Voting on Taiwan's future

The Japan Times 31 January 2000

By ALEXANDER K. YOUNG, professor of international relations
emeritus at the State University of New York.

Taiwan's presidential campaign is moving toward the
final stretch. It is being fought among three top contenders: Vice
President Lien Chan of the Nationalist Party, Chen Shui-bian of the
Democratic Progressive Party and James Soong, an independent. The
second free, direct presidential election on March 18th, now too close
to call, will have a significant impact on the future of Taiwan's
democratization program and its relations with China and the United
States.

The election is being fought over two issues: money
politics and avoiding war with China. Soong, an ex-governor who is
defying the Nationalist Party, and who is reportedly China's choice,
is being attacked by opponents for his potential "sellout"
of Taiwan to China if elected. He has, thus, defined Taiwan and China
as "both sovereign, independent, but not subordinated to each
other" and their relation as "a quasi-international
relation,"' somewhere between Beijing and President Lee
Teng-hui's positions - the former claiming Taiwan is a renegade
province and the latter insisting on an equal "special
state-to-state relationship."

Soong long led Lien and Chen in opinion polls. His
standing plummeted, however, following last December's disclosure that
he allegedly transferred the equivalent of tens of millions in dollars
to the personal accounts of his son, in-laws and associates, including
more than $6 million to U.S. banks, possibly breaking tax and criminal
laws.

The scandal, with charges and counter charges flying
about money politics and underworld ties, has damaged Soong, the
Nationalist Party and Lien and helped Chen. This prompted Lien, a
scholarly statesman, to launch a radical reform program in the new
year to prohibit the running of businesses by political parties and to
place of Nationalist Party assets (said to exceed $ 1.7 billion) in
independent trusts.

Chen has needed to calm the voter's fears that,
because of his past advocacy of Taiwan independence, his victory would
lead to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Chen has switched to a more
moderate middle-of-the road line, defining cross-strait ties as "a
special state-to-state relationship," but calling for closer
ties, provided Taiwan's independence and interests are safeguarded. If
elected, Chen will visit China and permit direct shipping and mail
traffic with China.

While the two policy issues are important, they are
secondary compared with four other factors. The most important is the
role of social/immigrant groups. Taiwan is a socially and politically
complex society due to different waves of immigrants, history
(Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945; Nationalist rule slice 1945),
diverse political experience (first authoritarian rote under the
Nationalist Party, then democracy since 1988) and transition from an
agricultural to a global-information economy.

While Lee has preached "a new Taiwanese theory"
to forge harmony, animosity between the "old" Taiwanese
(immigrants to Taiwan before 1945) and the "new" Taiwanese
or "mainlanders" (immigrants after 1945, many of whom moved
to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek in 1849) lingers, though much less
among the young generation, because of the latter's monopoly of power
until the early 1990s.

The "old" Taiwanese have three subgroups:
the earliest settlers (from South Seas islands, about 2 percent of the
population); the Hakkas (mostly from the Canton region, about 14
percent ) and the Holo group (from Southern Fukien opposite Taiwan, 72
percent of the 22 million people). Mainlanders are about 13 percent of
the population. Many split from the Nationalist Party to form the New
Party in 1993 because of their resentment of Lee's effort to share
power with the ''old" Taiwanese.

It's taboo for candidates to openly talk about the
social-group factor, but it is an open secret that voting on March 18
will be largely along group lines. Recent surveys indicate that large
segments of the Holo group will vote for Chen, a Holo Taiwanese, and
that the majority of the Hakkas will vote for Lien, with some voting
for Soong. Most striking, the mainlanders group, which have many
Nationalist Party and government officials, form Soong's "absolute
electoral base." Equally striking, 97 percent of the New Party
supporters, mostly mainlanders, are expected to support Soong rather
than their own party candidate.

The second factor is geography. Soong's power base
is Taipei, the capital of 2.6 million people, where one-third are
mainlanders. Chen's stronghold is central and southern Taiwan, where
the majority are Holo people. While Lien has no dominant geographic
bases, he enjoys a 20 percent support throughout Taiwan.

The third factor is whether the Nationalist Party,
which has suffered Soong's rebellion and defections, can unify and
mobilize resources to help Lien win.

Lee is a final, critical factor. A charismatic
leader, his success in turning Taiwan into a democratic state and a
prosperous market economy, and his effort to enhance Taiwan's
international status, has endeared him to millions of Taiwanese,
including many DPP supporters. Lee genuinely believes that his
legacies, Taiwan's national security and the peace and stability of
Japan, the U.S. and East Asia area at stake. His ability to appeal to
the voters and to mobilize the fragmented Nationalist Party will spell
victory or defeat for Lien.

With the election too close to call and one-third of
the voters still undecided, no one can accurately predict the election
outcome. But one may venture three predictions.

First, the voters' primary concern being the safety
of their. lives, properties, and their jobs, and the majority favoring
maintaining the status quo to avoid war with China, with Lee's
assistance, Lien probably will win by a small margin. Second, Liens
victory would mean the continuation into the foreseeable future of
Lee's democratization, national security and China policies.

Chen's victory would bring two big changes: First,
the first ever assumption of power by an opposition party (DPP), but
not a complete Nationalist loss if Chen forms a coalition government.

Second, Taiwan's eventual (it may take decades), but
not immediate, independence. Tension with China and some regional
instability may rise, but war will not occur if China acts rationally.

Soong's 's victory would lead to the return of but
not the monopoly of, the mainlanders to power a speeded-up unification
of Taiwan with China and some domestic instability.

Regardless of who wins, no one -- not China, which
has stated its opposition to Chen, and not even the U.S. -- can ignore
the legal and moral rights of the people of Taiwan, in particular
those of the "old" Taiwanese, whose voices and rights have
been too long ignored by the powers, to decide Taiwan's future.

If the U.S. government is to remain faithful to its
professed policy to support the democratically elected leader on March
18, it must also respect policies that enjoy the support of Lien,
Chen, the DPP and the vast majority of the Taiwanese, including those
that upset the U.S. and China.

These include Lee's policy of a "special
state-to-state relationship" with China, which aims at protecting
Taiwan's equal sovereign status, dignity and national security, as
well as his policy of winning Taiwan's rightful international status.