Brian May wrote:
> Unfortunately, it is not as simple as just updating the
> virus signatures on every upgrade.
>
> There are hacks in /usr/sbin/amavisd, for instance, the unmangle_sender
> routine to be precise, that attempts to guess the "true" sender name
> (and not a the forged address) based on the virus that was detected.
>
> I would imagine that this needs to be kept up to date.
>
> Yes, this function could be seperated into a data file, but what are you
> gaining by seperating it? A user could break amavis just be replacing
> it with a bad version, just the same as a user could break amavis be
> installing a broken version of the deb package from stable.
The more you say, the more I realize that amavis is not suited for
stable. I would be glad if you could take the proper steps to preserve
it's inclusion in the next stable release.
Regards,
Joey
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