Army divided over Algeria’s future

Some 40 candidates are standing in the presidential election on 15 April. Several are backed by army factions. General Khaled Nezzar is publicly supporting Abdelaziz Bouteflika, while other officers are banking on an open election to provide the future head of state with legitimacy. On 12 February President Liamine Zeroual threatened to take all necessary measures “if attempts to pervert the course of this election continue.” This threat brought an immediate response from General Nezzar. The split in the army is understandable. The generals have won a military victory in the civil war but suffered a political defeat. Public support for the army, weakened by the economic crisis, has been further undermined by the extraordinary violence used to crush the Islamists. It is no coincidence that most of the candidates are advocating dialogue with all parties to the conflict. After more than 60,000 deaths, a political solution may finally be at hand. But if so, the army will have to allow the president to be freely elected and, once elected, allow him to exercise real power.

President Liamine Zeroual’s announcement last October that he was stepping down as head of state caught many observers on the hop. But although his decision was unexpected, it was not entirely unpredictable once his conflict with the army chief-of-staff, General Mohamed Lamari, had come out in the open. During the summer the newspapers had reported insults and threats on both sides. Public disagreement between the real power in the country - the army - and the official authorities - the president and government - led to the inevitable conclusion: the holder of formal power gave way to the real boss (1).

But Zeroual’s resignation, under pressure from General Lamari and the head of the all-powerful Military Security (SM), General Tewfik Mediene, paradoxically rebounded on the victors. It confirmed what the generals have always denied: since the death of President Houari Boumedienne in 1978 the army has acted as an institution above the presidency and withheld from the government the authority needed to run the country. Now groups close to the presidency are seeking greater freedom of movement vis-à-vis the army. And it is this which is giving rise to friction and conflict.

When Chadli Bendjedid became president in 1979 he immediately found himself competing with the colonels who had designated him as head of state (Kasdi Merbah, Ahmed Belhouchet and Mohammed Attailiah). He freed himself from their grasp only to fall under the control of the men he had promoted to the rank of general - those he was counting on to consolidate his constitutional position as supreme commander of the armed forces. Bendjedid managed to stay in office for 13 years (1979-1992) by showing no appetite for power and avoiding decisions that would antagonise one faction or other. But following the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 elections, his most faithful subordinates, Generals Larbi Belkeir and Khaled Nezzar, asked him to resign rather than risk (...)