Except in the case of documents with numbered
paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been
omitted, diamonds (♦) are used to indicate the omission of one or
more paragraphs.

Chapter V:

Washington or London?

In no war of American history were preparations for civil affairs as
energetic as in World War II and yet in none was as long a time required
for their completion. That more than two years elapsed before all the
major national and combined control agencies had been established and
their basic functions defined is partly explained by the fact that the
civil affairs mission was of unprecedented scope. But the cause of the
delay lay also in the novelty of the approach taken in important phases of
the organizational problem. Firm decisions on this problem could not be
made until issues more controversial than any of previous wars had been
settled to the satisfaction of all whose jurisdiction was involved. Even
preparations on the purely national level were enormously complicated, as
has been seen, by the initial intention of departing from the tradition of
exclusive Army control; only after primary responsibility had been
entrusted to civilian agencies in French North Africa and, after long
debate, the effort adjudged unsatisfactory could the Army begin to shape
its organization to a task of known responsibilities.

This delay on the national level in turn tended to postpone the attempt to
come to close quarters with the even more complicated problem of organizing
civil affairs control on the combined level. Aside from the ad hoc and rather loose agencies required for the limited
problems of civil affairs co-operation in French North Africa, combined machinery could not be established until the United States
as well as Great Britain had created an agency to centralize its control of
civil affairs both nationally and in international relations. The problem of
combined organization also involved an inherent difficulty for, with the
decision to dispense with the separate zones that had usually characterized
international military government of the past, it became necessary to provide
for reconciliation of national policies by creating tightly knit control organs
on the highest level. The greatest difficulty of all came into view when it was
discovered, as soon as discussions began, that Great Britain and the United
States were approaching the problem of combined control from premises as
divergent as those which had separated American military and civilian agencies
on the question of national control. Thus a second great debate was
necessary-one which if only because of international comity was conducted with
more restraint than the first but with scarcely less strength of feeling. Once
again the issue was the U.S. Army's share in control but in this case the Army
was the sole representative of the nation.

With both governments desirous of instituting full collaboration as early as
possible, it is evident that only a matter of such major moment as control could
have protracted debate on the basic issues from March 1943 till the early part of 1944. Many minor differences in civil affairs

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procedure existed and, in addition, a major divergence in administrative
philosophy. These issues could probably have been compromised rather quickly if
the organizational question alone had been involved. But the nature of combined
control machinery would have an important bearing upon the major problem of
Allied military government and in fact of all international collaboration-the
problem of how to reconcile common with national interests. On the one hand, it
was hoped that conflicting views of this problem would be reduced to a minimum
if, instead of being left to take place haphazardly in every phase of
operations, they were considered as early as possible by a high-level policy
body whose familiarity with the basic facts of the civil affairs task as a whole
would give the best promise of compromise. On the other hand, it was feared that
if the combined body placed either partner in a position of advantage it would
be able under the guise of compromise to shape civil affairs policy unduly in
its own interest.

The hopes were greater than the fears because the two countries had common
political values, including a common regard for equitable dealing on differences
that required reconciliation. The caution evinced was prompted in large measure
by the duty of every governmental agent to consult his apprehensions more than
his hopes in representing his country's interest, but it rested also upon
concrete experience in the initial phase of Anglo-American civil affairs
relations. Thus all had not been harmonious in the family when the United
States, which wanted to leave the French people free to determine eventually
their own political destiny, at first favored excluding the de Gaullists from
control in French North Africa despite earlier British support of General de
Gaulle. Later, when planning for Sicily began, British authorities had argued that the paramountcy of their country's strategic interests in the
Mediterranean entitled it to the senior role in military government rather than
merely the equal partnership recommended by General Eisenhower. Continuing
differences in point of view could be expected from the general background of
the two partners on the one hand a country which, because its involvements in
foreign power politics were occasional rather than constant, could afford to
identify its primary interests with broad principles of international order; on
the other hand a nation which, forced to consider short-range as well as
long-range interests, tended to alternate unpredictably between pious
international declarations and the position that until a better world was
actually at hand some of the precautions of traditional power politics could not
be safely dispensed with.

It may at first appear that each government could have expected adequate
protection for its interests in the principle of concurrent decisions, which had
been taken for granted in Anglo-American collaboration from the beginning. But
this principle, while ensuring that each government would have freedom of action
in any issue wherein agreement could not be reached, came really to very little
because during military government in the theaters every major operational issue
would have demanded eventually some sort of agreement whether for better or for
worse. Thus the only meaningful protection of national interests would lie in
ensuring that negotiations took place on terms of complete equality, and, since
equality was theoretically already assured by the principle of concurrent
decision, what was still needed may be designated as practical equality. This
more tenuous kind of equality has probably been sought in every attempt at
international organization but the record of the Anglo-American negotiations is of unique value to the student of

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international relations in its clear indication of both the nature and the
motivating force of the concept. Practical equality has to do with the relative
degree of power or influence acquired by each partner in an enterprise through
all the terms or circumstances under which it is conducted. It is not something
which is specified in the charter of an international enterprise but an
objective in the light of which the entire charter is drawn.

To illustrate the intricate calculus of practical equality as worked out by
Americans, the site of the proposed combined committee was of major importance
because government agents stationed in a foreign country are under the
disadvantage of being away from their own principals and of being exposed, even
if only unconsciously, to the subtle but powerful influences arising from the
presence of high-level authorities of the other country as also of its entire
body of technical experts. This consideration applied to the assumption that
only a single combined committee would be created; if control were divided
between a committee in Washington and a committee in London it would be
important to note the distribution of functions lest the major areas of
responsibility were assigned to the latter. But perhaps more important than
anything-and pertinent even if civil affairs policy were entrusted to a single
committee located in Washington-was the avoidance of any stipulation which would
tend to obligate the committee to give special weight to the objectives of
previous British planning, which especially in the British civilian economic
agencies had gone much farther than that of their American counterparts.

The truth is that American civil affairs authorities did not start out with
any hyper-nervous approach to Anglo-American relations but became cautious only
after receiving British proposals which from the American point of view were
almost wholly on the wrong tack. The British opened the discussion with a proposal
to begin the transfer of the combined control of civil affairs to British and
American civilian agencies at an early stage. This not only seemed to entail
divided control in the theater before the theater commander could consider it
safe but appeared also to give the British the advantage of being represented by
civil affairs agencies which had achieved a far more elaborate organization than
the American civilian agencies had as yet developed. As the discussions
progressed further, London met American views on the duration of military
responsibility and proposed a scheme of control which was, indeed, on an equal
basis insofar as it envisaged one combined agency in Washington and another in
London. But the committee in London, which was to be formed by adding American
representatives to the Administration of Territories Committee (Europe) (AT(E)
), was to have jurisdiction over the European Theater, which, aside from Italy,
comprised the most important areas of Europe. American misgivings became still
greater when the British pressed the thesis that combined supply planning for
northwest Europe should be based upon planning which had already been
accomplished for that area by their own agencies. It was not difficult to
presume the informed character of British planning but Americans could not
overlook the fact that the premises of this planning were largely different from
their own, especially in including in the military supply program categories of
supplies which in the United States were the responsibility of civilian
agencies.

Among American civilian as well as military authorities there was general
agreement that these proposals would have the effect of entrenching British
leadership and policy in civil affairs relations with the countries of northwest
Europe, and there

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were more than a few Americans who believed that the British had presented
them with this aim in view. If the British had such an ambition it would not
have been an unnatural one in view of their strong political interests in the
adjacent European areas. But the fact remained that the United States had never
consented to play the game under the rule of spheres of special influence, and
such a rule seemed the less equitable because the huge civilian supply program
would have to be sustained chiefly by American resources. It is true that the
British position had in its favor administrative expediency- the advantage of so
dividing civil affairs functions as to utilize as much as possible the greater
proximity of London to the European governments in exile and the longer and
fuller experience of British planners in respect to the problems of northwest
Europe. But it seemed feasible to make adequate use of these British advantages
only at the expense of carrying division of functions to the extreme of
bifurcating the control of civil affairs policy making. American military
leaders saw in the British proposal a revival of the same evil of divided
control that they had finally succeeded in terminating in their relations with
civilian agencies. They considered that the existence of two major civil affairs
committees separated by the ocean would mean the artificial division of a
problem that was essentially unitary, would result in duplication and waste of
effort, and would entail the risk of impasse when the two committees pursued
different policies on common problems. While in theory unified control would not
completely satisfy the principle of equality-for one control organ could not be
in two capitals-yet, realistically considered, the proper site of the senior
civil affairs committee seemed to be dictated by the location of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Thus American authorities proposed a civil affairs committee situated in Washington, subordinated to the CCS and primarily
military in its composition, and possessing general jurisdiction though assisted
(as was added in a later recommendation) by a subcommittee for civilian supply.
Both committees would be free either to accept or to reject the conclusions of
previous British planning but the special facilities in London for detailed
planning for the European Theater would be recognized by the addition of
American representatives to the AT(E) Committee.

British formal acceptance of the American proposals for the Combined Civil
Affairs Committee came only after months of negotiations so tortuous and
finespun that a single article of the draft CCAC charter, such as that giving
special rights with respect to liberated Pacific islands to whichever government
enjoyed previous possession, might go through revision after revision until each
party was satisfied that every punctilio of phrasing took proper care of its
just interests. The selections from the documentary record of the negotiations
reflect the inexhaustible patience and semantic ingenuity required of
negotiators if a close international partnership is to get started. One learns
also that however careful the preparations, the formal beginning of the
partnership gives no assurance that it will continue if its charter compromises
disagreements with such vague wording as to be subject to different
interpretations. One can imagine the discouragement of American authorities when
they learned, after an interval so short that the birth pains of CCAC were still
fresh in memory, that they and the British had completely different ideas about what the newly created CCAC was.

The Americans believed that the CCAC was the senior combined civil affairs
agency but the British, as they made clear in objecting to the American proposal
to place the draft civil affairs agreement with

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Norway before the CCAC, believed that it was merely the partner of a combined
agency in London which had jurisdiction over civil affairs in the European
Theater. Thus the issue of unified versus divided control had not been settled
at all, and Americans in their struggle for maximum freedom of action had merely
worked themselves into a trap unless they should now make their own
interpretation of the agreement prevail. The American negotiators had not
foreseen that, despite the absence of any express limitation upon the
jurisdiction of CCAC, the acknowledgment of a role for the London committee
would be interpreted as an implicit limitation upon the seniority of the former
rather than as the assignment of a minor function to the latter. The British
representatives in Washington had not foreshadowed such an interpretation, and
probably the cause of the misunderstanding-a -confirmation of American fears on
the separation of principals and agents-was that London took or came to take a
different view of the CCAC charter from that of its representatives. Americans
could argue that London's interpretation was farfetched but could not prove that
it was wrong. With each side convinced that its own legal argument was correct
and the other's the rationalization of a desire for seniority, it was impossible
to avoid the spectacle of a partnership set up for the control of others turning
into one in which there was passive resistance of each partner to the other. For
several months neither the Washington committee nor the London committee could function
because, pending settlement of the jurisdictional issue, the British withheld
their co-operation in the former and the Americans their collaboration in the
latter. At this stage, even though the impasse did not become publicly known,
there were doubtless those on both sides who questioned the wisdom of having attempted so intimate a partnership.

How the Americans and British found their way out of this seeming impasse
illustrates the necessity of persistent hope and effort in seeking international
compromise. This is, to be sure, itself a business not without danger, and it
has been a common assumption among Americans-though not among Europeans who have
dealt with representatives of the United States-that American negotiators tend,
out of either excessive kindness of heart or sheer naiveté, to give up much more
than they obtain. The present case is of peculiar interest in that the principal
responsibility in negotiation was carried by American military authorities who,
because this was their first intensive experience in the international politics
of civil affairs, might have been expected to err somewhat on the side of
concession. Yet, however cordial their personal relations with their British
colleagues, their intransigence in the issue ended only when it became possible
to effect a settlement in which no major American objective was abandoned. But
the art of successful compromise demands that one attempt to avoid the
appearance of a victory for either side, and matters were so arranged that no
substantial British interest or point of prestige was sacrificed. The United States,
victorious in its claim as to the jurisdiction of CCAC, assented to the creation
of a face-saving but scarcely very important subcommittee of CCAC in London (CCAC/L), and agreed
to appoint military representatives to assist the European Advisory Commission,
for which the British desired the broadest possible jurisdiction over surrender
and posthostilities problems. In return the British recognized the seniority and
general jurisdiction of CCAC in civil affairs during the period of military
responsibility. This was, indeed, the American goal from

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the beginning, but it is doubtful that the British would have acquiesced in
it had they not finally come to feel that far from being incompatible with
British interest the location of the major civil affairs agency in Washington
could possibly even serve it. Nothing would be a greater obstacle to Great
Britain in securing sympathetic American consideration of British requirements
than any residual American isolationism, a characteristic of which had been the
distrust of decisions arrived at in foreign capitals even though American
representatives had participated in making them. There is evidence in any case
of eventual British awareness of the greater understanding which could be
expected of the American component of CCS if the problems and views of the
combined civil affairs committee could be personally explained to them by its members. General Hilldring has stated that the crisis
with the British ended when it became possible to point out face-to-face to
their high-level representatives the practical advantages which location of the
senior civil affairs committee in Washington would offer in relations with the
CCS.1This decided the question whether Washington or London should be the
principal scene of the combined control machinery for civil affairs. Still open
was the question whether Washington or London would achieve greater weight in
the scales of civil affairs policy if, unfortunately, operations should prove to
involve too many conflicts of national interests.

1. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff welcome the basic
principles underlying the proposals contained in CCS I9o 1 and regard this
initiative as particularly opportune, since a considerable amount of work has
lately been done in London on the problem of the provision of essential supplies
for the local population in territories which may be liberated or conquered as a
result of military operations. It is clearly very desirable that this work,
should be pursued and developed on a fully combined basis.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will doubtless agree with the principle of an
initial military period during which the responsibility for the conduct of all
civilian affairs in the area concerned (including supplies, finances, etc.) must
rest solely with the military authorities and that that this initial military
period should be followed by a period during which an increasing degree of
responsibility will be transferred-to appropriate civilian agencies.

4. It is appreciated that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRRA) when created, may be called upon to carry out some of the
functions with which this memorandum is concerned. As, however, a considerable
time must necessarily elapse before that organization is fully operative, as the
exact role and status of UNRRA have still to be worked out, and as some of the
functions in question may in any case fall outside the scope of UNRRA, it is
considered that immediate steps should be taken to harmonize the work already in
progress in London with any similar

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planning that may be in progress or in preparation in Washington.

5. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff therefore propose in
regard to the problem of providing essential supplies for liberated or conquered
territories:

(a) That the principle of an initial military period (as defined in paragraph
3 above) should be formally recognized and that full liaison should be
established between the War Office Directorate of Civil Affairs in London and
the Civil Affairs Section of the War Department in Washington by the appointment
of special representatives of the latter to sit on the London Administration of
Territories (Europe) Committee.2

(b) The co-ordination of planning of civilian supplies for the period
subsequent to the period of initial military responsibility (see paragraph 3
above) should be conducted on a combined basis in Washington by the appointment
of a Committee of representatives of the interested U.S. and U.K. agencies which
would work in parallel with the appropriate Committee in London-at present the
Shipping and Supply Subcommittee,3 on which the U.S. Government are represented.
This Washington Committee should, it is suggested, be composed not only of
representatives of the Combined Food Board, Combined Production and Resources
Board, Combined Raw Materials Board and Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and
the appropriate U.S. and U.K. civil agencies, but also of representatives of the
War and Navy Departments. Its secretariat should include representatives of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff secretariat.4 ♦ ♦ ♦

If the foregoing principles are accepted, it is suggested that the Combined
Chiefs of Staff should address a letter to the Secretary of State in the sense
of the attached draft, asking him in consultation with the British Embassy to
arrange for the organization of the Committee referred to in paragraph 5(b)
above.

2. C. . . . Both British and the United States Chiefs of Staff agree
with the principle of an initial military period during which the responsibility
for the conduct of all civilian affairs in occupied areas (including supplies,
finances, etc.) must rest solely with the military authorities. Both United
States and British Joint Chiefs of Staff also agree that upon the termination of
the period of military occupation responsibility of all phases of local
government will be returned either to a liberated local government or some form
of territorial government, and at such time the matter ceases to be of concern
to the military. This leaves only the period between the initial military
operation and the termination of the military occupation and government where
the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . and those of the British are
somewhat at variance.

d. During this transitory period the plan proposed under CCS 190/1 would
establish a Combined Committee of Boards, governmental agencies, and War and
Navy Departments in Washington and in London under leadership of the Department
of State and Foreign Office as the controlling and administrative body for the
civilian affairs of occupied enemy and liberated areas. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff do not favor this procedure because it would result in a dual chain of
command and require the Theater Commander in his role of military governor to
report to two Chiefs. It would result in the participation in the administration
of occupied areas of civilian agencies or representatives of civilian agencies
having two loyalties: the first and greatest to the particular governmental
department or agency by whom they are employed and, second, to the military
governor or Theater Commander by virtue of his local position. It would be apt
to lead to the establishment of a civilian Economic Board or shadow government
in the local area in parallel to and duplicating the functions of the divisions
of the established military government.5
♦ ♦ ♦

3. Recommendations:

a. That the planning, co-ordination and administration of civil affairs in
occupied enemy or liberated areas be conducted in a combined operation in
accordance with the general policies stated

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in the letter included herewith as Appendix "A" [JCS 250, in Chapter III,
Section 3]

b. That this general policy of the joint Chiefs of Staff be implemented
for combined operations by the immediate designation by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee under the co-chairmanship of United
States and British military representatives consisting of representatives of the
U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff with authority to consult with such United
States and British governmental departments, agencies and combined boards as may
be necessary (CCS 190/2).

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the medium of its Combined Civil
Affairs Committee have primary responsibility for the planning and
administration of civil affairs in areas occupied as a result of combined
operations, including the co-ordination of the activities of the United States
and United Kingdom civilian agencies, and the issuance of all directives to the
Commanders in Chief in the field.

d. That a letter be addressed to the President and the Prime Minister
requesting their concurrence in the recommendations set forth above.

BRITISH CONSENT TO JCS PROPOSAL ON CONDITION THAT CERTAIN BRITISH INTERESTS
ARE RECOGNIZED
[Paraphrase of Msg (84391), War Office to British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM) in Washington, 28 May 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec.
1]

2. We are ... in agreement that the War Department should in consultation
with you proceed with a redraft of their paper for the CCS [CCS 190/1 above] on
the basis that we accept a Washington Combined Civil Affairs Committee. There
are a number of points which we require you to cover when negotiating the
redraft of this paper with the War Department and in discussions later at the
CCS. You are instructed to obtain express agreement in two of these points as a
condition of our accepting the American proposal. These two points are
elaborated in paragraphs 4 and 5 below. You have authority to agree the exact
form of words with which to secure the satisfactory safeguarding of these
provisos. ♦ ♦ ♦

4. Our first proviso covers the question of British territories under enemy
occupation, such as Burma, Malaya, Channel Islands and other Far Eastern and
Pacific territories, including those such as New Guinea the government of which
is an Australian responsibility. The interests of New Zealand might possibly be
affected also. Future developments may result in the CCS controlling combined operations in countries which are at present included in
areas where the responsibility is purely British under the control of the
British Chiefs of Staff. The corollary of the proposal which the Americans have
made would be that the Washington Committee would handle all civil affairs
questions which might arise out of the combined operations referred to above,
but obviously in enemy occupied British territories His Majesty's Governments in
the U.K. and Dominions have special interest and responsibilities just as the
U.S. Government has in U.S. enemy occupied territories like the Philippines.
Accordingly, we require you to obtain express acceptance from the Americans of
the principle that final decisions on all civil affairs matters must lie with
His Majesty's Government in the U.K. or in the Dominions in the case of enemy
occupied British territories, with similar provision for the U.S. Government and
U.S. enemy occupied territories.

5. Our second proviso is that we want the existing A.T.(E) London Committee
to be expanded into a fully combined committee with strong U.S. representation
which must be fully authorized to speak for the U.S.6 Government." The Committee
could, if desired, have a combined secretariat. U.S. representation on this
committee would include State Department, Service Departments, and any other
representatives the Americans may desire. It is difficult to emphasize too much
the important nature of this proviso. At the present the U.S. representatives
are hardly better than observers. Thus, even on minor points on which
disagreement is most unlikely, it is impossible for us to feel that the War
Department are in agreement or even advised of our decisions. For your
information, we have been advised by the U.S. representatives that, in spite of
the fact that we have at their request given them copies of A.T.(E) papers for
transmission to the War Department, none has yet been sent. We must rectify this
situation; otherwise the Washington Committee will be burdened with a mass of
detail which you and the War Department deprecate, and the final result would be
the worst form of remote control.7

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In addition we have in London the Allied Governments in whose countries
future operations will take place based on the U.K. and it is essential that
detailed consultation should be carried on with them on questions of liaison
officers, jurisdiction, knowledge of local conditions and of administration,
etc. It is also fair to say that there is in London a mass of information and a
body of experience which are elsewhere unobtainable. If the A.T.(E) Committee
becomes fully combined it will make possible a thorough and efficient use of
these factors.
8♦ ♦ ♦

1. The War Department and the British Joint Staff Mission are considering a
proposal for the establishment of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee under the
Combined Chiefs of Staff for the planning, co-ordination and administration of
Civil Affairs in occupied areas.

2. The British Joint Staff Mission advise that the War Department proposal
will be accepted provided (a) that a representative of the United States
Government be designated to act as a member of the London A.T.(E) Committee with
authority to speak for the United States and (b) that the United States or the
United Kingdom, as the case may be, will control any decisions on Civil Affairs
which are made with respect to any enemy occupied territories of the respective
governments, such as Burma and the Philippines....

3. a. Although it does not appear to be desirable to have the War Department
recognize and be a part of any agreements which are made by the War Office
Committee, it does seem desirable to designate an officer to serve as a member
of the A.T.(E) Committee with authority:

(1) To negotiate for the United States with respect to Civil Affairs matters
in the European Theater.
(2) To transmit to the War Department studies and problems relating to other
American theaters of operations.

b. The State Department concurs.

4. There does not appear to be any objection to the condition that final
decisions on civil affairs matters in occupied territories of either the United States or Great Britain
be the primary responsibility of the Government with the primary interest. The
State Department concurs.

II.
Action Recommended

The Secretary of War directs:

a. That the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, designate an
officer from his staff to serve as a member of the A.T.(E) London Committee,
with authority to negotiate with respect to the planning of civil affairs in
areas in the European Theater which are presently subject to enemy occupation,
and to transmit to the War Department studies and problems relating to other
American theaters of operation.

b. That the proposal of the British Government as to the control of
decisions on civil affairs in enemy occupied territories of the United Kingdom
and United States be accepted.

Sir John Dill [Br Representative, CCS] said that it seemed that the Civil
Affairs Division of the War Department had gone a long way in solving a
difficult problem. He thought it possible to approve in principle the
recommendations of the paper, subject to a few minor drafting alterations, one
of which dealt with the important subject of U.S. representation on the A.T.(E)
Committee in London.

General Hilldring explained that the Civil Affairs Division of the War
Department had achieved complete understanding with the U.S. Civil Agencies
concerned.9 The British Government had for some time been operating a most
successful system of military government. The War Department had now set up a
comparable organization. The proposals set out in the paper aimed at bridging
the gap between the U.S. and British organizations, by setting up a Combined
Civil Affairs Committee responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This would,
in fact, legitimize an existing arrangement since the HUSKY

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directive had been negotiated by an unofficial combined committee composed of
members of the War and Navy Departments, State Department, Treasury, the British
Embassy and the British Army Staff. The Civil Affairs Division had established a
mechanism of linking in to their organization the interested U.S. Civil
Agencies, such as the State Department, Treasury, Board of Economic Warfare,
O.S.S. and Governor Lehman's organization. It was now hoped to use the British
and U.S. organizations. ♦ ♦ ♦

PRESIDENT WANTS THE NEW COMMITTEE SET UP PROMPTLY
[Draft of Note from Roosevelt to Leahy, 10 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43),
sec. 1]

I have considered the arrangement whereby the Combined Civil Affairs
Committee is to act as the planning and co-ordinating group for Military
Government under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and have approved it. I understand
it meets with the approval of the State Department and has been drawn up with
the intention of meeting the expressed views of the British to whom it has not
been officially submitted. I feel it should be instituted as promptly as
possible.10

Where an enemy-occupied territory of the United States, the United Kingdom,
or one of the Dominions is recovered as a result of an operation by forces of
either the United States, United Kingdom or one of the Dominions, acting alone
or on a combined basis, final decision with regard to civil affairs policies to
be followed in the area after the capture will be determined by the government
which formerly had sovereignty over the territory.11

General Hilldring explained that there was a difference in substance between
the U.S. and British proposals with regard to the wording of paragraph 6.
Briefly, the point at issue was whether the military commander, if British and
occupying U.S. territory, or vice versa, must accept the views on civil affairs
of the government originally owning the territory immediately it was liberated;
or whether he should plan his civil affairs in the light of the situation at the
time of the occupation. In his own view the primary interest of the commander
concerned must be to rid the area of the enemy and to achieve this most easily
he should have no over-all restrictions with regard to civil affairs imposed on
him....

1. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee (C.C.A.C.) is hereby established in
Washington as an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Membership

2. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee will consist of: One representative
each of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. State Department, the British
Foreign Office, two representatives of the British Joint Staff Mission, and two
additional civilian members, one of whom shall be designated by the United
States and the other by the United Kingdom.

Functions

3. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee shall with respect to enemy or
enemy-held areas occupied or to be occupied as a result of combined (U.S.-U.K.)
operations:

a. Recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff general policies which should be
adopted for civil affairs, including supply and related matters;

b. Under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, be responsible for
the broad civil

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affairs planning and the direction in Washington of civil affairs problems
presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by theater commanders; and

c. Under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, be responsible for
the co-ordination of the British and American military and naval establishments
with the appropriate civilian departments and agencies of the respective
governments which are concerned with civil affairs matters.

Policies

4. a. Complete plans for a military operation must anticipate the problems
which will be presented by local populations. Planning and administration of
civil affairs are an integral part of military operations and cannot be
separated.

b. The administration of civil affairs should be delegated to appropriate
civilian departments and agencies just as soon as the military situation
permits. This may be accomplished gradually, even though the area is still the
subject of military control. The decision as to when and to what extent civilian
departments and agencies will assist the military in the administration of civil
affairs will be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, upon recommendation
of the military commander in the area. Generally, responsibility for the
handling of civil affairs should be relinquished by the military as quickly as
this can be accomplished without interference with the military purposes of the
occupation.12

London Committee

5. At the present time there is established in London an Administration of
Territories (Europe) Committee which is engaged in advance planning for civil
affairs in areas which are occupied by the enemy. The Commanding General,
European Theater of Operations, U.S.A., has been authorized to designate an
officer from his staff to serve on the London Committee with authority (a) to
negotiate for the United States with regard to the planning of civil affairs in the European Theater, U.S.A., (b) to transmit to the War
Department studies and problems relating to other theaters of operation and (c)
to transmit to the Committee the views of the War Department, co-ordinated,
where necessary, with those of other United States Departments and agencies.
[See sec. 5 for revision of 29 Jan 1944]

Reoccupation of U.S. or U.K. Territory

6. a. Combined Operations

Where an enemy occupied territory of the United States the United Kingdom or
one of the Dominions is to be recovered as a result of an operation combined or
otherwise, the government which formerly had sovereignty over the territory may
prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff an outline of policies
desired for the handling of civil affairs. So much of this outline will be
accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as they determine, upon the
recommendation of the force commander concerned, will not interfere with the
military purposes of the operation.

b. Other Operations

For use in other than combined operations in enemy occupied territories of
the U.S., the U.K. or one of the Dominions, the government which formerly had
sovereignty over the territory may prepare and submit through the Combined
Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Chiefs of Staff an outline of policies
desired for the handling of civil affairs. This outline will be accepted by the
Chiefs of Staff (U.S. or U.K.), unless it will interfere with the military
purposes of the operation, in which case reference will be made to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff for a decision.13

"When an enemy occupied territory of the U. States, U. Kingdom, or one of the
Dominions is to be recovered as a result of an operation combined or otherwise
the directive to be given to the Force Commander concerned will include policies to be followed in handling of Civil Affairs as formulated by the
Government which exercised authority over the territory before ene-

[124]

my occupation. If the Chiefs of Staff or Force Commander consider that such
civil affairs policies will impede or are impeding military purposes of the
operation the matter will be referred to aforesaid Government with recommendations."

Washington, D.C.
3rd July 1943

3 July

Above is reply from London (Colonial Office) in commenting on P6 as approved
by CCS 99th Mtg.

General Marshall suggested that the word "military" should be inserted before
the word "directive" in the new paragraph 6 of the directive to the Combined
Civil Affairs Committee contained in CCS 190/7. He explained that this word was
in order to ensure that directives to the theater commanders should be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not through political channels....

6. When an enemy occupied territory of the United States, the United Kingdom
or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as the result of an operation
combined or otherwise, the military directive to be given the Force Commander
concerned will include the policies to be followed in the handling of civil
affairs as formulated by the government which exercised authority over the
territory before enemy occupation. If paramount military requirements as
determined by Force Commander necessitate a departure from those policies he
will take action and report through the Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff.14

BRITISH CLAIM THAT A LONDON AND NOT THE WASHINGTON COMMITTEE SHOULD PLAN FOR
ETO
[Memo by Representatives of Br CofS (CCS 274/1), 10 Jul 43, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1) ]

We are concerned over the question of procedure in this matter. The situation
regarding this paper is that it was prepared in London at AT(E) Committee, has
been considered by the British Chiefs of Staff and approved by them, and now has
been brought over here by a representative of [Lt.] General [Jacob L.] Devers
[CG ETOUSA ] for necessary approval by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.15

In accordance with the charter in CCS 190/6/D, paragraph 5 [sec. 1, this
chapter], it is the London "ATE" Committee which engages in advance planning for
civil affairs in the European Theater, in close touch with U.S. representatives.
We feel, therefore, that this paper, after consideration by the U.S. Chiefs of
Staff, should be referred to the London Committee and not to the CCAC,
Washington, and that the American representatives in London should be fully
briefed to negotiate.16

a. General procedure to be followed regarding Civil Affairs matters handled
by the AT(E) Committee in London and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in
Washington.
b. Immediate procedure to be followed in handling C.C.S. 274, the
projected Norwegian-British agreements.

2. With reference to paragraph 1a above:

Paragraph 5 of the Charter (C.C.S. 190/6/D) contemplates that, in the main,
advance planning with respect to the European Theater of operations (U.S.) will
probably be carried on by the AT(E) Committee in London. However, there is
nothing in that paragraph, nor in paragraph 3 (establishing the Civil Affairs
Committee), which restricts the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff nor of
its Combined Civil Affairs Committee with respect to civil affairs matters in
the European Theater of operations to the extent that the Combined Chiefs of
Staff desire to influence the course of that planning. 3. With respect to Ib
above:

a. The Norwegian agreement is a most important international document. It was
prepared between Great Britain and the Norwegian Government-in-Exile without
participation by the United States and without prior commitment by the United
States. This document has been submitted by the British War Office to the United
States Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the
agreements reached by the British are acceptable to the United States in the event that U.S. troops
participate in the liberation of Norway.

b. The joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff have examined the agreement and found
it acceptable with several minor exceptions. However, before reaching final
agreement, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire to assure themselves that the
exceptions they have made are acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.

c. In view of the fact that the document and the deliberations
concerning it are now centered in Washington, and since the Civil Affairs
Charter obviously permits such action, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire
that their attitude, with respect to the British-Norwegian agreement, be
referred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee
for study and recommendation. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. I believe there is no longer any real function to be performed by the AT(E)
Committee with regard to the military phases of civil affairs. Consideration
should be given for the withdrawal of Colonel Ryan's membership in it, if
General Devers and you consider such a move to be politically expedient.17

... I think the correct procedure would be for the agreed London paper to be
forwarded from the CCAC Secretariat to the CCS with the statement that it has
been agreed by the AT(E) Committee in London, and has been cleared by the
British and US authorities concerned. It should not be brought up at the CCAC
meeting but I think that as a matter of procedure the document should be
forwarded to CCS through CCAC....

2. As a result of completing the discussions in London the present paper (CCS
274/4) is now being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for final
approval.

3. As the paper will be considered at today's meeting of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, I would like to suggest that they recommend that the document be referred
to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for comment. This will be consistent
with the intended procedure to be followed in the case of not only the Norwegian
Agreement but all subsequent similar agreements which will be concluded with
governments-in-exile.

4. One important reason for referring the matter to the Combined Civil
Affairs Committee is that the State Department can thus comment officially on
the contents for the first time, which is most essential as the US Government
will undoubtedly desire to conclude a similar separate agreement with the
Norwegian Government. The State Department was not officially represented during
the London discussions.

2. At a recent meeting of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, the U.S.
members presented for consideration a draft of a directive for the
administration of civil affairs in France during the period of military
necessity. . . . [Discussions on a directive and decision reached will be found
below, in Chapter XXII, Sections 3-5.]

3. The British view appears to be that the War Office AT(E) Committee in
London, which derives no authority from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should
have jurisdiction to determine policy and to make broad plans for the
administration of civil affairs in combined operations, particularly as to
operations based on the United Kingdom. The AT(E) Committee has no independent
jurisdiction to formulate policies on the administration of civil affairs on
parallel with, or to the exclusion of, the Combined Chiefs of Staff or their
Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

4. The U.S. members of the Committee are clear that since civil affairs are
an inseparable part of military operations, broad plans and policies must be
established for all combined operations by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting
on the recommendation of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. This procedure
has been followed, with the concurrence of the British, for operations based on Algiers [ MTO ]. It is consistent with the charter of the
Combined Civil Affairs Committee and the purpose for which it was established.

5. If a decision should be made on a political level to transfer jurisdiction
over these problems to a British Committee which has been operating in close
collaboration with the exiled governments, the War Department and the agencies
of this government which have an interest in the political and economic phases
of civil affairs may be placed in the position of having to accept policy
decisions on military and post military issues which have already been reached
by the British through this Committee.

I. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, at their I22d meeting held on 8 October .1943, agreed that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee be directed to make recommendations to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the procedure to be followed with respect to
future papers of this nature (Norwegian Agreement)... .

Recommendation

6.
a. Basic papers relating to civil affairs in combined operations based
on the United Kingdom dealing with law, order and security be submitted to the
CCS for final action through either the British or the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The CCS may, at their discretion, refer any such directive to their established
agency for recommendation prior to final action.

b. With respect to planning or operations under the broad directives
mentioned in paragraph 6a above it shall be normal procedure to refer these
questions to the War Department for action of the U.S. interested departments
and agencies.

c. This arrangement is applicable only to combined operations based on the
U.K.

2. Procedure for Civil Affairs in operations based on the United Kingdom
(CCAC 33) Mr. McCloy stated . . . that CCAC 33 contains a suggested procedure to
be followed with respect to papers similar to the Norwegian Agreement.

After considerable discussion,

[127]

The Committee:

a. Took note that the British members would convey the views of the U.S.
members to London, where discussions on the subject matter of the paper were
already in progress.

b. Agreed to postpone action on the paper until such time as the British
members had received a reply.

... things require a great deal of clarification with regard to our
relationship with the British agencies. . . . The difficulties arise through our
relationship with the War Office and its related establishments, including the
AT(E) which, unhappily, is not as defunct as we had thought it was.

... As you know, there has always been a considerable degree of resentment in
the War Office because we declined to participate in AT(E)'s activities. I was
informed yesterday that there is a disinclination on the British part to
participate in Civil Affairs matters through the agency of the CCAC.

The last named disinclination stems, apparently, from two causes:

a. The aforementioned resentment about our nonparticipation in AT(E);

b. A desire, and this is very marked, to have all Civil Affairs matters
pertaining to COSSAC transferred from the Washington CCAC to a similar body here
in London.

All this tends to have a stultifying effect on Civil Affairs in COSSAC. For
example, Major General Sir Roger Lumley, head of the British side of Civil
Affairs in COSSAC, has been instructed by the War Office that he is not to be
party to any transactions as between COSSAC and the CCAC. ♦ ♦ ♦

... the responsibility as regards territory should be divided as between U.K.
and U.S., preferably according to agreed areas of strategic responsibility or,
if not on that basis, on such other basis as might be determined18 ♦ ♦ ♦

NEED FOR BRITISH-AMERICAN CO-ORDINATION OF SUPPLY Is RECOGNIZED IN PLANNING
FOR SICILY
[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 10 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM OUT 4110]

... In view of previous cables on this subject ... it is evident that a
definitive procedure to handle all categories civilian supply for AMGOT must be
established on a combined basis and clearly understood to avoid duplication of
bidding here and in U.K. In view of urgency HUSKY Operation and without
prejudice to future arrangements between U.S. and U.K. Governments and decisions
of Combined Chiefs of Staff, CCS took note at 8oth meeting that War Department
would expedite planning and necessary co-ordination with British with regard to
supply of civilian population and administration civil affairs necessary
immediately upon occupation enemy territory HUSKYLAND.

Therefore Allied Forces Headquarters should submit promptly to CCS for War
Department its estimate even if tentative of total AMGOT civilian needs by item
quantity, priority desired, destination, and markings in 15 day cycles from

[128]

D Day to D plus 90 including medical and sanitary supplies and barter goods
required to supplement local supplies and production. Upon receipt and
consideration your requirements by War Department source of supply as between
U.S. and U.K. will be discussed with appropriate U.S. and U.K. authorities and
requirements which U.K. is unable to supply which we assume to be the majority
will be filled by War Department. In connection with requirements, studies being
made by War Department which should enable us to make suggestions which may be
helpful. ♦ ♦ ♦

BRITISH PROPOSE DRAWING SOME FOOD SUPPLIES FROM U.S. IN PREPARING FOR SUPPLY
REQUIREMENTS OF NORTHWEST EUROPE
[Msg, Br Ministry of Food to Br Food Mission to the United States, 8 May 43,
ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS83]

... Minister has approved following proposals:

a. To import immediately for arrival before end June so far as possible
130,000 tons of flour from North America over and above present programme of
flour shipments.

b. To place orders immediately in North America for 180,000 tons of flour
with intention of having it ready for immediate shipment when offensive begins.

c. To ship from North America immediately offensive begins wheat at the rate
of 20,000 tons per month or 120,000 tons in all being balance of War Office
requirements for the 6 months.19

(4) In our opinion, the United States should not agree to the British
proposal. In the first place, if there is to be any stockpiling in the United
States of American supplies for reoccupied areas these should be under the
control of the United States Government in the same way that we control
munitions or other war supplies....

The British should not be allowed to become intermediaries between the United
States and the reoccupied territories. The supply arrangements for United States
products should be direct with the territory concerned and the United States
should be free to make its own arrangements, if it desires, with the country
concerned as is done in North Africa....

Dunn of State Department says that State does not propose to recognize any
relief requirements unless they have been approved by the Army. The worry of
State is that London might otherwise become the final arena of requirements,
even though the Combined Chiefs are in Washington. To date, Leith-Ross Committee
20. and AT(E) Committee have, consequently, not been recognized by State, just as
they have not been recognized by War.

General Wright. It seems clear that determination of U.S. relief requirements
should be made, for the military period of supply, the responsibility of the
U.S. Army, and that the place for determining over-all military requirements
should be in Washington, under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. .. .

With respect to your specific inquiry as to flour, we believe that the
stockpiling of supplies against requirements for civil population of occupied
areas is a proper responsibility of this government in all cases where the
supplies are to be drawn from U.S. resources.

The above has been discussed with and approved by the Office of Lend-Lease
Administration, Governor Lehman, and the Food Administration for War, who concur
in this letter.

4. The U.K. has advised the War Department that its basic interest is
assurance that:

(a) Supply requirements shall be reviewed by the appropriate combined boards,
and

(b) That the U.S. will furnish the supplies not available from U.K. sources.

5. As you know, the U.S. has not participated in the A.T.E. proceedings
except as observers.

Actual operational planning is now being undertaken at COSSAC headquarters in
London in which the U.S. will fully participate. Consequently, the War
Department should not agree except on the recommendations of E.T.O. as to the
details of supplies to be furnished beyond food, medical supplies and fuel, but
should agree only to the basic principle that minimum essential supplies shall
be furnished.

6. As to supply procedure, the method proposed by the U.K. contemplates that
after requirements are agreed in the Theater, the U.K. will designate which
items they can supply from U.K. sources, and will ask our support for U.K.
acquisitions in this country of the unfilled balance.

7. It seems more appropriate to have the U.S. Theater Commander present to
the War Department requirements to be drawn from U.S. sources along with his
recommendations. The War Department would then procure all U.S. supplies
necessary for the combined operation, and forward them to the U.S. Theater
Commander to be made available by him for joint use as he deems necessary. This
procedure should meet the basic problems of the U.K. outlined in paragraph 4
above, and yet avoid the possible repercussions of having the U.S. turn its
supplies over to the U.K. for relief purposes except as the final need is
determined. In considering this aspect of the problem it should be realized that
supplies for civilian populations, if furnished as suggested by the U.K., would
in due course come under Lend-Lease.

8. On the basis of the foregoing it is recommended that:

(a) The U.K. be advised that requirements for relief of civilians will be
accepted only on basis of recommendation of U.S. Theater Commander.

(b) Supplies to be furnished from the U.S. will be furnished through our
Theater Commander on his requisition.

(c) Such supplies will, as appropriate, be available for joint use, in the
discretion of the U.S. Theater Commander.

As to matters of supply it seems clear to me that the War Department should
be designated as the executive agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the
Theater Commander during the period of military occupation. Within the War
Department the supply responsibility would then be ultimately discharged by the
Army Service Forces with the concurrence of your office. ♦ ♦ ♦

... Mechanically the plan would work out as follows

a. As to Planning

The Army Service Forces, with your concurrence and after consultation with
the B.A.S. [British Army Staff], will recommend the basic provisions to be made
for each potential area of occupation, subject, in the event of disagreement, to
review by the Combined Committee. Similarly, after consultation with the British
Army Staff, a recommendation will be made as to the sources of supply for such
requirements. As a result of the foregoing there will be established appropriate
procurement objectives for the Army Supply Program to provide the necessary Army
stores to fulfill civil requirements to be drawn from United States resources.
In the case of a particular operation the Army Service Forces will, again in
consultation with the British Army Staff, recommend the supply requirements, the
sources and the method of operation for final adoption by the Combined Board. ♦ ♦ ♦

I.... It is obvious that joint Anglo-American planning, procurement and
stockpiling is essential if duplication and inefficiency are to be avoided. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. . . . the British viewpoint in the matter appears to be in substantial agreement with conclusions previously reached by
the Civilian Relief Branch....

4. In order to facilitate the co-ordination of British-American estimates of
requirements the [British] memorandum proposes that agreement be reached on the
standardization of time periods and uniformity of terminology.

7. In regard to the above proposals, the following observations are made:

a. The principle of combined planning in combined operations in the strategic
sphere was fully accepted with the establishment of CCS. It is no less important
that the same principle of co-equal partnership be accepted and implemented in
the sphere of civil affairs....

b. The six months military period has the advantage of insuring against
under-procurement of supply requirements. In the event of over-procurement,
supplies thereby released would be available for future operations, or could be
turned over to the civilian agencies in the succeeding civilian phase.

c. If the principle of co-partnership in combined civil affairs is accepted,
the War Department and the War Office should, as a natural corollary, prepare
and submit joint requirements and procurements schedules to the appropriate
combined boards.

d. The proposal that responsibility for supply planning and procurement
should be delegated by the proposed Combined Civil Affairs Committee to a Supply
Subcommittee would provide the necessary machinery to deal with these important
questions. It would not appear necessary however to include in the Subcommittee
all the elements represented on the main CCAC. It is suggested that membership
in the case of planning and procurement for the military period should be
confined to representatives of the U.K. and U.S. Armed Forces....

I. The Supply Subcommittee is hereby established as an agency of the Combined
Civil Affairs Committee.

[131]

Membership

2. The Supply Subcommittee will consist of: a. One U.S. Army Officer b. One
U.S. Navy Officer c. One British Military or Naval member d. One British
civilian member e. One U.S. and one British Secretary.24

Functions

3. The Supply Subcommittee shall:

a. Study and make recommendations on supply matters referred to it by the
combined Civil Affairs Committee.

b. Review for the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and advise them in
regard to action to be taken on recommendations of other agencies referred to it
by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

Procedure

4. The Supply Subcommittee shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Form such working groups as are necessary to assist it in the
performance of its duties.

c. Consult formally or informally with such U.S. and British authorities in
Washington as necessary to be sure that supply matters under its cognizance are
adequately co-ordinated.

d. The U.S. members of the Subcommittee will be responsible for
maintaining close liaison with the interested U.S. civilian supply agencies on
all matters which are of concern to them.

... Our policy is at variance with proposed British policy in which A.T.E.
apparently combined the military requirements with the type of requirements
computed by Governor Lehman's office. We have asked the British to separate
essential military from their requirements so that we may reach an agreement. We
feel strongly that the War Department using military priorities for procurement
must limit its procurement to the basic ration, soap, medical and sanitary

supplies and fuel essential to military operations at variance from a more
generous relief standard or from rehabilitation measures.

5. It is recommended that an over-all combined program of requirements
covering the minimum economic relief for the population of occupied areas that
must be furnished by the military during the period of military operations and
for some time thereafter, be developed in accordance with the following
principles:

a. The quantities incorporated in the program to be confined to the provision
of the basic ration, soap, medical, sanitary supplies, fuel (coal and petroleum
products), and other agreed articles considered essential to military
operations. The basic ration should be as nearly as possible the same whether
supplied by United States or United Kingdom.

b. Stockpiling should be limited to the smallest possible amount.

c. A statement of requirements will be prepared indicating the quantities of
each category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and the United
States.

d. Responsibility for arranging for shipment will rest with the country
procuring the supplies.

e. In the provision of coal and other supplies required for relief of
civil populations in reoccupied countries, maximum use will be made of supplies,
stockpiles and resources locally available within such reoccupied countries.
Where possible and where a surplus of coal or other supplies exists within any
particular reoccupied country over and above the requirements for such
commodities by that country, such surpluses will be used to fill the
requirements of other reoccupied countries.

f. The monthly requirements for the various countries which it is anticipated
may be reoccupied, will be a matter for recommendation by the Combined Civil
Affairs Committee.

g. It is agreed that for a period of three months subsequent to the
occupation of Italy, the United

[132]

Kingdom will deliver up to 100,000 tons of coal to Italy each month if the
Italian stock position and the need require it. Deliveries after the first three months will be the subject of further negotiation. Subsequent to the
occupation of Italy within the strategic plan, the United States will make
available the equivalent of two ships each month for the purpose of supplying
the Italian civilian population with the essential dry cargo imports other than
coal if the need requires it. Should it be agreed that essential civilian
requirements exceed the capacity set forth above additional shipping will be
provided as may be agreed upon. This paragraph is subject to the provision that
Italian ships are not available for the purposes herein stated.

b. Colonel Rickards [British member] .. . stated . . . that the following
appeared to constitute the present status of agreement and disagreement between
the US and UK: (I) Both U.S. and U.K. were agreed on the six-month period of
military responsibility and the desirability of achieving a 2,000 calorie level
of food relief.

(2) U.K. differed with U.S. on the composition of items required as a
military necessity to achieve 2,000 calories, the U.K. feeling strongly that
fats, meats, and sugar should be added, with a corresponding reduction in
cheese, pulses, and soup, and that coffee was not to be regarded as a luxury
item.

(3) U.K. regarded provisions to be made for relief rather as a supplement to
locally available supplies so as to raise the level of consumption in any given
area to one of 2,000 calories, than as a standard ration.

c. General Wright, referring to paragraph, CCS 324/1 [above] indicated that
he felt that the Committee was obligated under that directive to agree on a
basic ration, which, however, did not preclude consideration of further items to
be added to or substituted for the ration proposed by the U.S.

d. Colonel Rickards urged that the U.S. study with care the Sinclair-Young
estimates,26 which, he assured the Committee, had been prepared with extreme pains as to
accuracy and which should be accepted as setting forth the scale on which the
U.K. felt all liberated areas should be fed during the first six months. He
added that it was the U.K. view that any lesser scale would fail in meeting the
mutually agreed end of preventing disease and unrest.

e. Colonel [William A.]Rounds stated that there were two primary
considerations behind items proposed by the U.S. for the basic ration: (1) That
where items were in short supply, such as fat, the decision as to whether the
needs of European or U.S. civilians were to be met must be made politically and
in the open and not be concealed by the processes of military priority
procurement;
27

(2) That provision for civilian feeding by the military must be on the basis
of additional provision of normal military stores.
28

Mr. McCloy summarized the respective positions of the U.S. and U.K. members
of the Supply Subcommittee and stated that the sole question is whether the
Combined Civil Affairs Committee shall authorize the Subcommittee to apply
formally to the Combined Boards for their recommendations concerning appropriate
sources of supply responsibility, or whether, instead, the

[133]

Subcommittee shall merely consult informally with members of the Combined
Boards.

General Macready [British representative] stated that he and Lt. Gen.
Somervell had participated in the drafting of CCS 324/1 [above] and that, while
it was intended that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee make recommendations
concerning monthly requirements of civilian supplies, it was definitely not
intended that the Committee determine the division of responsibility between the
U.S. and the U.K. without prior consultation with appropriate civilian boards
and agencies which are familiar with the entire world supply picture. He stated
further that since food supplies for the British Army are procured not by the
Army itself but by the British Ministry of Food, British military officials must
necessarily refer problems of food procurement to civilian agencies.

General Wright stated, with reference to General Macready's last statement,
that it was his understanding that British civilians had been placed on the
Supply Committee for the very purpose of meeting the point raised by General
Macready. General Wright further stated that he construed CCS 324/1 as placing
two responsibilities on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee; first the
determination of requirements, and second, the division of supply responsibility
between the U.S. and the U.K. He stated that therefore it does not appear
appropriate to make a formal submission of this question to the Combined Boards;
that such formal submission is not necessary to obtain the benefit of the
experience and knowledge of the appropriate supply authorities of the two
governments; and that formal submission of such questions to the various
Combined Boards will seriously affect their prompt disposition.

Mr. [A. Dennis] Marris [British representative] stated that the British
position envisaged the obtaining of formal recommendations from the Combined
Board and not decisions which would be binding upon the Combined Civil Affairs
Committee or its Supply Subcommittee.

Mr. McCloy suggested that for the time being the Supply Subcommittee be
authorized to refer the pending question formally to the Combined Boards, with
the understanding that when General Somervell returns to the U.S. he will be
consulted and further consideration will be given to the entire question....

After discussion,

The Committee:-
Agreed that in order to avoid further delay and without prejudice to a decision on a policy to be adopted upon the return of
General Somervell, the CCAC Supply Subcommittee be instructed that formal
submission of Italian civilian requirements should be made to the appropriate
Combined Boards in order to obtain their recommendations as to sources of supply
for such requirements.29

The Combined Civil Affairs Committee on 23 November 1943 agreed to instruct
the Supply Subcommittee as follows:

"The Supply Subcommittee shall make recommendations to the Combined Civil
Affairs Committee as to the requirements of civilian supplies to be provided by
the military during the period of military control and also as to the respective
U.S. and U.K. responsibility therefor. In formulating recommendations as to
supply responsibility, the U.S. and U.K. members may refer any requirement in
question to their respective supply authorities for suggestions as to the
appropriate sources of the necessary supplies. The supply authorities for either
government may in their discretion refer any such question to the

[134]

relevant Combined Board in order to obtain its views and advice as to source
of supply."
30

Sir Frederick stated that he was interested in discussing the effect of the
Presidential Directive with regard to the responsibility of the War Department
in Civil Affairs matters in liberated areas. He stated that before the British
Government could agree to accept a similar responsibility, it would be necessary
to ascertain the implications of the letter as to supply and manpower....

Sir Frederick inquired as to the extent to which the U.S. Army contemplated
supervision over the distribution of relief supplies. He stated that the British
were anxious about the possible large commitments in manpower and transport if the Army was to be responsible
for the distribution of relief within hiatus areas,31 or in the event of a
general collapse of the enemy....

General Hilldring stated as the U.S. position that requirements were being
developed in the War Department for all enemy and enemy-occupied countries....
He stated that it was not possible to plan requirements for operational areas
alone since in the development of military plans, operational areas were
constantly changing....

Sir Frederick stated that the War Office had hitherto assumed that
procurement and distribution of relief supplies would be undertaken by the
military only in operational areas and not in hiatus areas. He stated that in
view of the U.S. position, it would be necessary for him to take the matter up
with the War Office.
32

BRITISH WILL CO-OPERATE IN CCAC BUT EXPECT CONCESSIONS IN RETURN
[Msg, ASW to the SW, 27 Nov 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 16774]

Had talk yesterday with [Br Foreign Secy Anthony] Eden. Quite evident he
feels European Advisory Commission [EAC]
33 in London important achievement and
does not wish to derogate in any way from the authority which he feels was given
it by the terms of reference and documents which were referred to it at Moscow.
He wants to dignify it and have us send a small but good staff to London immediately to assist [John G.] Winant whom the
President has advised Prime Minister he intends to appoint to Commission.
However Eden has agreed and I believe favors submission by Advisory Commission
of their tentative recommendations to Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment and
suggestion by them prior to any final submission of recommendation by Commission
to Governments. Also has tentatively agreed to remove further pressure for
removal of Combined Civil Affairs Committee
34 in London and if we are prepared
to take step one above will agree to permit British representatives CCAC to take
full part in all dis-

[135]

cussions relating to U.K. based operations, perhaps sending to Washington a
man with substantial authority to augment or replace existing British
representation. . . .35

... I have a very brief report to make to you in regard to certain action
that I thought you should know about, if you have not already been informed. It
is in regard to the action taken by the British War Ministry with respect to the
CCAC. They have agreed that the CCAC shall have jurisdiction over all combined
civil authorities matters with regard to Northwest Europe. I believe they have
in mind proposing that there be established here in London a Branch of the CCAC,
a London Echelon, which will have jurisdiction over political matters and the
remainder of the questions regarding supply, etc., to come before the main CCAC
in Washington. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully considered the question of military
and naval advisors for the European Advisory Commission and have directed that
adequate military and naval personnel be provided in London and Washington for
liaison with the Commission.

Based on military considerations, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that the following should be incorporated in the instructions to Mr.
Winant and should provide the accepted procedure for handling matters of direct
or indirect military concern which may arise in connection with the work of the
Commission:

a. That the European Advisory Commission, from the U.S. point of view, is an
important body, whose functioning and development should be guided and
maintained in accordance with the U.S. concept as to the scope of its activities
and the manner of its operation.

b. That the Commission should keep strictly within the letter and spirit of
its directive and in so doing be particular to avoid problems relating to the
conduct of military operations, and concerning civil affairs of liberated or
enemy territories incident to such operations prior to the end of hostilities. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. It is understood that this proposal [that a subcommittee of CCAC sit in
London] is a compromise designed to avoid the vitiation of the Combined Civil
Affairs Committee in Washington. It is, in our opinion, very doubtful whether
your proposal will not have the opposite effect. The Subcommittee in London is
empowered to act on matters "which do not require reference to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff" and "do not justify reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff."
Apparently the London Subcommittee can under the proposed Charter decide what
does require reference. As far as is known, no other agency of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff has a sub-agency with powers to act in London. It appears that
your proposal may well eventually place the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in
a position of a figurehead only with all real power in London.36

Admiral Leahy said that while not fully briefed on this matter he was
naturally averse to any proposal which involved the establishment of yet another
committee in the CCS organization. Personally he was unable to see the necessity
for the new committee as proposed.

General Macready explained that the agreement as put forward by the Combined
Civil Affairs Committee had been reached as a result

[136]

of a special mission from London. There were, he thought, good reasons why a
subcommittee of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee should be set up in London
to deal with the many day to day minor matters on which the Supreme Commander
would require advice. It was essential to have a body closer to the scene of
action, particularly since it was in London that the exile governments were
situated, who would have to be consulted on many of the points which arose. The
Supreme Commander himself could not deal within his own staff with all these
problems. It was hoped that the new Committee would assist in arriving at rapid
decisions on matters other than of major policy.

General Hilldring explained that the subject had been under discussion for
some three months. There had been in London an Administration of Territories
Europe Committee (A.T.E.) which was a high level British committee with one U.S.
War Department representative. The present proposal was that this committee
should be abolished and that its place should be taken by a subcommittee of the
Combined Civil Affairs Committee sitting in London and dealing with day to day
civil affairs problems in Northwest Europe. In his opinion this arrangement
would smooth out many difficulties and assist in the easy working of the
machine. There had been a difference of opinion between the two governments as
to where decisions on Northwest European civil affairs should be made. As a
result of these differences of opinion, during the past three months no guidance
had been given to the Supreme Commander on these vital problems. The setting up
of the new committee under the terms set out in the Combined Civil Affairs
proposal would, he felt sure, enable the Supreme Commander rapidly to be given
the much needed directives to enable him to carry out his planning for civil
affairs in Europe.37

A London Subcommittee of CCAC is hereby established (CCAC/L) as agency of the
Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

a. Functions

(i) To give guidance and make recommendations within the framework of the
directives issued to the Supreme Allied Commanders Northwest European and Mediterranean
Theaters by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with respect to the application of such
directives to day-today problems or to detailed civil affairs planning which do
not require reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(ii) At the request of the Allied Supreme Commanders to resolve such civil
affairs questions arising within the Northwest European and Mediterranean
Theaters as do not justify reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but on
which the Allied Supreme Commanders desire advice.

Note: Until adequate machinery is established in London, the matters relating
to the Mediterranean Theater under (i) and (ii) above will continue to be
resolved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as at present.

(iii) To make recommendations to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on
civil affairs matters arising within the Northwest European and Mediterranean
Theaters which require decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(iv) With reference to paragraph 6 of this Charter to receive from His
Majesty's Governments the civil affairs policy of His Majesty's Governments in
regard to territory of the United Kingdom or the Dominions (if HMG in the
Dominions desire to use this channel) which is to be recovered from the enemy
and to communicate such policy to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for them
to take note of and to transmit to the Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff as may
be appropriate.

(v) Except as provided in subparagraph (iv) above, the CCAC/L will not
consider civil affairs matters arising in the Pacific.

b. Membership

CCAC/L will consist of a war office chairman and a representative from the
War Office, the Foreign Office, the Treasury on the British side, and one
representative of the U.S. Army, one of the U.S. Navy, two civilian members
appointed by the U.S. Individual persons and representatives of the department
or agencies, both British and American, may be invited to attend as required.

c. Exchange of Information

The London Subcommittee will keep CCAC currently advised of the suggestions
and recommendations made to SAC and will forward to them minutes of all
meetings. There will be full exchange of information, and papers between CCAC
and CCAC/L. ♦ ♦ ♦

All of us here agree with you completely that SCAEF, unencumbered and
uninhibited must have complete and absolute authority and responsibility with
respect to the operation of Civil Affairs. . . . In recognition of this, both
Mr. McCloy and I made it clear to Bovenschen when he was here that the
usefulness and success-as a matter of fact, the very existence of the
Subcommittee-would be dependent upon its ability to be of service to the Supreme
Commander and to perform this advisory service without interference with the
Civil Affairs operations of SCAEF or without annoyance to the people involved in
those operations. I am confident that he understands his position, although it
may be that some bluntness on your part will as you say, be necessary to keep
this point in focus, and if bluntness is necessary it should by all means, as
you suggest, be applied. . . . This, however, in my opinion does not alter the
desirability of making the people who render advice to SCAEF as members of the
Subcommittee those individuals on your staff who are struggling each day with the problems that will be
discussed in the Subcommittee....

The British position appears to be that coordination on supply matters should
be in London.38 The State Department, the War Department and FEA
are opposed to this, primarily because all of the combined supply machinery is
centered in Washington and only confusion and duplication can result by
transferring responsibility as to this phase of the supply business to any
combined group in London at this time. It is impossible to predict when the
deadlock will be broken, but our position is very clear and we propose to stand
firm. ♦ ♦ ♦