Ukrainian Tractors

Δημοσιεύτηκε: Μαρ 06 , 2014
Συγγραφέας: Stephen White

As the current situation in Ukraine is changing so swiftly that
no one has any serious ability to predict the outcome,
conflict-resolution pundits should be reading the unfolding events
in negotiating terms in order to make sense of what is going on,
for themselves and for those who follow them.

Why in negotiating terms? Because it is inevitable that sooner
or later the parties involved will sit down and talk to each other.
The world will hope that this happens within days, although recent
history, for example in Syria, suggests that these talks might take
years, with untold human misery happening in the vacuum. Here are
some easily identifiable negotiating pointers to the events of the
last 2 weeks.

Deals Don’t Stick if they Don’t Resolve the Problem

The deal brokered on February 21st in Kiev, which
would have created a coalition government and legislated for new
elections quickly didn’t stick, because the Western facing
constituency which had been demonstrating in the days before was
unprepared to accept anything short of the immediate removal of
President Yanukovich. He was the core of their problem. The deal
didn’t deal with him effectively, so it failed.

All Parties Involved Must be Involved in the
Negotiation

In the week after the President ran away the major focus should
have been to start to resolve the known differences in sentiment
and political vision between Western and Eastern Ukraine, and in
particular semi-autonomous Crimea, which has a Russian speaking
majority. Maybe there were multi-party negotiations behind closed
doors in Kiev, but it didn’t look like it; more importantly the
people of Crimea didn’t see it happening. Of course the parties are
deeply divided in their political aspirations, and chasms between
them might not have been bridgeable, but not being invited to the
party was a certain way of ensuring that the Crimean government
would go their own way.

Preconditioning Tactics are Transparent

The Russians have played hardball many times during the Putin
era, most recently in the way they have blocked level-headed
resolutions at the UN Security Council over Syria. Their strategy
is to use preconditioning techniques (putting fear into the hearts
and minds of their opponents) so they subsequently have an easier
time (a more powerful base) at the negotiating table. So the
intrusion of Russian Troops into Crimea and the heightened tension
as a result will give them more power at the negotiating table if
and when negotiations begin. The West reciprocates with the talk of
visa and economic sanctions against Russia. One has to say that the
Western preconditioning is pathetically weak in terms of
tension-building compared with the Russians actions. But in both
cases everyone recognises what their counterparty is doing, so the
purpose is effectively neutered.

Telling Lies Might Help Diplomacy

The Russian claim that its troops have not invaded Crimean
territory is laughable. As I write I am listening to Sky News
journalists openly indicating incredulity at this claim – they saw
and filmed the troops roll in over last weekend, and they are still
there now. However, if the Russian strategy is based on the ‘What
If’ technique, it might help to allow the parties to start the
negotiating process. In this case the relevant sentence is ‘What if
we consider the 6000 Russian troops which entered Crimea last
weekend as part of the existing Russian establishment in the
country? For example, that they were simply relieving the
troops already stationed there. Can you (the West) now stop
protesting and start negotiating?’

But it Doesn’t Help the Negotiating Process

The downside of lying is that once at the table everyone will be
suspicious of parties which have demonstrably not told the truth
earlier in the process. What goes around comes around.

Having a Big Stick - Help or Hindrance?

There is speculation that Russia would have had to deal
differently with Ukraine if the nuclear missiles which were on
Ukrainian territory until 1994 (as a throwback to its Soviet days)
had still been there, under Ukrainian control. We will never know.
But it does make for an interesting analogy with the current
Iranian nuclear discussions because the world will not be a safer
place if the threat of nuclear war, maybe made by madmen who have
taken over the asylum, prevents a world united against
terrorism from taking effective action.

There is no significant difference between seeing these tactics
and stratagems for what they are in a big ticket negotiation and a
more mundane commercial negotiation. The stakes may be higher, but
the process is the same.