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March 30, 2015

As readers of this blog might remember, I began following the Fukushima Daiichi and Daiini events as they unfolded starting on March 11, 2011. The disaster at Fukushima Daiichi occurred because of the lack of external power to the plant to keep cooling processes operating. While external power was restored to Fukushima Daiini within hours preventing a major disaster at that plant, it took weeks to restore external power to Fukushima Daiichi.

Microgrids might be a way to help prevent this kind of disaster in the future. Navigant Research has just released a report on what it calls Community Resilience Microgrids (CRMs) which Navigant defines as microgrids that provide emergency power services to communities rather than private sector end users, national security critical infrastructure assets such as military bases, or for overall grid reliability. The focus in the Navigant report is on microgrids for resilence and community. Another differentiator is that the CRM segment is being stimulated by specific government programs that are providing funding and regulatory support. The Navigant research is centered on recent programs and projects specifically linked to resilience in communities in light of recent natural and man-made disasters such as Hurricane Sandy in the United States and the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in Japan.

CRMs are an interesting segment of the microgrid market. Navigant's perspective is that CRMs represents an emerging market opportunity, but that there are important challenges including regulatory inhibitors and an uncertain business model. Communities are interested in CRMs because for energy resilience they represent an alternative to their local utility. Utilities may perceive CRMs as a threat because they potentially could mean losing customers and revenue.

Navigant forecasts that the CRM "implementation revenue", which will amount to about $160 million in 2015, will reach $1.4 billion by 2024. The United States currently leads in terms of policy and technology innovation, but Navigant projects that the Asia Pacific region will become the largest market share due to government programs in place in Japan and China. By 2024 Asia Pacific is projected to be roughly half of the total CRM market.

Temporary shutdown of 50 of Japan’s operable reactors - it now looks likely that some reactors will be restarted beginning with the Sendai plant

Phaseout of Switzerland's and Belgium's reactors

But despite Fukushima, 72 new reactors were under construction at the end of 2013, mostly in China, India and Russia. Belarus, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Viet Nam, Bangladesh, Jordan, Poland and Saudi Arabia have projects under development. The United States is building its first new reactors in 30 years in Georgia and South Carolina. The United Kingdom and Finland have announced plans to build new reactors. South Korea has decided to build two more reactors to add to the 23 already operating in that country.

Nearly half of the reactors under construction use Generation III technology, generally believed to be much safer than previous types of reactors. China has announced that it will build only Generation III reactors. A Westinghouse AP1000 pressurized water reactor is scheduled to come online in Sanmen, China in late 2014.

However, the rate of development of new nuclear capacity is much less than what was projected pre-Fukushima. In the context of emissions reduction the IEA projects that installed nuclear capacity in 2025 will be 7% to 25% below what it estimates is required to reduce carbon emissions sufficiently to keep climate warming under 2° C.

Fukushima is not the only factor that has slowed the development of nuclear power capacity. The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), which allows comparison of the cost of different fuel sources for power generation, shows that from a cost perspective solar PV ($130/MWh) and wind ($80/MWh) have become comparable to nuclear power generation ($96/MWh). As smart grid technology developes and becomes more capable of integrating distributed intermittent sources, wind and solar PV will continue to become increasingly attractive alternatives to nuclear power.

October 30, 2012

As readers of this blog will know, I began following the Fukushima Daiichi and Daiini events as they unfolded starting on March 11, 2011. Everyone following the events had a lot of questions about TEPCO's handling of the disaster. To me the critical question is why it took weeks to restore external power to Daiichi, when external power was restored to Daiini within hours preventing a major disaster at that plant.

Fukukshima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

In October, 2011, the
National Diet established the Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) chaired by
Kiyoshi Kurokawa, a former president of the Science Council of Japan.
The NAIIC is the first independent commission created in the history of
Japan's constitutional government. The Executive Summary is available in English.

The main players in the report are the Prime Minister's Office
(Kansei), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC), and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).

The key conclusion of the report was that the accident was a "manmade" disaster.

The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power
Plant accident was the result of collusion between the government
(METI), the regulators (NISA and NSC), and TEPCO. Therefore, we
conclude that the accident was clearly "manmade".

The regulator NISA

Since 2006, the regulators and TEPCO
were aware of the risk that a total outage of electricity (station
blackout) at the Fukushima Daiichi plant might occur if a tsunami were
to reach the level of the site.

There
were many opportunities for taking preventative measures prior to March
11. The accident occurred because TEPCO did not take these measures,
and [the regulators] NISA and NSC went along.

The operator TEPCO

TEPCO's mindset which included the
reluctance to take responsibility epitomized by President Shimuzu's
inability to clearly report to the Prime Minister's Office the
intentions of the operators of the plant.

TEPCO was too quick to cite the
tsunami as the cause of the nuclear accident. The Commission believes
that this is an attempt to to avoid responsibility by putting all the
blame on the unexpected (the tsunami) and not on more the foreseeable
earthquake. The damage to Unit 1 was caused not only by the tsunami but
also by the earthquake. Additionally there two causes for the loss of
external power, both earthquake related: there was no diversity or
independence in the earthquake-resistant external power systems, and the
Shin-Fukushima transformer substation was not earthquake resistant.

TEPCO's internal reform task force

According to the Japan Times, after the Fukushima disaster TEPCO set up an internal reform task force headed by TEPCO President Naomi Hirose to investigate TEPCO's handling of the disaster. October 12, the internal reform task force said in a statement that

The utility was aware safety improvements were necessary long before last year's quake and tsunami caused three catastrophic core meltdowns at the facility, but failed to act because it feared the political, economic and legal consequences of implementing new measures.

According to the task force,

TEPCO feared that efforts to upgrade its nuclear facilities to be better prepared for major natural disasters would stimulate antinuclear sentiment, interfere with operations and increase litigation risks.

Specifically, the task force said that

TEPCO could have mitigated the impact of the Fukushima meltdowns if it had diversified the plant's power and cooling systems by paying closer heed to international standards and recommendations.

The task force also said that

TEPCO should have trained its employees in practical crisis-management skills, rather than conducting obligatory safety drills as a mere formality.

This is the first time that TEPCO has acknowledged that the
nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant could have been
avoided.

The statement was released after TEPCO's Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee, a five-member committee that was set up to monitor the task force's reform plans, held its first meeting Friday. According to the head of the Committee, the committee's goal is to ensure that TEPCO develops practices and procedures so an accident like (the Fukushima meltdowns) will never happen again.

September 15, 2012

Prior to Fukushima, Japan generated about a quarter of its electric power from 50 nuclear power plants. Japan lies in a heavily earthquake prone area, and all of its nuclear power plants are on the coast and susceptible to earthquake originated tsunamis such as those that led to the Fukushima disaster..

Japan has just announced plans to phase out nuclear power by 2040. The announcement was made by issuing a "policy goal", which is not binding on future governments and which a new government administration could reverse.

The new energy policy aims to

shut down reactors that are more than 40 years old,

not issue new licenses for reactor construction

restart existing reactors only if they pass standards issued by the new Nuclear Regulatory Agency

The Nuclear Regulatory Agency, which is an independent body to be launched on Sept 19, replaces two regulatory agencies, NISA and NSC, which were heavily criticized after the Fukushima disaster.

All but two of Japan's 50 reactors remain shutdown in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. After Fukushima all reactors were shutdown and the first two reactors were only restarted in June 2012.

At this point Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium have announced that they plan to phase out nuclear power by 2022. France has announced that it plans to reduce its reliance on nuclear power from 75% to 50% by 2025. In contrast the United States and Canada have issued the first new licences for nuclear facilities in 30 years. However, in the U.S. a recent court decision has temporarily halted the issuance of any new licenses until the disposal of radioactive waste is resolved. Both India and China are actively investing in new technologies to expand their nuclear fleet.

July 07, 2012

After the Fukushima nuclear plant accident in March, 2011, the National Diet of Japan established in October, 2011, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) chaired by Kiyoshi Kurokawa, a former president of the Science Council of Japan. The NAIIC is the first independent commission created in the history of Japan's constitutional government.

The Commission began work in December, 2011 and after a six month investigation including 900 hours of hearings and interviews with 1167 people (government, regulators, and TEPCO) and 19 commission meetings open to public and broadcast on the internet (simultaneously in Japanese and English) has just submitted its report (only the Executive Summary is available in English at present).

The main players in the report are the Prime Minister's Office (Kansei), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).

The key conclusion of the report was that the accident was a "manmade" disaster

The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion between the government (METI), the regulators (NISA and NSC), and TEPCO. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly "manmade".

Replacing people or changing the names of institutions will not solve the problems. The underlying issue is the social structure that results in "regulatory capture" and the organizational, institutional and legal framework that allows individuals to justify their own actions, hide them when inconvenient, and leave no records in order to avoid responsibility.

The regulator NISA

Since 2006, the regulators and TEPCO were aware of the risk that a total outage of electricity (station blackout) at the Fukushima Daiichi plant might occur if a tsunami were to reach the level of the site.

The regulators also had a negative attitude toward the importation of new advances in knowledge and technology from overseas. If NISA had passed onto TEPCO measures that were included in the B.5.b subsection of the U.S. security order that followed the 9/11 terrorist action, and if TEPCO had put measures in place, the accident may have been preventable.

There were many opportunities for taking preventative measures prior to March 11. The accident occurred because TEPCO did not take these measures, and [the regulators] NISA and NSC went along.

Further exacerbating the problem was the fact that [the regulator] NISA was created as part of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), an organization that has been actively promoting nuclear power.

The crisis management system of the Prime Minister's Office, the regulators, and other responsible agencies did not function correctly. NISA was expected to play the lead role as designated in the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. However, NISA was unprepared for a disaster of this scale and failed in its function.

The operator TEPCO

TEPCO's mindset which included the reluctance to take responsibility epitomized by President Shimuzu's inability to clearly report to the Prime Minister's Office the intentions of the operators of the plant.

The Commission concludes that there organizational problems within TEPCO. Events make it clear that if there are not response measures for a severe accident in place, the steps that can be taken on-site in the event of a station blackout are very limited. On top of this, sections in the diagrams of the severe accident instruction manual were missing.

TEPCO was too quick to cite the tsunami as the cause of the nuclear accident. The Commission believes that this is an attempt to to avoid responsibility by putting all the blame on the unexpected (the tsunami) and not on more the foreseeable earthquake. The damage to Unit 1 was caused not only by the tsunami but also by the earthquake. Additionally there two causes for the loss of external power, both earthquake related: there was no diversity or independence in the earthquake-resistant external power systems, and the Shin-Fukushima transformer substation was not earthquake resistant.

I remember hearing early in the accident, that it was at the time that the Prime Minister was briefing the opposition in the Diet to reassure them on the status of the plant, based on information he had received from TEPCO, 20 minutes into his presentation is when the first (hydrogen) explosion occurred.

Three Mile Island

On March 28, 1979, the United States experienced the worst accident in the history of commercial nuclear power generation at Three-Mile Island (TMI). Two weeks later, the President of the United States Jimmy Carter established an independent Presidential Commission headed by John G Kemeny. Oct 30, 1979, about six months later, the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island submitted its report.

Its overall conclusion was

To prevent nuclear accidents as serious as Three Mile Island, fundamental changes will be necessary in the organization, procedures, and practices -- and above all -- in the attitudes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, to the extent that the institutions we investigated are typical, of the nuclear industry. ...

We are convinced that if the only problems were equipment problems, this Presidential Commission would never have been created. The equipment was sufficiently good that, except for human failures, the major accident at Three Mile Island would have been a minor incident. But, wherever we looked, we found problems with the human beings who operate the plant, with the management that runs the key organization, and with the agency that is charged with assuring the safety of nuclear power plants.

In conclusion, while the major factor that turned this incident into a serious accident was inappropriate operator action, many factors contributed to the action of the operators, such as deficiencies in their training, lack of clarity in their operating procedures, failure of organizations to learn the proper lessons from previous incidents, and deficiencies in the design of the control room. These shortcomings are attributable to the utility, to suppliers of equipment, and to the federal commission that regulates nuclear power. Therefore -- whether or not operator error "explains" this particular case -- given all the above deficiencies, we are convinced that an accident like Three Mile Island was eventually inevitable.

Specifically on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Commission said

We had a broad mandate from the President to investigate the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. When NRC was split off from the old Atomic Energy Commission, the purpose of the split was to separate the regulators from those who were promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We recognize that the NRC has an assignment that would be difficult under any circumstances. But, we have seen evidence that some of the old promotional philosophy still influences the regulatory practices of the NRC. While some compromises between the needs of safety and the needs of an industry are inevitable, the evidence suggests that the NRC has sometimes erred on the side of the industry's convenience rather than carrying out its primary mission of assuring safety. ... The old AEC attitude is also evident in reluctance to apply new safety standards to previously licensed plants.

About the operator GPU and its subsidiary Metropolitan Edison

First of all, it is our conclusion that the training of TMI operators was greatly deficient. While training may have been adequate for the operation of a plant under normal circumstances, insufficient attention was paid to possible serious accidents. And the depth of understanding, even of senior reactor operators, left them unprepared to deal with something as confusing as the circumstances in which they found themselves.

Second, we found that the specific operating procedures, which were applicable to this accident, are at least very confusing and could be read in such a way as to lead the operators to take the incorrect actions they did.

We found that at both companies, those most knowledgeable about the workings of the nuclear power plant have little communication with those responsible for operator training, and therefore, the content of the instructional program does not lead to sufficient understanding of reactor systems.

...the analysis of this particular accident raises the serious question of whether all electric utilities automatically have the necessary technical expertise and managerial capabilities for administering such a dangerous high-technology plant. We, therefore, recommend the development of higher standards of organization and management that a company must meet before it is granted a license to operate a nuclear power plant.

And I remember a documentary about TMI where the then Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania related that it was while he was briefing the press to reassure them about the status of the plant, based on information just received from Met Ed, that the first release of radioactive material occurred.

June 29, 2012

The Japanese Government has approved the resumption of operations at two of Japan's 54 nuclear reactors, the first to come back on line after they were all shut down following the Fukushima crisis. The two reactors are operated by Kansai Electric Power Co at Ohi in western Japan.

Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco) says that as of December 2011 conditions equivalent to a cold shutdown, where the inside reactor temperatures have decreased to below 100 degrees C, have been achieved at Units 1 through 3. Tepco also says that the release of radioactive materials has been significantly suppressed. Efforts to continue cooling down the reactors, control radioactive emissions into the atmosphere, and stop all radiation leakage into the ocean continue ongoing. Tepco says that in the future they will move forward with their primary mission to decommission Units 1 through 4.

After Fukushima, the last operating nuclear reactor was shut down May 6, 2012.

Tepco shareholders have approved nationalization of Tepco, which would have been forced into bankrupcy as a result of the Fukushima incident. Tepco management has secured an agreement from the government to inject ¥1 trillion ($12.6 billion) in government capital in return for a 50.1% stake in the company.

December 18, 2011

Tomoyuki Taira (member of the House of Representatives) and Yukio Hatoyama (a former prime minister) in an article (Nature 480, 313–314,15 December 2011) recommend that the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant needs to be opened to independent scientists not affiliated with Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) or TEPCO, the plant's operator.

They argue that the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant following the earthquake and tsunami are of crucial importance for the future of atomic energy globally. In particular they are concerned about whether re-criticality occurred, whether the explosions that occurred at the plant after the earthquake were nuclear in origin, and whether molten fuel has broken through the reactor's base potentially creating more serious environmental contamination.

A group of representatives from the Japanese Diet will be releasing an independent report that argues that key pieces of evidence remain incomplete, that we do not yet know whether re-criticality occurred, and that to answer these questions, independent scientists must have access to the plant. They further argue that the only way to do this and deal with the issue of compensation is to nationalize the plant.