provided.

More than a decade ago the government liberalized visa requirements for Armenian nationals wishing to travel to Turkey. This opened the way for Armenian citizens to enter the informal labor market in Turkey, especially in domestic work. The Turkish government has generally tolerated this arrangement and recently adopted legislation allowing the possibility for undocumented workers to regularize their status. Informal developments at the societal level are in some ways more conspicuous, but more difficult to document. Turks across all segments of society are facing the history of World War I in a new light. They are questioning official narratives, and struggling to come to terms with this troubled period in Turkey’s Ottoman past. As de Waal notes, after a long period of collective amnesia during which Armenians were essentially absent from Turkish historical accounts, a flood of books have appeared focusing on the legacy of Armenians in Turkey. Within the social history of Turkey, there is growing recognition of the thousands of Islamized Armenians – those Armenians, many of them young women, who were captured during the deportations by Kurds and Turks and taken into their families, and who adopted Islam to avoid persecution.

There are also growing interactions among academics, businesspeople, journalists, and representatives of civil societies from both countries. Prosecutions under the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which made “denigrating Turkishness” a crime, have diminished significantly in recent years, facilitating the breaking down of taboos. A noteworthy example is the 2008 “I apologize” campaign, an online initiative led by a group of Turkish intellectuals to reject the official denial of the massacres and offer an apology. (6) The petition initially provoked strong outcries from Erdoğan and Turkish nationalists, but has now been signed by over 32,000 Turks. (7) Growing numbers of Turks also annually recognize the significance of April 24th through both informal and public commemorations.

Efforts to Normalize Relations Between Armenia and Turkey

Based on interviews held in October and November 2014, with officials and civil society representatives in Ankara, Yerevan, and Tbilisi, the authors of this article believe that current efforts to normalize diplomatic relations could also help push along the process of Turkish-Armenian societal reconciliation. The idea of promoting
reconciliation through official normalization would be in line with the ideas and legacy of Hrant Dink, a Turkish- Armenian journalist from Istanbul, who was assassinated in January 2007 by a young Turkish nationalist. Dink long objected to the idea of using outside pressure – through international governmental, parliamentary, and other institutional resolutions – to force the Turkish state and society to recognize the Armenian genocide. He believed history could not be legislated. Support for reconciliation and recognition would have to come from within Turkey. In his articles, Dink advocated for an open democratic dialogue about the events of 1915 to provide the Turkish public with a more informed understanding of the events. He encouraged closer societal contacts between Armenia and Turkey, which he considered crucial to a deeper comprehension of the complexities of the past by both sides. (8)

In the years since his death, Hrant Dink’s work has become a key factor in bringing Armenia and Turkey together. Regional events have also played a role in shaping attitudes towards the stalemate in bilateral diplomatic relations. The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, for example, ruptured Armenia’s sole trading route through Georgia to Russia. It starkly underscored the strategic risks posed by Armenia’s position, framed by closed borders with both Turkey and Azerbaijan since the 1990s. Given the ongoing stalemate with Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories, Armenia’s chances of opening the border with Azerbaijan were slim. These considerations subsequently led Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to invite his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gül, to a soccer game between the two national teams in Yerevan later in 2008. The “soccer diplomacy” and subsequent interactions eventually culminated in the negotiation and signing of two sets of bilateral protocols in Zurich in October of 2009. (9) The Protocols offered a basis for further negotiations aimed at re-establishing formal diplomatic relations, opening the international border, and setting up a joint history commission to address the issue of the Armenian genocide.

Ultimately the Protocols could not be ratified on the Turkish side, in large part due to assurances Ankara had previously given to Baku during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan put considerable pressure on the Turkish government, including running a well-financed direct lobbying, PR, and media effort in 2009-10 against the Protocols that highlighted Turkey’s cultural ties with Azerbaijan and its political and security commitments. On the Armenian side, nationalists and hard-liners, especially within the global diaspora, denounced the Protocols and declared that any future deal with Turkey that lacked genocide recognition would be a capitulation. The Armenia-Turkey diplomatic track has been bogged down in issues related to Nagorno-Karabakh ever since, and the Protocols have remained frozen.

The idea of establishing diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey and opening the border as a step toward reconciliation is not new. In fact, this proposal originally emerged in Armenia itself, immediately after its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 under the government of Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Diplomatic relations with Turkey and the establishment of a new international border, on what had previously been the USSR’s frontier, were seen in Yerevan as a means of mitigating the dire economic consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the ongoing humanitarian crisis resulting from the devastating earthquake of 1988. Opening Armenia’s border with Turkey, a NATO member, was also seen as a signal of independence from Russia, and of an eventual Western vocation. After the Armenian earthquake, Turkey periodically opened the land border for shipments of EU grain to Armenia; and, in 1991, Turkey was the first nation after the United States to recognize the newly-independent Republic of Armenia. Turkey reopened the historical czarist-era railway between Kars and Gyumri. This was followed by informal contacts between both governments to explore the establishment of diplomatic relations and formal border agreements. At the time, Ter-Petrosyan is reported to have told Turkey’s Ambassador to Moscow Volkan Vural: “I cannot forget the past, but I don’t want to live with this past. I want to build a future for our children and grandchildren.” (10) This pragmatic approach brought both sides very close to adopting an agreement, until the Armenian occupation of the Kelbajar region of Azerbaijan in 1993.

Against the backdrop of war and Turkey’s decision to break off relations, Ter-Petrosyan’s pragmatism – including his support for a negotiated settlement with Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh and his willingness to put the issue of genocide recognition to the side – was denounced by Armenian hardliners. He was forced out of power in 1998, and succeeded by Robert Kocharian, the former leader of Nagorno-Karabakh. Kocharian put the embryonic rapprochement with Turkey on the back burner of Armenian policy and focused on broadening and deepening Armenia’s relations with Russia, which became the guarantor not only of the ceasefire with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, but also the formal guarantor of Armenia’s security. Domestic developments in Armenia in 2008, even before Russia’s war with Georgia, shifted the political calculus again. The election of Kocharian’s hand-picked successor, Serzh Sargsyan, was marred by allegations of electoral fraud and high-level corruption, and met with street demonstrations. Heavy-handed attempts to quash the protests resulted in clashes with the police, scores of arrests, and 10 deaths. In the aftermath, Sargsyan’s administration was eager to burnish its international credentials and gradually pursued closer relations with the European Union. These developments also contributed to expanding civil society (11) and trade ties with Turkey that paved the way for Sargsyan’s invitation to President Gül to attend the soccer game between the two national teams. (12)

Armenia’s Balancing Act

After the historic 2008 soccer match, Serzh Sargsyan attempted a delicate political balancing act between the West (including Turkey) and Russia: a strategy termed
“complementarity.” The risks of this tight-rope policy were underscored after the Protocols failed in spring 2010. In July 2010, Yerevan began the first round of its negotiations with Brussels to conclude an EU Association Agreement, an initial and crucial step toward closer political association and eventual economic integration with Europe. A month later, however, Yerevan also signed an agreement extending Russia’s military presence and basing rights in Armenia. In 2013, the policy of complementarity hit a dead end, when Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that Armenia should sign on to the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) along with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Moscow exerted similar pressure on Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which were also negotiating EU Association Agreements. The machinations around the competing EU and Eurasian associations were a key factor in generating the political crisis in Ukraine that ultimately led to the ouster of President Victor Yanukovych in February 2014, and, from there, Moscow’s decision to annex Crimea, and the subsequent civil war in Ukraine.

Following a meeting between Sargsyan and Putin in summer 2013, and against the background of an upsurge of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia made an abrupt policy U-turn. (13) Yerevan rejected the Association Agreement and then formally signed the Eurasian Economic Union Agreement in October 2014. In discussions with Armenian officials and experts in Yerevan in this same timeframe, the authors’ interlocutors stressed that Armenia’s existential security concerns about the escalating conflict with Azerbaijan had tipped the balance toward Russia. Armenia’s close economic ties with Russia, including trade and financial flows, and its large diaspora in Russia, also constrained Yerevan’s options for associating formally with the EU. Armenian government officials openly admitted that the Sargsyan regime’s decision to join the EEU was forced by economic and security concerns. It was a decision driven by the three decades long blockade imposed on Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey, the resulting economic dependency on Russia, and the escalating violence along the “contact line” between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. In short, it was a pragmatic, expedient move, not a “civilizational choice” to turn away from Europe and the West.

Windows to Turkey

Armenia’s lurch toward Russia and the Eurasian Union seemed to deal a further blow to the prospects of normalization with Turkey. Many had hoped in Yerevan, Brussels, and Ankara, that with Armenia and Turkey both engaged in negotiations for closer EU relations (or, in the case of Turkey, for accession), new doors might open for bilateral diplomatic contacts. However, even with these doors closed, regional policymakers and analysts suggested that some windows might still be opened, given the desire on both sides to forge a new relationship. In interviews in Yerevan in October 2014, Armenian experts stressed the intrinsic importance of opening the border with Turkey and maintaining a semblance of independence from Russia. As one academic put it: “without opening the border with Turkey, we can’t go West.” Another analyst argued that normalization with Turkey was a way for Armenia to show that “it is not a vassal of Russia.” In meetings in Ankara in November 2014, Turkish officials and foreign policy analysts discreetly noted that the decision in 1993 to break off the border negotiations with Armenia had not only left Yerevan completely dependent on Moscow, it had also limited Ankara’s own outreach to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Ratification of the 2009 Protocols, in their view, might have helped create new geopolitical configurations in the Caucasus. Furthermore, Turkish analysts recognized that Turkey’s policy of blockading Armenia since the 1990s had not persuaded Yerevan to change its policy toward Nagorno-Karabakh in the ways that Turkish decision makers had hoped. (14)

Behind the scenes and beyond the political gamesmanship, the Armenian and Turkish governments continue to be supportive of civil society contacts. They have not disrupted trade and the movement of people between the two countries. Nationals of both countries enjoy relatively free travel through electronic visas or visas obtained at international border crossings. This practice was introduced by Turkey in 2003 as part of what was then the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission and eventually reciprocated by Armenia. (15) Between 2000 and 2004 the number of Armenian nationals entering Turkey increased from less than 5,500 to about 32,000. The number had more than doubled to 73,000 by 2013. (16) Two private charter flights now operate between Istanbul and Yerevan each week – and those flights will likely bring some members of the Armenian diaspora to Yerevan for the genocide commemoration. There are also seasonal flights between Yerevan and the Turkish resorts of Antalya and Bodrum. Efforts to launch a Van-Yerevan air-route have been underway for some time, along with an ongoing project to open a new land border crossing between Turkey and Georgia that is much closer to the Armenian-Georgian border. (17) This crossing would cut travel time for road transportation between Armenia and Turkey and significantly increase the capacity for handling Turkish goods transiting through Georgia into Armenia. These and other initiatives illustrate the importance both sides ascribe to eventual normalization.

Looking Ahead

Moving beyond the anniversary of 2015, however, will be a significant challenge. Armenian distrust in Turkey’s intentions was exacerbated by the April 24th Gallipoli commemoration rescheduling and invitation. This will inhibit progress in the near future. Once April 24th has passed, the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will continue to plague Turkish-Armenian relations. As analysts in both Ankara and Yerevan admitted in the authors’ meetings, underestimating Azerbaijan’s fierce objections to the 2009 Protocols was a “strategic mistake” for both sides. Azerbaijan’s reactions will now have to be factored into any future steps toward diplomatic normalization. Similarly, Russia’s relations with both Turkey and Armenia will remain a complicating factor, with analysts stressing that Ankara and Yerevan will have to make a strong case to Moscow that opening the border would benefit Russia economically and politically. Many diplomats and regional experts suggested, as a result, that both countries should focus on small, “under the radar” projects and informal contacts to pave the way for returning to the basic tenets of the 2009 Protocols. Turkey and Armenia should avoid large, conspicuous initiatives that might provoke adverse reactions from either Azerbaijan or Russia.

One such smaller meeting that could help pave the way forward took place in Ankara in November 2014, under the auspices of the Hrant Dink Foundation. The Foundation and the School of Political Studies of Ankara University hosted the “Sealed Gate: Prospects of the Turkey-Armenia Border” conference, where Turkish bureaucrats, officials and academics, along with Armenian analysts and international diplomats and experts, engaged in a series of discussions on topics related to opening the border and societal reconciliation. The conference setting was deeply symbolic. The School of Political Studies has long been recognized as a “bastion” of the Turkish bureaucracy and known for educating state officials committed to the denial of the Armenian genocide. Outside the auditorium where the conference was held, portraits are permanently displayed of the Turkish diplomats who were assassinated in the 1970s and 1980s by ASALA, an Armenian terrorist group. Posters were also on exhibit that depict the tumultuous events in late-Ottoman Turkey that preceded World War I and the genocide.

At the opening of the conference, statements were read from Turkish parliamentarians representing both the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). Books, published by the Hrant Dink Foundation, relating the oral histories of families who went through the events of 1915 in Anatolia, including the revelations of many Turks about rediscovering their Armenian ancestry, were available at the conference. Photographs and other images from both sides of the Turkish-Armenian border were hung in the hallways. The significance of the juxtaposing images and narratives was inescapable. The substance of the conference itself was restrained, but Armenian and international participants appreciated the importance of the event as another step in a gradual process of reconciliation.

On the margins of the Hrant Dink conference in Ankara, other plans were discussed to organize follow-up events, including Turkish civil society efforts to observe, in some way, the upcoming commemorations in Yerevan. These types of discussions and initiatives were precisely what Hrant Dink had in mind when he considered the necessary steps toward Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. Dink was in favor of a methodical series of goodwill gestures, and increased interaction. This is the direction that both governments also generally favored before they embarked on the 2009 Protocols. Small, symbolic steps like the conference at the School of Political Studies and an intensification of bilateral engagement at the societal level, along with the efforts to enhance trade and communications, could help put Turkey and Armenia back on track toward diplomatic normalization – and, over time, toward reconciliation.

A unilateral act of statesmanship could also advance normalization as well as reconciliation. One proposal is for the Turkish government to quietly open its side of the land border with Armenia. Former Turkish Ambassador to London, Ünal Çeviköz recently suggested a game-changing step along these lines in an article published in late 2014. (18) A move like this would be akin to the Turkish Cypriot decision in April 2003 to lift their long-standing restrictions on crossing to the Greek Cypriot side of the island. The conflict over the reunification of Cyprus has not been resolved in the decade since, but the tension on the island has dramatically diminished. Greater contacts across the divide in Cyprus keep the prospects of a peaceful resolution alive. A similar quiet move by Turkey would do the same for realities with Armenia, once both countries have dealt with their competing commemorations of 1915.

(1) Thomas de Waal, “The G-Word: The Armenian Massacre and the Politics of Genocide” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2015), p. 136, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142489/thomas-de-waal/the-g-word
(2) David Shahnazaryan, “Five Years After the Armenia-Turkey Protocols,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2014), http://turkishpolicy.com/article/Nervous-Neighbors-Five-Years-after-the-Armenia-Turkey-Protocols-Fall-2014-1010
(3) Ayhan Aktar, “Yüzleşme yerine acıları yarıştırma hamlesi: Ankara ‘biz de mağduruz’ diyecek” Taraf, 25 January 2015, http://www.taraf.com.tr/guncel/yuzlesme-yerine-acilari-yaristirma-hamlesi-ankara-biz-de-magduruz-diyecek#; Robert Fisk, “The Gallipoli centenary is a shameful attempt to hide the Armenian Holocaust,” 19 January 2015, The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-gallipoli-centenary-is-a-shameful-attempt-to-hide-the-armenian-holocaust-9988227.html
(4) These include the Church of the Holy Cross on the Akdamar Island and Saint Bartholomew Monastery near Van. Parkinson, Joe. “Armenian Church in Turkey Reopens to Worship”, Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2010 and “Historic Armenian church to reopen in Turkey’s east”, Anadolu Agency, 4 February 2014.
(5) “Turkey Approves Construction Of First New Church In Nearly A Century,” The Huffington Post, 1 May 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/05/turkey-syriac-church_n_6418676.html
(6) Cengiz Aktar, “Turkish Civil Society: Driving the Politics of Memory,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.13, No. 1 (Spring 2014), http://turkishpolicy.com/article/Turkish-Society-Driving-the-Politics-of-Memory-Spring-2014-977
(7) See: www.ozurdiliyoruz.com The full text reads: “My conscience cannot accept the ignorance and denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and – on my own behalf – I share the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters – and I apologize to them.”
(8) “To Unlock and Transcend History,” Agos, 27 May 2005. Translation provided by Hrant Dink Foundation.
(9) “Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” and “Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.” For the full text see: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/88032/full-text-of-the-protocols-signed-by-turkey-and-armenia.html
(10) “Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders,” Crisis Group Europe Report No 199, 14 April 2009.
(11) For an assessment of projects supportive of civil society contacts between the two countries see: Susae Elanchenny and Narod Maraşlıyan, Breaking the Ice: The Role of Civil Society and Media in Turkey-Armenia Relations (Istanbul: Istanbul Kültür University, GPOT, 2012)
(12) Tracing the volume of trade between the two countries is very difficult as it occurs mostly through Georgia. However, according to one study of Armenian-Turkish economic relations “the trade volume between the two countries is 150-200 million USD.” See: Armenian-Turkish Business Relations through the Eyes of Business Opinion Leaders - Study Report (Yerevan, 2011), p. 15. According to a more recent study, Armenia’s imports from Turkey were 213 million dollars and Turkey was listed as Armenia’s fifth largest import partner, ahead of Germany, Italy, and the USA. See: “Strengthening Connectivity and Business Synergies in the Southern Caucasus Towards a new Confidence Building Agenda: Final Report,” TEPAV (March 2014), p. 28. Businessmen dealing with Turkey told the authors of this article that they estimated the trade volume between the two countries to be between 250-300 million dollars but that it was probably much higher.
(13) For more on Armenia’s decision to abandon the EU Association Agreement in favor of joining the Russian-led Customs Union see: Richard Giragosian, “Armenia’s Strategic U-Turn,” European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR99_ARMENIA_MEMO_AW.pdf.
(14) Ünal Çeviköz, “Turkish-Armenian relations need a new game-changer,” Hurriyet Daily News, 13 November 2014.
(15) David L. Phillips, Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols (New York: Columbia University, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, 2012).
(16) Statistics obtained from www.tuik.gov.tr
(17) “Turkey-based Van Airlines plans to operate flights to Armenia,” PanARMENIAN.Net, 10 July 2014, http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/180630/
(18) Çeviköz (2014).

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/02/19-turkey-middle-income-trap-raiser?rssid=turkey{8A225007-EEBD-4C02-A1EF-3A33BD1585C2}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85587154/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~From-KnowWho-to-KnowHow-Turkey-and-the-%e2%80%9cmiddleincome-trap%e2%80%9dFrom Know-Who to Know-How: Turkey and the “middle-income trap”

After several decades during which Turkey’s per capita income relative to the EU hardly changed, the 2000s saw an (albeit modest) improvement (Figure 1). This led to confident predictions of Turkey’s continuous rise, reflected in the official target of reaching a per capita income of $25,000 by 2023. And yet, in recent years, confidence has given way to doubt as growth rates have moderated. Will Turkey remain trapped in middle-income status? (See me address this topic at a Brookings event here.)

First, as countries get richer, growth rates tend to slow down. Both neoclassical growth models where countries converge to some steady-state growth path and endogenous growth models where followers can benefit from technological diffusion during catch-up can account for this basic fact. Growth episodes should therefore be related to the underlying potential growth rate to see whether a country is really falling behind. Using this criterion, a recent IMF study does not find a single 5-year episode in Turkey during which growth fell significantly below the rate predicted by existing investment rates and lagged per capita income. Using a similar framework, we estimate that Turkey’s growth potential over the coming two decades is around 4.2 percent, or 3.3 percent per capita, enough to get Turkey into high income status. This would seem a reasonable benchmark against which to evaluate Turkey’s growth performance. Faster growth is possible of course, but would require higher investment rates and above historical average increases in total factor productivity.

Second, low and middle-income countries experience a lot more volatility in their growth rates than high-income countries. To “escape” from middle income and join the ranks of the high-income countries, persistent growth over long periods of time is necessary. Turkey is a good case in point. The country is used to wild swings in growth rates, with booms and busts in every decade. The longest period of uninterrupted growth was from 1962 to 1977 and saw average GDP growth of 6.2 percent (3.9 percent per capita). Avoiding another crisis and maintaining macroeconomic stability would seem a lot more crucial for reaching high income than going for growth at any price.

Third, when we look across empirical studies for factors that account for the probability of extended growth spells, or for the probability of growth slow-downs, a few repeatedly stand out. These may be grouped into three broad categories: (1) policy related factors, such as the degree of openness to trade and foreign direct investment, macroeconomic stability, or the quality of the business environment; (2) structural factors, such as demographics, the share of the labor force in agriculture, or the extent of income inequality; and (3) institutional factors, such as the rule of law. Turkey’s record compared to other middle-income countries is mixed on policy, with the macroeconomic policy framework in particular an apparent source of risk. The structural factors speak strongly in Turkey’s favor, as the country is young and has far from exhausted the potential for productive labor reallocations from agriculture. However, neither group of factors points to imminent risks of a growth slow-down.

The real challenge for Turkey, it seems, lies with the creation of the institutional prerequisites of a high-income country. It is not that Turkey performs poorly in institutional quality when compared with other middle-income countries (Figure 2). Rather it is the distance between Turkey and the high-income countries that is noticeable. From all we know about the history in other countries, the transition to high income requires the evolution of rules from those that favor “know-who” to those that favor “know-how.” Turkey started on this transition with major institutional reforms implemented over a decade ago. But for the last 5 years the process has slowed and the reforms remain contested and incomplete.

If the middle income trap remains a topic of debate in Turkey (and other middle-income countries) today this, rather than policy related or structural factors, may be the reason. It is time to change that.

Authors

Martin Raiser

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Thu, 19 Feb 2015 09:30:00 -0500Martin Raiser
After several decades during which Turkey's per capita income relative to the EU hardly changed, the 2000s saw an (albeit modest) improvement (Figure 1). This led to confident predictions of Turkey's continuous rise, reflected in the official target of reaching a per capita income of $25,000 by 2023. And yet, in recent years, confidence has given way to doubt as growth rates have moderated. Will Turkey remain trapped in middle-income status? (See me address this topic at a Brookings event here.)
This blog has featured a number of contributions on the “middle-income trap” in recent weeks (see for instance Nguyen, Quah). I can distinguish three broad schools in this growing literature. Some argue that growth at middle income is just a lot harder than at lower income levels, because it relies more on innovation to drive total factor productivity growth and benefits less from the gains of structural change. Others respond that sustained growth spells are not less likely at middle income than at low income, but are still hard to achieve. Successful escapees, they note, share a set of common characteristics and policies which allow them to grow faster at all income levels. A third view maintains that sustained growth spells are by themselves rare and unlikely to persist the longer they last. Policies may stimulate periods of rapid growth, but what distinguishes high-income economies is ultimately a set of institutions that make economies resilient against regime shifts and allow growth to continue uninterrupted over very long periods of time.
So what are Turkish growth pundits to make of it all?
First, as countries get richer, growth rates tend to slow down. Both neoclassical growth models where countries converge to some steady-state growth path and endogenous growth models where followers can benefit from technological diffusion during catch-up can account for this basic fact. Growth episodes should therefore be related to the underlying potential growth rate to see whether a country is really falling behind. Using this criterion, a recent IMF study does not find a single 5-year episode in Turkey during which growth fell significantly below the rate predicted by existing investment rates and lagged per capita income. Using a similar framework, we estimate that Turkey's growth potential over the coming two decades is around 4.2 percent, or 3.3 percent per capita, enough to get Turkey into high income status. This would seem a reasonable benchmark against which to evaluate Turkey's growth performance. Faster growth is possible of course, but would require higher investment rates and above historical average increases in total factor productivity.
Second, low and middle-income countries experience a lot more volatility in their growth rates than high-income countries. To “escape” from middle income and join the ranks of the high-income countries, persistent growth over long periods of time is necessary. Turkey is a good case in point. The country is used to wild swings in growth rates, with booms and busts in every decade. The longest period of uninterrupted growth was from 1962 to 1977 and saw average GDP growth of 6.2 percent (3.9 percent per capita). Avoiding another crisis and maintaining macroeconomic stability would seem a lot more crucial for reaching high income than going for growth at any price.
Third, when we look across empirical studies for factors that account for the probability of extended growth spells, or for the probability of growth slow-downs, a few repeatedly stand out. These may be grouped into three broad categories: (1) policy related factors, such as the degree of openness to trade and foreign direct investment, macroeconomic stability, or the quality of the business environment; (2) structural factors, such as demographics, the share of the labor force in agriculture, or the extent of income inequality; and (3) institutional factors, such as the rule of law. Turkey's ...
After several decades during which Turkey's per capita income relative to the EU hardly changed, the 2000s saw an (albeit modest) improvement (Figure 1). This led to confident predictions of Turkey's continuous rise, reflected in the official ...

After several decades during which Turkey’s per capita income relative to the EU hardly changed, the 2000s saw an (albeit modest) improvement (Figure 1). This led to confident predictions of Turkey’s continuous rise, reflected in the official target of reaching a per capita income of $25,000 by 2023. And yet, in recent years, confidence has given way to doubt as growth rates have moderated. Will Turkey remain trapped in middle-income status? (See me address this topic at a Brookings event here.)

First, as countries get richer, growth rates tend to slow down. Both neoclassical growth models where countries converge to some steady-state growth path and endogenous growth models where followers can benefit from technological diffusion during catch-up can account for this basic fact. Growth episodes should therefore be related to the underlying potential growth rate to see whether a country is really falling behind. Using this criterion, a recent IMF study does not find a single 5-year episode in Turkey during which growth fell significantly below the rate predicted by existing investment rates and lagged per capita income. Using a similar framework, we estimate that Turkey’s growth potential over the coming two decades is around 4.2 percent, or 3.3 percent per capita, enough to get Turkey into high income status. This would seem a reasonable benchmark against which to evaluate Turkey’s growth performance. Faster growth is possible of course, but would require higher investment rates and above historical average increases in total factor productivity.

Second, low and middle-income countries experience a lot more volatility in their growth rates than high-income countries. To “escape” from middle income and join the ranks of the high-income countries, persistent growth over long periods of time is necessary. Turkey is a good case in point. The country is used to wild swings in growth rates, with booms and busts in every decade. The longest period of uninterrupted growth was from 1962 to 1977 and saw average GDP growth of 6.2 percent (3.9 percent per capita). Avoiding another crisis and maintaining macroeconomic stability would seem a lot more crucial for reaching high income than going for growth at any price.

Third, when we look across empirical studies for factors that account for the probability of extended growth spells, or for the probability of growth slow-downs, a few repeatedly stand out. These may be grouped into three broad categories: (1) policy related factors, such as the degree of openness to trade and foreign direct investment, macroeconomic stability, or the quality of the business environment; (2) structural factors, such as demographics, the share of the labor force in agriculture, or the extent of income inequality; and (3) institutional factors, such as the rule of law. Turkey’s record compared to other middle-income countries is mixed on policy, with the macroeconomic policy framework in particular an apparent source of risk. The structural factors speak strongly in Turkey’s favor, as the country is young and has far from exhausted the potential for productive labor reallocations from agriculture. However, neither group of factors points to imminent risks of a growth slow-down.

The real challenge for Turkey, it seems, lies with the creation of the institutional prerequisites of a high-income country. It is not that Turkey performs poorly in institutional quality when compared with other middle-income countries (Figure 2). Rather it is the distance between Turkey and the high-income countries that is noticeable. From all we know about the history in other countries, the transition to high income requires the evolution of rules from those that favor “know-who” to those that favor “know-how.” Turkey started on this transition with major institutional reforms implemented over a decade ago. But for the last 5 years the process has slowed and the reforms remain contested and incomplete.

If the middle income trap remains a topic of debate in Turkey (and other middle-income countries) today this, rather than policy related or structural factors, may be the reason. It is time to change that.

Authors

Martin Raiser

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/02/19-israel-turkey-trade-business-economy?rssid=turkey{80408D5E-E00F-4FD1-99F5-9C9877A4D3C1}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85599249/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~TurkeyIsrael-relations-a-political-low-point-and-an-economic-high-pointTurkey-Israel relations: a political low point and an economic high point

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusolu’s decision earlier this month to decline to participate in the Munich Security Conference due to Israeli ministerial participation marks a new low in the troubled Turkish-Israeli relationship.

And yet, the latest statistics released this week by the Israeli government document an overall volume of $5.44 billion dollars in Turkish-Israeli trade during 2014. This marks an all-time high point in Turkish-Israeli economic relations, up 11.5 percent from 2013, including $2.75 billion in Israeli exports to Turkey (a 10 percent year-to-year increase) and $2.68 billion in Turkish imports to Israel (13 percent higher than 2013).

This pattern of an almost non-existent political dialogue at the senior levels accompanied by robust bilateral trade has characterized the Turkish-Israeli relationship since 2011. Short of unexpected dramatic changes, the relations between the two former allies will likely continue in this pattern for the foreseeable future.

Almost two years after Israel’s official apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara incident (which I wrote about in depth here), the two countries continue to move in different directions, despite sharing similar strategic concerns on a range of regional issues – the civil war in Syria, instability in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear program.

The main bone of contention between the AKP-led Turkish government and the Likud-led government in Israel remains the Palestinian issue. Turkey continues to speak out against Israeli occupation and settlement activity in the West Bank, as well as on Israeli human rights violations towards the Palestinian population. In addition, Turkey remains one of the main (very few) patrons of Hamas, providing the group with political and economic support and allowing the organization to maintain representation in Istanbul. Israel viewed with disdain Turkish attempts, together with Qatar, to facilitate a ceasefire with Hamas during the summer 2014 war. Anti-Turkish sentiments in Israeli public opinion skyrocketed in response to President Erdogan’s allegations that Israeli policies on Gaza are genocidal.

Amidst rising tensions in the relationship, President Erdogan publicly vowed after his August 2014 election that as long as he’s in power, Turkey’s approach to Israel will not change. As a result, there are no serious expectations that any senior-level political dialogue will resume, and mutual representation is likely to remain at a junior diplomatic level (after ambassadors were withdrawn from Tel Aviv and Ankara in 2011).

The interesting aspect of the relationship continues to be the booming trade between the two countries, which despite political tensions continues to grow at a rapid pace. Clearly there is an interest on both sides to insulate the economic sphere from the political sphere. Robust trade serves both countries’ economic interests and during a very unstable period keeps the relationship afloat. Nevertheless, an Israeli – Turkish natural gas deal which was considered in the past as a likely scenario and possibly a regional and bilateral “game changer” seems at present to be “off the table.” Potential energy cooperation between Turkey and Israel around the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries may be possible only in the context of political rapprochement.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusolu’s decision earlier this month to decline to participate in the Munich Security Conference due to Israeli ministerial participation marks a new low in the troubled Turkish-Israeli relationship.

And yet, the latest statistics released this week by the Israeli government document an overall volume of $5.44 billion dollars in Turkish-Israeli trade during 2014. This marks an all-time high point in Turkish-Israeli economic relations, up 11.5 percent from 2013, including $2.75 billion in Israeli exports to Turkey (a 10 percent year-to-year increase) and $2.68 billion in Turkish imports to Israel (13 percent higher than 2013).

This pattern of an almost non-existent political dialogue at the senior levels accompanied by robust bilateral trade has characterized the Turkish-Israeli relationship since 2011. Short of unexpected dramatic changes, the relations between the two former allies will likely continue in this pattern for the foreseeable future.

Almost two years after Israel’s official apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara incident (which I wrote about in depth here), the two countries continue to move in different directions, despite sharing similar strategic concerns on a range of regional issues – the civil war in Syria, instability in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear program.

The main bone of contention between the AKP-led Turkish government and the Likud-led government in Israel remains the Palestinian issue. Turkey continues to speak out against Israeli occupation and settlement activity in the West Bank, as well as on Israeli human rights violations towards the Palestinian population. In addition, Turkey remains one of the main (very few) patrons of Hamas, providing the group with political and economic support and allowing the organization to maintain representation in Istanbul. Israel viewed with disdain Turkish attempts, together with Qatar, to facilitate a ceasefire with Hamas during the summer 2014 war. Anti-Turkish sentiments in Israeli public opinion skyrocketed in response to President Erdogan’s allegations that Israeli policies on Gaza are genocidal.

Amidst rising tensions in the relationship, President Erdogan publicly vowed after his August 2014 election that as long as he’s in power, Turkey’s approach to Israel will not change. As a result, there are no serious expectations that any senior-level political dialogue will resume, and mutual representation is likely to remain at a junior diplomatic level (after ambassadors were withdrawn from Tel Aviv and Ankara in 2011).

The interesting aspect of the relationship continues to be the booming trade between the two countries, which despite political tensions continues to grow at a rapid pace. Clearly there is an interest on both sides to insulate the economic sphere from the political sphere. Robust trade serves both countries’ economic interests and during a very unstable period keeps the relationship afloat. Nevertheless, an Israeli – Turkish natural gas deal which was considered in the past as a likely scenario and possibly a regional and bilateral “game changer” seems at present to be “off the table.” Potential energy cooperation between Turkey and Israel around the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries may be possible only in the context of political rapprochement.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/02/19-eastern-mediterranean-energy?rssid=turkey{5E925763-5BC9-4CEE-9A30-1AB7A1524112}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85556829/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~The-future-of-energy-in-the-Eastern-MediterraneanThe future of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean

Event Information

Beginning in 2009, major natural gas fields have been discovered in the Levant Basin of the Eastern Mediterranean. These discoveries have the potential both to transform the energy outlook of the countries in which they were found, and foster regional energy cooperation.

On February 19, the Energy Security and Climate Initiative (ESCI) and the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP) at Brookings launched three papers dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean gas energy discoveries. The first looks at the potential development of the Palestinian Gaza Marine gas field and its importance to the Palestinian economy. The second discusses the evolution of Israel's energy policy since large discoveries were made in Israeli waters, and the effect of this process on regional cooperation. The third publication, an edited volume published by the PRIO Cyprus Centre, explores the hydrocarbon findings offshore Cyprus and their effects Cypriot relations with its neighbors.

The panelists, who authored the papers, discussed the natural gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean and the potential of these discoveries to enable regional energy cooperation.

Audio

Transcript

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Thu, 19 Feb 2015 14:00:00 -0500http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/150219_EMedEnergy_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
February 19, 2015
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
Beginning in 2009, major natural gas fields have been discovered in the Levant Basin of the Eastern Mediterranean. These discoveries have the potential both to transform the energy outlook of the countries in which they were found, and foster regional energy cooperation.
On February 19, the Energy Security and Climate Initiative (ESCI) and the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP) at Brookings launched three papers dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean gas energy discoveries. The first looks at the potential development of the Palestinian Gaza Marine gas field and its importance to the Palestinian economy. The second discusses the evolution of Israel's energy policy since large discoveries were made in Israeli waters, and the effect of this process on regional cooperation. The third publication, an edited volume published by the PRIO Cyprus Centre, explores the hydrocarbon findings offshore Cyprus and their effects Cypriot relations with its neighbors.
The panelists, who authored the papers, discussed the natural gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean and the potential of these discoveries to enable regional energy cooperation.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #EastMedEnergy
Audio
- The future of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean
Transcript
- Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
Event Materials
- 20150219_eastern_med_energy_transcript
Event Information
February 19, 2015
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
Beginning in 2009, major natural gas fields have been discovered in ...

Event Information

Beginning in 2009, major natural gas fields have been discovered in the Levant Basin of the Eastern Mediterranean. These discoveries have the potential both to transform the energy outlook of the countries in which they were found, and foster regional energy cooperation.

On February 19, the Energy Security and Climate Initiative (ESCI) and the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP) at Brookings launched three papers dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean gas energy discoveries. The first looks at the potential development of the Palestinian Gaza Marine gas field and its importance to the Palestinian economy. The second discusses the evolution of Israel's energy policy since large discoveries were made in Israeli waters, and the effect of this process on regional cooperation. The third publication, an edited volume published by the PRIO Cyprus Centre, explores the hydrocarbon findings offshore Cyprus and their effects Cypriot relations with its neighbors.

The panelists, who authored the papers, discussed the natural gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean and the potential of these discoveries to enable regional energy cooperation.

Event Information

In 2014 the World Bank published two important reports on the Turkish economy. The first report published in the Spring assessed the customs union (CU) between Turkey and the European Union, concluding that both sides had benefitted but the CU was in need of modernization. A second World Bank report focused on Turkey’s emergence over the last two decades as a dynamic, growth-oriented economy and manufacturing and export powerhouse. However, this report also warned that without further reforms, Turkey risks becoming stuck in a “middle income trap”. At a time when concerns are growing about Turkey’s geopolitical orientation, its commitment to the West and its allegiance to liberal democratic values, could Turkey’s ongoing economic transition become a means to re-anchor Turkey to the transatlantic community?

Brookings TÜSİAD Senior Fellow and Turkey Project Director Kemal Kirişci moderated the conversation. Panelists included Martin Raiser, the director of the World Bank Office in Turkey; Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, professor of economics at the University of Maryland; and Stuart Eizenstat, former U.S. ambassador to the EU, former deputy secretary of the Treasury and current partner at Covington & Burling LLP.

Audio

Transcript

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Wed, 18 Feb 2015 10:30:00 -0500http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/150218_TurkeyEconomy_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
February 18, 2015
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EST
Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
In 2014 the World Bank published two important reports on the Turkish economy. The first report published in the Spring assessed the customs union (CU) between Turkey and the European Union, concluding that both sides had benefitted but the CU was in need of modernization. A second World Bank report focused on Turkey's emergence over the last two decades as a dynamic, growth-oriented economy and manufacturing and export powerhouse. However, this report also warned that without further reforms, Turkey risks becoming stuck in a “middle income trap”. At a time when concerns are growing about Turkey's geopolitical orientation, its commitment to the West and its allegiance to liberal democratic values, could Turkey's ongoing economic transition become a means to re-anchor Turkey to the transatlantic community?
On February 18, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted a panel discussion to explore the economic challenges and opportunities ahead for Turkey. In particular, the panel considered how modernizing the customs union and expanding U.S.-Turkey economic relations—through either a bilateral free trade agreement or the possible inclusion of Turkey in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—could play a key role in Turkey's overcoming the “middle income trap."
Brookings TÜSİAD Senior Fellow and Turkey Project Director Kemal Kirişci moderated the conversation. Panelists included Martin Raiser, the director of the World Bank Office in Turkey; Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, professor of economics at the University of Maryland; and Stuart Eizenstat, former U.S. ambassador to the EU, former deputy secretary of the Treasury and current partner at Covington & Burling LLP.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #Turkey
Audio
- Turkey's economic transition and transatlantic relations
Transcript
- Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
Event Materials
- 20150218_turkey_economic_transition_transcript
Event Information
February 18, 2015
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EST
Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
In 2014 the World Bank published two important reports on the ...

Event Information

In 2014 the World Bank published two important reports on the Turkish economy. The first report published in the Spring assessed the customs union (CU) between Turkey and the European Union, concluding that both sides had benefitted but the CU was in need of modernization. A second World Bank report focused on Turkey’s emergence over the last two decades as a dynamic, growth-oriented economy and manufacturing and export powerhouse. However, this report also warned that without further reforms, Turkey risks becoming stuck in a “middle income trap”. At a time when concerns are growing about Turkey’s geopolitical orientation, its commitment to the West and its allegiance to liberal democratic values, could Turkey’s ongoing economic transition become a means to re-anchor Turkey to the transatlantic community?

Brookings TÜSİAD Senior Fellow and Turkey Project Director Kemal Kirişci moderated the conversation. Panelists included Martin Raiser, the director of the World Bank Office in Turkey; Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, professor of economics at the University of Maryland; and Stuart Eizenstat, former U.S. ambassador to the EU, former deputy secretary of the Treasury and current partner at Covington & Burling LLP.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/02/18-getting-out-middle-income-trap-turkey-kirisci?rssid=turkey{DC70E55F-C10C-47DE-8762-3FFDDB177791}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85530520/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~Getting-Turkey-out-of-the-%e2%80%98middleincome-trap%e2%80%99Getting Turkey out of the ‘middle-income trap’

Today, Turkey’s economy is no longer growing at the 2010-11 levels of 9.2 and 8.8 percent and instead faces a number of structural problems, appearing to be stuck in the infamous “middle-income trap.”

According to a World Bank report, “Turkey’s Transitions,” Turkey is “some 20 percent shy of the high income threshold.” The report recommends a range of economic, institutional and political reforms to overcome this gap. However, considering the chaos reigning throughout Turkey’s neighborhood and the accompanying loss of markets for Turkish goods and services, it also critical that Turkey deepens its economic integration with the transatlantic community.

The EU recently increased Turkey’s growth rate predictions for 2015 from 3.3 to 3.7 percent as the drop in oil prices precipitated a fall in one of Turkey’s perennial structural problems: its large current accounts deficit. Turkey’s growth performance for 2014 was 3 percent, far ahead of the European Union’s average of 1.3 percent. Nevertheless, this growth rate is considered by many to be short of what Turkey should be achieving to break out of the middle-income trap and ensure the successful integration of newcomers into the labor market.

There are many causes for this. A setback in democratic governance and the rule of law in Turkey in recent years has been cited extensively. A drop in the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Turkey, especially from developed Western economies, is at least partly attributed to the Turkish government’s growing authoritarianism and erosion of the rule of law. The chaos in Turkey’s neighborhood is inevitability contributing to this fall as well, as investors worry about long-term stability and the security of their investments.

This instability is also taking a toll on Turkey’s foreign trade. Turkey’s dynamic growth performance was closely linked to the expansion of trade with countries in its immediate neighborhood. Between 1992 and 2012, trade with neighboring countries increased 23-fold from $4 billion to $93 billion, in contrast to a nine-fold increase in EU-Turkish trade during the same period. This was also a period during which the EU’s place in Turkey’s foreign trade dropped from a peak of 55 percent to 38 percent.

As violence in the Middle East persisted and Russia became embroiled in the Ukrainian crisis, however, this picture quickly changed. Turkey’s exports to the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, have dropped dramatically. In the case of Iran, for example, exports plummeted 61 percent between 2012 and 2014. Similarly, Turkey’s exports to Russia and Ukraine between 2013 and 2014 fell by 15 and 21 percent, respectively, while expanding to the recession-stricken EU and the United States by 9 and 13 percent. These trends are likely to continue in the near future. As long as the instability in Turkey’s neighborhood continues to erode its exports markets and capital inflows, it will need the transatlantic community’s business.

Although Turkish membership in the EU is not likely to happen anytime soon, maintaining a credible process is crucial. The Turkish government should adopt the reforms and policies necessary to ensure the EU opens new chapters for negotiations. This will also help boost confidence in the Turkish economy. Additionally, it is crucial for Turkey to adopt the World Bank’s April 2014 recommendation to upgrade its Customs Union with the EU. Many experts as well as Turkish officials recognize that the Customs Union has been beneficial to Turkey’s economic development and expansion of its exports.

Thus, a stronger political will should be shown by the Turkish government in support for upgrading the Customs Union. Words must be translated into actions. The EU should reciprocate as well, especially at a time when they are still struggling to come out of recession and sanctions on Russia are hurting exports, they need Turkey economically. Turkey is a major importer of the EU’s goods and services and was the EU’s sixth largest trading partner in 2013, just behind Norway and Switzerland. Even if at a modest level, Turkey contributes to the economic growth and employment in the EU. These economic realities suggest it is in the EU’s interest to engage Turkey, particularly by upgrading the Customs Union, a move that would benefit everyone.

This also applies to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that the EU and the U.S. are in the process of negotiating. Once an agreement is reached, the TTIP will cover a geographic area generating nearly half of the world’s GDP and close to a third of world trade. The Turkish government has been following these negotiations closely and has repeatedly called for its inclusion in the TTIP given that its Customs Union with the EU would be negatively impacted by the TTIP. While the issue of the TTIP’s enlargement has not yet been resolved, it is important for Turkey in the meantime to start adopting the necessary economic and trade-related reforms. As the chaos in Turkey’s neighborhood persists, closer and deeper economic relations with its traditional transatlantic community partners would help Turkey overcome the structural problems that keep it in the “middle-income trap.”

Authors

]]>
Wed, 18 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0500Kemal Kirişci
Today, Turkey's economy is no longer growing at the 2010-11 levels of 9.2 and 8.8 percent and instead faces a number of structural problems, appearing to be stuck in the infamous “middle-income trap.”
According to a World Bank report, “Turkey's Transitions,” Turkey is “some 20 percent shy of the high income threshold.” The report recommends a range of economic, institutional and political reforms to overcome this gap. However, considering the chaos reigning throughout Turkey's neighborhood and the accompanying loss of markets for Turkish goods and services, it also critical that Turkey deepens its economic integration with the transatlantic community.
The EU recently increased Turkey's growth rate predictions for 2015 from 3.3 to 3.7 percent as the drop in oil prices precipitated a fall in one of Turkey's perennial structural problems: its large current accounts deficit. Turkey's growth performance for 2014 was 3 percent, far ahead of the European Union's average of 1.3 percent. Nevertheless, this growth rate is considered by many to be short of what Turkey should be achieving to break out of the middle-income trap and ensure the successful integration of newcomers into the labor market.
There are many causes for this. A setback in democratic governance and the rule of law in Turkey in recent years has been cited extensively. A drop in the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Turkey, especially from developed Western economies, is at least partly attributed to the Turkish government's growing authoritarianism and erosion of the rule of law. The chaos in Turkey's neighborhood is inevitability contributing to this fall as well, as investors worry about long-term stability and the security of their investments.
This instability is also taking a toll on Turkey's foreign trade. Turkey's dynamic growth performance was closely linked to the expansion of trade with countries in its immediate neighborhood. Between 1992 and 2012, trade with neighboring countries increased 23-fold from $4 billion to $93 billion, in contrast to a nine-fold increase in EU-Turkish trade during the same period. This was also a period during which the EU's place in Turkey's foreign trade dropped from a peak of 55 percent to 38 percent.
As violence in the Middle East persisted and Russia became embroiled in the Ukrainian crisis, however, this picture quickly changed. Turkey's exports to the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, have dropped dramatically. In the case of Iran, for example, exports plummeted 61 percent between 2012 and 2014. Similarly, Turkey's exports to Russia and Ukraine between 2013 and 2014 fell by 15 and 21 percent, respectively, while expanding to the recession-stricken EU and the United States by 9 and 13 percent. These trends are likely to continue in the near future. As long as the instability in Turkey's neighborhood continues to erode its exports markets and capital inflows, it will need the transatlantic community's business.
Although Turkish membership in the EU is not likely to happen anytime soon, maintaining a credible process is crucial. The Turkish government should adopt the reforms and policies necessary to ensure the EU opens new chapters for negotiations. This will also help boost confidence in the Turkish economy. Additionally, it is crucial for Turkey to adopt the World Bank's April 2014 recommendation to upgrade its Customs Union with the EU. Many experts as well as Turkish officials recognize that the Customs Union has been beneficial to Turkey's economic development and expansion of its exports.
Thus, a stronger political will should be shown by the Turkish government in support for upgrading the Customs Union. Words must be translated into actions. The EU should reciprocate as well, especially at a time when they are still struggling to come out of recession and sanctions on Russia are hurting exports, they need Turkey economically. Turkey is a ...
Today, Turkey's economy is no longer growing at the 2010-11 levels of 9.2 and 8.8 percent and instead faces a number of structural problems, appearing to be stuck in the infamous “middle-income trap.”
According to a World Bank ...

Today, Turkey’s economy is no longer growing at the 2010-11 levels of 9.2 and 8.8 percent and instead faces a number of structural problems, appearing to be stuck in the infamous “middle-income trap.”

According to a World Bank report, “Turkey’s Transitions,” Turkey is “some 20 percent shy of the high income threshold.” The report recommends a range of economic, institutional and political reforms to overcome this gap. However, considering the chaos reigning throughout Turkey’s neighborhood and the accompanying loss of markets for Turkish goods and services, it also critical that Turkey deepens its economic integration with the transatlantic community.

The EU recently increased Turkey’s growth rate predictions for 2015 from 3.3 to 3.7 percent as the drop in oil prices precipitated a fall in one of Turkey’s perennial structural problems: its large current accounts deficit. Turkey’s growth performance for 2014 was 3 percent, far ahead of the European Union’s average of 1.3 percent. Nevertheless, this growth rate is considered by many to be short of what Turkey should be achieving to break out of the middle-income trap and ensure the successful integration of newcomers into the labor market.

There are many causes for this. A setback in democratic governance and the rule of law in Turkey in recent years has been cited extensively. A drop in the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Turkey, especially from developed Western economies, is at least partly attributed to the Turkish government’s growing authoritarianism and erosion of the rule of law. The chaos in Turkey’s neighborhood is inevitability contributing to this fall as well, as investors worry about long-term stability and the security of their investments.

This instability is also taking a toll on Turkey’s foreign trade. Turkey’s dynamic growth performance was closely linked to the expansion of trade with countries in its immediate neighborhood. Between 1992 and 2012, trade with neighboring countries increased 23-fold from $4 billion to $93 billion, in contrast to a nine-fold increase in EU-Turkish trade during the same period. This was also a period during which the EU’s place in Turkey’s foreign trade dropped from a peak of 55 percent to 38 percent.

As violence in the Middle East persisted and Russia became embroiled in the Ukrainian crisis, however, this picture quickly changed. Turkey’s exports to the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, have dropped dramatically. In the case of Iran, for example, exports plummeted 61 percent between 2012 and 2014. Similarly, Turkey’s exports to Russia and Ukraine between 2013 and 2014 fell by 15 and 21 percent, respectively, while expanding to the recession-stricken EU and the United States by 9 and 13 percent. These trends are likely to continue in the near future. As long as the instability in Turkey’s neighborhood continues to erode its exports markets and capital inflows, it will need the transatlantic community’s business.

Although Turkish membership in the EU is not likely to happen anytime soon, maintaining a credible process is crucial. The Turkish government should adopt the reforms and policies necessary to ensure the EU opens new chapters for negotiations. This will also help boost confidence in the Turkish economy. Additionally, it is crucial for Turkey to adopt the World Bank’s April 2014 recommendation to upgrade its Customs Union with the EU. Many experts as well as Turkish officials recognize that the Customs Union has been beneficial to Turkey’s economic development and expansion of its exports.

Thus, a stronger political will should be shown by the Turkish government in support for upgrading the Customs Union. Words must be translated into actions. The EU should reciprocate as well, especially at a time when they are still struggling to come out of recession and sanctions on Russia are hurting exports, they need Turkey economically. Turkey is a major importer of the EU’s goods and services and was the EU’s sixth largest trading partner in 2013, just behind Norway and Switzerland. Even if at a modest level, Turkey contributes to the economic growth and employment in the EU. These economic realities suggest it is in the EU’s interest to engage Turkey, particularly by upgrading the Customs Union, a move that would benefit everyone.

This also applies to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that the EU and the U.S. are in the process of negotiating. Once an agreement is reached, the TTIP will cover a geographic area generating nearly half of the world’s GDP and close to a third of world trade. The Turkish government has been following these negotiations closely and has repeatedly called for its inclusion in the TTIP given that its Customs Union with the EU would be negatively impacted by the TTIP. While the issue of the TTIP’s enlargement has not yet been resolved, it is important for Turkey in the meantime to start adopting the necessary economic and trade-related reforms. As the chaos in Turkey’s neighborhood persists, closer and deeper economic relations with its traditional transatlantic community partners would help Turkey overcome the structural problems that keep it in the “middle-income trap.”

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/02/11-turkey-euroatlantic-community-kirisci?rssid=turkey{B90D4E3C-682A-4199-A094-DDB28014540F}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85186535/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~Turkey-and-the-EuroAtlantic-communityTurkey and the Euro-Atlantic community

2014 was another year characterized by turbulence in Turkish relations with Europe and the United States. In Turkey’s neighborhood, large swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory fell under the control of the Islamic State group and Russia annexed Crimea. While the regional chaos and insecurity raised friction between Ankara and its Western allies, it also paved the way for some degree of policy convergence.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and continued destabilization of eastern Ukraine are blatant violations of established norms and rules of the post-World War II European security order. For Turkey, however, these conflicts pale in comparison to the challenges and headaches created by the violence and instability in Syria and Iraq. The country hosts a refugee population fast approaching 2 million and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus is not about to fall anytime soon. Instead, the emergence of the so-called Islamic State has exacerbated the situation. Turkey is depicted in Western media as both a key player in efforts to “degrade and ultimately defeat” the group as well as a spoiler of these efforts. After the Turkish government showed reluctance to intervene in support of Kurdish resistance to an Islamic State onslaught on the Syrian border town of Kobane, some even called for Turkey’s expulsion from NATO.

However, a degree of convergence between Turkey and the transatlantic alliance appears to be unfolding, slowly but surely. Defeating the Islamic State group, stabilizing Iraq, and finding a solution to the Syrian quagmire will all require Turkey’s active support. This is widely recognized. There is also growing recognition that Turkey’s policies are more consistent with those of its transatlantic partners on issues like foreign fighters and oil smuggling. Despite President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s insistence that the primary focus of the transatlantic alliance should be the removal of Assad, more and more Turkish analysts and officials on the ground recognize this is an unrealistic approach, and pragmatism is needed. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Turkey in November and his remark that “we need Turkey, and I think Turkey believes that it needs us as well” should be seen from the perspective of growing realism. Furthermore, the swelling refugee population in Turkey and the need to continue humanitarian assistance into Syria are bringing Turkey and the transatlantic community closer to each other, as the EU and United States are trying to put a refugee resettlement program in place in response to calls from Turkey for greater burden sharing.

Another source of turbulence in Turkey’s relations with the transatlantic community is a deepening of Turkish-Russian relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Turkey within one week of Biden’s departure, and Ankara has kept its criticisms of Putin’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine to a minimum. Turkey’s muted response to a blatant violation of a neighbor’s territorial integrity is puzzling, particularly since “territorial integrity” has long been a sacrosanct principle of Turkish political culture. Furthermore, Crimea has a large minority of Tatars with close ethnic, historical, and religious ties to Turkey and a clear preference to remain part of Ukraine. Russia and Turkey also have conspicuous diametrically opposed policies toward Syria: Putin has been unrelenting in his support for al-Assad, while Erdoğan has been a virulent opponent. But Turkish officials have yet to complain about Russia’s stance on Syria, in stark contrast to Erdoğan’s consistent, bitter criticism of the West over its inaction.

It is clear Putin has been playing on Turkey’s dependence on imported energy. The Russian president’s decision to scrap the South Stream project and instead promise an alternative transit pipeline through Turkey, if realized, is likely to further enhance this dependence. Turkey runs a more than three-fold trade deficit with Russia, which it can only partly balance with income from Russian tourism and from Turkish companies doing business in Russia. Maintaining good relations with Russia has become an economic sine quo non. Putin’s leadership style and anti-Western rhetoric may also endear him to Erdoğan and to some extent the Turkish public.

Yet the stark reality is that Turkey is far more deeply integrated economically with the EU than with Russia. In 2014, the EU accounted for 39 percent of Turkey’s foreign trade, compared to 8 percent for Russia. Exports to the EU rose by 9 percent compared to 2013, while exports to Russia fell by 15 percent. The mounting economic crisis in Russia is likely to further undermine Turkish exports and possibly Russian tourism to Turkey.

Turkey’s recent democratic backsliding is another good argument for why Turkey needs the EU. Erdoğan’s decision to clamp down on media closely associated with the Gülen Movement at the end of 2014 provoked widespread criticism of disregard for basic democratic freedoms and rule of law in Turkey. Erdoğan’s rebuke that he did not care what the EU thought brought EU-Turkish relations to a new low. Many in Turkey long for the days when the AK Party government adopted reform packages one after the other, grew the economy, and presented Turkey as a model for democratic transition in the region. Today, democratic regression and a weakening of rule of law are frequently cited as adversely affecting the performance of the Turkish economy. Continued engagement with the EU is critical to building confidence. Turkey also needs the EU’s business because the instability in its neighborhood to the south and east has resulted in a loss of markets and fall in capital inflows. The case can also be made that the EU needs Turkey economically, especially at a time when the EU is still struggling to come out of recession and sanctions on Russia are hurting exports.

Under these circumstances, it seems both sides have an interest in overcoming the turbulence in the relationship and remaining engaged with one another. While Turkish membership in the EU is not likely to happen anytime soon, maintaining a credible process is crucial. It is paramount the EU open a number of new chapters for negotiations. It is also crucial that the EU and Turkey adopt the World Bank’s April 2014 recommendation of upgrading their customs union. Both sides have expressed interest in doing so, and economic realities suggest that everyone would benefit.

Additionally, the United States should explore the idea of enlarging the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to include Turkey or sign a bilateral free trade agreement with Turkey. In the long run, this would help re-anchor Turkey to the transatlantic community, enlarge the business community with a stake in liberal market values, make Turkey a net contributor to the transatlantic economy, help with employment creation, and increase strategic cooperation.

Stronger and deeper relations with the West would help revive Turkey’s democracy and economy and restore its soft power in the region. Early signs of such engagement could also help minimize the damage resulting from the continued populist and anti-Western discourse emanating from Turkey’s political leadership. However, it is likely that Erdoğan’s resentful discourse towards the West will continue at least until the parliamentary elections in June this year. In turn, the outcome of the election will not only determine whether Turkey will be able to recover from the democratic setbacks of recent years but also whether the turbulence in its relations with the transatlantic community can be overcome.

Authors

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Wed, 11 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0500Kemal Kirişci
2014 was another year characterized by turbulence in Turkish relations with Europe and the United States. In Turkey's neighborhood, large swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory fell under the control of the Islamic State group and Russia annexed Crimea. While the regional chaos and insecurity raised friction between Ankara and its Western allies, it also paved the way for some degree of policy convergence.
Russia's annexation of Crimea and continued destabilization of eastern Ukraine are blatant violations of established norms and rules of the post-World War II European security order. For Turkey, however, these conflicts pale in comparison to the challenges and headaches created by the violence and instability in Syria and Iraq. The country hosts a refugee population fast approaching 2 million and Bashar al-Assad's regime in Damascus is not about to fall anytime soon. Instead, the emergence of the so-called Islamic State has exacerbated the situation. Turkey is depicted in Western media as both a key player in efforts to “degrade and ultimately defeat” the group as well as a spoiler of these efforts. After the Turkish government showed reluctance to intervene in support of Kurdish resistance to an Islamic State onslaught on the Syrian border town of Kobane, some even called for Turkey's expulsion from NATO.
However, a degree of convergence between Turkey and the transatlantic alliance appears to be unfolding, slowly but surely. Defeating the Islamic State group, stabilizing Iraq, and finding a solution to the Syrian quagmire will all require Turkey's active support. This is widely recognized. There is also growing recognition that Turkey's policies are more consistent with those of its transatlantic partners on issues like foreign fighters and oil smuggling. Despite President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's insistence that the primary focus of the transatlantic alliance should be the removal of Assad, more and more Turkish analysts and officials on the ground recognize this is an unrealistic approach, and pragmatism is needed. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Turkey in November and his remark that “we need Turkey, and I think Turkey believes that it needs us as well” should be seen from the perspective of growing realism. Furthermore, the swelling refugee population in Turkey and the need to continue humanitarian assistance into Syria are bringing Turkey and the transatlantic community closer to each other, as the EU and United States are trying to put a refugee resettlement program in place in response to calls from Turkey for greater burden sharing.
Another source of turbulence in Turkey's relations with the transatlantic community is a deepening of Turkish-Russian relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Turkey within one week of Biden's departure, and Ankara has kept its criticisms of Putin's actions in Crimea and Ukraine to a minimum. Turkey's muted response to a blatant violation of a neighbor's territorial integrity is puzzling, particularly since “territorial integrity” has long been a sacrosanct principle of Turkish political culture. Furthermore, Crimea has a large minority of Tatars with close ethnic, historical, and religious ties to Turkey and a clear preference to remain part of Ukraine. Russia and Turkey also have conspicuous diametrically opposed policies toward Syria: Putin has been unrelenting in his support for al-Assad, while Erdoğan has been a virulent opponent. But Turkish officials have yet to complain about Russia's stance on Syria, in stark contrast to Erdoğan's consistent, bitter criticism of the West over its inaction.
It is clear Putin has been playing on Turkey's dependence on imported energy. The Russian president's decision to scrap the South Stream project and instead promise an alternative transit pipeline through Turkey, if realized, is likely to further enhance this dependence. Turkey runs a more than three-fold ...
2014 was another year characterized by turbulence in Turkish relations with Europe and the United States. In Turkey's neighborhood, large swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory fell under the control of the Islamic State group and Russia annexed ...

2014 was another year characterized by turbulence in Turkish relations with Europe and the United States. In Turkey’s neighborhood, large swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory fell under the control of the Islamic State group and Russia annexed Crimea. While the regional chaos and insecurity raised friction between Ankara and its Western allies, it also paved the way for some degree of policy convergence.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and continued destabilization of eastern Ukraine are blatant violations of established norms and rules of the post-World War II European security order. For Turkey, however, these conflicts pale in comparison to the challenges and headaches created by the violence and instability in Syria and Iraq. The country hosts a refugee population fast approaching 2 million and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus is not about to fall anytime soon. Instead, the emergence of the so-called Islamic State has exacerbated the situation. Turkey is depicted in Western media as both a key player in efforts to “degrade and ultimately defeat” the group as well as a spoiler of these efforts. After the Turkish government showed reluctance to intervene in support of Kurdish resistance to an Islamic State onslaught on the Syrian border town of Kobane, some even called for Turkey’s expulsion from NATO.

However, a degree of convergence between Turkey and the transatlantic alliance appears to be unfolding, slowly but surely. Defeating the Islamic State group, stabilizing Iraq, and finding a solution to the Syrian quagmire will all require Turkey’s active support. This is widely recognized. There is also growing recognition that Turkey’s policies are more consistent with those of its transatlantic partners on issues like foreign fighters and oil smuggling. Despite President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s insistence that the primary focus of the transatlantic alliance should be the removal of Assad, more and more Turkish analysts and officials on the ground recognize this is an unrealistic approach, and pragmatism is needed. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Turkey in November and his remark that “we need Turkey, and I think Turkey believes that it needs us as well” should be seen from the perspective of growing realism. Furthermore, the swelling refugee population in Turkey and the need to continue humanitarian assistance into Syria are bringing Turkey and the transatlantic community closer to each other, as the EU and United States are trying to put a refugee resettlement program in place in response to calls from Turkey for greater burden sharing.

Another source of turbulence in Turkey’s relations with the transatlantic community is a deepening of Turkish-Russian relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Turkey within one week of Biden’s departure, and Ankara has kept its criticisms of Putin’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine to a minimum. Turkey’s muted response to a blatant violation of a neighbor’s territorial integrity is puzzling, particularly since “territorial integrity” has long been a sacrosanct principle of Turkish political culture. Furthermore, Crimea has a large minority of Tatars with close ethnic, historical, and religious ties to Turkey and a clear preference to remain part of Ukraine. Russia and Turkey also have conspicuous diametrically opposed policies toward Syria: Putin has been unrelenting in his support for al-Assad, while Erdoğan has been a virulent opponent. But Turkish officials have yet to complain about Russia’s stance on Syria, in stark contrast to Erdoğan’s consistent, bitter criticism of the West over its inaction.

It is clear Putin has been playing on Turkey’s dependence on imported energy. The Russian president’s decision to scrap the South Stream project and instead promise an alternative transit pipeline through Turkey, if realized, is likely to further enhance this dependence. Turkey runs a more than three-fold trade deficit with Russia, which it can only partly balance with income from Russian tourism and from Turkish companies doing business in Russia. Maintaining good relations with Russia has become an economic sine quo non. Putin’s leadership style and anti-Western rhetoric may also endear him to Erdoğan and to some extent the Turkish public.

Yet the stark reality is that Turkey is far more deeply integrated economically with the EU than with Russia. In 2014, the EU accounted for 39 percent of Turkey’s foreign trade, compared to 8 percent for Russia. Exports to the EU rose by 9 percent compared to 2013, while exports to Russia fell by 15 percent. The mounting economic crisis in Russia is likely to further undermine Turkish exports and possibly Russian tourism to Turkey.

Turkey’s recent democratic backsliding is another good argument for why Turkey needs the EU. Erdoğan’s decision to clamp down on media closely associated with the Gülen Movement at the end of 2014 provoked widespread criticism of disregard for basic democratic freedoms and rule of law in Turkey. Erdoğan’s rebuke that he did not care what the EU thought brought EU-Turkish relations to a new low. Many in Turkey long for the days when the AK Party government adopted reform packages one after the other, grew the economy, and presented Turkey as a model for democratic transition in the region. Today, democratic regression and a weakening of rule of law are frequently cited as adversely affecting the performance of the Turkish economy. Continued engagement with the EU is critical to building confidence. Turkey also needs the EU’s business because the instability in its neighborhood to the south and east has resulted in a loss of markets and fall in capital inflows. The case can also be made that the EU needs Turkey economically, especially at a time when the EU is still struggling to come out of recession and sanctions on Russia are hurting exports.

Under these circumstances, it seems both sides have an interest in overcoming the turbulence in the relationship and remaining engaged with one another. While Turkish membership in the EU is not likely to happen anytime soon, maintaining a credible process is crucial. It is paramount the EU open a number of new chapters for negotiations. It is also crucial that the EU and Turkey adopt the World Bank’s April 2014 recommendation of upgrading their customs union. Both sides have expressed interest in doing so, and economic realities suggest that everyone would benefit.

Additionally, the United States should explore the idea of enlarging the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to include Turkey or sign a bilateral free trade agreement with Turkey. In the long run, this would help re-anchor Turkey to the transatlantic community, enlarge the business community with a stake in liberal market values, make Turkey a net contributor to the transatlantic economy, help with employment creation, and increase strategic cooperation.

Stronger and deeper relations with the West would help revive Turkey’s democracy and economy and restore its soft power in the region. Early signs of such engagement could also help minimize the damage resulting from the continued populist and anti-Western discourse emanating from Turkey’s political leadership. However, it is likely that Erdoğan’s resentful discourse towards the West will continue at least until the parliamentary elections in June this year. In turn, the outcome of the election will not only determine whether Turkey will be able to recover from the democratic setbacks of recent years but also whether the turbulence in its relations with the transatlantic community can be overcome.

With only 20 percent of the population, the world’s 300 largest metropolitan economies account for nearly half of global economic output. Through our new Global Metro Monitor report and interactive, users can understand the individual trajectories of the world’s large metropolitan economies and gain new insights into sources of growth that national or regional assessments tend to obscure.

The fastest growing metro areas this year, as measured by our economic performance index that combines employment and GDP per capita growth, are concentrated in China, Turkey and the Middle East.

10. Fuzhou, China

Fuzhou is the political capital of Fujian province, located on China’s east coast. The metro economy specializes in the manufacture of chemicals, food, and textiles, but its fastest growing industry in 2014 was business, financial, and professional services. In an effort to lure higher order economic activity, China recently announced an expanded Free Trade Zone in Fuzhou.

9. Ankara, Turkey

Ankara, Turkey’s capital, is the first of four Turkish metro areas in the top 10. Turkish cities are growing fast due to significant infrastructure and construction investment, an emerging industrial base, and sound macroeconomic policies. In Ankara, while government continues to account for the largest share of the economy, manufacturing saw even greater annual output and employment gains of 4.1 and 6.8 percent, respectively. Many of the country’s largest aerospace and defense companies have their headquarters and industrial plants in Ankara.

8. Xiamen, China

Located just south of Fuzhou in Fujian province, Xiamen has been one of China’s fastest growing cities since 2000. In 1980, the Chinese government selected Xiamen as one of China’s five original special economic zones. Manufacturing accounts for nearly half of the metropolitan economy and Xiamen houses the world’s 18th busiest port.

7. Hangzhou, China

Hangzhou, a metro area near Shanghai, led all Chinese metro economies in 2014 with employment growth of 3.3 percent. Business, financial and professional services led employment growth in the region. Hangzhou is a promising e-commerce hub, anchored by Alibaba’s global headquarters.

6. Kunming, China

Kunming was the best performing mainland Chinese metro area, ranking sixth in this year’s performance index. About the size of Dallas, Kunming is the capital of Yunnan province in southeast China, where it has become a budding transportation gateway to Southeast Asia and is home to major universities.

5. Dubai, United Arab Emirates

The most populous city in the UAE, Dubai is a global hub for transportation, tourism, trade and professional services. Thanks to an ambitious strategy to diversify its economy Dubai no longer relies on commodities to power its economic growth, and today the service industry accounts for more than 70 percent of total GDP.

4. Bursa, Turkey

Bursa, located along Turkey’s west coast, is a manufacturing power house known internationally for its strong automotive cluster, which accounts for 60 percent of the national industry. International automakers such as Fiat and Renault, as well as a wide variety of suppliers make Bursa “Turkey’s Detroit.”

3. Istanbul, Turkey

Istanbul is Turkey’s economic and cultural center, as well as its most populous metropolitan area. Located amid historic land and sea trade routes that connect Central Asia with Europe, Istanbul has developed a diversified economy with strong services, trade, tourism and manufacturing sectors. The regional economy accounts for over one-quarter of Turkey’s economy.

2. Izmir, Turkey

Izmir has been a key trade hub since the 17th century, leveraging its easy access to Mediterranean and Aegean Sea shipping routes. The government has leveraged its geographic location through the promotion of industrial zones in and around the Izmir area. Izmir ranked first in our report for employment growth in 2014, and posted the second strongest employment growth of the 2009 to 2014 period.

1. Macau

Population: 574,200Employment Growth: 4.2%GDP Per Capita Growth: 8.0%

As in 2012, Macau topped our economic performance index, due to substantial GDP per capita growth. This relatively small metro area has become the world’s largest gaming center, attracting large global companies like Wynn, Sands and MGM.

Authors

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Tue, 10 Feb 2015 15:44:00 -0500Joseph Parilla and Jesus Leal Trujillo
With only 20 percent of the population, the world's 300 largest metropolitan economies account for nearly half of global economic output. Through our new Global Metro Monitor report and interactive, users can understand the individual trajectories of the world's large metropolitan economies and gain new insights into sources of growth that national or regional assessments tend to obscure.
The fastest growing metro areas this year, as measured by our economic performance index that combines employment and GDP per capita growth, are concentrated in China, Turkey and the Middle East.
10. Fuzhou, China
Population: 6,618,900
Employment Growth: 2.7%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 8.0%
Fuzhou is the political capital of Fujian province, located on China's east coast. The metro economy specializes in the manufacture of chemicals, food, and textiles, but its fastest growing industry in 2014 was business, financial, and professional services. In an effort to lure higher order economic activity, China recently announced an expanded Free Trade Zone in Fuzhou.
9. Ankara, Turkey
Population: 4,975,400
Employment Growth: 5.7%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 1.1%
Ankara, Turkey's capital, is the first of four Turkish metro areas in the top 10. Turkish cities are growing fast due to significant infrastructure and construction investment, an emerging industrial base, and sound macroeconomic policies. In Ankara, while government continues to account for the largest share of the economy, manufacturing saw even greater annual output and employment gains of 4.1 and 6.8 percent, respectively. Many of the country's largest aerospace and defense companies have their headquarters and industrial plants in Ankara.
8. Xiamen, China
Population: 3,715,900
Employment Growth: 2.6%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 8.6%
Located just south of Fuzhou in Fujian province, Xiamen has been one of China's fastest growing cities since 2000. In 1980, the Chinese government selected Xiamen as one of China's five original special economic zones. Manufacturing accounts for nearly half of the metropolitan economy and Xiamen houses the world's 18th busiest port.
7. Hangzhou, China
Population: 8,909,700
Employment Growth: 3.3%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 7.0%
Hangzhou, a metro area near Shanghai, led all Chinese metro economies in 2014 with employment growth of 3.3 percent. Business, financial and professional services led employment growth in the region. Hangzhou is a promising e-commerce hub, anchored by Alibaba's global headquarters.
6. Kunming, China
Population: 6,605,500
Employment Growth: 2.9%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 8.1%
Kunming was the best performing mainland Chinese metro area, ranking sixth in this year's performance index. About the size of Dallas, Kunming is the capital of Yunnan province in southeast China, where it has become a budding transportation gateway to Southeast Asia and is home to major universities.
5. Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Population: 3,332,500
Employment Growth: 4.7%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 4.5%
The most populous city in the UAE, Dubai is a global hub for transportation, tourism, trade and professional services. Thanks to an ambitious strategy to diversify its economy Dubai no longer relies on commodities to power its economic growth, and today the service industry accounts for more than 70 percent of total GDP.
4. Bursa, Turkey
Population: 3,722,600
Employment Growth: 6.4%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 1.8%
Bursa, located along Turkey's west coast, is a manufacturing power house known internationally for its strong automotive cluster, which accounts for 60 percent of the national industry. International automakers such as Fiat and Renault, as well as a wide variety of suppliers make Bursa “Turkey's Detroit.”
3. Istanbul, Turkey
Population: 14,023,500
Employment Growth: 6.5%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 2.0%
Istanbul is Turkey's economic and cultural center, as well as its most populous metropolitan area. Located amid ...
With only 20 percent of the population, the world's 300 largest metropolitan economies account for nearly half of global economic output. Through our new Global Metro Monitor report and interactive, users can understand the individual ...

With only 20 percent of the population, the world’s 300 largest metropolitan economies account for nearly half of global economic output. Through our new Global Metro Monitor report and interactive, users can understand the individual trajectories of the world’s large metropolitan economies and gain new insights into sources of growth that national or regional assessments tend to obscure.

The fastest growing metro areas this year, as measured by our economic performance index that combines employment and GDP per capita growth, are concentrated in China, Turkey and the Middle East.

10. Fuzhou, China

Fuzhou is the political capital of Fujian province, located on China’s east coast. The metro economy specializes in the manufacture of chemicals, food, and textiles, but its fastest growing industry in 2014 was business, financial, and professional services. In an effort to lure higher order economic activity, China recently announced an expanded Free Trade Zone in Fuzhou.

9. Ankara, Turkey

Ankara, Turkey’s capital, is the first of four Turkish metro areas in the top 10. Turkish cities are growing fast due to significant infrastructure and construction investment, an emerging industrial base, and sound macroeconomic policies. In Ankara, while government continues to account for the largest share of the economy, manufacturing saw even greater annual output and employment gains of 4.1 and 6.8 percent, respectively. Many of the country’s largest aerospace and defense companies have their headquarters and industrial plants in Ankara.

8. Xiamen, China

Located just south of Fuzhou in Fujian province, Xiamen has been one of China’s fastest growing cities since 2000. In 1980, the Chinese government selected Xiamen as one of China’s five original special economic zones. Manufacturing accounts for nearly half of the metropolitan economy and Xiamen houses the world’s 18th busiest port.

7. Hangzhou, China

Hangzhou, a metro area near Shanghai, led all Chinese metro economies in 2014 with employment growth of 3.3 percent. Business, financial and professional services led employment growth in the region. Hangzhou is a promising e-commerce hub, anchored by Alibaba’s global headquarters.

6. Kunming, China

Kunming was the best performing mainland Chinese metro area, ranking sixth in this year’s performance index. About the size of Dallas, Kunming is the capital of Yunnan province in southeast China, where it has become a budding transportation gateway to Southeast Asia and is home to major universities.

5. Dubai, United Arab Emirates

The most populous city in the UAE, Dubai is a global hub for transportation, tourism, trade and professional services. Thanks to an ambitious strategy to diversify its economy Dubai no longer relies on commodities to power its economic growth, and today the service industry accounts for more than 70 percent of total GDP.

4. Bursa, Turkey

Bursa, located along Turkey’s west coast, is a manufacturing power house known internationally for its strong automotive cluster, which accounts for 60 percent of the national industry. International automakers such as Fiat and Renault, as well as a wide variety of suppliers make Bursa “Turkey’s Detroit.”

3. Istanbul, Turkey

Istanbul is Turkey’s economic and cultural center, as well as its most populous metropolitan area. Located amid historic land and sea trade routes that connect Central Asia with Europe, Istanbul has developed a diversified economy with strong services, trade, tourism and manufacturing sectors. The regional economy accounts for over one-quarter of Turkey’s economy.

2. Izmir, Turkey

Izmir has been a key trade hub since the 17th century, leveraging its easy access to Mediterranean and Aegean Sea shipping routes. The government has leveraged its geographic location through the promotion of industrial zones in and around the Izmir area. Izmir ranked first in our report for employment growth in 2014, and posted the second strongest employment growth of the 2009 to 2014 period.

1. Macau

As in 2012, Macau topped our economic performance index, due to substantial GDP per capita growth. This relatively small metro area has become the world’s largest gaming center, attracting large global companies like Wynn, Sands and MGM.

There are now some 9 million Syrian refugees and it is estimated that 5,000 additional refugees are created every day. Over 5 million Syrians reside in neighboring countries, principally Jordan (800,000), Lebanon (1.8 million) and Turkey (1.8 million). Europe and the West have been largely closed to these refugees with desperate boat journeys the stuff of daily news items. The crisis is not abating, and with 2 million refugees in Iraq the problem is expanding. What is clear is that many of these refugees are unlikely to be going home soon, if ever.

The vast majority of Turkey’s Syrian refugees are not in camps but among the broader population; only 220,000 remain in camps. Turkey maintains its open border policy—most recently accepting some 160,000 Syrian Kurds from Kobani over a three-day period in October. Though rare, tensions between locals and Syrians do erupt occasionally, as low-skill wages are depressed, the cost of low-end housing increases, and Syrians get blamed for the increase in crime. These issues need to be addressed, and addressed in the context of the real challenge—avoiding a permanent refugee population that turns into an underclass.

As noted by Kemal Kirisci and Raj Salooja in Foreign Affairs, “the Syrians in Turkey are no longer refugees waiting for the war to end but…immigrants ready to write a new chapter in their lives.” Following four years of temporary protection under the nebulous designation “guests,” refugees are now receiving identification cards granting them access to basic services like preventive health care and education. This stops short of official refugee status, which includes more rights, but is still a significant move in the right direction. Moreover, a proposal to regulate working conditions was submitted to the Council of Ministers, allowing Syrians to apply for work permits with their ID cards.

In the meantime, a burgeoning Syrian business community is emerging. Many are in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Urfa—cities bordering Syria. There are also fairly large Syrian middle-class communities in cities like Mersin, 300 kilometers from Syria. There, over 50,000 Syrians have established Syrian schools, hundreds of businesses, and other reminders of home. The old Istanbul neighborhood of Aksaray boasts a “Kucuk Halep” (small Aleppo) with Syrian restaurants, bookstores, movie houses and other businesses. Similar areas can be found in other urban centers.

In 2013, Syrians established 489 of the 3,875 foreign-owned firms out of the 49,000 firms established in Turkey. That number grew to 1,122 in 2014 when Syrians accounted for 26 percent of the 4,249 foreign firms out of a total of 54,000 established in 2014. A larger influx is expected in 2015 as Syrians use their new status to establish more businesses or formalize them. Many other firms operate informally while some use Turkish partners of convenience. Many also employ Syrian workers. Turkish officials are looking at special arrangements for Syrians to work in Syrian firms. The Syria Trade Office, a Mersin consultancy, estimates that some $10 billion in Syrian capital has entered Turkey since 2011.

Turkey’s links with Syria were growing rapidly before 2011 and the subsequent civil war. The removal of visa barriers in 2009-2010 between Turkey and Jordan, Lebanon and Syria led to economic agreements and activities promising much greater economic cooperation. The World Bank noted the potential of regional economic integration through two recent reports, one by Sibel Kulaksiz, et al. and the other by Elena Ianchovichina and Maros Ivanic. The war abruptly slowed this growth in trade, which was expected to go from $2.3 billion annually in 2010 to $5 billion by 2014. Also coming to an end at that time was the deepening in trade that had just begun.

Yet, the visa-free area has continued to expand as Turkey and Iraq lifted visa requirements in 2014. Iraqis are now the fourth largest owners of newly established foreign firms in Turkey. Trade with both Iraq and Syria is expected to further increase in 2015. The recent rapprochement with Iraq and the re-opening of the Iraqi economy to Turkish firms (until recently largely concentrated in the Kurdish region) should help. In the meantime, while trade with Syria, now at its 2010 level, is recovering, its content is different, with a focus on basic foodstuffs, construction material, etc. It also remains a far cry from the consumer durables and capital goods that were expected to dominate prior to the war. Still, it underlines that trade continues and the growing number of Syrian firms are key to maintaining and even strengthening these ties. The over 330 percent increase in Mersin’s 2014 trade with Syria and in other border cities is linked closely to Syrian firms there.

Nevertheless, life remains difficult for many refugees in Turkey as they try to adapt with language, yet another barrier. However, the resilience of Syrian workers and businesses and their legalization provides hope that Turkey may yet avoid a permanent refugee population and a persistent underclass. When peace comes, these links will undoubtedly serve both countries well. In the meantime, it would be useful to think about how the international community could support Syrian businesses in Turkey (as well as in their other countries of refuge). For example, the World Bank’s creative way of helping Syrian refugees by supporting local communities in Lebanon and Jordan could perhaps inspire similar programs for Syrian entrepreneurs and workers in need of new skills.

Authors

Omer Karasapan

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Mon, 26 Jan 2015 09:00:00 -0500Omer Karasapan
There are now some 9 million Syrian refugees and it is estimated that 5,000 additional refugees are created every day. Over 5 million Syrians reside in neighboring countries, principally Jordan (800,000), Lebanon (1.8 million) and Turkey (1.8 million). Europe and the West have been largely closed to these refugees with desperate boat journeys the stuff of daily news items. The crisis is not abating, and with 2 million refugees in Iraq the problem is expanding. What is clear is that many of these refugees are unlikely to be going home soon, if ever.
The vast majority of Turkey's Syrian refugees are not in camps but among the broader population; only 220,000 remain in camps. Turkey maintains its open border policy—most recently accepting some 160,000 Syrian Kurds from Kobani over a three-day period in October. Though rare, tensions between locals and Syrians do erupt occasionally, as low-skill wages are depressed, the cost of low-end housing increases, and Syrians get blamed for the increase in crime. These issues need to be addressed, and addressed in the context of the real challenge—avoiding a permanent refugee population that turns into an underclass.
As noted by Kemal Kirisci and Raj Salooja in Foreign Affairs, “the Syrians in Turkey are no longer refugees waiting for the war to end but…immigrants ready to write a new chapter in their lives.” Following four years of temporary protection under the nebulous designation “guests,” refugees are now receiving identification cards granting them access to basic services like preventive health care and education. This stops short of official refugee status, which includes more rights, but is still a significant move in the right direction. Moreover, a proposal to regulate working conditions was submitted to the Council of Ministers, allowing Syrians to apply for work permits with their ID cards.
In the meantime, a burgeoning Syrian business community is emerging. Many are in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Urfa—cities bordering Syria. There are also fairly large Syrian middle-class communities in cities like Mersin, 300 kilometers from Syria. There, over 50,000 Syrians have established Syrian schools, hundreds of businesses, and other reminders of home. The old Istanbul neighborhood of Aksaray boasts a “Kucuk Halep” (small Aleppo) with Syrian restaurants, bookstores, movie houses and other businesses. Similar areas can be found in other urban centers.
In 2013, Syrians established 489 of the 3,875 foreign-owned firms out of the 49,000 firms established in Turkey. That number grew to 1,122 in 2014 when Syrians accounted for 26 percent of the 4,249 foreign firms out of a total of 54,000 established in 2014. A larger influx is expected in 2015 as Syrians use their new status to establish more businesses or formalize them. Many other firms operate informally while some use Turkish partners of convenience. Many also employ Syrian workers. Turkish officials are looking at special arrangements for Syrians to work in Syrian firms. The Syria Trade Office, a Mersin consultancy, estimates that some $10 billion in Syrian capital has entered Turkey since 2011.
Turkey's links with Syria were growing rapidly before 2011 and the subsequent civil war. The removal of visa barriers in 2009-2010 between Turkey and Jordan, Lebanon and Syria led to economic agreements and activities promising much greater economic cooperation. The World Bank noted the potential of regional economic integration through two recent reports, one by Sibel Kulaksiz, et al. and the other by Elena Ianchovichina and Maros Ivanic. The war abruptly slowed this growth in trade, which was expected to go from $2.3 billion annually in 2010 to $5 billion by 2014. Also coming to an end at that time was the deepening in trade that had just begun.
Yet, the visa-free area has continued to expand as Turkey and Iraq lifted visa requirements in 2014. Iraqis are now the ...
There are now some 9 million Syrian refugees and it is estimated that 5,000 additional refugees are created every day. Over 5 million Syrians reside in neighboring countries, principally Jordan (800,000), Lebanon (1.8 million)

There are now some 9 million Syrian refugees and it is estimated that 5,000 additional refugees are created every day. Over 5 million Syrians reside in neighboring countries, principally Jordan (800,000), Lebanon (1.8 million) and Turkey (1.8 million). Europe and the West have been largely closed to these refugees with desperate boat journeys the stuff of daily news items. The crisis is not abating, and with 2 million refugees in Iraq the problem is expanding. What is clear is that many of these refugees are unlikely to be going home soon, if ever.

The vast majority of Turkey’s Syrian refugees are not in camps but among the broader population; only 220,000 remain in camps. Turkey maintains its open border policy—most recently accepting some 160,000 Syrian Kurds from Kobani over a three-day period in October. Though rare, tensions between locals and Syrians do erupt occasionally, as low-skill wages are depressed, the cost of low-end housing increases, and Syrians get blamed for the increase in crime. These issues need to be addressed, and addressed in the context of the real challenge—avoiding a permanent refugee population that turns into an underclass.

As noted by Kemal Kirisci and Raj Salooja in Foreign Affairs, “the Syrians in Turkey are no longer refugees waiting for the war to end but…immigrants ready to write a new chapter in their lives.” Following four years of temporary protection under the nebulous designation “guests,” refugees are now receiving identification cards granting them access to basic services like preventive health care and education. This stops short of official refugee status, which includes more rights, but is still a significant move in the right direction. Moreover, a proposal to regulate working conditions was submitted to the Council of Ministers, allowing Syrians to apply for work permits with their ID cards.

In the meantime, a burgeoning Syrian business community is emerging. Many are in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Urfa—cities bordering Syria. There are also fairly large Syrian middle-class communities in cities like Mersin, 300 kilometers from Syria. There, over 50,000 Syrians have established Syrian schools, hundreds of businesses, and other reminders of home. The old Istanbul neighborhood of Aksaray boasts a “Kucuk Halep” (small Aleppo) with Syrian restaurants, bookstores, movie houses and other businesses. Similar areas can be found in other urban centers.

In 2013, Syrians established 489 of the 3,875 foreign-owned firms out of the 49,000 firms established in Turkey. That number grew to 1,122 in 2014 when Syrians accounted for 26 percent of the 4,249 foreign firms out of a total of 54,000 established in 2014. A larger influx is expected in 2015 as Syrians use their new status to establish more businesses or formalize them. Many other firms operate informally while some use Turkish partners of convenience. Many also employ Syrian workers. Turkish officials are looking at special arrangements for Syrians to work in Syrian firms. The Syria Trade Office, a Mersin consultancy, estimates that some $10 billion in Syrian capital has entered Turkey since 2011.

Turkey’s links with Syria were growing rapidly before 2011 and the subsequent civil war. The removal of visa barriers in 2009-2010 between Turkey and Jordan, Lebanon and Syria led to economic agreements and activities promising much greater economic cooperation. The World Bank noted the potential of regional economic integration through two recent reports, one by Sibel Kulaksiz, et al. and the other by Elena Ianchovichina and Maros Ivanic. The war abruptly slowed this growth in trade, which was expected to go from $2.3 billion annually in 2010 to $5 billion by 2014. Also coming to an end at that time was the deepening in trade that had just begun.

Yet, the visa-free area has continued to expand as Turkey and Iraq lifted visa requirements in 2014. Iraqis are now the fourth largest owners of newly established foreign firms in Turkey. Trade with both Iraq and Syria is expected to further increase in 2015. The recent rapprochement with Iraq and the re-opening of the Iraqi economy to Turkish firms (until recently largely concentrated in the Kurdish region) should help. In the meantime, while trade with Syria, now at its 2010 level, is recovering, its content is different, with a focus on basic foodstuffs, construction material, etc. It also remains a far cry from the consumer durables and capital goods that were expected to dominate prior to the war. Still, it underlines that trade continues and the growing number of Syrian firms are key to maintaining and even strengthening these ties. The over 330 percent increase in Mersin’s 2014 trade with Syria and in other border cities is linked closely to Syrian firms there.

Nevertheless, life remains difficult for many refugees in Turkey as they try to adapt with language, yet another barrier. However, the resilience of Syrian workers and businesses and their legalization provides hope that Turkey may yet avoid a permanent refugee population and a persistent underclass. When peace comes, these links will undoubtedly serve both countries well. In the meantime, it would be useful to think about how the international community could support Syrian businesses in Turkey (as well as in their other countries of refuge). For example, the World Bank’s creative way of helping Syrian refugees by supporting local communities in Lebanon and Jordan could perhaps inspire similar programs for Syrian entrepreneurs and workers in need of new skills.

Over the last few weeks, a number of prominent world leaders have called on Turkey.

Late in November, for example, Vice President Joe Biden was in Turkey to discuss cooperating against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. His visit was followed by that of Russian President Vladimir Putin. This month it was Frederica Mogherini’s turn, the European Union’s new foreign policy chief. Her visit coincided with ones by Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskite, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who also holds the presidency of the European Council.

Clearly, Turkey is in high demand, but which way will Turkey actually go: East or West. East represents a world with an emphasis on sovereign democracy, state capitalism, authoritarianism, populism and the rise of religiously driven nationalism, in contrast to a West traditionally associated with liberal democracy and markets predicated on the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. Here Putin’s Russia offers a good approximation of the East compared to the transatlantic community which represents the West. It will be important to sustain the pace of these visits from members of the transatlantic community and match them with deeds to revitalize Turkey’s relations with the West, especially economic ties.

It is no surprise that Turkey is in high demand. It sits in the midst of a neighborhood in a chronic state of upheaval. Across the Black Sea, Putin’s Russia has annexed Crimea and continues to destabilize eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia continues to perpetuate frozen conflicts of the post-Soviet space from Transnistria in Moldova to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

However, no challenge has been greater for Turkey than the instability in Iraq and Syria. Turkey is hosting a refugee population fast approaching two million and is far from seeing the moderate opposition gain the upper hand and replace Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Instead, the emergence of IS has further exacerbated the situation and led to Turkey being portrayed in Western media as both a key player in efforts to “degrade and ultimately defeat” IS as well as a spoiler of these efforts. The latter portrayal is often based in part on Turkey’s reluctance to support the Kurdish resistance to IS’s onslaught on the Kurdish town of Kobani located on the Syrian-Turkish border. Some have gone so far as to accuse Turkey of directly assisting IS.

The need to improve relations with Turkey and better coordinate the fight against IS brought Biden to Turkey. The visit came on the heels of deep policy differences between the U.S. and Turkey over how to deal with IS. The U.S. emphasized the immediate threat from IS and the need for Turkey to be more forthcoming in its support to defeat IS militarily. For his part, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insisted on the need to create no-fly zones along the Turkish border to increase pressure on al-Assad and bring about regime change.

These differences brought bilateral relations to a new low when Biden claimed publicly that Erdogan had privately recognized Turkey’s failed policies in Syria. This remark precipitated denials and calls for an apology from the Turkish side. Nevertheless, the threat from IS and the growing instability in the Middle East elicited a more pragmatic approach from both sides, as was captured by Biden when he stated, “We need Turkey. And I think Turkey believes that they need us, as well.” Time will tell whether his remarks will translate into action on the ground and if these two allies will be able to transcend their differences and achieve greater strategic cooperation.

Russian President Putin’s visit to Turkey occurred within a week of Biden’s departure, against the backdrop of Turkey minimizing its criticisms of Putin on Crimea and Ukraine. Such a response is very puzzling, particularly because “territorial integrity” has long been a sacrosanct principle of Turkish political culture. Turkish citizens have long been warned about conspiracies threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity and unity. Turkey’s silence is all the more puzzling considering that there is a large minority of Tatars in Crimea with close ethnic, historical and religious ties to Turkey. Much more conspicuously, in Syria, Russia and Turkey hold diametrically opposed policies: Putin has been unrelenting in his support for al-Assad, while Erdogan has been a virulent opponent and considers any attempts to compromise with him as amounting to treachery.

Turkey’s silence on Crimea is likely due in no small part to its massive dependence on Russian energy, especially natural gas. Prospects of Russian gas, coupled with Russia’s capacity to interrupt gas and petroleum flows through the South Caucasus, clearly weighs heavily on Turkey’s stance on Russia. Furthermore, Turkey runs a massive trade deficit with Russia and can only balance it partly with income from Russian tourism in Turkey and with Turkish companies doing business in Russia. Thus, maintaining good relations with Russia has become an economic sine quo non for Turkey.

There is much to be said about Putin’s leadership style and anti-Western rhetoric, which endears him to Erdogan and, to some extent, the Turkish public. One fascinating manifestation of this came at a previous meeting between the two leaders in St. Petersburg in November 2013. During a press conference, in response to a comment by Putin that “Turkey [had] great experience in EU talks,” Erdogan said, “You are right. Fifty years of experience is not easy. Allow us into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and save us from this trouble.”

Clearly, Putin has been clever in exploiting Turkey’s grievances. For example, following recent EU economic sanctions on Russia, Putin offered Erdogan the possibility of greater exports to Russia, allowing him to mitigate the impact of sanctions on consumer goods while simultaneously whetting the appetite of Turkish businesses that have lost markets in the Middle East. This has been accompanied by a promise to replace the cancelled South Stream natural gas pipeline project with an alternative one to carry gas to Europe via Turkey. As can be seen, then, Putin is trying to entice Turkey away from the West and increase its dependence on Russia.

It is against this backdrop that Mogherini’s visit becomes strategically important. Turkey’s problematic relations with the EU have been captured by a standstill in accession negotiations. Technically, for Turkish accession to be completed, 33 chapters representing the EU acquis, the corpus of EU laws and policies, have to be negotiated and closed. Croatia, which began accession negotiations together with Turkey in 2005, completed them in late 2011 and became a fully-fledged member of the EU in July of this year. In Turkey’s case, eight chapters were suspended in December 2006 by the EU while another nine chapters are being blocked by France, Cyprus, Germany and Austria. It was only last summer that the 14th chapter was finally opened for negotiations after stalling back in 2010.

However, the chaos surrounding Turkey is pushing both sides closer together. This fall, both sides expressed their will to revive relations. Ahead of her visit to Turkey, for instance, Mogherini emphasized the strategic importance of EU-Turkish relations while Johannes Kahn, the Commissioner for the EU’s Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement, stressed the EU’s determination to get accession negotiations with Turkey back on track. Similarly, an October 2014 EU document stated that, “active and credible accession negotiations provide the most suitable framework for exploiting the full potential of EU-Turkey relations.” A similar sentiment came from Ankara when Erdogan announced that 2014 would be the year in which the EU and Turkey committed to revive the accession process. Subsequently, Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator, Ambassador Volkan Bozkır, announced “Turkey’s New EU Strategy” in Brussels in September 2014, and detailed the measures to be taken to improve ties.

Economic factors and public opinion in Turkey are also favorably disposed for an improvement in relations with the European Union. Until 2013, Turkey’s economy maintained robust growth. Since then, however, it has encountered myriad challenges, including a general slowdown in emerging economies around the world and regional instabilty. Democratic regression and a weakening of the rule of law are also frequently cited as has having an adverse impact on the Turkish economy.

Closer relations with Russia are unlikely to remedy these problems. Turkey’s exports to the EU are almost tenfold of those to Russia and nearly 70 percent of Turkey’s foreign direct investment (FDI) comes from the EU. Mogherini’s visit comes at a time when public opinion in Turkey has begun to turn in EU’s favor. According to the 2014 Transatlantic Trends published by the German Marshall Fund, after consecutive years of decline since 2006, those among the Turkish public who looked at membership favorably increased by 8 percentage points to 53 percent from 2013 to 2014. The Turkish public senses that economic, political and strategic considerations make it quite clear that Turkey needs to re-anchor itself to the transatlantic community.

The EU and the U.S. need to reinforce this trend. Mogherini’s words should be matched with action. Thus, it is paramount that the EU opens a number of new chapters for negotiations. Turkey has expressed interest in the opening of at least three chapters calling for domestic political and economic reforms. While Turkish membership is not likely to happen anytime soon, maintaining a credible process is crucial. In the meantime, it is important to take up the World Bank’s recommendation to upgrade the customs union between the EU and Turkey. The customs union helped make Turkey the 6th largest trading partner of the EU and the 16th largest economy in the world. There is also the need for greater recognition from the EU that it benefits from economic relations with Turkey, especially at a time when the EU economy is still struggling to come out of recession and sanctions on Russia are adversely impacting exports.

The strategic value of Turkey’s EU ties continues to be of great importance, particularly in light of the heightened contest between the West and Russia and deep instability throughout the Middle East. In 1995, the U.S. played a key role in supporting the negotiation and signing of Turkey’s customs union with the EU as well as Turkey’s EU membership vocation as a means to deepening Turkey’s transatlantic relations.

The U.S. should reinvigorate these efforts. Additionally, the U.S. should explore the idea of enlarging the TTIP to include Turkey or sign a bilateral free trade agreement with Turkey. This would help re-anchor Turkey to the transatlantic community, enlarge the business community with a stake in liberal market values, make Turkey a net contributor to the transatlantic economy, help with employment creation, and increase strategic cooperation. In turn, stronger and deeper relations with the West would help revive Turkey’s democracy and economy, as well as its soft power in its neighborhood. This would not necessarily mean Turkey’s relations with the East would weaken. Relations with Russia could be maintained and even expanded but without making Turkey vulnerable to Russian influence. Similarly, in the Middle East Turkey could return to the days when it was hailed as a model for the region, economically as well as politically.

Authors

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Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:00:00 -0500Kemal Kirişci
Over the last few weeks, a number of prominent world leaders have called on Turkey.
Late in November, for example, Vice President Joe Biden was in Turkey to discuss cooperating against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. His visit was followed by that of Russian President Vladimir Putin. This month it was Frederica Mogherini's turn, the European Union's new foreign policy chief. Her visit coincided with ones by Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskite, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who also holds the presidency of the European Council.
Clearly, Turkey is in high demand, but which way will Turkey actually go: East or West. East represents a world with an emphasis on sovereign democracy, state capitalism, authoritarianism, populism and the rise of religiously driven nationalism, in contrast to a West traditionally associated with liberal democracy and markets predicated on the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. Here Putin's Russia offers a good approximation of the East compared to the transatlantic community which represents the West. It will be important to sustain the pace of these visits from members of the transatlantic community and match them with deeds to revitalize Turkey's relations with the West, especially economic ties.
It is no surprise that Turkey is in high demand. It sits in the midst of a neighborhood in a chronic state of upheaval. Across the Black Sea, Putin's Russia has annexed Crimea and continues to destabilize eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia continues to perpetuate frozen conflicts of the post-Soviet space from Transnistria in Moldova to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.
However, no challenge has been greater for Turkey than the instability in Iraq and Syria. Turkey is hosting a refugee population fast approaching two million and is far from seeing the moderate opposition gain the upper hand and replace Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Instead, the emergence of IS has further exacerbated the situation and led to Turkey being portrayed in Western media as both a key player in efforts to “degrade and ultimately defeat” IS as well as a spoiler of these efforts. The latter portrayal is often based in part on Turkey's reluctance to support the Kurdish resistance to IS's onslaught on the Kurdish town of Kobani located on the Syrian-Turkish border. Some have gone so far as to accuse Turkey of directly assisting IS.
The need to improve relations with Turkey and better coordinate the fight against IS brought Biden to Turkey. The visit came on the heels of deep policy differences between the U.S. and Turkey over how to deal with IS. The U.S. emphasized the immediate threat from IS and the need for Turkey to be more forthcoming in its support to defeat IS militarily. For his part, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insisted on the need to create no-fly zones along the Turkish border to increase pressure on al-Assad and bring about regime change.
These differences brought bilateral relations to a new low when Biden claimed publicly that Erdogan had privately recognized Turkey's failed policies in Syria. This remark precipitated denials and calls for an apology from the Turkish side. Nevertheless, the threat from IS and the growing instability in the Middle East elicited a more pragmatic approach from both sides, as was captured by Biden when he stated, “We need Turkey. And I think Turkey believes that they need us, as well.” Time will tell whether his remarks will translate into action on the ground and if these two allies will be able to transcend their differences and achieve greater strategic cooperation.
Russian President Putin's visit to Turkey occurred within a week of Biden's departure, against the backdrop of Turkey minimizing its criticisms of Putin on Crimea and Ukraine. Such a response is very puzzling, particularly because “territorial ...
Over the last few weeks, a number of prominent world leaders have called on Turkey.
Late in November, for example, Vice President Joe Biden was in Turkey to discuss cooperating against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria.

Over the last few weeks, a number of prominent world leaders have called on Turkey.

Late in November, for example, Vice President Joe Biden was in Turkey to discuss cooperating against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. His visit was followed by that of Russian President Vladimir Putin. This month it was Frederica Mogherini’s turn, the European Union’s new foreign policy chief. Her visit coincided with ones by Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskite, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who also holds the presidency of the European Council.

Clearly, Turkey is in high demand, but which way will Turkey actually go: East or West. East represents a world with an emphasis on sovereign democracy, state capitalism, authoritarianism, populism and the rise of religiously driven nationalism, in contrast to a West traditionally associated with liberal democracy and markets predicated on the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. Here Putin’s Russia offers a good approximation of the East compared to the transatlantic community which represents the West. It will be important to sustain the pace of these visits from members of the transatlantic community and match them with deeds to revitalize Turkey’s relations with the West, especially economic ties.

It is no surprise that Turkey is in high demand. It sits in the midst of a neighborhood in a chronic state of upheaval. Across the Black Sea, Putin’s Russia has annexed Crimea and continues to destabilize eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia continues to perpetuate frozen conflicts of the post-Soviet space from Transnistria in Moldova to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

However, no challenge has been greater for Turkey than the instability in Iraq and Syria. Turkey is hosting a refugee population fast approaching two million and is far from seeing the moderate opposition gain the upper hand and replace Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Instead, the emergence of IS has further exacerbated the situation and led to Turkey being portrayed in Western media as both a key player in efforts to “degrade and ultimately defeat” IS as well as a spoiler of these efforts. The latter portrayal is often based in part on Turkey’s reluctance to support the Kurdish resistance to IS’s onslaught on the Kurdish town of Kobani located on the Syrian-Turkish border. Some have gone so far as to accuse Turkey of directly assisting IS.

The need to improve relations with Turkey and better coordinate the fight against IS brought Biden to Turkey. The visit came on the heels of deep policy differences between the U.S. and Turkey over how to deal with IS. The U.S. emphasized the immediate threat from IS and the need for Turkey to be more forthcoming in its support to defeat IS militarily. For his part, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insisted on the need to create no-fly zones along the Turkish border to increase pressure on al-Assad and bring about regime change.

These differences brought bilateral relations to a new low when Biden claimed publicly that Erdogan had privately recognized Turkey’s failed policies in Syria. This remark precipitated denials and calls for an apology from the Turkish side. Nevertheless, the threat from IS and the growing instability in the Middle East elicited a more pragmatic approach from both sides, as was captured by Biden when he stated, “We need Turkey. And I think Turkey believes that they need us, as well.” Time will tell whether his remarks will translate into action on the ground and if these two allies will be able to transcend their differences and achieve greater strategic cooperation.

Russian President Putin’s visit to Turkey occurred within a week of Biden’s departure, against the backdrop of Turkey minimizing its criticisms of Putin on Crimea and Ukraine. Such a response is very puzzling, particularly because “territorial integrity” has long been a sacrosanct principle of Turkish political culture. Turkish citizens have long been warned about conspiracies threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity and unity. Turkey’s silence is all the more puzzling considering that there is a large minority of Tatars in Crimea with close ethnic, historical and religious ties to Turkey. Much more conspicuously, in Syria, Russia and Turkey hold diametrically opposed policies: Putin has been unrelenting in his support for al-Assad, while Erdogan has been a virulent opponent and considers any attempts to compromise with him as amounting to treachery.

Turkey’s silence on Crimea is likely due in no small part to its massive dependence on Russian energy, especially natural gas. Prospects of Russian gas, coupled with Russia’s capacity to interrupt gas and petroleum flows through the South Caucasus, clearly weighs heavily on Turkey’s stance on Russia. Furthermore, Turkey runs a massive trade deficit with Russia and can only balance it partly with income from Russian tourism in Turkey and with Turkish companies doing business in Russia. Thus, maintaining good relations with Russia has become an economic sine quo non for Turkey.

There is much to be said about Putin’s leadership style and anti-Western rhetoric, which endears him to Erdogan and, to some extent, the Turkish public. One fascinating manifestation of this came at a previous meeting between the two leaders in St. Petersburg in November 2013. During a press conference, in response to a comment by Putin that “Turkey [had] great experience in EU talks,” Erdogan said, “You are right. Fifty years of experience is not easy. Allow us into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and save us from this trouble.”

Clearly, Putin has been clever in exploiting Turkey’s grievances. For example, following recent EU economic sanctions on Russia, Putin offered Erdogan the possibility of greater exports to Russia, allowing him to mitigate the impact of sanctions on consumer goods while simultaneously whetting the appetite of Turkish businesses that have lost markets in the Middle East. This has been accompanied by a promise to replace the cancelled South Stream natural gas pipeline project with an alternative one to carry gas to Europe via Turkey. As can be seen, then, Putin is trying to entice Turkey away from the West and increase its dependence on Russia.

It is against this backdrop that Mogherini’s visit becomes strategically important. Turkey’s problematic relations with the EU have been captured by a standstill in accession negotiations. Technically, for Turkish accession to be completed, 33 chapters representing the EU acquis, the corpus of EU laws and policies, have to be negotiated and closed. Croatia, which began accession negotiations together with Turkey in 2005, completed them in late 2011 and became a fully-fledged member of the EU in July of this year. In Turkey’s case, eight chapters were suspended in December 2006 by the EU while another nine chapters are being blocked by France, Cyprus, Germany and Austria. It was only last summer that the 14th chapter was finally opened for negotiations after stalling back in 2010.

However, the chaos surrounding Turkey is pushing both sides closer together. This fall, both sides expressed their will to revive relations. Ahead of her visit to Turkey, for instance, Mogherini emphasized the strategic importance of EU-Turkish relations while Johannes Kahn, the Commissioner for the EU’s Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement, stressed the EU’s determination to get accession negotiations with Turkey back on track. Similarly, an October 2014 EU document stated that, “active and credible accession negotiations provide the most suitable framework for exploiting the full potential of EU-Turkey relations.” A similar sentiment came from Ankara when Erdogan announced that 2014 would be the year in which the EU and Turkey committed to revive the accession process. Subsequently, Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator, Ambassador Volkan Bozkır, announced “Turkey’s New EU Strategy” in Brussels in September 2014, and detailed the measures to be taken to improve ties.

Economic factors and public opinion in Turkey are also favorably disposed for an improvement in relations with the European Union. Until 2013, Turkey’s economy maintained robust growth. Since then, however, it has encountered myriad challenges, including a general slowdown in emerging economies around the world and regional instabilty. Democratic regression and a weakening of the rule of law are also frequently cited as has having an adverse impact on the Turkish economy.

Closer relations with Russia are unlikely to remedy these problems. Turkey’s exports to the EU are almost tenfold of those to Russia and nearly 70 percent of Turkey’s foreign direct investment (FDI) comes from the EU. Mogherini’s visit comes at a time when public opinion in Turkey has begun to turn in EU’s favor. According to the 2014 Transatlantic Trends published by the German Marshall Fund, after consecutive years of decline since 2006, those among the Turkish public who looked at membership favorably increased by 8 percentage points to 53 percent from 2013 to 2014. The Turkish public senses that economic, political and strategic considerations make it quite clear that Turkey needs to re-anchor itself to the transatlantic community.

The EU and the U.S. need to reinforce this trend. Mogherini’s words should be matched with action. Thus, it is paramount that the EU opens a number of new chapters for negotiations. Turkey has expressed interest in the opening of at least three chapters calling for domestic political and economic reforms. While Turkish membership is not likely to happen anytime soon, maintaining a credible process is crucial. In the meantime, it is important to take up the World Bank’s recommendation to upgrade the customs union between the EU and Turkey. The customs union helped make Turkey the 6th largest trading partner of the EU and the 16th largest economy in the world. There is also the need for greater recognition from the EU that it benefits from economic relations with Turkey, especially at a time when the EU economy is still struggling to come out of recession and sanctions on Russia are adversely impacting exports.

The strategic value of Turkey’s EU ties continues to be of great importance, particularly in light of the heightened contest between the West and Russia and deep instability throughout the Middle East. In 1995, the U.S. played a key role in supporting the negotiation and signing of Turkey’s customs union with the EU as well as Turkey’s EU membership vocation as a means to deepening Turkey’s transatlantic relations.

The U.S. should reinvigorate these efforts. Additionally, the U.S. should explore the idea of enlarging the TTIP to include Turkey or sign a bilateral free trade agreement with Turkey. This would help re-anchor Turkey to the transatlantic community, enlarge the business community with a stake in liberal market values, make Turkey a net contributor to the transatlantic economy, help with employment creation, and increase strategic cooperation. In turn, stronger and deeper relations with the West would help revive Turkey’s democracy and economy, as well as its soft power in its neighborhood. This would not necessarily mean Turkey’s relations with the East would weaken. Relations with Russia could be maintained and even expanded but without making Turkey vulnerable to Russian influence. Similarly, in the Middle East Turkey could return to the days when it was hailed as a model for the region, economically as well as politically.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/12-putin-turkey-india-gambit-hill?rssid=turkey{3F9DC711-3019-4465-A4FE-6BF2924281FB}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80783874/0/brookingsrss/topics/turkey~Putin%e2%80%99s-Turkish-and-Indian-GambitsPutin’s Turkish and Indian Gambits

In the first two weeks of December, Russian President Vladimir Putin made two quick trips to Turkey (December 1) and India (December 10 to 11) to sign a number of trade deals. As Clifford Gaddy and I underscore in the new expanded version of our 2013 book, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Brookings, February 2015), this is all part of a carefully crafted foreign policy agenda. Putin’s agenda also happens to mesh neatly with those of his counterparts in Turkey and India.

The agenda stems from Putin’s long-standing concerns about the Russian economy that pre-date Western sanctions on Moscow after Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea. When Putin announced he would return to the Russian presidency in September 2011, Russia’s economy was already at risk. In the summer of 2011, his economic experts were full of bad news about spillover from the ongoing eurozone crisis. Putin concluded he would need to shift his economic policy to put less emphasis on growth and more on survival. Once he was back in the Kremlin, he moved to ensure that Russia (and his regime) could withstand economic shocks.

Putin encouraged the development of domestically-produced goods to replace imports, promoted large state-financed infrastructure and defense projects, and pushed for the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union to create a protectionist regional buffer around the Russian economy. He also set out to make sure he had plenty of economic alternatives outside Europe, in case his European trading partners continued on their downward spiral––or just in case Moscow’s relations with any of them soured. He perhaps did not anticipate, back in 2011-2012, that his push for the Eurasian Union would lead to a clash with the EU, a proxy war in Ukraine’s eastern regions, and an open rift with Russia’s most important European partner, Germany, but Vladimir Putin always plans for contingencies and keeps his options open.

Working Around Sanctions

U.S. and E.U. sanctions have inflicted considerable damage on the Russian economy in 2014, but they have not yet persuaded Putin to change course in Ukraine. In part this is because Putin is still betting he can work around the sanctions by associating with countries that want to dilute the political influence and economic leverage of the United States. Putin has long prioritized presidential visits and trade deals that revitalize old Soviet connections in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Now he is nurturing relationships with leaders like Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan of Turkey and Narendra Modi of India who see themselves as major regional players.

In selecting countries and leaders to engage with, Putin is almost always guided by Russia’s economic interests––targeting states with industries that link to the production chains of key Russian economic sectors, or the home countries of international companies operating in Russia’s energy and manufacturing sectors that produce massive tax revenues and/or large numbers of Russian jobs. Putin has put particular emphasis on China and other members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping, who have common economic interests and a degree of antipathy toward the United States. Most importantly, from Putin’s perspective, Russia’s “fellow” BRICS are all outside the Euro-Atlantic system.

Putin’s efforts to embrace the BRICS paid off when Russia was axed from the G8 in March 2014 just after the annexation of Crimea. Putin was due to host the G8 meeting in Sochi to top off his successful Winter Olympics. When the G7 leaders decamped to Brussels instead, he countered their move by launching a six-day tour of Latin America after the BRICS summit and 2014 World Cup final in Brazil.

Targeting Turkey

Unlike India, Turkey is not a member of the BRICS. But it is an important regional player that considers itself independent, in spite of its links to European-Atlantic institutions. Ever the operative, Putin sees Turkey as a valuable asset in dealing with two of his main adversaries in the Ukraine standoff, NATO and the EU. In the case of NATO, Turkey’s value is clear. Turkey is a full member of NATO. Putin will have a “friend” inside the enemy camp. The EU connection is different. Despite years of waiting in the wings, Turkey has not been accepted into the EU, and it has grown more and more frustrated at its lack of progress. Turkey is already a headache for the EU. The country’s move towards Russia is not likely to make things better. If that happens, Putin—who is a master of tapping into others’ discontent and desires for alternatives—will be delighted.

Putin’s Turkish business deals send another important signal to Germany and EU countries that became significant trading partners with Russia in the 1990s and 2000s. Putin and Erdoǧan differ, very strongly, on how to deal with Assad and the civil war in Syria, and Turkey has its own historic equities in Crimea and Ukraine. But Putin put political differences and geopolitics aside in his trip to Turkey. His visit was all about business. Putin’s message to Europe was: disagreements don’t have to get in the way. It is possible to do business even if you are at odds on Syria, or Crimea and Ukraine!

Putin also surprised the EU, in Turkey, by jettisoning Russian energy giant Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline, which was planned to bring gas to Europe across the Black Sea and up through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to Italy. This was done in the manner of a gambit in a chess game: Putin offered up a tactical sacrifice (South Stream) in order to avoid a strategic defeat (the potential loss of Russia’s dominant position in Europe’s gas market). South Stream had become too expensive financially and politically. Sanctions and falling energy prices were reducing Gazprom’s disposable cash and cutting off future loans; and Gazprom’s primary international commercial partner, the Italian energy company ENI, had balked at the idea of footing more of the bill. The EU was also blocking the pipeline construction in Bulgaria, and putting pressure on the other states to reconsider their participation. The game was up on South Stream, and in Putin’s view, it was better to make the tactical sacrifice, in spite of all the sunk costs, and look elsewhere for advantage.

In Turkey, Russia already has a gas export pipeline in place that can be expanded; and Turkey, itself, has aspirations to become a major energy trading hub between Europe and the Middle East. Turkey’s ambitions and existing infrastructure could eventually allow Putin to bring more Russian gas into Europe through the back door. Turkey’s gas transit corridor might not be as desirable for Putin as Russia’s own pipeline across the Black Sea, but it will get the job done.

The Turks are willing players in this particular game, and just like the Indians––who want to cut out middlemen in Europe and the Middle East to buy rough diamonds directly from Russia for India’s massive diamond cutting and polishing industry. Modi and Erdoǧan are not just pieces that Putin is moving around a geo-economic chess board. They have their own gambits to play.

Diamonds may not be forever, and their prices fluctuate just like those of oil and gas, but there is a great deal of mutual benefit for India and Turkey in creating their own commodity hubs based on Russian raw materials. With moves like this, with ready partners in different arenas, Putin intends and hopes to stay at least one step ahead of the West and U.S. and European sanctions in the ongoing struggle over Ukraine.

Authors

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Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:09:00 -0500Fiona Hill
In the first two weeks of December, Russian President Vladimir Putin made two quick trips to Turkey (December 1) and India (December 10 to 11) to sign a number of trade deals. As Clifford Gaddy and I underscore in the new expanded version of our 2013 book, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Brookings, February 2015), this is all part of a carefully crafted foreign policy agenda. Putin's agenda also happens to mesh neatly with those of his counterparts in Turkey and India.
The agenda stems from Putin's long-standing concerns about the Russian economy that pre-date Western sanctions on Moscow after Russia's March 2014 annexation of Crimea. When Putin announced he would return to the Russian presidency in September 2011, Russia's economy was already at risk. In the summer of 2011, his economic experts were full of bad news about spillover from the ongoing eurozone crisis. Putin concluded he would need to shift his economic policy to put less emphasis on growth and more on survival. Once he was back in the Kremlin, he moved to ensure that Russia (and his regime) could withstand economic shocks.
Putin encouraged the development of domestically-produced goods to replace imports, promoted large state-financed infrastructure and defense projects, and pushed for the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union to create a protectionist regional buffer around the Russian economy. He also set out to make sure he had plenty of economic alternatives outside Europe, in case his European trading partners continued on their downward spiral––or just in case Moscow's relations with any of them soured. He perhaps did not anticipate, back in 2011-2012, that his push for the Eurasian Union would lead to a clash with the EU, a proxy war in Ukraine's eastern regions, and an open rift with Russia's most important European partner, Germany, but Vladimir Putin always plans for contingencies and keeps his options open.
Working Around Sanctions
U.S. and E.U. sanctions have inflicted considerable damage on the Russian economy in 2014, but they have not yet persuaded Putin to change course in Ukraine. In part this is because Putin is still betting he can work around the sanctions by associating with countries that want to dilute the political influence and economic leverage of the United States. Putin has long prioritized presidential visits and trade deals that revitalize old Soviet connections in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Now he is nurturing relationships with leaders like Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan of Turkey and Narendra Modi of India who see themselves as major regional players.
In selecting countries and leaders to engage with, Putin is almost always guided by Russia's economic interests––targeting states with industries that link to the production chains of key Russian economic sectors, or the home countries of international companies operating in Russia's energy and manufacturing sectors that produce massive tax revenues and/or large numbers of Russian jobs. Putin has put particular emphasis on China and other members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping, who have common economic interests and a degree of antipathy toward the United States. Most importantly, from Putin's perspective, Russia's “fellow” BRICS are all outside the Euro-Atlantic system.
Putin's efforts to embrace the BRICS paid off when Russia was axed from the G8 in March 2014 just after the annexation of Crimea. Putin was due to host the G8 meeting in Sochi to top off his successful Winter Olympics. When the G7 leaders decamped to Brussels instead, he countered their move by launching a six-day tour of Latin America after the BRICS summit and 2014 World Cup final in Brazil.
Targeting Turkey
Unlike India, Turkey is not a member of the BRICS. But it is an important regional player that considers itself independent, in spite of its links to European-Atlantic institutions. ...
In the first two weeks of December, Russian President Vladimir Putin made two quick trips to Turkey (December 1) and India (December 10 to 11) to sign a number of trade deals. As Clifford Gaddy and I underscore in the new expanded version of our ...

In the first two weeks of December, Russian President Vladimir Putin made two quick trips to Turkey (December 1) and India (December 10 to 11) to sign a number of trade deals. As Clifford Gaddy and I underscore in the new expanded version of our 2013 book, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Brookings, February 2015), this is all part of a carefully crafted foreign policy agenda. Putin’s agenda also happens to mesh neatly with those of his counterparts in Turkey and India.

The agenda stems from Putin’s long-standing concerns about the Russian economy that pre-date Western sanctions on Moscow after Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea. When Putin announced he would return to the Russian presidency in September 2011, Russia’s economy was already at risk. In the summer of 2011, his economic experts were full of bad news about spillover from the ongoing eurozone crisis. Putin concluded he would need to shift his economic policy to put less emphasis on growth and more on survival. Once he was back in the Kremlin, he moved to ensure that Russia (and his regime) could withstand economic shocks.

Putin encouraged the development of domestically-produced goods to replace imports, promoted large state-financed infrastructure and defense projects, and pushed for the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union to create a protectionist regional buffer around the Russian economy. He also set out to make sure he had plenty of economic alternatives outside Europe, in case his European trading partners continued on their downward spiral––or just in case Moscow’s relations with any of them soured. He perhaps did not anticipate, back in 2011-2012, that his push for the Eurasian Union would lead to a clash with the EU, a proxy war in Ukraine’s eastern regions, and an open rift with Russia’s most important European partner, Germany, but Vladimir Putin always plans for contingencies and keeps his options open.

Working Around Sanctions

U.S. and E.U. sanctions have inflicted considerable damage on the Russian economy in 2014, but they have not yet persuaded Putin to change course in Ukraine. In part this is because Putin is still betting he can work around the sanctions by associating with countries that want to dilute the political influence and economic leverage of the United States. Putin has long prioritized presidential visits and trade deals that revitalize old Soviet connections in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Now he is nurturing relationships with leaders like Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan of Turkey and Narendra Modi of India who see themselves as major regional players.

In selecting countries and leaders to engage with, Putin is almost always guided by Russia’s economic interests––targeting states with industries that link to the production chains of key Russian economic sectors, or the home countries of international companies operating in Russia’s energy and manufacturing sectors that produce massive tax revenues and/or large numbers of Russian jobs. Putin has put particular emphasis on China and other members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping, who have common economic interests and a degree of antipathy toward the United States. Most importantly, from Putin’s perspective, Russia’s “fellow” BRICS are all outside the Euro-Atlantic system.

Putin’s efforts to embrace the BRICS paid off when Russia was axed from the G8 in March 2014 just after the annexation of Crimea. Putin was due to host the G8 meeting in Sochi to top off his successful Winter Olympics. When the G7 leaders decamped to Brussels instead, he countered their move by launching a six-day tour of Latin America after the BRICS summit and 2014 World Cup final in Brazil.

Targeting Turkey

Unlike India, Turkey is not a member of the BRICS. But it is an important regional player that considers itself independent, in spite of its links to European-Atlantic institutions. Ever the operative, Putin sees Turkey as a valuable asset in dealing with two of his main adversaries in the Ukraine standoff, NATO and the EU. In the case of NATO, Turkey’s value is clear. Turkey is a full member of NATO. Putin will have a “friend” inside the enemy camp. The EU connection is different. Despite years of waiting in the wings, Turkey has not been accepted into the EU, and it has grown more and more frustrated at its lack of progress. Turkey is already a headache for the EU. The country’s move towards Russia is not likely to make things better. If that happens, Putin—who is a master of tapping into others’ discontent and desires for alternatives—will be delighted.

Putin’s Turkish business deals send another important signal to Germany and EU countries that became significant trading partners with Russia in the 1990s and 2000s. Putin and Erdoǧan differ, very strongly, on how to deal with Assad and the civil war in Syria, and Turkey has its own historic equities in Crimea and Ukraine. But Putin put political differences and geopolitics aside in his trip to Turkey. His visit was all about business. Putin’s message to Europe was: disagreements don’t have to get in the way. It is possible to do business even if you are at odds on Syria, or Crimea and Ukraine!

Putin also surprised the EU, in Turkey, by jettisoning Russian energy giant Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline, which was planned to bring gas to Europe across the Black Sea and up through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to Italy. This was done in the manner of a gambit in a chess game: Putin offered up a tactical sacrifice (South Stream) in order to avoid a strategic defeat (the potential loss of Russia’s dominant position in Europe’s gas market). South Stream had become too expensive financially and politically. Sanctions and falling energy prices were reducing Gazprom’s disposable cash and cutting off future loans; and Gazprom’s primary international commercial partner, the Italian energy company ENI, had balked at the idea of footing more of the bill. The EU was also blocking the pipeline construction in Bulgaria, and putting pressure on the other states to reconsider their participation. The game was up on South Stream, and in Putin’s view, it was better to make the tactical sacrifice, in spite of all the sunk costs, and look elsewhere for advantage.

In Turkey, Russia already has a gas export pipeline in place that can be expanded; and Turkey, itself, has aspirations to become a major energy trading hub between Europe and the Middle East. Turkey’s ambitions and existing infrastructure could eventually allow Putin to bring more Russian gas into Europe through the back door. Turkey’s gas transit corridor might not be as desirable for Putin as Russia’s own pipeline across the Black Sea, but it will get the job done.

The Turks are willing players in this particular game, and just like the Indians––who want to cut out middlemen in Europe and the Middle East to buy rough diamonds directly from Russia for India’s massive diamond cutting and polishing industry. Modi and Erdoǧan are not just pieces that Putin is moving around a geo-economic chess board. They have their own gambits to play.

Diamonds may not be forever, and their prices fluctuate just like those of oil and gas, but there is a great deal of mutual benefit for India and Turkey in creating their own commodity hubs based on Russian raw materials. With moves like this, with ready partners in different arenas, Putin intends and hopes to stay at least one step ahead of the West and U.S. and European sanctions in the ongoing struggle over Ukraine.

We were in Istanbul, Turkey recently to launch a new collaboration with the Knowledge Society Institute. It is a nongovernmental organization established to accelerate Turkey’s transformation into a knowledge society. The goal is for the Institute to become a hub for innovation, a meeting platform for key stakeholders, and a place to share knowledge.

This technology policy partnership with the Brookings Center for Technology Innovation is the first of its kind in Turkey. In the coming months, we plan to work with the Knowledge Society Institute on a variety of topics, such as mEducation, mHealth, smart cities, and wearable devices. These subjects represent areas that are rapidly growing and we want to bring the latest research on consumer trends from around the globe.

We view this collaboration as a way to promote long-term innovation and economic growth in each country. Information and communications technology helps to break down regional and economic disparities and brings the benefits of digital technology to millions of people. It also has significant economic benefits. A World Bank study of 120 nations between 1980 and 2006 found that a ten point increase in broadband penetration was associated with a 1.3 percent increase in gross domestic product.

Phones, tablets, and mobile devices are key to economic development and long-term prosperity. Usage levels are skyrocketing. By 2016, it is estimated that mobile devices will account for 80 percent of the broadband connections. According to GSMA Wireless Intelligence, there are currently 3.9 billion mobile subscribers using 7.4 billion devices.

The mobile economy will likely continue to expand at a rapid pace. We are in the midst of a mobile revolution that will transform the lives of people everywhere. These devices provide opportunities for millions to connect to new developments in education, health care, and smart cities. This is a collaboration that we believe will yield great dividends for Turkey and the United States in the time to come.

We were in Istanbul, Turkey recently to launch a new collaboration with the Knowledge Society Institute. It is a nongovernmental organization established to accelerate Turkey’s transformation into a knowledge society. The goal is for the Institute to become a hub for innovation, a meeting platform for key stakeholders, and a place to share knowledge.

This technology policy partnership with the Brookings Center for Technology Innovation is the first of its kind in Turkey. In the coming months, we plan to work with the Knowledge Society Institute on a variety of topics, such as mEducation, mHealth, smart cities, and wearable devices. These subjects represent areas that are rapidly growing and we want to bring the latest research on consumer trends from around the globe.

We view this collaboration as a way to promote long-term innovation and economic growth in each country. Information and communications technology helps to break down regional and economic disparities and brings the benefits of digital technology to millions of people. It also has significant economic benefits. A World Bank study of 120 nations between 1980 and 2006 found that a ten point increase in broadband penetration was associated with a 1.3 percent increase in gross domestic product.

Phones, tablets, and mobile devices are key to economic development and long-term prosperity. Usage levels are skyrocketing. By 2016, it is estimated that mobile devices will account for 80 percent of the broadband connections. According to GSMA Wireless Intelligence, there are currently 3.9 billion mobile subscribers using 7.4 billion devices.

The mobile economy will likely continue to expand at a rapid pace. We are in the midst of a mobile revolution that will transform the lives of people everywhere. These devices provide opportunities for millions to connect to new developments in education, health care, and smart cities. This is a collaboration that we believe will yield great dividends for Turkey and the United States in the time to come.