William E. Black, stacker operator, age 47, was fatally injured
at 11:15 p.m. on January 14, 1997 when he attempted to clean a
conveyor end-roller and became entangled at the pinch point.
Black had two years mining experience, the past 11 weeks at this
operation. Black had been trained in accordance with 30 CFR Part
48. He had received Newly Employed Experienced Miner training on
October 30, 1996.

Clyde Drake, director of safety and security, notified MSHA of
the accident at 11:35 p.m. January 14, 1997. An investigation
was started the following day.

The Mt. Hamilton Mining Company mine,located 54 miles west of
Ely, White Pine County, Nevada, was a surface open pit, multiple
bench gold mine. It was owned and operated by Mt. Hamilton
Mining Company, a subsidiary of REA Gold Corp. of Vancouver, B.C.
Canada. The principal operating officials were Joe R. Dewey,
mine manager, and Clyde Drake, director of safety and security.
The mine operated two 12-hour shifts, seven days per week. A
total of 143 persons were employed at the mine.

Ore was transported by 40-ton Freightliner over-the-road trucks
to the crushing facility where it was crushed, screened to size,
and transferred by conveyor to a cyanide leach pad for
processing.

The last regular inspection at this operation was completed on
September 11, 1996.

PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED

The screen feed conveyor involved in the accident was designated
by the company as conveyor Number 2, and was manufactured by U.S.
Machinery Company. The conveyor was inclined at 30 degrees and
was 115 feet long with a self tracking, 36-inch wide, reinforced
nylon, rubberized belt. Raw material from the primary crusher
was transferred onto the belt at the tail pulley and conveyed to
the head pulley, where it was discharged into the primary
screening system. It was powered by a 1750 rpm, three phase, 480
volt AC, 50 horsepower, electric motor with a 15-to-1 gear ratio.

The tail pulley was a self cleaning, 18-inch diameter steel end-roller with slack adjuster bearing saddles affixed to the
conveyor framework. The framework was constructed of 3/8-inch
thick steel. The underside of the conveyor framework was 18
inches above ground level at the tail pulley. The center of the
end roller shaft was 32 inches above ground level. The side
opening in the framework was 30 inches long by 11-3/4 inches
high. The conveyor belt had tracked to within 1/2 inch of the
north (right) side and had a 5-1/2 inch gap on the south side.

The Number 2 screen conveyor was equipped with an emergency stop
device which could be activated with a stop cord. The stop cord
ran alongside the permanently secured walkway on the conveyor's
south side. The stop cord was about one foot from the location
where the victim became entangled in the pinch point and could
easily be reached. After the accident, the stop cord, as well as
the manually activated start-up warning horn, were tested and
found to be functioning properly.

The operator's control tower was located about 180 feet from the
Number 2 screen feed conveyor tail pulley and 25 feet above the
surrounding ground level. From the tower it was not possible to
see the area of the tail pulley where the accident occurred.

Conveyor guards were constructed of used screening material. The
top guard was 1-inch square mesh and the side and end guards were
3/4-inch square mesh. Guards were secured to the framework with
3/4-inch diameter bolts and nuts. The bolt heads were welded to
the frame. The left side guard for the Number 2 screen conveyor
tail pulley had been removed and two of the bolt nuts were found
in the victim's pocket.

The victim had a company issued, battery powered, CB radio in his
possession at the time of the accident.

The heater that the victim had taken to the conveyor to thaw
frozen material consisted of a 20-gallon propane tank supplying
fuel through a 1/8-inch, 20-foot nylon reinforced, rubberized
hose with a weed burner attached. A manual control on the burner
allowed the flame to be adjusted up to 18 inches in length.
Company policy and past practice, according to mine employees,
was to thaw built-up material located at the tail pulley with the
guards in place.

Illumination at the time of the accident consisted of four lights
mounted on top of the loader used to transport the propane
bottle; a pole mounted light about 18 feet northeast of the
pulley; and a portable multi-light located about 100 feet
southeast of the pulley.

The weather was mostly clear, with a light wind and below
freezing temperatures. There were patches of snow in the
immediate area; however, the area at the tail pulley had been
cleared of ice and snow.

William Black, stacker operator, began work at 6:00 p.m., his
regular starting time. Chris Martinez, crusher operator and lead
man, assigned Black to clean up around the primary crusher with
the loader/backhoe. About 11:00 p.m., Black received a request
from Martinez to go to the tail pulley and thaw accumulated
material. A propane fired weed burner was maintained on site for
this common winter-time occurrence. Normally, thawing of
material was undertaken with the guard in place.

Black loaded the propane tank and burner into the loader bucket
and transported them to the Number 2 tail pulley. He unloaded
the propane tank, removed the guard, and lit the burner. Because
it was not the practice to remove guards for thawing, it appears
that Black may have set the burner aside and removed the tail
pulley guard to dislodge a boulder in the pinch point between the
belt and tail pulley. He had two bolt nuts from the guard in his
pocket.

Shortly after 11:00 p.m., Tim Helms, crusher operator, attempted
to contact Black on the mobile radio but got no reply. He then
drove the loader he was operating to the Number 2 screen feed
conveyor tail pulley area and found Black, at 11:15 p.m.,
entangled in the tail pulley pinch point. Helms radioed Martinez
and told him to shut down the plant because Black was entangled
in the tail pulley. Martinez shut the plant down and called the
mine office for assistance. Robert Coca, an EMT, responed to the
request and upon traveling to the scene determined that there was
nothing that could be done for Black.

Helms used a razor knife to cut the upper section of the conveyor
belt to relieve belt tension. The county coroner and deputy
sheriff arrived about 1:45 p.m. Black was pronounced dead and
later transported to a mortuary in Ely, Nevada. Death was
attributed to massive crushing injuries.

CONCLUSION

Failure to deenergize and lockout the conveyor system while
performing work around the unguarded conveyor pulley was the
primary cause of the accident

CITATIONS/ORDERS

Order No. 7951440

Issued on January 15, 1997 under provisions
of Section 103(k) of the Mine Act:

On January 14, 1997, a surface miner was fatally injured when he
was drawn into a conveyor tail pulley. This order was issued to
insure the safety of persons until the affected areas of the mine
could be returned to normal oerations and was terminated on
January 16, 1997.

Citation No. 7951441

Issued on January 16, 1997 under the
provisions of section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30
CFR 56.14107(a):

On January 14, a surface miner was fatally injured while melting
frozen material when he was drawn into a conveyor tail pulley.
He had removed a guard, which allowed exposure to the moving
roller and belt pinch points.

This citation was terminated on January 23, 1997. The operator
conducted safety meetings on all shifts and posted memoranda
informing all employees of proper guarding and lock out
procedures.

Citation No. 7951442

Issued on January 16, 1997 under the
provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30
CFR 56.12016:

On January 14, a surface miner was fatally injured when he was
drawn into a conveyor tail pulley. The electrical power circuits
to the Number 2 screen feed conveyor drive motor were not de-energized and locked out. A metal guard was removed for the
purpose of cleaning a frozen build-up of mud from the tail pulley
end-roller.

This citation was terminated on January 23, 1997. The operator
posted a memorandum and conducted safety meetings on all shifts
addressing guarding and lockout procedures.