Before
the court is Plaintiff and Counter Defendant's Brief as
to Court's Granting it Summary Judgment and the
Dispositive Effect on Defendant and Counter Plaintiffs
Counterclaims, filed December 26, 2001, and Defendant's
Motion and Brief Regarding the Effect of the Court's
December 4, 2001 Order, [1] filed December 21, 2001. After careful
consideration of the parties' briefs, the summary
judgment record, and the applicable law, the court
denies Defendant's Motion to Reconsider
and with respect to the court's request that the parties
submit briefs addressing whether its ruling of December 4,
2001 would defeat Defendant's counterclaims, the court
also grants summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims.

On
December 4, 2001, the court issued an order granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and declaring that
Plaintiff Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
("Nationwide") had fully satisfied its obligations
under David Haffley's automobile insurance policy as to
the judgment entered in favor of Defendant Judy Mae Chaney
("Chaney") against David Haffley
("Haffley") in the case styled, Judy Chaney and
Ray Chaney v. David Haffley, Cause Number 96-2192-B, the
124th District Court of Gregg County, Texas, and that it
therefore had no duty to indemnify or pay Chaney. Because it
appeared Nationwide contended that a judgment in its favor
would defeat Chaney's counterclaims against Nationwide
for conspiracy, tortious interference with prospective
business relations, fraudulent transfer, and turnover, the
court sua sponte raised the issue of whether summary
judgment was appropriate with respect to Chaney's
counterclaims and requested that the parties submit briefs
addressing this issue by no later than December 26, 2001.

II.
Summary Judgment Standard

Summary
judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323-25
(1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136
F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material
fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn
from the factual record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio,475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136
F.3d at 458.

Once
the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party
opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary
judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory
allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and
thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Eason v. Thaler,73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th
Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent
summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19
F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 513 U.S.
871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required
to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate
the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim.
Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a
duty on the court to "sift through the record in search
of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition
to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see
also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc.,953 F.2d 909,
915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 506 U.S.
832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues
which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be
considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion.
Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at
trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23.

III.
Analysis

Chaney
contends that none of the relief Nationwide sought in its
motion for summary judgment disposed of her counterclaims,
because the release entered into by Haffley and Nationwide
served as the basis of her claims. Chaney therefore maintains
that the court must conclude that the release is not a
fraudulent transfer as a matter of law in order to dispose of
her claims. If the court concludes the contrary, that the
release is invalid, Chaney contends she is entitled to a
turnover of Haffley's Stowers[3] cause of action.
The court disagrees.

After
judgment was entered in the Chaney suit, Nationwide tendered
to Chaney $32, 000, the amount remaining under Haffley's
insurance policy, along with postjudgment interest due on the
judgment as of the date of tender. In its motion for summary
judgment, Nationwide argued that its obligation to pay on the
judgment in the Chaney suit was limited to the terms
of the policy ($32, 000), which was satisfied when it paid
Chaney this amount. It therefore contended it had no further
liability and moved for summary judgment on the following
grounds: (1) Nationwide has no liability under the
Stowers doctrine, because Chaney's settlement
offer did not include a full release of claims against
Haffley; and (2) even if there was a Stowers claim
against Nationwide for its handling or defense of
Chaney's claims against Haffley, "Haffley released
Nationwide from any and all claims (including, but not
limited to those arising under the Stowers
doctrine)." In her response, Chaney argued that there
remained material issues of fact that precluded summary
judgment with respect to: (1) whether the release entered
into between Nationwide and Haffley was a fraudulent transfer
as to a judgment creditor under section 24.005 of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code; and (2) whether Nationwide
violated the Stowers doctrine. The court concluded
that Chaney's arguments were erroneous, because they were
based on the assumption that she was entitled to a claim that
belonged exclusively to Haffley and that absent assignment of
the claim, of which there was none here, she had no standing
to assert the claim. The court further determined that
Chaney's argument regarding her prejudgment demands
constituting an implied release of all claims against Haffley
were irrelevant because she did not have a right to pursue a
Stowers claims against Nationwide. Having further
considered the issues raised in the parties' briefs, the
summary judgment record, and the applicable law, the court
clarifies its previous order by holding that Nationwide never
had a Stowers duty to settle with Chaney. Thus,
Haffley had no Stowers claim he could assert against
Nationwide or assign to Chaney, voluntarily or involuntarily
by way of a turnover order.

To
impose a Stowers duty on an insurer, a settlement
demand must propose to release the insured fully in exchange
for a stated sum of money. American Physicians Ins. Exch.
v. Garcia,876 S.W.2d 842, 848-49 (Tex. 1994);
Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Bleeker, 966
S.W.2d489, 491 (Tex. 1998). When a hospital lien exists, a
release is not valid unless it complies with section
55.007(a) of the Texas Property Code. Id.; Tex.
Prop. Code Ann. § 55.007(a) (Vernon 1995). Chaney
presented the following summary judgment evidence in response
to Nationwide's contention she had not satisfied the
release requirement:

1. On January 6, 1996, Chaney's counsel sent a letter of
protection[4] to Laird Memorial Hospital, which
contractually obligated Chaney and her attorney to pay and
forward to Laird Memorial Hospital "any amount owing to
[Laird Memorial Hospital] for services rendered to [Chaney]
to the extent that a sufficient judgment or settlement is
obtained and collected regarding this matter.'"

2. On January 25, 1996, Laird Memorial Hospital filed a lien
against Haffley to secure the payment of Chaney's medical
expenses.

3. On June 14, 1996, Chaney sent Nationwide a letter offering
to settle for $32, 000. Chaney renewed this offer on October
9, 1996. In response, Nationwide limited its offer to $15,
000, reasoning that "the information [Nationwide has]
regarding Mrs. Chaney is incomplete and somewhat conflicting
as to the extent ...

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