Friday, September 25, 2009

Media reports and security “experts” routinely ask if TSA really makes air travelers safer or if we are simply trying to make things more inconvenient in the name of security.

Safety and convenience can be a bit like oil and water at times, but TSA is always trying to balance the two. It’s not always easy, and we know passengers aren’t always thrilled to take off their shoes or put their liquids in a baggie. But you don’t take your shoes off because of Richard Reid and the liquid explosive threat isn’t over because the UK plot was foiled. Everything TSA does is rooted in intelligence, and every security measure is done to mitigate a threat.

Sometimes security measures come after a plot is busted, such as the August 10 liquids plot. In August 2006, existing technology could not root out the peroxide-based explosives from all the other liquids that come through the checkpoint. The threat was very real, and continues to be real, as all the news on terrorism this week shows. Three men involved in the UK plot have since been convicted for trying to blow up commercial airliners with liquid bombs. Watch this video to see the capabilities of liquid explosives to do catastrophic damage to a commercial airliner.

So we first enacted a total ban along with the UK and other countries. Then after national labs here and overseas studied the intel, we worked with international partners to come up with the policy of packing 3.4 ounce or smaller containers in the one quart baggie so passengers could take necessary liquids in their carry-on bags.

Other times, we proactively enact measures to mitigate a threat, like when we announced that remote control toys could receive additional screening last year, and again this month, when we deployed test kits to give added scrutiny to certain powders that could be used to make explosives. Both items can be used to create an IED, but instead of banning them, we use existing technology to mitigate the threat with very little impact on most travelers.

There are some other examples of balancing security with convenience to improve your travel experience:

Laptop Friendly Bags: Officers continue to this day to find gun parts and other prohibited items hidden in laptops, as well as tampered laptops. While it’s an extra step to take your laptop out of its bag, that extra step helps officers make sure they get a clear view without other items in your laptop bag getting in the way. So we worked with industry to come up with Laptop Friendly Bags that allow you to keep your laptop in your bag and give officers the clear view of the laptop that they need to keep you safe.

AT X-rays: Advanced Technology X-rays give officers a better and multidimensional view of your bag which in turn leads to fewer bag searches and reruns. AT X-rays can also be upgraded to address evolving threats.

Black Diamond Self Select and Family Lanes: Self Select and Family Lanes are based on feedback from frequent fliers and passengers with children or special needs. This enhancement allows passengers to travel through checkpoints at their own skill level and pace. TSA has also positioned technology to screen medically necessary liquids at the Family/Liquids lanes.

Imaging Technology: Not only has the use of Millimeter Wave and Backscatter made things safer for the flying public by detecting both metallic and non-metallic threat items that could be hidden on a body, it has allowed us to take a more hands-off approach when screening certain passengers. It has been a long time coming for passengers with metal implants who always have to undergo a pat down.

Alternative Screening Procedures: Good security requires giving the same level of screening to all passengers. While we must treat those with disabilities and other special needs with respect, over the years, we have seen many people try to get prohibited items through the checkpoint using wheelchairs, casts – even in prosthetics. If people think there’s a loophole, they will try to use it. That’s why TSA has created many alternate screening procedures for passengers with special needs such as disabilities, children, small infants , soldiers and wounded warriors.

Secure Flight: It’s critical to keep known terrorists off planes. But it’s unfortunate when people whose names are similar to those who are really on a watch list are unable to print a boarding pass at home or at a kiosk. It’s worse when someone in an airport tells a mom or dad that their child is on the No Fly List – because no child is. Secure Flight brought watch list matching back inside the government, so we could ensure a high level of security and reduce the hassle factor. Providing your name as it appears on your government-issued ID as well as your gender and date-of-birth reduces the chance of misidentification by more than 99% to make travel safer and easier.

Paperless Boarding Pass: The paperless boarding pass puts a 2D barcode encrypted boarding pass directly onto a passenger’s PDA or cell phone. It mitigates the threat of fraudulent boarding passes and it’s a customer service improvement for airlines and passengers.

TSA is not only concerned about balancing security and convenience – the equation isn’t complete without talking about privacy. Privacy considerations have been built into Secure Flight, imaging technology and other screening functions.

TSA’s layered approach to aviation security incorporates elements long before the airport all the way to the plane. You will never see or be affected by many of those elements. And while engaged passengers and hardened cockpit doors have gone a long way to preventing another 9-11 style attack, we also have to focus on preventing future attacks. As current media reports show, terrorists continue to look at IEDs, including peroxide-based explosives. Preventing an IED from getting on a plane involves intel-sharing, technology, highly trained officers and random, unpredictable screening procedures.

Kristin LeeAssistant Administrator for Strategic Communications and Public Affairs

162 comments:

Anonymous
said...

"It’s not always easy, and we know passengers aren’t always thrilled to take off their shoes or put their liquids in a baggie. But you don’t take your shoes off because of Richard Reid and the liquid explosive threat isn’t over because the UK plot was foiled."

Kristin, why did TSA decide to make the shoe carnival mandatory in August 2006? There were no shoe-bombings of US flights when shoe removal was optional before that date. There are no shoe bombings taking place in all of the other countries without a mandatory shoe carnival. So why does TSA insist on the shoe carnival when it's been demonstrated that the use of shoe bombs is profoundly rare -- indeed, that it began and ended with Richard Reid's failed attempt?

Why can TSA not produce any peer-reviewed independent research that supports its 3.4-1-1 policy?

Why does TSA insist on posting incorrect signage in airports about the 3.4-1-1 policy?

Why does TSA refuse to post, on this blog and at the checkpoints where TSA is using its virtual strip-search machines, images of the same size and resolution as seen by the operator of the strip-search machine?

In short: How stupid do you think we are, and why do you keep lying to us?

If TSA cared at all about convenience it would end the pointless shoe carnival (unduplicated anywhere else in the world), admit the liquid policy is a hysterical overreaction, and stop wasting its time on ID checks that have nothing to do with security. It would also probably stop trying to take pictures of children's genitals.

Can I ask a question here? Obviously there are many people here who disagree with many TSA policies. What is the official procedure for changing them? Who has authority to make those calls? In other words, who do I send letters to explaining why I don't feel a lick safer than I did on 9/10, yet am 10x more inconvenienced? If I were in charge, we'd be locking the cockpit doors, and running everybody through metal detectors, bags through xray, none of this crazy laptop, shoe, and liquid nonsense. Who do I need to tell this to?

The liquid policy keeps a single individual from carrying enough liquids to assemble an effective bomb.

Thank goodness terrorists would never think of working in concert, with 7 to 11 of them on a single flight, each carrying liquid precursors! Thank goodness that people skilled enough in chemistry to build powerful bombs from over-the-counter products would never have the math skills to figure out how to carry a sufficient quantity aboard when limited to 3.4 ounces apiece!

I must disagree with the unfounded conclusions of some of my fellow bloggers. The shoe removal policy makes sense; people can hide things in their shoes so TSA makes passengers take them off so that TSA can check them out. I believe it has been mentioned before that the “strip search machines” can find non-metallic items therefore stopping bombs from getting on planes; it seems the continued use of such machines is warranted. I have also seen pictures of what these machines’ images look like, do some research and you can find them too. If multiple men can be convicted in a court of law of trying to kill others, using liquid explosives, then what proof do you have that the liquid explosives can not work?

As with most of our security woes I have one thing to say. If you don’t like the way the government decides to protect you and I when we fly and want them to stop protecting you then you are freely choosing to stop complaining when another plane falls from the sky (mine won’t explode in mid-air because I allow the government to protect me :)

Anonymous: we HAVE been locking REINFORCED cockpit doors since 2002. No one will cooperate with hijackers any longer. The rest is not only pointless and expensive, it pushes U.S. citizens to use our much more lethal highways, or spend their money on foreign ports and carriers who treat them better.

The black diamond lane at ATL after customs and immigration is never available for expert travelers when I go through there at least monthly. Whenever I approach a TSA employee about this, I get the brush off. What is the point of this lane if an expert flyer cannot use it?

Why does the TSA not know their own policies? I have the NEXUS card and have been using it at airports domestically for almost a year now...DFW, BNA, MGM, BDL, ICT, BOS, MIA, LAX, LAS, IAH, HOU, DAL, DCA, IAD, BUF, STL, SPI, ORD, MDW, PIT, PHL, RDU, ATL, MEM... at these airports no one, including supervisors recognized the card. Why won't you train your people correctly? As a NEXUS card holder, DHS knows more about me than someone with a state issued drivers license. Why won't you train these supposed "document experts" in all of the forms of ID you accept?

As someone who flies weekly and sees this: why do you not make all of your officers go through screening? On a weekly basis, I witness screeners at DFW walking through the metal detectors with backpacks on, obviously reporting to work, and walking through to the "secure" side without going through screening? When I bring this up to TSA supervisors, the response is always something like "well, they have had a background check!"...I don't care what checks they have had! They need to go through screening just like anyone else entering the secure area! Why do you allow airline employees into secure areas without passing through security?!? I notice this all the time at BOS (lower level by the baggage claim in the AA terminal)? Airline employees in MIA were just arrested for smuggling drugs! They went through a background check! Isn't BOS one of the airports that the 9/11 hijackers went through? You would think that they would not allow this!

Your "layers" have more holes than a pound of Swiss cheese. Why don't you start by mandating that all TSO's go through screening? (Yeah, I know they are supposed to, but "supposed to" and what actually happens at the airports is two different things!). Why don't you then make ALL airline employees go through screening and not allow them direct access to the ramp/SIDA area?

Now...Blogger Bob. You are a government employee, correct? Paid by taxpayer money, correct? A public servant, correct? I know that people on here and other places personally attack you, etc. While that must be hard to take, you need to demonstrate a little more professionalism. Most of the time you are fairly professional, but I have seen you on here be extremely sarcastic and down right rude to people. Regardless of what they say, you should always maintain professionalism. Your comment several weeks ago to a person about "doing more by 9am then you do in an entire day" is one example of this. As a government employee, you must learn to accept criticism and not take it personally.

Other times, we proactively enact measures to mitigate a threat, like when we announced that remote control toys could receive additional screening last year, and again this month, when we deployed test kits to give added scrutiny to certain powders that could be used to make explosives. Both items can be used to create an IED, but instead of banning them, we use existing technology to mitigate the threat with very little impact on most travelers.

----

Given the above, and given that technology exists to properly screen liquids, why does the TSA continue with the 3.4-1-1 nonsense? Why not, instead of banning certain liquids, use the same logic to screen them?

Jannis -- The false choice you present in your post (9/25, 8:43 PM) is more than a bit silly. The choice is not between "government security" and "no security". The choice is between the security we have now, and real security -- security which keeps us safe, but at the same time protects our civil liberties and doesn't lead to silly things like virtual strip searches, shoe carnival, and LAG nonsense.

But you don’t take your shoes off because of Richard Reid and the liquid explosive threat isn’t over because the UK plot was foiled. Everything TSA does is rooted in intelligence, and every security measure is done to mitigate a threat.

Oh no she didn't. After I demolish the liquid explosive myth in the previous blog entry talking to West, here Kristin goes ahead and repeats it as if nobody knows that it's a work of fiction.

Kristin, we know it's a work of fiction. There is no intelligence involved in the war on water. The UK plot never even got to the point where they had a plan more detailed then "gee that would be a cool idea."

There are two explosives under discussion, and they have to have ALL of these characteristics.

1. The components are safe to transport, individually cannot be detected by explosives detection, are liquid, and can be combined easily and safely into an explosive using only facilities found on the other side of the TSA checkpoint.

2. The combined explosive is safe to transport, liquid, and cannot be detected by explosives detection.

Neither of those two liquid explosives exist outside of Hogwars School of Witchcraft and Wizardry. And if a Hogwarts graduate does come through the checkpoint, he'll have ways to evade security that you cannot match.

It’s critical to keep known terrorists off planes. But it’s unfortunate when people whose names are similar to those who are really on a watch list are unable to print a boarding pass at home or at a kiosk. It’s worse when someone in an airport tells a mom or dad that their child is on the No Fly List – because no child is

I have to admit this blog entry is gold, because you have mentioned the third greatest procedural complaint, the "extra groping" list (note I did not say "no fly" list). And you cannot find out if your name is really on the list because that's SSI. And you cannot get your name of the list.

And you call that security.

Wow, Kristin, whose side are you on? Are you secretly in support of the critics and put up this softball deliberately so we could hit it out of the park?

Oh, and will you be answering any of these complaints yourself, or will you leave that to Bob, West, and Ron to do all the dirty work?

The post strikes an entirely false dichotomy between "security" and "convenience. In reality, the more important distinction between security and liberty. TSA checkpoints are only slightly inconvenient. I'm fully capable of shuffling along with the rest of the herd, juggling my shoes and trying to get my belt back on-- the inconvenience factor is minimal. But I shudder to think of where such unthinking, unprotesting acts of submission might lead us in the future.

Good morning! This is just an FYI that I'm traveling to the Midwest for a few days and will return on Tuesday.

I should be able to moderate a little when I find a Wi-Fi hot-spot, but we'll see...

Also, I just wanted to say that I can't believe some of the comments I've had to reject already for this post. My snarkiest comments are like little cute little puppies compared to some of the vile comments I've had to reject.

JB sez - A whole bunch of other stuff I am not going to address and "Now...Blogger Bob. You are a government employee, correct? Paid by taxpayer money, correct? A public servant, correct? I know that people on here and other places personally attack you, etc. While that must be hard to take, you need to demonstrate a little more professionalism. Most of the time you are fairly professional, but I have seen you on here be extremely sarcastic and down right rude to people. Regardless of what they say, you should always maintain professionalism. Your comment several weeks ago to a person about "doing more by 9am then you do in an entire day" is one example of this. As a government employee, you must learn to accept criticism and not take it personally."

Give me a break, Bob gives an element of snarkiness here from time to time, but most of his posts are direct, have a bit of humor (I know that some of you that post here weren't issued a sense of humor, but we were) and give good information. It sounds as if YOU are the one taking statements personally, I can assure you that they are not personal in nature and mostly humorous in their content.

Ayn sez - "There are two explosives under discussion, and they have to have ALL of these characteristics.

1. The components are safe to transport, individually cannot be detected by explosives detection, are liquid, and can be combined easily and safely into an explosive using only facilities found on the other side of the TSA checkpoint.

2. The combined explosive is safe to transport, liquid, and cannot be detected by explosives detection."

If you call your post in the previous blog destroying, remind me not to put you in charge of any military actions. I will again, outline for you the problem with the above statements.

1. If the current LAG protocols were not in place, the items would not have been tested to begin with. Therefore the "not detectable" part would be moot.

2. Currently the testing procedures for LAG are time consuming, so if you want all LAG to be allowed and we are going to test them, the lines will be much longer, and the wait times will be much longer.

3. If there are new tech items that come out, I will betcha that TSA will review them and if they are feasible, employ them ASAP. They will then look at modifying the LAG protocols.

Fire is one of the most dangerous things in an aeroplane, so what about the fact that it is simple to make a Molotov cocktail with materials you can buy after you pass the security checkpoint?

All one would need is a bottle of vodka - or other strong liquor - and a rag. For anybody to do this they would not need to even have shoes, a laptop or take fluids through a check point. Many terrorist acts could be performed with items available from stores after the security checkpoint.

When it is no longer possible to buy these after I have passed the security checkpoint I will believe the measures are effective, otherwise it is just a farce.

The choice we all must make is between the security that is currently in place, or, the swiss cheese security we used to have. No one cared about knives until 19 hijackers killed thousands by taking over planes using knives. No one cared about stuff hidden in shoes until a guy got on a plane with a bomb in his shoe. You talked about “real security.” If you actually presented some ideas to improve security (instead of simply telling the U.S. government that they don’t know what they are doing) then I would be more than happy to demand that my elected leaders enact them.

JB said…”Why don't you start by mandating that all TSO's go through screening? (Yeah, I know they are supposed to,)… “

Actually we are not “supposed to” go through screening. We have been given an exemption and must only submit to random checks just like most airline employees. I agree, this should be changed. Everyone who enters the “secure area” should be checked every time.

As far as the woes about the NEXUS card your problem is actually that you are among a rare group of travelers. In all the years I have been doing document checking I only remember seeing this card used once. It took a moment to check it out and the passenger was on his way. It’s simple; if we only occasionally see these kinds of ID they are going to raise questions.

Anon said…” why does the TSA continue with the 3.4-1-1 nonsense? Why not, instead of banning certain liquids, use the same logic to screen them?”

The amount of time this would take would back up the security lines even more then they are now. It just takes to long to screen every single oversized liquid that passengers want to take with them.

Actually Ayn you did not demolish anything. What you did do is continue to bury your head in the sand. West, as well as many others, demonstrated a logical reason why the LGA ban works. If you want to know more about liquid explosives I would suggest you go talk to anyone who works with them, like someone who works for bomb squad or EOD, or a miner or a powder man for the studios. You could also go online and simply do a search for liquid explosives. If you educate yourself you will be able to open your eyes.

"My snarkiest comments are like little cute little puppies compared to some of the vile comments I've had to reject."

Bob, as a supposed public servant you are expected to comport yourself with a level of dignity and respect for the public. You fail to do so; please post the name and contact information of your supervisor so I can file a complaint.

Bob, the reason the responses probably got so nasty is because this post is nothing more than a rehash of all the TSA's most popular refuted lies given as support for absurd security. If you were to come up with new lies (or better yet but less likely stop lying) you wouldn't get such a negative response. There's nothing new in the post itself, but the fact that everything refuted in previous blog entries has popped up AGAIN has aroused the ire of all those who have proven you and your fellow bloggers wrong.

Look, you've been refuted. Repeating what has been refuted as a positive basis for your intrusions doesn't make it more true, and it does nothing for the public image of the TSA.

JB said... Why does the TSA not know their own policies? I have the NEXUS card and have been using it at airports domestically for almost a year now...DFW, BNA, MGM, BDL, ICT, BOS, MIA, LAX, LAS, IAH, HOU, DAL, DCA, IAD, BUF, STL, SPI, ORD, MDW, PIT, PHL, RDU, ATL, MEM... at these airports no one, including supervisors recognized the card. Why won't you train your people correctly? As a NEXUS card holder, DHS knows more about me than someone with a state issued drivers license. Why won't you train these supposed "document experts" in all of the forms of ID you accept?

As someone who flies weekly and sees this: why do you not make all of your officers go through screening? On a weekly basis, I witness screeners at DFW walking through the metal detectors with backpacks on, obviously reporting to work, and walking through to the "secure" side without going through screening? When I bring this up to TSA supervisors, the response is always something like "well, they have had a background check!"...I don't care what checks they have had! They need to go through screening just like anyone else entering the secure area! Why do you allow airline employees into secure areas without passing through security?!? I notice this all the time at BOS (lower level by the baggage claim in the AA terminal)? Airline employees in MIA were just arrested for smuggling drugs! They went through a background check! Isn't BOS one of the airports that the 9/11 hijackers went through? You would think that they would not allow this!

Your "layers" have more holes than a pound of Swiss cheese. Why don't you start by mandating that all TSO's go through screening? (Yeah, I know they are supposed to, but "supposed to" and what actually happens at the airports is two different things!). Why don't you then make ALL airline employees go through screening and not allow them direct access to the ramp/SIDA area?

Now...Blogger Bob. You are a government employee, correct? Paid by taxpayer money, correct? A public servant, correct? I know that people on here and other places personally attack you, etc. While that must be hard to take, you need to demonstrate a little more professionalism. Most of the time you are fairly professional, but I have seen you on here be extremely sarcastic and down right rude to people. Regardless of what they say, you should always maintain professionalism. Your comment several weeks ago to a person about "doing more by 9am then you do in an entire day" is one example of this. As a government employee, you must learn to accept criticism and not take it personally.---------------

Relative to RB maybe? Let me try to explain some things for you JB. NEXUS cards....no idea what that is and I can tell you they are not on the list of acceptable IDs. HOWEVER any ID not on the list is acceptable if it meets certain standards. It must have tamper proof security features, an expiration date, your full name, your birth date, and a photo. I work for TSA and I can't even use my DHS badge for airport security because it does not meet the requirements. As for screening officers, we do not screen officers. We use to screen security screeners but we are now designated as federal officers and just like local law enforcment officers we do not have to be screened. As for screening employees, the airline and airport are private business'. They own the building, so if they want to build a door to get their employees in and out of the sterile area faster then they can. HOWEVER that door and that airport has to follow STRICT FAA regulations at all times or that privelage gets taken away very very fast. As for blogger bob I think he has handled this blog site more proffesionaly than any person can hope to. The people that post on these blogs are just mean and nasty and probably enjoy being so.

Blogger Bob said:Also, I just wanted to say that I can't believe some of the comments I've had to reject already for this post. My snarkiest comments are like little cute little puppies compared to some of the vile comments I've had to reject.

May I gently suggest that this might be a direct response to this very condescending posting that is, by it very nature, patently offensive and insulting to anyone who does not drink the TSA bathwater.

Another Anonymous poster said:"Given the above, and given that technology exists to properly screen liquids, why does the TSA continue with the 3.4-1-1 nonsense? Why not, instead of banning certain liquids, use the same logic to screen them?"

Because the technology is not deployed, yet. Its quite expensive, has a fairly high operations cost, and is just finishing its operational testing. Give it time, the government does not build the things, a company does. Until then, please put your liquids into a baggie and be patient.

I have never left a comment before on this blog, but I have to say that the TSA and its apologists have really lost it now. I can only assume you have no perception of how low you are held in the traveling public's esteem. I had hoped this foolishness would abate with the new administration, but alas, I was wrong and this dog and pony show continues. I only hope that enough regular travelers are so inconvenienced by you that the airlines start to go bankrupt. Then maybe the Congress will put you out of this intrusive business of which you are so proud.

Anonymous said... Can I ask a question here? Obviously there are many people here who disagree with many TSA policies. What is the official procedure for changing them? Who has authority to make those calls? In other words, who do I send letters to explaining why I don't feel a lick safer than I did on 9/10, yet am 10x more inconvenienced? If I were in charge, we'd be locking the cockpit doors, and running everybody through metal detectors, bags through xray, none of this crazy laptop, shoe, and liquid nonsense. Who do I need to tell this to?

BobPlease pass to Ms. Lee to do a Blog post on the rights of travelers when passing through the jurisdiction within TSA control.I think it would be more beneficial to travelers than what was posted.

What is exactly required of travelers? What are OUR rights?Where can we find all the rules that a person must obey to be able to pass through all of TSA requirements to fly domestically in the USA? I don't think that is asking too much. Every police department in the USA can give us the rules, so I think TSA can at least do the same.

Please explain where the TSA does have jurisdiction within an airport? The entire airport? Only at checkpoints? Within the sterile area? Parking lots of the airports?Many travelers are intimidated and do not understand just what authority a TSA agent has and does not have. It should be easy for Ms. Lee to point out exactly just how much authority a TSA agent has or does not have, and where they do have that authority.

When a TSA agent yells "Everybody FREEZE!!! Nobody MOVE!!!" at a checkpoint, must EVERYONE within earshot stop?Do TSA agents have the authority of detaining someone? Do agents have the right to interrogate someone? Must I answer questions posed to me by a TSA agent? Can I lie to them? What type questions can they legally ask of me?

When searched at the gate, and agents begin to look in carry-ons for who knows what, can we ask exactly what it is they are looking for? Can they open wallets and look at our credit cards, pictures, cash? Can we refuse the search as excessive, as our belongings did pass the tests at the original checkpoint? Do agents have a "free pass" to do any and all searches they want in the sterile area which is after the initial checkpoint?

Can agents randomly test our liquids that we have purchased in the sterile area? Must we comply when asked to break the seal on our water bottle that we purchased in the sterile area?

Can agents ask for boarding pass and ID in the sterile area? What if I do not have that on my person? I usually give all that to my wife (I tend to lose things), and may not be with her at all times while waiting to catch a flight.

I am sure Ms. Lee can come up with many more "Rights of the Traveling Public" as she appears to be an experienced and highly qualified public affairs spokesperson with a top notch resume.

Bob said: "Good morning! This is just an FYI that I'm traveling to the Midwest for a few days and will return on Tuesday.

I should be able to moderate a little when I find a Wi-Fi hot-spot, but we'll see...

Also, I just wanted to say that I can't believe some of the comments I've had to reject already for this post. My snarkiest comments are like little cute little puppies compared to some of the vile comments I've had to reject.

Blogger BobTSA Blog Team"

Perhaps if you actually *ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS POSED*, once in a while, adequately dealing with the legitimate security, civil-rights, and other legal issues raised WRT your agency's absurd "security" procedures, you might be getting far fewer "snarky" (or outright hostile) comments, Bob. This should be no surprise to you and your teammates here on PV, though - since DAY ONE, you guys have been dodging questions posed to you on this alleged public-interaction blog.

Answer the questions, respond to the complaints, and quit falling back on the tired old "SSI/Because we said so/Do you want to fly today?" routine, and you might actually start getting some of the respect you're wanting. Alternatively, grow a thicker skin and accept that a spokes...person for a near-universally-reviled agency such as TSA, which is *COMPLETELY* unaccountable to the public it allegedly serves, which is demonstratedly INCOMPETENT at its designated job, as proven by repeated testing (even ANNOUNCED testing), and which refuses to take action on the NUMEROUS PUBLICIZED abuses of "authoritah!" by frontline and supervisory personnel, is GOING to catch quite a bit of flak in the course of interfacing with the public said agency has been abusing for years now.

Kristen, can your imaging machines detect and display an inserted tampon? Many people have expressed the idea that if the machines do, then they are too invasive, and if the do not, then the machines are not effective enough. Could you please comment on the tampon paradox?

However, today, I saw a video of a September 24, 2009, KSL-TV news broadcast about Congressman Jason Chafetz of Utah and his experience with TSA staff at a TSA airport checkpoint. From 1:09 to 1:13 into the piece, we are shown a computer monitor displaying an image that looks similar to those you've offered as examples of the MMW machine output, except that it is not a still image, it is an animated loop. Picking a single image out of this video that operators apparently see is rather disingenuous of you, as it allows the viewer to perceive far less detail than the rotating 3D view does.

One of the following must be the case: 1) Lynn was mistaken when she wrote that the image operators see is still, 2) that which is shown to operators has changed since Lynn wrote this, or 3) the video in the KSL broadcast was not representative of what your operators see. Which is the case?

Anonymous said... In short: How stupid do you think we are, and why do you keep lying to us?

You must not have been in an airport in the last decade so the answer to your first question is... extraodinarily stupid. Passengers complaining that their 6 inch knives get taken away every tiem they fly. Passengers that don't believe water is a liquid.

...and its not that TSA lies to you... its that there are some people too dumb to see the truth for what it is.

Your "layers" have more holes than a pound of Swiss cheese. Why don't you start by mandating that all TSO's go through screening? (Yeah, I know they are supposed to, but "supposed to" and what actually happens at the airports is two different things!). Why don't you then make ALL airline employees go through screening and not allow them direct access to the ramp/SIDA area?

Now...Blogger Bob. You are a government employee, correct? Paid by taxpayer money, correct? A public servant, correct? I know that people on here and other places personally attack you, etc. While that must be hard to take, you need to demonstrate a little more professionalism. Most of the time you are fairly professional, but I have seen you on here be extremely sarcastic and down right rude to people. Regardless of what they say, you should always maintain professionalism. Your comment several weeks ago to a person about "doing more by 9am then you do in an entire day" is one example of this. As a government employee, you must learn to accept criticism and not take it personally.___________________________________

Wow JB. Thanks for all of your great advice!"(Yeah, I know they are supposed to, but "supposed to" and what actually happens at the airports is two different things!)." No TSO's are not supposed to go through security. That is a wrong statement. And thank you for your advice to Bob on how you think that he should respond to the posters on this blog. BLAH!

"Also, I just wanted to say that I can't believe some of the comments I've had to reject already for this post." And I can't believe that you want to see naked images of my family! I guess we're both in a state of disbelief, huh?

No wonder this post has attracted so much vitriol--a new TSA PR cheerleader touting the party line without any consideration as to the logic of what is being written. There's so much wrong with her post that I can only address a bit of it.

1) TSA learned nothing new in 8/06 that justified the absurd war on water; if anything the threat of a liquid bomb went *down* that month because the plotters were busted. DHS had known about the UK plotters for months, yet had not changed the policy. Nitroglycerin was first synthesized in 1847, before the invention of the airplane, let alone TSA. Nitroglycerin was used to kill one passenger on a Philippine Airline's flight in the 90s and was involved in a larger plot, but pre-TSA sanity prevailed and they busted the plotters instead of absurdly banning an entire state of matter and punishing millions of innocent travelers. ETD is perfectly capable of detecting nitrates and/or components of peroxide bombs, and a rational response to the threat would have been to increase random ETDs of unusual liquid containers months before 8/06. The only point of TSA's 8/06 liquid ban was as a CYA to give the impression that they were "doing something" to make people "feel better." And it was an excuse to make the completely un-related shoe carnival mandatory. (Mandatory shoe carnival was something TSA had been looking for an excuse to do for months/years, as indicated by the full-sized professionally-prepared "all shoes must come off" signs that appeared at checkpoints within weeks of the new policy, well ahead of such signage explaining the war-on-water.)

2) To call the experience of innocent no-fly-list victims "unfortunate" is a gross understatement. Subjecting innocent Americans to a secret blacklist with no due process and no effective means of redress is as un-American as you can get. Kristin should go meet face-to-face Americans who have missed flights, been publicly embarrassed, and even been detained by police, sometimes in handcuffs, as a result of no-fly mismatches. Then she should apologize to them. Secure Flight is a terrible step towards a papers-please state, and it is yet to be seen if Secure Flight will actually reduce mismatches. (If TSA searches for "near matches" on DOB as they do with names, mismatches could actually go up.)

3) If Kristin is such a fan of the virtual strip search machines, I invite her to post full-sized, full-resolution front and back images of herself on this blog.

Another Anonymous poster said: "Given the above, and given that technology exists to properly screen liquids, why does the TSA continue with the 3.4-1-1 nonsense? Why not, instead of banning certain liquids, use the same logic to screen them?"

Because the technology is not deployed, yet. Its quite expensive, has a fairly high operations cost, and is just finishing its operational testing. Give it time, the government does not build the things, a company does. Until then, please put your liquids into a baggie and be patient.************Ron, would you care to explain why in Europe there is no ban on liquids or the size they come in? Unless you are flying to the United States. After all the liquid explosives plot originated in London.

If this truly was a threat wouldn't airplanes all over Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa, and the Middle East be falling out of the skies.

You talked about “real security.” If you actually presented some ideas to improve security (instead of simply telling the U.S. government that they don’t know what they are doing) then I would be more than happy to demand that my elected leaders enact them.*******Actually Jannis we have tried, one of the best examples came from Trollkiller. He suggested using strapping machines as way to provide security to passenger luggage. Which would prevent theft and prevent someone from slipping a bomb into your luggage after you checked it.

Bob, as a supposed public servant you are expected to comport yourself with a level of dignity and respect for the public. You fail to do so; please post the name and contact information of your supervisor so I can file a complaint.___________________________________

You talked about “real security.” If you actually presented some ideas to improve security (instead of simply telling the U.S. government that they don’t know what they are doing) then I would be more than happy to demand that my elected leaders enact them.*******Actually Jannis we have tried, one of the best examples came from Trollkiller. He suggested using strapping machines as way to provide security to passenger luggage. Which would prevent theft and prevent someone from slipping a bomb into your luggage after you checked it.

September 29, 2009 1:16 PM.......................Perhaps if TK's recommendation on strapping machines had been accepted we wouldn't be hearing about several more TSO's employees at Miami being caught stealing from passengers bags.

Not only should all airport workers, including TSA employees, be screened entering the secure area they should also be screened leaving the secure area.

It's time to stop the open season on checked luggage and other possesions of travelers that thieves have at this nations airports courtesy of TSA.

"Safety and convenience can be a bit like oil and water at times, but TSA is always trying to balance the two."

Cost-benefit analysis is how responsible organizations balance the two. With TSA it is all balanced in terms of PR.

How many lives does TSA save by adding an extra hour of IN-convenience to 2,000,000 people per day? Some analysts have seen that diverting travellers from relatively safe airline travel into more risky automobile travel may have actually cost us lives. With TSA's imperfect detection, as seen in coverage of red team tests, how much 'security' is TSA supplying? Especially since other changes, like armored cockpit doors and different hijack response policies predate TSA.

Is TSA just an expensive extra layer of duct-tape on top of the barn door lock after the horse bolted?

The NEXUS card is provided by the DHS, so I would assume it is an acceptable form of ID. It appears to be a replacement for passports for cross-border travel between Canada and the U.S.At least that is my reading of the CBP webpage that came up with a simple Google search.

"...As far as the woes about the NEXUS card your problem is actually that you are among a rare group of travelers."

So why should we expect TSO's to detect a traveler even more rare than the NEXUS card carrier, the terrorist?

September 29, 2009 2:15 PM*********I expect a TSO to be able to identify a Nexus card because it is the third on the list of commonly accepted forms of ID on the TSA website. If they can't do something as simple as that they should be sent to do checked baggage searches until they learn otherwise.

Bob, while your at it I have some questions. What happened to answering our top 5 questions from your post on July 24? Still trying to cherry pick the questions like last year or is Francine checking Google for the answers.

Or the answer as to which department destroyed a concert piano because of suspicious glue? Is it possible the TSA did that or is the answer SSI.

"Yes, West. Destroyed. You were forced to rely on "prove it can't be done" when I challenged you to prove your explosives exist. That's not the way science is done.

That means you admitted you had nothing. Until you satisfy your burden of proof you are admitting you have no scientific basis for your policy."-------------------------------

ok.........i can make/have seen made the liquid explosives you are crying do not exist.............put together with stuff from Vons........its not that hard....if you don’t believe me its called google.

i don’t like the policy because 3.1.1 still lets you bring some liquid on. do they let you bring just a little C4 on? nope. so i say don’t let any go. but that’s just me. i don’t like going boom on my flight home.

None of the complaints I read in the comments above suggested how to do it better. They only lamented on how it was not good enough.

Security, by its very definition, results in inconvenience. It fundamentally channels people together into a single chokepoint and deliberately slows down movement to allow security personnel enough time to assess the people and property it allows inside.

Security will never be looked upon favorably by those who have to submit to its scrutiny. I've worked in classified facilities that used biometrics, and even then there were complaints about how ridiculous it was to place one's thumbprint on a scanner or to hold still while a retina scan was completed.

No matter what TSA does, there will always be a number of people who are dissatisfied, unconvinced or otherwise unhappy with its procedures.

On the flip side, no security system is perfect. None. The only way for a security system to remain effective is to avoid predictability by changing its procedures constantly. From a passenger standpoint, this only adds to the frustration.

I can see that TSA needs to improve its procedures; and some of its current processes are a little over the top. However, overall, compared to how porous airport security was prior to 9/11, I think TSA is a great improvement.

"NEXUS cards....no idea what that is and I can tell you they are not on the list of acceptable IDs. HOWEVER any ID not on the list is acceptable if it meets certain standards."

Well, this is what I love about the TSA...the flying public had to educate them! TSOWilliamReed... The NEXUS card is in fact accepted ID. It is one of the "Trusted Traveler" Cards. The NEXUS card is more secure then any state drivers license, has RFID tech, a universal format and the holders ungero deep background checks from both the US and Canadian governments. But bottom line is...it is acceptable by the TSA (As are all of the "Trusted Traveler" program cards - SENTRI, etc.). The NEXUS card IS ON the list.

TSOWilliamReed... you may want to go over this list and get retrained on the acceptable forms of ID since you have not even heard of an ID that is on the list. http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/acceptable_documents.shtm

Yes, NEXUS cards are an acceptable form of ID. I am sure Mr. Reed is very well aware of that now. I doubt he sees many of those cards in Ketchikan, Alaska.

Does it matter where Mr. Reed works?

As I've said before, numerous times ... TSA expects passengers to follow all the rules, all the time ... and shouts to the world when it catches passengers not following the rules on its homepage (under the "TSA Week At A Glance" item). TSOs should be held to the same standard of perfection.

TSOWilliamReed said...Relative to RB maybe? Let me try to explain some things for you JB. NEXUS cards....no idea what that is and I can tell you they are not on the list of acceptable IDs.*******And Bob wonders why some of the comments have been snarky. Here we have a TSO who is so badly trained that he can’t remember something as basic as the forms of ID the TSA considers acceptable. And I’m sure that this is just one many TSO’s who do the same with other guidelines.

Bob said...Yes, NEXUS cards are an acceptable form of ID. I am sure Mr. Reed is very well aware of that now. I doubt he sees many of those cards in Ketchikan, Alaska.

Blogger BobTSA Blog Team*********Bob, just because a TSO may not see a NEXUS card very often does not excuse the fact that they are not familiar with the list of accebtbale ID’s. If a TSO, any TSO, can not remember something as simple as this what other procedures are they not familiar with? This is not only a failure on the part of the TSO, but also the TSA for allowing this to happen.

Anonymous said...Here's a suggestion for the complainers:Why doesn't TSA just create two separate lanes? One where you receive screening and one you don't and you can pick which one!******Here’s a suggestion for you. I’d like to see two lines as well. One staffed by TSO’s who are know the SOP, including acceptable forms of ID, who treat passengers with respect instead of potential terrorists. And a second line staffed by the rest. Guess which one I’ll pick.

Manny said...None of the complaints I read in the comments above suggested how to do it better. They only lamented on how it was not good enough.

********As stated in a previous post it’s been tried. One of the best examples was Trollkiller’s recommendation to use a strapping machine for checked luggage to prevent the contents from being stolen and to prevent someone from placing a bomb in your check luggage. A low cost, low tech solution that does not require custom hardware or software or training.

ok.........i can make/have seen made the liquid explosives you are crying do not exist.............put together with stuff from Vons........its not that hard....if you don’t believe me its called google.

Is the residue of this liquid explosive detectable by ETD? Or if your model is that the explosive will be made airside, is at least one of the components detectable by ETD? If so, there is no point to the war on water. If lab equipment is required to mix the components airside, there's no point to the war on water.

i don’t like the policy because 3.1.1 still lets you bring some liquid on. do they let you bring just a little C4 on? nope. so i say don’t let any go. but that’s just me.

Under your logic, because we don't let pax bring "just a little C4," C4 being a solid explosive, passengers should not be allowed to bring any baggage, wear clothes, etc., since those are all solids.

People like you would have us fly naked just to "be as safe as possible" and "feel good." That vision of an America filled with timid, frightened cowards is not my vision for the country.

Banning an entire state of matter is not the answer. Good police work to stop terrorists before they get to the airport is.

I think the TSO/document checkers need a refresher. I don't care if they are in Alaska or Hawaii or Texas... they should know the rules and acceptable forms of ID. This is insane that they do not! There are at least two TSO's on this blog that have admitted to not knowing the NEXUS card. How are they supposed to know an out of state driver's license? How are they supposed to check if the ID is real or not if they do not even know what is accepted and what is not?! As someone else mentioned, if we are expected to follow all of the "rules"... shouldn't the TSA know them as well? I do not care if their airport only sees one NEXUS card every 30 years -- it is an acceptable form of ID and they should treat it as such (but first they would have to know about it!). I have been given so much hassle about my NEXUS card (a card I had to go through background checks and interviews with DHS and Canadian officials to even obtain) but Ma and Pa Smith from Omaha can use their drivers license in Alaksa and would not even be questioned about it.

Relative to RB maybe? Let me try to explain some things for you JB. NEXUS cards....no idea what that is and I can tell you they are not on the list of acceptable IDs. HOWEVER any ID not on the list is acceptable if it meets certain standards. It must have tamper proof security features, an expiration date, your full name, your birth date, and a photo. I work for TSA and I can't even use my DHS badge for airport security because it does not meet the requirements. As for screening officers, we do not screen officers. We use to screen security screeners but we are now designated as federal officers and just like local law enforcment officers we do not have to be screened. As for screening employees, the airline and airport are private business'. They own the building, so if they want to build a door to get their employees in and out of the sterile area faster then they can. HOWEVER that door and that airport has to follow STRICT FAA regulations at all times or that privelage gets taken away very very fast. As for blogger bob I think he has handled this blog site more proffesionaly than any person can hope to. The people that post on these blogs are just mean and nasty and probably enjoy being so.

Hope that helps!-------------

Read what I type please. Sorry the ID list at our checkpoint hasn't been updated in awhile but honestly it doesn't have to be. Like I said in my first post if your ID is NOT on the list (yes nexus is on the list sorry) your ID can still be ACCEPTABLE. If your ID has your photo, an expiration date, your birth date, your full name, and TWO tamper proof features (which the nexus card has) then it is a valid ID. The list doesn't matter because what makes the IDS on that list valid IS what matters. So even if you did bring me a NEXUS card before this post happened and I looked at it I would send it through because IT MEETS ALL REQUIRMENTS.

And yes I DID mention this in my previous post please read what I type before you make a fool of yourself.

Also any old police officer can't just hop on a plane with a gun. He has to have a purpose to be their like escorting a prisoner or something like that. We get armed LEO's all the time here in Ketchikan usually escorting prisoners up north where the main prison system is. They also have to get approval from DHS and the airline. Responsibility for this process is solely up to the supervisors, TSO's never deal with the armed LEO's other then informing the STSO that there is one coming up.

A. U.S. Government ID1) Passports and Passport Cards 2) U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) ID cards (active duty and retired military, their dependents, andDOD civilians), including DOD Common Access Card (CAC) (Dozens of variations)3) U.S. Government Agency issued credential with second form of ID (Hundreds of variations)4) U.S. Merchant Mariner Card5) ID issued to Members of Congress (Senators and Representatives) Dozens of current versions6) Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Card (New)7) Trusted Traveler Nexus, Secure Electronic Network for Traveler Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), and Free andSecure Trade (FAST) Cards (Nexus – United States/Canada, SENTRI – United States and Mexico, FAST –United States, Canada, and Mexico) (Some are new, but there are already multiple variations of the same cards)8) American Indian Card (I-872) or Native American Tribal Photo ID (Multiple variations by territory and state)9) Permanent Resident Card/Resident Alien Card (I-551) (Many variations)10) Border Crossing Card/non-immigrant Visa (DSP-150) (Many Variations)11) DHS Permit to Re-enter the United States (I-327) (Varied)12) DHS Refugee Travel Document (I-571) (Many variations)13) U.S. Government issued Personal Identification Verification (PIV) Card (Varied)14) Immigration and Naturalization Service Employment Authorization Card (I-766) (Multiple variations)15) Other U.S. Government ID that has name, gender, date of birth, expiration date, and some tamper resistantFeature (Hundreds of variations)B. U.S. State and U.S. Territory ID (Hundreds of Variations)1) Driver’s or Enhanced Driver’s License (Hundreds of variations)2) Photo ID issued by State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) or equivalent State or U.S. TerritoryGovernment office for the sole purpose of identification, and not for evidence of employment status, studentstatus, or other status. (Thousands of Variations)C. Foreign Government ID (Hundreds of Variations)1) Passports (Hundreds of Variations)2) Canadian Driver’s License (Multiple Variations)3) Canadian Province/Territory ID(Multiple Variations)4) Indian and North Affairs Canada (INAC Card) (Multiple Variations)D. Other ID (?)1) Registered Traveler Cards that include: name, photo, date of birth, gender, expiration date, and tamper resistantfeature after TSA approval (Hundreds of variations)2) Aircraft Operator Photo ID (at any airport in the U.S.) (As many as there are Aircraft operators)3) Airport or Aircraft Operator-issued Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) ID (only for the airportwhere the SIDA ID was issued)4) Sterile Area ID (only for the airport where the Sterile Area ID was issued)5) Prison IDs issued by State or Federal correctional institutions that contain the individual’s name,photo, and date of birth (Thousands)

Perhaps you are ignoring all the qualities I insist the explosives must have. Let's refresh your exceedingly short memory.

1. The components are safe to transport, individually cannot be detected by explosives detection, are liquid, and can be combined easily and safely into an explosive using only facilities found on the other side of the TSA checkpoint.

2. The combined explosive is safe to transport, liquid, and cannot be detected by explosives detection.

You are probably ignoring undetectability, although you may be ignoring stability of transport or you may be ignoring the ability to mix it in an airport terminal.

If you really can build a liquid explosive that has ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL those characteristics, please submit your recipe to the Nobel Prize Committee.

Read what I type please. Sorry the ID list at our checkpoint hasn't been updated in awhile but honestly it doesn't have to be. Like I said in my first post if your ID is NOT on the list (yes nexus is on the list sorry) your ID can still be ACCEPTABLE. If your ID has your photo, an expiration date, your birth date, your full name, and TWO tamper proof features (which the nexus card has) then it is a valid ID. The list doesn't matter because what makes the IDS on that list valid IS what matters. So even if you did bring me a NEXUS card before this post happened and I looked at it I would send it through because IT MEETS ALL REQUIRMENTS. *************We read what you stated and in your previous post you stated that a NEXUS card was not acceptable ID. Now you have back tracked by claiming you would allow it if it has certain features.

As to the ID list at the check point not being up to date and that there is no need to do so. After your statement about NEXUS cards being invalid, its time to get an update, which is easily done by visiting the TSA website, the information is available to everyone including a TSO.

Read what I type please. Sorry the ID list at our checkpoint hasn't been updated in awhile but honestly it doesn't have to be. Like I said in my first post if your ID is NOT on the list (yes nexus is on the list sorry) your ID can still be ACCEPTABLE. If your ID has your photo, an expiration date, your birth date, your full name, and TWO tamper proof features (which the nexus card has) then it is a valid ID. The list doesn't matter because what makes the IDS on that list valid IS what matters. So even if you did bring me a NEXUS card before this post happened and I looked at it I would send it through because IT MEETS ALL REQUIRMENTS.

********Bob, I’m not sure which is the bigger training failure. A TSO who is not familiar with the list of approved ID’s. Or a TSO who when he realizes he is wrong about the NEXUS card still insists that his checkpoint doesn’t need an updated approved ID list. Makes you wonder what other procedures they are misinformed about and how it affects passengers who pass through that airport.

The reason many TSO's only see NEXUS / SENTRI cards on rare occasion is simple (which ironic, since it is much more "secure" than any DL)

AS VALIDATED BY THE TSO RESPONSES ABOVE, NEARLY EVERY TIME I TRY TO USE ONE, I AM ADMONISHED BY A TSO WHO SAYS IT IS NOT A VALID ID, AND ORDERS ME TO SHOW A DRIVERS LICENSE TO BE CLEARED.

If I don't plan on an extra 20 minutes to challenge the TSO and frequently his supervisor, I will miss my flight!

Additionally, responding to these TSOs typically brings out an agressive "How dare you challenge my authority," or equivalent.

Get verbally slapped by a TSO a few times, and most travellers will give up and present a DL.

DAY: "why don't you just make it easy on yourself and use a DL"

ELP: "These are no longer valid. We just received a communication that this company is out of business" (?!?!?!?!? - it's issued by DHS)

EWR: "WHAT IS THIS? I need to see a DL"

ELP: "We don't accept these here. Show me your DL"

etc., etc., etc.

EXCEPTION -- CVG: "Hey boss, I've never seen one of these before. Is this OK?" (one of the few appropriate responses I've heard when I use it - he actually called for his supervisor instead of making something up)

Another Anonymous poster said:"No one complained about airport security before TSA set up shop and declared war on shampoo and flip-flops."

Sorry, but you are incorrect. People have been complaining about airport security since its inception, as they have about every other thing that they seen as intrusive. The only difference here is that the TSA is a government agency and not a company.

Bob said... ...Yes, NEXUS cards are an acceptable form of ID. I am sure Mr. Reed is very well aware of that now. I doubt he sees many of those cards in Ketchikan, Alaska.

Blogger BobTSA Blog Team

September 30, 2009 12:55 PM_______________________________

Bob, your comment and quick defense suprises me.

A) In typical TSO style, Mr. Reed stated "they are not on the list of acceptable IDs", before checking his SOP (which I believe is now online, negating the paper taped to his station - which must be old, yellow, and tattered as these IDs have been valid for years).

B)The NEXUS card was created for travel between Canada and the US. Although getting to a land crossing near Mr. Reed is difficult, his state is fairly adjacent to Canada.

C) "A NEXUS card is the only acceptable alternative to a passport for traveling between the United States and Canada via air." Is it a stretch to imagine that some Alaskans just may utilize the "Ketchikan International Airport" to get to Canada?

Why do travelers so often have to educate TSOs on their basic job functions?

Why do so many TSOs feel it necessary to speak with authority in areas they are not familiar with?

Why do the TSOs who do their jobs appropriately and with respect to travelers continue to tolerate this behavior from their peers?

TSOWilliamReed said If your ID has your photo, an expiration date, your birth date, your full name, and TWO tamper proof features (which the nexus card has) then it is a valid ID. The list doesn't matter because what makes the IDS on that list valid IS what matters. So even if you did bring me a NEXUS card before this post happened and I looked at it I would send it through because IT MEETS ALL REQUIRMENTS.

I hope I never go through the checkpoint that TSOWilliamReed is the TDC, if he continues to use his logic.

If an expiration date is one of the criteria that an ID MUST have in order for TSOWilliamReed to allow me to pass his checkpoint, then I guess my service to my country for 21 years and the retired military ID card they gave me would be NOT be sufficient enough for TSOWilliamReed.

Ayn, Your argument is invalid; you set up an irrelevant criterion:There are two explosives under discussion, and they have to have ALL of these characteristics.

1. The components are safe to transport, individually cannot be detected by explosives detection, are liquid, and can be combined easily and safely into an explosive using only facilities found on the other side of the TSA checkpoint.

2. The combined explosive is safe to transport, liquid, and cannot be detected by explosives detection.

Then when something can't meet your criteria you scream its proof that the liquid ban is a waste. Can you present me some peer reviewed research showing that your proposal is a valid standard?

Let me now "destroy" your argument: Why do BOTH items need to be liquids? What if we are to take a liquid and mix it with a solid that is not a prohibited item? Sugar is a very good fuel when mixed with certain liquids to form an explosive. I can just imagine how you would scream and writhe if TSA "Declared War on Sugar." Second you state "must not be detectable by explosive detection." What standard of explosive detection are we discussing? ETDs currently in use? Some other system? Something that could be easily detected in a laboratory environment can be more difficult in a checkpoint situation. Also, the time and invasiveness of the procedure are relevant. We have ways to detect just about anything, but if it takes 5 minutes to sample every water bottle it’s probably not terribly effective. If the test is destructive of the material being tested as many tests are that’s not terribly useful either. Why must is be mixable on the sterile side? You don't think someone could mix it elsewhere and try and bring it through? Why not? If your assumption is based on mixing it on the sterile side then the issue of it being detectable once mixed is irrelevant as the mixture is already past the checkpoint. As an example if mixing liquid A and liquid B form explosive C and can be performed on the sterile side, it becomes moot if explosive C is detectable or not as it is already in a secure area, the only thing that is relevant is whether or not A and B can be detected.

Why must it be safe to transport once mixed? What if I mix it in the airplane lavatory? Does it present a significant difference if a detonation occurs in the aircraft lavatory as the bad guy mixes it? Further, what is your standard for "safe to transport"? If we follow a "prudent person" rule then placing a TATP detonator in a shoe would be considered unsafe to transport, yet Mr. Reid accomplished this little feat. The risks that a suicide bomber is willing to take and what he or she might consider an acceptable risk are likely very different than what you or I would consider acceptable. There have been many cries on this blog that NG is too dangerous to transport despite having a long history.

Bottom line, you have set vague, meaningless standards and are now using them as "proof" when it is nothing of the sort.

Ryan, you present a much more intelligent argument than the other apologists do. But criteria are valid because those are the very criteria offered by the TSA as the basis for the war on water. It is never offered all at once, which is why my list of two is an effective argument - if you corner the blog team and their defenders on one of the two they claim they were talking about the other of the two.

So we need to have both listed and come up with an explosive that meets one of the two, and meet the critical criteria.

Now you are right that one of the two could theoretically be a solid, but for the liquid ban to make sense at least one of the two must be liquid. And if you are discussing mixing it once past the checkpoint then you must be able to mix it past the checkpoint.

You ask "why must it be safe to transport" which indicates that you do not realize I'm discussing TWO explosives as a way to avoid the shell game that the TSO plays with regards to the basis of the liquid explosive. One mixed on the other side of the checkpoint doesn't need to meet the "safe to transport" critera, it needs to meet the "mixable using only facilities found in a terminal" criteria. One mixed on the unsecured side of the checkpoint can be mixed in a full chemlab, you don't need only terminal facilities, but you need to be able to take it TO the airport. If you blow up on the way to the airport then you do not get to blow up anything on the other side of security.

So either you need to be able to mix it OR you need to be able to transport it. You can choose which of the two liquid explosives you are discussing (don't pretend I'm discussing ONLY one explosive) but you have to meet the criteria of whichever explosive you are discussing. I listed two of them to beat the shell game the TSO plays and I"m not going to play the shell game with you.

Finally you need to have the explosive, whether mixed or unmixed, be able to sneak past security. There are many different explosive detection technologies, and if the TSA wasn't wasting money on MMW machines that Congress is working on banning. But you are mixing the two criteria again, pretending I'm talking about only one explosive, playing the shell game. If mixed in the terminal the mix doesn't need to sneak past security. But the components do need to sneak past security. If mixed outside the terminal the mix does need to sneak past security.

You are right that the standards are vague and meaningless, but I didn't come up with them. They are the standards the TSA came up with in order to justify the war on water. I'm merely trying to get the TSA to justify their own vague and meaningless standards. It's their standards. I'm merely making them explicit, stated all at once. When stated all at once, defeating the shell game by choosing both shells and not letting the defenders of nonsense say "oh but I was talking about the other explosive" I point out that the standards they offer are vague and meaningless. Unfortunately for those not paying attention they think I'm coming up with the standards and accuse me of having vague and meaningless standards.

Please have consideration for your fellow passengers. Folks please pile your bins at the end of the rollers after you are finished with them. Also, it would be helpful if you could gather up your belongings and move to the benches provided for this purpose to put yourself back together. Wait times would go down a lot if these suggestions were followed.

Yes, NEXUS cards are an acceptable form of ID. I am sure Mr. Reed is very well aware of that now. I doubt he sees many of those cards in Ketchikan, Alaska.

Does it matter where Mr. Reed works?

As I've said before, numerous times ... TSA expects passengers to follow all the rules, all the time ... and shouts to the world when it catches passengers not following the rules on its homepage (under the "TSA Week At A Glance" item). TSOs should be held to the same standard of perfection."

-----------------------------

Actually, Jim, a few months ago I gave examples of when TSA does not expect passengers to follow the rules all the time.

If I remember correctly, you then complained that just causes future confusion and arguments when the TSO allows a passenger to slide by without following the rule, as the passenger thinks what they did was ok.

Actually, Jim, a few months ago I gave examples of when TSA does not expect passengers to follow the rules all the time.

Ok ... so which of TSA's many rules are passengers expected to follow all the time, and which of them are passengers allowed to violate at their own discretion because they're not really "rules" at all?

There's a certain hypocrisy in condemning passengers for not knowing the rules (as happens frequently here), but excusing TSOs for not knowing the rules. Either both TSOs and passengers should be held to a "no excuses" standard, or both should be treated with forgiveness and grace. Frankly, I don't care which position TSA takes ... as long as both passengers and TSOs are treated the same.

If an expiration date is one of the criteria that an ID MUST have in order for TSOWilliamReed to allow me to pass his checkpoint, then I guess my service to my country for 21 years and the retired military ID card they gave me would be NOT be sufficient enough for TSOWilliamReed.

I stopped using my retired ID at checkpoints because I didn't want to expose my social security number to a screener. If they balk at an "indefinite" expiration date, just show them the DEERS expiration date below the barcode on the back side. They'll never know the difference.

For a while a few years ago, the TSA wasn't even accepting active duty Common Access Cards (CACs) because they didn't contain all the TSA-required information. The TSA had to be publically humiliated into accepting them.

But, in another stroke of genius, the TSA still continues to refuse civilian CACs -- DoD and all other federal agencies. BTW, CACs conform to Homeland Security Policy Directive 12 (HSPD-12) criteria for secure IDs. HSPD-12 was issued several years ago by none other than the Department of Homeland Security.

Eric sez - "Answer the questions, respond to the complaints, and quit falling back on the tired old "SSI/Because we said so/Do you want to fly today?" routine, and you might actually start getting some of the respect you're wanting." and a whole bunch of other stuff that made my head hurt.

You know, this is not gonna make you happy, but some of the questions the posters here ask pertain to SSI. When the question is about SSI, the answer will be "it is SSI, sorry we can't answer that at this time" until it is no longer SSI. That is not tired old anything, it is regulation and what the agency HAS to do. I agree with you on one thing (will wonders never cease), the dreaded DYWTFT should never be used. It is a terrible phrase and only escalates the situation, when therre are several other ways to explain the procedure and what options are available to the passenger.

Ayn sez - "Yes, West. Destroyed. You were forced to rely on "prove it can't be done" when I challenged you to prove your explosives exist. That's not the way science is done.

That means you admitted you had nothing. Until you satisfy your burden of proof you are admitting you have no scientific basis for your policy."

I have provided you with firsthand accounts of what I have seen done. I have given you the opinion of security and explosives experts the world over. I have given you the word of certified EOD techs from govenrment sources, local LEO sources, and (just to be nice) a guy that cooked up stuff like Jekyll and Hyde in his backyard to do stump removal. I even posted you a link to a recognized EOD consultant with 40 years (I think it is at 40 years but don't quote me directly on it) or explosives design and development and contracting - showing him make a bottle bomb that blew a hole in the side of a plane fuselage, using the same basic ingredients from intelligence reports and from some of the testimony in the London cases.

Yet, this is still not enough for you Ayn, you have completely destroyed all the information I have posted here (yeah right).

None of those people that have been working with explosives for decades (some so closely that they have blown off fingers), know anything about what could possibly blow up a plane. Heck they probably couldn't even blow their way out of a paper bag. Yet they manage to bring down bridges, buildings, fortified enemy positions and any other host of things that need to be blown up.

Do you realize just how unreasonable you sound when you make statements like the ones you have made here?

Anon sez - "Is the residue of this liquid explosive detectable by ETD? Or if your model is that the explosive will be made airside, is at least one of the components detectable by ETD? If so, there is no point to the war on water. If lab equipment is required to mix the components airside, there's no point to the war on water."

This is misleading, just because one element of the mix may be detectable by ETD, does not guarantee that it will be tested.

By this train of thought, we could allow all LAG to go, and then simply ETD ALL LAG. Do you realize just how long it would take the average flight load to come through the checkpoint?

Not all LAG were ETD tested before the ban went into effect. So to state that if one of the components is detectable by ETD then the mixture or items would not make it through - is misleading at best.

Nice form Ayn, I can always count on you to be a sterling example of what is considered bad form. I always label my posts, and as for the non detectable point you keep making - it is not a factor.

As I have indicated to you (ad nauseum, but here we go one more time just for old times sake) before, not all LAG were tested prior to the LAG ban. Therefore, you could bring the detectable liquid into the checkpoint, and if it was not found to be suspicious, it would go right through. What you are asking for may not exist, but it does not make any difference because the testing protocols are what would have determined what was caught or not caught. What you keep holding up is misleading.

Anonymous said... TSOWilliamReed said If your ID has your photo, an expiration date, your birth date, your full name, and TWO tamper proof features (which the nexus card has) then it is a valid ID. The list doesn't matter because what makes the IDS on that list valid IS what matters. So even if you did bring me a NEXUS card before this post happened and I looked at it I would send it through because IT MEETS ALL REQUIRMENTS.

I hope I never go through the checkpoint that TSOWilliamReed is the TDC, if he continues to use his logic.

If an expiration date is one of the criteria that an ID MUST have in order for TSOWilliamReed to allow me to pass his checkpoint, then I guess my service to my country for 21 years and the retired military ID card they gave me would be NOT be sufficient enough for TSOWilliamReed.--------------

actually it is valid because it has an expiration date of INDEF which actually is an expiration date.

Alright I am tired of this argument please let me finish this in one statement. Yes, Ketchikan is near Canada and yes there are probably a good sized group of Alaskans with Nexus cards. However I assure you that I have never seen one at all and even if someone did bring me one, it would take 30 seconds to figure out what it is and to clear it through security just like any other ID I or any other TSO is not familiar with. The TDC acceptable ID list in our SOP was correct I was just missing the part that said nexus (you would miss it if you were not actually looking for it) I apologize for the misunderstanding, but please listen. TSA has given us standards, training, and responsibilities to process IDS even if they aren't on the list or even if you don't even have an ID. All you need to do for the TDC is prove that you are the person that your boarding pass says you are. The longest checking your identity should take is 10-15min and that’s only when you have absolutely nothing and we have to call TSOC. Everyone has a driver’s license or a state ID and they are the documents used the most so they are the easiest to clear. Why complicate things by using a document you don’t really need to use that has a chance the officer may have never heard of such a thing? Let me give an example, by the TDC acceptable ID list airline employee badges are valid forms of ID. However, as a TSO working in Ketchikan, AK I have only ever worked with Alaska Airline employees. I have no idea what a southwest airline employee badge looks like or even a delta employee and delta is a sister company to AK airline. So when I get airline employees on vacation that uses their foreign badge I simply ask if I could see their driver’s license instead. I explain to them why and they laugh and understand. So if a TDC officer asks to see a driver’s license rather than the ID you have presented him it’s not because he is saying your nexus/twic/whatever card is invalid. It’s because he probably doesn't know what it is supposed to look like and if you cooperate and produce your driver’s license (which he has lots of experience with) then you are done with the TDC position and can move on. Longest we have ever taken verifying an ID in the year and a half I have worked here was 15min and only because the guy had lost his wallet and had no identity papers on himself at all. He still got on the plane on time.

As for the explosives argument, watch the video that is linked in the blog post about the juice bottle bomb. That was mixed at a table outside with no real tools tang and some liquid that could be mistaken for anything. That was just one juice bottle full and the guys making these were planning to have around a six pack. TSA is a very proud organization and you guys have said it yourselves hundreds of times that we don't like admitting mistakes and failures right? Then how serious could it possibly be when TSA admits their technology is not good enough to detect liquid explosives? Just think about that

You claim TSA always try to say they were talking about the “other explosive”, in your made up example, that is probably because they are. Your argument is: if you cannot stop BOTH then why bother trying to stop either. The fact is: TSA has said multiple times that they can stop some of the liquid explosives but NOT ALL, hence the LGA rules.

Why don’t you provide proof that TSA has the ability to stop ALL liquid explosives? Is it because you don’t have any?

Ayn, You keep using the "Shell game" argument as an excuse why the criteria you listed are valid, even though it isn't. You state in your original criteria that it must meet "all of the standards" but in your follow up post you admit that it’s really "or" that means you were being less than truthful.

Further, while you attacked people and moaned about the "shell game" which you also seem to be playing you ignored several important questions I raised.

First: Who and what determines the standard for what is and isn't detectable? You never answered the question just used it as an opportunity to take a shot at MMW technology. Simply stating there is lots of detection technology out there doesn't answer the question.

Second: You proposed the standard, don't try to back away from it now by claiming "its TSA's standard" you proposed, you used it as "proof" to "destroy" West and now you won't stand behind it?

Third: Can you please list some peer reviewed journals that print articles on explosives that would be acceptable references?

Fourth: Do you really think it’s reasonable for you to hold to your peer-reviewed gold standard when you also attack Sidney Alford as "unqualified" because he does research for the government? Most of the research in explosives and explosive security is either government funded or funded by private companies hoping to do business with the government. To then claim that they are unqualified because of the connection creates an unrealistic expectation. Further, a central part of your standard goes to the issue of detectability, do you really think it’s reasonable for TSA (or any other government agency) to release a list of "here is what we can't detect"? Because TSA, quite reasonably, isn't going to publish a comprehensive list of their detection capability no one can perform the study you require as the only "proof" that the liquid ban is necessary.

Let me give you a couple of simple questions:

1. Do you acknowledge that liquid explosives do in fact exist?

2. Do you acknowledge that liquid explosives have been used in the past to destroy a commercial airliner? (Korean Air Flight 858)

If you accept both of those statements as True, and if you don't please explain why you don't, then you have to accept that liquid explosives present a viable threat to aviation. Now, I am not claiming they present "MORE" of a threat than other types of explosives, I am simply stating that a pound of C-4 is bad for an airplane and so is a pound of PLX.

So, we can establish that liquid explosives do present a threat and TSA should prevent them from getting on board an aircraft just like they need to prevent any other explosive from getting on board.(To be continued)

(part 2)This brings us to the next issue, which is one of detection. TSA has stated that their liquid detection capability is lacking, and the ban is necessary until they fill in that gap. Your argument about "undectable" is wonderful in the laboratory but totally irrelevant in the real world. It doesn't matter what can be detected in a lab, it only matters what can be detected at the checkpoint with the tools currently available. TSA has stated they don't have adequate liquid detection capability. Do you have any evidence to refute that? Are you claiming TSA could in fact detect those things and for some reason chooses not to?

Now, this isn't to argue that TSA shouldn't be working on getting that capability. As I have said before, I supported the liquid ban as a temporary measure, and I think TSA needs to hurry up with a solution, but I understand the technical hurdles involved. You are asking for a system that can rapidly and reliably identify liquids in a non-destructive, non-intrusive way while contained in bottles or cans that are transparent, translucent or opaque. That is a tough nut to crack. If you have information on a system capable of that I would be very interested in seeing it.

If we accept that a liquid explosive can bring down an airplane (and KAL proved it can) then TSA's mission is to prevent that explosive from getting on a plane. If you are claiming they could stop it with some system other than the ban I would like to know what you propose.

Anon said: If I were in charge, we'd be locking the cockpit doors, and running everybody through metal detectors, bags through xray, none of this crazy laptop, shoe, and liquid nonsense. Who do I need to tell this to?

Okay, let me explain something. The whole point of putting things in the x-ray, is to check for prohibited items. I am a TSO and when laptop computers are in the bag with all the wires and other electronics, you cannot clearly see anything. So the only way to clear it up is to pull the laptop out. Its not always done, but we ask that you don't clutter any bag so that we can clearly see everything. The purpose of the xray is not just to have somewhere to put your bag so you can walk through the metal detector. We cant look at a bag that is cluttered and just say "Well, can't see whats in here b/c of all the clutter, but I'll just let it go anyway"...we have to separate something so we can see everything so ensure nothing prohibited is being hidden. The same with shoes..shoes can hide plenty, so they are going to be xrayed. Just remember that most procedures in place act more as a deterrent than anything. We dont expect to find explosives in shoes, but we must screen them to keep the terrorists from using this method. If we stopped screening shoes, it opens that possibility again. Sure, it sucks, but I'd rather be safe than sorry...does it really kill you to take them off or do most people just like to have something else to complain about the TSA?

Those who are willing to exchange freedom for security deserve neither. -- Ben Franklin

The TSA will not and cannot stop determined terrorists from blowing up a plane. They can mitigate that risk by keeping people with bomb belts, guns and large knifes from going on board through simple security measures. The current security measures in place simply make travel intolerable, violate our freedoms and privacy to levels beyond George Orwells 1984. Our Fore Fathers are turning in their graves.

A real risk evaluation should be performed to determine what an adequate level of security should be at a risk level acceptable to society. The goal of zero risk is not acceptable to those who embrace freedom and we who love freedom should not be held hostage to the threat of terrorism.

Yesterday, Congressmen John Mica (R-Fla.), Tom Petri (R-Wis.), Allen Boyd (D-Fla.), Vernon Ehlers (R-Mich.), and Sam Graves (R-Mo.) introduced legislation into the House which will attempt to reign in the TSA.

The proposed legislation will amend 49 USC 114 to require the TSA to have all proposed Security Directives reviewed by the Transportation Security Oversight Committee to determine if they are a response to an imminent threat before they go into effect.

The bill would also require the TSA to consider whether the cost would be excessive in relation to the enhancement of security and any SD issued lasting more than 180 days must go through the Administrative Procedures rule making process (which requires publication, a public comment period before enactment). .......................Seems the citizens have had all the TSA koolaide they want and are not buying the party line.

TSA has overstepped and with luck will have their coat strings shortened a bit.

tso derek said... Please have consideration for your fellow passengers. Folks please pile your bins at the end of the rollers after you are finished with them. Also, it would be helpful if you could gather up your belongings and move to the benches provided for this purpose to put yourself back together. Wait times would go down a lot if these suggestions were followed.

TSOWilliamReed said... Alright I am tired of this argument please let me finish this in one statement. Yes, Ketchikan is near Canada and yes there are probably a good sized group of Alaskans with Nexus cards. However I assure you that I have never seen one at all and even if someone did bring me one, it would take 30 seconds to figure out what it is and to clear it through security just like any other ID I or any other TSO is not familiar with.....................

....................Mr Reed, the TSA has published a list of acceptable ID's. If I present an ID that is on that list there is no reason for me to have to pull out another ID your more familar with.

It is part of your job to know which ID's are acceptable. Plain and simple.

Further, believe it or not a few people have never had a license to operate a motor vehicle (which is not an ID card) or other TSA acceptable form of ID.

I suggest that if you don't have a basic understanding of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable that you are in need of remedial training.

Don't expect the public to provide you with the crutch so you can do your job.

Anon said… “A real risk evaluation should be performed to determine what an adequate level of security should be at a risk level acceptable to society.”

Great point! The same people who use this blog to whine about TSA not making anything secure are the same ones who are going to whine when a plane falls from the sky. It is a simple choice that the American people must make, do you want the government to protect you entirely or do you want to risk that a terrorist will down the aircraft you a flying in?

Each and every one of us must decide if we want to allow the government to provide us complete protection or are we willing to risk an attack by telling the government. This is NOT a choice between security or no-security, it is a choice between complete protection provided by the government or the freedom to take our own lives into our own hands by asking the government to back off.

Ryan, perhaps you weren't playing the TSA's shell game, and actually did confuse the two separate explosive I mention in my list of two explosive. Perhaps you did think I was talking about just one explosive.

Let me explain this to you as simply as possible.

When a TSA critic debunks the 3.4-1-1 rule by pointing out that the bomb cannot be assembled inside an airline terminal, TSA defenders say "oh but it is already mixed in a chem lab and being transported pre-mixed to the airport".

When a TSA critic debunks the 3.4-1-1 rule by pointing out that the bomb cannot be transported safely to the airport, TSA defenders say "oh but it is being transported in components and mixed in the terminal".

That's why I have a list of two bombs. TSA critics can now say "Oh but when you were talking about unmixed I was talking about mixed and when you were talking about mixed I was talking about unmixed." Or they can do as you do and attack the criteria I listed in the two separate bombs.

The TSA can prove either one of those bombs exist in order to support 3.4-1-1. They don't have to prove both, but that would be a nice "above and beyond."

That's why I have two lists.

The components on the list, yes I insist on them because they came from the TSA as reasons why we have the 3.4-1-1 rule. I will back away from them when the TSA backs away from them - except now that I've put all of there reasons together into two bullet points they rely on everyone else to defend the rule and don't discuss it other than to say "yes we have good signage."

To cut off your next point and to skip the trap you are trying to lay for me, admitting that liquid explosive present a threat does not mean that I admit that the 3.4-1-1 rule addresses that threat.

I agree that the liquid detection capacity of the TSA is currently lacking. They have been spending their money on child porn strip search machines (Bob hates it when I call the mmw by that name so I do it every chance I get). They could have been purchasing puffers and other chemical detectors, but they have not been doing that. Therefore their liquid detection capacity is currently lacking. Congress is working (slowly) on banning the child porn strip search machines. If the TSA was smart they'd have gotten a clause in the contract giving a full refund if the machines are banned, but more likely the vendor put in a clause giving no refund if the machines are banned. Or perhaps the TSA put in the "no refund" clause themselves in order to convince congress that if the machines are banned they become a complete waste of money so don't ban them.

The point is that puffers and other chemical detection devices do exist and could have been purchased. Therefore the onus is no longer on me to think that the 3.4-1-1 rule is any sort of stopgap measure that we need to endure until the TSA finally does the right thing. The onus is instead on the TSA to explain why they spent their money on child porn strip search machines instead of chemical detection machines, and why they spend their money on child porn strip search machines instead of using it to get rid of the 3.4-1-1 rule.

Those who defend the TSA have said that these bombs cannot be detected with puffers or other similar chemical detectors. They haven't said that about all liquid bombs, but that some can bypass chemical detection. Therefore either a pre-mixed bomb can pass chemical detection or all the components of an unmixed bomb can pass chemical detection - for an unmixed bomb you need all the components to be individually safe. Saying "well we can use sugar in a bomb" doesn't discuss the rest of the components. Yes, most of the components of an unmixed bomb are safe. But in order for 3.4-1-1 to make sense all of them must be individually safe. Having sugar and gasoline doesn't pass the test because gasoline won't pass the test.

Now you come to accusing me of wanting the TSA to post a comprehensive list of everything they are going to detect. Don't be silly. All I am asking for is one bomb of either of the two types. They can keep the rest of their list secret, and revealing that one bomb won't decrease security. If anything it will increase it since the terr'ists willk know that they can't try that one for sure, and probably can't try the rest. And that one bomb will decrease public (and therefore political) pressure to get rid of what is, as far as any independent analysis has shown, a baseless rule.

I didn't criticize Sidney Alford for working for the TSA (you must be confusing me with someone else by the way). I've worked for government departments involved in science before. I criticize him for only publishing through the TSA. It really is possible to get the appropriate forms signed to get a document published publicly. It's even possible to get it published by a non-government source. That very last one is the key point of dissention between Alford and myself. Let's pick an agency that publishes science often ... NASA. They have procedures to follow to publish. Their procedures even allow their scientists to publish in independent peer-reviewed journals. Now NASA is far less paraniod than the TSA, and NASA occasionally works with the DOD on defense projects. And they are so much less paranoid that they even have way to publish parts of the science from those projects, once the proposed publication passes through legal and security review.

Does the TSA have a similar process? If not, why not? If so, why hasn't Alford taken advantage of it?

The most telling point is that no scientist outside the TSA has corroborated Alford.

RB said... TSOWilliamReed said... Alright I am tired of this argument please let me finish this in one statement. Yes, Ketchikan is near Canada and yes there are probably a good sized group of Alaskans with Nexus cards. However I assure you that I have never seen one at all and even if someone did bring me one, it would take 30 seconds to figure out what it is and to clear it through security just like any other ID I or any other TSO is not familiar with.....................

....................Mr Reed, the TSA has published a list of acceptable ID's. If I present an ID that is on that list there is no reason for me to have to pull out another ID your more familar with.

It is part of your job to know which ID's are acceptable. Plain and simple.

Further, believe it or not a few people have never had a license to operate a motor vehicle (which is not an ID card) or other TSA acceptable form of ID.

I suggest that if you don't have a basic understanding of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable that you are in need of remedial training.

Don't expect the public to provide you with the crutch so you can do your job.

October 3, 2009 9:20 AM------------------

RB it seems you are under the impression that when I ask for another form of ID this string of words would be coming out of my mouth "Show me your drivers license now! Do you want to fly today?" Sadly this is NOT the case, and I hate that TSO stereo type. I have worked for TSA for over a year and a half and have NEVER heard a TSO use the dreaded "Do you want to fly today." All I am asking is to see a form of ID that I can clear. If I never see nexus cards then I am not use to the security features on the card. It doesn’t matter what training I have if I never get any exposure to the card. I probably did receive training on nexus cards 6 or 8 months ago but without exposure my brain and anyone else’s brain would NOT retain the knowledge. I don't have time to go look it up or ask someone else at the checkpoint (since they are all busy doing other things and have never seen one either) then it not only saves you time, but also saves everyone else standing in line behind you time for me to simply state, "Sir we don't get these often could I please see your drivers license to cross reference the information?" Also yes you’re right not everyone has a driver’s license. Everyone does have at least an identification card. The average traveler has at least 2-4 pieces of valid photo ID with them, but don’t usually know it. Trust me, I would know since I see and work with them every day.

TSOWilliamReed said...Alright I am tired of this argument please let me finish this in one statement.----------------------------

And don't you think many are tired of the TSA antics?

When you hold the traveling public under scrutiny and treat us as potential terrorists, then I think it is only fair we hold the TSA to the same scrutiny.

Seems you can dish it out but can't take the same treatment back. The hatred is growing each day that you find some new way to harass innocent people. An example would be the searches at gates, after we all complied with the nonsense at the checkpoint, and were cleared to be in the sterile area. Are the searches at the gate an admission that your checkpoints are flawed?

"So if a TDC officer asks to see a driver’s license rather than the ID you have presented him it’s not because he is saying your nexus/twic/whatever card is invalid. It’s because he probably doesn't know what it is supposed to look like and if you cooperate and produce your driver’s license (which he has lots of experience with) then you are done with the TDC position and can move on."

--

Ummm... There is no reason a TRAINED DOCUMENT CHECKER shouldn't know what a NEXUS card looks like. You would think the DHS/TSA would provide sample IDs during training, or at least pictures of them. If it is an acceptable ID then I shouldn't have to show a second form of ID. Period.

"We dont expect to find explosives in shoes, but we must screen them to keep the terrorists from using this method. If we stopped screening shoes, it opens that possibility again."

No, it doesn't. There weer no shoe bombings that brought down planes between Richard Reid's failed attempt and TSA's inexplicable decision to make the shoe carnival mandatory in August of 2006. There are no shoe bombings taking place today in any of the countries that don't have the mandatory shoe carnival. That is because no one is trying to use shoes as a delivery system for explosives, regardless of whether shoes are removed for screening or not.

"Sure, it sucks, but I'd rather be safe than sorry...does it really kill you to take them off or do most people just like to have something else to complain about the TSA?"

We complain because it is an inconvenience that makes no one safer and makes traveling more difficult with no return on our effort. For those with medical issues that make it difficult to remove shoes while standing in a line, it is more than a mere inconvenience. And it is a public health hazard on top of all that. TSA's shoe policy is a pathetic joke -- almost as much as TSA itself it.

Ayn, bomb number one is a peroxide based bomb; bomb number two is a nitro based bomb. The two types of bombs are a reality and can be used against aircraft. The only way to stop the use of the two different bombs, without backing up security lines for hours, is to institute the LGA restrictions. Until technology improves that is a fact of life. If you do not understand how to make these explosives I suggest you perform some independent research because TSA is NOT going to tell you how to build a bomb that can take down an aircraft. If you need some advice on where to start Al-Qaeda is a great source.

2. Too bad. Not walking any further than I have to shoeless. Besides many airports do not have "recomposure" areas."

I think the comments you responded to were just a suggestion to keep the security lines moving smoothly. It is troubling to see that you will be doing everything in your power to delay me when I am trying to pass thru security. I hope you are in front of me in line so that I can personally tell you to get out of the way!

"Also, it would be helpful if you could gather up your belongings and move to the benches provided for this purpose to put yourself back together."

Nope. I make a point of "putting myself back together" right there at the end of the X-ray machine. If you have a problem with it, implement policies that don't require people to have to put themselves back together in the first place.

"It is troubling to see that you will be doing everything in your power to delay me when I am trying to pass thru security."

Anything an individual passenger does that might delay a line pales in comparison to the nonsensical TSA policies that create the lines in the first place. You have a problem with backups? Blame the shoe carnival, the liquids farce, and the ID nonsense.

It is a simple choice that the American people must make, do you want the government to protect you entirely or do you want to risk that a terrorist will down the aircraft you a flying in?

There is no such thing as "protecting you entirely". Security can never be absolutely guaranteed. Any terrorist, anywhere, if they're determined enough, can find a way to down an aircraft.

So ... given that your first option really isn't an option after all, what's left? A cost-benefit analysis. How do we decide what procedures to employ? Every procedure has a cost --- both in terms of money to implement, and loss of freedom.

Should we ban all items inside the cabin, no matter how innocuous? Should we permit any and all items in the cabin, no matter how dangerous? Obviously, neither option is appropriate. So, where do we draw the line? That's a matter where reasonable people can have a debate.

TSO Jacob said... Ayn, bomb number one is a peroxide based bomb; bomb number two is a nitro based bomb. The two types of bombs are a reality and can be used against aircraft. The only way to stop the use of the two different bombs, without backing up security lines for hours, is to institute the LGA restrictions. Until technology improves that is a fact of life. If you do not understand how to make these explosives I suggest you perform some independent research because TSA is NOT going to tell you how to build a bomb that can take down an aircraft. If you need some advice on where to start Al-Qaeda is a great source.

October 5, 2009 12:04 PM.....................Jacob, what are the liquid restrictions for none passengers entering the secure area?

RB Asked:…Jacob, what are the liquid restrictions for none passengers entering the secure area?---------------I assume that you mean “non-passenger”. Passenger status does not matter, if they pass through the checkpoint then they must adhere to the same requirements as passengers.And before you go off on a tangent about employee’s, TSO’s, or purple dinosaurs, there are exceptions. Exceptions that do not include non-flying folks accompanying passengers to the gate area.

"So if a TDC officer asks to see a driver’s license rather than the ID you have presented him it’s not because he is saying your nexus/twic/whatever card is invalid. It’s because he probably doesn't know what it is supposed to look like and if you cooperate and produce your driver’s license (which he has lots of experience with) then you are done with the TDC position and can move on."

--

Ummm... There is no reason a TRAINED DOCUMENT CHECKER shouldn't know what a NEXUS card looks like. You would think the DHS/TSA would provide sample IDs during training, or at least pictures of them. If it is an acceptable ID then I shouldn't have to show a second form of ID."

-------------------------

Oddly enough, I saw one - once - during training over a year ago. That was the only time I have ever seen one.

There are virtually hundreds of IDs that are acceptable. Almost all federal employment government IDs (hundreds of those) can be used, all state driver's license/state ID's, and the various other identifiers, such as TWIC, NEXUS.

It does not matter if you do not understand, but you see some of these cards 1 time a year in training, and then thats it. And I doubt that you, any of you, can remember hundreds of IDs just by sight with no resource to look them up on the spot. Don't even try to claim you can; you would be lying.

It does not matter if you do not understand, but you see some of these cards 1 time a year in training, and then thats it. And I doubt that you, any of you, can remember hundreds of IDs just by sight with no resource to look them up on the spot.

Look, we've lost sight of what started this particular debate.

TSOWilliamReed stated, emphatically, that the NEXUS card wasn't a valid ID for passing through a TSA checkpoint. Numerous posters here corrected him, and he admitted his error.

But then Mr. Reed, and other TSA advocates, attempted to offer excuses for Mr. Reed's error ... some even going as far as to blame passengers who use NEXUS cards for causing the confrontation instead of using other IDs that might be more familiar. That's where things got heated.

Just as passengers are responsible for knowing all of TSA's rules, all the time, TSOs are responsible for knowing all the rules, all the time. Being sincerely wrong about a particular rule doesn't make the person --- whether TSO or passenger --- any less wrong.

You make every excuse known to man why you might not know what ID are acceptable and then expect the traveler to fix your problem.

Did someone sign off that you were fully qualified to do the job of TDC?

Did that certification entail knowing which ID's TSA considers acceptable?

Just wondering!---------------------

RB, listen to what I am saying. I am not trying to say you shouldn't use your rare hard to acquire ID that is really only used for crossing the Canadian border. What I am saying is that if you want to keep things fast easy and simple then use your state issued divers license/ID card or passport. The reason why is simply because the officer your working with will have had more exposure to one of these items and you will get through security faster. You said I am asking the passenger to fix my problem? This is 100% wrong in every shape and form. I do my job and I do it very well, however even with all the training in the world and me and my team working as hard as we can to pick up the slack you the passengers give us we will still only screen you as fast as you allow us to screen you. I am not asking you to make my job easier for me just because I am lazy oh no that is so wrong it makes my head hurt. I am trying my hardest to get you the public educated on how to get yourselves through security as fast as possible because no matter what I do you are still only going to go through security as fast as you make yourself go through security. If you want to hand me rare complicated documents that are never actually used for identification any where other than the Canadian border that’s fine, but you need to understand its going take about a minute or two longer to process you and everyone else behind you because of that. Your actions are going to slow down the person behind you and so on. When I say keep it simple it’s not for my sake but for your own. If you want to get through security fast then keep the process simple. I will give you another example of something I have to deal with all the time here in Ketchikan. In Washington when people need a new drivers license the state will give them a cheap little piece of paper that is basically a photo copy of a driver’s license, It is a temporary driver’s license. However, people coming through airport security with one of these things for some reason believe their little piece of photo copied paper is a valid ID. This is not the case since these ID's are only valid for granting you the privilege of driving, they are NOT valid identification. Remember to keep things simple when going through the checkpoint and you and everyone else will be able to go through allot faster.

Oddly enough, I saw one - once - during training over a year ago. That was the only time I have ever seen one.

There are virtually hundreds of IDs that are acceptable. Almost all federal employment government IDs (hundreds of those) can be used, all state driver's license/state ID's, and the various other identifiers, such as TWIC, NEXUS.

It does not matter if you do not understand, but you see some of these cards 1 time a year in training, and then thats it. And I doubt that you, any of you, can remember hundreds of IDs just by sight with no resource to look them up on the spot. Don't even try to claim you can; you would be lying.

October 6, 2009 12:39 PM

___________________________________

Anon - yes, we understand you are human.

The problem: frequently a passenger explains to the TSO what the ID is and that it IS acceptable per TSA guidelines.

Instead of looking it up or calling a supervisor, the TSO becomes indignant at being challenged and proceeds to fabricate any one of multiple reasons as to why that ID is not accepted, while denying the passenger access to the secure area.

Anonymous said... There are virtually hundreds of IDs that are acceptable. Almost all federal employment government IDs (hundreds of those) can be used.

**********Both you and Mr Reed need to go to the TSA website and review the list of acceptable IDs. Because on that list it does not state that all federal government ID's are acceptable. It's a short list one that any TSO should know.

A few things Ayn, I am not “laying a trap” by wanting you to admit liquid explosives can present a threat. There are several posters here who argue quite vehemently that “liquids aren’t a threat” and I consider it important to establish that yes in fact they are a potential threat. Second, please dispense with all this “well other people” I don’t really care what “the other people” are saying, you keep trying to drag other people’s points into this and they are irrelevant. It really seems nothing more than a way to try and muddle the issue and provide cover for the fact you are ducking many of my questions, much in the same way you criticize TSA for ducking questions.Now, one moment you admit that the standard you proposed is ludicrous, and yet now you defend it, which is it? Why would anyone waste time or money conducting the research necessary for a peer reviewed article when you yourself admit the criteria is shoddy? You quite surely are asking TSA to release the entire list of what they can and can’t detect, there is no other means to conduct a peer reviewed study to determine if anything meets your criteria. How can someone put forth that “one bomb” you want to know about when they don’t know TSA’s entire capability?As for puffers, they bought puffers, they didn’t work. Don’t you remember all the screaming and crying on this very blog about the puffers they pulled out of airports because they didn’t work?Can you show me some peer reviewed research showing how a puffer is effective against liquid threats? Or some peer reviewed studies showing a liquid detection capability that can be used quickly and efficiently in a checkpoint environment to detect liquid explosive threats in a sealed or unsealed container regardless of the composition of the container?Can you show me the independent (peer reviewed) analysis you claim has shown to prove 3-1-1 is baseless? “And that one bomb will decrease public (and therefore political) pressure to get rid of what is, as far as any independent analysis has shown, a baseless rule.”You are claiming it’s out there, let’s see it.You also failed to address the issue of detectable in a TSA Checkpoint setting versus detectable in a lab. You delight in telling TSO Jacob “Epic Fail” yet you don’t set forth any standards or any solutions of your own. Is peroxide detectable? It certainly is, now imagine how long it’s going to take to test every single bottle coming through the checkpoint with the existing technology. As for Sidney Alford, comparing TSA to NASA is ludicrous. NASA has a mission to further science, of course they publish like crazy, it’s one of the reasons Congress funds them. Yes, some of science from classified DOD stuff gets published, but I can’t see anyone in their right mind approving the release of TSA’s detection shortfalls in the name of “good science.” That’s like asking the NSA to release a list of foreign codes they can’t crack and then blaming it on “paranoia.”Since you have all the answers why don’t you tell us what they should have bought (instead of the “strip search machines”) and the peer reviewed science backing up that technology. And save me the comments about “not doing TSA’s job for them” you claim to have all the answers, let’s see some of them.

Oddly enough, I saw one - once - during training over a year ago. That was the only time I have ever seen one.

There are virtually hundreds of IDs that are acceptable. Almost all federal employment government IDs (hundreds of those) can be used, all state driver's license/state ID's, and the various other identifiers, such as TWIC, NEXUS.

It does not matter if you do not understand, but you see some of these cards 1 time a year in training, and then thats it. And I doubt that you, any of you, can remember hundreds of IDs just by sight with no resource to look them up on the spot. Don't even try to claim you can; you would be lying.

__________________________________

Anon - yes, we understand you are human.

The problem: frequently a passenger explains to the TSO what the ID is and that it IS acceptable per TSA guidelines.

Instead of looking it up or calling a supervisor, the TSO becomes indignant at being challenged and proceeds to fabricate any one of multiple reasons as to why that ID is not accepted, while denying the passenger access to the secure area.

This IS a problem with training and/or attitude."

****************************

I am very hesitant to have a passenger explain to me that their ID should be accepted if I am not familiar with the ID. Not because it challenges me, but because of experience.

As many have noted throughout this blog, it is easy to make a fake ID. How do I know if I am being tested or not? I know people here love to comment on how often TSA misses Red Team. Would you forgive us if we let Red Team talk us out of rejecting an ID we should not accept? I doubt it; most likely many of you here would be critical that we failed another Red Team test. That is just one reason, but there are other reasons.

You are correct in saying the TSO should call for a STSO, but depending on the airport, how long would that take? What if the STSO is with another passenger at that time?

I wish we could look it up, that would be wonderful. But that option does not exist. Maybe it should.

When I run across IDs that I do not know, I do explain that I will call a STSO, but also state that they will get through more quickly if they have another form of ID. Some people get very mad that I would even dare to ask for another ID, because, by golly, they want to use that one. Which is fine. I offer both options as a benefit for the passenger - they can have an STSO verify that the ID is ok, or they can show me another ID and get through quickly. I do NOT do this out of any sort of vindictiveness.

But I also suggest to the passenger when I give them this option, and it does not happen that often at all, that their best bet is to stop at the STSO desk and let the STSO know that we were not familiar with their form of ID, so that we can be briefed about it after the shift. However, in the very few experiences that I have had with rejecting a passengers ID, I do not beleive any has told a STSO. Too mad, I guess, which I do understand.

One last thing, yes, I have had Red Team attempt to use unacceptable ID.

The bad experiences you and others have had with TSOs I do not believe to be a result of a failure of training, but of bad TSOs.

"Some people get very mad that I would even dare to ask for another ID, because, by golly, they want to use that one. Which is fine. I offer both options as a benefit for the passenger - they can have an STSO verify that the ID is ok, or they can show me another ID and get through quickly. I do NOT do this out of any sort of vindictiveness."

Why don't you just do your job and learn what IDs are acceptable instead of whinging about it?

""Some people get very mad that I would even dare to ask for another ID, because, by golly, they want to use that one. Which is fine. I offer both options as a benefit for the passenger - they can have an STSO verify that the ID is ok, or they can show me another ID and get through quickly. I do NOT do this out of any sort of vindictiveness."

Why don't you just do your job and learn what IDs are acceptable instead of whinging about it?"

-----------------------------

Where did I whine? In fact, I didn't, but you did, right?

Besides that, you statement borders on the absurd and stupid. Can anyone here name any job where a person has to work on total recall? I doubt it. ALL professions allow people the ability to reference what they need to complete their work. From cooks to doctors, janitors to lawyers, all have to re-reference someting from time to time. No job is done from total recall. Hence, reference books, reference desk, and so on. This is not my opinion, it is fact.

If you attempt to tell my you never have to look anything up regarding whatever your employment happens to be, I would say you are less than honest.

Again, not whining, as you content, simply stating FACTS. It would be very nice and helpful to have a reference desk at the TDC for the few times when it is needed, simply because IT WOULD HELP PASSENGERS proceed more quickly. I could care less about helping out the TSO; that is a simple externality. But for now we do not have a reference desk, so we have to deal with what we have.

As such, as a TSO I will call a STSO to help clear an ID I can not clear, but if the passenger does not want to wait and has another ID on them, that will work too.

"Anonymous said...There are virtually hundreds of IDs that are acceptable. Almost all federal employment government IDs (hundreds of those) can be used.

**********Both you and Mr Reed need to go to the TSA website and review the list of acceptable IDs. Because on that list it does not state that all federal government ID's are acceptable. It's a short list one that any TSO should know.

Please feel free to post a link that proves your claim,"

----------------------------

Sorry, but there are hundreds of IDs that are acceptable. Like I said before, almost all government employment IDs are acceptable, even if you do not see it on the list.

How many federal goverenment agencies are there? Hundreds. They all have their own ID. Those are proper forms of ID that can be used to access the checkpoint.

Besides that, many state issued IDs can be used, such as state university employment and student ID, highschool ID (if the person is 18 or older), and many state employment IDs.

Notice I am using the term employment", in other words, agency ID. As example, I often see IDs from employees of the DOJ and DOT, and there are even IDs that are "sub-agencies" of those.

On the TSA web site I found a list for acceptable IDs. Is this the one you wanted me to look at?

http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/acceptable_documents.shtm

If so, notice how it says "acceptable IDs include:", meaning these are just some, other IDs are allowed.

If this was not the list, and the web-site provides another list, please post it.

Anonymous said...Sorry, but there are hundreds of IDs that are acceptable. Like I said before, almost all government employment IDs are acceptable, even if you do not see it on the list.

*************

No there are not hundreds of acceptable ID’s. The list on the TSA website is a complete list and says nothing about it being a partial list or up to the judgment of a TSO. No matter how much you want to split grammatical hairs about the meaning of “the list includes”. As I stated in a previous post if Federal employee ID’s are acceptable, prove it. A web link, document number or anything else besides your word or that the real list is SSI. I have already proved that they as verified by the TSA website

Another Anonymous poster stated:“As I stated in a previous post if Federal employee ID’s are acceptable, prove it. A web link, document number or anything else besides your word or that the real list is SSI. I have already proved that they as verified by the TSA website”-------------------Sorry Anon, I don’t think you read quite far enough. ”Drivers Licenses or other state photo identity cards issued by Department of Motor Vehicles (or equivalent) that meets REAL ID benchmarks”. The Federal Employee ID meets the READ ID standards and is issued by the federal government.

You can find the entire list of acceptable ID’s at the following link:http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/acceptable_documents.shtm

********This is the same grammatical hair splitting you tried in your last post about the meaning of "the list includes". It does not say that Federal ID's are acceptable. It says State ID's or their equivalent, which means other state ID's. It does not state that Federal employee ID's are acceptable.

Provide a reference from the TSA that clearly states that Federal employee ID's are acceptable to back up your claim. If you can't do this then your statement is invalid.

******All this says is that ID's issued by a state that meets the REAL ID standard are acceptable. If you have something that says Federal employee ID's are acceptable post it. So far you have nothing that from the TSA that expressly states that this.

********This is the same grammatical hair splitting you tried in your last post about the meaning of "the list includes". It does not say that Federal ID's are acceptable. It says State ID's or their equivalent, which means other state ID's. It does not state that Federal employee ID's are acceptable.

Provide a reference from the TSA that clearly states that Federal employee ID's are acceptable to back up your claim. If you can't do this then your statement is invalid."

---------------------------

Sorry, I think your confusing what I said with what another anonymous person said, but thats understandable. :)

What it really comes down to is what is accepted and what is not accepted at TSA checkpoints, not what is on any TSA web-site, correct? How many times have people complained about what is post on the web-site is different that what is encountered at the ceckpoint? Easy to search through this blog and find those examples.

At the TDC I and other, as we have been taught, have accepted all sorts of federl employment ID's, from HUD, DOT, STate Department, FBI, Congress, FEMA, Dept. of Commerce, District/Federal Courts, State Universities/Colleges, and even public high schools (when the individual is 18 or older, and some are).

Its not about splitting hairs, as you think. Its simple truth, even if you do not like it.

I suggest, if you do have a federal employment ID, use it to get through a checkpoint, as it is acceptable, even if it is not list on the TSA website.

What it really comes down to is what is accepted and what is not accepted at TSA checkpoints, not what is on any TSA web-site, correct?

And here is the problem, TSO’s inventing their own policy to make their lives more convenient and ignoring the official ones. No where on the TSA website does it say that Federal employee ID’s are acceptable and yet we have at least one checkpoint that is a major security threat. Instead of following the approved guidelines and limiting the ID’s that can be used to an easily identifiable group. We have TSO’s being instructed to accept ID’s that they have no way to confirm if they are fake or valid because they are not familiar with them.

***********

This is no longer about splitting grammatical hairs; this is about a group of TSO’s who are placing airport security at risk with a gross violation of TSA procedure.

The TSA Identification requirements page begins with the following statement:

"Effective June 21, 2008, adult passengers (18 and over) are required to show a U.S. federal or state-issued photo ID that contains the following: name, date of birth, gender, expiration date and a tamper-resistant feature in order to be allowed to go through the checkpoint and onto their flight. "

No other information is needed. By this statement, any U.S. Federal or State issued ID that meets the specific criteria listed is valid. The other items listed are merely specific IDs to give reference and more information to the public.

On the TSA ID page at the top of the list, it reads “Acceptable IDs include:” It does not say “the only acceptable IDs are:”.In the paragraph above the list, it clearly states “adult passengers (18 and over) are required to show a U.S. federal or state-issued photo ID that contains the following: name, date of birth, gender, expiration date and a tamper-resistant feature in order to be allowed to go through the checkpoint and onto their flight.”

It says federal or state-issued photo ID. In my opinion, the reason why most IDs get rejected is the inability of the officer to find the tamper-resistant feature of the ID. You could probably find about a hundred usable IDs that meet that requirement, but if the officer cannot find the tamper-resistant feature it becomes an unacceptable ID for that particular officer.I think to mitigate this problem there should be a TDC duty instead of general training or move TDC into the BDO department. A specialized officer should be used. I’m sure false ID catch rates would increase as well but I am only speculating. This opinion is based off of observations at the checkpoint.

Why not have a fully armed air marshal insert himself into your anus while you are in, around, looking at, or thinking about air planes. That way we can be REALLY secure. Who cares about peoples rights. Who cares that the government is essentially stripping everyone's rights away if they want to go more than 20 ft off the ground.

Since you claim you are not trying to lay a trap, perhaps you can back away from asking me if liquid bombs in general exist. Nobody contests that liquid bombs in general exist. I am specifically and directly contesting the claim by the TSA that one of two specific liquid bombs exist, not liquid bombs in general.

And yes, I am referring to two entirely different bombs, one of which must exist for the TSA to be right, and neither of which have ever been proven to exist.

Yes, the standard I propose is ludicrous and I defend it because the TSA defends it. They came up with it, it is the basis of the war on water. Since I want them to prove their claims I must use their ludicrous standards and ask them to prove their claims by their own ludicrous standards. The criteria is shoddy for reasons other than the ones you claim. The criteria is shoddy because they came up with the basis for the rule in a Hollywood movie instead of in a science lab.

The reason they need to submit to peer review is specifically so actual scientists can call them on their crap. Except even if that happened they would not change their standards. The more the TSA is proven to be in the wrong, the more they refuse to change their mind.

I'm not asking for their entire list of what they can detect and cannot detect. It's nice of you to say I am asking for that when I am not. It is so typical of defenders of fascism to lie about those of us who are trying to force the TSA to be honest. I am asking for one of two specific bombs. There is no reason to fear those of us on the outside knowing how to make those two bombs because we know the attempt would be futile - the TSA can find them. The only reason the TSA cannot find them now is the same as the reason the TSA cannot currently find unicorns.