U NU OF BURMA - BORN LEADER

Thursday, May 23, 2013

Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 47

47. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690B.93/3–3161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, and CINCPAC. Rangoon, March 31, 1961, 6 p.m. 774. James Barrington, Permanent Secretary,
Burmese Foreign Office, conferred with Secretary Rusk at Embassy
residence Bangkok, 7:00 to 8:00 P.M. March 29. Ambassadors Johnson and
Snow also present. 11. Rusk was in Bangkok attending the SEATO Council meeting March 27–29.
Barrington first presented to Secretary a copy of Prime Minister U Nu’s
play “The Wages of Sin”, stating U Nu particularly hoped Secretary
would find time to read it. Secretary replied he had heard of play and
was very happy to have a copy. Then Barrington took up KMT issue in
some detail, beginning with brief historical review. In 1953–54, because
KMT irregulars had allied themselves with Shan and Karen insurgents who
were seriously threatening continued existence of Burmese Union, GUB
had taken case to UN. As Secretary would recall, GUB also terminated
USG’s technical assistance program in Burma as consequence of charges it
felt compelled to make against US in that connection. Evacuation of KMT
irregulars undertaken in 1954 had not been thorough enough to remove
them all. Moreover, Formosa Regime had re-supplied the remainder and, in
recent years, increased their numerical strength and combat
effectiveness. The action initiated in 1961 to remedy situation,
including current evacuation program, had been going quite well so far,
but GRC had now begun to announce that program would be terminated
mid-April. This was causing considerable concern in Rangoon because
according to Burma army sources a group of at least 500 irregulars, who
had first retreated to Northern Thailand, had now returned to Burmese
territory and were moving Westward toward or into Kayah State. Back in
1952–53, KMTs, in conjunction with KNDOs, had occupied Loikaw, Capital
of Kayah State. Danger now was that this group and other KMTs might
again join forces with KNDOs and cause serious further trouble. In
1953–54, although Burmese government had become aroused over KMT issue
to point where US-Burmese relations had suffered, the Burmese public had
not been nearly as inflamed as it was now. Barrington had been
instructed to ask Secretary for all possible USG assistance in insuring
that KMT problem was completely eliminated this time. Something needed
to be done about the 500 irregulars he had referred to, and it would
also be very desirable for GRC to extend evacuation program until
combined efforts could bring about removal greatest possible number of
KMTs. Barrington went on to say that Burmese Parliamentary Leaders were
beginning to assert in debates that SEATO Bases had been used in support
of KMTs and would be again. Burmese public opinion was picking up this
theme and hostility was mounting against SEATO, whereas previously no
strong feeling in Burma about SEATO other than clear decision on part of
GUB not to consider membership therein. Barrington thought there were
upward of 3,000 KMTs left in Burma, possible 3,500. Johnson and Snow
both questioned these figures as appearing too high. The Secretary
in reply first pointed out that there were no SEATO Bases as such; there
were merely bases situated in SEATO countries. Barrington acknowledged
that in talking about SEATO in this sense, Burmese really meant
Thailand, but since Thailand was neighboring country, Burmese did not
like to accuse Thais directly for fear of damaging friendly relations.
The Secretary said that upon assuming office in January, he had been
dismayed to find KMT issue, with which he had been so familiar in early
fifties and even during World War II when he had served in the area in
command of KMT troops, had arisen again as major problem. As Barrington
knew, firm representations had been made in Taipei and much accomplished
already toward resolution of the problem. GRC gave every evidence of
sincerely and efficiently cooperating. US Government would continue to
help in every appropriate way but he wished to make it clear that US was
not involved; in short, the problem was not “our baby.” He had
personally gone to considerable lengths since January to ascertain
whether any branch of US Government, even at middle or lower levels, had
been involved in or had even connived at KMT re-supply and build-up. He
had found no evidence of any such thing. He realized that any country
such as Burma had sensitivities but he thought GUB should appreciate
that United States also had its sensitivities. President Kennedy, as his
letter to Prime Minister U Nu must surely have revealed, had special
interest in US relations with Burma. The President also had strong
feelings and opinions on certain subjects. He had strong feeling with
regard to US prestige and respect for our good faith and would not be
prepared to have them put in question by anybody. There was, for
example, the case of Lumumba’s death; USG had had no part whatsoever in
his death and yet when certain people “pushed the button,”
demonstrations occurred simultaneously against American Embassies in
forty different countries. There had also been the mob action against
our Embassy in Rangoon. We were not prepared to accept such actions with
equanimity. Riots inspired or abetted by Governments against our
Embassies were something we were “not having” and we looked to
governments to take the proper steps to prevent them. Barrington,
after taking rather confused exception to implication that February 21
riot against Embassy Rangoon had been government-inspired (Note: It was
in fact inspired by anti-US propaganda fed to press by Burma Army),
sought to defend role of Rangoon police on that occasion, although he
acknowledged police had not handled situation February 21 as well as
they might have. Prime Minister had been out of town; other cabinet
ministers had been indecisive; police had hesitated to start shooting;
but two people were killed and fifty or more injured by police action.
After some further discussion about KMTs, the Secretary outlined
briefly the current US position on Laos. The Russians had not yet
replied to British proposal that cease-fire be agreed upon, to be
followed by reactivation of ICC and convoking of 14-nation conference.
British proposal, supported by USG, represented clear test of Communist
intentions. If Communist countries persisted in their military and
subversive efforts, “there would be trouble in Laos.” The Secretary
believed that neither Burma nor other comparable nations wanted to see
Laos go Communist. Barrington agreed Burma did not want Communists
to take over Laos. He supposed Russian hesitation in responding to
British proposal had been occasioned by ChiCom objection to having an
Indian again serve as Chairman of ICC in view of present tension in
ChiCom-Indian relations. The Secretary said that since Burma realized
the threat which Communism represented for Laos, GUB could play a most
important part in the 14-Nation conference deliberations when the time
came. The Secretary asked Barrington if all other aspects of
US-Burmese bilateral relationship were in reasonably good order.
Barrington indicated he believed they were. The Secretary told
Barrington that although American Ambassador in Rangoon was always
available, he, himself, had retained his genuine interest in Burma and
would be willing to hear personally from Barrington or other Burmese
officials if they wished to bring some particular point to his attention
in that way. Snow Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690B.93/3–3161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, and CINCPAC. 1 Rusk was in Bangkok attending the SEATO Council meeting March 27–29.