The Senate ain't broke: now watch Howard fix it

June 15 2003By Ray Cassin

John Howard did not coin the slogan "If it ain't broke, don't fix it", but it has come to be as closely associated with him as his famous non-promise that "there'll never, ever be a GST". The slogan and the non-promise do have a lot in common, of course. Just as, once Howard became prime minister, it became evident that introducing a broad-based consumption tax was still very much on his agenda, so, too, is it apparent that he has never really believed that the existing constitutional arrangements ain't broke, and are not in need of fixing.

The slogan is just something Howard ritually intones whenever someone proposes constitutional change he would find unpalatable. Like creating an office of head of state whose occupant is not chosen by the prime minister, for example. But there are other aspects of the constitution that he obviously believes require radical change.

At the Liberal Party's federal convention this month, Howard suggested that a referendum might be held in conjunction with the next election. Its aim would be the effective removal of the Senate's power to do anything other than delay government legislation. He didn't put it that baldly, and if such a constitutional amendment is put to a referendum, whoever drafts the "yes" case will not do so either. But the message is clear: apart from judicial review, the Prime Minister doesn't want any check on the government's agenda other than the need to seek re-election every three years.

It is not the first time Howard has spoken on this theme. At a Liberal federal council meeting last year, he responded in this way to others in his party who were demanding that the Senate be hobbled: "The main difficulties we've had over the past six years... have been related to the composition of, and the powers of, the Senate." It is a fair summary of the role that the Senate has come to exercise in our system of government. What is odd is that the Prime Minister now appears to think a substantial portion of the electorate might agree with him that the Senate's role is a bad thing.

Perhaps it is hubris; the kind of hubris that overtakes governments that have been in power long enough to start behaving as though they hold office by natural right. The Howard Government's plans for Medicare are one indication that this may be happening, and the campaign against the Senate is another. The difference between the Senate and Medicare agendas is that Howard can expect some support for hobbling the Senate from the Labor side of politics: Bob Carr and Gough Whitlam have both endorsed the idea. If the major parties line up against the Senate, however, popular resistance to any change is likely to be even greater.");document.write("

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Conventional wisdom has itthat referendums are most likely to be carried when they have wide cross-party support. The record, however, suggests that the key to a referendum's outcome lies in whether voters see the proposalas conferring greater power on themselves or on governments. ItIs proposals of the latter kind that typically fail, and on that measure any attempt to reduce the Senate's powers would probably fail, too.

Australia's system of strong bicameralism gives nearly equal powers to the Senate and Houseof Representatives, and the useof proportional representationin Senate elections means that it represents a greater diversity of opinion than the lower house, which is dominated by the major parties. This broad representation, coupled with the Senate's extensive use of committees for the scrutiny of bills and inquiries into mattersof public interest, has transformed the upper chamber into a more effective house of review than the founders of Federation could have imagined it would be. Much of the real work of legislating is now done in the Senate, whereas the House functions largely as a kind of political theatre.

There is a democratic deficit in the Senate in that it is not electedon the basis of one vote, one value, because the states are represented in it equally, regardless of the sizeof their populations. But the deadlock provision devised by the founders corrects the deficit: if the Senate twice rejects a bill passed by the lower house, Parliament can be dissolved so that the matter may

be referred to the judgement of the people. If the chambers are still deadlocked after an election, a joint sitting may be held at which the government's numbers could be expected to prevail.

The Howard proposal would eliminate the people from this process. Instead of both chambers being dissolved after a bill istwice rejected by the Senate, the legislation would be submitted a third time and, if rejected again, then referred to a joint sitting. Under this formula, the Senate would become a sort of elected version of the House of Lords: a debating society that ultimately exists only to rubber-stamp legislation. It is a prescriptionfor dignified impotence.

In a system that provides too few checks on the abuse of executive power, and at a time when the convergence of the major parties on broad economic policy is fuelling support for minor parties and independents, the Senate stands out. Its acquired role as the chief forum of diversity in national politics, and the chief enforcer of accountability by the executive government, is an amusing irony, given the anti-democratic historyof upper houses in Westminster systems. This evolution could continue: the Senate would be an even more effective house of review if ministers did not sit in it. But that is not on the Howard agenda. This Government's agenda is to promote reaction - and call it reform.