Joseph Stinney
and Cynthia Stinney, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of
Maurice Stinney, a minor over the age of fourteen years, and Marquis Stinney, Respondents,

v.

Sumter School
District 17, Petitioner.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS

Appeal From Sumter County
R. Ferrel Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Opinion No. 26928
Heard December 1, 2010 - Filed February
14, 2011

REVERSED

Robert
T. King, of Willcox, Buyck & Williams, of Florence, for Petitioner.

Dwight
Christopher Moore, of Moore Law Firm, of Sumter, for Respondents.

CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: Maurice
and Marquise Stinney were expelled from Sumter High School for being involved
in a fight with other students. After appealing the expulsions up to the Board
of Trustees (the Board), Joseph and Cynthia Stinney (the Stinneys), Maurice's
and Marquise's parents, filed a suit in circuit court against Sumter School
District 17 (the District) for violating Maurice's and Marquise's due process
rights, among other claims. The circuit court granted the District's motion
for summary judgment on the due process claim, finding the Stinneys failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies. The court of appeals reversed, and this
Court granted the District's petition for a writ of certiorari.

Facts/Procedural Background

In
September 2003, Maurice and Marquise Stinney were expelled from Sumter High
School for their involvement in a fight with two other students. The District
superintendent and the Board both upheld the expulsions upon appeal, in October
2003 and November 2003, respectively. Maurice and Marquise had the right to
appeal the Board's decision to the circuit court but they did not.

Nearly
two years later, the Stinneys brought a suit against the District in circuit
court, alleging, among other causes of action, the District's actions or
inactions regarding the expulsions violated Maurice's and Marquise's due
process rights. The circuit court granted the District's motion for summary
judgment as to the due process claim because the Stinneys failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies by not appealing to the circuit court. The court
of appeals reversed, holding the Stinneys had exhausted their administrative
remedies. Stinney v. Sumter School District 17, 382 S.C. 352, 359-60,
67 S.E.2d 760, 764 (Ct. App. 2009). This Court granted a writ of certiorari to
review that decision.

Standard
of Review

Summary judgment is
appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is clear
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), SCRCP. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court
applies the same standard applied by the trial court. Fleming v. Rose,
350 S.C. 488, 567 S.E.2d 857 (2002).

Analysis

The
District argues the court of appeals erred in failing to affirm summary
judgment as to the due process claim. We agree.

The
circuit court granted summary judgment on the Stinneys' due process claim
because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as to that claim.
This was legal error.[1]
Regardless, we find that the Stinneys were afforded all process that was
constitutionally due and affirm the grant of summary judgment.

The
United States Supreme Court has said the fundamental touchstone of due process
is the opportunity to be heard. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.
Ct. 728, 739 (1975). The Supreme Court further stated that the type of hearing
required to be provided will depend upon the nature of the case. Id. at
579, 95 S. Ct. at 738. For example, in Goss, the Supreme Court held a
public school student facing a short-term suspension need only be provided with
notice of the claims against him and an opportunity to explain his side of the
facts, and was not constitutionally guaranteed a full adversarial hearing. Id. at 581, 95 S. Ct. at 740.

Expulsion
is a more serious disciplinary action than is suspension. Accordingly, the
procedures and protections given to the accused student should be greater than
the informal, immediate hearing that was authorized in Goss.

Without
deciding the constitutional minimum that must be given in these circumstances,
we find those procedures and protections outlined in section 59-63-240 to be
constitutionally sufficient. The statute reads, in pertinent part:

If
procedures for expulsion are initiated, the parents or legal guardian of the
pupil shall be notified in writing of the time and the place of a hearing
either before the board or a person or committee designated by the board. At
the hearing the parents or legal guardian shall have the right to legal counsel
and to all other regular legal rights including the right to question all
witnesses.

S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-240 (2004).
This statute affords notice, the opportunity to be heard, the right to be
represented by counsel, and the right to present evidence and question
witnesses. The record shows the Stinneys were provided with the process
established in the statute. The Stinneys chose not to be represented by
counsel during the initial hearing, and the fact that they did not present
evidence or exercise their statutory right to question witnesses does not
create a procedural due process violation.

Conclusion

This
Court can affirm for any reason appearing in the record. Rule 220(c), SCACR; I'on
L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 418, 526 S.E.2d 716, 722
(2000). Accordingly, we hold the Stinneys were provided with due process, and
we reverse the court of appeals and affirm the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment as to the Stinneys' due process claim.

[1] Both the circuit court and the court of appeals erred in applying the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies only applies when a litigant invokes the
original jurisdiction of the circuit court to adjudicate a claim based upon a
statutory violation for which the legislature has provided an administrative
remedy. Thomas Sand Co. v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 349 S.C. 402, 563
S.E.2d 109 (Ct. App. 2002). When an administrative remedy is not available for
the injury suffered, the doctrine of exhaustion is not applicable. Id. Here,
the claim before the Board was an appeal of the expulsions—the Stinneys were
seeking to have the expulsions reversed. The Stinneys did not appeal the
Board's decision upholding the expulsions to the circuit court. Instead, they
initiated a new suit in the circuit court seeking damages and alleging
negligence, violations of due process, and failure to follow disciplinary procedures.
This new suit was a tort claim, not a statutory violation for which the
legislature has provided an administrative remedy. For that reason, exhaustion
simply is inapplicable to the new suit. This conclusion does not indicate that
any litigant in an administrative process can bring a tort suit to collaterally
attack the findings of the administrative bodies. Res judicata still applies
in the administrative setting, and such determinations may bar subsequent
litigation. See Earle v. Aycock, 276 S.C. 471, 475, 279 S.E.2d 614, 616
(1981) (administrative decision can have preclusive effect in collateral
litigation).