CHAPTER IX.—­Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between
States.

The occasion which led to war between the Romans and
Samnites, who for long had been in league with one
another, is of common occurrence in all powerful States,
being either brought about by accident, or else purposely
contrived by some one who would set war a-foot.
As between the Romans and the Samnites, the occasion
of war was accidental. For in making war upon
the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the
Samnites had no thought of involving themselves with
the Romans. But the Campanians being overpowered,
and, contrary to the expectation of Romans and Samnites
alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the Romans, on whose
protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour
them as dependants, and to accept a war which, it
seemed to them, they could not with honour decline.
For though they might have thought it unreasonable
to be called on to defend the Campanians as friends
against their own friends the Samnites, it seemed
to them shameful not to defend them as subjects, or
as a people who had placed themselves under their
protection. For they reasoned that to decline
their defence would close the gate against all others
who at any future time might desire to submit themselves
to their power. And, accordingly, since glory
and empire, and not peace, were the ends which they
always had in view, it became impossible for them
to refuse this protectorship.

A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war
with the Carthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed
by the Romans of the citizens of Messina in Sicily,
and this likewise came about by chance. But the
second war with Carthage was not the result of chance.
For Hannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the
Saguntans, who were the friends of Rome in Spain,
not from any desire to injure them, but in order to
set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity
of engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into
Italy. This method of picking a quarrel is constantly
resorted to by powerful States when they are bound
by scruples of honour or like considerations.
For if I desire to make war on a prince with whom
I am under an ancient and binding treaty, I shall
find some colour or pretext for attacking the friend
of that prince, very well knowing that when I attack
his friend, either the prince will resent it, when
my scheme for engaging him in war will be realized;
or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or baseness
in not defending one who is under his protection will
be made apparent; either of which alternatives will
discredit him, and further my designs.