Since June 1940, the nation of Lithuania has been
illegally occupied by the Soviet Union. With the exception of a brief
occupation by Hitler's Reich, Lithuania has remained under oppressive
Soviet rule. The people of Lithuania did not meekly accept their fate.
The ensuing political and military resistance movement was of
significant magnitude in recent history. Students of history and
political science forget or never learn of the efforts made by the
Lithuanian people or those of the Ukrainians and other nationalities.
The standard history texts will not talk of the resistance or will
mention the resistance in a brief footnote at best. The forgotten and
ignored resistance was of great political and military significance.

On February 16, 1918, in the wake of the Russian
revolution, the independence of the Republic of Lithuania was
proclaimed. After brief conflicts with the Soviet Union and Poland, the
sovereignty of Lithuania was restored. In the following years, the new
republic was recognized by most of the world's nations, including the
United States and the
Soviet Union. Throughout the twenties and thirties, the country
prospered, while the economy grew. At the outbreak of the Second World
War, Lithuania remained neutral. The independence of the Baltic states
was in its last year, however. On August 23,1939, the Non-Aggression
Pact between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union was secretly signed
by Ribbentrop (for Hitler) and Molotov (for Stalin). One of the clauses
of this clandestine agreement placed the Baltic states (Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia) in a Soviet sphere of influence. On October 10,
1939, Stalin's government coerced the Lithuanian government of
President Antanas Smetona to sign a "Mutual Assistance Treaty" which
provided for Soviet garrisons in Lithuania and a Soviet guarantee of
Lithuania's sovereignty. On June 15, 1940, in violation of several
treaties and international law, the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania
after issuing an ultimatum. Throughout the initial Soviet occupation
(1940-41), the Nazi occupation (1941-44), and the second Soviet
occupation (1944 to the present)1,
the fiercely independent and nationalistic Lithuanians fought to resist
the invaders, both German and Soviet. Although faced by overwhelming
opposition, the Lithuanians actively resisted the occupation of their
nation, showing that aggression was not accepted without a heavy price
in blood.

The First Soviet Occupation

After June 15, 1940, various political events
occurred in Lithuania and the other Baltic republics. President Smetona
and some of the members of the legal government fled
Lithuania. In their wake, the Soviet occupying forces set up a puppet
government. Through a rigged election, wherein non-communist candidates
were intimidated, arrested, or silenced, the newly formed "People's
Diet" was dominated by the Communist Party. The Diet "asked" that the
Lithuanian Republic be disbanded and that the Soviet Union annex
Lithuania. On August 3, 1940, the Soviet Union formally annexed the
Lithuanian nation.

The month of August brought the full force of
Stalin's secret police apparatus to bear in Lithuania. Lithuanian law
was abolished and replaced by Soviet justice. One of the first acts of
the NKVD (Stalin's secret police) was to persecute the remnants of the
Republic's government and suppress the Roman Catholic Church.
(Lithuania was, and still is, 90 percent Roman Catholic.) During 1940
and 1941,19 members of the Lithuanian cabinet, 14 ranking members of
the leading National party, and 9 leaders of other political parties
were deported.2
Churches and synagogues were confiscated. All of the monasteries were
closed. Of four seminaries, only the one located at Kaunas remained
open, although it was soon converted into an army barracks. The
religious press was silenced and wide scale destruction of religious
books occurred. On January 21, 1941, all members of the clergy were
prohibited from receiving salaries and were forced to pay special
taxes. During the first year of occupation, 15 priests were executed
for conducting religious services. All of these instances of oppression
are merely examples; the full extent of religious suppression was far
greater.3 Clearly, the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion, written in the Soviet constitution, did not apply
to the Lithuanians.

Soviet oppression was not limited to the Church
and former government officials. All privately owned land larger than
30 hectares was declared to be state property. About 385,000 hectares
(more than 800,000 acres) were confiscated,
without compensation, from 27,000 landowners.4
Kolkhozes (collective farms) and Sovkhozes (state farms) were planned.
In the cities, all banks, industries, and businesses were nationalized,
again without compensation. By the spring of 1941, the Lithuanian
Litas, the unit of currency, was banned. Any bank deposits worth more
than 1,000 rubles were impounded by the occupiers. The Lithuanian
economy was mauled and agriculture disintegrated. The economy had been
sovietized.

This was not the full extent of the Soviet terror
apparatus. The Lithuanian armed forces, although 20- to 30,000 in
number, were dismembered and neutralized. The armed forces were
incorporated into the Red Army, purged repeatedly, and staffed by
Russian commissars.

The final, and most devastating step of the terror
were the deportations that occurred in June 1941. The NKVD realized
that certain groups might pose a threat/in theory or in reality, to the
communization and russification of Lithuania. A list of 23 different
groups were considered a threat to the occupation:

1. Former members of legislative bodies and prominent members of political parties

2. Army officers from the Russian Civil War (1917-1921)

3. Prosecutors, judges, and attorneys

4. Government and municipal officials

5. Policemen and prison officials

6. Members of the National Guard

7. Mayors

8. Border and prison guards

9. Active members of the press

10. Active members of the farmers' union

11. Business owners

12. Large real estate owners

13. Ship owners

14. Stockholders

15. Hoteliers and restaurateurs

16. Members of any organization considered to be right wing

17. Members of the White Guard

18. Members of anti-communist organizations

19. Relatives of any person abroad

20. Families against whom reprisals had been taken during the Soviet regime

Under article 58 in the Soviet penal code, any
relative or associate of a person charged with a political crime could
be found guilty of that crime. Given these provisions, nearly the
entire population of Lithuania was liable to be prosecuted, deported,
tortured, or executed at the whim of the NKVD. From June 14 to June 21,
1941, the first wave of Soviet deportations occurred. In one week,
30,425 deportees in 871 freight cars were sent to various remote
regions of the Soviet Union.6
According to Joseph Vizulis and the Estonian Information Center, at
least 7,777 children under 18 were included in this deportation.7
It is an accepted estimate that approximately 75,000 Lithuanians were
executed, imprisoned, deported, placed in internal exile, or simply
disappeared during 1940-41. Given the population of Lithuania (more
than 3 million in 1939), this number is more than two percent of the
entire population.

Despite the intent of the Soviet occupation
forces, the policies of the Soviet government did not stifle dissent.
From the beginning of the occupation, Lithuanian patriots planned
resistance. Although the Soviets sought out and removed potential
troublemakers, any attempt to resist the universally unpopular Soviets
had overwhelming public support. In the days immediately following the
occupation, both passive and armed resistance groups began to covertly
organize as early as August of 1940. Although much information is
lacking, acts of passive resistance in outright defiance of the Soviet
government occurred. In the puppet elections for the "People's Diet",
only 15 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots. Hundreds of
ballots were cast for a cartoon character. Political rallies and
parades were sparsely attended. Portraits of Lenin and Stalin were
stolen from public places. The concert of the Red Army Chorus was
disrupted by crowds singing patriotic songs. High schools and colleges
became sources of sedition. National flags appeared out of nowhere. In
response, the Soviet government rounded up many activists.

On October 9, 1940, a coordinated resistance
group, calling itself the Lithuanian Activist Front (Hereafter referred
to as the LAP) was formed in Kaunas. The leader and one of the founders
of this organization was Colonel Kazys Škirpa, the Republic of
Lithuania's Minister-Plenipotentiary to Berlin, who had remained in
exile after June 1940. The LAP was organized with its leadership under
Co. Škirpa in Berlin, two centers (in the Lithuanian cities of
Vilnius and Kaunas), and hundreds of three man "cells" across the
country. The eventual goal of the LAP was to incite a revolt when the
leadership determined that the conditions were right. Arms were
stockpiled and plans were made. The NKVD was alarmed by the fact that
the highly compartmented LAP could not be seriously compromised. The
LAP began to serve as a unified resistance command, absorbing such
resistance groups as the Iron Wolf and the Lithuanian Freedom Army, of
later fame. According to Vardys, the LAP grew to a strength of 36,000
members, a very significant underground movement.8

The 1941 Revolt and Declaration of Independence

On June 22, 1941, Hitler's Germany
invaded the Soviet Union. As the panzers rolled over the routed Red
Army, news of the invasion spread like fire across Lithuania. In a
matter of hours, the LAP went into action in Kaunas. By noon on the
23rd, the telegraph and telephone center, the central post office,
police headquarters, arsenals, and the radio station in the city of
Kaunas were controlled by LAP members. In a dramatic radio broadcast,
the LAP announced the formation of a Lithuanian Provisional Government.
The revolt spread throughout the country. Many of the major cities were
liberated by LAP members. The retreating Red Army was harassed. For a
few brief weeks, the Lithuanians believed that their republic has been
restored. The German army arrived in Lithuania to find a functioning
government; the Germans did not fire a shot to take the city of
Kaunas.

The joy of the Lithuanian people was dampened,
however. Out of the estimated 100,000 persons participating in the
revolt, 2,000 had died. The retreating Soviets paused only to massacre
political prisoners and others who simply got in the way of the Soviet
retreat. For example, in the Rainiai forest, 76 high school students
and Boy Scouts were brutally tortured, murdered, and mutilated.9

German Occupation — 1941 to 1944

Nazi Germany soon became the Soviet Union's heir.
The Lithuanian Provisional Government was disbanded. Under the
leadership of Reichkommisar Heinrich Lohse, the German government
formed an administrative region known as Ostland, which was composed of
the three Baltic states
and Byelorussia. Adrian von Renteln was appointed as the General
Commissioner for Lithuania. The German administration maintained the
land and business policies of the Soviets. Although the civil
administration of occupied Lithuania was quite unpopular, other Nazi
policies provoked overt discontent. One such policy was the
"recruitment" of Lithuanian men for forced labor throughout the Reich.
In the spring of 1942, Lithuanian trustees in the occupational
government were ordered to mobilize 100,000 Lithuanians for labor in
Germany. Only five percent of the quota was filled, and Gestapo agents
and SS troopers resorted to wholesale abduction of Lithuanian youths in
order to fill their quotas. The Gestapo also persecuted Lithuanians
considered to be threats to the occupation. Thousands were jailed or
executed. The LAP was suppressed and many of its leaders were jailed.
Finally, any study of Lithuania during this era must include the Nazi
Party's systematic destruction of the Jews. During the Second World
War, at least 200,000 Lithuanian citizens of Jewish origin were
deported or killed. The nature of the Nazi occupation was little
different from the Soviet occupation. Resistance was inspired by the
acts of the Nazi occupier. The Lithuanians resisted the Nazi overlords
as well.

Organized resistance was incoherent at first,
since the leadership of the LAP had been disrupted. Small political and
guerilla resistance groups slowly formed, often without concrete
leadership or organization. In time, a number of resistance groups grew
in strength and effectiveness. The Union of Lithuanian Freedom Fighters
(known by its Lithuanian initials LLKS) and the Lithuanian Front (a
Catholic activist group) were formed in 1941. In 1942, the Lithuanian
Unity Movement (a youth movement) and the Lithuanian Freedom Army (a
purely military/guerilla group) were organized. Finally, the Lithuanian
Nationalist party, which had partially cooperated with the Nazi
administration, joined the ranks of the underground after the Germans
silenced the party. These groups, and others, waged a war against the
occupiers in many different forms. However, military
resistance was avoided, since such efforts would militarily aid the Red
Army.

An important facet of resistance was opposition by
members of the local governments in Lithuania. After the German
invasion, the Reichkommisar established the Council-General, an office
composed of Lithuanians to assist with the administration of Lithuania.
While pretending to be collaborators, many members of this puppet
government covertly contributed to the resistance movement in various
ways. For example, Dr. Germantas-Meškauskas, the
Councillor-General for Education, worked incessantly to preserve
Lithuanian culture and educational institutions from nazification. Dr.
Germantas-Meškauskas was deported to the Stutthof concentration
camp after two years of covert resistance, where he died.10
As a result of their resistance, five of the nine members of the
Council-General ended their lives at the Stutthof concentration camp.
Another aspect of this sort of resistance was the recalcitrance of the
Lithuanian police. Because of manpower shortages, the Germans were
forced to use Lithuanians as policemen. As well as conventional police
duties, the Gestapo attempted to use Lithuanian police for political
oppression. Unfortunately for the Gestapo, many policemen cooperated
with the resistance by disposing of evidence, protecting resistance
agents, and providing advance notice of Gestapo and police raids and
searches. Through the efforts of Lithuanian policemen, the resistance
at times was protected from the Gestapo.

An extremely important part of the Lithuanian
resistance to the Nazi occupation was the proliferation of an extensive
underground press. The first manifestation of clandestine publications
was the distribution of pro memoria, brief
bulletins of news and resistance literature. Because few Lithuanians
received accurate news from official sources, underground literature
soon became very popular. Soon, full newspapers, printed with great
difficulty and under adverse conditions, appeared. Many of the
underground factions,
both violent and non-violent, issued publications. The LLKS
mimeographed the newspaper Laisvės Kovotojas (Freedom Fighter), which had a circulation of 20,000 and the papers "Word of Freedom" and Apžvalga The Lithuanian Front published its own newspapers as well: / Laisvę (Toward Freedom), Lietuvių Biuletenis (Lithuanian Bulletin), Vardan Tiesos (In the Name of Truth), and Lietuvos Judas (a compilation of Lithuanian collaborators). The Lithuanian Unity Movement published Atžalynas (The
Sapling). The Lithuanian Freedom Army (LFA) published regular
bulletins. A number of other publications, including the influential Nepriklausoma Lietuva (Independent
Lithuania, published by the Populist Party) were distributed across the
country. Although fiercely combated by the Gestapo, the publishers and
distributors of these clandestine journals accomplished several
important goals of the resistance. The Lithuanian press served to unite
the people against the oppressor, to provide communication from the
resistance leadership to the people, to warn the populace of the
policies of the occupier, and to provide uncensored news from abroad.
The Lithuanian underground media accomplished these goals, despite
constant disruption by the Nazi authorities.11

Another facet of the German occupation were the
continuing attempts by the authorities to mobilize Lithuanian manpower
to further the Nazi war effort. The German losses on the Russian front
in 1942 and 1943, as well as the withdrawal of the Italian, Hungarian,
and Rumanian armies left the German military with an acute shortage of
troops in the East. In the eyes of many German leaders, the Baltic
Republics could provide a satisfactory solution to the manpower
problem. E. J. Harrison, the former British
Vice-Consul in Lithuania, summarizes the German view of Lithuania's
military
utility.

In some ways such a force (troops from the
Baltic states) would perhaps prove to be even more valuable than the
withdrawn Italian, Hungarian, Rumanian units; they had a better
knowledge of Russian and the Russians; they inveterately hated the
Soviet regime of which they had had a taste for one year, and they
dreaded the possibility of its return.12

Given the recruitment for SS legions in Estonia
and Latvia, the Germans estimated that Lithuanians could provide
250,000 soldiers. However, the German manpower managers in Berlin did
not take into account the fiercely independent nature of the
Lithuanians. The recruiting drive was bitterly opposed by the
Lithuanian intellectuals and the underground press. Fierce reprisals
were undertaken, but Lithuania, along with Poland, became one of only
two occupied nations that had no native SS Legion. Of the Lithuanian
soldiers drafted into German service, many deserted. The Lithuanians in
German service had one of the highest desertion rates of any group
during the Second World War. As a result of the continued German
oppression, especially the attempted formation of the SS legion, the
Lithuanian resistance hardened. By the spring of 1943, the Lithuanian
resistance organizations began to consolidate and form a unified high
command. Representatives of several pre-occupation political parties
formed the Vyriausias Lietuvių Komitetas (VLK — The Supreme
Lithuanian Committee). The VLK was composed of the Nationalist,
Populist, Social Democrat, and several other parties. The VLK was
instrumental in combating the formation of the SS legion through a
determined media campaign. A number of factions, including the LLKS
soon affiliated themselves with the VLK. A member of the LLKS, Algirdas
Vokietaitis, was dispatched by the VLK as an envoy to the West.
Vokietaitis crossed the Baltic Sea to Sweden on a fishing boat and
arrived as the official representative of the Lithuanian resistance. As
well as the VLK, a group known as the National Council was formed out
of the Christian Democratic party (another prewar political party), the
Lithuanian Front, and the Unity Movement. The National Council was
primarily a Roman Catholic organization. Both the VLK and the National
Council worked at a feverish pace against the German occupation through
their support of the underground press, draft evasion, and other forms
of resistance.

The two resistance organizations were unable to
cooperate effectively; friction between the VLK and the national
Council developed. Undoubtedly, Gestapo officials were pleased by the
friction between the two groups. During the summer and fall of 1943,
the leadership of the VLK and the National Council met to discuss
unification. As a result, the groups merged to form the Vyriausias
Lietuvos Išlaisvinimo Komitetas (VLIK — The Supreme
Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania.)13
The VLIK provided the national leadership for the Lithuanian Republic.
The VLIK soon set up a nationwide network of resistance organizations
and published its proclamations in the underground press. On February
16, 1944 (Lithuanian Independence Day), the VLIK issued a proclamation
containing ten clauses outlining the position of the resistance. These
clauses included the restoration of the 1938 constitution, the
formation of a provisional government, a re-affirmation of the
Lithuanian democratic ideal, and the re-constitution of the Lithuanian
Army.14 The VLIK realized that the German occupation would soon end and the Soviets would have to be resisted once again.

The last year of German occupation brought
redoubled efforts to conscript Lithuanians. One German official, Major
General Just, succeeded in forming several construction battalions.
Despite Soviet allegations, these battalions were composed of draftees,
not volunteers; the battalions did not indicate public support for
Nazism.

In early 1944, groups of Soviet guerrillas
combated the Germans and wreaked havoc in eastern Lithuania. The
Germans decided to permit the formation of a Lithuanian Territorial
Defense Force under Lithuanian leadership to fight the oncoming Red
Army. A Lithuanian officer General Povilas Plechavičius was placed in
command. Fourteen battalions and an officer's school were planned. This
defense force was to be under the command of Lithuanians and was
intended to operate in Lithuanian territory. Under these conditions,
the resistance endorsed the force. Surprisingly, about 20,000
volunteers, twice the requirement, appeared at recruitment points. The
success of this recruitment was due to three factors: the impending
arrival of the hated Soviets, the confidence in General Plechavičius,
and the possibility of serving a strictly Lithuanian cause. Despite the
successful recruitment, German duplicity prevailed. The Home Formation,
as the Lithuanians called it, was equipped with obsolete weapons,
little ammunition, and few uniforms. The German command began to
disrupt the Home Formation by randomly ordering the battalions to
different parts of the country without the knowledge of the Lithuanian
commanders. Although the Germans attempted to disrupt the Home
Formation, the Lithuanian officers, most of whom were officers in the
prewar Lithuanian Army, openly displayed their patriotic beliefs.

The Home Formation was short ived. Upon the German
discovery of the VLIK, the Nazi authorities informed General
Plechavičius that they were taking command of the force. At this time,
many soldiers of the Home Formation split into small groups and melted
into the rural areas, where they planned for guerrilla warfare against
the Soviets. On May 15, 1944, the entire senior staff of the Home
Formation was
arrested. The next morning, German troops attacked the officer's school
and the remaining cadets resisted.15
In the eastern regions of Lithuania, seven battalions (nearly half the
Home Formation) fled into the forests. Of the 10,000 members of the
Home Formation, the Germans captured 3,400, some of whom were forced
into the German Army. During the course of the German occupation,
severe damage had been inflicted. As many as 200,000 Jews had been
deported, most of whom died in extermination camps. Some 75,000 men had
been impressed for factory labor in Germany. About 20,000 men had been
conscripted for the German military. Several thousand political
prisoners had been liquidated. More than 100,000 refugees fled
westward. Some $600 million worth of property, goods, and currency had
been seized.16 However, the impact of the impending Soviet re-occupation promised to be even greater.

The Second Soviet Occupation — 1944 to the Present

In July and August 1944, Lithuania became a heated
battleground as the Red Army drove towards Berlin. On July 14, Vilnius
was captured by the Soviets. On July 31, Kaunas fell.

The second occupation resumed the practices of the
first. The Church was suppressed and the intelligentsia were harassed
and obstructed. Stalin's tyranny remained unchanged.

The second Soviet occupation was violently
resisted from the start. Tens of thousands of Lithuanians armed
themselves against the invader. The almost universal support for the
resistance can be explained by several factors. The Lithuanian people
had no illusions about the intentions of the Soviets. Nearly anyone
with a history of nationalism or open dissent had three choices: flee,
join the resistance, or face the wrath
of the Soviets. Many relatives of resistance members had little choice.
Relatives were occasionally executed as a deterrent to opposition.
Hundreds, maybe thousands, took to the forests in order to escape
conscription into the Red Army, where Lithuanians were universally
mistreated by Russian officers and NCOs. Some joined the resistance out
of fear, since innocent peasants were often imprisoned merely to
terrorize the nation. The Roman Catholic Church gave its support to the
partisans; indeed, many priests actively served in the resistance. The
battle lines were drawn and the Lithuanian population was forced to
resist the Soviets en masse.

Arrayed in opposition to the resistance was the
combined military and secret police infrastructure of the Soviet Union.
By 1948, eight divisions of the Red Army were stationed in Lithuania.
These were not second or third line conscript outfits with obsolete
equipment; these Red Army units were veteran combat infantry armed with
modern weapons and supported by tanks, artillery, and the world's
largest military intelligence organization. The Soviet Air Force
stationed units to support the Red Army. A far greater threat to the
Lithuanian freedom fighters was the NKVD. The NKVD was not only a
secret police organization. The NKVD had its own infantry troops, as
well as an efficient network of intelligence operatives and informants,
and a brutal terror apparatus. With security forces numbering more than
100,000 men stationed in a nation of only 3 million people, the true
extent of the resistance can be ascertained.17

In general, the Lithuanian resistance was
organized like an inverted pyramid. The first layer of the resistance
was composed of active partisans. Also known as the "Forest Brothers",
the partisans were armed with captured German and Soviet weapons,
including Czechoslovakian Skoda machine guns, Soviet "Maxim" machine
guns, and a few mortars. The partisans lived in the forests and
isolated farms
of rural Lithuania. Many active partisans wore old Lithuanian military
uniforms, emphasizing the fact that they were uniformed combatants
engaged in warfare, not bandits engaged in criminal acts, as the
Soviets attempted to portray the resistance. There was a high rate of
turnover in the partisan units; the average active life span of a
partisan was two years.

The second layer of the resistance was the passive
fighters. The passive fighters were also armed, but they lived "legal"
lives, fighting only when an opportunity presented itself. Finally,
there were the supporters, who comprised a substantial portion of the
population. The supporters provided supplies, shelter, and intelligence
to the partisans, as well as supporting the underground press and other
resistance activities.

The membership of the various resistance groups
was incredibly diverse. Although the majority of the resistance came
from the worker and peasant classes (the same groups that the
occupation claimed to serve), people of almost every background served.
Priests, professors, large employers, Boy Scouts, high school and
college students, teachers, lawyers, and many others took up arms
against the Soviets. Women were not only couriers and nurses, but armed
guerillas who fought admirably. In some cases whole families joined the
resistance. Escaped German POW's and Red Army deserters joined the
battle. The leadership of the movement was provided by the
intelligentsia, and many command positions were filled by former
officers of the Lithuanian Army. Membership in the resistance cut
across traditional political barriers. Nearly every non-communist
political belief was represented in the ranks of the resistance. From
these observations, it can be seen that the resistance had a wide
popular backing.

At first, the resistance groups were small.
However, nearly all of the resistance groups had much in common. The
various underground groups were based upon the ideals of Lithuanian
nationalism and Roman Catholicism. Most groups had solemn oaths of
secrecy, under penalty of death. In
addition, most groups had common goals. Apart from the admittedly
distant goal of independence, the resistance groups strived to prevent
the sovietization of Lithuania and to fight the oppressor wherever
possible. The partisans carried out a number of operations in order to
achieve their goals, including disrupting the establishment of Soviet
institutions, punishment of collaborators, collection and distribution
of intelligence, documentation of Soviet crimes, protection of the
civilian population, and maintaining the underground press.

According to several sources, including Vardys and
Gerutis, the resistance had more than 30,000 active participants at its
height, one percent of the population of Lithuania. At the height of
the Vietnam conflict, membership in the Viet Cong among the people of
South Vietnam was a fraction of this percentage. If any indicator can
demonstrate the significance of the Lithuanian resistance campaign, the
figure of 30,000 will.

As the Red Army rolled into Lithuania, the largest
and best organized partisans were the Samogitians, under the leadership
of General Motiejus Pečiulionis. The Samogitians were comparatively
well armed and had several thousand partisans. The Soviets avoided open
confrontation with the Samogitians at first; the Soviets resorted to a
campaign of provocations. By the start of 1945, the partisans could be
found everywhere except near the Red Army garrisons. The resistance had
no centralized command, since each commander had his own strategies and
objectives. Nonetheless, the basic objectives of the resistance were
universal: paralyze local communist activities, obstruct communist
plans, and destroy NKVD units in the provinces. The various groups of
partisans soon gained the respect of the local populace. Effective
Soviet government was not possible in many rural districts because of
the assassination of Soviet officials. By April 1945, the resistance
controlled some districts and established local governments.18 The Red Army and NKVD
did not dare to venture into some regions of the countryside in less than company or battalion strength, especially at night.

Many of the brave exploits of the resistance will
remain unknown. Much of the information about the resistance perished
in the forests of Lithuania or in labor camps in Siberia and Central
Asia. Individual stories of partisan actions will be used as examples,
but an anthology of resistance tales is beyond the scope of systematic,
objective documentation.

Throughout the spring of 1945 the partisans grew
bold in their activities. Because of excellent leadership and their
familiarity with the local terrain and guerrilla tactics, the partisans
inflicted great losses on Soviet units. Sometimes the partisans would
successfully ambush units ten times their size. In the forest and
fields, like any group of insurgents, the partisans had nearly complete
freedom of movement, allowing them to choose where, when, and who to
fight. The resistance fighters rarely confronted the Red Army, but
concentrated on the NKVD troops, who were seen as a greater threat to
the civilian population. In southern and western Lithuania the
partisans were limited to smaller units. In the large, dense forests of
eastern and northern Lithuania, larger groups, often as many as several
hundred, conducted operations. The patriot leader Žalgiris led 800 men.
Large battles, occasionally involving entire regiments of NKVD troops
were fought. The occupation, considered at first to be an easy task for
a superpower, evolved into a quagmire, not unlike the recent Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan.

One of the early tactics of the Soviets was called the istrebiteli ("destroyer")
program. This program organized and equipped local Lithuanian villagers
to fight against the insurgents. Each township was to establish a unit
of 30 men under NKVD leaders. These units were not paid, receiving only
weapons and ration cards. Mostly the dregs of society comprised, the istrebiteli units.
The men of these units engaged in many criminal activities with the
apparent sanction of the Soviet authorities. As for the success of the istrebiteli, there was little. In combat, the istrebiteli performed poorly, and many units were infiltrated by partisans.

Many individual members and occasional whole units
deserted. A number of units were mauled or destroyed. The entire
program was a complete failure. The failure of the program disproved
the Soviet myth that the violence in Lithuania was a civil war.

In July 1945,10,000 new NKVD troops arrived in
Lithuania. October brought wild rumors of a partisan assault on the
city of Kaunas. Throughout the fall and winter of 1945, the rebels
continued their struggle. Local government was paralyzed by the
killings of Soviet officials. Few people had desire to work in
government positions. Soviet officials engaged in "land reform"
(nationalization of farmer's holdings) were obstructed. The Soviets, a
military superpower with the most powerful police apparatus in the
world, were not able to govern a small nation of 3 million inhabitants.
The situation in many places approached anarchy. In the first half of
1946, occupation authorities recorded over 800 acts of sabotage.19The
Soviet authorities soon realized that the situation was polarized and
that extreme measures would be necessary to pacify Lithuania.

The NKVD began a series of vicious reprisal
operations against the partisans. Between June 28, and July 16, 1946,
about 7,000 NKVD troopers performed a search-and-destroy operation in
southern and western Lithuanian Thirty-one partisans were killed but
more than 299 NKVD soldiers died.20
Another large operation occurred in August, which resulted in the
deaths of more than 200 partisans, including several leaders. Again,
the Soviet losses outweighed the partisan losses. A third operation of
similar magnitude was conducted in September. It has been estimated
that 9,000 partisans and direct supporters died between Jurte 1944 and
June 1946. However, these losses did not deter young men from joining
the movement, and effective partisan control of the countryside was
only temporarily disrupted. These
operations resulted in a severe shortage of trained partisan officers
in many units. In 1946, 72 officers graduated from an underground
partisan cadet school. The second officer's course was attacked and
dispersed in 1948. Afghanistan was not the Soviet Union's first
experience with guerilla warfare.

Throughout 1945, 1946 and 1947, there were several
attempts to unify the partisans into a single organization. VLIK had
been eliminated in Lithuania itself and existed only in exile. In 1945,
a group called the Lithuanian Council of Liberation (Lietuvos Išlaisvinimo Taryba) was formed,
but was soon discovered by the NKVD and eliminated. The survivors
formed the Committee of Unity, which made some efforts at unifying the
resistance. This group was also eliminated. In June 1946, resistance
leaders, with the encouragement of
émigrés abroad, formed the United Movement for Democratic
Resistance (Bendrasis Demokratinio Pasipriešinimo Sąjūdis). Because
of arguments about strategy and organization and the organization's
proposal that armed resistance be ended, the UMDR eventually failed.
For the next few years, there was
little central coordination of the resistance; coordination was the
result of cooperation between different districts, not the result of
directives from a central headquarters. Each rural district organized
to fit its own needs.

In 1946 and 1947, the partisans effectively
obstructed the Soviet elections in Lithuania. In February 1946, the
Soviet authorities were preparing to hold elections for the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R., a mere formality. Only one candidate for an
office appeared on a ballot. The voters received pre-marked ballots and
merely dropped them in a box. The partisans terrorized Soviet election
officials and disrupted balloting operations. Despite Soviet efforts to
coerce the Lithuanians to vote in order to maintain the appearance of
democracy, less than one-third of the eligible voters cast ballots.
Soviet officials reported the turnout as 96 percent and submitted
thousands of ballots. In February 1947, the authorities prepared to
hold elections for the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Because of the
disruption of the previous elections, many precautions were taken:
additional units of
the Red Army were sent to Lithuania to preserve order and detachments
of troops were posted at every polling place. When election day came,
nearly all of Lithuania stayed home. Armed election committees coerced
voters and cast thousands of votes themselves. Because of the efforts
of the resistance, the Soviet government could not even maintain a
facade of democratic elections.

The underground press continued to publish despite
the NKVD's brutal attempts to silence it. The worst difficulty faced by
the press was the chronic shortage of paper, a condition existing
throughout the Soviet Union. Sometimes partisans were forced to raid
Soviet warehouses and administrative offices for paper. In 1945 and
1946 the press was somewhat centralized. The press was decentralized in
1947 when it became apparent that the NKVD's suppression efforts were
effective. Each local resistance organization published their
periodical at least once each month. In some units the circulation was
several thousand. The press performed well, publishing journals under
grave threat of imprisonment or execution. Until 1952, the underground
press was a persistent rival to the Soviet sponsored press. In
Lithuania today, an underground press survives, providing an
alternative to the Soviet media.

The Lithuanian resistance maintained contact with
the West. In 1945 the liaison agent Daunoras secretly entered Lithuania
and made contact with Colonel Kazimieraitis, the leader of the
partisans in Tauras district. Daunoras returned west and for the next
two years he communicated intermittently with the underground in
Lithuania. In December 1947, a group of envoys from the resistance, led
by the partisan Juozas Lukša, made their way to the West to seek
assistance from the western democracies. Lukša brought many
documents, appeals to the Pope and the governments of the West. In
addition, Lukša made contact with VLIK and the intelligence
services of several western nations. Unfortunately, the appeals of
Lukša fell largely on deaf ears. The partisans in Lithuania had,
for many years, hoped for assistance from the United States and other
nations in their struggle. Some
leaders predicted that a third world war would occur, pitting the
western nations against the Soviet Union. The partisans gradually
perceived the international political climate. Disillusionment
followed:

They delivered (the resistance) to death at
Yalta, Postdam, . . . The same mistakes are being repeated. The West
does not dare raise a voice in protest against the destruction of our
nation; it does not even want to know that we have lost confidence in
them, that we are continuing the struggle . . . Long and terribly
bloody is the struggle before our eyes . . . We can only continue the
struggle by the most ingenious methods which would give us the
necessary conditions until the necessary moment.21

The partisans were almost completely on their own.
However, their pleas were heard in some quarters, including the
intelligence agencies of the West.

During the first years of the Cold War, the
intelligence services of the United States and Great Britain pursued a
policy known as "positive intervention". Part of the ClA's
responsibility in this policy was the secret support of anti-communist
resistance movements behind the Iron Curtain and the operation of radio
stations in the west, such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. The
CIA and the British were involved in projects in Albania, the Baltic
States, Poland, and the Ukraine. All of the projects were failures,
possibly because of Kim Philby, a British intelligence officer who was
secretly a Soviet agent. Philby managed the Albanian project and had
access to information on other projects, including the Lithuanian
operation.22

The CIA and MI-6 (British Intelligence) Lithuanian
operation consisted only of two groups of Lithuanian agents
parachuted into Lithuania. On October 2, 1950, Juozas Lukša and
two others were dropped into Lithuania. General Kruglov personally
commanded
the manhunt to find Lukša. After a year, Lukša was
cornered by security forces and died before he could be captured. The
second mission consisted of two men and included the leader Julijonas
Butėnas. Butėnas parachuted into Lithuania on April 19, 1951 and began
his search to locate Lukša. Within a month, Butėnas was trapped
and committed suicide before he could be captured. The handful of
agents sent by the West did little to aid the resistance, although
Lukša was responsible for a period of renewed guerilla activity.23
The ClA's half-hearted attempt to aid the Lithuanian partisans resulted
in nothing tangible. It may be argued that if the CIA had the ability
to parachute agents into Lithuania, then it had the ability to airdrop
vitally needed supplies and information.

From the beginning of the armed resistance, the
Soviets were gravely concerned about the situation in Lithuania. In the
fall of 1944, Lieutenant General Sergei Kruglov, the Deputy Minister of
the Interior, was assigned to organize counter-insurgency efforts in
Lithuania. Kruglov had been assigned to pacify Lithuania because of
Stalin's dissatisfaction with the events there. Kruglov ordered that no
efforts should be spared to liquidate the partisans. The NKVD soon
became incredibly brutal in its efforts to destroy the opposition.
Suspected partisans were tortured and executed. Friends and relatives
of known resistance members were imprisoned and sent to labor camps in
Siberia, usually without trial or formal charges. Farms and homes where
partisans supposedly took refuge were burned to the ground and their
occupants were arrested. The bodies of killed partisans were mutilated
and publicly displayed. These tactics only increased the hate of the
Soviet occupation, but they also delivered results to the Soviets.
Subsequently, the Soviet authorities adopted new strategies. The
private farmers,
perhaps the strongest supporters of the resistance, faced the forced
confiscation and collectivization of their land. This act alone was the
most effective tool against the partisans. The farmers were no longer
able to supply the guerillas with food and refuge. The most vicious
tactic was the wholesale deportation of approximately 300,000
Lithuanians in order to deprive the resistance of supporters. This
number represents one out of every ten Lithuanians. The Soviet
oppression soon became genocide, the systematic destruction of a
nation. As well as forced deportation, the Soviets attempted to
discredit the partisans by sending bands of NKVD men disguised as
partisans to commit atrocities. Many Lithuanian civilians began to
distrust partisans because of this strategy. These brutal efforts
eventually achieved their goal. The resistance began to whither and
die.

Throughout this period, the partisans were called
"bandits" or "criminals" by the Soviet authorities. This propaganda
tactic was intended to deny the partisans any political legitimacy and
to harm their public and international image. Soviet history works will
still label the various resistance members in Lithuania, the Ukraine,
and the other Baltic republics as "bandits."

In 1950, the resistance was unified under an
organization called the Movement of Lithuania's Struggle for Freedom
(MLSF, Lietuvos Laisvės Kovų Sąjūdis). The
MLSF was active in nine districts and waged war on active and passive
fronts. By this time, the ranks of the resistance had dwindled
significantly, causing the MLSF to change its strategy. The partisans
were unable to engage in many guerilla skirmishes because of manpower
and equipment shortages. Instead, the guerillas resorted to sabotage
and infiltration of Soviet collective farms. The partisans soon
realized that their war would soon end. Only a handful of embittered
men stayed in the forests to do battle with the occupier. In 1952,
collectivization was complete and the resistance died. The MLSF decided
to demobilize in favor of passive resistance. Passive resistance
continues to this day.

The last large unit of guerillas, the Iron Wolf
unit, survived until the fall of 1952. This did not represent the end
of the armed resistance. In 1955, Radio Vilnius offered an amnesty to
partisans, indicating that the government still perceived a guerilla
threat. In March 1956, the KGB offered yet another amnesty. In 1956
riots broke out, partly in protest of the Soviet intervention in
Hungary. Also in 1956, the partisan leader Vanagas (the Hawk, Adolfas
Ramanauskas, a U.S. born leader of the Resistance) was captured and
hanged in Kaunas. In 1957, several men were arrested for armed
resistance. In 1959, fifteen years after the Soviet re-occupation of
Lithuania, three partisans were captured in Samogitia. Many partisans
committed suicide, sometimes by detonating grenades at face level so
that their faces would not be identified, thereby dooming their
relatives to imprisonment. Thousands of partisans re-entered civilian
life under assumed names and family histories. Many probably survive to
this day. Finally, it must be remembered that although the partisans
retreated and demobilized, they never surrendered. Perhaps the
Lithuanians, who are still engaged in fighting the occupier, have won a
moral victory. Resistance, in the passive form, continues throughout
the Baltic states.

Concluding Remarks

Realistically, the Lithuanians' chance for victory
was slim at best, yet they tried very hard to make life difficult for
the Soviet occupiers. The Lithuanian resistance knew of the words of
the Atlantic Charter, a declaration of policy jointly issued by
President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister
Winston Churchill of Britain in 1941. The third clause of this
statement respects "the right of all people to choose the form of
government under which they will live" and wishes "to see sovereign
rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly
deprived of them."24
The resistance believed that the West would
implement the Atlantic Charter and demand freedom for the occupied
nations. The resistance did not believe that they could defeat the
occupation forces; they only sought to delay and harass the Soviets
until help arrived. The resistance hoped for liberation from the West.
Their disappointment was acute.

In the face of grave danger, the Lithuanian
"Forest Brotherhood" waged a guerilla action that defies belief. With
almost no outside aid, the Lithuanians waged a twelve-year effort (1940
to 1952) to liberate their nation. It has been estimated that the
Soviet Union's losses amount to around 70,000 NKVD and Red Army deaths.
For comparison, the United States lost 58,000 lives in the 15-year
Vietnam conflict (1960 to 1975). In strictly military terms, the
Lithuanian insurrection is on an equal footing with the Vietnam
conflict. Perhaps additional parallels can be drawn between Lithuania
and Afghanistan. If the Afghans fight with only a fraction of the
tenacity of the Lithuanians, the Soviets may face a losing battle.

When one adds the Lithuanian insurrection to the
rebellions in Latvia, Estonia, and the Ukraine, a grave threat to
Stalin's policies can be seen. Only through genocide, torture, and the
wholesale obliteration of villages could the Soviets suppress the
rebels. In the process, Lithuania was mauled. Over ten percent of the
Lithuanian population was deported. Only these barbaric measures
defeated the Lithuanian freedom fighters. If the measures necessary to
contain an insurrection are a valid measure of the magnitude of the
guerillas, then the Lithuanian resistance was significant.

The Lithuanian partisans fought with uncommon
bravery and determination against a military superpower. The partisans
felt that they were not only fighting for Lithuania, but for the free
world. As many as 40,000 Lithuanians died for this cause. Whether the
West recognizes it or not, the Lithuanians fought bravely for
democracy, as did others, such as Ukrainians, Poles, Latvians, and
Estonians. Perhaps they died for us.

1 According to the Lithuanian people and
international law, the Lithuanian Republic is a free republic under
hostile foreign occupation. Lithuanian Legations, representing the
former government of Lithuania exist in Washington and several other
cities throughout the world. William J. H. Hough III, "The Annexation
of the Baltic States and its Effect on the Development of Law
Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory," New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, Winter 1985, VI, 2.
2 Ibid. p. 487.
3 Dr. Albertas Gerutis, ed., Lithuania 700 Years (New York: Manyland
Books, 1969), pp. 277-278.
4 Ibid. p. 279.
5 I. Joseph Vizulis, Nations Under Duress (Port Washington, N.Y.: Associated Faculty Press, 1985), p. 101.
6 Joseph Pajaujis-Javis, Soviet Genocide in Lithuania (New
York: Manyland Books, 1980), p. 42. These figures are based upon
captured deportation lists which came into the possession of the
Lithuanian Red Cross. See A.
Merkelis, Lietuvių Archyvas (Lithuanian Archives) p. 49.
7 Vizulis, p. 104.
8 V. Stanley Vardys, Lithuania Under the Soviets (New York: Frederick F.
Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 66.
9 The full account of this massacre was given by the Lithuanian surgeon
who examined the remains, Dr. Leonards Plechavičius. Dr. Plechavičius
testified before the U.S. House of Representatives and detailed the
hideous details. Nearly every sort of torture had been inflicted. Boys
had been burned with acid or torches, various bodily appendages had
been severed, spikes had been thrust through skulls, and bones had been
crushed while the victims were still alive.
10 Gerutis, pp. 334-335.
11 As a final comment on the underground media, several authors,
including Vardys and
Gerutis, claim that the underground press rivaled, and perhaps
outnumbered the legal press, in terms of total circulation. In
addition, it should be noted that the LLKS operated the only opposition
radio station in the entirety of occupied Europe. The other resistance
radio stations operated out of allied territory.
12 E.J. Harrison, Lithuania's Fight for Freedom (New York: Lithuanian American Information Center), pp. 37-38.
13 The VLIK is still in existence to this day, with its headquarters in
Washington, D.C. Through the efforts of VLIK and its press agency,
ELTA, the Lithuanian people have not been forgotten.
14 Gerutis, pp. 346-347. Gerutis provided the entire text of the declaration in his work.
15 Ibid. p. 335.
16 Dr.Constantine Jurgėla, Lithuania: The Outpost of Freedom (St.Peterburg,
Florida: The National Guard of Lithuania in Exile, 1976, p.226.)
17 For comparison, the Soviet Union maintains approximately 170,000 security
troops in Afghanistan, a nation of 15 million people.
18 Gerutis, p. 366.
19 Ibid. p. 371.
20 The details of many individual partisan actions can be found in the works of Gerutis and
K.V. Tauras. All of the examples cited in this work have been mentioned in more than one source.
21 Gerutis, p. 368.
22 A full discussion of the Iron Curtain programs and Kim Philby can be found in
a number of works on espionage, including Harry Rozitzke's The ClA's Secret
Operations (New York, 1977).
23 Thomas Remeikis, Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 7945-7980 (Chicago, 1980), pp. 48-52.
24 Encyclopedia Americana (Danbury, Connecticut: Crolier, 1985), Vol. 22 p. 618.