The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.

From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."

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Tuesday, November 24, 2015

-- we must have a realistic view of the true scale of commitment
required to defeat ISIS: namely, an extensive international presence on
the ground to enforce a political settlement acceptable to all major
actors and to assist a massive nation-rebuilding project.

The recent attacks in Paris carried out by the Islamic State have led to widespread speculation
about a possible shift in strategy on the part of ISIS. Taken in
conjunction with the downing of a Russian passenger plane over the Sinai
and the bombings in the predominantly Shia Dahiyeh suburbs of Beirut,
it is argued that ISIS is lashing out at the "far enemy" as it comes
under pressure on the home fronts in Iraq and Syria, such as its recent
loss of control of Sinjar, a town that formed part of a key route
connecting the de facto ISIS capitals of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in
Iraq.

Further, Iranian-backed forces – including Lebanese Hezbollah and
Syrian President Bashar Assad's army, backed by Russian airstrikes, were
able to break the long-standing ISIS siege of Kweiris airbase to the
east of Aleppo city despite ISIS mobilization calls in Aleppo province
to counter the offensive. On a more general level, internal documents
suggest that ISIS is facing problems
of cohesion in its military ranks, as the General Supervisory Committee
issued an amnesty for deserters last month, whereas the normal ruling
for fleeing from battle without appropriate justification is execution.

While it certainly is valid to point to these developments as
setbacks for ISIS, they are too ephemeral in nature to tie them to the
Paris attacks in particular. The sophisticated nature of the Paris
attacks would have required planning and procurement of provisions
predating ISIS's latest setbacks. Though it will still take time for
more precise details to emerge, nothing so far definitely shows that the
Paris attacks differ significantly from prior failed plots involving
sleeper cells operating in Europe – including returned foreign fighters
in their ranks – with suspected links to low to mid-level ISIS
operatives in Iraq and Syria.

In fact, Abdelhamid Abbaoud, a key figure in the Paris attacks, was openly flaunting his role in establishing cells to conduct attacks in Europe in an interview with ISIS's magazine Dabiq
in February. If he was assigned a general role by the highest echelons
of ISIS to conduct attacks in Europe, this assignment apparently took place almost a year ago.

Concerns regarding these networks have long been on the radar of
Western intelligence services, and the fact the Paris attacks came to
fruition represents a significant failure in detection more than
anything else. The reason we have come to associate ISIS with lone wolf
attacks rather than well-planned operations is because lone wolf attacks
are usually harder to foresee and easier to carry out.

The fact the Paris attacks came to fruition represents a significant failure in detection.

A similar analysis of the problem of sleeper cell networks applies to
the situation of ISIS in Lebanon. Lebanon is a target for ISIS as it
constitutes a part of the greater al-Sham region over which ISIS claimed
geographical coincidence when it officially declared its expansion
beyond Iraq in April 2013. Indeed, the Dahiyeh suburbs were already the
subject of ISIS-claimed bomb attacks in January 2014. Only the Russian
aircraft downing can be tied to recent developments as ISIS seeks to
gain credibility for fighting back against the Russian intervention in
Syria that has provoked widespread anger among Sunni Muslims.

As for the recent setbacks for ISIS within Iraq and Syria, they do
not represent a decisive shift away from the overall reality of
stalemate that was apparent months ago amid proclamations that ISIS was
on the march and "winning," following the capture of Palmyra and Ramadi.
Even now, ISIS has more recently made advances further west through the
Homs desert with the capture of the town of Muhin from regime forces.
In addition, there are still no effective ground forces to challenge
ISIS control of the most important population centers of Raqqa and Mosul
cities, as well as the majority of Deir az-Zor province and the towns
of western Anbar province and eastern Aleppo province.

ISIS seeks to exploit and reinforce Muslim vs. non-Muslim divides in Western countries.

The larger fallacy in viewing the attacks in Paris and elsewhere as a
shift in strategy is the premise that the ISIS state-building project
and the notion of attacking the far enemy are mutually exclusive. In
fact, the latter is meant to complement the former in undermining the
ability of ISIS's enemies to harm its state structure. ISIS hopes to
confuse enemy consensus on what to do about the terrorist group, as many
ponder whether any intervention is justified at all given the risk of
retaliatory terror attacks or fear "mission creep." ISIS hopes to sow
division and discord on the enemies' home fronts. It wants to instill
terror in its enemies and reinforce Muslim versus non-Muslim divides in
civilian populations.

Looking foward to the question of responses to these attacks, it is
tempting to look to the intense French airstrikes launched on Raqqa as
the way forward. However, reports indicate
that no major damage has been inflicted on ISIS military assets by
these strikes as ISIS has learned to keep them out of the sight of
coalition bombing. The U.S. has also decided to go after trucks carrying
oil in ISIS territory in the belief that oil is the key lifeline for
ISIS funding. Such a policy reflects a serious over-estimation of the
contribution of oil to ISIS income, which actually relies far more on
confiscation and taxation.

More airstrikes and tougher talk will not lead to the defeat of ISIS.

Worse, the U.S. bombing overlooks the fact that those who transport
oil from ISIS-controlled oil fields are not necessarily affiliated with
ISIS. The end effect instead is likely to be significant humanitarian
harm – not only to civilians in ISIS territory but also those living in
rebel-held areas of Syria, which suffered a major fuel crisis when last
cut off from trucks delivering oil from ISIS-held territory on account
of an ISIS-imposed blockade in the early summer.

In short, one should have no illusions that simply intensifying
airstrikes and more tough talk can lead to the defeat of ISIS. As
before, we must have a realistic view of the true scale of commitment
required to defeat ISIS: namely, an extensive international presence on
the ground to enforce a political settlement acceptable to all major
actors and to assist a massive nation-rebuilding project. Unless
international consensus emerges for such an undertaking, one must not
harbor pretenses about destroying ISIS.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a research fellow at Middle East Forum's Jihad Intel project.