Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18998

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DC Field

Value

Language

dc.contributor.author

Konrad, Kai A.

en_US

dc.contributor.author

Skaperdas, Stergios

en_US

dc.date.accessioned

2009-01-28T15:54:21Z

-

dc.date.available

2009-01-28T15:54:21Z

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dc.date.issued

2005

en_US

dc.identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18998

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dc.description.abstract

Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order topreempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect thepower of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possiblesuccession struggles. We compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regimeand the divide-et-impera regime which differ with respect to the role of supporters of theprevious leader once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supportersreceive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters have to fightharder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. A leader, then, would like to inducethe divide-et-impera regime even when every supporter has veto power over his leadership.