Wednesday, July 31, 2013

DeBaathification is one of the lasting legacies of the
American occupation of Iraq. Passed in May 2003 by the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) the effort to rid the country of the Baath Party quickly took
on a life of its own that continues with the current Iraqi government.
DeBaathification was not a vetting process meant to weed out the good and the
bad. Rather it set out to ban the top ranks of the party, but then quickly
expanded to any Baathist in a politicized, open ended effort that lacked due
process, and coherent guidelines. While it had many supporters in both the U.S.
and Iraq, there were just as many detractors. It ended up dividing the country,
and hindered the development of a new Iraqi government and democracy.

The Baath was one of the most successful authoritarian parties
in modern history. By the end of 2002, it had just under 4 million members. From 1986 to 2002 it increased 140% as Saddam Hussein attempted to maintain
control of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and then the sanctions period following
the Gulf War by reaching out to young people and women. Out of an estimated 25
million people in 2002, Baathists were 16.5% of the population. That was much
higher than the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Party
members who had actual power were only about 4% of Iraq, while the party elite
was around 2.4% of the populace. Towards the top of the party were Secretary Generals, amin sir, who set policies and had power over the military. Branch members, udhu fir, led party sections, could order arrests, use weapons,
and had some authority over the security forces. A section member, udhu shu’ba,
led cells, and supervised and could work with local security forces. A division
member, uhdu firqa, implemented orders, and could oversee the security forces
and local administrators. Below that were the lower level party members
consisting of active members, udhu amil, apprenticed members, udhu mutadarib,
candidates, murashih, advanced supporters, nasir mutaqadin, supporters, nasir,
and sympathizers, muayid, all of which belonged to party cells. By 2002 there
were 69 party branches across the country, 612 sections, 3,787 divisions,
32,852 cells run by 76 Secretary Generals, 1,027 branch members, 6,128 section
members, 45,537 division members, 223,662 active members, 254,081 apprenticed
members, 27,242 candidates, 1,113,211 supporters, and 2,328,080 sympathizers. DeBaathification
was originally supposed to only affect the top four party levels, approximately
52,700 people, that it was assumed had participated in crimes. It was later
applied to far more than that with many exceptions. DeBaathification was not a
vetting process to see which Baathists could remain in office, and which could
not, but was rather more like a purge of anyone the authorities felt needed to
be removed or retired.

The Bush administration liked to compare Saddam’s Iraq to
Nazi Germany, but was divided on what to do with the Baath Party. The State
Department and the Central Intelligence Agency wanted to get rid of Saddam and
a couple of other leaders only, while the Pentagon and Vice President Dick
Cheney called for a broad purge of Baathists. National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice was in the middle. Early in 2003 the Defense Department
and Cheney won the debate. Ahmad Chalabi had the ear of both of them, and
pushed the idea that Saddam was like Hitler and needed a deNazification
process. That comparison didn’t quite hold up. DeNazification did not hold all
senior Nazis accountable or stop them from returning to office. It was more of
a vetting process meant to keep the German government running after World War
II. More importantly, it didn’t seem that the administration even studied how
deNazification worked to help plan the deBaathification it would soon order.

How to deal with the Baath Party on the ground in Iraq also
created divisions. After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, General Tommy
Frank’s Freedom Message to Iraqis bared the Baath Party. Afterward, the Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) under Jay Garner followed a
mild deBaathification approach. It only disqualified the 55 top party members
on the deck of cards wanted list, and anyone implicated in crimes. Otherwise,
it allowed hundreds of Baathists to return to work. That quickly changed when
Paul Bremer arrived in Iraq in May and the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) was announced. Bremer received a draft deBaathification law from
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith who wanted it implemented
immediately. Four days after Bremer landed in Baghdad he issued CPA Order 1
banning the Baath Party. The top four party ranks, Secretary General, branch
member, section member, and division members were barred from working in the
government. That was quickly expanded to the three highest levels of
administration in each office, and criminals. That meant that any Baathist
could be included no matter what the rank. That immediately created opposition
from people like Garner, and the CIA station chief in Baghdad Charlie Sidell.
They went to Bremer warning him that such a broad deBaathification effort would
create tens of thousands of opponents to the CPA. They pushed for only the top
two tiers of the party to be excluded. Bremer replied that he was under orders
from Washington. He also believed in getting rid of the Baathists, and thought it would be a strong statement about the dramatic transformation the U.S. was
hoping to bring to the country. The CPA head went on to promote
deBaathification as being just like deNazification to help justify it. (1) After
the order came out others came out against it as well. That included General
David Petraeus who was then the commander of the 82nd Airborne
Division in Mosul, and General Ricardo Sanchez, the commanding general of
Coalition forces in Iraq. The former was afraid that getting rid of Baathists
would cause people to turn against the Americans and deprive the government of
needed officials, while the latter thought that the CPA never paid attention to
how to implement the order or its effects. By the end of his time in Iraq, Bremer
also understood that deBaathification had backfired, cutting into the
bureaucracy much deeper than he thought, and banning far more than he had
envisioned. The executive director of the deBaathification Commission Ali
al-Lami later told the Washington Post that 150,000 people were banned from May to September 2003. The Pentagon and Bremer wanted to make their mark on
Iraq. They considered the Baath a totalitarian party that needed to be rooted
out of Iraqi society. The various officials who came out against it were not
able to change the policy, but eventually Bremer saw the error of his ways. The
problem was that by then, the process was out of his control.

Ahmad Chalabi quickly took over deBaathification, and ran
with it. In July 2003, the CPA created the Iraqi Governing Council. The next
month, when Chalabi was the rotating president of the Council it created the
deBaathification Commission. Then in September, Chalabi became its chairman,
and appointed Mithal al-Alusi as its director. Alusi was a former Baathists
himself who went into exile in the 1970s. The staff that was hired mostly
came from the Shiite religious parties, while Chalabi centralized control over
the commission. He immediately expanded its scope by adding more party levels, including
people who had been kicked out of the party before 2003, banned those belonging
to “oppressive institutions” or involved in stealing or corruption, and created
deBaathification offices in each ministry. He then cancelled all previous
reinstatements, and took over the appeals process, even though there were no
rules for how that would work. In early 2004 the Commission issued regulations
about its powers. It said it would oversee all information about the Baath, all
personnel in the ministries, control all exemptions, said that only certain
party members had the right to appeal, and if they did, they would lose their
pension if they were rejected. This new approach led to a dispute with the CPA,
but by then the Americans had no real influence over the matter. In April 2004,
Bremer attempted to add due process procedures, and later rescinded the order
authorizing the Commission, but they had little actual effect. At the same
time, the Dawa Party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan supported deBaathification,
which was more than enough to keep the process moving forward. At the same
time, the Shiite religious parties saved some Shiite Baathists, and re-employed
them making them dependent upon those same organizations. This was part of a
larger process where a little over 100,000 former Baathists were brought back
into the government to help with administration. Under Chalabi
deBaathification became an open ended and politicized process. Any Baathist was
open to investigation even if they had left the party before the 2003 invasion.
The ruling parties could pick out people they wanted, and exempt from the
process. This was when Bremer saw the errors of the policy, but it was too
late. The Iraqis were now in control, and they were not going to let go.

In June 2005 when Iyad Allawi was made interim prime
minister, he immediately came into conflict with Chalabi and the
deBaathification Commission. The new premier wanted to limit deBaathification
to only a small group of party leaders, as he was a former Baathist himself,
and did not see the party in the same light. Chalabi refused to change his
policy. This feud was not just about politics, but became a personal one
between Allawi and Chalabi. The Commission went to the Shura Council, a part of
the Justice Ministry, and got a favorable ruling to continue with its work. At
the same time, the Council said that there could be new limits placed on
deBaathification. Afterward, the cabinet said that all contacts with the
Commission had to go through it. Shortly after that, Mithal al-Alusi faced
criminal charges, and was removed from his position. The government then got
rid of three more members of the Commission, cut its funding, and attempted to
evict it from its offices in Baghdad. It also drafted a new law to replace the
Commission. Unfortunately for Allawi he was not in office long enough to carry
through with his plans. Allawi’s Iraqi National List was based upon former
Baathists like himself and ex-military men. He therefore had the exact opposite
opinion of Chalabi and the deBaathification Commission, which was to go after
any former regime member they wanted to. He could not win this war however as
he made way for a new government in 2005.

The parties that wanted to rid the country of the Baath
Party were the ones that took power in the 2005 elections. After the January
2005 vote, the United Alliance led by the Shiite religious parties won the most
seats in parliament, and eventually got Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the Dawa Party
elected prime minister. Chalabi was named his deputy. Shortly afterward, the
new government was ordered to cooperate with the deBaathification Commission.
Its work was later included in the 2005 constitution, it banned candidates in
the 2005 elections, and influenced the trial of Saddam Hussein. Article 7 and
135 prohibited the Baath Party, and said that all government offices were
subject to deBaathification. Before the December 2005 balloting, the Commission
tried to bar 170 candidates even though both Chalabi and the new director Ali
al-Lami were candidates. The Election Commission objected, claiming that it was
given multiple lists of banned politicians with different names on them just
before the voting with little evidence against them. The Election Commission
only ended up banning 40 candidates. Finally, the deBaathification Commission
tried to insert itself into the trial of Saddam. First, it objected to many of
the judges and staff on the tribunal being former Baathists. Three times it
stopped personnel from participating for their ties to the former regime, and
eventually got 19 employees of the tribunal to quit including the
administrative director. The U.S. stepped in and stopped any of the judges from
being dismissed, but the Commission did succeed in getting the president Judge
Said al-Hammashi being transferred. Giving into this pressure, the tribunal
eventually created its own deBaathification committee in 2006, and agreed to
get rid of more of its staff. After Saddam was sentenced to death, the
Commission told four judges they could transfer or face deBaathification. Given
the make-up of the new government, and the support it gave to deBaathification
it was no surprise that the commission would expand its power and try to
influence the new political system. Although not always successful it did play
a role in the voting process and Saddam’s trial, and most importantly was given
constitutional legitimacy. The Commission therefore could continue its work as
long as it wanted. For the Shiite religious and Kurdish parties, they supported
the process, because they still feared the return of the Baath Party, and
believed that many party members deserved to be excluded and prosecuted for
their crimes.

When the civil war took off into high gear in 2006, the new
government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came under increasing pressure from
Washington to reform the deBaathification process in an effort to appease
Sunnis. In June 2006, Maliki said he would revise the process in an attempt at
reconciliation, but nothing came of it. In March and August 2007 he
tried again, but was shot down by the Shiite and Kurdish parties. Chalabi even
offered to loosen the deBaathification rules, and claimed that 2,300 high-ranking
Baathists would get their jobs back or pensions in 2007. Eventually these
different ideas coalesced into the Accountability and Justice Law, which was
passed in January 2008 despite much opposition. It basically continued the same
process, but simplified it, and offered more opportunities for some Baathists
to receive pensions. The new Accountability and Justice Commission immediately
became a point of contention. First, Chalabi and Lami argued that the new law
allowed the old deBaathification members to maintain their positions in the new
commission. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi believed that an entirely new
leadership should be appointed. Not only that, but Lami called for all former
Baathists in the government to apply for reinstatement or retirement under the
new law, and received 41,000 applications as a result. This started another
argument over the approval process in the cabinet and parliament. That
controversy finally ended when the Americans arrested Lami in September for
alleged connections to Iranian backed Special Groups. He was not released until
July 2009 as part of a political deal. Without Lami, the new commission
stalled, and the cabinet was successful in stopping some of its work. When Lami
returned to office, he went to the Supreme Court and Shura Council, and
successful got the old deBaathification Commission to become the new
Accountability and Justice Commission. Ironically, by the time the Accountability
and Justice Law was passed, the civil war was coming to an end, and there was
not as much pressure to appease the Sunnis so that they would give up fighting.
Instead, the new Accountability Commission caused a battle over who would
control it. Chalabi and Lami were eventually able to win that match, and stay
in power.

The Accountability Commission would soon make its mark in
the 2010 parliamentary elections. Like in 2005, Chalabi and Lami were once
again running for office, which would make their decisions all the more
controversial. In January 2010 the commission went after former Baathists,
intelligence and security officials, and those they claimed promoted the Baath
Party just before the vote. In total, it wanted to ban 511 candidates including
some sitting parliamentarians, 15 parties, and 376 military and police
officers. That included Salah al-Mutlaq the head of the Iraqi National Dialogue
Front, the director of military intelligence, the commander of the Federal
Police, and many members of secular and Sunni parties. After a long drawn out
battle more than 170 candidates appealed their cases, and 26 won. The Election
Commission also refused to disqualify 52 others. After the balloting, the
Accountability Commission went after some of the winners. When negotiations
started for putting together the new ruling coalition, the ban on the lawmakers
was dropped. That eventually allowed Mutlaq to become a deputy premier. At the
same time, Lami became the head of the commission as Chalabi was elected to the
legislature. In May 2011, Lami was assassinated, and the commission lost much
of its power without its dynamic leader. The next month, Maliki dismissed
Chalabi from the commission, and replaced him with Human Rights Minister
Mohammed Soudani from the Dawa Party. In September, the prime minister
dismissed two Chalabi allies from the commission and replaced them with his own
followers. This political struggle meant that the 7 commissioners were not
appointed until July 2012. Falah Shanshal of the Sadr trend was elected its head with Omar al-Qadhi of the Kurdish Coalition his deputy. That didn’t
stop Maliki from trying to replace Shanshal in February 2013. That same
month, Maliki issued orders through the cabinet to cancel all the decisions of
the Accountability and Justice Commission while it was under Shanshal’s
leadership. It wasn’t until July that parliament confirmed Shanshal in his
position in a deal between the Sadrists, Supreme Council, and Mutahidun. DeBaathification
was always open to political manipulation by Chalabi and the ruling parties.
Its bold attacks upon candidates in the 2010 elections showed that it could be
used as a powerful tool in shaping new governments. That led Maliki to attempt
to take over the Accountability Commission, which was eventually spoiled by his
rivals that did not want the premier to extend his influence into the
deBaathification process.

Today, there is renewed talk of reforming the anti-Baathist
legislation. In the spring of 2013, the cabinet agreed to amend the Accountability and Justice Commission by allowing division members to no longer
face disqualification as part of a reconciliation deal between Maliki and
Mutlaq aimed at the protests, which started in Sunni provinces at the end of
2012. The Sadrists, Fadhila, and Badr parties all expressed reservations
about changing the law. Even a member of Maliki’s own State of Law came out against any amendments saying that the Baathists should be given no
concessions. The Iraqi National Movement (INM) initially supported the changes, because it backed the protest movement, but now may not be willing to back
it, because Maliki could claim it as a victory. The Shiite parties have always
been the strongest supporters of deBaathification, and see no reason to appease
the demonstrations, especially because they have taken on a sectarian tone, and
some have joined the insurgency. They along with the INM and others are also
thinking about the 2014 parliamentary elections, and see Maliki as their main
rival. They do not want to give him any successes, which could help him out with
voters. That means this talk of amending the Accountability and Justice law
will likely go nowhere.

DeBaathification has had a profound impact upon Iraq.
Thousands of Baathists were banned from office, crippling much of the
bureaucracy. The process was not evenly felt across the government however.
Many former regime members were able to get jobs in the security forces for
example. The Foreign Affairs Ministry gave lots of exemptions as well, because
of its need for specialized skills in international relations. The Education
Ministry on the other hand lost over 18,000 of its staff, four more times than
any other ministry. In comparison, the Higher Education Ministry only lost
4,361, the Agriculture Ministry 999, the Health Ministry 236, and the Science
Ministry only 120. The politicization of the process allowed many public
servants to get their jobs back for ties to the ruling parties. Since 2006 deBaathification
has mostly been concerned with retirements and reinstatements. The basic
problem with banning the Baath Party was that it was based upon mass guilt for
the crimes of Saddam. That didn’t take into account the role of Baathists in
running the government, and how many were culpable of actual illegal activities.
People were initially dismissed with no chance to question their case
beforehand. The deBaathification Commission then took up appeals, but had no
rules for how that would work. There was no due process until 2010 when the
Accountability Commission set up a court that heard complaints. Even then,
parties were able to cut deals to get their followers exempted. Most
importantly, it caused grave mistrust amongst Sunnis who believed that they were
being singled out for sectarian reasons even though plenty of others were party
members as well. This was one factor leading to the growth of the insurgency.
The acts of the deBaathification and later Accountability Commissions in the
country’s elections have also discredited the process in the eyes of many.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq could have benefited
from a reconciliation process. That could have attempted to bring the
population together by airing the crimes of the former regime, while at the
same time moving forward. The new ruling elite however did not want anything to
do with the Baath Party as a whole, and the White House wanted deep
institutional changes. That led to deBaathification, which was a politicized
purge. Its failure is seen in the fact that the Shiite religious parties still
fear the return of the Baathists to power, while the Accountability Commission has
become a prize to be controlled by the Iraq parties. It also did not help with
building the new government and democracy. Instead it led to resentment amongst
many Sunnis, and the insurgency. Since it is an open ended process, getting rid
of Baathists will continue for years, banning candidates in elections and
forcing members of the bureaucracy to retire.

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

In July 2013, Iraq’s parliament passed along a draft law to
redraw the country’s provincial boundaries. The bill was proposed by President
Jalal Talabani back at the beginning of 2012 to reverse all the internal
changes made by Saddam Hussein. If passed it would dramatically change the
internal contours of the country. Unfortunately, Iraq’s legislature is not
known for its expertise. Many lawmakers are probably unaware of what the law
would do to Iraq. It would mean many elected politicians would lose their jobs
or get lower positions within existing governments. One thing the Iraqi elite
is most protective of is their privileges. That means that while the bill is
going through the motions there’s little likelihood that it will ever be
passed.

In early 2012, Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani submitted a
bill to modify Iraq’s internal borders. (1) The draft was based upon
re-doing all of the boundaries changed by Saddam. It took until July 2013 for it to move out of committee. At the beginning of that month, Kurdish
President Massoud Barzani visited Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad.
The two made a number of promises to each other including cooperating on the
border law. Like any major piece of legislation this one has its supporters and
detractors. The Kurdish parties obviously support the bill claiming that it is
part of Article 140 of the constitution, which is meant to reverse the
Arabization policies of the former regime. A State of Law member said he was
for the draft as well. Two parliamentarians from the Iraqi National Movement
however came out against it saying that it would be wrong to go back in time
several decades, while the other believed that the law would simply increase
Iraq’s difficulties. Finally, a legal expert stated that the bill was not
covered by the constitution, and that it would only cause conflicts between the
parties and provinces. It sounded like the legislators were only talking about
the idea of changing the boundaries of the country’s governorates. If they knew
exactly how much would be altered the majority would probably reject it
outright.

Iraq’s provincial boundaries in 1970 when the Baath were
already in power, but Saddam was not the head of state (Dr. Michael Izady)

Iraq’s provincial boundaries in 1990 during the Gulf War (Dr. Michael Izady)

Iraq’s provincial boundaries today. Note that Baghdad is
much smaller than it actually is on the majority of modern Iraq maps. (Wikipedia)

Iraq’s provinces pre-Saddam look little like the current ones.
In 1970 before Saddam became the head of state there were 19 provinces not the
current 18. Not only that, but Dohuk did not exist, it was part of Mosul, present day Ninewa. Anbar was Dulaim and cut in half by the Northern Desert. Muthanna was Samawa and only consisted of the area around that city. The
southern part of Basra, the Zubayr district that borders Kuwait was part of the
Southern Desert. Dhi Qar was known as Mutafiq and the southern portion belonged
to Basra. The northern section of Muthanna, the Samawa, Rumaitha and Khidhir
districts were part of what was then known as Samawa governorate. Najaf was
much smaller, only consisting of the area around the city of Najaf. Babil was
Hillah, and it and Karbala were larger extending into present day Anbar. Diyala
on the other hand, was smaller with Kirkuk province cutting into its northern
region. Salahaddin was Samarra, but smaller. Mosul governorate consisted of
present day Ninewa and Dohuk, and part of northern Salahaddin. The two southern
districts of Sulaymaniya, Chamchamal and Kala belonged to Kirkuk. That province
was much larger extending into Salahaddin, Diyala, and Sulaymaniya. The only
governorates that were roughly the same as today were Irbil, Qadisiyah, which
was Diwaniya then, Maysan that went by Amarah, Wasit, which was known as Kut,
and Baghdad. By 1990, Iraq had 18 provinces, and their current names, but the
borders were still a little different. It is not known which map the bill is
based upon, but if it really intends to reverse all the changes made by Saddam
it would mean the elimination of several governorates, and the redrawing of
many of the others. Not only that, but the provincial council of Dohuk would
disappear, while those in Anbar, Basra, Muthanna, Salahaddin, Diyala, and
Karbala would face possible cuts, and Najaf’s, Tamim’s, and Ninewa’s could be
expanded. Elections would also have to be held in the new provinces of Northern
and Southern Desert. The Kurdish Coalition claimed that it supported the draft,
but it would mean that the Kurdistan Regional Government would lose a third of
its territory, while Sunni and Shiite areas would add one province each. That
would cause political and administrative chaos.

The idea of reversing Saddam’s border changes may seem like
a good idea in theory, but in practice it would only add more problems to a
troubled country. It’s doubtful that many parliamentarians have even looked at
a map to see the transformation that would happen if the draft bill were
passed. None of the ruling parties would want to give up seats in the existing
provincial councils, and the Kurds would never agree to losing Dohuk although
they would probably rule the expanded Ninewa. Iraq’s parties are not about to
see any diminution of their powers. Once the details of the law become known
there will be few who will support it. Like many major pieces of legislation,
this one will simply sit in parliament to die a slow death.

Monday, July 29, 2013

The summer months have brought about Iraq’s seasonal hot
weather. That has also led to a new wave of protests over power shortages for
the third time in four years. The demonstrations started in Nasiriyah in Dhi
Qar in early June 2013, and have since spread to Basra, Muthanna, Maysan, and
Wasit governorates. They have charged the government with incompetence and
corruption, and asked for Deputy Premier Shahristani who is in charge of energy
policy and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to step down. The growing protests
have applied enough pressure on Baghdad that Maliki, Shahristani, the
Electricity Ministry, and parliament are all exchanging accusations over who is
responsible for this fiasco. The problem is that the Electricity Ministry is
incapable of meeting demand, likely leading to growing anger and demonstrations
throughout the south.

Demonstration in Basra July 2013 over the lack of electricity
(Dananer)

Protests over the lack of electricity are taking place in five
of Iraq’s eighteen governorates. The first were in Nasiriyah at the beginning
of June. By July, they had spread to Basra, Maysan, Muthanna, and
Wasit. People in Basra have called for the prime minister to step down,
holding him responsible for the failure to provide services and security. These demonstrations have gained the support of the governors of Basra and
Dhi Qar showing that the anger over this issue is not just in the street,
but in the halls of the local governments as well. All of these provinces saw similar activities in 2010 and 2011. Many Iraqis have simply lost faith in
Baghdad providing for their needs. Every year since 2003, the Americans and
then the Iraqi authorities have claimed that the country would overcome its
chronic power outages in just a few months to a year. While production has
steadily increased, so has demand as Iraqis, freed from sanctions, have bought
more and more consumer goods like refrigerators, televisions, and air
conditioners. That’s what has led to these constant protests over the last
several years, as the Electricity Ministry has never produced enough power to
catch up with the escalating levels of usage.

Parliament has tried, but failed to hold the government
accountable for the repeated failure to solve the electricity problems. The
legislature recently called on Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani and
Electricity Minister Abdul Karim Aftan to appear before it, but the former
refused. Aftan testified to the oil and energy committee, and tried to deflect blame to the Finance Ministry for not allocating funds for projects,
and the Oil Ministry for not providing enough fuel. At the same time, the
minister admitted that he lacked experienced and trained staff to man all the
new power plants being build. Parliament has brought up other issues as well
such as why Iraq bought gas driven turbines when it doesn’t have enough natural
gas to fuel them, and continues to purchase them, as well as why 18% of the country is not connected to the national grid. These problems and
others have been known for years, and brought up again and again by lawmakers,
but to no affect. The parliament is given wide ranging oversight powers under
the 2005 constitution, but either chooses not to exercise them or is ignored by
the government. Electricity is a perfect example, as lawmakers’ constant
criticism has brought no changes.

Government officials have responded to the renewed protests by
blaming each other for the country’s predicament. Prime Minister Maliki
recently said that the Electricity Ministry was responsible for the power
failures, claiming that it had failed by signing fraudulent contracts with
companies. He went on to claim that Deputy Premier Shahristani gave him erroneous information about the power sector. That set off rumors that Shahristani
was going to resign, but that was quickly denied. The deputy’s office responded
that he was only responsible for formulating strategy and coordination when it
came to the energy file, and went on to point to the Electricity Ministry
as the main culprit. This was a rare break within Maliki’s coalition, and
showed what pressure he must be under. Shahristani is the head of the
Independents bloc one of the most important elements within the prime
minister’s State of Law list. Maliki has been willing to fire officials in the
past to make them scapegoats for government failures, but going after the head
of a party, especially one so crucial to the premier’s own list is quite
different. If the demonstrations were the only thing going on in the country,
the prime minister would not be publicly breaking with Shahristani. Instead,
Sunni protests continue in western, northern and eastern parts of the country,
the insurgency is taking off, and most importantly, the premier is facing
re-election next year. That’s leading to some desperation with the
recriminations.

The Electricity Ministry has tried to act like everything is
proceeding according to plan, but its own figures don’t add up. Minister Aftan
announces almost every week that the power shortages will be over by the end of the year. The Ministry claims that it is producing 10,600 megawatts, and
constantly talks about new power stations coming on line soon. That figure is
actually probably the capacity that the country has reached, not its actual
output. For example, it always notes there is a lack of fuel that is cutting into production. More importantly, the Ministry wants to achieve 11,000
megawatts by the end of 2013, while stating that demand is at 14,000 megawatts.
It is therefore impossible for the energy problem to be solved, as Minister
Aftan likes to claim. An adviser to Maliki recently pointed this factor out,
which is another reason why the premier and his deputy are pointing fingers at
the Electricity Ministry.

The increasing temperatures in the country are symbolic of
the growing anger felt amongst many common people over the lack of power
supplies in Iraq. The fact that this issue has dragged on for so long despite
the constant promises of officials has boiled over into the streets in the last
several years, and 2013 is no different. The infighting amongst officials is
not likely to solve anything other than some symbolic firings that try to
appease the public. That has not worked in the past, and won’t this year as the
Electricity Ministry knows that it can’t meet demand for power anytime soon.
The growing protests also come at a dire time for the prime minister who is facing
a number of other crises at the same time. The pressure upon him will only
increase in the coming months, as the protests are likely to spread to other
provinces. It is the lack of results that is bringing out the frustration of
Iraqis, and could cost Maliki in next year’s election.

SOURCES

Abdullah, Ali, “Minister of
Electricity renewed pledges that the end of the year ending the energy crisis,”
Buratha News, 7/15/13

Buratha News, “And tribal elders
Basra threatened large demonstrations in protest against the deteriorating of
electricity and purses confirms: I own files of corruption in the Ministry’s
projects,” 7/14/13

- “Dhi Qar pretend for the eighth
day in a row and the demonstrators contend: the sacking of police chief victory
for us and corrupt,” 7/26/13

Dananer, “Minister of Electricity
and renewed his pledge to end the crisis despite Maliki’s recognition of his
failure Baghdad,” 7/24/13

Thursday, July 25, 2013

Iraq’s oil exports and profits were down for the third
straight month in June 2013. Bad weather led to a small drop in the south. More
importantly, the northern pipeline to Turkey was down due to repairs for almost
the entire month. That points to a larger problem that the country’s oil
facilities have reached their limit as seen over the last 16 months, and there
can be no more growth in exports until new infrastructure is added.

The petroleum industry faced several problems last month.
Total exports dropped from 78.7 million barrels in April to 76.9 million in May
to 69.8 million in June. That averaged out to 2.33 million barrels a day.
That placed exports right back to where they were in December 2012 and January
2013 when they were at 2.34 million barrels and 2.35 million barrels
respectively. The southern pipeline to Basra had a slight drop from 2.19
million barrels in May to 2.13 million in June. It is still averaging more this
year, 2.169 million barrels a day, than last, 2.042 million barrels. The real
problem was with the northern Kirkuk line to Turkey. For June it only averaged
193,300 barrels a day down from 283,800 barrels the previous month. That was
the lowest amount in years. It exported a total of 5.8 million barrels in June
when it was supposed to ship 9.6 million, and an average of 309,600 barrels. Bad weather and attacks upon the northern pipeline were the reasons given
by the Oil Ministry for the lower than expected exports. Rough waters in Basra
did temporarily halt docking in the ports there in early June. There were
no reported bombings of the Kirkuk line however. Instead, it was down for
almost the entire month because of leaks and maintenance work that continues into July. Overall, Iraq’s exports have been at a plateau for the last 16
months. They are almost the same this year, 2.45 million barrels per month as
last, 2.41 million. Bad weather is seasonal. The problems with the northern
line however point to a larger issue. The country’s export infrastructure has
reached their limit, and there can be no further growth until new facilities
are opened, and old ones rehabilitated. There are plans to add two more docking
points in Basra, to build a connecting line from the northern fields to the
southern ones, to expand the capacity of the Kirkuk line, to re-open a pipeline
to Syria, and build a new one to Jordan. That’s an ambitious and aggressive
strategy. Some of it, like the line to Syria will probably never materialize
however, and due to Baghdad’s inefficient government, the rest may take far
longer than planned to come to fruition. The Oil Ministry has recently revised down its export target to 9 million barrels a day by 2018. That’s probably
unrealistic given the bureaucracy’s lack of capacity, which has made Iraq miss
all of its previous goals.

Iraq Oil Exports And Profits
2011-2013

Month

Avg.

Exports

(Mil/

Bar/

Day)

Avg. Price Per Barrel

Revenue (Bill)

Jan. 11

2.16

$90.78

$6.082

Feb.

2.20

$98.44

$6.064

Mar.

2.15

$107.13

$7.167

Apr.

2.14

$114.26

$7.342

May

2.22

$108

$7.45

Jun.

2.27

$105.17

$7.173

Jul.

2.16

$108.79

$7.311

Aug.

2.18

$104.91

$7.124

Sep.

2.10

$104.89

$6.619

Oct.

2.08

$104.04

$6.742

Nov.

2.13

$106.59

$6.833

Dec.

2.14

$106.18

$7.061

2011 Avg.

2.16

$105.00

$6.913

Jan. 12

2.10

$109.08

$7.123

Feb.

2.01

$112.92

$6.595

Mar.

2.31

$117.99

$8.472

Apr.

2.50

$116.79

$8.795

May

2.45

$103.03

$7.831

Jun.

2.40

$90.09

$6.487

Jul.

2.51

$97.14

$7.577

Aug.

2.56

$106.22

$8.445

Sep.

2.59

$107.59

$8.371

Oct.

2.62

$105.51

$8.578

Nov.

2.62

$104.32

$8.200

Dec.

2.34

$103.72

$7.551

2012

Avg.

2.41

$106.20

$7.835

Jan. 13

2.35

$104.92

$7.672

Feb.

2.53

$107.66

$7.644

Mar.

2.41

$103.76

$7.772

Apr.

2.62

$98.70

$7.764

May

2.48

$97.23

$7.477

Jun.

2.33

$97.41

$6.8

2013 Avg.

2.45

$101.61

$7.521

Oil
Exports Through Basra 2012-2013
January 2012 1.711 mil/bar/day

February
1.639 mil/bar/day

March 1.917
mil/bar/day

April 2.115
mil/bar/day

May 2.086
mil/bar/day

June 2.085
mil/bar/day

July 2.216
mil/bar/day

August
2.252 mil/bar/day

September
2.178 mil/bar/day

October
2.172 mil/bar/day

November
2.122 mil/bar/day

December
2.022 mil/bar/day

2012 Avg. 2.042 mil/bar/day

January
2013 2.093 mil/bar/day

February
2.196 mil/bar/day

March 2.1
mil/bar/day

April 2.31
mil/bar/day

May 2.19
mil/bar/day

June 2.13
mil/bar/day

2013 Avg. 2.169 mil/bar/day

Oil Exports Through Kirkuk 2012-2013

January
2012 393,500 bar/day

February
375,800 bar/day

March
400,000 bar/day

April
393,300 bar/day

May 364,500
bar/day

June
316,600 bar/day

July
300,000 bar/day

August
312,900 bar/day

September
420,000 bar/day

October
451,600 bar/day

November
426,600 bar/day

December
325,800 bar/day

2012 Avg. 373,300 bar/day

January
2013 264,500 bar/day

February
339,200 bar/day

March
316,100 bar/day

April
306,600 bar/day

May 283,800
bar/day

June
193,300 bar/day

2013 Avg. 283,900 bar/day

Prices for Iraqi crude have also fallen recently. A barrel
of Iraqi petroleum sold for $97.41 in June, earing the country $6.8 billion down
from $7.48 billion in May and $7.76 billion in April. This was the third month
in a row that prices were below $100 per barrel after being there 23 months out
of 30 since the start of 2011. That has brought down the average price from
$106.20 per barrel in 2012 to $101.61 this year. Average monthly earnings have
gone down as well from $7.835 billion last year to $7.521 billion this year.
The 2013 budget is based upon 2.9 million barrels a day in exports at $90 per
barrel. The former is improbable, but the latter is still a reality. Iraq
relies upon oil for 90% of its revenue. Fortunately for it, the government has
never been able to spend all of its budget, especially as it has grown in size
the last few years, so not reaching the export mark is not so important as
keeping up prices.

Iraq was hoping for large growth this year in its oil
industry, but that has not materialized. There was a large spurt in exports
towards the beginning of 2012 when two new mooring points were opened in Basra.
Exports continued to climb throughout 2012 as the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) and Baghdad reached a new oil deal. That fell apart, bad weather has hit,
and the northern pipeline has been plagued by problems all contributing to the
current stagnation. It doesn’t matter whether production goes up if it can’t be
pumped out to foreign markets. This is the dilemma facing Iraq right now. Until
new facilities are opened exports will remain at the current plateau.

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com