Voltaire's militancy in favor of religious toleration is well-known. But he seems to be concerned by its practical results, the rehabilitation of those religiously persecuted, rather than by the theorectical reasonings to convince his opponents. That can be seen in the few importance given to argumentation in the Traité sur la tolerance , mostly composed by historical examples of violence caused by religious fanaticism. However, in Voltaire we find real philosophical reflection on tolerance, but the author finds it inneficient to (...) convince his contemporaries, who are more inclined to accept the presentation of matters of fact rather than the discussion of matters of right. But Voltaire does not limit his comments to facts, he knows that philosophy and law have something to say about tolerance, and that theory influences on and is influenced by practices. So that Voltaire's reflections on tolerance are not limited only to practical positions adopted to defend some individuals from religious persecution, his positions have to be understood also at its theorectical level, for at this level he is also original and gives no concessions, which separates him from his English masters such as John Locke. (shrink)

I argue that the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), as an organization and through its individual members, can and should be a far greater ally in the prevention of violence against women. Specifically, I argue that we need to pay attention to obstetrical practices that inadvertently contribute to the problem of violence against women. While intimate partner violence is a complex phenomenon, I focus on the coercive control of women and adherence to oppressive gender norms. Using physician response (...) to alcohol use during pregnancy and court-ordered medical treatment as examples, I show how some obstetrical practices mirror the attitudes of abusive men insofar as they try to coercively control women's behavior through manipulation and violence. To be greater allies in the prevention of violence against women, obstetricians should stop participating in practices that inadvertently perpetuate violence against women. (shrink)

Using the moral work on trust and lying, I argue that allowing or encouraging children to believe you are their biological parent when you are not is a breach of trust in the parent-child relationship. While other approaches focus on specific harms or the rights of the child, I make a virtue theory argument based on our understanding of trust, lies, and the nature of the parent-child relationship. Drawing heavily on Nancy Potter's virtue theory of trustworthiness, I consider the nature (...) of trust in the parent-child relationship and what this means for being a trustworthy parent. (shrink)

La place qu'occupe l'imagination dans la philosophie berkeleyenne semble ne pas poser de problème et n'être en rien originale, consistant en une simple reprise de la position lockéenne. Pourtant, en attribuant une spontanéité créatrice à l'imagination, qui en fait une faculté tout à fait particulière, et en insistant sur la puissance et les limites de cette même faculté, Berkeley réintroduit subrepticement un principe de différenciation au plan épistémologique, que l'on peut retrouver mutatis mutandis au plan moral à travers son opposition (...) à la libre pensée. It may seem that Berkeley's treatment of imagination is neither problematic, nor original, in so far as he simply seems to repeat what Locke has said on this subject. However, Berkeley attributes to imagination a creative spontaneity that makes it a very special faculty, and he insists on the power (and limits) of this faculty in a very particular way. In so doing, he surreptitiously reintroduces a principle of differentiation at the epistemological level, one that can also, mutatis mutandis, be found at the moral level in his opposition to the free thinkers. (shrink)

In “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” Natalie Stoljar asks whether a procedural or a substantive approach to autonomy is best for addressing feminist concerns. In this paper, I build on Stoljar’s argument that feminists should adopt a strong substantive approach to autonomy. After briefly reviewing the problems with a purely procedural approach, I begin to articulate my own strong substantive theory by focusing specifically on the problem of internalized oppression. In the final section, I briefly address some of the concerns (...) raised by procedural theorists who are leery of a substantive approach. (shrink)

The reflection on science seems to be linked today with the concept of hypermodernity which refers to a society of excesses without any global alternative model. In this article, my aim is to show how the modernisation of our societies was connected with scientific development, and what place science may be expected to occupy in hypermodern societies—societies built around the notion of risk. After presenting the concept of hypermodernity, I propose an analysis of the inherent risks involved by the development (...) of technology in our societies, and what limits may be desirable in order to prevent an excessive or partial valorisation of a “society of knowledge,” a notion itself not without its problems. Finally, I remind of the possible contribution humanities and social sciences can make to maintain balance in what is today called a knowledge economy. (shrink)

In the classical era, imagination garnered poor press: fooling the senses, perverting judgment, subverting reason, skewing social relations, and generally providing wrong ideas about the way things are; it was a faculty of which to beware. Occasionally it was recognized as not being entirely without value—Descartes, for example, insisted on its great usefulness as a figurational function in simplifying the work of the understanding in geometry. The traditional tendency in philosophy, though, was to denigrate imagination for its misleading nature and (...) negative effects and to dwell on its limits as a faculty bound to the body. Indeed, its first function is to represent to the mind things previously perceived by the senses as images in their likeness. But as imagination has neither the same vividness nor the same order as sensation, it is potentially misleading, since in fact images look only approximately the same as their models. Above all, however, imagination was reproached to be potentially misleading for its second function, the creation of images or entire fictions bearing no relation whatsoever to reality, which made it dangerously capable of nourishing all manner of superstition and fantasy. Within such a context, Berkeley’s conception of the imagination hardly seems original at first glance. But as I will propose, in its creative guidance of reason, imagination plays an important and distinctive role in Berkeley’s scientific, moral, and religious discussions. Rather than focusing solely on the representational character of imagination, then, I suggest that we attend also to the way in which Berkeley appeals to the imaginative aspects of reason itself. In this way, we can better appreciate the educational presuppositions of human freedom. (shrink)

Le scepticisme des Lumières est le parent pauvre des études que Popkin a consacrées au scepticisme moderne. En général, Popkin ne confère au scepticisme des Lumières qu’une valeur propédeutique ou méthodologique. Si Popkin est revenu à plusieurs reprises sur ce portrait qu’il a brossé du scepticisme des Lumières pour le nuancer, évoquant notamment les travaux de Baker, d’Olaso ou de Tonelli, c’est pour accepter que le scepticisme ait été plus prégnant au XVIIIe siècle qu’il ne le pensait, mais sans pour (...) autant modifier son sentiment quant à l’usage qui en fut fait. Or, à partir de l’évocation de formes de scepticisme délaissées par Popkin , cet article propose une réévaluation de l’ensemble du scepticisme des Lumières et en teste la validité en prenant Rousseau pour exemple. L’avantage du recours à Rousseau, c’est que ce dernier a connu à la fois le scepticisme clandestin et l’égoïsme, et qu’il est donc à même de montrer l’influence de ce scepticisme souterrain sur les Lumières dans leur ensemble.The scepticism of the Enlightenment was neglected in the studies that Popkin devoted to early modern scepticism. Generally, Popkin only attributes a preparatory, or methodological role to the scepticism of the Enlightenment. Indeed, Popkin himself has come back several times to the picture he had drawn of the Enlightenment, notably in light of the works by Baker, Olaso or Tonelli. However, it was only to accept that scepticism was more developed than he had first thought, and never to change his mind about the influence that it had on this time-period. Through the analysis of forms of scepticism that were totally neglected by Popkin , this article proposes a complete re-evaluation of scepticism in the Enlightenment. Rousseau is particularly interesting here because he has known both the clandestine scepticism, and the egoism movement. This article takes him as a case study in order to test the validity of its thesis concerning the influence of this underground scepticism on the Enlightenment as a whole. (shrink)

The Emergent Metaphysics in Plato's Theory of Disorder presents for the first time Plato's theory of disorder as it pertains to his understanding of powerful causal forces at work within and outwith the cosmos and the soul of man. Divided into two Parts and presenting passages in both Greek and English, Plato's cosmology, the Timaeus, and his chief theological work, Laws X, are discussed in detail.

A influência do ceticismo nos século XVI e XVII é por demais evidente para ser posta em questão. De Montaigne a Bayle, parece que o cético foi o promotor tanto de uma refutação radical dos princípios metafísicos escolásticos e depois cartesianos quanto de uma crítica feroz às autoridades religiosas e políticas. Ora, esse papel parece ter se amenizado no Século das Luzes, ou melhor, se deslocado - somente as dimensões críticas do social continuaram pertinentes. Pretende-se mostrar aqui o pressuposto de (...) uma tal leitura que leva em conta apenas o aspecto visível da crítica cética e mostrar que o ceticismo, sob uma forma particular (o solipsismo), foi uma das grandes questões da epistemologia das Luzes e que ele é indissociável, para ser compreendido em toda a sua dimensão polêmica, da recepção européia do imaterialismo berkeleyano. O objetivo de nossa intervenção se faz compreender então claramente: explicar primeiramente como uma tal concepção epistemológica pôde nascer em terra cartesiana e quais foram os seus líderes desse solipsismo das Luzes, a supor que os tenha havido, para mostrar, em seguida, porque ela pôde se tornar uma questão metafísica maior no século XVIII, antes de definir, para concluir, os interesses a que ela serviu ou desserviu. Berkeley in the land of the Enlightenment: skepticism and solipsism in the XVIIIth centuryThe influence of skepticism on the XVIth and XVIIth century is far too evident to be questioned. From Montaigne to Bayle, the skeptic seems to have been the furtherer both of a radical refutation of the metaphysical principles of scholasticism and, later, of Cartesianism, and of a fierce critique of the political and religious authority. Well, this role seems to be diminished, or displaced, in the Enlightenment: only the critical dimensions on the social aspect continue to be pertinent. We would like to show that the parti pris of such a consideration only takes into account the visible aspect of the skeptical critique, and that the skepticism, under a very particular form ( the solipsism), was one of the greatest assets of the Enlightenment epistemology and that, in order to apprehend it thoroughly in its polemical dimension, it is inseparable of the European reception of the Berkeleys immaterialism. The aim of our intervention is easily understood: it is to explain, firstly, how such a epistemological conception could have been born in the land of Descartes and who were the leaders of this solipsism in the Enlightenment, supposing that there were such people, and, secondly, why it could become a major metaphysical asset in the XVIIIth century, before defining, as a conclusion, the interests it has done service or disservice. (shrink)