Still during the last millennium, I consumed the very tiny last bits of my oral competence in French – but remain able to feel astonished for the moral competence that is expressed in that language. First of all I’ve felt strange in the last years – having more and more French acquaintances, cooperations and colleagues around me – that for decades I’ve failed to recognise that Racine’s and Hugo’s language tends more and more to suppress expressions of the form „nous parlons“, „nous souhaitons“, „nous philosophons“ etc to prefer impersonal ones like „on parle“, „on souhaite“, „on philosophe“ etc.

On the first glance, this is awkward. „We talk“, you see, is arguably very much like „some talk“ – but far from being the same. In order to say the same as „we talk“ by using „some“, I have to say „some talk and I’m one of them“. But the French use an expression literally to be translated as „some talk“ meaning „we talk“.

This is gorgeous although philologically irritating and grammatically incorrect. And it is, in terms of political philosophy, rather Austrian in the following sense: in a very influential and much admired article, Schumpeter reduced social value to individual values. The one who’s content or discontent is not someone who can call himself „we“ but rather some are content or discontent and at the end you have to sum up. Popper saw tribalism lurking behind many general statements about „us“ – Europeans, Germans, Christians etc. Often when I hear „We are such-and-such“ I feel tempted to object „Talk about yourself and leave the other few millions alone or at least ask them first“.

I must become more fluent in French and use it in everyday conversation. It’s a language in which you don’t even feel tempted to think that the other is a tribalist – and this independently from his values! Isn’t this improving one’s standard of living?

The glimpse of the tri-country region consisting of the southwesternmost edge of the Black Forest in Germany (from where I took this video), Basel in Switzerland (urban, towers) and Alsace in France (vineyards at the other side of the river Rhine) I find interesting for reasons of ontology.

Borders are frames. Generally, geographical limits bound a geographical entity from all sides. Between three regions none of which is wedged among or inside the others, you can have one tri-country region. You have one between France, Germany and Switzerland. But you have two between Switzerland, Austria and Liechtenstein because this last country is wedged between the two former. Thus, the regional ontology of geography appears to be a branch of topology. Its constants are toponyms – NB proper names.

In contrast, ethnonyms, the names of the people of regions, are not proper but common names – and ones that resulted after huge semantic shifts.

As an aftermath, you can’t define „the Swiss“ as easily as you can define „Switzerland“. The only problem you have with the definition of the term „Switzerland“ is to capture territorial shifts through centuries while you maintain that it is a proper name. But it is not clear whether the term „the Swiss“ always referred throughout this time. It has been referring after 1848 for sure, but in the 15th century the only people you could call thus was the population of one landscape in the middle of the country. Another example: it’s been more or less clear for centuries where Alsace is. Still, who’s an Alsatian? – that’s the question of the century! Until the beginning of the XXth century, it was essential to Alsatians to speak their Germanic language. But an essential property of Alsatians today is to speak French whereas apologising for not speaking German.

The only grammars I know that clearly show that toponyms are proper names and ethnonyms common names is the Italian and the German: the former prescribes to capitalise „Ingleterra“, not however „inglese“, the latter capitalises all nouns. It’s so true! England will always be the country that the Angles once possessed. But the Angles, the English, the German, the Macedonians, all peoples of this world, are called thus simply because nominalism has a chance to be true.