This rather short book - in fact 275 pages are 1.5-spaced with large margins and in 11-point font[[1]] - is a compelling treatment of what is termed as "Socratic intellectualism". Apart from Acknowledgments, Introduction, Bibliography[[2]], Index of passages and General index the book is composed of seven chapters and an Appendix. As it is supposed to be "a complete re-evaluation of Socrates' moral psychology" (132), the book is to a large extent polemical. In the Acknowledgment and in the Introduction we are explicitly told that the main target of the book's criticism are Mark McPherran's and Terry Penner's positions as well as those of Daniel Devereux, though in a somewhat different manner. Its novelty lies in taking desires and appetites, absent from the standard interpretation, into account as factors in human motivation.

The Introduction presents a distinction between the two senses of "Socratic intellectualism" (virtue versus motivational intellectualism) as well as an overview of the status quaestionis. According to Brickhouse and Smith (hereafter B&S), until the publication of Devereux's paper in 1995 "every scholar" - a very strong claim indeed, and, I am afraid, a false one - , including B&S themselves, "working on Socrates" held "a mistaken picture of Socratic moral psychology". This mistaken view is identified as ""the standard intellectualist conception" of Socratic moral psychology" (5). B&S recognize Devereux's paper as a direct impulse to change their former view. Yet, they make a step further and depart from Devereux's position ("the view we defend in this book is [not] exactly the same as what Devereux first proposed [...]" (2)). B&S have been for a long time evolving in considering their position and Devereux's influence to end up thinking that "our view is now [...] importantly different from Devereux's" (2).

The first chapter is exactly what its title means: an Apology of Socratic studies. It can be, therefore, seen as an introduction to Socratic studies in general. The main purpose of the chapter is, on the negative side, to refute scepticism towards the philosophy of Socrates, as it is professed, among others, by Ch. Kahn, and, on the positive side, to defend the foundations of Socratic studies. The main argument consists in re-interpreting "a central aspect of the philosophy of Socrates" (11). First, B&S put forward the Identity Principle, according to which "Socrates is the same character, with essentially the same philosophical opinions, in each of a certain group of dialogues by Plato" (13). They are keen, however, on insisting that the principle makes no commitment as to whether or not the Platonic portrait of Socrates in any group of dialogues squares with the historical figure. Thus, relying on an assumption that in early Platonic dialogues there are philosophical views of one character, call him Socrates, B&S carry on their analysis of Socratic moral psychology. And by reversing this we can say that Socratic moral psychology can be reconstructed from early Platonic dialogues. This chapter in itself forms a separate entity and in my view the refutation of counterarguments - which include arguments against chronology, against historicity of Plato's dialogues and so on - is convincing.

With the second chapter, devoted to intellectualism understood as motivational ("all human actions are in some way directly or immediately the result of what those acting think is best for them" (1)), we come to the main topic of the book. On standard interpretation Socrates claimed that "no one desires bad things or neither good nor bad things", since only good things are conducive to human happiness. Whenever it seems that someone did desire bad things, this is only by way of being misled about his action or goal. Put plainly, "[b]ad actions are the products of cognitive errors" (49). Such interpretation is defective, since "there are conative psychic powers other than the rational desires" (51), for instance pleasures, pains and fears as well as anger, shame and pride, which play a role in the explanation of human behaviour. This role is not only an informational but also a causal one. A series of evidences is taken from the Apology. B&S argue also for "[t]he existence of very different kinds of desire" (52). This remark is fundamental but is, to my mind, obvious to any attentive reader of Plato's dialogues (occurrences such as desire for food vs desire for wisdom are too numerous not to be noticed).

In the next chapter (The "prudential paradox") B&S tackle the first of the two paradoxes attributed to Socrates. They attempt to explain how Socrates could have stated that "no one ever acts contrary to his knowledge of what is best for him" (63). After rightly observing that the attribution of the statement to Socrates goes back as far as Aristotle, B&S, here again, put the stress on two distinct kinds of desire: one nonrational, another one rational. The problem is that nonrational desires, when strong, can endanger human choice, but not the ethical knowledge itself, which "is incompatible with the possession of strong appetites or passions" (71). However, the necessary condition for the good choice is bound up not with having or not nonrational desires, but with possessing the craft of measurement, which "can make the appearances lose their power". B&S's main point is that ""the power of appearance" - which causes one to be mistaken about what is evil and good - "is tied up with the psychological agency of the appetites and passions" (71). Yet, one can have no strong appetites and passions and still be mistaken, when he is lacking the craft of measurement. All in all, there are four cases: of people with strong passions and either with or without the craft of measurement and of people without strong passions and either with or without the craft of measurement.

The fourth chapter deals with the moral paradox ("no one voluntarily does what is unjust" (63)). The question is how Socrates could have maintained that harming someone is more damaging - evil is to be taken in a prudential sense - than being harmed. B&S explain that this is so, because harming someone damages one's soul and the damage can be so great that there is no more possibility of repair. According to B&S the standard intellectualist view meets difficulties which on their new account are solved, because apart from cases of cognitive errors, viz. cases of simple ignorance which can be improved by philosophical dialogue, there are others which require court trial and punishment. These are non-cognitive errors resulting from "the satisfaction of some appetite or other nonrational potential (such as a passion) in the soul" (104). Such "unruly" appetites and passions are, according to B&S, considered by Socrates as a part of human condition and thereby can never be wholly eliminated.

There are, however, some ways of educating the appetites and passions. What a new interpretation of Socratic moral psychology means for Socratic education is the subject of chapter 5. Here again, consequently and consistently, passions and appetites are at stake. For example, Socrates' processes of humiliating and shaming his interlocutors "are not purely and simply intellectual ones" (137). It is rather by producing an unpleasant experience that Socrates hopes to change their beliefs. For this sake Socrates avails himself not only of irony, mockery and sarcasm but also of the myths he recounts. So, the final myth in the Gorgias is designed to impress Callicles by working on his fears, while from the purely intellectual point of view its meaning is pointless. As B&S claim, by resorting to myth, Socrates "shows some recognition of the emotional effect such stories can have on others", while "[t]hese emotional effects go unrecognized in the traditional account of Socratic intellectualism" (141-142).

The sixth chapter, which can be taken as a conclusion to the main part of the book, presents B&S's argument about the second form of intellectualism - virtue intellectualism - a position according to which any virtue is constituted by knowledge. We find there a series of arguments, of which the most developed concerns the Euthydemus. In the end, surprisingly, we are told that B&S "agree with the standard view that Socrates held the identity of virtue and knowledge" (192), and the only difference with the standard interpretation is that they acknowledge "that the virtuous person [has] his or her appetites and passions in the weak condition that results from discipline and self-control" (192).

Chapter 7 constitutes a kind of coda and it contrasts first Socrates' moral psychology with Plato's, then with Aristotle's, and, finally with the Stoic one. This is the longest chapter (more than 50 pages) and in itself it provides an impressive and useful panorama of Socratic influence on subsequent philosophers in Ancient times. First, we learn that "the Platonic account is actually quite different from the Socratic view" (195) because Plato accepted what Socrates denied, namely, the possibility of synchronic belief-akrasia, which occurs when appetites or passions lead someone to act in ways contrary to one's belief. Next, we are told that Aristotle actually sides with Socrates and against Plato "about the impossibility of synchronic belief-akrasia" (214), since he takes into account nonrational desires which can impede the power of reason. Yet, Aristotle acknowledges the distinction between an akrates person and one who is completely vicious. Finally, B&S claim that, all similarities and differences between Socrates' and the Stoics' moral psychology considered, the Stoics advocate for freedom "from all passions" (this view is more than questionable but cannot be discussed here[[3]]), while "Socrates can allow that even someone who possesses ethical virtue may for a moment feel anger at some perceived injustice [...]" (245).

The book ends with an Appendix on the genuinely Socratic character of the Gorgias, especially of its final myth, as well as on Socratic belief in the immortality of the soul.

On the whole, the book is doubtlessly a stimulating work to be read by anyone interested in Socrates' anthropology. When I look now at my copy, I see it full of notes - practically on each page - which I felt compelled to put down. It contains much more nuances, refinements and sharp remarks that I could have accounted for in this review. Yet, on the other hand, I find it rather disappointing in what concerns it main promise to deliver a new interpretation of Socratic moral psychology. As a matter of fact, the use by B&S of passions and appetites in explaining human activity applies, so to speak, only to actions, goals and behaviours when they are mistaken and negative. I must say, I am not sure how to understand the argument's novelty. We are told, it is true, that Socrates never suggests that "one would be better off without appetites or passions" (197), but what does it matter if the possession of knowledge "is a sufficient [sic!] condition for being in a disciplined condition" (192). I think that B&S stopped just half-way in their research, because nothing is said about the positive role of passions and appetites. The word emotions or affectivity should be here probably more adequate and one could ask how Socrates could have missed the fact that emotions are, in some cases, indispensable for constructing human knowledge. I can hardly believe Socrates to be so blind to the fact that, in some cases, affective intuition is essential for apprehending values. As it was shown, in my opinion convincingly, for instance by Krokiewicz (1950, 1960, 1971) speaking about "the "beautiful and good" cooperation of the emotions and of the will with the reason that is superior to them") and more recently by Dorter (1997) writing that: "oppositions among them [i.e. appetite, spiritedness and reason] disappear, and the soul is no longer tripartite"), emotions together with other faculties are crucial for ethical progress. I am personally of the same view and would gladly rule out the notion of Socratic (ethical) intellectualism altogether and speak about Socratic ethical integralism instead.

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[[1]] This, as well as a transparent structure and a neat presentation of arguments, with concluding remarks at the end of chapters, makes the book pleasant to read. Yet, the footnotes are in so a small character (7-point) that I needed a magnifying glass in order to be sure I read them correctly.

[[2]] Non–English secondary literature is nonexistent for B&S..

[[3]] One can be surprised that there is no mention of the Stoic notion of propatheia.

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