Do Angela Merkel and Germany have a joint future?

Many foreign media and even some German media people reported during the endless appearing process for finding a coalition 2017/2018 about a “governmental crisis”. This mostly due to the lack of knowledge these coalition talks being a defined process despite taking unusually long. Germany sure wasn’t able to take major decisions hurting especially Emmanuel Macron and his affair of the heart: the renovation of Europe. On the topics Europe and Foreign Policy, Germany steps on the brakes for many years now, therefore the result remains the same – little or nothing happens anyway.

The new German government is in operation since a few weeks now but there is trouble brewing afoot in Berlin. Unexpectedly, the right wing AfD is pretty quiet at the time.

The CSU remains the arsonist

Those who have hoped the CSU (the Bavarian sister party to the CDU of Angela Merkel) will concentrate on governing the country after the forming of the government are utterly wrong. With the elections ahead in Bavaria, Horst Seehofer wanted to gather his voters and attract those who have left CSU for the AfD with the powerful comment “The Islam does not belong to Germany”. He even doubled within this context by adding “People of Muslim Belief belong to our country”. Just like one could take his belief and values off before going out on the streets. It certainly appears Horst Seehofer is able to abandon his belief and Christian values scarifying them to preserve his own power.

If you look into the history of Europe and Germany – and therefore Bavaria – you soon will discover Horst Seehofer wants to make the pure opposite of history to become reality. Whether by ignorance or on purpose is hard to determine, however based on facts the Bavarian Blusterer simply is wrong – “fake news” might the right term. During the early Middle Age Arabs and the academic people from their countries brought an enormous amount of knowledge to the backwardly European countries. People actually have to thank the Muslims for the following flourishing or Europe. They benefitted from countless innovative products and a vast knowledge transfer from the Occident into the countless by monarchs oppressed, socially underdeveloped and by a faint educational system inhibited countries of Europe. A startling detail: the majority of the academics originate from Chorasan – an expanded Afghanistan – and Iran, namely from the former intellectual stronghold Bagdad.

Angela Merkel took a clear position, criticised and rectified Horst Seehofers statement – who received it thin-skinned but did no longer make such unqualified statements.

Settlements within CDU still not finished

Angela Merkel has many areas with the need for improvement within her own party, too. While the Chancellor tries to convey she has understood the vote and is working on improvements her Health Minister Jens Spahn is backstabbing her. It took him just three appearances – perceived by the people concerned as big-headed and ice-cold calculated arrogance – to destroy Angela Merkels recently planted crop of hope. “Hartz IV does not mean poverty” was his first statement causing backlashes from many sources but also support by those who do not like governmental interventions (Hartz IV is the German unemployed support and welfare system introduced by the SPD in earlier times and a constant annoyance since it does not cover the rapidly increasing cost of life). With his second appearance Jens Spahn talked against the liberalisation of the abortion law unveiling his lack of knowledge and tact. Just a few days later he wanted to comply with his promise to create 8000 new jobs in health care and wanted to speed up the homologation of education certificates of nurses and doctors from other European countries. Again, the Health Minister unveiled he is unprepared since today it already is impossible to convince more than 1000 nurses from EU countries per year to come to Germany – also due to the questionable working conditions and much too low salaries in Germany.The situation is critical since many German nurses and doctors leave for better jobs in other countries like Switzerland. Based on these facts counting on foreign nurses and doctors seems to be questionable on two levels: these people leave a vacancy in their home countries and the problem in Germany becomes the burden of the foreign workers – the question is how long this can be done. Even more problematic is the continuous decrease of the quality in nursing which gradually becomes life-threatening, particularly with cheap foreign workers. Voices rise Jens Spahn is pulling wool on people’s eyes.

Even CDU exponents oppose the young politician and reveal there’s much to learn for Jens Spahn. At least, with his thoughtless, unemotional and erroneous appearances Jens Spahn is keeping all these issues prominently on top of the agenda of the Grand Coalition.However, the local CDU parties and the local party members have not yet understood the troubles of the German society, thus their ignorance could become a bigger problem than expected. The CNT Alliance visited some Kreisveranstaltungen (party gatherings) of the CDU in first semester of 2018 and discovered the mostly elderly party members are interested only in issues securing their own wealth. Other issueswere just briefly touched by the politicians on stage.

All this is a bit more than a tendency towards right. Like the strategy paper presented the group “WerteUnion” (Union of Values) beginning of April with lots of criticism for Angela Merkel. With this paper the opponents request a re-positioning of the CDU from the middle towards the right and fiercely oppose Angela Merkels refugee policy. Within this conservative manifesto they request the “return to the core values” of the CDU. The main part of the manifesto focusses on the Islam and migration. Again, it seems much easy for the authors of this manifesto to leave their Christian values behind (refugees) and putting them back in the centre of attention (Family) by demand. It doesn’t come as a surprise Jens Spahn sending a greeting to the approximately 100 people of this manifesto.

Interest to enthuse new members and to focus on younger people or migrants does not exist – in the contrary: our questions regarding rejuvenating the CDU or to include new members originating from foreign countries were quietly, but definitely opposed even with some discomfort. It seems Angela Merkel does not recognize the “Small AfD” among their own people – or she tolerates them on purpose.

Little fuss from the SPD

The partner in the coalition, the SPD, did not stir issues up after they’ve started governing. During the coalition negotiations the SPD has secured the Ministries of Finance, Justice and the Foreign Ministry besides others, much to the displeasure of those people in CDU and CSU who were keen on these jobs as well. With these ministries the SPD owns quite some power and the ability to steer the government: an excellent success for the negotiators of SPD.

At the other hand the SPD remains in a fuzzy situation not just within its own quest for identity. Several representatives of SPD do not find common ground regarding the welfare programme Hartz IV. Some people around vice president Ralf Steger for instance want to replace Hartz IV knowing the programme was introduced by the SPD but also is the reason for the downfall of the party. At the other hand, the Finance Minister Olaf Scholz wants to keep Hartz IV – since it is some kind of his own child from the time he worked for Chancellor Schröder, the facilitator of Hartz IV. The designated president of the party Andrea Nahles rarely shy of some “Kick-Ass”comments is very quit despite the discussion about Hartz IV and the job market being the opportunity for SPD to position itself clearly. She commented Jens Spahn’s intentional slip geared towards media with surprisingly soft voice, but straight into the face. Horst Seehofe and Jens Spahn are after the personal representation but missing out on their duties, and adds: “The primary job of the Chancellor is to sort out the act of government”.

Angela Merkel is flagging

Over the past years Angela Merkel became the symbol for political stability and predictability. She is popular in Germany and abroad but scratches in the paint become visible. Her political style is increasingly perceived as boring and leaden even by her own people. Usually, watched from distance she acts successfully and well balanced even for extensive problems. Angela Merkel is the chancellor of compromises and subtle but also of half-hearted decisions and stalling in front of complex problems. This works fine at the moment since economy runs excellent and tax revenues are on a steady high – both causing additional problems which she isn’t regulating. This stability increasingly is perceived as stagnancy which it actually is e.g. if looked at the Digital Offensive launched by the government many years too late.

Along with a certain fatigue in society towards Angela Merkel – a phenomenon previous chancellor Kohl encountered too – and her style the many postponed “building lots” become visible. Media often simplify the situation and explain the fatigue towards Angela Merkel merely with her misjudgment in the situation with the refugees and her catastrophic and negligent management of this issue. This, however, is just a small part of the real reasons for the poor results of the elections and the steep head wind Angela Merkel is facing. It is the combination of various diverse issues such as the state of emergency in nursing, poverty among the elderly, housing shortage, low wages and this in combination with contemptuousness and ignoring several population groups, particularly those at the far right of the political spectrum. The situation with the refugees therefore is just one part of the picture – but one people easily can discharge their hate and anger. Also because of the right wing party AfD right wing ideas and right wing protesting became “En Vogue” – even the voters of CDU/CSU are going towards the right. In this climate the uprising hostility against the Jews in the German society and the anti-Semitic activities of the past month are not unexpected. The internal policy of Angela Merkel was meant to be visionary and creative but it looks more like uncertain, delayed, reactive, and unveils many large problem.

Rumble at the right

The “old” parties still underestimate the right wing AfD. The equally underestimate the potential of right wing populism and the count of German citizen having conservative/right wing thoughts – even within CDU and CSU. For example, much disregarded by politics the right wing union “Zentrum Automobil” gained six mandates during the last works committee elections in March 2018 at the Daimler (Mercedes) plant in Untertürkheim (Stuttgart) – with the result of 13.2% they achieved a similar result like the AfD during the election last year, the Bundestagswahlen. The “Forschungsgruppe Wahlen“ stated approximately 15% of the members of the politically social unions did voted for AfD instead for SPD during the last Bundestagswahlen. A result pretty much replicated during the works committee elections at Daimler.

The statements by some of the exponents of the works committee of the IG Metall union: right wing ideas today are little visible but are spread subliminal throughout the whole company and, therefore, it’s expected to see a further rise of the “Zentrum Automobil”. The confronted union IG Metall got us evasive responses only.It seems this issue is hushed up. Time will tell whether Angela Merkel tactics to sit such problem out are the successful tactics for the unions. Looking at the general tendency in the country towards the right we believe Angela Merkel and the unions both are playing with fire.

Some more foreign policy?

During the past Germany was known for a little consolidated, imprecise and often lacking foreign policy. Domestic policy always was more important and it still is. The country focuses on economic foreign policy driven by the industry and its lobbyists, and otherwise relies on symbolic policy geared towards the media.

This image could slightly change. One of the first official acts by Heiko Maas, the new foreign minister, was his visit to Israel. His predecessor Sigmar Gabriel several times acted awkwardly and Angela Merkel didn’t want to become involved but Heiko Maas clearly, pragmatically and quietly put down some counterpoints.On top of it he clearly took position against the lighting up anti-Semitism.

Despite his appearances sometimes being perceived as nicely stage-made he did not make his own life easier since expectations are high now. The quick and friendly meet up with the French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in Israel stirs up some hope Germany – after months of naval-gazing – finally will take over responsibility in Europe and the World. Moving from inactivity towards political creation with the friendly support by France.

The future of Angela Merkel

Foreign policy slowly picks up speed but Angela Merkel seems to have a hard time with her country. It no longer seems to be the Germany she knows. She seems to lose more ground contact the more she tries to understand the problems of society therefore losing more and more ground contact while facing fronts she has to fight. In the Bundestag CDU/CSU and SPD have to heavily deal with an number of parties, all of them having gained more than 5% of the votes. On top there is the AfD, the strongest party in the opposition owning an uncomfortable agenda – some of it even being attractive to her own party members.

With their vote for the Grand Coalition the SPD members have saved it and also saved the faces of SPD as well as the CDU/CSU. The SPD finds herself in a disruption and renovation process, even more so than the CDU. On top of it the parties of the opposition got stronger and this comes together with the incapability or the active reluctance of the governing parties to tackle the urging problems in the country in all consequence.

A forecast about the future of Angela Merkel and, therefore, of the German bipartisan system seems to be tricky. Though, the recent Grand Coalition steers towards the end of the factual bipartisan system in Germany. And people in Germany will be even more discontent for the next elections in 2021.The question how CDU/CSU and SPD will score is eligible. And whether the right wing AfD will establish itself as the third constant in the party landscape. The other question is whether the other parties will see the signs. Some media are singing the swan song for Angela Merkel forgetting she is not for nothing the most powerful woman in this world. It will be interesting to see how she will cope with the erosion on several fronts. It is not the end of Angela Merkel but she and her party are showing heavy signs of wear.

Sanctions Policy: The ‘European Paradox’

Since the end of the Cold War, economic
sanctions have increasingly been used by big players as a tool of foreign
policy. The initiators of sanctions use trade and financial restrictions to try
to force the target countries to change course politically as well as to
influence internal political processes. The United States has positioned itself
as the largest sanctions initiator. Over the past hundred years, the US has
used them more often than all other nations and the UN combined. The Americans
remain second to none in terms of the number of developed state institutions
involved in the policy of sanctions. The US sanctions apparatus far exceeds the
capabilities of the UN and any other country in terms of financial, human and
organisational resources.

The European Union is also showing increasing
activity as an initiator of sanctions. There are several conditions for this. First,
the EU is a powerful economy with huge human, financial and technological
potential. Economic power is the most important condition, without which an
effective policy of sanctions is simply impossible. After all, sanctions are
effective when the initiator can inflict much greater harm on the target
country than vice versa. Second, the European Union has not yet become an
independent military-political force. Its foreign policy is based on soft power
and economic instruments, so in conflict situations, sanctions are the best
option. Third, the EU coordinates its sanctions policy with the actions of the
United States, its main ally. The growing number of sanctions on the part of
Washington has also led to the growth of sanctions initiated by Brussels.

At the same time, there are a number of
distinguished features that define the EU approach. One of the key elements is
the commitment of Brussels to multilateral diplomacy. The EU avoids being the
sole initiator of sanctions. This is an important difference from the United
States. The Americans often impose sanctions without any regard for others.
They recognise the importance of coalition pressure on the target countries and
strive to involve their allies and a wider range of countries in launching
sanctions. However, their support for the United States is more instrumental –
the more sizable the coalition, the greater its potential for taking a toll on
the economies of sanctioned countries. However, for the EU, the multilateral
use of sanctions remains an important normative issue and even means of
conveying shared values. The European Union carefully implements UN Security
Council resolutions, and EU countries which are members of the UN Security
Council have often offered their own draft resolutions on sanctions.

The EU, however, allows sanctions which bypass
the decisions of the UN Security Council. Here the policy of Brussels differs
from the positions of Moscow and Beijing, which consider the UN Security
Council as the only legitimate source of sanctions. These countries also use
unilateral measures, but so far they’ve done it much less often in comparison
with the EU and especially the USA. However, by bypassing the UN, the EU is
trying to combine efforts with the United States and other Western countries,
that is, to provide a multilateral format. At the same time, the EU retains its
own view on many problems and calibrates a set of restrictive measures at its
sole discretion.

Another important distinction of EU policy is
its extremely reserved attitude towards extraterritorial sanctions. The
European Union authorities may well use secondary sanctions, that is, to punish
certain companies or organisations for violating existing restrictions.
However, Brussels uses such measures within its jurisdiction. The United
States, on the contrary, is increasingly introducing secondary sanctions
against foreigners, putting foreign companies on the SDN list or fining
violators.

Interestingly, over the past ten years, most of
the related fines were levied against European companies. This situation may
well be called the “European paradox.” EU authorities support many US sanctions
initiatives, but at the same time many Europeans are negatively affected by the
secondary sanctions. They pay the most fines. According to the Russian
International Affairs Council (RIAC), over the past 10 years, out of 201 US
Treasury fines, 40 were levied against EU companies and 133 were paid by US
companies. In just 10 years, the US Treasury has collected $ 5.6 billion in
fines. Of these, the Europeans paid more than $ 4.6 billion (83%), and the
Americans only paid 177.2 million (3%). This distribution resembles the “Pareto
law”: most of the revenue is generated by a minority of players. And this
minority is concentrated in Europe, whereas the smaller proportion was paid by
the US-based majority. Of course, such a distribution can hardly be the result
of the deliberate activity of American authorities. But the fact remains:
Europeans pay the most.

At least since the 1990s, The European Union has
tried to take measures to protect itself from secondary US sanctions. A serious
incentive was the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. Washington unilaterally resumed
large-scale financial and sectoral sanctions against Iran. A significant number
of companies operating in the Iranian market, including European ones, turned
out to be facing the threat of secondary sanctions and subsequent penalties.
The EU has resumed the so-called 1996 Blocking Statute, which should shield
European companies from secondary sanctions. However, a significant number of
big EU companies have already left Iran. Many large European companies which do
business in Iran also conduct business in the US, and preferred to maintain
their loyalty to American requirements, even though Brussels was critical of
the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and introduced protective measures. The threat
of having problems with the US authorities in the form of fines and “weaning”
from the US market and financial system outweighs possible profits in the
Iranian market.

In Europe, some politicians proposed
establishing their own payment system, in the interests of European sovereignty
and financial independence. In January 2019, INSTEX SAS company was registered
in France (with the participation of Germany and the United Kingdom). It was
tasked with securing transactions between European companies and Iran,
bypassing US sanctions. So far the fate of this initiative remains unclear. The
big problem is its approval by other EU members. Also, the real functionality
of INSTEX remains unclear. In the end, nothing is preventing the Americans from
including INSTEX in their SDN list, making it “toxic”, or fining the company in
proportion to the volume of its deals with Iran.

The prospects for INSTEX are becoming even more
vague, against the background of diplomatic difficulties. After the US exit
from the JCPOA, Washington found itself in diplomatic isolation on the Iran
issue. However, this didn’t bother the Americans much. The situation began to
heat up after the United States lifted the restriction exceptions on the
purchase of Iranian oil, which they made for eight countries, including Italy
and Greece. In May 2019, Tehran announced that it would refuse to fulfil
certain obligations under the JCPOA. In response, Washington immediately
introduced harsh, newer sanctions against Iran. The EU reacted coolly to the
actions of Tehran. Now Iran could be considered isolated.

The diplomatic development of the situation
around the JCPOA is likely to seriously undermine European ambitions to create
an alternative payment system. If Iran once again becomes a pariah state (as
the Americans would like to see), then the reason that gave rise to the
discussion about it will disappear. As for fines against banks and companies,
Brussels is likely to leave these risks to the discretion of the business
community itself. Moreover, entrepreneurs haven’t demonstrated any serious,
noticeable activity lobbying for alternatives. Apparently, the business sector
feels comfortable in the dollar system, and the risks of secondary sanctions do
not outweigh the benefits the system presents and the costs of its
transformation. Moreover, outside of the Iranian problem, there is not a single
issue that the sanctions policy presents that could seriously stimulate
discussion about a European financial alternative. The commonality of the
political positions of the United States and the EU will ensure the status quo.

Related

How Romania’s battles over corruption hamstrung economic progress

When
Romania took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union
in January, news coverage in Western Europe mostly focused on the tensions between Brussels and
Bucharest over the latter’s judicial reforms. Jean-Claude Juncker publicly
called Romania’s ability to fulfil its presidential duties into question; the European Commission, meanwhile, accused
the ruling Social Democrats (PSD) of backsliding on corruption.

Since
then, however, Romania has executed its presidential duties without a hitch, hosting
European leaders
for a major EU summit in Sibiu on May 10th that earned plaudits from top EU officials like Donald Tusk. In
hindsight, has the overarching media narrative ignored important developments
inside Romania? Does the Sibiu summit demonstrate that Romania has regained its
footing as one of Europe’s most dynamic economies?

Economic growth no longer extraordinary

Romania’s
economy, while still growing at an impressive rate, has slowed down from the remarkable rates the country was
registering as recently as 2017— when its 7% expansion outpaced nearly all
European peers. 2018 saw growth rates of 4%, while estimates point to 3.5% for 2019.

Bucharest’s
economic slowdown is due to a variety of factors, from tightened global financial conditions to falling
birth rates. Foreign investors, however, may also be skittish thanks to the
long-running battle between Romania’s political establishment and its
controversial anti-corruption agency, the National Anticorruption Directorate
(DNA). Under the leadership of agency head Laura Kövesi, the DNA undertook (by
its own count) 2,396 investigations targeting Romanian magistrates between 2014 and 2018.
Kövesi’s tenure saw over 1,000 figures from the country’s political and business circles convicted for
corruption.

The
DNA’s swathes of
indictments
targeting Romania’s leading political figures, with charges ranging from
forgery to money laundering, have certainly played into the country’s
reputation for corruption. That image has hamstrung Romania’s ability to
attract foreign capital and investment, from Europe and beyond.

EU
leaders, meanwhile, have heaped praise on the DNA’s stack of convictions, holding the
anti-corruption agency up as a model for other European countries to emulate.
Concerns have mounted, however, that the DNA is abusing its power and reverting
to communist-era investigative practice.

Long lists of convictions—but at what cost?

Hiding
behind the DNA’s unusually-high conviction rates were potential due process
violations,
including lengthy pre-trial detainment periods equivalent to imprisonment
before having been sentenced by a court of law, or otherwise threatening
suspects that a lack of cooperation could see their family members prosecuted.
Increased scrutiny of these violations may help explain why the number of cases
resulting in acquittals rose markedly, from 12.2% in 2017 to 36.3% in 2018.

Some
of the DNA’s most prominent targets have drawn parallels between its behaviour
and that of Romania’s Communist-era security services. Alina Bica, who formerly
served as chief prosecutor for organised crime and was arrested in 2014, described her experience with the DNA as “like in the 1950s
when the communists came. You get called an enemy of the state, you get put in
the truck…they damage your family.” Kövesi reportedly made a personal visit to
the Supreme Council of Magistrates to persuade them to sign off on Bica’s
arrest, while Bica’s husband was targeted with charges of tax evasion and her
lawyer was also detained.

Many
of those singled out by the DNA accuse the body of pursuing political or
personal vendettas. Bica, for example, claimed the charges against her stemmed from her 2012
investigation into Transgaz, where Kövesi’s brother served as a director. PSD
spokespeople have suggested treasurer Mircea Drăghici,
currently under investigation for embezzling party funds, is being targeted as part of the lead-up to this month’s European
elections.

Troubling collaboration with the intelligence services

Recent
revelations about the DNA’s investigative tactics have given new life to
comparisons between today’s anti-corruption czars and the communist-era
Securitate secret police. Earlier this year, Romania’s Constitutional Court ruled secret protocols between DNA prosecutors and
the country’s domestic intelligence agency, the SRI, were unconstitutional. The
Constitutional Court concluded that the SRI, successor to the Securitate, had
signed agreements allowing the intelligence agency to circumvent the authority
of prosecutors in criminal investigations, while simultaneously conducting over 20,000 wiretaps a year on behalf of the DNA—an excessive violation of privacy.

The
investigation by the Constitutional Court culminated in Kövesi’s removal from
her position in 2018. Kövesi herself
has been indicted
on charges of corruption and abuse of office, relating to allegations by
Romanian businessman Sebastian Ghita that Kövesi strongarmed him into paying for the repatriation of a fugitive from Indonesia. Romanian
police claim they footed the bill, but criminal proceedings are ongoing. The
former prosecutor nevertheless retains many fans in Brussels. Allies in the European Parliament want to name her
to the new position of EU Chief Prosecutor despite the ongoing investigation in
Romania.

Increased transparency

With
the steady release
of DNA documents
to the newly formed Special Section for the Investigation of Crimes Committed
by Magistrates and the National Union of Judges in Romania, which both operate
independently of the DNA, efforts to increase transparency in Romanian
governance may soon move beyond the bitter political rivalries that undermined
Romania’s political stability and global reputation.

While
the Sibiu summit was a political success, the economy is also regaining its
footing. Consumer confidence is recovering, with better prospects for future
savings. Wage growth
remains impressive
while lending activity continues to expand. And CFA Romania, an association of
investment professionals, released a
report predicting
Romanian economic activity will improve over the next 12 months. It seems that,
despite the corruption battles of the past several years, both Romanian
businesses and consumers remain optimistic about their future prospects.

Related

Any signs of a chill between France and Germany?

The past few months have seen many signs of growing
friction and divisions between the two European superpowers, Germany and
France. Before the February vote on changes to the EU Third Energy Package,
meant to expand the European Commission’s power to regulate Europe’s electricity
and natural gas market, France opposed, until the very last moment, Germany’s
position on the issue. In April, Paris and Berlin failed to agree on how much
more time Britain should be given to decide on its withdrawal from the EU.
During the recent presidential elections in Ukraine, France and Germany
supported various candidates. Moreover, they are equally divided on who will be
the new head of the European Commission. What is happening in relations between
members of the “European tandem”?

During the latter half of 2018, it looked as if relations between the EU’s
two powerhouses were reaching a new strategic level. In a joint
statement made in Meseberg in June, Berlin and Paris outlined their shared
vision of the European Union’s future development. In late August, French
President Emmanuel Macron and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas simultaneously
spoke out about a new role for Europe to make it “sovereign and
strong.” During their informal meeting in Marseille in September, Emmanuel
Macron and Angela Merkel agreed on a coordinated response to the main
challenges facing Europe and on concerted work on shaping the “agenda for
Europe.”

In November, the two leaders spoke in favor of
creating a “European army,” “real Pan-European armed
forces” capable of defending Europe. And in January of this year, they
inked a broader cooperation accord in Aachen, which commentators described as a
“new big step” in bringing the two countries closer together. The Treaty of
Aachen covers new areas of political cooperation, including common projects and
commitments in the fields of defense and international relations.

Just a month later, however, the Franco-German rapprochement hit a snag
over two strategic projects worth billions of euros, namely the Nord Stream 2
gas pipeline and trade relations with the United States. Here the interests of Paris and Berlin differ
the most. Underscoring the seriousness of the rift, Emmanuel Macron
canceled a planned trip to a security conference in Munich in what many
commentators described as a “demonstrative” move. As for the issue of
completing the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the compromise
reached by France and Germany and approved by the European Parliament, imposed
on Berlin “a formula that the German
government wanted to avoid.”

Regarding the issue of trade relations with the United
States, it wasn’t until mid-April that Brussels collectively managed to prevail
over France, which had been blocking the start of pertinent negotiations with
Washington. Any delay may cost the German automakers multi-billion dollar
fines from the United States. If the French succeed in delaying the start of
negotiations, Germany, which is already experiencing a sharp slowdown in
economic growth, may end up the loser again.

France’s sudden move left
the German media guessing whether Macron’s
actions were dictated by his displeasure about Berlin’s “slow response” to his
initiatives, or by Donald Trump’s threat to sanction companies involved in the
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, including the French concern Engie.
Or maybe Macron had resorted to this “show of force” in a bid to strengthen his
hand amid the conflict with the “yellow jackets” and growing tensions with Italy?

Indeed, the
statement made in Meseberg and the treaty signed in Aachen could have proved
too much of a compromise for Macron, if not a serious blow to his ambitions.
According to critics, “the Treaty of Aachen dodges the most sensitive topics
characteristic of modern Europe.” Including migration and political unification
of Europe – something Macron is so eager to accomplish. The treaty makes no
mention of a common EU tax and financial policy, while the issue of creating a
single economic space is spelled out declaratively at
best. Angela Merkel essentially
emasculated virtually all of Macron’s initiatives pertaining to the financial
and economic reform of the EU and the Eurozone. Emmanuel Macron has been
out to become one of the EU’s leaders, or even its sole leader, ever since he
became president in 2017. All the more so following Britain’s exit from the
bloc and amid the ebbing political authority and the planned resignation by
2021 of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, once the informal leader of a united
Europe.

The current political situation in France is also
calling for more decisive actions by President Macron. To ensure at least a
relative success in the upcoming European elections, he needs to enlist the
support not only of the traditional left-and right-centrists, but possibly of
some representatives of the new European right too. Whether or not Angela
Merkel stands down in 2021, or after the elections to the European Parliament
(as has been rumored since April), Emmanuel Macron essentially remains the only
top-level proponent of greater European integration. (Unless Merkel ultimately
moves to the head of the European Commission, of course). With Macron eyeing a
second presidential term in 2022, the advancement of the modernization model
for France depends directly on the success of the European project. And here
any significant changes in the European Union “mainly depend on the position of
France’s privileged partner
– Germany.”

All this means that Macron needs a breakthrough now that Berlin is going through a
“complicated power transit” with Merkel having resigned as the head
of the CDU and preparing to hand her post as Federal Chancellor over to a
successor. Therefore, she is now taking her time and, according to her
successor as CDU leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, is holding out for a new
vector in the development of the European project as “the common
denominator of the distribution of political forces after the elections.”
Does this mean that Berlin’s is staking on the success of its candidate in the
ongoing struggle for the next president of the European Commission? For the
first time ever, the CDU and the CSU have managed to nominate a common
candidate who has “good chances” of heading the EU’s executive body.

Meanwhile, Berlin is facing an intractable dilemma.
Since 1949, “avoiding by all means situations necessitating a hard choice
between France and the United States has been a key principle of German foreign
policy.” This approach “survived all governments and coalitions, and was
maintained after the reunification of Germany.”
Under the present circumstances, however, remaining firmly committed to the
transatlantic relationship threatens to further destabilize the European
integration project, which is now seen as being key to Germany’s future.
Simultaneously, a course aimed at minimizing damage from the policy of external
powers that threatens the fundamental German interests might necessitate
radical and ambitious geopolitical maneuvers that would almost inevitably
revive the Europeans’ and Americans’ historical fears of “German
instincts.”

US and British analysts already worry that “the

[geopolitical]

shackles that are voluntarily accepted [by Germany] can be
thrown off.” They also wonder how long it will take before new generations of
Germans want to restore their country’ full state sovereignty.

In Germany itself, promotion of such slogans have
already given the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) the third largest
fraction in the Bundestag. A major paradox of the current European and German
policy is that Berlin’s activity or passivity is equally detrimental to the
Pan-European project and could eventually lead to the EU’s fragmentation and
even disintegration.

However, the
Franco-German “tandem” is already being dogged with contradictions and
compromises, which are highly unpopular among many in the German establishment.
The cautious response by many EU members to the latest joint geopolitical
initiatives of Berlin and Paris, gave Germany more reasons to fear that Macron’s global ambitions could exacerbate
the differences that already exist in the EU. Many in Germany have long
suspected Macron of wishing to make the EU instrumental in his foreign policy
aspirations.

Some experts still believe that at the end of the day
the current chill between Germany and France may turn out to be just a sign of
the traditional “propensity for taking independent political decisions.” The
sides are sizing each other up to see “who will be setting the rules of the roadmap in the future.” Also, Paris’s tougher stance towards Berlin
may be a tactical ploy, a pre-election maneuver to “hijack” part of the agenda
from the “national populists” of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe where
many people are not happy about the German “diktat.”

Emmanuel Macron has proved once and again his ability
to ride the wave of public discontent with certain issues. His Plan for Europe,
published in early March, carefully avoids any mention of France’ and Germany’s
leading role in advancing EU reforms.

On the other hand, the foreign policy of the leading
European powers has a long history, and long-term geopolitical considerations
continue to play a significant role. Germany, for one, has traditionally been
looking for a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxons, while France – to German
dominance in Europe. As a result, the search by Paris and Berlin for common
points of political contact is now turning into intense efforts to find the
“lowest common denominator.” The overall impression is that we will only be
able to see a greater deal of certainty in relations between the two countries
after the results of elections to the European Parliament have been summed up.
The distribution of roles both within the “European tandem” and
in the EU as a whole depends on which political forces – pro-Macron or
pro-Merkel, the Europeans will vote for.