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Friday, January 31, 2014

China and Islam: The Double Edged Sword

China
has recently been subject to terrorist attacks by its Uyghur Muslim
minority, most notably in Tiananmen Square in October, 2013. International
opinion doubts that the attacks were related to Islamic militancy,
while Beijing is insistent that Uyghur jihadists are to blame. Is
Beijing now facing its own war on terrorism? Or is China putting the
Islamic cart before the Uyghur horse? How Beijing handles the Uyghur
issue may be key to China's future relations with Islamic states and
Muslims worldwide as the spectre of Islamic militancy in China looms
larger, Paul Cochrane in Beirut reports.

On
29 October, a Uyghur man, accompanied by his wife and mother, rammed
his Jeep through the barriers at Tiananmen Gate, wreaking death and
destruction in the symbolic heart of the capital. All three occupants
burned to death when the vehicle caught fire.

It
was a startling act in one of the most surveilled areas of Beijing,
and the authorities were quick to link the attack to the East
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),
a shadowy organization that wants independence for the Uyghurs, an
ethnic Turkic-speaking people from the autonomous region of Xinjiang.
Some two weeks later, 11 people were killed in an attack by armed Uyghurs on a police station in Serikbuya, some 400 km southwest of
Urumqi, the capital of the North-Western region.

The
incidents have put the Uyghurs under the spotlight as part of the
“Three
Evil Forces” (terrorism, separatism, and extremism) policy to be
contained by Beijing, with the Tiananmen incident the most
significant involving the Uyghurs since major demonstrations in
Urumqi in 2009.

But
was the attack in Tiananmen of an Islamic bent, or instead connected
to Uyghur grievances over Beijing's policies in Xinjiang? Beijing
however has not been forthcoming in laying out the evidence, making
it difficult for observers to gauge the truth.

“There is
significant doubt out there about the claims of the Chinese
government, not just from human rights activists, but also from the
U.S. State Department and academia,” said Henryk Szadziewski,
Senior Researcher of the Uyghur Human Rights Project in Washington
D.C. “In relation to the broader claim from the Chinese government
that the Uyghurs are moving towards militancy, we need more
information than we are getting, and claims surrounding the ETIM have
not been corroborated.”

More forthcoming
information on the incident and the connection to the ETIM would
assuage such doubts internationally, as well as to prove to Uyghurs
that the attack did have an Islamic bent and is not being utilized
for an unwarranted clampdown on Uyghur Muslims.

“You don't put curtains
around an incident like in Tiananmen, instead you let the lenses of
the world see if it's true and have an independent investigation so
there is not so much suspicion on both sides,” said Dru
Gladney, an expert on China and Professor of Anthropology at Pomona
College, California.

What observers are
finding hard to swallow is that the Tiananmen incident was not an
individual attack – like many other incidents that have occurred in
the country - but an orchestrated operation linked to an organization
like the ETIM. “Whats seems un-credible is that it was an organized
attack by ETIM. It didn't have any signature of a coordinated attack
but rather the hallmark of a psychotic, crazed individual,” said
Gladney. “That is what is puzzling about China portraying it as a
terrorist threat, as no attacks have the signature of Al Qaeda or the
like, as there has been no large infrastructure attacks on airports,
power plants or installations.”

Furthermore there
are doubts that the ETIM exists at all, which the US took off its
list of terrorist organizations in 2008, after listing it in the wake
of the 11 September, 2001 attacks. “Terrorist analysts say ETIM did
this and did that, but I have never seen primary sources that it
exists, and human rights groups say it doesn't either, probably quite
rightly,” said Jacob Zenn,

an analyst of
Eurasian affairs at the Jamestown Foundation and an expert on Islamic
terrorism.

If the group does
exist, analysts believe it has limited operational capacity.

“From what I see
it is not an organized or concerted terror organization of which Uyghurs are a part of. Those attributed to ETIM, if it exists, are
very unsophisticated, and don't show any real sign of premeditated or
organized attacks. A lot of the
grievances or violence this summer were locally based, like land
grabs and restrictions on religion, as there is no system where
people can air those grievances. The idea that such violence is
organized by outside forces is dubious,” said Szadziewski.

This is not to
suggest that there is not growing discontent among the Uyghurs that
erupts into sporadic violence, as the recent attacks more than
highlight. Uyghur demands for greater autonomy and separatism have
grown stronger in recent years amid widespread feeling that
Xinjiang's ethnic populace is not getting as good a deal as it could
from the central authorities. As in many regions around the world,
the situation is reflective of a clash of ideas and cultures between
urban centers and rural peripheries, where getting economic and
social development right has proven fraught, whether in the West, the
Muslim world, Russia or indeed China.

“In my opinion,
there is a genuine movement among Uyghurs, but it is not a single
one, there are many. Some are political, others have a more religious
nature. Whether there's a terrorist threat or not I can't say, but I
don't think there is any imminent threat for China,” said James
Frankel, an expert on China and Associate Professor, Department of
Religion, at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

With the Uyghurs
not as culturally assimilated into mainstream Han Chinese culture as
the Hui Muslims, Uyghurs feel that they are being unfairly singled
out as a terrorist threat, and compounded by being Muslim. Such
vilification is termed Islamophobia – fear of Muslims as the
“other.” But such Islamophobia can cause unintended consequences,
as it could feed into the narrative being pushed by radical Islamists
that there is a war on Islam. The media in China has largely been
responsible for allowing such Islamophobia to manifest in the wake of
the Tiananmen attack.

“My concern is
the way the attack was reported, that the government allowed this
hysteria and undocumented accusations to run rampant in the media and
social media, as it further marginalizes the Uyghurs and makes the
situation worse,” said Gladney.

The situation in
Xinjiang is a Catch 22 for China and the Uyghurs, with neither side
able to “win” outright. Beijing will not give greater autonomy,
yet alone allow a separate, independent state, as that could set the
precedent for other problematic regions like Inner Mongolia and
Tibet, while Xinjiang is an important source of raw materials and
geostrategically crucial as it borders the Central Asia states. But
by not addressing core Uyghur grievances risks further attacks, and
possibly in the future, more definitive “textbook” Islamic
terrorism.

Blowback?

To Gladney, the Uyghur cause is not an Islamic one and furthermore, Uyghur Islam is
not conducive to the kind of extremist Sunni Islam apparent in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria or Iraq today, which for instance
considers music, dancing and saint worship as un-Islamic. “Many of
the hallmarks of Uyghur identity are an anathema to Jihadi groups as
they are mainly Sufi or infused with Sufism such as tomb patronage
and respect for saints. They also exalt in their own culture, in
dance and the epic Muqam songs,” said Gladney.

However, this can
change and appears to be happening, similar to how elements of the
Kashmiri Muslim community - which had followed a “lighter,” less
dogmatic version of Islam - were radicalized in the ongoing dispute
between India and Pakistan over the mountainous region.

Gladney added that
there been a reported rise in conservatism among Chinese Muslims and Uyghurs in particular, “although that is true globally. The
government is clearly worried, with a great deal of fear and anxiety
about radical Islam spreading in China.”

Zenn
thinks that Uyghur separatist tendencies will take on more of an
Islamic tone as nationalism is not as popular a rallying theme in the
Islamic world. “It is about Islamo-nationalism, and if an
organization says it wants to be separatist and secular, it doesn't
have the same appeal. An Islamic state does (have appeal), and I
think that is the way the Uyghurs are going,” he said.

China is home to
21.6 million Muslims - 1.6% of the population, and 1.4% of the
world's Muslims - according to an official census, while other
estimates put the number as high as 100 million.Whatever the
exact figure is, it is a significant number. Uyghurs number around 10
million, with the remainder primarily Hui Muslims. The Hui, as noted,
are better integrated into mainstream China, and have not posed
problems while Beijing has held up the Hui for the world to see as
evidence of its benign policies towards Muslims in China.
“Some Uyghurs have conformed, and others not, and that is also
where tensions come from. China rewards those that conform but
similarly China has to have a method to deal with those that “corrupt
national unity,” as that often involves curtailing rights,” said
Frankel.

The Uyghur issue
could be an Achilles heel for Beijing internationally if a perception
develops that China is cracking down on Muslims, as happened in 2009.
While only Turkey officially spoke out – reflective of China's
good relations with Muslim countries in general – there was
response from the religious community. “No other country spoke out,
but some members of the Iranian religious elite made statements,
although not on behalf of the government,” said Frankel.

Furthermore, according to a
leaked US Embassy cable, “two Islamist parties in Algeria,
the Movement for Society and Peace (MSP - part of the governing
coalition) and Ennahda, sent delegations to the Chinese embassy to
voice their concern over the treatment of the Muslim Uyghur community
in China. This was followed by Algeria's Higher Islamic Council
publicly denouncing the 2009 crackdown.”

Analysts suggest that Muslim
states are not likely to voice any criticism in the advent of any
future clampdown to not jeopardise economic or political bilateral
ties - Turkey included which has strengthened relations, including
militarily, this past year - but the risk lies with how non-state
actors and Muslim public opinion will react.

“Now that China
is rising to the level of world power, I don't know whether it is
ironic or predictable that some of these non-state organizations that
claim to represent Muslims see China as another power that subjugates
Muslims,” said Frankel.

While there is the argument
that radical Islam has decreased in recent years, with the
assassination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 a factor in that, on the
other hand arenas like Syria and Iraq show that Islamic extremism is
very much alive and kicking. Indeed, the uprisings in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) has propelled political and militant Islam
back into international politics. Yet while China has tried to stay
out of the MENA's messy politics and adopt a more neutral stance over
the conflict in Syria, Beijing's support for the regime of Bashar
Assad has not gone unnoticed.

Indeed, China's support for
Syria means, by proxy, that it is against Islamic rebel groups like
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Al Nusra Front.
“This has already been brought it up in a Jihadist
video,” said Zenn. “I think there will be blow back on the “Arab
Street” or “Islamic street” from what China is doing. I
wouldn't be surprised if Chinese workers or diplomats come under fire
around the Islamic world.”

Earlier this year,
a YouTube video surfaced of a Han Chinese convert to Islam – who
had fought in Libya and Syria – telling Beijing to end its support
for Assad or “all Islamic countries of the world will unite to
impose economic sanctions against the Chinese government.” He went
on to say that Beijing has destroyed “the traditional friendship
between the Chinese and Arab people” because China along with Iran
and Russia “sell weapons and provide financial assistance to the
Assad government.”

Regional
concerns

The ingredients would seem to
be there for China to become a target of Islamic groups domestically
and internationally. “I
think China has the advantage right now of being a spectator, but it
can't for too long. There was a period when the US was not aware or
bothered by Islam either,” said Frankel.

At this juncture, a question to
raise is whether state actors would be willing to utilize Islamic
groups against China. If history is anything to go by, the West, its
Middle Eastern allies and Pakistan have used Islamic groups for their
own ends, from false flag operations to trying to undermine the
political status quo.

China
however has tight connections with the nations most involved in
political and militant Islam, from the two Wahhabi Islamic monarchies
of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to Sudan and Syria, while also having
strong relations with the only Islamic republics in the world, Iran,
Pakistan, Mauritania and Afghanistan. Given the amount of trade with
such countries – with China a major buyer of energy in particular –
there would appear little appetite to sour relations by utilizing
Islamic groups for leverage.

“We know there
are Al Qaeda sympathisers still in Saudi Arabia, but what influence
they have in deals between Beijing and Riyadh is anybody's guess. I
think on a state level, you will not see the Saudis really antagonize
Beijing in that way, because the volume of trade is so great,” said
Gladney.

Unless
relations deteriorate with current allies, the immediate outside risk
would appear the US and India. While the US has a history of working
covertly with Islamic groups, its current position is to contain
China militarily, primarily via Japan and Taiwan, and through
strengthening military relations with India. The US has not yet had
any cause to seek to undermine China via the Xinjiang arena, but
Washington's support for the World Uyghur Congress is a bone of
contention, which Beijing considers a terrorist organization that
could be used as political leverage.

As
for India, its external intelligence agency, the Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW), has been involved for decades in Afghanistan to
undermine its nemesis Pakistan.Given India and
China's often tense relations (the two did go to war in 1962),
leverage could be utilized by RAW against China if relations
deteriorated. For instance, according to a 2009 US Embassy Cable
quoting Beijing University Islamic Studies Professor Wu Binbin,
“Uyghur extremists had previously received training from the
India-supported Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.” RAW was also
covertly involved in supporting the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
in their separationist war against the Sri Lankan state in the 1980s.
This does not suggest that Delhi would use such tactics against China
via Islamist groups, but it does demonstrate that India's
intelligence service has the capabilities to do so.

Conjecture aside, the primary
threat comes from non-state actors in the Middle East, and more
closer to home, Central Asia, which shares a 4,300 mile
border with China. As veteran Pakistani
journalist Ahmed Rashid observes in Descent Into Chaos: “Central Asia, but especially
Uzbekistan, remains a powder keg,” and there is a need “to pay
much closer and better attention to the region to contain the fallout
from any political or social explosion there. Central Asia is the new
frontier for Al Qaeda, and at present there is no leadership in
Central Asia effective enough to resist it.”

What will play a major factor
in how the situation may play out is the future of Afghanistan once
the US and NATO roll back their operations in the country in 2014.
Indeed, China views relations with Afghanistan and
Pakistan through the lens of its concerns about stability in
Xinjiang. “I think China is trying to anticipate these issues by
stepping up work in the MENA, with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as well
as with Afghanistan and Pakistan,” said Szadziewski. “The
withdrawal from Afghanistan is key, how Beijing handles that and its
approach to the Islamic world. They are at a cross roads right now as
China may have to get more involved in security in unstable areas.”

Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan's membership of the Shanghai
Cooperation Agreement has eased concerns of Islamic militants basing
themselves in these countries for cross-border attacks. Pakistan
however has not always acted as Beijing has wanted.

“Pakistan is a
big ally of China but at the same time has been unable or unwilling
to kick out Uyghur militants. At some point push might come to shove
and China will have to try and make Pakistan do something about it or
else do it themselves, as in 10 years they may have good drone
capabilities,” said Zenn.

Ultimately, it would appear in
Beijing's long-terms interests to deal with the Uyghurs in a
pragmatic and not antagonistic fashion to avoid providing fertile
ground for radical Islam to take hold. An irate Uyghur
population is a thorn in China's side, but an irateUyghur population with a global Islamic cause to rally around would
be a knife in China's side. China does not want to become a target
for global jihad as its influence expands around the world.

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Paul Cochrane is the Media Director and Co-Founder of Triangle Consultants (triangleconsultants.net) in Beirut, where he has lived since 2002. He has written for over 80 publications worldwide, covering business, media, politics and culture in the Middle East, East Africa and the Indian subcontinent. He is also a media commentator, and has appeared on CBS-NYC radio, Canada's CTV and CBC Radio, Press TV, Etejah TV, Future TV, Al Manar, Sahar TV, Today FM Ireland, and South Korea's TBS eFHM radio.