Comments on: Death from Above? The Airborne Illusionhttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm
HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 5,000 articles originally published in our various magazines.Mon, 19 Mar 2018 21:14:00 +0000hourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.4By: Devantehttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-809255
Sun, 17 Jun 2012 00:02:16 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-809255I believe airborne operations can work even if they are market garden sized, the main problem would be enemy aircraft and anti aircraft fire. Both would have to be cut down for operations like those to work and they need to get a steady resupply which would be big. If I were General I would bring back the 11th, 13th, and 17th airborne, and redesignate the 101st back to jump status. Airborne divisions are a very valuable asset as a helicopter are very limited in range and are not exactly that silent. We learned a lot from Market Garden but the operation itself was not a failure, it was lack of sufficent resupply and the failure of the British III Corps to arrive on time to back up Arnhem. Please excuse me if I spelled Arnhem wrong, paratroopers are actually very sufficent they’re the digestive juice that spiders inject in their prey to dissolve their insides. And hopefully in the future, paratroopers will turen to orbital drop operations as dropping from space in drop pods will be the next step in Airborne/Spaceborne operations. If paratroopers had equals they will have to be marines, that was a random opinion. They both specialize in certain kind of operations.
]]>By: Willhttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-786625
Wed, 11 Jan 2012 20:06:32 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-786625Lol. Never happened.
]]>By: Demarchehttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-779822
Thu, 20 Oct 2011 22:18:17 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-779822Don’t know if ya’ll have heard this rumor about possibly a brigade of the 82nd being dropped into enemy fire at a Libyan air strip late Sept-early Oct.

Supposedly their intel had said the rebels had control, but it had been taken back by the Libyan army before the drop. Some reports had said over 380 82nd troops were killed. (If the mission was as large as a brigade it should become obvious at some point…there are only 3 in the 82nd, right?)

This is unconfirmed, but there has been a lot of reports and news anomolies that seem to lend credence to the rumor. One strange thing building on another.

Maybe if you guys have any insiders you might be able to get some info.

Surely, Obama, Clinton, Sec of Def, the generals and whoever else responsible should be impeached and/or held accountable.

This would be a travesty of the highest kind if these chickenhawk warmongers are playing fast and loose with some of our best and brightest and bravest! And since it is a ‘secret’ mission, we never know the truth…

]]>By: Willhttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-654956
Thu, 21 Jul 2011 12:59:38 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-654956I think the issue is more about size than anything else. Do we need an airborne asset? Absolutely. Does it need to be the size of a division? No. The 82nd Airborne needs to be built around their infantry regiments. The infantry and some slice elements would actually be the ones parachuting into combat and they should be the ones on jump status, not the whole division. Also, airborne training should be limited to only those heading to an airborne assignment in order to save money. Right now, the airborne is too bloated and needs to be streamlined.

We cannot give up our strategic ability to drop troops anywhere in the world within 18 hours, but we should look at the package and ask ourselves if it is really required to maintain such a large airborne force. I just feel that the 82nd Airborne infantry units should be designated as airborne commando regiments to act as the shock troops for conventional forces. We have the Rangers, but they work for USASOC and is a special operations outfit. The 82nd infantry has nearly the same capability as the Rangers and they should be converted to a more commando type of role that conventional commanders can use at their disposal.

The mixed record of airborne ops has more to do with planning and execution than the actual use of the insertion method. Airborne ops are inherently dangerous (did my share of mass tactical jumps), but can be extremely effective for specific operations to either seize territory or assault key targets in a area. We have small kinetic engagements in today’s world and airborne ops would be great in this atmosphere. WWII is a bad example to talk about the shortcomings of the airborne. It was a massive undertaking against a sizeable enemy force. Mistakes and failures were bound to happen at times given the scope of the missions and the logistics involved which only points at the shortcomings of the period since back in those days they could not drop any support elements like artillery and armor to help add to the combat power of the light infantry.

We still need the airborne, but it definitely needs to be changed.

]]>By: Jonhttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-527804
Tue, 19 Apr 2011 00:21:54 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-527804Seems everyone is centered on Airborne Ops in WWII. The Grenada drop by Army Rangers to rescue our medical students worked fairly well, as did the Ranger and 82nd boys in the Panama drop in 1989. Also in 1967 the 173rd jumped in the 2/503rd in Vietnam without any loss of life and was well supplied immediately. They were used as a blocking force in operation Junction City. That operation included a number of 105mm howitzers and their ammo being dropped. The 173rd made another combat jump into Iraq in 2003 to open the Northern front when Turkey refused to allow our 4th ID to move throught their space. The 173rd dropped in about 1000 of its paratroops along with some SF guys. Other SF soldiers were already on the ground and being used as Pathfinders to mark the DZ which was an Iraqi airfield. Follow on troops landed in cargo aircraft. This operation worked very well.

Lets not forget that the 82nd Airborne was the first U.S. conventional ground combat force to arrive after Iraq invaded Kuwait. They were not dropped in but landed in Saudi Arabia. Since they were already packed and on stand-by as our quick reaction force, they were the first boots on the ground. It was kind of funny since the Navy came in soon after and gave the 82nd boys the food that was to be given to the Marines who the Navy thought would be the first ground force to arrive. It upset the Marines greatly to see the soldiers eating their chow.

]]>By: Sam McGowanhttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-329544
Fri, 03 Sep 2010 01:27:13 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-329544Cyprus should read Crete. What the heck, they are both Greek islands!
]]>By: Sam McGowanhttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-329540
Fri, 03 Sep 2010 01:23:21 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-329540The problem with airborne operations in WW II was that the Allies never used them as intended. The Germans did, but their operation at Cyprus failed because the British controlled the seas around the island. The Nadzab operation in the Southwest Pacific was a complete success, as was Corregidor. In Europe the First Allied Airborne Army was created as a large airborne army to carry out “bold” plans, such as seizing airfields and establishing an airhead deep inside occupied territory onto which troop carrier transports would fly conventional infantry and even artillery. Even though Marshall and Arnold pushed for such operations, Bradley was reluctant to carry them out. Operation MARKET was a complete success. The failure was on the part of the British III Corps to advance, not to mention a failure of intelligence. The airborne operations in Sicily, on D-Day and Southern France all accomplished their objectives. Granted, there were heavy losses in Sicilty but most of them were due to trigger-happy Allied soldiers and sailors who opened up on the low-flying transports with everything they had.
]]>By: Justinhttp://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-257720
Fri, 23 Apr 2010 01:25:19 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-257720Dr.Citino,
Did not the concept of vertical envelopment geometrically expand operational art? It might be anachronistic to say that the American planners and commanders understood the elements of operational design during World War II; however, they certainly were able to link those concepts to create successful airborne operations. Paratroopers offered the allies an operational reach well beyond anything mechanized forces could attain in a few days or weeks. Airborne operations provided both depth and simultaneity to amphibious operations. Paratroopers could seize decisive points (geographic places) well in advance of ground forces. Finally, they gave Allied commanders the ability to control the tempo of the operation. This forced the Germans to expand energy and time preparing for an airborne assault that could come at any location or time. There was risk involved and that was clearly understood by Eisenhower prior to Operation OVERLORD. However, when all the above elements are taken into account, I believe the benefits outweighed the dangers. These risks were mitigated somewhat by jumping at night and by the extensive training the airborne divisions undertook.
Regarding successful airborne operations, I believe Operation VARSITY was already mentioned as a success but were there not more? Besides Operation DRAGOON, the Pacific theater offers two great examples. The 11th Airborne Division jump on Los Banos as well as the 503rd PIR jump on Corregidor were both successful.
]]>By: Bill Nance (the Elder)http://www.historynet.com/death-from-above-the-airborne-illusion.htm#comment-244181
Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:14:25 +0000http://historynet.wpengine.com/?p=13682151#comment-244181Rob

One of your earlier comments about the lack of heavy weapons in an airborne operation are spot on! Having been engaged in “professional” wargaming for some time and using the results of those wargames to validate or write operational plans, two major concerns always came to the fore in developing the plans for an air assault (whether it was airborne or air assault) and that was 1) how do you get supporting artillery (and ammunition) to the LZ and 2) how soon can you push through with a ground relief due to the lack of logistics and heavy weapons. Too many times I saw a BDE air assault successfully secure their objective only to be destroyed by a lack of counterfire assets. The comments by Bill Nance (the Younger) about covering the “Paras” with air until you establish the link-up is a very modern American paradigm because of the overwhelming air superiority we have enjoyed since the latter days of WW-II and the better technology of our aircraft and air delivered munitions. However, imagine a much less permissive air environmet either through enemy air defense systems or weather (it still has a significant effect on the amount and accuracy of air delivered weapons).

One should consider that Operation Market, which was the airborne part of the operation, went pretty well, including the drops – especially considering they were in daylight. Very low casualties, accurate drops, and accurate follow-up glider landings. Remember, once the drop and assembly ends, it is no longer an airborne operation; the vertical envelopment is over.

The final phase of Operation Market was the ground tactical plan being executed by light infantry forces (the airborne units). Even considering the poor intelligence around the Arnhem area, the Operation Market ground tactical plan, designed for taking and holding the bridges for 3 days in order to set conditions for Operation Garden, went exceedingly well. I believe holding objectives for 7 days (4 days beyond the plan) with light infantry against enemy armor would be considered quite a success by most people.

What didn’t go well was the planning and execution of Operation Garden, the ground maneuver unit plan. Planning on using one route, through restrictive terrain, with a less than aggressive exection of such, caused the airborne ground maneuver units to have to hold well beyond the 3 days against increasing enemy firepower. Eventually, that is what caused the failure and high casualties of M-G, not the airborne operation and vertical envelopment, however the Poles might beg to differ since the bad intell around Arnhem caused them to take massive casualties during their airborne operation on Day 2 or 3 I believe.

While large scale airborne operations success may be arguable, before painting them with the brush of failure perhaps we need to examine them in more detail and make sure we seperate the airborne operation from other factors that may have led to less than optimal outcomes. Operation Market, examined by itself, was a success. Operation Garden was a dismal failure. Due to the failure of Operation Garden, Operation Market-Garden failed.